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and ethics

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Encyclopædia
of
Religion and Ethics

Volumes XI and XII

Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics

Volumes XI and XII

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME XI

SACRIFICE—SUDRA

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LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.
f. = and following verse or page.
ff. = and following verses or pages.
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J" = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–1905.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (²1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897–1902.
Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
Budge = *Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
Daremberg-Saglio = *Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886–90.
De la Saussaye = *Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*³, 1905.
Denzinger = *Enchiridion Symbolorum*¹¹, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, 3 vols. 1875–1878, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–1888.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (²1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
Holtzmann-Zöpffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*², 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, 1904.
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*², 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic-English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual and Religion*², 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Ægypten u. Æthiopien*, 1849–1860.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–1896.
Muir = *Sanskrit Texts*, 1858–1872.
Muss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1893–1895.
Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
Preller = *Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*², 1893–1894.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*², 1856.
Roscher = *Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884.
Schaff-Herzog = *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Relig. Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–1875.
Schürer = *GJV*³, 3 vols. 1898–1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*², 1899.
Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*⁴, 1896.
Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*², 1894.
Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*³, 1885–1896.
Spencer-Gillen[a] = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
Spencer-Gillen[b] = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*³, 1891 [⁴1903].
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–1874.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*², 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*², 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopædia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscrip. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI = Encyclopaedia of Islām.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HL = Hibbert Lectures.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscrip. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908–09).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT² (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³ = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MVG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE^{3} = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog–Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REG = Revue des Études Grecques.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RGG = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RMM = Revue du monde musulman.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RVV = Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeitungen.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
SBB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien und Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte und Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*^{2}, *LOT*^{6}, etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

S

SACRIFICE.

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Vedic.—See VEDIC RELIGION.

SACRIFICE (Introductory and Primitive).—Sacrifice (Lat. *sacrificium; sacer*, 'holy,' and *facere*, 'to make') may be defined generally as a rite in the course of which something is forfeited or destroyed, its object being to establish relations between a source of spiritual strength and one in need of such strength, for the benefit of the latter. This relationship may be one of communion, *i.e.* one by which strength is conceived to be imparted to man (communal type); or, conversely, it may be one whereby a human weakness is held to be withdrawn and neutralized (piacular type). An instance of the first type occurs whenever the victim is consumed in a sacred meal, of the second whenever it is treated as unclean and cast away to beasts of prey.

1. Origin.—It was not until the spirit of historical inquiry had come to pervade the study of religion, during the latter part of the last century, that scientific theories regarding the origin and significance of sacrifice were put forward by anthropologists. Hitherto the institution had been usually regarded as of divine appointment, since from Gn 4^{3-5} and He 11^{4} it appears that the divine authority sanctioned Abel's offering, and considered it, by faith, more acceptable than that of Cain. It need not, however, follow on theological grounds that the ordinance is of divine origin because it is said that by faith Abel's offering to Jahweh was a more excellent sacrifice than that of Cain. For the Jahwistic writer treats sacrifice as a natural institution, an instinctive mode of worship, while the Priestly creation-document ignores the existence of the rite altogether. But such a theory of the origin of sacrifice hardly harmonizes with the present tendency of historical theology or of the science of religions. To-day the divine origin of religious institutions is sought in the ever-developing minds of men rather than in sacred tradition.

(*a*) *E. B. Tylor.*—As soon as it became apparent that sacrifice involved a natural desire on the part of man to establish a bond between himself and that which he conceived to be sacred, the way was opened for scientific investigation of the rite. E. B. Tylor was the first to enter the field with the hypothesis that sacrifice was originally a gift offered to supernatural beings to secure their favour or minimize their hostility. As this purpose gradually became transformed in the mind of the sacrificers, the dominant note became that of homage, which again passed into that of renunciation.[1]

Herbert Spencer was of much the same opinion. The origin of sacrifice, he says, is to be found in the custom of leaving food and drink at the graves of the dead, and as the ancestral spirits rose to divine rank the refreshments placed for the dead developed into sacrifices.[2] Now the conception of sacrifice as a gift to the deity is very wide-spread especially among people in a relatively advanced state of culture. 'Gifts,' says Hesiod, 'prevail upon gods and reverend kings.' Offerings to

[1] *PC*[5], London, 1913, ii. 375 f.
[2] *Principles of Sociology*[3], London, 1885, i. 277 ff.

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sacred trees, etc., are common in parts of Africa.[1] Sacrificial gifts are often offered to appease the soul of the victim after a successful head-hunting expedition or similar escapade;[2] and the numerous examples of the oblation of the firstfruits (*q.v.*) come under the same category.[3] The Hebrew term for sacrifice (*minḥah*, 'gift') is used of both bloody and unbloody offerings, though from the time of Ezekiel (6th cent. B.C.) onwards it became a technical term for cereal offerings (Gn $4^{3t.}$, Lv 2). To this class too belongs the unction of sacred stones (menhirs, etc.) to the deity in the *maṣṣēbhāh* (*q.v.*). Oblations of fruits, etc., were also presented to local *numina* by being deposited within the sacred precincts or thrown into sacred wells. Likewise the holocaust, or whole burnt-offering, that plays so important a part in the sacrificial system of the Priestly narrative in the OT can scarcely be regarded otherwise than as an offering of food—a gift—since it was all assigned to the deity. According to Robertson Smith, this type of sacrifice was evolved from the original sacramental meal by the discontinuance of the use of totemic conceptions, and the recourse to human victims to renew the bond between the worshippers and the worshipped. The eating of human flesh became in time repugnant to the mind of man, and the human victim was therefore offered as a holocaust. In process of time an animal came to be substituted for a human victim, and the whole burnt-offering resulted.[4] Thus he makes the holocaust a late derivative of an earlier rite in which the eating of flesh and drinking of blood played an important part[5]—a theory largely based on late Arabic practice.

(*b*) *W. Robertson Smith.*—Robertson Smith's encyclopædia article on 'Sacrifice'[6] marks a new departure in the history of religion. In his paper on 'Animal Worship and Animal Tribes,' in *The Journal of Philology*,[7] after discussing the question of totemism on the strength of the evidence furnished by J. F. McLennan in the *Fortnightly Review*,[8] he proceeded to make totemic cult the basis of sacrifice. In 1889 (two years after J. G. Frazer's encyclopædia article on 'Totemism'[9] had appeared) he published the well-known lectures on *The Religion of the Semites*, in which, while he again suggested a totemic basis for Semitic religion, he was careful to add:

> 'It is one thing to say that the phenomena of Semitic religion carry us back to totemism, and another thing to say that they are all to be explained from totemism.'[10]

Nevertheless, he held that the conclusion that the Semites did pass through a totemic stage can be avoided only by supposing them to be an exception to the universal rule. He proceeded to restate his theory in order to overcome the difficulty resulting from his view that the god became identified with the animal or plant kind by the blood-bond—a custom which he now regarded as relatively late. On the new hypothesis he considered the god, the victim, and the totemic group to belong to the same kin. The original totem is female, and therefore descent 'follows the distaff' in primitive society. With the introduction of patrilineal descent the totem became male. Sacrifice in the first instance is, he thinks, a communion established by a bond of kinship. In these lectures he developed his theory of the 'theanthropic' animal, at once god and kinsman, as the originating cause of sacrifice of the communal type.[1] He considered Frazer to have proved the existence of annual totem sacraments involving actual communion in the flesh and blood of the sacred animal.[2]

This view distinguishes (1) honorific, (2) piacular, and (3) mystical or sacramental offerings. His leading conception is the distinction between the view of sacrifice as a gift to the deity—the worshipper laying upon the altar the offerings of the firstfruits of the harvest as a tribute to the god—and the view that regards it as a sacramental ritualistic act whereby the worshippers pass into actual communion with the god by partaking of food and drink in which the deity is immanent. In the *Religion of the Semites* Robertson Smith appears to confuse the two distinguishable aspects of sacrificial communion—the mystic and the non-mystic. The kinship of man with the divinity celebrated by sharing in a common meal, or in any other non-mystic manner, is by no means the same thing as a sacramental communion in the deeper and truly mystic sense, in which the deity and man enter into vital relationship by the latter partaking of divine food (see artt. COMMUNION WITH DEITY).

In support of his view that an expiatory function may attach to the sharing of animal flesh, Robertson Smith quotes numerous examples (such as the shedding of blood and offering of hair) in which there is no death of a victim and no idea of penal satisfaction given to the deity. In the Hebrew ritual he lays special stress on the *zebhaḥ*, *i.e.* the ordinary festal sacrifices, vows, and free-will offerings, of which the deity's share was the blood and the fat of the intestines, the rest of the carcass, after payment of certain dues to the priest, being left to the worshipper for a social feast. This he contrasts with the offerings wholly given to the god, likening the distinction to that between animal and vegetable offerings, the latter not being conciliatory. This hypothesis, however, takes no account of the holocaust and the piaculum, expiatory sacrifices in which there is no communal eating. To obviate this difficulty, Robertson Smith propounds the theory of the derivation of these from an earlier rite in which the sacrificial meal played an important part.

(*c*) *F. B. Jevons.*—Jevons, in his *Introduction to the History of Religion*,[3] derives inspiration directly from Robertson Smith's theory, basing his investigations on the assumption that a totemic system was the earliest form of society. He supposes totemism to have originated in a covenant or alliance between a human society and what the savage conceives as an animal clan organized on the same lines as his own. At this stage, he says, 'man imagines all things, animate or inanimate, to think and act and feel like himself.'[4] But apparently he forgets that the savage, like the child, realizes that some things are not alive. The primitive mind attributes *mana* (*q.v.*) only to those things that act abnormally or that present a strange or uncanny appearance. Jevons then argues that, since savages take up a blood-feud against an animal species, therefore they may establish an alliance with them.[5] Exactly how this alliance comes thereupon to be reinterpreted as a real flesh and blood union between man and beast is a point over which he passes lightly. Presumably he would say that it was by a natural extension of the initiation rite, whereby a youth is anointed with tribal blood and so becomes infused with a new life which is the common life of the

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1890, p. 49 ff.; H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1890, ii. 832; *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, ii. 30.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 166.
[3] *Ib.*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 117.
[4] *The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, pp. 353–387.
[5] *Ib.* p. 312 ff. [6] *EBr*[9] xxi. 132 ff.
[7] ix. (1880) 95 ff.
[8] vi. [1869] 407 ff. and 532 ff., vii. [1870] 194 ff.
[9] *EBr*[4] xxiii. 467 ff. [10] *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 139.

[1] *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 409. [2] *Ib.* p. 405.
[3] London, 1896, p. 96 ff. [4] *Ib.* p. 99. [5] *Ib.* p. 100.

clan. In this way the society becomes a religious community, since each initiated member participates in the divine essence of its totem. In due course the animal is advanced to the status of a sort of superman—a hypothetical father of the human group.[1]

The blood-covenant established, the rite of sacrifice and the subsequent communion, he supposes, arose as the natural corollary from the savage principle that the blood is the life. The obvious procedure, if the 'real presence' of the totem—the sacred ally of the people—be desired, is to shed its blood. In such a sacrificial rite the essential feature is that the worshipper should partake of the sacred animal so that its supernatural qualities may be absorbed and evil influences expelled.

On this hypothesis the offering of an animal as a gift to a superhuman being is the result of the domestication of animals, the victim, which was originally itself sacred, having degenerated into a mere food animal, now held inferior to a stone hewn into the likeness of a human god, assumed to possess anthropomorphic qualities.[2] Thus arose the custom of sacrifice to non-totemic deities—the normal manner of approaching any god.[3]

(*d*) *Salomon Reinach.*—Reinach, in *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*,[4] also professedly adopts the theory of Robertson Smith. With Jevons he thinks that the evolutionary processes which fused the communion type of sacrifice with that of the later sacrifice by gift were agriculture and the domestication of animals, dispelling the mystery surrounding the different forms of plant and animal life. Thus little by little the idea of a divinity hedging certain species of animals faded away, and man began to create the godhead in his own likeness. Yet there remained a tradition of animals sacrificed and eaten by the community. Therefore both sacrifice and banquet were retained in the belief that the god—anthropomorphic now—smelt the blood and inhaled the smoke of the burnt-offering. To provide him with a representative, a priest assisted at the ceremony, until in the end he and his ritual completely dwarfed the part which was played by the body of the faithful, and, while the sacrifice and banquet still survived, their significance was wholly inverted.[5]

(*e*) *L. Marillier.*—Some anthropologists, however, refuse to regard the theory of totemic sacrifice as primitive. Marillier, *e.g.*, argues that an original bond of union between the god and the kin eliminates the need for sacrificial rites, and therefore makes initiation ceremonies superfluous.[6] On the other hand, if the common meal was the only bond between the god and the kin, it does not appear that the god is a totem.

(*f*) *H. Hubert and M. Mauss.*—Hubert and Mauss think that the evidence of Semitic types of sacrifice may be only fragmentary, and in any case there is no proof that they are primitive. They hold that the numerous forms of sacrifice cannot be reduced to 'the unity of a single arbitrarily chosen principle.'[7] In view of the paucity of accurate accounts of early ritual, they reject the 'genealogical' or evolutionary method, and devote themselves to an analysis of the ancient Hindu and Hebrew sacrificial ritual. Thus they arrive at the following 'definition of type':

'Sacrifice is a religious act, which, by the consecration of a victim, modifies the state of the moral person who performs it, or of certain objects in which this person is interested.'[8]

Like Robertson Smith, they think that sacrifice establishes a union between the human and the divine. This is effected by the intermediation of a victim destroyed in the rite, and eaten by the worshippers or by the priests. But the victim must be ceremonially prepared for the rite, and freed from tabu after the ceremony has been performed. It must be remembered, however, that the rituals chosen by Hubert and Mauss for analysis are by no means primitive, and therefore can hardly be said to represent fairly the essential nature of sacrifice in the earliest cults of undeveloped peoples.

(*g*) *E. Westermarck.*—Westermarck takes the view that 'the idea that supernatural beings have human appetites and human wants' led to the practice of sacrificial gifts being offered to them by men. 'If such offerings fail them, they may even suffer want and become feeble and powerless.' Thus 'in early religion the most common motive is undoubtedly a desire to avert evils.'[1] The practice of human sacrifice, according to this writer, is based on the idea of the substitution of a victim for other individuals whose lives are in danger, which in course of time led to the offering of animals instead of men.[2]

(*h*) *J. G. Frazer.*—Frazer, in the first edition of *The Golden Bough*, says that the central idea of his essay—'the conception of the slain god'—is derived directly from his friend, Robertson Smith. In the second edition, however, he virtually contradicts this statement, maintaining that he never assented to Robertson Smith's theory. This change of opinion was apparently due to the fact that Frazer, on further investigating the subject in the production of his work *Totemism and Exogamy*, came to lay more stress on the social side of totemism, whereas Robertson Smith throughout emphasized its religious aspect. Furthermore, to follow Robertson Smith meant destroying his newly-formulated stratigraphical distinction between magic and religion. There could not, on this hypothesis, be any sacramentalism, *i.e.* something religious, in an age of magic. Therefore what on the face of it appears to him to be sacramental communion is for him simply a magical rite. It is difficult to understand how he reconciles this view with the fact that, in the highest and purest form of religion that the world has so far known, sacramental union with the Deity is the essential feature. To avoid deriving the slain god from the sacrifice of totemic animals, or from any operation of vegetation magic, Frazer is forced to find the origin of the rite in the slaying of the king. But, if the slain god is to be identified with the slain king, the king must first be proved divine. Thus he argues that, since kings and chiefs are tabu, they must therefore be sacred, in the sense that they are possessed by a god or a spirit. The numerous examples quoted do not, however, cover the whole field of primitive religion. Moreover, by his own definition of tabu as negative magic,[3] he divides sacred things into two classes—those that are divine and those that are not divine. Now kings are divine because they are tabu; and tabu is merely a 'negative magic.' Once more we are faced with the problem of how to derive the religious from the non-religious.

It is somewhat surprising that Frazer should have abandoned his original theory just at the moment when most remarkable evidence in favour of the mystical union between the totem or 'theanthropic' animal and the totemite was forthcoming from Australia, on the authority of Spencer and Gillen.

2. The Australian totemic rites.—By the performance of sacred ceremonies known as *intichiuma*

[1] *Ib.* p. 108.
[2] *Ib.* p. 230.
[3] *Ib.* p. 104.
[4] *RHR* xxxvi. [1897] 243.
[5] 'Essai sur le sacrifice,' *L'Année sociologique*, ii. [1899].
[6] *Ib.*

[1] *MI*, London, 1908, ii. 611 ff.; cf. Gn 28[20ff.].
[2] *MI* i. 469 ff.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 111

it appears that the Arunta endeavour to secure the multiplication of some particular animal or plant, and actually enter into sacramental relations with the totem. After the performance of *intichiuma* at Emily Gap (a place specially associated with the mythical Alcheringa ancestors and the totems) the witchetty grub is tabu to the members of the totem, and must on no account be eaten by them till it is abundant.[1] The Purula and Kumara classes may eat it at any time, provided it be cooked in camp. After *intichiuma*, when the totem is plentiful, large supplies are gathered, brought into camp, cooked, and stored away in bark vessels called *pitchi*. In due course—at the period analogous to harvest-time among agricultural people—they are taken to the *ungunja*, or men's camp, where all the men assemble. The leader grinds up the contents of the *pitchi* between two stones. Then he and the other men of the totem eat a little and distribute what remains to those who do not belong to the totem. He repeats the operation with a *pitchi* from his own store. The witchetty grub totem may then eat sparingly of the grub.[2]

Similar rites take place in other totems in Central Australia, differing, of course, in detail, but everywhere made up of the same essential elements.[3]

Among the Undiara Kangaroo, *e.g.*, when an *intichiuma* ceremony is to be performed, the men proceed to the foot of a hill on the slope of which two blocks of stone project, one above the other. One of these stones is supposed to represent a male, the other a female, kangaroo. The headman of the totem clan and a man who is in the relation of mother's uncle to him climb up to a rocky ledge, supposed to be haunted by the spirits of ancestral kangaroos, and paint it with stripes of red and white to indicate the red fur and white bones of the kangaroo. When this is done, a certain number of young men sit on the top of the ledge, while the men below sing of the increase of the kangaroos. Blood-letting follows. 'The young men open veins in their arms and allow the blood to stream out on to, and over, the edge of the sacred ceremonial stone which represents the spot where a celebrated kangaroo of the Alcheringa went down into the earth, its spirit part remaining in the stone which arose to mark the place.'[4]

After the rite has been duly performed, the young men go and hunt the kangaroo, bringing their spoils back to the camp. Here the old men, with the *alatunja* in the midst, eat a little of the flesh of the animal and anoint with the fat the bodies of those who took part in the *intichiuma*, after which the meat is divided among all the men assembled. The men then decorate themselves with totemic designs, and the night is spent in singing songs relating to the exploits of the Alcheringa men. When this has been done, the animal may be eaten sparingly.[5]

When men of the emu totem desire to perform *intichiuma* ceremonies, several of the men open veins in their arms and allow the blood to stream on the ground till it is saturated. When the serum has coagulated, they trace designs in it in white, yellow, and black, representing the different parts of the body of an emu. Several men of the totem then dress themselves to resemble emus and imitate the manners and customs of the bird. They fasten *churinga* on their heads to represent the neck of the emu, and chant a song to the emu constructed in the blood. They think that this act has the effect of preventing the totem from disappearing, by quickening the embryos of the new generation.[6]

In the Unjiamba or Hakea-flower totem an *intichiuma* ceremony is performed by the men of the Bulthara and Panunga classes at a shallow, oval-shaped pit, by the side of which grows an ancient *hakea*-tree. In the centre of the depression is a small projecting and much worn block of stone, which is supposed to represent a mass of *hakea*-flowers. After the pit has been swept and songs sung inviting the tree to flower much and the blossoms to be full of honey, a young man is told to open a vein in his arm and allow the blood to sprinkle on the stone till it is covered. This done, the ceremony is complete. The stone is regarded as a *churinga*, and the spot is forbidden to women, children, and the uninitiated.[7] In other words, the ceremony has established a blood-bond between the totem and the totemites, and the place of the rite is rendered sacred and therefore tabu.

Spencer and Gillen, in a paper contributed to the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, say that for the totemite 'the one essential feature (of the ceremonies) is the necessity of identifying himself closely with his totem.'[1] That is to say, by opening a vein in his arm upon the kangaroo rocks, or eating the flesh of the sacred animal, or having its fat—a substance which with the Australian ranks equally with the blood as regards potency—rubbed on his body, the totemite establishes a union of a sacramental nature with the totem. True, the present-day native explanation of the ceremonies is that they drive out in all directions the spirits of the kangaroos, etc., and so increase the number of the animals.[2] But is this the only purpose of the rites? To prevent the totems from vanishing from the land, an alliance, in the nature of a blood-covenant, is made with the animal species by means of a solemn sacrificial meal. The blood rite, therefore, has a twofold efficacy. It is with the communion aspect that we are here concerned. The slain kangaroo closely resembles a sacrificial victim, although it can hardly be described as a 'mediator' between man and the sacred species, exactly in the sense suggested by Robertson Smith in his theory of the 'theanthropic' animal. The *mana* concentrated in the victim (especially in its blood) goes out and gives strength to the communicant, neutralizing his infirmities by drawing them into itself. In this way, rather than as an intermediary between God and man, the totem may be regarded as a victim.

Another difference between the Australian and more advanced forms of sacrifice lies in the fact that the animal in this case is naturally sacred, while ordinarily it acquires this character during the rite. But a mystic sacramental union between the totem and the totemite is none the less established by the *intichiuma* ceremony. A man of the witchetty grub or emu totem believes himself to be a witchetty grub or an emu. In order to keep this quality, he assimilates the flesh of the creature, that he may dwell in the totem and the totem in him. The solemn preparations show with what reverential awe these sacramental meals are regarded by the natives. The fasts, the *churinga*, the totemic decorations, the sacred rocks and designs, all testify to the sacred atmosphere surrounding the mysteries.[3] In the blood ceremonies we see exemplified not only the means whereby a blood-covenant is made with the totem, but also the psychological concept that in later cults develops into the sacrificial shedding of the blood of bulls and goats. As the Arunta sprinkle the sacred rocks or the totemic design with blood, so, in the more advanced religions, the priest offers upon the altar the blood of the sacrificial victim (Ex 29^{10-14}, Lv 9^{8-11}).

3. The primitive conception of sacrifice.—E. Durkheim maintains that both the essential forms of evolved sacrifice—the act of oblation and the act of communion—are found in germinal form in the *intichiuma* rites. The only difference, he thinks, is that in the later offerings the two acts in the *intichiuma* are parts of one undivided rite, while in the Australian ceremonies they are separated.[4] But, apart from the evidence of Strehlow that the hymn which is sung at the *intichiuma* of the kangaroo describes the offering of a morsel of kangaroo-fat to make the fat of the kangaroos increase,[5] the act of oblation can hardly be said to form a part of the Australian totemic rites. Apart from this instance, and from offerings to the dead consisting of stone hatchets, clubs, water, and in modern times matches,[6] there

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 170–179; cf. E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, London, 1917, p. 120 ff.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 203.
[3] *Ib.* p. 295 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 294, 296; J. D. Woods, *Native Tribes of S. Australia*, Adelaide, 1879, p. 187.
[4] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 462. [5] *Ib.* p. 204.
[6] *Ib.* p. 181. [7] *Ib.* p. 184 f.

[1] *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 278.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 206; O. Strehlow, *ZE* iii. [1871] 7, 12, ver. 7.
[3] E. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, p. 484.
[4] *Ib.* [5] *ZE* iii. 12, ver. 7. [6] Howitt, p. 465.

is no evidence of gift-sacrifice in Australia. If, as we suggest, the *intichiuma* be regarded as the earliest form of sacrifice, it seems that the rite automatically involves the union of the totem and the totemite through the communication to the latter of the *mana* resident in the former (especially in the blood and its sacred flesh). The effect of this sacramental union is the neutralization or expulsion of the evil in man, by contact (as distinct from contract) with his supernatural ally. It is only when animistic and theistic conceptions arise that offerings of food are made to divine beings to secure their favour or to minimize their hostility. True, the Australian has a very real belief in tribal All-Fathers, but only as remote anthropomorphic beings in need of nothing that man can give. Therefore they are not the recipients of sacrificial gifts. Consequently we contend that, in what R. R. Marett calls the 'pre-animistic' type of religion,[1] the earliest attempts at sacrifice were means whereby the worshippers were placed in physical contact, after a sacramental manner, with their totem. But, it may be asked, do the Australians really represent a truly primitive people? Have they not had countless generations in which to evolve social and religious institutions? In order to answer these not unreasonable objections to a hypothesis founded on evidence from Australia, a brief survey must be made of the archæological facts which we have at our disposal.

4. Primeval sacrificial rites.—Within recent years numerous paintings and engravings of animals together with other designs have been discovered on the walls of palæolithic caverns in France and Spain,[2] having, it is supposed, magico-religious significance. If these caves were not 'pre-historic sanctuaries,'[3] why should palæolithic man draw outlines of animals and fish in the dark recesses of a mountain? Surely, if he were gratifying his æsthetic tastes, he would have chosen a place open to the light of day, where he and his companions might enjoy the fruits of their labours. It therefore seems much more reasonable to regard such caves as Niaux and Gargas as sacred spots where primeval mysteries were duly celebrated, and which had to be approached with solemn and esoteric rites. In the latter rock-shelter curious interlacings and arabesques have been made, either with the fingers or with some pointed instrument, in the gluey clay of the walls and roof of the cave. These have been described as imitations of the scratches left by the claws of the cave-bear, perhaps a totem of these particular Aurignacians.[4] In support of this view may be mentioned the numerous deep striæ on the walls of the cave of Font-de-Gaume. On the floor of this cavern a great many bones of the cave-bear have been found, as well as striæ corresponding to the rows of claws on the bear's foot, and the red outline drawing of the animal at the end of the gallery. Of course, this is slender evidence upon which to base the assumption that palæolithic man was given to totemism, but, taken in conjunction with the cave-paintings representing animals and designs similar to the totemic decorations of the Central Australians at Emily Gap, and the incised figures painted over with vermilion on the totemic grave-posts used by the American Indians, it makes it highly probable that these primeval inhabitants of Europe were acquainted with this primitive mode of social and religious organization. Moreover, the dots and bands in red and black ochre with which the pebbles found by E. Piette at Mas d'Azil are decorated correspond to the designs on the Australian *churinga*, while the so-called *bâtons de commandement* may have played their part in primeval totemic ceremonies.[1] But, even if these palæolithic paintings had no totemic significance, it can hardly be denied that they were used for magico-religious purposes.

It is well known that the modern savage frequently depicts the image of a creature in order to obtain magical power over the real animal. F. H. Cushing describes the images of totems carved out of stone by the Zuñi Indians, with a flint arrow bound to the 'fetiche.'[2] Likewise among the Ojibwa Indians the medicine-man makes a drawing of the animal to be hunted and paints the heart in vermilion, drawing a line from it to the mouth, along which magic is supposed to pass at his incantation.[3] Now, in the pre-historic caverns at Niaux and Font-de-Gaume bisons are represented with arrows painted in their sides, and, in the former, there is a curious design showing a wounded bison surrounded by marks which have been likened to boomerangs. Such drawings are inexplicable except as a means whereby these ancient hunters endeavoured to procure success in the chase.

It has been noticed that among the Central Australians, in order to cause a multiplication of the totem, *intichiuma* ceremonies were held in places in which the sacred animal is symbolically represented on rocks, or, in the case of the emu totem, on the ground. Since palæolithic man, like his modern representative the Australian, was a hunter, depending on the chase for his subsistence, the conclusion seems inevitable that he too performed sacred ceremonies in the dark recesses of his 'sanctuaries' for the same purpose. Of course, it is not suggested that the totemic cult of modern aborigines is in any way identical with that of primeval man, but, judging from the numerous similarities between the two cultures, the Arunta rites appear to represent the nearest approach to the totemic mysteries celebrated by palæolithic man at Gargas, Niaux, and similar sites. If this is so, the rudimentary conceptions of sacrifice set forth in *intichiuma* ceremonies formed part of magico-religious cult at least as early as the Aurignacian culture-period in Western Europe.

5. Ideas connected with sacrifice.—(*a*) *Communion.*—Jevons is of the opinion that 'the core of worship is communion.'[4] This conception, if it is used in the wide sense of contact, is, as we have seen, the fundamental principle underlying the most rudimentary forms of sacrifice. Wherever totemism is found, a union with the sacred species is effected by physical assimilation of the supernatural qualities of the divine animal or plant. A typical instance is the well-known sacramental eating of the bear among the Ainus.[5] The Ainus, like many other primitive people, also eat sacramentally the new crops.[6]

In New Caledonia the eating of the first yams of the season is a solemn ceremony in which the women take no part.

Seven or eight yams are dug up with the greatest precaution, wrapped in leaves, and carried before the great wooden images, rudely carved in human form. The yams are then cooked in special pots by boys, and eaten by them. The pots are afterwards buried, and the chief addresses the crowd, praying the images to give them a good crop of yams every year. The new yams are then dressed and eaten.[7]

1 *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914, p. xxi.
2 Cf. art. ART, 'Note on the Use of Painting in Primitive Religion,' vol. i. p. 821 ff.; E. A. Parkyn, *An Introd. to the Study of Prehistoric Art*, London, 1915, pp. 19–131.
3 Marett, pp. 203–220.
4 *L'Anthropologie*, xxi. [1910] 139, 142; cf. Marett, p. 217.

1 *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903] 357; cf. M. Bernardin, *Revue savoisienne*, Feb. 1876; Spencer-Gillen[s], p. 128; cf. art. STAFF.
2 2 *RBEW* [1883], pp. 9–43.
3 W. J. Hoffman, 7 *RBEW* [1891], pp. 221–223.
4 *Introd. to Hist. of Religion*, p. 225.
5 A full description is given in art. AINUS, vol. i. p. 249 f.
6 See art. AINUS, vol. i. p. 248[b].
7 *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 53.

The inherent tendency, the yearning of the feeble human soul to reach out towards and make itself part of the divine nature, which finds its satisfaction in the Christian Eucharist, is even more clearly set forth in the sacrificial ritual of the native tribes of America. The most notable and instructive example is the custom observed among the Aztecs of sacramentally eating bread as the body of the god Huitzilopochtli or Vitzilipaztli.

In addition to the holding of a feast at which the people ate their god sacramentally in the outward and visible shape of bread and grain,[1] they entered into a closer union by fortifying dough with human blood. A youth was chosen and named for the god. For months the person doomed to play the fatal part of divinity was treated with divine honour, and permitted to taste all the joys of the world to which he was soon to bid farewell. At the expiration of the set time he was slain on the altar and his fresh blood was mixed with dough, which was divided among the worshippers and eaten.[2] Thus they became partakers of the divine nature.

Savages sometimes seek to enter into communion with the dead by eating part of the body of the deceased or by holding a feast as part of the funeral rites. Sometimes the flesh provided at the banquets is that of the dead man himself, as in the case of the Dieri.[3] More frequently animal victims, whose blood and soul the dead man has consumed, are slain and their flesh is eaten by the survivors to establish a sacramental union with the deceased. The Nicobar Islanders hold a feast at the grave 'in the presence of the dead' after a funeral,[4] and in Melanesia the chief mourner takes a piece of fowl and of yam and calls the names of those who have recently died in the place saying, 'This is for you.'[5]

Robertson Smith explains the mutilation of the bodies or garments of the living as constituting a bond of union between them and the dead.[6] It seems reasonable to suppose that by causing their blood to flow over the corpse or grave a 'covenant in blood' is established; conversely, other primitive people daub themselves with the blood, etc., of their kinsman, and thus incorporate in themselves a portion of the dead. For the same reason bones, hands, locks of hair, and the like are retained by survivors. Likewise, savages often endeavour to form a covenant with their dead enemies by establishing a blood-brotherhood with them.

Thus, 'when an Arawak Indian of British Guiana has murdered another, he repairs on the third night to the grave of his victim, and pressing a pointed stick through the corpse he licks off and swallows any blood that he finds adhering to the stick.'[7] If this were not done, it is believed that the murderer would go mad and die.

Sometimes it is thought sufficient merely to anoint the communicant with the blood or oil exuded from the body of the deceased.[8]

Parallel with these rites is another mourning rite—that of cutting or tearing the hair and burying it with the body or dedicating it at the grave. In the case of certain tribes in Central Australia the hair is burnt instead of dedicated.[9] The object of these rites, as with the blood ceremonies, is seemingly to form a bond of union with the dead, so as to prevent his inflicting any harm on the survivors. It may be that hair is thrown on the corpse for the same reason.

(*b*) *Conciliation.*—Although the most common motive in early conceptions of sacrifice is undoubtedly a desire to enter into sacramental relations with a source of spiritual strength, and thereby to obtain *mana*, yet the wish to avert, neutralize, or expel evil is by no means an uncommon source of sacrificial offerings among primitive people. The savage is very susceptible to apprehensions of danger from supernatural powers, and, although there is no proof that fear was the cause of the earliest attempts at sacrifice, yet in the course of the development of the rite, the idea of 'conciliation' soon arose. Thus the 'piacular,' or propitiatory, offering of an atoning nature came into force. The 'gods' were thought to be displeased with men, and in consequence a sacrifice had to be offered to avert their supposed anger or indignation. In very primitive cult offerings were made to anything that was considered to be dangerous—rocks, glaciers, earthquakes, diseases, death, and so forth, or even curiously shaped stones, fish, animals, trees, etc.[1] In S.E. Australia, when a man of another clan entered a certain tract of country, he had to propitiate the local spirits by performing such rites.[2] On building or entering a new house or canoe, starting on a war or trade expedition, and, as has been seen, at the time of sowing or reaping the new crops, sacrifices were made to bring 'luck' and the 'blessing of heaven' on the venture. Parallel to these rites is the offering of the first-born of man and beast.[3] When sin is regarded as contagious and capable of transmission, a sacrificial victim is used as a scapegoat.[4] Such a vicarious sacrifice, however, is expiatory only in the sense that the death of the victim expiates the guilt of the actual offender.

(*c*) *Honorific offerings.* — Another aspect of more developed sacrifice is the free-will offering in grateful recognition of the goodness and beneficence of the deity. Although the desire of primitive man to show his thankfulness to the higher powers is secondary to the communal and piacular conception, it is by no means unknown in early cult. The offerings of firstfruits and many other gift-sacrifices conceived of as an honorarium rather than a bribe come under this division.

'When certain natives of Eastern Central Africa, after they have prayed for a successful hunting expedition, return home laden with venison and ivory, they know that they are indebted to "their old relative" for their good fortune, and give him a thank-offering.'[5]

The 'eucharistic' conception of sacrifice—*i.e.* one free from the desire to secure material benefits in the future (cf. Gn $28^{20ff.}$)—is seldom found in really primitive cult.

In the higher religions the ethical notions of self-sacrifice and the oblation of a contrite heart develop conceptions involving intelligent self-unification with God through prayer, penitence, and abstinence. Such ideas, however, are entirely absent from primitive cult. In the rudimentary form of the rite the communion-theory is adequate to cover most of the facts if it be construed on liberal lines, remembering that the primitive mind is more concerned with getting into contact with his supernatural ally than in entering into elaborate and solemn contracts with him. What he needs is *mana* both to join himself on to his source of strength and to neutralize and expel the evil in and about him. The *intichiuma* rite is a means of attaining this end, since the *mana* concentrated in the victim goes out and gives strength to the communicant, drawing into itself his infirmities. With the rise of animistic and theistic beliefs,

[1] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 86 ff.
[2] B. de Sahagun, *Hist. générale des choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne*, French tr., Paris, 1880, p. 203 f.
[3] Howitt, p. 449. [4] *AE* vi. [1893] 25.
[5] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 284.
[6] *Rel. Sem*[2]. p. 336.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 154.
[8] Howitt, p. 467. [9] Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 507, 520.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 15, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 291.
[2] Howitt, p. 403.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 179 ff.; R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, Melbourne, 1878, ii. 311; Ex $13^{2\text{-}15}$, Nu $18^{15ff.}$, Gn $22^{1\text{-}13}$; cf. Mic 6^{7}; *MI* i. 458; artt. FIRST-BORN.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913; cf. Lv 16^{21} artt. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, PROPITIATION, SCAPEGOAT.
[5] *MI* ii. 615.

gifts, honorific offerings, and the whole complex system of developed sacrificial ritual are gradually added to the original rite.

LITERATURE.—Sources are cited in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

SACRIFICE (Buddhist). — The attitude of Buddhism towards every kind of external sacrificial ritual was one of uncompromising dissent. It judged such ritual (1) to be the futile expression of misdirected outlay and effort, and (2) in some of its forms to involve cruelty. And (3) the kind of benefits hoped for from the rites was not sufficiently, as we should say, spiritual. References to this opposition, however, are far to seek in its ancient literature, and we are tempted to infer that such sacrificial feasts as involved the taking of life or much elaborate ceremonial were not of periodical occurrence, and indeed were rare events. It is only in the tending of a consecrated fire, and in oblations made through that fire, not apparently to the deceased Vedic god Agni, but to 'great Brahmā,' that any continuity of sacrificial observance appears. Had sacrifices of animals been of frequent occurrence, it is probable that the canonical accounts of the Buddha's deeds and words would have contained more frequent records of protest publicly made. As it is, no such public protest is to be found in any of these books. There does not in fact appear to have been any sacrificial ceremonial made at stated intervals by a hierarchy acting for the people and for the people's welfare. Such sacrificial ceremonies could be arranged by the powerful and wealthy, but they were held on behalf of some individual, and not by or for the community. Thus the king of Kosala, the Pasenadi, is recorded as commanding a great animal sacrifice, explained in the commentary as advised by his chaplains to avert personal evil threatened in a dream.[1] The *seṭṭhi*, or leading millionaire merchant of Rājagaha, was supposed, on one occasion, by his brother-in-law, Anāthapiṇḍika, to be preparing 'a great sacrifice,' so absorbed did he appear to his visitor.[2] In the *Kūṭadanta Suttanta* an eminent Brāhman abbot is represented as preparing a great animal sacrifice, concerning the complicated procedure of which he consults the Buddha's wisdom.[3] This, as the translator points out, is a deliberate fiction full of ironical humour, since to ask such advice is 'the last thing a Brahmin of position would do.'[4] Other allusions to 'great sacrifices' (*mahā yaññā*) may be found in the *Jātaka* stories, and are of course no less deliberate fictions,[5] especially the story of the king consenting to sacrifice all his family.[6] It is only on the occasion of the king of Kosala's great sacrifice just mentioned that we meet with any expressly uttered protest against such a ceremony. Even here the protest is made, not to king or people, but to the disciples who bring the news to the *vihāra* (or grove 'settlement'). It is only in the commentary, and in that of the *Jātaka*,[7] that we read of the utterance being promptly reported to the king and of his countermanding the ceremony. And the terms of the protest are so general as to suggest with some force that verses and *sutta* were a piece of ancient editorial work carried out with very scanty material. They may be found in the writer's translation of *Saṃyutta*, i.[8] The verses ran thus:

'The sacrifices called the Horse, the Man,
The Peg-thrown Site, the Drink of Victory,
The Bolts Withdrawn, and all the mighty fuss:—
These are not rites that bring a rich result.
Where divers goats and sheep and kine are slain,
Never to such a rite as that repair
The noble seers who walk the perfect way.
But rites where is no slaughter nor no fuss,
Are offerings meet, bequests perpetual,
Where never goats and sheep and kine are slain
To such a sacrifice as this repair
The noble seers who walk the perfect way.
These are the rites entailing great results.
These to the celebrant are blest, not cursed.
Th' oblation runneth o'er; the gods are pleased.'

This is not so much a reasoned argument against such rites as a categorical impeachment of 'much ado about nothing,' of ineffective activity, coupled with an implicit contempt for acts and beliefs that could no longer appeal to men of lofty mind. Herein, as Rhys Davids writes, the early Buddhists evidently took up and carried on to complete victory the growing feeling of intelligence and humaneness to which the seal is set in that Rock Edict of King Aśoka which begins: 'No animal may be slaughtered for sacrifice.'

'Isolated instances of such sacrifices are known even down to the Muhammadan invasion. But the battle was really won by the Buddhists and their allies,' especially, as is probable, by the Nigaṇṭhas or Jains, with their central tenet of *ahiṃsā*, or 'non-injury.' 'And the combined ridicule and earnestness of the Kūṭadanta Suttanta will have had its share in bringing about the victory.'[1]

The sacrifice stories, moreover, in the *Jātakas*, especially the extraordinarily outspoken sarcasm of Bhūridatta's verses, in the *Jātaka* of that name,[2] will have helped later to consummate that victory, appealing, as they must have done, to popular audiences who, instead of rising in shocked wrath to stone a blaspheming narrator, sat and listened with the amused appreciation of the enfranchised.

More pointed than the above-cited protest is the rebuke against the futility of oblation by fire, which is put, with felicitous irony, into the mouth not of a teacher, but of the divine object himself. It occurs in the same book.[3] A Brāhmanee, whose son is a pervert—in other words, a young *arahant* in the Buddha's order—is a habitual sacrificer to Brahmā. Her son approaches her house on his round for alms. Brahmā appears to her and utters a eulogy of the son as the more fitting recipient of the food which she is wasting:

'Far hence, O brahminee, is Brahmā's world,
To whom thou servest offerings alway.
And Brahmā feedeth not on food like that.
What babblest thou unwitting of the way,
O brahminee, unto the Brahmā world?
Lo here! this Brahmadeva, son of thine,
A man who ne'er will see another world,
A man who past the gods hath won his way;
Meet for oblations from both gods and men,
Let him enjoy the choice meats thou hast served.'

Our second point, that in the 'great sacrifice' the slaughter of life was reprehensible, appears, in the *Suttas*, in the doctrine of the four classes of individuals—those, namely, who (1) torment themselves, (2) torment others, (3) torment both self and others, (4) torment neither. Of these the first practise austerities; the second include butchers, trappers, fishermen, brigands, etc.; the third include kings or mighty priests who, on some such occasion as the opening of a new mote-hall, hold a sacrifice with great ritual, with the slaughter of many cattle, goats, and rams, with wood-cutting and grass-strewing, and with much bullying and hustling of servants and slaves, working in fear of chastisement.[4] This point as to cruelty is much more eloquently expressed in the *Bhūridatta*,[5] in the address uttered by the *bodhisatta* (Buddha-to-be) on the futility of sacrifices practised by Brāh

1 *Saṃyutta*, i. 76. 2 *Vinaya Texts*, *SBE* xx. [1885] 180.
3 *Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, Oxford, 1899, i. 173.
4 P 163. 5 *E.g.*, vol. iii. nos. 314, 433.
6 Vol. vi. no. 542. 7 Vol. iii. no. 314.
8 *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, *PTS*, 1917, p. 102.

1 *Dialogues*, *loc. cit.* 2 Tr. vi. 109–112.
3 *Saṃyutta*, i. 139 f., tr. 176 f.
4 *Majjhima*, i. 342 f.; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 205.
5 *Jātaka*, vol. vi. no. 543.

mans, and on the abuses to which those practices led:

'If he who kills is counted innocent,
. . . . . .
Let Brahmins Brahmins kill. . . .
We see no cattle asking to be slain
That they a new and better life may gain.
Rather they go unwilling to their death,
And in vain struggles yield their latest breath.
To veil the post, the victim and the blow,
The Brahmins let their choicest rhetoric flow.
. . . . . .
These cruel cheats, as ignorant as vile,
Weave their long frauds the simple to beguile.'

The sympathy with animal suffering betrayed here is essential to the view that spoke, in its religious terms, not of 'all men' only, but of 'all beings' or 'creatures' (*sabbe sattā, bhūtā*) as objects for compassion. And this standpoint would of itself, without other reasons, rule all blood-sacrifice out of court as monstrous.

The third point, as to the low aspirations which the sacrificial rites were intended to further, is best illustrated by the words ascribed to a notable early convert, Kassapa of Uruvelā. His conversion is recorded in a series of legends.[1] The Buddha invites him to make public confession of his faith:

'What hast thou seen, thou of Uruvelā,
That thou, preacher and votary austere,
Hast left the Fire? I ask thee, Kassapa,
The cause of this. Why is thy sacrifice
Of holy fire bereft of all thy care?'

To this Kassapa replies:

'The sacrifices speak to us of things
We see and hear, yea, taste, of men's desires
And women. I have learnt to say of things
That bring rebirth, "Lo! it is canker." Hence
No more delight I take in sacrifice
Nor in oblation.'

He then tells what he has 'seen.' Kassapa might well have made out a better case for the loftier-minded among celebrants, without violating the truth. From the standpoint of Buddhist saintship, however, such loftier aspirations as the prayer so to live as to be reborn in Brahmā's heaven were but a palliative, and not the real 'escape.' The contrast is shown in Kassapa's verses preserved in the anthology:

'Once well content with sacrifice, 'bove all
Concerned within these worlds[2] once more to live,
Now have I set myself to extirpate
All passion, all ill will, illusion too.'[3]

The transformation and spiritualization of the two aspects of sacrifice—as symbol and as self-devotion—are emphasized by Buddhism much as they were by Hebrew psalmist and prophet. The stations in the road to the good life—the perfect lay life and the perfect religious life—are, in the *Kūṭadanta Suttanta*,[4] set forth as so many degrees of 'sacrifice' (*yañña*). Elsewhere the inwardness of the right sacrificial celebration is dwelt upon:

'I lay no wood, brahmin, for fires on altars.
Only within burneth the fire I kindle.
Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent
I, Arahant, work out the life that's holy.
. . . . . the heart's the altar,
The fire thereon, this is man's self well tamèd.'[5]

And of such fire-tending no class could hold a monopoly:

'Ask not of birth. Ask of the course of conduct.
From any sticks verily fire doth take birth.
The steadfast seer, though his descent be lowly,
To intellect's aristocrats is lifted,
By noble shame all that is evil curbing.'[6]

As to the surrender of self or property in the right sacrifice, the votary of the religious life in leaving the world had surrendered his all; to the layman not so sacrificing it was left to offer often and gladly of his goods to these sons and daughters of the homeless life. By thus sowing his harvest in that 'field of supreme merit,' he maintained the high religious standard in his community, and the means of hearing good doctrine, and he also lived in faith of reaping a crop of happiness in both the near and the distant future.[7]

1 *Vinaya Texts*, *SBE* xiii. [1881] 118–139.
2 'These worlds' includes every sphere, terrestrial or celestial, of life.
3 *Psalms of the Brethren*, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *PTS*, 1909–13, cox.; cf. also his brother's verses, cciii.
4 Referred to above (*Dialogues*, i. 173 f.).
5 *Samyutta*, i. 169. 6 *Ib.* p. 167.

LITERATURE.—The literary references are given in the article. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, pp. 240 f., 248 f., 294, should also be consulted.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SACRIFICE (Celtic).[1]—**1. Evidence of ancient writers.**—As has already been pointed out in art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Celtic), statements are made by Cæsar and other writers of antiquity that the Celts offered human sacrifices. Cæsar[2] says that in Gaul men who were suffering from serious illness, or who were in the midst of war or any other great danger, would sacrifice or promise to sacrifice human victims, in the belief that the majesty of the gods could be appeased only when a life was given for a life. He also refers to the burning of human sacrifices enclosed in huge wicker images (*simulacra*). In the first instance the victims chosen for such a fate were such criminals as brigands and thieves, but, in default of such criminals, innocent victims would be sacrificed. Lucan[4] speaks of human sacrifices as being offered among the Gauls to the gods Hesus, Taranis, and Teutates; and his statement is repeated by Lactantius, who says: 'Hesum atque Teutatem humano cruore placabant.'[5] Diodorus Siculus,[6] following Posidonius, refers to the quinquennial sacrifice of evil-doers (*κακούργους*) by impalement. He further states that captives taken in battle, as well as certain animals similarly captured, were by some tribes sacrificed by burning or otherwise.

In one passage[7] Diodorus speaks of a certain general as having sacrificed to the gods the handsomest of the youths. Tacitus[8] speaks of the Britons as thinking it right to offer up the blood of captives, and Plutarch[9] mentions the human sacrifices of the Gauls, which they considered, he says, of all sacrifices the most perfect (*τελεωτάτην θυσίαν*). Athenæus,[10] too, refers to the Gaulish sacrifice of prisoners of war in the case of a defeat. According to Pliny,[11] the human sacrifices of Gaul were suppressed by Tiberius, but, according to Mela,[12] a vestige of the ancient practice remained in the cutting off of a portion of the flesh of those condemned to death. The notes on Lucan called 'Commenta Lucani Usener' say that Hesus, whom the commentator identifies with Mars, was appeased by the hanging of a man in a tree, until his limbs wasted away, while, in another passage, he identifies Hesus with Mercury, and says that he is worshipped by merchants. With Mercury he also identifies Teutates, and states that he was appeased by thrusting a man head-foremost into a full vat, and keeping him in that position until he was drowned. Taranis he identifies with Jupiter, and says that he used to be appeased with human beings, but that he was now content with cattle. How far the commentator was speaking from knowledge it is impossible to say. According to Suetonius,[13] it was Claudius (not Tiberius) who completely abolished druidism, after Augustus had prohibited Roman citizens from taking any part in its rites. In Pausanias[14] we are told that the Gauls under Combutis and Orestorios put to death the whole male population of Callieas, and then drank the blood and tasted the flesh of the slain. A passage from Procopius[15] also speaks of the Celts as especially prizing the sacrifice of their first prisoner of war; the form which the sacrifice took, according to him, was that of hanging the victim from a tree, throwing him amid thorns, or putting him to death in some other horrible fashion.

2. Expiation and atonement as explanations of earlier practices.—In view of the evidence of Cæsar and others, it would be useless to deny that the Celts offered up human victims; and certainly, in Cæsar's time, as in the time of Posidonius, who was the chief authority of Strabo and Diodorus, the human sacrifices that were offered, whether

1 Cf., *e.g.*, *Samyutta*, p. 97, tr. p. 123 ff.
2 Cf. throughout artt. CELTS and COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Celtic).
3 *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 16.
4 *Pharsal.* i. 444 ff.
5 *Div. Inst.* i. 21.
6 v. 32. 7 v. 31.
8 *Ann.* xiv. 30.
9 *De Superstit.* 13, p. 171 B
10 ii. 51.
11 *HN* xxx. 4.
12 iii. 2. 18.
13 *Claud.* 25.
14 x. 22.
15 *De Bell. Goth.* ii. 15.

quinquennially or otherwise, seem distinctly to have had a religious sanction, and to have then been regarded as piacular. It is, however, worth considering whether the practice of ridding society of superfluous members may not have been, in its origin, independent of religious considerations, and based rather upon the co-operation of instincts of antipathy to the unfit with a state of economic pressure. The religious sanction and interpretation of the practice may well be later than the practice itself, and it is not improbable that religious and ethical development helped to mitigate the custom and to lead to the substitution of animal for human victims. It is clear from the testimony of ancient writers that the Celts of antiquity were characterized by two well-marked traits: (1) a remarkable indifference to human life in themselves and in others, and (2) an intense and scrupulous regard for religious observance.[1] With their indifference to life was closely connected their belief in its duration after death. Under the conditions of Celtic life, children must have grown up with a most vivid sense of the uncertainty of existence. Fathers, according to Cæsar,[2] had the power of life and death over their own wives and children, and the practice of sons not appearing in their father's presence[3] until they reached manhood may have originated in a judicious concealment by the mothers of the boys from the sight of their fathers, lest the head of the household should decide to reduce the number of his children. In battle, too, it was considered improper for the attendants of a chieftain to survive him, and the institution of the *solduriī*[4] probably constitutes, on the highest plane in the Celtic community, a practice of non-survival on the part of dependents which was originally doubtless more compulsory than voluntary. The wanderings of the Celts in antiquity speak of intense economic pressure; and, in times of famine, or in districts where the supply of food was inadequate, it is in the highest degree probable that the stronger elements in the community would not hesitate to eliminate the weaker or those whose continued existence increased rather than lessened the burden of the community. It was probably this economic pressure, combined with the idea that the dead had the same wants as the living, that caused the wives and servants of a dead man to accept death voluntarily on his decease, or the attendants of a king to be willing not to survive him. When brought face to face with sheer necessity and economic conditions which threaten society with extinction, human nature, in its crude state, is capable of great harshness in order to ensure its own preservation; and the human sacrifices of the Celts, as well as of other races, probably owe their origin to economic rather than religious ideas. The strain of living had probably much to do with the proverbial ferocity of the ancient Celts. In normal times it is not improbable that the better placed Celts came, by adjustment to their environment, to be relieved from the continuous necessity of weeding out the community; but times of abnormal stress would arise, and recourse would be had to the ancient practice of eliminating the unfit, and its employment would probably now take a double form. On the one hand, it might be adopted as a measure partly of economic, partly of religious, necessity in the actual period of exceptional stress, or it might be adopted in anticipation of a threatened calamity. Its character as a solemn and deliberate act of the whole community, in relation to events which were beyond man's control, would ensure its interpretation in current religious terms. In course of time some effort would be made to bring the practice into relation also to the needs of primitive jurisprudence, and, as Cæsar[1] states was the case in Gaul, the victims offered would, as far as possible, be those who deserved punishment for their conduct. As in all ancient customs, there would be a tendency to continue human sacrifice, especially when the idea of the necessity of appeasing angered gods and of restoring communion with them had become firmly implanted in the mind of the community; but the relief of economic pressure, through the improvement of tillage and the like, would in most cases tend to humaner practices. There would ensue, *e.g.*, a reduction in the number of victims, and a substitution for human victims of animals, while the sacrifice would tend to change its character, from being viewed as an act of expiation or atonement to becoming mainly a remedial or medicinal rite. Thus, a practice which originally arose in the main from a real or supposed economic necessity might, at different stages in its history, receive a different interpretation. The interpretation need not necessarily be religious, but at a certain stage the practice in question and the domain of religious thought would be so closely connected that a practice of remote and non-religious origin would receive a religious interpretation, just as at a still later stage its interpretation as a charm might be purely remedial or medicinal.

The idea that the gods were specially in need of human victims before they could be appeased could have arisen only in the days of a belief in humanized deities, while there is abundant evidence from the names of Celtic deities that they were originally far from being exclusively or mainly human. The practice of human sacrifice belongs, as its wide-spread traces show, to a far deeper layer of mankind's history than the development of anthropomorphic deities; and the conclusion appears inevitable that the practice existed long before its explanation as a piacular sacrifice, whether private or public, especially pleasing to anthropomorphic deities, could have arisen.

Among the Celts, as among other races, the practice in question would appear to have become associated with certain periods of the year and with certain agricultural operations. The association of the form of sacrificial death with a tree, or with thorns, or with wicker-work images, appears to point to its connexion at an earlier epoch in its history with some of the main events of the agricultural year. And economic stress in the case of man, as in the case of cattle, would be more acutely felt at certain periods than at others, and might then lead to drastic action. Certain times of the year, too, more than others, would make clear who were the worthless members of the community. Hindrances to vegetable growth would suggest the desirability of promoting it by a clearance of such human elements as were deemed likely to check it. The Celtic year began in the beginning of November, while its second half began in the beginning of May; and, as these periods became more and more fixed, the clearances, by burning and otherwise, which took place in them might include some human elements. The Beltane fires, which continued in Scotland well into the 18th cent., clearly suggest in some of their features[2] that originally they included the burning of human victims.

3. General survivals in folk-custom and folk-lore.—Through the diligent researches of members

[1] As shown by the statement of Diodorus (v. 27) that, in spite of the fondness of the Celts for money, gold could be left unguarded among the inland Celts in temples and on consecrated ground without the slightest risk of its being touched. Cæsar (vi. 16) bears witness to the intense hold which religious scruple had upon the Celts, and the allusions to the practice of consulting soothsayers and others as to the future, even in early Christian centuries, show the strength of their old beliefs. See A. Holder, *Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, Leipzig, 1891–1913, *s.v.* 'Caragus.'

[2] vi. 19. [3] *Ib.* vi. 18.

[4] Mentioned in Nicolaus Damasc. *Hist.* frag. 86, p. 79 D, in Athenæus, vi. 54, p. 249 A–B. Here they are called σιλοδόνροι, and an instance is given of 600 men who, in return for the privilege of ruling with their king and wearing the same raiment, vowed to die with him, whether he fell in battle or was carried off by disease, and no one was known to have broken the vow. Cæsar (iii. 22) calls them *soldurii*.

[1] vi. 16.

[2] See *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 146 ff.

of the Folk-Lore Society and others into the folk-lore of Celtic countries various traces of sacrifices have been discovered which bear the impress of the stage when such sacrifices were interpreted through conceptions of expiation and atonement and through the closely allied conception of purification.

Rhŷs[1] mentions a tradition at St. John's in the Isle of Man that witches were at one time punished by being set to roll down the steep side of the mountain in spiked barrels. He also tells[2] of the burning of a calf by a farmer to secure luck after he had lost a number of his cattle. The same author quotes R. N. Worth's *History of Devonshire* (London, 1886) as saying: 'Living animals have been burnt alive in sacrifice within memory to avert the loss of other stock. The burial of three puppies "brandise-wise" in a field is supposed to rid it of weeds.'[3] He also records[4] an account given by an old woman of the burning of a sheep in Andreas parish in the Isle of Man on Old May-day, but he was not satisfied that the narrator heard the burning spoken of, when it occurred, as a sacrifice. We are told again[5] of a cattle-dealer in Ireland who was familiar with the practice of driving cattle through fire or between fires on May-day. Cormac is quoted[6] as explaining that 'Belltaine (May-day) was so called from the "lucky fire" or the "two fires" which the druids of Erin used to make on that day with great incantations.' It is significant that Cormac makes no reference to sacrifice either of sheep or of human beings. In the old Welsh poem called the *Gododin* there is a reference to the lowering of a sacrifice upon a bonfire, 'Aberth am goelcerth a discynnyn.'[7] In *FL* vi. [1895] 164 an account is given by John Abercromby (on the authority of a MS by Malcolm MacPhail, formerly schoolmaster in Lewis and afterwards Free Church minister in Argyllshire) of the practice of 'sacrifice to procure good fishing.' This practice of sacrificing a sheep or goat at the commencement of the herring-fishing season was employed on the west side of Lewis. The oldest fisherman in the district was selected to perform the ceremony on the very edge of the sea, 'so that any of the blood that might be split would fall into the water.' The blood of the animal was collected with scrupulous care in a boat's bailer. When the blood had ceased to flow, the old fisherman waded into the water and poured it out to the ruler of the deep. The body of the victim was cut up into portions sufficient to give one to each of the paupers of the district. This ceremony appears to have been performed once with due solemnity within the last ninety years. There is an account (p. 165) from the same MacPhail MS of an invocation and offering to Shoni (or Sonidh) for sea-ware (*i.e.* sea-weed), with which it was the custom to manure the fields. The offering on this occasion took the form, not of the sacrifice of a living creature, but of a libation of malt liquor. There is also a description of this practice by M. Martin.[8] In *FL* vi. 167[9] there is an account of the sacrifice of a black cock to cure epilepsy. The black cock had to be one hatched in March, and was 'buried alive, with clippings of the patient's hair and nails, at the very spot where the sufferer had had his first attack.' The same article contains an account of the sacrifice of a black cock on account of disease in cattle. About ninety years ago, according to the same article, a black sheep was flayed alive, and the skin, while still warm, was placed over the diseased limbs of a person suffering from rheumatism, with a view to their cure. About the same period, too,[10] it was the practice, on the first night when cattle were brought home and housed for the winter, to carry fire around them three times in the direction of the sun. Whether this was a vestige of any sacrificial practice it is difficult to say. In *FL* ii. [1891] 20 there is an account of a vestige of sacrifice at Whitsuntide in the parish of King's Teignton, Devonshire, where a lamb was killed and roasted whole in the middle of the village, for the purpose, it is said, of obtaining water. The lamb was decorated with garlands, and the roasted flesh was given to the poor. The same article speaks of the similar roasting of a whole ram lamb at Holne, on one of the spurs of Dartmoor, in a field called 'the Ploy Field,' in the centre of which is a *menhir* 6 or 7 ft. high. In *FL* iv. [1893] 498 ff., in a valuable article on the sanctuary of Mourie, there is a quotation from the records of the Presbytery of Dingwall for 5th Sept. 1656, referring to the 'abhominable and heathenishe practices' of the people of 'Appilcross,' who used to sacrifice bulls at a certain time on 25th August. It was decided 'that quhosoever sall be found to commit such abhominations, especiallie Sacrifices of any kynd, or at any tyme, sall publickly appear and be rebuked.' There is a similar reference in another minute of 9th Sept. 1656 to 'the sacrificing of beasts' at Gairloch as well as to the 'pouring of milk upon hills as oblationes.' In *FL* x. [1899] 118 there is an account by Leland L. Duncan of the survival in Ireland of the sacrifice at the building of a house at Kiltubbrid, Co. Leitrim. When the ground for the house had been measured out, a sod was turned at each of the four corners. The four sods would be left for two or three nights to see if the house were on a fairy 'walk,' in which case they would surely be found replaced, and another site would have to be found. If nothing occurred, a hen or some small animal would be killed, and the blood allowed to drip into the four holes, after which the building of the house might proceed. According to N. W. Thomas,[1] there was a custom in Wales at the end of the 18th cent.[2] of throwing a victim down a precipice, whenever a murrain broke out among the cattle.

Frazer[3] refers to the practice of burning, at Lesneven in Lower Brittany on Ash Wednesday, a straw man covered with rags, after he had been promenaded round the town. This practice is strikingly similar to that at Massilia (whether Greek or Celtic) mentioned by Servius (see art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY [Celtic], 3). With this custom Frazer compares the English practice of burning Jack o' Lent. In *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 322 f., there is a reference to an ancient rite of sacrifice that occurred in the Highlands of Scotland and in St. Kilda, described by John Ramsay, laird of Ochtertyre.[4] Here, however, there may be rather a vestige of totemistic communion, as in the passage quoted in C. Elton, *Origins of English History*[2], London, 1890, p. 411. In the case of the later vestiges of sacrifice the interpretation given when the sacrifice is medicinal is that of transference of the evil from the sufferer to another living creature. In *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 52, there is an interesting account of a practice, once in existence in the village of Llandegla in Denbighshire, where a fowl of the same sex as the sufferer was used to heal the falling sickness, by having the disease transferred to it. As late as 1855[5] the old parish clerk of Llandegla remembered the practice.

4. Survivals at bonfires.—Perhaps the clearest traces of sacrifices, which were doubtless at one time represented as piacular, are to be found in the case of the Beltane fires of Scotland and Ireland, and of the bonfires of other Celtic countries. The fullest description of the Scottish bonfires is that given by Ramsay of Ochtertyre, the patron of Burns and the friend of Sir Walter Scott. A selection of his voluminous MSS has been published in *Scotland and Scotsmen of the Eighteenth Century*. In *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 147 ff., there are quotations from this work that give an excellent account of the Beltane fires, which appear to have marked the commencement of the second half of the Celtic year in the beginning of May. There are traces in these of the ceremony of choosing a victim on behalf of the community, and also of the ceremony of burning human and animal victims for the public benefit. The choosing of a victim was probably the original object of the Beltane cake, which was divided into a number of pieces and distributed among the company. There was, however, one particular piece the obtaining of which gave the person to whose lot it fell the name of *cailleach beal-tine*, 'the Beltane *carline*,' a term of great reproach (i. 148). When this person was known, part of the company took hold of him and pretended to put him into the fire, but, through the interposition of the majority, he was rescued. In some places the person in question was laid flat on the ground, and there was then a pretence of quartering him. Afterwards the person so treated was pelted with egg-shells, and bore his opprobrious name for a whole year, during which time it was the custom to regard him as no longer living. In the parish of Callander the Beltane customs were in vogue towards the end of the 18th century (i. 150). There, again, a portion of the cake was marked out from the rest, being blackened with charcoal. The person who drew it was regarded as the devoted person, and had to leap three times through the flames.[6]

In some countries, as in Brittany, the chief bonfires were lit at the summer solstice, and somewhat similar customs prevailed there; *e.g.*, in Upper Brittany people leap over the glowing

1 *Celtic Folklore: Welsh and Manx*, Oxford, 1901, i. 296.
2 i. 306. 3 i. 339. 4 i. 307.
5 i. 309. 6 i. 310.
7 T. Stephens, *The Gododin of Aneurin Gwawdrydd*, London, 1881, pp. 124–126.
8 *A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland*, London, 1673, reprinted in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, do. 1808–14, iii. 583.
9 Cf. also *FL* xiv. [1903] 370. 10 *FL* vi. 170.

1 *FL* xvii. [1906] 276, 'The Scape-Goat in European Folklore.'
2 Mentioned by W. Owen [Pughe], *Heroic Elegies of Llywarch-Hen*, London, 1792, p. xxxi.
3 *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 229 f.
4 *Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. A. Allardyce, Edinburgh and London, 1888, ii. 438 ff.
5 J. Brand, *Observations on Popular Antiquities*[3], ed. W. C. Hazlitt, London, 1870, ii. 375.
6 James Robertson (parish minister of Callander), in John Sinclair's *Statistical Account of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1791–99, xi. 620 ff.

embers of the bonfires.[1] 'In many parishes of Brittany the priest used to go in procession with the crucifix and kindle the bonfire with his own hands; and farmers were wont to drive their flocks and herds through the fire, in order to preserve them from sickness till midsummer of the following year.'[2] There is a reference[3] to bonfires in Ireland in 1782, in which it is said that the people danced round the fires, and, at the close, went through the fire, and the whole was conducted with religious solemnity. In *FLR* iv. [1881] 97 there is a statement by G. H. Kinahan that, in Munster and Connaught, it is said that a bone must always be burnt in the fire.

There are also some traces of sacrifice in the case of the Hallowe'en (31st Oct.) bonfires of Scotland, which were most common in the Perthshire Highlands. The Hallowe'en fires are described by Ramsay.[4]

James Robertson[5] speaks of the practice of carefully collecting the ashes into the form of a circle, and putting in a stone, 'near the circumference, for every person of the several families interested in the bonfire. Next morning, if any of these stones was found to be displaced or injured, the people made sure that the person represented by it was *fey* or devoted, and that he could not live twelve months from that day.' Frazer[6] states that, in the case of the Hallowe'en fires in some districts of the north-east of Scotland, such as Buchan, each of the youths present at the bonfire would lay himself on the ground as near to the fire as he could without being burnt, and, while so lying, would allow the smoke to roll over him. The others ran through the smoke and leapt over their prostrate companion. According to a MS of the traveller Thomas Pennant,[7] it was the custom in N. Wales for each person present at the Coel Certh, or bonfire kindled on All Saints' Eve, to throw a marked white stone into the fire and for these stones to be examined next morning. If any person's stone was missing, he was regarded as doomed to die before he saw another All Saints' Eve. Rhŷs[8] refers to the Welsh superstition which held that the *Hwch ddu gota* ('the short black sow') would take the man who was hindmost of those who ran away after throwing their stones into the fire.

5. Sacrifice and substitution.—In view of the foregoing accounts it appears probable that, in Celtic as in other countries, ideas of expiation and atonement once played their part in religious thought, but certain of the harsher practices of the Celts, such as human sacrifices, probably did not originate from these ideas, but were older and came to be interpreted through them, and it may well be that the ideas of expiation and atonement were helpful in diminishing the number of victims, and in gradually changing their character, through the development of the idea of the substitution of one type of victim for another. The real motive for the human sacrifices was probably, in the main, real or supposed economic pressure, and there are some traces in folk-lore of such a practice as the dispatch of an aged parent by his able-bodied son.

Cf. art. by G. L. Gomme, in *FL* i. [1890] 197 ff., containing the outline of 'A Highland Folk-tale,' collected by J. F. Campbell, after the publication of his *Popular Tales of the West Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1862). John Aubrey also refers to an English 'countrie-story' of 'the holy mawle, which (they fancy) hung behind the church dore, which, when the father was seaventie, the sonne might fetch to knock his father in the head, as effœte, & of no more use.'[9]

It may well be, too, that the human clearances from which human sacrifices may have originated were not at first regular institutions, but, like wars, arose when necessity seemed to require. Among the ancient Celts and races similarly situated the risk of a death by violence, whether in war or otherwise, was probably viewed with as little normal perturbation as the risk of death through illness, and the possibility of having to die when an occasion for human sacrifice arose was accepted as a matter of course. All the writers of antiquity who speak of the Celts refer to their remarkable fearlessness and indifference to death. Much of the ferocity which ancient writers attribute to them was probably also due to the high tension produced by the strain of living and by preoccupation with the constant problem of procuring food for their vigorous and prolific communities.

See also artt. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Celtic), 4, CELTS, xiii. 2, and SIN-EATING.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article. E. ANWYL.

6. Human sacrifice among the Irish Celts.—The existence of human sacrifice among the Irish Celts has been denied by E. O'Curry and P. W. Joyce.[1] But, as O'Curry's editor, W. K. Sullivan, says—

'As the Gauls, Germans, and Slavonians practised human sacrifice, it is very improbable that the Irish had not a custom which seems to have been universal among all the other European branches of the Aryans.'[2]

The practice certainly existed among the British Celts down to A.D. 77,[3] and among the Gauls, the latter of whom were rather more civilized than the Goidels of Ireland. Hence there seems no good reason for this denial, especially as the evidence of certain passages in the Irish MSS points to it. This is the more remarkable as pagan rites are apt to be glossed over by the Christian scribes who handed down or recomposed the tales and myths of an earlier age. In the cult of Cromm Cruaich the Irish are said to have given a third of their healthy issue for the milk and corn which they asked of the god.[4] The *Dindsenchas* also says that 'the firstlings of every issue and the chief scions of every clan' were offered to this god.[5] Joyce compares the *Dindsenchas* notice of the custom with the mythical tales contained in it, and says that the one is as incredible as the other, forgetting that the myths were credible to the pagan Irish. The archaic evidences of ritual in the *Dindsenchas* may certainly be regarded as credible. An exaggerated memory of human sacrifice either among the Celts or among a pre-Celtic people in Ireland is found in the mythico-historic account of the peopling of the land. To the Fomorians—a group of gods who may have been evil divinities of the Celts, or perhaps the gods of the aborigines regarded by the incoming Celts as hostile to themselves—the Nemedians are said to have given in tribute two-thirds of their children born throughout the year and two-thirds of the year's supply of milk and corn.[6] The Fomorians are here regarded as an actual race; but there is no doubt that they were supernatural beings, and that tribute here means sacrifice, exaggerated though it may be. St. Patrick is said to have preached against 'the slaying of milch cows and yoke oxen and the burning of the first-born progeny' at the fair of Taillte.[7] 'First-born progeny' may here refer to children.

Human sacrifices to remove plague—the equivalent of the Gaulish sacrifice for health mentioned by Cæsar — are mentioned in the metrical *Dindsenchas*.

'During the Trena of Taillte, at sunrise
I twice invoked Mac Ere
The three plagues to remove
From Erin, though it be a woman's command.
Their hostages were brought out;
The drowning of the bonds of the violated treaties,
Immolating the son of Aedh Slane
To Mac Ere—it was not a cause of shame.'[8]

Through the obscurity of these lines may be discerned a memory of sacrifice, the offering of

1 P. Sébillot, *Coutumes populaires de la Haute-Bretagne*, Paris, 1886, pp. 192–195.
2 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 184 *f.* 3 *Ib.* i. 202.
4 ii. 427 ff. 5 In *Statist. Acc. of Scotland*, xi. 621 ff.
6 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 233.
7 Quoted by Brand, i. 389 ff.
8 *Celtic Heathendom*[3], London and Edinburgh, 1898, p. 575 ff.
9 *Remaines of Gentilisme and Judaisme, 1686–87*, London, 1881, p. 19.

1 E. O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, London, 1873, ii. 222; P. W. Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland*, do. 1903, vol. i. ch. ix.
2 O'Curry, i., Introd. p. cccxxxiii.
3 Pliny, *HN* xxx. 4. 13; cf. Dio Cass. lxii. 6; Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 30.
4 *Book of Leinster*, p. 213*b*.
5 *Rennes Dindsenchas*, text and tr. by W. Stokes, *RCel*, xvi [1895] 35.
6 *Book of Leinster*, p. 7*a*. 7 O'Curry, i. p. dcxli.
8 *Ib.* i. p. dcxl. ii. 222.

hostages and of a captive prince to dispel blight and disease. Myth also refers to the necessary offering of the son of a sinless couple and the sprinkling of his blood on the doorposts and over the land of Tara during a time of blight, caused by the marriage of Conn, king of Erin, to Becuma, a goddess banished from the gods' land because of her sin with the son of the god Manannan. The son of the sinless couple was the son of a queen of the divine land. But, when he was about to be slain, his mother appeared with a cow and recommended that it should be slain in his stead.[1] The memory of human sacrifice and of its commutation for an animal offering is obvious here, in spite of its being enshrined in this curious mythical story.

Traditions of the human foundation sacrifice[2] are also found among both the Irish and the British Celts. In one case the legend has become attached to the account of the founding of the monastery of Iona, but must first have been told in some other connexion.

St. Columba is reported to have said to his monks: 'It is good for us that our roots should go under the earth here; it is permitted that one of you should go under the clay of this island to hallow it.' St. Oran agreed to do this, and the church was built over the grave. As a reward he went straight to heaven.[3] Perhaps the story was connected with Oran because he was the first to be buried in the churchyard which still bears his name. But it is evident that memory of the old pagan rite suggested that it must have been used at the founding of Columba's monastery. This is clear, because in another version a different reason is given for Oran's death. He was buried alive as a judgment and through Columba's curse because after a visit to the other world he denied the current beliefs about it.[4]

The ritual aspect of the foundation sacrifice is more evident in the story of the building of Vortigern's castle on Snowdon, told by Nennius. The building materials disappeared as soon as they were brought together. Vortigern's 'wise men' (probably druids) informed him that he must find a child born without a father and put him to death, sprinkling with his blood the ground where the castle was to stand.[5] The child Embreis or Ambrose escaped by showing the real cause of the trouble; in Geoffrey's *History* he is Merlin, of Arthurian fame. The foundation of the palace of Emain Macha was also laid with a human victim, as was that of a stone fort mentioned in the *Book of Lecan*, under which 'groaning hostages' were enclosed.[6] Similar legends are attached to many buildings all over the Celtic area.

For the sacrifice of human victims at funerals see art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 302[b].

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

SACRIFICE (Greek).—1. Theistic significance of the rite.—In order to obtain a clear understanding and definition of sacrifice, in accordance with its signification for the Hellenic peoples within the Hellenic period, we must interpret it in the terms of the word *θυσία*; and, as this word had always a 'theistic' intention, always denoting a certain act performed in relation to a certain deity or semi-divine personality, we must not apply it to those acts of ceremony or ritual which might bear an outward resemblance to an ordinary act of sacrifice, but bore no direct reference to any deity, being performed solely as acts of automatic or magical efficacy. For research into the primitive origins of sacrifice impresses on us the fact that much that on the higher plane of religion is done in honour of the god is performed on the lower plane without any such intention. This is particularly the case in what is often loosely called 'blood-offering.' Finding clear evidence in a story recorded by Pausanias[1] of the survival of a ritual at Haliartos in Bœotia of shedding human blood over a dry land in order to obtain water, we must not interpret this as a blood-sacrifice to the earth-goddess, though it could easily have developed into that; but, accepting the simple account as it stands, we must regard it as a magical rite, dictated by the belief common to so many primitive peoples in the automatic magical efficacy of blood. Again, when the people of Methana, near Troizen, carried round their vineyards the dismembered limbs of a cock to preserve the fruit from the baneful effects of a certain wind,[2] this act, as Pausanias presents it, may be best called pre-animistic magic; not a word in his account authorizes us to call it a sacrifice to a wind-god. It may be that later Greek authors applied the term *θυσία* to an act of ritual that originally had not, perhaps never came to have, any such religious character. But the application of the word proves that the author himself attached a theistic significance to the rite. On the other hand, it is clear that not every kind of offering to a deity was called a *θυσία*, which must be distinguished from mere *ἀναθήματα*, such as the dedication of a statue, or the spoils of war, or a woven garment. Only the ceremonial oblation of animals, vegetables, fruits, or liquids—blood, wine, milk, water, honey, oil—is normally described as a *θυσία*. It was not always necessary that these should be brought up to or laid upon an altar. A more primitive ritual, belonging to a less developed stage of anthropomorphism, appears in a passage of the *Iliad*[3] describing the Trojan sacrifice to the river Skamandros; not only were bulls offered to him in the usual way, but horses were thrown alive into the water; and the fashion survived in the historic period, for we hear of horses and bulls being thrown into the sea to Poseidon,[4] of the Rhodians sinking a four-horsed chariot into the waters for the service of Helios.[5] That such acts were regarded as 'sacrifices' in the proper sense is proved by a ritual law preserved in an inscription of Mykonos ordaining a sacrifice of a ram and lambs to the river-god, Acheloos, of which some are to be 'slaughtered' by the altar, some 'cast into the river,' the same word being used for both acts.[6] Other ceremonies therefore of the same type—the oblation of barley-cakes to Ge,[7] which were thrown down into a chasm at Athens, the throwing down of pigs to Demeter and Kore into their *μέγαρα*, or underground vaults[8]—may also be described as *θυσίαι*.

But normally, and in nearly all the public as well as the private services of religion, the altar was the essential requisite for the sacrifice; and from the first the word *θύειν* would imply some kind of altar or table for holding the fire, if the theory that derives it from a root meaning 'to smoke' or 'to burn' is certain. At any rate, the ideas of greatest interest attaching to the Greek sacrifice will be found to arise from its association with the altar, which gives a special sanctity to the victim and the participants.

2. Communion-feast theory.—Before we consider the different types of Greek sacrifice, it is convenient to raise the question whether they can be all interpreted from one single point of view. To explain sacrifice in general as a gift to the god seemed to some ancient writers, and has seemed to

[1] *Book of Fermoy*, p. 89 f., ed. and tr. in *Ériu*, iii. (1907) 150 f.
[2] See art. FOUNDATION, vol. vi. p. 113.
[3] Adamnan, *Vita S. Columbæ*, ed. W. Reeves, 1874, p. 288.
[4] From a local tradition given in A. Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica*, Edinburgh, 1900, ii. 317.
[5] Nennius, *Hist. Britonum*, ch. 40.
[6] W. Stokes, *Three Irish Glossaries*, London, 1862, p. xli; O'Curry, ii. 9.

[1] IX. xxxiii. 4. [2] II. xxxiv. 2. [3] xxi. 130–132.
[4] Athenæus, p. 261 D; Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* i. 13.
[5] Festus, *s.v.* 'October equus.'
[6] Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[2], 615, 35.
[7] Paus. I. xviii. 7; cf. Theophr. *de Plant. Hist.* IX. viii. 7.
[8] At Athens in the Thesmophoria (Clem. Alex. *Protr.* p. 14 P; Lucian, schol. in *Rhein. Mus.* xxv. [1870] 548); at Potniai (Paus. IX. viii. 1).

many moderns, a satisfactory account of it. But a new theory has been brought into vogue, chiefly through the insight and researches of Robertson Smith,[1] which interprets ancient sacrifice, Greek as well as Semitic, as a communion-feast with the divinity, in which the god and his people 'become of one flesh' by partaking in common of the flesh of the victim, the animal being regarded as in some degree divine, as having the divine spirit incarnate in it. And that writer himself and some of his followers drew the corollary that, where the view of the sacrifice as a gift or mere bribe to the god prevailed, that was a later degeneracy of religion, possible only when the sense of communion had faded from the ceremony. This theory needs much modification to bring it into harmony with modern knowledge and research. It was disfigured by immature ideas concerning totemism; and modern anthropology disproves that part of it which asserts the gift-sacrifice to be invariably due to a later degeneracy. Nevertheless, it retains its value as a guide to our researches into ancient sacrifice. And, if we find two types of sacrifice—one that may be called the gift type, one the sacramental or communion type—we need not for our present purpose discuss the question whether the one arose from the other; for both are certainly older than the beginnings of the Hellenic period.

It is obvious that no sacramental character, none of the ideas associated with a communion-feast, was likely to attach to those primitive acts of oblation mentioned above, offered without an altar—the throwing of the animal victim or cakes into the water or a chasm of the earth; these must have been regarded as gifts given to please, placate, or stimulate the divine powers of earth and water.

3. Bloodless offerings. — Turning now to the much larger question of the altar-sacrifice, we are confronted at once with the important distinction, familiar to us through the story of Cain and Abel, between the bloodless offering and the blood-offering—a distinction that runs all through Greek ritual. Upon certain altars a severe local law might prevail that no blood could be shed, but only harmless cereals, vegetables, fruit, and 'sober' liquids might be offered. The most conspicuous examples are the so-called 'pure' altar of Apollo in Delos,[2] *καθαρός* specially connoting purity from contact with blood, and the altar of Zeus Ὕπατος,[3] 'the Highest,' in Athens. As all blood-offerings required fire, to convey the flesh of the victim in fragrance to the divine participant, bloodless offerings might be sometimes called *ἄπυρα* when they consisted of fruits and liquids for which no fire was required. Thus we hear of *ἄπυρα ἱερά* being prescribed by an immemorial law of ritual in the shrine of Athene at Lindos;[4] nor does it appear that such offerings as cakes, which required fire for the baking, needed an altar-fire for their offering, as they were in most cases merely laid on the altar;[5] yet a fire might be maintained, even when the offerings were bloodless, for the sake of the incense thrown into it.

Cereal and vegetable offerings and fruits, as vital elements of human nourishment, were natural oblations to the deities of vegetative growth and fertility, and most of the Hellenic divinities included this among their other functions; they were natural therefore and common in the cults of Demeter and her daughter, of the Earth-Mother of the Great Mother of the Gods, and of Dionysos, and are found even in the ritual of Poseidon and Herakles. Yet all of these admitted and accepted, except in certain shrines, the blood-offering as well; therefore, whatever philosophers of the later period might assert about the higher refinement and spirituality of the bloodless oblation, no Greek divinity down to the end of paganism could be regarded as championing any such dogma. The worship of Athene at Lindos, for some local reason that we cannot trace, might proscribe the animal victim; but elsewhere Athene delighted in it as did Zeus and the 'pure' Apollo. In fact the divergences of Greek ritual in this respect are not to be explained by the operation of any high moral idea.[1]

Such oblations were made at various times throughout the year according to the ritual calendars of the Greek states, and in accordance with the religious needs of early agrarian society. The various festivals of Demeter in Attica range throughout the agricultural year; and in one of them at least—the Haloa, or festival of the threshing-floor—we are explicitly informed that the animal victim was forbidden. The most critical time was the beginning of harvest, when all the Greek states, we may affirm with confidence, offered *ἀπαρχαί*, or firstfruits, of field and vintage to the protecting deities of tilth, orchard, and vineyard.

Are we to regard this class of sacrificial offerings as a pure gift to the divinity? Gifts in some sense they certainly were; and there is no evidence that the bloodless offerings of the altar were ever consumed by the worshippers in the ordinary public cults as a sacramental meal or for purposes of sacramental communion with the deity. If they were eaten by the people as 'blessed bread,' some feeling of communion might have arisen; for we may trace faint survivals of the primitive belief that Demeter was incarnate in the corn;[2] and some of these sacrificial cakes were shaped so as to bear the insignia of the divinity—*e.g.*, cakes offered to Apollo in the form of lyre or bow or arrows[3] — whereby the essence of the divinity might be attracted into them. But we are fairly certain that such offerings laid on the altar were never eaten by the worshipper, though an unscrupulous priest might surreptitiously purloin them.[4]

On the other hand, in the ritual of the Greek mysteries—Eleusinian, Samothracian, and those of Attis-Kybele—we have some evidence, mainly indeed doubtful, that the votaries attained to a sense of communion with the divinity by eating holy bread or drinking some preparation from cereals,[5] and on a vase in Naples we have probably an actual representation of the administration to the *μύσται* of the sacred cup containing the *κυκεών*, or the mixture of the barley-meal, which the goddess was believed to have drunk in her sorrow. But it does not appear that the *κυκεών* had ever been hallowed on the altar in any form of sacrifice, or that the communicant was ever penetrated with any mystic idea that it contained the divine substance of the goddess.

We must believe, then, that the average Greek offered these bloodless oblations to his divinities as pure gifts, partly to secure their blessing and favour for the year to come, partly as a thank-

[1] See especially his *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 269 ff.

[2] Diog. Laert. VIII. i. 13; Macrob. III. vi. 2; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 848 P.

[3] Paus. I. xxvi. 5.

[4] Pind. *Ol.* VII. 48; Diod. Sic. V. 56.

[5] See Aristoph. *Plut.* 661 and schol.; the only exception perhaps was the ὄμπναι, sacrificial cakes burnt in the altar-fire, according to Kallimachos, schol. Nikand. *Alex.* l. 450.

[1] Occasionally the character of the deity might explain the type of offering regarded as appropriate; *e.g.*, only the blood-offering was considered acceptable to Ares (*Anth. Pal.* VI. 324).

[2] See *CGS* III. 33 f.

[3] Steph. Byz., *s.v.* Πάταρα.

[4] See the humorous passage, Aristoph. *Plut.* 676–681. The harvest-offerings laid before the image of Demeter at Mykalessos remained fresh for a year (Paus. IX. xix. 5).

[5] *CGS* III. 195, 240 f.: 'Sacrificial Communion in Greek Religion,' in *HJ* II. 317.

offering for the blessings of the past year. But in respect of the ἀπαρχαί, of the firstfruits of the harvest and vintage, another motive, belonging to a different order of ideas, may be discerned or surmised. On the day called the Pithoigia, 'the opening of the wine-casks'—the first day of the Attic Anthesteria, when the new wine was ready for drinking—the citizens bore a mixture of the sweet wine to Dionysos 'in the marshes' before they ventured to drink themselves.[1] We may regard this as a religious rite instituted for the purpose of removing the tabu from the new vintage; and, as there is abundant evidence of the belief that a religious sanctity conserves and fences round the growths of the field before they are fit for the use of man, we may suppose that the ἀπαρχαί of corn had originally this significance. The most conspicuous example of these was the ἀπαρχαί sent from a great part of the Greek world to the goddesses at Eleusis; but a detailed inscription of the 5th cent. reveals that they came to be regarded as mere tributes or thank-offerings, and a certain residue of them were sold in the market, the price being devoted to the purchase of ἀναθήματα.[2]

4. Blood-sacrifices and the gift theory.—The blood-sacrifices have now to be considered, and it is to these rather than to those of the former type that certain ideas which may be called mystic will be found to attach. Before considering any general theory about them, one must review the facts. The first question is whether any general principle is discoverable governing the choice of animals. The choice was certainly a wide one, including all domesticated animals, all edible birds, even fish, and all the wild beasts of the chase. The domesticated animals are nearly always those that form the ordinary food of man. The only exceptions were dogs occasionally offered to Hekate, Ares, and Eileithyia,[3] horses offered to Helios and Poseidon,[4] and asses to Apollo and the winds;[5] we have a record of the sacrifice of an elephant offered by one of the Ptolemies on a single occasion, which excited so much popular disapproval that it was not repeated.

Apart from these few exceptions, the facts at first sight seem to be sufficiently explained by the gift theory, namely, that the meat-offerings were tributes paid to the deity for favours received in the past or expected in the future, or to deprecate his anger. And such a rite reveals the working of the primitive idea that the deity is not of his own nature immortal and self-existing, but is dependent like mortals on continual nourishment for his continual existence—an idea plainly enough expressed in Egyptian, Babylonian, and Vedic religions. It is true that in no articulate Greek utterance, nowhere in the earliest literature, is the belief bluntly proclaimed that the divinity would perish if not fed by the sacrifices, and later thinkers scoffed at the view that the gods needed them in any sense. But we cannot avoid supposing that such an idea, however inarticulate, was in the background of the popular religious consciousness; and, in spite of the refining influence of more cultured thought, the popular faith must have long prevailed that the deities in some way actually ate of the flesh of the victim and always delighted in it. Hence arose at some indeterminate date such divine epithets as Αἰγοφάγος, 'goat-eater,' Ταυροφάγος, 'bull-eater,' of Hera[6] and Dionysos,[7] derived from the victims offered. Also, in a well-known passage in the *Iliad*, Zeus himself admits that he owes great consideration to Hektor in return for his many offerings.[1] This is the fundamental view of the gift theory.

But, when we look more closely into the facts, whether in regard to the choice of victims or in regard to the actual forms of the sacrifice itself, the more we find that this theory, even if always true to some extent, is seriously inadequate. If the sacrifice were regarded merely as a gift to provide the divinity with food, why should the rule obtain on the whole that the god prefers the male victim, the goddess the female?[2] Why should it have been supposed that a maiden heifer should be more acceptable as food to a maiden goddess?[3] Why should the horns of the ox be elaborately decked with gold, its neck in later times with wreaths, and why should the rule have been generally insisted on that the victims should be καθαρά and ὁλόκληρα, pure and unblemished?[4] Certainly the primitive mind applies certain ideas of sympathetic magic to the choice of food; and we can explain, in reference to them, why a pregnant sow should be offered to the earth goddess to stimulate her fertility,[5] why entire male victims, ἔνορχα, should be chosen as sacrificial food by specially virile divinities such as Ares, Poseidon, the river-gods, and certain heroes, and why a cock should be an appropriate offering to the war-god, to quicken his fighting powers. But the simple food theory, whether assisted or not by ideas of magical working, would not explain why black animals should be offered to the dark powers below the earth, called 'chthonian,' and to the gods of storm, and animals of bright hue to celestial powers, the Olympians, and the deities of brightness.[6] Such a choice would be dictated by the idea that there should be some resemblance or affinity between the animal of sacrifice and the divinity. And later writers of classical antiquity were evidently aware of this prevalent feeling; we find such pronouncements as that bulls were offered to Selene because the horns of the animal resemble the horns of the moon,[7] and a general axiom that 'victims are offered because of some similitude' to the deity.[8] The author of this phrase impairs its value by adding to it the words 'or because of some contrariety,' which is explained by his later statement, 'victims are offered which are detrimental to the deity'—'immolantur quae obsunt.'[9] This was doubtless suggested by such facts as that the goat was commonly offered to Dionysos, and the goat was injurious to vines. But we are certain that this view is false, and that it was utterly repugnant to ancient Hellenic thought and feeling that an animal should be chosen for sacrifice which was naturally detrimental or hostile to the divinity. On the contrary, evidence can be given establishing a mysterious connexion or sympathy between the victim and the divine power to whom it is consecrated on the altar, and it is this that compels us, in certain forms of sacrifice, to regard the gift theory as inadequate.

5. Sanctity of the altar.—It is now necessary to consider those forms for which the earliest evidence is afforded by certain passages in the Homeric poems. By combining some of them we can present a typical Homeric sacrifice, as offered by a tribe or a group of men.

1 *CGS* v. 214 f.
2 Dittenberger², 20, ll. 10–12; see *The Year's Work in Classical Studies*, 1914, London, 1915, p. 114 f.
3 *CGS* ii. 707 n
4 See above, § 1.
5 *CIG* 1688; *CGS* iv. 100; *Et. Mag.*, *s.v.* Ἀνεμύτας.
6 Paus. III. xv. 9.
7 Schol Aristoph. *Ran.* 360.

1 *Il.* xxiv. 64 ff.
2 To this rule, formulated by Arnobius (*adv. Gent.* vii. 19), the exceptions are very numerous (some shrines were indifferent as to the sex of the victim—*e.g.*, at Thasos [Roehl, *Ins. Græc. Ant.*, Berlin, 1882, no. 379]); but on the whole it prevailed.
3 *Il.* vi. 275.
4 Aristot. frag. 108 (Athenæus, 674 *f.*); for curious exception to this rule see Æl. *Nat. An.* xii. 34.
5 Prott-Ziehen, *Leges Sacræ*, 26.
6 Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 18; Aristoph. *Ran.* 847.
7 Lact. *Div. Inst.* i. 21.
8 Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* ii. 380.
9 *Ib. Æn.* iii. 18.

The victim, one or many, was brought near the altar; holy water, barley-stalks in a basket, and a vessel for catching the blood were held in readiness; the sacrificers purified themselves with the holy water and formally raised up in their hands the barley-stalks, which had been sanctified by some preliminary rite; then the chief officiator—the king or chieftain or, more rarely, the priest—cut off some of the victim's hair and threw it into the fire, at the same time or immediately afterwards uttering the prayer to the deity for blessing or special aid. At this point the sacrificers 'threw forward the shredded barley (or barley-stalks)'; the victim, if a powerful one like an ox or a bull, whose struggles would be embarrassing, was smitten with an axe in such a way as to render it impotent; then, if women were present, they raised the ὀλολυγή, which was an auspicious appeal to the deity by name to grace the ritual with his or her presence;[1] the animal, if the oblation was to the Olympians, was lifted off the ground, its head drawn back so that its face was turned to the sky, and its throat cut; the blood was probably caught in the sacred vessel, though we do not know for what purpose; the dismembering of the carcass began, the thighs were cut away and wrapped in fat, and, with portions of meat cut probably from every part of the victim, were placed on the altar and roasted, while a libation of wine was poured over them. While these were roasting, the worshippers ceremonially partook of the inward parts—σπλάγχνα—which had been cooked; then the other parts of the victim were cut up and roasted on spits and provided a common feast for the sacrificers; the feast was followed by a wine-drinking, inaugurated by a libation to the deities, and in certain cases the rite might close with religious dance and singing.[2] There is much here that needs skilled interpretation. Homer is not an expounder of ritual; much of his account is stereotyped and has the quality of shorthand. One point of importance is obvious: the victim is not a gift to the gods for their own exclusive use; only that portion of it belongs to them which is burnt on the altar; the rest serves as a feast for the people, in which they may be supposed to be feasting with their divinity; so that the typical Homeric sacrifice may best be described, not as a tribute or bribe, but rather as a communal meal in which the people strengthened their sense of fellowship with the god or goddess. But is there any trace of the idea that the victim is in itself divine? Nowhere in the Homeric poems is there any hint of such a character attaching to it before it has been brought into touch with the altar. But we may discern in part of the ritual the intention to sanctify the animal, to fill it with the divine spirit; and, as the altar was the centre to which the divine spirit was attracted, this aim would be effected by establishing a *rapport* between the deity represented by the altar and the victim. Such might well have been the intention of throwing its hair into the altar-fire before the immolation, for by a well-known law the sanctification of the part means the sanctification of the whole. There is reason for thinking that this was also the intention and use of the οὐλόχυται, though careful consideration is needed before arriving at any definite view of these. The acts expressed by οὐλοχύτας ἀνέλοντο and οὐλοχύτας προβάλοντο belong to the initial part called ἀπάρχεσθαι, which preceded the central act of sacrifice and of which the purpose was the sanctification of the victim and the worshippers. A comparison of many later authorities suggests the following interpretation:[1] the barley-stalks are first placed on the altar, and thus become charged with its spirit, as does everything that touches it; they are then solemnly taken up and 'thrown forward' so as to strike the victim or touch it on the forehead, whereby the holy spirit passes into it. When, elsewhere, the Achæans have no barley at hand, they use leaves,[2] and we know that in later ages leaves were strewn on altars. There is no hint that barley or any other cereal had this mystic power, independently of contact with the altar. Thus charged, the victim is no longer, as it had been hitherto, a merely secular beast, but becomes holy flesh, and those who partake of it are filled with the divine spirit and enter into mystic fellowship with their deity, however faintly this may have been realized by the poet and his contemporaries. This idea will also explain the ceremonial tasting of the σπλάγχνα before the communal feast begins; and it is in the Homeric evidence concerning this part of the whole rite that the sacramental concept emerges most clearly.[3]

Such is the general type of sacrifice familiar to Homer, from which we must carefully distinguish another that we may call the oath-sacrifice; this, which was known to Homer and the later periods, presents special characteristics and will be discussed below. The communal sacrificial feast, which has been described above and which may be interpreted as a ceremony in which the worshippers feasted with the deity and feasted on flesh into which the divine spirit had temporarily entered, was a genial institution, containing potential germs of advanced religion. It may have inspired Hesiod with his vision of a golden age, 'when immortal gods and mortal men had fellowship in the banquet and sat together.'[4] And, although in the later periods the sense of inner fellowship and mystic union with the divine may have waxed dim, the forms of it certainly survived. The later literature gives us abundant testimony that the altar continued to be the radiating centre of sanctity for the whole sacrifice. The οὐλαί, barley-stalks or meal, continued to be strewn on the altar and used for the sanctification of the victim and even perhaps the bystanders; the χέρνιψ, or holy water, was sanctified by a brand from the altar being dipped in it; the κανᾶ, or baskets containing cereals, were sanctified by being taken in solemn procession round the altar; and, thus charged, they sanctified the sacrificial knife which was carried in them.[5] Connected thus by more than one link with the centre of sanctity, the victim became temporarily a sacrosanct beast, and the eating of its flesh might be felt in some degree to be a sacrament. The belief that a part of the personality of the deity might be thus incarnated for a time in the victim explains many of the old rules concerning the choice of animals: the maiden goddess might prefer a maiden victim, the bright deities a bright-haired victim.

6. Bouphonia ritual.—This view of the sacrifice emerges clearly in the ritual of the Bouphonia at Athens and in the legends concerning it, upon which much has been written in the way of con-

[1] This has been wrongly interpreted as a cry of sorrow, also as a cry to avert evil spirits (*e.g.*, G. G. A. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[2], Oxford, 1911, p. 87); in no passage in Greek literature is ὀλολυγή or its cognates a sorrowful cry (the two examples quoted in Liddell and Scott, *s.v.*, are false); it is generally joyful, always auspicious.

[2] The two most complete passages from which this description is taken are *Il.* i. 447-474, and *Od.* iii. 440-463; cf. *Od.* iii. 5, *Il.* ix. 220.

[1] The most important references are schol. Hom. *Od.* iii. 441, 445, schol. *Il.* i. 449; schol. Aristoph. *Eq.* 1167; Eustath. *Il.* i. 449; Aristoph. *Pax*, 961; for modern theory see Ziehen, in *Hermes*, xxxvii. [1902] 391; and Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*.

[2] *Od.* xii. 357.

[3] See art. Greek Religion, vol vi. p. 398.

[4] Frag. 82 (Rzach).

[5] Athenæus, pp. 297 D, 409 B; Aristoph. *Pax*, 948-960, *Lysistr.* 1129; Eur. *Elect.* 800-814 (full account of 5th cent. sacrifice); cf. *Iph. Aul.* 955, 1111, 1471, 1540; Herod. i. 160.

troversy and theorizing.[1] The sacred character of the ox in this ceremony is shown in strange and impressive ways: he dedicates himself to the god by voluntarily approaching the altar and eating the corn upon it; the priest who slays him flees into feigned exile, a solemn trial is held for his murder, and the axe of sacrifice is adjudged guilty and cast into the sea. All partake of his flesh, and a simulated resurrection of the ox is enacted by sewing his hide together, filling it with hay, and yoking it to the plough. This ox has been interpreted by Robertson Smith as a totem-animal, and the name 'theanthropic' has been applied to him; but the theory of totemism breaks down here when critically examined, and the name 'theanthropic' has no right to be applied to any sacrificial beast in Greece; some were regarded temporarily as divine, but none as at once divine and human. There is much more to be said for Frazer's theory that this ox is the vegetation-spirit; but the theory is not essential to explain the facts. What emerges clearly from the records of the ritual and the legends is that the ox has no innate and independent sanctity of his own; this quality enters into him only after his contact with the altar, whereto he is called by the god; henceforth he is charged with the god's spirit, and the slaying of him is felt to be an awful deed, though necessary; and the eating of his flesh is felt to be a sacrament, whereby the Cretan stranger who in the legend performs the ceremony becomes of one flesh with the citizens and is admitted to citizenship. The feigned resurrection may be an apology to the spirit of the ox. Similar ideas are discernible in the ritual of Zeus Sosipolis of Magnesia, as attested by a famous inscription of the latter part of the 3rd cent. B.C.[2] At the beginning of the agricultural year the finest bull that could be procured was solemnly dedicated to Zeus, 'the Saviour of the City,' in a ceremony called the *ἀνάδειξις*; we are not told, but we may suppose, that the consecration took place by the altar of the god; towards the close of the year, when the harvest was ripe, the bull, having been treated with great reverence and care all through the months, was led in a solemn procession and sacrificed to Zeus, and his flesh was distributed among those who took part in the procession. There is no reason to suppose that the bull possessed any independent sanctity previous to his dedication; but by that ceremony the spirit of Zeus, who was undoubtedly a god of fertility in Magnesia, became temporarily incarnate in the bull, and those who ate the sacrificial meat would be put in communion with him; if they ate it in a communal meal round the altar, the concluding act of the ritual would be exactly parallel to the old Homeric sacrificial feast. And that this was a common practice in the State sacrifices is indicated by such not infrequent formulæ as *οὐκ ἀποφορά*, or *δαινύσθων αὐτοῦ*, 'let not the flesh be taken away' (from the neighbourhood of the altar), 'let them banquet there' (around the altar)[3]—rules which show that the flesh was considered too holy to be removed with safety into private dwellings, and that the full virtue of the sacrifice could be maintained only if the worshippers ate the sacred flesh in the presence of their deity.[4]

Moreover, the mystic power that the animal acquired from the altar and through the sacrifice remained after its death. Its blood might be used for cathartic purposes, and specially and chiefly for washing the altar-steps,[1] probably a post-Homeric ceremony. The *ὅσιοι*, the 'holy' priests of Delphi, acquired their holiness from the victim that had been sacrificed to Apollo and was called *ὁσιωτήρ*,[2] 'he who makes holy,' because the beast communicated holiness to the official, probably by means of some ritual contact. Also the skin of the sacrificial animal might long retain mystic power: the *Διὸς κώδιον*, the skin of the ram offered to Zeus Meilichios at Athens, was employed in the purification of homicides;[3] the consultants of the prophetic hero, Kalchas, slept on the fleece of the black ram that had been offered to him;[4] the *αἰγίς* of Athene, probably nothing more than the skin of the goat yearly offered to her on the Acropolis at Athens, was taken round by the priestess to bless newly-married couples with.[5] But these are exceptional cases; ordinarily the sacrificial skins—so great was their number in the Greek States and especially in Athens—formed a valuable revenue from which the priest sometimes got his dues and the State an appreciable return.

We no longer hear of the ceremonial or sacramental eating of the *σπλάγχνα* by the worshippers, and we have some evidence that these might be given to the priest or sacrificer for his private profit or burned on the altar as the deities' portion;[6] but they evidently retained here and there a certain mystic value, for sometimes they were separately placed on the knees of the idol,[7] and in the narrative of Herodotus the Spartan prince who desired to extract from his mother a solemn attestation sacrificed and placed in her hands the *σπλάγχνα* of the victim as she swore.[8] We may say, then, that the belief remained vivid down through the later periods that the divine spirit was specially infused into these parts; and it was therefore these that were of chief avail in the post-Homeric ritual of divination.

7. **Incarnation of deity in certain animals.**—In the cases hitherto dealt with it appears that the sacrificial animal obtains his temporarily divine character merely through contact with the altar. But we are able to discover traces in ritual legend of the primitive belief that the deity habitually incarnated himself or herself in some favourite animal—*e.g.*, Apollo in the wolf,[9] Artemis in the bear;[10] and that such holy animals might occasionally be offered—an act of ritual which might evolve the conception that the deity actually died in the sacrifice. Most of such legends are vague and difficult to interpret with certainty, and, though the bear which contained the spirit of Artemis and the wolf that incarnated Apollo might at times have been sacrificed, we are not told that this was for the purpose of a sacramental feast; and no higher Hellenic divinity was supposed to die in and through the sacrifice. It is only when the Thracian Dionysos is admitted into Greece that such ideas can be traced in the legend and ritual, especially in the Mænad and Bacchic 'omophagies,' or rendings of the bull or goat, and the drinking of its hot blood, which was the very spirit or substance of the god.[11]

[1] Paus. II. xxiv. 4; Porph. *de Abst.* II. xxix. 30 (from Theophrastos); *CGS* i. 56 f., 88–92; Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], p. 304 ff.; *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 5–9; Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, p. 14.

[2] O. Kern, *Die Inschr. von Magnesia am Maeander*, Berlin, 1900, no. 98; Nilsson, p. 26.

[3] See examples in Ada Thomsen, 'Der Trug des Prometheus,' *ARW* xii. [1909] 467.

[4] That this type of sacrifice and this view of it were rife in later paganism is proved by St. Paul's phrase, *τραπέζης δαιμονίων μετέχειν* (1 Co 10[21]).

[1] *αἱμάσσειν τοὺς βωμούς* (schol. Hom. *Od.* iii. 444); Pollux, i. 27; Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*, p. 19.

[2] Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 9.

[3] Suidas, p. 1404, *Διὸς κώδιον*; Eustath. pp. 1935–1938.

[4] Strabo, p. 284.

[5] Varro, *de Re Rustica*, i. ii. 19; Suidas, *s.v.* *Αἰγίς*.

[6] See Dittenberger[3], 371; *Athen. Mitt.* xiii. 166; Athenæus p. 661 A; Stengel, *Jahrb. des kais. deut. arch. Inst.* ix. [1894 114.

[7] *BCH*, 1913, p. 195; Aristoph. *Birds*, 518.

[8] vi. 67 f.

[9] *CGS* iv. 113–123.

[10] *Ib.* ii. 434–438.

[11] *Ib.* v. 164–181.

Originally these were no acts of sacrifice, but acts of wild ecstatic communion, enacted without fire or altar. But in a more civilized Hellenic form they survived in a unique ritual practised down to a late period in Tenedos. The citizens selected a pregnant cow and treated it with great respect until the calf was born; the latter they dressed up in buskins—part of the human equipment of Dionysos—and sacrificed it to the god, but pelted the sacrificer with stones and drove him into exile for a time.[1] Here both animals are semi-divine, not through any contact with the altar; but the preference of the god for and his immanence in the new-born calf are quaintly and picturesquely displayed; therefore by those who devoured its flesh—and we must suppose that this was the intention of the sacrifice—the idea of sacramental communion must have been vividly realized.

8. Underworld sacrifices. — There is another type of Greek sacrifice, essentially distinct from the above, wherein none of the worshippers partook of the food, but all was made over to the divine or semi-divine power. The simplest forms of it, where the gift was offered directly without an altar, have been already considered. In other cases the victim was wholly burned on the altar, and no sacrificial meal was allowed (*ὁλοκαύματα*).[2] We find this rule most frequently, though not exclusively, in the ritual associated with the lower world, the cults of the chthonian deities, heroes, and souls of the dead. In these cases the blood was usually poured down through an opening into the *βόθρος*, the grave or the earth-hollow,[3] and the flesh of the victim was wholly consumed in the altar fire. The underlying motive was, no doubt, the desire to avoid communion with the lower world lest its contagion should blast the living; hence *ὁλοκαύματα* were offered to the Eumenides,[4] to Zeus Meilichios,[5] and usually to the heroes.[6] The words *ἐνάγισμα, ἐναγίζειν*, specially used for sacrifices to the last, express the tabu put upon the food-offering, and point to the same feeling, which would also explain why only the most abandoned vagrant would venture to taste the offerings placed for Hekate, the ghost-goddess, at the cross-roads.[7] Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this fear of the contagion of death did not so far possess the imagination of the later Greeks (more sensitive as they were in this respect than was the Homeric world) as to prevent their desire at times to enter into communion with the kindly powers of the lower world by means of a sacrificial feast of the Homeric type. An inscription records a sacrifice at Mykonos to 'Zeus of the under world' and 'Ge of the under world,' in which a communion-meal was held round the altar and only citizens could partake;[8] and a similar rite occurred in the cult of the *θεοὶ Μειλίχιοι*, undoubtedly chthonian gods in Lokris.[9] We have more than one example of communion-feasts with heroes;[10] and in the private grave-ritual there is clear evidence of a family meal taken with the departed spirit.[11]

On the other hand, in the case of the *ἀποτρόπαιοι θυσίαι*, sacrifices to avert evils and to assuage the wrath of *δαίμονες*, vaguely conceived powers of revenge and pestilence, it was an absolute rule that the offerings must not be tasted and even that the officiator must purify himself after the ceremony before returning to the society of men;[1] and the victim chosen for these rites of 'aversion' or 'riddance' was often an animal unfit for human food, such as the dog.[2] Akin to the 'apotropæic' rites are the 'cathartic,' those intended to purify from stain, and especially the stain of bloodshed. Much of the latter ritual does not concern sacrifice at all; but, when it was performed at an altar, as was sometimes the case,[3] it is probable that a purificatory victim was sacrificed upon it. Any thought of a sacrificial meal would be repugnant here; but the animal's blood or skin would be used in the purification; the blood of the pig, the familiar animal of the lower-world powers, was specially effective in the case of homicide;[4] and we hear of the 'fleece of god,' the skin of the ram offered to Zeus Meilichios, being used for the same purpose.[5] In these instances the person to be purified is brought into spiritual contact, through the immanent sanctity of the sacrificial animal, with the offended divine powers. Therefore, though there is no question of a sacrificial meal, we must reckon with the possibility that the idea of divine communion underlies some of the ritual of Greek *κάθαρσις*.

9. The oath sacrifice.—Again, in the type of ritual which may be called the oath-sacrifice, if the ratification of the oath was accompanied by the slaying of an animal, the flesh was never eaten, but was either buried or cast into the sea. The flesh was tabued, because the slaying was the enacting of a conditional curse against oneself.[6] The animal was consecrated to a divinity only in order that the divine power might be present at the oath-taking; and those swearing put themselves into communion with the deity by touching a portion of the victim;[7] this contact ensured dangerous consequences in the event of perjury. The gift-theory of sacrifice has no meaning here.

10. 'Sober' and wine offerings. — Another special distinction in Greek sacrifices is between those that were called 'sober' (*νηφάλια*) offerings of, or with, non-intoxicant liquids and those that were accompanied with wine. The scholiast on Sophokles[8] declares that the former were offered to Mnemosyne, the Muses, Eos, Helios, Selene, the Nymphs, Aphrodite Ourania; we have other evidence that enables us to add to this list Zeus *Γεωργός*, the god of agriculture, the Eumenides, the child-god Sosipolis of Elis, the winds, and in some cults Poseidon and even Dionysos.[9] Merely looking at the variety of this list of names, we see that no single explanation will apply to all of them. The cheerless powers of the dark world might refuse wine, yet it was offered generally to the dead and to the heroes.[10] Nor can we suppose that the rule arose in a period before the introduction of wine;[11] for these cults are by no means all among the most ancient. In some centres of worship the rule might be explained by the date of the

1 Æl. *Nat. An.* xii. 34.
2 Cf. the name *καυτός* for the purificatory pig burned at Kos (W. R. Paton and E. L. Hicks, *The Inscriptions of Cos*, Oxford, 1891, no. 37).
3 Hom. *Od.* x. 517; Porph. *de Antro Nymph.* 6; Lucian, *Char.* 22.
4 Æsch. *Eum.* 106; schol. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 39.
5 Xen. *Anab.* VII. viii. 3 f.
6 The proper word to designate the altar of the hero was *ἐσχάρα*. The sacrifice to him took place towards evening, to the Olympians in the forenoon (Diog. Laert. viii. 1, p. 33; schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 587).
7 Demosth. *in Konon*, § 39.
8 Dittenberger[2], 615, l. 25.
9 Paus. x. xxxviii. 8.
10 *Ib.* x. iv. 10, v. xiii. 2.
11 *E.g.* the *περίδειπνον* (Artemid. *Oneirok.* v. 82).

1 Porphyr. *de Abst.* ii. 44; cf. E. Littré, *Œuvres complètes d'Hippocrate*, Paris, 1839–61, vi. 362.
2 Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* iii. p. 290 D.
3 *E.g.* Paus. I. xxxvii. 4.
4 See art. PURIFICATION (Greek); cf. Athenæus, p. 410 A–B (quoting from Doritheos).
5 Above, p. 16.
6 Cf. Hom. *Il.* iii. 103, xix. 267.
7 Æsch. *Sept.* 45; Demosth. κ. Ἀριστοκράτ., § 68; Hom. *Il.* iii. 274. Plato, *Kritias*, p. 120 A, imagines a form of oath-taking among his citizens of Atlantis which may be called an ordeal by communion; those who swear drink the blood of the bull sacrificed to Poseidon.
8 *Œd. Col.* 109.
9 See *CGS* v. 199 f.
10 Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* p. 270 B; Hom. *Od.* x. 517; Lucian, *Charon*, 22.
11 J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 90–94.

sacrifice, occurring at a time of the year when no wine was forthcoming.

11. Human sacrifice.—The most striking phenomenon in the history of Greek sacrifice, namely, the offering of a human victim, which survived either as a real or as a simulated act of ritual down to the late period of paganism, is treated separately in art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Greek), and in art. GREEK RELIGION, § 14. Nearly all the recorded types stand in profound contrast to the cheerful Homeric conception of *θυσία*; they exclude the idea of a sacramental communion or a sacrificial meal. Only in the legends of Zeus Lykaios and King Lykaon, who sacrifices his own son and feasts on his flesh with Zeus, we may recognize the reflex of a primitive cannibalistic sacrament, in which the tribe feast on human flesh supposed to incarnate a divine life;[1] and, if this interpretation of half-incoherent legend is precarious, we can safely apply it to the legends of the rending asunder, *σπαραγμός*, of the human victim in old Dionysiac ritual.

Some of the legends concerning human sacrifice bear the print of savage religious conception: we have a glimpse of deities, especially the earth-powers, craving human blood; in others we discern a more advanced idea, but still belonging to barbaric ethics, that an angry and vindictive deity demands a life by way of vengeance for sin committed.[2] But what is of much more interest and peculiar value in Greek mythology is the early emergence of the belief that the high deity is merciful and hated such oblations and himself provided the substitute of the ram. In a legend concerning Tyndareus and Helen we have an exact parallel to the story of Abraham and Isaac, in one of Idomeneus to the story of Jephthah and his daughter, except that the Greek myth ends more mercifully.[3] From an early period the higher conscience of Hellas, the most merciful in antiquity, revolted from the cruel rite; in time of great panic and peril it might be practised on an alien as late as the 5th cent.; in most centres of cult it was abolished as a regular ordinance or converted into a sham; here and there where it survived—and we hear of it surviving till the period of Hadrian—it was moralized by the selection of a criminal as the victim.

12. Conclusion.—The current Greek view of all sacrifice was that it was a gift to the gods.[4] Apart from the inadequacy of this as an account of the popular ritual, its moral weakness was felt by the more refined natures; and a higher theory and ethical view concerning sacrifice emerge in Greek literature and philosophy. To some, as to Euripides and Theophrastos, 'the sacrifice without fire of all fruits of earth poured forth in abundance on the altar' appeared more acceptable to a merciful deity than the blood-offering of an animal victim.[5] Even the Delphic oracle was supposed to encourage the idea that the simplest offering of the poor man with righteousness was more acceptable than the lavish hecatombs of the rich.[6] 'Know well that when one sacrifices to the gods in piety one wins salvation though the sacrifice be little' is a sentence preserved from a lost play of Euripides.[7] One of the last writers of Greek paganism who deal with the subject, Iamblichus, in his book *de Mysteriis*,[8] rejects altogether the theory that sacrifice is a gift that could bribe God, but justifies it as a symbol of friendship between the mortal and the deity. But neither he nor any other Greek theorist appears cognizant of the idea of sacramental communion.

The types and forms of Greek sacrifice here sketched present a general resemblance to those prevalent among the older leading peoples of ancient civilization. But they also show certain characteristics that mark the Hellenic spirit. The ritual belongs on the whole to real religion of the genial character proper to the Greek State and family. There is little or no magic in it, little debasing superstition: the sacrifice did not compel the deity or control the course of nature; nor did the sanctity that attached to it so stupefy the public sense that the sacrifice itself could come to be deified or that the priest who administered it could attain a detrimental degree of divine prestige. In fact in his attitude towards ritual we mark as clearly as elsewhere the characteristic difference of the Greek from the Indian and the ancient Egyptian.

LITERATURE.—See the references given in notes and also: P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*, in Iwan von Müller's *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, v. iii., Munich, 1898, and *Opferbräuche der Griechen*, Leipzig, 1910; H. von Fritze, *Die Rauchopfer bei den Griechen*, Berlin, 1894; M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, Leipzig, 1906; A. Thomsen, 'Der Trug des Prometheus,' in *ARW* xii. [1909] 460 ff.; L. R. Farnell, 'Sacrificial Communion in Greek Religion,' *HJ* ii. [1903–04] 306 ff., 'Magic and Religion in Early Hellenic Society,' *ARW* xvii. [1914] 17 ff. Epigraphic material mainly in W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*[2], Leipzig, 1901, iii.; and I. de Prott and L. Ziehen, *Leges Græcorum sacræ*, do. 1896–1906. L. R. FARNELL.

SACRIFICE (Iranian).—**1. Prevalence in early Irān.**—Even in the earliest times the Iranians were accustomed to bring offerings and sacrifices to complete and render more acceptable and effective their worship of the gods. It was certainly a feature of the united or Aryan period. Evidence of this is afforded by a comparison of the sacrificial terminology and usages as found in the Vedas and in the Avesta. Resemblances in procedure and identity as to certain elements are so manifest that only a common practice during the Indo-Iranian period sufficiently accounts for them. Notably is this the case in respect of *haoma* (Skr. *soma*), the sacred 'death-averting' beverage,[1] and the *baresma*, or *barsom*,[2] twigs which have always[3] been, and remain to this day, essential elements in all Parsi sacrificial rites.

2. Animal sacrifices.—There is no reason to suppose that the vegetable kingdom supplied all the ritual requirements of the early Iranian worshippers. Not only do we find that their Indian fellow-Aryans extensively employed animals for sacrifices in Vedic times, which, it must be admitted, in view of their absence from early Avestan ritual, does not of itself constitute a sufficient proof of their use by the contemporary Iranians; but this, taken in conjunction with the testimony of Herodotus,[4] which, as we have seen,[5] has reference to the practices of a date anterior to his own, leaves little doubt that animals formed in early times important, and possibly the principal, elements in Iranian sacrifices. The references in the *Yashts*[6] to heroes such as Vishtaspa as having extensively practised animal sacrifice indicate the existence of a tradition that the custom was of great antiquity in Irān.

1 *CGS* i. 41 f.

2 There is no evidence for J. C. Lawson's suggestions (*Modern Greek Folk-lore and Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 339, 350) that the human victim in Greece was ever offered as the spouse of the divinity or was ever intended as a messenger to convey the prayers of the living.

3 See art. GREEK RELIGION, vol. vi. pp. 401, 416; Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 121.

4 Plato, *Euthyphro*, p. 14 C: *τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς.*

5 Eur. frag. 904; Porph. *de Abst.* ii. 29.

6 *CGS* iv. 210. 7 Stob. *Flor.* (Meineke, iv. 264).

8 V. 9.

1 See art. HAOMA. 2 See art. BARSOM.

3 *Haoma* at least must be excepted for the duration and in the area of Zarathushtra's public ministry. Owing to its intoxicating character, it is strongly condemned in the *Gāthas* (see *Ys.* xlviii. 10; cf. also xxxii. 14). Even the *Yasna haptanhaiti*, which is later than the *Gāthas*, contains no allusion to *haoma*.

4 i. 132. 5 Art. GOD (Iranian), vol. vi. p. 290

6 *Yt.* v. 21, 25, 29, 33, 37, 108, etc.

3. Zarathushtra and animal sacrifice.—Just as *haoma*-sacrifice conflicted with the distinctly ethical character of the prophet's reform, so also did animal-sacrifice conflict with the highly spiritual conception of God to which he attained. We are prepared, therefore, to learn that under his influence the practice was discontinued,[1] and the emphasis on ritual generally was greatly reduced.[2] Plutarch was undoubtedly right when he said[3] that Zarathushtra taught the Persians to sacrifice to Ahura Mazda 'vows and thanksgivings.' Even Anāhita, who, according to the *Yashts*, was honoured by all her other devotees with 100 stallions, 1000 oxen, and 10,000 sheep, was invoked by Zarathushtra with no animal gift.[4] But after the death of the prophet—how long we cannot say—and with the return of the old nature-worship, the custom of sacrificing animals returned, just as did the practice of preparing and drinking the *haoma*-juice at the service.

4. Animal sacrifice and the dualism of later Mazdaism.—The revival of the custom, however, did not take place without encountering and overcoming more than one difficulty. In addition to the spiritual and religious opposition to animal sacrifices which was part of the inheritance bequeathed to his successors by Zarathushtra, the dualism of the later Mazdaism, whether inherent in the prophet's teaching or only due to a wrong and inconsequential development by the Magi, presented a cosmological problem which had to be solved before animal-sacrifice could be reinstated in the Mazdæan ritual as it existed in pre-Zarathushtrian days. All life, with perhaps the exception of that of a few noxious creatures, belonged to the kingdom of Mazda, and death to that of Ahriman. Hence to bring about the death of even a sacrificial animal seemed to limit the kingdom of the good and to extend that of evil. As to the manner in which the Persians surmounted this difficulty, Strabo's remark[5] may have much significance when he says that the deity claimed the soul of the victim. The principle of life, therefore, as it left the animal, was regarded as returning to its original source in Mazda, and the kingdom of death was deprived of the prize that seemed to have come so near its grasp. And the use to which the flesh of the animal was put (see below) also served to assist the sacrificer's belief that the whole animal was made to serve divine ends.

5. Animal sacrifices in the later Avesta.—When we come to the period of the *Yashts* and later portions of the Avesta, the sacrifice of animals and other living creatures is fully restored. The victims used were chiefly horses, camels, oxen, asses, deer, and birds. But it is to be noted that these sacrifices were offered almost exclusively, not to Ahura Mazda or the *amesha spentas*, but to the *yazatas*, or angels. Anāhita's acceptable offerings have already been mentioned. Mithra was invoked with cattle and birds, together with *haoma* and libations.[6] In the liturgy the *yazatas* are invited to the sacrificial feast singly or in groups.[7] Different portions of the slaughtered animal were assigned and dedicated to various divinities. The Pahlavi *Shāyast lā-Shāyast*[8] supplies what seems to be an exhaustive list of these assignments. Ahura Mazda has assigned to *haoma*, *e.g.*, the jawbone, the tongue, and the left eye of the victim, or, according to a later tradition, the whole head.

6. Persian kings and animal sacrifices.—The sacrificial practices of the Achæmenian kings, as described by Greek writers, seem to have been on a very large scale,[1] and uninfluenced by the reform of Zarathushtra. But it can hardly be claimed that these kings represented the orthodox Mazdaism of their age. Moreover, where the Greek historians have exceeded the limits of the bare objective facts and sought to supply the motive and significance of Persian religious customs, it does not follow that their interpretations were always right. They would naturally be for the most part in terms of Greek usages. When Herodotus,[2] therefore, records that Xerxes offered 1000 oxen as a sacrifice to Athene of Ilium, it may signify only that the beasts were consecrated to the deity, to whom they were regarded as sacred, before being killed for human consumption; while the deity named would probably be the Greek counterpart of the Persian god actually honoured. Xenophon[3] says that at the feasts of kings consecrated flesh had to be used. The same was true of the Sasanian kings. And, when Elisæus says that Yazdagird II. caused a large number of white bulls and fine rams to be offered in recognition of his victory, it is very probably to be understood that the animals were consecrated to the deity and then employed to make a great commemorative feast for the victory.

7. Method of sacrificing animals.—The victim was led to a clean or consecrated spot, which, as Herodotus says, was frequently on the summit of a high mountain;[4] and, after the deity in whose honour the sacrifice was made had been invoked and his favour and blessing implored on behalf of the king and the whole Persian people, the animal was slain, according to Strabo,[5] not by the use of a knife to pour out the blood, but by striking with a log of wood or pestle. Under no circumstances was the offering burnt, although Strabo[6] records that sometimes a little of the caul was thrown upon the fire, but only to make the fire burn more brightly. The slaughtered animal was then taken limb from limb—whether by the sacrificer, as suggested by Herodotus,[7] or by the Magus, as Strabo states.[8] The flesh was seethed and placed on a carpet of tender herbage, 'preferably clover,' says Herodotus.[9] The Magus then sang his theogony or hymn of praise to the deity, whose presence was always symbolized by the fire which was the invariable concomitant of such sacrifices.[10] When the flesh had remained a little longer on its vegetable altar, it was taken away and used for human consumption partly by the bringer of the offering and partly by the Magus.[11] The somewhat modified form of procedure employed in their sacrifices to water, as given by Strabo, has already been detailed under ALTAR (Persian), vol. i. p. 346.

8. Sacrifices and offerings other than those of animals in Zoroastrianism.—Prominent as we have found the place of animals at the sacrifices to have been in pre-Zarathushtrian and late Avestan times as well as in the usages of the Persian kings, nevertheless the impression received from the Avesta as a whole is that throughout its history, excepting the Gāthic period, the centre of the Mazdayasnian ritual was the preparation and offering of *haoma*; and the greater part of the gifts brought and spread out by the *bihdīnān* for the divinities and departed spirits was derived from the vegetable world. It is true, as M. N. Dhalla says,[12] that 'up to the middle of the last

[1] See J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 395, note 1.
[2] See art. PRIEST (Iranian), vol. x. p. 319.
[3] *De Is. et Osir.* 46.
[4] *Yt.* v. 104. [5] xv. iii. 13. [6] *Yt.* x. 119.
[7] *Ys.* i. 19, ii. 18; *Yt.* xi. 17. [8] xi. 4.

[1] Athenæus (iv. 10) states that the Persian kings brought 1000 cattle, horses, and asses every day for sacrifice.
[2] vii. 43. [3] *Cyr.* viii. iii. 9 ff.
[4] See art. ALTAR (Persian), vol. i. p. 346.
[5] xv. iii. 15. [6] *Loc. cit.* [7] 71 132.
[8] *Loc. cit.* [9] *Loc. cit.*
[10] See art. ALTAR (Persian).
[11] See Herod. and Strabo, *locc. citt.*
[12] *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914, p. 355.

century the priest consecrated the fresh tongue, the jaw, and the left eye of the sacrificial animal to the angel-Hom'; and that 'it was similarly the practice until very recently with the officiating priest to slaughter a goat with his own hands on the third day after the death of a person, and to dedicate the fat to the fire on the dawn of the fourth day.' Still at the great *yasna* ceremony to-day the only real vestige of animal-sacrifice[1] consists of three, five, or seven hairs of a white bull (*varasa*), tied together by a metal ring, generally of gold, and placed in a cup and deposited, with other sacrificial objects, on the *takht i ālāt*, or low stone table, in front of the chief officiating priest.

The other principal elements in the sacrifices were, and still are to-day, a twig of the pomegranate (*hadhānaēpata*, often called simply *urvara*, or 'plant'), which is pounded in a mortar and forms one of the ingredients of *parahaoma*, or juice of *haoma*, fresh milk (*gāush jīvya*), butter (*gāush hudhāo*), *zaothra*, or consecrated water, *darūn* or *draona*[2] (a sacrificial wafer), and fruit and flowers, together with incense and sandalwood for the fire.

The method of the presentation of these offerings and their place in the ceremonies will be more fully and fittingly described in art. WORSHIP (Iranian). Here it may be explained that the officiating priest, after announcing the sacrifice that he is about to make and invoking the divinities whom he wishes to honour, takes up the *barsom*, sprinkles it with holy water or with milk, and repeats the invocations. He then consecrates the offerings of milk, fruit, and viands, together with the wood and perfumes for the fire. After a prayer to Ahura Mazda and the other divinities there follows the presentation of the offering.[3] Then the *mobed*, as the representative of the divinities invoked, partakes of the offerings. These, however, are really only preparatory, and to be followed now by the principal offering of *haoma* or, rather, *parahaoma*—*i.e.* the prepared juice of the plant. After the praises of the sacred beverage have been celebrated,[4] the *mobed* and his assistant priest drink some of it, and what remains is poured on the fire altar.

In early times, as appears from *Visparad*, iii., there were present on this occasion representatives of all the classes of Mazdayasnians. The priest closes the *yasna* ceremony by renewing the offering and invoking this time the *fravashis*, or spirits of the departed faithful. The *haoma* is twice prepared during the whole service, corresponding, as Haug says,[5] to the morning and midday libation of the Brāhmans. There was no evening libation among the Parsis; for this, it was held, would benefit only the *daēvas*.[6]

In addition to the great *yasna* ceremonies, at which all the offerings are present, there are at least two lesser ceremonies which may be and are held independently of the *yasna* service, and at which some of the subsidiary offerings of the *yasna* became the principal sacrifices. The first is the *darūn* ceremony. It is with this offering that the young Parsi is initiated[1] into the circle of believers. The *amesha spentas* and Sraosha are honoured with the *darūn*, which is always held also at the *Gahanbārs*.[2] In addition to the plain *darūn* wafers, two of which are used at the ceremony, two others are necessary in which three rows of three dents or cuts, *i.e.* nine in all, are made with the finger-nail before frying, while repeating the words *humata, hukhta, hvarshta* thrice, one word for each of the nine cuts. This dented cake is called *frasast*. The four wafers are placed on the *takht i ālāt*, the two *frasasts* being on the right and the plain *darūns* on the left. On one *frasast* is placed a twig of pomegranate, and a little butter as a rule accompanies the *darūn*, and between them, according to Haug,[3] is placed an egg. After the formulæ prescribed for the service[4] have been recited, into which the name of the angel or *fravashi* in whose honour the sacrifice is made is introduced, the priests and those present partake of the cakes.

The other important secondary ceremony is the *afrīngān*. This again is in honour of a *yazata* or of the spirit of a deceased person. Special prayers called *afrīngān* are recited by the priests. The following is a Parsi description of this ceremony.

'The prayers are recited on a carpet spread on the floor on which are placed, either in a metallic tray or in plantain leaves, the choicest and most fragrant flowers of the season, while glasses are filled with fresh milk, pure water, wine and sherbet. These prayers are recited with the object either of expressing remembrance of the souls of the dear departed or of invoking the aid of some guardian angel.'[5]

9. The Mazdayasnian conception of the purpose and significance of sacrifice.—Certain aspects of the procedure followed by the Persians at their sacrificial ceremonies, as described by Herodotus and Strabo, are highly suggestive of the meaning of early Iranian sacrifices. The custom of laying the flesh of the victim on attractive herbage and allowing it to remain for a while upon its vegetable altar before it was removed and employed (as no doubt it was) for human consumption must signify that it was offered as food to the gods. Before the time of Strabo, however, the Persians had advanced in their conception of the nature of their divinities and believed that the gods needed only the soul of the animal. Originally the idea at the root of this custom was undoubtedly similar to that underlying the phenomenon of the 'shew-bread' (*q.v.*) among the Hebrews.[6] The manner in which some of the *yazatas* are represented as soliciting the offerings of their devotees also suggests that they thought these gods needed strengthening and encouraging as well as honouring and invoking, and consequently more abundant blessings would result to their worshippers.

In the Avesta the offerings and sacrifices are not frequently brought into relation to sin. In *Vendīdād*, xviii. 70–76, however, the man who has had relations with the *dashtān* woman atones for his sin with many sacrifices, including that of supplying the carcasses of some noxious creatures. The Pahlavi literature, on the other hand, contains several allusions to the vicarious or atoning character of the sacrifices. The *darūn* offering, *e.g.*, is regarded as a sufficient atonement for a class of transgression called *tanāpūhar*.[7] If the *barsom* twigs were used, they possessed the virtue of raising the atoning value of the offering tenfold.

Plutarch attributes still another motive to some Zarathushtrian oblations; for, while the Persians offered vows and thanksgiving to Ormazd, they

1 Unless we reckon the viands prepared from meat, which are apparently still in use.

2 The *darūn* is a flat cake of about the size of the palm of the hand, made of wheaten flour and water with a little melted butter, and fried. The *darūn* is not mentioned under its specific name in the Avesta, but is included under the more general term, *myazda*, which is employed to designate consumable offerings either individually or collectively. While originally and etymologically meaning 'meat' or 'flesh,' *myazda* at the present day seems to be applied to fruits and flowers such as are used at the *Sròsh darūn*.

3 *Ys.* vii. 4 *Ib.* ix.–xi.

5 *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*[4], ed. E. W. West, London, 1907, p. 282 f.

6 *Ib.* p. 283; see also Dhalla, p. 139; Moulton, p. 129 f.; cf. *Vend.* vii. 79; *Yt.* v. 94.

1 The whole ceremony is called *gīti khirīd*.

2 See art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Iranian).

3 P. 407. 4 *Ys.* iii.–vii., xxiii. f., xxviii.

5 Dosābhāi Framjee Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884, ii. 171.

6 Cf. Moulton, p. 394, note 4.

7 See *Shayast lā-Shayast*, viii. 20; cf. also i. 1, xvi. 6; *Dātistān i Dinik*, lxxii. 11, lxxviii. 19.

brought other offerings to Ahriman for averting evil.[1] There is, however, much improbability in this statement, inasmuch as it involves a direct contradiction of the fundamental doctrine of Mazdaism, that the evil one was not to be propitiated, but strenuously opposed.[2] If Plutarch was describing an actual phenomenon, it was observable only in a degenerate or counterfeit Mazdaism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works already referred to in the article, the following may be consulted: F. Spiegel, *Eränische Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871-78, iii. 559-596; C. de Harlez, *Avesta, traduit du texte zend*, Liége, 1875-78, vol. ii. p. 15 ff.; A. Rapp, 'Die Religion und Sitte der Perser,' *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 77-94; J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, Paris, 1892-93, i., Introd. iii. pp. lxv-lxix (*AMG* xxi.); Spiegel, *Zend-Avesta*, Vienna, 1853-58, ii., Einleitung, ch. iv. pp. 62-83; J. H. Moulton, *The Treasure of the Magi*, Oxford, 1917, ch. iv.

E. EDWARDS.

SACRIFICE (Japanese).—1. Importance of sacrifice in Shintō.—When we consider that the primitive Japanese had a very practical mind, and that their dealings with the gods were more frequently of the character of a bargain than of mystic adoration,[3] we are not surprised to find that offerings occupied a particularly important place in their religion—so much so that, in the curious account of a solemn sacrifice offered by the first legendary emperor, Jimmu Tennō, the food-offering is personified, and even deified, under the name of Idzu-uka no me.[4] Sacrifice appears also at other important parts of the mythological account—*e.g.*, when the gods themselves reveal to the empress Jingō the special offerings which will permit her to cross the sea and conquer Korea.[5] But it is particularly in the worship that the importance of offerings may be best gauged. The eclipse-legend,[6] which gives the divine prototype of the Shintō cult, shows the gods hanging strings of jewels on the highest branches of a huge *sakaki* (*Cleyera japonica*), a mirror on its middle branches, and pieces of cloth on its lowest branches. These primitive offerings were afterwards increased, and by the time of the ancient rituals they formed long imposing lists—in fact, the evolution of the offerings presented or promised to the gods occupies the greater part of the text.[7] Moreover, not only are those offerings prepared with the greatest care, in order to avoid all pollution, but they are often duplicated, so that at least one portion of the things offered may escape possible blemish, which would forfeit the whole magical effect expected; *e.g.*, the rice for the coronation feast (*Oho-nihe*) was brought from two different provinces and preserved for the time being in two separate buildings; the first portion was called *yuki* ('religious purity'), and the second *suki* ('subsidiary'). Lastly, the deification which we noticed in the story of Jimmu becomes generalized in the worship: the mirror or the sword, which was at first a simple offering, comes to be regarded as implying the real presence of the god, and finally as being the god himself or at least one of his material incarnations (*shintai*, 'body of the god').

2. Psychological basis.—It is a question whether Shintō offerings are made with the idea that they may supply, in some mysterious manner, the physical needs of the god or the spirit of a dead person, or whether they are merely symbolical. W. G. Aston supported the latter theory, but he was building mainly on considerations derived from observation of the sentiments of a modern European, *i.e.* of a man who, like Montaigne and St. Augustine before him, thinks, *e.g.*, that the funerary rites are a consolation for the living rather than a help to the dead.[1] In agreement with the majority of those who have studied comparative religion, the present writer thinks rather that the state of mind of uncivilized man was as a rule much more commonplace; and it is certain that the ancient Japanese, in particular, took a very material view of things. If the learned theologian, Hirata, in the 19th cent., did not hesitate to claim that food-offerings lose their savour in a manner inexplicable by natural causes, this crude conception must have been all the more strong among the primitive Shintōists. The question has been discussed in art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese), vol. i. p. 457[a]; and the reasons stated there with regard to offerings to the dead apply equally to offerings to the gods, conceived by men in their own image.

3. The reason for offerings.—Offerings are made often with a general intention of propitiation, but often also as a distinct reward for services rendered by the gods or expected from them in the future. The offerings were then one of the terms of a kind of mutual contract concluded between the gods and men.[2] The result was that these offerings were sometimes of a conditional character.[3] There were also expiatory sacrifices (*aga-mono*, 'things of ransom') for cleansing the faithful from any ritual impurity. The most famous example of these—showing also their mythical origin—is the removal of the hair and nails of Susa-no-wo.[4]

4. Recipients of offerings.—The offerings were made sometimes to the spirits of the dead, sometimes to the gods.[5] Between the offerings to the dead and the offerings to the gods, we may mention as a natural transition the offerings to the *manes* of emperors or other deified personages. The offerings to the gods properly so called, *i.e.* especially to the powers of nature, were sometimes made to one or several individual gods, sometimes to a collective category of gods, and sometimes to all the gods;[6] *e.g.*, the offerings of the *Toshigohi no Matsuri*[7] were made to the deities of the 3,132 official temples, *i.e.* to all the deities in a mass.

5. The sacrificers.—Originally the offerings were undoubtedly individual, and they evidently remained so in many cases, as the accompaniment of the prayers of each worshipper. But for various reasons (the increased price of certain of the things offered, the necessity of preparing the offerings with particular care in order to avoid all ritual pollution, etc.) they naturally tended to assume a collective character. This tendency was further developed by the progressive concentration of all the powers, religious as well as political, in the hands of the emperor, who from that time officiated in name of all his people. When a subject accompanied the emperor, he had not the right to make his offering to the gods himself; his personality disappeared somehow, and was included in that of his sovereign.[8] That is why the emperor Jimmu Tennō (see above) personally performed the sacrifice. But, the very concentration of powers having later involved their division, the Mikado entrusted his religious functions to the care of various hereditary sacerdotal colleges; and, just as the *nakatomi*

1 *De Is. et Osir.* 46. 2 Cf. Moulton, pp. 128 f., 399, note 8.
3 See art. MAGIC (Japanese).
4 Text cited in art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Japanese), vol. iii. p. 775[a].
5 See art. POSSESSION (Japanese), vol. x. p. 131[b].
6 Cf. art. NATURE (Japanese), vol. ix. p. 235[a].
7 See, *e.g.*, the text of the 3rd *norito* in art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 191[a].

1 *Shinto*, London, 1905, pp. 59 f., 210 f.
2 For typical examples of those bargains see art. MAGIC (Japanese).
3 See, *e.g.*, *ib.* vol. viii. pp. 296[b], 297[a], and cf. art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 191[a].
4 See *Kojiki*[2], tr. B. H. Chamberlain, Tokyo, 1906, p. 70.
5 The offerings to the dead are discussed in art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese).
6 See art. MAGIC (Japanese), *passim*.
7 *Ib.* vol. viii. p. 296[b].
8 See M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*[3], Paris, 1918, p. 109.

were specially commissioned to pray in place of him,[1] so the *imibe*, or *imbe* ('abstaining priests'), had the special duty of preparing the offerings. Their very name (*imi* expresses the idea of abstinence) comes from the care with which they had to avoid all cause of impurity during the preparation. Moreover, by their mythical origin they were connected with the god Futo-dama, whose name may be translated 'great gift or offering,' and whose rôle in the eclipse-myth agrees with this presentation of offerings. Historically they were probably the successors of the 'abstainer' of primitive Japan,[2] with the single difference that, while, like him, observing ritual purity, they were not obliged to abstain from eating meat or approaching women except during the few days before a religious festival, and that, far from not being able to wash themselves or comb their hair, they had always to attend carefully to their personal cleanliness. Their part in connexion with offerings in the chief Shintō festivals is prescribed in the ancient rituals; they officiated especially at the *Toshigohi no Matsuri* (*norito* 1),[3] at the *Ohotono-Hogahi* (*norito* 8),[4] and at the *Oho-nihe* (*norito* 14).[5] There are also other priests, inferior to them, the *hafuri*, or *hōri*, whose name (from the verb *hoburu*, or *hafuru*, 'to slaughter,' 'to throw away') denotes that they were originally sacrificers; in fact, the *Nihongi* mentions, in the year 642, a sacrifice of horses and cattle directed by them to obtain rain. The *oho-hafuri* ('great *hafuri*'), the legendary descendant and high-priest of the god Take-minagata at Suwa, still superintends sacrifices of deer, whose heads are offered to his divine ancestor.

6. Objects sacrificed. — The most interesting question in this respect is that of the human sacrifices of primitive Japan.[6] For these human victims others were substituted, either animal victims[7] or effigies of baked earth or even metal.[8] Slaves were also offered to the temples.[9]

Besides those ancient human sacrifices and their more modern substitutes, we find offered to the gods all the things that man regards as useful or even merely pleasing to them—in the first place, the things corresponding to the three primordial needs of food, clothing, and habitation, and then things corresponding to secondary requirements.

i. OFFERINGS CORRESPONDING TO THE THREE ESSENTIAL NEEDS.—(*a*) *Offerings of food.*—In the sacrifice of Jimmu Tennō, mentioned above, the only offerings were of food. Indeed the offering of the things most necessary for life, viz. food and drink, is the most ancient form of sacrifice. It is also the most important; more than once, therefore, in the titles of the rituals connected with the chief Shintō festivals the word *nihe* ('food-offering') appears, beginning with the *Oho-nihe* ('great food-offering'), the most solemn of these festivals. Those food-offerings include all the chief elements of Japanese feeding: as food and drink of mineral origin, salt and water; as food of vegetable origin, rice in its different forms (in the ear and in grain, hulled and in husk), and also in rice-cakes, then various kinds of pulse and fruits, especially edible sea-weed, and, as drink, *sake*, also made from rice; of animal origin, on the one hand, fish of all kinds, especially the favourite of the Japanese, *tai* (a kind of gold-bream), on the other hand, game, either with hair (deer, boars, and hares) or feathered (pheasants, wild ducks, and other birds). The ritual quoted in art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 191[a], gives a good example of the catalogue of foods generally offered.

(*b*) *Offerings of clothing.*—As the clothing of the primitive Japanese was made mainly of hemp (*asa*) and *yufu* (the fibre of the inner bark of the paper mulberry-tree), these are the materials, raw or woven, that figured in the ancient offerings. Silk, which was of comparatively recent importation at the time when the rituals were drawn up, had only a secondary place in them. As a rule, a certain weight of fibre (of hemp or mulberry-bark) or a certain number of pieces of cloth made from these materials was offered; and it was only natural that woven stuffs, which were the money of the period, should take the place of other articles more perishable, such as food, or more difficult to procure. The *awo-nigi-te* ('soft blue articles') and the *shira-nigi-te* ('soft white articles') which, in the eclipse-myth, the gods hung on the low branches of the sacred tree were respectively hemp and *yufu*. These are the *nusa* ('offerings'), the prototype of the later offerings. They afterwards took the more conventional form of the *oho-nusa* ('great offering'), consisting of two sticks set up side by side, the one of *sakaki*, the other of bamboo, from the top of which hung fibres of hemp and strips of paper, the latter representing the bark of the mulberry from which it was made.[1] This manner of supporting religious offerings was most natural, because, even in everyday life, Japanese politeness demanded that an inferior should offer anything to a superior only at a respectful distance, from the end of the branch of a tree.[2] With this may be connected the *tama-gushi* (probable meaning 'gift-skewer'), branches of *sakaki* or bamboo, with tufts of *yufu*, which formed a simpler way of presenting the *nusa*.[3] Still later the *oho-nusa* were generally displaced by the *gohei*, made of a single stick from which hung strips of white paper, cut at right angles. This is the emblem seen at the present day in all the Shintō temples; and, having lost its primitive signification of substitute for the ancient cloth-offerings, it is now regarded by the worshippers as a symbolical representation of divinity, or even as the temporary dwelling-place of the deity himself, who, at certain festivals, by the mere pronunciation of the formula called *kami-oroshi* ('bringing down the god'), descends into it, and remains in it during the whole ceremony.[4] One more form of *nusa* deserves mention, less important and still more simple, the *ko-nusa* ('little offerings') or *kiri-nusa* ('cut offerings'), consisting of paper with raw *sakaki* or hemp leaves mixed with rice; these are the portable *nusa*, which the traveller took with him in a small bag (*nusa-bukuro*, 'offering-bag') for the religious offerings which he might have to make during his journey.[5]

Such was the evolution of the important offerings of cloth, from the primitive *nusa* of mythology to the modern *gohei*. Besides these typical and general offerings, other articles of clothing were offered to the gods—sometimes skins of bears, boars, deer, or cattle, sometimes bright-coloured materials or even made-up garments.[6] But these are secondary offerings and of a somewhat exceptional kind.

Along with clothing mention must be made of adornment—that accessary which was so important among primitive races that in their eyes it often surpassed clothing itself. Now, in contrast to the modern Japanese, who (even the women), with a few rare exceptions introduced by

[1] See art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 189[b].
[2] See art. ASCETICISM (Japanese), vol. ii. p. 96[a].
[3] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 296[b].
[4] *Ib.* p. 297[a]. [5] *Ib.* p. 298[b].
[6] See artt. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Japanese and Korean) and ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese).
[7] See art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Japanese and Korean), vol. vi. p. 856[a].
[8] *Ib.* p. 857[a]. [9] *Ib.*

[1] Cf. the sceptre, with tufts of wool, of the Homeric age.
[2] See Revon, p. 168.
[3] Cf. the wool-crowned olive-branches of the suppliants of Greek tragedy.
[4] Cf. art. POSSESSION (Japanese), vol. x. p. 132[a].
[5] See Revon, p. 347.
[6] See art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 191[a].

imitation of Europeans, regard our use of jewels as barbarous, the primitive Japanese willingly covered themselves with head-ornaments, necklets, and armlets, the beads of which, some round, some tube-shaped (*kuda-tama*) or comma-shaped (*maga-tama*), and made of various stones, otherwise of no great value (chalcedony, jasper, chrysoprase, serpentine, crystal, etc.), are found in the excavations of the oldest native tombs. The celestial gods had a divine jeweller among them, whom we meet in the eclipse-legend, the god Toyo-tama ('rich jewel'), the legendary ancestor of the corporation of imperial jewellers; and in the mythology reference is continually being made to the jewels of the gods, which are mentioned even in the most important stories.[1] We gather therefore that jewels play a comparatively large part in the Shintō ceremonies and that they sometimes figure among the religious offerings.[2]

(c) *Offerings of habitation.*—Just as the gods desire offerings of food (*nihe*) and clothing (*nusa*), so they desire offerings of dwelling-places; and the word *miya*, applied to Shintō temples, means nothing else than 'august house'; *miya* also denotes a palace. Another word for temple, *araka*, seems likewise to signify 'dwelling-place.'[3] In the mythology we often find the gods requesting the raising of a temple to them 'to make them rest well.' To the present writer it seems probable that the meaning of the word *yashiro*, 'house-representative,' also used to denote Shintō temples, refers specially to the rite which consisted in fixing the boundaries of an open place on the ground[3] for the time being consecrated as the god's place of abode during a ceremony—just as, even at the present day, a small enclosure of this kind (*himorogi*) is reserved for the purification which precedes every great Shintō festival—but that this substitution of a temporary residence for a real building represents merely a later simplification of the more ancient, very material, conception of the *miya*.

This *miya*, being intended as the dwelling-place of the god, does not require to be very large; and it is not calculated to hold a vast assembly; it is only in the precincts of large temples that there is, among other secondary buildings, an oratory (*haiden*) meant for the imperial envoy who may occasionally come there; as a rule, the worshipper who passes a Shintō temple simply stops at the outside, says a short prayer, and goes on. This explains the fact that to-day in the Japanese empire there are close on 200,000 Shintō temples. The smallest temples (*hokora*) can be carried about on a cart; the largest, such as those of Ise, are of quite modest proportions, and of a very simple structure, which purposely intends to represent only an architectural enlargement of the ancestral thatched cottage. In the 10th cent., of 3,132 officially recognized temples only 492 were classed as important enough to have offerings deposited on an altar; in the other 2,640 they were simply laid on the ground; with still greater reason the innumerable small temples dotted over the whole surface of the country were only very slim buildings, where the offerings were as humble as the worshippers. We must mention, lastly, the modest domestic altar (*kami-dana*, 'god-shelf') in each house, devoted principally to the cult of the family ancestors, who are thought to dwell there—at least during certain festivals.

In this dwelling-place the gods required furniture. And the furniture was as simple as that of Japanese houses, which includes hardly any of the pieces of furniture considered essential in our too complicated modern civilization. The most important piece was perhaps the *makura*, the native wood-pillow, for the sleep of the god—the pillow which, in certain cases, was regarded as so much impregnated with his divinity that it was made a *shintai*. The same thing happened not only with the metal mirrors which, originally simple offerings, were readily deified (*e.g.*, that of the sun-goddess of Ise), but also—a much more curious thing at first sight—with simple articles of pottery, which were naturally offered to the gods as to the ancestors,[1] and which ended by being worshipped as 'god-bodies.' We may conclude, therefore, that those objects of furniture, having, as it were, become fixtures on account of their purpose and their connexion with the dwelling-place, have gradually, by long contact with the deity dwelling there, assumed that permanent and precious character which leads to their deification.

ii. OFFERINGS CORRESPONDING TO SECONDARY NEEDS.—One of the most important of the secondary requirements is locomotion. Therefore, just as living horses, for which horses of baked earth were afterwards substituted, were buried in the tombs of the Mikados and princes,[2] so offerings were made to the gods of living horses, preferably white (the colour of the sun), which were left at liberty in the precincts of the temple; for these also there were afterwards substituted at first wooden effigies (in certain processions men represented the horses of the gods by mounting *koma-gata*, 'hobby-horses,' or by carrying attached to their chest a wooden horse's head), and then painted horses. The last phase of the evolution led to the construction of special buildings called *emadō*, 'horse-picture-galleries,' collections of *ex-votos* which may be seen in the precincts of some of the large temples. Lastly, the gods also have their carriage, the *mikoshi*, which, on the contrary, presents a sumptuous appearance; on religious feast-days the worshippers carry the *shintai* in this *mikoshi* on their shoulders.

A people essentially agricultural, as the Japanese seem to have been originally, whose Mikado himself occasionally set the example of ceremonially digging the earth, and among whom every year at Kasuga the young girls called *miko* ('august children') might be seen solemnly planting rice with their pure hands, was necessarily inclined to suppose that the gods devoted themselves to agriculture. And, as a matter of fact, the mythology, beginning with the great stories about the sun-goddess (the crimes committed by Susa-no-wo against her cultivations), shows that it was really one of the chief occupations of the deities on the Plain of the High Heavens. It was natural, therefore, that offerings of this kind should be made to those deities; and agricultural implements, reels for winding yarn, etc., figure in certain lists of offerings.

Another important requirement in a warlike country like primitive Japan was weapons for war. The mythology abounds in stories of marvellous swords—*e.g.*, the famous Kusa-nagi-no-tachi ('the herb-quelling great sword') which Susa-no-wo found in the body of the monster of Koshi,[3] which reappears later in the legend of Yamato-dake,[4] and which is worshipped at Atsuta as one of the three insignia of the imperial power. The majority of those swords must originally have been offerings, which gradually became *shintai* and even gods—

[1] See, *e.g.*, art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 164ᵃ.

[2] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 297ᵃ, *norito* 8, p. 298ᵇ, *norito* 15, p. 299ᵃ, *norito* 25, p. 299ᵇ, *norito* 27.

[3] Cf. the Roman *templum*.

[1] See art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese), vol. i. p. 457ᵃ.

[2] See art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Japanese and Korean), vol. vi. p. 856ᵇ.

[3] See *ib.* vol. vi. p. 855ᵇ.

[4] See art. HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Japanese), vol. vi. p. 663ᵇ.

e.g., the war-gods Take-mika-dzuchi and Futsu-nushi. In the 10th cent. offerings of wooden swords were already substituted for real weapons, and these have continued to the present day.[1] Other weapons, both offensive and defensive, were also offered—lances, bows and arrows, and shields.[2]

Lastly, even the need of entertainment, which was logically attributed to gods as to men, gave rise to appropriate offerings. Each important temple possessed a platform for the performance of sacred dances (*kagura*), the name of which is written with two Chinese characters meaning 'pleasure of the god.' Those pantomimes, whose mythical origin is found in the dance, before the cavern of the sun-goddess, of the goddess Uzume, the ancestor of the Sarume ('monkey-women'), the religious dancers of the court, were performed in the chief temples, to the accompaniment of flutes and castanets, by the *miko*, who thus represented the great episodes of the sacred story. The present writer was once present at the *kagura* in an old temple of Nara, and noticed to what an extent this dance of priestesses has, after all those centuries, scrupulously observed to this day the antique gestures and symbolical attitudes as we find them in the most ancient monuments of Japanese art. By a curious turn of events those primitive pantomimes, at first intended to charm the Shintō gods, later, after various developments, became the *nō*, or lyrical drama, generally composed by the bonzes or in any case under Buddhist inspiration, and thus greatly helped in the propaganda of the foreign religion. A fact which proves clearly that those artistic dances were at heart real offerings is that the rituals themselves, as the eclipse-legend shows, were, in the same way, regarded as charming the gods by the harmonious beauty of their language and the grandeur of their solemn declamation. Artistic pleasure, like literary pleasure, was regarded as a requirement of the gods which men must satisfy.

Besides these æsthetic enjoyments of a general kind, other more specified offerings might be made to the gods with the same intention of amusing them, as the texts clearly show; *e.g.*, to keep away the deities who send plagues, the Japanese gave them 'as things to play with, beads.'[3]

7. Fate of the offerings.—The offerings, once made, had various fates. The food-offerings were usually consumed—as, *e.g.*, after the emperor Jimmu's sacrifice. At the festival of firstfruits (*Niihiname*) the emperor tasted the new rice which had just been offered to the gods;[4] the priests followed his example, and even the simple worshippers might do the same. So also at the festival of Kasuga[5] the participants proceeded solemnly to eat the offerings in a dining-hall, while the servants of the imperial stables, who had had charge of the horses offered to the gods, were given a drink of the sacred *sake*. Even to-day pilgrims to the temples of Ise eat the rice of the offerings, which they buy from the priests. At the festival of the god of Suwa, mentioned before, while the heads of the seventy-five sacrificed deer are presented as offerings, the flesh is eaten by the priests, and the worshippers may also take a share of it, on condition that they obtain from the priests chopsticks which will allow them to do so without contamination. On the other hand, offerings of a valuable and durable kind, such as mirrors and swords, remained in the temple, where they were not placed on the altar, but were locked in the treasury; there they remained permanently, as *shimpō*, 'divine treasures,' later on often becoming *shintai* or even gods. The same thing happened in the case of the sixty white, red, and green jewels of the 27th ritual.[1]

Between those two extremes of ephemeral and permanent offerings there were offerings of a durable kind but not so precious—*e.g.*, bells or pottery—which were presented and then taken away to be presented again, so that the same objects were always used, just as to-day at Buddhist funerals, when birds are set at liberty, the undertakers make arrangements to capture them again immediately after the ceremony in order to use them on the next occasion.

The *aga-mono*, expiatory offerings to which were magically attached the impurities from which the worshippers wanted to be cleansed, were removed and thrown into the river.[2]

8. Buddhist offerings.—As Buddhist offerings have no special characteristic in Japan, they require no treatment here. We mention them merely to point out, by way of contrast, that the only original religion of the Japanese, viz. the ancient official Shintō, knew nothing of burnt incense, lighted candles, flowers on the altar—in a word, the characteristic Buddhist offerings. As regards offerings of flowers, we may mention that, at certain Buddhist festivals which require lotus flowers, but which fall at a period of the year when the lotus (or, more correctly, the *Nelumbium*, which is the lotus of Japan) is not in bloom, the equally pure magnolia flowers are used.

LITERATURE.—This is cited throughout the article.

M. REVON.

SACRIFICE (Jewish).—The destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem wrought a profound change in the religious life of the Jews. The entire divine service had come to a standstill. The priests and Levites had lost their position and occupation, and to the Israelite the very centre of worship had been destroyed. The sacrifices, among other things, had ceased. But divine ordinances cannot be abrogated. They are merely temporarily suspended until the time comes when they can again be enacted. A time will come when a new Jerusalem and a new Temple will be built up again. This conviction lives deep down in the hearts of the Jews, who look forward to the realization of the divine prophecies and with that the restoration of the ancient worship. This was the hope of Ezekiel, who in the midst of the Babylonian exile not only foretold the return, but went so far as to draw the picture of the future Temple. In the Talmudic literature there is a treatise called *Middôth*, *i.e.* the measurements of the pre-Herodian Temple—as the present writer has shown elsewhere[3]—and not of the Herodian described by Josephus. The preservation of this detailed description of the Temple is due not to any antiquarian interest, but to the desire to keep alive for the future the architectural details of the last Temple. It is to serve as a guide for the reconstruction. In *4 Ezra* and other apocalyptic writings, and especially in Revelation, we have the picture of the heavenly Jerusalem which will descend from on high at the consummation of the appointed time, and within it the heavenly Temple. Similar descriptions can be found in other eschatological writings, all testifying to the belief that the destruction of the Temple was only a temporary event. The service has been suspended for a while, to be taken up again at the proper time. The Jewish sages maintain the principle of the everlasting value of the ordinances of the Law,

[1] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 298a, *norito* 11.
[2] *Ib.* p. 299a, *norito* 25. [3] *Ib.* p. 299a, *norito* 25.
[4] See art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Japanese).
[5] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 296b

[1] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 299b.
[2] *Ib.* p. 297b, *norito* 10, and p. 298, *norito* 11.
[3] *RThPh* x. [1914–15] 21–31.

though they do not go so far as the author of the book of *Jubilees*. According to the latter, the patriarchs already had kept them; nay, they were written on the tablets of heaven and kept by the angels, although, according to the legend,[1] Moses heard the angel recite the *sh'ma'* (Dt 6^{1-10}) and therefore he instituted it afterwards as part of the daily service. The fact that the Jews considered that the service in the Temple with the sacrifice was merely temporarily suspended, owing to the impossibility of carrying it out, is shown also by the compilation of many treatises in the Mishnāh forming the section *Ḳoddashim*, *i.e.* things connected with the sanctuary, in which minute details are preserved as to the services, sacrifices, offerings, etc., in the Temple; and the belief in the re-establishment of the sacrifice is found repeatedly referred to in the Jewish prayers recited in the daily service and on festival occasions. Thus in the *'amidah*, which every observant Jew is expected to repeat three times daily, he prays:

'Mayest thou bring back the sacrifice to thy holy house, and the fire offerings as well as their prayers receive with favour.'

This is also the preamble in the *musaf 'amidah* on Sabbath, new moon, and festivals, etc., before the recital of the corresponding portion of the Bible (see below), when it is said:

'May it be thy will, O Lord our God, and the God of our fathers, that thou mayest bring us up with joy to our country, and there we will perform before thee all the obligatory sacrifices, the permanent ones according to their order and the additional ones according to the law.'

This formula varies but slightly and it is retained in every such prayer.[2]

This constant prayer for the re-establishment of sacrifice has been a bone of contention between the Reform Jews and the Conservative Jews. The former contend that they can no longer pray for the re-establishment of sacrifices. Æsthetical considerations of no real value are put forward to explain this position. But the vast majority of Jews have retained the ancient formula together with the undying hope of the revival of a national life in the land of their fathers according to divine promise. In this hope all the Jewish sects unite—the Rabbanites as well as the Ḳaraites, and the Falashas no less than the Samaritans, who, however, pray in a different form for the removal of the *Fanutha* (the turning away) and the return of the *Rachutha* (the divine favour), and the restoration of the service on their holy Mt. Gerizim. It must be pointed out at the same time that the Jewish sages are alive to the great difficulties which will have to be overcome before the sacrifices can be renewed, for they acknowledge those difficulties to be insurmountable unless removed by superhuman intervention. The *kōhănîm* (priests) are all defiled by the touch of dead bodies, of which defilement they cannot now purify themselves in the absence of the ashes of the red heifer. They have also intermarried to such an extent that the purity of their descent has in many cases become doubtful. The prophet Elijah then will segregate the right from the wrong and will purify those to be set aside as fit for the service.[3] Thus the practicability of restoring sacrifices is made to depend on the re-appearance of the prophet Elijah, whose coming before the great day is the last message of the last prophet (Mal $4^{5f.}$). It is relegated to a distant future, but the obligatory character of the sacrifices is not thereby affected. It was therefore necessary to establish temporary substitutes for the actual sacrifice. The sacrifices themselves varied in character. There were the early morning and afternoon sacrifices; there were additional sacrifices at new moon and festivals. These were collective sacrifices brought in the name and by the means of the entire nation. There were, besides, individual sacrifices—sin-offerings, thank-offerings, etc. Some were of a propitiatory nature; others were expiatory sacrifices. It is necessary to bear in mind this multifarious character of the sacrifices in the Temple if a correct description is to be given of the manner in which the Jews kept up the ordinances of the sacrifices and perpetuated them without Temple and priests. They spiritualized the sacrifice. The prophets had paved the way for this spiritualization. They already hinted at acceptable substitutes for the animal sacrifice. It is the sacrifice of self that they preach—the offering of the heart and of the soul, the outpourings of the broken heart, of the meek mind, which are accepted of the Lord, 'the sacrifice of the lips instead of the calves' (Hos 14^{2}), the meditations of the heart (Ps 19^{14}).

Whatever interpretation of the origin and meaning of sacrifice be given—and the interpretations are many and contradictory—the primitive stage had already been passed when, in the religious evolution of Israel, sacrifices took their place. Sacrifice represented then a free-will offering to God of what is best in man—an act of exaltation by which man, purified through this voluntary act of self-abnegation, draws nearer to God. He has either atoned thereby for his sin or given public expression of his thankfulness for the inexhaustible mercy of God. He may also expiate in his death, though not as a vicarious atonement, the guilt of others. The sacrifice of life, of health, and of wealth now takes the place of the sacrifice in the Temple of oxen and rams, or, rather, the substitutes are prayer, self-chastisement, and almsgiving. Traces of the ancient form of animal sacrifice still survive, however, on rare occasions and among Jewish sects.

(1) Foremost among those new substitutes for sacrifice stands *prayer*—the sacrifice of the lips. Prayer has taken the place of the service altogether, but here we shall consider only that part of the prayer which is exclusively regarded as the substitute for the sacrifice. The prayers are ordained to take place at the time when sacrifices were brought in the Temple; but, whilst the patriarchs are credited with having established the evening, morning, and afternoon prayer,[1] these were later to take the place of the sacrifice. Daniel prayed three times (Dn 6^{10} 9^{4}).

The practices in the second Temple paved the way for the substitution of prayers for sacrifices. There were the daily sacrifices which were brought in the name of the whole nation, and for which the shekel contributed by every Jew was used. Now, the nation could not all be present on the occasion of the offering, and thus a rota of deputies was established which, by tradition, was carried back to the time of David. The country was divided into twenty-four sections;[2] and out of each of these sections representatives, consisting of priests, Levites, and Israelites living in that section, went up to Jerusalem and were present, or 'stood by,' on the occasion of the sacrifices (hence the name *ma'amad*, pl. *ma'amadôth*). Thus the whole nation was practically represented by such delegates throughout the year; but, while the delegation was standing by in Jerusalem, the priests, Levites, and Israelites left at home gathered in their assemblies (synagogues) and, as it were, united with their brethren in Jerusalem. On that occasion they recited portions of the first chapter of Genesis in addition to the general benedictions and prayers, such as the *sh'ma'*, and probably they also recited hymns, whilst their brethren

[1] *Tanḥūmā* in Vaethanan and in Deut. *Rab.* *ib.*; and also *Tanya Rab.*, ed. S. Horwitz, Warsaw, 1897, p. 16.

[2] M. Gaster, *Sephardic Prayer-Book*, London, 1901–06, i. 117.

[3] See *Mechilta*, ed. M. B. J. Friedmann, Vienna, 1870, fol. 51 to Ex $15^{22f.}$.

[1] *Gen. Rab.* 68.

[2] *Ta'anith*, iv. 2.

in Jerusalem did likewise. If it were not for the *ma'amadôth*, the world would not exist.[1] No doubt on that occasion, while the *ma'amadôth* were present at the sacrifice, the corresponding passages from the Law concerning the institution of this sacrifice were recited in the synagogues in the provinces. Thus the first step was taken to represent sacrifice by prayer and recitation. This was afterwards enlarged upon when the Temple was destroyed and the possibility of bringing sacrifices had come to an end.

It has already been observed that the revival of the sacrifice is earnestly prayed for. But this alone does not suffice. The chapter of the corresponding portion in the Bible in which the Law commands the bringing of the sacrifice was to be publicly recited. Here we have to divide it in accordance with the Jewish form of liturgy: there are (1) a private devotion, which, however, does not materially differ from the public, especially on week-days; (2) the public worship of week-days, in which no lessons of the Bible, or practically none, are recited; and (3) the Sabbath, new moon, and festivals, in which, in addition to the special prayer, lessons from the scroll of the Law are also recited. The substitution, therefore, of corresponding portions had to be adjusted to these varying forms of the Liturgy. On week-days reference is made to the 'perpetual sacrifice' morning and evening, and the few verses of the Bible containing this commandment are recited in the early part of the prayers and hymns called *b'rākhôth* or *z'mirôth*. On the special days (Sabbath, new moon, and festivals), when in the Temple an additional sacrifice was brought (*musaf*), an additional portion is added, and in the additional (*musaf*) *'amidah* the same verses are again repeated. The introductory formula runs thus, and it contains practically the whole basis for the substitution of prayer for sacrifice according to Jewish tradition:

'Sovereign of the universe! thou didst command us to offer the daily sacrifice in its appointed time and that the priests should officiate in their service and the Levites at their stand and the Israelites by their delegates. But, at present, on account of our sins, the temple is laid waste, and the daily sacrifice hath ceased; for we have neither an officiating priest, nor a Levite at his stand, nor an Israelite as delegate. But thou hast said that the prayers of our lips shall be as the offering of bulls (Hos 14[2]). Therefore let it be thy will, O Lord our God, and the God of our fathers, that the prayers of our lips may be accounted, accepted, and esteemed before thee, as if we had offered the daily sacrifice at its appointed time, and had been represented by our delegation.'[2]

On the Day of Atonement the central portion of the *musaf* service contains a minute and elaborate description of the sacrifices offered in the course of the service performed by the high-priest on that day in the Temple in Jerusalem. Thus far concerning the daily prayer incumbent upon every Israelite, whether in public or in private devotion. In addition to those portions included in the prayer, and possibly of a higher antiquity, are the lessons read at the public service. These are read from the scrolls on Sabbaths, new moon, and festivals. On these occasions such sections of the Law are read as refer to specific festivals, such as Passover, Tabernacles, etc. They are read from one scroll independently of the weekly lesson on the Sabbath and the special lesson containing the institution of these festivals. On the new moon they form the only lesson, which is read from a single scroll brought out on that day. Of special significance in this connexion is the lesson read from the first scroll on the second day of the New Year. It is Gn 22, containing the story of the sacrifice of Isaac. This is embellished by a legend of the Rabbis in which it is stated that, for the sake of Abraham's compliance with the divine command of offering up Isaac, God would accept hereafter sacrifices of animals as an atonement for the people's sin. When Abraham asked, 'What will happen if they will no longer be able to bring such sacrifices?', God replied, 'Let them recite it before me, and it will be for me like unto the sacrifice.'[1] This view, then, that prayers, and above all the recital of the portions dealing with sacrifices, are the proper substitute for sacrifice, is often repeated in passages in the Talmud—*e.g.*, *B'rākh.* 15*a* and *b*, 33*a*; *Sukk.* 45*a*; *Ta'an.* 26*a*–27*b*; *M'g.* 31*a*; *Midr. Psalm*, ed. S. Buber, p. 54; *Yalk.* to Ps 90, ii. § 533 and i. § 77; *Midr. Rab.* ch. 18 (end), ch. 30, § 3; *P'sikta*, ed. Buber, fol. 102*b*; *Ruth Rab.* to ch. 3.[2]

'Behold the one who is asked to "offer up" prayers for the community is invited to do so by using the word "Kerab," which means both "draw near" and "offer up" a sacrifice, for prayers are like sacrifices.'[2] 'To prepare thyself for prayer is like building an altar for bringing a sacrifice.'[3]

The substitution of recital of portions of the Law for sacrifices seems to go back to a very ancient time—the time of the *ma'amadôth* before the destruction of the Temple. It is therefore not surprising to find the same practice among the Samaritans. In their prayers, as already remarked, they also invoke God's blessing and pray for the restoration of the ancient sacrifices, which are considered by them also as only temporarily suspended until the advent of the Taheb. They also have similar lessons, which they read on special days, on the eve of Sabbath, and on festivals; and they insert in their prayers corresponding portions of the Law describing either the institution or the sacrifice set aside for special occasions.[4] Moreover, they also have the term 'addition,' which they, curiously enough, spell *mozef*, not *musaf*; and they form from it a verb which they write *yozef*, 'to add.' They also introduce into their prayers verses from the Bible applicable to the significance of the day, which they group together to form an anthology, *catef*, thus substituting the recital of verses and of whole sections of the Bible for the sacrifices no longer to be offered in their Temple, which has been destroyed. Unfortunately A. E. Cowley did not realize the importance either of these *catefs* or of the Biblical lessons, and has omitted them from his *Samaritan Liturgy*,[5] and has thereby rendered reference to the peculiar form of the *catef* found in the rubric unintelligible. For their sacrifice of the Paschal lamb see below. The same principle is also followed by the Karaites, who in a way approximate to the practice of the Samaritans by accumulating Biblical verses of similar contents into collects in which the name of the festival forms, as it were, a kind of catch-word.

(2) *Study of the Law* in general is also considered an equivalent substitute for sacrifice, and the study of the chapters dealing with the various forms of sacrifice—peace-offerings, sin-offerings, thank-offerings—or the chapters containing the description of the sacrifice is considered of the highest merit. Studying the portion of thank-offering is like bringing it.[6] It is even put into the mouth of God that it is as acceptable to Him as the sacrifice of old in the Temple. The sin of Eli cannot be atoned by sacrifice, but only by the study of the Law.[7] And this has been extended to the study or recital of those portions in Rabbinical literature which contain references to the sacrifices in the Temple, such as *Zebahim*, 5; then the description of the incense[8] and the order of service arranged by Abbaye;[9] also *Lev. Rab.* ad Lv 1[11]; *Kolbo*, ch. ii.; *Siddur Rashi*, fol. 4.

(3) The same principle applies to the substitution of *fasting* for sacrifice: 'To fast is to bring a

[1] *B.T. Ta'anith*, 26*a*–27*b*. [2] Gaster, *Prayer-Book*, i. 11.

[1] *Ta'an.* 12*a*, 27; *M'g.* 31*a*. [2] Jer. *B'rākh.* iv. 17.
[3] *B'rākh.* 46*b*. [4] See Codex Gaster, 829.
[5] London, 1906. [6] *Menahoth*, 110*a*.
[7] *Rôsh. Hash.* 18*a*. [8] *Keritôth*, 6*a*.
[9] *Yôma*, 33*a*; see Gaster, *Prayer-Book*, i. 11 f.

sacrifice.'[1] And joined with it is almsgiving. In each case this means sacrifice of substance, both spiritual and material.

Fasting can be either individual or general, for propitiatory purposes (to avert impending evil) or for an expiatory reason (to atone for sin committed and to avert the dreaded consequences). The real object, however, in all cases is not to obtain God's favour, as it were, by a bribe, but to give outward expression to the mortification caused by sin and backsliding, in contrition of heart, self-chastisement, self-abnegation, and meekness, and to appeal to God's mercy and forgiveness. The result expected from self-denial and charitable deeds was inner purification and approach to God, from whom man had departed by forsaking His ways or breaking His commands. The great prototype, of course, is the Day of Atonement, but during the Temple period it was accompanied also by sacrifice, and on that day (see above) the recital forms part of the service. Now only the fasting remains, and it is considered as an equivalent for the sacrifice on every other occasion. In the prayer accompanying the individual fast as well as in those used on public occasions of fasting the words used by Rabbi Simeon[2] find their place:

'Therefore, O Lord! with thy abundant mercy answer me at this time and hour and let the diminution of my fat and blood, which hath by this day's fast been diminished, be accounted and favourably accepted before thee as the fat of the sacrifice laid on thine altar; that it may atone for what I have sinned, trespassed and transgressed against thee, whether accidentally or by choice; through ignorance or presumption; knowingly or unknowingly.'[3]

The same sentiments run through all the propitiatory and expiatory prayers connected with fasting. The Talmud has many examples of men who fasted a number of days and continued to fast even for years in order to avert impending evil—*e.g.*, Rabbi Ṣadoḳ, who fasted 40 years to avert the impending doom of Jerusalem,[4] and Rabbi Ḥanina, who fasted to avert misfortune from an individual.[5] A well-known fast is that of Adam, who fasted 130 years to expiate his sin.[6] These men, as it were, sacrificed themselves for the benefit of others and hoped to win thereby the favour of God, just as if they had brought sacrifices to the altar.

In a way self-mortification is considered a substitute for sacrifice, inasmuch as man offers himself up entirely to the service of God. It is a minor form of martyrdom, not free from selfish motives. Judaism has not looked with favour upon asceticism, celibacy, and self-mortification. The institution of the Nazirite, however, is recognized by the Law, but the Nazirite was expected, on the conclusion of his period, to bring an offering, which, as is explained by the sages in the Talmud, was a kind of expiation for the sin of self-mortification. Fasting is described as almost equivalent to sin;[7] it is almost like committing suicide.[8] It is not the fasting that brings the desired result, but repentance and almsgiving;[9] for fasting must lead to charity.[10] But the institution, as such, was a kind of self-sacrifice. Both men and women were allowed to take the vow of abstinence. In the Rabbinical literature a whole treatise has been preserved (*Mishnāh Nazir*) in which all the details connected with the Nazirite, as observed during the Temple period, are minutely described. It is there[11] said among other things that the Nazirite can be only in Palestine, and that Queen Helena of Adiabene had observed the vows of a Nazirite for seven years, and, on coming to Jerusalem to bring her offerings, was told that she had to keep the vows for seven years more, inasmuch as she could not take them outside of Palestine. But after the destruction of the Temple, when the cutting off of the hair and the other sacrifice brought at the conclusion of the period of the vow could no longer be observed, the practice of living as a Nazirite seems to have still persisted. A few men are known in Jewish history as Nazirites, and to one, Isaac Nazir, the origin of the later phase in the development of the Ḳabbālā is ascribed. He is the reputed first teacher of the new doctrine which was afterwards propagated by R. Abraham ben David. Otherwise very few examples are known.

The whole principle of celibacy and seclusion was unnatural to Judaism. Among the Samaritans there are also parallels to the practice of Naziriteship. In the Samaritan version of the Susanna legend[1] the two wicked old men who bring the false accusation against an innocent young woman are described as Nazirites, and the young woman herself, who was the daughter of a high-priest, was also a Nazirite; and in the present writer's Codex 1170 there has been preserved a very curious prayer, which, according to Samaritan tradition, was the one offered up by the Nazirite when taking the vow. The practice of Naziriteship seems to continue among the Falashas of Abyssinia. See also art. NAZIRITES.

(4) The highest form of sacrifice is for the *glorification of the name of God*, or for the *expiation of sin*. Although Judaism does not encourage self-sacrifice or even asceticism, yet the principle is laid down that a Jew should offer himself up as a sacrifice for his principles and convictions rather than commit the three cardinal sins—idolatry, immorality, and murder.[2] The sentence often appears, 'May my death be accepted as a sacrifice before the Lord, as an atonement for my sins.'[3] The Rabbis say that death is a sin-offering; *i.e.*, it atones for sin as a sin-offering. And it is only in the light of this conception that the remarkable law which is mentioned in Nu $35^{26\text{-}28}$ may be explained. It is there stated that one guilty of manslaughter who has found safety in the city of refuge must dwell there until the death of the high-priest, after which he is free to return to his own home unmolested. The connexion between the death of the high-priest and the freedom thereby accorded to the man guilty of murder can be explained if the death of the high-priest is regarded as an atonement for all the sins and sinners of his time. To this the statement in the Talmud, 'the death of the high-priest is an atonement,' seems to point.[4] In fact it is said that the righteous man dies for the sin of his generation. He is, as it were, the victim and the sacrifice of atonement for the sins of his generation. One sage is reputed to have offered himself up as an atonement sacrifice for R. Ḥanina and his children.[5] The death of the pious atones or purifies like the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer.[6] Another saying is, 'May I be an atonement for my daughter Kuza!'[7] When the son of R. Simeon ben Shetaḥ was falsely accused and condemned to death, he said, 'May my death not be an atonement for my sins if I am guilty!'[8] Moses' grave was facing Beth-peor in order that by his death he might atone for the sins of the Israelites committed at that place.[9] Moreover, the souls of the pious are, according to a saying in the Midrāsh, recorded also in the Jewish burial service,[10] offered up as a sacrifice to God on the heavenly altar by

1 *B'rākh.* 33*a*.
2 Gaster, *Prayer-Book*, i. 174.
3 *Ib.* 17*a*.
4 *Gittin*, 56*b*.
5 *Bābā Meṣi'ā*, 33*a*.
6 *Book of Adam and Eve*, and *'Erūbin*, 18*b*.
7 *Ta'ānith*, 8*b*.
8 *Sanh.* 105*a*.
9 *B'rākh.* 6*a*; *Ta'ānith*, 8*b*, 17*a*.
10 *B'rākh.* 6*b*.
11 Ch. iii.

1 Discovered and published by the present writer in the *International Journal of Apocrypha*, July 1913.
2 Jer. *Ḥagigāh*, ch. i.
3 *B'rākh.* 60*a*.
4 Jer. *Yōmā*, viii.; *Makkōth*, 11*b*.
5 *Sukk.* 20*a*.
6 *Mo'ed Ḳaṭan*, 28*a*.
7 *Y'bamōth*, 70*a*.
8 *Sanh.* 44*b*.
9 *Sōṭāh*, 14*a*.
10 Gaster, *Prayer-Book*, i. 197.

the archangel Michael, who is described as offering up sacrifices and prayers before that great altar in heaven.[1] The sinners respond from hell shortly before the advent of the Messiah and thus obtain their liberation.[2]

(5) Another substitute for sacrifice is *charity*, which, however, has not been considered to be an equivalent to sacrifice in the full sense of the word. The giving of alms, the support of the poor, the succour of the sick, and every assistance that is given to those who have succumbed to the trials of the world are meritorious acts in themselves, but are not to be regarded as equal to the sacrifices offered in the Temple. Nevertheless the giving of alms is regarded by the sages as almost equivalent to sacrifices. So we are told in the Talmud that he who gives alms to the scholar is like one who brings a sacrifice.[3] Or, again, a man's table is like the altar of the Temple: on it he brings a sacrifice.[4] The charity performed by the Gentiles is like a sacrifice brought by the Jews.[5] The giving of charity is like the sacrifice of atonement,[6] and in the *Chapters of R. Eliezer*[7] it is said, 'More beloved is to me the service of loving-kindness than sacrifice.' Fasting and prayer, especially when they are of an expiatory character, are expected at the same time to be supplemented by liberal gifts to the poor—a kind of sacrifice of atonement for wrong done, and even for evil thoughts, which have mastered men's minds for a while (see above). In later times a symbolical meaning has been added to the eighteen pieces given to charity (for חי, whose numerical value is 18, means also 'life'). The underlying idea is that of ransom of oneself, as in the five pieces of silver given to the *kôhēn* as a ransom for the first-born male child (Nu 18^{16}).[8] This is also a substitute for sacrifice, as is the other Biblical ordinance of the ransom of an animal unfit for sacrifice (Ex 13^{13}).

(6) Another substitute for sacrifice may be mentioned here, although the author of the *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh*, R. Joseph Ḳaro,[9] strongly condemns it and calls it a stupid practice. It is the practice of *offering up a white cock or hen as a ransom* (sacrifice) on the eve of the Day of Atonement. The bird is afterwards slaughtered according to the Law and is given away as a gift to the poor.[10] Curiously enough, the present writer has learnt from the Samaritans that, whenever they kill an animal or a fowl during the ten penitential days—*i.e.* from the 1st to the 10th of Tishri, from New Year to the Day of Atonement—in addition to the usual blessing, they repeat the following three words: לכפר ולכפר יכפר, 'to atone, and to atone, he shall atone.'[11] These are evidently taken as sin-offerings preparatory to the Day of Atonement; on it, through fasting and prayer, the great atonement is made for obtaining God's forgiveness for the spiritual and moral sins committed during the year.

(7) It remains now to refer to practices of *sacrifice outside of Jerusalem*, probably going back to the time of the second Temple. It must remain an open question whether in the temple of Onias in Egypt real animal sacrifices were brought, especially sin-offerings. Though the results at which Flinders Petrie[12] has arrived could be fairly accepted, the finding of burnt animals' bones on the spot identified by him with the ancient temple of Onias may still be explained in a different manner. It is well known that, in addition to the sacrifice brought into the Temple, there was the offering of the Paschal lamb initiated in Egypt and then continued in the desert long before the Temple existed. That being the case, the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb may also have been brought outside the Temple and after the destruction of the Temple. It may be, therefore, that the bones found in the Onias temple are the remains, not of the regular service, but of these Paschal sacrifices, which were believed to be independent of the Temple in Jerusalem and could be offered anywhere. The sacrifice of the Paschal lamb seems to have been a persistent independent feature in pre- and post-Biblical Judaism. Sacrifice seems to be referred to as part of the service in the temple of Yeb in Assuan, described in the Elephantine papyri. In the letters of the people addressed to Sanballat and to the high-priest in Jerusalem they complain of the cessation of various sacrifices. It will be noticed that in his reply the high-priest refers only to the incense- and meal-offerings, avoiding mention of the animal-sacrifice, which, from the point of view of the Temple in Jerusalem, could not well be sanctioned outside its precincts. The *ostrakon* published by Sayce[1] and commented upon by Daiches,[2] in which reference is made to preparation for the Passover, seems to refer to the preparation of the Paschal lamb, though the lamb is not mentioned, but the name 'Pascha' may refer to the lamb in addition to the flour for the cake. This is the same use of the word *pascha* or 'passover' for the lamb as in Mt 26^{7}, Mk 14^{2}, Lk $22^{7.\ 8.\ 11}$. A certain Theodosius in Rome took the liberty of eating on the first night of Passover the young kid slaughtered and prepared in accordance with the prescription for the Paschal lamb, and the patriarch (R. Gamliel) tolerated it, as he wrote, out of personal consideration for this Theodosius. Better known than these facts is the continual sacrifice of the Paschal lamb by the Samaritans on Mt. Gerizim. It has often been described by outsiders, and even photographed.[3]

We may mention here also the continuation of sacrifice by the Falashas in Abyssinia, but it is doubtful whether they sacrifice animals or merely make incense- and meal-offerings like those referred to in the papyri of Assuan. They seem to offer them up on special occasions, especially at the new moon. In the same connexion reference must be made to the peculiar form of the ancient synagogue, now destroyed, and once possessed by the Chinese Jews in Kai-Fong-Fu, of which a tracing has been preserved. Although some of the books of the liturgy, taken from these Jews by the missionaries more than a century and a half ago and now lying at Lincoln's Inn, agree in the main with the other Jewish Prayer Books hitherto known, they show a strong Persian influence. They have evidently travelled *via* Persia to the interior of China, as also have their ancient scrolls and books of the Law. Still the structure of that synagogue resembles very closely the inner structure of the Temple in Jerusalem, and in the very centre of it stands what appears to be an altar. Whilst real animal sacrifices are not likely to have been brought there, still incense-offerings and perhaps meal-offerings may have been brought, in

1 *Ḥagṭgāh*, 12*b*; cf. *Zebaḥim*, 62*a*.
2 *Ôtiot de R. Akiba*, letter *shin*.
3 *Berākh.* 10*a*.
4 *Ib.* 55*a*.
5 *Bābā Bathrā*, 10*b*.
6 *Ib.*
7 Friedländer's tr., London, 1916, p. 276.
8 For the ceremony see Gaster, *Prayer-Book*, i. 131.
9 See art. QARO.
10 See *Abodat Yisrael*, ed. S. Baer, Rödelheim, 1868, p. 409 f.; and *Siddur Hegyon Leb.*, ed. L. Landshuth and H. Edelmann, Königsberg, 1845, p. 482 f.
11 Gaster, Codex 1170, p. 343.
12 *Hyksos and Israelite Cities*, London, 1906.

1 *PSBA*, 1911, 183 f., [1912] 212.
2 *Ib.* [1912] 17–23.
3 A full description of the method of procedure and of the manner in which it is prepared and divided according to Samaritan law is found in Gaster, Cod. 872, fol. 129 ff., and there, as well as in some of the MS Prayer Books for the festival of Passover, a rough illustration is given of the vessels used and of the manner in which they are disposed (so in Gaster, Cod. 1120, fol. 55 f.).

accordance with the example of the Chinese worship. Unfortunately no detailed description of their mode of worship has been preserved, but from the Prayer Books just mentioned we may conclude that in general outline their worship was identical with that of the rest of the Jews.

Finally, reference must be made here to the letter which Joseph the king of the Khazars had sent to the Jewish vizier in Spain, Ḥisdai Aben Chiprut (middle of the 10th century).[1] In this letter he informs R. Ḥisdai that he has built in his capital a temple according to the model of that in Jerusalem, and among the vessels in that temple he mentions the table, the candlestick, and the altar. Whether he meant here the altar for the sacrifices or the golden altar for burning the incense remains obscure. In any case, the idea of bringing some sort of sacrifice could not have been absent from his mind. But, though there are these scattered reminiscences among sectarians and remote isolated communities, the only generally recognized substitutes for the sacrifices offered up in the Temple are the recital of the Biblical lessons and of the passages containing the institution of the sacrifices for daily services and for other occasional services such as Sabbaths, new moons, festivals, etc., accompanied by prayers, fasting, and charity.

LITERATURE.—The literature is given in the article. This subject has not been dealt with anywhere else.

M. GASTER.

SACRIFICE (Muhammadan).—1. Meaning of sacrifice among the Arabs.—As there are, properly speaking, no temples and no priesthood in Islām, so there is no sacrifice in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The sense of sin and the need for an atonement are even more strongly felt by the pious Muslim than by us, but they are not brought into connexion with the shedding of blood, whether of animals or of human beings. Thus in the Qur'ān the atonement (*kaffārah*, a Hebrew word) for the sin of deliberate perjury is not a sacrifice, but the feeding or clothing of ten poor folk, or the freeing of a Muslim slave, or, if these are beyond the culprit's means, then a fast of three days (v. 91). In v. 96, it is true, the penalty for killing game while in pilgrim garb is the slaying of some domestic animal of equal value (*e.g.*, a sheep for an antelope, a pigeon for a partridge), which is to be brought as an offering (*hady*) to the Ka'bah, but even here the purpose is not to make propitiation for sin, but simply to prevent the delinquent from being a gainer by his breach of the law. And so it is the alternative penalty of feeding the poor or fasting that is called an atonement. The expiation of sin in Islām rests entirely on the repentance of the sinner and the forgiving and merciful nature of God, to which must be added, in the popular religion, the intercession of Muhammad. The fact that the worst sinner in order to be saved has merely to declare himself a Muslim cuts the ground from under the feet of any theory of an atoning sacrifice. To be a follower of the Prophet is to be forgiven; not to be such is the unpardoned crime.

The idea, again, which is said (perhaps in error) to have lain at the foundation of sacrifice among the Hebrews and other ancient peoples—that the Deity was an invisible guest at the sacrificial meal and that His share was the blood, the smoke, or the smell—would have been as repugnant to the Muslims as it is to common sense. The vicarious element in sacrifice also is excluded by the Muslims' strong sense of justice and of fate. With the idea, on the other hand, that the virtue of the pious might in effect be imputed to the wicked they were not unfamiliar. Muhammad was asked by one of his wives: 'Can we perish as long as amongst us are the pious?' He replied: 'Yes, if wickedness be great.' The one devout Umayyad Khalīfah 'Umar II. († A.H. 101, A.D. 720) also said: 'It used to be said: "God will not punish the many for the fault of the few," but if the wickedness be done openly, they deserve all to perish.'

2. Influence of climate.—Even if the pagan Arabs had held any of these theories of sacrifice, they would have been prevented from putting them into practice by the same cause which has led to the discontinuance of sacrifice among the Hebrews, namely, their poverty. Animal sacrifice could arise and continue only in a country rich in pasture, in which a sheep or even a camel could be easily spared; but in Arabia, if we leave out of account the south-west corner, the whole population outside the towns has always been in a chronic state of semi-starvation. So poor were the Arabs that up to the time of Muhammad they were in the habit of burying their female infants, nominally for fear lest they should, by capture or otherwise, bring dishonour upon the tribe to which they belonged, but in reality because they had not the means of supporting them. The ordinary food of the desert Arab consisted of dates and the milk of his camels when available, and, when his inveterate hospitality did lead him to the lavish slaughter of his beasts, every particle that could be eaten was consumed, if not by himself and his guests, by the destitute women and children who hung about his tent, so that not much was left for the dogs. The only occasion on which there is waste of animal food in Arabia is at the great slaughter of beasts in the valley of Minā at the annual pilgrimage, and that is from sheer inability to consume or carry it away.

3. Motives of sacrifice.—The motives which underlie the very faint shadow of sacrifice as it was practised by the people of Arabia, and through them by the Muhammadan nations to-day, are different from those which actuated the more happily situated northern Semites or the races of Europe.

(*a*) Perhaps the most radical of all was the instinctive belief of the Semitic peoples in the sacredness of blood. Hence every slaughter of an animal, by the shedding of its blood, is an act of religion. Accordingly the same word is used in the Semitic languages for 'to slaughter' and 'to sacrifice' (Heb. *zābhaḥ*), and the Muslim always pronounces the name of God as he strikes the animal. A second motive for sacrifice among the Arabs was the natural belief of man that he can get something on which he has set his heart by surrendering something which he already possesses, or which he values less. Hence sacrifice is very commonly the fulfilment of a vow. Muhammad's grandfather vowed that, if he became the father of ten sons, he would offer up one of them as a sacrifice; and, when his wish was realized, he expiated his vow by a sacrifice of camels instead. A third commonly occurring motive is the natural inclination of men, when they have done anything of which their conscience disapproves, or which is against the tribal ethics, to punish themselves by a self-inflicted penalty. This motive is called *jazā'*, 'compensation'; and an example of it is the case mentioned above of the person who kills game while on pilgrimage. Connected with this motive and complementary to it is the instinctive impulse of any one who has met with a piece of good fortune to do some act of kindness to those who have not had the same fortune. An instance of this is the sacrifice of a sheep after the birth of a child, referred to below and named *'aqīqah*. But in all these cases there is no real sacrifice in the

[1] Reprinted by J. Buxtorf, jun., in his ed. of the *Cuzari*, Basel, 1660, and also in an Eng. tr., *Miscellany of Hebrew Literature*, London, 1872, p. 107.

ritualistic sense. The sacrifice is really simply a feast, in which, as a rule, the poor share. No portion of the victim is supposed to be consumed by the Deity, nor is there any religious mystery inherent in the rite. The beast is killed just as it might be killed in the hunting-field, except for the fact that the blood is not eaten, but the idea that the blood is the portion of the Deity would be entirely abhorrent to a Muslim.

(*b*) The great day of sacrifice in Islām is one of the days of the annual pilgrimage, the 10th of the twelfth month (Dhu'l-Ḥijjah). The motive in this case is not any of those mentioned above, but is purely historical and commemorative, as were, from one point of view, the feasts of ancient Israel. According to the prevalent belief, it was not Isaac but Ishmael that Abraham was commanded to offer up in sacrifice. The story given in the Qur'ān is as follows:

'And We [God] gave him [Abraham] good tidings of a gentle son. Then when he was old enough to work along with him, he said to him, "My son, I am seeing in sleep that I am to sacrifice [*dhabaḥ*] thee: therefore consider what thou thinkest we should do." He said: "My father, do what thou art commanded: thou shalt find me, please God, one of the patient." So when they thus submitted themselves, and he had laid him with his forehead on the ground, We called to him, "Abraham! Thou hast believed the vision. Thus do We compensate those who do right. This is a clear trial," and We redeemed him with a mighty sacrifice [*dhibḥ*].'[1]

It will be seen that the Qur'ān does not specify either Ishmael or Isaac, but the fact that it goes on to mention the latter is taken to mean that here the former is intended. The place of the intended sacrifice is commonly believed to have been the valley of Minā, a few hours' journey to the east of Mecca, and the ram which became the substitute is said to have come down from Mt. Thabīr, which abuts on the valley. It is this event that is commemorated on the occasion of the annual pilgrimage. On the 8th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah the pilgrims remove from Mecca to Minā, where they spend the night. Early on the 9th they go in haste to Mt. 'Arafāt, where they hear the sermon, returning the same evening to Muzdalifah between 'Arafāt and Minā; and, after a night spent in devotion, the morning of the 10th finds them back again at Minā. There they slay the victims which they have brought with them, and, their purpose thus accomplished, they shave their heads. What they cannot eat of the victims they either carry away or give to the poor. Even so, however, the waste of only too precious food every year is enormous. But the point to be noted for our present purpose is that the whole ceremony is purely commemorative. It is the keeping up of an old national custom. It is not the sacrifice that redeems the pious Muslim from his sins, but the visitation of the House of God in Mecca.

4. All taking of animal life sacrificial.—As there is no proper sacrificial ritual in Islām, so the words now employed in a semi-religious sense originally meant to slaughter in the ordinary everyday usage, or else they are words borrowed from other faiths, in which sacrifice was a truly religious act. Any ritual slaughtering that there might be in Islām is founded, not on any innovations introduced by Muhammad, but merely on the primitive human instinct which feels a natural repugnance to the shedding of blood. The Muhammadans generally hold the belief that the spirit escapes through the wound that is the cause of death. Thus a man who dies a natural death is said in Arabic to die 'the death of his nose'; *i.e.*, his spirit goes out at his nostrils. It may have been a superstitious dread of the vengeance of this spirit that originated the custom of making every act of slaughtering an animal an act of religion, which put, as it were, the responsibility upon God, by always invoking His name. This would be the case all the more among the Hebrews, since the animals killed among them for food were mostly animals of considerable size. We do not read in the OT of domestic fowls being used for food, but the Muslim kills a cock in just the same way as he kills a sheep, and with the same formality; *i.e.*, he faces in the direction of Mecca and says, 'In the name of God,' as he cuts its throat.

5. Mode of slaughter.—Islām is a religion without mystery and therefore without sacraments. Consequently it is not possible to draw a distinction between sacrificing an animal and simply slaughtering it for food. There is no difference at this point between the religious and the secular. In the case of the Hebrews, although they use the same word to denote sacrificing and killing for food, it is possible to say when it is used in the one sense and when in the other. But it is a mistake to suppose that this difference exists in orthodox Islām. With the Hebrews, as with many other ancient nations, sacrifices were consumed in whole or in part upon the altar; but in Islām there is no altar. The Muslim slays his 'sacrifice' exactly as the Jew kills beasts for the market; the one act is as religious as the other. The legal mode of slaughter, whether merely for food, when it is called *dhakāt*, or for 'sacrifice,' when it is called *dhabḥ*, is, except in the case of camels, by cutting the throat. In *dhakāt* the knife must sever the windpipe and gullet, but the school of Mālik say the gullet and the veins of the neck; others say the two jugular veins, or one of the jugular veins. The same remarks apply to *dhabḥ*.[1] These rules are based upon those of the Jews.

6. Technical terms.—(*a*) ***Naḥr.***—The noun denotes the upper part of the chest where the windpipe begins, which is the spot where a camel is stabbed for slaughter. The infinitive *naḥr* denotes the act of stabbing a camel in this place in order to kill it. In this respect it is distinguished from *dhabḥ*, which means slaughtering an animal by cutting its throat. The two are also different in that the former is a pure Arabic word, whereas the latter represents the Heb. *zebhaḥ*, 'slaughtering' or 'sacrificing.' Perhaps it is due to its pagan connotation that the former occurs once only in the Qur'ān (cviii. 2); 'We [God] have given the Kauthar: then pray to thy Lord and slaughter.' Kauthar is explained as the name of a river in Paradise, but this is the usual explanation given of the unknown vocables in the Qur'ān. Perhaps it is nothing else than the Heb. *kosher*, 'lawful,' used of meat killed in the legal manner. As all blood is sacred, so all slaughtering of beasts partakes of a semi-religious character; but the 10th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah is named esp. *yaum an-naḥr*, 'the day of slaughter.' On it the great pilgrimage culminates in the slaying of the victims (*hady*) at Minā near Mecca in imitation of the sacrifice of Ishmael there. On the same day all over the Muslim world sheep are killed in the principal towns. In Tangier the sheep is carried in great haste from the slaughtering-place at the top of the town through the principal street down to the great mosque. If it is still alive when it arrives there, it is considered a good omen for the coming year. On the same day sheep are killed in every household that can afford it, and the flesh is shared with the poor.

(*b*) *Hady.*—This word is properly the inf. of the verb *hadā*, 'to lead (or bring),' esp. to bring a gift or offering (*hadiyah*), consisting of a camel, cow, sheep, or goat, to the Ka'bah at Mecca for sacrifice or slaughter. It occurs in Qur'ān, ii. 196, v. 96, xlviii. 25; and in v. 2, 98 the garlands (*qalā'id*) hung upon the victim to mark it as sacred are also mentioned. *Hady* is used specifically of offering a sacrificial gift, but *hadīyah* is the general word for 'anything which is taken without any stipulation for service rendered.'[2] The rules for the *hady* and the traditions regarding it, *i.e.* the practice of Muhammad and the first Muslims, as they are given in the oldest collection of traditions available, the *Muwaṭṭa'* of Mālik ibn Anas († A.H. 179, A.D. 795), are as follows:

Those who could afford to do so usually offered one head of large cattle (called a *badna*), a camel, a cow, or a bull, but 'Abdallah, son of Khalīfah 'Umar I., usually sacrificed two *badna* at every visit to Mecca, and there was no limit to the number which might be offered. It was not thought right to ride the victim on the journey to Mecca, but Muhammad permitted this to be done. The Arab's humanity, however, did

[1] xxxvii. 99 ff.

[1] Muḥammad 'Alī at-Tahānawī, *Kitāb Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn*, i. 511.

[2] Jurjānī, *Ta'rīfāt*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1845, p. 277.

not always let him take advantage of the indulgence. Similarly, it was not thought proper to drink the milk of the she-camel destined for sacrifice, except under necessity. If the she-camel should calve on the journey, her calf might be carried, if necessary, upon the back of the dam, and it was sacrificed along with her. The victim was 'garlanded' and 'marked.' The garland did not consist of flowers, which were, of course, not to be found. In the times of 'ignorance' before Islām the pagan Arabs used bark from the trees of the sacred territory of Mecca. Thereafter any object served. 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar, mentioned above, used to hang a pair of worn-out sandals on it, facing the *qiblah* as he did so. The 'mark' was an incision made with a fleam or lancet on one side of the camel's hump, sufficient to draw blood. 'Abdallah used in addition to cover the sacrifice with fine, white Egyptian linen or other saddle-cloth (*jull*), which, when done with, he presented to the Ka'bah, or, if it should have already been 'clothed,' gave away in charity. According to this 'Abdallah also, the camel should be not less than five full years old, and other animals in their third year at least. Another of the early Muslims used to bid his son 'not to offer to God any beast which he would be ashamed to offer to his most honoured friend, for God is the noblest of the noble, and the worthiest of those for whom choice is made.' Should a camel break down on the road through fatigue, Muhammad ordered it to be slaughtered, its garland to be dipped in its blood, and its flesh to be eaten. If the offering was purely voluntary, it was then regarded as accomplished; otherwise—if, *e.g.*, it was in fulfilment of a vow—the offerer must find another victim. If any one missed the pilgrimage, *i.e.* failed, whether through losing his way or through miscalculating the days, to be present at Minā on the day of sacrifice, 'Umar required him to offer another victim the next year. If he had not the wherewithal, he must fast three days during the pilgrimage, and seven on his return home.[1] This verse mentions the sacrifice of 'what is convenient' as an atonement for not duly performing the pilgrimage. The phrase is generally taken to mean a sheep or goat. The sacrifice which is a penalty for killing game during the pilgrimage or a similar offence must be offered in Mecca;[2] but, if it take the form of fasting or of alms, this may be accomplished in whatever place the penitent may choose. As originally signifying 'a gift,' these terms may be compared to the Hebrew *minḥah*.

(*c*) *Nusuk*, *nusk*, and *nasikah* are all used of a victim offered in sacrifice. In the Qur'ān the pilgrim who through sickness cannot shave his head (in token of having performed all the ceremonies and fulfilled his vow) must pay a ransom or forfeit by fasting or giving alms or sacrificing a sheep (*nusuk*).[3] The other forms of the word do not occur in the Qur'ān. In later times the word came to mean asceticism, and already in the Qur'ān *nusuk* is used in the sense of worship generally,[4] and *mansak* means a religious ceremony, and *nasaka* to practise these ceremonies or rites.[5] The root meaning of the word appears to be to wash or cleanse—*e.g.*, a garment. *Nasikah* is synonymous with *dhabīḥah*. The terms are probably derived from the Heb. *nesekh*, a libation of oil often joined with the meal-offering (Nu $28^{7ff.}$ etc.).

(*d*) *'Aqīqah*.—This is the hair which covers the head of a newborn infant, and which the Muslims shave off on the seventh day after birth. Herodotus[6] mentions a similar custom in Egypt. The occasion is celebrated by the slaughter of a ram or a goat, the flesh of which is cooked and distributed to the poor. This victim is also named *'aqīqah*. The practice is not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but Mālik ibn Anas states that Muhammad, being asked about it, replied that he did not like it; Mālik adds that he only meant that he did not like the name, not the thing, as the word means a beast having its throat slit right across, and so was considered ill-omened. It is related in a tradition that Fāṭimah weighed the *'aqīqah* of each of Muhammad's grandsons, Ḥasan and Ḥusain, and gave the weight in silver in alms; and this became a recognized custom. One of the early Muslims permitted the substitution of a bird for a sheep,[7] but this was not approved, and the practice is one sheep for each child, whether a boy or a girl. Moreover, the sheep must be without blemish—not blind, emaciated, sick, or having a broken horn—nor may any of its flesh or its skin be sold. The blood also must not be allowed to touch the child.

(*e*) *Ḍaḥīyah*.—The victim slaughtered on the morning (*ḍuḥa*) of the 10th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah is so named from the hour at which the sacrifice takes place. The word has various forms, in both singular and plural. The collective is *'aḍḥā*, from which the day is named *yaum al-'aḍḥā*, 'the day of the victim'; also *'id al-'aḍḥā*, 'festival of the victims.' These words do not occur in the Qur'ān. The regulations laid down in the *Muwaṭṭa'*[8] are identical with or supplementary to those for the sacrifice under its other names. Muhammad, asked what was to be avoided in the *ḍaḥīyah*, replied: 'Four things: the lame whose limping is visible, the evidently blind, the evidently diseased, and what is so starved as to have no fat.' To these must be added that it be of the proper age (see above, [*b*]). Hence 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar sacrificed any victim that was of the right age and without blemish; and this is the principle approved by Mālik.

In the great pilgrimage no one may slay his sacrifice before the *imām*, or leader of the pilgrimage, has slain his; still less may he slay it at an earlier hour of the day. In either case Muhammad ordered the offender to sacrifice a fresh victim, even if he could not find one that had attained the prescribed age. Muhammad on one occasion forbade the eating of the *ḍaḥīyah* after three days. It was pointed out to him that the people were in the habit of melting the fat and preserving it in skins. He replied that he had said what he did only for the behoof of certain Arabs of the desert who had been driven by drought into the town; and he gave full permission to preserve and store the meat of the sacrifice. Opinions are divided as to whether it is allowable for a number of pilgrims to take shares in a sacrifice. On the one hand, it is related that at al-Ḥudaibiyah, when Muhammad was prevented from entering Mecca and sacrificed on the spot the victims which he had brought with him, seven of his followers went shares in each camel or each head of cattle. Hence the Shāfi'ites and Ḥanbalites hold that partnership in a sacrifice is legitimate. Mālik, on the other hand, maintains the preferable doctrine that, whilst people of the same family may sacrifice for the family, for those who are not so connected to contribute towards the purchase of the beast and then share in its flesh is a thing 'to be hated.' Sometimes a child still unborn was made a partner.

(*f*) *Qorbān*.—This is simply the Hebrew word taken over into Arabic. It occurs three times in the Qur'ān—iii. 179, where it is put into the mouth of the Jews; v. 30, in the story of Cain and Abel; and xlvi. 27, where, however, it means 'a *near* associate,' from the verb which in Arabic, as in Hebrew, means 'to bring near' or 'to sacrifice.' No doubt it is borrowed from the Hebrew. Lane[1] mentions a tradition, 'Prayer is the offering of every pious man,' meaning that it is what brings him near to God.

7. Arab and Hebrew sacrifice compared.—In conclusion it may be of interest to note some of the points of contrast between Arab and Hebrew ideas about sacrifice. The most important is that the idea of an atonement scarcely, if at all, enters into Arab sacrifice. Even when the offerer is regarded as having forfeited his life, as in the case of the pilgrim who breaks his *iḥrām*, he is ransomed not by the act of slaying a victim, but by the act of benevolence in distributing the portions to the poor. There is, again, no holocaust in Muhammadan sacrifice; the victims are slain to be eaten; only the blood is rejected, but it is so whether the slaughtering has any religious import or not. There is no libation, no meal-, wave-, or heave-offering in Islām; the sacrifice is always a beast or bird which is killed. With the Hebrews the beast sacrificed was a male; with the more open-handed Arabs it was often a female. With the Arabs the sacrifice was shared, not with the priests—an unknown class among them—but with the poor. With them also the only sacrifice of a communal character, if any can be considered such, is the annual sacrifice of the Great Feast. The rich man's offering with them is the camel, an animal held unclean by the Hebrews. Among the latter every sacrifice, and even every implement, was salted; on the other hand, preserving the flesh for future use was not allowed. Partnership in a sacrifice, except between members of a family, is (by the Mālikite school) forbidden in Islām. All these differences point to the fact that with the Hebrews sacrifice was a really ritualistic act of worship, whilst it was not so among the Muslims.

LITERATURE.—Muhammad 'Alī at-Tahānawi, *Kitāb Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn* ('Dictionary of Technical Terms'), ed. W. N. Lees and others, Calcutta, 1854–62, *s.vv.*; Al-Bukhārī, *Les Traditions islamiques, traduites de l'arabe, avec notes et index*, ed. O. Houdas and W. Marçais, Paris, 1903 ff., index; Mālik ibn Anas, *Al-Muwaṭṭa'*, any ed., contents; E. W. Lane, *The Thousand and One Nights*, London, 1883, introd., note 1, ch. i., note 16, iii. 63, iv. 24, v. 40, vi. 11; R. F. Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah*, do. 1855–56, iii. 302 ff.; E. Westermarck, 'The Popular Ritual of the Great Feast in Morocco,' *FL* xxii. [1911] 131–182.

T. H. WEIR.

SACRIFICE (Semitic).—In this section we consider the subject of sacrifice among the following peoples—Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Aramæan and Arab tribes (ancient and modern), Hebrews, Phœnicians and Carthaginians, and Abyssinians. On the propriety of including (with reservations) the Egyptians in the foregoing list see the beginning of art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Semitic).

[1] *Qur'ān*, ii. 196. [2] v. 96. [3] ii. 196. [4] vi. 163. [5] xxii. 66. [6] ii. 65. [7] Cf. Lv 12^{8}. [8] P. 186 ff. (ed Delhi, 1307 A.H.).

[1] *Arab.-Eng. Lex.*, 1863–93, *s.v.*

1. Occasion of sacrifice.—One of the most satisfactory classifications of sacrifices available is that which divides them into (*a*) periodic, and (*b*) non-periodic or occasional. To the former belong sacrifices on feast-days recurrent at certain seasons or days of the year; to the latter belong sacrifices offered on particular occasions, as at the birth of a son, the foundation of a building, the initiation of some military or other enterprise, etc.

(*a*) Periodic sacrifices may be daily, monthly, or seasonal. In Egypt part of the daily temple services consisted in clothing and decorating a figure of the deity, and then setting before it an offering of food—bread, geese, beef, wine, and water. These, after standing a while before the god, were most probably appropriated by the priests (cf. the story of Bel and the Dragon). The dead were supposed to partake of this daily banquet.[1] At certain great feasts—*e.g.*, the anniversaries of the birthday of the god, or of his mighty deeds—there were increased offerings, which the worshippers shared in a common feast.

In the fully developed sacrificial liturgy of the Hebrews we read of a variety of periodic sacrifices—the daily burnt-offering (Nu 28^3); the weekly offering on the Sabbath, double in number of the daily offerings (28^9); the monthly sacrifice, at the new moon (28^{11}); and certain annual sacrifices, as the Passover (full moon of first month), the day of the firstfruits, the beginning of the second half of the year (first day of seventh month), and the full moon of the seventh month (28^{16}–29^{40}).

In Arab heathendom the annual sacrifices of the month Rajab must be mentioned; this was perhaps the most important ceremonial event of the pre-Muhammadan religion.

Examples of periodic sacrifice might be multiplied from the other branches of the Semitic world, but these will suffice. It is obvious that they all depend on the motions or phenomena of the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, the planet Venus, etc.), or on the annual recurrence of seed-time and harvest, or on the increase of flocks. They are such as would naturally arise in the regular unbroken existence of a pastoral or an agricultural community.

(*b*) Non-periodic sacrifices are more of a personal nature. They take place on the occasions which break the monotony of the existence of such a community, or of individual members thereof. The birth and circumcision of a son; the foundation of a house; the beginning of a military or other enterprise, and its successful conclusion—all these are events celebrated by a sacrifice. Moreover, by sacrifice an individual seeks to obtain some desired boon from the gods—the health of a sick relative, purification from the sense or consequence of sin, and the like. A few examples may be cited in illustration.

(1) *Birth.*—Among the Arabs 'the child must be taken on a pilgrimage to the shrine to which the sheik of the tribe belongs. The minister of the shrine sacrifices for them near the threshold. The child is anointed on his forehead, or on his nose, with a mark of the blood of the victim.'[2] The Hebrews do not appear to have had a special sacrifice to celebrate a birth, but the first-born son had to be redeemed (Ex 13^{13} 34^{20}) with a money payment of five shekels.

(2) *Children.*—The modern Arabs offer sacrifices for a child (especially a son), if there is any fear that it may not live. It is also customary to offer sacrifices at circumcisions. In sacrificing for a child care must be taken (according to Curtiss)[3] not to break one of the animal's bones, lest a similar injury be inflicted on the child.

(3) *Foundation of a building.*—A tablet given by Zimmern[4] apparently records a sacrifice at a new house. In various Palestinian excavations traces of foundation-offerings of one kind or another have been found.[1] Among the modern Arabs a sheep is sacrificed when a new building is begun.

(4) *Inauguration of a king.*—In Egypt the king began his reign with a sacrifice to Min, the god of fertility, in the presence of the statues of his ancestors. 'A priest presents him with the royal sickle, with which he cuts a sheaf of corn; he then strews it before the white bull, symbolizing the offering of the first-fruits of his reign. He then offers incense before the statue of the god, while the priest recites from the mysterious books of the "dances of Min."'[2] Cf. the inauguration of Saul (1 S 10^8).

(5) *Dedication or consecration of a building.*—Ashurnaṣirpal dedicated the temple of Ninib in Calah with prayer and offerings,[3] as did Solomon the Temple of Jahweh at Jerusalem (1 K 8).

(6) *As a sin-offering.*—Curtiss[4] quotes 'a devout Muslim, of good sense but unlettered,' as saying that 'sacrifice would cover sin.' He likewise quotes from Burton a statement that the victim at the Mecca pilgrimage is sacrificed 'as a confession that the offender deems himself worthy of death.' The sin-offering occupies a conspicuous place in Hebrew ritual (Lv $4^{22ff.}$ etc.), as does the analogous purification-offering from various forms of uncleanness (Lv 14, 15, Nu 19). The Babylonians likewise had purification-sacrifices for a house after sickness.[5]

(7) *Sickness.*—In Babylon, according to a ritual tablet printed by Jastrow,[6] a lamb was to be sacrificed near a sick man, the body of the animal being opened and its inwards torn out—possibly with the idea of tearing out the malady by sympathetic magic. Sacrifices at exorcism of demons and at the purification of a house may also be mentioned here.

(8) *Death and funeral ceremonies.*—Offerings of the mourners' own hair and blood to the dead are forbidden to the Hebrews (Lv 19^{28}), but were nevertheless practised (Jer 16^6). W. R. Smith[7] and Curtiss[8] note similar customs among the Arabs. The latter cites a peasant informant as telling him that 'when a man comes to die he appoints some one as executor to sacrifice some animal. It is preferable for a man to offer the sacrifice during his life. . . . He rides the animal across the narrow way on the day of judgment.' Another informant told him that 'only the Arabs [*i.e.* the Bedawin] offer sacrifice for the dead';[9] but Curtiss questions the accuracy of this statement. The sacrifice for the dead is not eaten in a feast, like other Arab sacrifices, but is given to the poor.[10]

(9) *Sacrifice of spoil captured in war.*—This, according to Diodorus Siculus,[11] was a custom of the Carthaginians; and it is indicated for the Hebrews by 1 S 14^{34} 15^{18}; cf. also David's laying up of Goliath's sword. A similar instance is cited from Arab heathendom by Wellhausen.[12]

The above must suffice as a selection of the occasions on which non-periodic sacrifices were offered among the Semitic tribes. A full list, with a properly marshalled series of illustrative examples, would fill a large volume. It may be said in short that there was hardly any possible event in the individual or communal life that was not marked by a sacrifice among one or more of the Semitic peoples.

2. The persons and materials involved.—The persons involved, in a complete sacrificial ritual, are four in number—either four individuals or four communities. These are (1) the person or persons offering the sacrifice; (2) the person or persons for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered; (3) the intermediary or priest, who receives the sacrifice from the person offering and disposes of it according to the rubrics governing the ritual; and (4) the person to whom the sacrifice is offered. On occasion these four may be reduced to three, (1) and (2) being identical, or even to two, (1), (2), and (3) being identical; but as a rule the interposition of a priest between the person offering and the recipient is considered desirable, as he by his ordination and consecration is supposed to be more familiar with the unseen world, and by his special knowledge is able to avoid ritual mistakes. Among the Hebrews the Passover sacrifice was the only one that could be offered without the mediation of a priest.

The person or persons offering the sacrifice may be any member of the tribe or any group of fellow-

[1] A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, tr. A. S. Griffith, London, 1907, p. 46 f.
[2] Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, p. 201.
[3] P. 178.
[4] *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, pp. 147–149.

[1] See R. A. S. Macalister, *The Excavation of Gezer*, London, 1912, ii. 426–437.
[2] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, tr. H. M. Tirard, London 1894, p. 66.
[3] Jastrow, *Rel. Babyloniens und Assyriens*, i. 225.
[4] P. 211.
[5] Jastrow, *Religious Belief in Bab. and Assyr.* p. 318.
[6] *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* i. 350.
[7] *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 323.
[8] P. 178.
[9] P. 179.
[10] *Ib.*
[11] xx. 65.
[12] *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], p. 112.

tribesmen (a family, clan, gild, secret society, etc.). Foreigners are as a rule excluded from participation in the presentation of offerings (Lv 22^{25}); and the priest must be chosen by some special sign (*e.g.*, heredity, as among the Hebrews) and set apart for his calling by ordination. The recipient of the sacrifice is as a rule a deity; but sacrifices, as we have just seen, may be offered to the dead, and may even be claimed as a mark of divinity by a king during his lifetime.[1]

The materials involved (*i.e.* the object offered in sacrifice) can be grouped into a number of different classes. The object sacrificed is a kind of intermediary whereby the worshipper comes into contact with the divinity. Such contact as a rule is of this indirect kind; but there are cases when the worshipper offers a part or characteristic of himself, in which the contact is more direct—*e.g.*, the numerous offerings of blood or of hair, and sacrifices of manhood or of female chastity.[2] More commonly, however, the offering consists of some object not a part of the offerer, though selected from his property; and in the vast majority of cases it is an animal. Vegetable offerings are also made, especially of the firstfruits of the field or of the trees; but mineral offerings are rare except as a simple *ex voto* donation or as a concomitant of animal or vegetable offerings (especially salt).

The animal kingdom is divided by every tribe into beasts which may, and beasts which may not, be sacrificed. According to the totemistic theory of the origin of sacrifice (see below), the totem-animals would in the beginning be the normal, if not the only admissible, victims; and W. R. Smith saw relics of totemism in the sacrifices of swine, dogs, and mice reproved by the second Isaiah.[3] The sacrifice of the totem-animal had already in pre-historic times given place to the practice of sacrificing the animals normally used as food, especially of the cow and sheep kind. Besides these the Hebrews admitted sacrifice of goats, turtle-doves, and pigeons. Fish, though eaten, was not sacrificed, nor were wild beasts. The Arabs added to these permissible animals the camel[4] and gazelle (as a miserly substitute for a sheep).[5] The same animals—cow, sheep, goat, and fawn—as well as some kind of domestic bird (cock and hen?) are enumerated on the Marseilles and Carthaginian sacrificial tablets.[6] The Babylonians added fish and cream[7] to the list. Human sacrifice is discussed under its own heading and need not be referred to here.

The vegetable offerings were those of the ordinary harvest produce, and need not be specially enumerated. Dates and other fruits were offered in Babylon. The burning of aromatic gums (see art. INCENSE) calls for passing notice here; it is found in sacrificial worship among all the Semitic peoples[8] except, apparently, the Arabs.[9] Wine-libations and the use of oils (like the holy ointment of which the prescription will be found in Ex $30^{23ff.}$) also belong to this category. These also are not found among the Arabs. Milk is the normal Arab drink-offering.[10] There is some inconsistency in the Hebrew documents as to the use of leaven in the sacrifice. It is forbidden in Ex 23^{18} and Lv 2^{11}; the latter passage also excludes honey. On the other hand, it is enjoined in Lv 7^{13} 23^{17}, with which passages Am 4^{5} may be compared. Probably W. R. Smith is right in associating with the prohibition of leaven the precautions taken to prevent any of the meat of the sacrifice being left over; similar precautions are found in the Arab rites, and are evidently designed to prevent the sacred flesh from putrefying.

Among minerals we need refer only to salt (Lv 2^{13}). David's libation of water (2 S 23^{16}) is an exceptional and special case, not indicating any rule. The gifts of gold from which Aaron made the calf (Ex 32^{2}) hardly come under the head of sacrificial material. The total or partial destruction of the object sacrificed distinguishes a sacrifice from an *ex voto*.

3. **The purpose of sacrifice.**—It may be taken that in all cases the purpose of sacrifice is to secure a benefit, but the benefit may be for the donor, for the recipient, or for a third party.

The majority of sacrifices are for the benefit of the donor (whether an individual or a community) or of some third party. Such are the primitive communal sacrifices, in which the god and his worshippers partake of a common meal. Here the meal preserves the fatherhood of the tribal deity from suffering eclipse owing to neglect or transgression on the part of the tribe, and thus keeps the deity on friendly relations with his children. The offerings of firstfruits belong to the same category: the bounty of the tribal god is acknowledged by the gift and by that form of gratitude manifested which has been cynically defined as 'a lively sense of favours to come.'

Such is, primarily, the purpose of the seasonal sacrifices. The deity is periodically fed by the gifts of his children, and thus is kept continually favourable towards them. But the non-periodic sacrifices are likewise meant to secure a favour of one kind or another. Special sacrifices, when the deity is for any reason supposed to be angry with his people, or cathartic or piacular sacrifices, designed to win for the offerer a deliverance from disease or from sin or its consequences, fall under the same category.

The only sacrifices in which the recipient is directly benefited, without a necessary reflexion of the benefit on the donor, are sacrifices made to the dead or offerings deposited in the tomb. As the latter not infrequently consist of human beings or animals put to death, to provide the dead with servants or assistants in the future life, these may fairly be included among sacrifices; as is well known, even inanimate objects are often broken, to liberate their spiritual essence; and excavation in Palestine and elsewhere has shown that this is the case in the Semitic world as well as elsewhere. Food offerings are also given, perhaps, as E. S. Hartland has ingeniously suggested,[1] that the shade may not be compelled by hunger to eat of the food in the other world, and so be obliged to remain there for ever, in accordance with an ancient and wide-spread belief. In Egypt offerings to the dead were often endowed, an attendant being paid to keep the tomb in order and supplied with relays of gifts. In special cases, from an early time, the endowment was granted by the king himself, and the prayer 'Let the king give an offering' begins almost every funerary inscription in Egypt.[2] The specific purpose of the various kinds of Semitic sacrifice can, however, be more conveniently considered in connexion with the ritual observed, to which we now turn.

4. **The method of sacrifice.**—(*a*) *The place.*—Sacrifice must be offered at an appointed holy place. The killing of a sacrificeable animal else-

[1] As by Gudea; see Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* i. 170.
[2] See Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, *passim*.
[3] *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 290 ff.; on the occasional use of certain other animals—deer, stags, wild asses, quails—see additional Note F in the same work.
[4] Wellhausen, p. 114, etc.; *Qur'ān*, xxii. 38.
[5] Wellhausen, p. 115.
[6] *CIS* i. 165–170; *RHR* lxix. 70, and references there.
[7] Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* i. 59.
[8] *Ib.* i. 385, etc.; Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 507; Lv 10^{1}, etc.
[9] Wellhausen, p. 114. [10] *Ib.*

[1] *The Science of Fairy Tales*, London, 1891, p. 47.
[2] Erman, *Handbook of Egyp. Rel.* p. 128 f.

where is a murder, to be expiated as such (Lv 17[3-5]). Even in patriarchal times, as a rule, sacrifice takes place on a spot hallowed by a theophany (Gn 28[17]); it is probably indeed a mere accident when specific mention of the theophany is omitted (4[3-7] 8[20]). Moses cannot allow his followers to sacrifice to their Lord in Egypt; he must conduct them to a place 'three days' journey into the wilderness' for the purpose (Ex 3[18]). The 'camp' of the wandering Israelites, owing to the presence of the Ark, is *ipso facto* a holy place, and therefore anything that defiles, such as the burning of the sin-offering (29[14]), the bodies of the sacrilegious Nadab and Abihu (Lv 10[4]), a leper (13[46]), the execution of a criminal (24[14]), must not profane the sacred precinct. The same ideas are to be traced among the Arab tribes.[1]

(*b*) *The altar.*—This has already been described,[2] so that few words are necessary here. The necessity for the altar arose from two requirements—the need of something visible and tangible to which to apply a gift supposed to be made to a physically invisible and intangible deity, and the need of something to prevent the sacrilege of the holy blood falling on the level earth.[3] For this purpose a heap of stones (such as, we may presume, the altar that Abraham built [Gn 13[18]]), a bank or mound of earth consecrated for the purpose (Ex 20[24]), or a large stone (1 S 14[33]) would serve. According to the Book of the Covenant, a stone altar was not to be profaned with the touch of new-fangled metal tools (Ex 20[25]), though doubtless this rule was not universally observed—*e.g.*, by Ahaz (2 K 16[10]). An altar, however, is not absolutely necessary; Gideon (Jg 6[20]) offers his sacrifice on a rock (which may, however, have been an altar-like mass or boss of rock). The altar of Elijah (1 K 18) was apparently a cairn of stones surrounded by a circle of twelve monoliths outside which was a trench; it is the most completely described 'high place' altar mentioned in Hebrew history.

Among the Arabs the sacred stone (*nuṣb*) served the purpose of an altar. It was, however, more than an altar; rather was it a representation of the divinity, sometimes indeed hewn into a form to represent him.[4] A curious series of rock-cuttings found some years ago at Petra[5] may perhaps be a late Aramæan or Nabatæan place of sacrifice, as has been supposed. But the rocks of Palestine are cut about in all sorts of ways, with quarries, wine-presses, tombs, etc.; and, unless evidence were found confirming the explanation of these Petra cuttings as a kind of sanctuary, it would be rash to build very much upon them. For Egyptian altars, and the few facts known about altars of the other Semitic peoples, reference may be made to the artt. ALTAR.

(*c*) *The ritual.*—This naturally varied according to the character of the sacrifice. In the primitive communal sacrifice the animal was slaughtered, usually by having its throat cut (with an antique form of knife),[6] and the blood was allowed to fall over the altar-stones. This was the share of the deity, and its application to the sacred stone was equivalent to feeding the deity upon it. In the official Hebrew legislation sacrifice could be offered only by those of the house of Levi; but in the earlier history Jethro (Ex 18[12]) and Balaam (Nu 23[1f.]) offer sacrifices to Jahweh. The flesh of the animal was divided among the worshippers and eaten by them; thus they shared in the meal with their deity. Such a sacrifice is known in the Hebrew Scriptures as זֶבַח or שֶׁלֶם, translated 'sacrifice' and 'peace-offering'[1] respectively in the RV. The etymology on which the latter translation is based is not absolutely certain.[2] The former word, like the modern Arabic ذَبْح, includes the slaying of animals for food, after such an action had ceased to have any special sacrificial significance. The occasions for such a sacrifice, besides the periodic feasts, were numerous—any time of rejoicing, such as the end of a successful war (1 S 11[15]), the cessation of a pestilence (2 S 24[25]), and a family gathering (1 S 20[6]). A preliminary sanctification was obligatory on the worshippers, with lustrations, continence, and change of garments (Ex 19[10-14]). When the animal was slaughtered, the blood and the fat—the portion assigned to the divinity—were consumed on the altar, and the rest was divided between the priests and the worshippers. Hophni and Phinehas in their greed seized more than their share, before the portion meant for the deity had been set aside (1 S 2[12-14]). With the offering was unleavened bread. The flesh was boiled—Hophni and Phinehas offended the people's religious feelings by requiring it to be roasted. Similarly, Curtiss tells us,[3] 'the ministers of some [modern Arab] shrines are inclined to frown upon the custom of preparing the sacrificial meal away from the shrine.'

On occasions when the joyful feast of the שֶׁלֶם was inappropriate the proper sacrifice was the עֹלָה.[4] In times of war, doubt, or difficulty the animal was slain beside the altar and there wholly consumed. The sacrificers did not in this case partake of it; the whole was, as it were, volatilized and placed at the service of the deity.

While in Hebrew and Arab theory the animal thus offered seems to have been regarded as a tribute, Babylonia preserves for us an older stage of the development which may well be totemistic in origin. Here the idea of tribute is secondary. The primary purpose of sacrifice, so far as the sacrificers are concerned, is divination, especially by markings upon the animal's liver (interpreted as modern charlatans interpret the markings on the human hand). This form of divination is referred to in Ezk 21[21]. The sacrificed animal seems to have been considered as having partaken of the divine nature, just as an animal whose flesh has been eaten by a man enters his organism and henceforth partakes of his nature; the various parts of its organism are therefore essentially the corresponding parts of the divinity, in tangible form; and on them are impressed signs of the divine foreknowledge. This is conspicuously the case of the liver, which is regarded as the seat of the soul.[5]

The treatment of offerings other than animal victims (cereals, meal, etc.) was presumably similar to that of animal victims. Under the Levitical code part was consumed by the altar-fire, and the other part was at the disposal of the priests (Lv 6[14-16]). Under the Levitical régime a sacred fire (perhaps kept burning perpetually from a flame supposed to have been miraculously kindled) was used for these ritual purposes. To use other fire was sacrilege (Lv 10). The Arabs, on the other hand, scarcely offered fire-sacrifices at all.

[1] W. R. Smith[2], pp. 115–118.
[2] See art. ALTAR (Semitic), vol. i. p. 350.
[3] See Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, p. 131.
[4] Wellhausen, p. 101 f. [5] See, for references, *ERE* i. 351.
[6] Wellhausen, p. 115.

[1] A more general term for gift or offering is מִנְחָה, which in the later books denotes more specifically offerings of cereals. The general term in the later books is קָרְבָּן. אִשֶּׁה is a 'fire-offering.'
[2] See W. R. Smith[2], p. 237. [3] P. 171, n. 5.
[4] The עֹלָה seems, properly speaking, to have originally meant the part of a sacrifice burnt. A 'whole burnt-offering,' in which the entire animal is burnt, was כָּלִיל (Nowack, *Archäologie*, ii. 215).
[5] See Jastrow, *Rel. Belief in Bab. and Assyr.* p. 147 ff.; also his *Rel. Bab. und Assyr., passim*, esp. ii. 213 ff.

'The altar,' says Wellhausen,[1] 'is not a hearth: no fire burns on it.' After mentioning a few doubtful exceptions, he adds: 'The normal Arab rite of animal sacrifice consists simply in smearing the blood on the sacred stone, or pouring it into the *ghabghab*' (the receptacle for this offering).

Among the Babylonians, however, fire was essential to sacrifice: by fire the offering was brought to the presence of the gods, and fire symbolized the intermediation between the worshipper and the divinity. Owing to this fact the fire-god Girru-Nusku (a conflation of two ancient fire- or solar-deities) was present at every sacrifice.[2]

For a discussion of some of the minutiæ of Hebrew sacrificial ritual, such as the ceremony of 'waving' and 'heaving' the portions set aside for the priests, reference should be made to special works on Hebrew archæology (such as that of Nowack or of Benzinger) or to the standard commentaries on the legislative parts of the Pentateuch. We must, however, note some peculiar rites which do not fall under the foregoing heads.

(α) The first of these is the rite of the *scapegoat* (Lv $16^{8.\ 10.\ 26}$). In this very primitive rite, on the great Day of Atonement, two goats were brought to the sanctuary. One was slain, and the other, after confession of the people's sin had been made over it, was turned loose in the wilderness 'for Azazel' (AV 'for a scapegoat,' a translation based on an analysis of the name now deemed untenable). Whatever Azazel (*q.v.*) may have been—a question to which no certain answer can be given—the sacrifice evidently belongs to a well-known group of purificatory rites in which uncleanness is transferred to another man or animal. A precisely similar rite, with birds, was performed at the purification of a leper—one of two birds being sacrificed, the other, after being sprinkled with the blood, wherewith the leper also was sprinkled, being set free (Lv $14^{4ff.}$; cf. also v.$^{51ff.}$). The whole subject has been studied by J. G. Frazer in *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913. See, further, art. SCAPEGOAT (Semitic).

(β) Another form of sacrifice involving the liberation of an animal is recorded from Arabia in which a camel, stallion, etc., being dedicated to some deity, is allowed to go free and can never again be used.[3] The milk of such a dedicated animal could be used only by the poor and by guests.[4]

(γ) *Libations.* — David's water libation has already been mentioned as an exceptional case.

'The libation, which holds quite a secondary place in the more advanced Semitic rituals, and is generally a mere accessory to a fire offering, has great prominence among the Arabs, to whom sacrifices by fire were practically unknown, except in the case of human sacrifice.'[5]

Smith cites libations of blood and milk. He might have added coffee, of which among the modern Arabs libations are poured at feasts in honour of a being called Shaikh Shādli.[6] A libation, presumably of wine and oil, was poured by Jacob on the stone at Bethel (Gn 35^{14}); and elsewhere throughout the OT we find passages which indicate that among the Hebrews wine was the proper material for 'drink-offerings,' and a regular accompaniment of animal-sacrifice—*e.g.*, Ex 29^{40}, Lv $23^{13.\ 18.\ 37}$, Nu 15^{5}, Dt 32^{38}. From these we learn that ¼ *hin* (about 3 pints) of wine was the proper drink-offering to accompany a lamb, ⅓ *hin* (2 quarts) of wine a ram, and ½ *hin* (3 quarts) of wine a bullock. Drink-offerings of blood are condemned in Ps 16^{4} as heathenish, but on the other hand a wine-offering to the deity Meni is referred to in Is 65^{11}. The actual ritual is nowhere described, but presumably the libation was poured over or beside the altar. The heathenish rites of the Israelite women, who worshipped the 'Queen of Heaven' (*q.v.*) with 'cakes' (כַּוָּנִים, *i.e.* probably terra-cotta plaques stamped with the likeness of the divinity, such as have come to light in large numbers in Palestine), included libations as an essential element, though the material is not specified (Jer 19^{13} 32^{29} $44^{17ff.}$). The water poured annually into a cleft in the temple at Hierapolis[1] was probably not a libation, but a rain-making or fertilizing charm.

It is not quite correct to speak of libations as occupying 'quite a secondary place in the more advanced Semitic rituals.' Certainly in Mesopotamia they are abundantly referred to as an essential concomitant of the burnt-offering. The material is not often specified; a libation of some drink prepared from a cereal is mentioned in a tablet given by Jastrow.[2]

(δ) *Lectisternia.*—The table of shewbread was the Hebrew equivalent of the lectisternia, a table laden with food being set before the god. The name of this offering would perhaps be better and more intelligibly translated 'bread of the presence' (of Jahweh). The custom of laying up food before the god is wide-spread, and was no doubt adopted into the official Priestly Code from earlier pre-Pentateuchal rites. We have already seen illustrations from Egypt, and have referred to the tale of Bel and the Dragon. In the earlier rites the consumption of the food by the priests of the temple was probably secret, and arranged to keep up among the uninitiated the fiction that the god himself partook of the banquet. In the Hebrew rite, however, the food was openly the perquisite of the priests, and in the earlier times could even be given by them to laymen (1 S 21). The same or a similar rite was observed by heathenish Israelites: Is 65^{11} speaks of people 'preparing a table for Gad,' doubtless a god.

(ε) *The Passover*, though ostensibly a memorial feast commemorative of the Exodus, is probably one of the most primitive of the religious rites which Hebrew ritual preserved, belonging in fact, like the sheep-shearing festival of 1 S 25, to the time when the ancestors of the Hebrews were nomad shepherds. The special characteristics of the Passover are (1) that it took place in spring, at the time of the vernal equinox (Ex 13^{4}, Dt 16^{1}); (2) that the victim was a lamb or a kid (Ex 12^{5}), a male in its first year; (3) that, unlike the other sacrifices, this was a domestic celebration, the lamb being sacrificed by the head of the house, not at any special sanctuary, and not by any special religious functionary (Ex 12, though this is modified in the Deuteronomic legislation [$16^{2.\ 5.\ 7}$]); (4) that the entire lamb was to be roasted, not boiled as in other sacrifices (see above), and eaten by the household in haste (two households individually too small to dispose of a whole victim being allowed to combine), all properly initiated Israelites attached to the household being admitted, as well as any foreigners naturalized by the rite of circumcision, though all uncircumcised foreigners were excluded (Ex 12^{43-51}); (5) that, when the animal was slaughtered, the blood was smeared on the door-posts and lintels of the house. The feast was followed by a period of a week in which no leavened bread was to be used; but it seems to be a doubtful point whether this was an intrinsic part of the Passover ceremony or whether the proximity of the two ceremonies in the calendar is not merely accidental. The events said to be commemorated by the Passover were (i.) the last of the Egyptian plagues, when the first-born in the land of Egypt was smitten except in those houses on which the paschal blood was smeared; (ii.) the hasty departure of the people from the land. The original

[1] P. 116.
[2] Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* i. 297, 486.
[3] Wellhausen, p. 112 ff.
[4] *Ib.* p. 113.
[5] W. R. Smith[2], p. 229.
[6] Curtiss, p. 183; see also J. E. Hanauer, *Folk-lore of the Holy Land*, London, 1907, p. 293.

[1] Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 13.
[2] *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* i. 448.

celebration is, however, probably much older, and the connexion with the Exodus only secondary and ætiological. Wellhausen[1] and J. Müller[2] see in the sacrifice a survival of an ancient pastoral feast, when the firstfruits of the flock were sacrificed (as in the sacrifice of Abel [Gn 4[4]]). The 'sacrifice in the wilderness,' which was the ostensible motive of the Exodus, was, in fact, the Passover; and the king of Egypt, by preventing this, roused the wrath of Jahweh, who in punishment took to Himself the first-born of Egypt. The domestic nature of the rite certainly favours its origin among a simple and primitive pastoral organization; but the peculiar details of the rite—the rapid devouring of the whole animal and the smearing of the doorway with the blood—show that it is in its nature something more than a mere offering of *primitiæ*. With regard to the former, we are irresistibly reminded of the famous Arab camel-sacrifice described by Nilus, to which frequent reference is made by W. R. Smith[3] and by the writers who follow him; and the analogy suggests that the haste with which the animal was to be eaten was primarily inspired by a similar cause—a ceremonial requirement that it should be disposed of before some (astronomical?) occurrence had taken place. The door-post rites indicate that the ceremony belonged to the numerous blood and threshold covenants (on which see the works of Trumbull). The sedulous avoidance of the chance putrefaction in any form, to which allusion has already been made, is specially to be noticed in the Passover rite.

(ζ) *The red heifer sacrifice.*—This singular rite is described in Nu 19. A red cow (note the sex, which is the opposite to that of most sacrificial victims) which was without blemish and had never been used in a yoke was to be taken 'without the camp'—*i.e.* outside the temple hill—by a subordinate priest (the high-priest could not risk the contamination of the rite). A second official slaughtered the animal, and the first priest dipped his finger seven times in the blood, sprinkling it 'towards the tabernacle.' A pyre having been erected, the body of the heifer was to be placed upon it and reduced wholly to ashes, sweet-smelling woods being thrown on the fire during the ceremony. A third official was to gather the ashes of the heifer and of the pyre together and deposit them 'without the camp' in a clean place, where they were to be preserved. The three officials involved in the rite were made unclean, *i.e.* tabu, by the ceremony till the evening, when by washing they recovered their normal condition. The ashes thus obtained and preserved were to be used in lustrations necessitated by the uncleanness involved by contact with a dead body or any part thereof (such as a bone), some of the ashes being placed in a vessel and having running water poured over them, which was then sprinkled with hyssop on the person or thing requiring to be cleansed. The rite, though the description of it is preserved in a comparatively late document, is probably in its origin of very great antiquity. The red colour of the cow, and the scarlet cloth burnt on the pyre with the aromatic woods, suggest the colour of blood; the aromatic woods are also probably connected with primitive ideas of the cathartic value of odours such as they produce.[4]

Analogous with this rite, but to be carefully distinguished from it, is the sacrifice of a heifer in Dt 21[1ff.] as an expiation for an unexplained murder. Here the village nearest to the spot where the murdered body was discovered had to provide a heifer (colour not specified) which, like the red heifer, had never been brought under a yoke. The village elders were to lead the animal to 'a rough valley' and there to break its neck, probably by precipitating it over a high rock. Over the body the elders were then to take an oath of compurgation.[1]

5. Origin of sacrifice among the Semites.—It may be taken as a universal rule that no trustworthy account of the origin of sacrifice, or of specific sacrifices, is to be gleaned from those who themselves perform the ceremonies. In every case they give us ætiological myths of other than historic interest. Thus it is necessary in considering the development, and especially the origin, of sacrifice among any people to apply the comparative method and to draw our conclusions from a large number of related examples. In an article like the present it is not possible to give more than the conclusions, with references which will enable the reader to follow out for himself the premisses and arguments of the authors quoted.

E. B. Tylor[2] was the first to endeavour to give a scientific explanation of sacrifice. He regarded the rite as simply the offering of a gift or bribe to a divinity, precisely analogous to the gift or bribe that might be offered to an Oriental potentate, and for analogous reasons—to secure favour or to avert anger. As the gods recede from man, the gift becomes more and more an act of homage and self-abnegation. This theory, as Hubert and Mauss well say,[3] describes rather the moral development of the rite than its actual machinery, and, while it doubtless contains an element of truth, is little more than a restatement, in definite scientific language, of the vague pre-scientific ætiological myths.

W. R. Smith[4] showed that the problem was much more complicated, and involved a variety of elements. His work, though in certain minor details proved open to criticism, has stood as the foundation of all subsequent study of the subject. Beginning with totemism, which J. F. McLennan had (a short time previous to the first publication of this book) brought to the notice of anthropologists, he formulated a theory which may be thus briefly summarized. In the primitive nomadic life the solidarity and unity of the clan is an essential feature. Its members are bound by a tie of common blood with one another and with the god, their father. The domestic animals of the tribe to some extent share in this community, at least inasmuch as they are the tribal guests, and have the privilege of adoption conferred on human strangers by the mere fact of guesthood. When the god is angry, his favour can be restored by an act of communion between him and his worshippers; and the victim is the non-human member of the clan (*i.e.* the totem). When the nomad ceases from his wandering life and becomes an agriculturist, his relation with the god alters. The god is no longer a father, but a king or proprietor, from whose hand the worshipper receives his land as a tenant. The sacrifice is now not so much a communion as a tribute. The god is fed (both in the earlier and in the later theories) first by leaving portions of the flesh by the sacred stone; afterwards (as less materialistic ideas of the nature of deity develop) by pouring out the life-bearing blood on the earth as his portion, which, as it sinks and disappears, can more readily be supposed to be absorbed by the Deity than the solid flesh; and finally by burning the victim, which thus becomes volatilized and, as it were,

[1] *Prolegomena zur Gesch. Israels*[6], Berlin, 1905, pp. 82–94.
[2] *Kritischer Versuch über den Ursprung und die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Pesach- und Mazzothfestes*, Bonn, 1883, esp. p. 69.
[3] Pp. 281 ff., 381 f.
[4] See art. INCENSE.

[1] For the peculiar method of slaughtering the animal whereby effusion of blood was avoided see W. R. Smith[2], pp. 371, 419.
[2] *PC*[4] ii. ch. xviii. p. 362.
[3] *L'Année sociologique*, ii. 31
[4] *Rel. Sem.*[2], *passim*, esp. lects. vi.–xi.

etherialized by the smoke. The deity is thus satisfied by the 'sweet savour' of the offering. The temper of a master is more doubtful than that of a father, so that the worshippers are uncertain whether he is satisfied. In the stress of calamity human victims are offered, and finally victims counted unclean and therefore exceptionally sacrosanct. W. R. Smith seems to have been the first to insist on the importance of distinguishing three types of sacrifice: the communion form, in which the god and his people were commensals; the piacular form, an expiation for sin—essentially substitutionary in character, the [totem] animal being slain as a substitute for the guilty tribesman; and the mystical form, in which the god himself, in bodily form, is supposed to be slain by his worshippers and ceremonially eaten by them.

A covenant-sacrifice is the most obvious illustration of the communion-nature of the rite. When two men (as Jacob and Laban) made a covenant, they held a common meal on an altar (Gn 31[46]). When Abraham and the deity made a covenant, victims were divided, and God, typified by a torch, passed between them (Gn 15). When Moses made a covenant with God on behalf of the people, he poured half the blood of the victims on the altar and sprinkled the people with the other half (Ex 24[4-8]).

That offerings are regarded as literally the food of the gods is illustrated by numerous texts. In one of the Babylonian penitential hymns, as restored from a fragmentary tablet by Jastrow, the sinner confesses to having eaten and drunk unknowingly of the food and drink of his goddess, and also to having eaten what was unclean (*i.e.* tabu) to her; and Tabi-utul-Bel, king in Nippur, speaks of troubles having fallen upon him 'as though he had eaten of his god's food, and neglected to bring drink to his goddess.'[1] Another tablet speaks of offerings as 'the pure heavenly food.'[2]

Frazer[3] founds his work on the foregoing conclusions, but in some points carries it farther. Especially with regard to the last-named point, he infers from the comparison of an enormous number of related rites from all parts of the world that the ceremonial god-slaying is intended to prevent the god from being overborne by old age.

These theories have not gone unchallenged. L. Marillier doubts the essential postulate on which they are based, that an animal-god is necessarily a totem-god; and Hubert and Mauss question the essential connexion between the communal meal at the god's table and the more complex form of sacrifice.[4] M. J. Lagrange,[5] following Smend,[6] objects to Smith's theory, while doing full justice to the value of his masterly work, that totemism is assumed rather than proved for the Semitic tribes, and substitutes for his view of the origin of sacrifice among these people the theory that sacrifice is essentially an act, not of consecration, but of de-consecration. Starting from animism, whereby the savage sees a spirit in everything, he argues that, if a savage wished to make use of anything—say, an animal whose flesh he desired to eat—the presence of the spirit would make it tabu. By sacrifice the savage desecrates the desired object; by leaving a part of it (*e.g.*, the blood) as the share of the spirit he hopes to obtain the rest for himself. By offering the firstfruits of his flocks and his crops, and even of his own family, he earns the right to secure the remainder of the produce to his own use. The newly-planted tree (Lv 19[23]) remains 'uncircumcised' (*i.e.* tabu) for three years; its fruit for the fourth year is given to the deity; from the fifth year onwards it may be freely used. The sacrifice of the firstfruits was probably the beginning of animal-sacrifice. Lagrange holds that, while animals might have entered into totemistic relationship with a human clan, they could hardly be supposed to have similar relations to gods, and that to regard every immolation as a sacred act is not the same as to abstain from all immolation except when one is definitely intending to engage in an act of worship; moreover, that to admit the whole clan to a share in the feast does not mean that no slaughter can take place without the consent of the whole clan.

Curtiss, as a result of his researches in modern Palestine, was led to dissent from the theories of the origin of sacrifice usually associated with the name of W. R. Smith. According to his view, the essential point was not the gift or the eating of the sacrificial animal, but the effusion of its blood, the substitutionary idea being in his belief the prevalent and the original essence of the rite.[1] Thus, a sheep is slain at the foundation of a house because every new house requires a life; the life of the sheep redeems that of an occupant of the house. A sheep slain on behalf of a sick person, likewise, is a substitute whereby the life of the patient is redeemed. The blood is placed on the door-post and lintels of the shrine 'perhaps to remind the saint of the blood of the victim that has been slain.' The fallacy that the East is 'immovable,' however, vitiates some of these deductions. It is true that very primitive rites and beliefs survive among the modern Arabs; but they do not necessarily survive in their primitive form, or with primitive ideas attached to them. On the contrary, they have been modified profoundly by the leavening influence of Islām. Moreover, Curtiss takes no account of the bloodless sacrifices or those in which the effusion of blood is carefully avoided.[2]

LITERATURE.—i. *GENERAL.*—For brevity only the later works are named; references to older books will be found in the bibliographies in *HDB*, *EBi*, *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Sacrifice'; H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, London, 1887; W. R. Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, do. 1889, reprint of 2nd ed., 1907; L. Marillier, 'La Place du totémisme dans l'évolution religieuse,' *RHR* xxxvi. [1897] 208, and subsequent numbers; Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, Edinburgh, 1892; P. Sartori, 'Ueber das Bauopfer,' *ZE* xxx. [1898] 1; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896; H. Hubert and M. Mauss, 'Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice,' *L'Année sociologique*, ii. [1897–98] 29–138; G. A. Wilken, *Eene nieuwe theorie over den oorsprong der offers*, in *Verspreide Geschriften*, Hague, 1912 ff., iv. 157.

ii. *EGYPT.*—The works of Erman mentioned in the article; E. Naville, *The Old Egyptian Faith*, London, 1909, p. 295 ff.

iii. *BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA.*—H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1901; E. Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*[3], Berlin, 1903, esp. p. 594 ff.; M. Jastrow, Jr., *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 2 vols., Giessen, 1905–12, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1911.

iv. *ARAB AND ARAMÆAN TRIBES.*—J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897; S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, London, 1902.

v. *HEBREWS.*—The standard commentaries on the books of the Pentateuch and the prophets (esp. Ezekiel); also G. F. Moore, art. 'Sacrifice,' in *EBi*, and E. G. Hirsch, art. 'Sacrifice,' in *JE* (very useful for late Jewish belief and practice). See also W. Nowack, *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Archäologie*, Freiburg i. B., 1894; R. Smend, *Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte*, do. 1893; K. Marti, *Gesch. der israelitischen Religion*, Strassburg, 1907; I. Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie*, Freiburg i. B., 1894, [2] rewritten, Tübingen, 1907; S. A. Cook, 'The Significance of the Elephantine Papyri for the Hist. of Hebrew Religion,' *AJTh* xix. [1915] 346; O. Schmitz, *Die Opferanschauung des späteren Judentums und die Opferaussagen des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen, 1910.

vi. *PHŒNICIANS AND CARTHAGINIANS.*—F. C. Movers, *Untersuchungen über die Religion und die Gottheiten der Phönizier*, Bonn, 1841; R. Dussaud, 'Les Tarifs sacrificiels carthaginois et leurs rapports avec le lévitique,' *RHR* lxix. [1914] 70; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*[2], Freiburg i. B., 1897, i. 237.

[1] Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* ii. 102, 126.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 93, n. 8.
[3] *GB*[3], *passim.*
[4] For the references see the bibliography at the end.
[5] *Études sur les religions sémitiques*, Paris, 1905, ch. vii.
[6] *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgeschichte*, p. 123 ff.

[1] See esp. p. 224 ff. [2] On which see W. R. Smith[2], p. 418.

vii. *SOUTHERN SEMITES (ABYSSINIANS).*—No satisfactory literature; but, owing to their close connexion with the Yemenite Arabs, there was probably a close community of belief and religious practice between them. See L. J. Morié, *Hist. de l'Éthiopie*, Paris, 1904, ii.

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SACRIFICE (Teutonic).—For our knowledge of the ancient Teuton religion we are almost entirely dependent on Icelandic sources, as in Iceland there was a great literary activity in the 12th and 13th centuries, when several prominent men collected whatever of ancient oral or written tradition had come down to their own time in poetry or prose. In other Teutonic countries we find only occasional references to the religious rites of heathen times, though a great many names occur in Scandinavia, Germany, and England signifying religious customs and reminding of ancient rites. Often such names as Frey, Thor, Odin, Baldr, and a few others are prefixed to mounds, hills, groves, springs, etc., indicating that those places formerly were dedicated to the divinities mentioned. In Sweden there is a great number of such places.[1] It is difficult, however, to decide whether a given rite or legend which is mentioned only in the Icelandic literature was really peculiar to that country alone or to the North generally, or whether it was once the common property of all Teutonic peoples.[2] In many cases we shall have to leave this matter undecided or be satisfied with probabilities. Yet it is well understood that long before those public religious festivals were instituted of which Snorra Sturlason, Saxo Grammaticus, Adam of Bremen, and others write there had been sacrifices offered by the Teuton tribes to their gods, and that long before priests were set apart among the northern Teutons sacrifices were made by the people themselves, either for the sake of the offerer alone or in a representative way for his family or tribe. Everybody felt himself in duty bound to some particular god or gods, and this duty was most religiously observed. As the gods were many and of several kinds, so must those services, sacrifices, and offerings have been. Minor things such as fruit, bread, fowl, prepared foods, trinkets, and even money were offered and brought to holy springs, bogs, lakes, and hills, where they were dedicated and turned over to the god of the place with such formalities as were considered proper. One of these demanded scrupulous cleanliness[3]—a cleanliness which in certain cases required that the sacrificer should approach the god in a naked state.

For how many generations and to what extent these individual offerings were carried on it may be difficult to determine, but all indications agree that some gods were sacrificially worshipped in Sweden at a very remote period. Montelius holds that Frey was worshipped there for at least two thousand years before the Christian era.

With the advancing civilization arising from conditions of more settled habits and of larger tribal and political unifications, together, in some countries at least, with a more generally recognized order of sacred persons or priests, certain periods for public sacrificial festivals were decided upon and observed, at first by the vicinity mostly and then by the entire realm. Thus there were three yearly sacrificial festivals—in autumn, midwinter, and spring. These festivals assembled and unified the people and served to foster the idea of their mutual social union as of divine character. Participation in these sacrificial feasts and meals made peace between the rival races.[4]

Some of these feasts were in a special sense connected with the memory of the dead. This was the case with the midwinter festival—the greatest feast and family reunion of the Teutons—when the departed and disembodied spirits returned to their own, and, mingling with them, gave them cheer and encouragement, or proffered warnings of impending danger. At this season the gods themselves also showed special favours, helping in every way and keeping off the evil spirits, so that entire peace and goodwill might prevail. A general peace applying to the entire festival period was also declared by the king himself, so that no wrong could be done then. Under the shield of this peace the sacrifices with the attendant banquet were prepared, deliberations were held, sentence was passed, and commerce conducted, for which reason *thing*, the old name of these conventions, stands for sacrifice, banquet, diet, assize, and fair.[1] Upon the general celebrations of these great festivals at Upsala was founded the right of the Svear, or Swedes, to give a sovereign to the whole realm, for the Upsala king was the guardian of the holy altar.[2]

Frey, or Froe, was the northern god of fertility and peace. He was the patron god of Sweden and was worshipped as the god of plenty. According to Adam of Bremen, his worship was of the phallic order, and as such gave rise to very popular gatherings and religious feasts; as we have already seen, Montelius considers that the worship of Frey was current in Sweden at least two thousand years before Christ. Saxo has the following:

'Also Frey, the regent of the gods, took his abode not far from Upsala, where he exchanged for a ghastly and infamous sin-offering the old custom of prayer and sacrifice, which had been in use for so many ages and generations. For he paid to the gods abominable offerings by beginning to slaughter human victims.'[3]

The Frey-period is contemporary with that of Odin in Sweden, but there it begins much earlier. No doubt, human sacrifices occurred also during the régime of Frey at Upsala. At a later period we know that human victims were sacrificed to the name of that god. Ibn Fadhlan, the Arabian geographer, reports in 921 that he had been present at an immolation among Teuton varings on the Volga, when a young girl was sacrificed according to the funeral rite of Frey.[4] Thus the same religious customs prevailed wherever the Teutons happened to live. It is also known that religious festivals similar to those at Upsala were held in other countries, but the Upsala ones became better known, being more fully described in Icelandic and northern literature. From most of these sources it is inferred that Odin established them. Indeed, it is said that, when taking possession of the land, he erected a temple there and sacrificed after the manner of the Æsæ. To him people paid tribute, that he might be propitious to them and give them good harvest. Snorra Sturlason says:

'Odin made laws for his country, laws which formerly obtained among the Æsir. At the beginning of winter sacrifices should be made for a good year, in the midwinter for good crop, and in the spring for victory in intended campaigns. Tribute was given to him "for every nose" the country over, in order that he should protect the people in times of war and grant to them a good year.'[5]

In the *Saga of Hakon the Good* we have the following full description of one of these religious festivals:

'It was an old custom that when there was to be sacrifice all the bonders should come to the spot where the temple stood, and bring with them all that they required while the festival of the sacrifice lasted. To this festival all the men brought ale with them. All kinds of cattle, as well as horses, were slaughtered, and all the blood that came from them was called *hlaut*, and

1 Hyltén-Cavallius, *Wärend och Wirdarna*, i. 2 f.
2 *EBr*[11] xxvi. 033.
3 Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, p. 451.
4 *Yngl. Saga*, 24.

1 E. G. Geijer, *Hist. of the Swedes*, tr. J. H. Turner, London [1845 ?], p. 31.
2 *Yngl. Saga*, 24. 3 i. 186.
4 Frähn, *Ibn-Fozlan's und anderer Araber Berichte über die Russen älterer Zeit*; Thomsen, *Ryska Rikets grundläggning genom Skandinaverne*.
5 *Yngl. Saga*, 8.

the vessels in which it was collected were called *blaut*-vessels. *Blaut*-vessels were made, like sprinkling brushes, with which the whole of the altars and the temple walls, both outside and inside, were sprinkled. The people were also sprinkled with the blood, and the flesh was boiled into savoury meat for those present. The fire was in the middle of the floor of the temple, and over it hung the kettles. The full goblets were handed across the fire, and he who made the feast, and was chief, blessed all the full goblets, and the meat of the sacrifice. First Odin's goblet was emptied for victory and power to the king, and thereafter Njord's and Freyja's goblets for peace and a good season. Then it was the custom of many to empty the Bragi-goblet, and then the guests emptied the goblet, called the "remembrance-goblet," to the memory of departed friends.'

After this description of the feast itself Snorra continues:

'Sigurd, the earl, was an open-handed man, who did what was very much celebrated, for he made a great sacrifice-festival at Hlader, of which he paid all the expenses. Kormak Ogmundson sings of it in his ballad of Sigurd:

> "Of cup or platter need has none
> The guests who seek the generous one,—
> Sigurd the Generous, who can trace
> His lineage from the giant race . . .
> He loves the gods,—his liberal hand
> Scatters his sword's gains o'er the land."'[1]

Following chapters of this saga (17–19) are of special interest in regard to the Teutonic sacrifices, as they treat of the Frosta-thing, King Hakon's sacrifice, and the sacrifice at More.

Bloody sacrifices were always made by the priests, or the chiefs who acted as priests, usually at the beginning and the close of the great public festivals. All the people of the realm, or as many as could be present, were in close attendance at the rite and were blessed. Expiatory sacrifices were held once in every nine years at Upsala and at Lethra in Sealand, at which a great number of animals and human victims were offered.[2] At the beginning of wars and other great undertakings, such as the election of kings and leaders for great battles, great and imposing sacrifices were made.

All animals were offered according to prescribed forms, which were well known to the people and because of which they all could understand and take part. If occasion required, as in times of famine and great danger from enemies, human sacrifices were made, the victims ranging from innocent children up to the king himself, who was offered because his was the most precious life in the whole land and therefore a most valuable gift to bring the gods for reconciliation. Among the Goths, the Saxons, the Langobards, and other Teutonic tribes it was also common to present prisoners of war as sacrifices to the god who had given the victory. Jordanes tells us that in some cases such prisoners were immolated by the Teutons. In later writers we read that such captives were hung to the branches of the trees in the sacred grove, and sometimes they were decapitated or slaughtered, 'not for vengeance but as a thank-offering.' To 'inscribe the bloody eagle' on the back of the conquered enemy was an inhuman mode of vengeance sometimes practised by the vikings, and may be considered as a sacrificial act, as it was done in the name and to the honour of the war-god.[3]

Several authors hold that it was not uncommon to sacrifice a thrall or some other person whose life could be taken without cause, when a great journey was to be undertaken or some decisive matter attended to. The offerer smeared his own body with the blood of the victim and then considered himself well protected. Other shocking cruelties were performed in the name of Teutonic religion, as when in a certain year of poor harvest it was agreed that there would never more be a good year until a boy from one of the foremost families had been sacrificed to Odin.[4]

[1] Ch. 16. [2] Adam Brem. iv. 27.
[3] See E. H. Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 200; also G. Storm, in *Norsk Historisk Tidskrift*, ii. 436.
[4] *Herv. Saga*, 9.

Capital punishments of sacramental nature were of common occurrence. They were made in the first place as an expiation of sin and then as a thank-offering for the restored condition of favour with the divinity. Cowards and infamous people were sometimes sunk in some fen or bog—*e.g.*, in the great pool of Upsala.[1] According to Odin's own command, traitors must be hanged.[2] In *Starkad's Saga* it is said that in times of divine wrath the hanging of the king would bring great reconciliation, if the victim was pierced through with a spear as a sacrifice to Odin. Common malefactors had their backs broken, just as Thor broke the neck of Greip and Gjalp. In old age men were sometimes thrust down from steep rocks, so as to bring them sooner to their god.[3]

Thus with its decline the heathen religion became more and more cruel and savage. Indeed, it is said in the appendix of the old law of Gothland that 'they then sacrificed to the heathen gods their sons and daughters and their cattle with meat and drink.' But this was in an age 'when men yet believed in groves and mounds, in holy places and palings.'[4] It is probable that the unbelief as regards the old religion was a greater cause of the cruelties of the viking age than the belief itself. Adam of Bremen writes that about that time a Christian traveller had related that he had seen seventy-two dead bodies of immolated men and animals hanging in the grove of the temple at Upsala, which shone with gold and had the images of Odin, Thor, and Frey set up in the interior. In German countries the Teuton religion had ceased to exercise any power long before that time, while in other parts of Europe, as in the Baltic provinces, it may have had its devotees for yet a few generations.

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[1] Adam Brem. iv. 26. [2] *Yngl. Saga*, 6 f.
[3] Strabo, vii. 2–3; see also art. OLD AGE (Teutonic).
[4] Geijer, *Hist. of the Swedes*, ch. ii. p. 32.

SACRIFICE (Human).—See HUMAN SACRIFICE.

SACRILEGE.—See TABU, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Primitive and Savage).

SACRILEGE (Greek and Roman).—When the Greek term *ἱεροσυλία* and the Latin *sacrilegium* were used by lawyers of the classical periods, they implied, like the corresponding phrases in modern systems of law, the removal from sacred places of property dedicated to sacred uses. Sacrilege was a form of theft, distinguished from other forms only by the nature of the objects affected. But in the later forms of ancient law, and still more in popular usage, the idea of sacrilege was stretched far beyond these limits. There was a natural tendency to regard as cognate, and as deserving the same punishment, many other offences which could be viewed as outrages on the dignity of gods, or of beings raised above the ordinary human level, especially autocratic rulers and the spirits of the dead.

I. *GREEK.*—**1. Temples.**—In Athens the strict definition of the crime of sacrilege made it consist in the robbery of movable property dedicated to a divinity from his temple and not from the sacred precincts outside it (Syrianus, *ad Hermog.* iv. 497, ed. C. Walz, Stuttgart, 1833). A crime against the protecting gods of the State was a crime against the State itself, and hence in all periods the conceptions of sacrilege and treason lay very near together. One and the same Athenian statute punished both these iniquities (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I. vii. 22). Ancient Greek writers treat both, along with murder, as the most heinous breaches of law (Plato, *Laws*, 854, and elsewhere; Antiphon, *de Herodis cæde*, 10). In Athens the capital penalty was assigned to the sacrilegious, and it was accompanied by a confiscation of property and a prohibition against the burial of the offender in Attic ground. But execution was not a special mark of reprobation, since it was allotted to smaller crimes, when regarded as directed against the nation, the procedure being that called *γραφή*. Even the common thief could be so treated, and especially the stealer of clothes, the cutpurse, the burglar, and the kidnapper (Xen. *Memorabilia*, I. ii. 62). And in all these cases the amount of the property involved was immaterial (Isocrates, *c. Lochitem*, 6). Such was the theory of the Athenian law; in practice it was not always carried out with strict severity. Stealing from the precincts of a temple or appropriating money belonging to the temple was often dealt with as ordinary theft. Apparently there was a form of charge for 'appropriating sacred property' (*κλοπὴ ἱερῶν χρημάτων*), which led to less stringent procedure than was assigned for sacrilege. In many directions we find extensions of the idea of *ἱεροσυλία*. Demosthenes (*c. Timocratem*, 120) qualifies as sacrilege the withholding of tithes due to a temple. In Greek inscriptions the endeavour to protect property given over to sacred uses is carried further. At Iasos an inscribed column set forth the rights of certain priests, and any one who made away with the pillar or even damaged the inscription was to be treated as *ἱερόσυλος* (W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*, Leipzig, 1898–1901, no. 602). At Teos in Asia Minor there was a benefaction for the education of boys and girls, and he who embezzled the funds was to suffer the penalties inflicted by the laws on the sacrilegious. The offender was also to be held accursed, like the offender against early Roman laws on whom the doom was pronounced, 'Sacer esto' (*ib.* no. 513). At Dyme in the Peloponnese stealing sacred treasure and coining it entailed death (*ib.* no. 513). In the island of Syros offences against the festival of Demeter were sacrilegious (*ib.* no. 680).

There was in Athens a form of prosecution for *ἀσέβεια* ('impiety'), which to some extent overlapped that for *ἱεροσυλία*, but it included a much wider range of crimes against the dignity of beings and possessions under divine protection. Polybius (xxxvii. 1) describes this impiety as directed against gods, parents, and the dead. The mutilation of the Hermæ in Athens, which occurred about the time when the expedition against Sicily started in 415 B.C., is a famous example of this class of wrong, which included contempt for the gods of the city, violation of the mysteries of Eleusis, and similar errors. To injure sacred olives in Attica entailed banishment and confiscation.

2. Asylum.—A very important kind of impiety recognized all over Hellas, and specially characteristic of the Hellenic peoples as opposed to those of Italy and the barbaric West generally, was the violation of the right of asylum. To drag away suppliants who had committed themselves to the protection of an altar or the precincts of a temple was an enormity. In wars between Greeks a shrine was deemed inviolable (*ἄσυλον*) (Thucydides, iv. 97). In general persons who had been condemned by a regular court or had undergone deprivation of civic privilege (*ἀτιμία*) had no right to the protection of the god. The Spartans, however, held even these to be immune if they sought asylum (Polybius, iv. 35). There is a complaint in the *Ion* of Euripides that the inviolable sanctuary protects the unjust and the just alike (line 1315). The Hellenic theory that all sacred places should afford a refuge to suppliants was of course often rudely broken through in practice. For such impiety there was ordinarily no secular penalty. The divine being was left to avenge these wrongs, which he oftentimes did through human instruments. A curse would lie upon the offender and his progeny. Great families could be made to suffer politically for the sins of their ancestry.

Megacles, the head of the great Athenian family of the Alcmæonidæ, in 612 B.C. treacherously slew Cylon, who had attempted to make himself despot in Athens, and his followers, when they had shielded themselves in the temple of Athene on the Acropolis, and had surrendered on a promise that their lives should be spared. The religious blight that lay on the house was repeatedly exploited for political purposes in the two centuries that followed. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war Sparta demanded that the Alcmæonidæ should be expelled from Attica. This was a blow aimed at Pericles, who was an Alcmæonid on his mother's side. He parried the attack by calling attention to the impious stain (*ἄγος*) that rested on Sparta for having torn away Helots from the very sacred sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus. The Spartans themselves believed that the great earthquakes at Sparta in 464 B.C. came as a punishment inflicted by Poseidon himself, the 'earthshaking' god.

Sometimes it seems to have been thought that the divine vengeance might be escaped if the refugee were done to death without shedding of blood.

Thus the Spartan king Pausanias, who had commanded against the Persians, was walled in at the temple of Athene Chalkioikos, and perished of hunger.

Sometimes a suppliant was forced to surrender by the application of fire. On the other hand, there are not wanting remarkable examples of the protection afforded by the holy precincts.

In 445 B.C. another king of Sparta, Pleistoanax, fell under suspicion of having been in collusion with the enemy, and was condemned to pay a heavy fine. He took shelter in the sacred enclosure (*τέμενος*) which surrounded the temple of Zeus Lykaios at Megalopolis, and there lived for nineteen years (Thuc. v. 16). His son Pausanias had a similar fate. Being convicted of treason, he fled to the shrine of Athene Alea at Tegea and lived out his life in her domain.

The right of sanctuary accorded in lands to which Hellenic culture extended was important to slaves, and was one of many influences which rendered slavery on the Eastern side of the ancient

world less grievous than on the Western. In Athens the temple of Theseus was a notable refuge, and in Laconia that of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus. The tricky slave who, after committing some misdeed, seated himself on an altar and jeered at his owner was a common figure in the later Greek comedy. The scene is to be found on a number of ancient works of art, and has been transferred by Plautus from Greek originals to his *Rudens* and *Mostellaria*. Sometimes the priest of a shrine would arbitrate between the slave and his master; of this we have an illustration in an inscription from the temple of Apollo Karneios at Andania in Messenia (Dittenberger, no. 653, line 81 ff.). Athenian law permitted a slave who had taken sanctuary owing to cruel treatment to demand that he should be sold to another master.

As time went on, this right of asylum, having been widely extended in barbarian regions which fell under Hellenic influence, naturally became less effective, and conceptions of the inviolability of sacred places became confused. In Attica, so far as the free citizens were concerned, the privilege of sanctuary seems to have died out, because a burgess who had been condemned in a court was held to have no right of access to sacred places. The Acropolis of Athens, which had sheltered Cylon, protected no conspirators in the later time. Among Greeks generally the degree of respect in which consecrated buildings and ground were held varied greatly. Sometimes the sanctity of a consecrated spot was recognized only by the inhabitants of the country in which it was situated. In other instances there was wider, and only in a few universal, recognition. In the case of fugitives from foreign countries extradition was to some extent practised. The evidence of coins and inscriptions, as well as literature, shows that a very great number of towns in Asia Minor claimed inviolability, not only for their temples with the precincts, but for a wider area and sometimes for the whole territory of the city. Naturally there was a great desire to obtain from dynasts and free communities a formal acquiescence in these claims. Alexander and his successors often responded to appeals in such matters. Sometimes ancient privilege was definitely enlarged. Mithridates increased the extent of the holy enclosure of Artemis at Ephesus. The Romans followed the earlier precedents. L. Scipio bestowed like favour on Magnesia after his victory there; and Sulla, Julius Cæsar, Mark Antony, Augustus, and other Romans took similar action in a number of cases. Inscriptions record extraordinary activity on the part of commonwealths desirous of obtaining admission of the sanctity of their temples and the land round them; *e.g.*, we have a remarkable list of towns which confirmed the inviolability of the temple of Hecate at Stratonice (Dittenberger, *Orientis Græcæ Inscr.*, Leipzig, 1903–05, no. 441). A record of places entitled to be regarded as inviolable seems to have been kept at Delphi (*ib.* no. 228). Often the compact had only a political value, and the title 'inviolate' (ἄσυλος) was a mere compliment. So—to take one example from many—the Ætolians contracted to treat as holy the temple of Athene Nikephoros at Pergamon, as a mark of respect for the king. Agreements of the sort frequently have reference to the establishment of games and festivals connected with temples. It was an attraction to visitors to know that the sanctity of the territory to which they were to travel was generally admitted.

Such compliments were often purely personal—*i.e.*, the inviolability was conferred on individuals as a distinction. We have a very long series of inscriptions of this kind, many of them interesting. That great and wide-spread gild, the company of Dionysiac artists, passed for inviolable throughout the Greek world.

The Greek right of asylum, as claimed by temples in Asia Minor, became a trouble to the Roman government. At the sanctuaries were wont to assemble throngs of insolvent debtors, criminals of all sorts, slaves, and every class of refugee. The injury to local administration came to be so serious that in the reign of Tiberius a great inquisition was held into the privileges which were asserted. As Tacitus drily remarked, a god would shield the scoundrelisms of mankind as though they belonged to his own ritual (*Ann.* iii. 60). The senate grew weary of the innumerable claims and authorized the consuls to deal with them, referring to the body only doubtful cases. The list of *asyla* was obviously cut down with severity. See art. ASYLUM.

3. Tombs.—There is little information concerning protection for the sanctity of tombs in the age of Greek independence. But the sepulchral monument was very commonly regarded as a kind of shrine. The 'tomb-breaker' (τυμβώρυχος) was punished as impious by public indictment under Athenian law, and generally in the Greek States. By permission of authority pecuniary penalties for violation were also created, and sometimes set forth on tombs, recoverable in court by any common prosecutor. The crime of injuring sepulchres was sometimes brought under the head of sacrilege (ἱεροσυλία) and sometimes under that of impiety (ἀσέβεια). (See Mommsen, *Röm. Strafrecht*, p. 821, n. 2.)

II. *ROMAN.* — In some important respects sacrilege and impiety were treated differently on the Eastern and the Western sides of the ancient world.

1. Temples.—In the Roman law of the republican and early imperial times *sacrilegium* was defined as robbery of movable objects dedicated to a divinity in his own house (Cicero, *de Leg.* ii. 22). Theoretically this offence could be committed only against Roman civic gods, for each commonwealth would punish crimes committed against its special divinities. The extension of protection to non-Roman shrines by the Roman government was a matter of favour. But the public mind at Rome was early shocked by outrages upon temples committed by Romans in allied and even in hostile States.

Thus Fulvius Flaccus, who pillaged the temple of Juno at the Lacinian promontory soon after the Hannibalic war, and Pleminius, the violator of temples in S. Italy during the war, and Fulvius Nobilior, who plundered Ambracia a little later, were reprobated by opinion, and expiation was in such cases sometimes made by the government.

The robbery by Q. Servilius Cæpio and his accomplices in 104 B.C. of the gold deposited in the temple of Apollo in Tolosa was punished by a Roman court as an offence against the Roman treasury, into which booty taken from an enemy ought to be paid. But the public belief was that the god sent to a miserable death all who had stained their hands by the outrage (Aul. Gell. III. ix. 7). In the late Republic the feeling of Roman officials about such matters had become gravely corrupted. But the popular estimate remained the same. In the strict interpretation of the Roman lawyers a man was not sacrilegious unless he stole from the holy place something which had been so dedicated as to become the actual property of the god. For full sanctity dedication by public authority was necessary. In doubtful cases the *pontifices* decided. Cicero indeed declared that what was entrusted to the god's keeping was in the same case (*de Leg.* ii. 22). This was a very important matter, since the temples served often the purpose of the modern banks, and the officials made money for the divinity by lending the capital deposited with

them. The question seems to have been in dispute until it was authoritatively decided by the emperor Severus that robbery of this kind was not sacrilege, but theft (*Digest.* xlviii. 13. 6. 5). In some respects the privileges of a temple depended on what was called the *lex templi*, which was laid down for the regulation of all matters connected with it. The law of the temple of Diana on the Aventine hill in Rome seems often to have served as a model. (See H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinæ*, Berlin, 1892–1906, nos. 112 and 4907.)

It seems clear that the law drew a distinction between dedicated objects and money belonging to a temple. Theft of this *pecunia sacra* was classed as *peculatus, i.e.* appropriation of moneys belonging to the State. There was a single statute (*lex Iulia*) dealing with the two offences of *peculatus* and *sacrilegium* (*Digest.* xlviii. 13). The distinction between sacred and national property was often not drawn (cf. *CIL* i. 185, 6: 'aut sacrum aut poublicom').

Instances are not wanting of an appropriation of sacred treasures by the government in times of crisis. Thus, *e.g.*, Sulla in 82 B.C. melted down the gold and silver possessions of the temples in order to provide pay for his soldiers (Val. Max. VII. vi. 4).

The Roman tradition was that in very early days the secular punishment of sacrilege was death. In the historic age it was pecuniary until a *lex Iulia* passed either by Cæsar or by Augustus added the penalty of exile. In the imperial period the personal suffering that might be inflicted was more severe. In the reign of the emperor Tiberius the form of exile called *deportatio* was introduced (Quintilian, III. x. 1). In accordance with the general custom which was established by the end of the 2nd cent. A.D., lighter chastisement was imposed on the rigidly defined class of the 'more honourable' (*honestiores*) than on the others, the 'more humble' (*humiliores*). Ulpian (early in the 3rd cent.) stated that in his time many had been condemned to the arena, to perish by the wild beasts, or to be burned alive or crucified (*Digest.* xlviii. 13. 4. 2). Theft from shrines privately consecrated was regarded as 'more than theft (*furtum*) and less than sacrilege' (*ib.* xlviii. 13. 9. 1).

Corresponding to the form of prosecution for ἀσέβεια in Attic law, there was an indictment for injuring religion (*crimen læsæ religionis*) in Rome, and the line between this and sacrilege tended to be loosely drawn. The tendency was stimulated by the partial divinization of the living emperor; and this cause also helped to confuse the distinction between treason (*maiestas*) and sacrilege and the contempt of religion. Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 24) blames Augustus for inflicting death or exile on the paramours of his daughter Iulia and her daughter Iulia. He qualified their fault 'by the serious title of injured religious usage (*læsarum religionum*) and treason (*violatæ maiestatis*).' This is an early example of the elasticity of the criminal law in all matters that could be described by any stretch as affecting the sacred person of the emperor. Ulpian, early in the 3rd cent., described treason as *quasi sacrilegium*. His lawyer's conscience would hardly allow him to identify completely the two offences. But popular usage had already obliterated the distinction. Tertullian spoke of the Christians being charged with *sacrilegium* (*Apol.* 2). The *Acta* of the martyrdom of Symphorianus (A.D. 179) indicate him as guilty of *maiestatis sacrilegium*—a curious expression (T. Ruinart, *Acta primorum martyrum*, Paris, 1689, p. 129). The refusal to take an oath by the genius of the emperor was sufficient ground for the indictment (Tert. *Apol.* 32). The emperor Constans II. treated coining as sacrilegious, and the definition was extended even to less serious crimes. A great variety of infringements of imperial edicts could be so treated. In this connexion it may be noted that even after the acceptance of Christianity the rulers and all that appertained to them retained in official language the quality of 'sacred' and 'divine.'

After the time of Constantine very many offences against Christianity and the orthodox beliefs and the property and privileges of the Church and clergy were regarded in the light of sacrilege. An imperial edict of the year 380 stamps as sacrilegious 'those who either by ignorance confuse religious law or by carelessness outrage it and scorn it' (*Cod. Justin.* ix. 29. 1). This appears to have been at first directed against bishops on the eastern side of the empire who were lukewarm in repressing heresy.

2. Tombs.—In the view of the Romans, which spread throughout the West, a tomb was a shrine dedicated to the spirit of the dead. Inscriptions not uncommonly present the two denotations as alternatives. The emperor Gordian, in the 3rd cent., treated the violation of a place of burial as *crimen læsæ religionis* (Cod. ix. 19. 1); and Julian, with some exaggeration, declared that the 'ancestors' of the Romans had looked upon the crime as *sacrilegium*. He assimilated the penalties of the two offences (*ib.* ix. 19. 4). In popular usage this view had long been adopted (*CIL* vi. 10120). For a long time, however, wrongs done to monuments and places of sepulture had been vindicated by pecuniary damages, which parties legally interested could recover by the aid of the *prætor urbanus*. Only gradually did *sepulcri violatio* come to be regarded as in the full sense a public crime. In innumerable extant inscriptions from tombs of the imperial age mention is made of particular sums of money which an offender may be compelled to pay. It appears that in Rome the authority of the *pontifices* was required to render the penalty effective, while, outside, permission was required from the municipal authorities. At first the fines, which might be sued for by any prosecutor, went in Rome into the coffers of the *pontifices* and Vestal Virgins, and elsewhere into the municipal treasuries. Condemnation in such a case, though not regarded as strictly criminal, carried with it the disabilities which were connoted by the term *infamia*. It seems probable that general statutes prescribed maxima which might be exacted. These maxima were not the same in all the quarters of the empire.

About the middle of the 2nd cent. A.D. the crime of desecrating tombs had evidently become very prevalent, and fresh means were sought of protecting them from attack. The custom was introduced of devoting part of the fines to the senatorial treasury (*ærarium*) or the imperial exchequer (*fiscus*), which before long became the sole public treasury. Sometimes a share remained for the local municipal exchequer (Mommsen, pp. 812–815, with notes). The destruction of tombs to provide material for new buildings became, in spite of these fines, increasingly common, and Christianity even stimulated the process. Criminal punishment, which in the age of Cæsar had been possible only where violence had been used (under the *lex Iulia de vi privata*), was extended to all instances of the offence, and the punishments became more and more severe. The methods of protection afforded to sepulchres by fines became common in Italy and all over the eastern side of the empire, in the Græcized lands of the East, but did not spread generally over the West.

3. Asylum.—The right of asylum attached to

temples, which was of immemorial antiquity among the Greeks, was not an indigenous Roman or Italic institution. It finds a place in the fable of the foundation of Rome by Romulus; but that is only an example of Greek imagination playing on the darkness of pre-historic times; and no Latin term could be discovered which was the equivalent of ἄσυλον. In the desire to support the ancient tale, scholars have ransacked the records of Roman religion to find a divinity whose shrine might conceivably have possessed the right of sanctuary, but in vain. When Dionysius of Halicarnassus (iv. 26) spoke of the temple of Diana on the Aventine as sacred and inviolable, he perhaps had a hazy recollection of its long connexion with the plebeian tribunes, whose persons were sacrosanct. Only when Julius Cæsar was deified a temple was founded which was possessed of the privilege of asylum (Dio Cass. xlvii. 19). As the persons of the emperors were in a way above human level, the custom grew of taking refuge at an imperial statue. It became a public nuisance and caused trouble to the senate (Tac. *Ann.* iii. 36, 60, iv. 67; Suet. *Tib.* 53). Soldiers in the camp sought protection from the imperial effigy in the camp shrine (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 17). Slaves who fled to the temples of the gods and the statues of the emperors had to be restrained. Often they were warned off by inscriptions. But Antoninus Pius laid down that, if it were found that their masters had treated them intolerably, they might claim, as they could under old Attic law, to be sold to other masters (Gaius, i. 53).

LITERATURE.—Information is to be found on these matters in works on Greek and Roman antiquities, of which the following may be mentioned: H. E. Meier and G. F. Schömann, *Der attische Process*[2], 2 vols., Berlin, 1883–87; C. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten*, 3 vols., Heidelberg, 1841–52; Pauly-Wissowa, esp. *s.vv.* 'Asylon' and 'Hierosulias Graphē (ἱεροσυλίας γραφή)'; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.vv.* 'Asylum,' 'Hierosulia,' and 'Sacrilegium' (where references will be found to special monographs); T. Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht*, Leipzig, 1899 (which includes much information about later Greek usage). J. S. REID.

SADDHARMA-PUṆḌARĪKA.—See LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW.

SADDUCEES.

—As usually understood, 'Sadducees' is the name of a party which was engaged in controversy and conflict with the Pharisees down to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in A.D. 70 and even later. Did this party stand for positions distinctively and genuinely religious? Did it represent the old conservative scribism, which had within it a large priestly element? Or was it primarily political in character? These questions have been raised by recent criticism, and it is necessary at the outset to face the issues opened up by them.

1. **The Sadducees primarily an ecclesiastical party.**—G. Hölscher, in an important monograph,[1] has argued that the Sadducees are to be regarded not as an organized party, with definite and positive beliefs, but as 'the lax, the scoffers who make merry over the strict religious practice of the pious, as the infidels and godless.' They represented a tendency which favoured Græco-Roman culture and enlightenment, and which was influential among the rich and high-class Jews, especially those who had relations with the Roman government. The attitude of the Sadducees towards religious questions was purely negative, being fundamentally determined by political and cultural considerations. They were not recruited, as is commonly supposed, from the priestly nobility of Jerusalem, but included the rich merchants, officials, and others. The Sadducees were thus not a religious party at all, but simply a body of people loosely bound together by a common interest to maintain the existing *régime*. The name is explained as meaning 'Zadokites,'[1] and was given to them by their opponents, the Pharisees, who borrowed it from an earlier age, the period of Antiochus Epiphanes, when the descendants of Zadok, who then filled the high-priestly office, identified themselves with Hellenism in its most dangerous forms. It could thus, according to Hölscher, be used appropriately at a later time to brand with ignominy similar tendencies which would appear to the Pharisees to be godless and unpatriotic.

This theory seems to have been suggested by the later unhistorical use of the term 'Sadducee' as an equivalent of 'free-thinker' or 'Epicurean.' In the later Rabbinical literature 'Sadducee' is often used in this loose way. But in the earlier sources, Josephus and the NT, Sadduceeism appears to be combined with certain definite religious positions of a conservative kind. And this is, no doubt, historical.

It may be assumed, then, that the Sadducees represented the old priestly party of which the earlier Sōpherîm were largely composed; that they inherited the cautious and conservative orthodoxy of which the book of Ecclesiasticus is probably an excellent expression; and that the division between the two elements which became the opposed parties of Sadducees and Pharisees did not occur till the Maccabæan period.

2. **Name and antecedent.**—The best explanation of the name is that already assumed above and first proposed by A. Geiger, viz. that 'Sadducees' (Gr. Σαδδουκαῖοι) means 'Zadokites'; and the Heb. צדוק (point צדוקי) is an adjective meaning an adherent of the בְּנֵי צָדוֹק.[2] The 'sons of Zadok' were the members of the priestly family who traced their descent back to Zadok, head of the priesthood in the days of David and Solomon (cf. 1 K 1^{34} 2^{35}). They were singled out by Ezekiel (44^{10-15}) as worthy to be entrusted with supreme authority in the Temple; and in fact members of this family formed the Temple-hierarchy down to the time of Ben Sira, who, in the psalm preserved in the Hebrew text of Sir 51^{12}—if it be genuine, as it almost certainly is—gives thanks to 'Him that chooseth the sons of Zadok to be priests.' At a later time the 'sons of Zadok' (*i.e.* the priestly aristocracy) succumbed to the seductive influence of Hellenism (especially in the time of the Seleucidæ). It is possible that at this period the name 'Sadducee' was coined by the 'pious' (the Hasîdîm) as a term of reproach for those who followed the degenerate priestly aristocracy, and that, when these ceased to hold the office of high-priest, which was usurped by the Hasmonæan princes, the party name was retained for the adherents of the old high-priestly families among the priests. On the other hand, it is not certain that the designation 'Zadokite' (צדוקי) was actually given by opponents in the first place. It may well have been the title assumed by the conservative element in the priesthood who, after the disappearance of the old Zadokite high-priests, may have wished, under the altered conditions that grew up in the 2nd cent. B.C., to perpetuate the traditions of an earlier time. It is clear, as we shall see, that the Sadducæan party did stand for an older religious tradition and practice; and the most reasonable hypothesis is that it consisted essentially of the priestly party which upheld conservative priestly traditions. The later high-priests were no doubt, as a rule, adherents of this party. It is unfortunate that we have no statement of the Sadducæan position from

[1] *Der Sadduzäismus*, Leipzig, 1906.

[1] *I.e.* בְּנֵי צָדוֹק.

[2] A philological objection has been urged on the ground of the double ד (δ); but this may be explained as compensatory.

themselves,[1] unless the 'Zadokite' work discovered and published by S. Schechter represents, as is possible, the views of a section of this party. The result is that their religious positions have been placed before us only by opponents. No doubt the Sadducees appeared to their Pharisaic opponents often to take up positions inimical to the 'truth.' It is easy to understand how, in the bitterness engendered by conflict, the very name of 'Sadducee' came to be identified, in Pharisaic circles, with 'infidel.' R. Leszynsky,[2] who accepts the connexion of the name 'Sadducees' with 'the sons of Zadok,' finds also a cardinal difference of principle between them and their Pharisaic opponents on the question of the Messianic hope. Whereas the latter held fast to the old popular expectation of a Davidic Messiah, the Sadducees, he contends, maintained that the kingship was vested in the priestly line. For them the Pentateuch was decisive on this point. True, the Pharisees could appeal to Gn 49[10] ('The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet'); but other passages could be cited from the Tôrāh which could be held to override the Messianic interpretation of this passage. Had not Aaron and his tribe been specially chosen by God, and had not God concluded an eternal covenant with Phinehas? But the strongest proof-text was found in Ex 19[6] 'And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation.' It might be inferred from this declaration that the priests were also destined to possess the kingdom, and not a family of the tribe of Judah. That a controversy was in fact focused on this text is a not improbable inference from the phenomena of the ancient versions, where particular pains seem to have been taken to exclude the possibility of such an interpretation as the assumed Sadducæan one. Thus the Palestinian Targum renders the verse: 'And before Me you shall be crowned kings, and sanctified priests, and a holy people.'[3] There was also the precedent of the priest-king Melchizedek (Gn 14[18ff.]), to which the Hasmonæan priest-kings undoubtedly appealed when they assumed the title of 'priest of God most High,'[4] and which was cited also by the writer of Ps 110[4], which many scholars think was originally written in honour of Simon Maccabæus. The ascription of this Psalm to 'David' is doubtless due to Pharisaic influence. Leszynsky thinks that Pss 89 and 132 are Pharisaic protests against this Sadducæan doctrine. It is easy to see how the assumption of the priestly and regal dignity in one person by the Maccabæan princes, who themselves belonged to one of the most distinguished priestly families, would appeal to those who held the view just referred to, while it would excite the bitter hostility of the Pharisees, as in fact it did. Doubtless it was due to this hostility that both John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannæus found it expedient to recommend an arrangement of the succession which would separate the two offices.[5]

The name 'Melchizedek,' which may be interpreted to mean 'true king,' would also suggest a significant reference to 'Sadducee.' Its latter element 'zedek' is strikingly suggestive of 'Zadok,' and it almost inevitably brings to mind the idea that Melchizedek is really equivalent to 'Zadok-king,' or 'Sadducæan-king.' For the history of the division between the two parties see art. PHARISEES, §§ 1, 3.

3. Doctrinal beliefs and principles.—The Rabbinical literature contains many references to points of controversy between the Sadducees and Pharisees, which it will be impossible to enumerate fully and discuss here. It will suffice to point out and endeavour to estimate the significance of the fundamental points of difference.

When Josephus depicts the Sadducees as representing nobility, power, and wealth, and as engrossed in political affairs and interests,[1] all that this need mean is that the high-priest and his *entourage* were members of the Sadducæan party. It need not mean that the ideals of this party were purely worldly and political. Nor because a high-priest was a Sadducee does it follow that he was necessarily destitute of religious convictions. The numerous points of controversy between the Pharisees and Sadducees all proceed from radical divergence of principles.[2]

The most important of these was the position taken up with regard to the written Law (the Pentateuch). Both parties assigned supremacy to the Law. But, whereas the Pharisees supplemented the written Law by the oral tradition, and placed this on an equality with the Mosaic Tôrāh, the Sadducees refused to accept any ordinance as having Scriptural authority unless it was based directly upon the written Tôrāh. They also claimed, as priests, on the authority of Dt 17[8ff.], the legal power to decree and revoke ordinances from time to time of a temporary character. This position has been well stated by J. Z. Lauterbach:[3]

'Considering themselves as interpreters of the Law, like their fathers, they could see no reason for departing from the rules and methods, or losing the privileges of their fathers. Like their fathers, they held that there was only one law of absolute authority, and this was the Law of Moses as contained in the Pentateuch, which the people of the time of Ezra had sworn to keep and obey. . . . The priestly group and their followers, who formed the Sadducean party, did not . . . differ at all from the former priestly teachers, their ancestors, the Soferim, in their attitude towards the Law. They accepted and followed, strictly, the simple, sound interpretations of the Soferim, based upon the plain sense of the words of the Law. They rightly assumed that, as a code of laws, the Torah is clear, distinct, and unambiguous in expression, that every commandment or law is stated in plain and simple words, easily understood by men for whom the laws and commandments are intended. . . . The Sadducees held that "the Torah speaks in human language," a principle which was retained long after even among the Pharisees by the representatives of the older Halakah, which has many points in common with the teachings of the Sadducees. . . . They would not devise ingenious methods to explain away a written law, or give it a new meaning not warranted by the plain sense of the words. They also held in reverence the unwritten laws and traditional customs and usages of which, as priests, they were in possession. They observed them in most cases in the same manner as their fathers had done.'

It is probably a mistake to say that they 'rejected' the prophetic and other Scriptures outside the Pentateuch. Their attitude towards these books is well expressed by a sentence quoted by C. Taylor in his edition of the *Pirqe Âbhôth*, Excursus iii.:

'And therefore I say that the Prophets and Hagiographa are called words of Qabbalah [*i.e.* mere tradition], because they were received by διαδοχή [succession], . . . and by no means are they equal to the five books, which are all precepts and ordinances.'[4]

Whereas the Pharisees would harmonize an apparent contradiction between the Tôrāh and the prophets by exegetical devices which might conform both to a part of the oral law, the Sadducees did not hesitate to reject outright doctrines and practices which could not be based primarily on the written Law.[5] An interesting example may be cited to illustrate these points.

[1] No doubt Sirach represents the older orthodoxy inherited by the Sadducees; but the Sadducæan party is later.

[2] *Die Sadduzäer*, Berlin, 1912, p. 95 ff.

[3] See R. H. Charles, *The Book of Jubilees*, London, 1902, p 116, for a full list of the passages, and add 2 Mac 2[17]

[4] Jos. *Ant.* XVI. vi. 2.

[5] Cf. Jos. *Ant.* XIII. xi. 1, xv. 5.

[1] *Ant.* XVIII. i. 4.

[2] This is denied by M. H. Segal in 'Pharisees and Sadducees,' in *Exp*, 8th ser., vol. xiii. [1917] 81 ff. Segal maintains that the Sadducees had no religious principles, but were solely interested in securing political power. His arguments are unconvincing.

[3] In *Studies in Jewish Literature issued in Honour of Prof. Kaufmann Kohler*, London, 1913, p. 182 ff.

[4] *Sayings of the Fathers*[2], Cambridge, 1897, p. 114.

[5] Cf. Jos. *Ant.* XIII. x. 6.

A certain Jacob of Kefar Nibburaya (A.D. 4th cent.) taught in Tyre certain practices which were regarded by R. Ḥaggai as heterodox. The rabbi summoned the delinquent before him, and asked him to justify himself. Jacob quoted passages from the Law (Nu 1^{18} and Gn 17^{12}). The rabbi declared that his teaching was wrong, and justified his view of its erroneousness by quoting a passage from the Hagiographa, viz. Ezr 10^{3}. Jacob was consequently condemned to be flogged. 'What!' he exclaimed, 'will you have me flogged on the strength of mere Ḳabbalah?'[1]

We have already seen that the Sadducees rejected the Messianic doctrine of the Pharisees, which looked for a Davidic Messiah, because they considered that the prophetic teaching on this subject was in conflict with that of the Tôrāh. They further rejected the Pharisaic doctrine of the resurrection of the body, on the same ground.[2] It should be noted that both in the Talmudic and in the NT passages just cited the question in debate is not, 'Is there a resurrection or not?' but rather, 'How can the resurrection be proved from the Tôrāh?' According to Ac 23^{8}, the Sadducees also denied the existence of angels and spirits. This can hardly mean, however, a mere denial of the reality of such existences, for it is obvious that the Pentateuch contains many narratives which affirm the activity and appearance of angels. The statement may possibly mean that they did not accept the developed and elaborated angelology and demonology—in which angels and demons were graded and assigned special names and functions—that had grown up in the Persian period under Persian and Babylonian influence. In matters of binding rule and law (Halākhāh) the Sadducees were, as we should expect, apt to press the literal and plain meaning of the letter of the Tôrāh. The most notorious example of this is their insistence on the literal interpretation of the law of retaliation: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth' (Ex 21^{24}).[3] Another instance is their famous controversy with the Pharisees over the method of reckoning Pentecost. They contended that the seven weeks from the offering of the 'omer' (first barley sheaf) to Pentecost should be counted as Lv $23^{15ff.}$ directs, 'from the morrow after the Sabbath,' 'Sabbath' being interpreted as the Saturday which fell in Passover week, with the consequence that Pentecost would always fall on a Sunday, whereas the Pharisees reckoned from the day immediately following the Passover (reckoned as a 'Sabbath'). Here, as generally, the Sadducæan rule undoubtedly conformed to ancient practice.[4] It was naturally within the Temple precincts that Sadducæan influence was strongest and most firmly entrenched. While the Pharisees were supreme outside the Temple, and even made their power felt within it for at least a century before A.D. 70—it must always be remembered that there were many Pharisaic priests—yet they did not secure absolute power in the Temple itself till about A.D. 50 to 60. Thus the Sadducees claimed that the high-priest's burnt-offering should be provided at his own expense, in accordance with Nu 28^{4} (where the singular is used), whereas the Pharisees insisted that the sacrifice was a national one, and should be provided out of the Temple treasury. Against the Pharisees they laid great stress on the high degree of purity of those who officiated at the preparation of the ashes of the red heifer,[5] and they extended the power of contamination to indirect as well as to direct contact.[1] On the other hand, they refused to accept the Pharisaic view that the scrolls of Holy Scripture 'defile the hands' like any holy vessel.[2] They also refused to countenance the ingenious method devised by the Pharisees for evading the strict Sabbath law, known as *'Erūb*. They opposed the popular festivity of the water-drawing, and its associated processions, which took place at the Feast of Tabernaclés. In all these cases they were faithful to their fundamental principle—that what could not be proved by the letter of the written Tôrāh was not to be made of binding obligation.

Reference has been made to the fact that the Sadducees, when they found it necessary to develop or innovate on the letter of the Law in order to meet the needs of the time, issued decrees or decisions on their own authority, as provided by the Law itself (Dt $17^{8ff.}$). But these 'decrees' were never put on a level with the letter of the Law; and they could be modified or abrogated as circumstances dictated. The evidence for the existence of such a 'Book of Decrees' (or legal decisions) is contained in the *Megillāth Ta'ănīth*,[3] iv., where under date of the 14th of Tammuz this 'book' (ספר גזירתא) is stated to have been finally abrogated (by the victory of the Pharisees over the Sadducees). The 'book' is explained by the glossator to mean the Sadducæan code of laws, or rather, it is probable, a collection of case-law. Instances are given of the harsh interpretation of Biblical law on which the Sadducees proceeded, and the day when this code was finally abrogated is marked as a festival.

With the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70 the power of the Sadducees, which had already been seriously impaired, still further declined. Though their influence was still apparent in various ways, and was later perpetuated, it would seem, by the Ḳaraites, their organized force as a party vanished with the Temple and the cultus.

4. The vitality and influence of Sadduceeism.—That Sadduceeism stood for something more than mere negations is evident from the persistence with which it waged its age-long conflict with Pharisaism. It even impressed itself, to some extent, on the latter, and we can see its influence especially in the conservative element among the Pharisees represented by the school of Shammai.[4] If, as is generally conceded, the book of Ben Sira represents the standpoint of the primitive Zadduḳim, it is clear that Sadduceeism inherited a positive, though conservative, theology. The attitude of Ben Sira, in this connexion, to the books of the Bible outside the Law is interesting. He quotes freely from all parts of the Hebrew Scriptures to illustrate his themes, though he would, of course, not found any doctrine on a book outside the Tôrāh, nor uphold such unless it could be proved from the Pentateuch.[5] We must also be on our guard against identifying Sadduceeism as a whole with the small body of the Temple hierarchy. Doubtless the high-priest and his immediate circle were (up to quite the last years of the existence of the Temple) members of the Sadducæan party. But the worldly and political character of this small section must not be imputed to the party as a whole. It must be remembered

[1] See *Qoheleth Rabbāh*, vii. 23. The rabbi evidently felt the force of this appeal, for he immediately cited a further proof from the Law itself (Dt 7³), whereupon Jacob gracefully submitted.

[2] Cf. T.B. *Sanh.* 90*b*; Mk 12^{18}.

[3] Cf. T.B. *Bābhā Qamma*, 84*a*; Mt 5^{38}.

[4] Another old view interpreted 'Sabbath' as = 'festival-week' in this passage (*i.e.* Nisan 15–21); its 'morrow' would then be Nisan 22; see the writer's Introd. to *The Book of Jubilees*, London, 1917, p. xviii.

[5] *Parah*, iii. 7.

[1] *Yad*, iv. 7.

[2] *Yad*, iv. 6.

[3] The *Megillāth Ta'ănīth*, in its original form, is written in Aramaic, and was probably compiled within the first decade of the Christian era. It enumerates 35 eventful days which were to be kept as joyful festivals, and which were reminders of glorious events in the life of the nation.

[4] After the destruction of the Temple the most consistent Shammaite was Eliezer b. Hyrḳanos (end of 1st–beginning of 2nd cent.). R. Jose the Galilæan (early 2nd cent.) maintained in his Halākhāh older conservative tradition.

[5] 1 Mac may also be a Sadducæan work, the companion book of 2 Mac being a Pharisaic counterblast.

that the gulf between the aristocratic priests and the main body of the priests was almost as marked as that between the conflicting parties. Doubtless among the priests generally there were many pious Sadducees as well as Pharisees. Nor must the possibility be lost sight of that there may have been different circles or schools of Sadducees, just as there were among the Pharisees—a possibility which recent discussion and research have made increasingly probable.

The whole question of Sadduceeism may be said to have entered on a new phase, owing to the remarkable discovery by Schechter of documents emanating from a Zadokite sect.[1] It is true that the exact value of this writing has not yet been finally settled, some scholars (*e.g.*, A. Büchler) impugning its early character; but, on the whole, its importance and genuineness as an early production, written before the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70, have been vindicated by critical discussion.[2] Not only Schechter, but Lévi, Leszynsky, Charles, G. Margoliouth, and Kohler believe the writing to be of early origin. Leszynsky, in his discussion of the Zadokite Fragments, has no difficulty in demonstrating its Sadducæan affinities, which are found especially in the rejection of Pharisaic tradition and in the recognition of the written Tôrâh as the only law-book. There are, however, two striking developments which, at first sight, are surprising in a Sadducæan document. A system of exegesis is adopted which is remarkably like that of the Pharisees. But, as Leszynsky remarks, we were already aware that Pharisaic methods of interpreting Scripture had a vogue in the later period (1st Christian cent.) far beyond the boundaries of Pharisaism proper. Both Jesus and Paul, the enemies of Pharisaic tradition, were ready, on occasion, to adopt Pharisaic methods of exegesis. The second striking development is the recognition of the sacred character of the prophetic writings. But here, again, it is unnecessary to suppose that all sections of Sadducees refused to recognize the sacred character of all books outside the Pentateuch. It may be true that certain sects of Sadducees did so, agreeing in this respect with the Samaritans. The Zadokite Fragments reveal striking features, which point to a Sadducæan origin. The glorification of the priesthood and the corresponding depreciation of the royal Davidic house, already apparent in Sirach (45 f.), are even more pronounced in this work.

'David is accused of ignorance of the Law (vii. 5). The title "king" (מלך) is replaced by that of "prince" (נשׂיא [vii. 4]). In ix. 7 the passage from Am 9^{11}, which promises the setting up of "the tabernacle of David that is fallen," is explained in such a way that all reference to David is got rid of; for "the king" is said to denote "the Congregation," and "the tabernacle of the king" to denote "the books of the Law."'[3]

This work has a Messianic expectation of its own. It looks forward to the advent of a Messiah 'from Aaron and from Israel.' In other words, it expects a priestly Messiah. From v.[6] it also appears that the author believed in immortality.

We have here, then, the Messianic manifesto of a party or section of the Sadducees, which may have differed from the main body in its acceptance of a Messianic hope and a doctrine of immortality (not resurrection of the body). Kohler regards it as a manifesto setting forth the claims of the Messiah of the Dositheian sect (Samaritan). But this is improbable.[1] According to pseudo-Tertullian,[2] Dositheus was the first to deny the Prophets, whereas the Fragments put them almost on an equality with the Law.

After our previous discussion we are prepared to discover, with Leszynsky, a Sadducæan element in certain apocryphal and pseudepigraphical books. These are the *Book of Jubilees*, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, the *Book of Enoch* (with the exception of the similitudes), and the *Assumption of Moses*. It is also noteworthy that Jesus seems to have sided with the Sadducees against the Pharisees on certain points. He, it is true, upheld the resurrection doctrine of the Pharisees against the Sadducees. But He certainly agreed with the latter in their main contention, viz. the rejection of the Pharisaic traditional law.

It may be said that recent investigation and discussion have revealed Sadduceeism in a new light, as an active, energetic movement, full of life, variety, and vital developments.

LITERATURE.—To the literature cited in the body of the art. and at the end of the art. PHARISEES add K. Kohler, art. 'Sadducees,' in *JE*; G. H. Box, in *Exp*, 8th ser., xv. [1918] 401 ff., xvi. [1918] 55 ff.; and A. Büchler, *Das grosse Synedrion in Jerusalem*, Vienna, 1902. Büchler's art. impugning the early character of the 'Zadokite Fragments' was published in *JQR*, new ser., iii. [1913] 429–485, and Schechter's rejoinder, *ib.* iv. [1914] 449–474.

G. H. Box.

SĀDHS.—The Sādhs are a unitarian sect of N. India, founded in 1543 by Bīrbhān, of Bijēsar, near Nārnaul in the S.E. Panjāb. The sect may be looked upon as an offshoot of the Rai Dāsīs (*q.v.*), Bīrbhān having claimed to be inspired by Ūdhō, or Uddhava, Dāsa, who was a pupil of Raī Dāsa; but, like Kabīr, they have wandered rather far from the Vaiṣṇava teaching of Rāmānanda, Raī Dāsa's master. Regarding the origin of the name, see art. SĀDHU. The Sādhs call upon God under the name Satnām, said to mean 'the True Name,' and among themselves employ Satnāmī as the name of the sect. The name Satnāmī (*q.v.*) is, however, also applied to at least two other sects.

The Sādhs are found in the United Provinces and in the Panjāb. Their principal seats are at Āgrā, Jaipur, Farrukhābād, and Mirzāpur in the former, and in the Districts of Delhi and Rohtak, close to Nārnaul, in the latter. Their number has not been accurately recorded, but probably amounts to between two and three thousand.

The following summary of the facts about this sect is given by Crooke:

'Adults are required to wear a white dress: and ornament and the use of rich apparel of every kind are prohibited. They never wear a cap, but use instead a turban of a peculiar shape. They are enjoined by their religion never to tell a lie and never to take an oath. They are in the same way prohibited from using any kind of intoxicant or any article which borders upon luxury. Wine, opium, *gānja*, *bhang*, betel and tobacco are abominations to them. They have an intense respect for animal life, which extends to even the smallest insect, and the use of any kind of animal food is strictly denounced. They will salute no one but the Divine principle, which they term Sat or "The Truth"; and when they meet a European or any superior they salute merely by raising the hands to the level of the breast. They detest idolatry and all outward forms of religious belief. They are very reticent about their beliefs, and it is only with the greatest difficulty that it has been possible to obtain a copy, which is probably incomplete, of the book of religious songs (*bānī*) which embody the principles of their faith. All controversy or argument on religious matters with strangers to the sect is reprobated. Their religious books, known as *pōthī*, are written in *Bhāshā*, or ordinary Hindi, and are not the work of any single author, but contain a number of songs, many of which are taken from the writings of Nānak and Kabir. These books are read almost daily in their chapel or meeting-house, which is known as *jumlaghar*, or "house of assembly," or *chaukī*, "station." The service takes place in the evening when all members of the sect, male and female, attend. This is their only form of worship.'[3]

The substance of these *pōthīs* is contained in a tract called *Ādi Upadēś*, or 'First Precepts,' which

[1] *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, vol. i., *Fragments of a Zadokite Work*, Cambridge, 1910.

[2] See esp. Israel Lévi in *REJ* lxi. [1911] 161–205; Leszynsky, *ib.* p. 142 ff.; Charles, 'The Fragments of a Zadokite Work,' in *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, Oxford, 1913, ii. 785–834; K. Kohler, 'Dositheus, the Samaritan Heresiarch,' in *AJTh* xv. [1911] 404–435.

[3] Charles, *Apoc. and Pseud. of OT*, ii. 796. It is significant that in T.B. *Sanh.* 100*b* 'the books of the Sadducees and the Book of Ben Sira' are classed together.

[1] We should hardly expect such a manifesto to be written in Biblical Hebrew.

[2] *Adv. omnes Hær.* i.

[3] *Tribes and Castes*, iv. 245.

includes the twelve *hukms*, or commandments of the sect. Put summarily,[1] these are:

(1) There is only one God. Worship thou Him. (2) Be modest. Adhere to thine own creed. Mix not with those of other faith. (3) Lie not. Speak not evil of any. Employ the tongue only for the praise of God. Steal not. Look not at improper things. (4) Listen not to evil discourse, nor to music or singing except of hymns. (5) Covet not. God is the Giver of all. (6) Declare thyself a Sādh, but engage not in controversy. (7) Wear white garments, and no ornaments or sectarian distinctions. (8) Avoid intoxicants, perfumes, tobacco. Bow not down to idols or to men. (9) Kill not. Take not by force. (10) A man may have only one wife, and a woman only one husband. The woman to be obedient to the man, and to eat his leavings. (11) Wear not a mendicant's garb, nor beg for alms. (12) Be not superstitious as to days, times, seasons, or omens. Seek only the will of God.

Raī Dāsa was a contemporary of Kabīr (*q.v.*), and his fellow-disciple. The teaching of the latter was strongly unitarian, and at the same time borrowed freely from the Christian Scriptures. It is evident that the unitarian doctrines of the Sādhs were borrowed, with the traces of Christianity evident in the above, either from Kabīr or from his successor Nānak (*q.v.*). In other respects, such as cosmogony, and the belief in transmigration and in *mukti* (final release), the doctrines of the Sādhs do not differ from those of other Vaiṣṇava Hindus.

The Sādhs, under the name of Satnāmīs, appear to have been the heroes of the revolt of Hindu devotees against Aurangzīb in 1672. The leaders were mendicant Satnāmīs, who were nicknamed by the people 'Mundiyās,' or 'Shavelings,' from their habit of shaving the body clean of all hair. Ḥāfī Ḫān, a contemporary, who gives the fullest account of this rising, describes them in the following terms:

'There were four or five thousand of these, who were householders in the *parganas* of Nārnaul and Mēwāt. These men dress like devotees, but they nevertheless carry on agriculture and trade, though their trade is on a small scale. In the way of their religion they have dignified themselves with the title of "Good name," this being the meaning of *Sat-nām*. They are not allowed to acquire wealth in any but a lawful calling. If any one attempts to wrong or oppress them by force, or by exercise of authority, they will not endure it. Many of them have weapons and arms.'[2]

This description, together with their connexion with Nārnaul, would be sufficient to identify them with the Sādhs, were it not for another and contradictory account given by Īśwara-dāsa Nāgara, the Hindu historian, also a contemporary:

'The Satnāmīs are extremely filthy and wicked. In their rules they make no distinction between Hindūs and Musalmāns, and eat pigs and other unclean animals. If a dog is served up before them, they do not show any disgust at it. In sin and immorality they see no blame.'[3]

This, however, is evidently written by a bigoted Hindu, and, in the light of Ḥāfī Ḫān's remarks, it may be considered as a false and libellous attack on a Hindu heresy which acknowledged no caste and refused to worship the customary Hindu deities.

Owing to oppression exercised by Aurangzīb's revenue officials, and led by an old prophetess who promised them invulnerability against the emperor's weapons, they rose in arms. Most of the royal troops were at the time engaged in S. India, and for a space the revolters had considerable success, defeating small local bodies of soldiers. Magical powers were soon attributed to them, and discontented landholders of the neighbourhood adhered to their cause. The revolt had acquired most serious proportions, and the rebels had sacked Nārnaul and other towns and had approached Delhi, when Aurangzīb sent against them a large force, protected by rival spells to counteract their magic. There was a bloody and obstinate battle, in which several thousands of the Satnāmīs were slain and the rest put to flight. This terminated the revolt.

[1] They are very diffuse, and contain much repetition. Full translations are given by Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, p. 354 f., and Crooke, iv. 248 f.

[2] *Ap.* Elliot, *Hist. of India*, vii. 294.

[3] Quoted by Jadunāth Sarkār, 'Satnamis and Sikhs,' in *The Modern Review*, xix. 385.

LITERATURE.—The principal authorities, on which the foregoing account has been based, are H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 352 ff., and W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 245 ff. Wilson gives some earlier authorities not quoted here. Crooke's account is especially full and valuable, and the reader is referred to it for further particulars. Cf. also *PNQ* i. [1833–34] 1033; *NINQ* i. [1891–92] 790, ii. [1892–93] 429; and D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Panjāb Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, § 521.

For the Satnāmī revolt see Sāki Musta'idd Ḫān, in H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India as told by its own Historians*, London, 1867–77, vii. 185 f., and Ḥāfī Ḫān, *ib.* p. 294 ff.; N. Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, tr. W. Irvine, do. 1907, ii. 167 ff.; Jadunāth Sarkār, 'Satnamis and Sikhs: 17th Century,' in *The Modern Review*, xix. [Calcutta, 1916] 385.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SADHAN-PANTHĪS.—The Sadhan-panthīs, a petty Vaiṣṇava sect of Benares, founded by Sadhan, a butcher, who is said to have lived there in the 17th cent., are really nothing more than a group of men of the despised butcher caste, who would not be received as members by any respectable Vaiṣṇava community, and therefore formed a sect for themselves. So far as is known, they have no distinctive tenets, professing to follow the ordinary Ramāwat doctrines (see art. RĀMĀNANDĪS).

In order to lend respectability to their founder, they assert that, although he sold meat, he never slaughtered animals, but purchased it ready slain. For weighing his wares he had a marvellous *śālagrāma* stone, which became any weight that was for the time required, from the smallest to the greatest. This was given to him by a wandering ascetic, and he worshipped it so devoutly that Viṣṇu was propitiated, and conferred upon him all his desires. When on a pilgrimage, a Brāhmaṇa woman fell in love with him, and, misinterpreting his rejection of her advances, murdered her husband. When Sadhan still refused to have anything to do with her, she burnt herself on her husband's funeral pyre. Sadhan thereupon remarked, 'No one knows the ways of woman; she kills her husband and becomes a *satī*,' which has passed into a proverb, and has been adopted as the tag for a popular folk-tale current in many parts of India.[1]

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 181, where the sect is called 'Sadhaná Panthis'; M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes in Benares*, Calcutta, Bombay, and London, 1872–81, i. 266.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SĀDHĀRAṆA BRĀHMA SAMĀJ.—When Keshab Chandra Sen married his daughter to the Mahārājā of Kuch Bihār in 1877, the majority of the members of his society, the Brāhma Samāj of India, rose in opposition and tried to depose him from the leadership.[2] Failing to do this, they left the Samāj, and, after consulting with the various Brāhma Samājes throughout the country, formed a new society, the Sādhāraṇa Brāhma Samāj. The word *sādhāraṇa* means 'general,' and corresponds to the broad, democratic character of the new society and its organization. The chief desire of the leaders was to continue the theistic teaching, social service, and philanthropy which had been Keshab's own programme when the Brāhma Samāj of India was founded; but they were also determined to have no autocratic leadership such as Keshab's rule had developed into.

The Sādhāraṇa Samāj has had no outstanding leader, and its history is a story of quiet steady growth without any remarkable events. It is now the one solid and influential section of the Brāhma

[1] See, *e.g.*, G. A. Grierson, *Hātim's Songs and Stories*, London, 1919, story iii.

[2] See art. BRĀHMA SAMĀJ, §§ 5–7.

movement; for the old and conservative Ādi Samāj has little vigour left, Keshab's New Dispensation Samāj is rendered impotent through divisions and quarrelling, and even the Prārthanā Samāj of Bombay shows little power to make progress. The Calcutta Samāj with its group of buildings in Cornwallis Street is by far the strongest of the Sādhāran societies, but there are many smaller bodies scattered over India. The governing organization is in Calcutta.

The work is carried on by a large general committee representative of all the local Samājes, and an executive committee. The actual workers are of three types—missionaries, unordained workers, and lay volunteers. There are eight ordained missionaries, and on them falls the heavy work of general supervision and of touring and preaching throughout India. The nine unordained workers are all grouped under the Sādhan Āśram, or Training Institute, in Calcutta, but there are branches in three other towns. In the Sevak Mandali, or Lay Workers' Union, there are fifty members.

Besides the ministerial work required in Calcutta and in the 47 affiliated Samājes, and the missionary propaganda, the most interesting feature of the work is the Brāhma Mission on the Khāsi Hills, where Brāhma unitarianism is being offered to uncultured hill-people, and various educational and philanthropic activities are carried on.

The propaganda of the Samāj seems to be most successful at present in the Telugu field and in Travancore.

The Samāj publishes a weekly in English called *The Indian Messenger* and a fortnightly in Bengali called *Tattvakaumudī*. East Bengal publishes a vernacular monthly called the *Sevaka*, while the *Brahmabādī* appears at Barisal, the *Brahmaprachāraka* in Lahore, and the *Dharmasādhanī* in Coconada. The Samāj in Madras publishes an English weekly, *Humanity*.

There is some reason for asking whether the Samāj is not nearing a crisis in its history. For many years the progressives have been able to keep what may be called the Hinduizing party within the Samāj well in check, but there are signs that the latter section is rapidly growing in power. The change is traceable in large measure to the increasing vigour and boldness of the various movements within Hinduism for its full defence and re-organization; but it has also been considerably hastened by the teaching and influence of Rabindra Nath Tagore. So far as one can see, the reactionaries have not yet agreed on a definite policy, but their teaching and opinions would unquestionably tend to check aggressive theism in favour of the more general atmosphere of the higher Hinduism. If this party should gain the upper hand, the Samāj will clearly be in grave peril.

The following, taken from the Report for 1910, is the official statement of the principles of the Sādhārana Samāj:

'(1) There is only one God who is the Creator, Preserver and Saviour of this world. He is spirit; He is infinite in power, wisdom, love, justice and holiness; He is omnipresent, eternal and blissful.

(2) The human soul is immortal, and capable of infinite progress, and is responsible to God for its doings.

(3) God is to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Divine worship is necessary for attaining true felicity and salvation.

(4) To love God and to carry out His will in all the concerns of life constitute true worship.

(5) Prayer and dependence on God and a constant realization of His presence are the means of attaining spiritual growth.

(6) No created object is to be worshipped as God, nor is any person or book to be considered as infallible and as the sole means of salvation; but truth is to be reverently accepted from all scriptures and from the teaching of all persons without distinction of creed or country.

(7) The Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man and kindness to all living beings are the essence of true religion.

(8) God rewards virtue, and punishes sin. His punishments are remedial and not eternal.

(9) Cessation from sin accompanied by sincere repentance is the only atonement for it; and union with God in wisdom, goodness and holiness is true salvation.'

LITERATURE.—Sivanath Sastri, *Hist. of the Brahmo Samaj*, Calcutta, 1911–12, ii. 119 ff., *Mission of the Brahmo Samaj*, do. 1910; J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915, pp. 54 f., 70 ff. J. N. FARQUHAR.

SĀDHU.—*Sādhu* is a Sanskrit word literally meaning 'straight,' and hence 'pure,' 'holy.' In modern India it is commonly applied, as an equivalent to 'saintlike,' to any respected Hindu saint or devotee. In the Hindī language the final *u* is commonly dropped, and the resultant word Sādh (*q.v.*) is also used to connote a certain sect.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SĀGAR, SAUGOR. — This island, at the mouth of the Hugli, Bengal (lat. 21° 36′ N.; long. 88° 2′ E.), is famous for its annual bathing fair held in January. It lasts for three days and is attended by a multitude of pilgrims from all parts of India, who visit the place to wash away their sins. Before British rule was established in Bengal, it was believed that suicide in the Ganges was a means of obtaining immediate beatification.

At this place, according to W. Ward, 'it is accounted an auspicious sign if the person is speedily seized by a shark, or an alligator; but his future happiness is supposed to be very doubtful if he should remain long in the water before he is drowned. The British Government, for some years past, has sent a guard of sepoys to prevent persons from murdering themselves and their children at this junction of the Ganges with the sea, at the annual festivals held in this place.' The same writer adds that in 1805 he saw a Brāhman woman 'dripping with wet and shivering with cold, who had just been prevented from drowning herself, and during my continuance there I heard of several mothers who had been prevented from drowning their children.'[1]

The island derives its name from Sagara, whose story is told in the *Vishnu Purāṇa*.[2]

He was of the solar race, king of Ayodhya. He performed the Aśvamedha or horse-sacrifice; but, guarded though it was by his sixty thousand sons, the horse was carried off to Pātāla, the nether world. Sagara ordered his sons to recover it, and, digging their way down, they found Kapila, the sage, engaged in meditation. They accused him of the theft, and the enraged saint, looking upon them, reduced them to ashes by means of the sacred flame which issued from his body. Anśumat found their ashes, and begged Kapila to pardon them and restore them to heaven. He promised that the grandson of Anśumat should accomplish this by bringing down the river of heaven. When Sagara heard this, he completed his sacrifice, and called the chasm which his sons had dug Sāgara, the ocean. Bhagiratha, grandson of Anśumat, by the force of his austerities brought down the Ganges from heaven, and its waters cleansed the sons of Sagara, and their spirits became fitted for the death rites and for admission to heaven, or Svarga.

Sagara was possibly a historical personage, who warred with the Śakas, Yavanas, Kāmbojas, Pāradas, and Pahlavas, northern tribes who invaded India.[3] At the temple of Kapila on the island pilgrims write their names on the walls, or hang a piece of earth or bark on a banyan-tree close by, with a promise of an offering if the boon prayed for be granted.[4]

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures chiefly on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1862, ii. 164 ff.; *IGI* xxi. [1908] 366; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*, London, 1887, p. 255 ff.; T. Bowrey, *A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669–79* (Hakluyt Society Publications), do. 1905, p. 202 f. W. CROOKE.

SAGHALIEN.—See AINUS, GILYAKS.

[1] *View of the Hist., Lit., and Relig. of the Hindoos*, Serampore, 1815, ii. 314. For religious suicide in India see Crooke *PR*[2] i. 256, ii. 169; Rājendralāla Mitra, *The Indo-Aryans*, London, 1881, i. 70; and for offering first-born children to the Ganges *NINQ* iv. [1894–95] 187.

[2] ed. H. H. Wilson, London, 1840, p. 378 ff.

[3] V. A. Smith, *The Early Hist. of India*[3], Oxford, 1908 p. 190.

[4] H. H. Wilson, *Essays*, ii. 169; cf. *FL* iv. [1893] 458.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS.

Buddhist (E. J. THOMAS), p. 49.
Celtic.—See 'Christian.'
Chinese (P. J. MACLAGAN), p. 51.
Christian (H. THURSTON), p. 51.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 59.
Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 60.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 61.
Jewish (J. ABELSON), p. 62.
Muhammadan (W. M. PATTON), p. 63.
Muhammadan in India (T. W. ARNOLD), p. 68.
Semitic and Egyptian (G. A. BARTON), p. 73.
Syrian (E. W. G. MASTERMAN), p. 78.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Buddhist).—The popular notion of the saint, as a being of eminent holiness, and especially as one of the immediate disciples of the Master, holds a prominent place in early Buddhism. The term is used occasionally as a technical translation of *arhat* (*q.v.*), but this does not correspond exactly with the usual idea of the saints of history. These are rather the apostles of Buddhism (*anubuddha*, 'minor Buddhas') or 'Buddha-sons,' such as Ānanda the favourite disciple, who did not win *arhat*-ship till after Buddha's death; Asita, the Simeon of Buddhism; the two chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna; or Anāthapiṇḍika and Visākhā, the great lay disciples.

1. Saints in the Buddha legend.—Starting from the historical nucleus of the Buddha and his first followers, the records of saints form an integral part of the Buddha legend. This account is a growth, and, though traces of combination, accretion, and systematization have been pointed out in it,[1] it has not yet been sufficiently analyzed to make it possible to treat it otherwise than as legend.

The legends in their earliest attainable form are doubtless the separate stories that occur in the various parts of the *Suttas*, but some which we should naturally expect to find there are omitted. In the *Majjhima*, no. 26, Buddha tells how he left his weeping parents, removed his hair and beard, put on the yellow robe, and went out to a homeless life; how, after following two teachers, he left them in disgust, went to Uruvelā, attained enlightenment, and was persuaded by Brahmā to preach the Doctrine; how he thought of first doing so to his former teachers, but, on being told by certain divinities that they were dead, went to his five former disciples, and preached to them. In this account nothing is said of his seeing the four omens that induced him to leave the world, of the flight from his palace with Chhanna, of the food given by Sujātā under the *bodhi*-tree, or of his first two lay converts.

Part of this occurs in the *Vinaya*,[2] but, besides showing variations of detail, it differs from the *Sutta* account in the addition of incidents to the story and a continuation of further legends. It is here that some of the chief legends of the saints occur. Beginning with the first events after the enlightenment, it inserts the story of the conversion of the two laymen, Tapussa and Bhallika, recounts the conversion of the five disciples, and continues with the stories of the conversion of Yasa, his parents, and his companions, and of the three Kassapas, the visit of King Bimbisāra, the conversion of the two chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, of Upāli, and the admission of Buddha's son Rāhula to the order. The whole forms a quasi-historical sequence, and, apart from the extremely composite *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*,[3] an account of the last few months of Buddha's life, it is the nearest approach in the Scriptures to a connected Buddha legend. Several stories prominent in later accounts occur in the *Sutta Nipāta*—Bimbisāra's visit to Buddha at the time of his renunciation, Māra's temptation (which is here represented as before the enlightenment), and the visit of the sage Asita, or Kāladevala, to the infant Buddha.

2. Development of the legends.—These *Sutta* accounts, with perhaps the *Vinaya* tales as a second stratum, form the basis of the legends of saints. The *Suttas* themselves, however, reveal different stages, and show evidence of systematization. In the *Mahāpadāna Sutta*[1] a list of the seven Buddhas is given. Not only has the historical Buddha a chief attendant, two chief disciples, a certain *bodhi*-tree, and so on, but all the Buddhas have the same. In the *Buddhavaṃsa*, also a canonical text, the list of Buddhas is increased to 25 (besides three whose history is not given), and to their common characteristics are added two chief female disciples, and four chief lay attendants, two men and two women. In the case of the historical Buddha, these disciples and attendants are among the foremost saints.

There is here the possibility that certain features in the story of Gautama Buddha are due to the adoption of legends originally relating to previous Buddhas, but nothing as to the historical existence of these can be affirmed. Fausböll indeed made the extraordinary statement[2] that one of them (Kanakamuni; Pāli Koṇāgamana) was a real historical person, because a *stūpa* was erected to him, and Aśoka worshipped before it and restored it. But the legend of previous Buddhas was an established belief certainly before the time of Aśoka, and the *stūpa* to Kanakamuni merely illustrates the existence of this belief. The historicity of the person commemorated is quite another matter.

Further systematization is shown in the *Aṅguttara*, i. 24 ff., where a list of 80 of the chief disciples is given, divided into the usual four classes of monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen. Each has a special epithet descriptive of the feature in which he or she was eminent. But the most comprehensive list occurs in the *Thera-* and *Therī-gāthā*. Most of these are said in the commentary to have won complete knowledge (*aññā*), or to have attained *arhat*-ship. There are 259 possible names of monks, and over 70 of nuns, many of whom are otherwise unknown, but both lists contain the prominent disciples of the *Suttas*. The history of each is given in Dhammapāla's commentary.[3] Cf. artt. ĀNANDA, DEVADATTA, MOGGALLĀNA, SĀRIPUTTA.

3. Extra-canonical legends.—The chief later development of the Buddha legend is the *Nidāna-kathā*, the introduction to the *Jātaka*, the author of which in various places refers for his authorities to the *Vinaya* and *Suttas*, as well as to the 'commentary' (*Aṭṭhakathā*) and 'other commentaries.' The commentary mentioned is probably the *Mahā-aṭṭhakathā*, or Great Commentary, a work which Siṅhalese tradition says was fixed at the first

[1] H. Oldenberg, *Buddha, his Life, his Doctrine, his Order*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, Excursus 2, p. 411 ff.
[2] *Mahāvagga*, i. ff.
[3] *Dīgha*, no. 16
[1] *Dīgha*, no. 14.
[2] *The Jātaka with its Commentary*, ed. V. Fausböll, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, London, 1877–91, vol. vii. 'Index to the *Jātaka*,' p. xi.
[3] Translated in C. A. F. Rhys Davids' *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*.

Council, and introduced by Mahinda with the Scriptures into Ceylon.[1] Whatever its actual form and origin, it is no doubt mainly from this that the extra-canonical legends have come. Many are found in the existing commentaries on the *Jātaka* and *Dhammapada*.

4. Influence of Brāhman legends.—In the case of two saints Windisch derives features of their legends from Brāhman sources.[2] The *Mahāvastu*[3] gives a description of Moggallāna's visit to the hells and heavens. Evidently, says Windisch, the account in the *Mahābhārata*[4] of his pious ancestor Mudgala, or Maudgalya, who obtains the favour of going to heaven with his body, has been transferred to Moggallāna. But the question of transference is more complicated than this. The late account in the *Mahāvastu* goes back to earlier Pāli versions that do not mention Moggallāna. In *Jātaka* 541 a visit to the hells and heavens with their description is told of King Nimi, and in *Jātaka* 530 a similar description occurs which has several verses in common with the *Mahāvastu* account.[5] That there has been a borrowing of legends is probable, but it is not possible to say that this borrowing is direct,[6] and Moggallāna does not owe his individuality to Brāhmanism. Windisch grants that he is an historical character.

The other instance is Asita, or Kāladevala, the sage who visited the infant Gautama. In this case it is probable that Buddhism has adopted the name of a character well known in Brāhman legend. He is said in the commentary on *Sutta Nipāta* 679 to have been *purohita*, or family priest, to Suddhodana's father, but there is no trace of the Buddhist legend in Brāhmanism.

5. Saints in the Mahāyāna.—In the Mahāyāna schools the legendary basis is much the same, but further developed. Some entirely new saints in the line of patriarchs appear, such as Upagupta, who came from the bottom of the sea to prevent Māra from disturbing a sacrifice celebrated by Aśoka,[7] and Asaṅga, who in the 5th cent. A.D. went up to the Tusita heaven and received the doctrine of the Void as a new revelation from Maitreya.[8] But, though the disciples remain as interlocutors in the *Suttas*, their importance as a religious and devotional factor is overshadowed by the growth of *bodhisattva*-worship and of new Buddhas. See artt. BODHISATTVA, ĀDIBUDDHA, AMITĀYUS, ASAṄGA, AVALOKITEŚVARA, MAÑJUŚRĪ.

6. Saint-worship. — The worship of Buddhas and their apostles consists in the honour done to them, their relics, or other memorials. The worship confers merit, and consists in reverent salutation, adornment of the shrines with garlands and unguents, and a ceremonial procession round.[9] The most general term for a memorial is *chetiya*, usually divided into bodily relics (*sārīrika*), objects that have served the use of a Buddha (*paribhogika*), and shrines or memorials (*uddesika*).[10] The *chetiyas* include sacred localities, trees, and commemorative buildings, cairns, or *stūpas*, which may also contain relics.

1 *Mahānaṃsa*, xxxiii. 100.
2 'Brahmanischer Einfluss im Buddhismus,' *Aufsätze Ernst Kuhn gewidmet*, Breslau, 1916, p. 1 ff.
3 i. 4 ff.
4 iii., Adhyāya 259 and 260; cf. J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1858–72, v. 324.
5 *Jātaka*, v. 266; *Mahāvastu*, i. 9.
6 O. Franke, 'Jātaka-Mahābhārata-Parallelen,' *Vienna Or. Journ.* xx. [1906] 317 ff.
7 C. Duroiselle, 'Upagutta et Māra,' *Bull. de l'École française de l'Extrême-Orient*, jan.–juin, 1904; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 356 ff.; another version in Tāranātha, *Gesch. des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. A. Schiefner, Petrograd, 1869, p. 18.
8 S. Lévi, Introd. to *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*, Paris, 1911, p. 2.
9 *Kathāvatthu*, xiii. 2.
10 *Jātaka*, iv. 228; *Bodhivaṃsa*, p. 59.

In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*[1] the Buddha gives a list of four classes of persons who are worthy to have a *stūpa* erected to them — a Buddha, a *pratyekabuddha*, a disciple of the Master, and a universal king. This indicates Buddhist belief at the time of the composition of this *Sutta*, and the account of Fa-Hian[2] in the 5th cent. shows its full development. He found in India *stūpas* to the Buddha, previous Buddhas, and to such saints as Ānanda, Sāriputta, Moggallāna, and Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī. The development of the idea of the patron saint is also shown in the nuns making offerings at Ānanda's shrine, because it was he who persuaded Buddha to admit nuns to the order. Similarly the patron saint of the novices was Rāhula.[3]

Pilgrimages to places memorable in the life of a Buddha are also recommended in the same *Sutta*,[4] and Buddha prophesies:

'There will come believing monks and nuns, laymen and laywomen, and say, "Here the Tathāgata was born," "Here the Tathāgata became supreme Buddha with highest supreme enlightenment," "Here the Tathāgata began to turn the highest Wheel of the Doctrine," and "Here the Tathāgata attained Nirvāṇa with the Nirvāṇa that leaves no element behind." And all they who die while making pilgrimages to *chetiyas* shall, with the dissolution of the body after death, be born in the happy world of heaven.'[5]

References to pre-Buddhistic *chetiyas* are common in the Scriptures, and there is no doubt that *chetiya*-worship is merely a continuation of a general Hindu custom. It is referred to several times in the *Vinaya* as being an established practice.[6] See art. CHAITYA.

7. Martyrs.—The martyrs of a religion usually arise from persecution, but it is unnecessary to discuss here the question of Buddhist persecutions, as none is recorded in the Scriptures, and the later accounts of Brāhman and Jain hostility have not given rise to a martyrology. Among the early saints extra-canonical records mention the murder of Moggallāna as due to the enmity of the Jains, who hired robbers to kill him, because he was able to go to heaven and find out how the disciples of Buddha went to heaven and those of the naked ascetics to hell.[7]

The real martyrology of Buddhism is the *Jātaka* commentary, which records the sufferings and repeated death of the *bodhisattva* and his disciples, especially in exhibiting the virtues of patience and self-sacrifice. In *Jātaka* 313 the *bodhisattva* as an ascetic preaches the Doctrine to the royal *harīm*, and is tortured and cut to pieces by the king. In several the persecution is due to the jealousy of Devadatta, a motive which is already found in the Scriptures. The *bodhisattva* suffers for the sake of the *Dharma*, but, except in the case of the legends of Jains, it cannot be said that the persecution is due specially to anti-Buddhistic hostility; nor is there any definite historical evidence for the supposed Brāhmanical persecutions, which were once supposed to have exterminated Buddhism in India.[8]

The Mahāyāna teaching degenerates into the most grotesque and gruesome tales of suffering (often self-inflicted) for the sake of the *Dharma*. They are imaginative developments, due to the idea of acquiring merit in repeated births for the

1 *Dīgha*, ii. 142; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 156.
2 See art. YUAN CHWANG
3 *A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms*, tr. J. Legge, Oxford, 1886, pp. 44–46.
4 *Dīgha*, ii. 140; *Dialogues*, ii. 153.
5 *Dīgha*, ii. 141; *Dialogues*, ii. 153.
6 *Nissaggiya*, xxx. 2; *Pāchittiya*, lxxxii. 2.
7 *Jātaka* v. 125 ff., tr. p. 62 ff.; *Dhammapada Comm.* iii. 65; R. C. Hardy, *A Manual of Budhism*[2], London, 1890, p. 349 ff.
8 See H. H. Wilson, 'On Buddha and Buddhism,' *JRAS* xvi. [1856] 229 ff.; R. S. Hardy, *The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, London, 1886, p. 205; T. W. Rhys Davids, 'Persecution of the Buddhists in India,' *JPTS* [1896] 87 ff.; V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 202.

sake of becoming a *bodhisattva*, rather than compositions having any relation to history or legend.

LITERATURE.—References to the sources are given throughout. See also C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Introductions to *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, 2 vols., London, 1909–13; E. Müller, Introduction to *Paramatthadîpanî*, pt. v., *Commentary on the Therigâthâ*, do. 1893; Mabel Bode, 'Women Leaders of the Buddhist Reformation,' *JRAS*, 1893, p. 517 ff.; K. F. Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, i., Berlin, 1857.

EDWARD J. THOMAS.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Chinese).—The word *sêng*, which has been adopted in Chinese Christian literature as the translation of 'holy,' hardly suggests that relation to the divine which is connoted by the English word. It lays stress rather on the idea of perfect realization of human nature, and at least as much on the intellectual as on the moral side, whence it is also often translated 'sage.' Of those of the Confucian school who are reckoned as entitled to be called *sêng jên*, 'holy men,' 'sages,' Confucius (*q.v.*) is the latest and most famous. The doctrine which he transmitted and taught is the 'holy teaching.'

The other teachings in China—Taoism and Buddhism—have also those in whom their ideal of human nature or conduct received embodiment.

E.g., the *Shên Sien Thung Kâm* gives 'a series of biographical sketches for the most part legendary and fabulous, of upwards of 800 saints, sages and divinities selected chiefly from the ranks of Taoism but some Buddhist characters are also admitted into the number.'[1]

The Christian Church in China, as elsewhere, is proving itself to be the nursery of that type of character which is entitled in the Christian sense to be called 'holy.'[2]

It has been said that in the biographical records of the Chinese we find 'extraordinarily few instances of religious fanaticism, bigotry, and persecution; still fewer, if any, examples of men and women who have suffered for their faith, when mere verbal recantation would have saved them from a dreaded fate.'[3] The supremacy of right even over life itself is, however, recognized: 'I desire life and I desire right; if I cannot keep both together, I will give up life and choose right';[4] and in China there have never been lacking those who have been willing to lay down their lives for an idea to the truth and worth of which they thus witnessed; nor, as during the Boxer troubles, have there been lacking martyrs in the full Christian sense of that term.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Christian).—1. **Dogmatic teaching.**—The Roman Church, together with the Oriental Churches, and notably the Orthodox Eastern Church in all its branches, considers the doctrine of the veneration of saints to be an integral part of Catholic tradition. Both by Greeks and by Latins this teaching is held to follow from the conception of the Church's unity. In the *Longer Orthodox Catechism* of Philaret,[5] *e.g.*, we have the following questions and answers:

'262. Q. Is there likewise unity between the Church on earth and the Church in heaven?

A. Doubtless there is, both by their common relation to one Head, our Lord Jesus Christ, and by mutual communion with one another.

263. Q. What means of communion has the Church on earth with the Church in heaven?

A. The prayer of faith and love. The faithful who belong to the Church militant upon earth, in offering their prayers to God, call at the same time to their aid the saints who belong to the Church in heaven; and these, standing on the highest steps of approach to God, by their prayers and intercessions purify, strengthen, and offer before God the prayers of the faithful living upon earth, and by the will of God work graciously and beneficently upon them, either by invisible virtue, or by distinct apparitions, and in divers other ways.'

The *Catechism* then goes on to declare that the rule of the Church upon earth to invoke in prayer the saints of the Church in heaven is grounded upon 'a holy tradition, the principle of which is to be seen also in holy Scripture,' and it appeals to 1 Ch 29^{18}, where David cried out in prayer, 'O Lord, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Israel, our fathers,' 'exactly,' we are told, 'as now the Orthodox Church calls upon Christ our true God, by the prayers of His most pure Mother and all His saints.' Scripture is further appealed to as supplying warrant for the mediatory prayer of the saints in heaven (Rev $8^{3f.}$), for the fact of beneficent apparitions of saints from heaven (Mt $27^{52f.}$), and for the belief that the saints after their departure work miracles through certain earthly means (2 K 13^{21} and Ac 19^{12}). Moreover, all these points of ecclesiastical tradition are illustrated and enforced by testimonies cited from the great Greek Fathers.

Not less clearly defined is the belief of the Roman Church formulated in a decree of the Council of Trent and summarized in these words of the Creed of Pope Pius IV.:

'In like manner I hold that the saints reigning with God are to be venerated and invoked, and that they offer prayers to God for us, and that their relics are to be venerated.'

Although no anathemas are attached to the canon drafted by the Council itself, the Fathers declared that those who deny the lawfulness of invoking the saints 'hold an impious opinion' (*impie sentire*); on the other hand, the affirmative portion of the canon is couched in studiously moderate language:

'The saints reigning with Christ offer their prayers to God on behalf of men, moreover it is good and useful to invoke them as suppliants and to have recourse to their prayers, support, and help, in order to obtain benefits from God through His Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, who is our only Redeemer and Saviour.'[1]

The Council also goes on to say:

'The holy bodies of holy martyrs, and of others now living with Christ—which bodies were the living members of Christ and the temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Co 3^{16}), and which are by Him to be raised unto eternal life, and to be glorified—are to be venerated by the faithful, through which bodies many benefits are bestowed by God on men.'[2]

Finally, we have this very careful statement of the Catholic teaching with reference to the use of images:

'Moreover, that the images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and of the other saints, are to be had and retained particularly in churches, and that due honour and veneration are to be given them; not that any divinity or virtue is believed to be in them, on account of which they are to be worshipped; or that anything is to be asked of them; or that trust is to be reposed in images, as was of old done by the Gentiles, who placed their hope in idols; but because the honour which is shown them is referred to the prototypes which those images represent; in such wise that by the images which we kiss, and before which we uncover the head, and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ, and we venerate the saints, whose similitudes they bear; as, by the decrees of Councils, and especially of the second Synod of Nicæa, has been defined against the opponents of images.'[3]

Similar limitations are emphasized in the authoritative *Roman Catechism*, issued in accordance with the Tridentine decrees. It is there pointed out in detail that there is a wide difference between the prayers addressed to God and those addressed to the saints:

'We ask God to grant blessings, we ask the saints to be our advocates. To God we say: "Have mercy on us"; to the saints we commonly say: "Pray for us"; and if at times we ask the saints also to have mercy on us, it is in a different sense. We beg of them, as they are pitiful, to take compassion on us and to interpose in our behalf.'[4]

In the 22nd of the Thirty-nine Articles the Church of England, following the example set in the *Augsburg Confession* and other dogmatic pronouncements of the Reformers, condemns

'the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory, Pardons, Worshipping and Adoration, as well of Images as of Reliques, and also invocation of Saints' as 'a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God.'

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[1] A. Wylie, *Notes on Chinese Literature*, London, 1867, p. 178.
[2] *E.g.*, Mrs. Howard Taylor, *Pastor Hsi*, London, 1904; C. Campbell Brown, *A Chinese St. Francis*, do. 1912.
[3] H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals*, London, 1915, p. 1.
[4] Mencius, vi. ii. 10. 1.
[5] See *ERE* vi. 432b.

[1] Sess. xxv. [2] *Ib.* [3] *Ib.*
[4] *Roman Catechism*, Eng. tr., Dublin, 1829, p. 466 f.

It has been maintained by many, and notably in recent years by Bishop John Wordsworth of Salisbury, that the 'Romish doctrine' here rejected was the official teaching of the Church of Rome as formulated by the scholastic theologians and the Council of Trent. The admission, indeed, is made that the decree of the Council quoted above was passed only in Dec. 1563, some months after the Article in question had been accepted by both Houses of Convocation; but, on the other hand, as Wordsworth[1] contended, there are references both to purgatory and to the veneration of saints in the decree of the 22nd Session, passed on 17th Sept. 1562. In reply to this, Darwell Stone[2] and others have urged with reason that in the earlier Tridentine canon there is no proper reference to the *invocation* of saints or to relics, images, and pardons. Hence they consider themselves still free to hold that by the 'Romish doctrine' referred to was meant, not the official teaching of Roman authority, but the extravagances of an extreme section. Further, some evidence has been quoted to show that the phrase 'invocation of saints' was used to denote addresses to the saints similar in wording to the adoration which we render to God, and 'formal and absolute prayers tendered to saints, as distinguished from requests for the prayers of the saints.' According to this view, the Articles, both in connexion with the veneration of saints and in dealing with sundry other controverted points, were deliberately framed with a purpose of comprehension rather than exclusion. Consequently the Church of England, it is maintained, only condemned the extreme practices and ways of thought in which the saints, being called upon to grant favours which are in the power of God alone, had been given a prominence in devotion which was derogatory to the divine honour. Thus the question was left open whether the clergy might express approval of the practice of invoking the saints in the limited sense of seeking from them the help of their prayers.[3] Undoubtedly many Anglican theologians of the 17th cent. seemed to adopt this view, and the extreme iconoclasm of men like Hooper and Latimer soon gave place to the academic speculations of the Caroline divines. Bishop W. Forbes of Edinburgh, whose *Considerationes modestæ . . . de . . . invocatione sanctorum* was published posthumously in 1658, approximated closely to the Roman and Orthodox position. In one chapter[4] he defends the proposition that the simple invoking of or appealing to the angels and saints to pray to God with us and for us is not to be reprobated as either useless or unlawful. Still even the most advanced of the High Church party in England were hardly prepared to go as far as this. In 1716 proposals were made by the nonjuring bishops, who called themselves 'the Catholic Remnant of the British Churches,' for a concordat with the Orthodox Eastern Churches. Among matters recognized as 'the five Points of present Disagreement' we find the two following heads:

'Though they [the Remnant] call the Mother of our Lord Blessed, and magnify the Grace of God which so highly exalted her, they were afraid of giving the glory of God to a creature, or to run to any extreme by unduly blessing or magnifying her.

As to angels and saints, they were jealous of detracting in the least from the Mediation of Jesus Christ, and therefore could not use a direct Invocation to any of them, the Blessed Virgin herself not excepted.'

The four Oriental patriarchs, in reply, appeal to the distinction which had been recognized even in the West from the time of St. Augustine onwards, and which both the Roman and the Orthodox Church still emphasize.

'The Greeks,' say the patriarchs, 'know how to make a distinction in worship, and they give that of Latria to God only, and that of Dulia to the holy Apostles, martyrs and righteous and godly Fathers, honouring them as faithful servants and true friends of God. They worship our Lady, the Virgin Mother of God with Hyperdulia, not as God, but as the θεοτόκος and Mother of God; not with Latria—God forbid, that would be blasphemy; God alone they worship with Latria—but they make her their intercessor with Him for post-baptismal sin, and hope through her to receive remission from Him.'

The patriarchs then go on to make it clear that, upon this head and in the matter of the invocation of saints, their position is unalterable. Indeed the tone of their reply to the English bishops is not conciliatory:

'Set yourselves free from the heavy bondage and the captivity of prejudice, and submit yourselves to those true doctrines which have been received from the beginning and the traditions of the holy fathers and are not opposed to the Holy Scriptures.'[1]

Of late years among a certain school of Russian theologians there has been a tendency, probably fostered by Anglican influences, to discover a distinction between the Orthodox and the Roman point of view as to the relations of the Church militant and the Church triumphant. 'The Easterns,' W. J. Birkbeck[2] insists, 'when they think of the Church, think more of it as a whole than is the custom in the West.' They are familiar with the conception of St. John Chrysostom,[3] who speaks of the body of Christ as 'the faithful from all parts of the world, who are, have been, and shall be.' Mutual intercessions are, it is said, at once the expression and condition of that faith and love which constitute the organism of the Church. Birkbeck writes:

'One of the most solemn thoughts that I have met with in conversing with Russians is, that not only is each one of us assisted by the prayers of the Blessed Virgin and of all saints, but that the saints themselves, and even the glorious and ever-blessed Mother of God, were assisted by the prayers, foreknown to God, of every member of the Church that has lived, or ever will live upon earth.'[4]

But this seems after all to differ very little from the conception of the communion of saints which will be found presented at large in the *Roman Catechism* and elaborated in such a work as that of J. P. Kirsch, *Die Lehre von der Gemeinschaft der Heiligen im christlichen Altertum*. On the other hand, a greater familiarity with the teaching and practice of the Eastern Churches seems to have done something towards modifying the intransigeance of official Anglicanism in this matter of saint-worship. During the Church Congress held at Southampton in 1913 the bishop of London (A. F. Winnington Ingram), who not so long before had visited Russia, preached a sermon on the invocation of saints. After weighing the arguments for and against and rejecting any direct form of invocation, such as 'Saint Andrew, pray for us,' etc., he approved the practice of 'comprecation,' which has been defined as praying to God to receive benefit by means of the prayers of the saints.

'We recognize,' he said, 'the fellowship of the saints in our praise. . . . Why should we not have in the new supplement to the Prayer-Book some form of comprecation which shall recognize more fully their fellowship in prayer?'

2. History.—It is admitted without dispute that the veneration of saints had its starting point in the veneration of the martyrs who suffered death for the Christian faith. The word 'martyr,' of course, means witness, but already in the NT we have indications of a tendency to use this term as a label, even if not yet exactly to limit it to those who sealed their testimony with their blood. 'Ye shall be my witnesses,' we read in Ac 1[8] (cf.

[1] *The Invocation of Saints and the Twenty-second Article*, London, 1908, and in *The Guardian*, 26th May, 2nd June, 21st July, 1909.
[2] *The Invocation of Saints*[2], p. 39 ff.
[3] Stone, p. 49. [4] Pt. II. ch. 3.

[1] See A. H. Hore, *Eighteen Centuries of the Orthodox Greek Church*, London, 1899, pp. 597-605, who summarizes the documents published by G. Williams in his *Orthodox Church of the East in the 18th Century*.
[2] A. Riley, *Birkbeck and the Russian Church*, p. 237.
[3] *In Epist. ad Ephes.* hom. x. 1 (*PG* lxii. 75).
[4] Riley, *Birkbeck and the Russian Church*, pp. 237, 345.

Lk 21[12], Jn 15[27], Mt 10[18]) and in Rev 17[6] 'I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs (RVm witnesses) of Jesus.' The same document, for which, in the opinion of the present writer, no later date can be assigned than A.D. 96, describes 'underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God, and for the testimony (*μαρτυρίαν*) which they held. . . . And there was given them to each one a white robe,' etc. (Rev 6[9-11]). Similarly 'I saw thrones . . . and the souls of them that had been beheaded for the testimony of Jesus' (Rev 20[4]). We do not wish to pronounce too positively, but this looks very like a beginning of cultus, and the evidence becomes unmistakable in the account of the martyrdom of St. Polycarp in the middle of the 2nd century. The pagans and Jews of Smyrna wished the saint's body to be reduced to ashes, 'lest they [the Christians] should abandon the crucified one and begin to worship this man.' The Christians of Smyrna indignantly repudiate the insinuation that they could ever renounce 'the Christ who suffered for the salvation of the whole world,' and they continue:

'For Him, being the Son of God, we adore, but the martyrs, as disciples and imitators of the Lord, we cherish as they deserve for their matchless affection towards their King and teacher. . . . And so we afterwards took up his bones, which are more valuable than precious stones and finer than refined gold, and laid them in a suitable place, where the Lord will permit us to gather ourselves together, as we are able, in gladness and joy and to celebrate the birthday of his martyrdom (*τὴν τοῦ μαρτυρίου αὐτοῦ ἡμέραν γενέθλιον*) for the commemoration of those who have already fought in the contest and for the training and preparation of those that shall do so hereafter.'[1]

These passages are important as bearing witness not only to the dignity of martyrdom and to the sense of joy and triumph associated with it, but also to the idea of a sacrifice over the martyr's remains, and of an annual commemoration in his honour to be maintained in future years. This 'birthday,' the *γενέθλιος* (*ἡμέρα*) or *natale*, was afterwards to become a very conspicuous feature in the calendars and martyrologies. No doubt paganism among both Greeks and Romans had long before been familiar with the yearly commemoration of the illustrious dead; but, while in the case of the emperors and other famous men it was literally their birthday that was kept in remembrance, the Christian martyr was honoured on the anniversary of his death. The dignity of the martyrs was emphasized in many other ways. Tertullian, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and Cyprian proclaim it in glowing language.[2] Already in the *Pastor* of Hermas[3] the martyrs are represented as wearing crowns; Hippolytus,[4] Dionysius of Alexandria,[5] and Tertullian[6] describe them as fellow-judges with Christ, seated beside Him on thrones. The most laudatory epithets—*e.g.* *μακάριος*, *σεμνός*, *θεῖος*, *benedictus*, *beatus*, etc. — are applied to them. On the other hand, we find an intense desire for martyrdom, regarded as a privilege and a trust, manifested by such confessors of the faith as the apostolic Ignatius of Antioch, the nonagenarian Pothinus of Lyons, the boy Origen, the scholarly bishop Cyprian, the mothers of young children like Perpetua and Felicitas, the tender maiden Blandina, with many others of whom authentic records are preserved. Frequently the idea is made prominent that it is Christ Himself who is present and who suffers in the person of the martyr.[7] As a natural consequence, the greatest veneration was shown to the martyrs by the faithful during the period of their incarceration, and, as the letters of St. Cyprian in particular allow us to see, their standing in the Church was altogether exceptional—so much so that their mediation was accepted as decisive when it was exercised in favour of those who sought reconciliation after falling away from the faith. No doubt there were abuses. The Novatianist heresy[1] was an indirect result of a too rigoristic view of the discipline which ought to be followed in such cases. On the other hand, it became a commonplace among the writers of the 3rd cent. to hold that the giving of one's life for Christ, the baptism of blood, was the equivalent of sacramental baptism in its effect of completely remitting sin and rendering the sufferer worthy of immediate admission to the joys of paradise. The passages in Tertullian, Cyprian, and other writers of that age which bear witness to this belief are very numerous.[2] In the contemporary *Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs* (A.D. 180) Nartzalus cries out, when sentence is pronounced, 'Hodie martyres in caelis sumus. Deo gratias.' Further, the martyr's lot while he remained alive was in every way a privileged one. A reflected lustre shone upon his family and even upon the town in which he resided,[3] and he himself, while awaiting in prison the hour of the supreme sacrifice, was an object of solicitude and veneration to all his fellow-Christians. The long passage which stands at the beginning of the 5th book of the *Apostolical Constitutions* probably reflects a much older tradition, and it is in any case very striking:

'If any Christian, on account of the name of Christ, and love and faith towards God, be condemned by the ungodly to the games, to the beasts, or to the mines, do ye not overlook him; but send to him from your labour and your very sweat for his sustenance, and for a bribe to the soldiers, that he may be eased and taken care of . . . for he that is condemned for the name of the Lord God is an holy martyr, a brother of the Lord, the son of the Most High, a receptacle of the Holy Spirit . . . by being vouchsafed the incorruptible crown, and the testimony of Christ's sufferings and the fellowship of His blood, to be made conformable to the death of Christ for the adoption of children.'

Lucian in his *de Morte Peregrini* satirizes the attentions lavished upon those who suffered for the Christian faith. Moreover, the confessors who, after bearing testimony in bonds, escaped the final ordeal were regarded as the *élite* of the faithful, and their steadfastness in the hour of trial became a sort of title to the episcopal office.[4] In the primitive Church Order, which Schermann has conveniently labelled *ET* (*ecclesiastica traditio*), and which he would trace back to the inspiration of St. Clement of Rome, the martyr (*i.e.* one who has suffered torment for the name of Christ) is described as already possessing the dignity of the priesthood without ordination. Hands are to be laid upon him only when he is to be promoted to the episcopate.[5] Despite the attitude of veneration to which these facts bear witness, we have no satisfactory evidence of any general practice of cultus before the middle of the 3rd century. The origins of this cultus are no doubt to be found in the funeral rites which the Christians, in accordance with the customs of the pagan society in which they lived, paid to their honoured dead. Even in the case of those who had suffered capital punishment, Roman practice usually conceded to the relatives of the deceased the free disposal of their remains. For the most part, therefore, the martyrs, like their fellow-believers, were buried with such observances as everyday usage prescribed, so far at any rate as these rites involved no direct recognition

[1] *Letter of the Smyrnæans*, xvii. *f.*
[2] See, *e.g.*, the extracts given at length in J. P. Kirsch, *Gemeinschaft der Heiligen*, Eng. tr., pt. ii. ch. 3, p. 73 ff.
[3] *Simil.* viii. 3, 6.
[4] *In Dan.* ii. 37, ed G. N. Bonwetsch and H. Achelis, i. 112.
[5] *Ap.* Eusebius, *HE* vi. xlii.
[6] *De Resurr. carnis*, 43, and *de Anima*, 55.
[7] Delehaye, *Les Origines du culte des martyrs*, p. 11 ff.

[1] See art. NOVATIANISTS.
[2] See H. Achelis, *Das Christentum in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, Leipzig, 1912, ii. 340, 439.
[3] See Delehaye, pp. 12–28.
[4] See Eus. *HE* iii. xx. 6, vi. viii. 7, etc.
[5] See T. Schermann, *Ein Weiherituale*, Munich, 1913, p. 31, and *Die allgemeine Kirchenordnung*, Paderborn, 1914–16, p. 51

of polytheism or pagan superstition. For the sacrifices to the gods was substituted the Eucharistic oblation; the banquets offered to the dead at the tomb were replaced by the Christian love-feast,[1] and the same intervals between the celebrations were observed—3rd day, 9th day, 30th day (which in later centuries became the 'month's mind'), and anniversary. It was no doubt from these elements that the cultus of the Christian martyr took its point of departure. All are agreed that, where the existence of a sepulchral chamber or mausoleum rendered it possible, the Eucharist was celebrated at the grave side, and at this not merely the family but the whole Christian community seems to have assisted. There has, however, been some difference of opinion regarding the manner in which these rites were carried out. F. Wieland,[2] in opposition to the traditional view, holds that 'the breaking of bread' was not originally conceived of as a sacrifice in any proper sense, and that even in the case of martyrs the tomb itself, in the pre-Constantinian period, was not treated as an altar. But the question is mainly one of the date of the development of this sacrificial conception. It certainly did establish itself before long, as J. Wilpert[3] and others have shown. During the ages of persecution the faithful, anxious to live as inconspicuously as possible among their fellow-citizens, very probably emphasized unduly the feature of the funeral banquet, which was common to all, pagans and Christians alike. In the case of the pagans these banquets (*cenæ*) were meals offered to the *manes* of the departed; for the Christian community they were love-feasts which, on the one hand, provided charitably for the needs of the poor, and, on the other, veiled the true nature of the Eucharistic oblation, celebrated as a memorial of the Last Supper. In time the love-feasts led to abuses and were to a large extent suppressed, but the celebration of the liturgy still brought these little assemblies of the faithful together beside the graves of the honoured dead. It was inevitable that this solemn rite, though offered in the same forms at the tomb of the martyr and at that of the ordinary Christian, should in the former case soon assume a different colour in the eyes of the worshippers. Though the liturgy from the earliest times, as still in the East to-day, offered the sacrifice to God *for* (*ὑπέρ*) the holy apostles and the martyrs, as well as for all the faithful who have fallen asleep, the note of triumph soon came to prevail, whenever the Church paid honour to her champions.

The *Oratio Constantini* tells us how 'the martyr's death is followed by hymns and psalms and songs of praise to the all-seeing God, and a sacrifice is offered in memory of such men, a blameless, innocuous sacrifice.'[4]

Cyril of Jerusalem in the middle of the 4th cent. draws a clear distinction between the commemoration in the liturgy of 'patriarchs, prophets, apostles and martyrs, that by their prayers and mediation God may receive our petitions,' and, on the other hand, the appeal made in behalf of 'the holy fathers and bishops and all those who have fallen asleep,' whose souls, says Cyril, we are assured will be benefited by the offering of this most holy sacrifice.[5] Half a century later we find both Chrysostom[6] and Augustine explaining the commemoration of the martyrs in the liturgy in much the same sense. Their names are recited, says the latter, but they are not prayed for;[7] and in another place he urges that, when the sacrifice of the altar and alms are offered for all Christians departed, 'it is a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the perfect and a propitiation for those whose virtue is incomplete.'[1] At this date, the close of the 4th cent., we find all the great orators of the Church both in the East and in the West preaching panegyrics of the holy martyrs before vast audiences assembled to pay respect to these champions of the faith on their festivals, and at such reunions the celebration of the liturgy formed the central feature. It is true that, as St. Augustine and others expressly pointed out, the sacrifice was offered to God, and in no sense *to* the saint himself, but it was none the less a supreme recognition of the martyr's dignity and formed the germ from which the whole calendar of saints' days ultimately developed.

It is at this period also that we find the practice of the invocation of saints firmly established in every part of the Church. Prayers and appeals to the dead, as many inscriptions on pagan tombstones prove, were by no means unfamiliar to the heathen of Greece and Rome. But, as P. Dörfler[2] has recently pointed out, we find running through all these appeals a certain element of fear. The *manes* of the dead were asked to spare. They were conceived of as resenting neglect and as rewarding dutiful service. 'O manes parcite, ni parcetis, credite mi, nemo referet solemnia vobis' may be taken as a more or less typical example of the tone commonly prevalent. In Christian sepulchral inscriptions of the early centuries we also often find an appeal to the dead—even to those who were not martyrs—but the spirit is notably different. What the survivors ask of their dead is remembrance and sometimes prayer—*e.g.*, 'Marine im et mentem . . . nos . . . habeto' or 'Pete pro parentes tuos.'[3] Naturally enough, such an attitude towards the dead must have paved the way for the more formal invocation of those who had laid down their lives for Christ. Once it was generally admitted, as even pagans like Æschylus[4] and Plato[5] seemed ready to admit, that those who had passed into the next world might have knowledge of human needs and desires, it was inevitable that Christians who already made a practice of commending themselves to the prayers of the martyrs in prison should renew their appeal when the martyrs' triumph was completed by death. Hence, as early as the time of Hippolytus and Origen we find unmistakable traces of a belief in the power of the holy dead to intercede for those on earth.[6] The rude inscriptions and *graffiti* in the Catacombs, which, however, it is unfortunately very hard to date, may be appealed to as supplying similar evidence from the 3rd cent. onwards—*e.g.*, 'Domina Bassilla commandamus tibi Crescentinus et Micina filia nostra Crescen . . . que vixit men. x et dies . . .' (the title 'Domina' given to the martyr is an indication of early date); 'Sancte Laurenti suscepta habeto anim[am eius]'; 'Salba me Domne Crescentione meam luce.'[7] As appears in many of these ungrammatical memorials, it is the martyr's protection that is asked, and often for quite young children. Hence it seems probable that the prevalent atmosphere of paganism exercised some vague influence upon Christian feeling, especially in the case of the ruder populace. The strongly marked desire to be buried near the martyrs is no doubt to be attributed to a similar hope of protection. It was a matter not so much of logic as of a deep and primitive instinct—the

1 See art. AGAPE.
2 *Mensa und Confessio*, Munich, 1906, *Altar und Altargrabe*, Leipzig, 1912.
3 *Fractio Panis*, Freiburg i. B., 1895.
4 Cf. Delehaye, p. 50.
5 *Cat. Myst.* xxiii. 9.
6 *In Acta Apost.* xxi. 4 (*PG* lx. 170).
7 *Sermo* clix. 1 (*PL* xxxviii. 868).

1 *Enchiridion*, n. 110; *PL* xl. 283.
2 *Die Anfänge der Heiligenverehrung*, Munich, 1913.
3 See many examples in O. Marucchi, *Christian Epigraphy*, Eng. tr., Cambridge, 1912, pp. 151–156.
4 *Choeph.* 129–141, 476–478.
5 *Sympos.* 23.
6 See examples in Delehaye, p. 131 f.
7 Marucchi, nos. 125, 124, 478, etc.

same which in pagan times had led to the development of hero-worship.[1] Even for Christians the passage to another world was fearsome. It was felt that help might be looked for from those who had made the journey in triumph and whose acceptance with God was assured. Burial in proximity to the martyrs was itself a form of commendation, a tacit request for their intercession.

Be this as it may, the direct invocation of the holy dead had become by the latter half of the 4th cent. a received practice among Christians in both East and West. St. Basil († 379), St. Gregory of Nazianzus († 390), St. Ambrose († 397), not to speak of St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine, all furnish evidence which shows that in their time the practice of praying to the martyrs was already firmly established. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *e.g.*, not only tells the story of a girl who in the hour of danger called upon the Blessed Virgin for aid, but himself in his sermon on St. Cyprian unequivocally invokes the martyr.[2] St. Ambrose writes:

'Martyres obsecrandi . . . possunt pro peccatis rogare nostris, qui proprio sanguine, etiam si qua habuerunt peccata, laverunt . . . non erubescamus eos intercessores nostrae infirmitatis adhibere,' etc.[3]

In St. John Chrysostom evidence of what may be called active devotion to the martyrs meets us at every turn.[4] But perhaps no better illustration can be found of the attitude of the devout laity than an incident from the newly recovered *Life of St. Melania the Younger*. Living in Rome in the year 403, she, owing to her self-imposed vigils on the eve of the feast of St. Lawrence, gave birth prematurely to a child and her life was in imminent danger. Thereupon her husband, rushing off to the shrine of St. Lawrence ('festinus perrexit ad S. martyrem'), prostrated himself before the tomb beneath the altar and with tears and lamentations begged God to spare the mother (*ἔβόα πρὸς Κύριον περὶ τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς*). Both the Greek and Latin redactions of the *Life* clearly show that, though the martyr's intercession was invoked, it was to God, the master of life and death, that the ultimate appeal was directed. Similarly Melania, just before her death at Jerusalem in 438, asked to be carried to the shrine of the martyrs. Then she called upon them as '*athletes* of the Lord' and asked them to have pity upon her, their unworthy servant, who had always venerated their relics, adding:

'O ye, who have always free speech with God that loves mankind, be my intercessors (*πρεσβεύσατε*) with Him that He may receive my soul in peace.'[5]

It is just this *παρρησία*, attributed to the martyrs, that is put forward again and again in patristic writers as the motive for having recourse to their help.[6]

Undoubtedly one of the causes which contributed most powerfully to the rapid extension of the veneration of martyrs was the multiplication of shrines and saints' days, due to the Oriental practice of translating and dividing relics. It was beside the tomb of the martyr and upon his *dies natalis*, or anniversary, that his aid was primarily invoked. In the West the old Roman idea of the sacredness and inviolability of the tomb persisted for many hundred years. Even Gregory the Great, upon whom Harnack lays the blame of 'systematizing that resort to saints and relics which had already existed for a long time,' still firmly refused at the end of the 6th cent. to allow the resting-places of the great Christian heroes of Rome to be in any way disturbed. In a famous letter addressed to the empress Constantina, he point-blank refused her request to allow the head of St. Paul or some other portion of his body to be transported to Constantinople.[1] It was not, he declared, the Roman custom to allow any but representative relics, the *brandea* or *sanctuaria*, *i.e.* cloths which had been lowered into the tombs, to be given to applicants, however illustrious. Nearly a century earlier, in 519, the legates of Pope Hormisdas had maintained the same attitude in regard to a request of the emperor Justinian. The Oriental custom, however, was different, and the Greeks were not content with the legal fiction of *brandea*. Thus, as early as 351–354 we have definite record of the translation to Daphne, a suburb of Antioch, of the body of the martyr St. Babylas, and this was followed by many other translations. Still more fraught with the possibilities of future abuse were the dismemberment of the bodies of martyrs and the division of objects connected with them. This aspect of the question of relics (*q.v.*) is only touched upon here to explain the multiplication of centres of cultus and also the multiplication of feasts, for the translation commonly entailed the observance of a perpetual anniversary. The miraculous effects attributed to these relics, wonders which were attested by St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and all the great Christian teachers of that age,[2] must undoubtedly have accounted for much in the abnormally rapid development of the cultus of the martyrs.

So far we have taken no account of any saints but those who within the knowledge of all men had given their lives for the faith. As early, however, as the time of St. Cyprian we find in that writer constant references to a class of *confessores*, and, though Lucius has asserted that Cyprian's use of the term is loose and confused, his consistency has of late been successfully vindicated. J. Ernst[3] shows that in Cyprian's idea the martyrs *par excellence* are those who have actually laid down their lives for Christ, but that he also extends this term to all who have suffered grievous torment for the faith. On the other hand, the confessor is one who has borne testimony to his belief at some cost to himself—*e.g.*, by imprisonment or exile. All martyrs are therefore of necessity confessors; but, where the terms are contrasted, the confessor, as opposed to the martyr, is one who has not been put to the test of grievous bodily torment. Still Cyprian's language clearly suggests that, while the martyr's dignity is pre-eminent, the confessor in many cases is worthy to stand beside him and must also be highly honoured. 'A man *has* suffered,' he urges rather rhetorically, 'all that he was willing to suffer.'[4] This was in substance the principle in virtue of which a second category of saints gradually came to be recognized. In point of historical development, however, the process was greatly assisted by the practice of according a special commemoration in the liturgy to deceased bishops and of keeping locally a formal record of their anniversaries. Cyril of Jerusalem (*c.* 349), as pointed out above, indicates the classes of those no longer living for whom prayer is made in the liturgy. The first consists of 'patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs'—and it is worth noting that St. Hilary[5] names just these four groups in the same order; the second class is that of the 'holy fathers and bishops who have fallen asleep before.' Now this distinction is in noteworthy accord with

[1] Cf. *ERE* vi. 652 ff. [2] *Orat.* xxiv. 11 (*PG* xxxv. 1181).
[3] *De Viduis*, 9 (*PL* xvi. 251).
[4] See, *e.g.*, Kirsch, *Gemeinschaft*, pt. iii. ch. 4, Eng. tr., p. 216 ff.
[5] See M. Rampolla, *S. Melania Giuniore*, Rome, 1905, pp. 6, 11, 81.
[6] See, for a summary of some of this evidence, Stone[2], pp. 9–38, and Kirsch, pt. iii. ch. 4, Eng. tr., p. 212 ff.

[1] See *Regesta*, iv. 30, ed. Ewald, *MGH* i. [1891] 264 f.
[2] See Delehaye, pp. 139–157.
[3] In *Historisches Jahrbuch*, xxxiv. [1913] 328–353; and cf., still more recently, R. Reitzenstein, *Die Bezeichnung Märtyrer* (*GGN*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1916, p. 417 ff.).
[4] 'Qui se tormentis et morti sub oculis Dei obtulit, passus est quidquid pati voluit, non enim ipse tormentis sed tormenta ipsi defuerunt' (*Ep.* xii., ed. Hartel, p. 503).
[5] *Tractatus in Ps. 146*, ed. Zingerle, p. 851.

the data supplied by the famous *Chronography* of Philocalus[1] (A.D. 354). In this are preserved two separate documents of the Roman Church, one originally drafted in 332, which, under the heading 'Depositio episcoporum,' furnishes a record of the anniversaries of the bishops of Rome with their names and places of interment, the other, a separate list, headed 'Depositio martyrum,' giving similar information regarding the Roman martyrs. Be it noted in passing that even in 354 this Roman 'Depositio martyrum' had been augmented by two African anniversaries (those of St. Cyprian and of Perpetua with Felicitas) and also by another entry described as 'natale Petri de cathedra,' now known as the Feast of St. Peter's Chair. In these two short lists, thus gradually amplified and eventually blended into one, we may recognize the first rude outlines of the elaborate *calendaria* and *martyrologia* which came to play so prominent a part in the hagiographical developments of the Middle Ages. Other important Churches besides that of Rome kept similar lists of the anniversaries of their martyrs and of their bishops. In the 4th and even in the 5th cent. it appears that on account of the exalted dignity of the martyrs the two sets of records were still kept separate, and the traces of this distinction, as Delehaye has pointed out,[2] survived to a later period in the prayers of the *Leonine Sacramentary*. But before long the two lists, as might be expected, were fused into one document. From certain details in the Syriac *martyrologium* of 411 it has been inferred that this had already occurred at Antioch before that date. But the fusion is more conspicuous in the ancient calendar of Carthage, compiled apparently about 525. Here the commemorations of African martyrs and of a number of bishops of Carthage who were not martyrs stand side by side, together with other entries not of local origin. This process of equalizing confessors and martyrs seems to have begun soon after the restoration of peace to the Church. It was realized that holy ascetics like St. Anthony the hermit, or devoted bishops like St. Meletius of Antioch, not to speak of Chrysostom and Athanasius, suffered more in a lifetime of courageous endurance than if they had actually shed their blood for Christ. Further, a sort of middle term was found in the patriarchs and prophets of the OT, who, as pointed out above, were already grouped in the liturgy with the apostles and martyrs. The miracles attributed to some apostolic preachers like Gregory Thaumaturgus († 274), and the cult of relics, which, *e.g.*, in the case of the hermit Hilarion, though he was no martyr, led to the translation of his remains almost immediately after his death, brought about rapid developments. Hence we may fairly consider such a panegyric as that of St. Gregory of Nyssa upon Ephraem Syrus, which was spoken seemingly upon his anniversary and which ends with a direct invocation, to be evidence that the cultus of confessors was already established. Still the recognition of a definite category of 'saints,' in such sort that the word ἅγιος or *sanctus* was no longer a descriptive epithet but the formal style of a class of specially venerated champions of the faith, cannot be said to have yet taken root. The monograph of Delehaye[3] discusses in detail the development of the word *sanctus* and shows that even the epitaphs of Pope Damasus († 384) supply no example of the technical significance which finally attached to it.[4] It is not until the next century that the use of such a phrase as 'Sanctus Athanasius' can be taken by itself as any evidence of cultus.

When we go on to ask what elements entered into that conception of a 'saint' which gradually grew up in the early Church and has lasted until our own day, we have to distinguish between a genuine claim to saintship and one which is to some extent only ostensible and illusory. The genuine claim rests upon local cultus initiated by the clergy and people who had personal knowledge of the saint's martyrdom or of his heroic virtue. His name and anniversary were entered in the local *martyrologium*. His feast was kept by a synaxis, at which a panegyric was delivered and the liturgy was celebrated. His *Acta* were collected and preserved, and, when possible, the tomb enclosing his remains was honoured by the erection over it of an altar and a church. There are cases —*e.g.*, that of St. Polycarp—in which we have evidence of all these things. There are other instances in which they can be inferred with little risk of error; but at a later date, when the martyrologies were no longer local and had enlarged their scope, it must be admitted that many names were added to the roll of saints without adequate investigation and upon quite insufficient data. Delehaye has pointed out numerous examples of these 'literary canonizations,' as he has called them.[1] An old-world story familiar to modern readers as that of Faust was at one time attached to the name of a mythical St. Cyprian of Antioch; the gruesome tale of Œdipus seems responsible for the evolution of a St. Albanus and other imaginary personages; while the well-known legend of Buddha re-appears in Christian hagiography under the guise of the *Acta* of Saints Barlaam and Joasaph. In very few, however, of the more extreme cases can it be pretended that there was any real cultus of the supposed saint. On the other hand, there are a number of instances in which a perfectly legitimate cultus, contemporaneous with the saint's death, has afterwards become surcharged with all sorts of legendary excrescences, often preposterous in themselves, and quite inconsistent with the facts of history. The stories recounted in the apocryphal *Acta* of St. Thomas, or in those of his fellow-apostles, or of Thecla, St. Paul's reputed convert, do not constitute a valid disproof of their title to veneration. In the case of St. Procopius, again, who was undoubtedly an authentic martyr, the character of the saint was in time completely transformed. In reality Procopius was a studious ascetic; in legend he becomes a warrior-saint, the hero of incredible adventures.[2] A similar extravagance pervades all the *Lives* of St. George, the 'megalo-martyr,' although, according to Delehaye,[3] we know no more that is authentic about him than the bare fact of his existence. The same process, of course, went on in secular history. For mediæval readers the personality of Alexander the Great or of Charlemagne became quite unrecognizable owing to the myths which by a sort of magnetic attraction attached themselves to all such famous names. Moreover, even where no doubt can be felt as to the existence and the holiness of the person venerated, it is not always possible to explain how the cultus first arose. Often enough its chief developments were associated with the discovery of relics of doubtful authenticity, or with the occurrence of cures believed to be miraculous. The information given by St. Augustine regarding the marvels wrought by the relics of St. Stephen at Uzalum throws an

[1] See art. CALENDAR (Christian), § 1. [2] P. 114.
[3] In *Analecta Bollandiana*, xxviii. [1909] 145-200.
[4] Curiously enough, however, in the *Amherst Papyrus*, described by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (*Amherst Papyri*, London, 1900, pt. i. pp. 23-28), which may be dated with Harnack between A.D. 250 and 350, the word ἅγιοι occurs three times in the sense of the blessed in heaven.

[1] For a classification of the various forms of literary canonization see Delehaye, *Legends of the Saints*, Eng. tr., p. 113 ff.
[2] See Delehaye, *Les Légendes grecques des saints militaires*, pp. 77-89.
[3] *Ib.* p. 70

interesting light on the spread of popular devotion to the saints in quite early times.[1] It has been maintained,[2] on the ground of a passage of Optatus of Milevis which condemns the veneration of the relics of one who was a martyr but 'necdum vindicatus,'[3] that some process of official inquiry and canonization (*vindicatio*) existed even at this early date; but such a conclusion, as O. Marucchi has shown,[4] is not borne out by the facts adduced to support it. Although the attempt may sometimes have been made to preserve the 'proconsular acts,' *i.e.* the official record of the trial and condemnation of certain martyrs, very little material of this kind has come down to us, and even less seems to have been known (*c.* 380) to so devoted a student of their history as Pope Damasus.[5] As a result, legend and historical fact have in many cases become hopelessly confused. Though the primitive local martyrologies were no doubt trustworthy as to the very simple data they enshrined, consisting probably of little more than the name, the day of the anniversary, and the place of burial, the case is quite otherwise when we come to the later compilations formed by the unskilful combination of lists and materials derived from many different churches.

The most famous among these is the document falsely ascribed to St. Jerome and known as the *Martyrologium Hieronymianum*. This was probably first compiled in Italy, and then revised and added to in Gaul at the end of the 6th century. Among the sources used we may recognize (1) a general martyrology probably written in Greek at Nicomedia and embracing the churches of the East, (2) the local martyrology of Rome, (3) a general martyrology of Africa, (4) a general martyrology of Italy, (5) some literary sources, including Eusebius. Unfortunately the text has reached us in a very corrupt state. From the nature of the case, the document consists of little else than lists of names arranged according to the days of each month, and these names have constantly been misplaced, miswritten, and confused.

The Venerable Bede seems to have been the originator of a new type of *martyrologium*, in which the number of entries was much reduced but brief historical details were added concerning the saints who were commemorated. It was only in 1908 that Bede's true text was isolated from subsequent accretions by the researches of H. Quentin.[6] The importance of Bede's work lay especially in this, that he had several mediæval imitators, the best known being Ado and Usuard, and that mainly from the work of the last-named the present quasi-official Roman martyrology, which is read in choir as part of the liturgical office, was compiled by Cardinal Baronius at the end of the 16th century. It need hardly be pointed out that, although the name suggests a roll of 'martyrs,' all these martyrologies without exception included many 'confessors.' The earliest document in which this fusion is found is possibly the fragment of a Thracian Gothic calendar in the Ulfilas codex.

We can touch but briefly upon the later developments of Christian hagiology. It seems probable that the more emotional manifestations of devotion to the Madonna and the saints are traceable ultimately to East Syrian influences. E. Lucius[7] has rightly called attention to the extremely romantic spirit conspicuous in the writings of St. Ephraem and his school. From Syria this movement in some strange fashion made itself felt apparently in Spain, and by this channel was carried to Ireland, whence it spread to Britain and the Continent.[8] Certain it is, in any case, that the devotional atmosphere of such a writer as Cynewulf in the 8th cent. differs hardly at all from that of St. Bernard or Jacopone da Todi many hundred years later. But, however it came about, this attitude of mind and sense of personal relation to the saints exercised a wide influence upon many aspects of life. The system of patrons, shrines, pilgrimages, gilds, etc., reacted in a thousand ways upon art, literature, trade, and social economics generally. Despite many abuses and blunders, even the most rigid censor will find it difficult to maintain that the influence thus exercised was entirely evil. The origins of the practice of choosing saints for patrons may be traced back to the time of Dionysius of Alexandria († 265), who bears witness to the custom prevalent among Christians of giving to their children the names of Peter or Paul or John, and assigns motives for such a choice.[1] Chrysostom and especially Theodoret[2] furnish further evidence to the same effect. In the Middle Ages the selection of patrons was often determined by the most grotesque of reasons. St. Barbara, who was believed to secure for her clients the boon of receiving the sacraments before death, was invoked especially in thunderstorms, and became the patroness of all the more dangerous trades, notably miners, tilers, masons, and those who had to do with firearms. Similarly the association of St. Clare with sufferers from sore eyes, as also with glass-workers and laundresses, seems to have been dictated by no better reason than the fact that her name (Clara) suggested transparency and whiteness. Examples of this kind of extravagance were undoubtedly very numerous.

In Celtic lands confusion has been caused by native writers who frequently use the term *sanctus* of those consecrated to a religious life independently of personal holiness.

The title of the Celtic saint, says Willis-Bund,[3] 'rested on the fact that he was either the member of a certain family or of a certain monastery,' and he goes on to declare that 'a Celtic saint was never the person whom a Celt invoked in prayer. . . . No churches were dedicated to him. . . . No shrine containing his relics was set apart for the adoration of the faithful.'

Even if this statement be from any point of view correct, its general import is certainly misleading. The Celtic Church venerated apostles, martyrs, and ascetics exactly as the other Churches did. One of the earliest texts of the Litany of the Saints is that of the Stowe Missal,[4] where it appears as part of the priest's ordinary preparation for Mass. The *Félire* of Oengus, the earliest of the four extant Irish martyrologies, and many similar Celtic documents are extravagant in their invocation of, and their expressions of veneration for, 'Christ's kingfolk' (*rigrad Christ*), *i.e.* the saints. The whole truth seems to be that in some Celtic countries the word 'saint' was used of all men dedicated to God—the celebrated communion hymn, '*Sancti* venite, Christi corpus sumite,' is plainly addressed to a community—and that in Wales certain clans or families were regarded as a sort of priestly caste of whom it was expected that they should furnish recruits for the ascetic life. No doubt abuses followed. It was clearly undesirable that a 'saint' should establish a claim in perpetuity to a particular church merely by proving his nearness of kin to the founder and by fasting for forty days on the site;[5] but there is no reason to suppose that the Celts did not distinguish between this official sanctity and true holiness of life, and, though Druidical traditions may have familiarized the people with the idea of a hereditary priestly caste, there is little direct evidence, beyond the existence of the genealogies, to prove that the

[1] See Delehaye, *Culte*, pp. 148–158.
[2] *E.g.*, by G. B. de Rossi, *Roma sotterranea*, Rome, 1903, ii. 61.
[3] *De Schismate Donatistarum*, i. 16 (*PL* x. 917).
[4] *Nuovo Bullettino di Arch. Crist.* xv. [1909] 40 ff.
[5] See Delehaye, *Legends of the Saints*, Eng. tr., pt. 75, 111.
[6] *Les Martyrologes historiques du Moyen Âge.*
[7] *Anfänge des Heiligenkults*, p. 441 f.
[8] See Edmund Bishop, *Liturgica Historica*, Oxford, 1918, pp. 162, 178 ff.

[1] See Eus. *HE* vii. xxv. 14.
[2] *Græc. affect. Curatio*, viii. (*PG* lxxxiii. 1033).
[3] *Celtic Church of Wales*, p. 415.
[4] See E. Bishop, *Liturgica Historica*, p. 137 ff.
[5] See Baring-Gould and Fisher, *Lives of the British Saints*, i. 3

system was acquiesced in without protest. There is no indication of any such element among the Culdees,[1] and in Ireland Whitley Stokes[2] denies that even the pagan Druids 'constituted a hierarchy or a separate caste.' Further, if certain patriotic Celts have professed to count their national saints by thousands, this does not show that the conditions in Wales or Ireland differed from the rest of the Christian world, but only that they have taken advantage of a simple ambiguity of language. In truth, terms of respect seem particularly liable to such misinterpretation. The phrase 'Your Holiness' (*Sanctitas vestra*) was everywhere of common occurrence in the Middle Ages, and was addressed to ordinary bishops. It is now part of the official style of the Roman pontiff, but of course does not imply that the pope is deserving of liturgical cultus. Similarly the word 'venerable' is used at the present day in three different senses. An Anglican, *e.g.*, may speak of 'the Venerable Archdeacon Wilberforce,' a Roman Catholic of 'the Venerable Father Southwell,' or an agnostic of 'the venerable author of the *Origin of Species*.' In the first case the word is a title of courtesy; in the second it designates one who has reached a particular stage in the process of canonization; in the third it expresses the writer's belief that Darwin was a scientist worthy of reverence.

The reproach has constantly been made against the veneration of saints, as it was practised in the Christian Church from the 4th cent. onwards, that it differed little either in its essence or in its manifestations from the pagan worship of gods and heroes.

Harnack, *e.g.*, while admitting the early date of this development, describes it as 'polytheism in the fullest sense of the word,' and declares elsewhere that 'the saints took the place of the local deities, their festivals were substituted for the old provincial services of the gods.'[3]

Many other writers have emphasized the same objection in various forms, from the scholarly and temperate treatise of E. Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults*, to such highly polemical works as *Les Saints, successeurs des Dieux* of 'P. Saintyves' or the *Orpheus* of Salomon Reinach. A number of monographs have also been written to deal with separate cases and to prove that this or that deity has passed into Christian hagiography under some more or less unfamiliar designation. Thus E. Maas and H. Usener have identified St. Pelagia with Aphrodite; Rendel Harris sees a replica of the Dioscuri in nearly all such pairs of saints as Gervase and Protase or Cosmas and Damian; A. von Gutschmidt maintains that St. George is no other than Mithras, and so forth. The matter can be touched on only very briefly here, but it seems worth while to lay stress on the following points:

(1) The object of cultus, in the beginning, as we have shown, was undoubtedly a historical personage, whose cruel death or ascetical life was well known to those who paid reverence to his memory and invoked his aid by prayer. It is incredible that, in the beginning of things at any rate, those who honoured the martyr for the very fact that he was willing to lay down his life rather than sacrifice to Jupiter or pay unlawful honour to the deified emperors should themselves have elevated him into an object of worship and a rival to the true God. The evidence of such a case as that of St. Melania, quoted above—and many others might be added—proves clearly that by all Christians of education and intelligence the saint was honoured only subordinately and relatively. He was in no true sense worshipped. The charge of virtual polytheism was urged against the Christians by such antagonists as Julian the Apostate, Vigilantius, and Faustus. On their side the apologists—Jerome, Augustine, Theodoret, Maximus of Turin, and many more—invariably replied that λατρεία was paid to God alone:

'Colimus martyres eo cultu dilectionis et societatis . . . Cultu, quae Graece λατρεία dicitur, . . . nec colimus, nec colendum docemus, nisi unum Deum.'[1]

'We do not worship the saints . . . but we venerate them as men of God.'[2]

(2) The almost ineradicable tendency among the rude and uneducated to cling to their primitive customs led beyond doubt to a certain amount of compromise in matters which were not judged to be distinctively pagan. It was the advice of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, of St. Augustine, and of St. Gregory the Great that an attempt should be made to Christianize their popular observances, if not absolutely evil in themselves, rather than to extirpate them. If a particular day had been kept as a holiday, let it be transformed into a Christian festival; if there had been resort to a particular site for superstitious purposes, let some worthier object of pilgrimage be substituted; if certain practices connected with funerals, weddings, or other ceremonial occasions had established themselves firmly in the hearts of the people, let them be given a Christian colouring or significance. Certainly there was much danger of grave abuses resulting from such condescensions, but also it may be doubted whether a too rigid attitude would not have frustrated the work of conversion altogether, if we take into account ingrained habits of the mass of the people. There is more force than some would be disposed to admit in a remark of F. C. Conybeare:

'Perhaps we ought to be grateful to the Catholic Church in Latin countries for having established cults so respectable as those of the Virgin and the saints, for it is certain that, in default of them, the Latin peasant would relapse into a fetichism as old as the hills around him. You can turn Spanish and Italian peasants into anticlericals, but you seldom turn them into Rationalists. They may give up Christianity, but they only believe all the more firmly in the evil eye and in all the debasing practices which attend the belief.'[3]

(3) While the ceremonial of Christianity and that of paganism include many identical elements—*e.g.*, the use of ablutions, lights, incense, prostrations, unctions, linen vestures, *ex votos*, etc.—it would be rash to conclude that in all cases, or even in any case, the Church was guilty of conscious imitation. In such external rites the range of choice is limited. Moreover, an act which has become familiar from its being frequently practised or witnessed soon seems to be a natural and spontaneous expression of inward feeling, and men lose the sense that it belongs distinctively to one cult rather than another. Even with regard to such a matter as incubation (*q.v.*) it must not be forgotten that the Christian vigils, which probably grew out of the primitive celebration of Easter Eve, familiarized men with the idea of spending the night in the church. On the other hand, as Delehaye points out,[4] it would be foolish to deny the existence of this and other survivals of paganism in isolated cases.

Lastly, it may fairly be said that the attempted identification of saints with pagan heroes and deities has been much more commonly a matter of guesswork than of scientific method. The unsatisfactory character of the proofs adduced has often been pointed out in the reviews of such works appearing in the *Analecta Bollandiana*, a periodical specially devoted to hagiographical research and criticism. In any case it cannot be

[1] W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], Edinburgh, 1886–90, ii. 226–277.
[2] *Tripartite Life* (Rolls Series), London, 1887, i. p. clix.
[3] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*[4], Tübingen, 1909–10, ii. 442, 471–490

[1] Augustine, *c. Faustum*, xx. 21.
[2] Theodoret, *Græc. affect. Curatio*, viii. (*PG* lxxxiii. 1032).
[3] *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, London, 1909, p. 360
[4] *Legends of the Saints*, ch. vi.

contested that the identifications to which different scholars have been led are often widely divergent.

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H. THURSTON.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Indian).—The study of Indian hagiology is of exceptional difficulty; the number of personages worshipped or venerated is enormous, and a voluminous cycle of legend has been collected round them. The reason of this abundance of saints lies in the fact that Hindu and Muhammadan society is broken up into numerous groups. Thus there are tribal and caste saints, and the founders of sects and religious orders are usually credited with miraculous powers which lead to their veneration or worship. There is, again, no controlling organization, no prescribed system of canonization, such as that of the Roman curia; and any tribe, caste, order, or village is at liberty to confer the honour of saintship on any worthy at its own discretion. It has been the rule in India from the earliest times that each village worships its own local gods—godlings of fertility, who promote the happiness of the community, and repel famine, pestilence, and other misfortunes which are believed to be caused by the action of foreign and necessarily hostile spirits. These deities, under Musalmān influence, are often superseded or absorbed by the local saint who performs the same functions as his predecessor.

1. Powers ascribed to living saints.—The worship or reverence paid to deceased worthies of this class depends on the popular reputation of the living saint. This has been well described by H. B. Edwardes from his experience of the N.W. Frontier:

'For him [the Bannūchī] the whistle of the far-thrown bullet, or the nearer sheen of his enemy's shumsheer [shamshīr, 'a sword'] has no terrors; blood was simply a red fluid, and to remove a neighbour's head at the shoulder as easy as cutting cucumbers. But to be cursed in Arabic, or anything that sounded like it; to be told that the blessed Prophet had put a black mark against his soul, for not giving his best field to one of the Prophet's own posterity; to have the saliva of a disappointed saint left in anger on his door-post; or to behold a Hajee [Ḥājī], who had gone three times to Mecca, deliberately sit down and enchant his camels with the itch, and his sheep with the rot; these were things which made the dagger drop out of the hand of the awe-stricken savage, his knees to knock together, his liver to turn to water, and his parched tongue to be scarce able to articulate a full and complete concession of the blasphemous demand.'[1]

From this point of view it is clearly advisable that each village, caste, or tribe should be provided with a saintly protector.

'The Afridī Paṭhāns of Tīrāh had shame in the sight of their brethren, in that their territory was blessed with no holy shrine at which they might worship, and that they had to be beholden to the saints of their neighbours when they wished for divine aid. Smarting under a sense of incompleteness, they induced by generous offers a saint of the most notorious piety to take up his abode amongst them. They then made quite sure of his staying with them by cutting his throat, they buried him honourably, they built over his bones a splendid shrine at which they might worship him and implore his aid and intercession in their behalf, and thus they purged themselves of their reproach.'[2]

2. Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu saints.—The three great religions of India — Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism—recognize to a less or greater extent the reverence or worship of saints.

(*a*) *Buddhist.*—In its orthodox form Buddhism does not admit saint-worship; but in its later developments, such as the Mahāyāna, we find it recognized. In the Indian cave-temples images of Buddha are associated with those of *bodhisattvas*, or saints who in the next birth become Buddhas. *Stūpas* were erected to contain not only the relics of Buddha, but also those of the *sthaviras* or *theras*, elders of the faith; images of Padmapāni and Mañjuśrī are specially associated with those of Buddha, and at Junnar there is an altar (*toraṇa*) on which relics of Buddha or of Buddhist saints were placed.[3] The saints of Lamaist or Tibetan Buddhism are both Indian and Tibetan, with a few from China and Mongolia. Of the Indian saints the chief are the leading disciples of Buddha, and the sixteen *sthavira*, or chief apostles or missionaries.[4]

(*b*) *Jain.*—In Jain hagiology 63 persons, including 24 *tīrthaṅkaras*, or perfected saints, are regarded as 'pre-eminently spiritual.' 'These are not all "saints," *i.e. sādhus*, but spiritually great souls.'[5] In W. India each Jain temple contains an image of the *tīrthaṅkara* who was most popular with the person or persons who erected the temple; these images are placed in shrines fixed on raised seats, and are called *mūlnāyak*, or 'chief leaders.'[6] Luard reports that in Central India Jains revere the *tīrthaṅkaras*, but do not worship them, regarding them as models and mediators, but not in themselves objects of worship; the *śrāvaks*, 'hearers,' at first are taught to worship them, but, as they rise in knowledge and religious standing, they cease to do so; *gurus* or *yatis* look on the *tīrthaṅkaras* as only examples to be followed.[7]

(*c*) *Hindu.*—The chief Hindu saint is Gorakhnāth.[8] One account describes him as flitting round the earth with a train of nine *nāths*, 'lords,' and 84 *siddhs* (Skr. *siddha*, 'perfected,' 'versed in magical arts,' 'sanctified by penance and austerities'). These *siddhs* are, properly speaking, saints of exceptional purity of life who have attained to a semi-divine existence; but in the eyes of the vulgar

[1] *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, London, 1851, i. 83 f.
[2] D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 144.
[3] J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, pp. 172, 177, 239, 255, 298, 354, 357, 371.
[4] L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 376 ff.
[5] Jagmanderlal Jaini, *Outlines of Jainism*, Cambridge, 1916, pp. 5, 129 ff.
[6] *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 111.
[7] *ICR, 1901*, xlii., *Central Provinces*, pt. i. 67.
[8] *ERE* vi. 328 ff.

they seem to be little more than demons who have gained their power from Gorakhnāth. In the hilly parts of the Panjāb, where they are especially reverenced, they are often worshipped in the form of stones and the like, the distinctive emblem of their votaries being a silver *siṅgī*, a cylindrical ornament worn on a thread round the neck.[1] The Ghirth tribe erect a small shrine or a pillar bearing a relief in stone of the feet of the *siddh*; he is worshipped every morning like the other house gods, or at least on Sunday. The Gaddī tribe offer a sack, a stick of rosewood, a crutch, sandals, and a thick cake of bread to him, regarding him as a wandering ascetic.[2]

Another class of Hindu saints is that of the *bhagats*, or sect leaders, of whom the most important are Kabīr (*q.v.*) with his successors, Rāmānand, said to be the founder of the *bhagats*, and Nāmdeo, the cotton-printer, who has become the patron saint of the Chhimbas, or dyers of the Panjāb.[3] The saint Gūgā or Guggā is of another type. He is also known as Zāhir Pīr, which is usually taken to mean 'the saint apparent'; but Harikishan Kaul[4] says that the proper form of the word is Zahrīā, 'poisonous,' because while in his cradle he sucked the head of a snake. He is regarded as an incarnation of Nāga Rāja, the snake-king, and there seems good reason to believe that he is a snake-godling turned into a saint.[5]

3. Saint-worship on the N.W. Frontier.—Saint-worship in its most primitive form appears among the savage Musalmān tribes of the N.W. Frontier.

'Nowhere are saints held in greater worship than in the Brāhūī country. A place without a shrine is a place to be avoided; a shrineless road is wearisome, unlucky, unsafe. Happily there are very few of either. For the typical shrines of the Brāhūī country are not the domed shrines one sees in Las Bela and the Kachhī and occasionally in Jhalawān, but rough piles of stones, strewn about almost at random, often surrounded by a low wall. They can be descried from afar by the rags and tatters that flutter from the collection of poles stuck up over them. Though a shrine is often the actual grave of some saint, almost anything seems to serve as an excuse. One shrine may mark the spot where the saint disappeared below the earth; another the spot where he performed some miracle; another, more humble in origin, but none the less worshipful for that, the spot where he said his prayers. Hither come all who are in need, sickness, or any other adversity, to entreat the saint for the fulfilment of their desires, vowing to sacrifice this or that in return—the barren woman to pray for children, the sick to pray for health, the traveller for a safe return from his travels, the hunter for luck in the chase. Hard by most shrines of high reverence there are sacrificial altars, where the attendants preside at the sacrifice and receive a set portion of the flesh as their wage before it is distributed in alms. . . . Some shrines there are in which largish stones, polished and, to all seeming, chiselled with devoted care, occupy the place of honour in the niche towards which the worshippers direct their prayers. In a certain Chāgai shrine there stands a stone, about two feet high, with a flat base and a rounded, bullet-shaped head, too lifelike, it would seem, to be other than the conscious work of men's hands. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in this far-off shrine the pious Musalmān is bowing his head all unwittingly before a *lingam*, an ancient relic of pre-Islamic times.'[6]

'The belief of the Hindus in Muhammadan saints is nearly as great as that of the Muhammadans themselves. Pilgrimages are made by the Hindus to the shrines of the various Musalmān Pīrs, who are believed to have power to cure diseases, give children, and perform all kinds of miracles. One of the most favourite places of pilgrimage is Shāh Bilāwal on the Windhar river near Sommiānī in Las Bela. The Hindus have gone so far as to name the stream which passes the shrine of Shāh Bilāwal the Ganges, and the ashes of the dead are thrown into its water.'[7]

4. The orthodox Muhammadan saints.—The orthodox saints of Islām in India form a heterogeneous group. Among the titles applied to them are *pīr*, 'old,' 'reverend'; *walī*, 'one who is very near';[1] *quṭb*, 'axis,' 'pivot,' the highest degree of sanctity among Muslim saints; *ghauṯ*, 'one to whom we can cry for help'; *buzurg*, 'high'; *zāhid*, 'abstinent,' 'ascetic'; *'ābid*, 'a worshipper [of God]'; *sālik*, 'a traveller,' a Ṣūfī term; *faqīr*, 'one who is poor in the sight of God'; *shaikh*, *mīr*, *miyāṅ*, 'chief,' 'master.'[2] See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Muhammadan in India).

5. Martyrs.—The Arabic word for 'martyr' used in India is *shahīd*, 'one who is present as a witness,' the perfect martyr (*ash-shahīdu' l-kāmil*) being one who has been killed in a *jihād*, or religious war.[3] The sites of battles with Hindus or other 'infidels' are known as 'treasuries of martyrs' (*ganj-i-shahīdān*). It is remarkable that many of these shrines are visited by Hindus, who have themselves adopted the cult, as among the Hindu and Sikh Jāṭs of the Panjāb, whose tribal shrine (*jaṭherā*) sometimes commemorates an ancestor who was a martyr, the spot being marked by a mound of earth or a masonry shrine, round which the bridegroom walks and bows his head at his wedding.[4] Sūr Sadi, a Chibh Rājput, died by a violent death in the reign of Aurangzīb, and is venerated as a martyr. The Muhammadan branch of the sept offer the scalp-locks of their children at his tomb, and, until this rite is performed, the child is not considered to be a true Chibh, and his mother is not allowed to eat meat.[5]

LITERATURE.—See the literature quoted in the article.

W. CROOKE.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Iranian).—1. Introductory.

The idea of 'saints' and 'saintship' will of course differ greatly in various religious systems. Whilst all will involve blamelessness of character and life and, generally at least, beneficence to others, in some there will be also combined the ideas of asceticism, or intensity of devotion, and even absorption in the Divinity, often with the addition of extraordinary supernatural powers, such as the gifts of miracle-working and prophecy. The Indian religions afford many illustrations of these ideas. Perhaps a more general formula would be that of the most perfect conformity in life and conduct to the ideals and precepts of the particular faith to which the saint belongs and of which he is looked upon as a hero or model. The Zoroastrian idea of saintship is simple and easily defined. At no era of its development has the idea of asceticism ever entered into the concept.[6] As M. N. Dhalla writes, speaking of the Gāthic theology:

'The Zoroastrian saint is more a saint in action than in thought. He is the one whose mission for the advancement of the world is to live in society and to minister to the wants and grievances of the less fortunate of mankind. He is not the recluse who assumes the tonsure, dons the ash-coloured robe, and besmears his face. The Zoroastrian saint does not sacrifice for the self-centred self, he sacrifices for others. The ascetic that selfishly seeks his own personal salvation, without contributing his mite to the general uplift of humanity and the regeneration of society, as well as the redemption of the universe, is not so much the beloved of Ormazd as is the active saint who lives in the world of joy and sorrow, without separating himself from the world of activity. . . . The true devotee of religion does not withdraw from the company of men in seeking the blessed company of Ormazd.'[7]

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[1] *ICR*, *1891*, xix., *Punjab*, pt. i. 114 f.

[2] H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, ii., Lahore, 1911–14, ii. 294, 268.

[3] *Ib.* ii. 417, 166; *ICR*, *1911*, xiv., *Punjab*, pt. i. 122; R. C. Temple, *Legends of the Punjāb*, Bombay, 1884–85, ii. 52, 99. A full account of these worthies will be found in H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, i., London, 1861; G. A. Grierson, 'Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan,' *JASB*, pt. i. [1888].

[4] *ICR*, *1911*, xiv., *Punjab*, pt. i. 121.

[5] Ibbetson, p. 115; Temple, i. 121, iii. 261.

[6] *ICR*, *1911*, iv., *Baluchistan*, p. 62 f.

[7] *Ib.*, *1901*, v. p. 47.

[1] 'Are not, verily, friends (*auliyā*, pl. of *walī*) of God they on whom is no fear?' (*Qur'ān*, x. 63).

[2] Hughes, *DI*, *s.vv.*

[3] *Qur'ān*, ii. 155: 'Count not those who are killed in the way of God as dead, but living with the Lord.'

[4] Rose, ii. 371.

[5] *Ib.* ii. 169; for offerings of hair at tombs see *GB*[2], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 31: 'If the sacrifice of hair, especially at puberty, is sometimes intended to strengthen the divine beings to whom it is offered by feeding or fertilising them, we can the better understand . . . the common practice of offering hair to the shadowy dead.'

[6] See art. CELIBACY (Iranian).

[7] *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914, p. 15.

All this is practically true of the Mazdean religion throughout its history and in all its stages. It is the characteristic difference between Mazdeism and all forms of Hinduism, with its *yōgis, sannyāsis,* or *faqīrs.* But, more than this, Dhalla's last sentence hints at the absence of another element, which has led J. H. Moulton, in his posthumous work, to say :

'One who loves and reveres Zarathushtra confesses with keen reluctance that sainthip seems less easy to find in his community than in some religions which are far inferior in the apprehension of Truth. The reader will have realized ere this that with all its grandeur and purity Zoroastrianism as a whole has a certain coldness.'[1]

In other words, there is lacking, as above remarked, the element of personal 'devotion' to the Deity, so conspicuous not only in India but also, *e.g.*, in the Ṣūfīs of Persia. As Moulton puts it, 'Love is not the power that inspires the Gathas. The very word is practically absent from them.'[2]

The Avestan word that corresponds to our 'saint' is *ashavan* (*aŝavan*, pl. *aŝaono*), a derivative of the substantive *asha* (*aŝa*), whether used as an abstract term signifying 'righteousness,' 'holiness'—the Old Persian *arta*, so common as an element in proper names, corresponding etymologically with the Skr. *ṛta*, 'established order,' 'divine law,' 'truth,' 'right,' and the Latin *ritus*—or as the name of the archangel or genius Asha, the personification of these ideas, originally conceived as an attribute of Ahura Mazda 'within the hypostasis of deity.'[3] *Ashavan* is strictly opposed to *dregvant*, the latter indicating a follower of Angra Mainyu, the spirit of evil, and his *daevas*, the former an adherent of Ahura Mazda, the supreme deity, and his 'good law.'[4] In this sense, then, it may be used in general of all good Zoroastrians, like 'saints' in the NT. But it also indicates specially the chief and most illustrious members of the Faith, and of course, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, Zarathushtra himself.[5] Among those to whom the title of *ashavan* is specifically given in the Avesta we find such heroes of the Faith as Frashaostra, Jamāsp, Vīshtāspa (the Prophet's royal patron), Hvōvi (the Prophet's wife).

2. Cult of the saints.—Under this heading must come the special homage paid to those enigmatical beings, the *fravashis* of the holy ones.[6] Among the *Yashts* there is a very long 'litany of the saints,' the *Farvardīn Yasht*,[7] devoted to these personages—at least 336 in number—which Darmesteter likens to 'a Homer's catalogue.'[8] The last 27 are the names of female saints, either married or 'holy maids,' headed by Zarathushtra's wife Hvōvi and his three daughters. The great bulk of the names in the catalogue are quite unknown; some are of mythical personages; a considerable number are of the Prophet's patrons and chief disciples, headed by his own name. Like the other *Yashts*, this 'litany' is of comparatively late date, so we are not surprised to find here and there certain miraculous powers attributed to some of the saints. But it is more interesting to note that it not only embraces 'the first man,' Gayo Meretan, and winds up with Saoshyant, the future Saviour, who is to come at the end of the world, but includes also a number of those personages called *paoiryō-ṭkaēsha*, 'men of the Old Law,' who were believed to have worshipped Ahura Mazda and held his religion even before the coming of Zarathushtra, and who may be strictly compared to the Patriarchs of the OT before the Mosaic dispensation. To each name of the litany is attached the verb *yazamaide*, 'we worship (or venerate).'

[1] *The Treasure of the Magi*, London, 1917, p. 194 *f.*
[2] *Ib.* p. 195. [3] *Ib.* p. 24. [4] See art. Ormazd.
[5] *Passim*, in both *Gāthās* and Later Avesta—once even without his name (*Yt.* xii. 1, 'the Saint').
[6] See art. Fravashi. [7] *Yt.* xiii.
[8] *SBE* xxiii. [1883] 179.

In the later Pahlavi, or so-called 'patristic,' literature the term *arta*, exactly corresponding to the Old Persian, as opposed to the Zend or Avestan form, is used as an epithet like our 'saint,' applied once at least to Zaratûsht (Zarathushtra) himself, and especially to Vīrāf, the Mazdean Dante, whose famous visit to hell and heaven is the subject matter of the *Artā-i Vīrāf Nāmak*,[1] which may be exactly translated 'the Book of Saint Vīrāf.'[2]

3. Martyrs.—Strictly speaking, a martyr is one who lays down his life in the cause of his religion or faith. There is a fairly unanimous tradition that the prophet Zarathushtra himself ended his life in this manner with 80 of his priests. The whole story is gone into with great wealth of detail and careful weighing of evidence by A. V. Williams Jackson in his life of the Prophet.[3] Briefly summed up, it comes to this :

During the last twenty years of Zarathushtra's life there were waged 'holy wars' between the Iranian king Vīshtāspa, the Prophet's convert—who has been styled the Constantine or the Ethelbert of his religion—and the Turanian Arejataspa, or Arjasp, the great enemy of the Faith. A dispute about tribute is said to have been the pretext of the Turanian invasions: 'the actual ground for difficulty, however, seems to have been the religious difference; for Vīshtāsp's adoption of the new Faith really lies at the basis of the trouble.'[4] The tradition is that it was during the second invasion, in all probability 583 B.C., that Zarathushtra with the other priests was massacred whilst at worship in the fire-temple (according to some at Balkh), and 'the fire was quenched with their blood.' The Greek legend about the Prophet's death by lightning seems to be quite apocryphal.

The celebrated 'magophonia,' or slaughter of the Magi, under the Achæmenid monarch Darius (521 B.C.) can hardly be reckoned in this category of martyrdoms; for it is by no means certain that these 'Magi' were really Zoroastrians, whilst, on the other hand, the bloody execution was a political measure rather than a religious persecution. Alexander the Great, after his overthrow of the Persian monarchy, though he was always referred to in subsequent Mazdean literature as 'the accursed Alexander' (*gajastak Alaksagdar*) and credited with the wanton destruction by fire of the greater part of the original Avesta, adopted a policy of conciliation with the Persians, and no religious persecution or martyrdom marked his reign. But the Arab conquest (A.D. 641) brought with it violent persecution of the Mazdean religion and real martyrdom for the few unhappy adherents of the national Faith who refused to adopt the creed of Islām, or did not succeed in making their escape from Persia, like the small band of 'Pilgrim Fathers,' the forbears of the modern Parsis of India. The great majority of the people seem to have been thus forcibly 'converted' to Muhammadanism—it is said at the rate of 100,000 a day[5]—so that the number of those who laid down their lives instead of apostatizing must have been relatively small, and no record of them seems to have been kept.[6]

Literature.—See the ordinary translations and commentaries of the Avesta, and the writings of Dhalla, Moulton, and Williams Jackson as quoted in the footnotes.

L. C. Casartelli.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Japanese).—

The true national religion of Japan, *i.e.* Shintō, knows neither saints nor martyrs. The absence of martyrs is easily explained. A martyr, in the proper sense of the word, is a man who suffers torture and even death to testify to the truth of his religious faith. Now, at the dawn of Japanese history we find Shintō firmly established as an official religion, its

[1] Ed. M. Haug and E. W. West, *The Book of Arda-Viraf*, Bombay, 1872.
[2] See the present writer's 'The Persian Dante,' in *The Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1913; and J. J. Modi, *Dante Papers*, do. 1914.
[3] *Zoroaster*, New York, 1901, pp. 102–132.
[4] Jackson, p. 106.
[5] D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 23.
[6] Cf. art. Persecution (Muhammadan).

origin lost in legend; later, when Buddhism was introduced, its triumphal progress, largely due to the eclecticism of the Japanese, entailed no persecution of the partisans of the ancient worship. If we take the word 'martyr' in the broader sense of a man who suffers death for any noble cause—for the defence of a particular idea or of a political opinion—we find innumerable examples in the history of a heroic people like the Japanese, even in modern times; but these are not martyrs in the normal sense, the sense in which we speak of Christian martyrs.

As regards saints, their non-appearance in Shintō is simply due to their confusion with the gods. An expression which appears continually in Japanese literature is 'the *kami* and the *hotoke*,' 'the gods [of Shintō] and the saints [of Buddhism],' meaning the whole spiritual world of the two religions. Whilst Buddhism has practically no gods, but simply saints, Shintō has, properly speaking, no saints, but only gods. It does not, like Buddhism, reserve its admiration exclusively for men who, by their wisdom and intelligence, usually through several successive existences, have finally reached the perfection of Buddhas. Nor has it, like Christianity, a special category for the souls of the faithful who, sustained by divine grace, have died in the observance of certain religious virtues, have earned fame by miracles, and been assigned a place in paradise by their living adorers. In Shintō those who would be called saints by Buddhists or Christians are enrolled directly in the ranks of the deities, with the same rights as nature-powers or ancestors famed for achievements, services, useful discoveries, or other merits equally unconnected with sanctity. This conception appears very natural when we remember the extremely vague and relative character of the Japanese *kami*. See art. HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Japanese).

MICHEL REVON.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Jewish).—Judaism has its martyrs and its martyrologies, its saints and its specialized teachings on saintliness; but the position held by these in the Synagogue and its liturgy is far less prominent than that held in the Christian Church by the parallel literature. The Jew understood the word 'saint' (*kādōsh*, *ḥāsīd*, or *tsāddīk*) in quite a different sense. He was never made an object of religious worship, whether in life or in death; and the Christian idea of the canonization of saints on account of their eminently pious and pure lives is quite foreign to Jewish theology, which has nothing analogous to the *Acta Martyrum* and the *Acta Sanctorum* of the older Church. Whilst the Christian Church celebrated the anniversaries of the deaths of its saints by the intensely mystic formulæ connected with the sacrifice of the Mass, the Synagogue looked upon the heroes of the faith as Jews who had fulfilled the Law with heart, soul, and might, and who, if the necessity arose, would have undergone torture and death rather than infringe its commands. Many of these saints certainly did lay down their lives for the Law, but their claim to sainthood is based not upon the fact of their martyrdom but upon the exemplary Jewish life which they led. Nevertheless, the Synagogue perpetuated the memory of these martyred saints in a prayer commencing 'Āb Hā-rāḥāmīm' ('Father of Mercies'), which was, and still is at this day, recited in all places of worship on the last days of festivals, on the Day of Atonement, and on the Sabbaths preceding the feast of Pentecost and the 9th of Ab (the anniversary of the destruction of Jerusalem).

But there was another way — one partaking rather of a religio-secular character—in which the memories of saints and martyrs were kept from fading. The custom arose among the Jews of mediæval Europe of compiling necrologies. MS lists which, originally known as *Sēfĕr Hā-Zikrōnōth* (*i.e.* 'Book of Records'), afterwards became generally known as 'Memor-Books' (Germ. *Memorbuch*) were made of the names of martyrs and of the localities in which they met their fate. These 'Memor-Books' were possessed by many a mediæval synagogue, and the contents were read out to the congregation during service on holy days and on the Day of Atonement. The 'Memor-Books' bore some resemblance to the necrologies, calendars, and martyrologies of the Roman Catholic Church—but only in form; in matter they are essentially and characteristically Jewish. The object of the compilation seems to have been not so much that of inciting to prayer on behalf of the dead—a practice by no means over-prominent in Jewish worship—as that of preserving for future generations the inner history of local communities. The names recorded in these lists—the earliest extant specimen being the *Memor Book of Nüremberg*, begun in 1296 by a scribe, Isaac ben Samuel of Meiningen, and presented to the community of Nüremberg at the dedication of one of its synagogues in 1296—are principally, though by no means entirely, those of Jews distinguished for their great Talmudic learning or for their admirable qualities as philanthropists or communal workers. The entire book, in which numerous entries were made after 1296, was edited by S. Salfeld[1] in 1896–98, and contains, besides poems (in Hebrew) and prayers for the heroes who sleep their last sleep, an elaborate martyrology which is introduced by a summary of the persecutions suffered by the Jews of France and Germany from 1096 (the year of the First Crusade) till 1298, the names of the martyrs between 1096 and 1349, and a list of towns and villages in which abundant martyrdoms took place at the time of the Black Death (1348–49). It is of this blood-stained period of Jewish history, stretching down to the 17th cent., that Graetz says:

'The persecutions and massacres of the Jews increased with frightful rapidity and intensity, and only alternated with inhuman decrees issued both by the Church and by the State, the aim and purport of all of which were to humiliate the Jews, to mark them with conspicuous brands, and to drive them to suicide. . . . It mattered little to the Jews whether they lived under proper government or under anarchy, for they suffered under the one no less than under the other.'[2]

The mediæval Jewish communities which suffered the greatest numbers of martyrdoms were those of Worms (1096 and 1349), Cologne (1096), Mayence (1096 and 1349), Blois (1171), Nüremberg (1298), Troyes (1288), Navarre (1328), Augsburg (1349), and Erfurt (1349). According to Zunz,[3] the communities of Cologne, Worms, Mayence, and a few other cities in the Rhine district observed fast-days in memory of the saints and martyrs who perished 'for the Sanctification of the Name' during the First Crusade (1096).

Mention must here be made of one exceptionally striking martyrology to be found in the Midrashic literature and known as the מדרש עשרה הרוגי מלכות ('the Midrash of the Ten Martyrs') or מדרש אלה אזכרה ('the Midrash beginning with the words, "These do I remember"'). There are four extant versions of this, each differing from the others in various points of detail.[4] The work is a product of the Gaonic period of Rabbinic literature and is a curious embellishment of the narratives given in many passages of the Babylonian Talmud and the

[1] *Das Martyrologium des Nürnberger Memorbuches*, Berlin, 1898.
[2] *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, iii. 630 f.
[3] *Die Monatstage des Kalenderjahres*, Berlin, 1872, pp. 40–58.
[4] See A. Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrasch*[3], Leipzig and Vienna, 1853–77, i. 64, vi. 19.

early Palestinian Midrashim[1] of how ten great and saintly teachers of the Law suffered martyrdom in the reign of Hadrian for having, in defiance of an imperial edict, founded schools for the study of the *Tôrāh*. The ten martyrdoms are represented as having taken place on one and the same day, which is contrary to the Talmudic view. This was most probably done with the intention of heightening the effect on the reader. These ten martyrs were all of them 'saints' in the real Jewish sense of that term—men of exceptional learning in the Law and of spotless conduct, whose single-minded, self-sacrificing zeal in the cause of the propagation of the *Tôrāh* among the masses showed itself in a readiness to accept torture and death rather than a life in which the Law of God had no place. The most famous of the ten is 'Aqîba ben Joseph (A.D. 50–130), whose last moments are invested by the Rabbinic recorders with an ultra-heroic fortitude.

Amidst his excruciating agonies he recited the *Shema* with a peaceful smile on his face. Asked by the executioner whether he was not a sorcerer, seeing that he appeared to feel no pain, 'Aqîba replied: 'I am no sorcerer, but am overcome with joy at the thought that the opportunity has at last been given me of carrying out the Deuteronomic precept, "And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might."' He expired with the word 'One' (*i.e.* confession of the Divine Unity) on his lips.

The deaths of several of the remaining nine martyrs are ornamented with highly-coloured details which are purely legendary. It has ever been, and still is to-day, the custom of the Synagogue to recite the martyrdom of these ten sainted Rabbis in a special *seliḥah* (*i.e.* prayer for forgiveness) on the Day of Atonement. The *seliḥah* is a poem based on the above-mentioned 'Midrash of the Ten Martyrs.' Another poetic form of it appears in the *Kînah*, commencing with the words 'Cedars of Lebanon,' recited in all orthodox synagogues on the 9th of Ab.

It remains now to state more explicitly what, in the Jewish view, constitutes the quality of saintliness and the title to the dignity of sainthood. As has already been said, one need not have undergone martyrdom in order to be regarded as a saint; and the fact that many among the latter order became martyrs is but one of the accidents of history. M. H. Luzzatto has aptly characterized the Jewish standpoint thus:

'Whosoever loveth God the Creator with a true love will not think that he has acquitted himself of this duty of love by merely following out the religious rules which are practised by Jews generally. He will rather resemble the loving son who carries out the father's wish to an extent far beyond what the father expects of him—and all for the purpose of causing him additional pleasure.'[2]

In other words, saintliness is a higher stage of religious loyalty transcending all idea of law or rule. The Talmud expresses it thus:

'Sanctify thyself even in that which is permitted to thee.'[3]

Such is the saintliness which in the Talmud and all the Jewish mediæval theology is termed *ḥăsîdûth*. The doer of it (*i.e.* the *ḥăsîd*) does not wait for a distinct commandment. His service of God is prompted and sustained by his own inner instincts untrammelled by any instruction from without. One possession, however, is indispensable to him—learning. The saint must be a man of learning; and only a man of learning can be a saint.[4] The Mishnah speaks ironically of the 'illiterate saint,' stigmatizing him as belonging to those undesirables 'who turn the universe into a chaos';[5] and the Talmud describes such an 'illiterate saint' as 'one who would see a woman drown without giving her a helping hand because of the rule forbidding a man to look upon a woman.'[6]

[1] See, *e.g.*, T.B. *'Abôdâh Zârâh*, 17*b*, 18*a*; *Ber.* 61*b*; *Sanh.* 14*a*; *Lam. Rabbâh*, ii. 2.
[2] See *Messillat Yesharîm*, Amsterdam, 1740, ch. xviii.
[3] T.B. *Yebâmôth*, 20*a*. [4] Cf. *Mishnâh Abôth*, ii. 6.
[5] *Mishnâh Sôṭâh*, v. 2. [6] T.B. *Sôṭâh*, 21*b*.

Besides the saints mentioned in the early part of this article as having undergone martyrdom, the following who were not martyrs stand out prominently: Hillel the Elder (30 B.C.–A.D. 10), who at his death was eulogized as 'the saint, the meek, the disciple of Ezra';[1] R. Hûna and R. Ḥisda (4th cent. A.D.), whose prayers for rain were very efficacious;[2] Mar Zûtra (4th cent. A.D.), who, when finding it necessary to rebuke a disciple and put him under the ban (*ḥerem*), would first exercise these inflictions on himself and then on the disciple.[3] The typical Jewish saint of the Middle Ages is R. Judah ben Samuel Hâ Ḥâsîd of Regensburg († 1217), who wrote, in Hebrew, a famous ethical work (*Sêfer Ḥâsidîm*) which contains various original and quaint maxims relating to this order. The mediæval *ḥâsîd* was usually saint and mystic combined. Superior holiness, independence of 'law,' and a partial withdrawal from things earthly brought about a state of communion with the divine which is the prime incentive to the mystic life.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the literature already alluded to see A. Neubauer, 'Le Memorbuch de Mayence,' in *REJ* iv. [1887] 1 ff.; H. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866–78, iv. 161 ff.; S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, London, 1909, pp. 199–218; *JE*, *s.vv.* 'Martyrology,' 'Martyrs, the Ten,' 'Saint and Saintliness.'

J. ABELSON.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Muhammadan).

1. Relation of the two terms.—The saints of Islâm are commonly regarded as martyrs, but the latter term is of wider application than the word 'saint.' Those who die in the 'holy war' (*jihâd*) are martyrs, but not necessarily saints.

2. General prevalence of the veneration of saints.—Every neighbourhood in the Muslim world has its patron saint and in addition recognizes the claims of saints elsewhere. There are also saints who belong to the universal community of believers rather than to the special shrines where they are honoured. To this class belong the Prophet, the first three *khalîfahs*, 'Alî, his two sons, the Khidr, the greatest of the OT worthies, and possibly some others.

3. Names.—The common Arabic term for a saint is *walî*; for a martyr it is *shahîd*. The former implies more precisely one who is near, a friend (*i.e.* of God); it is usually applied to living saints, but is very generally employed of the dead. The term is also used regularly in a secondary sense for the tombs of the saints. *Shahîd* is, primarily, one who gives testimony as an eye-witness, then one who seals his testimony with his blood (commonly employed in the plural *shuhadâ* of those who are killed fighting the battles of Islâm). The living saint, particularly, is spoken of as the *shaikh*, in the same honorific way as we make use of 'elder,' though with more intensive meaning. *Zâhid* has a special reference to the ascetic self-denial of the eminently pious. *Sâ'iḥ* has in view rather the hermit saint who retires from the common life to dwell in the desert. The Ṣûfî is a member of the mystical movement called in Islâm Ṣûfîism (*q.v.*). The Ṣûfî may be a saint, but the term does not necessarily declare that he is.

4. Attitude of Islâm towards saint-worship.—(*a*) *Sunnîs.*—Since the days of al-Ghazâlî (12th cent. A.D.) the Sunnite branch of Islâm (excepting the Hanbalite school) has given its approval to the cult of the saints. The orthodox teachers claim that what is accorded the saint is not worship. Nor is there any thought of the saint having power in himself to answer prayer. The Qur'ân and the Sunnah recognize intercession on the part of those favoured by Allâh, and the orthodox Sunnîs say that there is no cult of saints beyond the permissible seeking of their help as mediators

[1] T.B. *Sôṭâh*, 48*b*. [2] See T.B. *Ta'ânîth*, 22*a*, *b*.
[3] T.B. *Mô'êd Kâtân*, 17*a*.

with God. The more intelligent may approach Allāh in this orthodox way, but the vast majority of unthinking Muslims regard the *walī* as being a proper object of worship and in himself the source of blessing. The Bedawīn and the Kabyle tribes of N. Africa, with the *fellaḥīn* of Egypt and Syria, may employ phrases which seem to imply an orthodox attitude, but in reality the saint is a far more real God to them than Allāh is. If the orthodox teachers of the Sunnīs were not compelled to accept the facts of the situation, they would see that the general practice of Islām as to the saints was a violation of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. It imperils the unique deity of Allāh and leads directly to *shirk*, the 'association' of other objects with Him in worship. It sets aside the authority of the Prophet in adopting a basis of religion which is in conflict with the primary sources sanctioned by him.

(*b*) *Shī'ahs*.—The Shī'ahs are enthusiastic worshippers of the saints, and their writers especially have been responsible for the production of martyrologies and other literature relating to them. Persia has been the home of Muslim mysticism. It is the native soil of the Ṣūfī movement, and within Ṣūfīism there is provided a prescribed discipline for saintship. The whole Shī'ah movement is one which gathers round the idea of a 'Holy Family,' and most of all about the sufferings of the 'People of the House,' as the family of 'Alī and the Prophet's daughter Fatima were styled. In the 'People of the House' (*Ahlu 'l-Bait*) there has been found a conspicuous invitation calling their followers to saintship, and in the spiritual atmosphere charged with emotion excited by their pains and sacrifices there has been a powerful stimulus to imitation. The Ṣūfīs have gone beyond loyalty to recognized authority as understood by the Shī'ah. Their ideal is a life in which law and authority have no place and the notion of obedience is excluded. For this reason the orthodox Shī'ahs are jealously suspicious of the professors of saintship among the Ṣūfīs. The saints of the Shī'ah provinces have very often based their claims upon alleged descent from the holy *imāms*: they are *sayyids*, nobility. They are in parts so numerous that their number has become a subject of innocent jesting. The Persians, as well as the Berbers of N. Africa, are more favourable to women saints than are the Arabs.

(*c*) *Hanbalites*.—The Hanbalites find no room for the cult of the saints. They hold that it is contrary to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. To this the other Sunnites, who are favourable to the cult, answer that it is supported by the Consensus of Islām through hundreds of years. The Hanbalites do not deny the authority of the Consensus (*Ijmā'*), but claim that *Ijmā'*, properly understood, embraces only the agreed opinion of the first age of Islām. The Consensus of the Companions of the Prophet condemns the offering of worship to any but Allāh, and this, added to the voice of the other great authorities, Qur'ān and Tradition, is deemed to be decisive against the practice. The Hanbalite school has made its influence felt at different times. 'Umār II., at a date earlier than the foundation of the school, had refused to face the grave of the Prophet towards Mecca, lest it should become a shrine where prayer would be offered to the Prophet along with Allāh. Ibn Taimīyya, a Hanbalite, in the 14th cent. A.D. wrote against the veneration of the *walīs*, including the cult of the Prophet's tomb at Medīna. The latter had become part of the prescriptions for the *ḥajj* and had come under Hanbalite censure as *bid'a*, 'innovation.' Earnestly as Ibn Taimīyya set himself to oppose the popular favour shown to the saints, he accomplished little and brought persecution upon himself. He died in prison in A.D. 1328, and by a certain irony of fate came to be regarded as a saint by those who accepted his views. The Hanbalites kept alive his principles until, at the end of the 18th cent., the iconoclastic Wahhābī crusade again sought to make them effective by the destruction of tombs and shrines throughout Arabia and the adjacent lands. Not even the most venerable shrines, such as the tombs of the Prophet and the earliest *khalīfahs* at Medīna, and the shrines of the great martyrs of the Shī'ahs—'Alī, Ḥusain, and the *imām* Riḍā—were spared. The Wahhābī desolation was brought to an end when Muhammad 'Alī's forces finally overcame the Wahhābī army in 1818. Since that time the Wahhābīs have been indeed represented by the Wahhābī State in central Arabia, by groups of extreme Hanbalites in the eastern part of Arabia, and by a few sectaries in India; but the attempt to check saint-worship has been a failure, nor will it ever succeed as long as Islām continues to be what it has been for 900 years past.

5. **The conception of saintship in Islām.**—The saint is one who is near to God, a 'friend of God.' In Islām, as in less advanced religions, this has no necessary ethical implication. It does imply the indwelling and inspiration of 'divinity.' The saint has a supernatural quality by reason of which he (or she) is held to be above criticism and by some is thought to be invulnerable against attack on either body or soul. It is this quality that explains the superhuman knowledge and power of the saint and makes him the source of either miraculous blessing or terrible and mysterious curses.

This 'light of the saint' is said by the orthodox to come to him as a gift of God through the mediation of the Prophet. The miracles (*karamāt*) are a grace from Allāh with which He honours His servant. The orthodox will not allow that the saint is by nature more than human nature commonly suggests. What is beyond that is endowment. In the thought of the Muslim peasantry and the Bedawīn of the desert there is only one conception, namely, that the saint is of a divine nature and can by reason of his inherent capacity do acts that lie properly within the power of God and know things knowable only to a god. It has been truly said that, in spite of their profession of Islām, the ignorant populations in many Muslim lands have but slight spiritual relations in religious thought and feeling with any god other than the *walī*. Allāh is at most a name, without power to stir interest in those who use it, and without effect in moulding their purposes.

In the case of each individual saint there was a time when he began to be esteemed a saint. Those about him took note of certain characteristic features. He was a man whose thought was filled with God, who lived in God, and whose acts were moved by God. He was judged to be a man who had renounced desire and had become completely passive, a vessel for divine inspiration, a receptacle for a deposit of divine qualities and influences. To the soul thus prepared there come such thoughts and impulses as are proper to a life secluded, shut off from the avenues of ordinary human experience, and shut in to a purely self-occupied experience which is saturated by a ruling religious motive. The impression made by a man of such a mode of life would be infallibly that of a man 'possessed' by divine influences. Such a mysterious human being easily fancied himself the recipient of divine communications or one appointed to undertake marvels. His proofs were subjective and were not easily disputed by others. Many of the saints have been eccentrics, defectives, or idiots (not insane). Such persons have

been thought to be saints because they, too, have become emptied receptacles which Allāh was to fill and use. Their pure souls have been taken up to heaven, and what has remained of them was esteemed a most meet and fitting vessel of inspiration. As long as this class of persons was typical of what a saint should be, the lesser peculiarities, begotten of mere habitual introspection and negation of self, procured a reputation for sanctity in proportion to their extravagance.

While many who have achieved saintship did not renounce the world and separate themselves from their fellow-men, the surest path to saintship was found in poverty and a contempt of the world. Thus it comes about that the typical garb of the saint is that of the beggar and his habit of life is that which answers to his garb. Poverty and sanctity are so far synonymous that the most effective counterfeit of the saint is the *faqīr*, or beggar—a term which still serves to indicate the saint, but is also all too commonly made to denote beggars who, being such and nothing more, would pass for saints.

The contempt for the world led a fair proportion of the saints to a hermit life in the desert or, in the case of the Ṣūfīs, to a cloister life under the direction of a *murshid*, or spiritual director, often in a *zāwiyah*, or community house. Scorn of the world also finds expression in another way. The saint spurns the esteem of men, deeming it a temptation to a divided devotion, and provokes with careful deliberation their ill-will. In this way he is the more inevitably set apart unto God. With this traditional attitude, it is easy to understand that in the early days of the khalifate the 'saints' were in many cases opposed to the government of their time and were found allied with seditious movements and conspiracies. For one or other party in a quarrel to obtain the support of some powerful *shaikh* was sure to bring many to that side. The saints as a matter of course were generally of the revolutionary party; but they were not always so. The illustrious martyr, the *imām* Riḍā, was bought at a great price to support the policy of the *khalīfah* al-Mamun, and many of the most influential of the *shaikhs* of Morocco in the 16th cent. A.D. were supporters of the reigning rulers. The earliest of the Safawid kings of Persia in the 16th cent. were themselves saints and enjoyed the spontaneous support of the *shaikhs* of their time. In fact, the saints of the modern period of history have been loyal to the powers that be and have been held in esteem by them.

One of the cherished evidences of saintship is the inspired dream or the ecstatic vision in which the Prophet, one of the *imāms*, or one of the greater saints appears to one who is thus shown to be in the favour of heaven. The nature of the communication granted is not as important as the vision itself.

There is no disapproval of the warlike character in a saint. It has always been to the glory of the Prophet that he was a man of war; and, among his successors, the holy martyrs 'Alī and Ḥusain acquired an added lustre of saintliness from the fact that they were men of proved martial quality. In the hagiologies the warlike deeds of the saints find a large place. There is found also allusion to carrying a saint's dead body into battle to ensure victory.

According to the accepted view, the *walīs* form an invisible order with ascending dignities and ranks. At the head is the leading saint of the age, who bears the title *quṭb* (literally 'pole,' 'axis'). Under him are deputies, commonly reckoned to be three in number, and in Egypt designated by the respective names, *nakīb*, *nagīb*, and *badīl*. He has his favourite abodes on earth, one of which is the roof of the Ka'bah in Mecca and another the Bab-az-Zuwailah (or Bab al-Mutawallī) in Cairo. It is his custom to appear in some familiar disguise among men, and to reveal his presence at times by the performance of some mysterious and uncanny act which, despite unpromising appearances, often turns out to be really beneficent in its purpose. Among the saints of Morocco two or three are said to have attained the rank of *quṭb*, but there is reason to suppose that this refers rather to the perfect stage of the Ṣūfī *tarīqah*, or discipline.

The pains and death of the *walīs*, especially of such as had been the victims of persecution, were deemed to have a merit not needed on their own account by beings of such sanctity. Such merit therefore is supposed to be available for those who seek the intercession and help of the saint. It is both prudent and pious to entrust one's soul to such an one as the *walī*, whether for this life or for the life to come. It is from this kind of motive that Muslims in all parts of Islām desire that their bodies should rest under the shadow of some *walī* (here used in the secondary sense of the tomb of a *walī*). The presence of the tomb of Ḥusain at Kerbela, that of 'Alī at Nejef, and that of the *imām* Riḍā at Meshed have caused the bodies of thousands of persons to be brought to these places for burial, sometimes from a great distance. In Syria[1] the *walīs* (tombs of the saints) stand frequently in the midst of a number of humbler graves which have gathered about them as time has passed. The dead rest in peace under the protection of the *walī*.

While it would be admitted to have occurred only in very rare cases, the teaching of Islām is that the gifts of a saint may be withdrawn by Allāh for mortal sin or for infidelity.

6. Origins of the cult of saints.—It is in the essential nature of Islām that it should call for a renunciation of the world and a committal of oneself to God. Consistently, therefore, the Prophet himself, on entering upon his preaching mission, gave up secular ambitions (*dunya*) and urged his hearers to do the same. In contrast to the motive of later saintship, Muhammad's motive in demanding renunciation of the world was not to meet the requirements of a profession, but to glorify Allāh and save men's souls. The term which came to be applied to such an ascetic withdrawal from the world as Muhammad at first contemplated is *zuhd*. It implies an ideal which the opportunities and temptations of power soon thrust out of his thought, and as long as his followers were occupied with the lust and sweets of military conquest it remained neglected. There are traditions dealing with the Prophet's Medīnan period which echo even positive disapproval of the ascetic life. Shortly after Muhammad's death the pious life seemed to have found its best type in men diligent in religious duties while at the same time efficiently pursuing the aims of their earthly vocation. It was inevitable that a religious revolution like Islām, in its period of reconstruction following the early conquests, should revert to its original ideal. The ascetic life claimed many followers and in the early days of the Umayyad *khalīfahs* they were described by a special name, *'ubbad* (='religious' in the French sense of the word). This term implies a life with two distinctive aspects: (1) exclusive occupation with God (*tawakkul*); (2) worship in prayer, recitation of the Qur'ān, and meditation (*dhikr*).

About the close of the 1st cent. of the Hegira men began to write about the marks and rules of the saintly life, and devotees began to be regarded as divinely inspired. There was furnished a motive to turn true saintliness into a professional

[1] Cf. art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Syrian).

calling. For this the suggestion was conveniently at hand in the presence of Christian monks and hermits within the Muslim domain. Abstinence, poverty, and reproach became the badge of sanctity, and the rough woollen garb (*ṣūf*) of the beggar and criminal was chosen to advertise saintship as a vocation. The Ṣūfī movement took its start from this unorganized pursuit of what was now conventionally recognized as a holy life. Ṣūfiism originated in Persia, but before it took its rise the profession of the saint was already as widespread as Islām itself.

It has been intimated that the earlier saints of Islām were men engaged in the public affairs of their time. With the growing ascendancy of the Turks in the eastern khalifate, the devotees were gradually eliminated from positions of influence, but meanwhile the Ṣūfī life had become more popular, and the number of those who adopted it gradually increased. The movement was carried into Africa and Syria, and wherever it went it produced its own type of saints—a type which exaggerated the features of the earlier devotees and intensified the interest in the mystic aspects of religion. The later saints of Islām have probably all felt the influence of the Ṣūfī spirit and practice, though even among the Shī'ahs the extreme type of Ṣūfī is condemned ; in Egypt they are under the supervision of the Shaikh al-Bakrī. The Safawid dynasty had its origin in a line of Ṣūfī saints, and in its early days (1502 onwards) there were fairly good relations between official Shī'ism and Ṣūfiism.

7. Cult of the saints.—The living saint is resorted to for the purpose of securing his advice or his decision in a legal dispute, to obtain his opinion as to the success of private or public undertakings, to ask his intercession on behalf of the sick, or to seek the gift of a child, especially a son. His active help may be requested and given for various purposes, inasmuch as nothing is too difficult for his miraculous powers. The removal of some blight or plague from field or flock, the healing of human ailments, the confounding of enemies, are all within the province and gift of the *shaikh*. Those whom he serves are only too glad to provide for him the means of living. His interposition is beneficent to those who ask it with honest purpose, but to those who oppose him or act dishonestly his supernatural power works in awful and mysterious punishment. The supernatural element in the saint is an extremely jealous and resentful power, very like the divinities of primitive monolatrous communities. There is a natural awe before one on whom has descended the 'light of inspiration'; in his immediate vicinity marvels happen ; men do not presume to treat him familiarly ; only the profane would venture to dispute his purposes, and only the recklessly wicked would dare to inflict persecution upon him. Physical contact with a saint, whether with or without his knowledge, may draw from him a supernatural effluence for healing or blessing, and objects that have been in close relation to his person may operate for good or harm without his being present.

The dead saint is in the nearer presence of God, and, according to a principle found widely in primitive religions, is more fully charged with supernatural influence than he was during his lifetime. He is now a *walī* in a more potent sense, one in whom the divine is more intimately at home and more readily active. Many more persons now resort to him, and much greater pains are taken to gain access to him and to do him honour. Men assume towards him the same worshipful attitude as they assume towards God, and freely think of him as one who can secure to them all the blessings for which men usually ask God. For the unreflecting worshipper the approach to the saint seeks no Higher Being beyond him, and rests fully satisfied in his sufficiency. The cultivation of the *walī* is a truly religious practice which often takes the place of the worship of Allāh. The phrases of orthodoxy and the Qur'ān are echoed in the liturgy of the saints, but they are used by ignorant and humble worshippers as magical formulas to predispose the saint favourably. Nevertheless, Muslim authority has taken the *walī* cult under its protection, and one may say that the real power of Islām over its lower classes lies in its promotion of saint-worship on the one hand and in the emotional atmosphere created by Ṣūfiism on the other. It is to the credit of al-Ghazālī that he found a way to retain these more vital forms of religious life as elements of Islām wherewith to counteract the effects of its unappealing dogmatism and institutionalism.

The local centre of the saint's influence after his death is his tomb. From that centre a tutelary benefit extends over the neighbouring community, of which he is the patron spirit. Beyond that his magical influence may reach as far as a prosaic peasant imagination may deem it strong enough to go, possibly to a radius of fifteen miles from the tomb. But the virtue of a *walī* may be carried to any distance by his relics. The most cherished of these is his ragged robe, which falls to the successor nominated by himself. It is especially infected by the supernatural quality of its one-time owner.

One leaves one's prayer with a saint at his shrine together with a vow to be fulfilled when the answer is received. Meanwhile the act of petition truly performed has been an act of faith in a power believed to be divine, and the petitioner goes away comforted by the reaction of his own faith—a blessing of no little moment. Occasionally prayers are written and left in faith at the grave of the saint.

8. Tombs of the saints: walīs.—These are of common occurrence in all parts of the Muhammadan world. Every little village has its *walī*. As a rule they are placed in a conspicuous position and are readily recognized by the domed roof of the building containing the grave. The dome (*ḳubbah*) is whitewashed, care being taken in every well-regulated community that some individual or family shall assume responsibility to give it a new coat when needed.

In poor and out-of-the-way places the tomb, sometimes called *ḳubbah* as well as *walī*, may be only a rude, frail structure of sticks, perhaps open above to the sky. In some cases a natural cave has been chosen as the shrine because of ancient religious or demonic associations. Sometimes the location of *walīs* has been determined by a lingering tradition from an earlier pagan or Jewish sanctuary. Again there are cases where, in the lack of a historical saint, the name of the place itself becomes the text for a saint's legend, which then becomes attached to the spot and makes out of it a *walī*, or saint's tomb. In settled communities the *walī* comprises a plot of ground, the front part of which constitutes a court, possibly 20 ft. square, and generally surrounded by a wall. Beyond this is the tomb proper (*ḳubbah*), which is often a low building 15 to 20 ft. square. Within the *ḳubbah* is the grave, which may be a somewhat elaborate structure, or again may be only a plain cenotaph. There may be grated windows, a grating overhead, and a grated door. The door-posts, the lintel, and the threshold or door-step play an important part in the blood ritual of the saint's cult. The grave is covered with a cloth, sometimes green, sometimes white.

Within the *ḳubbah* are found offerings of many kinds which have been left with the saint, though edible offerings, where they are left at the shrine,

are perquisites of the *shaikh*, or ministrant. In some of the *walīs* there have been found great numbers of jars and other pieces of pottery, many of which have been broken in honour of the saint. Attached to the gratings of the *ḳubbah* or placed upon the grave are articles of apparel or rags torn from them. Those who thus leave in contact with the *walī* articles which have been associated closely with their persons are supposed to be under his care and to share in the blessing of his efficacious influence. The neighbouring tree or grove of the saint is his property and a part of the shrine. To the tree of the *walī* rags and articles of clothing are likewise attached, and with a similar motive.

In the court of the *walī* there is sometimes found a spring forming a pool or fountain. It may be a mineral spring, possibly a hot spring, in which case it is connected with the healing powers of the *shaikh*, and to drink or bathe, as the case may be, will cure disease, remove sterility, or restore the mentally deranged, provided the good offices of the saint can be secured.

The area of the *walī* affords asylum from blood revenge and places animals or other property which may in any way come within the sacred limits under the protection of the saint; the animal or article becomes his property for the time being. In various parts of Syria farming implements are found lying about the tomb of a *walī*; there is no likelihood of their ever being disturbed or appropriated, as the curse of the saint is thought to rest upon the violator of his tomb. In spite of this feeling that the saint will fully guard his own rights, there is also a lively jealousy on the part of the saint's worshippers in certain cases, and intrusion upon the sanctity of a shrine may be violently punished by them. This E. H. Palmer[1] proved on the occasion of his visit to the famous tomb of Nebī Harīn, in the Sinaitic peninsula. The Benē-Ma'azeh, who are the special followers of the saint, angrily resented the visit which they supposed he had made to the shrine, and serious trouble was narrowly averted.

The *shaikh*, or ministrant, as a rule lives in the neighbouring village or town. The office generally descends in a given family, and in some cases not merely one member is set aside as *shaikh*, but the several males of the family are designated to act. The function of the *shaikh* is to direct worshippers as to their duties, to supervise the offering of votive sacrifices, and to receive the portion of the saint, which is quarter of a sheep or goat, together with the hide, or a relatively smaller share if the victim be a larger animal, such as a cow or camel. The *shaikh* may be called upon to furnish what is lacking to a sacrificial meal, if the number of participants be too large for the offerer's portion of his sacrifice. The offerer may ask or buy from the ministrant the additional provision which he requires.

The sacrificial victim is regularly a male animal at least six months old. It is slaughtered by the offerer, usually at the door-step of the *ḳubbah*. It is thrown upon its left side and made to face towards Mecca, and is killed in this position. The blood is applied to the door-posts of the tomb and sometimes to the lintel. In a number of instances the victim is slaughtered upon the roof of the *ḳubbah* in such a position that its blood flows down over the lintel of the door-opening. Very often, instead of the blood being smeared, the hand of the offerer is dipped in the sacrificial blood and imprinted upon the door-posts. In the case of a child who has been the subject of a vow the blood is applied to the forehead and the tip of the nose or to the latter only

Where the offerer is too poor to afford anything more, it is permissible to bring to the saint a fowl. In the case of inability to bring the victim, or to have present at the shrine those who should take part in the feast, permission may be given to conduct the ceremonies at home and bring the price of the *shaikh's* part to the *walī*.

Most of the offerings are votive in character. A visit is made to the saint's tomb with the object of obtaining his help in order to secure some desired end. The petition is presented with due observance of the required ritual, and with it a vow is made contingent upon the fulfilment of the petition. When the prayer has been fulfilled, the vow is due. It may be a vow calling for an offering made once for all, or it may call for a yearly offering. If the vow be not paid, the saint is supposed to visit dire temporal misfortune on the recreant worshipper; notwithstanding this, unpaid vows are regularly collected in some places by a person appointed for the purpose.

The feast which is enjoyed by the worshipper and his friends is not a commensal feast in which the divinity makes one with other guests at the table, nor is there any notion of the victim being itself sacred or divine. The view is that the *walī*, out of what has become his property by the gift of the offerer, spreads a feast for his guests and they, as they share the feast, rejoice before him. The victim is made ready, not by roasting, but by boiling.

The occasional worship represented by the visits of those who have vows to make and petitions to present, or who wish to pay a vow, contains also an element of honorific worship. The motive is not wholly self-centred. The ritual expresses reverence and adoration such as belong to religious worship, and the desire is to celebrate the greatness of the saint and give him his meed of respect. The recitation of the Qur'ān, the repetition of the formulas, the feast, are *for* the saint in the sense of being for his advantage. They are *to* him in the sense of being a tribute of worship. The offering of the blood has a special motive; in many instances it is a *keffārah*, which may be understood to be a means of removing sin; in other more numerous instances it is a *fedū*, which may be taken to imply a propitiatory offering or a ransom.

The individual or family visits to the *walī* are properly described by the term *ziyārah*, though less frequently the term *ḥajj* is employed. The latter term in strictness belongs to the Meccan pilgrimage. The *ziyārah* is more especially applied to the annual pilgrimage which is observed in connexion with the greater number of shrines. These annual pilgrimages are occasions when the whole community, men, women, and children, takes part, and, in the case of some famous saints, people from far and near also participate. This is to be observed at the annual feast of Nebī Mūsā, east of the Dead Sea. There are reported to have been as many as 15,000 present at the annual celebration of this *walī*. The great days at Meshed, Nejef, and Kerbela are occasions for the whole Shī'ah world. At some of the shrines Jews and Christians are present to do honour to one who has often had a longer record of respect with them than among the Muslims. The participation on the part of non-Muslims is confined for the most part to saints who were Jewish or Christian before they were Muslim. At very many *walīs* the intermingling of outsiders and Muhammadans is not allowed. As Palmer[1] described the annual *ziyārah* at Nebī Sāleh, it included a procession round the *ḳubbah*, a visit to the grave, the sacrifices, and the common festival meal. Outside of these prescribed obligations, the time was occupied by merry-making and apparently love-making, by games

[1] *The Desert of the Exodus*, New York, 1872, p. 364 ff.

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 218 f.

and contests of various kinds. The annual feast of the saint is regularly fixed on the traditional day of his birth, the *maulid* of the *walī*.

Other feasts are held at many shrines. In some cases the month day of the saint is kept.

Such saints as al-Khidr, the Quṭb, ʿAlī, Ḥusain, and Ḥasan, and even St. George (Mar Jirjis, *mar* = *walī* in Syria), are deemed ubiquitous, though they have their local shrines and local community of worshippers. The same may be said of some of the Shīʿah *imāms*, especially 'the Hidden *imām*.'

The Metāwileh and the Nuṣairīyah of Syria have an exaggerated reverence for saints. The latter should not be regarded, however, as Muslims. The Ismaʿīlīyah, wherever they are found, have developed extreme views likewise.

9. **Efficacy of the cult.**—It is firmly believed that miraculous answers are granted to the petitions presented to the saints, and it may be allowed that instances of child-bearing have followed such prayers. For these the most satisfactory explanation is that mental suggestion has been powerful enough to effect a desired physiological change. It is the belief of the *walī*-worshippers that, in cases of barrenness, conception, if it occurs, is to be attributed to the saint. It is said that this belief leads the *shaikhs* in charge of some shrines to actual cohabitation with women who come seeking the gift of a child from the saint. It has not been shown that this occurs often.

The relics of the saint are often preserved in connexion with the tomb and have in themselves efficacy for blessing. The merits of the saint have atoning value with God and constitute a ground of confidence in the efficacy of his intercession. To the merits of the *walī* the devotions of those who worship at his grave add increase continually. But, as intimated above, for most of those who come the idea of the saint as a mediator is not uppermost. He is looked upon by them as in himself an original source of help and blessing.

The effect of the *walī*-cult has been to foster superstition and belief in magic among the ignorant classes of Islām. It has, nevertheless, served to bind more firmly to the Muslim faith those who are its votaries. For centuries the orthodox leaders of Islām have endorsed the cult and allowed it to develop as it would. They have supported it with contributions and recognized continually and officially the gifts of private individuals for the maintenance of the local and national shrines of the saints.

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SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Muhammadan in India).—The hagiology of Muslim India is as abundant and diversified as that of any other part of the Muhammadan world, and in many respects this rich development is probably due to the Hindu influences with which Islām in that country has been surrounded. As in all hagiographic literature, we find not only that historical personages have been canonized, but that legends have grown up around names for which there is no authentic record, and the cult of local saints can often be shown to be the survival of an earlier faith which has passed on into Islām under another guise.

1. **Chishtī saints.**—Among the saints of whom there are ample historical records there are certain outstanding figures whose influence upon the religious history of Muslim India has been considerable, especially those belonging to religious orders, such as the Chishtī, the Suhrawardī, the Qādirī, the Shaṭṭārī, and the Naqshbandī. Each of these religious orders originated outside India, but enjoyed a considerable vogue in that country; the first was introduced by Khwājah Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī, a native of Sīstān, who migrated to India and reached Dihlī in the year (1193) in which the troops of Muḥammad Ghōrī captured that city; later he settled in Ajmēr, where he attracted to himself a large number of disciples; he died at Ajmēr in 1236, and his tomb still attracts thousands of pilgrims. In the same year died another saint of the Chishtī order, Khwājah Quṭb al-Dīn Bakhtiyār Kākī, who was born in Farghāna and spent a wandering life visiting holy men in Baghdād and other places; when he came to India, Iltutmish wished to make him *shaikh al-Islām*, but the saint refused this high office; he spent the last years of his life in intimate friendship with Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī, whom he predeceased by a few months; he was buried at Dihlī near the great minaret, the Quṭb Mīnār, which is called after his name. Among his disciples was Shaikh Farīd al-Dīn Shakarganj, who died in 1265 and was buried at Pākpattan, midway between Multān and Lahore, where his shrine is visited by a large number of devotees and is still in charge of one of the descendants of the saint. He had two famous disciples, each of whom has given his name to a separate branch of the Chishtī order, his nephew Shaikh ʿAlī Ṣābir († 1291), and Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyā, who was recognized by Farīd al-Dīn as his *khalīfah* ('successor') when he was only twenty years of age; he established a *khāngāh* (convent of dervishes) in the neighbourhood of Dihlī and exercised a great influence over the court and the men of letters who were attracted to the capital; he died in 1325 and his grave has been a place of pilgrimage ever since. One of his disciples, Sayyid Burhān al-Dīn, is one of the most famous saints of the Deccan, and is buried in Rawẓah (in the Ḥaidarābād State), where also is the tomb of his equally famous successor, Zain al-Dīn Dāʾūd († 1370). Niẓām al-Dīn's spiritual successor was Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd († 1356), known as Chirāgh-i-Dihlī ('the lamp of Dihlī'), whose tomb is also visited by many of the faithful. One of his disciples, Muḥammad Gīsūdārāz (*i.e.* 'with long curls'), migrated to the Deccan, where he and his descendants enjoyed the liberal patronage of the Bahmanī Sultans, and a magnificent tomb was erected in Gulbarga over his remains when he died in 1422; for persons who are unable to undertake the journey to Arabia a pilgrimage to his tomb is said to be attended with the same benefit as performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. The renown of these saints gave a great impulse to the spread of the Chishtī order, which in succeeding centuries produced a large number of saints, among whom two are of special importance—Shaikh Salīm Chishtī († 1572), in whose house the emperor Jahāngīr was born, an event which prompted his father, Akbar, to build the wonderful city of Fatḥpūr-Sīkrī in the vicinity of the saint's hermitage; and Khwājah Nūr Muḥammad, known as Qibla-i-ʿĀlam († 1791), whose influence led to a wide extension of the Chishtī order in the Panjāb and Sindh.

2. **Suhrawardī saints.**—The Suhrawardī order was introduced into India by disciples of the founder of the order, Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, who taught in Baghdād; one of these, Shaikh Jalāl al-Dīn Tabrīzī († 1244), made his way to Bengal, where a

shrine, to which is attached a rich endowment, was erected in his honour; another, Bahā al-Dīn Zakarīyā († 1266), settled in Multān, in the neighbourhood of which he had been born, and his tomb, which he is said to have built during his lifetime, is one of the few great monuments of Indian architecture of this period. One of his disciples, Jalāl al-Dīn Surkhpōsh († 1291), a Sayyid from Bukhārā, settled in Uch (in the present Bahāwalpūr State) and was the progenitor of a long line of saints, and his descendants still guard the shrine of their great ancestor; but his fame is outshone by that of his grandson and successor, Sayyid Jalāl, known as Makhdūm-i-Jahāniyān ('served by all mankind'), who is said to have made the pilgrimage to Mecca 36 times and to have performed innumerable miracles. One of his grandsons, Burhān al-Dīn († 1453), known as Quṭb-i-'Ālam ('the pole-star of the world'), settled in Gujarāt, as did his son, Muḥammad Shāh 'Ālam († 1475), who played an important part in the political and religious life of his time.

3. **Qādirī saints.**—The Qādirī order has had a considerable extension in India, as in most other parts of the Muslim world; though the founder, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī ([*q.v.*] † 1166), never visited India, shrines erected in his honour are common, in some of which relics of him are venerated; *e.g.*, his tooth-brush is said to have taken root in Ludhiāna and to have grown into a tree, near which an annual fair is held, which is attended by 40,000 to 50,000 persons. The festival of his death is widely celebrated in India on the eleventh day of the month Rabī' II., with reading of the Qur'ān, offering of prayers, and the reciting of the 99 names of the saint;[1] at times of plague or cholera processions are held in his honour, and childless parents vow to dedicate to him any son or daughter that may be born to them through his intercession. The Qādirī order was introduced into India by Sayyid Muḥammad, known as Bandagī Muḥammad Ghawth, a native of Aleppo, who migrated to India and settled in Uch in 1482, and died there 35 years later; many of his descendants were also saints and workers of miracles, and his tomb at Uch is still kept up by members of his family, who preserve there some precious relics, such as a footprint of the Prophet, a turban of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, etc. Among the numerous saints of the Qādirī order mention may be made of Shaikh Mīr Muḥammad, known as Miyān Mīr, who died at Lahore in 1635—he was the spiritual preceptor of Prince Dārā Shikōh, and his tomb is still held in reverence—and of Tāj al-Dīn († 1698), one of the descendants of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, whose tomb is at Aurangābād.

4. **Shaṭṭārī saints.**—The Shaṭṭārī order has also produced a number of saints—*e.g.*, Muḥammad Ghawth, who counted the emperor Humāyūn among his disciples; when he died in 1562, Akbar built a magnificent tomb in his honour at Gwalior; one of his disciples, Wajīh al-Dīn Gujarātī, a man of great learning and considerable literary activity († 1589), is buried at Aḥmadābād. Another saint of the same order, Shāh Pīr († 1632), is buried at Meerut in a mausoleum erected by Nūr Jahān, wife of the emperor Jahāngīr.

5. **Naqshbandī saints.**—The Naqshbandī order did not attain such a vogue in India as the others mentioned above; it was introduced there by Shaikh Aḥmad al-Fārūqī, who died at Sirhind in 1625, and there are several other shrines of saints of this order in India, notably that of Shāh Musāfir († 1698) at Aurangābād.

It is not possible here to enumerate all the religious orders of Muslim India, or the hundreds of saints that have arisen within them or outside. Of those already mentioned there is some historical record, but in many instances it is difficult to disentangle historical fact from a mass of superincumbent legend.

6. **Missionaries and miracle-workers.** — Many of the Muhammadan saints played an important part in the promulgation of Islām in India; *e.g.*, Mu'īn al-Dīn Chishtī is said to have received a call to preach Islām to the unbelievers in India while on a pilgrimage to Medīna, when the Prophet appeared to him in a dream and bade him spread the faith in that country; he is said to have converted 700 persons in Dihlī on his way to Ajmēr, and when he settled in the latter city the number of his converts increased rapidly. Makhdūm-i-Jahāniyān is said to have converted several of the tribes in the Panjāb, and both Bahā al-Dīn Zakarīyā and Farīd al-Dīn Shakarganj were successful in their missionary work in this part of India. Sayyid Nathar Shāh († 1039) was the pioneer of Islām in S. India, and his tomb in Trichinopoly is still a place of pilgrimage; a later saint, Shāh al-Ḥamīd, who died in Nagore, carried out successful missionary tours in this part of India and finally settled in Nagore, where he is buried. A number of saints are famous for the conversions which they effected in the Deccan; among them is Muḥammad Gīsūdarāz, mentioned above. The success of their propaganda is often attributed to miraculous powers.

E.g., Jalāl al-Dīn Tabrīzī is said to have converted a Hindu milkman to Islām merely by a look. Ḥasan Kabīr al-Dīn, one of the saints of Uch, is said to have had a like miraculous power, and it is told of him that once when he was sick he called in a Hindu physician, who refused to come, fearing that the saint might convert him by a mere glance, but sent word that he would examine his urine; and, as soon as he looked at it, he at once accepted Islām. Imām Shāh of Pīrāna, who worked in Gujarāt in the latter half of the 15th cent., converted a large body of Hindu cultivators by bringing about a fall of rain after two seasons of scarcity; on another occasion, meeting a band of Hindu pilgrims passing through Pīrāna on their way to Benares, he offered to take them there; they agreed and in a moment were in the holy city, where they bathed in the Ganges and paid their vows; they then awoke to find themselves still in Pīrāna and adopted the faith of the saint who could perform such a miracle. A similar story is told of Ḥasan Kabīr al-Dīn, who saw a number of Hindu pilgrims passing through Uch on their way to the Ganges; he offered to show them both of the holy rivers, the Ganges and the Jamna, flowing at that very spot, if they would renounce their false religion; certain definite marks of identification were agreed upon whereby the rivers might be recognized, and next morning they saw the Ganges and the Jamna flowing parallel to one another, and having all the marks of identification that had been asked for; whereupon all the pilgrims embraced Islām.

7. **Ascetic practices.** — Several of the saints referred to above spent many years in wandering, making frequent pilgrimages to Mecca, or visiting contemporary saints and the tombs of departed saints. Miyān Ḥātim of Sambhal († 1562) spent ten years roaming about, bareheaded and barefooted, in the waste country about Sambhal and Amroha, never sleeping on a bed. Muḥammad Ghawth († 1562) spent twelve years among the hills north of the Ganges, practising severe austerities, feeding on the leaves of trees, and sleeping in caves. Al-Badāōnī gives interesting details of the ascetic practices of the saints who were his contemporaries. Of Shaikh Burhān († 1563) he writes:

'For nearly fifty years (before his death) he had abstained from fleshmeat and from most other articles of food and drink, contenting himself with a little milk and some sweetmeats; and at the end of his life he abstained also from drinking water, so that to outward appearance he was an incorporated spiritual form, supernaturally illuminated. He had a very small and dark cell in which he constantly sat, engaged in reciting God's praises and in meditation and contemplation.'[1]

Al-Badāōnī describes also the state of ecstasy or religious trance which was a frequent experience in the religious life of these saints. Of Miyān Hātim he says:

'He was a man who took a keen pleasure in contemplating

[1] For an account of this festival see Jaffur Shurreef, *Qanoon-e-Islām*, ch. xviii.

[1] *Muntakhabu-t-tawārikh*, tr. T. W. Haig, iii. 10.

God and whom the singing of God's praises threw into an ecstasy of delight, and ever, as he spoke and smiled, the name of God was on his tongue. In his last years the intoxication of joy which he experienced in his love of God so overpowered him that to listen but for a short space to the chanting of God's praises placed him beside himself.'[1]

The saints belonging to the various religious orders spent much of their time in the devotions peculiar to the order (the so-called *dhikr*), which consisted of continued repetitions of the name of God, of the creed, etc., and in instructing their disciples in the due performance of these devotions and in the practice of meditation. These religious exercises were sometimes (especially among the members of the Chishtī and Suhrawardī orders) accompanied by religious songs and dances, and many anecdotes are recorded of the intense religious fervour excited on such occasions. Of Shaikh Badr al-Dīn (a contemporary of Farīd al-Dīn Shakarganj) it was said:

'In his old age when he was unable to move, the sound of a hymn would excite him to ecstasy and he would dance like a youth. When asked how it was that the Shaikh could dance notwithstanding his decrepitude he replied: "Where is the Shaikh? It is Love that dances."'[2]

8. **Unorthodox saints.**—A clear distinction is drawn in India between (*a*) the above-mentioned religious orders, which are *ba-shar'*, *i.e.* in accordance with the ordinances of the Muslim law—the adherents of which, and the devotees of the saints belonging to them, are for the most part orthodox Muhammadans and comprise persons of culture and education—and (*b*) the *be-shar'* orders, the members of which often do not submit their lives to the customary rules of the religious law of Islām; the devotees of their saints are mostly to be found among the uneducated sections of the Muhammadan population and among those Hindus who worship Muhammadan saints. It is seldom possible to find any historical foundation for the legends of these saints, which are filled with wild and fantastic stories; it is, *e.g.*, doubtful whether there was ever such a person as Shāh Mādār, whose shrine is at Makanpūr, about 40 miles from Cawnpore; according to the legend, he was a converted Jew, born at Aleppo in the middle of the 11th cent.; he made his way to India and expelled a demon named Makan Deo from the spot where he himself is now venerated; he is believed to be still alive within his tomb. His devotees are said to be secure against snakes and scorpions and to have power to cure those who have suffered injury from them. The *faqīrs* who are termed Mādārī, after the name of their patron saint, are wandering mendicants or jugglers and do not observe the ordinary Muslim prayers, and are consequently regarded with disfavour by the orthodox. His cult has a wide extension in Muhammadan India and a large number of pilgrims visit his tomb.[3] There is equal uncertainty as to the historicity of Sakhī Sarwar, a famous worker of miracles, who has been variously assigned to the 12th or 13th cent.; after many wanderings he settled down in Nigāha, at the edge of the Sulaimān mountains, where his shrine is visited by a large number of pilgrims, Hindu and Sikh as well as Muhammadan; but other shrines of this saint are found elsewhere and almost every village in the Central Panjāb contains one.[4] Among the *be-shar'* orders are reckoned the followers of Mūsā Suhāg, who lived at the close of the 15th cent.; his prayers for rain are said to have delivered the country from a threatened famine; he dressed in women's clothes as a symbol that he was devoted to God as a wife to her husband, and the members of his order still dress like women and are celibate. Near his tomb at Aḥmadābād is a tree the branches of which are covered with glass bangles, thrown by persons who pay their vows to the saint; if the bangles stay in the tree, they believe that their petition will be granted. Among the ignorant Muhammadans there is a quintet of saints who enjoy an extensive popularity; these are the Pāñch Pīr, 'five saints,' who are worshipped by illiterate persons throughout the greater part of Muslim India, as well as by large numbers of Hindus. They are fully treated in art. PANCH-PIRIYĀ. One of the saints who is often reckoned among the Pāñch Pīr is Khwājah Khiẓr, a saint who is known all over the Muhammadan world and is commonly identified with the nameless companion of Moses in the Qur'ān;[1] he is worshipped in India as the protector of travellers and especially of seamen and boatmen and of all whose occupation is connected with water in any form; *e.g.*, a goat is sacrificed to him when a new well is sunk, and in Bengal his annual festival is celebrated by setting afloat on a river at sunset little rafts of plantain stems or small paper boats, carrying a light.

Veneration is also commonly paid to giant saints, the so-called *naugaza*, or saints nine yards high, whose tombs are of this length; often no knowledge is claimed of the name of the saint, or he may be described merely as a *shahīd* ('martyr'); in some cases an impossible attempt is made to identify the *naugaza* with one of the Companions of the Prophet; *e.g.*, such an antiquity is claimed for the giant saint, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, whose tomb is at Jalna, in the Ḥaidarābād State. The *naugaza* at Fīrōzpūr, in the Panjāb, is identified with Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, sixth *imām*, who died at Medīna in 765.

9. **Famous shrines.**—The worship of saints is severely reprobated by many Muhammadans, notably by the Wahhābīs; and those of the educated classes who do resort to their shrines maintain that the saints are only asked to intercede with God; but there is no doubt that among the lower classes prayers are directly addressed to the saint and the desired result is believed to lie within his power. Devotees may resort to the shrines of the saints on any occasion of need; but there are certain saints who are especially prayed to for particular temporal blessings. A large number are believed to grant the petitions of childless women, and others effect the cure of special diseases; *e.g.*, lepers resort to the tomb of Shāh Sufaid, in the Jhelum District, or that of Dā'ūd Jahāniyān, in Muzaffargarh; Mīrān Nau Bahār, a disciple of Farīd al-Dīn Shakarganj, cures hysterical fits; a cock should be offered at the tomb of Shaikh Saddū, in Amroha, for the cure of mental ailments. Niẓām al-Dīn († 1705), whose tomb is at Lahore, is famous for curing warts; dust from the shrine of Pīr Bukhārī in Quetta is a specific for venereal diseases; in the Hazāra country persons suffering from neuralgia make a pilgrimage to a shrine at Jatti Pind, those troubled with coughs to the shrine of 'Abdul Wahhāb Ghāzī at Qāzīān. The litigant appeals to Shāh Mīnā († 1478), in Lucknow, for help in legal difficulties, or to Manṣūr Pīr, at Gaya. In Lahore the oilmen frequent the tomb of Ḥassū Tēlī, the blacksmiths that of Shaikh Mūsā, the dyers that of 'Alī Rangrēz. In Bengal Pīr Badar of Chittagong is the guardian saint of sailors, while the boatmen on the Chināb and the Indus invoke Bahā al-Dīn Zakarīyā as their patron saint in times of difficulty. Owners of barren cows pay vows at the tomb of Khākī Ṣaḥāba or of Mūsā Nawāb in the Bahāwalpūr Territory. Shēr Shāh of Multān is the protector of persecuted lovers. To Shāh Daula

[1] *Muntakhabu-t-tawārikh*, iii. 3.
[2] Abu'l Faẓl, *Ā'īn-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, iii. 368.
[3] W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iii. 397 ff.
[4] H. G. Raverty, 'Account of a Visit to the Shrine of Sakhi Sarwar,' *JASB* xxiv. [1855] 239 ff.; M. Macauliffe, 'The Fair at Sakhi Sarwar,' *Calcutta Review*, lx. [1875] 78 ff.

of Gujrāt in the Panjāb parents dedicate microcephalic children. Students make offerings of sugar at the tombs of Shāh Laṭīf Qādirī or of Amīr Ḥasan Sanjarī († 1337) in the Aurangābād District (Ḥaidarābād State), in the hope of improving their memories. The shrine of Shāh Daula used to be frequented every Friday by dancing-girls, and they also look upon Tānsēn, the famous musician of Akbar, as their patron saint. The worship of Shaikh Saddū is in Bengal almost entirely confined to Muhammadan prostitutes, but there are several other saints for whom they have a predilection. Persons possessed by spirits are cured at the shrine of Mīrān Sayyid 'Alī in N. Gujarāt, and several other saints are invoked by persons so afflicted.

There are some shrines into which women are not admitted, such as that of Jatī Abdāl ('Abdāl the chaste ascetic'), a servant of Prince Dārā Shikōh, in the Multān District; some, on the other hand, are especially frequented by women—*e.g.*, the grave of Sulṭān Aḥmad Qattāl, who was born at Uch in 1542 and, after many years of wandering, during which he visited the holy cities of Islām, settled down in Jalālpūr (in the District of Multān), where he died in 1631; a large fair is held near his tomb every Friday in the month of Chet (March–April), during which evil spirits are exorcized from women who are believed to be troubled by *jinns*; the tomb of Zain al-Dīn Biyābānī († 1503), at Fukrābād (Ḥaidarābād State), is also especially frequented by women.

There are also a certain number of shrines of women saints, particularly in Baluchistān; *e.g.*, that of Bībī Nāhzan (near Kalāt), who sank into the earth together with her maid when they were persecuted by some infidels, is visited by persons who have been bitten by mad dogs, and those who pay a fixed contribution to the shrine secure immunity from cholera; persons bitten by mad dogs also resort to the tomb of Bībī Nāzo, a Sayyid lady of Mastung; in the Loralai District a virgin saint, named Haro Ana, guards the Wanēchīs (a section of the Tarīn Afghāns) from the incursions of their enemies; in the neighbouring Marri country (at the southern end of the Sulaimān Range) there are also the shrines of several female saints. In the Panjāb, in the District of Multān, is the tomb of a woman named Māī Sapūran, who has given her name to the village where she lies buried; she was a disciple of a saint named 'Abdul Ḥakīm, who died in 1732; she was able to spread her prayer-carpet on the waters of the river Ravi and kneel for prayer upon it, and could cure the bites of mad dogs. At Fīrōzpūr, in the same province, an annual fair is held in honour of a woman saint, named Māī Amīrān Sāḥiba.

10. Offerings and festivals.—To win the favour of some saints, certain specific offerings have to be presented. To Sālār Mas'ūd at Bahraich a long embroidered flag is offered. Khājūria Pīr, whose tomb is at Ambāla, must be given a white cock in full plumage and a plateful of sugar and cardamoms, to effect a cure of the palsy. Bahā al-Dīn, a Bukhārī Sayyid, a boy-saint who died at the age of five, is propitiated by the gift of a clay horse, and these toy horses are stacked up round his tomb in thousands. Childless women offer toy cradles at the shrine of Quṭb Nikka, in Baluchistān. Small horses made of cotton cloth, stuffed with sawdust, are hung up in the tomb of Shāh 'Ālam († 1475), near Aḥmadābād. But the usual offerings are of sweetmeats or some kind of food, and a goat or a fowl on special occasions.

The annual festival held in commemoration of a Muslim saint in India is called *'urs* (*i.e.* 'nuptials,' as signifying the union of the saint with God) and usually takes place on the date of his death. The day before the *'urs* is in some parts of the country called the *sandal*, because pots containing sandal-wood paste are carried in procession through the streets and deposited at the shrine for the use of the votaries. The festivities sometimes last for several days and are attended by a large concourse of persons; at Ajmēr, *e.g.*, the celebration of the *'urs* of Mu'īn al-Dīn Chishtī is continued for six days, and in some years as many as 25,000 persons, from all parts of India, have taken part in it; in the courtyard of the shrine are two enormous copper boilers fitted into solid masonry, the larger one capable of holding 5400 lbs. of rice, the other about half as much; these are filled with a mixture of rice, milk, honey, etc., and the contents, when thoroughly cooked, are distributed among the pilgrims. From 50,000 to 60,000 persons are said to attend the *'urs* of Farīd al-Dīn Shakarganj, who is reported to have declared that whosoever should pass through his shrine on the anniversary of his death would gain a place in paradise; the silver entrance-door through which the pilgrims struggle is known as the Gate of Paradise. The annual festival of 'Alā al-Dīn Ṣābir, at Pīrān Kaliar (in the Sahāranpūr District), is attended by 40,000 pilgrims, while as many as 100,000 flock to the tomb of Sālār Mas'ūd at Bahraich.

Some of the tombs of Muslim saints in India are stately, magnificent buildings and are counted among the finest monuments of Muhammadan architecture in the country, having been erected by emperors, sultans, or wealthy devotees. Some shrines also receive gifts from Hindus; *e.g.*, a railing of solid silver was given to the shrine of Mīrān Sayyid 'Alī in N. Gujarāt by a Gaikwar of Baroda. Many of these tombs, on the other hand, are plain, unpretentious buildings, or may even have nothing to distinguish them from the graves of ordinary men.

Besides the tomb of a saint there is often a subsidiary memorial of him to mark the place where he kept a *chillā*, or fast of 40 days, and invocations are offered to him here also. In the Deccan there are about 360 *chillās* sacred to the memory of Dāwal Shāh Walī, the son of one of the nobles of Maḥmūd Bīgarah (1459–1511), who travelled about extensively on proselytizing missions.

11. Upkeep.—Several of the greater shrines of Muhammadan saints have large endowments or have attached to them landed property, from which a considerable income is derived. If the original saint was a historical personage, this religious endowment is generally in the hands of one of his descendants, who is styled the *sajjāda-nishīn* (lit. 'sitting on the prayer-carpet'); the office is generally hereditary, or in default of issue descends to a successor nominated by the childless *sajjāda-nishīn*; he has a number of *murīds* (disciples or followers), some of whom live at a distance, and an agent of the *sajjāda-nishīn* goes round among them at intervals to collect contributions. Other shrines depend merely on casual contributions. At the shrine of Sakhī Sarwar the pilgrims enter into a regular contract with the spirit of the saint, and written promises of future payment are inscribed on the walls, on condition of the fulfilment of certain petitions.

12. Outstanding examples of saint-worship. In no part of India has the worship of saints attained so rich a development as in the Pathān country in the north-west and among the Brahūīs in Baluchistān. Almost every village has its patron saint, who is credited with the possession of miraculous powers of healing or protection; some are said to have produced the spring from which the village obtains its water; others are canonized ancestors. In the Brahūī country a place without a shrine is held to be a place that should

be avoided, and the Paṭhāns carry their reverence for shrines to such an extent that in Bhangikhel (in the Mianwali District, Panjāb) a Sayyid is said to have been murdered and buried, in order to supply the deficiency of a sacred tomb in the neighbourhood.[1]

A similar story is told of the Afrīdī Paṭhāns of Tīrāh, who 'had shame in the sight of their brethren, in that their territory was blessed with no holy shrine at which they might worship, and that they had to be beholden to the saints of their neighbours when they wished for divine aid. Smarting under a sense of incompleteness, they induced by generous offers a saint of the most notorious piety to take up his abode amongst them. They then made quite sure of his staying with them by cutting his throat, they buried him honourably, they built over his bones a splendid shrine at which they might worship him and implore his aid and intercession in their behalf, and thus they purged themselves of their reproach.'[2]

13. Muslim saints and Hindu cults.—In many instances there is no doubt that the shrine of a Muslim saint marks the site of some local cult which was practised on the spot long before the introduction of Islām. Such a survival has frequently occurred in the Buddhist shrines in the Gandhāra country (in the north-west of India) and to an enormous extent in the case of Hindu sacred places in Kashmir; *e.g.*, the tomb of Bāmadīn Ṣāḥib, which is a popular place of pilgrimage for Muhammadans in Kashmir, has been identified with an ancient Hindu temple built by Bhīma Sahi, the last Hindu king of Kabul († 1026); the saint is now said to have been a Hindu ascetic, who bore the name of Bhūma Sādhī before his conversion to Islām; a pious Hindu monarch is thus transformed into a Muhammadan saint, and a legend formed to bring the local cult into harmony with the new faith.[3] In like manner many Muhammadan shrines in Kashmir mark the site of a *tīrtha*, or place of pilgrimage, in the Hindu period. In India proper the origin of the local cult is often more difficult to ascertain, but it is significant that the tomb of Sālār Mas'ūd is said to occupy the site of a former temple of the sun, and the mosque of Shaikh Saddū, at Amroha, was also originally a temple. The Pāñch Pīr are undoubtedly reminiscent of the Pāṇḍavas, the five hero brothers of the *Mahābhārata*, and it is significant that the shrine of Sakhī Sarwar (in the Dera Ghāzī Khān District) contains, besides the tombs of the saint and his wife, a shrine dedicated to Bābā Nānak and a temple to Viṣṇu, and that Hindus believe that Shāh Mādār is an incarnation of Lakṣmana, the brother of the god Rāma. The influence of Hinduism on a Muhammadan religious order is strikingly exemplified in the case of the shrine of Ṣādiq Nihang, in the Jhang District (Panjāb); the *faqīrs* in charge of the shrine keep up a number of Hindu practices; *e.g.*, the superior of the order remains celibate[4] and a disciple succeeds him, in contrast to the usual practice at a Muhammadan shrine, where the succession passes from father to son; a fire is kept alight day and night, and once a year a large loaf of bread is cooked at this fire and distributed to all present. These are Hindu customs, but there is no doubt about the Muslim orthodoxy of the superior and the other *faqīrs*. In a similar manner there is little doubt that Bābā Ratan, whose shrine is at Bhatinda in the Patiala State, is a Hindu Yōgī who has been adopted into the Muhammadan calendar of saints.[5]

The process of canonization continues to the present day, and new saints are from time to time included in the calendar; *e.g.*, at Mōtīhāri in Bengal a *pīr*, named Patukī Sā'īn, who died between 1860 and 1870, is worshipped as possessed of miraculous power and is invoked by litigants.

14. Martyrs' graves. — The term *shahīd* ('martyr') is given a wide interpretation in Muslim India; primarily it commonly means one who has died while fighting in defence of the faith, but nineteen other ways of attaining the glory of martyrdom are enumerated—*e.g.*, dying in the act of reciting the Qur'ān or while praying; being murdered by robbers or struck by lightning; being drowned, or killed by falling into a dry well, etc.[1] In the case of many of the graves that are pointed out as being graves of *shahīds* there is no record or even tradition as to how the martyr met his fate; but in others he is said to have died in battle with the Hindus. The most famous of these is Sālār Mas'ūd, the nephew of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghaznī, who is believed to have performed prodigies of valour in his conflicts with the Hindus and to have been slain by them in battle in 1033 and buried at Bahraich in Oudh, where his *shādī* ('wedding') is annually celebrated in the month of Jeṭh (May–June); he is commonly known as Ghāzī Miyān, and his festival is celebrated throughout India.

In S. India a famous martyr is Sayyid Ibrāhīm Shahīd, who put himself at the head of an invading force and waged war against the Pandyan kingdom; after a brief period of success he was put to death by the heir to the Pandyan throne, towards the close of the 12th cent.; he is buried at Ervadi and is revered as a saint. To the same period belongs a martyr named Sayyid Ni'mat Ullāh Shahīd, whose tomb is at Hānsī, a town in the Hisār District of the Panjāb; he is said to have been present at the battle of Thanesar in 1192, when Muhammad Ghōrī laid the foundation of the subjugation of N. India by his defeat of the Rājpūt army; the festival held at his tomb is called 'the feast of lances.' A mound with a mosque about three miles from the same town, Hānsī, is styled Shahīd Ganj, because 150,000 Muhammadans are said to have perished there. Many of the *naugaza*, or saints nine yards long, mentioned above are stated to have been *shahīds*.

A *shahīd* who was not slain in battle with the infidels is Shādnā Shahīd, who was killed by his own mother; she had brought an accusation of unchastity against Bahā al-Dīn Zakarīyā, and her infant son, who was then only ten months old, gave miraculous evidence on behalf of the saint, like the child in the cradle who exculpated Joseph when he was accused by Potiphar's wife;[2] Bahā al-Dīn restored the child to life, and he became the faithful attendant of the saint until he died a natural death, and a shrine was erected over his grave near the Dihlī gate of the city of Multān. A famous *shahīd* of Bengal, Shāh Ismā'īl Ghāzī, is said to have come from Mecca to fight against the infidels in India, and, after performing great feats of valour in Bengal, was put to death in 1474 by order of the Muhammadan sultan, who listened to the slanders of one of his Hindu officers who falsely accused Ismā'īl of plotting to set up an independent kingdom. There are four shrines erected to his honour in Rangpūr, one over his body and another over his head, and they are famous resorts for pilgrims and enjoy a considerable revenue. Pīr Bālāwal Shāh, who is said to have been a contemporary of the emperor Akbar and is buried at Fīrōzpūr (Panjāb), became a *shahīd* by being put to death by a man who had been robbed; he mistook the saint for a thief, as the actual thieves had put some of their plunder as a pious offering under the saint's pillow while he was asleep.

Among the *shahīds* is reckoned 'Alā al-Dīn, a

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xiv., *Punjab*, Calcutta, 1918, pt. i. p. 172.
[2] *Report of the Census of the Punjab, 1881*, Calcutta, 1883, i. 144.
[3] Kalhaṇa, *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, tr. M. A. Stein, London, 1900, i. 249.
[4] The *sajjāda-nishīn* of the tomb of Shauq Ilāhī, in the Bahāwalpūr State, is also always celibate.
[5] *Journal of the Panjab Historical Society*, Calcutta, 1913, vol. ii. no. 2.

[1] Shurreef, *Qanoon-e-Islam*, ch. xii. *fin.* [2] Qur'ān, xii. 26

grandson of the great saint of the Deccan, Burhān al-Dīn († 1331); he is said, when returning from a pilgrimage to the tombs of the saints of Gulbarga, to have met a Hindu goddess, whom he destroyed; a band of demons then made their appearance, and in fighting with them he suffered martyrdom.

A number of martyrs are commemorated at Karnāl in the eastern Panjāb; the legend is that a Brāhman girl was abducted by a rājā, and a saint named Asthān Sayyid Maḥmūd led a large force of Muhammadans and rescued the maiden, but not before 500 of his followers had lost their lives. Each one of them was honoured as a *shahīd*, and small tombs were erected over them, at which lamps are kindled every Thursday; but the number of shrines is now considerably in excess of the 500, as every remarkable object in the neighbourhood (such as a milestone, etc.) has been turned into one. Similarly, the tombs of three brothers, known collectively as Jetha-Bhutta (after the names of two of them), are venerated as the graves of martyrs and receive a grant from the Bahāwalpūr Government; they are said to have been appealed to by a woman who had been robbed, and in their attempt to recover her property from the robbers they were killed and thus attained the glory of martyrdom. Lāl Sohanra, one of the disciples of Bahā al-Dīn Zakarīyā, also became a *shahīd*, when helping some persons against a gang of robbers in Sindh.

LITERATURE.—For the original Persian sources see *EI*, *s.v.* 'India,' § 5. Among such works as have been translated into English may be mentioned Abu'l-Faẓl, *Ā'īn-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1873–94, iii. 349–375; al-Badāōnī, *Muntakhabu-t-tawārīkh*, tr. T. W. Haig, do. 1899, iii.; Jaffur Shurreef, *Qanoon-e-Islam, or the Customs of the Mussulmans of India*, tr. G. A. Herklots, London, 1832, [2]Madras, 1863, reprinted 1895; R. C. Temple, *The Legends of the Panjab*, Bombay, 1884–1901. The official publications of the Government of India—*e.g.*, those of the Ethnological Survey, Census Reports, and Gazetteers—contain a mass of information; but otherwise the subject has received little attention from European writers; some account of Muslim saints is to be found in J. H. Garcin de Tassy, *Mémoire sur les particularités de la religion musulmane dans l'Inde*[3], Paris, 1874, pp. 380–403; H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1911 ff., i. 529 ff.; A. J. O'Brien, 'The Mohammedan Saints of the Indus Valley,' *JAI* xli. [1911] 509–520.

T. W. ARNOLD.

SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Semitic and Egyptian).

—The word 'saint,' as we apply it to individuals among the Babylonians and Egyptians, must necessarily have a connotation different from that which it bears in Christianity. It could not indicate sanctity of an ethical quality; rather it denotes the heroes, tales of whose lives and deeds embodied the qualities which men then regarded as desirable. These heroes might be real men, half-legendary individuals, or wholly mythical; so long as their memories were cherished as examples of desirable forms of life, attained by the possession of crude sanctity or qualities that linked them with the gods, they occupied the place filled in the Christian religion by saints.

I. *BABYLONIAN.*—The earliest heroes of this type in Babylonia were half-mythical kings. A tablet in the University Museum in Philadelphia contains a list of these.[1] They were the following:

'Galumum, who ruled 900 (?) years,
Zugagib, 840 (?) years,
Aripi (or Ademe), 720 years,
Etana, the shepherd, who ascended to heaven, 635 years,
Pilikam, 350 years,
Enmenunna, 611 years,
Melan-Kish, 900 years,
Barsalnunna, 1200 years,
Meszamu, . . . years,
Meskingashir, 325 years,
Enmeirgan, 420 years,
Lugalbanda, the shepherd, 1200 years,
Dumuzi, 100 years,
Gilgamesh, 126 years.'

Dumuzi, of this list, is a god. Etana and Gilgamesh were heroes about whose names legends and myths were collected. They will be treated more fully below. Each of these beings, whether real or mythical, was believed to possess a quality that enabled him to live and rule for hundreds of years. The early Babylonians yearned for long life.[1] Probably they did not clearly distinguish in thought between 'holiness' and 'divinity.' Power to live and rule as long as these kings are said to have done constituted them at least saints, as we believe the Babylonians conceived the equivalent of sainthood.

As time passed, the unique quality of these or similar monarchs so impressed the imagination of the Babylonians that the length of their reigns was greatly extended. Berossos, a Babylonian priest who died about 260 B.C., compiled a list of kings who lived and reigned before the Flood, attributing to them much longer reigns. His list is as follows:

'Alorus, who reigned 36,000 years,
Alaparos, 10,800 years,
Amēlon, 46,800 years,
Ammenon, 43,200 years,
Megalaros, 64,800 years,
Daonos, or Daos, 36,000 years,
Euedorachos, 64,800 years,
Amempsinos, 36,000 years,
Otiartes, 28,800 years,
Xisouthros, 64,800 years.'

Poebel thinks that these kings are different from those mentioned above;[2] the present writer believes that most of them are corruptions of the list first mentioned.[3] In either case they were believed by Babylonians to have possessed in such a degree that quality which among them corresponded to saintliness that they were permitted to survive to these extraordinary ages. Long life was not the only way in which the Babylonians thought that saintliness manifested itself.

1. **Mythical saints.**—About the names of certain individuals, partly contained within the first of the above lists and partly outside of it, legends and myths gathered, attracted by the heroic quality believed to reside in the individual.

(1) *Etana*, who is said in the tablet of long-lived kings to have been a shepherd and to have gone to heaven, is the hero of various tales. These are woven into a story, which seems to have existed in various recensions, and of which large fragments, though not all, have been recovered. The outline of the story is as follows:[4]

The Igigi, or spirits of heaven, were hostile to a certain city that seems to have been deserted by its patron deity or deities. Confusion and anarchy existed; productivity ceased on earth: the gods were deaf to appeals or were powerless to intervene. The Anunaki, or spirits of earth, held a council, and Enlil and Ishtar were chosen to come to its rescue. A king, who is designated a shepherd, and so may have been Etana, was put in power by Ishtar. An eagle and a serpent allied themselves to carry on the work of destruction, and defied Shamash, the god of justice and order. They went with their young into the mountain to seek food. Each found some and shared it with the young, but the eagle could not resist the temptation to consume the young of the serpent. The serpent thereupon appealed to Shamash, who advised him to conceal himself in the carcass of a wild bull and, when the eagle swooped down upon it, to seize him and tear him in pieces. The ruse succeeded. The serpent tore the wings and feathers of the eagle and left him to die in a hole in the mountains. The eagle then appealed to Shamash, promising eternal obedience for his aid. At the same time Etana appealed to Shamash to show him the plant of birth to bring fertility to his sheep. This plant grew in the very hollow in the mountains into which the eagle had been cast. Shamash told Etana of this, and one of the young of the eagle guided him to the spot. The eagle

[1] The tablet is published by **A. Poebel**, *Publications of the Babylonian Section of the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, 1914, vol. v. *Historical and Grammatical Texts*, **no. 2**; it is translated by him, *ib.* vol. iv. *Historical Texts*, p. 73 f.; also by G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 264 f.

[1] See art. OLD AGE (Semitic). [2] iv. 85 f.

[3] Cf. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 270 f., and *JBL* xxxiv. [1915] 6 f.

[4] Cf. Jastrow's reconstruction in *JAOS* xxx. [1910] 123 f., which is in the main followed here.

appealed to Etana to release him and promised to fly with him to the dwelling of the gods. We are not told (owing to a break in the text) whether Etana obtained the plant of birth, but on the back of the eagle he flew upward to the gate of Anu, Enlil, and Ea, *i.e.* to the ecliptic. A break in the text deprives us of what occurred there. From there, at the instance of the eagle, they started to fly to the place where Ishtar dwelt. After flying for six hours, they began a precipitous descent, whether through failure of the eagle's strength or through Ishtar's displeasure is not clear. For six hours they fell through space to the ground. The close of the story is missing, but it is clear that the purpose of the flight failed. Etana had striven for immortality, as other heroes did, but had failed.

(2) *Gilgamesh* is the hero of a well-known epic[1] in twelve tablets or cantos. The composite story represents the powers and limitations of a saintly hero, according to a crude idea of saintliness. He could do mighty deeds, rule, oppress, build, fight enemies, kill extraordinary bulls, voyage to the isles of the blessed, but was powerless in the face of the mystery of death. That dark mystery baffled all, even Gilgamesh.

(3) *Engidu*[2] (*Enki-du*) has been described in treating of Gilgamesh.[3] He represents the wild uncivilized man of the steppe. He consorted with animals, was clothed with hair, ate grass with gazelles, drank at the streams with cattle, his heart was pleased with the living things in the streams. From this life he was enticed to the city by a *hierodoulos*. She cast aside her garments, exposed her charms, let him glut his passion, and led him in her thrall to civilization. For a time he was half satisfied, but his restless heart ultimately took him back to the animals and the steppe. His friendship with Gilgamesh continued; he joined with him in raiding Humbaba and in fighting the bull, but death ended his career.

Engidu, the heroic wild man, was believed to be created by a goddess. His marvellous powers were said to be due to sanctity of the rude sort believed in by early men. His story has been thought to embody in myth the civilizing influence of woman and family life.

(4) *Adapa* was another Babylonian hero about whom saintly myths collected.[4] He represented to the Babylonians something of the same story as that concerning Adam in Gn 3. Like Adam he obtained knowledge; like Adam too he missed immortality through the jealousy of a god.

(5) *Utnapishtim* (called in Sumerian *Ziugiddu*, and in later time *Atrakhasis*) was the Babylonian hero of the Deluge. From the different versions of the Deluge now extant we know that the legend concerning him was of gradual growth.[5] In its final form the story runs that Utnapishtim, warned by the god Ea of a coming deluge, built a ship and collected in it all that he had as well as all forms of life. The flood came, drowned all others in the lands, while he and his ship survived. The ship grounded on Mt. Nizir, as the water subsided. Utnapishtim built an altar, and offered sacrifice to the hungry gods. Bel then made Utnapishtim and his wife immortal. In its later form the story has become an episode in the Gilgamesh epic. A hero who could achieve such things fulfilled the Babylonian ideals of a saint.

(6) *Ishum*, a man of the city Dûr-ilu, was another hero about whom legends of familiarity with deity have clustered. The fragmentary text[6] which tells us of him opens with an account of how the god Urra was inflicting various plagues upon Babylonia. Ishum boldly complained to the god, saying:

> 'The Babylonians are as birds
> And thou hast become their catcher,
> With the net thou subduest, catchest, destroyest them.'

In a long address Ishum recounted the sufferings of Babylon, of Nippur, and of Dûr-ilu; he accused Urra of destroying the righteous and the wicked alike. In reply Urra said to Ishum in part:

> 'The Sea-land the Sea-land,
> Mesopotamia Mesopotamia,
> The Assyrians the Assyrian,
> The Elamites the Elamite,
> The Kassites the Kassite,
> The Kuthæans the Kuthæan,
> The Lulubites the Lulubite,
> One land another, one house another, one man another,
> Brother shall not spare brother; they shall kill one another,
> And thereupon the Accadian shall raise himself up;
> They are all struck down, together thrown to the ground.'

The text then goes on to relate how Ishum fulfilled the destiny thus pointed out to him and overran these lands.

(7) *Takku* (read by Langdon *Tagtug*) was a Babylonian hero, whose nature is not yet fully determined. It is possible that he was a deified king, but, in the opinion of the present writer, probably an agricultural deity.[1] Whatever his origin, he was regarded as a sort of representative or patron of humanity. Enki (Ea) revealed to him the secrets of agriculture, in order that he might be able to take advantage of the irrigating waters that Enki had created. This made the goddess Ninkharsag, the spouse of Enlil of Nippur, jealous of him, and in the name of Enki she uttered a curse against him denying him immortality. Enlil thereupon placated her by promising that her name along with Enlil's should be invoked at Nippur. After this, apparently to compensate Takku for the loss of immortality (some lines are broken from the text at this point), the medicinal properties of several herbs were revealed to Takku.[2] In another text, containing an account of the creation,[3] Takku appears as the creator of land and water, to whom many shrines were dedicated. He appears to have been a Babylonian saint, but, in the judgment of the present writer, a purely mythological one.

(8) *Enmeduranki* was the name of another hero, believed in later generations to have been a king of Agadé or Sippar. He was reverenced as the discoverer of the art of forecasting events by pouring oil on water.[4]

(9) *Tabu-utul-Bêl*,[5] or *Laluralim*,[6] was another hero, who has been designated a Babylonian Job. He is said to have been a king of Nippur, and a meticulously righteous man, who omitted no known religious or ethical duty. Like Job, he was overtaken with a torturing sickness, which called forth from him a sorrowful lament. At last he found a magician who drove away the sickness and relieved him of his affliction. The tale of his sufferings and deliverance was calculated to make the Babylonians believe that magic was more potent than righteousness.

2. Historical saints. — In addition to these mythical or semi-mythical saints, a number of Babylonian kings must be placed among the heroes who in the estimation of their countrymen attained a similar distinction.

[1] For an account of this poem see *ERE* vi. 643a; for translations of the epic cf. P. Jensen in *KB* vi. [1900] 116 ff., and A. Ungnad's *Das Gilgamesch-Epos*.

[2] Our knowledge of Engidu is derived from the Gilgamesh epic.

[3] See *ERE* vi. 643a. [4] *Ib.* p. 644a.

[5] For the different accounts cf. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, pt. ii. chs. vi. vii.

[6] Cf. O. Weber, *Literatur der Babylonier und Assyrier*, p. 104 ff., and, for the text, Jensen in *KB* vi. 56 ff., and Ungnad in H. Gressmann, *Altoriental. Texte und Bilder zum AT*, Tübingen, 1909, p. 71 ff.

[1] See *AJTh* xxi. [1917] 596 ff.

[2] Stephen Langdon's interpretation is quite different, but Jastrow's and J. D. Prince's agree closely with that of the present writer. For full references to the literature see *AJTh* xxi. 576.

[3] Cf. Barton, *Miscellaneous Babylonian Inscriptions*, i., New Haven, 1918, no. 8, and *AJTh* xxi. 592 f.

[4] Mentioned in H. Zimmern, *Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager*, Leipzig, 1900, no. 24 ff.

[5] For the poem cf. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*[3], Philadelphia, 1917, p. 392 ff.

[6] Cf. H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* v. 44, 17 b.

(1) *Sargon* of Agadé, who about 2800 B.C. founded the dynasty of Agadé and Kish, was the first of these. So great was his success as a military leader and ruler that a legend of his birth was treasured down to the time of Ashurbanipal (668–626 B.C.).[1] According to this legend, Sargon was begotten by an unknown father and brought forth in secret. His mother, apparently ashamed of him, placed him in a basket of reeds lined with bitumen and set him afloat on the Euphrates. The water carried him to Akki, the irrigator, who adopted him and reared him as his son. The goddess Ishtar became his patron and made him ruler of the people.

Sargon practised liver-divination, and, if he did not introduce it into Babylonia, he made it so popular that it was ever afterwards practised. In the time of Urkagina, thirty years before Sargon, the favourite method of divination at Lagash had been by means of oil on water. The markings on livers consulted by Sargon before each great undertaking were recorded and became the basis of the science of liver-divination in subsequent centuries.[2] If one could obtain the same omen as the mighty Sargon had beheld before accomplishing some successful deed, one felt sure of success.

(2) *Rimush*, who was perhaps Sargon's immediate successor, was during his lifetime regarded as a god. What the cause was that led his subjects to accord him this honour we do not know, but it was, no doubt, the possession of qualities that passed among them for saintliness.

(3) *Naram-Sin*, of the same dynasty, whose reign of 44 years began about 2700 B.C., was also regarded as a god while he lived.[3] We know that he was a successful warrior and a great builder, but why he more than many others should have been accorded this honour we do not know.

(4) *Shargalisharri* was Naram-Sin's successor. His name is once preceded by the determinative for deity in one of his own inscriptions.[4] He probably inherited the honour from his predecessor.

(5) *Gudea*, the great Patesi of Lagash about 2500 B.C., was also deified. He appears as a god in certain proper names, such as Gin-^{d}Gudea and Lù-^{d}Gudea. Probably this occurred in his lifetime, though the names in question come from the dynasty of Ur.

(6) *Dungi*, of the dynasty of Ur, who ruled 2429–2371 B.C., was the next king, so far as we know, to be deified during his lifetime. While he was still living, men in his service bore such names as: Lù-^{d}Dun-gi, 'man of the god Dungi'; ^{d}Dun-gi-ḫé-gál, 'the god Dungi makes abundance'; ^{d}Dun-gi-ra-kalam-ma, 'for the god Dungi is the land'; ^{d}Dun-gi-kalam-ma-ḫi-li-bi, 'the god Dungi—the land is his delight'; ^{d}Dun-gi-à-uru, 'the god Dungi is the reward of the slave'; ^{d}Dun-gi-ki-par-šag, 'with the god Dungi is great favour'; Ka-^{d}Dun-gi-ib-ta-ê, 'the word of the god Dungi has gone forth'; ^{d}Dun-gi-a-du-kalam-ma, 'the god Dungi is the counsellor of the land'; Ama-^{d}Dun-gi-e-^{d}Ur-ru, 'the mother of the god Dungi is the goddess Urru'; ^{d}Dun-gi-ú-nam-ti, 'the god Dungi is the food of life';[5] and Tab-^{d}Dun-gi-^{d}Nannar, 'the twin of the god Dungi is the god Nannar.'[6]

A hymn,[7] apparently addressed to him while he lived, contained the most fulsome praise. Some of its lines are:

> 'Wise ruler, hero, come!
> Give rest to the land!
> A faithful hero, a sun-god, who art just,
> At the head with sceptre thou standest.
> O exalted lion, the fat of life thou eatest.
> O ox, mighty wild ox, O ram great to bless,
> Thy word breaks the mountain—holy and just.
> . . . . . .
> Enlil,
> The faithful lady, Ninlil,
> Whom he loves in his heart,
> O my king, are like thee.
> . . . . . .
> O mountain of fate, the firm bow of Nannar
> For the land thou carriest
> To fight in gladness.
> . . . . . .
> Enlil below thou art!'

(7) *Bur-Sin*, *Gimil-Sin*, and *Ibi-Sin*, three successors of Dungi, were also accounted divine. Their names are regularly written preceded by determinatives for deity. A fragmentary hymn[1] addressed to Ibi-Sin, apparently while he lived, contains the following:

> 'Food and drink abundantly thou . . .
> For the people as protector thou . . .
> My king, known of Nannar, exalted one of Enlil,
> Ibi-Sin, in exalted power thou art alone!'

The names of other kings are at times found preceded by the determinative for deity—*e.g.*, Ur Ninib, Irraimiti, Zanbia, Ishbiurra, Idin-Dagan, Ishmi-Dagan, Libit-Ishtar, Itirpisha, Damiqilu-shu, Ibiq-Adad, Nur-Adad, Warad-Sin, Rim-Sin, and Ḫammurabi.[2] All these were deified for the same reason.

It may be said that the Babylonian conception of saintliness was the successful exercise of the will to power. Often it was believed to be exhibited in the form of political power, but often, too, in unusual deeds of other kinds.

Only one possible trace in Babylonian lore of anything that could be called martyrdom is known to the present writer. That is the myth preserved by Berossos[3] that Oannes cut off his own head and mingled his blood with the dust to create man. As Oannes is but another name for the god Ea, this cannot be called martyrdom as the term is ordinarily understood.

II. *EGYPTIAN.* — The Egyptian conception of sainthood was of the same semi-primitive, heroic character as that in Babylonia, though it manifested itself in some respects in a different way. In Babylonia some kings were considered divine; in Egypt all kings were so considered. The cause that led to this is shrouded in the mystery that conceals all things pre-historic, but it was probably the primitive way of recognizing that one who could gain control over his fellows possessed rare ability. Such ability was regarded as an especial attribute of divinity. Some Egyptian kings, such as Mena, Khufu, and Thothmes III., possessed unusual ability. The divinity of many of the kings was, however, purely traditional.

More illuminating than the saintship of Egyptian kings is the study of the type of heroes about whose names Egyptian traditions clustered. These reveal at once the likeness and the difference between the Babylonian and the Egyptian conceptions. The likeness consists in the heroic quality that passed among both peoples as saintliness, the difference in the fact that intellectual power attracted the Egyptians quite as much as brute force, and apparently to a somewhat greater degree than it did the Babylonians. This will become evident as we glance at some of the Egyptian heroes and note their qualities.

(1) *Imhotep* was a vizier of King Zoser of the IIIrd dynasty. He was famed for his priestly wisdom, his knowledge of magic, his reputation for making wise proverbs, his knowledge of medicine, and his ability as an architect. So great

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[1] Cf. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 310 f.
[2] Cf. H. Radau, *Early Babylonian History*, New York, 1900, p. 157 ff. His name is uniformly written with the determinative for deity.
[3] See Barton, *Sumerian Business and Administrative Documents from the Earliest Times to the Dynasty of Agade*, Philadelphia, 1915, no. 25.
[4] See H. V. Hilprecht, *Old Babylonian Inscriptions*, Philadelphia, 1896, no. 2.
[5] See Barton, *Haverford Library Collection of Cuneiform Tablets*, Philadelphia, 1905–14, pt. ii. pl. 53, no. 10, and *JAOS* xxxvii. 162 ff.
[6] Barton, *Haverford Library Collection*, pt. i. pl. 12, no. 52, line 9.
[7] Barton, *Miscellaneous Babylonian Inscriptions*, no. 3.

[1] Barton, *Miscellaneous Babylonian Inscriptions*, no. 7.
[2] Cf., for references, *JAOS* xxxvi. 365 ff.
[3] Cf. I. P. Cory, *The Ancient Fragments*, London, 1828, p. 23 f.

was his reputation that he became the patron spirit of later scribes, who regularly poured out to him a libation from their water-jar before beginning their work. Centuries later people sang his proverbs, and twenty-five hundred years later he had become a god of medicine. The Greeks called him Imouthes, and regarded him as the equivalent of their own Asklepios. A temple was erected to him near the Serapeum at Memphis, and numerous statues of him have been found.[1]

(2) *Other magicians* were also reverenced, and tales concerning them circulated in later centuries.[2] One of these, *Ubaaner*, lived under Khufu of the IVth dynasty, the builder of the Great Pyramid. He is said to have made a wax crocodile, which, when thrown into the water, became a living crocodile and devoured a lover of Ubaaner's wife. Another was *Tchatchamānkh*, who flourished in the time of Seneferu, who reigned between Zoser and Khufu. When a bracelet was lost in a lake, he is said to have made the water in one half of it stand upon that of the other half, so that the bracelet could be seen upon the dry bottom. Still another, *Teta*, is said to have lived in the reign of Khufu and was believed to have power to restore life to dead animals. A fourth magician, *Ruttetet*, is said to have foretold to King Khufu the birth of three sons of the god Rē who should overthrow the IVth dynasty—a prophecy that was believed to have been fulfilled by the establishment of the Vth dynasty.

(3) *Ptahhotep* was an Egyptian sage who is said to have lived during the Vth dynasty, about 2600 B.C. To him later ages attributed a body of 'precepts' that are certainly as old as 2000 B.C. and perhaps older.[3] These 'precepts' are designed to guide Egyptians to the way of happily and successfully living in the social *ensemble*. They form an ethical code of a remarkably high order. If Ptahhotep was their author, he is worthy of being compared to Confucius.

(4) *Ipuwer* was another Egyptian sage who lived before 2000 B.C. and whose name later centuries reverenced for his wisdom. Certain 'admonitions,' said to have been uttered in the presence of the king, are attributed to him.[4] In these 'admonitions' the imperfections of the social order of the time are arraigned, and it is predicted that an ideal king will arise and establish justice.

(5) *Hunanep*, the 'eloquent peasant,' was a 'saint' of a different character.[5] Whether he was a real person or only a character in a story may perhaps be open to question. When one considers the concreteness of ancient thinking and writing, the probability is that he was a real character who lived in the feudal age before 2000 B.C. He is the hero of the story of *The Eloquent Peasant*, whose pleading for the rights of the poor so delighted a local governor that he purposely referred his case to the king, so that the king might have the pleasure of listening to one so eloquent. The speeches of Hunanep embody social ideals that were long cherished in Egypt.

(6) *Bata* was an Egyptian hero of a somewhat different sort, since he was apparently in part a real character, though his story has attracted to itself a number of mythical elements. He is the righteous younger brother in the Egyptian *Tale of Two Brothers*, who, like Joseph, was faithful, underwent temptation without yielding, was falsely accused, but, unlike Joseph, escaped punishment.[1] How he went to the Lebanon and became a tree, became an animal and returned to Egypt, became a shrub planted by his brother's door, etc., are mythical elements, derived perhaps from some form of the Osiris myth. The integrity of Bata himself is a close approach to saintliness in its later sense. Whether it was this or the mythical elements that made the tale popular with the Egyptians it is difficult now to tell.

These heroic figures, whose memory and writings were treasured by the Egyptians, indicate that the people of Egypt reverenced the social virtues. Had we only the Babylonian heroic stories as evidence, we should say that the Babylonians fell behind the Egyptians in this respect. The code of Ḫammurabi is proof, however, that such an inference would be wrong. Social qualities were as strongly developed among them as among the Egyptians, though the evidence for it is not found in the tales concerning their heroes.

III. *JEWISH.*—See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Jewish).

IV. *ABYSSINIAN.*—With the exception of a few inscriptions, all our sources of information concerning Abyssinia relate to the Christian period of its history. The country was Christianized in the 4th cent. from Egypt, so that the Abyssinian Church is an offshoot of the Coptic Church. In the Abyssinian liturgy prayers are offered for the patriarch of Alexandria as archpope.[2] Abyssinian Christianity has, therefore, a general Christian inheritance, a specific Egyptian inheritance, and a native element. The native element is partly from pre-Christian Abyssinian heathenism, on which Christianity was grafted, and partly a development within the Abyssinian Church itself. Abyssinian saints are accordingly derived from all these sources.

1. **Catholic saints**, or saints recognized by the Church Catholic, are numerous in Abyssinia. There is, of course, the Virgin Mary, Stephen the protomartyr,[3] Zacharias the priest, John the Baptist, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, Peter, Andrew, James and John, Philip, Bartholomew, Thomas, Matthew, Thaddeus, Nathaniel, James the son of Alpheus, and Matthias; also James the brother of Jesus, Paul, Timothy, Silas, Barnabas, Titus, Philemon, Clement. In addition to these, the 72 disciples of Lk 10, the 500 companions of 1 Co 15[6], and the 318 Orthodox are also counted as saints, the merits of whom are invoked in the liturgy.[4] In the thought of the people some of these are more important than others. The Virgin Mary naturally holds an important place. Next to her is St. John, to whom many places are sacred. On his festival firstfruits are offered, and people bathe—a rare thing in Abyssinia![5] On his day also a sheep is led around people who are supposed to be possessed of the devil.[6] St. Stephen is also fairly popular. There are several churches called after him.

The archangels Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, and Suriel are also made saints. Michael and Gabriel are among the most popular. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jonah are counted saints, as are the four living creatures, the four-and-twenty elders, and the 144,000 of the book of Revelation. St. George, conqueror of the dragon, has also a place.[7]

[1] Cf. J. H. Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*[2], p. 112 *f.*

[2] See E. A. W. Budge, *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 25 ff.

[3] Cf. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 231 ff., and Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 409 f.

[4] Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 204 *f.*; Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 421 *f.*; A. H. Gardiner, *The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage.*

[5] Cf. F. Vogelsang and A. H. Gardiner, *Die Klagen des Bauern*, and Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 418 *f.*

[1] Cf. W. M. F. Petrie, *Egyptian Tales*, 2nd ser., p. 36 ff., and Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 300 ff.

[2] F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, p. 228, and S. A. B. Mercer, *The Ethiopic Liturgy*, p. 343.

[3] Cf. I. Guidi, *Annales Iohannis I.*, in *Corpus Script. Christ. Orient. (Script. Æthiop.*, 2nd ser., vol. v.), Leipsig, 1903, pp. 22, 46.

[4] Cf. Brightman, p. 228 *f.*, and Mercer, p. 350.

[5] M. Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia*, ii. 66 *f.*

[6] *Ib.* p. 81. [7] *Ib.* p. 78.

A St. Ewostatewos, who is called the Just,[1] is probably no other than St. Eustathius, bishop of Antioch (A.D. 324–331), a determined foe of the Arians.

2. **Saints of Egyptian origin** include St. Athanasius and St. Cyril, who are also recognized by the Church Catholic. Less clear is the identity of SS. Mercury, Basilides, Claudius, Mennas, Manādelēwos, Philotheus, Mermehnām, Kirkōs, Victor, Abli, and Esderos; but they are of Egyptian or Roman origin.[2] Maximus and Demetrius are called 'our holy Roman fathers.'[3] Antony, Besōi, John Kamā, Pachomius, Barsūmās, Sīnōdā, Besnedā, and Būlā are saints of the Coptic Church,[4] and were introduced from Egypt. All these were imported into Abyssinia and naturalized there.

3. **Native Abyssinian saints** were of three classes. (*a*) There were native heathen deities, worshipped on hill-tops, that were taken over and christened as Christian saints. Five of the most important churches in Abyssinia had apparently been heathen shrines, and to this day the heathen idea of sanctuary attaches to them. Such are the churches at Axum, Adowa, Waldeba, Gundi-gundi, Debra-Damot, and Debra-Abai.[5] A number of the most sacred churches are situated on hill-tops and surrounded by groves. Doubtless they are ancient Semitic high-places. Two on isolated peaks near Axum contain the shrines of saints. One is that of Abbalicanos, said to have been the confessor of Queen Candace, the other that of a certain Abbapantalian who is supposed to have been so holy that the place is one 'of great devotion amongst them.'[6] Three others near Axum are said to be the residences or burial-places of saints and are regarded as very holy. One, the Hallelujah Monastery, is on a high hill surrounded by trees. It is said to have been given its name because a holy man who dwelt there when the monastery was first built claimed that at night he heard the angels in heaven singing 'Hallelujah.' Another was named for Abbagarima, who, it was said, left his kingdom in Greece and spent his life near Axum doing penance, and who is believed still to work miracles. The third, also on a hill, is named for St. John,[7] a very favourite saint in Abyssinia. A fountain, believed to have healing properties, near the plain of Gobe is also named for St. John. It is, no doubt, an old Semitic sacred spring.[8] Another sacred cave, the sanctity of which doubtless dates from heathen times, contained in the 16th cent. a church named Imbra Christus. Here, it was believed, a holy king named Abraham was buried. There are numerous St. Johns, just as in Europe there are different Virgin Marys at different shrines, and at least some of these are heathen deities baptized with Christian names. Abuna Aragawy, the saint of the celebrated monastery of Debra-Damot, is said to have been a missionary sent to the country by Athanasius. He gained access to the inaccessible height on which the monastery stands by clinging to the tail of a boa-constrictor, which pulled him up.[9] The caves about are full of snakes, and the boa that helped the saint up the hill is believed by some to be still alive there. The place was, no doubt, the site of ancient serpent-worship before the introduction of Christianity.

(*b*) Other native Abyssinian saints have developed out of their dead kings. Just as many a Muslim *walī* is inhabited by a dead *shaikh*, so a number of Abyssinian shrines are believed to be the resting-places of departed monarchs. St. Theodore, the patron saint of Rohabaita, is believed to be a great worker of miracles.[1] Perhaps he is very old; but, if so, he is now confused with King Theodore I., who reigned 1409–12, and who is believed to have been a great worker of miracles. It is expected that another king will arise in his name, restore the Holy Sepulchre to the Cross, and make Ethiopia the first of the nations.[2] Other saintly kings were Lalibela and Abraham.[3]

(*c*) Less exalted holy men have, as elsewhere, developed into saints. Alvares tells of an *ichee*, or monk, who was very holy, was thought to work miracles, and at whose tomb a monastery was built.[4] One of the most noteworthy of this class of saints is Takla Hāymānōt,[5] who was the patron saint of King Menelik.[6] His life and actions are believed to have been an exact copy of those of Christ, even to the fact that his father was a carpenter named Joseph and his mother was named Mary.[7] Gabro Menfos Kuddos ('slave of the Holy Spirit') is believed to have been a saint from his birth.[8] On his festal day everybody eats vetch-peas which have been made to sprout by soaking them in water for three days. Portions of these peas are sent as presents to friends and neighbours.[9]

Abyssinian saints are numberless.[10] Those named are but examples of the different classes. Saints are held in the highest reverence, often being preferred to the Deity Himself. One who would not hesitate to invoke the name of God in witness to a falsehood cannot be persuaded so to invoke the name of his patron saint. Beggars who vainly ask alms for the sake of God obtain them if they ask for the sake of the Virgin Mary or Takla Hāymānōt.[11]

It is a common custom to vow to one's patron saint the sacrifice of a bullock or sheep on his festal day, in order to secure his favour and protection for the rest of the year. Each family has its patron saint, who is handed down from father to son. On the festal day of this saint each family according to its means entertains its friends with some sort of merry-making. The saints most popular as patrons are St. Michael, the Virgin Mary, St. John the Baptist, Takla Hāymānōt, and Gabro Menfos Kuddos.[12]

Numerous stories, mostly of a trivial and childish character, are told of Abyssinian saints.

An example of these is the story told above of Abuna Aragawy and the boa-constrictor. Of Gabro Menfos Kuddos it is said that as soon as he was born he stood up. When three days old he bowed thrice, saying in a distinct voice: 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.' He never tasted his mother's milk; through his whole life he never tasted food or drink. Once, when praying on a mountain, he fell over a precipice 200 ft. high. Two angels immediately spread their wings to support him, but he declined their assistance, and, trusting in God, was unhurt. Another time, while ascending a mountain, he was worn out with fatigue, and the Holy Spirit came and helped him up. After a very long life God sent Azazel, the angel of death, to take him, but he refused to die, saying that, as he had neither eaten nor drunk all his life, he could not die. Then all the saints in paradise came, one by one, to try to persuade him to leave the world and go to paradise. The first to come was St. John the Baptist, who said to him: 'I have

[1] Cf. Guidi, pp. 39, 40, 48.
[2] This is clear from a comparison of the Abyssinian prayer of intercession (Brightman, p. 230; Mercer, p. 369) with the similar prayer in the Coptic liturgy (Brightman, p. 169).
[3] Brightman, p. 230; *cf.* p. 169.
[4] Most of their names are corruptions of Coptic names; *cf.* Brightman, p. 230, and Mercer, p. 369 f., with Brightman, p. 169. Some, such as Sīnōdā, who do not appear in the Coptic liturgy, are known from Ethiopic translations of Coptic works to have been introduced into Abyssinia from Egypt; *cf.* *ZDMG* lxvii. [1913] 187 ff.
[5] Cf. J. C. Hotten, *Abyssinia and its People*, London, 1868, p. 48 f., and Parkyns, p. 185 f.
[6] F. Alvares, *The Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia*, Eng. tr., p. 86.
[7] *Ib.* p. 88 ff. [8] Parkyns, i. 241 ff. [9] *Ib.* ii. 86.

[1] Parkyns, i. 265 f.
[2] J. T. Bent, *The Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, London 1893, p. 156.
[3] Alvares, p. 130. [4] *Ib.* p. 161.
[5] Guidi, pp. 9, 25, 39, 48. [6] Mercer, p. 359.
[7] Parkyns, ii. 86. [8] *Ib.* p. 85 f.
[9] *Ib.* p. 65. [10] *Ib.* p. 84.
[11] *Ib.* [12] *Ib.* p. 70 f.

gone the way of all flesh, notwithstanding all my privations and sufferings.' To this Gabro replied: 'Yes; but *you* could not fast even forty days, but fed on locusts and wild honey.' Thus he replied to all the saints, and even at last to the Virgin and to our Saviour. Nevertheless his life was at last taken from him, since the decrees of the Almighty must be obeyed. Then the elements fell to disputing as to what should be done with his body. The earth refused to receive it, since he had never partaken of her produce; the water refused, because he had never drunk a drop of it; fire had equally strong objections. So the saint was restored to life and taken up alive to heaven. Notwithstanding this, his tomb is shown at Zukwala in Shoa.[1] It is told of other saints that they plucked out their eyes and cast them before vultures, and that they rode on lions.[2]

Lives of saints, filled with such stories, are written in large numbers and circulated throughout Abyssinia.

Martyrs play no large part in Abyssinian thought. The intercessory prayer of their liturgy intercedes for Stephen the proto-martyr, for 'all the martyrs,' for the 'holy abba Nob, virgin and singular martyr, Eleazar . . . and all the martyrs,' for 'holy abba Moses,' and for the 49 martyrs.[3] Although the abba Nob does not appear in the liturgy of the Coptic Jacobites,[4] it is probable that he too is an Egyptian martyr. Martyrdom appears to have formed no important part of the experience of Abyssinian Christians, and their attention to it is accordingly not great. It is an exotic in their midst.

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SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Syrian). — **1. Introduction.** — Although to the superficial observer the religions of the modern inhabitants of Palestine and Syria may be classified with apparent exactitude under a number of well-recognized divisions—Christianity, Judaism, Muhammadanism, Druse, etc.—and these religions again may be divided into a great variety of sects, each, with fanatic devotion, holding to very definite and characteristic doctrines and ritual, yet such a classification by no means covers the whole ground. When the peoples of these lands are more closely studied—particularly the *fellaḥīn*, or villagers, and the *bedu*, or nomads—it will be found that under the outward profession of adherence to orthodox creeds lies a substratum of more primitive belief, common, in varying degrees, to all the religions, and reaching far deeper into the heart of things than all the outward forms. This is broadly true of Christian and Jew, of orthodox (Sunnite) Muslim and Metāwileh (Shī'ite), of Druse and Nāṣīrīyyah. This primitive faith includes an animistic belief in *jinn* and *ghūl*, a common faith in various spirit agencies as causing misfortune, illness, and death, a profound dread of the 'evil eye' which leads to the almost universal use of charms, similar customs with regard to vows and their fulfilment, a belief in the efficacy of sacrificial rites, and a universal respect paid to dead saints and heroes. For the great majority of the native inhabitants of the land, in all but the largest towns, these items of belief have for long ages made up substantially their real religion; and even the average town-dwellers, though making more intelligent and sincere profession of their nominal faith, have a fundamental regard for those more primitive beliefs, as is constantly demonstrated by their reversion to them in times of moral stress. The importance of these beliefs to the proper understanding of all the higher developments of Semitic religion is unquestionable. The cult of saints and heroes, though, on the one hand inextricably mixed with the other primitive beliefs enumerated above and, on the other hand, shading off into the orthodox professions, presents many features of great interest and importance.

2. The shrines.—It may be said that a certain degree of superstitious reverence is given to all tombs, and still more to all cemeteries, as they are viewed as places charged with potential spiritual forces. Some special historical association or some supposed manifestation of supernatural influence is usually necessary to call out the devotion of the inhabitants of an extended area to any special site. The shrines which to-day enjoy an acknowledged reputation may be classified very roughly into three groups: (*a*) the village *maḳām*, (*b*) the *walī*, and (*c*) the universally visited shrines, such as Nabī Mūsa, Nabī Rūbīn, etc., at which annual festivals are held.

(*a*) *The maḳām.*[1]—In practically every village in the land may be found a *maḳām* (lit. a 'place of standing') dedicated to some dead worthy and sometimes covering his actual grave. This is looked upon as the shrine of the guardian-spirit of the neighbourhood. It is usually a small square building surmounted by a whitewashed cupola (hence the not infrequent name of such a shrine, *ḳubbah*, 'dome'); it is commonly shaded by one or more trees—*e.g.*, oak, terebinth, carob, or *sidr*—which themselves partake of the sacredness of the shrine. Sometimes the building may cover a cenotaph only; sometimes there may be nothing but a bare floor with a few straw mats, but almost always there is a *miḥrab* pointing the pious Muslim to Mecca. In other cases the building itself has long ago perished, and is now represented by the mere foundations of four walls or by an irregular pile of stones, shaded, it may be, by a sacred tree. With the *bedu* in particular the shrine is commonly a tomb often little better than an ordinary grave. But, whether conspicuous or not, the spot is 'holy' and under the protection of a spirit, or *walī*, usually called *shaikh* or *nabī* (lit. 'prophet'), less commonly *saidna* ('our lord') or *ḥājj* ('pilgrim'). In the case of a building no one dare enter without using some such expression as *Dastūr ya mubārak*, 'By your leave, O blessed one!' Goods left under the protection of the spirit of the shrine are never touched. Such spots, whether actual buildings or even lonely graves, are commonly seen surrounded by bundles of wood, ploughs, and other instruments of husbandry, left to the care of the *walī* till the owner comes to claim them, while sometimes less valuable things—*e.g.*, old rusty knives, worthless coins, etc.—are left as offerings. The stones of the shrine and even the twigs from the neighbouring trees are sacred and must on no account be taken for use, though a fragment may be removed as a charm. Many stories are told of the mis-

[1] Parkyns, p. 85 f.
[2] Cf. C. W. Isenberg and J. L. Krapf, *Journals . . . detailing their Proceedings in the Kingdom of Shoa*, London, 1843, p. 161.
[3] Cf. Brightman, p. 230, and Mercer, p. 369 f.
[4] Brightman, p. 169.

[1] This Arab word appears to be the exact equivalent of the Heb. מקום of Dt 12[2].

fortunes befalling the impious who removed wood or stone for his own use.

(*b*) *The walī.*—In addition to the *maḳām* a more sacred class of shrine is found on the tops of many hills or hidden within isolated sacred groves. Through the length and breadth of Palestine the tops of lofty hills are crowned with these buildings, sometimes with conspicuous, whitewashed cupolas, sometimes marked only from a distance by a great tree, and sometimes, through neglect, reduced to four ruined walls—but always revered. Such a place is popularly known as a *walī*[1] (lit. 'protector'), a name applied strictly to the saint himself; sometimes the name *ḳubbah*, 'dome,' is given if such a structure crowns the building; and occasionally we find the name *mazār*, 'place of visitation,' a term which might be applied to most of these shrines, for to any one of them pilgrimages may be made, and sometimes a man, particularly one from a distant land, will make a round of all the best known *walīs* in succession. Many of these shrines have annual feast-days, when they are specially visited by the pious. They are all dedicated to some more or less powerful saint. There is no sharp line of division between the village *maḳām* and the more potent *walī*, but the latter is a spot specially honoured by some supposed powerful manifestation of supernatural influence—*e.g.*, some strange occurrence at the time of burial, the bearers being dragged apparently against their will away from the proposed place of burial to an unexpected spot, where alone the body of the *walī* consents to be interred; an answered prayer or a portentous dream; or an exhibition of vengeful power upon one who slighted the place. The influence of *walīs* is, however, usually friendly in contrast to the malevolent freaks of the *jinn*. Any tomb or any village *maḳām* may become worthy to rank as a *walī*, if credited with active supernatural powers to an unusual degree. These lonely shrines are usually under the guardianship of the neighbouring village *shaikh* or of a special 'holy man' or dervish, who lives on the offerings of the faithful and often becomes credited with much of the influence of the *walī* himself. Although the tops of hills are favourite sites, they are by no means the only ones. All along the deep cleft of the Jordan Valley there are such buildings, many of them not improbably the tombs of Arab warriors who perished in the conquest of Palestine during the first enthusiastic outburst of Islām.

(*c*) *The greater shrines.*—In the front rank of importance are a few shrines, venerated all over the land, which are each visited at a special annual feast (*maulid*) by thousands of people. In the case of some of them the duties of guardianship belong to certain families and are hereditary; considerable property has become attached to such resorts, and the hereditary guardians, besides keeping the buildings in repair, use part of these endowments for their own support, and with part provide contributions in food (sheep, rice, butter, etc.) to the annual festivities.

3. The cult of the walī.—The spiritual personalities inhabiting all these varieties of shrines are conceived of as very active and powerful. Their influence extends a varying distance from the neighbourhood of the 'holy' place—in the case of the village *maḳām* probably not farther than the boundaries of the village property, but very much wider in the case of the most important *walīs*. To offend a *walī* would appear to be more dreaded than to offend God Himself. Certainly a vow made at a shrine in the name of the *walī* is more binding than one made in the name of God or on the sacred books. Many a man has perjured his oath made under the latter circumstance, trusting, as some of them have openly said, to the mercy of the All-Compassionate; but he dare not offend the *walī*, whose vengeance knows no compassion and is sure. Hence all over the land these places are used for the public taking of oaths. Of these the following are common.

(*a*) *The oath of purgation or innocence.*—The accusing parties take the accused to the shrine, and, if he takes solemn oath in the name of the *walī* that he has not committed the crime of which he is accused, he is acknowledged to be innocent. Any one wishing to bind a *fellah* or a *bedawī* by a serious oath can assure himself by insisting on his swearing at a *maḳām* of repute. Rather than perjure himself at such awful risk, many a man has quietly made restitution of stolen goods. To the *walī* Shaikh Aḥmad at Felujah, near Gaza, the people come from all parts of the country to take an oath of purgation, after which they receive a certificate from the attendant of the shrine sealed by the village *mukhṭār*. The possession of such a document is considered sure evidence of innocence.

(*b*) *The vow of the incense* (*nidhr al bakhūr*) is also a common vow at a *walī*. The person making such a vow visits the *maḳām*, kisses it, recites the *fatḥah*,[1] and then utters some such prayer as the following:

'I make a vow in order that the sick one should recover (or the absent one return in safety). I present thee with this incense, oh my Lord! Oh my Lord, accept this vow for God the highest.'

He then places a small piece of metal or a sherd of pottery before the *maḳām* and burns some incense in it. He also very commonly lights a small pottery hand-lamp, and, before leaving, he again kisses the sacred spot. Around all important shrines will be found fragments of pottery or metal marked by the burning incense and sometimes lamps also.

(*c*) *The vow of the veil.*—A similar vow is the *nidhr al istar*, 'vow of the veil (or covering),' which may be made instead of the former or in association with it. A person wishing to make a solemn vow brings a piece of green calico or linen about a yard and a half long, which he affixes to the pillar at the head of the tomb with the same ceremony and with words similar to those quoted above, except that he says, 'I bring thee this veil,' etc.

(*d*) *The vow of pilgrimage.*—A more ceremonious vow is made by richer people on special occasions—*e.g.*, in petitioning for the restoration to health of a beloved one or for the birth of a son. This is the *nidhr az ziyārah*, 'vow of pilgrimage.' The details vary in different localities. In parts of Galilee the custom is as follows:

The man and his nearer relatives and friends, men, women, and children, dressed in their best, make a solemn procession to the shrine. In front walks the head of the family, accompanied by the men; then (when a son is to be petitioned for) there is often a young man or boy on horseback, who is named the *arīs*, 'bridegroom'; behind him come the maidens walking two or three together; and in the rear the married women. Such a *ziyārah*, or pilgrimage, may last two or (if the distance is considerable) three days. On arriving at the shrine, the man kisses the tomb, recites the *fatḥah*, and makes his vow somewhat as follows: 'Oh my lord, I have a vow to make and have come to visit thee. If God gives us a son, I will bring thee a beast for sacrifice and a sack of rice.' After he has again kissed the spot, a feast is held. On the second day they celebrate what is called a *fantasiyah* (*i.e.* dancing and games) at the spot. On the last day the man who has vowed lays at the foot of the tomb, in the presence of the *arīs*, a small money-offering, which is kept by the caretaker, if there be such, or is given to the poor, if there is no regular custodian. It is not always necessary to make this ceremonial visit when making the vow; the man may simply look towards the distant shrine and raise a *mashhad*[2] (a pile of small stones) to witness his oath. But, when the prayer has been granted, a pilgrimage

[1] Much less commonly *wāliyah* (female *walī*) is used, the traditions connecting the shrine with a woman.

[1] The opening verses of the Qur'ān.

[2] The *marǧemah*, 'heap of stones,' of Pr 26[8] (RV).

must be made with banners and beating of the tom-tom (*tubl*); the devoted sheep and other food are eaten by the whole party, parts of the banquet being reserved for the caretaker.

(*e*) *Various offerings.*—The *bedu* of Moab, before going on a warlike expedition, sacrifice sheep at a tomb or *walī* to bring success. If there is sickness among the flocks, they may be driven to the *walī* for cure, or one of the flock may be sacrificed. A sick person may sometimes sleep at a sacred tomb to obtain healing, and on such occasions the saint himself, usually as a venerable man, appears in a vision or a dream and brings health and encouragement. In attending these places for prayer or vows, sometimes the worshippers sprinkle on their faces and necks some of the dust from the neighbourhood, and sometimes they carry away a portion of this or of the surrounding herbage as a charm; the earth from Mecca is sold in this way all over Syria. Among the *bedu* of Moab the first milk taken in the spring, the first butter made, the earliest wheat or lentils, and the first-born of the flock are presented to the *walī*, and are there either given to the guardian of the shrine or to the poor in the name of the *walī* or, in the case of milk or butter, simply poured out on the ground. When an animal is sacrificed at such a spot, some of the blood is poured on the tomb, and, if there is a building, some is commonly sprinkled on the lintel and sideposts of the door. In the case of tombs attended by a class of people slightly more educated, it is common to find written petitions to the dead saint thrust into the tomb or into parts of the building connected with it. This is specially noticeable in connexion with the well-known Mosque of the Patriarchs at Hebron. Many of the more important shrines have annual feasts connected with them attended by multitudes, some of which are referred to below.

4. **The personalities honoured at the shrines.**—These are various. Some are connected with Biblical traditions, some with the history of Islām, but a considerable number are known to be of no great antiquity. A few of the tombs are those of persons who were known in life by many still living. As will be seen, greatness or goodness in this life is by no means necessary to make a man a much-respected *walī* after death.

Among the shrines in the front rank of importance, which have each an annual feast (*maulid*) attended by thousands of people, are Nabī Mūsa, the tomb of Moses, according to Muslim tradition, in the Jordan Valley between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea; Nabī Rūbīn, identified in tradition with the son of Jacob, south of Jaffa; and Nabī Sālih, in the peninsula of Sinai, in memory of an unknown pious man. The annual festival of Nabī Mūsa is held for a week at Easter,[1] that of Nabī Rūbīn for ten days in September, and that of Nabī Sālih for three days in June. Thousands of Muslim pilgrims from all over the country attend these gatherings; at Nabī Rūbīn Christians as well as Muslims assemble. Another shrine of Nabī Sālih near Ramleh also attracts many Muslim pilgrims in the spring.

The building called Nabī Daūd, the reputed tomb of King David, and the shrine of al-Khudr (Elijah) on Mt. Carmel are held in equal veneration by Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The former is specially visited by Muslim women and also by the Yemen Jews annually at their New Year. The annual feast of the latter is attended by members of all these religions. Nabī Sha'ib, the reputed tomb of the father of Jethro, near Hattīn, and Nabī Safa, near Rashiyah, are both held in the highest honour by the Druses.

It is impossible to enumerate more than a small percentage of the hundreds of shrines which are held in reverence. The traditional tomb of Aaron on Mt. Hor, that of Joseph at Nāblus (venerated equally by Muslims, Samaritans, Jews, and Christians), the tombs of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and their wives at Hebron, and the tomb of Rachel on the road to Bethlehem (specially honoured by the Jews) are some of the best known; but there are few notable early OT characters whose memory is not preserved in this way, and some have several sanctuaries.

The saints, however, are by no means limited to Bible characters; some are historical personages whose true history has in many cases been long lost in myth. Thus the tomb of the *imām* 'Alī ibn 'Ala Ṭa'lib, the son-in-law of Muhammad, and that of Bellah ibn Rubāb—both at Jericho—are now supposed by many to be those of Joshua and his servant. A revered shrine is the *maḳām* of Saidna 'Alī ibn 'Alam, north of Jaffa, the tomb of a warrior who bravely defended Arsūf against the Christians in Crusading times.

A number of shrines are dedicated to the 'forty martyrs,' but who these individuals were it is impossible to ascertain. In Hebron a ruin is shown called Deir al-Arba'in, said to be dedicated to the forty witnesses of the transaction whereby Abraham acquired his property in Hebron.[1] At Safed there is a mosque called Jama' al-Arba'in. On Mt. Carmel there is a splendid grove of evergreen oaks known as Shajaret al-Arba'in, 'the trees of the forty,' or, as the Christians say, 'of the forty martyrs.' Under these trees there is a *miḥrāb* and there appear to be traces of an ancient altar. The *fellaḥīn* of the district believe that the spirits of the saints hold an annual festival here, but the date of the anniversary is secret. To take the smallest branch, even of the dead twigs, from this sacred grove is sure to bring disaster upon the aggressor. At Ramleh also the white mosque is dedicated to the Arba' in Ghazāwi, 'forty victors,' and there are several other such places.

Many of the shrines are dedicated to *shaikhs*, *nabīs*, etc., whose names are obviously apocryphal—*e.g.*, the *walī* of Shaikh Nabī Billān, near Nāblus, is certainly so called from *billān*, a common shrub which from its quantity gives its name to the mountain and neighbouring valley. It is common, too, to put Nabī before the name of a village or town when naming the adjoining *maḳām*. Some of the names are very curious. At Ṣafed the most sacred *maḳām*, at which judicial oaths are regularly made, is that of Shaikh Abu Kamīs, lit. 'the old man of the shirt,' a name given to the tomb because it is that of a dervish who was peculiar in having that garment only. On Carmel the Ḳabr al-Majdūbi, 'the tomb of the idiot,' is revered; and farther south we find the 'tomb of the madman.' In Moab there is a Walī Khanzīr, *i.e.* 'the *walī* of the pig,' which by local tradition actually covers the head of a wild boar. Yet it is much respected.[2]

It is by no means necessary that the man buried at the tomb should have lived very long; indeed some *walīs* belong to people who have died within living memory. Nor need he have been in any way a pious follower of religion or morals. The revered tomb of Abu Ghōsh between Jerusalem and Jaffa covers the remains of a cut-throat bandit who plundered the whole district in the middle of last century. Near Ṣafed there is a shrine on the eastern extremity of Jabal Kana'an dedicated to Shaikh Hadīd, a man who was well known to many of the present residents of Ṣafed. When the

[1] Beginning on the Friday before the Greek Good Friday.

[1] The tale is told in J. E. Hanauer, *Folk-lore of the Holy Land*, p. 30 f.

[2] See also the story of 'Ayr in Hanauer, *Tales Told in Palestine*, p. 165 f.

old man died and his body was being carried to burial, the bearers professed that they were dragged by supernatural influence beyond the ordinary cemetery (a common indication of the sanctity of a dead person) and over two miles of rough stony ground until the corpse came to rest at this lone spot overlooking the Jordan Valley. Although so modern a *walī*, the *shaikh's* tomb is much reverenced, as is shown by the following recent incident.

A few years ago some Jews were anxious to buy the part of the mountain on which this shrine stands—a proposal much resented by the more fanatic Muslims. At this juncture one of the *shaikhs* of Ṣafed declared that Shaikh Ḥadīd had appeared to him in a dream and had told him that he was against this proposed transaction and had recorded his wishes on a paper which would be found sticking in a certain part of his tomb. The ignorant people, unsuspicious of any fraud, went to the spot and found there a paper bearing many threats in Arabic of the evils which would fall on the town if its inhabitants allowed so impious a sale. Needless to say, this stopped all further negotiations.

The saints of many of these shrines are little more than names, and nothing is really known of them; yet their influence is great. When the saint is credited with having belonged to one of the four orders[1] of dervishes, the colours of the different orders are frequently tied to some part of the tomb.

Common as are these shrines and sacred groves in Palestine, they are even more plentiful and influential in the Lebanon mountains; and Palgrave and other travellers witness that similar holy places occur in the deserts of Arabia.[2]

5. Christian and Jewish shrines.—Christian and Jewish tombs and shrines have a similar cult. By far the greater proportion of the peasantry of Palestine are Muslims—of various sects—but among the Christian *fellaḥīn* in a similar state of culture practically the same ideas prevail as regards saints and heroes. In many of the towns and villages the Christians have a more intelligent view of their religion, and their customs merge into adoration of the ordinary Christian saints;[3] but, among the more ignorant, considerable numbers pay reverence to exactly the same shrines as the Muslims and follow identical customs. Famous *walīs* are visited by parties of Christians for the payment of vows. One example, among many known instances, must suffice here: there is a ruined *walī* overhung by an old *sidr*-tree on the northern shore of the Lake of Galilee near Tell 'Oraimah called Shaikh 'Alī as-Sayyād which is considered by the neighbouring *bedu* a very powerful *walī*; till quite recently a number of Christians at Ramah used to come annually and sacrifice a sheep and hold a day's feast at this *walī*.

The Christians hold an annual festival at the reputed cave of Elijah at the foot of Mt. Carmel; it is a Muslim shrine, guarded by hereditary Muslim custodians, but it is also held in high repute by Jews and Christians. At the Convent of Elijah on Mt. Carmel an annual feast is held on 20th July, which is attended by thousands of Christians as well as by Muslims, Jews, and Druses. Many sheep are sacrificed on such occasions.

Among the Oriental Jews the cult of sacred tombs and the worship of saints—under the name of rabbis—are very prominent. The sacredness of three of the four 'Holy Cities' of the Jews depends almost entirely upon the tombs in their neighbourhood. Thus Hebron contains the tombs of the Patriarchs; Tiberias is the site of the reputed tombs of Maimonides, Rabbi Meir Baal Nes, and Rabbi 'Aqība. Rabbi Meir is one in whose name an oath is more binding than one by God or any of the Patriarchs; his tomb is credited with wonder-working powers, and every spring a great festival is held there in his honour, to which hundreds of Jewish pilgrims come from all parts of the Orient. The celebration is similar to the older feast held at the tomb of Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai near Ṣafed. Near this town are many tombs to which great virtues are ascribed—*e.g.*, the tomb of Benāt Ya'qūb, belonging to the Muslims, and the tomb of Hoshea ben Be'ari, which are visited in times of drought as spots favourable to prayers for rain. For similar reasons the tomb of Khune Amagdol, near Far'am, a village near Ṣafed, is a place of pilgrimage; this rabbi is said to have slept for seventy years, and, according to the Talmud, he was in his lifetime a successful intercessor for rain. At Merōn, a village to the west of Ṣafed, are the reputed tombs of several great rabbis. Those of Hillel and his disciples and of Rabbi Shammai are shown, but the most important is the tomb of Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, the reputed author of the *Zôhār*. Over this tomb and that of his son, Eleazar, is erected a large synagogue with adjoining courtyard and lodgings somewhat similar in appearance to the buildings at Nabī Mūsa. The whitewashed domes make it conspicuous from afar, and the customs connected with it are quite comparable with those associated with Nabī Mūsa. Here in May—on the 33rd of 'Omar[1] and succeeding day—an extraordinary festival is held which seems to preserve many elements of paganism.

Jews assemble from all parts of the country—indeed, even from distant lands. On the afternoon of the first day the *Tôrāh* is carried in grand procession from Ṣafed. After sunset the place becomes packed with people, who gradually work themselves up into frenzied excitement, dancing wildly in the courtyard, chanting in Hebrew, throwing about lighted matches and fireworks, and eating and drinking. At length, when darkness has fully gathered, a series of bonfires are lit, made of garments saturated in olive oil. For the privilege of lighting the first fire, which is kindled in memory of Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai himself, a heavy price is paid, and until recent years costly garments and jewellery were cast into the blaze. The other fires are kindled successively in honour of Rabbi Eleazar and two other worthies. While the fires are blazing, the Jews, with linked hands, dance frantically round the flames, shouting and singing, while those of a quieter disposition engage in muttered devotions. On this occasion many vows are fulfilled; thus fathers who have made a vow to do so dance for hours, each with a little child of his own perched upon his shoulder; others buy the holy oil for the bonfires before ignition, paying a considerable sum for a small quantity, considering it endowed with supernatural virtues. On the second day of the feast little boys are brought to the neighbouring tomb of Yuḥannan ha-sandalar to have the first beginnings of their side-locks (*peyūt*) trimmed in his honour.

A very similar gathering, though considerably quieter, is held twice a year in the spring at the reputed tomb (wrongly, as a Latin inscription found there proves) of Shaddek Shim'on (Simeon the Just) in the upper part of the Valley of Jehoshaphat, north-east of Jerusalem. On the 50th day after the Passover, and also for some days before the feast of Tabernacles, the Jews pour out of the city to the neighbourhood of this tomb. The majority make little more than a picnic, but the pious burn candles and recite psalms within the cave-tomb itself.[2]

6. Al-Khudr. — Besides the saints with local shrines there are two personages who belong to a category by themselves. The first of these is al-Khudr, 'the green (or ever-living) one,' confused by Muslims and Jews with Elijah or with Phinehas, the son of Aaron (Ex 6^{25}, Nu 25^{7} 31^{6}, Jos 22^{13} etc.), and by Christians with St. George. The shrines of this saint are not tombs, because he did not die; for this reason indeed his influence is looked upon

[1] The distinguishing colours of the four orders are as follows: Sulṭān 'Abd al-Kadir, white; Sayyad 'Abd al-Bedāwi, red; Rafa'i, green and red; Dusuki, white with a red stripe at the edge. The colours of all four orders are found on some tombs.

[2] Opposition to these shrines is one of the great tenets of the Wahhabis of Arabia.

[3] See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Christian).

[1] This is traditionally the day of his death, yet the feast is called 'Hillula' ('wedding') of Simeon ben Yoḥai.

[2] For a fuller account of the Jewish places of pilgrimage in Palestine see *JE*, *s.v.* 'Pilgrimage'; and cf. art. PILGRIMAGE (Hebrew and Jewish).

as peculiarly potent. The village of al-Khudr, between Bethlehem and Hebron, is a small Muslim village in the midst of which is the Convent of St. George, where Muslims and Christians pay their vows and bring their sick friends, lunatics in particular, for healing. When attending the place to pay a vow, the *fellaḥīn* (usually Muslims) are permitted to sacrifice animals in the courtyard of the convent, and they hand over to the priest a share of the meat. The church is full of the offerings of those who have vowed in time of need, and the very chain to which the unfortunate lunatics are fixed is credited with miraculous powers. A somewhat similar institution to this is Mar Jirius on the Nicophorea, near the Jaffa Gate, Jerusalem; and there are three other churches dedicated to this saint in the city. Before pictures of Mar Jirius (St. George) the native Christians make vows and burn incense, and they have many tales of how al-Khudr, or St. George, appeared on a white horse to help one who called upon him in difficulty or danger. Of the many shrines to al-Khudr all over the land the most famous, besides those mentioned, are the Church of St. George at Lydda, where by tradition St. George was buried; the ruined church of Mar Jirius at Ṭaiyibah, north of Jerusalem, about which a curious folk-lore tale is told;[1] the great Convent of Elijah on Mt. Carmel; the above-mentioned cave of Elijah at the foot of Carmel; and the synagogue dedicated to Elijah at Jobar, near Damascus. The last by tradition marks the spot where Elijah anointed Elisha to be a prophet, and at the back of the building is an underground chamber where by tradition Elijah was fed by the ravens. In this chamber, as in the cave at the foot of Carmel, sick folk, especially lunatics, are shut up in order to obtain health and healing.

This identification of Elijah and St. George under the name of al-Khudr is very curious, and it is suggestive, too, that the feast of St. George, held, according to the Arabic calendar, on 26th April, is called 'the feast of the spring,' which makes everything green — al-Khudr from some aspects appears to be a deity of the spring and of vegetation, but his identification with Elijah and St. George is inexplicable.

7. Shaikh ash-Shadhilly.—Another mysterious personage is Shaikh ash-Shadhilly, the supposed inventor of coffee, to whom libations of coffee are made whenever that beverage is drunk in public assembly, and in whose name coffee is sometimes poured out before the feet of a bride as she leaves her parents' home. Oaths are made in his name; he is a true *walī*.

8. The bearing of the cult of saint- and hero-worship upon other Semitic religious customs.—When the essence of the cult of *walī*-worship is examined, it will be found that among the majority of the ignorant the saint is looked upon as the one from whom the favour is actually asked; he is the being who is obeyed and dreaded; vows to him must be kept because his activity is great and his power of vengeance is sure. He is a much more active force, whether as guardian or as persecutor, than a far-off, unchanging God or even a personal devil. It is hardly necessary to say that all this is quite contrary to the orthodox religions, emphatically so as regards Islām; the better-educated religious leaders know and confess this, though they have practically to bow to it.

It is the same contest as has been going on in these lands for millenniums. Josiah fought against these local shrines (2 K $23^{8.\ 13}$) just as any reforming Muslim would have to do to-day. In Arabia the very spots which once were idol-shrines are now *walīs* with very similar cult, and this may be said of many of the more important shrines in Palestine and Syria.

The whole cult merges into many kindred ideas. On the one hand, it is difficult to draw a hard and fast line between this worship at tombs of *walīs* and *shaikhs* and the whole cult of worship of the dead, feasting at tombs, etc.; and, on the other hand, the visits to these shrines are identical with what the orthodox Muslim does when he makes the *ḥajj* to Mecca — which was a pre-Islāmic heathen shrine—or the orthodox Oriental Christian when he makes the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre and other 'holy' places.

Another closely allied subject is the cult of sacred stones, caves, springs, and trees, all looked upon by the *fellaḥīn* as inhabited by some supernatural being and likewise as objects of special reverence and worship. Many of these are quite unconnected with any historical or mythological personage. The people burn incense at these spots and make their vows in the same way as at the tomb. Some such spots are credited with healing virtues; others are believed to be beneficial for sterility. The belief in the incarnation of the deity in certain historical or living personages, which is found in the Druse, Nāṣirīyyah, and Bābite faiths, though closely connected with the present subject, is one which is dealt with elsewhere.[1]

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SAINTS, LATTER-DAY.—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, commonly called Mormons, an American sect, claims to number over 300,000 adherents, whose capital is Salt Lake City, Utah.

I. *DOCTRINES AND ORGANIZATION.*—**1. The creed.**—According to the present official handbook, the religion of the Latter-Day Saints consists of doctrines, commandments, ordinances, and rites revealed from God to the present age. The first principle is faith in God and in Jesus Christ; the next is repentance from all sin; then follows baptism for the remission of sin, as a preparation for the gift of the Holy Ghost, bestowed by the laying on of hands. Obedience to these principles is necessary for membership in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Faith in God is the beginning of religion, and confers spiritual gifts such as healings, miracles, tongues, the interpretation of tongues, discernment, visions, dreams, prophecy, and revelation. Authority to administer in the name of the Deity must of necessity come from God. This involves revelation. There having been no communication with heaven for hundreds of years, the world was without divine authority to administer gospel ordinances until Joseph Smith came. By John the Baptist he was ordained to the lesser or Aaronic priesthood, and by Peter, James, and John to the higher or Melchizedek priesthood, receiving the holy apostleship and the keys of the kingdom with power to seal on earth so that it might be sealed in heaven. The religion of the Latter-Day Saints is progressive. It cannot be defined in a written creed. It is added to by the revelations of God as the capacities of the Saints enlarge and the needs of the Church increase. Every member of the Church is entitled

[1] See Hanauer, *Folk-lore of the Holy Land*, p. 52 ff.

[1] See artt. SECTS (Christian), (Muslim), BĀB, BĀBīs.

to the blessings of divine communion and revelation for his or her own comfort and guidance. Revelations for the whole Church are given only through its President, who is its earthly head and holds the keys of the kingdom. Among the later revelations to the Church are the doctrines of baptism for the dead and of celestial marriage. As there was no authority among men to administer the ordinances of the gospel from the days of the early apostles, or shortly after, to the time of the restoration of the priesthood to Joseph Smith the Prophet, all the baptisms during the intervening period were void. The friends of the dead, however, are permitted to take their names and be baptized in their stead, the ceremony being duly witnessed and recorded on earth and accepted and ratified in heaven. Other ordinances may also be admitted by proxy, the living on behalf of the dead.[1]

In the above declaration three principles are of significance: (*a*) continued revelation and primitive 'gifts,' (*b*) baptism for the dead, and (*c*) 'celestial' marriage or authorized polygamy. Of these principles the first was obviously borrowed from the Restorationists, a local sect, contemporary with the founding of Mormonism. The second was a retro-active application of the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purgatory. The third was more than a logical variation upon the doctrines of other religious bodies.

(*a*) *Continued revelation and primitive 'gifts.'*—The first principle is set forth by the chief Mormon theologian, Parley P. Pratt, as follows:

'Theology is the science of communication, or of correspondence between God, angels, spirits, and men, by means of visions, dreams, interpretations, conversations, inspirations, or the spirit of prophecy and revelation; it is the science by which worlds are organized, sustained and directed and the elements controlled; it is the science of knowledge, and the key and power thereof, by which the heavens are opened, and lawful access is obtained to the treasures of wisdom and intelligence—inexhaustible, infinite, embracing the past, the present, and the future; it is the science of life, endless and eternal, by which the living are changed or translated, and the dead raised; it is the science of faith, reformation, and remission of sins, whereby a fallen race of mortals may be justified, cleansed, and restored to the communion and fellowship of that Holy Spirit which is the light of the world, and of every intelligence therein; it is the science of spiritual gifts by which the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, the sick are healed, and demons are expelled from the human system.'[2]

(*b*) *Baptism for the dead.*—The second principle means that some living believer shall be baptized as proxy for some one of the dead. This doctrine, whereby 'the hearts of the children are turned to the fathers,' is thus expounded by J. E. Talmage:

'The redemption of the dead will be effected in strict accordance with the law of God, which is written in justice and framed in mercy. It is alike impossible for any spirit, in the flesh or disembodied, to obtain even the promise of eternal glory, except on condition of obedience to the laws and ordinances of the gospel. And, as baptism is essential to the salvation of the living, it is likewise indispensable to the redemption of the dead. . . . The necessity of vicarious work is here shown—the living laboring in behalf of the dead; the children doing for their progenitors what is beyond the power of the latter to do for themselves.'[3]

(*c*) *Celestial marriage.*—The practice of 'spiritual wifehood' started early in the Latter-Day Church. The doctrine was an afterthought promulgated in defence of what was plain polygamy. In the last year of the life of Joseph Smith, jr., founder of Mormonism, there came the notorious *Revelation on the Eternity of the Marriage Covenant, including Plurality of Wives. Given through Joseph, the Seer, in Nauvoo, Hancock County, Illinois, July 12th, 1843.* The salient parts of this revelation are as follows:

'Verily, thus saith the Lord unto you, my servant Joseph, that inasmuch as you have inquired of my hand, to know and understand wherein I, the Lord, justified my servants Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; as also Moses, David and Solomon, my servants, as touching the principle and doctrine of their having many wives and concubines:

Behold! and lo, I am the Lord thy God, and will answer thee as touching this matter:

Therefore, prepare thy heart to receive and obey the instructions which I am about to give unto you; for all those who have this law revealed unto them must obey the same;

For behold! I reveal unto you a new and an everlasting covenant; and if ye abide not that covenant, then are ye damned; for no one can reject this covenant, and be permitted to enter into my glory;

For all who will have a blessing at my hands, shall abide the law which was appointed for that blessing, and the conditions thereof, as were instituted from before the foundation of the world:

And as pertaining to the new and everlasting covenant, it was instituted for the fullness of my glory; and he that receiveth a fullness thereof, must and shall abide the law, or he shall be damned, saith the Lord God.

And verily I say unto you, that the conditions of this law are these:—All covenants, contracts, bonds, obligations, oaths, vows, performances, connections, associations, or expectations that are not made, and entered into, and sealed, by the Holy Spirit of promise, of him who is anointed, both as well for time and for all eternity, and that too most holy, by revelation and commandment through the medium of mine anointed, whom I have appointed on the earth to hold this power (and I have appointed unto my servant Joseph to hold this power in the last days, and there is never but one on the earth at a time, on whom this power and the keys of this Priesthood are conferred), are of no efficacy, virtue or force, in and after the resurrection from the dead; for all contracts that are not made unto this end, have an end when men are dead. . . .

As pertaining to the law of the Priesthood: If any man espouse a virgin, and desire to espouse another, and the first give her consent; and if he espouse the second, and they are virgins, and have vowed to no other man, then is he justified; he cannot commit adultery, for they are given unto him; for he cannot commit adultery with that that belongeth unto him and to no one else;

And if he have ten virgins given unto him by this law, he cannot commit adultery, for they belong to him, and they are given unto him, therefore is he justified.'[1]

Although this document was not officially promulgated until 1852, when Smith was dead and his followers were safe in Salt Lake Valley, its authenticity is provable from its similarity in style to the other sacred books of the Mormons. As to this series, there was a kind of gross philosophic basis to the doctrine of 'celestial' marriage. This doctrine is perhaps remotely attributable to the notions of an obscure sect, the German Pietists of Pennsylvania, followers of Tauler and other mediæval mystics. Dwelling in the same State in which the early writings of Joseph Smith were excogitated, they likewise taught a doctrine of the 'spiritual' union of the male and female. It may be paradoxical to assert that Mormonism was made in Germany, yet Conrad Beissel, head of the Ephrata community, initiated in the doctrine of the heavenly *Sophia*, may have been the fount and origin of the esoteric teachings of the Latter-Day Saints. Then, too, Sidney Rigdon, or that 'German peddler' who at one time influenced Smith, may easily have served as the vehicle of transmission for these perverted notions of a cosmic dualism. Be that as it may, precisely what the Prophet himself taught on the 'mysteries of the kingdom' is unknowable, since part of his testimony in Rigdon's trial was declared unprintable. Nevertheless, the system of Mormon metaphysics, justifying plurality of wives, is to be gathered from the writings of the two Pratts.

According to Orson Pratt, called 'the Gauge of Philosophy,' 'celestial marriage opens the way for all women who wish to marry to fill the measure of their creation. . . . It shows how the innumerable creations of God (*i.e.* this world and other planets) may be peopled with intelligences. . . . Woman without man and man without woman cannot be saved. The larger a progeny a man has, the greater will be the fullness of his eternal glory.'[2]

Such was the first promulgation and vindication of the doctrine of 'spiritual wifehood' in the early

[1] Cf. *The Book of Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Latter-Day Saints*, Kirtland, Ohio, 1833, sect. 20.
[2] *Key to the Science of Theology*, Liverpool, 1855, p. 15 f.
[3] *Articles of Faith*, Salt Lake City, 1899, p. 152.

[1] *Doctrine and Covenants*, sect. 132.
[2] *Treatise on the Regeneration and Eternal Duration of Matter*, 1840.

days of the Church. The present official handbook contains this account of the matter:

'Celestial marriage is marriage unto all eternity. According to the revelation on this subject all the marriages entered into without divine authority are dissolved by death. Celestial marriage is entered into by those who have obeyed the gospel and become the sons and daughters of God by adoption. The woman is given to the man and they become one flesh. That which is thus sealed on earth is sealed in heaven, and is as valid as though performed in person by the Deity. If a wife thus sealed to her husband should precede him in death, it would be his privilege to wed another. The second wife, or third, if the second should die, would be sealed to him in the same manner as the first. They would all be his equally. In the resurrection he would have three wives, with their children, belonging to him in the everlasting covenant. The revelation on celestial marriage declares that if given to man in the everlasting covenant in the way appointed to God, he is not under condemnation, but is justified in receiving more wives than one. They are sealed to him and become his, and he cannot commit adultery with them because they are his and his alone. None of them are concubines or mistresses, or mere ministers of lust. Celestial marriage in its fullness is ordained of God. It is an establishment of religion. It is ecclesiastical in its nature and government. It is, therefore, outside the domain of constitutional law. Being within the pale of the Church, its free exercise cannot of right be prohibited.'

2. Organization.—The Mormon hierarchy is complicated. Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery were the first two elders and apostles in the Church. Smith, who bore the title of 'Prophet, Seer, and Revelator,' stood at the head of the Melchizedek priesthood, of which three presiding high-priests, chosen by the body, form a quorum of the Presidency of the Church. The President of the Church and his two counsellors form the First Presidency, and the three together represent the Trinity. The Twelve Apostles form a quorum equal in authority and power to the three Presidents previously mentioned. The Twelve are a travelling presiding High Council, under the direction of the Presidency of the Church, to build up the Church and regulate its affairs in all nations. The Seventies are also called to preach the gospel and form a quorum equal in authority to that of the Twelve. The Seventy Elders have seven presidents to preside over them, chosen out of the number of the Seventy. In addition to these the officers of the Melchizedek priesthood are high-priests and elders. The officers of the Aaronic or lesser priesthood are priests, teachers, and deacons. There are twenty-one 'Stakes of Zion' in Utah. Over each stake there is a presidency consisting of a president and two counsellors, who are high-priests. This presidency bears the same relation to the stake that the First Presidency bears to the whole Church. A high council in each stake, consisting of twelve members, who are also high-priests, acts for the stake as the travelling presiding High Council acts for the Church in all the world. It is the province of the high-priests to preside, while the special calling of the Seventy is to travel and preach the gospel and build up the Church.

The Mormon system of proselytizing is simple. Twice each year, at the annual and semi-annual conferences held in Salt Lake City, a number of the faithful elders of the Church are selected by the authorities and 'called' by the assembled Saints to visit the home or the foreign field. They travel at their own charges. Each mission is presided over by some elder selected by the general authorities of the Church, and the minor divisions of branches and conferences have their proper officers. The Utah missionaries remain in their fields of labour from two to four years and until released by competent authority to return home. Mormon missionaries have gone to Canada, Mexico, the Antilles, Brazil, Peru, Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, S. Africa, India, the East Indies, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Society Islands, and the Hawaiian Islands. The Church has an organization known as the Perpetual Emigration Fund Company, which makes advances of money to assist the faithful to Utah and adjoining districts.

II. *HISTORY.*—**1. The founder of Mormonism.**—The growth of the Church of Latter-Day Saints in both beliefs and structure is most clearly portrayed in the history of its founder.

Joseph Smith was born at Sharon, Windsor County, Vermont, in Dec. 1805. There are three views concerning his personality—the orthodox, the popular, and the critical. The first makes him 'God's vicegerent, a prophet of Jehovah, a seer and a martyr: Every Mormon, if true to his faith, believed as freely in his holy character as they did that God existed.'[1] The second view makes him a visionary, a fanatic, an impostor, and a libertine. The third view is a compromise; taking both the accounts of early Church narrators and the contemporary adverse descriptions, it attempts to explain the conviction of his followers that their leader was the medium of supernatural communication, and the belief of his neighbours and contemporaries that his character was marked by abnormal peculiarities. The naturalistic explanation further depends upon a study of heredity and environment. According to suppressed sources, particularly the *Biographical Sketches* of the Prophet's mother, his paternal grandfather, Asael Smith, was a man of distorted views on religion, while his maternal grandfather, Solomon Mack, an infirm beggar, was highly credulous, believing, like Joseph's mother, in cures by faith and in dreams as warnings from heaven. The career of the father, Joseph Smith, was that of a wanderer; failing as a farmer, a store-keeper, and a root-digger in Vermont and New Hampshire, he assumed a land claim in Ontario County, New York, in 1815. Like his son, he believed in witchcraft and demon-possession. In his autobiography Smith declared that these were the reports of evil-disposed and designing persons. At the least they disclose three traits inherited by the youthful seer—his illiteracy, his restlessness, and his credulity. Furthermore, the ancestral characteristics may be interpreted from a pathological standpoint, for there was much to be transmitted in the way of erratic tendencies. On the maternal side Joseph's grandfather was subject to 'falling fits,' consequent upon a severe wound to his head. This was received about a year before the birth of the Prophet's mother, Lucy Mack, who was in turn liable to mental hallucinations, such as hearing supernal voices and seeing luminous faces. On the paternal side Joseph's grandfather, Asael, nicknamed, for a bodily deformity, 'Crook-necked Smith,' is spoken of,[2] at the age of eighty-six, as 'just recovering from a severe fit,' and of a 'weak mind.' Granting that these were merely the symptoms of senility and not transmissible qualities, Asael's son was nevertheless the victim of decided neural instability, being at times 'much excited upon the subject of religion.'[3] If to this aberrant history of his progenitors be added the fact that 'fits' have reappeared in the fifth generation, some grave neuropathic disturbance, such as epilepsy, is to be surmised as the most likely cause of the Prophet's abnormalities. In particular, his phantasms may be considered as the epileptic reduplications not only of the 'lights' seen by his 'imagining but agitated' maternal grandfather, but also of the 'visions' of his own father, the last of which was 'received' in 1819. His own peculiar psychic experiences the Latter-Day seer was wont to liken to those of St. Paul; they may be more appropriately compared to those of Muhammad, whose

[1] *Times and Seasons*, v. 856.
[2] Lucy Smith, *Biographical Sketches*, p. 154 f.
[3] *Times and Seasons*, v. 173.

career as prophet-statesman is to be similarly interpreted by means of the formulæ of modern psychology.[1]

The 'conversion' of Joseph Smith took place near Palmyra, New York, in 1820—in a region infested by fanatic sects and at a period marked by excessive revivalism. Of this affair Smith in his maturity gave the following account:

'Some time in the second year after our removal to Manchester, there was in the place where we lived an unusual excitement on the subject of religion. . . . I was at this time in my fifteenth year. . . . During this time of great excitement, my mind was called up to serious reflection and great uneasiness; but though my feelings were deep and often pungent, still I kept myself aloof from all those parties, though I attended their several meetings as often as occasion would permit. . . .

It was on the morning of a beautiful clear day, early in the spring of eighteen hundred and twenty. It was the first time in my life that I had made such an attempt, for amidst all my anxieties I had never as yet made the attempt to pray vocally.

After I had retired into the place where I had previously designed to go, having looked around me and finding myself alone, I kneeled down and began to offer up the desires of my heart to God. I had scarcely done so, when immediately I was seized upon by some power which entirely overcame me, and had such astonishing influence over me as to bind my tongue so that I could not speak. Thick darkness gathered around me, and it seemed to me for a time as if I were doomed to sudden destruction. But, exerting all my powers to call upon God to deliver me out of the power of this enemy which had seized upon me, and at the very moment when I was ready to sink into despair and abandon myself to destruction, not to an imaginary ruin, but to the power of some actual being from the unseen world, who had such a marvellous power as I had never before felt in any being, just at this moment of great alarm, I saw a pillar of light exactly over my head, above the brightness of the Sun, which descended gradually until it fell upon me. It no sooner appeared than I found myself delivered from the enemy which held me bound. When the light rested upon me, I saw two personages whose brightness and glory defy all description, standing above me in the air. One of them spake unto me. . . . When I came to myself again I found myself lying on my back, looking up into heaven.'[2]

The second of the 'visions of Joseph' took place on 21st Sept. 1823, when the heavenly messenger disclosed the hiding-place of the gold plates upon which the *Book of Mormon* was asserted to be engraved. There was a series of seven visions in all, extending over as many years, and variously characterized by epileptic symptoms, such as dazzling colour sensations, dizziness, coma, vacuity, and bodily bruises. This explanation of the 'visits of the angels' to their leader is, of course, repudiated by the orthodox Saints, as is the report that the Prophet's wife asserted that she never believed in what her husband called his apparitions or revelations, as she thought him labouring under a diseased mind. Nevertheless, psychological method goes far to explain not only Smith's visions but his more pretentious activities in 'translating' the *Book of Mormon*. Connected with his abnormal trances is the so-called 'transcription of the gold plates.' Having dug for fabled treasures among Indian mounds on the western frontier, Joseph Smith found a 'peek-stone,' which became the later 'Urim and Thummim' whereby 'Joseph the Seer translated the reformed Egyptian of the plates of Nephi.' Recent inspection of the original 'transcription,' with its crude superscription 'Caractors,' and its partial back-handed autographs, shows it to be nothing but the automatic scrawl of the self-hypnotized crystal-gazer. And Smith's peculiar method of giving 'revelations' bears out this hypothesis of a subconscious activity. Hidden behind a blanket and throwing himself into a condition of reverie by gazing into his 'interpreters,' he dictated to his scribes communications of supposedly supernatural origin. Of these writings the first was the *Book of Mormon*, begun in Sept. 1827, at Manchester, New York, continued at Harmony, Pennsylvania, and finished at Fayette, New York, in June 1829. The original MS has disappeared; there remains only a duplicate made by Smith's principal scribe, the schoolmaster Oliver Cowdery. This Cowdery copy is of value as containing the author's preface with its original erasures and its misspellings, solecisms, and improprieties. The first edition also presents this illuminating title page:

'The *Book of Mormon*, an Account written by the Hand of Mormon, upon plates taken from the plates of Nephi. Wherefore it is an abridgment of the record of the people of Nephi; and also of the Lamanites, who are a remnant of the House of Israel; and also to Jew and Gentile; written by way of commandment, and also by the spirit of Prophecy and of Revelation. Written, and sealed up, and hid up unto the Lord, that they might not be destroyed; to come forth by the gift and power of God unto the interpretation thereof; sealed by the hand of Moroni, and hid up unto the Lord, to come forth in due time by the way of Gentile; the interpretation thereof by the gift of God. An abridgment taken from the Book of Ether. Also, which is a Record of the people of Jared; which were scattered at the time the Lord confounded the language of the people when they were building a tower to get to Heaven; which is to shew unto the remnant of the House of Israel how great things the Lord hath done for their fathers; and that they may know the covenants of the Lord, that they are not cast off forever; and also to the convincing of the Jew and Gentile that Jesus is the Christ, the Eternal God, manifesting Himself unto all nations. And now if there be fault, it be the mistake of men; wherefore condemn not the things of God, that ye may be found spotless at the judgment-seat of Christ. By Joseph Smith, junior, Author and Proprietor, Palmyra, printed by E. B. Grandin, for the author, 1830.'

The fifteen books of this 'Sacred History of Ancient America from the Earliest Ages after the Flood to the Beginning of the Fifth Century of the Christian Era' Smith himself thus summarized:

'We are informed by these records that America, in ancient times, has been inhabited by two distinct races of people. The first were called Jaredites, and came directly from the Tower of Babel. The second race came directly from the city of Jerusalem, about six hundred years before Christ. They were principally Israelites, of the descendants of Joseph. The Jaredites were destroyed, about the time that the Israelites came from Jerusalem, who succeeded them in the inhabitance of the country. The principal nation of the second race fell in battle towards the close of the fourth century. The remnant are the *Indians*, who now inhabit this country. This book also tells us that our Saviour made His appearance upon this continent after His resurrection; that He planted the gospel here in all its fulness and richness, and power, and blessing; that they had apostles, prophets, pastors, teachers, evangelists; the same order, the same priesthood, the same ordinances, gifts, powers, and blessing, as was enjoyed on the Eastern continent; that the people were cut off in consequence of their transgressions; that the last of their prophets who existed among them was commanded to write an abridgment of their prophecies, history, etc., and to hide it up in the earth, and that it should come forth and be united with the Bible, for the accomplishment of the purposes of God in the last days.'[1]

As a product of abnormal mentality, this 'account of the aborigines of America' has been recently described as made up of fantastic explorations of the imagination, assumptions of narrative, incidents, and style apparently foreign to the subject's normal intelligence, the invention of fictitious names, persons, places, and things—incidents and details which may be traced to the authentic experiences of the subject, but experiences which may have been subconsciously realized, and are certainly recorded while in an abnormal state of dissociation.[2] Here again is furnished a mediating position between the orthodox view, which holds the *Book of Mormon* to be the authentic Word of God, vouchsafed through verbal inspiration, and the hostile view, which considers it a rank imposture—a blending of petty information, gross anachronisms, and the muddled superstitions of the rural mind. Rather does the critical view hold that the work contains some details of historic interest, since there appear in it, in Scriptural paraphrase, references to the agitations of the day against Romanism, Deism, and Freemasonry, besides references to Swedenborgianism with its three heavens, and to the 'Washingtonian' movement for total abstinence. The current theory that the Indians were the lost ten tribes of Israel

[1] D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, New York and London, 1905, p. vii f.
[2] *Pearl of Great Price*, p. 84 ff.

[1] Smith's art. 'Mormonism,' in I. D. Rupp, *He Pasa Ekklesia: An Original Hist. of the Religious Denominations of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1844, p. 4.
[2] J. Jastrow, in the *Psychological Review*, Jan. 1903, p. 70.

is also embodied. But, while the Nephites in their actions were the modern Redmen in disguise, in their mental habits they more closely resembled the local sectarians. Thus the speech of Nephi contains quotations from the *Westminster Confession of Faith*, and the speech of Lehi the heretical tenets charged against the Presbytery of Geneva, New York, in whose bounds Joseph himself lived. The book is also interspersed with the catch-words of the Methodist camp-meeting exhorter, its last section, in fact, being a palpable imitation of a Methodist book of discipline.

Such higher criticism of the most sacred book of the Latter-Day Saints is apparently unacceptable to their apologists; yet it might be of service to them, since it goes far to render untenable the chief contention against the authenticity of the work. This is, in a word, that the ideas in the book were not within the mental horizon of a youth who described himself as 'a rough stone, desiring the learning of heaven alone.'[1] But this ignores the more popular sources of information open to Smith. His Calvinism need not have been derived even from the *New England Primer*, nor his arguments on Deism from Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason*, since the backwoods pulpit and tavern gossip supplied the notions in question. Hence, if the internal evidence makes the *Book of Mormon* indigenous, the external evidence is equally against the supposition of a foreign authorship as presented in the ordinary Spaulding-Rigdon theory. This is, briefly, that a romance of pre-historic America, written in Ohio in 1812 by a Congregational minister, Solomon Spaulding, was the 'source, root, and inspiration' by which Smith's associate, Sidney Rigdon, concocted the scheme of a Golden Bible. The recovery in 1885 of the purported original of Spaulding's 'Manuscript Story' has been to the Saints conclusive proof of its non-connexion with the *Book of Mormon*, for there is no real resemblance between the two. The theory is further invalidated by the fact that it is impossible to show how, when, or through whom Smith could have obtained one of the two copies of the Spaulding MS.

The founder of Mormonism entered upon the second phase in his career, that of 'Prophet, Seer, and Revelator,' with the publication of the next instrument in the Mormon canon, the *Book of Commandments*. This, like its enlargement, the *Book of Doctrine and Covenants*, contains 'revelations to Joseph Smith, Junior, for the building up of the kingdom of God in the last days.' These oracular utterances range from an interpretation of the Ancient of Days to predictions of the Second Advent. Their reception as authentic vaticinations among Smith's first adherents is to be explained by the credulity of his audience and the religious primitiveness of the times. The local relish for the predictive and oracular is manifest by the success of other founders of occult sects in those parts. Jemima Wilkinson prophesied at Crooked Lake; at Rochester William Miller predicted the end of the world; and the Fox sisters started spiritualism only ten miles from Smith's home. Moreover, the return of apostolic gifts was hoped for by the local Quakers, Primitive Baptists, and Restorationists. Upon this prepared soil the Latter-Day Prophet now assumed the additional rôle of exorcist.

When Newel Knight, an early convert, was 'attacked by the power of Satan, and after he had thus suffered for a time,' narrates Smith,[2] 'I succeeded in getting hold of him by the hand, when almost immediately he spoke to me, and with very great earnestness required of me that I should cast the devil out of him. . . . I rebuked the devil and commanded him in the name of Jesus Christ to depart from him.' And so 'at the first conference of the Church,' continues Knight,[1] 'many prophesied, others had the heavens opened to their view, which tended to confirm our faith in Joseph Smith being the instrument in the hands of God, to restore the priesthood again to man on earth, and to set up the Kingdom of God.'

As in the case of the 'Three Witnesses' to the *Book of Mormon*, Smith here appears to have exerted a partially hypnotic influence over his followers. As by mental suggestion he had induced a veritable hallucination in which his closest disciples thought they saw the 'gold plates,' so now he exerted this influence upon a wider circle of adherents, and induced in them an absolute confidence in his powers as exorcist and faith-healer. In these new activities it has been claimed that the Mormon leader achieved his successes by borrowing the principles and methods of kindred pseudo-scientific cults which swept over the country. But it was too early in the century for him to be acquainted either with the French animal magnetism or with its American variety, the so-called electro-biology.

Hence it is more logical to suppose that his knowledge of hypnotic possibilities was inadvertently discovered, and that his attempts to bring about ecstatic trances, speaking with tongues, and healing by prayer were connected with belief in the restoration of apostolic gifts, such as was promulgated by the two Campbells in Scotland and in America. But, although the practice of hypnotic suggestion was empirical, it was none the less successful. It is true that during the revival meetings of the Mormons in Ohio the trances and prostrations led to uncontrollable spasms and convulsions, yet subsequently the Prophet brought about some actual cures. While Smith, with his accustomed opportunism, attributed his failures to the creeping in of false spirits, and his successes to the restoration of the priesthood again to man on earth, both are rather to be attributed to the unstable neurotic condition of the young body of believers. On the one hand, the people looked on the Kirtland frenzy as a 'sign,' and were loath to abandon such strange 'handling by the spirits'; on the other hand, their mental suggestibility was highly conducive to 'divine' healing and to 'miraculous' cures. And so the casting out of devils led to the casting out of diseases. As in the case of the Irvingites and of the Oneida Community of Perfectionists, veritable therapeutic results were obtained in the sphere of non-organic troubles. Laying on of hands did not cure cholera, nor prayer brain-fever, but psychic suggestion alleviated a case of rheumatism, and a sort of collective hypnosis toned up the systems of the fever-ridden Saints on the banks of the Mississippi.

That Joseph Smith in all his activities as 'Prophet, Seer, and Revelator,' occultist, exorcist, and faith-healer, was the real master of Mormondom is borne out by a number of accounts of him in the height of his power. The view that, along with his impressive manner in making the healing suggestion, there was 'an expression peculiar to himself, which the eye was never weary of beholding,'[2] is obviously due to the false perspective of emotional excitement. Yet the descriptions of non-Mormon eye-witnesses imply that there was something remarkably forceful in the man. One of these described him as maintaining a grave demeanour;[3] another as of indomitable perseverance, strange and striking views, and great influence over enemies and followers alike;[4] a third as a man of commanding appearance leaving an

[1] G. Q. Cannon, *Life of Joseph Smith the Prophet*, Salt Lake City, 1888, p. 496.
[2] Newel Knight, *Journal*, Salt Lake City, 1883, p. 50.

[1] Newel Knight, *Journal*, p. 52 f.
[2] P. P. Pratt, *Autobiography*, Chicago, 1888, p. 47.
[3] J. S. Buckingham, *The Eastern and Western States of America*, London, 1841, iii. 193.
[4] P. H. Burnett, *Recollections and Opinions of an old Pioneer* New York, 1880, p. 66.

impression of rugged power. To the last portrait, however, its author, Josiah Quincy, added the qualification that, while Smith gave the impression of kingly power, his talk was garnished with forcible vulgarisms; and, while he had a statesman-like prevision in advocating the buying of slaves, eleven years before Emerson advocated that scheme, yet with it all he betrayed unexampled absurdities in showing off his museum containing Egyptian mummies and the autograph of Moses.

'The man mingled Utopian fallacies with his shrewd suggestions. He talked as from a strong mind utterly unenlightened by the teachings of history.'[1]

While the success of Mormonism is chiefly attributable to the personality of its founder, there was another leader among the Latter-Day Saints who had much to do in shaping both the character of the movement and the character of the man. In striking contrast to Joseph Smith, the illiterate son of an ignorant father, was Sidney Rigdon, an ex-Baptist preacher, who was in actuality something of a Biblical scholar and in reputation held to be learned in history and literature. In comparing the two men, a friend of both said that Rigdon did not possess the native intellect of Smith and lacked his determined will.[2] But we may add that what Rigdon lacked in strength of character he made up in breadth of ideas. For one thing, he was acquainted with some of the socialistic notions of that day. While an adherent of Alexander Campbell, who had attacked Robert Owen in a notorious debate in Cincinnati, Rigdon had indirectly obtained from the father of English socialism those communistic notions which he utilized in his branch of the Disciples' Church in Ohio. This collectivist community, made up of a score of families, Smith took over upon his arrival at Kirtland. But, in thus borrowing through Rigdon what were remotely the ideas of Fourier, Smith, of course, gave credit neither to their foreign originator nor to their native intermediary. In a characteristic passage he said that, because Rigdon's church at Kirtland 'had all things in common, the idea arose that this was the case with the Church of Jesus Christ.' He added that the plan of 'common stock' which had existed in what was called 'the family . . . was readily abandoned for the more perfect law of the Lord.' To this explanation was added a special revelation of Feb. 1831:

'Behold, thou shalt consecrate all thy properties which thou hast to impart unto me with a covenant and a deed which cannot be broken . . . And it shall come to pass, that the bishop of my church, after that he has received the properties of my church, that it cannot be taken from the church, he shall appoint every man a steward over his own property, or that which he has received, inasmuch as is sufficient for himself and family; and the residue shall be kept to administer to him who has not, that every man may receive accordingly as he stands in need: and the residue shall be kept in my storehouse, to administer to the poor and needy, as shall be appointed by the elders of the church and the bishop; and for the purpose of purchasing lands, and the building up of the New Jerusalem, which is hereafter to be revealed.'[3]

With the advent of Rigdon, Smith's activities took a turn more comprehensible but less successful than were his occult performances. The eloquent ex-Campbellite minister was at first received as a messenger 'sent to prepare the way'; in a dozen years he was thrown off by the prophet as 'a millstone on his back.' Smith had hitherto confined himself to vague predictions of a good time coming. But, when definite financial schemes were added to millennial promises, the bubble burst. The story of the Smith-Rigdon business enterprises is a story of continued misfortune. It includes the failure of a general store at Hiram, of the paper City of Zion at Kirtland, of the church sawmill, of the church tannery, and of a $40,000 temple, upon which was left a debt of nearly half its value. But before the crash in the Kirtland Safety Society Anti-Banking Company, for the altering of whose notes Secretary Rigdon and Treasurer Smith were forced to flee to Missouri, the Prophet had put a typical religious veneer upon his utopian projects. In 1833 he 'dedicated to the Lord' the printing-office of the *Latter-Day Saints' Messenger and Advocate*. In 1834 he organized the First High Council of the Church of Christ, with himself, Rigdon, and Williams as the first Presidency. In 1835 he chose the Twelve Apostles, among whom were Brigham Young, 'the Lion of the Lord,' Parley Pratt, 'the Archer of Paradise,' and Lyman Wight, 'the Wild Ram of the Mountains.' In 1836 Smith instituted the several quorums, or executive bodies of the Church—first the Presidency, then the Twelve, and the Seventy, also the counsellors of Kirtland and Zion. In 1837 he set apart apostles Kimball and Hyde to go on a mission to Great Britain, the first foreign mission of the Church. This mission appealed strongly to English weaver, Welsh farmer, and Scotch miner, by holding out the promise to each convert of owning his own farm in the land of Missouri, where 'the Lord had been raining down manna in profusion.'

While the outward success of Mormonism abroad is not to be attributed so much to the imaginative Smith as to practical emissaries like Brigham Young, the internal dissensions at home are to be laid at the former's door. In 1832, as a prophet of woe urging the Saints to sell all that they had and flee from the wrath to come, Smith brought the mob upon himself and Rigdon, and the two were tarred and feathered by 'a banditti of blacklegs, religious bigots, and cut-throats.' In the great apostasy of 1836 the Church lost some of its pillars. The Three Witnesses to the *Book of Mormon* were soon cut off. In the bull of excommunication David Whitmer, the anti-polygamist, was compared to Balaam's ass; Martin Harris was called a negro with a white skin; while 'all the dissenters,' said the Prophet, 'are so far beneath my contempt, that to notice any of them would be too great a sacrifice for a gentleman to make.'[1] Again, when the town of Independence, Missouri, was declared the new City of Zion, the converts poured in from the Middle Atlantic States and Canada with such rapidity that the non-Mormons were somewhat alarmed. And the ill-advised printing of the *Book of Commandments*, with its revelations to the Saints calling Missouri 'the land of your inheritance, which is now the land of your enemies,' led to acts of hostility from the citizens of Jackson County. The burning of barns and the shooting into Mormon houses at night were followed by demands for the removal of the Mormons from the county within a reasonable time, and for the prohibition of future Mormon settlement therein.

The history of the events which led up to the 'martyrdom'[2] of Joseph Smith is a tangled tale in which both sides are implicated. Border ruffians were doubtless responsible for the speedy destruction of the Church printing-office, and for the tarring and feathering of Bishop Partridge, yet the Saints themselves were not without fault. Their agreement to depart within eight months was written, as they alleged, 'supposing that before the time arrived the mob would see their error and stop the violence.' Such reasoning may justly be ascribed to the Mormon leader's mental duplicity, which led to further untoward results. While, until 1838, the town of Far West was materially prosperous and on good terms with

[1] Josiah Quincy, *Figures of the Past*, Boston, 1883, pp. 376–379.
[2] Burnett, p. 67.
[3] *Book of Commandments*, ch. 44.

[1] *Elders' Journal*, July 1837.
[2] Cf. L. O. Littlefield, *The Martyrs: Joseph and Hyrum Smith*, Salt Lake City, 1882, chs. vi.–viii.

its neighbours, upon the Prophet's arrival there arose dissensions within and without. The Presidency was deposed on a charge of misappropriating trust funds, and Oliver Cowdery was expelled for counterfeiting. With the later defection of the Twelve, and of Orson Hyde, one of the original apostles, there came the establishing of an organization named the Danite Band, and known popularly as 'the Avenging Angels.' Bound to secrecy by blood oaths, obeying every behest of the Church against property and life, this Western variety of Thugs owed its origin to Smith's revelation of 6th Aug. 1833:

'Thine enemy is in thine hands, and if thou reward him according to his works thou art justified; if he has sought thy life, and thy life is endangered by him, thine enemy is in thine hands and thou art justified.'

For the agitations of those days Smith was not entirely responsible. While it was upon his suggestion that the organization of the 'Fur Company' let loose foraging bands over the country, yet the beginning of civil strife in Missouri dates from Rigdon's 'salt sermon,' a Fourth of July oration of 1838, in which there was officially predicted a war of extermination between Saints and Gentiles. Then followed the killing of the Danite leader, 'Fear Not' Patten, the defeat of the Missouri Captain Bogart, and the retaliation upon the Mormons in the infamous Hawn's Mill massacre. On 27th Oct. the governor issued orders that the Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the State, and there ensued a determined campaign against them. The final terms of surrender, offered at Far West by General Lucas, included the payment of debts and the expulsion from the State of all the Latter-Day Saints except the leaders, who were subject to prosecution. In the trial of Joseph and Hyrum Smith, Rigdon, and others, at Liberty, testimony was given that the members of the Danite Band considered themselves as much bound to obey the heads of the Church as to obey God, and that Smith advised his followers to spoil the Gentiles. Smith was confined in Liberty gaol until April 1839, but in vain.

The Mormon leader now employed politics to alleviate persecution, but with what proved to be fatal results. Mass meetings were called in the Eastern cities to express sympathy with the Mormons as oppressed by the enemies of the freedom of religious opinion. Moreover, through the promise of obtaining the votes of the Saints, the Illinois legislature granted charters for the new Mormon capital, the city of Nauvoo, and for the Nauvoo Legion, a militia organization which the Prophet held up as an instrument to 'warn the lawless not to be precipitate in any interference in our affairs.'[1] As the military head of a theocratic Church, 'General' Smith's high ambitions now seem to have turned his head. Confounding State and Church, and relying upon the implicit devotion of his followers, he not only defied the local authorities, but made preposterous claims upon the Federal Government. Indicted as the instigator of the plot to assassinate Governor Boggs of Missouri, whom he had called 'knave, butcher, and murderer,' he was released by his own municipal court. Inflated by his power in controlling the votes of the faithful, and exasperated both by the civil suits against himself and by the property losses sustained by his adherents, he called on President Van Buren, with a claim on the public treasury amounting to $1,383,044. 55½. Having failed to obtain redress from Congress, Smith penned a letter of inquiry to the opposition, and asked the Whig candidate: 'What will be your rule of action relative to us as a people, should fortune favor your ascension to the chief magistracy?' Henry Clay's answer being non-committal, Smith called him a black-leg, and became a candidate for the Presidency himself.

[1] Cf. *Revised Laws of the Nauvoo Legion*, Nauvoo, 1844.

The irritating effects of the Prophet's public activities were now increased by the discovery of his equally illicit private practices. That he was in some degree involved in polygamy is probable from a variety of evidence. The introduction of spiritual wifeism was indeed fathered upon the older men like Rigdon, Hurlbut, and Bennett, yet as early as 1833 the Prophet began to 'unfold the mysteries of the kingdom,' and within a decade the Saints in the city of Nauvoo expressed the wish to have the privilege of enjoying their 'peculiarities' unmolested. Besides various revelations concerning this and that 'handmaid,' and concerning care in guarding against 'evils which may arise from accounts given of women,' outward proof of the teaching of the plurality of wives is found in the supersession of the monogamous *Book of Commandments* by the polygamous *Book of Doctrine and Covenants*, and of its practice in such virulent persecutions as caused the expulsion of 15,000 Saints from Missouri.

Discussion now arose within the Mormon community itself. Three of the more intelligent men —R. D. Foster and William and Wilson Law— published a journal called the *Expositor*. This advocated 'disobedience to political revelations' and sought to 'explode the vicious principles of Joseph Smith.' Of this journal there was but one number. This condemned not only the plurality of wives but also the Church appropriation of property without accounting and the preaching of the doctrine of plural gods. Smith's order for the destruction of the *Expositor* press under the plea of martial law increased the excitement among non-Mormons to such an extent that on 22nd June the Prophet and a small number of followers started to flee to the Rocky Mountains. Governor Ford now promised to protect Smith, and the latter surrendered himself to the authorities. Charged with treason in levying war against the State, Smith and his brother Hyrum were shut up in Carthage gaol. Through the governor's bad judgment in appointing as guard the Carthage Grays, who were the confessed enemies of the Smiths, and through evident collusion with a band of disguised assailants, the Prophet and his brother were assassinated on 27th June 1844.

2. The Schismatics and Brigham Young.— The rival claimants to the prophetic successorship were J. J. Strang, Smith's own son, and Brigham Young. The 'Strangites' disappeared when their leader was killed in 1856 because of his practice of polygamy. The 'Young Josephites,' however, founded in 1852 the Re-organized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, which still exists under the presidency of Joseph Smith, 3rd. It claims to be the continuation of the original Church of Latter-Day Saints, and has been recognized as such by the courts. It maintains that the doctrines of plurality and community of wives are heresies. The headquarters of the Church is at Lamoni, Iowa. It has a publishing-house, and issues two weekly papers (*Zion's Hope*, for Sunday schools, and the *Saints' Herald*, a general religious weekly and the official organ), a monthly magazine (*Autumn Leaves*) for young people, and books and tracts. It maintains Graceland College and a home for the aged poor. There is another establishment at Independence, Mo., with a printing-press, whence are issued *Zion's Ensign*, a weekly paper, books, and tracts. The Church has about 45,000 members.

Of the three claimants Brigham Young was the logical successor of the Prophet. He had joined

the Latter-Day Saints in 1832, had been sent as missionary to tour Canada, had returned to Ohio with a band of adherents, and in 1834 went with the 'Army of Zion' to Missouri as one of the 'Captains of Tens.' Appointed one of the original quorum of Twelve, Young helped Smith to flee to Missouri in 1838. For these services Young was left President of the Twelve upon Smith's assassination.

3. The Mormon Hegira. — Smith's brutal murder did not soften the hearts of the enemies of the Mormons. In 1845 they repealed the Nauvoo charter, and Young made plans to go far west. A small group of Saints was sent ahead to spy out good locations in California and Oregon. Through an accidental meeting with some trappers, the Great Salt Lake Valley was chosen as a final resting-place. Then began the remarkable flight of the Mormon tribe. Under Young's leadership their organization was most effective. This was given in the form of a revelation:

'The Word and Will of the Lord, given through President Brigham Young, at the Winter Quarters of the Camp of Israel, Omaha Nation, West Bank of Missouri River, near Council Bluffs, January 14, 1847.

The word and will of the Lord concerning the Camp of Israel in their journeyings to the West; let all the people of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and those who journey with them, be organized into companies, with a covenant and promise to keep all the commandments and statutes of the Lord our God; let the companies be organized with captains of hundreds, captains of fifties, and captains of tens, with a president and his two counselors at their head, under the direction of the Twelve Apostles; and this shall be our covenant, that we will walk in all the ordinances of the Lord; let each company provide themselves with all the teams, wagons, provisions, clothing, and other necessaries for the journey that they can; when the companies are organized, let them go to with their might, to prepare for those who are to tarry; let each company with their captains and presidents decide how many can go next spring; then choose out a sufficient number of able-bodied and expert men, to take teams, seeds, and farming utensils, to go as pioneers to prepare for putting in spring crops; let each company bear an equal proportion, according to the dividend of their property, in taking the poor, the widows, the fatherless, and the families of those who have gone into the army, that the cries of the widow and the fatherless come not up into the ears of the Lord against this people; let each company prepare houses; and fields for raising grain, for those who are to remain behind this season, and this is the will of the Lord concerning his people; let every man use all his influence and property to remove this people to the place where the Lord shall locate a Stake of Zion.'[1]

The versatility of the American pioneer was displayed in the establishment of way-stations, with various repair-shops and with a flour-mill built by Young himself. The largest company, which started from Elk Horn River on 4th July, included 1553 persons, with 566 wagons. By 1848 all the Mormons had crossed the plains, except a few left on the Missouri as forwarding agents for emigrants from the Eastern States and Europe.

4. The settlement in Salt Lake.—Despite the poor crops and great sufferings of the first winter in Utah, glowing accounts of the new Zion were sent abroad. The English immigration included men of varied professions and trades, for Young proposed to start cotton-mills and woollen- and glass-factories. Since there were no manufactured goods to be obtained nearer than 1000 miles, the Mormon leader sought to create a self-sustaining State, but the accounts of 1852 showed a deficit, in spite of an attempt to retrench expenses by giving less help to immigrants coming across the Great Plains. But the economic salvation of the Mormon State arose less from the financial ability of the leaders than from the money spent in Utah by the Forty-Niners hastening to the California gold-fields, and from the building of the Pacific Railroad. Young's dictatorship over the new State of Deseret was based on both personal and religious grounds. His people knew him as 'hard-working' Brigham Young; they also believed that his word was the word of God. His power being further increased by the issue of paper money and the tithing system, there now arose a veritable despotism with such means of espionage as the School of the Prophets and Church Confessors (to visit the families of the Saints).

By 1856 great discontent arose, but the disaffected were weeded out in the so-called 'Reformation.' Young now instigated the murder of William R. Parrish, who attempted to apostatize, organized 400 'Wolf Hunters' to prevent such rare escapes out of the valley as that of Frederick Loba and his wife, and instituted blood atonement, as exemplified in the throat-cutting of Rosmos Anderson, who wished to marry his step-daughter, contrary to the wishes of the ward bishop.

Such were the means used for keeping Zion pure within. From without the irruption of the Gentiles was prevented by such cases of frightfulness as the murder of the Akin party in 1857 by 'Brigham's Destroying Angel,' Bill Hickman, and the Mountain Meadows massacre of a party of Gentiles from Arkansas and Missouri who were passing through Utah on their way to S. California. For this the Mormon Bishop Lee was executed by the Federal Government twenty years later.[1]

5. Relations to the Federal Government.—The Mormons who sought to found a State within a State were long neglected by the authorities at Washington. This was due in large measure to the approach of the Civil War and the ignorance of officialdom as to the practices and principles of the Latter-Day Saints. Thus, when Young flouted a federal judge and threatened vengeance for infringement upon his personal rights because of the appointment of another governor, President Buchanan declared that there was no longer any government in Utah but Brigham Young. Moreover, General Scott's expedition to punish the leaders charged with adultery was rendered ineffective by President Buchanan's pardon, while President Lincoln had his hands so tied by the war between North and South that he was unable to back up Colonel Connor's plans to keep Young in subjection. It took another generation before the heads of the Church unwillingly exchanged polygamy for statehood.

6. Anti-polygamy legislation. — Federal legislation against plural marriage began with the Morrill bill of 1860, which was ineffective, as the severest penalty was that for bigamy. The Cullom bill of 1869 was opposed by the Mormon delegate to Congress, who claimed that the United States constitution guaranteed essential principles of religious faith, and that pluralism was one of these principles, so far as the Saints were concerned. The root of the matter was not reached until 1879, when President Hayes declared that polygamy could be suppressed only by taking away the political power of the sect. This eventuated in the Edmunds bill of 1882, which disfranchised polygamists and forbade their holding federal offices. Within two years 1200 persons were deprived of their right to vote, and within eight years 468 persons were convicted of polygamy or unlawful cohabitation. In 1890 the courts declared the ecclesiastical property confiscated because the Mormon Church was an organized rebellion. Hereupon Young's successor, President Wilford Woodruff, advised his followers to 'refrain from contracting any marriage forbidden by the law of the land.'

In 1893 the federal authorities declared an amnesty for all offenders who could prove that they had not broken the law since 1890. The un-

[1] *Doctrine and Covenants*, sect. 136.

[1] Cf. *Mormonism Unveiled; or the Life and Confessions of John D. Lee*, St. Louis, 1892.

seating of Congressman Roberts, six years later, led to the official declaration from the Latter-Day Saints that they 'form not a rival power as against the Union, but an apostolic ministry to it, and their political gospel is State rights and self-government.' Since obtaining statehood in 1896, the Mormons have been more circumspect in their conduct, the State constitution of Utah expressly forbidding polygamy. Anti-Mormons, however, still claim that it is even yet practised in the remote rural districts, and that plural wives, old and new, are clandestinely supported by the wealthy Church leaders. Charges have also been recently made that the practices of the parents have been imitated by the younger generation.[1] The defence of the doctrine of plural marriage, in theory at least, is still attempted.

'The truth of the matter,' says one of the most recent apologists, 'is that the Mormon estimate of this institution makes it an actual means of grace, an eminent instrument for the salvation of souls. Just as they hold most strenuously to the doctrine of salvation of the dead by means of proxy baptism, just so, with the belief in pre-existence, as already explained, they consider it an act of eminent piety to provide for the birth of a human soul under the fullness of Gospel influences. That the birth of as many souls as possible under such conditions will hasten the redemption of humanity, and of the world, is an evident corollary to the high importance attached to life on earth in the teachings of the Mormon system. In this aspect of the matter, it is easy to see how that parenthood could be made to assume the aspect of a high virtue, involving that a person who had brought many souls into life was entitled to honor, as an instrument in God's hands in the grand work of populating the world with a race, whose leading attribute is the possession of the Divine Spirit. Because, however, the child-bearing capacity of the average woman is limited, it is evident that the only available means by which a worthy man could multiply his offspring would be by taking to himself a plurality of wives.'[2]

LITERATURE.—The four chief collections of *Mormoniana* in America are: the Church Archives at Salt Lake City; Government publications at Washington; the Berrian Collection, New York Public Library, rich in first editions and rare publications of the early Church; and the collection of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, at Madison, which includes the unique private collection of A. T. Schroeder, late of Salt Lake City.

i. *MORMON PERIODICALS.*—*Deseret News*, Salt Lake City, 1852–87; *Elders' Journal*, Kirtland, Ohio, and Far West, Missouri, 1837–39; *Evening and Morning Star*, Independence Missouri, and Kirtland, Ohio, 1832–34; *Journal of Discourses* (by Brigham Young and the Church leaders), Liverpool, 1854–86; *Latter-Day Saints' Messenger and Advocate*, Kirtland, Ohio, 1834–37; *Latter-Day Saints' Millennial Star*, Liverpool, 1840 ff.; *The Times and Seasons*, Nauvoo, Illinois, 1839–45, vol. iii. ed. Joseph Smith; early files suppressed by Brigham Young.

ii. *PRO-MORMON WORKS.*—H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, vol. xxi., 'Utah, 1540-1886,' San Francisco, 1889; *Handbook of Reference to the Hist., Chronology, Religion and Country of the Latter-Day Saints*, Salt Lake City, 1884; B. H. Roberts, *Defence of the Faith and the Saints*, do. 1907; Joseph Smith, Jr., *A Book of Commandments for the Government of the Church of Christ*, Zion, Jackson County, Missouri, 1833 (exceedingly rare); *Salt Lake City Tribune*, reprint, 1884; *Book of Mormon*, Palmyra, New York, 1830, 2nd ed. (equally rare), Kirtland, Ohio, 1835; *The Pearl of Great Price* (selections from the writings of Smith), Liverpool, 1851, and Salt Lake City, 1891; Lucy Smith, *Biographical Sketches of Joseph Smith and his Progenitors for many Generations*, Liverpool, 1853, and Piano, Illinois, 1880 (by the mother of the prophet, suppressed by Brigham Young); Joseph Smith (3rd) and Heman C. Smith, *A Hist. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints*, Lamoni, Iowa, 1901 (from the standpoint of the Re-organized Church); Charles Thompson, *Evidences in Proof of the 'Book of Mormon,'* Batavia, New York, 1841 (suppressed by Brigham Young); E. W. Tullidge, *Hist. of Salt Lake City*, Salt Lake City, 1886 (the work of a reformer, but censored by the Church); R. C. Webb, *The Real Mormonism*, New York, 1916 (the ablest modern apologetic); David Whitmer, *An Address to All Believers in Christ*, Richmond, Missouri, 1887 (written by a primitive non-polygamous Mormon).

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iv. *CRITICAL WORKS.*—W. A. Linn, *The Story of the Mormons*, New York, 1902 (the most complete and exhaustive history of Mormonism); I. Woodbridge Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism: a Psychological Study of Joseph Smith, Jr.*, New York, 1902, London, 1903 (with bibliography); *Utah Commission* (Government Reports under the Edmunds Law, Washington); Eduard Meyer, *Ursprung und Gesch. der Mormonen, mit Exkursen über die Anfänge des Islâms und des Christentums*, Halle, 1912.

I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

ST. THOMAS'S MOUNT.—St. Thomas's Mount, a town in the Chingleput District of Madras, lat. 13° N., long. 80° 12′ E., is known to the natives as Parangîmalai, 'hill of the Franks.' The connexion of St. Thomas with this place has been much disputed. G. M. Rae writes:

'The view which seems on the whole most consistent with all the facts of the case is, that the local or South Indian tradition concerning St. Thomas is an example of that curious phenomenon commonly described under the name of the migration of traditions. Not St. Thomas, but only the tradition, migrated to Southern India. . . . We shall find proof that St. Thomas is described as giving his services to the cause of Gospel propagation in a locality far removed from Southern India, and that he lived and laboured, died and was buried, in that remote locality [Caramene, or Caramana, the modern Kermân in E. Persia; but, if not at Calama, the town mentioned by Nearchus, on the seaboard of Gedrosia], so that not only is no opportunity left for a visit to Southern India, but the probability of it is excluded.'[1]

On the summit of the hill stands the curious old Portuguese Church of the Expectation of the Blessed Virgin. At this place, in A.D. 1547, while the foundations of a chapel or hermitage were being dug, there was found a slab of dark granite, one face of which was decorated with a cross in bas-relief of the Greek type, with floriated ornament at all the ends. At the top of the upright shaft is figured a bird like a dove, with its wings expanded, supposed to represent the Holy Spirit. On the slab is an inscription which was interpreted by an unscrupulous Brâhman to set forth the story of the Incarnation and of the spread of Christianity through the world by the agency of the twelve apostles—how one of the apostles came to Mailâpur (Tamil Mayilâpur, 'peacock city'), a place about three miles S.S.W. of the city of Madras, with a pilgrim's staff in his hands, and how St. Thomas died by the hands of a Brâhman, and his blood formed a cross.[2] A similar cross found at Cottayam in N. Travancore is attributed by A. C. Burnell[3] to the 7th or 8th cent. A.D., and the inscription may be interpreted to mean: 'In punishment by the cross (was) the suffering of this one; He who is the true Christ, and God above, and Guide ever pure.'

According to Rae, the Cottayam inscription 'sets forth a view of the person of Christ characteristic of Indian Nestorianism; for in no other theological literature, so far as I am aware, will the notion be found which this inscription seems intended to convey. The first or shorter part speaks of the suffering Saviour, "who," continues the second part, "is the true Messiah, and God above and Holy Ghost." Nothing can be inferred from the order in which the persons of the Trinity are here named, being the same as in the Apostolic benediction; but the second clause of the inscription seems intended to give expression to a doctrinal belief entertained in olden time among the Syrian Christians in Southern India, and often quoted from those books of theirs which were condemned as heretical by the Synod of Diamper (1599 A.D.). The doctrine was to the effect that in the Christ each of the persons of the Trinity was incarnate. . . . The doctrine is peculiar—the Godhead, not the Logos only, being incarnate. It seems intelligible on Nestorian premises, but its genesis historically is probably impossible to trace.'[4]

Rae goes on to show that the symbol of the peacock, said to be connected with St. Thomas, is probably of S. Indian origin.

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W. CROOKE.

[1] Cf. W. M. Gallichan, *Woman under Polygamy*, New York, 1915, Preface.
[2] Robert C. Webb, *The Real Mormonism*, p. 240.

[1] *The Syrian Church in India*, p. 24 f.
[2] H. Yule, *Book of Marco Polo*, London, 1871, ii. 293 f.; Rae, pp. 19, 119 f.
[3] *IA* iii. [1874] 308 ff.
[4] *The Syrian Church in India*, p. 29.

ŚAIVISM.—In orthodox Hinduism the religious instructor (*guru*) bestows consecration (*dīkṣa*) on his disciple by informing him of the name of the deity to be worshipped. The name of the deity is given to the disciple in the root-formula (*mūla-mantra*).

'If the mūla-mantra contains the name of Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa, he is a Vaiṣṇava, if it contains the name of Śiva he is a Śaiva, if the name of the mūla-mantra is Durgā, Kālī, Tārā, or Tripura-Sundari he is a Śākta. The initiated Hindu may be personally free from sectarian narrowness, still he must be classed as a sectary.'[1]

In Śaiva temples and in Śaiva households the deity Śiva is honoured and worshipped as Śiva-Rudra, 'the auspicious Rudra.' In early Vedic times the deity Rudra was a personification, in vague and uncertain anthropomorphic form, of the destructive powers of nature, of the storms, of the lightning and forest-fires.[2] In *Rigveda*, I. cxiv. 8, Rudra was invoked so that he might become auspicious and benign:

'Do not out of thy anger injure our children and descendants, our people, our cattle, our houses, and do not kill our men. We invoke thee always with offerings.'

In the *Śata-Rudrīya* the deity Rudra is invoked by the one hundred names by which he is still invoked by all devout worshippers of Śiva-Rudra. He is invoked[3] as a haunter of the mountains (*giriśa*), and as lying on a mountain. He is blue-necked and of red countenance like a thunder-cloud edged with the red gleam of the lightning. He has braided hair (*kaḍarpin*) and wears a hide (*kṛttin vasānaḥ*). He is invoked as lord of the forest and of burglars, the cheat and the swindler, as the dweller with Yama, the god of the dead, yet as a physician bearing healing herbs. He is the bearer of a drum, the wearer of the triple thread, the lord of cattle (*paśunām-pati*), dread and destructive like a fierce wild beast. He is prayed to so that he may become auspicious, and be Śaṅkara, or beneficent, be Śambhu, or benign, and he is lauded as Śiva, or auspicious.[4] The name Śiva becomes the distinctive term for Rudra in the later *Vājasaneyi Saṁhita* and in the *Atharvaveda* and *Aitarēya* and *Saṁkhyāyana Brāhmaṇas*. For all Śaivas the deity Śiva-Rudra is the one great god, the Mahādeva and Maheśvara and the ruler, Īśāna. In the non-sectarian *Śvētaśvatara Upaniṣad* the deity Rudra-Śiva is declared to be known through love and faith (*bhāva*), so that it has been said:

This *Upaniṣad* 'stands at the door of the Bhakti school and pours its loving adoration on Rudra-Śiva instead of on Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa as the Bhagavad Gīta did in later times when Bhakti doctrine was in full swing.'[5]

The *Upaniṣad* lauds Rudra-Śiva as a deity to be worshipped by all Aryans who were acquainted with Vedic ritual and Vedic traditions. It is permeated with Vedantic and Sānkhya teachings and inculcates a mystic knowledge of the divine through meditation and Yōgic practices. The *Śata-Rudrīya* rendered homage to many Rudras as *gaṇa-patis*, or leaders or lords of tribes and hosts. It paid homage to the worshippers of the Rudras, to the non-Vedic potters, carpenters, smiths, cart-makers, and to the Niṣādas, or forest tribes. It paid homage to Rudra as Bhava, the eternal and the creator, as Śarva, the destroyer or arrow-wielder. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[6] Agni is declared to be the gentle name of Rudra whom the Eastern people call Śarva and the Bāhikas Bhava and Paśunām-patī, lord of cattle. All these names, except Agni, are said to be ungentle.[1] In the *Atharvaveda*[2] Rudra is besought to free his worshippers from unlucky omens:

'May shrieking female demons with dishevelled hair go far from us.'

In the *Atharvaveda* also the gods are said to have made Mahādeva the deliverer from the upper region, Rudra from the lower, Ugra from the southern, Bhava from the eastern, and Īśāna from all intermediate regions. It also describes Bhava and Śarva as *bhūta-patis*, 'lords of *bhutas* (evil spirits)'; and the inclusion of such deities of outlying folk of feverish tracts under the name of Śiva-Rudra or Agni is indicated by invoking Rudra in the words:

'Reverence be to him whose consumption, whose cough, whose bolt assails some one like the neighing of a stallion.'[3]

In the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*,[4] which follows the epic tradition,[5] the story is told of how Dakṣa gave his daughter Umā in marriage to Śiva, how Śiva neglected to bow down in respect before the Vedic rites, and how he was thereupon cursed by Dakṣa. Śiva is described in the story as an impure and proud demolisher of rites, as roaming about in cemeteries attended by hosts of ghosts and spirits, as like a madman, naked, with dishevelled hair, as laughing and weeping, as smeared with ashes from funeral pyres, as wearing a garland of dead men's skulls, pretending to be Śiva ('auspicious') but being in reality Aśiva ('inauspicious'), as insane and the lord of *bhūtas*. Śiva was cursed by Dakṣa as being the lowest of the gods, as Bhava, as unworthy of receiving any homage or offering along with the Vedic deities Indra and Viṣṇu. The Purāṇic account illustrates the mode of transition from a period of religion based on Vedic traditions and Brāhmanic supremacy to a period when it became necessary to recognize the worship of the demoniacal gods and deified heroes by the outlying non-Aryan Niṣādas and Dravidians, who were not allowed to study the Vedas or to perform the Vedic rites. The local shrines, with their associated worship of deified heroes and their appeasing of ghosts and evil-working spirits of the dead by human and blood sacrifices and magic spells, were scattered throughout the villages of India, where the aboriginal primitive ritual was ministered by local sorcerers and priests. As these local shrines became more renowned, they grew in wealth and importance, and became endowed by local chieftains and landowners. The shrines became temples wherein the aboriginal deities were raised to new honour and rank as manifestations or servants of Śiva and Viṣṇu, or of their *śaktis* (female consorts). From the beginning of the 5th cent. of our era, when Brāhmanism was passing into Hinduism,[6] all the gods and deified heroes of India were given Purāṇic legends until 'myriads of gods connected one way or another with the Vedic and Epic deities appear and vanish in the kaleidoscopic panorama of the Hindu pantheon.'[7]

Under Brāhmanic guidance the deities of the villagers become Śiva ('auspicious'), and their goddesses become identified with Kālī or Bhavānī, the wife, or female energy, of Śiva. Under Brāhmanic guidance human sacrifices are gradually abandoned, and in most southern temples blood sacrifices are displaced by offerings of incense and flowers. The rites once lay in the hands of the aboriginal village priests.

'But the transition to Hinduism took place when they were celebrated under Brāhmanic auspices. As in all districts and

1 Ramaprasad Chanda, *Indo-Aryan Races*, Rajshahi, 1916, p. 144.
2 Cf. art. BRĀHMANISM.
3 A. B. Keith, *Taittirīya Saṁhita* [Harvard Oriental Ser. xviii. xix.], Cambridge, Mass., 1914, pt. ii. p. 353.
4 Cf. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*[2], iv. 328.
5 R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* III. vi.), Strassburg, 1913; cf., however, art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA and G. A. Grierson, *JRAS*, 1907, p. 494.
6 I. vii. 3. 8.

1 *Agnir iti eva śāntam.* 2 XI. ii. 11.
3 *Atharvaveda*, XI. ii. 22. 4 IV. ii. 7.
5 Cf. Muir[2], iv. 373 ff. 6 Cf. art. HINDUISM.
7 Note received from M. Srinivasa Aiyangar.

sects of India, the really important point was not the character of the god, the doctrine, or the ceremony, but the admission that the right to worship, teach and officiate resided in the Brāhmans.'[1]

In some well-known temples in S. India the ancient blood rites and drunken orgies are permitted to be revived yearly as a compromise with the aboriginal worshippers, whose primitive shrines were annexed by Brāhman priests acting under the protection of local chieftains, who in return for their patronage and countenance obtained rank as Kṣatriyas with spurious pedigrees. Dubois[2] mentions cases where out-caste pariahs still act as priests in Hindu temples, and others in which the village out-castes have the prior right to enter the sanctuary of the temple and make offerings to the gods, and the Brāhmans do not begin till they have ended. The *Sthala Māhātmya* (local record) of the now ruined temple at Śrī Śailam (the Holy Mount) describes its dedication to Mallikārjuna, and how in the 4th cent. B.C. the daughter of the Maurya Chandra Gupta was so full of love for the deity that she presented jasmine flowers (*mallikā*) daily at the shrine.

It is also recorded that the Buddhist Nāgārjuna 'summoned Bhikshus or devotees to reside in it and stored it with all the Buddhist canonical books and their commentaries.'[3]

Brāhmanism gained the temple on the decay of Buddhism and dedicated it to the worship of Śiva and his *śakti*, Mādhavi or Brahma-rambhā. It is, however, the only temple in the south where all castes and creeds, both men and women, can join in the worship. In the 14th cent. there were evidently human sacrifices, for an inscription of that period records:

'Hosts of Koṅgu heroes highly excited under religious fervour cut off their heads and tongues as offerings and obtained a brilliant body of blessed limbs. The next moment they shine with three eyes, five faces and five tongues and become the eight embodied Śiva.'[4]

The annual festival now held to the god and goddess lasts from February to the end of May, at which period the Brāhman head of the Pushpagiri Maṭha at Cudapah officiates. At other times a Śaiva mendicant attends to the temple and deity, while the jungle Chenchus do service. Here the transition is clear from the worship of a primitive forest deity by human sacrifices to the settling of Buddhists, who in turn were ousted by Brāhmans, who brought the aboriginal deity into Hinduism under the form of Śiva. At the Śaiva temple at Tiruvottīyūr inscriptions of the 13th cent. record that a ritual was then in vogue in the temple which included animal sacrifices and their surrounding saturnalia of horrors, and at the present day animal sacrifices are made yearly to the goddess and intoxicating drink is offered to her.

'Orgiastic rites are observed and the terrible and all swallowing spirit is believed to be appeased.'[5]

At Tiruvottīyūr, as at the temple at Melkote in Mysore, the aboriginal object of worship was an ant-hill, abode of the cobra or *nāga*-snake. The prevailing animism of the village folk of S. India has always incited them to worship objects which they imagine to be the abode of some personal agency or power.

It is reported that in 1904 two little boys watching cattle in the fields of a village near Ellore imagined that they heard a noise of trumpets resounding from an ant-hill. The news spread, and the place became a place of pilgrimage. 'Every Sunday as many as 5000 people, men and women, assembled before the ant-hill, and might be seen prostrate on their faces, rapt in adoration.'[6]

With few exceptions all the village deities of S. India are goddesses, wandering spirits of the dead, goddesses of famine, plague, and pestilence, all of whom are appeased by sacrifices and offerings of sheep, goats, fowls, buffaloes, and pigs.

The explanation of the fact that these evil spirits are goddesses is 'in all probability simply that the feminine characteristics of the Dravidians are such as to make their ghosts more feared than those of men.'[1]

These local goddesses are often considered to be wives of Śiva.

'A favourite method of attaching a Dravidian goddess to the Hindu pantheon is by a marriage with Śiva or some one of his incarnations.'[2]

The fact that Śaktism, or the worship of cosmic power personified as a female, has not developed into a special cult in Tamil-land, as it did in Bengal, has been held to militate against the theory that the worship of tribal goddesses was based on a matriarchal state of society.[3]

Instances are numerous where the deities worshipped are merely images representing local saints or recent heroes.

Many Śaiva temples of S. India are now being renovated by Nāttukottai Cettis, and it has been recorded that they 'have often found human bones and ashes at some depth below the floor on which the sacred image stands, thus indicating that the original shrine was erected over the relics of some saint or important person.'[4] One record, of the 9th cent. A.D., at Solapuram, N. Arcot, states that the Ganga King Rājāditya caused to be built a temple to Iśvara Śiva on the spot where his father had been buried. Another inscription records that a shrine was built over or near the burial-ground of the Chola King Aditya I. An inscription found in the Cholesvara temple at Melpadi states that, at the end of the 10th cent. A.D., Rājarāja I. 'had been pleased to build the temple of Arinjiśvara as a burial place for the lord who died at Arrūr.'[5] It has been suggested that 'the cell-like proportions of the shrine chamber of a typical South Indian temple may be traced to the Dravidian cell tomb or Dolmen.'[6]

Instances are known where dolmens have actually been transformed into Śiva shrines by placing in them the typical symbol of the deity.[7]

In S. India the typical Hindu temples were endowed and enlarged from the 10th to the 12th centuries, under the Chola kings, and in Bengal from the 9th to the 12th centuries, under the Pāla dynasties. The origin of the worship of Śiva, as symbolized in the chief temples of the early Pallava, Pāndya, and Chola dynasties by the *liṅga*, has been explained as follows:

The *liṅga* 'resembled the tomb stone, or Vīrakals which used to be set on the graves of Dravidian warriors and sometimes worshipped. Some of the Śaiva temples are even believed to be the graves of Siddhas, or Saints.'[8]

Purāṇic Hinduism, which arose during the period of the revival of Hindu rule and tradition under the Guptas of Kanauj, from the 4th and 5th centuries, absorbed the prevailing Mahāyāna Buddhist idol-worship. The Buddhist worship of the burial-mound, or votive *stūpa*, has also been held to have been absorbed into Hinduism in the form of the worship of the *liṅga* by Śaivas.[9]

Śiva is not only worshipped under the form of Ardhanārīśa,[10] but is symbolized everywhere by the bull Nandi and by the phallic male and female emblems, the *liṅga* and the *yōni*. The two earliest known representations of the *liṅga* are said to date from about the 1st cent. B.C.; one from Bhiṭa is now in the Lucknow Museum, the other

[1] Charles Eliot, *JRAS*, 1910, p. 1158.
[2] Cf. *Hindu Manners and Customs*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 583.
[3] See *Epig. Report*, Madras, 1915, p. 91.
[4] Cf. H. Krishna Sastri, *S. Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses*, Madras, 1916, p. 161 note.
[5] *Epig. Report*, Madras, 1912, p. 67.
[6] H. Whitehead, *The Village Gods of South India*, London and Calcutta, 1916, p. 15.

[1] W. T. Elmore, *Dravidian Gods in Modern Hinduism*, New York, 1915, p. 146.
[2] *Ib.* p. 84.
[3] See Chanda, p. 156 f.
[4] *Annual Report, Arch. Dep. S. Circle*, Madras, 1915–16, p. 29.
[5] *S. Indian Inscriptions*, ed. and tr. E. Hultzsch, Madras, 1900–03, vol. iii. pt. i. p. 26 f.
[6] *Annual Report, Arch. Dep. S. Circle*, 1915–16, p. 35.
[7] *Ib.* p. 29.
[8] Private note from M. Srinivasa Aiyangar, dated July 1916.
[9] Cf. E. B. Havell, *The Ideals of Indian Art*, London, 1911, p. 87.
[10] Cf. art. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 702[a].

was recently discovered[1] at Gudimallam in N. Arcot.

Although they are realistically phallic, it is claimed that 'there is nothing to be ashamed of'; the two great Generative Principles of the Universe, Śiva and Śakti, or Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the father and mother of all creations, the energy and matter of the physical scientist, are symbolized briefly in the form of the liṅga and yōni. For the past two thousand years at least, the Hindus, males and females, have been offering worship to this symbol of the Great Architect of the Universe, without in the least adverting to or feeling conscious of the so-called obscenity of this pure symbol of the fatherhood and motherhood of the supreme deity, to them it is a symbol and nothing more.'[2]

The stronghold of those worshippers of Śiva who venerate the deity in the form of the *liṅga* and who are known as Liṅgayats (*q.v.*) is in S. Bombay, Belgaum, Bijāpur, and Dhānvār, while of the 3,000,000 Liṅgayats classed as such in the *Indian Census Report* of 1911 only a little over one-tenth are to be found in the Madras Presidency. The stronghold of the Śaktas, or worshippers of the Śakti aspect of Śiva, is in Bengal, where the majority of Brāhmans, Kayasthas, and Vaidyas are Śāktas, who are also spread throughout N. Bihār, Gujarāt, and in the Marāthā countries.[3] The worship of the *śakti*, or female energy, of Śiva is inculcated in *Tantras* chiefly devoted to the goddess known as Ānanda-bhairavī, Tripura Sundarī, and Lalita, the worship known as the Chakrapujā being centred chiefly in mystic circles, representing in some cases the material object worshipped through pictures, though in other cases the living material object is worshipped. Śiva is thus considered subsidiary to his *śakti*, and the ideal is that motherhood is the chief element in creation. The Śāktas base their doctrines on the assumption that through Śiva and Śakti there is a drop, Bindu, formed which develops into a female element Nāda (sound), containing in itself the names of all things to be created. With Bindu and Nāda are associated male and female elements so that the substance—*kāmakalā*—is formed from which creation ensues.

Rāmānuja, in the 12th cent., states[4] that there were two extreme sects of worshippers of Śiva, known as the Kāpālikas and Kālāmukhas, who held fanciful theories of reality, all of which are opposed to the *Vedas*. The Kāpālikas are those who hope to reach *nirvāṇa* by meditation and who know the meaning of the six marks (*mudrās*)—the necklace, the gold ornament, the earring, the head-jewel, the ashes, and the sacred thread. There seems to have been but slight difference recognized between the Kāpālikas and Kālāmukhas, whose chief temple was at Śrīśaila, the Holy Mount. Rāmānuja describes the Kālāmukhas as using a skull as a drinking-vessel, smearing themselves with the ashes of a dead body, eating human flesh, holding a club, setting up a wine-jar as a site for offerings to the deity. Both Mādhava[5] and Ānandagirī described Śaṅkara as having controversies with the Kāpālikas—at Ujjayinī according to the commentators—where Śiva, as Bhairava, was worshipped with human sacrifices and wine libations. Śaṅkara, in the 8th cent., in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*,[6] states that the Śaivas, or Mahēśvaras, held that Paśupati, or Śiva, was 'the Lord' and the 'operative cause' of the creation of the world. They believed that Śiva taught five categories, viz. *kārya* (effect), *kāraṇa* (cause), *yōga* (union), *viddhi* (ritual), *dukhānta* (the end of pain and final deliverance, so that the bonds of the soul [*paśu*] might be severed). Mādhava, in the latter half of the 14th cent., in his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, described three Śaiva systems — the Nakulīśa-Paśupatas,[1] the Śaiva system, and the Pratyabhijña, or recognitive system. In his account of the Nakulīśa-Pāśupatas he states that they teach the five topics mentioned by Śaṅkara as the tenets of the worshippers of Paśupati, viz. *kārya*, *kāraṇa*, *yōga*, *viddhi*, and *dukhānta*, as taught in a work entitled the *Pañchādhyāyī* or *Pañchārtha-vidyā*. The name Lakulin means one who bears a club (*lakula*), and, according to the Purānic account,[2] Śiva, by his Yōga powers, entered into a dead body at a cemetery and became incarnate as Lakulī at Kalyāvarōhana or Kārōhana, in the Laṭa country at Baroda. The system as taught by Lakulī, probably the author of the *Pañchādhyāyī*[3] in the 1st cent. A.D., was the main system from which later Śaiva systems arose. This main system, according to Mādhava, aimed at union or conjunction of the soul with Śiva—a mystic union to be reached by pious mutterings, meditation, and the cessation of all action, so that a state of mere feeling (*saṁvid*) is attained. By Yōgic practices the ascetic (*siddha*) gains miraculous powers of assuming various shapes and forms and of receiving messages from the dead. The religious emotions are to be excited by song and dance, by laughter, by simulating the acts and gestures of one in love, by speaking wildly, by wearing ashes and flowers from the images in the temples, and by loud uttering of a sacred sound, *hum*, like the sound *vaṣaṭ*, an imitation of a sound ascribed to a bull. The nature of the *viddhi*, or rules of conduct, of the Kālāmukhas, which appears to have been identical with that of the Nakulīśa-paśupatas, may be judged from the following statement:

'It appears quite probable that this viddhi of the paśupatas is responsible for the origin and existence of obscene sculptures in Hindu temples.'[4]

Mādhava describes the Pratyabhijña, or recognitive, system of teaching as follows:

'There being a God whose omnipotence is learned from accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from argumentation, there arises in relation to my presented personal self the cognition that I am that very God—in virtue of the recollection of the powers of that God.'[5]

This system was expounded in Kashmir by Abhinava Gupta at the beginning of the 11th cent. (A.D. 993–1015) in his commentaries—the *Pratyabhijña-vimarśini* and *Paramārtha-sāra*—which he wrote on the *Śiva-dṛṣṭi* of the *siddha* Somānanda, from whom he was fourth in succession. The *Śiva-dṛṣṭi*, which set forth the metaphysical doctrines of Kashmir Śaivism is now lost, but an epitome was composed by Utpāla, the pupil of Abhinava Gupta, in 190 *anuṣṭubh* verses known as the *Pratyabhijña sūtras*. The system described by Mādhava under the name of the Śaiva system corresponds to the Śaiva Siddhānta system of Tamil-land and has been described as 'a dualistic system fundamentally different from the monistic philosophy which constitutes Kashmir Shaivaism.'[6] The same authority further describes this Śaiva system as 'plain and unvarnished dualism or even pluralism.'[7] The Kashmir and Tamil schools of Śaivism, which arose out of the extreme schools of the Nakulīśa-paśupatas, were both faced by the difficulties inherent in teaching what they both describe as the highest mysticism—an absorption of the soul into a universal unconscious Soul or the universe, which often ends in nothing—and at

[1] Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, London, 1915, vol. i. pt. i. p. 65.
[2] *Ib.* p. 69; cf. also G. Jouveau-Dubreuil, *Archéologie du Sud de l'Inde*, Paris, 1914, ii. 11.
[3] Chanda, p. 143.
[4] *Vedānta-sūtras*, II. ii. 36.
[5] *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*, xv. 1-28.
[6] II. ii. 37.

[1] Cf. art. HINDUISM.
[2] *Vāyu*, xxi. 205–212; *Liṅga*, xxiv. 124–133.
Cf. Bhandarkar, *JRASBo* xxii. [1910] 151 ff., and J. F. Fleet *JRAS*, 1907, p. 419 ff.
[3] Gopinatha Rao, vol. ii. pt. i. p. 23.
[4] *Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha*, tr. E. B. Cowell and A. E Gough, London, 1894, p. 131.
[5] J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Shaivaism*, Srinagar, 1914, p. 20 note 1.
[6] Cf. L. D. Barnett, tr. of *Paramārthā-sāra*, in *JRAS*, 1910

the same time the realization of a personal revealed God. The revelation of Śiva, according to Āgamic teachings, was uttered from the divine voice of the five faces of the deity, representing his *chit*, *ānanda*, *ichchhā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā* aspects (intelligence, bliss, will, knowledge, creation) called Iśāna, Tat-puruṣa, Sadyōjata, Aghora, and Vāma. Here the revelation rests on the dualism, but in Kashmir in the 9th cent. the sage Vasugupta declared a new revelation, as expounded by his pupil Kallaṭa, in the *Spanda-sūtras*, or *kārikas*, teaching the *advaita*, or non-dualism, of the Kashmir system or Trika (the Pati-paśu-pāśam). In this Spanda school the soul gains knowledge through intense Yōgic contemplation, whereby the vision of Parama-Śiva ('highest Śiva') as Supreme Soul of the universe is realized and the individual soul is absorbed in a mystic trance of peace and quietism. In the Pratyabhijña school the soul by its own intuition, trained under the instruction of a *guru*, recognizes itself as God and so rests in mystic bliss of oneness with God. The sectarian *Upaniṣads*, which treat of the nature of Śiva, in many instances teach this spiritual monism. The Śaiva *Kaivalya Upaniṣad* says of Śiva:

'He is Brahmā, he is Śiva, he is Indra, he is undecaying, supreme, self-resplendent, he is Viṣṇu, he is breath, he is the spirit, the supreme Lord, he is all that has been or that shall be eternal.'

The *Atharvaśiras* also teaches that Rudra is Śiva 'who evolves, creates and sustains all worlds.' The *Nīla-Rudra Upaniṣad* says of the soul:

'I formed of earth (Pṛthivi-mayaḥ) beheld descending from the sky, that blue-necked Rudra.'

In the *Pañcha-brahma Upaniṣad*, 20, we read:

'In this city of Brahman (body) there is, O Sage, a small lotus-like house. In the centre of it there is a subtle ether. He is Śiva, Sad-chid-ānanda. He should be sought after by those desirous for salvation.'

In order to explain the true nature of Śiva and his manifestations throughout the universe, Śaivism essays a metaphysical analysis of objective reality through its 'thatnesses,' or *tattvas*. These *tattvas* transcend all physical notions of reality, but are believed capable of being realized through the long trained thought of Eastern sages.

To realize them the means are said to be 'self-culture, mental, moral, spiritual and even physical, which constitutes what is called Yoga, in the true sense of the word, which enables a Spirit to shake off the very limitations that make of the real experiencer such a limited entity and to rise to those regions of experience which the highest Tattvas are. Those who train themselves by this method of Yoga, and who are called Yogins, can and do realize the Tattvas by direct experience as clearly as, indeed more clearly than, we perceive the physical and sense objects.'[1]

The primary *tattvas* are 36 in number, and the highest *tattva* is that of the spiritual essence, or 'thatness,' of Śiva, existing alone before the manifestation of a universe. Śiva manifests in the universe through his grace in order that the *paśu*, the flock of souls, may gain knowledge of their oneness with the Supreme Soul and so find rest from transmigrations through which they are doomed to pass by their ignorance and resulting actions. The manifestation of the universe is analyzed, through the *tattvas*, in Kashmir Śaivism in the same way as it is in the Śaiva school of S. India,[2] where the Parama Brahman, or Śiva, manifests regions (*bhuvanas*) for the souls, through a *śakti* associated with a metaphysical conception of abstract matter termed pure *māyā* or *suddha māyā*. This pure *māyā* is also termed *kuṭali*, *kuṇḍalinī*, and sometimes *vindu* and even *śakti*; and its first manifestation is *nātam* or *vāc*—the subtle basis of the 'sound' or 'word' which precedes the beginning of all things. From the Śiva-Śakti *tattva* arises the Sadā Śiva *tattva*, or the eternal aspect of Śiva, also termed Sādākhya, in which the *śaktis*, or energies of *jñāna* (wisdom) and *kriyā* (action or creation), are in equilibrium. In the term Sādākhya the first glimmer of a physical conception arises from amid the vague metaphysical speculations of the Śaiva systems both of Kashmir and of S. India. In the southern school[1] the workings of Śiva and *śakti* are figuratively illustrated by the analogy of the reproductive organism of a lotus, where the stamens of the lotus are compared to the lord, the Sadā Śiva, and the pistil to the Śakti-*tattva*, while above the *śakti* is seated the supreme Śiva. The same system teaches[2] that the subtlest form of matter, the imperceptible *māyā*, is the product of Bindu, or Vindu, which means a seed, a drop, or a point. In Yōga teachings Bindu was the centre of a mystic wheel (*chakra*), of which there are supposed to be six in the body as dynamic tattvic centres, the principal of which, the *mūlādhāra*, or chief region, is described as like a red lotus of four petals situated in the lower part of the body near the spinal cord.[3] By concentrating the mind on these *chakras*, or force centres, in the body, the Yōgi, ever since Vedic times, has hoped to obtain absolute knowledge, and to discover the mysteries of creation, in the psychic energy of the *kuṇḍalinī*. In the Hatha Yōga, and the higher Yōga, the Rāja Yōga, the *kuṇḍalinī* is described as the highest *śakti*. It is supposed to be coiled up like a serpent (*kuṇḍali*) nine inches from the middle of the body, and is covered by a membranous covering. In the Yōga system the terms *kuṭali*, *kuṇḍalinī*, *śakti*, *śwarī*, *bindu*, or *vindu*, are thus used to signify the seat and source of creative energy in man and are then applied to mean the creative force, or *śakti*, of the creator.[4]

In the Śaiva systems of Kashmir and S. India the Sādākhya *tattva* or Sadā-Śiva *tattva* is the beginning of the development of the manifest world from the energy of the Śiva-Śakti *tattva*. The term Sādākhya implies the beginning of the being (*sat*) of a real manifest world free from Yōgic mysticism and metaphysical speculations or dogmas.

Although the Sādākhya *tattva* is a stepping-stone towards a reality,[5] it is held to be 'just the beginning of activity—of just the first stirring of life—and therefore the thought or feeling of the Ideal Universe at this stage is only a dim one, like a faint and indistinct picture of a long-forgotten scene which is beginning to reform itself in one's memory and is still in the background of consciousness.'[6]

Hence creation is described as a process where from the Sadā Śiva *tattva* arises the Maheśvara *tattva*, or principle of obscuring (*tirobhava*) true knowledge from the soul until it has eaten the fruits of its *karma*. Thence springs the pure *tattva* of wisdom, the *suddhā vidyā tattva*, known as Rudra, the source of destruction and regeneration, which *suddhā vidyā* further develops as Brahmā the creator and Viṣṇu the preserver of the universe.

From *suddhā vidyā* arise through impure *māyā* the five *tattvas* of limited experiences—those of (1) *kālam*, 'time'; (2) *niyati*, 'order' or 'necessity,' through which *karma* acts on its fate or destiny; thence (3) *kalā*, 'learning' or 'continency,' the *tattva* of the faculty which enables man to experience perceptions; then (4) *vidyā*, 'knowledge,' for the intellectual power of the soul; from *vidyā* arises (5) *rāgam*, 'desire,' and thence *puruṣa*, or limited individual spirit or man, with a five-fold clothing or body, the *pañcha-kanchuka* of *kālam*,

[1] Chatterji, p. 162.

[2] Cf. art. DRAVIDIANS (South India).

[1] *Śiva-jñāna-Siddhiyar*, ix. 9.

[2] *Ib.* i. 12.

[3] Cf. A. Avalon, *Tantra of the Great Liberation*, London, 1913, p. lvii, also *Gospel of Śrī Rama Krishna*, Madras, 1912, p. 85, note: 'The Mūladhara is the first lotus with four petals in which the Yōgi meditates upon Śiva and Śakti (God personal and impersonal) as manifest in their glory It is the root of the Sushumna in the spinal cord.'

[4] Cf. Swātmarām Swāmi, *Hatha Yōga pradīpika*, Bombay, 1893, p. 44.

[5] Cf. *Sādākhyāyām-bhavam yatas prabhriti Sad iṭiprakhyā*, quoted in Chatterji, p. 67. (The derivation from Sā-dākshya by Western authorities is clearly erroneous.)

[6] Chatterji, p. 67.

niyati, *kalā*, *rāgam*, and *vidyā*. From the *tattva kalā* arises *prakṛti*, undeveloped matter, with the three *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, 'goodness,' 'passion,' 'darkness,' in equilibrium. Thence ensue *tattvas* of the *buddhi*, 'intellect,' of *manas*, 'mind,' of *ahamkāram*, 'individuality,' of *chitta*, 'will,' with the *tattvas* of the five organs of sense, of the five organs of action, and five subtle elements of sound, touch, form, taste, smell, and of ether, air, fire, water, and earth.

The Kashmir school of thought is based on the belief that 'concentration of thought can be practised to absolute perfection and that when perfected, by its means alone, everything can be known and realized by direct experience.'[1]

The system teaches that through a knowledge of the *tattvas* the soul can realize God, as identical with the individual soul, as pure unconscious soul of the universe.

The Tamil Śaivas of S. India base their knowledge of Śiva on twelve Sanskrit *sūtras* forming a portion of the *Vidyā* section of the *Raurava Āgama* which were expounded at the beginning of the 13th cent. by the Veḷḷāla, Meykaṇḍa Devar, 'the divine Seer of Truth,' in his *Śiva-jñāna-bodham*, 'Instruction in the knowledge of Truth.' The Śaiva *Āgamas*[2] are each divided into four parts of *Charyā*, *Kriyā*, *Yōga*, and *Vidyā*. The chief Śaiva *Āgamas* are 28 in number, and are held to contain a direct revelation from Śiva for all classes, even Śudras and women, who were competent to receive *dīkṣā*, or consecration from a *gurū*, and to follow the path to salvation. The Śaiva sage Tiru Mūlar, who has been ascribed to the 9th cent. A.D., says in his *Tiru Mantiram*:

'The Vedas and the Āgamas are both true and both are the word of God. The first is a general treatise and the latter a special one. When examined and where difference is perceived between the Vedānta and Siddhānta they will perceive no difference.'[3]

The distinction between the *Vedas* and *Āgamas* was not only a religious but also a racial distinction. Brāhman Śaivas still adhere to the Vedic ritual, as they hold that the *Vedas* and *Vedānta* were a special revelation for all Aryan people. All Śudras, and consequently most of the Dravidians and people who resided outside the Aryan pale, were excluded from even hearing the sacred sound of the *Vedas*, and accordingly they, with all women and those of mixed castes, were excluded from Vedic religious ceremonies and from salvation. Brāhmans who were Śaiva worshipped Śiva according to the Vedic ritual; but, as the Dravidian population of S. India was in the majority, the claim was early raised that both *Vedas* and *Āgamas*, or *Tantras*, were of equal authority in ritual and ceremony. Śrikaṇṭha Śivāchārya, held by Tamil Śaivas to have lived before the 9th cent., wrote a commentary based on Āgamic teachings, in which he held that there was no difference between the *Vedas* and *Āgamas*.[4] He declared that the *Vedas* may properly be called Śiva *Āgamas* as having been revealed by, or come down (*āgama*) from, Śiva.

'Accordingly Śiva Āgama is two-fold, one being intended for the three higher castes, the other being intended for all. The Vedas are intended for people of the three classes, and the other for all.'[5]

It was not until the 17th cent. that the Śaiva teacher Appaya Dīkshitar (1552–1624) endeavoured to unite the two streams of belief and salvation which flowed from Aryan Vedic and non-Aryan Āgamic sources. Appaya Dīkshitar was intellectually swayed—as all southern Śaivas are—by the spiritual singularism of the *māyā* doctrines of Śaṅkara, but he would gladly have accepted a personal deity such as the Nārāyana of the school of the Vaiṣnava Āchārya Rāmānuja. He begins his *Siddhānta-lēśa*, an exposition of the teachings of Śaṅkara, with this statement:

'Just as the Ganges springs from the feet of Viṣṇu and gains many a land and flourishes, so the wise words which flowed from the fair lotus lips of Śaṅkara have divided a thousandfold as they reach teachers among whom arise differences as to the nature of God and of the soul's bondage, all of which teachings are intended as stepping-stones to the true knowledge that Brahman is One only, without a Second.'[1]

The S. Indian Tamil school of Śaivism, known as the 'pure' (or Śuddha) Śaiva Siddhānta, in its ultimate teachings, has always contended against a non-dualism, or *advaita*, wherein the soul loses its identity through final absorption into an unconscious soul of the universe—into *Brahman*, 'One only, without a second.' It has also striven to free itself from the *māyā* teachings of Śaṅkara and to approach an ideal where the soul in final salvation

'retains its individual consciousness, remains for evermore in separate existence, sharing the blessedness and wisdom of the Supreme but unmingled with his essence. In fact the doctrine held by Śaivas on this point is hardly to be distinguished from Christian teachings.'[2]

The Śaiva Siddhānta in Tamil-land rests for its primary dogmas on the exposition by Meykaṇḍa, in the 13th cent., of the twelve Sanskrit stanzas from the *Raurava Āgama*. The *Āgamas* have been ascribed to a period somewhere between the 5th and 8th centuries of our era, and the development of Tantric worship has been ascribed to a period before Nāgārjuna (*c.* A.D. 200).[3] The *Uttara Kāraṇa Āgama* refers to the persecution of the Jains by Tiru-Jñāna Sambandhar, held to have taken place in the 7th cent.; and other *Āgamas* direct that the hymns of the earlier Śaiva saints, Appar and Sundara, should be recited during the temple services. The *Āgamas* are referred to frequently in the hymns of the Śaiva saint, Mānikka Vāchakar, who has been assigned to about the 9th century.[4] Down to the present day non-Aryan Śaivas adopt the Āgamic teachings and ritual, while the Aryan Śaivas retain the Vedic ritual, although Vaidik, or Smārta, Brāhmans may be found worshipping the *liṅga* in the Śaiva temple. The Āgamic ritual and teachings were current long before the time of Meykaṇḍa in the 13th century. The Chola sovereign Rājarāja (A.D. 985–1014), who built the Bṛhadīśvara temple at Tanjore, is recorded to have appointed Brāhman priests from the Arya, Madhya, and Gauḍa countries to act as teachers and priests in the temple. Rajēndra Chola, shortly afterwards, in the first quarter of the 11th cent., is recorded in Āgamanta works to have brought Brāhman Śaiva teachers to the south from the Amardaka Matha on the banks of the Godavari with the following result:

'An impetus was given to the spread of Śaivaism and a very large number of original works belonging to the Āgamanta school of Saivaism was written.'[5]

The early Śaiva saints had, from the 5th to the 11th century, sung of their faith in Śiva and of his grace, whereby he had revealed himself to them as ideal love and bliss. These Śaiva saints were 63 in number, and their hymns were sung in 274 Śaiva temples[6] still held sacred as having been visited by these saints. The most renowned of the temples had been built and endowed by Pallava and Chola kings on the sites of previous and primitive shrines. The Śaiva saints believed in

[1] Cf. Chatterji, *The Hindu Realism*, Allahābād, 1912, p. 143 f.
[2] Cf. Shanmukha Sundara M., *Sakala-āyama-sāra-saṅgraham*, Madras, 1900, who published separate *Āgamas* with Tamil commentaries.
[3] Cf. Tamil ed. of M. V. Viśvanātha Pillai, Madras, 1912, p. 406, no. 2397.
[4] *Na vayam Veda Śivāgamayor bhedam paśyāmah.*
[5] Bhāshya on II. ii. 38; *Siddhānta Dipika*, ii. 267.

[1] Tr. by A. Venis, in *The Pandit*, nos. 21, 22, and 23, Benares.
[2] G. U. Pope, *The Tiruvāçagam*, Oxford, 1900, p. lxv; cf. art. DRAVIDIANS (South India).
[3] See A. Avalon, *Principles of Tantra*, London, 1914, p. lix.
[4] See L. D. Barnett and G. U. Pope, *Tamil Books in the British Museum*, London, 1909, p. v, for many references to the date of the saint.
[5] Gopinatha Rao, vol. ii. pt. i. p. 4.
[6] See V. T. Subramanya Pillai, *Śiva-sthala-manjari*, Madras, 1905, pp. 1–7.

the revelation that their inward eye had gained of the divine, and the Śaiva sages who succeeded them placed this mystic knowledge of God as the foundation of all their efforts to reason out their beliefs and faiths. The Śaiva Siddhānta, which they formulated, is therefore closer akin to a mystic phase of religious belief than it is to a philosophic school of reasoning from the known to the unknown. The sages strove in their chief, fourteen Śiva Siddhānta, *Sūtras* to steer clear of a mysticism wherein the self vanishes with the absorption of the soul and all personality into a *Brahman* as the unconscious Soul of the universe. Still Tamil Śaivas style their system as follows:

'Mysticism of the highest quality as its bed-rock is formed of the twenty-eight divine Āgamas of spiritually supernal order.'[1]

The *Siddhānta* teaches that the soul is eternal, formless, all-pervasive (*vibhu*), and that its all-pervading nature (*vyāpaka*) leads it to become one with what it dwells in for the time being, with the material or the divine. The original sin, the *pāva-mūlam*, of the soul is an eternal ignorance which reduces the soul to the condition of *āṇava* (from *anu*, 'atom'), so that it cannot attain to its true all-pervading nature freed from the material body. The soul, by assimilating itself to the material, which is without intelligence and unknowing, the product of elemental matter (*māyā*), has desires and delusions which draw it into actions (*karma*), good and evil. Through its *āṇava* it tends to be drawn away from the feet of the Lord. Its true intuitions tend to urge it to free itself from its material surroundings and to seek rest and support in the absolute true and real, the ideal love and bliss—the ideal which has set Śiva as supreme god of Tamil-land.

The soul can know nothing of itself. It is not pure knowledge (*chit*), like the Lord; for the soul and its surroundings of *karma*, *māyā*, and *āṇava* are unintelligent. How then, it is asked, can the soul gain knowledge of the divine? The answer is that knowledge can be gained only through the free grace of the Lord, and the soul becomes 'intelligent or unintelligent according as divine irradiation is given or withheld.'[2] The authoritative *Śiva-ñāna-Siddhiyar* of Arunandi Śiva Āchārya, a pupil of Meykanda, says of Śiva:

'If you contemplate Him as beyond contemplation, even this gives no benefit as it is a mere fiction. If you contemplate Him as yourself, this also is a fiction. The only way to know Him is by understanding Him through his Arul, or Grace.'[3]

The same idea of final salvation flowing from the grace of Śiva was set forth by Umāpati, a Śaiva sage of the 14th cent., in his *Tiru-Arul-payan* ('Fruit of Divine Grace') in the words:

'Where the search ends there is the abode of the Lord.'

LITERATURE.—See the authorities given in the course of the art., and especially artt. BRĀHMANISM, HINDUISM, and DRAVIDIANS (South India).

R. W. FRAZER.

ŚAKA ERA.—The Śaka era is one of many reckonings which are or have been in use in India, and has the special interest of being the most important of them. It is treated as running from either of two points in March, A.D. 78—as a solar reckoning, from the Hindu vernal equinox, and, as a luni-solar reckoning, from the first day of the bright fortnight of the Hindu month Chaitra.

In N. India, *i.e.* in those parts which lie to the north of the rivers Narbadā and Mahānadī, the chief reckoning is the Vikrama or Samvat era, known in an early stage as the time or reckoning of the Mālava people, the starting-point of which, as fixed in mediæval times, is, from one point of view, the earlier one, the first day of the bright fortnight at Kārttika, in September, 58 B.C., and, from another point of view, the same day of Chaitra in March of the same year. The Śaka era is the chief reckoning of S. India, though, in fact, it had its origin in western parts of N. India; it prevails, however, to a certain extent in N. India too, and in Kashmīr, Nēpāl, and Assam. Like the Vikrama era, it is in use for historical, calendrical, and all general purposes. But it is also an astronomers' reckoning, which the Vikrama era never has been.

The first Indian astronomical reckoning was the Kaliyuga era; this was devised by the Hindu astronomers about A.D. 400, and was laid out so as to start from an assumed general conjunction of the sun, moon, and the planets, at the conventional Hindu vernal equinox in February 3102 B.C. The Kaliyuga era has always been more or less in use for astronomy from the time of its invention, and to a small extent for other purposes also. But about A.D. 500 the Śaka era was taken up by the Hindu astronomers as a second reckoning, for laying down more recent epochs for some of their calculative purposes, and was fitted by them to the exact solar and luni-solar starting-points mentioned above; they used it to such an extent that it soon very largely superseded the Kaliyuga reckoning; and it is, in fact, owing to its adoption by them, and to their use of it for calendrical as well as calculative purposes, that it gradually acquired its wide prevalence, extending not only throughout India but also across the sea to Cambodia, Java, and Ceylon.

The Kaliyuga era is a purely artificial reckoning, invented by the astronomers. Not so, however, the Vikrama and Śaka eras. These have actually existed from 58 B.C. and A.D. 78 respectively, and had their origins in historical events which happened in those years, the Śaka era owing its birth to an irruption of foreigners, who invaded India from the west, established themselves and acquired dominion in India, and founded this reckoning there, and who, whether they were or were not actually Śakas, *i.e.* Scythians, were recalled as Śakas in later times.

In its earliest stages the reckoning of A.D. 78, like other Indian eras, ran on for a long time without a name, its years being simply quoted by their numbers as 'the year so-and-so,' and in this way it is found used in inscriptions and on coins from soon after its foundation down to nearly A.D. 400. The earliest inscriptional instance of the connexion of the name of the Śakas with the reckoning is found in a record of A.D. 578, after which time it was habitual; the connexion, however, is carried back to A.D. 505 by an astronomical date. The era also became known as the era of Śālivāhana; but this name for it was of late invention, the earliest known certain instance of the use of it being found in an inscription of A.D. 1354; it was applied to the Śaka era in imitation of the association of the name of Vikrama with the northern era, which dates from some time in the 9th or 10th century A.D. The popular belief, shown, *e.g.*, in the introductory passages of some of the *Pañchāṅgs*, or Hindu almanacs, is that the Vikrama era was founded by a King Vikrama reigning in 58 B.C. at Ujjain in Mālwā, and that the Śaka era was founded by a King Śālivāhana reigning A.D. 78 at Pratishṭhāna, which is the modern Paiṭhaṇ, on the Gōdāvarī, in the Nizam's territory; this, however, is fiction, without any real basis.

LITERATURE.—For more details about the Śaka, Vikrama, and Kaliyuga eras, with an account of the other reckonings and the Hindu calendar, see the present writer's art. 'Hindu Chronology,' in *EBr*[11] xiii. 491–501; see also R. Sewell and S. B. Dikshit, *The Indian Calendar*, London, 1896.

J. F. FLEET.

[1] *Siddhānta Dīpika*, x. 476.
[2] Umāpati, *Tiru-Arul-payan*, tr. J. M. Nallaswami Pillai, Madras, 1896, iv. 37.
[3] vi. 7.

SAKHĪBHĀVAS.—The Sakhībhāvas are a branch of the Rādhāvallabhīs (*q.v*), small in number and of little importance. They carry to extremes the worship of Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa's mistress, whom they look upon as his *śakti*, or energic power. The men assume the character of Rādhā's *sakhīs*, or girl friends, and, to enforce the idea of the change of sex, assume female garb, with all women's manners and customs, even pretending to be subject to the catamenia. Their aim is to be accepted as genuine *sakhīs* in a future life, and thus to enjoy a share of Kṛṣṇa's favours. They are of ill repute, and do not show themselves much in public. According to Wilson, they are to be found in Jaipur and Benares and also in Bengal. Some of them also are wandering mendicants. They appear to have been numerous in the 17th century.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 177; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., do. 1882, p. 236; M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes in Benares*, Calcutta, Bombay, and London, 1872–81, i. 264; R. G. Bhandarkar, 'Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems,' *GIAP* III. vi. [1913] 86.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SAKHĪ SARWAR.—Sakhi Sarwar, or Nigāhā, is a famous Muhammadan shrine in the Derā Ghazī Khān District of the Panjāb (lat. 29° 59′ N.; long. 70° 18′ E.), situated on the high bank of a hill stream in the Dāman-i-Koh, or flanks of the Sulaimān range, in arid jungle scenery.

The place takes its name from the saint Sakhī Sarwar, or 'generous leader,' also known as Lakhdātā, 'giver of lakhs,' Lālanwālā, 'he of the rubies,' or Rohiānwālā, 'he of the hills.' He is generally known by the title of Sulṭān, 'lord.' His real name was Sayyid Aḥmad, but his exact date is unknown, tradition varying from the 12th to the 16th cent. A.D. His life is a mass of legends, describing the miracles which he worked. Within the enclosure of his shrine are to be seen the tomb of the saint, of his lady known as Bībī Rāẽ, and that of a *jinn*, or demon, whom he overcame. The place is visited by sick people, who, as a proof of their recovery, hang small ornamented pillows on the walls, or, when cured of ophthalmia, offer, in performance of a vow, eyes made of gold or silver.[1] Other persons vow to shave the hair of an expected child at the shrine and to present its weight in gold or silver. Some childless people vow their first child to the saint, and on its birth take it to the shrine with a cord round its neck. Sacred pigeons, fed from the proceeds of an endowment, are attached to the shrine. The marks of the finger of 'Alī, son-in-law of the Prophet, and the print of his foot are shown to visitors. Diseases, like hysteria, which are supposed to be the result of spirit action are said to be cured here. Huge cakes are offered at the tomb, on receipt of which the priests read the benediction (*darūd*), return a portion of the offering, and keep the remainder for themselves.[2] Many shrines of the saint are found in other parts of the Province. A favourite method of sacrificing to him is to place dough on a piece of ground on which a large fire has been previously lighted, and to distribute it when it is baked. He is also worshipped by the rite of sleeping on the ground instead of on a bed—a primitive ascetic rite.[3] The followers of the saint are known as Sulṭānī, and have special priests called Barhaī, or Bharaī.[4] Rose[5] traces a connexion between them and the Yogīs (*q.v.*). The cult, again, is associated with that of the earth-god, Bhairoṅ, and Bhāī Pherū, the *numen* of the whirlwinds common in the Panjāb. There is also a tradition of a criminal leaping over a rock near the shrine, which may be associated with a fertility cult.[1]

Rose further states that at pilgrimages 'blankets of black, the colour of Śiva, are worn. In the east of the Punjāb, at least, the cult of Sakhī Sarwar is peculiarly favoured by women, which is consistent with its connection with Bhairava, the earth being the emblem of fertility, and this again is in accord with the somewhat Paphian rites observed at the shrine itself. Further, the theory that the worship is really one of the earth-god would account for its being essentially the cult of the Jāṭ peasantry.'[2]

It therefore seems probable that the place may have been for ages the seat of the cult of the earth-god and of the powers of fertility and that this was taken over by Buddhism and Hinduism, and finally connected with a modern Muhammadan saint—an interesting example of that fusion of cults which is at the basis of so much in modern Hinduism.

LITERATURE.—*Census of India, 1891*, vol. xix., *Punjab*, pt. i. p. 132 ff., Calcutta, 1892, *1901*, vol. xvii., *Punjab*, pt. i. p. 133, do. 1902; M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, iii. 7, 419, iv. 147 n., 339; W. Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 208 ff.; A. O'Brien, 'The Mohammedan Saints of the W. Punjab,' *JRAI* xli. [1911] 519 f.; *IGI* xxi. 390; E. D. Maclagan, *Census Report, Panjab, 1891*, pt. i., Calcutta, 1892, p. 134 ff. (*Census of India Reports*, vol. xix.).

W. CROOKE.

SĀKTAS.—See HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 705 f.

ŚĀKYAMUNI.—See BUDDHA, BODHISATTVA, ĀDIBUDDHA.

SALISH.—The Salish peoples lived in the four adjacent States of Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon. A marked distinction existed between the coast Salish west of the Cascade range and the Salish of the interior. The social organization of both was very loose, the various tribes having little unity in spite of the existence of a head or premier chief for each. The coast Salish possessed three castes, but clans and gentes were replaced by village communities in which descent was usually patrilineal, although a man might also become a chief among his mother's people. In the interior, however, personal ability counted for more than descent in determining leadership, whether in war, in peace, or in religious ceremonials. The interior tribes also depended far more on the chase than did those of the coast, who were principally fish-eaters.

I. *COAST SALISH.*—1. **Supernatural beings.**—Among most of the coast Salish 'the Great Transformer,' called usually by some variant of the word Käls, was the highest object of worship, though the Nanaimo, while recognizing him, paid higher regard to the sun. Käls was similar in character to Raven[3] and Mink of the northern tribes, but, since he was also the highest deity, he was not such an utter charlatan. C. Hill-Tout[4] mentions a 'sky chief,' addressed by the Halkomelem tribe as 'parent,' 'father,' or 'creator,' but does not state whether he was identical with Käls.

A multitude of lesser potencies furnished individual helpers, or *sulia*, with which each person was provided among the more southerly tribes. Nearer the Kwakiutl, however, they were obtained only by prominent men such as shamans, warriors, hunters, and chiefs. Among most of the lower Fraser tribes the chief was also a tribal high-priest, without whom no religious ceremony or observance could be performed; in other words, he was the leader in national religious observances.

2. **Shamanism.**—The shamans were of three

[1] Cf. the offerings at the shrine of Æsculapius (J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, iii. 248 ff.; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 345).
[2] M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, iii. 419.
[3] Cf. the Selloi (Homer, *Il.* xvi. 234 f.); *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xvii. pt. i. p. 113 *f.*; *FL* xix. [1908] 68.
[4] D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 227.
[5] *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xvii. pt. i. p. 133.

[1] Cf. *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 196 *f.*
[2] *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xvii. pt. i. p. 133.
[3] See art. HAIDA, vol. vi. p. 473.
[4] *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1902, p. 410.

kinds: (1) the shamans proper, called *skelam* ('to heal,' 'to make well') by some of the Fraser tribes, cured internal diseases produced by witchcraft, the absence of the soul, etc., and employed the usual methods; (2) the *olia*, or soothsayer, besides interpreting dreams, visions, omens, and portents, healed external injuries and took care of the bodies of the dead; he alone might prepare a body for burial and protect a person from the evil influence of ghosts, of which all the Salish were extremely afraid; (3) the *seuwel*, or wizards, who might be men or women, instead of being universally abhorred as among most tribes, were recognized as a regular class. They were employed to injure people, and they did this by washing their hands in water at sun-down and repeating the victim's name, or by repeating formulæ over some of his belongings. They were also engaged by the relatives of a deceased person to hold converse with the ghost and adjure it never to come back to trouble the living. After a person had died, they were employed to drive away sickness. Corresponding to this class among the Songish were the *sioua* women, who were acquainted with herbs and performed the functions of midwives.

3. **The dead.**—The stories told of the world of the dead were obtained from the first class of shamans and differed little from those found elsewhere. The salmon-feast, celebrated by all these tribes when the great salmon-run began, was the only one of importance outside of the winter potlatches, and partook somewhat of a religious character.

II. *Bellacoola.*—The Bellacoola, an isolated Salish group on Bentinck arm and Dean inlet, were unlike all the others in having evolved a mythology of considerable system and originality.[1] They postulated five different worlds, two of which were above and two below the plane of this earth. In the highest realm, called Atsaaktl, resided an old woman called Kamaits, Tsi sisnaahitl ('our woman'), or Eku yakimtotlsitl ('afraid of nothing'). This world was believed to be a treeless plain over which a wind continually blew towards Kamaits's house, situated in the far east; but near the house it was calm. In front stood a post in the shape of a monster whose mouth formed the door, and near it was gravel of three colours, blue, black, and white. Behind the house was a salt-water pond in which Kamaits bathed. In the same pond lived a snake, or fish, prominent in Bellacoola mythology, called the *sisiutl*.

In the centre of the lower heaven, Sonh, stood the House of Myths (Nusmeta), also known as 'the-house-where-man-was-created,' 'the-house-from-which-people-came-down,' or 'the-house-to-which-people-go.' This was ruled by Senh, the sun, also called 'our father,' or 'sacred one.' He was the only deity to whom the Bellacoola prayed, for they did not pray to Kamaits. Indeed, Kamaits does not appear prominently in the religious thought of the nation except for the war which she waged in primitive times with the mountains and her final victory over them. A second deity, who lived in the back part of the House of Myths, and who was of almost equal importance with Senh, was Atlkuntam. The two together might be called the rulers of mankind. Near the fire was an old man called Snutlkulhals, who formerly ruled over the house, but had given up his place in favour of those two deities. Besides those three there were a number of inferior beings, many of whom had to do solely with the *kusiut* ceremony. Of the others, one gave a child its individual features; another, a female deity, rocked infants and the young of animals before sending them down into the world; a third was 'the mother of flowers'; and there were two beings whose function it was to determine when a person was to die. Still others acted as messengers for the superior deities. Raven was said by some to have his abode in this house, and to him was attributed the invention of the salmon-weir and of the ceremonial whistles and the institution of the ceremonies themselves. The beings concerned particularly with the *kusiut* were nine brothers and a sister. There were special deities to initiate shamans and one whose office was to protect mountain-goat hunters. We also find a belief in the thunder-bird. In a room in the back part of the House of Myths resided several deities who initiated the cannibal dancer and other novices. Along the course pursued by the sun, which is represented as a celestial bridge, were stationed several additional beings, and twenty-four were guardians of the sky, which they fed with firewood continually. Where the sun set was a post supporting the sky and preventing the sun from falling into the lower world. Our world was supposed to be an island in the ocean, held up by a giant who sat in the far east with legs apart. The earth was fastened by two ropes to a long stone bar held in his hands, and, when he got tired and moved his hands, there was an earthquake. If he moved the earth westward, people had epidemics; if eastward, sickness disappeared. In the sea dwelt a being who swallowed and gave forth the water of the ocean twice every day. Salmon were supposed to come from a land in the far west. The world nearest beneath us was described as the country of the ghosts and lay along the sandy banks of the river. Winter in their country was our summer, and their summer was our winter; their night was our day, and their day our night. There was a dancing-house in that country, where the *kusiut* was performed, and the ghosts entered it through the smoke-hole by means of a rope-ladder. They were not allowed to return directly to our earth by this ladder to be reborn, but might ascend another to the lower heaven and be sent down from there by the deities. Those who enjoyed staying in the ghost country descended to the lowest world of all, whence there was no return. From the world above were sent down the ancestors of each of the Bellacoola village communities.

III. *Thompson River tribes.*—Thanks to the researches of Boas, Teit, and Hill-Tout, our knowledge of the religion of the Ntlakyapamuk, or Thompson River Indians, is much more ample than that of any other of the interior Salish tribes, but the rites and beliefs of all were nearly the same.

1. **Cosmological beliefs.** — According to Teit, the Thompson River Indians believed the world to be square with its corners directed towards the cardinal points, and Lytton, where Coyote's son reached the earth, was its centre. Round the edges were lakes, over which clouds and mists hovered. The earth rose towards the north, and that was why it was colder there. Cold winds were caused every time people far in the north left their houses, and warm winds by people far in the south. Formerly the northern and southern people waged war with each other, exposing the earth to alternate periods of extreme heat and extreme cold, but their wars were ended by the marriage of the daughter of the chief of the south to the son of the chief of the north. Thunder was caused by a huge bird like a grouse. It shot arrows by using its wings as a bow, and their rebound in the air produced the noise. Fog or mist was described as the steam of the earth rising

[1] The Bellacoola information is all taken from Boas, 'The Mythology of the Bella Coola Indians,' in *Memoirs of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition*, vol. i. pt. ii. [1898].

when it was heated, or was said to be caused by Coyote turning over. Lakes and ponds originated at the time of a deluge, which also swept the fish into them. Fire and water were in the possession of certain animals, from which they were liberated. By the Upper Thompsons rain and snow were said to be made by the 'Old Man' scratching his back or urinating, but the Lower Thompsons ascribed their production to a female deity. The sun and moon were formerly men, and the reason why the latter is less bright is that his sister Hare or Frog sits continually on his face. Haloes about the sun and moon were their respective 'houses.' Stars were described as transformed people or as roots growing in the upper world, though special tales were told of the Pleiades and the stars of the Great Dipper. The Milky Way was called 'the trail of the stars,' 'what has been emptied on the trail of the stars,' or 'the tracks of the dead.' The rainbow was formerly a friend of the thunder, which was in the habit of painting its face frequently with bright colours.

2. Supernatural beings. — All sorts of 'land mysteries' and 'water mysteries' were prayed to. Those that might in any way be considered tribal deities were the sun, the dawn, the rain, tops of mountains, certain lakes, the spirit of sweat-bathing, and perhaps also the Old Man, who was said to live on the tops of high mountains, and in former days sent the Old Coyote, the principal Ntlakyapamuk transformer, to set the world in order. There were also three brothers, called Koaktlka, and another individual, who acted as transformers. The three brothers were finally changed into stone, while Old Coyote retreated to his house of ice. After that the Old Man himself travelled throughout the world. He thus appears to have occupied an elevated position in native mythology, but little attention was actually paid to him in daily life. The leading objects of regard were the sun and the dawn, the latter being frequently invoked by boys and girls during their puberty ceremonials. The spirit of sweat-bathing naturally derived his importance from the prominent place which sweat-bathing occupied in the acquirement of guardian-spirits. Each person, male or female, whether a shaman or not, possessed a guardian-spirit which differed somewhat for a shaman, warrior, hunter, fisherman, gambler, runner, etc., but all were otherwise much alike and resembled the personal *manitus* found elsewhere in N. America. A very few shamans inherited guardian spirits which had been especially powerful, but most were acquired by a longer or shorter course of sweat-bathing, fasting, abstinence from women, and isolation in the mountains. Dwarfs and giants were believed in by the Upper Thompson Indians, the latter being supposed to inhabit the Okinagan country, and there was a race of pale, ghost-like people who sometimes pursued lonely travellers. They were different from ghosts only in one particular—they could not be deterred from pursuit by turning out of the trail.

3. The dead.—The land of souls was thought to be beneath, towards sunset, and was approached over a dimly-lit trail, which finally descended a gentle slope and came to a stream spanned by a single log. Just before this another trail joined it, used by shamans as a short cut when pursuing a soul that had been carried off. At either end of the log bridge was a guardian, who sent back souls whose time had not yet come. Another stood at the entrance of the land of souls. From the bridge the trail rose gradually, and it began to grow light again. At the top of the ascent was an immense pile of clothing, where the souls left everything that they had worn in this world. Further on the trail ended at the door of a great lodge, made of hard white material similar to limestone. This door was narrow, but at the opposite or western end was a wider one opening into the soul country. In the lodge there was always some one to welcome the new-comer, and generally his departed friends gathered there to receive him when they learned that he was coming. The land of the souls was a most delightful country, full of berries and flowers; the air was pleasant and still; and it was always light and warm. Some said that the souls went naked without appearing to notice it, but others supposed that they wore clothes such as they had had on earth. There is another story describing the journey to the land of souls which makes it lead to a lake on which one must paddle for days in a dim atmosphere. A notion existed that animals also have worlds situated under ground; when many went back there, they became scarce on our earth.

Each soul had a shadow or ghost, which remained behind after death, visiting for four days the persons and places formerly frequented by the dead man, after which it generally haunted the place where the body was buried. These ghosts plotted to take away souls from living persons, and were consequently much feared. Suicides did not go to the abode of souls, but became 'lost,' or ceased to exist. The souls of those who were drowned perished entirely, or continued to dwell in the water, or followed the waters to a land beyond them which shamans could not reach. Some said that the souls of those who had led good lives reached the spirit country much more quickly, but in general moral character seems to have affected their future very slightly. The soul of a dead child might return in one of the same sex born soon afterwards, but otherwise rebirth was not believed in. It was thought that the souls would continue in the country of the dead until the Old Man and Coyote came again. These would be preceded by messengers and would bring the souls with them. Christians were believed to go to the land of souls over a different trail from that used by others.

4. Shamanism and witchcraft.—The doings of shamans and wizards, although interesting, present few features not found in other parts of the continent. It was believed that they could harm a person wearing an article of clothing of Indian make more easily than one who was dressed like a white man. Shamans were greatly feared on account of their power of bewitching; but, if it was thought that they had injured or caused the death of any one, they were sometimes killed, though ordinarily failure to cure simply made it necessary to return the fee. Occasionally they were called in to treat horses or dogs if these were highly valued.

5. Prophets.—As elsewhere in America, prophets made their appearance every now and then, generally claiming some message from the spirit-world, and they drew large followings for a time, the Indians gathering from all quarters to see and hear them. They foretold such affairs of general interest as epidemics and the coming of the Whites with the consequent changes in customs and manners. See art. PROPHECY (American).

6. Tabus, etc.—There were numerous tabus and certain ceremonies when the firstfruits, roots, etc., came. When the first tobacco was gathered, the inhabitants of each lodge went through a special ceremony, and there were larger festivals for feasting, dancing, and praying participated in by each neighbourhood.

LITERATURE.—The Salish have been treated by **F. Boas** in report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report*

of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1889, p. 801 ff., report vi., *ib.* 1890, p. 562 ff., report vii., *ib.* 1891, p. 408 ff., and report x., *ib.* 1895, p. 523 ff., and by C. Hill-Tout, 'On the Ethnological Survey of Canada,' in *Rep. Brit. Assoc. for Adv. of Science*, 1899, p. 500 ff., 1900, p. 472 ff., and 1902, p. 355 ff., and in *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 20–91. Besides having report vii. 'On the N.W. Tribes of Canada' devoted to them, the Bellacoola have been the subject of a special paper by Boas, in *Memoirs of the Amer. Mus. of Nat. Hist., Jesup North Pacific Expedition*, vol. i. pt. ii. [1898], 'The Mythology of the Bella Coola Indians.' The interior Salish have been discussed by Boas in report vi. 'On the N.W. Tribes of Canada,' and by Hill-Tout, 'On the Ethnological Survey of Canada,' 1899, but most thoroughly by J. Teit and F. Boas, 'The Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in *Memoirs of Amer. Mus. of Nat. Hist., Jesup N. Pacific Expedition*, vol. i. pt. iv. [1900], and by Teit in vol. ii. pts. v. and vii. of the same series. The myths of the Thompson River Indians have been treated by Teit in the *Memoirs of the American Folk-lore Society*, vi. [1898]. The material on the Salish of Washington and Oregon leaves much to be desired. We are dependent principally on G. Gibbs, 'The Tribes of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon' (*Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, vol. i., Washington, 1877), in J. W. Powell's *Survey of the Rocky Mountain Region*, and M. Eells, 'The Twana, Chemakum and Klallam Indians of Washington Territory,' in the *Report of the Smithsonian Institution* for 1887, pt. i., Washington, 1889, p. 605; also see Boas in *JAFL* xi. [1898] 23 ff., 133 ff., and 'Kathlanet Texts,' *Bull* 26, *BE*, Washington, 1901; and *Globus*, lxiii. [1893] 154 ff., 172 ff., 190 ff.

JOHN R. SWANTON.

SALIVA.—In the folk-beliefs of most backward races and among the less intelligent classes in civilized communities many superstitious beliefs are associated with this bodily secretion.

According to J. E. Crombie, this has been explained as follows:

'At one time the life of a man must have been generally believed to have been bound up in his saliva; just as it can be shown that the life of a man has been very generally believed to have been bound up in his blood . . . therefore the spitting rite is a parallel to the blood rite.'[1]

This theory has been extended by E. S. Hartland:

'The transfer of saliva is more than a gift of a portion of the spitter's life. It is a gift of a portion of himself, which is thus put into the power of the recipient as a pledge of goodwill. Nay, it is a bodily union with the recipient, such as can be effected by a blood-covenant. Possibly, as Mr. Crombie suggests, it is, where an interchange of saliva occurs, a form of blood-covenant consequent upon milder manners. . . . Rather it seems to be a more evanescent and less solemn, though still emphatic, form, intended only for temporary purposes.'[2]

To this it may be added that the effect of the transfer of saliva depends upon the intention of the spitter. It is often the result of a kindly intention, that of associating the personality of the spitter with the person on whom it is discharged; where the intent is hostile, it implies reprobation, abhorrence, or contempt. The exact purport of some of the beliefs and usages quoted below is vague and uncertain; but most of the cases may be explained on the principles already stated.

1. **Saliva as a part of the personality.**—This often appears in popular belief and usage; *e.g.*, English slang 'spit'=a facsimile—'He's the very spit of his father or mother'; French, 'C'est son père tout craché';[3] 'Ce'estoit luy tout craché.'[4] In the folk-tales saliva is often represented as speaking, warning the hero or heroine of approaching danger, and so on.[5] Among practices to obtain children Hartland quotes the case of a gypsy woman drinking the water in which her husband has spat.

'What is the meaning of the expression "He is the very spit of his father" current not only in England, but also, according to the learned Liebrecht, in France, Italy, and Portugal, and alluded to by Voltaire and La Fontaine, if it point not back to a similar, perhaps a more repulsive ceremony formerly practised by the folk all over Western Europe?'[6]

2. **Saliva causing conception.**—The belief that saliva, as part of the personality, may cause conception is common in the lower culture.

In the *Popol Vuh* the demi-god Hunhun Ahpu spits into the hand of the princess Xquiq, and she finds herself pregnant.[1] According to the Hindu legend, Agni spat upon the waters, and three personages, Ekata, Dvita, and Trita, were born.[2] The Chapotās of Bengal profess to be descended from a man who sprang from some betel-leaf which Śiva, after chewing it, spat out.[3] In the Teutonic myth Qvasir, at the making of a covenant between the Aesir and the Vanir, was formed out of their spittle, and in the Edda the spittle of the waves was shaped by the gods into a man.[4] In the Garo creation legend Nostu spits upon the lilies and grass in the water, and the land is formed.[5] In Egyptian mythology Isis gathers up the spittle which falls from Ra, and from earth and the spittle forms a snake.[6] In parts of England the fertilization of the turkey and the capercailzie is caused by the same means.[7] Many similar beliefs are collected by Hartland.[8]

3. **Black magic worked through saliva.**—The belief that magic may be worked to the injury of the owner by the acquisition of a piece of his clothing, hair, nail-parings, or other personal relics is common in the lower culture, and extends to saliva.[9]

'Every part of a man's body is regarded by primitive science as impregnated with his properties; but such parts are especially so considered which themselves are held to have a special connection with the life and soul.'[10]

In S. India saliva is placed in a coco-nut, which is pierced with twenty-one nails, buried, and a fowl sacrificed, for purposes of black magic.[11] In Polynesia sorcerers 'secure something connected with the body of the object of vengeance; the parings of the nails, a lock of the hair, the saliva from the mouth, or other secretions from the body.'[12] Spittle, like hair, is *tapu* in New Zealand.[13] Among the Columbians spittle is collected and given to a magician, who charms away the owner's life.[14] Hence this substance is carefully guarded.

'The use of the portable spittoon by the Sandwich Island chiefs, in which the saliva was carefully deposited, carried by a confidential servant, and buried every morning . . . originated in their dread of sorcery.'[15]

In Hawaii a chief of high rank held the office of spittoon-bearer to the king.[16] Among the Burmese and Shans the disposal of the saliva and water in which clothes have been washed is superintended with anxious care to avoid witchcraft.[17]

4. **Spitting on oneself.**—Hence spitting on oneself, clothes, or other personal articles enforces the influence of the personality on such things, and produces union or communion with them.

In Theocritus the maiden who rejects a rough country lover spits in her breast as a protective (τρὶς εἰς ἐὸν ἔπτυσε κόλπον).[18]

'Hunc puer, hunc iuvenis turba circumterit arcta;
Despuit in molles et sibi quisque sinus.'[19]

The Cherokee brave, on the eve of battle, chewed a charmed root and spat the juice on his body to protect himself from bullets.[20] In Lesbos, if a person admires a child, the mother spits three times in her bosom.[21] In Germany, if a person happens to spit on himself, he will hear some news; in Jamaica it means that some one is saying something untrue about him.[22]

5. **Union promoted by spitting on another.**—The belief that, by dropping saliva on a person or thing, union may be created, or immunity from sorcery,

[1] *The International Folk-lore Congress, 1891: Papers and Transactions*, p. 251.
[2] *LP* ii. 260.
[3] A. Barrère and C. G. Leland, *A Dict. of Slang, Jargon, and Cant*, London, 1897, ii. 273.
[4] R. Cotgrave, *French and Eng. Dict.*, London, 1650, *s.v.* 'Crache.'
[5] M. R. Cox, *Cinderella*, London, 1893, pp. 428, 518; J. A. MacCulloch, *CF*, do. 1905, pp. 171, 193, 197.
[6] *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909, i. 70.

[1] H. H. Bancroft, *NR* iii. [New York, 1875] 478.
[2] *SBE* xlii. [1897] 521.
[3] *Census of India, 1901*, Calcutta, 1902, vol. vi., *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 405.
[4] J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, i. 319; G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 464.
[5] A. Playfair, *The Garos*, London, 1909, p. 84.
[6] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 387.
[7] *FL* viii. [1897] 375 f.
[8] *Primitive Paternity*, i. 12, 18, 19, 68, 73 f.
[9] J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, i. 413 f.
[10] A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 104.
[11] E. Thurston, *Ethnog. Notes on S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 328; cf. Westermarck, *MI* i. 589 f.
[12] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1830, ii. 228.
[13] E. Tregear, 'The Maoris,' *JAI* xix. [1890] 123.
[14] Bancroft, *NR* i. 171 n. [15] Ellis, ii. 229.
[16] *FL* vi. [1895] 73.
[17] *Gazetteer of Upper Burma*, Rangoon, 1900, pt. i. vol. ii p. 87.
[18] *Idyll.* xx. 11; cf. vi. 39.
[19] Tibullus, *Eleg.* I. ii. 95 f.; cf. Theophrastus, *Charact.* (*de Superst.*) xvi.
[20] J. Mooney, 7 *RBEW* (1891), p. 389.
[21] W. H. D. Rouse, 'Folklore Firstfruits from Lesbos,' *FL* vii. [1896] 148.
[22] Grimm, iv. 1795; *FL* xvi. [1905] 76.

witchcraft, or the evil eye secured, is common. The idea appears in many different forms.

(*a*) *Spitting as a form of salutation or greeting.*—'The Wa-chaga share with the Masai . . . a curious habit of *spitting* on things or people as a compliment or sign of gratitude. I remember one man . . . was so pleased at my safe return that he took my hand in his and spat repeatedly at the sky, saying constantly "Erua icha!"—"God is good!"'[1] 'The old lady's farewell of me was peculiar; she took my hand in her two, turned it palm upwards, and spat on it . . . the doctor [Nassau] . . . says the spitting is accidental, a by-product [of the performance which the natives call *bata*, and which consisted in blowing a blessing].'[2] On the Lower Congo, 'in saying good-bye to each other, they pretend to spit on the forehead and hands of the departing one, and on some grass which, after being spat upon, they stick in the hair of the beloved one leaving them. This is to bring good luck and keep away evil spirits.'[3] In Yucatan 'the highest mark of respect was to place the right hand, anointed with spittle, on the ground, and then to rub it over the heart.'[4] Among the Masai spitting is a sign of welcome; women spit on their palms and shake hands with a visitor.[5]

(*b*) *On receiving the handsel or first coin in the day, or a gift.*—'Tis a common use in London, and perhaps over great part of England, for Apple-woemen, Oyster-woemen &c. & some Butchers, to spit on the money wch they first recieve in the morning, wch they call good handsell.'[6] The custom is common in Great Britain and Ireland.[7] In E. Africa people spit on a gift for good luck.[8] 'An Atlas Berber . . . spat on the coin which I gave him . . . and my native friends told me that he did so for fear lest the coin, owing to some sorcery on my part, should not only itself return to me, but at the same time take with it all the money with which it had been in contact in his bag.'[9]

(*c*) *Lustration of children with saliva.*—The usual explanation of this custom is that it is intended to ward off the spells of witches or fairies or to counteract the evil eye.

Hartland regards this as 'only a specialisation of a more general intention. The evidence points to the meaning of the ceremony as a welcome into the world, an acknowledgment of kindred, a desire to express those friendly feelings which in archaic times none but a kinsman could entertain, whatever flattering words might be spoken.'[10]

In Cork immediately after birth, the child is sometimes spat on by the father, and in Wicklow they spit on a child for luck the first day it is brought out after birth; at Innisbofin, when old women meet a baby out with its nurse, they spit on the ground all round it in a circle, to keep fairies from it.[11] In modern Greece a visitor's first greeting to a baby is to spit on it.[12]

A special case is that of the use of saliva in the baptismal rite of the Roman Catholic Church. 'The priest exorcises the child; anoints his ears and nostrils with spittle—after our Lord's example, who thus cured the deaf and dumb man—and asks him in three separate interrogations whether he renounces Satan, all his works, and all his pomps.'[13]

In modern Greece 'at a baptism . . . the priest opens the service by exorcising all evil spirits and influences from the four corners of the room by swinging his censer, but the midwife, who usually knows something of magic, or one of the godparents, accompanies him and makes assurance doubly sure by spitting in each suspected nook.'[14]

(*d*) *Procuring communion with sacred objects by means of saliva.*—In many places communion with sacred objects is procured by spitting upon them.

In Guatemala at small chapels along the road the passer-by halted, gathered a handful of herbs, rubbed his legs with them, spat reverently upon them, and with a prayer placed them upon the altar with a small stone and an offering of pepper, salt, or cacao, which no one dared to touch.[1]

In Korea 'my coolies occasionally added a few stones to the heaps of more than usual importance even by the wayside, bowing before them and expectorating on them.'[2] In the practice of folk-medicine in Borneo 'the sorcerer then takes the image from the boat and instructs it what to say to the spirit on behalf of the patient; after abusing the image and enforcing on his mind the necessity of remembering the lesson, by way of indelibly fixing it on his memory, he winds up by spitting sirih juice in its face.'[3] 'The Basutos worship a big block of granite, dance round it on one leg, and at the same time spit on it.'[4]

At Brighton there is a stone wall in which is a crystal, called by schoolboys 'the holy stone'; it used to be the custom for every boy who passed this stone to spit on it for luck.'[5]

Sometimes the spitting seems to be a form of coercion of the *numen* in the sacred object:

'In the Tamil districts, if a temple car does not move from its position when an attempt is made to drag it, a lot of people, who are allowed to get intoxicated, are given toddy mixed with castor-oil. Some of this they spit out upon the wheels of the car, which cannot stand defilement, and proceeds to move.'[6]

The idea of communion is perhaps shown when in Japan pilgrims to Buddhist shrines chew strips of paper into pellets and spit them out at the images of guardian deities; if the pellet sticks, the prayer will be heard; if not, the prayer will not be heard.[7]

(*e*) *Spitting as an asseveration or as a bond of union.*—

Among the Bechuanas, 'when it thunders every one trembles; if there are several together, one asks the other with uneasiness, Is there any one amongst us who devours the wealth of others? All then spit on the ground saying, We do not devour the wealth of others.'[8] When in the 18th cent. English tenants combined against their landlords, 'it is usual with them to assemble round a great Stone, upon which they are to spit, believing this practice (joyn'd with a promise of what they will do, and stand to) to be as sacred and binding as if they had taken a publick oath.'[9]

Spitting, again, is a means of transmitting magical powers.

In Baluchistan the holy man who is able to charm away locusts passes on the charm to his successor by spitting into his mouth; the man thus initiated goes mad, but this passes off and leaves wonderful power.[10]

6. Spitting as a mark of contempt or hatred.—Here the intent is changed, and the object is to exhibit enmity or aversion.

Spitting in the face was common among the Jews.[11] Among the Greeks we have the phrase of Sophocles, πτύσας προσώπῳ.[12] Compare with this Shakespeare's:

> 'I do defy him, and I spit at him;
> Call him a slanderous coward and a villain.'[13]

> 'As she spit in his face, so she defied him.'[14]

'The fanatic nigger, spitting in disgust on the ground, declared that this made matters worse, and that he believed me not only to be a Kafir (infidel), but also a spy.'[15]

When a girl in S. Africa is found not to be a virgin, the women spit on her pudenda.[16] Among the Fellahin of Palestine, if a man marries a widow, unless she needs protection, the men

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[1] H. H. Johnston, 'The People of E. Equatorial Africa,' *JAI* xv. [1886] 11.
[2] M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, pp. 288, 453.
[3] J. H. Weeks, 'Some Customs of the Lower Congo People,' *FL* xx. [1909] 470.
[4] Bancroft, *NR* ii. 635.
[5] J. Bland-Sutton, *Man and Beast in E. Ethiopia*, London, 1911, p. 98; J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, do. 1887, p. 166; H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, do. 1902, ii. 833; S. L. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, do. 1901, p. 47 f.; for the Dinka custom see *ERE* iv. 712.
[6] J. Aubrey, *Remaines of Gentilisme and Judaisme* [1686–87], ed. J. Britten, London, 1881, pp. 80, 231.
[7] *NQ*, 4th ser., vi. [1870] 339 f., 5th ser., viii. [1877] 46; J. Brand, *Observations on Popular Antiquities*, London, 1849, iii. 262; J. Nicholson, *Folk-lore of E. Yorkshire*, do. 1890, p. 82.
[8] Mrs. French-Sheldon, 'Customs among the Natives of E. Africa,' *JAI* xxi. [1892] 383.
[9] Westermarck, *MI* i. 594; cf. L. Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, London, 1898, p. 77, for the Barotse: 'When they do not want a thing touched they spit on straws and stick them all about the object.'
[10] *LP* ii. 263.
[11] A. C. Haddon, 'A Batch of Irish Folk-lore,' *FL* iv. [1893] 357 f., 361.
[12] *Ib.* v. [1894] 339; cf. Tylor, *PC*[2] ii. 441.
[13] W. E. Addis and T. Arnold, *A Catholic Dict.*[6], London, 1893, p. 72; *ERE* ii. 372 f., 400.
[14] J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 15 f.

[1] Bancroft, *NR* ii. 738, iii. 481.
[2] W. Gowland, 'Dolmens and other Antiquities of Korea,' *JAI* xxiv. [1894–95] 329.
[3] H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British N. Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 284.
[4] T. Hahn, *Tsuni-Goam*, London, 1881, p. 91.
[5] *NQ*, 5th ser., iv. [1875] 495.
[6] Thurston, *Ethnog. Notes*, p. 296.
[7] B. H. Chamberlain, 'Minor Japanese Religious Practices,' *JAI* xxii. [1893] 357.
[8] T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Narr. of an Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, Eng. tr., London, 1852, p. 322 f., quoted in Westermarck, *MI* ii. 60.
[9] E. Laurence, *The Duty of a Steward to his Lord*, London, 1727, quoted in *NQ*, 4th ser., x. [1872] 312.
[10] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. iv., *Baluchistan*, i. 67 f.
[11] Nu 12[14], Job 30[10], Mt 26[67], Lk 18[32]; cf. Gal 4[14].
[12] *Ant.* 1232. [13] *Richard II.*, act. i. sc. i. l. 60 f.
[14] *Measure for Measure*, act. ii. sc. i. l. 86.
[15] M. Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia*, London, 1853, ii. 379.
[16] J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xx. [1891] 118.

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spit on her face as she goes to her new home.[1] If a Hebrew refused to perform his legal duties towards his sister-in-law, she was directed to spit in his face, saying: 'So shall it be done unto the man that doth not build up his brother's house';[2] and, if a widow repudiates the levirate, she takes off her sandal and spits on the ground.[3] In Scotland, when two boys quarrelled, and one wet the buttons of the other with his saliva, this was a challenge to fight or be dubbed a coward; when children try to solve a puzzle, the usual way of acknowledging defeat is to spit on the ground.[4]

Hence spitting becomes an embodied curse.[5]

When a Zulu is doing magic, while he is eating 'he spits in different directions, especially in the direction of those he hates, or who are at enmity with him, and whom he thus, as it were, defies, fully believing that he is surrounding himself with a preserving influence against their machinations and power, and at the same time exerting an influence injurious to them.'[6]

7. Saliva of various kinds.—There are numerous varieties of saliva in folk-belief.

(*a*) *Saliva of gods.*—

Of Marduk, the god of Babylon, it is said, 'the spittle of life is thine,' probably in allusion to its magical qualities.[7] The spittle of the Teutonic gods had mighty virtues.[8] Tchim-paz or Chkai, the god of the Mordvins, spat on the waters, and his spittle grew into a mountain.[9]

'The modern Icelanders relate that Christ, while walking with Peter along the seashore, spat into the sea, and from his spittle a stone-grig developed. Peter also spat, and his saliva turned into a female stone-grig. Both these are excellent eating. The Devil, who was not far behind, saw this, and also spat into the sea. But his spittle changed into a jellyfish, which is fit for nothing.'[10]

(*b*) *Saliva of holy men.*—The spittle of holy men has manifold virtues.

Vaiṣṇavas in S. India regard a piece of food which a *guru* has masticated and the water with which he has rinsed out his mouth as sacred, and swallow them with avidity.[11] In Madras a Mādiga woman spits on the assembled people, who believe that the spittle removes pollution because she is an impersonation of the goddess Mātangi.[12]

The Quissama of Angola 'practise the fine old recipe that Mr. Hamilton has remarked to be so much in vogue among the Kaffir medicine men, *i.e.*, that, in cases where medicine has been administered, in order to give it proper efficacy, the doctor spits his saliva down the patient's throat.'[13] In Borneo the natives 'brought portions of cooked rice on leaves, and begged the Englishmen to spit into them. After which they ate them up, thinking they should be the better for it.'[14]

At the sacrifice of the Meriah victim of the Kandhs (*q.v.*), who was regarded as semi-divine, while he was being taken in procession, some persons solicited a drop of his saliva and anointed their heads with it.[15]

(*c*) *Saliva poisonous.*—Some saliva is regarded as poisonous.

According to Socrates, a man ejects saliva because it is injurious to keep it in his system.[16] The famous Maḥmūd Begaḍā of Gujarāt was, it is said, nourished on poison, and by chewing certain fruits he could discharge saliva so poisonous that any one touching it died.[17] In the Malay Peninsula the Kenaboi have such an evil reputation that any one treading on their spittle is believed to suffer from boils and blains.[18] The spittle of a witch—*e.g.*, among the Babylonians—is naturally poisonous.[19] So also is the saliva of various animals—the lizard, the snake, the rukh in the East; in Ireland, if a weasel spits in milk, those who drink it suffer from gripes.[20]

[1] Mrs. H. H. Spoer (A. Goodrich Freer), 'Marriage Customs of the Bedu and Fellaḥin,' *FL* xxi. [1910] 275.
[2] Dt 259. [3] *ERE* v. 56.
[4] J. Napier, *Folk-Lore or Superstitious Beliefs in the W. of Scotland*, Paisley, 1879, p. 101.
[5] Westermarck, *MI* i. 255, 589, ii. 209.
[6] H. Callaway, *Nursery Tales, Traditions, and Histories of the Zulus*, Natal and London, 1868, i. 163 n.
[7] L. R. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 176.
[8] Grimm[3], iv. 1377.
[9] F. Max Müller, *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, London, 1897, ii. 250 f.
[10] *FL* iii. [1892] 325.
[11] J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 132.
[12] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, iv. 295.
[13] F. G. H. Price, 'A Description of the Quissama Tribes,' *JAI* i. [1872] 192.
[14] Ling Roth, i. 241.
[15] J. Campbell, *Thirteen Years' Service among the Wild Tribes of Khondistan*, London, 1864, p. 112.
[16] Xenophon, *Mem.* i. ii. 54.
[17] L. di Varthema, *Travels in Egypt, Syria, etc.*, Eng. tr., London, 1863, p. 110; *BG*, vol. i. pt. i. [1896] p. 248 f. note.
[18] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, i. 67 n.
[19] *HDB* v. 554.
[20] *BG*, vol. ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 380; Somadeva, *Kathāsaritsāgara*, Calcutta, 1884, ii. 296; H. M. Elliot, *The Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, ii. 208; *FL* xxii. [1911] 452.

(*d*) *Saliva medicinal.*—Some saliva is curative. The virtues of fasting spittle are widely recognized.

In Scotland its prophylactic properties are famous,[1] as also in Arabia,[2] and in Madagascar.[3] Pliny gives many prescriptions of this kind. Beneath the tongue of a mad dog is a slimy saliva which, taken in drink, prevents hydrophobia; the foam from a horse's mouth is useful in ear disease, in chafing caused by riding, and in diseases of the uterus.[4] Serpent's slime and foam form the *anguinum*, or snake-egg, which has magical powers.[5] A dry white moss grows on stones near streams; if one of these stones, with the addition of human saliva, is rubbed against another, it cures ring-worm when rubbed on the part affected, with the spell, 'Cantharides begone, a wild wolf seeks thy blood!'[6] Some people used to rub their own spittle with the finger behind the ear to relieve disquietude of mind.[7] Sometimes the cure was effected by transference, as when a person suffering from cough spat into the mouth of a small frog and gained relief.[8] A sort of lizard in Malabar is believed to suck the blood of children by looking at them; as soon as people catch sight of the creature, they apply saliva to the child's navel, from which it is supposed that the poisoned blood is thus extracted.[9] As a cure for gout, in Italy, a small boy, while fasting, is made to spit thrice on the affected limb, to repeat a charm, and to spit behind him thrice for three successive mornings.[10] In the Greek Islands thrush (*afta*) in a child is cured by the mother showing the sore to the evening stars, spitting on it, and saying: 'This evening stars and *afta*, tomorrow no stars and no *afta*.'[11] In the Panjāb a clan of Aroṛas can cure hydrophobia by spitting on a little earth and applying it to the bite.[12] A gentleman travelling by train in Germany was asked to spit in the face of a man suffering from a fit.[13] Magyars believe that styes on the eye can be cured by some one spitting on them.[14] In Lesbos, to cure a wasp sting spit four times on the place, do this thrice, and say *nibi*, 'drink.'[15] In Ireland it is believed that pricking of the foot ('pins and needles') is relieved by wetting the popliteal space with saliva.[16]

8. Protective powers of saliva.—The use of saliva is valuable against fascination and ill-luck generally.

(*a*) *Against fascination.*—Spitting is a common mode of repelling the evil eye.

In Greece saliva obtained from a person who is suspected of having unintentionally over-looked a child is mixed with water, and the patient is made to drink it; or the incautious person is asked to spit in the child's face.[17] In Scotland spitting three times in a person's face, turning a live coal in the fire, and exclaiming, 'The Lord be with us!' protects from the evil eye.[18] When making a protective necklace in the Malay Peninsula, the maker recites a charm and spits twice on the necklace.[19] Over-praise—'fore-speaking,' as it is called in Scotland—is dangerous. In Russia, if a person praises a baby without the precautionary ejaculation, 'God save the mark!' the nurse spits in the person's face.[20]

(*b*) *Against unlucky animals, things, etc.*—

In Aetolia, when travellers meet an unlucky animal, they spit three times before continuing the journey.[21] In Macedonia a certain insect which enters houses in summer is supposed to bring fever, and people spit three times when it appears.[22] In Great Britain and Ireland the sight of a single magpie is ominous, and in Cheshire people spit on the ground and make a cross with the foot to drive away ill luck.[23] The Irish, when they see a caterpillar creeping, spit three times on it, lest it may come to the house and sleep with the person who has seen it; they do the same on meeting a stoat in the morning.[24] In Central India people spit three times on seeing a falling star.[25] In Italy, when a hare is released as a scape-animal, to remove disease, the officiant must spit three times behind it, and must not look back or leave the house for three-quarters of an hour.[26] In Kumaun, in order to stop a hail-storm, people spit on the stones as they fall, or sprinkle on them some drops of blood from the body of a noted magician.[27] It is a common practice to spit on a witch

[1] Napier, p. 98 f.
[2] S. M. Zwemer, *Arabia, the Cradle of Islam*, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 282.
[3] *FLR* ii. [1879] 36 f.
[4] *HN* xxix. 32, xxviii. 48, 61, 77. [5] *Ib.* xxix. 12.
[6] *Ib.* xxvii. 75. [7] *Ib.* xxviii. 5. [8] *Ib.* xxxii. 29.
[9] Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 98.
[10] C. G. Leland, *Etruscan Roman Remains*, London, 1892, p. 297.
[11] J. T. Bent, *The Cyclades*, London, 1885, p. 436.
[12] H. A. Rose, *Glossary of Tribes and Castes*, Lahore, 1911, ii. 19.
[13] *FL* xxi. 388. [14] *FLJ* i. [1883] 359; cf. Grimm, iv. 1789.
[15] *FL* vii. 143. [16] *Ib.* v. 283.
[17] G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folk-lore*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 143; cf. Persius, *Sat.* ii. 30 ff.; Petronius, 131; R. Rodd *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, London, 1892, p. 161 f.
[18] Napier, p. 39.
[19] Skeat-Blagden, i. 153. [20] Grimm, iii. 1102
[21] Lawson, p. 307. [22] Abbott, p. 110.
[23] *NQ*, 4th ser., xii. [1873] 327.
[24] *Ib.* p. 469; *FL* xxii. [1911] 452. [25] *NINQ* ii. 184.
[26] Leland, p. 259 f. [27] *NINQ* iii. 135.

or sorcerer, or, as a protective, to get the witch to spit on her supposed victim.[1] Muhammad, in order to make a bad dream harmless, used to spit three times over the left shoulder—a habit still prevailing in Egypt.[2] In the Ægean Islands, when dough is being kneaded by a woman, if another woman chances to arrive, she must spit on the ground to charm away the evil of her presence; otherwise she will 'carry away the bread with her.'[3] In Shetland, when a sick person describes his ailment, the listener is apt to have the disease conveyed to himself, unless he spits covertly.[4]

Among the Kikuyu of E. Africa 'if a man hears that a near relative is very ill he makes a point of going to see him, and takes the precaution of getting him to spit ceremonially on his hand and rub his visitor on his navel. If a man goes to see his sick father or mother he takes a piece of mutton fat, and the sick parent ceremonially spits on it, and the visitor rubs the saliva covered piece of fat on his navel.'[5]

The same procedure takes place on hearing unlucky names.

In parts of Wales it was the custom to spit when the name of the Devil was mentioned, and at the prayer in the Litany 'to beat down Satan under our feet.'[6] In Greece, if children are sent to draw water, they must spit three times into the spring before they dip their pitchers, to escape the Nereids; in ford rites the traveller spits in the water before crossing or when crossing haunted water.[7]

Muhammad ordained: 'There is a demon called Khinzab, who casts doubt into prayer; when you are aware of it, take protection with God, and spit over your left arm three times. . . . When you stand up to prayer, spit not in front because you are then in God's presence; neither spit on your right hand, because an angel is there; spit therefore on your left side, or under your feet, and throw earth over it.'[8]

The evil influence of seeing the moon through glass or through the bough of a tree is broken by taking a piece of money from the pocket and spitting on each side of the coin.

In Clare, when the new moon is seen for the first time, people turn thrice sunwards, bowing and spitting at each turn.[9]

Spitting thus becomes a symbolical purification from the effects of tabu.

In Japan 'in the Izanagi myth a God of the Spittle (Hayatama no wo) is the result of that deity's spitting during the ceremony of divorce. The "spittle" deity is here associated with another God, who is styled a God of Purification. A commentator on this passage says that "at the present day spitting is essential in the purification ceremony." The ritual, however, does not mention it. Another writer adds that "this is the reason why at the present day people spit when they see anything impure." In the myth of Susa no wo spittle is mentioned along with the nails of the fingers and toes and nose-mucus among the materials for expiatory offerings. When Hohodemi is recommended to "spit thrice" before giving back the lost fish-hook to his brother, a magical effect is probably intended, such as to convey to him any impurity which may have become attached to his own person. Rinsing the mouth as a purifying ceremony before pronouncing an oath is mentioned in the *Nihongi* [ii. 96].'[10]

9. Reinforcing the powers of spittle.—The efficacy of the saliva is increased by spitting out certain substances with it.

At the Lemuria the Roman house-father laid the ghosts by spitting out black beans as he walked, saying, 'With these I redeem me and mine.'[11] In Melanesia a charm for stopping rain is to chew ginger, which is then expectorated in a fine spray; the same process, with appropriate words, is used to propitiate or avert any possibly dangerous influence, as, *e.g.*, that of a stranger; Government parties and camps are charmed by a man walking round them and spraying chewed ginger from his mouth.'[12] When the Shans are building a house, they chew betel-nut and spit it into each hole dug for a post, to expel evil spirits; to expel disease the Malay medicine-man, with a charm, ejects chewed betel-leaf on the patient's person, and, when taking omens for agriculture, the farmer chews betel, repeats charms, and spits it out in the direction of the cardinal points.[1] At meals the Haussas always spit out some of the kola-nut on the ground as an offering.[2]

To relieve evil dreams the Zulu medicine-man prescribes: 'When you dream of him, take this medicine and chew it; then take a stone or a piece of firewood, and spit on it the spittle which is in your mouth when you dream of him, mixed with this medicine . . . and throw it behind your back without looking.'[3]

10. The use of saliva in magic.—This assumes many forms which may be explained on the principles already stated.

In N. India, at cotton-picking, women spit out parched rice as a magical mode of improving the produce.[4] In a Vedic charm to appease wrath the person takes a stone, spits round it while reciting a charm, and lays an arrow on a bow while standing in the shadow of the wrathful one.[5] Natives of Australia of the Irriakura [a certain bulb] totem, before eating the tubers, rub them in their hands, and, putting them in their mouths, blow them out again in all directions, obviously to increase the crop.[6] In W. Africa the owner of a portable charm, in the morning, before speaking to any one, wets his finger with saliva, draws it over the amulet, and then down his forehead, saying: 'May every man, woman, and child do good to me.'[7] In Shetland the fishermen spit into the mouth of the last caught cod, 'and the consequence, they say, is that it will be followed by a fish equally large or larger.'[8] In India it is believed that buffalo's saliva, if applied to the soles of the feet, causes sleep, possibly because the animal is sluggish.[9]

'The Galelareese think that when your teeth are being filed you should keep spitting on a pebble, for this establishes a homeopathic connexion between you and the pebble, by virtue of which your teeth will henceforth be as hard and durable as a stone.'[10]

11. Toleration and horror of saliva.—Among some people saliva, preferably that of women, is not regarded with abhorrence.

In some of the Polynesian islands the kava root is chewed by old women in a ceremonial way and distributed at feasts.[11] Among some American Indian tribes cassava root is chewed by young women and the liquor drunk.[12] It is believed that the Kafir beer is made in the same way.[13]

But among people, like the Hindus, who are subject to rigid tabus of food and drinking it is regarded with disgust.

Dubois remarks that 'their strong aversion to wind instruments of music' is due to 'their insurmountable horror of saliva. They would look on a man who spat upon the floor as quite destitute of good manners. Spittoons are to be found in every house; but should none be provided and any one require to spit he would have to go outside.'[14]

The danger of treading on saliva is as old as the days of Manu,[15] and has been perpetuated in the custom which prevailed among some menial tribes in Bombay, Madras, and the Central Provinces up to quite recent times, of requiring them to carry spitting-pots hung round their necks in order to avoid danger to travellers.[16] Spitting on a man of high caste is a serious offence in India. 'They who spat upon the Brâhmaṇa . . . sit in the middle of a pool of blood, chewing hair.'[17] If a low caste man spits on a superior, the king shall cause his lips to be cut off.[18] After spitting, a Brâhman has to sip water.[19]

In Ceylon 'the most dreaded of all punishments under the Kandyan dynasty was to hand over the lady of a high caste offender to the Rodiyas [degraded menials]; and the mode of her adoption was by the Rodiya taking betel from his own mouth and placing it in hers, after which till death her degradation was indelible.'[20]

Buddhist monks in Burma may not spit on green grass or in fresh water.[21] The ancient Persians never defiled a river with

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[1] Hartland, *LP* ii. 272 f.; Grimm, iii. 1102 f.
[2] *NINQ* i. 120; E. W. Lane, *The Modern Egyptians*[5], London, 1871, i. 330.
[3] *FL* xviii. [1907] 330.
[4] *County Folk-lore*, III., *Orkney and Shetland Islands*, London, 1903, p. 159.
[5] C. W. Hobley, 'Kikuyu and Kamba Religious Beliefs and Customs,' *JRAI* xli. [1911] 429.
[6] *NQ*, 4th ser., viii. [1871] 547, 11th ser., iii. [1911] 148.
[7] Lawson, p. 160; *FL* xxi. [1910] 159; Grimm, iii. 1102 f.
[8] Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah, *Mishcat-ul-Masabih*, tr. A. N. Mathews, Calcutta, 1809–10, i. 24, 150.
[9] *NQ*, 4th ser., xi. [1873] 141; *FL* xxii. 54.
[10] W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 260 f.; cf. p. 114.
[11] Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 429 ff.; W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 109.
[12] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, London, 1910, p. 735; cf. pp. 85, 287.
[1] Mrs. Leslie Milne, *Shans at Home*, London, 1910, p. 101; Skeat-Blagden, i. 366.
[2] A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Tailed Head-hunters of Nigeria*, London, 1912, p. 247.
[3] H. Callaway, *The Religious System of the Amazulu*, London, 1870, p. 160.
[4] Crooke, *PR*[2] ii. 306. [5] *SBE* xlii. 479.
[6] J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, i. 110 f.
[7] *FL* xxii. 397.
[8] *County Folk-lore*, III., *Orkney and Shetland Islands*, p. 166.
[9] *PNQ* iii. 26.
[10] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 157.
[11] *JAI* xxvii. [1898] 424 f.
[12] H. A. Wickham, 'Notes on the Soumoo or Woolwa Indians,' *JAI* xxiv. [1895] 203; Bancroft, *NR* i. 739.
[13] E. S. Hartland, 'Travel Notes in S. Africa,' *FL* xvii. [1906] 481.
[14] *Hindu Manners*[3], p. 183. [15] *Laws*, iv. 132.
[16] *EG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 341, xx. [1884] 176; Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, i. 44, iii. 428; *Eth. Surv. Central Provinces*, ix. [Allahabad, 1911] 97.
[17] *SBE* xlii. 171. [18] Manu, *Laws*, viii. 282.
[19] *Ib.* v. 145.
[20] J. Tennent, *Ceylon*, London, 1860, ii. 189.
[21] Shway Yoe, *The Burman*, London, 1882, i. 147.

the secretions of their bodies, and Deloces forbade any one to spit in the royal presence; the term *hikhra*, 'impurity,' was applied to bodily refuse or excretions from men or dogs, including saliva.[1] In India to spit in the direction of the tomb of a saint excites his wrath; and, in China, if any one dares to spit towards the north, he outrages the gods and profanes their presence.[2] The prohibition against spitting on fire is very common. In Scotland some evil is likely to befall those who do so.[3] Negroes in Jamaica believe that spitting in the fire causes the saliva to dry up.[4] On the Lower Congo, if a person spits in the fire, his blood will become thin, his hair turn reddish, and dropsy of the stomach will follow.[5] The Yezidis never spit in the fire.[6]

'Even the breath of man or his spittle is sufficient to desecrate it [the Iranian sacred fire]. Therefore even the priest before the fire-altar must perform his ceremonies and recite his prayers with his mouth covered.'[7] 'A decent man will not spit or eject any impurity in front of the moon, fire, the sun, water, wind, or any respectable person.'[8]

LITERATURE.—H. S. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, London, 1894–96, ii. 258 ff.; J. E. Crombie, 'The Saliva Superstition,' *The International Folk-lore Congress, 1891: Papers and Transactions*, London, 1892, p. 249 ff.; J. Tuchman, 'La Fascination,' *Mélusine*, Paris, 1878–, vols. i., ii., v., vi., viii., ix.; C. de Mensignac, *Recherches ethnographiques sur la salive et le crachat*, Bordeaux, 1892. The classical references have been collected and discussed by F. W. Nicholson, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, viii. [Boston, 1897] 23 ff.

W. CROOKE.

SALT.—See METALS AND MINERALS, vol. viii. p. 591 f.

SALUTATIONS.—Salutations have in all parts of the world been an index of ethics and frequently have had religious significance. They vary from the elaborate ceremonies by which savages of different tribes prove to one another, when they approach, that they have no hostile intent, to the informal greetings with which modern civilized man accosts a comrade.

1. Australian savages probably preserve better than other peoples savage customs in their purest form.

'They have a very strict code of etiquette and distinct terms, implying strong disapproval, which they apply to any member of the tribe who does not observe this. Visits are frequently made, either by individuals or by parties of men and women, to friendly groups of natives living in distant parts. If it be only one man who is paying a visit he will often, in the first place, make a series of smokes so as to inform those to whose camp he is coming that some one is approaching.'[9] The fact that he thus makes his approach known proves that he has no hostile intention. 'Coming within sight of the camp he does not at first go close up to it, but sits down in silence. Apparently no one takes the slightest notice of him, and etiquette forbids him from moving without being invited to do so. After perhaps an hour or two one of the older men will walk over to him and quietly seat himself on the ground beside the stranger. If the latter be the bearer of any message, or of any credentials, he will hand these over, and then perhaps the old man will embrace him and invite him to come into the camp, where he goes to the *ungunja* (men's camp) and joins the men. Very likely he will be provided with a temporary wife during his visit, who will of course belong to the special group with which it is lawful for him to have marital relations.'[10]

Spencer and Gillen[11] describe what actually took place when a party of some thirty Arunta men visited a group of Alice Springs people.

The Arunta group, each wearing two curiously flaked sticks on his head, with a tuft of eagle-hawk feathers in his waist, and armed with boomerang and spears, sat down about half a mile away from the Alice Springs camp. After a time they were invited to come up. They did so on the run, holding their spears aloft. Some of the older Alice Springs women came out to meet them, gesticulating, yelling, and dancing wildly before them. They were received in a small flat among some hills. As they approached the spot some Alice Springs men stood on the tops of the surrounding hillocks, their bodies being sharply outlined against the sky, waving their spears. As soon as the visitors had reached the open flat, they were joined by a number of local men. All then formed into a series of lines four deep and marched round and round the place, led by the chief man of the visitors. This march was accompanied by a considerable amount of excitement, and soon the whole camp—men, women, and children—were assembled at the spot. When this preliminary dance was over, the visitors sat down on the level space and the Alice Springs people grouped themselves on the rocks at one side. The head man of the visiting party then collected all the flaked sticks and handed them over to the head man of the Alice Springs group. This indicated that the visitors came with no hostile intent. A fire was then made and the sticks were burned.

Danger of hostile attack had not yet passed, for after a short pause members of the Alice Springs group began, one after another, to taunt individual visitors with various delinquencies. One was accused of not having mourned properly for his father-in-law, an Alice Springs man; another was challenged to fight for having killed the brother of an Alice Springs man, while a visitor accused a local man of not having cleared out of camp according to custom when his father-in-law died. He should have remained away until the grass was green upon the father-in-law's grave. These and other taunts led to individual scuffles. A general *mêlée* followed, during which every one seemed to be accusing every one else; the women ran in and out among the men, all of whom were talking or yelling at the top of their voices, while spears and boomerangs were raised ready to be thrown. After about three-quarters of an hour the men separated and camped apart. During the next day the relations of the two camps were strained, but by the third day harmony was restored.

The same authorities also relate[1] the ceremonies by which the Warramunga tribe welcomed a party of men from the Walpari tribe.

The visitors sent a messenger ahead to give warning of their approach, and about mid-day six Warramunga men went out to meet them, taking food and water with them. Here they remained until late in the afternoon. Then the local people assembled on a specially cleared space of ground a quarter of a mile from the main camp. They were divided into three groups—a central group of men and two side groups of women. They all stood except two of the principal men, who squatted on the ground. The group of women that came from the territory nearest to the Walpari, peculiarly decorated with white spots running down their breasts and across their shoulders, moved backwards and forwards with arms extended as if beckoning to the strangers to come on. A few local men had meanwhile joined the strangers, and now approached with them in single file. The leader carried a spear, but with the point turned towards the ground; each of the others carried a spear, but grasped it near the head, to show that he had no hostile intent. As they approached, they performed a series of evolutions in the form of a huge S. At the close of each evolution they grouped themselves about the leader for a minute or two, shouting '*Wah! wah!*' The group of women that had beckoned to them answered with the same cry. Finally, at a signal from one of the local men, they approached the Warramunga people. The women who had answered their cry fell in behind them and performed the last evolution with them. The women then returned to their place, and the visitors sat down on the ground. They had their backs to the Warramunga men and were about five yards from them. After a silence of two or three minutes the women who had taken part in the evolution, at a signal from the same old man, threw food at the visitors. The strangers caught it, and the women returned to their places while the visitors ate the food. The Warramunga men, with the exception of three officials, then withdrew. These officials gave the visitors more food, apologizing for the smallness of the quantity. After the repast was over, the visitors were led to camp. In the evening a dance was performed in honour of their arrival.

These Australian customs indicate, perhaps, the kind of elaborate etiquette by which in savage days men everywhere approached strangers. Since the establishment of settled civilized society forms of salutation have been greatly simplified. These forms naturally vary almost endlessly in different parts of the world. To describe all the variations would demand a volume. It may be noted in general that among equals salutations tend to become brief and simple, while salutations to sovereigns by their subjects, or to persons of higher rank by those of lower rank, retain much elaborate ceremoniousness.

2. Civilized equals, as a rule, greet one another briefly and simply, though naturally the salutation to a friend who has been long absent, or to an equal to whom one is introduced for the first time, is more elaborate and formal than the greeting given to a comrade with whom one associates daily. Greetings of the last-mentioned type assume many

[1] Herod. i. 139, 99; M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*, London, 1907, p. 325 n.
[2] R. K. Douglas, *Confucianism and Taoism*, London, 1877, p. 268.
[3] Napier, p. 37. [4] *FL* xv. [1904] 211. [5] *Ib.* xx. 476.
[6] A. H. Layard, *Nineveh and its Remains*, London, 1849, i. 301.
[7] W. Geiger, *Civilization of the E. Iränians*, Eng. tr., London, 1885–86, i. 10.
[8] *Vishnu Purana*, ed. H. H. Wilson, London, 1840, p. 311; cf. Manu, *Laws*, iv. 52.
[9] Spencer-Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 569.
[10] *Ib.* p. 570. [11] *Ib.* p. 570 ff.

[1] Spencer-Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 576 ff.

forms. The ancient Greeks said, *Χαῖρε!*, 'Be glad!', 'Be joyful!' The Romans said, '*Salve!*', 'Be well!', 'Be in good health,' or, more formally, '*Salvere jubeo*,' 'I bid you be well.' The idea underlying this Roman salutation underlies that of many modern peoples, though in different countries the reference to the health of one's friends is expressed in different ways. Thus in English one says, 'How are you?', 'How do you do?', or 'I hope you are well?' The French say, '*Comment vous portez-vous?*', 'How do you carry yourself?', and the Germans, '*Wie befinden Sie sich?*', 'How do you find yourself?' Similarly the Arabic '*Salaam aleika*,' 'Peace be unto thee!', includes the idea of a wish for the health of the one saluted, as did the Hebrew '*Shalom*,' 'Peace!' Both, however, included much more, as will be noted below.

In common intercourse still less formal greetings are generally employed. Thus in English we say, 'Good morning!' (Old English, 'Good morrow!'), 'Good day!', or 'Good evening!' The Germans say, '*Guten Morgen!*', the French, '*Bonjour!*', the Italians, '*Buono giorno!*' The Arabs of the Levant similarly say, '*Naharak saïd!*', 'May your day be happy!'. All these imply the wish that the one saluted may have a happy day or evening. Possibly the original meaning was, 'May God give you a good day!' In Occidental lands one replies to such a greeting by simply repeating it, but in the Levant politeness demands that the response shall add something to the original wish. Thus, when a friend says, '*Naharak saïd!*', it is polite to reply, '*Naharak saïd wa mubarrak!*', 'May your day be happy and blessed!' In Japan the greetings among equals are similarly brief. Thus in the morning one says to a friend, '*Ohayo!*', literally, 'Honourably early!'; later one says, '*Konnichiwa!*', literally, 'To-day!'; and in the evening the greeting is '*Oyasuminasai!*', 'Honourably rest!' In like manner in China one says, '*Tso shan!*', literally, 'Early time!', which is equivalent to 'Good morning!', and '*Tso tau!*', 'Early rest!', for 'Good night!' The Japanese also have a greeting which makes inquiry for one's health—'*Ikagadesuka?*', 'How is it?' In Occidental countries the more formal salutations addressed to friends who have been long absent or to persons to whom one is introduced for the first time are not as a rule crystallized into such set phrases as those that have just been considered. They express the pleasure of the speaker at seeing a friend again or at making the acquaintance of the stranger: 'I am glad to see you again!', 'I am glad to meet you!', or 'I am delighted to see you!' The Japanese, when introduced to a stranger, say, '*Hajimeete omeni kakaïmusu!*', literally, 'See you for the first time!' A young person meeting an older person says, '*Doka yoroshiku!*', 'Please in your favour!' The Chinese have a form of salutation, '*Yat yat pat kiu ue sam tsau hai!*', literally, 'One day not see like three falls!', equivalent to 'If I do not see you for a day, it is like three years!'.

In the Occident, when one receives a call, the greetings are soon over and the time is passed in conversation upon other topics, but in Syria the greetings and inquiries for the guest's health and that of his family last for some time, and during the call the conversation will often be interrupted by saying the greetings and making the inquiries all over again. Among equals the salutations at parting are as a rule brief and informal. The Greeks employed at times the same phrase as in greeting, *Χαῖρε!* at others *Ἔρρωσθε!* 'Be strengthened!'. The Romans said, '*Vale!*', or '*Valeas!*', 'Be well!', 'Be strong!' Akin to thisis the English 'Farewell!', meaning, 'May it go well with you!', or 'May you prosper!' More frequently 'Good-bye' is employed. This is believed by many to be a corruption of 'God be with you!'. If this be the correct etymology, it has a religious colouring. Probably a similar thought underlay the German '*Auf Wiedersehen!*' and the French '*Au revoir!*' Of similar import was the Hebrew parting salutation, 'Go in peace!' (1 S 20[42]), and the modern Arabic '*Ma'salameh*,' 'With peace!' The Chinese say, '*Maan maan haang*,' 'Slowly, slowly walk!', or '*Tsing wooi*,' 'Please return!' The Japanese say, '*Sayčnara*,' 'If it must be so!'

Along with the words which are uttered in formal and impressive salutations there are often physical contacts. These vary with different countries and with the degree of intimacy between the persons concerned. In civilized countries the most common and universal form of contact is 'shaking hands.' The persons performing the salutation grasp each other by the right hand and gently shake or press the hand thus grasped. The cordiality of the salutation may be graded by the vigour or listlessness of the pressure. Another method of expressing cordial salutation frequent among relatives and intimate friends is kissing (*q.v.*), sometimes on the cheek, or, in cases of great intimacy, on the mouth. In some countries kissing is largely confined to greetings between women. In Syria men as well as women kiss one another, often on both cheeks. Sometimes men will grasp one another by the shoulders and, without kissing, place the head first over one shoulder and then over the other. Perhaps this is the modern survival of 'falling on the neck' (Gn 33[4] 45[14]). Still another method of physical contact is 'touching noses.' This is employed among various savage peoples, as, *e.g.*, the Melanesians.[1]

Even when there is no physical contact, any salutation which is at all formal is accompanied by a bow or an inclination of the head. This is almost universal in modern civilized society, and in some parts of the world the custom is very ancient. Confucius is said by his disciples to have bowed forward when saluting one who was in mourning.[2] In Syria a bow is often accompanied by a sweeping motion of the right hand towards the ground. At other times the hand is made to touch one's breast, lips, and forehead.

In some countries there is a strict etiquette concerning salutations.

'Among modern Moslems one riding should first salute one on foot; one who passes by should first salute a person standing or sitting; a small party those of a large party; a young person should be first saluted by the aged. One who enters a house should first salute the people of that house.'[3]

Similarly among the Tikopia of Melanesia[4] 'a man who wishes to pass another who is sitting down will call out as he approaches: "*O mata, mata*," meaning "eye," and if the answer comes "*Poi, erau*," "Yes, all right," he goes by. If there are two or more people sitting down, he will say, "*Ote mata*," and will be answered as before. Several men going together ask leave to pass in the same way. A man walks upright, but a woman who is passing bends down slightly with her hands between her thighs. If a man went by without the proper greeting, it would be supposed that he was angry and he would have to return and sit down near those whom he had passed. If he explained that this behaviour had been due to carelessness, he would be called a fool and his apologies would be accepted. . . . When a man goes to visit another at his house, he calls out the name of the occupant at some distance, and if the latter is at home, the visitor is invited to enter. If there is no answer, the visitor will wait for a time and then go away. Only near relatives may enter a house without invitation. Similarly in the Levant a Moslem on approaching the house of a neighbour gives a peculiar call in order that the women may retire to their own apartments before he enters.'

It is not possible to trace in detail the customs of salutation among all peoples within the compass of an article. Certain forms of etiquette are observed throughout the world. Among the peasantry of

[1] See W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, i. 305.
[2] *Analects*, bk. x. ch. xvi. 2 f.
[3] E. W. Rice, *Orientalisms in Bible Lands*, p. 79.
[4] Rivers, p. 324 f.

Palestine, *e.g.*, one says to a guest, '*Fût*,' 'Enter,' '*Foddel!*', 'Welcome!', '*Marḥabâ!*', 'Welcome!', or '*Miyet marḥabâ!*', 'A hundred welcomes!' One familiarly asks, '*Kaif ḥalak?*', 'How are you?' The reply is, '*Ḥumdillah*,' 'Praise God!', *i.e.* 'Praise God I am well,' the full form of the phrase being '*Ḥumdillah salaameh.*' In the early morning one greets another with '*Ṣubaḥkum b'l-khair!*', 'May your morning be in good [fortune]!', to which the reply is, '*Yâ ṣubaḥ el-khair*,' 'Oh, the morning is good!' At evening the greeting is '*Mesaikum b'l-khair!*', and the response, '*Mesâ el-khair!*' At night it is '*Lailtak saideh!*', 'May your night be happy!'[1]

3. To monarchs. — Superiors and especially monarchs are in all countries saluted with much greater formality than equals. In the countries around the eastern end of the Mediterranean it was customary in ancient times to prostrate oneself before a monarch. Thus Araunah, the Jebusite, bowed himself before David with his face to the ground (2 S 24^{20}). Not only the foreigner, but Nathan, David's frequent adviser, did likewise (1 K 1^{23}), and even David's favourite wife, Bathsheba ($1^{16.31}$). Such homage was not, however, confined to kings, but was also accorded to prophets (see 2 K 2^{15} 4^{37}). Its motive was probably the belief that in both kings and prophets a superhuman spirit dwelt. Physicians are still often thus saluted at hospitals in the Levant.[2] Perhaps this is in part an earnest way of proffering a request for healing, just as Esther is said to have fallen on her face before Ahasuerus (Xerxes) when she wished to make a particularly urgent request (Est 8^{3}). Where such customs prevailed, it was natural that conquered princes should fall on their faces and kiss the feet of their conquerors. The act was at once an expression of homage and an appeal for mercy. Assyrian kings say again and again in their annals that such-and-such a king came and kissed their feet, and the Black Obelisk of Shalmaneser III. pictures Sua, king of Gilzan, and Jehu, king of Israel, in the act of doing this.

Similar customs are found in many other parts of the world. Thus among the Melanesians a visitor who visits a chief in his house kneels at the door and moves towards the chief on his hands and knees. When he reaches him, they touch noses in the customary manner, and the visitor withdraws a pace or two, and sits down cross-legged. No other position is allowed in the presence of the chief. When the interview is finished, the visitor asks permission to go, and leaves on his hands and knees in a similar manner, without turning his back to the chief. If a man wishes to pass a chief out of doors, he will say, '*O mata pa*' (*mata*, 'eye'; *pa*, 'father'). The chief will reply, '*Elau! saere, opoi!*', 'All right! Walk, yes,' and the man will go by on hands and knees as when approaching him.[3]

In India similarly deep obeisance has always been performed before a sovereign. Thus we read in the *Rāmāyaṇa*:

> 'And with greetings and obeisance spake their message calm and bold,
> Softly fell their gentle accents as their happy tale they told.
> Greetings to thee, mighty monarch!'[4]

According to the *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa, the Shakespeare of India, it was customary for subjects on approaching a king to shout, 'May the king be victorious!', 'O king, be victorious!', or 'May our sovereign be victorious!'[5]

In like manner in less effusive China the customs, as we learn from the *Analects* of Confucius, were not radically different. When Confucius entered the gate of the palace of the prince, it was with body somewhat bent forward, almost as though he could not be admitted. When passing the throne, his look would change somewhat; he would turn aside and make a sort of obeisance, and the words that he spoke seemed as though he were deficient in utterance.[1]

At modern European courts the ceremonial, though less demonstrative than that among many of the ancients, nevertheless emphasizes in a variety of ways that the sovereign is not an ordinary mortal and must be much more ceremoniously saluted. The climax of salutations to royal personages is found in the public ceremonies of welcome which are prepared for them when they pay visits to cities on public occasions or return from victories or long absences. A fine literary description of such a welcoming salute is found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in the passage which tells of Rāma's return to Ayodhya:

> 'Elephants in golden trappings thousand chiefs and nobles bore,
> Chariot cars and gallant chargers speeding by Sarayu's shore,
>
> And the serried troops of battle marched with colours rich and brave,
> Proudly o'er the gay procession did Ayodhya's banners wave.
>
> In their stately gilded litters royal dames and damsels came,
> Queen Kausalya first and foremost, Queen Sumitra rich in fame,
>
> Pious priest and learned Brahman, chief of guild from near and far,
> Noble chief and stately courtier with the wreath and water jar.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Stately march of gallant chargers and the roll of battle car,
> Heavy tread of royal tuskers and the beat of drum of war.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Women with their loving greetings, children with their joyous cry,
> Tottering age and lisping infant hailed the righteous chief and high.
>
> Bharat lifted up his glances unto Rama from afar,
> Unto Sita, unto Lakhsman, seated on the Pushpa car,
>
> And he wafted high his greetings and he poured his pious lay,
> As one wafts the pious *mantra* to the rising God of Day!'[2]

Mutatis mutandis, similar scenes of salutation have occurred in all civilized countries. They have been accorded not to kings alone, but to presidents, generals, governors, and distinguished visitors. Salutations given in different cities and countries to visiting delegations since the Great War began, such as the French delegation to the United States of America in May 1917, although they lacked the peculiar colour imparted by the native Indian bent as well as the religious flavour of that accorded to Rāma, in spontaneous heartiness and general interest resembled that described in the epic.

4. In letters.—Salutations in letters exhibit much the same variation as other greetings, though they have some peculiarities of their own. Among the ancient Romans the salutation in a letter was reduced to a designation of the person addressed and of the writer of the letter. Thus a letter of Cicero, selected at random, begins: '*Cicero Attico S.*,'[3] the '*S.*' standing for *socio*, 'colleague.' A letter of Pliny selected in the same way begins: '*C. Plinius Hispullæ suæ S.*'[4] This dignified brevity corresponds to the French form, in which after the name of the person addressed a simple '*Monsieur*' or '*Madame*' is placed. In very

1 Cf. E. Grant, *The Peasantry of Palestine*, p. 161 f.
2 Cf. Rice, p. 78. 3 Rivers, p. 305.
4 Cf. R. C. Dutt, *The Ramayana and the Mahabharata condensed into English Verse*, p. 7.
5 See the ed. published by T. Holme, London, 1902, pp. 43 and 76.

1 *Analects*, bk. x. chs. 1-4. 2 Dutt, p. 167 f.
3 See *M. T. Ciceronis Epistolæ*, ed. J. Billerbeck, Hanover, 1836, i., *Ep.* lx.
4 Pliny, *Epistularum Libri Novem*, ed. H. Keil, Leipzig 1876, p. 161.

formal letters in English the name is followed by a simple 'Sir' or 'Madam,' but it is far more common to prefix to the 'Sir' or 'Madam' a conventional 'Dear.' Similarly the Germans in beginning a letter place after the name of the person addressed '*Mein'Herr*,' literally 'My lord,' though *Herr* has been attenuated till it means simply 'gentleman.' In ancient Babylonia it was customary to insert after the address a sentence of good wishes. Thus in a letter selected at random from the time of the Ist dynasty of Babylon (*c.* 2000 B.C.) we find the following beginning:

'To Manatum speak, saying: Yamsi-Shamash says: "May Shamash and Marduk make thee to live!"'[1]

Then the business follows. Most of the letters from the time of the Neo-Babylonian and early Persian empires (*c.* 550–450 B.C.) are somewhat more elaborate. An equal is addressed as 'brother,' a priest as 'father.' Thus a letter taken at random begins:

'Letter from Nabu-zira-ibni to Rimut, his brother. May Bel and Nabu grant peace unto my brother.'

Another runs:

'Letter from Nabu-zira-ibashshi to the lady Sikkû, my sister. May Bel and Nabu grant peace and life unto my sister.'

Still another:

'Letter from Nabu-suma-ibni unto the priest of Sippar, my father. May Bel and Nabu grant peace and life unto my father.'[2]

A somewhat similar form of letter was widely employed in the Levant for centuries. A letter written from Egypt in 172 B.C. begins:

'Isias to her brother, greeting: If you are well and other things happen as you wish, it would be in accordance with my constant prayer to the gods. I too am in good health, and so is the boy: and all at home make constant remembrance of you.'[3]

In the letters of Paul to the Thessalonians we have the same elements expanded. The salutation is longer; the prayer is made more prominent; and the assertion that the recipients of the letter are constantly borne in mind is more emphatic. Still another letter from Egypt may be cited to show the frequent recurrence of the religious element in such salutations:

'Ammonios to his sister Tachnumi, much greeting: Before all things I pray that you may be in good health, and each day I make the act of worship for you.'[4]

The classical Arabic form of greeting in a letter is given in the story of Bilkis, in the letter which Solomon is said to have written the Sabæan queen:

'From the servant of Allah, Solomon son of David, to Bilkis queen of Saba. In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Gracious! Peace upon all those who follow the right guidance! As to what follows'[5] (then follows the business in hand).

Epistolary salutations present an endless variety. The above are but a few examples.

As in the case of oral greetings, the salutations in letters addressed to monarchs are more elaborate and tend to greater adulation. The following is typical of the beginnings of letters addressed to Assyrian kings of the Sargonid dynasty:

'To the king my lord, thy servant Ishtar-iddin-apla, chief of the astronomers of Arbela, makes report to the king, my lord. May Nabu, Marduk, and Ishtar of Arbela be gracious to the king, my lord.'[6]

There are many variations in detail. The climax of adulatory addresses to sovereigns is reached in the letters sent by Syrian vassals and officials in the 14th cent. B.C. to their overlord, the king of Egypt. One of these runs:

'Rib-Adda sends to his lord, the king of countries, the great king, the king of battle. May Ba'alat of Gebal give power to the king, my lord. At the feet of my lord, my sun-god, seven times and seven times I fall!' (then the business which called forth the letter is taken up).[1]

In all monarchical countries letters to the sovereign are of course begun in a more formal way than letters to one's equals, though in Occidental countries and in modern times such adulation as was expressed to the kings of Egypt is lacking. The correspondence of one monarch with another (unless they are of close kin, as in modern Europe) has probably always been attended with greater formality than that between private persons. The El-Amarna letters afford us glimpses of the earliest royal international correspondence of which we know. Kings greeted one another as follows:

'To Kadashman-Kharbe king of Karduniash (Babylon), my brother, speak saying: Nimmuria (Amenophis III.), the great king, king of Egypt, thy brother. With me there is peace (or health). With thee may there be peace (or health); to thy house, to thy wife, to thy sons, to thy princes, to thy horses, to thy chariots, in the midst of thy lands may there be peace (or health)!'[2]

The salutations of the Babylonian king and the king of Mitanni to the king of Egypt are variations of this formula.

The salutations at the conclusions of letters differ greatly in different countries and with different individuals. Letters written in ancient Babylonia and Assyria contained no salutation at the end; when the business part was completed, the epistle broke off abruptly. The Romans at the close of a letter wrote a simple '*Vale!*' At the end of many letters written in κοινή Greek salutations are sent by the writer to friends of the recipient or members of his family. The term employed is ἀσπάζομαι, 'I welcome,' 'I greet,' 'I salute.'[3] It is employed in the Gospels, where the disciples are bidden to salute the house which they entered (Mt 10^{12}). Similar greetings expressed by the same word are found in the Epistles of Paul (see, *e.g.*, Ro $16^{22ff.}$, 1 Co $16^{19f.}$). In addition to such greetings Greek letters usually concluded with a farewell expressed by some form of the verb ῥώννυμι, 'I strengthen,' 'I make strong.' Thus the letter sent by the Church at Jerusalem to the Christians of Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia (Ac 15^{23-29}) ends with a simple ἔρρωσθε, 'Farewell.' Later Christian usage expanded this. Thus Ignatius concludes his letter to Polycarp with ἔρρωσθε ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ, 'Farewell in the Lord.' In the papyri the formula is often expanded as ἐρρῶσθαί σε εὔχομαι, 'I pray that you may be strong,'[4] ἐρρῶσται σοι εὔχομαι πολλοῖς χρόνοις, 'It be strengthened to you I pray many times.'[5] The Japanese write, '*Oomni gotaisetsuni*,' 'Take care of your honourable body.' In the Occident such salutations have shrunk to an expression of 'good wishes,' 'kind regards,' an assurance of the writer's '*sentiments très distingués*,' or some equivalent formula. Often this is accompanied by a 'Good-bye,' '*Au revoir*,' or '*Auf Wiedersehen*.'

5. **The religious element** is prominent in many of the salutations which have been noted above. All those which call upon God or some god to bless or to give health breathe a religious atmosphere. This atmosphere is wide-spread; it is found in some degree in most parts of the world, though it is much more prominent among some peoples than among others. There is very little, if any, of it in Japanese salutations. One such Chinese salutation is known to the writer: '*Poo shat tsunk fok fai ko tseung tai*,' 'The gods bless you and make you grow very fast.' In Spain, when one wishes to deny

[1] Cf. A. Ungnad, *Babylonische Briefe aus der Zeit der Hammurapi-Dynastie*, Leipzig, 1914, no. 175.
[2] Cf. R. C. Thompson, *Late Babylonian Letters*, London, 1906, p. 123.
[3] Cf. *Exp.*, 5th ser., viii. [1898] 164. [4] *Ib.* p. 166.
[5] Cf. R. Brünnow, *Chrestomathie aus arabischen Prosaschriftstellern*, Berlin, 1895, p. 8.
[6] From F. Delitzsch, *Assyrische Lesestücke*[5], Leipzig, 1912, p. 92.

[1] From O. Schroeder, *Die Thontafeln von El-Amarna*, no. 56, in *Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler*, xi., Leipzig, 1914.
[2] Cf. J. A. Knudtzon, *Die El-Amarna Tafeln*, Leipzig, 1912, no. 1.
[3] Cf., *e.g.*, B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, London, 1898–1914, x. no. 1296.
[4] *Ib.* viii. no. 1160. [5] *Ib.* no. 1158.

a beggar, he says, 'Pardon brother!' or 'May God relieve you!' The beggar answers, 'Go, your worships, with God; another time it will be.'

Certain religions, such as early Christianity and Muhammadanism, introduced new elements into salutations or gave new emphasis to old ones. The influence of early Christianity upon salutations is patent to one who compares early Christian letters with other letters of the time. This difference is most manifest in letters addressed to groups of people or to churches. Thus in the Epistles of Paul the ordinary χαίρειν is displaced by the benediction: 'Grace to you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ' (Ro 1^7; cf. also 1 Co 1^3, 2 Co 1^2, Gal 1^3, Eph 1^2, Ph 1^2, Col 1^2). Similarly in place of the farewell ἔρρωσθε he employed a benediction. It varies in different Epistles more than the greeting at the beginning does, but nearly always contains the phrase, 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you.'

The letters of Ignatius of Antioch contain a variety of salutations. Like Paul, he introduces considerable theology into his descriptions of the churches addressed, but his actual salutations are much more varied than those of Paul.

Thus to the Smyrnæans he employs πλεῖστα χαίρειν, 'Much greeting'; to the Trallians he says, 'Whom I greet in the fullness in the apostolic manner and pray for much joy' (εὔχομαι πλεῖστα χαίρειν); to the Magnesians, 'In whom [viz. Jesus Christ] may you have much joy' (πλεῖστα χαίρειν ὑμᾶς εἴη); but to the Philadelphians, 'Whom I greet (ἀσπάζομαι) in the blood of Jesus Christ, which is an eternal and abiding joy.'

His final salutations also differ from those in heathen letters of the time.

Thus to the Smyrnæans he says, 'Farewell [or be strong—ἔρρωσθε] in the grace of God'; to the Philadelphians, 'Farewell in Jesus Christ, our common hope'; to the Magnesians, 'Farewell in divine unity, possessing no party spirit, which is Jesus Christ'; to the Trallians, 'Farewell in Jesus Christ, being in subjection to the bishop as to the commandment, likewise also to the presbyter; and each of you love one another with undivided heart. My spirit sanctifies itself for you, not only now, but when I attain to God (for I am still in danger), but faithful is the Father in Jesus Christ to fulfil my desire and yours; in whom may we be found blameless!'

As time passed, this exuberance of Christian greeting in some degree subsided, but still Christian epistolary greeting retained a character of its own. The letters of Augustine, *e.g.*, begin with the salutation '*In Domino salutem.*' As in the letters of Paul and Ignatius of Antioch, many adjectives and sometimes some theology are introduced into the description of the person addressed, but, however much of this there may be, the real address usually concludes with the salutation '*In Domino salutem.*' The parting salutations of the letters of Augustine are exceedingly varied. Sometimes they end with a benediction, sometimes with a simple '*Amen*,'[1] sometimes with a salutation such as: '*Saluto et pignus pacis, quod Domino Deo nostro adjuvante feliciter accepisti ea dilectione qua debeo*';[2] at times they conclude abruptly without salutation.

Again passing over several centuries and taking the letters of Bernard of Clairvaux as an example, we find numerous instances where there is reversion to the old Roman form. Thus one letter begins, '*Bernardus abbas Claræ-Vallis, Romano suo, quod suo*';[3] another, '*Thomæ dilecto filio, Bernardus, quod filio.*'[4] At other times he recurs to the formula of Augustine, '*In Domino salutem*';[5] still again he varies this with such phrases as '*Salutem plurimam dicit.*'[1] Formal salutations at the end of the letter he usually omits.

[1] Cf. *PL* xxxiii. 1013.
[2] *Ib.* 1020.
[3] Cf *ib.* clxxxii. 240.
[4] *Ib.* 242.
[5] *Ib.* 225.

It is clear from these examples that for a time at least Christianity imparted a religious flavour peculiarly its own to epistolary salutations. Indeed, in circles that are particularly pious some attempts are still made to retain something of this flavour. Such writers begin letters 'Dear brother' and conclude them with 'Yours in the Lord' or a similar phrase.

The colouring that Muhammadanism imparted to epistolary salutations has been already indicated by the quotation made from the story of Bilkis (above, § 4). Islām has, however, imparted a religious significance to one old Semitic greeting, '*Salaameh alaik!*', 'Peace (or health) be to you!', to which the proper reply is, '*Wa alaik salaameh!*', 'And to you be peace!' This is regarded as a proper greeting among believers, but it is thought not quite right to say it to foreigners. When one meets Bedū or Muslims from the desert, who seldom come in contact with foreigners, one may, even though a Christian, receive this greeting, but in the towns, where the inhabitants are sophisticated, one will be saluted with '*Naharak saïd!*' or some phrase to which no religious interpretation could possibly attach. When the Bedū meet one another, they often employ the salutation '*Gawwāk!*', an abbreviation of '*Gawwāk Allah!*', 'May Allah give you strength!' Sometimes the invocation of peace is varied thus: '*Allah yusallimak!*', 'Allah preserve you in peace!'[2]

6. National characteristics are often strikingly manifest in salutations. One needs only to glance at the difference between a list of Japanese salutations and a similar list of those employed in the Levant to be convinced of this. The Japanese greetings are non-religious and self-restrained; they are polite but dignified. Those of the Levant often exhibit great religiosity and servility. Perhaps it is not quite accurate to call these national characteristics, as they are in the Levant confined to no one nation; in this region race has mingled with race as in a great melting-pot until the forms of salutation have in some degree become those of a region rather than a nation. It has been said that the characteristics of Western peoples are also revealed by their greetings. Thus the French '*Comment vous portez-vous?*' betrays the French feeling for artistic effect. The German '*Wie befinden Sie sich?*' is prompted by the Teutonic tendency to introspection; one wishes to know what his neighbour discovers when he turns his outer consciousness in upon his Ego. The English and American 'How do you do?' reveals the social bent towards work and activity; the standard of wellbeing is efficient work.

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[1] Cf. *PL* clxxxii. 228.
[2] See A. Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, p. 279 f.

SALVATION.

Assyro-Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 109.
Buddhist (C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS), p. 110.
Christian (T. B. KILPATRICK), p. 110.
Egyptian (A. M. BLACKMAN), p. 131.
Greek and Roman.—See MYSTERIES (Greek, etc.) and (Roman).
Hindu (A. S. GEDEN), p. 132.
Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 137.
Jewish (M. JOSEPH), p. 138.
Mithraic.—See MITHRAISM.
Muslim (E. SELL), p. 148.
Teutonic (S. G. YOUNGERT), p. 149.

SALVATION (Assyro-Babylonian).—Notwithstanding all the inscriptions of a religious nature left by the Assyro-Babylonians, there are few which show any really spiritual conception of the future life in which the people believed, and the state of existence therein. The belief which they had in heaven and hell ('the land of No-return') was a very different one[1] from that of Christian theology, though the latter is based upon the teaching of the Hebrews (who were likewise Semites) among whom Christianity had its origin. In one thing, however, the creed of the Babylonians and our own are in agreement — the necessity for salvation from the pains of hell. Their conception of that place, however, differed considerably from the views which Christians hold. The hell of the Babylonians was apparently not a place of fire and brimstone, in which the unrighteous were tormented, but simply a domain of ignominious existence, 'where dust was their nourishment, and their food mud.' Both creeds, however, have felt the necessity of salvation from this undesirable abode, whatever its torments and its miseries may have been conceived to be.

The Babylonians, therefore, like the Christians, found a belief in the existence of a 'merciful God' needful, the deity in question being Merodach,[2] though the adjective (*rêminū*) could probably be applied to other divinities of their pantheon. In both cases the right to accord salvation was based upon self-sacrifice; but, unlike Christ, Merodach did not submit to anything resembling the death of the Cross—his self-sacrifice was the conflict waged by him[3] on behalf of Creation as a whole, and the shedding of his blood[4] in order that mankind might come into being.

It is doubtful whether the Babylonians held the dogma of original sin. That some isolated sect may have believed in this is not only possible, but probable. In this connexion it is to be noted that the Babylonians seem to have thought that the sin or misdeed which brought upon a man the anger of the gods might possibly have been an involuntary one. He might, without knowing, have eaten of some forbidden thing or have trampled upon some sacred object. And not only might the sin have been committed unawares, but the deity sinned against might be one whom he did not know. These involuntary sins, with others which were not so, were expiated by punishment in this world; hence the need of litanies and prayers to excite the divine being's commiseration and pardon, so that the sin that a man had sinned might turn to good, and the misdeed that he had committed might be carried away by the wind. No second expiation, in all probability, was in such a case regarded as being necessary; and it may likewise be supposed that, if a man had already been saved from the effects of his sins in this world, no saving power needed to be invoked on his behalf in the world to come.

Another aspect of the question of salvation and divine disfavour, however, is to be found in the final tablet of the Gilgameš legend, which gives descriptions of the two states of happiness and misery, and regards the two differing treatments accorded to the dead (in this case a warrior) as being due to the consideration whether the departed had received due burial or not.[1] But there was apparently something more than this—he had to die the death of the [? righteous], or the like. The happy warrior, who had fallen in battle, supported by his father and mother and attended by his wife, reposed in the resting-place of [? the just], pure (holy) water was given him to drink, and the food which he ate was probably of the same sacred nature.

The above is followed by the second picture. The spirit (*êdimmu*) of him whose corpse had been thrown down on the plain reposed not in the earth. Apparently it remained, in this case, without a caretaker, and was compelled to subsist on the leavings of the dish and the remains of the food which was thrown into the street (? in the great city of the under world, presided over by Ereš-kigal and Nergal, her spouse). It is clear that the spirits of the departed, saved and unsaved, needed nourishment, like their contemporaries and descendants who still inhabited the earth.

These details seem to have been given by the spirit of Enkidu (Êa-bani) to his old friend and master, Gilgameš, when the former was allowed to visit earth again and communicate what he had seen in the regions below. But the ideal of existence is that announced by Ut-napištim[m] in the Flood-story which forms the 11th tablet of that same series. In this[2] the Babylonian Noah states that he intended, on account of the hatred of Enlil, the 'older Bêl,' in whose territory he could no longer dwell, to descend to the Abyss, the abode of Êa (Oannes) his lord, where he would henceforth constantly dwell. This view of the life beyond the grave seems to have been that generally accepted by the Sumero-Akkadians of Babylonia during the final centuries of the 3rd millennium B.C., and probably later. When a man died, it was said that his god took him to himself, and we may therefore suppose that there were as many heavens or abodes of bliss as there were great gods in the Babylonian pantheon. Every good man (*i.e.* every man after his god's own heart) was regarded as going and dwelling evermore with the deity whom he had worshipped and served faithfully during his lifetime. Each god thus became a saviour, and had for his faithful servants his own special salvation—even Nergal, the king of the under world, in whose abode the hero Etana[3] seems finally to have dwelt.

The word for 'salvation' in Semitic Akkadian (Babylonian), when found, will probably be some form of *ezēbu*, 'to escape.' For 'to save' the Shaphel (or Shuphul) was used, as in Aramaic: *Aššur-šēziba(n)ni*, 'Aššur, save me'; *Nabû-šēzib-(anni)*, 'Nebo, save (me),' etc., also *Mušēzib-Marduk*, 'Merodach is a saviour,' etc., with such feminines as *Mušēzibtu*[m], 'She who saves,' in which a goddess's name is understood. [*Ê*ṭ*ēr*]*a gamāl û šūzubu tîdî*, 'Thou knowest (how to) protect, spare, and save (O Šamaš)'; *Yâti Nabû-na'id šar Bâbili*

[1] See *ERE* ii. 316.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 311 f.
[3] *Ib.* iv. 129, vi. 644.
[4] T. G. Pinches, *The OT in the Light of Hist. Records*, p. 28.

[1] *ERE* ii. 316. [2] Pinches[3], p. 102.
[3] *ERE* ii. 315[a].

ina ḫiṭu ṭūti ka rabîti šûzibanni-ma balāṭa ûmu rûqūti ana širikti šurkam, 'As for me, Nabonidus, king of Babylon, save me (O Sin), from sin against thy great divinity, and give (me), as a gift, to live to remote days.' Thus prays the learned restorer of the temple of the moon at Mugheir (Ur of the Chaldees), the restorer of many temples, of divers gods, thus becoming a candidate with many deities for the reward of salvation in their heavenly abodes.

LITERATURE.—Friedrich Delitzsch, *Assyrisches Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 35a; T. G. Pinches, *The OT in the Light of the Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia*,[3] London, 1908, pp. 49–52, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, do. 1906, p. 120 ff. T. G. PINCHES.

SALVATION (Buddhist). — As meaning (1) well-being won and held against disaster, (2) assurance and realization of blissful security hereafter, salvation is a structural idea in Buddhism no less than in other religions. The facts of suffering and of death wherever there is life, the possibility of escape *from all three* for all living things —these are corner-stones of Buddhist doctrine. But the question of ultimate safety is developed in accordance with the evolutionary and non-animistic standpoint of that doctrine.

The word 'salvation' has its counterpart in the terms *su-v-atthi* or *sotthi* and *sotthibhāva* ('well-being,' 'health,' *salus*, 'safe,' and 'safety'), and *khema*, or *yogakkhema*, 'security,' 'salvation.' See, *e.g.*, the refrain:

> *Etena saccena suvatthi hotu!*
> 'By this truth salvation may there be!'

in the *Ratana-sutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta* and *Khuddaka pāṭha*; and in the *Mangala-sutta* of the same works:

> 'They who such things have done are nowhere worsted. Everywhere they go to salvation' (or 'walk in safety,' *sotthiṃ gacchanti*),

where 'salvation' and 'safety' refer to present and future. Or, again, the frequent references in the anthologies of the Canon, such as:

> 'O would that I who hourly waste might change
> For that which ne'er decays—who ever burn
> Might change for that cool bliss, e'en for the peace
> That passeth all, safety beyond compare!
> . . . . . .
> Make thee
> Adept in the path to sure salvation leading.
> . . . . . .
> Yea, to the mighty haven doth it wend;
> High peace it brings and bliss lies at the end.'[1]

In these verses 'safety,' 'salvation,' 'haven' are all equivalents of [*yogak*] *khema*. And the two terms are combined in a *sutta* of the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*,[2] where a layman asks Ananda the Elder whether there is any one thing (or doctrine, *dhamma*) where (*sic*) an earnest devoted member of the order could win emancipation, or eradicate the *āsavas*,[3] or win ultimate *yogakkhema*. Ananda replies in terms of mental training of eleven stages. The layman exclaims that, whereas, if he were in a burning house, one door would suffice 'to make himself safe (*sotthiṃ*),' he had now learnt of eleven doors to the 'ambrosial'[4] whereby safety was attainable.

To these terms should be added that of 'refuge' (lit. 'resort,' *saraṇa*). To confess that he 'takes refuge in the Buddha, the Norm, the Order' is the first step of every Buddhist layman or *religieux* in the path to salvation.[5] And the *Sutta* literature abounds in similar figures illustrating life as perilous and pointing to the pressing need of seeking salvation.

Coming from terms to meaning, we find that salvation in Buddhism is, ultimately, escape from *dukkha*, *i.e.* from suffering, pain, misery, sorrow, proximately, from the lusts, enmity, and stupidity that inevitably entail suffering, however much they may induce transient delights or satisfaction. These causes of *dukkha* are constantly represented as dangerous, not because, as a body of 'sin,' they set man at enmity with a deity, but because they hold him in bondage to misery now or hereafter. Thus 'salvation,' for a Buddhist, is a state of sentient existence conceived as freed from *dukkha*. Nor is the sentient, conceived as thus freed in a future life, considered as a saved 'soul' or detached entity. Salvation as fruition is the pleasanter environment in some heaven, the happier mental processes set going afresh in a suitable celestial mind-and-body, which are the resultants of previous mental activity. But such salvation is relative only. In a celestial rebirth *dukkha* is driven far away, for the chief sorrow is decay, disease, death, and the gods (*i.e.* the communities of happily reborn persons) live well and long. But eventually death comes again, for life is, in its essence, growth followed by decay. And the only final salvation is to end life, either as *arhat* on earth or as a god in some immaterial heaven. Of the ultimate destiny of those who accomplish the final going out, or *parinibbāna*, as of flame in water, the scriptures speak in solemn triumph, but do not speculate. Neither the words nor the concepts of life apply.

> 'Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion,
> That whereby we speak of him—that exists no longer.
> Wholly cut off are all forms of our knowing,
> Cut off the channels of speech, every one.'[1]
>
> 'Whose range is in the Void and th' Unmarked
> And Liberty: as flight of birds in air
> So hard is it to track the trail of him.'[2]
>
> 'Set free from bonds, happy and void of longing
> Him gods and men, here on this earth or yonder
> Or in the heavens, in every sphere of being
> Seeking they seek vainly, they will not find him.'[3]

LITERATURE.—C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (Home University Library), London, 1912, ch. vii. The texts and translations quoted in the art. are published by the Pāli Text Society. On the subject of assurance of salvation and the grounds thereof see S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy* (the *Kathāvatthu*), London, 1915, pp. 177, 185, 383.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SALVATION (Christian).—This article does not intrude into the domain of exegetical or doctrinal theology. It attempts to follow, through the history of Israel and through the period covered by the NT, the experience of salvation. The point of view from which it has been written, as well as the conclusion which it seeks to establish, is the unity and continuity of the experience, as well as its vital and growing quality.

I. *THE EXPERIENCE OF SALVATION IN THE HISTORY OF ISRAEL.*—1. **Its interpreters.**—An older method of study went to the OT to discover what it had to say of all topics which theology had defined, and particularly how its utterances anticipated and illustrated conclusions at which dogmatic had arrived. Such a method was, no doubt, mechanical, and inevitably missed the vividness and fullness with which the OT presents the great varieties of religion. But it did grasp one fact of first-rate importance, viz. the unity of the OT as a statement of the salvation experienced in Israel and set forth by its great religious teachers. Its error lay in its conception of unity as bare logical identity, to which the actual increases brought by

[1] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, 2 vols., London, 1910–13, ii. verses 82, 415, 422.
[2] v. 342 f.
[3] The poisons of sense-desires, renewed life, opinions or error, and nescience.
[4] *Amata*, lit. the 'not-dead,' 'immortal,' a word equivalent to 'salvation,' but implying not safety so much as 'the divine,' or 'bliss,' and, in its first intention, like ἀμβροσία, a heavenly elixir.
[5] *Khuddaka-pāṭha*, i.; *Vinaya Texts*, i. (*SBE* xiii.) 115.

[1] *Sutta-Nipāta*, verse 1075.
[2] *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, ii.; *Psalms of the Brethren*, verse 92.
[3] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings*, London, 1917, i. 32.

the discipline of centuries are indifferent and irrelevant. It ought to be possible to conserve the truth of this older view without being misled by its rigid and abstract scheme.

The historical and critical method of study has established what the least technically trained mind never failed to discover, viz. that the OT is a history, the history of a salvation, which had very rude and even crude beginnings, which grew in ethical quality and religious meaning, till it was ready under the quickening force of new influences to enter upon a further historic development, of which the NT is the literary record and the whole subsequent history of man the rich and varied consequence. It is literal fact that the salvation which, in the Christian gospel, has penetrated to the confines of the world, and is producing profound and revolutionary changes among all races of men, had its historic origin in the experience of a group of tribes which entered Palestine from the desert and occupied it in the name of Jahweh, their God.

It is in this experience, and in this only, that the significance and value of Israel for the moral progress of mankind consist. The point of interest does not lie in the customs prevalent in Israel, which differed little from those of surrounding peoples; or in the details of legislation, which may have been copied from the laws of nations somewhat higher in the scale of material civilization; or in the apparatus of worship, which, in the earlier periods at any rate, had little in it that was unique or distinctive; or even in the ideas entertained by Hebrews regarding creation, cosmogony, or similar subjects, which seem to have been drawn from the common stock of Semitic reflexion upon the mysteries of the universe. Our valuation of Israel's history depends entirely on its whole scope, and on the tendency manifested in its whole development. An observer of its earlier stages would have found nothing to indicate its future course. He would have noted merely one more Semitic people, and would have predicted no more than an ordinary political career, including possibly a period of imperial expansion, followed by swift decay and complete extinction. In one sense, indeed, such a prediction, made so easily and so confidently, would have been sound and accurate. Israel showed no more political genius than its neighbours and rivals, and shared in the disasters that overtook the Oriental world. All this estimate and prediction, however, would have been superficial, and would have missed the heart of Israel's historic value. Beneath the casing of customs and culture and philosophical opinion, apart from, and deeper than, the surface movements that led through calamity to ruin, there was a life of the spirit, for which it is no more than plain justice to claim absolute uniqueness. It could not have been predicted from the phenomena attendant upon Israel's origin, it could not have been inferred from any qualities displayed by Israel at any stage of its career, that, as the ages rolled by, there would have been developed a conscience singularly enlightened and sensitive, clear to discern everlasting moral verities, and drastic in self-analysis and self-condemnation, together with an extraordinary power of moral recovery, and a conviction, deeper even than the sense of sin and failure, of the presence and action, in all the long tragedy of Israel's political destruction, of a purpose at once omnipotent and redemptive. Yet this is precisely what did happen; and this is the pre-Christian stage of that salvation which, through the Christian Church, has become the permanent possession of the race and is gradually being communicated to the whole world.

The history of such a salvation was, as we have said, unpredictable from the standpoint of its beginning. It was also unnoticed by the vast majority of those who took part in its onward movement. Even very sophisticated and self-conscious people are not continually reflecting upon the lives they are leading day by day. They act for the most part automatically; other incidents of life flow by in a kind of dream. Conceive, then, how few, in an age long previous to the intense subjectivism which is our inheritance, were capable of estimating the nature of the forces which moved in their national history or of discovering their direction. The multitudes of men and women which made up the Israel of these early times were no more intelligent or introspective than the modern *fellahîn* who till the same fields where their remote ancestors carried on a scarcely less primitive agriculture. At the same time, two points are to be noted. First, these simple and unknowing souls were experiencing, to the extent of their capacity, the salvation of which they had such dim and shallow apprehension. They lived by things of which they could give no adequate account. He who toiled in vineyard or wheatfield and brought his offering to Jahweh, and, if need were, died in defence of his wife and children, was 'being saved,' and was proving a living link in the chain which binds the dim apprehensions of primitive times to the richer and clearer experiences of the Christian believer. Second, not all in Israel, even in the very early stages of its advance, were thus spiritually unawakened. In the history of Israel, as in all history, we have to reckon with personality. That there should arise in any nation at any time a man who is able to lift himself above the stream of incident and event in which most of his contemporaries are submerged, and to grasp the significance of a history which to most other men is blind or misleading, is very wonderful. All attempts to explain such a man fail. This wonder stands out in the history of Israel, not to be missed or explained away. The prophets understood: that is their greatness. In the mirror of their consciousness we discern the meaning of Israel's history. They are not students of the history, painfully piecing together its chronicles, and precariously drawing deductions. Nor are they makers of the history in the sense in which monarchs and conquerors make or mar the fortunes of men. Their function, in reference to their nation, is more intimate, and their influence more profound and far-reaching. Their experience is that of the people to whom they belong, with all the difference that lies between consciousness and unconsciousness, between clear sight and purblind vision, and with the yet wider difference between subjection to an unknown purpose and devotion to a purpose recognized with deep intuition and accepted, with entire consecration, as the vocation of life. Their salvation is the salvation of Israel. They, like the humblest of their fellow-countrymen, are being educated and trained in the moral life. Salvation means for them, as for others, a moral discipline. In them, however, in virtue not so much of greater religious susceptibility as of greater willingness to obey a higher guidance, the salvation proceeds at a swifter rate and reaches nobler results.

As we read the story of their inner life, we see what no observer could have predicted — the intended issue of Israel's history. Not to create a State or Empire, but to make men like these, is the teleology of Israel's strange and infinitely tragic career. This is the salvation of which Israel was meant to be the recipient and the exponent—the creation of just such a character related in this manner to God, marked by such communion with

Him, and showing in life and conduct the ethical fruit of such divine fellowship. The prophets were themselves 'saved' with a salvation which is not static, but dynamic, and exerts upon and through its recipients a moral energy which is inexhaustible. Their salvation, accordingly, is not merely a high degree of that which was common to all Israelites. It becomes, in their experience of it, the condition under which salvation is possible as an experience for all. Being saved themselves, they become the saviours of those whose life they share, as being with them members of Israel.

They have a message to deliver to their fellows. They have much moral and religious truth to communicate. Their duty was, as one of their titles signifies, to interpret for the ignorant and unenlightened the divine principles immanent in the history of Israel. But the supreme service that they rendered to their people was the life they lived. By it they illustrated the meaning of the divine salvation, and proved its reality. By it, moreover, they mediated that salvation to their people. Salvation became, in the life and ministry of these men, a fact of the moral order. Through them and their actions and sufferings God was approaching Israel, in the energy of His redeeming purpose. To cleave to them, to obey their counsels, and to breathe their spirit was salvation for the whole body of the people, or, failing a national obedience, for such circles as might permit the prophetic spirit to permeate and govern them. Such is the fact of salvation, as it presents itself in the history of Israel and in that interpretation of the history, given by prophetic men, which we find in the OT. It is an experience which rises from rudimentary forms towards great spiritual fullness, and contains the promise and the potency of yet greater experience, still to come.

2. Its source.—The salvation which was an experience in Israel originated in the act of God. No doubt, Israel might be saved at any given moment of need by human instrumentality. But the instinct of Israel always passed beyond the human agent to the real doer, who was Jahweh Himself, 'who himself saveth you out of all your calamities and your distresses' (1 S 10^{19}). To prefer the human to the divine Saviour is practical apostasy. The creed of Israel is, in brief, 'Jahweh saves'; and their creed is not the work of philosophers, the product of speculation, but the immediate deliverance of an experience, too real and too great to be susceptible of any other explanation than this, that it is the direct, though not unmediated, operation of God Himself.

The OT as a whole is no more than illustration and exposition of this primary conviction. In its most rudimentary form this creed contains the germs of the whole subsequent religious development. Two elements of special importance lie hidden in Israel's earliest confession of faith.

(*a*) *The nature of God.*—God is conceived as a Power, who does things. To pass from the *Upaniṣads* to the Prophets is to leave one universe of religious thought for another, wholly different in fundamental conceptions. In the one God is substance, in the other He is power. In the one He is, and all being is merged in Him. In the other He acts, and is the source of all the energy that is needed for His purposes. It may be that some higher synthesis of these widely contrasted ideas of the divine nature is possible; but no attempt to harmonize them must ignore their difference. To say '*Brahman-atmān*,' and to say 'Jahweh saves,' represent two worlds of experience, which cannot be inhabited together. Indian thought is, necessarily, without history, and does no more than confront the illusory manifold of the world's life with the sublime monotony of its assertion that all being is one. Hebrew experience is essentially historic, and is the product of an immanent energy, moving towards a goal, which the rarer minds alone, and they only dimly, can discern in the distant future.

A curious contrast may be observed between the ancient Hebrew cultivator and the toiler in the wide Gangetic plain. The former is not nearly so intellectual or reflective as the latter. He holds no metaphysical theory about the constitution of the world. He is simpler and cruder in his ideas, and stands much nearer the primitive animism. Yet he entertains an idea, and he uses a term, which are destined to carry his successors towards experiences incomparably richer than his and yet genetically connected with them. The idea is that God is one who exerts power, and the term is 'the Spirit of God.' From the beginning of Israel's history, so far as we know it, the Hebrew mind discerned the operation of God in the world, and yet never proceeded to a philosophical theory of the relation of God to the world. Its ideas had little philosophic breadth, but great experimental intensity. The powers that control the history of Israel are God's; and, wherever these powers are seen in action, they are identified with the Spirit of God. God—God acting in the world—God acting by His Spirit: this is the primitive, simple, yet far-reaching Hebrew doctrine of God.

(*b*) *The character of God.*—In 'Jahweh saves' the emphasis passes from the one term to the other. Jahweh is known as Saviour of Israel. God loves Israel, and will save Israel out of all his distresses. What that saving action might involve—what exertions on God's part, and what discipline on man's—what issues it might have for the people, and what form it might assume lay within the unknown future. But the abiding conviction was that God's action would be saving, that His settled purpose was redemptive, and that He would not cease His dealing with Israel till the deliverance was complete. Here we touch the earliest Hebrew thought of God: He is one who loves and saves. Whatever His love and His people's need require, He will do. Whatever He does is the expression of His love for His people, and is meant for the furtherance of their salvation. It would be ridiculous to attribute to the early mind of Israel exalted conceptions of the moral character of God and rich religious experience of salvation. But it would be equally unhistorical to deny, even to the tribes that broke in from the desert to occupy the hills and valleys of Palestine, the conviction that they were living under the direction and inspira- of a Saviour-God.

History itself, becoming articulate in the prophets, would unfold the meaning of salvation, and would bring home to the awakening religious consciousness what are the real evils from which men are suffering, and what God is willing to do for their deliverance. But, whatever befalls the people of Israel, whether judgments smite them or mercies crown them, they are being 'saved'; God is making His salvation known; God is revealing Himself. Students of the OT are apt to be disastrously doctrinaire in their methods, whether their conclusions are conservative or advanced. The interest of the OT lies not in opinions which may or may not be supported by proof texts, but in the picture which it presents of a nation in the hands of God. Israel does not consist in pupils being instructed in theological lore; it is a community of men and women who, collectively and individually, are being saved, with a salvation which is, fundamentally, a moral experience. Of that experience, and of those in those far-off days subjected to it, the members of the Christian Church are the heirs and the successors. The history of Israel is not closed. It is continued in the history of mankind. The religion of Israel is not superseded. It remains, man's only religion. The theology of Israel is not an anachronism. It is the abiding truth of God.

3. Its warrant.—Salvation in Israel is an experience of the present, and contains a prophecy of the future. But it is securely grounded in the past, and derives therefrom its confidence and its strength. 'Behind the people's national life lay the consciousness of redemption as much as it lies behind the life of the Christian.'[1] The point of interest is not the outward form which the deed of redemption assumed. It is certain that some visitor (let us suppose) from the Farther East would have sent to the court which he represented a very different account of the incidents connected with the deliverance from Egypt from that which the prophetic historian gives in Exodus. Such differences do not impugn the historicity of the event itself, and in no way invalidate its significance for the conscience and intelligence of Israel. In this event the religion of Israel is born. Upon this event the salvation of Israel is established. In the experience which Israel then passed through God became known to His people; not, be it noted, by a formula, but by a personal name, which gathered to itself epithets descriptive of personal qualities. When we ask how the primitive mind would most naturally express the relation towards God into which the experience of deliverance had introduced the redeemed people, one form at once suggests itself, viz. a 'covenant.' It is true that most of the great 'covenant' passages belong to an age far later than that of the exodus—*e.g.*, Lv 26^{44}, Ezk 16^{60}. But this is no evidence against the primitive character of the thought and no proof of the unhistoric nature of the narrative, which describes the institu-

[1] A. B. Davidson, *s.v.* 'God,' in *HDB* ii. 202^{b}.

tion of the covenant as following immediately upon the national deliverance. The very fact of the redemption creates the covenant relationship. The God who saves does, in the very act, pledge Himself to persevere in one line of action towards the people whom He has redeemed. Salvation was undertaken on His initiative. It becomes the goal of His action. He is vitally concerned with reaching it. His movement towards it is the only reliable revelation of His nature, and forms the ever-renewed proof of His being. In every time of strain and doubt the disciplined mind of Israel goes back to the covenant into which God entered of His own free motion, and cleaves, even amid sorest trial, to the faithfulness which will not suffer Him to forget His obligations. In like manner, the people who are the subjects of God's redeeming action stand pledged to carry out the divine purpose in saving them, as it is gradually disclosed to them. Salvation is their privilege. It is also their vocation. The scope of the privilege and the nature of the vocation are alike disclosed only through long ages, in which the self-consciousness of the nation became explicit and the national ideal became clear and full. But the most glorious utterances of the most inspired prophet turn back upon the earliest experiences of mutual pledges between Jahweh and Israel, and present the fulfilment of what was germinal therein (cf. Dt 26^{16-19}).

It is impossible, in describing the covenant relation between Jahweh and Israel, to avoid using terms which imply personality on both sides. God is intensely personal and has all the qualities by which men recognize a personal as distinguished from an impersonal force. Israel also is personal, viewed in its national and corporate existence—in this sense at least that it is susceptible of a moral discipline and is being led to a spiritual consummation, in both of which every individual Israelite has his part as a member of a living whole. God and Israel, accordingly, confront one another, God viewing Israel as the object of His love, and Israel gradually recognizing God for what He is and discerning more clearly His demands and purposes.

The relationship between these two, therefore, is wholly personal. God knows Israel in its weakness, its need, and its possibilities, and bends Himself to make of Israel what He will. Israel makes progressive discovery of God, gaining insight into His character and beginning to discern His aim.

'All Israel's history is filled with this reciprocal knowledge, rising up from strength to strength, till One came who knew the Father, and whom the Father knew in fulness.'[1]

Knowledge of God, in fact, is one of the Biblical synonyms for salvation; and in this lies the uniqueness of the Bible among all the 'Sacred Books of the East.' It is not a disquisition; it is the record of an experience, gained in actual fellowship with God.

4. Its verification and exploration.—It belongs to the essence of religious experience that it can never be immobile. In the life of the spirit there is no stable equilibrium. The intense interest belonging to Israel's history lies in the double movement discernible throughout its whole course. On the one hand, there is a constant downward tendency, a ceaseless misunderstanding of God and misinterpretation of His salvation. On the other hand, there is an upward movement, towards a discovery of God and a realization of His purposes. This movement, though it be the true life of Israel, does not proceed by steady uninterrupted progress, nor does it include within its scope even the majority of the people. It is marked by revivals. It is concentrated in unique personalities. It extends to circles who are but dimly discernible and whose exact numbers cannot be calculated. The details of this experimental verification and exploration of the divine salvation are of thrilling interest. They have their parallels and analogies in all religions and in the discipline of every separate soul.

The history of religious experience in Israel has never been written; and still less has a history of religious experience as such been attempted. Perhaps such books, condensing the spiritual progress of mankind, could never be composed with any hope of accuracy. The value of the OT literature is that it presents a touchstone, by which we may evaluate religion anywhere and note its progress in races or individuals. That touchstone is the ethical element in the conception of God. Where it is seen that God is righteous and requires righteousness, there the higher life of man ripens towards noble fruit; the divine salvation opens to vision and appropriation that are in fact boundless; and communion with God is not an occasional ecstasy, but a reality of the daily life and its continual delight. The use of this ethical standpoint, in reviewing religious life in general, establishes this conclusion, viz. that progress in the discovery of salvation is always accompanied by disillusion, and often by the utmost sorrow and pain. The form of salvation breaks, as advance is made; and salvation itself has to be sought in some deeper region, where the soul shall find itself more perfectly at home.

The OT records are full of this strange commingling of victory and defeat, of despair and exultation. The form which salvation at first assumes is national and political. It is identical with the integrity and independence of the Hebrew nationality. Its great events are deliverances from national peril. Its scope and contents consist in peace and plenty, and the abundance and security of those possessions are the normal conditions of happy and prosperous living. Precisely at this point lay the testing of Israel's moral sense; and here emerges the tragedy of Israel's history. Will Israel discover no more in Jahweh than Moab in Chemosh? Will Israel explore the farther reaches of salvation or be satisfied with external satisfactions and external deliverances?

The history gives a sad and terrible answer to these questions. The 'Israel' which we name as such, for purposes of comparison with 'Egypt' or 'Assyria,' failed in moral discernment, and was not merely destroyed politically, but deprived of place and function in the moral development of mankind. At the same time, there was another 'Israel,' the true Israel, consisting of those persons, whose numbers are unknown and whose experiences are largely unrecorded, who were being taught another conception of God and were making proof of another kind of salvation. Their existence and the continuity of their religious experience are facts absolutely certain, and of transcendent importance for the vindication of revelation and the upward movement of humanity. While the political fabric of Israel's existence lasted, they testified that the condition of its permanence was obedience to the moral will of Israel's God, that God would save those who yielded Him this obedience, and that, should disaster threaten, such obedience would secure the divine salvation. Those OT writings which belong to the period of national independence develop the idea of righteousness into its social applications, and connect it vitally with the presence of God and the enjoyment of His favour. We have before us the picture of a community of which God is at once the Head and the indwelling life. Every member of this organism is related to every other, through

[1] A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the OT*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 78.

the relation in which all stand to the unseen King. In their fulfilment of their mutual obligations, they are glorifying God and are pursuing a path of moral education in which conscience will be enlightened, the will trained, and faith strengthened.

Israel is the microcosm of salvation, the prefigurement of a redeemed and perfected humanity.

'J" chose a nation, because His idea of mankind, of which He will be God, is that of a social organism. It is this organism of which He is God. But though the relation might seem to be with the ideal unity, it operated in disposing all the parts making up the unity rightly to one another. And in this way each individual felt J" to be his God.'[1]

This conception of a religious organism and a social salvation is the contribution of pre-Exilic Israel to the spiritual progress of the race. Any experience, Christian or other, which omits it is to that extent impoverished, and is condemned from the point of view of a full salvation.

The time came, however, when the national form of existence, which had conveyed and conserved the divine salvation, became too narrow and limited for the experience which had been made possible within it. Whether the transition to a fuller salvation could have been made without the tragedy of Israel's destruction as a political institution is a fruitless problem. We may dream of a people learning to distinguish between form and content, discovering that the essence of salvation was separable from the outward framework of the State, and passing onward to a knowledge of God, so deep and intimate that it ceased to be a national perquisite and was fitted to the needs and destined for the reception of all men everywhere.

In point of fact, however, the political 'Israel' did not rise to this thought of God, and so failed in its historic mission. It did not 'lose' its life, and therefore did not 'save' it. It perished as a nation, and did not survive as a community of the Spirit. The inner Israel, which did know God and was testing His power to save, suffered intensely at the hands of its politically-minded fellow-citizens. Its affirmation of an ethically conditioned salvation seemed, at one period, to be the dream of an impossible patriotism, and, at another, to be treason against the State and impiety against a God whose very existence was bound up with that of His people. Then, when the worst happened, and the political Israel passed amid unknown agonies to its doom, those very persons who were proving in their own souls the permanence of a moral union with God shared the sorrows of those whose ignorance and disobedience had made that judgment inevitable, and felt their griefs the more intensely that they discerned the nature and guilt of the sin which was thus receiving its due reward.

Thus the older form of salvation was broken up and a new experience of God's saving help was born, amid such confusion and pain as have made the Exile the symbol of the utmost desolation that the human soul can bear.

The transition was accomplished in anguish—an anguish which, ideally, need not have been. Yet through the agony the new fact came gloriously into being, a salvation in which the living God grasped and mastered and held the soul, when all the lesser values of life were discredited, and all its earthly treasures dispersed for ever. Salvation, in this era of national disintegration, is concentrated in the experience of individuals, of whom Jeremiah and Ezekiel stand out as examples. The State is gone; but God remains; and His presence is salvation. The religious experience of such men forms at once the goal of Israel's past and the starting-point of Israel's future.

The secret of Israel is its relation to God. Its salvation rests on the 'covenant' between God and His people. And now the covenant is passing to a new stage of experimental verification and new ranges of discovery. Its subjects are human souls, taken out of the broken forms of national life and dealt with in their bare humanity, with its needs and possibilities; and its experiences lie within the compass of a divine fellowship, realized with an intensity and tenderness unknown hitherto. It is a 'new covenant,' and yet its source is the changeless love of God; its guarantee is His steadfast purpose of mercy; and its issue is the understanding of His unchangeable will of righteousness and profound surrender to it. This is the imperishable gain of the Exile. Salvation is a relation of the human soul to God, a fellowship of man with God, enduring through the dissolution of forms of life, which had seemed inseparable from well-being, and dependent only on man's entire subjection to divine holy will and unwavering confidence in divine power and faithfulness. This individual salvation is the complement to the social salvation of the pre-Exilic period. Israel has made the experiment for humanity. A social salvation that is not rooted in a personal covenant with God is imperfect and insecure.

The history of Israel, however, is not closed with the Exile; nor is its contribution to the religious experience of mankind exhausted. There follow the strange and disappointing centuries which intervene between the Exile and Israel's new birth in Christianity. We observe with impatience and regret that the vision of a new religious life, individual, subjective, free, and rich, is clouded over by the intervention of another external framework. It is not now a political fabric that in part conceals, and in part conveys, the new salvation. It is something more unfamiliar, and even less pleasing, to modern eyes—a system of ceremonial law, laid with iron rigidity upon souls which had caught the sight and even tasted the joys of the liberty of the spirit. If it was difficult to imagine the religious life of the national period, it is still more difficult to figure to ourselves the possibility of any noble, joyous, and progressive life lived under the yoke of the law. Yet the patent and amazing fact is that such a life was lived by a community which accepted every jot and tittle of the law as of divine enactment, and set itself resolutely to the laborious task of complete fulfilment.

In short, we have to revise our first rough estimate of the ceremonial law, and to distinguish between law and legalism.

We can well imagine that a discipline of law was needed for a religious consciousness which had been formed in the intense and individualizing experiences of the Exile. There is danger of subjectivism and mysticism, with their incapacity for educative or evangelistic work. There is need of training in the ethical and religious meanings and issues of a life lived in thoroughgoing submission to the will of a holy God. The sequence with which we are familiar in the inner life—after conversion, sanctification—is wrought out in the life of Israel: after the Exile, the return to Palestine and the scheme of 'a holy people in a holy land.' We are conscious of a change of atmosphere when we compare the post-Exilic 'Church' with the pre-Exilic 'nation.' The priest is a much less inspiring personality than the prophet. The social salvation of the earlier period seems more ethically fruitful, and more capable of modern applications, than the religious experience shaped and limited by a legal dispensation. Yet this judgment is certainly incomplete and misleading. Conceive the inner life of this people as depicted in the Psalter. Follow the narrative of their conflicts with heathen elements surviving among themselves and their splendid resistance to a tyranny which would have destroyed their very soul. How easily they might have perished, absorbed into surrounding populations, and losing all religious function in the history of the race! And, instead of this doom, the divine saving power is manifest in their life: and they verify the salvation of God by a demonstration absolutely conclusive, and explore its riches in a manner which has made their devotional literature the nourishment of the soul of man in every age and clime. The sense of sin as an infinite injury to God and man, the exercise of faith which throws itself absolutely on God and owes its standing to His sovereign grace, the joy of reconciliation and forgiveness, the

[1] A. B. Davidson, *s.v.* 'Prophecy,' in *HDB* iv. 120.

converse of the soul with God, progress in moral achievement through lowliest obedience—these elements of a full salvation were being wrought into the experience of men and women, to form permanent features in the redemption of man. With such a treasure they could not afford to part. Persecution might break upon them, but its bitterness did not lessen their assurance of salvation. Rather did the things that they suffered unlock the stores of divine help. The fire not only tried and purified them, but it revealed a Presence with them, which, in its radiance and its sustaining comfort, was their salvation and their song. The OT ought not to have closed with Malachi; it ought to have culminated in the books of the Maccabees.

At the same time, these blessed experiences were enclosed, as it were, in a rigid framework of precept. Israel was still in the hands of a Pædagogue, and the time of liberty was not yet. The defects of law are manifest. It is a burden, not an inspiration. It suggests a false inference, viz. that men are saved by their observance of precepts, not by their inward relation to the Source of all truth and right, by works, not by faith. It begets a misconception of God, exaggerating His transcendence, neglecting His knowableness and accessibility, forgetting the affinity of man with God and the susceptibility of human nature for divine fellowship. It creates a spirit of bigotry and exclusiveness, and makes those who are the subjects of divine salvation not the saviours of men, but their tyrants.

These defects had not belonged to the great days of Israel's religion, when the prophets were its evangelists and its examples. But they were rife in the days when the priest and the scribe dominated the spirit of the people.

It became increasingly evident, accordingly, that the end was not yet. The salvation of men lay still in the future. Not till the shell of law was broken, even as the older shell of nationality had been broken, could the human spirit enter on the treasure of grace reserved for it in the intention of Him who is the Saviour of men. In this legal period the true evangelical succession belongs to those who, penetrated by the sense of need, waited for the consolation of Israel.

Once more the easily neglected fact of 'the Remnant' stands out as the most remarkable and the most influential element in the history of Israel. Once more the unifying principle in the history of divine salvation becomes apparent, binding the far-off Hebrew tribes breaking into Palestine in the power of a recent deliverance with the disciplined souls who poured forth in the Psalms their confessions and aspirations, and with all, in every age, who have made the supreme discovery that, in the stress of life, the human spirit cannot stay itself upon any form, political, ritual, or intellectual, but only upon God, obeyed and trusted to the last limit of a surrendered will.

5. Its instruments and mediators.—As long as the religion of Israel is living, *i.e.* as long as men are conscious of redeeming forces operating in their lives, God is known to be acting directly for and within His people. His presence and His power are both immediate. It is only when the last and most decadent state of religion in Israel is reached that God is conceived of as remote, and a cosmological and metaphysical machinery has to be invented to connect Him with His world and provide channels for the course of His operations. In that age such an OT concept as 'the Spirit of God,' which was meant to express God's presence to and in the world without identifying Him with it, has been changed to mean a kind of being intermediate between God and the world. It may be said, broadly, for all religion and all theology that only when the sense of the divine salvation has become feeble and empty is such an artificial conception of God's relation to the world and human history tolerable to the intelligence; attractive to the heart that pants after the living God it never can be. The divine salvation in Israel, accordingly, is always God's own immediate work. It does not follow that it operates magically or without means and instruments. The idea of mediation runs deep through the OT.[1] But it stands in no manner of opposition to the immediacy of God's presence and working. It has no reference to the supposed necessity of an intermediate being to cross the chasm between infinite and finite. It belongs to a totally different universe of thought. It means that the divine salvation, being the salvation of man, must find in man its adequate organ. God and man are by nature so close together that nothing that is not perfectly human is needed, or can be permitted, to intervene between them. Man needs to be saved. Only God can save him; and God can save man only by man.

This is the message of Israel's religion. Its history is the history of saviours, *i.e.* of organs and instruments of the divine salvation, human all of them, each with some special aspect of the great work to do, each with special aptitude and fitness. In each it is the Spirit of God, *i.e.* God Himself in power, who operates. In each the saviour is not the man, but God, choosing, preparing, finding, in the man, the adequate organ for His saving work, and so, also, for the revelation of His being and character. As we turn the pages of the record, we note that, in every age, men needed, and God provided, saviours. We observe the suddenness of their appearance and the spontaneity of their ministry. There is nothing stereotyped or predictable in their service. There is clearly-marked immediacy in their personal experience and strongly-defined originality in their service. Yet there is equally observable a profound unity connecting them; so that, from whatever grade they come (peasant or prince), to whatever age they belong (pre-Exilic, Exilic, or post-Exilic), whatever their precise commission may be (that of warrior, statesman, priest, or prophet), they form one company and toil at one task. They are the agents of one salvation, which originates in the counsels of a righteous God, consists in moral oneness with Him, and is secure in His power and goodness. The mediation of salvation in the OT is not confined, however, to the individual saviours, to whose actions more or less full allusion is made. A broad generalization arises out of the history. Thoughts begin to shape themselves which rise beyond the confines of the history. It becomes apparent, *e.g.*, that the full salvation of Israel cannot be achieved by the sporadic endeavours of any individual members of Israel. The double conception of Israel, noticed before, receives now a special and crowning application. Not only is 'the Remnant,' the inner, the true 'Israel,' the subject of the divine salvation; it is also the mediator of that salvation to the political 'Israel,' whose ignorance of God's real character and mind was plunging it into ruin. Not only so; but, when the political Israel perishes, the true Israel survives, not in weakened, but in heightened, power and nobler function. It is called to mediate salvation to nations that know not God, to be the instrument of a salvation which shall include mankind. There is no doctrinaire universalism in those writings which thus exalt the function of Israel. They are not operating with abstract conceptions and deductive logic. They are interpreting the experience of a people and of disciplined souls within it.

Thus there arose, says Davidson, 'the great conception of "the servant of the Lord." The phrase expresses the highest generalization on the meaning of Israel in the religious life of mankind—Israel is the Servant of J" to the nations to bring to them the knowledge of God.'[1]

When we ponder the work of mediation, we perceive that it necessarily involved two sides or aspects, and that, therefore, those who laboured at it must necessarily have possessed a twofold qualification. On the one side, God must be made known to man—not in a theoretic manner, and not through a magical phrase, but in His character as a living God, engaged in carrying forward His purposes for His people. On the other, men must be led into a condition of moral harmony with the will of God, not as mere acceptance of a code, but as loyal surrender to a personal and gracious authority.

The servants of God through whose activities and experiences this double work is done have

[1] Though the word μεσίτης occurs only once in LXX (Job 9[33]); see art. MEDIATION.

[1] *HDB* iv. 122.

plainly a double relationship—to God, on the one hand, and to the people, on the other. They are God's agents and representatives. They also act on behalf of the people and represent them. This is true of them all, princes and statesmen and warriors, as well as prophets and priests; true also of the company, or inner circle, which constituted the true Israel. To discharge their functions, accordingly, their sympathy must include both God and man. They must be at one with God, knowing His mind and receiving communications from Him. They must be at one with the people, not as being mere political nationalists, but as discerning, realizing, and seeking to further the true purpose of the nation's existence and the real trend of its history. Technical distinctions ought not to hide from us that which underlies separate stereotyped manner or office, viz. a life actually lived, in which God is moving towards man, and man is rising towards God. In the religious experience of such servants the divine salvation becomes a power available for all who range themselves with them in their faith and obedience. In this sense, while they are being saved themselves, they become saviours of their people. They are the organic centre of the redeemed community. In them God is present as saving power. The degree of their consciousness or the outward form of their work does not alter the reality of their divine vocation. They serve, in the measure of their loyalty and in the sphere of their operation, as meeting-points for God and man. Mediation is accomplished, not by cultus or dogma, but by life.

This life, moreover, as the problem of salvation deepened in the course of Israel's history, necessarily became harder and more marked by suffering. A soldier or statesman in Israel, if he was a genuine servant of Jahweh, had hard work to do and much suffering to undergo, and his labour and pain were the condition of the people's salvation. Yet he might not penetrate to the heart of God's concern for Israel or to the depths of Israel's need. He might not, accordingly, load himself with the whole burden created by the people's ignorance and sin. Suppose, however, a different case. Suppose a patriotic Israelite, clearly discerning the mistaken optimism of the 'false prophets,' *i.e.* the political nationalists; feeling in his inmost soul the demands made as well by the love as by the holiness of God, and the failure on Israel's part to respond by a changed mind and a morally renewed life; reading aright the story of Israel's past, and foreseeing nothing but multiplied disaster and ultimate ruin as the issue of present materialism and corruption. It is plain that he will suffer, as none other in Israel save those like-minded with himself can suffer. The afflictions of his people, coming on them as the fruit of their doings, are his afflictions, though he deserve them not; and in his case they are intensified a thousandfold by his sense of the guilt of which they are the exposure and the judgment. It is true, the guilt is not his, and his sufferings are not his punishment. But, if any one should imagine that on that account the suffering is less, or that the sufferer is able to throw off the pain, he cannot know the passionate heart of one who knows and loves both God and his fellow-countrymen. There is no sorrow like the sorrow of the soul which is consciously and voluntarily identified with God in His holiness and man in his need.

This is the sorrow that sounds, as one long cry of anguish, through the life of Jeremiah. It was the sorrow also of others, unrecorded, who are, however, grouped around the central figures in the tragedy of Israel's judgment, a dim and piteous remnant of the nation that had so fearfully missed its way. This sorrow, the experience of living souls in Israel, lasted through the centuries, and is the most significant fact in the history of Israel. The prophetic minds which surveyed and interpreted that history could not miss this significance. Such sorrow has atoning value. Sin makes a breach with God. The life of the innocent Servant of the Lord, freely and consciously given, amid unknown grief and pain, for a guilty nation, is an expiation for guilt, and effects the reconciliation of God and man. Language borrowed from the ritual of sacrificial worship is applied with enriched meaning to the sorrows of the Servant: 'God hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. . . . He bears the sin of many, he makes intercession for the transgressors' (Is $53^{6.\ 12}$). The theological implications of such a view of the sufferings of the Servant will necessarily be of the highest importance for thought. The important point is that the sufferings actually endured by servants of God in Israel, or by Israel as the Servant, have value for God and have a saving efficacy for men. Yet not merely as the pain of individuals, standing apart from God. If this were the meaning, we would have a reversion to a heathen view of God and of sacrifice, as though a man offered his pain to God and God were placated thereby. God in Israel is not thus separated from His servants. Their pain is His. 'In all their affliction he is afflicted' (Is 63^{9}). At the heart of the religion of Israel there is pain, divine pain. This is the everlasting rock on which the divine salvation rests; and this is the power which, exerted upon the hearts of men, leads them to a new vision of God and wakens in them deep compunction and relenting towards Him. No religion which ever linked man with God has been without some sight of this principle of redemptive suffering. But in the religion of Israel it finds rich and adequate expression, and becomes the chief and proximate source of the Christian message of salvation, as proclaimed and illustrated in NT Scriptures.

As we ponder the conception of the Suffering Servant and note how the NT reverts to it in its fullest interpretation of the Person and Work of Christ, we are apt to ask what becomes of it in the intervening period. It is incredible that it should have disappeared for hundreds of years, and then have owed its re-emergence to the genius of the apostle Paul, who used it to replace the primitive religion of Jesus by a Christianity of which he was practically the inventor. Two points here are of importance.

(1) The true succession in religion does not run through books, or systems of thought, or ceremonial practices. It is to be traced in actual experience; or else its existence evaporates into scholastic theology or magic ritual. The succession in Israel is manifest, and belongs, not to any officials, but to the souls which, through national and personal discipline, were led into an apprehension of God far other than theoretic and a service greater than political or intellectual. The existence of such servants and sufferers is not in any doubt in the centuries immediately preceding the rise of Christianity. They form, in part, the martyr-age of the religion of Israel; and, where no names stand pre-eminent, there is an unmistakable company of those that 'wait for the consolation' of Israel. In them the calling of the true Israel, the Servant of the Lord, is continued. Out of the heart of their experience there shall arise the final redemption of man.

(2) But, further, it would seem that the absence from Palestinian Jewish literature of the idea of the redemptive value of the suffering of the righteous is due to Pharisaism, which, in its just quarrel with the later Maccabees, sought to obliterate almost the very memory of the deeds and sufferings of the great founders of the family. Where the influence of Pharisaism is not felt, these sufferings are remembered and are interpreted in the spirit of Is 53.

'In Second but more especially in Fourth Maccabees we have the only clear survivals in the later Jewish literature of that doctrine of vicarious suffering, atonement, or reconciliation of the Divine favour by the blood of heroes willingly offered for the nation, which appears so clearly in the doctrine of the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, and thereafter seems obliterated from synagogue teaching, awakening again to a world-wide significance only in the Christian doctrine of the Cross.'[1]

Pharisaism had no use for the doctrine; but it formed a vital part of the religion of the common people, who believed, unintelligently and crudely perhaps, but passionately, that the sufferings of

[1] B. W. Bacon, in *HJ* xv. [1917] 268.

the righteous did have atoning value, and annually in the Feast of Renewal celebrated the memory of such martyred yet triumphant servants of God. Thus the main stream of Israel's religion passes through the ages and is ushered at last into the great ocean of the Christian salvation.

6. **Its consummation.**—Salvation, in the widest, most formal conception of it, is throughout the OT a life completely determined by the sovereign will of God. The content of this idea grows richer as God is construed with an ever-increasing moral and spiritual discernment. Gradually it becomes identical with knowledge of God and fellowship with Him, implying at the same time removal of all barriers to those blessed experiences. But the religion of Israel is never individualistic and mystical, though it is intensely personal and intimate. It could never rest content with a *merely* individual religious life; or, rather, it kept true to its deeply social and historic character. Salvation cannot be consummated, even for the individual, without the environment of a redeemed community, and, indeed, a redeemed world. Cosmology has no interest *per se* for the OT or, we may add, for the NT. But the religious mind of Israel demands the complete penetration of the whole sphere of human life by the sovereign will of God. Till that be accomplished salvation is incomplete. Out of this demand apocalyptic is born. Faith grasps ever more firmly the thought of the divine supremacy. At the same time, it sees ever more clearly that the utmost efforts, even of the most devoted servants of God, cannot vindicate this supremacy, under the existing circumstances of human life. Nothing earthly, no human society or institution can perfectly express the glory of God. Even nature itself in some sense fails to do so. And, as terrible and prolonged experience shows, there are evil forces running rampant among men and occupying the very air around them which baffle the wit and overwhelm the power of man. Very early, therefore, faith rises above the level of human enterprise and fastens upon divine intervention, as essential to final salvation. In doing so faith strikes upon a radical incapacity of the human understanding. It is not possible to express in terms of time and space that which is, in the very idea of it, above both. Apocalyptic is, therefore, necessarily and essentially symbolical. Its truth is the supremacy and omnipotence and faithfulness of God—in short, the central message of the OT, viz. that Jahweh saves. Its religious value is hope, sustaining, comforting, strengthening, especially in dark times of oppression and persecution and apparent disaster. Its vehicle is picture and symbol, whose use and value lie wholly in their vivid presentation to the mind of that which no picture or symbol can adequately represent. Take the symbol apart from the religious truth, and it becomes crass, foolish, mischievous. Take apocalyptic away from prophecy, and it becomes mere mythology. This, however, is very likely to happen when faith decays; and it is precisely what did happen in the later stages of Israel's religion, and, we may add, has happened again and again in the religious life of mankind. Indeed, when we note the amount of apocalyptic in the later literature of Israel, and note how its figures are drawn from the mythologies of the nations around, we are apt to think that this kind of thing, materialistic and semi-pagan, was the whole religion of the Jews, or at least constituted their main religious pabulum. But such a view would certainly be an exaggeration. Within the circles which formed the religious core of the nation, 'the circles in which Christianity arose,'[1] the great thoughts of prophecy regarding redemption are still dominant. Apocalyptic did, indeed, make definite some of these thoughts, notably the personality of Him in whom Jahweh would visit His people and achieve His salvation; and it did carry forward the religious mind towards questions which the OT canonical writings did not settle, particularly the problem of death and immortality; and in general it did fulfil its proper function of inspiring hope and courage. Educated in faith, quickened in hope, patient in prolonged delay, the true Israel, undeluded by political fantasies, and unintoxicated by mythical imaginings, waited for its 'consolation' with gaze fixed heavenwards for the breaking of the day.

[1] Cf. G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1907–08, ii. 539 ff.

II. *SALVATION AS AN EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE TIMES OF THE NT.*—The Christian creed and the Christian Church can be understood only through the experience of which they are, respectively, the intellectual and the institutional forms. It may be doubted whether Biblical Theology, Church History, and History of Dogma have always borne in mind that they were dealing, not with intellectual conceptions or institutional forms *per se*, but with these as the outcome and vesture of an actual religious experience, which is, in a large measure, different from, and, in respect of value, much greater than, the forms in which it was clothed and through which it, in part, expressed itself. Certain it is that the point of view of experience must be carefully adhered to, if the birth and permanence of the Christian community are to be understood; and those studies, now happily increasing, which seek to depict the experience which lies behind creed and culture bring new light and life to the more rigidly intellectual disciplines. It may happen that 'advanced' views will have to endure correction, as well as those that are 'conservative.' Our hope must be that the result will be a new valuation of redeeming forces, a new emphasis on vital truths, and a new discernment of continuity amid change and unity amid variety.

1. **Jesus and His disciples.**—The fact presented to our view in the Synoptic Gospels is a religious experience, possessed by a group of persons, gathered round the central figure of Jesus of Nazareth.

In seeking to realize what that experience was, all the difficulties beset us which belong to the problem of life. If Christianity were a mosaic of ideas and practices, the work of understanding it though toilsome would be comparatively simple. But Christianity is, primarily and ultimately, life; and to penetrate to its secret needs more than tabulation and classification of details. This, at least, is true, that life begets life. There were religious life and experience in Israel before Jesus gathered His disciples about Him. It is certain that neither to His consciousness nor to theirs did the life and experience which they possessed present themselves as marking a breach with the past. They did rejoice in what they regarded as development, or even transition, into a new region of saving powers. But they would have rejected with horror the suggestion that they were founding a new religion, or were abandoning the highway of salvation, trodden by patriot and martyr, saint and seer, of Israel's lineage. Their conviction expresses the literal truth, and we may accept their estimate as the clue to the facts regarding them. They represent the element which is continuous in the history of Israel from the very earliest times. Their religion is the religion of the prophets. Jesus Himself and, with one or two exceptions, the young men who were attracted to Him or were summoned by Him to His side belonged to that inner heart of Israel which in every age had beat true to God and had consciously received the com-

munications of His mind and will. They inherited the fruits of that discipline of spirit which is the real history of Israel, and which lies behind and apart from political changes and varying forms of thought. The religious gains of that history may be summed up in two words—possession and expectation. The devotional literature on which the souls of the contemporaries of Jesus were nourished bears witness to a real knowledge of God, certifying itself in a definite moral character. The men and women who gathered round Jesus were not legalists. They were oppressed by legalism, administered by bigots. But their religion was not law; and it seems certain that the experience of Paul was not the path by which the primitive believers ordinarily entered the Christian Church. To believe in a living God, to know the effects of His saving power, to love Him with heart and soul and mind, to obey Him with more than formal rectitude—these elements of a deep and true religion were found in the aspirations and, in a measure, in the spiritual attainments of those who came to hail Jesus as Lord. Yet none of them was satisfied with the position that He had reached, or recognized in it the end of God's dealing with His people. The Kingdom of God had not come; and nothing in the state of Israel or the world could be right till there came a direct, manifest, and supernatural intervention of divine power and glory. This expectation centred in the figure of the King-Messiah. In endeavouring to reproduce the mind of those who became disciples of Jesus we must do justice to the religious quality of this expectation. It is true that it was at once apocalyptic and political. They could not conceive of divine intervention in any other form than that of which the deliverance from Egypt was the classical example. Another deliverer was to secure the emancipation of Israel and to establish Jewish supremacy. As nationalist, as particularist, this was the form of their hope. And yet it would be gross misunderstanding to suppose that their expectation had no other contents. They shared with all Israel the Baptist's summons to repentance. For them the coming of the Kingdom was poised upon a religious preparation; and its arrival was to be accompanied by a perfecting of religious knowledge, as well as by national triumph.

By both these influences—their actual religious life and their Messianic hope—they were attracted to Jesus. This is the twofold explanation of the Christian movement, as we find it in the first group of disciples, and as we trace it afterwards throughout the Hellenic world. Christianity was borne into both Jewish and Hellenic circles on a wave of Messianism; but it had power and permanence only as a religious experience; and it is in its religious qualities that we must seek for its essence.

When we watch the cinematographic pictures in the Synoptic Gospels, and seek to comprehend the life behind the stories, the following notes and characteristics cannot be missed.

(*a*) *The experience was intensely individual.*—It is difficult to remember, when reading the Synoptic Gospels, that we are watching the beginning of a great world movement, which gave rise, in its development, to vast intellectual systems and huge ecclesiastical apparatus. In these stories we seem to be concerned only with a man among other men. And, indeed, this is precisely where the point of interest does lie. Let apocalyptic lie over. Let Christology wait. Meantime, see what one Man made of other men. The beginning of Christianity was not a 'mass movement.' It was personal contact of individuals with Jesus and, later, of individuals with other single souls. The Gospels are largely made up of 'cases.' The details of the narrative, the outward form of recorded events, are of subordinate value. The heart of the situation lies in the souls with whom Jesus dealt, His handling of them, and the stamp He put upon them. Sometimes the need which confronted Jesus was mainly physical; and He met it in quick compassion with a word of power. Sometimes the need was definitely and keenly religious, and then His compassion was yet more tender, and His power more wonderful (Lk 7^{36-50} 19^{1-10} 23^{39-43}). Sometimes the case was harder than that of conscious need—a condition of moral torpor—and this He provoked into action by a summons and a challenge (Mk 2^{13-18}, Lk $5^{27ff.}$). Often He had to deal with an unawakened conscience and a spiritual self-sufficiency which was impervious to criticism, and then He spared no sternness of rebuke that might pierce the harness of conceit (Lk 7^{40}, Mt 23^{13}). Where He found an open mind and an unprejudiced judgment, He was frank to acknowledge the honest and good heart and eager to win a full surrender to the claim of God (Mk 12^{28-34}).

The moral state which moved Him to most severe criticism and most sorely tried His good will was that of a divided heart; and here His demand for absolute surrender was inexorable (Lk 9^{57-62}, Mk 10^{17-22}). The cases recorded in the first chapter of the Fourth Gospel (vv.$^{34-51}$) are too thoroughly human to be dismissed as unhistorical. They are at least typical of the manner in which disciples attached themselves to Jesus. They came by way of the Messianic expectation, and they cast their thoughts into Messianic forms; but the roots of their conviction run deep into the soil of a personal experience. The Messianic form might break, or be changed out of knowledge, but the attachment would remain and be ready to find for itself more adequate expression. These stories give the real origins of Christianity. Forms of thought, inherited from Jewish tradition, or intruded from Oriental religions or from Hellenic speculation, do not afford the clue. The clue is the universal demand of the human spirit, welling up in real human hearts and met by a living human voice.

(*b*) *The experience was, fundamentally, a process of education.*—A book which marked an epoch in the study of the Gospels bears the title, *The Training of the Twelve*, but the idea of training for a vocation might be extended beyond the Twelve to all disciples. Jesus is characteristically Hebrew in His conception of religion. He is not misled by intellectualism or subdued by emotionalism. He is living in the region of redemptive forces which operated in the long history of Israel, and He desires to have every man whom He summons to be subjected to these forces, to be mastered and made by them, and to become their living vehicle. His deepest equation for 'salvation' is 'life'—not a state, but an energy, working now as a dynamic in the world of men, and finding its triumph in a universe remade. His 'message of the Kingdom' was not a phrase to be learned in a few moments of memory-work and then repeated with fanatic reiteration or deadly monotony. Entrance into the Kingdom is not accomplished by cold assent or spasmodic feeling. The Kingdom is a great determining and fertilizing idea, or world of ideas, a realm of facts and forces, of motives and ideals, into which men could enter only *sub persona infantis*, whose wealth is open only to the poor in spirit, amid whose impulses and influences men might live and grow to a wonderful maturity of knowledge, character, and power. In one sense, men were already in the Kingdom and the Kingdom was in them. In another sense, they were to be prepared for the Kingdom and were to be at once its heralds and its servants. It is both *Gabe* and

Aufgabe. When we ponder the fact, than which none in the gospel narrative is more certain, that Jesus occupied Himself mainly in the making and training of men, we are growingly convinced that both the 'liberal Jesus' picture and the 'apocalyptic dreamer' picture are out of focus. If either of these was accurate, we would need to say that His methods did not correspond with His aims, and we would need to explain the success of the movement which bears His name by attributing it to some other than Himself. He could have no central place in the Christian religion.

How, then, did Jesus train men for the Kingdom of God? The answer is: By making them sharers in His own thought of God. Yet there is nothing doctrinaire in this. He gives no new definition of God, though He does use a new name for God—new, at least, in His use of it. He stands deep within the OT religion, and is Himself the fulfilment of the highest spiritual type which the OT records supply, viz. the believing man, the man who knows God, deriving His knowledge, on the one hand, from God's self-communications in revealing words and deeds and, on the other, from the activity of his own soul in prayer and meditation, in deep discernment and lowly obedience. The God of Jesus is the God of the OT, apprehended, not through the medium of Jewish forms of thought, but directly with the unveiled face of a Hebrew prophet. He knows God; He sees God; He hears God speaking. And it is into His own acquaintance with God that He seeks to lead His disciples. He will be satisfied if He can give them the guiding principle by which they will be led into a life-long exploration of the divine nature and a continuous application of the divine mind to all the emergencies of their life in the world. In that case the cause which He has at heart will be secure. They will be fit persons to preach the gospel, to bear witness to Him, and to prepare for the coming of the Kingdom. In the nature of the case, accordingly, the educative process to which Jesus submitted His disciples could not follow the conventional forms of school theology. He trained His disciples mainly in two ways.

(1) He trained them by admitting them to a share in His own experience, whether of action or of suffering. In Mk 3^{14} we have the reason of His appointment of the Twelve, viz. to 'be with Him.' The stories illustrate the meaning. They watched Him at His work; they underwent a slow and largely unconscious revolution in their thoughts of the Kingdom of God and of the salvation of men. They heard Him speak to the people, and they were profoundly disturbed. Not that there was any obscurity in the words of Jesus. They were simple, lowly, and persuasive. But the disciples differed from probably the majority of the hearers of Jesus in not being satisfied with the mere charm of His teaching. They were constantly being thrown into amazement and perplexity. Their distress of mind, indeed, is evidence that their Master's method was proving successful. They were learning, very slowly indeed, but surely, to think, to apprehend, to discover, and to possess. Their fathers' God was being interpreted for them by Jesus; and they began to understand what human life might be under such divine governance, and what their vocation was as servants of such a redeeming purpose. Their being 'with Him,' however, meant far more than seeing or hearing. It meant what was indefinable, and indescribable in any memoirs, their entrance into the secret of His personality, and that secret was His life in God. They heard Him pray. They felt the thrill of His exultation (Lk 10^{21}). Three of them, at least, felt beneath them the unplumbed depth of His sorrow (Mk 14^{32-34}). No human beings were ever nearer God than these men who had been with Jesus from the beginning (Jn 15^{7}). What they carried out of that companionship was Christianity. Lessons, however, are not learned by looking on. They require the supplement of, at least, tentative effort.

(2) This, accordingly, was the second aspect of Jesus' training of His disciples. He sent them forth to preach (Mk 3^{14}). Such tentative efforts at evangelism must have been very crude, and could have had little success. Yet in them the disciples were exploring the divine resources, and Jesus recognized in their achievements the operation of the divine omnipotence and the presage of the triumph of the Kingdom (Lk 10^{17-20}). More broadly and more deeply He impressed upon them the necessity of a living experience as the condition of growing knowledge. He is leading them into new regions of unexplored truth. They must, therefore, literally come after Him, putting their feet down in His very footsteps. He is introducing them to new values. To appreciate them, they must be willing to forgo every other advantage. He is opening to them a new life. To obtain it, they must die. The surrender value of the Kingdom is life itself (Mk 9^{42-50}, Mt 16^{24-28}, Lk 14^{25-35}). This, then, is what we behold in the Gospels—men in process of being made.

> 'The greatest miracle in history seems to me the transformation that Jesus effected in those men. Everything else in Christian or secular history, compared to it, seems easy and explicable; and it was achieved by the love of Jesus.'[1]

The Gospels explain Christianity. To go outside of them is to pick up a great deal of information, and to throw light on many points in the history of the Christian movement; but the Gospels contain the only authentic and valid explanation of how Christianity got under way, and of what it essentially is. It began as an experience created by Jesus of Nazareth, and that is what it is at this day.

(c) *The experience may be characterized as a paradox.*—(1) It has the note of immediacy. Jesus is concerned with the condition of men, as it directly presents itself to His penetrating insight, and He seeks to produce an immediate effect within their life and character.

(a) Thus, the need and peril of men are interpreted by Him in the light of their present moral state; and His main effort is to direct men to an apprehension of their inward condition as the source of their real danger. The distinction of righteous and unrighteous, of those who were sure of their place in the Kingdom and those who had no such hope, had been externalized and falsified beyond endurance by a mind which understood God so well as to have pity on man. To be formally correct in opinion and conduct, while permitting the soul to be devastated by moral evil; to allow evil desires to occupy the imagination, even though they find no concrete expression; to be legally just, without one generous impulse overflowing in unconscious grace of helpfulness; above all, to have no decision of character, and to allow the cause of God to remain unchosen and unserved—these are real grounds of exclusion from the Kingdom and its salvation. Moral evil, clothing itself in actions which the perpetrators themselves know to be wrong, is, of course, absolutely inconsistent with a place in the Realm of God. On this Jesus did not need to insist. What He emphasized was rather, first, the ruinous effects of sin within the life; and, second, the attitude of God towards those who were thus hopelessly lost.

The yearning of God over sinful, suffering Israel which utters its passion through a Hosea or a Jeremiah finds new and more compassionate voice

[1] T. R. Glover, *The Jesus of History*, London, 1917, p. 83f.

in Jesus of Nazareth. The old religion of Israel, never forgotten, though sorely travestied by its professional exponents, came to life again through the ministry of Jesus, and surrounded those who were its objects with a more inexorable holiness and a more tender pity.

(β) If the need which Jesus uncovered so relentlessly and so mercifully was thus immediate, so also was the salvation which He promised. It was, as it has been happily described, 'a thoroughly effective salvation.' It was not to take effect at an unknown date, amid scenes of apocalyptic splendour, but right now, in the moment in which sin was actually ruining human life. This immediate salvation shines in a twofold light. It is forgiveness by God, and it is sonship towards God; and these two are one. The one Jesus announces directly, positively, absolutely, in full view of the action of legalism in at once banishing the soul from the Realm of God and enclosing it in the paralysis of despair. He never argues the matter. He has authority to forgive sins, and He exercises it royally. He understands God. He has caught the simplicities of an old-time experience: 'There is forgiveness with thee'; and He echoes it in His pronouncement: 'Thy sins are forgiven.' To imagine that Jesus, and those to whom He gave such assurance, were thinking only of a future when they would find themselves denizens of a glittering region of Jewish supremacy is to misread the simplest records of the human heart. God in His love, man in his need, Jesus speaking for God and bringing God near—these are the abiding three in the Christian salvation; and their relations to one another are never more vividly presented than in the stories of forgiven sinners told in the Gospels. The other view of salvation, viz. sonship, cannot, in the nature of the case, be thus condensed into a sentence. It is the translation into human life of Jesus' conception of God. The 'Jahweh' of the OT, Redeemer, Saviour, Father, of His people, is 'the Father' of Jesus' faith and preaching. Words, even Jesus' words, cannot exhaust the fullness of this Fatherhood. The Father loves and saves; He cares and keeps. The world is under the Father's governance; and His omnipotence is available for all the ends of His love. Into such a region of fatherly control and filial confidence the disciples of Jesus enter in company with their Master. To say that it was an unfamiliar region, and that their steps in it were slow and stumbling, that they but dimly apprehended the mind of God, often burdened themselves with needless anxieties and ridiculous scruples, and often behaved in an unfilial and unbrotherly manner, is only to repeat what we have noted—that they were in process of training, a training, however, which was conducted within the circle of divine saving power and, in essence, was their salvation. No doubt, Jesus had much to communicate before He could set forth His whole thought of God, and so demonstrate it that it would waken in sinful hearts a perfect conviction and a victorious faith.

Still it remains true that, in the company of Jesus, as He lived and taught, salvation, both as deliverance from sin and as enjoyment of God, was a fact of human experience—a fact, in respect of range and degree, new in the history of the human spirit, type and norm of Christian salvation as such, a religious standard of absolute and universal validity.

(2) It had, besides the note of immediacy, the contrasted note of imperfection and expectation. The difference between these two notes is one of emphasis on Jesus' part, and of appreciation on the part of the disciples. It is remarkable that each receives such ample recognition in the Synoptic narratives. Either by itself might have formed the organizing idea in a constructive theory of Jesus' message and mission. In point of fact, both are present, and there is no theoretic synthesis of them. The centre of unity must lie in Jesus' dynamic conception of the Reign of God. God is working for the salvation of men. Age after age He has been present in redeeming power. In every age men have had experience of this 'plenteous redemption.' Yet no age has seen the completion of the divine history. Always men have been waiting for that consummation which will mean that God's power is operating in unhindered freedom throughout the whole creation. Jesus was conscious that that power was operating in His ministry. The healing of disease, the expulsion of demons, the forgiveness of sins, the unfailing providence of the Heavenly Father, the development of the filial character, the reproduction of the Father's 'perfection,' meant for Him the presence of the Kingdom; and for those who partook of such benefits they meant aspects and proofs of the great salvation. Yet the highest range of such blessed experiences did not amount in sum to the whole salvation; and the Kingdom had not come, though its influence, as a dynamic both in the inner man and in the outer world, was making itself plainly felt. Jesus' gaze throughout His whole mission is fixed on the future. He is as convinced as any of the prophets that the present is not the end, that, beyond any present achievement of divine power, there is a goal when the divine movement shall be complete and the Kingdom shall have come. Teleology and eschatology are essential to Jesus' conception of God and His relation to the world. But Jesus' occupation with the future never led Him to belittle the present. He did not despise this world and man's life in it; and His directions as to conduct are not merely temporary rules for a mode of existence which stands in no living relation to the Messianic Kingdom. The end is certain; and, when confronted by doubt or outrageous denial, He asserted His own amazing claims and His own sublime faith. Yet He never represents the Kingdom as coming with the inevitableness of bare omnipotent decree. For Him, as for the Hebrew prophets, the coming of the Kingdom is ethically conditioned. It is the goal of God's saving work, and that goal cannot be reached apart from man's attitude to the Kingdom. The Kingdom is God's, and the power is wholly His, and the glory shall be His alone. Nevertheless, the Kingdom is an end for man, to be served by man, with complete inward identification of will with the will of God.

This service of the Kingdom takes two forms. On the one hand, with reference to the world, it is a ministry of help to be carried out to the last limit of life itself. On the other hand, with reference to God, it is fulfilled in intercessory prayer. In prayer, especially in intercessory prayer, there is more than submission to the divine will. There is such an entrance into the will of God as gives to it scope and freedom and enables God to carry out His purpose with a fullness and swiftness which, apart from such prayer, would be impossible (Mt $9^{37f.}$, Mk 11^{22-25}, Lk 11^{5-13} 18^{1-8}). The actual word for 'hope' does not appear in the recorded teaching of Jesus. The explanation is probably His desire to differentiate His gospel of the Kingdom from the excited anticipations or fatalistic passivity which were the natural result of popular apocalyptic. In any case, His strong assurance of the coming of the Kingdom is blent with His deep insight into the conditions of its coming.

It comes through service. The certainty of its coming quickens the present ministry of those who expect a share in it. Those whom Jesus called were being prepared for the Kingdom. But their preparation was not a tedious interval, to be hurried through, that the joys of the Kingdom might the sooner be possessed. It was itself result and proof of the imminence of the Kingdom, and was conducted under the present control of spiritual

powers resident in the Kingdom. The disciple band is the community of the Kingdom. Its members are in possession of the privileges of the Kingdom. The OT oracle of the New Covenant is fulfilled in their experience. Their sins are forgiven. God is their God, and they are His people. His law is not a burden, but is within, the standard of their character and the delight of their souls. They know God in His Fatherhood, and commit themselves to the omnipotence of His love. They thrill with the sense that the redemption of Israel is proceeding before their eyes, and they answer joyfully the call to prepare the way for its consummation. These brief months of discipleship, before the Cross had thrown its shadow on their souls, were the springtime of Christianity. The Christian salvation is there, in bloom and promise. The Kingdom of God has come, as a possession, and is sure to come, as an inheritance.

The teaching of Jesus is an exultant 'Lift up your hearts!' The company of disciples makes response, 'We lift them up unto the Lord.'

(*d*) *The experience is the creation of Jesus.*—This aspect of the experience of the disciples carries us beyond what is observable in any company that ever surrounded any human leader of a school or founder of a religion. It is not that they ever paid Him, consciously and expressly, divine honours. Disciples of other masters have been led to regard their teachers as in some sense divine. The disciples of Jesus, however, were too thoroughgoing in their monotheism to dream of regarding Him as a second God or as a demi-god. It is the more remarkable to observe, therefore, that the religious experience of the disciples is the creation of Jesus. In its origin and development it is bound up with the Person and Presence of their Master. He pervades it as an immediate possession, and His figure stands at the goal of its consummation.

Take any element of their religious life, and Jesus is inseparable from it, in a sense and degree which wholly differentiates their relation to Him from that of pupil to teacher. *He created in them the sense of sin.* What legalism could not produce, what the thunders of the Baptist's threatenings could not effect, the personality of Jesus wrought for them and in them. To hear Him as He re-valued legal estimates of right and wrong was not to listen to a wise Teacher merely, but to look into a stainless soul, moving in unshadowed light, and wielding absolute moral authority. Even the general hearers felt this: 'for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes' (Mt 7^{29}). How much more those to whom He unveiled the inmost secrets of the moral life, forcing them to face the infinite standard of divine purity and love (Mt $6^{14f.}$ 18^{15-35}), and turning them back on themselves with a correspondingly absolute demand (Mt $18^{1ff.}$ $19^{10-12.\ 24-26}$, Mk 9^{41-49}). Yet even such hearing was not enough. They might have stood out against it. More penetrating and illumining was the sight of sin which they got, standing by, when Jesus laid bare the festering sores of some human soul. They were gazing through His eyes into the moral abyss that yawns beneath the surface of respectable society and underlies the most decorous existence. Nay, more: they could not fail to note that sinners whom law had failed to convince broke down in godly sorrow under the spell of Jesus' holy yet tender influence. Above all, they were themselves in the same condemnation, and even in a deeper self-judgment, subjected as they were to a more constant and more searching discipline. Whatever occasions the prominence given to Peter in the Synoptic narrative, there is no doubt that the references form a human document of profound psychological interest, and of first-rate historic importance.

We see the thing happening: conviction of sin wrought by the personality of Jesus; a character displayed and a character re-made. Whatever the world knows of sin—and apart from knowledge of sin the knowledge of salvation is worthless—it owes to Jesus of Nazareth, as He stamped it deep in the hearts of these men.

He won from them trust in Himself as Saviour. We would, indeed, have been entitled to suspect the narrative had we found resounding titles adorning it and a theory of their Master's Person and Work detailed therein. What we do find is much more impressive: a company of men and women, gathered round one Man, and finding Him to be for them the means and assurance of divine salvation, the source of their confidence towards God, the warrant of their standing in His Kingdom, a fountain of life and joy, the object of a hope that rose above the earth. They were moving up and down in the Realm of God, with Jesus as Instructor and Guide, Shepherd and Friend. They were themselves the community of the Kingdom (Lk 12^{32}), the new Temple, of which their Master is the Builder, Maker, and Lord (Mt $16^{18f.}$). The most sacred thing in the aspirations of humanity is theirs; and they owe it to Jesus. They heard Him pray. He taught them to pray. He introduced them to God. He brought God to them. This they had because Jesus gave it to them, and without Him it would not have been possible, and as a dream (Mt 6^{9-13} 7^{7-11}). To Jesus, accordingly, they surrendered themselves with an absoluteness which must have been the degradation and enslavement, if it had not been the emancipation and perfecting, of their manhood (Mt 4^{18-22} 19^{27} 5^{10-12} $10^{32f.}$). Words like these open a view into the consciousness of Jesus which carries with it amazing inferences as to His person. But they also reveal the consciousness of the disciples, created through intercourse with Jesus, rising towards Him, under the constraint of His holiness and love, in the spontaneity of a free and full surrender. This is not learning a lesson in religion. It is religion itself, and its centre is Jesus. They had, in their vocabulary, only one name to give Him (Mt 16^{16}), and this title of Messiah carried with it to their imagination much that had to be unlearned and laid aside. None the less, it summed up for them what they believed of God's redemptive work in the history of His people; and their application of it to Jesus was not the result of ingenious exegesis, but the expression of an attitude towards Him that was, in essence, religious trust (Mt 16^{17}). We are a long way from Jn 1^{12-18}; but that statement contains no more than this experience, of which it is only the expression in the terms suggested by the educative processes of a generation.

'For those who attached themselves to Him, Jesus became Messiah *and more*. And . . . the experience of "the more" was also latent in the consciousness of the disciples, waiting to be quickened by [an] . . . event, and developed by a future experience.'[1]

(*e*) *Estimate.*—In seeking to estimate the salvation value of this experience of the disciples of Jesus, we cannot fail to be impressed by its superiority to anything that contemporary religion in Palestine could supply. To vindicate its superiority, it is enough to say that it was the religion of Israel, in all the highest qualities manifest in the post-Exilic stage of its history. Here we have the piety of the Psalter, with its sense of sin and of the holiness of God, its realization of forgiveness, and its possession of the divine favour; and, at the same time, the alertness and certainty of moral judgment begotten of centuries of discipline and education under Law and Prophets; together with the hope which never failed the old religion, and was never brighter or more confident than in those disciples of the Nazarene.

We have all these things, with an added intensity and assurance, which differentiate the experience of the disciples from the type of spiritual life of which theirs was the consequence and the flower. The difference is felt in the whole narrative. It is the difference which their Master made. It is the difference of a new era in the religious history of mankind (Lk $10^{23f.}$). And it is needless to say that the religion of the disciples knows nothing of the gleam of legalism; while, with all its mistaken Messianism, it is free from craze or frenzy. It is salvation in the concrete, communion with God, and deliverance from fear. We are not surprised, accordingly, to find that it has the note of joy,

[1] C. A. Scott, *s.v.* 'Christ, Christology,' in *DAC* i. 183[a].

heard in the OT fitfully like songs in the night, but now full-throated and exuberant, like the joy of 'children of the bride-chamber' (Mt 9^{15}). A. B. Bruce has a chapter on 'the joy of the Jesus-circle,'[1] which he analyzes as 'the joy of *love*, the joy of *fresh inspiration*, and the joy of *liberty*.' It is the 'shining morning face' of the young Church of Christ, never seen again in history, yet very lovely in the time of its continuance, 'while the Bridegroom was with them.'

The very beauty of this phase of religious life, however, reminds us that it was, in the nature of the case, vague, inadequate, and unstable. These features, of course, with the dangers which threatened, were quite hidden from the minds of the disciples themselves. To them the matter seemed definite enough, and they were confident in its permanence. They had in the current Messianism a form of thought into which they easily ran all their experiences. Their Master was the Messiah. He would inaugurate and preside over the coming Reign of God. True, they were learning a great deal about God and His Kingdom which was inconsistent with popular Messianism. But they were not critically minded; and the growing spiritual content did not lead them, as yet, even to modify the general thought form.

In one respect this uncriticalness of theirs seriously misled them. It rendered them incapable of assimilating one profound element in OT religion, namely, the place which suffering had to play in the divine salvation. The function of the great sufferers of Israel's past was too deeply printed in the history, the prophecies, and the psalms of Israel's sacred writings to be ignored by any whose souls were fed by these inspired records. The idea of a suffering remnant, of heroes and martyrs, nay, of a martyr nation, lay at the very core of the nation's faith. Even cynicism could make use of such a conception to excuse its selfishness and cruelty (Jn $11^{49f.}$). The disciples could have dared and borne anything for such a Master, passing on His way to a throne (Mk $10^{38f.}$). They were even prepared (or thought they were) to perish with Him in His failure (14^{31}). But that suffering should be the lot of the Messianic King Himself was unthinkable (Mk $8^{29.\ 32}$). Cross-bearing might be the law of discipleship (Lk 14^{27}); but it could never apply to Him, who was to approve and reward His servants. The redemptive value of the suffering of righteous servants of the Lord had not perished out of the religious consciousness of Israel, even under the blight of legalism, and was destined to a splendid revival. But never, within the OT canon or out of it, had a synthesis been made of the Suffering Servant and the Messianic King. Never had it been discerned that His were the sufferings that were to redeem Israel and inaugurate the Kingdom.

That synthesis took place in the consciousness of Jesus. To Him 'Son of Man' = 'Messiah' = 'Suffering Servant'; and He sees that by the path of suffering, at once divinely appointed and freely chosen, and by none other, can the purpose of God be fulfilled and salvation won (Mk 8^{31} 9^{12} 10^{45} 14^{22-24}). But teaching, warning, and prediction fell unheeded on ears stopped by theological commonplaces. Between them and their Master a rift opened, which, in His death, widened to a great gulf. Refusing to catch His meaning, they missed the element of sorrow borne and victory won which was needed to give their experience depth and permanence and to enable their faith to bear undismayed the fact of the Crucifixion.

It is an absolutely safe historical judgment that no development of the religion of Israel could take place till the synthesis referred to had been made. Without the combination of the two elements which lay side by side within it, viz. Messianic sovereignty and vicarious suffering, the religion of Israel could not have survived. In point of fact, it has not survived, apart from this combination. Christianity is the religion of Israel, thought through in its ideal unity, and grasped in the reality of a great experience.

The salvation value of the experience of the disciples, prior to the Crucifixion, depended on their being able to rise experimentally to the height of this great synthesis. If they are not able to do so, then, the Messiahship of the Master being disproved, as suffering would disprove it, the experience itself would vanish with the form with which, unhappily, they had identified it. Three things are needed ere they can move to a higher plane of religious attainment: (i.) a death, which shall shatter their false Messianism; (ii.) a victory, which shall restore to them all of which they deemed the death had robbed them; (iii.) the abiding presence of Jesus, which shall reproduce in undreamed of power and joy their life with Him in Galilee.

2. The Apostolic Church.—(*a*) *The creation of the Church.*—The movement inaugurated by Jesus of Nazareth seemed, both to its enemies and to its adherents (Lk 24^{21}), to have been brought to a close by His death. In point of fact, after a few weeks during which it had disappeared from observation, it is seen to be in action, with renewed energies, equipped with new instrumentalities, and manifesting unconquerable hope. A community exists, consisting of the original disciples, united, as they had been before His death, by common allegiance to Jesus, and living the same kind of life which they had formerly owed to His presence with them; and to this community accessions are constantly being made, as they had formerly been, by the spell of His personality. The creation, more properly the reconstitution, of the Church of Christ is due to three vital facts.

(1) The first is a fact of religious experience, appreciable only by its subjects, though its outward manifestation fell under common observation; viz. that Jesus is present in power in the company of those who believe in Him. This is the meaning of Pentecost (Ac 2^{33}), as well as of all those gifts and powers and fruits which occupy so large a space in the records and are always referred to the Spirit of God. They mean that Jesus is operating in full saving power in the lives of His disciples. They are simply Jesus at work now, as once He worked in the days of His flesh. To say that the Spirit is present, or that Jesus is present in the Spirit, is to say the same thing (Ro 8^{9}, 2 Co 3^{17}, 1 Co 6^{17}). It is certain that the Church would not have come into existence to cultivate a hero's memory or perpetuate the cult of a demi-god. It was essentially the community of the Spirit; and that meant the spiritual presence of Jesus. This was as true on the day of Pentecost as it has ever been in the ages of the Church's ripest spirituality and clearest thought, though in the first stages of its experience the operations of the Spirit were little understood, and the quality and reach of the saving power of Christ had only begun to be appreciated.

(2) The second is a fact of history, which, however, derives its significance from, while at the same time supplying the necessary basis to, the experience of the day of Pentecost. Only One whom the power of God had raised to a position of sovereignty in the realm of redeeming forces could 'pour' on His disciples what was seen and heard that day and has been repeated in every age of the Church's history and in the life of every believer. The resurrection of Jesus, accordingly, stands behind the gift of the Spirit, and, along with that gift, forms the foundation of the Church of Christ. These two were never separate in the apprehension of the Church, and together they establish the Messiahship of Jesus. Jesus is enthroned; and the Spirit has come (Ac $2^{32f.}$). Therefore, Jesus is the Messiah (2^{36}). The attendant circumstances of the Resurrection and the Pentecostal gift cannot now be straightened out into a formally consistent

[1] *The Galilean Gospel*, Edinburgh, 1882, ch. xii.

narrative. But the two facts themselves establish the redemptive supremacy of Jesus. They explain the existence of the Christian Church; and nothing else does. And they form the bridge, at once historical and experimental, by which the experience of salvation passed over from the confines of Palestine to occupy the wide world of humanity and become the inheritance of mankind.

(3) The third is the fact, terrible in its cruel actuality, of the Cross. It is a strange testimony to the place which Jesus occupied in the Church's faith, and a curious comment on the narrowness of intellectual processes, that this fact had in later ages to be insisted on in its crassness and horror. To the primitive disciples, however, precisely its literalness was its preciousness. By one stroke it destroyed the Messianism which hid from them their Master's Messiahship. In one revealing act it did for them what even their Master's words had failed to do, and brought together what their dogmatic had held apart—the glory of King Messiah and the suffering of the Servant of the Lord. It gave to their growing apprehension the whole world of truth and power, which lay in suffering. What had been missing in their experience before the Crucifixion, the lack of which had doomed to evanescence its highest joys, has been supplied. Through death, inflicted by 'wicked hands,' but appointed by divine redeeming will, Jesus enters on His kingly position. The Kingdom of God is no longer an object to be anticipated, but a power already victorious over the utmost that sin can do. God is not planning salvation; He has effected it, and will make it effective to all who will receive it. 'Christ died for our sins' (1 Co 15^3). This is the gospel which Paul 'received.' It is the absolutely primitive faith of the Christian Church. Without it the Church could not have existed. Only such a transmutation of death into victory could have brought the Church into being. The death of Jesus meant either utter and absolute defeat or the fulfilment and interpretation of Is 53. There was no interval of time—not a day or an hour—in which a Christianity existed which did not centre in the Cross. There was never a movement of Christian faith which did not converge on Jesus, Servant of the Lord, suffering and victorious. Anselm did not invent the Atonement, nor did Paul, though they and countless others have sought for theories of it. Suffering needs no key. It is its own interpreter. The religion of Israel had its sanctuary in pain, the suffering of God; and Christianity began its career with this in its heart—'Christ died for our sins.'

(*b*) *The Christian message of salvation.* — The religion of Israel had always been presented as a gospel. The prophets preached Jahweh as the Redeemer of His people—not an idea, not a remote and careless Deity, but a living being, animated by a gracious purpose and seeking its consummation through toil and pain, opposed by enemies, hindered by His servants, but sure to triumph in a day of mercy and of judgment, for the dawning of which expectant and penitent souls waited in deepest silence. The apostles had no other message, though, as it came from their disciplined and instructed hearts, it had a richer content and a more confident note. Their proclamation still concerned the redeeming power of God. They declared, regarding it, that in Jesus its operation was complete. He is its Agent and Mediator. Through Him, suffering and victorious, it enters afresh the lives of men—of His own selected people, and, as they soon discover to their unspeakable amazement, of all men everywhere who will believingly submit themselves to Jesus. It works with an effective salvation, redeeming men from the evils that had all their lifetime oppressed them, and placing them under the emancipating influences of the Reign of God, constituting them also heirs of the Kingdom, when, in the hands of the Crucified and Exalted Lord, it shall be established in complete and unquestioned dominion. All this they summed up in a word, which needed the interpretation which they gave it, yet did carry with it the answer to the demand of the heart of Israel, and, indeed, to the religious demands of the human spirit amid all the races of the earth. Jesus is the Christ. Through Him God works savingly. He is the Saving Power of God to all who accept Him.

The proposition, 'Jesus is the Christ,' is not an opinion, however true, which may be held by a sect or by an individual, like any other tenet which intellect might devise and bigotry retain. It is the utterance of an experience, the experience of actual salvation as a power in personal life. It receives from that experience its warrant and proof, its illustration and interpretation. Above all, it is the outcome of an irresistible impulse, to propagate the experience and to bring all men within the scope of the divine salvation. Nothing in the history of the Christian Church is more impressive than the fact that its birth hour is the beginning of its evangelism. The subjects of salvation are its instruments. The disciples remembered how their Master had not kept them always 'with Him,' much as they needed His presence, but had 'despatched them to preach, with the power of casting out demons' (Mk 3^{14}). And now the same thing is happening under more wonderful conditions. He is with them in power, and He is sending them out on the same errand of mercy. His very voice is in their ears with 'majestic instancy,' saying, 'Go to all the world and preach the gospel to every creation' (16^{15}). There is nothing formal about it, no clank of machinery. The world, and all the men and women in it, are under bondage. Jesus saves. They knew it by experience; and, therefore, they spoke. They could not help themselves. 'Not for a single day did they cease to teach and preach the gospel of Jesus the Christ in the temple and at home' (Ac 5^{42}). And on journeys of business or flight they did the same thing (8^4).

It follows that we need not look in the records for any exact reproduction of the mission preaching of the early Church, which must have been marked by the widest variety and must have included every kind of simple and unstudied testimony as well as more formal addresses. A theory can be put into swaddling bands, an experience never. We can see, however, what elements belonged to the message and gave it driving power.

(1) Stories about Jesus.—If any part of the NT gives us the 'mission preaching' of the primitive Church, it is the Synoptic Gospels. Many of the narratives bear traces, according to Denney, of being 'sermon notes.' In any case, they provide what the preacher needed. He claimed that Jesus was the Messiah, and that in Him the power of God wrought savingly. Being challenged, he replied not by argument, but by instances. He gave case after case of Jesus' power to heal and save; and so the Gospels are full of miracles wrought on the bodies and souls of men. He quoted sayings of Jesus, which showed His deep spiritual-mindedness, a knowledge of God greater than that of sage and prophet; and so the Gospels contain teachings of Jesus, though they never present Him merely as a teacher. Above all, he conveyed the impression made by Jesus on those who knew Him; and so the Gospels contain a portrait of Christ at once in His deep humanity and in that quality which, without separating from men, lifts Him out of the class of the 'lost' and sinful and makes it possible for Him to bring near to them the divine salvation. We constantly think of the Gospels as written up, or down, to some theological theory. In point of fact, they are the gospel, as told by individual Christians, in all sorts of places, to all sorts of audiences, told in tale after tale, on a roof-top, by the wayside at the noon hour, round the camp fire, in synagogue or market-place. What the preacher sought to accumulate on the minds of his hearers was simply this: 'If there is to be a Messiah, He is certainly Jesus; not what we had expected; but certainly Jesus is He.'

(2) The word of the Cross.—There were audiences among whom the story of the death of the Christ might seem to bring the missionary's office to an end; for some would think it 'sheer folly' and others would be outraged by such an insult to national and religious feeling. Yet the preacher had no option. He might leave to teachers more learned than he—a Paul or an Apollos—the task of supplying an intellectual solution

of the problem raised by the Cross. But the Cross itself was no problem; it was an integral part of the gospel—the gospel which he and all Christians 'received.' It was simply the redeeming love of God, which, in all ages of Israel's history, had been burdened by the sins of His people, in its last and final act of sin-bearing. Accordingly, even the least lettered preachers told the story of Jesus, with the shadow in it mounting steadily towards the blackness of Calvary. It has been, curiously, maintained that the Gospels sink beneath the level of the primitive gospel which the first disciples 'received' by ignoring the connexion between the death of Jesus and the sins from which He redeemed His people, leaving us no more than a benign and singularly endowed Teacher. The Gospels would thus represent a lapse towards legalism. The absence from the Gospels of such a construction of the Atonement as we get, *e.g.*, in Ro 3 may, however, be much more simply explained.

The early missionaries, whose 'sermon notes' we are supposing the Gospels to be, had no theory, and needed none. But they had a story to tell, and they told it with utter artlessness and consummate skill. They let their hearers feel the weight of sorrow which their Master carried in an intensity of love and pity which divided Him from those whom He sought to save, while it drew Him to them in great nearness of spirit (Mt $11^{28ff.}$ 8^{17}). They told how, once and again, the anguish of His soul broke into tears as He contemplated a woe which He alone understood. They told how, in suggested figure or dark and pregnant saying, He had indicated something of what lay upon His heart; and how He had even definitely predicted a grief so intolerable that it paralyzed their intelligence. Finally, they told the story of the last hours, with such fullness and selection of detail as make them, not an impressive tragedy, but the fulfilment of a purpose, the crowning issue of self-dedication. The narrative is given without one pause of theological explanation, but not without prophetic consciousness.

Simple as they are, these missionaries have been bred on the prophetic writings, and have been instructed by the event to lift into the light the element by which they had been baffled, and to bind together the suffering of the Servant with Messiah's saving work. Their very language echoes strains from the songs of the Servant.[1] They had no theory of the Atonement; but their identification of their Master with the Messiah and with the Servant of the Lord was intentional and was complete. This identification was the very nerve of their gospel. The sorrow of the Redeemer, which is the very sorrow of God (Ac 20^{28}), is set in such relation to the sin of man that it constitutes deliverance from the evils that sin has wrought. The religion of Israel is that of a living God pledged to redemption. In Is 53 the pledge is made in most solemn articulation. In the Cross of Christ it is fulfilled with divine completeness. This is the gospel which the first converts 'received' and which they 'passed on,' not in the language of Romans or Hebrews, but in that of the Synoptic Gospels, as that repeats and illustrates the language of Isaiah (Ac $8^{28\text{-}35}$).

(3) The resurrection of Jesus.—The heart of the Church's message was redemption. The preaching contained nothing that was not relevant to this mighty fact of the moral world. To prove and illustrate this, the stories of Jesus' ministry were told. He had been, in the experience of His own disciples and of all who trusted Him, the redeeming power of God. The story of the Cross grounds this redemption in suffering, and matches the world's sin with the Redeemer's pain, blood-shedding and sin-remission standing together in the history of God's redeeming acts (Mk 14^{24}, Mt 26^{28}). Here is a claim of transcendent magnitude; the divine redemption is now in action; the divine salvation is now guaranteed. But it is liable to utter rejection, if He in whose name it is made is dead and gone. Death, that complex fact of the physical and moral world, if it be the final act of Jesus' life, does indeed end all. There can be no talk of redemption or salvation, none of a Redeemer and Lord, if there be no more operative in the world the redeeming forces concentrated in Jesus and inseparable from His personality. On this point the missionaries were competent to speak. Their evidence reached the point at issue and established the twofold fact: Jesus lives; Jesus reigns. The first part of the evidence deals with the conquest of death and the continuity between Him whom they had known in the flesh and the glorified being who now reveals Himself to them. He has not changed, nor has His function altered; He still takes command and opens to them the powers and privileges of the Kingdom. The second part of the evidence, accordingly, is the life of the redeemed in the actual experience of reconciliation and forgiveness, of moral power and spiritual joy. This witness is primitive. It is found articulated in such a record as 1 Co $15^{3\text{-}11.\ 12\text{-}19}$. It is repeated in every disciple, as such, who is a living witness to the power of the living Christ. 'The primary testimony of the disciples to Jesus was their testimony to His resurrection: except as Risen and Exalted they never preached Jesus at all.'[2] What they preached was not a bare physical fact; and what it meant was not the apotheosis of Jesus, who now takes His place as a 'cult god,' comparable to Serapis or Mithras in the ethnic faiths. It was the crowning act of God's long labour of redemption. It was the victory of Jahweh, the Redeemer of Israel. It meant that the power of God to save, as it had worked through Jesus of Nazareth and had been embodied in Him, now operates in Him, whom it has raised from the dead, in unhindered omnipotence, throughout the whole universe of man's life and discipline. Jesus had always wrought His redeeming works in His Father's name and power. Now, by the Resurrection, He exerts that same power, unrestrained by the limitations of the flesh and the conditions of His earthly ministry, in sovereign freedom and exultant victory. They could remember strange moods and words of His, in which the sense of power and victory found expression—*e.g.*, Lk $10^{17\text{-}24}$. Already Jesus had been living in the new age, when Satan should be overthrown (v.[18]), and the supreme authority vested in the Son (v.[22]) should be vindicated to the 'simple-minded,' who were already in a position of privilege for which prophets and kings had longed in vain.

And now the new day, the day of the Resurrection, has dawned. The Crucified is King. This is the message: 'So let all the house of Israel understand beyond a doubt that God has made him both Lord and Christ, this very Jesus whom you have crucified' (Ac 2^{36}). The supremacy of Jesus is an integral part of the Church's faith and the Church's proclamation. The question is not as to the title Kyrios; and no vital element of the faith would be affected by proof that it came into use only after Christianity had been 'carried from the soil of Judaism to that of Hellenism.'[1] The real question is as to the function of Jesus in the divine salvation and His place in the Church's faith and witness. This problem was raised, and was settled, on 'the soil of Judaism,' or, rather, within the religion of Israel, by the revelation which, beginning in the life experiences of the prophets and like-minded souls in Israel, culminated in Jesus. It is the question whether the divine action was carried out in Him, and is now being carried on by Him. This question has been answered by the Resurrection. By the Resurrection Jesus is set in a place apart in relation both to God, the only Saviour of men, and to sinful men, needing deliverance. In this place and function the primitive missionaries preached Him. Whatever words they used, even if 'Kyrios' never fell from their lips, they bear witness to His resurrection and to His supremacy; and this is essential Christianity, whatever phrases, in any age, may be used to express the meaning.

(4) The return of Jesus.—The Church's message of salvation is now, in one sense, complete. Jesus in His exaltation is God's final and glorious organ of salvation. The Reign of God has entered on its triumph. Salvation is being made effective in the lives of believers, and the company of the disciples is being increased daily by the addition of the 'saved' (Ac 2^{47}). In Jesus, therefore, in His earthly ministry and in His exaltation to Heaven, the disciples were beholding the culmination of the history whose former periods had been marked by God's redemptive dealings with His people Israel; and this they were proclaiming with an exultant confidence, which every new manifestation of saving power made more strong and joyful. The culmination itself, however, is a period, not a point of time. The Resurrection is the beginning of that period, and contains the warrant of its progress, but it is not itself the end.

Contemporaneous with the new age of divine victory there is the old age, in which powers of evil still rage and men are still held in bondage and in misery. The Christian missionaries are confronted, both in Judaism and in the Gentile world, with a vast mass of wretchedness and despair, caused by forces of evil, to which, whether seated in human nature or occupying a place in a supersensuous region, men have yielded, and from which they have sought deliverance in vain. To such a world the message proclaimed (i.) the absolute supremacy of the Exalted Christ over every possible force of evil; (ii.) His return, when 'the end' appointed by God shall have come, in final judgment of all evil, and the salvation of His people. The Parousia, accordingly, is part of the message. It derives its whole value, however, from that which is the heart and core of the message, viz. that the Kingdom has come, Jesus is supreme, salvation is a present experience. It is vain, therefore, either to rule eschatology out of primitive Christianity or to make it the whole of Christianity. The so-called 'consistent eschatology' is too easy. It breaks upon the data. God's redeeming action, in the hands of Him who is the only and altogether adequate organ of this saving power, will be completed in a definite, recognizable, and most glorious intervention. We can understand the powerful effect of this part of the message, how weighty an argument it was for repentance on the part of those who had belonged to the evil age (Ac $3^{19\text{-}24}$); what a mighty source of comfort to those harassed and oppressed by world powers (1 Th 4^{18}, Ph 4^{5}); and what a steadying influence to those who were labouring in the service of the Kingdom (1 Co 15^{58}). We can imagine also how the Christian hope would shine into the darkness of the world beyond the confines of Israel, where the same sense of an evil age and the same longing for a new dispensation were deep-seated and universal.

When the message was proclaimed, there was possible for the hearer only one of two attitudes. Either he might believe what was told him, viz. that Jesus was the power of God for salvation, or he might reject it. The nature of the former attitude, moreover, is defined by the burden of the message. It is an attitude, or act, of the soul in reference, not to a proposition, but to a personal

[1] For instances see H. A. A. Kennedy, in *ExpT* xix. [1907–08] 346 ff., 394 ff., 442 ff., 487 ff.

[2] J. Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*[4], London, 1918, p. 107.

[1] W. Morgan, *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, Edinburgh, 1917, p. 47.

power. It carries with it the recognition of that power as now operative in Jesus, the confidence that it is capable of effecting salvation and that nothing is beyond its scope, and the trustful commitment of the soul to Jesus as the active power of God and the bearer of the divine salvation. It is, accordingly, very much more than intellectual assent. It is, even in its most rudimentary stages, a religious experience with the promise and potency of rich moral development. It is the condition of man's realization of the divine salvation, and is the human counterpart of divine power.

The whole of God's redemptive action centres in Jesus the Christ. The whole of man's response to the divine appeal is centred in faith. The object of this faith is always God in His saving power; but it is never truly and adequately exercised apart from Him in whom that power is operative. The range and action of that faith ought to be as wide as the love of God, which has all His power at its disposal. The Christian life itself is simply a training in the exercise of faith. The ministry of Jesus supplied the evangelists with ample illustration of the nature and operation of faith,[1]

Their own daily experience added new instances, and made more definite their conception of faith (Ac 3^{16} 16^{31}). Faith may vary widely, from the crudest 'miracle faith' to the most articulate and educated apprehension. But its value never varies. It is the turning of the soul to Jesus; and in that act the divine salvation enters human life, and begins its beneficent and far-reaching operation.

(*c*) *Salvation within the Church.*—Christ is 'the power of God' (1 Co 1^{24}). The gospel is 'God's saving power' (Ro 1^{16}). Salvation consists in the effects wrought by God's power in the lives of those who submit themselves trustfully to Christ, meeting 'point by point'[2] the ultimate and universal needs of man. Christian faith is belief in the willingness and power of God to deal thus effectively with man's whole case, as he stands in the midst of the world, to the uttermost of his need, to the utmost of his capacity.

Christianity, accordingly, can be understood only through 'human documents,' which, when sympathetically read, become 'human sacraments.'[3] These documents are open to our view in the NT. A great deal of the material consists in life stories, in character studies, exhibiting the entrance of divine power into human life through the point of contact established by faith in Christ. Even where names and incidents do not occur, we are aware of many persons thus 'saved,' gathered into small communities at various places in the great world, and all together forming a brotherhood, sharing a common experience, aiding one another in religious faith, and ministering to one another's need to the utmost of gifts and resources. For such persons the various NT writings were composed, in a familiar and occasional manner, according as exigencies required and love prompted. And they were composed, it is also to be particularly noted, by persons who, however gifted naturally or specially endowed by the divine spirit, belonged to the same class as those for and to whom they wrote. They wrote out of the fullness of that very experience which belonged to their readers as well as, though it might be not in the same degree as, themselves. There is, therefore, nothing *ab extra* in the NT as regards its content. It is experimental through and through. Forms of thought may be picked up here or there; but one thing underlies all forms, and that is the experience of God's saving power as it meets man in Christ and the message. It is quite possible to turn over the leaves of the NT and to say, 'Lo this is Oriental, this is Hellenic, this is Roman, and the bulk is Jewish!' But to conclude that, therefore, Christianity is a mosaic of bits picked up, or a window formed of pieces of glass stained by the imaginations of men, is wholly to miss our way. Such a mosaic, or rose-window, of religion might be very beautiful, but it would bear no analogy to Christianity, which in its very origin and in its inmost being is life, is power, is Christ. This point of view, securely established as it is by modern scientific method, has, without doubt, great apologetic value.[1] But it is not a pronouncement in favour of any system of theology which may claim to be orthodox. Rather does it give an earnest warning against the idea that finality can be attained in the work of theological reconstruction; and it suggests that the task of theology is the interpretation of the ever-living experience of the Church, including the criticism of those forms of thought in which that experience has been clothed by the growing apprehension of disciplined Christian intelligence.

When we turn to the NT, to discern what needs of men are met and what blessings are gained in the great salvation, it cannot be with any expectation of making an analysis or enumeration that could conceivably be complete. For one thing, human need is endlessly varied amid the innumerable experiences that make up the sum of human life. For another, growth and development culturally and morally are registered by increasing sense of need. But, more particularly, the greatest needs are not felt till there be a revelation of God to the soul. The religious attitude of the human spirit to God is not, 'Here is a list of my needs; now satisfy them,' but, 'I need Thee,' and the divine response is at the same time the revelation of need and the answer of love.

This, then, is what we find in the NT—a voyage of discovery, an exploration at once of human life and of the divine resources. Those who make the journey report continually new 'finds,' new experiences, new possessions, new prospects. Their language rings with wonder, joy, and praise. One explorer testifies to his friends, as the considered result of his own experience: 'My God shall fulfil every need of yours according to his riches in glory in Christ Jesus' (Ph 4^{19}).

Although, however, the acceptance of the gospel brings with it wealth that is 'fathomless' (Eph 3^{8}) and therefore incalculable, it is possible, contrasting the world to which the bearers of the message belonged with that to which they were introduced through faith, to catch some definite aspects of their experience and to begin to understand what Christianity meant for them.

(1) **Darkness.**—The Gentile world was steeped in darkness. It is true that God was never without His witness; and it is true that He does not deal with men according to the abstractness and hardness of human judgment, but according to His own individual knowledge of them (Ac 10^{35}). None the less, a gross darkness did cover the nations, and such light as they had only renders less excusable their misunderstanding of the divine nature and character (Ro $1^{20f.}$). The Jewish world is in a different condition, and Jews are in a position of immensely superior privilege—if only they had availed themselves of it (2^{17-24}). None the less, the ripest and most intelligent adherent of the religion of Israel is still waiting for the light of the knowledge of God. He has not the key to the Scriptures, and is liable to think of God and His ways with men in a manner that mistakes and dishonours Him (Mt 16^{22}). But He has in Christ made Himself known. That which had been partially disclosed in the progress of Israel's redemption has been gathered into one act. He has sent His Son into the world. God is known, as in Israel, so now in Christ. The darkness is past. The true light is shining. To accept Jesus, preached as Christ, is to pass out of shadows into marvellous light. Conceive the ideas of God entertained in Judaism—how remote and unapproachable! Think of the gods of the Gentiles—how foolish and helpless, how, often, monstrous, capricious, and

[1] *E.g.*, Mk 5^{34-36} 10^{52} 2^{1-12}, Mt 8^{5-13} 9^{29} 15^{28}, Lk 7^{50}, Mt 13^{58}, Mk 6^{6} 440.

[2] Cf. W. P. Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*, London, 1912, p. 179.

[3] P. T. Forsyth, *The Principle of Authority*, London, n.d. [1913], p. 23 f.

[1] Cf. T. R. Glover, *The Christian Tradition and its Verification*, London, 1913.

unclean! Then imagine the effect of being led through faith in Jesus to know God in His holy character and in the triumph of His love! It is impossible to mark the contrast too widely (1 Co 12², 1 Th 1⁹, Ph 3⁸, Jn 14⁹ 17³). Even when, in the effort of philosophic thought, the idea of God had been purified and exalted, the end of the religious quest was still unreached; and the missionary of Christ had to proclaim a God, ethical and gracious, dealing with the world in mercy and in judgment (Ac 17²³ᶠ· ³⁰ᶠ·). Knowledge of God, accordingly, gained through historic deeds and a historic character, is salvation.

(2) Sin.—The world to which all men, Jews as well as Gentiles, belonged was a world of sin. The deepest problems of the religious heart were relief from guilt, the remission of sins, and reconciliation to God, whom conscience reckoned hostile. The question is not really debatable. The gospel is preached in view of an undeniable situation. Sin? 'Christ died for our sins.' The salvation offered is forgiveness, reconciliation; and the offer is amply verified in the experience. We are so accustomed to go to the NT for theories of atonement that we are apt not to lay the emphasis on the primary fact portrayed in the NT, viz. a life lived without the over-hanging sense of guilt and condemnation. To accept the divine mercy extended in a Christ who died and was now enthroned in power is to pass into a new world. The writings make the contrast vivid; and always the emphasis lies on the immediacy of the experience: instead of guilt, pardon; instead of enmity, reconciliation; instead of despair, peace and joyful confidence. There is nothing abstract, doctrinaire, intellectualist. All is concrete, living, personal. To believe in Jesus, the Christ, was to gain in the moment what all religions sought and none had to offer, not even Judaism. What Jesus gave in the days of His flesh (Mk 2¹⁰, Mt 11²⁸) He gives now in the day of His accomplished sovereignty. 'In him we enjoy our redemption, that is, the forgiveness of sins' (Col 1¹⁴). This is not theory. It is life, and salvation.

(3) Human life.—In the world, where men dwell in alienation from God, human life has not its proper value and human beings have not secured to them their true rank. It is true that theoretical affirmations of the independence and worth of the individual were common in an age when the steam-roller of empire had crushed national and civic freedom. It is true that the Jews claimed to be a spiritual *élite*, and to stand high in the favour of God; but a claim to spiritual rank grounded on ethnic descent defeats itself. All theory, however, broke on the hard facts of the social condition of the Roman world, where the dignity and security of man depended on accidents of birth and fortune. But the situation is absolutely changed for those who have seen and received God in Christ. It is impossible to put this too strongly, if we are to enter into the heart of primitive Christianity. Had Christ been 'a god' or 'a demi-god,' belief in Him would have left the chasms that yawned between man and man uncrossed. But, if God, Creator and Redeemer, be so present in Christ that He manifests and fulfils His gracious will towards sinful men, there is simply no room left for distinctions of grade in humanity.

Man is admitted to the divine. He has gained, in the act of faith, a rank compared with which the decorations of the world are paltry and unreal. This sense of human dignity was profoundly marked in all the teaching of Jesus; and now it belongs to the consciousness of all who believe in Him as the living organ of the divine salvation. Take the highest rank known on earth, rank that carried with it the most sacred privilege and the holiest religious function—kingship and priesthood; that belonged to the humblest believer in Jesus, the slave-girl equally with the Roman noble (Rev 1⁶ᶠ·). More profoundly still, consider a standing which belonged in the religion of Israel to the Messianic King, or to the privileged people as a whole. Note how this position of sonship towards God belonged to Jesus, and received in His person an interpretation beyond anything that the highest reach of Hebrew religious aspiration had conceived. Then note what happens in the act of faith in Jesus as Christ. Entrance is made into that very standing of filial relationship to God. It is simple matter of fact that to be receptive of, and to be laid hold of by, the saving power of God in Christ makes a man, not a servant, but a son, not a doorkeeper, but a child in the Father's house. This is Jesus' assurance to His disciples, so confident and comprehensive that the Christian Church even yet grasps it too timidly. But it is typical and essential Christianity. It is not the thin and jejune dogma of a vague and philosophic theism. It is a fact in the lives of those who have made the transition from one universe to another through faith in Christ. 'Children of God! That is what we are' (1 Jn 3¹). This is not a guarded inference. It is an actual experience. This is what 'salvation' means for a Christian.

(4) Corruption.—The world into which Christianity entered was morally corrupt. Salvation, operative as a force in that world, meant moral transformation (1 Co 6⁹⁻¹¹). It is not necessary to exaggerate. Even Paul, who dips his brush in darkest colours (Ro 1²¹⁻³²), is ready to recognize higher elements in the society to which he bore his message. But the terrible facts of moral decay and impotence are patent. The heart of mankind was aware that the remedy lay not with itself. The demand was for a 'Saviour,' and no religion had any chance of winning adherents which did not present a method of 'salvation.' Historically, Christianity ranks as one of these religions. Its historic warrant lies simply in the fact that it did what it professed to do. It did not, of course, profess to make, on the instant, morally perfect beings. But it did claim that persons submitting themselves to Jesus were, in that act of soul, lifted out of the region of moral decay and death, and were placed in a new world and made subjects of healing and transforming agencies which contained the promise and potency of a result nothing less than divine perfection.

And the actual healings, the progressive transformations, verified the claim. Whatever may be thought of Jn 4⁴³ as the authentic record of an incident in the life of Jesus, it is the exact and reliable account of an experience which included, not only the dwellers in a remote Samaritan town, but all men everywhere who made experiment in the saving power of God in Christ. The method of the Church was the method of Jesus (Mk 2¹⁷). The success of the Church was the success of Jesus, multiplied by all the difference between a ministry accomplished in the limitations of the body and one achieved in the unhindered exercise of sovereign power (Jn 5³⁶ 14¹²ᶠ·). Jesus Himself was profoundly aware that a new world of moral and religious powers was coming into being with Himself (Lk 16¹⁶, Mt 11¹¹), and those who enter it become new, as if they had—as indeed they really had—begun life over again (Mt 18³). And this sense of newness pervades the NT (2 Co 5¹⁷, Gal 6¹⁵, Eph 4²⁴, Ro 12², Tit 3⁵ᶠ·, Ro 6⁴). Christians live and move in a 'new sphere of life,' and no symbol is too strong to suggest the wonder of the change—creation, resurrection, or birth. But no physical analogy or metaphysical explanation affects the fact, which is a moral experience, the possibility of which lies in the power of God, and the responsibility for which lies in man's act of repentance and faith. Even as Jesus wrought a moral miracle in His training of His disciples when He was with them, so does He now continue the same operation, through the discipline of life, till He has gained an even more marvellous result. He puts His stamp on them. They are transformed into His likeness. Salvation is none other than this process.

(5) Bondage.—The world lying outside the moral universe, where the holy love of God is dominant through the exalted Saviour, lies in bondage. The philosophic Greek mind construed this through a physical or metaphysical dualism of form and matter. Men, unhappily, are immersed in a material element and are wholly subdued by it. The mind of Israel is not obsessed by such metaphysical abstractions. It knows nothing of metaphysical dualism, and sees in man a unity of matter and spirit, of body and soul, within the sphere of personal life. The religion of Israel, developing through ages of moral education, has reached an analysis of man's condition at once darker and more hopeful than the Greek. The dualism is not between two substances or elements of which man is the combination, but between man in his self-will and God in His holy sovereignty. Sin, therefore, is worse than a misfortune or cruel destiny, of which even great criminals are the helpless and hapless instruments. It is an act of man, which, thrown back upon his own nature and on human society, has produced anarchy and confusion, disorganization and enslavement. To escape from this bondage, the Gentile world had its philosophies and moralities, its popular faiths, and its mystery-religions. The Jews had their Law, magnificently superior in moral quality to anything that the rest of the world could provide. It was, however, at its best, a conspicuous failure, and left men, indeed, in a double bondage—bondage to a code, without the faintest degree of freedom from the tyranny of sin. Here the Christian message intervened and, in a word, emancipated the human spirit for ever. The saving power of God, the power that has met and vanquished sin, is ever active and accessible in Jesus, the living Lord. To accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord is, in that act, to receive the power of God into the springs of life, and to be forthwith under its enabling influence. This power is designated the Spirit, the term which the religion of Israel reserved for God in His indwelling and inworking, in the sphere of human life and on behalf of men. To be a Christian is to believe in Jesus the Christ *and* to receive the Spirit. To believe in Jesus as the Christ, without having received the Spirit, is not yet to be a Christian (Ac 19¹⁻⁷). To believe in and seek to possess the power of God, without repentance and faith in Christ, is to be miserably self-deceived and hideously guilty (8¹⁸⁻²⁴). Here is a moral principle of boundless applicability. Its range of action could not be discerned at first. Dangers threaten its application. But from the beginning 'the reception of the Spirit is the whole of Christianity.'[1]

Christianity is the religion of the Spirit. The Church is the community of the Spirit. Legalism, magic, externalism of every sort is condemned from the outset. Without the Spirit there is no salvation. The possession of the Spirit gives the Christian salvation the notes of power (Eph 3¹⁴⁻²⁰), freedom (2 Co 3¹⁷), and joy (Lk 10²¹, Ro 14¹⁷).

(6) Fear of demons.—It is impossible to contemplate the ancient world without observing one feature which it shares with all lands which at the present time are under control of animism—the wide-spread fear of demons. Whatever psychologists or members of the Society for Psychical Research may make of the phenomena, the fear itself is beyond all question. Illustrations abound; and we are to conceive to ourselves a state of mind according to which the supersensuous region, the 'air,' is inhabited by malignant beings seeking the destruction of men in body and in soul. Beings well-disposed towards man no doubt exist and give their aid; but the battle is sore, and the issue is undecided, and the fear remains. The Christian missionaries, like Jesus Himself, shared the belief in the existence of such evil powers, and admitted the helplessness of man in conflict with them. But the message declared that the power of God, almighty in its holiness and love, is now effective in the person of the conquering Christ, to beat back the worst assaults of such enemies and ultimately to banish

[1] J. Denney, *s.v.* 'Holy Spirit,' in *DCG* i. 733.

them from the universe of God. This is the claim of Jesus (Mt 12^{28}); and the claim is verified by the cases of cure (Mk $1^{32ff.}$). The power of victory resides in the message, and is exercised by those who proclaim it (Mk 3^{15} 16^{17}). The NT is steeped in the conviction of the reality and fearful workings of these evil spirits, and in the triumphant assurance that they cannot harm those who have taken refuge with the power of God, which acts through the uplifted Lord by faith in Him (2 P 2^{4}, Rev 9^{20}, 2 Ti 1^{7}, 1 Jn 4^{6}, Ja 2^{19} 3^{15}, Ac 5^{16} 8^{7} $16^{18\text{-}40}$). The apostle Paul moves in this region of thought, and contemplates with awe and triumph the havoc wrought by these evil powers and their overwhelming defeat by the sovereign power of God in Christ (Eph 2^{2} 6^{12}, Ph 2^{10}, 1 Co 2^{8}, Col 1^{13} $2^{14f.}$, Gal $4^{8ff.}$, Ro $8^{38f.}$). The point of interest is to be found, of course, not in the alleged reality of these evil beings (a question which, be it noted in passing, has been reopened by the discovery of the 'subconscious'), but in the reality of the fear, and in its expulsion by the conviction of the sole supremacy of that God who, through Jesus, has revealed Himself as the only Redeemer. To the men of that day salvation carried with it deliverance from demons, and to animists of the present day it means the same thing. Missionary records echo the NT sense of immense relief, and the confident security, which is like an awakening out of nightmare.

(7) Fear of death.—A yet more intimate and personal fear possessed the world, apart from the influence that streamed from the resurrection of Jesus—the fear of death. The human heart reacted passionately against this inevitable end of human aspirations and endeavour and enjoyment. And in the age in which Christianity entered on the scene of human hopes and fears the demand for assurance of immortality was loud and insistent. It was met by philosophical arguments and by the promises of the mystery-religions. But the fear and the doubt brooded over mankind. Those who were trained in the religion of Israel were in a different position. Apocalyptic conceptions might help (Dn 12^{2}), and might issue in a dogma of 'resurrection at the last day.' But such a belief was scarcely a deliverance from the gloom of separation from the sphere of life and love. The real line of hope lay in the faith which apprehended God as Redeemer. In this, after the terrible discipline of the Exile, the religion of Israel culminated. The individual human being who commits himself to God possesses a salvation which is not limited to time and space. 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living' (Lk 20^{38}). Such a faith, however, needs to be grounded in an act of God, which meets the fact of death once for all, and for ever changes its significance.

The hope of immortality cannot stand apart from the triumph of redeeming love. When that triumph takes place, hope becomes certainty, being, indeed, simply the register of the inner quality of redemption. Salvation from sin is salvation from death, because the enthroned Lord has the whole power of God at His disposal, and none of the powers of the earth or of the air can make head against Him (Ro $8^{38f.}$). Hence, the message met this profound need of man, not with a speculation, but with a fact: 'Christ is risen.' Questions remain regarding the attendant circumstances of man's future life; but they do not touch the central fact of the resurrection of Christ, which carries everything with it and without which nothing remains (1 Co $15^{12ff.}$ $16f.$ 20). Much of Paul's arguing may slip over us, but, as he meets the conjoined evil of sin and death with the double fact of the Cross and the Resurrection of Christ, he is on the secure ground of history and experience; and on that ground the whole primitive Church stands with him.

Salvation, therefore, means deliverance from the thraldom of a life-long fear of death (He $2^{14f.}$). It means, too, a change in the very nature of death, so that it becomes comparable to the sleep which precedes the daily resurrection to life and action (1 Co 15^{18}). It means, even more, a transfiguration in the experience of dying, which is no longer a fate, but an opportunity and condition of realizing what the power of God in Christ can do for a mortal man (1 Co 3^{22}). The defeat of death lies in the moral sphere, and is already absolute. The physical counterpart of that victory belongs to the consummation of salvation, when the period ushered in by the Resurrection shall be crowned by the return of the Lord. Then in a transition which, in the nature of the case, is unimaginable death shall be 'swallowed up in victory' (1 Co 15^{54}). But this anticipation is not a hope thrown into the unknown; it is the sure and certain issue of a salvation which is a present experience.

(8) Sensitiveness to suffering.—The world which saw the Roman Empire erect itself above shattered cities and states and an artificial society plant itself upon varied masses of enslaved humanity could not but be full of pain. And the rise of an intense individualism was necessarily accompanied by a developed sensitiveness to suffering. Obviously, here was a need in which body and soul cried for relief and the heart of tortured humanity imperiously demanded comfort. It was slow in coming and miserably inadequate to cope with the extent or the depth of human distress. In the Hellenic-Roman world a noble effort was made to bid defiance to pain and take refuge in the inwardness of the true Good. The defect of this view is the irrelevance of pain. Pain is not conquered till it is seen to have a meaning, in relation to the realization of the highest good of mankind. The wise and devout had much to say of the disciplinary value of suffering and sorrow, and cultivated the hope of another world, which would make amends for the griefs of this one. Yet, apart from the fact that such a literature of consolation, eloquent and tender though it was, did not reach beyond the *élite* of cultured sufferers and had no message for the dumb pain of the unknown multitude, it missed the point. A Providence which does not take pain into itself can scarcely be a Deity to which the sorrow-laden will take their case. Accordingly, myths of a divine suffering had a wonderful attraction for a world in pain. But they were too unsubstantial, too remote from the bitterness of the woman, the slave, the prisoner, the bereaved, the tormented, to constitute a world-remedy.

Within the discipline of Israel a thought was growing which might seem to have little of hope in it, and yet did contain the secret of consolation. The problem before the exercised soul of Israel was pure pain—not pain demanded by guilt, but the pain of the guiltless, suffering in a world in which moral considerations are confounded and the wicked flourish, while the righteous are cast down. The customary consolations are offered: that the triumphing of the wicked is short, that judgment is sure though delayed, that suffering is disciplinary, that God is the true good of man, and that this good, being inward, spiritual, and permanent, outweighs the evils of life—and all are of no avail. None of them goes to the root of the matter or stays the revolt of the soul. But there was a suffering in Israel which had in it redemptive value—the suffering of those Servants of God who held office under Him as mediators of His redeeming purpose, whose vocation (it came to be seen) was fulfilled in suffering, a suffering, not inflicted by a God who stood outside in untouched bliss, but appointed by God in pursuit of His gracious design, and in some sense shared in by Himself. And this suffering of God is seen in Jesus, identified in the faith of the disciples as the Suffering Servant of the Lord. The message of salvation to a suffering world does not come down upon it from a region of empyrean bliss, but enters it through the door of sympathy, and speaks to it of a divine experience of pain, and comforts it, from within, from a sanctuary of sorrow. Jesus is prepared for His saving office through pain (He 2^{10} $5^{8f.}$). Thus, and thus only, is He enabled to offer 'eternal salvation,' and to 'save to the uttermost' of man's need. Corresponding to human suffering is the suffering of the Christ of God. The Christian preachers did not unfold a theodicy. They laid bare the heart of God. From the point of view of faith in the Servant of the Lord, suffering and victorious, the fact of pain is met, not theoretically, but experimentally.

In the first place, it appears as the thing which ought not to be in the universe where love is supreme. It belongs essentially to this world, where the love of God has still to win its practical lordship. Jesus healed disease and relieved suffering as part of His redemptive work; and the Church continued His task, bringing to bear the resources of God which were available to faith both in direct healings (1 Co 12^{9}) and in a ceaseless ministry of comfort (2 Co $1^{3f.}$).

Not merely, however, is pain met by the counter-remedy of divine power; it is taken up into the redemptive operation of God, and is thus transmuted into blessing. It is not endured apart from Christ, nor is He separated from it. Those who preceded Him in time were caught in the tide of suffering, whose waves submerged the soul of Jesus (He 11^{26}). And those who follow Him do so by the way of the Cross, and share His pain, as He does theirs; and in their case, as in His, the suffering is an element in the salvation (Ro 8^{17}, Ph 3^{10}). A sorrow shared with the Man of Sorrows is a sorrow healed. Never had there been such sufferers as the disciples of Jesus, and never souls so glad (2 Co 4^{8}). In the experience of the sufferers pain acts as it did in Jesus, who was perfected by suffering, though in the case of disciples pain had a relation to personal sin which it had not in His case (He $12^{7\text{-}11}$). Nay, the pain of Christians, borne as part of their witness to the world, reproduces the very sufferings of Christ (2 Co 1^{5}), and continues them on behalf of the Church (Col 1^{24}). Nevertheless, the pain remains as pain, glorified though it be (1 P $4^{13f.}$). The NT is superhuman, but not inhuman. It does not glorify pain as such, and the Christian experience of pain was not touched with fanaticism. Pain belongs to that period of time in which the Kingdom of God has not yet come in fullness; and the brevity of the trial is frankly appealed to as an element of encouragement (1 P 1^{6}, Ro 8^{18}, 2 Co $4^{17f.}$). From a world where pain is inevitable the suffering Church lifted its eyes to that other world where 'there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain' (Rev 21^{4}). Meantime, the life-story of believers is included in the redeeming purpose of God, which is no matter of doubt, because it has triumphed in Christ. Providence (*q.v.*) in the NT was not a Stoic theorem; it was an inference from redemption achieved in Christ (Ro 8^{28}). Pain, therefore, in Christian experience is not merely defeated; it is transfigured. Christians are not merely stern and magnificent bearers of pain, they are 'more than conquerors' over it (8^{37}); they are saved in it and by it, out of it and over it.

(9) Moral evil.—Passing from separate evils belonging to the present period, we note in it one comprehensive quality. This world is under the control of moral evil; it stands condemned by the holiness of God; and it is reserved for His final judgment. A modern revision of Christianity may reverse this estimate of the world, and take an optimistic view of the forces evident in it. But it is indisputable that the gloomier view was universal in the century in which Christianity was born. It was entertained by reflective minds everywhere. The Christian preachers had scarcely anything to add to its darkness, though they construed it through a more ethical conception of God and a more austere idea of His holiness. Proof that this was the Christian view of the world lies broadcast through the

NT, and may be collected under the heads of *αἰών*, *κόσμος*, and *γενεά*. In relation to this world, therefore, salvation, which means, as we have seen, so much positively in Christian experience, takes on a strongly negative quality. To be saved is to be saved out of this world and from the 'wrath' which is about to break upon it. It is the purpose of Messiah's coming to save men from this evil world (Gal 1^4, 1 Th 1^{10}). This salvation rests upon, and is guaranteed by, His atoning death (Ro 5^9).

From the very beginning the message warns and pleads in view of this coming doom (Ac 2^{40}; cf. Mt 3⁷). Christians are 'refugees' (He 6^{18}), who, in another metaphor, are anchored to the hope which is as immovable as 'the inner Presence within the veil.' This negative attitude to the world has to be made good by a continual rupture of all ties which could bind a man to that which he has forsaken. Sins are to be broken off (Col $3^{5.\ 6}$, Ro $6^{11f.}$, 1 P $4^{1f.}$). Even things not sinful must be renounced if they threaten the integrity of a disciple's devotion to the Kingdom. The strenuousness of the Master's words was not forgotten (Lk $9^{57.62}$ $14^{26f.}$), and is echoed by those who know His mind (1 Co $9^{25f.}$).

Yet salvation, while thus consisting in deliverance from this world, and carrying with it a negative relation to the world, is not in itself negative. It is essentially positive and dynamic. It is intensely individual, but it is not individualistic, and does not terminate in the escape of the solitary soul. It is a gift; but it is the impartation of divine power, of which the 'saved' are at once the subjects and the organs. Hence it is also a task, and is possessed only in fulfilment of vocation. The disciple band, accompanying the Master, trained by Him and sent forth on errands of mercy, remains type and norm of the Christian Church in the primitive times, and, we may surely add, in every period of its history. The task is set by the gift. The gift is God's redeeming love in Jesus, who lived, and died, and rose again. It is received in faith, and operates inexhaustibly through the experience of a lifetime, and, after this life, will continue towards issues of inconceivable glory and joy. Being received, it rises in the individual as a fountain of energy corresponding to its own nature. Received as redeeming love, it acts through the saved, as redeeming love for those whom Jesus died to redeem. There is a uniqueness and absoluteness in the Person and Work of Christ, from which Christian faith has never wavered; but this did not hinder recognition of the moral congruousness of the Church's task with that of its Lord, or the sense of obligation to continue the operation of redeeming love towards the world. To separate the service of love from the experience of love is to cut the nerve of Christian faith. The service is twofold: (i.) confession of Jesus as Lord (Ro 10^9, Mt 10^{32}), witness-bearing to the fact and power of His resurrection (Ac 1^8 2^{32}); evangelism, a ministry of reconciliation which is the very action of God towards men between whom and God there exists a state of enmity (2 Co 5^{18-21}); (ii.) the activities of love in sympathy and help. Love is essentially social. Its bent is towards an organism. The primitive Christians had no social theory; but they were a society. They had no stereotyped programme; but they acted on an inspiration of compassion, and sought to gather into their living body the very Body of Christ, the *disiecta membra* of the dissolving fabric of contemporary civilization. This is what we see in the NT—love in action, having in it the very quality of the divine mercy, seeking the worst, despairing of none, integrating all into the organic unity of the society which is created by Christ and lives in Him. Salvation, accordingly, is social or it is nothing. It is the organization of mankind under the rule of redeeming love.

(10) Doom of the world. — Finally, salvation within the Church, whether viewed as the possession of the 'good things' which the Heavenly Father delights to bestow on His children or as escape from a world which is 'not of the Father' and is doomed to destruction, is not complete in an experience which is measurable by time. There is no hope for this world. Its doom is irrevocable. The only hope for mankind is the replacing of this order by another, in which other powers bear sway and other relations prevail. Salvation belongs to that other order, and comes when that order shall supervene upon this. This is the paradox of the Kingdom of God. It is, and it is to be. Salvation, in like manner, is both immediate as a fact and future as a hope. It is impossible to miss this futuristic note of the Christianity of the NT, however great may be our prejudice against it, or however carefully we may exclude it from our own type of religion. The 'saved' of the times of the NT are looking for a 'salvation' yet to come, ensured to them by the faithfulness of God, certified by the earnest of the Spirit (2 Co 1^{22} 5^5) and by incalculable riches of Christ (Eph $2^{7f.}$). Sometimes the future seems, as it were, in process, and the 'saved' are 'being saved' (1 Co 1^{18} 15^2, 2 Co 2^{15}). Oftener it is regarded as about to be ushered in, in a day or an event, whose date cannot be fixed, but which stands imminent to the faith and awe of believers (Ro 13^{11}, 1 Co 3^{15}, Ph 1^{28}, 1 Th 5^8, 2 Th 2^{13}, He 1^{14} 2^3. ^{10} 5^9 6^9 9^{28}, 1 P $1^{5.\ 9}$). It is obvious that there was much in this Christian attitude to this world and outlook towards a world to come which resembled the views and estimates entertained by non-Christians. There is, however, one radical and characteristic difference, viz. that the Greek was operating, if we may use the phrase, with the category of substance, the Christian with that of power. The Greek thought of matter, from which he desired to be free. The Christian, trained in the OT, thought of moral evil working through the lower nature but not identical with it; and from this evil he knew he could be delivered only by the act of God. Already he knew by experience the efficacy of that power; and he expected a day of its complete vindication, in salvation and in judgment.

The 19th cent. mind, accustomed to speak of a 'Christian civilization,' and hearing vaguely of 'evolution,' resented this position, and preferred an optimistic view of the world, as being in a condition of progressive improvement. Probably the Great War will modify, if not reverse, this general estimate, and may lead back to the primitive Christian attitude and outlook. In any case, neither optimism nor meliorism represents the primitive Christian attitude. At the same time, that attitude will be utterly misconceived, if it is stated as a pessimism, with the practical result of leaving the world to grow worse and worse, and even being satisfied that it should do so. Salvation certainly is perfected in the Parousia. But this does not mean that the Kingdom of God is non-existent or impotent, or that its subjects are to stand by as idle spectators of the world's tragedy. The rule of God is real, living, and almighty. It is in the hands of the King Messiah. He is at work in the world. Its evil powers are already broken. He has overcome the world. In the interval which lasts till His return He is in conflict with the world powers. That divine warfare is waged above man, in a manner and by means beyond human calculation; so that believers have constantly to look on, while the Angel of the Lord works wondrously. But it is not waged wholly apart from man. The believer is also a participator in this great conflict. His faith is a factor in the victory. It has three lines of operation: (i.) direct action with reference to the world, in witness-bearing and in Christian ministry, both of these being a vindication of the sovereignty of Christ, leading to the winning of men to His allegiance; (ii.) waiting, watching, looking out for the coming Kingdom, and hastening towards it; devout men in the primitive Church are the direct successors of those who waited for the consolation of Israel, and they continue the waiting attitude, which is the essential piety of Israel, from the Exile onwards (Is 40^{31}, Ps $62^{1.\ 5}$ $130^{5f.}$, Mk $13^{33f.}$ $^{35.\ 37}$, Mt $24^{42f.}$ 25^{13}, Lk 2^{38}, 1 Co 1^7 16^{13}, 1 Th 1^{10}, 1 P 1^{13}, Ja 5^7, Rev 3^3 16^{15}, 2 P 3^{12}); such waiting is very far from passivity; it is itself issue and proof of the powers of the Kingdom, and is a condition of its arrival; (iii.) as the accompaniment of waiting, prayer. The NT practice of prayer is controlled by the thought of the Kingdom. Its typical aspiration is for the coming of the Kingdom (Mt 6^{10}). Its requests are directed to all things which carry out the designs of the Kingdom, and are granted, as they are preferred, in the name of Christ (Jn $14^{13f.}$). Above all, prayer, especially in its intercessory form, is work done for the Kingdom, and conditions the coming of the Kingdom. The Kingdom will not come to an unwatchful and prayerless Church. In this, as in other forms of service, the power is God's; and prayer means the presence and operation of God, and, therefore, is sure of its answer (Ro $8^{26f.}$, He 7^{25}, Jn $16^{23.\ 26f.}$).

The coming of the Kingdom, accordingly, with the realization of salvation is 'at hand.' Jesus will return 'very soon' (Rev 22^{20}). The unseen world, eternal and divine, impends over this doomed and transient world, and may break through into it at any moment. And yet its arrival is not a bare event, poised on nothing in human life and history. Some of the conditions of its coming lie within the divine vision only; and therefore the mind of men and angels, as of Messiah Himself in the days of His earthly manifestation, contains no means for determining the date. Others lie within the reach of man, and are summed up in faith, with its exercises of loving service, watchfulness, and prayer. Salvation, in its beginning, continuance, and consummation, as gift, and task, and heritage, is relative to faith, and apart from faith is impossible as an experience. Hence the NT closes, not with a prediction, but with a prayer, 'Amen, Lord Jesus, Come.'

(*d*) *Defensive statement of the Christian salvation.*—The Christian message of salvation is not addressed to the intellect as a 'faculty,' and does not terminate in the construction of an intellectual system. It comes as a living word, instinct with life and power, and evokes an experience in which the whole man participates, and brings salvation as an invincible spiritual dynamic. If the NT thus escapes intellectualism, however, it is equally removed from emotionalism, and its insistence on experience does not mean surrender to the caprices of subjectivity. It never attempts to separate life and thought. The experience grows towards 'knowledge,' a discernment of the realities of God's character and purpose, of the values and powers of human life, of man's state and need, as well as his destiny and perfection. Such 'knowledge' is a 'gift' of the Spirit (1 Co 12^8). But it is for the use of the Church at large, and its diffusion and increase are an object of prayer (Ph 1^9, Eph $1^{17f.}$). By such knowledge the experience of salvation is interpreted and made aware of itself, and grows clear-eyed and strong. Such an interpretation is the necessary task of the Church throughout all the periods of its history. Gathered into succinct expression as the voice of the Church,

it forms creeds and symbols. Developed systematically, it forms a body of doctrine, growing through criticism to fuller and more concrete statement. Theology is properly soteriology, 'the science of realised redemption.'[1] In the NT, however, the interpretation has not yet taken the form of articulated creed or systematized doctrine. Rather we have in it the work of men, who had the gift of knowledge, setting forth, as occasion served and the needs of the Church required, aspects of the great salvation, and bringing before the minds of Christians the necessary implications and issues of the faith by which they lived. There is no speculation *in vacuo*. Everything said is practical in aim and is relevant to the actual condition of believers. The concern of the writer is always salvation, as message and as experience. Full details belong to the discipline of exegetical and Biblical theology. Here it will be enough to indicate the points at which danger threatened the Church's treasure of salvation within the times covered by the NT literature, and the character of the defensive statement made of the Christian experience.

(1) *Misuse of the Christian hope.*—Eschatology has been, in all ages, the happy hunting-ground for religious cranks. The primitive Church did not escape the presence of such pests. If we suppose the bare idea of the Parousia to take possession of the mind, without any deep insight into the nature of God's redeeming power, or any experimental acquaintance with His salvation, the effect will be inevitable; and there will be persons wandering about in idleness, spinning endless yarns out of their own brains, and sponging on their neighbours for the necessaries of existence. This was met on the part of the leaders of the Christian movement by a strong emphasis on the value of the present, as affording the sphere of moral discipline and the opportunity of loving service. It mattered not how short the interval before the Parousia might be; the immediate duty of living under the direction of God's holy will remains unaffected. The certainty of the Return gives great comfort and encouragement in the discipline of life, and adds great urgency to the vocation of the Christian. But there is a conspicuous absence of luscious description of the delights of heaven, and there is a resolute insistence upon the performance of common duties (1 Th $4^{11f.}$ 5^{14}, 2 Th $2^{1f.}$ 3^{9-12}). There is no withdrawal of the hope. A Church, or a soul, in 'the great tribulation' could not tolerate that. But there is balance and proportion in statement and conspicuous ethical sanity.

(2) *Perversion of the gift of the Spirit.*—The idea of the Spirit of God has a long history, and is bound up with the idea of salvation. As the latter deepens in moral and religious quality, the former grows in purity and is more and more removed from physical or psychical excitement. Yet there are obvious dangers connected with the possession of the Spirit, which are marked in almost every 'revival.' It is accompanied by intensity and fervour, which are very apt to take crude, offensive, or even unethical forms. The Christian movement did not escape this peril. To believe in Jesus was to receive the Spirit and to become the subject of its special operations. Some of these implied psychical disturbance and the manifestation of supernormal experiences and powers. Inevitably these attracted attention, and captivated the imaginations of minds untrained in the Christian life. The whole Christian movement was in danger of being assimilated to popular animism, especially in those lands where statelier and colder religions were already being replaced by more fervid and even frenzied types. The apostle Paul understood the danger as none of the other leaders could, and it is the great achievement of his career that he met it fully, and beat back an evil which would have made the Christian salvation a mockery. He did not deny the value of ecstatic phenomena. Intense experiences in the crisis of the soul's inner history may be expected, are to be counted a privilege, and are not to be condemned or repressed (1 Co 14^{18}, 2 Co 12^{1-5}, 1 Th 5^{19}). But they are not the only or the chief gifts of the Spirit. They occur among many others (1 Co $12^{4-11, 28-31}$, Ro 12^{6-8}, Eph 4^{11}). They must submit themselves to one obvious test, viz. value for edification and ministry. Submitted to this test, they sink to the bottom of the scale (1 Co 14^{19}). The apostle has a broader treatment of the question. He carries out the process begun within the OT, and lifts into full view the moral and religious value of the Spirit. He interprets it through Jesus (Ro 8^{9}, 2 Co $3^{3, 17f.}$). This, indeed, is the ultimate valuation of the Spirit as the power of the Christian salvation; for Paul fully believes in demonic powers which are hostile to man and to the Redeemer of men (1 Co 12^{3}). The ecstatic phenomena, though prized, fall out of notice, as he fills the idea of the Spirit with the meaning of salvation, as wrought by the living Lord within the higher life of man.

(3) *Lowering the level of the salvation experience from grace to legalism.*—Here we have a danger, the exact opposite of that which we have just noticed, though often in fact connected with it. An immature Christian has been delivered from the present 'world' or 'age' with its dominant powers of evil. The historic events of the Cross and the Resurrection stand behind him as the guarantees of his deliverance. But how is he to live, and order his doings, in this new world into which he has entered? The intoxicating sense of emancipation carries him on for a while; but, as it subsides, what is to take its place? The nearest, most familiar, answer is to be found in rules and statutes. Let him govern himself by these, and all will be well. The gospel itself, to one in this state of mind, is a new law, embodying the old law, with additions of its own. Salvation, it seems, while made possible by an event now past, has still to be won, and appears as a recompense for a steadfast adhesion to law and a requisite number of 'works.' Thus legalism follows hard upon the gospel. This peril appears within the times of the NT; but it is a familiar phenomenon in the mission field to-day. In another way the danger of legalism threatened. Suppose the intoxicating sense of liberty to be cultivated, and its most intense and bizarre expressions to be prized as notes of a high degree of spirituality, while sheer immorality threatens the unstable soul, how shall this evil be met? A direct and obvious answer is: Cut out the liberty itself, and put this soul, that is not fit for freedom, into the shackles of law. Let the Church administer salvation under a code, apportioning it according to the measure of obedience. The tendency to legalism, accordingly, is entirely natural, and yet it is plain that it subverts Christianity in its inmost essence. Legalism, in point of fact, is not religion at all. Certainly it is not the religion of the OT. Law in the OT presupposes grace. The *Psalmi Paulini*, born in the midst of a law-observing Church, stand an imperishable witness against legalism. Ezekiel, the parent of the later systematized law in Israel, is no legalist.

[1] P. T. Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, London, 1909, p. 216.

[2] In his sketch of the ideal sanctuary of the future, a great moral change in the people, brought about by the Spirit of Jahveh, is presupposed. The nation, in whose midst Jahveh

deigns to dwell, is a nation prepared for His indwelling by a thorough regeneration of heart and life. . . . Ezekiel's conception of holiness is rooted in a profound conviction of the evil of sin, and in a keen sense of the necessity of personal faith and repentance for acceptance with God.'[1]

When the religion of Israel culminated in the Person and Work of the Redeemer, it certainly was not to sink its adherents to a lower stage than had been known in the OT. The new stage of the religion of redemption is inaugurated not by a mere event of the past, but by an abiding event, if it may be so described. Resurrection and Pentecost go together. The Redeemer is not dead and relegated to a distant throne. He is living, as Spirit, in His Church. He, by the Spirit, is present and operative in all believers. He is everything to them, standard and strength, guidance and power.

The answer to the practical problem, 'How shall the believer conduct himself in the new world?' is met, as the first demand for salvation is met, by the appeal for faith. Trust the living Lord; receive the Spirit of Jesus. Live by the Spirit; be guided by the Spirit (Gal 5^{25}). No doubt there are dangers in such a course (5^{13}). But they are to be met, not by a faint-hearted compromise with legalism, but by the interpretation of the Spirit through the historic Lord, whose *alter ego* the Spirit is—an interpretation which is gathered up into love, that very love which is the essence of God and the motive of the Redeemer's sacrifice (Eph 5^{2}). To a clear eye legalism and the gospel of God stand as contradictions (Gal 5^{2}). Legalism is bondage and shuts the soul into that old world where 'elemental spirits' vaunt themselves against God's redeeming power (4^{1-9}). No compromise is possible ($2^{3f.}$). What is at stake is salvation itself. If legalism triumphs, the labour and suffering of God have been of no avail. He has been defeated. He can do no more. We can understand Paul's passion as he fronted the Judaizers. He saved Christianity as the religion of the Spirit.

(4) *Changing the nature of salvation from the power of God to magic.*—Amid the welter of religions which in the first century of our era were offering 'salvation' to a needy world there was one general conception and one prevalent method. The conception is union with the divine; the method is rite and ceremony, acting magically. The details are curious, but the interest lies in the ruling idea that it is possible by an external act to be united with some superior being or substance, and so be saved from a world which, being material, is inherently evil. The problem, the idea, and the machinery all belong to a far lower level of religious experience than that occupied in common by the religion of Israel and by Christianity. It is true that these 'mystery-religions' were a notable evidence of the world-wide sense of need and did form a *preparatio evangelica* which might truly be regarded as inspired by God. A skilful missionary, therefore, would not enter the lists against them in arid controversy. He would use everything in them which he could transmute into Christian uses. But on two points he could make no compromise: (i.) the nature of faith as the 'universal coefficient of all spiritual blessing' (Ro 1^{17});[2] (ii.) the ethical quality belonging to the Spirit of God and to the life in salvation. Paul is conspicuous for his sympathetic appreciation of all elements, even in heathenism, which have affinities with the religion of redemption. But his conceptions of faith and of the Spirit are rooted in the religion of Israel, and are determined through the Person of Christ, as God's agent in redemption, and the source of salvation to all who believe.

[1] R. L. Ottley, *The Religion of Israel*, Cambridge, 1905, p. 118.

[2] J. V. Bartlet, in art. BAPTISM (New Testament), vol. ii. p. 377b.

'The evidence,' says H. A. A. Kennedy, 'makes it wholly superfluous to seek for the explanation of Paul's use of any of these terms in Hellenistic Mystery-Religion. What we do learn from the parallels is the ability of many of his readers to catch the meaning of a more or less technical terminology, due not merely to a course of instruction in the Old Testament, but to their acquaintance with a religious vocabulary already current among the Mystery-associations.'[1]

There is only one 'saving' institution in Christianity, and that is the gospel (Ro $1^{16f.}$, 1 Co 1^{18}). Any rite tolerable in the Christian cultus derives its value from the measure in which it sets forth the gospel, and the 'coefficient' of any blessing that it conveys is only and always faith.

(5) *Depriving Christ of His unique function and supreme place in the divine salvation.*—This danger threatened as soon as Christianity entered the region where Greek thought formed the intellectual atmosphere of educated men. The general scheme, developed in various forms of Gnosticism (*q.v.*), and later systematized as Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*), runs on lines such as these: (i.) the idea of God as the indeterminate, a Being above the categories of human thought, and wholly removed from contact with matter; (ii.) the metaphysical and cosmological problem, arising from this dualism of God and the world, viz. how to cross the gulf separating the two—a problem two-sided, how the ineffable perfection of God can conceivably be connected with the material world and how man can rise out of the material to the divine; (iii.) the speculative problem solved by subordinationism, the invention of intermediate beings to account for the existence of the material world; (iv.) the religious problem, solved in three stages—morality, legal and ascetic; contemplation, knowledge; ecstasy, the vision of God, and metaphysical absorption in Him. At this last point philosophical thought joined hands with the mystery-religions.

Such a scheme might readily make room for Christianity, by accommodating Christ with a place, possibly even the first place, amid the crowd of intermediaries, and by giving a Christian tone to asceticism and contemplation, and by transforming the Christian symbols of baptism and the Lord's Supper into 'mysteries.' This subtle danger belongs mainly to a period subsequent to that covered by the NT and, indeed, proved too strong for the early Church, producing that amalgam of historic Christianity with Hellenism and the mystery-religions which we know as Catholicism.

Within the NT itself, however, lies the answer to this peril, and to the NT every revival of Christianity owes its standard and inspiration. It is to be carefully observed, at the same time, wherein the nerve of the answer lies. It does not lie in NT Christology, if by that is meant an intellectual system, woven by St. Paul and crowned by St. John, and reproduced by professional theologians in their various elaborations. It is to be sought in the experience of salvation, which underlies all theory and is registered, particularly, in Christology. For OT and NT alike salvation is not a scheme; it is an action. God is the only Saviour. He acts directly. There are no lists of subordinate beings who should form links between the divine and the human. There is no metaphysical obstacle to His approach to man and to His operation on man's behalf. The history of redemption is the history of such approach and such operation. Its climax is Jesus the Christ. In Jesus God works out to its glorious consummation the salvation of men. There is no other agent of the divine salvation. 'There is no salvation by any one else, nor even a second name under heaven appointed for us men and our salvation' (Ac 4^{12}). Far less is there an array of mythological figures, gorgeous or

[1] *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, p. 198.

grotesque, to help men across the gulf to God. This is historic Christianity, the only Christianity which has a right to the name. Again, however, it is to be repeated that what is primitive and normative for our conception of essential Christianity is the experience of salvation through acceptance of Jesus as Saviour, and not a Christology in the systematized form which we know as Pauline or Johannine. The experience is vital and developing. The Christology keeps pace with it as the registration of its values. The salvation is never construed cosmologically. It is always interpreted, through the sense of sin, as forgiveness and possession of the Spirit (Ac 2^{38} 3^{26} 10^{43}). And, whatever rank is ascribed to Jesus, it is His alone.

'Jesus had in the earliest preaching and the earliest faith of Christians that solitary and incommunicable place which the Church assigns Him still.'[1]

From this starting-point the life and thought of the Church move forward together. There is a growing experience of salvation as a present possession, element after element in the great fact of salvation being appropriate to the manifold needs of humanity. There is a corresponding growth in the conception of Christ, a more and more adoring view of Him in His sole sufficiency for salvation, whatever its dimensions and content may be. Various types of Christology are to be found in the NT, but they are not mutually exclusive. The distinctions between them are to be found 'in the aspects of religious experience which are respectively emphasized.'[2]

Some of these Christologies are 'higher' than others, because they recognize wider reaches of Christ's saving function, not because they have left the ground of experience and have entered the region of speculation. It is true, they use freely the terminology of the educated world of the day, and sometimes deliberately adopt the catch-words of current systems. But they never force Christ and Christian experience into these intellectual formulæ, and they never commit the grotesque mistake, fatally committed by later theology, of imagining that they have explained Christ. Their aim is practical and defensive throughout. They reply to cloudy and pretentious schemes by claiming for Jesus all that they have guessed or imagined, and have distributed among vague divinities. What words are these—'Lord,' 'Logos,' 'Image,' 'Fullness'? They all belong to Jesus. He is Lord of all. He is the Word of God. He is the image of the invisible God. In Him dwells the Fullness. But, though the phrases be borrowed, their content is derived from what the Church knows of Jesus, the only Redeemer. Over against all these elaborate and baseless systems, and high above the frenzied efforts of the mystery-religions, there stands the figure of Jesus, the historic Jesus, the exalted Saviour. All that God is is seen in Him. All that God does is done through Him. God is in Him reconciling the world to Himself. Instead of asceticism, or so-called knowledge, or ecstasy, there is but one condition of salvation—the faith that throws itself on the divine mercy, as it reaches men in the depths of their need through Jesus. This is the answer of the NT to the peril of Gnosticism, Docetism, subordinationism, and mysticism, in every shape and form, earlier or later.

(6) Reviewing the experience whose history we have sought to trace, we name, in conclusion, one or two of its abiding features. (i.) Its unity and continuity. It begins deep in the religion of Israel; it culminates in the NT; it moves onwards through the ages; it lives to-day throughout the wide world; and into it multitudes of every race and culture are continually entering. But fundamentally it is one thing—the action of the Redeeming God, whose nature is love, who moves, through judgment and mercy, to the victory of His saving purpose; and corresponding to this action is the answer of the human heart in trust and devotion. There is no other Christianity than this. (ii.) The place of Jesus in it. The action of God centres in Him. The character of God is disclosed in Him. In Him God enters human life, and through Him communicates Himself to man. The action of faith, in like manner, centres in Him, meets God in Him, knows God as revealed in Him. In Him man enters divine life, and through Him believes in God, worships and serves God, and returns to God the natural gifts which He Himself has imparted. This supremacy of Jesus is essential to Christianity. Wherever and by whomsoever this supremacy is practically acknowledged, there is essential Christianity, even if it be inarticulate. (iii.) Its expansion, intensively and extensively. It is measureless as the love of God, which is a shoreless, unfathomable ocean, covering the deeps of human need, surrounding, comprehending, and satisfying the capacities and dreams of man. Hence, it manifests itself in endless variety from generation to generation and from soul to soul. It cannot be run into a mould or stereotyped in a formula. Even within the NT the emphasis varies from the crudest expectation of the Parousia to the wealth of a present union with the living Lord. And always there is the sense of a beyond, uplifting the soul, revealing its necessities, and leading to unknown reaches of attainment. (iv.) It rises out of depths which cannot be plumbed by the logic of the mere understanding. Yet it constantly seeks conscious expression. It is not doctrine; yet a doctrine of salvation is a necessity for those who are 'being saved.' It is needed for their own sakes, that their experience may be strong and deep, able to resist disintegration and perversion; and for the world's sake, that the message of salvation may be clear and powerful. The formulation of such a doctrine, however, can never be complete or final. It is the task of a living Church, continuous and expanding, as the experience of which it is the vital interpretation.

[1] Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*[4], p. 17.
[2] Scott, *s.v.* 'Christ, Christology' in *DAC*.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the articles in *HDB*, *SDB*, *DCG*, and *DAC*, see D. S. Adam, *Cardinal Elements of the Christian Faith*, London, 1911; W. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, Edinburgh, 1895; J. S. Candlish, *The Christian Salvation*, do. 1899; J. Estlin Carpenter, in *Studies in Theology*, London, 1903; J. Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, do. 1917; A. Dorner, in *Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung der christlichen Religion*, Munich, 1905; W. P. Du Bose, *Soteriology of the New Testament*, New York, 1892; F. von Hügel, *Eternal Life*, Edinburgh, 1912; H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, London, 1913; E. Ménégoz, *Le Péché et la rédemption d'après St. Paul*, Paris, 1882; A. Ritschl, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[3], 3 vols., Bonn, 1888–89, Eng. tr. of vol. i., Edinburgh, 1872, of vol. iii., do. 1905; J. Rivière, *Le Dogme de la rédemption*, Paris, 1905; G. B. Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, New York, 1905, *The Theology of the New Testament*, Edinburgh, 1899; A. Titius, *Die neutestamentliche Lehre von der Seligkeit*, 4 parts, Freiburg, 1895–1900; K. W. Zeigler, *Die Versöhnung mit Gott: Bekenntnisse und Erkenntniswege*, Tübingen, 1902; C. A Scott, *Dominus Noster*, London, 1918.

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SALVATION (Egyptian).—1. Conceptions of posthumous happiness. — The Egyptian conceptions of posthumous happiness are confused and conflicting. The blessed dead, we are told, dwell in heaven as the intimate companions of the sungod.[1] It is said of him 'who has reached (the existence yonder) without wrongdoing' that 'he shall continue yonder like a god, stepping forward

[1] A. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, Berlin, 1896, lines 142–147, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion* Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 89; J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 118 ff.

boldly like the Lords of Eternity.'[1] The *bai* of such an one 'shall abide beside the Lord of All, his name shall be good in the mouth of the living.'[2] A righteous dead person, we are also informed, has his place in the Hall before the great god (Osiris),[3] or he is clothed in fine linen and is near Osiris.[4] Again, he may dwell in the Field of Earu, or Field of Offerings, the great city, the possessor of winds, where he is a mighty one (*sakhem*) and a blessed one (*ikh*) and where he ploughs, reaps, eats, drinks, copulates, and does all that is done on earth.[5]

A great official of the XVIIIth dynasty expresses his desire for a happy life after death in the following terms:

'May the memory of me remain on earth, may my soul live with the Lord of Eternity. The keepers of the doors, the guardians of the portals of the Tĕi shall not drive it back when it comes forth at the summons of the oblationer in my Tomb of the necropolis. May it [my soul] abound in bread, may it overflow with beer, and may it drink the water upon the eddy of the stream. May I enter in and come forth like the blessed who have done what their gods praise. May my name be good among men in the years to come, and may they give me praises at the two seasons by the favour of the city god.'[6]

2. The means of attaining posthumous happiness.—(*a*) *The virtuous life.*—The idea that the deceased's happiness depended upon his obtaining a favourable verdict at the posthumous trial is already found in inscriptions of the Old Kingdom.[7] To obtain such a verdict, a man must have been righteous during his life on earth.[8]

Osiris himself did not attain to his position of king and judge of the dead until he had undergone trial before the judicial council of gods at Heliopolis and had by them been proclaimed 'justified' or 'righteous (true) of voice.'[9]

(*b*) *Identification with Osiris.*—Side by side with the view that the happiness of the dead depended upon how their life on earth had been spent existed the idea that they could attain bliss hereafter through identification with Osiris. Originally only the dead Pharaoh was identified with Osiris, who appears in the *Pyramid Texts* as the prototype of all dead Pharaohs, the dead Pharaoh *par excellence*. This identification ensured to the deceased Pharaoh the same renewed and glorified existence as that of the god. As Osiris lives, he also will live; as Osiris dies not, he will not die; as Osiris was not destroyed, he will not be destroyed.[10] The gods do for the deceased Pharaoh what in the first instance they did for Osiris. Nut, the mother of Osiris, gives the dead Pĭōpi his head, unites for him his bones, puts together his limbs for him, and places his heart in his body.[11] Isis and Nephthys may also perform this service for him and make his eyes to shine in his head.[12] Again, he is washed and embalmed by Anubis[13] and revivified by Horus.[14] As the representative or successor of Osiris, the departed is said to be a blessed one or spirit (*ikh*), and to be mighty as a god. His soul (*bai*) is within him and his power (*sakhem*) behind him.[15] Finally, the dead Pharaoh must appear before the judicial council of the gods, by whom, like Osiris, he is pronounced 'justified,' 'righteous of voice,'[1] thanks to the pleading of Thōth, who also made Osiris to triumph over his enemies.[2] He can now enter upon a glorified existence—according to one conception, in heaven, or, according to another, in the West.[3] After the VIth dynasty every dead person was identified with Osiris, and the custom then arose of appending to the deceased's name the Osirian epithet 'justified.' The tendency, therefore, was to regard the deceased as righteous or 'justified,' not on his own merits, but, owing to his identification with Osiris, his personality and acts becoming merged in those of his righteous and justified prototype.[4] This is apparent in the following passages, which depict the dead in the rôle of the accused and justified Osiris:

'He [the dead Unis identified with Osiris] is justified by what he hath done. . . . The Two Rights have held the legal hearing. Shu was witness. The Two Rights have ordained that the thrones of Geb belong to him, that he should raise himself up for that which he desired, that his limbs which were in concealment should be joined together, that he should unite with those who are in Nun, and that he should put an end to the words in Heliopolis.'[5]

'Atum, father of the gods, is satisfied, Shu and Tefnut are satisfied, Geb and Nut are satisfied, Osiris and Isis are satisfied, Sĕth and Nephthys are satisfied . . . with that great and mighty utterance that came out of the mouth of Thōth in favour of Osiris, treasurer of life, seal-bearer of the gods. Anubis who reckons the hearts, he reckons the Osiris Pĭōpi from among the gods who belong to the earth unto the gods who are in heaven.'[6]

'O Thōth, who justified Osiris against his enemies, justify NN. against his enemies even as thou didst justify Osiris against his enemies before the judicial council . . . in Heliopolis.'[7]

It should here be noted that a deceased person was identified with Osiris only in his earlier rôle of a dead god-king who had been killed and revivified, and who finally had triumphed over his accusing enemies at the trial before the judicial council in Heliopolis. The deceased is always clearly differentiated from Osiris in his later rôle of judge of the dead.[8]

For the various ceremonies and spells through the performance or by the repetition of which a person, during his life or after death, was identified or associated with Osiris, or was rendered righteous or accounted as such, and so obtained justification and posthumous bliss, see art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 10.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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SALVATION (Hindu).—The Sanskrit term for 'deliverance' or 'salvation' is *mukti* or *mokṣa* (*q.v.*). Derived from the root *muc*, it signified in the first instance 'deliverance' or 'release' in general from pains and penalties of any kind. In all systems, however, of Hindu philosophical and religious thought *mukti*, or *mokṣa*, has become the technical and specialized expression to denote that deliverance from bondage to the world and its fetters which is the desired and ideal end of the Hindu religious life. Hindu aspiration and longing centre always in *mukti*, in deliverance in one way or another from the weariness and bondage universally associated with temporal existence.

The *mukta*, therefore, is one who is emancipated from all that detracts from fullness of life, who has been discharged from the cramped and fettered conditions of earthly existence, and has entered upon a state of endless freedom and felicity. The sects differ in their interpretation of the conditions and character of the state itself and the means and methods of its attainment. Ultimately, however, Hindu religious thought always formu-

1 A. H. Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyptian Archæology*, i. [1914] 27, § 13.
2 K. Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums*, iv. [Leipzig, 1905–09] 62, line 6 f.
3 E. Naville, *Das ägyptische Todtenbuch der xviii. bis xx. Dynastie*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1886 (hereafter referred to as *Tdb.*), ch. 99, line 38.
4 F. Ll. Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 48 f.
5 *Tdb.* ch. 110 (Einleitung), lines 1–3.
6 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 430.
7 See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), §§ 5, 9 (1), (i.)–(iv.).
8 *Ib.*
9 Breasted, p. 34 ff.; art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 7.
10 K. Sethe, *Die altägyp. Pyramidentexte*, Leipzig, 1908–10 (hereafter cited as *Pyr.*), § 167.
11 *Ib.* § 834 f. 12 *Ib.* § 1981.
13 *Ib.* § 1122 *c*, 1364 *f.*, 1995 *f.*; Breasted, p. 27.
14 Breasted, pp. 31–33. 15 *Pyr.* § 752; Breasted, p. 162.
1 *Pyr.* § 316 f. 2 *Ib.* § 1522 *f.*; *Tdb.* chs. 18–20.
3 Erman, *Handbook*, p. 96 f.; Breasted, p. 159 ff.
4 See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 10.
5 *Pyr.* § 316 ff.; Breasted, p. 34.
6 *Pyr.* § 1521 ff.; Breasted, p. 35.
7 *Tdb.* ch. xviii. line 1 f.; cf. chs. xix., xx.
8 See also Breasted, p. 164.

lates 'salvation' in terms of release from bondage to the present evil world to a further unworldly existence, which is not subject to change or liable to distress and harm.

Both terms are employed in the literature in a more general sense. Thus *dāsatvamukti* is release from servitude,[1] *śāpamukti* or *mokṣa* is release from an anathema or curse,[2] and the *śapamukta* is one who has been thus set free. *Praśnamokṣa* is the answer to or resolution of a question.[3] The words are also used with an active connotation; e.g., *ṛṇamukti* or *mokṣa* is the discharge of an obligation or debt. Technically also *muktimārga* or *mokṣamārga* is the path or way of emancipation.

1. Essential character and principles. — In Hindu thought and teaching, therefore, 'salvation' is essentially the solution of intercourse with the material world, with the universe created and visible; it is emancipation from bondage to matter with all that this involves of pain and penalty, and entrance into a haven of rest and peace for ever untroubled by the afflictions and sorrows that attend upon all earthly conditions. There underlies the doctrine, therefore, that deep-rooted conviction of the essential poverty and wretchedness of earthly existence which is so characteristic of every variety of Eastern thought. Throughout the long history of Indian speculation in all its modifications and varieties and in all the sects this conception has retained a leading place, that true freedom and happiness are not attainable here, under the dominance and constraint of earthly passions and privations; only by and through deliverance from every earthly fetter is salvation secure. In the many varieties of religious teaching the goal is ever the same, although the means prescribed for its attainment vary greatly. By the more or less complete suppression of the desires and faculties of the body, by mechanical devices, ascetic or other, for controlling the bodily passions, partial satisfaction is given to the longing for emancipation even in the course of this present life. The final goal, however, is unchanged and unchangeable, and demands the severance of the last earthly tie. This doctrine of salvation by release from earthly bonds is one of the most enduring of Hindu dogmas, because based on the deep underlying presuppositions of Indian thought.

It is further and almost of necessity allied to the equally widely held doctrine of transmigration. Salvation and rest are not attainable, in most instances at least, at once and immediately when the dissolution of the bodily frame supervenes upon death. Through a series of 'recurrent deaths' and rebirths into a new existence upon earth, when the varied fruits of merit and demerit have been fully and finally gathered, and action with its resultant effects is nullified, when *karma* ceases, only then may the goal be reached. The vista of these renewed lives, with their dreary and indefinite sameness of misery, has driven many a man to despair. To hasten their progress is all that in most instances he can hope to do; and the end, whether near or far, often appears so uncertain as to be hardly worth the struggle and endurance necessary for its attainment.

2. History and development of the doctrine. — The most definite statements with regard to the nature and character of *mukti* are to be found in the *Upaniṣad* literature, and in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja (*qq.v.*) on the *Vedānta Sūtras*.[4] These thinkers expound, with an insight and conviction that have rarely, if ever, been excelled, its philosophical content and import. The religious aspect of *mukti* and its value for the individual soul are set forth in works of a more definitely religious character and aim, especially in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), and in the popular religious literature of the sects. It is the teaching of the last, rehearsed in the ears of the people and enforced in the schools, that has made the meaning and worth of *mukti* a possession of all the Indian peoples, or at least of that overwhelming proportion of them which has come within the range and influence of Hindu thought. The difference between the two—the philosophical and the religious and popular—may be broadly stated as the difference between salvation by knowledge and salvation by faith. Moreover, in India philosophical theory is in practice always modified and coloured by religious emotion and need; and the creeds and conclusions of religion are rarely, if ever, separated from the principles and doctrines of a generally accepted metaphysic.

In the early literature of the Vedic hymns deliverance is by favour of the gods. The prayers and aspirations of the worshippers are for the most part concerned with the obtaining of earthly good, and their aim and outlook are limited to the present life. The benefits sought are those conducive to temporal well-being and enjoyment, nor is there any apparent consciousness of a need for deliverance, except in so far as it is deliverance from the adverse conditions of the present earthly existence. By the *ṛṣis* and poets, therefore, of this early age 'salvation,' so far as it was a subject of thought at all, was conceived in material, not spiritual, terms, and meant rescue from the pains and penalties of a troubled life to a state of existence more abundantly endowed with earthly goods. The future beyond the grave was not illuminated by a hope which made the present life seem valueless in comparison, nor, on the other hand, did it bear any sure deterrent prospect for the evil-doer. The desire and expectation of good for the most part found their satisfaction in worldly and material advantage. To a future existence after death, with its alternative of felicity or suffering, conditioned by righteous or unjust dealing here, little if any thought was given.

It is in the *Upaniṣads* and the philosophical systems based upon them that the Hindu conception of *mukti* is most fully worked out and expounded. Their leading thought was essentially idealistic, and the only knowledge worthy of the name was in what way and under what conditions release (*mukti*) might be gained from the woes of an earthly life. This teaching, expounded with little order or system in the *Upaniṣad* treatises themselves, was later systematized in the Vedānta under the influence and guidance of Śaṅkara, and became the dominant conception of Hindu religious thought. Its only serious rival on the philosophical side, as an ordered theory of human life and destiny, was found in the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*); and here the difference lay rather in the means by which salvation was to be sought and attained than in the nature of the salvation itself. Invariably the end in view was escape from the world. A more profound distinction separated the philosophic doctrine of the Vedānta from the spiritual aspirations and faith of the great popular religions. In the latter a formal profession of belief and acceptance of dogma was quickened by strong emotion and a fervent longing for personal and individual communion with the deity. The adherent of the *bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*), as he pursued a different road from that of the pure Vedāntist or the convinced and life-long ascetic, so sought and won a goal, the nature of which, although it might be and was expressed in similar terms, was interpreted in an entirely different spirit. From the philosophical point of view, however, the Vedāntic doctrine has remained dominant, and has been almost universally accepted in India; and has thus, apart from external influences, Christian or other, determined and controlled the form of the

[1] *Kathās.* xxviii. 171. [2] *Ib.* xxxiv. 139. [3] *Ib.* v. 53.
[4] See also artt. Upaniṣads and Mokṣa.

eschatological thought of the great majority of Hindus.

It is not a little remarkable that no direct proof of a doctrine so comprehensive, and so intimately affecting the future state and destiny of man, appears ever to have been attempted, or the want of it to have been deplored. It is dogmatically asserted, with many repetitions and in slightly varying forms; and the contrary teaching is declared untenable, sometimes with the semblance of an attempt at logical or scientific refutation. Full and frequent exposition of the doctrine is also offered; but this always assumes a dogmatic form, and no light is thrown upon its historical development or upon the steps by which the conclusions formulated have been reached. Nor is any direct connexion made with earlier forms of belief as suggested or traced in the Vedic hymns and elsewhere. The doctrine appears complete, thought out in all its relations, and is adopted and enforced as the one tenable and sufficient view of the character and destiny of the human soul.

3. Methods of attainment of salvation.—Indian writers on *mokṣa* almost invariably seek to illuminate their subject by an illustration or an analogy; and these, far more than a rigid or logical proof, make appeal to their readers' sympathies and command their assent. The statements made, however, with regard to *mukti* converge upon the same point of view and express essentially the same thought. The principal authorities in the ancient philosophical literature besides the *Upaniṣads* are the *Vedānta Sūtras*, with the commentaries or expositions thereon, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, together with other chapters or treatises of the same tendency contained in the *Mahābhārata* (*q.v.*). The *Bhagavad-Gītā* in particular has for its leading motive the duty or propriety of so ordering present conduct as to secure future and abiding felicity, redemption from the evils of this world in submission to the will and leading of the supreme Lord. This redemption is set forth negatively and positively. A few out of many references that might be given will sufficiently indicate the character of the Indian teaching.

(1) *Mukti* is negatively release from the restraints of the body to a condition of bodiless existence, which is thenceforth unchanging and eternal.[1] The *mukta*, therefore, is not subject to rebirth or death.[2]

(2) The passions of desire and self-love, of craving for earthly objects, have ceased to exercise him; he has attained to rest of soul, and no longer fears.[3]

(3) The *mukta* is no more bound and bewildered by *avidyā* (ignorance), or fretted by consciousness of earthly things.[4]

Mokṣa or *mukti* is at times described metaphorically as a fruit, to be plucked and enjoyed.[5] Other metaphors are employed, as that of dreams, etc.[6]

False views also are combated—*e.g.*, that *mukti* may be obtained through sleep.[7] It is argued that this would imply a return to earthly conditions, but *mukti* is eternal.

Positively, however, and in its fullest expression, *mukti* is union with the supreme Brahman. This is the highest goal, the true life, when all the shadows have passed away, a blissful eternal rest untouched by sorrow and untroubled by fear. To describe this state figurative expressions are freely employed; it is perfect knowledge, supreme felicity, unrestrained freedom. The central thought, however, the background and support of all metaphor, is always that of oneness with Brahman. There is nothing beyond this to be coveted or experienced.

He whose mind is restrained attains emancipation in union with him;[8] *mokṣa* is oneness with Brahman, and is eternal;[9] release is the intuition of the highest Self consequent on the destruction of ignorance;[1] the individual soul is Brahman, or has itself in Brahman.[2]

Indian writers further expound and discuss many ways by which the one end may be reached, some negative, enjoining the disuse or destruction of modes of action and thought which cloud the insight and understanding, and hinder devotion; and some positive, which aim at quickening faith and fortifying the motives or qualities that hasten its attainment. The goal in prospect, however, is always the same; it is *yoga* in the widest acceptation of the term, the severance of all earthly bonds in permanent union with the one and only Lord. In the philosophical idealism of the Vedānta this union is represented as in fact already existent; it is not a hardly-won achievement, a goal to be reached by endeavour, neither is it in the strict sense a union at all. *Mukti* is the lifting of the veil of ignorance, which conceals from the soul the truth that it is and always has been one with Brahman. Where there is only one and not another, there can be no union, no coming together of two parties. In the realization of this identity *mokṣa* consists, and the road thereto lies not through something done or accomplished, but through knowledge and the removal of the delusive cloud of ignorance.

There are, however, to the Vedāntist himself subsidiary and less secure methods by which the desired end may be attained, some more ready and effectual than others, but all wearisome and difficult to the soul compared with the direct way of revelation and knowledge. The more noteworthy of these urge the abandonment of all action, thereby to break the bonds of *karma* and secure the cessation of all attachment or desire. Works performed without desire (*tṛṣṇā*, 'thirst') are valueless, and do not forge fresh links in the otherwise endless unrolling chain of *karma*.[3]

A second and much-frequented path lies through renunciation (*q.v.*), the voluntary setting aside of the cares and claims of the world, and adoption of a life of entire devotion to spiritual aims and thoughts, either as a *brahmachārin*, or a hermit in the recesses of the forest, or in other ways.[4] Such ascetic devotion and self-denial are means of very considerable efficacy for the attainment of redemption, and are often commended as an honourable and sure, if long and exacting, way to success;[5] perfection is by renunciation.[6] Not seldom this is set forth polemically; the exact performance of the Vedic ritual and the study of Vedic books are no real means to salvation.[7] It is allowed, however, that these, and especially sacrifice to the gods, are in a less degree efficient for securing deliverance.[8]

By concentration of thought also and meditation (*samādhi* [*q.v.*]) the soul is led to Brahman and achieves its deliverance from bondage to the world;[9] a man should practise meditation until he is free;[10] *samādhi* is the condition of release from worldly fetters.[11]

The perfect way, the path chosen by the wise, which supersedes all other ways, is through knowledge.

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1 Cf. *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 4, IV. 15. 2 *Bhag.-Gītā*, ii. 8.
3 *Anug.* xiii. 27; *Bhag.-Gītā*, ii. 59, iii. 17, xviii. 1 ff.; *Maitr. Brāh. Up.* vi. 25.
4 *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 1, ii. 12, II. i. 15, iii. 19.
5 *Ib.* IV. iv. 1. 6 *Ib.* IV. iv. 13 f.
7 *Ib.* III. ii. 10, IV. iv. 17.
8 *Inst. of Viṣṇu*, xcvii. 14; *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 4.
9 *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 13, ii. 12.

1 *Vedānta Sūtras*, II. i. 14. 2 *Ib.* III. ii. 37–40, iv. 52.
3 Cf. *Vedānta Sūtras*, III. i. 9, IV. i. 13, 15, not clinging to works; *Bhag.-Gītā*, xvii. 30, without expectation of fruit; *Sanats.* iv. 17.
4 *Bhag.-Gītā*, vi. 14, viii. 11 *et al.*; *Sanats.* iv. 17.
5 *Bhag.-Gītā*, vi. 13, 42, xvi. 1–7, xviii. 49.
6 *Anug.* iv. 1 ff.; *Inst. of Viṣṇu, passim*; *Maitr.* vi. 20, through the serenity of the thought he kills all actions . . . and obtains imperishable bliss.
7 E.g., *Bhag.-Gītā*, ii. 42 ff., iv. 28 ff.; *Anug.* xix. 7; *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 1. 4.
8 *Bhag.-Gītā*, xvii. 30.
9 *Ib.* viii. 10; *Vedānta Sūtras*, I. i. 1.
10 *Vedānta Sūtras*, II. iii. 38 11 *Ib.* iii. 40; Manu, iv. 258

Śvet. i. 11, when that god [Brahman] is known . . . birth and death cease; *ib.* ii. 15, he who sees the real nature of Brahman . . . is freed from all fetters; *ib.* vi. 12–15, the wise who perceive him . . . theirs is eternal happiness . . . they pass over death; *Bhag.-Gītā*, iv. 18, the man of understanding attains by knowledge to the everlasting glory; *Vedānta Sūtras*, i. 1. 3 f., release follows upon the knowledge of Brahman; iv. 22, etc.; i. 1. 1, the cognition of Brahman is that which effects final release.

In the later and more popular religious literature the chief exponent of these conflicting views of redemption is Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. There are put into his mouth strong and urgent appeals for devotion, self-consecration to the one divine Lord, that in union with him deliverance and rest may be found; and, on the other hand, doctrinal expositions of the Vedāntic theory of redemption through knowledge alone, delivered with apparently as urgent and sincere conviction as though no other means of salvation existed or were conceivable. Both doctrines seem to be recognized as orthodox, and equally effective for salvation.

Historically also it is through the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the popular poems of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*q.v.*) that these thoughts and conceptions of final deliverance have permeated the minds of the Indian peoples, and become a constant part of their accepted philosophy of life. It is with reason that the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has been termed the New Testament of all thoughtful Hindus. Similar teaching has everywhere been popularized and enforced in the vernacular songs and epics, recited in the village assemblies, and taught in the village schools. Philosophically at least Hindu thought is remarkably consentient and harmonious with regard to the ultimate destiny of the soul delivered from the bondage of evil.

4. Nature of final mukti.—The protagonists of the two great schools of Hindu eschatological belief as it concerns the nature and means of ultimate redemption are Śaṅkara, to whom the elaboration and completion of idealistic Vedāntic doctrine are due, and Rāmānuja, the champion of an intimate and personal theism. These two influential teachers in their commentaries on the *Vedānta Sūtras* interpreted the same text in entirely different ways;[1] and the controversy between them turned mainly upon the question of the character and quality of redemption, and the means by which it was to be attained. The philosophical and religious thought of India has been practically determined upon these lines, upon the basis of what may be termed idealistic and theistic teaching respectively, by these leaders and the disciples who followed them. To Śaṅkara, the exponent of the strictest Vedānta, redemption, which was only loosely and inaccurately described as union with Brahman, was not something to be achieved or won, a step forward in a progressive gain or accretion; it was not a new fact, superadded upon the existing facts of experience and life. It was in the fullest sense a revelation, an opening of the eyes, an awakened consciousness of a real fact which had always been there, but veiled from the mind by apathy and ignorance. *Mukti*, therefore, was arrived at through knowledge, the sweeping aside of the delusive veil of *avidyā*. It was not an actual addition to the sum of human possessions and enjoyments, a new fact breaking forth where nothing had been before, but the removal of a barrier and the entering into the secure realization of a permanent and inalienable truth. It is not easy to formulate the Vedāntic conception of *mukti* without employing categories and terms that inevitably suggest personality and its assumed qualities or attributes. To the consistent Vedāntist 'personality' was meaningless; the term had no force, and conveyed no idea that was capable of being contained within the four corners of his scheme of philosophy. 'I am thou,' 'thou art that' (*i.e.* Brahman), *tat tvam asi*; Brahman and the individual soul of man (*ātman*) were one and the same, and neither was an individual at all in any ordinary or intelligible sense of the word. *Mokṣa*, or *mukti*, was essentially the apprehension of this fact.

[1] See *SBE* xxxiv. [1890], xxxviii. [1896], xlviii. [1904], where the respective commentaries are translated and elucidated.

There were thus two chief methods of attainment or lines of approach—the ideal or metaphysical, by the way of knowledge, and the theistic and practical, by the way of *bhakti*, faith and love; in each case the end was the same, *mukti*, deliverance from this evil world, achieved not within it by redemption from sin, but by passing beyond it, so as to be no longer within its bounds or subject to its control. It was in this regard that the so-called popular religions, which were all theistic, found themselves in strongest contrast to the metaphysics of the Vedānta. For the most part the belief of the popular faiths has accepted the interpretation of Rāmānuja, and while honouring Śaṅkara has found his doctrine too abstract and uninspiring to satisfy the needs of daily life. Union with Brahman was still the end, the *terminus ad quem*; but it was defined as a goal to be reached by endeavour, not a present and persistent fact to be realized; and the consummated union was such as did not imply the loss of individual self-consciousness or life. In neither case, therefore, was there 'absorption,' in any real or interpretable meaning of the word. That could not be 'absorbed' which was already one with the divine. And in the belief of the adherents of Rāmānuja, or of any one of the numerous successors who accepted his teaching, the soul, when it entered into the bliss of union with its Lord, was not effaced or 'absorbed' in an unconscious identity, but maintained its self-knowledge and capacity, and enjoyed the fruit of its faith and endeavour in unending felicity. With varying degrees of apprehension and detail the religious thought of the Hindus, apart from the bare and unfruitful philosophical theory, holds on to this view of future deliverance, and craves a union with the divine, the essential element of which is not the cessation or destruction of consciousness and personality, but their maintenance, purification, and exaltation.

Practically, therefore, by the Hindus as a whole, both of the north and of the south, the stress is laid upon *bhakti*, not upon any abstract doctrine of the Vedānta. The latter is accepted for argumentative or controversial purposes by those—and they are numerous in India—who have an interest in these things. The real faith as regards the future, upon which a man falls back in circumstances of distress or need, is not an intellectual conclusion of abstract reasoning, but an emotional impulse and conviction of the heart. Apart from the influence of modern sceptical thought, which in India has been neither penetrating nor far-reaching, the belief of the great majority of the Hindu people is neither atheist nor agnostic, but represents a sure and convinced theism.

The third and admittedly subordinate and inferior method was that of works (*karma-mārga*, *karma-kāṇḍa*). For those who were incapable of proceeding by the way of faith or knowledge the less sure way of works was open, and by sacrifice and toil, energy and perseverance, they might finally attain salvation (*mukti*). It was consistently maintained, however, that this was a secondary, tedious, and not always effective road to the end in view. By some its efficacy was altogether denied. Others assigned to it a preliminary or introductory place in the scheme of redemption, claiming that it afforded guidance at the beginning of the journey,

but could not conduct to the goal. For this the enlightenment of knowledge or faith was needed. The weary traveller and seeker after rest must add to his works a further achievement of thought or will, and according to the school to whose teaching he lent his ear must trust or know. His future then was secure, and *mukti* already virtually won.

How far these doctrines and theories exercised a really practical influence upon the lives of the theorists or of those whom they taught it is not easy to determine. Probably they always remained to a considerable extent theoretical, accepted like the Vedānta teaching as a whole as a matter of belief, but modifying little the course of daily habit and life. Certainly throughout Indian history, as far as it is possible to trace the hopes and ideas of the great majority of the people, it has been present, not future, deliverance that has occupied their thoughts. *Mukti* has been negative, from the oppressive fear and malign power of the demons, not positive, to a future state of felicity; and immediate deliverance from the grasp of the jealous and ever-present evil powers was that for which men sacrificed and prayed. Demonolatry, sorcery, magic, and the countless charms upon which the common people rested their faith must at all times as now have craved and demanded a deliverance that should be at once effective, not with promise for the future only, but with performance in the present. The nature-worship of both earlier and more recent times has regard to immediate and sensible needs, and pays little heed to the possibilities of a remote future.

In the modern reform movements—the Brāhma Samāj, Sadhāraṇa Samāj (*qq.v.*), and others—the conception of deliverance or salvation, as formulated in the Indian classics, has been modified by Christian influence. The Ārya Samāj (*q.v.*), indeed, stands apart. It is strongly imitative, but consciously and intentionally anti-Christian, and to an even greater extent anti-foreign. The general type of belief and doctrine maintained by the earlier reformers, as by those of preceding centuries, was confessedly eclectic. In regard to the doctrine of *mukti* the ancient Indian faith which found expression in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, and the teaching of the NT, more especially the words and example of Christ Himself, were combined in a profession of faith which, except in the denial of the divinity of our Lord, was hardly distinguishable from Christian formulas. Practically, however, the tendency was always, as in more recent periods in the West, to lay stress on present duty and service, on an altruism which accentuated the need of immediate physical relief, and to ignore the prospects and conditions of the future, at least so far as they might be supposed to serve as incentives to action in the present. In this service and in devotion to the wellbeing of their fellow-men the Ārya Samāj have led the way. Theoretically, however, the purpose of all was the same, viz. to secure for man union with the divine. With Vedāntic thought they were at variance, in that salvation, whatever its terms, was to them a matter of future attainment, not of immediate intellectual recognition of an existing fact. Thus conceived and defined, *mukti*, as a consciously desired goal, came to be more remote and shadowy, as the urgency of present need increased. The doctrine of the abiding felicity of the future in union with God was indeed maintained as a hope, passionately clung to by the more mystical and devout souls; but for the most part men sought the satisfaction of their religious cravings in the discharge of present duty as it appeared to be set before them within the circle of their sect or caste, or in rarer cases as determined by the appeal of the suffering or need of their fellow-men.

The reformers also accepted and emphasized the ancient Hindu belief, practically universal in spite of philosophical dogma, in the permanence of the individual life. The doctrine of absorption, regarded as implying future and final unconsciousness and the cessation of individual being, although theoretically maintained, has never effectively modified or controlled Hindu faith. Partly under the influence of Christianity it was now set aside in favour of a redemption which was definite, personal, and abiding. The future promised a felicity with God, in which the individual according to his merits would or might have a conscious and abiding part.

5. Comparison with other faiths.—The Hindu doctrine, in what it teaches, in the facts of experience which it ignores, and in the difficulties of reason and thought over which it lightly passes, challenges comparison with the teaching of other faiths, especially with Christianity and with some forms of Buddhism. With both these creeds Hinduism in the days of its greatest plasticity and receptiveness was in long and intimate contact; and it would have been strange if no traces of the mutual intercourse remained. The inference may be accepted; but sufficient evidence is not available to indicate with certainty the doctrines or elements of belief derived from a foreign source. The fundamental thought of *bhakti*, with regard to which the claim of Christian indebtedness has been more often and confidently made than with regard to any other Hindu doctrine or practice, is certainly of Indian origin, and served as a religious motive in India long before Christianity entered the country. In its development and progress it may have owed much to Christian teaching and example. From the first, however, salvation through *bhakti* has laid greater stress upon emotion, upon feeling, and the play of the affections, than Christianity, at least in its more restrained and orthodox forms, has done. The duty or claims of faith and works, when recognized at all, have been relegated to an altogether subordinate position.

The relation of the *mukti* doctrine to Buddhism is more uncertain. It is indeed only with the Mahāyāna teaching that comparison is profitable, or mutual accommodation of doctrine through mutual intercourse may seem to have been possible. For in the Hīnayāna the thought of salvation won as the reward of individual insight and achievement, through and in the monastic career alone, is in every respect by way of contrast to the Hindu; even if the same end is sought, the method and means by which deliverance is to be gained are entirely divergent. Of the Mahāyāna doctrine it might not unfairly be said that together with the *bhakti* teaching of Hinduism it is more nearly akin to Christian principle and thought on this subject than any of the other faiths of the world. The difference is to be found rather in the stress laid upon different aspects or elements of the doctrine than in the general or essential character of the respective teaching. The Mahāyāna doctrine emphasizes the necessity and omnipotence of faith to a degree that is strange to Hindu thought. By mere faith in Amida the greatest sinner is delivered from the power and penalty of his sins, and secures entrance into the heaven of eternal bliss. The Indian affinities of this doctrine cannot be questioned. But in its evolution as a doctrine of faith and trust in a living and personal Saviour it has gone far beyond any indigenous teaching of the land whence it came. It is difficult to resist the impression that, where there is so much in common between the *bhakti-mārga* and the Christian and Mahāyāna creeds, there have been also mutual intercourse and discussion that have led to the adoption of elements of belief, perhaps on more sides than one.

In two respects, however, the contrast between the doctrines taught by these three systems is sufficiently great, between Christianity on the one hand, and Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism on the other, to be worthy of notice. Christianity emphasizes and has always emphasized the necessity of moral reformation and effort, if salvation is to be attained; it is by the grace of God, but by grace which co-operates with human endeavour. The element of strain and search on man's part is not wholly absent from this form of Buddhism or from the teaching of Hindu preachers and reformers; but it has, as it were, never taken effect. The ordinary and orthodox attitude is that of passivity, in which the part played by the man himself is reduced to the vanishing point; and there is an entire lack of moral urgency or impulse, or of any conception of need of moral regeneration of character. This may well be deemed the

most important and far-reaching distinction. It is not, however, confined to this one doctrine. It underlies all the thought of East and West, and of Christianity as estimating and encountering rival systems and creeds. The doctrine of salvation in Hinduism is essentially colourless as regards any ethical requirement or necessity.

In another respect also neither Hinduism nor Buddhism has made any approximation to the Christian belief. The Hindu doctrine in particular relegates the attainment of salvation to a distant and uncertain future. It has not formulated, and on its premisses it was hardly possible that it should formulate, a doctrine of present and immediate deliverance from the strain and distress of life, or from the thraldom of evil. Only at the close of a series of rebirths and travail in this world is deliverance achieved. Then, when the power of *karma* is exhausted, and no more fruit of deeds remains to be gathered, the end is reached as it were automatically, *mukti* is the attained and inevitable goal. But the way is hard and long, and not all have the courage and good fortune to persevere through successive births, and by zeal and devotion and good works to hasten the desired end.[1] Salvation is from the power and grip of *karma* to a union with the divine, when there will be no further rebirth to the servitude and misery of a life on earth—or, as the Hindu teaching would prefer to express it, no more 'recurrent death' (*punarmṛityu*)—but in its place a changeless passionless immortality (*amṛitatvam*).

A reminder, however, must be given in conclusion that among the millions who call themselves Hindus it is hardly possible to assert a definitely consistent or unified belief on any theme. Hinduism is almost the last system in the world to possess a clear-cut and stable doctrine. Modifications due to temperament, education, and environment will be found on every hand. Essentially the doctrines above described may be said to represent the convictions of all thoughtful Hindus, and to form the basis of all formulated creed or belief with regard to relief from the burden of the present and final salvation. Moreover, in their application to the hard realities of daily life, and in practical realization of their force and efficacy as a rule or motive of conduct, there will be, as might be expected, almost infinite variation in individual instances. To the majority of the people ultimate *mukti* is a thing too remote to be a controlling factor in their thoughts or lives. At the best it is a theory to which they render a more or less convinced and intellectual assent. The prospect and possibilities of the immediate future make sufficient demands upon their thought and care. To the successive æons of a more distant future and a *saṁsāra* which holds them in its relentless grasp they pay little practical heed.

LITERATURE.—Reference is made to the subject of *mukti* in all books on Hindu religion or philosophy, but no special treatise is available. Cf. P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, tr. A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906; R. W. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*, London, 1915; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*[3], tr. J. Wood, do. 1891; N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915. For the *bhakti* doctrine see esp. art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA.

A. S. GEDEN.

SALVATION (Iranian).—The idea of 'salvation' may be considered in reference either to the individual or to the community, or indeed to the whole race. In the former acceptance there is nothing in the Avestan system to correspond to the Indian concept of liberation from a succession of rebirths by final extinction or absorption, as not only in Buddhism, but also in other Hindu systems. The Mazdean ideal is quite simple and singularly like the Christian—the delivery from evil, moral and physical, in this life and the securing of eternal happiness in a conscious individual life of bliss after death. Man is helped to the attainment of this consummation by the revelation of the Good Law of Ahura Mazda and is invited to choose between the service of the supreme deity and that of his enemy, Angra Mainyu, the spirit of evil. Man is endowed with free will and thus has the power and responsibility of the choice. By good thoughts, good words, and good deeds (*humata, hūkhta, hvarshta*), a constantly repeated formula, he acquires merits during his lifetime here and thereby takes his share in the perennial warfare between the good and evil spirits. If he yields to the seductions of evil and indulges in evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds (*duzhmata, duzhūkhta, duzhvarshta*), he becomes an enemy of Ahura Mazda and a follower of the *druj*, acquiring demerits for the future. After death there occurs what has been termed a 'spiritual book-keeping'—the soul of the deceased has to face a judgment before the three spirits, Mithra, Rashnu, and Sraosha (personifications of truth, justice, and obedience), and this takes the form of a 'weighing' of merits and demerits.[1] The preponderance of good or evil merits determines the safe passage of the 'Chinvat Bridge' ('the Bridge of Separation'), and the entrance of the soul into Ahura Mazda's heaven, Garō-nmāna—in other words, its eternal salvation. It would appear that we have here a somewhat awkward syncretism of two concepts—that of a regular trial by weighing (as in Egypt) and that of a mythological bridge-test, afterwards borrowed in the Muhammadan Al-Sīrat. In any case the soul's salvation and eternal bliss are worked out by its conduct here below in obedience to the Good Law of Ahura as revealed by his prophet Zarathushtra. There is, of course, no idea at all corresponding to the Christian idea of atonement, or the apprehension of the merits of a Saviour, as is found even in some forms of Buddhism. The post-Avestan doctrine is substantially the same, but more precise views are set forth in the Pahlavi treatises on the subject of merit (*kerfak*), and at least in one treatise there is mention of a treasury (*ganj*) of merits accruing from divine worship, which is placed in the hands of the *yazads*, or celestial spirits, who can confer it on the souls of the just.[2] Spiegel thinks that this concept is of Semitic origin. On the whole, then, the Mazdean doctrine is that each man works out his own salvation, though under the guidance of divine revelation and with the powerful spiritual aids of Ahura Mazda and his hierarchy of spirits, and of the teachings and examples of Zarathushtra and his followers.

When we turn to the question of the salvation of the world, or of humanity at large, we are met with the figure of a future saviour or saviours to come at the end of the world. The word 'Saoshyant' (Pahlavi Soshyōs or Soshyāns) is the future participle of the verb *su* or *sav*, 'to benefit,' 'do good,' 'save,' which is temptingly reminiscent of the Greek verb *σάω*, whose future participle *σώσοντ-* is practically identical in form. Now this word can be used both as a common noun and in the plural as well as in the singular: thus in the *Gāthās* Zoroaster and his fellow-workers are denominated *saoshyantō*, 'saviours.' But, used as a proper noun in the Later Avesta and in Pahlavi literature, it indicates specifically the three last great prophets, who are to be miraculously born of the seed of Zarathushtra,[3] and who are to reign

[1] Cf. Mt 7[14], *στενὴ ἡ πύλη καὶ τεθλιμμένη ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ ἀπάγουσα εἰς τὴν ζωήν*, which some have thought to be an echo of Buddhist teaching.

[1] For a fuller discussion of the whole scene see J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, pp. 164–177.

[2] *Shāyast lā-Shāyast*, viii. 4, in *SBE* v. [1880].

[3] An ingenious attempt to 'rationalize' the grotesque story of the manner of these miraculous conceptions and births as

each at the end of a millennium (counting from the end of the millennium of Zarathushtra himself). They are named respectively Ukhshyat-ereta, (Pahl. Hōshedar), Ukhshyat-nemah (Pahl. Hōshedarmāh), and Astvat-ereta, who is *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the Saoshyant or 'Messiah' to whom Mazdeans still look forward (the title Sōshyōs alone has survived in Pahlavi, with no individual name). It is this last saviour who is to preside, according to the detailed accounts of the Pahlavi *Bahman-Yasht* and the *Būndahishn*,[1] at the resurrection of the dead and the regeneration of mankind (*tanū-i pasīn*, the Avestan *frasho-kereti*), followed by the great flood of molten metal, which is not only to destroy but to purify the creation. It is he, too, who is to prepare, after a great sacrifice of the mystic ox, the ambrosia (*hūsh*) which is to render mankind immortal. According to some authorities, this *ἀποκατάστασις* is to extend even to hell and the wicked therein:

'Praise to Him, the merciful Lord who maketh the final Retribution, and who at the end shall deliver even the wicked from Hell and restore the whole creation in purity.'[2]

As to the end of the evil spirit, Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) himself, the Pahlavi theologians are not in agreement. Some seem to have believed in his total annihilation. The Muhammadan treatise *Ulamā-i Islam*[3] quotes five different opinions concerning the final end of evil.

LITERATURE.—The ordinary translations of the Avesta and treatises on Mazdeism by F. Spiegel (*Eranische Alterthumskunde*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1871–78, *Die arische Periode*, do. 1881); C. de Harlez (*Des Origines du Zoroastrisme*, Paris, 1879); A. V. Williams Jackson ('Die iranische Religion,' in *GIrP* ii. [1904] 612 ff.); N. Söderblom (*La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, tr. J. de Coussanges, Paris, 1901); J. H. Moulton, (*The Treasure of the Magi*, London, 1917); M. N. Dhalla (*Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914). For Pahlavi (Sasanian) theology specially see L. C. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884, Eng. tr. *The Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids*, by Firoz Jamaspji Dastur, Bombay, 1889.

L. C. CASARTELLI.

SALVATION (Jewish).—I. *SIGNIFICATION OF THE TERM.*—Judaism has no equivalent for 'salvation' used theologically, unless we are to see a very rare example of such usage in the phrase *teshu'ah ve-hazalah* in Maimonides' *Yād.*[4] Redemption from sin here, and deliverance from its consequences hereafter, is an idea which occupies a large place in Jewish theology; but there is no word that succinctly and exactly expresses either side of it, certainly no word that expresses it in its entirety. The Rabbinical writers know such a phrase as *nekiyuth meavon*, or, more briefly, *nekiyuth* ('purification from sin' or 'purification'). For the second aspect of the idea there is no word or phrase. The sacramentalism attaching to the English term is foreign to Jewish thought. Redemption, according to Judaism, is no mysterious or supernatural process, but essentially simple and straightforward. The divine grace plays a certain part in it, but the chief part, by common consent, is performed by the man himself. In the case of sin—and all men are sinners in various degree—expiation by repentance and suffering is the condition precedent to acceptance by God; and, if that essential condition is satisfied, forgiveness and reconciliation follow as a matter of course. No superhuman ally is needed by the atoning soul. The forces in the sinner's own breast suffice. If they are marshalled in their full strength, they are all-powerful; if they are insufficiently used, or not used at all, nothing avails. The divine grace is freely given, not to supersede, but to aid and crown the sinner's repentance. Salvation, then, is a simpler affair for the Jew than it is for the Christian—simpler because less recondite; but it is less simple, too, in the sense of being less automatic. The Jew trusts to the reformed life as the one trustworthy means of making his peace with God and his conscience. At one of the most impressive moments in the service on the New Year Festival and on the Day of Atonement—the most solemn occasions in the Jewish year—there comes the characteristic cry, 'Repentance, prayer, and righteousness avert the evil decree.' For the Jew contrition, supplication, and, more important still, the contrite life suffice for salvation. Thus it is that the word itself seems somewhat strange to the Jewish mind. The Jew does not anxiously ask himself, 'Am I saved?', as though the matter called for profound heart-searchings. They are superfluous, seeing that, as the means of salvation are obvious and within a man's own control, there can be no doubt about his spiritual state either one way or the other. Rather he will ask himself, 'Am I worthy? Am I genuinely penitent?' Moreover, salvation, in its eschatological sense of deliverance from punishment or assurance of eternal life hereafter, means less to the Jew than to some others. This is because the hereafter generally bulks less in his thoughts. Not, however, because his belief in futurity is less strong, but because it is less dominant. The next world fills a smaller space in his mind because of the larger space occupied by this world. He has his work to do here—work at once mundane and heavenly—and this immediate duty keeps him from thinking mainly about the hereafter. He divides his attention equally between both worlds. This life, with all its strenuous, health-giving activities, is good—good in itself and also in its quality as a preparation for the life to come.[1] It is, according to Rabbinic doctrine, man's one sure chance of justifying himself, of redeeming himself, in God's sight. So he must take this life and make it as good as he can. If he is to be 'saved' hereafter, he must save himself here—save himself by living the worldly life in worthy fashion, by interpreting it in terms of the divine, and energetically giving effect to the interpretation. Thus it is that, while the idea of salvation is in the thoughts and heart of the Jew, the word is never on his lips. He believes in a blissful realm 'beyond these voices,' but he knows that his one hope of entering it lies in his helping to win from those voices their underlying music, to found a Kingdom of God on earth. This is his immediate business and, therefore, his chief concern and preoccupation.

1. **In OT.**—The word 'salvation,' however, occurs frequently in the English version of the OT. The Hebrew terms so translated are *yesha'*, *yeshuah*, and *teshu'ah*. Like the English word, these terms have various meanings. They, and the verbal forms connected with them, stand for 'help,' for deliverance from distress or peril of some kind, particularly from enemies (Ps 18^2 34^6, Is 33^2, Jer 14^8, 1 S 4^3); they are also used to denote rescue from death (Ps 6^5 68^{20}) and from sin (Ezk 36^{29}, Ps 51^{14}). The deliverance is sometimes wrought by earthly means (Ps 33^{17} 'An horse is a vain thing for safety'; cf. Pr 21^{31}), more frequently by superhuman agencies. The Hebrew terms further stand for victory (1 S 14^{45}, 2 S 19^2 23^{10}, 2 K 5^1; probably the cry rendered 'Save now' in Ps 118^{25} should be rendered 'Give victory'; it voiced the presentiment of the Maccabæan

[1] See art. LIFE AND DEATH (Jewish).

allegories of the teachings of the Prophet concerning *humata*, *nūkhta*, and *hvarshta* (see above) by a Parsi scholar, Aerpat Meherjibhai Palanji Madan (*Actes du douzième Congrès international des Orientalistes, Rome, 1899*, Florence, 1901, i. 213–224), does not seem to have met with any acceptance either from his co-religionists or from Western scholars.

[1] Both translated by E. W. West in *SBE* v.

[2] *Dīnkarṭ*, ed. Peshotan, Bombay, 1874–1917, ii. ch. 81, § 6.

[3] Tr. J. A. Vullers, *Fragmente über die Religion des Zoroaster*, Bonn, 1831, p. 67.

[4] *Hil. Teshūbāh*, iii. 4.

triumph). They variously connote the victory (α) of God (Is $45^{22ff.}$ $51^{6.8}$), (β) of Israel, his redemption from captivity, the fulfilment of his mission and the conquest of the Gentiles (Is 45^{17} 49^{6} 60^{18}, Ps 14^{7} $98^{1ff.}$), and (γ) of God and Israel together (Is $60^{10ff.}$). In Second Isaiah, indeed, the two are identical. The salvation of Israel is always a vindication of God, the redemption of the elect people always the redemption of the divine promise (cf. $51^{4ff.}$ $56^{1ff.}$). Nor is the promised salvation limited to Israel; it extends to 'the ends of the earth'; but knowledge of the true God, submission to Him, a confession of His kingdom and righteousness, are the conditions precedent (Is $45^{22ff.}$). Thus the Hebrew terms acquire not only a universalistic, but also a spiritual significance. In Is 56 God's 'salvation' is declared to be near, and among its manifestations is the union of 'the strangers' to the Lord. They are to minister unto Him, to love His name, and to be His servants; them He will bring to His holy mountain and make joyful in His house of prayer, which is to be called a house of prayer for all peoples. The worship of the true God, with the inner regeneration which it betokens, is an element of the redemption itself as well as its essential preliminary. And prominent among the instruments of that redemption is Israel; the radiance of His own life is to light the path of regeneration for others: 'I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth' (49^{6}). The Hebrew terms are also used eschatologically. Is 25^{8}, which describes God as 'swallowing up death for ever (or in victory),' is possibly a reference to the Resurrection (the next chapter plainly alludes to it)—certainly a formulation of the doctrine of last things. The word used to characterize this miraculous event is 'salvation': 'And it shall be said in that day, Lo, this is our God; we have waited for him, and he will save us . . . we will be glad and rejoice in his salvation' (v.[9]). But the dividing line between the worldly and the spiritual salvation is necessarily faint and indefinite. God's salvation, just because it is His, must, from the very facts of the case, touch the spirit, though outwardly and directly it affects the temporal life. It implies a recognition of God, homage to Him as the Redeemer; it implies a deepened faith and a changed heart. And this higher connotation of the term is not restricted to eschatological passages; it is to be met with in utterances dealing with the present world-order. Thus one Psalmist (Ps 25^{5}) can pray: 'Lead me in thy truth, and teach me: for thou art the God of my salvation; on thee do I wait all the day.' Another can cry: 'Mine eyes fail for thy salvation, and for thy righteous word' (119^{123}). In these passages salvation almost certainly means the higher deliverance which is wrought by the illumination of the spirit and the invigoration of the will. In other words, men are helped and saved through the divine truth; they are saved from themselves and for God (cf. Ps $27^{9ff.}$).

2. In Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha.—In the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical writings the usage corresponds in most of its variations with that in the OT (cf. Wis 16^{7}, Jth 9^{11}, 1 Mac 4^{30}). But the eschatological signification becomes more pronounced. Thus in *Enoch* the repentant sinners are saved, delivered from punishment, 'in those days,' *i.e.* at the Last Judgment (50^{3}; cf. *4 Ezr.* 6^{25} 7^{96} ^{121} 9^{7}, where the just are saved 'either because of their works or their faith'; *Ps. Sol.* 18^{6}).

3. In Talmudic literature.—In the Talmudic literature deliverance, or salvation, is one of the boons associated with the Messianic order. The Messiah is specifically styled *Gō'ēl*, the 'Redeemer' or 'Saviour.'[1] He was to save not only Israel but humanity.

'The Messiah,' says J. Klausner,[2] 'was to be both king and saviour. He was not only to overthrow the enemies of the Jewish people, to restore the kingdom, and to rebuild the Temple, but also to set free all mankind from idolatry, to proclaim the glory of the one God throughout the world, and to destroy sin out of the earth.'

The Talmudic connotations of the term may be conveniently gathered from the Prayer Book, in which the equivalent word for 'salvation' denotes deliverance from earthly ills, but more often is used eschatologically. In one paragraph of the *'Amīdhah* (the prayer recited 'standing,' sometimes called the 'Eighteen Blessings') the salvation asked for is health;[3] but in another paragraph it expresses the belief in the Resurrection,[4] and in yet another the Messianic hope.[5] In at least one instance it seems to have a spiritual connotation; on Sabbaths and festivals a prayer[6] is offered for such higher blessings as sanctification through the Commandment (*mitzvah*) and the inner purity of sincere service, and with these there is associated the further boon of joy in the divine 'salvation,' to which the context warrants us in attaching a spiritual significance. The hope of salvation in the Messianic time expresses itself with especial force and clearness in certain services of the Synagogue. One example is the service held on Saturday night at the close of the Sabbath; it includes a string of Prophetic utterances containing the promise of national redemption—*e.g.*, Is $12^{2ff.}$: 'Behold, God is my salvation; I will trust, and not be afraid. . . . Therefore with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation.' And the climax of the service is reached in the rite of *habhdālāh*,[7] which is a thanksgiving for the 'separation' of the Sabbath from the workaday week and of Israel from the Gentiles. The rite is introduced, at private worship, by other Messianic verses from the OT, and also by a prayer for the coming of Elijah the precursor (see Mal 4^{5}). The cup of wine used in the ceremony is styled 'the cup of salvation' (see Ps 116^{13}). At least equally notable is the fact that a special day, the seventh day of the Feast of Tabernacles, has been set apart by the Synagogue in honour, so to speak, of the idea of salvation. On that festival, as the Mishnah records,[8] a circuit of the altar in the Temple was made daily to the sound of the trumpet (*shōphār*), the worshippers carrying their palms and repeating the cry, 'Save now, I beseech thee,' in Ps 118^{25}. The cry in the Hebrew original is *Hoshiāh-nā*, which was abbreviated into *Hosha'nā* (the 'Hosanna' of Mt 21^{9}). On the seventh day there were seven circuits, and hence the day came to be known as *Hosha'nā Rabbāh*, 'the Great Hosannā.' The salvation asked for seems to have been, specifically, the salvation of the soil from drought—the season in which the Tabernacles falls being that of the autumn rains, of which the willow of the brook bound up with the palm (cf. Lv 23^{40}), and on this occasion decking the altar, was regarded as the symbol. In course of time an extended significance was given to the Great Hosanna Day. The circuits were taken over by the Synagogue from the Temple, and in the accompanying prayers (called *hosha'noth* from *hosanna*, their refrain) other boons besides rain, the general fertility of the earth, and the physical well-being of man and beast, were asked for—Israel's final ingathering, *e.g.*, the advent of the Messiah, and the restoration of Jerusalem; and they were asked for all the

[1] Midr. *Rabbāh* to Ru 2^{14}; cf. *The Authorised Daily Prayer Book*[9], London, 1914, p. 44; the usage is based on Is 59^{20}.
[2] *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten*, Berlin, 1904.
[3] *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*[9], p. 47.
[4] *Ib.* p. 45.
[5] P. 49; cf. p. 282.
[6] P. 117.
[7] See *Berākhōth*, 33*a*.
[8] *Sukkāh*, iv. 5.

more passionately because the land was lost and the people scattered. The Great Hosanna (originally only the 'Seventh Day of the Willow,' as the Talmud styles it) had meanwhile, probably because Tabernacles was regarded as a Day of Judgment for the Fruits,[1] become a day of penitence, a faint reminiscence and revival of the recent Day of Atonement, and a supplementary and final effort after reconciliation with God. The additional boon of the divine forgiveness and salvation was accordingly added to the blessings invoked, and the following prayer, with others of a like tenor, was included in the service: 'O God, like sheep we all have gone astray. From out Thy book wipe not our name away. Save! O Save!'[2] The penitential character of the day (especially emphasized in the Spanish liturgy) is recognizable in all the orthodox Prayer Books. At the final point of the service the palm is laid aside, but the willow is retained, the worshipper beating off its leaves to the cry, 'A voice bringeth good tidings' (cf. Is 52[7]), and then follows a prayer for the Messianic redemption, and for the spiritual 'waters that satisfy the thirsty soul' (cf. Ps 107[9]).

Thus salvation, attaining its highest and most personal significance, becomes a synonym for redemption from sin and its consequences. As was to be expected, the term is used largely in this sense in the liturgy for the Day of Atonement, the day of the divine salvation.[3] There the cry is for spiritual redemption, for escape from the effects and the very bondage of sin, for the creation of the new and the higher man: 'We have done wickedly, therefore we are not saved; but do Thou put it into our hearts to forsake the way of wickedness, and hasten our salvation.'[4] The utterance is typical. The worshipper's renunciation of the way of wickedness, his restoration to the divine fellowship, constitute his salvation, and the divine help is to hasten it.

II. *ATTAINMENT OF SALVATION.*—Understanding 'salvation' to mean moral and spiritual redemption here or hereafter, let us now consider how, and by whom, it may be attained according to Jewish teaching.

1. OT teaching.—In the OT and the Apocrypha the chief, practically the sole, way to divine acceptance lies through obedience and, in the case of sin, through repentance: 'What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul'; and, further, 'The Lord shall scatter you among the nations . . . and there ye shall serve gods, the work of men's hands . . . But if from thence thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with all thy soul' (Dt 10^{12} $4^{27ff.}$). These typical utterances might be multiplied indefinitely. Here and there we come upon pregnant sentences briefly summarizing the essentials of the acceptable life. There is, *e.g.*, Ps 15, with its list of prerequisites for him who would abide in God's tabernacle, dwell in His holy hill. The catalogue is almost exclusively ethical; it includes such virtues as truthfulness and sincerity, the avoidance of detraction and usury, and of wrongdoing generally to one's neighbour. Micah (6^8) has a yet shorter formula: 'What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' These utterances are sublime because of their very simplicity. Beside them the tangled schemes of salvation propounded by later theologians seem forced and artificial. Equally simple are the prescriptions for achieving redemption from sin. Nothing is finer, or more characteristic of the Prophetic teaching on this point, than the exhortation of Hosea ($14^{1f.}$): 'O Israel, return unto the Lord thy God; for thou hast fallen by thine iniquity. Take with you words, and return unto the Lord: say unto him, Take away all iniquity, and accept that which is good (in us)'; upon which follows (v.$^{4f.}$) the saving promise: 'I will heal their backsliding, I will love them freely. . . . I will be as the dew unto Israel.' But the repentance must be whole-hearted, not merely lip service or outward show. God refuses to hear the man whose hands are stained with blood, and the sinner must rend his heart and not his garments if he is really to turn unto God (Is 1^{16}, Jl 2^{12}).

2. Apocrypha.—The OT is echoed by the Apocrypha. The one way of salvation is service, obedience to the Commandment or the Law (God 'hath mercy on them that accept the Law, and that diligently seek after his statutes' [Sir 18^{14}, according to Kautzsch's reading; cf. 35^{16} Eng. RV and *4 Ezr.* $7^{72f.}$ $9^{32ff.}$]). Repentance, too, must be real, finding its expression in amendment: 'Return unto the Lord, and forsake the sin' (Sir 17^{25}). Sometimes faith is postulated as the avenue to acceptance (cf. *4 Ezr.* 9^7), but exceptionally; the chief stress is laid upon works. In an utterance reproduced by the Talmud[1] Ben Sira says ($34^{25f.}$): 'He that washeth himself after touching a dead body, and toucheth it again, what profit hath he in his washing? Even so a man fasting for his sins, and going again, and doing the same; who will listen to his prayer?' In like manner, according to Wis 1^1 $5^{2ff.}$, the divine criterion of human merit is 'righteousness,' *i.e.* morality touched by religion, which, in the case of the Jew, becomes obedience to the law or the 'discipline.' They that 'take their fill of lawlessness are consumed'; they are 'amazed at the marvel of God's salvation' wrought for the righteous, who 'live for ever and receive the diadem of beauty from the Lord's hand' ($5^{2.\ 7.\ 15f.}$). And righteousness is to know God and to love men (12^{19} 15^3). But even for the sinner there is acceptance if he repents, and God so accepts him because He loves all His creatures and cannot hate any of them: 'Thou sparest all things, because they are thine . . . for thine incorruptible spirit is in all things' (11^{26} 12^1; cf. Ps 119^{94}). The thought that man is God's handiwork, akin to Him, moreover, through the soul, moves the divine heart to compassion and forgiveness (cf. Is $64^{8f.}$). The *Psalms of Solomon*, though a product of a different school of religious thought, contain similar doctrine: 'Faithful is the Lord to them that love him in truth, to them that walk in the righteousness of his commandments, in the law which he commanded us that we might live'; and the singer praises God for having accepted his repentance, for having saved him and not appointed him for destruction with sinners ($14^{1f.}$ 16^5). In *4 Ezra* God declares that 'few shall be saved'; but Ezra invokes the divine rectitude and goodness as a plea for mercy towards 'them that have no store of good works' ($8^{1.\ 3.\ 36}$). Thus the Commandment, or the Law, takes high rank in the Apocrypha among the essentials of the acceptable life. It is the Law that nerves the Maccabees for their desperate and glorious conflict with the Greeks (1 Mac 2^{27} etc.).

3. Talmud and Midrash.—(*a*) *The Law.*—The Law enjoys no less estimation in the Talmud and the Midrashim. The *Tôrāh* is the one 'way of life' here and hereafter,[2] the corrective to the

[1] Cf. *Mishnāh R. Hashānāh*, i. 2.
[2] *Service of the Synagogue*, iv., *Tabernacles*, ed. Davis and Adler, London, 1908, p. 178.
[3] Cf. Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 27^1.
[4] *Service of the Synagogue*, ii., *Atonement Eve*, London, 1904, p. 46.

[1] *Ta'ānith*, 16*a*.
[2] *Shab.* 30*a*, Midr. *Rabbāh* to Lv 23^{24}; Philo (*de Vita Mosis*,

evil impulse, the antidote to sin, the source and the guarantee of all moral and spiritual good.[1] In a striking passage the Rabbis, commenting on the words (Jer 16[11]), 'They have forsaken me and have not kept my law,' picture God as saying, 'Would that they had forsaken Me, but kept My Law!' But how is it possible to keep the Law while forsaking God? The answer is that, if they had occupied themselves with the Law, it would have led them back to God.[2] The study of the *Tôrāh* is a saving influence—the idea fills a large place in the Rabbinic doctrine. The Mishnāh[3] gives a catalogue of good actions of which the usufruct is secured in this world, but which are stored up by way of capital, or substance, for enjoyment in the world to come—*e.g.*, filial reverence, visiting the sick, dowering the bride, and peacemaking—and it ends by adding that 'the study of the Law is equal to them all.' What does the phrase mean? Does it mean study only? Was the man of evil life who pondered the *Tôrāh* (*i.e.* the whole body of religious lore) day and night automatically guaranteed salvation according to the Rabbinic teaching? The entire Talmud and its allied literature refute the notion. Again and again with '*Tôrāh*' the phrase 'good deeds' is joined, to show that religious study and meditation are not enough, that the guarantee of salvation, though it may be obtained through them, is something higher, something essentially independent of them, and is to be looked for in the obedient and devout life. The final aim of knowledge (*i.e.* of the Law), say the Rabbis, is repentance and good deeds, and God is described as saying, 'Keep my *Tôrāh* in thy heart, but let the fear of me also be before thine eyes; guard thy life from all sin, and purify thyself from all iniquity. Then I will be with thee.'[4] And, still more plainly and trenchantly, the Rabbis say: 'He that studies *Tôrāh* without practising it—better for him if he had never been born.'[5] Weber[6] cites some of these passages, but implies, in spite of them, that the Rabbinical conception of salvation is essentially mechanical. The Psalmists, he remembers, also have high praise for the Law (cf. esp. Ps 119), but on their lips the Law means something more than the written word, something wider and higher. For the Rabbis, on the contrary, the *Tôrāh* is Law pure and simple, and as such they extol it. The distinction is false, as will have been seen. Sometimes, it is true, the *Tôrāh*, or even the study of the *Tôrāh*, stands alone in Talmud and Midrash as the *summum bonum*, as containing all the promise and potency of salvation. But that the thought underlying such utterances is larger than the literal meaning is proved by the quotations just given, and by the spirit of the Talmudic doctrine generally. And this repeated insistence upon the importance of the Law becomes intelligible when it is remembered that, for the Rabbis, the *Tôrāh*, used in the wider sense above indicated, contained all the knowledge and the inspiration needed by the Jew for attaining to the good life. Through study of the Word, and of the teachings which provide its explanation and complement, that saving knowledge and inspiration could most certainly be acquired; but they were useless unless they were translated into action. The very phrase 'to study the Law' was often used in a larger sense, and included obedience to it; and every morning the devout Jew prays for help in his endeavour to understand the *Tôrāh* and lovingly to fulfil it.[7] The ardour of the Jewish fathers for the *Tôrāh* was no more mechanical, and no less worthy, than is the zeal of the good Christian who diligently searches the Scriptures for the guidance and illumination which are essential to right living. Unquestionably part of the charm of the *Tôrāh* for the Jew was, and is, the very fact of its being law, though not in the mechanical sense imagined by Weber. For the Jew the *Tôrāh* is law understood as the supreme commandment, and also as discipline. It contains definite, concrete rules, which it is his greatest delight to perform, seeing that they have come from God. 'The joy of the Commandment (*mitzvah*)' is a familiar Rabbinic expression,[1] and the joy was not only real, but also spiritual, springing not from the consciousness of a merely automatic obedience, but from the thought of being at one, through obedience, with the Divine Master. Through the joy of the Commandment, the Talmud explicitly declares,[2] the Divine Presence is brought down and abides; and this joy, a mediæval teacher adds, is even more pleasing to God than the obedience.[3] 'To do the will of the Father in heaven' is an equally familiar phrase of the Rabbis; for that a man should make himself light as an eagle, swift as a hart, strong as a lion.[4] For obedience to the divine commands gives to life all its real meaning and savour. The *Tôrāh*, moreover, was law in the sense of a saving discipline. The Jew saw this, and the thought gladdened him. How low might he not have fallen, to what debasing bondage might he not have been reduced, but for that corrective and exalting influence! He might have been an idolater, a thief, a sensualist—a slave, in short, to his worst self. 'There goes John Bunyan but for the grace of God!'—the saying has its parallel in the utterance of Rabbi Joseph on Pentecost, the Feast of the Law: 'But for this day I might have been some low man in the street.'[5] The *Tôrāh* saved him from that degradation. 'I will walk at liberty,' says the Psalmist (Ps 119[45]), 'for I have sought thy precepts'; and 'He only is free who gives himself to the *Tôrāh*,' taught the Rabbis in their turn.[6] 'They that busy themselves with *Tôrāh* and deeds of love,' they say elsewhere,[7] 'are the masters of their lives; they are free from the yoke of sin, from sorrow, from oppression, from death.' The *Tôrāh* is the guarantee of salvation both here and hereafter. Greater than sacrifice, which procures only earthly life, it secures the heavenly life also.[8] For, when a man passes hence, none of his possessions goes with him, neither silver, nor gold, nor precious stones, but only *Tôrāh* and good works; they alone hearten him and plead for him.[9] In this world, too, their power is tremendous. 'He that accepts one single commandment in perfect faith deserves that the Holy Spirit should rest upon him,'[10] and still more definitely Maimonides declares that to fulfil only one of the 613 precepts of the *Tôrāh* for the love of God is to be worthy of eternal life.[11] In fine, the *Tôrāh*, according to the Rabbinic conception, is at once the base and the crown of the good life. Its acquisition is the seal of the moral and spiritual perfection which has been already attained by the quest of it. This thought is set forth in a striking passage[12] in which various qualifications, covering almost the entire domain of human excellence, are enumerated as

ed. Mangey, ii. 7) speaks of the 'incomparable' Law, and Josephus (*c. Apion.* ii. 22) deems the loss of all material treasures unimportant as long as the 'eternal Law' remains.

1 *Qid.* 30*b*.
2 Jer. *Ḥagîgâh*, 76*c*.
3 *Peah*, i. 1.
4 *Berâkhôth*, 17*a*.
5 *Sifra* to Lv 26[3].
6 *Jüdische Theologie*, p. 24.
7 Cf. *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*[9], p. 89*f*.; for the wide signification of '*Tôrāh*' see Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 117 ff.
1 Cf. *e.g. Shab.* 30*b*.
2 *Ib.*
3 Bahya ibn Ḥalwah, in *Kad Haqemah*, cited by Schechter p. 15.
4 *Âbhôth*, v. 23.
5 *Pesâḥîm*, 68*b*.
6 *Boraithâ of R. Meir*, 2.
7 '*Abôdâh Zârâh*, 5*b*.
8 *Shab.* 30*a*.
9 *Boraithâ of R. Meir*, 9.
10 *Mekhilta* to Ex 15[1].
11 Commentary on Mishn. *Makkôth*, iii. 16; see Schechter, p. 165.
12 *Boraithâ of R. Meir*, 6.

essential to that acquisition—moderation in worldly enjoyment, patience, goodness of heart, submission under tribulation, contentment, humility, love to God and man. To possess *Tôrâh* is to be assured of salvation because it guarantees the possession of the high attributes by which salvation is automatically attained.

(*b*) *Faith and belief.*—The Law, then, means practical goodness, but also faith. The sharp distinction between faith and works as the means of salvation is unknown to Judaism. This is easily understood. In a certain sense acceptance by God necessarily presupposes belief in Him. If that belief is lacking—if there is no conviction of God's saving power, no desire for it—then the very idea of salvation is excluded. Used in this sense, faith does, and must, enter into the Rabbinic scheme. 'The just shall live by his faith,' cries Habakkuk (2[4]), and this utterance a Talmudic sage cites as an epitome of the entire religion.[1] Faith, moreover, is a saving virtue; it is so fine, so courageous, when confronted with the trials and the tragedy of life, as to deserve God's best blessings. It was Abraham's faith that won for him life in this world and in the next.[2] In virtue of faith the Israelites were redeemed from Egypt;[3] they believed in the divine promise of redemption, though their misery 'shrieked against the creed.' But, as has been said, the salvation of God is obviously conditioned by faith in Him. The good life is the one saving force, according to Judaism, and the good life, also according to Judaism, is the God-inspired life. We reach the same conclusion when we think of salvation through repentance. By repentance all the Jewish teachers mean return to God. Judaism knows no other kind; the word for repentance—*t'shûbâh*—means 'return.' But to go back to God implies the possession of a God to go back to—in other words, it presupposes belief and faith in Him. Works and faith, then, are inseparably bound up together in Judaism as in every other religion. Works are the substance of the ideal life; faith is its spirit, its driving force. But farther than this it is unnecessary to go. The familiar assertion that, according to Judaism, God judges men by their lives, which are within their own control, and not by their creed, which is not, remains unquestionably true. Attempts have been made in the Jewish domain to embody the essentials of belief in a rigid scheme or formula, and they have been rashly understood as touchstones of the Jew's orthodoxy and even of his fitness for salvation. The Thirteen Articles propounded by Maimonides[4] are the best-known example. But, as all Jewish scholars agree, Maimonides' scheme was never formally accepted by the Synagogue; on the contrary, it was fiercely assailed by many great authorities, some of whom propounded alternative schemes of their own—Abba Mari (13th cent.), with his three creeds, Ḥisdai Kreskas (14th cent.), with fifteen, and Joseph Albo (15th cent.), also with three. On the other hand, Isaac Abravanel (15th cent.) scouted every attempt to frame a dogmatic scheme; every word of the *Tôrâh*, he declared, was a dogma. Nor did Maimonides himself give out his Thirteen Articles in the name of the Synagogue, though it has in a measure fathered them by permitting their inclusion in the liturgy in hymnal form.[5] He had no power to claim general authority for them. They represent his personal opinions only, and in selecting them he probably had an eye to the special religious needs and the theological controversies of his day—a remark which applies to most of the dogmatic schemes put forth by Jewish teachers at various periods. But that Maimonides thoroughly believed in the saving character of his creeds and formulated them only after profound consideration is clear from his own explicit statements.[1]

Of far greater moment is the famous passage in the Mishnâh[2] which runs as follows:

'All Israel have a share in the future life. But these have no share in it:—he who says that the dogma of the Resurrection of the Dead is not taught by the *Tôrâh* [or more broadly, according to another reading, 'he who denies the Resurrection of the Dead'], or that the *Tôrâh* has not come from God, and the "Epicurean." Rabbi Aqiba says, he also that reads external [*i.e.* heretical] books, or that uses a Scriptural verse as an incantation in order to heal a wound. Abba Saul says, he also that pronounces the Divine Name (the Tetragrammaton) as it is written.'

The Mishnâh then proceeds to supplement these categories by adding the names of certain notorious transgressors, among them Jeroboam, Ahab, King Manasseh, and Balaam. Rabbi Jehudah, however, puts in a plea for Manasseh. The importance of this passage lies in the fact that it forms part of the Mishnâh, the recognized code of the Rabbinical law, and has consequently, in so far as its uncontentious dicta are concerned, to be regarded as an authoritative utterance of the Synagogue. That it has always possessed this character is certain, and it has shaped not only the belief of orthodoxy, but its practice also. A Jew who denied, *e.g.*, the Scriptural authority of resurrection would be deemed unfit, even to-day, to hold the position either of Rabbi or of religious teacher in a rigidly orthodox congregation. The inclusion of this passage in the Mishnâh has stereotyped orthodox opinion on this particular question beyond the possibility of modification. If it had escaped the Mishnâh, and appeared merely as an *obiter dictum* of the Talmud at large, it might conceivably have gone more or less unregarded. The question arises, however, whether orthodoxy has not invested the passage with a significance which it was never meant to possess. When its various authors declared that this or that person, or category of persons, would have no share in the future life, did they mean the phrase to be taken literally, as a deliberate expression of their opinion that such person or category would be eternally lost? Were they not rather speaking loosely and rhetorically, using the formula, 'these have no share in the future life,' not in its exact eschatological sense, but merely as an arresting way of expressing their opinion of the heinousness of the offences specified? In other words, are we not at liberty to see in the formula one of those exaggerated modes of speech purposely impressive, but literally inexact, which are so dear to the Oriental mind?[3] Other Talmudic passages lend support to this suggestion. According to Jer. *Sanh.* x. 28*a*, among the 'heretical books,' the readers of which, in the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba, will have no share in the future life, are the 'books of Ben Sira.'[4] Now, Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus), far from being a heretical book in the opinion of the Talmudic doctors generally, is a work which they prize and often cite with approval.[5] How, then, could Aqiba have been speaking literally when he consigned to perdition a man who read it? Anticipating the view of a later generation of teachers,[6] he doubted whether Ecclesiasticus was a 'safe'

[1] *Makkôth*, 24*a*. [2] *Mekîlta* to Ex 14[31]. [3] *Ib.*

[4] In his commentary on Mishn. *Sanh.* x.; for the Articles see the *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*[9], p. 89 f.

[5] Cf. *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*[9], p. 2 f.

[1] Cf. his Introduction to Mishn. *Sanh.* x., end; see, on the whole subject, Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 1st ser. ch. vi.

[2] *Sanh.* x. 1.

[3] Cf. Mk 3[29]. This theory is advanced after full consideration of the parallel passage in *R. Hashânâh*, 17*a*, with its circumstantial description of the future fate of these heretics and sinners.

[4] M. Joel, *Blicke in die Religionsgeschichte*, Breslau, 1880, p. 68 ff., tries to show that 'Ben Sira' has been erroneously substituted for some other name.

[5] Cf. *e.g.* *Bâbhâ Bathrâ*, 98*b*; Jer. *Ḥagîgâh*, 77*c*.

[6] See *Sanh.* c. (100) *b*.

book, and he expressed his doubts with a certain rhetorical violence. But more than this he could not possibly have meant. Again, in *Abhôth de R. Nathan*[1] it is declared that among those who have no share in the future life are the judges of a city. The source of this dictum is to be found in the Talmud.[2] Merely because the troubles that have befallen Israel are there laid at the door of corrupt judges, therefore the judges of a city, without distinction of moral character, are excluded, for all time, from the world to come. Good and bad are classed together indiscriminately. Is it possible to understand such an utterance literally? Yet again they are declared[3] to be eternally lost who profane holy things or despise the religious feasts, and those, again, who put a fellow-man to public shame (the last category is omitted from some variants), and they are lost 'even though they possess *Tôrâh* and good deeds.' These are comparatively venial offences, and yet they are to be visited with eternal perdition. Even so conservative a writer as Bacher does not seem to think that the last-cited statement should be taken seriously; he regards it as embodying the theme of a sermon directed against the sins or heresies of the preacher's time.[4] That all such utterances should be marked by some extravagance of expression is quite intelligible, and that the Rabbis were accustomed to resort to these rhetorical devices is made clear by their language when, instead of denying, they affirm a man's chances of future life. A certain type of persons or actions is declared to merit happiness hereafter for quite inadequate reasons. 'Who,' *e.g.*, the Talmud asks, 'is worthy of the world to come?' And some of the various answers are: he that, at prayer, joins the '*Amîdhah* to the benediction for Israel's deliverance; or he that shows respect to the aged; and he that repeats Ps 145 thrice daily.[5] These exaggerations are the most familiar things in the Talmudic literature. In *Berâkhôth*, 4*b*, it is declared that he who transgresses the injunctions of the sages makes himself liable to the death penalty. But the offence against which these words are intended as a warning is the trivial one of reading the evening *sh'ma'* (Dt 6[4]) after midnight. Yet it is admitted that the right time for reading it lasts till dawn, and that the sages only desire to make the proverbial 'fence to the law,' and to keep men from transgression. Is it not clear, then, that this portentous dictum is merely a conscious exaggeration used for this specific purpose, and not a literally intended pronouncement? It is true that this loose and rhetorical use of the eschatological phrase, in both its positive and its negative forms, seems to have become more frequent in the later Talmudic period, but the fact does not exclude the possibility of its having been in vogue in the earlier times from which the Mishnâh in *Sanhedrin* is to be dated. In fact Elazar of Modin, the author of the saying in *Abhôth* above cited, which denies salvation to those who despise the festivals, belongs to those times. This passage, like the Mishnâh in *Sanhedrin*, was doubtless a polemical utterance aimed at theological opponents (mainly the Jewish Christians),[6] such fulminations being the only means of self-defence possessed by the Synagogue. But this very circumstance supports the hypothesis that these expressions were only rhetorical. The invective of rival theologians is notoriously inexact and wild; and, when the Mishnaic sages consigned their opponents to perdition, they may consciously have meant to do no more than imply that the opinions and the acts which they had in mind were a source of danger to the religion.[1]

As an eschatological statement Mishnâh *Sanh.* x. 1 must be deemed ineffective from another point of view also. There was always an obvious antidote to its sting. Maimonides[2] embodies the Mishnaic dictum in his code of Jewish law, as he was bound to do; but he is careful to add that it applies only to offenders who die impenitent. Let the sinner repent, he says, and, though his sin be a denial of the divine existence itself, he will enjoy everlasting life, 'for nothing can stand against repentance.'[3] Elsewhere[4] he seems to affirm that the attainment of moral and spiritual perfection automatically secures eternal bliss for men, the bliss being the perfection itself. Thus, according to the best Jewish teaching, there is hope for the most deep-dyed sinner, even for the worst heretics. The phrase indeed is inadequate; for Judaism has always laid less stress on the revolt of opinion than on the revolt of action. There are teachers, like Moses Mendelssohn, who go so far as to deny that Judaism has any saving truths whatever. Nowhere, said Mendelssohn, does the Bible command men to believe; it commands them to know. Punishment, in the Biblical age, began only at the point where opinion passed over into overt action; up to that point a man might think what he pleased without being chargeable with heresy.

'I recognize,' he says, 'only those as eternal truths which the human mind can comprehend and human powers verify,' and he adds: 'The divine religion brandishes no avenging sword; its power is the divine might of truth.'[5]

It follows that, according to Jewish doctrine, duly considered and properly understood, there is salvation for all. The general declaration of the Mishnâh above quoted, 'All Israel have a share in the future life,' might well stand without the subsequent qualifications.[6] But, as we shall see, for 'all Israel' there might have been substituted 'all men,' if the real heart of Judaism is to be regarded as speaking.

(*c*) *Repentance.*—We are thrown back, then, upon works as the essential condition of salvation. If they fail, there is, as already stated, repentance, *i.e.* return to God, and conversion from the evil life. Thus repentance, which K. Kohler[7] calls 'an exclusively Jewish conception,' is essentially good works; it is a change of temper issuing in the changed, the reformed, life (cf. Is 55[7], Jl 2[13], and the OT Prophets, *passim*). The Rabbis emphasize the idea. In the liturgy for New Year and the Day of Atonement, the great festivals of repentance, it is declared that 'penitence, prayer and righteousness (of which charity is the typical example) avert the evil decree.'[8] With repentance good deeds are repeatedly coupled in the

1 I. Abrahams (*Studies in Pharisaism*, p. 143) characterizes these utterances as 'theoretical metaphysics rather than practical religious teaching.' Cf. Schechter, *Studies*, 1st ser. ch. vi.

2 *Yâd; Hilc. Teshûbâh*, iii. 6 ff.

3 *Ib.* iii. 14. According to the Rabbis, God created repentance before the world, which could not otherwise have stood; cf. Midr. *Rabbâh* to Gn 1[4]; and, as Abrahams (p. 145) acutely points out, though the confession of sins on the Day of Atonement specifies offences theoretically unpardonable, the worshipper adds, 'For all these forgive us, O God of forgiveness.'

4 Introd. to Mish. *Sanh.* x.

5 Cf. his *Jerusalem*, Berlin, 1783, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1838, and his letters in M. Kayserling, *Moses Mendelssohn*, Leipzig, 1862; for his views at length see Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866–78, ii. 86 ff.

6 'The angel that keeps Gehenna,' according to the *Alphabet of R. Akiba* (Introd.), 'has no power over Israel, for he studies and fulfils the *Tôrâh*, and the love of him is for ever in God's heart.'

7 *Grundriss*, p. 187.

8 *Service of the Synagogue*, iii., *The Day of Atonement*. London, 1905. The original is in the *Tanhuma* to Gn 8[15]; cf. Jer. *Ta'anith*, 65*b*; *Sanh.* 28*a*.

1 Ed. Schechter, Vienna, 1887, p. 108.

2 By R. Elazar of Modin in *Abhôth*, iii. 11.

3 *Shab.* 139*a*.

4 *Die Agada der Tannaiten*[2], Strassburg, 1903, i. 190.

5 *Berâkhôth*, 4*b*; *Bâbhâ Bathrâ*, 10*b*; cf. *Shab.* 118*a*, where those who keep the ordinance of the 'three Sabbath meals' are promised immunity from Gehenna!

6 See J. Guttmann, in *MGWJ* xlii. [1898] 289 ff.

Rabbinic literature.[1] 'For him,' declare the Rabbis, 'who saith, "I will sin and repent," repentance availeth not.'[2] Repentance, they also say, 'makes a man a new creature';[3] if it fails to do this, it is nothing. But, when it does achieve this, it is all-powerful; it lifts the sinner to the very throne of God.[4] The sinner is to repent every day; a man's garments should be always white.[5] But, since man is forgetful of his highest interests, there are special days, the 'Ten Days of Repentance,' ear-marked for this duty and particularly favourable for its fulfilment. On those days the Divine Presence dwells among Israel.[6] Beginning with the New Year Festival, the Biblical 'Day of Blowing the Trumpets' (Lv $23^{23ff.}$), they reach their close and climax on the Fast of Atonement, the most solemn celebration of the Jewish year (the observance of the 'Day of Blowing the Trumpets' as the New Year festival is post-Exilic, according to Friedmann;[7] but the distinctive rite of the feast, and its proximity to the Day of Atonement, must have invested it with some of its present solemn and penitential character at an early date; to-day the Prayer Book for the festival shares many of the special features of the liturgy for the Day of Atonement). The traditional solemnity of the Day of Atonement, which extends back to Biblical times (Lv $16^{29f.}$), its historic associations, the mortification of body and spirit, and the withdrawal from the world, which form part of its observance, make it a peculiarly appropriate opportunity for repentance. It is also a day for the exercise of God's special grace in response to the strenuous effort after reconciliation put forth by a united Israel. It is the day of moral and spiritual salvation *par excellence*. But the sinner must aid its gracious work by his contrition. Three books, say the Rabbis, are opened on New Year's Day—one for the righteous, who are written down for life straightway, another for the wicked, who are irrevocably condemned to die, a third for the 'intermediates,' whose fate, held in abeyance until the Day of Atonement, is determined by the quality of their repentance.[8] According to another view, repentance atones for small sins; but for the expiation of more serious offences the Day of Atonement is also needed.[9] But there are limits even to the Day's great power. Without repentance it is ineffective, and, if the worshipper trusts to it alone to bring him absolution automatically, the Day avails him nothing.[10] Moreover, before the sinner can make his peace with Heaven, he must make it with his brother.[11] Apart from these admirable reservations, the austerities of the Day have an inherent value as an aid to reconciliation. Fasting takes the place of the ancient sin-offering, and the 'affliction of the soul' is an acceptable offering in God's eyes; He will regard the fat and blood lost by the fasting worshipper as though it were laid upon the altar.[12]

(*d*) *Asceticism and tribulation.*—Further, there are certain aids to salvation which, joined to amendment, may increase its effectiveness. Among these are the ascetic life, tribulation, and 'the merit of the fathers.' The first is held in especial favour by the mystical school. Thus Bahya ibn Pakudah (11th cent.) writes that he who prefers death in God's service to life in revolt from Him, poverty to riches for His sake, sickness to health, suffering to well-being, and who submits himself joyfully to the divine decrees, is fitted to receive the beatitude which God, in His love and grace, hath stored up in the future world.[1] But asceticism as a means of reconciliation with God is not the exclusive prescription of any one school. Penances for sin are a familiar feature in Jewish teaching and practice; the Rabbinical writings contain many references to them and even prescribe them in detail, their severity being proportionate to the nature of the offence.[2] Tribulation, too, is an aid to expiation, and opens the way to heaven.[3] To go for long without tribulation is to arouse doubts as to one's certainty of eternal life, to justify a man's fear that he is getting his reward here instead of hereafter.[4] 'If,' say the Rabbis, 'thou desirest life, hope for affliction.'[5] But, if tribulation atones, death, the supreme visitation, necessarily does so. In this respect it is the mightier of the two; it absolves when affliction and repentance together are powerless.[6] Death, say the Rabbis,[7] expiates every sin, blasphemy alone excepted—an utterance which, taken alone, would stretch the scheme of salvation almost to the widest possible limits.

(*e*) *Imputed merit.*—A potent aid to salvation, in the case of Israel, is the merit of the fathers—an idea which has played a larger part in the literature of the Jew than in his life. The excellences of the three patriarchs (those of the matriarchs also, though this idea is far less emphasized), and indeed of all the righteous Israelites of the past, are supposed to be thrown into a common stock for the benefit of their people, collectively and individually, in every age. The salvation which the Jew might possibly not attain in virtue of his own life may be assured to him by the merit of the righteous dead. Even as a living vine is supported by a lifeless prop, and is thereby kept verdant and flourishing, so the living Israel is upheld by the virtues of the fathers who sleep in the dust.[8] 'I am black, but comely,' says Israel with Ca 1^{5}—'black because of my own actions, comely because of the acts of the fathers.'[9] The germ of the idea is Biblical. Moses, interceding for his people, appeals, in arrest of judgment, to the righteousness of the patriarchs, God's 'servants' (Ex 32^{13}; cf. Lv 26^{42}), though the chief stress is laid on God's covenant with them rather than on their virtues. The Rabbis, however, see in Moses' intercession an appeal to ancestral merit, and expound his appeal in the following parable:

> There was once a king, with whom his friend deposited a string of ten pearls. The friend died, leaving one daughter, whom the king then married, giving her as a bridal gift a string of ten pearls of his own. In course of time she lost the gift, and the king threatened to divorce her. Her nearest friend interceded on her behalf. 'Why divorce her?', he pleaded, 'hast thou forgotten the pearls which her father deposited with thee? Take them and make good thy loss.' And the king consented. So, when Israel sinned in the matter of the Golden Calf, and God would have cast them off, Moses makes intercession for them. 'Why,' he asks, 'wouldst thou cast off thy people?' 'Because,' God answers, 'they have broken my Ten Commandments.' 'Remember,' Moses answers, 'the ten temptations that Father Abraham withstood, and let them atone for Israel's ten sins.'[10]

This idea of ancestral merit, M. Lazarus rightly says,[11] is specifically Jewish. The merit of the fathers, in Jewish teaching, unlike the Atonement

[1] Cf. *e.g. Abhôth*, iv. 17: 'Better an hour of repentance and good deeds in this world than all the life of the world to come.'
[2] Mishn. *Yômâ*, viii. 9.
[3] *Pesiqtâ Rabbathi*, 160*a*, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1880; cf. 2 Co 5^{17}.
[4] *Yômâ*, 86*a*. [5] *Shab.* 153*a*, in allusion to Ec 9^{8}.
[6] *Pesiqtâ R.* 156*b*. [7] *JQR* i. [1889] 67.
[8] *R. Hashânâh*, 16*b*; later teaching extended the time of grace to the Great Hosannâ.
[9] Mishn. *Yômâ*, viii. 9.
[10] Tos. *Yômâ*, iv. 10; Mishn. *Yômâ*, viii. 9. [11] *Ib.*
[12] Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 25^{3}; *Berâkhôth*, 17*a*. These ideas are woven into the liturgy; cf. *Service of the Synagogue*, iii., *The Day of Atonement*, p. 224 ff.

[1] *Hoboth Halebaboth*, ch. iv., ed. M. E. Stern, Vienna, 1856, p. 239; cf. *Reshith Hokhmâh* (16th cent.), ch. vi. end. The Introduction to the *Roqeah* (12th cent.), another work of the mystical school, contains similar doctrine.
[2] See the *Hûc. Teshûbâh* appended to the Introduction to the *Roqeah*. [3] *Berâkhôth*, 5*a*; *Yômâ*, 86*a*.
[4] *Erahin*, 16*b*, 17*a*. [5] Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 16^{11}.
[6] *Sifrê* to Nu 15^{31}; *Hagigâh*, 9*a*. [7] *Sifrê*, *loc. cit.*
[8] Midr. *Rabbâh* to Ex 32^{13}. [9] *Ib.* to the verse.
[10] *Ib.* to Ex 32^{18}.
[11] *The Ethics of Judaism*, Philadelphia, 1901-02, ii. 289.

in Christianity, does not depend for its efficacy upon the self-immolation of its possessors. The fathers do not deliberately sacrifice themselves for the salvation either of posterity or of their own generation. They may be quite unconscious of the expiatory value of their goodness. What is supposed to happen is a transfer, under God's grace, of that goodness to the credit side of other men's moral account. But, just as probably the belief in the Atonement has seldom weakened any Christian's sense of personal responsibility for his sins, so the thought of imputed virtue has seldom lessened a Jew's desire for personal virtue, or his effort to attain it. The Rabbis make it clear, indeed, that the merit of the fathers is of no avail unless part, at least, of the virtues of the fathers is transmitted with it, and the Jew is expressly warned against saying, 'My father was righteous; I shall be saved for his sake'; Abraham did not save Ishmael.[1] God, moreover, as S. Levy points out,[2] credits the virtues of the fathers to the children as a token of His love; it is an act of divine grace which no man can claim as a right, or count upon as certain to be exercised. On the other hand, the divine grace is operative when ancestral merit is not available,[3] and yet, as we have seen, the good life, equally with the divine grace, is an essential condition of salvation. It is true, then, to say that, great as is the place which the theory of ancestral merit fills in Jewish teaching, its influence upon Jewish conduct has been very small. The Jew has prayed fervently for the exercise of the divine forgiveness on the ground of the virtues of the fathers; but all the time he has felt, and known, that his moral salvation was, in the last resort, mainly, if not exclusively, dependent upon himself.[4]

The 'fathers' whose merit is thus imputed are not exclusively those who lived in the remote past; they may have lived and died recently. The son of a righteous man gets the benefit of his father's rectitude, which directly transmits to him gifts like beauty, wisdom, and longevity, but also aids him indirectly by increasing his worth in the sight of God.[5] These expiatory offices of the righteous may be exercised even during their lifetime by their prayers and even by their very existence. Their merit avails to redeem the whole world; their lives may redeem it, and so may their death.[6] The importance attached to this imputed merit is exemplified by the choice of the story of the sacrificial 'binding' of Isaac (Gn $22^{1ff.}$) as the lesson read on the New Year festival. On that day the prayer is offered:

'As Abraham overcame his compassion in order implicitly to do thy will, so may thy compassion overcome thine anger against us.'[7]

In some Jewish liturgies, indeed, Gn 22 is set down for recital every day in the course of the morning service. But the Prayer Book is full of the general idea. In the *'Amīdhah*, one of the oldest and most important constituents of the liturgy, God is described as remembering the pious deeds of the patriarchs, and as bringing a redeemer to their children's children;[8] and the passage is typical of many similar utterances. The seven circuits of the synagogue, made by the palm-bearers on the Great Hosannā (see above), are associated with the three patriarchs together with Moses, Aaron, Phinehas, and David, whose virtues are invoked as a plea for the divine salvation.[9]

[1] Midr. to Ps 46^{3}. [2] *Original Virtue*, p. 23.
[3] Midr. *Rabbāh* to Lv 89^{6}.
[4] Cf. Schechter, *Aspects*, p. 170.
[5] *Eduyōth*, ii. 9; *Yebhāmōth*, 64*a*.
[6] *Sukkāh*, 45*a*; *Moēd Qaton*, 28*a*; Eleazar, the martyr of the Maccabæan age, prays when dying that his soul may be accepted in substitution for the souls of his people; cf. 4 Mac 6^{29}.
[7] Cf. *Authorised Prayer Book*[2], p. 250. [8] *Ib.* p. 44.
[9] Cf. *Derekh Eres Zutā*, i., where the seven are specified as those who made a 'covenant' with God. In some liturgies Joseph is substituted for Phinehas.

The doctrine of imputed virtue has still wider implications. The good deeds not only of the righteous but also of the average man are placed to the credit of the general account. The world, say the Rabbis, is made up of righteous men and sinners; it is the divine will that they shall live together in a united society so that the righteous may absolve the sinners. When this happens, God is truly exalted.[1] In like manner Maimonides says that it behoves a man to regard himself as partly innocent and partly guilty, and with himself the world at large. If he does one good deed, he inclines himself and the whole world on the side of merit, and obtains 'salvation' and deliverance for himself and for his fellow-men.[2] According to a beautiful Talmudic idea, if there are no righteous men in a generation, it is saved by the children in the school-house.[3] This vicarious power is not, and should not be, merely automatic. The Jewish moralists exhort their readers to strive after the salvation of others, to seek, by precept and example, 'to lead the sinner gently heavenwards.'[4] As to salvation hereafter, that, too, may be aided by the action of the living. A godly son, by his very godliness, may win eternal rest for his parent.[5] Hence the superstitious idea which ascribes the same effect to the recital of the *Qaddish*[6] by orphans; for the fervent 'Amens' of the righteous deliver sinners from Gehenna.[7] Intercessory prayer for the dead is not unknown to the Synagogue; but no example of a 'fixed' prayer of this kind is to be found during the first ten centuries of the Christian era.[8]

(*f*) *Mediation.* — Here the question of the Jewish attitude to mediation as an aid to redemption presents itself. Salvation through a mediator is not an idea alien to Judaism. Intercessory prayer is a familiar feature in Jewish history, Biblical and post-Biblical. What is alien to Judaism is the idea that salvation is possible through a mediator alone, that it may be automatic, that faith in the mediator may avail without repentance or good works.[9] Equally foreign to Judaism is the idea that invocation may properly be made to the mediator. So to invoke him is to associate divine or semi-divine beings with God, and in effect to limit His power, seeing that He is supposed to need the intercession of others to move His justice or His mercy. It is also to limit the sonship of man, to deprive him of his right of going straight to the Father with his wants and his prayers. It is true that invocations of angels have found a place here and there in the Jewish Prayer Book, though not in the statutory portions of it, but their inclusion has been due chiefly to the influence of the mystics, and representative authority has consistently opposed it.[10] That salvation is of God alone is, it need hardly be said, a reiterated Biblical doctrine (cf. Hos 13^{4}, Dt 32^{39}, Is 12^{2} 43^{11}, Jon 2^{9}, Ps 3^{8} etc.). Hence the idea of the merit of the fathers, as a means of salvation for their descendants, has not gone unchallenged in Judaism. Even some of the

[1] Midr. *Rabbāh* to Lv 23^{40}.
[2] *Hilc. Teshūbāh*, iii. 4.
[3] *Shab.* 33*b*. Merit, indeed, may be fully retro-active; the living may be saved by those yet to be born. Thus Noah is said to have owed his deliverance from the Flood to the goodness of his descendants; cf. Midr. *Rabbāh* to Gn 6^{8}.
[4] Introduction to the *Rogeah*.
[5] *Sanh.* 104*a*; *T. de b. Eliyahū*, ii. 12, end; Abraham bar Hiyah (c. 1100), however, strenuously rejects the idea; see his *Sepher Hegyon Ha-hephesh*, Leipzig, 1860, p. 32*a*.
[6] *Authorised Prayer Book*[2], p. 77.
[7] *Yalqūt Shimōni* to Is 26^{2}.
[8] Cf. Schechter, *Aspects*, p. 198.
[9] On the difference between Judaism and Christianity thus suggested see F. Delitzsch's remark quoted in a footnote in *JQR* xvi. [1904] 212.
[10] Cf., *e.g.*, Maimonides' Commentary on *Sanh.* x. 1.

'almudic Rabbis contested it.[1] According to one pinion, God's grace was extended to the Israelites as a reward for their refusing to rely upon ancestral merit when pleading for pardon.[2] There were Rabbis also who held that the merit of the fathers, operative once, was efficacious no longer, and they busied themselves about the precise date on which it lost its saving force.[3] But all teachers alike maintain that the one external saving power is the divine grace. In the *'Amīdhah* the Jew pleads not only the merits of the fathers, but also God's 'Name,' *i.e.* His reputation, His bond with himself, as a ground for salvation.[4] On the other hand, the theory of imputed virtue has, for its necessary correlative, the idea of imputed sin. The iniquity of the fathers is visited upon the children, especially if the children perpetuate that iniquity.[5] But, as a rule, the transmission of the responsibility for ancestral transgression is limited to the sin of Adam, which brought death into the world and increased liability to suffering. The poison with which the serpent infected Eve was transmitted to her descendants; but the *Tôrāh* is its antidote.[6] Moreover, the transgression of the individual, like his good deeds, may affect the moral and, with it, the material well-being of his generation.[7] But let Israel be united, let them love one another, and their salvation is assured.[8]

(*g*) *Grace.*—Crowning all the means of salvation, and completing their effectiveness, is the divine mercy, which compensates for human deficiencies and supplements human merits. 'Not because of our righteous acts,' so the Jew prays daily, 'do we lay our supplications before Thee, but because of Thine abundant mercies. What are we? What is our piety? What our righteousness?'[9] In like manner, 'He who would purify himself,' say the Rabbis, 'is helped.'[10] 'If,' they also say, 'men have no merits (*i.e.* no sufficient merits), God gives them His grace; can there be greater goodness than this?'[11] The idea inspires the extemporary prayers publicly offered by various sages on days of fasting and humiliation. Thus one cries, 'O King and Father, have mercy upon us for Thine own sake';[12] and another prays, 'If we are bare of good works, deal charitably with us for the sake of the sanctification of Thy name.'[13] And the very words of these prayers, as well as their spirit, have been incorporated into the liturgy. This divine grace or mercy consists in the acceptance of repentance as the sinner's expiation.[14] In a striking passage the Rabbis speak of repentance as 'a bribe,' which God accepts for the salvation of the sinner. But He does so only in this life; at the judgment hereafter He will be swayed by stern justice only.[15]

III. *SALVATION HEREAFTER.*—Thus the complex question arises: What does salvation hereafter mean according to Judaism? What is the future reward of the just? As to the Bible, little can be said on the subject with certainty. The belief in Sheol, the region of the shades or ghosts, prevailed at an early period (cf. Gn 37^{35}), but Sheol seems to have been a colourless, almost a negative, existence, which was regarded with dread. The Psalmists pray to be delivered from it, and apparently to be delivered from it, not for extinction, but for a heavenly life of conscious spiritual beatitude more or less intense (cf. Ps $16^{10f.}$ 17^{15} 49^{15}). But such utterances are probably late, and express Jewish thought as it was moulded by external, notably by Greek, influences. On the other hand, there is the story of the translation of Enoch (Gn 5^{24}), who 'walked with God, and he was not; for God took him.' Does this necessarily mean extinction, a preferable alternative to Sheol, as the reward of the patriarch's righteousness? 'God,' says the Psalmist (Ps 49^{15}), 'will redeem my soul from the power of Sheol; verily he will receive me,' and the Hebrew word for 'receive' is identical with that for 'took' used in the case of Enoch. Does it not seem as though the hope breathed by the poet animated the historian also? At any rate we are entitled to say that, at some period in the Biblical age, the idea, even the conviction, of a spiritual reward for the righteous hereafter was cherished by certain minds in Israel. Parallel with this conviction was the belief in a Messianic era, with which the idea of a resurrection of the dead and a last judgment was closely associated (Is $25^{8f.}$ 26^{19}, Dn $12^{2f.}$). This belief is elaborated in the Apocrypha, and is stoutly upheld by the Talmud and the Midrashim. The hope in a physical resurrection was reinforced for the Rabbis by the thought of the miraculous revivals accomplished by Biblical prophets,[1] of the germination of the seed sown in the earth,[2] and of the divine justice which, to vindicate itself, must needs judge body and soul together, united as in life.[3] Restricted at first to the righteous, the resurrection came to be regarded as universal (certain individual sinners and categories of sinners being specifically excepted, as above stated), and the dogma has for centuries past retained this character in orthodox Judaism.[4] It is embodied in the Prayer Book in many places, notably in the second benediction of the *'Amīdhah*,[5] in the burial service (where the resurrection is associated with the judgment), and in the ancient prayer, originally intended to be recited privately by the Jew on awaking in the morning, which begins, 'O my God, the soul which Thou gavest me is pure.'[6] The resurrection and the judgment were conceived of as following the advent of the Messianic era, though originally they were supposed to precede it. The dead, aroused by the sound of the trumpet, would rise and be judged; the wicked would be condemned to punishment, temporary or endless, or to extinction (opinion differed on these points), the righteous to everlasting life in paradise. The generic Talmudic name for the future life was *'Olam Habā*, 'the world to come.' It was at first applied indiscriminately to the Messianic era, the resurrection, and the life in paradise. But at an early date (probably in the 1st or 2nd cent. of the Christian era) the application of the term was limited to the last of these three stages—a practice possibly due to the increased emphasis of individual as distinguished from national hopes of salvation which was the natural consequence of the downfall of the Jewish State.[7] Thus we find a Talmudic teacher of the 3rd cent. (Rabbi Johanan) declaring that the Biblical prophets only predicted the events of the Messianic age, but, as to the *'Olam Habā*, no eye but God's hath seen it; and yet another (his contemporary Samuel) affirming that the only difference between the present world-order and the Messianic will be the destruc-

1 Cf. *Sifrē* to Dt 32^{39}. 2 *Shab.* 89b.
3 *Ib.* 55a; Jer. *Sanh.* 27*d*; Midr. *Rabbāh* to Lv 39^{6}—all cited by Schechter, *Aspects*, p. 177.
4 Cf. *Authorised Prayer Book*[9], p. 44; and S. Baer, in his *Seder 'Aboḏat Yisrael*, Rödelheim, 1868, on the passage.
5 *Sanh.* 27b.
6 Midr. *Rabbāh* to Ec 7^{13}; *'Abhōdāh Zārāh*, 22b.
7 *Qid.* 40b; *Tanḥumā* to Dt 29^{10}.
8 *Ib.*; Midr. *Rabbāh* to Gn 11^{1}; *T. de b. Eliyahū*, xxviii.
9 *Authorised Prayer Book*[9], p. 7.
10 *Yōmā*, 38b. 11 Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 72^{1}.
12 *Ta'ănith*, 25b. 13 Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 22^{2}.
14 See Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 57^{1}.
15 Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 17^{5}.

1 Midr. *Rabbāh* to Lv 27^{4}. 2 *Sanh.* 90b.
3 *Sifrē* to Dt 10^{6}; *Sanh.* 91a.
4 Cf., *e.g.*, M. H. Seligsberg, *S'dē Ḥayim*, Rödelheim, 1845, p. 219.
5 Cf. *Authorised Prayer Book*[9], p. 44 f.
6 *Ib.* p. 312, 5.
7 See *MGWJ* xli. [1897] 392 ff.; the credit for having discovered this change of usage belongs to Abraham Geiger.

tion of despotism which is to mark the latter.[1] At one and the same time, then, the Messianic age was shorn of much of its miraculous character and its joys, and the true, the ideal, *'Olam Habā* relegated to a heavenly realm which it was beyond human power to picture. This sharp differentiation of the two states of existence became the rule. The modern Jew still distinguishes in his prayers between 'the days of the Messiah' and 'the life of the *'Olam Habā*,' asking to see and taste the varying blessedness associated with each of them.[2] Concerning the nature of the heavenly bliss conflicting ideas prevailed. According to some teachers, paradise (*Gan Eden*) was an existence, even a place, of fleshly delights; according to others, its joys were purely spiritual.

'Better a single hour of blissfulness of spirit in the world to come than all the life of this world'; and again, 'The future world is not like this world; there is no eating or drinking there, no bodily pleasures, no strife or jealousy or rancour, but the righteous sit with crowns on their heads nourished by the divine splendour';[3] and Maimonides[4] declares that even the crowns in the latter passage are but a figure of speech.

There were teachers, as we have seen, who deprecated any attempt to depict the happiness of the future world, quoting in their support Is 64[4]: Men have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye seen what God hath prepared for him that waiteth for him. Maimonides himself seems to have had two minds on this subject. While in his Commentary on the Mishnāh[5] he accepted the dogma of a physical resurrection, and also wrote a special tract to vindicate the sincerity of his belief in it, he ignored it altogether in his *Yād*, and gave an exclusively spiritual interpretation of the future world.[6] But materialistic conceptions of the heavenly life were frankly avowed by certain Jewish teachers in the mediæval period, and it was the task of writers like Maimonides to make war upon their ideas. A like divergence of view prevailed with regard to future punishment. According to some writers—and they formed the majority—there is a veritable Gehenna; 'there is no hell,' say others.[7] Some teach the doctrine of eternal punishment;[8] others deny it, regarding Gehenna as a place of purgatory only.[9] This purgatory lasts twelve months, and its redemptive action is quickened by the intercession of the righteous.[10] Maimonides, in his turn, seems to reject the idea of a hell; the punishment of the evil-doer unworthy of heaven is eternal death, and this death is what is meant by the 'excision' threatened in Gn 17[14] and elsewhere in the Pentateuch.[11] Paradise, on the other hand, according to the Rabbinic teachers, is variously a place fragrant with flowers and resplendent with gold and precious stones, through which flow streams of milk, wine, and honey,[12] but more frequently it is simply a beatific state of being. Maimonides expresses the general view when he says that the reward of the just hereafter is 'bliss.'[13] Joseph Albo, in a fine passage,[14] spiritualizes the punishment as well as the reward. It lies, he says, in the torment of the soul torn by conflicting desires—by its old sinful longings which it can no longer gratify, and by its yearnings after the higher joys which it is not yet pure enough to attain. Agony such as this, he adds, far surpasses all earthly pain.

1 *Berākhōth*, 34*b*.
2 Cf. *Authorised Prayer Book*[9], pp. 74 f., 285.
3 *Abhōth*, iv. 21; *Berākhōth*, 17*a*.
4 *Hilc. Teshūbāh*, viii. 2. 5 To *Sanh.* x. 1.
6 On the other hand, in his less lofty-minded *Moreh* (iii. 27, ii. 2) he denies eternal bliss to all but the most gifted souls, whose spiritual endowments automatically guarantee that immortality. This limited outlook was contested by Ḥisdai Kreskas (*Or Adonai*, 2. 6. 1 ff.).
7 *Nedārim*, 8*b*. 8 *R. Hashānāh*, 16*b*.
9 *Eduyōth*, ii. 10; *Yalqūt Shimōni* to Mal 4[2].
10 *Ib*. 11 *Hilc. Teshūbāh*, viii. 1.
12 *Yalqūt Shimōni* to Gn 2[9]. 13 *Hilc. Teshūbāh*, viii. 1.
14 *Ikkarim*, iv. 33.

With the process of time Jewish conceptions of the hereafter have become definitely spiritual. The tendency is to look, when picturing the future life, not to a resurrection of the body, but to the bliss of the soul. The idea of resurrection is sharing the fate of the Messianic hope. Just as the modern Jew pins his faith to a Messianic age rather than to a Messianic person, so he interprets the resurrection wholly in terms of the spirit. For him salvation, both here and hereafter, means life with God—here in the quest of the higher good, hereafter in its full and certain attainment.

IV. *SALVATION OF THE GENTILES.*—Finally, there is the question of the Gentiles' chances of salvation. From an early date the belief in the universality of the divine grace existed among the Jews. The book of Jonah was written to uphold it, and it found support among the Rabbis. According to the Midrash,[1] Adam was warned that on the day he ate of the forbidden fruit he should die; but God, in His grace, interpreted the word 'day' to mean one of His own days, which lasts a thousand years (Ps 90[4]), and, so prolonging Adam's life, saved him from the punishment entailed by his sin. Adam, in this passage, stands for all humanity, and the idea of universal salvation is thus implicit in the legend. The greatest utterance of the Law, say the Talmudic sages, is 'This is the book of the generations of man; in the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him' (Gn 5[1]), which proclaims the high lineage of men, all of whom are sons of God. 'Say not, then, O man,' the sages continue, '"I am vile, and my neighbour shall be vile with me." If thou sayest so, know that thou despisest the Divine image in thee and thy neighbour.'[2] Equal, or only inferior, in rank to this verse, according to the Rabbis,[3] is the command (Lv 19[18]), 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' which declares that all men are equal in the sight of God. Consistently, then, the Rabbis see in an early *Tōrāh* (the seven Noachian precepts [*q.v.*], which prohibit idolatry, incest, homicide, blasphemy, robbery, lawlessness, and the eating of living flesh) the means of salvation ordained for the world before the birth of Israel and the revelation at Sinai.[4] In like manner the Talmud points out that the refrain, 'His mercy endureth for ever,' which occurs 26 times in Ps 136, corresponds with the same number of generations that existed before the *Tōrāh* was given, but for whom the divine grace atoned.[5] Even for such deep-dyed sinners as the generation of the Flood God waited in the hope of their repentance.[6] Nor were the Gentiles cut off from salvation after the *Tōrāh* was given; 'deeds of mercy,' declares the Talmud, 'are their sin-offering,' reconciling them with God.[7] The 70 sacrifices offered in the Temple on the Feast of Tabernacles atoned for the 70 nations.[8] A striking utterance on this subject is that of the *Pesiqtā Rabbāthi*,[9] in which God is described as judging the Gentiles mercifully by their own moral standards and equipment, and in the night, when, for the time, they have ceased from evil-doing. For 'God delighteth not in the destruction of the wicked; all men are His creatures, and what potter desireth that his vessels shall be broken?' Equally impressive is the saying, '"Peace, peace," God cries to him that is far off as well as to him that is near: "to every human being that draws nigh unto me in repentance I will come and heal him."'[10]

1 Midr. *Rabbāh* to Gn 3[8]; *Pesiqtā Rab.*, ed. Friedmann, 167*a*.
2 Jer. *Nedārim*, ix. 4; Midr. *Rabbāh* to Gn 5[4].
3 *Ib*. 4 *Sanh* 56*a*.
5 *P sāḥim*, 118*a*; *Pesiqtā R.*, ed. Friedmann, 15*b*.
6 *Sanh.* 108*a*. 7 *Pesāḥim*, 118*a*.
8 *Sukkāh*, 55*b*. 9 Ed. Friedmann, p. 167*b*.
10 Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 120[7]; cf. *Sepher Hegyon Ha-hephesh*, p. 8*a*.

Thus much as to this life. What of the future life? Here a diversity of opinion confronts us. It is exemplified in the controversy[1] between two Rabbis, one of whom denies, while the other affirms, the possibility of eternal salvation for the Gentile. A passage in the Tosefta[2] declares plainly that the righteous among the Gentiles will have a share in the *'Olam Habā*, and the saying recurs four times in Maimonides' codex.[3] Even the Mishnāh in *Sanh.* x. 1, repeatedly quoted in this article, implies the possibility of salvation for others besides the Jew. Since it specifically excludes Balaam from the future life, it would seem to follow that, as a rule, Gentiles are included. This, indeed, is the inference drawn by the Gemara in its comment on the Mishnaic text.[4] Nine, say the Rabbis elsewhere,[5] entered paradise living, among them Enoch, Eliezer, the servant of Abraham, Hiram, Ebed-melech, the Ethiopian (cf. Jer $38^{7f.}$), and Pharaoh's daughter, none of whom was an Israelite. In a notable passage in the *Yalqūt Shimōni* (to Is 26^{2}) God is described as having compassion, at the Last Judgment, upon the sinners in Israel and the righteous among the Gentiles, who are left in Gehenna, but who, with the cry of 'Amen,' acknowledge the justice of their sentence. 'It is the evil impulse,' He says, 'that has caused them to sin.' Thereupon He gives the keys of Gehenna to Michael and Gabriel, who bathe and anoint the sinners, heal them of 'the wounds of purgatory,' clothe them in fair raiment, and finally lift them to God.[6] It is also noteworthy that eternal salvation for the Gentile is preached even in times of persecution, and by those who had experienced that persecution in their own person. Thus it is not surprising to find the names of deceased Gentiles of eminence—monarchs, philosophers, and others—followed by pious ejaculations, such as 'Peace be to him!' or 'May paradise be his rest!', which are commonly associated with the mention of departed Jews.[7] In later times Jewish doctrine on this subject became more liberal still. Zunz[8] tells how a Rabbi of the 17th cent., being asked whether Christians could be saved hereafter, answered that 'God must indeed be cruel if He consigns them to perdition, seeing that they are not bound to obey the Jewish Law.' This common-sense view was virtually anticipated by the author of the *Tana de b. Eliyahū*, who exclaims, 'I call Heaven and earth to witness that, whether he be Jew or Gentile, the Divine Spirit rests upon every man if his life be worthy,'[9] and by Ḥisdai Kreskas, who declares that salvation is attained not by subscription to metaphysical dogmas, but solely by love to God fulfilling itself in action. 'That,' he adds, 'is the cardinal truth of Judaism.'[10] This is the view embodied in the latest teaching. Men like Moses Mendelssohn and H. Wessely, conservative in temper though they were, could say:

'According to the Talmudic doctrine concerning the future happiness of the righteous, the greater part of existing mankind, acknowledging as it does the principles of Revelation and the Divine Unity, is finally destined to everlasting bliss.'[11]

This view is expressed with especial emphasis and frequency with regard to Christians. They are not idolaters, and, on the other hand, they respect the laws of morality; therefore the denunciations of the Talmud do not apply to them. They are ensured the divine love here and hereafter. They are in every respect on the same level as Jews; 'they are our brothers.'[1] The famous Paris Sanhedrin, convoked by Napoleon I. in 1807, formally reiterated these teachings, and to-day they are fast embedded in the Jewish consciousness. All men, every Jew will now unhesitatingly affirm, are judged by their lives, not by their creed, and all have an equal chance of salvation. Jewish particularism no longer extends to the eschatological domain. On the contrary, since each man's fitness for eternal happiness depends upon his conformity to the standards of conduct imposed upon him by his ethical or spiritual knowledge, it is especially hard for the Jew to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. 'You only have I known of all the families of the earth: *therefore* I will visit upon you all your iniquities'—the warning of Amos (3^{2}) still holds good. The election of the Jew does not give him a larger share, or a greater assurance, of the divine grace than it gives to others; it simply increases, in his case, the difficulty of winning it. And, as to the Gentile, let him be true to his own conception of goodness, and he has in that very faithfulness the full guarantee of salvation hereafter.[2] Far from saying 'Only believe and you shall be saved,' modern Judaism says, 'In spite of not believing you shall be saved.' The Jew holds that his theism will one day be the universal religion; but he holds, too, that until that day comes the just God will not reject any of His human children, whatever their theology may be. He could not consistently hold any other view. His religion preaches the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man; and, if the sonship binds man to service of the Highest, the fatherhood binds God to forbearance and compassion when the service has been feeble and imperfect. 'I am thine, save me,' cries the Psalmist; the plea is not Jewish merely, but human, and the conviction of its validity comes from the inmost soul of Judaism.

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MORRIS JOSEPH.

SALVATION (Muslim).—Immediately after Adam and Eve fell and were banished from 'the place in which they were,' God promised them guidance—a promise which also applies to their descendants:

'Guidance shall come to you from me; whoso shall follow my guidance on them shall come no fear, neither shall they be grieved.'[3]

Thus early did God declare that some persons would be saved. Man must be willing to receive this guidance; the wicked cannot receive it.

'Many will He mislead and many guide; but none will He mislead thereby except the wicked.'[4] 'God guideth whom He will; and He best knoweth who will yield to guidance.'[5] 'When they went astray, God led their hearts astray, for God guideth not a perverse people.'[6]

1 In *Sanh.* 105*a*; cf. Midr. *Tehillim* to Ps 9^{17}.
2 *Sanh.* xiii. 2.
3 Cf., *e.g.*, *Hilc. Teshūbāh*, iii. 5; cf. also *T. de b. Eliyahū*, ii. 12, where the righteous Gentile is described as enjoying the light which will shine forth for the just both in the Messianic time and in the future world; and by the righteous Gentile is meant he who obeys the seven Noachian precepts; see also ch. xx., end.
4 Cf. *Sanh.* 105*a*. 5 *Derekh Eres Zutā*, 1.
6 Cf. *The Alphabet of R. Akiba*, letter Zain.
7 Cf. Zunz, *Zur Geschichte und Literatur*, Berlin, 1845, p. 388.
8 P. 385. 9 Ch. ix., beginning. 10 *Or Adonai*, 2. 6. 1.
11 Zunz, p. 385; cf. the fine passage in S. R. Hirsch's *Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel*, tr. B. Drachmann, New York, 1899, p. 142 ff.

1 For the authorities see Hamburger, *s.v.* 'Christian.'
2 Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*[3], pp. 154, 272, 510; C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism and Hellenism*, London, 1918, p. 122.
3 *Qur'ān*, ii. 36. 4 ii. 24. 5 xxviii. 56. 6 lxi. 5.

This offer of guidance, which leads to salvation, is made to all.

'The truth is from your Lord; let him then who will believe.'[1]

'This is no other than a warning to all creatures, to him among you who willeth to walk in a straight path: but you shall not will unless as God willeth.'[2]

God then purposes to forgive some men, *i.e.* to give them salvation.

'Thus make we our signs clear to those who consider, and God calleth to the abode of peace (paradise), and He guideth whom He will into the right way.'[3]

This is God's gift to those who believe and obey. They enter into heaven because they have fulfilled certain conditions. It is independent of any moral change in the believer. In emphasizing the idea of forgiveness the Qur'ān seems to lose sight of the fact that man is in a position from which he needs to be redeemed. Thus we read much of guidance and instruction, but little or nothing of redemption. The Qur'ān nowhere teaches that the sinner must be regenerated. According to it, man is not dead in sin; so no new birth of the Spirit is needed; but he must repent.

We shall now see how these ideas are practically worked out in Islām. Though words such as 'mercy' and 'forgiveness' are common, the word for salvation (*najāh*) is only once used in the Qur'ān:

'O my people, how is it that I bid you to salvation, but that ye bid me to the fire?'[4]

The idea which the term *najāh* conveys to the Muslim mind is that of escape from future punishment in hell. *Khalāṣ*, which means 'deliverance,' is also used in the same sense. Thus it is not so much escape from the power of sin in this life as escape from its punishment hereafter that is implied in the term 'salvation.' A mystic might look upon it as release now from ignorance of God's nature—ignorance which prevents the union of the human soul with Him—but even then it is intellectual deliverance, not moral. Muslim theologians explain what may be termed 'the way of salvation' as consisting in submission to the orders concerning the due performance of the five duties of Islām—the recital of the creed, the saying of the five stated daily prayers, fasting (especially in the month of Ramaḍān), the payment of the legal alms, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. He who does these things is in a state of salvation, though whether he will really attain to salvation he cannot say, as it depends ultimately on the arbitrary decree of God concerning him. To ensure merit all these actions must be done with the closest attention to the prescribed ritual. Muhammad is reported to have said regarding the ablutions before prayer:

'My people will be summoned at the day of judgment with foreheads, arms and feet resplendent with the effects of *wuḍū* [legal ablutions].'

The pilgrimage to Mecca is a sure means of salvation. Man is to be saved by his own works. A believer must accept without reserve the dogmas of Islām, especially those concerning the unity of God and the apostleship of Muhammad; and he perfects that faith by good works. A man who neglects good works would not be a perfect believer, but he will find salvation; for no Muslim, however wicked he may be, can be finally lost. If his intellectual belief from the Muslim standpoint is sound, his moral character is quite a secondary matter. No matter what his crimes may have been, after a period of punishment he will attain salvation, *i.e.* release from the punishment of his sin.[5] It will thus be seen that salvation does not necessarily imply a change in the moral nature. All the minute details about ceremonial purification[6] and the tedious ritual connected with the ceremonies for the removal of bodily defilement show that stress is laid on outward purification of the body rather than on moral or spiritual purity. It is true that pious men here and there speak of outward purity as being the shell of inward purity, which is the kernel; but neither the Qur'ān nor the traditions nor the books on law put forward moral purity as the essential thing. The notion rather is fostered that salvation depends on scrupulous attention to the ritual of outward purification. Again, as the joys held out to the Muslim in another life are carnal, they do not tend to elevate the moral nature in this life. Many good Muslims escape this danger by looking upon these statements as figurative expressions denoting spiritual joys. It seems doubtful whether Muhammad so intended them, and certainly his followers, except a very few, do not so understand them.

The Islāmic conception of salvation, then, is entirely legalistic; it is not a moral change in the heart now, leading a man to have power over sin to repress it, but a release in the next world from the punishment of hell, in virtue of certain good acts done in this life. It is not a becoming, but a receiving. If, however, the good deeds fall short, then, provided the intellectual assent to certain dogmas is correct, the release may be postponed, but it will come at last, and so all Muslims will be saved.

[1] xviii. 28. [2] lxxxi. 27–29. [3] x. 6. [4] xl. 44.
[5] See artt. FAITH (Muslim) and SIN (Muslim).
[6] Cf. art. PURIFICATION (Muslim).

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SALVATION (Teutonic).—To the ancient Teuton the idea of salvation applied in the first place to the getting rid of those things which to him were absolutely evil. It also meant preservation from such destruction, danger, and calamity as he expected to meet. Salvation thus meant delivery from evil spirits and from anything which they might bring about. Of evil spirits there were a great number and many kinds, such as dwarfs, giants, dragons, and kobolds. Then there were the witches and wizards, the sorcerers and the enchanters, with all their arts and incantations used for the destruction of man. These powers the old Teuton wished to be free from, or, still better, to know how to become independent of. Salvation as a state of happiness was to be achieved only by fight and honest victory, as is abundantly witnessed in the *Nibelungenlied* and in the heroic lays of the Older Edda. How closely the same ideal obtains in regard to salvation in a future existence is seen in such songs as the *Vǫluspa* and the *Lay of Vafthrudnir*, while in *Hávamál* and in the *Song of the Sun* we observe that no rest or victory of moral order can be had except on the same ground.

The dread of evil, as noticed in all the ancient Teutonic literary remains, was ever at hand, and thus those persons were considered great and real heroes of the people who understood how to combat this evil, whether it was done by craftiness and secret arts, as often in the heroic lays of the Edda, or by valour and strength, as in the Siegfried legends and in the *Beowulf*. The lesson is the same: man had to learn and to dare in order to overcome so as to save or to be saved. Many are the tales of heroes and great men who were either preserved or destroyed in such contest.

Through secret arts man could obtain influence and power even over nature itself, so that he could start storms or still the waves according to his own pleasure. The witches, at least, were expected to be able to do so. Thus all through life men had to be engaged in a constant warfare

with opposing powers, some of which were almost fathomless in strength and cunning. To those who would not fight, and did not dare to conquer, there was no future. They were stranded somewhere and lost. Thus there are hosts of departed spirits who continue as shadows only; they have no individuality. Before such souls will find rest, they will have to be driven about for ages in winds and storms and among the most forsaken places and awful situations; and, if they are saved at all, it must be through some kind of redemption, as they are unable to extricate themselves from their unhappy state.

These and similar ideas are constantly brought to the front in the Teutonic epics, folklore, and sagas, of which even the *Nibelungenlied* and the *Gudrunlied* are eloquent witnesses.

Now, while salvation or deliverance thus far spoken about refers, in the main, to this life, we also meet with ideas of salvation in the world to come, when that which will never die, 'judgment upon each one dead,' shall be pronounced,[1] for that world is reached only through the Hel-way which all men have to go.

Various are the ways to the kingdom of Death, the abode of Hel, whose habitation is Helheim under one of the roots of Yggdrasil. Her realms all must enter, but all will not have the same future. There are those who can proceed to the regions of the blessed Æsir, and those who must go to Niflheim, the place of punishment for the wicked. All must go as they came. The way of all who fell by the sword is sure to lead to Valhall, to which Odin invites those who are slain in battle. Half of that number, however, belong to Freyja, and those she receives in Folkvang, where her beautiful mansion, Sesrumner, stands. Those received by Odin himself are the great champions, or Einherjars—Odin's elect, who now will enjoy themselves more than ever with battles during the day and during the night with feasts which are held in the great refectory of Gladsheim, the palace of the Æsir. Those who had no opportunity to fall in the fight, but who by risting themselves with the spear-point as a dedication to Odin returned their souls to him, are also received by him as his friends and guests.

And there are other ways to the happy regions of the blessed—ways of peaceable virtues, which lead to salvation, though in other parts of the Æsir heaven, as in Vingolf, the mansion of bliss for noble women with the Asynjes themselves, and in Thrudvang, or Thrudheim, which is Thor's abode. Here he receives his own in his magnificent castle, Bilskirner.

Most people who were drowned are received by Ægir's wife, Ran, in her palace, which she holds open for them at the bottom of the sea, and where they are welcomed and offered 'seat and bed.'[2] Hoenir cares for those who die in tender years. Indeed, in Egil Skallagrimson's *Sonatorrek*, 20, we read of still another being called Gauta Spjalli, who in the most tender manner is similarly engaged.

The rest of mankind—workers of the peaceful arts, in the field and at home, men and women who have died during the countless ages of human history, but who did not use the sword—have, it is true, no place assigned to them in the Teutonic heaven, yet are understood to pass on and to be somewhere, anxiously awaiting the final outcome of the great strife which they know is going on.

Warriors by profession are not secured a place with Odin or Freyja, but only those who in the great trial have fought the good fight. This brings out the importance, according to Teutonic evaluation, of having preserved a good name and established a good report while in this life. On this we have the famous 76th and 77th strophes in *Hávamál*, where it says:

'Your cattle shall die; your kindred shall die; you yourself shall die; one thing I know which never dies: the fair name of him who has earned it, and the judgment upon each one dead.'

The more complete interpretation of this passage we must leave out here, but no one will venture to dispute that the main idea conveyed is that man can have no greater possession, when going from this world, than a good name, and that nothing can be of more value to him than a reputation established and known for its integrity. That will go with him to the judgment.

When a deceased person who has received good testimony leaves the Thing in the lower realms, he is brought to a home, which has been prepared for him somewhere 'in the green world of the gods.' What he then first of all has to do is to *leita kunnis*, find and visit kinsmen and friends, who have gone before him to their destination.[1] He not only finds those with whom he became personally acquainted on earth, but he may also visit and converse with ancestors from the beginning of time; and he may hear the history of his race—nay, the history of all past generations—told by persons who were eye-witnesses of the things themselves.[2] The ways he travels are *munvegar*,[3] paths of pleasure, where the wonderful regions of Urd's and Mimer's realms lie open before him—the entire past and its history.

Above the courts of the Æsirs and far away from the recesses of Hel there is yet another region of bliss, where that god dwells whom no one is as yet able to mention. His hall is called Gimle, and will become the abode of the righteous after Ragnarok, the final dissolution both of the Æsir world and of the Vanir and the race of men. Then, at 'the twilight of the gods,' the last reckoning shall be taken and judgment pronounced. This judgment all mankind and all the Æsir gods are anxiously waiting for. And it will come. Everything will be tried then, for the long strife between good and evil must finally reach a crisis. There will be a call for a great battle which will take place on the Vigrid fields. To that battle Odin will come, with his Einherjars, together with all the Æsirs; all that is good will meet on one side and all that is evil, cowardly, beastly, gruesome, and wicked will hold together on the other. The fight will be fierce and will end with the combat between the Æsir gods and the sons of Surt. The gods are vanquished; Thor and Jörmungandur, Heimdall and Loki, destroy each other. Odin is swallowed up by the Fenris wolf, which in turn is crushed by Vidar, Odin's son. This is the end of the reign of the Æsir. Then the great and mighty one appears, and he will drive all evil to Niflheim, while the good will be gathered together in the halls of Gimle, the home of eternal bliss. Valhall ceases to be Valhall; Serumner, Vingolf, and Thrudvang are no more; for all is Gimle and happiness and joy.

Gimle, however, is joined with the new-born earth—the earth which has come in place of the former one, as the new-born from the mother. Of this earth and the conditions brought with her we read in *Völuspa* as follows:

'She (the Vala) sees arise, for the second time, the earth from the deep, beauteously green, waterfalls descending; the eagle flying over, which in the fell captures fish. The Æsir meet on Ida's plain, and of the mighty earth-encircler speak, and there to memory call their mighty deeds, and the supreme god's ancient lore. There shall the wondrous golden tablets in the grass be found, which in days of old had possessed the ruler of the gods, and Fiölnir's race. Unsown shall the fields bring forth; all evil amended. Baldr shall come; Hödr and Baldr, the heavenly gods, Hropt's[4] glorious dwelling shall

[1] *Hávamál*, 77.
[2] V. Rydberg, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., ii. 422.
[1] *Sonatorrek*, 17.
[2] Rydberg, ii. 529.
[3] *Sonatorrek*, 10.
[4] Another name for Odin.

inhabit. Understand you yet or not?—A hall standing than the sun brighter, with gold bedecked, in Gimle: there shall the righteous people dwell, and for evermore happiness enjoy. Then comes the mighty one to the great judgment, the powerful from above, who rules o'er all. He shall dooms pronounce, and strifes allay, holy peace establish which shall ever be.'[1]

We believe that in this description ancient Teutonism and Christian eschatology are blended, at least to some extent, but so far no one has been able to tell which is which. The hope of final salvation is expressed, and in terms which we meet in many other of the literary remains of the Teutons. In the Younger Edda, which was composed from ancient sources by Snorra Sturlason († 1241), we read things similar to those in the *Völuspa*. Some of the ideas there presented appear more ethical and ancient than those in the Older Edda, while their form indicates a later period together with more admixtures of external elements than in the strophes just quoted. He says:

'There will be many abodes, some good and some bad. The best place will be Gimle, in heaven, and all who delight in quaffing good drink will find a great store in the hall called Brimir, which is also in the heaven in the region Okolni. There is also a fair hall of ruddy gold called Sindri, which stands on the mountains of Nida. In those halls righteous and well-minded men shall abide. . . . There will arise out of the seas another earth most lovely and verdant, with pleasant fields where the grain shall grow unsown. Vidar and Vali shall survive; neither the flood nor Surtur's fire shall harm them. They shall dwell on the plain of Ida, where Asgard formerly stood. Thither shall come the sons of Thor, Modi and Magni, bringing with them their Father's mallet Mjolnir. Baldr and Hödr shall also repair thither from their abode in Hel. There shall they sit and converse together, and call to mind their former knowledge and the perils they underwent, and the fight with the wolf Fenris and the Midgard serpent. There too shall they find in the grass those golden tablets which the Æsir once possessed:

There dwell Vidar and Vali
In the god's holy seats,
When slaked Surtur's fire is,
But Modi and Magni will Mjolnir possess
And strife put to an end.'

'Thou must know, moreover,' so the prophecy continues, 'that during the conflagration caused by Surtur's fire, a woman named Lif (Life), and a man named Lifthrasir, lie concealed in Hod-Mimir's forest. They shall feed on morning dew, and their descendants shall soon spread over the whole earth. But what thou wilt deem more wonderful is, that the sun shall have brought forth a daughter more lovely than herself, who shall go in the same track formerly trodden by her mother. And now, if thou hast any further questions to ask, I know not who can answer thee, for I never heard tell of any one who could relate what will happen in the other ages of the world. Make, therefore, the best use thou canst of what has been imparted to thee.'[2]

From the *Völuspa* we have learnt that 'the righteous people shall dwell in Gimle for ever and happiness enjoy.' It is the same view as here quoted that we meet in the *Gylfaginning*. And let us note with regard to 'Lif and Lifthrasir,' who had been kept safe in Hod-Mimir's grove even through the terrible Fimbul-winter, which immediately precedes Ragnarok and the final restoration of all things, that they symbolize the ancient Teutonic belief that the life which in time's morning developed out of chaos is not destroyed even by Surtur's flames, but rescues itself, purified, for the coming age of the world. The same human race will live again. It is not a new creation that the Teutonic people waits for as the final salvation, but a complete regeneration of all—a perfect ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων—when even Surtur himself shall be in Gimle, as we read in the Upsala codex of the *Gylfaginning:* 'best er att vera a Gimle medr Surt.'

See also artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic), STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).

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S. G. YOUNGERT.

[1] *Völuspa*, 57–64. [2] *Snorra Edda Gylfaginning*, 66 f.

SALVATION ARMY.—The Salvation Army is a religious organization of international scope which had its beginnings in England in 1865. It may be regarded as having three functions, which are closely interwoven and to be treated as one: it is (1) a mission of Christ's gospel, (2) a religious community, (3) an agency to combat poverty and vice and to further social reform. Its philanthropic and reforming activities have come about as the result of a natural evolution, and have not affected its primary object of militant evangelism, except to strengthen it. The purpose underlying all its activities is to subdue in Christ's name—not merely to teach, but to compel men everywhere to become the disciples of the Son of God.

I. *ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT.*—1. **The founder and first General.**—The founder and first General of the Salvation Army was William Booth, who was born at Nottingham in 1829. He was brought up within the Church of England, and to its early influence he attributed the fact that, although subsequently becoming a Methodist minister, he never entirely accepted some of the Nonconformist views of denominationalism.[1] At the age of fifteen, about which time he was converted, he joined the Wesleyan Methodists and, as he said later in life, decided that 'God Almighty should have all there was of William Booth.'[2] Soon afterwards he became the leader of a band of zealous young men whose methods of evangelizing their own town had a curious resemblance, on a small scale, to those adopted by the Salvation Army in later years. They worked among the poorest, utilized in some capacity those who joined them, and anticipated the Army in their aggressiveness, in their meetings for penitents, and even in their small demonstrations of rejoicing. The time was one of unrest in Wesleyan Methodism, and a Reforming element was breaking with the parent body, but the dispute bore chiefly on methods of government, and these did not greatly interest this young disciple. Nevertheless, as the result of a hasty action on the part of his superintendent minister, he became attached to the Reformers. He had already resigned his local preachership, feeling that the pulpit work allotted to him afforded too little scope for his already ardent evangelism. His minister jumped to the conclusion that he was a 'Reformer,' and cut him off from membership. The Reformers thereupon invited him to join them. This he did in 1851, and became a minister of their body at Spalding in Lincolnshire. A prospective Congregational pulpit had been offered to him, but he found himself unable to accept the Calvinistic doctrines set forth in the books recommended him for preparatory study. Although now a member of the Reforming body, he never seems to have championed their cause as against other Methodists; moreover, he saw that their organization had few elements of permanence (most of the Reformers merged themselves a few years later into what became the United Methodist Free Churches), and, after he had given careful study to the Methodist New Connexion system, he offered himself for its ministry and was accepted. The Methodist New Connexion did not differ greatly in doctrine and general usage from the Wesleyan Methodist, from which it had been the first important secession, but its Conference was constituted on a more democratic pattern, and William Booth hoped to obtain a considerable measure of freedom for the exercise of his evangelistic ambitions. He 'travelled' in its circuits until 1861, but his heart was set upon work among the classes altogether

[1] Hulda Friederichs, *The Romance of the Salvation Army* p. 2 f.
[2] G. S. Railton, *General Booth, by his first Commissioner*. p. iv.

outside the Churches. He had been greatly influenced by C. G. Finney, whose direct and personal manner helped to mould his own style of appeal, while the American evangelist's 'anxious bench' was perhaps the forerunner of the Salvation Army penitent form. William Booth himself and his wife Catherine,[1] who was becoming known as a preacher of considerable power, had remarkable results following upon their revival services. Certain influences in their Connexion, however, had crystallized against all itinerant evangelism, and at the Conference of 1861 considerable opposition was manifested to the proposal which Booth made, that he should be set apart for purely evangelistic work. A suggested compromise whereby he should retain a circuit while giving part of his time to evangelistic campaigns elsewhere he declined as unworkable, and in the end Mr. and Mrs. Booth left the Connexion. They began at once to travel in various parts of the country conducting services, which were often the means of important spiritual awakenings.

2. Beginnings in the East End of London.—Drawn at last to London, partly because of the opportunities for such work which the metropolis presented, and partly from a desire to have a settled home, William Booth 'found his destiny,' as he expressed it, among the outlying masses of the East End. He received an invitation to conduct some services in a tent which had been erected in Whitechapel, the appointed missioner having fallen ill; and, faced by these East End multitudes, he felt, as even he had never felt it before, 'the compassion for souls.' He saw focused there all the problems which arose out of a reckless and godless population, largely untouched by any civilizing or Christianizing influence, and presenting a very Niagara of poverty and vice. He thus describes his experiences:

'When I saw those masses of poor people, so many of them evidently without God or hope in the world, and found that they so readily and eagerly listened to me, following from Open-Air Meeting to tent, and accepting, in many instances, my invitation to kneel at the Saviour's feet there and then, my whole heart went out to them. I walked back to our West-End home and said to my wife:

"O Kate, I have found my destiny! These are the people for whose salvation I have been longing all these years. As I passed by the doors of the flaming gin-palaces to-night I seemed to hear a voice sounding in my ears, 'Where can you go and find such heathen as these, and where is there so great a need for your labours?' And there and then in my soul I offered myself and you and the children up to this great work. Those people shall be our people, and they shall have our God for their God."'[2]

Mrs. Booth's later account of her reply to this announcement is almost as illuminating:

'I remember the emotion that this produced in my soul. I sat gazing into the fire, and the Devil whispered to me, "This means another departure, another start in life!" The question of our support constituted a serious difficulty. Hitherto we had been able to meet our expenses out of the collections which we had made from our more respectable audiences. But it was impossible to suppose that we could do so among the poverty-stricken East-enders—we were afraid even to ask for a collection in such a locality.

Nevertheless, I did not answer discouragingly. After a momentary pause for thought and prayer, I replied, "Well, if you feel you ought to stay, stay. We have trusted the Lord *once* for our support, and we can trust Him *again*!"'

The Mission in the East End, like the Salvation Army into which it grew, was thus in the first instance to the lowest, those whom society regarded as its outcasts, the 'submerged tenth.' In an address to the Wesleyan Conference in 1880 William Booth described himself and his fellow-missioners as 'moral scavengers who netted the very sewers.'[3] 'We want all we can get, but we want the lowest of the low.' Many years afterwards he declared to Cecil Rhodes that he dreamed, day and night, of making new men out of the waste of humanity.

3. Growth of the Christian Mission.—When William Booth began his services in the East End, he had no idea of anything beyond a purely local work. It was with some difficulty that he found a suitable habitation for his Mission, and various places were occupied in turn, some of them the most unlikely, to all appearance, for such an enterprise. But his faith was justified, and by 1875, after ten years of vicissitude, trial, and contumely, the Christian Mission, as it was called, was being carried on at 32 stations, in charge of an equal number of evangelists supported out of its funds. It had extended beyond the borders of East London, to Portsmouth and Chatham among other places, largely as the result of campaigns undertaken by Mrs. Booth. Her work in the provinces prepared the way for the spread of the organization, for in every place which she visited she left a nucleus of people whom she had impressed, so that the Christian Mission had only to enter into possession. What the movement owed during those formative years, and subsequently, to 'the Mother of the Army' it is very difficult to estimate. Catherine Booth was a woman of prophetic vision, commanding eloquence, and rare intellectual power. She was the means of introducing to the Mission a new kind of leader, drawn from a different class of society, who was able to devote to the common cause a cultivated mind as well as a consecrated heart. She also helped to secure the support, or at least the sympathetic toleration, of influential people, including certain friends of all evangelical effort who were too zealous for the end in view to be antagonized by methods which undoubtedly shocked their sense of decorum. Along with her persuasive speech she had a capacity for strategy which stood the new organization in good stead. She shared to the full her husband's hope and courage, and her deeply earnest and spiritual temperament was itself a guarantee that beneath the apparent irreverences attaching to an entirely new type of evangelistic propaganda there was a thoroughly wholesome spirit. The converts of the Mission were soon to be counted by the thousand. Many of them had been reclaimed from the utmost degradation, and their testimony was extremely effective. The immediate use of the converts, to work for the salvation of others as an attestation of their own changed lives, was one of the principles by which the Mission developed. The man who had been saved from some vicious course was found to exercise a remarkable spell over his former associates when he appeared among them as a changed character. Writing on this subject later, General Booth said:

'I found that ordinary working-men in their corduroys and bowler hats could command attention from their own class which was refused point-blank to me with my theological terms and superior knowledge. I found that the slaves of intemperance were accessible to the influence and testimony of a little band of converted drunkards, whose message was a message of hope when mine was only too often one of condemnation. I found that the wild and unruly East-enders, whose highest idea of happiness was too often enshrined in a skittle-alley, or a boxing-booth, or a "penny gaff," could be made to feel that there was, after all, "something in religion" when they found their old acquaintances living clean and yet happy and prosperous lives under its influence.'[1]

4. The name: 'The Salvation Army.'—During the first ten or twelve years William Booth was feeling his way out of the conventionalism which had hitherto fettered the presentation of religion to the lapsed masses. He saw that some more energetic propaganda was needed than was possible through the ordinary churches and chapels with their formality and sombreness. Already he had been freed from many limitations of both thought and outlook, but his early experiences of irregular 'warfare' in the East End compelled him to revise his whole conception of evangelistic effort, in respect of both the form of its popular appeal and

[1] William Booth married Catherine Mumford in 1855.
[2] Railton, p. 56. [3] *Ib.* p. 77.
[1] Friederichs, Preface by General William Booth, p. 4.

the organization necessary to make that appeal continuous. No more than with George Fox in the 17th cent., or John Wesley in the 18th, had the formation of a new sect been his aim. At first, indeed, he passed on his converts to the various Church organizations around, until he found that in some cases they did not go where they were sent, and that in others, when they did go, they were not welcomed, and in consequence were in danger of lapsing. He drew them therefore into small societies, under the care of appointed leaders, and gradually he perceived that his organization, with its love for the lost and sinful, its spirit of aggression, its definite objective, and its impact upon evil at close quarters, had the elements of an army, waging incessant warfare against the enemy of souls. The idea of a war for the souls of men had abundant Biblical foundation, while Bunyan's *Holy War* could be cited, as well as some of the most sacred hymns of the Church. Although the conception of an army came gradually, the name was the result of a sudden inspiration, some months after a semi-military constitution had actually been decided on. The late Commissioner Railton, in drafting an account of the work, had written: 'It will thus be seen that the Christian Mission is a Volunteer Army,' and William Booth revised the sentence to read: 'The Christian Mission is a *Salvation* Army.'

5. **The military constitution.**—The adoption of a *quasi*-military system was by no means a mere matter of titles and uniforms; it was not intended as a spectacular demonstration, either to please the adherent or to touch the imagination of the outside public. It corresponded to the conception of a fighting religion. William and Catherine Booth, and now also the small group of kindred spirits whom they had gathered around them, came to see that a military form of government was most likely to secure the authority and discipline which are at the root of all fighting power. Perhaps nothing has been elaborated in the history of mankind which is so effective for bringing instant force to bear upon an objective as a military organization, especially when those who compose it are prompted by a high motive. It is prompt, energetic, decisive, and mobile. It may have the disadvantage of involving a kind of autocracy, but the first General (whose title came about by a process of elimination —he was known at first as General Superintendent) found in practice that what his people wanted was leadership, and that, as long as they were led, the possible evils arising from the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals little concerned them. The main thing was to secure such a direction of their energies as should tell to the fullest advantage. The Christian Mission had been governed at first on purely paternal lines, all management and control proceeding from its General Superintendent and his immediate assistants. Then it was remodelled on the lines of the representative system of liberal Nonconformity, with conferences and committees; but this entailed obstruction, or at least delay, and at the same time the Mission lost distinctiveness, and was in danger of becoming sectarian. Finally, the committee system was abandoned in favour of this vigorous reorganization into a military body with a 'Council of War' instead of a 'Conference'; and, while this change provoked ridicule in some quarters and resentment in others, especially among religious people, it immediately gave greater cohesion with uniformity and oneness of direction. The inner spirit of the movement all through these early years had been the spirit of war. This was now for the first time recognized. Ranks and titles and military terms came later. No one appreciated better than the founder that organizations are only temporary adjustments to existing conditions, and that what ultimately signifies is the spirit which animates them.[1] Nevertheless, it is claimed that the government of the Army presents in its main features a strong resemblance to the divinely-appointed government of the Jewish nation and church, and bears a certain likeness also to the system which prevailed in the early Gentile churches, so far as can be judged from the NT. This reorganization on a military basis took place in 1878, in which year a deed-poll was executed and registered setting forth the constitution of the Christian Mission (the name of 'The Salvation Army' was endorsed on the deed by memorandum two years later) and declaring it to be a religious society, composed of persons desiring to unite together for the purpose of spreading the gospel, under the direction of a General Superintendent. The work at once went forward and came into touch with a wider public. At the time of its reorganization it was being carried on at 80 stations, each of them the centre of a witnessing community in a town or district, and these became known as 'corps,' with their 'citadels' or 'halls.' Within less than ten years from that date the 1000th British corps was established, and the work had extended internationally in a remarkable way.

6. **Openings in other lands.**—The progressive extension of the work of the Salvation Army will be best appreciated from the following list (the dates given are those at which the Army flag was unfurled in the respective countries):

England (1865), Scotland (1878), Wales (1879), Ireland (1880), United States (1880), Australia (1880), France (1881), Canada (1882), Sweden (1882), India (1882), Switzerland (1882), S. Africa (1883), Ceylon (1883), New Zealand (1883), Germany (1886), Denmark (1887), Italy (1887), Holland (1887), Norway (1888), S. America (five Republics) (1889), Finland (1889), Belgium (1889), W. Indies (1892), Dutch E. Indies (1894), Iceland (1895), Japan (1895), Korea (1908), Burma (1914), China (1915), Russia (1917).[2]

The openings in many of these countries have come about as a result of the inherent vitality of the movement rather than as part of a deliberate scheme. In the case of the United States the first party of officers was sent out in response to an appeal from a family of Salvationist immigrants who had begun to hold meetings in Philadelphia; immigrants were also the means of planting the Army flag in Australia and New Zealand. Within two years the Army extended from the United States into Canada, and it was also by way of America that the Army gained a footing in Germany. A German-American, having been influenced by the Army in New York to such an extent as to resolve to devote his life to the salvation of the Fatherland, was sent to German Switzerland, there to learn more about the Army's work, and subsequently was commissioned to launch it in Stuttgart. In Sweden the work began with the same apparent casualness through a lady who was influenced at meetings addressed by Bramwell Booth, then Chief of the Staff, on a vacation visit to that country; and from this new centre Norway was in turn occupied, the Army finding in all these northern lands some of its most devoted officers. In Holland the way was prepared by a retired officer of the Dutch army who, having seen something of the work in England, introduced workers from London to Amsterdam. From Holland the work spread to the Dutch E. Indies, where there are now corps, not only of Javanese and Sumatran 'soldiers,' but also of Malay and Chinese, with an extensive and growing social organization. The entrance into India, Japan, and other Eastern

[1] *Orders and Regulations for Staff Officers*, London, 1904, Introd. by General William Booth, p. xv.

[2] In Russia there had been for some years the nucleus of an organization, but not until after the revolution of 1917, when religious liberty was proclaimed, was the way cleared for the open establishment of the Army.

countries was gained also under circumstances in which very little of human design was perceptible, and so the expansion went on until 63 countries and colonies have been occupied (the latest being Burma and the new republics of Russia and China), and the salvation of Jesus Christ is proclaimed in 40 languages. In all its missionary activities the Salvation Army adheres to the principle of adaptability of method which characterized its beginnings. No means of approach is slighted, if it seems likely to open a way into the mental processes of the people. This is especially illustrated in India, of which country a famous Hindu said that it would accept Christ 'when He stepped out of trousers and shoes.' The Salvation Army officers have not hesitated to do that when it seemed likely to be availing, and to adopt the turban and dhotee. Its first leader in India, Commissioner Frederick Booth-Tucker, was formerly a member of the Indian Civil Service, who was powerfully attracted to the Salvation Army through a chance reading of the English *War Cry*. The organization in the Indian Empire comprises, besides its direct salvation efforts in a thousand places, a whole network of social and educational agencies, including special schemes for reforming the very lowest of the pariah classes. It aims at nothing less than the general leavening of the lump of India with the spirit of the gospel of Jesus.[1]

7. Co-operation with Governments.—One remarkable piece of Army work in India is that which is carried on among the criminal tribes, really an aboriginal remnant. The care of some thousands of these outlaws has been handed over to the Army by the Government, and in 32 settlements (continually increasing) they are now being cared for and taught useful occupations. The native non-Christian press, which at one time urged the expulsion of the Army from India, is now generously appreciative of the efforts in this direction.[2] Various other Governments have given practical expression of their confidence by handing over certain work to the Army and subsidizing it, as, *e.g.*, the work among reformatory boys in Australia and inebriates in New Zealand; and in many colonies the Army has been called into co-operation in the matter of dealing with criminals both before and after their discharge from prison. Holland has done the same, and the Government of the Dutch E. Indies has placed certain of its institutions and hospitals under Army care. Several of the cantonal Governments of Switzerland as well as certain German, Scandinavian, and S. American municipalities subsidize one or other of the Army's agencies; and in nearly every country the recognition of rulers and Governments is forthcoming, by way of special grants and privileges, or (particularly in the case of the United States) by being called into State counsel on problems connected with social relief, or by the personal interest and help of sovereigns and presidents. In some countries the philanthropic side of the work is more appreciated, while in others its purely evangelistic propaganda is regarded as being of the highest value. But the motive of the Army has not altered with the widening of its field and the dispersal of early prejudices; if there has been change, it is in the attitude of those who view it from without.

II. *ORGANIZATION AND POLITY.* — **1. The structure of the Army.**—The General, or, as he is sometimes designated, the Commander-in-Chief, is in control of the entire Army, directing its operations throughout the world, and appointing the commissioners and other leading officers in the several countries. Each General is required under the deed-poll of 1878 (see above, § 5) at once to appoint his successor, which he does under seal, and the name of the person chosen is not divulged until the proper time. When the first General 'laid down his sword' in 1912, he was succeeded, in harmony with this arrangement, by Bramwell Booth, his eldest son, who had been Chief of the Staff for more than 30 years. This does not imply, however, that the office is hereditary, or that the succession belongs to the holder of any particular command. In 1904 means were provided by deed-poll approved and adopted by the International Staff Council of that year for removing from the position any General proved to be unworthy of confidence, and also for the selection of a General by a High Council of the Army called into being for this purpose, on which every territory is to be represented, should the position become vacant through failure to appoint or from any other cause.

For administrative purposes the Army is organized in two main sections, one of which is known as International Headquarters, and the other as territorial commands. International Headquarters, having its seat in London, includes a number of personally directed departments which are concerned with the oversight and management of the entire Army in its world-wide, as distinct from its local, operations. These departments are controlled by responsible officers acting under instructions of the General and his Chief of the Staff. To International Headquarters are also attached a number of commissioners who travel the world in the spiritual interests of the Army and to stimulate missionary enthusiasm at the various bases. Territorial commands are concerned each with the direction of Army affairs in one or other of the geographical areas into which the world-operations of the Army are divided. A territory, which is the command of an officer known as a territorial commissioner, may include a whole country or part of a country, or a group of two or more countries.[1] It is further partitioned into divisions. Each of the divisions consists of a group of local corps, under a divisional commander who maintains the general oversight and control of the affairs of the group. The local corps, together with their auxiliary wards for the working of towns and districts, are the units of the Army. A corps may consist of one society of Salvationists or a number of such societies together; in the latter case they are known as circle corps. Each is under a commanding officer, who may be assisted by a second, or even by two subordinates.

2. Property and finance.—(*a*) *Property.* —The whole of the Army's property is vested in the General for the time being, as trustee, with full power to dispose of it in any way (in harmony with the trusts) which he thinks most likely to promote the objects of the Army. He is required, however, to keep full accounts, and to publish every year an audited balance-sheet. This enables the General to arrange for the holding and administration of the property in harmony with the various legal systems obtaining in the several countries, while still preserving to himself and his successors the supreme direction and control. The object in view in making these arrangements has been threefold: (1) to secure the property for the Army; (2) to prevent any interference in its management which might be alien to Army principles; (3) to retain perfect freedom to use or dispose of the

[1] See Harold Begbie, *The Light of India.*

[2] The *Khalsa Advocate*, devoted to championing the cause of the Sikhs, wrote (1913): 'In the Punjab and United Provinces the work of the Salvation Army has been splendidly successful and the Collectors of these districts have warmly praised their activities and spoken of their marvellous achievements in terms of the highest approbation. The number of criminal classes has rapidly diminished as a result of their beneficial influence.'

[1] At the time of writing they number 23, but this number may be increased at any time.

property for the advance of the work, in any way that changing circumstances may require. In some countries, such as the United States, the Army is incorporated under a special act of legislature which defines and guarantees the position of the board of officers by whom the property is administered. In other cases, as in certain Australian States and in S. Africa, the property is administered under trusts publicly declared, on behalf of the General, by the territorial commissioner for the time being. In yet other cases, owing to the absence of any legal recognition of trusteeship for charities or religious associations, the constitution and machinery of a limited liability company have been set up, with the share capital so divided and controlled that, while the requirements of the laws have been complied with, a paramount voice is assured to the General; this is the case in Germany and Norway. In yet other cases, as, *e.g.*, the W. Indies and some of the S. American States, the respective legislatures have constituted the General a 'corporation sole.'

In these various ways 'it is believed that the character of a trust has been imposed upon the property of the Army which the courts of all countries will recognize, and to which they will, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, give effect.'[1]

(*b*) *Finance.*—In obtaining funds for its work three guiding principles have actuated the leaders of the Army: (1) to stimulate and require the freewill offerings of its own people, in the belief that, if religion is worth anything at all, it is worth paying for; (2) to expect officers of the Army, working as they do for the souls of the people, to live in a simple and self-denying way, and that not as a matter of economy only, but because it harmonizes with the example of Jesus Christ and the spirit of their endeavours; (3) to ask for and accept support from irreligious people for the purpose of spreading religion among them —'getting supplies from the enemy.' The ideal aimed at in arranging the Army's finance is that each country should support its own work, and also contribute to the extension and maintenance of the Army in other and more needy parts of the world, particularly in non-Christian lands. The Salvation Army is an international organization, and, although it has not advanced in the same degree in this matter in all countries, it is very widely realized that the responsibility for the extension of its work and influence rests as much upon the Salvationists of, *e.g.*, the United States or Holland as upon those of Switzerland or the United Kingdom. This principle of international responsibility is illustrated in the work on the whole field. Nor does this apply only or mainly to money. In India, *e.g.*, officers from the United Kingdom, from half-a-dozen European countries, and from the Americas have been working together;[2] and more recently the missionary contingent which was sent out to China in 1917 was recruited from no fewer than five countries East and West.

Salvation Army finance is divided into national (or territorial) and international categories, and in each territory the finance may again be divided into funds for national and funds for local purposes, the former division holding good in respect of both the evangelistic and the social side of the work. National funds for spiritual work are employed in the general control and extension of the work within a country, and the first charge upon them is the maintenance—necessarily somewhat costly—of the strong driving power at the centre of each command. From this same source contributions are made to new branches and to branches not yet self-supporting, and there are allocations also for such objects as the training of young officers, the assistance of sick and disabled officers and soldiers, and the cost of special campaigns. A somewhat similar system operates in each of the divisions. Local or corps funds are used for the payment of local expenses and for the acquisition and maintenance of buildings. A small proportion of the corps income is remitted to the headquarters of the division, and of this a proportion is remitted in turn to the territorial headquarters. In this way a fair adjustment of local and central claims is secured. The other section of territorial finance—the social fund—is again divided into (1) funds for the maintenance of the social work, including operations among the homeless, the unemployed, the vicious and unfortunate, and support of the hospitals, schools, and reformatories, which form part of the Army's social work; and (2) local funds for social relief.

The funds of International Headquarters, again, are divided into those for spiritual and those for social purposes. The former, which is the major division, is utilized again in the maintenance of the central driving force, and also in the carrying through of evangelistic campaigns, the training of officers, field and staff, the making of grants for new work (outside the British Isles), and the upkeep of the general organization. The sources of income for this fund are (1) donations of the benevolent outside the Army; (2) gifts of those who have benefited by the Army; (3) certain surpluses from territorial or local funds, which from time to time are forwarded voluntarily; (4) contributions raised by the annual Self-denial Fund[1] (half the proceeds of which are remitted to International Headquarters, mainly for work in non-Christian countries); (5) legacies; (6) profits of publications; (7) proceeds of the sale of uniforms, musical instruments, and other incidentals of Army work. The social funds of International Headquarters are provided in much the same way, by gifts from outsiders, the contributions of people who have benefited, a proportion of the Self-denial Fund, and legacies.

The oversight of expenditure is conducted on a very precise system. Every payment is made in the General's name, and theoretically he is the first party to every transaction, but he is assisted by finance councils and expenditure boards, whose business it is to frame estimates and check outgoings. The functions of these bodies, however, are advisory only, and the final approval of all budgets rests with the highest command. A rigid system of account-keeping is in vogue, and the departments and commands are subject to a double audit—one an internal Army audit with its travelling accountants whose business it is to criticize expenditure as well as to attest accuracy and who report directly to International Headquarters, and the other the audit of the central accounts of each country, including those in London, by local public auditors.

3. **Officers' commands.**—The officers of the Army, who are, in fact, its ministers and who universally testify to having received a definite call of the Holy Spirit to devote themselves to its work, are divided into two classes—staff officers and field officers. All are commissioned either by the General for the time being or in his name; they abandon all secular employments, devote themselves entirely to Army service, and are supported out of its funds.

The staff officers, with the Chief of the Staff at their head, are responsible to the General for the direction of the Army's operations, either internationally or territorially. The highest rank is that of commissioner. Officers of that rank have the direction of departments at International Headquarters, or command the work of the Army in a territory, or are charged with the conduct of some special branch, and are assisted by staff of varying rank.[2] The field officers are mostly in command of local corps. Their ranks vary.[3] It is their business to seek the salvation of the people, to visit, instruct, and advise the soldiers of their corps, to look after the converts, to carry out the weekly programme of meetings, to attend to the organizing side of the work, and generally to represent the Army and exercise an influence for aggressive religion in the neighbourhood. These field officers, unlike the staff officers, who have more the character of fixed points in the Army system, may be likened to an army of manœuvre. They may be required at any time, without reference to their own choice, to transfer their services from one part of the field to another.

The commissioned officers are assisted by local officers, who are soldiers selected for particular work in their own corps, and who give their time without remuneration, many of them following some secular calling. They answer to the lay workers in some of the churches, except that their responsibility is generally carried much further, and correspondingly they are expected to attain, and many of them do attain, a high standard of self-denial, obedience, and spiritual efficiency. They must give evidence of certain spiritual qualifications; they provide and wear their own prescribed uniform; they neither smoke nor drink; and they are covenanted to discharge the duties allotted to them. They are known by various titles,

[1] L. A. Atherley-Jones, 'Legal and financial Aspects of the Salvation Army,' in *Essays and Sketches*, p. 196.

[2] Bramwell Booth, *Servants of All*[2], London, 1901, p. 120.

[1] The Self-denial Fund originated in 1886, when £4820 was collected; in 1918 the sum raised in the United Kingdom alone was £117,503. The scheme extended to other countries until now at least 70 per cent of the Army's forces all over the world voluntarily join in this yearly self-denying ordinance.

[2] The ranks of staff officers are (in 1918) commissioner (in some countries described as commander or kommandant), colonel, lieutenant-colonel, brigadier, major, staff-captain, and staff-lieutenant.

[3] The ranks of field officers are commandant, adjutant, ensign, captain, lieutenant, and sub-lieutenant.

including sergeant-major, secretary, treasurer, bandmaster, young people's sergeant-major, and quarter-master. These local officers are a great strength to the Army, often constituting a powerful link between the local leaders and the outside population. The junior or young people's section of the corps is, in the main, organized and maintained by the local officers. The children's services, the company meetings, the Young People's Legion, the Corps Cadets' Brigade, the Life-Saving Scouts and Life-Saving Guards, together with other agencies, form a comprehensive system for the salvation and instruction of young people both in childhood and in adolescence.[1]

The Army claims to be a thoroughly democratic body in this respect that the soldier may aspire to any command, and, in fact, all or very nearly all promotion is from the ranks. Candidates for officership, who must be soldiers in good standing, receive a course of instruction (for not less than one year and not more than three) at one or other of the Army's 'Training Garrisons' or colleges. These training institutions, the first of which was opened in London in 1880, have now been established in 22 countries. The training given is not so much scholastic as spiritual and practical, and the cadet learns to do the actual work among the people in which he or she will presently be entirely engaged. Afterwards the 'probationary' is generally appointed in the first instance as lieutenant or sub-lieutenant under a captain of a corps, and continues for a time in the field the studies begun at the training centre. The fitness of officers is judged not alone by their ability to speak, and still less by their erudition, but by the proof that they give of their faith in God, their devotion to their work—above all, by their love of souls.

4. Position of women.—One of the foundation principles of the Salvation Army is that for any position, up to the Generalship itself, women are as eligible as men. Two of the territorial commands at the time of writing—those of the United States and of Denmark—are filled by women, and women are also at the head of many departments, while hundreds of them are in command of local corps. The principle that women have an equal standing with men as publishers of salvation to the world followed as a natural result from the part which women played in the early history of the Army; Catherine Booth was one of those who, long before the birth of the Army, protested strongly against the circumscribed sphere of women's labour in the churches.[2] She had expressed the belief, in letters written before her marriage, that much of the non-success of the gospel was to be attributed to the restrictions imposed upon the Holy Spirit in this particular. The rise of the Quakers—'the Salvationists of the 17th century'—had already opened the door to a female ministry, and Mrs. Booth, who amid obloquy and misrepresentations pioneered the ministry of these sisters of the people and shaped the Salvation Army bonnet, was assisting perhaps the next most striking step in religious history in the spiritual enfranchisement of women. When she died in 1890, the number of women officers of the Salvation Army exceeded 5000, and the godly women who publicly declared the works of Jesus Christ were to be counted by tens of thousands.

5. Orders and Regulations.—The system of the Salvation Army and the principles which govern its warfare are set out in a series of *Orders and Regulations*. Separate volumes have been compiled for different classes of officers according to the nature of their service, and every command and following in the Army has its own *vade mecum*. There are *Orders and Regulations* not only for soldiers in the ranks, but also for the various local officers, field officers, officers engaged in social work, staff officers, and territorial commissioners.[3] The general aim of this comprehensive series is not only to furnish definite instructions in methods of Army service and principles of organization and government, but also to offer counsel from the vast treasury of experience which the first General and those associated with him have accumulated. William Booth first began to issue instructions to his helpers in the form of correspondence, but with the growth of the work this method soon became impracticable, and gradually he came to embody his wishes in sets of printed regulations.[1] It was recognized that no code, however deliberately planned, and however capable the men upon whose practical experience it drew, could suffice as a final rule of faith and practice,[2] but by continual revision and reference to explicit cases these various directions have been made and will continue to be made as useful and particularized as possible. The leaders of the Army have never aimed at anything approaching a compendium of mechanical rules set forth in immutable terms; their aim has been rather to give expression to the demands of a living organism which grows and moves in response to the needs of the world of men for whom it works and to the mind of Christ which those leaders believe it has received of Him.

These regulations make severe demands. Intoxicating liquor is prohibited, severe plainness of dress is enjoined, the wearing of uniform is urged as a witness to salvation, the use of tobacco in the case of officers is required to be given up, and in the case of soldiers, although the renunciation is not compulsory, persistence in the habit is a barrier to promotion, even to the rank of sergeant or bandsman.

In the solemn matters of courtship and marriage the Army takes something more than a parental prerogative. All who are married under the Army flag subscribe to certain *Articles of Marriage*, the purport of which may be gathered from the first of them:

'We do solemnly declare that we have not sought this marriage for the sake of our own happiness and interests only, although we hope these will be furthered thereby; but because we believe that the union will enable us better to please and serve God, and more earnestly and successfully to fight and work in the Salvation Army.'

In their infancy the children of members are dedicated to become future soldiers in the war. The Salvationist conception of domestic duty is perhaps best unfolded in books by William and Catherine Booth.[3]

6. The Salvationist and the State.—The position of the Salvationist with regard to politics and the State is, in general, one of neutrality. It is impressed upon him in his *Orders and Regulations* that, 'although still living in the world, he is not of it,' and has no more business with its politics than with its pleasures. He is enjoined to render obedience to the Government under which he lives for the time being, to respect authority, and to conform, as far as he conscientiously can, to its requirements. While not forbidden under certain circumstances to join in patriotic or local demonstrations, he is reminded that the Salvation Army is a company of men and women of many nationalities who, while rendering to Cæsar the things that are his, acknowledge a higher authority than Cæsar's.[4] The super-national character of the Salvation Army is very well illustrated in the German Salvationist adaptation of Hoffman's patriotic song:

'Jesus, Jesus über alles,
Über alles in der Welt.'

At the same time its attitude to public questions is not necessarily negative. When social reform is to the fore, or any matter which concerns the moral well-being of the community, or the position of the Salvation Army, the Salvationist is at liberty to give his support to parties and organizations which are prepared to further the principles to which he stands committed as a Salvationist, but his support of those parties and organizations ceases with the accomplishment of the immediate object. He is advised even then to concern himself, not with parties, but with measures, and with measures only in so far as they have a direct bearing upon his principles and his work as a Salvation soldier. The same rule holds good in local

[1] *Orders and Regulations for Local Officers*, London, 1917.
[2] Catherine Booth, *Practical Religion*[3], pp. 133–167.
[3] See 'Literature' at end of article.

[1] The first *Orders and Regulations* was issued in 1878, but certain rules were printed as early as 1874.
[2] *Orders and Regulations for Staff Officers*, Introd. p. xv.
[3] William Booth, *Religion for Every Day*, and *The Training of Children*; Catherine Booth, *Practical Religion*[3].
[4] *Orders and Regulations for Soldiers of the Salvation Army*[5], London, 1907.

politics, while in the case of industrial disputes the Salvation Army still maintains this neutral attitude so far as the merits of the case are concerned, although ready for any opportunity to reconcile the disputants and to alleviate distress.

The Salvation Army in the United Kingdom has at various times assisted in bringing about legislation having a moral purpose; it helped to secure the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Acts and the Children's Act. It has acted in a like way in other countries, as, *e.g.*, in Japan, where it has been the means of bringing about changes in the laws protecting women. It has helped to win further liberty of speech and opinion both in the United Kingdom and in some Continental countries, where at first it was bitterly persecuted. In the early days of its history in England Acts of Parliament were erroneously evoked, and by-laws were frequently made to prevent open-air meetings. In one year alone more than 600 Salvationists in England, as well as considerable numbers in Sweden, Switzerland, India, and the United States, suffered imprisonment for their action in the open air. The decisions, however, of some local authorities were carried to the higher courts and there reversed: and in many other cases, without taking such a course, the Salvation Army, by a firm though non-provocative attitude, has carried its point and gained toleration and protection for its own street propaganda and that of other bodies. In a wider aspect still the Salvation Army by its work among vast subject populations is rendering a certain amount of imperial service, for it is developing the native power along purely Salvationist and therefore non-insurrectionary lines.

III. *THE SALVATION ARMY AS A SPIRITUAL FORCE.*—**1. 'Articles of War.'**—The simplest exposition of the religion of the Army is to be found in its 'Articles of War,' to which every Salvationist subscribes on enrolment. These 'Articles' number sixteen, half of them mainly doctrinal in character, the other half mainly ethical. They are quoted in full in art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 887.

2. The need for conversion. — The doctrinal standards of the Salvation Army are in general those of evangelical Christianity.

'We believe,' wrote William Booth, 'the three creeds of the Church with all our heart. We believe every word of the Commination Service, and we go about denouncing the wrath of God against sinners just as people must who really believe that all these things are true.'[1]

Catherine Booth was equally explicit:

'We have not given up any of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, such as the fall, the universal call to repentance, justification by faith through Jesus Christ, a life of obedience, and heaven and hell.'[2]

Salvationist theology includes the leading truths which are held by all orthodox communities, and any apparent newness of presentation is due mainly to its concentration upon those few and simple truths which it holds to be vital to salvation. In an interview which the late General afforded one of his journalists on the fiftieth anniversary of his own conversion he expounded his idea of the scheme of salvation in considerable detail. After the elementary truths regarding the work of each Person of the Trinity, he instanced three other doctrines upon which, he said, constant stress was laid at almost every public effort of Salvationists. These concerned the day of judgment, the existence of a real place of punishment, and the existence of 'a glorious heaven where all faithful and victorious soldiers will enjoy unspeakable happiness in companionship with saints, angels, and God.' Beyond these, again, there were certain other truths which had a formative influence upon his mind and, in consequence, upon the doctrinal position of the Army. These had been borne in upon him alike by personal experience, by observation, and by his study of the Bible. One was the division of all men into two classes in their relation to God and eternity—the righteous and the wicked. These answered to the two destinies of heaven and hell which awaited men in the next world. There was nothing clearer than that there is a right side and a wrong in the relations of each individual to the salvation offered by God through the sacrifice of Christ, and that it is within a man's own determination which side he should be on. Change of character can be brought about only by a change of nature, and of this change God is the Author, with the consequence that it is possible to expect and to witness this change even in the worst of characters, where, in the nature of the case, no merely human means, such as good resolutions, even when fortified by ceremonial, can avail. It is God who saves, and therefore no man is beyond the pale of this miracle. At the same time, he could never admit that forfeiture of individual responsibility which seemed to be involved in the extreme Calvinist position. Every man was responsible for his own salvation. It was clear that a man must be empowered to accept or reject the proffered mercy, and that upon his acceptance or rejection depended his eternal destiny, and, further, that this great act of reconciliation with God was a definite transaction, occurring at a given time, on the simple conditions of repentance and faith.

[1] *CR* xlii. [1882] 176.
[2] Catherine Booth, *The Salvation Army in Relation to the Church and State*, p. 30.

3. Holiness teaching. — The Salvation Army from the beginning had insisted upon the need for definite spiritual development after conversion, or on what it calls a 'full salvation.' In the prominence which it has thus given to the doctrine of entire sanctification it has shown itself in the inheritance of John Wesley, who consistently taught that the same power which pardoned the sinner could purify the heart from evil tendencies and tempers, and it has gone in advance of Wesley in insisting that this perfecting of the heart in love will result in a life of conflict and sacrifice for the salvation of others. Full salvation is not to be introspective merely, but a practical following of Jesus Christ as a living sacrifice; not so much a 'rest of faith' as a 'fighting holiness.'[1] This truth has been placed in the forefront of Salvation Army work, and the 'holiness meeting' is usually a feature of the weekly programme of a corps in every country. The teaching is that the Holy Spirit is able to subdue the whole man — will, thought, feeling, and action—to the law of love and keep him walking according to that law in holiness and righteousness all the days of his life.

This experience is taught as a definite state, first towards sin, and then as to conformity to the known will of God. In a series of *Letters to Salvationists* on this subject William Booth speaks of three conditions in which the soul may be:

'In the first stage the soul is *under* sin—it must sin and sin rules. In the second stage the soul is *over* sin. The yoke of evil is broken. Deliverance as well as pardon has come by Christ. In the third stage, the soul is *without* sin. Then the soul may adopt the words of the Apostle, with a variation, and say, "The very God of peace has sanctified me wholly, and He preserves my whole spirit and soul and body blameless, and He will continue to do so unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is He that has called me to this experience of purity, who also will do it."'[2]

The conditions of obtaining this pure heart are (1) obedience in separation from evil, (2) surrender of the soul to the will of God, and (3) faith, which is the committal of the soul to the Sanctifier in full confidence that He will cleanse and keep it from sin.

4. Sacraments.—Conceiving its purpose to be that of calling universal attention to central and vital truths, and making them stand out in the utmost directness before the individual conscience, the Salvation Army has largely avoided the subtleties and intricacies of controversial theology, and this not merely for the sake of peace but for the sake of concentration. The administration of the sacraments was abandoned in 1882, and all ritual which might be supposed to contain some intrinsic

[1] See Samuel L. Brengle, *The Way of Holiness*.
[2] William Booth, *Purity of Heart*, p. 36 f.

or mystic merit was put on one side. The Army has never denied the value of the sacraments in individual cases, and indeed, occasionally, its members have been granted liberty to partake of these ordinances in one or other of the Churches. But the broad fact upon which Salvationism rests is that the sacraments are not necessary to salvation—whether salvation is considered as an act of divine grace or as a holy life.

The present attitude of the Army on this subject is identical in practice with that of the Society of Friends. The Friends, however, arrived at their position by way of the doctrine of the 'inward light,' whereas the Army takes the simple utilitarian ground that these observances introduce complication, that they are open to argument and attack, and that by many who would participate in them they would not be understood, and, most important of all, that they would often obscure the necessity for the vital experience.

5. Salvationizing methods. — With unchangeableness of principle there is combined the utmost flexibility of method. Some features of the Army's assemblies have aroused intense criticism, but a good deal of its procedure which might seem to be extravagant or even irreverent when described at second-hand is not so at all in the actual circumstances of the occasion. Army demonstrativeness, as Catherine Booth once said, is not a putting on, but a letting out. The Salvationist's vision of a rebellious world and of perishing souls seems to justify any and every device, however sharp, striking, or even vulgar, for attracting, for compelling, the attention of the hardened and indifferent to whom his appeal is made. For this reason ordinary religious phraseology is largely laid on one side, and what has been called 'surprise power' or novelty is utilized. The testimony meeting is described as a 'free and easy,' and the response of 'Amen' as a 'volley.' Many Army services are punctuated from first to last with joyous exclamations, clapping of hands, laughter, or tears. The soul-winning propaganda of the Salvation Army, as illustrated in its street marches and in meetings of an unusual type, has sometimes taken the form of almost physical persuasion. Among the people to whom the Salvationist goes he has to compete with a hundred other clamant appeals to eye-gate and ear-gate, and, his object being to win men for the highest good, he sees it necessary to be in his way as vociferous and aggressive as any. Above all things he is to be definite. It is not his business to produce a vague emotion; he is to bring men to a state in which they are convinced of sin and convicted of its guilt and of its awful peril. Mere belief is not enough; there must be an active repentance. Therein lies one chief reason for the penitent form or mercy-seat. This feature of Salvationist public gatherings is a row of seats immediately in front of the platform, at which seekers are invited to kneel in token of their resolution to abandon their sins and to live henceforth to please God. It is a method which the Army defends on the ground that it is conspicuous enough to register a distinct break in a man's life, and does not lend itself to a mere passing impressionism. A further reason for Salvationist enthusiasm is seen in the fact that many of the workers have themselves passed through such inward experiences as to make it unnatural for them to maintain their ordinary reserve when they speak of such things.[1] Many of them also have witnessed remarkable—they often justify the word 'miraculous'—changes occurring in the lives of others, such as those described[1] as having occurred in one London corps, where a group of men known locally as 'the terrible ten' were won for God.

6. Other features of propaganda.—Although the first Army band was not established until 1879, the enthusiasm of the movement found expression in song from the very beginning. It carried a step further the evangelistic singing which had been such a feature of the Methodist revival in the previous century. Soon after the commencement of his work in the East End of London William Booth published *The Christian Mission Hymn-Book*, and later a whole series of *Salvation Army Song Books*, which contained songs[2] in abundance, some of original composition and others gathered from every quarter. These songs were taken up by his people with fervour and spontaneity. Rather to the offence of a good many outsiders, the leaders of the Salvation Army have systematically adapted sacred words to popular tunes on the principle, 'We'll take these songs from the devil; he has no right to a note of music.' But always both rhythm and words were subservient to the Salvationist sentiment. Soon the penetrating melodies, especially those of Salvation Army origin, demanded a more considered musical accompaniment, and bands began to be formed, at first among families or groups of Salvationists, and then as a regular part of each corps, until now, with nearly 30,000 bandsmen and more than 20,000 members of Songsters' Brigades, the Salvation Army, as Samuel Morley once prophesied would be the case, has 'sung its way round the world.' In the jubilant cadences has been found a language in which Salvationists of every tongue can understand one another and tell to all men the joy that is in them. The band (in some countries a guitar combination, but more generally with brass instruments) is a feature of Salvation Army work in every part of the world. The strictest surveillance over the bands, both as to personnel and as to music, is maintained at each territorial headquarters. Bandsmen have their own *Orders and Regulations*, and the part which the instruments can take in the meetings, both in time and in volume, is carefully limited so as to assist the proceedings without monopolizing them.

Another means of propaganda which the Army was quick to appreciate was the printing-press. Within a few months of the organization becoming known as the Salvation Army the first *War Cry* was established to inspire Salvationists, educate them, and bind them together. This, the *Official Gazette* of the Army, has now (1918) some 80 companions, most of them weekly periodicals, issued in more than 20 languages, including several of the languages of Asia and Africa. The combined circulation is more than seven millions, 1¼ millions for each issue, and the total number of readers is estimated at more than seven millions. The selling of these papers by members of the Army is looked upon as offering a precious opportunity of witnessing for Christ. In most territories the name *War Cry*, or its equivalent, is adopted as the title of the official organ—*e.g.*, the *Strijdkreet* of Holland and *Il Grido di Guerre* of Italy; and in addition there are in most countries, as in the United Kingdom, magazines for special departments of the Army's work. By means of explicit instructions and vigilant insight it is ensured that these papers reflect the spirit and polity of the one movement, both in the kind of articles they publish and in the way in which they deal with topics of interest. The power of the

[1] See art. CONVERSION, vol. iv. p. 109[b]: 'The type of religious experience that seems native to a cultured community is calm and restrained; but the fervours of the Salvation Army and the Methodist meeting are to the psychologist no less natural.'

[1] Harold Begbie, *Broken Earthenware*.

[2] Always 'songs' rather than 'hymns,' following the general custom of the Scriptures.

printed word has also been recognized in the systematic publication of books dealing with phases of Salvation Army thought and experience, and of many volumes of a didactic character by William and Catherine Booth, G. S. Railton, and others.

7. **Indirect influences.**—The influence of any organization beyond the ranks of its immediate followers is difficult to estimate, but some of the features of the Salvation Army are so marked a departure from ordinary religious life and methods that they could hardly fail to have important reactions in the Christian Churches. In one form or another many of the leading authorities of the religious world have testified that its spirit and example have brought about changes which amount to a revolution in the methods of the Church. Bishop Lightfoot of Durham pointed out one influence of the Army upon his own Church — the Church of England:

'Shall we be satisfied with going on as hitherto, picking up one here and there, gathering together a more or less select congregation, forgetful meanwhile of the Master's command, "Go ye into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in"? The Salvation Army has taught us a higher lesson than this. Whatever may be its faults, it has at least recalled us to this lost ideal of the work of the Church—the universal compulsion of the souls of men.'

Not only has the Salvation Army stimulated a more aggressive evangelism, but it has also suggested methods of presenting religion to the masses upon which in some instances other bodies have admittedly modelled their own propaganda. The idea of a military organization has been taken up in some cases,[1] and in others the influence of the Army has been apparent in various 'forward movements' in Britain. The same leaven has been at work in other lands, as, *e.g.*, in the 'Innere Mission' of Germany, in its counterpart in the Scandinavian countries, and similar home mission movements in the United States and the British colonies. In India a 'Buddhist Salvation Army' concerns itself with the moral uplifting of those whom it seeks to influence. Individual inspirations, though acknowledged by public men of every communion, including Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Jewish rabbis, and priests of the Greek Church, cannot of course be catalogued; but here again there is abundant evidence that in almost every land the indirect influence of the Army has awakened interest in religion or revived a shaken faith or a languishing devotion among many who have not enlisted under its flag. Thousands of ministers, missionaries, and lay workers serving in other Churches took the first step that led to their present vocation as a result of influences set in motion at its meetings or on reading its publications.

IV. *SOCIAL WORK.*—1. **The incentive.**—The revival of evangelical zeal in the second half of the 19th cent. which the Salvation Army undoubtedly greatly helped to produce, and which in turn did much to help forward the Salvation Army, brought with it a further realization of the inter-relationship of moral failures and physical and economical evils.[2] The social conscience of the people was being quickened, and it was revolted by the spectacle of large sections of the people living either on the edge of economic disaster or plunged already into a sea of grinding want, vice, or crime. At the same time, it was seen that the problems to be dealt with required statesmanlike judgment as well as the philanthropic spirit.

[1] *E.g.*, a 'Church Salvation Army' was started at Oxford (1882–85), the title being chosen 'as a tribute to General Booth'; the organization was one of those which were subsequently merged into the Church Army. See Edgar Rowan, *Wilson Carlile and the Church Army*, London, 1905, p. 140.

[2] Gilbert Slater, *The Making of Modern England*, London, 1913.

William Booth had always deeply sympathized with the workless.

'When but a mere child,' he says, 'the degradation and helpless misery of the poor Stockingers of my native town, wandering gaunt and hunger-stricken through the streets, droning out their melancholy ditties, crowding the Union or toiling like galley slaves on relief works for a bare subsistence, kindled in my heart yearnings to help the poor which have continued to this day and which have had a powerful influence on my whole life.'[1]

It is not surprising, therefore, that quite early in its history (1874–78) the Salvation Army had looked with anxious solicitude into the under-world of want and vice, and had stretched out a hand to certain classes of its sad inhabitants. Prison-gate homes and food depots and some scattered efforts on behalf of lost women—the beginnings of the social work which was presently to grow to such world-wide dimensions—were established. But it was not until the middle eighties that the General, greatly moved by the sight of the vagrant and destitute classes, made certain extensive experiments. Then came a more comprehensive scheme, an organized warfare against social evils—at least the worst of them—as a preliminary to evangelizing the outcast with the saving health of religion. It was a deep spiritual sympathy with suffering that led the Salvation Army into its social enterprises, but with this sympathy was linked a keen appreciation of the sufferers' temporal misery and need.

The social work of the Army is not to be regarded as an additional wing to its main structure, or as a sudden afterthought to modify its governing idea. It is a natural development, involving no departure from the principles by which the Army has been actuated from the beginning. It is true that so far as finance is concerned the spiritual and social operations have since the launching of the Darkest England scheme been sharply distinguished, and subscribers must say to which fund their contributions shall go. This is a matter of legal correctness and of administrative convenience.[2] The place of social work in the Army's operations was definitely indicated by William Booth when he wrote:

'In providing for the relief of temporal misery I reckon that I am only making it easy where it is now difficult, and possible where it is now all but impossible, for men and women to find their way to the Cross.'[3]

The Darkest England scheme, therefore, when it was unfolded in 1890, did not break so freshly upon the Salvation Army itself as it did upon the outside public, whom it awakened in an extraordinary degree to the social misery which existed, and to the availability of the Army for coping with at least some part of the problem by virtue of the extent and solidarity of its organization. The details of the proposed scheme were only in sketch, to be altered, abandoned, or added to as experience and advisability determined. The general purpose was to offer in the first place to the workless and destitute a chance of recovery through industry and discipline, the Army providing them with the opportunity and meeting their immediate needs. Industrial reclamation was, of course, only one phase of the problem, and perhaps not the acutest. The vicious and the morally helpless had to be dealt with, special provision had to be made for prisoners on their discharge, for the habitually drunken, for lawless lads, and for fallen or tempted women. At the back of every effort was the hope of the spiritual reformation of the individual. His character must be changed, if his character was in question, before any change in circumstances could greatly avail.

The principles of social work as laid down in *Orders and Regulations for Social Officers* (1915) include the importance of

[1] *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, Preface, p. i.

[2] The Darkest England scheme was declared a separate trust by deed-poll, dated Jan. 1891.

[3] *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, Preface, p. iv

a change of environment, the provision of useful occupation, the cultivation of a spirit of mutual assistance, discipline, and so on, but first of all 'the salvation of the individual through faith in Jesus Christ,' not, indeed, as a condition of being helped, but as the chief ground of hope for effecting any permanent improvement.

2. Organizations.—The social enterprises of the Salvation Army lend themselves to descriptive detail, but here it will be enough to refer the reader to the published accounts of various aspects of the work.[1] The following enumeration of the social activities of the Army, though the list may not be quite complete, affords some idea of the variety and scope of its efforts for the benefit of the poor and friendless of every land :

(*a*) *For the starving.*—Children's free and farthing breakfasts, midnight soup and bread brigades for the homeless, cheap food depots, special relief funds for cases of special destitution, old clothes depots for slum families, poor men's hotels, cheap grain stores, famine loan fund for the destitute of the East.

(*b*) *For the drunkards.*—Drunkards' brigades, drunkards' advice and home bureaux, homes for inebriates (men and women).

(*c*) *For the paupers.*—Workhouse brigades, salvation guardians of the poor, pauper colonies, pauper transportation, labour bureaux, homes for the aged and for the dying.

(*d*) *For the unemployed.*—Labour bureaux (men and women), industrial homes, labour wood-yards, city salvage brigades, workshops, elevators.

(*e*) *For the homeless.*—Midnight scouts in cities, shelters for men and women, metropoles.

(*f*) *For the criminals.*—Prison visitation, police-court work, prison-gate work, prison corps, probationary policy, correspondence bureaux, ex-criminals' homes, and criminal settlements.

(*g*) *For the daughters of shame.*—Organized visitation of 'walks,' brothels, red-light districts, yoshiwaras, clubs, etc., midnight meetings and marches, receiving homes, industrial homes, factories, 'out of love' funds, service girls' brigades, shepherding brigades, maternity homes, investigation and affiliation departments, mothers' hospitals.

(*h*) *Slum work.*—Visitation, first-aid brigades, district nursing, 'poorest of the poor' aid.

(*i*) *For the sick.*—Visitation, hospitals, dispensaries, village dispensing, leper hospitals, maternity nursing.

(*j*) *For the lost.*—Inquiry and correspondence bureaux, legal assistance.

(*k*) *Preventive and protective work for young girls.*—Servants' homes, city institutes, registries, students' homes, residential clubs.

(*l*) *Anti-suicide bureaux* —Advice department, loan department.

(*m*) *Land schemes.*—Emigration, home colonization, colonization over the sea, land and farm and irrigation colonies, small holdings.

(*n*) *Deep sea brigades.*—Mission boats, lifeboat.

(*o*) *Training colleges.*

(*p*) *Students' homes.*

(*q*) *Working-men's associations.*

(*r*) *Village banks* (agricultural).

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W. BRAMWELL BOOTH.

SAMĀDHI.—The use of this term in Buddhism has been explained briefly in the art. DHYĀNA (Pali *jhāna*). *Samādhi* is a many-sided word, signifying both (1) a complex state or habit of mind and (2) a system of training or culture intended to produce that state or habit. As (2) it forms one of the three bodies of doctrine (*khandhā*) with which all followers of the holy life in Buddhism were to be continually occupied : *sīlak*

[1] *E.g.*, H. Rider Haggard, *Regeneration*; Arnold White, *The Great Idea*; F. A. MacKenzie, *Waste Humanity*; David Lyall, *Handicapped*; see also 'Literature' below.

khandha (morals, ethics), *samādhikkhandha*, and *paññākkhandha* (wisdom, insight).

Thus the distinguished Sister Dhammadinnā comprises the Eightfold Path under these three:

Sīla	right speech	*Samādhi*	right effort
	,, action		,, mindfulness
	,, livelihood.		,, *samādhi*.
Paññā	right views		
	,, intention or aspiration.		

She is then asked: 'What is *samādhi*? What induces[1] it? What are the requisites for it? What is the culture of it?' She replies: 'It is concentration of mind; the Four Applications of Mindfulness induce it; the Four Supreme Efforts are its requisites; the practice, development, repetition of these things are the culture of it.'[2]

Here we see the twofold import of the term as stated above. Let us consider each of these two in order. Concentration is *chittass' ekaggatā*, that is, one-pointedness of mind, or the power of exclusive single-minded attention. This definition is repeated and elaborated in the *Abhidhamma* analyses, where *samādhi* and concentration are described in similar terms:

'Stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought which . . . is the absence of distraction, is balance, unperturbed mental procedure, calm, the faculty and power of concentration.'[3]

The commentaries maintained this teaching as handed on by Buddhaghoṣa:

'What is *samādhi*? It is of many aspects and divers modes . . . not to confuse the issues just here, we say it is concentration of good consciousness. In meaning it is the *samādhānaṃ*;—the "thorough-placing-on-to," that is, on one object of consciousness and its concomitants. Its salient mark is balance; its essential property is the expulsion of wavering, its resulting manifestation is impassivity; happy ease is its proximate antecedent.'[4]

The various channels and modes of *samādhi* are then gone into at length, including *jhāna*, whether induced by self-hypnotism or otherwise. The chief of these are subsequently developed in the following ten chapters of *Visuddhi-Magga*. He concludes the chapter in question with a reply to the inquiries: How is *samādhi* to be cultivated? What is the advantage gained by its culture? The former question is also answered in the ten following chapters. In the eleventh the advantage is stated to be fivefold, according to the lower or higher aims and modes of culture in each practiser: —present happiness, insight into things 'as they really have become' (*yathābhūtaṃ*), superknowledge (*abhiññā*),[5] rebirth in the Brahmā heaven, and *Nirvāṇa*.

Coming to the more discriminating psychological analyses of later scholastics—*e.g.*, in the *Compendium of Philosophy* by Anuruddha—we find that, whereas *chittass' ekaggatā* is recognized as a constant factor among the seven factors present in every unit of conscious activity, *samādhi* is reserved for the whole of a given state of mind describable as concentration[6] and is also called 'ecstatic apperception'[7] in states of mystic or jhānic rapture. In other words, the factor in every act of consciousness which we know as 'selection' becomes, when trained and developed, the power and faculty (*indriya*) of *samādhi*.[8]

Thus *samādhi* is no more confined to the highest, most unworldly aims and activities than is 'concentration' in English-speaking culture. Nor is it right to speak of it as the 'sole' or even the chief aim of the Buddhist. It is quite essential as a means. But the aims and ideals which it made possible to realize are reserved by Buddhaghoṣa for the *Paññākkhandha*, the third and last section of the *Visuddhi-Magga*.

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C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SAMARITANS.—1. Name. — Those who today are called Samaritans are but the last little remnant of a Jewish sect that for centuries has looked upon Mt. Gerizim in Palestine as the one rightful place appointed unto it by God for His worship. Their name has come to its present meaning through several stages of development. First of all it was applied to the once famous capital of the kingdom of Northern Israel. Then, by a natural extension, it was made to include the entire district of which this city was the political head; any dweller within this territory might properly be called a Samaritan. Finally, through NT usage and the practice of early Christian writers, the word came to be limited to adherents of a particular form of faith.[1]

2. Origin. — The origin of the Samaritans is veiled in obscurity. The meagre data at our disposal permit and have received different interpretations. According to the Biblical narrative in 2 K 17–18, their beginning is to be dated from the downfall of the kingdom of Northern Israel in 722 B.C.

Then it was that 'Jahweh removed Israel out of his sight, as he spake by the hand of all his servants the prophets. So Israel was carried away out of their own land to Assyria, unto this day. And the king of Assyria brought men from Babylon, and from Cuthah, and from Avva, and from Hamath and Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria instead of the children of Israel: and they possessed Samaria, and dwelt in the cities thereof' (2 K $17^{23f.}$). Thus it came to pass that Israel was removed and that 'there was none left but the tribe of Judah only' (*cf.* 2 K 17^{18}).

These diverse imported peoples, settled in the devastated land of Israel, were made by Jewish teachers to be the progenitors of the Samaritans. That such a mixed group should speedily come to resemble Israel closely in customs and manner of worship was said to be due to the fact that they were 'lion converts.' Being menaced by a scourge of savage beasts, they found deliverance by worshipping Jahweh as the God of the land under the guidance of a priest, or priests, who were sent back from among the captive Israelites.[2] Meanwhile they did not abandon their former idolatrous cults,

[1] *Nimitta*; see *Points of Controversy* (*PTS*), London, 1915, p. 388.
[2] *Majjhima*, i. 301.
[3] *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, §§ 11, 15, tr. in C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, London, 1900, pp. 13 f., 17.
[4] *Visuddhi-Magga*, ch. iii.; *cf. Atthasālinī*, p. 118, where he cites the figures from the *Questions of King Milinda*, i. 60, comparing *samādhi* to the ridgepole of a roof, binding and crowning the moral consciousness, and to a king as head and nucleus of his armies.
[5] *Cf.* art. DHYĀNA, § 5 (*c*).
[6] P. 108 f. (f), (g).
[7] *Ib.* p. 129, n. 1.
[8] *Ib.* pp. 54 f., 89, n. 4, 129, n. 1.

[1] The city of Samaria is said to have received its name from one Shemer (שֶׁמֶר), who sold to Omri the site on which the city was built (1 K 16^{24}). The term 'Samaritans' (*Shomeronim*, שֹׁמְרֹנִים) is found only once in the OT (2 K 17^{29}). Rabbinical writers frequently allude to their northern neighbours as Cutheans, while Josephus calls them by preference Shechemites. They themselves lay claim to the title 'Israel' or 'the Children of Israel.' They acquiesce, however, in the name Samaritans, giving to it their own interpretation of 'observers' or 'keepers,' namely, of the Law or the Sabbath (*i.e. Shomerim*, שֹׁמְרִים, from שָׁמַר).

[2] 'And so it was, at the beginning of their dwelling there, that they feared not the Lord: therefore the Lord sent lions among them, which killed some of them. Wherefore they spake to the king of Assyria, saying, The nations which thou hast carried away, and placed in the cities of Samaria, know not the manner of the God of the land: therefore he hath sent lions among them, and, behold, they slay them, because they know not the manner of the God of the land. Then the king of Assyria commanded, saying, Carry thither one of the priests whom ye brought from thence; and let *them* go and dwell there, and let *him* teach them the manner of the God of the land. So one of the priests whom they had carried away from Samaria came and dwelt in Beth-el, and taught them how they should fear the Lord' (2 K 17^{25-28}). The text fluctuates between the singular and plural in its allusion to the priest or priests. It is probable that the plural should be retained throughout. Josephus (*Ant.* IX. xiv. 3) makes the danger that threatened them to have been a pestilence.

for, while 'they feared Jahweh,' at the same time they 'served their own gods, after the manner of the nations from among whom they had been carried away' (2 K 17[33]).

Two further OT allusions to the introduction of foreign colonists are found in the book of Ezra. In the first (4[2]) the Samaritans make request to have part with the returned exiles in rebuilding the Temple at Jerusalem, and urge their claim on the ground that they worship Jahweh as do the Jews, and that they have sacrificed unto Him from the time that they were brought into the land by Esar-haddon, king of Assyria (681–668 B.C.).[1] Further on in the chapter the same people are described as belonging to the 'nations whom the great and noble Osnappar brought over, and set in the city of Samaria, and in the rest of the country beyond the river' (Ezr 4[10]).[2] Both the latter statements are beset with textual difficulties, but they agree with the account of 2 Kings in emphasizing the alien origin of the Samaritans. Later Jewish tradition perpetuates the same disparaging view and uses by preference the term 'Cuthean' for the people of the north.[3]

The fall of Israel and the deportation of its people are also mentioned in two Assyrian inscriptions. It appears that Shalmaneser IV. (727–722), who began the siege of the city of Samaria, died before its completion, and that accordingly the glory of the conquest was claimed by his successor, Sargon II. (722–705). The latter king says:

'At the beginning of my reign, in my first year . . . Samaria I besieged, I captured. 27,290 people from its midst I carried captive. 50 chariots I took there as an addition to my royal force . . . I returned and made more than formerly to dwell. People from lands which my hands had captured I settled in the midst. My officers over them as governors I appointed. Tribute and taxes I imposed upon them after the Assyrian manner.'[4]

The second inscription is of like purport, with an added statement to the effect that those who were left undisturbed in their homes were permitted to retain their possessions.[5] In the royal enumeration of the exiles probably only the heads of families were counted, and consequently the total number of captives may have been much greater; but, even so, this deportation can have affected only a small percentage of the entire population.[6] The capital and the larger towns would doubtless suffer most, whereas the smaller villages of the rural districts would remain largely undisturbed. The concern of the Assyrian conqueror would be to remove the more influential political and religious leaders. Whether there was a further deportation two years later, when Samaria joined in a fruitless uprising against Sargon II., is not stated in the surviving fragments of the inscription which commemorates the event. Accordingly, so far as Assyrian records permit any inference, it appears that the major portion of the Israelites continued to dwell in their own land subject to local Assyrian governors.

[1] Josephus, in reporting this incident, states that the king in question was Shalmaneser IV. (*Ant.* XI. ii. 1; cf. *ICC*, *ad loc.*, and Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, p. 169).

[2] It is probable that the name Osnappar is a corruption, since it is not otherwise known to have been borne by any king or high official. A widely accepted conjecture would substitute Asshurbanipal (668–626 B.C.) on the ground of resemblance and because he alone of the later Assyrian kings would be in a position to deport colonists from Susa and Elam. Others would restore Shalmaneser, a reading that has the support of Lucian's text of the LXX (cf. L. W. Batten, *The Books of Ezra and Nehemiah* [*ICC*], Edinburgh, 1913, p. 172; *HDB* iii. 634; Torrey, p. 169).

[3] Jos. *Ant.* IX. xiv. 3, XI. iv. 3, vii. 2; Schürer, *GJV*[3] ii. 15, note 43, for passages in the Mishnâh.

[4] *KAT*[3], as tr. by G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 369.

[5] This at least is the presumable meaning of the passage (*ib.* p. 370).

[6] There is a tradition of much larger deportations from Judah. Sennacherib speaks of devastating 46 fortified towns of Hezekiah, the Judæan, and of leading captive 200,150 'people, small and great, male and female' (*KAT*[3], tr. Barton, p. 373).

Such a conclusion receives a measure of confirmation from Biblical data. The Chronicler states that soon after the fall of Samaria King Hezekiah (715 (?)–686 (?) B.C.) sent to all Israel and 'wrote letters also to Ephraim and Manasseh,' inviting them to participate in a great Passover at Jerusalem, with the result that many came from Asher, Manasseh, and Zebulun (2 Ch 30[1. 11]). This implies the continued presence of Israelites in the north.[1] In the next century the reform of Josiah (639–608 B.C.) purged Bethel of its idolatry and took away 'all the houses also of the high places that were in the cities of Samaria, which the kings of Israel had made to provoke Jahweh to anger' (2 K 23[15–20]). There is no suggestion in this tradition that these high places differed in any particular from those in the south, or that the cultus was other than that which had been established by the kings of Israel. The Chronicler includes Manasseh, Ephraim, and 'all the remnant of Israel' among those who contributed to the repairs of the Temple in the days of Josiah (2 Ch 34[9]; cf. 2 K 22[4]). In the 5th cent. we hear of 80 men who came out of Shechem, Shiloh, and Samaria, bringing offerings to the house of Jahweh. They came in the garb of mourning, doubtless because of the desolation of Jerusalem and the ruin of the Temple (Jer 41[5]). It seems most natural to suppose that these worshippers were Israelites, and that the former relationship to Jerusalem had not yet been interrupted. To a somewhat later period in the same century belongs the tradition already discussed, that the inhabitants of the north claimed the right to co-operate with the returned exiles in the rebuilding of the Temple (Ezr 4[2]).

These scattered notices are best understood by supposing that the descendants of the Israelites continued to live on in the land of their fathers and that they are the same people that emerged later as the sect of the Samaritans. The loss of the Ten Tribes would then be due more to vicissitudes suffered at home than to deportations. The whole religious development of the Samaritans requires such an ancestry and would be largely inexplicable without it. Rabbinical enactments appear at times frankly to recognize the true situation. A Talmudic booklet (*Massekheth Kuthim*) dealing with the Samaritans closes as follows:

'When shall we receive them? When they give up their faith in Mount Gerizim and acknowledge Jerusalem and the resurrection of the dead. Thenceforth he who robs a Samaritan will be as he who robs an Israelite.'[2]

Anthropology, working independently, has reached the same conclusion. H. M. Huxley gives it as his judgment that the Samaritans 'are to-day the sole, though degenerate, representatives of the ancient Hebrews.'[3]

3. The emergence of the Samaritans as an independent religious community.—As to the time and circumstances of the final rupture between the Jews and the Northern Israelites there are two divergent traditions.

One rests upon a brief allusion in Neh 13[28f.], where it is stated that 'one of the sons of Joiada, the son of Eliashib the high priest, was son in law to Sanballat the Horonite: therefore I chased him from me. Remember them, O my God, because they have defiled the priesthood, and the covenant of the priesthood, and of the Levites.'

The second and more explicit tradition is recounted by Josephus, who tells us that the schism was occasioned by the marriage of Manasseh, a brother of the high priest Jaddua, to an alien wife, namely to Nikaso, the daughter of Sanballat, the Persian governor of Samaria. The elders at Jerusalem and the high priest demanded that the wife should be divorced, or that Manasseh should renounce his sacerdotal rights. Unwilling to accept such an alternative, he sought help from his aged father-

[1] Cf. E. L. Curtis and A. A. Madsen, *The Books of Chronicles* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1910, p. 471 ff., and Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, p. 55.

[2] Nutt, *A Samaritan Targum*, p. 172; Montgomery, p. 208 On the whole attitude of Jewish teachers, cf. Montgomery, pp 165–203.

[3] *JE* x. 676.

in-law, who promised to secure for him the dignity and rights of the high priesthood in connexion with a temple that should be built on Mt. Gerizim. The young priest was likewise assured that he should be Sanballat's successor in temporal power. Ultimately the promised religious privileges were gained under the sanction of Alexander the Great, who had meanwhile defeated the Persians at Issus and conquered Syria. Forthwith the temple was built and regular worship was established at the rival sanctuary.[1] If Josephus can thus record an incident that establishes the legitimacy of the priestly line of the rival temple, it is evident that the tradition must have appeared to him well founded, for he otherwise gives abundant evidence of his hostility towards the Samaritans. It is further stated in his account that Manasseh was joined by many priests and Levites who had alien wives, and also that other disaffected Jews, who from time to time became guilty of breaches of the law at Jerusalem, found refuge with the Shechemites.[2]

These two accounts have this much in common, that each makes mention of the marriage of a member of the Jewish high-priestly family to the daughter of a Sanballat; but in the former instance the priest in question was an unnamed son of Joiada and a grandson of the high priest Eliashib, while in Josephus he is Manasseh, brother of the high priest Jaddua, who was a contemporary of Alexander the Great. Thus the incident would occur, according to Josephus, in 332–331 B.C., or about a century after Nehemiah. Again we note that Nehemiah speaks only of the expulsion of the offender and gives no hint that this act of discipline resulted in the founding of a rival sanctuary on Mt. Gerizim, or in any way affected the Samaritans.[3] Without entering upon a discussion of the problem that is thus presented, it may be said that the date fixed by Josephus for the schism appears to be confirmed by several important facts. First in order is the agreement of the Samaritans with the Jews in accepting the fully revised and developed Pentateuch. Had the separation taken place before the sacred documents assumed their present form, the Samaritan Bible would almost certainly give some evidence of belonging to the earlier period. It is further highly significant that, so far as we can discover, Samaritan worship and ritual from the first conformed closely to Jewish rites and practices—a result that could hardly have been anticipated if Jewish influence had made itself felt only indirectly in the time after Nehemiah. A further reason for the later dating of the Samaritan schism is furnished by the recently discovered Elephantinē temple papyrus. This document, written in 408–407 B.C., gives no suggestion that a state of bitterest enmity existed openly between Jews and Samaritans. On the other hand, the Jewish community of Egypt can appeal with confidence not only to Jerusalem, but also to the political heads of Samaria for assistance. There is no allusion to a religious head of the Samaritans in this connexion, doubtless because as yet none existed.[4]

[1] Jos. *Ant.* XI. vii. 2, viii. [2] *Ib.* XI. viii. 2, 7.

[3] In spite of these important differences in detail, it is quite generally believed that both accounts must refer to the same experience. Usually a way out of the difficulty is sought by making Josephus to be in error as to the date. It is assumed that Nehemiah's stringent reform in the matter of marriage must have been the immediate occasion of the violent rupture between Jews and Samaritans. On the other hand, it is coming to be recognized that Josephus is here following an independent source which ought not to be discarded too hastily. It is not easy to discover any valid reason why his narrative may not be essentially correct, barring a few details that may have been borrowed from Nehemiah (cf. C. Steuernagel, *SK* lxxxii. [1909] 5, and *Handkommentar zum AT*, Göttingen, 1900, iii. 276; B. Stade and A. Bertholet, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, Tübingen, 1905–11, ii. 27 f.). Torrey would hold the Chronicler responsible for our difficulty, on the supposition that he has fashioned the passage in Nehemiah in such a way as to reflect later events (pp. 330 f., 235, 249). It was desired to show thereby how Nehemiah had dealt with a case precisely like that of Manasseh. It is urged by Torrey with much cogency that, if the great patriot Nehemiah had been connected in written tradition with the Samaritan secession, the facts would not have been forgotten in Jerusalem. No more would the name of the high priest in whose time the momentous event occurred have been lost to memory.

[4] The Elephantinē papyrus is an appeal from a military colony of Egyptian Jews and is addressed to Bagoses (Bagohi), the Persian governor of Judæa. The petitioners desire permission, or assistance in gaining permission, to rebuild their temple of Jahweh which had been destroyed by their adversaries three years previously. In the course of the letter we learn that an earlier application has been made to the governor, and that at the same time letters of like purport had been dispatched to the high priest in Jerusalem and to influential Jewish leaders. Since no replies had been received, the request to the governor was renewed, and it was added that an appeal for assistance was likewise being forwarded to Dalajah and Shelemjah, the sons of Sanballat the governor of Samaria (cf. Barton, p. 337 ff.). The papyrus proves that there was a governor named Sanballat who was in office in 407 B.C., and in so far corroborates the narrative of Neh 13^{28}. It is quite possible, however, that a grandson of this man, bearing the same name, may have been in authority at the time of Alexander (this is the view of Torrey, p. 330 f.; cf. also pp. 324 and 315 f., and Steuernagel, *SK* lxxxii. [1909] 4 f.).

Whether the final separation between Judæa and Samaria dates from the days of Alexander the Great, or whether it came earlier, we may suppose that it was the culmination of an antagonism that had long existed. Henceforth the enmity was intense, as is made evident by the few manifestations of it that can still be traced in the centuries immediately following and in NT times. During the 3rd cent. we have the testimony of the Chronicler, whose attitude is shown by the way in which he idealizes Rehoboam and his successors, thereby throwing Israel's apostasy into darker relief.[1] He denies to them the right of being regarded as a part of the people of God (2 Ch 13^{9} 25^{7}). As for their successors, the Samaritans, they are idolaters and self-confessed aliens (Ezr $4^{1f.}$). In the opening years of the 2nd cent. Jesus Sirach (c. 180 B.C.) voices a like reprobation. For him, too, the Samaritans are a 'no nation,' a foolish (or godless) people that dwell in Shechem ($50^{25f.}$).[2] At the opening of the Christian era the traditional hatred flashed out in deeds of violence,[3] and at all times there existed a dangerous tenseness of feeling (Jn 4^{9} 8^{48}, Lk $9^{52f.}$).

4. **Later history.**—Of the experiences of the Samaritans in the disturbed period following the death of Alexander we have little reliable information; but that they suffered severely, as the tide of war swept backward and forward through their land, may be accepted as certain. During the troubled years of the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. doubtless not a few of them found their way to Egypt as emigrants or captives, and became the nucleus of the colonies that existed later at Alexandria and Cairo.[4] Meanwhile the province of Samaria, by virtue of its geographical position and accessibility, was open to foreign influences. Under the Syrians the city of Samaria continued to be a Gentile centre and the seat of civil administration, as it had been during Persian supremacy. The Samaritans apparently escaped extreme persecution during this early period. This is to be attributed to the fact that they were not disturbed as were the Jews by party factions, and that they held aloof from political movements. However, 2 Mac ($5^{23f.}$ 6^{2}) implies that in the 2nd cent. they were included by Antiochus Epiphanes in the repressive measures employed by him against the Jews.[5] Hellenizing influences may well have served to consolidate them more and more and to

[1] Cf. 2 Ch 11 and 1 K 12^{21-24}, 2 Ch 13^{4-12} and 1 K $15^{3, 4}$, and see Stade-Bertholet, ii. 75 f.

[2] The authenticity of these verses was questioned by Edersheim, but they are now generally accepted (cf. R. Smend, *Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach erklärt*, Berlin, 1906, p. 491). Various OT passages have been thought without sufficient reason to contain references of like purport to the Samaritans. Cheyne so interpreted Is 65 and 66^{1-22} (*Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, New York, 1898, p. 25 f.), but a more probable interpretation can be suggested (cf. Montgomery, p. 70 f.).

[3] Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. ii. 2, XX. vi., *BJ* II. xii. 3; cf. *GJV*[3] ii. 17.

[4] Jos. *Ant.* XII. i., XIII. iii. 4.

[5] Josephus charges the Samaritans with a lapse from faith under Antiochus IV.; but this accusation may have been born of Jewish prejudice, since their subsequent history seems to disprove the charge (*Ant.* XII. v. 5).

mark them off from the other inhabitants of the district as a distinct sect. In any event it was during this obscure period that they came to wear the aspect under which we know them in later days.

A new crisis in Samaritan history was brought about by the remarkable rise of the Maccabæan princes of Judæa. These leaders gradually extended their conquests northward until they not only mastered Shechem and Mt. Gerizim, but also captured and destroyed the city of Samaria itself. Once established, the Jewish dominion continued, with one or two possible interruptions, down to the days of Pompey and Roman supremacy (63 B.C.). At the time of the destruction of the temple on Mt. Gerizim by John Hyrcanus in 128 B.C.,[1] we can well believe that the Samaritans were called upon to endure other hardships besides the loss of the place and privileges of worship. Roman dominion must have brought most welcome release from the oppression of their hated Jewish rivals. For a time they once again enjoyed a position of relative religious independence, which was not disturbed when they passed under the rule of Herod and then of Archelaus.

Very little is known of the part played by the Samaritans in the Jewish war of A.D. 66–70. Quite probably they held aloof or acted independently, since they could hardly bring themselves to co-operate with their Jewish adversaries, even though they might have little liking for the tyranny of unprincipled Roman officials.[2] A portion of the sect took part in a fanatical uprising that was quelled by Vespasian with much bloodshed in A.D. 67.[3] In the centuries immediately following the Jewish war there are traditions of measures of repression and persecution under the direction of the Roman authorities;[4] but, through all these trying ordeals, the Samaritans seem to have remained loyal to their faith.

There was a brighter period of considerable material prosperity, as well as of intellectual and religious awakening, in the 4th cent. under the leadership of the national hero Baba Rabba. Marqah, who is honoured by the Samaritans as their greatest theologian, lived somewhat later in the same century.[5] For the most part, however, Samaritan history under the Christian emperors is a tale of disaster. Repeated fanatical outbreaks were forcibly repressed and severest penalties were inflicted. Often these took the form of drastic legal restraint and the abrogation of civil and religious rights. Finally, in A.D. 529 Justinian quelled a formidable uprising with a harshness from which the Samaritans never recovered. Many were killed, others fled, and still others apostatized.

Whether a second Samaritan temple was built after the destruction of the first by John Hyrcanus in 128 B.C. is not certainly known. By some scholars it is supposed that the Romans did permit such a restoration in the 2nd cent. A.D. as a reward for aid given by the Samaritans in suppressing the rebellion of the Jews under Bar Kokhba (A.D. 132–135). This second temple, it is thought, was finally destroyed in A.D. 484.[6]

[1] Jos. *Ant.* XIII. ix. 1, *BJ* I. ii. 6.

[2] The recall and banishment of Pontius Pilate in A.D. 36 was brought about by an unwarranted attack that he had made upon a company of Samaritan pilgrims that had assembled at the call of a false prophet (Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. iv. 1, 2). See also the reference given above to the recall of Cumanus (*ib.* XX. vi., *BJ* II. xii. 1–7).

[3] Jos. *BJ* III. vii. 32. [4] Cf. Montgomery, p. 89 f.

[5] Cf. Montgomery, p. 294 f.; Cowley, *JE* x. 677.

[6] So Cowley, *JE* x. 672, on the basis of *Chronicon Paschale*, *Chron. Abu'l Fath*, and *Chron. Adler*. On the other hand, Procopius, *de Ædificiis*, v. 7, states that there was no rebuilding of the temple. A temple is depicted upon early coins of Neapolis, but doubtless it is the one built by Hadrian and dedicated to the Most High Jupiter (*GJV*[3] i. 651, note 13; cf. Montgomery, p. 91, note 35). The first Christian church on Mt. Gerizim was built in A.D. 484.

Under Muhammadan supremacy the Samaritans had to endure their share of oppression and suffering. Small surviving groups came to be distributed through the larger cities of Palestine. Outside of Nablus, the most important and influential was settled at Damascus.[1] All these communities have long since disappeared, and to-day the sole survivors are found at Nablus, where their numbers have steadily decreased.[2]

5. Religious beliefs.—The faith of the Samaritans was Jewish monotheism, and there is nothing to indicate that it was influenced in any fundamental way by infusions from pagan religions. It has rather every appearance of being an arrested development of Judaism. The Samaritan canon included only the Pentateuch, which was supposed to be the sole source and standard for faith and conduct. The vital spiritual element, which was represented in Judaism by the prophets, was largely lacking. The writings of the prophets of Northern Israel were not received, and would have been lost had they not been kept by the Jews. Modifications in creed came for the most part through a process of accretion under outside influences and not through a living development from within. The dominant trait of Samaritanism was a conservative and tenacious adherence to traditional belief. This characteristic can be traced even in the heretical movements that are treated in art. SECTS (Samaritan).

In doctrinal achievement the Samaritans seem to have reached a climax in the 4th cent. of the Christian era in the work of Marqah. The essential articles of their faith had, however, become fixed earlier during periods of which we have only the most meagre information. Under the Muslims in the 11th cent. there was an epoch of some little literary activity, and still another in the 14th cent., while Phinehas (Finias) was high priest, but neither era seems to have resulted in any material contribution to theology. Declining numbers and the struggle for existence are perhaps largely accountable for this lack of intellectual fruitfulness. At the same time, even under favourable conditions, the Samaritans appear never to have shown any theological originality that was at all comparable to that manifested in Judaism. They were distinguished rather at all times by a rigid, if not turbulent, persistence in their ancestral faith. This darker side is somewhat relieved by the brighter picture of their responsiveness to noble impulses that is presented in the NT.

(*a*) *God.*—The monotheistic confession, 'There is no God but the One' (לית אלה אלא אחד), is an ever-recurring refrain in Samaritan liturgies. It was with this formula, elaborated and adapted in various ways, that they opposed Christian teaching and Gnostic speculation. In all Samaritan literature a constant theme is the unity of God and His absolute holiness and righteousness. He is usually conceived of as spirit, and there are few expressions that suggest His localization. In Marqah there is a tendency towards the hypostatization of the divine attributes, but this cannot be said to be characteristic of Samaritanism. The avoidance of anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions is more marked in the Samaritan Targum than in that of the Jews. At times, however, as in the account of the giving of the Law, the Biblical narrative is closely followed, and it is taught that God wrote the Tables with His own hand and gave them to Moses (Ex 31[18]). The disinclination to ascribe to God any form of sensuous activity is prob-

[1] On Samaritan inscriptions that have been found in Damascus, cf. *SWAW* xxxix. [1903] 127 f.; *MNDPV*, 1902, no. 5.

[2] In 1163 Benjamin of Tudela speaks of 1000 still clinging to the sacred mountain, whereas now there are fewer than 200, who live in a special quarter of the city of Nablus.

ably accountable for the failure of the Samaritans to follow the Jews in developing a doctrine of divine fatherhood, since otherwise such a conception would be in accord with their exaltation of His mercy and loving-kindness. The utterance of the ineffable name of Jahweh was avoided by them as by the Jews, but it was written without hesitation.[1]

(*b*) *The Law.*—The one sacred book of the Samaritans was the Pentateuch, which, they believed, embodied the supreme revelation of the divine will. They taught that it was most intimately associated with the being of God, and they accorded it the highest veneration. To-day the surviving Samaritans have one particular roll which they cherish with jealous care, and for which they claim a great antiquity.[2] Their version of the Law differs from the current Hebrew text in numerous details, but variants of real material importance are comparatively few.[3] One instance of particular interest is Dt 27^4 (cf. Jos 8^{30}), where the Samaritan version makes Moses command the building of an altar on Mt. Gerizim, and not on Mt. Ebal, as in the Hebrew. The charge is often made against the Samaritans that they have tampered with the text of the passage[4], but there is even greater likelihood of an alteration of the original reading on the part of the Jews.[5] At the close of the Decalogue in Ex 20^{17} and Dt 5^{21} the present Samaritan text also has an added command to build an altar and offer sacrifices on Mt. Gerizim.

The Samaritans were always extremely punctilious in the observance of the Law. Even their Jewish opponents recognized their excessive zeal regarding certain commandments. Rabbi Simon, the son of Gamaliel, is reported to have said, 'Every command the Samaritans keep, they are more scrupulous in observing than Israel.'[6] The moral side of the Law was emphasized by the Samaritans, and they were less inclined to theoretical speculation regarding its precepts than were the Jews.

(*c*) *Moses.*—Something of the sanctity of the Law itself was made by the Samaritans to attach to Moses, through whom the Law was revealed. He is for them the one incomparable prophet and apostle of God. Their Targum in Dt 34^{10}, by a change of reading, affirms that none shall rise like unto him.[7] None indeed will be needed, for all things were shown to him in the Holy Mount. There appears to be no particular glorification of his death, but the story of his birth was much embellished and at times took a form that implied pre-existence or a unique creation. His efficacy as mediator and intercessor is highly extolled in later liturgies. Doubtless the advances over Jewish tradition in his exaltation are to be attributed in large measure to Christian and Muhammadan influences, but an additional motive may be found in the fact that the Samaritan Bible did not include a prophetic canon. A measure of compensation for this very serious lack was found in thus venerating Moses, not alone as giver of the Law, but also as the full and perfect embodiment of the prophetic ideal. For them the Messiah, the Restorer, was a figure of lesser importance. Abraham likewise did not play the same significant part that was assigned to him in Jewish teaching, and much the same may be said of Aaron, and this too in spite of the dominance of priestly influence among the Samaritans. The patriarchs and early leaders did receive, however, a considerable measure of honour, and there was a doctrine of the merits of the Fathers, as in the case of the Jews.

(*d*) *Mt. Gerizim.*—The claim that Mt. Gerizim was the one rightful centre for the worship of Jahweh continued to be the chief cause of the bitterest strife with the Jews. The issue was clearly stated by the woman of Samaria: 'Our fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship' (Jn 4^{20}). However favourably disposed towards the Samaritans large-minded Jewish teachers might be at times, the claim for the sanctity of Mt. Gerizim always remained an insuperable and divisive dogma.[1] In seeking to substantiate the extravagant claims for this mountain it was possible to point to many sacred associations gathering about its summit and the immediate locality. Abraham, Jacob, and Joshua had worshipped here; the bones of Joseph were buried near at hand; and the Samaritan Scriptures recorded a special command given through Moses to build an altar on this spot.[2] With such a real basis of tradition it was not difficult to devise further sanctions by identifying Gerizim with Bethel, by making it to be the site of the garden of Eden, the place where altars were built by Adam, Seth, and Noah, the spot of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, the mountain which was still shadowed by the presence of God, and to which at last the tabernacle was to be restored. Even when its temple had been destroyed, the Samaritans still clung devotedly to its slopes; and, whenever the way was open, they celebrated their chief festivals near the site of their former sanctuary.[3]

(*e*) *The Messiah.*—The expectation of a coming Messiah was doubtless cherished by the Samaritans at an early date, notwithstanding the fact that such a doctrine does not properly fall within the limits of Pentateuchal teachings. While the beginning of the hope is undoubtedly to be attributed to Jewish influence, its later development must have been greatly stimulated by the successive hardships and calamities through which the Samaritans were called to pass. Their Targum is silent on the subject, but we have evidence in Jn 4 for the existence of the belief in definite form in the last Christian century. This testimony is confirmed by the ready response of the Samaritans to the claims of a Messianic pretender in the days of Pontius Pilate.[4] In the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr ascribes Messianic hopes to the Samaritans as well as to the Jews,[5] while in the 4th cent. we have in Marqah testimony to the same fact. The first extended treatment of the subject comes, however, from the 14th cent. and, consequently, after an interval that leaves large opportunity for development; but, even so, the primitive character of the hope is apparent when it is compared with Jewish and Christian views.

The name given by the Samaritans to their Messiah is Taheb, 'Restorer.'[6] His office was to

[1] In reading they substitute for Jahweh 'the Name' (שְׁמָא). The malicious charge that they worshipped a God Ashima (עֲשִׁימָא, 2 K 17^{30}) may possibly have come from this practice (cf. Petermann, *PRE*[1] xiii. 372). Equally false was the claim that the Samaritans had a dove-cult (cf. *ib.*; Montgomery, p. 320 f.). For the great variety of names and titles given to God by the Samaritans, see Montgomery, p. 214 f.

[2] They affirm that it was copied by Abishua, the son of Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron. This tradition appears first in the 14th cent. (Abu'l Fath), and consequently the MS in question may be somewhat older.

[3] A brief analysis of the Samaritan variants from the Hebrew is given by E. König, *HDB* v. 68–72.

[4] Cf. Montgomery, p. 235.

[5] Cf. Torrey, p. 322 ff.; E. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, Halle, 1906, p. 545 ff.

[6] Cf. Montgomery, p. 170.

[7] It was held that Dt 18^{15} referred to Josnua alone

[1] Cf. citation above from *Massekheth Kuthim*, p. 162b.

[2] Dt 27^4; cf. previous statement and the note regarding the reading.

[3] For a considerable time during the 18th and 19th centuries they were denied all access to the mountain, and the same was doubtless true of earlier periods.

[4] Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. iv. 1–2. [5] *Apol.* i. 53.

[6] Most probably תהב (תהבה) is derived from the Aramaic root תוב=Heb. שוב. For a discussion of the various meanings

bring in for Israel the age of divine favour, and to restore the Tabernacle and its services to Mt. Gerizim. It was expected that he would be of the house of Joseph and that he would live for 110 years. He apparently was not thought of as divine, but ranked in importance below Moses. After his death and burial there was to come a culmination of evil, and, following this, the day of judgment. In due course of time various passages from the Pentateuch were interpreted in such a manner as to support the doctrine of the Taheb.[1]

(*f*) *Angels.*—There are repeated allusions in early Christian writers to Samaritan disbelief in angels.[2] But such statements must be received with caution, since the angelic messengers of the Pentateuch can never have been altogether overlooked. Furthermore, a belief in an order of higher spiritual beings is attested with certainty for the 4th cent. by the first Samaritan literary remains. And this witness is confirmed by their Targum, which often substitutes the mention of an angel for the name of God. Thus it states that man was made in the image of angels, that an angel spake to Moses from the bush, that Enoch was not, for the angels took him. Originally Samaritan teaching on this subject may have been akin to that of the Sadducees, but with the passing years it was doubtless variously modified. It should be added that, while the existence of angels, both good and bad, was an accepted article of belief, these intermediate agents never played the important part with the Samaritans that was assigned to them in later Judaism and Muhammadanism.

(*g*) *Eschatology.*—The Samaritan doctrine of the future is known to us only in its later developments. It is safe to conjecture that the earliest views were identical with those of the least progressive Judaism of the day. There was the expectation of the Great Day of the Lord, a day of vengeance and recompense.[3] Starting with the belief that this was to bring national vindication, they probably advanced, as did the Jews, to the thought of individual reward for the righteous. Such a teaching is found in the 4th cent. in Marqah, who cherishes the hope of the resurrection and the future life. Accordingly, the assertion of early Jewish and Christian writers that the Samaritans were without such a belief is not true for this period, whatever may have been the case earlier. Paradise was usually pictured as a transfigured Gerizim. The wicked, on the other hand, were to be burned with fire. The possibility of repentance after death seems not to have been cut off altogether, at least not for the faithful who may die in their sins, since for such there are prayers of intercession.[4] The Taheb, at his coming, was to usher in a new age of divine favour (*Rachutha*, רחותה or רצון=Arabic *Ridhwan*) and thus bring to an end the present period of God's displeasure (*Fanutha*, פנותה). According to the Samaritans, this had continued from the day when Eli forsook Mt. Gerizim and established a sanctuary at Shiloh, thus inaugurating the schism of the Jews. In general it should be noted that eschatological speculation did not play the important part with the Samaritans that it did with the post-Exilic Jews, especially in their later apocalypses, nor did it ever have the prominent place that it occupies in Muhammadan teaching.

(*h*) *Festivals.*—We have no account of the earliest festival observances of the Samaritans, but there is no reason to suppose that there was any radical departure from Jewish practice, not at least in so far as this usage was sanctioned by the Pentateuch (cf. Lv 25). After the destruction of the temple on Mt. Gerizim sacrifices were offered only in connexion with the Passover. For a considerable time the Samaritans have been wont to keep this festival on a little plot of ground which they have been able to acquire some distance below and to the west of the summit of the mountain where their temple once stood. Here they encamp with elaborate equipment and in much comfort for the celebration of the Passover and the feast of unleavened bread. No longer do they fear the enemies that formerly made such a protracted sojourn dangerous. Seven lambs have usually been sacrificed in recent years. After having been offered and dressed with due ceremony, they are roasted for several hours in a heated pit and then are hastily eaten with unleavened bread and bitter herbs. All bones and remnants, together with the utensils that have been used in the service, are straightway burned. Everything is supposed to be done in exact accordance with the requirements of the Law (Ex 12).[1]

The feast of Pentecost was kept as the anniversary of the giving of the Law. The solemn fast of the Day of Atonement was observed with greater strictness than by the Jews. Not even children under seven were exempted from this fast, but only nursing infants. Conversation was forbidden, and from sunrise to sunset the day was spent in fasting, vigil, and the reading of the Pentateuch and the liturgy.[2] In connexion with the major celebrations of the Passover of Unleavened Bread, Pentecost, and Tabernacles, there were sacred processions up Mt. Gerizim whenever this was possible. Special liturgical services, made up largely of citations from the Pentateuch, were elaborated in the course of time for these and for lesser occasions.

The sacredness of the Sabbath seems always to have been rigorously guarded by the Samaritans. They allowed no Sabbath day's journey or kindred exceptions, but remained at home except for attendance at the synagogue. The Law was portioned out for reading at their Sabbath services in such a way as to include the whole Pentateuch during the year.[3]

(*i*) *The priesthood.*—The central importance of the priesthood among the Samaritans is noteworthy. It appears that from earliest times the high priest and those associated with him have dominated the community. It is said that in 1623–24 successors in the line of Aaron died out, and that since that time the office has been filled by those who are sprung from the tribe of Levi, being descended from the house of Uzziel, son of Kohath. In later days, at least, the Samaritan calendar was calculated semi-annually by the high priest for an ensuing period of six months, and was delivered to the people at two assemblies (עצרת) held 60 days before the first of Nisan and the first of Tishri respectively.[4] On these occasions the half-shekel prescribed by the Law (Ex $30^{13f.}$) was supposed to be paid to the high priest. These payments, together with the tithes, made up the major part of his very slender income.[5]

6. Writings.—(*a*) *Pentateuch.*—The Samaritan Pentateuch was known to early Jewish and Christian writers, but later

that have been proposed for the name, cf. Cowley, *Exp*, 5th ser., i. 161 ff.; Montgomery, p. 245 ff., and the literature there cited.

[1] Cf. Montgomery, p. 247 f. [2] *e.g.*, Epiphanius, *Haer.* ix.

[3] יום נָקָם לְשִׁלֵּם (Dt 32^{35}). By a change of reading (ליום for לו) this passage was made to support a doctrine of future rewards and punishments. 'Till the Day of Vengeance; till the times when their foot shall slide' (cf. Cowley, *JQR* viii. 569 ff.; Montgomery, p. 240).

[4] Cf. Cowley, in *JE* and in *JQR*, *locc. citt*

[1] Among the earlier accounts of the Passover ceremony that by the German Orientalist Petermann is particularly valuable. He was present in 1853, and has recorded his observations in *Reisen im Orient*, Leipzig, 1860, i. 260–292, and in *PRE*[1] xiii. 378 ff. The present writer has described the Passover of 1903 in *JBL* xxii. [1903] pt. ii. 187–194, and in *ZDPV* xvii. [1904] 194. For recent articles of importance see *Palästinajahrbuch*, viii. [Berlin, 1913], ed. G. Dalman.

[2] *PRE*[1] xiii. 382. [3] *JQR* vii. 134–140.

[4] *PRE*[1] xiii. 382; *JQR* vii. 127. [5] *PRE*[1] xiii. 382.

seems to have been altogether overlooked, until it was rediscovered and brought to the attention of the modern world by Pietro della Valle in 1616. It is written in the Hebrew language and with a script resembling the most ancient Hebrew characters. The urgent need of a critical text is now at last being supplied by the splendid edition of August Freiherr von Gall.[1] There are some indications of the existence of an early Greek version of the Samaritan Pentateuch, but no MSS of such a translation are known to survive.

The paraphrase of the Pentateuch in the vernacular Aramaic known as the Samaritan Targum is doubtless of a very early date, although we have no reliable information as to its beginning. Quite possibly it may go back ultimately to the same traditional oral Aramaic rendering as is represented in the Jewish Targum of Onqelos.[2] Its aim was to reproduce the original Hebrew text with a slavish literalness, and consequently the study of the Targum has not thus far yielded any considerable results for Samaritan teaching. The language of the work is important because it represents the particular form of the Aramaic dialect that was in current use among the Samaritans in the period of their greatest vigour. Their earliest and most important surviving literary productions are written in this language, which, however, differed but little from other dialects of Palestinian Aramaic.[3] An edition of this Targum was begun by Petermann and subsequently completed by C. Vollers.[4]

Under Muslim supremacy, with the passing of the Aramaic vernacular, the Targum was superseded by an Arabic version of the Pentateuch which recent investigators have concluded dates from the 11th century. This, too, is marked by a painstaking adherence to the original Hebrew.

(*b*) *Commentaries.*[5]—Of the expository and controversial literature of the Samaritans very little has survived, and what exists is, for the most part, in MS form. A Midrāshic work of Marqah in Samaritan Aramaic, belonging probably to the 4th cent. A.D., treats of a variety of topics and of Scriptural passages that were of particular interest to the author. Of the later commentaries in Arabic that by Ibrahim ibn Yaqub (15th or 16th cent.) on the first four books of the Pentateuch is the most important.

(*c*) *Liturgies.*—Doubtless the most significant feature of the worship of the Samaritans was always the reading of the Law. To this there came to be added at an early date the use of prayers, hymns, and responses, made up in large measure of Scriptural phrases. The earliest existing collection of such material is the *Defter* ('the Book,' Arab. دفتر, Gr. διφθέρα), which dates from the 4th cent. and consists for the most part of compositions of Marqah and of a certain Amram, who was probably his father.[6] The language is Aramaic, and this dialect continues to be used for liturgical compositions down to the 14th cent., when it is superseded by a decadent form of Hebrew. During the 11th and 12th centuries the *Defter* was extended by the inclusion of later prayers and hymns, and the same thing took place again in the 14th century. In the last-named period the new developments in the liturgy were due to the inspiring influence of Phinehas ben Joseph (1308–63). Special services for the several feasts and fasts were now arranged, and, with various modifications and elaborations, they have continued to be used down to the present time. In all this progress the influence of Jewish teaching and practice is clearly discernible.[7]

(*d*) *Chronicles.*—As historical records the Samaritan Chronicles have little value. They are relatively late, vague, and contradictory, but it is possible that they have preserved at times older sources.[8] An Arabic book of Joshua covering the period from the last days of Moses to the 4th cent. is thought to be a compilation going back to the 13th century.[9] There is a Chronicle called *Et-tholideh* (*Et-taulideh*) which was begun by Eleazar ben Amram in the 12th cent. (1149–50), continued by Jacob ben Ishmael, a priest of Damascus, in the 14th cent. (1346–47), and brought down to modern times, probably by Jacob ben Aaron in 1859–60.[10] It is written in Samaritan Hebrew, with an Arabic translation, and covers the period from Adam to the present. Its most valuable feature is the statement of each successive writer regarding the genealogy of the high priests and leading Samaritan families of his day.

The *Chronicle* of Abu'l Fath is one of the fruits of the renaissance of the 14th century. It is written in Arabic and is compiled from earlier sources. The original author brought his account down to the time of Muslim supremacy, and in some MSS there are continuations by later hands.[1]

The *Chronicle Adler*, so named from its publisher, was compiled in Hebrew from earlier sources in 1900.[2]

(*e*) *Letters.*—Finally, mention should be made of the correspondence that has been carried on between the Samaritans and European scholars during the last 300 years. Two letters, one from Shechem and one from a Samaritan in Cairo, were sent to Joseph Scaliger in the year 1589 in response to inquiries previously made by him.[3] In the next century Samaritan letters were received by Robert Huntington, afterwards bishop of Raphoe, and by Hiob Ludolf, the German Orientalist, while in the 19th cent. there was a particularly valuable correspondence with de Sacy. Within the last half century less important letters have been sent, among others to Kautzsch, Cowley, and Montgomery.[4]

LITERATURE.—Many of the more important works have been mentioned throughout the article. A full Samaritan bibliography is given by J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect; their History, Theology and Literature*, Philadelphia, 1907, pp. 322–346; cf. also A. E. Cowley, *EBi* iv 4264 f., *JE* x. 631; J. H. Petermann, *Reisen im Orient*, Leipzig, 1860, i. 233 ff., 260 ff.; *PRE*[1] xiii. 359–391; J. Mills, *Three Months' Residence at Nablus, and an Account of the Modern Samaritans*, London, 1864; J. W. Nutt, *Fragments of a Samaritan Targum, edited from a Bodleian Manuscript, with an Introd. containing a Sketch of Samaritan Hist., Dogma, and Literature*, do. 1874; M. Heidenheim, in *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für englisch-theologische Forschung und Kritik*, i. [1864]–iv. [1871]; L. Wreschner, *Samaritanische Traditionen mitgeteilt und nach ihrer geschichtl. Entwickelung untersucht*, Berlin, 1888; I. Taglicht, *Die Kuthäer als Beobachter des Gesetzes nach talmudischen Quellen nebst Berücksichtigung der samaritanischen Correspondenz und Liturgie*, Erlangen, 1888; A. E. Cowley, *The Samaritan Liturgy*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1909; *JE*, *EBi*, and *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Samaritans'; *JQR* vii. [1894] 121 ff., viii. [1896] 562 ff., xvi. [1904] 474 ff.; *Exp*, 5th ser., i. [1895] 161 ff.; E. Kautzsch, *PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Samaritaner'; C. C. Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, Chicago, 1910.

WARREN J. MOULTON.

SAMBATYON (or SABBATION).—The Sambatyon, a mythical river which, according to some narratives, runs on six days and rests on the seventh, and, according to others, runs only every seventh day, is mentioned in several of the mediæval Lost Ten Tribes legends. Its situation varies from Caucasia in the north to Arabia in the south, and from India and even China in the east to Ethiopia in the west. The river, although it had then no mystical or Ten Tribes associations, is first mentioned by Josephus.

'It runs in the middle between Arcea, belonging to Agrippa's kingdom, and Raphanea . . . when it runs, its current is strong, and has plenty of water; after which its springs fail for six days together, and leave its channel dry, as any one may see; after which days it runs on the seventh day as it did before, and as though it had undergone no change at all; it hath also been observed to keep this order perpetually and exactly; whence it is that they call it *the Sabbatic river*, the name being taken from the sacred seventh day among the Jews.'[5]

Pliny[6] also mentions the river, but in his account it runs on six days and rests on the seventh. It was in the latter character that Rabbi Akibab referred to it as evidence of the sanctity of the Sabbath.

In the Middle Ages the river was frequently mentioned in the writings of Christians and Arabs as well as of the rabbis, and apparently there was a wide-spread belief in its existence. It was closely interwoven in the legends of Prester John (*q.v.*), and in fact it was practically impossible to accept the authenticity of that potentate without

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[1] Giessen, 1914; three parts, including Gen., Ex., and Lev., have thus far been received in America.

[2] So Cowley, *JE* x. 677. [3] Cf. Kautzsch, *PRE*[3] xvii. 438.

[4] *Pentateuchus Samaritanus*, Berlin, 1872–91.

[5] Cf. Cowley, *JE* x. 677 f.; Montgomery, pp. 294–297.

[6] A full collection of liturgical texts, ed. Cowley, was published in two vols. by the Clarendon Press in 1909. The introduction describes the MSS used, and collects the known facts regarding the several authors of liturgical compositions, together with genealogical tables. There is also a glossary of the Aramaic texts and grammatical notes supplementing the treatment of Petermann in his *Brevis Linguæ Samaritanæ Grammatica*, forming pt. iii. of the *Porta Linguarum Orientalium* (Leipzig, 1873).

[7] Cf. Cowley, *The Samaritan Liturgy*, ii. pp. xx–xxv, *JQR* vii. 121 ff.

[8] Cf. Montgomery, p. 308 ff.

[9] T. G. J. Juynboll, *Chronicon Samaritanum . . . cui titulus est Liber Josuæ*, Leyden, 1848; O. T. Crane, *The Samaritan Chronicle or the Book of Joshua*, New York, 1890.

[10] Published by A. Neubauer, in *JA*, 1869, p. 385, and Heidenheim, *Vierteljahrsschrift*, iv. [1871] 347 ff.

[1] E. Vilmar, *Abulfathi Annales Samaritani*, Gotha, 1865; R. Payne Smith, *The Samaritan Chronicle of Abu'l Fatah*, in Heidenheim, *Vierteljahrsschrift*, ii. [1866] 303 ff., 431 ff.

[2] E. N. Adler and M. Séligsohn, 'Une nouvelle Chronique samaritaine,' *REJ* xliv. [1902] 188 ff., xlv. [1902] 70 ff., 223 ff., xlvi. [1903] 123 ff., and reprint, Paris, 1903. The text is accompanied by a good French tr., together with notes.

[3] Cf. Petermann, *PRE*[1] xiii. 371.

[4] Some of the earlier letters were published, with tr., in J. G. Eichhorn, *Repertorium für biblische und morgenländische Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1777–86, xiii. 257 ff., 277 ff. Later correspondence is included in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, xii. [1831] 1–235, under the title *Correspondance des Samaritains de Naplouse pendant les années 1808 et suivant*. For additional literature, cf. Montgomery, p. 6 ff.

[5] *BJ* VII. v. 1. [6] *HN* xxxi. 2 (18).

accepting that of the river also. Eldad Hadani, who visited Europe in the 9th cent., coming, as he said, from the Lost Ten Tribes who were settled in Asia, gave the legend renewed and fortified currency in Jewish circles. According to Eldad's account, the river surrounded the Sons of Moses, a tribe of Levites, and separated their territories from the tribes of Dan, Naphtali, Gad, and Asher, who dwelt in the land of Cush. It was full of sand and stones, but had little water.

'The stones make a great noise like the waves of the sea and a stormy wind, so that in the night the noise is heard at a distance of half a day's journey . . . and this river of stone and sand rolls during the six working days and rests on the Sabbath-day. As soon as the Sabbath begins, fire surrounds the river, and the flames remain till the next evening, when the Sabbath ends. Thus no human being can reach the river for a distance of half a mile on either side; the fire consumes all that grows there.'[1]

Prester John places the river in India.

'Know that from the stone-sea flows a river, which comes from Paradise, passing between us and the great country of the mighty Daniel, king of the Jews. This river flows all the week-days, but remains quiet on the Sabbath-day. When full, this river carries a great quantity of precious stones, consequently no one can pass it except on the Sabbath.'[2]

In another account, the letter to the Emperor Frederick, it is stated:

'On one side of our country is a river, on the border of which all kinds of excellent spices are found. Near to it is another river, full of stones, which falls into the ocean which flows between the sea and the Nine Tribes of Israel. This river runs all the week till the Sabbath-day, when it rests; it carries large and small stones to the sea, like a river of water does; consequently the Nine Tribes of Israel cannot pass the river.'[3]

The Italian-Jewish traveller, Obadiah di Bertinoro, writing in 1489, mentioned, on the authority of some Muhammadan traders, that the river was to be found at a distance of fifty days' journey inland from Aden, where it separated the territories of the Children of Moses from other Jewish tribes.

'This river rolls stones all the week-days and rests only during the Sabbath-day; it is therefore impossible for any Jew to go there without profaning the Sabbath.'[4]

Obadiah learnt from another source that Prester John had entirely defeated the Jewish tribes. A few decades earlier, however, a report was current in Jerusalem to the effect that the Sambatyon had dried up and that the Jewish tribes had crossed and had attacked Prester John. Abraham Farissol (1451–1525 ?), the Italian-Jewish scholar and geographer, identified the Sambatyon and also the river of Gozan (2 K 17[6]) with the Ganges, which he believed separated the Indians from the Jews. He placed Prester John also in that region. Abraham Yagel, another Italian-Jewish scholar (16th and 17th centuries), held similar views. Quoting unpublished letters of Maimonides, he said:

'As to your question concerning the Ten Tribes, know ye that their existence is quite certain, and we expect daily their arrival from the dark mountains, the river of Gozan, and the river Sambatyon, places where now they are hidden away. This river flows all the week-days, and rests on the Sabbath. Indeed in the time of my learned and pious grandfather, a bottle was brought filled with the sand of this river, which sand was in movement the six days, and rested on the Sabbath. This is a true fact, for more persons have seen it with their own eyes.'[5]

Yagel mentioned the Sambatyon on several occasions in the course of his writings. He quoted a Christian, named Vincenzo Milano, who said that he had spent twenty-five years as a prisoner of the Turks and in the course of his journeys with them had visited the river.

In his account the river 'is full of water all the week-days, so strong that it rolls along great stones and a quantity of sand, so that no ship dare venture upon it; but on Friday towards sunset, the river rests, and becomes quite dry, so that a child can cross it. It is said that the river is in some places one and a half, three and four miles broad . . . ships which venture or it lose their way; indeed no ship is yet known to have returned safely from this river.'[1]

In the year 1630 a Jerusalem Jew, Rabbi Baruch, is said to have found himself in the neighbourhood of the river and to have been given a letter from the Children of Moses and neighbouring Jewish tribes to be delivered in Jerusalem. There seems no reason to doubt that a letter purporting to come from the Lost Tribes did exist, for there is considerable evidence to that effect, but regarding its authenticity there is much room for doubt. Baruch's account of the Sambatyon agrees with that of Eldad Hadani.

Manasseh ben Israel repeated in his *Hope of Israel* most of the statements that had previously been made regarding the Sambatyon, in whose existence he believed. He added that a book on the subject was written by two Polish Jews in the year 1634, but was at the instigation of the Jesuits ordered by the senate at Breslau to be burnt. Manasseh also tells a story of a glass of Sambatyon sand being mysteriously agitated. He quotes his father as his authority.

'He told me there was an Arabian at Lisbon, who had such an hour-glass: and that every Friday at evening he would walk in the street called the New Street, and show this glass to Jews who counterfeited Christianity and say, "Ye Jews, shut up your shops, for now the Sabbath comes." Another worthy of credit told me of another hour-glass, which he had some years before, before the Port Mysketa. The Cadi, or Judge of that place, saw him by chance passing that way, and asked him what it was. He commanded it to be taken away, rebuking the Mahomedans that, by this, they did confirm the Jewish Sabbath.'[2]

As late as 1847 one hears of the existence of the river Sambatyon, on the authority of the governor of Aden. In that year a messenger from Tiberias arrived at Aden on a journey in search of assistance for the Jews of the Holy Land. The governor is reported to have advised him to visit the great Jewish kingdom some forty days' journey inland from Aden, the discovery of which, he stated, he had reported to London. The discovery of that great and wealthy kingdom, the governor added, had converted him to the belief in the advent of the Messiah and the return of the kingdom to Israel. But Sambatyon was not there. The governor added that there was another Jewish kingdom in China and that there the river Sambatyon was to be found.

LITERATURE.—A. Neubauer, 'Where are the Ten Tribes?' *JQR* i. [1889] *passim*; M. Seligsohn, art. 'Sambation,' in *JE*; I. Abrahams, art. 'Sabbation,' in *EBr*[11]; Manasseh ben Israel, *The Hope of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1650; David Kaufmann, 'Le Sambation,' in *REJ* xxii. [1891] 285 ff.

ALBERT M. HYAMSON.

SĀṂMITĪYAS.[3]—Details as to the position of this sect in the development of the Buddhist Church are given in the so-called 'genealogies of the sects,' found in the *Kathāvatthu*[4] and in several Tibetan sources.[5] They are conflicting. Two points are ascertained: (1) the Sāṁmitīyas were a branch of the Vātsīputrīyas and were sometimes styled 'Vātsīputrīya-Sāṁmitīyas';[6] (2) they constituted, in the days of Yuan Chwang, one of the most important sections of the Saṅgha.[7] They

[1] *Sammelband*, iv. 42. [2] *The Hope of Israel*, p. 27.

[3] See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 148; *Dipavaṁsa*, v. 46, has Sammiti; the forms Sammitīya and Sammatiya are also known. The Tibetan *maṅ pos bkur pa*, or *kun gyis bkur pa*, means 'honoured by many,' 'honoured by all'; for Chinese equivalents see Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, Petrograd, 1860, p. 231.

[4] Tr. in S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy* (*PTS*), London, 1915.

[5] Vasumitra, in Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*; Bhavya, in W. W Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884; Tāranātha, *Gesch des Buddhismus in Indien*, Petrograd, 1869, pp. 175, 271. See the summaries of H. Kern, *Hist. du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde*, tr. G. Huet, 2 vols., Paris, 1901, and cf. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy*, preface; see also art. SECTS (Buddhist).

[6] *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, MS Burnouf, fol. 473.

[7] See T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1905, *passim*.

[1] See Eldad Ha-Dani's *Diary*, printed by A. Jellinek, in *Beth ha-Midrasch*, Leipzig, 1853-78, pt. v. pp. 17-21; also *JQR* i. [1889] 102.

[2] *Sammelband* of the Meqiṣa Nirdamim, Berlin, 1889, iii. 14.

[3] *Ib.* iii. 19.

[4] *Jahrbücher für die Gesch. der Juden und des Judenthums*, iii. [1863] 222.

[5] *Sammelband*, iv. 37 *f.*; and G. Oppert, *Der Presbyter Johannes in Sage und Geschichte*, Berlin, 1864, p. 18.

were both a sect and a school; *i.e.*, they had a special rule of discipline—viz. as concerns the undergarment, the girdle, remedies, and beds[1]—and they maintained a number of philosophical tenets. Many of these tenets were admitted by the schools (not sects) of a later age—the Vaibhāṣikas, *e.g.*—and also by some of the old sects.

Of the views of the Sāṁmitīyas[2] the following seem worthy of notice. (1) An *arhat*, *i.e.* a saint already in possession of *nirvāṇa*, a *jīvanmukta* (*q.v.*), can fall away; this opinion was common; its importance has been emphasized and exaggerated by J. P. Minayeff.[3] (2) There is an 'intermediate state' (*antarābhava*); *i.e.*, the dying consciousness creates a shortlived being which finds the right matrix where the dead being is reborn—a view shared by many sects (Vaibhāṣikas, Tāntṛikas).[4] (3) As concerns *karman*, (*a*) there is a *paribhogānvaya puṇya* distinct from the *tyāgānvaya puṇya*; *i.e.*, while there is a merit in giving (*tyāga*), there is also a merit accruing to the giver by the use (*bhoga*) which a monk makes of the object given;[5] (*b*) the 'orthodox' strictly understood morality as 'abstaining from (killing, etc.)' (*virati*); but the 'declaration' (*vijñapti*) by which a monk binds himself under the obligation of non-killing, etc., is also a moral act; (*c*) such a *vijñapti* creates the kind of action that is styled *avijñapti*;[6] independently of any further mental action, a man who has 'declared' that he will not kill, etc., goes on accumulating merit.[7] (4) The most important tenet of the Sāṁmitīya creed (and of the Vātsīputrīya creed) is the *pudgalavāda*, the belief in a *pudgala*, a sort of person or soul. Whereas the other tenets of the school are the common property of many sects, the *pudgalavāda* is severely criticized by all the non-Sāṁmitīyas (or non-Vātsīputrīyas) and appears as a form of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* or *śāsvatadṛṣṭi*, belief in permanence, belief in *ātman*—a view obviously condemned by Śākyamuni and the scriptures of every sect without exception.[8]

According to the *Kathāvatthu*, the chief scriptural authorities of the Sāṁmitīyas are a number of texts[9] which point to the existence of some transmigrating entity; the Sanskrit sources, including Uddyotakara,[10] lay the stress of the discussion on the *Bhārahārasūtra*,[11] 'the *sūtra* of the burden-bearer,' which describes the *pudgala* as a 'bearer.' In short, the five *skandhas* (the physical and intellectual 'constituents' of the Ego) are the burden; to desire (*tṛṣṇā*, 'thirst') is to shoulder the burden; to give up desire is to lay down the burden; the bearer is the *pudgala*—*e.g.*, 'this monk, of such a name, of such a family, living on such food, living so many years.' Now, is it not clear that the bearer (*pudgala*) is not the burden (*skandhas*), that there is an Ego independent of the so-called 'constituents' of the Ego? Thus say the Sāṁmitīyas. But the answer is at hand: 'The desire, owing to which the *pudgala* shoulders a new burden at each new birth, is evidently a part of the burden itself.' The simile therefore is not to be understood strictly.

While they maintain that the *pudgala* is different from the *skandhas*, the Sāṁmitīyas admit that the *pudgala* is not non-different from the *skandhas*; technically the *pudgala* is 'indescribable' (*avāchya*); it cannot be described either as different or as non-different from the *skandhas*.[1] A favourite argument is the attitude of Buddha to the so-called 'unsettled question,' Is the living principle or soul (*jīva*) the body or not?[2] Buddha condemns both alternatives; he admits the existence of a *jīva*, but refuses to state the relations of the *jīva* with the body. The 'orthodox' answer is that a thing which cannot be described as different or non-different (*sattvānyatva*) is really no thing. No answer can be given to the question, Are the fruits of the mango-trees in the palace of Milinda sweet or bitter?, because there are no mango-trees in the palace of Milinda.[3] In the same way there is no *pudgala* or soul (*jīva*):[4] its 'undenotability' establishes its non-existence.

The present writer believes that the position of the Sāṁmitīyas is a good and truly Buddhistic one. If we try to state it in plain language, we should say that the relation of the *pudgala* to the *skandhas* is like the relation of the whole (*avayavin*) to its part (*avayava*). The Sāṁmitīyas do not maintain that there is a soul existing *in se* apart from the *skandhas*—just as there is no whole apart from its parts, no cloth apart from its threads—but they say that a man is something more than a collection of *skandhas*: he is a *pudgala*, 'a monk of such name, of such family, living so many years.' All these characters, while they belong to the whole, do not belong to the parts or to the constituents; the whole is made up of parts, but it is lacking neither in unity nor in continuity. The *pudgala* cannot be said to be transitory (*anitya*), like the *skandhas*, since it transmigrates, laying down the burden (*skandhas*), shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent (*nitya*), since it is made of transitory constituents. The orthodox say that there are parts (threads), but not a whole (a cloth); that there is a series (*saṁtāna*) of states of consciousness, but not a 'serial entity' (*saṁtānin*); and the orthodox are right so far; but are the Sāṁmitīyas wrong when they choose to style *saṁtānin* the very processus (*saṁtāna*) of states of consciousness?

The only known treatise where the views of the Sāṁmitīyas are explained by themselves is the *Sāṁmitīyaśāstra* or *Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra*, a book translated into Chinese between A.D. 350 and 431.[5] Until it has been studied, we are dependent upon the statements of the 'orthodox.' It is worth while to remark that they recognize that 'the doctrine of *pudgala* has been taught by Buddha.'[6]

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

[1] See I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, pp. 7, 66, 140; on the geographical repartition of the sect see preface, p. xxiv.

[2] The tables of C. A. F. Rhys Davids (*op. cit.*) are excellent; see also Wassilieff, pp. 252, 257 (*Saṁkrāntivādin*); Rockhill, p. 193; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 148 (a curious theory on the fourteenfold *parivāra*: production of production, etc.).

[3] *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, tr. R. H. Assier de Pompignan, Paris, 1894, ch. ix., 'Les Doctrines hérétiques.' The schools which maintain that an *arhat* may fall agree that he will in any case recover his state before dying (*Abhidharmakośa*, ch. vi.).

[4] See L. de la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 83, *JA* ii. [1902] 295; *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. iii.

[5] See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 309 f., and *Kathāvatthu*, vii. 5.

[6] xv. 11.

[7] See artt. KARMA and RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Indian); those three opinions are held by the Vaibhāṣikas.

[8] Accordingly the Vātsīputrīya-Sāṁmitīyas are styled *antaścharatīrthika*, 'infidels within the church' (*Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 60, *fin.*).

[9] *Itivuttaka*, § 24; *Saṁyutta*, iii. 149; *Petavatthu*, iv. 7. 3; *Majjhima*, i. 482; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 97.

[10] *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 342.

[11] *Saṁyutta*, iii. 25, tr. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 159, and E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du buddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844, p. 507; see *JA* ii. [1902] 266; *JRAS*, 1901, pp. 308, 573 (notes by the present writer and E. Hardy); also A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, p. 112; Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 225.

[1] See *Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, ad ix. 60, *fin.*; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, pp. 64, n. 3, 192, 283, n. 4, 529; *Madhyamakāvatāra* vi. 146; Bhavya, *ap.* Rockhill, p. 194; Vasumitra, *ap.* Wassilieff, p. 252.

[2] See art. AGNOSTICISM (Buddhist).

[3] From the Northern *Milindapañha*, as quoted in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*; see S. Lévi, *CAIBL*, 1893, p. 232.

[4] *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 389 (the five 'things' which do not exist).

[5] See B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 272.

[6] See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, pp. 248, 276, 357.

SAMOA.—See POLYNESIA.

SAMOSATENISM. — It was apparently in A.D. 260 that Paul, a native of Samosata and a *protégé* of Zenobia, queen of Palmyra,[1] succeeded Demetrianus as bishop of Antioch. He had the title of *ducenarius*, from which it may be inferred that along with his bishopric he held high office under Odenathus and Zenobia and was probably governor of Antioch. Not long after his elevation to the episcopate his mode of life and his unorthodox teaching began to cause scandal. A contemporary description of him, taken from an encyclical letter of the Synod of Antioch, to which reference will be made below, is still preserved.[2] It may be exaggerated in detail, but it cannot be wholly misleading.

In that document it is asserted that Paul, though in his youth he had been poor, and though he had neither inherited property nor prospered in business, had amassed great wealth by acts of sacrilege (ἱεροσυλιῶν) and by extortion and deceit. He was vain, ostentatious, and fond of notoriety, preferring the title of *ducenarius* to that of bishop, attending to his correspondence as he walked in public, surrounded by his guards, and preceded and followed by crowds. Even in ecclesiastical assemblies (σύνοδοι) he must have his bema and lofty throne and *secretum*, like the rulers of the world; and in his discourses he used violent gesticulations and demanded uproarious applause, as if he were in a theatre. Moreover, he made insulting attacks on the Biblical interpreters of former days, bragging of himself as a sophist. He put a stop to the customary psalms addressed to the Lord Jesus Christ, calling them modern compositions, and had psalms sung to himself by women in the midst of the church on Easter Day. He did not forbid his adulators to describe him, even in his presence, as an angel from heaven—conduct all the more blasphemous because he denied that the Saviour Himself came down from heaven. He had in his household women who at Antioch were called *subintroductæ* (συνείσακτοι), of whom two accompanied him wherever he went. He also connived at similar practices among his clergy, though some had thereby fallen into sin, that he might bind them to himself. And he lived in luxury and surfeiting.

It seems that in Antioch at this period there was a perpetual synod of bishops, priests, and deacons, somewhat resembling the σύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα of a later date in Constantinople.

That there was a synod in constant session at Antioch seems to be implied by Eus. *HE* VI. xlvi. 3, VII. xxvii. 2. In each of these passages reference is made to 'the synod,' though there is no previous statement that such an assembly had been convened. The synod apparently consisted of such bishops of neighbouring cities and provinces as might be in Antioch, together with a smaller number of priests and deacons.[3] That it was a fluctuating body may be inferred from the words of Eusebius,[4] πάντων οὖν κατὰ καιροὺς διαφόρως καὶ πολλάκις ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ συνιόντων, κτλ. And the inference is supported by the varying numbers of bishops who were present on different occasions. Six wrote a letter to Paul,[5] seventy or eighty voted for his deposition, and between ten and fourteen were responsible for the encyclical epistle which announced it to the Church. These facts give probability to the hypothesis that the epistle was drawn up some time after the condemnation of Paul, when many of those who concurred in it had left Antioch. Further, 'the synod' was actually engaged on the business of Paul for a considerable period. The proceedings against him began before Eusebius, the deacon of Alexandria, became bishop of Laodicea, and lasted till after his death.[6] In his *Chronicle* Eusebius makes the interval between those events five years (273–278). This may be correct, though his dates are too late; there is at any rate no ground for assuming that the episcopate of Eusebius of Laodicea was short. Helenus of Tarsus presided over the synod on two occasions. We may perhaps infer that the bishop of Antioch was not the normal president; for Harnack's explanation that on the first occasion the see was vacant[1] is scarcely tenable: Dionysius of Alexandria seems to have been invited to the synod by the letter in which he was informed that Demetrianus had been elected bishop.[2] In times of special difficulty bishops from distant places were summoned to the assistance of the synod,[3] though the decrees actually ran in the name of the local members.[4] It is clear that Eusebius used the word σύνοδος in this context not only for the council as a permanent body, but also for its frequent meetings.[5] One of these was no doubt the 'final synod'[6]—*i.e.* the meeting at which a final decision was reached—though we need not suppose that it was the last which concerned itself with Paul. As we have seen, the encyclical epistle was probably later.

It was natural that Paul's improprieties should be discussed by this synod; but the irregularity of his conduct was soon overshadowed by the unorthodox teaching attributed to him, with which some of his malpractices had an obvious connexion. Accordingly, about the year 264 the synod called to its aid some eminent bishops, among the rest Firmilian of Cappadocia and Dionysius of Alexandria. Dionysius, now old and infirm, contented himself with writing a letter to the church of Antioch expressing his opinion on the questions at issue. Firmilian attended twice and condemned Paul's doctrine. Through his influence, however, Paul having promised to recant, decisive measures were postponed. But the promise was not fulfilled, and matters at last came to a head. Apparently the fresh proceedings began with the presentation to Paul of a statement of belief by six bishops, with a request that he would inform them whether he assented to it.[7] Subsequently a disputation was held between Paul and a presbyter named Malchion, who was head of the Greek school at Antioch. This disputation was reduced to writing by stenographers. Finally, the synod, including seventy[8] or eighty[9] bishops, deposed and excommunicated Paul and elected Domnus to succeed him in the episcopate. These facts were communicated to the Church throughout the empire in the encyclical already mentioned, which was addressed primarily to the bishops of Rome and Alexandria. It reported the opinions of the heresiarch at considerable length. St. Jerome tells us[10] that it was written by Malchion; and it was certainly based, to a large extent, on the speeches made by him in the course of the disputation. The *Acta Disputationis* and the letter of Dionysius referred to above were enclosed with it.

The principal dates may be determined thus. The epistle of the synod was addressed to Dionysius of Rome and Maximus of Alexandria. It must therefore have been dispatched before the death of the former (26th Dec. 268) had been reported at Antioch. We may assume that the deposition, which was somewhat earlier, took place in 268 at the latest. Eusebius in his *History* wrongly places it under Aurelian; in the *Chronicle* he assigns it to the year 265–266. Paul is unlikely to have been appointed bishop before 260, when Antioch fell into the hands of Odenathus. As his episcopate is said to have lasted eight years,[11] we may therefore infer that it began in 260, and that he was deposed in 268. The proceedings against Paul began before the death of Dionysius of Alexandria (12 Gallienus, the year ending Sept. 265);[12] but the date cannot be fixed more accurately than between 260 and the early part of 265. His expulsion obviously occurred while Aurelian was in Antioch in 272.

Fortunately sayings of Paul are still extant in sufficient number to enable us to reconstruct his system of doctrine in its main lines without having recourse to the unsupported statements of his enemies. It may be summarized as follows.

He held a Monarchianist doctrine of the God-

1 Athan. *Hist. Arian.* 71. 2 Eus. *HE* VII. xxx. 7–14.
3 Eus. *HE* VII. xxviii. 1, xxx. 2; note that at least the first ten of the sixteen named in the latter passage were bishops and at least the last two of lower rank.
4 *Ib.* VII. xxviii. 2. 5 Routh, *Rel. Sac.*[2] iii. 289.
6 *HE* VII. xxxii. 5, 21.

1 *Chronologie*, i. 215. 2 Eus. *HE* VI. xlvi. 3, 4.
3 παρακαλεῖσθαι (*ib.* VI. xlvi. 3, VII. xxvii. 2, xxx. 3); but καλέω of a neighbouring bishop (VII. xxxii. 21). The deacon Eusebius does not seem to have been summoned (VII. xxxii. 5); he may have been sent by Dionysius of Alexandria.
4 *Ib.* VII. xxx. 2.
5 *Ib.* VII. xxviii. 2, xxix. 1; cf. xxx. 9.
6 *Ib.* xxix. 1.
7 Theodoret, *Hær. Fab.* ii. 8; Routh[2], iii. 289 ff.
8 Athan. *de Syn.* 43. 9 Hil. Pict. *de Syn.* 86.
10 *De Vir. Ill.* 71. 11 Harnack, *Chronologie*, i. 95.
12 See C. H. Turner, in *JThSt* i. [1900] 189.

head.[1] He insisted strongly on the unity of God, relying mainly on Dt 6[4]; and he identified the uni-personal God with the Father. But the Word or Wisdom was from eternity (ἀεί) in God, in the same manner as reason (λόγος) is in the heart of man, as an element of his personality. Thus the Word is rightly described as ὁμοούσιος τῷ θεῷ (πατρί), inasmuch as its οὐσία or ὑπόστασις is identical with that of the Father. The Word was begotten of God before the ages and so had a real existence. Though impersonal, it was therefore in a true sense the Son of God. The word was essentially λόγος προφορικός, λόγος ἐνεργός, and therefore attained full existence only in activity. When not active, it may be regarded as dormant in God: it was then not ἐνυπόστατος, almost ἀνύπαρκτος, existed τῷ προορισμῷ; when active, it existed τῇ ὑπάρξει.

The Holy Spirit is not often mentioned by Paul, but always as distinct from the Word. He seems to imply some inferiority of the Word to the Spirit, if he is rightly credited with the pronouncement that the Word had need of the Spirit before it became incarnate;[2] but, on the other hand, Jesus Christ, though begotten of the Spirit, was in no sense divine; it was in virtue of the indwelling Word that he at length 'became God.'

Paul's Christology was Adoptianist.[3] Jesus Christ, begotten of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin, was a mere man. But 'the man' was anointed by the Holy Ghost and for that reason was called Christ. (Once,[4] if our texts are correct, Paul said that through the Wisdom he became Christ.) There is no express statement concerning the time or manner of this anointing. But, inasmuch as we are told that Jesus Christ (not merely Jesus) was begotten by the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin, it may be inferred that it took place at the very moment of conception. Thus Christ was a man like one of us, yet superior to other men in all respects, 'since grace was upon him from the Holy Ghost, and from the promises and from the things that are written' in the Scriptures. So he had a special preparation (κατασκευή), such as was vouchsafed to no other, for the reception of the divine Logos. For the Logos or Wisdom went forth from God and was joined to him. In virtue of his unique preparation, the Logos entered into him, not as into a strange place, but, as it were, coming to its home. It came before his birth, for 'Mary received the Logos.' It had come to others, for Wisdom was in the prophets, and still more in Moses. But it was in Christ in such a manner as it had never been in any other; it took up its abode in him as in a sanctuary; it was in the whole man.[5] Thus dwelling in him, the Logos inspired Christ and through him proclaimed the gospel (Ac 10[36]), as in former times God spoke through the prophets. The Logos was seen in him. By its active indwelling in Christ it attained its true existence; so that it might be said that its being had its beginning from Nazareth. At length it returned to God and resumed its former state in God, as reason is in the heart of man. So Paul seems to explain the significance of the Ascension.

But, though the Logos was in Christ, it did not invest him with divinity. It dwelt in Christ as we dwell in our houses, neither being part of the other. Each retained its own nature. They were not fused together as constituent parts of a single person, having a single essence, though Christ was one with the Logos, and so Son.[6] Christ was a human person, who possessed the Logos as an attribute. As man, in virtue of his nature he suffered; as man, in virtue of the grace bestowed on him by the Holy Spirit, he worked miracles. But, by reason of the indwelling of the Logos, the life of Christ was a continuous progress towards higher things. 'By wisdom he became great.' By the steadfastness of his purpose he was made like to God and remained pure from sin. By contest and labour he conquered the sins of our first parent and established virtue. Finally he became God; *i.e.*, he was united to God in the only way in which unity between persons is possible, by absolute harmony of will. So he attained the title of Redeemer and Saviour of the race. His miracles manifested the harmony of his will with the will of God. Having preserved it inviolable, he is granted the Name which is above every name. His union with God is eternal and will never be dissolved.

Since this deification of Christ seems to have followed by a considerable interval the 'anointing' and the coming of the Logos and to have preceded his contest with sin and the exhibition of his miraculous power, it may probably be connected with the Baptism. It did not entitle Christ to worship as God.[1]

The ultimate source of this theological system has been a subject of dispute. Newman maintained that it was of Jewish origin and was devised in order to secure the favour of Queen Zenobia.[2] But it is improbable that, as Newman assumes and Athanasius states,[3] Zenobia was a Jewess;[4] and the accusation of judaizing which was so often made against Paul, especially by Epiphanius, or the earlier writer whom he followed, may be explained without the aid of this hypothesis. Any teacher who substituted a uni-personal God for the Trinity laid himself open to the charge. The epistle of the Synod of Antioch[5] implies that Paul's doctrine was a modification of that of the heretic Artemas (Artemon). If that be true, the accusation of judaizing must be at least transferred to his spiritual 'father.' It is unfortunate that we know nothing about Artemon except that he was, in the main, a follower of Theodotus the cobbler, that he probably flourished about the middle of the 3rd cent., and that he was apparently still living in 268.[6] But Paul's doctrine of God has striking points of contact with that of Hippolytus, who seems in this matter to have differed little from the Theodotians, while the Christology of Paul approaches closely to that of the earlier Theodotians, and still more to that of the Melchizedekians, a later sect of the same school. Thus the testimony of the epistle is confirmed.[7]

Paul refused to submit to the Synod of Antioch. He continued in possession of the 'house of the church' for four years, protected no doubt by Queen Zenobia and still retaining the office of *ducenarius*, which must have given him formidable means of resisting his opponents. He seems also to have had considerable ecclesiastical support. For Basil the deacon tells us that after his excommunication 'there arose schisms of congregations (λαῶν), revolts of priests, disorder of pastors.'[8] And the epistle of the synod implies as much. It claims indeed to express the unanimous opinion of the assembled ecclesiastics;[9] but it admits[10] the existence of bishops and presbyters of adjacent places — apparently not a few — who 'flattered' Paul, and (as it seems) preached his doctrines. Thus the immediate result of the condemnation of Paul was the formation of his followers into a sect

1 See art. MONARCHIANISM, vol. viii. p. 779.
2 *JThSt* xix. 119.
3 See art. ADOPTIANISM, vol. i. p. 103.
4 *JThSt* xix. 118, frag. viii. 5 *Ib.* p. 116.
6 *Ib.* p. 118, frag. viii.

1 Eus. *HE* VII. xxx. 10.
2 *Arians of the Fourth Century*[3], London, 1871, pp. 4 f., 22 f.
3 *Hist. Arian.* 71.
4 H. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866–78, iv. 295, 297 f.
5 Eus. *HE* VII. xxx. 16. 6 *Ib.* § 17.
7 See *JThSt* xix. 44; cf. Theodoret, *Hær. Fab.* ii. 4.
8 Mansi, *Concil.* iv. 1103.
9 Eus. *HE* VII. xxx. 2; cf. the statement of Eusebius in § 1.
10 § 10.

outside the Catholic Church. It was evidently for some time a powerful rival of the church in Antioch and its neighbourhood, though its influence was probably not strong outside that district. Its adherents were known later as the Paulianists and were nick-named Samosatites and New Jews by Epiphanius, or the author of his source.

It may be supposed that the synod made attempts to dislodge the heresiarch from the 'house of the church'; and it was probably while this struggle was proceeding that Anatolius, formerly deacon of Alexandria, now co-bishop of Cæsarea, first took part in its deliberations.[1] But whatever efforts were made proved fruitless. At length Antioch was wrested from Zenobia by the emperor Aurelian in 272; and, while he was in the city, in response to a petition of the orthodox he decreed that the house should be given to those to whom the bishops of Italy and Rome should award it.[2]

After this we hear nothing of Paul. He probably died or left Antioch soon afterwards. But the sect did not immediately die out. Its second head was Lucian, one of the most famous Biblical critics and interpreters of the age.[3] This we learn from a letter of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, written about 315.[4] Lucian, like Paul, was a native of Samosata. He studied at Edessa under Macarius and afterwards settled at Antioch, where he founded a school and was ordained presbyter, probably by Paul. After the deposition of Paul he remained out of the communion of the Church, as Alexander tells us, under three bishops of Antioch. Since the episcopate of Cyril, Paul's third successor in the see, ended in 303,[5] Lucian must have been reconciled to the Church in that year or perhaps a few years earlier. He was a celibate and famed for his ascetic piety. He suffered martyrdom in 312.

Lucian was the real founder of Arianism.[6] Many of the early Arians and Semi-Arians were his pupils, and did not consciously deviate from his teaching. This need not surprise us; for, though on his re-admission to the Church he must have satisfied the ecclesiastical authorities at Antioch of his orthodoxy, it does not follow that he would have been accounted orthodox by the Nicene fathers. Thus Epiphanius[7] charges Lucian and all the Lucianists with denying that the Son of God assumed a soul (ψυχή), 'for they say that he had only flesh.' This doctrine does seem to have been held by Lucian in his later days;[8] but it is also the reiterated statement of the Synod of Antioch.[9]

The connexion of Lucian with the Paulianists, though the only evidence for it is the statement of Alexander, can scarcely be questioned; and it is important. He seems to have taken no prominent part in the proceedings at Antioch up to 268. In the contemporary documents Paul is represented as the only person with whom the synod had to do; in the final debate Malchion and Paul were the only disputants. But it is clear that the argument on both sides turned largely on the interpretation of passages in the Old and New Testaments.[10] It is impossible to doubt that Lucian, the most learned of Paul's adherents and the founder of the new school of Biblical study at Antioch, was in many instances responsible for the glosses which his bishop put upon them. We do not forget Paul's avowed contempt for the commentators of previous generations. But we may go further. Paul, in spite of the fact that he claimed to be a sophist, was not one who might be expected to elaborate a carefully constructed scheme of theology. He was a man of affairs. Moreover, his life and character could have had no attraction for a pious ascetic student like Lucian. It is most difficult to believe that he was Lucian's teacher. The probabilities are much in favour of the supposition that tradition had reversed the relation which subsisted between the two men. It is at least worth suggesting that Lucian was the author of the heresy of which Paul, by reason of his exalted ecclesiastical position, his prominence in civil affairs, and his popular gifts, was in his lifetime esteemed the head and after his death the originator; in other words, that Paul was the disciple of Lucian, not Lucian of Paul.

The Paulianist sect remained in being for some time after the defection of Lucian, though apparently in an enfeebled condition. Canon xix. of the Council of Nicæa regards it as an existing body; but the enactment concerning the treatment of such of its clergy and deaconesses as desired admission to the Church suggests that it was dwindling away. Later in the same century St. Athanasius hints that its members were divided among themselves on important questions.[1] In the 5th cent. evidences of its existence are not numerous. Pope Innocent I. refers to it as a contemporary sect; but he cannot have known much about it, for in direct contradiction of Athanasius[2] he denies that the Paulianists baptized in the three Names.[3] Theodoret[4] classes them with the heresies which had utterly perished, and the very names of which were known only to a few.

Samosatenism cannot be said to have made any considerable contribution to the development of Christian belief. It was an attempt to revivify a system of doctrine which the common sense of the Church had already rejected. It was overwhelmed by the flood of new teaching let loose by its former exponent, Lucian, the martyr of Antioch.

LITERATURE.—Most of the authoritative documents relating to Paul of Samosata may be read in M. J. Routh, *Reliquiæ Sacræ*[2], Oxford, 1846–48, iii. 285–367. For some which he has omitted see Epiphanius, *adv. Hær.* 65; A. Mai, *Nova Collectio*, Rome, 1825–38, vii. 68 ff.; J. B. Pitra, *Analecta Sacra*, Paris, 1876–88, iv. 183–186, 423–425. The sayings of Paul are collected in *JThSt* xix. [1918] 20–45, 115–120. Accounts of his teaching are given in all works on the history of the Church and of Christian doctrine. See especially I. A. Dorner, *Hist. of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1861–63, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 10–15; A. Harnack, *Die Überlieferung und Bestand der altchr. Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 520–525, *Die Chronologie*, do. 1897–1904, ii. 135–138, *Hist. of Dogma*[3], Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, iii. 38–48. On Lucian see Eusebius, *HE* viii. xiii. 2, ix. vi. 3; Jerome, *de Vir. Ill.* 77; Pseudo-Athanasius, *Synopsis Scripturæ Sacræ*, 77; Philostorgius, *HE* ii. 12, 13; Suidas, and the material collected by Routh, *Rel. Sac.*[2] iv. 3–17. See also Harnack, in *PRE*[3] xi. 659 ff., and his *Überlieferung und Bestand*, pp. 526–532, *Chronologie*, ii. 138–146; H. B. Swete, *Introd. to the Old Testament in Greek*, Cambridge, 1900, pp. 81–86.

H. J. LAWLOR.

SAMOYED.—I. *ETHNOLOGY*.—1. Distribution and number.—Where the coast-line of European Russia is no longer inhabited by Lapps, we find another group of Arctic natives, the Samoyed. Their habitat stretches from the eastern part of the government of Archangel, namely Cheskaya Bay, across the Urals, along the Siberian coast and islands as far east as the Khatonga, between the Yenisei and the Lena. Not all this region, however, is inhabited, the exception being three-quarters of the north-eastern portion of the Taimyr peninsula, which, owing to scarcity of reindeer-moss and of driftwood for fire, is left vacant.

The name 'Samoyed' is perhaps derived from one of the following Russian words: *sam-syebye-yed*, 'self-eater,' 'cannibal' (this derivation is scarcely possible, since cannibalism is not found among the Samoyed); *syryo-yed*, 'raw-eater,' 'raw-meat-eater'; and *sam-odin*, 'alone,' this being the most probable derivation, since 'Samodin' and not 'Samoyed' is the colloquial name for these natives even now. The name 'Samoyed' has also been traced from *Suomi*, the Finnish name for Finland. The Eastern and Taz Samoyed call themselves Nyenach or Khassauo, both words meaning 'man.'

The total number of Samoyed in Europe and

1 Eus. *HE* vii. xxxii. 21.
2 See art. ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY, vol. i. p. 584.
3 *Ap.* Theodoret, *HE* i. 4.
4 *Passio SS. Quattuor Coronatorum*, auctore Porphyrio, § 6, in *AS*, Nov., vol. iii. p. 769; Eus. *HE* vii. xxxii. 2, 4; cf. Harnack, *Chronologie*, i. 217.
5 See art. ARIANISM, vol. i. p. 776.
6 See his *Apologia*, in Routh[2], iv. 6, ll. 8 f., 19 f.
7 *JThSt* xix. 116.
8 *Anc.* 33.
9 *Ib.* vii. xxx. 19.
10 *Ib.* pp. 26, 115 f.

1 *Orat. adv. Arian.* iv. 30.
2 *Ib.* ii. 43.
3 *Ep.* xvii. 10.
4 *Hær. Fab.* ii. 11.

Asia is about 20,000. Those living in Asiatic Russia numbered 12,502 in 1897, and about 14,986 in 1911. Among the Asiatic Samoyed the largest group is formed by the people speaking Yurak Samoyed; in 1911 they numbered 7059. The number of Ostyak Samoyed, or Forest Samoyed, was then 6559, and of Yenisei and Avamsk, or Eastern, Samoyed 1376.

The people speaking the Yurak Samoyed language and the Eastern Samoyed live along the Arctic shore and inland in the mossy or rocky *tundra*, the Ostyak Samoyed in the forests (*taiga*) from the Upper Taz and Baikha rivers to the Tym and Ket, and even as far south as the Chulim, where, however, the population is very much mixed and is Turkic in speech. Still farther south, in the Kansk district, along the Kana, there is a small remnant (about 400) of the Kamashints nation, which is supposed to be of Samoyedic race—at least it seems to have been so linguistically, though Turkic is their principal language at present.

Besides the Kamashints, several other tribes of the Upper Yenisei are held by some scientists to be of Samoyedic descent. These doubtful Samoyed are: the Karagass, the Beltir, the Sagai, the Motor, the Soyot, and various tribes called Tuba, in the Altai-Sayan region. At the present time, however, all these tribes are linguistically and ethnologically more Turkic than anything else.

2. **Language.**—The Samoyed languages belong to the Ural-Altaic linguistic group. Castrén, the first linguist to investigate the Samoyed languages and at the same time one of the greatest authorities on the subject, expressed the opinion that the Samoyed languages have 'no nearer relation in the world than the Finnic stock,'[1] and that in fact they form one linguistic family. According to him, the resemblance lies in the fact that in both Finnic and Samoyedic the process of agglutination has made far more progress than in Mongolic, Tungusic, or even Turkic, and also in the great number of root forms they have in common. He conceived Finno-Samoyedic as forming a bridge between Indo-European and Ural-Altaic.[2] Later Finnish linguists have contradicted Castrén's theory. Thus Finsch,[3] quoting Bergroth, says that, while the Ostyak and the Vogul belong to the Finnic linguistic race, the Samoyed have no place in it, and Ahlqvist expresses the opinion that in vocabulary and grammar Finnic and Samoyedic resemble each other no more closely than do Swedish and Portuguese.[4]

Since the Samoyed languages have been less studied than other Ural-Altaic languages, it is perhaps too soon to define the linguistic relationships of these Northern people. With what knowledge we have at present, Castrén's linguistic classification of the Samoyed dialects[5] still holds good. His linguistic division[6] is as follows:

(1) Yurak Samoyed, spoken in the north, from the White Sea to the Yenisei Valley.

(2) Tavgi Samoyed, also spoken in the north, from the Yenisei to the Khatonga by the Tavgi proper and the Avamsk Samoyed.

(3) Ostyak Samoyed, spoken on the Upper Taz, Upper Ob, along the Yenisei (Yenisei-Samoyed), and along the Kana (Kamashints).

Each of these groups may be subdivided into several sub-groups.

3. **Origin.**—There are two main theories as to the geographical position of the original home of the Samoyed.

(1) The first is that they came to their present abode from S. Siberia.[7] Thus Fischer saw in the Samoyed and the Ugrian Ostyak remnants of the ancient and powerful Chud of Mid-Siberia. Pallas[8] believed himself to have discovered some remnants of the Samoyed among the Kamashints, Karagass, Koibal, Motor, Arine, and Assan, all living on the Upper Yenisei at the time of his travels. This was contradicted by the traveller who followed him, Stepanoff,[9] who declared that all these people were Turko-Tatars. Castrén was the next to investigate the racial relationship of these tribes; he stated[1] that in his time only the Kamashints remained Samoyed, and that the others were now Turks, but had traditions of having used other languages in the past. From this statement, and the fact that some of the clan names of these people are similar in sound to the clan names of the Northern Samoyed, Castrén carried his linguistic views into the sphere of ethnology and concluded that the Finnic, Samoyedic, and Turkic tribes all originated in Central Asia, moving from there to the Upper Yenisei and the Sayan mountains.[2] Thus Castrén and his followers believe that the majority of the Samoyed migrated northwards from the Sayan mountains along the Yenisei and then spread to the west across the Urals and to the east as far as the river Khatonga. The Samoyed who remained behind and became Mongolized or Turkicized are the present tribes of Soyot, Koibal, and Karagass, together with the group called Tuba, inhabiting the Upper Yenisei region.[3]

(2) The second theory was advocated by P. J. Strahlenberg[4] as early as 1730 and brings the Samoyed and the Siberian Finns from the west. Strahlenberg believes that they migrated from Lapland, and, in the opinion of modern Finnish investigators, the Samoyed came to their present homes from the Ural district, whence they spread north-west, north-east, and southwards.[5] In any case the well-developed reindeer culture of the Samoyed proves that, from whatever region they originally came, they must have been in the Arctic regions for a considerable time. We know also from the Ostyak traditions[6] that, when this tribe came to W. Siberia (not later than the 11th cent.), they found the Samoyed already there.

4. **Physical type.**—Influenced by Castrén's superficial identification of the Samoyed with the Finnic tribes, too many ethnologists are inclined to see a resemblance between the peoples of these stocks. The first reliable description of the physical characters of the Samoyed was given by A. T. Middendorff,[7] who distinguishes among them two main types—the Mongol type (*e.g.*, the Timansk Samoyed) and the Finnic type (*e.g.*, the Kaninsk Samoyed). For the last ten years the attention of anthropologists (K. I. Goroshchenko, A. A. Ivanowski,[8] and S. I. Rudyenko[9]) has been directed to the resemblance between the Samoyed and the Soyot of the Sayan mountains. But, since the discovery of this resemblance is the result of a comparatively small number of measurements (for some characters the measurements were taken on 20 individuals only), and on the observation of only six anthropological characters (colour of eyes and hair, cephalic index, alveolar index, stature, and length of lower limbs), it is safer to look forward to more exhaustive studies and meanwhile to adopt the classification of Ivanowski,[10] and make of the Samoyed a special anthropological group. This group can be characterized as follows: dark eyes, dark, straight, and coarse hair, yellow-grey skin, short stature with long trunk and short legs, broad heads, long faces, prominent cheek-bones projecting sideways, absence of Mongolian eye-fold, though the eye has usually the Mongolian narrowness and obliquity.

The present writer's anthropological investigation of the Eastern and Taz-Yurak Samoyed compared with the Western Samoyed (from the Urals to the Taz), studied by Rudyenko,[1] seems to show that in all the chief anthropological characters the Eastern and Western Samoyed resemble one another—in fact, are often identical—while the Yurak Samoyed of Taz form a wedge of a slightly different type, taller, with narrower nose, wider forehead, and broader head.

5. **Cultural type.**—The Samoyed have now one of the most perfect Arctic cultures, namely the reindeer culture. They seem to have conquered

1 M. A. Castrén, *Nordische Reisen und Forschungen*, iv. 82.
2 *Ib.*
3 O. Finsch, *Reise nach West-Sibirien im Jahre 1876*, p. 500.
4 Quoted by S. I. Rudyenko, *Antropologicheskiya Izsledovanya Inorodtsev Syevyero-Zapadnoi Sibiri*, p. 109.
5 Castrén, iv. 83 ff. 6 *Ib.* p. 82.
7 J. E. Fischer, *Sibirische Gesch. von der Entdeckung Sibiriens bis auf die Eroberung dieses Landes durch die russischen Waffen*, pp. 120, 123.
8 *Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des russischen Reichs*, ii. 304, 373 ff.
9 A. P. Stepanoff, *Yeniseyskaya Gubernya*, pt. ii. pp. 37, 45 ff.

1 Castrén, iv. 83–86. 2 *Ib.* v. 107–122.
3 D. Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, i. 20.
4 *Das nord- und ostliche Teil von Europa und Asien*, pp. 36, 46.
5 Kai Donner, quoted by F. Nansen, *Through Siberia*, p. 92.
6 See art. OSTYAKS.
7 *Putieshestvie na Syevyer i Vostok Sibiri*, ii. 626 f.
8 K. I. Goroshchenko and A. A. Ivanowski, 'Yeniseyskiye Inorodtsy.'
9 S. Rudyenko, *Antropologicheskiya Izsledovanya Inorodtsev Syevyero-Zapadnoi Sibiri*, pp. 108–110.
10 Supplement to his *Nasyelyenya Zyemnovo Shara*, Moscow, 1912.
11 *Op. cit.*

the severe climate and to have developed the appropriate technique, their culture being very little inferior in this respect to that of the Eskimos and Lapps, and decidedly superior to that of the Tungus; hence they are much less capable than the Tungus of accepting European culture and a settled mode of life. Reindeer culture is based on reindeer-breeding,[1] but fishing, hunting, and trapping seem always to be additional aids in the struggle for existence. The Samoyed who live in the sub-Arctic forest regions have far fewer reindeer, and here hunting and fishing may be said to be their chief, sometimes their only, occupations.

All the Samoyed are wanderers, but superficially they may also be called seasonal nomads, as they live along the rivers, lakes, and seashore in summer, and inland, in the *tundra* or the forest, in winter. Some Archangel Samoyed and some Ostyak Samoyed adopt a settled mode of life.

Though reindeer-breeding is an industry which all Northern Europeans and Asiatics practise, there are great differences in method, pointing to the small degree of contact which the present inhabitants of N. Siberia have with one another. Not only do the terms for the reindeer at different stages of its life vary according to the tribe, but we see too, *e.g.*, that the Samoyed never ride their reindeer, which is a favourite mode of progression among the Tungus; that the Samoyed (and Ostyak) drive from the left side of the sledge, while the Tungus (and Yakut) drive from the right, and so on. Whether the Samoyed evolved for themselves the culture under which they now live or adopted it from the former inhabitants of the country, it is clear that they must have been in the Arctic regions for a very long time to have reached their present stage.[2]

II. *RELIGION.*—The Samoyed, like the other natives of N. Asia, and indeed of the Arctic region generally, are shamanists; *i.e.*, their religion is based on animistic beliefs, and all knowledge of religious secrets is in the possession of a shaman. Nominally only a part of the Yurak Samoyed are still pagan; the rest are members of the Russian Orthodox Church.

1. **The shaman.**—The shaman of the Samoyed of the river Ket must be a man; among the Tavgi Samoyed and the Yurak Samoyed there are often shamanesses. But, although the most successful healing is often achieved by a Yurak Samoyed shamaness, we never find her as a leader of religious ceremonies. This office is reserved for a male shaman. Also, being a woman, she is debarred from offering sacrifices to the domestic gods—a rite which is performed by an elder male member of the family.

In the northern region, far away from the colonists, the shaman's costume is very rich, but among the Ostyak Samoyed of the forest region it is quite plain. This is due to the prohibition of costumes, as well as of shamanistic practices, by the Russian authorities. In a general way, the details of the costume are not unlike those of the costume of the Ostyak shaman;[3] the figure of the ancestor spirit occupies an important place, and the whole universe is represented by various objects embellishing the coat. We find, however, much less iron on the Samoyed shaman's coat than on that of the Ostyak, which, again, has less iron than that of the Yakut and Tungus shamans. The Yurak shamans of the river Taz sometimes have costumes made entirely of skins and furs, reindeer-bone, and mammoth-ivory, but the figure of the sun is usually made of metal.

The shaman is the man who knows the religious secrets and the order of the religious ceremonies. He is an intermediary between the people and the spirits, whose words he interprets. He also acts as an adviser and medicine-man. The office of shaman is often hereditary. The Samoyed call their shaman *tadibey*, and the spirits through which the shaman communicates with the spiritual world *tadebtsy*. The *tadebtsy* act as benevolent or malevolent spirits according to the use which the shaman makes of them.[4] The Yurak Samoyed call the *tadebtsy syaddai* or *syadachi*, and represent them by wooden anthropomorphic figures, which are used in divination in the same way as the divining-ring (*arpa*) is used by the shamans of the Lapps. Among the Ob Samoyed the shaman's spirit is sometimes called *lōz*, *lōh*, or *koika*.

2. **Gods and spirits.**—The name for the shaman's spirits is collective, but each shaman has his own spirits, who accompany him when he is performing his duties. These may be called the shaman's individual spirits. There are three more kinds of spirits: (1) those common to one family—domestic god-spirits; (2) those common to a local group (probably originally to one clan)—ancestor god-spirits; and (3) those common to all the Samoyed—spirits dwelling in the water, stones, and forests.[1]

The domestic gods are called by the Yurak Samoyed *haha* (*hahe*); sometimes they are represented by roots or stones of unusual shape, sometimes by anthropomorphic figures. Usually each family has at least one male and one female domestic god; they are kept covered on a special sledge, the '*haha*-sledge,' which is not used for any other purpose, and, when the family moves, special '*haha*-reindeer' draw the sledge. Women are not allowed to uncover the '*haha*-sledge' or even to take care of the reindeer. Even a shamaness, who has her shamanistic spirit and propitiates the higher clan-god, is not allowed to take care of the domestic gods. The '*haha*-sledge' usually stands behind the *chum* (tent) on the outer side of the place of honour called *si*, which is occupied only by the eldest male of the family.

Some of the spirits common to all the Samoyed, such as the spirits of the water (usually malicious) and the spirits of the bushes (usually benevolent), have local names; but the collective name for the chief spirit-gods, whether common to one group or to all the Samoyed, is *num* (*nim*, *nga*). Sometimes the word *haha* is used not only for domestic deities, but also as a generic term for 'deity' in the same sense as *num*. *Num* also means the thunder and the sky, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the thunder, being a voice of Num, is one of his characteristics, and the sky, being the abode of one of the chief *nums* (usually the ancestor *num*), is thus identified with him. Thus the fact that the same word is used for 'deity' and for 'sky' does not necessarily imply that sky-worship is the highest expression of Samoyed religion. In the Yurak Samoyed tales we meet with expressions such as these: 'Num became summer,' 'I sat until Num dawned'; at the same time 'to pray to Num' is a usual expression, but an individual name is then added to the title Num. The lesser spirits dwelling in natural objects are vaguely defined; the highest beings have their own individual characteristics, often anthropomorphic or zoomorphic. If by the term 'highest god' we understand the one to whom sacrifices are most often made, and who is concerned directly or indirectly with human affairs, then in the highest god of almost every locality we can trace the ancestor of the people. Among the national gods and goddesses common to all the Samoyed are those connected with fertility.

The house-ancestor gods are identified with a material object more often than are the nature-gods. Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a god is to be considered as common to one group only or to all the Samoyed; for, if a small group of Yurak Samoyed lives among the Tavgi Samoyed, it may borrow the gods of the latter, even their ancestral gods.

The chief national gods can travel from one place to another; there are, however, several places, far distant from one another, of which nearly all the Samoyed would have heard as being

[1] See art. PASTORAL PEOPLES.
[2] See artt. OSTYAKS and PASTORAL PEOPLES.
[3] See art. OSTYAKS.
[4] M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, p. 289.

[1] The forest-spirit exists among the Ostyak Samoyed of the forest region.

holy, as the dwelling-places of gods. Such a Samoyed Jerusalem is to be found on the island of Walgach, which possesses several important *nums* (also called *haha*), some of which are related to one another. Thus the three-headed old man Wesako-haha, living in the extreme south-west of the island, is supposed to be the husband of Nyebye-haha (Mother-god), who lives in the central part of the island, while their son, Nyu-haha, lives in the extreme north-west. Islavin[1] thinks that the gods (represented by stone figures) residing in three other northern localities, viz. at Minisei, a peak of the Urals, in the Yaumau Peninsula, and at a place about 20 versts from Mesen, are also sons of Wesako-haha and Nyebye-haha.

The highest gods worshipped by the Yurak Samoyed are Numkympoi ('among the stars'), who watches man from above; Yaumau ('land's end'); and Yahammü ('out of the water'). The meaning of the term Yaumau is, strictly speaking, 'land's end,' but it is also sometimes used to mean 'river-source,' since the mouth of the river—which is called by the Samoyed the river-source—is understood to be at the end of the earth. The same word is used for the name of a peninsula to the west of the Gulf of Ob. Yaumau has never shown himself to man, but has sent him his iron staff (a rod, probably of Russian workmanship), which was found in the *tundra*. This staff is kept by the Yurak Samoyed near the Plakhina sand-banks on the Northern Yenisei and is held by them in great veneration. Then there is Yaumau-Haddaku (*haddaku* = 'grandmother'), goddess of the fishes, who is responsible for good and bad fishing seasons, and who lives at the mouth of the Ob. The outward shapes of Yaumau and Numkympoi are known only to the shamans, who see them in visions and make wooden images of them. These images are not regarded as gods, but only as their representations. The only image which is held to be itself a god is that of Yahammü. It is supposed to have fallen from the sky into a river, whence it was taken by a Yurak Samoyed, and is a stone of sufficiently unusual shape to have attracted the finder's attention. Its size is about that of a child of five, and it closely resembles the figure of a man in a sitting posture, holding the head of some animal by a bridle. This figure is in charge of a great shaman at a spot about 100 versts from the settlement of Tazovskoye, on the river Taz. Since Yahammü has actually 'descended' to men, he is on the whole more esteemed than Yaumau and Numkympoi, though it is the last-named who is always called 'grandfather' and treated as tribal ancestor, while other gods are so addressed only at the moment when sacrifice is being offered to them.

Among the lesser gods is the god-owner of quadrupeds, particularly reindeer. He is called Illibium Parche, and it is said that he needs no sacrifices, for he has reindeer enough, and, besides, he does not help or heal men.

Kai Donner[2] found that along the river Tym the Ostyak Samoyed consider their highest god the 'grandfather of the clan,' who is worshipped under various names, while the Ostyak Samoyed along the river Ket symbolize him by a living bear. The Ostyak Samoyed of Ket believe in the transformation of man into an animal, and *vice versa*. If a man jumps over fallen trees and pronounces certain incantations, he will change into a bear.[3]

Although in a general way we can call the Samoyed polytheists, in practice they are nearer to monotheism. Each Samoyed local group has several gods, but the individual chooses one god, whom he propitiates, while behaving reverently to the others. In the agglutinative language of the Yurak Samoyed there is a special compound expression *Amgenulumhehon*, meaning 'What *num* do you worship?'—a question which people ask one another when they meet for the first time. It often happens that, if one god does not satisfy the needs of the worshipper, he takes up another.

3. **Dualism.**—Since the Samoyed believe that evil must be overcome with evil, it is not possible to make a clear division of their spirits into good and bad, for an essentially 'good' spirit can, as a shaman's assistant, act either for good or for evil. Both the shaman's spirits and the highest clan or tribal spirits are apt to act for good or evil according to circumstances. There are, however, two classes of spirits which are well-defined in this respect. The *haha*, or domestic gods, may be described as a class of good spirits, for we never hear of malevolent actions being performed by them against any one, and they are well-disposed towards the inhabitants of the tent, whom they protect in a passive way against *illike*. The latter can be defined clearly as a class of bad spirits. The chief of all the *illike* is Chir or Non, who lives in the dark north. Whenever there is a storm with lightning, the Samoyed say that Chir is fighting with one of the *nums*. All the other gods are a combination of good and evil, but are benevolent to the men who carefully perform the required ceremonies. The evil spirits are conceived by some Samoyed as dwelling underground, and by others as in the water, and no representations of them are made. The shaman's spirit assistants, especially those of the great shamans, are more evil than good, but they can be beneficent to the petitioner when they use their evil powers against his and the shaman's enemies. Although images of these spirits are made and kept by each shaman, it is dangerous for any one except the shaman who owns the spirits to look at them. During the shamanistic ceremonies, however, they are shown to the public.

4. **Religious ceremonies.**—Among the Yurak Samoyed one of the male members of a family will often offer private sacrifices to their domestic god, but to propitiate the higher gods it is necessary to offer the sacrifice through a shaman. The domestic gods are propitiated by sacrifices of small objects or portions of food, but a sacrifice to the higher gods must take the form of a reindeer or a dog. If a private person sacrifices an animal to the domestic or to the clan gods, care must be taken that no blood is shed. The animal must be strangled by means of a rope twisted round its neck, the ends being held by a man on either side of the victim. While the deer is being choked to death, a third man prods it in the side with a goad, the object being to hasten the sacrifice along the road to the god or spirit for whom it is destined. The sacrifice is accompanied by petitions to the *num* whom it is designed to propitiate, that he may vouchsafe help to the worshippers in return for the sacrifice offered. If blood is shed, a shaman is summoned, and the petitioners await his pronouncement anxiously, hoping that he will only enjoin the sacrifice of another reindeer and say that they had chosen a wrong one or that one was not sufficient. For the shaman may say that the fact that blood came from the nostrils or mouth of the deer signifies that the god desires a human victim, and then somebody will die soon. Some unimportant fishing or hunting expeditions may be started with a private sacrifice, but important ones like the salmon-fishing on the Yenisei can never be started without a shaman.

One of the most important ceremonies of the

1 *Samoyedy, v domashniem i obshchestvennom bytu*, p. 19.
2 Quoted by Santeri Yacobson, 'Sredi Sibirskikh Samoyedov,' *Sibirskaya Zhizn*, no. 90, May 1916.
3 *Ib.*

Samoyed is the sacrifice to Yaumau-Haddaku, goddess of the fishes.

The finest fish of the first catch of the season is opened and cleaned as for eating. It is then impaled on a stick and planted at the water's edge. The head of the fish is turned towards the water, and a small image of the goddess is placed astride its tail, the idea being that the goddess is riding the fish into the water. The entrails of the fish must be very carefully burnt; for, if any part of it is thrown away (as is usually done with the entrails), it will not reach the goddess, who may then do harm to the community instead of sending good fishing.

But the sacrifices are not necessarily all blood sacrifices. Reindeer may be consecrated to the gods without being actually killed, which means that nobody can make use of them. Children may also be consecrated, which means that they must not marry.

Another of the principal Yurak Samoyed ceremonies is the changing of the sledges on which the images of the gods are kept. This takes place once a year in the spring. The most elaborate performance is that connected with the sledge of the god Yahammü.

A shaman is usually the leader of the ceremony. It is a great privilege to make even one small part of the new sledge. Each man who has a share in the making of it kills a reindeer and smears with its blood the part that he has made. The work on the new sledge is carried on only while the sun is shining, and with the dusk every one retires to the *chum*, where the shaman shamanizes. This shamanizing is not for healing the sick, or any other practical purpose, but for the glory of Yahammü. No women or children may be present while the sledge is being made, or during the placing of the god on the new sledge, but they may take part in the shamanistic performances at night. The god is placed on the sledge so that he faces the south, the region of light and life, while the old sledge is placed behind the other, so that its forepart is turned towards the north, the land of darkness and death. In front of the sanctuary of Yahammü a regular forest of old sledges may be seen.

The Avamsk Samoyed, more strictly than the others, hold a sun-festival when the sun returns in January. It is now held only every second year.

It lasts about nine days and must be timed so that the sun will appear on the sixth day. The shaman shamanizes during all the dark hours of the first six days, and the dance begins on the sixth day, *i.e.* the first day of the sun's appearance. Great freedom is observed between young men and young women, but it does not reach anything like that displayed in the orgiastic spring dances of the Yenisei Ostyak. The shaman takes part in the dance, but on this occasion he lays aside his drum and some of his most important garments. Towards the end of the festival the shaman heals the sick and foretells the future. All the shamanistic performances are held in the 'clean *chum*,' a tent specially erected and made of the skins of young reindeer. This *chum* must not be used for taking meals or for any other purpose than that of shamanizing.

5. **The soul.**—The Yurak Samoyed, as well as the Yenisei Samoyed, believe that a man possesses three kinds of soul: (1) the soul through which he feels and thinks (the intellectual soul), (2) the soul-life (the physical soul), and (3) the soul accompanying a man outside himself (the shadow-soul). The soul-life is called *iindad*, and the same word is used for breath and also for the vapour which rises from the bodies of men and animals in winter. Thus the Yurak Samoyed say, '*Iindytte ngaidapta*,' 'He let go his soul' ('He sighed'), and they believe that death is caused by the malevolent spirit Illike Nga carrying away a man's *iindad*.

There is no theory as to what happens to the *iindad* of an ordinary man after it is separated from his body; but the *indad* of a shaman becomes an *iterma*, a spirit more dangerous than benevolent. In spite of the separation of the *iindad* from man and his other souls, the dead are believed to live in their own Land of the Dead in the north and also to have the power of returning to do harm to living men. This belief is shown by the Samoyed custom of moving with their *chums* from the place where a death has occurred and occasionally leaving behind a person at the point of death. Sometimes the body is nailed to the ground during the burial ceremony, and the eyes are as a rule covered with heavy objects. Another custom which may be ascribed to fear of a dead person is that of turning away the head when driving near a tomb. The name of the dead is strictly tabued. The Land of the Dead seems to be at the mouth of a river—the Yenisei among the Yenisei Samoyed, and the Ob among the Yurak. The dead person receives all his belongings to assist him in his other life, which is supposed to be similar to the life that he led on earth. One or more of his personal reindeer are sacrificed, and the antlers are hung on the tomb, which is composed of a wooden box made of drift-wood; usually some of the poles of his tent are also used in its construction. The sledges and other objects are usually slightly damaged; for otherwise, say the Samoyed, the dead man will not have the use of them. There is always a reindeer-skin pouch containing valuables, including Russian money—not gold and silver coins, which the Samoyed value highly, but paper money; or even such paper as the wrappers of tobacco-packets, which resemble paper money in colour. Kai Donner[1] says that the Ostyak Samoyed believe the Land of the Dead to be at the mouth of the Ob and ruled over by a woman, who sends death to the Samoyed through her numerous spirit-assistants. She also regulates birth.

6. **Totemism.**—The social organization, especially the marriage regulations, of the Samoyed have been to a great extent modified or destroyed by contact with colonists. This is shown clearly by the acceptance by the Samoyed of the Russian names given to them at their official baptism, which often leads to their forgetting their own, and also by their acceptance of certain Russian marriage restrictions enforced by Russian law, while they remain true shamanists in the marriage ceremonies. It is therefore difficult to trace their totemism by a study of their exogamy, and it seems doubtful whether a regular relation between the two exists among them. We find clans with plant- and animal-names, but these are by no means exclusive or even in a majority; for alongside of such names we find many others, given to clans for some peculiarity which characterizes their members. Neither in terminology nor in mythology nor in real life do we find any relation between the clan-group named after an animal and the animal itself, such as is found among typical totemists. Thus the clans of the Yurak Samoyed of Obdorsk and Taz include: Horelle, 'bucks'; Nguluchi, 'of the grass'; Lampai, 'the base of the antlers of the buck reindeer'; Maryik, 'the neck of the wild buck reindeer'; Nohoi (Nokhoi), 'of the white fox'; but they have also clans with such names as Yadanye, 'walkers'; Shiallanke, 'runners'; Ngasyedda, 'without feet.'

The tales of the Yenisei Samoyed are rich in names of heroes suggesting totemistic elements: we hear in one tale about a fight between seven *chums* of Grass Fringes (the people of these *chums* would have grass fringes hanging on the back of their winter coats) and seven *chums* of Talnik Fringes (with *talnik*, or dwarf willow, twigs hanging on the back of their winter coats). The power of the first-named comes from their grass fringes, for another hero says to one of them: 'Comrade, how heavy you are; you look very small to me, but you have on your back a grass fringe, one string of which would make a canoe.' There is a hero named White Owl and another named Eagle Buck, but besides these there are heroes called Iron-Cube-Belt, Silver Buttons, Iron Boots, etc. With the exception of the Ostyak Samoyed, the Samoyedic tribes are much more given to ancestor- and hero-worship than to animal-worship. This does not prevent the anthropomorphic gods from having many animal characteristics (*e.g.*, they

[1] *Loc. cit.*

can fly and can change into animals) nor certain animals from having special places assigned to them in the shamanistic mysteries as the shaman's spirit-assistants. As far as is known at present, only the Ostyak Samoyed have any beliefs which can be called totemistic. Itte, the hero of the epic of the Ostyak Samoyed recorded by Kai Donner,[1] had by one of his wives, the daughter of Massullözi, 'Forest-Spirit,' a son, 'Bear-Spirit' (Pärgäikuorgai lözi or Pärgäi-kuorg, *pärgäi* meaning 'bear-spirit'); from this son the Samoyed of the Ket river derive their descent. For this reason they call themselves Kuorgai-tämder, 'race of bears.'

Along the river Tym, Kai Donner found that the name for the forest spirit is Päryä, which must be the same word as occurs in the form Pärgäi-kuorg (Pärgäi-bear).[2] We can hardly reckon the animal monsters with which this epic is filled as traces of totemism; and even Pärgäi-bear is, after all, the descendant of Itte, a man-hero. It is only among the Ostyak Samoyed of the river Ket that the bear rises to the dignity of an ancestral god. Since, as far as is known, these Samoyed are the only ones who personify their ancestral god in animal form, it may be only a local variation in the method of picturing the ancestor. The worshipping of a tribal ancestor is common to all the Samoyed, and endowing him with the form of a bear may merely indicate his unusual origin, having no reference to totemistic beliefs. Much the same can be said about the shaman's spirit-assistants, which are represented by animal forms, though never identified with animals.

7. **Mythology.**—Samoyed mythology is extraordinarily rich not only in variety of motives but also in variety of forms. The two chief forms are the tale which is sung, called by the Yurak Samoyed *syodobobs*, and the tale which is told, *uahanoku*. We do not include in Samoyed mythology any songs, whether the shaman's songs, which are more or less alike among all the Northern natives, or the songs, so characteristic of the Northern Samoyed, which are sung at burials and match-makings. Thus the widower will sing at his wife's funeral a song expressing his sorrow and loneliness, while the young wooer will express his affection in song. These ceremonial songs are disappearing from Samoyed life more rapidly than the myths.

The tales of the Yurak Samoyed and Yenisei Samoyed can be divided according to their contents into customary tales and fantastic tales. Both are to a certain extent hero-tales. The customary tales relate various events in the life of the family or the clan, and are usually put into the mouth of the hero or heroine, who relates them in the first person. This device and the wonderfully artistic and realistic descriptions, obtained by the simplest means, make these customary tales a mine of rich material for the study of primitive mentality as well as of social anthropology. They are full of descriptions of hunting and fishing expeditions, marriage- and initiation-ceremonies, tribal law, and various incidents arising out of love affairs; and, though all are related as they really occur, yet, when touched with the characteristic logic of the primitive mind, they receive a mythical colouring. But it is the other kind of tale that really deserves the name of myth—the fantastic hero-tale, which perhaps originated as a customary tale, but from long ages of oral reproduction has received a hyperbolic form. Many details indicate that this type of Samoyed literature is older than the customary tales. The hero is usually a warrior wandering about in search of adventures. At the same time, he often possesses shamanistic power, or at least meets the great shamans, so that the hero-tales are interwoven with religious beliefs. If the hero is a shaman, it is nearly always his struggle with another great shaman that forms the subject of the tale, and in this case the other shaman is very often of Yakut nationality, since the Yakut shamans have a widespread reputation. In a Yenisei Samoyed tale of the great shaman Kuobaldi, he fights the Yakut shaman first on land, then in the sky, and then under the water.

Far from disappearing with the decline of native life, the customary myths are actually growing. As to the fantastic tales, alongside of the ancient ones new ones occasionally come into existence even now, after the death of a prominent shaman or hunter; there are no more new legends of warriors, since the Samoyed no longer fight.

Although there are no myths concerned only with gods and spirits, these hero-myths have frequent references to them. There seems to be no type of zoological myth among the Samoyed as there is among the Palaeo-Siberians and among the people belonging to the N. Pacific culture-ring generally; but the heroes can temporarily change into animals, or at least assume animal characteristics, though they never cease to be men. To this class belongs the myth recorded by Kai Donner among the Ostyak Samoyed of the forest region along the rivers Ket and Tym, which he calls 'the Samoyed epic of the hero Itte.'[1] Itte's chief struggles were with the giant man-eater, Pünegusse, whom he at last vanquished. Although forced by foreign evil spirits to leave the Samoyed lands, he is expected to return one day to make the Samoyed rich and happy, just as the return of the hero Alba is looked for by the Yenisei Ostyak.[2]

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SANCHUNIATHON. — A. *HISTORICAL NOTICES.*—Sanchuniathon (Gr. Σαγχουνιάθων, Σαγχωνιάθων, Συνιαθων) is said by Porphyry[3] to

[1] *A Samoyede Epic*, p. 6. [2] *Ib.* p. 9.

[1] *A Samoyede Epic*, p. 3 ff.
[2] See artt. OSTYAKS and SHAMANISM.
[3] In Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, ed. Gifford, p. 31a.

have been a native of Berytus (Beirût) who lived before the Trojan war, about the times of Moses and Semiramis, who wrote in the Phœnician language a history of his people and of their religion, based on the records of the cities and the registers of the temples and on records received from a certain Hierombalos (=Jerub-ba'al), priest of the god Ieuo (=Jahweh). This he dedicated to Abibalos=Abi-ba'al, king of Berytus. It was translated into Greek by Philo of Byblos.[1] Philo Byblius[2] says that Sanchuniathon was a man of much learning and curiosity, who searched out a history written by the god Thôth.[3] He also found the secret writings of the *ammouneis* (= *ḥammānîm*, 'sacred pillars').[4] The teaching of Thôth was preserved by the seven sons of Suduḳ, the Kabeiroi, and by their brother Asklēpios (= Eshmun). These stories were allegorized by a certain Thabion and handed on to the prophets and to their successors, one of whom was Eisirios, the brother of Chna (Canaan), who was afterwards called Phoinix (Phœnicia).[5] Many generations afterwards a god Sourmoubelos and Thuro, whose name was changed to Eusarthis, brought to light the theology of Thôth.[6] Suidas calls him 'a Tyrian philosopher, who lived about the time of the Trojan war, who translated into Phœnician a work of Hermēs (Thôth) concerning the origin of things, who wrote in Phœnician on the institutions of the Tyrians, Egyptian theology, and some other matters.' He is also mentioned by Athenæus,[7] by Eusebius,[8] and by Theodoret.[9]

Sanchuniathon is not named by any Greek writer before Philo; but this is no proof of his non-existence, since a Phœnician author would not be known to Greeks unless he were translated. The references in Athenæus, Porphyry, Eusebius, Theodoret, and Suidas are probably all derived from Philo; but this also proves nothing, since Philo's translation was the only form in which Sanchuniathon was accessible to Greek readers. Sanchuniathon is a genuine Phœnician name, Sankun (or Sakkun)-yaton, 'Sakkun has given.'[10] As far as it goes, this is evidence that he was a real person.

B. *THE TRANSMISSION OF SANCHUNIATHON'S HISTORY.*—The Phœnician original of Sanchuniathon, if it ever existed, has perished, and we know only the reputed Greek translation of Philo Byblius (*q.v.*). In 1836 F. Wagenfeld reported the discovery in Portugal of a MS of Philo.[11] This was soon shown to be a fraud, particularly by F. C. Movers.[12] Philo is known to us only from the citations in Porphyry, Eusebius, Johannes Lydus, and Stephen of Byzantium.

The fragments of Philo have been gathered by J. C. Orelli, *Sanchoniathonis Berytii quæ feruntur Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1826). This edition is incomplete and uses a defective text of Eusebius. A better ed. is that of C. Müller, *FHG* iii. [1849] 560–576. Here Gaisford's revised text of Eusebius is followed. The bulk of the quotations of Philo are found in Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* i. 9–10, iv. 16), who uses them in a furious attack on Porphyry to prove that the gods of the heathen are only deified men. Eusebius is ed. by T. Gaisford, *Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicæ Præparationis*, Oxford, 1843; and by E. H. Gifford, 4 vols. in 5, Oxford, 1903 (a more critical ed.). English translations of the fragments of Philo in Eusebius are given by R. Cumberland, *Sanchoniatho's Phœnician History*, London, 1720; I. P. Cory, *The Ancient Fragments*, do. 1826, ²1832, ³ed. R. E. Hodges, 1876, and by E. H. Gifford, in vol. iii. of his ed. of the *Præp. Evang.*

C. *CONTENTS AND COMPOSITION.*—The extracts preserved by Eusebius fall into three groups.

1. **A cosmogony** (i. 10; 33b–34b).—According to this, the beginning of the universe was Dark Air and Chaos dark as Erebus. These correspond to darkness and the Deep (Tĕhôm) in Gn 1[2] and to Apsu and Ti'âmat of the Babylonian creation story.[1]

From Darkness and Chaos sprang Wind (Pneuma) and Desire (Pothos). With this agrees the statement of Damascius[2] that the Sidonians 'before all things place Chronos and Pothos, and Omichles' (=אֹם כל, 'mother of every man'?). Wind corresponds to the Wind of Elohim in Gn 1[2]. Desire is not found in the Babylonian or in the Hebrew cosmogony, but appears as Eros, 'love,' in Hesiod[3] and as Pothos in the theology of the Ophites as reported by Epiphanius.[4]

From the union of Wind and Desire Môt was produced. This Philo defines as 'slime, or putrid water,' which shows that it is an abstract noun formed from the Phœnician and Hebrew word *mô*, or *may*, 'water' (cf. Eth. plu. *mâyat*). It corresponds to the waters (*mayim*) of Gn 1[2] and to Mummu, 'waters,' the offspring of Apsu and Ti'âmat in the Babylonian cosmology.[5] The same idea appears in Egypt.[6] Môt had the form of an egg (following the textual emendation of Bunsen, Renan, and Baudissin). The conception of a world-egg was known in Egypt,[7] in India,[8] and among the Greeks.[9] No trace of this conception is found in Babylonia, unless it be in the splitting of Ti'âmat and setting up of half as the dome of the sky; but it is suggested in Gn 1[2] by the statement that the Wind (or Spirit) of Elohim was *mĕraḥepheth* upon the face of the waters. Even if *mĕraḥepheth* does not mean 'brood,' but 'swoop,'[10] still the word is applied only to birds and therefore hints dimly at the idea of the world-egg.

Within Môt were formed first 'germs of creation,' then 'animals without sensation,' and from the latter grew 'intelligent animals' called *zōphasēmîn* (צפי שמין), which Philo correctly translates 'observers of heaven.' The Aramaic form *semin*, instead of Phœnician *samim* (cf. [Sa]mem-roumos, 34d), is to be set to the credit of Eusebius rather than to that of Philo. All these creatures remained motionless within the world-egg until it opened. This is different from the Babylonian and the Hebrew accounts, which know no creation of plants and animals *in posse* before their creation *in esse*.

Môt then burst forth into light, and sun, and moon, and stars, and the great constellations. As a result of the action of the light, the waters were 'separated' (*διεκρίθη*) and clouds were formed. This corresponds to the Babylonian narrative of the appearance of Marduk, the god of light, who split the body of Ti'âmat into halves and set up the upper half to form the sky, in which he placed the heavenly bodies. It corresponds also to the Hebrew narrative of God's creation of light and His 'splitting' the waters under the firmament from the waters above the firmament and setting the sun, moon, and stars in the firmament (Gn 1[3-10. 14-19]). The meeting of the clouds in the sky caused thunder, and on hearing this the animals that had been formed in the world-egg 'woke up and began to move, on land and sea, male and female.' With this corresponds Marduk's creation of plants and animals in the Babylonian story and the appearance of all forms of life at the word of Elohim (Gn 1[20-25]).

2. **The origin of men and their discovery of the arts** (i. 34b–36a).—The original pair were 'the wind Kolpia and his wife Bâau.' Kolpia=Ḳôl-pîăh, 'voice of a breath,' which suggests the statement of Gn 2[7] that Jahweh 'breathed into man the breath of life.' Bâau=Bôhû, the primal chaos of Gn 1[2]; it corresponds also to the 'dust' of Gn 2[7] into which the breath of Jahweh entered to create man.

The children of Kolpia and Bâau were Aiôn, 'lifetime'=Ḥawwa (Eve), 'life,' and Prôtogonos, 'first-born'=Adam (first) 'man'; 'and Aiôn discovered the food obtained from trees,' which corresponds to Eve's plucking of the forbidden fruit.

The children of Prôtogonos and Aiôn were Génos and Geneá. Génos, 'race'=Enosh, 'mankind' (Gn 4[26]), and Geneá is his female counterpart. They first worshipped the sun, whom they called Beelsámēn, which in the Phœnician language is 'Lord of Heaven' and in Greek Zeus.[11] In like manner Gn 4[26] says of Enosh that he was the first to call upon the name of Jahweh.

The sons of Génos were Light, Fire, and Flame. 'These discovered fire from rubbing pieces of wood together, and taught the use of it.' This recalls the myth of Prometheus and similar Aryan myths. There is no mention of the discovery of fire in Babylonia or in the narrative of the origin of the arts in Gn 4[16-22]; still it is implied by Tubal-ḳayin's invention of the forging of metals (Gn 4[22]). Ḳayin, son of the man (Gn 4[1], J), or Ḳeynān, son of man (Gn 5[9], P), means 'smith,' and the smith's art is impossible without fire. Ḳayin's sacrifice (Gn 4[3f.]) also presupposes the use of fire. The Babylonian

1 See also Porphyry, *de Abstin.* ii. 56.
2 In Eus. *Præp. Evang.* p. 31d.
3 Cf. 34a.
4 32b.
5 39c. d.
6 40b.
7 iii. 126.
8 *Præp. Evang.* p. 9, ed. Gifford, 30d.
9 *De Cur. Græc. affect.*, serm. ii.
10 See art. PHŒNICIANS, vol. ix. p. 893, § 46.
11 *Sanchuniathons Urgeschichte der Phönizier*, Hanover, 1836, *Sanchuniathonis histor. Phoen. libros novem*, Bremen, 1837, Germ. tr., Lübeck, 1837.
12 *Jahrb. für Theol. und christ. Philos.* VII. i. 95 *f.*; see also C. L. Grotefend, *Die Sanchuniathonische Streitfrage*, Hanover, 1836.

1 For similar Greek conceptions see *ERE* iv. 145–148.
2 *De Prim. Princip.* 125, ed. J. Kopp, Frankfort, 1826, p. 385.
3 *ERE* iv. 146.
4 *Hær.* xv. 5.
5 Cf. Damascius, 125.
6 *ERE* iv. 144, § x.
7 A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyp. Religion*, Eng. tr. London, 1907, pp. 26, 31, 157.
8 *ERE* iv. 156 f.
9 *Ib.* p. 148.
10 J. P. Peters, in *JBL* xxxiii. [1914] 81.
11 *ERE* ii. 288, § 8.

fire-god Girru is specially described as the patron of smiths,[1] and Ḳeynān appears as a Sabæan God.[2] It appears probable, therefore, that the original Hebrew legend and other Semitic legends narrated the invention of fire.

From Fire the Giants were born who gave their names to the mountains of Phœnicia. These correspond to the Nephilim, or 'giants' (Gn 6[4] J, Nu 13[33] JE), also to the monstrous brood of Tiʾâmat in the Babylonian creation-story, and to the Giants and Titans of Greek mythology.[3] To this race belonged [Sa]mēmroumos (Shamîm-rûm), which Philo correctly translates Hupsouranios, 'heaven-high.' He was the first city-builder, and therefore corresponds to Cain, the city-builder, in Gn 4[17]. He quarrelled with his brother Ousōos. This is the counterpart of Cain's quarrel with Abel, only here the brother's name is Ousōos, the equivalent of 'Ēsau. The two pairs of hostile brothers Cain and Abel and Jacob and Esau have been confused. Ousōos was a hunter who invented garments of skin. This agrees with the characteristics of Esau in Gn 27[3. 11]. Ousōos originated the use of standing-stones in worship and the pouring of libations of blood upon them. This corresponds to Abel, who first offered bloody sacrifices. After his death he was worshipped as a god. There is abundant evidence that 'Ēsau, 'maker,' was the name of an ancient Canaanite deity.[4]

Sanchuniathon then enumerates six pairs of brothers who were inventors of the arts:

(1) Agreus, 'hunter,' and Halieus, 'fisher'=Phœn. Ṣîd and Dayyōg (Heb. דָּיָג). Ṣîd is known as a Phœnician god.[5] In character he corresponds to Nimrod, the mighty hunter of Gn 10[9].

(2) Chrusor, or Hephaistos, and Zeus Meilichios. Chrusor-Hephaistos=Heb. חָרָשׁ, Phœn. Ḥārōsh, 'smith.'[6] He was 'the discoverer of iron and the method of working it,' and also 'practised incantations and divinations.' This is a play on the two meanings of Ḥārōsh, viz. 'smith' and 'magician.' He is the counterpart of Tubal-ḳayin, or Tubal the smith, the father of every *ḥōrēsh*, or metal-worker (Gn 4[22]). His brother Meilichios=Malliḫ, 'the sailor,' 'invented the hook, and bait, and line, and raft, and was first of all men to make a voyage.'

(3) Technitēs, 'artificer,' and Gēinos-Autóchthōn, 'earth-born aboriginal.' These invented sun-dried bricks and roofs. Technitēs seems to correspond to Heb. *ḳayin*, 'artificer' (cf. Tubal-ḳayin, Gn 4[22]), and Gēinos-Autóchthōn to Adam, who was made out of the ground, *ʾādāmâ* (Gn 2[7 3]19).

(4) Agrós, 'country,' and Agrótēs, 'countryman.' Of the latter 'there is a much venerated statue and a shrine drawn by yokes of oxen, and among the people of Byblos he is named pre-eminently the greatest of the gods. From them came farmers and huntsmen.' Agrótēs seems to represent the local *baʿal* of Byblos.[7] Agrós will then be a minor *baʿal* associated with him. This inventor of agriculture corresponds to Cain, the 'tiller of the ground,' who 'brought of the fruit of the ground' (Gn 4[2c]).

(5) Amunos and Magos (both in acc., Amunon and Magon), 'who established villages and sheepfolds.' In 32b Philo speaks of the secret writings of the *ammouneis* hidden in the temples. This seems to refer to the *ḥammānim* (Heb. חַמָּנִים), or steles.[8] In the inscriptions Ḥammōn, or Ammōn, appears as a god in 'Abd-ḥammōn, 'servant of the stele,'[9] or more frequently Baʿl-ḥammōn.[10] Amunos, accordingly, seems to equal the well-known Phœnician god Baʿl-ḥammōn. Magos (in acc. Magon)=Maʿon, who appears as a god in the place-name Baʿal-Maʿon,[11] or Bēth-Baʿal-Maʿon;[12] also mentioned in Nu 32[38], 1 Ch 5[8], Ezk 25[9], Jos 13[17]; perhaps also in the name of the Arabian people Maʿon.

(6) Misor and Ṣuduḳ (מִשׁוֹר and צָדֶק), which Philo correctly translates 'straight' and 'just.' They are identical with Mesharu, 'equity,' and Kettu, 'justice,' the children of Shamash, the god of justice in the Babylonian religion.[13] Ṣuduḳ, or Ṣedeḳ, is a well-known Canaanite god.[14] He also appears in S. Arabia[15] and in many OT names compounded with Ṣedeḳ.

(7) From Misor Taautos was born, whom the Egyptians call Thouth, the Alexandrians Thōth, and the Greeks Hermes. He was the inventor of writing. This is clearly the Egyptian god Thōth who has been incorporated into the Phœnician pantheon.[16]

(8) 'From Ṣuduḳ came the Dioscuri, or Kabeiroi, or Corybantes, or Samothraces.'[17] The Kabeiroi (*q.v.*), whose cult spread so far in the Greek world, bore the Semitic name כִּבִּירִים, 'the mighty,' and were doubtless genuine Phœnician divinities.

This genealogy is composed out of at least three independent traditions. Prōtogonos is the counterpart of Génos and Autóchthōn. Hupsouranios and also Technitēs and Gēinos are the inventors of houses. Ousōos and also Agrós and Agrótēs are the inventors of hunting. Ousōos, Meilichios, and the Kabeiroi are the inventors of boats.

3. The theogony and war of the gods (36a–40d).—The original pair of gods were (1) Elioun, 'high'=Heb. 'Elyōn,[1] and (2) Bērouth, an abbreviation of Baʿalat Bērūth, 'mistress of Beirût,' or possibly 'mistress of the cypress' (=Aram. בְּרוֹת, Heb. בְּרוֹשׁ, 'who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Byblos').[2] 'Elyon was killed by wild beasts; *i.e.*, he was identical with the Phœnician Adōn, Adonis, 'lord,' the consort of the Baʿalat of Byblos.[3] The children of 'Elyōn were (3) Ouranos, 'sky,' and (4) Gē, 'earth.' Ouranos is Baʿal-Shamim, 'owner of the sky.'[4] He corresponds to the Babylonian Anu, 'the sky,' 'father of the gods.' Earth is named as a Carthaginian goddess in the treaty of Hannibal.[5] A trace of similar conceptions among the Hebrews is found in the formula of Gn 2[4a], 'These are the generations [*i.e.* 'offspring'] of the heaven and of the earth.' Similarly in Hesiod Ouranos and Gē are the parents of the Titans and gods.[6]

The children of Ouranos were (5) Ēlos=Ēl, 'god';[7] Philo translates Kronos (*i.e.* Saturn), in imitation of Hesiod,[8] who makes the Titan Kronos the son of Ouranos; he was the builder of the temple and of the city of Byblos; (6) Baitulos=Bēth-ēl, 'abode of deity,' *i.e.* a *maṣṣēbhāh*, or standing-stone inhabited by a god;[9] in *Præp. Evang.* 37d Sanchuniathon expresses the same idea when he says that 'Ouranos devised the *baitulia*, having contrived to put life into stones'; (7) Dagōn,[10] which Philo translates *sitōn*, 'corn' (=Heb. *dāgān*), and says[11] that he discovered corn and the plough and therefore was called Zeus Arotrios, 'Zeus of ploughing'; (8) Atlas (Phœnician equivalent unknown), whom Ēl threw into a deep pit and buried;[12] this deed Hesiod relates of Ouranos in his treatment of his children, which shows that Philo does not borrow this myth from Hesiod; (9) Zeus Demarous=Baʿal Tamar;[13] he and his brother Ēl waged unsuccessful war against (10) Pontos, 'the sea' (=בעל־ימם). The son of Baʿal Tamar was (11) Melcathros, or Hercules, *i.e.* Melḳart, the Baʿal of Tyre.[14] (12) Astarte='Ashtart[15] was 'the greatest goddess, who reigned over Phœnicia with Baʿal-Tamar and Hadad; she set the head of a bull on her head as a mark of royalty, and, finding a fallen star, she consecrated it as the holy island of Tyre.' (13) Rhea (=Tanit?) in Hesiod is the wife, not the daughter, of Kronos. (14) To Dione=Baaltis, *i.e.* Baʿalat, 'mistress,' Ēl gave the city of Byblos (Gebal). The Phœnicians say that she is Aphrodite. She is evidently the old Baʿalat of Gebal.[16] (15) Eimarmene, 'fate'=Mēnî, 'fate,' a god of the Arabs[17] and of the Nabatæans,[18] is mentioned in Is 65[11]; perhaps also in the personal name Man(n)asseh, 'Mēnî has lifted up.' (16) Hora, 'season'='Ate. Philo has confused the word, עֵת, 'season,'[19] with עָתָא, the god 'Ate.[20]

In company with his brothers and sisters, Ēl waged war on his father, the Sky, and eventually succeeded in emasculating him with a sickle, so that his blood stains the waters of one of the rivers of Phœnicia to this day. This is the counterpart of the war of the gods of light and order against the forces of chaos in the Babylonian creation epic and in the OT, and of Zeus's victory over the older gods in Hesiod, where also the sickle and the emasculation appear, only in Hesiod it is the children of Kronos who overthrow him, while here Kronos and his brethren overthrow their father Ouranos. Sanchuniathon adds that the allies of Ēl were called Eloim, *i.e.* Elohim, 'gods.'

The children of El (Kronos) were as follows: (17) Persephone (Phœnician equivalent unknown); (18) Athene='Anath;[21] the equation of 'Anath and Athene is found in bilingual inscriptions; to her was given the kingdom of Attica; (19) Sadidos=Shaddai (Phœn. נרשר=נרשר in שר, 'client of Shaddai'), whom Ēl slew with the sword; (20) a daughter whose head Ēl cut off; these correspond to the children of Kronos in Hesiod whom their father devoured as soon as they were born; (21) by his sister Astarte, seven daughters, the Titanides, and two sons; (22) Pothos, 'desire,' and (23) Eros, 'love'; by his sister Rhea, seven sons, one of whom was (24) Muth, 'death';[22] (25) by his sister Baaltis, daughters; (26) Kronos (or Ēl) of the same name as his father; (27) Zeus Bēlos (=Bēl, the Babylonian god),[23] the father of (28) Nereus (=Ea?), the father of (29) Pontos (=Baʿal-yammim), the father of (30) Sidon (=Ṣîd)[24] and Poseidon (=Baʿal-Ṣîdōn); (31) by the nymph Anobret='En-ʾobereth, 'overflowing spring,' or 'En-hobereth, 'uniting spring,' he had an only-begotten son called Iedud (Heb. *yĕdîdâ*, 'beloved'); in a time of great danger Ēl arrayed this son in royal apparel, prepared an altar, and sacrificed him.[25] It has often been claimed that this

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1 H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. [1891] 14. 2.
2 *CIS* iv. no. 8, l. 2.
3 *ERE* vi. 198.
4 *Ib.* iii. 183, § 12.
5 *Ib.* § 14; W. W. Baudissin, *Studien*, i. 16; M. Lidzbarski, *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, Berlin, 1898, p. 356.
6 Lidzbarski, p. 281.
7 *ERE* ii. 293.
8 See *ib.* 287, § 5.
9 Lidzbarski, p. 333.
10 *Ib.* p. 289.
11 *Mesha Inscr.* 9.
12 *Ib.* 30.
13 H. Zimmern, *Beitr. zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 90; A. Deimel, *Pantheon Babylonicum*, Rome, 1914, no. 1750; cf. Ps 89[15].
14 *ERE* iii. 183[a], § 15.
15 Baudissin, p. 15.
16 See *ERE* ix. 894, § 72.
17 Cf. *Præp. Evang.* 37b.

1 *ERE* iii. 180, § 13.
2 On the cypress as the sacred tree of 'Ashtart see Baudissin pp. 192–198.
3 *ERE* ii. 118.
4 *Ib.* p. 288[b].
5 Polyb. vii. 9.
6 *Theog.* 104 ff.
7 *ERE* iii. 178, § 1, ix. 889, § 1.
8 *Theog.* 137.
9 *ERE* ii. 287, § 5, iii. 186, § 1, ix. 895, § 3.
10 *Ib.* iv. 386.
11 *Præp. Evang.* 37d.
12 *Ib.* 37a.
13 *ERE* ii. 286[b].
14 *Ib.* ii. 292, ix. 892, § 25.
15 *Ib.* ii. 115.
16 *Ib.* ii. 117, 293.
17 J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1887, p. 25.
18 J. Euting, *Nabatäische Inschriften*, Berlin, 1885, p. 5.
19 Lidzbarski, p. 347.
20 *Ib.* p. 348; see *ERE* ii. 165, 166 end, 168[b].
21 *ERE* iii. 182, § 2.
22 *Ib.* § 10.
23 *Ib.* ii. 296–298.
24 *Ib.* iii. 183, § 14.
25 Cf. *Præp. Evang.* 156d.

story is based upon the Biblical narrative of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, especially because it was found in Sanchuniathon's *History of the Jews*, but there is no evidence of any direct connexion. More probably both stories go back to some common early Canaanite original.

D. *AUTHENTICITY OF THE PHŒNICIAN HISTORY OF SANCHUNIATHON.*—**1. Theory that Eusebius invented the fragments.**—C. A. Lobeck,[1] on the basis of their euhemerism, holds that the reputed extracts from Philo are the invention of Eusebius himself or of another late Christian writer; but this is impossible in view of the strong Semitic flavour of the material. The names of the gods are mainly Phœnician, and the Phœnician words are correctly translated. The extraordinary frequency of *καί* at the beginning of sentences also indicates translation from a Semitic original. The stories have points of contact with the OT, but are so different that they cannot have been derived from it. In their divergences they have analogies in Babylonia and in other parts of the Semitic world. Neither Eusebius nor any other Christian writer of his period possessed the knowledge of Semitic religion necessary for the composition of these fragments. The genuineness of Eusebius's quotations is proved further by the fact that Johannes Lydus[2] gives an extract from the Phœnician *History* that is not found in Eusebius. This shows that he derived his information directly from Eusebius's source and not from Eusebius himself. In the other passages Lydus agrees closely with Eusebius, which shows that the latter has correctly reported his original.

2. Theory that Eusebius derived the fragments from Porphyry.—Eusebius[3] quotes Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, as an authority in regard to Sanchuniathon. Gifford[4] and others think that this shows that Eusebius derived his quotations of Philo from Porphyry. This is unlikely. Eusebius quotes Porphyry only as witness to the antiquity and credibility of Sanchuniathon. He never mentions him in connexion with the extracts, but names only Philo himself. This shows that he had access to Philo's work directly. Lydus also cites Philo, not Porphyry. Porphyry was a Neo-Platonist and defender of the old gods. He was the last man to approve and quote extensively the euhemeristic legends preserved by Eusebius. Still less is it possible that Porphyry invented the fragments ascribed to Philo. It is true that he was a native of Tyre, but he received a Greek education, was a pupil of Plotinus, and spent most of his life in Rome. It is improbable that he possessed the Semitic knowledge necessary for the composition of these extracts; and, as remarked above, they do not agree with his philosophy.

3. Theory that Philo invented the fragments.—F. C. Movers, in his earliest treatise on the subject, 'Die Unächtheit der Fragmente des Sanchoniathon,'[5] pronounced the extracts given by Eusebius an invention of Philo. The claim to have discovered a work that had been hidden by the priests, which in its turn was based upon secret writings of the *ammouneis*, bore on its face the mark of fraud. Philo was a native of Byblos and knew the names of the Phœnician gods and their popular identification with Greek divinities. He derived the stories which he ascribes to Sanchuniathon from Hesiod and other Greek poets and philosophers. This theory, like the foregoing, does not do justice to the strong Semitic character of the fragments and to their analogies in the OT and in other Semitic literatures.

4. Theory that Philo gathered late Phœnician traditions which he worked over to suit his purposes.—Movers in his later works abandoned the extreme view that he held at first and maintained that Philo used genuine Phœnician traditions, but did not find them already collected by Sanchuniathon. This is the view also of Bunsen, Duncker, von Gutschmid, Baudissin, Wachsmuth, and most of the recent writers. This theory does justice to the Phœnician material found in the fragments, but emphasizes the lateness of the tradition as shown in the following characteristics.

(*a*) *Syncretism of the fragments.*—The Phœnician gods are identified with Egyptian and Greek gods, and the mingling of Egyptian, Hebrew, Persian, and Greek ideas in the legends shows, it is said, that the tradition cannot have arisen before the beginning of the Christian era.

In the case of Egypt the only clear borrowing is Thōth, the scribe of the gods and inventor of writing.[1] Here, however, it may be questioned whether this name, like Hermes, is not merely Philo's translation of some Phœnician god of writing, such as Nabu, the antiquity of whose cult in Canaan is attested.[2] Granted, however, that Thōth is original, Egyptian influence on the religion of Canaan began so early that we do not have to wait for the age of Philo for the introduction of this deity into the Phœnician pantheon.[3]

In relation to the OT there are many similarities in the fragments, but there is no evidence that any of the myths are derived from the OT; on the contrary, they are so independent as to indicate that they are both variants of a primitive Canaanite tradition.

Persian influence is claimed in the reference to Zoroaster the Magian in the *Sacred Collection of Persian Records*.[4] This, however, is given by Philo, not as a quotation from Sanchuniathon, but as a new extract from a different work. The other supposed trace of Persian influence is Magos, 'the Magian,' who with his brother Amunos established villages and sheepfolds.[5] The activity of this personage does not point to a Persian origin; and, as remarked above, it is probable that Magos does not mean 'Magian,' but is merely a transcription of the Phœnician name Ma'on.

Greek influence is shown in the identification of the gods of Phœnicia with Greek divinities, but this may be the work of Philo rather than of his Semitic originals. In most cases Philo gives the Phœnician name alongside of the Greek name, and the former may have been the only one in his sources. Movers claims that the supposed Sanchuniathon derives some of his stories from Greek etymologies; *e.g.*, he states that Persephone, Περσεφόνη, 'died a virgin,' which shows that he derived Persephone from *παρθένος* and *φονή*; but this is too far-fetched to be probable. Of Astarte he says that she found a star and consecrated it as the island of Tyre, which shows that he derived 'Ashtart from *ἀστήρ*; but the connexion of 'Ashtart with the planet Venus can be traced back in Babylonia at least as far as the dynasty of Ḫammurabi.[6] It is even possible that *ἀστήρ* may be a derivative from 'Ashtar. It is claimed further that the supposed Sanchuniathon depends upon Hesiod in his theogony and war of the gods. Unquestionably Philo knows Hesiod and follows him in translating the names of the Phœnician gods; but, as remarked before, the numerous deviations from Hesiod show that he is not the source of the narrative. Both Hesiod and Sanchuniathon go back to a common Semitic original.

(*b*) *Euhemerism of the fragments.*—The fragments show throughout the effort to explain the gods as men who have been deified after death for the

[1] *Aglaophamus*, pp. 1265–1279.
[2] *FHG* iii. 571.
[3] 31a.
[4] Eus. *Præp. Evang.* i. 36.
[5] *Jahrb. für Theol. und christl. Philos.* vii. i. 51 f.

[1] *ERE* v. 246a, vi. 330b.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 184, § 6, ix. 894, § 7a.
[3] *Ib.* iii. 184 f.
[4] *Præp. Evang.* 42a.
[5] *Ib.* 35d.
[6] *ERE* vii. 432, § 13.

services that they have rendered to humanity. This feature cannot be attributed to the translator; it lies in the very substance of the material. This theory of the origin of the gods was first given currency by Euhemerus, a contemporary of Alexander the Great. It gained favour, particularly among the Romans, at the beginning of the Christian era and found a fanatical advocate in Philo; accordingly, it is argued that its presence in these fragments proves their origin in the Greek period.

Against this view it may be argued that so-called euhemerism is far older than Euhemerus even among the Greeks[1] and existed still earlier among the Semites. The work ascribed to Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, which certainly depends throughout on Semitic sources, shows as pronounced euhemerism as do the fragments preserved by Philo. The legends in Gn 1–11, preserved not only by P but also by J, show a similar euhemerism. The names recorded both in J's and in P's list of the descendants of Adam are found elsewhere in the Semitic world as gods, but here they have become men, the discoverers of the arts, just as in Sanchuniathon. It seems, therefore, that this feature characterized already the primitive Canaanite tradition which underlay both Sanchuniathon and the OT.

5. Theory that Philo translated an older Phœnician writer.—Influenced by the foregoing considerations, Ewald, Renan, Tiele, and Spiegel accept the genuineness of the Sanchuniathon fragments and believe that Philo has given us a real, if somewhat free, translation. Ewald dates Sanchuniathon in the pre-Davidic age, Tiele in the Persian period, Renan in the Seleucid. Ewald attempts to prove that Porphyry knew the Phœnician original of Sanchuniathon and did not depend on Philo's translation. Renan argues from the scientific spirit of Philo that he would not have been likely to forge a document. It is impossible to prove the existence of Sanchuniathon, since we have only the testimony of Philo; still it is equally impossible to disprove it, so that critical opinion will probably continue to vacillate between this theory and the preceding one.

LITERATURE.—C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, pp. 1265–1279; F. C. Movers, 'Die Unächtheit der im Eusebius erhaltenen Fragmente des Sanchoniathon bewiesen,' *Jahrb. für Theol. und christl. Philos.* VII. i. [1836] 51–94; C. F. Bähr, art. 'Sanchuniathon,' in Pauly-Wissowa, VI. i. [1852]; H. Ewald, 'Abhandlung über die phönikischen Ansichten von der Weltschöpfung und den geschichtlichen Werth Sanchuniathon's,' *AGG* v. [1851–52] 3–68; E. Renan, 'Mémoire sur l'origine et le caractère véritable de l'histoire phénicienne qui porte le nom de Sanchoniathon,' *MAIBL* XXIII. ii. [1858] 241–334; H. Ewald, review of Renan's art. in *GGA* cxiv. [1859] 1441–1447; F. Spiegel, art. 'Sanchuniathon,' in *PRE* xiii. [1860]; W. W. Baudissin, 'Ueber den religionsgeschichtlichen Werth der phönicischen Geschichte Sanchuniathon's,' in *Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1876–78, i. 1 ff.; F. Lenormant, *Les Origines de l'histoire*, Paris, 1880, Eng. tr., *The Beginnings of History*, London and New York, 1883; J. Halévy, 'Les Principes cosmogoniques phéniciens ΠΟΘΟΣ et ΜΩΤ,' in *Mélanges de critique et d'histoire*, Paris, 1883, pp. 331–338; O. Gruppe, *Die griechischen Culte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orientalischen Religionen*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 347–409; F. Lukas, *Die Grundbegriffe in den Kosmogonien der alten Völker*, do. 1893, p. 139 ff.; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905, pp. 396–437; Baudissin, art. 'Sanchuniathon,' in *PRE*[3] xvii. [1906] 452–470 (with full bibliography of the older literature); R. Gottheil, art. 'Sanchoniathon,' in *Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia*, New York, 1895; H. Gressmann, art. 'Sanchuniathon,' in *RGG* v. [Tübingen, 1913] 248; see also the literature under PHILO BYBLIUS, PHŒNICIANS.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

SANCTIFICATION.—1. The term in theology.—In general, sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit of God, in delivering men from the guilt and power of sin, in consecrating them to the service and love of God, and in imparting to them, initially and progressively, the fruits of Christ's redemption and the graces of a holy life.

[1] *ERE* v. 572.

The term ἁγιάζειν is also applied in the NT to (*a*) the reverent recognition or making known of an already existing sanctity (Mt 6[9], 1 P 3[15]; cf. Nu 20[12], Is 8[13], Ezk 20[41]); (*b*) the setting apart of material objects as holy, through their special association with God or with things divine (Mt 23[17. 19], 1 Ti 4[5]; cf. Ex 29[27. 37], Lv 27[16-21])[1]; (*c*) God's consecration of Christ, or Christ's consecration of Himself, to the office and work of the Messiah (Jn 10[36] 17[19]; cf. Ex 40[13], 2 Ch 5[11] 30[17]).

Sanctification is usually the subjective side of salvation (*q.v.*), particularly as viewed in relation to God's purity. That reinstatement of the sinful soul in the divine favour which the term 'justification' describes under the figure of a court of law (with reference to God's righteousness), and which the terms 'adoption' and 'regeneration' describe under the figure of family life (with reference to God's fatherliness), the term 'sanctification' describes in terms of ritual worship (with reference to God's holiness). Just as God's ceremonial purity, in the OT, forbade the near approach of that which was levitically unclean, until its defilement should be purged by the blood of sprinkling, and required that the offering should be withdrawn from profane or common use and dedicated in sacrifice upon the altar, so, in the NT, God's ethical holiness demands that the souls of sinners, who are in themselves unworthy to draw nigh to Him, shall be purged from the defilement of personal sin, sprinkled from an evil conscience through the blood of the everlasting covenant, separated from worldly and profane service, and dedicated to a progressive hallowing in the service and love of God (He 9[11-13] 10[10-14. 19-22. 29] 12[14], Ro 12[1]).

2. NT doctrine.—The following points receive emphasis in the NT. (*a*) The whole process is based upon and conditioned by Christ's perfectly achieved holiness, which grounds and guarantees the sanctification of all His followers and is a perpetual life within them, overcoming sin (1 Co 1[30], Eph 5[26], He 2[11] 10[10. 12. 14] 13[12]; cf. the use of καθαρίζειν, He 1[3], 2 P 1[9]). (*b*) The gift and process of sanctification are primarily traceable to the free grace of the divine consecrating Spirit, normally associated with or taking full effect through baptism (Jn 17[17. 19], 1 Co 6[11], 1 Th 5[23], 2 Th 2[13], Ro 15[16]); yet they also involve, though in a subordinate degree and as a result of the foregoing, the believer's own self-dedication and ethical striving, through faith, strenuous self-discipline, and moral habit (Ac 26[18], 1 Th 4[3-7], Ro 6[19-22], 2 Co 7[1], He 12[14], 1 Ti 4[7]; cf. the use of ἁγνίζειν in Ja 4[8], 1 P 1[22], 1 Jn 3[3]). These two necessary conditions, of human obedience and divine sprinkling, are brought together in 1 P 1[2] (cf. Ph 2[18]). (*c*) Sanctification has no prescribed limits set to it in this earthly life, and it is intended to be finally complete and perfect through the fidelity of God (1 Th 3[13] 5[23], 1 Co 1[8. 9], Eph 1[13. 14] 3[16-19]); yet the term 'sanctified' (present participle) is applicable to all who are renewed in Christ Jesus, to whatever degree of holiness they may have attained (Ac 20[32] 26[18], 1 Co 1[2], He 10[14]). Generally, sanctification (ἁγιασμός), as an act or process, begun by God and ever going on 'in Christ,' is distinguished from holiness or sanctity (ἁγιότης [2 Co 1[12], He 12[10]]) and moral purity (ἁγιωσύνη [1 Th 3[13], 2 Co 7[1]]), which are the state and quality respectively. See, further, art. HOLINESS, and *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Sanctification.'

In historically unfolding and developing the NT doctrine of sanctification the Christian Church has concerned itself chiefly with (*a*) the manner in which grace is related to faith in the work of sanctification, and (*b*) the degree to which sanctification may be carried in the present life.

3. Teaching of Augustine.—The Church's thought on the subject flowed first of all into the moulds provided for it by Augustine. His opposi-

[1] See art. CONSECRATION.

tion to Pelagianism ([*q.v.*] which represented a strong tendency in prior Catholic piety, especially in the East) led him to insist that the whole process of sanctification has its beginning, middle, and end in the grace of God, freely and spontaneously bestowed, man's co-operating effort being itself a divine gift. Further, his view of original sin, and of human nature as radically corrupted by the Fall, led him to conceive that sanctifying grace as a new supernatural impartation of divine life. Finally, his doctrine of the Church led him to regard that infused energy of grace as operating exclusively within the Church through the sacraments—a view not fully reconciled with his doctrine of predestination and the final perseverance of the elect. Augustine never lost sight of the importance of personal love to Christ as a constituent element of Christian holiness; yet the tendency of his system to take a metaphysical and almost physical view of grace (due to the influence of Neo-Platonism) and the absence from it of any due emphasis on the religious preoccupation of faith with the historic redeeming Christ, revealed in the gospel, as the prime factor in the transformation of the Christian's character, profoundly affected the subsequent theology of the Church in this as in other directions.

Augustine in theory allowed for the possibility of perfect sanctification in this life through the special operation of supernatural, irresistible grace; but he somewhat weakened the admission by affirming that, by the judicial act of God, such entire sanctification had never been achieved. 'See how unexampled among men is an instance of perfect righteousness; but yet it is not impossible. For it might be achieved if there were only applied as much of a favourable will as suffices for so great a work . . . Now the fact that this is not realized, is not owing to any intrinsic impossibility, but to God's judicial act.'[1]

4. Mediæval Catholic developments.—The teaching of Augustine was further developed by Aquinas and systematized into the mediæval doctrines of scholastic Catholicism, which received their dogmatic sanction and final form in the decrees of the Council of Trent. Ordinary human nature being incapable of forsaking sin, or meriting salvation, or truly apprehending God, supernatural grace is imparted, as 'aliquod habituale donum naturae superadditum,'[2] to raise the soul to a new level or higher order of being and so enable it to achieve its heavenly destiny and beatitude of knowing, possessing, and enjoying God. This sanctifying grace is derived in the first instance from the inexhaustible treasury of Christ's merit, at the disposal of the Church, and made available by means of sacraments, which prolong and universalize Christ's incarnate activities as Redeemer. From the divine side, the presence of this sanctifying or sufficient grace within the soul remits original sin, imparts a permanent habit of inherent righteousness, and carries within itself the promise and potency of all perfection. Out of it, as from a divine seed, emerges the tree of spiritual life, which branches out into the three theological and four cardinal virtues and yields ultimately the seven ripe fruits of the Holy Spirit. Only by mortal sin can its operations be neutralized or destroyed, the guilt which is contracted subsequently to baptism being removed by the eucharist in the case of venial sins and by the penitential system of the Church in the case of those that are more serious. From the human side, good works or supernatural acts of faith working through love have merit before God and secure increase of grace on that account; yet no such meritorious works are possible without the continuous assistance of actual, co-operating, or efficacious grace, which supplements the sanctifying grace originally bestowed, and mysteriously inclines the will, by its own effort, to give a free assent to righteousness. The resulting process and goal of holiness are spoken of, not as sanctification (which is already bestowed in God's initial act), but as justification, or the actual making just or righteous, through infused grace leading to final perseverance, of him who was once a sinner but can now stand before the bar of God, deserving eternal life.

'Quae [justificatio] non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum; unde homo ex injusto fit justus.'[1]

According to Roman Catholic teaching, there is no particular sin which may not be wholly overcome by sanctifying grace, and no commandments of God which are impossible to the justified;[2] but the perfect eradication of all sin in this earthly life implies such a special infusion of assisting grace that it cannot be predicated of any one save of the Blessed Virgin.[3] Nor can any one be so sanctified during this life as to be able to assure himself that he will not fall from grace.[4] 'The Catholic can obtain the forgiveness of his sins only when he abandons them, and in this view the justified man—the man acceptable to God—is identical in every respect with the sanctified.'[5]

5. Reformed doctrine.—The Reformed doctrine of sanctification differed from the mediæval in laying stress on the category of sin and redemption rather than on that of nature and supernature. Grace did not mean to Luther a supernatural essence or virtually impersonal energy, derived from God and mysteriously yet infallibly infused into the soul by means of the sacraments. That view he found linked, in popular practice, to the immoral system of the sale of indulgences for sin. Rather, grace was conceived by him, more religiously, in the light of the teaching of the NT and his own experiences of inward piety, as the free, unmerited favour of God to sinners, in opening His fatherly heart to them in the forgiving love of Christ. This personal divine grace of Christ in the Holy Spirit, mediated primarily through the Word and only secondarily and derivatively through the sacraments, regenerates the soul and spontaneously evokes in us, in accordance with the laws of moral personality, a childlike confidence or trust (*fiducia*), which at once justifies us before God (thus delivering us from the guilt of sin) and through the further gift of the Holy Spirit continuously sanctifies us (delivering us also from the power of sin), so enabling us to produce good works.

'The soul, through faith alone, without works, is, from the Word of God, justified, sanctified, endued with truth, peace, and liberty, and filled full with every good thing, and is truly made the child of God.'[6]

Sanctification was thus conceived by Luther as the necessary corollary or complement of justification, the fulfilling of the law through love, though never in this life could that goal be perfectly attained.

In his view, 'the gospel . . . while it awakens faith, does not limit itself to the task of bestowing upon that faith forgiveness of sins through Christ, and, by assurance of this, pacifying the conscience. It proceeds further to bestow the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that the soul may exhibit that reciprocity of love towards God which evinces itself in the fulfilling of the law. Although such fulfilment is of course always imperfect, it is still obligatory, because the law is of everlasting obligation.'[7]

The position of Calvinism was very similar, as may be seen from the following statements of the *Westminster Confession* (1647), ch. xiii.:

'(i.) They who are effectually called and regenerated, having a new heart and a new spirit created in them, are further sanctified really and personally, through the virtue of Christ's death and resurrection, by His word and Spirit dwelling in them; the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed, and the

[1] 'On the Spirit and the Letter,' ch. 63, in *Works*, ed. M. Dods, Edinburgh, 1872, iv. 226 f.
[2] *Summa Theol.* II. i. qu. cix. art. 1.

[1] *Council of Trent*, sess. vi. cap. 7. See, further, art. GRACE.
[2] *Ib.* sess. vi. cap. 11. [3] *Ib.* sess. vi. cap. 23.
[4] *Ib.* sess. vi. cap. 9, 13.
[5] J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, tr. J. B. Robertson, London, 1894, p. 116.
[6] 'On Christian Liberty,' in Luther's *Primary Works*, ed. H. Wace and C. A. Buchheim, London, 1896, p. 110.
[7] A. Ritschl, *A Critical Hist. of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, tr. J. S. Black, Edinburgh, 1872, p. 171.

several lusts thereof are more and more weakened and mortified, and they are more and more quickened and strengthened in all saving graces, to the practice of true holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.

'(ii.) This sanctification is throughout the whole man, yet imperfect in this life; there abideth still some remnant of corruption in every part: whence ariseth a continual and irreconcilable war; the flesh lusting against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh.

(iii.) In which war, although the remaining corruption for a time may much prevail, yet, through the continual supply of strength from the sanctifying Spirit of Christ, the regenerate part doth overcome; and so the saints grow in grace, perfecting holiness in the fear of God.'

6. Pietism, Moravianism, and Methodism.—The Reformers, however, largely because of their preoccupation with the Roman controversy and the doctrine of justification, did not fully develop the doctrine of sanctification; nor did it receive much attention from later Protestant scholasticism. A more experimental interest in the subject came with Pietism, Moravianism, and Methodism (*qq.v.*). Here the emphasis shifted from the ecclesiastical method and discipline of holiness, and all abstract theories and theological conceptions of grace, whether Catholic or Protestant, to a more directly personal, emotional, and evangelical inward communion with Christ Himself, as the Divine Sanctifier and ultimate object of faith, love, and adoration. It was claimed that hourly fellowship with Him, through the Holy Spirit, in the thoughts and activities of ordinary life, ought normally to lead to entire sanctification, an unswerving loyalty, at least, of love and fidelity to God.

In defence of this position it was argued (*a*) that it is the office and work of the Holy Spirit to administer as perfect an atonement inwardly as Christ on the Cross has accomplished for us outwardly; (*b*) that Christ Himself bade His followers be perfect; (*c*) that St. Paul contemplated the complete destruction of sin in the believer even in this life (Ro $6^{6.\ 7.\ 11.\ 22}$), and that St. John spoke of the continued presence of sin in the truly regenerate as an impossible event (1 Jn 3^{9}); (*d*) that the NT repeatedly either prays, promises, or exhorts that men should be 'filled with the Spirit,' 'sanctified wholly,' 'perfected in love,' 'redeemed from all iniquity,' 'purified even as He is pure,' 'filled unto all the fulness of God,' 'presented unblamable before God at Christ's coming'; (*e*) that only a non-Christian (Gnostic or Manichæan) view of human nature can regard sin as necessary, and entire sanctification as impossible, for physical reasons; (*f*) that 'evangelical' perfection, or blamelessness of sincere reaction against all sin, and inward consecration to the rule of love, in reliance upon divine grace, is quite compatible with intellectual mistakes, creaturely limitations, and even moral lapses due to transmitted tendencies to evil or the pressure of a hostile environment; (*g*) that sensitiveness to evil, humility arising out of past sin, vicarious penitence before God, and the corporate confession of the sins of others continue to be the marks of true holiness even among the blessed; (*h*) that the moral and spiritual conditions of entire sanctification cannot be affected by the physical fact of death, but must be the same here as they shall be hereafter.

'The NT gives no ground for supposing that there is such an absolute contrast between the conditions of the heavenly life and those of the Christian life in this world that sin must be entirely alien to the one and inevitable in the other. In the absence of such a contrast, the commands, instructions, and prayers which look to entire sanctification or perfect love carry a certain presumption that the state which these terms define is of possible attainment in this life.'[1]

At the same time, it was recognized that, while such a sincere spiritual fidelity of the soul to its opportunities and ideals might be achieved in this life, no guarantee could be given that it would consistently be maintained. See, further, artt. Backsliding and Perfection (Christian).

The revivalist type of piety favoured an experimental and even doctrinal dualism between the soul's imperfect first love in conversion (which might easily cool or become lost) and the 'second blessing' of a perfectly clean heart in sanctification (or the conscious and glad experience of love habitually prevailing in all one's actions). Many, however, thought that this separated justification and sanctification too widely, and claimed that an immediate entrance into full sanctification, *per saltum*, as it were (yet not so as to exclude the progressive enlightenment of the mind and refinement of the conscience), was possible and incumbent upon all Christians. Others went farther and advocated full sanctification in a more absolute sense, denying the possibility of any progressive hallowing of the spiritually loyal will or conscience, as distinct from mere growth out of mental ignorance or mistakes of judgment. See art. Holiness, *ad fin.*

7. Kant.—An entirely new approach to the Christian doctrine of sanctification was made necessary by the revolutionary philosophical thinking inaugurated by Kant. Although reared in the atmosphere of Pietism, Kant broke away from the whole dogmatic system of supernatural or 'revealed' religion on which it rested and based the necessity of holiness solely on the nature of the thinking, experiencing, and acting self, and on the categoric claims of the moral law, without any reference to a theology of grace. Man's ethical nature demands, as its supreme good, the union of perfect virtue and perfect happiness. Such a consummation requires God to guarantee it, freedom to realize it, and immortality to perfect it. In this view, sanctification is construed in terms of moral character alone, and all hope of its being in any sense complete during this earthly life is swept away.

'The perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a *progress in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.'[1]

8. Schleiermacher.—If Roman Catholicism conceived sanctification institutionally, and Kant ethically, Schleiermacher conceived it mystically and subjectively. Growth in holiness is the progressive domination of the God-consciousness within us over the merely sentient and ever morally defective world-consciousness. This is derived by us historically from the perfect and archetypal God-consciousness of Christ and mediated to us spiritually through the redemptive life-fellowship of the Church. Within that fellowship the Holy Spirit rouses our free, loving surrender to the attractive and formative personality of the Redeemer, who in His turn communicates to us, relatively but in ever-increasing measure, His own supreme blessedness and unclouded consciousness of God.[2] It is noticeable that, whereas Kant's moral and individualistic view of sanctification demanded a personal immortality for its perfecting, Schleiermacher's more emotional and social view looked to the perfecting of sanctification in fellowship and was consistent in his mind with an almost impersonal pantheism.

9. Ritschl.—Ritschl's doctrine of sanctification was determined by his governing conception of the Kingdom of God. If in the experience of redemption we find ourselves forgiven and regenerate, it is not with a view to our subsequent personal holiness before God, as a Pietist might say, nor yet with a view to our attaining the freedom of perfect moral character, as Kant might say, but rather with a view to the practical fulfilment of our vocation as members of God's kingdom of goodness, righteousness, and love. This inward experience of redemption, begun in our awareness

[1] H. C. Sheldon, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Cincinnati, 1903, p. 468.

[1] *Critique of Practical Reason*[6], ed. T. K. Abbott, London, 1909, p. 218.

[2] *Der christliche Glaube*[3], Berlin, 1836, §§ 88, 100.

of reconciliation with God and restored harmony with the universe through the inner life of Jesus, historically and spiritually mediated to us through the Church, is consummated by the help of God the Holy Spirit. Ritschl, however, conceived the Holy Spirit, not metaphysically as a Person of the Trinity, but religiously and experimentally as 'the power of the complete knowledge of God which is common to believers in Christ,' 'an attribute of the Christian community,' 'the motive-power of the life of all Christians—a life which, as such, is necessarily directed to the common end of the Kingdom of God.'[1] This indwelling spirit of life imparts justification, regeneration, and sanctification primarily to the Church or community of believers and only secondarily to such individual members as personally appropriate these gifts through faith; since 'it is not permissible for any man to determine his relation to the Holy Spirit by observation of himself, in which he isolates himself from all others.'[2] The result is perfection, or 'faith in the Fatherly providence of God, which maintains a right feeling with God through humility, and with the world through patience, and which expresses and confirms itself through prayer . . . with the disposition to obey the moral law and with good action in one's calling.'[3] Ritschl's repudiation of the Augustinian doctrine of original or transmitted sinfulness, and his own teaching that sin is not the violation of an absolute or statutory moral law, but only a relative failure to fulfil one's vocation in the service of the Kingdom and in the active exercise of patience, humility, and prayer, lead naturally to the view that sanctification may quite well be complete, qualitatively if not quantitatively, during the present life.

'The conception of a moral perfection in the Christian life ought on no account to be associated with the idea of a fruitless search for actual sinlessness of conduct in all the details of life. It rather means that our moral achievement or life-work in connection with the Kingdom of God should, however limited in amount, be conceived as possessing the quality of a whole in its own order . . . the realisation of the universal good within the special limited domain of our vocation.'[4]

10. Modern Christian view.—This modern emphasis on social service and moral sacrificial action as integral parts of true holiness is heartily to be welcomed. 'It has been the bane of evangelical Christianity, and often its perdition, to have severed justification in the cross (or religion) from sanctification in the spirit (or ethic).'[5] It is obvious, however, that in the course of our survey we have already travelled far from the original idea of temple-sprinkling and the conditions of approach to a holy God. Viewed in the light of NT teaching, Ritschl's doctrine is defective in three respects. (*a*) His interest in the practical aspects of religion, and his dislike of mysticism led him to conceive sanctification as a moral and social task of mutual loyalty laid upon the community in its dominion over the world, rather than as a religious privilege, training, and aspiration experienced by the individual in his fellowship with God. (*b*) While he dealt suggestively with the moral vocation of Jesus and His influence upon men as the Founder of the Kingdom and humanity's ideal representative before God, he related inadequately the work of Christ to the divine holiness and righteousness in taking away the sin of the world and so providing a moral and spiritual basis for forgiveness and sanctification. (*c*) He minimized the distinctive testimony of the Christian consciousness as to the nature and function of the exalted Christ and the personal work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification.

It has been the work of subsequent theology to endeavour to remedy these defects. A modern Christian view of sanctification is likely to bring the Roman Catholic doctrine of grace objectively given and the Protestant doctrine of grace subjectively realized into closer relation with one another, by means of a more comprehensive and dynamic doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and so to regard justification and sanctification, not as separate and detached experiences, but as complementary aspects of one vital relationship of union with the living Christ. 'The attitude of faith in justification implies the implicit energy of sanctification.'[1] At the present day there is evidence of a revived interest in the more experimental aspects of Christian holiness. The increase in the number of clerical and lay retreats, prayer-circles, fellowships of silence, conventions for the deepening of spiritual life, and the like, shows that the subject of personal sanctification is again taking possession of men's minds. Of the growingly popular Roman Catholic retreats for working men, *e.g.*, it has been written:

'The effects are lasting. The men have had serious instruction, have faced life calmly and sensibly, have deepened their religious spirit. You meet them coming in from thirty leagues round to make a retreat, and you ask them where they are going; they answer: "To sanctify ourselves."'[2]

See, further, artt. HOLINESS, PERFECTION (Christian), and the literature there cited.

LITERATURE.—See the references in the footnotes.

R. H. COATS.

SANCTION.—See REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, UTILITARIANISM.

SANCTUARY.—See ASYLUM.

SANDEMANIANS.—See GLASITES.

SANDWICH ISLANDS.—See POLYNESIA.

SANHEDRIN.—A certain reaction seems due against what may be termed historical scepticism as applied to the history of Israel. Uncritical acceptance of so-called traditions needed the severest testing and repudiation; but, when this process tends to an equally uncritical denial of all traditions, it must be the function of a true scientific criticism to redress the balance. In brief, legendary embellishments in an olden narrative do not necessarily destroy the whole trust to be placed in it.[3] This judgment applies with special force to the Jewish 'traditions' as to the communal organization in Judæa. Criticism has been inclined to a catastrophic series, while tradition has posited continuity. Thus the 'Great Synagogue' forms the traditional link between the prophets and the teachers of the type who constituted the Sanhedrin.[4] In the Great Synagogue were included, according to one form of the tradition, the latest of the prophets—Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. The activity assigned to the Great Synagogue was clearly meant to represent the completion of the work of Ezra and to account for the internal development during the Persian period, the records of which are so scanty. The functions of the Great Synagogue were taken to be threefold: 'the preservation of the Scriptures, the establishing of the Liturgy, and the foundation of the Oral Law.'[5] Clearly, the 'tradition'

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, tr. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 605.
[2] *Ib.* p. 606. [3] *Ib.* p. 652. [4] *Ib.* pp. 665, 667.
[5] P. T. Forsyth, *The Christian Ethic of War*, London, 1916, p. 86.

[1] H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 319.
[2] C. Plater, *Retreats for the People*, London, 1912, p. 157.
[3] Cf. two articles by the present writer on 'The Two Books of the Maccabees,' and 'The Letter of Aristeas,' in *JQR* xiii. [1901] 508 ff. and xiv. [1902] 321 ff.
[4] *Mishnāh Abhōth*, i. (begin.).
[5] S. Krauss, *JQR* x. [1898] 363.

as to the Great Synagogue based itself on the reports contained in Neh 8–10. The returned exiles had to organize the community round the Second Temple as a centre. Hence the leaders constituted an assembly for the purpose. The traditional chronology regarding the date and contemporaneity of the leaders cannot be defended; thus the Tannaitic chronology treats the whole Persian period as extending over only 34 years. Then Alexander the Great appears, and with him ends the Great Synagogue.[1]

Here, however, we are faced by the consideration to which allusion has been made above. As Bacher cautiously concludes, it must be assumed that *some* governing council of a more or less central character existed throughout the Persian period.[2] It is undeniable that a great change had occurred in the standard of conduct and in devotion to the Law between Nehemiah and Mattathias, a period of some two centuries.

'This,' as Krauss points out, 'can only be understood if, during that period, the laws were studied, commented upon, and taught. No high-priests of the class of Joiakim and Eliashib at the time of Ezra, or of Alcimus and Menelaus of the Greek period, would have been able to produce such a signal change in the life of the people. Quite a different class of men must have been at work, who executed and spread the divine teachings with the whole force of religious conviction. Such men were, according to Talmudical information, the men of the Great Synod.'[3]

Nevertheless, Schürer expresses the general conclusion when he asserts that 'the existence of a Jewish γερουσία earlier than the Greek period cannot be proved with any degree of certainty.'[4] It was the work of Hellenism to reorganize the Orient; but, as Schürer concedes, such a council, with tolerably large powers, may date back to the Persian period. The new institution would be not a creation, but a revision. The main difference in the points of view between the Talmudic and the modern conceptions is the position of the priesthood. 'At the *head* of the Jewish commonwealth, and therefore of the γερουσία as well, stood the *hereditary high-priest*.' With the Maccabæan triumph, the chief alteration was the substitution of a new line of high-priests, but throughout the Roman period the high-priest stood at the head of the συνέδριον—a term which, though probably current in this sense in the 2nd cent. B.C., first meets us in the decree of Gabinius, 57 B.C. The power of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin, especially as supreme court of justice, was emphasized by the Roman régime until in A.D. 70 the existing powers of the Sanhedrin were removed, and it became a civil and religious, instead of being a political, body. The Rabbinic tradition regarded the Sanhedrin as an academic court, composed of the teachers of the Law. But it is now recognized 'from the concurrent testimony of Josephus and the New Testament that, till the very last, the head of the sacerdotal aristocracy continued to preside over the Sanhedrin.'[5] On the other hand, Schürer modifies his view by conceding that the growth of Pharisaism must have affected the constitution of the Sanhedrin so that in the Roman period the council was a composite body, consisting most probably of 71 members, among whom were included the Sadducean priestly aristocracy and the Pharisaic lay democracy.[6]

It is not proposed here to enter into the details of the powers and activities of the Sanhedrin, as referred to in the NT or Rabbinic period, beyond remarking that there is a fair consensus of opinion that the accounts of the trial of Jesus are in many respects irreconcilable with what is recorded in Jewish sources as to the legal and regular procedure before the court. But attention must be drawn to the fresh light thrown by recent investigation on another apparently irreconcilable conflict of evidence—the relation of priest to laity in the headship of the Sanhedrin. There is here a bold contradiction between the NT and Josephus on the one side and the Rabbinic records on the other. It has recently been urged that the two sets of documents relate to quite different bodies—that there were in fact two councils: (1) a political Sanhedrin, continuous with the γερουσία, and (2) a religious Sanhedrin of later institution. The two, on this theory, co-existed in the Roman period. The former directed public affairs and administered the criminal law (under the control of the procurator); of this Sanhedrin, mainly sacerdotal and aristocratic, the high-priest was president. The latter was lay and democratic, and almost exclusively Pharisaic. It supervised the religious life, supervised the priesthood, discussed the interpretation of the Law, regulated ritual, and arranged the calendar. At the head of this council was the *nasi*, a Pharisaic teacher.[1] This latter Sanhedrin survived the fall of the city in A.D. 70; at all events an academy of the type was founded at Jabneh and afterwards moved to Tiberias. Such an academy existed in Palestine until the 5th cent. A.D.; to it is due the great development of law and learning contained in the Rabbinic books.

A very curious revival of a Sanhedrin occurred in the year 1807. Napoleon convened this assembly of Jewish notables so as to use its decisions as a basis for his legislation. These decisions concerned chiefly the relations of Jews to the State and upheld the principle that the Jew in modern states is in no way precluded by his religion from identifying himself completely with the national life of the state of which he is a citizen.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

I. ABRAHAMS.

ŚAṄKARĀCHĀRYA. — No name is better known in the history of Brāhmanic philosophy than that of Śaṅkarāchārya, and no doctrine has exercised greater influence than his on Hindu thought in general. Traces of its influence are unmistakable even at present, notwithstanding the existence of a number of rival systems of Hindu philosophy, whose main if not sole object was and has been to controvert his doctrine. With all this, it is surprising that very little that is of historical importance is known about the life of this great philosopher and the age in which he lived.

1. Date. — It is now generally accepted that Śaṅkara lived in the latter half of the 8th century. The view which assigned him to the 7th cent., and which was so eloquently propounded by Telang, has been completely refuted by the arguments of K. B. Pathak, who regards A.D. 788 as the year of Śaṅkara's birth, specially depending upon a MS from which he gives an extract in *IA* xi. [1882] 174 ff.[2]

2. Life.—Many legends of miraculous powers and fabulous incidents are associated with Śaṅkara's biography. The two works pretending to

[1] For a good account of Kuenen's view, to the effect that the 'Great Synagogue' was at most a temporary phenomenon of the age of Nehemiah, see J. A. Selbie, in *HDB* iv. 643 f.; the literature on the subject is there given. An excellent survey of the whole question by W. Bacher is to be found in *JE* xi. 640 ff.

[2] Cf. J. Derenbourg, *Essai sur l'histoire et la géographie de la Palestine*, Paris, 1867, ch. ii.

[3] *JQR* x. 349.

[4] *GJV*[4] II. i. 166.

[5] *Ib.* p. 174.

[6] *Ib.* p. 248 f.

[1] The view that there were two councils is admirably developed by A. Büchler, *Das Synhedrion in Jerusalem*, Vienna, 1902. A criticism of the view may be read in G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1907, i. 419 ff. The two councils are, on the other hand, accepted by J. Z. Lauterbach, in *JE* xi. 41 ff.

[2] Further discussion of this question of date will be found in *JRASBo* xvi. [1885] 190, xvii. pt. 2 [1889] 63, xviii. [1894] 1, 147 (and esp. pp. 88, 213 for Pathak's further arguments); *IA* xi. 174, xiii. [1884] 95, xvi. [1887] 41, 160; H. H. Wilson, *Works*, London, 1861–77, i. 198; *Saṅkṣepa-Śaṅkara-vijaya*, ed. Kesnalāla Govindarāma Devāśrayi, Bombay, 1899.

give an account of his life are the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya* of Mādhavāchārya and the *Śaṅkara-vijaya* of Ānandagiri. Both these biographers deify their hero, regarding him as an incarnation of the god Śiva for the special purpose of putting an end to Buddhists and dualists, and establishing the Brāhmanical religion and philosophy.

The account of his birth is related differently by the two biographers. According to Mādhavāchārya, in the Kerala country (modern Malabar), in a village named Kālaṭi, there lived a Brāhman named Vidyādhirāja who had a son named Śivaguru. This Śivaguru, after having completed his studies, married. Up to very old age he and his wife had no issue; so they worshipped Śiva, practising severe austerities. Śiva appeared before them in a dream and asked them if they would like to have one son of great merit and knowledge, but of short life, or many sons of the opposite character. The parents chose the former; and at last a son was born to them, when all the constellations were in their most favourable positions.

According to Ānandagiri, Viśvajit and Viśiṣṭā were the parents of Śaṅkara. Viśvajit went into a forest to practise penance, and in his absence Viśiṣṭā, who lived at a place named Chidambarapura (also in Kerala), worshipped Chidambareśvara (name of the local Śivaliṅga). This Śivaliṅga entered into her, and the result was the birth of Śaṅkara. Even at a very early age Śaṅkara was master of all the sciences, and various miraculous exploits are attributed to him. Thus, *e.g.*, he is said to have brought the local river near his house in order to save his mother the trouble of going to a distance for water. So also he is credited with having forced his mother to consent to his becoming a *sannyāsin*, while passing through a river, when a crocodile seized him by the foot and would not leave him, unless he made up his mind to retire from the householder's life. After some time Śaṅkara went to the forest called Govindanātha on the bank of the river Indubhavā (Narmadā, according to the commentator), where he met Govinda and became his pupil. We find the name Govinda in the various colophons in the works of Śaṅkara, who always calls himself 'Śrīmad-govinda-bhagavat-pūjyapāda-śiṣya.' This Govinda is the pupil of Gauḍapādāchārya, who in his turn is supposed to be the pupil of Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, identified with the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. Next Śaṅkara, at the command of his *guru*, went to Kāśī and composed the commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. At Prayāga he met Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the great Mīmāṃsā-writer, who was burning himself as punishment for the sin of having destroyed the family of Sugata, his teacher, and of having discarded Īśvara, out of his zeal for the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of Jaimini.

The next great event in Śaṅkara's life is his visit to Maṇḍanamiśra, a very ardent exponent of Mīmāṃsā at Māhiṣmatī, and his dialectical contest with him, which lasted for several days and at the end of which Maṇḍanamiśra, accepting defeat, became a *sannyāsin* and Śaṅkara's most beloved pupil—afterwards known as Sureśvarāchārya, the writer of a *vārtika* on Śaṅkara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya*. To be able to answer satisfactorily the questions pertaining to erotics put to him by the wife of Maṇḍanamiśra, Śaṅkara next entered into the dead body of a king named Amaraka and had all the experience of the science in question, a result of which was a poem ascribed to him, called *Amaruśataka*.

Śaṅkara then made a tour through India, refuting all doctrines except that of absolute monism (*kevalādvaita*) by his wonderful power of dialectic. He attracted several zealous and clever pupils — *e.g.*, Padmapāda, Toṭaka, Hastāmalaka, and others. He succeeded in mounting the seat of omniscience (*sarvajña-pīṭha*) in the temple of Śāradā in Kashmīr, while others could not even get through the doors of the temple.

Śaṅkara attended his mother during her last illness; and, when she was dead, the relatives refused to give him fire with which to burn her, since Śaṅkara was a *sannyāsin*. At this Śaṅkara cursed them all, saying that they would be excluded from the study of the Vedas (*veda-bahiṣkṛta*), that no *sannyāsin* would receive alms from them, and that the cemetery would be very near their houses.[1] Śaṅkara died at the early age of thirty-two.

The great object of Śaṅkara's labours was the revival of the system of religion and philosophy taught in the *Upaniṣads*; and for this he wrote many works and carried on dialectical controversies all through India, from Kāmarūpa or Assam in the north-east to Kashmīr and Kalkha in the north-west, and from the Himālayas down to Cape Komorin, and succeeded in putting down the heterodox systems and establishing the doctrine of absolute monism. He established four *maṭhas*, or seats of religion, at the four ends of India—the Śṛṅgerimaṭha on the Śṛṅgeri hills in the south, the Śāradāmaṭha at Dwarka in the west, the Jyotirmaṭha at Badarikāśrama in the north, and the Govardhanamaṭha at Puri in the east. Each of these *maṭhas* has a *sannyāsin* at its head, who bears the title of Śaṅkarāchārya in general, with a proper name of his own, and who exercises only a nominal control over the religious matters in the province.

[1] And such is the case even at present in that part, remarks the author of *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya*.

3. Works.—The following is a brief notice of the works supposed to be written by Śaṅkara, but about the authorship of some we are not sure:

The best, of course, is (1) his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which, apart from its philosophical value, is a masterpiece as a literary product. Śaṅkara also wrote (2) commentaries on the ten principal *Upaniṣads* and (3) on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the two other *prasthānas* of the Vedānta. His main object was to show that the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* contain no doctrine but absolute monism. There are also his commentaries (4) on the *Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma* and (5) on the *Sanatsujātīya*, both *prakaraṇas* from the *Mahābhārata*. He also wrote several independent treatises dealing with the principal topics of the Vedānta-doctrine, such as (6) *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, (7) *Upadeśasahasrī*, (8) *Aparokṣānubhūti*, (9) *Ātmabodha*, (10) *Daśa-śloki*, (11) *Mohamudgara*, and many other minor works, such as (12) *stotras* in praise of Viṣṇu, Devi, and other deities.[1]

4. Doctrine.—In Europe by the name Vedānta is generally understood the philosophical doctrine of Śaṅkara; but it is a misunderstanding. There are several philosophical schools which bear the name of Vedānta—*e.g.*, those of Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, etc., which, however, differ essentially from each other, not only in the theological and practical parts, but even in the metaphysical part properly so called. For this reason the several Vedānta schools have their distinctive significant names also. The name which distinguishes the doctrine of Śaṅkara is 'Kevalādvaita,' or absolute non-duality. This doctrine may be briefly expressed in the well-known line: *Brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā jīvo Brahmaiva nāparaḥ*, 'Brahman or the supreme spirit is real; the world is unreal; the individual self is only the supreme self, and no other.' Only intelligence (*chaitanya*), which is without form, without qualities, without any limitations of time, space, or causality, is real; everything else without exception is unreal, phenomenal, erroneously superimposed upon the self-existing, self-refulgent intelligence. Thus the unity of the *Brahman* or the supreme self, according to Śaṅkara, is absolute, without the slightest trace of plurality, which can belong only to the ephemeral and the empirical world; and, if the essence of philosophic thought consists in proceeding from plurality to unity, in finding the one which underlies the many that we see in us and around us, no human conception can go any farther.

(*a*) *Nescience.*—But how can unity be reconciled with the plurality by which we are surrounded and of which we cannot get rid? This question Śaṅkara solves by bringing in the principle of *māyā*, or illusion. Thus his doctrine has always two aspects, esoteric and exoteric, be it in reference to theology, cosmology, or psychology. This is the great merit of Śaṅkara, viz. that he has succeeded in a most satisfactory manner in reconciling the mutually opposed texts of the *Upaniṣads*, which sometimes speak of the unity of the supreme spirit, without attributes, which alone is real and of which one can give only a negative description, but sometimes assert the plurality, the supreme cause being possessed of qualities and capable of controlling from within the world intelligent as well as non-intelligent. The principle of illusion served like a two-edged sword to cut asunder all kinds of opposition. The world around us consists of souls with limited knowledge and of non-intelligent objects; and, if we once admit the existence of a supreme spirit without any limitation, omnipresent, omniscient, how can we explain the creation of souls with limited knowledge and of objects without intelligence, from this omniscient spirit, except as the result of ignorance or

[1] The ed. in 20 vols. of Śaṅkarāchārya's *Works*, published at Śrirangam, 1910 ff., is recommended.

nescience, which, so to speak, puts limitations on the unlimited spirit? And that there exists such ignorance is not only a fact mentioned in the Scripture, but a matter of ordinary experience, as when one has consciousness in the form, 'I am ignorant.' If this consciousness is true, it is a proof of ignorance; if it is not true, it is an even better proof of the same ignorance.

Thus the highest intelligence, which is really without quality, without any limitations, appears to be possessed of qualities, limited in nature, owing to its being conditioned by nescience, which cannot be described as 'being' (*sat*), for it is, as a matter of fact, not real; nor can this nescience be described as 'not being' (*a-sat*), for its effects are incontestable. This nescience consists in erroneously superimposing on something something else that does not exist there, as, *e.g.*, mistaking a rope, which is not a serpent, for a serpent. This nescience manifests itself in various ways and is the cause of all the misery suffered by the soul, though, in its original nature, the soul is nothing but existence, intelligence, and bliss. The most striking and far-reaching example of this is the confusion of the subject with the object, of the knower with the knowable—in fact, of what is real with what is not real or what is only phenomenal.

'It is a matter not requiring any proof,' says Śaṅkara, in the very beginning of his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, 'that the object and the subject whose respective spheres are the notion of the "Thou" (the Non-Ego) and the "Ego," and which are opposed to each other, as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject—whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego—the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versâ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural procedure—which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal, to make use of expressions such as "That am I," "That is mine."'[1]

Śaṅkara gives several definitions of this superimposition (*adhyāsa*), but lays down at last that its essence consists in the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing, with which agrees the popular view exemplified by expressions such as 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon, although one only, appears as if she were double.'

'This superimposition,' he says further on, 'learned men consider to be Nescience (*avidyā*), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (*vidyā*). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition. This mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release.'[2]

Notwithstanding the fact that the whole objective world is the result of nescience, Śaṅkara allows that this objective world is real for all practical purposes (*vyavahārārtham*). Thus, although the *Brahman* alone has an existence real (*pāramārthika*) in the highest sense of the word, the objective world also has an existence, but with a reality of the second order, or practical (*vyāvahārika*); or we may say that the former represents the metaphysical or esoteric or absolute reality, while the latter represents only the practical or exoteric or relative reality. Thus, esoterically, the *Brahman* alone is real, while the individual souls (*chid*) and the inanimate world (*achid*) are unreal, mere appearance, a mirage. Exoterically, however, the individual souls and the material objects exist for all practical purposes, and, as long as the right knowledge has not arisen, we cannot and must not ignore them.

[1] *SBE* xxxiv. 3 f. [2] *Ib.* p. 6.

(*b*) *Theology.* — Even the *Brahman* has, for Śaṅkara, a double character. Esoterically the *Brahman* is knowledge or realization itself, non-qualified, also absolutely incapable of change, unknowable, indescribable, absolutely unique, nothing but existence, intelligence, and bliss — the *para* or *nirguṇa Brahma*. Exoterically, however, the *Brahman* is qualified, possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes, capable of producing the world from itself and of re-absorbing it into itself; in brief it is Īśvara, or God—the *apara* or *saguṇa Brahma*.

(*c*) *Cosmology.*—The exoteric cosmology, according to the natural but erroneous realism (*avidyā*) in which we are born, considers the world as real and can express its entire dependence on *Brahman* only by the mythical way of a creation of the world by *Brahman*, thus implying a temporal character of this creation. But this is against the 'beginninglessness' of the migration of souls. Śaṅkara, therefore, to reconcile this, teaches that there is not a single creation once for all, but that the world in great periods is created and re-absorbed by *Brahman*, and this succession of creation and re-absorption lasts from eternity, and no creation is the first. This never-ceasing creation is a moral necessity — it is not for God's glorification, not for His particular amusement, not for love of mankind. Thus explains itself the theory of *karma* and of *saṃsāra*, which goes on, as the sprout grows from the seed, which grows from a previous sprout, and so on.

The esoteric cosmology, however, says that all this is a mere representation of the truth. The manifold world is only an illusion (*māyā*), a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*), a dream; and the reality is to be attained not by reasoning (*tarka*), but by introspective realization (*anubhava*). If you return from this variegated world to the inmost recesses of your soul, you will become aware of a reality, a timeless, spaceless, changeless reality. The same thing was said by Plato, according to whom this world is a world of shadows and not of realities, and also by Kant, to whom the world is an appearance only, and not the thing-in-itself.

(*d*) *Psychology.* — According to the esoteric psychology, the *jīva*, or the individual soul, is *Brahman*, or the supreme spirit itself, fully and totally possessed of eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, etc., but these divine qualities are hidden in the individual as the fire is hidden in the wood, and will appear only after the final deliverance. *Brahman* itself, which is one and limitless, appears as the *jīva*, limited and multiple, owing to its being conditioned by *māyā*, just as, *e.g.*, ether (*ākāśa*), which is one and all-pervading, is looked upon as so many different ethers limited (*e.g.*, the ether contained by a jar or that contained by a room), the notion of limitedness and multiplicity being due to the conditioning objects, but having nothing to correspond to it in the ether itself. Thus exoterically the individual souls are limited in size and qualities, infinite in number, one for each body, the cause of this concealment of their original divine nature being the external adjuncts which condition them (*upādhi*), such as the mind (*manas*), the sense-organs (*indriyāṇi*), and the vital airs (*prāṇāḥ*) which constitute the subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*). This whole psychological apparatus together with *karma* accompanies the soul in all its ways of migration, without essentially infecting its divine nature. These *upādhis* are of course only part of the phenomenal world, due to the innate *avidyā*.

But whence comes this *avidyā*, this primeval cause of ignorance, sin, and misery? No satisfactory answer has been given to this question; or the question itself is inadmissible; for causality goes only as far as the *saṃsāra*, and we do not know anything farther.

(*e*) *Eschatology.*—From the conception of rewards in heaven and punishments in a dark region contained in the hymns of the *Rigveda* there arose the theory of *saṃsāra*, teaching rewards and punishments in the form of a new birth on earth. The Vedānta thus exoterically admits of a threefold division: those who perform good deeds, sacrifices, etc., follow the path of the fathers (*pitṛ-yāṇa*) and are born again; those who worship the qualified *Brahman* or Īśvara follow the path of gods (*deva-yāna*) and are on their way to final deliverance; and those who are evil-doers have a third place (*tṛtīya-sthāna*) reserved for them. Esoterically, however, the only reality is *Brahman* and its knowledge itself is *mokṣa*.

(*f*) *The pramāṇas, or sources of knowledge.*—According to Śaṅkara's system, there are three principal sources of knowledge—*pratyakṣa*, or sensuous perception; *anumāna*, or reasoning; and *śabda*, or word; to which later writers on Śaṅkara's Vedānta have added *upamāna*, or comparison; *arthāpatti*, or implication; and *abhāva*, or negation.[1] Of the three first *śabda* is the most important, while *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* play only a secondary rôle, especially in the case of ascertaining the truth regarding purely metaphysical and abstract matters like the nature of the cause of the universe, etc. By *śabda* is meant revelation, or *śruti*, represented by the *Saṃhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, which relate to action and form the *Karma-kāṇḍa*, and by the *Upaniṣads*, which relate to knowledge and form the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*. It would appear curious to most philosophers that revelation could ever claim more than a subordinate place as a source of knowledge; but, if we remember that the highest object of the Vedānta is to prove that there is only one true reality, namely *Brahman*, and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that nescience which the Vedānta is meant to destroy, it will become easily intelligible why an appeal to the evidence of the senses or to inference would be out of place and almost self-contradictory.[2] Reasoning or speculation (*tarka*) is to be employed, but only when it does not go against the fundamental truths proclaimed by revelation. Thus Śaṅkara says, while commenting on *Sūtra* II. i. 11:

'In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on. . . . As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation . . . since we observe that even men of the most undoubted intellectual eminence, such as Kapila, Kaṇāda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.'[3]

Śaṅkara is naturally taunted by his adversaries with using reason against reasoning. His final position according to Vedānta is that Scripture is the principal source of knowledge with regard to *Brahman*, and that reasoning is allowed only as it is subordinate to and in conformity with Scripture. But in other matters reasoning has its full scope.[4]

(*g*) *The doctrine of karma.*—Individual souls are partially bound by their former acts and are partially free to better or to worsen their lot. So far as they can claim any reality, they date from all eternity and not from the day of their birth on earth. They are clothed in their *upādhis*, or conditioning adjuncts, according to the merit or demerit which they have acquired by their former, though long-forgotten, acts. This doctrine of *karma* (*q.v.*), which has remained to the present day and has leavened the whole of India, furnishes the principal moral element of the Vedānta. The whole world, such as it is, is the result of acts; the character and fate of each man in this life are the result of his acts in this or in a former life; and it entirely depends on his acts here what he will be in the next life. This is the solution of what we venture to call the injustice of God. A man who suffers, and suffers, as it appears to us, unjustly, is only paying off a debt or laying up capital for another life. A man who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that he is spending more than he has earned, and that he has therefore to make up his debt by new efforts. It cannot be by a divine caprice that one man is born deaf, dumb, or blind, another strong and healthy. It can only be the result of former acts, whether, in this life, the doer of them is aware of them or not. The merit which can be acquired by man is such that he may rise even to the status of a god, though for a time only, for at the end of a *kalpa* even gods like Indra and the rest have to begin their career afresh.

(*h*) *Cause and effect.*—The relation between cause and effect is one of the questions that have engaged the attention of all the schools of philosophy. The Vedāntists in general hold that absolute identity of substance exists between cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇābheda*). The effect, even before its production, is already existent in the cause; for it is in fact nothing but the cause (*sat-kārya-vāda*). This follows not only from the Scripture, but also from observation.

'The non-difference [of cause and effect],' says Śaṅkara, commenting on *Sutra* II. i. 15, 'is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing called "cloth" in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads . . . in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second.'[1]

But this implies an element of plurality and modification with regard to *Brahman*, while the Scriptures declare *Brahman* to be one, without a second, unchangeable. How can such a *Brahman* be called the material cause (*upādāna*) of the intelligent and non-intelligent world? No such difficulty, however, exists for Śaṅkara, according to whom the whole of the world is unreal, while *Brahman* alone is real. What the rope mistaken for a snake is to the snake, that *Brahman* is to the world. There is no idea of claiming for the rope a real change into a snake, and in the same way no real change can be claimed for *Brahman* when perceived as the world. *Brahman* presents itself as the world, and, apart from *Brahman*, the world would be simply nothing. If, therefore, *Brahman* is called the material cause of the world, this is not meant in the sense in which the clay is the material cause of a jar. *Brahman* is only the real substratum of the apparent and illusory existence of the world. This is what is called the doctrine of *vivarta* ('illusory manifestation') peculiar to Śaṅkara, as opposed to that of *pariṇāma* ('modification') held by the other Vedānta schools and especially by the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*).

(*i*) *Two kinds of knowledge and mokṣa.*—Corresponding to the twofold distinction of *Brahman*, higher and lower, owing to *māyā* or the two kinds of reality, absolute and relative, there are two kinds of knowledge and two kinds of *mokṣa* resulting therefrom. The higher knowledge consists in the distinction and thereby the freedom of the

[1] See, *e.g.*, Dharmarājādhvarindra, *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*.

[2] Cf. *SBE* xxxiv. 323 f. Notice that the words *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, which ordinarily mean 'sensuous perception' and 'inference,' are used by the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras* in the sense of *śruti*, 'revelation,' and *smṛti*, 'tradition.'

[3] *SEE* xxxiv. 314 f.

[4] *Ib.* p. 315 ff.

[1] *SBE* xxxiv. 331 f.

self from all its *upādhis*. It is the knowledge of the absolute unity of *Brahman*, apart from which nothing really is. The higher *mokṣa*, which arises simultaneously with such a knowledge, consists in the entire absorption of the individual soul into *Brahman*. This does not mean any approach of the individual soul towards *Brahman* or their union, such an idea being impossible where there is absolute identity; it is only a recovery, a restitution, a return, a becoming of the soul of what it has always been, a revival of its true nature.

On the other hand, the lower knowledge consists in the worship, or *upāsanā*, of the lower *Brahman*, or *Brahman* in its phenomenal state, conceived as a personal Lord and Creator, Īśvara. This *upāsanā* is obligatory on all who have not yet reached the highest knowledge. Such worshippers of a personal God are really worshipping *Brahman*, though in its phenomenal aspect, and they are promised as a reward, not only happiness on earth and in heaven, but, by way of preparation, a kind of second-class *mukti* (*krama-mukti*) which gradually leads to the complete deliverance or highest *mukti*.

In this sense it may be truly said that Śaṅkara did not attack or destroy idolatry, though with him it was always symbolism rather than idolatry. It may be easily understood how he condemned all ritualism and *karma* and at the same time defended the worship of popular gods. Idolatry, if understood in the right spirit, is nothing but religious symbolism, and, as such, it can be open to no objection. Symbolism there must be, whether in words or in things. Verbal symbols appeal to the ear and the symbols of things to the eye, and that is all the difference between them. Verbal symbolism is language; and, if this is allowed in religion, why should not also the other? At one stage of its growth idolatry is a necessity of our nature. When the religious spirit is mature, symbols are either given up or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. Thus Śaṅkara allowed idols as symbols of the great Infinite for those who cannot raise themselves to the comprehension of the one, changeless, non-qualified *Brahman*.

(*j*) *The means of mokṣa.*—Knowledge and knowledge alone can lead to *mokṣa*. For *mokṣa* (*q.v.*) is not something to be obtained or produced. It is only a realization of our real nature, of which we can never be really deprived, but of which we have been only forgetful; it is therefore only knowledge that can be the means of *mokṣa*. The performance of actions, however, and the practice of moral virtues are allowed as being preparatory to knowledge. Good works, even merely ceremonial works, if performed from pure motives and without any hope of reward, form an excellent preparation for reaching that highest knowledge which it is the final aim of the Vedānta to impart. It is in this sense that we read:

'Brāhmaṇas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by charitable gifts.'[1]

Thus a person qualified for the study of Vedānta is described as being one who has studied the Vedas and the Vedāntas, who has got a general idea thereof, whose spirit has been entirely purified by the performance of the obligatory, occasional, and expiatory acts and by the avoidance of all interested and forbidden acts, who possesses discrimination between what is eternal and what is not eternal, who is indifferent and without the least attachment to the enjoyment of rewards here or in the next world, who has tranquillity of spirit, self-restraint, quiescence, endurance, concentration of mind, and faith, and who longs to be free. But, when the knowledge of the highest *Brahman* has once been reached, all works, whether good or bad, fall away.

'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works, when He has been beheld who is both high and low.'[1]

(*k*) *Tat tvam asi.*—The well-known formula *tat tvam asi* (lit. 'Thou art that'), which asserts the identity of the individual soul and the supreme self, would be interpreted according to Śaṅkara's doctrine thus: *tat* literally means the *Brahman* with omniscience, omnipresence, absence of limitations, etc.; *tvam* literally means the *jīva*, or the individual self, with limited knowledge, powers, etc.; and the copula *asi* signifies the apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of these two. Now this is not possible in the full literal sense. So what is inconsistent in the connotations of the two terms is to be rejected and what is consistent is alone to be retained—which is only intelligence (*chaitanya*) pure and simple, indivisible and without attributes, all the rest being only phenomenal and consequently illusory. In other words, the identity of 'thou' and 'that' is not possible, unless one alone is real, and the other unreal. In the same way is to be understood the formula *sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ Brahma* (lit. 'All this is *Brahman*'), which asserts the identity of the world and the supreme spirit.

LITERATURE.—Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, tr. G. Thibaut, in *SBE* xxxiv. (1890) xxxviii. (1896), tr. P. Deussen, Leipzig, 1887; *Vedānta-sāra*, tr. G. A. Jacob, London, 1881. There are many treatises and manuals in Sanskrit dealing with the system of Śaṅkara, like *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, *Pañchadaśī*, *Advaita-siddhi*, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, which cannot all be mentioned here. Some of these are translated in the volumes of *The Pandit* and *The Indian Thought*. H. T. Colebrooke, *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus*, new ed., London, 1858; A. E. Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads, and ancient Indian Metaphysics*, do. 1882; F. Max Müller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, do. 1899, *Three Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy*, do. 1894; P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906, may also be recommended.

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SĀṄKHYA.—*Sāṅkhya* is the title of the oldest system of Indian philosophy, the founder of which was Kapila. Its origin must be sought in a reaction against the idealistic monism of the *Upaniṣads* (*q.v.*), and its rise may be attributed to the same district of India as produced Buddhism. According to the native tradition, the Sāṅkhya is older than Buddha (*c.* 500 B.C.), and was used by him as the basis of his own system. The correctness of this tradition is confirmed by a series of coincidences in doctrinal statement, and is not to be refuted by a reference to the fact that the specific text-books of the Sāṅkhya originate from a much more recent date. The oldest text-book of this system that has come down to us complete belongs to the 5th cent. A.D.

Originally the Sāṅkhya must have taken up a position of direct opposition to the doctrines of the Brāhmans, as is proved *inter alia* by its polemic against their ceremonial. Nevertheless, in the 1st cent. B.C. the Brāhmans began to adopt the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya, and later on it was received into the number of the so-called orthodox systems, after its adherents had acquiesced in a nominal recognition of the infallibility of the sacred scriptures of the Brāhmans. The Sāṅkhya system flourished chiefly in the early centuries of our era; and, if we bear in mind the active relations which at that period existed between India and Alexandria, it is not to be wondered at that the Gnostic systems and Neo-Platonism have been deeply influenced by Sāṅkhyan ideas. Since that time the whole of Indian literature, so far as it touches philosophical thought, beginning with the *Mahābhārata* and the law-book of Manu, especially the literature of the mythological and legendary *Purāṇas*, has been saturated with the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya.

[1] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upan.* IV. iv. 22 (*SBE* XV. 179).

[1] *Muṇḍaka Upan.* II. ii. 11 (*SBE* XV. 37).

The founder of the Sāṅkhya system was a clear and practical thinker of an altogether different class from the authors of the *Upaniṣads*, who, in a lofty and enthusiastic spirit, endeavoured to solve the great riddle of existence. Kapila did not attempt to find unity in everything, but sought to maintain variety. He not only rejected the *Brahman*, the All-Soul, but emphatically denied the existence of God. It is true that he continued to hold the ordinary Indian views to the extent of believing in the transient forms of the popular religion, in gods, demi-gods, and demons, together with heavens and hells; but this popular faith had nothing at all to do with the question of a real eternal God in the theistic sense of an independent creator and ruler of the universe. The denial of a God of this nature is one of the characteristic features of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and the system is therefore in India described explicitly as atheistic.

The Sāṅkhya system is throughout rationalistic. It recognizes two uncreated substances, existing from all eternity, but differing essentially from one another. These are (1) matter, which Kapila, in opposition to the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, regarded not as an illusory appearance, but as something real; and (2) souls, which are conceived not as emanations from the world-soul, but as an *infinite multitude of individual souls*.

The material universe is traced back by a correct philosophical method to a first cause. The Sāṅkhya doctrine proceeds on the principle that the product is none other than the 'material cause' in a definite stage of evolution, and that the preceding stages are to be inferred from that which lies open before us. By this means a first principle was finally reached, which is of the nature of cause only, and not also of product. This is *prakṛti*, primitive matter, from which the universe is evolved in regular course. It further teaches the existence in the entire material universe of three substances (*guṇa*), united in dissimilar and unstable proportions, of which the first (*sattva*) exhibits the qualities of lightness, illumination, and joy; the second (*rajas*), of movement, excitation, and pain; the third (*tamas*), of heaviness, obstruction, and sloth. Hence the conclusion necessarily follows that primitive matter also was composed of these three constituents. Undeveloped primitive matter is the 'state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas*.' As the result of a disturbance, which is not more definitely described, of this condition of equilibrium, the material universe is evolved, first the subtle elements, out of which are formed the psychical organs of living creatures, and, lastly, the gross elements of matter. At the close of a world-period the products return by a reverse movement into the preceding stage of development, and so, finally, into primitive matter. By this process of re-absorption matter regains precisely the same condition in which it had existed in the period before the evolution, and remains in this condition until the time arrives for the development of a new universe. This cycle of evolution, existence, and decay has never had a beginning, and will never have an end.

Unconscious primitive matter then issues from its stable equilibrium and becomes the subject of evolution; and matter during the period of the existence of the universe continually brings forth new products. For this process it becomes necessary to assign some cause. The developments and combinations of inert matter which take place unceasingly would be inexplicable if they were not effected by a spiritual principle. This principle is the collective influence of the innumerable individual souls which—themselves incapable of any activity—contemplate, as spectators from all eternity, the movement of matter. It is not by conscious will that the souls exert an influence on matter, but by their mere presence, which in a purely mechanical way excites matter to activity and development, just as the magnet acts on the iron.

As to the physiological side of the Sāṅkhya system, however great the difference of organization that may exist between living creatures endowed with souls, it is yet one of degree only, not of essence. Every living being, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, possesses within the gross material body, which suffers dissolution after death, an inner or subtle body which is formed essentially out of the psychical organs and the senses. This subtle body accompanies the soul in the cycle of existences from one gross body to another. It is, however, not only the basis of metempsychosis and the principle of personal identity in the various existences, but also the vehicle of personality in this life; for in the subtle body all the events and states which we are accustomed to term psychical have their home and origin.

Here we already touch upon the most peculiar part of the Sāṅkhya system, its psychology. It has already been pointed out that the Sāṅkhya professes the most uncompromising dualism conceivable, since it starts from the absolute and essential difference of matter and soul. In one respect only are the two alike—in the absence of beginning and end; but in this likeness is already involved the most important distinction between them; for the soul is eternally unchangeable, while matter is eternally subject to change. The soul is defined as 'pure spirit.' Further description in a positive sense is impossible. Whatever can be asserted of it is of a negative character. The soul is without attributes or qualities, without parts, and therefore imperishable, motionless, absolutely inactive and impassive, unaffected by pleasure or pain or any other emotion, completely indifferent towards all sensations. The soul being conceived in this negative manner, and since changes, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, can be effected solely and alone in matter, it is evident that all the states and events also which appear to us to belong to the realm of the psychical—*e.g.* perception, idea, thought, feeling, will, etc.—belong in reality to the realm of matter. For they imply in fact an alteration, a change.

Mention has previously been made of the psychical organs, because the easily misunderstood expression 'inner organs,' which our authorities use, must be avoided until an explanation of the conception has been given. In the inner organs all those functions and affections take place which we erroneously call psychical. The inner organs are purely physical and material throughout—as material, to use the ordinary example of the Sāṅkhya texts, as pots and other objects of the external world. The Sāṅkhya philosophy assumes three such inner organs, which are closely related to one another. It treats them, however, very frequently as one, and the same course will be adopted in the following paragraphs. This combined material inner organ exactly corresponds, as regards its unspiritual nature and all the functions that the Sāṅkhya doctrine ascribes to it, to the nervous system. This comparison may be made in order to indicate the place of the inner organ in the animal organism, although naturally no teacher of the Sāṅkhya had any conception of the nervous system as it is understood by modern science.

When the inner organ receives the objects presented to it by the external world by means of the

senses, it assumes—as is said in the texts—the form of these objects; in other words, an image of the object rises up within us. The most diverse results follow. An impression latent in the inner organ may thereby be aroused, and so the recollection excited of earlier experiences. The images of external objects and recollection may suggest abstract conclusions, but may also call forth affection, aversion, joy, pain, desire, or other emotions. These in turn may excite the will and the determination to act, and may urge them on a definite course. All these numerous processes consist, just as simple perceptions, in changes or modifications of the inner organ, so that at each moment it assumes a different form. This incessant transformation, effected in the inner organ by perception, thought, emotion, and will, is not essentially distinct from the change and variety which are found everywhere in the external world. In the one case as in the other we have to do entirely with material changes, with purely mechanical processes carried on in matter.

What place, however, in a system which maintains such views is to be found for the soul? Strangely enough, former scholars who made exhaustive investigations into the Sāṅkhya system did not succeed in answering this question. They regard the soul in this system as entirely superfluous, and hold that its founder would have shown himself more logical if he had altogether eliminated it. And yet the function of the soul in the household of the individual life is, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, of the greatest importance. That the soul by its mere presence excites matter, and therefore the inner organ which belongs to matter, to the path of activity has already been mentioned. Here, however, we are concerned with a much more important office which the soul has to fulfil in the life of the individual. It is true that only figurative expressions are here employed by the original texts; but there is no possibility of mistaking their meaning when they ascribe to the soul the *illumination* of the processes going on in the inner organ. All these processes must indeed remain purely mechanical and unconscious, unless the soul, 'by virtue of its nearness,' illuminates them, *i.e.* brings them to consciousness. The soul remains, on its side, in the most complete passivity, in harmony with its nature, as already described. It is regarded by no means as an illuminating substance; and the texts emphasize the fact that in speaking of the illumination they use a metaphorical expression to explain the process. In the same sense in which the enlightening office of the soul is spoken of, our authorities employ a further illustration which in a similar way is intended to make intelligible the soul's independence of the processes in the inner organ, and its influence on these processes. The Sāṅkhya texts compare the soul with a looking-glass, in which the inner organ is reflected. It is certainly no accident that the Neo-Platonist Plotinus not only compares soul with light, as the Sāṅkhya philosophy does, but also, in order to explain conscious knowledge, makes use of the other comparison of the looking-glass in which the images of objects appear, just as it occurs in the Sāṅkhya texts. This fact supplies one of the arguments in favour of the direct dependence of the Neo-Platonic doctrine on the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Briefly described, therefore, the relation between soul and inner organ in the Sāṅkhya system is conceived in the following way: from the purely immaterial soul a power that excites consciousness issues and flows forth uninterruptedly, so that no process in the inner organ remains unconscious. If the soul, then, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, thus fulfils its office without either doing or suffering anything further, it is scarcely necessary to point out how closely related this view is to certain modern conceptions of the soul which assert the passivity of consciousness.

Like all the Indian philosophical systems (with the exception of materialism), the Sāṅkhya also aims at setting man free from the sufferings of earthly existence. In no other system, however, does the pessimistic view of the universe which lies at the basis of Buddhism find such distinct expression as in the teaching of the Sāṅkhya. All conscious existence is suffering; and even pleasure, which falls to the lot of comparatively few individuals, conceals pain in its womb, and leads infallibly to suffering. Thus pleasure also 'is accounted pain by the wise.'

The connexion of the soul with suffering consists, then, as may be inferred from the preceding, in the soul's bringing to consciousness the pain of which the body, or, more precisely, the inner organ, is the seat. This peculiar relation between soul and suffering or inner organ (which amounts to the same thing) is not essential to the soul; for in that case it would be totally impossible to bring it to an end. The Sāṅkhya regards this connexion as determined solely by 'want of discrimination,' *i.e.* by our failure to recognize the essential distinctness of soul from matter, and especially from the most subtle products of matter, the inner organ and the senses. The cause of this want of discrimination is the disposition innate in man, a fatal inheritance from the last existence, the after-effect of the want of discrimination at that time. Here also, if we look backwards, we arrive at a *regressus in infinitum*, as in the case of the retributive power of action.

As the 'want of discrimination' is the root of all evil according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, the sole means of deliverance is the 'discriminating knowledge' by virtue of which we discern the absolute difference between soul and matter. When once we have recognized that it is in matter that everything which happens takes place, that the soul, the *ego*, has no part in any movement or change, any suffering or sorrow, and stands aloof from it all, and that the soul is just as little affected by re-birth and death as by the other processes in the inner organ, release is at once attained. For the soul of the wise matter ceases to be active, as the dancer ceases to dance when the spectators are satisfied.

That the life of the emancipated does not forthwith come to an end with the acquisition of knowledge, but still endures for a considerable time, 'as the potter's wheel continues to revolve in consequence of the initial impulse even after the completion of the pot,' is explained in the same way as in the other philosophical systems of the Brāhmans. The present life is the result of works, the seed of which has sprung up before the attainment of the emancipating knowledge. These works must come to full maturity, and for that purpose the continuance of life is necessary, while, on the contrary, the germinating force of those works whose seed has not yet sprung up 'is consumed by knowledge.' When the power of the works that bear fruit in the present life is exhausted, and death overtakes the emancipated man, for him no re-birth is possible.

With the close of the bodily life the soul of the emancipated attains independence. The inner organ connected with it is dissolved, and the subtle body, on which hitherto the wandering through various forms of existence has been dependent, perishes. The soul continues to exist individually in the state of emancipation, *i.e.* of final separation from matter; but it abides in eternal

unconsciousness, since, indeed, the material basis necessary for all the processes of knowledge and experience is wanting. Moreover, the remark constantly made in older treatises on the Sāṅkhya philosophy, that the text-books of the system do not describe the state of the soul after its release from earthly existence, is a mere error; for they expressly declare that during life the very same condition is temporarily attained in deep dreamless sleep, in swoons, and in abstraction that reaches the stage of unconsciousness as in emancipation after death. 'The soul therefore abides eternally released from the delusion and suffering of this world, as a seer who no longer sees anything, a glass in which nothing is any longer reflected, as pure untroubled light by which nothing is illuminated.' With these words H. Oldenberg[1] closes his brief exposition of the Sāṅkhya system.

LITERATURE.—R. Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894; cf. also *GIAP* iii. 4 A; A. Barth, *Religions of India*[2], London, 1891; F. Max Müller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, ch. vi.; Monier Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], London, 1893: P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899, ch. x. (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906); *Sāṅkhya kārikā*, ed. and tr. Colebrooke and Wilson, Oxford, 1837, reprinted Bombay, 1887; *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, tr. Cowell and Gough, 2nd ed., London, 1894, ch. xiv.

R. GARBE.

SANNYASA.—See RENUNCIATION (Hindu).

SANNYĀSĪ.—1. Meaning of the name.

The term Sannyāsī (Skr. *sannyāsin*) is defined as follows:

'One who lays down or deposits; one who abandons or resigns; an ascetic, devotee; especially one who retires from worldly concerns, and is no longer bound to read the *Mantras* and perform sacrifice, but only to read the Āraṇyakas or Upanishads.'[2]

The name is sometimes applied to Vaiṣṇava ascetics, as in the case of the officiants at the Kṛṣṇa temple at Udipi in S. Kanara District, Madras.[3] It is also used to designate the fourth stage (*āśrama*) of the life of an orthodox Brāhman, when he abandons earthly concerns and devotes himself to penance and meditation:

'But having passed the third part of (a man's natural term of) life in the forest, he may live as an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence, after abandoning all attachment to worldly objects. He who after passing from order to order, after offering sacrifice and subduing his senses, becomes tired with (giving) alms and offerings of food, an ascetic, gains bliss after death.'[4]

2. Numbers and distribution.—According to the *Census of India, 1911*,[5] the Sannyāsīs, also known as Swāmi ('lord') or Atīt ([*q.v.*] Skr. *atīta* 'gone by,' 'past,' 'passed away,' 'dead'), numbered 147,016, of whom about half were found in Bihār and Orissa, and, of the remainder, the majority were recorded in the United Provinces and Rājputāna. But the designations and enumeration of the ascetic orders are very uncertain, and, though Sannyāsīs are known in S. India,[6] they do not appear under that name in the census returns.

Monier-Williams writes:

'A Sannyāsī may have been once a married man. But there are Sannyāsīs (such as the late Dayānanda) who have become so without going through the previous stages of Gṛihastha [householder] or Vānaprastha [anchorite]. Equivalent expressions for Sannyāsīs are Parivrājaka [wandering mendicant], Bhikshu [beggar], Daṇḍin [one who carries a staff], and Maskarin [one who carries a cane] (Pāṇini, vi. 1. 154); but the term Bhikshu is now applied in Western India to those clerical Brāhmans (as opposed to lay) who perform religious ceremonies and are not engaged in worldly pursuits.'[1]

3. Admission to the order.—As a general rule, the order is open to all Hindus except Śūdras.

'Any Hindu of the three first classes may become a Sannyāsī or Daṇḍī, or, in these degenerate days, a Hindu of any caste may adopt the life and emblems of the order. Such are sometimes met with, as also are Brāhmans, who, without connecting themselves with any community, assume the character of this class of mendicants. These constitute the Daṇḍīs simply so termed, and are regarded as distinct from the primitive members of the order, to whom the appellation of Daśnāmis [*ERE* vi. 332] is also applied, and who admit none but Brāhmans into their fraternity.'[2]

In the Panjāb the rule is somewhat different.

'Some of the Sanīāsīs in order to oppose the Muhammadan invasions, endeavoured to found a militant branch of the Order, but this was opposed by other Sanīāsis on the ground that the Order was spiritual, not secular. The Sangiri Maṭh, however, at last agreed that if Rājputs were admitted into the Order, Sanīāsīs might bear arms.[3] All the other Maṭhs concurred. Later on Vaiśyas were also admitted and managed the finances and commissariat of the Order. Lastly, all restrictions were removed, and even men of inferior castes admitted, but they cannot rise to the position to which Brāhmans and Rājputs may rise, and the higher castes never eat food cooked by them, nor may they learn the Vedas. In other words, caste restrictions hold good after admission into the Order.'[4]

They mark their devotion to Śiva in various ways.

They 'not infrequently bear the *Śaiva* mark upon the forehead, smearing it with the *Tripuṇḍra*, a triple transverse line made with the *Vibhūti*, or ashes which should be taken from the fire of an *Agnihotra* Brāhman [one who practises the cult of fire], or they may be ashes of burnt cowdung from an oblation offered to the god. They also adopt the initiating *Mantra* of all the *Śaiva* classes, either the five or six syllable Mantra, *Nama Śivāya*, or *Om, Nama Śivāya* ["In the name of Śiva!"].'[5]

For the organization of the order see art. GOSĀĪN, vol. vi. p. 332 f.; *Census of India, 1911*, xiv., *Punjab*, pt. i., p. 117 ff.

4. Death rites.—The Sannyāsī death rites are of special interest.

'A dead Sanniāsī is always buried in the sitting attitude of religious meditation with the legs crossed. The grave may be dug with a side receptacle for the corpse so that the earth, on being filled in, does not fall on it. The corpse is bathed and rubbed with ashes and clad in a new reddish-coloured shirt, with a rosary round the neck. The begging-wallet with some flour and pulse is placed in the grave, and also a gourd and staff. Salt is put round the body to preserve it, and an earthen pot is put over the head. Sometimes cocoanuts are broken on the skull, to crack it and give exit to the soul.[6] Perhaps the idea of burial and of preserving the corpse with salt is that the body of an ascetic does not need to be purified by fire from the appetites and passions of the flesh like that of an ordinary Hindu; it is already cleansed of all earthly frailty by his austerities, and the belief may therefore have originally been that such a man would carry his body with him to the afterworld or absorption with the deity. The burial of a Sanniāsī is often accompanied with music and signs of rejoicing. Mr. Oman[7] describes such a funeral in which the corpse was seated in a litter, open on sides so that it could be seen; it was tied to the back of the litter, and garlands of flowers partly covered the body, but could not conceal the hideousness of death as the unconscious head rolled helplessly from side to side with the movement of the litter The procession was headed by a European brass band and by men carrying censers of incense.'[8]

In the United Provinces the present writer witnessed the funeral of a Sannyāsī, in which the body was carried in a litter in procession to the bank of the Ganges, where it was tied up between four large slabs of stone. This coffin was carried in a boat to the middle of the river and flung into the water amidst the shouts of the mourners.[9]

1 *Buddha*[3], Berlin, 1897, p. 67.
2 M. Monier-Williams, *Skr.-Eng. Dict.*, Oxford, 1872, *s.v.*
3 H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, i. 141; but the same writer (i. 188) remarks: 'Although, however, *Sannyāsīs* and *Vairāgīs*, and other similar denominations are used, and correctly used in a wide acceptation, yet we occasionally do find them limited in meaning, and designating distinct and inimical bodies of men. When this is the case, it may be generally concluded, that the *Sannyāsīs* imply the mendicant followers of Śiva, and the Vairāgīs those of Vishnu' (see art. BAIRĀGĪ, vol. ii. p. 337).
4 Manu, *Laws*, vi. 33 f. (*SBE* xxv. [1886] 204 f.).
5 Vol. i. pt. ii. [Calcutta, 1913] p. 222.
6 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, vi. 295.

1 *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, p. 55, note.
2 Wilson, i. 197.
3 This seems to imply that Sannyāsīs were formerly not recruited from Rājputs. It may be that originally they were recruited only from Brāhmans, as is indeed expressly stated by P. Harikishan Kaul.
4 H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, iii. 358.
5 Wilson, i. 194 f.
6 The intention is to open the skull suture known as *brahmā-randhra*, 'Brahmā's fissure,' or *sushumṇa-nāḍī*, 'blessed suture'; see *PR*[2] i. 238 f.; J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 249; Thurston, ii. 299.
7 *The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, p. 156 f.
8 R. V. Russell, *Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces*, iii. 158.
9 For the death rites of Sannyāsīs see also J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 538 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 49 f., xviii. pt. i. [1885] 562 ff., xxiv. [1886] 145 f.; *PNQ* iv. [1886-87] 5, 177.

5. The militant Sannyāsīs.—The Sannyāsīs from an early period have been known as a turbulent order. In A.D. 1567, when the emperor Akbar arrived at Thānesar in the S.E. Panjāb, he found an assemblage of Yogīs and Sannyāsīs at the site of the great battle of the *Mahābhārata*, Kurukṣetra.

'In consequence of a feud which existed between these two sects, they came to the Emperor, seeking permission to settle it by fighting. The *Sannyāsīs* were between two and three hundred in number, and the *Jogis*, who only wear rags, were over five hundred. When the adversaries stood ready to begin the fray, by the Emperor's orders some soldiers smeared their bodies with ashes, and went to support the *Sannyāsīs*, who were the weaker party. A fierce fight ensued, and many were killed. The Emperor greatly enjoyed the sight. At length the *Jogis* were defeated, and the *Sannyāsīs* were victors.'[1]

'The name of Sunnyasee was applied familiarly in Bengal, c. A.D. 1760–75, to a body of banditti claiming to belong to a religious fraternity, who, in the interval between the decay of the imperial authority and the regular establishment of our own, had their headquarters in the forest-tracts at the foot of the Himālaya. From thence they used to issue periodically in large bodies, plundering and levying exactions far and wide, and returning to their asylum when threatened with pursuit.'[2]

LITERATURE.—R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iii. 150 ff.; W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 278 ff.; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Madras, 1909, vi. 295 f.; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, Calcutta, 1896, p. 374 ff.; D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Punjab Ethnography*, do. 1883, p. 286; H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911–14, iii. 358 ff.; *Census of India, 1891*, xix., *Punjab and Feudatories*, pt. i.; *Census of India, 1911*, xiv., *Punjab*, pt. i., p. 117 ff.; J. C. Oman, *The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*[2], London, 1905, p. 152 ff. W. CROOKE.

SĀNSĪ, SĀNSIYĀ.—The Sānsī are a gypsy-like Indian tribe, numbering 34,459 at the census of 1911, found chiefly in the Panjāb, United Provinces, Rājputāna, Central Provinces, and Berār.

In occupation, if not in origin, they closely resemble the Bediyā (*q.v.*). They are the vagrants of the Central Panjāb, seldom or never settling in one place. They catch all kinds of wild animals, clean and unclean, and eat carrion. They keep donkeys, sheep, goats, and pigs, work in grass, straw, and reeds, and beg, while their women dance and sing and are prostitutes. They have a curious connexion with the Jāṭs of the Central Panjāb, of whom they are the hereditary bards and genealogists, and even in Rājputāna they call themselves Bhāṭ (*q.v.*). They derive their name from their eponym, Sāṅs Mall of Bharatpur, whom they revere as their *guru*; and they are said to worship his patron saint under the name of Malang Shāh, Malang being the title of an order of *faqīrs*, followers of Jaman Jatī, a disciple of Shāh Madār.[3] In the Panjāb they also worship Gūgā or Guggā Pīr, a saint who was originally a snake-god. They cremate their dead, and after a death they feed their sisters' sons—a survival of mother-right. They are said to worship the sword, and an oath on it is held binding. Their religious beliefs, however, are almost entirely confined to the rites performed at birth, marriage, and death.

In the Eastern Panjāb they call on Rāma morning and evening, and worship Gūgā or Guggā Pīr. They cook rice in honour of the goddess Jualāmukhī (*q.v.*) and Kālikā, the mother-goddess; they perform the usual death rites according to Hindu custom, but in an incomplete manner.[4]

'All Sānsis are said to worship the sword; and so an oath sworn on a *talwār* [the Indian sword] is popularly said to be binding on a Sānsi, but this may be a fiction set going by the Sānsis for their own ends. In Sialkot, however, it is probably true to say that no Sānsi will ever take a false oath on a sword.'[1]

In Bombay the most binding oath is on Gangā, the Ganges, or on Kālikā. The former is taken by raising a pot containing water, salt, charcoal, and millet grains, and swearing to speak the truth; the latter by pouring a little liquor on the ground out of a bottle while affirming.[2]

Their deified ancestors appear to be of a malignant rather than a benignant type. The Sānsī have no clear idea of the fate of the soul after death, but women who die in childbirth are supposed to linger on in this world and torment living beings. Some members of the tribe act as sorcerers and practise an elaborate system of casting out evil spirits.[3] In the United Provinces they have a vague idea of a Creator, and some worship the goddess Devī or Kālī. They are in constant fear of malignant ghosts (*bhūt*) and propitiate the dead by feeding virgin girls of the tribe in their honour. They revere a saint whom they call Miyān, 'Master,' who is said to be king of the snakes.[4] They form one of the most notoriously criminal tribes in India, committing thefts, gang-robberies, and house-breaking. For this purpose parties of them go as far south as the Central Provinces, Bombay, and the Deccan.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted in the footnotes see R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iv. 485 ff.; M. Kennedy, *Notes on the Criminal Classes in the Bombay Presidency*, Bombay, 1908, p. 245 ff.; E. J. Gunthorpe, *Notes on the Criminal Tribes of Bombay, Berar, and the Central Provinces*, do. 1882, p. 46 ff.; D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 311. W. CROOKE.

SANTĀL.—The Santāl are a tribe of the Mundā stock, inhabiting the Santāl Parganas, the southern portion of the Bhāgalpur Division, Bengal, and numbering 2,068,000 at the census of 1911.

1. Name and origin.—H. H. Risley has the following:

'According to Mr. Skrefsrud, the name Santāl is a corruption of Sāontār, and was adopted by the tribe after their sojourn for several generations in the country about Sāont in Midnapur. Before they went to Sāont they are said to have been called Kharwār [*q.v.*], the root of which, *khar*, is a variant of *hor* "man," the name which all Santāls use among themselves. As regards the derivation of the name from Sāont, an obscure village, somewhat off the main line of their recent migrations, it may be observed that Colonel Dalton suggested a doubt whether the name of the place may not have been taken from the tribe, and this view seems to derive some support from the discovery of a small tribe of Sāonts in Sargujā and Keunjhar. The point, however, is not one of great importance. At the present day when a Santāl is asked what caste he belongs to, he will almost invariably reply "Mānjhī" (literally "village headman," one of the commonest titles of the tribe), adding "Santāl Mānhji" if further explanation is demanded of him.'[5]

They seem to be connected with the Hazārībāgh tableland, as they venerate the Dāmodar river, by which its southern face is drained. Their features are of the Negritic type, and their colour varies from very dark brown to almost charcoal black. They speak a singularly elaborate language of the Mundā family.[6]

2. Religion.—The creation legend of the tribe is of the totemistic type, tracing the origin of the tribe to a wild goose that laid two eggs, from which sprang the parents of the race; and many of the names of their septs and sub-septs are derived from those of animals and plants.[7] Skrefsrud traces in the background of their religion a *fainéant* supreme deity, called Thākur, 'Lord,' who troubles

[1] Nizāmu-d-dīn Aḥmad, *Tabakāt-i-Akbarī*, in H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India as told by its own Historians*, London, 1867–77, v. 318.

[2] H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson: a Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases*[2], ed. W. Crooke, London, 1903, p. 871 f., with numerous quotations; T. Pennant, *The View of Hindoostan*, do. 1798, ii. 192.

[3] See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Indian).

[4] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xiv. *Punjab*, p. 147.

[1] H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province* Lahore, 1911–14, iii. 367.

[2] M. Kennedy, *Notes on the Criminal Classes in Bombay Presidency*, p. 248.

[3] Rose, iii. 362 ff.

[4] W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 277 ff.

[5] *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 224 f.

[6] *Census of India, 1901*, Calcutta, 1903, vol. i. pt. i. p. 279 ff.

[7] Risley, ii., Appendix, i. 125 ff.

himself little with human affairs; some identify him with the sun, and the Santāls regard him as a good god, worshipping him every fifth or tenth year with a sacrifice of goats. There are six great gods in their pantheon: Marang Buru, the great mountain, the leader of the group, with far-reaching powers by virtue of which he associates both with gods and with demons; Moreko, fire, now a single god, but formerly known in the form of five brothers; Jāir Erā, sister of Moreko, the goddess of the sacred grove (*jāhirthān*), which is preserved inviolate in every village as a home for the deities; Gosāin Erā, a younger sister of Jāir Erā; Parganā, chief of the gods (*bongā*), and in particular master of all witches—a function which causes him to be highly respected; and Mānjhī, the second in command to Parganā, a personage who is supposed to be particularly active in restraining the other gods from doing harm to men. Some of these names, like Gosāin (*q.v.*) and Parganā, 'a barony,' are derived from Hindu sources and suggest some contamination of beliefs since they came into contact with Hindus. All these, the greater gods, have their places in the sacred grove and are worshipped only in public, except Marang Buru, who also ranks as a family god. Besides these, each family has two gods of its own, the *orakbonga*, or household god, and the *abgēbonga*, or secret god. No Santāl will divulge the name of his secret god to any one but his eldest son.

'Men are particularly careful to keep this sacred knowledge from their wives for fear lest they should acquire undue influence with the bongas, become witches, and eat up the family with impunity when the protection of its gods has been withdrawn.'[1]

When sacrifices are offered to the *orakbongas*, the whole family partake of the offerings; but only men may touch the food which has been laid before the *abgēbongas*. Sacrifice is offered once a year, and each man chooses the most convenient time for offering it. There are traditions within recent times of human sacrifices being made to a mountain-god of unknown name.

3. Festivals.—The tribal festivals are especially interesting. The *Sarhūl* or *Bahāpūjā* is held towards the end of March, when the *sāl*-tree (*Shorea robusta*) blossoms.

'Tribal and family sacrifices are held, many victims are slain and eaten by the worshippers, every one entertains their friends, dancing goes on day and night, and the best songs and flute-music are performed. A peculiar feature of this festival is a sort of water-bottle in which men and women throw water at each other until they are completely drenched.'[2]

The most important feast is the *Sohrāī*, or harvest festival, held in November–December; the headman entertains the people, the cattle are anointed with oil and daubed with vermilion, and a share of the rice-beer is given to each animal. Public sacrifices of fowls are offered by the priest in the sacred grove; goats and fowls are sacrificed by private families, and a general Saturnalia of drunkenness and licence prevails; chastity is in abeyance for the time, and all unmarried persons may indulge in promiscuous intercourse, but this licence does not extend to adultery, nor does it sanction intercourse between persons of the same sept, though even this offence, if committed during the *Sohrāī*, is punished less severely than at other times.[3] The agricultural festivals include those at sowing, offering of the firstfruits of millet, sprouting of the rice, and the offering of firstfruits of the winter crop. Bread, parched grain, and molasses are offered to dead relatives in November–December. *Māgh-sim*, the cutting of the jungle grass in January–February, marks the end of the year, when servants receive their wages and fresh engagements are made; the village officials go through the form of resigning their appointments, and all the tenants give notice of throwing up their lands. But after a few days they agree to change their minds, and there is a general carouse of rice-beer. The *sīmabongas*, or boundary gods, are propitiated twice a year with sacrifices of fowls offered at the village boundary. *Jom-sim pūjā* is an offering of two goats, or of a goat and a sheep, to the sun. Every Santāl ought to perform this sacrifice at least once in his life. After a year's interval it is, or ought to be, followed by *kutam-dangra*, when a cow is offered to the household gods and an ox to Marang Buru and to the spirits of the dead; the fire-god, Moreko, receives an offering of three goats and many fowls when any calamity, such as a failure of the crops or an outbreak of epidemic disease, occurs.[1]

[1] Risley, ii. 232. [2] *Ib.* ii. 233.
[3] E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 213; Risley, ii. 233

LITERATURE.—Besides the authorities quoted in the art. see F. B. Bradley-Birt, *The Story of an Indian Upland*, London, 1905; E. G. Man, *Sonthalia and the Sonthals*, Calcutta and London, 1867. For the folklore see A. Campbell, *Santal Folk Tales*, Pokhuria, 1891; C. H. Bompas, *Folklore of the Santal Parganas*, London, 1909. For the geography and history of the tribe see W. W. Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, London, 1897; *IGI* xxii. 60 ff.

W. CROOKE.

SANŪSĪ (fem. or plur. Sanūsiyyah). — **1. History.**—Sanūsī is the name of a religious order founded by Sī Muḥammad ibn Sī 'Alī al-Sanūsī al-Khaṭṭābī al-Ḥasanī al-Idrisī al-Muhajirī.[2] His name Idrisī was derived from his supposed ancestor Idris, great-grandson of Ḥasan II., son of Ḥasan the Prophet's grandson; his name Khaṭṭābī refers to the tribe Khaṭāṭibah, to which his family belonged. He was born at Mostaganem in 1806 (or earlier) and migrated with his father to Fez in 1814, where he came under the influence of Shaikh Aḥmad Tijānī, founder of the Tijāniyyah order. In 1829 he went on pilgrimage to Mecca, after having been initiated into numerous orders in Africa and having studied at al-Azhar, where he encountered opposition. In Mecca he attached himself to Sī Aḥmad b. Idris of Fez, head of the Khidriyyah order, which had been founded in 1713 by Sī 'Abd al-'Azīz Dabbar. Sī Aḥmad b. Idris taught in Mecca from 1797 to 1833; in the latter year, owing to difficulties with the other religious authorities, he fled to Sobia in the Yemen, whither Sanūsī with other adherents accompanied him. At his death in 1835 the Khidri order split into two divisions, headed respectively by Sī Muḥammad Salaḥ Magharani and Sanūsī, who both returned to Mecca, where the latter established the first *zāwiyah* of his new order on the historic Mt. Abū Qubais. He continued to reside there till 1843, when his situation became intolerable owing to the opposition of the rival sect, which was more easily able to win the approval of the established authorities; he therefore, ostensibly in accordance with an injunction from the Prophet to go and found new *zāwiyahs* in other countries, returned to Africa and founded at al-Baida in the Jibāl Akhḍar in the Tripolitaine the institution whence his system began to spread far and wide. Towards 1855, owing to the hostility of Turkish, Egyptian, and Meccan authorities, he transferred his headquarters to Jaghbūb, some days' march to the south-west of his former seat. It was in Baida that his sons, Shaikh Mahdī and Sī Muḥammad Sharīf, were born; and on his death in 1859, as is usual with these orders he was succeeded by them; they were very young at the time, but they were well served by their guardians and instructors, and after a time assumed control, the former as administrator, the latter as spiritual teacher. The latter died in 1895; and in the same year the former secretly transferred his residence to the oasis of Kufra in the Eastern Sahara, where he remained till 1900;

[1] Risley, ii. 234.
[2] See also art. RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Muslim), § 38.

in 1900 he moved yet farther south to Garu in Dar Gurani of the Wadai region of the Sūdān. In 1902 his followers endeavoured to resist the French attack on Kanam, east of Lake Chad, and their failure caused him to die of chagrin on 30th May of that year. He was succeeded by his brother's son, Aḥmad Sharīf, who again made Kufra his headquarters.

2. The Sanūsī doctrines.—The system advocated by Sanūsī and his followers appears to be a combination of Wahhabism with Ṣūfism (*qq.v.*). It professes to aim at restoring the primitive 'purity' of Islām, as taught in the Qur'ān and the Prophet's *sunnah*; hence it prohibits music, dancing, singing, tobacco, and coffee. On the other hand, like other 'orders,' it prescribes certain forms of devotion; in prayer the arms are crossed on the breast, with the left wrist held by the thumb and forefinger of the right hand. The rosary should be carried in the hand, not hung on the neck. In the *dhikr*, or additional devotions, certain formulæ are to be repeated forty, others a hundred, times.[1] Several other practices are ascribed to them that are at variance with the Maliki practice, which, however, they profess (or professed) to observe; these are enumerated in a polemical treatise directed against them, of which Depont and Coppolani give a French translation.[2] What appears to be the greatest enormity criticized is that the Shaikh Mahdī received visitors only at particular hours and after repeated applications for an audience and habitually absented himself from public prayer, even on the Fridays. His admirers attributed this to his wish to meditate and pray in solitude.

The founder appears to have been unwilling to start an additional order in the style of the many already existing, maintaining that membership of another order was not inconsistent with adherence to his own society; he therefore, in spite of his puritanism, made certain concessions to orders that had adopted practices of which his system ordinarily disapproved—*e.g.*, the dances of the Maulawiyyah, the cries of the Rifā'iyyah, and the swaying of the Qādiriyyah. Certain practices which go farther than these in the direction of producing ecstasy were not tolerated; and indeed the main purpose of Ṣūfī practice—the production by hypnotism of the sense of unity or identity with the Deity—does not appear to have lain within his scope.

On the other hand, what rendered his order specially important was his insistence on a doctrine which orthodox Islām at times maintains, viz. that no Muslim should live in any region where Islām is not the dominant power. Hence, when a Muslim finds himself in a country which fails to answer to that description, it is his duty to emigrate; and the founder of the order sought in the desert of the Sahara that freedom from non-Muslim authority which was wanting in the large portions of Asia and Africa where Christian powers were dominant, and very imperfectly realized in those nominally independent Islāmic empires whose policy was subordinate to European guidance. Moreover, the Shaikh Mahdī was certainly identified by many of his followers, and possibly claimed identity himself, with the 'expected Mahdī,'[3] a fact which would have rendered it impossible for him to subordinate himself to any other sovereign, Islāmic or non-Islāmic.

3. Spread of the order.—The founder, as has been seen, employed his followers, especially those among them who were illiterate, in building *zāwiyahs*. These were then organized on the principle described in the art. DERVISH. In a few years after his arrival at Jibāl Akhḍar it was literally covered with establishments; he then undertook new constructions first in the rest of the Tripolitaine, then in the south of Tunisia, on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, in Egypt, Arabia, and Central Africa, among the Tawariq, and in the Sūdān. By the end of his life he was practically sovereign of the region bounded by the Mediterranean from Alexandria to Gabes and stretching south to the negro kingdoms. But he also acquired a great following in the Hijas, where a number of tribes—the Banu Ḥarb, Lam, Ḥarith, Thaqif, and others—accepted Sanūsī as their supreme lord. It is asserted that all the Bedawīn tribes of W. Arabia which had not embraced Wahhabi tenets adopted his; and the movement spread with no less rapidity among the Bedawīn or nomad tribes of the Sinaitic peninsula and Palestine. Before leaving Arabia, in spite of the opposition which drove him thence, he had founded *zāwiyahs* in various places of importance in addition to the original institution on Abū Qubais, viz. Ta'if, Medīna, Badr, Jedda, and Yanbu'. The original presidents of these and their successors are enumerated by Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, p. 273 f. In the *Manār* for 1330 (1912), pp. 532-538, there is an enumeration of the *zāwiyahs* belonging to this community to be found between Alexandria and Derna (140 miles N.E. of Benghāzī); the distance is eleven stages for camel-riders, and there are about twice that number of *zāwiyahs*. The inhabitants belong mainly to the Wuld 'Ali, who are without exception members of the order. To each *zāwiyah* (according to this account) about 2000 persons are attached, who complete the Qur'ān once a month in the buildings, which also serve as hospices to travellers in this region; no money is taken from the guests, as the institutions are maintained out of the land which is attached to them. Surplus produce is sent as tribute to the head of the order at Jaghbūb or Kufra. In addition to these, the same writer enumerates many more in the adjoining country. His list exhibits a great advance on that of Depont and Coppolani,[1] which bears date 1897, both in the number of the institutions and in that of their adherents. It has at times been asserted that there are great numbers of secret adherents of the order in Egypt, the Sūdān, and other Islāmic countries, in addition to those who make no concealment of their membership.

4. Reason for the progress of the movement.—Rinn attributes the great success which attended the efforts of the Shaikh Sanūsī largely to his personal qualities; he understood how to organize the community which he had founded and to maintain rigorous discipline; further, he attracted adherents by the boldness of his teaching and the dexterity which he displayed in basing his profound and learned exegesis on the most orthodox conceptions.

'Hence it may be said that his moral and intellectual superiority impressed all the Muslims who approached him, since the austerity of his puritanical precepts, his gloomy and taciturn character, his severity towards himself and every one else, were not of a nature to win much sympathy.'[2]

This statement is scarcely borne out by experience in either Eastern or Western revivalism. His influence in Wadai was due to his having purchased a caravan of slaves which the nomads had plundered from the slave-dealers; these he manumitted, had trained at his *zāwiyah* in Jaghbūb, and, some years later, when he believed them to be sufficiently qualified, sent home as missionaries to their native country; from that time the negroes of Wadai regarded themselves as servants of the

[1] These are given by Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, p. 503.
[2] *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, p. 546 ff.
[3] See art. MAHDĪ.

[1] P. 569 f.
[2] Rinn, p. 491.

Sanūsī institutions, and their Sultan became one of the most faithful followers of the Shaikh Sanūsī.

Of his successor, the Shaikh Mahdī, the organ of reformed Islām speaks in glowing terms, similar to those quoted about his father; and the names of several followers are mentioned who seem to have been men of unusual energy and ability.

Besides these personal qualities, it is probable that the notion of creating an area in which Islām would be undisturbed by any foreign—*i.e.* non-Arabian—influence had great attractions for those who found Turkish rule unsupportable, and who, even if they recognized the blessings which European protection confers, held that they were too dearly purchased by the humiliation of Islām which such an arrangement involves. Further, the principle by which adherence to the new order was made compatible with membership of the older orders was likely to win for the Sanūsī system those whose spiritual needs required some such ritual as the orders enjoin, but who desired some sort of unity between the orders to be effected. We can scarcely be wrong in finding the main cause in the partition of Africa, which, commencing with the French occupation of Algiers, has now rendered the whole continent a European colony.

5. Political activities of the order.—The rise of the order was viewed with alarm by the French in Africa, as also by the Turks; for, although the order abstained from all warlike enterprises, there was a general belief that such were ultimately contemplated, and indeed that the head of the order in his oasis was amassing guns and ammunition for the purpose of starting a *jihad* when the time arrived. It was in this belief that in 1896 a French adventurer, the Marquis de Morès, led a small expedition into the interior of the Sahara with the view of offering his services as military leader to the Shaikh Mahdī at his oasis; he was, however, murdered at Bir Yusuf by the Tawariq before he reached his destination.[1] Nevertheless numerous earlier attempts to employ the supposed force of the Sanūsī chief in the interests of one Power or another had failed; thus in 1872 the Germans endeavoured to approach the Shaikh Mahdī with the view of getting him to preach the *jihad* against the French, but the envoys were not even permitted to enter the Shaikh's presence; the Ottoman Sultan was no more successful when he endeavoured to obtain the help of the Sanūsīs against the Russians in the war of 1876–78; the Italian mission to the Cyrenaica in 1881, the object of which was to form an alliance with the Sanūsīs in order to counterbalance French influence in Tunisia, was a failure; in the same year the Egyptian insurgent Arabi Pasha could gain no help from them; and in 1884 the Shaikh Mahdī not only declined to lend his aid to the Sūdānese Mahdī, but publicly declared him to be a liar and impostor. The principle which was supposed to guide their action was not to attack, but to defend themselves when attacked; and probably the need for armed resistance on their part first materialized in connexion with the French advance in Central Africa early in this century. The first important victory for the French was the capture of the *zāwiyah* of Bir Alali in Kanen, north-east of Lake Chad, in Jan. 1902. After more than eleven years of war the Sanūsīs in 1913 still held six or more important *zāwiyahs*, some of them strongly fortified, in Borku and Tibesti. The capture of these was effected by the Largeau expedition in 1913–14. After severe fighting, Sī Muhammad Sunni, the chief official of the Sanūsīs in these regions, his son Sī Mahdī, and the remnant of the army fled to Kufra. As soon as the European War commenced in 1914 the Sanūsī chief, Sayyid Aḥmad, adopted a threatening attitude towards the Egyptian government, but it was not till Nov. 1915 that he definitely threw in his lot with the Turks and Germans. In that month two English steamers were torpedoed and one Egyptian steamer sunk by fire from a German submarine in Sollum harbour, while three coastguard posts were attacked by Sanūsī forces. The whole number of fighting men in the service of the Sanūsī Shaikh appears to have been under 10,000; he himself displayed no ability of any sort as a commander or fighter, but he had in his employ a Turkish officer of some ability, who had been trained in Germany, named Ja'far. It was necessary to prevent danger from this source assuming serious dimensions, and an expedition was sent against the Sanūsīs first commanded by General Wallace, who was succeeded on 9th Feb. 1916 by General Peyton. The campaign practically terminated in Feb. 1917, and was uniformly successful; from Matruḥ, to which the Sanūsī army had advanced, it was by a series of defeats driven westward, and afterwards southward into the desert. Sollum was taken on 26th Feb. 1916, when Ja'far and his staff were captured, and in Feb. 1917 Sayyid Aḥmad was driven from the Siwa oasis, whither he had fled. It is possible that the disasters brought upon the sect by the part taken by this chief in the War may lead to a decline in its influence and eventually to its extinction.

[1] See Auguste Pavy, *L'Expédition de Morès*, Paris, 1897.

LITERATURE.—L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan: Étude sur l'Islam en Algérie*, Algiers, 1885; A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, Paris, 1887; O. Depont and X. Coppolani, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, Algiers, 1897; the Egyptian journal *Manar*, xv. [1912] 532–538; *Geographical Journal*, xlvii. [1916] 129 f.; W. T. Massey, *The Desert Campaigns*, London, 1918.

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SARAPIS.—See GRÆCO-EGYPTIAN RELIGION.

SARASVATĪ (Skr. *saras*, originally perhaps 'flowing water'; *sarasvat*, 'having water,' 'watery,' 'elegant').—In the *Rigveda* there is nothing to show that Sarasvatī is ever anything more than a river-goddess, but we find her in the *Brāhmaṇas* identified with Vāch, 'speech,' and in post-Vedic mythology she has become goddess of eloquence and wisdom, invoked as a muse and regarded as wife of Brahmā.[1]

'The Sarasvatī appears to have been to the early Indians what the Ganges (which is only twice mentioned in the Rigveda) became to their descendants. . . . When once the river had acquired a divine character, it was quite natural that she should be regarded as the patroness of the ceremonies which were celebrated on the margin of her holy waters, and that her direction and blessing should be invoked as essential to their proper performance and success. The connection into which she was thus brought with sacred rites may have led to the further step of imagining her to have an influence on the composition of the hymns which formed so important a part of the proceedings, and of identifying her with Vāch, the goddess of speech.'[2]

The name is at present applied to two rivers in N. and W. India. The first, in the Panjāb, rises in the Sirmūr State and, after disappearing in the sand, emerges once more and joins the Ghaggar in Patiāla territory; the second, rising in the Arāvallī range, falls into the lesser Rann of Cutch. The latter is visited by Hindus, particularly those who have lost their mothers, whose propitiatory rites are performed at Sidhpur. There has been much controversy as to the identity of the river of which the goddess Sarasvatī is the personification.

'The name is identical with that of the Avestan river Haraqaiti in Afghanistan, and it may have been the latter river which was first lauded as the Sarasvatī. But Roth, Grassman, Ludvig, and Zimmer are of opinion that in the Rigveda Sarasvatī usually and originally meant a mighty stream, probably the Indus (Sarasvatī being the sacred and Sindhu the secular name), but that it occasionally designates the small stream in Madhyadeśa [the first mentioned above] to

[1] A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 86 ff.
[2] J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, v. [1870] 338 ff.

which its name and its sacred character were in later times transferred. Max Müller believes it to be identical with the small river Sarasvatī, which with the Dṛṣadvatī formed the boundaries of the sacred region Brahmāvarta,[1] and which loses itself in the sands of the desert, but in Vedic times reached the sea. According to Oldham, a survey of ancient river-beds affords evidence that the Sarasvatī was originally a tributary of the Sutudrī (the modern Sutlej), and that when the latter left its old bed and joined the Vipāś, the Sarasvatī continued to flow in the old bed of the Sutudrī.'[2]

LITERATURE.—*IGI* xxii. 97; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 86 ff.; A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, ii. 434 ff.; J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, 5 vols., do. 1858–70, *passim*; J. Dowson, *Classical Dict. of Hindu Mythology*, do. 1879, p. 284 f. For the Sarasvatī Brāhmans, J. Wilson, *Indian Caste*, Bombay, 1877, ii. 124 ff.

W. CROOKE.

SĀRIPUTTA.—Sāriputta was one of the two chief disciples of the Buddha. In Sanskṛit works the name occurs as Śāriputra, Śāliputra, Śāriputa, and Śāradvatīputra, *i.e.* 'son of the woman Śārī, Śālī, or Śāradvatī.' He is also called Upatissa (Skr. Upatiṣya), which was probably his personal name, though the commentary on his verses in *Theragāthā*, 981 ff., explains it differently. The story of his conversion is told in art. MOGGALLÁNA. He has the title Dhammasenāpati, 'general of the Dharma,' and in *Sutta-Nipāta*, 557, the Buddha, when asked who is his general, declares that after himself it is Sāriputta who turns the Wheel of the Dharma.[3] It is thus not surprising to find several discourses in the Scriptures as well as whole *suttas* ascribed to him.[4] He is also found as the author of Mahāyāna works.[5] In the list of chief disciples in the *Aṅguttara*[6] he is mentioned as the first of those possessing great insight (*paññā*). An account of his previous existences is given in the commentary on the *Theragāthā*.[7] The commentary on *Jātaka*, i. 391, makes the Buddha, when deciding to pass away, refer to the death of Sāriputta at the village of Nāla in the room in which he was born; but this looks like an accretion, as the account of Buddha's death in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* ignores all reference to Sāriputta, though it does introduce him as a short time previously uttering his *sīhanāda* (lion's roar), his great confession of faith in the Buddha; even this is probably inserted here from other parts of the Scriptures.[8] There are still later accounts of his death, which naturally increase in detail.[9] In the Mahāyānist *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[10] he is transformed into a *bodhisattva*, who is to appear as the future Buddha Padmaprabha.

LITERATURE.—The sources are given above.

EDWARD J. THOMAS.

SĀRNĀTH.—Sārnāth is the name applied to an extensive group of Buddhist ruins situated in the Benares District, United Provinces, India, about 3½ miles to the north of Benares city (*q.v.*), in N. lat. 25° 23′, E. long. 83° 2′. The name properly belongs to a Śaiva temple called Sārnāth to the south-east of the prominent Dhamēkh *stūpa*. An annual fair is, or used to be, held close to the temple—a circumstance which caused its name to become well known. The locality seems to have been sacred and the resort of ascetics from very ancient times, even before the days of Gautama Buddha. Its fame is due to the belief that the site includes the Deer-park (Skr. *mṛgadāva*, Pāli *migadāya*) adjoining Ṛṣipattana (Pāli Isipattana), where Buddha, in or about 528 B.C., preached to his first five adherents the 'first sermon,' expounding the 'four noble truths.' The legend and the substance of the sermon may be read in most of the books about Buddhism. The Deer-park, now known as Sārnāth, thus became one of the four principal holy places of Buddhism, the others being Kapilavastu with the Lumbinī garden, Bodh Gayā, and Kuśinagara (*qq.v.*). The sanctity thus acquired naturally resulted in the erection of commemorative monuments, magnificent monasteries, and all the appurtenances of a first-class place of pilgrimage.

[1] Manu, *Laws*, ii. 17. [2] Macdonell, p. 87 f.
[3] Cf. *Aṅguttara*, i. 23 (Ekapuggala).
[4] *E.g.*, *Dīgha*, iii. 210, 272; *Majjhima*, i. 13; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 160, etc.
[5] H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (*GIAP* III. viii.), Strassburg, 1896, p. 5.
[6] i. 23 (Etad-agga).
[7] Unpublished, but tr. by C. A. F. Rhys Davids in *Psalms of the Early Buddhists* (*PTS*), London, 1909–13, ii. *Psalms of the Brethren*.
[8] Cf. *Dīgha*, ii. 81 with *Dīgha*, iii. 99, *Saṃyutta*, v. 159.
[9] Kern, p. 42. [10] iii. 22.

The construction of monuments probably began before the close of the 5th cent. B.C., but at present no part of the remains can be assigned with confidence to a date earlier than the middle of the 3rd cent. B.C., in the reign of Aśoka. The Buddhist buildings were destroyed by the Musalmān invaders a little before the close of the 12th cent. of the Christian era. The ruins of Buddhist edifices, so far as yet ascertained, consequently cover a period of about fourteen centuries and a half. A modern Jain temple and many ancient images indicate that the locality is and long has been sacred in the eyes of the Jains, while the existence of the shrine of Sārnāth above mentioned and sundry mediæval sculptures prove that it is venerable also for Brāhmanical Hindus. But the whole interest of the site is connected with the Buddhist legends and remains, which alone need be noticed.

Exploration.—A visit of the Pādshāh Humāyūn to the site is commemorated by an inscription set up by his son Akbar in A.D. 1588, but the Musalmāns neither knew nor cared anything about the local history. Attention to the nature of the ruins was first attracted by excavations conducted in 1794 by a landholder for the sake of building material, which destroyed a *stūpa* and disclosed a relic casket and certain Buddhist images. Jonathan Duncan, then Resident at Benares, recorded a note on the subject. Other persons subsequently made desultory researches, but the first attempt at systematic exploration was made by Cunningham in 1834–36. Kittoe and others, between 1853 and 1865, did some more excavation. Cunningham recorded all information known up to date in his *Archæol. Survey Report* for 1861–62, published as the first vol. of his *Reports* at Simla in 1871. Nothing further of importance was done at the site until 1904–05, when Oertel made interesting discoveries. The work was taken up officially by the Archæological Department in 1907 and has been continued with excellent results. A museum has been built on the site, and a scholarly catalogue of its contents was published in 1914.

The site is divided into two distinct areas by an ancient wall running east and west. The monastery area to the north of that wall was occupied by four monasteries of various ages. The *stūpa* area south of the wall contains the remains of innumerable edifices, small and great. The 'main shrine' (*mūlagandhi kuṭi*) occupied the centre of the western section, and the Aśoka column discovered by Oertel stood to the west of the main shrine. The inscription, fortunately preserved, is classed as a 'minor pillar edict,' and is directed against schismatics. Jagat Singh's *stūpa*, the one dug up in 1794, is to the south of the main shrine. The Dhamēkh (Dharmekṣā) *stūpa*, a memorial of some sacred incident, not a depository for relics, stands in the south-eastern part of the area. It dates from the 5th or 6th cent. in the Gupta period and is adorned with fine decorative designs. It is impossible to enumerate the minor buildings. The principal establishment was known as the 'Monastery of the Wheel of the Law' (*dharmachakra*). Buddhists figured the first preaching of the Master as the 'turning of the wheel of the law.' Aśoka's column, accordingly, was surmounted by a wheel, and the symbol recurs frequently on the sculptures.

About A.D. 300 the leading sect at the locality was the Sarvāstivādin (*q.v.*). A little later the Sāmmitīya (*q.v.*) sect or school prevailed, and in Hiuen Tsiang's time it had 1500 monks. Both sects were Hīnayāna.

The buildings, from Maurya or pre-Maurya times to the closing years of the 12th cent., were

destroyed more than once and frequently rebuilt. The first destruction perhaps occurred in the Hun period (6th century). Restorations are recorded in 1026 and the first half of the 12th century. The end came about 1193 at the hands of Kutb-ud-dīn's fierce Muslims. The traces of more than one burning are clearly visible.

The hundreds of sculptures include the magnificent capital, 7 ft. high, of the Aśoka column, the finest known Maurya composition, and multitudes of excellent works in the 'suave and gracious' Gupta style, some of which rank in the first class of Indian sculpture. In fact, the Sārnāth finds in themselves are almost enough to illustrate adequately a history of Indian sculpture. They are equally important as illustrations of Buddhism, and especially of the development of the Buddha cult and the later worship of minor deities, male and female. Jambhala or Vaiśravana, Vasudhārā, Tārā, Mārīchī, and others are frequently represented. Only one *Jātaka*, that of Kshāntivādin, has been noticed, but many discoveries of all kinds may yet be made.

LITERATURE.—Daya Ram Sahni, *Catalogue of the Museum of Archæology at Sārnāth*, with introd. by J. P. Vogel, plan and full bibliography, Calcutta, 1914 (well illustrated, gives the best general account); A. Cunningham, *Arch. Survey of India Reports*, i. Simla, 1871; *Arch. Survey Annual Reports, for 1904–05, 1906–07, and 1907–08*, Calcutta, 1906–12. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang), in any of the versions, gives a detailed description. See also the other pilgrims, sundry books about Benares (*q.v.*), and a multitude of publications listed in Vogel's bibliography.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

SARVĀSTIVĀDINS.—Sarvāstivāda is one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism[1] and was at one time the most wide-spread and influential of all. As a philosophy, it is a school which holds a realistic view, as the name indicates (*sarva*, 'all'; *asti*, 'exist'; *vāda*, 'saying,' *i.e.* one who maintains that everything, external as well as internal, is real); and it is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, in deviating from the opinions of the orthodox Theravāda school.

In the course of 100 to 200 years after the Buddha's *nirvāṇa*, *i.e.* after the Council of Vaiśālī, the object of which was chiefly to refute the ten theses of the Vajjian *bhikkhus*, the Buddhist Church is said to have split into various schools.[2] We are told in the *Dīpavaṁsa*, v. 47, that the Mahiṁsāsaka (Mahīsāsaka) separated itself from the Theravāda, and from the Mahiṁsāsaka the Sabbatthivāda (=Sarvāstivāda) and the Dhammagutta (=Dharmagupta).

The Mahīśāsaka and the Dharmagupta will subsequently be found as the subdivisions of the school,[3] and we may assume from this fact that these three schools did not differ much in their philosophical opinions. The history of this school, however, begins practically with the Council of Pāṭaliputra under King Aśoka, for it was in that Council (240 B.C.) that Moggaliputta Tissa, the head of the Council, compiled the *Kathāvatthu*[4] to refute the schismatic views current at his time. This work directs only three questions against the Sabbatthivāda: (1) Does every thing exist? (2) Can an *arhat* fall from *arhat*-ship? (3) Is continuation of thought *samādhi*?[5] All these questions would be answered in the affirmative by the Sabbatthivādas, contrary to the opinions of the orthodox school.

Though it does not seem to have played a very important part at the time of King Aśoka, it must have found a new home in the northernmost regions and flourished vigorously there as the Vaibhāṣikas of Gandhāra and Kaśmīra. The word 'Vaibhāṣika' is derived from *Vibhāṣā* ('Option'), which is the name of a great commentary compiled some time after Kaniṣka's reign to explain the *Jñānaprasthāna* ('Origin of Knowledge') by Kātyāyanīputra, a brilliant philosopher of this school.[1] The commentary receives its name from the fact that different opinions of the leading teachers of the school are carefully recorded, so that the reader may at his own option adopt whatever opinion he feels inclined to.

The *Vibhāṣā* and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* in three Chinese versions were translated in A.D. 383, 427, and 659 respectively,[2] and we have therefore to attribute the compilation to a period prior to the first date and to assume that the period during which this literature was studied must cover those dates. The Sarvāstivādins appear from this work to have been, after their first deviation from the original school, the upholders of a well-organized philosophical system. This is fully borne out by subsequent writers, especially Vasubandhu (*c.* A.D. 420–500)[3] and his powerful opponent Saṁghabhadra, who often refer to and criticize the opinions of the Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣikas as a body of thinkers.[4]

According to Parāmartha (A.D. 499–569), the *Vibhāṣā* was a principal subject of philosophical discussion during the 5th cent., when there was also a great controversy between Buddhist and Sāṅkhya philosophers.[5] The Neo-Vibhāṣanic activity seems practically to have ceased with the conversion of Vasubandhu to the idealistic philosophy, though his work appears to have been still in vogue among Buddhist scholars, Guṇamati, Vasumitra, and Yaśomitra successively compiling a commentary on it.[6]

Śaṅkarāchārya ([*q.v.*] born *c.* A.D. 788), while explaining Bādarāyana's *Vedānta-sūtra*, remembers the Vaibhāṣika school and refutes its doctrine of realism (*sarvāstitvavāda*) along with the other systems of Buddhism, idealism (*vijñānamātratvavāda*) and negativism (*sarvaśūnyatvavāda*).[7]

Vāchaspatimiśra's *Bhāmatī* of the 12th cent. follows Śaṅkarāchārya in giving three schools of Buddhism, classifying the Sarvāstivādins as those of inferior thought (*hīnamati*) against those of middle (*madhyama*, the idealist) and advanced thought (*prakṛṣṭamati*, the negativist).

In the 14th cent. the system is reviewed as one of the four Buddhist schools by Mādhavāchārya.[8] Here it is expressly stated that the Vaibhāṣikas acknowledge the direct perception of external objects (*vāhyārtha-pratyakṣatva*), while the Sautrāntikas (*q.v.*), to whom Vasubandhu himself was

[1] The enumeration of eighteen schools is official as well as historical. See Takakusu, 'The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins,' *JPTS*, 1905, pp. 67–146.

[2] *Dīpavaṁsa*, v. 16–18; *Mahāvaṁsa*, v. 8.

[3] See Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* (*A.D. 671–695*) *by I-tsing*, Oxford, 1896, p. xxiv.

[4] *Points of Controversy*, tr. with commentary by C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London, 1915.

[5] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy*, i. 6 (p. 84), i. 2 (p. 64), xi. 6 (p. 260), and *JRAS*, 1892, p. 8.

[1] Hiuen Tsiang's statement that this commentary was drawn up by 500 *arhats* in the Buddhist Council under King Kaniṣka is very doubtful, because the book relates a miracle which it says occurred *formerly* in the reign of that king; see T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–645*, London, 1904–05, i. 277.

[2] Bunyio Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, nos. 1299, 1264, 1263.

[3] In spite of a grave objection raised by M. Peri and B. Shiio, the present writer still holds A.D. 420–500 to be the safest date for Vasubandhu.

[4] Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (Nanjio, no. 1267), Saṅghabhadra's *Satyānusāra* (no. 1265) and *Samaya pradīpikā* (no. 1266) often quote the Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. For Yaśomitra's explanation of the name see his *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ch. iii.

[5] See Takakusu, 'Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu,' *Tongpao*, July, 1904, pp. 279, 287, 289, and also 'The Date of Vasubandhu,' *JRAS*, Jan. 1905, p. 47.

[6] See C. Bendall, *Catalogue of Buddhist Sanskrit MSS in the [Cambridge] University Library*, Cambridge, 1883, add. 1041 p. 26.

[7] G. Thibaut, *Vedānta-sūtra*, pt. i. (ii. 2–18), *SBE* xxxiv. [1890] 401.

[8] *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, ch. ii.

inclined, hold that external objects merely exist as images and can only be inferred (*vāhyārthānumeyatva*).

Though the existence of the Sarvāstivādins can be traced during more than fifteen centuries of Indian history, yet the exhaustive study of their religious practices was not undertaken till the 7th cent., when I-tsing translated the whole of their Vinaya literature and wrote a treatise on the current practices.[1] The geographical extension described by him is more minute than those of his predecessors. Fa-Hian (A.D. 399–414) says that the Sarvāstivāda was followed in Pāṭaliputra as well as in China in his time.[2] According to Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629–645), the school was found chiefly in Kaśgar (Central Asia), Udyāna (Yusefzay, N.W. Frontier), and the neighbouring territories, in Matipura, Kanauj, and a place near Rājagrha in Mid-India, and also in Persia in the West.[3] I-tsing (A.D. 671–695), himself a Sarvāstivādin, gives a fairly detailed description of this school. The places enumerated by him as belonging to it are the following:

C. India	Magadha, where it is chiefly flourishing.
W. India	Lāṭa (Gujarāt) and Sindhu, where it had a few adherents.
N. India	Almost all belonged to it.
S. India	A few adherents are found.
E. India	Side by side with the other schools.
(Ceylon	No adherents.)
Sumatra, Java, Bali Islands	Almost all belong to it.
Champā (Cochin-China)	A few adherents.
S. China	The south valley of the Yang-tse-kiang, Kwang-tung, and Kwang-si, where it is chiefly flourishing.

The three subdivisions of this school, Dharmagupta, Mahīśāsaka, and Kāśyapīya, are found in Central Asia (Kharachar, *i.e.* Kuche, and Kustana, *i.e.* Khotan) and the N.W. Frontier (Udyāna, *i.e.* Yusefzay); and the Dharmagupta alone is flourishing in E. China and also in W. China (Shen-si).[4]

The Tibetan Buddhism is said to belong to this school, while in Japan a tenet founded on the *Abhidharmakośa* is still studied as the foundation of a philosophical training. This wide-spread school was, according to I-tsing, in possession of a *Tripiṭaka* (sacred books so called) amounting to 300,000 *ślokas*.[5] Whether this statement is to be taken as literally true or not, an examination of the extant Buddhist literature shows clearly that this school had a separate *Vinaya Piṭaka*[6] and also a distinct *Abhidharma Piṭaka*.[7] These are very complete in contents, a counterpart of almost all the Theravāda works being found in them. A striking resemblance between the names of the seven works of the *Abhidharma* of the two schools is so puzzling to the present writer that he has thought it necessary to show clearly that the two sets had no real connexion with each other.[8]

The whole of the *Abhidharma* literature centres on the work *Jñāna-prasthāna* ('Origin of Knowledge') by Kātyāyanīputra. Hiuen Tsiang tells us that he composed this work about 300 years after the Buddha's decease, in a monastery called Tāmasāvana of Cīnabhukti, N. India, in which the traveller himself found 300 brethren of the Sarvāstivādins learning the Hīnayāna doctrine. The work treats of matter (*bhūta, bhauta*) and mind (*chitta, chaitta*) with all their bearings, giving definitions and classifications when necessary. Among the subjects discussed we find the supramundane state (*lokāgra-dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), thought (*chetanā*), meditation (*samādhi*), views (*dṛṣṭi*), person (*pudgala*), form (*rūpa*), elements (*mahābhūta*), bondage (*saṁyojana*), path (*mārga*), action (*karma*), and the like. It is to this work that six authors, either contemporaries or successors, wrote each a supplementary treatise called the *pāda* ('foot'). The six *pādas* take up the subjects again and try to systematize or supplement what is, in their eyes, wanting in their predecessors.

The *Saṅgīti* ('Rehearsal') by Mahākauṣṭhila arranges the subjects in the numerical order, while the *Prakaraṇa* ('Classification') by Vasumitra tries to group the questions under chief heads. The *Vijñāna-kāya* ('Consciousness-body') of Devaśarman, the *Dhātukāya* ('Element-body') of Pūrṇa, the *Dharma-skandha* ('Norm-group') of Śāriputra, and the *Prajñapti* ('World-formation') of Maudgalyāyana treat of a subject each as the title indicates. These constitute the seven official works of the school,[1] but they by no means exhaust all the literature of the Sarvāstivādins.

As is shown in the present writer's 'Analysis,'[2] there are the *Vibhāṣā* (14 fasciculi, no. 1299) and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (200 fasciculi, nos. 1263, 1264), each being a different translation of a commentary on the *Jñāna-prasthāna* just mentioned. This *Vibhāṣā* is practically an encyclopædia of the Vaibhāṣika philosophy, for it records carefully the often conflicting opinions of various realistic philosophers residing at the two great centres of Kaśmīra and Gandhāra.[3] The bulk of this great commentary and the discrepancy of the opinions expressed in it gradually made the necessity of a concise treatise or a short versification keenly felt. To supply this need there appeared the *Abhidharmakośa* (no. 1269) of Vasubandhu early in the 5th cent.[4] and in opposition to it the two treatises of Saṁghabhadra called the *Satyānusāra* (no. 1265) and the *Samaya-pradīpikā* (no. 1266). Saṁghabhadra represents the orthodox opinion of realism, while Vasubandhu was much inclined towards the Sautrāntic philosophy and introduced some ideas foreign and heretical in the eyes of the orthodox. The brilliant leader of the Neo-Vaibhāṣakas soon proved the founder of the idealistic school. Of all the *Abhidharma* literature we have no original Sanskrit text at present, nor is there any prospect as yet of its being discovered in the remote Himālayan regions. The Chinese translation is, therefore, the sole authority.[5] To compensate for this, we have Yaśomitra's *Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā-sphuṭārtha*, a Sanskrit commentary on the *Kośa* of Vasubandhu. This is almost the last work which reflects the activity of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy on Indian soil.

In Japan, however, the *Kośa* doctrine is still

[1] See Takakusu, *I-tsing's Record*, p. xxxvii.

[2] Fa-Hian, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, ch. xxxix., ed. J. Legge, Oxford, 1886, p. 99.

[3] Hiuen Tsiang mentions some thirteen places as belonging to this school, but the number of its adherents in India proper was not so great as in those of the other schools (see T. W. Rhys Davids, *JRAS*, 1891, p. 420).

[4] See Takakusu, *I-tsing's Record*, p. xxiv.

[5] A *śloka* = 32 syllables.

[6] For the list of nineteen works of the *Vinaya* in 189 volumes see Takakusu, *I-tsing's Record*, p. xxxvii.

[7] The present writer has analyzed the *Abhidharma* literature of this school in *JPTS*, 1905, pp. 67–146.

[8] A question was raised by H. Kern and M. Walleser as to a possible connexion of the Pāli with the Chinese, and the result of an examination was communicated to *JRAS*, 1905, pp. 160–162.

[1] That these were authentic classics of the school is seen from Yaśomitra's giving a list of these authors as handed down. See *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā Kārikā*, iii. The *Mahāvyutpatti*, §§ 65, 91–96, gives six works and omits *Vijñānakāya*. For Takakusu's list of Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese (transliteration and translation) equivalents see *JPTS*, 1905, p. 75.

[2] *JPTS*, 1905, p. 125 f.

[3] The text cites the views of at least six schools, viz. Vibhajyavādin (Theravāda), Sautrāntika, Dharmagupta, Mahīśasaka (the two are the subdivisions of the Sarvāstivādins), Vātsīputrīya, and the school which holds the distinction of *chitta* (mind) and *chetanā* (thought). Among the names of philosophers quoted we find Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, Ghoṣa, Pārśva, Vasumitra, and Kātyāyanīputra.

[4] See p. 198b, n. 3.

[5] No text is found in Tibetan. The Tibetan *Dharmaskandha* (*Mdo*, xx. 3, wa 39–46) to which M. Walleser refers (*Die philosoph. Grunde.*, Heidelberg, 1904, p. 18) proved, on comparison, to be an entirely different work (see Takakusu, in *JPTS*, 1905, p. 77)

studied by Buddhist scholars, and a considerable amount of literature is in existence. Among others, we have the two priceless commentaries on the *Kośa* (each 30 vols., being notes of Hiuen Tsiang's lectures) by Fu-kuang and Fa-pao (A.D. 645–664 with Hiuen Tsiang) and two other commentaries of a little later date (each 29 vols.) by Yüan-hui and Tun-lin, all of which were lost in their original home, China.[1] The preservation of these works in the Far East, along with a Turkish commentary found in Central Asia,[2] is a proof of the wide propagation of the Sarvāstivada school.

As to the religious life and the monastic rules of the school, there are numerous points of interest in which they differ from the orthodox school. These will become clear when all the *Vinaya-piṭakas* (eleven in all) have been examined, and then I-tsing's painstaking *Record* will assert its importance in religious history.[3]

There are some doubtful points as to the name of the school. Sarvāstivāda (Pāli Sabbatthivāda) is the regular name of it. The *Dīpavaṁsa*, v. 47, however, gives Sabbatthavāda, which looks like Sarvārthavāda in Sanskrit, but 'attha' for 'atthi' is probably due to a euphonic change. The oldest Chinese name Sā-p'o-to (Jap. Sat-ba-ta) very probably represents the Pāli Sabbattha.[4] An ingenious suggestion of F. W. Thomas of the India Office Library, that it may represent Sadvāda in contradistinction to Asadvāda, is very appropriate, if we can only adduce any evidence of the use of such a name in Buddhist literature.[5] When the three minor schools[6] became subordinate to it in the 7th cent., this school seems to have used the name Mūla-sarvāstivāda. A general appellation, comprising the four together, is, according to I-tsing, the Ārya-mūla-sarvāstivāda-nikāya, *i.e.* the 'noble fundamental school which affirms the existence of all.' We have no reason to doubt the accuracy of I-tsing's statement when we have the evidence of the name Sarvāstitva-vāda (which is practically the same as Sarvāstivāda) used by Śaṅkarāchārya and Vāchaspatimiśra.[7] The *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 275, further gives two forms of the name, Ārya-sarvāstivāda and Mūla-sarvāstivāda, in conformity with the names given by I-tsing. In conclusion a summary of the above description of the philosophical and literary activity of the school may be useful:


Sarvāstivādins
Gandhāra Abhidharmikas. (Jñāna-prasthāna and its six pādas)
Kaśmīra Abhidharmikas
Vaibhāṣika-śāstrins (Vibhāṣā and Mahāvibhāṣā)
Neo-Vaibhāṣika śāstrins
Vasubandhu (Sautrāntic) (Abhidharmakośa and the Kārikā)
Saṅghabhadra (Orthodox) (Satyānusāra and Samaya-pradīpikā)
Fu-kuang and Fa-pao (pupils of Hiuen Tsiang) (The two great commentators on the Kośa)
The other commentators in Sanskrit, Chinese, Turkish, etc.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in footnotes.

J. TAKAKUSU.

[1] First published in Japan in the Kyoto ed. of the *Tripiṭaka* (Continuation series, cases 84–86).

[2] This work is now being studied by E. D. Ross. It seems to have been translated into Turkish from Chinese.

[3] The present writer is now engaged on publishing *Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Vinaya, the Samantapāsādikā*, of which a Chinese text exists.

[4] This name Sā-p'o-to is used from the Three Chin dynasty (A.D. 350–431). Watters restored it into a very unlikely form 'Sarvata.' Though phonetically this may fit better than 'Sabbattha,' we cannot assume that such a form as 'Sarvata' has ever existed as a name.

[5] In *JPTS*, 1905, p. 72, the present writer gave *sarvavāda* instead of *sadvāda* by mistake.

[6] See above, p. 199[a], n. 1.

[7] See above, p. 198[b].

SĀSANA.—This term, meaning 'instruction,' 'teaching,' 'injunction,' and etymologically allied to *satthā*, 'teacher,' and *śāstra* (Skr.), 'treatise,' 'didactic compilation,' appears in the earliest books of the Buddhist canon. There it almost invariably means the teaching, doctrine, or evangel of the Buddha.

There is this special touch of similarity with the word 'evangel' (εὐαγγέλιον) that *sāsana* is occasionally employed in the commentaries to mean 'message' or 'news'—*e.g.*, 'the king sent a message, saying' . . .[1]

In such passages as those translated 'the teaching of the Master,'[2] 'the doctrine of the Teacher,'[3] 'Gotama's commandments,'[4] the original is *satthu* or *Gotamassa sāsanaṃ*. And we find it repeatedly used as a co-ordinate and equivalent of *dhamma* and *vinaya*—'doctrine' and 'discipline,' or 'rule': 'this is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's Teaching.'[5] In fact, in so far as *dhamma* meant formulated doctrine, and *vinaya* meant spiritual discipline, *sāsana* implied both of these. For it connoted essentially 'precept,' 'ordinance,' enjoined by an instructor on a pupil as a rule of life; hence the term for a loyal recluse, *sāsana-karo* (*-karī*, or *-kārako*[6]), 'doer of the *sāsana*'; and hence the frequent refrain of triumph when he realizes that he has graduated in such a course:

'And all the Buddha's ordinance is done.'[7]

Occasionally the *sāsana* so obeyed is ascribed to a notable teacher in the order, even though it were to a contemporary of the Buddha—*e.g.*, Sister Paṭāchārā:

'THE SISTER: "Do ye the Buddha's *sāsana*" . .
The will (*sāsana*) of her who spake, Paṭāchārā,
The thirty sisters heard and swift obeyed . . .
. . . . . they hailed her blest:
"Fulfilled is thy will!"'[8]

Once only is the teaching of one 'outside' the order (*ito bahiddhā*) called his *sāsana*. This was the saintly Sunetta,[9] and he belonged to the dim past.

Gradually the import of the word developed. From meaning the fluid series of personal teachings it came to represent both a body of compiled if unwritten literature (*pariyatti-sāsana*), which was to be committed to memory, and the system of conduct and mental training (*paṭipatti sāsana*), as enumerated in the *Niddesa*.[10] It has been sought to reproduce this organic development in the term by the word 'rule':

'But I will in this Rule renounce the world.'[11]
'If he the training in the Rule fulfil.'[12]

In its relation to the individual follower's consciousness, it coincides with the word 'religion.' And in historical documents of Buddhism, such as the account of the growth of the seventeen partly divergent schools,[13] and the *Mahāvaṃsa* and *Dīpa-*

[1] *The Jātaka*, ed. V. Fausböll, London, 1877, i. 60, etc., tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, in *Buddhist Birth Stories*, London, 1880, i. 79, 119 f.; cf. *Dhammapada Commentary* (*PTS*), ed. H. C. Norman, Oxford, 1906–14, i. 60.

[2] *Dialogues of the Buddha* (*SBB*), tr. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London, 1910, ii. 135.

[3] *Mahāvagga*, I. vi. 32 (*SBE* xiii. [1881] 98); cf. *Dhammapada*, 183, 185 (*SBE* x.[2] [1898] pt. i. p. 51).

[4] *Sutta-Nipāta*, II. xiv. 19 (*SBE* x.[2] pt. ii. p. 169).

[5] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, ii. 168, iv. 143, 280.

[6] *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 129, 284; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, ii. 26; *Sutta-Nipāta*, 445 (*SBE* x.[2] pt. ii. p. 70).

[7] *Psalms of the Early Buddhists* (*PTS*), London, 1909–13, i. 26, etc., ii. 107, etc.

[8] *Ib.* i. 74; cf. 95, where *anusāsani* ('instructions') is substituted probably *metri causa*.

[9] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iv. 104; cf. 136: *ito bahiddhā*.

[10] *Mahā-Niddesa*, 143. This is the canonical commentary on part of the *Sutta-Nipāta*; it is here commenting on the word *sāsana* (precepts) in verse 815 (*SBE* x.[2] pt. ii. p. 151). 'Religion' would have been a better rendering here of *sāsana* than 'precepts.'

[11] *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, ii. 313; cf. F. Max Müller, *Dhammapada*, 164 (*SBE* x.[2] pt. i. p. 46).

[12] *Kindred Sayings* (*PTS*), London, 1917, i. 246, tr. of *Saṃyutta*, i.

[13] *Points of Controversy* (*PTS*), London, 1915, p. 2, n. 1; see art. SECTS (Buddhist).

vaṃsa, sāsana can rightly be translated 'the faith,' 'religion,' 'the church.'

So H. Oldenberg ('Will exist as long as the Faith'[1]); W. Geiger and M. H. Bode ('Is there a kinsman of Buddha's religion?');[2] S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids ('Now the Sāsana held on its way as these eighteen early schools').[3]

Such down to the present day is the significance of the term to a Buddhist.

LITERATURE.—See the sources indicated in the footnotes.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SASANIANS. — **1. History.** — The national dynasty which, overthrowing the Arsacid line, ruled in Persia from A.D. 226 to 651 — George Rawlinson's 'Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy' —derives its name from Sasan, father of Papak (otherwise Babek), whose son **Ardashir I.** (same name as Artaxerxes) was the founder of the line of some 28 monarchs who ruled Irān for over four centuries. We are concerned here with this long dynasty only so far as it was connected with the history of the national religion as well as with Christianity. The question whether the great Achæmenian dynasty (559–331 B.C.), which was certainly Mazdean (for its kings proclaim themselves in their famous rock-inscriptions as 'Mazdayasnian'), was also Zoroastrian, as has been held by so many, or whether it professed another form of that cult, is still one of the unsolved riddles of history, in spite of J. H. Moulton's able advocacy of the former solution.[4] The faith of the Parthian or Arsacid dynasty (250 B.C.–A.D. 226) is a subject of considerable obscurity; it was perhaps a debased form of Mazdeism, with a heterogeneous syncretism of alien and pagan cults. Still Zoroastrianism continued to subsist, at least in the more purely Persian parts of the empire, and the fragments of the sacred books which had escaped the (traditional) destruction by Alexander the Great were handed down during the 476 years of the dynasty; probably it was also during this period that the surviving portions of the Avesta were translated into Pahlavi, the daughter and successor of the Old Persian language.[5] Be this as it may, with the Sasanians the Zoroastrian religion, though much altered from the days of the Prophet and his *Gāthās*, mounted the throne of Persia and became the undoubted national faith of a mighty empire. The kings of this line were ardent, and only too frequently intolerant, upholders of the faith. Ardashir himself on his coins styles himself from the beginning 'Mazdayasn,' *i.e.* worshipper of Mazda, like the Achæmenian 'Auramazdiya,' and his successors retained the title. It was under the second king, **Shahpuhr (Sapor) I.**, that Māni, the founder of the subsequently world-wide system of Manichæism (*q.v.*), first came into prominence. By the Persians he was always regarded as a heretic and his religion as a 'heresy' of Mazdeism. He was cruelly put to death by Varahran (Bahram) I. in 272. His execution seems to have been concomitant with an extensive persecution, by the Magian priesthood, not only of Māni's followers, but also of the Christians. The long reign of **Shahpuhr II.** (A.D. 309–380) is of importance in the religious history in that, at least according to the native tradition, the celebrated priest Aderbad Marehspand (Aturpāt-i Maraspandān) completed during it the final redaction and correction of all that remained of the Avesta texts in the form in which we now possess them.[6] To him is also ascribed the compilation of the *Khorda Avesta*, or 'Little Avesta,' being selections from various sacred texts and containing the *Nyayishes*, or 'Litanies,'[1] together with the *Gahs*, *Siroza*, and *Afrīngān*. Other original compositions in Pahlavi are attributed to him, especially his *Andarj*, or 'Book of Counsel' to his son.[2] Of Aturpāt and his fellow 'diaskeuasts' Geldner says:

'Out of the surviving remains and fragments [of the Avesta] they built up a new Canon. With old materials they erected a new edifice.' What materials they found, what they themselves added, how far they reproduced passages literally or recast them, it is impossible to decide.'[3]

Probably we owe to them the division into chapters and verses. West takes a less favourable view of the work of these revisers. Certainly a great deal of the meaning of the sacred texts had been forgotten—many of them are still in a very corrupt state—and we do not exactly know in what script they were preserved; for, strange as it sounds, what is now known as the Zend or Avestan alphabet, in which all existing MSS of the sacred book are written and which is now used in printing, is posterior to and derived from the Pahlavi alphabet, and evolved from the latter possibly as late as the 6th cent. A.D., eked out with vowel characters borrowed from the Greek.

The reign of **Yazdagird II.** (Yazdakart, lit. *θεόκτιστος*), A.D. 438–457, is noteworthy in the religious history for his violent attempts to force the Mazdean religion upon the Armenians, and after a long religious war Zoroastrianism was imposed upon that nation, amidst bloody episodes, in 456. As a preliminary to this scheme of proselytism must be mentioned the celebrated 'Edict of Mihr Narseh,' the vazir or prime minister, addressed to the Armenian people and preserved to us by the Armenian historians. It is extremely curious in many ways. It begins with the solemn words: 'Ye must know that every one of those who live beneath the sky and hold not the Mazdean religion is deaf and blind and deceived by the demons,' and proceeds to give a summary of that faith, followed by a detailed criticism of the doctrines of Christianity, insisting especially on the absurdity of the divine incarnation, the crucifixion of God, abstinence and celibacy, and so forth. It is surprising to find, however, that the form of Mazdeism which this official edict sets forth is no other than what would be termed the heterodox one of Zervanism, or the reduction of the primitive dualism to the primordial principle or deity Zervan ('Time'), of whom were born in fantastic wise both Ormazd and Ahriman.[4] We must suppose, therefore, that this represents the royal belief at the time. The Christian bishops under the catholicos Joseph drew up a reply to the document. What argumentation failed to effect was, as we have seen, subsequently carried out by ruthless persecution.

The eventful reign of **Kobad (Kavāt) I.** (A.D. 490–531) is remarkable for a most unusual episode in the history of the Zoroastrian faith. This was the rise of the second great 'heresy' in its midst, the extravagant communism of Mazdak (*q.v.*), a Magian priest, whose name is constantly coupled in the Pahlavi writings with that of Māni as a heresiarch in terms of special reprobation. The extraordinary thing is that the king himself fell under the influence of this wildly ultra-socialistic system and became not only a protector but even a proselyte of Mazdak. This led to his deposition in 498 and the substitution of his brother Jamasp. After his restoration Kobad broke with the sect, which was now plotting his overthrow, and inflicted a general massacre upon them. Mazdak himself survived till the next reign, but Chosroes

[1] Tr. of *Dīpavaṃsa*, London, 1879, p. 135.
[2] Tr. of *Mahāvaṃsa*, London, 1912, p. 42.
[3] *Points of Controversy*, p. 5.
[4] In his *Early Zoroastrianism*.
[5] On the Arsacid religion see Justi in *GIrP* ii. 694.
[6] See K. Geldner, *GIrP* ii. 34 f.; West, *ib.* pp. 94–96.

[1] 'A sort of religious chrestomathy . . . employed in daily use by laymen as well as by priests,' separately ed. and tr. by M. N. Dhalla, New York, 1908.
[2] Tr. C. de Harlez, Louvain, 1887. [3] P. 35.
[4] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Iranian), § 2.

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(Khusrau) I. exterminated the sect, slaughtering the heresiarch with 100,000 of his followers. It will be seen that, whilst Manichæism was a philosophical and theological system, Mazdakism was almost exclusively of a social and economic character, proclaiming communism not only of goods but even of women. Its extension in both Persia and Armenia was at one time very remarkable.

We now come to the most illustrious of all the Sasanian reigns, that of the well-known **Chosroes Anoshervan** (in Pahlavi, Khusrau-i Anōshak-rūbāno, *i.e.* 'the immortal souled'), A.D. 531–579. This was the golden age of the imperial Mazdean religion and of the Pahlavi literature. To it belong most of the many Pahlavi treatises which have been preserved to us and of which by far the fullest and best account is that of E. W. West in *GIrP* ii. 75–129. It is quite evident that the court of this famous monarch was a great centre of intellectual activity. Foreign philosophers and men of science, Indian, Syrian, and Greek, from East and West, met and discussed; whilst even in the national religion itself we know that rival theological and philosophical sects existed side by side, on the evidence of an eye- and ear-witness, Paul the Persian.[1] The king himself seems to have taken a keen personal interest in theological questions. If we may credit a strange tale recorded by the Syriac historian Barhebræus,[2] he summoned on one occasion a Nestorian catholicos ('who had formerly been a magus') and held a brief discussion with him concerning Cyril and Nestorius, apparently trying to persuade him to give up Nestorianism for Christian orthodoxy. It is distressing to learn that, as the royal logic did not convert the unfortunate man, he was incarcerated and subsequently put to death. Several Pahlavi compositions are attributed to Chosroes himself—it is difficult to say with what authority. There is a very interesting Aśoka-like doctrinal proclamation, styled 'The Ten Precepts of the Immortal-souled Khusrau, King of Kings,' embodied in the *Dīnkart*,[3] and translated by the present writer in *The Babylonian and Oriental Record*.[4] More interesting still is the *Andarj-i Khusrau-i Kavātān*, a little treatise first published with some others by Dastur Peshotan at Bombay in 1888. Whether this piece be merely a rhetorical composition of subsequent date, such as Xenophon's dying speech of Cyrus the Great is supposed to be, or whether it be genuinely the last will and testament of the great Sasanian monarch, in any case it is a noble composition of lofty morality and sentiments worthy of a Christian, surpassing in its reverent humility the words put by Xenophon in the mouth of his hero.[5]

'As soon as this life shall be parted from my body,' it begins, 'take this my throne and bear it to Ispahan, and in Ispahan set me up; before the face of the people make ye proclamation, saying: "O men, from doing sin preserve yourselves; and in the working of meritorious deeds be ye active; and the splendour of the world hold ye in contempt. For this is the body of him who yesterday was in the body, and whom men approached with three obeisances; in every place he cultivated purity and the splendour of this world. But to-day on account of his condition of impurity,[6] every one who placeth his hand upon him is thereafter obliged to purify himself by the *bareshnum*, else to the worship of God and the converse of the good they do not admit him. Yesterday on account of the pomp of his sovereignty he gave not his hand to any one: to-day on account of his condition of impurity, no man putteth his hand on him!"'

There follow a number of truly admirable moral and religious precepts addressed to his people; and the conclusion is:

'From before the majesty of Aŭharmazd have I come, for the purpose of overthrowing the Evil Spirit am I here; again before the majesty of Aŭharmazd must I go; moreover this is required of me—holiness and the actions proper to the wise and the living in union with wisdom and the due ordering of my nature.'

It is of course only natural that all kinds of traditional utterances should gather round the name of so celebrated a ruler, of whom his subjects made not only an Alexander and a Justinian, but also a Solomon. Numerous conversations, shrewd replies, solutions of cases, and messages to foreign monarchs are preserved by Eastern writers, such as the Arab chronicler Tabarī, and at least eighteen letters and speeches are quoted as his in Firdausi's great national epic, the *Shāh-nāmah*. One of these[1] he introduces with the words: 'I have seen in an old book that (Chosroes wrote as follows).'

Whatever be thought of the attribution to the King of Kings himself of participation by word or pen in the active literary and scientific life of his court, it is quite certain that the royal patronage stimulated an extraordinary intellectual activity in the national literature. We are told that he encouraged translations from foreign writers of all kinds, ordering the works of Aristotle and Plato to be rendered into Pahlavi, and that even Homer was similarly translated. Philosophers persecuted by Justinian were received with open arms, as well as Syrian scholars. Indeed it is to this golden age of Persian literature that the Arabs owed their introduction to Greek culture.[2] One important influence of the kind in Sasanian times was that of Greek medicine—an influence, by the way, which goes back to the Achæmenian dynasty (Demokedes, under Darius I.,[3] Ktesias, Apollonides). The Greek Stephanos of Edessa cured Kobad I.[4] It appears that at the same time was begun the compilation of a 'King's Book,' or royal chronicle, to which subsequently Firdausi owed so much of the material for his epic. Probably, too, several of the standard Pahlavi treatises began to take shape at this time. Among these the first rank belongs to the invaluable *Būndahishn* (or *Būndehesh*, lit. 'The Original Creation'), which, though doubtless extended and revised much later, preserves some very ancient material—in some cases old traditions and myths which are even pre-Zoroastrian, such as those referring to the creation and the first men. The very miscellaneous *Dīnkart* ('Acts of Religion'), 'a collection of information regarding the doctrines, customs, traditions, history and literature of the Mazda-worshipping religion'[5]—the most extensive of all Pahlavi works—was certainly completed as a kind of encyclopædia or miscellany several centuries later in Muhammadan times; but it contains a good deal of older material, including

[1] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Iranian), § 2.

[2] *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, ed. Abbeloos and Lamy, Louvain, 1872–77, ii. coll. 91–96.

[3] Ed. Darab Peshotan, London and Bombay, 1874–1917, vol. v. ch. 201.

[4] iii. [1889].

[5] Tr. by the present writer in *BOR* i. [1887].

[6] It is well known that in the Mazdean system death, through the operation of the demon Nasu, renders the corpse impure—so held by the Parsis to the present day.

[1] J. Mohl, *Le Livre des rois*, Paris, 1876–78, vi. 408.

[2] It was at this time that there came from India the famous story *Kalīla va Dimna*, translated into Pahlavi from Sanskrit, and with it the game of chess, the treatise on which, narrating the sending of the game to Khusrau, is still preserved in the little treatise, *Chatrang-nāmak*, published by Peshotan in 1885. From the Persian court both the tale and the now universal game rapidly spread throughout the Western world. On the important subject of Sasanian art see M. Dieulafoy, *L'Art antique de la Perse*, Paris, 1884, and, for the most recent (highly laudatory) appreciation, W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Eastern Exploration Past and Future*, London, 1918, pp. 39–42 ('Of the Sassanian Empire our estimate must be mainly from its political power and its artistic work. The huge rock-cut monuments . . . are of excellent work, equal to good Hellenic carving, and above what Rome could do at that age. The coinage of the Sassanians is quite equal to that of Rome in the third century. We want to know much more of this age, in order to trace the effect of Persian art on the West').

[3] Herod. iii. 180.

[4] For the relations between Greek (and Indian) medical science and that of Sasanian Persia see E. Haas, *ZDMG* II. xxx., xxxi., A. Müller, *ib.* xxxiv., and the present writer's *Traité de médecine mazdéenne traduit du Pehlevi*, Louvain, 1886.

[5] West, *GIrP* ii.

certain 'enclaves,' or short treatises, preserved, like flies in amber, in chapters of the larger compilation. Such a one is the medical tractate referred to in art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Persian), as also the *Andarj*, or 'Ten Precepts,' mentioned above. But its chief value is in the preservation of a detailed analysis of the contents of all the 21 *nasks*, or books, of the original Avesta, whose text had long since perished.[1] There seems no reason to doubt that these summaries may faithfully represent the subject-matter of the lost sacred books.

Chosroes II., known as Parvēz, grandson of Chosroes I. (A.D. 590–628), conquered Jerusalem and carried off the True Cross, afterwards restored under the emperor Heraclius. This was the last great king of the Sasanian dynasty. Four years after his death the ill-starred **Yazdagird III.** (A.D. 632–651), the last of his race, acceded and in the last-named year had the unhappiness to witness the final conquest of his kingdom by the Muslim, he himself perishing miserably by the hand of an assassin.

2. Relations with Christianity.—Christianity spread widely and was well organized in the Persian Empire under the Sasanians, especially in its Nestorian form. At the moment of the Musalmān invasion it counted seven metropolitan provinces and 80 bishoprics, stretching from Armenia to India. Not infrequently Christians enjoyed high favour at the court, especially during the great reign of the first Chosroes. Both that mighty monarch and his grandson namesake had Christian wives, the wife of the latter being the beautiful Shirin, renowned in Persian poetry, to whose influence may be largely attributed his proclamation of liberty of conscience and his liberality to the Christian Church. Notwithstanding all this, the history of the dynasty contains records of persecutions as terrible as any in the Church's annals. We have seen that the execution of Māni was the occasion of a massacre not only of his own followers but of Christians also. There were political as well as religious reasons for these persecutions. It is true that the Mazdeism of the time was intolerant on principle. The fourth of the 'Ten Precepts' attributed in the *Andarj* to the great Chosroes runs: 'To destroy with crushing severity the teaching of heretics from out of Irān,' and the eighth: 'To smite, smash up, and overthrow the diabolical, violent, and idolatrous disobedience [to the religion] which may co-exist.' The Pahlavi treatises constantly group together Manichæans, Christians, and Jews among these heretics. There is a great amount of polemical argument in several of these treatises directed against Christian teaching, showing a considerable acquaintance with the books of both the OT and the NT. This is especially the case with the *Shikand-gūmānīk Vijār* ('Doubt-dispelling Explanation'),[2] which actually contains an (incomplete) Pahlavi version of the Lord's Prayer. Very remarkable is a passage in the *Dīnkart*,[3] which is a direct attempt to discredit the teaching concerning the Λόγος in Jn 1.

But there was also, as said above, a strong political motive for many of these persecutions. The Roman emperors, now Christian, from being fierce persecutors, had become the friends and protectors of the Church. And the great Persian Empire, whether under the Arsacids or under the Sasanians, was the lifelong foe of 'the Empire of Rūm.' The Christian religion was looked upon as essentially 'the religion of Rūm.' The natural sympathy of Christians in all lands with the now Christian Empire not unnaturally rendered them suspect to the kings who were the ardent followers and champions of the national 'religion of Irān.'[1]

The Persian persecutions extended, with various intervals, from the reign of Shahpuhr II. to the 7th century. Their cruelty was often incredible—for excessively cruel punishments were a characteristic of Persian governments in all ages and under all dynasties, so that 'Persian torments' became an epithet of specially dreadful tortures. The most memorable of these persecutions is the one proclaimed in 340, which lasted till Shahpuhr's death. It is unequalled for its duration, its ferocity, and the number of the martyrs, said by some to have been 190,000. In spite of this, it is recorded that apostates were less numerous than during the great persecutions of the pagan Roman emperors. After Shahpuhr's death persecution of the Christians continued, but with less intensity until the reign of Bahram (Varahran) V. (A.D. 420–438), who, at the instigation of the Magian priests, ordered a general persecution, which lasted, with intervals, for thirty years. Under his successor, Yazdagird II., occurred the celebrated massacre of the Christians at Beit-Slokh in 446—said, perhaps with exaggeration, to have claimed 12,000 victims—the beginning of a persecution which may have lasted till 450. Under subsequent monarchs there occurred from time to time cruel treatment of Christians, though by no means on so vast a scale. Even Chosroes I. and Chosroes II. are stated to have made some martyrs

The *Acta* of these Persian martyrs have received a considerable amount of careful and critical study of late years, and on the whole, with the natural exception of certain unreliable or exaggerated portions, their general credibility has been maintained. To Louis H. Gray belongs the credit of having most carefully worked over these *Acta Martyrum*, as far as they are yet available, in search of fresh material for the study of Mazdean religion of the times.[2] His research has revealed a considerable amount of Zoroastrian religious material.

> These writings, he remarks, 'possess one great advantage over the pagan classical sources. They record, in many cases, the experiences and the words of converts to Christianity from Zoroastrianism. . . . What we read here will scarcely coincide with the Pahlavi treatises which date, at least in conception, from this same Sasanid period; but this is only a superficial objection. . . . Our concern is with the religion of the masses, on which a valuable side-light is cast by the Christian *Acts of the Saints*.'[3]

This remark seems to the present writer of great importance.

LITERATURE.—F. Justi, *Gesch. des alten Persiens*, Berlin, 1879; G. Rawlinson, *The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, London, 1876; E. W. West, 'Pahlavi Literature,' in *GIrP* ii. [Strassburg, 1895–1904]; F. Justi, 'Gesch. Irans von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Ausgang der Sāsāniden,' *ib.*; L. C. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884, tr. Firoz Jamaspji, Bombay, 1889. For relations to Christianity and persecutions of Christians see esp. J. Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide*, Paris, 1904; a useful condensation in D. Marsiglia, *Il Martirio Cristiano*, Rome, 1913; and special articles as quoted in text.

L. C. CASARTELLI.

SATAN.—See DEMONS AND SPIRITS.

SATANISM.—The worship of the Devil alleged during the two final decades of the 19th cent. to have been carried on in various countries of Europe

[1] Tr. West in *SBE* xxxvii. [1892]; Pahlavi text recently published by Darab Peshotan in his fine ed. of the *Dīnkart*, vol. xv. [1916] and vol. xvi. [1917].

[2] Tr. West in *SBE* xxiv. [1885] 115 ff.

[3] Ed. Peshotan, iii. 180, tr. by present writer in *Philosophie rel. du Mazdéisme*, §§ 59–61.

[1] Christianity is known under various titles in Pahlavi literature, such as *Kēsh-i Mashīh* ('religion of the Messiah'), *Kilīsyākīh* (apparently from *Kilīsya* = ἐκκλησία), and the obscure name *Tarsāk* (surely no connexion with Tarsus?). Also a 'white demon' (*shēdā-spīh*) is attributed to Christianity.

[2] His results are embodied in a valuable paper in the *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1913–14, pp. 37–55.

[3] *Ib.* p. 39.

and America was stated to have two branches or divisions. One of these, to which the name Satanism is more strictly applicable, was a worship of Satan, the adversary of God and of Christianity, admitting that he is an evil being, a rebel against God, a lost archangel. The worshippers are said to have had recourse to the Devil because they held that God had betrayed the human race; they knowingly entered into alliance with His adversary and worshipped him with rites which were a defiance of the true God. It was a counsel of despair; and we are not surprised to be told that the adherents of this mad cult consisted of 'scattered associations or isolated persons, labouring alone, or with the aid of a few seers, and pursuing a personal aim,' that they were in fact recluses, and that they had no relations with the other and more important group.[1]

The latter group, with which we are mainly concerned, was known under the alternative names of Luciferians and Palladists. They were said to adore Lucifer, the equal and foe of Adonai, or Jahweh. He was in their view the God of light, the good principle, while Adonai was the God of darkness, the evil principle. In short, he was Satan himself. This worship was founded on a dualistic philosophy and was a sort of topsy-turvy Christianity.[2] The name of Palladists is derived from a palladium which they were said to revere, namely the Baphomet, or grotesque idol, the worship of which was one of the articles of accusation against the Knights Templars in the 14th century. It was alleged that the Baphomet was preserved in secret through nearly five centuries after the suppression of the order and ultimately carried by one Isaac Long in 1801, together with the skull of the last Grand Master, the unhappy Jacques du Molay, from Paris to Charleston in the United States of America. These relics were averred to have there become the sacred objects of a society which was a development of Freemasonry. The head of the society, we are told, was one Albert Pike, under whose influence it spread all over the civilized world. The tendencies already at work in his lifetime, but in some measure held in check by him, were left unfettered by his death. His successor, Adriano Lemmi, transferred the supreme direction of the society from Charleston to Rome. The practice of magic blossomed out in its lodges, accompanied by not merely nonsensical but foul, cruel, and obscene rites, culminating in the formal abjuration of Christ and His religion, the apparition of the Devil in person to his votaries, and their organized and periodical worship of him.

Some of these charges were among those brought against the Knights Templars in the year 1307. Charges to the same effect continued to be made against persons accused of witchcraft so long as the witch-trials persisted. Inasmuch as torture was nearly always practised in connexion with legal proceedings for witchcraft, the persecutors of witches could usually extract a confession in the sense they required. By that means they succeeded in securing against their victims a great mass of what they called evidence, which is now altogether discredited by every rational being. What astounds an intelligent reader is to find these ancient accusations, refurbished and mingled with new ones equally improbable, and indeed impossible, brought with an apparently serious purpose against a body of citizens of every civilized country in the last quarter of the 19th century. It behoves therefore to inquire into the circumstances of the 'disclosures' on which the accusations are founded.

[1] J. K. Huysmans, pref. to J. Bois, *Le Satanisme et la magie*, Paris, 1895, p. xvi.
[2] *Ib.*

The evidence for the existence of either Satanists or Palladists consists entirely of the writings of a group of men in Paris. The earlier of these writings seem to have suggested a novel called *Là-bas* (Paris, 1891), by J. K. Huysmans, a literary man of some reputation who had professed materialism and afterwards abandoned it. One of the chief personages of the novel is a certain Canon Docre, a renegade priest whose portrait is alleged to be sketched from a real man then living in Belgium. He acts as the leader of the Satanists and performs the Black Mass, which is of course a horrible and indecent parody of the Roman Catholic rite. In one form or other the Black Mass is a very old story; heretics and witches from the Middle Ages downwards have often been accused of it. Huysmans relates it in detail, sparing nothing. More tangible evidence of the existence of the Satanists and their worship than that of Huysmans in this novel and in his subsequent preface to the book by J. Bois cited above has yet to be produced. At any rate the allegations as to the sect have supplied little more than a background for the hardly less lurid 'revelations' concerning the Palladists.

These were originally undertaken by a young man named Gabriel Jogand, a Provençal, born at Marseilles in 1854. He was educated at a Jesuit college, but, speedily breaking loose from it, led a Bohemian life and attempted to make a livelihood by bitter vituperative attacks upon the Roman Catholic Church and everybody and everything connected with it. For his assaults on religion and libels on individuals he was repeatedly condemned by various French tribunals to fine and imprisonment. In 1881 he became a Freemason; but, as he left the order within the same year in consequence of a quarrel, it is obvious that he did not proceed very far into its mysteries. A man of considerable resource, restless, vain, he was constantly devising something fresh to bring himself before the public and to put into his pocket the money of which he was sorely in need. Suddenly in April 1885 he professed to be 'converted.' He repudiated his old opinions and his old associates. He expressed the deepest contrition. He offered himself to confession at the parish church of St. Merri. After a little suspicion and delay he was accepted and reconciled to the Church. Two years later he went to Rome, where he was solemnly received by the pope, Leo XIII., and his labours against the Freemasons were approved and blessed.

Immediately after his conversion he had begun the publication of a work in four volumes, entitled *Révélations complètes sur la franc-maçonnerie* (Paris, 1886). From this time until 1897 one book and periodical after another poured forth from his pen and those of his co-operators, each of them containing 'revelations' more blood-curdling than its predecessor. They were boomed by the hierarchy and the religious press and greedily bought by the orthodox public in France, Germany, and Italy. In his unconverted years Jogand had adopted 'Léo Taxil' as his pen-name; and he continued to write under this signature. He had many assistants and ecclesiastical backers. Prominent among the latter were Fava, bishop of Grenoble, and Meurin, archbishop of Port Louis in the Mauritius, who distinguished themselves by the virulence of their anti-masonic writings. Meurin, in 1892, issued a book entitled *La Franc-maçonnerie, Synagogue de Satan*, in which he connected Palladism with the Jewish Kabbala and elaborated the mystic value of numbers into proofs of the enemy's diabolical conspiracy. Another assistant (or rather confederate) was a German, C. Hacks, who wrote under the name of Bataille.

Another was Domenico Margiotta, who claimed to have been born in 1858 at Palmi, in Italy, and to have been a Freemason of very high dignity in the order. If we may believe his statements, he was 'converted' and from his former position was able to make very important revelations concerning masonic doings and beliefs. His principal work was published at Paris in 1894, on Adriano Lemmi, whom he alleged to be the supreme head of the Freemasons throughout the world. Even earlier than he, yet another German, Paul Rosen, originally of Berlin, but then in Paris, had published in French a work directed against the Freemasons under the title of *L'Ennemie sociale* (Brussels, 1890). But, valuable as was the help thus lent to him by others (and the enumeration above is not exhaustive), Léo Taxil was by no means dependent upon it. Fertile in his ingenuity, audacious, and cynical, he wrote rapidly and recklessly under the name by which he was known as a writer; and, when tired of that or desirous of creating a new sensation, he freely invented further pseudonyms. These were represented to be the real names of real persons whose adventures were sometimes mysteriously referred to, sometimes given more or less at length. One such was A. M. Ricoux, who pretended to have been a settler for four years in Chile. Under this name Taxil wrote in defence of his own allegation that there were female Freemasons. As Ricoux, he professed to have obtained a code of secret instructions to supreme councils and grand lodges, alleged to have been printed at Charleston in 1891, from which he claimed to have learned that the Supreme Directory of universal Freemasonry was centred in Berlin, with subordinate Directories in Naples, Calcutta, Washington, and Monte Video, a Chief of Political Action in Rome, and a Grand Depositary of Sacred Traditions, the Sovereign Pontiff of Freemasonry, at Charleston, an office then filled by Albert Pike.

Bataille's principal, but not his only, contribution to the revelations was a work which appeared in serial parts entitled *Le Diable au xix^e^ siècle* (Paris, 1893–94). In it he related his travels and adventures among Freemasons in various parts of the world, including India and America, both North and South. In the course of his journeys he met (so he declared) a certain Miss Diana Vaughan, in whose company he visited the Mammoth Cave of Kentucky and was present at a *séance* with Asmodeus in person. Shortly afterwards this lady was more directly introduced to the gaping antimasonic public of Paris as the editor of the *Palladium régénéré et libre*, a periodical represented to be the outcome of a quarrel between herself and other highly-placed authorities of the Palladist organization. Only three numbers, however, appeared. Nominally directed to the advocacy of a reformed Palladism, it was obviously only a step to a further development. When it had served the purpose of an attempt to convince the world of the real objective existence of the Palladist society, Miss Diana Vaughan's conversion to the Roman Catholic Church was announced; and within a month afterwards, in July 1895, she began the publication of her autobiography, under the title of *Mémoires d'une Ex-Palladiste*. It proved quite exciting and supplied pabulum for the faithful during many months of serial publication. She averred herself a descendant of Thomas Vaughan, the twin brother of Henry Vaughan, the Silurist. Thomas Vaughan was always mystical. At one period of his life he was devoted to alchemy, which he appears to have afterwards renounced. Diana Vaughan imputed to him Rosicrucianism, which he distinctly disclaimed; and she related that he was himself the executioner of Archbishop Laud, and that he had steeped a linen cloth in the 'martyr's' blood, and burnt it by way of a sacrifice to the Devil. The Devil thereupon made his appearance and entered into a pact with him. Diana Vaughan sent her 'ancestor' subsequently to America, where he wedded Venus-Astarte, who came down out of heaven and remained with him for eleven days, leaving with him when she reascended a child, the fruit of their union. It need not be said that this is pure nonsense. Thomas Vaughan never was in America, so far as is known from any authentic record. Of the same character is Diana's account of her own birth and early life. She declares that she was early initiated into Palladism, advanced from grade to grade, ultimately appointed grand priestess of Lucifer, and destined to be united in marriage with no less a personage than Asmodeus. Her progress is described in the most melodramatic fashion. It includes of course interviews with Lucifer himself, exchange of affectionate passages with her future bridegroom, Asmodeus, the description of a terrific combat between the hosts of Lucifer and those of Adonai, which she was privileged to witness and describe after the manner of a war-correspondent, and her visit, transported in the arms of Lucifer, to a distant region of the universe in which he was supreme.

With the help of these and other writers, some real, some fictitious, a deluge of 'revelations' was poured forth for about twelve years. Not merely was the rise of Palladism narrated, or rather its development out of the highest grades of Freemasonry under the hands of Albert Pike, with its headquarters at Charleston and its subordinate branches throughout the world, but also the cleavage of the institution into two mutually hostile forces, the one led by Diana Vaughan, the other by Adriano Lemmi. The personal and family history of Diana Vaughan occupies a considerable part of the *Mémoires* with which she enlightened the world. Weird details accompany and complete the story. But they yield in extravagance to Bataille's marvellous travels. He started by being a ship's doctor on the Eastern service. If he may be credited, he was introduced into Freemasonry at Naples and by bribery succeeded in obtaining the highest degree. Armed with this, he penetrated the most secret dens of the order in East and West, one of which he describes as being a Presbyterian chapel at Singapore, where he witnessed the initiation of a Mistress-Templar according to the Palladian rite, that is to say, with revolting obscenity. He attended a lodge in Calcutta, at which Lucifer himself was present, delivered an oration, and accepted a human sacrifice. At Gibraltar he explored caverns in the great rock, which were occupied, so he says, by British criminals condemned to life-servitude. They were engaged in the making of Baphomets and other idols and of various instruments of black magic, including terrible poisons for putting away any one whose destruction was desired. These travels are cast in a form and adorned with particulars both grotesque and gruesome that would not have been out of place in mediæval witch-tales.

Léo Taxil and his co-operators succeeded in imposing, by such means, on a large number of the ecclesiastics and devout laity on the Continent. The 'revelations' were of course denied and denounced as lies by the Freemasons. Demands to produce Miss Diana Vaughan were eluded on the pretext that she was compelled to remain in concealment for the preservation of her life from the attacks of infuriated Freemasons and Palladists. Letters written in her name by (as it afterwards turned out) Léo Taxil's female secretary, and in some cases accompanied by presentation copies of her works, were received by high dignitaries of the

Church and the papal court and were replied to in the most flattering manner. The pope himself, if we may believe Léo Taxil, sent her his apostolic blessing. The bishop of Grenoble repeatedly affirmed his childlike belief in her existence and the sincerity of her conversion. He compared her with Joan of Arc and exhorted her to pray, to labour, to struggle, and even to die on the gallows if necessary; for victory sometimes exacted that price. Such rodomontade was naturally published by the conspirators to augment the faith of those who accepted the 'revelations.'

The excitement caused among credulous people aroused special interest in the Antimasonic Congress which was to be held at Trent in 1896. At the same town that was the scene of the great Council in the 16th cent. it was hoped to give the final blow to Freemasonry and Protestantism. The campaign started by Pope Leo XIII. against Freemasonry had acquired an added impulse by the 'revelations' of Léo Taxil and his confederates. Yet doubts as to the 'revelations' had been expressed in various quarters; and there was an undercurrent of scepticism. Léo Taxil faced the situation with characteristic courage and audacity. He went to Trent, met the Congress, and delivered an impassioned harangue. In answer to demands for information as to Diana Vaughan's existence, history, and conversion, he solemnly affirmed her existence; he declared that he had seen her with his own eyes, but she could not venture from her concealment, threatened as she was every hour by the daggers of the Freemasons. To a confidential committee only would he entrust his proofs. The result was a complete success. Doubters were silenced. Taxil was victorious. The hero of the hour, he was rewarded with enthusiastic and continuous thunders of applause, he was invited to the episcopal palace, where he was received by the bishop, and mingled with the most distinguished representatives of ecclesiastics and nobles from various Roman Catholic states.

But the imposture was now approaching its end. At the close of September Taxil had triumphed at the Congress. Scarcely more than a fortnight later Bataille (Hacks) threw off the mask. He wrote to the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, expressing his complete contempt for the Roman Catholic religion, and a little later, on 2nd Nov., to the *Univers* at Paris, declaring that *Le Diable au xix^e^ siècle* and Diana Vaughan were *Märchen* (idle tales) and a thorough swindle. Taxil brazened it out a few months longer. At last he announced a meeting at the Geographical Society's rooms, Boulevard St. Germain, Paris, on 19th April 1897, at which Diana Vaughan would make her public appearance. At the meeting he mounted the platform alone. To a crowded assembly he confessed that Palladism and Diana Vaughan were inventions of his own, and that the revelations that had poured forth so lavishly from his press for years were a gigantic fraud, or, in his own euphemism, 'a mystification.' 'I have always loved mystification,' he explained, and impudently went on to express his thanks to the Catholic press and bishops for the splendid help they had given him to organize the finest mystification of all, which was to crown his career.

The rage of his deluded victims was boundless, but impotent. At first they declined to believe his confession; they could not abandon their faith in Diana Vaughan; they distinguished between Taxil's earlier and later 'disclosures'; there must, they said, be substantial facts underlying at least the former. Some of course asserted that they had suspected the truth all along; and their efforts were directed to show that the pope and other high ecclesiastical authorities were not committed to belief in the swindle. But the violence of the denunciations which were naturally heaped upon him did not disturb Léo Taxil. He had doubtless made money; he had achieved notoriety; he had imposed a succession of extravagant lies by the most ingenious methods on his open-mouthed disciples. When the bubble burst, as sooner or later it inevitably would, he retired to write the story of how he had befooled the Catholic world.

The soil had been prepared for the sowing, or the seed scattered by Taxil would not have taken root. During the long twilight of the Middle Ages and later a vast number of legends had accumulated concerning the relations of the spiritual world with humanity, including temptations by evil spirits in corporeal or quasi-corporeal form and leagues entered into by individual men with the Devil himself. These legends had never been repudiated by the Church of Rome. Rather they had been accepted and stamped with authority, seeing that they had been incorporated in monastic chronicles and in the lives and writings of the most eminent saints and teachers, they had been confirmed by confessions wrung from the victims of the witch-prosecutions, recorded solemnly by ecclesiastical and civil courts, as the evidence on which thousands of men and women had been condemned to the most barbarous deaths, and they had been taught as facts without any doubt by the Inquisitor Sprenger, the Jesuit Delrio, and other authors of works on magic and witchcraft. From early ages witchcraft, sexual immorality of the grossest kind, and foul rites, amounting to a rival and obscene religion, had been imputed to heretics and unbelievers. The Church had long been definitely opposed to Freemasonry — an opposition probably arising, first, from jealousy of its secrecy, and, secondly, from its well-known liberalism. Recently Pius IX. had denounced the Freemasons as 'the Synagogue of Satan' and had approved and encouraged a French fraternity, founded under the influence of the Ultramontane party to exterminate them. In 1884, the year before the 'conversion' of Léo Taxil, Leo XIII. by his Encyclical had inveighed against them in no measured terms as guilty of unbridled licence in crime, as regardless of the marriage-bond, as going about to destroy the foundations of law and morality, a sect whose object was to prepare the ruin of mankind; and he had called upon the faithful to unmask and oppose them. He thus practically initiated a new crusade, which he subsequently drove further by a succession of fresh appeals to the ignorance and bigotry of his flock.

Into a soil thus charged with sectarian bitterness and misrepresentation Taxil astutely dropped his seed. Charges of witchcraft and the Black Mass had been made in a sporadic manner during the previous century and a half. They had thus strengthened the traditional attitude of the Roman Church and provided new, if slender, foundations for the popes' battery of denunciation. Taxil's 'revelations' and those of his confederates were eagerly seized by the bigots and speedily spread all over the Continent. No sort of criticism was applied to them. The denials of the Freemasons were treated as negligible. The organization attributed to Freemasons and Palladists was in fact a parody of the real organization of the Jesuits. If the correspondence between the two was observed, the known existence of the Jesuit organization merely served to render credible to the minds of the faithful that of which their opponents were accused. An examination of Taxil's romances shows that they were derived from the old works of the Inquisitors and other writers on witchcraft, supplemented by hints from A. L.

Constant's *Dogme et rituel de la haute magie*[2] (Paris, 1861), written under the pseudonym of Eliphas Lévi, and from the researches of the French Freemason, Ragon. Hacks's yet more extraordinary stories were inspired by Archbishop Meurin's farrago. Diana Vaughan's confessions were founded on those of Taxil and Hacks. If any basis of fact underlay the superstructure of 'mystification,' it was supplied by allegations, widely believed, of the theft without apparent motive of the consecrated host from various churches in France and elsewhere. How far these allegations were true it is impossible to say; no prosecutions are known to have been instituted against any one for the crime. Taxil indeed after the crash was suspected by members of the committee of the Congress of Trent to have contrived such a theft from Notre Dame in Paris in order to provide sensational material for his pen; but the charge was probably mere gossip. So remarkable a hoax has seldom, if ever, been perpetrated; and it could not have succeeded in an environment less dense with ignorance and fanaticism.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works of Huysmans, Taxil, and others mentioned throughout, reference may be made to A. E. Waite, *Devil-worship in France*, London, 1896; A. Lillie, *The Worship of Satan in Modern France, being a Second Edition of 'Modern Mystics and Modern Magic,'* do. 1896, preface; and J. Rieks, *Leo XIII. und der Satanskult*, Berlin, 1897. The two English books named were published before the 'mystification' was confessed.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

SATI.—*Satī* is a feminine noun formed from the verbal root *sat*, meaning what is real, true, good, or virtuous. A *satī* therefore signified a woman whom her religion considered as good and virtuous if she sought death on the decease of her husband and was burned along with his corpse. It was not until 1829 that this custom of widow-burning was declared illegal in British India. The Indian penal code enacted that whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. The code further enacted that, if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to ten years. Any one who applauds or encourages an act of *satī* is also held by the penal code to have abetted suicide.

Schrader[1] states that Indo-Germanic custom ordained that the wife should die with her husband, and this custom he ascribes to the desire to provide the deceased with what was dear to him during life as well as 'to make the life of the housefather safe on all sides, and to render him an object of perpetual care and anxiety to his family.'[2]

In the *Atharvaveda*[3] the suicide of the widow on the death of her husband is said to be 'her ancient duty'; but, although she ascended the funeral pyre and lay by the side of her husband, she is said to have as her reward 'progeny and property.' Here, as in the *Rigveda*,[4] the widow is made to rise up from the funeral pyre and is led away by a new husband. The *Atharvaveda* declares:

'Get up, O Woman, to the world of the living; thou liest by this one who is deceased; come! to him who grasps thy hand, thy second spouse, thou hast now entered into the relation of wife to husband.'[5]

The ancient custom and ancient duty of the widow to burn herself on her husband's death had therefore given place in Vedic India to a second marriage; but in later times[1] the ancient custom was revived under the influence of Brāhmans anxious to obtain command over the property of the widow. In order to give the custom a religious sanction, a passage in the *Rigveda*[2] which directed the widow to rise from her husband's funeral pyre and go forth in front (*agre*) was altered into to go into the fire (*agneḥ*). The result was that, wherever Brāhmanic influences predominated, especially along the Ganges valley, in Bengal and in Oudh, as well as in Rājputāna, widow-burning increased from the 6th cent. onwards, while in outlying districts of the Panjāb it was not commonly practised and was forbidden in most parts of S. India.

A gifted writer and a zealous defender of Hinduism, T. Ramakrishna, of Madras, has forcibly stated the Hindu religious sanction for widow-burning in the words:

'If the husband predeceases the wife, she must face a new situation with a courageous heart, and remain to pray day and night for the repose of his soul, or, if unable to bear the pang of separation she wishes to ascend the funeral pyre to be consumed to ashes with her dead husband, her religion allows her to do so.'[3]

On the other hand, Romesh Chunder Dutt referred to *satī* as 'a barbarous custom' and as 'the most cruel of all human institutions.'[4]

LITERATURE.—See especially A. R. Coomaraswamy, 'Sati: a Vindication of Hindu Women,' paper given to Sociological Society, London, 1912.

R. W. FRAZER.

SATISFACTION.—'Satisfaction' is defined by the mediæval Schoolmen as the third part of penance (*q.v.*).

'In perfectione autem poenitentiae tria observanda sunt: scilicet, compunctio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operis.'[5]

1. History of the idea in the Latin Fathers and in the early Middle Ages.—The introduction into theology of the term 'satisfaction' is due to the quondam Roman jurist Tertullian, who, in describing the relation of man to God, frequently makes use of the word *satisfacere*, which is a term of Roman law belonging especially to the sphere of obligations. Here, in the wider sense of each word, *satisfacere* and *solvere* are equivalents: both refer simply to the discharge of an obligation in any manner whatever. But there is a distinction between *satisfacere* in the narrower sense and *solvere* in the narrower sense: *solvere* is the strict fulfilment of the obligation, *satisfacere* is the discharge of it by some other means than its strict fulfilment, which yet is agreeable to the creditor.

'Nam quia id quo quis contentus erat ei praestabatur, satisfieri dictum est.'[6] In this sense it is said: 'Satisfactio pro solutione est.'[7]

Tertullian applies the term *satisfacere* especially to the sphere of penance. In the earliest times it was held by the Christian Church that after baptism, while lighter sins needed only to be confessed to the gracious God,[8] serious sins excluded the offender altogether from the community.[9] But this rigorous practice was soon broken through, and by a public confession of sins even gross sinners were allowed restoration, though at first not more than once. This mitigation is announced by Hermas as a special divine revelation:

'The sinner who repents must be received, but not frequently. For there is only one repentance for the servants of God.'[10]

The public confession (ἐξομολόγησις) was in each case associated with visible signs of humiliation, in order to testify to the genuineness of the repent-

1 *Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples*, Eng. tr., London, 1890, p. 391.
2 Cf. Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 19.
3 XVIII. iii. 1.
4 X. xviii. 8.
5 XVIII. iii. 2; see *Atharvaveda*, tr. W. D. Whitney and ed. C. R. Lanman (Harvard Oriental Ser., vol. viii.), Cambridge, Mass., 1905.

1 See Fitz Edward Hall, *JRAS*, new ser., iii. [1866] 133–192.
2 X. xviii. 7.
3 *Early Reminiscences*, Madras, 1907 (for private circulation only), p. 71.
4 *Hist. of Civilization in Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1889–90, i. 110.
5 Lombard, *Liber Sententiarum*, iv. dist. 16 A.
6 Justinian, *Digest*. 45. 1. 15. 3.
7 *Ib.* 46. 3, 52.
8 Cf. 1 Jn 1⁹.
9 See Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*⁴, p. 205.
10 *Mand.* IV. i. 8.

ance experienced. Discipline was at first exercised by the community as a whole, but from the 2nd cent. onwards the community was represented in this matter by the bishop. Tertullian now views this penitential humiliation as a satisfaction to God. He regards God as the Roman law viewed an injured person:

'Thou hast offended, but thou canst still be reconciled; thou hast One to whom to make satisfaction, who also is willing to receive it.'[1]

The means of this satisfaction are self-humiliation and voluntary self-denial, above all fasting:

Man is to make satisfaction to God, through the same thing through which he had offended (in Adam's fall).[2] The penitent must 'offer to an offended God self-humiliation (*castigatio*) in food and dress.'[3]

It is important to observe that the idea of satisfaction thus constituted has two sides. (*a*) On the one hand, it touches the notion of merit (*q.v.*), of which it is in fact a sub-species.[4] If merit in general establishes a claim to a reward, where an obligation has been caused by a wrong, the merit that has been acquired can serve as satisfaction, and the reward to which it establishes a claim is from the nature of the case pardon or remission of punishment. The thought in the background is of course that of the power of God to enforce His claim by punishment, if satisfaction is not forthcoming. Tertullian says:

'How foolish and unjust it is to leave penance unperformed and yet to expect pardon for our sins! What is it but to fail to pay the price, and yet to stretch out one's hand for the reward? The Lord has decreed that pardon has to be awarded at this price; He purposes that the remission of punishment shall be bought by this payment of penance.'[5]

(*b*) On the other hand, penitential satisfaction is regarded in a way that brings it nearer to the conception of punishment than to that of merit. Here it appears not as a positive good work, which cancels the liability to punishment, but as a substitute for punishment, of kindred nature, but of different degree. Thus Tertullian says:

'So far as thou hast not spared thyself, so far, believe me, will God spare thee.'[6] 'All these things penance does . . . that it may, by itself pronouncing against the sinner, take the place of God's indignation and by temporal mortification, I will not say, frustrate, but discharge, eternal punishment.'[7] 'Every sin is discharged either by pardon or punishment, pardon as the result of self-chastisement, punishment as the result of condemnation.'[8]

The key-note of this conception of penance is the substitution of temporal for eternal punishment. We may finally observe that, in the above doctrine of Tertullian, satisfaction is not yet a *part* of penance, but the *whole* penance, including the public confession and the accompanying austerities, is viewed as a satisfaction to God.

The Latin Fathers after Tertullian continue, with some developments, the same ideas as to penance and satisfaction which we have found in him. On the one hand, we have passages where penance is regarded as a good work or merit, which avails as a satisfaction for post-baptismal sin. Thus Cyprian says:

'He who has thus made satisfaction to God, will not only deserve the Divine pardon, but also a crown.'[9]

This passage is noteworthy as bringing out the relation between merit and satisfaction which has already been explained—where merit does more than extinguish the debt of sin; it wins a reward besides. In Cyprian, moreover, we see how the notion of the transferability of merit begins to affect penitential satisfaction.

'God can reckon to the penitent . . . whatever the martyrs have asked, or the priests have done, for such persons.'[10]

Yet, because penitential satisfaction was a sign of personal repentance, it could not have been entirely superseded by the merit of others.

[1] *De Pœn.* 7. [2] See *de Jejun.* 3. [3] *De Pœn.* 11.
[4] Cf. the phrase 'merita poenitentiae' (*de Pœn.* 2).
[5] *De Pœn.* 6. [6] *Ib.* 9. [7] *Ib.*
[8] *De Pud.* 2. [9] *De Laps.* 36. [10] *Ib.*

Augustine follows in the same strain:

'The life must be amended, and God must be propitiated for past sins by almsgiving. . . . For He has given no one licence to sin, although in pity He blots out sins already committed, if proper satisfaction is not neglected. For the small and light sins of every day, however, . . . the daily prayer of the faithful is sufficient satisfaction.'[1] 'There are many kinds of almsgiving, the doing of which assists in the remission of our sins.'[2]

On the other hand, we have places in the Latin Fathers where penitential satisfaction is viewed as being of the nature of punishment. Thus Augustine says:

'In penance every one must use severity against himself, that, being judged by himself, he may not be judged by the Lord.'[3] 'He who truly repents does nothing but refuse to allow what he has done wrong to remain unpunished.'[4]

So also Gregory the Great writes:

'God cuts away our sins either by our means, or by His own hand, even when He forgives them. For He seeks to wash away from His elect by temporal chastisement the stains of the wickednesses, which He hates to see in them for ever.'[5]

We have next to notice a change in the form of penance which affects the idea of satisfaction. In the East public penance died out after the union of Church and State under Constantine, which made ecclesiastical control of morals more difficult, in so far as a denunciation of mortal sin before a bishop became equivalent to a denunciation of crime to the State. In the West, to alleviate this difficulty, the severity of the ancient penance was modified in the case of secret sins (*peccata occulta*) from complete publicity to the publicity involved merely in belonging to the penitents. Such was the state of affairs at the break-up of the Western Empire. The stormy nature of the times which followed prevented a consistent practice of discipline from being enforced upon the new races who came in to occupy the territory of the Empire. For secret sins public penance fell altogether into disuse. In Ireland and England it was never enforced, though under the Carlovingians it was restored in France for open sins. From the end of the 11th cent. onwards, however, public penance became 'a mere curiosity in the inventory of possible Church procedure against sinners.'[6]

On the other hand, there grew up in the West, at first side by side with public penance and ultimately almost entirely displacing it, a custom of private penance. This was a growth of the monastic spirit and aimed at extending the discipline of the Church over other sins than those which in the ancient Church were regarded as mortal. It was accompanied by an extension of the idea of mortal sin to the roots of sin in the heart. The circumstances of this private penance were confession to a priest and performance of a satisfaction which, as a condition of his absolution, he prescribed in accordance with the character of the sin. It is easy to understand how the pride of races who would not willingly submit to public penance (the outward humiliation of which they regarded as degrading to free men) favoured the extension of this private penance, originally intended for the discipline of the cloister, among the laity also.

In connexion with this newer penitential discipline three things in particular are to be noted:

(1) Penitential discipline was converted into a sacrament, in so far as confession to the priest assumes a continually more important position, and the theory establishes itself that his absolution converts even mortal sins into venial sins, which require to be expiated, not in hell, but in purgatory, unless they are cancelled by the satisfaction appointed by the priest. The pseudo-Augustinian treatise, *de Vera et Falsa Pœnitentia* (11th cent.), says:

'In that [the sinner] of himself speaks to the priest, and overcomes his shame by the fear of an offended God, there

[1] *Ench.* 70 f. [2] *Ib.* 72.
[3] *Serm.* 351. 7. [4] *Ep.* 153. 6.
[5] *Moral.* ix. 34 on Job 9[28]. [6] Loofs[4], p. 478.

comes about the forgiveness of the crime. For that which was criminal in the doing becomes venial through confession, and even if it is not purged away at once [*i.e.* by satisfaction] nevertheless that becomes venial, which as committed was mortal.'[1]

(2) Penitential satisfaction tends more and more to be regarded as a merit that can be detached from the person and treated upon commercial lines. This change is particularly evidenced by the 'Penitential Books' which were composed (on the basis of the ancient canons of various Church Councils as to penance), first in Ireland, then in England, and finally on the Continent, with a view to assisting the priest in his office as confessor. In the ancient Church it had been allowed that in cases of extraordinary penitence the satisfaction might be diminished. But in the penitential books we find a complete tariff of 'redemptions,' or commutations, by which the fasting of others might be substituted for personal fasting or the more exacting satisfaction of fasting might be redeemed by almsgiving.

(3) Closely connected with the 'redemptions' is a yet more momentous development in regard to penitential satisfaction, viz. that of 'indulgences' (*q.v.*). These were remissions of the temporal punishments which were still owed by those who had received absolution. Their origin is obscure, but it is clear (*a*) that they were in the first place episcopal indulgences, granted to those who made pilgrimage and brought offerings to a particular church on its dedication or other annual festival; (*b*) that they originated in the south of France before A.D. 1050.[2]

2. The mediæval doctrine of penitential satisfaction.—In the 12th cent. penance was definitely included among the seven sacraments by Peter Lombard, whose division of penance into the three parts of contrition, confession, and satisfaction has already been quoted. The mediæval doctrine of penance was, however, finally put into shape by the great Schoolmen of the 13th century. The following account of it, especially as concerns penitential satisfaction, is taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*; the part which deals with satisfaction in particular is, however, from the 'Supplementum,' which has been added from the author's earlier commentary on the *Sentences* to complete the doctrine of the sacraments, which Thomas left unfinished at his death.

The general basis for the doctrine of satisfaction is to be found in the distinction made[3] between guilt (involving an obligation to eternal punishment) and an obligation to temporal punishment. Mortal sin involves a turning away from the unchangeable good and an inordinate turning to the changeable good. The former demands eternal punishment, the latter temporal punishment. Venial sin is an inordinate turning to the changeable good without a turning from the unchangeable good. Hence it demands only temporal punishment.

Qu. lxxxvii. art. 2 teaches that venial sins may be remitted without the sacrament of penance, though some act of a penitential character is required. But no new infusion of grace is necessary, as venial sin does not constitute a fall from grace. In the case of mortal sins the sacrament of penance is required.

According to qu. xc. art. 2, the *form* of penance is the absolution of the priest; its threefold *matter* consists in contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Contrition and confession, with the absolution of the priest, remove the guilt of sin and the obligation to eternal punishment and lessen the obligation to temporal punishment (in purgatory) to such a degree that it can be expiated by the satisfaction appointed by the priest.[4]

Suppl. qu. xii. deals with satisfaction, 'quoad ejus quidditatem.' According to art. 1, satisfaction is formally an act of virtue, in so far as it implies the idea of the mean, which is the formal essence of virtue. The mean which it implies is that of equality, 'for no satisfaction is said to be made except in accordance with a proportion of equality to somewhat.'

Further light is cast upon the subject by the treatment of the following difficulties:

(1) Satisfaction cannot be an act of virtue, for every act of virtue is meritorious. Satisfaction, however, is not meritorious; for merit is gratuitous, but satisfaction is in respect of debt.

Answer: Although satisfaction is in respect of debt, yet in so far as it is voluntary it is meritorious.

(2) Every act of virtue is voluntary, but satisfaction sometimes is involuntary, as when a man is punished by a judge for an offence.

Answer: In the case of satisfaction through punishment inflicted by a judge the act of virtue is in the judge; where, however (as in penance), a man punishes himself, the act of virtue is in him.

(3) The principal thing in virtue is choice, but satisfaction has to do, not with choice, but with external works.

Answer: The principal thing that makes satisfaction an act of virtue is choice, but the principal thing that differentiates it from other virtues is external works.

According to art. 2, since it is equality on which satisfaction turns, the particular virtue shown in it is justice, and, since the equalization takes place in respect of the debt created by an offence, the particular kind of justice exemplified is vindicative justice.

Art. 3 teaches that satisfaction is not merely compensation for past offences, but is also a preservative from future transgression. This medicinal office of satisfaction is another reason (cf. art. 1) why it is to be regarded as an act of virtue, for nothing can destroy sin except virtue.

Qu. xiii. deals with the possibility of satisfaction. According to art. 1, men cannot in the strict sense satisfy God, but only by means of an equality proportional to their relative positions. As sin is infinite in view of the infinity of the Divine majesty, so satisfaction obtains a certain infinity from the Divine mercy, so far as it is informed by grace, by which what man can do is made acceptable to God. Another form of statement is to say that satisfaction is sufficient by the virtue of the merit of Christ, which is in a certain way infinite; but this practically comes to the same thing, as grace is given through faith in Christ the Mediator. If, however, grace were given otherwise, satisfaction would still be possible.

Art. 2 states that one man can satisfy for another as regards the payment of the debt of sin, if he does it in charity. Such vicarious satisfaction, however, is not a medicine against future sin, except accidentally, so far as it merits for the other the grace which may help him to avoid sin; but this mode of operation is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction.

Qu. xiv. treats of the quality of satisfaction. According to art. 1, it is impossible to satisfy for one sin apart from others, since the removal of the offence is the same thing as reconciliation with God, which cannot take place as long as any hindrances to it remain.

Art. 2 teaches that, for similar reasons, it is impossible for one who has again fallen into sin to satisfy for sins already repented of.

Art. 3 maintains that it is impossible for works of satisfaction done out of grace to receive value from charity afterwards infused.

According to art. 4, works done without charity merit nothing 'de condigno'; by the Divine goodness, however, they merit somewhat 'de congruo,' viz. temporal mercies, a disposition to grace, and the habit of good works.[1]

Finally, art. 5 teaches that works done without charity obtain a mitigation of eternal punishment only in so far as they avoid the sin of omission and also prevent a man from falling farther into sin.

Qu. xv. is entitled, 'De his per quae fit satisfactio.' According to art. 1, satisfaction must be made by works of a penal character, in so far as the equalization demanded by justice in the matter of the offence requires something to be given to the offended party and something to be taken away from the offending party. As regards God, nothing can be given Him, but man can take away from himself by works of a penal character. It is clear also from its medicinal nature that satisfaction must be penal in character. Art. 2 teaches that God's temporal chastisements may become of the nature of satisfaction for us, in so far as they are voluntarily accepted by us.

Finally, according to art. 3, almsgiving, fasting, and prayer are the three forms of works of satisfaction. By them we humiliate ourselves before God, in our goods, our body, and our soul.

In qu. xxv. art. 1 Thomas discusses 'whether anything can be remitted from the punishment of satisfaction by means of indulgences.' His doctrine is that there is in the Church a treasure of merits, consisting both of the merit of Christ, as it exceeds by its infinity its effect in the sacraments, and of the merits of the saints, so far as they superabounded in works of satisfaction for the good of the whole Church. This treasure can then be applied for the good of the individual by the ruler of the Church (*i.e.* the pope), for the remission not merely of penitential satisfaction, but also of punishment in purgatory. According to art. 2, indulgences avail for their published value, if there be authority in the giver, charity in the recipient, and piety in the reason of the granting of the indulgence.

3. The controversy at the Reformation concerning penitential satisfaction. — The Reformation began with Luther's *Ninety-five Theses* of 1517 against indulgences, in which it was argued, among other things, that the repentance of a Christian man should be lifelong, that the pope could not remit any punishment beyond that of penitential satisfaction, and that every truly con-

[1] x. (25).
[2] See Loofs[4], p. 495 f.
[3] *Summa*, III. qu. lxxxvi. art. 4.
[4] Suppl. qu. ix. art. 2.

[1] For the distinction between *meritum de condigno* and *meritum de congruo*, see art. MERIT (Christian), vol. viii. p. 564.

trite Christian has complete remission of both punishment and guilt, without any indulgence.

In his immediately subsequent sermon on indulgence and grace Luther went on to declare that the common division of repentance into contrition, confession, and satisfaction had no foundation either in Scripture or in the Fathers, and that it could not be proved from Scripture that the Divine righteousness required of the sinner any pain or satisfaction, except his true repentance and conversion, with the intention to carry the cross of Christ and do the fitting works (which, however, are not appointed by any). Christian men should not seek indulgence.

A protest against the doctrine of penitential satisfaction thus became a point in the propaganda of the Reformation. It is admirably voiced by Melanchthon in his *Apology for the Augsburg Confession*, in the section 'On Confession and Satisfaction' (art. XII. vi.):

(19) The canonic satisfactions are not necessary by the Divine law for the remission of sins. 'For the opinion concerning faith must be preserved, that by faith we obtain the remission of sins for Christ's sake, and not because of our works either preceding or following.'

(20) The error here is aggravated by the Scholastic definition of satisfaction, viz. that it takes place for the placation of the Divine anger.

(21) Our adversaries, however, admit that satisfactions do not avail for the remission of guilt. But they fable that they are of value for the remission of punishments in purgatory or elsewhere. They teach that in the remission of sin God forgives its guilt and yet, since the Divine justice must punish sin, changes eternal into temporal punishment. They add also that part of this temporal punishment is remitted by the power of the keys; the rest is redeemed by satisfaction.

(22) All this is a fable, recently concocted without the authority of Scripture and the older ecclesiastical writers. The Schoolmen, in fact, mixed up things spiritual and political and imagined that the satisfactions, which were intended for ecclesiastical discipline, availed to appease God.

(34) True repentance is conversion and regeneration, which are followed by good works as their natural fruits.

(35) When Christ says 'Repent,' He speaks of regeneration and its fruits, not of the fictitious satisfactions of the Schoolmen.

(45) Though external works can be done beyond the Divine commandment, it is vain confidence to suppose that they satisfy the Divine law.

(46) True prayers, alms, and fasts are *in* the Divine commandment; what goes beyond it is of human tradition.

(53) The Schoolmen say that it belongs to the Divine justice to punish sin. God punishes it, however, in contrition, which is more truly the punishment of sin than any satisfaction.

The Reformation protest is met in the canons of the Council of Trent by a section 'de Satisfactionis necessitate et fructu' (sess. xiv. cap. viii.). The Catholic argument is briefly as follows:

Of all the parts of penance satisfaction is most attacked by the innovators, who assert that the remission of guilt is always accompanied by the entire remission of punishment. Scripture (Gn $3^{16ff.}$, 2 S $12^{13ff.}$, Nu $12^{14ff.}$ $20^{11f.}$) and tradition combine to refute the Protestants together with reason, which shows that the Divine justice must make different demands upon those who sin in ignorance before baptism and those who sin against the Holy Ghost after baptism. Besides, penitential satisfactions are a great preservative against further sin, and the Church has always seen in them, if performed with true contrition, a guarantee against the Divine punishment. In them, further, we are conformed to Christ, who made satisfaction for us, and we know that, if we suffer with Him, we shall be also glorified with Him. Nor does our satisfaction take place without the help of Christ, so that we do not glory in ourselves, but in Him, through whom we live, and acquire merit, and make satisfaction. The sacrament of penance, again, is no judgment-seat of wrath, just as no Roman Catholic ever thought that our satisfactions obscured or diminished the virtue of the merit or satisfaction of our Lord Jesus Christ. When innovators make true repentance no more than regeneration, this amounts to taking away satisfaction altogether.

Finally, the *Decretum de indulgentiis* (sess. xxv., 'Continuatio sessionis') maintains that Christ has given to the Church the power of granting indulgences, which power has been in use since the earliest times (Mt 16^{19}, Jn 20^{23}). Indulgences, it is held, are therefore salutary for the Church and not to be done away with; but the power of indulgence is to be applied with moderation, that discipline may not suffer.

LITERATURE.—W. Moeller, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, i.[2], Tübingen, 1902; A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*[4], do. 3 vols., 1909–10, Eng. tr. of 3rd ed., 7 vols., London, 1894–99; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*[4], Halle, 1906; R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*[2], 3 vols., Leipzig, 1908–13; H. Wasserschleben, *Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche*, Halle, 1851, *Die irische Kanonensammlung*[2], Leipzig, 1885; H. J. Schmitz, *Die Bussbücher und die Bussdisciplin der Kirche*, Mainz, 1883; H. Schultz, 'Der sittliche Begriff des Verdienstes und seine Aufwendung auf das Verständniss des Werkes Christi,' in *SK* lxvii. [1894] 7–50, 245–313, 445–553. See also artt. INDULGENCES, MERIT (Christian).

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

SATNĀMĪS.—The Hindī word *Satnām* is said to mean 'the True Name' or 'the Name of Truth' and, like *Sat*, 'Truth,' has been used by several Hindu reformers to connote the Supreme Deity. *Sat* is usually stated to be a corruption of the Sanskrit *satya*, 'truth,' but this is phonetically impossible. It is most probably derived from *sattwa*, 'true essence,' and hence, as a religious technical term, it connotes the abstract quality of purity and goodness. *Satnām* therefore really means 'He whose name is Purity and Goodness.' At least three religious bodies of N. India have adopted the term 'Satnāmī' as the title of their respective sects. We shall consider them separately.

1. The name 'Satnāmī' is employed among themselves by the sect of Sādhs (*q.v.*). It is probable that it was these Sādhs who were responsible for the Satnāmī revolt against Aurangzīb in 1672.

The Sādhs claim an indirect spiritual descent from Raī Dāsa, but, as is pointed out in the article devoted to them, the important unitarian side of their doctrine is derived rather from the teaching of another of Rāmānanda's disciples—Kabīr.

2. The next sect calling itself Satnāmī was founded by Jag-jīvan Dāsa of Sardaha in the Bārabankī District of the United Provinces. He was born in 1682 and began his religious career as a Kabīrpanthī—indeed, according to some authorities, these Satnāmīs are merely a branch of that faith.[1] In the United Provinces they number about 75,000, but in other parts of India figures have not been recorded for them.

Jag-jīvan Dāsa lived the greater part of his life at Sardaha, gaining reputation and followers by his miracles. He was a Chandēl Ṭhākur by caste, and his four chief disciples were all of high caste—Brāhmaṇas or Ṭhākurs—but, like Kabīr and Nānak, he adapted his teaching to all classes. Among his followers were low-caste Hindus, such as Chamārs (curriers), and he succeeded in establishing some community of thought between himself and Islām. Two at least of his disciples were Musalmāns. The fullest account of his teaching is that contained in the *Oudh Gazetteer* (see Literature); it has been repeatedly copied by subsequent writers.

The Satnāmīs profess to adore the so-called True Name alone, the one God, the Cause and Creator of all things, the *Nirguṇa*, or He who is void of all sensible qualities, without beginning and without end. As in the Vedānta philosophy, worldly existence is illusion, or the work of Māyā, whom they identify with Bhavānī, the consort of Śiva. They recognize the whole Hindu pantheon, and, although they profess to worship but one God, they pay reverence to his manifestations as revealed in incarnations, particularly those of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. Their moral code enjoins indifference to the world, its pleasures and its pains; devotion to the *guru*, or spiritual guide; clemency and gentleness; rigid adherence to truth; the discharge of all social and religious obligations; and the hope of final absorption into the Supreme. Caste-distinction is not lost on profession, and care is taken not to interfere with caste-prejudices or social customs. Fasts are kept, at least to a partial extent, on Tuesday (the day of Hanumān) and on Sunday (the day of the sun). A good deal of liberality is shown towards local superstitions, especially as regards Rāmachandra and his monkey-ally Hanumān, and the ordinary festivals are regularly observed.

The water in which the *guru's* feet have been washed is drunk only when his caste is equal to or higher than that of the disciple. The distinctive mark of the sect is a black and white twisted thread, generally of silk, worn on the right wrist. It is technically known as *ādū*. The full-blown *mahanth* wears an

[1] Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, p. 96.

ādū on each wrist and each ankle.[1] On the forehead is worn a *tilak*, consisting of one black perpendicular streak. The bodies of the dead are buried, not burnt.

The consumption of flesh, certain pulses, and intoxicating liquors is forbidden. It is also forbidden to eat the *brinjal*, or egg-plant. The last prohibition is due to the belief that, by prayer, it is capable of being converted into meat. The legend on which this belief is based will be found in most of the authorities quoted below.

Several works are attributed to Jag-jīvan. The most important, ranking as the sacred book of the sect, is called *Aghavināśa*,[2] 'The Destruction of Sin.' It is in verse and is believed to be inspired. Its contents are miscellaneous stories from the *Purāṇas*, lessons on morals, ethics, divinity, and rules of piety. Most of these are taken from earlier Sanskrit works and translated. Other works attributed to him are the *Jñāna-prakāśa* (dated 1761), the *Mahā-pralaya*, and the *Prathama-granthā*. The last is in the familiar form of a dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī.

LITERATURE.—**H. H. Wilson**, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 356 ff.; *Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh*, Lucknow, 1877, i. 362 ff.; this has formed the basis of all subsequent accounts, such as **B. H. Badley**, in *IA* viii. (1879) 289 ff.; **W. Crooke**, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 299; **H. R. Nevill**, *Bara Banki Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1904, p. 67 ff.

3. Another sect called Satnāmīs is found in Chhattīsgarh in the east of the Central Provinces of India. In 1901 it numbered nearly 400,000 persons, of whom all but 2000 were members of the caste of Chamārs. It originated with Ghāsī Rāma, a Chamār of Bilāspur District, between 1820 and 1830. He apparently got his inspiration from the Satnāmī teaching of the followers of Jag-jīvan Dāsa mentioned above, but the sect claims that it is a branch of the Raī Dāsīs (*q.v.*) founded by Raī Dāsa the Chamār, who was one of the twelve apostles of Rāmānanda.[3] There seems to be no basis for the claim, and so little do these Satnāmīs know about their alleged founder that they miscall him Rōhī Dāsa and themselves Rōhī Dāsīs.

Ghāsī Rāma was originally a poor farm-servant in a village named Girod, then in the Bilāspur, but now in the Raipur District. He took to ascetic practices and became venerated as a saintly man whose miracles quickly gained him fame. He next retired for a season to the forest and emerged with what he called a new revelation for the Chamārs, which was really a repetition of the tenets of Jag-jīvan Dāsa, with a few additions.[4] His teaching included the worship of the name of one solitary supreme God; abstinence from meat, liquor, and certain vegetables including (as in the case of Jag-jīvan's disciples) the *brinjal*; the abolition of idol-worship; and the prohibition of the employment of cows for agriculture and of ploughing after the midday meal. His followers were bidden to cast all idols from their homes, but were permitted to reverence the sun, as representing the Deity, every morning and evening with a pious ejaculation. Caste was abolished, and all men were declared to be socially equal, except the family of Ghāsī Rāma, in which the priesthood of the cult was to remain hereditary.

Since the death of its founder in 1850 this simple faith has become overlaid with much legend and superstition; and aboriginal social rites which, in spite of his teaching, had survived have only lately been abandoned in a few isolated localities, where they are said to be still occasionally practised. One of these was a kind of social prostitution in which a newly-married wife had to submit for one night to the embraces of a number of men of the village whom she named to her husband as her *gurus*, or spiritual guides—a variation of the *jus primæ noctis*, in which the woman selected the men who were to be favoured by her. One important sub-sect has arisen, the schism turning on the question as to whether the use of tobacco is or is not prohibited. The pro-smokers claim that in his later years Ghāsī Rāma withdrew his former prohibition; but, with tobacco, these *chungiās*, as they are called, have also returned to idolatry, and their villages contain stones covered with vermilion, which the true Satnāmīs eschew.

Satnāmīs admit to their ranks all persons except members of the impure castes, such as Dhōbīs (washermen), Ghasiās (grass-cutters), and Mehtars (sweepers), whom they regard as inferior to themselves. They bury their dead and observe mourning for three days. On the third day they have the head shaved, with the exception of the upper lip, which is never touched by the razor.

All over India the Chamārs are one of the lowest and most despised castes, and there can be no doubt that, as in the case of the Raī Dāsīs and similar sects, the success of Ghāsī Rāma's teaching was primarily due to his decree that caste was abolished, and that consequently the Chamār was as good as any other Hindu. It is this that has roused the bitter hostility to the sect on the part of Hindus of the higher castes—a hostility which is repaid with interest by its members. The women now wear nose-rings, an ornament hitherto forbidden to the lower castes, and the Satnāmīs show their contempt for orthodox Hinduism by rudely parodying Hindu sacred festivals. They insist on travelling in the trains in the same compartments with caste Hindus, who are defiled by their touch and against whom they do not hesitate to jostle. This anti-caste feeling has operated in more ways than one. It has created a feeling of independence among a formerly down-trodden people, which, in its basis, is worthy of all commendation; but its assertion has given rise to a bitter class-antagonism. The relations between a Chamār tenant and his Hindu landlord are often seriously strained, one side or other or both being to blame, and many Chamārs have developed into dangerous criminals, restrained only by their cowardice from the worst outrages against person and property.

LITERATURE.—The foundation of all accounts of these Satnāmīs is contained in **J. W. Chisholm**, *Bilaspur Settlement Report*, Nāgpur, 1861, p. 45 ff. Based on this, in each case with additions and corrections, are the following: *The Central Provinces Gazetteer*, Nāgpur, 1870, pp. 100 ff., 412 ff.; **A. E. Nelson**, *Gazetteer of the Raipur District*, Bombay, 1909, p. 79 ff.; **R. V. Russell**, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, i. 307. The last-named contains all that is in the preceding works, with some additional information.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SATYRS.—The word 'satyr' conjures up to the modern mind a fabulous creature half-man, half-beast, goat-footed, with pointed ears, shaggy body, a creature mainly malevolent, sportive but always on the verge of licence; unlike the solitary fawn, the Satyr hunts in troops; he is one of the *θίασοι* of Dionysos. The picture is substantially correct, but with one important reservation. In origin the Satyr is not a mere imagined fabulous monster; he is an actually existing ritual mummer. This simple fact explains the whole being and functions of the creature. In the time of Antony it was still the custom for men to dress up and walk in procession as Satyrs.

Plutarch tells us that, when Antony entered Ephesus and was hailed as Dionysos, 'women disguised as Bacchæ and men and boys as Satyroi and Panes marched before him.'[1]

We are apt to explain such figures as men dressed

[1] An *ādū* is, properly speaking, the chain or hobble fastened round an elephant's ankles, when he is tied up.

[2] Misprinted *Aghavinsa* in *IA*, and so in later writings copied therefrom.

[3] See artt. RĀMĀNANDĪS, SĀDHS.

[4] The present writer would suggest that this retirement to the forest really covered a visit to N. India, where he met some Chamār follower of Jag-jīvan and learnt from him the Satnāmī doctrine.

[1] *Ant.* 24.

in imitation of Satyrs. We thereby disguise the simple fact that from these ritual figures the mythological conception of Satyrs or Panes sprang.

The *locus classicus* on the origin and nature of the Satyrs is Strabo, x. 3. He is mainly concerned to discuss the Kouretes (*q.v.*), but incidentally he throws out the priceless indication that a number of other mythological figures—Silenoi, Satyroi, Tityroi, Bacchæ—are of like origin. All these he calls *δαίμονες*—creatures half-divine, half-human. Their semi-divinity is instantly understood if we realize that they are not unreal monsters, but ritual mummers, real men, yet half-removed from reality, set apart, *i.e.* semi-divinized by their ritual disguise and function.

Once this substantial unity is clearly grasped, the diversity in forms and names need not embarrass us. Each local ritual would have for its *δαίμονες* its local ritual dress and local name. The disguise was usually half-animal; the worshipper was dressed up as a horse or a bull or a goat. The object of the disguise in animal form has been made abundantly clear by the study of beast-dances among primitive peoples all over the world. They danced as horses or goats or bulls according as they wished to promote the fertility of horse or goat or bull. Hence the *ταῦροι*, bull-*δαίμονες* of Ephesos, the *τράγοι*, goat-*δαίμονες* of Athens, the *ἵπποι*, horse-*δαίμονες* of the Peloponnese.

It is fortunate that in one case we are able from the monumental evidence to say with certainty what particular beast-form attaches to a special name. The horse-*δαίμονες*, creatures with horses' hoofs and manifest upspringing horse-tails, are Silenoi. This fact is put beyond doubt by inscriptions. On the early black-figured krater of Klitias and Ergotimos, now in the Museo Greco-Etrusco at Florence, three *δαίμονες* ithyphallic, with horses' ears, tails, and legs, are clearly inscribed 'Silenoi.'[1] It has long been the custom to call the horse-*δαίμονες* of the Attic vases, who constantly attend Dionysos, 'Satyrs'; accuracy obliges us to substitute the term 'Silenoi.'

It is to be regretted that we have no monumental certainty as to the precise animal-form of the Satyr. But the deficiency is less important than it seems. The particular animal-form is merely, as we saw, a matter of local differentiation springing from particular local circumstances and does not affect the ritual gist of the figure. As to the etymology of the word, again we cannot claim certainty. The most probable suggestion is that of F. Solensen,[2] who holds that both *Σά-τυροι* and *Τί-τυροι* are authentic Greek words from the root *τῡ*, 'to swell,' appearing in *τύμβος*, *ταῦρος*, etc. The Satyroi are *δαίμονες* of the budding, germinating, of plant and animal life; they are fertility figures, and with this their constant ithyphallic character quite agrees. Whatever the original animal-form of the Satyroi, the name came to cover pretty well the whole field of fertility *δαίμονες*. The cause of the dominance of the Satyr-name is lost to us.

As to the functions of the Satyrs, happily Strabo is explicit—they celebrated 'orgies'—and their relation to Dionysos was the same as that of the Kouretes to Zeus in Crete. Strabo's view is confirmed or rather anticipated by Euripides, whom he quotes.[3] The ritual of Dionysos, son of Semele, is substantially that of the Phrygian Mother; the Kouretes are substantially the same as the Satyroi. The sacred mime that they enact is that of the birth, the rescue, and the initiation of the holy child. With the birth and magic growth of the child are re-enacted and magically reinforced the re-birth and re-growth, the *renouveau*, of the whole animal and vegetable world.

The Satyrs far more than the Kouretes are essentially revellers. The Kouretes are essentially child-rearers, more quiet, more conservative. The rite of the birth and finding and cherishing of the child is, it is now known, only one factor in a wider magical folk-play—a folk-play that is in effect the utterance of the cycle of the life of man and of plants and animals. The play in full was cyclic—a birth, a contest, a death, a resurrection, a triumphant marriage, and again a birth. The whole cycle is preserved to us in the mime observed by R. M. Dawkins[1] at Viza in E. Thrace—the region of Dionysos himself. But it is obvious that in one place or another one feature of a plot so diverse may easily be emphasized in contrast to the rest. Crete and the Kouretes emphasize the birth of the child; the Satyrs emphasize the marriage, *κῶμος*. The Satyrs are in fact the *κῶμος*, the festival marriage procession incarnate; their leader is Comus. In the fragments of the recently discovered Satyr-play by Sophocles, the *Ichneutai*, 'Trackers,' the Satyrs, however, attend the birth of the wonder-child Hermes.[2] The Satyr-play lies at the basis not only of tragedy, but first and foremost of comedy—the song of the *κῶμος*. Whether the Satyr-play becomes tragedy or comedy depends on which point in the drama-cycle one elects to stop at. Tragedy ends with a death, comedy with a marriage.

But—and the point needs emphasis—it must never be forgotten that tragedy and comedy, important though they are to us, are late and purely literary developments. In the history of the ritual folk-mime they are, so to speak, episodic. Among the Greeks the ritual-mime, the Satyr-play, was caught up by men of conspicuous literary genius, Æschylus and Aristophanes, and used by them as the vehicle of tragedy and comedy. So splendid was the final transfiguration that the humble origin was all but lost, and only with difficulty has it been rediscovered by the industry of recent days. But it must always be remembered that tragedy and comedy alike, though especially tragedy, are exceptional phenomena occurring only sporadically and always calling for local and temporal explanation; it is the ritual-mime that is the permanent basic fact.

The reason is clear: the primary intent of the ritual-mime, the Satyr-play, was practical, *i.e.* magical, the object, to secure the fertility of man and flocks and fields. As in the Hymn of the Kouretes, the disguised worshippers 'leap for full years, and leap for fleecy flocks, and leap for fields of fruit and . . . leap for young citizens.'[3] With the decay of magic and the emergence of full-blown Olympians to be approached by prayer and sacrifice rather than compelled by magic, the magical aspect of the Satyrs of course dwindled, and their practical magical dance was misconceived as an idle sport. Even as early as Hesiod the process is well-nigh complete. Hesiod tells of the

> 'worthless, idle race of Satyrs
> And the gods, Kouretes, lovers of sport and dancing.'[4]

But—and this is conclusive for the substantial truth of the view here maintained—when Greek comedy and tragedy, splendid sporadic off-shoots, were dead and gone, the permanent element, the ritual-mime, lived on and lives to-day as a folk-play; and this folk-play is still credited with a faint magical potency; it is played at fixed seasons, mainly Christmas and Easter or Whitsuntide, and

[1] A. Furtwängler and K. Reichhold, *Griech. Vasenmaleret*, Munich, 1904–09, i. 58, plates xi., xii.; and see fig. in art. SILENOI.

[2] *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xxx. [1912] 31 ff.

[3] Strabo, x. 3, p. 468; see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 39.

[1] *JHS* xxvi. 191 ff.

[2] See J. E. Harrison, 'Sophocles, *Ichneutæ*,' in *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 136 ff.

[3] See 'Hymn of the Kouretes,' *BSA* xv. 359.

[4] Frag. cxxix.

played 'for luck.' The players are still disguised as beasts, with horns and beast-skins, and sometimes horses' or bulls' heads. They still enact the fight, the *ἀγών*, of summer and winter, the death, the ritual resurrection, the marriage with its *κῶμος*, its revel rout (Comus). They still bring luck to the house where they enact their ritual-play. Finally, they are still always a band, a *θίασος*, pointing back to the days when the group and not the individual was the begetter of sanctities. We think of Dionysos as 'attended by a band of Satyrs'; it was from the band of Satyrs that Dionysos sprang.

LITERATURE.—For Satyrs in art and literature see E. Kühnert, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Satyroi'; O. Navarre, in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Satyres'; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1897–1906, *s.v.* 'Satyroi.'

For origins and relation of Satyroi to Kouretes and other figures and for discussion of Strabo passage, see J. E. Harrison, 'Kouretes and Zeus Kouros,' in *BSA* xv. [1908–09] 308–338, and *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 1–49. For Satyrs and Satyr-play see Gilbert Murray, 'Ritual Forms preserved in Greek Tragedy,' in Excursus to *Themis*, pp. 341–363; F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, London, 1914; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 695–705, where full reference to preceding literature will be found. For survivals of ritual Satyr-mimes see R. M. Dawkins, 'The Modern Carnival in Thrace and the Cult of Dionysus,' *JHS* xxvi. [1906] 191; A. J. B. Wace, 'North Greek Festivals,' *BSA* xvj. [1909–10] 232; J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folk-Lore and Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 190–255; E. K. Chambers, *The Mediæval Stage*, 2 vols., London, 1903, *passim*; J. Spens, *An Essay on Shakespeare's Relation to Tradition*, London, 1916, pp. 35–55. For Indian parallels to Satyrs and Kouretes see L. von Schröder, *Mysterium und Mimus im Rigveda*, Leipzig, 1908, *passim*.

J. E. HARRISON.

SAURAPĀTAS, SAURAS, or SAURYAS.—This is the name of a small sect in Central and Southern India, whose special object of worship is the sun. According to the *Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency*,[1] those of the south are all Drāviḍa Brāhmaṇas, form a sub-tribe of that caste, and are very few in number. According to Wilson, they scarcely differ from other Hindus in their general observances. This is to be expected, for the worship of the sun forms a part of every orthodox Hindu's worship. The *tilaka*, or frontal mark, is of red sandal and of a special shape, and the necklace is of crystal. According to the *ICR* for 1901,[2] the *tilaka* of the Sauryas of Central India may be one of three varieties—three straight lines across the forehead, a single perpendicular line, or a double crescent joined by a bar in the middle. Here also 'they are nearly all Brāhmaṇas.'

They do not eat until they have seen the sun; and on every Sunday, and on the day of the sun's entry into a fresh sign of the zodiac, they eat one meal without salt.

For the general history of sun-worship in India see art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hindu). Cf. also art. NATURE (Hindu), vol. ix. p. 230. The forest tribe Sauras (=Savarās) is treated in art. SAVARĀS.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, ed. R. Rost, London, 1861, p. 266, from which much of the above is taken; R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 151ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

SAUTRĀNTIKAS.—**1. Name, scriptural position, and character.**—The philosophers of the Little Vehicle (Hīnayāna [*q.v.*]) were divided into two schools: on the one hand, the Vaibhāṣikas, who accepted the Abhidharma books of the Sarvāstivādins (the seven Abhidharmas) as 'revealed' scripture (*ipsissima verba*), and the commentary on them, *Vibhāṣā*, as the oldest and the most authoritative 'treatise' (*śāstra*); on the other hand, the Sautrāntikas, who considered the seven books simply as 'treatises' (*śāstra*) of human inspiration and therefore liable to error, who maintained that Buddha had not composed treatises dealing with Abhidharma or given indications for the composition of such treatises under his authority (a working hypothesis in Pāli scholasticism),[1] but had taught Abhidharma doctrines in certain *Sūtras* (or *Sūtrāntas*).[2] According to them, these *Sūtras*, the *Arthaviniścaya*, etc., constitute 'the Basket of Abhidharma.' Hence their name Sautrāntikas, the philosophers who recognize the authority of the *Sūtrāntas* alone.

They are also named Dārṣṭāntikas, 'philosophers who deal with similes' (*dṛṣṭānta*);[3] but there is some reason to believe that the Dārṣṭāntikas are a branch of the Sautrāntikas.

The following gives an accurate idea of the character of the school, and the progress accomplished by Buddhist thought is evident when the Sautrāntikas are compared with the older Pāli or Sanskrit schools:

> The point to be discussed is of importance. Does the eye or the 'consciousness' (or the 'mind') see visible objects? (1) The Mahāsāṃghikas (an old sect and school) adhere to the letter of the scriptural text: 'When he sees an object with the eye . . .' and believe that the eye—the subtle eye, not the eye of the flesh—sees visible objects. (2) The orthodox Pāli school (Vibhajjavādin) maintains that, in this scriptural statement, 'eye' indicates the necessary instrument of vision, as when we say 'wounded by a bow,' when, in fact, the wound is inflicted by an arrow. The eye, they say, being matter, does not see; seeing belongs to 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*).[4] (3) The Vaibhāṣikas agree with the Mahāsāṃghikas: the eye sees, the consciousness or 'discernment' (*vijñāna*) discerns (*vijānāti*); they refute the Pāli point of view (by adducing a new simile, *mañchāh krośanti*, 'stalls applaud'). (4) The Sautrāntikas recognize the weight of the scriptural text: 'When he sees an object with the eye . . .' but, by referring to other scriptural evidence, they show that the problem is not well stated: 'What is the use of this discussion? Very much like "chewing space." It has been said by the Lord that, "the eye being given and a visible object also being given, there arises, depending on both, a visual cognition." Therefore such a question as "Who sees?" is not justified, as therein no activity comes into play. These are only correlated phenomena, causes and effect—in fact a blue image resulting from a mechanical process, no seer, no vision. It is said that the eye sees, that the discernment (*vijñāna*) discerns (*vijānāti*)—mere metaphorical phrases which we must not take literally, on which we must not lay stress (*abhiniveśa*), says the Lord.'[5]

2. Sources.[6]—Although the origin of the Sautrāntikas may be traced to the time of the rise of the Vaibhāṣikas—Sautrāntika doctors are quoted in the *Vibhāṣā*[7]—it seems that the Vaibhāṣikas preceded the Sautrāntikas in the systematization of their doctrines. That would explain why the views of the latter are to be found chiefly in commentaries on the books of the former. Vasubandhu, in his *Abhidharmakośa*, 'the scabbard of the Abhidharmas' (meaning the seven Abhidharmas of the Sarvāstivādins),[8] sets out to state the views of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr, but in his *Bhāṣya* (auto-commentary) to the *Kośa* he points out the errors of the Vaibhāṣikas, and these errors are dealt with in the *Vyākhyā* (sub-commentary) of Yaśomitra.[9] A number of doctors, among them

[1] Madras, 1885–93, iii. 863.
[2] Vol. xix., *Central India*, Lucknow, 1902, p. 86.

[1] See, *e.g.*, Atthasālinī (*PTS*, London, 1897), p. 3.
[2] *Abhidharmakośakārikās*, and *Bhāṣya*, Tib. tr., ed. T. de Stcherbatskoi, *Bibl. Buddhica*, xx. [Petrograd, 1917] 7; Tāranātha, *Gesch. des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. A. Schiefner, do. 1869, p. 56; Tibetan text, do. 1868, p. 56.
[3] É. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'histoire du Buddhisme indien*, Paris, 1845, p. 448; W. Wassilieff, *Der Buddhismus*, Petrograd, 1860, p. 274; Tāranātha, tr. Schiefner, p. 274.
[4] *Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 9, tr. S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy*, London, 1915, p. 333.
[5] *Abhidharmakośakārikās*, p. 76 f.
[6] European sources: H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 126, *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indie*, 2 vols., Haarlem, 1882–84, French tr., *Histoire du Boudhisme dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1903, ii. 395–402; Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 447; Wassilieff, *Der Buddhismus*, p. 222.
[7] See *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* ad i. 20. On the date of Kumāralabdha see H. Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London, 1917, pp. 43, 45.
[8] See *Abhidharmakośakārikās*, p. 2.
[9] See J. Takakusu, 'On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins,' *JPTS*, 1904–05, p. 67, and sources quoted; Paramārtha, 'Life of Vasubandhu,' *Tong-pao*, July 1904, pp. 278, 290.

Saṃghabhadra, thought that Vasubandhu had unduly sacrificed the 'orthodox system,' and they wrote purely Vaibhāṣika commentaries to the *Kośa*, refuting the particular views of the Sautrāntikas. These books (*Samayapradīpa*, *Nyāyānusāra*) exist only in Chinese translations.

There are a few references to the Sautrāntikas in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*[1] and in Vinītadeva's commentary to the *Nyāyabindu*.[2] Tāranātha gives some information on the history of the school and the activity of its scholars;[3] and so do the Chinese pilgrims.[4] Some Tibetan treatises (*siddhāntas*), especially the *Mañjughoṣa-hāsavajrasiddhānta*, explain at length the position of the Sautrāntikas. These *siddhāntas* are intricate, and Wassilieff, who has summarized them, is not to blame when his statements are obscure.[5] Most fortunately, Brāhmanical and Jain philosophers have paid attention to the theory of the origin of knowledge as stated by the Sautrāntika school, and they furnish us with the best account that we possess. In many cases their evidence is supported from Buddhist sources.[6]

3. Doctrines.—It is not possible to give a systematic account of the doctrines of the Sautrāntikas. On the other hand, a mere list of the points referred to in our authorities would involve the reader in a maze of obscure technicalities. A few remarks will show the variety and the importance of their views.

(1) Thought knows itself, just as a lamp renders itself manifest—a theory (*svasaṃvedana*, *svasaṃvitti*, 'self-consciousness') which has often been opposed by the Indian philosophers from the days of the *Upaniṣads*, and which is admitted in Buddhism by the Vijñānavādins alone,[7] who have much in common with the Sautrāntikas.

(2) There is no direct perception of exterior objects (*contra* the Vaibhāṣikas); exterior objects are known by inference, not by evidence.

(3) The exterior object really exists (*vastusat*); but it is an open and much debated question whether it possesses a form (*ākāra*) of its own. Some Sautrāntikas believe that 'form' belongs to the object; some maintain that thought 'imposes its own form on the object'; others, again, as the result of a more delicate inquiry, admit a compromise—the semi-realistic theory of the 'two halves of an egg.'

(4) The Sautrāntikas have had a certain share in the development of the atomistic theory. They say that there is no contact (*sparśa*) between atoms; for, as atoms have no parts, contact could not be contact between parts; it would be contact between wholes and therefore would involve identity; a compound of atoms would not be larger than one atom (so far the reasoning of the Vijnānavādins, who deny the existence of matter). But there is 'contiguity' between atoms—literally 'there is no interval' (*nirantaratva*) between them, for matter is impenetrable.[1]

(5) Matter (*rūpa*) is only 'colour' (*varṇa*), not 'shape' or 'figure' (*saṃsthāna*) (*contra* the Vaibhāṣikas).[2]

(6) Everything is painful. Pleasant feeling itself is painful, as it is only attenuated pain.

(7) Destruction has no cause: things are perishable by their very nature; they are not transitory (*anitya*), they are 'momentary' (*kṣaṇika*).[3] Birth or production (*utpāda*) is 'existence after having not existed' (*abhūtvā bhāvaḥ*); neither the past nor the future exists. *Pudgala* ('soul') and space (*ākāśa*) are also mere names.

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted in the footnotes.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

SAVARĀS.—The Savarās, Saoras, or Sauras, a forest tribe of India, numbering 582,342 at the census of 1911, are found in largest numbers in Madras, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and Bihār and Orissa. The name of the tribe, popularly derived from Skr. *śava*, 'a corpse,' is interpreted by Cunningham to mean 'axe-men,' the axe being the implement characteristic of forest-dwellers. They have been identified with the Śabaras, who were grouped with the Andhras, Pundras, Pulindas, and Mūtibas, 'the most degraded classes of men, the rabble for the most part.'[4] In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh they are represented by the Soerī, Soirī, or Suirī.[5]

As might have been expected in the case of a tribe dispersed over a large area of forest country, their environment preventing inter-communication between the various groups, there are considerable differences of belief.

In Bengal the members of the tribe in the Bankura District 'have become thoroughly Hinduised, and Brahmans serve them as priests in the worship of the standard gods. These Brahmans are received on equal terms by the *purohits* [family priests] of Bagdis, Koras, Kewats, and other low castes. In Orissa the original faith of the tribe has been less modified by the influence of Hindu usage. The worship of the Brahmanical deities is indeed gaining ground among them, but the elder gods, Thānpati, who dwells in the *thān* or sacred grove of the village, and "Bansuri or Thākurāini, no doubt the same as the bloodthirsty she-devil revered by the Bhuiyās,"[6] still receive offerings of goats or fowls at the hands of the elders of the community, who have not yet been supplanted in their office by the professional Brahman.'[7]

The Soerīs of the United Provinces are worshippers of Śiva, Mahābīr, or Hanumān, the monkey god, Sītalā Māī, the smallpox goddess, and the Pāñchoñ Pīr.[8]

In Madras the tribal beliefs are of a more primitive kind. In the Vizagapatam District they worship Jākarā or Loddlū, the latter being sometimes a generic term for the gods in a body, who have no regular temples, but are symbolized by a stone placed under a big tree. Sacrifices of goats are made to them when the various crops are ripening, and the victim must first eat food offered

[1] *Bibl. Buddhica*, iv. [Petrograd, 1913] 61, 263, 281, 413, 444, 488, 523.

[2] *Bibl. Indica*, Calcutta, 1908, pp. 34, 40, 59; see also *Saṃtānāntarasiddhi*, Tib. tr., ed. T. de Stcherbatskoi, *Bibl. Buddhica*, xix. [1916].

[3] Tāranātha, tr. Schiefner, pp. 56, 58, 78, 271, 274; the Sautrāntikas are often regarded as a branch of the Sarvāstivādins, the second branch being the Mūlasarvāstivādins (W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884, p. 186), or as scions of the Tāmraśātiyas.

[4] T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1904–05, i. 210, 245, 318, 322, 326, 374, ii. 225, 286. The four suns of the Sautrāntikas—Kumāralābha (or Dlabdha), the reputed founder of the school (see Watters, ii. 225, and cf. ii. 286), Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and Śrīlābha—are frequently quoted in the *Kośa* literature.

[5] Wassilieff, *loc. cit.*; Kern (*Geschiedenis*) has translated a part of the summary of Wassilieff.

[6] Mādhavāchārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, ch. ii., tr. A. E. Gough in E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, *The Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha: Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy* [2], London, 1894; tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin, in *Muséon*, new ser., ii. [1901] 56, 187 (notes contain references to Buddhist and Brāhmanical sources); Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuchchaya*, ed. L. Suali, *Bibl. Indica*, Calcutta, 1905; *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, ed. F. W. Thomas and L. de la Vallée Poussin, in *Muséon*, new ser., iii. [1902] 403, and ed. M. Rangāchārya, Madras, 1909, pt. i. p. 9; *Brahmasūtras*, with commentaries, ii. 2, 18; *Sāṃkhyasūtras*, i. 42, v. 77; *Nyāyasūtras*, iv. 2, 35; *Ślokavārttika* (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series), p. 272.

[7] See *Kathāvatthu*, v. 9.

[1] See Wassilieff, p. 333; *Abhidharmakośakārikās*, i. 43; *Sarvadarśana*, Fr. tr. n. 77; *Nyāyavārttika*, Calcutta, 1907, p. 518; cf. Ui, p. 26 f., and art. ATOMIC THEORY (Indian).

[2] *Abhidharmakośa*, iv.

[3] *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 231.

[4] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, vii. 18, ed. M. Haug, Bombay, 1863, ii. 470; cf. J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, pt. ii. [1860] p. 331; W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 175.

[5] W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of N.W. Provinces and Oudh* iv. 320 ff.

[6] E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 149.

[7] H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, ii. 244.

[8] See art. PANCHPIRIYĀ.

to it.[1] The hill Savarās fear Jaliā, who in some villages is provided with a home under a small thatched shed, in which are placed images of household implements and requisites as well as figures of men, animals, birds, and the like.[2] F. Fawcett[3] remarks that Jaliā is sometimes male, sometimes female, and very malevolent, going from one village to another and causing death. The god's shrine is provided with all sorts of furniture for his or her use or amusement; goats are killed close by, and the blood is poured on the platform. Among other gods he named Kitung, said to be the creator, who brought the tribe to their present settlements; Rathū, who causes pains in the neck; Dharmabojā or Lankan, 'the one above,' or Ayungang, the sun, who causes all births and is not always benevolent, sometimes bringing sickness; Kannī, who is very malevolent and lives in big trees, those haunted by him never being cut down. Some of these hill deities resemble the spirits of the dead. The same writer adds that the *kadang* is a medium, sometimes a woman, all to the manner born and needing no training, who communicates with the unseen world. Their gradual approximation to Hinduism is shown by the belief that they can gain union with the gods in a future life by worshipping at the Śivarātrī, or 'night festival' of Śiva, at his ancient temple at Mehendragiri. There is no distinct evidence of human sacrifice like that of the Kandhs (*q.v.*); but J. Campbell remarks that they used to participate in the *meriah* rite of the Kandhs, though they did not seem to attach much importance to it and readily promised to discontinue the practice.[4] They have no commemorative sacrifices or feasts, those which are held being intended to appease evil spirits, especially those of the angry dead. They make offerings to the sun at the mango harvest, an offering of food or a small sacrifice when a child is born, and an offering to Sattivā at the sprouting of the rice crop to secure a good harvest. On this occasion a stake made from a sacred tree is planted in the ground, the top of it is sharpened to a point, on which is impaled a live young pig or chicken, and over the animal an inverted earthen pot daubed over with white rings is placed.[5]

In the Central Provinces they worship the goddess Bhavānī under various names and Dulhā Deo, the young bridegroom who was killed by a tiger.[6] He is believed to dwell in the house kitchen. In other places Būṛhā Deo, or Bad Rāul, is worshipped, and, as the tribe becomes Hinduized, he develops into Bhairava, 'the terrible one,' just as farther north the earth-god Bhairon is similarly transformed.[7] Like all secluded tribes, they are notorious for their knowledge of sorcery, and their charms are specially valued by those who have to appease the spirits of persons who have died by violence. In former times, if a member of the family was seriously ill, they were accustomed to set fire to the forest, in the hope that by burning the small animals and insects they might propitiate the angry gods.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 241 ff.; W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, do. 1896, iv. 320 ff.; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, i. 258 ff., vi. 304 ff.; *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 177, do. *1911*, vol. xii. pt. i. p. 64; *Ethnographic Survey: Central Provinces*, pt. iii., Allahabad, 1907, p. 75 ff.; A. E. Nelson, *Gazetteer of Bilaspur*, do. 1910, i. 91 ff.; L. S. S. O'Malley, *Gazetteer of Sambalpur*, do. 1909, i. 74; E. A. de Brett, *Gazetteer Chhattisgarh Feudatory States*, do. 1909, i. 210; J. N. Bose, *JASB* lix. [1890] 289; T. J. Maltby and G. D. Lemam, *Manual of Ganjam*, Madras, 1882; R. V. Russell, *Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iv. 500 ff.

W. CROOKE.

SAVIOUR.—See SALVATION.

SAVONAROLA.—**1. Life.**—Although we naturally associate Girolamo Savonarola, the prophet of the Italian Renaissance, with Florence, he was not and never regarded himself as a Florentine. Michele Savonarola, a Paduan scientist and man of letters, had settled at Ferrara in 1440 as physician to the court and professor in the university. His son Niccolò married a Mantuan lady, Elena Bonacossi, by whom he had seven children, the martyr being the third. Girolamo was born on 21st Sept. 1452. The second duke of Ferrara, Ercole d'Este, was making his capital a centre of the learning and splendour of the Renaissance; but the young Savonarola, profoundly conscious of the evils of the time and suffering the pangs of unrequited love, poured out his heart in a canzone, *De ruina mundi* (1472), bewailing the perversion of the world and the corruption of the life which he saw around him. He set forth the same conviction in a small prose essay, *Del Dispregio del Mondo*, invoking the divine intervention. On 24th April 1475 he left his home and entered the Dominican order at Bologna.

'The reason,' he wrote to his father, 'that moves me to enter religion is this: first, the great misery of the world, the iniquities of men, the ravishing, the adultery, the pride, the idolatry, the cruel blasphemies; for the age has come to such a pass that not one is found who acts rightly; wherefore, many times the day, did I sing to myself this verse with tears: *Heu! fuge crudeles terras, fuge litus avarum.*'[1]

In his novice's cell he wrote a second canzone, *De ruina ecclesiæ*, deploring the decay of religious life and the corruption of the Church, praying for power 'to break those great wings' of temporal and spiritual power in the hands of the wicked. He returned to Ferrara to preach the Lent of 1481, but failed to impress his countrymen, and was transferred to the convent of San Marco in Florence. Lorenzo de' Medici was then at the height of his power; his rule, though there was no court and republican appearances were maintained, was a despotism in which even art and letters and festivities became instruments of statecraft for holding the people in contented servitude. The uncouth utterances of the new friar-preacher from the north were at first ignored by the cultured and sophisticated Florentines. Poring over the pages of the Hebrew prophets, himself seeing visions and hearing voices, Savonarola became inspired by the conviction that he was set by God as a watchman in the centre of Italy to warn her peoples and princes of impending doom. He first delivered his message at San Gimignano during the Lent of 1485, and then, with greater power and terrible predictions, in the Lent of 1486 at Brescia. The sensation caused by the latter sermons gained him a better hearing on his return to Florence (whither he was recalled at the instance of Lorenzo de' Medici), when, on the first Sunday of August 1489, preaching on the Apocalypse in San Marco, he repeated his three conclusions: the Church would be scourged, then renovated, and these things would come quickly. In 1491 he was elected prior of San Marco. He stood by the deathbed of Lorenzo de' Medici (April 1492) and, according to the disputed but still generally accepted story, bade him gain remission of his sins by restoring liberty to Florence.

Up to this time Savonarola had based his prophecies on natural reason and the authority of the

[1] Cf. the test of the victim by its shivering (*BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 516; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, v. 237, *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 384 f.).
[2] W. Francis, *Gazetteer of Vizagapatam*, Madras, 1907, i. 96.
[3] *JRASBò* i. [1886] 242.
[4] *A Personal Narr. of Thirteen Years' Service amongst the Wild Tribes of Khondistan*, London, 1864, p. 204.
[5] *Ib.* p. 259; for further details of the belief in Madras see E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, vi. 304 ff.
[6] Cf. Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 119 f. [7] *Ib.* i. 108.

[1] Villari and Casanova, *Scelta di prediche e scritti*, p. 419.

Scriptures. He now began to speak openly of his visions and to lay claim to divine revelation. In the same year (1492), on the night of Good Friday, he saw 'per immaginazione' the vision of the two crosses—the black cross of the wrath of God in the midst of Rome, the golden cross of the mercy of God rising up over Jerusalem. In the following Advent (Alexander VI. having been elected pope under scandalous circumstances in August) he had 'un' altra immaginazione,' in which he beheld a hand in heaven wielding a sword, of which the point was turned towards the earth. Throughout 1492, 1493, and 1494 his sermons increased in vigour and fearlessness of utterance, as he denounced the crimes and corruption of prelates and princes, bidding men turn for happiness and salvation to 'the simplicity and life of Christ and of the true Christians.' The prelates, he declared, had not only destroyed the Church of God, but had made a Church after their own fashion—the modern Church, which retained only the splendour of outward ceremonies, a mere show falsely satisfying men, like the festivities and spectacles introduced by secular tyrants. His prophecies of imminent chastisement culminated in the sermon on the Deluge (Gn 6^{17}), delivered in the Duomo on 21st Sept. 1494, heralding the French invasion. The vision of the sword seemed fulfilled, and Savonarola hailed Charles VIII. as the minister of God who should reform the Church and the world. The friar's bearing in the crisis that followed the expulsion of the Medici, the passage of the French through Tuscany to the conquest of Naples, and their precipitous retreat in the following year gave him an almost unlimited power in Florence. Henceforth Savonarola claimed a supernatural sanction for his prophecies and conduct, in the religious and political sphere alike. From the pulpit he directed the reorganization of the Republic with a Greater Council, on the model of the Venetian constitution ('which was given them by God'), and the reformation of life and conduct that transformed the city into a theocratic state with Christ as King. There were bonfires of the 'vanities,' the streets echoed with processional hymns and chants of divine love, the children were organized into bands as the chosen emissaries of this holy time. At Ferrara the duke—with whom Savonarola was in constant communication, and who for a while believed unreservedly in his prophecies—attempted a similar reformation. The prior of San Marco was now the central figure in Italy.

'Tell me,' he cries in one of his sermons, 'ye who contradict,—did you ever in your times see a man preach in one city, and his voice run through all Italy and beyond Italy?'[1]

Savonarola, while always professing absolute submission to the doctrines and decrees of the Church, now came into direct conflict, both spiritually and politically, with the pope. Alexander, who had vainly attempted to silence him or induce him to come to Rome, finally sought to bribe him by the offer of a cardinal's hat. The friar's answer was a terrible course of sermons on Amos and Zechariah, in the Lent of 1496, openly denouncing the corruption of the papacy. He continued in the same strain, preaching on Ruth, Micah, and Ezekiel, during this and the earlier part of the following year. At the same time he was engaged, together with the duke of Ferrara (whose faith, however, was wavering), in an intrigue for the return of Charles VIII., in opposition to the league for the defence of Italy formed by the pope, Venice, and the duke of Milan. In June 1497 Alexander issued a bull of excommunication against him. Savonarola respected the bull until Christmas Day, when he publicly celebrated mass. Disregarding the advice of the Ferrarese ambassador, he followed this up by preaching in the Duomo on Septuagesima Sunday, 1498, declaring that the excommunication was invalid and the pope himself a broken tool. He began to talk of the summoning of a Church council. When the government, threatened with an interdict, forbade him to preach again, he prepared an appeal to the princes of Christendom, urging them to summon this general council and depose the pope as a simoniacal usurper. A preliminary dispatch to France was intercepted by a Milanese agent and forwarded to Rome. The duke of Ferrara had already dissociated himself from the friar's cause. Faced by a hostile government in Florence itself and by the increasing enmity of the populace, Savonarola had now no supporters save a dwindling party of religious enthusiasts. The abortive ordeal by fire (7th April 1498) precipitated the inevitable catastrophe. A Franciscan of Santa Croce challenged him to prove his doctrines by passing unscathed through the fire; Savonarola would perhaps have ignored the matter (as he had done on a previous occasion), but his chief follower, Fra Domenico da Pescia, impetuously accepted. The affair was probably an organized plot, and the fiasco was so contrived as to excite the popular indignation still further against him. San Marco was stormed on the following day (Palm Sunday). The friar and his two companions—Fra Domenico da Pescia and Fra Silvestro Maruffi—were subjected to repeated tortures, and Savonarola's depositions were falsified to make it appear that he confessed 'that he had not received from God the things he preached.' Finally, to conclude the prolonged martyrdom, papal commissioners were invited to Florence, and the three Dominicans were hanged and their bodies burned on 23rd May 1498. Savonarola's calm correction of the phrase of the bishop of Vasona in degrading him ('Separo te ab Ecclesia militante atque triumphante') was long remembered: 'Militante, non triumphante; hoc enim tuum non est.'

The personal character of Savonarola was unquestionably one of heroic sanctity. His letters to his mother and other relatives and his attitude towards women and children testify to his strong family affection and innate tenderness of disposition. A mystic and contemplative by nature, he was impelled to action solely by the spirit of holy zeal and the conviction that a special mission had been assigned to him by God.

'Zeal,' he declares in one of his sermons, 'is nought else than an intense love in the heart of the just man, which does not let him rest, but ever seeks to remove all that he sees to be against the honour of God whom he vehemently loves.'[1]

In his *Dialogus de veritate prophetica* he pathetically describes his reluctance to enter the deep sea in his little boat, finding himself far from shore, yearning to return to his cell:

'All those who have known me intimately from my childhood, know that these things which I do at present are contrary and repugnant to my natural desire.'[2]

His inordinate belief in his visions was due to a nervous and highly-strung temperament, to which must likewise be ascribed his intolerance towards political opponents. This at times marred his otherwise enlightened statesmanship; but nowhere in his career is there a trace of personal arrogance or self-seeking. The Ferrarese ambassador wrote of him, on his first accession to power in Florence: 'He aims at nothing save the good of all, seeking for union and peace.' In religious doctrine and practice he remained to the last a fervent and rigid Roman Catholic of the type of the mediæval saint. As a reformer he is the successor of St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard, Dante, and St

[1] *Prediche*, ed. Baccini, p. 21 f.

[1] *Sermoni e prediche*, Florence, 1845, p. 555.
[2] *Dialogus, ad init.*

Catherine of Siena, rather than a precursor of Luther.

2. Works.—Savonarola's literary works are closely connected with his utterances from the pulpit.

'His religious treatises, including those in the form of epistles to the faithful, set forth, scientifically and more in order, the same ideas that are found scattered in his sermons.'[1]

Savonarola appears to have usually written his sermons beforehand in Latin, though they were delivered and consequently taken down in Italian. His more important treatises (with the exception of the *Reggimento e governo della città di Firenze*) were first published in Latin and afterwards, for the sake of the unlearned, in the vernacular; only in the case of the *Trionfo della Croce* is the Italian version from his own hand; he more generally relied on the assistance of one or other of his followers, such as the poet Girolamo Benivieni. In his shorter writings he used Italian or Latin according to the nature of the subject and the class of readers to whom they were addressed.

(i.) *Sermons.*—There are 15th or early 16th cent. editions of ten courses of Savonarola's sermons: (*a*) on the First Epistle of St. John (probably delivered in 1491); (*b*) on the Psalm *Quam bonus Deus Israel* (Advent, 1493); (*c*) on the Ark of Noah (mainly Lent, 1494); (*d*) on Haggai (1494–95); (*e*) on the Psalms (1495); (*f*) on Job (Lent, 1495); (*g*) on Amos and Zechariah (Lent, 1496); (*h*) on Ruth and Micah (1496); (*i*) on Ezekiel (1496–97); (*k*) on Exodus (1498). Several sermons were separately printed during the preacher's life. There are modern editions of (*a*) and (*b*), *Sermoni e prediche di F. Girolamo Savonarola* (Florence, 1845, and Prato, 1846), and of (*h*), *Prediche di F. Girolamo Savonarola*, ed. G. Baccini (Florence, 1889). An excellent selection is given by Villari and Casanova. Though the magic of the preacher's personality has passed away, and we are mainly dependent upon reporters (and sometimes upon an intermediate Latin version), enough remains to enable us to realize the terrible quality of Savonarola's eloquence, his apocalyptic fire and religious fervour, his zeal for righteousness, his fearlessness of men, and the profound emotion that these discourses must have stirred in his audience.

Savonarola claims[2] to have preached on four subjects: the truth of the faith, the simplicity of the Christian life as the highest wisdom, the imminence of certain future events, the new government of Florence. Consequently he regards as his most significant works the four in which these matters are set forth in writing: the *Trionfo della Croce*, the *Semplicità della vita cristiana*, the *Dialogus de veritate prophetica*, the *Reggimento e governo della città di Firenze*.

(ii.) The *De veritate Fidei in Dominicæ Crucis triumphum*, or *Trionfo della Croce*, the longest of Savonarola's works, was completed in the summer of 1497. Both the Latin and Italian versions are by himself, the latter not being a literal translation, but the setting forth of the contents of the work in a more popular and less scholastic form. He regarded it as the supreme vindication of his orthodoxy. 'From this book,' he wrote to the pope, 'it will appear manifestly whether I am a sower of heresy or of the Catholic faith.' Starting from a pageant of the triumph of Christ (suggested probably by the carnival *trionfi* of the Florentines), he attempts in four books to show that the Christian faith should be accepted, not only by supernatural revelation, but by the natural light of reason. Mainly Thomist in conception but more modern in form and treatment, it sought to give the Renaissance a volume of Roman Catholic apologetics somewhat analogous to what Aquinas had given the 13th cent. with his *Summa contra Gentiles*.

(iii.) The *De simplicitate Christianæ Vitæ* (1496) was written in Latin and followed by an Italian version by Girolamo Benivieni. Here Savonarola defines the essence of the Christian life as the imitation of the life of Christ and the following of His teaching. Such a life is founded not on imagination or on natural reason alone, but on the grace of God which forms it, and the means by which it is chiefly preserved and increased are the sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist. Divine grace produces simplicity of heart, from which proceeds simplicity in external things, which must, however, be always relative, according to a man's state and position and his duty as a citizen. The end of the Christian life is man's true felicity, which consists in the contemplation and fruition of God. We may regard this work as a kind of scholastic companion to the *De imitatione Christi* of Thomas à Kempis.

(iv.) In 1495 Savonarola published his *Compendium Revelationum*, an account of his principal visions, some of which are related with no small dramatic power, while others read like the mere phantasies of the older mediæval seers. The *Dialogus de veritate prophetica* (1497, after the excommunication) is an apologia, not only for the previous work, but for the writer's whole attitude as a prophet of renovation. Its general purport is that he is convinced that he is neither a deceiver nor himself deceived, but that, over and above what he has derived from the light of reason, from the understanding of the Scriptures, and from the practice of the spiritual life, he has received a direct revelation from God. Among his arguments is the perfectly legitimate one, known to all students of mystical experience: these revelations have given him greater intensity and increased purity in his own spiritual life. Both the *Compendium* and the *Dialogus* appeared first in Latin and were followed by Italian versions not by Savonarola himself.

(v.) The *Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze* was written in Italian, apparently in the latter part of 1497 or (as Villari holds) in the first months of 1498, Savonarola intending to produce a larger work in Latin on the same subject later. It is divided into three parts. In the first he distinguishes between three forms of government: the rule of a single man (*regno*), an oligarchy (*governo degli ottimati*), and a genuine republic of all the people (*governo civile*), the third being the form most suitable for Florence. The second part deals with tyranny, of which the worst is that of a private citizen who has become a tyrant. It includes a striking picture of such a tyrant, an imaginary portrait, but with features manifestly drawn from the darker side of the character of Lorenzo de' Medici. The third part, with great insight and true statesmanship, shows how the new form of republican government in Florence, with its *consiglio grande*, is to be regulated, perfected, and maintained. Such a republic, accompanied by moral reformation and based upon faith in God, will transform the city into an earthly paradise, in which civic liberty and true Christian living will be indissolubly united.

(vi.) *Minor works.*—(*a*) *Poetry.*—The most interesting of Savonarola's poems are the two early canzoni, *De ruina mundi* and *De ruina ecclesiæ*, already mentioned. The imitation of Petrarch, here manifested, becomes devout parody in a few later sonnets and canzoni. Though not by nature a poet, there is true lyrical exaltation in some of his *laude*, hymns sung in procession to replace the profane *canti carnascialeschi* of the Florentines:

[1] Villari and Casanova, *Scelta di prediche e scritti*, p. iv.
[2] *Reggimento . . . della città di Firenze, ad init.*

O anima cieca, Ben venga amore, Jesù sommo conforto, Che fai qui core, and especially that on Christ as King of Florence (*Viva, viva in nostro core, Cristo re duce è signore*).

(*b*) *Philosophical.*—To the early days of Savonarola's priorate at San Marco belong three Latin works: *Compendium philosophiæ naturalis, Compendium philosophiæ moralis, Compendium logicæ.* Written for the use of friar-students, they are Aristotelian and Thomist in theory and treatment, with occasional traces of Neo-Platonic influence. A little later is the *De divisione, ordine, ac utilitate omnium scientiarum*, with an appended fourth book on the art of poetry. Here he protests against the use of pagan mythology by Christian poets, questions the spiritual utility of religious verse, and draws a curious contrast between the classical poets and the inspired prophets.

(*c*) *Mystical and ascetic.*—A somewhat large number of small religious treatises were composed by Savonarola from 1491 down to a few days before his death. Particularly noteworthy are the *Trattato della orazione mentale* and the *Trattato dell' amore di Jesù Cristo* (both in Italian, 1492); the former inculcates inner worship as more fruitful and more pleasing to God than outward ceremonial; the latter, a work of the highest spirituality, is both practical and mystical, a guide for the devout soul on the mystic way; the examples are usually from the life of the cloister, but they are applicable to all, the book ending in a long series of contemplations moving the soul to the impassioned love of Jesus. Two other tracts (originally in Latin) which also still hold their place in spiritual literature are the commentary on the Lord's Prayer, *Expositio Orationis Dominicæ*, and that on Psalm 79 (80), *Qui regis Israel intende.* The *Solatium itineris mei* (of uncertain date) consists of dialogues between the spirit and the soul, anticipating the matter of the *Trionfo della Croce.* Best known of all (partly from the fact of their having been republished by Luther) are the meditations on the Psalms *Miserere mei Deus* (50–51) and *In te Domine speravi* (30–31), written by Savonarola in prison a few days before his death. The first is purely devotional in treatment, closing in the vision of the future renovation of Zion and the writer's oblation of himself as a victim upon the Cross of Christ. In the second, which was left unfinished, a more personal note is struck; it depicts the struggle between hope and despondency in Savonarola's own soul, ending with the vindication of his revelations as 'divine illuminations' and the utterance of his trust in the Lord and in His name.

No complete collection of Savonarola's letters has yet been edited. Some of them are practically tracts, like those on the exercise of charity and on discretion in prayer, addressed to the friars of his own convent, and the beautiful epistle to the sisters of the third order of St. Dominic. We have also tender letters to his mother and members of his own family, letters of spiritual or political counsel to various persons, and correspondence on affairs of Church and State. Peculiarly interesting among the last is his correspondence with the duke of Ferrara, throwing light not only on the character of the friar himself, but also on that of the conscience-tortured prince whom he addressed, and who besought him 'to be a good ambassador for us in the sight of God.'

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SAXONS.—See TEUTONS.

SCAPEGOAT.

Greek (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 218.
Semitic (J. D. PRINCE), p. 221.
Teutonic.—See PURIFICATION (Teutonic).

SCAPEGOAT (Greek). — The ideas and the ritual analogous, among the Greeks, to those covered by the term 'scapegoat' are connected chiefly with Athens and the festival of the Thargelia, held on the 6th and 7th of the month Thargelion (May–June).[1] Originally and essentially a festival of thanksgiving for the early harvest, or at any rate agrarian in origin and scope, the Thargelia in historical times included also certain ceremonies of purification and perhaps of expiation, connected with the Pharmakoi (*Φαρμακοί*)[2] hereafter described. Those ceremonies themselves were perhaps originally agrarian, though their original character had become obscured and in a sense moralized. The two elements, or strains of ritual, whether or not springing from the same agrarian stock, were kept so far distinct as to fall on separate days. On the 6th, after sacrifice of a ram to Demeter Chloe ('of green things') on the Akropolis, the city was 'cleansed' by the procession, expulsion, and perhaps ultimate stoning and burning, of the Pharmakoi; on the 7th cereal offerings of various kinds were brought to Apollo, these *θαργήλια*, 'firstfruits,' giving their name to the whole series of celebrations.

The earliest connected account of this ritual of cleansing is given by Istros (3rd cent. B.C.). He says:

'At Athens they used to lead forth (*ἐξάγον*, perhaps a ritual term) two men to be purifications for the city (*καθάρσια τῆς πόλεως*) at the Thargelia, one for the men, and the other for the women.'[1]

Then he gives a legend of a certain Pharmakos, who, having stolen libation-cups from Apollo's temple, was caught and stoned to death by the

[1] The Thargelia is known only as an Ionian festival; likewise a month Thargelion is not found in the calendars of Dorian or Æolian cities. For a definition of the word see A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen*, p. 480. For the dates cf. Plut. *Symp.* viii. 1. 1 f., who says that Plato was born at the time of the Thargelia in Athens, and on the 7th of Thargelion, which was also the birthday of Apollo, according to the Delian legend (Diog. Laert. iii. 2). Sokrates was born on the 6th of Thargelion (the birthday of Artemis), 'when the Athenians purify the city' (*ib.* ii. 44—doubtless alluding to the Pharmakos ceremony).

[2] *Φαρμᾰκός* in Attic, but *φάρμᾰκος* in Ionic Greek, as always in Hipponax (cf. frag. *ap.* J. Tzetzes, *Chiliades*, ed. Th. Kiessling, Leipzig, 1826, bk. v. p. 726 f.: *φάρμακος ἀχθεὶς ἑπτάκις βαπισθείη*); see O. Hoffmann, *Die griech. Dialekte*, Göttingen, 1898, iii. 136, 316.

[1] See Harpokrat. *s.v.* *Φαρμακός*; cf. Hesych. *s.v.* *Φαρμακοί· καθαρτήριοι, περικαθαίροντες τὰς πόλεις ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή*, where the last words may be due to misunderstanding. But apparent parallels (*e.g.*, Paus. VII. xix. 2 f.) would suggest that sometimes a woman really may have been among the victims

'companions of Achilles'; of this the ceremony at the Thargelia was, he says, an 'imitation' (*ἀπομιμήματα*).[1] Hence it would appear that at the Thargelia two unfortunates were actually stoned to death, or that at least a show was made of stoning them, as the concluding act of a ritual procession. An earlier allusion to the Pharmakoi, in the speech, attributed to Lysias, against Andokides for impiety (date, 399 B.C.), contains no direct statement as to their violent death; but this may be due to the speaker's wish to confine himself to ritual terms—which of course may mean much more than they say.[2] Nor is the ultimate fate of the Pharmakoi made any clearer in the account of Helladios (3rd cent. A.D.),[3] who tells us that it was the custom in Athens to lead in procession two Pharmakoi with a view to purification (*πρὸς καθαρμὸν ἀγομένους*), the one intended for the men having a string of black figs about his neck, while the one intended for the women wore white figs; they were also called by the mysterious title *Συβάκχοι*. He adds that this ceremony was meant to ward off plague, and gives a legend of the usual type to account for it.[4]

Only the very latest authorities assert in so many words that the Pharmakoi were slain.[5] Of these latest accounts the most detailed is that given by Tzetzes (A.D. 1150).[6] He says:

'The Pharmakos was a purification of this sort of old. If by God's wrath a visitation fell upon a community—famine or pestilence or other ill—they led forth to sacrifice the ugliest of them all for a cleansing and medicine for the suffering city.[7] And, setting the sacrifice in the fit place, they gave him cheese in his hand, and barley-cake and figs; and, having smitten him seven times on his genitals with squills, wild figs, and other wild things, they finally burned him with fire, with faggots of forest trees, and the ashes they scattered to the sea and the winds, a purification of the suffering city.'

Tzetzes proceeds to quote illustrative extracts from the Iambic poet Hipponax of Ephesos (540 B.C.), who is thus embodied as our earliest authority in our latest. Hipponax writes as he does by way of pointing insult at his enemy Boupalos,[8] expressing the hope that Boupalos may share the fate of a Pharmakos; he is alluding to a familiar ritual in vogue either at Ephesos or at Kolophon. It is quite perverse to say that his phrases are 'all comic or rhetorical curses' invoking 'an obsolete and imaginative punishment' on his victim.[9]

It seems, then, that both in the cities of Ionia and in Athens, at some time or other, there was consummated, either annually or at intervals, a ritual man-slaying of human sacrifice, *i.e.* a public religious rite involving and centring in the taking of human life, apparently by stoning. 'In the history of religion there are many strange contradictions; and the bondage of ancient ritual is often stronger than the strongest civilizing instinct of the most progressive race.'[1] It is obvious that the establishment of this as a fact for Athens would gravely affect our general view of Attic culture. To dispute the applicability of the term 'sacrifice' here (as, *e.g.*, Harrison, *Prolog.*[2] p. 108: 'it was not really a sacrifice in our modern sense at all . . . not a sacrifice in the sense of an offering *made to appease an angry God*') seems to the present writer to be quite beside the mark. Who can say what exactly was the mental attitude of the participants in the ritual? Yet upon that question the definition must ultimately turn. For us the real point is simply this—Was human life annually taken, at Athens, as part of public State ritual? No 'misunderstanding of the gist of the ceremony' (*ib.*) can be invoked to defeat this question of fact or to cloud the issue. Whether the evidence is sufficient in amount and quality to enable us to answer it one way or the other is, of course, an entirely different matter.

That at some time in the history of Attica sacrifice of human victims at the Thargelia was in vogue as an element of the national religious cycle is beyond serious dispute. Whether the practice survived as a periodical rite as late as the 5th cent. B.C. is a question generally answered upon purely subjective grounds by appeal to *a priori* ideas of what is appropriate to Periclean Athens, rather than in the light of the facts of tradition, *i.e.* the extant literary evidence. Consequently, neither this nor the general phenomenon of human sacrifice in Greece at large in historical times is treated very honestly; so that it seems necessary here to review the salient facts.

Recorded instance of the offering of human life in Athens belongs to the time when Epimenides was 'purifying Attica by human blood'[2] after the Kylonean massacre, and a youth named Kratinos voluntarily gave himself for his country (*ὑπὲρ τῆς θρεψαμένης*); his friend Aristodemos 'also devoted himself to death, and so the calamities of the land were stayed.'[3] Again, just before the battle of Salamis, three Persian prisoners of high rank, nephews of Xerxes himself, were brought to Themistokles, and the prophet Euphrantides 'bade him sacrifice them all to Dionysos Omestes (Cannibal), for so would there be deliverance and victory for Greece. Themistokles was horrified at the prophet's strange and monstrous pronouncement; but, as is generally the case in great crises and times of difficulty, the multitude, pinning its faith to irrational rather than rational methods, invoked the god with one voice, and bringing the captives to the altar insisted upon the sacrifice being consummated as the prophet had directed.'[4]

That 'in the fifth century, such sacrifices, even as a desperate expedient in great danger, revolted Attic feeling, of which we can take Æschylus and Euripides as safe interpreters,'[5] is a dictum somewhat hard to reconcile with the surprising frequency with which Euripides avails himself of just this motive of the bloody sacrifice of a noble youth or maiden—once at least apparently quite gratuitously[6]—and still harder to reconcile with the repeated deliberate and official acts of cold-blooded ferocity which stain the pages of Athenian history during that century.[7] When Plutarch, in his account of the battle of Leuktra, describes the searchings of heart of the leaders of the Theban army (371 B.C.), by reason of the vision of

[1] The term *ἀπομίμηματα* can mean (1) a 'reproduction,' death-scene and all; (2) a 'make-believe' or piece of play-acting. Nothing can fairly be based upon its use here, by asserting the one sense to the exclusion of the other.

[2] Lysias, vi. 108: *νῦν οὖν χρὴ νομίζειν τιμωρουμένους καὶ ἀπαλλαττομένους Ἀνδοκίδου τὴν πόλιν καθαίρειν καὶ ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι καὶ φαρμακὸν ἀποπέμπειν καὶ ἀλιτηρίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τούτων οὐτός ἐστιν.* The speech, though perhaps not by Lysias, is by a contemporary. The passage quoted is described by G. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*[3], p. 327, as 'comic abuse'!

[3] See Phot. *Bibl.* p. 534.

[4] Phot. *Bibl.* 279, p. 534, Bekk.: *τὸ δὲ καθάρσιον τοῦτο γοιμικῶν νόσων ἀποτροπιασμὸς ἦν, λαβὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Ἀνδρόγεω τοῦ Κρητός, οὗ τεθνηκότος ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις παρανόμως τὴν λοιμικὴν ἐνόσησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νόσον, καὶ ἐκράτει τὸ ἔθος ἀεὶ καθαίρειν τὴν πόλιν τοῖς φαρμακοῖς.*

[5] Cf. Suid. ii. 2, p. 1423: *φαρμακοὺς τοὺς δημοσίᾳ τρεφομένους, οἳ ἐκάθαιρον τὰς πόλεις τῷ ἑαυτῶν φόνῳ.*

[6] *Chiliad.* v. 726 f.

[7] *τῶν πάντων ἀμορφότερον ἄγων ὡς πρὸς θυσίαν | εἰς καθαρμὸν καὶ φάρμακον πόλεως τῆς νοσούσης.* The phrase *ὡς πρὸς θυσίαν* indicates the purpose in the mind; it does not mean 'as if for sacrifice.' During the ceremony a certain special strain was played on the flutes (cf. Hesych. *s.v.* Κραδίης *νόμος· νόμον τινὰ ἐπαυλοῦσι τοῖς ἐκπεμπομένοις φαρμακοῖς, κράδαις καὶ θρίοις ἐπιραβδιζομένοις*).

[8] Hipponax, therefore, is the progenitor of the use of the word *φαρμακός* as, like its equivalent *κάθαρμα*, 'offscouring,' a current term of abuse and contempt in Attic Greek; cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 732: *οἷσιν ἡ πόλις πρὸ τοῦ | οὐδὲ φαρμακοῖσιν εἰκῇ ῥᾳδίως ἐχρήσατ' ἄν*, and *Eq.* 1405. These usages throw no light upon the ritual.

[9] Murray, p. 327.

[1] *CGS* iv. 275.

[2] Athen. *Deipn.* xiii. 78.

[3] Diog. Laert. i. 110 has a somewhat different account: *οἱ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν* (*sc.* Epimenides) *τοῦ λοιμοῦ τὸ Κυλώνειον ἄγος, σημαίνοντα τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποθανεῖν δύο νεανίας, Κρατῖνον καὶ Κτησίβιον, καὶ λυθῆναι τὴν συμφοράν.* That the sacrifice was voluntary (according to the account given by Athenæus) does not alter its character; theoretically, every victim was supposed to offer itself willingly.

[4] Plut. *Themist.* 13, *Arist.* 9, *Pelopid.* 21. This narrative, Plutarch observes, is from Phanias (Phainias) of Lesbos, 'a man not unversed in letters and philosophy.' The general modern attitude towards it is reflected by Grote, who remarks (*Hist. of Greece*, new ed., London, 1884, iv. 479) that 'it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting it.' The incident is, on the contrary, as well vouched for as almost any detail in Greek history that depends upon purely literary authority. Cf. the burying alive in the Forum Boarium at Rome, after the battle of Cannæ, of a 'Gallus et Galla, Graecus et Graeca' (Livy, xxii. 57), and the sacrifice of 300 prisoners to Zeus Ithomatas by Aristomenes (Clem. Alex. *Protrep.* 36).

[5] *CGS* iv. 277.

[6] *E.g.*, Makaria (*Herakleid.*); Iphigeneia (*Iph. in Aul.*); Ohthonia (*Erechth.*); Polyxena (*Hec.*); Menoikeus (*Phœn.*). It is possible that the sacrifice of Makaria was the poet's own invention, independent of tradition; cf. A. Lang, *The World of Homer*, London, 1910, p. 210: 'This enables him to please an Ionian audience by introducing their favourite incident, the sacrifice of a princess: Attic traditions harp eternally on this un-Homeric horror' (speaking of the poet of the *Cypria*), and p. 211: 'the Ionian author of the *Cypria* cannot deny himself an allusion to human sacrifice'; see also p. 279.

[7] *E.g.*, Ægina (Thuc. ii. 27, iv. 57); Skione (*ib.* v. 32); Melos (*ib.* v. 116). The sole example of compunction and mercy, that in regard to Mitylene (*ib.* iii. 36), is dealt with at remarkable length by Thucydides precisely because of its rarity.

Pelopidas, which seemed to point to the sacrifice of an 'auburn virgin' as the price of victory, that will prove nothing for Athens, but at best is evidence only for the culture of Pelopidas himself and certain of his colleagues.[1] In the dialogue *Minos*, attributed to Plato, the speaker declares that human sacrifice is in vogue among barbarians, but is considered 'illegal and unholy' by the Greeks[2]—though he is fain to confess that it still survived on Mt. Lykaion and at Halos in Thessaly.[3] When Æschylus calls human sacrifice ἄνομος,[4] or Euripides calls it οὐχ ὅσιος,[5] that proves little enough for average Greek sentiment at normal temperature and nothing at all for Greek practice at fever heat. For 'it is a marked feature of the evolution of Greek religion that the lower and more embryonic forms of faith survive through the ages by the side of the higher and more developed.'[6]

It is clear enough that, in the popular conception, the gods were little more than the bestowers of physical and material goods, the guardians of herds, of crops, and of human increase, and that the primary purpose of worship lay in the mere instinct of social preservation. The higher thought which found literary expression moves upon a plane widely removed from the conceptions and religious practices of the people as a whole. In some respects, indeed, the religious history of the time exhibits obvious symptoms of retrogression and a resurgence here and there of what may be called the underlying primeval religious magma; *e.g.*, it is only in the 3rd cent. B.C. that we get the extended use of magic tablets, the so-called *Defixionum Tabellæ*, or leaden plates of spells or curses, by means of which the life of a man's enemy was devoted to destruction by nailing down his name.[7]

We may agree, therefore, with the conclusion that 'such sacrifices may have survived in the Greek world sporadically,[8] or as an expedient in a great crisis, far on into the Hellenistic period,'[9] and even later;[10] but we must repudiate the demand that by one means or another the Athenians must be certificated as having emancipated themselves from such practices a long time in advance of the rest of the Greeks.[11] It is at any rate impossible to pitch upon any particular date as marking the time after which a literal performance of the Pharmakos rite is unthinkable for Athens; certainly such date would not fall within the 5th century B.C. The fate of the six generals who saved Athens at Arginusai (406 B.C.), only to be swept to their doom by the 'burst of mournful and vindictive feeling'[1] following the Apatouria festival, on the part of a people which cried out that it was 'monstrous if the Demos shall not be allowed to do as it likes,' is a measure of what in moments of excitement the Athenian populace was capable of doing.[2]

There is ground for drawing a distinction between what may be called the normal annual ritual of the Pharmakos and exceptional occasions of its use. Neglect or ignorance of this distinction has affected the ancient accounts, as is apparent in the two versions of the scapegoat ritual in use at Massilia (a colony of Phokaia). According to Lactantius, a pauper was induced to 'sell' himself for the purpose, and, having been fed at public cost a full year upon specially selected diet, was, on a great day, conducted through the town and finally stoned to death by the people, outside the walls.[3] The account of Servius, copied from Petronius, represents the ceremony, not as an annual lustration, but as exceptionally used in time of plague.[4] So Tzetzes, whether it be the Athenian rite that he has in mind or only that of the Ionian cities, speaks of it as occasional and as applied in times of plague, famine, or other visitation.[6] Similarly the schol. on Aristoph. *Eq.* 1136 says:

'The Athenians used to feed up certain very ill-favoured and worthless creatures, and in time of national calamity—pestilence, I mean, or such like—used to sacrifice them, by way of getting cleansed from the defilement.'[6]

It seems that the divergence here noted may be best explained by supposing that, apart from the regular annual purification, extraordinary occasions of public calamity, especially of plague or famine, may have led to repetitions of the ceremony or to its performance at the due date with special solemnity—that is to say, with a reversion for the nonce to the full primitive savage ritual which in normal times was replaced by a fiction or simulation, as is so frequent in the history of religious practice.[7] Such recrudescence of primitive barbarism is a familiar phenomenon.[8]

[1] Plut. *Pelop.* 21; Polyæn. ii. 3. 8. The solution of the dilemma by the apparition of the mare and chestnut filly was, of course, a happy thought on the part of Pelopidas and his prophet Theokritos. The arguments purporting to be those of the Theban war council are an invention of the amiable and humane Plutarch himself (though Murray, p. 331, seems to regard the narrative as an authentic record of what actually passed). The story is rather different in Plut. *Amat. Narr.* 3.

[2] See § 315 C: ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν, ἀλλ' ἀνόσιον . . . καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἄλλοις νόμοις χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀυκαίᾳ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἐκγονοποίας θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες. Cf. Plut. *Quæst. gr.* 38 (Orchomenos).

[3] Cf. Plut. *Quæst. gr.* 39; Paus. VIII. xxxviii. 7: πολυπραγμονήσαι δὲ οὔ μοι τὰ ἐς τὴν θυσίαν ἠδὺ ἦν, ἐχέτω δὲ ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἔσχεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς—the reluctance of Pausanias to speak of it seems to indicate that the sacrifice was still in vogue in his day (*c.* A.D. 170). For Halos see Herod. vii. 197, where note the expression καθαρμὸν τῆς χώρης ποιευμένων Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ θεοπροπίου Ἀθάμαντα τὸν Αἰόλου καὶ μελλόντων μυθύειν. It seems fairly clear (though Farnell [*CGS* i. 94] is doubtful) that this sacrifice, without any pretence, was in vogue in 480 B.C., or at any rate that Herodotus thought so.

[4] *Agam.* 158. [5] *Iph. in Taur.* 466.

[6] L. R. Farnell, *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, London, 1912, p. 5.

[7] For specimens see E. S. Roberts and E. A. Gardner, *Introd. to Greek Epigraphy*, Cambridge, 1887–1905, ii. 520. The oldest and most numerous of these plates come from Attica. The Greek term from these *Diræ* is κατάδεσμοι.

[8] Unless he is simply copying some older authority, we learn from Ovid that in his time the old rite in all its naked horror was still annually observed at Abdera (a colony of Klazomenai) —*Ibis*, 467: 'Aut te devoveat certis Abdera diebus, | Saxaque devotum grandine plura petant,' on which the schol. says: 'Mos erat in Abdera civitate singulis annis homines immolari pro peccatis civium, sed prius septem diebus excommunicari, ut sic omnium peccata solus haberet.' Cf. Strabo, p. 683 (of a promontory near Kourion in Cyprus): ἀφ' ἧς ῥίπτουσι τοὺς ἀψαμένους τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος—apparently a similar ritual then still in use.

[9] *CGS* iv. 277.

[10] Cf. Lactant. *de Div. Inst.* i. 21: 'apud Cyprios humanam hostiam Jovi Teucrus immolavit, idque sacrificium posteris tradidit, quod est nuper, Hadriano imperante, sublatum'; and cf. Paus. VIII. xxxviii. 7 (quoted above).

[11] Cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[4], Tübingen, 1907, ii. 78, note 2: 'Gegen die bestimmten Zeugnisse können Erwägungen allgemeiner Art nichts ausrichten'; cf. Murray, p. 31: 'Practices that to us seem like the scarce credible stories of a remote past were to the fifth-century Athenian possibilities and even dangers.'

[1] Grote, vii. 437.

[2] Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 12: τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται. Cf. Grote, vii. 449: '"Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout"—the same words, understood in a far more awful sense . . . sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.'

[3] Lact. Plac. *Comment. in Stat. Theb.* x. 793: 'Lustrare civitatem humana hostia Gallicus mos est. Nam aliquis de egentissimis proiiciebatur praemiis, ut se ad hoc venderet, qui anno toto publicis sumptibus alebatur purioribus cibis, denique certo et sollemni die per totam civitatem ductus ex urbe extra pomeria saxis occidebatur a populo.'

[4] Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 57: 'Nam Massilienses quotiens pestilentia laborabant, unus se ex pauperibus offerebat alendus anno integro publicis sumptibus et purioribus cibis. Hic postea ornatus verbenis et vestibus sacris circumducebatur per totam civitatem cum execrationibus, ut in ipsum reciderent mala totius civitatis, et sic proiiciebatur (praecipitabatur, *Stephanus*): hoc autem in Petronio lectum est.' The terms *quotiens* and *anno integro* are clearly mutually irreconcilable.

[6] *Chiliad.* v. 726 *f.*: εἰτ' οὖν λιμὸς εἴτε λοιμὸς εἴτε καὶ βλάβος ἄλλο.

[6] ἔτρεφον γάρ τινας Ἀθηναῖοι λίαν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀχρήστους, καὶ ἐν καιρῷ συμφορᾶς τινος ἐπελθούσης τῇ πόλει, λοιμοῦ λέγω ἢ τοιούτου τινός, ἔθυον τούτους ἕνεκα τοῦ καθαρθῆναι τοῦ μιάσματος· οὓς καὶ ἐπωνόμαζον καθάρματα.

[7] Cf. Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* ii. 116: 'sciendum in sacris simulata pro veris accipi.'

[8] Cf. *CGS* ii. 442: 'Where the view prevailed that the animal took the place of the human life, we can believe that in times of great peril the latter might actually be offered as the more real and acceptable sacrifice'; G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 52: 'Like most manifestations of early religion, they (the Oracles) throve upon human terror: the more blind the terror the stronger became their hold. In such an atmosphere the lowest and most beastlike elements of humanity tended to come to the front; and religion no doubt as a rule joined with them in drowning the voice of criticism and of civilization, that is, of reason and of mercy. When really frightened the oracle generally fell back on some remedy full of pain and blood.' Cf Plut. *Quæst. gr.* 26: the Ainaines, when they lived in the Cirrhaian plain, stoned their king to death in time of drought, in obedience to an oracle, no doubt that of Delphi.

This would help to explain the peculiarity that the Athenian ceremony is never described as one belonging to a remote prehistoric past, as a piece of barbarism later eradicated, or at least ameliorated, under conditions which formed the matter of a sacred story, such as that told about Artemis Triklaria at Patrai,[1] or Artemis of Brauron, upon which Euripides wrote a play. We could still imagine that such amelioration, as the outcome of a slowly developing sense of humanity and justice, did come about as a matter of use and wont under normal circumstances. It is to be remembered, however, that the Greek communities—and this is true of them not merely in the political sense—were ever in a condition of unstable equilibrium. How easily these old horrors could blaze up afresh is well illustrated by the way in which Apollonios of Tyana hounded on the populace of Ephesos to stone to death an old blear-eyed beggar, making out that he was the embodied plague-demon which vexed the city.[2] Even in Athens in the 5th cent. B.C. it was still possible seriously to propose the expulsion of the foremost man in the State, on account of his descent from one who had been guilty of sacrilege nearly two hundred years previously.[3]

Some have thought to save, as it were, the credit of Athens by imagining that only criminals already condemned to death for their crimes were taken for the fatal rôle of the Pharmakos.[4] For this idea, as applied to Athens, there is not a particle of evidence in the tradition, which insists, characteristically, not upon the moral depravity, but upon the physical deformity, of the victims;[5] they are chosen not for their badness, but for their ugliness.

That in some places a condemned criminal was used as a Pharmakos is very true. Thus in Rhodes annually, on the 6th of their month Metageitnion, a man was sacrificed to Kronos. A criminal who had been publicly condemned to death was reserved for the anniversary of the Kronia. Then he was led outside the gates, in face of the image of Aristoboule, and was filled with wine and so slain.[6] A further development is found at Leukas. From the famous crag Leukatas the Leukadians used annually to hurl a criminal into the sea as a scapegoat. To break his fall, he was fastened about with feathers and live birds, and small boats waited below in order to pick him up, if he survived, and to carry him beyond the frontier. This took place at the time of a sacrifice to Apollo, who had a sanctuary at that spot. This was a mitigation, probably, of an earlier custom of actually drowning the scapegoat.[7] An example of still further developed amelioration of the rite was the ceremony annually performed at Chaironeia both by the chief magistrate at the Town Hall and by each head of a family in his own house, and once duly performed by Plutarch himself, who describes it.[8] It was called the 'expulsion of hunger' (*βουλίμου ἐξέλασις*), and Plutarch speaks of it as an 'ancestral sacrifice' (*θυσία πάτριος*). A slave was ceremonially beaten with rods of *agnus castus* and then driven forth with the formula: 'Out with hunger, in with wealth and health.' At Delphi the ritual, recurring every ninth year, which Plutarch characterizes as a 'sacrifice with admixture of purification,'[9] connected with the use of an image or puppet (*παιδικὸν εἴδωλον*), called after Charila, is an example of the Pharmakos ceremony in its most attenuated form.

The significance of the Pharmakos ritual was probably not so much that of vicarious piacular sacrifice—of expiation or pardon for the sins of the community at the price of a human life—as the more primitive belief that the Pharmakos was a real sin-carrier, whose death purged the community of its sins and misfortunes by virtue of magical transference in a literal and quasi-mechanical way. Combined with this, however, in the inconsistent and illogical manner characteristic of religious thought and procedure, is a function of the Pharmakos in which he acts as an incarnation of the vegetation-power. Hence he is decked out with fruits of the soil, and chastised with stimulating herbs and branches, and finally put to death in order to impregnate the soil with his magically fructifying ashes.[1] Possibly the sacrifice to Demeter Chloe with which the Thargelia opened at Athens on the 6th of the month indicates that originally the Pharmakos incarnated the primitive earth-goddess, who once demanded human victims in Greece, and to whom the cereal offerings of the Thargelia perhaps belonged before Apollo came on the scene. It has also been suggested that the human victims at the Thargelia more particularly masqueraded as spirits of fig-trees, and that the strings of black and white figs hung about their necks were an imitation of the process of caprification or artificial fertilization of cultivated fig-trees by hanging strips of wild figs among the branches.[2] The ceremony, as regards this detail, was therefore one of imitative magic, to assist the fertilization of the fig-trees.[3]

LITERATURE.—V. Stengel, 'Die angeblichen Menschenopfer bei der Thargelien in Athen,' in *Hermes*, xxii. [1887] 86 f.; J. Toepffer, 'Thargeliengebräuche,' in *Rheinisches Museum*, xliii. [1888] 142 f. (repub. in *Beiträge zur griech. Altertumswiss.*, Berlin, 1897); A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum*, Leipzig, 1898; M. P. Nilsson, *Griech. Feste von religiöser Bedeutung*, do. 1906; *CGS*, Oxford, 1907, iv.; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908; G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[2], Oxford, 1911 (Appendix A); *GB*[3], pt. vi. *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913; F. Schwenn, *Die Menschenopfer bei den Griechen und Römern* (*RVV*, vol. xv. pt. 3), Giessen, n.d. [1918?].

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SCAPEGOAT (Semitic).—In the Pentateuch (Lv 16) it is stated that on the day of expiation Aaron, the high-priest, was commanded to enter the sanctuary after purifying himself and putting on the sacred vestments. Two goats were chosen as a sacrifice for sin, a young bullock for a sin-offering, and a ram for a burnt-offering. The two goats were placed before Jahweh at the entrance of the tabernacle. The high-priest cast lots upon the two goats, one lot for Jahweh and the other for the scapegoat, which was allotted to the demon Azazel (*q.v.*). The goat upon which the lot for Jahweh fell was sacrificed at once as a sin-offering along with the bullock and the ram. The high-priest, placing his hands on the head of the living goat, confessed over it all the sins of Israel, which were in this manner transmitted to the animal. A special messenger was deputed to lead away the goat into the desert, where it was abandoned to the demon Azazel. Both the high-priest and the

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[1] Paus. VII. xix. 2. [2] Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* iv. 10 f.
[3] Thuc. i. 127; cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 445.
[4] Cf. *CGS* ii. 439: 'Two human *καθάρματα*, being probably criminals, were sacrificed in a sort of religious execution.' This was written in 1896. In 1907 (*ib.* iv. 276) Farnell rightly sees that 'we cannot apologize for them [the contemporaries of Perikles and Demosthenes] by saying that, like the Rhodians, they reserved their worst criminals for this fate and merely condemned to a religious death those who deserved a secular.' See also Harrison, p. 104: 'Civilized Athens had its barathron: why should civilized Athens shrink from annually utilizing two vicious and already condemned criminals to "purify the city"?'
[5] Cf. Tzetzes, *Chiliad.* v. 726 f.: *τῶν μάντων ἀμορφότερον ἦγον*; schol. in Aristoph. *Eq.* 1136: *λίαν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀχρήστους*; schol. in Aristoph. *Ran.* 733: *τοὺς φαύλους καὶ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιβουλευομένους*, 'victims of nature's malice.' At Massilia the scapegoat, being 'aliquis de egentissimis (unus ex pauperibus),' was clearly not necessarily a condemned criminal.
[6] Porphyr. *de Abstin.* ii. 54: *ἐθύετο . . . ἄνθρωπος τῷ Κρόνῳ. ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ πολὺ κρατήσαν ἔθος μετεβλήθη· ἕνα γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ δημοσίᾳ κατακριθέντων μέχρι μὲν τῶν Κρονίων συνεῖχον, ἐνστάσης δὲ τῆς ἑορτῆς προαγαγόντες τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔξω πυλῶν ἄντικρυς τοῦ Ἀριστοβουλίης ἔδουσ, οἶνου ποτίσαντες ἔσφαττον.* Aristoboule is probably Artemis. What happened if there was no convenient criminal? Were there Rhodian analogues to the argument used to Athenian juries in order to secure a conviction? (cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 1359 f.; Lysias, xxvii. 1).
[7] Strabo, p. 452: *ἦν δὲ καὶ πάτριον τοῖς Λευκαδίοις κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τῇ θυσίᾳ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἀπὸ τῆς σκοπῆς ῥιπτεισθαί τινα τῶν ἐν αἰτίαις ὄντων ἀποτροπῆς χάριν, κτλ.* Cf. the custom elsewhere of throwing every year a young man into the sea, with the words, 'Be thou our offscouring' (*περίψημα ἡμῶν γενοῦ*); see Suid. and Phot. *s.v.* Περίψημα (locality not given). The word *περίψημα* occurs in 1 Co 4[13]: *ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν, πάντων περίψημα*, where it is rendered 'offscouring' in AV and RV.
[8] *Quæst. Conv.* vi. 8.
[9] *Quæst. gr.* 12: *μεμιγμένην τινὰ καθαρμῷ θυσίαν.*

[1] Hence Farnell (*CGS* iv. 281) would explain the ætiological legend given by Istros, of the stealing of Apollo's cups by Pharmakos and his atoning, as an indication that the Pharmakos (perhaps in some of the Ionian cities) was, previous to his immolation, treated as an incarnation of the god and carried his emblems. The story of the ugly Æsop, who was accused of stealing temple treasures at Delphi, and was thrown from the rock Hyampeia (Plut. 557b), will probably be a reflex of the same ritual.
[2] 'Though it must be confessed,' remarks Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vi. *The Scapegoat*, p. 259, 'that the ancient writers who describe the Greek custom appear to regard it merely as a purification of the city and not at all as a mode of fertilizing fig-trees.'
[3] See W. R. Paton, 'The *φαρμακοί* and the Story of the Fall,' in *RA*, 4th ser., ix. [1907] 55 f.

person whose duty it was to lead away the scapegoat were enjoined to purify themselves after the rite of transmission. It is interesting to note in this connexion that a similar usage was followed with birds at the purification of a leper. If the leprous pustules had disappeared from the patient, the priest took two birds, one of which was killed and its blood poured into a vessel over running water. The patient was sprinkled with the blood of the dead bird. The living bird, however, after being soaked in the blood of the dead bird and in this manner infected with the disease, was set at liberty 'out of the city into the open fields' (Lv 14[53]).

It should be noted in connexion with the symptoms of leprosy that the disappearance of the pustules is very common at the beginning of the malady. The initial hyperæmia tends to diminish and to remain latent until the ultimate attack of the leprous fever—sometimes a year later than the first appearance—when the pustules reappear more violently than in the first stages of the disease. It is probable that this fact was not known to the ancient Hebrews, and that they regarded the frequently long disappearance of the leprous symptoms as the result of the rites just described. The subsequent development of the disease was no doubt looked upon as a fresh attack.

These species of transmission rites were not confined to the Semitic peoples. The western Irish still believe, *e.g.*, that whooping-cough may be diverted by passing the patient three times under the belly of an ass, and that certain fevers may be cured by carrying the patient three times round a special kind of tree. In these instances, of course, the triple repetition is due to the belief in the Trinity, in whose name the act is always done.[1] The disease in each case is thought to be transmitted from the patient to the ass or to the tree. In the same way, children with measles or scarlet fever are often given a kitten to play with, in the belief that the animal will contract the malady and thus remove it from the sufferer.

That sin and disease were closely allied in the minds of the ancient Semites has been fully shown in the artt. GOD (Assyro-Babylonian) and DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Assyro-Babylonian), so that the parallel seems to be perfect between the Semitic ideas of transmission and those of the Celtic Irish. Such a natural primitive conception, however, does not imply any connexion between peoples of such different origin who may have held it.

A highly interesting question as to the existence of a rite similar to that of the scapegoat among the Assyro-Babylonians has been discussed technically by the present writer in several articles.[2]

The following inscription seems to indicate a belief in a species of transmission rite:

'Ea, the king of the abyss, speaks to his son Marduk: Go my son Marduk. The plague has seized the man. Take thou the *máš-ġul-dub-ba*. Place its head upon his head. Chase the plague from the presence of the king, the son of his god [=the patient]. May his saliva run freely in his mouth. May this king be clean; may he be without spot. The man shall no longer know the plague. May it go forth from his body.'[3]

The expression *máš-ġul-dub-ba* really means 'the horned animal which alleviates pain' and seems to point to a belief that a living scapegoat was actually employed in very much the same manner as appears in the Hebrew sources. The idea that the *máš-ġul-dub-ba* was a living animal has been called in question by Fossey,[4] who adduces certain passages which we may now cite.

In Zimmern's *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, Leipzig, 1896–1901, p. 122, the following interesting passage appears:

'Then with clean purifications thou shalt purify the king. As soon as thou shalt have finished the purification, thou shalt make them [the patients] go forth out of the door. Then with the *máš-xuldupp*ú, with the *máš-gibilá*, with the sheep of life, with the copper of strength, with the skin of the great bull, and with seed-corn thou shalt cleanse the palace [=the house].'

Here it will be noted that the patients are brought out of the house and the dwelling is purified by various means, among which the *máš-xuldupp*ú and the *lu-ti-la*, 'the sheep of life,' or perhaps 'the living sheep,' play the principal part. It is certainly significant to find the *máš*, or animal, of the torch mentioned among these means of purification, as flame was a recognized purifying agent. We are forced to conclude, owing to the presence of the Sumerian word *máš*, 'a horned animal,' that all these words were originally names of certain kinds of horned animals which were primitively used in a ceremony like that of the Hebrew scapegoat. When, therefore, we read the phrase cited above, 'place its head [that of the *máš-ġul-dub-ba*] on the patient's head,' the conclusion seems unavoidable that this was distinctly a ceremony of transmission. A strikingly analogous passage in IV. Rawl. 26, no. 6, 22 ff. is too significant to be ignored:

'The *uriçu* [a sort of horned animal] has been given for his [the patient's] life; the head of the *uriçu* has been given for the head of the man; the neck of the *uriçu* has been given for the neck of the man; the breast of the *uriçu* has been given for the breast of the man.'

This passage plainly shows that an *uriçu* (probably =*máš*, 'horned animal') might serve vicariously for the life of a man, and the parts of the animal are enumerated one by one with the corresponding parts of the man.

An important point in this connexion is now to be observed. Fossey compared the Sumerian word *máš-ġul-dub-ba* (=Semitic *máš-xuldupp*ú) with *giš-xul-dub-ba*, which occurs in another passage, undoubtedly as the name of an implement probably used in a purification ceremony. This *giš-xul-dub-ba* is not the *máš-ġul-dub-ba*, although it may have been used in the same manner. A flood of light is thrown upon the difficulty by the passage in IV. Rawl. 21, no. 1, 28–28, an inscription giving directions how to avert evil, which reads: 'in order to avert anything evil, the *máš-ġul-dub-ba* is set up in the door-way.' Here is the key to the whole difficulty. In this passage and in the passage just cited from Zimmern the *máš-ġul-dub-ba* is an image of the original horned animal which alleviates pain and is probably identical with the *uriçu* whose parts were to correspond with the parts of the patient and whose life was given for the life of the man. Zimmern's 'living sheep' or 'sheep of life' was probably an image of the same sort.

In other words, the appearance of the *máš-ġul-dub-ba* in Zimmern as a probable implement of purification is merely a development of the original force of the *máš-ġul-dub-ba* seen in the passage in Haupt, no. 12, p. 30 ff. In the primitive rite the horned animal was a live creature endowed with malevolent powers. It might, however, by the use of the proper incantations, be made to carry away disease. This was done, in the one instance, by driving away the evil influence from the patient and, in the other case, by first bringing it into contact with the patient and then driving it away. It may be supposed that in the course of time the practical difficulty of procuring a live animal for the ceremony gave rise to the use of an image of the original animal which was employed ritually in the manner just indicated. In short, the horned animals were malevolent in so far as they represented disease, but might be turned to a benevolent use by the power of the incantation for their expulsion. Hence the pregnant expression arose, *máš-ġul-dub-ba*='the horned animal which assuages evil or pain.'

A further instance of transmission among the Babylonians is seen in the following passage:

[1] The usual formula after the invocation is: 'Good-morning to you boar-tree bush, Good-morning to you. I come for to leave the heart-fever with you.'

[2] *JAOS* xxi. [1900] 1–22; *JA*, July 1903, pp. 133–156, with contradictory notes by C. Fossey, the reply to which is published in *AJSL* xx. [1904] 173–181.

[3] Paul Haupt, *Akkadische und Sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1881–82, no. 12, lines 34–43.

[4] *JA*, July 1903, p. 143, note 2.

'Place the gazelle which ranges the plain before Shamash [the sun-god]. Give the bow to the king, the son of his god [the patient]. When he shall go forth from the house of purification, let him kill the gazelle before Shamash. When the king draws the bow against the gazelle, may the fatal affliction . . . the impure malady, the sorcery, everything which causes evil, every ailment which at the rising of the sun was in his body go far forth from his body like the flight of the arrow.'[1]

To sum up on this point, the facts relating to the transmission rites among the Assyro-Babylonians are as follows. The inscriptions in Haupt, no. 12, deal most plainly with the destruction and expulsion of certain horned creatures which are equivalent in effect to the evil demons. They are sent forth to an unclean place. Then follows the inscription of the *máš-ǵul-dub-ba*, which is to be sought by Marduk and its head placed against the head of the patient, after which the patient is to recover. Then follows the reverse, describing the bowshot which shoots away into the gazelle the malady of the patient. How are we to conclude otherwise than to suppose that the Babylonians, like the Hebrews, had a well-defined transmission ceremony similar to the Biblical rite described above?

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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SCARABS.—The scarab is one of the most characteristic productions of ancient Egyptian art, and one of the best-known. Scarabs take much the same place in the art of Egypt as coins do in the art of Greece or as the *netsuké* and the *tsuba* (sword-guard) do in that of Japan. We cannot, it is true, claim exactly the same specialized position for the study of the scarab as we can for that of the coin, but nevertheless the two are analogous. Egypt had no coinage, and her artists found in the fabrication and decoration of the scarab the same scope for the exercise of their ingenuity and felicity of design in 'small art' as the Greek and the modern do in their coin or the Japanese in his *netsuké* and *tsuba*. The scarab has a further, a religious, interest. Its religious signification makes it as important a relic of Egyptian religion as it is of art. And, like the coin, though not to so great an extent, it has a historical value.

Stated simply, the scarab is, properly speaking, a seal made in the form of a certain religious amulet, the figure of the sacred beetle, or *scarabæus*, the *Ateuchus sacer*,[2] as entomologists call it. But by no means every scarab was a seal. It was only during the second period of the development of the scarab that most specimens were intended to be seals as well as amulets. Later it became, as it was originally, almost invariably an amulet only, but still retained in most cases the old seal-base, with its inscription or design like that of a seal. Later still images of the insect pure and simple, without inscription, became common again.

Egyptian seals were not from the beginning made in the form of scarabs. It was not till the beginning of the XIIth dynasty that the fashion became general of having one's seal, in the form of the sacred beetle, strung on a ring, string, or necklace. The oldest Egyptian seals were generally, though not invariably, cylinders, meant to roll over the sealing-clay like their congeners in Babylonia and Assyria. Later, under the VIth dynasty, the 'button-seal,' a form apparently introduced from the Ægean islands and Crete, became popular, and from this was developed the scarab-seal. Actual scarab-beetles had been occasionally buried with the dead as early as the pre-dynastic period.[3] Little uninscribed images of the scarab, usually made of blue glazed steatite or of ivory, had been buried with the dead under or even before the VIth dynasty, and doubtless were worn by the living as amulets. Under the VIth dynasty the seal, in itself in some sort an amulet, since it bore the name of the owner—and all students of simple magic know how magically important his name is in the mind of primitive man[1]—became combined with this particular amulet, at any rate in the case of kings. Under the XIIth dynasty private persons chose to have their seals made in the form of the little scarab-amulet instead of the simple 'button' or rosette. Its form was convenient for the purpose: the oval base on which it stood was well-adapted for seal-design; and the name derived added protection from being inscribed on the sacred object.

1. **Popularity of the scarab.**—Under the XIIth dynasty most scarab-inscriptions are names and titles, whether royal or private, and the scarabs are real seals, of hard stone or faience, intended for use as such. When no inscription appears, the base is usually adorned with a spiral or other linear design of Ægean origin, often combined with plant motives and very beautiful, which was very soon used as a seal too for ordinary purposes when no name was necessary. These seals were worn by the living and buried with the dead. Towards the end of the Middle Kingdom, however, more purely amuletic scarabs began to appear. They bore designs of religious or semi-religious import, lucky symbols, etc., and one can see that they could be regarded as amulets only, though they were still used on occasion as seals. If amulets pure and simple, it was evident that their material need not always be so durable as that necessary for real seals; so faience and a composition ware became more common than hard stone for their fabrication under the XVIIIth dynasty. This was the time of the great manufacture of the scarab. So far it had been, if not exactly an object *de luxe* intended for the use only of kings and great persons, at any rate not a common object in the possession of everybody. But under the XVIIIth dynasty it was vulgarized. Millions of cheap scarabs were made of blue and green glazed steatite or faience, which any *fellah* could string round his neck and use as a seal, if it did not break in the process. We admire their colours now, when these have survived the centuries, and give high prices for them, but to the XVIIIth dynasty Egyptian they were the commonest objects, and probably of no more value than picture postcards are now. The present writer uses the word advisedly. The scarab was now the picture postcard of the ordinary Egyptian. If he went to some well-known shrine to pray, to some religious fair, or *mólid*, as his modern descendant would call it, he brought away his cheap memento, his picture postcard, his 'present from Margate,' in the shape of a scarab. Did he go to Karnak, he took home a scarab with an inscription on it—'Good is the coming to Epetesut'—which may almost literally be translated as 'A present from Karnak.' The virtues of the god of Karnak and Thebes are celebrated on thousands of scarabs: 'Amen is strong to help,' 'Fear not; Amen is near,' and so forth. Nor did Ptaḥ of Memphis yield in popularity to Amen, at any rate in the north; and a little later, under the XIXth dynasty, when Egyptian snobbery exalted the Memphite god, to whom the new northern dynasty was more especially bound to pray, the pilgrim could buy at Memphis as good a scarab, advertising the virtues of Ptaḥ, as he could one advertising Amen at the rival shrines of Thebes. Most of the scarabs that we have were the property of the 'man in the street.' Pos-

[1] *JA*, July 1903, p. 143, lines 14–21.

[2] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Egyptian), vol. iii. p. 432a. Scarabs were often made in the likeness of other allied species, such as *Sc. venerabilis*, and other genera such as *Catharsius*, *Copris*, *Gymnopleurus*, and *Hypselogenia* (Petrie, *Scarabs*, p. 5).

[3] Petrie, p. 2.

[1] See art. NAMES (Primitive).

sessors of fine blue scarabs with the name of Thothmes III. or Rameses II. on them are wont to believe that their treasures were once the property of the kings whose names they bear. What millions they must have possessed! A few of the scarabs in our chief collections may have been (some, from the circumstances of their discovery, are known to have been) actual royal possessions, but the old Egyptian liked to have his king's name on his scarab as much as anything else, just as the modern British person likes to have pictures of the King and Queen in his home. But, just as Queen Victoria's was a name universally venerated, and her portrait appeared among the possessions of high and low, so with the Egyptian was the name of Thothmes III. one to conjure with, and that speaking literally. Its magical virtue was obvious, and so it appeared on scarabs innumerable; it was the most popular of all scarab-inscriptions, and that not only during the king's own long life, but for centuries after his death, so that it is now the commonest of scarab legends. Almost half the royal scarabs in existence are of Thothmes III. and of one or two later kinglets who aped his throne-name 'Men-kheper-ra.' Scarabs bearing this name alone are as many in number as all those bearing the names of all the rest of the kings of Egypt. And Phœnicians, understanding nothing of its meaning, went on putting his name on the imitation scarabs which they made for the Greek and Italian market a thousand years after his death.

2. Decadence and disappearance.—It is impossible to say much more of the popular scarab of the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties, to recount any of the innumerable variations of inscription and design that are found on them: wishes for children, for a good wife or husband, glorification of gods, scenes of the king, as leader of his people, offering to the gods, and so on *ad infinitum*; the most cursory examination of any good collection in one of our museums will show their infinite variety. One of the most characteristic forms of the later XVIIIth dynasty is a picture postcard pure and simple, or rather a cheap popular medal. Thousands of this peculiar type were no doubt made; now we possess but a few specimens, which are regarded as very valuable varieties. We refer to the large scarabs of Amenhetep III., with their proclamatory inscriptions announcing his marriage with Queen Tii, his slaying of lions and wild bulls, etc. These were issued and were acquired by his loyal subjects just as a popular medal commemorating a royal marriage might be now. But all scarabs were not of course of this popular cast, and we have many beautiful specimens which were undoubtedly made for persons of taste and state, even for the royal household itself. Still, even in the best of them, the old beauty of the true seal-scarabs of the XIIth dynasty has gone, and, when we come to certain cheap scarabs of the XIXth dynasty, which were cast in a mould instead of cut or modelled by hand, we see decadence fully setting in, from which not even the manufacture of some really very pretty specimens by the archaizing artists of the XXVth and XXVIth dynasties can save the scarab. Then the Mediterranean commerce of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. took the scarab abroad into all lands: Naukratite Greeks made it in its cheapest form, and Phœnicians peddled it to Sardinian savages; the Greek artists took it up and made very beautiful Greek scarabs, with purely Greek intaglio designs, in hard stone, to be used as seals; Etruscans acquired them as part of their borrowed raiment of civilization; like Greek vases, they were 'the proper thing' to possess, and 'all the best people' in Etruria used them. And then, whether because they had become too common and the outer foreigners thought too much of them or not, they suddenly lost their charm for their originators. With the coming of the Persian the seal-scarab absolutely disappears. Under the Ptolemies stone scarabs are still made, but without the characteristic seal-base; they are amulets only, and, as one of the quaint conceits of the beast-worshippers of the Nile, they end grotesquely and pitifully under the Romans. The scarab is practically no longer made at all,[1] and the figure of the *scarabæus* appears only in company with absurd cock-headed demons wearing Roman uniform on Gnostic gems or furnishes a telling image either of reprobation or of comparison to early Christian apologists. For the religious importance of the *scarabæus* was as great as, or greater than, ever, and to this we must now return.

3. Religious importance.—What was the religious idea of the scarab? The scarab-beetle, *Ateuchus sacer*, was the emblem of Khepera or Kheperi, the self-begetting, self-creating sun-god, originally a primeval Nilote deity distinct from the sun-god, Ra, or Rē', of Heliopolis.[2] The name Kheperi means 'he who becomes (or creates),' from the verb *khoper*, 'to become (or create),' written with the scarab hieroglyph. The insect itself was called *khepror*, a form of the same word, which seems to have had also the meaning of 'rolling,' 'the roller.' The peculiar habits of the scarab-beetle seemed (as Apion, quoted by Pliny, said) to the indigenous Nilotes to typify the movement of the sun, which appeared to be rolled across the sky like the ball of dung which the beetle rolled along the ground. The beetle therefore became the emblem of the sun-god holding the solar disk, as the beetle holds his dung-ball. And, further, out of the ball of dung, according to the erroneous popular belief, came the little *scarabæi* when their time came to be born. This is an erroneous idea, because, as the great French naturalist, J. Henri Fabre, has shown,[3] the dung-ball of the scarab-beetle is intended to be his food, and has nothing to do with the pear-shaped ball, never seen above ground, in which the female lays her eggs, thus providing food for the larva when it is hatched. The Egyptians appear to have had no idea of the metamorphosis of the insect, and thought that the scarab issued from the egg as a fully-formed beetle. The fact that the round dung-ball is made only by the male beetle was also not known; there seemed to be no difference between the sexes, and so the scarab was supposed to be male only, and to create his offspring without the intervention of a female. This seemed to typify the idea that the sun-god was self-creating.

'Since it was αὐτογενής, the scarab was also μονογενής, and in Horapollo[4] we find it cited as the symbol of μονογενής. This idea, connected with the fact that the scarab lays only one egg, was taken by Christian writers to allow of the scarab being spoken of as a type of Christ, the "only-begotten" son of God, and we even find Our Lord described as "the good Scarab," or as "God's Scarab."'[5] '*Scarabæus in cruce . . . Bonus Scarabæus qui clamavit e ligno* are phrases used of Our Lord by St. Ambrose in his exposition of St. Luke's Gospel.'[6] 'It may be questioned whether this was not a slight misunderstanding, and whether the word μονογενής means in the case of Our Lord quite the same thing as it does in Horapollo with regard to the scarab; he seems to use it rather in the sense of "born of one sole person," in this case the male scarab, without the intervention of a female.'[7]

The idea of personal resurrection was also associated with the scarab in late times. The old Egyptians had no such idea.

'It was a new life in the Underworld that, they hoped, was assured to the dead man by the placing over his heart of a stone image of the Scarabæus-beetle, type and emblem of life

[1] The latest known is one of Antoninus Pius, in the Louvre.
[2] See art. EGYPTIAN RELIGION, § 39.
[3] *Souvenirs entomologiques*, Paris, 1879–1912, v. 1–85.
[4] i. 10.
[5] Hall, *Catalogue of Egyptian Scarabs*, vol. i. p. xviii.
[6] Budge, *The Mummy*, p. 233, note 1. [7] Hall, *loc. cit.*

ever renewing itself unaided, as its race seemed to beget itself unaided and to spring in multitude from the revolving ball, fosterer of their life as the revolving sun-ball fostered the life of man. So they prayed that with the help of the Scarab over his heart the dead man might find just judgment in the "Hall of Double Truth," that the Powers of the Underworld might not be hostile to him and that the result of the Weighing of his Heart in the presence of the Guardian of the Balance might be satisfactory. In the latter days of Egypt this hope of just judgment and renewed life in the Underworld seems to have been confused with a foreign idea (perhaps of Indian origin?) of renewed life upon this earth, which in fact was confounded by the Christians with their idea of the resurrection of the actual body at the Last Day.'[1]

4. The heart-scarab. — The heart-scarabs, intended as amulets for the protection of the dead, were usually larger in size than the ordinary seal-scarabs, which were primarily intended as amulets for the living, though, of course, constantly buried with the dead. They were emblems of the protecting power of the living sun. In the under world the sun also shone, the dead sun, Osiris, and it is only on the large heart-scarabs of comparatively late times that his figure appears. On the scarabs of the living he is never seen.

'The supposed relation of the Scarab to the heart of a man does not seem very clear to us. Perhaps the heart, as the seat of life, was regarded as specially connected with the Creator god Khepera and his emblem the Scarab, the symbol of "coming-into-being" and of existence generally. In any case, the Scarab was ritually connected with some of the more important chapters of the Book of the Dead, which were believed to save the life of the dead man in the next world, notably the all-embracing chapter lxiv., which was the quintessence of all the magical protective formulæ. The rubric of this chapter and of chapters xxx. and xxxb. prescribe that it shall be said over a Scarab of basalt or green stone, set in an electrum or gold mount or rim, which shall be placed on the heart of a man, after the ceremony of the "Opening of the Mouth" has been performed. This Heart-Scarab, one side of which was sometimes fashioned in the form of a heart, was usually placed over the place of the heart, on the breast of the mummy.'[2]

Its green colour is probably an allusion to the green dung-ball of the beetle. A typical specimen of an early heart-scarab of this kind is that of King Sebekemsaf, of the XIIIth or XVIIth dynasty (*c.* 1800 B.C.), which is in the British Museum.[3] It is a green jasper scarab, $\frac{3}{4}$ in. long, with domed back and human face, set in a gold plinth, rounded at one end, and $1\frac{3}{8}$ ins. long. The legs of the scarab are represented in relief, splayed out on the surface of the gold plinth. On the base and sides of the latter are beaten in sentences from ch. xxxb. of the *Book of the Dead*:

'To be said over his mouth as an incantation: "My heart of my mother, my heart of my mother, my heart of my existences, may naught stand up to bear witness as an enemy against me before the judges." Made over the king Sebekemsaf, justified.'

In accordance with a superstition peculiar to the Old and Middle Kingdoms, the legs of the bird-hieroglyphs are omitted, so that they should not run away from the amulet and so impair the efficacy of the inscription. The providing of the scarab with a human face is a peculiarity of the Middle Kingdom. This face developed under the XVIIIth dynasty into the negro-head which is seen at the back of many scaraboids of that time.

In later times the heart-*scarabæus*, not unusually made of faience, is often inlaid in various colours. Sometimes the figure of the scarab disappeared altogether, and it became an amulet entirely in the shape of a heart, possibly with a human head, and with, cut upon it, a representation of the *bennu*-bird, the sacred crane of Ra of Heliopolis, which was regarded as 'the soul of Kheperi' after the union of the solar cults. Under the Saites, and even earlier, the heart-scarab was often given detachable wings, fastened with thread, and sometimes we see it in the centre of a pylon-shaped pectoral, placed on the breast of the mummy.

We have already said that at a late period we also meet with a small scarab purely amuletic in character and without inscription of any kind, as it has no base on which to put it. Instead of the base is a small ring for suspension.

'In a very interesting set of amulets in the British Museum, exhibited exactly as they were found, we find that this base-less Scarab was put over the throat of the mummy, while a seal-Scarab with base was placed with a model signet-ring (all are made of faience) below its left shoulder, the shoulder over which the scribe usually carried, slung, his writing materials.'[1]

Monstrous forms of the scarab sometimes occur in late times, purely amuletic and without the seal-base like those just described. An instance is the bull-headed scarab, usually made of hæmatite. This was connected with the moon-god Khons, as Horapollo says.[2] Horapollo speaks of the ordinary scarab of Kheperi as 'having the form of a cat,' and also mentions a single-horned scarab sacred to Thoth. The latter, as Petrie says,[3] is no doubt the long-beaked *Hypselogenia*, its beak being compared with that of the ibis, the sacred bird of Thoth. The present writer does not know of any monstrous ibis-headed or cat-headed scarabs, though the former is by no means inconceivable. It is difficult to see any resemblance between the ordinary *scarabæus* and a cat.

The scarab is often figured in the *Book of the Dead*,[4] and sometimes Kheperi appears there as a beetle-headed man. Gigantic stone *scarabæi* were sometimes set up in the temples. There are two (one of remarkable size, but uninscribed) in the British Museum, and one with a long inscription on its high pedestal was found at Karnak by Georges Legrain. In Gnostic iconography the scarab often appears.

5. Modifications of the scarab.—We thus see how it was that the small amulets representing this very sacred object were early adopted as seals on account of their convenient size and material, as well as their magical power; how the two aspects of the scarab are inextricably intermingled; and how it is difficult to treat apart the scarab-seal and the scarab-amulet, with the result that the pure signet of non-scaraboid form, such as the ring, the button-seal, and the cylinder, appears in a comprehensive catalogue like that of the British Museum collection of seals and scarabs at one end of the scale, with at the other the heart-amulet, which has nothing of the seal (or even sometimes of the scarab, except implicitly) about it. The two are connected by the scarab, in its double capacity as seal and amulet, and by its modifications, such as the 'scaraboid,' with scarab-like form and inscribed base, but with back either plain or cut or impressed in various forms like that of the head of a negro, a cynocephalous ape, and so forth; by the 'cowroid,' which is a cross between a scaraboid and a bead of lentoid shape, originally made in the form of a cowry-shell (but afterwards losing all trace of this original) and inscribed on its flat base in the same way as the scarab; and by the 'plaque,' which has lost all trace of the scaraboid form and is merely a plaque-shaped amulet developed from the flat bead and inscribed in the same manner as the seal-scarabs, usually on both sides.

'Various combinations of the Scaraboid and the Plaque are met with. All these derivatives of the Scarab partake of the nature of beads, as also does the Scarab itself to a great extent, since all are perforated for stringing, and, when worn as amulets, were usually strung with beads on necklaces, etc. . . . When intended not to be strung as a bead, but, as was often the case, to be mounted as the bezel of a signet-ring, the Scarab or Plaque was still always perforated, and was secured to the ring by means of a metal wire passing through the perforation.'[5]

Much light was thrown on the popular use of the scarab as an ornament of the living, strung on

[1] Hall, p. xviii f. [2] *Ib.* p. xix f.
[3] No. 7876; Hall, no. 211.

[1] Hall, p. xx. [2] i. 10. [3] P. 3.
[4] Oddly enough, it was occasionally confused with another beetle, the *'apshait*, which had an unlucky significance.
[5] Hall, p. vii f. There is the exception of the small late uninscribed scarabs with a suspension ring beneath instead of a perforation (see above, § 4).

necklaces, etc., by the discovery of hundreds of small necklaces of scarabs and beads of faience in the dust-heaps of the temple of Queen Hatshepsut at Deir el-Baḥri, in Western Thebes. They were the poor offerings of the *fellaḥīn* at the shrine of Hathor, which the queen annexed to the great temple which she built in honour of Amen. These, when damaged or broken, or when the shrine became too full of them, were thrown out by the sacristans chiefly into the deserted courts of the ancient funerary temple of King Mentuḥetep close by, used in Hatshepsut's time as a dust-heap, where they were found during the excavations of the Egypt Exploration Fund in 1903–07.[1] Nearly all are of XVIIIth dynasty date, and Deir el-Baḥri has been one of the most fruitful sources of the fine blue scarabs of Hatshepsut's reign that are to be seen in our collections.

6. Material and colouring.—This brings us back to the artistic interest of the scarab. 'As the gem and coin are microcosms of Greek art, so the scarab is a microcosm of the art of Egypt.'[2] On some scarabs we see miniatures, whether good or bad, of the great scenes sculptured on the temple-walls, executed within the compass of an oval space half an inch long. On others cheap and inferior artists produced only the roughest of scenes, the rudest of hieroglyphs.

'To trace the development of the scarab and its ornaments from the elaborately conventionalized scenes of the XIIth dynasty with their beautiful spiral patterns or the finely cut legends of their priestly or official owners, through the fine designs of the XVIIIth dynasty to the delicately glazed pale blue faience amulets of the XXVIth, is one of the most interesting studies in the whole realm of ancient art.'[3]

The first and always the most generally used material for the making of scarab-seals was steatite or steaschist, a grey schistose stone (silicate of magnesium) resembling, but not so soft as, soapstone. This when used for scarabs was usually glazed, generally either blue or green. Faience appears under the XIIth dynasty, and was generally used from the time of the XVIIIth dynasty. Under the XIXth the faience scarabs of the cheapest kind were often cast in moulds, with disastrous effect. A fine deep blue glaze was used under the VIth–XIIth dynasties. A delicate blue glaze at the beginning of the XVIIIth dynasty gave way to the brilliant blue of the reign of Hatshepsut and the beginning of that of Thothmes III. During his reign green became the fashion and persisted under the XIXth, though blue is often found. In later times green was usual, until under the Saites a delicate light-blue glaze took its place. The preservation of the colour is more usual on faience than on steatite scarabs. On the latter it has often disappeared or has turned brown. On faience, when the colour goes, blue usually turns white. A homogeneous hard blue paste, usually light-blue, was also used under the XIIth and XVIIIth dynasties, and a soft paste, also light-blue, was very common under the XXVIth. Hard stones of the finest kinds were used from the XIIth to the XIXth dynasty. Amethyst was the most usual in the earlier period, and the amethyst scarabs of the XIIth dynasty often have a gold plate on the base, on which the inscription was engraved. Usually, however, this plate has disappeared, or was never fixed, so that the scarabs have no inscription, though amethyst scarabs with inscriptions cut directly on the base are not unknown. The beautiful light-blue felds-par was also used at this time, as well as hæmatite, carnelian, green jasper, crystal, quartz (sometimes glazed blue), lapis-lazuli, and obsidian. Under the XVIIIth dynasty carnelian was the favourite stone, though it was used more for cowroids than for scarabs proper. Bright yellow jasper followed at the end of the dynasty, and under the XIXth dynasty red jasper, red felds-par, carnelian, sard, and red stones generally, were in fashion, as also were crystal and chalcedony, and even jade (for heart-scarabs), but less commonly. Malachite and turquoise scarabs are very rare. Under the later dynasties lapis-lazuli supplanted all the others for small scarabs, and granite, diorite, and basalt were all used for the large heart-scarabs, as well as a stone usually called 'green basalt,' which is not a true basalt, and is called by Petrie[1] 'durite.' This was common at all periods for heart-scarabs, but was rarely used for the small scarabs. Metal scarabs are rare, though we may well suppose that they were often made of gold, especially under the XIIth and XVIIIth dynasties; and the splendid find of XIIIth dynasty jewellery at Dashur includes golden scarabs splendidly inlaid with lapis, felds-par, and carnelian. Silver is so perishable that a silver scarab would be a great rarity. Bronze scarabs are usually Ptolemaic or Roman, rarely XXth dynasty. Blue glass scarabs are known under the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties; they are often small and rudely cut, obviously of the cheapest description. Amber scarabs are very rare, but there is one of the Middle Kingdom in the British Museum.[2] The material is very perish-able. Wood occurs under the XIIth dynasty, but is very rare. Ivory was also rarely used; the small amuletic scarabs of the VIth dynasty may be mentioned, and larger ones are sometimes found later on: these have usually magical inscriptions.[3]

7. Historical value.—The types of the scarabs of the various periods of the XIIth to the XXVIth dynasty are easily distinguishable. Under the XIIth dynasty a very naturalistic type was in vogue side by side with an oblong conventionalized type, which is the commoner of the two. In this type the legs are merely marked by striations at the sides. Under the XIIIth dynasty larger and more oval scarabs of this type were usual. The wing-cases of this type were often not marked, under both dynasties. At the end of the Middle Kingdom we find the wing-cases often replaced by little serrated lines, like palm-sprigs. At the beginning of the XVIIIth dynasty a purely oval base was usual, and the hinder end of the scarab was sharply raised or hunched up; this is characteristic of the time of Amenhetep I. Later a naturalistic form, with less oval base and with triangular marks at the corners of the wing-cases, was *de règle*; this is the characteristic form of the reign of Thothmes III. and persisted with variations till the time of the Saites. Under the XIXth dynasty highly arched backs were common, and the legs were often cut free. Aberrant forms with almost pyramidal backs and elaborately cut heads are met with under both the XIIth and the XIXth dynasties, but are rarely found in the intervening period; the XIXth dynasty scarab-cutters seem occasionally to have tried to revive the forms of the Middle Kingdom. Under the Ethiopians (XXVth dynasty) began the archaistic revival of art generally, which went for its models back to the Old and Middle Kingdoms. Scarab-forms of the XIIth dynasty were now commonly imitated, and even their spiral base-designs were occasionally revived. But under the Saites of the XXVIth, though the sculpture of the Old Kingdom was imitated, scarabs of the Old Kingdom could not often be imitated, because there were so few to imi-tate—those in our museums which bear the names of monarchs of the IVth dynasty, for instance, are

[1] Hall, in E. Naville and H. R. Hall, *The XIth Dynasty Temple at Deir el-Baḥari*, London, 1907–13, i. 17, iii. 13.
[2] Hall, *Catalogue of Egyp. Scarabs*, vol. i. p. xxiv.
[3] *Ib.*

[1] P. 8. [2] No. 17,718. [3] Brit. Mus., no. 30,730.

considered by most writers on the subject to be all posthumous.[1] So a typical Saite form was evolved, with a characteristic bulbous abdomen which cannot be mistaken. Names of ancient monarchs were often put on them, as had already been the case under the XIXth dynasty. And that of Thothmes III. is almost as common on scarabs of the XXVIth dynasty as on those of his own time.

This fact is apt to make us doubt the historical value of the scarab. If a scarab bearing the name of Menkaura is probably not, or one bearing that of Thothmes III. is not necessarily, of the time of the king whose name it bears, of what value is it as a means of dating objects with which it may be found? If the name of one king can be imitated on later scarabs, why not that of another? We know, however, that only a limited number of royal names were so imitated, and, when we find that a scarab bearing the name of Thothmes III. is identical in style with one bearing that of his successor, Amenhetep II., whose name was never imitated later, we know that the Thothmes scarab is of the XVIIIth dynasty. And so in all other cases. All scarabs of unimportant monarchs are contemporary, as are also all scarabs of Akhenaten and the other 'disk-worshippers,' who were regarded by all later Egyptians as abominable heretics, and whose names would never be commemorated. There is really very little uncertainty in the matter. So royal scarabs can be used by archæologists well acquainted with scarab-lore as important evidence of the date of other antiquities with which they may be found. A crucial instance of this is the discovery of scarabs and rings of Amenhetep III., Queen Tii, and Akhenaten with Mycenæan antiquities in Greece. This was rightly taken to prove the date of these antiquities long before the other confirmatory evidence, which has conclusively shown that the Mycenæans and Minoans were contemporary with XVIIIth dynasty Egypt, was available. At the time of the original discovery the study of scarabs in connexion with other Egyptian antiquities had not progressed so far as it has of late years, and doubt as to the contemporaneity of the scarabs with the monarchs whose names they bore was not altogether unjustified. But the criterion of style settles the matter now, and the possibility of a scarab being older than the antiquities with which it is found can thus be dealt with, and its evidence discounted. In the British Museum there is an obsidian scarab of the XIIIth dynasty which has the name of Shishak (XXIInd dynasty) cut upon it.[2] Its real date is settled by its style, about which there is nothing archaistic. The archaistic scarabs of the XXVth–XXVIth dynasty are distinguishable (though sometimes with difficulty) from those which they imitate. They are most easily identified when they bear inscriptions which must demonstrably be later in date than the Middle Kingdom. Some confusion is caused by the habit of the XXVIth dynasty Egyptians of putting names of imaginary kings on scarabs. Our other knowledge and the suspicious forms of the names themselves enable us to put these on one side as historical evidence. The only really 'historical' scarabs are the great medal-like scarabs of Amenhetep III., already referred to. But the value of the ordinary scarab as historical evidence is clear. The existence of a Hyksos king, Aapehti Nubti, who had been regarded as doubtful and been relegated by Eduard Meyer to the realm of religious fable, has possibly been confirmed by a British Museum scarab[3] bearing his name. Its style is unmistakably of his time, the period just about the beginning of the XVIIIth dynasty. It and any typical scarab of Aahmes and Amenhetep I. are as alike as two peas, both in style of make and in cutting of inscription. There is the possibility that the scarab may belong to Thothmes I., who bore the name Aapehti among his titles,[1] but it is equally possible that the scarab is King Nubti's. Then a scarab of Thothmes III., usurped by Hatshepsut, which is in the British Museum,[2] confirms to some extent the view of K. Sethe as to the peculiar succession of these two monarchs.[3] Other analogous instances might be quoted. Indirectly much may be gleaned from scarabs. An interesting sidelight on history is given by the design, common on the remarkable scarabs of the Hyksos period, which shows the conflict between the desert lion and the river crocodile, probably typifying the contest between the Hyksos of the north and the Thebans of the south. The peculiar semi-barbaric designs of the scarabs of the Hyksos seem to have persisted in the north under the XVIIIth dynasty, and the Hyksos types come again into prominence, in a somewhat modified form, under the XIXth dynasty, where the style of the later 'Delta-scarabs' strongly reminds us of that of the Hyksos scarabs, which are often known by the same appellation. This is an interesting confirmation of the view that the Hyksos strain was by no means rooted out of the Delta by the XVIIIth dynasty kings, and that the people of the Delta, when it resumed its importance under the XIXth dynasty, were largely of Hyksos origin. The devotion to the god Set which was professed by the XIXth dynasty kings, and the constant appearance of this deity of the Hyksos, so hated in Upper Egypt two centuries before, on the Tanite or Delta scarabs (often in his Hittite form as Sutekh, with horns and pigtail), are strong confirmation of this view. Ptaḥ, the god of Memphis, is naturally also commemorated on scarabs of this period, when the seat of government was in the north. Ptaḥ was the deity of the Memphites, and the Hyksos Set-Sutekh was the god, not only of the court at Tanis, but of the people of the Delta generally, under the XIXth dynasty. It was only when the Ramessids of the XXth dynasty returned to Thebes that Ptaḥ resumed undivided sway over the north, the worship of Set disappeared, and the Hyksos-Tanite style of scarab went out of fashion. We thus see that the historical value of the scarab is by no means negligible, and that on all counts—religious, historical, and artistic—the little Egyptian seal in the form of the sacred beetle is one of the most interesting objects which antiquity has handed down to us.

LITERATURE.—S. Birch, *Catalogue of the Egyptian Antiquities at Alnwick Castle*, privately printed, 1880, p. 103 ff. (the first considerable catalogue of scarabs); E. A. W. Budge, in *Catalogue of the Hilton Price Collection*, London, 1897, p. 20 ff.; *The Lady Meux Collection of Egyptian Antiquities*, do. 1896, p. 185 ff.; *Catalogue of Egyptian Antiquities* (Harrow School Museum), Harrow, 1887, p. 14 ff.; *Catalogue of the Egyptian Antiquities in the Fitzwilliam Museum*, Cambridge, 1893, p. 87 ff. (all valuable for inscriptions); W. J. Loftie, *An Essay of Scarabs*, London, n.d. [1884] (the first general book on the subject; uncritical, but illustrations good); W. M. F. Petrie, *Historical Scarabs*, do. 1889 (the first comprehensive work on royal scarabs); Budge, *The Mummy*, Cambridge, 1894, p. 231 ff. (valuable on the religious side); G. W. Fraser, *Catalogue of Scarabs*, London, 1900; F. Ll. Griffith, 'A Collection of Historical Scarabs' (The John Ward Collection), *PSBA* xxii. [1900] 305 ff., 386 ff., xxiii. [1901] 19 ff., 79 ff. (good illustrations); John Ward, *The Sacred Beetle*, London, 1902 (republication of the above); P. E. Newberry, *Scarabs: an Introd. to the Study of Egyptian Seals and Signet Rings*[2], do. 1908 (very valuable for scarabs of the Middle Kingdom), *Scarab-shaped Seals*, do. 1907 (forming a vol. of the *Catalogue Général* of the Cairo Museum); H. R. Hall, *Catalogue of Egyptian Scarabs, etc., in the British Museum*, vol. i. 'Royal Scarabs,' etc., do. 1913; Petrie, *Scarabs and Cylinders with Names*, do. 1917. Two artt. by Mrs. Alice Grenfell, 'Amuletic Scarabs for the Deceased,' and 'The Rarer Scarabs of the New Kingdom,' in *RTr* xxx. [1908] 105 ff., and

[1] Petrie is the only exception (pp. 11 ff., 14 ff.).
[2] No. 30,625; Hall, no. 2405. [3] No. 32,368; Hall, no. 801.

[1] Petrie, p. 24. [2] No. 29,232; Hall, no. 550.
[3] For a criticism of this view, however, see Hall, *Ancient History of the Near East*, p. 286.

xxxii. [1910] 113 ff., should also be mentioned, and the art. 'Scarab,' by F. Ll. Griffith, in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 301. [It should be noted as a curious fact that practically nothing has been written on scarabs by any but British archæologists.]

H. R. Hall.

SCEPTICS (*σκεπτικοί, ἐφεκτικοί*).—In this article the term 'sceptics' is used strictly of the adherents of the doctrine which we know best from Sextus Empiricus (2nd cent. A.D.). There were, of course, sceptical tendencies in Greek philosophy long before his time. Xenophanes was regarded by the later sceptics as almost one of themselves, and with considerable justification. Protagoras (*q.v.*), the real author of the sceptical formula 'no more such than such' (*οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ τοῖον*), prepared the way for scepticism, but he was no sceptic himself, and his chief work was known as *The Truth* (Ἀλήθεια). We must carefully distinguish between real scepticism and disbelief in the trustworthiness of the senses, such as we find in the school of Democritus (*q.v.*) and in that of the Megarics (*q.v.*). Both of these rejected sensation altogether, but both maintained the reality of something inaccessible to sense. A disciple of Democritus, Metrodorus of Chios, said indeed,[1] 'None of us knows anything, not even this, whether we know or do not know,' but he also said,[2] 'All things are which one can think' (ἃ *ἄν τις νοήσαι*), and he taught the doctrine of atoms and the void. The Megarics held that the senses were deceptive, but they maintained the reality of the Good, which they identified with the Eleatic One. The Academy (*q.v.*) under Arcesilaus and Carneades is often regarded as sceptical, but the genuine sceptics refused to admit that it was. The Academics, they said, were really dogmatists, since they affirmed dogmatically that things were 'incomprehensible' (*ἀκατάληπτα*), and to assert scepticism dogmatically is to cease to be a sceptic. Moreover, the Academics held that a belief might, for practical purposes, be more or less probable or justifiable (*εὔλογον*) or more or less convincing (*πιθανόν*). Sextus[3] even reports a statement that Arcesilaus used scepticism only to test his pupils, and that he communicated the doctrine of Plato to those whom he found fit to receive it. The truth of the matter appears to be that the scepticism of the Academy was primarily a scepticism *ad hoc*, directed against the 'comprehensive impression' (*καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*) of the Stoics, and in opposing that doctrine Arcesilaus and Carneades were faithful to the teaching of Plato, who held firmly that it was impossible to have scientific knowledge of the world of becoming. The Academic doctrine of probability is also Platonic; for Plato conceived it to be possible to give a 'likely account' (*εἰκότα λόγον*) even of this world. Neither Arcesilaus nor Carneades wrote anything, and of course their controversies with Zeno and Chrysippus would attract more attention than anything else that they may have taught; but there is no evidence that they felt any inconsistency between their official positions as 'successors' (*διάδοχοι*) of Plato and their doctrine. Cicero and Plutarch, who represent the best Academic tradition, are quite unconscious of any departure from Platonism on their part. It may be that they became so absorbed in their criticism of the materialistic dogmatism of the Stoics that they let the other side of Platonism fall into the background, but there is no reason to think that their sceptical attitude to the Stoic theory of knowledge would have been disowned by the founder of the Academy. In any case, though the sceptics derived most of their arguments from the Academy, they were quite justified in holding that they were separated from it *toto cælo*.

[1] Frag. 1 (Diels). [2] Frag. 2 (Diels).
[3] *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 234.

The favourite formula of the sceptics was that the wise man would withhold his assent from all opinions and would 'suspend his judgment' (*ἐπέχειν*), and there is good evidence that this formula is due to Arcesilaus. That created a difficulty for the sceptics, who did not wish to appear indebted to the Academy for anything, and it probably explains the fact that they claimed Pyrrho of Elis as their founder and liked to call themselves Pyrrhoneans. Pyrrho belonged to an earlier generation than Arcesilaus, and it was possible to represent the Academy as having borrowed its weapons from him. It is very difficult to accept this account of the matter. Cicero often names Pyrrho, but never as a sceptic. For him he represents the doctrine of apathy (*q.v.*), or insensibility to feeling (*ἀπάθεια*), and he also tells us that he regarded virtue (*ἀρετή*) as the highest and even the sole good. He says too, more than once, that the doctrine of Pyrrho had long been extinct, and these things make it necessary for us to examine the alleged scepticism of Pyrrho more closely.

For the originality of Arcesilaus cf. Cicero, *Ac.* ii. 77: 'Nemo umquam superiorum non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem, posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti'; and Diog. Laert. iv. 28: (Ἀρκεσίλαος) *πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις*. The present writer was therefore wrong in saying (in art. Academy, § 2) that Arcesilaus 'made use of the weapons provided by scepticism.' The doctrine of *ἐποχή* is entirely his own. In the *de Finibus*[1] Cicero takes Pyrrho as the type of extreme moral rigorism, more extreme even than that of Ariston of Chios at a later date. He apparently knows nothing of a Pyrrhonean scepticism.

Our difficulties are considerably increased by the fact that Pyrrho, like Arcesilaus, wrote nothing, and we are confined to what we can learn on good authority of his life. According to Diogenes Laertius, the chronologist Apollodorus[2] said that he was originally a painter and had 'heard' Bryson (the Megaric philosopher).[3] Subsequently he attached himself to Anaxarchus (the Democritean) and followed him everywhere, so that he associated with the 'Gymnosophists' and 'Magi' in India. That was, of course, when Anaxarchus went there in the train of Alexander the Great (326 B.C.). The authority for this is Pyrrho's younger contemporary, Antigonus of Carystus, who wrote a special treatise on him and visited Elis shortly after his death to collect information about him. Diogenes Laertius[4] quotes him as follows:

'Antigonus of Carystus in his work on Pyrrho says of him that he was originally a poor painter with no reputation, and that a work of his called *Torchbearers* is preserved in the Gymnasium of Elis, which is fairly good. He used to frequent solitary and desert places, and showed himself only on rare occasions to his people at home. This he did from hearing an Indian reproaching Anaxarchus, saying that he could not teach anything good to any one else, since he himself haunted the courts of kings. He was always in the same disposition, so that, if any one left him when he was still speaking, he finished what he had to say for himself, and yet he had been excitable in youth. Often too he went on a journey without giving notice to any one and wandered about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a pond, he passed on without going to his assistance, and, when some blamed him, Anaxarchus himself commended his indifference and absence of affection (*τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ ἀστοργον αὐτοῦ*). And once, when he was caught talking to himself and asked the reason, he said he was practising to be good. He was not overlooked by any one in their inquiries; for he would speak both at large and in answer to questions, so that even Nausiphanes fell a victim to him in his youth and said one should try to combine Pyrrho's character and one's own theories. He said too that Epicurus admired Pyrrho's way of

[1] Cf. ii. 43, iii. 12, iv. 43.
[2] F. Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*, Berlin, 1902, p. 340.
[3] Much confusion has been caused by the apparent statement in Diogenes that Pyrrho 'heard Bryson the son of Stilpo.' The present writer would read *καὶ ἤκουσε Βρύσωνος [τοῦ Στίλπωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς] εἶτ' Ἀναξάρχου, κτλ.* Bryson belonged to the first generation of the Megaric school and is mentioned in Plato's thirteenth Epistle (360D). This dispels the chronological difficulties raised by Zeller. The interpolated extract from Alexander no doubt refers to Timon (see below).
[4] ix. 62.

life and constantly asked questions about him. Pyrrho was so honoured by his native city that they appointed him chief priest and gave immunity from taxation to all philosophers on his account.'

This passage has been quoted in full because it is the earliest well-attested instance of Indian influence on Greece, and it reflects with obvious fidelity the astonishment of the good people of Elis on finding that they had produced a saint. We see that those who knew Pyrrho well described him as a sort of Buddhist *arhat*, and that is doubtless how we should regard him. He is not so much a sceptic as an ascetic and a quietist.

As we see from Antigonus, Pyrrho was accustomed to expound his views orally, but they were known to later times only from Timon of Phlius (*c.* 322–232 B.C.), whom Sextus[1] calls the prophet of his doctrines. Timon is an interesting figure, and we know a good deal about him, as Antigonus also wrote a life of him, some notices from which have found their way into Diogenes Laertius. He had 'heard' Stilpo,[2] but subsequently attached himself to Pyrrho at Elis. After making a competence as a 'sophist' at Chalcedon, he settled at Athens, where he lived to a great age. His best-known work was the *Silloi*, a mock-heroic poem, in which he satirized the philosophers of the past and those of his own day without mercy, in order to bring out the superiority of Pyrrho to them all. He addresses him thus:[3]

'O aged man, O Pyrrho, how or whence didst thou find a way of escape from the service of the beliefs and empty-mindedness of the sophists, and burst the bonds of all deceit and persuasion? Thou didst not care to inquire whose[4] breezes rule in Hellas, whence and whither each one goes.'

This means that Pyrrho had emancipated himself from the vain subtleties of the Megarics (for they are meant by 'sophists' at this date), and there is probably an allusion to the great popularity of Stilpo. In any case, Timon is particularly severe on the Megarics, though he himself was brought up in their school. But he does not mean that Pyrrho found release in scepticism. This is made quite plain in a passage from his elegiac poem *Indalmoi*:

'This, O Pyrrho, is what my heart is longing to hear, how it is that, while as a man thou livest in such great ease and quiet, without a care and immovably constant, thou dost yet rule alone among men, like the god that ranges over the whole earth in his chariot, displaying the fiery burning circle of his rounded sphere.'[5]

And Pyrrho answers:

'Truly I will tell thee, as it appears to me to be, the word of truth (for I have a straight rule to judge how the nature of the divine and of the good is ever) whence comes for a man the most equable life.'[6]

A sceptic can hardly speak of a 'word of truth' (*μῦθον ἀληθείης*) or of a 'straight rule' (*ὀρθὸς κανών*) or of the true 'nature' (*φύσις*) of the divine and good. Sextus[7] feels the difficulty and gets over it only by putting an unnatural emphasis on the words 'as it appears to me to be' (*ὡς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι*). It is surely clear, however, that Timon is making Pyrrho declare a higher truth of some sort. What this was we may partly infer from a quotation from one of Timon's prose works preserved by Aristocles:[8]

'He himself [Pyrrho] has left nothing in writing, but his disciple Timon says that the man who is to be happy must look to these three things: (1) what is the nature of things, (2) what attitude we should take to them, and (3) what those who take this attitude will gain by it. He says that he declared that things were in an equal degree indifferent and unstable and incapable of being tested. For this reason neither our senses nor our opinions are true or false. So we must not put our trust in them but be free from beliefs and inclinations and unshaken, saying of each thing in turn that it no more is than it is not, or that it both is and is not, or that it neither is nor is not. And those who take this attitude, Timon says, will gain first speechlessness (*ἀφασία*) and then imperturbability (*ἀταραξία*).'

Now it is easy to see how this could be regarded as scepticism, and so in fact Aristocles regards it. But that is a superficial view. In the first place, all the apparently sceptical phrases are Democritean and such as Pyrrho might well have learnt from Anaxarchus, the disciple of Metrodorus of Chios; and in particular the appeal to the nature of things (*οἷα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα*) is one which a sceptic is debarred from making, though quite in order for a Democritean. It is possible too that the doctrine of imperturbability is Democritean, though the importance given to it by Pyrrho is more Indian than Greek. In the light of that we see that the passage has really much more to do with the supposed good things and bad things of life than with speculative questions, and that it is, in fact, a recommendation of the indifference (*ἀδιαφορία*) and apathy (*ἀπάθεια*) towards these which is the only doctrine that Cicero attributes to Pyrrho. The really remarkable thing is that Sextus can quote so little of a definitely sceptical character even from Timon. He refers to a saying, 'That honey is sweet, I do not lay down; that it appears sweet, I admit,' which is sound Democritean doctrine, and to an argument that 'nothing divisible can arise in an indivisible time,' which is plainly Megaric. To appreciate the importance of this argument from silence, we must remember that Timon lived at Athens when the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno was in full blast, and that he attacked both of them without mercy. If he had ever said anything about suspense of judgment (*ἐποχή*), we may be sure that Sextus would have repeated it. The speechlessness (*ἀφασία*) of which Timon did speak is a different thing. Sextus is quite aware of this, and he explains[1] that the sceptics do not receive the doctrine of *ἀφασία* in the sense that the nature of things is such as to produce speechlessness (which is just what Timon says it is), but as a mere indication of a temporary condition (*πάθος*) at the moment when they pronounce the word. Sextus is far too candid a writer to identify the sceptical 'suspense of judgment' with an attitude based on the 'nature of things,' which implies a dogma.

The actual words of Sextus are: *Τὴν ἀφασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστε πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἡμεῖς νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν.*[2]

We have seen that Cicero regarded the philosophy of Pyrrho as extinct, and this is confirmed by Menodotus, who is himself reckoned as one of the leading sceptics before Sextus, and who stated distinctly that Timon had no successors, and that the school (*ἀγωγή*) lapsed till it was revived by Ptolemy of Cyrene.[3] The writers of *Successions* of course give us a complete list of the successors of Pyrrho down to Sextus, but the names are mere names for us, and there are in any case too few of them to bridge the interval. The first tangible personality we come to is Ænesidemus, who is of fundamental importance in the history of scepticism as the author of the 'ten tropes.' According to Aristocles,[4] it was he who revived scepticism at Alexandria, and it is certain that he wrote a work called *Pyrrhonean Discourses* (Πυρρώνειοι λόγοι). This was dedicated, Aristocles tells us,[5] to one L. Tubero, who had been a member of the Academy along with Ænesidemus, who had deserted it on the ground that 'those of the Academy, especially the present, sometimes agree with the Stoic doctrines, and, if the truth must be told, they are

[1] *Adv. Math.* i. 53; *ὁ προφήτης τῶν Πύρρωνος λόγων.*
[2] See art. MEGARICS. [3] Frag. 48 (Diels).
[4] The MS reading is *τίνος*, which Cobet wrongly changed to *τίνες*. Surely there is no reference to meteorology, as Diels says. We may take *αὖραι* in the sense of 'vogue' or 'popularity.' In the last line read *ἑκάστη* with Wilamowitz.
[5] Frag. 67 (Diels). [6] Frag. 68 (Diels).
[7] *Adv. Math.* xi. 20.
[8] *Ap.* Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 18.

[1] *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 192. [2] *Ib.* 193.
[3] *Ap.* Diog. Laert. ix. 115. [4] *Loc. cit.* [5] *Loc. cit.*

like Stoics fighting with Stoics.' We know that it was Antiochus of Ascalon who introduced Stoicism into the Academy, and it is argued that, as Sextus[1] uses very similar language of Antiochus, Æenesidemus must refer to him too. In that case, as Antiochus died not long after 70 B.C., Æenesidemus must be earlier still. This would make it very difficult to explain Cicero's statement that Pyrrhonism was extinct in his time. It is easier to suppose that the successor of Antiochus, his brother Aristus, continued and even aggravated his eclectic tendencies. Cicero stayed with him at Athens in 51 B.C. and was shocked by the 'topsy-turvy' (*sursum deorsum*) condition of the Academic philosophy in his hands.[2]

Aristocles[3] says that no one paid any more attention to the old sceptics than if they had never been born, and that it was only the other day that 'one Æenesidemus' began to rekindle the rubbish at Alexandria (ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῇ καθ' Αἴγυπτον Αἰνησίδημός τις ἀναζωπυρεῖν ἤρξατο τὸν ὕθλον τοῦτον). Aristocles belongs to the 2nd cent. A.D., and his words suggest a fairly recent date. On the other hand, H. von Arnim has found at least eight of the ten tropes in Philo[4] and concludes that Æenesidemus must have been earlier than Philo. That, however, is not quite decisive, since the tropes are mostly to be found already in Cicero's *Academica*,[5] which means that they are crumbs from the table of Carneades and may have been put together before Æenesidemus. The idea that the Academy came to an end with Philo and Antiochus is responsible for a good deal of faulty argument on this subject. We know little about it between that time and the rise of Neo-Platonism, but it still went on without interruption. We cannot, therefore, say at what date Æenesidemus seceded from it.

The *Pyrrhonean Discourses* of Æenesidemus were read by the patriarch Photius in the 9th cent. A.D., and he has left us an analysis of their contents. The first book dealt with the divergence between the sceptics and the Academy, and we see that Æenesidemus definitely laid down that things were incomprehensible either by sense or by thought. That, then, is a complete scepticism and the first of which we have any clear record. The subjects of the remaining books, however, are just those we know to have been treated by Carneades and do not suggest any great originality. We are certainly doing Æenesidemus too much honour if we attribute to him the argument against causation reported by Sextus.[6] In this the noticeable thing is that, while he gives a subtle proof of the impossibility of a corporeal thing being the cause of any thing either corporeal or incorporeal, he simply takes for granted that the incorporeal is not the cause of any thing, since it is intangible (*ἀναφὴς φύσις*) and cannot act or be acted upon. Now Carneades might assume this in arguing against Chrysippus, who would admit it at once, but it is not a sufficient refutation of all possible theories of causation, as it ought to be. The natural conclusion is that we have here simply an argument of Carneades transcribed from Clitomachus. The arrangement in eight 'tropes' (*τρόποι*) of the various fallacies into which people fall in dealing with problems of causation[7] is more likely to be the original contribution of Æenesidemus to the subject.

Quite distinct from these are the ten 'tropes' (*τρόποι*, also called *τόποι* and *λόγοι*) with which his name is chiefly associated. These are simply a rather unsystematic list of sceptical commonplaces. They are as follows:

(1) From the divergence of animals (some animals have one sense highly developed, some another); (2) from the divergence of human beings; (3) from the different constructions of the organs of sense; (4) from circumstances (sleep, waking, jaundice, etc.); (5) from positions, distances, and situations (the colours in a dove's neck, the square tower which appears round at a distance, the oar which appears bent in water); (6) from mixtures (we never perceive anything by itself, but always accompanied by light, heat, moisture, etc.); (7) from the quantities and structure of objects (scrapings of horn are white, but horns are black; scrapings of silver are black, but silver is white); (8) from relativity (*τὸ πρός τι*); (9) from frequency or rarity of occurrence; (10) from laws and customs, mythical arguments, and dogmatic prejudices.

Even in the case of Æenesidemus the sceptic still eludes us. According to Sextus,[1] he was not a true sceptic any more than the Academics; for he regarded 'Pyrrhonism' simply as 'a way to lead us to the philosophy of Heraclitus,' and Sextus more than once speaks of 'Æenesidemus after Heraclitus' (*Αἰνησίδημος* or *οἱ περὶ Αἰνησίδημον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον*). Zeller and Diels regard this as impossible. It is suggested that Æenesidemus merely gave an account of the philosophy of Heraclitus or that he really meant to say that the philosophy of Heraclitus was a way to lead us to scepticism. It seems impossible to accept either of these explanations. Sextus must have known perfectly well how the matter stood, and he appears to be making a verbal quotation. If we remember that in the Academy, to which Æenesidemus had belonged, scepticism must always have been regarded, at least officially, as a way to lead us to the philosophy of Plato, it is not hard to understand the point of view. There is a perfectly intelligible sense in which a scepticism like that of Æenesidemus might lead to a philosophy like that of Heraclitus (*q.v.*). The Ephesian himself founded his philosophy on the contradictions of the world of appearance, and it was just on those that Æenesidemus insisted. The Stoics themselves appealed to Heraclitus as their precursor, and they distorted his doctrine accordingly, and Æenesidemus may very well have thought that he understood it better than they did, and that it was better approached from the side of scepticism than from that of dogmatism. If that is the true explanation of his attitude, he was quite right in his view, but Sextus was also quite right in refusing to recognize him as a true sceptic.

The man who really formulated the canons of scepticism—those with which Sextus works—was Agrippa, of whom we know nothing whatever except that he must have lived between the time of Æenesidemus and that of Sextus. His name does not occur in any of the lists. His tropes are on a far higher level than those of Æenesidemus and may be given thus:

1. *The argument from discord* (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας). On any point proposed we find, both in life and among philosophers, a divergence from which there is no appeal (*ἀνεπίκριτος στάσις*). One assertion (*φάσις*) has no more claim to be accepted than its opposite; for each is a part of the discord (*μέρος τῆς διαφωνίας*).

2. *The argument from infinite regress* (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως). If we attempt to demonstrate our assertion, that which is brought forward as a proof itself requires a proof, and that in turn another, and so on *ad infinitum*. As we cannot find a point from which to start, we are reduced to suspense (*ἐποχή*).

3. *The argument from relativity* (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι). An object appears such and such relatively to the judging subject and to the things along with which it is observed, but we must suspend our judgment as to what it is relatively to nature (*πρὸς τὴν φύσιν*).

4. *The argument from hypothesis* (ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). This is applied when the dogmatists arbitrarily select a point in the infinite regress and take it for granted.

5. *The argument from circular reasoning* (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος). This is applied when the dogmatists give as proof of a thing something which itself requires to be confirmed by that thing.

To these Sextus[2] adds two tropes formulated by 'the more recent sceptics.' These are:

'Everything is apprehended either from itself or from something else. But (1) that nothing is apprehended from itself is proved by the discord among philosophers with regard to all things sensible and intelligible, from which discord there is no appeal, since we can make use of no criterion sensible or intelligible, because whatever we take is untrustworthy as being subject to discord. So (2) nothing is apprehended from anything else; for, if that from which a thing is apprehended always has to be apprehended from something else, we fall either into the argument in a circle (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος) or into the infinite regress (ὁ ἄπειρος τρόπος).'

[1] *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 235.
[2] Cic. *ad Att.* v. 10. 4.
[3] *Loc. cit.*
[4] *Phil. Untersuch.*, Berlin, 1888, pt. xi. p. 56 *f.*
[5] See J. S. Reid's ed., London, 1885, Introd. p. 65 *f.*
[6] *Adv. Math.* ix. 218 *ff.*
[7] Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 180.

[1] Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 210.
[2] *Ib.* i. 178.

Scepticism had at last found its formula, and it was soon to find a singularly competent exponent. The date of **Sextus Empiricus** is quite uncertain. He is mentioned in Diogenes Laertius, but not by Galen, so we may probably refer him to the beginning of the 3rd or the end of the 2nd century A.D. Nor do we know where he lived. From his own works it appears that he was a doctor, and his name suggests that he belonged to the empirical school. On the other hand, he expressly denies[1] that the empirical school of medicine was to be identified with the sceptical philosophy. The sceptic would rather adopt the principles of the methodic school. However that may be, the preservation of his writings (which fill over 750 pages in Bekker's edition) is one of the greatest pieces of good fortune in the general wreck of Hellenistic philosophical literature. That is partly, no doubt, because it has preserved so much of the acute dialectic of the Academy (a point which has not yet been sufficiently attended to), but not altogether so. Sextus is a real personality and a genuine thinker, and he is actually at his best in such parts of his work as are obviously original, above all in his polemic against the grammarians. He mentions 'imperturbability' (*ἀταραξία*) in a perfunctory way, as he was bound to do, but he himself would not have cared for such a state in the least. He has an active mind and a passion for clearness. The ordinary arguments against scepticism do not touch him at all; for it is an attitude with him, and not a doctrine. He is thoroughly sceptical about scepticism itself. He also makes a strong impression of sincerity and candour, and he has great learning and considerable humour. His works are the only key we have to the real meaning of Hellenistic philosophy.

The books entitled *Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων* **ΑΒΓ** are the most valuable for our purposes, as they contain an outline of the whole system with historical notices. In the MSS the two other works of Sextus are combined under a common title, *Πρὸς μαθηματικούς* (*adv. Math.*), which properly belongs only to the books against the teachers of the *ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα* or liberal arts (=*adv. Math.* i.–vi.), while the treatise against the dogmatists (*Πρὸς δογματικούς*=*adv. Math.* vii.–xi.) is further subdivided into three sections, *Πρὸς λογικούς* (two books), *Πρὸς φυσικούς* (two books), and *Πρὸς ἠθικούς* (one book).

It is, of course, impossible to give here any idea of the wealth of matter in the works of Sextus; but it is desirable to note two points of interest in his philosophy. In the first place he was faced with the necessity of finding some rule of life. The Academic plan of taking probability as our guide was not open to him; for he is too clear-sighted to admit that a sceptic can regard anything as more probable than anything else. He therefore falls back on the rule that we should follow the usage of the society in which we live (*ἡ συνήθεια*). There is no more reason to suppose that this usage is wrong than to suppose that it is right; and, that being so, the simplest thing is just to follow it. At the very least that will save us from being ridiculous, as the Stoics were apt to be. They declared things which were shocking to ordinary people to be 'indifferent,' but the sceptic has no more reason to believe them indifferent than not, so he will respect all the conventions. Sextus has a true enthusiasm for this doctrine of conformity, and it gives great value to his discussion of grammar, where it is really applicable. It is not a heroic creed, but it will save a man from the worst excesses. The other point is more immediately connected with his medical profession. Though he refuses to admit that anything can be an 'indicative sign' (*ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον*) of anything else, he fully admits the existence of the 'reminiscent sign' (*ἀναμνηστικὸν σημεῖον*). There is, after all, a sort of sequence (*ἀκολουθία*) in appearances, and it is possible to make observation (*τήρησις*) of this and to act accordingly. When he is on this subject, he uses language very much like that of positivism (*q.v.*), and it may be questioned if he is always quite faithful to his scepticism. Perhaps, if the matter is pressed home, he is not; but he satisfies himself on the point. We have seen that we are to follow the usage of society in our actions, and, if nature too has ways of its own, we may as well conform to these. Everywhere conformity is the lesson of scepticism.

[1] Sextus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 236.

LITERATURE.—**N. MacColl**, *The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus*, London, 1869; **V. Brochard**, *Les Sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1887; **A. Goedeckemeyer**, *Die Gesch. des griech. Skeptizismus*, Leipzig, 1905; see also R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philos. Schriften*, do. 1877–83, iii. 64 f.; **P. Natorp**, *Forschungen zur Gesch. des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum*, Berlin, 1884, p. 63 ff., and the Appendix.

The fragments of Timon of Phlius have been last edited by Diels along with the Life of Diogenes Laertius in *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, Berlin, 1901. The most recent edition of Sextus Empiricus is that of Bekker (Berlin, 1842), but a new one by H. Mutschmann was in preparation before the War.

JOHN BURNET.

SCEPTICISM.—See AGNOSTICISM, BELIEF, DOUBT.

SCEPTICISM (Buddhist).—**1. Buddhism a 'rationalism.'**—Buddhism is a 'faith,' since it is ultimately based upon the authoritative word of the Master, the omniscient one; but it is also a 'free thought' or a philosophy, since the Master is not satisfied with a blind adhesion to his word and emphasizes the necessity of personal conviction, of personal inquiry. A Buddhist walks by 'sight' (*darśana*), not by 'faith' (*śraddhā*):

'Now, O monks, are you going to say: "We respect the Master, and out of respect for the Master, we believe this and that"?'—'No, O Lord'—'Is not what you will say to be true, that exactly which you have yourselves, and by yourselves, known, seen, apprehended?'—'Exactly so, O Lord.'[1]

This attitude of the Buddhist mind, which is an early one and may be described as the attitude of 'criticism,' is illustrated by the formula, 'Every thing that is well and truly said is a word of Buddha'—a recast of an earlier formula, 'Every Buddha's word is well said.'[2] The Buddhist philosopher is justified in developing any consequence of the traditional sayings, in evolving any theory—even a quite new one—which 'is' right, in denying the truth of any traditional saying which seems to be wrong. That has been taught by Buddha, not because it is true, but because it is useful.

'That *sūtra* is not a *sūtra* of "an obvious meaning" (*nītārtha*), but of a "meaning to be understood" (*neyārtha*); that has been said with an intention (*saṃdhāya*); for "it is the habit of Buddhas to comply with the world."'[3]

Buddhists, if not from the beginning, at least at a very early stage in the development of their philosophy, have been sceptics as concerns the truth of the obvious meaning of the Buddha's sayings: that only is to be regarded as true which can be proved to be true.

2. Scepticism properly so called.—Scepticism is likely to arise from rationalism, as soon as the philosopher admits that what does not support critical, dialectical inquiry (*vichārāsaha*) cannot be true. Such is the position of the Buddhist philosopher who recognizes in pure reasoning the standard of truth. The later Buddhism states this position very clearly;[4] but early Buddhism also gives evidences of it.

[1] See *Majjhima*, i. 265; cf. i. 71, and *Mahāniddesa*, p. 235; L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Authority of the Buddhist Agamas,' *JRAS*, new ser., xxxiv. [1902] 375, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, p. 139, *The Way to Nirvāṇa*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 155.

[2] Cf. and cf. *Suttanipāta*, p. 78, and *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* (Bibl. Buddh. i., Petrograd, 1902), p. 15.

[3] See *Mūlamadhyamaka* (Bibl. Buddh. iv., Petrograd, 1913), pp. 41, n. 1, 59 f.

[4] See artt. MADHYAMAKA, MAHĀYĀNA, NIHILISM (Buddhist), PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist).

Early Buddhism[1] denies the existence of a 'doer,' of a permanent self. It does not deny that there is a 'doer' or a self from the experimental or common standpoint (*sammutisachcha*). People at large (*mahatī janatā*) believe that 'thought, mind, or consciousness' is an 'I,' but this belief is the result of the inveterate habit of regarding thought as an 'I'; for, if we examine the notion of a permanent 'I,' we see that such an 'I' would be the master of his sensations. There are perceptions, feelings, states of consciousness; a permanent 'I' cannot be these perceptions, or the place of these perceptions, etc. Later Buddhism criticizes not only the notion of 'I,' but also either the notion of an exterior thing (*bāhya*)—the Vijñānavādins[2]—or all notions—the Mādhyamikas (*q.v.*).

The last-named philosophers have surpassed all Buddhists in dialectical inquiry; they have no tenets of their own; their only aim and task is to show the real or supposed antinomies which destroy all the commonly accepted ideas:[3]

Who walks? The man who has not begun walking, or the man who has finished walking, or the 'walker' (*gantā*)? Not the walker, since there would be two 'walkings': the walking by reason of which the walker is styled a walker and the walking which is attributed to the walker if one were to say that the walker walks.

Who obtains liberation? The man who is bound or the man who is not bound? Not the former, for he is bound; not the latter, for he is liberated.

The object of knowledge is previous to, or simultaneous with, or posterior to knowledge. The three hypotheses are absurd.

A cause (*pratyaya*) is so called because another thing is produced by reason of it. As long as the 'another thing' is not produced, the so-called cause is not a cause and cannot produce any effect. Seeds do not produce oil, just as sand does not produce oil, because, as long as oil is not produced, seeds, just like sand, are not a cause.

The effect is either existent or non-existent. If it is existent, it does not require a cause; if it is non-existent, thousands of causes cannot do anything to it.

There is a doer because there is a deed; there is a deed because there is a doer. Does the doer exist first and then the deed? or the deed first and then the doer? The existence of both is very much jeopardized.

Knowledge, say the Vijñānavādins, knows both itself and its object, just as a candle renders visible both itself and the non-self. If that were the case, darkness would darken itself as it does darken the non-self, and darkness therefore would not be visible.

Several of the Madhyamaka antinomies look rather sophistical and even childish; some may be worthy of attention. But is the general principle of their inquiry sound? Are facts (*vatthusachcha*) ascertained through the right means of knowledge (*pamāṇa*) to be rejected because we fail to understand them, to give a satisfactory definition of them (*lakkhaṇasachcha*)? Is the dialectical method the criterion of existence and non-existence? Śaṅkara rightly criticizes this philosophical position, and his remarks are worth considering.[4] But, as a matter of fact, Buddhists do not deny the existence of the things which they regard as logically impossible; they are sceptics as concerns ultimate reality, not as concerns mere existence. In the same way, Śaṅkara himself believes that individual experiences and objects exist without being real; and we may wonder how Śaṅkara, who has stated so clearly the contrast between the two truths, existence and reality, in the *Upaniṣads* and in the Vedānta, could be so slow in discovering his own theories in Buddhism.

[1] See art. HĪNAYĀNA.

[2] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist), 3 (*b*); *Mūlamadhyamaka, passim*, esp. i. 5, 6, 7, 13, ii. 1, vii. 12.

[3] See *Nyāyasūtra*, II. i. 8; and Vasubandhu's *Vimśakakārikā*, ed. and tr. in *Muséon*, xiii. [1912] 53.

[4] The Buddhist maintains that external things are impossible; for aggregates can be defined neither as different nor as non-different from the atoms, etc. 'This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms?' (Comm. on *Vedāntasūtra*, II. ii. 28, tr. G. Thibaut, *SBE* xxxiv. [1890] 421).

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

SCHISM.—I. Meaning of the word.—The word *σχίσμα*, as used in classical Greek, means a 'tear' or 'rent.' Aristotle[1] employs it to denote a cleft or division in a hoof, and Theophrastus[2] to denote a division in a leaf. In the Synoptists it has the same literal meaning. In Mt 9^{16}=Mk 2^{21} it means a rent in a garment. In the Gospel of St. John and 1 Cor. it has a metaphorical sense, signifying in Jn 7^{43} 9^{16} 10^{19} a difference of opinion about our Lord, and in 1 Co 1^{10} $11^{18f.}$ party strife in the Church. In the second of the passages from 1 Cor. it is connected with *αἱρεσις*:

ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν . . . δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι· ἵνα οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν.

Various attempts have been made to distinguish between *σχίσμα* and *αἵρεσις* in this passage,[3] but the two words probably mean much the same.[4] If there is any distinction to be made between them, *αἵρεσις* may imply the formation of a separate society or faction, not merely the holding of views different from those of the majority. In any case the difference is of degree, not of kind.

In the writings of the 'Apostolic' Fathers *σχίσμα* is used in much the same sense as in the passages quoted from 1 Cor., of party strife *within the Church*.[5] On the other hand, *αἵρεσις* has already come to mean 'false belief,' as in Ignatius, *ad Trall.* vi., where, speaking of Docetism, he says:

ἀλλοτρίας δὲ βοτάνης ἀπέχεσθαι, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἵρεσις.[6]

But differences of opinion in the Church tended to become separation from the Church, especially when the Church began to spread among men of various nationalities and modes of thought. Thus, in course of time, the word *σχίσμα* came to denote a separation from the main body of the Church, not involving the rejection of any of the fundamental doctrines of the faith, while *αἵρεσις* was confined to a denial of one or more of the fundamental doctrines. This use of *σχίσμα* appears first in Irenæus, whose words are:

Ἀνακρινεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰ σχίσματα ἐργαζομένους κενοὺς ὄντας τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγάπης, καὶ τὸ ἴδιον λυσιτελὲς σκοποῦντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς ἐκκλησίας· καὶ διὰ μικρὰς καὶ τὰς τυχούσας αἰτίας τὸ μέγα καὶ ἔνδοξον σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ τέμνοντας καὶ διαιροῦντας, καὶ ὅσιν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀναιροῦντας . . . Οὐδεμία δὲ τηλικαύτη δύναται πρὸς αὐτῶν κατόρθωσις γενέσθαι· ἡλίκη τοῦ σχίσματός ἐστιν ἡ βλάβη.[7]

Among the Fathers writing in Latin Augustine may be regarded as representative. In his treatise against Faustus he defines schism, as distinct from heresy, in the following terms:

'Schisma . . . est eadem opinantem atque eodem ritu colentem quo caeteri solo congregationis delectari discidio.'[8]

Some of the Fathers assert indeed that schism tends to become heresy. Jerome says:

'Inter haeresim et schisma hoc esse arbitrantur, quod haeresis perversum dogma habeat; schisma propter episcopalem dissensionem ab Ecclesia separetur. Caeterum nullum schisma non sibi aliquam confingit haeresim.'[9]

[1] *Hist. An.* ii. 1. 26. [2] *Ph.* III. xi. 1.

[3] *E.g.*, Trench, *NT Synonyms*[8], London, 1876, p. 359.

[4] Theodoret, in his commentary on the passage (J. A. Cramer, *Catenæ Græcorum Patrum in NT*, Oxford, 1844, v. 214), says: *Σχίσματα οὐ δογματικὰ λέγει· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ τῆς φιλαρχίας . . . αἱρέσεις τὰς φιλονεικίας λέγει, οὐ τὰς τῶν δογμάτων διαφοράς.* Cf. Cyprian, *Test.* iii. 86, 93. In Tit 3^{10} *αἱρετικός*=*σχισματικός*. But cf. *Essays on the Early Hist. of the Church and the Ministry*, ed. H. B. Swete, London, 1918, pp. 45, 319.

[5] Clem. *ad Cor. I.* 2^{6} 49^{5} 54^{2}; *Didache*, iv. 3; Barnabas, *Ep.* xix. 12; Hermas, *Sim.* viii. 9.

[6] Cf. *ad Ephes.* vi.

[7] *Adv. Hær.* IV. xxxiii. 7. He is speaking of the 'discipulus spiritalis' of 1 Co 2^{15}.

[8] *C. Faustum*, xx. 3; cf. *c. Crescon.* ii. 3–7, *Quæst. in Matthæum*, xi. ff.: 'Haeretici falsa credunt . . . schismaticos non fides diversa [facit], sed communionis disrupta societas,' *c. Gaudent.* ii. 9.

[9] *In Epist. ad Titum*, iii. 10.

And Cyprian appears even to identify the two.[1] But on the whole the distinction in meaning between the two words is preserved both by ancient and by more recent writers.[2]

2. The Church and schism.—Cyprian is the first writer to discuss the relation of the Church to schism. He had to combat Novatianism, which, like Montanism and the later Donatism, was a Puritan movement on the part of men impatient of the evils in the Church and dreading the contamination of what they regarded as Catholic laxity.[3] 'Those who tolerate such laxity,' they said, 'cease to be a part of the true Church.'[4] Cyprian's attitude towards schism may be gathered from his letters and especially from his tract *de Unitate Ecclesiæ*.

'Deus unus est,' are his words, 'et Christus unus, et una Ecclesia eius, et fides una, et plebs una in solidam corporis unitatem concordiae glutino copulata . . . Quidquid a matrice discesserit, seorsum vivere et spirare non poterit.'[5]

He heaps up metaphors to illustrate the unity of the Church. It is like the unity of the three Persons of the Godhead. He who does not keep this unity does not keep the law of God or the faith of the Father and the Son:

'Hanc unitatem qui non tenet, Dei legem non tenet, non tenet Patris et Filii fidem, vitam non tenet, et salutem.'[6]

The schismatic is worse than the apostate. The latter sins and may repent; the former sins daily and glories in his sin. Apostates injure themselves only; the schismatic endangers the souls of very many.[7]

Augustine had to deal with the Donatists (*q.v.*). He takes much the same view of schism as Cyprian had done. The Donatists argued that the Catholics by their laxity had forfeited their baptismal privilege, and that the Donatists alone formed the true Church. To this Augustine replied that the validity of a sacrament does not depend upon the holiness of him who administers it, and that the only feature by which the true Church can be recognized is its catholicity.

'Securus iudicat orbis terrarum, bonos non esse qui se dividunt ab orbe terrarum.'[8]

Schismatics like the Donatists should be punished. Those who are outside the Church have not Christ, the head of the Church.

'Clamate, si audetis puniantur . . . sceleris sive libidinis facinora seu flagitia; sola sacrilegia volumus a regnantium legibus impunita.'[9] 'Habere autem caput Christum nemo poterit, nisi qui in eius corpore fuerit.'[10]

But he does not go so far as Cyprian, who had maintained that sacraments administered by separatists were invalid.[11] He only asserts that no schismatic can receive them validly, so long as he remains a stranger to that unity in love which is the Catholic Church. And in his general attitude towards schismatics, like Optatus of Milevis, he is more kindly than Cyprian.[12] But schism, in his view, as in that of Cyprian, is a grievous sin.

Schism, then, since it is rebellion against authority, and since it causes a breach in the unity of the Church, was always regarded in early times as a very serious matter. To maintain unimpaired the unity of the Catholic Church was the duty of all good Christians.[1] But how was this unity to be maintained? By means of the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, the *sacramentum unitatis*. And, further, the centre of unity was the bishop. What Ignatius[2] constantly affirmed of particular churches Cyprian transferred to the Church as a whole.

'The Episcopate is one,' he says; 'the individual bishops are members of a great brotherhood, bound together in a corporate unity. Bishops form a kind of equal co-partnership.'[3]

This view of the episcopate, however, gradually gave place to another. Quite early in the writings of the Fathers is found the idea that churches founded by the apostles and churches to which they wrote letters were able to say with more certainty than others what the teaching of the apostles really was. Irenæus speaks of Rome and Smyrna as such churches. His words are:

'Maximae et antiquissimae, et omnibus cognitae, a gloriosissimis duobus apostolis Petro et Paulo Romae fundatae et constitutae ecclesiae, eam quam habet ab apostolis traditionem . . . indicantes, confundimus omnes eos . . . qui praeterquam oportet colligunt.'[4]

And a little later:

Καὶ Πολύκαρπος . . . ὑπὸ Ἀποστόλων κατασταθεὶς . . . ἐν τῇ ἐν Σμύρνῃ Ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐπίσκοπος . . . ἐξῆλθε τοῦ βίου, ταῦτα διδάξας ἀεί, ἃ καὶ παρὰ τῶν Ἀποστόλων ἔμαθεν, ἃ καὶ ἡ Ἐκκλησία παραδίδωσιν, ἃ καὶ μόνα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ.[5]

Tertullian[6] enumerates Ephesus, Smyrna, Rome, Corinth, Philippi. Fulgentius[7] speaks of Rome, Alexandria, Jerusalem. In all these lists Rome appears. Rome had been the capital of the world, and the bishop of Rome came to occupy a position of exceptional influence, partly because of the orthodoxy of the Roman Church, partly because of the position and history of Rome. The bishop of Rome, in fact, wielded in the Church the same kind of authority as the emperors had wielded in the State. Thus, in course of time, obedience to the Roman pontiff became the test of catholicity. Those who refused to submit to his authority were branded as schismatics. Optatus[8] is perhaps the first of the Fathers to claim for the bishop of Rome universal jurisdiction—a claim which eventually came to be admitted by the Western Church generally. The growth of papal absolutism was indeed slow and was not without its checks—as, *e.g.*, when Gregory the Great repudiated for him-

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[1] Cyprian, *Ep.* iii. 3, lii. 1, lxxiii. 2, lxxiv. 11, quoted by Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1893, ii. 92.

[2] Cf. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, v. 68. 6 *ad fin.*: 'Heretics, as touching those points of doctrine wherein they fail, and schismatics, as touching the quarrels for which or the duties wherein they divide themselves from their brethren . . . have all forsaken the true Church of God.'

[3] 'Schism may have what we must call a nobler root [than pride and self-assertion]. It may spring from impatient, undisciplined zeal against evil in the Church' (C. Gore, *Roman Catholic Claims*[9], London, 1905, p. 126).

[4] See art. NOVATIANISTS.

[5] *De Unitate*, 23. [6] *Ib.* 6.

[7] *De Unit.* 19; E. W. Benson, *Cyprian*, London, 1899, ch. lv.; J. F. Bethune Baker, *Introd. to Early Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, do. 1903, p. 363 ff.; T. A. Lacey, *Unity and Schism*, do. 1917, pp. 24 ff., 168 ff.

[8] *C. Epist. Parmen.* iii. 24 *ad fin.*

[9] *C. Gaudent.* 20, *c. Epist. Parmen.* i. 16, *de Correctione Don.* (=*Epp.* 185) vi.

[10] *De Unit.* 49.

[11] Cf. Basil, *Epist. Canon. I. ad Amphilochium.*

[12] Optatus, *de Schism. Don.* I. iii. 23: 'Sunt sine dubio [Donatistae] fratres, quamvis non boni.' For Optatus see O. R. Vassall-Phillips, *St. Optatus of Milevis*, London, 1917. The Church recognized degrees of schism. The gravity of the schism was in proportion to the degree of separation from the main body (J. Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, ed. London, 1870, ii. 879 f.). The worst form was the setting up of altar against altar. For Augustine's general attitude towards schism see P. Batiffol, in *The Constructive Quarterly*, v. [1917] 30–55.

[1] Cyprian is praised by Augustine because (in spite of the unjust claims of Stephen, bishop of Rome) he did not break the unity of the Church by separation. He is regarded as a typical instance of the 'unschismatic temper' (Augustine, *de Bapt.* v. 25–36; cf. Jerome, *adv. Lucifer.* 25).

[2] Cf. *ad Ephes.* 4, *Smyrn.* 8, *Trall.* 3. 'Ignatius is the incarnation, as it were, of three closely connected ideas: the glory of martyrdom, the omnipotence of episcopacy, and the hatred of heresy and schism' (P. Schaff, *Hist. of the Church: Ante-Nicene Christianity*, new ed., Edinburgh, 1884, ii. 657).

[3] *Epp.* lxvi. 8, *de Unit.* 5; see Lacey, p. 168 ff.; Benson, p. 182; Jerome, *Epp.* cxlvi.

[4] *Adv. Hær.* III. iii. 1. [5] III. iii. 4.

[6] *de Præscr.* 32, 36. [7] *de Trin.* i.

[8] ii. 2 (vii. 3): 'In qua una cathedra [Romae] unitas ab omnibus servaretur . . . ut iam schismaticus et peccator esset, qui contra singularem cathedram alteram collocaret.' Cyprian has sometimes been claimed as a supporter of the 'papal' view on the strength of his use of the phrase 'Cathedra Petri' (*de Unit.* 4). But his whole argument shows that the phrase denotes, not the see of Rome, but the bishop's seat of authority in each several church. See Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*[4], London, 1900, p. 156 n., *Roman Catholic Claims*[9], p. 177 n. ff., *The Early Hist. of the Church and Ministry*, p. 250 ff.

self the title of universal bishop.[1] But, on the whole, it was steady, till at length Thomas Aquinas in the 13th cent. could say, in language which was accepted as authoritative by the whole Church in the West:

'Et ideo proprie schismatici dicuntur qui propria sponte et intentione se ab unitate Ecclesiae separant . . . Caput [Ecclesiae] est ipse Christus, cuius vicem in Ecclesia gerit summus pontifex. Et ideo schismatici dicuntur qui subesse renuunt summo pontifici.'[2]

He goes on to distinguish between heresy and schism:

'Haeresis per se opponitur fidei; schisma autem per se opponitur unitati ecclesiasticae charitatis . . . Peccatum schismatis est gravius peccato infidelitatis . . . Schisma est contra bonum multitudinis, id est, contra ecclesiasticam unitatem; infidelitas autem est contra bonum particulare unius . . . Schismatici habent aliquam potestatem quia retinent ordinem . . . Potest sacramentum tradere separatus . . . Duplex est spiritualis potestas—una quidem *sacramentalis*—alia *jurisdictionalis*' (schismatics have the former, but not the latter; cf. the whole section).

The final stage in the growth of papalism was reached in 1870, when the Vatican Council promulgated a series of decrees, one of which runs thus:

'Nos dogma esse definimus: Romanum Pontificem, cum ex cathedra loquitur—id est, cum doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa Ecclesia tenendam definit, ea infallibilitate pollere qua Divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam instructam esse voluit: ideoque definitiones ex sese, *non autem ex consensu Ecclesiae*, irreformabiles esse.'[3]

No doubt such claims were, in themselves, not new. The bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. at the beginning of the 14th cent. had claimed for the pope absolute authority, but this was repudiated in the next century by the Council of Constance, which demanded that the pope should obey its decisions in matters of faith. The Vatican decree makes the pope independent of Councils.[4]

3. **Revolts from Rome.**—Absolutism, in Church as in State, tends to produce restlessness and eventual revolt. And it is roughly true that the majority of the 'schisms' from the 11th cent. onwards have come about as the result, direct or indirect, of the absolutism which finds its chief expression, in matters ecclesiastical, in the Church of Rome. The first great revolt was the separation of the Eastern Church from that of the West. Up to the 11th cent. the external unity of the Church had been, on the whole, maintained. The various schisms—Montanism, Novatianism, Donatism—had not seriously impaired that unity. But in 1052 the long-standing differences, partly racial, partly ecclesiastical, between Rome and Constantinople were brought to a head by the formal excommunication of the Eastern Church by Pope Leo IX. The position taken up, and held ever since, by the autocephalous Churches of the East is that the Western Church, by introducing innovations regarding the foundations of Church government, separated herself from the Mother Churches of the East, which are the true heirs of the old undivided Church.[5] It has been argued that this separation was not a pure schism, since a point of doctrine was involved. But the addition of the *Filioque* clause to the Nicene Creed was not, in itself, important doctrinally. In the words of Laud it was 'but a question in manner of speech, and therefore not fundamental.'[6] The protest of the East was chiefly against its insertion in an ecumenical creed on purely Western authority—that of Pope Nicholas I. Thus the separation of East and West was, fundamentally, a protest against papalism.[1] In the West external unity was maintained, not infrequently by force, till the 16th cent., when a considerable part of Europe broke away from the papal obedience. In England the Reformation was conservative in character. Episcopacy was retained. The ancient creeds of the Church were kept as the authorized expression of the faith. The public services were founded on the primitive offices. But elsewhere, save in Scandinavia, Episcopacy was rejected. In Germany the reforming movement took the form of Lutheranism (*q.v.*); in Scotland and, to a limited extent, in France Calvinism (*q.v.*) became the accepted form of Protestantism. So far as England is concerned, the last stage in the separation from Rome was reached when, in 1570, Pope Pius V. published his bull of excommunication, *Regnans in Excelsis*. By the bull the Anglican 'schism,' hitherto regarded as provisional, was made definite.[2]

4. **Post-Reformation schisms.**—The reign of Queen Elizabeth saw the rise of Puritanism (*q.v.*) and Presbyterianism (*q.v.*) *within* the Church of England. In the latter part of this reign the Puritan party became influential, and it grew still further in strength during the next reigns, though there was, as yet, no considerable secession *from* the Church. Congregationalism (*q.v.*), from small beginnings in Elizabeth's reign, became prominent during the Commonwealth. It would have nothing to do with the parochial system. The visible Church was, in its view, made up of faithful men and women, and of such only,[3] freely gathered together into congregations, each congregation being autonomous. Thus, in one of its main features, it resembled Donatism. In 1633 the first congregation of Baptists[4] was formed by a secession from the Congregationalists. Both these bodies were democratic and therefore farther removed than the Anglican Church from Roman Catholic autocracy. The final separation between that Church and Puritanism was brought about by the 'fatal' Act of Uniformity of 1662. From this Act Dissent took its rise. The next great secession was that of Methodism (*q.v.*), under the leadership of John Wesley. He himself declared that he lived and died a member of the Anglican Church, but his action in ordaining bishops and presbyters made separation inevitable. 'Ordination,' in Lord Mansfield's words, 'is separation.' Since that time numerous separated bodies have come into existence in Britain, America, and the British colonies. This 'fissiparous tendency' has been ascribed to the 'centrifugal force of Protestantism.' Probably, however, since it is found chiefly among Anglo-Saxons, it is, in essence, racial—the result of a strong individualism, and perhaps also of a certain self-regarding temper and an impatient zeal against evil in the Church. Nor must it be forgotten that the Anglican Church has in the past displayed something of the arrogant spirit which brings about schisms. She has too often shown a want of sympathy with new ideas

[1] *Epp.* viii. 30 ('ad Eulogium'); cf. F. Homes Dudden, *Gregory the Great*, London, 1905, ii. 224 ff.

[2] *Summa*, II. ii. 39.

[3] Sess. iv. cap. iv.; see art. INFALLIBILITY.

[4] See Gore, *Roman Catholic Claims*[3], p. 122. Those members of the Roman obedience who refused to accept this decree formed the 'Old Catholic' body (see art. OLD CATHOLICISM).

[5] See art. EASTERN CHURCH.

[6] *A Relation of the Conference between William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Mr. Fisher the Jesuit*, London, 1639, § 9; Laud, *Works*, Oxford, 1849, ii. 27.

[1] The 'schism' of Antioch in the 4th cent. did not result in a permanent separation from the main body of the Church, and the 'Great Western Schism' (1377-1417) was not, strictly speaking, a schism at all, since it did not involve any denial of papal authority, but was a dispute as to which of the rival popes had the right to wield that authority.

[2] Roman Catholic theologians sometimes distinguish between active and passive schism, the former being a deliberate separation from the Church on the part of the schismatic, the latter the lot of those whom the Church rejects by excommunication. Thus the Anglican Church can say: 'Schisma patimur, non fecimus.'

[3] 'The kingdom of God is not to be begun by whole Parishes, but rather by the worthiest were they never so few' (Robert Browne, *A True and Short Declaration*, Middelburg [1583]; see art. BROWNISM).

[4] See art. ANABAPTISTS.

and new movements. In striving after uniformity she has, not infrequently, sacrificed unity.

5. **The ethics of schism.**—Two opposite views have been held in regard to schism on its ethical side. (1) There is the view, first formulated by Irenæus in the passage quoted at the beginning of the article, that schism is so great an evil that nothing can justify it, and that no reforms brought about by schismatics can make up for the harm caused by the schism.[1] (2) The opposite view is that churches, like commercial undertakings, are all the better for competition, and that schisms are desirable in that they promote a healthy rivalry—that in short 'a plurality of independent Christian communities in the same country is the ideal state of things.'[2] The latter view has been largely abandoned during the last few years by Nonconformists as well as by Churchmen. The words of Richard Baxter, 'He that seeth not the necessity of unity knoweth not the nature of the Church,'[3] represent, on the whole, the attitude of the great majority of thoughtful people at the present time. 'We have at least ceased to be proud of our divisions,' says a leading Nonconformist. 'A great longing possesses many of us to break down the barriers which separate us one from another.'[4] And indeed it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain this view if the teaching of the Bible is accepted. Just as the prophets of the older Dispensation deplored the division between Israel and Judah (Is $11^{12ff.}$, Ezk 37^{16}, Jer 3^{18}, Hos 1^{11}), so our Lord and the NT writers constantly put forward unity in the Church as the ideal (Jn $10^{16, 17}$, esp. vv.$^{20-23}$, Eph 4, Ro $16^{17ff.}$, Gal 3^{28}). Moreover, the metaphors used to describe the Church—family, vine, body, temple, etc.—all emphasize the thought of oneness in Christ. There are, further, the practical evils of division—overlapping, waste of power, and rivalry, often degenerating into mutual hostility. In regard to the former view, it may be admitted that schism is an evil, since it is contrary to charity and that unity which is Christ's ideal for the Church, and is in many cases an act of disobedience to lawful authority. But the question remains, At whose door does the sin lie in any particular case of schism? The selfish and arrogant temper which is both the cause of schism in others and itself schismatic may be found in the body from which separation is made as well as in that which separates. In the case of the 'Anglican schism' the contention of the great Anglican divines of the 17th cent.—Hooker, Jewel, Jeremy Taylor, and the rest—is that the Church of England was compelled by the arrogant demands of Rome to break away from her obedience, and that, if that Church has separated from Rome, she has never 'swerved either from the word of God, or from the Apostles of Christ, or from the primitive Church.'[5] It may be thought that the English reformers displayed too much impatience and were overhasty in some of their proceedings. In no ecclesiastical quarrel is one party wholly in the right. But, when all deductions are made, it remains true that 'we were justified [in our separation from Rome] because the only terms on which we could retain communion with Rome were sinful terms.'[1] The Dissenters took up much the same position in regard to the Church of England. They contended that it was impossible for them to remain in communion with her, since they honestly and *ex animo* believed that they would be committing sin if they did so.[2] The extremists among them went so far as to declare that the Church of England had ceased to be a Christian Church. In like manner the separation of the Free Church of Scotland from the Established Church in the 19th cent. was regarded by the secessionists as the assertion of a great spiritual principle which made it impossible for them any longer to remain members of the Establishment.

If, then, schism is sometimes justified, it is yet clearly contrary to the ideal of our Lord and His apostles. The principle of schism has rarely been defended. At the present time the evils of separation are becoming felt more perhaps than at any previous era in the history of the Christian Church, and suggestions are being made in various quarters with the view of healing the divisions of Christendom. These are, as yet, for the most part tentative, although in Australia the question of the reunion of the Australian Church in communion with the Church of England and the Presbyterian Church seems to have advanced beyond the tentative stage.[3] But, before any large plans for reunion can be carried into effect, it would seem necessary that the various separated bodies should make it quite clear what they regard as essential and what they are prepared to sacrifice. Rome, officially at least, demands submission to the authority of the pope as the only condition of reunion. The Anglican Church, following the lead of the American Episcopal Church,[4] has, in the 'Lambeth Quadrilateral' of 1888, laid down 'as a basis for reunion' the following principles: (1) the acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as the rule of faith; (2) the acceptance of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as the sufficient statement of faith; (3) the recognition of the two sacraments, Baptism and Holy Communion; and (4) the recognition of the historic episcopate.[5] In March 1917 the 'Federation of Evangelical Free Churches of England,' wishing 'to seek closer federation with one another for the better witness to, and service of, the Gospel,' adopted the reports of four Committees which were drawn up with the object of promoting 'unity and communion . . . with other branches of the Church of Christ.' By action such as this the ground is being cleared and the hope of ultimate reunion and the healing of schisms brought nearer to realization. But it will take time and demand the exercise of much faith and patience before the consummation comes about. We must

[1] See Gore, *Roman Catholic Claims*[9], p. 128; L. Duchesne, *Autonomies ecclésiastiques: Eglises séparées*[2], Paris, 1904.

[2] See *The Life and Letters of Fenton John Anthony Hort*, London, 1896, ii. 428; he is referring to the position taken up by W. F. Moulton.

[3] R. Baxter, *The Cure of Church Divisions*, London, 1670, p. 66; cf. Preface, § 3, and the whole treatise.

[4] R. A. Aytoun, in *The Free Catholic*, Birmingham, April 1917, p. 56; cf. R. Baxter, *The True and Only Way of Concord*, London, 1680; R. J. Campbell, *A Spiritual Pilgrimage*, do. 1917, p. 298 ff.; P. T. Forsyth, *Lectures on the Church and the Sacraments*, do. 1917 ('We look forward to an Œcumenical Christianity').

[5] Jewel, *Works* (Parker Society), Cambridge, 1848, iii. 59 ff. For other references see A. J. Mason, *The Church of England and Episcopacy*, Cambridge, 1914, ch. i.: 'There is no Catholic principle which can justify us in supposing that either the . . . Eastern Church or the Anglican Church has been guilty of the sin of schism, in that sense in which schism is the act of self-withdrawal from the Church catholic' (Gore, *Roman Catholic Claims*[9], p. 137)

[1] Mason, p. 542.

[2] W. B. Selbie, in *Mansfield College Essays*, London, 1909, p. 29 ff. and the authorities there quoted. 'In the case of the protestant dissenters the whole argument turned upon the point whether the terms of communion with the church of England were or were not sinful. Church writers were ready to admit that if they were *thought* to be sinful, those who thought so were bound *in foro conscientiæ* to secede' (Mason, p. 542).

[3] H. Lowther Clarke (archbishop of Melbourne), in *The Constructive Quarterly*, v. 19 ff.

[4] See Lacey, p. 216 ff. The document of the American bishops, drawn up in 1886, differs somewhat in form, though not in essentials, from that emanating from the Lambeth Conference.

[5] 'Episcopacy has been the instrument of the Spirit . . . [but] it is conceivable that it may be changed out of recognition or that another instrument may be found. You may hold with unhesitating faith that the Church of Christ is one, and that its unity will, in good time, be made manifest, but it may be unwise to pin your faith exclusively to episcopacy' (Lacey, p. 48)

not make the old mistake of identifying unity and uniformity. In the early Church there was practical unity combined with a great variety of local use and custom. And at the present time certain 'Uniat' Churches of the Roman obedience have their own rites. 'In una Fide nihil officit consuetudo diversa.' And, finally, we must recognize that 'the necessary prelude to reunion is not a common formula but a whole-hearted acceptance of a common principle of thought and conduct.'[1] The unity of the Church must be put on a religious rather than a theological basis. We must recognize that all Christians are brothers in Christ, and this recognition will enable us to promote *τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης* (Eph 4^3).

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H. W. FULFORD.

SCHLEIERMACHER. — Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in Breslau in 1768 and died in Berlin in 1834. He is among the most important and influential of German theologians and has been called, not without reason, the father of modern theology. The boldness of his new departures, the wide range of his thought, and his experimental method mark him out as a pioneer.

1. **Life and character.**—Like many great men, Schleiermacher owed more to his mother than to his father. His mother, *née* Stubenrauch, was a woman of keen intellect and deep piety; she guided her son's earlier education, and throughout her life the two were knit together by bonds of the closest affection. His father, Gottlieb, was chaplain to a Prussian regiment in Silesia. His duties took him frequently away from the home and so left the family largely to the mother's care. He was a Reformed theologian of the old school and of a stern and unbending orthodoxy. As might be expected, plain living and high thinking were the rule in his household. The young Schleiermacher began his school-days at five years of age. In 1783 he was sent along with his brother and sister to a Moravian school at Niesky in Upper Lusatia and two years later to the Moravian College at Barby. In his many journeys the father had come into close contact with the Moravians and coveted for his children the pious atmosphere and healthy moral discipline of their educational system. To the son also this was at first equally congenial, but later the bonds began to chafe his restless spirit. He confesses to a constitutional scepticism, or itch for inquiry, which caused him no little mental disquiet and ultimately led to a temporary breach both with his teachers and with his father. He declined to bow to their authority and insisted on his own intellectual and spiritual independence, but always in the most filial and reverent spirit. At the same time he was deeply influenced by the Moravian teaching and tone, and to this he owed the strain of deep piety which is so marked in all his writings. In 1787, with the full consent of his father, Schleiermacher left Barby and entered the University of Halle. At that time Halle was a centre of rationalism under the influence of Semler and Wolf. Schleiermacher attended their lectures and those of Eberhard, from whom he learned that love of Plato for which he afterwards became conspicuous. He also studied NT criticism, but neglected the OT, to his lasting disadvantage. But his main interest was in the work of Kant, Jacobi, and Spinoza. Even as a student he began a reconstruction of Kant's system on lines suggested by his study of Plato, while from 'the holy and blessed Spinoza' he derived the foundation ideas of his ethical system. This eclectic course of study left him, at the end of his university career, with little more than the hope of 'attaining, by earnest research and patient examination of all the witnesses, to a reasonable degree of certainty, and to a knowledge of the boundaries of human science and learning.'[1]

In 1790 Schleiermacher obtained his licentiate and became tutor in the house of Count Dohna at Schlobitten in W. Prussia. For such a position his independent spirit was not altogether suited, but there is no doubt that he gained considerably in ease of manner and *savoir faire* from the home life of the Dohna family. In 1794 he was ordained and became for a time assistant to his uncle, the aged pastor of Landsberg-on-the-Warthe. Two years later he moved to Berlin to become chaplain to the Charité Hospital. This early sojourn in Berlin was the most formative period in his career. His ecclesiastical duties were largely formal, and he spent most of his time in philosophical and theological study and in intercourse with a wide and charming circle of friends. This drew him out of himself and completed the process of refinement begun at Schlobitten. It was the time when the Romantic movement was at its height, and Schleiermacher's sensitive and imaginative spirit was deeply influenced by it. His intimacy with F. Schlegel and his rather dangerous platonic friendship with Eleonore Grunow, the wife of a Berlin pastor, stirred his emotional nature to its depths and enriched his human sympathies. The firstfruit of this period of fermentation was the epoch-making work, *Reden über die Religion*, issued in 1799, in which, as against its 'cultured despisers,' he vindicated the place of religion in man's nature and laid the foundations of a theology based upon experience. The following year appeared the *Monologen*, in which he outlined his ethical system and asserted the freedom of the human spirit in its relations both with society and with the universe. Both books show the influence of his deeper studies in Spinoza and Fichte.

In 1802 Schleiermacher left Berlin in order to become pastor in the little town of Stolpe in Pomerania. The change was altogether to the advantage of his moral and spiritual development. It released him from the too fascinating literary and æsthetic influences of Berlin and gave him time to think and to cultivate his soul. While at Stolpe, he completed the translation of Plato which he had begun along with Schlegel—a task which confirmed him in the belief that he was dealing with the greatest of the philosophers. There, too, he published the first of his strictly philosophical works, *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre*—a Herculean labour which produced but little effect owing to its obscurity of style and its purely negative and critical spirit. He passes in review the systems of Plato and Spinoza, Kant and Fichte, and decides very strongly in favour of the two former; but even these he considers deficient in that they give no complete account of the laws and ends of human life as a whole. What Schleiermacher desiderated and

[1] F. Weston (bishop of Zanzibar), *The Fulness of Christ*, London, 1916, p. 5.

[1] Letter to his Father, Dec. 1789.

sought himself to supply was a moral system which would regard the universe as a realm of ends. During this period also he paid more attention to preaching, which he regarded as the best means of bringing his personal influence to bear on the general sense of mankind in the mass. He sought by it to bring home to men the power of religion, especially in its ethical and practical aspects.

In 1804 Schleiermacher returned to his old university, Halle, as preacher and professor of theology. In that home of rationalism his reputation as a *Romantiker* and a pietist caused him to be regarded at first with some suspicion. But he soon won his way to a considerable reputation as lecturer and preacher. The fine dialogue, *Weihnachtsfeier*, which he published in 1806, served to illustrate his growing appreciation of the fundamentals of Christianity and also the confusion which still marked his theology. It is a strongly imaginative work and shows traces of a vein of real poetry. At Halle he also busied himself with patriotic political utterances, drawn from him by the need of the times, and with schemes for Church reform—a subject in which he remained deeply interested all through his life. In 1806 the University of Halle was temporarily suspended owing to Napoleon's invasion, and Schleiermacher retired to the island of Rügen. After the battle of Jena he returned to Berlin and was soon afterwards appointed pastor of the Trinity Church. The following year he married the widow of his friend Willich, with whom he lived very happily, in spite of the disparity in years (he was old enough to be her father). In 1810 he took a leading part in founding the university of Berlin and was at once called to fill the chair of theology. He was also elected secretary to the Academy of Sciences. He lectured on almost every branch of theology as well as on philosophy and philosophical introduction. He also preached regularly on Sundays, and his preaching speedily won for him a foremost place in the national life. The force and fire of his sermons, their sound common sense, and their bearing on the needs and duties of the nation at a time of danger and humiliation won for them a wide hearing and a generous appreciation. At the same time Schleiermacher was deeply concerned with the reorganization of the Prussian Church and became a lifelong advocate of union between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. He became a great personage in the life of Berlin both social and official. The firstfruits of his new position appeared in the small volume entitled *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (1811). In this he surveyed the whole field of theological inquiry in quite a new way and laid down the lines for all future systematizing of the subject. It was a most important and fruitful new departure. Ten years later he issued his monumental theological work, *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche*. This was an attempt to reform and restate Protestant theology on lines suggested by the *Reden*, making religious experience, or the sense of dependence on God mediated through Jesus Christ, the norm of dogmatic theology rather than the Creeds, the Fathers, or the unaided human reason. It met with much criticism from both evangelicals and rationalists; but Schleiermacher defended his positions with vigour and masterly skill, and there is no doubt that the fundamental ideas of his work have entered into the warp and woof of modern theological thought. He may have no disciples in the strict sense of the term, but every theologian is his debtor. The *Christliche Glaube* went through two or three editions in its author's lifetime, each of which was greatly altered. It should be read in connexion with his defence of it published in letters to his friend Lücke in *Studien und Kritiken* for 1829. In the same year Schleiermacher lost his only son—a blow from which he never recovered. He was now an old man; but he persevered in his manifold labours and controversies and retained his full mental vigour to the end. He died in 1834 after a few days' illness, full of years and of honours.

In appearance Schleiermacher was short of stature and slightly hump-backed. His face was grave and strongly marked, but very mobile and full of fire and expression, while his movements were quick and nervous. He had a ready and satirical wit, but it was never malicious. He kept his friendships well and was of a most affectionate nature, and he bore no grudge against his opponents. He prided himself on a certain philosophic calm and on a complete control of his emotions. At the same time he felt strongly and was often moved by conviction into lines of conduct that were by no means to his advantage. He gives the impression of a strong, fervid soul, a deeply Christian spirit, and an intellect of the widest range and sweep. Germany has never failed to do him honour, and in recent years there has been a remarkable revival of interest in his works, which are now more widely studied than perhaps ever before.

2. Work.—(*a*) *Philosophy.*—Schleiermacher has been called the prince of *Vermittlers*, but this is more true of him as a philosopher than as a theologian. In theology he was a pioneer, and in striking out his own line he was not concerned merely to mediate between extremes. In philosophy, on the other hand, he sought quite frankly to give equal weight to the idealistic and realistic elements in the Kantian position and to allow for the *a priori* as well as for the empirical factor in knowledge. Quite in consonance with this position, he made no attempt at a systematic philosophy, but was content rather to sow seeds for future thinkers and to approach philosophy from the side of his religious and theological interest. His aim was to unify the world of being and the world of thought, the real and the ideal, in God.

The materials for his philosophy are to be found in his *Dialektik*, in the criticism of previous ethical systems, and in his *Aesthetik*. The first and last named, published from his pupils' notes, are materials and nothing more. His epistemology distinguishes between the form and material of knowledge, the former being given in the 'intellectual function' and the latter through sensuous perception. The forms of knowledge, which correspond with forms of being, are concepts and judgments, and knowledge is developed by induction and deduction. Knowledge is of phenomena; and Schleiermacher definitely repudiates the Hegelian theory as to the originative power of pure thought independently of the phenomenal world.

God is the great unifying principle in the universe. In Him real and ideal are one; and He is to be conceived neither as separated from, nor as identical with, the world. But, just as absolute knowledge, the complete identity of thought and being, is an ideal which can never be wholly realized by our finite minds, so we are incapable of knowing God as He really is. He is the great First Cause, mirrored in the universe and in human souls.

> 'The usual conception of God as one single being ou side of the world and behind the world is not the beginning and the end of religion. It is only one manner of expressing God, seldom entirely pure and always inadequate. . . . Yet the true nature of religion is neither this idea nor any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world.'[1]

Though Schleiermacher urges that philosophy is not subordinate to religion, it should be remem-

[1] *Reden*, tr. Oman, *On Religion*, p. 101.

bered that his chief interest is in the latter, and that he always confessed himself a dilettante in philosophy. The unconscious aim of all his speculation is to vindicate the need and worth of religion and the innate power of the religious consciousness. Far more important than any of his strictly philosophical works is the practical application of his philosophy found in the *Reden*. There he seeks the justification of religion, not in any dogmatic ideas, but in the religious consciousness of man.

'If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness which is derived, for ever apart.'[1]

Religion is the necessary and indispensable third to science and art, because it accompanies, if it does not produce, both knowledge and action. Whatever advances true art and science is a means of religious culture. The whole world is the mirror of the individual spirit, and the being of God is involved in the very idea of our personality. The soul, through meditation and self-contemplation, enters into union with the Eternal. This union is an act not of will or of intellect, but of feeling, and it is in this feeling, or consciousness, that religion consists. If we come to analyze it, we find it to be a feeling of absolute dependence on the Divine; and in the true exercise of this feeling piety is found. The communion of all those who practise this piety is the true Church, and the various religions of the world represent the different forms assumed by this fundamental religious consciousness. The Christian religion represents not only the striving of all finite creatures towards the unity of the whole, but also the action of God in response to this striving. It is essentially a religion of redemption and reconciliation with holiness as its goal. Of this Jesus Christ is the one Mediator to men. At this point the argument of the *Reden* merges into that of the *Christliche Glaube* and is carried on in strictly theological terms. Before leaving the *Reden*, however, we should note that they belong to Schleiermacher's Romantic period, and that he modified his position considerably as time went on. They should always be read in the light of the notes and corrections which he afterwards published.

Next to theology, Schleiermacher's chief interest was in ethics. As we have already seen, his earlier efforts were confined to the criticism of previous attempts at a moral philosophy. He fails to find in any of them a complete and systematic treatment and relation of moral states and actions. He therefore sets himself to supply these deficiencies and to give a coherent and exhaustive view of the entire world of human action. The subject-matter of ethics is the action of reason upon nature; and the good at which ethics aims is found in an agreement between the two. The subject assumes certain forms such as the doctrine of goods, the doctrine of virtue, and the doctrine of duty, according to the point of view from which ethical problems are approached. The force from which all moral action proceeds is virtue, and its function is to further the highest good of man found in the agreement between reason and nature. There are four great provinces of ethical action—organization, property, thought, and feeling; to them correspond four forms of ethical relation—legal right, sociability, faith, and revelation; and to these again correspond four ethical organisms—State, society, school, and Church, the common basis of all of which is found in the family. The duties which emerge in the system thus elaborated are those of love and law, vocation and conscience. Stated thus briefly, Schleiermacher's exposition seems somewhat mechanical in form, but there is plenty of warmth and actuality in the way in which he works it out. Generally speaking, it presents a lofty and really valuable discussion of ethical aims and relations, and it is animated throughout by motives of the purest idealism. It cannot, however, escape the charge of vagueness, owing to the use of terms like 'nature' and 'reason' without any very definite interpretation being attached to them. They are too generally used as abstract symbols and as though they had a fixed and recognized value. At the same time it cannot but be acknowledged that Schleiermacher here makes a fruitful and permanent contribution to the development of ethical philosophy.

[1] *Reden*, tr. Oman, *On Religion*, p. 40.

(*b*) *Theology.*—It is in the realm of dogmatic, or of theology proper, that Schleiermacher's chief work was done. As we have already seen, he may be regarded as the first modern systematic theologian, and in this respect he follows the great example set by Origen among the ancients. In his *Darstellung* he sets out the whole vast field of study in an ordered and comprehensive fashion which formed the model for many who have followed in his steps. His great work *Der christliche Glaube* (1821, 2nd ed. 1831) is an impressive monument, not only to his method, but to his grasp of the whole field of theology. It marks a new departure by repudiating from the outset the traditional view of Christian theology which made it consist of a number of fixed doctrines that must be accepted on faith. Schleiermacher would not allow such an interpretation. To him Christianity was not a body of doctrine in the first instance, but a condition of the heart—a mode of consciousness making itself known in devout feeling and notably in the feeling of dependence on God. The experience thus engendered, which is that not merely of any chance individual but of the Protestant Christian Church as a whole, gives to Schleiermacher a positive and stable foundation for his exposition of the Christian faith. No doubt he is here open to serious criticism as the father of a method and system too purely subjective and individual. Such criticism, however, is partly disarmed by his exposition; and, in any case, his attitude may be excused as a natural reaction from the intense dogmatism of his predecessors.

His doctrine of God owes much to Spinoza, especially when he expounds the relation of God to the world, of the *natura naturans* to the *natura naturata*, in terms of an immanence which makes all things subsist through one. In a note to the *Glaubenslehre* he defends his peculiar type of theistic pantheism as follows:

'If we keep pantheism to the customary formula, One and All, even then God and the world remain distinct, at least in point of function; and therefore a pantheist of this kind, when he regards himself as part of the world, feels himself with this All dependent on that which is the One.'[1]

In this way he reaches a conception of God as the 'somewhat' on which we depend, the correlative unity to the multiplicity of the universe. He ascribes to Him causality and omnipotence, but cannot conceive Him out of relation to His world. To do so would be mere mythology. It is from the divine causality, which to a large extent is to be identified with the totality of natural causes, that Schleiermacher derives both the actions and the attributes of God. The distinctions in them are due to our consciousness, and not to any distinctions in the Divine. This implies an ultimate conception of God very like Spinoza's Substance and apparently quite incompatible with anything of the nature of personality. At the same time Schleiermacher concedes to devout feeling (*Fröm-*

[1] Quoted by Pfleiderer in his *Development of Theology*, Eng tr., p. 110 f.

migkeit) what he cannot grant on any other terms, and in the *Glaubenslehre* he never explicitly denies what he had stated in the *Reden* as to the necessity of a personal conception of the Divine Being to devout feeling or to the enjoyment of communion with God. This apparent inconsistency is excused by his desire to interpret the Christian system as a whole; but it does not evade the criticism that he tended to reduce Christianity to the dimensions of his philosophical theory.

Schleiermacher's Christology is closely related to his doctrine of grace and redemption. One of its great merits is that he discusses the Person of Christ not as an abstract psychological problem, but always in its bearing on the Christian consciousness and on the work of redemption. He finds a link between his theology and his doctrine of Christ in the fact that Jesus is related to men in such a way that 'their conscious blessed relation to God is ascribed solely to Him as the author of it.'[1] Jesus Christ is distinguished from all other men by His essential sinlessness and absolute perfection and by the completeness of His God-consciousness. He is therefore the one perfect revelation of God, and His life is a miraculous phenomenon in a world of sin, only to be explained as a new creative act of God. At the same time His nature must not be regarded as differing in kind from ours, though He attains to a full spiritual vigour such as we cannot show. In Him human nature reaches its perfection; and His function is to impart to us that perfect God-consciousness which is normative in His own life. In his treatment of the historical personality of Jesus and His relations with both God and man, Schleiermacher shows a warmth and glow which bear witness to the fact that he is speaking out of a very real and deep experience. Imperfect as his Christology may seem according to some standards, it has the great merit of resting on the appeal which Christ makes to the soul of man and on the effect which He has produced on the consciousness of believers throughout the ages.

It is in the intensified consciousness of God which comes through Christ to men, translated into the consciousness of the Church, that Schleiermacher finds the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, he says, 'is the union of the Divine Being with human nature in the form of the common spirit of the community, as animating the collective life of believers.'[2] In other words, that saving principle which showed itself in the life of the individual Jesus Christ becomes in the community the Holy Spirit of God and works for the redemption of men.

The need for redemption arises from the sin of mankind, which Schleiermacher regards as the opposition between flesh and spirit, or between the lower and the higher self-consciousness or God-consciousness. The sin of Adam was but the first emergence of a tendency inherent in our human nature and existing alongside our native God-consciousness. Escape from sin can only be by strengthening the God-consciousness and so gradually overcoming the hindrances which are due to the sense-consciousness. Jesus Christ is the supreme Redeemer because He possessed the God-consciousness in a unique degree and so is able to impart it to others. The total impression of His personality has the effect of delivering men from the contradiction between the higher and the lower in their consciousness, and so reconciling them to the highest. Salvation is thus an inward process, the source and ground of which is Jesus Christ.

Schleiermacher lays considerable stress on the function of the Church, or Christian community, in originating and maintaining the Christian life.

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, p. 91. [2] *Ib.* p. 121.

The Church is the sphere within which opposition between the spirit and the flesh is overcome, and by providing the means of grace such as prayer, worship, etc., the Church furthers the Kingdom of God on earth. The position of the Church with regard to the future life and the final consummation of all things Schleiermacher only tolerates as 'tentative efforts of an insufficiently authorised faculty of surmise in conjunction with the reasons for and the considerations against them.'[1]

Such, then, are the dry bones of a theological system which is worked out with immense amplitude of detail, intense conviction, and rare breadth of view. Schleiermacher has had few immediate followers, but his work has provided a quarry in which every theologian since his time has been able to dig and find treasure. He was certainly in advance of his day and, like all pioneers, was slow in coming to his own. But his eager, reverent, and scientific spirit could not be denied, and his influence was never greater, especially in Germany, than it is to-day.

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SCHOLASTICISM.—'Scholasticism' is the term usually employed to denote the typical products of Christian thought in the West under the cultural and other historic conditions which characterized the Middle Ages. The mediæval period may be understood to extend from the 8th to the 15th century. During this period a group of definite tendencies in the history of philosophical and theological reflexion can be traced; they attain to their full strength and development

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, p. 159.

during the 12th and 13th centuries and thence decline in energy and effectiveness.

In a wider reference the term 'scholasticism' has been used to include mediæval Jewish and mediæval Arabian thought. Reference to these movements, except in their influence on Christian thought, falls outside the scope of this article. Both the Jewish and the Arabian philosophy of the period are entirely under the influence of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism. No distinctive national characteristics appear in them. They are, moreover, largely moulded by the fact that their founders and exponents were not priests but students of medicine and physical science. Two names are of outstanding importance—Avicenna (980–1037) and Averroes (1126–98), these names being originally grotesque Western corruptions of the Arabic names. The position of Avicenna (*q.v.*) is not far removed from that of pure Aristotelianism. Averroes (*q.v.*) is more independent and stands out as the most powerful and influential among the Arabian thinkers.[1]

In addition to its accurate historical sense, the adjective 'scholastic' has acquired a special meaning as descriptive of a kind of reflexion or discussion characterized by excessive formality or rigidity of method, or excessive intellectual subtlety, or punctiliously systematic development of minute details devoid of real significance. These defects, however, are not peculiar to historic scholasticism; and they are specially typical of it only in its decadence. Here we find unlimited analysis leading to endless distinctions corresponding to no real differences in the nature of things; elaborate discussion of questions having no relation to reality; and a terminology which went far beyond what was required for defining genuinely philosophical ideas or discriminating really scientific distinctions.[2] Hallam observes: 'The Aristotelian philosophy, even in the hands of the Master, was like a barren tree that conceals its want of fruit by profusion of leaves. But the scholastic ontology was much worse. What could be more trifling than disquisitions about the nature of angels, their modes of operation, their means of conversing?'[3] As a historic judgment, this is a partial and biased statement. The questions discussed in historic scholasticism were not all merely trivial or merely verbal.[4]

Scholastic reflexion involved certain general assumptions: (*a*) that absolute objective truth can be attained by the human mind (in the great age of scholasticism, *e.g.* in Aquinas, we may express the position as a claim to re-think the thoughts of the divine mind); (*b*) that the first principles or premisses of truth are revealed in Scripture and developed as Catholic doctrine by the Fathers of the Church, or, where philosophy extends beyond theology, may be ascertained by reflexion on the teaching of Aristotle; (*c*) that every principle must be worked out to its full logical issues. In estimating scholasticism, we must avoid two fundamental errors. The schoolmen did not limit themselves to discussion of merely immediate inferences from the dogmas of the Church; even in theology their work reveals remarkable variety and (within certain limits) freedom of thought. Nor is it true that in their distinctively philosophical speculations they were guided only by the doctrine of Aristotle. In philosophy and in theology alike they assimilated a stream of Neo-Platonist influence through the Fathers (especially Augustine), through the work of John Scotus Erigena and his Latin translation of pseudo-Dionysius (see below), and through the Arabians.

We must remember that, although an immense amount of ancient learning and ancient intellectual discipline had been lost, the Church never wholly lost the tradition of ancient education. What survived of ancient thought came to the Middle Ages through the Church. The Fathers, from the 2nd cent. onwards, were educated men, some of them trained in the best schools of their time. And the mediæval ecclesiastics inherited at least from the greater Latin Fathers educational and intellectual ideas akin to those of the ancient world.[1]

Hence, when Charlemagne, after consolidating his empire in the West, conceived the design of founding schools which should be centres of learning and mental cultivation, he naturally turned to the monasteries and with the help of such men as Alcuin established schools in connexion with most of the abbeys in his kingdom.[2] The name 'scholastic,' *doctor scolasticus*, given at first to teachers of the cloister schools, was afterwards given generally to teachers of systematic theology and philosophy following the tradition of the schools. At first the 'philosophy' consisted only of the elements of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, the *trivium* of the 'seven liberal arts,' of which the *quadrivium* consisted of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.

It has been said that the main objects of philosophy and theology are identical, though the method of treatment is different.[3] This may be admitted; but historically scholastic theology and scholastic philosophy must be distinguished. The former claims to be founded on the doctrine received by the Church from Scripture and the Fathers and taught as authoritative. Its detailed historical treatment belongs to the history of Christian doctrine and forms part of any standard work on that subject.[4] Scholastic philosophy, on the other hand, has its own first principles, claiming to be intuitive truths of reason. It embraces many questions wholly independent of theology, although its methods and conclusions were employed in the explanation of various dogmas. The distinction does not involve complete separation.

The scholastic age falls naturally into two periods owing to the fact that all the most important logical, metaphysical, and scientific writings of Aristotle came into the hands of Western thinkers for the first time during the latter part of the 12th century. It is convenient also to subdivide the periods as follows: (i.) the 8th, 9th, and 10th centuries, where we find (except in the case of Erigena) only the undeveloped germs of later problems and controversies; (ii.) the 11th and most of the 12th cent., where the conclusions of metaphysical logic are more and more consciously and deliberately applied to the elucidation of theological dogma; (iii.) the 13th cent., the great age of scholasticism, after the assimilation of the new Aristotelian materials, where we find strenuous endeavours to construct a comprehensive system based on an alliance of philosophy and theology; (iv.) the 14th and 15th centuries, where the alliance breaks down under the influence of Duns Scotus (who belongs historically to the previous period) and Ockham. The mutual independence of philosophy and theology involved the doctrine of the twofold nature of truth and led to the decline of scholasticism, which resolved itself ultimately into a formal perfecting of system with loss of vitality of thought.

The literature available up to the middle of the 12th cent. to stimulate and assist philosophical speculation was scanty. The facts have been well established since the work of Jourdain.[5] Of Aristotle the earlier schoolmen possessed only the two simpler parts of the *Organon*—*i.e.* the *Categoriæ* and *de Inter-*

[1] For the literature of the subject consult the standard histories named below. The following may be mentioned here: A. Schmolders, *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1842; E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*[2], do. 1882; M. Joel, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie*, Breslau, 1876: I. Husik, *Hist. of Jewish Mediæval Philosophy*, London and New York, 1916.

[2] Cf. Erasmus, *Stultitiæ Laus*, Basel, 1676, p. 141 ff.

[3] *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*[9], London, 1846, ii. 488.

[4] Cf. J. Rickaby's brief but instructive sketch, *Scholasticism* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern), London, 1908.

[1] Cf. J. Vernon Bartlet and A. J. Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, London, 1917, p. 352 ff.

[2] On the work of Alcuin see C. J. B. Gaskoin, *Alcuin*, London, 1904; A. F. West, *Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools*, do. 1892; J. Bass Mullinger, *The Schools of Charles the Great*, do. 1877; and *DNB*[3], *s.v.* 'Alcuin.'

[3] A. S. Pringle-Pattison, in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 846 ff., art. 'Scholasticism.'

[4] An extensive collection of brief extracts from the scholastic writers, classified under the various heads of doctrinal theology, is given in K. R. Hagenbach, *A Hist. of Christian Doctrines*, Eng. tr.[5], Edinburgh, 1880–81, ii. 106 ff.

[5] *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*[2], Paris, 1843.

pretationes, together with Porphyry's *Isagoge*, or 'Introduction,' to the former (all these in Latin translations by Boethius); a summary of Aristotle's *Categories*, *Categoriæ Decem*, wrongly attributed to Augustine; two commentaries by Boethius on the *Isagoge*; and his own short treatises on the elements of formal logic. Boethius was the principal source for the text-books which maintained the logical tradition of the cloister schools, such as those of Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville. Regarding Plato, their information was derived from the *Timæus*, or part of it, in the Latin translation of Chalcidius and his commentary, from Apuleius (*de Dogmate Platonis*), and from the writings of Augustine. Hence what little they knew of Plato came from sources moulded by Neo-Platonic influence.

Isidore of Seville († 636) is also of importance as the author of three books of 'Sentences' (*Sententiæ*) or doctrinal passages from the Fathers, systematically arranged. This and a few similar compilations circulated in the schools as material for whatever doctrinal reflexion was possible. The more elaborate work, Πηγὴ γνώσεως, by John Damascene (*fl.c.* 700), representing the Eastern Church, is the classical example of a systematic logical presentation of patristic teaching; but this was not in the hands of the earlier schoolmen. Such books suggested the plan or scheme which was carried out later in the *Liber Sententiarum* of Petrus Lombardus. It is not our purpose to refer to the history of theological doctrine except where it directly involves the conclusions of philosophical reflexion.

I. *FIRST PERIOD.*—Among the theological discussions of the first period we find in the eucharistic and predestinarian controversies of the 9th cent. the beginnings of an opposition that was destined to develop with great significance—that of faith (or authority) and reason. From this point of view we touch briefly on the subjects named, before passing to the logical and philosophical issues which were being opened up.

1. **Eucharistic controversy.**—In 831 Paschasius Radbertus, abbot of Corbie, published what was the first formal exposition and defence of the strict doctrine of transubstantiation; *i.e.*, that the substance of the bread and wine becomes converted into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, the same body in which He lived, suffered, rose, and ascended. This stupendous miracle takes place under the outwardly visible form ('sub figura') of bread and wine. There is nothing contrary to nature in this, because the essence of nature consists in the entire obedience of all things to the divine will ('ut a quo est semper ejus obtemperet jussis'). This uncompromising and absolute supernaturalism was contested by Ratramnus, a monk of the same abbey. While fully acknowledging an objective supernatural process in the eucharist, Ratramnus endeavoured to rationalize the doctrine as far as possible. The body and blood of Christ are present 'in mysterio'; *i.e.*, the Scriptural expressions are figurative and are to be spiritually understood. The elements after consecration produce an effect on the souls of believers which they cannot produce by their natural qualities, but this effect presupposes spiritual susceptibility on the part of the recipients; and, when the believer has attained 'ad visionem Christi,' he will no longer need such external means of perceiving what the divine love has achieved for him.

2. **Predestinarian controversy.**—The predestinarian dispute of the 9th cent. gives a more vivid picture of the conflict between reason and authority. In this case the Church employed the resources of human reason to counteract the unauthorized conclusions of the predestinarian Gottschalk. John Scotus Erigena, layman and independent thinker, was employed as the chosen advocate of the dogma decreed by authority.

'The force of reason evidently began to be acknowledged and felt as an antagonist which the Church had fostered within its own system, and against which the Church had need to fortify itself with the weapons of the same temper. The expedient was found to be of dangerous effect; since the philosophy of Erigena served to scatter the seeds of still more dangerous perplexity to the creed of the Church.'[1]

3. **Nominalism and realism.**—As with the problem of authority and reason, so with that of nominalism and realism and other logical and philosophical issues which occupied the attention of the later schoolmen. These problems were present in germ in the scholastic writings of the 9th and 10th centuries; but their implications were unknown, and their connexion with the fundamental principles of religion and ethics was not even suspected.

The problem at issue in the opposition of nominalism and realism was that of the objective significance of universals. The universal (general, generic or specific, typical) consists of those fundamental qualities, activities, uniformities of the object which it shares with others. When these are abstracted and generalized by our thought, the class-concept is formed. This consciousness of the universal is an act of thought; it is the consciousness that certain qualities realized in the individual thing are also realized in a whole group. Nominalism is the general theory that the universal has no existence outside our thought.

(*a*) Extreme nominalism may be expressed in the words of a modern writer: 'the only generality possessing separate existence is the name';[1] not even in the thought of the knower is there anything general; the universal is merely a *flatus vocis*. (*b*) Moderate nominalism, or conceptualism (*q.v.*), holds that universals exist, but only in thought; the universal is a *conceptus mentis significans plura singularia*. Both kinds of nominalism are included in the dictum, 'Species non sunt nisi termini apud animam existentes.'[2] Realism holds, on the contrary, that the universal has a being of its own, which is objectively given. (*c*) Extreme realism holds that the common nature of a group of beings—*e.g.*, man—exists *ante res*, distinct from and independently of the particular things of experience which exemplify that common nature. (*d*) Moderate realism means that the universal is an objective principle *in rebus*, common to the many different individuals and constituting them into a class. The schoolmen identified their problem with that which appeared to be at issue between Plato and Aristotle. The interest of the Greek thinkers, however, was different. They were concerned to show that the real is universal and to explain as far as possible how the universal became individualized in space and time. The schoolmen, on the contrary, started from the subjective side.

Cousin[3] and others have rightly pointed to a passage in Boethius' Latin translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry as suggesting the question to the scholastic thinkers. The essential sentences are these: 'de generibus et speciebus illud quidem . . . sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint. . . . et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa haec consistentia, dicere recusabo.' Nominalism and the two forms of realism are here indicated.

These theories were not apprehended in their full significance in what we have called the first period; as Cousin observes, the two systems were, as yet, merely two different ways of interpreting a phrase of Porphyry. Moreover, the influence of Boethius was indecisive. He refuses to argue to a definite conclusion, although his incidental statements tend sometimes towards moderate realism, sometimes towards moderate nominalism. It is clear, however, from the earliest remains of scholastic thought that there existed in the schools a nominalistic and a realistic tradition. A collection of incidental comments on Porphyry, *e.g.*, has come down to us from early in the 9th century. It has been attributed, probably incorrectly, to Rabanus Maurus († 856), under whose influence the school at Fulda had become an intellectual centre of some importance. Its authorship may be assigned to one of his pupils.[4] Its statements show a distinct tendency to moderate nominalism (*e.g.*, the genus is defined as *substantialis similitudo ex diversis speciebus in cogitatione collecta*), and the important principle is asserted, 'Res non predicatur.' A similar general observation may be made in reference to Heiricus (Eric) of Auxerre, originally a student at Fulda. On the other hand, at the close of the 9th cent. we find realism definitely taught at Auxerre by Remigius. What is individual and what is specific exists only by participation in the universal, which is the substantial unity of the individuals included under it (*e.g.*, 'Homo est multorum hominum substantialis unitas').

4. **Erigena.**—The system of John Scotus Erigena 'stands by itself in the 9th century like the pro-

[1] R. D. Hampden, *The Scholastic Philosophy in its Relation to Christian Theology*[2] (*BL*), Hereford, 1848, p. 36 ff.

[1] A. Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*[3], London, 1884, p. 179.
[2] See Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, iv. 16.
[3] *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Introd. p. 56.
[4] For references see F. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng tr.[4], London, 1874–75, i. 368 f.

duct of another age.'[1] Possessed of a high degree of intellectual originality, he endeavoured, in the spirit of Origen, to lay a philosophical foundation for theology; but his speculative genius led him into methods and conclusions hostile to the general tendency of ecclesiastical doctrine. His fundamental principle is the identity of faith and reason, so that philosophy and theology are manifestations of the same spirit. But theological doctrines are symbolic expressions of the truth; and the traditional doctrines, when taken up into his system, are treated very freely.

Erigena's speculative conceptions were profoundly influenced by his study of an anonymous writer who, under the name of 'Dionysius the Areopagite' (Ac 17[34]), had issued in the second half of the 5th cent. a short series of works which afterwards had a considerable influence on mediæval thought.[2] The writer combines Christian conceptions with the emanation system of Plotinus, without giving up the tri-unity of God. God, as Absolute Being, is beyond all conceivable human predicates: this is the principle of 'negative theology,' which Dionysius distinguishes from 'positive theology,' where a symbolic knowledge of God and a gradual approximation to His image are admitted to be possible. Both the negative and the positive theology are valid and do not conflict when each has its proper place.

Erigena's chief speculative work is entitled *de Divisione Naturæ*. His system is based on the idea of the absolute immanence of God; the divine is exclusively real, and the world of experience in space and time is but a 'theophany,' an appearance of God. By *natura* he means the sum of all that is, regarded not as a mere aggregate, but as a unity. It embraces four types of being: (1) that which creates and is not created—God as source of all being; (2) that which is created and which creates—the world of 'ideas' or ideal rational principles, active in and from God, after which finite things are fashioned; (3) that which is created but does not create—the world of finite individual things; (4) that which neither is created nor creates—God as goal and end of all being. The whole realm of created being has no independent reality; it exists, but it exists in God. Creation and revelation are one. The four stages form a process from God to God, which through our finiteness we think of as in time; but in itself it is eternal and beyond time altogether.

Like 'Dionysius,' Erigena combines a negative and a positive theology. Real being—in other words, absolute perfection—belongs to God alone; all else has only partial or imperfect being. No predicate applicable to finite being is applicable to God; He is above and beyond all qualities that we experience in finite being. Hence ultimately we can say what God is not rather than what He is. On the other hand, the whole realm of created nature is in its measure a 'theophany,' whereby we may attain to a knowledge of God, perceiving His being through the being of created things, His wisdom through their order and harmony, His life through their activity and movement. This is a basis for an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. God in His essential being is Father, God as realized Wisdom is Son, God as universal life and activity is Spirit. Erigena finds a reflexion of this Trinity in man; but further analysis of the conception is beyond the scope of this article.

The logical structure into which these principles are wrought is that of an infinite hierarchy of forms or types of existence, from the material objects of sense to the absolute being of Deity; and this graded scale of beings, in which each lower form proceeds from the forms above it, is completely parallel to the graded scale of logical conceptions in their successive orders of universality. Hence 'Intelligitur quod ars illa, quae dividit genera in species et species in genera resolvit, quae διαλεκτικὴ dicitur, non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ab Auctore omnium artium, quae vere artes sunt, condita, et a sapientibus inventa.'[3] Erigena is therefore a realist; universals are *in rebus* as the ground of their existence and *ante res* as ideal constituents of the second division of 'nature' (see above).

From the ethical point of view, this is equivalent to a hierarchy of degrees of value or perfection; and increase in perfection means increase in being. Evil as such has no real being at all; it is mere appearance. Nevertheless Erigena cannot interpret the doctrine of sin without admitting its reality. The will of the individual represents to itself something as real and good when it is neither. This is sin; but, if the representation is false, the will that represents it is real. Deliverance from sin is the discovery made by the sinner of the illusoriness of what he aims at. To become one with God through becoming like Him is the chief end of man, which humanity as a whole can attain by purification, enlightenment, and completion, with the help of the Logos.[4]

II. *SECOND PERIOD.*—The second of the four periods into which the history of scholasticism may be divided for our present purpose is marked by the appearance of men who were prepared to apply the distinctions of human logic to the elucidation of theological dogmas, and who thereby created scholastic philosophy in its distinctive forms. The speculations and discussions thus opened up may be grouped under the heads: (1) faith (or authority) and reason, (2) nominalism and realism, (3) dualism (of soul and body). Three leading thinkers of the period are the subjects of separate articles.[1]

1. **Faith and reason.**—Among the few names representing any original mental activity in the barbarism of the 10th cent. that of Gerbert († 1003 as Pope Sylvester II.) is prominent, not however in connexion with specially logical or philosophical questions. He had become acquainted with the work of the Arabians in Spain and Italy and had acquired an amount of knowledge such as to expose him to the suspicion of intercourse with the powers of darkness. He has the merit of urging the importance of the study of physical science and mathematics.[2] His pupil Fulbert founded the school of Chartres, which for two centuries was a centre of humanistic culture. Among its famous students was Berengarius of Tours († 1088), who was animated by a genuine impulse towards freedom of thought. This appeared in his general attitude towards cultural education and particularly in the fact that he adopted, developed, and defended the interpretation of the eucharist previously put forward by Ratramnus, which had also been defended by Erigena in his work *de Eucharistia*. Any detailed account of the prolonged controversy thus aroused belongs to the history of the doctrine of the sacraments;[3] but what is important to note is that Berengarius defended his position on philosophical grounds, and these grounds are found to involve the essential principle of nominalism. He denied the possibility of transmutation of the 'substance' while the former 'accidents,' or physically perceptible qualities, remained; and his argument was simply a specific application of nominalism. He does not appear to have investigated the question apart from this particular application of it. But it was at once perceived that the question was no mere technicality of logic, but was of momentous significance. The perception of its importance was intensified when Roscellinus, after defending nominalism as a general principle (see below), applied it to the interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, with results disastrous to the traditionally orthodox conception. He found in metaphysical individualism an immediate inference from nominalism. Defining 'person' as *substantia rationalis*, he concluded that, if the usage of language permitted, we ought to speak of three Gods, since the three Persons could be united only in name or abstract idea.

The controversy aroused by Berengarius ended in the complete triumph of the transubstantiation doctrine by an act of ecclesiastical authority. But the position of Roscellinus and its theological implications required to be met with the armour of reason. This led to a philosophical assertion of extreme realism by Anselm and William of Champeaux (see below), which held its ground until the more moderate doctrine of Abelard became the accepted principle of the schools. And from the time of Anselm the relation of faith and reason became a fundamental problem.

Anselm's solution is best expressed in his own words:

'Desidero intelligere veritatem Tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo, quia nisi credidero non

[1] Pringle-Pattison, in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 347.

[2] Cf. O. Siebert, *Die Metaphysik und Ethik des Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita*, Jena, 1894.

[3] *De Divisione Naturæ*, iv. 4.

[4] On Erigena see R. Adamson and J. M. Mitchell, art. 'Erigena,' in *EBr*[11]; R. L. Poole, art. 'Scotus,' in *DNB*[2]; and the standard histories named below.

[1] See artt. ANSELM, ABELARD, BERNARD.

[2] Cf. K. Werner, *Gerbert von Aurillac, die Kirche und Wissenschaft seiner Zeit*[2], Vienna, 1881.

[3] See art. EUCHARIST (to end of Middle Ages).

intelligam.'[1] 'Quanto opulentius nutrimur in sacra Scriptura, . . . tanto subtilius provehimur ad ea quae per intellectum satiant. . . . Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur; et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget.'[2]

In this connexion he contrasts *cognitio audientis* and *scientia experientis*. Faith is regarded as before all else a condition of the emotions and the will; but it is a positive duty, for those who are capable of it, to seek a comprehensive understanding of the content of faith:

'Negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere.'[3]

How Anselm was prepared to apply these principles is seen especially in his development of the arguments for the being of God, in *Monologium* and *Proslogium*, and his investigation of the doctrine of the Atonement in *Cur Deus Homo*. The principle is *fides praecedens intellectum*. This resembles some quite modern theories; but it should be noted that *fides*, to Anselm, means not only the religious truths to be derived from Scripture, and not only the personal religious experience of the believer; it means also the dogma as defined and authorized by the Church.

The position of Abelard is fundamentally different. Reason is not (as with Anselm) restricted to the explanatory treatment of what is in any case established as faith. The difference may be expressed by saying that reason is constitutive and even decisive of religious truth. The rule of truth is found in thought. Hence Abelard had a very high opinion of the religious and moral value of Greek philosophy. He regarded the Greek thinkers as the creators of a genuine religious tradition which was improved and widened by the Christian revelation. This view was not based on any real historical knowledge of ancient thought and its possible affiliations any more than the opposite view of the Fathers (that the Greek thinkers borrowed from the books of Moses). Abelard knew little of these thinkers; his estimate of their importance is an application of his general doctrine of reason and revelation. 'Nolo sic esse philosophus,' he says, 'ut recalcitrarem Paulo, non sic esse Aristoteles, ut secludar a Christo; non enim aliud nomen est sub coelo, in quo oporteat me salvum fieri'; but, unless faith comes to a rational consciousness of its own true nature and grounds, it lacks stability and full efficacy. The motto 'Intelligo ut credam' comes to mean, for Abelard, 'I seek to understand in order that I may believe more, and believe more fully and worthily.' His work *Sic et Non*, in which conflicting passages from the Fathers were arranged in opposition to one another, was compiled not to suggest scepticism but to promote rational inquiry; 'dubitando ad inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo ad veritatem.'[4] Yet, contrary to his own intention, the formal and theoretic precedence of knowledge to faith tended to mere intellectualism in theology and actually produced it.

At the opposite extreme to Abelard stands Bernard of Clairvaux. He contended for the existence in the human mind of an immediate inner apprehension of religious truth, with a distinctive certainty of its own. Many of his statements suggest a position akin to that of Anselm—*e.g.*, *de Consideratione*, v. 3, where it is said that faith holds the truth in a latent and implicit form; knowledge holds it in an open and explicit form, having both the truth and the distinct comprehension of it; faith is a spontaneous and assured intimation of truth that is not yet opened up before the mind in clear analysis and outline. The contrast emphasized appears to be between an implicit and an explicit form of the same truth. It would, however, be an error to assimilate the position of Bernard to that of Anselm. The former is a mystic; standing on the basis of a mystical view of religious belief, he represents a reaction against the influence of the 'dialecticians,' and especially those among them who had been influenced by Roscellinus and Abelard. The same attitude to contemporary logic was maintained through the 12th cent. at the monastery of St. Victor, near Paris, and especially by the three 'Victorines,' Hugo, Richard, and Walter; whereas the keynote of constructive scholasticism was sounded by Anselm in his solution of the problem of the relation of faith and knowledge.

2. Nominalism and realism.—The general meaning of these opposed theories has been concisely stated above. Roscellinus appears to have been the first to formulate nominalism as a general theory of the nature of universals. For knowledge of his doctrine we have to rely on the statements of his opponents, Anselm and Abelard. He is charged with making the universal a mere word, *flatus vocis*.[5] Taken strictly, this is a denial of any real connexion between similar things; their similarities become merely unessential accidents, and real knowledge is impossible. It is one thing to deny the hypostatization of an 'accident' like colour or wisdom, and another thing to deny the foundation in reality of all genera and species.

'The human race is not a word, or, if it is, we are driven to assert that there is really nothing common and identical in all men—that the brotherhood and equality of the human family are mere abstractions, and that, since individuality is the sole reality, the sole reality is difference, that is to say, hostility and war, with no right but might, no duty but interest, no remedy but despotism.'[1]

It is probable that some statements of Roscellinus suggested these consequences, but it is not probable that he intended them. These statements, and the heterodox theological conclusions alluded to above, discredited nominalism.

Anselm made no attempt to think out the difficulties of realism. He found in it what appeared to be the sole means of rationalizing dogma, and he adopted it accordingly. Universals, to him, are *in rebus* as objectively real and active principles and *ante res* as ideal principles in the divine mind. William of Champeaux (†1121) may be regarded as the founder of realism as an independent doctrine. He held it in its most extreme form, in which its pantheistic tendencies were plainly apparent. The individual has no independent being, but is only an 'accident' of the real being which is the universal. From this position he was driven by the criticism of Abelard. His final position is not clear. Opposite views of its meaning are taken by Cousin and Rémusat, on the one hand, and Prantl and Hauréau, on the other.[2]

It scarcely needs to be said that 'mediating views' found frequent acceptance, sometimes among men who had little insight into the real problem at issue. John of Salisbury[3] (†1180) gives an analysis of nine different views of the nature of universals.[4] The most interesting of the mediating theories is that of Gilbert of Poitiers (†1154), whose carefully thought out doctrine does not appear to differ in any essential point from that of Abelard.

Abelard perceived that general ideas or concepts are involved in all thought and are the instruments of all knowledge. This is so because they have an objective basis in the similarities of individual things; and the mind attains to conceptual knowledge by comparing individual things with one another. The universal, therefore, is more than a mere name. It is a predicate (*sermo*) and for that very reason cannot itself be a 'thing.' Moreover, it is a natural predicate, 'quod de pluribus natum est praedicari.'[5] The fundamental similarities of things are not accidental, but are due to the fact that the Creator formed them according to pre-existing types or ideals which in fact constitute the divine plan of the world. This type of moderate realism found sufficient acceptance to put the controversy into the background until the time of Ockham. Its place was taken by the problem of 'matter and form.'

Realism appeared to be satisfactory so long as interest was concentrated on those aspects of things which make them wholes or unities *inter se*—the universe as a whole, the State as a whole, the Church as a whole. The subsequent revival of nominalism indicates the rise of a new consciousness of individuality, which can be traced in the doctrines of Duns Scotus (who was not a nominalist) and of Ockham (see below).

3. Dualism.—The schoolmen inherited from Augustine the conception of body and soul as two

[1] *Proslogium*, 1. [2] *De Incarnatione Verbi*, 2.
[3] *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 2. [4] Cf. Bartlet and Carlyle, p. 439 f. Cf. Prantl, ii. 78.

[1] Cousin, Introd. p. 106, quoted by Pringle-Pattison, in *EBr*[9] xxi. 421.
[2] See also J. H. Löwe, *Der Kampf zwischen Realismus und Nominalismus im Mittelalter*, Prague, 1876; and Bäumker, *AGPh* x. [1896] 257.
[3] *Metalogicus*, ii. 17 ff.
[4] For details reference must be made to the larger histories.
[5] Cf. Prantl, ii. 181.

substances, entirely different and even opposed in character, so that no knowledge of the soul could be gained from its relations to the body; and in his work they saw how fruitfully the inner life of mental, moral, and spiritual fact could be studied as an experience. The reaction against 'dialectic' also helped to create a psychological interest, especially among the mystics. These men, in their religious aspirations and their struggles after the enjoyment of divine grace, became vividly conscious of an inner experience of a wider range; and they endeavoured to describe it. In doing so they employed a medley of Neo-Platonic and Augustinian terms and ideas; but incidentally, and amid much that was extravagant, they arrived at genuinely psychological results. John of Salisbury, man of affairs and cultured ecclesiastic rather than mystic, went farther and worked out the outlines of a systematic psychology based on a notion of development akin to that of the modern 'associationist' school.[1]

III. *THIRD PERIOD.*—The logical and speculative impulses lying behind all these discussions were exhausted by the middle of the 12th cent. through lack of material. Historical and scientific knowledge scarcely existed; and the logical impulse and the kindred interest in systematic methodology had to feed on themselves, or, at the most, had to turn back on the dogmas of the Church and analyze them into details of ever-increasing complexity, or, again, had to devote themselves to the systematic collection and arrangement of patristic authorities in the many works of which the *Liber Sententiarum* of Peter Lombard († 1164) and the *de Articulis Catholicæ Fidei* of Alan de Lille or de Insulis († 1203), are conspicuous examples—the former, *instar omnium*, destined to become the authoritative text-book for the teaching of the Fathers.

At the same time an epoch-making change was maturing. During the first half of the 12th cent. the remaining logical treatises of Aristotle—the *Analytics* (both parts), *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*—gradually and silently found their way into the schools. This by itself would not have brought about a great change; but in the course of the century the chief works of the Arabian thinkers were introduced into France from Jewish sources.[2] This came about as a consequence of the struggle with Muhammadanism, in the nearer East, and of the Crusades. And this knowledge of Arabian and Jewish thought carried with it a knowledge of the contents of almost all the Aristotelian treatises, including the *Metaphysics*, *Ethics*, *de Anima*, and the works on *Physics* and *Natural History*. At the beginning of the 13th cent. new and better translations from the Arabic were made, followed by translations direct from the Greek. These enabled the schoolmen 'to distinguish the genuine Aristotle from the questionable accompaniments with which he had made his first appearance in Western Europe.'[3] Arabian Aristotelianism was conceived in a Neo-Platonic sense; and in its most distinctive forms it implied the entire immanence of the Deity in an eternal matter and excluded the possibility of personal immortality and of creation as an individual act 'from nothing.'

[1] The history of mediæval psychology is beyond the scope of this article; but reference may here be made to Siebeck's valuable contributions to this study in his series of articles on the beginnings of modern psychology in the scholastic age, in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, dealing with the period from Augustine to Duns Scotus: xciii. [1888] 161 ff., xciv. [1888] 161 ff., xcv. [1889] 245 ff.; and in his series of notes on scholastic psychology in *AGPh* i. [1887] 375 ff., 518 ff., ii. [1888] 22 ff., 180 ff., 414 ff., 517 ff., iii. [1889] 177 ff. Further references are given below, under Duns Scotus and Ockham.

[2] See references given above for mediæval Arabian and Jewish thought.

[3] Pringle-Pattison, in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 353[a].

The first effects of this immense acquisition of new material are seen in a stream of confused and erratic speculation, the leading tendencies of which are revealed in the materialistic pantheism of Amalric of Bena († 1207) and David Dinant († 1215?), which was strenuously combated (along with Averroism, from which it was derived) by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. The doctrine of Amalric, we must add, was not identical with that of David;[1] and the doctrines of both must be distinguished from the tenets of the Amalricians, a widely extended sect animated by an antinomian fanaticism which exposed its adherents to fierce persecution after the Lateran Council of 1215.

The result of all this was that, along with Averroism, the study of all the Aristotelian writings except the purely logical treatises was proscribed by the Church. It is the merit of the so-called mendicant orders, Dominican and Franciscan, that they used all their power and influence to capture Aristotle for the Church. This result was achieved after a long struggle, which may be said to have ended in 1253 in the establishment, under papal authority, of two professorial chairs of the Aristotelian philosophy in the University of Paris.[2] Thus Aristotle, after being suspected and condemned, was placed on the same level with Augustine and came to be regarded as the forerunner of Christ in matters of nature, as John the Baptist had been in matters of grace. From the point of view of orthodox theology, therefore, it became necessary to combine adherence to Aristotelianism with fundamental criticism of Averroism and with justification of the doctrines of a transcendent creative God and of the immortality of the soul. This was a main part of the endeavour of Albert and Thomas.

None the less the stream of opposition to Aristotelianism was maintained during the 13th cent. by a succession of thinkers who, while making full use of the tools of analysis provided by the Aristotelian logic, advocated an Augustinian or Christianized Platonism as the true philosophical setting for the dogmas of the Church, as against the philosophical principles derived from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Among these must first be mentioned Alexander of Hales († 1245), Franciscan, who appears to be the first schoolman to face the problem of organizing Christian thought in full view of the wealth of Arabian and Aristotelian material now available. This he did, with genuine power, in his *Summa Universæ Theologiæ*. His pupil and successor, John of Rochelle, illustrates a growing psychological interest in his *de Anima*, written in view of Aristotle's treatise and the Arabian and Greek commentaries on it. He was succeeded in Paris by John of Fidanza, or 'Bonaventura' († 1274), Franciscan, contemporary and friendly critic of Aquinas, who organized and defended the principles implied in mysticism, especially the doctrines of the Victorines (see above), and whose distinctive position and influence belong to the history of that subject. William of Auvergne († 1249) and Henry of Ghent († 1293) must also be named as significant exceptions to the main tendency represented by the two great thinkers to whom we have now to refer.

It is generally admitted that the highest level of scholastic thought is found in the work of the two great Dominicans, Albertus Magnus (1193–1280) and his pupil Thomas Aquinas (1227–74). The greater part, in quantity, of Albert's work consists of paraphrases and commentaries on Aristotle, in which all the writings of 'the Philosopher,' as he was now called, are systematically dealt with. So far as theology and philosophy are concerned, the systems of Albert and Thomas need not be separated. Thomas[3] entered into his master's labours with an intellect finer, if not more powerful, than that of Albert;[4] and he was able to take a more comprehensive view of the whole field.

[1] Cf. *EBr*[11] xix. 123 ff., art. 'Mysticism'; and C. Jourdain, *Mémoire sur les sources philosophiques des hérésies d'Amaury de Chartres et de David de Dinan*, Paris, 1870.

[2] H. Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., London, 1895, esp. i. 345 ff.

[3] See art. AQUINAS and references there given.

[4] See J. Sighart, *Albertus Magnus, sein Leben und seine Wissenschaft*, Regensburg, 1857; and J. Bach, *Das Albertus Magnus Verhältniss*, Vienna, 1881.

It is noteworthy that the interests of Albertus Magnus embraced physical science. Here he advocated genuine empirical research, which he was able to engage in himself not without success, as his treatise *de Vegetalibus* shows. This interest in *a posteriori* inquiry was exceptional among the schoolmen as a whole. They would have admitted that these inquiries had a rightful place and a utility of their own. But, just as to-day there are mathematicians, with no taste for physical research, who revel in those developments of pure mathematics which have no connexion with such research, so the typical schoolmen preferred abstract argument to concrete investigation. This points to a fundamental weakness of scholasticism; and it sometimes led the schoolmen to attempt to determine, by abstract *a priori* argument, matters which should have been determined by observation or historical probability.[1]

The ablest and most original critic of the Thomist system was the Franciscan Johannes Duns Scotus (1270?–1308), of British origin, who taught at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne. The Franciscan edition of his works, published at Lyons in 1639, occupies 12 volumes, but contains much that is not genuine. His *Opus Oxoniense* consists of his own commentary on the *Liber Sententiarum*; the *Opus Parisiense* is a similar commentary, worked over by other hands. The miscellaneous *Questiones quodlibetales* have also been worked over.

Duns Scotus is not the subject of a separate article, and special reference will be made to his doctrines under the heads named below.[2]

The main problems of this third period of scholasticism may be viewed under the following heads: (1) faith (or authority) and reason; (2) realism and nominalism; (3) intellect and will; (4) matter and form, or the problem of individuality.

1. **Faith and reason.**—Albertus Magnus laboured earnestly to show that reason and revelation are neither identical nor mutually opposed, but harmonious, in the sense that certain doctrines, while not contrary to reason, are yet beyond reason. The human mind can completely know only those things the principles of which it carries within itself; hence there are some truths inaccessible to unaided human reason. Aquinas develops this fundamental conclusion and defines more precisely the doctrines which are beyond reason. He finds them to be the Trinity, the creation of the world out of nothing, the Incarnation, and the immediate inferences which follow from these.

'Et in his, quae de Deo confitemur, duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo, quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vera sint, ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest: sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia hujusmodi, quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.'[3]

Further,[4] he says that it is possible for natural reason to refute arguments against these supra-rational truths and even to produce considerations determining the mind towards their acceptance, since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truths of faith. Our unaided reason can discover and establish by argument a great body of truth, including natural religion and ethics; but the truths distinctive of faith are revealed to, not discovered by, the human mind. The principle underlying the supernaturalism of St. Thomas may be expressed thus: God is the chief end of man, but He is a transcendent end (*finis superexcedens*):

Man, the finite being, 'ordinatur ad Deum, sicut ad quendam finem, qui comprehensionem rationis excedit; finem oportet esse praecognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem.'[1]

This principle shows that he never intended to assert an absolute separation, much less an opposition, between the two kinds of truth.

In the hands of Duns Scotus the distinction widens and deepens; the range of philosophical and religious truth that can be demonstrated by the unaided reason is significantly restricted. This consequence flows from his theory of the primacy of will. For him theology is essentially practical; it points to salvation from sin by an appeal to the will. The part played by the intellect is reduced; and he finds that in addition to the Trinity, the creation at the beginning of time, and the Incarnation, the following articles of faith cannot be rationalized: the knowledge of God as omnipotent; the knowledge of God not only as infinite but as the chief end of man (*i.e.* as divine in the sense required by religion); and the knowledge of the incorruptibility and immortality of the soul. In all this there is implied the assertion of a breach between reason and faith, which had effects more far-reaching than Duns Scotus intended. Reason could claim unlimited scope and freedom so long as the finality of 'faith' was formally granted. Any doctrine, however sacred, might be intellectually analyzed and discussed; *e.g.*, atheism might be shown at length to be 'reasonable,' provided that the opposite affirmation of 'faith' was acknowledged. Hence some historians regard the position taken by Duns Scotus as the beginning of the decline of scholasticism.

2. **Realism and nominalism.**—The age of Albert, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus presents a substantial unanimity upon this question in the moderate realism which had been implied in the position of Abelard and was defended independently by the Arabians. Avicenna taught that the universal arises through comparison in thought; 'intellectus in formis agit universalitatem,' but there is a *genus naturale* as the basis of the *genus logicum*, and the *genus naturale* was *ante res* in the thought of God. Similarly Averroes: the universals are *in rebus*, but are posited as universals first by the intellect:

'Intellectus officium est abstrahere formam a materia individuata.'[2]

The position of Albert is not different:

'Universalis dicitur ratio non ideo quia tantum fit in nobis sive in mente nostra; sed ideo quia est res . . . quae in collatione accipitur, quae est in multis et de multis, quam collationem facit ratio.'[3]

So, again, Aquinas:

The universal is 'commune multis,' but it is not something 'praeter multa, nisi sola ratione.' It is 'aptum natum de pluribus praedicari.' 'Intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a materia.' In this sense, 'cognito singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium.' Before creation universals existed in the eternal intellect of God.[4]

In Duns Scotus we find the same doctrine, but with a stronger emphasis on realism:

'Universale est ab intellectu, universali autem aliquid extra correspondet, a quo movetur intellectus ad causandum talem *intentionem* [*i.e.* the universal as an act of thought]. Effective est ab intellectu, sed materialiter sive occasionaliter sive originaliter est a proprietate in re; figmentum vero minime est.'[5]

3. **Intellect and will.**—In this regard the opposition between Aquinas and Duns Scotus is precise. The former teaches that intellect and will are never separated either in God or in man, but in man their union is imperfect. Intellect is superior to will because it involves knowledge, contemplation, rational intuition, and is *per se* related to reality;

[1] For a grotesque example of this, taken from the writings of Albert himself, see Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, i. 464 f.

[2] The following authorities may be referred to: R. Seeberg, *Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Leipzig, 1900; H. Siebeck, 'Die Willenslehre bei Duns Scotus und seinen Nachfolgern,' in *Zeitschr. für Philos. und phil. Kritik*, cxii. [1898] 179 ff.; E. Pluzanski, *Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot*, Paris, 1887; A. Ritschl, 'Johannes Duns Scotus,' in *JDTh* x. [1865] 298 ff.; K. Werner, *Johannes Duns Scotus*, Vienna, 1881 ('Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters,' i.), also *Die Psychologie und Erkenntnisslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, do. 1877, and *Die Sprachlogik des Johannes Duns Scotus*, do. 1877.

[3] *Contra Gentiles*, i. 3. [4] *Ib.* i. 9

[1] Cf. *Summa*, I. qu. i. art. 1.

[2] Albertus Magnus, *de Prædicabilibus*, ii. 3; Prantl, ii. 348 ff.

[3] Albertus, *Summa*, I. xlii. 2.

[4] Aquinas, *Summa*, I. xvi. 7, lxxxv. 3; *c. Gentiles*, I. xxvi. 4, etc.

[5] Cf. Prantl, iii. 207 f.

will is determined by the perception of good, and this perception is an intellectual act, so that will is dependent on intellect. Moral freedom means that, by an intellectual act of analysis and comparison, various possible lines of action are revealed and one of them is perceived to be the best; the will then decides for the latter. In God the union of reason and will is perfect. The divine will is the total expression in action of the divine wisdom and in this sense is determined wholly by the divine nature, which is absolute goodness;[1] an alternative choice would be less good and therefore comparatively evil. This conception is applied to explain the origin of the moral law, which is a divine command. God commands it because it is good; but the goodness which is commanded is not foreign to the divine nature; it is an expression of the wisdom which is God. The chief end of man is conceived by Thomas, as by Aristotle, in intellectualistic terms. It is a rational intuition rising to a vision of God, from which love of God follows. The poetic expression of this ideal is given once for all in the *Paradiso* of Dante.

According to Duns Scotus, this dependence of will on intellect destroys freedom of choice and responsibility. He was led to this conclusion because he conceived the growth of ideas in the mind, after the manner of empirical psychology, as a natural process, so that the dependence of will on such a process involved determinism. If the will is free at all, its action must be wholly unrestricted. The intellect presents to the will the possibilities of its choice; but the will is absolutely autonomous; it is 'motor in toto regno animae, imperans intellectui.' And, as with the human will, so with the divine. Just as little can Duns Scotus admit a determination of the will of God even by His wisdom. The divine will is determined by nothing beyond itself; it acts *ex mera libertate*, free from every kind of necessity. And this will of God is the *summa lex*. Hence there is no necessity for the existence of the universe under its present constitution, forms, and relations.

Nevertheless two statements are made, in reference to this theory of Duns Scotus, which require important qualification: (*a*) it is sometimes said that he places the intellect at the mercy of arbitrary will, and (*b*) it is almost always said that, according to his teaching, a thing is good only because God has willed and commanded it, which is understood to mean that God might have made good evil and evil good.

(*a*) He does not teach that God 'could' make a square round or make contradictories identical; this is expressly denied.[2] But (*b*) God could have given to real beings other essences or natures than those which they actually have; and then, the natures of things being different, the laws of the universe would be other than they are.[3] It follows that, under the supposition stated, the laws of morality would be changed. Assuming that the content of duty depends on the constitution of human nature, it follows that, if human beings were constituted differently in certain fundamental ways, then the content of morality would be fundamentally altered. There is, however, no evidence that Duns Scotus intended to teach that morality could be determined differently by the will of God, human nature being constituted as it is.

This anti-moral conclusion was, however, actually derived from the statements of Duns Scotus. It was argued that nothing is, in itself or *per se*, either righteous or sinful, but only because God has commanded or forbidden it; and that the divine commands are made known to men only by the Church.[4]

What Duns Scotus did was to affirm an entire subordination of the speculative to the practical order, in a way that reminds us of Kant. But his position is different from that of Kant. He offers us a critique not of speculative reason as such, but of certain special uses of speculative reason. He has therefore been called a 'dogmatist Kant.'

4. The principle of individuality.—This question involves the distinction of matter and form which the schoolmen derived from Aristotle.[1] In Aristotle it is a distinction of two aspects of experience. In the hands of the schoolmen it becomes a division of the world into the spheres of two different real principles. In effect it becomes a distinction of two worlds. All beings in nature are composed of matter and form. 'Matter' is indeterminate and merely potential; it may be this or that. 'Forms' are equivalent to the constitutive laws of things; they are in all individuals of the kind or class and are essentially general. Averroes had laid down the principle that there is no form without matter and had based on it a system of pantheistic idealism indistinguishable from materialism.

Any subsistent being having a nature of its own, incommunicable to any other, is an individual. Such a being of rational grade is a person. Hence the metaphysical problem: Can we explain or conceive the means by which a being acquires individuality involving a nature that no other being can possess? The conclusions of Aquinas may be summarized as follows. Pure forms, real and active, exist only in the immaterial world. God is pure form and is unique and absolute genus and individual *per se*. The angels are relatively pure forms, each of whom is at once species and individual. Mankind belongs to both worlds and consists of matter and form in individual union. Hence men are members under a genus. How does their individuality arise? Individuality depends on matter *signata quantitate*, *i.e.* determined in reference to time and space. The matter of a man's body has been determined as to quantity by ante-natal hereditary and other influences. Matter, so determined, requires form to produce the individuality of *this* man, *this* embodied soul. The difficulty here soon became apparent. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that individuality depends on matter in a sense which puts immortality out of the question. But Aquinas and Albertus Magnus strenuously defend the incorruptibility and immortality of the soul against the materialistic implication of Averroism.

Duns Scotus appears to have seen more clearly than Aquinas that the problem of individuality is of central importance in any philosophy. It may be argued that from the nature of the case the problem is insoluble, since we cannot 'dig up the roots of our own being.' But the real nature and tendency of a philosophy depend on its grasp of the nature of this problem. In reference to the Thomist solution, Scotus affirms that all finite or created beings consist of form and matter: but there is an incorporeal matter. Formless *materia primo-prima*, *i.e.* matter as God created it, does not exist in isolation. It is *subjectum omnis receptionis*, the *radix et seminarium* of the world; rational souls are its 'flower' and pure intelligences (angels) its 'fruit.' *Materia secundo-prima* is the substrate of becoming and change. Scotus appears to have conceived of a series of forms determining the universal and primal matter. The result is a conception of nature as consisting of beings ever striving towards more complete and perfect individuality. Its unity consists in the order of its parts and the harmony of all bodies. The highest type of embodied existence is the human organism, because it is the organ of the rational soul.

[1] Cf. *Summa*, I. xix. 3, 10.
[2] Cf. commentary on *Liber Sententiarum*, I. dist. 43, qu. 1.
[3] *Ib.* III. dist. 37, qu. 1.
[4] Cf. W. Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr.[2], London and New York, 1907, p. 332 f.

[1] Cf. J. Royce, 'Latin and Scholastic Terminology,' in *DPAP*[2] I. 628 ff.

In criticizing the solution advocated by Aquinas, Scotus introduces a third principle, neither matter nor form, which he calls *hæcceitas*, and which is spoken of as if it produced or created the concrete individuality of the self-existent thing (*e.g.*, the soul of the man *qua* individual). The conception is thus stated by an interpreter of Scotus:

'Haecceitas est singularis . . . nihil aliud est nisi quidam modus intrinsecus qui immediate contrahit et primo quiditatem ad esse . . . et nominatur differentia individualis.'[1]

At first sight such statements appear to be open to two criticisms. (*a*) This is merely an illusory 'explanation' which consists in naming over again the fact to be explained: 'Socrates is an individual because he has individuality'; (*b*) more fundamentally, it is a case of the mischievous fallacy of treating the concrete existence involved in individuality as a logical quality like the differentia of a genus which makes it a species. On examination it appears that neither of these criticisms is relevant to the writer's real intention.

'The individual form (*hæcceitas*) is for Duns Scotus an original fact; no further question as to its ground is permissible. He designates individuality (both in the sense of individual substance and in that of individual occurrence) as the contingent (*contingens*); *i.e.* as that which cannot be deduced from a universal ground, but can only be verified as actual fact. For him . . . the individual is the form of all reality by means of which alone universal matter exists.'[2]

We find therefore two divergent tendencies in Scotus. His conception of *hæcceitas* implies that the real is the individual, while his theory of matter as always *informed* implies that the real is the universal.

In many respects Duns Scotus is the most important Christian thinker of the Middle Ages. Different aspects of his work have been dealt with as indicated in the references given above; but no monograph yet exists adequate to his significance as a critic of contemporaries and predecessors and as an original thinker. Nevertheless it has been said with much truth that 'in Scotus, great Schoolman as he was, Scholasticism overreached itself, and entered upon a subtlety which was the beginning of its decline.'[3] In every problem which he takes up Scotus tends to multiply divisions and distinctions to the utmost possible extent, until the essential factors of the question seem, as it were, to be reduced to impalpable particles and the real issues are lost sight of. Hence it is often far from easy to trace the fundamental and essential portions of his argument.

The opposition of principle between Aquinas and Scotus, even in questions of pure philosophy, went deep enough to perpetuate itself in two antagonistic schools. And, when it is remembered that matters of acute theological controversy, arising out of the doctrines of Incarnation and Atonement, were also involved, and that the respective doctors were impressive representatives of two different religious orders, it is easy to account for the feuds of 'Scotists' and 'Thomists' during the generation following the death of Scotus.[4]

There is, however, one fundamental question in which Aquinas and Scotus are in agreement, and in which they represent the position of the schoolmen as a whole. We may describe them both as strong realists, if we use this term, not in special reference to the question of universals, but as it is used in recent philosophy; in other words, they assume as an axiom that there is an immediate apprehension of the world as beyond and independent of the knowing mind. The distinction of understanding (or intellect) and sense, as two different modes of knowing, is always insisted on; but in each case the mind is directly related to the objectively independent world.[5] It might seem that this position was not tenable by Aquinas and Scotus, who speak as if they held a doctrine of what in recent times has been called 'representative perception.' Aquinas in particular speaks as if the interaction of the mind and the external object produced in the mind a copy of the object which is universalized by the intellect and becomes a permanent mental possession.[1] We find, however, that Aquinas is prepared to reconcile this view with the immediate objectivity of conception and of perception.

'In the process of understanding, the intellectual impression received in the potential intellect is that *whereby* (*quo*) we understand; just as the impression of colour received through the eye is not that *which* (*quod*) is seen, but that *whereby* (*quo*) we see. On the other hand, that *which* (*quod*) is understood is the nature of things existing outside the mind, as also it is things existing outside the mind that are the objects of visual perception.'[2]

In brief: our sensations and our ideas are not the objects of our knowledge but the instruments or means by which we know; or rather they are themselves the knowledge.

IV. *FOURTH PERIOD.*—Scholasticism in the proper sense of the term culminates in Thomism. Granting the inviolability of the system of ecclesiastical dogma, reason could do no more; and from this point of view the position taken by Duns Scotus already marks the beginning of the end. The decline of scholasticism is further marked by what is usually described as a 'revival of nominalism.' This expression is admissible only if we remember that it is not the nominalism of Roscellinus (whether understood as 'extreme' or as 'moderate'), but a nominalism newly thought out by a man whose ability, originality, and acumen are not inferior to those of any of the thinkers whom we have already named—William of Ockham.

William of Ockham was of British origin and was born towards the end of the 13th century. He became a member of the Franciscan order and was a pupil of Duns Scotus in Paris. He shared in the revolt of the Franciscans against Pope John XXII., which came to a head in 1322; and afterwards he supported Louis of Bavaria in the latter's famous contest with the same pope. During his life-time he was best known for the position which he took up against the Vatican: but his work as philosopher and theologian was influential enough to earn him the titles of *Doctor invincibilis* and *venerabilis Inceptor*. He became head of the order in 1342 and died about 1349.

During the years 1330–43 he issued a series of elaborate works circumscribing and limiting the authority of the pope. The issue with the Franciscan order concerned the duty of evangelical poverty. John XXII. had issued formal declarations condemning this practice; and the Franciscans maintained against him the ideal of strict imitation of Jesus in His poverty and obedience. The issue with Louis of Bavaria involved the whole question of the pope's authority as against that of the emperor. These works were theological as much as political; they served the purpose of the emperor and his supporters, because Ockham, in effect, cut at the root of the spiritual as well as the temporal supremacy of the pope. The temporal supremacy is openly and deliberately attacked. Independent civil power is declared to be as much an ordinance of God as spiritual power; and the authority of the State is affirmed in a manner which partially anticipated Hobbes.[3]

A brief comparison with the position of Aquinas may here be made. According to Aquinas, morality and social life are based on that *lex naturalis* which is an expression of the divine wisdom, and which the unaided reason of man can apprehend and realize in conduct. The State is the ordered, organized social life for which human nature is intended, and its proper end is to realize natural virtue. Natural virtue is only the preparation for man's higher destiny which grace offers him in the community of the Church; so that the State is subordinate to the Church as the *preambula gratiæ*. It is noteworthy, as Windelband[4] points out, that in Dante this relation of subordination has become one of co-ordination. But in Ockham the two powers are separated, as are reason and faith (see below). In the world of sense the civil State is supreme.

[1] Cf. Prantl, iii. 219, 280, 290. [2] Windelband, p. 341 f.
[3] Rickaby, p. 27.
[4] For detailed information respecting these reference must be made to the standard histories named below.
[5] In reference to Aquinas and Scotus this statement requires little or no qualification; but it scarcely need be pointed out that for a nominalist the objectivity of conceptual knowledge becomes the more questionable the more thoroughly his nominalism is carried out.

[1] Cf. *c. Gentiles*, in Rickaby's annotated tr., *Of God and His Creatures*, London, 1905, pp. 38, 122.
[2] *C. Gentiles*, ii. 75; Rickaby, *Scholasticism*, p. 45.
[3] Cf. S. Riezler, *Die literarischen Widersacher der Päpste zur Zeit Ludwigs des Baiers*, Leipzig, 1874; T. M. Lindsay, 'Occam and his Connection with the Reformation,' in *British Quarterly Review*, lxxv. [1872].
[4] P. 327.

Ockham's philosophical and theological works consist mainly of commentaries on the *Liber Sententiarum* and on the logical treatises of Aristotle. It is a mistake to underestimate the importance of these as compared with his political writings.[1]

1. **Ockham and Duns Scotus.**—The nominalism of Ockham is best viewed in contrast with the logical realism of Duns Scotus. If we isolate this element, with its implied intellectualism and universalism, in the thought of Scotus and examine its tendencies *per se*, we obtain a doctrine which in some respects is an anticipation of Hegelianism, pointing as it does to the identity of the conceived with the real and of logical with causal dependence. Against these conclusions and all that they imply Ockham maintains a continuous polemic. Negatively, his position involves a protest against the 'hypostatization of abstractions' (to borrow a modern phrase)—in other words, against the tendency to treat an idea derived by abstraction from perceptual experience as if it could have a substantial existence *per se* or even could correspond to (or be a copy of) anything having such existence.[2] He finds this fallacy in all forms of logical realism.

Hence he argues that the class-concept or universal cannot be what realism affirmed it to be. He resolved it into contingent acts of sense-perception related directly to external objects. Such an act leaves behind it a trace or disposition (*habitus*), resembling itself, in the mind; and, when several such acts, or their traces, occur together, the common elements are assimilated. But these common elements are merely *consimilia*. The intellect is nothing but a derivative continuation of this primary sense-elaboration of given material: 'intellectus operationem suam incipit a sensibus, neque enim non sentiens intelligit.'[3] Its procedure is always the same; abstracting from the variable particulars of perceptual experience, it retains the common or permanent elements, and the only existence which the concepts have consists in these ever-recurring mental acts of abstraction, which by the help of language can be combined into propositions and syllogisms. Universals are therefore artificial products of our mental activity, although indispensable to mental discourse. A universal has no existence or meaning but what it derives from the particular concrete thing or group of things whose place it takes ('pro quibus supponit'). As mental act it is *una res singularis* or *intentio singularis*; and therefore 'non est universale nisi per significationem quia est signum plurium.'[4] Universals are 'ficta quibus in esse reali correspondent (vel correspondere possunt) consimilia.' A common name is therefore like an algebraical symbol; it is a purely denotative term whose meaning is accepted on the basis of normal experience.

Notwithstanding all this, Ockham firmly adheres to realism in the modern sense.[5] He expressly repudiates anything resembling the later doctrine of 'representative perception' (that we know things by the intervention of mental copies). He appears to assume, as an ultimate position, that the mental act (whether *perceptio rei* or *intellectio rei*) and the objective fact are necessarily related to each other, and that truth consists in the completeness of this relation. The question which he appears to leave unanswered concerns the real basis of the *consimilia* whose objectivity he admits.

'Take the simplest possible instance. One stone falls to the earth when allowed to drop; another does the same. Is there any real connexion? If there is none, then it was a chance coincidence. If a million stones fell to the ground under the given conditions, it would be a chance coincidence, and would afford no *reason* whatever for supposing that the next stone would do the same. The events would be independent in their real nature. And Science would be impossible. If, on the other hand, they are not independent, if there is a real connexion, then it is a real universal. It proves on examination to be a Law of Nature.'[1]

2. **The authority of reason.**—The doctrine of the twofold nature of truth appears in its ultimate form in Ockham's writings and was indeed an inevitable consequence of his view of the nature of reason. If reason consists only in the analysis and combination of facts of sense-perception, then no article of faith (whether of natural or of revealed religion) can be rationally demonstrated. Ockham endeavours to show this in his *Centiloquium Theologicum* and in *de Sacramento Altaris*. In the case of some dogmas his conclusion is that they are not only indemonstrable but irrational. The idea of God, though not irrational, is one whose truth cannot be demonstrated. It is a composite idea whose parts have been abstracted from various aspects of normal experience.[2] The mind can form the idea of God only by the artifice of abstraction. We can therefore have no knowledge of the Supreme Being in Himself; we can acquire only a purely relative notion, whose truth-value remains an open question. There is no reason to believe that such arguments imply an 'ironical scepticism' concealed 'under the mask of a most rigid orthodoxy.'[3] Ockham holds that the soul has a faculty of its own for apprehending supersensuous truth. This is the significance of his metaphorical distinction between man as *viator mortalis*, limited to the world of sense, and man as *beatus*, endowed with the privilege of faith. There is no doubt that the distinction of truth *secundum rationem* and truth *secundum fidem* was used by others as a means of attacking faith while appearing to acknowledge its authority, and that Ockham's influence actually contributed to the spread of theological scepticism; but mysticism rather than scepticism is the characteristic effect of his teaching; and it is significant that an adherence to nominalism on Ockham's lines, a rejection of metaphysics, and a mystical doctrine of the basis of religious belief are combined in Pierre D'Ailly (Petrus de Alliaco, 1350–1425) and in Johannes Gerson (1363–1429).

Of Ockham we may say that, while his manner of expression and method of exposition are thoroughly scholastic, his thinking reveals a new mental energy and a wholly modern spirit. His appeal is constantly to experience. His central doctrine, that the individual is the real, implies that investigation is directed to the concrete actual fact. No free development of this tendency was possible except partially in the field of psychology, because the scholastic method and assumptions still ruled; but none the less Ockham may be described as one of the pioneers of scientific opposition to scholasticism.

3. **The new learning.**—As early as the 13th cent. the Franciscan Roger Bacon, at Oxford and Paris, had criticized the tendency of scholasticism and endeavoured to improve contemporary methods of studying theology. He appealed to sound common

[1] A view of Ockham's system as a whole can be obtained from a compilation issued in 1422 by Gabriel Biel († 1495, usually described as 'the last of the scholastics') under the title *Epitome et Collectorium ex Occamo super libros quatuor Sententiarum* (Tübingen, 1495). No good monograph on Ockham has yet appeared; and some of his writings have never been printed. We may name Werner, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, Vienna, 1881–87, iii.; Siebeck, 'Die Erkenntnisstheorie Occam's,' in *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* x. [1897] 317 ff.; Ritschl, 'Die nominalistische Gotteslehre,' in *JDTh* xiii. [1868] pt. 1; and (especially for references to existing sources of information) Poole, art. 'Ockham,' in *DNB* xli. 357 ff.

[2] The expression usually attributed to Ockham, 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,' is not to be found in his published writings, but is an accurate formulation of his intention.

[3] Biel, I. dist. cxi. qu. 6. [4] Prantl, iii. 337.

[5] Cf. above, III. *ad fin.* ('epistemological realism').

[1] S. H. Mellone, 'Real Kinds and General Laws,' in *Mind*, new ser., xx. [1911] 248 ff.

[2] Cf. Biel, I. dist. iii. qu. 2 ff. [3] Hagenbach, ii. 133.

sense, experience (outward and inward), and knowledge of nature and of humanity. In the second half of the 15th cent. the times were ripe for Roger Bacon's influence to come to its own. The restoration of classical studies tended to set the human mind free from absorption in one-sided theological and philosophical speculation and limited the excessive dominion of Aristotle over human thought. Scholasticism implies a Church unified and supreme, and a centralized learning employing exclusively one ancient language; but the spread of Greek literature, especially after the capture of Constantinople in 1453, exerted a profoundly transforming influence on the study of theological and philosophical subjects and promoted a reaction against the mediæval interpretation of Greek metaphysics, against the method of deduction from conceptions taken as authoritative assumptions, and against the rigidity of monastic Latin. Interest in the investigation and interpretation of nature found ever-widening scope for its effective development. Philosophy, finding a place for itself by the side of theology, claimed to be an independent secular science whose special task was the knowledge of nature; and natural science began to exert a decisive influence on the development of philosophic thought. The invention of printing (about 1440) and the discovery of America (1490) are only two out of many historic events converging to effect what was at bottom a revolution in the history of nations which necessitated a new development of religious and philosophic thought.

It is scarcely accurate to speak of a 'revival' of scholasticism in the 17th century. In 1563 the Council of Trent declared Thomism to be authoritative in reference to the essentials of philosophic truth. This, however, excluded the Church from the new movements of the time and reduced philosophy to a condition of stagnation in the seminaries. Half a century later a few writers of outstanding ability lent distinction to the movement in the Spanish peninsula, where the Thomist tradition had maintained itself most strongly: such were Gabriel Vasquez of Alcala († 1604) and Francis Suarez of Granada († 1617); but nothing that could be described as a 'revival' took place.

A certain turning-point in the history of scholasticism is marked by the publication of the papal encyclical *Æterni Patris* in 1880. In this Leo XIII. urged the intelligent study of Thomism on clergy and laity as wholesome alike for religion, philosophy, and civil life. Movements in this direction have been initiated and have not been fruitless. The *Revue Néoscolastique*, published (until 1914) at Louvain under the editorial supervision of M. de Wulf, throws interesting sidelights on what may be expected of a reformed scholasticism in the hands of Roman Catholic scholars of competence. The same observation may be made in reference to the *Revue Thomiste*, carried on by the Dominican Fathers since 1894 and published at Paris.

LITERATURE.—Within the limits of this article it has been possible to give only a concise summary of the most essential facts and to indicate sources from which reliable guidance for further study may be obtained. Numerous references have already been given for particular thinkers or particular aspects of scholasticism. The following notes relate to works where the subject as a whole is dealt with historically.

Among the most recent authorities must be mentioned: F. J. Picavet, *Esquisse d'une hist. générale et comparée des philosophies médiévales*[2], Paris, 1906; C. Bäumker, *Die europäische Philosophie des Mittelalters* (in series 'Allg. Gesch. der Phil.'), Leipzig, 1909 (cf. also Bäumker, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Münster, 1891 ff.); M. de Wulf, *Hist. de la philosophie médiévale*[2], Louvain, 1905, *Les Philosophes du Moyen Age: Textes et Études*, do. 1901 ff.; F. Ueberweg and M. Heinze, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*[10], 4 vols., Berlin, 1906–09, esp. vol. ii. (the existing Eng. tr. is from Ueberweg[3]). Among older standard authorities must be mentioned: B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la philosophie scolastique*, 3 vols., Paris, 1872–80; A. Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 4 vols., Mainz, 1864–66 (more briefly in *Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Phil.*[2], do. 1875); V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard* (General Introduction), Paris, 1836. The accounts given by J. E. Erdmann and W. Windelband in their Histories of Philosophy are good; and the older work of A. H. Ritter is not yet obsolete. Indispensable to the special student are A. L. M. Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*[2], Paris, 1843; and K. von Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1855–70.

S. H. MELLONE.

SCHOPENHAUER.—1. Life and works.—Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was born at Danzig on 22nd Feb. 1788. He was the son of Heinrich Schopenhauer, an intelligent and successful merchant, who with the help of a brother created a business which held a position of pre-eminence among the chief mercantile firms in the famous Hanse town. The grandfather, Andreas, was a large farmer, who began to add merchandise to his agricultural work. The family was of Dutch origin, and, curiously enough, this was also true of the maternal side of the house. The name of Arthur Schopenhauer's mother was Johanna Henriette Trosiener. She was an attractive young woman, not only gifted intellectually by nature, but educated (largely through the instrumentality of a Scottish minister) in a much more thorough manner than was customary at the time. She became an authoress of some renown in later years.

Young Arthur had an ideal training for a child both at home in a villa near Danzig and in a farmhouse which his father had acquired in the territory enclosed between the Baltic Sea and the arms of the Vistula. But this happy life was soon interrupted. The first partition of Poland in 1772 had given Danzig an autonomy, which was, however, an autonomy only in name, since Frederick the Great exerted himself by various exactions to make mercantile life difficult and irksome. After his death in 1786 things did not improve, and finally, after the second partition of Poland in 1793, Danzig ceased to exist as a free city, and the Schopenhauer couple, with their five-year-old boy, hastily departed and took up residence in Hamburg. Thus Arthur Schopenhauer passed the most impressionable part of his life, from 1793 to 1807—from his fifth to his twentieth year—in another great commercial city. This time was broken between the years 1797 and 1799, when he was taken by his father to Paris and Havre and was left at the latter town in the household of a commercial correspondent of the firm. The elder Schopenhauer was 'advanced' in his views and deeply impressed by the literary life of France, and more especially by the fame of Voltaire and his contemporaries. On his return the boy attended a school conducted on commercial lines, but, despite his father's strongly expressed desire, his inclinations were towards authorship and in no way towards commerce. On the promise of a long tour to France and England, however, he allowed himself to be coerced into an engagement to devote himself after all to commercial pursuits. Whilst in England he was boarded with a clergyman at Wimbledon and brought away with him a very unfavourable impression of an English boarding-school.

After leaving England, the Schopenhauer family went through France and Switzerland to Vienna and thence to Berlin. Arthur and his mother then proceeded to Danzig, where Arthur tried to learn the elements of business training. Subsequently he rejoined his father in Hamburg, and, on the conclusion of his seventeenth year, entered the office of a merchant there. He himself states that never was there a worse mercantile clerk, for his mind was continually fixed on other subjects, and more especially on the subject of phrenology, then engaging much attention in Hamburg owing

to the lectures of Gall the phrenologist. In April 1805 the dead body of the elder Schopenhauer was found in the canal; whether this had resulted from an accidental fall from a granary or not was never known. At any rate Schopenhauer had suffered serious money losses, resulting probably from the speculation that was then being carried on in the city, and the family was left in a less prosperous condition than it might have been. The widow, with her only daughter, aged ten, was glad now to be able to live a new and freer life wherein she might realize some of her social and literary aspirations. She and her child went in 1806 to Weimar, where she entered on a life of interest and happiness in the intellectual circle of men and women who had gathered round Goethe. On the social side this intellectual movement developed in great measure into the romanticism which characterized German society in later years.[1]

But Arthur Schopenhauer was left at Hamburg apparently in the depths of depression—the depression that followed him all through life in one form or another. His mother, who always regarded her son from a curiously detached and impersonal point of view, consulted her friend Fernow and on his advice gave her consent to his leaving his ledger and giving himself to classical study. At nineteen the young man entered the gymnasium and studied there with boys considerably his juniors. As this experiment was not successful, he went to Weimar, where he devoted himself to that Greek and Latin learning which (more especially the Greek) meant so much to him in later life.

Schopenhauer had already developed qualities of self-assertiveness and fault-finding which made him difficult to live with, and his mother had none of the maternal devotion that overlooks such faults or tries to remedy them. Hence the relationship between mother and son was strained in the extreme. The mother was satisfied with the position which she had attained and anxious to enjoy to the full her newly-found freedom; the son was critical, introspective, and gauche, never content with what was before his hands and always looking for something that was not to be found. In addition there was a mental side to his woes which his mother might have recognized, had she been less engrossed in her personal interests and happiness. It may have been inherited from a father who, with all his ability, was subject to outbursts of passion; his uncles, too, were mentally abnormal.

At the age of twenty-one Schopenhauer received his patrimony, which gave him the means of living in simplicity without dependence on professional gain. He enrolled as a student of medicine at Göttingen, but before long turned to philosophy, devoting himself specially to the study of Plato and Kant. He soon migrated to the young university of Berlin, where he worked under Schleiermacher, Wolf, and Fichte (though there perhaps was never a more critical student) and also did some clinical work in the hospital. In 1813 he was little moved by the call to arms, and, when Berlin was endangered (after Lützen), he fled for refuge to Dresden and subsequently to Weimar and then to Rudolstadt, where he composed his first published work, the philosophical treatise *Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* ('On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,' Rudolstadt, 1813), as an essay to qualify for his doctorate of philosophy at Berlin. Later, and in an altered form, it was made a part of his system of philosophy. In this treatise we have much that forms the basis of Schopenhauer's philosophy. We certainly find here what was characteristic of his teaching—the substitution of his doctrine of sufficient reason for Kant's system of the categories as constitutive of experience. In this book, too, we have the first statement of that conception of the world as will, the first step towards the notion of intelligence as a secondary result developed by will.

[1] See *ERE* iv. 359 f.

The great aim of the philosopher, though only twenty-five years of age, was to escape from the turmoil of war. In 1813 he left his inn at Rudolstadt and returned to his mother's house at Weimar, but the experiment was so disastrous that in May 1814 he left that house for good. The mother died twenty-four years later, never having seen her son again. Her qualities were fundamentally different from her son's. She was spoiled in early youth and, released from the trammels of a married life in which love had played little part, she found pleasure in surroundings which gave her opportunities for displaying her undoubted talents and social gifts. The son resented her male friendships and was morose and rude to those whom he met in her house. Schopenhauer's views of women are well known. He looked upon them as incapable of undertaking any responsibility—as creatures to be kept in subjection and regarded as unmoral rather than immoral. His own experiences certainly were far from happy. He never married, and it was perhaps as well that he did not. His nature was sensual; he was perpetually brooding over sexual matters and wrote of them in great detail.

Schopenhauer came into relation with Goethe at Weimar over a subject of interest to both—the theory of colour. He wrote an essay on the subject, which he sent to Goethe and which was published at Leipzig in 1816 under the title *Ueber das Sehen und die Farben* ('On Vision and Colours'). This treatise was in some degree in harmony with Goethe's conception of the nature of colour.

From 1814 to 1818 Schopenhauer was at Dresden, where he lived in a constant state of contemplation and self-immersion. His own notes describe the nature of that life—a life which he regarded as one continual struggle between diverging principles all endeavouring to assert themselves whilst only one could ultimately prevail. Hence came that constant consciousness of defeat to be overcome only by giving up the struggle as useless that associates Schopenhauer's name more almost than any other with the doctrine of pessimism.[1] He longed for relief such as the ascetic succeeds in reaching, although it meant mere withdrawal into negativity. He soon became convinced that his system was the great system of metaphysics and ethics combined for which the ages had been waiting. He had reached beyond the science of the day, which was no science but the 'philosophy of the barber's man,' to what towered above the sensible—the supersensible. Hence his attitude of certainty regarding his creed, an attitude which the common man called arrogance. His philosophy became fixed and certain in his mind, and he believed that he had only to wait for its recognition by the world. He had, however, to wait some time. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* ('The World as Will and Idea'), Schopenhauer's greatest and most important work, fell to all appearances dead in an unappreciative world. Most of the first edition, which appeared at Leipzig in 1819, was sold as waste paper. Another edition was, however, printed with considerable emendation in 1844. Nothing discouraged the author, so completely certain was he that he had found the truth in its entirety.

In 1818 Schopenhauer made a journey to Italy which greatly influenced his later life, though his

[1] See art. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM, § 5.

diary is full of somewhat morbid introspection and melancholy observation. Next year, while still in Italy, he heard that the parental business-house at Danzig had failed, and that his mother and sister had accepted a composition. Characteristically he would have none of this and held out for full payment to himself with such vigour and determination that in the end—three years later—he obtained it even with interest. He was indignant with the women, who were not willing to join him in the fray, and ceased for years even to correspond with them. Though riches came to him, his nature was not an enviable one as regards his wealth, for he was ever suspicious and distrustful.

Schopenhauer had a desire to be connected with a university, and in 1820 he tried to teach as *privat-docent* in Berlin, but without success. He became involved in disputes with Hegel and other fellow-teachers, and even threw a fellow-lodger downstairs, and had to pay her a substantial annuity till her death. Another visit to Italy was paid in the winter of 1822–23; then he returned to Munich and after some further travel settled in Berlin again in 1825. He made overtures for translating Kant's works into English, but with no practical result. In 1831 he went to Frankfort-on-the-Main to escape from an outbreak of cholera in Berlin and finally settled there.

He lived for many years a curiously ordered life, writing, reading, and taking exercise. He was devoted to animals and sensitive to their ill-treatment; he loved his dog, which the children named 'Young Schopenhauer' and which was his constant companion in his daily walks. His only diversion was music or the play, more especially the former. In 1836 he published at Frankfort a small book entitled *Ueber den Willen in der Natur* ('On the Will in Nature'), which was intended to be a corroboration of his theory of truth from the scientific point of view. It endeavoured to demonstrate the nature of will as the *prius* of the organism.

In 1838 a Norwegian society offered a prize for the proof of the existence of free will derived from the evidence of consciousness, and the prize was to his great satisfaction awarded to Schopenhauer. Unfortunately for his *amour propre*, he was not so successful in his competition for a Danish prize. He suspected a plot against him on the part of those who were inspired by the special objects of his hatred and jealousy—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the so-called transcendentalists. His jealousy for his own reputation and desire for recognition amounted to a disease.

He published at Frankfort in 1841 two essays under the title *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* ('The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics'). In them he formulates his scheme of morality, morality signifying the inevitable consequences which are realized when man reaches self-consciousness. Man has to become aware that life is self-delusion, and morality becomes inward self-abnegation and renunciation of the world as it has hitherto been known to us.

It was Schopenhauer's great work *The World as Will and Idea* that made him famous. It was through this, the result of a life's reflexion, that its author hoped for recognition for himself and defeat for his 'transcendental' opponents. Hegel was dead, and he hoped Hegelianism would die likewise. At first the success of his work was not very apparent, and the revolutionary years that followed soon after its completion tended to depress him. With the republican system of government he had no sympathy, and he dreaded losing his own possessions. Gradually, however, he found disciples here and there. One article which appeared in the *Westminster Review*,[1] and which introduced Schopenhauer to English readers as an opponent of the German transcendentalism expounded by Coleridge, specially delighted him. Gwinner, his literary executor and biographer, was a faithful follower and disciple.

The World as Will and Idea passed into three editions before its author's death. Some admired the work because of its views on art and music, others because of its exposition of sexual love, others looked upon the book as providing a new sort of faith for those who had rejected the old. The work that probably first succeeded in bringing popularity to its writer was, however, *Parerga und Paralipomena* (not very respectfully translated as 'Chips and Scraps'), which was published at Berlin in 1851. The book was made up of a number of essays on various topics, full of wit and sarcasm, and there was something in it to suit every taste. The date of the third edition of *The World as Will and Idea* was 1859, and a second edition of *Will in Nature* appeared in 1854 and of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* in 1860, so that before his death Schopenhauer at least had the satisfaction of finding his work appreciated. His portrait was painted in 1855 by a French artist named Lunteschutz and in the following year by Goebel. The latter is the portrait best known in its reproductions. The author's mother and sister died before success came, and he led a lonely life in spite of having many admirers. He lived comfortably and worked hard, although in a well regulated way, until his death, which took place on 21st Oct. 1860 from heart failure.

2. Teaching. — One can best make Schopenhauer's point of view intelligible by comparing it with that of Bergson, to which it has considerable analogy. Bergson holds that the ultimate reality is a creative *élan* which, operating in time (which is for Bergson real and ultimate but is in the nature of duration and not formal or spatialized time), gives rise to intelligence. Schopenhauer held that the ultimate reality or thing-in-itself was will, which developed itself into intelligence. Both consider that we have a direct intuitive apprehension of the existence of the *nisus* which is thus revealed to us not indirectly through knowledge, but directly. But Schopenhauer, agreeing with Kant, held that time, like space, was only a form of knowledge, while Bergson, agreeing with the denial of the reality of space, treats time not only as real but as of the very essence of the creative evolution of the *nisus*. The world arises for Schopenhauer when there has been evolved a nervous system sufficiently organized to be the instrument of knowledge. The will thus governs ruthlessly. If a man wishes to reach a state of rest, he can acquire it only by an absolute renunciation of the will to live. He may, if he struggles hard enough, attain to a condition of *nirvāṇa*—a state of non-being where the will has vanished and knowledge only is left. We see in this doctrine the influence of the Indian religions, and of Buddhism in particular, upon Schopenhauer's mind.

Schopenhauer teaches that we do not in the phenomenal world come into contact with the ultimately real. The intellect constructs that world according to a 'principle of sufficient reason.' It is by direct intuition that we apprehend that which is not phenomenal, and here we arrive at that *nisus*, or will, which is quite apart from the intellect and is something not in time nor determined by motives—the activity that underlies the whole universe. The will expresses itself in every phenomenon in nature, even in inorganic nature.

[1] April 1853, pp. 388–407, 'Iconoclasm in German Philosophy,' by John Oxenford.

But the body is distinguished from the rest of nature by the circumstance that by direct intuition we are aware of will as realized in it. Thus we have a conception of the universe as, on the one hand, a phenomenal construction by the intellect, and, on the other, as will—both conscious will and will revealed in the world in different stages and forms. In music and the arts universals somewhat analogous to the ideas of Plato more especially disclose themselves as stages in the self-realization of will.

Science, Schopenhauer affirms, can be learned by any one, but from art we get only what our nature brings to it. Science only teaches us how and why a thing has become what it is, how it is strictly limited in its sphere; art reveals the truth in a way that science cannot attempt to do; it teaches us, indeed, by its revelation of the truth, the unreality of the world and its manifestations. Schopenhauer was of course very largely affected by the romanticism of the day. The scholar, he tells us, is but the man who has painfully acquired certain knowledge; the genius has vision and sees the world in all its aspects and is also able to observe himself. Schopenhauer, however, follows out his theme to a point which may seem to us exaggerated, but which may be explained by the romantic reaction against the morality of culture and convention which had before this held the field. The old conventional morality he regards as selfishness of a refined sort. The will is really at the basis of all human nature, and the intellect is but a subordinate element in it. Art gives us the truest revelation of will and its stages as the meaning of life—a revelation which cannot be arrived at by any mere reasoning. The world is but an object in relation to a subject. It is from direct intuition of self that some glimpse into the nature of reality may be had, and this shows us that it is will that is the reality behind the illusionary things of sense.

Schopenhauer being naturally disposed to melancholy, his teaching turned into the pessimism that is associated with his name. The will struggles for self-assertion in existence, and this ends in a world-wide struggle in which no satisfaction for the individual is to be found. The will is inherently blind, and there is no release from the world of torture but by discovering the error of striving after the happiness of the individual and realizing our identity with other beings by finally renouncing the will and abstracting from individual desires. This is the only means of escape from the misery of the world, and artistic contemplation such as we experience in music helps it.

Schopenhauer has been regarded as an artist or a poet as much as a philosopher. Indeed, he himself has said that his philosophy is 'philosophy as art.' This explains his way of looking at philosophy as representing the vivid impression of a genius and his attitude of detachment as the teacher of a doctrine which could not be wholly carried out in practical life. We can understand how, after the period of disillusionment which followed the outbursts of 1848, men might take refuge in views such as Schopenhauer's, and we can also understand why his teaching did not take yet firmer hold as a system, even while it influenced very deeply contemporary thought and criticism. Schopenhauer has never founded a school; but as a critic he has an important place in the history of thought. He really represents one line of possible development of the Kantian system, while Fichte and Hegel (*qq.v.*) represent another and a very different one.

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SCHWENCKFELDIANS.—See SECTS (Christian).

SCIENCE.—1. Definition and characteristics.—Science is a system of knowledge defined partly by its subject-matter of more or less objective facts, but mainly by the methods by which its data are reached and by the extent to which its conclusions can be experimentally tested. Science is gained by observation (including, according to some, introspection) and by experiment, but also by reflecting (with every available technical aid) on the data thus supplied. Typically scientific knowledge is of such a kind that it can be verified by competent inquirers who repeat the observations and experiments and make them the subject of independent reflexion. In this respect, as in some others, science is a 'social phenomenon,' as it has been phrased. The verification requires, primarily, normally constituted minds; it also demands a certain competence—the fruit of discipline; it also desiderates some degree of freedom from prejudice and from the limitations imposed by the current errors of the age. Many sagacious astronomers were satisfied with the Ptolemaic system, and many sincere naturalists believed that they had evidence of the validity of the Linnæan conception of the fixity of species. Science moves asymptotically towards adequate accuracy.

Science is also essentially communicable knowledge; indeed the possibility of it depends on man's capacity for consulting with his neighbours. Yet it cannot be supposed that the range of com-

municability is to be limited either by the man in the street or by the man in the cloister. The average man does not find the science of Newton's *Principia* very communicable, because he does not know the technical language and cannot follow the argument. On the other hand, the accurate and astoundingly practical knowledge which a clever cattle-breeder has of the eugenic merits of an animal is often not communicable. It proves itself to be sound, like an artist's intuition, but the diagnoses involved have not been made the subject of scientific analysis, and they do not enter into the fabric of communicable science. Furthermore, knowledge does not become scientific until it is detachable from merely personal conviction, until it can be de-personalized. Those possessed by a burning enthusiasm for a conclusion, as unquestionable to them as the noonday sun, are often disappointed by the cold douche of scientific scepticism which demands personal de-polarization. The fact is, finally, that, if a conclusion is to form part of science, it must be stripped of every trace of an emotional halo. The emotional context may be essential to a sane synoptic view; it is irrelevant in science.

2. Aim of science.—The beginning of science involves a process of selection from the data of the personal thought-stream. Attention is concentrated on vivid sense-impressions whose external references are localizable in space and definable in time. The routine of these sense-impressions is observed and registered, and externalized (in most cases) as natural objects and occurrences. Whatever be the precise psychology of the beginning of scientific knowledge,[1] its pursuit depends on processes of selection and abstraction, detachment and definition. In this way there is built up a perceptual framework and then a conceptual system—the counterpart of the outer world, which empirical science at any rate must treat as real. The moment at which any part of this working 'thought-model' becomes definitely scientific is when it admits of formulation and is seen as part of a larger whole, when, as Aristotle said, from a great number of experiences one general conception is formed which will embrace all similar cases. The note of science is struck when uniformities of co-existence or succession are detected and formulated, when there is 'a unification of diverse phenomena through their reduction to a common law.' Science is essentially descriptive formulation. Its aim is to describe the impersonal facts of experience in verifiable terms as precisely and completely as possible, as simply as possible, and as consistently as possible. In its universe of discourse it keeps to experiential terms or verifiable symbolical derivatives of these. It answers the question 'How?' rather than the question 'Why?'. J. H. Poynting puts it thus:

> In science 'we explain an event not when we know "why" it happened, but when we show "how" it is like something else happening elsewhere or otherwise—when, in fact, we can include it as a case described by some law already set forth.'[2]

As Karl Pearson has said:

> 'The law of gravitation is a brief description of *how* every particle of matter in the universe is altering its motion with reference to every other particle. It does not tell us *why* particles thus move; it does not tell us *why* the earth describes a certain curve round the sun. It simply resumes, in a few brief words, the relationships observed between a vast range of phenomena. It economises thought by stating in conceptual shorthand that routine of our perceptions which forms for us the universe of gravitating matter.'[3]

The true nature of scientific explanation is well suggested by Kirchhoff's famous statement of the aim of mechanics: 'to describe completely and in the simplest manner the motions that occur in nature.' It must be recognized, however, that the end of science is not reached in the formulation of things as they are; it has also to describe how they have come to be. Its formulations have a historical or genetic, as well as an immediate, reference. They deal with the course of events. See art. NATURAL LAW.

What has just been said in regard to the past holds also of the future. The more complete a science is, the greater the power of prediction. Thus Helmholtz has written:

> 'We call our ideas of the external world *true*, when they give us sufficient information about the consequences of our actions throughout the external world, and bring us to proper conclusions regarding its expected changes';[1]

and Hertz said that it was the task of science to deduce the future from the past, the quality of scientific symbols being such that their intellectually necessary consequences correspond to occurrences.[2]

A scientific hypothesis *works* when it serves to sum up the observed facts in terms consistent with the rest of the scientific framework, and when deductions from it are verified in subsequent experience. If the contradictory of a deduced proposition should be verifiable, the hypothesis would have to be discarded or modified.

The primary aim of science is to see things clearly, consistently, and connectedly, to formulate, to discover laws. It reveals coherence and continuity. Its motives are curiosity, a dislike of obscurities, a desire for unity. But science as an intellectual system and endeavour has grown out of practical lore, and the desire of mastering circumstances remains as one of its mainsprings. On the other hand, while the pursuit of science will last as long as human curiosity, it is admitted by most that the crown of science is its contribution to the enrichment and betterment of human life. It is of interest to quote from a great investigator, H. A. Rowland, the following sentence:

> 'The aims of the physicist, however, are in part purely intellectual: he strives to understand the Universe on account of the intellectual pleasure derived from the pursuit, but he is upheld in it by the knowledge that the study of nature's secrets is the ordained method by which the greatest good and happiness shall finally come to the human race.'[3]

Trotter's excellent definition of a science sums up the matter: 'a body of knowledge derived from experience of its material and co-ordinated so that it shall be useful in forecasting and, if possible, directing the future behaviour of that material.'[4]

3. The scientific mood.—The scientific study of a subject implies a certain intellectual attitude or mood, which need not, however, be regarded as the only way of approaching a subject. Thus the æsthetic or artistic approach and the purely practical approach are not less legitimate than that of the scientific investigator. The characteristic features of the expert scientific investigator, or of any one desirous of having a scientific knowledge of a subject, may be described as a passion for facts (which implies a high standard of accuracy and a detachment from personal wishes); a cautious thoroughness in coming to a conclusion (which implies persistent scepticism and self-elimination in judgment); a quality of clearness (which implies a dislike of obscurities, ambiguities, and loose ends—what Faraday called 'doubtful knowledge'); and a less readily definable sense of the inter-relations of things, which discerns tentatively at least that apparently isolated phenomena are integral parts of a system. When Sir Michael Foster, in his Presidential Address to the British Association in 1899, said that the qualities which distinguish the scientific worker

[1] See art. EPISTEMOLOGY.
[2] *Report of the British Association, 1899*, p. 617.
[3] *Grammar of Science*[3], p. 99.

[1] Quoted by H. Höffding, *Modern Philosophers*, Eng. tr., London, 1915, p. 125.
[2] *Ib.* [3] *Amer. Journ. Sci.* viii. [1899] 411.
[4] *Instincts of the Herd*, London, 1916, p. 11.

are truthfulness, alertness, and courage, he was perhaps stating the case too generally, but he was making the point that the scientific mood does not necessarily imply expert knowledge of any particular science. It is often exhibited in a high degree by business men. Science is verifiable knowledge, systematized and generalized. As Benchara Branford puts it:

'Science is born anew in that wonderful world within each man when with deliberate will he succeeds in thinking about the principles of his work in the great world without in a clear, logical, and systematic way, and courageously puts his conclusions to the test of experiment; and the so-called sciences are the written records of such thinking, only more extensive, clear, systematic, and consistent, and more true to reality because they have been tested by countless experiments and experiences in the race.'[1]

Perhaps, however, Huxley went too far in this direction when he spoke of science as 'organized common-sense,' for common-sense is often very easy-going as regards both its facts and its inferences. A corrective suggestion of the difficulty of being scientific is given in Karl Pearson's statement:

'The scientific man has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his judgment, to provide an argument which is as true for each individual mind as for his own. The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance, is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment upon these facts, unbiassed by personal feeling, is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind.'[2]

4. The methods of science.—The first step in the scientific study of a problem is to get at the facts, to collect data. The virtues here are precision and exhaustiveness of observation, patience to go on collecting, impartiality to whatever is forthcoming, watchfulness against the deceptions of the senses, and humility to learn from previous mistakes made by ourselves and others. Common faults are hastiness, vagueness, acceptance of second-hand evidence, mixing up the immediate data of experience with inferences, and, worst of all, picking and choosing the facts that suit a preconceived theory.

A second step is accurate registration of the data. Science begins with measurement. Lord Kelvin said that 'nearly all the grandest discoveries of science have been but the rewards of accurate measurement and patient, long-continued labour in the minute sifting of numerical results.' Here come in instrumental aids to our senses, impersonal methods of registration such as photography, confirmatory observations by others, and various devices for securing accuracy. There is a quality of character involved, and it is very interesting that Clerk Maxwell should have referred in one and the same sentence to 'those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men.' There is an ethical factor in the development of what has been called 'the scientific conscience.'

A third step is bringing the data into the most useful form. They may be so numerous that some statistical or graphic device is required for dealing with them. A very simple illustration is plotting out a curve which shows at a glance the general outcome of a multitude of measurements. It may also be that the data are not fully useful until they have been further analyzed or reduced to simpler terms, to a common denominator with other sets of facts with which they have to be compared. There is a familiar opportunity for fallacy here, for in reducing facts to simpler terms something may be lost sight of, as when we reduce a physiological fact to a series of chemical and physical facts. But, while the reduction of phenomena to their common denominator cannot be accomplished by violence, it must always be attempted within the limits of the reasonable. Scientific description must be as *simple* as possible.

'To get away from appearances, to read the physical fact behind the sensuous effect, is one chief aim of science.'[1]

So far the methods have been observational and descriptive—representing what Lord Kelvin used to call the 'Natural History' stage of study. But the essential step is generalization and formulation, which brings the study to the stage of 'Natural Philosophy.' A whole series of occurrences is seen to have a uniformity, which is called their law. A formula is found that fits them all, or, more frequently, a new set of facts is shown to be in conformity with a previously established law. A set of occurrences is unified by the discovery of the causal relations that make them one; a puzzling phenomenon is shown to be a disguised form of a well-known case; a body of facts is fitted into its place in the growing system of ordered natural knowledge. In the discovery of a formula that fits, the investigator is often helped by a flash of insight; but often he has to try one key after another until he finds one that works the lock.

'Bounded and conditioned by co-operant Reason,' Tyndall[2] said, 'imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the physical discoverer. Newton's passage from a falling apple to a falling moon was, at the outset, a leap of the imagination.'

In other cases one hypothesis after another, one trial after another, may have to be made before a solution is found. And, whether the formulation is reached imaginatively or laboriously, whether it comes as a brilliant deduction from some previously established law or as a patient induction from many particulars or from an intricate interlacing of induction and deduction, it has to be tested and re-tested, criticized and verified, before it is allowed to rise to the rank of a theory. For a discussion of the logic of science we may refer to an essay by T. Case. Taking Newton's *Principia* as a supreme illustration, he shows that the method is neither the deductive Aristotelian nor the inductive Baconian, but both; it is the interaction of induction and deduction in a mixed method.

'The full title, *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, implies a combination of induction and deduction. It is also a combination of analysis and synthesis: it proceeds from facts to causes as well as from causes to facts.'[3]

Views of science are apt to swing from an extreme of objectivism to an extreme of subjectivism. On the one hand, it is sometimes forgotten that man forges the tools or refines the concepts which he uses in discovering and formulating the order of nature, that a great deal of the experimenting is experimenting with ideas and symbols in his own head, and that he labours under the difficulty of being immersed in the system which he describes, of being a product of the evolution which he analyzes. We can no more escape from anthropomorphism than we can from our shadow. Especially in the less exact sciences, such as biology, the danger is great that provisional concepts—*e.g.*, 'the struggle for existence'—often borrowed from human affairs, may lead to fallacy. It must be admitted that, while there are few who now think of the laws of nature as governing the universe, as our forefathers phrased it, there are many who think of science as more objective and 'pure' than it actually is.

But the other extreme is that of those who overemphasize the subjectivity of science. Impressed with the fact that man builds up his science by the sweat of his brow, inventing and trying concept after concept till he attains to an intellectual grasp of the facts, they exaggerate this into the doctrine that 'scientific truth is the creation of

[1] *Janus and Vesta*, p. 185. [2] *Grammar of Science*[2], p. 6.

[1] Arthur J. Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, London, 1915, p. 79.
[2] *Fragments of Science*, p. 131.
[3] In *Lectures on the Method of Science*, p. 15

the human mind and not of outer nature.'[1] But this misses what is characteristic of man's scientific formulation of the order of nature, that it must be verifiable by all normally constituted minds, that it must form a reliable basis for prediction, if not also for control. The order of nature is no human invention, though the formulations of it are often premature and inadequate. The concepts and symbols which man uses are not the happy thoughts of genius, but the outcome of other concepts which have survived a long process of trial and error, of testing and verifying. Between the two extremes of objectivism and subjectivism a reasonable position is tenable.

5. Scope of science.—Much confusion and unprofitable discussion might be avoided if the word 'science' were more frequently used with a qualifying adjective—chemical and physical science, exact science, mathematical science, natural science, biological science, mental and moral science, social science, abstract science, and so on. For investigators differ so widely in their outlook on the world that there can be no agreement as to the boundary lines of science. To many workers in chemical and physical science it seems doubtful whether biology and psychology are sciences at all, and to talk of political science seems to some the height of absurdity. What is just in this austere position is the recognition that in the domain of things, as treated by chemistry and physics, measurements can be made with extraordinary precision, analyses can be made with approximate completeness, formulations can be made with practical exhaustiveness, and, given a knowledge of the conditions, predictions can be made with remarkable success. So it is with the exact sciences—gravitational astronomy being the finest instance. When we pass to living creatures and their behaviour, to human societies and their inter-relations, we find that accurate measurement and precise registration are more difficult, analysis is very imperfect, formulation is only provisional, and prediction is in most cases hazardous. Moreover, test-experiments similar to those which are so valuable in the chemical and physical sciences are often difficult or impossible in biology, psychology, and sociology. The areas of greatest certainty in biology, *e.g.*, are in most cases those where chemical and physical methods are applied to the description of chemical and physical processes occurring in connexion with organisms. The discovery of methods, concepts, and formulæ for dealing with matter and energy is, as Bergson insists, far from having its counterpart in the realm of organisms or in the kingdom of man. The view taken in this article is the common-sense one, that science includes all knowledge, communicable and verifiable, which is reached by methodical observation and experiment and admits of concise, consistent, and connected formulation. In regard to one order of facts the application of scientific methods has gone far, in regard to another order of facts it has just begun, but the incipient science has no reason to be ashamed beside her full-grown sister. An exact science is like a solar system, a young science is like a nebula, but we see no reason why the student of dreams may not be as 'scientific' as the student of rocks, provided that he does not allow assertion to outstrip evidence and understands what he knows. The temptations not to be scientific increase, however, in proportion to the availability of precise methods, and it is interesting to notice that one of the kinds of scientific 'discovery' is finding a method that can be used in the investigation of a previously more or less refractory set of facts. Even the most advanced science is, in Spencer's phrase, 'partially unified knowledge'; the most living science is that in which the process of unification is most continuous.

Of importance is the distinction, on which emphasis has been laid by Clerk Maxwell[1] and others,[2] between dynamical and statistical knowledge in physics. It corresponds to the distinction between physiological and biometric knowledge in biology, to the distinction between the study of individuals and the study of averages in social affairs. The two are complementary, but in many cases our knowledge of natural occurrence is almost entirely statistical.

Another saving clause of importance relates to scientific symbols. The modern physicist visualizes all that his analysis can be applied to in terms of groupings and displacements of ultimate particles—the atomistic view of nature; and he is able with a good scientific conscience to assure us that there are such things as atoms.[3] The modern physicist can speak of the actuality of the atom, just as the geologist can speak of the actuality of the mountains. But this is a modern achievement, for until a few years ago the atom was only a symbol, a probably real working hypothesis. And, while the reality of the atom has been experimentally verified, there remain many useful working symbols that have not reached this stage. Thus the 'determinants' in Weismann's theory of heredity and the 'ceptors' in some theories of immunity are working symbols. Yet these symbols never live long if they are fanciful or arbitrary; they are retained only if experiment shows that they correspond in some measure to reality by forming a trustworthy basis for prediction and control. The history of science shows in an eloquent way how provisional symbols gradually attain to the dignity of realities.

6. Classification of the sciences.—It is useful to have in the mind some well-defined map of knowledge, which may suggest inter-relations, counteract partial views, and help towards the fulfilment of Plato's demand that the true lover of science shall be interested in the whole of his subject. But the particular form of the classification—whether after Comte or Spencer, Bain or Pearson, or Geddes—is probably of less importance than its personal quality. For the classification which we have in our mind must express part of our philosophy. Its boundary-lines will, for instance, express our conclusions as to the autonomy or dependence of biology and of psychology, our decisions on the difficult problems of vitalism and materialism, our views as to the distinctiveness of sociology or its subordination to biology, and so on.

Another general idea of importance is that a science is defined not by its subject-matter, as is often erroneously contended, but by the methods, fundamental concepts, and formulæ used in working with the material. Two or three sciences often deal with the same material; thus the chemist, the physicist, and the biologist may work with different ends in view, and in correlation if they are wise, at one and the same material, such as contracting muscle. A chemist, for purposes of his own, may devote his life to the study of the aromatic substances in flowers, and yet never ask a single botanical or biological question. It is a confusion of thought to map out territories as preserves of particular sciences, though every one recognizes broadly that there are three great orders of fact, viz. the domain of things, the realm

[1] J. B. Baillie, in *HJ* xv. [1917] 359.

[1] A paper in *The Life of James Clerk Maxwell*, by L. Campbell and W. Garnet, London, 1882, ch. xiv. p. 434.

[2] J. T. Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, ii. 599.

[3] See J. J. Thomson, *The Atomic Theory* (Romanes Lecture), Oxford, 1914.

of organisms, and the kingdom of man—the cosmosphere, the biosphere, and the sociosphere, as some have said.

It is useful to separate off, first of all, the abstract, formal, or methodological sciences, which deal with necessary relations between abstract concepts or between propositions, 'irrespective of the special nature of the concrete objects for which the ideas stand or to which the propositions refer.' They are deductive rather than inductive, ideal, not experiential, they are not directly based on the data of observation or experimentation. They deal with methods of inference, they supply intellectual instruments of investigation, they afford criteria for testing the consistency and completeness of scientific descriptions. They comprise especially mathematics (including statistics and graphics) and logic; and it appears to many that a place should be found here for a department of metaphysics, a criticism of categories, or a study of explanations as such.

The other sciences are concrete, descriptive, experiential, sciences of phenomena in contrast to sciences of formal relations. It is useful to recognize five fundamental and general sciences — chemistry, physics, biology, psychology, and sociology. Chemistry is mainly the science of the different kinds of matter, their transformations, affinities, and interactions; it is *par excellence* the science of molecules, atoms, and corpuscles. Physics is in the main the science of the transformations of energy. Biology is the science of the structure and activity, development and evolution, of organisms, including man as organism. Psychology is the science of the subjective aspect of behaviour, of man and animals. Sociology is the science of the structure and life, growth and evolution, of societary forms or of communities. There is something to be said for recognizing only three fundamental or general concrete sciences—chemistry and physics in one, biology and psychology in one, and sociology the third; but the fivefold scheme is the more convenient in the present state of science.

(*a*) Dependent on the five general sciences are the special or derivative sciences; thus botany, zoology, and protistology are special sciences within the rubric of the general science of biology. A great part of astronomy and most of meteorology must be ranked under physics, a great part of mineralogy under chemistry. These special sciences are to be distinguished from sub-sciences like morphology, physiology, and embryology, which are subdivisions of biology, or of botany and zoology when these are separated off. (*b*) Many of the derivative sciences deserve a compartment for themselves, being synoptic or combined sciences, using the methods and concepts of several sciences for their own particular purposes. Thus geology is a synoptic science, the focusing of several sciences on the study of the earth. Geography in the same way is a circle intersecting four or five other circles for a particular purpose. Anthropology is another good example of a combined or synoptic science. When it is practically convenient to segregate off a particular field of inquiry, a science may arise which has no radical characteristics of method. Thus the sublime science of astronomy is but a focusing of mechanics, thermodynamics, optics, and chemistry on the particular phenomena of suns, planets, and the like. (*c*) Lastly, it seems useful to keep the term 'applied science' for any department of a special science or for a combination of parts of several special sciences, directly oriented towards practical issues—*e.g.*, those of the arts and crafts. Thus agricultural science and medical science, the science of engineering, and the science of education are in great part applied sciences and are neither more nor less scientific on that account. As Huxley always insisted, 'applied science' is nothing but the application of 'pure science' to detailed practical problems.

7. Correlation of the sciences.—A counteractive to the impression of heterogeneity which a study of the classification of the sciences gives us is found in a recognition of their unity or, better, their correlation. They are parts of one endeavour to understand the order of nature and human life within it. They work into one another's hands, they react on one another, they are different modes of one rational inquiry. Several of them may deal with one and the same subject and yet not exhaust it. But it is begging many questions to insist that there is only one science of nature, which describes things and changes of things in terms of ideal motions, expressible in mathematical formulæ. This is false simplicity; it does not really work.

In seeking to understand and thus in some measure to control a difficult system, such as a living organism, the methods of several different sciences may be used in correlation. From the biological side the organism may be studied in its morphological, physiological, and embryological aspects; a deeper appreciation may be gained by studying its behaviour and the mental aspect of that. Many physical and chemical processes that contribute to the resultant which we call living may also be analyzed apart, and thus bio-physical and bio-chemical aspects receive their share of attention. Moreover, the creature has to be studied in its inter-relations with its appropriate environment, both animate and inanimate. It has also to be studied in its time relations; it is an heir of the ages, a historic being. The results of the various inquiries have to be pooled, or rather integrated. For the total scientific view must not be one that dissolves the organism; it must be one that makes its unity stand out conspicuously. The sciences are most scientific when they are most correlated, for they mutually correct one another, and our appreciation of the depth of reality is enhanced. New life came to astronomy and again to physiology when each established its correlation with chemistry; and biologists look with equal interest to such modern correlations as bio-physics on the one hand and psycho-biology on the other. One of the promising methods of scientific discovery is to effect new contacts or correlations.

If vital phenomena can be adequately described in chemical and physical (*i.e.* ideally mechanical) terms, a unification of biology and physico-chemistry has been effected. But the unification is not established by demonstrating that chemical and physical processes in an animal are in line with those in a thermodynamic engine. The applicability of chemical and physical methods to the study of vital processes is admitted by all; the utility of chemical and physical formulæ in the description of what goes on in living creatures is admitted by all; but the question is whether the chemical and physical concepts are adequate for anything like complete description of the behaviour of the animal, and whether we can deduce the behaviour of the animal from laws which apply equally to the animal and to the thermodynamic engine, to the flower and to the star.

We quote Arthur O. Lovejoy's statement of this point:

'Scientific unification, then, takes place in so far as diverse classes of phenomena come to be recognised as deducible from a single, relatively simple generalisation concerning the correlation of certain variables—provided that in each particular case the actual natures or values of the variables be known. And unification fails of attainment in so far as two or more kinds of phenomena appear (in the light of existing knowledge) as un

deducible from any single, already verified law, even were the actual values of the variables referred to by any such law precisely ascertained for the phenomena in question. When two or more comparatively specific laws are, in this latter sense, incapable of being deduced from any common, more general law—in other words, are not, thus far, unified—we may speak of those laws as being discontinuous with one another.'[1]

And, as the same author points out, another mode of discontinuity will emerge in this connexion if it should be shown that the motion of matter in a living cell does not correspond in its uniformities with the motion of inorganic matter. We have seen that what the animal does may be in conformity with the laws of thermodynamics and yet not be deducible from them; but there will be further discontinuity if it be shown that the motion of particles in the organism sometimes neither follows from nor conforms to the motion of particles in an inorganic system like, say, a whirlpool.

Treating of the work of science, A. E. Dolbear writes:

'By explanation is meant the presentation of the mechanical antecedents for a phenomenon in so complete a way that no supplementary or unknown factors are necessary.'[2]

Now, what many biologists are impressed with, *e.g.*, in regard to the higher reaches of animal behaviour, is the present *necessity* of invoking other than mechanical factors, such as memory and a power of learning.

Thus it may be said that the ideal of one science of nature—the ideal of Descartes, of Hobbes, of Leibniz—has given place to an ideal of correlation rather than of unity. There has, indeed, been much profitable breaking down of artificial partitions, many a useful discovery of a common denominator bringing apparently disconnected facts into comparable relationship, but the possibility of making physiology a branch of physics, psychology a branch of physiology, and so on, has not been realized. Moreover, the measure of abstractness which marks each science makes it impossible that a unified scientific view of the world can be attained by merely pooling the results of each kind of exploration. The chemical, the physical, the biological, and the psychological formulations of an organism, *e.g.*, cannot be left as accretions to an aggregate of knowledge; they must be correlated; and this is what some would call 'the philosophy of the organism.'

8. Limitations of science.—Science is knowledge gained by certain methods; to apply these methods usually demands a partial or abstract consideration of the subject-matter; 'Divide et impera' is the scientific rule. This is a self-imposed limitation of science—that its descriptions and formulæ refer to abstracted aspects of things. We can no more in actuality separate a living organism from its environment than we can remove a whirlpool from the river, yet for scientific purposes the abstraction has to be made; and up to a certain point—*e.g.*, in analytical anatomy—it is made profitably. The same is true in more exact spheres: the concept of mass is essential in dynamics; we treat of the mass of a body as if we had the body under the influence of gravitation only. But in actual observations and experiments we can never really secure the entire absence of electrical, magnetic, and other forces. To put it in another way, science works with 'ideal systems,' and this is one of its limitations. Thus in a general way it may be said that science aims at practically convenient representations of certain aspects of facts, deliberately abstracted from other aspects.

The terms of scientific formulation are in diverse degrees far from being self-explanatory. In biology it is necessary to speak of 'organism,' 'protoplasm,' 'heredity,' and so on, but these terms obviously require further analysis or definition—which the biologist is indeed trying to work out. In more exact sciences there are secret-hiding terms like 'gravitation' and 'chemical affinity.' It is true that the terms of scientific description are continually undergoing a process of simplification, but how limited is our comprehension of the fundamental terms like 'matter,' 'energy,' 'inertia,' 'life,' 'consciousness'! Thus a good deal of what is called scientific 'explanation' consists in reducing unusual unintelligibility to order rather than to understanding.

Another limitation concerns origins. The scientific treatment of an order of facts begins, not at the beginning—that is impossible—but from something 'given,' which is not explained. The biologist begins with the first organisms, or with the first visible organisms, or with the first visible organisms upon the earth. But what was their origin? The chemist begins with the chemical elements, but what is meant by being an element and what was the origin of the fourscore of them? Matter has seemed to many easy-going minds a firm basis to start from, but what is matter, and what has been its history? Must there not have been a differentiation of various forms of matter, and may there not have been a pre-material state of things? This necessary limitation of science has been well stated by Arthur Shipley:

'No body of scientific doctrine succeeds in describing in terms of laws of succession more than some limited set of stages of a natural process: the whole process—if, indeed, it can be regarded as a whole—must for ever be beyond the reach of scientific grasp. The earliest stages to which Science has succeeded in tracing back any part of a sequence of phenomena itself constitutes a new problem for Science and that without end. There is always an earlier stage and to an earliest we can never attain. The questions of origins concern the theologian, the metaphysician, perhaps the poet.'[1]

Another limitation has to do with causal sequences. In ordinary scientific discourse, as Bergson points out, three different meanings of the term 'cause' are common. A cause may act by impelling (one billiard ball striking another), or by releasing (a spark exploding the gunpowder), or by unwinding (the relaxing of the spring turning the cylinder of a gramophone and having the melody as effect).

Now 'only in the first case, really, does cause *explain* effect; in the others the effect is more or less given in advance, and the antecedent invoked is—in different degrees, of course—its occasion rather than its cause.'[2]

The only cases where a scientific account is complete are cases of mechanics, where the resultant is just a new form of the components, where we can say with a clear intellectual conscience, 'Causa aequat effectum.' In the great majority of cases all that science can say is, 'If this, then that'; and it is a very useful thing to be able to say. One particular totality of condition changes into another, but, when the chains of sequence are intricate, it is no longer plain that the resultant must be as it is and not otherwise. Science shows that a certain collocation of antecedents and no other will result in a certain collocation of consequents and no other; but it is only in the case of mechanical sequences that we fully know how it is that the consequents emerge from the often very different antecedents.

We have seen, then, that limitations are involved in the inevitable abstractness of science, in the residual or radical mysteriousness of its fundamental concepts, in what has to be taken as 'given,' and in the difficulty of giving complete causal explanations except in the case of purely mechanical sequences. But there are limitations of other kinds. Thus a reasonable humility of mind may be fostered by remembering how limited is our range of exact data. An admission of this may be cited

[1] 'The Unity of Science,' *Univ. Missouri Bulletin*, i. [1912] 17.
[2] *The Machinery of the Universe*[2], London, 1911, p. 13.

[1] Schuster and Shipley, *Britain's Heritage of Science*, p. 276.
[2] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., p. 77 f.

from an address delivered about the end of the 19th cent. by a distinguished physicist, Henry A. Rowland:

'It is a curious fact that, having minds tending to the infinite, with imaginations unlimited by time and space, the limits of our exact knowledge are very small indeed. In time we are limited by a few hundred or possibly thousand years; indeed the limit in our science is far less than the smaller of these periods. In space we have exact knowledge limited to portions of our earth's surface and a mile or so below the surface, together with what little we can learn from looking through powerful telescopes into the space beyond. In temperature our knowledge extends from near the absolute zero to that of the sun, but exact knowledge is far more limited. In pressures we go from the Crookes vacuum still containing myriads of flying atoms to pressures limited by the strength of steel, but still very minute compared with the pressures at the centre of the earth and sun, where the hardest steel would flow like the most limpid water. In velocities we are limited to a few miles per second. In forces to possibly 100 tons to the square inch. In mechanical rotations to a few hundred times a second.'

Finally, there is a sense in which science, if not asymptotic, is bound to remain approximate. A scientific law formulates an observed routine in the order of nature, and, if it has been established with due care, there is no going back on it unless the properties of the materials observed should change. It may be, however, that the law was only an approximate 'fit' and left residual phenomena, a recognition of which subsequently led to a re-statement of the law. So Kepler improves on Copernicus and Newton on Kepler. Even when the formulation fitted well and may have come to be regarded as of universal application, the extension or the intensification of research may show that it does not apply beyond certain limits. Thus the law of gravitation, which must be very near to perfect accuracy when applied to planetary distances, may not hold either for very minute molecular distances or for immense stellar distances. Even generalizations which work well and must bear a close correspondence to reality, since they afford a basis for effective prophecy, may require some modification, in their setting at least, in the light of some new fact or idea of great magnitude. Thus Frederick Soddy writes:

'It sounds incredible, but nevertheless it is true, that science up to the close of the nineteenth century had no suspicion even of the existence of the original sources of natural energy. . . . The vista which has been opened up by these new discoveries [of the radioactive properties of some substances] admittedly is without parallel in the whole history of science.'[2]

And Max Planck writes of the principle of the relativity of time:

'With the revolution which it brings about in our conception of the physical universe no other is comparable, in range and profundity, except that due to the introduction of the Copernican astronomy.'[3]

Finally, it may be useful to remember that, according to current and probably well-warranted scientific belief, there was once a time when what happened upon the earth might have been formulated in its immediacy with apparent exhaustiveness in terms of the dynamics of particles. But ages passed and living creatures emerged; new formulæ, as it seems to us, became necessary. Ages passed and intelligent creatures commanded their course; again a new aspect of reality required a new science. Ages passed and man emerged—with self-consciousness, language, reasoning capacity, and a social heritage. Science must always be asymptotic, for its subject-matter is evolving.

9. Science and feeling.—There is a natural antithesis between the scientific and the emotional mood; when either is in the saddle, it must keep the other at a spear's length. Science is essentially unemotional and impersonal, and its analytic, atomizing or anatomizing, methods are apt to be, in their matter-of-fact-ness, destructive of artistic unities and poetical interpretations. But, when science makes minor mysteries disappear, greater mysteries stand confessed. Science never destroys wonder, but only shifts it, higher and deeper. For one object of delight whose emotional value science has inevitably lessened—as Newton spoiled the rainbow for Keats—science gives back double. To the grand primary impressions of the world-powers, of the immensities, of the pervading order, and of the universal flux, with which the man of feeling has been nurtured from of old, modern science has added thrilling impressions of manifoldness, intricacy, inter-relatedness, and evolution. Science has supplied art and poetry with far more raw materials than have yet been utilized. Science is ever widening and clarifying the emotional window. There are great vistas to which science alone can lead, and they make for elevation of mind. In this and in other ways science may be epigrammatically called 'one of the humanities.'[1]

10. Science and philosophy.—A scientific system is the formulation or description of methodically observed sequences and inter-relations within groups of occurrences that admit of being measured or precisely registered. A philosophical system is the outcome of interpretative reflexion on the whole data of our experience. Science is characteristically impersonal, or, in any case, it must admit of being readily de-personalized by competent minds; but a man's philosophy must always have a personal note. To the influence of Kant, of the correlated 'philosophies of nature,' and of Hegel may be traced the fact that science and philosophy drew apart in the 19th cent., and more markedly in Germany than in France or England. Moreover, the rise of biology was giving a new completeness to science, and a fresh vigour possessed scientific inquiry as a whole. It naturally followed that scientific investigators began to resent the way in which philosophy called the tune that it wished science to play. More technically, science became less receptive to regulative concepts insinuated by philosophy into the scientific workshop. A diagrammatic example was the philosophical declaration that there could not be more than seven planets. For a time, indeed, it was in the interests of progress that science should be on the defensive against philosophy; but now there is more need for it to be afraid of thinking that it can dispense with its partner. It is well and good to ride the marches; 'I ask not proud Philosophy to tell me what thou art'; I shall scrutinize for myself. But there is a tendency on the part of science to forget its limitations, to be unaware of its assumptions, and to be easy-going in the criticism of its own categories. The truth is that science and philosophy are complementary. From the analytic descriptions which science gives we cannot but go on to the more synthetic endeavour of forming some coherent picture of the whole scheme of things and thoughts. Beyond the attainment of knowledge there is the unending search after truth.

A modern philosophy worthy of the name must take account of all the far-reaching results of scientific inquiry, of all the general conclusions of science in regard to the nature and genesis of the inorganic, the organic, and the human. A modern philosophy is inadequate which has not been influenced by the principle of the conservation of energy, by the doctrine of organic evolution, by the outstanding facts of heredity, and so on. On the other hand, philosophy justly reserves the right of critically scrutinizing the scientific conclusions which it uses in building up its interpretative system. Thus the principle of the conservation of energy, formulated in reference to the transfor-

[1] 'The Highest Aim of the Physicist,' in *Amer. Journ. Sci.* viii. [1899] 408.
[2] *Harper's Magazine*, December 1909, p. 53.
[3] *Acht Vorlesungen über theoretische Physik*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 119; quoted by Lovejoy, p. 7.

[1] See Baillie, in *HJ* xv. 353.

nations of physical energies, must not be allowed to foreclose discussion of the question whether mind and body (if these be recognized as admissible scientific or philosophical terms) can interact in a way that really counts. And the answer given to that question, or to some similar question more satisfactorily phrased, affects the general philosophical or metaphysical theory that one has of the world as a whole. Science may help philosophy by bringing into prominence the results that seem to be of the most radical significance, and also by inquiring whether the facts of the case, from the scientific outlook, are congruent with the interpretations which philosophy puts upon them. On the other hand, philosophy may help science by criticizing its categories and its logic. For philosophical discipline develops a critical faculty which is different from that cultivated by ordinary scientific methods though we lessen none of the emphasis with which we have indicated that the acquirement of the 'scientific conscience,' most practicable in the discipline of the natural sciences, is of fundamental value in the solution of human problems. Especially in the spheres where it remains less exact science requires the rigorous application of a higher logic, a methodology, a critique of explanations, which some have called metaphysics. Many of the greatest discoverers of new knowledge seem to have had singularly little philosophical sense.

A. E. Taylor gives a luminous statement of the relation between science and philosophy:

'The work of the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind only begins where that of the experimental sciences leaves off. Its data are not particular facts, as directly amassed by experiment and observation, but the hypotheses used by experimental science for the co-ordination and description of those facts. And it examines these hypotheses, not with the object of modifying their structure so as to include new facts, or to include the old facts in a simpler form, but purely for the purpose of estimating their value as an account of ultimately real existence. Whether the hypotheses are adequate as implements for the calculation of natural processes is a question which Philosophy, when it understands its place, leaves entirely to the special sciences; whether they can claim to be more than useful formulæ for calculation, *i.e.* whether they give us knowledge of ultimate Reality, is a problem which can only be dealt with by the science which systematically analyses the meaning of reality, *i.e.* by Metaphysics. We may perhaps follow the usage of some recent writers in marking this difference of object by a difference in terminology and say that the goal of experimental science is the description of facts, the goal of Metaphysics their interpretation. The difference of aim is, however, not ultimate. Description of facts, when once we cease to be content with such description as will subserve the purpose of calculation and call for the description of the fact as it really is, of itself becomes metaphysical interpretation.'[1]

One of the deep facts of experience, persistently impressive to the thoughtful, is that science is possible at all—and on so grand a scale; that nature is so amenable to scientific formulation. This raises questions for philosophical consideration, but it must also be looked at through scientific spectacles. Experiential science does not attempt to explain consciousness, but it is not quite accurate to say that science simply accepts in a naive sort of way the wonderful fact of its own existence. To be asked 'How is this marvellous fabric of science to be explained in terms of evolutionary formulæ?' is like being asked to account for some very complex and relatively perfect structure like the human eye. All such questions must be treated historically: science and the eye must be regarded as the results of long processes of evolution, vastly older than man. Science has its roots in prehuman capacities of 'learning,' of intelligently profiting by experience. It has grown from very elementary inferences relating to man's everyday practical problems. The acquisition of the early lore and the expansion of it had assuredly survival value; and inborn curiosity has been from first to last a stimulus to inquiry. Registration of gains in language and records, in instruments and permanent products, made cumulative advance secure. We are only hinting at an ætiology of science. But, when we go back to the possibility of it all, the metaphysical problem remains: the strands of naturally-determined sequence having woven themselves into an intelligible pattern, which human reason slowly and laboriously discovers, is it conceivable that they might have tied themselves into a knot baffling all disentanglement? In any case it is possible to suppose that our planet might have remained permanently beclouded like Jupiter, and then, as Poincaré points out, we should never have seen the stars and might never have advanced far in deciphering the order of nature. Various attempts, such as Lachelier's (1871), have been made to explain this 'correspondence' between the intrinsic order of nature and man's capacity for deciphering it, but it seems doubtful if we get beyond some device which dissolves rather than solves the problem. It looks like a frontier-problem for man's intellect. We may find ultra-scientific reasons for believing that nature is the embodiment of a divine thought and purpose, one evolutionary expression of which is man's increasing recognition of the order of nature. The Logos, or Mind, or Reason, thus postulated at the beginning, reappears in the form of science later on.

II. **Science and religion.**—Science is empirical in method and aim: it seeks to discover the laws of concrete being and becoming and to formulate these in the simplest possible terms. These terms are the immediate data of experience or verifiably derived therefrom. The scientific 'universe of discourse' does not include transcendental concepts; its aim does not include attempting to give ultimate explanations.

Religion, on the other hand, implies a recognition—practical, emotional, and intellectual—of a higher order of reality than is reached in sense-experience. It means the recognition of an unseen universe, which throws light on the riddles of the observed world. In the scientific light of common day are seen the hosts of the Assyrians encompassing the city; the opened religious eye sees the mountains crowded with the chariots of God. Unless religion is altogether illusory, the metaphor of this illustration expresses a cleavage. The religious language is not scientific language, but with different concepts and necessarily more metaphorical; its aim is not the scientific aim, for it seeks after interpretation, not description. In short, science and religion are incommensurables. As a diagrammatic illustration of misunderstanding, we may refer to the title of a book, *God or Natural Selection*—so obviously a false antithesis. But to call scientific formulation 'incommensurable' with religious interpretation is not to concede to the old-fashioned impossible solution of having idea-tight compartments in our intellectual voyages. Just as a novel scientific generalization is not incorporated into our scientific system unless it is consistent with previously established conclusions or unless the latter are susceptible of re-adjustment so as to admit the new idea harmoniously, so at a greater height, where philosophical discipline is invaluable, a religious idea, such as that of a Divine Creator, must be congruent with the rest of our world-picture. Here, both learned and laity have to face the moral obligation of clear thinking—which to be valid must be in conditions of organismal freedom.

Men are led to religion along many pathways—from the perplexing contradictions of the moral life, from an appreciation of the facts of history,

[1] *Elements of Metaphysics*[2], p. 192.

and from what is experienced by the three main types of mankind: at the limits of practical endeavour, of emotional expression, or of intellectual inquiry. When we think of the last-named pathways to religion — from baulked struggle, over-strained emotion, and baffled search after clear understanding—it is not difficult to see why the rapid development of science should have worked, for a time of transition at least, against religion. For science has given man an astonishingly increased mastery over nature; science with its numerous analytic triumphs has tended to diminish, in the shallow-minded, the sense of wonder, and science has dispelled much of the darkness which used to oppress man's mind. Moreover, the scientific mood has been widely diffused; it has a growing fascination of its own; it easily comes to preoccupy the mind and thus tends to crowd out the æsthetic, the poetic, the religious moods. The practically important conviction is that religious interpretation and scientific analysis are equally natural and necessary expressions of the developing human spirit.

12. Science and life.—In what has been said of the aim of science the primary purpose of understanding and the accessory purpose of controlling have been recognized. As Bacon said of Salomon's House in the *New Atlantis*:

'The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and the secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.'

It is unwise to separate the two aims too strictly, for all the sciences, including mathematics, sprang from concrete experience of practical problems, and many theoretical advances have contributed largely to the relief of man's estate. As Branford has well said:

'Science ultimately sprang, and is continually springing, from the desires and efforts of men to increase their skill in their occupations by understanding the eternal principles that underlie all dealings of man with Nature and of man with his fellow-men. . . . And if science ultimately has sprung from, and is continually springing anew from, occupations, science has repaid the debt both by rendering those who follow her teaching more skilled in their occupations and by actually giving rise by her discoveries to absolutely new types of occupations. One of the great conditions of human progress is this unceasing reciprocal relationship between occupation and science, each constantly producing and being produced by the other.'[1]

The practical utility of the sciences is so great that there is danger in exaggerating utilitarian criteria. It is profitable to remember the distinction drawn by Bacon long ago between those results of science which are light-giving (*lucifera*) and those which are of direct practical utility (*fructifera*), regarding which he said so admirably:

'Just as the vision of light itself is something more excellent and beautiful than its manifold use, so without doubt the contemplation of things as they are, without superstition or imposture, without error or confusion, is in itself a nobler thing than a whole harvest of inventions.'[2]

A second point is the historical fact that the kind of investigation whose results Bacon called *lucifera* is the surest, and sometimes even the shortest, road to that other kind of result which he called *fructifera*. The most 'theoretical' researches have often had practical results of extraordinary magnitude. The quiet thinkers in the scientific cloisters are, like the poets, the makers and shakers of the world. This is admirably discussed in R. A. Gregory's *Discovery*, where it is shown, *e.g.*, that wireless telegraphy, the telephone, aeroplanes, radium, antiseptics, antitoxins, spectrum analysis, and X-rays were all discovered in the course of purely scientific and very theoretical investigation.

The old discouragement expressed in the saying that increase of knowledge is increase of sorrow has been replaced by the hope of science as contributory to human welfare. This is pithily expressed in Herbert Spencer's well-known sentence: 'Science is for Life, not Life for Science.' While we may not be able to say of any specialized line of scientific inquiry that it is not of value to human life, there are undoubtedly some that are more promising and urgent than others. The pursuit of knowledge sometimes stands in need of being socialized, *i.e.* of being oriented in relation to the needs of the State. As Bacon said in a famous passage in *The Advancement of Learning*:[1]

'This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than they have been.' And the passage preceding this ends by declaring that what is sought in knowledge should be 'a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.'

The duty of science to provide knowledge 'for the relief of man's estate' has its counterpart in the duty of the State to utilize the resources of science. That this duty is only half realized is certain.

'Whether we think of the more effective and less wasteful exploitation of the Earth, or of the gathering in of the harvest of the sea, or of making occupations more wholesome, or of beautifying human surroundings, or of exterminating infectious diseases, or of improving the physique of the race—we are filled with amazement at the abundance of expert knowledge of priceless value which is *not* being utilised.'[2]

Just as many ills that the flesh is heir to are met no longer with fatalism and folded hands, but by confident therapeutics and preventive medicine, so over a wide range there is a promiseful application of all kinds of science for the amelioration of the conditions of human life. Man is only beginning to enter into his kingdom; much suffering, depression, and poverty is remediable; the potency of the influences of improved nurture, in the widest sense, has not as yet been adequately appreciated. The idea of a scientific control of human life is gripping men's minds with fresh force, and, instead of meeting suffering and disharmony by apologetic justifications of the ways of God to men or by submitting to them as means of discipline, a nobler piety is insisting on their reduction and, it may be, eventual disappearance. It is man's part to build up, as he is doing, a scientific systematization of knowledge which will increasingly form the basis of a control of life. The implications of this ideal have been well set forth by L. T. Hobhouse in his *Mind in Evolution*[3] (London, 1915), *Development and Purpose* (do. 1913), *Morals in Evolution* (do. 1906). He speaks of the mundane goal of the evolutionary movement as being the mastery by the human mind of the conditions, internal as well as external, of its life and growth.[3]

Thus, without any depreciation of the other factors that make towards a good life, one may emphasize the ethical value of science. For science judiciously applied removes gratuitous hindrances to the good life and opens portals. Science well taught and well learned means an introduction to the ever-expanding interest and wonder of the world. In many cases, as William Archer[4] has said, 'vice is a refuge from boredom, from that sense of emptiness and tedium that overtakes the idle brain, or the brain benumbed by soulless, uninteresting labour. But boredom, in this wonderful world, can only result from ignorance, or from—what is much the same thing—irrelevant, inert, burdensome knowledge.' On broader grounds still, he goes on to argue that in the building up of character a part is normally played by apprehension of the world as it is and as it has come to be.

[1] *Journ. of Education*, June 1904; see *Janus and Vesta*, p 186.
[2] *Novum Organum*, cxxix.
[1] Bk. i.
[2] Thomson, *Introd. to Science*, p. 249.
[3] *Morals in Evolution*, ii. 280.
[4] *Knowledge and Character*, Moral Education League, London, 1916, p. 5.

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J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

SCOTISM.—See SCHOLASTICISM.

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.—The specific doctrines of the Scottish school of philosophy come to us from the second half of the 18th cent. and are immediately associated with Aberdeen. Before that date, indeed, there were Scots philosophers who made their mark in various lands and in diverse circumstances of life; but this fact does not bring them within the range of the school that we are now considering. The term 'Scottish philosophy' is properly restricted to a certain type of Scottish thinking and must not be so extended as to include any and every philosopher (Hume, *e.g.*, or Hutcheson, or Thomas Brown) who happened to be by birth or by residence a Scotsman. It is the name for the philosophy of 'common sense,' characterized by its devotion to psychology, its adherence to the inductive method in philosophical research, and its determination to find in human nature itself the guarantee for truth. It owed its great impulse, in the 18th cent., to Thomas Reid, in Aberdeen, and was supported and expounded by several of his colleagues in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society—mainly by George Campbell, James Beattie, and Alexander Gerard. It was called forth by opposition to the principles and reasoning of David Hume; and, while having as its chief aim the due appreciation of the moral and religious tendencies of man, it paid full regard to the theoretical or speculative side of human nature. It was opposed to Hume, but, at cardinal points, to Locke and to Berkeley also, and to what Reid called 'the ideal system,' in all its forms. It was a spiritualistic philosophy, cautious and measured, designed to meet scepticism and to remove doubt by an appeal to what it conceived to be most fundamental in man's constitution.

Its appeal was to 'first principles,' intuitively apprehended. Experience was by no means ignored, but it was not looked upon as sufficient in itself for everything. While explaining much in human life, it needed itself to be explained: it could not account for principles that it itself presupposed, and whose authority was drawn from another source. That is what is meant by 'common sense.' The name has often been criticized, as though the use of it as a leading term ruled the Scottish philosophy out of court as a philosophy. It covered (so the critic has averred) a mere otiose acceptance of the unsifted opinions and beliefs of the plain man. But that is an entire misconception and could hardly have been entertained if due attention had been paid to the history of philosophy. Aristotle had employed the term 'common sense' as the designation of the synthetic power of the human mind in the unifying of experiences that come to us through the separate senses (sight, hearing, touch, etc.), in memory, and in 'the common sensibles' (rest, motion, etc.); and he had maintained the intellect (*νοῦς*) to be the *fons et origo* of first principles, regarding it as a native psychical activity, without which knowledge could not be, and through which alone experience becomes intelligible. So the Scottish philosophers held with regard to their doctrine of 'common sense.' The term indicates the native power and activity of the mind, which is necessary if experience is to be possible. In like manner, the Stoics, in their theory of knowledge, had laid stress on 'common consent' (*consensus gentium*) as the test of primary conceptions. They did not by this mean that the plain man, *qua* plain man, is to be the arbiter of truth; but, holding, as they did, that men everywhere share in reason and that reason is ultimately stored in the primal source of all things and is drawn by man therefrom, they maintained that there must be truths in which men in general share, and which, consequently, by the very fact that they are 'common notions' (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*), have an authority higher than experience alone could give—an authority that is all their own. It was sympathy with these thinkers (Peripatetic and Stoic) or with thinking on these lines that led the Scottish school to look for support to 'common consent' and to adopt the name of 'common sense' as designative of their philosophy.

I. *IN THE 18TH CENTURY.*—**1. Thomas Reid.**—The first and, in certain respects, the greatest of the Scottish philosophers was Thomas Reid.

He was the second son of the minister of Strachan, Kincardineshire, and was born there on 26th April 1710. On his mother's side, he was a member of the notable Deeside family of Gregory (akin to Rob Roy), of whom no fewer than fourteen became professors in Great Britain. He was educated at the parish school of Strachan in earlier days and, later, at the Grammar School of Aberdeen. He entered Marischal College and University in 1722 and graduated M.A. in 1726. Thereafter he studied Divinity, with a view to entering the ministry of the

Church of Scotland, and was licensed as a preacher of the gospel by the Presbytery of Kincardine O'Neil in 1731. From 1733 to 1736 he occupied the position of librarian of Marischal College. In 1737 he was presented by the Senatus of King's College and University to the parish of New Machar, adjoining Aberdeen, where he remained as minister till 1751. During his ministry he carried on and developed his philosophical and intellectual studies. He was expert in mathematics: his first publication was his 'Essay on Quantity,' contributed to *The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London* in 1748. But he exercised his thoughts also with the philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and laid the foundation of those literary writings which were ere long to bring him into fame. In 1751 the Senatus of King's College elected him regent or professor in succession to Alexander Ralt. For thirteen years he continued at his post in Aberdeen, teaching Moral Philosophy and Logic but also Natural Philosophy and Mathematics (for a 'regent' in those days carried his pupil through the whole of the curriculum). In 1764, with an established philosophical reputation, he was appointed professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University in succession to Adam Smith, who had resigned the chair; and he continued in this position till his death, although he retired from active duty in 1787. The order of publication of his writings was: *An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense* (Edinburgh, 1764), *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (do. 1785), and *Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (do. 1788). With the last of these works his literary career closed, although he did not yet cease to prosecute his studies with vigour. In 1796 he went to Edinburgh on a visit to his attached relative Dr. Gregory, returning to Glasgow in his usual health and spirits. In the end of September of that year, however, he was seized with illness, and, after several strokes of paralysis, he died on 7th October, in the eighty-seventh year of his age.

It was during his professorship in Aberdeen that, in co-operation with a few other congenial souls, he founded the Aberdeen Philosophical Society ('The Wise Club,' as the vulgar dubbed it), in which the Scottish philosophy took definite form, and which, therefore, demands here our explicit recognition. The society lasted somewhere over fifteen years, holding its first meeting in the Red Lion Inn, Old Aberdeen, on 12th January 1758, and finally disappearing in (or soon after) 1773, the last of the extant minutes of the society being dated 9th March 1773. Spread over these years, the total number of members was only fifteen (excluding the single honorary member in the person of James Trail, bishop of Down and Connor, elected in 1768). The object of the society, as at first constituted, is declared in rule 17 (in Reid's own handwriting and probably formulated by him):

'The Subject of the Discourses and Questions, shall be Philosophical, all Grammatical, Historical, and Philolological [*sic*] Discussions being conceived to be forreign to the Design of the Society. And Philosophical Matters are understood to comprehend, Every Principle of Science which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull Induction from the Phænomena either of the human Mind or of the Material World; All Observations and Experiments that may furnish Materials for such Induction; The Examination of False Schemes of Philosophy and false Methods of Philosophizing; The Subserviency of Philosophy to Arts, the Principles they borrow from it and the Means of carrying them to their Perfection.'

Philosophy, then, was the end, but it included the principles of science; and, as a matter of fact, most of the members of the society were intimately conversant with science in one or other of its branches (some of them being recognized scientific authorities), and all were imbued with the scientific spirit. The contributions of members to the *Proceedings* of the society were either 'discourses,' fully written out and read, or 'questions,' proposed for discussion, the former to be inserted by the writer himself in a book, and an abstract of the latter to be similarly inserted by the member who proposed the question and opened the discussion—any failure to do so in either case to be visited with a money fine, and the fine to be repeated, meeting after meeting, till the requirement was fulfilled. The minutes of the society are still extant and also portions of the MS books in which discourses and discussions were inserted (they are preserved in the Aberdeen University Library); and from them we can quite well see the wide range of the topics that came up for consideration. If philosophy, psychology, ethics, and natural theology supplied subjects for discussion, so also did political economy, jurisprudence, natural history, education, medicine, physics, chemistry, and even agriculture; and through all we can trace the gradual shaping of the writings that the world was later to know as Reid's *Inquiry*, Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, Gerard's *Essay on Taste* and his *Essay on Genius*, and John Gregory's *Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World*.

The key to Reid's philosophy is to be found in the phrase, 'the principles of common sense.' Common sense is a function of reason, and its office is 'to judge of things self-evident,' which Reid identified with 'judging of first principles'; and it is conceived as 'purely the gift of Heaven,' not requiring practice and rules for the efficient use of it. First principles are of two kinds (so the *Inquiry* lays down), according as they refer to contingent or to necessary truths. The characteristic of the second class of truths is that they are necessary and immutable, and their contrary is impossible; and of the first that they are mutable, 'depending upon some effect of will and power, which had a beginning and may have an end.' Contingent truths have a wide scope and include mental states given to us in consciousness, and the existence of objects of consciousness, the trustworthiness of memory, personal identity, the existence and nature of external reality as testified by the senses, the freedom of the will, the ability of our 'natural faculties' to distinguish truth from error, the possession of life and rationality by our fellowmen as manifested outwardly in their countenances, voices, and gestures, the propriety of paying a certain amount of deference to human testimony and to authority in opinion, and the instinctive belief in the uniformity of nature. On the other hand, the first principles of necessary truth have reference to the axioms of grammar, of logic, of mathematics, of 'taste' (æsthetics), and of morals, and to the great metaphysical principles that Hume had called in question, viz. the existence of mind and of body as the subject of conscious thoughts and of material qualities respectively, the law of causality, and the legitimacy of inferring design and intelligence in the cause from marks of them in the effect.

First principles are to be considered as laid in the structure or constitution of the human mind. They are, therefore, inscrutable and inexplicable, beyond the power of critical analysis, and to be accepted by us as given without comment or question.

Hume was the writer against whom this doctrine of first principles was specially directed; but not Hume alone, for the 'ideal system' of Berkeley also seemed to have scepticism embedded in it, and Berkeley and Hume drew their inspiration from Locke. What had happened, previous to Reid, in the development of British philosophy was this: Locke had laid it down that knowledge is 'the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repregnancy of, any of our ideas.'[1] On this basis Berkeley had shown that, if ideas are all that we can attain to in knowledge, 'matter' (as the metaphysician understood it) must be dispensed with, although he still retained 'spirit,' as being essentially active—an agent. Accepting Berkeley's doctrine of matter, Hume proceeded, on what he conceived to be the logical outcome of Lockean principles, to discard spirit also, maintaining that change, fleetingness, succession, holds as much in the realm of mind as in the realm of matter, and that, if matter be merely phenomenal, so also is mind. In neither case is there

[1] *Essay*, bk. iv. ch. i. sect. 1.

real permanence or true causation; there is only a flow or succession of ideas, held together as a continuity by custom or association.

'What we call a *mind* is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions [Hume's name for states of consciousness] united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity.'[1]

Substance of the soul there is none; and 'the question concerning the substance of the soul' is 'absolutely unintelligible.'[2]

Such was the logical outcome of philosophy, working on Locke's principles, as interpreted by David Hume. What, then, required specially to be done (so it appeared to Reid) was to prove that the Lockean conception of knowledge, accepted both by Berkeley and by Hume, was erroneous; that in knowledge we have more than 'ideas' and are indubitably in contact with reality. Accordingly, Reid set himself strenuously to the analysis of external perception and to a sustained criticism of what he called, in his own terminology, 'the ideal system'—a system that he found not only in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but also in Descartes, Malebranche, and many others. His first point was insistence on the distinction between bare sensation and perception proper in the perceptual process. He laid it down with emphasis that sensation is purely subjective—a mere feeling that can have no existence except in a sentient conscious mind; but perception is objective and knowledge-giving, taking us out of ourselves and indicating an object whose existence is independent of its being perceived. When, *e.g.*, I smell a rose, my sensation of smell is subjective, dependent on my sentient organism; but my consciousness of the smell as emanating from the rose gives objectivity—has reference to something that is an existent not-me. The beginning in sense-perception, therefore, is not made with bare sensation, to which objectivity is somehow tacked on afterwards—not, to use his own term, with simple apprehension—but with judgment, with 'a natural and original judgment.' I judge that the sensation is effected by an existent something outside and independent of myself. Sensations thus become 'signs' of the qualities of external objects, or 'suggest' the objects. The suggestive power is of two kinds, according to the two kinds of qualities of matter. In the case of the secondary qualities (taste, smell, sound, etc.), the suggestion is simply of *a* cause of the sensation, without any revelation being made of the exact nature of the *quality* of the object that causes it (my sensation of the scent of a rose does not *resemble* the quality in the rose that produces the scent). On the other hand, in the case of the primary qualities (hardness, solidity, extension, etc.), the sensation actually indicates, though it does not resemble, the quality of the object (its hardness or softness, roughness or smoothness, etc.) and thereby gives us true insight into objective reality.

This distinction of the two kinds of qualities in objects Reid put to great use, although he did not claim to have originated it (it is to be found in Locke and in Descartes and goes back at any rate to Democritus). It lies at the root of his contention of our unshakable conviction in external existence as obtained through sense-perception and supplies his answer to the idealism of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the other upholders of 'the ideal system,' which seemed to shut us out from external reality altogether, restricting us to 'ideas' in our own minds, outside of which we cannot get.

But, while in perceptive experience we get the existence and nature of external reality, we get also (so Reid taught) the existence and nature of the percipient's self or ego. The subject and the object in perception, though related, are not identical. The percipient subject is sentient and conscious, has all the qualities that we recognize in a real agent (is active and has 'power'), and is in many ways contrasted with the object. This fact, that the subject is in essence activity, energy, active power, introduces to us Reid's conception of causality and cause and brings out the nature of his opposition to Hume in regard to these. Causality, according to Hume, is mere uniform sequence guaranteed by custom, consequent on repetition, and involving an instinctive tendency to believe in uniformity of succession—which, however, has no rational basis and is not infallible, although it is for practical purposes indispensable. In causation there is 'conjunction,' indeed, but not 'connexion'—so Hume had phrased it. That view appeared to Reid to be wholly mistaken. It reposed simply on the physicist's conception of causation as found by observation of nature and natural events—a conception that does not refer to efficient causation at all, but only to general laws.

'In natural philosophy . . . we seek only the general laws, according to which nature works, and these we call the causes of what is done according to them. But such laws cannot be the efficient cause of anything. They are only the rule according to which the efficient cause operates.'[1]

However adequate this conception may be for the man of science, it is not sufficient for the philosopher. The origin of our idea of cause (so Reid held) is not mere sequence, however uniform, but personal volition—the individual's own consciousness of what takes place when he exerts himself in an act of will; and, although sequence is involved in it, there is involved also the exercise of power—an ultimate experience, which cannot be further explained. The principle of causality, therefore, becomes more than the generalized expression of observed facts: it is a first principle of necessary truth, expressive of the causal *nexus* and assuming the form that 'whatever begins to exist *must* have a cause which produced it.' If this be so, then, it appeared to Reid, the doctrine of Hume is irrelevant: it ignores the point to be explained, and is, consequently, ineffective.

Attaching to the principle of causality, in the view of Reid, is that of design as involving a designer. It is a first principle of necessary truth 'that design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred, with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect.' On this ground is the existence of God assured to us. From the world as a vast complex effect, manifesting intelligence, goodness, and purpose, we may legitimately infer 'an eternal intelligent First Cause'—an all-wise, all-good, all-powerful Creator. Here efficient and final causation are inseparably bound up together.

The same philosophical spirit that characterized Reid in his intellectual speculations characterized him also in his moral philosophy. To him it appeared that, unless there were some immutable foundation on which men could rely in ethics, some principles of human character and conduct that were indisputable, that were natural to men and must be taken for granted as being self-evident, we could put no certain trust in morals. These common-sense principles of morals include the freedom of the will, as the foundation of responsibility and moral approbation and disapprobation, and the deliverances of conscience as an innate faculty in man, determining duty, right and wrong, and the like, purely on the ground of intuition, and the rejection of interest or utility as the ultimate explanation of morality.[2]

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. i. pt. iv. sect. 2.
[2] *Ib.* bk. i. pt. iv. sect. 5.

[1] Reid's *Works*, ed. Hamilton[2], Edinburgh, 1849, p. 57.
[2] *Ib.*[2], pp. 586–590.

'The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.'[1]

For the positive doctrines of ethics Reid is very largely indebted to Butler, whose doctrines of conscience, anger, and resentment, etc., as laid down in the *Sermons*, he reproduces. The characteristic of *The Active Powers* does not lie in its doctrinal originality, but in its telling criticism of opposing views, its analysis of ethical phenomena, and its keenness of psychological insight.

These are the central points in Reid's philosophy. Where its weakness lies is obvious. In the first place, its enumeration of first principles is open to criticism. It is neither logical in the arrangement nor exhaustive: it is not sifted or determined by any rational ground, so that thinkers in general might be induced to accept it, but it savours not a little of Reid's own likes and leanings. In the next place, its appeal to consciousness as the ultimate testifier is to the *mature* consciousness—the consciousness of the adult—neglectful of the fact that the mature consciousness has at the back of it a long experience, which counts for much. It, further, ignores the fact that the individual consciousness is also social, and that the influence of heredity is of high importance. Lastly, it lends itself very readily to the loose and superficial thinker, who has simply to appeal to 'the inner light' in man for support to any prejudice or opinion that he himself may hold firmly.

Nevertheless Reid's teaching has its distinct place and value in the history of philosophy. It was the opportune insistence on the fact that more than sensation is necessary for the explanation of knowledge—that there is needed also the native activity of the mind (just as Kant, somewhat later, declared), and that the mind grasps reality and is not restricted to 'ideas.' To Reid an object implied a subject; thinking involved a thinker, and sentience a sentient. His philosophy is strong also in its psychology and its analysis of psychical processes and states, and in its recognition of the necessity of rising from psychology to metaphysics, and not, contrariwise, of sacrificing psychology to metaphysics. It is Baconian in its method—inductive and experiential—and is very suspicious of theories that are not adequately supported by facts. Hence it is robust and, in large measure, effective in its criticism. Reid's judgment is eminently sober and balanced: he hardly ever allows feeling to carry him away. He is a sound thinker, as distinguished from a deep and from an intellectually adroit thinker. His mental movements are, not infrequently, cumbrous and his literary style tedious; but he is patient and persistent and adheres closely to the point. He is also singularly fortunate in discovering the weak links in his opponent's arguments. He is fair and straightforward (sometimes even blunt) in his criticism; he is aided by humour on occasion, but he is rarely captious. He respected, while he criticized, his adversary; and Hume himself acknowledged that he was a gentlemanly antagonist. His end in arguing was truth, not victory; and that means a great deal.

2. George Campbell.—Next to Reid in intellectual ability, in balance of judgment, and in keen psychological insight is George Campbell.

Like Reid, Campbell was a son of the manse, his father, Colin Campbell, being one of the ministers of Aberdeen. He was born in Aberdeen, on Christmas Day, 1719, and was educated at the Grammar School of Aberdeen and at Marischal College, which he entered in 1734, taking his M.A. degree in 1738. After graduating, he was articled to a writer to the signet in Edinburgh, but later decided to abandon Law for Theology, and, in the last year of his term as law apprentice, attended Divinity classes in the University of Edinburgh. Returning to Aberdeen, he enrolled himself, in accordance with the usual custom, as a student under both professors of Divinity—King's and Marischal. While a student of Divinity in Aberdeen, he founded a Theological Club, among the members of which were Alexander Gerard and James Trail (the future bishop of Down and Connor). He was licensed as a preacher of the gospel on 11th June 1746, and was ordained minister of Banchory-Ternan, Kincardineshire, on 2nd June 1748. While a country minister, he conceived a plan of translating the Gospels and wrote part of his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. In 1757 he was appointed to one of the city charges in Aberdeen. The Theological Club was by this time extinct; but he entered with zest into the foundation of the Philosophical Society, of which he was an original member. In 1759 he was appointed principal of Marischal College and in 1771, on the transference of Alexander Gerard to King's College, was elected professor of Divinity, and held the office in conjunction with the principalship, but resigned his parochial charge. The Divinity chair was, however, connected with the college kirk of Greyfriars, so that his ministerial duties did not entirely cease. In 1795, 'owing to age and growing infirmities,' he resigned his Divinity professorship and soon after, on receiving a pension from Government, the principalship of the university. But he did not long enjoy his retirement. On 31st March 1796 (the year in which Reid died), he fell suddenly ill and, two days after, 'was seized with a shock of palsy,' and expired on 6th April, in his seventy-seventh year.

Campbell was distinguished as (*a*) a preacher, (*b*) a theologian, and (*c*) a philosopher.

(*a*) His preaching was characterized by solid thought, carefully elaborated and effectively presented, and enforced by sustained reasoning of a keenly argumentative kind. One of his sermons to which special interest attaches is that delivered before the Synod of Aberdeen on 9th Oct. 1760. The subject was miracles, and the discourse consisted of a reply to Hume and formed the groundwork of Campbell's *Dissertation on Miracles*. Another historical sermon was preached in 1776 on the day of the national fast held on account of the American War. It dealt powerfully with the duty of allegiance and strongly denounced the conduct of the colonies. Three years later (*i.e.* in 1779) he again intervened in a public crisis, and his attitude was greatly to his honour. The question of the repeal of the Roman Catholic penal laws was being debated, and people were much agitated over it. Campbell issued *An Address to the People of Scotland* (which formed no. 4 in the 'Tracts for the People' series), eagerly urging the claims of toleration. The result was that he provoked the hatred of an Aberdeen mob, which rushed excitedly to his house and smashed his windows.

(*b*) Campbell's fame as a theologian rests partly on his *Lectures on Ecclesiastical History* (published posthumously, 2 vols., Aberdeen, 1815), but mainly on his work on *The Four Gospels* (2 vols., London, 1789), being an original translation of the Gospels, together with learned preliminary dissertations and critical and explanatory notes. The very idea of a new translation of Scripture showed liberal and progressive thought, anticipatory of later critical requirements, though the execution hardly answered the conception. The dissertations are unique for the time and strikingly scholarly, raising Campbell at a bound to the first rank of Biblical critics. Their merit was at once recognized; they were accepted as authoritative not only in Scotland, but in England also, and continued to be the standard exposition of the subject for many years at Oxford.

(*c*) Campbell's philosophy was that of the Scottish school. As a member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, he was present at the first meeting on 12th Jan. 1758, and he continued a member down to the date when the minutes stop (9th March 1773). He read many papers and initiated many discussions, most of them having a bearing on the philosophical and literary positions ultimately embodied in his published works. The Scottish strain in his thinking comes out most clearly in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (2 vols., London, 1776). The plan of the treatise, in the words of the preface, is:

[1] *Works*[3], p. 590.

'On the one hand, to exhibit, he [the author] does not say, a correct map, but a tolerable sketch of the human mind; and, aided by the lights which the poet and the orator so amply furnish, to disclose its secret movements, tracing its principal channels of perception and action, as near as possible, to their source: and, on the other hand, from the science of human nature, to ascertain, with greater precision, the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by the use of language, to operate on the soul of the hearer, in the way of informing, convincing, pleasing, moving, or persuading.'

This kind of psychological inquiry was precisely to the liking of the Scottish philosopher; and, as the handling proceeds, many opportunities occur for the application of the principles distinctive of the school. Bk. i., which deals with the nature and foundations of eloquence, affords an excellent example. The two sources of Eloquence recognized are intuition and deduction. Under the head 'Of Intuitive Evidence' the mathematical axioms, consciousness, and common sense are handled; and it is here that we find, though on a less extensive scale, an enumeration and exposition of primary truths or first principles precisely after the manner of Reid.

But the Scottish standpoint is apparent in Campbell elsewhere than in the *Rhetoric*. The *Dissertation on Miracles* (Edinburgh, 1762) is as much philosophical as theological. The foundation argument is an appeal to common sense, or 'the primary principles of the understanding.' Hume had argued against the reasonableness of belief in miracles on the ground that such belief must rest on the evidence of testimony, but no amount of testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle, inasmuch as the evidence of testimony is based on experience, and experience 'firm and unalterable' has established the laws of nature, whereas a miracle claims to be a violation or suspension of these laws. To most people, perhaps, it would seem sufficient to reply to this that Hume's argument contains both a *petitio principii* and an *ignoratio elenchi*. To assert that the experience which has established the laws of nature is 'unalterable' is simply to beg the question; whereas to define a miracle as a violation or a transgression or even a suspension of nature is to mistake the character of a miracle, and, consequently, any argument based on that definition is beside the point. But this was not exactly how Campbell faced the problem. The stress in his reply was laid on this—that, so far is it from being true that our belief in testimony rests solely on experience, the reverse is the case: our belief in testimony (we see it in the unstinted credulity of children) is antecedent to experience and often needs experience to correct it or to tone it down.

'To say, therefore, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experience is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly, youth, which is inexperienced, is credulous; age, on the contrary, is distrustful.'[1]

When the objection is raised that such primitive credulity is inexplicable, he admits the fact, but maintains in substance that we must begin with something, must have some original grounds of belief, and this primitive credulity is one of the original grounds of belief, as the law of causation and the uniformity of nature are two others. This is precisely a reply forged in the Scottish school of philosophy and shows Campbell to be a true associate of Reid.

3. James Beattie.—Great though the reputations of Reid and Campbell were, they did not equal that of Beattie. This was not in strict accordance with merit, but was partly due to favouring fortune or the chapter of accidents.

James Beattie, the son of a small farmer at Laurencekirk, Kincardineshire, was born there on 25th Oct. 1735. His early education was acquired at the parish school of Laurencekirk, aided by instruction in classics from the parish minister. In 1749, at the age of fourteen, he enrolled himself as a student at Marischal College, Aberdeen, having gained the first bursary at the annual competition, and, after four years' study, graduated M.A. in the spring of 1753. The same year he became schoolmaster of Fordoun, adjoining Laurencekirk, in which post he remained five years, prosecuting studies in Divinity at the same time with a view to the ministry (which he did not ultimately enter). It was while schoolmaster of Fordoun that he began to reveal himself as a poet. In 1758 he left Fordoun for Aberdeen, having been appointed by the magistrates of the city one of the masters of the Grammar School. This position he held for two years only; for in 1760 he became a professor in Marischal College. The chair to which he was presented was that of Natural Philosophy; but, by a happy accident, before the session began, the chair of Moral Philosophy fell vacant by the transference of Alexander Gerard to the chair of Divinity. To Gerard's vacant chair Beattie accordingly was appointed, where he found the work that was proper and congenial to him. In 1761 he was duly elected a member of the Philosophical Society, to which he contributed essays and questions for discussion; and he continued a member till the society ceased.

In 1770 appeared the *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*—a work which, contrary to his expectations, brought him immediate fame. It sold rapidly, reaching a third edition within two years, and was translated into French, German, Dutch, and Italian. It was praised by English statesmen and English men of letters—such as Lord Chatham, Burke, Samuel Johnson, Garrick, and Sir Joshua Reynolds—and won for Beattie the friendship of these distinguished men and others. It was eulogized by Church dignitaries, including the two archbishops and Dr. Porteous of Chester, afterwards bishop of London, and brought forth offers of ecclesiastical preferment on the condition of his taking Holy Orders. Above all, it attracted the attention of George III. and led to Beattie's having several interviews with the king and to his obtaining a royal pension of £200 a year. Honours were now showered upon him. Oxford conferred upon him the degree of D.C.L. and made his work a text-book; Sir Joshua Reynolds painted his portrait as part of the famous allegorical picture of the Angel of Truth pushing down Voltaire and two other sceptics (now the prized possession of the University of Aberdeen); and he was lionized and welcomed everywhere as the philosophical champion of the faith. That last phrase gives the main reason of the extraordinary popularity of the *Essay on Truth*. The treatise was an exposition of the principles of Common Sense as a safeguard against sophistry and scepticism, accompanied with an unsparing and slashing criticism of Hume's philosophy—a philosophy that had seemed to religiously-minded people to undermine by invincible logic the groundwork of morality and religion alike.

The year 1771 saw the publication of the first book of *The Minstrel*, the second being issued three years later. This poem at once raised Beattie to a high place as a poet in the public estimation and had, like the *Essay*, a rapid circulation.

Other books of Beattie were: *Dissertations, Moral and Critical* (London, 1783), *Evidences of the Christian Religion* (Edinburgh, 1786), and *Elements of Moral Science* (2 vols., do. 1790–93)—all popular and commanding a wide circle of readers.

Beattie as a man of society makes a pleasing picture to the imagination; for, while moving in the highest social circles in the land and lauded by the leaders in thought and in letters, he never allowed himself to be carried away. He remained to the end unassuming and humble, being fully cognizant of his own limitations. His domestic life was clouded during many of his later years by the sad and long-continued illness of his wife, who suffered from mental derangement. Meanwhile, his own health gave way, and he had to carry on a struggle (and manfully he did it) against many physical infirmities. The situation was aggravated by the loss of his two sons—both of them very promising youths and dear to his heart. The elder, James Hay, had the religious seriousness and the philosophical tastes and aptitudes of his father and not a little of his father's humane and amiable disposition. So precocious was he that, at the age of nineteen, he was appointed his father's assistant and colleague in the chair of Moral Philosophy. But three years later, on 19th Nov. 1790, he died of lung complaint, at the age of twenty-two. The younger son, Montagu, was cut off even more prematurely, dying of a fever, after a brief illness, on 14th March 1796, aged eighteen. All this told severely on Beattie; his nerves became shattered, vertigo settled on him as his constant companion, and his memory began to give way. Paralysis overtook him; and, after repeated strokes, occurring at intervals over several years, he died in Aberdeen, on 18th Aug. 1803.

Of Beattie as a poet little need be said. *The Minstrel*, in both the parts of it (the intended third was never written), was praised by high authorities at the time and is appreciated by competent judges still. It has won this note of immortality: it appears, in selected passages, in the popular books of quotations at the present day. The same is true of his *Hermit*.

As a philosopher, Beattie has not attained the immortality that his contemporaries predicted. Yet his writings do not deserve the contemptuous neglect that has overtaken them. The principles of his *Essay on Truth* are those of Reid, although not so judiciously handled. They are expressed, however, in a harmonious Addisonian style, which

[1] *Dissertation*, p. 12.

drew forth the approbation of the greatest literary men of the day. The ultimate appeal with Beattie is to common sense; but the effect is spoiled by two defects: (1) his tendency to identify the philosophical principle with the plain man's unsophisticated 'intuition' (that is Beattie's favourite term) and his setting it forth as a kind of inner light or inward feeling, competent of itself to guide a man in any circumstances of life; and (2) the occasional exaggeration and vehemence of his language, especially when he has Hume in view, thereby giving ground for Hume's complaint that Beattie 'had not used him like a gentleman.'

Vehement language in philosophy is apt to arouse in one a suspicion of a lack, in the person who employs it, of that philosophic calmness and 'indifferency to truth' which are indispensable to clear thinking and to a due understanding and appreciation of an opponent's standpoint. On the other hand, the weakness of the conception of an inner light is manifest. The sceptic may reasonably enough feel that *his* doubt cannot be dispelled by another man's intuition; nor is a criterion like Beattie's of very much use if, on the occasion of a difference of opinion or belief arising between two men, each can appeal to the criterion as declaring in *his* favour. Nor is the application to the doubter of the general proposition that 'what everybody sees is indisputable' of very much avail, if the doubter can honestly say, 'But *I* do not see.' That, surely, cannot rightly be said to be seen by everybody which even one man fails to see.

The weakness of the appeal was early felt in Beattie's own day. In Aberdeenshire John Skinner of Linshart, author of *Tullochgorum*, turned the doctrine of the inward infallible light into sprightly Latin verse, set to the tune of 'Tullochgorum,' and treated it with pawky humour, the sting of which was removed by the laudatory epithet applied to Beattie in the catching refrain of 'Doctissime Doctorum.' On the other hand, Joseph Priestley seized the opportunity to turn the Scottish philosophy into ridicule, joining Beattie not only with Reid but also with James Oswald (who in his *Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of Religion* [2 vols., Edinburgh, 1766–72] had made such an unscientific and unphilosophical application of common sense to religion as to render him a ready butt to sarcasm and flippant wit).

'When we see,' said Priestley, criticizing Beattie, 'how miserably bewildered the bulk of mankind are, one would think that this principle of truth is like the god Baal, who when he was most wanted, and ought to have made a point of being present, to assist his worshippers, was asleep, or on a journey, or engaged some other way.'[1]

Beattie's claims as a philosopher are usually tested by his *Essay on Truth* alone. But his other philosophical works ought to be taken into account also. In particular, the *Dissertations* and the three essays in literary criticism (on poetry, laughter, and classical learning) appended to the quarto edition of the *Essay on Truth* (Edinburgh, 1776) show keenness of psychological insight and sobriety of judgment that are far from common. They also show Beattie's style at its best and put it beyond question that there is real critical power in that school of literary criticism in Scotland (headed by Lord Kames) to which Beattie belonged, and which was sufficiently important to arouse the jealousy of Voltaire and to draw forth his scorn.

4. Alexander Gerard.—Of the Aberdeen philosophers of the 18th cent. Gerard alone remains to be noted.

Alexander Gerard, son of Gilbert Gerard, minister of Chapel of Garioch, Aberdeenshire, was born in 1728 and died in 1795. He graduated M.A. at Marischal College in 1744. In 1752 he was appointed regent or professor of Moral Philosophy in that university, having acted for the two previous years as substitute for the then professor, David Fordyce. In 1760 he was transferred to the chair of Divinity, which he occupied till 1771, when he was appointed professor of Divinity in King's College. He was not, like Reid and Campbell, an original member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, but he joined it at its fifth meeting—on 8th March 1758. At Marischal College he showed himself a keen advocate of university reform, and it was mainly owing to him that Marischal College gave up the 'regenting' system in 1755 and substituted that of the professoriate. His views on academic teaching may be seen in his *Plan of Education in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen, with the Reasons of it* (Aberdeen, 1755)—a work that was translated into German in 1770. While professor of Divinity in Marischal College, he was elected Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (1764); and, while professor of Divinity in King's College, he held the office of one of His Majesty's chaplains in ordinary for Scotland.

Gerard attained distinction both as a theologian and as a philosopher. His two theological works are: *Dissertations on Subjects relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity* (Edinburgh, 1766) and *The Pastoral Care* (London, 1799). The former consists of two lengthy dissertations, the first dealing with the suggestive manner in which Christ and His apostles proposed the evidences of their mission, and the second with Christianity as confirmed by the opposition of infidels. The topics are ably treated, and the presentation is effective from the writer's point of view. If the book has only a historical interest now, it is simply because the modern spirit is rather impatient of such formal disquisitions as are here to be found and is more likely to be impressed by the living power of the gospel as manifested in the daily lives of believers. The lectures on pastoral theology were published, after the author's death, by his son Gilbert (who succeeded his father in the chair of Divinity in King's College) in 1799. They are full of wise counsel and sane judgment and have still an interest for all who are curious to know what was expected of a Scottish pastor in the days of parochial catechizing and at the moment when 'fellowship meetings' had made their appearance in the land and were as yet looked upon with suspicion by the older generation of divines.

But, besides being a trusted theologian, Gerard had a considerable reputation as a philosopher. This arose from his *Essay on Taste* (London, 1759) and his *Essay on Genius* (do. 1774). These two writings are marked by the analytic power of the Scottish philosophers and show the same calm, well-balanced judgment as was characteristic of Thomas Reid. Gerard, indeed, lacked Reid's faculty of sustained thinking, and one can hardly conceive him as the originator of a system; but he could handle a theme adroitly and with penetration and in a style that is pleasant to read. Special interest attaches to the *Essay on Taste* because it enunciates views that met with much acceptance in Scotland and in France, resolving beauty, 'at least in part,' into association. In like manner, the *Essay on Genius* enjoyed much popularity. In it he traces the origin of genius to the associating power of the imagination, and devotes space to a consideration of the laws of association following Aristotle—thereby giving occasion to Sir William Hamilton's complimentary remark on Gerard, that 'of the later British philosophers, indeed, there is hardly to be found another, who has studied the works of Aristotle more attentively and to better effect.'[1] But the most notable fact about this essay is that it specially attracted the attention of Immanuel Kant and affected his doctrine of genius as laid down in the *Kritik of Judgment*.[2]

[1] *Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry*, etc., p. 128.

[1] Reid's *Works*[2], p. 900, note 10.

[2] See Otto Schlapp, *Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der 'Kritik der Urteilskraft,'* Göttingen, 1901, pp. 9 244, 417, 441, etc.

II. *IN THE 19TH CENTURY.*—Two thinkers in the University of Edinburgh have great distinction in connexion with the Scottish philosophy in the 19th cent.—Dugald Stewart and Sir William Hamilton. Previous to either, in the second half of the 18th cent., was **Adam Ferguson** (1723–1816), who accepted Reid's 'common sense' teaching and reproduced it without appreciable modification. His reputation was mainly that of a moral philosopher, inculcating Stoical ethics, mellowed by the emphatic assertion of the importance of the benevolent affections and the reiterated insistence on the need of taking full cognizance of the essentially social nature of man.[1] His eloquence and his broadened sympathy attracted many hearers to his lectures, and elicited general admiration. He had also a reputation on account of his work on the *Hist. of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* (3 vols., London, 1783). His books were widely read. Yet his fame has long since gone, and his works repose peacefully on the shelves. There remains only the laudatory epitaph on his tombstone (read by every passer-by) in the cathedral graveyard of St. Andrews, written by Sir Walter Scott, which, however grandiloquent and extravagant it may appear to us to be, does quite well represent the general opinion of Ferguson's contemporaries.

1. **Dugald Stewart.**—

Dugald Stewart was the son of Matthew Stewart, professor of Mathematics in Edinburgh University, and was born in Edinburgh on 22nd Nov. 1753. His school and university education was received in his native town. As a student in Arts, he proved himself expert in mathematics and in philosophy. By the professors of philosophy he was instructed in Reid's principles; and he had his views expanded and confirmed later by attendance on Reid's lectures in Glasgow. In 1772 and for the three succeeding years he taught the class of Mathematics in Edinburgh as substitute for his father, whose health was beginning to fail; and in 1775 he was definitely associated with him as professor of Mathematics. In 1778, in addition to his mathematical duties, he conducted the Moral Philosophy class, in lectures of his own, during Ferguson's absence in America. In 1785, on Ferguson's resignation, he was appointed professor of Moral Philosophy. The active duties of the chair (which extended to Political Economy, as well as to Ethics) he discharged for 24 years (1785–1809); at the end of that time, without actually resigning the professorship, he had a colleague appointed in the person of Thomas Brown. Relieved thus of the active work of the chair, he retired to Kinneil House, Linlithgowshire, which was placed at his service by the Duke of Hamilton, and devoted himself to developing and finally formulating his philosophical views. On Brown's death in 1820 he retired altogether from the professorship, and John Wilson ('Christopher North') was—mainly on political grounds—elected his successor, in opposition to Hamilton. In 1822 he was attacked by paralysis, which, however, did not impair his intellectual powers; but a second stroke in 1828 ended his life. He died in Edinburgh on 11th June 1828.

His chief literary works are: *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, i. (London, 1792), ii. (do. 1814), iii. (do. 1827), *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, a students' text-book (Edinburgh, 1793), *Philosophical Essays* (do. 1810), *Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy*, written for the 'Supplement' of the *EBr* (pt. i. in 1815, and pt. ii. in 1821), *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers* (Edinburgh, 1828). The great edition of his *Collected Works* is that by Sir William Hamilton (11 vols., do. 1854–60, including the supplementary vol. of *Translations*).

Dugald Stewart was a strict adherent of the Scottish philosophy, but with characteristics of his own both in metaphysics and in ethics. First of all, like the rest of the school, he based his thinking on psychology, pursued on the inductive method. The psychology was Reid's, for the most part; but it is marked by a fuller and more sympathetic appreciation of association than Reid had shown. He carefully explains association and felicitously and copiously exemplifies its influence on all the parts of our mental being—our speculative conclusions, our judgments in matters of taste, our active powers and moral judgments. Although thus advanced in his regard for association, he stopped short of carrying the principle fully into the ethical sphere. This was specially noted and criticized by Sir James Mackintosh,[1] who set himself to prove that Stewart's refusal to acknowledge the power of association in the formation of conscience was a needless timidity; for conscience would be equally authoritative and equally entitled to be regarded as natural to man, whether it be conceived as derivative, and explained from the side of the associationist, or as original, and explained from the side of Butlerian intuitionism. The great point is that, if it be derivative or acquired, it is universally and necessarily acquired.

While accepting the general principles of the Scottish philosophy, Stewart entered a protest against its terminology. He did not approve of Reid's terms 'common sense' and 'instinct,' nor was he wholly enamoured of Beattie's 'intuition.' He saw how easily these words might encourage the belief that the Scottish philosophy was nothing more than an appeal to vulgar opinion and might create the impression of superficiality and lack of scientific precision. And so for the accredited phraseology he substituted the expression, 'the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief; or the Primary Elements of Human Reason.' This, doubtless, is to some extent an improvement, for it brings out the fact explicitly that psychology is the groundwork of the Scottish mode of thinking, and it emphasizes the rational aspect of the procedure. But the term 'laws' is not particularly happy in expressing what are held to be necessary *truths*—the indispensable *conditions* of belief; and there is a certain incongruity in designating them both 'laws' and 'elements.' But, further, Stewart objected to Reid's describing primary beliefs as 'first principles.' They are more like 'axioms' than 'principles,' he held; for the term 'principle' conveys the idea of some fact or some supposition from which a series of consequences may be deduced, whereas from fundamental laws of belief 'no inferences can be deduced for the further enlargement of our knowledge.' As regards primary beliefs themselves, however, it is to be remarked that Stewart is far more cautious than Reid in restricting the number of them.

Reid's doctrine of natural realism, in connexion with perception, was reproduced by Stewart almost to the letter and therefore does not call for special consideration. But it is different with Stewart's treatment of the epistemological question of the nature of the mathematical axioms and of mathematical or demonstrative reasoning. It was customary to regard the axioms, intuitively apprehended, as the foundation of mathematics; but Stewart, who was himself a mathematician, saw the importance of laying the stress on the definitions. These, he maintained, not the axioms, are the principles of mathematical science, but the axioms are not to be ignored; although they are not the foundation of mathematical demonstration, they are presupposed or implied in all mathematical reasoning, and, if their truth were challenged, further progress would be impossible.

'From what principle are the various properties of the circle derived, but from the definition of a circle? From what principle the properties of the parabola or ellipse, but from the definition of these curves? A similar observation may be extended to all the other theorems which the mathematician demonstrates; and it is this observation (which, obvious as it may seem, does not appear to have occurred, in all its force, either to Locke, to Reid, or to Campbell) that furnishes, if I mistake not, the true explanation of the peculiarity already remarked in mathematical evidence.'[2]

Consequently, he strongly opposes the view of mathematical evidence 'that it all resolves ultimately into the perception of identity [A=A]; and that it is this circumstance which constitutes

[1] See his *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1792.

[1] In his *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1836, pp. 324–334, 353–400.

[2] *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, pt. ii. ch. i. p. 302.

the peculiar and characteristical cogency of mathematical demonstration.' The peculiar cogency in the case, he holds, depends on definitions and hypotheses. "By adding hypotheses to definitions he meant to bring out the circumstance that the propositions to be established in mathematics are not, like those in the other sciences, expressive of facts or concerned with actual existence, but deal simply with 'the logical filiation of consequences' which follow from given suppositions or assumptions.

When we turn to Stewart as a moral philosopher, we find him eagerly engaged in arguing the two questions of the moral faculty (his own name for conscience, and preferable, in his view, to Hutcheson's term 'moral sense') and the moral standard. His doctrine is pronouncedly intuitionist. He maintains that we have an immediate apprehension of moral qualities—right, wrong, duty, obligation, etc.—and that this apprehension is ultimate and is in itself the guarantee of moral value, altogether apart from consideration of consequences. Nevertheless, he sets forth the moral faculty, not as a simple but as a complex thing, consisting of three elements: (*a*) the perception of an act as right or wrong, (*b*) an ensuing emotion of pleasure or of pain, and (*c*) a perception of the merit or the demerit of the agent; and he has a considerable appreciation of the power of association in relation to our moral judgments; nor can he refrain from joining the utilitarian on occasion and appealing to consequences. As the intention of the agent is the chief factor in estimating the moral character of an action, the question of the freedom of the will inevitably crops up, and a long section is devoted to the handling of it. Not deeply, but very interestingly, he marshals the arguments *pro* and *con* and clinches his reasoning by a detailed examination of the antithetic position of the necessitarian. This became the model for the treatment of the subject in Scotland for a full generation. But Stewart set the example also in psychological analysis of ethical notions. Accepting from Reid (who simply followed Aristotle) the twofold division of our mental powers into intellectual and active, Stewart was more successful than Reid had been in finding a place in his philosophical scheme for the sentiments and emotions. Under the heading 'Our Desires,' he treats of the commanding instinctive propensities of knowledge, society, esteem, power, and emulation; and the no less important impulses of love of kindred, friendship, patriotism, pity to the distressed, resentment, and anger come under 'Our Affections.' This is by no means an exhaustive enumeration of the emotive forces of our being, nor does the handling show the keen insight of (say) Spinoza in pt. iii. of his *Ethica*; but it is a distinct advance on what had previously obtained in Great Britain.

A very marked characteristic of Stewart's prelections as a moral philosopher was the large place that he assigned in his teaching to the treatment of natural theology—dealing with the being and attributes of God, the soul and its future existence. This was, no doubt, due partly to his conviction of the intimate relation between ethics and religion (though he did not base the former on the latter), but partly also and chiefly to the circumstances and requirements of the time. When Stewart began his professorial work, it was the eve of the French Revolution; and all the while that he actively discharged the duties of the Moral Philosophy chair, scepticism and atheism, connected with that great political upheaval, were rampant. He felt it to be his duty, therefore, in teaching inquiring youth, to try to mould and strengthen their characters by high spiritual principles, while instructing and developing their minds. And so successful was he in his effort, and so great was his fame, that he attracted to his class-room not only students from the various parts of Scotland and England, but also students from the United States of America, and from France, Switzerland, the north of Germany, and other regions of Europe.

Stewart occupies a very distinct place in the school of Scottish philosophy. He was neither a deep nor an original thinker, but he was an elegant and eloquent expositor, who did great service to the study of philosophy by attracting general attention to it, by stimulating the youth to think, and by creating in them a love of high ideals—truth, virtue, and liberty. His own personality counted for much. He was a man of deep convictions and elevated views, and a master of style (in spoken address and in writing), fluent and harmonious. Enthusiastic himself, he could arouse enthusiasm in others. His scholarship was great: indeed, previous to Hamilton, he was the most learned of the Scottish philosophers. His facility in apt quotations, selected with unerring literary instinct and drawn from a wide range of reading, is quite exceptional. And yet 'his learning,' as Veitch correctly puts it, 'was more of an accomplishment than an inspiring originating element in his philosophy.' He was fortunate in being able to gauge and to minister to the intellectual and moral needs of the age. The fact that he made a lasting impression on such men as Lord Cockburn, Lord Brougham, and James Mill is testimony enough to his ability and worth; and the imposing monument erected to him on the Calton Hill of Edinburgh testifies to the high esteem in which he was held by the community.

2. William Hamilton.—The greatest name in the Scottish school of philosophy in the 19th cent. was that of Sir William Hamilton. Endowed with a powerful intellect and a strong will, Hamilton added to his natural capacities unrivalled erudition. He had all the qualifications of a successful writer of a history of philosophy. His position as a psychologist and as a metaphysician is outstanding. While retaining the fundamental principles of Reid's philosophy, he engrafted on them some of the distinctive tenets of Kant, with which he was among the first in Great Britain to be intimately acquainted. Although not more reliable in judgment than Reid, or keener in analytic faculty, he went deeper into the consideration of speculative problems; and he had the advantage of a singularly extensive knowledge of Greek and of Scholastic philosophy and of German thought. The result was that, while adhering to the Scottish school, he promulgated doctrines of his own which Reid would not have acknowledged. To psychology and metaphysics Hamilton added logic—in which Reid showed no special originality, as may be seen from his 'Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic.'[1] Here also he was an original expositor and innovator; and, although his logical system, in its specific positions (such as the quantification of the predicate), has not been generally accepted, it aroused an interest in the subject that has had lasting effects. To his other merits has to be added that of a lucid style—inflated, indeed, and overloaded with terms of classical formation, Johnsonian to a fault, yet attractive to the student beyond anything that the accredited philosophical text-books of the time could claim. His power of incisive, even vehement, criticism has also an attraction in its way; but his personal animosities—his intolerance, let us say—sometimes narrowed his view and misled him in the interpretation of opponents, and his vast scholarship was prone to make him accept authority for argument.

[1] *Works*[2], pp. 681–714.

A son of Dr. William Hamilton, professor of Anatomy in Glasgow University, Hamilton was born in Glasgow on 8th March 1788. His early education was received in his native city, including his Arts curriculum at the university and attendance on several of the medical classes (Chemistry and Anatomy), supplemented later by a brief attendance on medical classes in Edinburgh, with a view to Medicine as a profession. In 1807 he proceeded, as Snell Exhibitioner of Glasgow, to Balliol College, Oxford. Here he developed his learning, according to a plan of study devised by himself. The result was an unusually intimate knowledge of Aristotle and his commentators and of the history of philosophy. Both the number and the nature of the books on which he offered himself for examination with a view to his degree surprised the examiners; 'and after a trial of many hours, besides the honours of the University, he received the thanks and the public acknowledgment of the examiners, that he had never been surpassed either in the minute or the comprehensive knowledge of the systems on which he had been examined.'[1] He graduated 'In literis humanioribus,' in class I. This was in 1810. Abandoning the idea of entering the medical profession, he devoted himself to the study of Law, and, in 1813, became an advocate of the Scottish bar, with his residence henceforth in Edinburgh. Now, as always, learning was supreme with him, and, with the Advocates' Library at his command, he had ample opportunities of pursuing it. On this account he never aimed at, nor did he acquire, an extensive practice as an advocate. In 1816 he established his claim to the title and style of Baronet of Preston and Fingalton. In 1820 he became a candidate for the chair of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh University on the death of Thomas Brown, but, being a Whig, was unsuccessful against John Wilson, a Tory. Next year, however, he was appointed to the chair of Civil History. It was not till 1836 that he was elected professor of Logic and Metaphysics—a dignity that he retained for the next twenty years.

Hamilton was late in life in appearing as a philosophical author: indeed, he was forty-one years of age when his first great production, the article on 'The Philosophy of the Unconditioned; in reference to Cousin's Infinito-Absolute,' saw the light, in the October number of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1829. To that review and to *Blackwood's Magazine* he made contributions on a variety of topics; and he also ventilated his opinions frequently in separate pamphlets or brochures. Education and the ecclesiastical movements of the time (ending in 'the Disruption'), as well as philosophy, greatly interested him, and he strongly advocated university reform. While busily engaged in formulating and elaborating his maturer thought in that storehouse of learning, the 'Notes' or 'Dissertations' in his edition of Reid's *Works*, he was stricken by paralysis, and the edition had to be brought out, in 1846, with the 'Notes' unfinished. Fortunately, his infirmity, while limiting his physical power, left him in full possession of his mental faculties; and he was able to go on with his university work till the end came on 6th May 1856.

His leading writings are his annotated edition of *The Works of Thomas Reid* (Edinburgh, 1846, [2] 1849), *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform* (London, 1852, [2] 1853), *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart* (11 vols., Edinburgh, begun to be published in 1854 and completed by Veitch in 1860), *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* (4 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1859–60, published posthumously and edited by Mansel and Veitch).

Hamilton's great contributions to the Scottish philosophy were his searching and extensive handling of consciousness in note A ('On the Philosophy of Common Sense') in Reid's *Works*[2] (pp. 742–803) and his recasting and elaborate exposition of Reid's doctrine of natural realism in connexion with the perception of an external material world, in several of the other notes and elsewhere. To the philosophy of common sense were now given a precision and a fullness of statement that it did not possess before; and Reid was presented in a fresh and telling setting, although, in the process of amendment, he was sometimes transformed almost past recognition, and not infrequently the corrections suggested are doubtful improvements.

The final appeal made by Reid in his philosophy was to consciousness. So, too, by Hamilton. But what is consciousness? What are the tests of it? How is it conditioned and limited? What is its veracity—the intrinsic worth or value of it? In answering these questions Hamilton went back in part to Descartes, in part to the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle and the Stoics; but he laid under contribution the whole of his vast reading, and he brought to bear on the subject his own acute and independent thinking.

To him consciousness is a sort of knowledge. But knowledge is of two kinds—immediate and mediate. Immediate knowledge is concerned with what is here and now present to the mind of the individual percipient. Its testimony is infallible and cannot be disputed; it must simply be accepted. Mediate knowledge is derivative—a consequence of, or deduction from, what is ultimate. It is knowledge at the second remove.

The tests of the data of consciousness, the criteria of the principles of common sense, the notes or characters by which we are able to distinguish our original from our derivative convictions, are laid down as four in number: (1) incomprehensibility—*i.e.*, there is nothing more fundamental than themselves, nothing higher to which they may be referred or by which they may be explained; (2) simplicity—the opposite of what is compound and therefore derivative; (3) necessity and absolute universality—securing unwavering conviction and excluding doubt; (4) comparative evidence and certainty—inasmuch as they are fundamental, and all else is known and believed through them. Valid as these tests are in themselves (although there are difficulties in the consistent application of them), they are obviously not mutually exclusive, but overlap: the first and the third include the other two.

Hamilton set himself with great energy to purify and strengthen Reid's doctrine of external perception—the central problem in his theory of knowledge. The vacillation and looseness of Reid's utterances here (especially in the *Inquiry*), more particularly the vagueness attaching to his double application of the term 'sensation' and his disconcerting statement that sensations are the *signs* of external objects, seemed to throw doubt on Reid's genuine adherence to natural realism—the doctrine of the immediate apprehension of external reality in sense-perception. The question would ever and anon suggest itself, Was Reid not, after all, a representationist, like his opponents, although the *tertium quid* between object and percipient was not with him an 'idea' but a 'sensation'? This ambiguity Hamilton proceeded to clear away. He reaffirmed Reid's distinction between sensation (subjective) and perception proper (objective) in the perceptive process and enunciated the law of the inverse ratio—the more fully we are engrossed with the one, at any moment, the less alive are we to the other, and *vice versa*; but he also explicitly formulated and repeatedly asserted the mutual implication of subject and object, Ego and non-Ego, in sense-perception: each is given, and each immediately, in the individual act of perceiving, and, while given in mutual relation, they are given also as distinct and contrasted—they are one in knowledge, but opposed in existence.

This, on the face of it, put natural realism in a direct and unambiguous way. But, unfortunately, in working out the subject in detail Hamilton enunciated qualifications and modifications that went far towards nullifying his original position. An excellent example of this is the case of visual perception of distant objects.

Here he alleged that 'As *not here present*, an immediate knowledge of an object *distant in space* is likewise [*i.e.* as well as an immediate knowledge of the *future*] impossible. For, as beyond the sphere of our organs and faculties, it cannot be known by them in itself; it can only therefore, if known at all, be known through something different from itself, that is mediately, in a reproductive or constructive act of imagination.'[1] Again, 'To this head we may refer Reid's *inaccuracy in regard to the precise object in perception*. This object is not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality; for we are percipient of nothing but what is in proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs of sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a subsequent process of inference founded thereon: and so far, as he somewhere says, from all men who look upon the sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each several eye.'[2] This, clearly, was a sad departure from strict natural realism, and

[1] Villers, in Veitch's *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*, p. 60.

[1] Reid's *Works*[2], p. 810[b]. [2] *Ib.* p. 814[a].

the critics seized upon it. None more effectively, or more facetiously, exposed it than Samuel Bailey[1] (1791–1870), who vividly pictures Hamilton lecturing to his class, consisting (say) of 100 students, whose eyes are directed towards the master. On Hamilton's doctrine, each student sees a different professor from what is seen by each of the others (indeed, two professors, for each student has two eyes), and, on the principle of the veracity of consciousness (to which Hamilton made constant appeal), he has a right to trust his own perception, so that there are 100 Sir William Hamiltons (not to insist on 200, 'a different object in each several eye') in the professorial garb. On the other hand, according to the doctrine that a distant object is not really perceived at all, but only inferred, no Sir William Hamilton is seen by the students, and the learned professor may literally be described as 'disappearing in the crowd.' These and other Hamiltonian inconsistencies Bailey discards and, in substituting his own view of strict natural realism, declares that our perception of external objects 'is a simple and primary act of consciousness not susceptible of any analysis or explanation,' and that it is 'vain trying to express the fact more simply or fully than by saying that he [the percipient] perceives the object.'[2] 'That there are external objects perceived,' he maintains further, 'is a primary fact, which admits neither of being proved nor of being disproved';[3] and he holds that this view of external perception is the only one that, on the lines of natural realism, secures absolute consistency.

But Hamilton essayed, further still, to strengthen and support the Reidian realism. He took up Reid's distinction of primary and secondary qualities of matter and worked it out with unparalleled minuteness in note D of his Reid's *Works*[2] (pp. 825–875, 'Distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body'), carefully estimating the evidential value of each. He analyzed the qualities into primary, secundo-primary, and secondary, and laid great stress on the second. His distinctive point lies in the strong and explicit way in which he takes account of the human body as an animated organism, the seat of sensation, and the necessary instrument and condition of external perception—a factor in the perceptive act equally indispensable with the mental factor. Perception (he lays down) is the apprehension, in and through the organism, of resistance and extension. In thus laying our knowledge of resistance and extension (the leading qualities of externality or real being) in the organism, Hamilton anticipated the epistemology of the present day. But, further, one may observe that, while it is so that sensation would be unintelligible if the body were eliminated (man being not merely mind, but mind *plus* body), it is of importance to remember that the body occupies a very peculiar position: it is in one aspect subjective and in another objective. To this fact the psychology of to-day, which is above all things genetic, has become alive. The body as sensitive organism, with the organic sensations, is of the utmost significance in the genesis of the conception of the individual 'self.' The body is to the individual primarily the self, from which the completed notion of self takes its start, and which must still be taken account of even after we have reached the higher and developed idea.

Not yet was Hamilton's work in the interests of natural realism complete: it had a negative as well as a positive side. He did not regard it as enough to establish a position; he conceived it necessary also to beat down all opponents. Hence he carried on a vigorous polemic against representationists of all types—especially against what he called the 'cosmothetic idealism' of Thomas Brown. His criticism is always keen, but not always valid; indeed, not seldom it rests on an obvious lack of ability to realize and appreciate the opponent's point of view. Yet it served the purpose of bringing out Hamilton's own doctrine and of setting in a clearer light certain difficulties and dangers that beset the speculative thinker when engaged with theory of knowledge.

Truth, then, according to Hamilton, rests on the testimony of consciousness; from this source emanate such metaphysical principles as those of causality and substance. This is the teaching of common sense. But what gives to consciousness its authority? Simply the fact that it is a necessary and fundamental part of the native structure of the human mind. To impugn the veracity of its primary cognitions or to suppose them false would be 'to suppose that we are created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of delusion; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie.'[1] The only valid way of rebutting or disowning the data of consciousness would be to show, if possible, that the primary deliverances are contradictory of each other—either that they are incoherent among themselves or that there is an irremediable conflict in their consequences.

Hamilton was not satisfied with simply buttressing the philosophy of Reid; he put forth doctrines of his own. The centre of his independent speculation was the relativity of knowledge. 'To think,' as he put it, 'is to condition'; and so knowledge of the unconditioned is for us impossible. 'The last and highest consecration of all true religion is an altar—Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ—"*To the unknown and unknowable God.*"'[2] Yet, by the necessities of the case, we are driven to the belief in an unconditioned reality, lying beyond the conditioned. But, if the absolute and the infinite are incognizable by us, if they cannot be construed to thought, what are they? The one is simply the negation of the relative and the other the negation of the finite. Of each we have 'a negative notion' and nothing more. For anything further we are thrown upon faith — faith, however, not as irrational and unjustifiable credulity, but in the philosophical sense of the term as a rational trust, the spontaneous adherence of our nature to the conviction that behind all that is relative is the absolute, and that what appears is simply the manifestation, under conditions of finite experience, of what is.

The law of the conditioned is expressed thus: 'The Conditioned is the mean between two extremes,—two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, *neither of which can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, *one must be admitted as necessary*.'[2] It testifies, therefore, to the inevitable weakness or limitation of the human faculties, but it does not charge them with being deceitful. On the other hand, the value that is claimed for it is not that it solves all intellectual puzzles, but that it enforces the fact that we must not take the capacity of thought as the measure of existence or maintain the realm of knowledge to be coextensive with that of faith. Which of the contradictory alternatives in any case is to be accepted by us (*e.g.*, whether liberty or necessity in the problem of the will) it cannot say; that must be determined on other grounds—such as the testimony of consciousness. Instances of contradictory alternatives both of which are inconceivable by us are to be found in connexion with space and time. It is impossible to conceive space as absolutely limited, as a complete totality. However far we may in thought push out the boundary of space, and however much we may try to regard space as completed there, we find ourselves constrained to represent to ourselves a space beyond. In like manner, we cannot conceive space as infinitely immense, as boundless. So with time. An absolute beginning of time and an endless duration (an infinite past) are alike inconceivable. But perhaps the application of the conditioned to the principle of causality is, in some respects, the

[1] *Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 2nd ser., pp. 54–56.
[2] *Ib.* p. 57.
[3] *Ib.*, 1st ser., p. 141.

[1] Reid's *Works*[2], p. 742[b].
[2] *Discussions*[2], p. 15 n.
[3] *Ib.* p. 15.

most interesting, as it shows strikingly Hamilton's departure from the position of the Scottish school on this important point. Reid and his disciples had regarded causality as a necessary principle—a primary positive affirmation of the mind, whose rejection in thought is impossible. But Hamilton refuses to accept this view and maintains that the judgment of causality, though *a priori*, is not original and positive, but derivative and negative—negative as a mental impotence, determined by the law of relativity. It is thus simply a corollary of the law of the conditioned, as applied to a thing thought under the form or mental category of 'existence relative in time.'

'We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of *Existence*; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as *in Time*; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in Time, and think it *absolutely to commence or terminate*. Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causality. Unable positively to think an absolute commencement, our impotence to this drives us backwards on the notion of Cause; unable positively to think an absolute termination, our impotence to this drives us forwards on the notion of *Effect*.'[1]

This has not seemed conclusive even to Hamiltonians themselves; and it does not appear to be an undoubted improvement on Reid.

The difficulty with the doctrine of the conditioned in general is that it is impossible to see (1) how it can be legitimately fitted into the philosophy of the Scottish school, which Hamilton so vigorously upheld, and (2) how it can be made consistent with itself or agreeable to fact. A merely negative notion is psychologically impossible. To conceive a thing as existing at all is to that extent to conceive it positively; the conception may be vague, but it is positive. On the other hand, the distinction between knowledge and faith in order to bring back from the side of practical need what is incompetent to intelligence (a heritage from Kant, who inherited it from the Schoolmen) is vicious. Our nature is *one*, else there can be no such thing as truth.

Yet the doctrine of the conditioned, although vehemently attacked by J. S. Mill and others, had no small influence on subsequent British philosophy. It told in two quite different directions. On the one hand, it stimulated Dean Mansel, who accepted it in its entirety and made it the basis of his famous Bampton Lectures on *The Limits of Religious Thought* (London, 1858). On the other hand, it was taken up by Herbert Spencer (who, however, discarded the doctrine of 'the negative notion') and issued in his presentation of the ultimate reality as the unknown and the unknowable, worked out in his *First Principles* (London, 1862). This agnosticism, inherent in Hamilton's teaching, would certainly have staggered Reid.

The Hamiltonian philosophy, excepting the agnostic side of it, was a real power in Scotland during the second half of the 19th century. It lay at the root of the professorial prelections of Hamilton's two former assistants—Thomas Spencer Baynes (1823–87) in St. Andrews, and John Veitch (1829–94) in Glasgow—and of his favourite post-graduate student, A. Campbell Fraser (1819–1915) in Edinburgh. Of these three Veitch came forward as the avowed defender of Hamilton against the criticism of J. S. Mill;[2] and Fraser carried forward the principles of Reid to this striking theistic conclusion:

'True philosophy is . . . the moral and religious venture which accepts and applies the principles of common sense, in the assurance that, in genuine submission to their inspired authority, we cannot finally be put to intellectual or moral confusion. Faith in God is latent even in the perceptions of external sense, in which Reid found the first example of the operation of this inspiration. Alike in the outer world of the senses, and in free or responsible agency in man, filial faith, ethical or theistic, may be justified by reasoning, although it cannot be reached by logic as a direct conclusion from premises. It is our primary postulate, and not an object of logical proof; therefore credible in reason while it is not demonstrable.'[1]

This thesis is worked out in detail in Fraser's Gifford Lectures on the *Philosophy of Theism* (2 series, Edinburgh, 1895–96, reproduced, in an amended form, in 1 vol. in 1899).

3. But, altogether apart from Hamilton and his modification of Reid, Reid's philosophy during the 19th cent. was powerful abroad. Through Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Victor Cousin, it became supreme in France. In Germany it was highly thought of by Fichte; and Schopenhauer said of the *Inquiry*:

'Thomas Reid's book is very scholarly and well worth reading, ten times more so than anything that, taken in all, has been written since Kant.'[2]

In America it was kept alive by James McCosh, Noah Porter, and others.

III. *IN THE 20TH CENTURY.*—At the present time the Scottish philosophy, after an eclipse in Great Britain, has come into view again. Not that Reid would now shape the lectures of any professor of philosophy in any of the universities, as he did formerly; but there is a marked tendency in many quarters to refer to him and quote him with respect and to claim his support as something worth having. A fillip to a fresh interest in him was given, in the end of last century, by A. Seth [Pringle-Pattison], in his Balfour Lectures on the *Scottish Philosophy* ([2] 1890). This was followed by Henry Laurie's *Scottish Philosophy in its National Development* (1902), and by T. M. Forsyth's *English Philosophy* (1910); and, quite recently (1915), we have had a book of very judicious *Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense*, by G. A. Johnston. It is, further, significant that the 'new realism,' however far from Reid it may be at many points, delights in attaching itself to him on occasion; and it would not be difficult to affiliate Bergson's doctrine of intuition to Reid's teaching. Certainly, modern movements in philosophy are suggestive in this connexion.

LITERATURE.—The works of the various writers of the Scottish school of philosophy have been duly enumerated in the text and need not be restated here. The following books (mostly additional to those mentioned in the text) may be noted.

I. *BIOGRAPHICAL.*—A. C. Fraser, *Thomas Reid* (in 'Famous Scots' series), Edinburgh and London, 1898; William Forbes, *Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie, LL.D.*[2], 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1807; Margaret Forbes, *Beattie and his Friends*, London, 1904; John Small, *Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson*, Edinburgh, 1864; John Veitch, *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart.*, Edinburgh and London, 1869.

II. *EXPOSITORY.*—James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy*, London and New York, 1875; John Veitch, *Hamilton* (in Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics'), Edinburgh and London, 1882; Andrew Seth [Pringle-Pattison], *Scottish Philosophy*[2], do. 1890; Henry Laurie, *Scottish Philosophy in its National Development*, Glasgow, 1902; T. M. Forsyth, *English Philosophy: a Study of its Method and General Development*, London, 1910; James Seth, *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, London and New York, 1912.

III. *CRITICAL.*—Joseph Priestley, *An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry, Dr. Beattie's Essay, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal*, London, 1774; Henry Calderwood, *The Philosophy of the Infinite*, Edinburgh, 1854; Samuel Bailey, *Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 2nd ser., London, 1858; J. H. Stirling, *Sir William Hamilton: being the Philosophy of Perception: an Analysis*, do. 1865; J. S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*[2], do. 1865; John Grote, *Exploratio Philosophica*, pt. i., Cambridge, 1865; David Masson, *Recent British Philosophy*[2], London, 1867.

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SCRIBES.—'Scribes,' as the title of a distinctive order in Judaism, denotes the character and vocation of a class which flourished between the return from the Exile in the middle of the 5th cent. B.C. and the collapse of the Jewish State under the Romans six centuries later.

1 *Discussions*[2], p. 618 f.
2 See his *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*, and also his *Hamilton*, in Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics.'

1 *Thomas Reid*, p. 158.
2 *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Leipzig, vol. ii. ch. ii., Eng. tr., London, 1883–86.

1. Origin and development.—In the sense of secretaries, who kept minutes, wrote letters, and even superintended the royal archives, there had been 'scribes,' or *ṣōpherîm*, under the Hebrew monarchy, as under the Persian. These functionaries might be little more than clerks like the Roman *scribæ quæstorii* or letter-writers; when attached to the army, as they still were in the Maccabæan age (1 Mac 5^{42}), they probably corresponded to subordinate officials like provost-marshals or quartermasters, who might be in charge of accounts and army-lists of men and booty. But at court the *ṣōpher* often held a more responsible position, as a secretary of State. Since his main business consisted in managing the royal correspondence, he was called 'the scribe,' the man who could write. What he wrote, as a rule, was letters for other people. They dictated; he transcribed. It was only after the fall of the monarchy that circumstances arose which led to the development of 'scribes,' in a new and technical sense, as a religious order in Judaism. These circumstances were the consolidation of the Jews as a community of the Law,[1] and the consequent need of expert students who should interpret the Tôrāh and apply its authentic decisions to the changing, varied conditions of the people.[2] It is unnecessary for our present purpose to tell over again the familiar story of this religious transformation. The point is that the *ṣōpherîm* of the post-Exilic age were not court officials, but men of the Book, charged with the task not only of copying its contents but of enforcing its administration as a code, of elucidating its bearing upon questions of practical conduct, and of instructing the bulk of the nation on their duties to its regulations. They had to be competent in a variety of ways, but the fundamental requirement for scribes was that they must be proficient in the oracles of the Law.[3]

Since γραμματεύς in Egypt covered practically all officials who had to deal with documents, from secretaries to registrars and clerks, as well as military officers, the LXX translators were free to employ this Greek term as a rule for the Hebrew *ṣōpher* in both of the senses already noted. The Vulgate *scriba* led to the English rendering 'scribe,' which in modern times has a connotation narrower than its original scope, and certainly narrower than the range of the Jewish *ṣōpher's* activities. The editing and transmission of the sacred text was only one of his functions. The *ṣōpherîm* were *litterati*, not mere copyists in the mediæval monastic sense of 'scribes.' They were bookmen, authors. Even their editing involved knowledge, scholarship, and commenting. Furthermore, the supreme importance of the Tôrāh for national life led them to be educationalists and jurists. But these functions varied according to the exigencies of the day; now one element, now another, was prominent in the vocation of these exponents of the Tôrāh.

The 'scribe' as a professional penman, who took down what was dictated, was of course a familiar figure (Ps 45[1]); later he became the *libellarius* of Judaism, who copied scrolls, phylacteries, etc. On the other hand, the scribes who tampered with the text of Deuteronomy (Jer 8^{8}) and a private secretary like Baruch (Jer 36^{32}) were more than copyists or clerks of this kind. Both lines of activity continued in the post-Exilic vocation of the scribes, but their functions became still more ramified and specialized as Judaism was driven back upon itself. The conventional idea of the Jewish scribes is twofold: that they were dull drudges, and that they were the deadly antagonists of Jesus. The former is a misapprehension; and to understand the latter it is necessary to survey their rise and scope within post-Exilic and particularly post-Maccabæan Judaism.

The origin and the development of the scribes during the post-Exilic period are still uncertain at several points; it is difficult, from the extant data, to determine the changes which passed over them as a class or even the tendencies which gradually shaped them into a class. But the general outline is fairly clear. Previous to the Maccabæan movement they seem to have been associated mainly with the priests. During the Exile the interest in national literature as an organ of continuity and unity stirred the scribes. The Tôrāh was compiled and edited by sacerdotal authorities, especially under the influence of Ezekiel, the outstanding priest and prophet of Judaism in Babylonia. Ezra himself was of priestly descent, and Levites (cf. 2 Ch 34^{12}) supported him in his endeavour to stamp the Law upon the conscience of the community. Indeed, the very formation of the Priestly Code expressed the conviction that 'in the future the delivering act of God would have to be preceded by a thorough sanctification of His people';[1] and, as this holiness involved the scrupulous and minute pressure of the Law upon life, the interests of the scribes from Ezra onwards and of the priests coincided, although the former acquired a broader and more popular position in the nation, since the cultus was no longer the be-all and end-all of religion. M. Jastrow[2] has shown that in a passage like Lv 13–14, as elsewhere in the Priestly Code, the addition of glosses, comments, and illustrations, which characterize the Mishnāh and the Gemārā, can be already traced. At this period the scribe and the priest had much in common, and this affinity continued. Thus Simon the Just (beginning of 3rd cent. B.C.), who flourished among the last of the primitive scribes entitled 'men of the Great Synagogue,'[3] was high-priest. For the most part, during this period, and even down to the time of Sirach, a scribe might be a priest, and a priest might be a scribe. Their interests were largely the same, but the scribal interest in the Law-book was naturally wider than that of the priests. The scribes were not yet the rigid canonists that they afterwards became. During the Greek period, in fact, they were often indistinguishable from the 'wise men.' The sketch of the ideal scribe in Sir 38^{24}–39^{11} suggests at any rate that his functions were not invariably associated with the scholastic study of the OT text or confined to Biblical interpretation. The scribal aim, according to Ezr 7^{10}, was threefold: 'to seek (search, study) the Law of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel rules and duties.' But Sirach ignores Ezra, perhaps 'because the only public services assigned to Ezra by the record were such as it would have equally depressed Ben Sira to speak of, and grieved his disciples to hear.'[4] Sirach correlates the Law with wisdom; his scribe has humanist interests as well as personal piety; he travels abroad, associates with courts and kings, and draws the materials of his knowledge and instruction from wider sources than the Tôrāh and its sacred tradition; he is a man of culture, with education and experience of the world. This portrait may be a protest against some contemporary tendency in scribism; it is possible to take it as an implicit criticism of elements which seemed to Sirach unduly narrow. But it is safe to infer that hitherto the line of demarcation between scribe and wise man was not sharply drawn, and perhaps that even the exclusive study of the Law had not yet amounted to anything like a characteristic feature of the scribes. It is obvious that the ordinary scribe was not absorbed in the regulations of the cultus; the obligations of the Tôrāh were much wider than the sacrificial ritual. Yet neither was he confined to the general study of the Law as an exclusive code of conduct and devotion. The scribal movement as yet had affinities to the wisdom-movement; if we cannot identify the 'wise men' or sages of Judaism at this period with the contemporary scribes, we are still less able to think of them as two independent

[1] *ERE* vii. 455, 587. [2] Cf. *ib.* vii. 855 f.
[3] *Ib.* ii. 97, 565 f.

[1] Cf. T. K. Cheyne, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, New York and London, 1898, p. 89 f.
[2] *JQR* iv. [1914] 357 f. [3] *Pirqê Âbhôth*, i. 2.
[4] Cheyne, p. 210.

companies of teachers. Both made themselves responsible for teaching true 'wisdom' to the people, and both enjoyed a measure of religious intuition; it was not yet a case of tradition *versus* humanism or fresh inspiration.[1] There were scribes who had cosmopolitan interests, and scribism was still unidentified with Biblicism.

Sirach's enthusiasm for the vocation of scribe prompts him to sketch an attractive outline. He claims that the vocation of scribe requires culture and leisure such as are impossible to tradesmen and artisans and peasants; these people, he admits, are useful in their place—no city can get on without them—but (38^{33}–39^{11})

'None seeks them for advice on public affairs,[2]
and they hold no rank in the assembly;
they do not sit on the judicial bench,
and have no knowledge of law and justice;
they do not expound the requirements of wisdom,
nor grasp the proverbs of the wise.
What they understand is their handiwork,
and their thoughts are for the practice of their craft.
Not so he who sets himself to the fear of God
and ponders the Law of the most High,
who explores the wisdom of all the ancients
and is absorbed in the prophets of old,
who treasures the teaching of famous men
and reflects on what is deep,
who probes for the secret meaning of proverbs
and is familiar with enigmatic parables,
who serves great men
and appears before princes,
who travels in foreign lands,
testing what is good and what is evil among men,
who is careful to pray to the Lord that made him
and entreats mercy from the most High,
who opens his mouth in prayer
and makes supplication for his sins.
If it seems good to God most High,
he shall be made wise with the spirit of understanding.[3]
He pours out a double measure of wise sayings,
and gives thanks to the Lord in prayer.
He understands parables of the wise,
and meditates on their mysteries.
He sets forth the requirements of wisdom,
and glories in the law of the Lord's covenant.
Many praise his intelligence,
and his name shall never be blotted out;
his memory shall not pass away,
and his name shall live from generation to generation.
The congregation proclaims his wisdom,
and the assembly publishes his praise.
If he lives on, he shall be reckoned happier than a thousand,
and when he dies, his name and fame are ample.'

The Maccabæan reaction against Hellenism was a turning-point in the evolution of the scribes.[4] Their vocation was at once contracted and intensified. The aristocratic priesthood lost the confidence of the people owing to their laxity, and the scribes now found themselves in opposition[5] to the sacerdotal authorities, obliged to uphold and enforce the Law at all costs. One outcome of this development was the popularization of the Law, which was no longer a predominantly sacerdotal interest. Another was the recruiting of the scribes from the ranks of the people; they became more and more a lay order[6]—no longer men of leisure who looked down upon manual labour, but for the most part students of the Law who supported themselves by a trade,

[1] Cf. J. Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*[6], Berlin, 1907, p. 195 f.

[2] It is this practical knowledge of the world, combined with the sway of a teacher over youth, that probably leads Josephus to call them *σοφισταί*—not at all, of course, in a derogatory sense. He attributes the popular rising against Herod and his golden eagles to the influence of two Jerusalem scribes. In one account (*BJ* I. xxxiii. 2) they are called *σοφισταὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, μάλιστα δοκοῦντες ἀκριβοῦν τὰ πάτρια, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔθνει μεγίστης ἠξιωμένοι δόξης . . . τούτοις οὐκ ὀλίγοι προσῆσαν τῶν νέων ἐξηγουμένοις τοὺς νόμους*. The other account (*Ant.* XVII. vi. 2) describes them as *ἐξηγηταὶ τῶν πατρίων νόμων, ἄνδρες καὶ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς διὰ παιδείαν τοῦ νεωτέρου*. But in Sirach's day the scribes had not yet taken so active a part in stirring up public opinion, and indeed their normal function was always that of pedagogues rather than demagogues.

[3] Scribes who breathed this atmosphere would look back to a prophet like Ezekiel as their prototype; they would carry on the divine inspiration for teaching men religion, which had been degraded by prophets who had become fanatics, demagogues, and visionaries.

[4] Cf. *ERE* ix. 553 f. [5] Cf. *ib.* 553[b].

[6] By the time that the Chronicler wrote they must have been formed into gilds or families (cf. 1 Ch 2^{55}).

declining to accept remuneration for their labours. This is a decisive change; it marks the rise of the scribes as we know them in the NT and the Mishnāh, where their power and sayings are now chronicled, and the legend of their unbroken succession is urged. To quote only one proof of their significance: we find that the thirteenth Benediction of the *Shemoneh 'Esreh*, which in its present form preserves an interesting memento of the Jewish community at the Maccabæan period,[1] definitely includes the scribes:

'Towards the righteous [*ṣaddikîm*] and the pious [*ḥasîdîm*], towards the elders of thy people the house of Israel, towards the remnant of their scribes [*sōpherîm*] . . . may thy tender mercies be stirred, O Lord our God.'[2] This is an incidental but remarkable proof of the tenacious memory which Judaism cherished of their Maccabæan rôle.

Then and thereafter the scribes contributed materially to the preservation of genuine religion under the Law. They deserved the grateful homage of posterity. The new conditions narrowed their horizon;[3] the older humanistic outlook passed away, and, when the Law, as the embodiment of all that man required to know and read, preoccupied their minds, the freer spirit of the former scribes waned; but this was the price paid for the intensity with which they enforced the claims of the Law, and the scribes probably did not regret it, in view of their fresh prestige and power within the nation. Cosmopolitan culture was now suspect. Any centrifugal tendency was resisted. Nothing mattered, if they could prevent the religious tone of Judaism from being secularized and preserve its unity from disintegration. Down to the revolt of Bar-Cochba, Greek was not eschewed entirely, it is true. But the stress of their study lay elsewhere.

2. **Functions.**—According to the *Bābā Bāthrā*, 14*b*, 'the men of the Great Synagogue wrote Ezekiel, the Twelve (prophets), Daniel and Esther. Ezra wrote his own book and the genealogies of the Book of Chronicles as far as (the mention of) himself.' Whatever basis (if any) underlies the rabbinic tradition that the great convocation of Neh 8–10 was an institution called 'the Great Synagogue,' which superintended the codification and administration of the Law for a generation and more, the early 'scribes' did undertake authorship. Sirach, himself a scribe, argues[4] that 'those who read [the Scriptures] must not only become skilled themselves but must also, as lovers of learning, be able to serve outsiders by speaking *and writing*.' 'The scribe,' as the man who describes and records things in heaven as well as on earth, was the title of Enoch in the book of Enoch; and the author of 4 Esdras (14^{50}) applied it to Esdras. The scribes, in fact, edited and composed; it is to them that we owe books like Chronicles, Jubilees, the Aramaic Aḥikar, and even some of the early Apocalypses—not merely compilations and extracts, but expositions and original works of a semi-Biblical kind. But, as time went on, when the canon was practically closed, and the exigencies of the situation made the Law more and more the business and bosom of the national life, the scribes ceased to produce literature; originality of this kind was not merely irrelevant, it was inconsistent; and their prominent services to practical religion were rendered eventually in what a modern would term (*a*) the-

[1] Eleazar, one of the great Maccabæan martyrs (2 Mac 7^{12}), was a distinguished scribe, and the *Test. XII Patr.* (Levi 8^{17}) predicts Maccabæan 'priests and judges and scribes.'

[2] Cf. I. Abrahams, *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, London, 1914, p. lxv.

[3] A partial historical parallel is the Protestant scholasticism which followed the rediscovery of the Bible after the Reformation; it was not altogether devoid of mysticism, and it helped to preserve religion during a transition period, but it could not furnish a permanent basis for the development of a living faith.

[4] Prol. 3 f.

ology, (*b*) education, and (*c*) jurisprudence, all three revolving round the study of the Law as Tôrāh or authoritative instruction.

(*a*) *Theology.* — The scribes edited, fixed, and transmitted the Hebrew text in an authoritative form, emending[1] it when necessary. In view of the Samaritan schism, this became specially important. They also elaborated and codified a system of common or traditional law, interpreting the written Tôrāh, explaining or explaining away its discrepancies, and clearing up its ambiguities; the technical term for this was '"to make a fence to the Thorah": to surround it with a margin of casuistry; to evolve the principles which underlay its words; to develop and apply its decrees, accommodating them to the varied requirements of the time.'[2] This function arose from the valuation of the Law. Wittingly or unwittingly, a man might infringe the Law in a dozen ways, as he ate, as he acted on the Sabbath, and so forth; consequently precautions had to be taken, and additional restrictions set up, to prevent such transgressions. It was an elaborate and delicate business, but the scribes were equal to it, as their record proves. They 'fenced' the Tôrāh. This amplification of the Law was at first conveyed orally (*παράδοσις*), for there could only be one *written* Law, but, as the oral law professed to do no more than draw out what was implicit in the Pentateuch, it was supposed to possess Mosaic authority in its punctilious regulations for faith and conduct. The nation was living under very different conditions from those in which the original Law had been drawn up; old regulations had to be modified or even abrogated, and fresh religious sanctions and prohibitions were necessary, in order to preserve the faith from being contaminated. Now it was the scribe's business to adjust these to the written Law somehow, by reading them into the text or by altering the text, in order to invest them with an authority equal to that of the text. He had also to put the meaning of the Hebrew code into the current Aramaic dialect. The work required ingenuity and mental as well as moral aptitude. Thus Ezra (Ezr 7^6) is called 'a ready scribe in the law of Moses,' *i.e.* apt in interpretation, skilful, quick-witted, and shrewd. Scribes often differed in their views,[3] and the echoes of controversy as well as of diplomatic evasions linger in the Mishnāh, where we can also overhear them often in their fanciful and artificial manipulation of texts, for the sake of edification. The better spirit of their work is described sympathetically by Lauterbach in the *Year-book of Central Conference of American Rabbis*, xxiii. [1913] 249–287, 'The Ethics of the Halakah.' Their aims are justifiable historically. Fundamentally the motive of their work was sincere and legitimate. The conception of revelation as embodied in a sacrosanct code left no other alternative open to the religious leaders of Judaism than to claim Mosaic authority for practical inferences and deductions drawn from what this complicated code said or did not say, about minute and central things alike. These regulations were laid down for the sake of a genuine nationalistic piety. But the method involved serious dangers and abuses. It made religion unduly complex and scholastic; it at once encouraged and tampered with scruples; it tended to subordinate the fundamental moral obligations to ritual niceties; and occasionally among its indirect effects were externalism and rigidity.[4] To be Biblical is not necessarily the same thing as to be spiritual. The attitude of the scribes in the Gospels is the first, though not the only, illustration of this truth upon a large scale.

(*b*) *Education.*—The equally responsible task of diffusing religious knowledge among the people devolved naturally on those who were responsible for determining the standards of piety; and the scribes, as *νομοδιδάσκαλοι* or *πατρίων ἐξηγηταὶ νόμων* (Josephus), or *ἱερογραμματεῖς* or *καθηγήται*, gave themselves faithfully to this task. They imparted their teaching by means of addresses delivered not only in the synagogues[1] but in private houses (their own and other people's) and in the open air, as well as at the Temple. They were not confined to their headquarters at Jerusalem. Among those who came to examine the mission of Jesus, *e.g.*, were 'Pharisees and teachers of the law who had come from every village of Galilee and Judæa and Jerusalem' (Lk 5^{17}). R. Johanan, according to Jerus. *Shabbāth*, 16, spent several years in Galilee as a teacher, though he was distressed to find the Galilæans sadly indifferent to his legalism. The activities of the scribes were wide-spread, within and beyond Palestine, and the weekly reading of the Law in the synagogues furnished them with an opportunity for reaching the common people with religious instruction in the shape of *halākhôth*. If Lauterbach[2] is right in his hypothesis, these *halākhôth* remained strictly expositions of or comments on the Law, down to the period of Simon the Just, after which abstract *halākhôth*, or independent traditional laws, were more and more taught in Mishnāh form (lacking Scripture proof). The object of the latter was to justify practices and customs which had sprung up in the nation, and which could not be furnished with any precedent either in the Law or in tradition. These later 'scribes' first found official authority in the Sanhedrin under Antigonus of Socho. But the change in the form of the *halākhôth* left the educational aim unaltered. The individual under the Law constantly required the scribe to explain his duties and interpret the bearings of the code in any given case. Ezra's supporters (Neh 8^8) 'read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, so that the people understood what was read,' *i.e.*, they supplied a running commentary to elucidate the text. This expository function was maintained and developed by the later scribes; they busied themselves with *halākhāh* rather than with *haggādāh*; 'what the scribes say' carried weight in popular esteem, not because they posed as authorities or claimed inspiration, but because they taught what they had received as the orthodox and original meaning of the Law, which had to be evolved from it by means of their tradition. Such was their regular and distinctive rôle. The congregational worship of the synagogues did something to familiarize Jews with the Law, but the masses required an ampler education in the principles and practice of their religion, and generations of expert scribes must have thrown themselves into this mission of popular instruction. Whether or not they took any direct part in the education of children,[3] they trained men to their own profession; their disciples or scholars, endowed with a retentive memory and an implicit deference to tradition, carried on their work and were proud to do them honour. The influence which they possessed ultimately among the people

[1] By the 3rd cent. A.D. these corrections of the ancient text were called *tikḳune sōpherîm* (cf. *JE* viii. 366 f.).
[2] C. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*[2], Cambridge, 1897, p. 111.
[3] Cf. J. Z. Lauterbach, in *JQR* vi. [1915] 304 f.
[4] The *halākhāh*, of course, was constantly changing—once scruples start, they go on. But the innovations only added to the network of the Law, and (theoretically at any rate) the individual 'dragged at each remove a lengthening chain.' The *παράδοσις πατρῴα* or *πρεσβύτερων*, long before it was put into writing (cf. H. L. Strack, *Einleitung in den Talmud*[4], Leipzig, 1908, p. 10 f.), claimed authority as emanating from Moses and regulated the practical life and worship of the devout.

[1] Cf. art. SYNAGOGUE. [2] *JQR* vi. 23 f.
[3] Cf. *ERE* v. 195.

and the deference which they received may be illustrated from two sentences of their severest critic. 'The scribes and Pharisees sit on the seat of Moses; so do whatever they tell you, obey them' (Mt $23^{2f.}$). This was spoken by Jesus to the people. It is not ironical. Jesus recognized the validity of the Law as a divine instruction for the people, and even the need of obeying the scribes in so far as their precepts and principles were true to the spirit of the Law; what He objects to is the failure of the scribes to practise what they preached, *i.e.* to live up to their ideal (see Ezr 7^{10}, quoted above). Again, in a different tone He charges them with using their powerful influence and authority to prevent people from becoming adherents of His cause: 'Woe to you jurists! you have taken away the key that unlocks the door of knowledge; you have not entered yourselves, and you have stopped those who were entering' (Lk 11^{52}). The difference between their methods and those of Jesus was plain to any audience. When the people were impressed by the difference between Jesus and the scribes in teaching—'He taught them like an authority, not like the[1] scribes' (Mk 1^{22}, Mt 7^{29})—the meaning is that Jesus showed an originality and an independence which were foreign to the scribes. He had a direct intuition of God, which made His message convincing.

'His teaching is fresher and more instinct with genius than that of the Rabbis, of whose teachings we have records in the Talmud and Midrash.'[2]

They taught with authority, but appealed strictly to precedent and tradition. One of the virtues of Johanan ben Zakkai, *e.g.*, according to the eulogy in *Sukkāh*, 28*a*, is that 'he never uttered a word which he had not heard from the lips of his teacher.' But Jesus did not speak in inverted commas. Thus, *e.g.*, none of His parables is even exegetical, whereas most of the scribes' parables start from an OT text. Jesus elsewhere denounced them for their self-righteousness, their hypocrisy, their ostentation, and their unscrupulousness. 'Beware of the scribes! they like to walk about in long robes, to get saluted in the market-places, to secure the front seats in the synagogues and the best places at banquets; they prey upon the property of widows and offer long unreal prayers' (Mk 12^{38-40}). If the charge of avarice refers to legacies which rich widows were induced to contribute to the support of rabbinical study, the scribes were guilty of the same conduct as disgraced the Roman clergy in Jerome's day. The other charges can be illustrated from the pages of Josephus and of the Talmud. Paul's only allusion to them (1 Co 1^{20}) is in an OT quotation; it echoes the saying of Jesus in Mt 11^{25}. But not all were degenerate. There were those among the scribal teachers who were not unwilling to keep an open mind or unable to appreciate the prophetic spirit of Jesus Himself (cf. Lk $10^{25f.}$, Mk $12^{28f.}$); the scribes seem even to have furnished the primitive Church with some recruits (cf. Mt 13^{52} 23^{34}),[3] one of whom at least is known by name (Tit 3^{13}: Ζηνᾶν τὸν νομικόν).

(*c*) *Jurisprudence.*—As the Law ruled the Jewish community, it was naturally the scribes (νομικοί) who took a leading place in pronouncing judgment upon what was permissible or unorthodox and in helping to enforce penalties upon those who broke the Law and tradition. They would exercise a strong indirect influence by their expert interpretations. They would not only discuss and decide cases of casuistry, but also investigate error and even upon occasion sentence an offender. Their ranks, as well as those of the priests, supplied members to the supreme court of the Sanhedrin (*q.v.*) at Jerusalem, which would formally ratify their interpretations as binding on the community. As responsible for the government and orthodoxy of the nation, they extended their jurisdiction to the provinces; thus, *e.g.*, we find that Jesus, whom they suspected of blasphemy and of lax intercourse with disreputable creatures like tax-gatherers, is threatened by their interference even in Galilee, and subsequently is condemned by them in the capital. This administrative authority fell to the scribes after their allies, the Pharisees, had become the governing party in the land. There must have been Sadducæan scribes, for both Sadducees and Pharisees appealed to the interpretation of the Law, but the development of the oral tradition and the popularity of the Pharisaic view of the Law gave special scope to the activity of the scribes, and we are not surprised to find 'the scribes and the Pharisees' so closely and constantly associated in antagonism to a prophet like Jesus. After the fall of Jerusalem this judicial power waned.

'After the last desperate struggle of the Jews for liberty under Hadrian, A.D. 132–135, the Scribes, no longer able to find a practical outlet for their influence in the guidance of the State, devoted themselves to systematizing and writing down the traditional Law in the stage which it had then reached. This systematization took shape in the collection which is called the Mishna.'[1]

When the Jewish State collapsed, the scribes passed finally into the rabbis.[2] But under Herod the Great and his immediate successors their judicial authority was in full play. Juristic influence attached to the scribes from an early period in their history,[3] and the paramount position of the Pharisees increased it. To what extent it survived the catastrophe of A.D. 70 seems uncertain, although the juridical activities of the scribes must have been restricted then[4] and less vital than their work at Jamnia and elsewhere on behalf of the Tôrāh. It is remarkable that the only mention[5] of them in the Fourth Gospel (Jn 7^{53}–8^{11})—or, at any rate, in an early Christian fragment which has become attached to the Fourth Gospel—is in connexion with their responsibility for public morals. 'The scribes and Pharisees brought a woman who had been caught in the act of committing adultery.' They asked Jesus for His opinion on the offender, not because they felt uncertain themselves,[6] but in the hope of drawing from Him a verdict which might convict Him of unorthodoxy. They intervened against the disciples (Ac 4^{5}) and against Stephen (Ac 6^{12}) in virtue of their judicial authority, and with this mention they pass out of the NT; like the first allusion to them in the NT (Mt 2^{4}), it is sufficient to emphasize the fact that they were not literary recluses and to correct the impression, suggested by their English title, that they were no more than religious men of letters.

LITERATURE.—The phases and functions of scribism are discussed in all treatises on the history and religion of Judaism, particularly in connexion with the Pharisees (*q.v.*). Some of the older special literature is chronicled by Schürer (*GJ* I^{4} ii. 372 f.). Among recent contributions the following are noteworthy: W. D. Morrison, *The Jews under Roman Rule*, Lon-

[1] Matthew reads 'their' (αὐτῶν); he recognizes Christian γραμματεῖς.

[2] C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, London, 1909, ii. 555.

[3] The difficult saying in Mt 13^{52} may perhaps be intelligible in the light of Is 22^{15}, where γραμματεύς (A) renders the Hebrew term for 'house-steward'; taken thus, it would tally with the following allusion to stores, the 'scribe' being not a man of the pen but a steward. The 'kingdom' probably denotes the moral and religious experience of Christian disciples, and the 'the old and new things' may refer to the order of grace in nature, as exemplified in the preceding parables.

[1] *OTJC*^{2}, p. 50. [2] Cf. *ERE* vii. 593.

[3] See Sirach's testimony above, § 1.

[4] Cf. H. P. Chajes, in *REJ* xlix. [1899] 39 f.

[5] On the 'scribism' attacked and exposed in the Fourth Gospel see E. A. Abbott, *The Founding of the New Kingdom*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 286 f.

[6] Cf. *ERE* i. 130^{b}.

don, 1890, p. 278 ff.; A. Réville, *Jésus de Nazareth*, Paris, 1897, i. 89 f.; W. R. Smith, *OTJC*, lect. iii.; O. Holtzmann, *Die jüdische Schriftgelehrsamkeit zur Zeit Jesu*, Giessen, 1901; D. Eaton, in *HDB* iv. 420 f.; J. D. Prince, in *EBi* iv. 4321–4329; M. Seligsohn, in *JE* xi. 123 f.; J. W. Lightley, *Les Scribes: Etude sur leur origine chez les Israélites*, Paris and Cahors, 1905; H. L. Strack, in *RE*[3] xvi. 775–779; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906, p. 186 f.; J. Mitchell, in *DCG* ii. 582–584; G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1908, ii. 364 f., 386 f.; B. Stade and A. Bertholet, *Biblische Theologie des AT*, Tübingen, 1911, ii. 335 ff.; A. Marmorstein, *Die Schriftgelehrten*, Skotschau, 1912; H. Lesêtre, in Vigouroux's *DB* v. [1912] 1536–1542; G. H. Box, 'Scribes and Sadducees in the New Testament,' in *Exp*, 8th ser., xv. [1918] 401 f., xvi. [1918] 55 f.

JAMES MOFFATT.

SCRIPTURE.—See BIBLE, INFALLIBILITY, INSPIRATION, REVELATION.

SCYTHIANS.—1. Name.—Scythian (Σκύθης, derivation unknown) has meant variously (1) a nomad tribe inhabiting the steppes north of the Black Sea from about the 7th to the 1st cent. B.C.; (2) this tribe with the various peoples in and round the steppe that it had subjugated; (3) any barbarian, especially a nomad, from the north-east quadrant of the world;[1] (4) later geographers—*e.g.*, Ptolemy—unwilling to drop the name, found a place for it in N. Asia, but common usage still connected it with the Black Sea; and (5) the Byzantines called new invaders like the Goths and Russians by the classical name of Scythians. In this article it will be used in (1), the narrowest sense. For the nomads of N. Asia the Persian inscriptions and Greek authors using Persian sources employ the term 'Saka,' which is possibly the same word as 'Scyth.'[2]

2. Geography.—Herodotus gives two mutually irreconcilable descriptions of Scythia.[3] The general meaning is that Scythia extended from the Danube to the Don and inland to the edge of the forest, a line running E.N.E. from the Bukovina to about Samara. In the western half were Tyritæ on the Dnestr, and south to north, from Olbia at the mouth of the Bug to the government of Kiev, stretched tribes called Callipidæ, Alazones, Scythæ Georgi, Scythæ Aroteres, all probably representing an older partly agricultural population and subject to the Royal or nomad Scyths. These ranged over the eastern half between the Dnepr, the Sea of Azov, and the Don, and over the northern part of the Crimea, the southern part of which was held by the non-Scythian Tauri. Round the borders of Scythia so defined dwelt Getæ south of the Danube, Agathyrsi in Transylvania, Neuri in Volhynia and the government of Kiev, Androphagi north of Chernigov, Melanchlæni north of Tambov, Budini with a trading settlement, Gelonus, on the middle Volga above Samara, Sauromatæ east of the Don, and Mæotæ east of the Sea of Azov.

3. History.—The tradition of a very early Scythian empire in Asia,[4] if it has any foundation, probably goes back to Hittite rule. The real historian of the Scyths is Herodotus. He gives three legends as to their origin: the first two, variations of the same tale, represent them as autochthonous and seem really to belong to a settled tribe, not to nomads; in the third story the Massagetæ on the Oxus and Jaxartes, perhaps, as says Aristeas, quoted by Herodotus, themselves impelled by Issedones and Arimaspi farther east, drove the Scyths out of Asia across the Araxes (Volga?) into Europe against the Cimmerians in S. Russia. These were cut in two, part driven west to join the Thracians, part forced through the Caucasus. The Scyths pursued these and, missing their way, found themselves in Media, which they ruled for 28 years. Then the Medes (*q.v.*) expelled them by the rising ever after commemorated at the feast called Sacæa,[1] and they returned to their own S. Russia. This story finds confirmation in Assyrian records. Asarhaddon's inscriptions (680 B.C.) tell of Gimirrai, north of Urartu (Ararat), attacked from the north by Aš-gu-za-ai (or Iš-ku-za-ai) and thus forced to invade the vassal state of Man and incur the enmity of Assyria. The latter made friends with the Ašguzaai and used them not only to drive the Gimirrai west, but in the next generation against the Medes and apparently against Egypt, so that parties of them plundered Ascalon[2] and held Bethshan, hence called Scythopolis.[3] Gimirrai is clearly the Gomer of Gn 10[2f.] and the Cimmerii of Herodotus; Ašguzaai=Ashkenaz (אשכנז, mis-written for אשגז) and Scyth. The incursion into Palestine is referred to in Jeremiah (4[3]–6[30]; cf. Ezk 38–39[16]). It is, however, possible that some of these invaders were not true Scyths penetrating the Caucasus, but Sacæ from the east of the Caspian.[4]

So the Scyths returned from Media to S. Russia and re-established their lordship over the slaves whom they had left behind. We know nothing of their history for over a century but the tale of Anacharsis (*c.* 530 B.C.), who was so attracted by the life of the Greeks now established in colonies along the Euxine coasts that he actually journeyed to Greece, but on his return was slain by his kinsfolk for being untrue to their ancestral customs. According to Herodotus, Darius, king of Persia, about 512 B.C. marched through Macedonia and Thrace, crossed the Danube, leaving the Ionians with orders to guard his bridge for 60 days, and invaded Scythia. Enticed by the Scyths as far as the river Oarus (Volga?), he began eight forts, but, leaving them unfinished, turned west again and was led round the edges of the country, through the lands of the border nations who had refused to help against the invader. Meanwhile the Scyths had tried to get the Ionians to desert and destroy the bridge, but they kept it in being even beyond the date promised. Finally Darius, unable to come up with the Scyths and running short of provisions, abandoned his wounded and baggage and returned hastily to the bridge. Ctesias and Strabo make much less of the expedition, which was probably a more or less unsuccessful demonstration meant to protect the new Persian conquests and magnified to exhibit the poor spirit of the Ionians and the advantages of nomad warfare. In revenge the Scyths made a raid that reached the Thracian Chersonese, drove out Miltiades, and even proposed to Cleomenes of Sparta a joint invasion of Asia. During the 5th cent. Scythian archers were employed as police in Athens. They are often represented on painted vases, but it is hard to distinguish their equipment from that of Persians, Amazons, and the like.

Shortly before the time of Herodotus Scyles, the Scythian king, undeterred by the fate of Anacharsis, had married a Greek wife and adopted Greek ways. He came to a like end, and his successor, Octamasades, is the last of the line whom we can name. We have hardly any glimpses of Scythia during the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.; in the latter part of the 4th the Sauromatæ were still east of the Don or just crossing; in 179 B.C.

[1] Of our two first-hand authorities, Hippocrates, *de Aëre, Aquis et Locis*, 24–30, keeps to (1), save that he includes as Scyths with a difference their eastern neighbours, the Sauromatæ; Herodotus, i. 103–106, 215 f., iv. 1–144, vii. 64, varies between (1) and (2); both expressly reject (3), the ordinary Greek use found in the other authors, who make but passing allusions to Scyths or wrote after their disappearance.

[2] Cf. Herod. vii. 64. [3] iv. 16–20 and 99–101.

[4] Tr. Pomp. *ap.* Justin, i. 1, ii. 2 ff.; Diod. Sic. i. 55, ii. 43.

[1] Strabo, xi. viii. 4. [2] Herod. i. 105.

[3] Josephus, *Ant.* xii. viii. 5.

[4] See H. Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, Leipzig, 1893–1906, i. 484 ff., 'Kimmerier, Aşguzäer, Skythen'; H. R. Hall, *The Ancient Hist. of the Near East*, London, 1913, pp. 495, 511.

Gatalus ὁ Σαρμάτης (the first occurrence of this form usual in later Greek writers and universal in Latin), now clearly in Europe, joined a league of Pontic states.[1] Long before this the Scyths' centre of gravity seems to have shifted westwards; their king, Atheas, defeated the Triballi on the lower Danube, but was himself defeated by Philip of Macedon (339 B.C.).[2] In an inscription *c.* 200 B.C.[3] we find the Scyths asking the men of Olbia for protection against the attacks of Galatæ and Sciri, invaders from Central Europe. In its last definite appearance the name Scyth is applied to the people of King Scilurus. Coins suggest that the kings of a Scythian remnant about the Danube mouth regained a certain amount of power and that the last of them, Scilurus, became suzerain over Olbia and extended his dominion as far as the Crimea. Inscriptions show that he had a kind of capital at Kermenchik, near Simferopol, entered into close relations with the Tauri, and threatened the city of Chersonesus. The latter called in the help of Mithridates and thereby defeated Palacus, son of Scilurus.[4] The Scythian element in the kingdom of Scilurus scarcely amounted to more than a name; and, when Strabo, rejecting the tradition of Herodotus, makes a fresh survey of the north coast of the Euxine, he finds no real Scythians there and speaks only of various Sarmatian tribes.

4. Physical characteristics, customs, etc.—Hippocrates,[5] discussing the effect of climate upon human physique, describes the peculiarities of the Scythians, whom he finds as little like other men as are the Egyptians. The special points are a close mutual resemblance, a reddish (*πυρρός*) complexion, a fatness, slackness, and excess of humours, a look as of eunuchs, and in certain cases a sexual indifference that amounts to actual impotence. This disease was well known; Herodotus[6] says that it was incurred through the sack of the temple of Derceto at Ascalon, but Hippocrates declares it to be a disease just like any other disease, and due to excessive riding. Men thus afflicted took their place absolutely among the women and were called 'Enarees.' He adds that all this applies only to the most noble and rich among the Scyths. The women, he says, always sit in waggons, whereas among the Sauromatæ they ride astride and take their share even in war.

Herodotus[7] gives a full account of Scythian customs; almost always he has in view the nomad Scyths, but some details seem to contradict their general scheme of life and are more probably true of the agricultural Scythians near Olbia, whence Herodotus seems to have obtained his information. The life of the nomad Scyths was conditioned by the necessity of tending their beasts; chief of these was the horse, used for riding (alone of the ancients the Scyths used geldings) and also to supply meat and mare's milk, kumys, cheese, butter, and butter-milk (*τυρός* and *βούτυρός* are perhaps Scythian loan-words), while the oxen drew the great waggons in which the women lived. They also ate sheep and game, but eschewed the pig. They used some vegetable food—grain, onions, garlic, and wild bulbs; when they could get it, they drank wine, and, unlike the Greeks, they drank it neat. For cooking they used great cauldrons; or they cooked an animal in its own skin, burning the bones at the same time. Of their dress he tells us only that they wore belts and trousers and pointed caps (*cyrbasia*). Their great weapon was the bow, with arrows and quiver, used from horseback; accordingly it was not a simple self-bow but a rather short bow with a complicated curve compared to that of the north coast of the Euxine. They also used darts, short swords (*acinaces*) or daggers (*ἐγχειρίδιον*), and axes (*sagaris*). For defence they had shields and scale-armour.

Their political organization consisted of an over-king, under-kings, nobles, freemen, and slaves. The women of the Scyths themselves rode in the waggons and had apparently much less freedom than those of the other nomad peoples (Sarmatæ, Massagetæ, and the like), and among them we hear of Queens Tomyris, Zarinaia, Amage, and Tirgatao. The kings were polygamous and married foreign women. On his father's death the son took over his wives, excepting of course his own mother. Their warlike tactics are proverbial—retiring before an invader, wasting the country, cutting off his supplies, harassing his rear, enticing him by feigned flight, and gradually exhausting him, while the nomads carry their supplies with them and are perfectly mobile. When they attack other countries, they leave no forces to guard their own, being quite independent of their base and so able to concentrate all their strength upon one point. But, when Thucydides[1] says that, as the most numerous people of the world, they could, united, vanquish any other nation, he exaggerates both their number and their power.

5. Religion.[2]—The Scythians reverenced chiefly Tabiti (=Hestia); next to her Papæus (=Zeus) with his wife Apia (=Ge); after them Goetosyros (=Apollo), Argimpasa (=Aphrodite Urania), and Ares. Thamimasadas (=Poseidon) was peculiar to the Royal Scyths. They raised no statues, altars, or temples to their gods, except to Ares. Their general way of sacrificing was as follows: the beast, usually a horse, took his stand with his fore-feet tied together; the sacrificer pulled the end of the rope from behind and brought him down; then he called upon the god and strangled the victim. Ares was worshipped in the form of a sword set on a platform of brushwood three furlongs square, heaped up in each district; besides horses and sheep they sacrificed to him one out of every hundred prisoners, pouring his blood upon the sword. The Ares cult suggests the more settled tribes of W. Scythia, where masses of brushwood would be obtainable; the native name is not given, and this points to a different source. The Scythian pantheon tells us very little; we do not know what aspect of the multiform Greek deities answered to the Scythian, nor can we establish the true form of the names of the latter.

6. Witchcraft.—Witchcraft[3] played a great part in Scythian life. The wizards divined with bundles of sticks, and the Enarees by plaiting bast. If the king fell sick, it was because some one had sworn by the royal hearth and had broken his oath, thus bringing down upon the king the deity's vengeance. Accordingly the wizards were called in to name the perjurer, and he escaped with his life only if he could adduce two sets of wizards to declare him innocent. If wizards were judged to have brought a false accusation, they were burnt on a pyre set on a cart.

The ceremony for taking oaths and swearing blood-brotherhood is widely spread: the parties mix their blood with wine in great cups, put therein a sword, arrows, an axe, and a dart, and, after praying long over it, drink it together.

7. Funeral customs.—In the case of the kings funeral customs[4] are very magnificent and cruel; the burials take place in the land of the Gerrhi, near the great bend of the Dnepr, and to this region the king is brought, wherever he may have died. The body is embalmed and put on a waggon. Its attendants disfigure themselves and all whom they meet, as they bring it from tribe to tribe to the appointed place, where it is laid in a great square pit under a roof of wicker-work. They strangle and lay in the vacant space one of the dead man's

1 Polybius, xxv. ii. [xxvi. vi.] 12.
2 Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, VII. iii. 18; he may have been king of the Getæ, who are constantly mentioned in this region; but some Scythians held the Dobrudzha, or it would not have gained the name of Little Scythia.
3 *CIG* ii. 2058; V. V. Latyschev, *Inscr. Oræ Septent. Ponti Euxini*, Petrograd, 1885, i. 16.
4 Strabo, VII. iii. 17, 18, iv. 3, 7, and a Chersonesan inscription (Latyschev), i. 185, *c.* 106 B.C.
5 *Loc. cit.* 6 i. 105. 7 iv. 50–75.

1 ii. 96. 2 Herod. iv. 59–62.
3 *Ib.* 67–69. 4 *Ib.* 71–73.

concubines, his cup-bearer, cook, groom, and messenger, also horses, set by him his cups of gold (they make no use of silver or bronze) and firstlings of all his possessions and over all they raise a great mound. After a year they slay 50 of his favourite servants, free Scyths all, and 50 horses, stuff them and set them in a circle round the mound. An ordinary Scyth when dead is carried about on a waggon to visit his friends, who feast the dead man and his attendants, until, after 40 days, he is laid in his grave.

One or two other customs may be worth mention: that by which a Scyth who has slain an enemy in war drinks his blood and scalps him, the scalp being a voucher in the distribution of booty, and the making into cups of the skulls of private adversaries vanquished in combat before the king show an extreme of barbarism; in iv. 73–75 Herodotus seems to describe three separate customs under one—a ceremonial purification from the taint of a corpse, the usual vapour-bath still popular in Russia, and a custom of intoxication with the vapour of hemp; he adds that the women whitened their skin with a paste of pounded cypress, cedar, and frankincense, which suggests considerable luxury and wide commercial connexions.

This picture of Scythian life is supplemented, and on the whole confirmed, by the results of excavations made in S. Russia during the past hundred years. Though no tomb can be said exactly to correspond to the ritual described by Herodotus, nearly every point can be paralleled from some burial or other. From Podolia and the south part of the Kiev and Poltava governments, south to the Euxine and the neighbourhood of the Greek cities of the Crimea and east across the Dnepr and Don to the valley of the Kuban along the north slope of the Caucasus, we find groups of barrows of every size up to 70 ft. high and 400 ft. across. The best are mostly about the bend of the Dnepr, just where we should seek the land of Gerrhus. The oldest contain skeletons coloured red and a few pots, but the rich contents of the greater number show them to be tombs of nomad people in touch with Assyrian, Iranian, and Greek civilization and dating from about the 7th cent. B.C. to the period of the great migrations. Most of them have been plundered, either just after their construction or by successive generations of tomb-robbers, but a few have kept their treasures, at any rate in part, to reward scientific investigation. We may take as an example the latest great find, made by N. I. Veselovski in 1912–13.[1]

The tumulus Solokha is 15 miles south of Nicopol in the middle of the Gerrhus group. In the centre had been the tomb of a woman arrayed in all her finery (now stolen) and supplied with drinking-vessels, a cauldron, and a gridiron, and near by two horses with gold trappings. In the south-east part of the mound, approached by a deep shaft and a covered way, was a larger chamber, containing the body of a king or chief, by him his sword-bearer, and another servant near the entrance. A little to the west was a second pit with the skeletons of five horses and a groom by them. Clearly the queen had died first, and the king had later been put into the same barrow. Other examples show that, if the king had died, his wife would have immediately followed him into the grave. The king's grave-goods were wonderfully rich: he wore a great lion-ended torque and five gold bracelets; some 300 gold plaques with repoussé designs, flowers, beasts, and human figures were sewn on to his pall; above his head lay a bone-handled knife, a rusted sword, a coat of mail, a pair of greaves, a wooden cup to which gold plates had been nailed; by his shoulder lay a bronze Greek helmet; by his right arm two iron lances and a copper mace; by his leg a leather *gorytus* (combination quiver and bow-case); by his right hip two iron swords, one of them with a gold haft and a peculiar sheath. Not far from his right shoulder was a wonderful golden comb of the finest Greek work, adorned with figures of three warriors; near by stood seven silver cups with men or animals in relief. In niches in the wall of the chamber, among other things, were ten Greek wine-jars, three great cauldrons with beef and mutton bones, and another amphora, a colander, and a silver-mounted drinking-horn; a special hiding-place held a *gorytus* of repoussé silver, bearing a wonderful representation of Scythians in combat and containing 180 arrow-heads, and a great golden saucer with a central boss, animals in repoussé all round, and an obliterated Greek inscription. The whole may be dated *c.* 300 B.C.

[1] See *Illustrated London News*, 3rd January, 14th February, 1914; and S. Polovtseff, in *RA*, 1914, i. 164.

The general inventory of the other great tombs is much the same and is dictated by the same ideas as the funeral rites described by Herodotus, illustrating them in such details as the presence of wooden tabernacles over the body, the remains of the funeral car and the funeral feast, etc. Discrepancies are the presence of silver and bronze and the rarity of any kind of axe. As to their style, the objects found are (1) a few Assyrian and perhaps Iranian, (2) archaic Ionian, (3) native Scythic, (4) 'finest' and Hellenistic Greek. Some of the last are of extreme beauty, and they are important as being easily dated and as presenting detailed representations of Scythians. Women's gear and things of general use are mostly of this class; weapons (except the *goryti*) and horse-trappings are usually of the other three. The native craftsman, though utterly failing to imitate the finest Greek work, succeeded better with the Ionian style, but imported into it a grotesque element recalling Upper Asia and Siberia, sometimes even China; he was very fond of animals, especially reindeer, and beasts and birds of prey, so foreshadowing the beast style of the great migration period. The most interesting types (both known also in Siberia) are the cauldron and the short sword with a heart-shaped guard; its sheath has a side projection and a separate tip necessary for a special way of suspending it from the belt; just such are shown upon bas-reliefs at Persepolis.

8. Ethnic origin.—The Scythians and Sarmatians used to be regarded as the ancestors of the Slavs; these are rather to be found among their north-west neighbours, the Neuri, the northern tribes adjoining being probably Finns. Niebuhr, and after him Neumann, struck by the many detailed resemblances in custom, took the Scyths to be Mongols or Turko-Tatars. Müllenhoff declared them, on the basis of the few names and words preserved, to be Iranians. No doubt Iranians formed the great bulk of the steppe population before the great migrations; this is proved by the foreign names in Greek inscriptions from Olbia and Tanais, most of which can be explained from the Iranian language of the Ossetes, a people now confined to the central Caucasus, but undoubtedly a remnant of the Sarmatians.[1] But it looks as if in the true Scyth dominant caste there was an element similar to the Huns, early Turks, and the like; this type is suggested by Hippocrates (*εὐνουχοειδέστατοι*),[2] by 5th cent. Greek terra-cottas of Sacæ from Memphis, showing that the Mongoloid type was already not confined to the extreme north-east of Asia, and by certain representations of natives found in Solokha. These all have beards, but this feature is quickly introduced by any crossing with Iranian blood. If the rulers were non-Aryan, it would explain why many words—*e.g.*, the god names—do not lend themselves to Iranian interpretation, though indeed no suggestions are very convincing. Similar customs too are mostly the product of similar physical conditions. Still the balance of the evidence inclines to the view that, while the steppe-population—*e.g.*, the Cimmerians and agricultural Scythians—was predominantly Iranian, the actual name Scyth belongs to a horde akin to the Turko-Tatars, which made great inroads in the 7th cent., was decadent by the 5th, and gave way in the 3rd to the Sarmatians with Iranian views of religion, of kingship,[3] and of the freer position of women natural among nomads.

[1] See art. OSSETIC RELIGION. [2] *Loc. cit.* (30).

[3] M. I. Rostovtsev, *Iranism and Ionism*, London, 1913. The author is projecting a general account of things Scythian in English.

The substitution of the Sarmatians was a change of name rather than of population or general mode of life, and the 'Scythic' tombs belong at least as much to Sarmatians as to Scyths.

LITERATURE.—K. Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, Berlin, 1855; K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, do. 1898–1900, iii. 101 ff.; O. Peisker, *The Cambridge Medieval History*, i. [1911] 323–359; Imperial Archæological Commission, Petrograd, *Antiquités de la Scythie d'Hérodote*, 1866–73, *Compte rendu*, 1859–88 (French), 1889– (Russian), *Bulletin* (Russian), 1901– ; N. P. Kondakoff, J. Tolstoi, and S. Reinach, *Antiquités de la Russie méridionale*, 3 pts., Paris, 1891–92; E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*, Cambridge, 1913.

E. H. MINNS.

SEA, SEA-GODS.—See WATER, WATER-GODS.

SE'ADIAH.—Se'adiah b. Joseph, the most prominent *gāôn* of the Jewish academy at Sura, inaugurated a new epoch in all branches of Jewish learning. He was born in Dilāz, Upper Egypt, in 892 and died at Sura in 942. Originally his name probably was Sa'īd (سعيد = Fortunatus), a form which he uses acrostically in some of his earlier writings. Later he adopted the Hebrew form סַעֲדְיָה, or, fuller, סעדיהו (= Se'adiah; the commonly accepted pronunciation, Saadya, is therefore incorrect). He is often surnamed al-Fayyūmī, *i.e.* 'of Fayyūm' (the Egyptian province near which Dilāz is situated), for which, owing to a mistaken identification by Se'adiah of Fayyūm with the Biblical Pitom,[1] Hebrew sources, especially those of Ḳaraite origin, usually substitute ha-Pitomi. Earlier mediæval Hebrew authors, particularly Abraham Ibn Ezra, mostly refer to Se'adiah simply as 'the *gāôn*,' without thinking it necessary to mention the name.

1. Life.—Of Se'adiah's origin and family relations very little is known. In some recently discovered documents whose authors were inimical to Se'adiah the claim is made that he was of non-Jewish origin, while he himself traces his pedigree to Shelah[2] and to the Mishnic teacher Ḥanina b. Dosa.[3] None of these assertions has any historical basis. The truth appears to be that Se'adiah was of humble Jewish parentage, his father, a pious and learned man, deriving his livelihood from some trade. A son of Se'adiah, Dosa by name, made a great reputation for himself as a scholar and is often referred to also as *gāôn*.

The circumstances of Se'adiah's youth and earlier education, both Jewish and secular, are likewise a matter of conjecture, as indeed is all our knowledge of the inner history of the Jews in Egypt during that period. It is quite certain, however, that the Ḳaraites (*q.v.*) had settled in various parts of Egypt at a very early time, and that, in their eagerness to make converts to their cause among the Rabbanites, they displayed a considerable literary activity in the various branches of Jewish studies, especially Hebrew grammar, Bible exegesis, calendar, and theology, which in turn served as an incentive to the intellectual elements among the adherents of traditional Judaism to devote themselves to the same courses of study, so as to be able to defend tradition with the same scientific weapons as their adversaries used. Se'adiah, who, as his subsequent career shows, was of a fearless and somewhat contentious character, took up the fight against Ḳaraism while still a very young man, which brought upon him the wrath and persecution of the fanatic devotees of the new creed. It was no doubt the persecution of the Ḳaraites that forced Se'adiah to leave his native country in the year 915 and to emigrate to the East. Here we lose trace of him for a while, but from certain letters of his, written about seven years later, we learn that he had lived in Palestine, probably in the city of Tiberias, renowned as the seat of the Masorites. There he came in contact with numerous scholars, among them the famous Masorite Moses ben Asher, and a certain 'Abū Kathīr Yaḥya ibn Zakariyya, who, according to the report of the Arabian polyhistor 'Alī al-Mas'ūdī († 957), became Se'adiah's teacher. This 'Abū Kathīr, with whom al-Mas'ūdī had a disputation on several religious-philosophic questions,[1] probably introduced Se'adiah into the field of philosophy, in which he was later to become the first and foremost exponent of mediæval Jewry. Se'adiah's association in the East with the Jewish philosopher David ibn Merwān al-Muḳammaṣ must likewise have influenced him in that direction.

In the years 921–923 we find Se'adiah embroiled in the fierce struggle that had broken out at that time between the Palestinian *nasī*, Ben Meir, and the heads of the Babylonian academies, Ben Meir trying to wrest from the latter the supremacy which they held over all Jewry, especially their old prerogative of fixing the calendar, and to restore it to the Palestinian authorities. Being a man of great influence, Ben Meir had almost succeeded in bringing over the communities to his side, and it was only through the energetic intervention of Se'adiah, who sent out circular letters and wrote a special work in defence of the Babylonian cause, that Ben Meir and his following met with a crushing defeat. In reward for this, Se'adiah was joined as an *'allūf* (chief judge, third in rank below the *gāôn*) to the staff of the Sura academy, in which position he remained until 928. In that year the gaonate had become vacant through death, and the then exilarch, David b. Zakkai, appointed Se'adiah to the office. It was not very long, however, before a bitter quarrel broke out between the new *gāôn* and the exilarch on account of an illegal procedure by the latter in a certain lawsuit which was calculated to bring him great profit, and which Se'adiah, as an upright man, would not countenance. The exilarch, as was customary in those times, excommunicated the *gāôn* and appointed another man as his successor (*c.* 930). Se'adiah, by the power vested in him, retaliated in kind and declared David b. Zakkai to be no longer exilarch. Babylonian Jewry was immediately split into two opposing factions, the one siding with the exilarch, the other with the *gāôn*. For two years Se'adiah maintained himself in the office in spite of all opposition, but finally the exilarchal party, headed by the very wealthy and learned Aaron Sargāda (שכנאזה), who offered a heavy bribe to the *khalīfah* for Se'adiah's deposition, succeeded in having him definitely removed from the gaonate (beginning of 933). Se'adiah then retired into private life, devoting himself entirely to his scientific work (933–937). In the meantime the strife which divided Babylonian Jewry continued unabated and often degenerated into open fights and even street riots. Some of the prominent men of the Baghdād community, finding the situation unbearable, urged a certain Bishr b. Aaron, father-in-law of Sargāda and a man of great influence, to try to bring about a reconciliation between the exilarch and Se'adiah, and Bishr succeeded in effecting this. Se'adiah was reinstated in his office (937), but held it for only five years. The excitement and suffering that he had undergone during the seven years of war with the exilarch had undermined his health and in 942 he died, as is reported, of melancholy, at the age of fifty, two years after the death of David b. Zakkai.

Se'adiah was undoubtedly one of the greatest men that mediæval Jewry ever produced. His universal mind embraced all branches of human knowledge cultivated by Jews and Arabs of his

[1] Ex 1[11]. [2] 1 Ch 4[21]. [3] *Ābhôth*, iii. 9 *f.*

[1] Goldziher, *REJ* xlvii. [1903] 41.

time. With him begins a new epoch in the history and development of Jewish learning and literature. He was the first scientific writer in the fields of Hebrew grammar and philology, Biblical exegesis, and synagogal liturgy, the first systematic expounder of Talmudic lore, and above all the pioneer and path-finder in the field of Jewish religious philosophy. His forceful personality left an indelible impress upon his age, and his literary achievements exercised a lasting influence on subsequent generations throughout the Middle Ages, even down to our own time.

2. Works.—It is impossible here to give an adequate appreciation of Se'adiah's very extensive life-work. Besides, most of his writings have come to us in fragmentary form or are known only from quotations in the works of later authors. The following is a general description of his more important works. Those of minor importance or not sufficiently known are referred to summarily.

(*a*) *Hebrew philology.*—(1) *'Agrōn*, a Hebrew dictionary in two parts with the special view of facilitating versification, preceded by a rhetorical introduction in pure Biblical Hebrew, in which the author briefly summarizes the history of the Hebrew language, deplores its neglect by the Jews of his day, and urges them to devote themselves again to its study and cultivation. Se'adiah wrote this work, his first production so far as is known, in his twentieth year (913), while yet in Egypt. Several years later he issued the work in an enlarged edition, containing also portions treating of the various themes of poetry, under the changed title, *Kitāb al-shi'r al-'ibrāni* ('Book on Hebrew Poetry'), and added an Arabic introduction which is of great historical value. Apart from a few very short fragments of the book, only the two introductions, nearly complete, have been preserved and were published by A. Harkavy, in *Studien und Mittheilungen*, Berlin, 1891, v. 40–57. For numerous bibliographical and other details see H. Malter, *Life and Works of Saadia Gaon*, Philadelphia, 1919, *s.v.* 'Agron.'

(2) *Kutub al-Lughah* ('Books on Language'), a grammatical work in twelve parts, the oldest work known on Hebrew grammar, of which, however, only fragments are extant; see W. Bacher, *Die Anfänge der hebräischen Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1895, pp. 38–62; Malter, Bibliography, i. 2.

(3) *Tafsīr al-sab'ina lafzah al-faridah* ('Explanation of the Seventy Isolated Words'). In this little work, which was published several times, the author explains on the basis of later Hebrew (Mishnāh) the Hebrew and Aramaic words which occur in the Bible only once or very rarely. The list actually contains the explanation of 91 words; hence the word *sab'ina* must be a scribal error, or represents the original number, which was later increased by the author or others; see Malter, Bibliography, i. 3.

(*b*) *Bible translation and exegesis.*—Se'adiah's translation of the Bible into Arabic, accompanied by extensive Arabic commentaries—the first in the Arabic language—ushered in a new epoch in the history of Judaism and to some extent of civilization in general. For, just as the Septuagint had been instrumental in bringing about that blending of Jewish and Greek thought know as Hellenism, so did Se'adiah's translation and interpretation of the Scriptures prepare the way for the inauguration of the famous Spanish-Arabic period in the history of the Jews during which they had again become the mediators between the Orient and the Occident and themselves made original contributions to all branches of mediæval science. Se'adiah's translation became the standard Arabic Bible for all Arabic-speaking Jews as well as for the Christian scholarly world down to our time.

The translation of the Pentateuch is contained in the Polyglot Bibles of Constantinople (1546), Paris (1645), and London (1657). In the Paris edition the Arabic text was translated into Latin by Gabriel Sionita, and the Hebrew characters of the *editio princeps* were transliterated into Arabic, which was the cause of innumerable mistakes in the text. A later edition (Jerusalem, 1894–1901), under the title תאג, Hebrew כתר תורה (see *JQR* xiv. [1902] 584, n. 1), is based on other MSS, in the possession of Yemenite Jews. A critical edition with Se'adiah's Arabic introduction appeared in Paris (1893) as the first volume of the *Œuvres complètes de R. Saadia ben Iosef Al-Fayyoûmi*, edited by J. Derenbourg. Genesis and Exodus in a somewhat different recension were published by P. de Lagarde from a Leyden MS in his *Materialien zur Geschichte und Kritik des Pentateuchs*, Leipzig, 1867.

Of the long commentary on the Pentateuch numerous fragments have been discovered among the Genizah MSS within the last twenty-five years and were sporadically published, partly with English translations by various scholars. For a detailed description see Malter, Bibliography, *s.v.* 'Bible.'

Of Se'adiah's translations of and commentaries on other Biblical books the following have been preserved:

Isaiah, first poorly edited by H. E. G. Paulus, Jena, 1790–91 (see S. Munk, *Notice sur Rabbi Saadia Gaon*, Paris, 1838, p. 29 ff.). Joseph and Hartwig Derenbourg edited the translation and the extant portions of the commentary as vol. iii. of *Œuvres complètes*, Paris, 1896 (containing also a French translation of the Arabic text).

Psalms.—Extracts with a German translation were published by G. H. A. von Ewald in his *Beiträge zur Geschichte der ältesten Auslegung*, i. 9–74, 154–160. Psalms 1–20 were published by S. H. Margulies (Breslau, 1884); 21–41 by S. Lehmann (Berlin, 1901); 42–49, 84, 87, 88 by T. Hofmann (*Die korachitischen Psalmen*, Stuttgart, 1891); 50–72 by S. Baron (Berlin, 1900); 73–89 by S. Galliner (Berlin, 1903); 107–124 by J. Z. Lauterbach (Berlin, 1903); 125–150 by B. Schreier (Berlin, 1904). Thus only Pss 90–106 are still awaiting publication, which was announced by E. Weil. All these editions, except that of Hofmann, bear the title *Saadia Al-fayjûmi's arabische Psalmenübersetzung*, and all contain also Se'adiah's commentary on the respective Psalms. A double introduction to this work by Se'adiah was published by S. Eppenstein in *Festschrift zu Ehren des Dr. A. Harkavy*, Petrograd, 1908, pp. 135–160 (cf. *MWJ* viii. [1881] 1–19, 61–91).

Proverbs, translation and commentary, forming the sixth volume of *Œuvres complètes*, edited and translated into French by J. Derenbourg and M. Lambert, Paris, 1894 (cf. Jonas Bondi, *Das Spruchbuch nach Saadia*, Halle, 1888; B. Heller, *REJ* xxxvii. [1898] 72–85, 226–251).

Job, translation and commentary, was first edited by J. Cohn (Altona, 1889) and then again with additional material and copious notes by W. Bacher in vol. v. of *Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1899), which contains also a French translation by J. and H. Derenbourg.

Daniel.—The translation was edited by H. Spiegel (*Saadia al-Fayjûmi's arabische Danielversion*, Berlin, 1906). The commentary exists in MS. Extracts from it were published by S. A. Poznański, *MGWJ* xlvi. [1902] 415 f.; cf. the Hebrew periodical *Ha-Gōren*, ii. [1909] 92–103.

There appeared also translations, partly with commentaries, of *Canticles*, *Ruth*, and *Esther* (cf. A. Merx, *Die Saadjanische Übersetzung des Hohen Liedes*, Heidelberg, 1882; M. Peritz, *Zwei alte arabische Übersetzungen des Buches Ruth*, Berlin, 1900; Poznański, *MGWJ* xlvi. 364–372), but they do not represent the original text of Se'adiah. They are later editions of the *gāōn's* works by anonymous authors who often modified and amplified the original wording; for further details see Malter, *s.v.* 'Five Scrolls.'

(*c*) *Liturgy.*—In his desire to strengthen traditional Judaism and to further the religious life of the Jews in the Diaspora, Se'adiah set himself the task of collecting all the ancient standard prayers and hymns as well as the liturgical productions of famous synagogal poets (Yannai, Eleazar, Ḳalīr, and others) and arranging them systematically in a so-called *Siddūr* or *Sēder* ('Order of Prayers') for the whole year.

In this work, which was first discovered by Steinschneider (1851) in a Bodleian MS and is as yet unpublished, Se'adiah embodied several liturgical compositions of his own. Some of these, among them a lengthy didactic poem on the 613 precepts of the Tōrāh (תרי"ג מצות), the so-called *'azhārōth* ('exhortations') on the same subject, and two highly poetical Hebrew prayers (*bakḳāshōth*), were published in J. Rosenberg's *Kōbēẓ*, Berlin, 1856; cf. also *Œuvres complètes*, ix. [Paris, 1897] 57–69; J. Bondi, *Der Siddūr des R. Saadia Gaon*, Frankfort a. M., 1904. A considerable number of liturgical compositions by Se'adiah were incorporated in the various rituals still in use in the synagogues. Some, more recently discovered, appeared in periodicals and other publications. For a detailed enumeration and description see Malter, *s.v.* 'Liturgy.' Here is to be mentioned only Se'adiah's 'Poem on the Number of Letters' in the Bible, which was repeatedly published and commented upon, by Buxtorf the Elder in his *Tiberias*, Basel, 1620, p. 183 ff., and C. D. Ginsburg, in *The Masoreth ha-Masoreth of Elias Levita*, London, 1867, pp. 271–278, and especially by J. Derenbourg in *Manuel du Lecteur*, Paris, 1871, pp. 139, 235 ff.

(*d*) *Halākhā.*—Se'adiah's work in this specifically Jewish field of learning was of the greatest importance, setting an example to future generations in the scientific and systematic treatment of the vast Talmudic material. Unfortunately most of his writings in this line have been lost, only three having been preserved, as it appears, in a complete form, while the others exist only in small fragments or are known from extracts and quotations in the works of later authors. So far as can be seen from the existing material, Se'adiah's Halākhic writings were divided into three classes: (1) methodology, (2) interpretation, and (3) codification of the Talmud.

(1) Of the works belonging to the first class we possess only the Hebrew translation of the originally Arabic *Interpretation of the Thirteen Hermeneutic Rules* (פרוש י"ג מדות), published first by S. Schechter in the periodical בית תלמוד, iv. [Vienna, 1885] 235–244 and re-edited by J. Müller in *Œuvres complètes*, Ix. 74–83. Another methodological work, *Introduction to the Talmud*, no longer exists; cf. L. Ginzberg, *Geonica*, i. 163.

(2) None of the works of the second class (commentaries on the Mishnāh and various tractates of the Talmud) has been preserved, with the exception of a very short *Commentary on the Tractate Berākôth*, containing merely lexical notes. It was edited from a Genizah MS by S. A. Wertheimer, Jerusalem, 1908; cf. Ginzberg, p. 164.

(3) About a dozen treatises representing the third group of Se'adiah's Talmudic writings are known by name, but only the *Treatise on Inheritance* (כתאב אלמואריث) has come down to us, edited by J. Müller (*Œuvres complètes*, ix. 1–53). The treatise is preceded by a philosophic introduction. Of some of the other treatises fragments have come to light—e.g., *On Testimonies and Contracts*, *On Usury* (H. Hirschfeld, *JQR* xvi. [1904] 294, xviii. [1906] 119 f.), etc. Mention must also be made of Se'adiah's *Responsa* (decisions in legal and religious questions), about 50 of which were published by J. Müller, pp. 87–142; cf. Malter, *s.v.* 'Halakah' D.

(*e*) *Calendar and chronology.*—The question of calendar was the subject of perpetual controversy between Ḳaraites and Rabbanites, and Se'adiah as the chief exponent of the latter has repeatedly treated of the matter in his polemical writings (see below) as well as in monographs, of which, however, only fragments have been preserved.[1]

A treatise on chronology under the title *Kitāb al-Ta'rīḫ* was published by A. Neubauer in *Mediæval Jewish Chronicles*, Oxford, 1887–95, ii. 89–110; cf. W. Bacher, *REJ* xxxii. [1896] 140 ff., xlix. [1904] 298 ff.; A. Marx, *REJ* lviii. [1909] 299 f. Two other treatises are known only by the titles; cf. Malter, *s.v.* 'Chronology.'

(*f*) *Philosophy.*—Se'adiah dealt with special problems of philosophy in nearly all his extant works, particularly in his commentaries on various books of the Bible. Here we are concerned, however, only with two of his works which represent his religious philosophic system as a whole.

(1) *Tafsir Kitāb al-mabādi* ('Commentary on the Book of Creation'), so far as known the first scientific attempt to unravel the mysteries of this obscure Hebrew treatise, called *Sefer Yeẓirah*, which the popular belief ascribed to the patriarch Abraham. In a lengthy introduction Se'adiah gives a historical account of the various theories of Greek thinkers as to the origin of the universe. The theory of the *Sēfer Yeẓirah* he identifies with that of Pythagoras, from which it differs only in so far as, in addition to the ten numerals of the latter, it postulates also the 22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet as the origin and essence of creation. Se'adiah devotes much space to the elucidation of this fantastic theory, which he endeavours to harmonize with the teachings of Judaism. He does not, however, subscribe to the views of the *Sēfer Yeẓirah*, accepting instead that of the *Tôrāh*, which teaches a *creatio ex nihilo*. Very interesting is Se'adiah's interpretation of the fourth chapter of the book, according to which the first thing that God created was a certain pneumatic substance, which differed from the visible air that surrounds us by its greater tenuity and by its sublimity. This pneumatic substance, or ether, which he probably adopted from the Stoics, pervades all existence, even the interior of the most solid bodies. It is through the medium of this sublimated air that God is omnipresent. Figuratively speaking, this air is 'the throne of God's Majesty,' the agency of the divine spirit that animates and sustains all creation. Scripture designates it by the term *kābôd* = 'glory,' as it is said (Is 6[3]): 'The whole earth is full of his glory.' By means of it the word of God is communicated to the prophets. The Rabbis of the Talmud coined for it the term *she*kīnāh* (שכינה).

The Arabic text of the commentary was edited with a French translation by M. Lambert, *Commentaire sur le Sêfer Yesira*, Paris, 1891. A Hebrew translation by an author of the 12th cent. exists in MS only. Portions of another translation are embodied in the *Commentary on the Sefer Yeẓirah* by Judah b. Barzillai of Barcelona (1135), ed. S. Halberstam, Berlin, 1885; cf. Malter, *s.v.*

(2) *Kitāb al-'Amānāt wal-I'tiḳādāt*, in the Hebrew translation of Judah Ibn Tibbon (1186), *Sēfer ha-Emūnôth we-ha-Dēôth* ('Book of Philosophic Doctrines and Religious Beliefs'), Se'adiah's most important philosophic work, written in Baghdād during the time of his seclusion (about 933). The Arabic text was published for the first time by S. Landauer (Leyden, 1880), while the Hebrew translation is accessible in seven editions (*ed. pr.* Constantinople, 1562), some of them with commentaries. J. Fürst translated the Hebrew text, with the exception of the last chapter, into German (Leipzig, 1845). Parts of the Arabic text were translated into German by P. Bloch (*Vom Glauben und Wissen*, Munich, 1879, containing the introduction and the first chapter) and W. Engelkemper (*Die religionsphilosophische Lehre Saadja Gaons*, etc., Münster, 1908, third chapter). An older Hebrew translation, usually called 'The Paraphrase,' with a very peculiar terminology, is as yet unpublished. This translation was the basis of Berechiah ha-Naḳdān (*c.* end of 12th cent.), who epitomized the whole work in two separate volumes, which were edited with an English translation by H. Gollancz under the title *The Ethical Treatises of Berachya*, London, 1902.

One of the main features of this great work of Se'adiah is its fundamental theory that philosophy and religion not only do not contradict each other, but actually support and supplement each other in the propagation of truth. For reason and religion sprang from the same divine source, and neither therefore can teach anything that is incompatible with the teachings of the other. With this theory as a basis, Se'adiah sets out to examine the various philosophic doctrines which seem to be at variance with the teachings of the Mosaic religion and endeavours to prove that the supposed antagonism is due either to fallacious reasoning or to a misinterpretation of the religious documents. In a long introduction he discusses the sources from which all human knowledge is derived and then divides his book into ten sections, in which the following problems are dealt with:

(1) The creation of the world. Four proofs are adduced for the *creatio ex nihilo*, while twelve contrary theories by various Greek and Muhammadan thinkers are refuted with much detail.

(2) Having demonstrated the necessity of presupposing the existence of God as a Creator, Se'adiah proceeds to a discussion of God's unity and uniqueness, as well as the other divine attributes. In this connexion he refutes the Christian dogma of the Trinity as a misinterpretation of the three attributes of life, power, and knowledge.

(3) The purpose of creation was to make all created beings happy. As a means to the attainment of happiness, the divine commandments of the Holy Scriptures were revealed to man. The necessity and reliability of prophecy are defended against the contrary views of a Hindu sect (Brāhmans), likewise the authority of the Biblical law against the contentions of Christian and Muhammadan theologians that it was abrogated.

(4) The question of free will is here minutely discussed. Man is a free agent, hence responsible for all his actions. Se'adiah tries to reconcile this view with the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Numerous passages of the Bible are interpreted in the light of this theory.

(5) Men are now divided into ten classes according to their religious and moral bearing in life. Special effort is made to vindicate the idea of God's justice, seeing that the righteous often suffer, while the wicked prosper (theodicy).

(6) This section contains Se'adiah's system of psychology. Six theories of Greek philosophers regarding the essence of the human soul are discussed. Against these, the author presents his own theory, that the soul is a separate entity created by God at the moment when the body, its habitat, is about to enter this world. He thus denies the pre-existence of the soul. He further investigates the mutual relation of soul and body, defends the idea of the immortality of the former, discusses the phenomenon of death and the state of the soul after death, and finally refutes the theory of transmigration of the soul.

(7) In this section Se'adiah tries to prove the possibility of the resurrection of the dead from the point of view of nature, reason, and the Bible. The closing portion contains the answers to ten questions that have a special bearing on the doctrine of resurrection.[1]

(8) Here the author takes up the Jewish doctrine of Israel's ultimate redemption by the promised Messiah, proving it from Bible and Talmud. He argues against those who claimed that the Messianic prophecies were fulfilled during the time of the Second Temple and also against the Christian doctrine of the Messiah.

(9) On reward and punishment in the future world. Se'adiah proves from reason, Bible, and Talmud that all inequalities will be adjusted in the world to come and then devotes much space to the discussion of thirteen eschatological questions.

(10) The tenth section represents Se'adiah's system of ethics. He describes thirteen different theories regarding the course which one should choose for oneself in life and shows that any of these theories, if applied dogmatically and one-sidedly, is bound to prove harmful. Man should live in accordance with his natural inclinations, but keep them under strict control and surveillance, carrying out all functions of life in the proper time and place and refraining therefrom when reason so demands.

(*g*) *Polemic works.*—(1) *Kitāb al-Radd'alā 'Anān*, 'Refutation of 'Anān,' the founder of Ḳaraism (760), written in 915. The book is known only from quotations; see Poznański, *JQR* x. [1898] 240 ff.

(2) *Kitāb al-Tamyīz*, 'Book of Distinction,' probably Se'adiah's most important and most voluminous polemical work, written in 926 and directed against schismatic teachings of the Ḳaraites. Several fragments were published by S. Schechter, *Saadyana*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 30–34; and H. Hirschfeld, *JQR* xvi. 98 ff.; cf. also Poznański, *JQR* x. 246–251, 262–274.

[1] See Malter, *JQR*, new ser., iii. [1912–13] 500–509; cf. art. CALENDAR (Jewish).

[1] The seventh section exists in two entirely different recensions, the one of which is contained in the edition of Landauer (see above), while the other, on which is based also Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew translation, was edited from another MS by W. Bacher, in the *Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstage M. Steinschneider's*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 98–112.

(3) *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā Ibn Sāḳawaihi*, 'Refutation of Ibn Sāḳawaihi,' of which several fragments have come to light; see *JQR* xiii. [1901] 655–667, xvi. 100, 112; Poznański, *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, London, 1908, pp. 4–8.

(4) *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā al-Mūtaḥāmil*, 'Refutation of an Overbearing Aggressor,' perhaps the same Ibn Sāḳawaihi. A fragment was published by Hirschfeld, *JQR* xviii. 113–119; cf. Poznański, *JQR* x. 254 f.

(5) *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā Ḥayawaihi* (*vulgo Ḥiwi*) *al-Balḫi*, 'Refutation of Ḥiwi of Balkh.' A considerable portion of the book, written in Hebrew rhyme, was recently published by I. Davidson under the title *Saadia's Polemic against Ḥiwi Al-Balkhi*, New York, 1915, to which edition the reader is here referred for further details.

(6) *Sēfer ha-Gālui*, an apologetic work written in Biblical Hebrew and directed against David b. Zakkai and his party. About three years later Se'adiah added an Arabic translation of and commentary on the Hebrew text and wrote an Arabic introduction in which he sketched the contents of the work. The introduction, in which verses from the original book of Sirach are quoted, and of which only a few lines are missing at the beginning, was published by Harkavy in *Studien und Mittheilungen*, v. 150–181. Part of the same introduction was published from another MS with an English translation by H. Malter, *JQR*, new ser., iii. [1912–13] 487–499. Several fragments of the work itself, both Hebrew and Arabic, appeared in various periodicals; see, for the bibliography, Malter, *Life and Works of Saadia*, *s.v.*

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HENRY MALTER.

SEAL AMULETS.—See SCARABS.

SECESSION.—See PRESBYTERIANISM.

SECOND ADVENT.—See PAROUSIA.

SECOND ADVENTISM.—This article will sketch the history of speculation about the return of Christ. Belief in His return has long been a widely accepted Christian tenet, but there have been many different opinions as to the time and manner of His appearing. These varying views fall into two main classes. One type of thinking regards the Second Advent primarily as a spiritual experience already realized through the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the disciples after the resurrection of Jesus—a 'return' repeated in the experience of successive generations of Christians. This interpretation is frequently supplemented by belief in a visible coming of Christ at an indefinite historical moment in the far distant future, after the gospel by its transforming power has gradually brought the world to a state of millennial perfection. The second type of opinion insists that the promised return of Christ has not yet taken place, but may be momentarily expected. In the meantime the world constantly deteriorates. Only by Christ's literal coming can the millennium be established and righteousness made to prevail upon the earth. The latter opinion is commonly designated pre-millenarianism and the former post-millenarianism. Since for pre-millenarians Christ's return is as yet in no sense realized, but is an imminent event greatly to be desired, they have usually been much more diligent than post-millenarians in their efforts to determine the date and manner of the Second Advent. It is mainly with pre-millennial teachings that we are here concerned.

1. Jewish antecedents.—Contemporary Judaism furnished a point of departure for early Christian belief in the return of Christ. Even the older prophets had announced the coming of a day when Jahweh would catastrophically intervene in the affairs of the world, much as the Christians of NT times depicted the imminent advent of their Lord Jesus Christ. But this type of imagery was developed most fully in the apocalyptic literature of later Judaism, whence it passed over into Christianity. Dn $7^{13f.}$ seems to have been a particularly influential passage: 'I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man. . . . And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve him.' Other apocalyptic writers revelled in descriptions of divine intervention when either God Himself or His heavenly Messiah would visibly appear descending from heaven to earth to inaugurate a new régime. This event was to be foreshadowed by a series of terrifying phenomena. Fearful wars would drench the world in blood, the heavens and the earth would be shaken, and the light would fail from sun, moon, and stars. Resurrection of the dead, the execution of judgment, and the inauguration of a new world were to occur in connexion with the advent of God or of His Messiah. Certain apocalyptists inserted an interregnum of bliss—sometimes 400 years, sometimes a millennium—

between the end of the present world and the final establishment of the new heaven and the new earth. Occasionally attempts were made to fix the date of the end, earlier estimates being revised from time to time in the light of subsequent events. Other seers were less confident of their ability to forecast exactly the hour of coming disaster, since this knowledge was not permitted to mortals, but in the signs of their own times they found ample evidence of the imminence of the event.[1]

2. Jesus on His return.—Jesus was baptized by John after hearing him announce the imminence of the judgment (Mt 3^{7-10}, Lk 3^{7-9}). Apparently the Baptist shared in the apocalyptic thinking of contemporary Judaism and awaited expectantly the impending catastrophe that was to end the old order and establish the new. But whether Jesus was so heartily in sympathy with this view that He predicted His own early return from heaven in apocalyptic fashion is still a debated question. One school of interpreters stoutly maintains that the Gospels correctly represent Jesus as teaching that He would return while men of His own generation were still alive (Mk 9^{1}).[2] Other interpreters are of the opinion that Jesus did not announce His early return in apocalyptic fashion, but that the prominence of this idea in the Gospels is due to the work of the disciples, who consoled themselves with this faith after Jesus' death.[3] While Jesus did not predict His own coming, He may on this interpretation have entertained current Jewish apocalyptic hopes and have expected an early intervention of God to inaugurate a new heavenly régime upon earth. A third view, more in accordance with popular opinion, is that Jesus, in speaking of His early return, used the apocalyptic phraseology of His time, but attached to it a deeper and more spiritual meaning. He was to return in spiritual power, and the new kingdom on earth was to be established by a gradual process of growth begun during His own career and continued by successive generations of His disciples working under the direction of His spirit.

3. NT teaching.—Belief in the Second Coming was popular among the Christians whose opinions are preserved in the NT. An expectation of Christ's early return in glory is frequently expressed in the Epistles of Paul. The Thessalonians are admonished to prepare for the approaching end of the age, waiting for the Son of God from heaven (1 Th 1^{10} 2^{19} 3^{13} 4^{15-18}). The present age is to end in a terrible outbreak of lawlessness to be followed by the coming of the Lord (2 Th 2^{1-12}). The Corinthians are advised to delay their litigations, awaiting the judgment presently to be inaugurated by Jesus when He returns. Since the time is short, it is unwise for them to become involved in family relationships such as marriage and the care of children. Within their own lifetime Christ will appear, the dead will be raised, judgment will be enacted, and the new age will be established (1 Co $1^{7f.}$ 4^{5} 5^{5} 7^{29-35} 15^{24-28} 16^{22}). This glorious day is at hand, and wise Christians will hold themselves in readiness for the imminent advent of the Lord (Ro 13^{12} 14^{10}, Ph $1^{6.\ 10}$ 4^{5}, 1 Th $5^{1-11.\ 23}$).

The Synoptic Gospels and Acts show a similar interest in the Second Advent, which is expected to occur during the lifetime of personal disciples of Jesus (Mk 9^{1} 14^{62}, Mt 16^{28} 26^{64}, Lk 9^{27} 22^{69}). Jesus is thought to have had in mind His own return when He spoke about the destruction of the Temple (Mk 13^{5-37}, Mt 24^{4-36}, Lk 21^{8-36}). The agonies experienced in the Jewish revolt of A.D. 66–70, which resulted in the destruction of the Temple, were interpreted as signs of the approaching end. Very soon after this disaster the Son of Man would appear with His angelic host to establish His kingdom upon earth. In the meantime certain preliminaries had to be completed, such as preaching the gospel to all the peoples living around the Mediterranean (Mk 13^{10}), and the exact date of the end could not be known by mortals, but in Mark's opinion it was so near that the men of that generation ought to be living in constant readiness for its coming (13^{30-37}). Similarly, Acts opens with the announcement that the disciples shall see Jesus return in like manner as they beheld Him going into heaven (1^{11}). Peter interprets the Pentecostal endowment of the Christians as a fulfilment of OT prophecies of the last times (2^{17-21}), and on still another occasion he admonishes his hearers to repent in preparation for the advent of Christ (3^{19-21}).

In Revelation the Second Coming is vividly portrayed. 'Behold he cometh with the clouds; and every eye shall see him' is the persecuted Christian's consoling hope (1^{7}). The things seen by John will 'shortly come to pass' and Christ will 'come quickly' ($22^{6f.\ 12.\ 20}$). The trials through which Christians are passing in John's own day are regarded as signs presaging the final period of distress to precede Christ's advent. He will come riding upon a white charger and accoutred with heavenly armour. The armies of heaven are to accompany Him, but the sharp sword that proceedeth out of His mouth will itself be sufficiently deadly to strike down all His enemies. The nations of the earth will fall in the terrific carnage to take place at Christ's coming (19^{11-21}). At this point John introduces a Jewish idea not explicitly mentioned in any other NT book. After His triumph Christ sets up an interregnum upon earth, dwelling with the martyred saints for 1000 years before the final judgment is staged and the New Jerusalem established. The actual date of the expected advent is vaguely indicated by John in his apparent reference to the imperial succession between his own day and the end of the present age (17^{10-14}). After the death of the present emperor his immediate successor will rule for 'a little while' before the final imperial 'beast' appears who holds dominion until overthrown by Christ. If, as seems probable, John was writing in the nineties under Domitian, he doubtless expected the Second Advent to occur not later than the second decade of the 2nd century.

Other parts of the NT also entertain the hope of Christ's coming. Readers of James are admonished to await patiently the advent of the Lord which 'is at hand,' and the judge 'standeth before the doors' (5^{7-9}). The author of Hebrews expects Christ to appear a second time to them that wait for Him to complete their salvation, and even as he writes the day seems to be 'drawing nigh' (9^{28} 10^{25}). In 1 Peter Christians are encouraged to suffer persecution, confident in the belief that the end of the present world is near. Suddenly Christ will appear, coming upon the clouds to destroy sinners and receive the faithful in His new kingdom (1^{3-7} $4^{7.\ 12f.\ 17f.}$ 5^{4}). Against sceptics who are losing faith in the Second Advent 2 Peter urges that delay is no sufficient ground for doubt, since with the Lord a thousand years are but as a single day (3^{1-13}).

[1] For a more extended statement of Jewish opinion on this subject see R. H. Charles, *A Critical Hist. of the Doctrine of a Future Life*[2], London and New York, 1913, chs. v.-viii.; S. J. Case, *The Millennial Hope*, pp. 80–98; P. Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba*, Tübingen, 1903; Schürer, *GJV*[4], Leipzig, 1902–11, ii. 579–651.

[2] *E.g.*, W. Sanday, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, Oxford, 1907; E. F. Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah*, Edinburgh and New York, 1911; A. Loisy, *Jésus et la tradition évangélique*, Paris, 1910; A. Schweitzer, *Gesch. der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, Tübingen, 1913.

[3] So, notably, W. Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, Göttingen, 1901.

The Gospel of John treats the Second Coming in a unique way. The idea rarely occurs. There is one reference to an hour when all that are in the tombs shall hear the voice of Jesus and come forth to judgment ($5^{28f.}$); but this is not the dominant teaching of the book. Elsewhere the return of Jesus is thoroughly spiritualized. He will 'come again' to receive His own at death, but not to introduce an apocalyptic kingdom upon earth ($14^{2f.}$). The kingdom He establishes is one of 'truth' (18^{37}), which is already inaugurated through His work upon earth. Those who hear His words and believe thereby acquire eternal life immediately, and those who reject incur, by that very act, a present and final judgment ($5^{24f.}$). Jesus indeed returns to earth after His death, but His return is a spiritual act affecting the personal religious living of successive generations of disciples and is not to mark a cataclysmic reversal of the present order of existence.

4. Early patristic opinion. — Throughout the 2nd and 3rd centuries many Christians continued to cherish the hope of an early visible return of their Lord. They not only reproduced the first disciples' vivid expectation of His early advent, but they frequently dwelt upon the idea of His millennial rule as depicted in Revelation. The *Didache* warns its readers to watch lest they be taken unawares by the Lord's sudden coming, which is to occur in truly apocalyptic fashion.[1] Hegesippus reported that Jesus' brother, James, just before the latter's execution, declared that Jesus was about to come upon the clouds of heaven, and the grandchildren of Jude also defined the Messianic kingdom in similar apocalyptic imagery.[2] Both Ignatius and Polycarp believed themselves to be living in the last times when Christ would suddenly appear to execute judgment upon the Christians' persecutors and to reward the faithful.[3] The so-called *Epistle of Barnabas* represents the last day as at hand, when the present world along with the evil one shall be destroyed by the returning Lord. Almost 6000 years are thought to have elapsed since creation, these years corresponding to the six days of creation week. The seventh day of 1000 years is about to begin with the Second Advent.[4] Papias also looked for a return of the Lord, when the earth would be made fabulously fruitful.[5] Hermas describes a beast seen in his vision and marked by four colours, black representing the present evil world, red signifying impending destruction by blood and fire, gold typifying faithful Christians tried by the testing fire, and white denoting the new coming age. The end is thought to be near. Even Jesus had lived in the last times, and in Hermas' day the tower representing the Church was so near to completion that the labour upon it had to be suspended for a brief period awaiting the return of Christ to inspect the structure. But this delay is not to be long.[6]

Among the early apologists, Justin is a confirmed believer in the Second Advent. He finds two advents of Christ predicted by the prophets—the one already past when He came as a dishonoured and suffering man, the second when He shall come from heaven with glory, accompanied by His angelic host.[7] This consummation is being delayed temporarily to allow more sinners to repent, and Justin thinks that the dispensation of grace may endure even long enough to include some who are not yet born.[1] But persecution of Christians will continue until Christ comes to destroy His enemies and dwell with the saints 1000 years in Jerusalem.[2] Irenæus agrees with Barnabas in placing the end of the world and the return of Christ 6000 years after creation. The date of the advent is not fixed more definitely, but the hostility of Rome is to continue until Christ comes to abolish all evil and establish His millennial reign.[3] The Montanists[4] were also enthusiastic believers in the early return of Christ, and their excesses did much to arouse opposition to the doctrine. Tertullian predicts a decline of the Roman power to be followed by the rise of the Antichrist, who will make war upon the Church until Christ suddenly appears, coming in glory upon the clouds to establish the saints in power upon earth. Already men are living in the 'last times.'[5] Hippolytus fixes the date of the Second Advent at 500 years after the birth of Christ, which is said to have taken place 550 years after creation.[6] Commodian looks for an early return of the Lord. The impending seventh persecution of the Christians is expected to introduce the tribulation of the last days. Then two Antichrists are to appear in succession, ruling for a short time before Christ's advent.[7] Lactantius dwells at length upon the events to precede the return of Christ which will occur 6000 years after the creation. He believes that at most the present world cannot endure beyond another 200 years, and the end is to be expected daily.[8] Other expectant pre-millennialists are Victorinus of Pettau,[9] Methodius of Olympus in Lycia,[10] and the Egyptian bishop Nepos.[11]

5. Early opponents of millennialism.—The idea of an early return of Christ to establish His millennial reign upon earth gradually grew unpopular as the Christian movement gained in power. While Christians remained few in numbers, and during periods of severe persecution, the only possible triumph for the new religion seemed to lie in the hope of the Second Advent. But, as Christianity became more influential, gradually rising to a position of supremacy in its world, the need for a catastrophic intervention of God disappeared. The Second Advent as a tenet of faith was not necessarily abandoned, but stress was placed upon the power of the Church to effect a gradual transformation of the present world, and the visible return of Christ was pushed far into the future.

The first opposition to Second Adventism seems to have come from the Gnostics, who were averse to the idea of any reunion of souls with restored physical bodies even in a millennial kingdom.[12] The excessive enthusiasm of the Montanists also provoked opposition to millenarianism, even causing the book of Revelation to fall into disfavour in certain circles. This is probably the reason for its rejection by the Alogi and apparently also by the Roman presbyter Caius, who calls it the work of the heretic Cerinthus.[13] But Origen was the first Christian writer to attempt a thoroughgoing refutation of vivid and literalistic Second Advent hopes.[14] He did not reject the Biblical writings commonly cited in support of these hopes, but he offered an allegorical type of interpretation by which all Scripture could be made to yield a spiritual meaning, teaching that the present world was to endure indefinitely, being

[1] Ch. 16. [2] Eusebius, *HE* II. xxiii. 13, III. xx. 6.
[3] Ignatius, *Eph.* xi. 1, xvi. 1 f., *Mag.* v. 1; Polycarp, *Phil.* ii. 1 f., v. 2, xi. 2; *Martyr. Poly.* ii. 3, xi. 2.
[4] IV. 1–3, vi. 11 ff., vii. 9 ff., xv. 1–9, xxi. 3.
[5] Irenæus, *Hær.* v. xxxiii. 3 f.
[6] *Vis.* I. iii. 4, II. ii. 7 f., III. viii. 9, ix. 5, IV. i.–iii., *Sim.* iv. 1–8, ix. 5, 12, 3.
[7] *Apol.* i. 52, *Dial.* 110.

[1] *Apol.* i. 28.
[2] *Dial.* 39, 81; see also *Apol.* i. 45, 51 f., 60, ii. 7 f., *Dial.* 30 f., 80, 113, 121, 138 f.
[3] *Hær.* v. 25–36. [4] See art. MONTANISM.
[5] *Apol.* 23, *de Spectac.* 30, *adv. Marc.* iii. 24, *de Resurr.* 24 f.
[6] *Frag. Dan.* ii. 4 ff. [7] *Instr.* 43–45.
[8] *Div. Inst.* vii. 14–26. [9] *Com. on Rev.*
[10] *Conviv.* ix. 5. [11] Eus. *HE* vii. 24.
[12] See art. GNOSTICISM, § 4 f. [13] Eus. *HE* iii. 28.
[14] E.g., *de Prin.* II. i. 3, xi. 2, III. vi. 9; see also *ERE* i. 317b.

gradually transformed by the power of the Christian gospel into a new ideal order of existence. The anti-millennial polemic was taken up by Dionysius of Alexandria. He did not completely reject the book of Revelation, but he did affirm that it was unintelligible to him and that it was not the work of John the Apostle.[1] Until the time of Athanasius the book of Revelation remained in disfavour with the churches of Syria and Palestine, while Origen's method of dealing with the Second Coming prevailed in the East.

Second Adventism was given a new turn by the Donatist Ticonius in his commentary on Revelation. He maintained that the return of the Lord would not occur until the true Church—meaning the Donatist Church[2]—had established itself in the world, successfully resisting both paganism and the false Church Catholicism. The book of Revelation was allegorically interpreted as a detailed forecast of this conflict. Although Ticonius, who wrote about the year 380, expected Christ to reappear soon, he made the intervening history of Christianity, gradually attaining perfection in its conflict with the world, the process by which Christ's kingdom was to be established upon earth. This notion was transformed and restated by Augustine.[3] He dismisses the view that Christ is yet to come to inaugurate a millennial reign upon earth. The Kingdom has already been established by Christ's first advent, when He bound Satan (Mk 3^{27}), and His coming 'continually occurs in His church, that is, in His members, in which He comes little by little and piece by piece, since the whole Church is His body.' When the Church has reached the climax of its growth, the present world will be transmuted by a fiery bath transforming corruptibility into incorruptibility and revealing the New Jerusalem which is from heaven 'because the grace with which God formed it is of heaven.' The work of Augustine (*q.v.*) virtually eliminated all realistic Second Adventism from the main stream of Roman Catholic thinking, and his views have also been widely current in Protestant circles.

6. Revival of interest in adventism. — When taken literally, Augustine's identification of the Church with the ideal earthly kingdom of Christ implied that the millennium would close about A.D. 1000, and that the final coming of Christ in judgment might then be expected. The approach of this date awakened a revival of interest in Second Advent hopes, and for several years thereafter more or less vivid expectations were frequently entertained; *e.g.*, the efforts of the Crusaders to gain control of the Holy Land owed not a little to the feeling that the imminent end of the world made it necessary for Christians to be in possession of that sacred territory when the Lord returned.

At the close of the 12th cent. a noteworthy reinterpretation of adventism is given by Joachim of Floris, who looked for the return of Christ to inaugurate His millennial reign upon earth in the year 1260.[4] This date was determined by reckoning the 1260 days of Rev 12^6 as the equivalent number of years that the true Church would remain concealed before the end. Stirring events of Joachim's own day, such as the aggressions of the Saracens, the Crusades, and the rise of the monastic orders, all became signs of the times fulfilling the predictions of the book of Revelation. Joachim's writings were regarded by his admirers as a new Scripture, and so incurred the hostility of the papacy; but his views gained wide currency among the Franciscans, who found the hostile papacy also prefigured among the signs of the last times in Revelation. The various Protestant movements took up this notion with avidity. Also the disturbed conditions preceding the Reformation tended to increase the conviction that the Second Advent was approaching. Militz of Kromeriz, a forerunner of John Hus, looked for the end between the years 1365 and 1367. In the next century the Hussite wars strongly stimulated advent hopes among the Bohemians, resulting in the rise of the Taborite movement and the formation of the sect known as the Bohemian Brethren.[1] The Thirty Years' War gave fresh stimulus to these hopes and called forth from the famous Comenius the prediction of an early return of Christ. Wyclif (*q.v.*) also regarded the papacy as the power of Antichrist, and other signs of the times were taken to imply the nearness of Christ's advent. The reformers in Germany and Switzerland often spoke of the Antichrist papacy, but they did not as a rule draw the logical conclusion that the literal Second Advent was imminent. Millenarianism was branded as a Judaistic heresy by both the Augsburg and the Helvetic Confessions.[2]

In the British Isles adventism was advocated more freely, the book of Revelation furnishing a basis for new speculation on the date of the Lord's return. John Napier[3] predicted the coming of the end between the years 1688 and 1700. In the next generation Joseph Mede[4] concluded from the data in Revelation that the present course of history would close about the year 1660. Isaac Newton[5] refrained from specifying an exact date, but he looked for an early consummation of the present age. William Whiston[6] less cautiously fixed first upon the year 1715, then upon 1734, and later upon 1866, as the date for the inauguration of the millennium. The same type of interpretation was advocated in France by Pierre Jurieu,[7] who sought to comfort the persecuted Huguenots by predicting the downfall of the Antichrist Roman Church in the year 1689. In Germany the Lutheran prejudice against adventist speculation was overcome by the Pietists. C. Vitringa,[8] who drew largely upon the English interpreter Mede, was specially influential in reviving German interest in this subject. But J. A. Bengel[9] did most to confirm that interest. From the figures and images of Revelation he concluded that a preliminary millennium would be inaugurated in 1836, when Satan would be bound for 1000 years. Then would follow the millennial kingdom proper, closing with the end of the world and the final judgment. Bengel exerted a powerful influence not only in his native land but also in England, where his commentary was translated at the special request of John Wesley. Thus advent speculations attained increasing popularity in various Protestant circles and have persisted down to modern times. The general method of the interpreter is to discover in Revelation a forecast of the entire history of Christianity up to his own day, noting especially those predictions that are believed to point to events of his age which convince him of the nearness of Christ's return to inaugurate the millennium.

7. Millenarian sects. — During the last two centuries advent teaching has occasionally furnished an incentive for the formation of separate sects.

1 Eus. *HE* vii. 24 *f.*
2 *De Civ. Dei*, xx.

2 See art. DONATISTS.
4 See art. JOACHIMITES.

1 See art. HUSSITES.
2 See art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. pp. 845 ff., 859 ff.
3 *A Plaine Discovery of the whole Revalation of Saint John*, Edinburgh, 1593.
4 *Clavis Apocalyptica una cum commentario in Apoc.*, Cambridge, 1627.
5 *Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the Apocalypse of St. John*, 2 pts., London, 1733.
6 *An Essay on the Revelation of St. John*, Cambridge, 1706.
7 *L'Accomplissement des prophéties, ou la délivrance prochaine de l'église*, 2 vols., Rotterdam, 1686.
8 'Ανάκρισις *apocalypsios Joannis apostoli*, Franeker, 1705.
9 *Erklärte Offenbarung Johannis*, Stuttgart, 1740, Eng. tr. by John Robertson, London, 1757.

Even as early as the time of Cromwell the Fifth Monarchy movement appeared as a religio-political party devoted to 'King Jesus' and ready to fight in order to prepare the world for His coming. In Germany at Elberfeld the Ronsdorf sect, founded in 1726, included a group of people who held themselves in readiness for the revelation of the new kingdom from heaven in the year 1730. The Shaker communities which trace their origin to Ann Lee, who emigrated from England to America in 1774, consisted of communistic groups who lived in the expectation of the near end of the world and the early return of Christ.[1] In the next century under the leadership of Christoph Hoffmann,[2] a new sect known as the Friends of the Temple, or People of God, emerged in Germany. Believing that Christ was about to return, they proposed to rebuild the Jerusalem temple in preparation for His coming. The beginning of the 19th cent. witnessed the rise of strong millennial sects in Great Britain. A movement was begun by Edward Irving, a popular Scottish Presbyterian preacher in London, which came to be known as the Catholic Apostolic Church (or the Irvingites). In 1823 Irving published a book[3] which attracted considerable attention and led to the holding of a series of yearly conferences at the home of Henry Drummond, a wealthy London banker living in Albury. From these beginnings grew the idea of forming a new spiritual Church ready to receive Christ at His coming—an event which Irving had predicted for the year 1864.[4] A kindred movement arising in Ireland and England between the years 1827 and 1831 received the name of Plymouth Brethren (or Derbyites). Its aim was to restore the simplicity and purity of primitive Christianity in preparation for Christ's imminent return. An elaborate scheme of events to take place in connexion with the end of the world was derived from the imagery of Daniel and Revelation.[5]

The year 1830 marks the beginning in America of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (or Mormons). The founder, Joseph Smith, is alleged to have received a new revelation from God instructing him to found a new community that would constitute a present city of Zion ready for Christ when He returns to set up His millennial reign. In the meantime the spiritual gifts of apostolic times were to be revived, and the original conditions of life in the early Church were to be restored. This movement began at Fayette in the State of New York, but the sect finally settled down to await the advent of Christ at Salt Lake City in the State of Utah.[6] A group of adventist sects resulted from the work of William Miller of Low Hampton, New York. He began public preaching in 1831, boldly proclaiming that Christ would presently appear in visible form to establish His millennial reign. This event was first predicted for the year 1843, but was later postponed to 22nd Oct. 1844. The failure of this prediction led to dissensions, and a branch known as the 'Seventh-Day Adventists' was formed in 1845, while the original body took the name 'Evangelical Adventists.' A separatist body of Seventh-Day Adventists was organized in 1866, bearing the name 'Church of God.' The cause of separation was unwillingness on their part to regard one of their revered teachers, Mrs. Ellen Gould White, as an inspired prophetess. Another branch of adventists, formed in 1861, is known as 'Advent Christians.' Two kindred bodies are the 'Life and Advent Union,' organized in 1862, and the 'Age-to-Come Adventists,' organized in 1888. Of similarly recent origin is the Russellite movement, resulting from a propaganda of the late 'Pastor' C. T. Russell, who in 1886 began a series of volumes on the general subject of 'the millennial dawn.' He maintained that the return of Christ and the inauguration of the millennium had taken place invisibly in the year 1874, and the end of the world was to occur in 1914. His disciples interpret the outbreak of the world war in 1914 as the fulfilment of their founder's prediction.

8. Modern non-sectarian adventism. — During the last half century some of the most vigorous forms of adventist propaganda in Great Britain and America have been conducted, not by separate sects, but by leaders within the different Protestant communions. These teachers revel in the study of prophecy, particularly in the interpretation of Daniel and Revelation. When studied with the adventist insight, these books and other Scriptures are found to yield specific predictions of all the outstanding events in history. Fulfilments of Scripture in recent times are emphasized and used as justification for predicting the early return of Christ and other happenings incident to a catastrophic end of the world. In the year 1878 this type of interpretation received a strong stimulus in England from the publication of the widely used book of H. Grattan Guinness,[1] who, on the basis of an extensive reckoning of data, predicted that the end of the present world will occur not later than the year 1923. Contemporarily with the work of Guinness similar teachings were being advocated with vigour in America. In New York in 1878 a group of adventists representing membership in ten different Protestant bodies met for a 'prophetic conference.' An active literary propaganda on behalf of belief in the early advent of Christ was also begun, typical works of that time being J. A. Seiss, *The Last Times* (Philadelphia, 1878), and W. E. Blackstone, *Jesus is Coming* (New York, 1878, [31908]). Advocates of these opinions took fresh courage with the outbreak of the world war in 1914. The horrors of the war, readily suggesting the predictions of apocalyptic prophecy regarding the agonies of the last times, revived an expectation of the end of the world. In the autumn of 1917 a group of English clergymen issued a manifesto declaring that in their opinion the signs of the times gave clear indications that the visible return of the Lord was at hand. In Canada and the United States the same view found wide acceptance and was made the subject of numerous 'prophetic' conferences, tracts, and books.

See artt. ANTICHRIST, ESCHATOLOGY, PAROUSIA.

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S. J. CASE.

[1] See art. COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA, § 2.

[2] *Gesch. des Volkes Gottes*, Stuttgart, 1855, and *Mein Weg nach Jerusalem*, 2 vols., do. 1881–84.

[3] *Babylon and Infidelity foredoomed of God*, 2 vols., London, 1826.

[4] See art. IRVING AND THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

[5] See art. BRETHREN (Plymouth).

[6] See art. SAINTS, LATTER-DAY.

[1] *The Approaching End of the Age*, London, 1878, [10]1886.

SECRET SOCIETIES.

Introductory (J. A. MacCulloch), p. 287.
African (N. W. Thomas), p. 287.
American (H. B. Alexander), p. 303.
Chinese.—See Sects (Chinese).
Hindu.—See Thags.
Melanesian and Polynesian (J. A. MacCulloch), p. 306.

SECRET SOCIETIES (Introductory).—In whatever ways religious brotherhoods have been evolved in primitive societies, their main purpose, as at higher levels, has been to attain a closer link, on the part of those composing them, with the divinities, for the ultimate benefit of society. While the social units of the family, the clan, the tribe, have a protective value for those individuals within them and are usually consolidated with the help of religious and magical rites, additional protection and closer communion with divinity is sometimes sought by closer groupings of men, although the form of these groupings may have been determined by other causes (see below). Such fraternities are common among savage tribes. Their purpose is to ensure closer connexion with gods or spirits and greater power in dealing with them. Ritual performances at stated times are gone through. Some moral and religious teaching is connected with the initiatory rites. Such fraternities are frequently engaged in promoting law and order, all the more so because of the mystery which surrounds their actions. Admission is usually gained after severe and protracted initiations and by large payments. The element of mystery which surrounds the doings of these fraternities, their assemblies, and the actions of their members, is an essential feature of their existence in certain areas. It has added to the respect in which they are held and has led to the heightening of the mystery as a means of adding to the prestige and influence of the societies. With the aid of masks, dresses, and sacred objects which no uninitiated person may see with impunity, the members of the society show that they are in intimate relationship with gods or spirits or that these are actually among their ranks. Ultimately, where law and order are concerned, they rule by terror, with the natural result that their powers are abused. These fraternities are found mainly among the N. American Indians, with whom their religious functions are most in evidence, and among the Melanesians and W. African tribes, with whom the aspects of maintaining law and order are more apparent. They are also found in some parts of Polynesia.

Most students of these religious associations now believe that there is some connexion between them and the totemic clan system, especially in N. America. Where totemism is declining, or where the ritual of a totem clan is diffused among other clans, or where amalgamation of totemic clans has taken place, a new grouping may occur—the religious fraternity with ritual borrowed from that of the earlier clans. The connexion is genetic as well as psychological. F. Boas says:

'The close similarity between the clan legends and those of the acquisition of spirits presiding over secret societies, as well as the intimate relation between these and the social organization of the tribes, allow us to apply the same argument to the consideration of the growth of the secret societies, and lead us on to the conclusion that the same psychical factor that moulded the clans into their present shape has moulded the secret societies.'[1]

As the clan system loses its rigidity, the esoteric fraternity is made possible. At all events, as J. G. Frazer says, we can hardly doubt that the totem clan and the fraternity are akin.

[1] 'The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians,' *Report of U.S. Nat. Mus. for 1895*, Washington, 1897, p. 662.

'They have their root in the same mode of thought. That thought is the possibility of establishing a sympathetic relationship with an animal, a spirit, or other mighty being . . . from whom [a man] receives . . . a gift of magical power.'[1]

But these fraternities have some connexion also with the wider tribal organization, especially, according to Webster, where the government of the tribe by headmen is passing over to a more autocratic form of government by chiefs. Here the societies, as in Africa and Melanesia, provide social restraints and enforce law. The point of connexion here as well as with the totemic clan is the elaborate ritual of initiation at puberty to tribal or totemic mysteries, which occurs also as a main aspect of these fraternities. All were once initiated, and all are sometimes still initiated into the lower grades of the association. But sometimes membership in all the grades is limited, as it certainly is in the upper grades which possess the inner mysteries and 'control the organization in their own interests.'[2] The grades now correspond to the system of age-classifications with their respective initiations, as found where no such fraternities yet exist. The real difference between totem-clan and fraternity is that the latter ignores the rigid limits of the former. The totem system is hereditary—a man is born into his totem clan and the members are kinsmen. The fraternity may be partly hereditary, but far more usually entrance to it is not dependent on birth, the members are not necessarily kinsmen, but voluntary associates. Admission depends on purchase, on a man's status or prowess, or on the connexion between a candidate and the spirit-guardian of the group, usually through a vision.

In totemism and tribal organization we find much that is common to the secret associations and *vice versa—e.g.*, age-classifications, on the one hand, and grades, on the other; the secret lodge; the *sacra* (dresses, masks, ritual objects, the bull-roarer which frightens off non-members of totem-kin or religious association); elaborate initiation rites; and the possession of supernatural power by the members, generally used for the public good.[3]

In parts of Melanesia where totemism flourishes the fraternity is unknown; where it does not exist, the latter is found.[4] Similarly the fraternities of the Pueblo Indians spring directly from the union of totemic clans into the tribe, the clans still existing as fraternities and preserving their ancient ritual, but adding new members from without the clan. 'The snake dance is simply a form of clan totemism having special modifications, due to environment, to fit the needs of the Hopi.'[5]

LITERATURE.—This is mentioned in the notes. See also A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 109 ff.; L. Frobenius, *Die Masken und Geheimbünde Afrikas*, Halle, 1898.

J. A. MacCULLOCH.

SECRET SOCIETIES (African).—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—**1. Definition.**—In its strictest sense the term 'secret society' is applied in Africa to the body of persons concerned in the admission, by means of initiation ceremonies, of youths (or maidens) to full tribal or adult rights. The words are also applied to purely religious confraternities (which often serve social ends), to bodies with mixed religious and social functions, and to purely social organizations. Any survey of the facts must reckon not only with this looseness of termi-

[1] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 273.
[2] H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908, pp. 75, 83, 93.
[3] Cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 547; Webster, 'Totem Clans and Secret Associations in Australia and Melanesia,' *JRAI* xli. [1911] 483.
[4] Webster, *JRAI* xli. 499, 505.
[5] J. W. Fewkes, *19 RBEW* (1900), p. 1009.

nology, but also with the circumstance that a society which is secret in one area may be found in another with precisely the same functions, rites, and general environment, save that the element of secrecy is lacking.

It will be seen in the course of the survey that the features which bring the societies to a common denomination are not any community of function, but the identity, from a formal point of view, of the rites of the associations which practise initiation or make it a condition of entry into the society, and the identity of the character of the relations which these societies, in respect of one or more points, maintain, as a rule, between themselves and the profane world. The secrecy which they uphold as a means of separating themselves from the non-initiated may refer to almost any point in the complex. Primarily, no doubt, it is to the non-public nature of the rites of initiation that the term refers, or to the veil which is drawn over the nature of the proceedings of fully-initiated members; but it may imply no more than the knowledge of a password or other sign of the duly admitted associate of a confraternity, or the limitation of membership to one or other sex, or even the use of a mask or masks by one or more members, when they appear in public.

It must be borne in mind that for a society with social or political aims secrecy is well-nigh indispensable. Such a society, especially where, as is normally the case, the power, by the operation of a system of age grades, of seniority by purchase, or in some other way, is concentrated in the hands of the few, is in reality a long step in the direction of aristocratic government; the secrecy in which its deliberations are wrapped not only enhances its power by confining the knowledge of its projects to a limited circle, but also casts a glamour round it, which tends to make it more formidable by obscuring the real limits of its power; add to this the fact that supernatural allies are claimed by or ascribed to such a society, and there is no further need to look for explanations of their common element of secrecy.

The same considerations apply to the more purely religious associations; and to them must be added the fact that the right to prepare a charm, to use a spell, to call upon a deity, or to officiate as a priest is a form of wealth, jealously guarded and purchasable at a price. Diviners, doctors, and priests, even more than the ordinary man, have an interest in keeping their secrets inviolate; and it is not surprising to find that their attitude is that of possessors of a trade secret, to be divulged only to those who themselves become members of the gild. In the Ibo area we find, in fact, that the blacksmith and the doctor, like the ordinary man, form their own societies and admit candidates under like conditions; indeed the process of equalization has gone so far that the *ozo* ('blacksmith') title is simply the highest in the hierarchy and does not imply any expert knowledge of the blacksmith's craft.

There is, however, another reason for the secrecy with which many societies surround themselves; and it is perhaps the original reason. All rites of initiation, all membership of any society whatsoever, imply a certain amount of separation from the outside world, a certain affiliation to a new world; this aspect is specially prominent where it is a question of admitting a youth to full tribal rights, a rite expressed from the native standpoint in the guise of a belief in his death and resurrection in the initiation bush. Rites of sacralization imply separation from the profane world; the separated person becomes tabu, for he is a danger to those who do not share his sanctity and is himself endangered by contact with the outside world, until he is restored to it by rites of desacralization.

This ground for secrecy may also play a part where to our eyes purely political considerations are concerned. The paramount chiefs of Sierra Leone undergo a period of separation, just as do youths in their progress to manhood, before they assume the reins of power; this is, however, an intrusion, from the European point of view, of the religious sphere into the realm of politics.

2. Sources. — It is generally recognized that anthropological data collected by the casual voyager are far from reliable even in matters which, so to speak, lie on the surface. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of our material on secret societies fails to attain anything like a reasonable standard of accuracy; for not only is the traveller as a rule debarred from actually seeing what he undertakes to report, but the information which he gathers, usually through an interpreter, from the native population is of necessity derived from non-members where a rule of secrecy is imposed upon a society; and it only needs a little experience in such matters to discover that the wildest reports as to the powers of members are current in the mass of the population. Where the observer has confined himself to a record of the simple occurrences that passed under his own eyes, he may indeed attain a higher standard of accuracy; but his account is inevitably one-sided. It is clear that we have only inadequate accounts of Mumbo Jumbo (Mama Dhiombo); inquiry must show that he acts as a representative of a society, of which he may be the most conspicuous, but is not necessarily the most important, member: his duties are not confined to those appearances which have struck the observer; for he exercises functions inside the society; he may be the operator at the festivals of circumcision or excision.[1] In any case he is only a portion of the institution; our descriptions fall as far short of the truth as would the observations of a traveller who described the functions of the man in possession without mentioning that his authority is delegated, that he is the humble embodiment of the judicial power of the State.

A conspicuous example of the errors into which some authors have fallen is afforded by Golbéry's account of Poro;[2] he says that it is found among five Fula-Susu peoples between the Sierra Leone River and Cape Mount. His location is accurate; but the tribes are neither Fula nor Susu; nothing seems to have been recorded of any society among the Fula, who probably have not in the area mentioned by Golbéry even the isolated villages found in the Timne country. The Susu are separated by the Timne, Limba, and Koranko from the area mentioned; of these three tribes the only one which has Poro is the Timne; but the Timne areas in which the society is found are not those in contact with the Susu; and it is certain that the Timne themselves have borrowed Poro; finally, the Susu society is the well known Simo, now decadent.

II. *DISTRIBUTION.*—In the survey of societies which follows nearly all those for which we have full reliable evidence are noticed; but they are scarcely a tithe of those mentioned by the authorities or known on good evidence to exist. Secret societies appear to abound in French Niger territory and Upper Senegal, but we have so far only a summarized statement of their nature. They are equally numerous in Senegambia and French Guinea; a score of them can be mentioned by name as existing in Sierra Leone—not of course all so important as Poro and Bundu; and we have good accounts of one or two societies of the Kru. From Liberia to the Slave Coast there is a great gap either in our knowledge or in the chain of secret societies, which are represented by only a few religious associations like those which practise the cults of Abirewa and Yewe. Much remains to

[1] Cf. below, II. 3.

[2] S. M. X. de Golbéry, *Fragmens d'un voyage en Afrique*, Paris, 1802, i. 114–122.

be learnt of the Yoruba societies, and most of those of the Edo peoples are mere names. The populous Ibo area, again, is comparatively bare of societies, if we except the dancing and gymnastic maskers and the 'titles'—a kind of age grade in which a rise in rank is attained by payment, often on a considerable scale. From Calabar through Kamerun to the Congo we find societies in swarms: they are found south of the Congo also, but to what extent is not clear. In the interior the Baya and other tribes have initiation schools, and secret societies are reported from the west of Tanganyika. Initiation schools exist among the Yao, Baronga, Basuto, and many other S. African tribes. The Ruanda have an apparently isolated secret society of a religious type; age grades are fully developed among the Masai, the Wanyika, and other tribes of the east, and among the Kru in the west; they are also found among the Ibo, the Edo, and many tribes of the Guinea Coast, but play a smaller part in the life of the people; the grades of secret societies, in so far as these embrace the majority of the population, may be in effect age grades, though arrived at in a different way.

For an adequate survey of the secret societies we must consider them not only from the point of view of outward form and function, but also in their origin, both topographical and psychological. For such a study the materials are at present too scanty; we can only sketch the distribution of some of the main types.

1. Poro.—The Poro society is found in three tribes—Bulom, Mendi, and Timne; but it seems clear that it is indigenous only in the first, or possibly the first two, for it is not known over a considerable part of the Timne area. The Bulom people speak a language of the same type as the Timne—with classes of nouns and prefixes—but there is no doubt that they preceded the Timne in their occupation of the area; the Mendi are at present, linguistically, an offshoot of the Mandingo group, somewhat aberrant in type; but it is more than possible that the main stock of the Mendi was originally allied to the Bulom and drifted away from them in language owing to foreign influence. Another member of the Bulom family, Kisi, has already made some progress in the same direction. It may be regarded as fairly probable that the Poro society has not come to this area from without, but is a native institution; the mention of *Purrus campus* by Ptolemy[1] suggests a great antiquity for it.

(*a*) *Bulom.*—There is little reliable information as to Bulom Poro; but it appears to differ considerably from Mendi Poro.

The *yafe* is said to eat the candidates, whose heads he first breaks; when they are about to come out, the *yafe's* belly is beaten, *i.e.*, a heap of clothes is made and tied tightly, and dragged round the town by the members, who beat it with sticks: some of them call on the *yafe*, who remains in the bush, to hand over the children whom he has taken. The boys are then carried into the town, and the adult members return to the bush; here they uproot trees or break off branches, to represent the efforts of the *yafe* to escape. The boys are kept for three nights in a special house and then put in the *bari*, or meeting-house; they may now walk out accompanied by an initiated member, but must wear long caps to protect their heads, which are said to be very soft, and they must carry on conversation through their guide, for they are yet ignorant of the ordinary language. Finally they receive new names, and Taso (one of the dignitaries of the society and the speaker of the *yafe*) releases them from the restrictions and enables them to come into everyday life again.[2]

(*b*) *Mendi.*—An account of Mendi Poro (or Poi) is given by Alldridge.[3]

Candidates are brought or come to the 'bush' (*kamera*) and are introduced, through a mat door, by a messenger (*wujak*), who puts questions as to their ability to perform impossible feats, and after three attempts they are drawn inside; the bush is divided into compartments, and the same ceremony is gone through a second time. Here the candidate says which section of Poro he elects to join; there are three of these, divided in two cases into subsections; one is for chiefs and has the actual power, one for dignitaries, and one for the mass of the people. When the time comes for the candidates to reappear, the 'devil' marches round the town collecting gifts and then returns to the bush, where dead silence is kept for a time; it is said that the 'devil' has fainted. While he is in the town, all non-members must shut themselves in their houses; the 'devil' makes doleful sounds on a reed covered with spider's web, and these are explained by saying that the 'devil' is about to give birth to the candidates, for he becomes pregnant when they go into the bush. The twisted fern ropes worn by the boys are fastened in the top branches of trees when they come out, and it is said that the 'devil' has gone that way to the sky. When the boys come out, they are allowed to seize live stock, etc., for one day only.

One of the Poro dignitaries is known as Taso; he wears a hat decorated with the skulls and thigh-bones of his predecessors and surmounted by an inverted cone of feathers. When Taso dies, he must be buried in the bush; as no woman may see his dead body, the women withdraw from the town till the funeral is over. Certain women, however, who have fallen sick through penetrating the mysteries of Poro, are initiated into the society, and henceforth enjoy certain privileges.

Poro is said to be put upon fruits and other objects when medicine or some symbol of the society is put on or near them to forbid their use.

(*c*) *Timne.*—There are three kinds of initiation ceremonies in the Timne Poro society, corresponding to the occasions when candidates are introduced.

(1) The first form is used when the *banika* (a screen of grass on the right of the road leading from the village, with the *fari*, a similar screen opposite to it) is to be rebuilt. Quite young children are eligible, and the rites last only one day, or, at most, two or three. The messenger, Raka, seizes the candidate, who is known as *ansuku akbah*: another name is *egbipe Araka* ('captive of Raka'), but this is a forbidden term. Boys initiated in this way receive no Poro marks; it is probable that they have previously been circumcised; but, if not, it would be necessary to perform the operation as a part of the ceremonies. Raka usually comes in the day-time to carry off the boy, who remains behind the *banika* till about six in the evening. When the rebuilding is finished, water is brought, the boys are washed, and loin-cloths and kerchiefs are put on them; after they have been perfumed, they are taken back to the town and sit in the *bari* for two or three nights, holding *kasimori* (short canes with cloth on each end) in their hands. Rice is brought, and the new members are shown by the initiates (*ansimori*) how to eat, for they pretend to put the *kasimori* into the rice and to be quite helpless, at any rate in some areas.

(2) The second form is also an abbreviated rite; the candidates must be at least five or six years old; it is used when some important person is performing ceremonies and is known as *bankalo*, from the name of the house to which the candidates are taken by already initiated men and boys, who push them three times and at the fourth attempt make them enter, right foot first. When they are taken to the Poro bush, the candidates lie face downwards and are marked: cold ashes are used to outline the herring-bone pattern which is cut between the shoulders with a hook; this is called *angkal* and should meet on the breast-bone; near the waist, at the foot of the line down the spine, is a small triangle. A new name is then given to the candidate, who is called *sokokant* (Poro member in the bush) or by the women *sogbaninga*. Each night they return from the Poro bush to the *bankalo* till the marks are healed, which should take about a week. When they are to be taken out, the door of the house is opened at 6 a.m. and each candidate holds by the waist the one in front of him; the leader is called Banabum; all but him stoop forward as they proceed to the *banika*. Here they stand facing the older members and are washed and dressed as in the former rite. Instruction in Poro law has already been given. They return to the *bari*, holding *kasimori*, and sleep there two or three nights, after which they are released.

(3) The main Poro bush is known as *amporo dif* ('Poro kills'); the candidates are seized by Raka or the *krifi* ('devil'), and the first boy taken is called *atolpi amporo*; a guardian (*kumra*) is appointed to look after each lot of boys; only wholly uninitiated persons are taken, not those who have undergone either of the previous rites; no woman or uninitiated person may see them, and they live in the *kamambwi* (house in the Poro bush) behind the *banika*. Poro at this stage is called *amfok*, 'wrapped' (*i.e.* not public). They are told by Pa Kashi (=Taso) that the *krifi* has eaten them and that nothing may be told to the women; in this form of initiation the candidate is not pushed in through the door by the *ansimori* (initiates). After some months in the bush they make hats of the inner bark of a tree (*Thalia geniculata*, Linn. or *Palisota thyrsiflora*, Benth.) put in the ashes and plaited; taking boys out of Poro

[1] iv. 1. 10.

[2] See also *Freetown Royal Gazette*, v. [1825] 225, vi. [1826] 188; *Proc. Roy. Irish Acad.*, 3rd ser., xv. 36 f.

[3] *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, London, 1901, pp. 124–138.

is called *atai asondir* ('drying of the hats'). Poro now ceases to be *amfok*, and the candidates wear black (in some localities white) cloth. They come out holding each other by the waist like the *ambankalo* and are taken out in the same way; they are now *ansimori*.

Women who have got mixed up with Poro are also initiated and receive marks; only married women appear to be eligible. They are called *mambori* ('tortoise-shell') and receive new names like men.

The Poro bush is usually on the road to the west of a village, but may also lie between the two parts into which many villages, especially in Muhammadan areas, are divided. The dignitaries of the society differ from chiefdom to chiefdom.

In one place, in addition to the chief, who is the head, the following personages figure in the rites: Sumano, Kagbinti, Faramancha, Kashi, Yamba, Raka Banabum; there may be more than one of the lower grades. Sumano is elected by all the members and initiated into his functions at the *borom-asar* (hut for the worship of ancestors, with stones representing the dead); he appears to be the principal judge when a case comes before the Poro society. Kashi is said to be chosen by his predecessor and initiated at the *borom-asar*, and he offers sacrifices to consecrate his cap, which is adorned with the skulls and thigh-bones of offenders against Poro law. He is a doctor, and is said to help women in difficult labour; he is subject to certain tabus; he is said to have a kind of magical fire that will fly through the air and kill people, provided he knows where his intended victim is; he must not lie down till this *tumpan* returns, or he may be killed by it himself. Raka's body is spotted with white clay, and he carries a fibre shield and a sword.

The central figure of the society, the *krifi*, has no distinctive dress; he speaks through a horn of corkwood with spider's web over the hole; he is said to enter a box only large enough for a child. They say that the *krifi* eats candidates or gives birth to them, and, when Soko (Poro) men run, they say the *krifi's* belly shakes. He is said to have a son, Bunu, who is always crying out.

Poro members appear (i.) in order to dance or plunder the property of an offender, (ii.) to bury a member, and (iii.) to seize candidates; they accompany the *krifi*. The members have also a certain amount of control over the chief. In the Timne country the Poro society (and the corresponding Ragbenle society in non-Poro areas) is the upholder of the chief's power. Singularly few tabus are incumbent on the members, beyond the prohibition to communicate Poro secrets; they may not abuse a member as *limpi* ('uncircumcised'), nor throw water over one, nor tell one that he has not been initiated. The only other tabu is on the use of the old name of a man. Of the important legislative and judicial functions of Poro little is known beyond the information, not necessarily very reliable, given by Golbéry and other old writers. Poro appears also to play a certain rôle as a mutual assistance society, and a member can call upon his fellow-members for aid in difficult work, precisely as in other parts a man can call upon those of his own age grade.

Although there is some reason to believe that the Human Leopard society stands in some relation to Poro, where both exist in the same area, it is certain that Poro is found beyond the limits of the Leopard society, and equally certain that the Human Leopard society exists to-day in areas, like the Bulom shore, where Poro is unknown. The Timne tradition clearly points to their having obtained Poro from the Bulom, who occupy the coast south of Freetown, but have now dwindled on the coast to the north till few if any communities exist that have held themselves distinct from the invading Timne. The non-existence of Poro in this area at the present day suggests that it is to the Mendi that we should look for the origin of the society. Some light may perhaps be thrown on the matter when examples of the secret Poro language are available for study.

How far the whole male population was in former days enrolled in the society it is difficult to judge. At the present day the spread of Muhammadanism and Christianity exercises a restraining influence; but even in non-Muhammadan areas in former days, as the rules regarding secrecy imply, there must have been men who were not members of the society.

2. Cannibal societies.—Although the Human Leopard society is commonly regarded as a thing apart, it is merely one of many magico-religious societies; its rites have developed in a special direction. It has been said that this society is not more than fifty years old, and this may well be true of it in its present form; but the *borfima* was originally a Mendi war-medicine formed of the viscera of dead enemies, to which a cult was addressed. At the present day the *borfima* is composed in part of the remains of human victims, in part of other objects; blood from a candidate is rubbed on the *borfima*; he takes an oath by it to preserve secrecy; fat from the *borfima* is also rubbed on his skin together with the mashed leaf of a tree called *nikili*; the mark of the society is cut upon the upper thigh or the buttocks. Victims are sometimes provided by members, sometimes seized by a man dressed in a leopard-skin; the corpse is shared out, portions being sent to absent members, but not farther than can be reached before daybreak; a man who has a *borfima* must eat of the victim; others can do so if they wish; as a rule a man who has no *borfima* does not touch the blood of the victim. The head of the victim is the perquisite of the chief; generally speaking, chiefs join the society in order to obtain *borfima*, which is believed to bring favour with the government and riches; the victim's head gives them authority over their people.

A cannibal society of another type is seen in the Nga of the Aduma (Ogowe River), which exists for the purpose of eating the bodies of dead members, if our information is to be relied on.[1]

3. Tenda.—In French Guinea the Tenda have secret religious societies which form the sole means of government; there appears to be no doubt that their object is to render worship to certain divinities and to obtain their protection; from one point of view the term 'secret society' is a misnomer; for the whole tribe and even slaves who have been reared in the country are initiated, practically without exception. There is, however, an element of secrecy within the society, for there are three grades, apart from the dignitaries, and the lower grades are said to be completely ignorant of the rites of the higher grades; there are, moreover, one or more secret languages. It is uncertain how far women are initiated; but, when members are on the march, they utter a distinctive cry to warn the women of their coming; it may therefore be inferred that they are at most incompletely initiated.

The three degrees are distinguished by their dress or ornaments; admission to the lowest grade coincides with the rite of circumcision, about the age of nine or ten, so that the society appears to partake of the character of a puberty group as well as of a religious association. But the rite of initiation is largely a family matter in the case of males. Admission to the second degree follows about the age of fifteen; the candidates are absent in the bush for several weeks and on their return they are separated from their families, with whom they have hitherto resided, and take up their quarters near the chief. The rite is begun by a sacrifice and consists in the tatuing upon the cheek of the tribal mark; after this any man of the village of the candidate may beat him with a stick; each village which uses the *opeda* (initiation ground) then marshals its candidates, and on their way home they are again liable to be beaten; they are lodged in a hut some 200 yards from the village, and the previously initiated members of their grade await them there. When, a fortnight later, the new initiate returns to the village, he is privileged for the first six days to insult and beat any woman whom he meets. The admission to this grade constitutes the real initiation into the ranks of the adult males, for the youths are told in advance that it involves death and subsequent resurrection; promotion to the next grade takes place when the new initiates reach the hut mentioned above: there is therefore only one group of the second grade in existence at any one time, viz. those who were initiated at the last gathering in the *opeda*; they are promoted as soon as the next group

[1] See also below, 15, Ngil.

of the first grade is advanced to the second grade, which does not happen every year. The head of the society in each village is known as *nemba*, but he never appears in public in this capacity; his agents are the *lukuta*; the *akore* are another class of functionary and, like the *lukuta*, are to be found in each village, from two to eight in number according to its size. The *lukuta*, who may not be seen by women save at certain seasons, appear in public in a bark dress which completely covers them; their function is to carry out the decisions of the *nemba*, to supervise the sacrifices offered by the women before the farming season, to secure the observance of customary law in criminal matters, etc. The *akore*, on the other hand, wear no disguise, but must observe silence when they proceed on a mission; they are concerned with quarrels between husband and wife, but an important part of their functions is to accompany girls after the ceremony of initiation, which consists in the excision of the clitoris, performed by a man.

It must also be remarked that, though the chief of a village is not necessarily one of the dignitaries, he plays an important rôle; it is probable that he nominates the dignitaries, and he can certainly issue orders to them. Moreover, among the Bassari, one of the constituent tribes of the Tenda nation, communal houses are provided for the *faleg* (second grade), the *dyarar* (third grade), and the *dyarar asonkaf* (older unmarried men of this grade). The girls of the village are free to enter these houses and pass the night there, but whether only after initiation at the age of seventeen is not made clear. War and even simple quarrels are forbidden when the initiation rites are proceeding, in the months of June and July.[1]

4. **Belli-Paaro.**—For the Vai, Gola, and adjacent tribes we have not only the good modern account of Büttikofer,[2] but also narratives by Barbot[3] and Dapper,[4] which go back about 250 years and show us how little change has come over the institution in the intervening centuries. Belli-Paaro is the Vai name for the boys' initiation school, to which the Sande of the girls corresponds; and, though we learn from Dapper of judicial proceedings and ordeals with which are associated the *Belli-mo* (*i.e.* 'Belli man [or priest]') and others, it seems clear that the institution is primarily an initiation school; that this is so may be inferred from the fact that Belli-Paaro and Sande are treated as co-ordinate and complementary.

Boys may enter the bush of their own free will; otherwise they are carried off by the *sova* or *soba*, who is perhaps known to the women under the name *njana* and appears to be regarded as an ancestral spirit. Circumcision is usually performed in the first year of life (by a woman), but a boy not yet circumcised must undergo the rite on entering the Belli. He is informed that he is killed by the spirit when he enters the bush, but returns to life again and receives a new name and the tribal marks. There is a considerable amount of real education, not only in dance and song, with, perhaps, acrobatics, but also in the use of weapons, in the endurance of hunger, thirst, and pain, together with a knowledge of the tribal religion and customary law. Residence in the bush may last from some months to several years, and the release takes place at the end of the rainy season, in October to November, when there is abundance of food for the celebrations. When they come out, the boys wear bark caps, which come down over their eyes; they pretend to be ignorant of the life to which they return. The *sova* appears in a leaf dress and wooden mask and performs all sorts of dances.

No one who has not been through the bush enjoys civil rights, according to Dapper, who also says that the school is held only once in twenty or twenty-five years; he adds that the candidates are killed and roasted in the bush and incorporated in the company of spirits. If a man is accused of theft, murder, or other crime, the *Belli-mo* administers the poison ordeal to him.[5]

5. **Kru.**—Although the Kru tribes lying to the east of the Vai and Gola have given up circumcision and have no schools of initiation, their territory is not without interest from the point of view of secret societies. In the first place, they have a well-marked system of age grades, under which two classes, the patriarchs and the Sedibo, are the legislature and executive of the nation, with classes of youths and boys below them; admission to all except the lowest class is gained by payment, but the fees are small, and practically every male joins the Sedibo as soon as he marries. Side by side with these classes are secret societies for magico-religious and judicial purposes, such as the hunting out of witches, the detection of thieves, etc. The Kwi-Iru ('children of departed spirits') admit males of all ages except the very young; a 'father' presides over the society, who is not visible or known except to members and who wears a mask during the day. The society comes out at night to find witches, who strip naked and visit houses or dance upon the graves of their victims. Persons found wandering abroad are seized by the Kwi-Iru and put on the top of a house in readiness for the sass-wood ordeal next morning; it is of interest to note that this is one of the functions of the *Belli-mo* among the Vai. The Kwi-Iru society is employed by the Sedibo in its official capacity.

A second society is known as the Deyabo; Deya men are said to be possessed.

A novitiate of three months is necessary, during which continence must be practised; a grass loincloth is the only article of clothing, and the candidate eats and sleeps apart. As a test a fowl's head is cut off and its blood put upon the candidate's eyes; the head is then thrown into the bush, and the candidate must find it, under the penalty of having his symptoms of possession—apparent death, gnashing of teeth, etc.—declared to be unreal or simulated. After passing this test he changes his dress and occupies himself with the manufacture of charms, the discovery of thieves, etc. The societies are in fact associations of diviners such as are common in other parts of Africa.[1]

6. **French territories.** — We have little or no detailed information as to the secret societies in the French territories of the Niger and Upper Senegal; but M. Delafosse[2] has published an excellent summary, which makes it clear that they are numerous in this area. Delafosse classifies them under three heads: (1) social and non-secret, (2) social and religious at once, and (3) purely religious.

(1) The first class celebrates its ceremonies in public, though its meetings for discussion are private, but the societies embraced in it correspond so exactly to the secret societies proper of other areas that it is necessary to include this kind of society in our survey. Each society is under a genius; it is composed of two or more age grades; it is confined to one sex and concerns itself with circumcision or excision rites. Thus there is one grade for the uncircumcised, who dance dressed in leaves or grass and use the bull-roarer, known as the 'dog' of Ntomo (the name of the society); above them comes the grade of the circumcised, much more important; the adult males form another grade, and it is incumbent upon them to assist each other in all cases; there is a very powerful grade composed of men in middle life; and finally the grade of old men. The women, on the other hand, have only two grades.

(2) In the case of religious societies grades are unknown, all members being on the same level. There are special burial rites for members, who have their own passwords; women are admitted, but only rarely. The rites are semi-secret and confined to initiates; but some ceremonies are public. To this class belongs the Mandingo society known as Kore, which exists for sexual purposes; among the Senufo is a society which prepares its members by a seven years' initiation for authority in the tribe.

(3) The last class is composed of societies devoted

1 *Rev. d'ethnog. et de soc.* iv. [1913] 31 ff.

2 *Reisebilder aus Liberia*, Leyden, 1890, ii. 302–308.

3 A. and J. Churchill, *Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1744–46, v. (containing Barbot, *Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea*), 126 f.

4 *Description de l'Afrique*, Amsterdam, 1686, pp. 268–270.

5 Frobenius, *Die Masken und Geheimbünde Afrikas*, pp. 116 f., 120.

1 H. H. Johnston, *Liberia*, London, 1906, ii. 1068, 1072; J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, do. 1856, p. 129.

2 *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, 1st ser., Paris, 1912, iii. 119.

to certain cults or to the practice of certain magico-religious rites. Some are confined to one sex, some initiate both sexes indiscriminately; some are absolutely secret, some secret for women only, while non-initiated men may follow their doings. As examples of these societies may be mentioned the Mandingo Tyi-wara, which practises the non-secret cult of the genius of agriculture, and the Koma society, formed to resist enchanters (*subɑ*). Masks are worn by the representatives of the genius and his satellites; special instruments of music are in use, and the meetings are held at night in the sacred bush.

In the absence of detailed information it is useless to attempt to discover the centre or centres of origin of these different types or to speculate as to the ethnical conditions that have given rise to them.

7. Yewe. — If initiation societies exist on the Gold and Ivory Coasts, little or nothing has been recorded of them, and the almost complete absence of masks from these areas supports the view that there is a real gap in the distribution of societies. In Jaman masks are used in connexion with the cult of Sakrobudi,[1] and girls are dedicated to certain 'fetishes' at Krobo.[2] In Dahomey, however, an important religious secret society took its rise, which has since spread over parts of Tongoland. This is the cult of Yewe, which appears to be a mixture of the worship of Xebieso, Voduda, and Agbui. The area is remarkable for the number of different languages spoken in it, often by quite small communities, and it is probable that the secret languages, of which more than one are used by the priests according to their original divinity, are in reality survivals of otherwise extinct local forms of speech preserved for a special purpose. Both sexes are admitted to the society, which has three grades: Husunuo for males, Yewesiwo and Vodusio for females, and Hundeo or Hunovio for both sexes.

The initiation ceremony consists in drinking water; certain emblems are also exhibited, such as a piece of iron wrapped in a cloth, which represents Yewe, a double axe, the emblem of So, a ram's horn, a holed stone, a long stone, and a bent iron. These are dipped in holy water, and the candidate is touched with them; the drinking of the water is sometimes explained as the taking of the god into the body of the candidate. A female candidate is shaved, washed, and rubbed with oil; she then receives a new cloth and a new name in place of her old one; during her sojourn of six months in the bush she learns the use of poisons and the secret Yewe language, known as Agbuigbe, which is said to be spoken as an ordinary language in Avleketi, near Dahomey. When the time comes for the candidate's release, a feast is made, and presents are offered to the priest.

It is incumbent upon members to assist each other in every way and to inform against all who speak ill of Yewe and his followers. Among the reasons which lead people to enter the service of Yewe is the freedom from restraint and even from ordinary law enjoyed by the members, who thus escape, *e.g.*, the penalty for non-payment of debt, which consisted in being buried alive or, at best, in death. If it is desired to compel an influential man to join the community, a small pot is buried in one of his fields; when this is dug up later, he has no choice but to become a priest. From motives of policy the chiefs endeavour to stand well with the Yewe society, even if they are not members. If a non-member insults a female member, the latter becomes *alaga* (a wild woman); she lives in the bush all day, returning to the Yewe house at night; if she is not 'brought home' soon, she is said to change into a leopard, and her enemy is soon compelled to make terms. In like manner the aid of Yewe may be invoked in legal cases by throwing over the defendant's head a ring made of oil-palm and other leaves; this compels the Yewe priest to take the matter up, and as a result the loser is compelled to pay three times the amount of the original demand, which is extorted from him, if necessary, by torture.

There is no doubt that the Yewe cult is alien to a large part of the area in which it prevails, and the complex is probably of comparatively recent origin; but there is good reason to believe that some at least of the elements which go to form it are of considerable antiquity.[1] This rise of a new cult is by no means an isolated phenomenon; for in recent years there have been similar manifestations on the Gold Coast, where the Abirewa 'fetish' gained great influence for a time; in like manner in Nigeria the cult of Isinegba has come down from the north. There can be no doubt that, generally speaking, this spread of a religion is a common occurrence in Africa; but, whereas one cult attains great influence and social importance, another, like the cult of Esu in the Yoruba-Edo area, has little beyond a kind of magical significance and brings no further profit to its votaries than the sense of protection against the evils of this life which the putting up of the image of Esu outside the house brings.

From the point of view of the present article, stress must be laid upon the fact that, before a man can take up the worship of a deity, a rite of some sort must as a rule be observed, which may range from a full-blown ceremony of initiation, parallel in every respect to that of an initiation society proper, to a simple transfer of a piece of earth in a pot to symbolize the transference to a new owner of the right to call upon the divinity represented by the piece of earthenware. The explanation of the secrecy of the rites lies on the surface: the social importance of the cult is increased and the authority of its officers enhanced by shutting the door upon the outside world.

It is perhaps not without significance that on the Gold Coast and in adjacent areas, where secret societies of the ordinary type appear to be wanting, these mushroom religions seem to attain their greatest development.[2]

8. Ogboni, Oro, Egũgũ.—In the Yoruba area we find a political secret society supported by a secondary organization with police duties; the latter has a parallel in the Zangbeto society of Porto Novo and more or less close analogues in parts of the Ibo area and the Congo. The government of the country is in the hands of the Ogboni, or elders; they are the heads of important families, but are accepted for membership only if reliable and capable men; the rank is said to descend from the oldest brother to the youngest, provided the latter is old enough and otherwise qualified. The Eda image is the amulet of the society, and a human sacrifice is offered on it at the initiation of a candidate, who is sometimes called upon to drink the blood of the victim. She is their goddess and is equated with Odudua of Benin city. The Oro society, composed of males only, carries out the decisions of the Ogboni, more especially among the Egba; members indicate their coming by swinging the bull-roarer, and, as soon as they hear this, all women must shut themselves up in their houses under pain of death, though they may see the instrument by day and even carry it. Criminals are usually disposed of in such a way that nothing more is seen of them than their clothes, high up in the branches of forest trees, where they were torn off as Oro hurried their wearers through the air;

[1] R. A. Freeman, *Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman*, London, 1898, p. 148.

[2] D. Kemp, *Nine Years at the Gold Coast*, London, 1898, p. 165.

[1] H. C. Monrad, *Bidrag til en Skildring af Guinea-Kysten*, Copenhagen, 1822, describes the proceedings of a woman who feels herself insulted by her husband or some other person, and they bear a close resemblance to those of the *alaga*.

[2] *Zeitschr. für afrikan. und ocean. Sprachen*, iii. [1897] 157–185; Frobenius, *loc. cit.*

in this case Oro is said to have devoured the bodies. When the body is found on the ground in the bush, no one is allowed to bury it. The central figure of the Oro society wears a white mask and a long gown hung with shells; his voice is heard from morning till night on the days on which he appears.

Egũgũ is another secret society of the Yoruba and, according to some, is associated with the Zangbeto of Porto Novo.[1] Egũgũ appears at an annual festival, a kind of All Souls' Day, and also at burial ceremonies, and is the police power of the Yoruba;[2] in the territory of neighbouring tribes the mask also appears as a kind of diversion, without any significance, for the purpose of obtaining money for its wandering owners. The mere appearance of a mask does not justify us in speaking of a secret society; in the Ibo territory the *maun* come out at burial ceremonies, but there is nothing worthy of the name of a secret society associated with them, though all knowledge of the fact that the masker is only a man is kept in the strictest manner from the women of the tribe; when, a few years ago, the ritual prohibitions of a portion of the Ibo nation were abolished by sacrifices in the presence of the Ezenri, the one point which it appeared important to the men to retain was the concealment of the real nature of the *maun*, though among the prohibitions thus summarily abolished was that of marriage with one's sister and similar fundamental ordinances.

9. Ovia.—According to R. F. Burton,[3] Oro was in existence at Benin; but this seems to be a misinterpretation of what the author saw. Okiason or Akpoka was the name given to men who used to wander at night during a certain season of the year, carrying an axe or, according to another account, a hammer, with which they used to kill people to procure certain portions of the bodies with which the king made 'medicine.' There is, however, no evidence of the use of a mask by members of this body. It is perhaps more probable that what Burton saw was the Ovia celebrations, which Fawckner[4] saw at Gwatõ and described as the 'dance of the great devils,' adding that no one ventured out at night when they were about for fear of being killed or maltreated. As the Ovia society at the present day dances in public only in the day-time and performs nocturnal rites in the Ovia enclosure alone, with the exception of one night, it seems probable that the author was misled, if he did not confuse the Ovia members with the Okiason.

According to tradition, Ovia was a woman, the wife of a certain king of Yoruba land, who was hated by her mates; by a trick they caused her to fall into disfavour with her husband, who turned her away, whereupon she began to weep and melted into water. She ordered that no woman should know the secret of her cult or enter the Ovia camp; hence she is worshipped by men only, and women hold aloof from the rites, except on two occasions: when the ceremonies are about to begin, at the beginning of the dry season, women come to the camp of Ovia to rub the house; and on one night during the subsequent rites they enter the camp and sing while the men dance; they also understand, unofficially, the secret language which is spoken by the men whenever they are wearing their dresses. Although the mask of the chief figure of the society is known as the 'mother' mask, he is always addressed as 'my father,' and the women in their songs speak of him as *ogie* ('prince'); there is therefore some doubt as to the facts, and it would be rash to lay any stress for purposes of interpretation on either the male or the female character of the principal figure.

There are four grades in the society: a boy joins at the age of seven or eight and remains one year in Oyo, the first grade, paying in kind to the value of perhaps ten shillings; a sacrifice is offered, and the boy marks his face with chalk; he is henceforth an Owiovia ('son of Ovia'); he remains seven years in the second grade, Igbe, admission to which costs only sixpence; the other two grades, equally easily attained, are Ixino and Urewa. The head man of the village is usually but not necessarily the head of the society; the second man wears the Ovia hat and, on certain occasions, a net mask and other ritual apparel. He, like the third man in the society, is selected for his knowledge of the rites.

The camp of Ovia consists of an enclosure, a house, and a small screened portion of the bush, where the elders meet to discuss during the ceremonies. In the Ovia house are kept the musical sticks (*akpasiko*), bull-roarers (*emilovia*), and, when the rites are in progress, the dresses, consisting of long clothes with a net mask, and enormous hats decorated with red parrots' feathers. Both in the nocturnal dances and in the procession of the masked Ovia round the village, which women are allowed to see, prayers are offered for the welfare of the community, and a ceremony is performed, for male children only, to prevent them from suffering from convulsions; when the child is handed back to the mother, she pours water on his head; otherwise she may not touch him. In the other daylight dances the Ovia mask does not appear, but the other members dance in their hats and masks every morning and evening in their own village.

The Ovia society clearly differs in a marked degree from any of those which have hitherto come under notice; it wears masks but is not a bugbear for the women; it has neither legislative nor police functions; although Ovia receives a cult of a kind at ordinary times, a shrine being kept outside the house of such people as worship him (or her), the object of the annual celebration does not appear to be the recognition of a divinity, for the annual rites in honour of Ake, *e.g.*, largely made up of sacrifices, may be regarded as the normal type of this description of rite. There is some evidence for the view that the object is to avert evil and bring good, for all the supplications emphasize this aspect; but it seems improbable that any such customs could have grown up round such a nucleus. On the whole it appears more probable that the ceremonies are connected with the growth of crops, though next to no evidence can be produced in favour of this view; at most we can quote a passage in one of the songs to the effect that 'our prince shall grow like a young palm-tree.' In accordance with this interpretation is the saying that Ovia 'dies' when the ceremonies are at an end.

10. Other Edo societies.—Innumerable masks are found in various parts of the territory of the Edo-speaking peoples, some isolated, some associated with organized groups, some appearing in connexion with initiation ceremonies, some at certain seasons of the year, some on the occasion of funeral rites, some apparently quite sporadically; but few, if any, are of much significance, and little information has been or, probably, can be obtained about them; the masks are the property of individuals, who readily dispose of them for a few shillings apiece. Their local character is shown by the fact that at Otua, where, as elsewhere in this area, age grades are of some importance in the life of the community, only one quarter of the ten or twelve of which the town is composed has a certain set of highly decorative and somewhat costly masks, for use when, every three years, a new 'company' comes in. They dance at any time they please for the next three months, and women and children are not permitted to approach the *elimi* house; but beyond this there is no special element of secrecy.

At Fugar maskers, one male, the other female, appear at the initiation of girls, which consists merely in a festival to celebrate their putting on clothes for the first time; cowries are given to the maskers. The wearer of another mask is permitted to kill any goats that he sees, and this feature recalls the licence permitted to the newly-circumcised in many parts of W. Africa; it seems not improbable that such celebrations are only a faded reproduction of customs practised at an earlier date. The maskers are called *alimi* ('dead people').

11. Ibo societies.—When we pass eastwards to the Ibo area, masks are equally common; some are associated with burial rites and do not appear to

[1] *Annales de la propagation de la Foi*, v. [1831] 194.
[2] Frobenius, *loc. cit.*, and *Und Afrika Sprach*, Berlin, 1912, i. 55; Baudin, in *Les Missions catholiques*, xvi. [1884] 257.
[3] *Abeokuta and the Camaroons Mountains*, London, 1863, i. 195.
[4] *Narr. of Capt. James Fawckner's Travels on the Coast of Benin, W. Africa*, London, 1837.

belong to any organized society; others are worn by dancers, who have no functions, however, resembling those of the members of secret societies of other areas; all maskers appear to be known indiscriminately as *mauṅ* ('dead people'); many, if not all, of them appear during the day, and the only element of secrecy is the concealment of the knowledge of their identity from the women. So much of the Ibo life has been borrowed from Benin that we may conjecture that these masked figures do not represent anything that ever played a more important part in tribal life. It is possible, however, that the societies to which they may have belonged have been overshadowed by the rise of the custom of taking 'titles.' These correspond roughly to generation grades or age grades, for originally a man took his first title after the death of his father; by a series of changes, however, of which the tradition is preserved, a man rises from grade to grade by payment, the only limitation being that he must have attained maturity; but even in this case the rule is not universal; for, apart from the fact that a father may purchase a title for his son, some of the titles, or at any rate their material benefits, are inheritable. In practice the system of titles provides the most profitable and indeed the only method of investing money, if we except the purchase of wives; in a rich community like Awka the highest grade may cost hundreds of pounds, and, as all subsequent members contribute the like amount, naturally in kind, not money, and their instalments are shared among the existing members, the result is the creation of a system of annuities.

From another point of view, these titles correspond to trade gilds; for the highest grade is that of *ozo* ('blacksmith'); it may be mentioned that a large proportion of the population of Awka is composed of blacksmiths, and it is possible that the customs, which have there attained perhaps their greatest development, also came from there originally, or were at the very least deeply influenced in their evolution by the fact that the blacksmiths of Awka, like the doctors (another grade) of the neighbouring town of Nibo, wandered far and wide over the face of the country in the practice of their trade, the doctors indeed without let or hindrance even in time of war. The Awka ceremonies have clearly influenced those of the towns immediately to the west of the Niger; but from the fact that the Udo bush figures largely in the Awka ceremonies and that an Udo (bush) was also of some importance in the rites of Benin connected with the worship of beads, it might be argued that Benin was the centre of origin; but much stress cannot be laid upon the point, for there is no evidence that the blacksmiths of Awka were in the habit of visiting Benin. The native explanation of the meaning of the first grade is that it indicates the freeborn status of the holder, and this is perhaps the most likely origin for this group of customs.

12. Egbo.—Although the Egbo society of Calabar is one of the most famous secret societies, we are singularly ill-informed as to the initiation ceremonies; there are, according to some authorities, ten or eleven grades, which are attained by purchase; but of the rites which actually admit the purchaser to the mysteries of the grade nothing seems to have been recorded. In some respects the society resembles the hierarchy of the Ibo titles; but there is an important difference; for the Egbo society is represented by a masked figure and thus stands nearer such societies as Poro. One tradition says that Egbo originated in a market situated between Calabar and Kamerun, where the traders decided to form it as a means of upholding order; but, quite apart from the fact that the African market is by nature orderly, this can hardly explain the existence of the masked figure, a non-human personage, nor yet the circumstance, reported by one author,[1] that Egbo comes out only at full moon, apart from circumstances of civil disorder. Each grade is said to have its own 'spirit' and its own day; on the day of the highest grade all houses have to be shut, and any one who wishes to go out must purchase the right.

The most striking and probably the most important side of the Egbo society was its judicial procedure;[2] a non-member had to purchase the protection of a member before his claim could be brought before the society; or he might even give himself to an important chief as a slave as a means of ensuring success. The intervention of the society could be secured by touching a member on the breast or by striking the big Egbo drum. In any case, the power of the society once invoked, a meeting had to be called and the case heard. When judgment was given, a representative of the society proceeded at once to the house of the loser; and not until the penalty had been exacted might any one of the inmates of the house leave it, even though they were wholly innocent of the matter in respect of which the charge was brought.

Like Poro, the Egbo society protected by its symbol the property of any one who put it in their charge; and here we see a side of the institution which recalls the tabu.[3]

13. Ndembo and Nkimba.—In the Lower Congo area the main societies, sometimes under other names, are Ndembo and Nkimba. There does not seem to be any ground for regarding the former as a puberty society; for both sexes join, and some persons pass through it several times. According to J. H. Weeks,[4] the object of joining is to escape from disease or malformation.

The candidate feigns death in some public place and is carried to the bush, where his body is said to decay till only one bone is left, which is kept by the doctor, who is supposed to raise him again from the dead. He receives a new name, is taught to eat, to feign complete ignorance, and to use a secret language, the vocabulary of which, however, is very limited.

There is more doubt as to the position of Nkimba, but good authorities assert that it has nothing to do with circumcision. Unlike Ndembo, mutual assistance is one of the objects of the society. It also aims at inuring youths to hardship; some societies (for there are many of the name, all restricted to males) check the power of the chiefs; in some cases the licence permitted to the members is the attraction, for they are allowed to assault travellers and rob them, in accordance with the principle that the candidates are separated from this world and therefore not amenable to ordinary law.

The candidate is drugged, dressed in a palm-leaf apron, whitened with clay, and taught a secret language, far more extensive than that of Ndembo; he also learns botany and spells, and hunts witches.

Like the Ndembo, the society is under a *ngaṅa* ('doctor'); there is therefore some ground for regarding it as different in character from an initiation school, especially as it is not necessary for all members of the tribe to pass through it; on the other hand, it is not necessary to suppose, with Weeks, that its objects were originally identical with those of Ndembo, unless the derivation of the name from *lemba*, 'to deliver,' should be well founded. It is, however, of some importance that Nkita, which is a local name for Nkimba, also means a power that inflicts disease and malformations.

[1] J. Thormählen, in *Mittheil. Geograph. Gesellsch.*, Hamburg, 1884, p. 332.
[2] Frobenius, p. 87.
[3] P. Amaury Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, London, 1912, p. 37 ff.; H. M. Waddell, *Twenty-nine Years in the W. Indies and Central Africa*, do. 1863, p. 247 ff.
[4] *Among the Primitive Bakongo*, London, 1912, p. 159.

Nearly the whole of our information regarding the Congo and Kamerun area is tainted with suspicion owing to the contradictions of the various authorities and still more to the new facts brought to light about the Fang societies by H. Trilles.[1] From his study it appears that there is a sharp line of demarcation between societies of priests and societies of sorcerers or witches. Both are secret, in a sense, but the meetings of the former, though closed to the profane, are held openly, and their place of meeting is known; sorcerers, on the other hand, who have a different kind of initiation, meet in private, for to be known as a sorcerer involves the poison ordeal and probably death. Totems, or animal protectors, are associated with both kinds of society; but the priest has an animal species forbidden to him *qua* priest, while the sorcerer has an individual animal familiar; the life of the priest is in no way bound up with his animal species, that of the sorcerer is linked to that of his familiar. There are human victims, whose blood is mixed with that of one of the 'totems' at the initiation of the priest, but only this ritual cannibalism is practised by the society; the sorcerers practise food cannibalism, and the rites may have in view magical purposes as well. Perhaps the most important difference is that the society of priests has a species of animal tutelar sacred to it, as it were, a totem, while the sorcerers are guarded by a spirit, possibly of a dead human being, as the name *engungure* is the same for both. Each society has an inferior grade of initiates, who assist in all the rites, but are not priests or sorcerers; the initiation of youths is distinct from the initiation rites already mentioned and precedes them.

It is clear at the outset that some of the distinctions drawn by Trilles cannot be applied to other areas—*e.g.*, the use of a protecting spirit by sorcerers only—but it is uncertain over what extent of territory his criteria will apply; it is probable that the features which he describes are not confined to the Fang, for it is common for elements of culture to spread laterally, without distinction of tribe, over a wide area. Until more exact data are to hand, it is impossible to deal at length with the societies of the region from the Cross River to the Congo.

It remains to be seen how far the distinctions drawn by Trilles are valid; for, although he distinctly states[2] that Ngil is a sorcerers' society, he also appears to imply[3] that it is a priests' society; and he formulates the same opinion without ambiguity in another work.[4] It seems clear that Ngil comes into the village openly, to detect thieves and murderers and punish unfaithful wives; not only so, but an initiate of Evodu, which is recruited in the three societies, Ngil, Ngan, and Akhun—themselves made up of devotees of Bieri, the national god, whose cult is confined to the warriors—acts, at least sometimes, as operator in the circumcision rites;[5] and Ngil must therefore, as the author says, be a grade of priests. On the other hand, it is affirmed with equal decision that the rites of initiation into Ngil include obscene practices, which are cited as a mark of sorcery. Further inquiry is needed before the distinction drawn by Trilles can be regarded as established.

14. Gabun.—North of the Congo, in the Ogowe region, are found secret societies too numerous to describe in detail. It has already been mentioned that masks appear at burial rites in parts of W. Africa; among the Balimba, Malanda is specially associated with funeral rites and the dead.

Fourteen days after the death of a member of a family a house is built on the edge of the bush by men only; a male figure is carved; the corpse disinterred, the brains are mixed with chalk and the body is tied to the side wall, while the image is at the closed end of the house. Women are warned not to look at Malanda, and the elders announce his coming in the morning. Twenty boys sit down on a long log; when they are exhausted, they are blindfolded and taken to the bush house; here a bundle known as *yaka*, consisting of brains and chalk, is opened and the new mixture added; this is then used as an ointment and smeared on the breasts of the candidates, vertically for those who are not 'witches,' horizontally for 'witches.' A six-foot pit is dug with a tunnel leading under the wall, into which the corpse is put; the skeleton is exhumed later, divided vertically, and the two portions are laid apart parallel to each other; the boys, formed into two companies, step over the remains, and an oath of secrecy is administered to them.[6]

15. Ngil.—The account of the initiation ceremonies is not free from obscurities, but it is clear that the same rites are undergone both by associates of the society, whose course of training is short, but includes two stages, and by the candidate for the position of Ngil, selected some six years younger than the age at which associates join, and trained to the work by constant association with the actual Ngil, whom he accompanies when a summons calls him from the bush.

After candidates of both classes have undergone various trials, they are secluded in the bush and are tortured by ants, flogging, etc. Those who pass these tests undergo a second period of seclusion, during which they provide a victim, sometimes a younger brother, but more often a mother, sister, or daughter (it is not explained how a candidate at the age of eighteen can do so); a euphorbia is cut down and the stump hollowed; into this is allowed to drop the blood of the victim, sacrificed by the novice himself and mingled with the sap; the members drink of the mixture, and then the victim is cooked and eaten. During this rite the novice is partially intoxicated with the sap of a tree called *ava* and a sort of fungus; but it is somewhat singular that there is no mention of any belief in death and resurrection.

It has already been mentioned that Evodu (possibly the origin of Voodoo, but cf. Dahomé *vodun*, 'fetish') is a higher grade; the highest of all is called Kouñ; it is said to have only three members—rulers of the waters, of the winds, fire, and fecundation, and of the earth and men respectively. In the view of Trilles[1] the higher grades are clearly priestly in their character; and the Kouñ grade comes near, if it is not actually identical with, the divine king of J. G. Frazer; it is therefore a curious and interesting problem to ascertain whether the Ngil society is really one of priests or of sorcerers, or whether it combines features of both.[2]

16. South-east Congo.—Masked figures play an important part in the south-east Congo, but it is not clear how far we can speak of a real secret society; from the reports of the earlier authors the mask appears to be the property of certain families; among other functions the Mukish is a rain-maker, prepares counter-magic, expels evil spirits, and exercises judicial functions; it might therefore be supposed that it is a case of a witch-doctor with special powers; it must, however, be remembered that the *ngaña* presides over the Ndembo and Nkimba; and, as it is expressly stated that Mukish directs a circumcision school, there is no reason for questioning the justice of the epithet 'secret society' in connexion with this masker.

17. Imandwa.—The Ruanda of E. Africa have an important society, the Imandwa, primarily religious in its nature, as it depends on the worship of *imandwa* (men, birds, etc.) and *angombe* (a grove, also a mortal hero); the aim of members, however, is to obtain success in life and other social objects, and all are sworn to secrecy. A sponsor is necessary, who becomes the representative of the *angombe*; other members invited to be present become the *imandwa* of the *angombe*; the profane are kept at a distance while the ceremonies are proceeding.

The candidate is thrown into the air, and a threat is made to cut him up; he receives a new name and enters into a blood-bond with his sponsor. The rites completed, the new initiate is transferred back to the world of men, and a feast is celebrated. Some time after another series of rites is held, which the missionary to whom we owe our knowledge of the society terms 'confirmation.'[3]

18. Labi.—The duplication of initiation ceremonies mentioned above, though unusual, is not without parallel, for the Baya and other tribes of the hinterland of Kamerun proceed in the same way.

A boy joins the Labi at the age of eight or ten; they have their own villages and their own farms; their secret language, made up in part of contributions from the dialects of other tribes, is intertribal in character; and candidates carry a basket shield covering the body from the head to the knee. After six months' instruction they are taken to the river and dropped through traps made of leaves; when they are half-asphyxiated, they are fished out again and wounded with a spear so guarded with a bark sheath that the point penetrates less than half an inch. The eyes, nose, and ears of the Labi are then washed to indicate that their senses have undergone a change. At a later stage the Labi return to the bush, covered by their shields, and receive a physical and moral education; when they again come out, they are free to marry.[4]

1 *Le Totémisme chez les Fân*, p. 436.
2 Pp. 453, 463. 3 P. 441.
4 *Quinze Années chez les Fân*, Lille, 1912, p. 210, though on p. 200 Ngil figures as a society of sorcerers.
5 *Ib.* p. 212.
6 R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, London, 1904, p. 250 ff.; cf. pp. 128, 247, 320; Frobenius, *loc. cit.*

1 *Quinze Années*, p. 214. 2 *Ib.* p. 174 ff.
3 *Anthropos*, vii. [1912] 273, 529, 840, viii. [1913] 110, 754.
4 *La Géog.* xvii. [1908] 453-457; E. A. Lenfant, *La Découverte des grandes sources du centre de l'Afrique*, Paris, 1908, p. 198.

19. Area south of the Congo. — Ordeals like those recorded for the Baya are a frequent feature of initiation ceremonies outside Africa. More elaborate kinds have been found among the Bushongo by Torday; candidates have to pass through a tunnel in which are a human leopard, a blacksmith with a furnace and hot iron, and other tests of courage. More commonly, especially in S. Africa, the ordeals consist in frequent beatings (explained as intended to harden the boys) and fasts.

Among the Basuto the candidates are associated together as a company with a young chief; they are brought back from the fields, where they hide, by armed warriors, and huts are built in the bush for them; after circumcision they are exercised in the use of arms; tribal rules are inculcated, and they undergo long fasts; the initiation over, the huts are burned, and the initiates leave them without looking round, for they are leaving their old life behind and are now at liberty to visit their families, especially their mother's brother, who gives them a spear and a heifer. Until they marry, they live in the men's house near the chief's hut and are assigned to works of public utility. In some at least of the tribes the solidarity of the company thus initiated is very marked; they may not eat food alone if some of their fellows are near, and they may not give evidence against a companion; the young chief chooses his councillors from them. An uninitiated man is reckoned as a child and may neither inherit property nor marry a wife.[1]

20. Masai, etc.—When we come to tribes like the Masai, the rites are less complicated, but the system has hardened into a hierarchy of age grades—so much so that a youth cannot be circumcised unless his father has joined the appropriate class, that of the old men. It is possible, however, to vary the age of circumcision on other grounds, such as poverty. There appears to be a good deal of uncertainty as to the number of age grades; either they vary from place to place or, what is perhaps more likely, each company, composed of the initiates for a period of five years (the interval between two series of rites), may also bear names, as in Nigeria, and these names have been confused with the more fundamental age grades. Apart from a few days of seclusion there is little or nothing in the age grades of the Masai which would justify the epithet 'secret.'

The Wanyika, on the other hand, have a well-developed political organization, on the basis of age grades, which seems to deserve the name better; some of the grades are in reality castes, for the *babasi* (wizards) form the highest rank; the next below them, the *fisi*, perform judicial functions and swear criminals on the hyena, from which they take their name, and protect the crops with the emblem of the hyena.[2]

21. Women's societies.—Apart from societies open to both sexes there are associations open to women only, some (probably the great majority) of the nature of initiation schools, others social or magical in their functions. For obvious reasons less information is available about women's societies: women do not inform the male inquirer of their doings, and female anthropologists in W. Africa have been few.

In Sierra Leone the female initiation society is known as Bundu; there is reason to suppose that it was originally a Mendi institution; from them it passed to the Timne; they in their turn are handing it on at the present day to the Limba, among whom the practice is confined to certain areas, together with the clitoridectomy which is the central feature of the rites of Bundu. Initiation schools for women are also found among the Vai and Gola, on the Lower Congo, among the Basuto and other S. African tribes, the Wayao of British Central Africa, and in all probability over a wide area of French Guinea and Senegambia; but reliable information is to hand for the Tenda people only. Both among the Wayao and among the Masai the stages of female initiation are regulated to some extent by the age of the candidate, though the age grade is less important for women than for men. The women's society not unnaturally exercises a certain amount of control over men, especially married men; males are of course forbidden to approach the bush and culprits have to buy themselves free on pain of falling victims to disease.

Among the Mpongwe an influential society exists, in some respects like the political organizations of the men. It is known as Njembe and appears to be feared by the men; it claims to discover thieves, but its main object is said to be to protect women against hard usage on the part of the male portion of the community.

There are also a certain number of magical and religious societies membership of which is confined to women; among the Timne the Raruba society sprinkles the farms with 'medicine' in order to procure good rice; the Attonga society of the Bulom is concerned with the cult of ancestors. Societies have also been recorded among the Ibibio.

Among the Mendi a society exists to which both men and women are admitted; but two distinct sides appear to be confined each to one sex; the male Humoi society has a 'devil' on which oaths are taken; the female Humoi society punishes offences against the marriage regulations known as *simongama*, as well as breaches of its own rules; in such cases the male offenders enter the house of the women's society.

III. *THEORIES OF ORIGIN.* — Secret societies have been discussed in three monographs. The first author to deal with them was Leo Frobenius, whose main thesis was the manistic nature of the secret society; he based this contention largely upon the feigned death and resurrection of the novice and also upon the rôle played by masked figures, interpreted as visitants from the spirit world, if not actually ancestral ghosts. He was followed by H. Schurtz, who referred age grades and secret societies to the operation of a 'gregarious instinct,'[1] assuming as axiomatic the essential identity of phenomena such as the men's house, age grades, initiation schools, and religious confraternities; he failed to observe that the identity of the rites is conditioned by the identity of their aim—to transfer a human being from one condition of life to another — and not by the functional homogeneity of the societies; a gregarious instinct no more explains the existence of secret societies than it explains the existence of armies; in each case we have to look for the ulterior motive which suggests to man the desirability of combining with his fellows. Hutton Webster starts with the idea that secret societies are everywhere lineal descendants of primitive initiation ceremonies, and he regards as degenerate many forms which may equally well be rudiments awaiting the opportunity for further development.

A different course is taken by van Gennep, who puts aside the questions of origin and function and shows that the rites on which stress has been laid owe their identity to the primitive conception of initiation, which persists in the great religions in the notion of rebirth, and not to the character of the society to which they admit the novice.

It is clear, from the survey of societies in the preceding pages, on which side the truth lies. There can be little doubt that the contention of Frobenius is in part justified, though it may be

[1] D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 206; H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, do. 1912, i. 71–99.

[2] A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 294 f.; *Brit. E. Africa Report*, 1897, p. 10; M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 60 ff.

[1] This instinct, however, is well marked among the Chinese of the present day, who appear to form societies merely for the sake of forming them.

questioned whether it is true of the majority of societies that they are founded on a primitive type, in which an ancestral spirit figured as the genius or the presiding deity of the society, or in which, it may be, the unity of the society expressed itself in the belief that its spiritual power was concentrated in a human being possessed by, or reincarnating, such a spirit. If it is true that the spirit which protects a society is often, as among the Vai, expressly affirmed to be ancestral, there does not, on the other hand, appear to be good ground for treating the fiction of death and resurrection as a proof of the manistic element in secret societies; for the same feature is found among tribes which, unlike the natives of Africa, lay no stress on the cult of the dead and do not appear to connect their initiation ceremonies in any way with their dead ancestors. In any case, if this feature is manistic in Africa, it should be possible to produce evidence of explicit native beliefs on the subject, instead of inferences from rites and other controversial evidence.

If, with Webster, we assume the clan initiation ceremonies to have been the prototype of secret societies, it does not follow that we must admit the lineal descent of all societies from such rituals; for nothing seems clearer than that in primitive society one institution is formed on the model of another, already known.

To take a concrete case, Ibo women have societies, with few functions, the very names of the dignitaries of which are derived from the corresponding dignities (quite distinct from the 'titles' mentioned above, II. xi), which in some parts are under the *obi*, the rulers and judicial authorities of a town. Not only so, but the names of the men's titles themselves are clearly derived from the neighbouring Edo, a memorial of the time when the effective authority of the king of Benin extended as far as the Niger.

Not less important is the fact that in some regions secret societies exist side by side with initiation schools, though the latter are in this case commonly found in the less pretentious guise of a circumcision bush, the ritual of which is limited to the actual operation, a period of rest for the healing of the wound, and a few rites when the new initiates rejoin the society as men (or women). The question is of course complicated by the fact, just pointed out, that institutions travel from tribe to tribe; in fact a big river is often a more important frontier for customs than the boundary between tribe and tribe, even when they belong to entirely different linguistic stocks. But the actual diversity of form and function in societies with secret rites is too great to make it a tenable hypothesis, apart from good evidence, that they have all been derived from a single type, though it is of course true that earlier types of cult societies must necessarily have influenced the development and form of later types. It is also necessary to recognize that the form no less than the functions of a society may undergo radical change, as we see in the case of the Human Leopard society, originally a warriors' league, which may possibly have had its rise in rites intended to protect the slayer against the evil influences of the slain.

We may perhaps sum up the position by saying that to trace all secret societies to a single origin is probably as mistaken as to trace all forms of religion to a single source or to seek to unlock all the mythologies by a single key. It seems clear that age grades, burial clubs, initiation schools, religious confraternities, occupation groups, and magical societies have all contributed to the mass of diverse elements grouped under secret societies; it cannot be definitely laid down that any one of these took an earlier type as a model; as we find all in their rudimentary stages in various parts of Africa, we must, unless we suppose that these rudiments are derived from the fully developed societies of other tribes, suppose that they are the seed from which, in other areas, secret societies have been evolved, and that all are equally primitive, though not necessarily equally old. As a conspicuous case of a society which cannot be reduced to a late form of the primitive initiation society may be cited the maskers that appear at burial ceremonies or are concerned, like Malanda, with a cult of the dead. Not only is there nothing in the proceedings of this society or of the simpler forms to suggest that they are derived elements, which figure in funeral rites as intruders from another sphere, but we find simpler forms still, in which the mask itself is missing and the genesis of the custom becomes plain.

In parts of the Kukuruku country in Nigeria, after a man's death a masked figure appears in the town to perform certain rites; in the case of a hunter he carries a gun; a skull of some animal is put on the ground at a little distance, and the masker imitates the actions of the hunter in tracking it; as he retires a dog is sacrificed and he steps over the corpse, perhaps to signify that the dead man, whose representative he is, has now to leave the society of his fellow-men; the explanation given by the natives is that it is killed to make the ground smooth for the dead man, alluding probably to the journey of the soul. Although but a single masker figures in the scene, there is already the germ of a society; for, before he appears, a swarm of boys dash across the open space in which the scene is enacted, carrying green branches, but for what purpose does not appear. In this scene we have the germ of a dramatic representation, perhaps, or the nucleus of a society specially concerned with funeral rites, such as we meet in the Yoruba and Congo areas; but even this simple ceremony is not the most elementary form; for the representative of the dead man wears a red costume and a net mask; he is differentiated from his fellows. Farther to the south, again, among the Edo proper also, the dead man has his representative, but only on the last day of the burial rites.

One of the family puts coral beads on his neck, and many cloths around his loins, with a white cloth on the top; while the rest of the family are dancing, this *nodiraia* sits down; he may not sleep till day breaks, under pain of dying himself; at daybreak a ceremonial gate is made by the young men; the 'father' is summoned and takes his seat on a chair from which they raise him; all proceed along the road, and the young men pass round his head sticks which they afterwards throw into the bush. Here we find the same elements as in the Kukuruku area; the dead man has his representative; at the end of the ceremonies the figurehead is conducted from the house, passing through the gate to typify his separation from the living, and is then divested of his manistic character by the ordinary rite of purification, which consists in passing sand, an egg, a chicken, or some other object, round the head, and throwing it away.

In the Ibo country and probably elsewhere, when the time arrives for 'second burial,' the dead man is summoned to the house, and a chalk line is sometimes drawn from the *ajoifia*;[1] the customs just mentioned are the obvious counterpart of those of the Ibo; the dead man, who is conceived of as hovering near as long as the rites are in progress, must be sent to his own place—a familiar rite in Indonesia—and one way of doing so is to send him on his way symbolically by means of a human representative.

Intermediate between the rites just described is a ceremony from another part of W. Africa, where we see perhaps the germ of the mask.

The Ishogo of French Congo have a secret society, Bwiti, which is found among the Bavili and many other peoples as well, and corresponds to the Bieri of the Fang, who include in it a cult of ancestors, represented by a skull, and of the totem, represented by some portion of its body; it is in a sense a national cult of the Fang, all warriors being initiated into it.[2] Among the Ishogo a dance is held during the funeral ceremonies; at night all torches are suddenly extinguished; dead silence falls upon the dancers, and one of them calls the dead man by name; an answer comes from the edge of the bush, where an initiate of the society has

[1] *JRAI* lxvii. [1917] 209 f.
[2] Trilles, *Totémisme*, pp. 4, 212, 530.

concealed himself. At other times the corpse is paraded round the village—a custom found among the Ibo and other tribes, though not in the same form; an initiate of the society raises the dead man on his shoulders and covers himself from head to foot with plaited palm-leaves, so that only the face of the corpse remains visible; women look on and applaud, but how far they penetrate the secret is left uncertain.

Here, then, we have in its clearest form the beginnings of disguise, and it is no long step from using the dead man to represent himself to taking a mask to wear as his representative; the mere fact that precisely in this part of Africa the corpse is left unburied several days suggests that, with the coming of a speedier burial, the rites would take some other form which must necessarily imply the representation of the dead man by some other means. It seems clear that the secret society associated with the cult of the dead, or with burial rites, can be traced back to its very beginnings.

But, even in the relatively few cases where the spirit of the secret society is specifically declared to be ancestral in its character, we cannot assume that it was acquired in the same way as the masked figure of the burial society was, on the hypothesis just suggested, developed. Where the spirit is not ancestral, it is far simpler to suppose that it was acquired on the analogy of the personal protective deity; it is not without interest that the *afet tot* of the Timne of Sierra Leone, although it is reckoned among the *wanka* (protective charms) by the native, is really a woman's *krifi* (spirit or genius), and that she acquires the right to it precisely as though a secret society were in question; although it appears to be primarily a kind of fertilizing spirit, it also keeps thieves at a distance and in this way recalls the tabu side of a secret society's activities.

There can be very little doubt that some, at least, of the judicial and police societies have originated in societies which are concerned with burial ceremonies and the cult of the dead. There need be no hesitation in accepting such an origin for Oro and Egũgũ, the Yoruba societies; for not only are both specially associated with burial ceremonies, but other societies of less importance, like Eluku, are obviously of similar origin, and other burial rites, such as *iyaku* and *ipeku*, are clearly of the same order without having developed a fully-fledged secret society; the object of all these ceremonies is to dismiss the dead man to his own place —and in this they seem to correspond to the Edo and Ibo custom of 'second burial'—and celebrate the funeral ceremonies; it is uncertain how far participation in the rites is limited, in the simpler forms, to relatives or others nearly related to the deceased; but there is evidence to show that they are specially connected with occupation groups (hunters, farmers, etc.)—a conclusion to which the Kukuruku facts also point; and from this stage to the secret society proper the path is not a long one. The name Oro is given apparently to the spirit of the deceased, which is deemed to inhabit the house till the rites are performed, as well as to the human participants in the rites; Oro is worshipped annually by each household at home, and there is also a presiding Oro of the town; the parallel with the ancestor-cult of the Ibo is therefore fairly close. In some of the rites a figure dressed in white appears when people assemble and call upon the dead man; this is the case among the Owu section of the Egba in the rite known as *igba irana*. No such usage has been recorded among the Oro rites; but the Oro shout, *mã mũ*, is heard in the house of the dead man, and the essential identity of the rites may be inferred.

The existence of two or more societies conjointly among the Yoruba is explained by the fact that they were originally localized societies or cults, Egũgũ at Oyo, Oro among the Egba, and Eluku (Agemo) at Ijebu; as communication became easier, these customs spread to a greater or less degree, and their judicial side assumed a greater importance until finally their funerary significance became altogether obscured. How far the same process will enable us to account for the existence of other judicial societies, like Poro and Egbo, it is difficult to say; only the record of the intermediate stages in the Yoruba customs enables us to lay down the course of development undergone by Oro and Egũgũ; the continued existence of these intermediate steps is conditioned among the Yoruba by the relatively large size of the tribe—at the present day perhaps 2,000,000, including aberrant dialects—compared with that of other tribes which have developed analogous institutions.

It must be admitted that the tutelary genius theory of the spirit of the secret society is not completely satisfying as an explanation, for the simple reason that the initiation school must, unless appearances are deceptive, be the most primitive type of African secret society; if this is so, it is a mere assumption that the tutelary genius of individuals was known at the time when the initiation school came into being. It should be observed, however, that, where a spirit is associated with initiation, viz. in the Sudanese area in the main, we also find the tutelary genius in a well developed form; where, on the other hand, as in Bantu regions, the tutelary genius appears to be unknown, the spirit of the initiation school is also absent; we cannot be sure that the tutelar of the initiation society is not an afterthought or derived from other ideas. When we look at the societies of the Fang, we see another starting-point—not remote in itself from the tutelary spirit, perhaps even the germ of the idea in other areas—for the tutelar of the secret society; here each society of *ngaña* has a 'totem' (*be mvame*), just as each individual *ngaña* has his *mvame*—in each case a species of animals, plants, etc.; we need not here inquire how far it is accurate to apply the term 'totem' to this conception; it is sufficient that the society has assumed a protector on the analogy of already existing tribal groups; for we must suppose that clans preceded societies of priests. Even if the example has not been widely followed, the analogy holds good; for it proves that some secret societies have deliberately assimilated themselves to other groups by securing a protector.[1]

At present too little is known of migration in Africa generally, especially in West Africa, and too little in the way of analysis of culture has yet been accomplished for it to be possible to say how far we can refer the origin of secret societies, in whole or in part, to the clash of cultures; but it is certainly worthy of note that Kamerun, the territory in which the Bantu languages meet the Sudanese, is one of the main foci of these associations. Similarly in the Senegambian and Western Coast area, a second area of high development, we have the point of contact between the Sudanese prefix languages, which correspond in structure to Bantu, and the non-inflecting group, of which the Mandingo tribes are the main representatives. But even a brief discussion of the question is not possible within the limits of this article.

IV. *CLASSIFICATION.*—From the formal point of view, secret societies naturally fall into three classes according to whether they are confined to males or to females or are open to both sexes; generally speaking, the religious or magical society tends to be open in this respect; initiation schools are naturally the reverse; but no rule can be laid

[1] The relations between totemism, secret societies, and the belief in tutelars are a matter for further inquiry. Interaction may well have occurred at more than one point.

down, for even societies like Poro, which are commonly regarded as a means of keeping the women in subjection, admit them under certain circumstances. The position of societies with regard to the admission of one or both sexes may turn out to be a valuable means of discriminating between such bodies according to their origins.

Less important in a way, but from the practical point of view equally if not more weighty, is the question whether the members of a society are all equal or are ranged in grades, attained by purchase or by seniority; for where graduation according to rank or seniority obtains we come near the beginnings of an oligarchy.

From the point of view of origin, again, it is of much importance to know whether the society is supposed to be under the guardianship of a spirit, human or non-human, or has as its leader and director a doctor or magician, recognized as a human being by initiated and uninitiated alike.

From one point of view, to classify societies according to the rites which serve to admit the novice to membership is to have regard to the function, and not the form, of the society, notably in the case of initiation schools, in which these rites alone form the *raison d'être* of the society; but, from another point of view, classification according to the ritual ordinances of the society is a merely formal procedure. It is of importance, *e.g.*, to know how far circumcision or other mutilations are necessary antecedents to or steps in the admission to full membership; for there is at least a probability that such societies, whatever their function, were at the outset bodies concerned with the admission of youths to the privileges of manhood. It must not, however, be forgotten that such matters are in the hands of the elders of the tribe; and in at least one case the rite of circumcision has been separated from the initiatory ceremonies for reasons of policy; we cannot therefore argue that no society which does not practise the rite, or a substitute for it, can be regarded as equivalent to or derived from an initiation school. Conversely, especially where circumcision is performed as a rule about the age of physiological puberty, it may well have happened that a society which embraced the manhood of the tribe for any reason would come to arrogate to itself the right of circumcising the youths and thus take on the aspect of an initiation school.

From the point of view of function, the classification is comparatively simple, though in practice the lines are by no means clearly drawn, as can be seen by reference to more than one example quoted above. The form of all societies except the age grades is religious, inasmuch as there appears to be, except possibly in a few initiation schools, a spirit leader of the society; and, even where the overt reference to religious ideas is absent, as in simple circumcision rites, there is always in the foreground the ever-recurring idea of holiness, which demands the separation of the candidates from the outside world. If, therefore, we undertake to classify the societies according to their functions, it must be understood that these religious elements are deliberately put in the background, and that only the actual aims, which are not necessarily the same as the avowed aims, of the association taken into account.

Broadly speaking, the societies fall into two main groups—religious and social; but it must be observed that the ultimate object of nearly all is worldly prosperity or political power; for, whatever be the facts as regards primitive races in other parts of the world, the Negro is religious, not from any obvious need or overwhelming desire to satisfy a spiritual side of his nature, but in order to secure himself from bodily ills, to add to his wealth in wives, children, and material property, to fortify himself against his enemies, human or non-human, and to secure the favour of those in authority over him, in the present day more particularly of the white man. But these ultimate objects are attained through a series of intermediate devices such as the acquisition of a tutelary deity, either personal or collective (in the sense of the genius of a society), the obtaining of 'strong medicine,' the acquisition of secret knowledge, and the like. Classifying the societies according to these immediate aims, we may divide them broadly into these two classes; but, as has already been pointed out, there are many with a mixed character. To the purely religious societies belong the Yewe-worshippers and the adherents of the Imandwa cult; the cult of Bieri among the Fang differs from these in being national, but confined to the warriors. We may perhaps add a third type, the burial societies, with aims probably allied to the worship of ancestors, though their object is somewhat obscure. Side by side with the religious societies, and operating with the same class of forces, are the magico-religious societies with, in some cases, agricultural objects; of a different type are the Human Leopard society and its congeners; other societies, especially in the French Niger territory and in the Congo, practise protective rites against the arts of diviners, witches, and other workers of evil; others, again, have in view the averting or cure of diseases or malformations or the driving away of evil spirits by making it appear to them that the area is already occupied by a spirit, viz. the masker.

The initiation societies may perhaps be placed midway between the purely religious and the purely social groups, the more so as the element of religion is a varying one in them and sometimes, according to our authorities, completely absent. Their primary purpose is no doubt to change the child into a man or woman.

To the social type of society belong the age grades of the Kru, Masai, Galla, and others, and the corresponding type of society, admittance to which is by purchase, such as the 'titles' of the Ibo; intermingled with these are some societies which may almost be classed as castes, in so far as they are limited, at least in theory, to certain occupations, such as blacksmiths. It will be remembered that blacksmiths occupy in many areas a peculiar position, like musicians in the Western Sudan; they are occasionally a pariah class, but more often, as among the Ibo, have succeeded in making their society the head of the hierarchy formed by the 'titles.' In more than one case the blacksmith is the operator in the initiation rites; this is probably the case in the society, among others, commonly known as Mumbo Jumbo, which is more properly termed Mama Dhiombo; here there can be little doubt, from the report of a recent author, that the blacksmith is the initiator of girls and performs the operation of clitoridectomy.[1] To these occupation groups belong also the diviners' society of the Kru, classified, from another point of view, among magico-religious societies, perhaps the *ngaña* of the Congo, and even from one aspect the witches or wizards. It has already been pointed out that the rites of initiation of doctors, priests, and diviners follow closely the type of secret society ceremonies; so, too, do the rites of coronation of kings and chiefs and those of admission to Muhammadan confraternities and similar institutions.

There is a large and important class of legislative, judicial, and, in general terms, political societies, of which Poro and Egbo may be mentioned as the best known. These in some aspects come very

[1] C. Monteil, *Les Khassonké*, Paris, 1915, p. 237.

near the age grades of such tribes as the Wanyika. An interesting variant of this type is seen in the Ogboni society of the Yoruba, with its subsidiary, Oro, which is the executive force. With the relation between Ogboni and Oro may be contrasted the relation subsisting between the Poro society and the paramount chiefs of Sierra Leone, who in non-Poro areas have in like manner the Ragbenle society at their back, though it is far less powerful, partly because it is far more restricted in numbers. The chief is often the head of Poro, but it is not precisely his executive staff; for, while the society supports the chief and, as a body, carries out decisions approved by him, it also claims the right to restrain him under certain circumstances, though it does not go so far as to depose an unworthy chief. The relations between Ragbenle and Poro are somewhat obscure; for there is some antagonism between them, quite apart from the fact that a chief is as a matter of customary law associated with either one or the other; it is a recognized rule that a Poro chief cannot rule in a chiefdom where the Ragbenle society holds the reins; on the other hand, there is a method by which he can divest himself of his Poro quality and thus fit himself for his duties. Possibly this antagonism arises from the fact that Poro, as has been pointed out above, is an alien society, whereas Ragbenle is probably a native institution. This does not explain how it comes about that Poro and Ragbenle are mutually exclusive; if Ragbenle existed when Poro was imported, it is not apparent why it should have altogether vanished from the territory where the chiefs are connected with Poro. In some cases these police forces seem to exist independently, as among the people of Porto Novo, where the night guard is the Zangbeto society. In the Ibo country west of the Niger the Onotu, 'dignitaries,' are the executive for many purposes; they are sometimes reinforced by a police force known as Anikamwadu; but the element of secrecy is here very slight.

In all the cases so far passed in review it may be assumed that the society is, so to speak, in full vigour; we can discern rudimentary forms, but there is nothing to lead us to suppose that there is any decadence at work. When, however, we find the Yoruba Egũgũ appearing, in the Ibo country or at Freetown, among the descendants of the freed slaves brought to Sierra Leone, whose original home was the Slave Coast, we are at once confronted with a new feature; the awe-inspiring figure of the secret society has become the diversion of the populace, though even now the enjoyment has in it something of the feeling, so evident in some of the diversions of our own children, that there is an element of danger.

In the same class perhaps, though the decay has not proceeded so far, are many or most of the dancing societies of the Ibo, which turn out on a day of festival to make a show and perform feats of gymnastics, such as climbing a palm-tree, dressed up as monkeys, and descending head first with the most ridiculously lifelike imitation of the real animal. In E. Africa the masker's rôle is slightly different, for he has become the court fool; and the same tendency is to be seen in parts of the Congo territory.

Finally, outside all the groups already indicated, we find the secret societies of boys and girls among the Yoruba and Edo, formed, without serious purpose, in imitation of the societies of their elders, but carried on less in sport than in a spirit of deadly earnest, though without conscious aim.

V. *ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLEX.*—It is apparent that there can be no large common element in societies so variously constituted and with such diverse ends as those surveyed here; but there are certain features which demand notice, if only because some authors have drawn conclusions from them which the facts do not warrant.

(*a*) *The men's house.*—Stress has been laid upon the existence of the men's house by Webster, who argues that its presence indicates that in the past secret initiation ceremonies have been practised. Now, in the first place, the men's house is in many cases not in the bush or remote from the village, but in the very centre of the village; it is the meeting-place of the men, who have far more leisure than the women for sitting down and talking; it is sometimes the guard-house; in any case it does not resemble the temporary structures, destroyed after the rites are over, which serve for the initiation of youths. Not only so, but in the Ibo country, where the men's house does not, strictly speaking, exist, each compound has its men's house (*obu* or *ogwa*), though women are not forbidden to enter. Moreover, in this area the function of the men's house proper is fulfilled by seats of rough logs in an open space at the meeting-point of important roads; here men, and sometimes women, sit in the cool of the evening, smoking and discussing things in general; it cannot seriously be maintained that this village meeting-place is necessarily a decadent feature, derived from the initiation bush, which, be it noted, exists side by side with the meeting-place. Webster regards the men's house as designed, among other things, to enforce the separation of the young men and maidens, despite the fact that it is in some cases, notably among the Masai, the spot where the unmarried of both sexes practise free love; so far from initiation necessarily meaning that the youths are cut off from sexual indulgence, it very often means that then for the first time they are free to choose temporary mates; but, above all, Webster's argument disregards the fact that initiation rites are coincident, not with physiological, but with social, puberty; in fact in some tribes sexual intercourse is permitted both before and after the rites, but not during them.

The existence of a bachelors' house indicates that the inmates have entered upon another stage of life; there is no longer room for them, perhaps, in the paternal dwelling, or, if there is, their freedom of action is hampered. That this is so is clear from the fact that among the Ibo, where the bachelors' house is unknown, the bachelor's house is an ordinary feature. Here the youth lives at his ease, and entertains his female friends, to whom his father's house is forbidden as a resort for sexual purposes; if his mother chance to die before he marries a wife, she is buried in or near her son's house. It is certain that it cannot be interpreted in the same way as the common dwelling.

It is possible that the men's house has in some places developed into the temple; but the house dedicated to a god answers a natural need; it is found in areas where the men's house exists quite apart from it; it is situated in the village, not without; and there is no reason for deriving it from any more remote origin than the need of housing a deity, of having a place where he may be sought with offerings and prayers.

(*b*) *Seclusion in forests.*—Other authors have laid stress upon the fact that the masked figure emerges from the bush, and that the forest conceals the *arcana* of the secret society. But to emphasize this point is to ignore the conditions; there may be some slight evidence of tree-worship in Africa, but the placing of the initiation school of youths among trees is not one of the proofs. For, in the first place, over large parts of W. Africa there is no open country; all is either bush or town; if, therefore, it is necessary to escape the gaze of the profane, it can be done only by seeking quarters

in the bush. The use of a leaf dress is equally meaningless in this connexion; for the tribes which do not use skins had of necessity to use vegetable products for clothing; to this day bark-cloth is woven, and for some magical operations banana-leaves are assumed as a garment; but this does not mean that the tree from which the bark is taken is sacred, still less that the banana is the object of a cult. Still farther from the truth, if possible, is the argument that the bull-roarer is evidence of tree-worship.

The real meaning of initiation rites, and consequently, among others, of the rites of secret societies, has been admirably set forth by van Gennep (*Les Rites de passage*) as first a transition of the novice from the world of the profane to the sacred world; then, after a period of instruction and ceremonies destined to mark the revolution that is coming over the nature of the candidate, a rite of separation from the world in which he has been living; then another one of redintegration into the world of the profane. Here, then, we have the explanation of the pretended death and resurrection, of the secret language, of the new name, of the ignorance feigned by the novice when he is restored to his relatives, and, finally, of the mutilations which will form a permanent memorial and proof of the change that has been undergone.

It must not, however, be supposed that these rites present themselves to the Negro under this aspect; to take only one example, circumcision, which is by no means universally practised, is not viewed by the native as anything but the removal of a useless or even hurtful appendage; but such transformations of belief are a commonplace in the history of primitive creeds.

A full analysis of the ceremonies would take us too far; but it may be pointed out that among the rites of separation is the carrying off of the novice, unresisting and even willing, to seclusion in the bush; this is sometimes preceded, sometimes followed, by a pretended death, which in some areas may possibly be produced by drugs. Widely spread too is the custom of wearing white paint, all clothing being discarded; this is worn in some areas as a mourning colour also; it is doubtful if we should interpret it as a means of assimilating the novice to the spirit world.

(*c*) *Tabus.*—During the period of residence in the bush a number of food tabus are enforced; the Ndembo, *e.g.*, may eat neither fish nor flesh; water may be used to rinse the mouth, but not otherwise. It may be noted in passing that some of the rites of redintegration consist in the public breaking of these tabus; the Ndembo member swallows an egg as part of the ceremony of the return to the village. He also touches a girl's hand; for one of the things most strictly forbidden to the novice is to touch a woman or to see a woman's face; the women therefore avoid the novice or hide their faces; this is a general rule which applies to other than initiation schools.

In connexion with the banning of women by the majority of societies, a curious fact may be mentioned (as it is rare to hear anything of the origin of the societies, parallels may be numerous, though it would be unwise to assume that this is the case). Both the Ovia society of the Edo and the Egbo society of Calabar are said to have been founded by women; in fact Egbo is said to have been a women's society at first; and to this day an old woman of the ruling family helps to bring the Egbo spirit back, when it flees from a town at the death of an important member. It is not necessary to take these stories at their face value; they may be no more than ætiological myths to explain why women are now excluded, and they may be deformed in the telling; but native traditions of origin have hitherto been unduly neglected. There is a vague story that women brought Poro to the Timne country; but here we are on somewhat different ground, for there is no question of the origin of the society, and women are admitted to it under certain circumstances at the present day.

There are certain cases—in the Yewe society, *e.g.*—where the novice must not only observe food tabus, but must drink water as part of his initiation; for by so doing he receives the god into his body.

(*d*) *Education.*—In some cases symbolic rites are performed to indicate that the eyes of the novice are now open; but a more general feature is the instruction in tribal lore and customs, in the duties of tribesmen, or of members of the society, and, generally speaking, the education of the candidate in native morality, as well as in the arts of dance and song. In this connexion the ordeals, of which examples have been given above, are of much importance.

(*e*) *Dress, lustral rites, etc.*—During the period of residence in the bush it is often permitted to the novices to come out, wearing a special dress; and during these excursions, sometimes after the final departure from the bush, they are at liberty to seize domestic animals at will.[1] It has been suggested that this is indicative of the fact that the novices are outside the law, because outside the community; but the custom is practised on other occasions, such as an interregnum in the course of marriage rites, after a theft in the market, and so on; and, though these customs are not all African, the whole group of rites needs to be surveyed before any final theory can be put forward.

There is less uncertainty as to the meaning of the ignorance feigned by the novices when they leave the bush; it is of a piece with their use of a secret language; they have been separated from this world and have come into it again; and, like infants, they have everything to learn. In fact, in an Akikuyu rite the novice undergoes a ceremony of rebirth and lives on milk, though, oddly enough, the rite takes place before circumcision; but in this tribe changes have been made in the rites by the old men.

Another series of rites—washing, donning of new clothing, burning of the bush huts—is partly to separate the novice from his life in the other world, partly to fit him to re-enter the everyday life of the tribe.

(*f*) *Secret language.*—Specimens of the languages have been recorded in Nigeria, on the Congo, and elsewhere. Broadly speaking, we may say that we find languages of three types: (1) old languages retained for cult purposes only, (2) languages made up in part of words from other dialects, in part of other elements, (3) languages in which the ordinary language is changed by the addition of a prefix or suffix, by a change of class in the noun, by a change of vowel, or a change of consonant. In this connexion it should be remembered that a kind of back slang is found at more than one point in Africa, notably among the Swahili and the Ibo.

(*g*) *The masker.*—Despite a vastly increased knowledge of Africa, there are many points of detail on which we are not much better informed than when Frobenius published his monograph in 1898. We can say that masked figures are associated with many societies in French territories since opened up, but in most cases we have few or no details. On the whole, however, it may safely be said that from Senegambia to the Ivory Coast, and from the Slave Coast through Kamerun to the Congo and beyond, with extensions of unknown depth in the hinterland of the Ivory Coast, masked figures are found which, at least in some cases, represent the tutelary spirit of the society with which they are associated. How far this applies to the masked figures of the Tenda, which are not the central figures of the society, but merely the executive power—and this is probably not a solitary instance—it is difficult to say; but it is certain that

[1] *E.g.*, see C. Lasnet, *Une Mission au Sénégal*, Paris, 1900, pp. 50, 65, 77, 89, 101, 127, 145.

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in a large number of cases (Poro, Oro, many of the Kamerun societies, etc.) a supposed spirit occupies the chief place.

In a small number of tribes, notably the Vai and Gola societies, the spirits of their ancestors are associated with the societies and initiation rites, though how far they are identified with the masked figure is not quite clear. In parts of Kamerun, on the Congo, and perhaps over the greater part of S. Africa there does not seem to be any masked figure, and we may perhaps infer that there is no tutelar; the boys are in charge of a *ngaña*; the power is said, in the case of the women's society of the Ogowe, Nyembe, to reside in the society as a body. We can hardly argue that the masked figure has disappeared owing to external or internal causes. There are therefore two, if not three, types of society from this point of view.

It is of some importance to note that, so far as the distribution of personal tutelary deities is known, it coincides, to a large extent, with the area in which societies have their tutelary geniuses; of course the absence of a society tutelar where no society exists does not disprove a causal relation in other areas. It is clear that such a conception may have been developed in a society which had originally no central figure at all, or one which associated the ancestors with their initiation schools, or had other ideas, such as are perhaps indicated by the earth figures of animals used by some of the Central African tribes; in this connexion it may be noted that similar practices are found among the Fang, whose societies seem now to be of a well-developed religious type.

There is of course no necessary connexion between the wearing of a mask and the idea of a tutelar, though in many parts of the world the wearing of masks is associated with the impersonation of deities, demons, or the spirits of the dead. But, so far as Africa is concerned, some masks are definitely connected with the dead (Ibo, etc.), while others, equally unconnected, so far as can be seen, with a secret society, have no apparent animistic significance; this is the case with many of those worn in connexion with circumcision. It is a notable fact that in some areas (and those the most remote from European influence, such as the bend of the Niger) women do not fear masks; they may know who is inside and see the masker dress and undress. How this state of things has arisen it is difficult to see. Among the Ibo, where the mask is associated with the dead—it is known as *mauŋ*, 'dead person'—women at ordinary times do not dread it, though they may not know who is inside; at certain times of the year, however, maskers pursue them and they flee in terror. Among the Senufo and Mande public masks are worn at circumcision and for harvest work; society masks, not to be seen by women, are worn at burial, during the actual rites of circumcision, at harvest festivals, during the building of furnaces, etc.; we are at present ignorant of the origin of this state of things; but it seems to denote either that the masks are of different origin—some derived from outside, some of genuine native origin—or that, if both are home products, they are not at the same period of development.

Frobenius has argued that Oceanic masks have created or influenced those of Africa; this means a considerable antiquity for the Oceanic masks; but, if the view put forward by Rivers to account for the secret societies of Oceania is correct, we could hardly admit them to be of an age to warrant this hypothesis even if Oceanic influences were otherwise proved; there may of course have been Oceanic masks before the rise of the present societies, but, in view of the wide distribution of masks—Australia alone is almost completely lacking in them, though the ceremonial garb of the Central tribes comes near masking—it seems unnecessary to derive African masks from elsewhere until it has been made clear that their technique makes their external origin probable.

Prima facie it seems likely that one aim of the initiation society would be to bring the new 'man' into relation with the ancestors of the tribe. To discuss the relation of initiation ceremonies to the belief in reincarnation is beyond the limits of this article.[1]

It has been pointed out above that we have every reason to regard the masker who figures in burial rites as an original type; but it is equally true that a masker is associated with the simplest circumcision rites, where there is no question of a society; it is true that in certain cases circumcision is associated with the cult of ancestors; the novices who rub themselves with white clay mix with it the ashes of their ancestor's bones in the Gabun area; but, generally speaking, we have no reason to regard the association of the rite with the ancestral cult as very close. It might therefore appear that we have here a second origin for the use of the mask; the argument would be difficult to meet if there were any reason to suppose that circumcision was an original possession of the Negro race; but among both Sudanese and Bantu tribes there are many which either do not know the rite at all or regard it with dislike if they do know it (Tamberma, Moba, Bassari, Gurunsi, Baganda, etc.). It is by no means clear how the rite spread; but it is at least permissible to suppose either that the use of the mask came with the rite or that it was developed after the rite was borrowed from elsewhere. In this connexion the public character of some circumcision masks, noted above, is very significant. In neither case are we compelled to regard the use of the mask at circumcision as a primitive African custom independent of the cult of the dead. At the same time, it must be recognized that the circumcision mask has probably served as a starting-point for the masker of the initiation schools, who has in certain instances been associated, possibly as an afterthought, with the cult of ancestors. There is no reason to suppose that the mask is in Africa frequently associated with the cult of divinities; nor, except in the Congo, is there any suggestion that the masker represents a non-human spirit; it is hardly possible to see the starting-point of the use of the mask in a belief confined to a small area.

In so far as initiation societies are independent of circumcision (it should not be forgotten that the substitutes for circumcision—the knocking out of the teeth and the like—are not associated with a mask), and in so far as the mask has played a part in the formation of initiation schools, we have, it may be, a mask of indeterminate origin; in all other cases the probability is that the mask is ultimately referable to a cult of ancestors or at least of the dead. The figure who wears the mask appears to be the protector of the society, assumed on the model of the totem, or of the individual tutelar, except in the case of simple religious societies, where the masker may represent the god of the society.[2]

VI. *INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIETIES.*—We know too little of the rise of the great empires of Africa to say how far the bond of unity created by intertribal societies helped in welding together the various parts. The support given to Timne chiefs by the Poro and Ragbenle societies suggests that their influence may at times have been

[1] See artt. INITIATION, TRANSMIGRATION.
[2] Cf. also art. MASK.

important. Less open to question is their stimulus to the growth of an organized police, which we find at more than one point; but it is in the general government of the tribe that their most important function lay in many areas; thus there is no doubt that Egbo was the equivalent of a judicial body with far more influence than the ordinary chief; and the same may be said of Poro. Even a religious association like the Yewe society exercises great social influence. In the case of age grades the government of a tribe is naturally vested in the highest ranks.

Not without importance too is the rôle played by the societies in setting up a feeling of solidarity apart from ties of tribe or kinship; mutual aid among members of the societies is a normal feature; and, if this aid sometimes aimed at defeating justice, the final result was probably not much worse than in areas where societies were unknown and the votes of the judges were bought by the highest bidder. It is a normal feature of Negro life that certain people, *e.g.*, the father-in-law, can call upon their sons-in-law and others for aid in farm work and other recurring or occasional tasks; where age grades exist, a man can in many cases call upon the men of his own grade or company for similar assistance; and no one who has seen the helplessness of the individual in some tribes before the ravages of wild animals among his crops will underrate the importance of mutual aid. Even where the secret society has not directly brought about this state of things, it may well have served as a model for other societies; it is certainly not without significance that both among the Yoruba and on the Congo, two of the chief areas of secret societies, co-operative societies for wife-purchase and other ends have been described by various authors.

How far the virtues of the unsophisticated native are due to the training received in the initiation schools is perhaps an open question, though many authorities lay stress upon the excellence of the teaching. At the same time it should not be forgotten that tribes without any such means of influencing the minds of the young show an equally high state of morality; by this is to be understood not necessarily sexual morality, which varies enormously from one part of a tribe to another, but the general respect for the native code of morals, such as honesty, truthfulness, and like virtues, which in contact with European influence disappear only too quickly.

LITERATURE.—The foregoing is based in part on unpublished material. The older literature will be found quoted at length in a monograph by L. Frobenius, *Die Masken und Geheimbünde Afrikas* (=*Abh. der Kaiserl. Leop.-Carol. deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher*, lxxiv.), Halle, 1898, pp. 1–278; on this is based to a large extent H. Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde*, Berlin, 1902. Further references will be found in H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908; A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, pp. 93–164. Additional references are given in the footnotes. On the general question consult *GB*[3], and A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, London, 1887.

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N. W. THOMAS.

SECRET SOCIETIES (American).—In the social economy of the tribes of America, as among primitive peoples elsewhere, secret societies are important agencies. Such societies are invariably the vehicles of esoteric rites, and normally of an exoteric display, in the form either of public ceremonials or of badges or other symbols by means of which their members are identified. In their simplest and earliest forms such rites are those which mark the progress of the individual from status to status in his own clan. Above them in generality of relation are rituals symbolizing the creation or cementing of ideal kinships between the members of different clans or tribes. In a third category are to be placed the still more general 'religions' which rest, one might say, upon a conversion rather than an initiation and in which the social relationship is nearly obliterated; they are mysteries universalized to such a degree that they may be regarded as veritable revelations or dispensations. None of these three stages has clear-cut boundaries: the clan rite melts into the tribal, the tribal into the intertribal, and the intertribal rite into the religion; indeed, the self-same rite may at an early period of its history be a clan rite and in its last development a general religion.

1. **Social background.**—In American Indian tribes are found various types of societies, broadly divisible into social societies, or institutional divisions of the tribe, and 'esoteric fraternities,' or secret societies. Organizations of both types are vehicles of religious mysteries, though it is naturally in the secret society that the sense of cult becomes eminent.

In a manner the tribe itself may be regarded as a secret society having several degrees or 'lodges,' through which the tribesman passes in natural course. The most significant passage is from childhood to maturity, at the period of puberty. Puberty rites, especially fasting and vigil, are almost universal among the American tribes, but formal initiation into tribal mysteries is not so common as in other parts of the world or, we may presume, as it once was in America. The annual rites of the California Maidu, in which the fast of the youth was accompanied by instruction in tribal lore and myth by the old men and was followed by a dance of the neophytes, is one of the few clear-cut instances of tribal initiation. The *huskanaw* of the Virginia Indians, described by early writers, was probably a similar rite; one of its curious features was the administration of an intoxicating drink—a veritable water of Lethe—which was supposed to take from the youth all memory of his former life. The Yuchi Indians, confederates of the Creeks, had a puberty initiation accompanied by rites strongly suggestive of the Creek *Busk*, or festival of the new fire, at which all old scores were supposed to be settled and

tribal activities begun anew. Garcilasso de la Vega[1] describes an interesting Inca rite of initiation for young nobles.

Age classes for both men and women are found in many tribes, each class forming a separate society with its own characteristic functions and dances and with its own appropriate initiation. Closely associated and in part identical with these were the military societies, whose membership was determined in part by age, in part by war record. Among the Plains peoples of N. America from four to twelve such societies occur in single tribes. One of the most famous was the Dog Men society of the Cheyenne, whose members came to be known as 'Dog Soldiers,' renowned for courage and endurance. Again, there are societies of a purely convivial nature, often with membership of both sexes, whose main purpose is entertainment or the preservation of some custom. Societies made up of tried warriors and of men approved in counsel have a political turn, dominating the affairs of the tribe and often establishing, by their habit, an ideal of decorum. Thus the Raritesharu of the Pawnees regards itself as the earthly counterpart of the star council forming the constellation Corona Borealis.

> The members of this society are chiefs, and they 'are permitted by the star chiefs to paint their faces with the blue lines [symbolizing the heavens] and to wear the downy feather [symbolizing the breath of life] on the head. The members of this society do not dance and sing; they talk quietly and try to be like the stars.'[2]

Societies of the type sketched are the natural outgrowths of tribal life, though frequently they are borrowings from neighbouring tribes. They commonly possess rites—dances and songs—peculiar to themselves. Entrance to membership is not automatic, but is more or less a matter of qualification and selection and is accompanied, as a rule, by ceremony. Thus, while their general nature is that of tribal degrees, they approach in character the secret societies in stricter sense.

As distinguished from the social societies, the secret societies (or 'fraternities,' as they are often called, although membership is often of both sexes) are such as have in charge some religious mystery. To be sure, in a life where nearly every activity is accompanied by religious observances this is not a clear criterion; and, in fact, the secret societies tend to assume a social importance, *i.e.* to become priesthoods. Thus, the Bow priesthood of the Zuñi is not only a society charged with its own esoteric ritual, but it has in charge the military affairs of the pueblo. The various fraternities which execute the rain-dances may similarly be regarded as priesthoods endowed with special appeals to the gods of rain and vegetation. Perhaps most such societies are the custodians of presumably therapeutic powers, ministering to the health or luck, not only of their own membership, but also of their tribes-fellows. Nevertheless, there is a fair distinction of these societies from those of a more social cast; their secret ceremonies tend to take the form of a teaching and transmission of a mystery, their public ceremonies the form of a dramatic display, and they demand of their initiates a special qualification, often in the nature of a supernatural sign or an exceptional experience.

The origin of secret societies is various. Where tribes are formed by the agglomeration of small groups or clans, the separate clans retain, in the tribal organization, the distinctive rites which they brought to it, forming the priesthood or sect of these rites; and, even after the clan system has broken down, ritualistic precedence is likely to be confined to descendants of the original bringers of the rites. The relation of the societies to the clan system appears most distinctly, perhaps, among the Iroquois, in some tribes of whom each clan had its own society. In general, the societies flourish as the clan organization decays, forming, as it were, a kind of mystery creed in substitution for the older gentile religion—though, even in a community where the societies are so important as in Zuñi, in certain cases membership to office still depends on clanship. The whole development is curiously reminiscent of the ancient mysteries of Eleusis, which, long after they had become open to the whole Attic State, and indeed to strangers, were still in the hands of the hierophantic Eumolpidæ and Kerykes.

But, while there is this residual relationship of the secret society to the clan, as an institution the societies seem rather to represent a new social order breaking through the rigid *encadrement* which clanship produces. The societies not only bring together members of the same tribe who are of different clans, but pass from tribe to tribe and even from linguistic stock to linguistic stock, vastly broadening the members' sense of relationship and introducing a spiritual kinship and a religious solidarity far beyond the reach of secular organization. As reflecting this function, the conditions of eligibility cease to be physical or political and become spiritual or supernatural. Sometimes a revelation to a group of people is the cause of the formation of a society. A curious illustration is that of the Struck-by-lightning fraternity of Zuñi, which originated in 1891 when five men, one a Navaho, and two women were rendered senseless by lightning striking the house in which they were—their common experience leading to their formation into a theurgical society. Among the Omaha all persons who have seen a buffalo in a dream become members of the Buffalo society, endowed with therapeutic powers. Membership in the various animal societies of the N.W. Coast Indians is commonly determined by some supernatural encounter with the beast-being that gives its name to the society. Again, a man may join a society as a consequence of being restored to health by its medicine—as is the case with the Zuñi skatophagic Galaxy fraternity. An individual is not necessarily restricted to membership in a single society, and in some cases, at least, the membership includes nominal Christians.

Thus the secret society holds a middle place in the Indian's religious economy between the more primitive group-rites reflecting clan and tribal organization and those broader intertribal dispensations, or 'religions,' for which the societies seem to prepare the way by their emphasis upon spiritual kinship rather than blood-relationship or political subordination.

2. Ritual form and content.—The formal rites of the societies are of a magical, therapeutic, and devotional character, with a turn for entertainment which assumes the form of dramatic portrayal. Purgation, continence, and fasting are the common preparations for initiation into and participation in these rites. Ceremonial lodges are erected or maintained for the secret rites; the public rites take place in the open. In the pueblos the several societies have their separate *kivas*, or underground chambers, while the public dances take place in the plazas. Masking and mummery are found from the east to the west, their highest developments occurring among the totemic tribes of the north-west of North America and in the pueblos of the south-west; among the ancient civilized peoples of Mexico and Peru; and among the tribes of north-western Brazil, although many other South American tribes, even including the Fuegians, have mask ceremonies. Symbolic paint-

[1] *Royal Commentaries*, Hakluyt Society, 1869, vi. xxiv.–xxviii.
[2] *22 RBEW*, pt. 2, p. 235.

ing of face and body, costuming, and the elaboration of ceremonial emblems are universal. A survey of the rites and usages brings before one constant suggestions of the Dionysiac development of the Greek theatre. The Kwakiutl of British Columbia divide the year into a sacred and a profane period; during the former personal names and indeed the whole social organization of the tribe are changed; the members of the societies—the 'seals,' or *mystæ*—form a group by themselves; initiates are supposed to be spirit-seized and in a kind of Bacchic frenzy tear the bodies of animals with nails and teeth or, in the case of the 'cannibals,' bite into the flesh of human beings (formerly slaves were slain and eaten). Again, in the pueblos of the United States the ceremonials centre in persons who personate and may, indeed, be said to embody gods and ancients, whose legendary acts they depict; and it is interesting to observe that satirical mockery and clownish acts, often obscene, are introduced into the festivals.[1]

The content of mysteries varies indefinitely. In the pueblos the most important ceremonies are dramatic prayers for rain and corn, accompanied by portrayals of the struggle of man with primal monsters. Feats of legerdemain, especially arrow-swallowing and sword-swallowing, are features of many performances, representing that acquisition of theurgic power which is one of the chief aims of society membership. Not all members are equally endowed, and two ranks are maintained in many societies, the higher being composed of the doctors. Knowledge of herbs and of such true medicinal art as primitive peoples possess is commonly imparted, a frequent name for the organizations, among the whites, being 'medicine societies.' Of these the most carefully studied, and perhaps the most elaborate in organization, is the Grand Medicine society, or Midē'wiwin, of the Ojibwa, a society both ancient and wide-spread in the Algonquian tribes. It is a secret society of four degrees, or 'lodges,' each higher degree taken by the initiate imparting to him added therapeutic and magical powers; these powers consist in a practical knowledge of herbs, in powers of communion with the supernatural—powers that might be described as clairvoyant, clairaudient, mediumistic, prophetic; and it is rather curious to find much of the paraphernalia and repertoire of the spiritualistic sect in use by the Midé shamans—all these powers centring in the idea of help and healing from a more than human source.

The mythologic background of the Midé mysteries may be characterized as the portrayal of the path from earth to heaven, as it was established in creation and as it is perpetuated in the ordinations of the creative powers. Knowledge of this 'Way' is the source of spiritual accomplishment. A similar idea underlies the important mystery of the Plains tribes, which is best known from Alice C. Fletcher's Pawnee version.[2] This extraordinary ritual—perhaps the most elaborate evolved by any American Indians — is not the possession of a secret society, in any formal sense, but has been passed from tribe to tribe by participation and preserved by priestly tradition. It presents surprising parallels to the Eleusinian mysteries—or to what is known of the latter.

The essentials of the rite are a mystic representation of the union of Father Heaven and Mother Earth and the resultant birth of a Spirit of Life, primarily a Corn-spirit. This event is in part a kind of theogonic myth, but in a nearer sense it is regarded as a forthfiguring of animal procreation and human parenthood—*i.e.*, it is a dramatic prayer for food and children; and thus it becomes a symbol of the perpetuity of life, tribal and individual.

The rite is undertaken only in the open season, spring, summer, or autumn, when life is astir. It falls, like the Eleusinian mysteries, into three parts: first, a period of purification and of the preparation of the *sacra*; second, a journey, in which the party of the 'Father,' bearing the *hako* (the sacred articles) and singing the 'songs of the Way,' are led by the Corn-spirit to the abode of the 'Son'; and third, the final ceremonies, consisting in part of a public festival, in part of a secret mystery—a dramatic portrayal of the birth of a sacred child. It is interesting to note that the *sacra* include winged wands—emblems of the evangels, mediating between Earth and Heaven—and an ear of corn, the symbol of the spirit of fruitfulness and life.

As in Greece the season of the mysteries was a season of truce, so the *Hako* was a ceremony of peace. War parties turned aside when they saw the bearers of the winged wands, and the bringing of the ceremony from tribe to tribe was a kind of pact of peace, symbolized by the 'Father' of the one tribe adopting as his 'Son' that man of the other to whom the rite was borne; chiefs commonly personated these rôles.

The further step, found in the classical mysteries, of symbolizing a life to come does not appear in this ceremony. It is not, however, without parallel in American mysteries. Zuñi boys are initiated into the Kotikili society, membership in which is necessary in order that a man may enter the dance-house of the gods after death. The initiation ceremony appears to symbolize a rebirth; girls are rarely initiated. The Omaha Shell society centres in a mystic revelation of the gift of life—first, of successful hunting, food, in this world; second, assurance of happy entrance into a life to come.

3. Religious sects.—The demarcation between such intertribal mysteries as the *Hako* ceremony and the somewhat more open sects or dispensations usually called 'religions' is a wavering one. Thus the 'Drum religion' of the Ojibwa appears to have originated in the peace-pact ceremony between this people and the Sioux. It has developed, however, into something more; it has become a religion not only of peace, but of righteous living.

Wiskino, owner of one of the sacred drums which are the symbols of this religion, said: 'I will keep this drum in my house. There will always be tobacco beside it and the drum pipe will always be filled. When I smoke at home I will use the pipe that belongs to the drum. My friends will come to my house to visit the drum. Sometimes my wife and I will have a little feast of our own beside the drum, and we will ask the drum to strengthen us in our faith and resolution to live justly and to wrong no one. When my wife and I do this alone there will be no songs. Only special men may sing the songs of the drum, and my part is that of speaker.'[1]

But, in the majority of cases, aboriginal 'religions' are the outcome of prophetic revelations and, in so far as they are reformatory, may even be hostile to the older rites. When Handsome Lake, the Seneca prophet, undertook to reform his tribe's religion, the societies were ordered to dissolve and the old mysteries to be discarded. Gradually, however, they re-asserted themselves, and the older religion came to be regarded as a sort of Old Dispensation in contrast to the New Religion. Kanakuk, the Kickapoo prophet, whose revelation was to lead to a land of peace and plenty in this world and show the 'Way' to happiness in the next, enjoined a similar break with old traditions; and in a degree this is true of the 'religions' of all the famous Indian prophets —Tenskwatawa ('the open door'), Smohalla, Wovoka—men whose primary intention appears to have been a doctrine of Messianic salvation, but whose followers, under the press of white encroachment, have been led to regard it as the credo of a pan-tribal revolt in this world as well as of spiritual freedom in the next. Cf. artt. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American), PROPHECY (American).

LITERATURE.—The most comprehensive survey of the general subject of secret societies is H. Webster, *Primitive Secret*

[1] Cf. art. DRAMA (American).

[2] 'The Hako,' *22 RBEW*, pt. 2.

[1] *Bull. 53 BE* (1913), p. 143; cf. art. MUSIC (American).

Societies, New York, 1908. H. Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde*, Berlin, 1902, and A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, give admirable analyses of special phases of the subject. For N. America see esp. J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 457–498, 'Secret Societies among the Indians of the United States,' and pp. 499–550, 'Secret Societies among the Indians of North-West America'; *Bull. 30 BE*, artt. 'Military Societies,' 'Secret Societies'; *The Mythology of All Races*, x. *North American*, Boston, 1916 (H. B. Alexander); and, for detailed reports, esp. *RBEW* vii. (1891), 'The Midē'wiwin' (W. J. Hoffman); xi. (1894), 'A Study of Siouan Cults' (J. O. Dorsey); xiv. (1896), 'The Ghost-dance Religion' (J. Mooney); xv. (1897), 'Siouan Sociology' (J. O. Dorsey), 'Tusayan Katcinas' (J. W. Fewkes); xxi. (1903), 'Hopi Katcinas' (J. W. Fewkes); xxii. (1904), 'The Hako' (A. C. Fletcher); xxiii. (1904), 'The Zuñi Indians' (M. C. Stevenson); xxvii. (1911), 'The Omaha Tribe' (A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche). The writings of F. Boas are the first authority for the customs of the Indians of the North-West Coast, esp. 'The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians,' *Rep. U.S. National Museum for 1895*, Washington, 1897; while a summary of the subject for this interesting section is given by E. Sapir, 'The Social Organization of the West Coast Tribes,' *Trans. of the Royal Soc. of Canada*, ix. [1915]. The writings of F. Cushing, J. W. Fewkes, and M. C. Stevenson describe the societies of the Pueblo Indians; and for the societies of the Plains tribes Clark Wissler, 'Societies of the Plains Indians,' *Anthrop. Papers of the Amer. Mus. of Nat. History*, xi. [1916], is the most comprehensive study. For a survey of the *Hako*, comparatively considered, see H. B. Alexander, *The Mystery of Life*, Chicago, 1913. Important articles are *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xi. [1909], 'Secret Societies of the Seneca' (A. C. Parker), and xii. [1910], 'The Great Mysteries of the Cheyenne' (G. B. Grinnell). For Central and S. America the materials are scattered in many sources, old and recent. A select bibliography, classified by regions, will be found in *The Mythology of All Races*, xi. *American (Latin)*, Boston, 1919 (H. B. Alexander). A number of artt. describing mask and similar ceremonies will be found in the *Comptes rendus* of the Congresses of Americanists, Paris and elsewhere, 1878 ff. Among recent descriptive works of special pertinence may be named, Th. Koch-Grünberg, *Zwei Jahren unter den Indianern. Reisen in Nordwest-Brasilien, 1903–1905*, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1909; Karl von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1897; and Thomas Whiffen, *The Northwest Amazons*, New York, 1916.

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SECRET SOCIETIES (Melanesian and Polynesian). — **1. Melanesian.** — Secret fraternities abound in Melanesia. Initiation is an arduous process, and women are rigorously excluded. The members of these fraternities do not appear to have a secret cult, but they are regarded as being in close association with ancestral ghosts. These are represented by the members, clad in special dresses and masks, terrifying to the uninitiated. Like the African societies, these fraternities are powerful in maintaining law and order; and, apart from the power of the chiefs, they form the tribal government, holding courts, exacting fines—the delinquent being visited by the masked persons—and imposing tabus on certain places and on fruit-trees.[1] Possession of a sacred enclosure (*tareu*) was general among these societies, with a lodge-room where the dresses were prepared, where the members met, and whence the spirit-personators emerged. No woman, uninitiated man, or boy might approach the *tareu*.

Among these fraternities the Duk-Duk of New Britain, the Solomon Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago is well known.

Its chiefs decide when the ceremonies are to begin and the number of boys to be initiated. These are then collected on the beach, where preliminary ceremonies take place, including striking the youths so that they sometimes faint or even die. Then they are taken to the *tareu* with their entrance fee, and there admission to the society takes place. To each candidate is appointed a Duk-Duk guardian, and they learn about the masks and dresses, dances, and secrets. All this continues for some weeks, and then Duk-Duk is supposed to be sick and near death, and the dresses are burnt.

Where crimes against native law have been committed, Duk-Duk exacts fines, though this frequently degenerates into gross extortion. But the people fear Duk-Duk so much that they submit. For the same reason the tabu of Duk-Duk on fruit-trees, which may be had for a fee, is widely respected.[1]

Another society is the Ingiet, or Iniat, of the Bismarck Archipelago, with many local branches, each presided over by a *tena kikiuwana*, or magician, whose help is available in time of sickness. He possesses knowledge of the spirits and power of controlling them, also the secrets of the dances and of magic ritual; and by his magic he can cause death.

The members of the society meet in a place called *marawot*, in which the dances take place, but which the uninitiated may not visit on pain of death by the spirits. A special part of it is visited by the *tena* alone and contains the images of the fraternity, the abode of dangerous spirits. Certain foods are tabu to members. The nature of this fraternity is little known, though witchcraft seems to be its main purpose. Initiation takes place in the bush, where the youths are fed with certain foods which are tabu to them ever after. These are pork, shark, turtle, and dog, and may represent earlier totems.[2]

In the eastern islands of Torres Straits the Bomai-Malu organization has two divisions—'shark men,' who are the principal men of the order, and another class of singers and drum-beaters. At the ceremonial ritual songs and dances take place, and there is an exhibition of masks to the newly-initiated, who are also taught religious and social duties. The society punishes sacrilege or breaches of discipline.[3]

2. Polynesia.—In Polynesia something analogous to these fraternities was that of the Areoi of the Society and neighbouring islands. The origin of the Areoi was the subject of myths and was connected with the gods.

The brothers of Oro, Orotetefu and Urutetefu, were made by him the first Areoi. One of them had transformed himself into a pig and a bunch of feathers as gifts to Oro, afterwards assuming his original form, though the gifts remained. A pig and a bunch of feathers were therefore important offerings in the Areoi festivals. At first there were ten Areoi, nominated by the two brothers, and chosen from different islands, with power to admit others to the order. The principal Areoi in later times bore the same names as they. The tutelar deities of the fraternity were Oro and his brothers.

There were seven classes of ascending rank in the society, indicated by different tatus, and numerous servants attended each class. Wives of the Areoi were also members, but infanticide had to be practised by all members according to the orders of Oro's brothers, who lived in celibacy.

Admission to the order was supposed to be directed by divine inspiration during a long novitiate. Then the candidate, in an excited state, appeared at one of the public Areoi exhibitions and, having been approved, was given a long period of probation. He received a new name and had to murder his children. During his stay in the lower grades he learned the sacred songs, dances, and dramatic exhibitions. Admission to the various grades was costly, and the higher grades were most expensive of all. Admission took place in the *marais*, or men's houses, a sacred pig being put in the hands of the postulant and offered to the gods. Then the tatu marks were put on him, and feasting, dances, and pantomimic displays followed.

The mysteries of Oro were celebrated by the fraternity, the hymns describing the life of the gods, but the highest secrets and cult were known to members of the upper grades alone. The members were believed to be allied to the gods, yet they indulged freely in lusts. They were supported by chiefs and people, and for them was reserved the fabled sensuous Elysium of the future, Rohutunoanoa, on a mountain in Raiatea. Special ceremonies marked the death and funeral of a member. After elaborate sacrifices the members set out for other islands to perform their plays, or *upaupa*—dramatic recitals of the divine myths, with dances and hymns, often of an obscene character. Special houses were erected, and the members were sumptuously entertained by the chiefs at the expense of the people.[4]

[1] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 270 ff.

[1] Brown, p. 60 ff.; R. Parkinson, *Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee*, Stuttgart, 1907, p. 567 ff.

[2] Brown, pp. 72 ff., 273; Graf von Pfeil, *JAI* xxvii. [1897] 181 ff.

[3] *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropol. Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1908, vi. 169 ff.

[4] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832–36, i. 229 ff.; R. P. Lesson, *Voyage autour du monde sur La Coquille*, Paris, 1838–39, i. 421.

Parallel institutions were known in the Marianne and Caroline islands.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned in the notes, see H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, London, 1908, and 'Totem Clans and Secret Associations in Australia and Melanesia,' *JRAI* xli. [1911] 482 ff.

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SECTS.

Buddhist (T. W. RHYS DAVIDS), p. 307.
Chinese (T. RICHARD), p. 309.
Christian (W. T. WHITLEY), p. 315.
Hindu (W. CROOKE), p. 329.
Japanese.—See JAPAN.
Jewish (I. ABRAHAMS), p. 332.
Muslim.—See MUHAMMADANISM.
Russian (K. GRASS and A. VON STROMBERG), p. 332.
Samaritan (N. SCHMIDT), p. 343.
Tibetan.—See LAMAISM.
Zoroastrian (E. EDWARDS), p. 345.

SECTS (Buddhist). — In none of the older books—the four *Nikāyas*, *e.g.*, or the *Sutta Nipāta*—is there any mention of sects. Divisions or dissensions in the order are referred to as follows. He who stirs up such dissensions is guilty of a 'black act' (*kammaṃ kaṇhaṃ*).[1] When diversities of opinion exist, it is not a suitable time for effort or energy in self-training.[2] Four reasons—not complimentary—are given for members of the order approving of such divisions.[3] In one passage 'ten points' (*dasa vatthūni*) are given as constituting such a division in the order (*saṅghabhedo*). These are: the setting forth as truth what is not truth, and *vice versa*; as a rule of the order what is not such a rule, and *vice versa*; as the word or the practice or the precept of the Master what he had not said or practised or enjoined, and *vice versa*.[4] The same ten points are elsewhere stated to result in harm to the laity.[5] Here it is said that by means of these ten points members of the order drag others after them, draw them asunder, hold separate sessions of the chapter at which the formal business of the order is conducted, and recite the *Pātimokkha* (the 227 rules of the order) at such separate sessions. This is a step towards the foundation of a sect. It is not merely a difference of opinion; it is also an innovation in the conduct of business. But there is no question so far of a sect in the European sense—*i.e.* of a body of believers in one or more doctrines not held by the majority, a body with its own endowments, its own churches or chapels, and its own clergy ordained by itself. In the *Vinaya* we get a little farther, but it is still no question of a sect. Devadatta (*q.v.*), to whose schism the 17th *khandaka* is devoted, did not originate a sect of Buddhists; he founded a separate order of his own, whose members ceased to be followers of the Buddha. At the end of the chapter, or *khandaka*, devoted to this subject we are told of the Buddha being questioned by Upāli as to what amounts to a division in the Saṅgha (the order). The reply is the repetition of the above-mentioned ten points, but with eight other points added—points in which *bhikkhus* put offences against a rule of the order under a wrong category, calling a minor offence a serious one, and so on. Thus we get eighteen occasions for dissension in the order, leading up to the holding of separate meetings of the chapter of the order.

Unfortunately we have no historical instance of this having actually happened. There is, however, a case put in illustration of the working of one of the later rules. It occurs in the 10th *khandaka*,[6] the whole of which is concerned with this matter of dissension in the order. There may be some historical foundation for this case, but it is more probably, like so many others, purely hypothetical. It is as follows:

A *bhikkhu* (no name is given) thought he had broken one of the rules (which of the rules is not specified). His companions in the settlement thought he had not. Then they changed their minds: he thought he had not broken the rule, they thought he had, and, when he refused to adopt their view, they held a formal meeting of the order and called upon him to retire—in fact, expelled him. The *bhikkhu* then issued an appeal to other members of the order dwelling in the vicinity, and they took his side. All this being told to the Buddha, he is reported to have said to the expelling party that they should not look only at the particular point in dispute; if the supposed offender be a learned and religious man, they should also consider the possibility of his being so far right that, in consequence of their action, a dissension might arise in the order. He also went to the partisans of the supposed offender and told them, in like manner, that they should consider, not only the particular question, but the possibility of their action leading to dissension. Now the party of the supposed offender held their chapter meetings within the boundary; the other party, to avoid meeting them, held their meetings outside the boundary. The story ends[1] with the restoration, at his own request, and at a full chapter held within the boundary, of the expelled *bhikkhu*.

It should be remembered that the order was scattered throughout the countryside, which was divided, for the purpose of carrying out its business, into districts, each about equal in size to two or three English country parishes. Meetings were held as a rule once a fortnight, and every member of the order dwelling within the boundary of the district had either to attend or send to the chapter the reason for his non-attendance. The meeting was quite democratic. All were equal. Each member present had one vote. The senior member present presided and put the resolutions to the meeting; but he had no authority and no casting vote. He was simply *primus inter pares*. If, then, as in the case just put, a meeting of some only of the resident members in a district was held outside the boundary, all the proceedings of such a chapter became invalid. It will be seen, therefore, how very important the fair fixing of such boundaries (*sīmāyo*) was to the preservation of the freedom and self-government of the order.

Another fact should also be remembered. No one of the 227 rules of the order refers to any question of dogma or belief or metaphysics. No member of the order had any power over any other (except by way of personal influence) in respect of the opinions which the other held. There was no vow of obedience. Of all religious orders mentioned in the history of religions the Buddhist was the one in which there was the greatest freedom, the greatest variety, of thought. One consequence of this, we find, was that, as the centuries passed by, an increasing number of new ideas, not found in the earliest period, became more prevalent among the members of the order. The rules of the order concern such matters of conduct as were involved in the equal division of the limited personal property, held socialistically by the order, among its several members. They are mostly sumptuary regulations or points of etiquette.[2] Beliefs or opinions are left free. And this spirit of freedom seems, as far as we can judge, to have survived all through the centuries of Buddhism in India and China.

[1] *Aṅguttara*, ii. 234, iii. 146, 436, 439.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 66, 105.
[3] *Ib.* ii. 229.
[4] *Ib.* i. 119.
[5] *Ib.* v. 73 *f.*
[6] *Vinaya*, i. 337–342 (tr. *SBE* xvii. 285–291); cf. *Majjhima*, iii. 152 ff.

[1] *Vinaya*, i. 345 f.
[2] See art. PĀTIMOKKHA.

About 100 years after the Buddha's death there was a formidable dissension in the order, which led to the well-known Council of Vesāli. This dissension was raised by a party of the *bhikkhus* resident there who put forward their ten points (*dasa vatthūni*). It is quite possible that they chose the number ten, and made use of the technical term 'ten points,' in deference to the tradition of the older, and quite different, ten points explained above. Their points were ten relaxations in the sumptuary rules of the order. The manner in which the contest was carried on by both sides, and was finally settled, is related in full in the last chapter (a supplementary chapter) in the *khandakas*.[1] In this, the oldest, account of the matter there is no mention of the starting of any sect. Each individual on both sides was at the beginning of the controversy, and remained at the end of it, a member of the Buddhist order.

The next work to be considered is the *Kathā Vatthu*, edited for the Pāli Text Society, and translated under the title of *Points of Controversy*. The book, probably of gradual growth, was put into its present shape by Tissa in the middle of the 3rd cent. B.C.; and it discusses about 200 questions on which different opinions were then held by different members of the order. About a score of these are questions as to the personality of a Buddha; another score are on the characteristics of the *arahant*, the fully converted man, who has reached, in this world, the end of the Ariyan 'path.' Three questions are on the nature of the gods, and four on the nature of the Saṅgha. The rest are disputes on points of cosmology, psychology, or ethics. The whole gives a valuable picture of the great diversity of opinion in the order, sometimes on questions which now seem unimportant, but for the most part on matters of the greatest interest for Buddhists who wished to understand, in detail, the scheme of life unfolded in the more ancient books. No one will dispute the evidence of this collection of 'points of controversy' as to the abounding life of the new movement and the wide liberty of thought involved in its teaching. But opinions may differ as to the advantages and disadvantages of the complete absence of any authoritative power in the order. We can find in the 'points of controversy' the germs of almost all the astoundingly divergent and even contradictory beliefs which grew in power and influence through the succeeding centuries, and which, though always put forward under the name of Buddhism, resulted in the fall of Buddhism in India, and in its transformation in Tibet, and still more in Japan, into rival sects. The only authority recognized by both sides in each of these 'points of controversy' is the actual wording of the more ancient documents of the Pāli canon; and in many cases the controversy turns on diverse interpretations of ambiguous terms in that wording. Of course all the supposed disputants in the book are members of the one Buddhist Saṅgha. There is no mention of sects, or even of differing schools of thought.

Unfortunately, after the date of the *Points of Controversy* there is a gap of many centuries before we get any further evidence. The few books still extant which date nearest to the canon are four or five centuries later; and they—*e.g.*, the *Divyāvadāna*, the *Netti*, and the *Milinda*—do not consider the matter worthy of their attention. Then suddenly, in the 4th and 5th centuries of our era—*i.e.* about 1000 years after the founding of Buddhism—we find the famous list of eighteen 'sects' supposed to have arisen and to have flourished before the canon was closed. These are at first simply lists of names.[1] The list is first found in Ceylon; but similar lists of a later date—three of them from Tibetan, five from Chinese, sources—have also been traced.[2] Each list contains eighteen names. But the names differ; and the total amounts to nearly thirty. All the lists agree that the Theravādino, 'those who hold the opinions of the Elders,' was the original body out of which the others gradually arose. The order in which they are said to have thus arisen is set out in tabular form in the introduction to the *Points of Controversy*.[3] A few details of the opinions maintained by some of these schools, or tendencies of thought, are given either along with the lists or in the commentary on the *Points of Controversy*. These are curt and scrappy, often obscure, and not seldom contradictory. But one general conclusion we may already safely draw. Precisely as in the earliest days of Christianity the most far-reaching disputes were on the details of Christology, so among the Buddhists the most weighty ones were on the personality of a Buddha; and the greatest innovations came, in India, from the pagan region in the extreme north-west.

Apart from these questions of doctrine there is a remarkable silence about other differences. There is not a hint of any difference in church government, in dress, in ritual, in public or private religious observances, in finance, in the custody of buildings or property, in the ordination or the powers of the clergy, or in the gradation of authority among them. This silence is suggestive.

Now in the oldest regulations of the order a whole *khandaka* deals with the duties of the brethren towards other brethren who propose, on their travels, to stay at any settlement occupied by the order.[4] It is entirely concerned with questions of courteous treatment on both sides—that of the residents and that of the 'incoming' or 'outgoing' *bhikkhus*. Every member of the order is to be equally welcomed. No inquiry is to be made as to opinion. The relation is to be one of host and guest. The story told by the Chinese pilgrims to India shows that in the 4th cent. of our era, and again in the 7th cent., these customs were still adhered to.[5] At the time when the pilgrims were in India monasteries had taken the place of the older settlements. Brethren belonging to different 'sects' (according to the lists of eighteen above referred to) were found dwelling in the same monastery.

If we take all this evidence together, it is possible to draw only one conclusion. There were no 'sects' in India, in any proper use of that term. There were different tendencies of opinion, named after some teacher (just as we talk of 'Puseyites'), or after some locality (as we used to talk of 'the Clapham sect'), or after the kind of view dominant (just as we use 'Broad' or 'Low' Church). All the followers of such views designated by the terms or names occurring in any of the lists were members of the same order and had no separate organization of any kind.

The number eighteen is fictitious and may very probably be derived from the eighteen moral causes of division set out above. As the so-called sects were tendencies of opinion, the number of them was constantly changing, and at no time or place which we can fix were more than three or four of them of any great importance. Two or three could, and did, exist at the same time, not only in the same monastery, but in the same mind.

[1] Tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. (*SBE* xx.) 386–414; see also art. Councils (Buddhist).

[1] *Dīpavaṃsa*, v. 39 ff.; *Mahāvaṃsa*, ch. v.
[2] See Geiger's tr. of the *Mahāvaṃsa*, p. 277.
[3] Pp. xxvii, xxxvi–xxxvii.
[4] Eighth *khandaka*, tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 272–298.
[5] All the passages relating to this matter have been tabulated and summarized by the present writer in an art. in *JRAS*, 1891.

The expression of these ideas was at first in Pāli. Very little of this has survived. But later there are Sanskrit books, mostly as yet not edited, containing detailed statements of the most trustworthy kind of the views of the Sarvāstivādins (*q.v.*), and perhaps of some others.

The condition of things is very much the same in all Buddhist countries at the present day, and even in China. In Ceylon,[1] *e.g.*, there are said to be three 'sects'—the Siamese, the Burmese, and the Rāmañña. They all belong to the same order (Saṅgha). The Siamese — so called because its members were originally ordained by Siamese *bhikkhus* — admit only high-caste laymen to the order and habitually wear their upper robe over the left shoulder only, differing in both these points from the early Buddhists. The members of the other two confraternities reject both these innovations, and the Rāmañña *bhikkhus*, who are very few in number, claim to be particularly strict in the observance of all the ancient rules. But the religious and philosophical opinions of all three are practically the same. We have no information as to the financial arrangements. Probably each *bhikkhu* recognized by any of these three confraternities would be legally entitled to his share in any land or other property held by the order as a whole. They may, and do, take part together in public religious services, such as the preaching of *Baṇa* (the Word). They hold separate meetings of the chapter for the admission of new *bhikkhus*. The laity look upon them all with equal respect, considering them as members of the one Saṅgha. There is said to be, in quite recent years, a tendency in the Siyama Samāgama (the Siamese confraternity) to break up into, or give rise to, other small confraternities. In Burma[2] there have been continual differences of opinion (*e.g.*, on the question of boundary, *sīmā*). Certain *bhikkhus* have also claimed a superior orthodoxy on the ground that they had been trained either in Ceylon or by others who had been admitted there. But nothing is known of the establishment of any sect apart from the order; and the old differences have now been settled. Of Siam and Annam we know very little; the conditions there seem to have resembled those in Burma.

In all these countries discussion has tended to recur to the ancient faith. In China[3] the deification of the symbols of the old ideas, begun already in India, has been carried on until Chinese Buddhism, to a careless observer, seems to have relapsed altogether into polytheism. But that is true only of the multitude. The more thoughtful members of the order, even in China, have been able always, in different degrees, to see behind the deified symbols. There are practically only two schools of thought—the mystics and the Amidists (the believers in Amitābha). Every member of the order belongs more or less to both schools; and at the present day the whole order, being thus both mystic and theistic, has arrived at more or less of unity, even of opinion. But the history of the differences and innovations all through the centuries shows as yet (the present writer cannot say what further research may not discover) no evidence at all of any 'sects' in our sense of the word. The order has been, and still remains, one.[4]

In Japan[5] the case is different. There is a Japanese work, apparently of the 19th cent. of our era, giving an account of twelve separate sects—separate either in dress, in beliefs, in church government, or in finance. We have this little work in two European translations, one into English by Bunyiu Nanjio,[1] and one into French by R. Fujishima.[2] Its author or authors are lamentably deficient in even the most elementary knowledge of historical criticism; and they do not make clear whether, or how far, all these sects are really existing now. But it gives the names and dates of the teachers who introduced each of the sects from China and the names of the books (mostly Chinese translations of late works in Buddhist Sanskrit) on which they respectively rely. The oldest of these works is the *Abhidharma-koṣa-vyākhyā*, of about the 12th cent. of Indian Buddhism, and the latest is the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha*, of unknown date. It is curious to note that these authorities breathe the same spirit. There are differences on minor points, but not such differences as are adequate in themselves to explain to a European the breaking up into different sects. Lafcadio Hearn unfortunately refuses to say anything about it.[3] Possibly the formation of a new sect was the expression of personal devotion to a new teacher. Or possibly the real cause of division was not so much religious or philosophic differences as difference in systems of church government. But the fact remains that in Japan there are sects. The Saṅgha has been broken up. See also artt. HINAYĀNA, TIBET, SARVĀSTIVĀDINS.

LITERATURE.—*Aṅguttara*, 6 vols., ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, *PTS*, Oxford, 1885–1910; *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, 5 vols., ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879–83; *Majjhima-Nikāya*, ed. V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, *PTS*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1888–99; *Vinaya Texts*, tr. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, do. 1881–85 (*SBE* xiii., xvii., xx.); *Kathā Vatthu*, *PTS*, do. 1894–97; *Points of Controversy* (tr. of last), *PTS*, London, 1915; *Dipavaṃsa*, ed. H. Oldenberg, do. 1879; *Mahāvaṃsa*, ed. and tr. W. Geiger, *PTS*, do. 1908–12.

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SECTS (Chinese).—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—There are eight religions in China: (1) Confucianism, the most ancient, grew out of the religion of the mythical past in the days of Yao and Shun (2356 B.C.); (2) Taoism, the philosophic, mystic, and magical, arose about the 6th cent. B.C.; its founder, Lao-tse, was contemporary with Confucius; (3) Buddhism was introduced by the Chinese emperor who invited missionaries from India in A.D. 61; (4) Muhammadanism: Muhammad's maternal uncle came to China as religious ambassador in 628; in 757, after helping to put down a serious rebellion, 4000 Uigur Muslims settled in China; this was five years after al-Mansur had founded Baghdād, the city of the Khalīfahs, which was destroyed by the Mongols in 1258; (5) Nestorian Christianity: Alopen, with a group of Syrian missionaries, arrived at Sian-fu in 635; they were encouraged by the Government and spread widely; (6) Manichæism came from Babylon about this time; (7) Lāmaism appeared in China in the Mongol dynasty (1280–1368); (8) Wahhābī Muslims arrived in 1787.

These were the main streams of religion, but each had many sects.

II. *HISTORY AND ENUMERATION.*—1. General.—By a secret sect one generally understands an esoteric religion known only to the initiated. In almost every country, and in connexion with most religions, there have been secret sects, with their mysteries, initiatory rites, and so forth. In China also they have existed for many centuries. Sometimes they have implied a protest or revolt against established authority which demanded uniformity of opinion and practice in religion and politics. The secret sects are chiefly religious, and the secret societies chiefly political; but the two are intimately

1 See art. CEYLON BUDDHISM.
2 See art. BURMA AND SIAM (Buddhism in).
3 See art. CHINA (Buddhism in).
4 On this question see the admirable summary of R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913, ch. v.
5 See art. JAPAN, II. 2.

1 *Short Hist. of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, Tokyo, 1887.
2 *Le Bouddhisme japonais*, Paris, 1889.
3 *Japan: an Attempt at Interpretation*, New York, 1904, p. 230.

connected with one another in China. Most of the chief secret sects have at one time or another been involved in politics, and taken a large part in many revolutions, or have been supposed to do so by the Government. Many were almost purely religious, the members living ascetic lives, abstaining from meat, and trying to acquire merit. Some originated in the early ages, and nearly all have grown out of the old Taoism, Buddhism, and ideal Confucianism, as is seen by their names. The Mahāyāna, Maitreya, White Lotus, Perfect Intelligence, are manifestly more Buddhistic; the Eight Diagrams is more Taoistic and Confucian.

We find a very large number of sect names, but the number of parent sects is small. Each larger community had many offshoots, which frequently took other names; and the same sect seems to have been known by different names at different times. When scattered by persecution, they took new names to mislead their persecutors.

The Buddhist element, with some admixture of early Christianity, seems to have predominated; and that is natural when we consider that Buddhism, both primitive and higher, preached a doctrine of salvation for all, in this life and the life to come, and thus satisfied the yearnings of the people. It taught that love to all that lives and breathes and the performance of good works were the means of obtaining this salvation, which was for any one who chose. So there arose lay communities whose members helped one another on the road to salvation. There were communities for abstaining from animal food, so as to avoid taking life, for rescuing animals from death, for the worship of particular saints, etc.; but the aim of all was the same, viz. the attainment of salvation. In the early days salvation was sought in the conventual life, but the State destroyed thousands of the monasteries and forced the inmates out into the world. The search for truth and immortality, however, was not easily suppressed; those whom the State tried to suppress formed the sects and because of persecution were obliged to hold their meetings in secret. Apparently dispersed and destroyed, they sprang up under another name. Their rites consisted chiefly in reciting formulas and Buddhist *Sūtras* and in burning incense, their practices in vegetarianism and the performance of good works. If the State had left them alone, they would have been harmless, but persecution more than once forced them into rebellion.

There have also been in China societies, like the famous Heaven and Earth Society (Tien-ti Hui) and the Kwo Lao Hui, which are confessedly of a political nature with revolutionary objects, though there is much that is Buddhistic in their origin and symbolism. They are of the class of religious societies which the State persecutes for heresy, which therefore closely fraternize for mutual help, and which are denounced by the State as hotbeds of rebellion and mutiny.

It will be well here to give a list of the principal secret sects known in China, bearing in mind that about many of them very little is known, as the Government has burnt their books again and again, and that probably they include some which are only branches of a larger community. De Groot[1] mentions the names of 68. The chief ones were: (1) Mahāyāna, (2) Maitreya, (3) Pai-lien, or White Lotus, (4) Pai-yun, or White Cloud, (5) Hung Yang (one of the Lo Hwai sects), or Red Ocean, (6) Pai Yang, or White Ocean, (7) Sien-tien, or Pre-Celestial, (8) Wu-wei, or Non-acting (natural), (9) Fen-hiang, or Incense-Burners, (10) Kin Tan Kiao, or Pill of Immortality, (11) Mi Mi Kiao, or Very Secret, (12) Pah-kwa, or Eight Diagrams, (13) Lung-hwa.

[1] *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, index.

Of secret societies we may mention: (1) Tien-ti Hui, Triad or Heaven and Earth Society, (2) Taipings, (3) Kwo Lao Hui, (4) Reform Society.

A large part of our knowledge of the sects is gleaned from Government persecution decrees. These reveal some interesting phenomena of Chinese religious life; they tell us with what undaunted zeal the sects sent out their branches in different directions, how indestructible they were, how powerful an organization bound together the numerous fraternities, how strong must have been the influence of the religion which effected all this, and how the sects, arming in self-defence, often made the Sons of Heaven tremble upon their throne.

2. The principal sects.—(*a*) *Mahāyāna.*—Just as Christianity arose out of Judaism and in its early days was referred to as a Jewish sect, so the Mahāyāna sect arose out of primitive Buddhism. The doctrines of primitive Buddhism, as taught by the first disciples of Śākyamuni, were afterwards known as the Hīnayāna (*q.v.*), the Smaller or Southern Vehicle, because largely followed in Ceylon and Burma in the south of Asia. The new school of Buddhism was called Mahāyāna (*q.v.*), the Greater or Northern Vehicle, because followed mainly in the north of Asia, China, Tibet, and Japan. Its chief sacred book, *Ki Shin Lun* ('Awakening of Faith'), was written by Aśvaghoṣa (called in Chinese Ma-ming Pusa) about the end of the 1st cent. of the Christian era. This is about the same size as the Gospel of Mark and is of immense importance. From it we find what striking contrasts there were between the old and the new Buddhism.

(1) The old Buddhism was atheistic; the new was theistic; (2) the old Buddhism taught salvation by man's own efforts; the new trusted also in the help of God; (3) the old Buddhism believed that men should retire from this evil world and seek their own salvation; the new believed that the highest virtue consisted in living in the world and seeking to save others; (4) the old Buddhism believed in the necessity of possible countless transmigrations before final deliverance; the new taught that men passed into paradise immediately after death, without transmigration.[1]

(*b*) *Maitreya.*—This must have originated from the study of a remarkable prophecy of Śākyamuni Buddha, which strongly reminds one of the Jewish prophecies of the coming Messiah. In the 'Diamond Sutra' (*King Kang King*), ch. vi., he speaks to this effect:

'Five hundred years after my death, there will rise another Teacher of religion (Maitreya) who will produce faith by the fulfilment of this prophecy. You should know that He will plant the root of His teaching, not in one, two, three, four or five Buddhas, nor in ten thousand Buddhas, but plant it at the root of all the Buddhas; when that One comes, according to this prophecy, then have faith in Him at once, and you will obtain incalculable blessings.'[2]

(*c*) *White Lotus* (*Pai-lien*).—This is the most notorious of all the sects. It seems to have been identical with the White Ocean and Incense-Smelling sects and to be closely connected with others, such as Perfect Intelligence and Mahāyāna. De Groot says:

'Possibly it is the greatest religious corporation in China, embracing all the others, or at least the chief ones.' It has flourished over a very wide area, if not over the whole realm. 'It has for centuries had a leading part in China's history, both as the chief object of persecution and as the mightiest rebel power.'

It existed in China as early as the 4th century. The goal of its members, like that of most of the sects, was salvation in the western paradise. The patron saint was Maitreya, the coming Buddha, the Messiah, for whom all longed, and who was to bring deliverance from oppression and persecution and restore the Church of Buddha to its ideal glory. For several ages we hear little of it, but in the 11th cent. the sect was patronized by the

[1] See Richard, *The New Testament of Higher Buddhism*, p. 48.
[2] *Ib.* p. 131.

then reigning emperor. It is mentioned in the 15th cent. as making common cause with rebels, and its members were severely persecuted. It had gradually grown to be a great power and could lead out armies. Because of the violence of the persecution it rose and helped to bring about the downfall of the Yuen (Mongol) dynasty. It sent thousands of its members against the Mings during the great insurrection and largely sapped that dynasty and led to its downfall. It was said to have no fewer than 2,000,000 adherents in Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Szechuen, and Chihli.

(*d*) *Lo Hwai*.—These include the *Sien-tien* ('Pre-Celestial') and *Wu-wei* sects, which are either identical or closely connected.

The members of the Sien-tien sect claim that it dates back to before the very earliest days of Chinese history, and that its founder was the primeval power which ruled the universe, Wu-kih, without beginning or end.

The papers of the sect relate how Wu-kih in far remote antiquity himself came down to earth to save men and spirits from the ocean of suffering. At different times he sent Buddhas and prophets to bring salvation to men. Later he spoke to the Buddhas of the suffering people and said, 'There are countless millions to be saved . . . I do not know who will descend to the earth and lead my children of both sexes to their home.' Then the patriarch Lo, moved with compassion, said, 'I will descend into the world and live there to bring salvation to your children and lead them back to their home.' The ancient father, joyful and cheered, handed to the patriarch Lo his instructions. He accepted them and descended to the earth, there cleared the waste, and made the doctrine shine clear and bright.

This was in the 16th century A.D. Wu-kih's earthly name was Lo Hwai; his clerical name Wunkung ('striver after the eternal'). He was born in Shantung, studied religion under wise Buddhist teachers, and settled in the cave of the White Cloud Mountain near Nanking, where he accepted the Buddhist commandments and received ordination. He went to Peking and published a book which showed that salvation was for every one, lay or clerical. He held meetings in Peking, but was arrested; he gave proofs of supernatural power. The MSS give a most interesting account of a discussion which he had with a foreign priest from Tibet; it shows us that the prophet's religion does not attempt to bring salvation to its adherents by making them indulge in active worship of saints and deities with offerings of food and incense, with drums and lights. They have no images, no temples, no prayers; they seek perfection and bliss exclusively in 'words of truth uttered by heaven and earth,' *i.e.* by the study of *Sūtras* explaining the natural order which bears sway within the all-embracing and yet empty universe, the only temple which this sect acknowledges. To be admitted to the 'realm of Wu-wei' and abide there is the ideal aim of the members. Identification with the world's course is the chief principle of the Sien-tien sect. We read in the MSS that heaven and earth, mountains and rivers, are its gods, winds and clouds its incense, thunderclaps its drums, sun and moon its sacrificial lamps, flowers and fruits its meat-offerings, seas and lakes its drink-offerings, and the universe its temple.

The practices of the sect are not quite in accord with its principles. It builds no temples or altars, nor does it make any carved or painted images of its gods or saints. Each member worships in his own house before a burning oil-lamp the god of his choice, presenting burning incense-sticks and offering sacrifices of fruit and vegetables, in spite of Lo Hwai's teaching that these are superfluous. Each member is required to occupy himself with his own perfection without forcing perfection upon others; so active propagandism is rare. Any one who professes the principles of the sect is simply admitted as a member; nothing is required of him but a solemn promise to keep the Five Commandments of Buddha; no other ritual or form of initiation has to be gone through. The various groups which constitute the sect are simply guided by the more learned and older members; there are no religious ranks or titles; the members call each other brothers and sisters. It is essentially a domestic religion. The members, mostly well-to-do people, meet where they please, men with men and women with women. There are larger meetings, where the adherents recite Buddhist *Sūtras*, formulas, and numerous names of Buddha, to promote self-perfection and salvation; but they do not beat hollow drums or metal balls. There is also pious conversation, particularly about the Five Commandments. The chief of these is, 'Thou shalt not kill anything that has life'; therefore vegetarianism is an absolute principle of this sect. The members also buy caged birds, fish, and other animals, and set them at liberty, whilst reciting part of a *Sūtra*, and loudly proclaiming the deed to the gods and spirits of sky, water, and earth, that they may enter it to their credit in the book of rewards and punishments.

The members of the Sien-tien sect show marked sympathy for Christian doctrine; many of them are acquainted with the gospel; to some Wu-kih is the same as Jahweh; some identify Jesus with Lo Hwai, their latest Messiah, sent down to the world from the Most High for the salvation of men, who worked miracles there, suffered at the hands of the authorities, died, and ascended to heaven. They generally show themselves eager to be informed about the Christian faith.

Edkins[1] says that in some places the sect has temples, but they are destitute of images and contain only the common Chinese tablets to heaven, earth, the emperor, parents, and teachers. He also says that they exhibit more depth and reality in their convictions than is common in other sects in China.

(*e*) *Eight Diagrams*.—This sect flourished principally in the north of China—in Honan, Chihli, and Shantung—and we hear of it chiefly in connexion with great rebellions, especially those of 1786 and 1813. It is one of the great sects which included or were closely connected with several others—*e.g.*, Red and White Yang. One protocol says that the Eight Diagrams is 'also called the Lung-hwa Society.' It is subdivided into eight great sections, distinguished by the names of the diagrams. Each section had its own ruling chief, one of whom was the general head of the sect. A Government decree says of it that the Great Light is worshipped every morning, and that the members recite formulas and *Sūtras* in order to escape dangers by sword and arms, fire and water.

In 1786 there was a great heresy hunt in Honan and Chihli, where this sect flourished. This was followed by a rebellion which, prisoners confessed, was caused by exasperation at the terrible persecutions. Many thousands of members were tortured and killed, and others were banished as slaves to Central Asia. But even in exile the brotherhood continued to flourish. Again in 1813 the Diagram sects in despair rose in open rebellion and stormed the palace in Peking; they were butchered in myriads. Their leader was held in high honour by them. He taught his followers a formula which he considered of the utmost importance—'Unbegotten Father and Mother in the home of the Immaterial Void.' He urged them to repeat it morning and evening; it would ward off all danger from arms, fire, and water, and ensure the success of every undertaking.

(*f*) *Lung-hwa*.—The following account, taken from De Groot, is given in great detail, not because

[1] 'The Wu-wei Sect,' in *Trans. RAS*, China Branch, vi. [1858] Oct.

the Lung-hwa is more important than other sects, but because we have access to a manual which fully sets forth its constitution, aims, and practices. Our intimate knowledge of other sects is scanty, and this is probably fairly typical. This sect, though one in aims and principles with the Sien-tien, is very different in many respects. Its institutions are entirely moulded upon Buddhistic monasticism; it possesses everything appertaining to a complete religious system—founder, prophets, pantheon, commandments, moral philosophy, initiation and consecration ceremonies, religious ritual, writings, a theology, a paradise, and a hell—everything borrowed partly from Mahāyānistic Buddhism, partly from old Chinese philosophy and cosmogony.

(1) *Organization.*—The Lung-hwa sect is thoroughly ritualistic. The founder is supposed to be the patriarch Lo Hwai, although it existed long before he lived on earth. The aim is that of the other sects, viz. salvation. It possesses a much larger number of adherents than the Sien-tien sect, and they are drawn chiefly from the middle and lower classes. They worship a number of gods and goddesses and make carved and painted likenesses of them. At the head are Wu-kih and two others, generally represented as three old men, each holding in his hand the Eight Diagrams arranged in a circle. The meetings are most often held in the chief apartment of an ordinary dwelling-house, called the vegetarian hall. The Amoy branch of the sect, to whose MSS we have access, acknowledged a head living near Foochow, whose title is Khong-khong ('empty'). He has received Buddhist ordination and lives in celibacy with other pious men, who devote themselves to salvation work and perform ceremonies for the redemption of dead members and their relatives. Those next in rank are heads of communities; then come those who travel about and edify the members. These three ranks are celibate, but dress like the laity. Then follow other ranks down to the ninth degree, to which all novices belong. Most members quickly rise to the eighth or seventh degree. All ranks but the highest can be attained by both men and women, in accordance with the great Mahāyāna principle that the way of salvation is open to all. They look upon one another as brothers and sisters. Each parish has a leader who has charge of the altar bearing the images. The hall is kept very clean, in striking contrast to the dirt of the people's homes; for they say that the holy doctrine of purity may be housed and practised only in clean surroundings. In strict obedience to the Mahāyāna command to propagate the doctrines and principles of salvation, they are zealous in enlisting new members. Many are widows who give themselves, heart and soul, to devotion and piety.

(2) *Initiation.*—The admission of candidates is considered very important, as it opens the door to salvation in paradise. In Amoy the ceremony is called 'taking refuge.' Each candidate must be introduced by a well-known member—the 'introductory master'—to warrant his good faith, in order to guard against the danger of exposing the sect to treason by admitting untrustworthy people. Their books fully describe the most interesting initiation-ritual, of which only a short account can be given here.

As a rule several candidates are admitted at once. They first place an offering of fruit and vegetables before the altar, and the leader offers incense and candles and humbly invites the saints to enter their images and so attend the ceremony. Then comes a short sermon on the excellence of Buddha, followed by an examination of the candidates. The leader exhorts them to cast themselves into the arms of the Three Refuges—'Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha; believe in them and admit them into your hearts. Ye may not seek or find them outside yourselves.' The candidates have now entered religion, and the way of salvation lies open before them, but they cannot make the slightest progress in it except by faithful obedience to the principal commands which are now to be solemnly accepted. These Five Commands are (1) against taking life (this is most important because of the belief in transmigration, according to which any living creature may contain the soul of one who in a former life was a man); (2) against stealing; (3) against unchastity; (4) against lying; (5) against the use of spirituous liquors and of certain plants. The candidates are then taught the special *Sūtra*, consisting of 28 characters, called the 'Dharma Jewel,' and they call down a curse upon themselves if they lose this jewel. When they have taken the vow, the introductory master addresses them, exhorting them never to sin against the Three Refuges or the Five Commandments, never to allow themselves to lose anything of the Dharma Jewel; 'Then, O disciples, the vow ye have taken will become for you a lake of lotuses red and white, across which you will travel to the West, to go out and go home into the company of the Buddhas. To those who refine their conduct nothing but Heaven belongs, Hell is not their share a second time. May your six roots (perception of eyes, nose, mouth, ears, body, and mind) remain pure and clean, and the five parts of your bodies (sinews, bones, skin, flesh, and hair) enjoy quietness and health, your homes be pure and happy, the inmates enjoy rest and peace. May all your undertakings be crowned with success, may happiness and blessedness come down upon you in profusion.' A general *Sūtra* reading brings the initiation to a close. The wishes just pronounced are written down in the form of a prayer; the paper is lighted at one of the candles and placed on the ashes of the incense-burner. This prayer reaches its destination, the gold lotus throne of Wu-kih.

There are also rituals for initiation into the higher grades, in which the candidates take further vows.

(3) *Meetings.*—The meetings do not generally take place at fixed dates, and, if persecution threatens, none may be held for months together or the members may meet only at night. There are thirteen worship days in honour of special saints, among them being the patriarch Lo, the god of heaven, Kwan-yin, the sun, Śākyamuni, the lord of hell, the moon, and Amita Buddha. On these days, in the early morning, cups of tea are placed on the altar to refresh the saints. When enough people are present, the service begins. Rice, vegetables, fruit, and tea are placed on the table in front of the altar, with fragrant incense. The members arrange themselves in long rows, men on one side and women on the other. With closed eyes and the palms of their hands pressed together before their breasts, they recite formulas and extracts from the *Sūtras*, one of them tapping on a hollow wooden bowl at every syllable and on a metal bell at the first word of every strophe. Then, two by two, first the men and then the women, they come forward and salute Buddha and the saints, touching the floor nine times with their foreheads. After this the dishes are removed, and they sit down to eat this vegetable meal.

(4) *Ceremonies for the dead.*—At some of their services there are ceremonies to convey departed souls to the Paradise of the West. A small barge composed of bamboo and paper is made; after *Sūtra* readings and invocations the ship is burned. 'Thus, through fire and flame, the Bark of Wisdom plies across the Sea of Transmigration to the promised Paradise where the Highest Intelligence prevails.' At some meetings members recite the *Sūtra* of 'Repentance of the Thousand Names of Buddha,' the object being to obtain pardon of sins by exciting internally, at the invocation of each name, a feeling of deep repentance.

(5) *Private worship.*—Members also recite *Sūtras* in their own homes. Most of them have only learned by heart the sound of the characters and do not know their meaning; but this does not matter; there is mighty salvation-working power in them, and perhaps there are myriads of unseen spirits listening to the recital and obtaining salvation thereby. The Mahāyāna code commands that they shall be recited in all times of sickness or when the realm is in danger; in times of rebellion; on the birthdays of parents, brothers, and religious teachers; during conflagrations and inundations, when storms harass ships, or giants and devils bring distress; also when one is struck by disasters or punishment; during epidemics, etc. Many women in their homes recite them before the image of Kwanyin, having first washed their faces and hands and put on clean clothes. Sometimes they place a cup of dry tea on the altar, and, when the recital is over, pour hot water on the tea and drink it as highly beneficial to health; or they put it away as medicine for future use. Sometimes a short invocation to Buddha or the saints is used and has the same power. It is quite usual to vow to recite, say, 1000 *Sūtra* fragments if a prayer is granted. The sectaries use rosaries to count the number of recitals. For those who cannot read or learn there is an easy way of obtaining salvation: they repeat hundreds and thousands of times the name of a saint, especially that of Amita Buddha. There are ceremonies for saving the dead by prevailing on Kwanyin to convey them to the western paradise—most interesting, but too long to be given here.

These accounts of the practices and beliefs of some of the sects are enough to give an idea of what sectarianism in China is and to point out the religious spirit which has created it and kept it alive in spite of cruel persecution. The sects have often been ranked by foreigners among the various secret societies and seditious clubs which were at work at the overthrow of the reigning dynasty; but this is largely untrue and unfair. In the MSS of the sects quoted above there is not one word about resistance and revolt, but much about being faithful to the powers that be.

Edkins,[1] writing of the books of the sects in Shantung, said that there was much therein in favour of loyalty and no word against the Government. He said that they were of a mixed Buddhistic, Taoistic, and Confucian character, containing admonitions to goodness, to loyalty, to devotion and submission to parents, to chastity, together with exhortations to abstain from the killing of living beings, from sins of the tongue and pen, from spirituous drinks and opium. The smaller religious sects all have one goal in common; they spring, partly at least, out of the common desire to know the Infinite and the Eternal. Not only do men who rank as philosophers feel after God, but

[1] *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* for 1888.

many of the weary combatants in the battle of life, familiar with poverty and hardship, also feel inexpressible longings to know what and who God is. Such must have founded and developed the various so-called secret sects of China and by their manifest faith in what they teach have drawn into communities multitudes of followers. It is among these sects that the movement of religious thought is most active.

3. **The principal secret societies.**—(*a*) *The Triad Society, or Tien-ti Hui (Heaven and Earth Society).*—This was always confessedly of a political nature with revolutionary objects; but it has also a Buddhistic religious character and has to be reckoned among the religious societies which the State persecuted for heresy. It was first heard of in 1789. William Stanton[1] gives a full account of this society. He says that its membership consisted of about equal numbers of Cantonese, Fukienese, and Hakkas. Its flag bore the legend 'Rebel against the Manchus, restore the Mings.' By 1832 its influence was felt from Formosa to Hunan, from Kiangsi to Kwangsi. In 1850 its members helped the Taiping movement. The Taiping rebellion was not a Triad rebellion, but the Taiping leaders availed themselves of the help of the society. For more than a hundred years this society has been a source of constant anxiety to officials.

(*b*) *The Taiping rebels.*—Religious persecution was the main cause of this rebellion. The first signs appeared in Hunan in 1836; by 1850 the insurgents numbered 8000 in Kwangtung alone. It is sometimes said to have been a Christian movement. The leader, Hung Siu-tsuen, had imbibed some Christian ideas from a pamphlet written by a Christian, a convert of Dr. Milne of Malacca; and the writings of Hung Siu-tsuen are certainly tinged with Christian ideas and contain confused allusions to Biblical characters, mixed up with heathen and Confucian philosophy. But it was really a rebellion against the persecuting dynasty—'the effort of a desperate people to throw off a yoke of bloody intolerance and tyranny.'[2] If it had been successful, there would probably have been religious freedom; but it was washed out in seas of blood and such devastation as converted large parts of the country into a desert.

(*c*) *The Kwo Lao Hui.*—This society arose about 1891 and was inimical to the foreign reigning dynasty. Hunan, Hupeh, and Szechuen were hotbeds of the movement. Very many of the Government soldiers joined it, with the result that the Government feared to try its strength with it lest the soldiers should go over to the other side.

(*d*) *The Reform Society.*—Another society, small but of great importance, was the Reform Society, which arose in 1894–95. A few earnest and brilliant young men read Mackenzie's *History of the Nineteenth Century*, and other books on Western civilization and progress, translated by the Christian Literature Society, and were filled with a desire to introduce reforms into China. Leading statesmen and scholars in Peking and the provinces studied these books eagerly, as did also the young emperor Kwang-su. A Reform Society, consisting of more than a score of the leading Hanlins, was formed in Peking, as well as branches in Shanghai and Wuchang. The leading spirits were Tan Tsu-tsung, Kang Yu-wei, and Liang Ki-chiao. Tan, the son of the governor of Hupeh, was an earnest Christian. Kang Yu-wei, called 'the Modern Sage of China,' had thousands of student followers; he wrote a series of brilliant reform edicts, which the emperor issued. Liang was a distinguished journalist, who spread widely over China the ideas of reform. The reactionary party in Peking was greatly alarmed at the rapid spread of these ideas and persuaded the empress dowager to seize the reins of government. The emperor was made a prisoner, the office of the reformers was sealed up, and six of the leaders were executed, among whom was Tan Tsu-tsung. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Ki-chiao narrowly escaped with their lives.

[1] *The Triad Society.* [2] De Groot, p. 555.

III. *PERSECUTION OF SECTS.*—Many writers about China have said that Confucianism is most tolerant to other religions; but a very little investigation shows how mistaken they were, and that, on the contrary, it persecuted on principle. For fifteen centuries the State insisted on the necessity of stamping out heresies. Sound doctrine was regarded as harmony with *Tao*, or the course of the universe. This *Tao* has no co-equal; hence there is no room for any second set of rules; if by chance another set should arise, it is necessarily 'not correct' and must be suppressed. The Confucian classics might be called the only Bible for religion, politics, and ethics during almost twenty centuries—the treasury of dogma, outside of which no truth ever was, is, or will be.

1. **From the time of Mencius.** — The sage Mencius, who lived 200 years after Confucius, laid upon all future ages the duty of persecuting heresy, and he himself violently attacked heretics. He declared that heresy was everything which departed from the teachings of the Sages, and particularly of three of them, viz. Yu the Great, Cheu-kung, the principal author of the *Yih King*, and Confucius, and that their teaching must be rigorously upheld for all time. According to Chinese logic and the immutable Confucian doctrines, the Government is *bound* to doom to death all religions, customs, and ethics which are not mentioned in the classics and, so far from being tolerant, is bound to be absolutely intolerant, not only of religious sects, but also of the great systems of Taoism and Buddhism.

This was the teaching, but was it carried out? A cursory glance at the Government edicts and the reports of officials for 2000 years reveals a tale of almost incredible horror—of persecutions in which men, women, and children, innocent and guilty, were barbarously destroyed, the total mounting up to millions. Buddhism, as an imported religion, suffered more than Taoism. It was at times in favour, and even patronized by the emperor; at other times it was violently persecuted, its temples and gods were destroyed, and priests and nuns scattered.

2. **From the 5th to the 17th century.**—The persecutions during these centuries were specially fierce during the Tang and Ming dynasties and were mostly directed against the Buddhists. Some were at the instigation of individuals—of Fu yeh in 624; of Yao-tsung, under the emperor Ching-tsung, 705–710; of Han-yu in 819; and of a Taoist doctor, Chao Kwei-chin, in 844.

(*a*) *Tang dynasty.*—It was impossible for the Government to root out Buddhism and Taoism, so its policy was to repress and weaken, to make it difficult for people to enter the monastic life or to build temples. About 845 the emperor decreed that more than 4600 monasteries and convents should be demolished, and that the 260,000 monks and nuns should return to secular life; their best lands were to be confiscated and the slaves divided among the families that paid ground-tax twice a year. The result was to scatter the devout priests and nuns who were zealous for their religion and to encourage the formation of secret associations throughout the country. It was further ordered that whoever surreptitiously shaved, as priests and nuns did, should be sent back to secular life, that

the religious teacher should be severely beaten, and both teacher and pupil sent to exile with hard labour for three years. All exhibitions of exorcism and witchcraft and the use of holy candles and holy water were forbidden, and those practising such things were condemned to exile on the distant frontiers.

(*b*) *Ming dynasty.*—It was during this dynasty, in 1511, that the famous 'Law against Heresies' was promulgated.

'It was specially enacted to keep the laity free from pollution by heretical doctrines and practices, and to destroy everything religious and ethical which was contrary to the Confucian standard.'[1]

This law declared that the leaders of sects should be punished by strangulation; the less prominent were to be beaten with long sticks—a very severe punishment, which most often resulted in death. Others were to be banished to the frontiers and to wear cangues for life, which of course meant beggary, as the wearing of a cangue prevented any kind of work; others were to be sent as slaves to Muslim *begs* in Central Asia, for the rulers knew how Muslims hated Buddhists and Christians; others were to be banished to malarious regions in S. China. The Government raged blindly against religious communities in general without any discrimination between degrees of heresy. The prefects were ordered to ransack villages and hamlets for heretical sects and prosecute them under fear of severe penalties if they were lax. Also rewards were offered to heresy hunters. Some sects were specially mentioned, as White Lotus, Red Yang, etc. The 'Law against Heresies' has always been considered to be in force against Christians. This terrible law was taken over unaltered into the penal and civil code of the Manchu dynasty.

In 1394 members of the White Lotus sect were threatened with death. In 1458 the emperor Yung-tsung decreed that any who had taken the tonsure without Government sanction were to be sent into 'everlasting banishment to the garrisons,' and 690 Tibetans were sent away. Monasteries were again demolished and images destroyed; it was even ordered that the bones and teeth of Buddha, with other holy relics, should be burned outside the walls. Later it was decreed that no young men should enter the clerical state, and that the Buddhist monasteries should be allowed to crumble to ruins, all permission to repair them being withheld.

In the middle of the 16th cent. the White Lotus sect came into full activity, and orders were given rigorously to attack it. It was branded and outlawed for ever as a political body of the utmost danger to the Government; from that day it was delivered unconditionally to the persecution of a merciless mandarinate. The patience of the sects was thoroughly exhausted; for centuries the Government had trodden down, harassed, and persecuted their members; so at last they broke out into open rebellion.

De Groot has fully proved that the Ming dynasty, in oppressing and persecuting the non-Confucian religions, conducted itself quite systematically and with rigid determination.

3. From 1664 to 1912.—There was very fierce persecution under the Manchu dynasty, and especially under two of the very ablest and most illustrious emperors, Kang-hi and Kien-lung. Kang-hi published a great encyclopædia and a famous dictionary. Kien-lung, the conqueror of Burma, Nepāl, Tibet, and Kashgaria, rivalled his grandfather in this respect and published histories and other works. But they were both fiendish persecutors of every form of heresy, and the cause of the first great outbreak of the White Lotus sect. De Groot says that Kang-hi was the cause of the death of nearly a million people.

[1] De Groot, p. 135.

It is impossible to mention here the numerous edicts and waves of persecution which swept over the land, but it is a tale of incredible cruelty and horror; none were too obscure to escape. The Government records themselves reveal a picture of awful persecution, of tremendous rebellions called forth by these cruelties—rebellions smothered in blood. The people saw their revered religious leaders and elders, their parents and children, brothers and sisters, dragged into dungeons, beaten, tortured, strangled, beheaded, cut to pieces alive, banished; harmless religionists had prices set on their heads and were hunted down as dangerous beasts. Simple membership of a sect was punished with deportation and slavery. These persecutions were often inspired by fear, for the Government almost identified heresy with sedition and rebellion.

Many sects are mentioned by name in the persecution edicts: Eight Diagrams, White Lotus, Mahāyāna, Muhammadans, Wahhābīs, Lo Hwai, Christians. Christians were persecuted as members of a heretical sect, thus coming under the 'Law against Heresies,' which was not specially directed against them; but later special edicts were promulgated against them as followers of a foreign religion, and therefore rebels.

From 1794 to 1802 there was a great heresy crusade, especially in the five provinces of Szechuen, Hupeh, Honan, Shensi, and Kansu. The people were slaughtered by hundreds of thousands, and the country was 'pacified,' as we read in *An Account of the Pacification of the Religious Rebels.*[1] In the next reign it was the same, and the cruelties and horrors provoked the great Muhammadan rebellion, in quelling which millions perished and large portions of the country were devastated. The next emperor, Tao Kwang, followed the same course; we hear of persecutions of the Tribute Rice Society, Red Yang, White Lotus, etc. White Lotus at times seems to be almost a general term for secret sects. These new persecutions in their turn gave rise to the Taiping rebellion; and so the tale goes on. We have the Government records up to 1875, and they still reveal fresh edicts against the sects. From 1861 to her death the great empress dowager, during the greater part of the time, was responsible for the action of the Government, and the usual edicts continued to be issued to the end.

From 1842 onwards European Powers interfered to protect the Christians, and forced the Chinese Government to sign treaties of toleration, giving Christians the right to live unmolested in the exercise of their religion. So from that date the 'Law against Heresies' did not apply to them. But, in spite of treaties, much persecution went on and was winked at, and often encouraged, by officials. In 1900 there was the outburst against foreigners and Christians, instigated by the empress dowager, and known as the Boxer Rising.

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[1] Wei Yuen, 1842; this occurs in ch. vii. of the *Shing wu ki*, 'Description of Military Operations.'

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SECTS (Christian).—A sect, strictly speaking, is a group of people following some leader, whether his influence be permanent and world-wide (*e.g.*, Calvin) or local and temporary (*e.g.*, Antoinette Bourignon). The group may maintain its footing within an organized communion, like the Clapham Sect; it may, actively or passively, take up separate existence, like the Jansenists. The subject has been clouded by heresiologists in all ages, who heaped together nicknames in two or three languages, sometimes coining new titles, so that an obscure group known only for a score of years may be labelled in several ways—after their founder, after another leader, by the name which they themselves chose, and by two or three epithets flung at them by their enemies. Epiphanius, Philastrius, Theodoret, Prædestinatus, have had many imitators such as Ephraim Pagitt; and even modern compilers are more content to give alphabetical lists of hundreds of sects in the United Kingdom and the United States than to offer any clue to their relations, their importance, or their doctrines. The present article will deal chiefly with such minor parties as claim notice and are not described elsewhere in this Encyclopædia, either separately or in art. HERESY (Christian). It will, however, be necessary in telling of the twigs to observe their ramification and to mention afresh some of the larger branches from which they are the offshoots.

I. *EARLY.*—Information for the first 300 years was long due chiefly to four Greeks—Clement at Alexandria, Hippolytus at Rome, Irenæus at Lyons, and Eusebius at Cæsarea—though Tertullian at Carthage adds something for the West. But Syriac, Armenian, and Arabic scholars are enabling us in a few cases to go behind these hostile reporters and to learn at first hand. In this nascent period Christian thought was much influenced by previous religions and philosophies, and three groups show clear traces of Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism; to these Ebionite, Manichæan, and Gnostic classes we may add the Monarchian.

The primacy of Jerusalem was lost by the catastrophe of A.D. 70, and no leader arose with the influence of James. Therefore the Christians of Jewish origin were soon out-numbered, and, since many of them clung to an observance of their Law, they came to be regarded askance. Even the fact that they had an ancient Aramaic gospel, *Secundum Hebræos*, when it became known by Jerome translating it, intensified the disposition to regard them as schismatics or heretics, who added to the sacred four an unnecessary fifth. Nor was much gratitude shown, except by Origen, to Theodotion, who revised the LXX, or to Symmachus, who made a new Greek version of the OT. Eusebius indeed took umbrage[1] at a commentary by Symmachus, regarding it as an attack upon Matthew, with a bias against the Virgin Birth; but probably it was a commentary on the Aramaic gospel.

Jewish thought ran in other channels than did Greek, and the difference was well marked in the domain of wedded life, which Jews insisted on, but Greeks and Copts disparaged. The Jewish Christians[2] admitted with most Jews that sacrifice was necessarily obsolete, but they circumcised, and prayed towards Jerusalem. Apparently they did not appreciate the writings of Paul, with his polemic against the Law. The points that did interest them emerge in the *Periodoi Petrou*, source of the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions*, and in the *Anabathmoi Jacobou*. The test-question was what they thought of Jesus; the Greeks discerned two groups: the Nazarenes, who agreed with them, and the Ebionites, who were content to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah and to say nothing as to pre-existence or deity.

Much less is known as to how these Jewish Christians appeared to the old Jews: the references in the *Mishnāh* and the two *Gemaras* have been sifted by R. T. Herford.[1] Among the Minim must be included the Jewish Christians, expressly said in A.D. 550 to be purely Palestinian, not Babylonian. The cleft between them and the old Jews was so deep that Rabbi Tarphon would not enter their houses or read their books, laying it down that a copy of the Law written by them should be burned, as they were worse than idolaters. About A.D. 200 they met in their own synagogues, clad in white, barefoot, with phylacteries, and read the Law. About 350 they had discarded the Law, and declared that only the Ten Words had been given at Sinai. To Jesus they attributed such utterances as 'I am God,' 'I am the son of man,' 'I will go up to heaven.' Many discussions are reported as to the duality of the Godhead, with comments on OT passages; the influence of the Epistle to the Hebrews can readily be recognized. Orthodox Jews were advised, 'If the son of the harlot say to thee, There are two gods, reply, I am He of the Red Sea, I am He of Sinai.' For a remarkable body largely recruited from Jewish Christians see art. ELKESAITES. Another body just outside the Christian border was the Dositheans, followers of a Messiah to the Samaritans, nearly contemporary with Christ. They continued to emphasize the Law, especially on points relating to the Sabbath; they were known in Persia, and in Egypt as late as A.D. 588.

In the Euphrates valley arose several blends of religion. The **Mandæan** (*q.v.*)[2] still survives near Basra, as army chaplains reported with surprise in 1917. **Manichæism** (*q.v.*) had a powerful influence in the Roman Empire. An old soldier, Acuas, from the Persian wars taught it in Palestine about A.D. 273,[3] and its aftermath appeared in sporadic mediæval sects.

At the beginning of the Christian era fusion of belief was taking place very generally in Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. It was to be expected that some thinkers would take up a few Christian elements, and many schools developed,[4] though there were Gnostics who had no Christian tinge, such as the Borbori, or dirt-eaters.

Alexandria had three famous **Gnostic** teachers. The indigenous system of Pleroma (*q.v.*), emanations of pairs, redemption by re-absorption, was tinged with Christianity by Basilides and Valentinus (*qq.v.*). Carpocrates also deserves notice, for Irenæus tells us that his followers coined and appropriated the term 'Gnostic.' He was indebted to Plato rather than to Egypt, and distinctly taught one supreme God, whence emanated the makers of the world. Into this came souls which had previously dwelt among Ideas, having had fellowship with God; pure souls, such as Homer, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Paul, strove to recall those Ideas and resist the influence of the world, even by magical arts; among the influences that would enchain them was to be ranked the Law of Jahweh. Transmigration of souls enabled all to rejoin the supreme God, who might welcome a few elect souls direct. Such teaching was developed by his son, Epiphanes, and others, on the topic, What were the influences to be resisted;

[1] *HE* vi. 17. [2] See art. EBIONISM.

[1] *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, London, 1903.

[2] The art. MANDÆANS discusses also the terms Hemerobaptist, Christians of St. John, Sābians. For other Sābians see art. HARRANIANS.

[3] Epiph. *Hær.* lxvi. 7. [4] See *ERE* vi. 215.

if all human actions are indifferent, the true Gnostic ought to experiment with all, so as to find out what really helped him. In some quarters this doctrine served as a pretext for immorality, which was then charged by Christians against all Carpocratians, and by outsiders against all Christians. One party of these antinomians, rejecting the theory of a demiurge, was named Antitactæ by Clement.[1]

Marcus was perhaps an Alexandrian, but he taught in Asia Minor, and is known chiefly through Irenæus, who had to do with the Marcosians in the Rhone valley. He introduced many Pythagorean speculations with numbers. On the authority of women who repented and returned to the Church, Irenæus charged them with conjuring tricks in worship and with immorality; though they denied this. Hippolytus with independent knowledge in Rome deliberately reiterated the charge. They lingered into the 4th century. Men and women were chosen by lot to prophesy or to baptize; their rite for this was to pour oil and water on the head, in the name of the unknown Father of all, truth the Mother of all, and Him who came down upon Jesus.

Antioch was the centre of Saturninus, who was heir of Simon Magus through Menander.[2] He was frankly dualist, conceiving Jahweh as the chief of the seven creators made by the good God, and Christ as sent by Him to depose the seven. Bad men, made by the rival god, were redeemable by Christ on condition of stern abstinence from all sensuous pleasures. It obviously followed that Christ was not of flesh and blood at all, but appeared only in the likeness of man.

This line of thought was developed by Tatian, and, because he used water at the Lord's Supper, his followers were labelled **Hydroparastatæ** or **Aquarii**, and, by distortion, Saccophori, Accaophori; while a sect of **Encratites** (*q.v.*) affiliated to him. His services to Aramaic Christianity in preparing the *Diatessaron* facilitated his views spreading down the Euphrates and paved the way for the great development of Christianity in Persia termed by the Greeks **Nestorianism** (*q.v.*). This great communion, with its mission-work in mid Asia, China, and down the Persian Gulf to the coasts of India and Ceylon, deserves to be more deeply studied in its own documents.[3] In this period only one exponent claims attention, Bardaisan of Edessa. He is known to us chiefly at second hand through Greeks, and it is agreed that we cannot reconstruct his theology from them, even with the added light from Ephrem; but his disciple Philip summarized his views in *The Book of the Laws of the Countries*, available now in Syriac. Bardaisan was of high rank, perhaps once a priest in the great temple of Atargatis at Mabug (Hierapolis). A Jewish colony produced a Syriac version of the Hebrew Scriptures, different from the Aramaic targums; the earliest converts to Christianity were doubtless won from this circle, and Bardaisan joined them. He seems to have won over some followers of Cucojo, who had built upon foundations laid by Valentinus.[4] His influence with the royal house of the Abgars greatly improved the standing of Christians in the kingdom. On its subjugation by the Romans, and a persecution by Caracalla, he went as a missionary to Armenia and wrote a history of that land which became the basis of Greek accounts. He also took advantage of an embassy from India to publish some knowledge of Indian religions, and thus prepared the way for the later missions. Accessory to this main work of propagation was his devotion to Christian song. Pliny vouches that there had been hymns before, but it was Bardaisan who deliberately wrote and collected 150 Christian hymns to match the 150 Psalms of Jewish worship.[1] Only Greek ignorance has attributed to Arius the honour discerned by Hahn as due to the Syrian, the *primus hymnologus*. Later ages kept up the tradition, so that the Syrian communion is the richest in this department of worship. Of Bardaisan's own writings none survives, unless the splendid 'Hymn of the Soul' in the *Acts of Thomas* is due to him; this is not distinctly Christian, though open to a Christian interpretation. His son, Harmonius, followed up his work, and the Christianity of Edessa was of this school till Ephrem of Nisibis settled there about 363 and set himself to transform it parallel with Nicene orthodoxy, writing new hymns to the Bardaisanian tunes.

In the 4th cent. the Gnostic theory of archons, or rulers, over the various heavens was blended with Ebionite teaching so as to identify the seventh archon with Jahweh and to make the devil his son. The leader was Peter of Judæa, a hermit near Jerusalem, who was excommunicated by Epiphanius.[2] His teaching and several books were taken by Eutactus to Armenia, where they had some vogue; but no more is heard of these **Archontici**.

Another Syrian had transferred his energies to Rome about 140, preceding Tatian. The teachings of Cerdo are reported by Irenæus and by Hippolytus. In his day there was no canon of Christian literature, and he perhaps began one by an edition of Paul's letters (evidently collected by some one with a purely Ægean outlook) accompanied by the historical introduction furnished by Luke. The Jewish Scriptures were nothing to him, for the God of the Jews was not the God proclaimed by Christ. He seems to have stereotyped the dogma, already denied in the Johannine Epistles, that Christ had no flesh, only an astral or docetic body. Cerdo seems to have gathered no party, but those who sympathized with him in the unorganized state at Rome found a leader in Marcion;[3] possibly some **Marcionite** teachings have been ante-dated and attributed to Cerdo.

In opposition to all the dualist schemes of Gnostics and Manichæans, some Greeks emphasized the unity of the Godhead, and the name **Monarchian** has been generalized to cover all such schools. The problem to be solved was the relation of Christ to God; two solutions were offered—a dynamic and a modal.

The former was first taught in Rome by Theodotus of Byzantium, a close student of Euclid, Aristotle, and Galen, who eschewed allegory and interpreted Scripture on straightforward lines. His view was that Jesus was an ordinary man till the Spirit entered Him at baptism. This idea was elaborated by a namesake, a banker, who, to meet He 2^{16}, suggested that Melchizedek was the heavenly mediator for angels; this permitted the name **Melchizedekites** to be attached to his followers. He attempted a separate organization in Rome and was fortunate enough to obtain as bishop a confessor, Natalius; but the latter repented and was reconciled to Zephyrinus. The same views were taught in Rome by Artemon, but nothing more is heard of the movement after 250.

A vague account of some **Alogi** is given by Epiphanius two centuries later; he describes them as disbelieving the Logos doctrine as taught in Jn 1; he links them with the former Theodotus,

[1] *Strom.* iii. 526 ff.
[2] From a misreading of this man's name seems to have been coined the title of an imaginary sect, the Adrianistæ.
[3] See also P. Y. Saeki, *The Nestorian Monument in China*, London, 1916.
[4] Ephrem, *Against Heretics*, ch. xxii. p. 485.

[1] See art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian).
[2] See *Hær.* xl. [3] See art. MARCIONISM.

but gives no details of place or of positive tenets. It does not appear that any one has quoted in this connexion the saying by Paul of Samosata: 'The Word is greater than Christ, for Christ became great through wisdom.'[1] As to the earlier state of Jesus, the Antiochene bishop declared:

'Mary did not bring forth the Word, for Mary was not before the ages, but she brought forth a man on a level with ourselves. It is the man who was anointed, not the Word. . . . By his unflinching, unblenched will and resolution, he made himself like unto God; and having kept himself free from sin, he was made one with Him.'[2]

The same line of thought is found a few years later in an argument professedly addressed to Mani by Archelaus, a Syrian bishop, which has come by tortuous channels not likely to modify the thought on this head:

'Doubtless Jesus was less than John among those born of women, though in the kingdom of heaven he was greater. . . . Tell me on whom the Holy Spirit came as a dove, who is it that was baptized by John. If he was perfect, if he was Son, if he was Power, the Spirit could not have entered even as kingdom cannot enter kingdom. . . . It was the Christ of God that descended on him who was Mary's son.'[3]

Archelaus infers that the Christ may descend on any man who lives a life like Jesus; he agrees with the doctrine of Mani on this point, though he denies that Mani is such a man:

'The Spirit dwells in a man, and descends and stays . . . and this often happens, even as you were professing lately that you yourself are the paraclete of God.'[4]

From such a clear utterance we may look back and discern the same doctrine held in the days of Justin.[5] Tarphon (Trypho) mentions the theory, held not by himself but by others, that Jesus can be shown to have been born as a man from men, and be proved to have been raised to the dignity of Messiahship by election. There is even an isolated passage in Hermas,[6] which may indeed be inconsistent with other passages in the same book, that is quite clear to the same effect:

When Jesus had laboured with the Spirit and had co-operated with it in everything, behaving boldly and bravely, then God chose Him as a partner with the Holy Spirit and took the Son as adviser, 'for all flesh, which is found undefiled and unspotted, wherein the Holy Spirit dwelt, shall receive a reward.'[7]

A different theory had been worked out in Asia Minor by Praxeas and Noetus. Holding the thorough deity of Christ and the absolute unity of God, they completely identified the two. They charged Hippolytus and Tertullian with being Ditheists and were in return labelled **Patripassians** or **Theopaschites**. By personal visits Praxeas won a few followers in Rome and many in Carthage. Epigonus, a disciple of Noetus, won in Rome Cleomenes and Sabellius of Libya, who spread the theory in Africa.[8] Beryllus of Bostra seems to have held kindred views, which Origen convinced him were untenable. And the same Father opposed some views held in Arabia, that the soul dies with the body and will share in its resurrection.[9]

All sects thus mentioned, except the last, crystallized on some point connected with the person of Christ. But the actual lowering of Christian life and the growth of a bureaucracy brought forth a conservative revivalist, Montanus of Ardaba in Mysia.[10] He emphasized some original features that were being dropped—*e.g.*, that the end of the age might be speedily expected (whereas Gnosticism was concerned rather with beginnings), that faith was more important than knowledge, that a high standard of morals must be maintained by rigid discipline, that the Spirit still spoke through many believers. On the other hand, he laid stress on martyrdom, virginity, widowhood; and he invented a distinction between venial sins after baptism, which could be forgiven by the Church, and mortal sins, which could not. It is singular that most of the old features which **Montanism** (*q.v.*) sought to preserve were therefore opposed and driven out, while nearly all the innovations of its founder were afterwards adopted by his opponents. Two of his helpers were Maximilla and Priscilla, whose names were used to denote sections of his followers that were said to have women not merely as preachers but also as priests and bishops. Because some at Ancyra seen by Jerome used cheese with bread at the Lord's Supper (or probably at a love-feast), they were called **Artotyritæ**. Others who practised meditation, and, like the Hindus, found special attitudes to promote this, were mocked at as **Papalorhynchitæ** or **Tascodrugitæ**; the latter word has been deformed into Ascodrugitæ, Ascodrupitæ, Ascodruti, Abrodici, Ascitæ; the former gave rise to variants, Passalorhynchitæ, Dactylorhynchitæ.

A fresh impulse was given to the demand for purity of life when the churches had leisure to recuperate after the Decian persecution. Many had apostatized, and the question became urgent on what terms they might be re-admitted to fellowship. A lenient policy was adopted in Rome, where the question was fought out. The leader of the stern party, Novatian, was chosen rival bishop, and soon the whole Christian community ranked itself on these lines. N. Africa and Asia Minor were strongholds of the puritan **Novatianists** (*q.v.*), and this geographical alignment suggests that they absorbed most Montanists. They regarded the others as apostate, incapable of regenerating any one by baptism; and therefore they baptized any candidate for admission, disregarding any previous ceremony performed by an 'apostate.' The same issue arose after the Diocletian persecution, and matters came to a head in N. Africa, where rival bishops were elected at Carthage. The stern party, or **Donatists** (*q.v.*), probably absorbed the local Novatians; they held their own, though the State patronized the others. Not till the Vandal invasions of the 5th cent. did both parties cease to be important. Various hard names flung at the Donatists were Montenses, Campitæ, Rupitæ, and Cotopitæ, Cothopithæ, Cutzupitæ, or Gotispitæ.

II. *ALONGSIDE ESTABLISHED CHURCHES.*—When Constantine recognized that the Christians were the most virile party in his empire, and decided to found a new capital near the provinces where they were strongest, he initiated a State policy of uniformity which created new sects by the score. The Greek world speculated, the Roman emperor strove to crush independence of thought, till the Arab gave both something else to think about. The rivalry of Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople expressed itself in theological formulas; each city fathered a great division of the Christian world, which has its representatives still. Very few doctrinal questions arose elsewhere, and even the Pelagian controversy came to its height among the Greeks. All other divisions turned on the personality of Christ.

As Illingworth says, neither the universality nor the unity of human personality was adequately understood in pre-Christian ages.[1] Greek thought was first forced to the problem by the absolutely unique case of Jesus Christ, and had no general theory as to the personality of an ordinary man. Origen was the first great thinker, and Alexandria

1 F. C. Conybeare, *The Key of Truth*, Oxford, 1898, p. xcv.
2 *Ib.*
3 *Ib.* pp. xcviii, xcvii, citing *Acts of Archelaus*, ch. 49 *f.*
4 *Ib.* p. xcix. 5 *Dial.* xlviii. 6 *Simil.* v. 6.
7 For the later development of this Christology in Armenia see art. PAULICIANS; John of Damascus refers to its adherents as Doxarii or Aposchistæ. For Spain see art. ADOPTIANISM.
8 See art. MONARCHIANISM. 9 Eus. *HE* vi. 37.
10 See *ERE* viii. 828.

1 *Personality, Human and Divine* (*BL*), London, 1894, p. 8.

continued to lead in speculation until the views of Arius threatened to wreck Constantine's hope of a united empire. The development for the next two generations has been described in art. ARIANISM; three leaders deserve mention afresh. Aëtius of Antioch, bred in the strictest school of Aristotle, urged that Christ must be radically unlike God, and gathered a party of **Anomœans**, or **Exucontians**. His most illustrious follower was Eunomius of Cyzicus, whom he won at Alexandria about 350; and this man organized their sympathizers, consecrating new bishops; with his death in 395 the sect died out.[1] Theophronius of Cappadocia taught within their bounds that there were limits to God's knowledge, which was absolute only as regards current events;[2] his followers were named **Agnoëtæ**.

From the theories propounded by and against Apollinaris and his followers[3] were coined the titles **Dimœritæ**, **Anthropolatræ**, **Sarcolatræ**, **Vitaliani**, **Synusiastæ**, **Polemiani**, **Valentiniani**. The extreme anti-Arians at Alexandria separated under Coluthus in 319, but were induced to reunite in 324 by Hosius.

The latter leader with his friend Potamius, in Spain, still confronted with great missionary tasks, put out a manifesto urging that speculation should cease, and that all non-Scriptural terms should be disused; this led to the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia in 359, when Acacius of Cæsarea led most of the Greeks to allow that the Son was like the Father, and thus provided for the Semi-Arians the new name of **Homœans**. But his influence waned within ten years.

An extraordinary interlude towards the end of the 4th cent. was connected with the name of Origen. Epiphanius of Salamis devoted some attention to him in his treatise on heresies and visited Palestine to destroy his influence. With Jerome at Bethlehem he succeeded, but Rufinus at Olivet had been a pupil of Didymus, who filled Origen's chair; and John, the patriarch of Jerusalem, regarded Epiphanius as intruding in his province. One result was that Rufinus returned to Italy and translated many of Origen's books into Latin, editing them freely. The controversy was complicated by Dioscorus and other Nitrian monks supporting the Origenists, while the Scetan monks went so far in their opposition that Theophilus, the patriarch of Alexandria, led soldiers to attack some monasteries and nearly lost his life. The one point that emerged was that Origen had denied that God had a human form, so that the Scetan-Jerome party could be called **Anthropomorphites**. As Chrysostom sided with John, the contest rapidly became personal, and Theophilus proved recreant to the traditions of Alexandria. As soon as Chrysostom was ruined by Epiphanius, the whole dispute died.

Older theories were revived, Photinus of Sirmium teaching afresh the Unitarian views of Paul of Samosata, and Marcellus of Ancyra reviving the doctrines of Sabellius. In 381 the Council of Constantinople pronounced against them, and also condemned a new theory of Macedonius,[4] late bishop of the city, who had begun to develop a doctrine of the Holy Spirit, whom he held to be a creature, ranking with the angels. It is the first sign of interest in the question which much later was to serve as a pretext for the rupture of East and West. Some of his followers were said by Philastrius to be unsocial at meals, and were therefore named **Adelophagi** by Praedestinatus.

As Christ was thus studied and dissected, till the reality of His human career was obscured by theories as to His nature, religious feeling turned to His mother. Some Thracian women who had migrated to Arabia revived in her honour the custom of offering cakes to the Queen of Heaven (*q.v.*) and were termed **Collyridians** (from κολλυρίς). Though their worship was condemned (as of women only?), the impulse to Mariolatry was strong. Helvidius of Rome maintained that after the birth of Jesus Mary bore children to Joseph; he and all who opposed the rising tide were blamed by Epiphanius[1] as **Antidicomarianites**. This led to the great controversies of the Nestorians and the Eutychians.[2] That section of the E. Syrian Church which has submitted to Rome, under the Syro-Chaldaic patriarch of Babylon, is now known as the Chaldæan.

The political problem of the emperors was to hold together Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, with the earlier conquests of Rome. About the year 500 these were submerged by northern invaders, Theodoric ruling from Ravenna; the Goths were won by Arian missionaries, and it was a question whether the cities still in their midst, with Athanasian churches, would succumb or would leaven their conquerors. The conversion of the Franks was a great step towards solidifying the West, and the emperors saw that it was advisable to conciliate Rome. They secured this by doctrinal concessions only at the expense of grave disaffection throughout the East. In Egypt there was indeed a State Church upheld by force, a manifest token being that the patriarch of Alexandria was also governor of the province; but nearly the whole population scoffed at it as Melkite. The people were heartily Monophysite and were so disgusted with the time-serving of their patriarch Mongus that some abjured his authority and became known as **Acephali**.

Apart from these extremists, the Copts continued to subdivide on various questions as to the body of Jesus. That this did not function naturally, but only by constant exercise of the will to lay aside divine attributes, was a view put forward at Alexandria by Julian of Halicarnassus and supported by the Syrian Philoxenus of Mabug. When the Coptic patriarch died, Julian put forward Gaianus as a candidate and secured him the post. Their followers were thereupon nicknamed **Aphthartodocetæ** or **Incorrupticolæ**; but the tenet as stated by Stephen Niobes was that, because Christ united the two natures, humanity obtained the privilege of being uncreate. This raised the question whether the human nature of Jesus had been created or was uncreate, and the opponents called one another **Actistetæ**, **Ctistolatræ**. The party which held that Christ's body was ordinary was headed by Severus, who, though for six years patriarch of Antioch, had experience of Rome and of Constantinople, and was Alexandrian by education and residence. In the contest for the Coptic patriarchate of Alexandria, when Theodosius failed to hold the post, their party was styled **Phthartolatræ**, **Corrupticolæ**. On their line of thought came next the question whether Christ's mind was ordinary, or whether He was potentially omniscient and simply declined to know certain things. The Kenotists,[3] who took the second alternative, were known as **Agnoëtæ**, or were called after their leader, Themistius Calonymus the deacon. When these bodies, including the **Esaiani**, numbered about a dozen, they were dismissed in despair by cataloguers as **Diacrinomenoi**, **Hesitantes**.

Another cause of fission in Egypt late in the 6th cent. was still the relation of the three persons of the Trinity. Damian, the Coptic patriarch, taught that, while the three unitedly were God, each separately was not; his adherents were known

[1] See *ERE* v. 575.
[2] Socrates, *HE* v. 24.
[3] See art. APOLLINARISM.
[4] See art. MACEDONIANISM.

[1] *Hær.* lxxviii.
[2] See art. MONOPHYSITISM.
[3] See art. KENOSIS.

sometimes by his name, sometimes as **Angelitæ**, from Angelium their chief church, or they were laughed at as **Tetraditæ**, **Condobauditæ**. Their chief opponent was John Philoponus, lay philosopher, who so emphasized the distinction of the three natures that the unity escaped notice, and his enemies readily styled him a Tritheist. He became involved also in a dispute on the resurrection with Conon of Tarsus, who held that the bodily form would not be resumed, only the material. On this line of thought the **Christolytæ** held that the body and soul of Christ fared as most do, and that only the divine nature ascended to heaven.

From a very different standpoint, another party earned the name of **Tetraditæ**; some Palestinian followers of Origen about 542, who followed up his doctrine of pre-existence and attributed divinity to the soul of Christ before the Incarnation, preferred the name **Protoctistæ**. In reaction the **Isochristi** taught that ultimately all would become like Christ; because in the course of the controversy two different monasteries became ranged against one another, they are also known as **Neolaurites**. The Abyssinian Church has steadily followed the Copts and has contributed nothing of more than local acceptance.

Theodosius, the Coptic patriarch, in 543 consecrated at Constantinople the Syrian Jacob as bishop of Nisibis. For thirty-five years he organized and ordained throughout Syria, so that the Monophysites of that land are often called **Jacobites**.[1] Not much original thought is recorded of this section; the works of Barsanuphius, an anchorite of Gaza, may be worth consulting; they are ascetic and doctrinal; those of Timotheus Ælurus of Alexandria were translated into Syriac and thence into Armenian; large numbers of sermons, hymns, and letters by Severus of Antioch are extant, and others by Jacob of Sarug. Philoxenus of Mabug about 508 revised the *Peshitta* in a most literal fashion, and a century later Thomas of Harkel edited the revision at Alexandria, adding the critical marks of Origen.

In 540 an Armenian council was held, which pronounced for Monophysitism and incorporated in the *Sanctus* the test phrase 'who wast crucified for us.' Under Heraclius this was abandoned, but from 728 communion with the Jacobites was restored. There are also remarkable relics of the Adoptian view, for the anniversary of Christ's birth is not observed, except for some mention on the great feast of the Baptism, 6th Jan.; the Julianite view of an incorruptible body was combined with this, as assumed in baptism. The Paulicians (*q.v.*) always objected to their rivals' worship of the Cross (Armenian, *Chazus*); therefore the term **Chatzitzarii**, **Chazinzarians** (**Staurolatræ**) seems to denote no small sect, but the Established Church of Armenia as viewed by the Paulicians.

Justinian sought to reconcile the Monophysites and so cement together the empire that his generals had re-conquered, and he called the fifth ecumenical council at Constantinople in 553 to ratify a compromise—his condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Ibas in the 'Three Chapters.'[2] The whole West disagreed, however, and the assent of Rome was won only by retaining its bishop in exile, and on his death by nominating Pelagius, a pliant successor. He was excommunicated by nearly all the West, the lead being taken by Paulinus of Aquileia, but after his speedy death the scandal began to heal. The great influence of Rome gradually secured the acceptance of the council, so that the dissentients were presently termed schismatics. The Lombards encouraged the bishops of Aquileia to revive their former title of 'patriarch'; not until 698 was the division healed, when the whole cause was unintelligible. Two rival lines of bishops, however, bore the mere title of patriarch till 1751.

Timotheus of Constantinople, in his *Reception of Heretics*, about the end of the 6th cent., describes some Melchizedekites of Phrygia, who observed the Sabbath day; as they touched no one, they were popularly called **Athingani**. This reads as if they observed the Jewish rules of cleanliness, but the information is too scanty to trace their origin and tenets.

In the last days of Greek power the emperor Heraclius asked whether the will of Christ was single or double. The Monothelete controversy[1] occupied the attention of the theologians for half a century; all the while Islām was driving the Greek troops out of Egypt and Syria, with the hearty good will of the natives, so that the State Church there fell irretrievably. The community which held longest to the single will dwelt on Lebanon, and is known as **Maronite**. It speedily fell out of touch with Greek thought, reverting to the Syriac language, in which the liturgy is still chanted; but under Muslim rule the people speak Arabic. In the 12th cent. the Maronites adopted Dithelism as the price of Crusading help, but they were not thoroughly organized under Roman influence till 1743. Until recent troubles there were nearly 250,000 on Lebanon, with 70,000 more in Syria, Cyprus, and Egypt; about 2000 monks of St. Anthony and 1100 secular priests are under their patriarch. A curious result of all these divisions is to be seen in the title 'patriarch of Antioch,' borne to-day by six rivals: besides the Græco-Arab or Melkite and the Syrian Catholic, a Latin is to be found at Aleppo, a Greek at Damascus, and a Syriac at Diarbekr.

The views of Pelagius as to the effect of sin on mankind[2] were canvassed in the West behind his back; he himself set them forth at Bethlehem and Lydda, and was supported by Julian of Eclanum and Theodore of Mopsuestia. His follower Celestine, ordained at Ephesus, was at last condemned there in 431. But the Greeks declined to follow Augustine, and presently were classed as Semi-Pelagians. One of the classical works on heresy, written in the West, in its catalogue of wrong opinions, leads up to predestination, which is then stated, and opposed from the Semi-Pelagian standpoint. And the famous test of Catholic doctrine, that it has always been believed by everybody everywhere, was formulated to indicate that Augustinianism was a heresy. From Marseilles (Massilia), the headquarters of these Western leaders, they were often called **Massilians**, **Massalians**, or **Messalians**; the controversy was closed in 529 at Orange in that district. Before then the opinions of Augustine against free will had been exaggerated by monks at Hadrumetum to the pitch of antinomianism; after them was coined the title **Adrumetians**.

Lucifer of Cagliari in Sardinia stemmed the tide of laxity, somewhat on the lines of the Donatists, opposing the restoration to office of those who had given scandal; but his objection was on the score of Arian doctrine more than of apostasy. The protests of his followers were last heard in 384.

In S. Gaul and Spain, where the West Goths spread, we hear much from the 5th to the 7th cent. of certain **Bonosians**, organized with bishops. Apparently they followed Bonosus of Sardica, who flourished from 392 to 430. At first he simply taught that Joseph and Mary had children, but he was finally classed with Marcellus and Photinus. As his views were accepted in Spain, we infer that he held the old Adoptianism.

[1] See art. MONOPHYSITISM.

[2] See *ERE* iv. 191 f.

[1] See art. MONOTHELETISM.

[2] See art. PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM.

Spain produced one leader in **Priscillian**[1] about 375. His opinions are certainly distorted by his opponents, who flung at him such epithets as Gnostic and Manichæan. Pamphlets of his discovered in 1885 show that he was a mystic, precursor of Santa Teresa. What really annoyed his neighbours was his asceticism, especially his strong views on the relation of the sexes, which he thought should be purely spiritual, whence the names **Abstinentes, Spiritales**; his world was not yet ripe for lay celibacy, and he was condemned at Saragossa, and finally beheaded at Trèves (385), the first victim of a new law against heretics. From Augustine we hear of a few Africans who lived as he advised, in foster-families, receiving adopted children; he called them **Abelonii, Abeliani, Abeloitæ**. If there be any truth in the tales told to Epiphanius about the **Adamiani**, reported to worship naked in the hot baths, and to maintain their virginity, they also may have reduced Priscillian's views to practice. A very different position was taken up by Jovinian of Milan, who opposed celibacy, fasts, the exaltation of martyrdom, the classification of sins; condemned at Rome and Milan, he was banished by the emperor. A pamphlet that he issued was controverted by Jerome,[2] whose abuse is our chief source of information. In the same way we hear of another Spaniard, Vigilantius, who wrote against prayers to the saints and other heathen practices, against celibacy of the clergy and monasticism; Jerome's wit coined for his followers the names **Dormitantes, Nyctages**. Vigilantius continued working at Barcelona unhindered.

Less fortunate had been **Aërius** of Pontus half a century earlier, known to us only through Epiphanius.[3] Not only had he opposed fasting and prayers for the dead, but he asserted that bishops and presbyters were one order, one honour, one dignity. He was excommunicated, and his followers were driven into practical communism till their extinction. Audæus of Syria was another contemporary reformer and missionary to the Goths of Scythia; but to quartodeciman and very ascetic practices he joined the theory that, as man was made in the image of God, therefore God must have a material shape; his **Anthropomorphite** followers are heard of till about 500. Of the **Apostolici**, or **Apotactici**, in Asia Minor we know only from Epiphanius that they were celibate communists, using the *Acts of Andrew* and *Acts of Thomas*; from the nickname Saccophori it would appear that they were mendicants. In the Theodosian law against heretics they were grouped with Encratites.

Mesopotamia, Syria, and Armenia saw during the 4th and 5th centuries a mystic movement of the Massilians, who sacrificed even self-support to constant prayer, as the means whereby the Holy Spirit entered and perfected, giving full knowledge of divine things and of the future. They were known also to the Greeks as **Euchites** (*q.v.*), **Euphemites, Choreutes**, or, after some leaders, as **Adelphians, Lampetians, Marcianites, Eustathians**. Akin to them seem to be the **Hypsistarians**, or **Cœlicolæ**, in Asia Minor, though they attracted attention by their worship of light, their rules as to food and the Sabbath, their opposition to images. The **Agonyclitæ** of the 7th and 8th centuries, who would not kneel at prayer, but preferred to stand, and often to dance, were forerunners of the dervishes, as also of many revivalist bodies in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, known derisively as Jumpers.

Quarrels between the patriarch of Constantinople and the pope of Rome as to jurisdiction over the Jugo-Slavs led to the formulation of charges on each side, when the name **Azymites** was used by the Eastern to blame the Roman use of unleavened bread at the Mass, and the Western retorted with **Fermentarii**. Trivial as the allegations were, the rupture of 1054 was complete and final. Fresh causes of difference have been added, notably one in the 14th century. The monks of Athos had adopted the Hindu methods of contemplation, which were attacked by Barlaam when sent to inspect them; the **Hesychasts** held that they could attain the vision of that uncreated light which was revealed on the mount of transfiguration, while Barlaam declared that this infringed on the accepted doctrine of God. After debates before the emperors (1341–51) the Eastern Church adopted the Hesychast view.

Since the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire it might appear that sects in W. Europe were few. But this view is superficial, as will appear by a comparison with the modern Roman Catholic Church. This is often regarded as homogeneous, but is in fact highly complex; its different branches are often as remote from one another as most Protestant bodies. In the same Canadian city will be found churches frequented by Irish and churches frequented by French, with decided antipathy, although the language and ritual used are the same in both. An English town will be worked partly by secular priests, partly by a regular order; their relations are as fraternal as those of Methodists with Presbyterians. The various monks, canons, and friars are traditionally rivals, not only of the seculars, but of one another, and they have been supplemented by numerous modern foundations. In England alone there are 19 chief superiors of the principal religious orders and congregations, while a single archdiocese has 31 different congregations of women, even overlapping in the same towns.

Thus in the Middle Ages we have to consider three sorts of movement—(1) those always independent of Rome, (2) innovations adopted and moulded by Rome, (3) reforms discountenanced by Rome. (1) Of the first class there were dualists inheriting Eastern doctrines, like the **Bogomils** and **Cathari**, and pantheists like the **Brethren of the Free Spirit** (*qq.v.*). With the last should be classed the followers of **Amalric**, though he lived and died in the Roman communion. Lecturing in Paris, first on philosophy and then on theology, he developed the principles of John the Scot. Three propositions attributed to him were condemned by the university, and then, on appeal, by the pope, so that he formally recanted them: God is everything; a Christian must believe that he is a member of Christ; to those constituted in love no sin is reckoned. He died about 1207, and his followers seem to have advanced rapidly. They taught that the Son inaugurated a second era, in which the Mosaic Law was abolished (and this became the pretext for antinomianism); that the third age, that of the Spirit, was just beginning with God incarnate in them; that hell was a consciousness of sin, and that the believer was freed from this by his regeneration, which was the promised resurrection. But these versions of their mystic pantheism come only from the records of the Inquisition, which began to work among them in 1209. The Lateran Council condemned them six years later, and in 1225 Pope Honorius and the Council of Sens condemned afresh the great work of John the Scot.[1] The Amalrician philosophy filtered into several of the Béguine sisterhoods.

[1] See art. PRISCILLIANISM. [2] *In Jovinianum.*
[3] *Hær.* lxxv.

[1] For the whole movement consult A. Jundt, *Hist. du panthéisme populaire au moyen âge et au xvie siècle*, Paris, 1875; and B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la philosophie scolastique*, 2 vols., do. 1872–80.

(2) For the great leaders whose programmes were accepted, and whose followers were organized with the sanction of Rome, see art. RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

(3) In the third class fall several millenarians[1]—**Wyclifites, Hussites, Brethren of the Common Life, Waldenses,** all described in separate articles. There remain to be noticed various evangelical groups following leaders who cared little about remaining in outward communion; they were chiefly of the 12th century.

Tanchelm preached in the Netherlands till 1124, Eudo de Stella in Brittany till 1148; but three disciples of Abelard (*q.v.*) produced more famous results. Peter of Bruys, a priest, taught for twenty years in S. France; the authorities who neglected to suppress him were thus adjured:

'In your parts the people are re-baptized, the churches profaned, the altars overthrown, crosses burned; on the very day of our Lord's passion meat is publicly eaten, priests are scourged, monks imprisoned and compelled by terrors and tortures to marry.'[2]

When Peter was lynched, his work was continued by a Cluniac monk, Henry of Lausanne, at first with some episcopal sanction, as the scandalous lives of many clergy needed checking by public opinion; but Bernard of Clairvaux (*q.v.*) suspected his work, and after about fourteen years had him imprisoned in 1148. Arnold of Brescia did similar work in N. Italy, France, Switzerland, and in 1145 obtained a commanding position at Rome; ten years later he was sacrificed to the pope by the emperor. The **Arnoldists** maintained themselves, chiefly in Lombardy, for some two centuries; they contemptuously rejected the clergy as of bad life and therefore unable to administer useful sacraments; they equally rejected the theory of the efficacy of any sacraments. Their stress on the laying on of hands is an obvious corollary from their attempt to revert to primitive models as depicted in the Acts of the Apostles.

About 1183, when the French troops were trying to suppress the Brabançon brigands, they were followed up by volunteer bands linked into a brotherhood on the basis of a revelation; they wore a leaden image of the Madonna of Puy, and their distinctive mark was a white cowl, whence they were named **Capuciati.** The name was speedily transferred by Thomas of Walsingham to the English followers of Peter of Pattishall, an iconoclast who advised that it was needless to bare the head before the host.

With the 13th cent. the virility of the papal system waned. When emperor and pope quarrelled, the Italian physician **Marsilius,** eminent at the university of Paris, produced a work, *Defensor Pacis*, which put plainly for scholars, politicians, and theologians the truths hitherto maintained chiefly by the Waldenses. A democrat and Bible student, he would take away all clerical power and wealth, subjecting even bishops and pope to the civil power; as a historian he showed the growth of papal power and denied any Petrine prerogative. Ludwig of Bavaria naturally protected with the sword one who protected him with the pen; he was crowned emperor in Rome in the name of the Romans; he deposed Pope John XXII.; he installed a new pope, Nicholas V. But his adoption of the principles of Marsilius was premature, and in a way was but an episode in the Guelph-Ghibelline strife. The book was a different matter; not only did it circulate among scholars, but it was rendered into French, Italian, and English. Not only was it known to Wyclif, the Parisian promoters of the general councils, and Luther, but even to the commonalty it showed that great scholars could demand a reformation in head and members, to sweep away usurpation, in the name of the apostles.

III. *MODERN.*—With the Reformation of the 16th cent. the ostensible unity of Western Christendom disappeared. The Roman communion was soon strengthened by new orders, notably the Jesuits (*q.v.*); and it has discountenanced other new movements, such as the Jansenist and Modernist.[1] But, whereas during the Middle Ages force could usually be invoked[2] to crush teachers of whom the Curia disapproved, in modern times that has been possible only in certain localities, especially under the banners of Spain and Austria. Each century has seen great new leaders, all of whom are separately treated in the present work, as also are some minor teachers; but of the first age only three seem to need mention here.

Nicolaus von Amsdorf (1483–1565) exaggerated Luther's insistence on faith, saying that good works, when done on purpose to win salvation, were absolutely harmful; he was disowned by most of his communion. Younger in years but more antique in thought, Heinrich Niclaes (1502–80?), an Amsterdam merchant, seems to have been introduced by David Joris to mediæval mystics. Taking up headquarters at Emden (1540–60), he taught that he was an incarnation of God in Christ to found the **Familia Caritatis,** whose members themselves partook of divinity and could become perfect. It was elaborately organized on the hierarchical pattern, but adherents were allowed to conform outwardly to any Church. Thus Plantin of Antwerp became a convert, and printed most of his books. These were all rendered into English, for Niclaes and Vitel of Delft did much work in Essex and London, especially after 1570. Fifty years later Edmond Jessop published a popular account based on good authority, in his *Discovery of the Errors of the English Anabaptists*, which shows development of the Familist movement. Even in 1652 the books of 'H.N.' were reprinted, but very few new adherents were won. The Friends have always found much that was congenial in the Familists, and the most sympathetic studies are by Robert Barclay[3] and C. Fell Smith.[4] John Cameron (1577–1625) taught in ten cities, and his system was popularized by his pupils, especially Moyse Amyraut.[5]

On the whole, minor sects could maintain themselves in Europe only under special conditions; Poland and Holland gave a certain amount of toleration, and England later. New countries naturally afforded refuges, and thus were predisposed for the appearance of new sects. To guard against this, the Inquisition was peculiarly active in the New World.

It might be expected that new lands under Protestant control would be sectarian museums, but this is hardly the case; in Victoria only 8054 people returned themselves in 1911 as outside the well-known Churches. Canada has become the home of refugees from all N. Europe, and displays many immigrant sects; but it seems to have originated none. The United States is so large, so old, so active, and so well investigated, that the whole modern period can best be studied with this continent in view.[6] The facts dovetail with every

[1] See artt. ENTHUSIASTS (Religious), § 3, and SECOND ADVENTISM.
[2] A. H. Newman, *Manual of Church History*, Philadelphia, 1900, i. 560.

[1] See artt. JANSENISM and MODERNISM.
[2] See art. INQUISITION.
[3] *The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, London, 1876, p. 25 ff. with bibliography.
[4] *DNB* xl. 427. [5] *ERE* i. 404.
[6] The regular censuses of 1900 and 1910 contain much valuable information. On the latter a popular book has been published by H. K. Carroll, *The Religious Forces of the United States*, New York, 1912; but, while it professes to be 'revised and brought down to 1910,' it is difficult in many places to tell whether the figures are not even of 1890. Moreover, the accuracy of the figures has often been doubted, and grave

permanent European movement of the last two centuries. That America chiefly reproduces, and only slightly modifies, the conditions of the Old World will be evident by enumerating the 22 denominations which have more than 50,000 communicants each. They are named here in order of their size: Roman Catholic, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Disciples of Christ, Protestant Episcopal, Congregationalist, Reformed, United Brethren, German Evangelical, Latter-Day Saints, Evangelical bodies, Eastern Orthodox, Friends, Christian Connection, German Baptist Brethren, Adventist bodies, Church of Christ (Scientist), Unitarians, Universalists, Mennonites.

The 'other Protestant bodies' in 1906 had not 250,000 members; their church property was small and heavily in debt; their permanence is uncertain, for, though 42 new sects appeared in twenty years, by immigration, division, or organization, yet 15 disappeared, and 30 more decreased so rapidly that many are probably extinct already. They have four times as many ministers as most Protestant sects, and have multiplied remarkably since 1890, especially in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Illinois. A fifth of them are in a thousand isolated groups with no distinctive principles, and they are classified in the census report as 'Independent Churches.' They indicate the presence of new life, but the results are too amorphous to be described. Even among the others, from the 78 'Christian Israelites' up to the tens of thousands of Winebrennerian members in the 'Church of God,' many appear negligible in practice, for on their own official showing they do no work at home or abroad.

Since the adoption of the constitution in 1789 perfect religious freedom has been assured throughout the United States. This arose not only from the highly miscellaneous character of the population, but from the fact that two States had been deliberately founded in order to secure homes for those who respected the rights of conscience. The French of Canada, Acadie, Louisiana, the Spanish of Mexico and California, the Dutch of New Amsterdam, the Swedes of New Jersey, and the second wave of English in Virginia, indeed belonged to their respective Established Churches, but these have not been the determining factors. The Pilgrim Fathers (*q.v.*) of Plymouth and the Puritans[1] of New England have had their story often told. Even more important for our theme are Rhode Island and the Providence Plantations, with charters, first from the Commonwealth, then from Charles II., assuring a welcome to all; the Jews found guaranteed to them here not merely an asylum, but equal opportunities. This tiny province was so hemmed in by intolerant Puritans that it offered no scope to develop its principles, and the wider application was made by William Penn, whose work is too little appreciated in England. In 1677 he was joint-proprietor of West New Jersey, and, desiring population, he joined George Fox and Robert Barclay in a journey to the lower Rhine, Hanover, Brandenburg. Becoming proprietor of Pennsylvania in 1681, he decided to make it a greater Rhode Island. Numerous German pamphlets were written, and the response was beyond expectation; before long there were more than 50,000 German sectarians in the province, with hardly one Reformed or Lutheran minister.

> 'Still throughout his peaceful country
> Traces linger of all lands
> Which here sent their early settlers
> In strange headgear and quaint costumes.'[1]

After long obscuration their story has at last been told.[2]

Caspar Schwenkfeld (1490–1561) was a Silesian noble, a lay reformer influential with the Duke of Liegnitz.[3] Influenced at first by Hus and Tauler, he approved the early doings of Luther; but, when the latter threw in his lot with the princes, he feared that the promotion of purity of life was being subordinated to the construction of a new ecclesiastical machine. He therefore published his *Ermanung dess missbrauchs etlicher fürnempster Artikel des Evangelii*—a treatise on the abuse of the Gospel for the security of the flesh; and in 1525 at a discussion with Luther and Bugenhagen he charged the former with receding from his own doctrine in the preface to the Magnificat, 'No one can understand God or God's word, unless he has it directly from the Holy Spirit, and no one has it unless he experiences and is conscious of it.' Fully agreeing with this, Schwenkfeld laid such stress on inner experience that he quite disused, and advised the disuse of, baptism and the Lord's Supper, as not being any means or vehicle of grace; thus he took no part in the Zwinglian or Anabaptist controversies.

> 'God must Himself, apart from all external means, through Christ touch the soul, speak in it, work in it, if we are to experience salvation.'[4]

He was reluctant to accede to any confessions, objecting to the many new formulas, and also challenging the old Greek definitions as to the person of Christ with some arguments in 1539 'that Christ according to His humanity is to-day no creature, but absolutely our God and Lord.' This doctrine of the deification of the flesh of Christ was central with him, and his followers took from it their own title, **Confessors of the Glory of Christ.** Theologians also disagreed with his doctrine of 'a double word of God, namely, an inward, eternal and spiritual word, and an outward and perishable word of the scriptures or letter.' He further challenged the external mechanical view of justification by faith, as though men had bought an indulgence from Christ and thereupon continued in sin; he taught that the elect are not esteemed justified before God entirely through imputation, but are actually made just; that the Lord is our righteousness not as outwardly believed in, but as enjoyed in faith by His inward working and life.

As the Duke of Liegnitz found that he was falling out of line with other reforming princes, Schwenkfeld left in 1529, and after five years at Strassburg went to Swabia. His followers were recruited largely from Anabaptist and Boehmenite circles, and included many of the upper ranks. He did not attempt to organize them or to ordain ministers, warning that no outward unity or uniformity in doctrine, ceremonies, rules, or sacraments could make a Christian church.

errors have been discovered during 1918. The official Bureau of the Census, in the department of Commerce and Labor, conducted special inquiries into religious conditions in 1906 and in 1916. Few of the last returns, so far as they relate to the minor bodies, are available for this article, which draws largely from the Report on *Religious Bodies, 1906*, pt. i. 'Summary and General Tables,' pt. ii. 'Separate Denominations, History, Description, and Statistics'; *Bulletin* 103, 'Religious Bodies, Introduction, Summary, Diagrams,' Washington, 1910. So far as the returns of 1916 have been published, they show no general change in the situation.

[1] See art. PURITANISM.

[1] William King Baker, *William Penn and Gulielma*, London, 1917, p. 231.

[2] See J. F. Sachse, *The German Pietists of Provincial Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, 1895, *The German Sectarians of Pennsylvania*, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1899–1900; with these may be read W. J. Hinke, *Life and Letters of the Rev. John Philip Boehm*, Philadelphia, 1916.

[3] *Collected Works*, 1564, 1566, 1570; studies in G. Arnoldt, *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*, 4 vols., Frankfort, 1700–15; W. H. Erbkam, *Gesch. der prot. Sekten in der Reformationszeit*, Gotha, 1848; O. Kadelbach, *Ausführliche Gesch. Kaspar von Schwenkfelds*, Lauban, 1861; C. Gerbert, *Gesch. der Strassburger Sectenbewegung*, Strassburg, 1889; R. H. Grützmacher, in *PRE*[3].

[4] *Schriften*, i. 768.

'When we come together, we pray with one another . . . we teach and also converse with one another, and ask questions concerning Christ, and afterwards in writing respecting the divine Trinity, the kingdom of God. . . . We busy ourselves also with the right understanding and exposition of holy scripture according to the mind of the Spirit. . . . The true knowledge of Christ must be expected not only out of the scriptures, but much more from the gifts of grace revealed by the Father; yet so that this revelation should always be in unison with and unite with the witness of the scriptures.'[1]

Persecution from all parties not only limited their numbers to about 5000, but also exterminated them outside Swabia and Silesia. The Jesuits from 1719 attacked them there and greatly depressed them till Frederick conquered the duchy and restored their property. Meanwhile many fled; some took refuge with Count Zinzendorf in Saxony and helped to rejuvenate the Unitas Fratrum (1722–35). Some 200 from Görlitz, just across the border from Herrnhut, went by Hanover and England to Philadelphia, settling about ten miles north. Barclay thinks that Fox was indebted to Schwenkfeld for some of his leading ideas, which were taught (1624–30) by Hans de Rijs and other Waterlander Mennonites near Amsterdam, and may have reached England by way of the General Baptists; but he offers no evidence on the last point. They were so unconscious of any external connexion that in the colony of the English Friends they maintained their German speech and worship, and indeed still belong to the 'Pennsylvania Dutch.' In 1895 they founded a board of missions to propagate their faith in the United States and elsewhere; lately the fields have been India, China, and Japan. In 1910 they numbered 306 communicants.

Jean de la Badie[2] (1610–74) was another noble trained by the Jesuits, successively a Catholic canon, Huguenot professor at Montauban, pastor at Orange, Geneva, London, Middelburg. By 1668 he was suspended, and he began a separatist church, which migrated to Amsterdam. His most prominent adherent was Anna Maria van Schürmann of Utrecht, whose *Eukleria*[3] contains the best exposition of his views. These included the usual separatist tenets, with a belief in the gift of prophecy and communism; no distinction was drawn between the days of the week, all being spent in the loftiest way possible. A remarkable departure from Calvinism was that, as marriage is between the regenerate alone, their children are free from original sin. About 60,000 people were supposed to sympathize with these views, but, when Gilbert Voet, rector of Utrecht university, drove the leaders into exile, only a few score went with them from 'the garden of souls planted at Amsterdam' to be watered at Herford, and, after transplantation to Bremen, to fruit at Altona. Cornelis van Sommelsdyk, whose sisters were in the community, offered his castle of Thetinga in W. Friesland, but, before the gift took effect, la Badie died at Altona in 1674. Anna van Schürmann then led the wanderers, between 300 and 400, to the castle, where they settled down to a happy community life, of which in 1677 William Penn gives a glimpse in his *Travels*.[4] Anna died next year, and in 1679 a colony of **Labadists** was taken to America by Pieter Sluyter. More converts were made there, one of whom presented Bohemia Manor at the head of Chesapeake Bay. Sluyter's rigid rule of the community was distasteful, and his traffic in slaves and other chattels brought the movement into disrepute, so that the settlement broke up in 1722. Its more spiritual side has been depicted by Whittier in *Andrew Rykman's Prayer*.[1] Sommelsdyk had become governor of Guiana, and in 1680 he invited a second colony, which faded away soon after his death in 1688. The communist life at Thetinga ended soon after these emigrations; the last Sommelsdyk died in 1725; and with the death of the last 'speaker' seven years later the movement practically ended. Yet a few Frisian Labadists still journey annually to the ruined castle; in the crypt of Wieuwert church, hard by, the bodies of five or six of the community are exhibited, and at Franeker town hall many portraits, pictures, and books of Anna van Schürmann are preserved.

The community had been offered a home on the island of Nordstrand by **Antoinette Bourignon**, whose influence had been in the Netherlands and in Holstein; she also was buried at Franeker in 1680.[2] Her system was distinctly personal; she was the 'bride of the Spirit,' the 'woman clothed with the sun,' the 'channel of revelation.' Yet she was original only on one point: the human nature of Christ was dual, and one part was liable to sinful corruption; similarly every man has a dual nature, one part being distinctly good; as the will is entirely free, any one may throw the balance on the right side and obtain perfection here. Her teachings were digested by her disciple Pierre Poiret, and published in 7 vols. at Amsterdam in 1687, *L'Œconomie divine, ou système universel*. An English version of her *Traité admirable de la solide vertu*, published in London in 1699, indicates influence in Britain; George Garden, who had been professor at King's College, Aberdeen, and minister of St. Nicholas Church in that city, was deposed from the ministry in 1701 for maintaining Bourignonist doctrines; in 1711 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland framed for all probationers an abjuration of these tenets. Thereafter the movement won no more adherents.[3]

Penn's journey in 1677 introduced him to Spener, who for seven years had borrowed from the Rynsburgers (*q.v.*) the idea of colleges of piety, which spread from Frankfort through Saxony. The new zeal for Bible study made the **Pietists** widely known and rather unpopular. The Frankfort Land Company therefore bought from Penn a block of land north of Philadelphia between the Schuylkill and the Delaware, as a Pietist settlement. F. D. Pastorius led out the first emigrants in 1683; the name of Crefeld was transplanted by some Mennonites to their new settlement; others were Krisheim, Sommerhausen, Germantown. By 1688 Pastorius saw that these Pilgrim Fathers to Pennsylvania had made their footing sure; his Latin ode to their descendants has been englished by Whittier:[4]

'Think how your fathers left their native land,—
Dear German-land! O sacred hearths and homes!—
And, where the wild beast roams,
In patience planned
New forest-homes beyond the mighty sea,
There undisturbed and free
To live as brothers of one family.'

Among the curious bodies that migrated from Germany was one group which declined this family life. John Kelpius, a graduate of Altdorf, had drunk deep of the Rosicrucian cup; after intercourse in London with the Philadelphians[5] he headed a band of 40 men — pilgrims, students, peasants—to Germantown. It is remarkable that

1 Barclay, p. 245.

2 Best recent accounts by B. B. James, *The Labadist Colony of Maryland*, Baltimore, 1899; Una Birch, *Anna van Schurmann, Artist, Scholar, Saint*, London, 1909; W. J. Kühler, *De Beteekenis van de Dissenters in de Kerkgeschiedeniss van Nederland*, Leyden, 1913; J. Dirks and B. J. Veenhoven, *De Oudheidkamer op het Stadhuis te Franeker*[2], Franeker, 1902.

3 The first part of this work was published at Altona in 1673, the second at Amsterdam in 1685.

4 *An Account of William Penn's Travails in Holland and Germany, anno 1677*, London, 1694, p. 163.

1 See also J. F. Sachse, *The German Sectarians of Pennsylvania*, vol. i. ch. vi.

2 See M. E. S., *Etude sur Antoinette Bourignon*, Paris, 1876.

3 See *ERE* x. 537.

4 See *The Pennsylvania Pilgrim*, 1872, with a historical preface in prose.

5 See *ERE* ix. 836 f.

in 1694 they found no meeting-house in all the province, except those of the Friends. On the Ridge they soon erected a log-house 40 ft. square, truly oriented; it included a hall for worship, a school-room, 40 cells, with an observatory on the roof. Here the band entitled themselves The Contented of the God-loving Soul. Kelpius himself, however, desired a more solitary life, and Whittier[1] has well sketched how

> '. . . painful Kelpius from his hermit den
> By Wissahickon, maddest of good men,
> Dreamed o'er the Chiliast dreams of Petersen.
>
> Deep in the woods, where the small river slid
> Snake-like in shade, the Helmstadt Mystic hid,
> Weird as a wizard over arts forbid,
>
> Reading the books of Daniel and of John,
> And Behmen's Morning-Redness, through the Stone
> Of Wisdom, vouchsafed to his eyes alone.'

Some of the 40 forsook the brotherhood before the death of Kelpius in 1708; a few lingered on till the death of Matthaei in 1748. The philosophy of Kelpius was best represented to English readers in the works of Robert Fludd[2] (1574–1637), who built on the foundations of Paracelsus. He taught that there are three realities, God, the world, man; that man and the world correspond in all respects and act mutually, so that natural law rules absolutely in the spiritual sphere; that man and the world proceed from and will return to God. The subject was complicated, being advertised and at the same time discredited by a hoax in 1615, when J. V. Andreæ published at Cassel anonymously *Fama Fraternitatis*, a history of an imaginary secret society said to be 200 years old. It does not appear that the speculations of Fludd were ever reduced to practice except by the followers of Kelpius.

George Keith, an Aberdonian Friend, himself tinctured with these mystic views through Helmont, found spiritual religion at a low ebb in Pennsylvania and at length drew off several followers. On his return to carry out a similar reform in London, where he failed and presently conformed to the Established Church, the leadership fell to H. B. Koester, a learned Westphalian, and he organized the body by the first baptismal service held in the province. But at the end of 1699 he returned to Germany, and the Keithians melted into the English Baptists in Pennsylvania, some ordinary, some Seventh-day.

While most of the German princes suppressed new sects, there was one illustrious exception, Casimir of Wittgenstein-Berleburg, about 40 miles east of Cologne. Hither flocked the converts of the untiring evangelist E. C. Hochmann of Lauenburg (1670–1715), and of the mystic chemist J. C. Dippel (1673–1734). Under the leadership of J. F. Haug several scholars made in 1726–42 a revision of the German Bible, in eight folio volumes with abundant notes and illustrations. Despite its heavy cost, this Berleburg Bible became very popular with the nonconformists, both in Germany and in Pennsylvania, though it was greatly undersold by the Canstein Bibles from Halle.

Another outgrowth of the Collegiant and Pietist movements became manifest in 1708. At Schwarzenau in Westphalia five men and three women had met at the mill of Alexander Mack, and had come to the conclusion that they must found a new Church by baptism. One was chosen by lot to baptize Mack, who in turn baptized the others; the procedure was closely akin to Smyth's foundation of the General Baptists at Amsterdam in 1609, except in the detail that the Germans adopted immersion. Many other collegia found their way to the same point, and little companies of German Baptists arose, in no way connected with the Mennonites or with the German Anabaptists. As the State disapproved of all dissent, twenty families went out to Germantown in 1719, and four years later, on Christmas Day, Peter Becker organized the first German Baptist Brotherhood in the province, partly from the immigrants, partly from new converts. Six years later Mack himself arrived, and within a few years all the communities from Germany came over, some of them numbered by hundreds. Thus they were enabled to maintain their own customs, love-feasts, feet-washing, the kiss of charity, and a generally austere life, aloof from all politics. The English population has always regarded these Dunkers, Dunkards, or Tunkers with good-humour as harmless and amusing. The annual minutes from 1742 show that they were pioneers in education, and published Sunday-school books when Raikes was a child; since 1870 this activity has been strongly developed. Their ministers are in three classes, the highest being termed 'bishops'; a few in the cities are paid, but in the country service is gratuitous. Since 1876 they have undertaken missionary work, now maintained in Scandinavia, France, Switzerland, India, China. The progressive policy, however, led to strain, and in 1882 a few of the 'Old Order' left on the one hand, more of the 'Progressives' on the other, the main body being now styled 'Conservatives.' Since 1908 these have adopted the official title, Church of the Brethren; they number 61,101 communicants, there being 8089 Progressives and 4411 of the Old Order.

In 1725 some Welsh Seventh-day Baptists came to settle near one of the German Baptist churches, and this resulted three years later in a remarkable movement headed by Johann Conrad Beissel, once a journeyman-baker in the Palatinate. He believed in the power of the press, and began with a German book on the Sabbath,[1] then encouraged both Benjamin Franklin and Christoph Saur to begin printing. He made a new settlement on the Cocalico, and imbibed ideas both from the Labadists and from the Rosicrucians. Uniform cells were built, monastic garb was adopted, evangelistic pilgrimages were undertaken. A large community building was erected at Ephrata, providing cells for the brethren on the ground-floor, then a hall for devotions, and cells above for the order of 'spiritual virgins.' This was soon outgrown, and many new buildings arose, making the Ephrata community famous for its architecture, its industries, and its piety. The organization was rather complicated, for a brotherhood of 40 was instituted, while there was also a secular congregation distinct from the two regular orders. Mysticism became ever more rife; *e.g.*, the stateliest of the edifices had doors only 60″ × 20″, because 'narrow is the way that leadeth unto life,' and iron was not used because, according to the Rosicrucian philosophy, it symbolized darkness and night.

Zinzendorf tried in 1741 to amalgamate the many German sects in America, but found that the tenacity which they had developed under persecution resisted his efforts. There was a struggle between the industrial and the pietist elements in Beissel's community, leading to the victory of the latter and the disuse of many mills. Both, however, co-operated in producing the German Bible, the first in a European tongue to be printed in the New World; Saur obtained his type from Frankfort, but his paper bears the watermark of the community, and to them he sent back the sheets to be bound. Soon the Ephrata press published hymn-books and many other works on religion and

[1] In *The Pennsylvania Pilgrim*.

[2] See J. B. Craven, *Robert Fludd the English Rosicrucian*, Kirkwall, 1902; see also art. ROSICRUCIANS.

[1] *Mystyrion Anomias*, Philadelphia, 1728, tr. into English by Michael Wohlfarth, 1729.

theology, up to the massive folio of the Mennonite martyrology. Books of mystic theology were also published, setting forth the Platonic view that man was originally male and female, and that the unity would be regained in the body of Christ.

Conrad Beissel had a brother Johann Peter, who lived at Gimbsheim in the Palatinate, a few miles north of Worms, west of the Rhine. This district was a hotbed of sectarianism in the early 18th cent., and correspondence between the brothers brought about a great pietistic revival and organization. The accession of a new Count Palatine in 1743 led to persecution, and by 1751 most of the community emigrated to Pennsylvania; some joined the Ephrata group, and others founded a new colony on the Bermudian in York county, where it gradually lost its peculiarities.

By 1786 Ephrata had abandoned its communist principles, and the two regular orders were dying out, never having numbered more than 300. In 1814 the secular congregation was organized and incorporated as the **German Seventh-day Baptists**; but apparently even by adding four regulars they numbered only 50. The centre of gravity shifted to Schneeberg, now Snow Hill, where there is a valuable library. A third church exists at Salemville; the total membership of the antique community is 194.

It is curious that, whereas the province was founded to secure religious freedom, the State in 1794 passed a Sunday law under which this harmless people was persecuted at intervals for half a century. Whittier forgot that they were Seventh-day Baptists when he put into the lips of Sister Maria Christina of Ephrata what he mistakenly styled the *Hymn of the Dunkers*, in which he also transferred to dawn what was really a midnight service; but the spirit is right.

> 'Lo! rising from baptismal flame,
> Transfigured, glorious, yet the same,
> Within the heavenly city's bound
> Our Kloster Kedar shall be found.
> He cometh soon! at dawn or noon
> Or set of sun, He cometh soon.
> Our prayers shall meet Him on His way:
> Wake, sisters, wake! arise and pray.'

George Whitefield and Wesley's missionaries ministered chiefly in their own tongue, but an atmosphere of revival was produced in which Swiss and German settlers were rejuvenated, so that new bodies were born which still survive: five claim brief notice.

Some Swiss immigrants of 1750 were affected by a revival twenty years later, and the converts were immersed in the Susquehanna, whence they became known as **River Brethren**. In many respects they suggest a Mennonite origin. They are chiefly in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kansas, and number 3427; they maintain missions in Rhodesia.

Another Swiss Mennonite, Martin Böhm, co-operated with P. W. Otterbein, a Prussian Reformed minister, in another revival deeply influenced by Methodist evangelism. This led to a conference in 1789, and the formation in Maryland eleven years later of the **United Brethren in Christ**. The body now has become mainly English-speaking, and numbers about 225,000 members in 23 northern States, in two groups, one conservative, one modern. They subscribe nearly $100,000 for missions in Japan, China, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Sierra Leone.

A Lutheran revivalist, Jacob Albright, under similar influences paralleled their work in his own communion, winning converts who organized in 1807; after his death they took the title, **Evangelical Association of North America**. They too have become mainly English and Methodist; they number 133,313 in all the northern States; at a cost of $28,323 they maintain missions in Japan, China, and Germany.

The **German Evangelical Protestant Church** originated about the same time and is still growing; two-thirds of its 36,156 members are in Ohio and Pennsylvania, Cincinnati being the centre. A mission in India is sustained by $27,183.

John Winebrenner was a Reformed pastor at Harrisburg in 1820, but had to retire owing to his evangelistic proclivities. In 1830 he and five friends founded the **Church of God**, with Baptist doctrines and Methodist polity. There are 22,511 members, chiefly in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, subscribing $2036 for a mission in India.

The outbreak of the French Revolution led to a recrudescence of religious thinking and the formation of a few sects with some permanence: three lay movements deserve attention. In the north of Sweden the population was so sparse that one parish covered 6500 square miles: the lack of priests caused the rise of 'readers,' and these gradually developed a decided hostility to a paid ministry, and a great complacency. It is not clear that they survive in their native home. In Norway the peasant Nielsen Hauge (1771–1824) proved a very Bunyan, and the strength of his movement may be judged by the emigration to the northern States in America, where **Hauge's Synod** of Norwegian Lutherans was organized in 1846; to-day there are 14,730 communicants. On the other hand, Baroness Krüdener (1766–1824), who attracted much attention in religious circles throughout Central Europe, was driven by the civil authorities from Paris and Switzerland to Riga, Petrograd, and the Crimea; but she never visited the New World. Her influence was that of the evangelist and healer; her only attempt at constructive work, an eirenicon between Protestants and Catholics in Switzerland, failed completely. Her followers soon died out. No new sect made good its footing on the Continent, though some continued to linger on till the increasing uniformity of the 19th cent. made existence almost impossible.

Another series of emigrations began with the wave of revolution in 1848. C. F. Spittler of the Basel mission sent a celibate colony of mechanics to Jerusalem. From their *Brüderhaus* they hoped to evangelize the world, but the missionary fervour seems to have been deflected to archæology and patriotism. A small remnant of the Hussites (*q.v.*), who had survived in Moravia and had not been influenced by Zinzendorf, migrated to Texas in 1848; there they are known as the **Evangelical Union of Bohemian and Moravian Brethren**; they still use their native tongue for worship. Some German-Swiss went to America in 1850, and are known as the **Apostolic Christian Church**, numbering about 4500. Germany saw a **New Apostolic Church** founded in 1862, which migrated entire to America a generation later; it numbers about 2000. The adoption of general military service in Europe caused two Mennonite colonies to quit Russia for S. Dakota about 1874. The **Brüderhof** had originated in Tirol early in the 16th cent., and, when expelled from Moravia, had remained encysted for over three centuries, with German speech and communist customs. The **Brüdergemeinde** were of more recent origin in Russia, and are of the Baptist genus.

In 1885 two bodies of Swedish dissenters found it wise to leave home; the **Evangelical Free Mission** and the **Evangelical Mission Covenant** are now chiefly along the northern border of the United States. Fifteen years later the **Church of the Lutheran Brethren** and a body of Finns followed the example, and by 1903 there had also departed some Slovak Lutherans.

The perpetuation of sects on American soil is

assisted by the perpetuation of European languages for worship, a factor hardly realized by English readers. To mention only the chief tongues, there are 4,500,000 Church members who never worship in English, but only in German, Polish, French, Italian, Norse, Swedish, Spanish, Bohemian, Slovak, Lithuanian, or Dutch; while 3,000,000 more use these tongues jointly with English. Americans in 1918 for other reasons began a vigorous campaign for the use of English solely; if this succeeds, some of the smaller bodies are likely to merge with others to which they are really akin.

While sects originally European can often be studied best on American soil, there are also others which arose west of the Atlantic. Henry Alline, of a Rhode Island family which moved to Nova Scotia, did great evangelistic work between 1775 and his death in 1784. He is said to have held the view that the Creation was after the Fall, in which all souls had personally shared; but this was never adopted by any number, and his Allinite converts formed the raw material for the ordinary Baptist churches that soon grew to great strength in the province. Of more permanent sects which claim fewer than eight per thousand of the population there are a number of small bodies to be found chiefly in Indiana, Oregon, Kansas, Ohio, Maine, Massachusetts, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Washington, New Hampshire, California, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Illinois. Altogether they aggregate 35 per 1000, and seven of them may be noticed.

The great revival caused reactions against New England orthodoxy. A Methodist in Virginia, a Baptist doctor in Vermont, and Presbyterians in Kentucky and Ohio independently discarded all theologies and concentrated on the Bible. By 1806 they were aware of one another, and their adherents entered into friendly relations, adopting as their name only the Biblical term 'Christians,' which others either pronounce with the first i long, or expand into Christian Connection. Ohio and Indiana contain half their 90,718 members; N. Carolina and Virginia are the stronghold of a southern group which separated on the question of slavery in 1854. One of the original leaders passed over to the Disciples of Christ;[1] and, after long confusion of the two bodies by outsiders, actual union took place in 1917. The polity being congregational, with conferences chiefly advisory, no great difficulty presented itself.

In 1831 William Miller of Low Hampton, New York, began lecturing on the second advent of Christ, which he expected in 1843. His influence extended from Lake George over New England, but after the non-fulfilment of his second prediction a conference at Albany in 1845 revealed differences which led in time to the formation of seven sub-divisions of Second Adventists, of which only two are at all numerous.[2] The mortality of the soul is held by 25,816 'Advent Christians'; 29,000 observe the seventh day of the week as Sabbath and have other Jewish proclivities as to diet and prophecy; they are very aggressive, spending about $400,000 a year on missions all over the world. The 'Adonai Shomo,' an Adventist community formed in Massachusetts in 1876, expired in the first six years of the present century.

About 1880 Mrs. Beekman, an Illinois lady, announced herself as the spiritual mother of Christ in the Second Coming, and identified Him with G. J. Schweinfurth. This man accepted the honour, and for about twenty years found three or four hundred people to form the Church Triumphant. This too was dead by 1906. This evanescent movement recalls the handful of Dumfriesshire people who from 1784 till the death of Elspeth Buchan in 1791 believed that she was 'the woman clothed with the sun.'[1]

The American civil war revealed the existence of many conscientious objectors to fighting. A Methodist minister, J. V. B. Flack, preached to these, and in 1864 a convention was organized almost on this one issue, for all questions of faith and polity were set aside in view of the diverse origins of the adherents. As the war was forgotten, members dropped off, and the Independent Churches of Christ in Christian Union are important only in Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Iowa, with some 18,000 members in 1906; next census may show them flourishing again.

In 1867 several Baptists and Methodists in Arkansas and Illinois withdrew and united; twenty years later they adopted a confession and rules; they number about 913, and call themselves the Social Brethren Church. Other secessions from the Methodists are the Heavenly Recruit Church of 1885; the Apostolic Holiness Union of 1897, near Cincinnati, with mission work; the Missionary Church Association of 1898, near Berne in Indiana; the Christian Congregation of 1899, near Kokomo in Indiana; the Apostolic Faith Movement of 1900, near Los Angeles; the Church of Daniel's Band, near Michigan and in Canada; these together seem to number about 5000 members, if they still exist.

In 1873 the Protestant Episcopal Church lost two bishops, who founded the Reformed Episcopal Church (*q.v.*) on an ultra-evangelical basis. A seminary was planted at Philadelphia, and mission work was undertaken to the southern negroes and in India. Work was extended in 1877 to England, and, as there was another small body of similar origin from the Established Church in 1844, known as the Free Church of England, the two united in 1918. The resultant Free Reformed Episcopal Church of England uses a revised version of the Book of Common Prayer, and is dividing the country into dioceses. One of its bishops has long ministered in a small iron building, and there appears no great probability of any extensive growth.

The Reformed Catholics arose in New York during 1879, but show little vitality. They may be compared with the Old Catholics of Europe,[2] who received accessions from 1898 onwards in the German provinces of the Austrian Empire. This Los von Rom movement seems, however, to have been anti-Slav, and reinforced Protestants quite as much, the tendency being to pave the way for these provinces to join the German Empire; this having been practically attained by other means, it is doubtful if the movement will continue. In America the Reformed Catholics, after absorbing the Old Catholics, number only 2100 communicants. Parallel movements have taken place in the province of Quebec and in the Philippines.

Another remarkable reaction of America on England is the Old Baptist Union. In Rhode Island General Baptists arose during the interregnum, and by 1729 were strong enough to form a yearly meeting. In the same year a similar step was taken by others in Virginia and N. Carolina, planted by 'Messengers' from England. Not all of these adopted Calvinism, and the remnant are known as Original Freewill Baptists, numbering now nearly 40,000. The northern group decided in 1880 to replant their principles in England, disregarding both the parent body,

[1] See *ERE* iv. 713. [2] See art. Second Adventism.

[1] J. Train, *The Buchanites from First to Last*, Edinburgh, 1846.

[2] See *ERE* ix. 488 ff.

which had dwindled to a handful of Unitarian churches, and the New Connexion of Evangelicals. They retained as their banner the Confession of 1660, but in organization revived the term 'bishop' for their presiding officers. After a generation they claim about 35 churches in England, 15 in America, and 7 missionaries abroad; but the English churches seem kaleidoscopic, and the census returns of 1910 show no trace of any in America, though in 1906 there were 649 General Six-Principle Baptists.

We now return to denominations in Britain and begin with the **Religious Societies.**[1] Under Charles II. several young Churchmen of London and Westminster, scandalized at rampant evils, betook themselves to their ministers for advice. Getting none useful, they joined in a weekly meeting for worship and the study of the Bible, and presently adopted rules. On the practical side they relieved the poor, freed prisoners, helped students and orphans; by 1678 it was needful to have two stewards for these purposes. Against popery they established special services at St. Clement Danes, conducted by eminent city divines, and by the close of the reign of James II. there were 39 of these societies in or near the two cities. To avert gossip and suspicion of their being Jesuits in disguise, they explained their aims and methods to the bishop and obtained his goodwill. With the accession of William and Mary they widened greatly, opening up relations with Francke of Halle and helping to found societies in other parts of the United Kingdom. Specially notable were those at Dublin (soon numbering 300 persons), at Cambridge, and at Oxford: they published their prayers that these ancient and famous nurseries of piety and learning might by the conduct of those students designed for holy orders render themselves renowned in the world. These societies were of laymen, like that founded by Francis of Assisi or the Collegiants; with the patronage of Queen Mary they increased to more than 100 in England and Ireland. They established more than 100 free schools in London, and subscribed to the colonial work of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. A remarkable off-shoot was the **Societies for Reformation of Manners,** which supplemented the positive work of the original, by helping to enforce the laws against Sunday traffic, music-houses, and brothels; dissenters were admitted as members of these newer bodies. The Religious Societies, like the Pietists, had to defend themselves from the charge of being a society within a society, of refining upon a reformed Church; they replied that they bound themselves to attend the common prayer and to communicate monthly, and that all new rules were to be approved by three clergy; they were also advised to choose a clergyman as director of each society, who should often attend the weekly meetings. They flourished for more than thirty years after the accession of Queen Anne, publishing their own hymn-books, until from one of their number, the **Holy Club of Oxford,** arose leaders who developed them even more, and made 'the wine ferment too strongly for the skins' of the parent Church.

Thirteen Oxonians, known in derision also as Methodists, founded four distinct bodies, led by **Benjamin Ingham, the Countess of Huntingdon,**[2] **George Whitefield,** and **John Wesley.**[3] It is curious that the pioneer steps in these movements, taken by Benjamin Ingham of Ossett (1712–72), should be the least known. He had Anglican orders, and was one of the party which in 1736 went out to work in Georgia; on the way he met some Moravian missionaries, who transformed his ideals. Returning to England, he was one of those who in May, 1738, founded a new religious society in Fetter Lane, where the Moravian influence was strong. After a visit to Herrnhut he returned to Yorkshire, and, finding no access to pulpits of the Established Church, preached in any available place or in the open air. By 1740 he had been formally excluded from public service in the diocese; and by that year he had founded 50 societies, linking them to the Moravians. The second phase of his career opened with his marriage in 1741 to Lady Margaret Hastings, sister of the Earl of Huntingdon; this led to the conversion of the countess, and the spread of religion among the aristocracy. Seven years later he issued at Leeds a hymn-book for the use of the societies, but in 1753 he severed his connexion with the Moravians. After a year or two, while his local work was in harmony with Wesley, he took the momentous step of definitely organizing a new connexion—the **Inghamites.** His plan was largely modelled on the Moravian, and over the 80 new societies which he had gathered he was appointed general overseer. In this capacity he ordained to the ministry two of his helpers, William Batty and James Allen—a precedent followed only in 1783 within the circle round the countess, and only in 1784 by Wesley. For the new body the *Kendal Hymn-Book* was edited by Allen in 1757, and this date perhaps represents the culmination of the work. Hearing how Sandeman was developing the work of Glas[1] in Scotland, Ingham sent Batty and Allen to examine it. They heartily appreciated it, and in their attempt to leaven the Connexion were most successful. He published at Leeds in 1763 a *Discourse on the Faith and Hope of the Gospel* to arrest the change, but this failed to provide any clear programme that justified separate existence. The organization broke up, the societies became Sandemanian, Methodist, or Baptist, and it does not appear that any second general overseer was appointed. To-day the original church may still be found at Salterforth, near Barnoldswick; also six more congregations within three miles of Colne, where in 1908 a new building was erected; the old graveyard at Wheatley Lane in Pendle Forest has many relics. The only other English congregation is at Kendal; but emigrants from Colne have built a church at Farringdon, two miles from Brantford, Ontario. The whole body probably numbers about 2000.[2]

Another minor leader in the Methodist revival was William Cudworth (1717–63). After a year in charge of Whitefield's school at the Tabernacle he worked independently, and by 1747 superintended five London congregations, known collectively as the **Hearers and Followers of the Apostles.** He was invited to Norwich in 1751, and made this city his headquarters, building the Pentagon chapel on Margaret Street, while his helper James Wheatley built a tabernacle, opened by Whitefield. Cudworth had begun printing extracts from Luther, Puritans, Baptists, then published his own views, and many collections of hymns, including some by his adherents. His sixty pamphlets record disputes with Crookshanks, Wesley, Anne Dutton, Moravians, Whitefield, Relly, Sandeman, Law; also his sympathy with Hervey and John Erskine of Edinburgh. His travels embraced not only East Anglia, but the shires of Leicester, Derby, and Stafford. His ablest lieutenant was Robert Robinson, who, however, was repelled by the renewed immorality of Wheatley, and in 1759 left for Cambridge Baptist church. When therefore

[1] Josiah Woodward, *An Account of the Rise and Progress of the Religious Societies*[4], London, 1712.
[2] See art. HUNTINGDON'S (COUNTESS OF) CONNEXION.
[3] See artt. METHODISM, WESLEY.

[1] See art. GLASITES (SANDEMANIANS).
[2] See *NQ*, Jan. 1918.

Cudworth died, on tour in 1763, his connexion slowly disintegrated. The church near Covent Garden is last known in 1778, the Norwich Tabernacle passed to the Countess of Huntingdon, the Pentagon heard very different doctrine before 1840 and soon afterwards was replaced by All Saints church. Yet his views on assurance and saving faith were reprinted for the Free Church of Scotland at the Disruption, and A. A. Bonar edited his chief work in 1851. A sketch with bibliography appears in the *Transactions* of the Congregational Historical Society for 1918, vii. 363.

The **Welsh Calvinistic Methodists** regard themselves as belonging to the Presbyterian family, but their peculiar isolation deserves some notice.[1] About 1735 Howell Harris, a layman of Trevecca, Daniel Rowlands, curate of Llangeitho, Howell Davies, an itinerant clergyman, and William Williams of Pantycelyn, a deacon who was refused priest's orders, led a great revival, which was at once labelled 'Methodist,' and thus turned their attention to George Whitefield. He was asked to preside at an 'association' in Glamorgan, and this meeting of 1742 crystallized the movement. Methods and names were arranged so as to hold aloof from the old dissent and not to clash with the Established Church system. Despite bitter opposition by mobs and magistrates the work extended, and spread into N. Wales. By 1751 there was a severe check owing to a split between Harris and Rowlands; the former had had no theological training, and expressed himself so unconventionally on the divinity of Christ that the trained clergy would not work with him. He then settled at Trevecca, built a huge community-house, and preached daily, till he accepted a commission in the Brecon militia and was sent on service to different parts of England. Evangelizing there, he came into contact with the Countess of Huntingdon, for whom he prepared an ancient building at Trevecca, which she used as a college for the training of ministers. In 1768 this was inaugurated, and for a few years the little town was a centre of great influence. But, as the Wesleys and Fletcher preached Arminian doctrine, the Methodist movement fell finally into two divisions in 1771. The Calvinists in England either remained within the Established Church or were drawn into the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion; in America they mostly formed separate churches which on the whole became Baptist. In Wales all the converts who did not join the Baptists or the Congregationalists held together and formed by degrees the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, who affectionately style themselves 'Yr Corff,' '*The* Body.'

A great binding force has been an *Annotated Family Bible*. The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge had issued in the 18th cent. only five editions of the Bible, totalling at most 70,000 copies. Peter Williams revived the old Genevan plan, and prepared a Bible with a commentary, printed and published at Carmarthen. It proved abundantly useful; it prompted Thomas Scott, John Fawcett, John Brown of Haddington, and others to do the same for readers of English; in its 38 editions it is still a great bond for the Calvinistic Methodists, though the editor himself was expelled for heresy in 1791. By that year Thomas Charles of Bala was the leader; known to Englishmen by his appeal which resulted in the British and Foreign Bible Society, he rendered constant service in Wales by promoting education, both by itinerant daily teachers and by residents on Sunday. He lived to see an important step in 1811, when Ingham's precedent was again followed, and preachers were ordained by the authority of representatives of the churches, Charles himself presiding. This led to most of the ordained clergy's ceasing to work with the body and to the withdrawal of several rich and influential families. A confession of faith was approved and published in 1823, and rules of government which had been growing for a generation were codified. A theological institute was opened at Bala, and the community-house at Trevecca was converted into a second college—not to be confounded with the Countess's college once in an older building there. The two colleges are now conducted at Bangor and Aberystwyth, in connexion with the University of Wales.

In 1840 foreign mission work was begun, and the Khasia hills, on the confines of Bengal and Burma, were chosen. A very large proportion of the population has been won to Christianity; the Connexion contributes about £16,000 yearly for this work. A little evangelism is also carried on in Brittany, whose kindred language attracts other Welsh bodies also.

With 1864 the two associations of N. and S. Wales united to establish a General Assembly. This has since entered into sisterly relations with the Presbyterian Church of England, and its churches east of Offa's Dyke often bear the legend 'English Presbyterian' in addition to the Welsh title. In America a single church was formed in 1826, and a General Assembly took shape in 1869; there are nearly 13,000 adherents.

The French Revolution brought together and stirred into activity a number of wealthy evangelicals, chiefly within the Church of England, many of whom lived at Clapham, London, whence arose the name of the **Clapham Sect**. John Thornton had done much to circulate Bibles and to buy advowsons; his son Henry became first treasurer of the Bible Society and of what became the Church Missionary Society. Zachary Macaulay by managing a Jamaican estate became sensitive to the evils of slavery. The Clapham Sect promoted the colony of Sierra Leone, of which Macaulay was governor from 1792 to 1799; he was also secretary to the company till 1808. William Wilberforce took up the cause, and in 1801 founded the *Christian Observer*, which advocated the abolition of the slave trade, and of which Macaulay was first editor. Hannah More in 1792 wrote a pamphlet on *Village Politics* which had great circulation and influence, and led in 1799 to the foundation of the Religious Tract Society. Her original interest was in village education, and she founded schools in Somerset from 1789 onwards. Charles Grant, an East India merchant, wrote in 1792 a pamphlet on the toleration of missions and education in India; in 1813 he secured in the new charter of the East India Company a grant for such education; he also promoted the building of churches in India and of Sunday-schools in Scotland. Wilberforce also furthered education, and founded a society for the better observance of Sunday. His brother-in-law, James Stephen, published in 1824 the first volume of his memorable work, *Slavery in the British West India Colonies Delineated*. The last leaders of the emancipation movement died in 1833, when slavery in the empire was on the verge of extinction; their other interests were safe in the hands of societies which have not taken shape as independent churches. The way was thus cleared for the Oxford Movement (*q.v.*).

During 1917 three groups of churches in Great Britain united under the title **Churches of Christ**, which had previously been borne by the English group. The oldest had previously been known as **Scotch Baptists**—a title peculiarly misleading, as most of its churches were in Carnarvon and Lan-

[1] W. Williams, *Welsh Calvinistic Methodism*[2], London, 1884.

cashire, one being in Yorkshire. The movement was due to Archibald McLean between 1765 and 1812, but only the one church in Edinburgh with which he was associated still upholds in Scotland the necessity of more pastors than one, which was the chief distinguishing feature of the group; and this one church is not concerned with the southern alliance, but is in harmony with all other Baptists in Scotland. For a few decades this view was propagated by many Scottish immigrants to England, and their churches were dotted along the west coast, in Birmingham, and in London. While several Welshmen preferred to stereotype their organization on that of Ephesus at one of Paul's visits, and thus disrupted a promising movement associated with Christmas Evans in N. Wales, yet the Scotch Baptist group had shrunk greatly. The third group, the **Disciples of Christ** (*q.v.*), sprang from American influences, and the vigorous efforts of these for reunion have succeeded in amalgamating the others.[1]

The chief ecclesiastical developments north of the Tweed[2] are described in the art. PRESBYTERIANISM. One movement, however, was away from that fold. From the United Secession Church in 1841 was suspended James Morison of Kilmarnock, whose views as to the universality of the Atonement, the nature of faith, and the work of the Spirit in salvation were not sufficiently Calvinistic. Three other ministers being also deposed, the four met in 1843 and formed the **Evangelical Union of Scotland**, for mutual aid and for training successors. They were soon joined by nine students from the Congregational Academy, and then by eight churches from the Congregational Union of Scotland. By 1889 there were nearly 100 churches, and seven years later these, with eight exceptions, joined the Congregational Union.

Among the Dutch there was no new religious movement till the 19th century. The churches then seemed to be settling into conventional respectability or moderatism, so that Mennonite, Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Arminian ministers began to interchange. The poet Willem Bilderdyk and the minister Hendrik van Cock headed a conservative reaction which resulted by 1834 in a separation. Leave was obtained with difficulty to form a new Christelyke Gereformeerde Kerk, marked by intense study of the Bible, strict adhesion to the standards of Dort, and a certain mystical strain. A similar movement in 1880 coalesced twelve years later. Meanwhile many of the Boers in Cape Colony had joined this **Dutch Reformed Church**, which there became better known as 'Dopper.' In the mother-country there is a seminary at Kampen, and the adherents are about 4 per cent of the population, ranking next to the former State Church and the Roman Catholics.

It seems as if the centrifugal forces have now been largely spent, and it is obvious that strong forces are at work for integration. The barriers between the Calvinistic and the Arminian Baptists have been taken down both in England and in America; the divisions of Methodism hardly spread outside England, and are quickly being healed there; so too with Presbyterianism. International bodies have arisen to promote fraternal intercourse of the great churches of the same faith and order, and in every part of the British Empire conferences are being held to see how far the movement towards unity may go speedily. Under these circumstances it would appear that any small sect which holds aloof is likely to become of mere local or antiquarian interest.

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted throughout.

W. T. WHITLEY.

[1] The native movements are being investigated by T. Witton Davies of University College, Bangor, who expects to publish a short monograph through the Baptist Historical Society.

[2] See W. Grinton Berry, *Scotland's Struggles for Religious Liberty*, London, 1904.

SECTS (Hindu).—1. Introduction.—The study of the Hindu sects presents difficulties of many kinds: the imperfect enumeration of these religious orders, the secrecy with which many of their rites of initiation and their ritual and devotion are conducted, the fact that the doctrines of some sects merge in or overlap those of others. But, if we are to arrive at any real knowledge of Hinduism as a religious system, it must be studied in its multitudinous sects. For a consideration of Hindu sectarianism see *ERE* vi. 700 ff., ix. 257, 619; and see separate artt. AGHORĪ, BAIRĀGĪ, GORAKHNĀTH, GORAKHPANTHĪ, GOSĀĪN, KABĪR, KABĪRPANTHĪS, KARĀ-LIṄGĪS, LIṄGĀYATS, NĪMĀVATS.

The difficulty of obtaining statistics of the religious orders is great.

'It may be asked why, when the term [Hinduism] covers such a multitude of beliefs and diversity of races, an attempt has not been made to disentangle them by a return of sect. . . In the first place, there is a bewildering maze of sects which overlap each other in a most extraordinary way. There are the two main divisions of Saiva and Vaishnava; and it has been said that all Hindus belong to one or other of these, but this does not seem to be correct. There is, for example, the Śākta sect, which owes its origin to the Tantrik developments that infected both Buddhism and Hinduism, chiefly in North-East India, about the seventh century of our era. This cult is based on the worship of the active producing principle of nature as manifested in one or other of the goddess wives of Śiva; it is a religion of bloody sacrifices and magic texts. This ritual is laid down in the mediæval scriptures known as Tantras, in one of which it is expressly stated that the Vedas have become obsolete. It would be incorrect to treat the followers of this cult as Saivas. The same remark applies to the Smārta [*q.v.*], Ganpatya and Saura [*q.v.*] sects, as well as to the numerous minor sects such as the Pāñchpiriya [*q.v.*] and Kartābhaja, which it would be equally wrong to allocate to either of the above main heads. Secondly, there is the practical impossibility of obtaining a complete return of sect. Of the great mass of Hindus, only a relatively small minority belong definitely to special sects, and still fewer have any idea that their peculiar cult differentiates them in any way from ordinary Hindus.'[1]

Sectarianism, in fact, so far as the mass of the rural population is concerned, depends largely on the local Brāhmans who perform the rites of public and domestic worship. With this is coupled the easy toleration which the Hindu feels towards those whose beliefs and usages differ from his own.

'There is no doubt a certain amount of hostility felt by the leaders and the inner circle of devotees against the adherents of their rival sects. It is due to this that devout Vaishnavas of the Vallabhachari sect are careful that they do not pronounce the Gujarati word *shivavun*, "to sew," lest they may indirectly utter the name of Shiva and show him reverence. The head of the Shaiva sect, the Shankaracharya of Dwarka, similarly shows hostility to the Swaminarayan and other Vaishnav leaders, and the brawls between them sometimes result in legal notices, apologies, and even criminal proceedings. But beyond these lies the great mass of the people who, while showing special reverence to the god of their sect, their *ishta deva*, worship also all the gods of the Hindu pantheon. A Shiva Brahman, for instance, visits Shiva's temples and also Vishnu *mandirs* and Mata temples. A Vaishnav makes obeisance to the Rama and Krishna idols of his sect, and also visits Mahadeo and Mata temples, and similarly *Devi-upasaks* [worshippers of the goddess Devi] have no objection to reverence Mahadeo or Krishna. The Gujarat Hindu is very religious and very tolerant. He worships not only his own and other people's gods, but also shows reverence to Musalman Pirs [saints] and Christian *padris*. He abstains from insulting the religious feelings of others, and avoids anything that may bring on him the wrath of any deity.'[2]

Hence in this article no attempt can be made to give an exhaustive account of the doctrines and practices of Hindu sectarians; all that can be done is to classify the sects into a series of groups, based on the worship of the sectarian gods. These groups are: Śaivas, worshippers of Śiva-Mahādeo; Śāktas, worshippers of various forms of the mother-goddess; Vaiṣṇavas, worshippers of Viṣṇu in his various incarnations (*avatāra*), especially those of Kṛṣṇa or Rāma; and some reference is made to those who worship a *guru*, or religious teacher.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. i. pt. i. p. 114 f.

[2] *Ib.* xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 74 f.

2. The Śaiva sects.—The cult of Śiva, being in its nature colder and less ecstatical than those of his consorts or Viṣṇu, presents fewer sectarial developments.

Of these the more important groups—Aghorī, Gosāīn, Liṅgāyat, Sannyāsī—are described in separate articles. The Daṇḍīs, who take their name from the wand (*daṇḍ*) which they carry, and the Vaiṣṇava Tridaṇḍīs 'are the only legitimate representatives of the fourth *āśrama*, or mendicant life, into which the Hindu, according to the instructions of his inspired legislators, is to enter, after passing through the previous stages of student, householder, and hermit.'[1] The term Paramahaṁsa, 'the great swan' (which can separate water from milk, truth from falsehood), is a general title of notable ascetics of every sect, but it is specially applied to the higher grades of Sannyāsīs, and more particularly Daṇḍī Sannyāsīs. Members of these orders can attain this grade only after twelve years' probation; they devote themselves to the search for the supreme Brahma, without regard to pleasure or pain, heat or cold, satiety or want. In proof of having reached this ideal of perfection, they wander about in all weathers, and do not speak even to indicate any natural want; some even go about naked, affect to live without food, or eat only when fed by others; some refuse food unless they are fed by a virgin (*kumārikā*) with her own hand; when they die, their corpses are buried or set afloat in a river.[2] For the Jogī, or Yogī, see artt. YOGA, YOGIN; H. A. Rose, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, ii. 388 ff.

In a lower grade are those who practise various kinds of disgusting mortifications.

'As a part of their *tapascharyā* or austerities, some Sādhūs undergo many inconveniences, pains, and sometimes terrible tortures. Some called Panchatapas or Panchadhūnī sit under the open sky girt about with five small fires.[3] Sometimes only four fires are lighted, the sun overhead being regarded as the fifth one. Some sit and sleep on a bed of spikes, called *kanaka-sayyā*; some, called Tharashri, stand leaning on some kind of rest for days or weeks together. Sādhūs known as Ūrdhha-mukhī hang downwards from the bough of a tree for half an hour or more. Those known as Ūrdhvabāhu keep one or both their arms erect over head till they are reduced to a shrunken and rigid condition. Some practise *ashṭaṅaṅvata*, that is, applying the eight parts of the body—the forehead, breast, hands, knees, and insteps—to the ground, and thus measuring the ground, go on a long pilgrimage by slow and laborious marches. Some called Jaladayā sit a whole night immersed in water. Some called Phalāhārī live upon fruits, others called Dūdhāhārī subsist on milk alone, while those known as Alonā never eat salt with their food. As aids to meditation, a number of *āsan* or postures, *e.g. padmāsan* or lotus posture, have been devised. Some Sādhūs perform pro-purificatory rites known as *neti karma*, drawing a thread through the mouth and one of the nostrils with the object of cleaning the nasal fossæ; *dhoti karma*, swallowing a long strip of cloth, and after it has reached the stomach drawing it out again with the object of cleaning out the stomach; *brahma dāṅtan*, cleaning the throat with a long and thin green stick used as a brush; *brajotē karma* and *ganesh kriyā*, for flushing the colon without instrumental aid.'[4]

3. The Śākta sects.—In the simplest acceptation of the term, Śāktism 'is the worship of force (Skr. *śakti*) personified as a goddess and subordinately in all women.'[5]

The best known Śākta sects are the Dakshiṇāchārī, 'right-handed,' or more respectable group; the Vāmāchārī, 'left-handed'; and the Kaulā, 'belonging to a family, ancestral,' the extreme Śāktas.[6]

'When the worship of any goddess is performed in a public manner, and agreeably to the *Vaidik* or *Paurāṅik* ritual, it does not comprehend the impure practices which are attributed to a different division of the adorers of Śakti, and which are particularly prescribed to the followers of that system. In this form it is termed the *Dakshiṇa* or right-hand form of worship. The only observance that can be supposed to form an exception to the general character of this mode is the *Bali*, an offering of blood, in which rite a number of helpless animals, usually kids, are annually decapitated.'[1]

The Vāmī or Vāmāchārī adopt a ritual of an unusual kind, and contrary to what they dare publicly avow. The practices of what are known as the Cholīmārg or Kāṅchulipaṅth, the 'boddice' sect, represent a form of debauchery which cannot be described.[2] The same is the case with the Kaul of Bengal.[3]

4. The Vaiṣṇava sects.—The cult of Viṣṇu, particularly in his manifestations as Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, has produced a number of sects, of which only a few examples can be given.

The Vaiṣṇavas are usually divided into four groups or sects (*sampradāya*), of which the most ancient and respectable is that of the Śrīsampradāyī or Rāmānujī, founded by Rāmānuja (*q.v.*), or Rāmānujāchārya, born in 1017 at Parambattur, near Madras. The distinctive mark of his teaching was his assertion of a triad of principles (*padārthatrityam*): (1) the supreme spirit, Parabrahman or Īśvara; (2) the separate spirits (*chit*) of men; (3) non-spirit (*achit*). Viṣṇu is the supreme being; individual beings are separate spirits; the visible world (*dṛiśyam*) is non-spirit; all these have an eternal existence and are inseparable. Yet *chit* and *achit* are different from Īśvara, and dependent on Īśvara.[4]

'This Sampradāya is divided into two sects, the Tenkalai and Vadakalai ['southerners' and 'northerners']. They differ on two points of doctrine which, however, are considered of much less importance than what seems to outsiders a very trivial matter, viz., a slight variation in the mode of making the sectarial mark on the forehead. The followers of the Tenkalai extend its middle line a little way down the nose itself, while the Vadakalai terminate it exactly at the bridge. The doctrinal points of difference are as follows: the Tenkalai maintain that the female energy of the Godhead, though divine, is still a finite creature that serves only as a mediator or minister (*purushakāra*) to introduce the soul into the presence of Deity; while the Vadakalai regard it as infinite and uncreated, as in itself a means (*upāya*) by which salvation can be secured. . . . The Vadakalai insist on the concomitancy of the human will in the work of salvation, and represent the soul that lays hold of God as a young monkey which grasps its mother in order to be conveyed to a place of safety. The Tenkalai, on the contrary, maintain the irresistibility of divine grace and the utter helplessness of the soul, till it is seized and carried off like a kitten by its mother before the danger that threatened it. From these two curious but apt illustrations the one doctrine is called *markaṭa-kiśora-nyāya*, the other *marjāla-kiśora-nyāya*; that is to say, "the young monkey theory," the "kitten theory."'[5]

Next come the Rāmānandī or Rāmāwat (*q.v.*), disciples of Rāmānanda, who is said to have been born in the 13th cent. A.D. They worship Viṣṇu in the form of Rāma, singly or conjointly with his wife, Sītā. His twelve disciples were drawn from all classes of Hindus, and among them Kabīr, Rāī Dās, and Tulasī Dās (*qq.v.*) are best known.

The sect known as Brahma Sampradāyī, Madhva (*q.v.*), or Madhvāchārī, owes its origin to Madhvāchārya, a S. Indian Brāhman, born in 1199. This sect is therefore popular in that part of India. Like other Vaiṣṇavas, Madhva identified Viṣṇu with the supreme spirit, as the pre-existent cause of the universe. But his special doctrine was duality (*dvaita*), as opposed to the non-duality of the opposing sect founded by the great Vedāntist, Śaṅkarāchārya[6] (*q.v.*).

The Vallabhāchārya (*q.v.*) or Gokulastha Gosāīn sect was founded by Vallabhāchārya, who is said to have been born in the Champāranya forest, near Benares, in 1479. Its cultus is devoted to the

1 H. H. Wilson, *Select Works*, i. 192; cf. Jogendra Nath (Bhattacharya), *Hindu Castes and Sects*, p. 376.
2 *Census of India, 1911*, xiv. *Punjab*, pt. i. p. 113; *ib.* xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 88 f.
3 Manu, *Laws*, vi. 23.
4 *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 86; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[3], London, 1891, p. 88; W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*[2], ii. 367 ff.
5 Monier-Williams, p. 180; H. H. Wilson, i. 240 ff.; Jogendra Nath, p. 409.
6 Jogendra Nath, p. 409 ff.

1 Wilson, i. 250 f.
2 *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 176; *ib.* xiv. *Punjab*, pt. i. p. 110.
3 Jogendra Nath, p. 411 ff. 4 Monier-Williams, p. 119 f.
5 F. S. Growse, *Mathura*[3], p. 193 f.; cf. *ERE* ix. 185.
6 Monier-Williams, p. 103; Wilson, i. 139 ff.

worship of Kṛṣṇa in the form of Bāla Gopāla, the child who played with the Gopis, or cow-herd maids of Mathura.

'Unlike other Hindu sects, in which the religious teachers are ordinarily unmarried, all the Gosāins among the Vallabhāchāryas are invariably family men and engage freely in secular pursuits. They are the Epicureans of the East, and are not ashamed to avow their belief that the ideal life consists rather in social enjoyment than in solitude and mortification. . . . The scandalous practices of the Gosāins and the unnatural subserviency of the people in ministering to their gratification received a crushing *exposé* in a *cause célèbre* for libel tried before the Supreme Court of Bombay in 1861.'[1]

5. Sects of modern origin.—The vigorous growth of sects in modern times may be illustrated by a few examples out of many.

The Kumbhipatiā sect, founded by Mukund Dās in Orissa, first attracted attention about 1874. Their name is derived from the practice of wearing the bark (*pāt*) of the yellow cotton-tree (*kumbhī*). Their founder was inspired with the idea that, if the image of Jagannāth were destroyed, it would convince the Hindus of the futility of their religion. As a result of this teaching, a band of his followers made an ineffectual attack upon the temple. There seem to be traces of Buddhism in this cult, with a substratum of phallism, and a strong antagonism to Hinduism and to Brāhmans.[2]

Guru-worship appears among the Rāmdē Pīr sect. The members worship a horse named after their founder, along with his foot-impressions (*pādukā*), before which incense is burnt, and a lamp fed with butter is kept burning.[3] Other sects display a curious combination of Christian with Hindu or Musalmān doctrines and practices.

In the Panjāb the Chetrāmī sect, founded by Chetrām († 1894), recognizes a Christian Trinity consisting of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, and God, while a second consists of Allāh, Parameśvar, and Khudā, Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer, based on the Hindu conception of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. They often carry a long rod surmounted by a cross, and practise a form of baptism. The sect is said to be persecuted by both Hindus and Muhammadans.[4] Still more remarkable is the Nikalsaini or Narangkariā sect, which sprang up in the Panjāb after the defeat of the Sikh army at the battle of Gujarāt in 1849. In order to secure the patronage of the celebrated General John Nicholson, who fell at the siege of Delhi in 1857, they attached themselves to him and took his name, though he is said to have flogged some of the members for their audacity. It is doubtful whether there was actually a cult of Nicholson, and the sect does not appear in recent returns.[5]

6. Sectarial marks.—Each sect uses as its outward symbol a mark (*tilak*) usually made on the forehead.

In the Central Provinces that of the Śaivas, which is believed to be of phallic origin, consists of two or more horizontal lines with or without a dot below or above the lines or on the middle line, and with or without an oval or half oval, a triangle, a cone, or any other pointed or arched figure having its apex upwards. The figure of a crescent moon or that of a trident (*triśūla*) also marks some Śaivas. These marks are made by hand or by metallic stamps with ashes collected from the sacrificial fire, or from burnt cow-dung, sandalwood paste, or turmeric steeped in a solution of lime-juice and saltpetre. The ashes used are said to represent the disintegrating force associated with Śiva. Vaiṣnavas usually make two perpendicular lines on their foreheads with or without a dot or circle between them. They also mark on their bodies the emblems of Viṣṇu: the discus (*chakrā*), the conch (*sankhā*), the mace (*gadā*), and the lotus (*padmā*). They have other signs which are coloured red, yellow, or black, and are made with sandalwood paste or charcoal taken from a fire in which incense has been burned before an image. Clay brought from sacred places is also used in the same way, especially by the lower castes, as sandal is considered to be too holy for them. Separate marks also indicate the subdivisions of the Vaiṣnava sects. Thus, among the Rāmānujas, the Vadakalai, or 'northerners,' make a simple white line between the eyes, curved like the letter U, to represent the sole of the right foot of Viṣnu, and a central red mark emblematical of Lakśmī, while the Tenkalai, or 'southerners,' have a more complicated device symbolical of both feet of the god, which are supposed to rest on the lotus. The complete Tenkalai symbol has the appearance of a trident, the two outer prongs painted with white earth standing for Viṣnu's two feet, the middle painted red for his consort Lakśmī, and the white line over the nose representing the lotus. The sect marks of Madhvās and Vallabhās are the same as those of the Vadakalai, but the Madhvās, instead of a red line in the centre, have a black one made with charcoal taken from incense burned before an image of Viṣnu. Vaiṣnavas also brand their breasts, arms, and other parts of their bodies with stamps representing the two chief emblems of Viṣnu, the lotus and the conch shell. These instruments are made of copper, brass, or silver, and are heated to a temperature sufficient to singe the skin and leave a deep black mark on it. These brandings are done chiefly at holy places like Dwārkā, Brindaban (*qq.v.*), and Udki. The Śāktas have no distinctive marks, using those of the Śaivas.[1] There are local variations in other parts of the country.[2]

7. The character of the ascetic orders.—Many members of these orders are men of high character, learned students of Indian theological literature, and, as *gurus*, or religious preceptors, exercise a healthy influence over their disciples. But the character of some sects is indifferent.

'Looked at with the light of common sense and unbiased judgment, the net result of their so-called reformations is that they let loose on society an army of able-bodied beggars, with the most preposterous claims on the charity and the reverence of the laity. Moral teaching of any kind seldom forms a part of the programmes of our prophets. They teach their followers to sing some songs which either tend to corrupt their morality, or to make them indifferent to work for the production of wealth. The most important part of the discipline enforced by our "incarnations" on their lay followers consists in requiring them to paint or brand their bodies in some particular manner, and to show every possible honour to their spiritual guides and to the begging mendicants. The monks and nuns of every sect are only so many licensed beggars.'[3]

LITERATURE.—The best general accounts of Hindu sects are those of H. H. Wilson, *Select Works*, i. London, 1861, and Jogendra Nath (Bhattacharya), *Hindu Castes and Sects*, Calcutta, 1896. Much information will be found in older works, such as W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*[2], 2 vols., Serampore, 1815–18, and J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Oxford, 1906. Among modern works the following deserve mention: H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, vols. ii. and iii., Lahore, 1911–14; R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, 4 vols., London, 1916; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, 7 vols., Madras, 1909; W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, 4 vols., Calcutta, 1896; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 2 vols., do. 1891; *BG*, esp. ix. pt. i. [1901]; F. S. Growse, *Mathura*[3], Allahabad, 1883; J. C. Oman, *The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903. The following reports of the Census of India are valuable: Punjab: *Census of India, 1891*, xix.; *Census of India, 1901*, xviii.; *Census of India, 1911*, xiv. 2 pts.; Bengal: *Census of India, 1901*, vi.; *Census of India, 1911*, v. 3 pts.; Baroda: *Census of India, 1901*, xviii.; *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. 2 pts.; Central Provinces: *Census of India, 1911*, x. 3 pts.

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[1] Growse, p. 284; Karsandas Mulji, *Hist. of the Sect of the Maharajas or Vallabhacharyas*, London, 1865.
[2] *Census of India, 1911*, v. *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 211 ff.
[3] *Ib.* xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 82. [4] Rose, ii. 137.
[5] *PNQ* ii. [1885] 181; *NINQ* v. [1895] 146.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, x. *Central Provinces*, pt. i. p. 79 f.
[2] See *ib.* v. *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 252 ff., with illustrations of the marks; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 534 ff.
[3] Jogendra Nath, p. 359.

SECTS (Jewish).—Since the reorganization of Judaism after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans there has been little or no sectarianism, in so far as the monotheistic principle of Judaism is concerned. There have been groups which bear some of the marks of sects, but they deserve to be described rather as parties, which indeed have often been divided as regards very important concerns of the religious life. There is, however, no general term in Rabbinic Hebrew for 'sect' corresponding to the *αἵρεσις* of Josephus.[1] Josephus treats the groups in Judæa less as political parties than as philosophical schools. In the new Hebrew the word *kath* (כַּת) denotes 'class,' 'band,' and only rarely 'sect' in the earlier literature. Similarly with *'aguddâh* (אֲגֻדָּה), which denotes 'party' on the disruptive side, just as *ḥaburah* (חֲבוּרָה) denotes it on the side of 'union.' In modern Hebrew the Biblical word *miphlagah* (מִפְלָגָה) is often employed both in the wider sense of 'party' and in the more specific sense of 'sect.'

In ancient Palestine there co-existed a number of local cults, and North and South (Israel and Judah) were divided religiously as well as politically. Within each division there were groups of devotees, such as Nazirites (*q.v.*), prophetic gilds, Rechabites ([*q.v.*] whose existence as late as the 12th cent. is recorded by Benjamin of Tudela), and even castes such as the Nethinim (*q.v.*). The resettlement after the Babylonian exile gave importance to the Samaritans (*q.v.*), afterwards divided into groups, among them the Dositheans. There may also have been proselytes of incomplete degree, though here the difference was of the nature of variety in status and obligation rather than sectarian.

With the later part of the Greek period the most famous parties, often described as sects, appear. The Ḥasidim played a conspicuous part on behalf of the Maccabæan rising,[2] while the Hellenists to a certain extent went into opposition. Not that this opposition lacked complexity. For Freudenthal has shown that there were 'orthodox' among the Hellenists, while Philo as a Hellenist denounced some of the antinomianism of his class. According to some authorities, the 'fearers of God' mentioned in various late passages of the OT were Greeks who adopted monotheism. Others consider the title a synonym for 'proselytes.' The Pharisees and the Sadducees (*qq.v.*) (of whom the Boethusians were a subdivision) then came into vigorous life. Whether there was a Zadokite sect (similar to the Samaritan or Sadducæan Dositheans) at the early period is still a matter of controversy. Side by side with these were the Essenes (*q.v.*), who have their counterpart in Philo's Therapeutæ (*q.v.*) and similar Egyptian groups, including the Abelites. The Pharisees, it is generally held, should hardly be considered a sect, as they gradually absorbed a preponderant majority of the Jews. During the Roman War there came into temporary being parties such as the Zealots (*q.v.*) and Sicarii, which, however, were mainly political groups.

With the birth of Christianity (which was regarded by the Romans as a sect of Judaism) we are met by the Judæo-Christian sect, known as Mînîm.[3] This term also applies to Gnostics (*q.v.*), some of whom were pre-Christian. They are described under various titles—Naasseni, Elkesaites (*q.v.*), Cainites, Ophites (*q.v.*), and so forth. The Judæo-Christians also assumed various designations such as Nazarenes, Ebionites (*qq.v.*). It is very doubtful whether we should regard the Epicureans[4] as a heretical sect.

[1] See art. HERESY (Jewish). [2] See art. HASIDÆANS, HASIDISM.
[3] See also art. HERESY (Jewish).
[4] See art. APOSTASY (Jewish and Christian).

With the 7th cent. arises the great Ḳaraite (*q.v.*) schism, which has some affinity with Sadduceeism. In Persia a sect of 'Isavites (an offshoot of these were the Yudghanites) was a forerunner of Ḳaraism. Within the Ḳaraite body there were also many subdivisions. In contrast to the Ḳaraites the great bulk of traditional Jews are known as Rabbanites. There were also wide differences within the Rabbanites, especially from the 12th cent. onwards, as regards the pursuit of metaphysics; the Maimonists and anti-Maimonists were respectively the friends and foes of this study, which was so prominently advanced by Maimonides (*q.v.*). Then the development of the Ḳabbala (*q.v.*) led to the growth of various groups of mystics, the Ḥasidim of the 18th cent. being the most important. Earlier the great Messianic movement of Shabbathai Ṣebi[1] had separative consequences, so that, even apart from the Frankists, one might almost speak of the Shabbathaian sect (who are not to be confused with the Sabbatarians). The Shabbathaian movement has left permanent traces, for there are descendants of the adherents to Shabbathai in the Donmeh of Salonica. Similarly, the Chuetas of Majorca have left their modern offspring. These were the result of the work of the Inquisition, which led to various groups of Crypto-Jews, more particularly the Maranos, who conformed externally to the Church but remained secretly Jews, often with debased theology, waiting for a favourable opportunity to throw off the mask. There had earlier been a similar phenomenon of Crypto-Muhammadans. There have been groups, similar to the pre-Islâmite Jewish communities in Arabia, which are ethnic rather than sectarian (as, *e.g.*, the Chazars, the Krimchaki of the Crimea, the Daggatuns of the Caucasus, the Falashas of Abyssinia,[2] and the Cochin Jews[3]). These are sometimes described in religious terms. Thus in China the Jews were the Tiao Kiu Kiaou ('the sect which extracts the sinews' [Gn 32^{33}]), and the Bene-Israel (*q.v.*) of Bombay were called the Shanvâr Teli ('Saturday oil-pressers') in allusion at once to their occupation and to their ritual.

Within the Synagogue there grew up varieties of rite (*minhag*) as between Palestine and Babylonia, and these perpetuated themselves between the Westerns (Ashkenazim) and Easterns (Sephardim). These differences do not constitute sectarianism, and they co-exist (with many others) in the same communities. Similarly it is inappropriate to describe the post-Mendelssohnian *haskalah*, or the modern liberal movements, as sectarian.[4]

LITERATURE.—W. Bacher, 'Qirqisani, the Qaraite, and his Work on Jewish Sects,' *JQR* vii. [1894] 687–710; S. Schechter, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1910; artt. in *JE* on the various sects named; H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., 5 vols., London, 1891–92 (see Index, American ed., 6 vols., Philadelphia, 1891–98, *s.v.* 'Sects'); the historical works of M. Jost, though superseded by that of Graetz, are still of value. It is important to note the title of his work: *Gesch. des Judenthums und seiner Sekten*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1857–59. Some interesting sketches of modern Jewish communities may be read in E. N. Adler, *Jews in Many Lands*, London, 1905.

I. ABRAHAMS.

SECTS (Russian).—I. *RASKÓL.*—1. **The term and its signification.**—The term Raskól ('separation,' 'schism,' 'dissent') is applied in Russia to those ecclesiastical groups and organized communities which took their rise in the 17th cent. in consequence of the liturgical reforms introduced into the Church of Moscow by the patriarch Níkon (1652–58), and which in part still maintain their separation from the Russian Orthodox State Church. These bodies are more correctly de-

[1] See art. MESSIAHS (Pseudo-), vol. viii. p. 585 f.
[2] See art. AGAOS.
[3] See art. JEWS IN COCHIN (Malabar).
[4] Cf. art. LIBERAL JUDAISM.

scribed as 'the Raskól of the Old Ritual'; they call themselves Old Ritualists or Old Believers (*Staroobrjádtsi*, *Starovêri*), claiming to be the true heirs of the Old Muscovite Church as it was before Níkon introduced his reforms. Since that Church, however, was the Orthodox Church (*Pravoslávnaja Zerkovj*), Old Ritualism really asserts—as against a State Church which has departed from the true faith—that it alone is the Orthodox Church, that in fact it is *the* Church, the true Catholic and Apostolic Communion, in relation to which all other ecclesiastical bodies are heretical.

The rise of this powerful dissenting movement was due, as indicated above, to a liturgical reform. In the Eastern Church, however, and especially in the Russian Orthodox Church, the distinctive quality of religion consists in ritual,[1] and no line of demarcation is drawn between ceremony and doctrine. Hence any attempt to alter the outward form of worship was to admit that the Church had erred, and could therefore no longer claim to be the infallible vehicle of divine salvation. Church and dissent were here at one. Previous changes had claimed to be simply a restoration of the original forms; and Níkon's reform purported to be no more; it was merely more thorough-going and more extensive. Níkon himself shared the prevailing conviction that the true character of the Church found its sole warrant in the 'orthodox' ritual. To ascribe to him a more liberal attitude towards the cultus is to show a complete misunderstanding of the matter at issue. To us the warring parties may seem to be fighting about trifling liturgical points; to themselves the very nature and standing of the Church were involved. It was this fact that made the conflict so bitter and ruthless; and thus it was no original divergence of opinion, but rather the long-continued strife, that at length generated unmistakable differences in the character of the two parties—differences in their religious spirit, their temperament, and their mental tendencies.

2. Inadequate explanations.—The usual theory has been that the schism was due to the blind dependence upon tradition, the ignorance, and the fanaticism which, as was almost natural in a predominantly ritualistic communion of that age, characterized the Muscovite Church. Níkon's reforms seemed akin to the work of the Illumination, and were therefore suspect from the outset, so that resistance was certain. Such is the explanation given by most Russian writers on the subject, and it might indeed be called the 'official' theory, *i.e.* the theory hitherto current among the authorities of both Church and State. It is nevertheless quite inept. For one thing, it fails to explain how the reforming party could have diverged so far from the principles of their Church as to propose the changes in question, and how, again, the resistance to the changes developed into a movement without parallel in Russia. The cardinal defect of the theory, however, is its failure to recognize the undoubtedly religious forces which lay at the root of the Raskól.[2] Finally, the hypothesis of mere ignorance and fanaticism is confuted by the facts of history. In Russia historical investigation of the Raskól has all along been cramped and fettered by the obstructive attitude of the authorities, and the State Church was quite content with a view which saw in the movement a merely mischievous revolt against the Church and the justifiable changes introduced by its former patriarch.

[1] See art. RUSSIAN CHURCH.

[2] It is in view of this religious factor that, in opposition, *e.g.*, to F. Kattenbusch (*Lehrbuch der vergleichenden Confessionskunde*, Freiburg, 1892, i. 235), we regard the Raskól as well worth the attention of Western learning.

Russian scholars themselves felt that the theory was inadequate, and sought other explanations; but, while they produced many interesting and ingenious hypotheses, they consistently undervalued the historical material and its investigation, and their work was stimulative rather than fruitful in positive results. Thus, for instance, Old Ritualism was capriciously brought into connexion with previous heretical movements in the Russian Church;[1] or its political aspect was accentuated;[2] or the social factor in its rise was unduly emphasized;[3] or, finally, attempts were made, under the powerful advance of Russian nationalism from 1870 onwards, to represent it as a product of the distinctively Russian spirit, *i.e.* of independent and genuinely native beliefs in the religious sphere.[4]

3. The Russian Church prior to the Raskól.—In order to gain a proper understanding of the rise of Old Ritualism, we must glance at the history of the Russian Church before the 17th century.

(*a*) *Alliance with national sentiment.*—Russia was evangelized from Byzantium, and for centuries the Russian Church was entirely under the Byzantine influence—organized by immigrant Greeks, governed by the Greek metropolitans of Kiev, and subject to the ecumenical patriarch, who nominated these metropolitans. As was inevitable, the influence and predominance of the Greeks declined and at last passed away. Their position in the Church was irreconcilable in particular with the rise of a strong native State, which made Moscow its capital. The Church itself succeeded in making a close alliance with the national movement, and its complete emancipation from the authority of Byzantium was only a matter of time. Nor could the princes of Moscow in common prudence leave the choice of the metropolitans in the hands of the patriarch of Constantinople, who frequently acted with an eye to his own advantage. Moreover, the political and ecclesiastical conditions of the Byzantine empire were not such as to evoke the respect of the Russians. Thus the Church of Moscow was in the way of becoming autocephalous—a natural process, but in this case complicated by the attempts then being made to unite the Greek Church with the Roman.

(*b*) *Growth of anti-Greek feeling.*—Among the members of the Reunion Council held at Florence in 1439 was Isidore, a Greek who had shortly before been elected metropolitan of Moscow. He was in favour of the union between Constantinople and Rome, and on his return to Moscow tried to carry it into effect there. Among the Russians, however, whom the Greeks had taught to regard the Roman Church as impiously heretical, the bare mention of union raised a perfect storm of indignation. Then Prince Vassilij of Moscow, himself apprehensive of the Florentine Union, appointed—only indeed after long hesitation—the first autocephalous metropolitan of Russia (Jonas, bishop of Riazan, 1448). Although the Florentine Union was, as regards Byzantium, barren of all practical result, it generated among the Muscovites the too-welcome conviction that the Greeks had become the betrayers of orthodoxy and had sold themselves to the Latins. This belief firmly held its ground in Moscow until the 17th century. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks and the fall of the Byzantine empire were regarded as confirming it: God's righteous judgments had fallen upon a faithless people. The belief served as a formula which at once explained the divergence, mainly liturgical, of the Greek Church from the Muscovite, and harmonized with the spirit of self-reliance now found in Moscow. All these circumstances conspired to develop an excessive ecclesiastical and national pride among the Muscovites, prompting them to look down upon the Greeks with scorn, and to regard themselves as the only orthodox and God-pleasing people on earth, and, steeped in self-complacency and crude superstition, they sank deeper than ever in mere stagnation and torpidity.

(*c*) *The idea of 'the third Rome.'*—Belief in the Greek apostasy and the fall of the Byzantine empire served to create still another idea, the importance of which in Russian life can hardly be exaggerated—the idea of Moscow as 'the third Rome.' Muscovy was now the only orthodox country in the world. The prince of Moscow was thus the legitimate successor of the Byzantine emperor. By God's unchangeable decree the Roman emperor was still the defender of the orthodox imperial Church. But by reason of Rome's unfaithfulness the headship

[1] P. Meljnikov, in W. Keljssijev, *Record of the Accounts of the Raskól brought to the Notice of the Government* [Russ.], 1860.

[2] A. Zhuravljóv, *Complete and guaranteed Information regarding the ancient Strigolniki and the modern Raskólniki* [Russ.], Petrograd, 1794.

[3] A. Shtchapov, *State and Raskól* [Russ.], 1862 (never completed because of the author's banishment to Siberia); W. Andrejev, *The Raskól and its Significance in the History of the Russian People* [Russ.], Petrograd, 1870.

[4] Cf., *e.g.*, J. Júsov, *The Russian Dissenters, the Orthodox, and the Spiritual Christians*, Petrograd, 1882; A. Prugavin, *Raskól and Sectarianism in the Life of the Russian People*, Moscow, 1905, *Old Ritualism in the latter Half of the 19th Century*, do. 1904 [all Russ.].

of God's kingdom upon earth had passed over to 'the second Rome,' Byzantium, and, in turn, to the princes of Moscow. Thus these princes (and later the tsars) laid claim to the hegemony of the world. Nor was this merely the overweening belief of politicians and ecclesiastics; it came to be a conviction of the whole people. It was largely fostered by an apocalyptic conception then prevalent in Russia, viz. that Moscow was not merely the third but the *final* Rome. Should Moscow fall away, as Rome and Byzantium had done, then the dread end of all things would be at hand; Moscow was the κατέχον of 1 Th 2⁶, and its constancy and faithfulness protected the world against the irruption of the divine judgment. It was under the dominance of the idea of Moscow as the third Rome that Ivan IV. (the Terrible) adopted in 1547 the title of tsar; and on the same ground was established the patriarchate of Moscow, since the orthodox emperor must by divine decree have at his side the imperial patriarch. It remains merely to emphasize the fact that this idea, besides enormously intensifying the national self-esteem, added powerfully also to the Church's sense of its importance. It also greatly strengthened the impression that only by rigid adherence to perfect orthodoxy—*i.e.*, in especial, absolute ritualistic purity—could the empire maintain its sovereign claims. Heresy of every kind, even the slightest liturgical departure from 'the faith of the fathers,' was not only a blow at the Church, but also a menace to the supremacy of Moscow as the third Rome.

(*d*) *The demand for social improvement.*—The accession of the second Romanov, the youthful Alexis (1645–76), saw the emergence of forces which gravitated towards a remodelling of the whole State, and the removal of the rigid barriers which hitherto had shut Moscow off from all non-Russian civilization. The appalling despotism of Ivan IV. († 1584), the extinction of the Ruric dynasty, and the anarchy during the interregnum (1610–13) created a sense of dissatisfaction with existent forms of life and a feeling of insecurity. Projects for ameliorating the life of the people by culture and education had now the support of the court.

(*e*) *The rise of a pro-Greek attitude and the opposition to it.*—But what concerns us in this connexion is the fact that the tsar and his *entourage* completely changed their attitude towards the Greeks, the orthodoxy of whom they now once more admitted. Our knowledge of how this was brought about is naturally rather meagre; we simply find ourselves before the accomplished fact. From about 1648 a more conciliatory attitude towards the Greeks becomes clearly noticeable at court, and was in part due to certain Greek hierarchs then present in Moscow, notably Païsios, patriarch of Jerusalem. He and others believed that in supporting the philo-Greek influences at the court of Moscow they were working in the interests of their own country, and, in particular, furthering the project of using the Russians to deliver Constantinople from the Turks and to restore the Greek empire. Païsios frankly announced this plan in his first interview with the tsar. He expressed the wish that God might assign to the tsar 'the highly exalted throne of the great emperor Constantine, your ancestor,' and that the tsar might, 'like a new Moses,' liberate the faithful from the Turkish yoke. The tsar and his counsellors could not but be impressed; they resolved upon an alliance with Greece and Greek culture, and coupled with this the idea of the third Rome in the sense that the liberated and restored Byzantium should have the Muscovite tsar himself as its head. These designs were not without a certain grandeur. They might be made a powerful instrument in breaking down the popular prejudice against the Greeks. It was forgotten, however, that, to the popular mind, the acknowledgment of Greek orthodoxy could not but seem an abandonment of the idea of the third Rome, or even a lapse of Moscow into the heresy so fatal to the Greeks. 'The third Rome,' hitherto a religious conception, had now become a political one.

(*f*) *Efforts to win the clergy for the pro-Greek attitude.*—If the cause was to succeed, it had to win the support of the Church. This was far from easy; for in the clergy was concentrated all the racial and religious conceit of the Muscovites. Thus a group of priests who had gathered round the tsar's confessor, the philo-Greek Vonifátjev, and who were earnestly bent upon social and religious betterment, were altogether unaware of the philo-Greek aims of the court, and, as was subsequently seen, were simply steeped in the traditional prejudice against the Greeks. It was from this group that the later leaders of the Raskól were drawn—its proto-popes (chief priests, proto-presbyters) Ivan Nerónov, Avvakúm, and others—and to it belonged also the archimandrite (abbot) of the new Monastery of the Saviour in Moscow, Níkon, who (born in 1605, of peasant parentage, at Veljemánovo in what is now the government of Nishni Nóvgorod) had risen by his undoubted ability and his vast energy to a position in which he had the tsar's intimate friendship and confidence. Níkon, however, was won over by the pro-Greek party—a fateful event, for the tsar believed that he was precisely the man to carry out the plans of reform. Having been appointed in 1649 metropolitan of Nóvgorod, the leading diocese of Russia, he was in a manner designated as the successor of the incompetent patriarch Josiph, and the vigour and ability of his administration added to his *prestige* alike at court and throughout the Church.

The tsar, however, could not yet prosecute his ends publicly, and meanwhile sought to prepare the way. His principal agent in the process is said to have been a Muscovite monk named Arséni Suchánov, a man of outstanding culture and of great influence in the Church. In the summer of 1649 this monk was sent to the East, accompanied by Païsios (who was returning to Jerusalem), to form a final opinion regarding the Greek Church and to lay this before the tsar. On his return he handed to the tsar a written account of his discussion with the Greek divines at Térgovite in Moldavia—*Prénije s Grekami* ('Controversy with the Greeks'). His verdict was altogether adverse, confirming the views generally prevalent in Moscow. Now, in thus employing Suchánov, did the tsar and his intimates really desire to obtain an impartial judgment regarding the Greeks before launching their pro-Greek policy? If so, it is strange that Suchánov's verdict had no effect. What was the actual object of that mission? The only adequate answer is that the philo-Greek party hoped for a reversal of Suchánov's views under the influence of the shrewd and capable Païsios. In that case they would be able to claim that a recognized authority of the Muscovite Church had now discerned the baselessness of the prejudice against the Greeks. Doubtless the tsar and his advisers were bitterly disappointed, and, if Suchánov did not fall into disfavour, it was owing to a circumstance of interest to us at this point. In his *Discussion* he had set forth the theory of the third Rome quite unambiguously, affirming that the authority of the empire had been definitely transferred to Moscow, and that the patriarch of Moscow was now the chief bishop of the Church. The pro-Greek party, while not conceding Suchánov's reason for supporting that theory, viz. the apostasy of the Greeks, were not disposed to disown so forceful a champion of the supremacy of Moscow.

4. The real origin of the Raskól.—Now the deeper cause of the Old Ritualistic movement was this change of attitude on the part of the leading political and ecclesiastical authorities towards the Greeks and the Greek Church, and their endeavour to apply their pro-Greek views in the work of reforming the Church of Moscow. The reform roused the fanatical opposition of the conservative classes, who, believing that they were defending the orthodoxy of the Church as well as the stability of the throne, and desiring to save their metropolis from the fate of Rome and Constantinople and avert the terrors of the Last Judgment, resisted with such vehemence that a conflict of unparalleled passion and virulence was the result.

5. How the reform was carried out.—(*a*) *Níkon's methods.*—On the death of Josiph (15th April, 1652) Níkon was appointed patriarch, and was consecrated on 25th July; his promotion was approved even by those among the Old Ritualists who became his bitterest enemies. The pro-Greek party at the court had thus gained their end; the elected head of the Church of Moscow was ready to carry out their plans. Níkon set himself to the work with a will. He acted with unexampled brutality, trampling upon all opposition, and ignoring the religious feelings of the people.

His ruthless methods cannot be explained wholly by his character, though he was certainly a man of harsh and rigid disposition, without patience, without the capacity of truly estimating his opponents. The deeper explanation of his actions is twofold: (1) in spite of his devotion to the cultus, he was not a man of truly religious temperament; (2) the reform was for him only a means of attaining certain ends of a politico-ecclesiastical character, his real object being to strengthen the authority of the patriarchate, even against the monarchy itself.

Thus, when Níkon entered upon office, he exacted with the sanction of the tsar an oath of inviolable obedience from the boyars and the synods. The tsar would doubtless regard this as merely a preparatory step to the work of reform, but Níkon had something more in view. The great aim of his administration was to liberate the hierarchy of Moscow, which had hitherto been a passive instrument of the monarch, and to get the reins of power into its hands. In the patriarch, as set forth by Níkon, is concentrated a power not less than divine; in him lies the source of all political and monarchical authority. Níkon exploits the theory of the third Rome by regarding the patriarch of Moscow as having been proclaimed the supreme hierarch of Christendom; and, if the tsar should become the recognized head of the world empire, what would be the position of the patriarch, the occupant of the sacred office from which were derived the jurisdiction, power, and authority of tsar and State alike?

(*b*) *His guiding principle.*—Níkon was no sooner installed in office than he began his revision and correction of the liturgical books. His guiding

principle was to substitute the Greek liturgical practice of the day wherever it differed from the Muscovite. In Moscow scholars had long been engaged with the variant and often inaccurate texts, but all attempts to construct a correct and uniform edition had been thwarted by the general lack of education and also by the prevailing belief that there was one original sacred text, which required only to be restored. This belief was associated with another, viz. that in the ritual there could be but one single 'true' form, which was likewise the original; this had been given by God, and any departure from it impaired its sacred and sanctifying power, and might even obstruct the divine activity conjoined with it. 'It is the duty of all of us, as orthodox Christians'—so writes a leader of the Raskól, the relatively enlightened deacon, Feódor—'to die for a single A' (in the liturgical texts). As regards the question of different versions and various readings—natural in a liturgy so extensive and of so long a growth—the Muscovites scorned the very thought of a historical account of the liturgy: there could be but one form. By what means, then, was a uniform text to be secured? By going back to the sacred original, said the Muscovites, quite unaware that no such original existed. Such views, of course, excluded the very possibility of emendation; all that could be done was to eject the more glaring blunders.

Even so the cry of heresy was always ready to break out. Thus, at the beginning of the 16th cent., the Greek monk Maximos, a learned and noble-minded man, who had sought to rectify the formularies, was condemned by two synods (1525, 1531), and spent 26 years in a Moscow prison. In 1551 'the Hundred Chapter Synod' (held at Stoglávy) ordered the priests to have the texts copied only from 'good' models, thus showing its own incapacity to deal with the prevailing confusion. The establishment of the first printing press in Moscow (1563) merely increased the disorder. Under the first of the Romanovs, Michaíl, the printing of the liturgical texts went assiduously forward, but only multiplied the variant editions. When Dionissi, abbot of the Trinity Monastery near Moscow and a cultured Greek scholar, constructed an emended text on the basis of the Greek form, he and his two assistants were convicted of heresy by a synod (Moscow, 1618), and imprisoned. The texts brought out under the patriarchs Philaréte (1619–33), Joasaph I. (1634–40), and Josiph (1642–52) were by no means uniform, and did nothing to relieve the situation.

Níkon's emendation, on the other hand, had a prospect of success, since it followed a definite principle. But to the Muscovites the principle itself could not but be obnoxious. In face of this difficulty Níkon committed the blunder of giving an influential position in the work of revision to a Greek monk named Arsénios.

This Arsénios was proficient in the Slavic tongues, but otherwise an arrogant adventurer. He had been a pupil of the Propaganda in Rome, but had been reconciled; had subsequently gone over to Islām and been reconciled again; and then, on coming to Moscow to seek his fortune, had been thrown into prison. The work of revision was thus discredited from the outset.

(*c*) *His first proceedings.* — Shortly after the beginning of the Easter fast of 1653 Níkon began the work of changing the ritual by issuing a decree substituting the Greek mode for the Muscovite in two rites, viz. the practice of bowing during a certain prayer (that, so called, of Ephraem Syrus) and the sign of the cross. In Moscow the sign of the cross was performed by two fingers of the right hand (representing the twofold nature of Christ), while in the Greek Church three fingers were used (representing the Trinity). In Moscow, moreover, the sign of the cross was in many cases the only act by which the uncared-for masses could manifest their religion and take part in worship; it was regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable; in its genuine form, as was said by a later writer among the Old Ritualists, was contained 'the whole secret of the faith.' Nor need we wonder at this, when we learn that the synod of 1551 had decreed as follows: 'If any one does not bestow his blessing with two fingers, as Christ did (!), or does not make the sign of the cross [in the same way], let him be accursed.' Thus Níkon's innovation seemed to expose believers to the Church's anathema; the Church was being betrayed by her own patriarch!

(*d*) *Clerical opposition.*—Hostility broke out at once, and was so vehement as to compel Níkon temporarily to desist; and it was not till 1656, when he was at the height of his power, that he sought to enforce the change in the sign of the cross. The rising opposition, however, revealed the malcontents. It had its source in the Vonifátjev group referred to above. Vonifátjev himself, it is true, shared the pro-Greek sentiments of the patriarch, and remained silent; but his friends raised a protest. Níkon did not hesitate to rid himself of these adversaries by degradation and the ban. Nerónov was excommunicated, Avvakúm was sent to Siberia; the group was broken up; Níkon had triumphed. But his ruthless policy was ill-advised, for these revered men, thus dispersed throughout the country, carried the opposition to the most remote places, and everywhere evoked fresh loyalty to the old rites. They now belonged to a class which in Russia has never failed to exercise a great influence—the class of 'sufferers,' those who bear injustice in silence.

In face of the growing resistance Níkon found it advisable to convene synods to give countenance to his measures. The first of these was held at Moscow in March or April 1654, the tsar being present, and this was followed by a series ending with the Great Synod of 1666–67. At the synod of 1654 the patriarch was supreme and despotic. In his inaugural address he summoned the assembly to make the 'divine law' operative in the Church of Moscow, to restore that Church to its pristine glory, to cancel all the 'innovations' that now disfigured it, the 'innovations' specified being all of a liturgical character and of little or no significance. The main point, however, was the reforming principle, for which Níkon obtained the sanction of the synod. This was that the 'Greek and Old Slavonic' books were to form the standard. In point of fact, however, it was only the Greek texts then in use in the Greek Church that Níkon had in his mind. The synod was a mere blind. The presence of the tsar, and his supporting vote, made opposition difficult. Pável, the revered bishop of Kolomna, who ventured very cautiously to express an opinion at variance with Níkon's, was dismissed from office, and finally banished. Here again Níkon showed his imprudence, for he furnished the adherents of the old institutions with a martyr.

(*e*) *Popular opposition.*—Opposition was not confined to the clergy. The course of events shortly after the synod of 1654 shows that a vague antagonism was stirring the masses, and that the soil was being prepared for the astonishingly rapid upgrowth of the Raskól.

In the late summer and autumn of 1654 Moscow was stricken with plague. The tsar had taken the field against the Poles, and the court, including the patriarch (who was also vicegerent), had left the city. Now Níkon, immediately after his accession to office, had started a campaign against the so-called 'Frankish' pictures of the saints, *i.e.* such as were not Byzantine, but painted from Western models. These his agents searched out, and destroyed or disfigured. On 25th August an excited mob appeared in the Kremlin carrying icons that had been disfigured by Níkon's orders; their fury was directed against him as the archiconoclast, and against the printing establishment where heresies were under his direction foisted into the liturgical texts. It was on his account that God had sent the plague! This disturbance

was quelled, but the trouble remained. The patriarch, however, simply seized the occasion to treat the opposition more harshly than ever, and, when the tsar and he returned to Moscow (Feb. 1655), he resolved to proceed more energetically upon his chosen path.

(*f*) *Nikon's further proceedings.*—His co-adjutor and adviser for some years after this was the patriarch Makarios of Antioch, a wily and time-serving Arab, who had come to Moscow that year for the purpose of raising funds. He devoted himself entirely to Nikon's will, covering the patriarch's reforming measures with his own authority. He played cleverly, and for his own pocket effectively, the part of a zealot for orthodoxy. On Orthodoxy Sunday, 1655, he began his work by pronouncing, in conjunction with Nikon, the solemn curse of the Church upon the Frankish icons, and upon all who made them or tolerated them in their houses. On the same day Nikon fiercely inveighed against the traditional Muscovite sign of the cross; it was not 'orthodox,' the 'true' form of the sign being found among the Greeks; and this was in turn solemnly confirmed by Makarios.

Nikon then sought to sustain his proceedings by convening another synod (Moscow, March 1655). This assembly, apprehensive of his vengeance, agreed to all his proposals, though not without mutterings. Besides a number of trifling liturgical changes, the synod was asked to endorse three measures of rather more importance:

(1) The creed generally used in Moscow was to be purged of its non-'orthodox' additions, *i.e.* it was to be superseded by the Greek form;[1] (2) the non-'orthodox' sign of the cross in practice in Moscow was to give place to the 'true' form, *i.e.* that used in the Greek Church; (3) the hitherto operative rule of the Muscovite Church according to which members of another communion, already baptized by sprinkling, could join the Russian Orthodox Church only by rebaptism was to be abrogated, and thus, as against the view prevailing in Moscow and explicitly confirmed by the patriarch Philaret, viz. that only a baptism by triple immersion was 'Christian,' baptism by sprinkling was not to be recognized.

These decisions of the synod could only strengthen the impression that the Church of Moscow had broken with her past and her traditions, and yielded herself wholly to the Greeks. Had not the head of the Church openly declared in the synod: 'I am a Russian, and the son of a Russian, but in faith and conviction I am a Greek'?

Immediately after the synod of 1654 Nikon had applied to the ecumenical patriarch Paësios for advice, but he did not wait for a reply, although he speaks of the answer as having been laid before the synod of 1655, and as containing a distinct approval of his proceedings. In point of fact, Paësios warned Nikon against precipitation, and enunciated a principle not understood in Moscow, viz. that ritual differences need not involve divergence in belief, and that variations in the liturgy did not as such imply heresy. Nikon simply ignored this, and at once published the resolutions of the synod of 1655, as well as the revised form of the liturgy. The printing was hurriedly done and corrections had to be made, so that the various issues differed from one another, and the existing confusion was made worse.

While Makarios of Antioch remained in Moscow, he was Nikon's preceptor in the details of the Greek liturgical practice, and the forms of the latter were forthwith forced upon the Church of Moscow. As regards the sign of the cross, however, Nikon felt that the resolutions of a synod were not enough. Hence at the festival of St. Melatios (12th Feb. 1656), in the presence of a large congregation, including the tsar and the court, he denounced the two-finger form as indicative of the Armenian heresy.

[1] Apart from some insignificant features, the main point here was that, whereas the Muscovite form of the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan creed contained the words, 'And in the Lord the Holy Ghost, the true and the life-giving,' the text of the Greek Church omitted the adjective 'true.'

The sting of this statement lay in the fact that the Armenians were regarded in Moscow as heretics of a peculiarly obnoxious type. The *Kirillova Kniga* ('Book of Cyril'), a work highly esteemed, denied that they were Christians at all; they did not observe the Lord's Supper; intercourse with them polluted the Orthodox. Should a Christian pass an Armenian church while service is going on, he must stop his ears to the diabolic strains; if an Armenian enters an Orthodox church during the liturgy, the service must at once be broken off; and so forth.

On Orthodoxy Sunday, 1656, Nikon once more had the curse applied by Makarios to the hitherto prevailing form, subsequently confirming it in a document signed by the Antiochene and other three Eastern prelates. Finally, he secured the ratification of all his liturgical changes at a synod of Russian bishops in Moscow (23rd April–2nd June 1656), which in particular condemned the Muscovite form as a 'Nestorian heresy.' All his modifications were then inserted in the new edition of the liturgical texts (1656–58), all the forms obtaining hitherto being suppressed.

Other changes regarded as peculiarly repugnant were: (1) the substitution of Ἰησοῦς for Issús; (2) the alteration of the form of the Cross; (3) the use of five hosts (prosphoræ) instead of seven in the Mass. Most of the changes are so slight that nothing but intense hatred of the reform generally could have magnified them into questions of faith. But, as Nikon's principle itself was mere apostasy, even the change of a letter was a mark of wickedness.

(*g*) *Nikon's fall, and the enforcement of the reform by the tsar.*—Thus in a short time Nikon had effected his reform, and above all had prepared for further advance by recognizing the Greek Church as the sole Orthodox norm. We hear little regarding the success of the process. The higher clergy, and doubtless many of the lower, acquiesced. The external nature of the reform, however, was such as to prevent its winning the masses. Resolutions, decrees, and new editions were of no avail there. What the people saw was simply that one ritual had been superseded by another; the new one was called 'true'; the old 'heretical.' Religious inertia together with custom would, it was believed, bring about the acceptance of the reforms. And, even if a smouldering excitement and dissatisfaction existed among the people, legal measures would keep them in check. Moreover, an event took place which strengthened the popular hope that the reform was a mere passing phase of things: Nikon, already at variance with the tsar, demitted office in July 1658, and left Moscow for a convent. The Church remained without a head till 1667. For over eight years an ever more embittered struggle was carried on between the tsar and Nikon as to the relations between the power of State and Church—till, in fact, Nikon was finally condemned (12th Dec. 1666) by the great synod of Moscow presided over by Paësios of Alexandria and Makarios. During that prolonged conflict the adherents of the old system still hoped that the change would be reversed. The tsar was meanwhile *de facto* head of the Church; was it not incumbent upon him to overthrow the work of the most dangerous enemy of his own purposes and the Muscovite State? It was a vain hope; the tsar might disagree with the methods of the reform, but the reform itself was his own policy. The whole situation becomes obscure: the reforms were not repealed, nor were they enforced; the tsar appeared to make friendly overtures to the opposition, the enemies of Nikon; he recalled Avvakúm from Siberia, and treated him with ostentatious kindness. It was only in the closing years of the struggle that the tsar, now determined to crush Nikon by means of the Greek hierarchs, once more resorted to stern measures. In 1664 the leaders of the opposition, including Avvakúm, were imprisoned, some of them suffering bodily disfigurement. At length Alexis summoned an assembly

of Russian ecclesiastics (Moscow, 1666), which solemnly reconfirmed Níkon's reform. He called upon it to recognize (1) the orthodoxy of the Greek patriarchs, (2) the orthodoxy of the Greek liturgical books, and (3) the decisions of the all-important synod of 1654. The synod also cited the opponents of the reform, and condemned those who would not submit, Avvakúm among them. Finally, in 1667, Níkon's reform and the foregoing resolutions were ratified by a synod presided over by the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, and, towards its close, by the recently elected patriarch of Moscow, Joasaph; here too the Church's curse was pronounced against the adherents of the old ritual.

6. The religious character of the opposition.—That the reaction against the reform was not more theological in character, but became a popular movement, and one vehemently hostile to the State Church, is explained by the peculiarly ritualistic bent of Orthodox Russian piety. Here the liturgy is not so much the expression and vehicle of divine wisdom—an aspect which is more prominent in the Greek Orthodox type of religion, and which to some extent mitigates the detrimental results of mere ceremonialism; in the Muscovite communion the liturgy, even in its minutest details, is a divine operation, a divinely revealed medium of intercourse with the sanctifying power of God.[1] Thus the Muscovites felt that Níkon's subversion of holy tradition in some sense maimed the activity of God, even as it debarred the faithful from access to Him. Again and again was heard the bitter outcry that Níkon had brought perdition upon all the Russian saints who had been 'saved' by the older rites. Accordingly, we cannot but admit that the resistance to the reform sprang from forces genuinely religious in character. The adherents of the old tradition believed that they were defending the Church as the infallible agent of salvation, and fighting for that assurance of their salvation which the Church guaranteed. Their conception of salvation, their ideas of religion in general, were, no doubt, stunted and defective; but a Church has ever the sects which befit it; they are bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. The perversion of the religious spirit among the Russian people comes out but too clearly in the Raskól, but the guilt of that perversion lies with the Church itself.

Again, it is these genuinely religious forces in the Raskól that enable us to understand the intrepid loyalty with which its partisans, in spite of the most inhuman treatment, clung to their faith. Similarly, we come to understand how the writings of the earlier Old Ritualists, notwithstanding their occasional absurdities and their blind fanaticism, show more of the spirit of true religion than is found among the reformers. As things were, that fidelity to the old was a more distinct indication of a living religion than was the facile acceptance of the new.

7. Avvakúm as champion of the opposition.—In spite of all these things, the reform might still have proved successful; the masses might have become habituated to the changes. To the personality of Avvakúm alone, the present writer believes, was due the fact that Old Ritualism did not collapse, but increased in power. A man of extraordinary energy and resolution, he was indefatigable in the defence of the 'old faith.' His life was a series of afflictions heroically borne—banishment, hunger, ill-usage, the suffering and death of his followers—till at last he died a martyr at the stake in 1681. But what made him the most outstanding figure in the Raskól was the conviction that he was not merely a servant of God, but also a prophet—one who in visions and ecstasies received the counsel of God—or rather a divinely commissioned messenger possessing absolute authority over his adherents.[1] This conviction enabled him to invest Old Ritualism with a vitality that defied persecution. Ultimately the process of events brought about so wide a severance between the mother Church and the Raskól that all attempts at reunion have proved futile.

8. Old Ritualism as a sect, and its disruption into denominations.—The resolution of the synod of 1667 greatly widened the cleavage between Church and Raskól by its enactment of excommunication and coercive measures against the latter. In the eyes of the Old Ritualists, the Church had now renounced God, and had become 'the woman drunken with the blood of the saints.' At first the State was regarded as less culpable; it had been seduced by the Church. But the latter attitude was soon abandoned in face of persecution. A decree of the regent Sófja in 1685 ordered the 'stiff-necked' sectarians, after three warnings, to be burnt, and those who did not denounce them to be knouted; those who recanted were set free if they found a sponsor. The cruel penalties inflicted by the patriarch Jakím (1674–90) fomented the fanaticism of the Old Ritualists to madness, and hundreds and even thousands, believing that the end of the world was imminent, sought death by burning or starvation. Some fled to the forests and desert places; others betook themselves to Poland, Sweden, Austria, Prussia, or even Turkey. Those who remained sought to form themselves into an organized community. But, as none of the Russian bishops had joined the Raskól, a hierarchic order was impossible; and without that, again, a Church was impossible. Without an episcopate and a priesthood how could an excommunicated multitude become a Church? The priests of the 'old ordination' began to die out, and could not be replaced without bishops. The early leaders of the Raskól had tried to grapple with the difficulty, but without success. Avvakúm was disposed to recognize priests who had been ordained subsequently to the reform, but had renounced their errors, while Feódor, his companion in suffering (and eventually his fellow-martyr), absolutely rejected the ordination of the State Church—certainly the more consistent view. The question led at length to the division of the Old Ritualists into two large and mutually hostile groups, the Bezpopóvtsi ('priestless') and the Popóvtsi ('priestly').

(*a*) *Bezpopóvtsi.* — The Old Ritualists who gathered together in the district of Pomórje, in the government of Olónez—a region hitherto sparsely populated and almost churchless—solved the problem of the priesthood by reducing the number of the sacraments to two, baptism and confession, which could be dispensed by laymen, the Mass, etc., being simply omitted in their priestless service. Their example was largely followed by the Raskól throughout the empire. It was theoretically vindicated as a provisional policy (*c.* 1700) in a work still highly esteemed by the sect, viz. *Pomórskije Otwêti* ('Answers from Pomórje'), which divided the sacraments into (1) those indispensable for salvation — baptism, confession, and communion, and (2) the useful—unction with the myron, the 'oil of prayer,' marriage, and ordina-

[1] Once, when an attempt was made to make some paltry liturgical change in the Solovietski monastery (which refused to accept Níkon's reform until 1676, after a siege of eight years), the monks cried out in their despair, 'Woe! they are taking away our Christ.'

[1] This conviction may be illustrated by a vision in which heaven and earth and all created things appeared as having been enclosed in his body by God. In an account of this sent to the tsar (1669) he says: 'Seest thou, Autocrat, thou . . . dost govern the Russian land, but to me the Son of God . . . has subjected heaven and earth?'

tion; and communion might be replaced by the desire for it ('spiritual communion'). This again was brought into logical connexion with the doctrine that the kingdom of Antichrist was at hand. The priesthood, originally a gift of God's grace, had been destroyed by Antichrist, as was to be expected in the tribulation of the last days. Here, be it noted, Antichrist was not a person, but the age that began with Níkon's reform; Church and State were the organs thereof. This attitude of the Bezpopóvtsi to the ruling powers was aggravated by the reforms of Peter I. Believers fled from an unclean world; and those who left the Church for the Raskól were baptized as heathen. As might be expected, dissensions arose, and fresh disruptions. These were due mainly to two questions: marriage and the relation to the State. As there were no priests, believers had to accept celibacy as a binding law; as a matter of fact, it was adopted as a principle, and communities were organized on the monastic model. In practice, however, some sought to retain marriage, while theoretical celibates sometimes gave themselves to the worst immoralities. Then the demand of the State for a recognition of its authority (especially by prayer for the tsar), the impracticability of complete isolation, and the compromises resulting from business relations, tax-paying, military service, etc., created new difficulties.

The more important sub-sects of the Bezpopóvtsi are as follows:

(1) *The Pomórtsi* (from Pomórje; see above), organized towards the end of the 17th century. Among their characteristics were the monastic pattern of their communities, rejection of marriage and of prayer for the tsar, as also the readiness of their members to die by burning themselves. The body became wealthy; it provided teachers for other Old Ritualistic groups, and in fact came to be a kind of centre for the entire priestless section. In process of time it became less rigid: prayer for the tsar—under compulsion, it is true—was countenanced by some, marriages originally contracted in the State Church, as well as irregular unions, were tolerated, and a community which arose in Moscow at the end of the 18th cent. actually permitted regular marriage. These are the Brátchniki ('having marriage'), or novo-('new')Pomórtsi.

(2) *The Feodossêjevtsi*, so named from their founder Feodóssi Wassêljev, originally one of the Pomórtsi († 1771), who instituted independent communities in W. Russia. Originally allied with the Pomórtsi, they broke away in a controversy regarding the form of the inscription upon the cross. The questions of prayer for the tsar and marriage widened the gulf, the Feodossêjevtsi maintaining the original strictness of the Pomórtsi themselves. In 1752 a synod declared the absolute necessity of celibacy. This denomination found its most powerful support in the establishment in 1771 of the Preobrazhénsk Institution in Moscow, its leader here being the uneducated but shrewd Iljá Kovylin, under whose almost unlimited authority it rapidly increased in wealth and influence, while it adhered to a most rigid rule of celibacy (married people were admitted to baptism only after divorce). The serious spread of immorality led Kovylin, by his insistence on the merits of penitence, virtually to exonerate it. After his death a kind of tolerance was granted to loose unions, but the persons concerned remained formally outside the community, and were absolved only on their deathbed. This question of marriage is still a fruitful source of dissension and disruption in the group.

(3) *The Philípovtsi*, founded in the first half of the 18th cent. by a certain Philip, who had been expelled on personal grounds from the Pomórtsi. Its distinctive tenets are somewhat obscure; but it rejects marriage and prayer for the tsar. When in 1743 a military expedition was sent to the settlement, Philip and his adherents burned themselves, with the result, however, that the sect increased. It is characterized by fanatical and divisive tendencies.

(4) *The Strânniki* ('wanderers') or *Béguni* ('runners'), founded not later than the latter half of the 18th cent. by a certain Jevfimi, are the extremists of the Raskól, rejecting all compromise with Antichrist. The members must pay no taxes, must not deny their nonconformity or let their names appear in the Government list of the Raskólniki, must receive no official papers, must (in one group) possess no money, and have no intercourse with members of the State. Jevfimi, for his salvation's sake, adopted rebaptism, and baptized his followers, thereby devoting them to a life of wandering and homelessness. While the other Bezpopóvtsi find Antichrist in a period of history, the Strânniki see it embodied in the succession of tsars from Peter I. State and Church are in its power; the Church is Satan's prophet. Disputes arose after the founder's death in 1792, ending with the triumph of a more tolerant party, and leading to the recognition of two classes of members, viz. (i.) those who keep the whole law and are under obligation to wander without rest, and (ii.) those 'who have discerned Christian doctrine' without practising it. The latter have homes and property, must be hospitable to 'wanderers,' and are not baptized till shortly before death, when, by being removed to some place associated with wanderers, they formally adopt the more extreme law. The Strânniki likewise have split up into sub-sects.

(5) *The Nétovtsi* ('deniers'), or *Spdssovo soglâssije* ('community of the Redeemer'), probably arose about 1700. They deny that the laity can take the priest's place in all cases. They have no worship, no sacraments; the Church, they believe, has forfeited God's grace. Still, they permit baptism and marriage in the State Church, though they do not regard this performance of the two sacraments as orthodox, and seek to make good all defects by the prayer, 'May God let his grace be effective!'

The fanaticism and ignorance of the Bezpopóvtsi have given rise to numerous less important denominations, many of them doomed to a brief existence.

(*b*) *Popóvtsi.*—This section of the Raskól differs from the Bezpopóvtsi in regarding a priesthood as essential to the existence of a Church, and from this all other differences result. When the priests ordained prior to the reform died out, others who joined the sect were admitted on renouncing their errors. This necessarily led to modifications of the doctrine of Antichrist, who was here believed to be an actual personage of the final age. Moreover, as such priests could be recognized only in virtue of their baptism (in the State Church), rebaptism was not universally required in the case of ordinary members who passed from the State Church to the sect. The Popóvtsi are accordingly less rigid in their renunciation of the State, though they hate it no less intensely.

The priests who deserted the State Church for the Raskól did so secretly and as runaways, and hence the Popóvtsi are also called Bêglopopóvtsi, *i.e.* the Popóvtsi who are served by fugitive priests. Many of these priests made the change not from conviction but from motives of material gain, and there was among them a large disreputable element. Such men could have no good influence upon their flocks, and, though retained as instruments, were often despised and merely tolerated—a circumstance which led to an even more formal conception of religious worship and to the transference of directive control to the laity.

Flourishing centres of the sect, with churches and monasteries, were established in the following localities: (1) the island of Werka, government of Mogiljóv (broken up in 1733; rebuilt, then finally destroyed under Catherine II.); (2) Starodúbje, gov. Chernigov; (3) the Don district; (4) the river Irgíz, gov. Sarátov; (5) the Rogóz Institution in Moscow (the present headquarters of the Popóvtsi). The position of the sect, nevertheless, remained insecure, depending as it did on the attitude of the Government, which was sometimes tolerant (as under Catherine II. and Alexander I.), sometimes repressive (as under Nicholas I. and Alexander III.). Moreover, doubts arose as to whether a Church could exist without bishops, and the unworthy element in the priesthood created scandals. These things, together with the difficulty of obtaining accessions to the priesthood during persecution, suggested the idea of an independent hierarchy, and in the 18th cent. many unsuccessful attempts were made to secure a bishop from the Eastern Church.

The situation became critical from *c.* 1825. By an enactment the sect was permitted to retain priests who had joined it prior to 1826, but later accessions were heavily penalized, and, though clandestine additions could not be altogether prevented, utter collapse seemed imminent. The arrogance, greed, and ill-behaviour of the dwindling group of priests added gravely to the difficulties. Then in 1838 a synod assembled at Moscow resolved to take energetic steps towards instituting an Old Ritualist hierarchy; and, after long delays, this design was eventually realized in 1844, largely through the instrumentality of

the devoted Pjotr Velikodvórski (Pável). Ambrosios, metropolitan of Bosnia, a Greek by birth, then living poverty-stricken in Constantinople, resolved to join the sect. In apprehension of Russian espionage, he left Constantinople secretly, and under Austrian protection became the first Old Ritualist bishop in the monastery of Bêlokríniza in the Bukovina. The Russian Government took fright, and their machinations led in 1848 to his being banished to Zill, where he died in 1863. Meanwhile, however, he had ordained several bishops for the Russian hierarchy, while his successor Kirill did the same for Old Ritualists in Turkey and Rumania, and in 1849 sent to Russia its first Old Ritualist bishop, Sofróni of Simbirsk, who secretly ordained others. The new hierarchy, however, was not too well received in Russia; some of the imported priests as well as of the laity saw in it a menace to their respective positions; its legitimacy was loudly questioned, while certain of the bishops themselves gave offence by their avarice and ambition.

What lay at the root of all the trouble, however, was the fact that many of the Popóvtsi had come to be influenced by ideas prevalent among the Bezpopóvtsi, and with a view to settling all perplexities a council of bishops sent out in 1862 a 'circular letter,' which had been composed by Ilarion Kabánov ('Xenos'). This pastoral, rejecting the doctrine that the State Church is ruled by Antichrist, expressly acknowledges the competency of its priests, and asserts that it serves the same God as the Raskól (denied by certain of the Bezpopóvtsi on the ground that 'Ιησοῦς had been substituted for 'Issús'); the real sin of the Church was its having excommunicated the Old Ritualists in 1667, and its 'new doctrines.' In thus recognizing the Church, the Popóvtsi were of course seeking to vindicate the legitimacy of their new hierarchy. The result, however, was further dissension, and eventually a division into Okrúzhniki ('adherents of the circular') and Neokrúzhniki (its opponents). The latter have now sunk into insignificance. The Okrúzhniki, on the other hand, have an organized hierarchy throughout Russia; its head is the archbishop of Moscow, and it has bishops in most of the great cities. The metropolitan of Bêlokríniza has only an honorary primacy, and it has been proposed to make the archbishop of Moscow a metropolitan. The Church of the Popóvtsi has thus become a counterpart of the State Church, and claims to be the genuine National Church. It has a vigorous communal life, which it directs by means of schools and a press, and its leading circles are in part open to progressive thought.

A small group of the Popóvtsi has never recognized the new hierarchy; it retains the name of Bêglopopóvtsi (see above). Another insignificant section, the Jedinovêrtsi ('of one faith'), made an alliance with the State Church in 1800, and had the 'old rites' conceded to them. Being scattered over the country, and having no hierarchy of their own—as, indeed, by their acceptance of the canonical regulations they cannot have, since one diocese cannot have two bishops — they have no real standing. Some sense of alienation between the members of the 'sect' and the Church is but natural in view of their divergent history.

Thus the Russian State Church has found its position challenged by a multitude of sects, some of them strong and well-organized. It certainly conducted a 'mission' to them, but on spiritual lines it has always shown an amazing incapacity. Down to 1905, when freedom of conscience was conceded to all, its great instrument was State coercion; and even since it has striven by legislation or local pressure to limit that freedom as far as possible. How the abolition of the State Church, and the ruin and misery of the whole country, brought about by the revolution of 1917 will react upon the whole religious situation it is impossible to predict.

LITERATURE.—The following are some of the more important Russian works dealing with the Raskól: Platón (P. G. Levshin), *Short Hist. of the Russian Church*, 1805, ii.; D. Opótski, *The Causes of the Rise of Raskól in the Russian Church*, St. Petersburg, 1861; S. Solovjóv, *Hist. of Russia*, Moscow, 1870; Philarét (Gumilevskij), *Hist. of the Russian Church*[6], St. Petersburg, 1895; A. Shchápov, *The Russian Schism of Old Ritualism*, 1859; Makári (Bulgákov), *Hist. of the Russian Raskól*[3], St. Petersburg, 1889, *Hist. of the Russian Church*, do. 1910, xii.; N. Ssubbótin, in his periodical *Brátskoje Slóvo* ('The Fraternal Word') and *Materials for the History of Raskól*, 9 vols. (a work of the utmost value in the scientific study of Raskól); N. Ivanovski, *Manual of the Hist. of, and the Polemic against, the Old Ritual Raskól*, 2 vols., Kazań, 1905; E. Golubinski, *Our Controversy with the Old Ritualists*, Moscow, 1905 ff.

Non-Russian writers, as A. Leroy-Beaulieu, P. Strahl, L. Boissard, and F. Kattenbusch, merely reproduce the views prevalent among Russian historiographers, and independent and scientifically developed conclusions are not to be looked for in their works.

Works (in Russian) which, while sometimes differing in details, deal with Old Ritualism on strictly scientific lines, and in particular recognize the philo-Greek movement as a powerful factor in the rise of the Raskól, are: N. Kaptenev, *The Nature of the Relations between Russia and the Orthodox Orient in the 16th and 17th Centuries*[2], Moscow, 1914, *The Patriarch Nikon and his Opponents in the Emendation of Church Rites*[2], do. 1913, *The Patriarch Nikon and Czar Alexis Michaílovich*, 2 vols., Sergiev Posad, 1909–12; E. Golubinski, *op. cit.*; P. Miljukóv, *Sketches from the Hist. of Russian Civilization*, ii.[3], St. Petersburg, 1916; W. Kluchévski, *A Course of Russian History*, iii.[3], Moscow, 1916.

A. BARON VON STROMBERG.

II. *OTHER SECTS.*—The sects which diverge from the Orthodox Church of Russia not merely in ritual but also in doctrine are gradually becoming more and more distinct from Raskól in its various denominations. They may be classified thus: (*a*) native sects: (i.) secret, including (1) the Khlysti, or Men of God, and (2) the Skoptsi; (ii.) public, including (3) the Doukhobors, and (4) the Molokani; (*b*) sects based upon foreign influences, the most important being (5) the Judaizers and (6) the Stundists.

1. **Khlysti.**—See art. MEN OF GOD, vol. viii. pp. 544–546.

2. **Skoptsi.**—The earliest known Skoptsi (*skopets*, 'eunuch'), 34 in number, were discovered in 1772 in villages around Orjól, in the districts of Belev and Aléxin belonging to the government of Tula, and in the district of Kosjólsk in the government of Kalúga; other 27 persons, though known to be castrated, evaded legal detection. All of them were Khlysti, led by the female teacher Akulína Ivánovna. The claim of having originated the practice of castration was made by André Ivanov Blochín, a runaway peasant thirty years of age and a professional beggar, who belonged to Brásovo in the district of Sevsk (Orjól). Having joined the Khlysti in 1769, he had mutilated himself because he found it difficult to fulfil the leading rule of that sect, viz. absolute sexual abstinence; and along with an assistant whom he had castrated—the untraced Kondráti Triphonov, or Nikiphorov, of Stolbishche, a village near Brásovo —he had in the course of four years won over the 60 others referred to above. The Khlystic female teacher already named and the Moscow 'Christ' whom she followed had not opposed this new propaganda, and in point of fact their own helpers had submitted to the rite. Blochín was knouted in Bogdanovka, where he was then resident, and sent to Nerchinsk in Siberia; his dupes, with the exception of two, were released.

In 1775, however, another Skoptsi community was discovered in a district far removed from the localities of the earlier movement, viz. in the village of Sosnovka (government of Tambov). A peasant named Kondráti, who styled himself 'the hermit of Kiev,' and his henchman Alexándr

Shilov were singled out as its founders, and were banished; the two had already been at work in the districts of Tula and Aléxin in the government of Tula, and, as regards Aléxin, in the very place where castrati had been discovered in the prosecution in 1772, viz. Luginin's linen factory in Aleshnja. Most Russian scholars identify this Kondráti with that earliest assistant of Blochín who had evaded capture in the former prosecution, but it seems more likely that he was none other than Blochín himself, since he was known among his later adherents in Petrograd by his real name, André Ivanov, and his self-confidence is difficult to explain on the theory of his being any one's disciple. Moreover, we see from the *Sorrows*[1] of Kondráti Selivanov (as he called himself in Petrograd), who is to this day regarded by the Skoptsi as their sole founder and their first leader, that the author had fled from the grasp of the law and at length reached the government of Tula. Here, however, he was still harassed; for the Khlysti, doubtless remembering what they had suffered in 1772 in consequence of his propaganda, wished to deliver him to the authorities. Nevertheless, he succeeded in winning fresh adherents from among them in the village of Aleshnja, where their local leader, Akulína Ivánovna — no doubt identical with the Akulína mentioned above — and her assistant, the 'prophetess' Anna Románovna, acknowledged him as 'Christ,' probably because he had suffered the knout (in Khlystic usage = crucifixion) and banishment, though he himself, as being the first to revive the forgotten teaching of Jesus regarding self-mutilation (Mt 19^{12}, $18^{8f.}$), accepted the dignity in a sense that excluded the other 'Christs' of the Khlysti, and then in turn recognized Akulína Ivánovna as the Mother of God, and Shilov as John the Baptist. Having been sent a second time to Siberia, on the way he brought himself, by further amputation, to the state of complete mutilation (the 'tsaric seal,' in contrast to the 'little seal,' *i.e.* simple castration), and then, in imitation of Pugachov, he assumed the designation of Tsar Peter III. Hardly anything is known of the twenty-two years he spent in Irkutsk. He returned, in a most adventurous fashion, to Russia in 1797. It appears that certain rich Skoptsi merchants in Petrograd availed themselves of Paul I.'s whimsical desire to interview those who claimed to be his father—there were fifteen such pseudo-Peters—and were permitted to bring Selivanov before him, but the impression which the fanatic made upon the tsar was such that the latter sent him to a madhouse. He was not discharged till the accession of Alexander I. From 1802 he lived with one or other of his followers in the rich commercial circles of Petrograd, and at length one of these, Solodóvnikov by name, built a kind of palace for him, where his adherents—alike those of the capital itself (now to be numbered by hundreds in consequence of a vigorously renewed propaganda) and those who came there as pilgrims from all parts of Russia—revered and worshipped him as 'Christ Peter III.'; for, while, during Selivanov's exile, the sect had expanded but slowly and only in the central provinces—with ramifications in Petrograd, Riga, and Odessa — the systematic propaganda now directed by him soon extended it over all Russia. In Petrograd it gained a certain footing also among the aristocracy. Madam de Tatárinova, while rejecting castration, introduced the Skoptsi form of worship into her 'Brotherhood in Christ.'[2] But, when castration was found to be making headway among officials and military men, Selivanov was thrown into the notorious cloister-prison of Susdal, and this town became the centre of the sect until his death in 1832. Since then the Skoptsi have contrived to keep secret the locality of their headquarters.

From the time of Selivanov's labours in Petrograd the sect has had numerous adherents not only among the peasantry, but also among the merchants and money-changers of the cities. Many of these are wealthy, and, as they have no children, their wealth passes by will from one to another, and tends to accumulate in the hands of individuals who use it in support of the work of promulgation and the policy of secrecy. Their attitude towards castration has varied between rigour and laxity. At the present day not only catechumens, but also many members in full standing, especially women, still remain unmutilated, availing themselves of the dispensation by which the operation may be again and again deferred. To-day, in fact, it is only a decided minority of the 100,000 Skoptsi that have submitted to the rite. Persecution has driven many of them to Rumania, where they have centres at Galatz and Jassy, and where, as foreigners, they are tolerated. Here, in 1872, arose a new 'Christ,' Lísin by name, who founded a party known as the New Skoptsi. In the course of a missionary journey into Russia Lísin, together with numerous helpers and followers, was arrested and banished to Siberia, and the movement collapsed. The Skoptsi have found recruits not only among the Orthodox Russians, but also among the Lutheran Finns of Ingria, and many Skoptsi of both classes are now resident in villages of their own in the government of Yakutsk, where they were forcibly settled. Selivanov himself, to judge from his appearance and character, was not of pure Russian descent, but of Russo-Finnish blood. Such half-breeds, as well as the pure Finns, find a peculiar attraction in the sect; the Finns are in fact temperamentally disposed to religious fanaticism.

Selivanov's claim of symbolic identity with Tsar Peter III. was accepted by the Skoptsi as literal fact, for they believed that Peter had been conspired against by Catherine II. because of his impotence, and had thus undergone Messianic sufferings. In order to lend this an air of plausibility they fabricated an absurd story in which certain other personages of the imperial family and the court were made to play a part. Akulína Ivánovna was identified with the tsaritsa Elizabeth, who was the virgin mother of Peter III. Napoleon was the son of Catherine II. and the Devil, was living in Turkey, and would return as Antichrist. When the number of the 144,000 virgins (Rev 14^{1-4}, but interpreted as 'castrated ones') is complete, Christ Selivanov will come from Siberia, will ring the Tsar bell in Moscow, gather around him all the Skoptsi, quell the Antichrist advancing from Turkey, and establish a Skoptsi kingdom upon the earth; only after these things will come the end. Apart from their ideas regarding Christs and the last things, the teaching of the Skoptsi differs from that of the Khlysti only in substituting mutilation (for which support was found also in Is 56^{3-5}, Wis 3^{14}, Col 3^{5}) for sexual abstinence. The idea that Adam and Eve were created sexless, and that the halves of the forbidden fruit were grafted upon them—as testicles, or as breasts—after the Fall (whence the necessity of restoring the disfigured image of God by the knife), is not received by the whole sect. Their original practice of operating with a red-hot knife was grounded on Mt 3^{11}, but the use of the cold knife was introduced while Selivanov was still living—a consequence, as the Skoptsi say, of his capitulation to human weakness. The mutilation of women likewise was subsequently

[1] Ed., together with his 'Epistle,' by the present writer as *Die geheime heilige Schrift der Skopzen*, Leipzig, 1904.
[2] See art. MYSTICISM (Christian, Russian), § 4.

performed in a less severe manner, and this was recommended, though not prescribed, by Selivanov. The assertion that the Skoptsi mutilate their proselytes against their will or after they have made them insensible is a calumny. The organization of the sect is much more rigid than that of the Khlysti. Its members constitute a centralized and strictly exclusive association, with well-developed methods of concealment, self-preservation, and expansion, and capable of acting throughout the whole Russian empire with astonishing unity and consistency. While their form of worship is externally almost identical with that of the Khlysti, the practice of ecstasy, borrowed from the latter, is now on the wane.

3. **Doukhobors.**—See art. DOUKHOBORS, vol. iv. p. 865 ff.

4. **Molokani** ('milk[moloko]-drinkers'). — The origin of the Molokani has not as yet been made out. The hypothesis that they were an offshoot from the Doukhobors, and separated from them by surrendering the residue of Khlystic ecstasy which these still retained and attaching supreme importance to anti-ritualism in contrast to the ritual (including the seven sacraments) of the State Church, is very probable, and seems to find some corroboration in the fact that, as the Molokani themselves represent, Semjon Uklé-in, whom they regard as their founder, married (*c.* 1750) the daughter of Pobiróchin, the leader of the Doukhobors. But the use of the name 'Molokani' is of earlier date, having been applied by the Russian people as early as the 17th cent. to all sectaries who drank milk and ate non-fasting foods during Lent. Moreover, the Molokani *Confession of Faith* printed at Geneva in 1865 says that the sect designated as such is of earlier date than Uklé-in. As far back as the 17th cent. it had been brought by a physician to Moscow from England. A certain Matvé Semjónov was the first Russian who spread abroad the 'worship of God in spirit and in truth,' and for this he was broken on the wheel. His teaching, however, was carried to the government of Tambov by some of his pupils, and, although they were at once and finally got rid of, their teaching held its ground there. Now, if this account is correct, what Uklé-in did was simply to give a fresh impetus to an existing denomination. Himself originally a Doukhobor, he made a stand, in the village of Goréloje, against the claim of Pobiróchin, the leader of the Doukhobors, to be the Son of God, and against their contempt for Holy Scripture. Fleeing before Pobiróchin's 'angels of death,' he reached Rübnoje, a village in the same government, and won many adherents there. Having chosen from among them 70 'apostles,' he led them in solemn procession into Tambov, there to make war against the 'idols' (icons, the saints' pictures of the Orthodox Church). He was arrested, but regained his liberty by an ostensible reconciliation with the Church. Thereafter he directed his propaganda from the village of Raskásovo as a centre, and extended it to the provinces of Voronesh and Saratov. During his lifetime he gained some 5000 followers, and after his death a succession of zealous disciples diffused his teachings throughout Central and S.E. Russia. In 1805 a portion of the Molokani were settled in the Molotchna, in Taurida; and there they founded the prosperous villages of Novovasiljevka, Astrakhanka, and Novospassk, in which by 1833 their number had reached 3000.

Molokanism was originally a simple Bible Christianity marked by anti-ritualistic opposition to the State Church. It gave full recognition to the Church's leading doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the God-manhood of Christ. Uklé-in accepted also the virgin-birth of Jesus, though he believed that the body of Jesus was not of the common human type, but was a spiritual one, like that of the archangel Raphael when he accompanied Tobias; on this point, however, the *Confession* of 1805 is entirely orthodox. That *Confession* also recognizes the moral perfection of Adam and the doctrine of original sin, as does also the *Foundations of the Molokany Doctrine*, published fifty years later. As regards the appropriation of redemption, the sect is far removed from Protestantism. It adhered rather to a naive legality, which it based equally on the OT and the NT. While it gave a symbolic interpretation to many of the OT commandments, it accepted others —*e.g.*, the prohibition of the use of pork—quite literally. Recently, however, the Molokani have been affected by the unitarianism of W. Europe, largely through the efforts of the able A. S. Próchanov († 1912), a physician who, educated at Dorpat, exercised a powerful influence upon them by his journal *Duchóvny Christianín*, founded in 1906. The unitarian leaven makes itself felt in the *Confession of the Spiritual Christians commonly called Molokani*, which was drawn up at the general congress of the Molokani held at Astrakhanka in 1905, was recognized as binding upon all 'spiritual Christians' (the only name that they apply to themselves), and so printed and published. The doctrine and worship of the sect are set forth by it as follows:

'God is the Good. Evil has no independent existence, but is merely the negation of God. God is not a trinity, but a unity, and the apparently trinitarian formula of Mt 28^{19} simply sets forth the one God in His threefold relation to the world and man. The innocence of the first man consisted in his ignorance of evil and good alike, in which he resembled the animals, whereas the innocence of Christ was a conscious and voluntary righteousness. Thus the Fall, although it resulted in man's loss of communion with God, was in reality a step forward, and man, having become like God in the knowledge of good and evil, has now to win that communion by his own efforts (Mt 11^{12}). But, while God has left man free to do either good or evil, it is the latter that is mainly preferred by him (Eph $2^{1ff.}$); he feels that God is alien to him and that His law is coercive and hard to obey. He violates it constantly, and thus regards God as his incensed Lord, who is to be propitiated by sacrifice. In the fullness of time, however, Christ came, and revealed to us our nearness to God; called God Father and spoke of us as His children (Jn 20^{17}, Ro 8^{14}); changed the covenant of fear into the covenant of love (Ro 8^{15}, He $2^{14ff.}$), so that goodness comes to have a meaning for us, and the law of compulsion becomes the law of liberty (Gal 5^{1}). He thus showed us the way to blessedness, and sealed His word with His death on the Cross. The Church which He founded is the community of those who believe in God; and in virtue of that belief all members of the Church are equal, so that the hierarchy of the Græco-Russian Church has no standing in it. The presbyters or bishops ("overseers") appointed by the "spiritual Christians" are not priests, but merely the servants of the ordinary members, and receive no remuneration for their voluntary labours. Christ instituted no visible sacraments, not even Baptism or the Lord's Supper, and the NT passages upon which these two sacraments are said to be founded are to be interpreted spiritually, *i.e.* as referring to the initial and continued-apprehension of God's word; the Church's practice of fasting must also be wholly discarded.

We do not use the sign of the cross, for we regard it as quite uncalled for. All that it does is to tire the hands, whereas Christ has bidden us endure the spiritual cross, *i.e.* the sufferings appointed to us.

The Sabbath was given for relaxation and divine worship; but good works may be done on the Sabbath, as appears from the example of Christ in contrast to the Pharisaic hallowing of the Day (Mt 12^{4-13}). It is specially necessary, however, to refrain on that day from evil deeds, unchastity, and drunkenness (Eph $5^{18ff.}$). As, in conformity with the witness of Holy Writ, the first day after the Saturday is kept sacred in place of the Sabbath by Christians of all creeds in commemoration of Christ's resurrection, we likewise do this.

We recognize only the tradition given in the Holy Scriptures —not the traditions and writings of the Fathers of the Græco-Russian Church (Ro 1^{22}), or the multitude of ceremonies in which its worship consists, for man should worship God in spirit and in truth (Jn 4^{24}). In our assemblies the worship of God begins with the Lord's Prayer, spoken by the presbyter. Then follows the reading of Scripture, the presbyter reading the verse, the congregation then singing it, and this is continued for several hours. Thereafter begins common prayer, which the presbyter recites while the congregation kneels (Lk 22^{41}, Ac 20^{36}), and the service closes with the singing of psalms. Our worship of God takes place in our own houses; for we do

not think that a building can give sanctity to an assembly; it is rather the assembly that sanctifies any place where it is held. The Ten Commandments must still be obeyed, for Christ did not abrogate them (Mt $5^{17f.}$). Hence God alone is to be worshipped. Nowhere does Scripture authorize the worship of any besides Him—not even of the Apostles of Christ, though they wrought miracles, or of the angels (Ac $10^{25f.}$, Rev $22^{8f.}$); and if not the former while they were still alive, all the less now when they are dead; while if not the latter, then all the less the so-called saints. In conformity with the 2nd Commandment, we have no images or icons. When the Græco-Russian Church puts forward the plea that it does not worship the images themselves, but the holy men portrayed by them, the defence is quite invalid, for in that case the images would all be regarded as of equal worth, or, at most, those which show the best painting and the most accurate representation would be the more highly prized, while, in point of fact, it is the badly painted, old, and grimy ones that are preferred. The worship of saints' images, said not to have been made by hand of man but to have come into existence miraculously, is commanded on pain of anathema. We simply do not believe that there are such things at all, for God is Spirit and not man, and would not therefore concern Himself with the making of idols, and the less so because He even forbids men to do it. The worship of images is prohibited by Holy Writ in its entirety (Ac 17^{29}, 1 Co 10^{7}, Ps 115^{4-8} 134 [135]$^{15-18}$, Wis 13^{9-19} 14^{8-17}, Ep. of Jer 3–12, Rev 9^{20}). The worship of human corpses conflicts with Gn 3^{19}. Even if the body in which Christ the Saviour passed His earthly life had by chance been preserved, we would not worship it, for we revere Christ for His divine spirit and understanding, and not for His perishable body, even were it turned to stone.

The 2nd [3rd] Commandment forbids oaths of all kinds, and the 5th [6th] includes the prohibition of war and capital punishment. Marriage was instituted by God Himself (Gn 2^{18-22} 1^{28} $2^{23f.}$, Mt 19^{3-9}), and God is likewise the source of the ordinances relating to those with whom sexual intercourse is not to take place (Lv 18^{6-18}. $22^{f.}$ $20^{f.}$, Sir 9^{3-9} 23^{22-27}, 1 Co 6^{15-20}). Our mode of contracting marriages we take from To 7^{10}. After the parents have given their blessing, Ps 113 [114] is sung, and a prayer recited. The bridal pair then express their mutual consent, promise to be faithful to each other, and not to separate (1 Co $7^{10f.}$). Thereafter To $8^{5f.}$ and Eph 5^{22-33} are read. The ceremony closes with an exhortation to the married pair, and then Ps 132 [133] is sung by all present. Although Christ Himself remained unmarried, He did not regard many as being capable of this, and therefore never urged it upon His disciples. Monasticism has against it both Scripture (Mt 19^{12}, 1 Co $7^{1f.}$) and the example of Christ. If monks and nuns seclude themselves in convents in order to engage in the worship of images, God punishes them by abandoning them to unchaste conduct (Ro $1^{24-26f.}$).

We believe in the resurrection of the dead and in a life to come (according to Mk $12^{26f.}$, 2 Co 5^{1}, Ps 55^{17-19}, Mt 24^{30}, Jn $5^{28f.}$, Rev 20^{12-15}, Ac 24^{15}), and accordingly we pray that their sins may be forgiven them (2 Mac $12^{44f.}$). When a member of our community dies, we pray and sing Ps 23 [24] and 145 [146], and, at the funeral, Ps 83 [84], in conformity with Ac 8^{2}, Sir $38^{16f. 23}$.'

At the present day the Molokani are very numerous not only in Taurida, but in the Caucasus region and in E. Siberia (to which their ancestors were banished), and they are to be found in many other parts of Russia. It is computed that they number in all over half a million. As a result of dissensions regarding what are mainly minor distinctions, they have split up into a considerable number of denominations.

5. Judaizers.—The founder of this group is generally supposed to have been a member of the Molokani named Sundúkov, a peasant from the village of Dubóvka in Saratov, and a pupil of Uklé-in. As early as the 15th cent., however, we can trace a 'heresy of the Judaizers' in Nóvgorod and Pskov (Pleskau), which spread from these cities eastwards to Moscow. This was founded by two learned Jews, Sharija, an astrologist and Kabbalist, and Moishe Chapusha, a Talmudic scholar. Its doctrinal basis was a fusion of Jewish and Christian elements, the former being by far the more predominant. It drew adherents even from the highest circles of Russian society; thus Sosima, the metropolitan of Moscow, and also the *fiancée* of Grand Duke John III. gave it their support. In 1490 and 1554 it was condemned by ecclesiastical councils in Nóvgorod and Moscow respectively. Gennadi, archbishop of Nóvgorod, and Josiph, abbot of the Volokolámsk monastery, made such onslaughts upon it that at length it disappeared from view, although it possibly survived in a state of concealment. At a later day ecclesiastical writers still occasionally refer to Judaizing groups, and it is possible that as a result of Jewish propaganda the sect may have repeatedly experienced a revival. In 1738 two Jews, by name Boruch and Faivist, diffused Jewish doctrines among the Orthodox, and, among other activities, built a Jewish school in Smolénsk for the use of the humbler classes among the Russians. The Judaizing sect of the present day, however, has no traceable connexion with these earlier movements, but took its rise independently from the soil of Molokanism, which regards the OT as a valid standard equally with the NT. Sundúkov, in fact, took the step of ranking the former above the latter, and this was certainly due in part to Jewish influence. He won numerous adherents among the Molokani. The authorities made their first discovery of Judaizing Molokani (called by the rest Subbótniki, 'Sabbatarians') in 1797 in Alexandrovka, a town in the north of the Caucasus region, where even by that time they were more numerous than the Orthodox. In 1814 proceedings were taken against them in Jélez, in the province of Orgól, and incidentally certain Jews belonging to Saratov were implicated as proselytizers. All the accused were found to be circumcised. They had connexions with fellow-believers in the province of Voronesh. One of their missionaries who had been arrested stated that they then numbered about 400 in the province of Saratov; in 1818 some 500 were identified in Voronesh, but by 1823 they had increased in that government to over 3700. In one particular village in Transcaucasia there lived at that time more than 7000 Subbótniki, while in the government of Archangel, *i.e.* the remote opposite quarter of the country, the entire Orthodox population of certain large villages had gone over to them. At the present day they possibly number 100,000. Many live in Siberia, as in the outskirts of Irkutsk and Minusinsk. As regards European Russia, they are particularly numerous in the middle and lower Volga districts, in the Crimea, in the region of the Don, and in the entire Caucasus area. Since the proclamation of religious liberty in 1905 their missionary activity has greatly expanded, and their agents are now penetrating the south-western region—as far as the government of Kiev—where previously they were not to be found. While a number of them eventually conformed in all respects to Judaism, learnt Hebrew, used the Hebrew Bible, and had their religious services conducted in that language by highly remunerated rabbis, yet the real Subbótniki—also called Karaims or Karaimites—remained Russians in all things, using their native language in all religious functions, and adhering only to some of the Jewish practices, as, *e.g.*, the laws regarding food, though indeed they are all circumcised. Their partial observance of Jewish customs is connected with the fact that, while accepting the Bible, they reject the Talmud. They do not look for a Messiah, and those who have gone wholly over to Judaism regard them as lost, declining all connexion with them either in eating or in marriage.

6. Stundists.—Stundism is an evangelical movement among the Russian peasantry of the south-west, and, according to Russian ecclesiastical writers, it is due to the propaganda of German evangelical, chiefly Lutheran, pastors who labour in the German settlements of that district. These Lutheran ministers in particular, however, in view of the legal restrictions under which the Lutheran Church was tolerated in Russia until the proclamation of religious freedom, refrained on principle from proselytizing work among the Russians, and long usage has made it easy for

them latterly to maintain their practice in this respect. The only exception was found in the case of the Reformed pastor Bohnekämper, who in the Odessa district of Kherson (from 1824 onwards) conducted his pietistic devotional 'hours' (*Stunden*) in the Würtemberg manner, not only for German settlers but also for Russian peasants. It was not till the time of his son and successor, Karl Bohnekämper, however, that any religious movement of the kind arose among the Russians themselves (1862); and that the rise of Stundism was due to him is admitted by the well-known religious and theological writer Hermann Dalton,[1] who at that time was superintendent of the Reformed Church in Russia. The movement, however, under the direction of zealous Russian leaders like Ivan Rjaboshapka, Gerásim Balaban, and the brothers Zibulski, presently freed itself from all connexion with the Reformed Church, became purely Russian in character, and, spreading at first from the government of Kherson to that of Kiev, soon extended over the south-western and central regions of the country. According to the annual reports presented to the tsar from 1873 to 1885 by M. Pobêdonostsev, chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Stundist communities, notwithstanding the most rigorous measures taken against the movement by the powers of Church and State, were then to be found everywhere in the areas indicated. It was during these years too that Stundism became more consolidated by union with the Russian Baptist body, which likewise owed its rise to W. European influence, and since then it has also been designated Stundo-Baptism. The relatively few who held aloof from this union were those who sought to maintain the original link of connexion, not indeed with evangelical pastors, but with the pietistic *Stundenhalter* ('those who *hold hours* of devotion') among the Swabian colonists, and these are now the 'Stundists' strictly so called in contradistinction to the Stundo-Baptists. The latter body, again, maintains its Russian character by keeping itself distinct from the Baptist group which originated in the work of Johann Gerhard Onken and his auxiliaries (Käbner, Lehmann, Willer, Ondra, Priezkau, Fischer, Schulz, Köniz, and Liebig) among the German colonists in Russia. The most outstanding agents of the Baptist movement among the Russian Stundists were André Miller and Vasili Ivanov, presbyter in Baku. The movement, as embodied in Stundo-Baptism, has also infected the south-east of Russia. More especially in the Caucasus region and in Siberia it carries on a strenuous and successful propaganda among the numerous Molokani residing there (to whom it has the right to preach), and also among the Orthodox, its chief missionaries being W. Pavlov and D. Masajev, a wealthy man of some celebrity. While generally at one with W. European Baptists in doctrine and worship, it devotes itself largely, in its conflict with the State Church, to fighting against the worship of images. The hotheadedness of some of its adherents has prompted them now and again to lay violent hands upon the saints' images of the Church, with the result that the sect has frequently suffered severe persecution, to which, it is true, it was exposed also in the days of Pobêdonostsev. The Stundists are now a vast multitude; they are to be met with even in the north of Russia. Reliable statistics as to their numbers are not to be had, and it is a debatable point whether they are to be reckoned by the million or only by the hundred thousand, though the latter would probably be the more correct.

[1] *Evangelische Strömungen in der russischen Kirche der Gegenwart*, Heilbronn, 1881.

LITERATURE.—(i.) Of works dealing with the Skoptsi, in addition to those cited in vol. viii. p. 546, the most important are: E. Pelikan, *Forensic-Medical Investigations of Skoptism and Historical Notices regarding it* [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1872, Germ. tr. by N. Ivanov, Giessen, 1876; K. Grass, *Die russischen Sekten*, vol. ii. 2 pts., *Die weissen Tauben oder Skopzen nebst geistlichen Skopzen, Neuskopzen*, etc., Leipzig, 1909–14; N. G. Wysozki, *The First Skoptsi Trial: Materials relating to the Earliest History of the Skoptsi Sect* [Russ.], Moscow, 1915.

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(iii.) The other sects have not been dealt with in monographs of a comprehensive kind, but short accounts of them will be found in the following general works: Vladimir Anderson, *Orthodoxism and Sectarianism* [Russ.] (*An Historical Sketch of Russian Religious Dissent*), St. Petersburg, 1908; T. Butkévitch, *Survey of the Russian Sects and their Denominations* [Russ.], Kharkov, 1910, ²1915; *The Russian Sectarians, their Doctrine, Worship, and Modes of Propaganda: Fraternal Work by Members of the Fourth Pan-Russian Missionary Congress* [Russ.], ed. M. Kalnev, Odessa, 1911.

K. GRASS.

SECTS (Samaritan).—Some of the tendencies that gave rise to sectarian movements within Judaism were also at work among the Samaritans (*q.v.*). This was natural, since the general development in many respects ran along parallel lines. The things that Jews and Samaritans had in common, such as the worship of Jahweh as the only God, the recognition of the Law with what it embodied of the prophetic spirit, and the consequent observation of the Sabbath, the other festivals, circumcision, and the dietary rules, were more important than those in which they differed. In spite of strong antipathy and more or less careful avoidance of commerce, analogous methods of interpretation, exchange to some extent of ideas and customs, and exposure to the same external influences were inevitable. Hegesippus, who flourished in the time of Eleutherus (A.D. 175–189) and appears to have been a Christian Jew, looked upon 'the sons of Israel' as a whole and counted the Samaritans as one of their seven sects. When he enumerated among these, in addition to the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Samaritans, and the Galilæans (probably the Jewish Nazaræans of Epiphanius), also Essenes and Baptist communions like the Masbothæans and the Hemerobaptistæ,[1] he may have thought of the latter chiefly as Jews, but probably had no intention of denying that they had likewise representatives in Samaritan circles. Just as Jewish sects arose from such causes as the adoption, in one form or another, of the Persian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, speculation concerning the desirable changes in the calendar or the mode of observing the festivals, doubts in regard to the permissibility of offering sacrifices in a sanctuary that had been desecrated and had an illegitimate or otherwise unworthy high-priesthood, opposition to animal sacrifices and to the use of animal food, abstinence from a second marriage or marriage with a divorced wife, preference for the celibate life, and the introduction of baptism as an initiatory rite for proselytes and frequently repeated ceremonies of purification, so similar tendencies seem to have occasioned schisms among the Samaritans. Nor is it at all improbable that they were at an early time affected by the currents of thought which later crystallized in the great Gnostic systems, though at first this incipient Gnosticism is likely to have appeared in a relatively crude form.

According to Epiphanius, there were four Samaritan sects, viz. Essenes, Sebuæans, Gorothenes, and Dositheans. Of the Essenes he gives, in this connexion, no description, evidently regarding their tenets as substantially identical with those of Jewish Essenes (*q.v.*). It is not impossible

[1] Eusebius, *HE* iv. 22.

that they were the earliest of these sects. Their name seems to designate them as 'quietists' (שׁקטאי). The etymologies of Herodianus (οἰκιστής) and Suidas (πολίτης) have no value; the generally assumed connexion with the Hasidæans (*q.v.*) is improbable; a Rechabite descent (Epiphanius, Nilus, Hilgenfeld) cannot be proved; and there is no basis for Lincke's theory that they were originally a tribe settled in Samaria.[1] But there is no reason to doubt that there were Essenes in Samaria as well as in Judæa. The desecration of the temple on Mt. Gerizim by Antiochus IV. in 168 B.C., and its destruction by John Hyrcanus *c.* 120 B.C.,[2] must have deeply affected the Samaritans; and it is not unlikely that some of them were opposed to a rebuilding of the temple, and, seeing in its destruction a judgment upon the worldly character and policy of the pontificate, were led to reject the sacrificial cult, and adopted the doctrines of the Jewish Essenes. As neighbours of the Sebuæans they seem to have followed them in the matter of the calendar.

The **Sebuæans** may well have been actuated by such a motive as Epiphanius assigns for their departure from the orthodox custom as regards the festivals, though he is no doubt wrong as to its date. Their origin is to be sought, not in the Persian, but in the Seleucid period. Even if a party of Galilæan Jews was rescued by Simon in the time of Judas Maccabæus[3]—and this has been questioned by Wellhausen[4]—it is by no means certain that the whole Jewish population was removed, and many Jews no doubt settled both in Galilee and in Samaria during the reigns of John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannæus. Conflicts would naturally arise when these went to Jerusalem at the same time as the Samaritans went to Mt. Gerizim. To eliminate this cause of friction the Sebuæans placed the Passover in the autumn. In doing so they may not only have desired to show their loyalty to the Seleucid rulers to whom Samaria belonged, and who began the year on the 1st of Tishri (Apellæus), but also have acted in harmony with their interpretation of Nu $28^{18ff.}$, which obviated a distinction between a civil and an ecclesiastical year. If this is the origin of the sect, Lagarde's[5] explanation of the name as derived from *šebu'ay*, one who counts the year as beginning with the 1st of Tishri, when God's oath (*šebu'a*) to Abraham (Gn 22^{16}) was celebrated on Mt. Gerizim, is to be preferred both to the older derivation from *šabuoth*, 'weeks,' and to that from *sabu'in*, 'Baptists,' adopted by Brandt, Bousset, and Holl; and the schism is perhaps more likely to have taken place early in the 1st cent. B.C. than after Pompey's conquest of Palestine. The result of this change in the calendar was that the Passover came to be celebrated in the autumn and the Feast of Tabernacles in the spring (Nisan, Xanthicus). Only some of the Essenes followed them in this innovation. It is not known whether they practised baptism; Abu'l Fatḥ[6] testifies that they opposed the innovations of Baba Rabba and preserved the ancient traditions of the Samaritans.

The **Gorothenes** are said to have adhered to the orthodox calendar. Their differences from the main body of Samaritans are not indicated. Possibly the name gives a hint. It may be derived from גּוּרתא (Syriac *giurutha*), 'a body of foreigners,' 'proselytes.' The objection that proselytes do not form a sect is scarcely valid. If they were received into the religious community by baptism, they may have been regarded, and even have considered themselves, in spite of their conversion, as a separate body, not quite on a par with 'the sons of Israel' according to the flesh. The Gorothenes may have been looked upon as a Samaritan branch of the Masbuthæans, so named from *masbu'tha*, *masbu'itha*, 'baptism.' As to the age of proselyte baptism, the prevailing view at present is that it antedates the Christian era; the researches of Brandt have especially tended to confirm this opinion.

Concerning the **Dositheans**, the fourth sect mentioned by Epiphanius, we possess a certain amount of information from native Samaritan as well as Christian, Jewish, and Muslim sources. Unfortunately, Abu'l Fatḥ, a Samaritan who wrote his *Chronicle* in Arabic in 1355, while familiar with the later customs and ideas of the sect, could only report, without critical sifting, the current traditions concerning their earlier history. The accounts of Dositheus and his followers by Hippolytus (whose lost work was known to Photius and apparently used by pseudo-Tertullian), Origen, Jerome, Philaster, Epiphanius, and Eulogius are often confused and contradictory; the references in *Pirqē de R. Eliezer* and *Tanḥuma* yield little that is dependable for the earlier period, as Büchler especially[1] has shown; and those in Mas'ūdī and Shahrastānī, repeated by Abu'l Fida and Makrizi, are important chiefly for the later period. Various attempts have been made, on the basis of this material, to reconstruct the earlier history. It has been supposed that there were two or three different sects, each founded by a Dositheus. Krauss[2] mentions ten men bearing this name. This scholar identifies the founder of the sect, which continued to exist into Muslim times, with Theodosius, one of the two Samaritans who, according to Josephus,[3] disputed with Andronicus before Ptolemy VII. Philometor (181–145 B.C.) and were put to death by this king for failing to prove that the true temple was on Mt. Gerizim. There is no evidence to prove either the identity of the two or the historical character of the legend. Another Dositheus is supposed by Krauss to be a disciple of Simon Magus and founder of a Christian sect referred to by Origen. Montgomery[4] rejects the identification with Theodosius, but thinks that the first founder of a Dositheanism may have opposed the Jews in Egypt at some time before the Christian era, while another Dositheus founded a different sect in the beginning of this era, the latter being distinguished by its belief in a resurrection, its practice of the ritual bath, and its inclination to asceticism and mysticism. But most of the ancient testimony connects Dositheus with Simon Magus (*q.v.*) either as his teacher or as his disciple. When the *Clementine Recognitions*, Philaster, pseudo-Tertullian, and Jerome derive the Sadducees (*q.v.*) from the Dositheans, it is to be remembered that they imagined absence of a belief in the Resurrection to be an innovation, and, as they knew some Dositheans in their own time to reject this doctrine, they charged them with having started this heresy. They evidently thought that Dositheus had appeared some time before the public ministry of Jesus and had been a predecessor of Simon Magus. This is indeed likely to have been the fact. As the importance of Simon Magus waxed, that of Dositheus waned, and the latter was relegated to a secondary place as disciple of the former. Dositheus may have been a *goēt*, regarded by a Samaritan party as the *taheb*, or Joshua returned to life, to lead a new conquest and fulfil the promises given to Abraham; and Krauss[5] may possibly be right in connecting him with the insurrection quelled by Pontius Pilate in A.D. 35.[6] There does not seem to be any real need

[1] *Samarien und seine Propheten*, p. 114 f.
[2] Jos. *Ant.* XIII. ix. 1. [3] Mac $5^{21ff.}$
[4] *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*[7], Berlin, 1914, p. 247 f.
[5] *Mitteilungen*, IV. 134 ff. [6] *Annales Samaritani*, p. 131.

[1] *REJ* XLIII. 50 ff. [2] *Ib.* XLII. 32.
[3] *Ant.* XII. iii. 4. [4] *The Samaritans*, p. 262 ff
[5] *REJ* XLII. 36. [6] Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. iv. 1.

of assuming a second Dositheus. In view of the strong evidence to the contrary from different periods, it cannot be successfully maintained that all Dositheans believed in the Resurrection. The Dositheans known to Epiphanius 'confessed a resurrection,'[1] and there are other indications of this belief in the history of the sect. At the time when the Samaritans generally accepted this doctrine (4th cent. A.D.), it is natural that it should also have been adopted by some of the Dositheans, and that they should have ascribed it to the original founder. But this seems to have been a temporary development within the sect. From Eulogius to Shahrastānī there is no trace of it. Even the omission of the formula, 'Blessed be God forever,' may, as Montgomery intimates,[2] be due to a desire the more emphatically to deny a life beyond. Neither a transient belief in some circles in the resurrection of the dead, nor the later legends clustering about the founder, nor the older peculiarities mentioned by Epiphanius, such as abstinence from animal food, sexual continence, and mysticism, can justify the assumption of a second Dositheus and a separate sect. Rigoristic interpretation of the Law, ritual washings, asceticism, and a penchant for mystical literature found their way into many of these sects; and the descriptions of the Dustan, or Dositheans, by Abu'l Fatḥ and the Arabic writers show the perseverance of such characteristerics in the main body of the followers of Dositheus. Abu'l Fatḥ mentions a number of minor sects apparently sprung from the Dositheans. They were distinguished by such names as Abunai, Katitai, Sadukai, Foskutai, sons of Yosudak, followers of Aulian, and disciples of Sakta ben Tabim; the Katitai declared the Law to have been abolished, the Saktai did not visit Mt. Gerizim, and the followers of Aulian were communists.

Was there a Simonian sect among the Samaritans? The existence of a religious body known as Simonians is not in doubt. It is clear that Justin,[3] Irenæus,[4] and Hippolytus[5] believed Simon Magus to be the founder, and inferred from Ac 8[9-25] that he and the multitudes who acclaimed him 'the great power of God' were Samaritans. The historical character of Simon Magus has been questioned in modern times, and the origin of the sect ascribed by some scholars to a Christian Gnostic of the 2nd century.[6] There is not sufficient evidence, however, to maintain either of these positions. In Samaritan tradition, manifestly influenced by Christian sources, Simon is remembered only as a wonder-worker and an opponent of Christianity. If Simon was actually baptized into the name of Jesus, this would inevitably tend to break up the Simonians as a Samaritan sect; and, if as a Christian his thought continued to move in the direction of later Gnostic speculation, this would naturally affect his fellow-converts among the Samaritans, and would, after all, best account for the characteristics of the Simonian sect described by Justin, Irenæus, Origen, and Hippolytus.

LITERATURE.—Justin, ed. J. C. T. de Otto, 3 vols., Jena, 1876–81; Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*, ed. P. Cruice, Paris, 1860; Origen, ed. P. Koetschau, 5 vols., Leipzig, 1899–1913; Eusebius, ii. ed. E. Schwartz, do. 1903; *Clementis Homiliæ*, ed. P. de Lagarde, Göttingen, 1865; *S. Clementis Romani Recognitiones*, ed. E. G. Gersdorf, Leipzig, 1838; *Clementis Romani Recognitiones Syriace*, ed. Lagarde, do. 1861; Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl, do. 1915; other patristic writers in Migne, *PG*; E. Vilmar, *Abulfathi Annales Samaritani*, Gotha, 1865; Silvestre de Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe*[2], 3 vols., Paris, 1827; S. Krauss, 'Dosithée, et les Dosithéens,' in *REJ* xlii. [1901] 27 ff.; A. Büchler, 'Les Dosithéens dans le Midrasch,' *ib.* p. 220 ff.; T. G. J. Juynboll, *Commentarii in historiam gentis Samaritanæ*, Leyden, 1846, *Chronicon Samaritanum*, do. 1848; J. Grimm, *Die Samariter und ihre Stellung in der Weltgeschichte*, Munich, 1854; J. W. Nutt, *Fragments of a Samaritan Targum*, London, 1874; M. Appel, *Quæstiones de rebus Samaritanorum sub imperio Romano peractis*, Breslau, 1874; G. Salmon and J. M. Fuller, art. 'Dositheus,' in *DCB*; R. A. Lipsius, *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und Apostel-legenden*, 2 vols., Brunswick, 1883–84; A. Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, Leipzig, 1884; Paul de Lagarde, *Mitteilungen*, Göttingen, 1884–91, iv. 134 ff.; J. Kreyenbühl, *Das Evangelium der Wahrheit*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1900-05; K. F. A. Lincke, *Samarien und seine Propheten*, Tübingen, 1903; P. W. Schmiedel, 'Simon Magus,' in *EBi*; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907; J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans the earliest Jewish Sect*, Philadelphia, 1907; W. Brandt, 'Die jüdischen Baptismen,' *ZATW* xviii. [Giessen, 1910].

N. SCHMIDT.

SECTS (Zoroastrian).—The emergence of distinct and properly called sects in the Zarathushtrian fold cannot, apparently, be definitely traced before Sasanian times (226–652 A.D.).

It must not, however, be inferred from this fact that complete uniformity of creed and religious practice obtained in Mazdæism before that period, or at any time from the days of Zarathushtra to the end of the Parthian domination. Throughout the Avesta passages occur revealing conditions of strong religious conflict in thought and usage. It is true that the chief opponents of the orthodox Mazdayasnians, especially in the *Gāthās*, were the adherents of the old naturalistic religion, led by the *kavis* and *karapans*—the priests of the nature pantheon. Still it would scarcely be safe to assume that the gulf that separates the rival parties is, in all instances, as wide as that which divided nature-worship from the Mazdæism of Zarathushtra or his immediate followers. Two considerations should be given their due weight in the interpretation of allusions to religious antagonists in the Avesta. In the first place, the degree of vehemence with which religious opponents are assailed and denounced is not always a true measure of the essential difference of the rival creeds; for the bitterest denunciations of the Zarathushtrians of the Avesta can be paralleled in the mutual anathemas of the various sects of almost every religion. And it is significant that the connotation which tradition[1] assigns to the names *kavis* and *karapans*, viz. 'blind' and 'deaf' respectively, exactly corresponds to the epithets with which Mihr Narsih,[2] the minister of Yazdagird II., stigmatizes those who did not hold the belief of the Mazdayasnians; and yet that dignitary immediately proceeds to set forth as part of the Mazdayasnian creed a doctrine which, as we shall see below, those in the direct doctrinal succession of the Gāthic Zoroastrians must have entirely repudiated.

Secondly, a religious community which recognized equally, as the basis of its creed and practice, the polytheistic *Yashts* and the monotheistic *Gāthās* could scarcely expect to achieve anything approaching unity of faith or religious usage. Hence there must have existed, even from late Achæmenian times, between the two extremes of Gāthic Mazdayasnians on the one hand and those converts who remained but little removed from nature-worship on the other, a large number of communities holding as many varieties, professedly, of the same creed. Nevertheless our only definite evidence of this is the presence of these divergent oracles in the same canon.

The establishment of Zarathushtrian Mazdæism as the state religion by the Sasanians (*q.v.*) no doubt gave a new impulse to the process of systematization and closer definition of religious dogma, and hence the cleavage between the

[1] *Hær.* i. 13.
[2] *Apol.* i. 26, 56, ii. 15.
[3] vi. 15.
[4] P. 262.
[5] I. xxiii. 4.
[6] See art. SIMON MAGUS.

[1] See W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*, tr. Dārāb D. P. Sanjānā, London, 1885–86, ii. 49 f.
[2] See Elisæus, *The History of Vartan*, tr. C. F. Neumann, London, 1830, p. 11 ff.

different teachings would be more distinctly revealed. The Pahlavi literature, strange as it may seem, contains no explicit allusions to the sects, known from other sources to exist in the Zoroastrian Church of Sasanian and early Muslim days, though the influence of the doctrines of the sectaries is discernible in some of them. With one exception—the small tract called *'Ulamā-i-Islām*,[1] whose author was almost certainly a member of the sect of which he writes—we are dependent for our knowledge of the sects of Zoroastrianism upon non-Zoroastrian works, of which the most extensive is that of the Muslim historian Shahrastānī[2] († A.D. 1153).

In addition to the two great heretical sects, the Manichæans and the followers of Mazdak, which really represented distinct religious systems, and are therefore treated in this work under their respective titles, Shahrastānī describes the tenets of two main sects which deviated from the position of the Zarathushtrians as represented in the Avesta.

1. **Zarvanists.**—By far the more important of the two were the Zarvanists. They derived their appellation from Zrvan or Zarvan (mod. Pers. زمان), Time, whose place in their conception of theogony is generally regarded as the distinctive doctrine of the sect. In the Avesta,[3] it will be remembered, 'the Good Spirit' is said to have created 'in endless time' (*zrvan akarana*), indicating, probably, that he was gifted with 'boundless time,' or eternity, as an attribute. In other passages[4] Zrvan[5] is praised as a *yazata*, or lesser divinity. According to the Zarvanist theory, he is neither an attribute nor a deity, but a primal source of deity, a *fons deitatis*. Moreover, not only did Ormazd owe his existence ultimately to Zrvan, but Ahriman also was derived from the same source. Thus it was sought to resolve the dualism which the orthodox faith seemed to have failed to achieve.[6] As to the details of the Zarvanist theogony there seemed to have been no unanimity. According to the *'Ulamā-i-Islām*, the origin of Ormazd from Zrvan was not direct, but mediated by the union of fire and water, which were first created, although creation was, according to this sect, a function not of Zrvan, but of Ormazd, as in the orthodox faith.

Shahrastānī and the Armenian writers[7] make no mention of any intermediary, but describe in a somewhat naive manner the conception and birth of Ormazd and Ahriman from Zrvan. According to the Armenian account, Zrvan had offered sacrifices for 1000 years in the hope of begetting a son who would bring creation into being. Shahrastānī extends the period during which Zrvan had whispered that desire to himself to 9999 years. At the end of the period all agree that misgiving assailed Zrvan and from that doubt Ahriman was conceived, although Ormazd was simultaneously generated in the womb through Zrvan's knowledge. When Zrvan realized this, he vowed to give the sovereignty to the first-born; whereupon Ahriman, although at the time the farther from the birth, perforated the womb and became the first-born. When he stood before his father to claim the sovereignty, Zrvan despised him on account of his ugliness and depravity and endeavoured to repudiate him, but owing to his vow he was constrained to grant him the lordship of the world, though in a somewhat limited form, for 9000 years.

The Zarvanists were by no means agreed among themselves as to the origin of Ahriman or as to his function in the scheme of things. Some held, according to Shahrastānī, that there was some evil principle in God eternally. Others maintained, according to the *'Ulamā-i-Islām*, that Ahriman was a fallen angel, thus agreeing with the Biblical conception. We may legitimately suspect Christian influence here. It is equally clear that the Zarvanists differed as widely among themselves as to the motive of Zrvan in the creation of Ahriman. Some held that his function was to prove to Ormazd the absolute power of Zrvan; others maintained that the two spirits were necessary for the production of variety in creation: while others again despaired of discovering the *raison d'être* of Ahriman, and regarded his existence almost as a mishap. In addition to their distinctive doctrine of theogony the Zarvanists had developed a system of cosmology which also differed in important respects from that of the Avesta.[1] The *'Ulamā-i-Islām* relates that, in the great conflict between the powers of light and the forces of darkness, seven demons were taken captive and chained to the heavens, but Ormazd changed their names and assigned to each of them a special sphere in the sky. The names prove to be the same as those given to the *apakhtars*, or planets, in the *Bundahishn*. These the Zarvanists evidently regarded as inimical to man, whereas they held the constellations to be friendly and helpful to him.[2] F. Spiegel[3] contends strongly that it was in their cosmology rather than in their theogony that the Zarvanist tenets differed from the accepted teaching of the Zoroastrian Church of Sasanian times. We may admit that Zarvanist cosmology may have been their major contribution to Zoroastrian thought, and that evident traces of Babylonian astrology can be detected in their teaching; but we can scarcely go so far as Spiegel[4] does in saying that their peculiar views on the nature of God were a matter of indifference in the Zoroastrian Church of the Sasanian period.[5] Nor do the special mention which the Zarvanist creed receives in the edict of Mihr Narsih and the fact that in his refutation of heresies Eznik confines himself to the Zarvanist doctrine warrant the conclusion that they were co-extensive with the whole or even the major part of the Church of those days. The latter fact may only prove that their theological doctrine was regarded by Eznik as by far the most pernicious.

Finally, there is much to connect the Zarvanist teaching with the strong fatalistic element that runs through some of the Pahlavi books.[6] Eznik explains the term 'Zrvan' as signifying 'fortune' (*bakht*). Theodore of Mopsuestia[7] similarly interprets the name (*Ζαρουάμ ὃν ἀρχηγὸν πάντων εἰσάγει ὃν καὶ τύχην καλεῖ*). The modern Persian term, زمانه, especially in the *Shāhnāmah*, signifies both 'time' and 'fortune'; and the frequent employment of *sipihr*, 'heavens,' and *charkh* in the same

1 *Fragmens relatifs à la religion de Zoroastre: extraits des manuscrits persiens*, ed. J. Mohl, Paris, 1819, pp. 1–5, Germ. tr. J. Vullers, Bonn, 1831, pp. 43–67.

2 *Kitābu'l-Milal wán-Nihal*, Arab. text by W. Cureton, 1846, Germ. tr. T. Haarbrücker, Brunswick, 1850.

3 *Vend.* xix. 33.

4 *Ib.* xix. 44, 55; *Ny.* i. 8, etc.

5 As to the antiquity of Zarvanism, N. Söderblom (*La Vie future, d'après le Mazdéism*, Paris, 1901, p. 248, note 2) reminds us that Berosus relates that Zrvan was a king, from which it is concluded (see M. Bréal, *Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique*, Paris, 1877, p. 214) that Zarvanism goes back to the 4th cent. A.D.

6 Paulus Persa tells us that in his day (6th cent. A.D.) many opinions were held as to the nature of God: 'There are some who believe in only one God; others maintain that he is not the only God. Some teach that he possesses contrary attributes,' etc. (*Logica*, *ap.* J. P. N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, Leyden, 1862–75, vol. iv., Lat. tr. p. 2).

7 Eznik (6th cent.), tr. in John Wilson, *The Parsi Religion*, Bombay, 1843, p. 542 f.; also Elisæus, *op. cit.*

1 See art. Cosmogony and Cosmology (Iranian).

2 Cf. *Maīnōg-ī-Khraṭ*, viii. 17 (ed. E. W. West, *SBE* xxiv [1885] 34).

3 *Eran. Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871–78, ii. 184.

4 *Loc. cit.*

5 See also J. H. Moulton, *The Treasure of the Magi*, Oxford, 1917, p. 189.

6 See art. Fate (Iranian).

7 *Ap.* Photius, *Bibl.* 81.

book, as metaphors for 'fate' and 'chance,' evidences perhaps the fatalistic tendency of Zarvanist astral lore. It may therefore be unnecessary to assume the existence of a separate sect of fatalists.[1]

2. Gayomarthians.—The other sect, clearly of far less importance, was the Gayomarthians. For their tenets we are almost entirely beholden to Shahrastānī's account. They believed in the existence of two principles or beings, Yazdān (God, *i.e.* Ormazd) and Ahriman. Yazdān is eternal, Ahriman derived and created. The origin of the latter is accounted for in much the same way as in some of the views attributed to the Zarvanists. A thought that crossed the mind of Yazdān, as to the kind of being his rival (if such existed) would be, was not in harmony with the nature of light, and thus darkness (which was called Ahriman) resulted from that thought. The essential opposition in the nature of the two beings inevitably led to a bitter conflict between them, just as is related in the Avesta. The new element here, however, is that an angel appears as mediator, and peace is made between the warring spirits on condition that the lower world, or earth, should belong to Ahriman for 7000 years, but that at the end of the period he should surrender it to light; yet those who were in the world before peace was made were to be assigned to the evil one.

Then there appeared the man Gayomarth and the ox; but both were killed, and in the man's place there sprang up a plant, *rībās*, and from the root of the plant sprang a man, *mīsha*, and a woman, *mīshāna*. They were the parents of the human race. In the place of the ox there came the domestic and other animals. Man as yet was only spirit, but now he was allowed the option of being carried away to the realms of Ahriman, on the one hand, or, on the other, of being clothed in bodily form and entering upon the conflict with Ahriman, with an assurance of the support of light and of final victory over the forces of darkness and entrance into the state of resurrection.

3. Saisāniya.—From the Zarathushtrians, *i.e.* apparently the orthodox section of adherents of Mazdæism, there originated at the time of Abu Muslim Sāhib-u'd-Dawlah († A.D. 755) a small sect which Shahrastānī calls Saisāniya or Bihāfridiya. Their founder was a certain Khawwāf from the neighbourhood of Nishapur. His secession seems to have been due mainly to his objection to next-of-kin marriage (*khvétōk-das*) and the drinking of wine, in which it is natural to suspect traces of Muslim influence. Shahrastānī also says that he was strongly opposed to fire-worship, which brought upon him the wrath of the *mobed*, at whose bidding probably Abu Muslim ordered him to be put to death. His followers are credited also with aversion to killing and eating the flesh of any animal until it was old. They acquired for their own possession the houses of strangers, and were lavish in their expenditure. After the death of their founder we have no record of the doings of this sect, but Shahrastānī relates that they believed him to have ascended on a yellow horse to heaven, whence he would return to take vengeance upon his enemies.

A Persian work entitled *Dabistān-i-Mazāhib*, written by Muhsin-i-Fānī in the 17th cent., claims to supply us with an account of some thirteen or fourteen Parsī sects. For two reasons, at least, no discussion of those sects is included in this article: in the first place, the historical value of the *Dabistān*, and especially of the *Dasātir* (whence the materials of the *Dabistān* in that part of it are drawn), has been seriously impugned by some of the highest authorities;[1] in the second place, inasmuch as we have no other account or mention of those sects by which to compare and check notices so overlaid with purely legendary lore as we find Muhsin-i-Fānī's account of the Parsi sects to be,[2] we do not possess the necessary data to pronounce a considered opinion upon them.

The reader may consult that work in the original Persian, of which many lithographed texts exist, or in the English translation of D. Shea and A. Troyer, *The Dabistān or School of Manners*, 3 vols., Paris, 1843.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works already referred to, see L. C. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884, Eng. tr., Bombay, 1889; *Avesta: Livre sacré du Zoroastrisme*[2], tr. C. de Harlez, Paris, 1881, Introd. pp. lxxxiv–lxxxviii. E. EDWARDS.

SECULARISM.—1. Antecedents.—Secularism may be described as a movement, intentionally ethical, negatively religious, with political and philosophical antecedents. Founded with the express intention of providing a certain theory of life and conduct, it follows that in its positive aspect it is ethical. Since it undertook to do this without reference to a deity or a future life, and thus proposed to fulfil a function of religion, apart from religious associations, it may be regarded as negatively religious. Its origin, however, was primarily due to certain political conditions and philosophical influences.

Politically, secularism sprang from the turmoil which preceded, and still more from that which followed, the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832. Its matrix was provided in the somewhat incoherent socialism of Robert Owen and his followers and in the ill-fated Chartist movement. It came to birth shortly after the collapse of the revolutionary hopes which had been inspired in the extreme Chartists by the Continental revolutions of 1848. It was, therefore, in some measure, a recognition of the necessity of attempting to further social and political progress by the quieter methods of organization and education.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that serious social wrongs produced the reaction of which secularism was one of the fruits. The selfishness of the wealthy and influential classes, the unreasoning opposition to political and religious freedom, the stolid dogmatism of theology, were all powerful irritants; and it is not to be thought strange that, among the working-classes, consciousness of such a state of things begot not only extreme political theories, but the tendency to anti-religious reaction. Secularism was essentially a protest-movement. It possessed the vehement character of all such movements and the driving-force of the passions which they arouse. At the same time, it inherited the inevitable defects—the tendency to destructive rather than constructive action, the warping influence of heated feeling, the limited outlook, and the negationism—which inhere in all movements that are primarily reaction against established facts. Although it is true that secularism was an attempt to provide a positive policy, its positive nature was based upon a specific limitation of range and outlook, rendered possible only by reason of prejudice against the religious implications of life and conduct, which secularism refused to take into consideration. It proved impossible, therefore, as the history of secularism shows, for the movement to disentangle itself from the political and social passions out of which it arose.

The philosophical roots of secularism run back

[1] See, however, M. N. Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914, pp. 205–208.

[1] E. G. Browne, *A Literary Hist. of Persia*, London, 1902–06, i. 53–56; also A. W. von Schlegel, *Réflexions sur l'étude des langues des Asiatiques*[4], Bonn and Paris, 1832, p. 51 *f.*

[2] This remark is not necessarily applicable to other than the accounts of Parsi sects.

to the 'associationist' school of James Mill (*q.v.*) and Jeremy Bentham, with an anti-theistic strain inherited from Thomas Paine and Richard Carlile. Secularism also reveals the influence of positivism (*q.v.*), of which it was in part the English re-echo. Although avoiding the positivist religion and refusing to constitute humanity as a deity, it espoused a theory of knowledge essentially positivistic. This influence was, however, imported into secularism chiefly at second hand, through G. H. Lewes and J. S. Mill (*q.v.*) in particular. The principles of secularism were submitted to the latter and received his approval. It was, accordingly, the British utilitarians who were philosophically the sponsors of secularism.

Whilst the main impulses of the movement were derived from the social and political conditions which roused its founders to rebel against the accepted doctrines of life and thought prevalent in their day, its collateral influences were philosophical. This was necessarily so, since its avowed separation from religion made it incumbent upon secularism to establish its claim to furnish a theory of life and conduct by an appeal to philosophy, and especially ethics. Positivism supplied a conception of knowledge affording a basis upon which it was held that religious considerations could be ruled out, and utilitarianism (*q.v.*) lent itself to a non-religious explanation of the motives and ends of conduct. In these theories, therefore, the requisite ground for secularism was given.

2. The founders.—Secularism owes its name, and in large measure its existence, to the life and labours of George Jacob Holyoake.

Holyoake was born in Birmingham in 1817. His parents were hard-working artisans, and his upbringing was religious. The atmosphere of the town of his birth and the circumstances of his own childhood aroused in him strong social and political convictions, which were fanned into flame by the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, at which time Holyoake was an impressionable lad of fifteen. He became estranged from the Churches because of their lack of social sympathy, and made his first ventures into political life as an Owenite 'social missionary.' Subsequently he was associated with Chartism (*q.v.*), and after the failure of that movement his later years revealed him as an advanced Radical. About the year 1841 he definitely abandoned belief in God, and his antipathy to Christianity was deepened by a somewhat unjust term of imprisonment imposed upon him at Cheltenham for 'blasphemy.' At the same time Holyoake never appears to have felt himself in sympathy with the dogmatic atheism of his day. His atheism was rather agnosticism (*q.v.*), and in one of the many periodicals with which he was from time to time associated, *The Reasoner*, he wrote: 'We are not infidels if that term implies rejection of Christian truth, since all we reject is Christian error.' During his life he was frequently in association with Christians who shared his social and political sympathies, and his attitude towards the 'Christian socialism' of Maurice (*q.v.*) and Kingsley reveals his union of aim so far as socialism was concerned, equally with his dislike of the doctrinal significance which he felt was conveyed by the term 'Christian.' For many years Holyoake was honourably connected with the welfare of the co-operative movement.[1] In middle life he settled in London as a bookseller, and among his many interests the struggle of Italy for freedom found a characteristic place. He counted in the circle of his friends both Garibaldi and Mazzini, and busied himself with promoting the unlucky 'English Legion' that sailed to their assistance. In later life he settled at Brighton, where he died in 1906, agitator and enthusiast to the end, welcoming almost with his last breath the Liberal victory at the General Election early in that year.

During his long life Holyoake was associated more or less sympathetically with the men whose anti-Christian propaganda was the storm-centre of the 19th cent.; and yet at the same time he maintained, especially in his later life, cordial relations with eminent supporters of Christianity, including W. E. Gladstone, who regarded him as an honest and single-minded opponent. None of the associates of Charles Bradlaugh was so generally esteemed among their opponents as Holyoake, and a number of attacks made upon him by members of his own party are significant testimony to the fairness and independence of Holyoake's judgment.

[1] See art. CO-OPERATION.

Among Holyoake's companions in establishing secularism may be named Charles Southwell, Thomas Cooper (afterwards converted to Christianity), Thomas Paterson, and William Chilton. The movement originated in 1849, and was expressly regarded by Holyoake as an alternative to atheism.[1] In 1850 Holyoake met Bradlaugh, and in the subsequent year coined the term 'secularism,' after some hesitation as to the merits of 'netheism' and 'limitationism' as alternatives, 'as best indicating that province of duty which belongs to this life.' Secularism was intended to differentiate Holyoake's anti-theistic position from Bradlaugh's atheistic pronouncements, and, although Bradlaugh, Charles Watts, G. W. Foote, and other atheists were identified with the secular movement, Holyoake always endeavoured to make it possible that the social, political, and ethical aims of secularism should not necessitate subscription to atheistic belief, in the hope that liberal-minded theists might, without prejudice to their theism, join in promoting these ends—an attitude to which he persisted in clinging, despite the small success which it achieved.

3. Principles.—The essential principle of secularism is to seek for human improvement by material means alone. It holds that such means are the more important, because the more proximate; and that, independently and in themselves, they are adequate to secure the desired end.

Secularism arose and developed at a period when the relations of science and religion were beginning to be regarded as those of sharp opposition. In harmony with that notion, it proclaimed the independence of secular truth. Secular knowledge is founded upon the experience of this life and can be maintained and tested by reason at work in experience. It conceived that, just as mathematics, physics, and chemistry were 'secular' sciences, so it would be possible on the same lines to establish a secular theory of the conduct and welfare of life, and to add the instruction of the conscience to instruction in the sciences, in a similar manner and on similar conditions.

The relations of secularism to religion were accordingly defined as mutually exclusive rather than hostile. Theology professes to interpret the unknown world. Secularism is wholly unconcerned with that world and its interpretation. It deals with the known world interpreted by experience and neither offers nor forbids any opinion regarding another life. Neither theism nor atheism enters into the secularist scheme, because neither is provable by experience. In so far as Christianity is moral, secularism has common ground with it, but it offers a basis for morality wholly independent of all Christian belief and one that will appeal to those who, for various reasons, are dissatisfied with theology. It submits that complete morality is attainable by, and can be based upon, secular considerations alone, just as all the uses for which the house was designed can be fulfilled without reference to the architect who may have designed it. It does not assert that there is no light elsewhere, but that such light adds nothing to the pursuit of human ends. Unless dogma actively interferes with human happiness, secularism is content to leave it to flourish or perish as it may.

Historically, secularism has been intermingled with atheism throughout its course, but Holyoake always insisted that the two were distinct. On secularist principles, he was willing to associate with Bradlaugh and equally ready to associate with any theist who would unite with him in seeking the mutual improvement of the race by secular means. He regarded both theism and

[1] See art. ATHEISM, § 6.

atheism as what would now be called 'overbelief.' In contrast with Holyoake, Bradlaugh considered that secularism was bound to contest theistic belief and that material progress was impossible so long as 'superstition' so powerfully manifested itself.

Secularism held that its principles could be established and sustained by the intellect as principles of reason and intelligence equally applicable to all humanity. It contended that morality was based upon reason and that error lay in knowledge rather than intention. Holyoake thought it possible to establish material conditions which would eradicate poverty and depravity. With the utilitarians he held it as self-evident that morality was the conduct which establishes the common welfare, and he thought that science could teach the laws of happiness equally with the laws of health. To that end we must be guided by reason, believing not what we desire, which gives the condition neither of certainty nor of uniformity, but that which reason can vindicate. To fulfil this function, reason must be left unfettered. Ethical and religious research must be as free as scientific research. There must be no penalties, legal or spiritual, for any investigation, criticism, or publicity. In this aspect of a reasonable theory of life secularism fulfils a function which it regards religion as imperfectly serving. It 'takes truth for authority, not authority for truth' and 'substitutes the piety of usefulness for the usefulness of piety.' What is best for man will be determined by reason tested by experience and will surely be approved by 'the Author of humanity.' The new piety exhibits itself in self-help and 'vexes not the ears of the All-wise with capricious supplications.'[1] Recognizing that we are wholly ruled by general laws, man's duty is to study them and live by them.

4. Progress and prospects.—The influence of secularism was most apparent during the middle of the 19th cent., when the movement flourished to a not inconsiderable extent among its allies in the anti-Christian reaction of the period. Latterly it has decayed rapidly and has almost disappeared from independent existence, being merged in such organized rationalism (*q.v.*) as now represents the more recent phases of the secular spirit. It is significant that the best days of secularism coincided with the definitely anti-religious propaganda of those of its sympathizers who, like Bradlaugh, joined with secularism what Holyoake refused to regard as essential to it, namely atheism. The atheistic controversy ended, the old animosities centred in it have softened, a less extreme view of the opposition of science and religion has prevailed, and with these things much of the *motif* of secularism has passed away. It is not likely to revive as an organized movement. The question is rather whether its spirit and principles are destined to continue in being. Secularism proposed a limitation of human knowledge and interest to the material sphere — an attitude which, whilst possible, and indeed often actual, in practice, is impossible to justify or establish from the theoretical standpoint, as secularism essayed to do.

In practice there are millions whose interests and concerns are confined to the material aspects of life. This attitude is practicable because they have no conscious theory of life and conduct. No such theory is needed. It is its absence that makes practical secularism possible. The weakness of secularism lies in the fact that it offers needless and insufficient reasons to mankind for doing what they can and will do without requiring reasons. It is much the same as if one should propose to afford a philosophical basis for the natural realism of 'the plain man,' which regards the evidence of the senses as indisputable testimony to the existence of an external reality which is what it appears to be. In practice no such basis is needed. In theory it cannot be given; for the first steps in philosophy reveal the insufficiency of 'the plain man's' assumptions. So it is with secularism. Many are secular in practice, but any theory of life or conduct is bound to discuss the questions which secularism attempts to ignore. Though Holyoake claimed that secularism was a theory of life and conduct, in reality it is the renunciation of one, like agnosticism, with which it is closely allied. As such it is needless, and it fails because it has no place to fill. In practice one can limit one's interests without a theory of limitation, and negate without a theory of negation. When, however, we propose to ask why we should limit our knowledge, we are obliged to take up an attitude of reception or rejection, not merely one of ignoring, in face of the claims of religion to afford a knowledge of other than material concerns. In this matter Bradlaugh acted more consistently than Holyoake, and his action is confirmed by the fact that secularism was most vigorous when linked with anti-religious views. The attempt to ignore rather than deny religion is impractical, because religion embraces both secular and spiritual concerns. Religion denies the secular conception of life, and that conception cannot establish itself without defeating the claim of religion to control life. It is an impossible proposition to maintain that there may be a God, but that He does not concern material existence. Whoever believes in God believes in Him *ex hypothesi* as the greatest of all realities Whilst it is true that in practice a believer in God may be sufficiently inconsistent to neglect the implication of his belief upon conduct, it is impossible to construct a satisfactory theory to justify this course. It is for this reason that a secularism which does not include a definitely anti-religious theory is bound to fail.

From the philosophical side, the weakness of secularism, as Holyoake presented it, consists in an inability to appreciate the distinction between fact and value—a failure which is perhaps attributable to the dogmatic certainty which characterized the claims set forth in the name of science in the middle of the 19th century. Whilst 'facts,' *i.e.* abstractions from experience considered by themselves, as science regards them, may be treated as matters of intellectual knowledge alone, the worth and permanence of values are posited only by an act of faith. In attempting to construct an ethical system of facts, analogous to mathematics or chemistry, to deal with knowledge and not with faith, secularism reveals its ignorance of a fundamental distinction. It proposed to decide between competing values by a standard of fact, and spoke of truth and reason without any clear understanding of the relation of these terms to value, as if they gave self-evident proof of the existence of values and obvious means of distinguishing between competing values. Whilst utilitarianism — the philosophical theory which gave most impetus to secularism—prevailed, it was possible to uphold, to some extent at least, the secularist ethic, but the collapse of utilitarianism involved the failure of the movement based, on the philosophical side at least, upon its premisses.

For these reasons it does not seem apparent that secularism is destined to survive as a theory of life and conduct, and it must be regarded as a movement arising out of, and passing with, the conditions of its time. Whilst its ethical aims were honourable, it lacked an adequate basis upon

[1] Holyoake, art. 'Secularism,' in Chambers's *Encyclopædia*.

which to establish itself as a permanent feature of human thought.

LITERATURE.—G. J. Holyoake, *Principles of Secularism*, London, 1859, *The Trial of Theism*, do. 1858, *The Limits of Atheism*, do. 1861, *The Origin and Nature of Secularism*, do. 1896. See also *The Secular Review*, vol. i., do. 1876–77, *The Present Day*, 3 vols., do. 1883–86, both ed. by Holyoake, whose autobiography is contained in *Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life*, 2 vols., do. 1892, and in *Bygones worth Remembering*, 2 vols., do. 1905; J. McCabe, *Life and Letters of George Jacob Holyoake*, 2 vols., do. 1908; C. W. F. Goss, *Descriptive Bibliography of the Writings of G. J. Holyoake*, do. 1908; R. Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories* (Baird Lecture for 1887), Edinburgh, 1879, pp. 211–249. ERIC S. WATERHOUSE.

SEEKERS.—The Seekers, in the narrowest use of the term, formed a small sect of the Independents during the period of the English Commonwealth. In a broader and more accurate sense of the word, the name 'Seeker' covers a movement or tendency, both Continental and English, extending from the time of the Reformation in Germany to the middle of the 17th cent., the definite sect of the Seekers in England being the historical culmination of this movement.

The definite Seeker tendency, with its characteristic group of ideas, first comes to light in the writings of Sebastian Franck (1499–1542), a humanistic reformer of Schwabia. Franck[1] describes groups of Christians among the Anabaptists who desire to allow baptism and other ceremonies to remain in abeyance until God gives further commands, and those persons, he says, suspending for the time external ceremonies, *wait* and *seek* for fuller light. Dirck Coornhert, a Dutch theologian and reformer, born in Amsterdam in 1522, strongly developed the Seeker tendency, and through his influence the Seeker attitude took an important place in the thought of an interesting section of Dutch dissenters. Coornhert considered the existing Church, with its divisions, external organization, and outward ceremonies, as only an interim Church, and he held that the faithful shall quietly wait for the true apostolic, authoritative Church to be divinely commissioned, endowed, and inaugurated. The Seeker attitude, emphasized in the writings of Coornhert, was taken up by the societies of Dutch Collegiants, or Rynsburgers (*q.v.*), in the 17th cent. and made a central feature of this interesting movement. Daniel Van Breen, Adam Boreel, and Galenus Abrahams of the Amsterdam Collegium, or Society, were the leaders of this Seeker movement in Holland, though the most developed expression of it is found in a tract entitled *Lucerna super candelabro* (Amsterdam, 1662), probably written by Peter Balling, a Collegiant of Rynsburg, and translated into English by the Quaker, Benjamin Furley, under the title, *The Light on the Candlestick* (London, 1665). This tract and 'the Nineteen Articles' (1658) with their 'Further Exposition' (1659), issued by the Amsterdam Collegiants, give the fullest available account of Continental Seeker views. The visible Church, with its doctrines, or 'notions,' as they named them, its external organization, its outward ceremonies, is here thought of as devoid of real authority and spiritual power, as lost in the wilderness and in an apostate condition, while the true believer is one who waits and seeks for the Church of apostolic power which in the fullness of time God will establish with freshly-commissioned prophets whose authority will be verified by miraculous gifts. The same ideas reappear, in a more developed stage and in more cohesive form, in the groups of English Seekers during the Commonwealth.

The word 'Seekers,' as the name of a sect, with its definite religious connotation, first appears in England in *Truth's Champion* (London, 1617), probably written by John Morton, where 'Seekers' are described as a people opposed to everything external, who do not need to 'hear preaching nor read the Scriptures.' Even before this date, however, Bartholomew Legate, an English cloth-dealer, whose trade took him to Holland, had taught definite Seeker ideas. Henoch Clapham[1] makes Legate say that God is soon to give a new revelation through 'myraculous apostles' and a 'myraculous ministry' and that until this commission appears there is 'no true Church,' 'no true baptism,' 'no visible Christian.' Until God acts, man can only wait and seek. Legate plainly held the group of ideas which formed part of the Continental movement traced above. He was burned at Smithfield in 1612 as a heretic, suspected of holding Arian views.

Ephraim Pagitt gives an adequate account of the Seeker position:

'Many have wrangled so long about the Church that at last they have quite lost it, and go under the name of *Expecters* or *Seekers*, and do deny that there is any Church, or true minister, or any ordinances.'[2]

Edwards's *Gangræna* (London, 1646), Richard Baxter's accounts in *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ* (do. 1696), John Jackson's *A Sober Word to a Serious People* (do. 1651), and John Saltmarsh's *Sparkles of Glory* (do. 1648) give further and somewhat fuller description of the Seeker movement of the time. The following passage is sympathetic and on the whole a fair description of the main features of the movement:

'Firstly, they seek the mind of God in the Scriptures. Secondly, they judge that prayer and alms are to be attended to, and for this purpose they come together into some place on the First-days as their hearts are drawn forth and opportunity offers. Then they seek, firstly, that they may be instruments in the hand of the Lord to stir up the grace of God in one another, by mutual conference and communication of experience; and secondly, to wait for a further revelation. Thirdly, to hold out their testimony against the false, and for the pure ordinance of ministry and worship. They behave themselves as persons who have neither the power nor the gift to go before one another by way of eminency or authority, but as sheep unfolded, and as soldiers unrallied, waiting for a time of gathering. They acknowledge no other visible teacher but the Word and works of God, on whom they wait, for the grace which is to be brought at the revelation of Jesus Christ.'[3]

It is, however, through the writings and documents of the early Quakers that it has been possible to discover the extent of the movement in England and at the same time to find the real characteristics of the sect of Seekers.

The First Publishers of Truth, printed in 1907, which contains a historical account of the rise and spread of Quakerism, contains the fullest available accounts of the Seekers. They appear in these documents to be a sincere, earnest, spiritually-minded people, who have turned away from outward things and are endeavouring to discover the will of God and His divine leading by waiting in silence for the light to break forth. They are described as 'a seeking and religiously inclined people.' They appear to have had large meetings in the West Riding of Yorkshire, in Westmorland, and also in Bristol. Their meetings seem to have been held with long periods of silence and with opportunity for free, spontaneous, and unprepared messages, though there were evidently leaders in the local groups who often, probably usually, preached to them and interpreted to them the spiritual nature of Christianity as they conceived it. The Seeker groups described in the early Quaker documents went over almost entirely to the new movement inaugurated by George Fox, and the leaders of the Seeker societies became after 1652 the foremost preachers in the early Society of Friends (*q.v.*). From having been 'seekers' they now believed that they had become what

[1] *Chronica*, Strassburg, 1531.

[1] *Error on the Right Hand*, London, 1608.
[2] *Heresiographie*, London, 1645, p. 128.
[3] Jackson, p. 8.

Cromwell once called 'happy finders.' After 1652 there is no indication of the continuation of a separate sect of Seekers, and the characteristic ideas which formed the body of their propaganda henceforth disappear from religious tractarian literature in England, though they continued somewhat longer to find expression in Holland.

LITERATURE.—J. C. van Slee, *De Rijnsburger Collegianten*, Haarlem, 1895; Hermann Weingarten, *Die Revolutionskirchen Englands*, Leipzig, 1868; D. Masson, *Life of Milton*, 6 vols., London, 1859–80; *The First Publishers of Truth*, ed. for the Friends' Historical Society by Norman Penney, do. 1907; *The Swaledale Papers*, in Devonshire House Library, given in extract in an art. by W. C. Braithwaite in *Journ. of the Friends' Historical Society*, v. [1908] 3 ff.; George Fox, *Journal*, ed. N. Penney, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1911, *The Great Mystery of the Great Whore*, London, 1659 (see esp. 'Epistle to the Reader,' written in 1653 by Edward Burrough); Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, do. 1909, *Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, do. 1914; William Charles Braithwaite, *Beginnings of Quakerism*, do. 1912.

RUFUS M. JONES.

SELF.—See PERSONALITY, EGO.

SELF (Buddhist).—In Buddhism the use and content of the term 'self,' both as separate word and as prefix, coincide largely with its use and content in Western religions and ethics. But the former system has some interesting features of divergent development to show—linguistic, psychological, ethical, and metaphysical.

Linguistically, *e.g.*, there is in Pāli the useful compound *atta-bhāva*, 'self-state' or 'self-hood,' meaning personality, individual life, the bodily and mental organism.

'I cannot remember, since I have had experience through this *attabhāva*, all its characteristics and habits; how then should I remember my various former existences?'[1]

'. . . each of the five organs of sense derived from the four great elements, included in the *attabhāva*.'[2]

It was consonant also with the old *Sutta* diction to use *atta* alone in this sense,[3] but the compound term superseded it.

It was used, wrote Buddhaghoṣa, 'both for the body and for all the corporeal and mental factors, foolish folk including these in the notion they hold that "This is myself" (or "my soul").'[4]

Again, there is the Pāli idiom of the dual self, a form of speech which corresponds to no psychologically conceived parallel, but in which one *atta* functions (instead of a personal pronoun) as the subject, the other as the object:

'These are the penalties of wrong-doing: self upbraids self.'[5]

'Any virtuous layman established in the fourfold peace can, if he will, confess self to self as being assured of happy rebirth.'[6]

'To whom is the self not dear? To evildoers, for . . . though they may say "Dear to us is the self," yet that which a foe would do to his foe, that do they by self to self.'[7]

'By self incite the self, examine self
By self; self-guarded thus, watchful of mind
And happy shalt thou live. For self of self
Is warder, unto self hath self recourse.
Therefore train well thyself.'[8]

Here we have a mode of psychical activity, known to psychological analysis, which bifurcates the unitary concept of the self, setting a self which is the accretion and outcome of experience—the 'character'—over against the self of the present moment, and so on.

Thus used, the former 'self' at times takes the place of our term 'conscience.'

'Doth self reproach thee not as to morals?'[9]

'There is not anywhere a place throughout the world
Where evil deeds may secretly be done.
The self doth know thee, Man, whether in truth
Thou didst it, or if it be false. O friend,
Thy better self[1] thou hold'st in mean repute,
Who within self hid'st evil from thyself.'[2]

'"Self-known" applies to one who reflects:—"Thus far am I in faith, morals, learning, self-surrender, insight, ready speech."'[3]

There are two adjectival forms of *atta*, neither of which has the meaning of our 'selfish.' The one, *attaniya*, is simply the adjective of relation, the other, *ajjhattika* (*adhi-att-ika*), is the same. But they are used in different connexions. The former is used with reference to soul, or ontological self. The latter is a purely psychological term, and is opposed to whatever is 'external' to one's self, corporeal and mental. Thus *ajjhattika* phenomena are the activities of the five senses and of the ideating factor or mind. External phenomena are objects of sense and images—mental constructions objectified. The former phenomena are 'self-referable, one's own, referable to the person, bodily and mental.'[4] And, because the corporeal factor is included, our modern term 'subjective' does not always form a fit rendering.

It is clear from the foregoing linguistic considerations that, whatever restrictions the religious philosophy of Buddhism imposed upon the metaphysical implications of the term and concept of 'self,' the use of it as a convenient label for the totality of any living individual was by that philosophy both approved and exploited. As such a label, it belonged to the stock of terms and ideas called *sammūti*, or 'of conventional usage.' The Buddhist scholar used it as such. Philosophically speaking, it did not mean for him an ultimate unitary principle, continuing self-identical amid a stream of transient manifestations. Contrariwise, it was merely a name-and-concept binding together and labelling a transient aggregate of factors. For him the ultimate principles, material and psychical, were not in the bond or label, but among those factors. But even they were evanescent, ever-changing.[5] And as to the name-labels he judged that

'These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. Of these he who has won truth makes use indeed, but is not led astray by them.'[6]

The ethical implications of *atta* have been already dealt with in art. EGOISM (Buddhist).

LITERATURE.—C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, pp. 26 f., 140 f., *Manual of Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, do. 1900, pp. xciv, 207, n. 1. The Pāli texts are published by the Pāli Text Society.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SELF-ASSERTION AND SELF-SUBJECTION. — 1. Primary instincts. — Self-assertion (or self-display) together with its opposite, self-subjection (or self-abasement), has been classed by many modern psychologists with the primary instincts of human nature—the instincts which, either directly or indirectly, are the prime movers of all human activity. The term 'instinct' has, unfortunately, not yet acquired a fixed meaning.[7] For the purposes of this article the definition of McDougall may be considered useful.

He defines it as 'an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor (1) to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, (2) to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and (3) to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.'[8]

Of the three parts of the psycho-physical disposition it is the second that is most stable and unchanging.

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[1] *Majjhima Nikāya*, ii. 32. [2] *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, § 597 f.
[3] *E.g.*, *Poṭṭhapāda-Sutta*, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 259; cf. n. 3; *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, i. 89, and citations below.
[4] *Atthasālinī*, p. 308. [5] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, i. 57.
[6] *Ib.* iii. 211. [7] *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, i. 72.
[8] *Dhammapada*, 379 f.
[9] *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, iii. 120, etc.; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iii. 255, etc.

[1] *Kalyāṇaṃ*; comparative not in the Pāli.
[2] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, i. 149. [3] *Ib.* iv. 114.
[4] *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, §§ 1207, 1044; cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 421 f., where physical elements of the anatomy are called *ajjhattika*.
[5] See art. REALITY (Buddhist).
[6] *Dīgha Nikāya*, i. 202 (tr. *Dialogues of the Buddha* [*SBB*, London, 1899], i. 263); in this connexion the art. SOUL (Buddhist) should be consulted.
[7] Cf. art. INSTINCT.
[8] *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913, p. 29.

'The emotional excitement, with the accompanying nervous activities of the central part of the disposition, is the only part of the total instinctive process that retains its specific character and remains common to all individuals and all situations in which the instinct is excited.'[1]

Not only has the emotional excitement of each instinct a specific character, but it always expresses itself by the same symptoms. McDougall describes the emotion characteristic of self-assertion by the term 'elation,' its opposite by the term 'self-subjection.' Ribot[2] uses the terms 'positive self-feeling' and 'negative self-feeling' to describe them. Positive self-feeling gives an impulse to the display of size, strength, and other traits of the self, whereas negative self-feeling leads to shrinking, self-effacement, submission, self-abasement. Drever[3] questions McDougall's statement that the affective part of these instincts is always an emotion. There is no evidence, he contends, that the complex experience denoted by that term is always present when the instinct is active. The positive self-feeling invariably present is more accurately described by the term 'interest' (a feeling of worth-while-ness) than by the term 'emotion.' The emotion of elation, according to him, is experienced only when self-assertion or self-display (which is the term Drever prefers) has met with its suitable response in the submissive attitude of those before whom self-display is made.

Drever[4] employs the following five tests in determining from a psychological point of view whether any particular instinct is to be considered primary, and the two instincts under consideration meet all five:

'(1) Irreducibility by introspective analysis to simpler components.
(2) Arousal of impulse and emotion, with its specific and unmistakable expressive signs, by specific objects or specific kinds of objects, prior to individual experience of these objects.
(3) Manifestation in the early months of child life.
(4) Wide diffusion in the animal world.
(5) Occurrence in exaggerated form under pathological conditions.'[5]

McDougall relies on the fourth and fifth. His discussion, however, implies the use of the first, while we find illustrations of the five in the examples that he gives of the operation of the instincts. His treatment of self-assertion and self-subjection is the most full and satisfactory that we possess. Ribot's treatment—which preceded McDougall's—is briefer and less thorough. Drever has improved on McDougall's analysis in some particulars. A good account of the significance of self-assertion and self-subjection in the social and ethical development of the child is given by Baldwin.[6]

These instincts are essentially social in nature. Their excitement depends on the presence of others. In the case of man the *idea* of others, without their actual presence, may cause elation or subjection with their corresponding manifestations. One may 'show off' before an imaginary gallery of spectators, or even before one's self in a mirror, as if he were another person. But the display is always to, and the shrinking from, some one's notice—usually some one of the same kind. A barnyard cockerel struts before other fowls, a hen among her chicks; a small dog crawls submissively towards, or away from, a big dog; but he will also slink away with his tail between his legs from a man who has shown disapproval of him. Generally, however, the instinct of subjection is excited by the presence of one of the same kind who is perceived to be in some respect superior, whereas the instinct of self-display is excited by another of the same kind who is perceived to be inferior. In the case of animals the superiority or inferiority is chiefly in size or strength, but other striking characteristics, such as the tail of the peacock, may be organs for the self-display of their owners, and may produce subjection in others. The self-display of animals occurs mainly, though not exclusively, during the mating season. Darwin,[1] in his interesting description of this instinct, regards it as a manifestation of the courtship instinct. The two should not, however, be identified.

Self-assertion and self-subjection come into operation at an early age in children. A child will crow and otherwise display its powers and become elated at the admiring applause of the family group, whereas the absence of applause or inattention will reduce it to silence and cause it to shrink out of sight.

Pathological cases show the operation of both the instincts in an exaggerated form. In certain mental diseases—*e.g.*, general paralysis of the insane—'exaggeration of this emotion and of its impulse of display is the leading symptom.' In other mental diseases the patient exhibits exaggerated symptoms of self-abasement. He 'shrinks from the observation of his fellows, thinks himself a most wretched, useless, sinful creature,' etc.[2]

2. Emotional complexes. — Instincts may be excited singly or in combination. In human beings they are seldom excited singly. When two or more are excited together, their emotions may fuse so as to form a complex emotion in which the various constituents modify one another. In the new emotion the various constituents may be detected; yet the whole is not a quasi-mechanical sum of the constituents, but a new emotion having a special emotional tone. Among the examples given by McDougall is admiration (*q.v.*). This he analyzes into the two primary emotions of wonder and negative self-feeling. Wonder he considers to be the emotion which is the affective part of the instinct of curiosity[3]—the instinct whose impulse is to cause us to approach a relatively novel object and to contemplate it. But we approach an admired object slowly and with hesitation, *i.e.* submissively. For admiration is elicited when the novel is in some respect superior. It is therefore most frequently excited by a person perceived to be superior to ourselves, whom we do not fully understand. McDougall maintains that in our admiration for books and works of art there is always present the thought of the maker. Admiration of natural objects implies the personalization of natural powers or the postulate of their Creator. The presence in admiration of the submissive attitude with the attendant negative self-feeling is an indication of this. Admiration qualified by fear is awe (*q.v.*). When the power which excites awe is beneficent towards us and excites gratitude (*q.v.*), we experience reverence (*q.v.*)—the religious emotion *par excellence*.[4] McDougall's account of reverence is scarcely satisfactory. Wonder, negative self-feeling, and fear are clearly elements in it; but gratitude is not essential. What is essential is respect. Respect depends on the recognition of some personal excellence other than size or power. Benevolence is such an excellence, so is righteousness; and a manifestation by a being of either towards even another may suffice to qualify our

[1] McDougall, p. 34.
[2] *The Psychology of the Emotions*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, pt. ii. ch. v.
[3] *The Instinct in Man*, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 156 ff., 192.
[4] *Ib.* ch. viii. [5] *Ib.* p. 173.
[6] *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*[4], New York and London, 1907, pp. 13 ff., 204 ff.

[1] *The Descent of Man*, 2 vols., London, 1871, ch. xiii.
[2] McDougall, pp. 64–66.
[3] Drever (p. 200) seems right when he says that the word 'curiosity' describes not only the impulse but the emotion attending it better than the word 'wonder.' Wonder is itself complex. In its simplest and most elementary form he thinks it is 'baffled curiosity.' The relatively novel rouses the instinct of curiosity. If the 'enquiring impulse' is not satisfied, 'wonder is developed,' curiosity, however, remaining an element in it.
[4] McDougall, pp. 128–135.

awe into reverence. We can respect another only if he is seen to respect himself. Indeed McDougall suggests that our 'respect for another is a sympathetic reflexion of his self-respect.'[1] Hence positive self-feeling qualified by a sense of personal worth enters into reverence. So it is an emotion possible only to a person conscious in some degree of his moral dignity or worth. Reverence for God the Father is attainable only by the man who is conscious of the value of 'sonship.'

McDougall suggests that 'the fundamental distinction between religious and magical practices is not, as is sometimes said, that religion conceives the powers it envisages as personal powers, while magic conceives them as impersonal; but rather that the religious attitude is always that of submission, the magical attitude that of self-assertion; and that the forces which both magical and religious practices are concerned to influence may be conceived in either case as personal or impersonal powers. Hence the savage, who at one time bows down before his fetish in supplication, and at another seeks to compel its assistance by threats or spells, adopts toward the one object alternately the religious and the magical attitude. The same fundamental difference of attitude and emotion distinguishes religion from science, into which magic becomes transformed as civilization progresses.'[2]

This theory cannot be justified. We have seen that in one of the highest forms of religious emotion—reverence—positive self-feeling in the form of respect is present. Durkheim[3] maintains that there is an element of respect in the fear of the primitive for his gods. And he shows that the religious rites of the Australian totemists have as one of their functions the strengthening of the divine principle in the totem and the ensuring of the reproduction of the totemic species. Their worshippers are as necessary to the gods as the gods are to the worshippers.[4] And in the higher religions (*e.g.*, Christianity) the worship and service of men are believed to be needed by their God. Hence the attitude cannot be one of pure submission. McDougall is probably right in saying that the magical attitude is self-assertive. Does not that distinguish it from both the religious and the scientific attitudes? For surely intellectual humility is a characteristic of the scientific mind. There is a confident assertion of power in the propounding and following out of hypotheses, but there is also a readiness to submit to facts, and a subjection of self to truth, even when truth demands the surrender of cherished beliefs and hopes. In the application also of scientific knowledge to practical affairs the scientific man can impose his will on nature only by obeying nature's laws. Positive and negative self-feeling are constituents of scientific and religious emotion.

3. **The self-sentiment.**—The emotions not only fuse to form new emotional complexes; they also compete with and inhibit one another. In comparatively undeveloped minds, such as those of animals and very young children, positive and negative self-feeling would simply preclude one another's appearance, or, if both appeared, one would expel the other from the mind. In bashful behaviour, which appears in a child's third year, neither succeeds in expelling its opposite. Both continue to be excited by different aspects of a situation—that constituted by a self in relation to other selves—but because of their opposite characteristics, and the opposite types of behaviour to which they lead, they do not fuse. The impulses to self-display and self-effacement struggle to check each other's manifestations. Such a struggle seems to imply the organization of the two dispositions into a system. The bond of union is the idea of the self, and a rudimentary form of the consciousness of self is therefore a condition of the union and consequent struggle. To such a system of dispositions organized about the idea of an object modern psychologists, following Shand, have given the name 'sentiment.'[1]

'When any one of the emotions is strongly or repeatedly excited by a particular object, there is formed the rudiment of a sentiment.'[2]

For example, the admiring applause of a child's nurse gradually develops the '"Am I not a wonder?" consciousness,' and the child will acquire the habit of displaying its powers and expect applause each time it does so. One that is always petted, admired, and allowed to have its own way may acquire the self-assertive habit to an excessive degree, will become what is called a 'spoilt' child. It will come to think of itself as a being superior to others, to whom all must always defer and submit. About its idea of self—an idea essentially social in character, for it is the idea of the self in relation to others—its emotions will become organized with positive self-feeling central and dominating. In the self-sentiment so formed it will tend to include all the emotions that are of service to its ends, and to exclude all those which are useless or antagonistic; *e.g.*, it will feel fear when the satisfaction of positive self-feeling is threatened, anger when it is obstructed, elation when it is satisfied, and sorrow when it is frustrated.[3] Signs of fear, admiration, gratitude, and deference in others it will welcome, but it will tend to restrain the impulses to exhibit them itself, and to feel the corresponding emotions. A fully-formed sentiment of this type is the cause of pride (*q.v.*) in its extreme and most objectionable form. But it never happens that the self-sentiment excludes negative self-feeling entirely. That would be possible only if a child were born devoid of the instinct, or never perceived persons in any way superior to itself. Where, however, this instinct is weak or its exercise much inhibited, a whole series of emotions into which negative self-feeling enters is only faintly felt—*e.g.*, admiration, reverence, respect, gratitude, humility. There would be comparative indifference to praise and blame—concern for either implies a recognition of the superiority of those who bestow it—and consequently little knowledge of other men, inasmuch as the motive for closely observing their attitudes and the expression of their opinions would be largely lacking. Further, there would be great ignorance of self, for we learn to know ourselves by comparing ourselves with others, by observing their attitudes towards us, and accepting their opinions about us. Moreover, weakness in negative self-feeling indicates incapacity to appreciate ideals (truth, beauty, goodness) and to devote the life to any great cause; for these ends imply the vivid realization of a form of personal life superior to one's own, which realization involves the consciousness of present inferiority and submissiveness.

In the case of the ordinary man negative self-feeling becomes incorporated with positive self-feeling, in varying degree, in the self-sentiment, because in the social environment the growing boy inevitably meets some who are superior to himself. Authority especially, represented by parents, teachers, etc., imposes its will on the boy; and above all the authority of society as a whole which 'with a collective voice and irresistible power distributes rewards and punishments, praise and blame, and formulates its approval and disapproval

[1] McDougall, p. 161. [2] P. 306.
[3] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1915, pp. 206 ff., 346 ff.
[4] Cf. J. G. Frazer, *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings*, London, 1918, i. 31.

[1] Some distinguish between simple and complex sentiments. 'A "simple" sentiment consists of a single emotional tendency associated with an idea or idea complex' (Drever, p. 215 f.). The term 'emotion' is reserved for an experience on the perceptual level, 'sentiment' for an experience on the ideational level (cf. *ib.* ch. ix.; see also art. SENTIMENT).
[2] McDougall, p. 163.
[3] Cf. A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, London 1914, bk. i. ch. iv. f.

in universally accepted maxims.'[1] Owing to the incorporation of these two emotions in the self-sentiment,

'all persons fall for the child into one or other of two classes; in the one class are those who impress him as beings of superior power, who evoke his negative self-feeling, and towards whom he is submissive and receptive; in the other class are those whose presence evokes his positive self-feeling and towards whom he is self-assertive and masterful, just because they fail to impress him as beings superior to himself. As his powers develop and his knowledge increases, persons who at first belonged to the former class are transferred to the latter; he learns, or thinks he learns, the limits of their powers; he no longer shrinks from a contest with them, and, every time he gains the advantage in any such contest, their power of evoking his negative self-feeling diminishes, until it fails completely. When that stage is reached his attitude towards them is reversed, it becomes self-assertive; for their presence evokes his positive self-feeling. In this way a child of good capacities, in whom the instinct of self-assertion is strong, works his way up the social ladder.'[2]

This account of the progress of a boy to manhood must be qualified by the fact that the self-sentiment is not the only one that moves him. Of special importance are the various love sentiments —love of parents, children, friends, home, country, church, God. At the basis of all the love sentiments is the primary emotion of tender feeling with its impulse to protect — an emotion and impulse which may lead to concern and care for others irrespective of their relation to the self-sentiment. This impulse may legitimately be called altruistic, and often leads to self-sacrifice.[3]

4. Extension and moralization of self-sentiment.—The moral character of the self-sentiment will depend largely on the idea of self about which it is organized together with the thoroughness of the organization depending on this idea. The idea of the self in all but its most rudimentary forms is essentially a social product, developed by interaction with other persons and involving constant reference to them; it is, in fact, a conception not merely of one's self but of one's self in relation to other selves. The relationship may be conceived to range from complete exclusion, through opposition, sympathy, co-operation in various degrees, to inclusion partial or complete.[4] The self conceived as an exclusive monad is not a defensible conception; but it has been maintained on theoretical grounds, though rarely assumed as a working conception in the actual affairs of life. Usually, as we saw above, a certain measure of antagonism and conflict of interests is felt to exist between self and others. The self, however, may identify itself with others—*e.g.*, a mother with her children; a boy with his family, school, or college; a man with his church, his country, and even with humanity. The group with which the self is identified becomes included, more or less firmly, in his self-regarding sentiment. The success or failure of the group may rouse his positive or negative self-feeling. He is concerned for its success or failure as he is for his own. He judges it to be his own, and feels and acts accordingly, when that group comes into relations of antagonism to, or co-operation with, other groups. Hence his emotions and actions, although in form self-regarding, are in effect other-regarding with respect to the group included in his self-regard. Thus, on the one hand, his conduct becomes moralized and socially valuable, through the extension of his self-regarding sentiment to include the interests of ever-increasing numbers of his fellowmen; the moralization may proceed, on the other hand, in what may be considered a more internal direction—*i.e.*, he may identify himself with the abstract sentiments which are suggested to him, or which he has thought out for himself (*e.g.*, the sentiments of truth, goodness, beauty), and incorporate them in the self-sentiment. They become his own ideals and represent the self that he wills to be—to realize them is to realize himself, to express them is to express himself. So he submits himself to them, strives to express, propagate, and defend them, is elated when their power triumphs over the impulses of himself and others, and is cast down when they are defeated.

Care for others and devotion to ideals may, and do, spring from other motives—the sentiment of love in its various forms, active sympathy which impels a man to seek to bring the feelings and actions of his fellows into harmony with his own, and his own into harmony with theirs—and these are essential moral and social motives. But these receive great reinforcement when their objects are included in the idea of self, and concern for them is incorporated in the self-sentiment. Conversely, the latter is raised to a higher level and becomes more comprehensive and adequate as a guide of conduct by the inclusion of the love sentiments within it. It is possible for a man to take pride in the thought of himself as a lover, and seek consequently to develop the love sentiments in his character. Some ethical writers have adopted this method of reconciling the claim of egoism and altruism. They maintain that the individual should seek his own good, but should conceive his good to include the good of others. Another method is to unite the self-regarding and other-regarding sentiments in a more general sentiment, the sentiment of the perfection of life—not one's own merely, but all life. One's chief concern may still be with one's own life, not because one thinks it more valuable, but because self-perfection is more within the individual's power, and by concentrating chiefly on that he will do most to promote the universal life. His efforts would have the advantage of reinforcement by the strongest human sentiment—the sentiment of self.

5. Sentiment for self-control.—Any one of the many sentiments which are formed in an adult consciousness may become sufficiently powerful to dominate large portions of a man's life—*e.g.*, avarice, ambition, love of a person, of home, church, art, science—and to inhibit all impulses which are inconsistent with, or irrelevant to, its end. But the sentiment which seems capable of meeting most of the situations in life, and of rendering an individual practically independent of passing solicitations, is the self-sentiment, when that incorporates a high ideal of life including a sentiment for self-control. Self-control is itself a particular development of the self-sentiment, and in virtue of it a man takes pride in realizing his ideal of self in all circumstances. It is the sentiment of self, according to McDougall,[1] which is roused into activity when we are said to determine by an effort of will to act along the line of greatest resistance.

'The conations, the desires and aversions, arising within this self-regarding sentiment are the motive forces which, adding themselves to the weaker ideal motive in the course of moral effort, enable it to win the mastery over some stronger, coarser desire of our primitive animal nature and to banish from consciousness the idea of the end of this desire.'[2]

It is not correct to say that only this sentiment enables us to act along the line of greatest resistance;[3] but we may say that, when, by the incorporation of the ideal of perfection of life including self-control, this master sentiment has been formed and become dominant, perhaps after many conflicts,

'it becomes capable of determining every conflict so certainly and easily that conflicts can hardly arise; it supplies a determining motive for every possible situation, namely, the desire that I, the self, shall do the right.'[4]

The subsequent struggles are no longer moral

[1] McDougall, p. 196. [2] *Ib.* p. 194.
[3] Cf. *ib.* ch. x.; Shand, bk. i. ch. iv. [4] Cf. art. Ego.

[1] Pp. 230, 246 f. [2] P. 248.
[3] Cf. art. Self-Satisfaction. [4] McDougall, p. 262.

conflicts, but intellectual efforts to determine what is right and most worth doing.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the literature given in the footnotes cf. A. F. Shand, 'Character and the Emotions,' in *Mind*, new ser., v. [1896] 203 ff., 'M. Ribot's Theory of the Passions,' *ib.* xvi. [1907] 477 ff.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.—This word is used in two senses, one of which has been sufficiently treated in art. CONSCIOUSNESS, and alluded to in art. COMMON SENSE. The question whether all consciousness may or may not be reduced to self-consciousness or how far by common sense, philosophically understood, the 'various impressions received' are 'reduced to the unity of a common consciousness' does not concern us here. Social and psychological observation shows that some persons are much more drawn than others to observe the workings of their own minds. The tendency and habit of introspection (*q.v.*) produces a type of mind and character capable (if literary abilities are superadded) of writing first-rate autobiography.[1] It is also valuable in helping the growth of medical and psychological knowledge, since patients who can observe their own symptoms, and artists or thinkers who can distinguish and remember their own impressions, are able to collect much valuable material for the scientific investigator. In common parlance, however, the word stands for something more pronounced than a tendency to introspection. The self-conscious person of the strongly marked type is one whose interest in the world and in society is inseparable from his personal status and individual inclinations and dispositions. Commonly this exaggerated self-consciousness accompanies a very exaggerated opinion of one's own character and abilities. But the reverse may sometimes happen, as personal responsibility for misfortunes may loom as large in the consciousness as personal credit when the event is good. In these cases it may rise to the height of mania.[2] In general, self-consciousness implies an intense sensitiveness to the opinion of friends and of society, and a constant fear of appearing in a ridiculous or undignified position, which causes diffidence in social intercourse and sometimes abnormal shyness. It becomes immoral only when the self (with its peculiar personal desires and aversions) is the one object the satisfaction of which is sought throughout life.[3] The tendency to excessive self-consciousness should be counteracted in young people by stimulating active interest in scientific and social pursuits, by extending and quickening the sympathies, and by imposing such disciplinary force as may lead the individual to regard himself as a not-all-important member of human society.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in footnotes; also literature under CONSCIOUSNESS, COMMON SENSE.

ALICE GARDNER.

SELF-CONTROL.—See ETHICAL DISCIPLINE.

SELF-CULTURE, SELF-DISCIPLINE.—The principle that there is a right self-love, though not ignored by Greek ethics, was first brought into prominence by Christianity.[4] Self-love is a duty implied, first, in the revelation of the archetype of manhood in the incarnate Christ; secondly, in the 'royal law,' 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (Ja 2^8). True or reasonable self-love is in fact a part of the love of God, and coincides with it. We are to love ourselves as God loves us; having regard both to what He would have us be and to what we are on the way to become.

[1] See G. Misch, *Gesch. der Autobiographie*, i., Leipzig, 1907.
[2] See S. Baring-Gould, *The Tragedy of the Cæsars*, 2 vols., London, 1892, *passim*.
[3] G. Meredith, *The Egoist*.
[4] See *e.g.*, Plato, *Legg.* 731 E; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IX. viii. 7.

'Tales nos amat Deus, quales futuri sumus Ipsius dono, non quales sumus nostro merito.'[1]

And this self-love involves a proper reverence and care for the personality — body, mind, and spirit. Self-culture, self-development, is a moral duty which has gained in significance in proportion as the idea of personality (*q.v.*) has been emphasized by modern philosophy.

1. **Self-discipline.**—Negatively, self-love takes the form of due self-discipline, including all that the Greek comprehended in the word *σωφροσύνη*—soberness, temperance, and chastity; the temper of sobriety in judgment and in the estimation of self (Ro 12^3, 2 Co 10^5); the habit of restraint in the indulgence of desire and in the enjoyment of pleasure.[2] In any case the aim of self-discipline is the cultivation of moral and spiritual power through the process of strengthening, renewing, and educating the will. In Christian language, the end of discipline is freedom, the unhindered dominion of the spirit in the personality.

The good man, says J. Smith, 'principally looks upon himself as being what he is rather by his soul than by his body; he values himself by his soul, that being which hath the greatest affinity with God, and so does not seek himself in the fading vanities of this life, nor in those poor and low delights of his senses, as wicked men do; but as the philosopher doth well express it, *ὅση δύναμις φεύγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος βούλεται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν συννεύειν*.'[3]

Thus the discipline of self begins with conversion and repentance—*i.e.* with an effort of will in the direction of self-purification; with the process which St. Paul describes as 'putting off the old man' (Eph 4^{22})—the counterpart in the moral life of the individual of that which has already been mystically accomplished in Christ (Ro 6^6, Col 3^{10}). We may observe that here emerges the distinctively Christian idea of a new self, which is to be 'put on' as a garment. The process of casting away the old nature is in fact crowned by the 'putting on of Christ' (Ro 13^{14}, Eph 4^{24}, etc.). In connexion with this subject the threefold ordinance of asceticism needs consideration. Prayer, fasting, and almsgiving are duties expressly commended by Christ Himself as efficacious aids to holiness. For the process of *κάθαρσις* is followed by *γυμνασία* or *ἄσκησις* (Ac 24^{16})—the systematic effort implied in such passages as 1 Co 9^{27}, 1 Ti 4^7, He 5^{14} 12^1; and fasting, almsgiving, and prayer stand in a natural relationship to the three great spheres of Christian duty—towards *self*, towards *our fellow-man*, and towards *God*. These duties must be understood in no narrow or merely technical sense. Aquinas well says:

'Omnia quae aliquis facit ad refrenandum seipsum in suis concupiscentiis, reducuntur ad jejunium; quaecunque vero fiunt propter delectationem proximi, reducuntur ad eleemosynam; quaecunque vero propter cultum Dei fiunt, reducuntur ad orationem.'[4]

Further, the very words *γυμνασία* and *ἄσκησις* remind us that the discipline of self is a continuous and prolonged process; the state of grace is one of unceasing warfare, demanding the qualities of the soldier and of the athlete—power to 'endure hardness,' readiness to meet emergencies, vigilance, sobriety, courage. Hence the frequency of military imagery in the NT and in early Church writers.[5] The need of self-discipline is involved in the very fact that the Christian is beset by sleepless spiritual foes (Eph $6^{11ff.}$, 1 P 5^8, 1 Jn 5^{19}), and that the new personality can only through exercise and discipline attain to its full development and acquire true spiritual liberty.

Self-discipline, then, implies the training of the

[1] Conc. Araus. ii. can. 12.
[2] See artt. TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY, MODERATION.
[3] *Select Discourses*, Cambridge, 1660, p. 387.
[4] *Summa*, I. ii. qu. cviii. 3 ad 4; see artt. PRAYER, FASTING, CHARITY.
[5] See Ro 13^{12}, 2 Co 10^5, 1 Th 5^8, Eph $6^{11ff.}$, 2 Ti $2^{3ff.}$; and A. Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, ii. 19 ff.

will, the right education of which is a matter affecting much more than the welfare of the individual. For in all social advance 'human will is the great factor, and . . . economic law and moral law are essentially one';[1] and a man is contributing to the solution of public problems by personal self-discipline. In this task religion supplies man's will with motives and helps, bringing within his reach the incalculable 'powers of the world to come' (He 6^5): impelling him to make great ventures of faith and heroic endeavours to live as God would have him live. For the most part it is by the fulfilment of plain, obvious, and even trivial duties that the will is braced and strengthened; and, as regards the control of appetite, weakness of will is often the result of the persistent neglect of minor obligations.

Christian self-discipline—*e.g.*, of temper, manners, behaviour under stress of difficulty or trial—'is a work of the Holy Spirit, and is in virtue of prayer, and tends to establish the soul in God. Any small act of self-repression done in the grace of prayer will have some result of communion with God, and will leave a capacity for a closer union with God than before. The occasions for our daily self-discipline are mostly unimportant and un-observed. But the littleness of the opportunity is no measure of the grace developed.'[2]

As we have seen, asceticism means that process of education or discipline by which the will is enabled to acquire or regain its rightful supremacy. Asceticism properly understood has no quarrel with pleasure as such.

'Its war has never been against pleasure, but against disturbing passion, and artificial wants, and weak dependence upon external and accidental things; its aim has been, not to suffer, but to be free from the entanglements of self, to serve the calls of human pity or Divine love, and conform to the counsels of a Christ-like perfection.'[3]

2. Self-culture.—Positively regarded, the spirit of self-love implies the duty of self-culture, the 'ordered use' of every gift and endowment which man has received. Self-culture includes the proper care of the body, the training of the intellect and imagination, the education of taste and of the faculty of judgment, and the training of character. Its general aim is to make both mind and body suitable instruments for the service of God and of mankind. A man is morally bound to make his personality all that it is capable of becoming. This is a debt owed to God, who has His ideal for us, and to society, which has a right to claim our service.

(1) *The care of the body* includes all that will tend to its preservation and development as a facile instrument of the spirit—self-control or temperance, and the maintenance of the due relation between work and recreation. As regards bodily strength and vigour, Dorner wisely observes that what we should aim at is not 'to make ourselves capable of great momentary achievements but rather to cultivate *endurance* within the limits of our individual strength.'[4] He points out that bodily endurance 'is the great support of *ὑπομονή*,' a virtue which holds a very high place in the NT conception of the Christian character, and is most conspicuous in the human example of our Lord Himself.

(2) *The culture of the intellect and imagination*, the education of judgment and taste, come next under consideration. The general aim of self-culture has been well described as 'openness of mind to the idea of humanity and its highest interests.'[5] The process of culture consists in such a development of our spiritual nature as may correct all one-sidedness or inordinate bias due to special training or to some peculiarity of temperament. This seems to be implied in such a passage as 1 Co 9^{22}, 'I am made all things to all men.' The truly cultured man[1] possesses the faculty of judgment, the capacity which is the great aim of all liberal education. The power of forming a sound judgment implies not merely a wide knowledge of many subjects, but a true estimate of one's own mental limitations, and a due sense of the diversity of method employed in different departments of knowledge.

The culture of the imagination is a prominent feature in the Platonic ideal of education.[2] Plato teaches with great emphasis that art has an ethical aspect and that the æsthetic faculty needs a deliberate and serious discipline from childhood onwards. He even insists that, in the ideal State, poets and artists ought to be restrained from hindering the cause of true culture by feeding the imagination of the citizens with unworthy or immoral representations.

They are to be required, he says, 'to express the image of the good (*τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα*) in their works, and prevented from exhibiting the forms of vice, intemperance, meanness, or indecency' under penalty of expulsion from the community.

The Christian spirit, on the one hand, claims as its own the apostolic utterance, 'all things are yours' (1 Co 3^{22}); on the other, it regards the gifts of nature and civilization — art, literature, the drama, etc.—as a heritage to be used under a serious sense of responsibility. 'All things' are the heritage of God's children, but they are to be used or enjoyed under the guidance of the Spirit and as ministering to spiritual ends. They are to be contemplated and judged in union with the mind of Christ (1 Co $2^{12ff.}$).

In modern times a sense of the importance of the proper culture of imagination has been developed by the wide diffusion of culture and by deeper insight into the theory of education. We appreciate better, perhaps, than formerly the power of imagination to kindle passion and to influence conduct by feeding upon worthy or unworthy ideals. St. Paul seems in Ph 4^8 to recognize the duty of cultivating imagination aright.

(3) The most important part of true self-culture is concerned with *the training of character*. When St. James (3^2) speaks of the 'perfect man' he implies that every character has an ideal completeness, the attainment of which depends upon the measure of a man's self-control. Self-discipline thus lies at the root of every advance in true culture. The central element in personality is will, and character grows by acts of moral decision, by the constantly renewed 'dedication of the will to goodness,' by persevering adhesion to truth and right. Thus character tends towards stability and fixity in proportion as it comes under the restraining and inspiring domination of a single aim and motive. Obedience is in the eyes of Christ at once the organ of religious knowledge and the condition of moral progress. He appeals, generally speaking, not so much to emotion or to intellect as to will. He calls upon a man to act and to follow Him. The perfect man is in fact he whose body, soul, and spirit act in obedience to a single principle—the love of God (Ro 5^5)—and the goal of all self-culture is singleness of heart and purpose, the bringing of every impulse, inclination, and thought into subjection to the obedience of Christ (2 Co 10^5).

Self-development, self-realization, self-culture—these are generally regarded as typical ideals of the Hellenic spirit. Hellenism is sometimes contrasted with 'Hebraism' to the disadvantage of the latter. 'Hebraism stands to us for moral

[1] H. George, *Progress and Poverty* (*Complete Works*, New York, 1904, i. 508).
[2] G. Congreve, *Parable of the Ten Virgins*, London, 1904, p. 99.
[3] J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], Oxford, 1886, ii. 181.
[4] *System of Christian Ethics*, § 60.
[5] Dorner, p. 481.

[1] Aristotle's *ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος* (*Eth. Nic.* I. iii. 5).
[2] *Rep.* 401 B f.

discipline; Hellenism for the culture of the human, the sensitive love of the beautiful and the joy of living.'[1] The antithesis, however, is at best superficial. The real reconciliation with Hebraism of all that is admirable in Hellenism is to be found in the NT. There we learn that the realization of self is a gradual process—a progressive self-surrender:

'progressive self-identity with that spirit of the Incarnate which, being the very Spirit of God in, and as, human character, is found to be the consummation of the perfectness of the self of every man.'[2]

The Christian is 'heir of both ideals.' He loses the world and forsakes it, only to receive it back transfigured and ennobled (Mk $10^{29f.}$, Lk $18^{29f.}$).

LITERATURE.—J. Butler, *Sermons upon Human Nature*; W. R. Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, London, 1907, lect. iv.; R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, do. 1901, ch. ix.; Hugh Black, *Culture and Restraint*, do. 1901; Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*[2], Edinburgh, 1893, pt. ii. ch. ii.; F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Christian Character*, New York and London, 1905, ch. vi.; I. A. Dorner, *System of Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1887, §§ 56–65; G. H. S. Walpole, *Personality and Power*, London, 1906; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, ii. 171 f.

R. L. OTTLEY.

SELF-DENIAL.—See SELF-SACRIFICE.

SELF-DISCIPLINE.—See SELF-CULTURE.

SELF-EXAMINATION.—See INTROSPECTION.

SELF-EXPRESSION.—1. Description and definition.—Morality and religion at their best and fullest are actuated by no particular 'motive'; they seek for the most part no conscious end or reward. They are the natural behaviour of a healthy personality. Kindliness, good-will, and service desire no 'wages'; they ask only 'the wages of going on, and not to die.'[3] Worship, reverence, and religious contemplation in a nature that has found itself issue forth spontaneously like the flow of springs of water and songs of birds.

There is an autodynamic quality in life as a whole that seems to be the direct source of its urge, its passion for novel conquests, its sense of freedom, and its joy in self-realization. The power of self-expression is not a force or agency impelling life from behind, nor an external stimulus accounting for its present behaviour, nor an end existing outside it leading it on. It is a descriptive aspect of life itself. The entire organism is, in the words of Lloyd Morgan, 'a going concern.'[4]

By 'self-expression' one does not mean 'spontaneity,' or 'self-activity,' or 'self-determination,' in so far as these terms indicate that conduct is independent of causal connexions. Every mental act or state has its inner or outer excitations, its immediate and remote causes, and observes the laws of association. When, however, all these conditioning factors of a certain phenomenon are summed up, they do not fully and completely account for the output. There is, in addition, a moving, self-creating something that is of the very stuff of which life is made. The environmental factors, immediate and remote, of an act are not its sole causes; they are the necessary and ever present conditioning factors of its amount and quality.

2. Philosophical setting.—The fact of self-expression is in harmony with Aristotle's energy concept of the nature of reality.[5] Pure spontaneity, however, rarely if ever happens.

'There is not any motion independent of things themselves, for change invariably takes place in accordance with the laws of substance.'[6]

[1] Black, *Culture and Restraint*, p. 17.
[2] Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 246.
[3] Tennyson, *Wages*.
[4] *The Interpretation of Nature*[2], London, 1906, p. 132.
[5] *Metaphysics*, bk. vii. ch. 11. [6] *Ib.* bk. x. ch. 9.

The notion that reality as a whole is in the last analysis an urgent something with spontaneity has been steadily gaining ground since Kant. It doubtless received an impetus as the result of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Metaphysic of Morality*, in which a good will is proclaimed as first in the world in primacy and in worth. Hegel's 'creative reason' is absolute self-activity moved by 'an inner necessity to set forth in itself what it inherently is.'[1] Schopenhauer, differing, as he thought, *in toto* from Hegel as to the nature of the stuff of which the world is made, is at one with him in finding it centre in a moving, self-creative principle—'the will . . . a blind incessant impulse . . . the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world.'[2]

3. The energy concept of nature and life.—The inevitable outcome of the evolutionary science of the last half-century and more has been to lay the foundations wide and deep for appreciation of the significance of spontaneous self-expression as a characteristic of mentality. Nature as a whole has a dynamical aspect that is fundamental. The synthesis of the physical and biological sciences shows the evolutionary process to be energy or manifestation of its modes of expression.

'The evolution of life may be rewritten,' says Henry Fairfield Osborn, 'in terms of invisible energy, as it has long been written in terms of visible form. All visible tissues, organs and structures are seen to be the more or less elaborate agents of the different modes of energy.'[3]

There are no longer two basal categories of being—matter and energy—as in Spencer's synthetic philosophy; matter, along with all other static existences, has gone by the board.

'The reality of matter, as formerly conceived, is now abandoned, and the invisible becomes the everyday reality of the scientific laboratory.'[4]

Essentially all physicists and chemists accept the electron theory of matter. Its supposed attribute of self-existent stuff has been dissolved in the universal flow of energies. At bottom energy alone remains. D'Arcy W. Thompson has set forth this profound scientific change of front in these words:

'Morphology then is not only a study of material things and of the forms of material things but has its dynamical aspect, under which we deal with the interpretation, in terms of force, of the operation of Energy . . . Matter as such produces nothing, changes nothing, does nothing . . . The spermatozoon, the nucleus, the chromosomes or the germ-plasm can never act as matter alone, but only as seats of energy and as centres of force. And this is but an adaptation of the old saying of the philosopher: in the beginning was a divine and creative essence rather than matter.'[5]

It is the conviction of modern students like Osborn and Thompson that the energy concept applies equally to the physical universe and to mentality. A description of the entire continuity in the evolution of the various types of energy is the task of J. M. Macfarlane in a recent significant work, *The Causes and Course of Organic Evolution*.[6] The energies range through the connected series—the thermic, electric, biotic, cognitic, cogitic, and spiritic. In such a scheme self-expression is the spontaneous manifestation of these energies in human personality. This conception runs centrally through the voluntarism of Paulsen, the creative evolutionism of Bergson, and the vitalism of Driesch. After passing in review various modern scientific tendencies in their bearing upon the ontological problem, Paulsen exclaims:

'Spontaneous activity everywhere! Your inert rigid matter, movable only by impact, is a phantom that owes its existence,

[1] *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. J. B. Baillie, London, 1910, ii. 814.
[2] *The World as Will and Idea*, tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, Boston, 1887, i. 354.
[3] *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, New York, 1917, p. 17.
[4] G. W. Stewart, 'A Contrib. of Modern Physics to Rel. Thought,' *HR* (American ed.) lxviii. [Oct. 1914] 278.
[5] *On Growth and Form*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 14 f.
[6] New York, 1918.

not to observation, but to conceptual speculation. . . . The human mind is but the highest development on our earth of the mental processes which universally animate and move nature.'[1]

4. Biological evidences of self-expression.—The behaviour of all organisms, plant and animal, indicates that each of them is a centre of energies that want only to meet an appropriate situation to be released. They are touched off by fitting excitations somewhat after the way in which a finely adjusted gun is discharged by the pressure on the trigger. The growth of seeds, the development of plants, the explosion of instinct tendencies, the flow of vegetative functions during sleep and waking, the universal restlessness of organisms, their demand for new and better adaptations, the creative intelligence in science and industry, the willed activities of a highly conscious and self-conscious personality, are all—like the auto-dynamism of radio-active substances on the one hand and the spontaneity of moral, æsthetic, and religious valuation on the other—manifestations of self-expression.

Careful experimental and observational studies of lower organisms prove to many students of genetic psychology that spontaneity is a basal characteristic of life. No one has pursued the study of protozoa and metazoa with greater thoroughness than H. S. Jennings. He claims that behaviour arises as much from internal as from external factors.

'Activity occurs in organisms without present specific external stimulation. The normal condition of Paramecium is an active one, with its cilia in rapid motion; it is only under special conditions that it can be brought partly to rest. Vorticella, as Hodge and Aikins showed, is at all times active, never resting. . . . Even if external movements are suspended at times, internal activities continue. The *organism is activity*, and its activities may be spontaneous, so far as present external stimuli are concerned.'[2]

It has become progressively possible to describe the behaviour of the entire organism, including its highest mental operations, in terms of the complication, through development, of physical and chemical reactions.[3]

The theory maintained by 'behaviourists' and 'tropists' is not at variance with the point of view herein set forth, if one keeps in mind two facts: (1) 'matter,' the subject of discourse of physics and chemistry, is dynamical, perhaps even auto-dynamical; (2) the inner factors of worth and value in mentality should help to interpret the lower orders of reality, even of the inorganic world, as truly as the mechanical aspects of behaviour help to describe the higher functions.

By keeping in mind that internal and external factors never exist apart from one another, it is possible to escape the excesses of both vitalism and mechanism.

'The spontaneous activity, of course, depends finally on external conditions, in the same sense that the existence of the organism depends on external conditions. The movements are undoubtedly the expression of energy derived from metabolism.'[4]

5. Physiological evidences of self-expression.—Muscles and cells of the body seem to be centres of energy. The electrical stimulation of a nerve of a live animal will 'cause' an output of contraction fifteen to twenty-five thousand times the work-value of the stimulus. The embryo heart of a developing chick begins to beat, touched off presumably by the normal salt solution with which it is bathed, before the nerves reach it from the central nervous system.

6. Self-expression and play.—The impulse to play is the best criterion of health. It is, at its best, almost pure spontaneity. Most theories of play miss this point, which is the heart of the problem. Play may indeed be an act of imitation; it does often anticipate adult activities and prepare for them;[1] it harks back not infrequently to old anthropological types of behaviour;[2] it furnishes relaxation, rest, and recuperation of the easily fatigued higher mental powers that are overwrought by the demands of civilization.[3] More central than all these is the energy concept of play. Every normal organism has a high potential of energy. It is activity. Play is self-realization. Through a spontaneity of activity life is coming into its own and fulfilling its destiny.

It is somewhat beside the mark to call play the toppling over of excess of energy from unused faculties that are well nourished, as Herbert Spencer has done—the 'tendency to superfluous and useless exercise of faculties that have been quiescent.'[4] For it is the very nature of play, just as of work, to find its supreme satisfaction in the use of its powers to the point of complete exhaustion.

7. Self-expression and art.—With the substitution of the energy concept of play for the superfluous activity theory, the claim of Spencer and many other students, that art is the evolved play of cultivated minds, seems well founded.

'I do but sing because I must,
And pipe but as the linnets sing.'[5]

The prevailing social-utility interpretations of primitive art falsify the soul of it.

'"He makes good songs," say the Hopis. "Everybody likes Tawakwaptiwa." The poet's answer to the question, "How do you make your songs?" was like the answer made by many a Hopi singer: "When I am herding my sheep or away in the fields, and I see something that I like, I sing about it."'[6]

The great modern artist, like the primitive, usually feels himself and his art to be the organ of some inner necessity which is his truest being and at the same time more than himself. Richard Wagner's compositions are always of that sort.

'The sound and sturdy man, who stands before us clad in the panoply of actual body, describes not what he wills and whom he loves, but wills and loves, and imparts to us by his artistic organs the joy of his own willing and loving.'[7]

One further picture of the mind of the true artist will suffice:

'I have once, perhaps not inaptly, called the composer "God's stenographer." With feverish haste he attempts (for what can man do more than attempt the expression of the sublime?) to jot down the harmony of the spheres. He is compelled to articulate in the manner that seems to him their only true expression the Truths that transport him to ecstasy. There is but One more divine than this Reproducer. Him we call Creator!

If it be true that the composer is God's stenographer, we may consider the instrumental artist as His interpreter. It is for him as a medium to express the music of the spheres, the endless story of Nature, of Love and Life. Every time he climbs to the platform he is there to fulfil his mission to tell you the story again, and it is through his universal love and the all-compelling sympathy of his Art that the people are attracted to him and he is made to live in the hearts of men and women!'[8]

The most extensive and consistent presentation of the expressionist theory of art is that by Colin McAlpin:

'Art, at root, is the expression of man's feelings. The world of art is but the world of expression. And expression is at once the deepest and divinest necessity of our being. . . . All high and noble expression, whether in art or actuality, is but the escapement of an inner spiritual solicitude.'[9]

[1] F. Paulsen, *Introd. to Philosophy*, tr. F. Thilly, New York, 1898, p. 101.

[2] *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, New York, 1915, pp. 283–294.

[3] Consult, *e.g.*, J. B. Watson, *Behavior*, New York, 1914; and on 'tropisms' see J. Loeb, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*, Chicago, 1912.

[4] Jennings, p. 284.

[1] K. Groos, *The Play of Animals*, Eng. tr., New York and London, 1898.

[2] C. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, new ed., London, 1911, i. 202 ff.

[3] G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation*, Boston and London, 1916, pp. 29–95.

[4] *The Principles of Psychology*[3], London, 1890, ii. 630, § 534.

[5] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, xxi.

[6] N. Curtis, *The Indians' Book*, New York, 1907, p. 481 f.

[7] *The Art of the Future* (C. D. Warner's *Lib. of the World's Best Literature*, New York, 1897–99, vol. xxvi. p. 15513).

[8] Arthur Hartmann, in *The Musical Observer*, April, 1917.

[9] *Hermæa: a Study in Comparative Esthetics*, London, 1915, pp. 1–3.

8. Self-expression and work.—In work as truly as in play there is satisfaction through 'escapement of an inner solicitude.' Work and play draw from the same fountain. They have more of likeness than of difference. Real play is exacting and exhausting, like work. That kind of work which counts for most is happy, contented, and buoyant because it is either life-giving in itself or moves towards a purposeful end that lightens the toil. It is done in the play attitude. Here lies the crux of a true interpretation of self-expression. Spontaneity is both serious and cheerful. As sometimes described, it is too thin and weak to function profoundly in the serious business of life with its tough struggles, defeats, and dearly-bought victories. The superficial romanticism, *e.g.*, of Rousseau and Novalis feels like an aroma, an efflorescence, or a gay holiday deliverance from the slavery of a work-a-day world. It openly rebels against the plodding programme of common life and the slavery of duty, conscience, and obligation, and lands in a 'romantic primitivism' with its 'delightful sense of having got rid of all boundaries and limitations whatsoever.'[1]

On the contrary, the energy concept of self-expression regards play, work, art, and religion as having a far more rugged constitution. Spontaneity in these human interests involves the stress and strain, the sweat and drudgery, the pain and tragedy of the world as truly as its moments of joyous self-realization. They are only part of the creative energy of the world.

'So far as the creative power of energy is concerned we are on sure ground: in physics energy controls matter and form; in physiology function controls the organ; in animal mechanics motion controls and, in a sense, creates the form of muscles and bones. In every instance, some kind of energy or work precedes some kind of form, rendering it probable that energy also precedes and controls the evolution of life.'[2]

In like vein Bergson:

'Reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end. Our will already performs this miracle. Every human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in which there is freedom, every movement of an organism that manifests spontaneity, brings something new into the world.'[3]

9. Struggle and conflict in morality and religion.—The game of living out the personal, social, and ideal values is not an easy one because, in one aspect, it is bound up in nature's drama that has throughout the element of movement through opposition and resistance accompanied not infrequently by cataclysm. There is, furthermore, the disturbing fact that mentality is always prognosticating lines of possible improvement, anticipating more desirable situations that are at variance with old systems of habits and conventions. Hence the conflict. Duty usually presents herself initially as a stern lawgiver, a 'rod to check the erring and reprove.' Religion not infrequently has its birth through cries and groanings of the spirit. These hard experiences are but morality and religion in the making. When they discover themselves, they issue into naturalness, grace, and beauty.

'The life of the saints has always been a mystery to the non-religious. The joy, equanimity, and triumph which they have shown in the face of apparent suffering, discouragement, obstacles, and grief is one of the wonders of the human spirit. It makes work play; it makes torture pleasure; and it makes faith the beginning of life. One side of religion is humiliation, confession, and petition; another is praise, thanksgiving, and adoration. . . . Where grace aboundeth, there aboundeth joy. This is one of the beauties of the biography of the stricken and long-suffering who have found an abiding comfort in religion.'[4]

10. Morality and religion as spontaneous self-expression.—Self-expression is a dominant and central human instinct. It is more than an instinct, the impelling, creating something—call it energy, personality, world-will, God-life, or what you will—that is the real within the phenomenal. Morality and religion are forms of self-expression—morality when it plays through social values chiefly, and religion when it centres in ideal values predominantly. They are among the higher, more refined, rationalized, idealized, spiritualized forms of self-expression.

'Only in some such view is it easy to understand the meaning of much that passes under the name of religion. From this standpoint one can take a sympathetic attitude toward dancing, shouting, boisterous music, ecstasy, and the like which accompany lower forms of religion; and in higher forms, the prominent place of music and other arts of reverie and contemplation, of ritual, of missionary activity, and of worship—the pure uprush of the spirit in the contemplation of high things, which is perhaps the centre and heart of religion. One may regard religion as consisting essentially in the spontaneous act of the soul in response to its most intimate sense of absolute worth.'[1]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

SELFISHNESS.—See SELF-LOVE.

SELF-LOVE.—The term 'self-love' is peculiarly associated with 18th cent. ethical speculation; indeed its employment by the English moralists of that period forms a distinguishing feature of their writings. In all such cases the term was understood to have reference (though by Butler other references were also included) to the question as to the disinterestedness or otherwise of the benevolent affections.

The prominence of this question was originally due to the influence—carried over from the previous century—of Thomas Hobbes (*q.v.*), who had made self-love the ultimate object of all human action, had rejected the notion of disinterested virtue, and had represented the affections as only so many forms of self-love. The ascendancy of the selfish philosophy, however, gave rise, early in the 18th cent., to a reaction against it. The latter movement was of the nature not so much of a direct attack on the then dominant tendency as of an attempt to show that the principles of Hobbes and Mandeville required to be considered in relation to certain other principles, and to be reinterpreted accordingly. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler (*q.v.*), the protagonists of the new school, were so far in agreement. But the last-named thinker differed from the two others in respect to the point of view from which he regarded the diversity of elements in human nature, and it is to this peculiarity that the more technical character of Butler's doctrine of self-love is mainly to be attributed. Though in his exposition benevolence, self-love, and conscience are regarded as primary constituents of human nature, yet the moral quality of each of these is made to depend (and this especially applies to self-love) on what it is in relation to the rest and to the whole of which it forms part, rather than on what it is in itself. Thus, with regard to benevolence, Butler's attention does not centre exclusively, as did that of the intuitive school of moralists, in the self-evidencing superiority of the claims of benevolence over those of self-love; whilst, on the other hand, with regard to self-love he is even more express in insisting that it demands recognition, on the ground that it serves a necessary and salutary purpose in the economy of human nature. Butler indeed is concerned not so much with self-love as with its relationships. The sporadic character of his references to the subject may perhaps thus be explained.[2] The definition given of self-love in

[1] I. Babbitt, *The New Laokoon*, Boston and London, 1910, p. 82 f.
[2] Osborn, p. 10 f.
[3] *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 252.
[4] C. E. Seashore, 'The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion,' *AJTh* xiv. [1910] 505–520.

[1] E. D. Starbuck, 'The Play Instinct and Religion,' *HR* (American ed.) lviii. [Oct. 1909] 278.
[2] 'It is perhaps to be wished that he could have found occasion to gather into one *conspectus* all the important and leading propositions on the subject [self-love] scattered about his Works' (W. E. Gladstone, *Studies subsidiary to the Works of Bishop Butler*, Oxford, 1896, p. 62).

Sermon xi.,[1] however, contains a sufficiently positive statement as to its nature:

'Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness. . . . [This] proceeds from, or is, self-love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness.'

Note that it is not here said that self-love itself produces happiness. Happiness, in Butler's view, is procurable only by the attainment of 'those objects which are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and affections.' All that self-love can do is to serve as an indirect agent; its office is, in Butler's expressive phrase, to 'put us upon' obtaining our own happiness. Thus, in the case of hunger, the particular desire is for food; self-love is but the general concern for our own welfare which prompts us to gratify the particular desire.

The argument is that 'all particular appetites and passions are towards *external things themselves*, distinct from the *pleasure arising from them*.'[2]

This is a matter of great importance not only for the right understanding of Butler's view, but also as bearing upon subsequent ethical theories, these being divisible into two classes according as they do, or (as with Butler) do not, represent that the motive of all our actions is the appeasing of pain and the gaining of pleasure.[3]

Note further the presupposition involved in the last words of the definition, viz. those relating to the reflective character of self-love. This is the feature referred to when Butler speaks of the 'cool principle of self-love.' In so speaking he means something more than that, in the interests of self-love, we should reflect before we act. His intention rather is to explain the function served by reflexion in bringing to light the total interests of our being, and to emphasize the fact that it is only with these that self-love is concerned. For, in one sense, our own self-love is at the bottom of everything we do, *i.e.* in the sense that 'every particular affection' is a man's own, and 'the pleasure arising from its gratification' is his own pleasure, so that 'no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love.'[4]

As distinguished from this, 'cool,' or (as it is elsewhere and perhaps better called) 'reasonable,' self-love expresses the judgment of our whole being, after taking into account 'the relations and respects which the parts have to each other.'

The two leading points with regard to the positive nature of self-love having thus been determined, viz. that it is the desire for happiness and that this desire leads to reflexion, with the result that we are enabled to act in conformity with our own self-interest in the most comprehensive sense, we are next invited to consider the relation in which self-love stands to benevolence.

'There is a natural principle of benevolence in man,' says Butler, 'which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual.'[5]

He, of course, admits that self-love may assert itself at the expense of benevolence, but this is so, he urges, only in the same sense in which self-love may assert itself at the expense of any other particular appetite, passion, or desire.

'The idea of self-love . . . can no otherwise exclude goodwill or love of others, than merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of arts or reputation, or of any thing else.'[6]

This, no doubt, is carrying the distinction between self-love and the particular affections to its furthest lengths. But, when Butler's argument is disencumbered of his peculiar psychology, there need be no difficulty in accepting his general conclusion, as, *e.g.*, in the following passage:

'That any affection tends to the happiness of another, does not hinder its tending to one's own happiness too. That others enjoy the benefit of the air and the light of the sun, does not hinder but that these are . . . one's own private advantage.'[1]

Moreover, there is truth in this assertion of his:

Though 'there is indeed frequently an inconsistence or interfering between self-love or private interest, and the several particular appetites, passions, affections, or the pursuits they lead to,' yet 'this competition or interfering is merely accidental; and happens much oftener between pride, revenge, sensual gratifications, and private interest, than between private interest and benevolence.'[2]

And, again, he is fully justified in impugning the theory of Hobbes that benevolent affection and its pleasures are merely a form of the love of power, and in maintaining that 'the love of power manifests its consequences quite as much in cruelty as in benevolence.'[3] In respect to Hobbes, however, it is of more importance to note that Butler mitigates the supposed mutual opposition of self-love and benevolence by holding, with Aristotle, that man is naturally a social animal:

'That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a relation to each other . . . is the sum of morals.'[4]

And these two principles of self-love and benevolence are, we are told, so far connected that 'we can scarce promote the one without the other' and 'self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society.'[5]

There remains to be considered the more positive association of self-love with morality which, from Butler's point of view, means its relation to conscience. Conscience, like self-love, is called a principle of reflexion, but, in the case of conscience, the principle is that 'by which men distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions.'[6] They both lead us the same way, though the fact that they do so awaits its perfect manifestation in the final distribution of things. This, though it may be disputed, cannot be regarded as a forced or arbitrary conclusion, since throughout his whole demonstration Butler exhibits the parts of human nature as having been designed by God for the furtherance of a common purpose and in the interests of the moral order. The coincidence of duty and interest is 'implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things.'[7] No doubt, passion or interest may rebel against the authority of conscience, but this is a mere usurpation, 'a violation of the constitution of man.' Again, we may submit only to such restraints as tend to our own interests and convenience. It is right that we should do so, says Butler, for our own happiness is the measure or end of virtue. Only, it is not vice but virtue that promotes happiness, and self-love does, in its true sense, accompany virtue.[8] However, apart from these statements regarding the harmony of virtue and self-interest, the higher character of self-love sufficiently appears from the mere consideration of the purpose for which, according to Butler, it exists.

'Surely there is nothing ignoble in conceiving,' says Gladstone (paraphrasing his master), 'of the Christian world as a garden divided into plots, each of which represents an individual soul, and is committed by the supreme Gardener, to the special care of that same soul. Self-love, then, in the only commendable sense, is our view, taken with the eye well purged from disturbance and obstruction, of what God has committed to every one of us as our principal work in life.'[9]

1 'Upon the Love of our Neighbour,' *ad init.*
2 *Loc. cit.*
3 Cf. on Butler, with reference to this question, A. Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*[3], London, 1884, p. 575; and, on the other side, T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*[3], Oxford, 1890, p. 240, and likewise the whole of ch. iv. of bk. iii. in the latter volume; also H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*[6], London, 1901, ch. iv.
4 *Loc. cit.*
5 Serm. i., 'Upon Human Nature.' 6 Serm. xi.

1 Serm. xi. 2 *Ib.*
3 Cf. Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*[3], p. 574.
4 Serm. ix., 'Upon Forgiveness of Injuries.'
5 Cf. W. Lucas Collins, *Butler* (Philosophical Classics for English Readers), new ed., Edinburgh and London, 1901, p. 54 ff.
6 Serm. i. 7 Serm. iii., 'Upon Human Nature.'
8 Cf. Collins, p. 53.
9 *Studies*, p. 102. At the same time, on p. 63 of this work too much is claimed for self-love under its religious aspects.

Self-love gradually ceased after Butler's time to retain the technical significance which he first had imparted to it. Hume[1] has an interesting discussion on the subject, whilst Price[2] confirms the teaching of Butler. And there are frequent references to self-love (which, however, is not always called by this name) in other writings of the period previous to the rise of the utilitarian school of ethics dating from Jeremy Bentham. But the subtlety of Butler's conception is peculiar to himself. An altogether grosser, though no doubt a more easily comprehensible, view as regards the claims of self acquired wide vogue not long after Butler's death, owing to the influence of Paley. Butler's psychological method, typically illustrated by his treatment of self-love, passed out of favour. More recently the study of the mind in the light of anthropological and physiological researches has changed the point of view from which ethical questions had been previously regarded. Not only so, but, even if we confine ourselves to the field of ethics pure and simple, we shall find that utilitarians and transcendentalists are agreed in ascribing to such speculations as those of Butler on human nature a purely historical value.

This, however, being admitted, or partly admitted (for there are at all events many side-issues on which these speculations throw light), the subject of this article, both on its own account and on account of its treatment by the English school of moralists (especially during the period which is of chief significance in connexion with it), will be found to present numberless attractions alike to the student of ethics and to the student of history, all the more so inasmuch as the interest taken in it during the 18th cent. is embodied in the literature of the period not less than in its philosophy, and was not more a favourite topic of discussion in England than it was abroad.

See also artt. SELF-CULTURE, SELF-DISCIPLINE, SELF-REALIZATION, SELF-SACRIFICE.

LITERATURE.—**Anthony Ashley Cooper** (third Earl of Shaftesbury), *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 3 vols., London, 1711, and frequently reprinted; **Francis Hutcheson**, *A System of Moral Philosophy*, 2 vols., Glasgow and London, 1755, esp. bk. i. chs. 1 and 3; **J. Butler**, *Sermons and Remains*, ed. E. Steere, London, 1862, *Works*, 2 vols., ed. J. H. Bernard, do. 1900; **T. Fowler**, *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*, do. 1882; **Leslie Stephen**, *Hist. of English Thought in the 18th Century*[2], 2 vols., do. 1881, ch. ix.; **T. H. Green**, *Works*, ed. R. L. Nettleship, 2 vols., do. 1885–88, vol. i. pp. 325–331; **Matthew Arnold**, *Last Essays on Church and Religion*, do. 1877, pp. 111–114; artt. 'Butler, Joseph' and 'Ethics' in *EBr*[11]; art. 'Butler, Joseph' in *DNB*; artt. 'Butler' and 'Hobbes' in *ERE*, in addition to the works already cited in the course of this article.

C. A. WHITTUCK.

SELF-PRESERVATION.—The term 'self-preservation' is used in ethics to denote (1) a particular duty and (2) the highest principle of conduct. In the first sense the term explains itself, referring to the duty, recognized to some extent by most systems, of preserving one's own life so far as is consistent with the demands of the highest good. The self to be preserved is here usually interpreted as the physical self or life, and the duty is taken to include the use of all means necessary for its maintenance—the care of health and the avoidance of unnecessary risk, as well as the more serious and unusual measures necessary for self-defence against violence. Even the more extreme forms of religious ethics, in which resistance is forbidden, usually recognize the care of the body as a duty. In some of the Oriental types of mystical pantheism or nihilism, however, which place the goal of life in the loss of selfhood and the freedom from the illusion of individuality, even this moderate care for the self ceases to have merit. The self, as ordinarily conceived, is to be neglected or suppressed in order that the one Being may be all in all. The evil selfhood to be overcome is essentially the individual will with its desires, rather than the mere physical body, but the latter, as the bearer of these desires, is also to be at least kept down to the lowest level consistent with bare life. So also in Western pessimism, with its conception of the world as a mistake, there can be no recognition of a positive duty of self-preservation. The negation of the will to live involves only a temporary and conditional tolerance of physical life.

When used as the supreme principle in ethics, the term 'self-preservation' has generally had certain specific implications not commonly present in its usage as a particular duty. In the first place, systems which make morality consist in self-preservation are essentially individualistic, whatever may be their final conception of the self. They conceive of morality as a product of selves, which develop it as a means to their own preservation. Social action may be shown to be necessarily involved in final and adequate action for the self, but it is involved as means and not as end. In Spinoza's system this is not unambiguously the case, but in the typical systems of the class it is fundamental. In the second place, such systems imply a struggle between individuals in which the conditions of self-preservation become the recognized laws of morality. The supreme good for each individual is thus his survival in the struggle for existence, and his supreme duty is the acquirement of power for this end. The ideal is in some sense the strong man, and right is made equivalent to might. In the third place, these theories emphasize the genetic or historical aspects of the problem. They are theories of how morality with its restraints came to be, and they are, accordingly, symptomatic of changes taking place in moral living, expressions of attempts to transvalue old values and find new meanings for life. In this sense they are revolutionary systems—ethics of revolt.

It is these implications that distinguish the concept of self-preservation from the similar terms 'self-development' and 'self-realization,' in both of which idealistic meanings are involved. In self-development the self is regarded as having a positive content which is unfolded on occasion of the stimuli furnished by experience, whereas in the self-preservation theories its content is determined by the environment. Self-determination is the implication of self-development. Similarly, the theory of self-realization (*q.v.*), as held by T. H. Green and his school, implies a conception of the self as rational and universal, and sees in morality the progressive unfolding of a single rational life. It is thus the direct antithesis of the individualism and naturalism of the self-preservation theory.

The representatives of this type of ethical theory are found in modern philosophy, not in ancient thought. It is true that some of the sophistic theories seem to express this revolutionary and individualistic tendency, but in general their emphasis seems to have been on self-interest rather than on self-preservation, on advantages to be gained rather than on a life to be conserved. They tend, therefore, to be hedonistic rather than biological or metaphysical. The individualism of the Hellenistic period took the form, not of revolt, but of abstention and withdrawal from active life. The Epicurean, while an individualist, had no taste for the active life, the good, as conceived by him, being the result, not of struggle, but rather of compromise.

It is not till the late mediæval, or early modern, period that we find typical theories of self-preserva-

[1] *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, London, 1751, appendix ii.

[2] *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, London, 1758, ch. iii.

tion. They arose as the expression of the growing gap between the Church and secular civilization, with the consequent necessity of finding a natural sanction for moral and political law. Even within the limits of late Scholasticism we find nominalistic political theorists taking the fallen state of mankind as conceived by the Church as the basis for a doctrine of sovereignty in which the State figures as the power necessary to control and further the interests of naturally unsocial individuals. The confusion of the religious wars emphasized still more the radically unsocial character of human nature, so that it is not surprising to find a complete doctrine of self-preservation put forward by Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan*, in the midst of the English civil wars.

According to Hobbes, individuals are reaction-machines, conveying the motion furnished by the stimulus inwards to the brain and heart, whence it is returned to the muscles, and issues in action either towards or away from the stimulus. The tendency towards the object is desire or appetite; the tendency away from it is aversion. The former, which is accompanied by a sense of pleasure, is 'a corroboration of vital motion and help thereto,' and its object we call good; the latter is accompanied by a sense of displeasure, and its object we call evil. Good and evil thus get their whole natural significance from their relation to the life of the individual, and have no meaning in themselves. The fundamental and necessary impulse of every individual is directed towards those objects and activities that minister to the preservation and enlargement of life, so that we may 'put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.' As a consequence, the natural condition of mankind is one of struggle, in which the only consideration is survival. The evils of such a war of all against all are so great and apparent that reason dictates conditions of peace, and men agree to renounce their natural rights of free offensive, in order that there may be a common power able to preserve order and make possible the values of peace. If the fundamental natural right is that of self-defence, its complement is the fundamental law of nature, 'to seek peace and follow it.'[1] All obligations go back to the primary fact that his own life is each man's nearest concern, and whatever is to be demanded of him must be demanded in the name of his own preservation. That social co-operation is the best means to accomplish this end is eternally true, but, until there is an organized State to compel peace, social morality can be only an ideal for the individual, and his actual practice must rely upon force and fraud as the means necessary for survival in war-time. Yet, while law-observance is, under almost all conditions, best for the individual, and hence has the strongest sanction, Hobbes recognizes that obedience is not an absolute obligation. There can be no gain to the individual in losing his life, and hence no reason why he should not resist the State when it threatens his life. Under these conditions we revert to the state of nature again, and use force and fraud to escape the extreme penalty of the law. The State has a right to crush us, but we have an equal right to resist, since social morality has only a conditional and conventional obligation. This reservation of the individual's right of self-defence (which is, of course, subversive of Hobbes' whole theory of State absolutism) illustrates well the essential characteristics of the self-preservation theory—its individualism, its naturalism, and its revolutionary character. Hobbes conceives of the end as the conservation of the individual life, for the sacrifice of which nothing can compensate. All that a man hath will he give, and should give, for his life. And, similarly, this life is identified with the physical life and its actual desires. An ideal or universal self can have no meaning in Hobbes' sensationalistic psychology. Selves are sharply distinct, and their relations are those of barter. So, too, the revolutionary or anarchic character of the doctrine is involved in its atomic individualism and its recognition of no ideal basis for the unity of society.

[1] *Leviathan*, ch. xiv.

These implications of the doctrine are brought out more clearly by comparison with a system whose principle seems identical with that of Hobbes, is, indeed, historically related to it, but whose development is different—so different that some would refuse to place it in the same class with his. This is the system of Spinoza. Like Hobbes, Spinoza assumes that the essence of each thing is its tendency to be, to persist in its being, its *conatus sese conservandi*. Whatever is done must in some way be the outcome of this inevitable tendency of each thing to be itself. It is inconceivable that anything could do anything else than be itself. Hence the virtue of the individual can consist only in the most complete self-expression.

'As Reason requires nothing contrary to Nature, it requires that each love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really for his own advantage, and desire all that which really raises man to greater perfection, and, to speak generally, it requires that each endeavour to maintain his own being as far as possible. . . . The foundation of happiness consists in this, that the man is able to preserve his own being.'[1]

Virtue does not consist, therefore, in self-abnegation or in mere negative control of passions, but in self-expansion and the attainment of positive good. The good man is the strong man. Repentance, humility, as signs of weakness, have only a slight value, and pity, so far as it is a mere feeling, is to be discouraged. This self-assertion, however, is not anti-social, since man is most useful to man. Moreover, man can be useful to man only in so far as he is himself a positive force and has something of his own to give. To be anything for another, one must be oneself. The good, therefore, Spinoza, with Hobbes, conceives, not as absolute, but as relative to the nature whose good it is. We do not desire things because they are good, but they are good because we desire them. No object of desire is in itself bad, but it may become bad when considered in relation to the whole system of desires with the satisfaction of which it may interfere. For man, as conscious, is able to form a concept of himself as a whole and hence of his total or ultimate good, which then becomes the object of his reflective pursuit. It is in his conception of the nature of the self and of its power that Spinoza differs from Hobbes and makes his classification difficult. For the self is essentially a rational self and, in so far as truly conceived, is one with the infinite nature of God. The more clearly it thinks, therefore, the more it is itself and the more adequately it expresses the nature of God. The more adequately, in turn, it conceives itself, the less is it in subjection to the power of the passions. The man who takes a thinking view of things knows himself and all things as modes of God and therefore absolutely determined both in nature and in existence by the divine nature. Knowing this absolute necessity of things, he ceases to be moved by things as individual, and fixes his contemplation on the order of nature as a whole. In this life of thought he is more truly active and himself, and therefore finds in it his highest joy. This joyful contemplation of the necessary order of things is the intellectual love of God and man's highest good. He is then free from the bondage of passion and

[1] *Ethica*, pt. iv., prop. 18, schol.

self-controlled. And, in so far as he is freed from his passions, he ceases to contend with others with whom he is united, in so far as they too have come to the recognition of their place in the necessary order of the world.

With Hobbes the tendency towards self-preservation and the power necessary to ensure it lead to the establishment of an external control through fear of which men restrain, but do not extirpate, their inordinate desires. With Spinoza the same tendency leads to the development of a rational view of the self and the world, which itself suffices to control the passions and make possible a common life. In the doctrine of Hobbes morality is a mere tool of which the individual makes use for his private ends, and which, under certain conditions, he may reject. In Spinoza virtue is itself blessedness. The knowledge which is power is not, as with Bacon, a power to do, but a power to be—the insight which is alone able to make man master of his passions.

The influence of Hobbes and Spinoza upon their age is to be found chiefly in the antagonisms which they aroused, and it is not till we come to the middle of the 19th cent. that we have again instances of the doctrine of self-preservation. And here it is not as expressions of political conditions that we find them, but as applications of the principles of biology to ethics. This is strictly true of the motives of **Herbert Spencer**, but in the case of Nietzsche the biological analogy is of secondary, rather than primary, importance.

The biological theory of evolution[1] has affected ethics in two ways: (1) by its contribution to the study of the development of morality, through which it has supplemented the older associationalist account of the genesis of conscience; and (2) by its suggestion of a new standard of morals, through which it has attempted to render the older utilitarian doctrine more exact. Spencer's *Data of Ethics* is concerned with both these problems, but the treatment of the latter is the more distinctive. His quarrel with the utilitarians, as he explains in a letter to J. S. Mill, is based upon the unscientific character of pleasure as a standard of conduct.

'The business of Moral Science [is] to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness.'[2]

Morality is only the latest phase of life in general; its laws, therefore, are only developments of the general laws of life. These laws of life are the conditions of self-preservation as they have been developed in the struggle of individuals and groups for existence. All life is striving to persist and to grow, and the moral life is only the final and self-conscious stage of the resulting development. A moral life is one that conduces to greater life, measured, not in mere length, but in breadth, or complexity, of activities as well. As biology, psychology, and sociology grow more exact, we shall have a more scientifically worked out system of morals in place of our empirical or rule-of-thumb system. Life and more life is thus the end suggested by the evolutionary theory. No distinction of quality can be recognized without destroying the value of the exact quantitative method. The breadth of life, which is recognized as one of the dimensions, means, not width of rationally interesting activities, development of a broadly human point of view, but only variety and complexity of biological activities so far as these promote survival. If conflict were to arise between these two dimensions of length and breadth so that the individual should have to choose between them, it would seem that the fundamental principle of self-preservation would demand the sacrifice of breadth to length. Spencer's assumption that no such conflict can arise is perhaps due to his preoccupation with the absolute ethics of ideal conditions. Certainly breadth of life cannot have equal value with length as a factor in determining quantity of life as the criterion of the moral, nor can any meaning be given to the idea of their multiplication into a single product. In the absence of any fixed unit, the very conception of quantity of life remains even more indefinite than the pre-scientific idea of the greatest happiness, which it was devised to supplant.

But, while Spencer emphasizes the fact that human conduct is what it is because the struggle for existence has so shaped it, and while therefore the end of self-preservation would seem to be the test of good and bad conduct, he yet insists that life is not in itself a value, but that it is pleasure alone that justifies it. Remove the pleasurable feeling from even the longest life and it would have no more value than a handful of dust. The universal object of desire is pleasure. There seem therefore to be two ends of human action: from the biological point of view, life is a ceaseless struggle to preserve and increase itself; from the psychological point of view, it is a search for pleasure. That the individual is not torn in two by this dual tendency is due to the fact that the two aims actually coincide—that, in the long run and under ideal conditions, pleasure-producing actions are also life-preserving. It must be so, Spencer urges, because the creature who took delight in conduct not conducive to life would be eliminated. This, of course, is no proof that pleasure is the universal object of desire, but only that, granting it to be such, the coincidence of its conditions with those of self-preservation can be explained. The implication is that the real determinants of conduct are mechanical, and that our conscious aims and interests are wholly fixed by the conditions of survival. It is physical life that unfolds itself in personal and social conduct, and it is to its laws that our conscious aims are to be adjusted. Its laws, moreover, are not so much expressions of its own nature as forms impressed upon it by the environment. Although the term 'self-preservation' seems to imply self-assertion and individual initiative, actually, as conceived by Spencer and the evolutionists, it has no such meaning. The self, whether we think of it as moulded by the direct action of the environment or as picked out by natural selection (and Spencer uses both theories), has no character of its own, makes no contribution to the result, but is wholly the product of the impersonal world-forces outside it. The forms of moral conduct are selected *for* man, not *by* him. It is the universe that is asserting itself, not individuals, and a universe in which there seem to be no real selves, but only 'others.'

The doctrine of Friedrich Nietzsche can be called one of self-preservation only in so far as he makes use of the biological conceptions of struggle and survival to support his thesis. As in the case of Hobbes, self-preservation is almost too negative a term to apply to that will-to-power which Nietzsche makes the essence of each individual being. The intellect and its creations have no independent value, but are only instruments in the service of this instinctive life. There is no purpose discoverable in the world at large; we are here, and our only intent is to fight our way to ever greater power. Unlike Hobbes, he can see no value in peace and ordered morality. All restraint, as a lowering of life, is bad. Nor is Nietzsche a hedonist in his individualism: it is not pleasure that gives value to life, rather almost is it pain. It is the glory and excitement of combat, the

[1] See art. EVOLUTION (Biological).

[2] *Principles of Ethics*, pt. i. ch. vi. § 21.

struggle itself, the sense of strength, that make it worth while. To eliminate this struggle, to make life comfortable and safe, is to take from it all that gives it its terrible charm. Hence our social morality and our religions of sympathy and renunciation are to be condemned as encouragements to the weak and inferior. This slave-morality of the herd is to be replaced by the master-morality of the higher man, and its supreme command is, 'Be hard.' Nietzsche's doctrine is thus one of pure individualism; the self to be preserved is the natural self of impulse, and its goal is the attainment of power in the abstract—not power for the realization of any final end, but power as power, empty of any end which might give meaning to its possession. It is the dream of the adolescent, impatient of restraint but unconscious of his ends. His ideal, therefore, in spite of its not making use of the name itself, is perhaps, in its individualism, its naturalism, and its anarchism, the most typical of the theories of self-preservation.

In Nietzsche, too, can be clearly seen both the strength and the weakness of these systems. They are strong in so far as they lay emphasis upon the actual self-preservative instincts and tendencies necessary for existence. Any order of life, whatever its ideal, must be rooted in the actual motive forces of human nature, must appeal to some real interest of the individual, or else remain a meaningless and remote idea, powerless to affect life. It is this that those thinkers feel and provide for—a real interest in the given ideal—under the obvious assumption that there can be no nearer and dearer interest to a man than his own self.

But they are weak in so far as they fail to recognize the reality of any other self than that which finds expression in the natural instincts of man—in so far as they refuse to admit a self whose interests are not individual, but reflectively social. Apart from the recognition of the reality of a direct interest in an over-individual good, Nietzsche rightly sees that there can be no such thing as moral obligation; hence his characterization of his doctrine as immoralism. Individualism made absolute renounces its claim as morality, and is indeed unable consistently to plead its cause. Self-centred and antagonistic selves can have no common good and therefore no basis for co-operative action or rational obligation. There may be an over-lordship based upon might, but no reasonable organization expressing the natural interests of all in a common life, and consequently no ground for a moral appeal for the recognition of any law not actualized by force.

The assumption upon which all these theories rest, however, that the individual is essentially and wholly a self-seeking creature, is not tenable in the light of our present psychology. The contention of Butler, as well as of the moral sense writers, that the other-regarding impulses are as fundamental as the self-regarding, has been borne out by all recent analysis. The fact that our desires are *our* desires by no means implies that we ourselves are their objects. The contrary rather is true, that our tendencies are naturally directed upon objects other than the self, and that conscious self-seeking is a secondary and reflective product. There is no reason against, but, on the contrary, all the evidence for, the fact that the social good is as immediate and natural an object as the private good, and, with this granted, the theories of self-preservation lose their plausibility.

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NORMAN WILDE.

SELF-REALIZATION.—I. 'Self-realization' is a term so vague and indefinite in connotation that some writers on ethics (*e.g.*, Sidgwick) consider that it would be well to expunge it from the vocabulary of ethical science. This indefiniteness is largely due to the ambiguity of the word 'self,' and also partly caused by the vagueness of 'realization.' The self can indeed be defined with varying degrees of narrowness or of comprehensiveness—a fact which is often expressed, in loose and inaccurate phraseology, by the assertion that each individual has many selves, such as the bodily, the animal, the rational, the social, self. 'Realization,' again, is a word which, in this connexion, may be taken to include or to exclude what is usually called 'self-suppression' or 'self-sacrifice.' Thus, before any precise meaning can be attached to the compound term 'self-realization,' it is necessary first to define precisely what is meant by 'self' and 'realization' respectively.

If (i.) the self be understood predominantly as sentient, and the individual's highest good be accordingly taken to be pleasure, self-realization will consist in so living as to secure for oneself the maximum of pleasurable feeling. This was the doctrine of the Cyrenaics (*q.v.*), and the more degenerate members of that school tended to identify self-realization with what would more correctly be called self-indulgence. The better Cyrenaics, however, did not restrict pleasure to the pleasures of sense, but rather had higher forms of pleasure—*e.g.*, that of friendship—in mind. Similarly the Epicureans (*q.v.*) repudiated sensualism or slavery to the lower desires and passions, while adopting a hedonism akin to that of the Cyrenaics.

If (ii.) man's rational nature be regarded as the truest expression of the self, and the highest individual good be accordingly sought in the control of the lower or animal 'self' by right reason, then self-realization will consist in the attainment of rationality or reasonableness and will involve suppression of many impulses and desires: the whole self, or the self in all its spheres of conative activity, will thus not be 'realized.' Anti-hedonistic ethic, proceeding on these lines, culminates in emphasis of self-sacrifice or self-discipline, even self-mutilation—in emphasis on the fact that we can only enter into the higher life halt or blind. Self-realization, according to this doctrine, is realization of the rational self at the expense of the sentient self. In ancient Greece the Cynics (*q.v.*) maintained such a view as this. They held that virtue is the chief good, and that virtue makes the human being independent of the vicissitudes of worldly fortune. The Cynics went on to teach that self-realization consists in living in the natural state, or according to nature. The Stoics (*q.v.*) also advocated realization of the rational self as the highest end, and, like the Cynics, inculcated freedom from the good or ill fortune which life may bring; but they saw the means to this end in repression of the elements of

feeling, desire, and emotion. This was their chief difference from the Cynics; they differed from the Epicureans, to whom they were most directly opposed, in emphasizing the supremacy of reason over feeling. Virtue, for the Stoic, consisted in the assertion of the rational side of man, and largely in extirpation of the passions, till 'apathy' was attained. A similar ethic was taught, within the modern period, by Kant (*q.v.*), and indeed by many rationalists and intuitionists.

As against both of these one-sided theories, each of which does full justice to but one side of our complex nature, the eudæmonism (*q.v.*) of Aristotle may be instanced. This philosopher held that happiness is the chief good, and regarded happiness as the outcome of life according to virtue. In eudæmonism it is rather (iii.) the whole self that is to be realized, and writers of the eudæmonistic school emphasize, more than do most ancient hedonists, the place of pleasures of the mind, while at the same time they assign more value than did the Stoics to the external goods of life and the æsthetic (as distinguished from the strictly ethical) adornments of conduct and character. Thus eudæmonism sees in self-realization, at any rate far more completely than do hedonism and rationalism, the complete development of all sides of the self, and discountenances the extirpation of any.

From what has been said it will appear that self-realization, in one form or another, is adopted as the chief good by all forms of egoism, as distinguished from altruism and systems which emphasize (iv.) the social self. In the broadest sense, self-realization will denote development of personality to the utmost, 'personality' being here used to refer to fully actualized human nature, as contrasted with the individual life of the child, the savage, or the non-rational animal. All of these inevitably seek self-realization of a kind—at least they aim at self-preservation, and at self-betterment in some sense. But the broader self-realization, or complete attainment of personality, will consist partly in synthesis or co-ordination of the conative elements of experience, and partly in the development of all the capacities of the soul. The former of these processes involves progressive control of impulse, desire, and passion, with a view to securing a full and untrammelled life for the whole self, inclusive of the higher faculties of reason, will, and moral sense. It is the means of securing that the momentary self, or, more correctly, the passing impulse or desire of the moment, indulgence or pursuit of which would mar the happiness and well-being and thwart the abiding purpose of the whole self or personality, be not allowed to have free play. For passing impulses and present passions often conflict with the attainment of enduring happiness; and desires frequently conflict with one another. If the agent in his completeness, *i.e.* as rational, volitional, and moral, as well as sentient and appetitive, be the controller of every kind of factor of his moral experience, he can effect realization of his higher or better self such as otherwise may be unattainable. The latter of the processes included in the attainment of self-perfection will involve the full use of all the individual's 'talents' or endowments, whether they be few or many, great or small, in that these may be instrumental to the completest moralization and perfecting of the self.

2. The various possible senses of 'self-realization' having now been enumerated and defined, we may turn to the further question whether any of them be adequate as a description of the highest good, and notice briefly some of the chief criticisms which the conception has received.

In the first place, it must be admitted that self-realization is very seldom actually before the mind of a moral agent when he is about to perform a moral act. Moral acts are almost always done without any consciousness on the part of the agent, at the moment, of self-realization; that is not set up by him as the final cause of his action. He chooses the course of conduct which he pursues as good, rather than as good for him. So, unless we commit 'the psychologist's fallacy,' or confound the 'psychic' and the 'psychological' standpoints (*i.e.* the standpoint of the agent at the time of his action with the standpoint of the external observer or of universal, scientific, knowledge), we must deny that self-realization is an end or a final cause that we ever set before us or by which we are ever motived, save in exceptional cases. And, if it be retorted that self-realization does not profess to be the end or the good which is consciously in view for the moral agent himself, but is nevertheless, objectively speaking, a realization of the agent's self, whether the individual know it or not, we then encounter the difficulty that all our moral acts, whether good or bad, must be regarded as stages in the assertion or realization of the self. There are objects of quite different ethical value in which a self may find its satisfaction or realization; or, as it is commonly expressed, there are different selves, or aspects of the self, to be satisfied; there is always, in moral action, a choice between the realization of one or another element in the whole self, unless self-realization be a mere empty form without content. This point has already been touched upon in the foregoing description of the various partial meanings of the self, and it has been remarked before that self-realization in actuality always involves self-negation.

In so far as self-realization is identified with self-satisfaction (*q.v.*), it may be urged that there is satisfaction of a kind for some individuals in that which is not good; and the more settled principles of individual lives, with which the momentary act may be contrasted and be found in conflict—the permanent 'self'—are not always or necessarily the best. Permanency of satisfaction, if we regard the self which is to be realized as the permanent self, is but one mark among others of the good act, moreover, when the permanent self is the better man. And, if we contemplate the whole self, rather than the self as the permanent (in contrast with the momentary), we are reminded that the whole self is never realized; as such, it cannot be, for our earliest moral teaching is directed chiefly towards the securing of our self-suppression, and 'the manifold temptations which death alone can cure' arise from conflict within the whole self which never can be wholly eliminated, in the case of most of us, while life lasts. We cannot enter into life 'whole'; the only question is, What kind of 'a whole' are we to be?

3. We pass now to a difficulty which has not been foreshadowed in our initial account of what self-realization may be understood to mean—a difficulty which arises when we turn from egoistic theories to altruistic, or even to all ethical systems which see the highest good in the *common* good. Self-realization is obviously incapable of being identified with the highest good by the altruist, for whom conduct is good in so far as it subserves the realization of other selves than one's own. And, without going to the extreme of literal altruism, we may, and nowadays generally do, demand that social activity have at least some place in the ethical ideal. If altruism fails to take note of the ethical element involved in personal culture, purely egoistic theories, which regard self-realization alone as exhaustive of the ethical ideal, fail to take note of the 'social self' in man,

and of the place which devotion to the common welfare occupies in a complete and adequate account of the moral life. There is much that is to be desired because it is good, though not because it is good for the particular agent bent exclusively on the realization of himself. The chief good must be desired by some self and for some self; but not necessarily by some self for itself. Thus self-realization alone, unless the term be used so broadly and vaguely as to include the extinction of self—as in the case of the patriot who dies for his country—cannot be the whole of the ethical end. Not realization, whether assertion or development, of the self is the essential rule of conduct, but rather the use of the self and all its powers and talents for the furtherance of the common, as well as of the individual agent's, welfare. Contribution and service thus take the pre-eminence over self-development and self-culture in the ethical ideal; and realization of the self can enter into the end only in so far as self-realization is compatible with, and conducive to, the common good. To seek one's own life merely is to lose it. Attainment of the end doubtless involves self-development and self-realization; but such development presupposes an end which is not the self.

Indeed the rational self is by no means rational, nor the whole self whole, if it be conceived as an independent unit; or, rather, an isolated rational individual is inconceivable. The realization of the individual self, as we know it, demands life in society; for without social intercourse there is no rationality, so thoroughly are we 'members one of another.' Our true self, regarded either as the rational self or as the whole self, can fully develop itself only by being also the social self, or by striving for social ends, which involves much sacrifice of the individual self. 'Looking at the matter, therefore, from this point of view, it might be better to describe the ultimate end as the realization of a rational universe, rather than as self-realization.'[1]

Christianity of course accentuates the idea that we are 'members one of another'; also the truth that self-sacrifice enters largely into the effort to attain to the highest end. It thus sees in that end something more than the realization of the individual self. And this something-more arises from man's relation to God as well as from his relation to his fellow-men. At the same time Christianity, through its doctrine of eternal life and its hope of immortality, is able to present an ideal of self-realization which escapes the inadequacy characteristic of such ideas of it as have as yet been discussed, in that it is one which embraces them and transcends their mutual conflictingness. For the Christian faith, in the doctrines just mentioned, recognizes yet another 'self' than those with which we have hitherto been concerned, viz. the eternal self or the self of the life to come, which may be realized only through devotion to the common good, and even through devotion unto death. Only, perhaps, when hope of an after life is thus presupposed can we reach a sense of 'self-realization' which is wholly compatible with the end as represented in non-egoistic systems of ethics; otherwise, from the point of view of such systems, self-realization will be but a means to an end.

But even in the light of a future life and of relation to a personal God we cannot now conceive fully how the distinct ideals of self-realization and of the social good can be reconciled and combined in one. Further consideration of how these ideals arise and are conditioned will enable us to appreciate the importance of this problem which seems to be ignored by the general assumption that there is but one absolute moral ideal or end presupposed in objective moral valuation.

Three levels of valuation are to be distinguished, each having its peculiar cognitional conditions and presupposing a different kind of abstraction from the effective-conational attitude called 'valuing.' At the sub-personal level we apprehend worths determined by individual feeling which we refer to the bodily self, and not to the self as person. Here the end is happiness, and our ethic is hedonism. At the personal level we apprehend worths determined by feelings, the presupposition of which is the ideally constructed self, and attainment of the ideal which now emerges involves sacrifice of the ideals of sub-personal valuation: pleasure must be subordinated to virtuous disposition. Personal dispositions have intrinsic value, and such objects may acquire absolute worth. These are internal to the self, and recognition of them is conditioned by abstraction from all instrumentality of the virtuous disposition to attainment of the common good. Their pursuit beyond certain limits is superfluous from the common or over-individual standpoint, though obligatory from that of the individual who is an end to himself. Finally, the self may participate in the valuations of his fellows, and play the rôle of the over-individual self or the impartial observer. He then contemplates exclusively the social good, and his intrinsic personal values have now to be sacrificed to the over-individual values of society. Of course the personal and the social ideals will at many points coincide; but they will not necessarily do so in all situations. And here the problem arises, Is there any absolute criterion or standard of preference for the one ideal over the other when, in concrete situations, they may conflict or be incompatibilities for the individual will? Such an *a priori* ground of preference seems to be beyond the range of our knowledge, and it becomes a question whether ethics is entitled to speak of one only absolute moral ideal, rather than of a plurality of them which cannot be unified. A philosophy of values may require a single supreme value; but from such a theoretical absolute there is no possibility of transition to an empirical unity of conscious ends and felt values. Perhaps the only direction in which we may look for a solution of this difficulty is in identification of the individual will with the metempirical will of God. Ultimate ends and their coalescence, it would seem, must be made intelligible otherwise than by logical subordination of the one to the other, and neither self-realization nor sacrifice to the social end can be the final word of ethics.

[1] Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*[4], p. 295

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F. R. TENNANT.

SELF-RESPECT.—1. Ethical import.—Self-respect is regard for one's existence, one's worth and dignity as a human person. As such it is a phenomenon both of civilization and of primitive society, although in its highest and most distinctly operative form it is a feature chiefly of the ethical life of the supposedly free and independent individual of modern times. It is here a high concern for one's personal honour and personal honesty, and for the due satisfaction of the powers and capacities of intelligent and active personality as a conscious possession. It is connected with the instincts and propensities of the 'self-feeling' (*Selbstgefühl, amour-propre*), with the various 'emotions of self' that are recognized and treated of by nearly all psychologists.

'Whatever name we may give them,' says Ribot,[1] 'these emotional forms are reducible to one primary fact of which they are the embodiment in consciousness—viz., the feeling (well-founded or not) of personal strength or weakness, with the tendency to action or arrest of action which is its motor manifestation.'

They may also be connected with the instinct of conservation, the will to live. They are finally connected, however, with the feeling and the idea of individuality and personality. It is in the latter idea (or reality) that the self-preservative instinct 'attains to the full consciousness of itself, and becomes incarnated in the idea of the ego.'[2]

The primary self-feeling of the human individual[3] is no doubt an undifferentiated feeling It may be connected with the feeling of the body (its increasing size, strength, power, etc.) or with the value of its activities to the tribal or family group in question. But in its higher and later developments this self-feeling is no doubt connected with the sense (or reality) of personality (*q.v.*), with one's conscious existence as a person among conscious persons. Where this sense is lacking, as it may be in some men of science or in moral weaklings, as well as in a Caliban, a Buddhist, or a mystic, there will be no such thing possible as self-respect, or even the sense of self-agency. The reality, however, at nearly all stages of civilization, of that manifestation of personality which we call self-respect is attested by evidence from all races.[4] We all, whatever our views about the universe, desire to be recognized and respected by our fellow-men, and we all dislike being ignored, or injured, or slighted by them. In ordinary life a man or woman without a self-respecting efficiency and sense of agency, without the reliability of the autonomous morality due to self-respect, is not looked upon as a responsible, or desirable, associate or servant.

And 'according to current ideas men owe to themselves a variety of duties similar in kind to those which they owe to their fellow-creatures. They are not only forbidden to take their own lives, but are also in some measure considered to be under an obligation to support their existence, to take care of their bodies, to preserve a certain amount of personal freedom, not to waste their property, to exhibit self-respect, and, in general, to promote their own happiness.'[5]

2. Development of the self-feeling.—The inevitable and the actual associations of the phenomena of self-respect with the various psychical tendencies underlying such terms as 'self-determination,' 'self-realization,' 'self-esteem,' etc., all tend to emphasize its connexion with that general growth in self-control, in rational self-love, in character, in the sense of personality, which forms such a large part of the study of genetic psychology or genetic sociology. Self-respect is undoubtedly a kind of development of the self-feeling that, at its lower levels, passes down into simple physical selfishness (natural egoism) and that has progressed from the second stage of self-interest and self-love to the third stage of a broad ethical force, or influence, that 'impels the individual to the pursuit of larger and more appropriate ends of activity.' At this last level it becomes a high, inward guarantee of objectively moral conduct. The very fact, however, that it has even here certain grave dangers and possible excesses and defects shows that it must indeed be studied in connexion with that entire development of the sense of individuality and separate personality which is our human birthright and which means the possibility of erring as well as of achieving and attaining. Self-esteem—Gall claimed a certain 'bump' for it in the brain—is probably the nearest expressive equivalent for self-respect; for the latter is clearly above some aspects of self-activity—above self-satisfaction or self-admiration, *e.g.*, and above even self-control and self-realization. And it is also a more ethical phenomenon than self-sufficiency, or that mere inward initiative and autonomy of which a confused thinker like Nietzsche would have us make so much. For there are very clearly many definite ethical norms and criteria of that true self-respect or that true self-esteem in which we all so thoroughly believe for ourselves and others. And, again, although a development of the sense of duty under which we are all brought up, self-respect is a still more reliable guarantee of really good conduct than the mere sense of binding duty. The latter will keep a man doubtless within the limits of what is definitely owed to others who have claims upon him—superiors, dependents, the law, God, and so on. But it is only an inward self-respect that will guarantee the higher conduct that may have to rise above what is definitely prescribed or demanded.

3. A phase of moral evolution.—We may see an important confirmation of the theory of the actual and the necessary connexion of self-respect with the different physical and intellectual forms of selfishness and self-interest in Henry Bradley's finding[1] that self-respect originally meant (1) 'a private, personal, or selfish end,' then (2) 'self-love, self-conceit,'[2] and finally (3) that ethical regard for one's person and position which is implied, *e.g.*, in John Hill Burton's phrase about the 'Scot Abroad'—'the well-becoming pride and self-respecting gravity.' And, with a further use of the same distinction—emphasized by moralists—between (1) the 'external,' (2) the 'internal,' and (3) the 'teleological' aspects of the moral standard, we may point out again that, even where morality is apparently sunk in external law or custom, we can still see there the self-respect that all human beings have either as physical existences or as members of some social group—the self-respect, *e.g.*, of some 'savage' female beauty, or the pride of an Aryan conqueror, a Brāhman, a Pharisee, a well-born Greek, a Spaniard, an Englishman. But, properly speaking, we are pointing out that self-respect belongs to, and remains on, that second great stage of moral evolution which we call 'internal' morality, the stage where morality has passed from 'instinct' and 'custom' to 'insight' and 'reflexion,' to inward or voluntary self-determination. Morality is never, properly speaking, morality at all as long as it is based upon mere natural instinct (self-defence, *e.g.*, protective anger, personal effort) or on mere custom (the law of the tribe or that of one's social set). Nor do we have morality on the basis of mere desire or emotion, mere feeling. Nor is morality mere duty or prescribed morality.

It is established and invested with a dignity and a controlling power only when 'it ceases to be wholly dependent on the fitful play of emotion, or on any externally imposed standard of duty; and possesses as well that higher appeal which lies in an inward sense of self-respect.' This inward sense 'disclaims the mean, the base, the cruel, not alone because injurious to others, and attended by the condemnation of others, but because of the scorn of self that would follow.' 'The morality that is based upon the resolution to be true to our own better selves has a greatness, a spaciousness, a completeness, that no other morality can approach. For no other moral sanction can so keenly probe into the shadiest corner of our minds, and ferret out the lurking meannesses of motive. Supreme then over most secret lives, it has power to stifle wrong that no other check could influence.'[3]

4. Defects and excesses.—But just at the very point of its true and proper function it is essential to refer to the defects and excesses and limitations of self-respect, and to connect them all with the fact of the undoubted superiority of the third stage

[1] *Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 239. [2] *Ib.* p. 240.

[3] Animals are credited by psychologists with pride, jealousy, a sense of esteem or lack of esteem, and so on, but not with a sense of selfhood or personality.

[4] See Westermarck, *MI* ii. 137–139, 141. [5] *Ib.* ii. 265.

[1] In *OED*, *s.v.* 'Self-respect.'

[2] For rational self-love see Aristotle and Butler.

[3] A. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, i. 63, 69.

of morality, the 'teleological,' the morality of enlightened love, the morality of the spiritual impulse after perfection. Owing to the fact of the purely natural and purely conventional basis of much self-respect, there may well be, and there often actually is, in ordinary daily life what may rightly be called (1) an entirely non-moral self-respect—the self-respect for the body, *e.g.*, or the pride in one's inherited social position. Both these things are obviously a self-respect into which the sense of duty or choice or volition has hardly as yet entered. There may also be (2) a quasi-moral self-respect—the false pride, *e.g.*, of a man who will not acknowledge a mistake, of the man who cannot bring himself to share a reduced meal with a time-honoured friend, or of the man who works hard to pay contracted debts out of a dread mainly of the personal disgrace of the bankruptcy court. And there may be the endless forms of (3) pseudo-self-respect to be associated in one form or another with egoism and with imperfect moral training—the desire, *e.g.*, to make a correct 'appearance' and to insist upon forms of etiquette and politeness rather than on reality, or the mere inward adoption of some purely conventional, outwardly prevalent, fashionable, mode of thinking and acting. These three forms are all different from the true self-respect that holds up before the self only that which it holds up—in courage, wisdom, justice, and kindness—before others. From the study of the lives of men who have professed an unswerving allegiance to diverse sets of supposedly fixed first principles; from the study of the lives of men who, like Jean Jacques Rousseau, have professed to see through all conventional and established 'principles'; from the study of the effects upon the minds and souls of the adherents of systems like Stoicism, Pharisaism, Puritanism, Brāhmanism, casuistry, transcendentalism, idealism, rigorism; from the study of the effect upon men of different forms of pride, we become aware, in fact, that the ideal of self-respect constantly requires enlargement, revision, and modification from (1) fresh knowledge of new conditions, (2) increased sympathy with beings different from oneself, (3) the imperative character of some actual duties to actual people. These last often cannot be set aside in the interest of any superman morality whatsoever.

Self-respect, in short, must progress with time and with the gradual unfolding of the possibilities and necessities of human nature. The intellectual and ethical approval of mankind can be expected only for true self-respect, viz. that which takes invariably what is to-day called the 'social' conception of the 'self' (as simply one being in a society of selves) and grasps the fact of the experimental or tentative character of even the best of our morality—the law was made for man, and not man for the law. Our self-respecting ideals are often poor things when compared with the dictates of divine goodness, of a real inward goodness of heart. An absolute belief in self-respect as the final standard takes, too, an unduly optimistic view of human nature, in ignoring its necessary and actual imperfections and the limitations of its knowledge. Like the egoist in general, the man who is all for self-respect will probably do right as long as this coincides with his own notions of the fitness of things—in general or in detail. But there is no guarantee of his doing so when this is no longer the case, or when it can no longer be the case. Both the morality of simple duty and the morality of sympathetic love are here probably superior. The morality of a so-called high or lofty self-respect has often collapsed into the meanest, basest, and cruellest of actions. And, again, in view of the diversity of actions to which an imagined self-respect may lead men, we must remember that society would fall to pieces if each person were to become a law to himself or herself.

Self-respect, in other words, although a perfectly well marked and necessary phenomenon in the evolution of morality from the stage of instinct and custom to that of conscience and insight (character and freedom), can become, if regarded as a supreme determining principle, a fetish, an idol, a stumbling-block, a rock of offence. It must pass into an operative and a sympathetic sense, an emotion, for the life of duty and achievement that we undertake for one another, as members of a 'kingdom of persons,' a 'realm of ends'; when things come to a pass, self-respect is other-respect, respect for others who are also persons, who have also self-respect, and who are worthy of it.

5. Sociological aspects.—As for some of the promised sociological aspects of a true self-respect, it follows from what has been said and implied about the true self being the social self that every self-respecting man must pursue certain impersonal, or supra-personal, common ends. Self-respect is obviously a social force of great importance, for it makes a man respect his work, his calling, his associates, his family, his 'shop,' his school, his town, his neighbourhood, his country, humanity. It involves a kind of loyalty or love to all these great personalizing and civilizing agencies. It is a cohesive force, and the person who possesses it is a valuable person, sociologically speaking—a good citizen, a good neighbour. He can be counted upon for his share of the common task, of the 'white man's burden.' And, again, in the matter of social reform, it has been discovered very definitely to-day that all the philanthropy that stops short of inculcating in the so-called down-trodden, in the poor, in the vicious, in the inefficient, in the discontented generally, a self-respect that may become a lever to efficiency and service is really wasted, and that the social problem is really the problem of adjusting our social machinery and our educational arrangements so that the unfolding of the powers and capacities of personality (a vital part of the idea of self-respect) may become a possibility for all those who are born into any society.

LITERATURE.—See the elaborate works of E. Westermarck (*MI*, 2 vols., London, 1908) and L. T. Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution*, 2 vols., do. 1906) on the evolution of morality.

The various histories of Greek philosophy (Zeller, Gomperz, Burnet, Cornford, and Grant's ed. of the *Ethics* of Aristotle) may be consulted for the story of moral philosophy from Socrates (the importance of self-knowledge) to Aristotle, Stoicism, and Christianity. Plato's theory of virtue as the sense of an inward harmony of the soul, and his idea that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong, is all an elaborate theory of self-respect for one's soul and its functions. To Aristotle the ethical life as the conscious realization of function is practically a lofty kind of self-respect, rising to its height in his famous conception of the 'high-souled man.' The self-respect of the 'wise man' of the Stoics, the idea that the wise man is as necessary to God as God is to him, the idea of solitary self-contemplation (seen at its height in Marcus Aurelius), is in many respects the highest form of self-respect that the world has ever seen.

By way of contrast to Greek ethics, which is all a kind of idealization of the natural reason-endowed man, and to the ethics of naturalism generally, consult the many works on Christian ethics, for to Christianity, as to Buddhism, not self-respect, but self-surrender and self-abnegation are the beginning of the morality of the spirit. See F. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, Eng. tr., London, 1899, for a comparison of the Greek, Christian, and 'scientific' elements in the modern moral consciousness; Butler, *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature*, do. 1726, for the legitimate place in the moral life for rational self-love; and Adam Smith, *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, do. 1759, for the 'sympathy' theory of conscience.

Kant's ethical system is practically founded on a rational self-respect. See J. G. Fichte, *Popular Works*[4], tr. W. Smith, 2 vols., London, 1889, for an attempt to found German national culture, and the 'vocation of man' generally, upon the consciousness of the inward dignity of our power of self-determination. A. Schopenhauer (*The World as Will and Idea*, tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 3 vols., London, 1883–86; various volumes of Essays, tr. T. Bailey Saunders, do. 1890–1902; W

Caldwell, *Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance*, Edinburgh and New York, 1896) despised the absence of self-respect and legitimate pride even in the ordinary man, although his moral principle is sympathy. See F. Nietzsche (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1907, and *The Genealogy of Morals*, Eng. tr., do. 1910) for the self-respect of the superman (cf., however, H. Lichtenberger, *La Philosophie de Nietzsche*, Paris, 1898, and W. M. Salter, *Nietzsche, The Thinker—A Study*, New York, 1917, on the spiritual, or even Christian, interpretation that may be put upon Nietzsche's and other similar attempts to transcend ordinary morality). Goethe's life may profitably be studied for the limits and the limitations of the inevitable egoism of an attempt to found the conduct of life on the idea of a kind of cultural self-respect, a natural and untrammelled self-development. See also A. E. Giles, *Moral Pathology*, London, 1895; A. Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, 2 vols., do. 1898 (the latter work has an excellent chapter on the different phases of self-respect); A. E. Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, London, 1901 (a penetrating examination of the theoretical and practical flaws in the Anglo-German 'idealistic' or 'self-realization' theory of morals); the artt. 'Self-activity,' 'Self-consciousness,' 'Self-exhibition,' 'Self-love,' 'Personality,' etc., in *DPhP*, and in works on psychology; W. McDougall, *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913; T. Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions*, do. 1907; A. Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*[3], do. 1884. See the terms *αἰδώς, αὐτάρκεια, μεγαλοψυχία* in Liddell and Scott; also the 'Three Reverences' in Goethe.

The whole subject is a comparatively new one, for in ancient times and in the Middle Ages there was no such separation of the self from society as has existed (with questionable consequences) since the Reformation and the French Revolution.

W. CALDWELL.

SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS. — 'Self-righteousness' is a term which figures little in philosophy, though the philosophical discussion of righteousness always raises the question, and requires by implication an examination of the self and the other-than-self as possible sources and bases of righteousness. The resources of one's own human nature are the nearest and most obvious refuge for the seeker after moral rightness and power. On the other hand, a mystical humanist or a passionate believer in human brotherhood may feel that the rightness of an individual, if it could exist and maintain itself in a self-centred form, would sin against ideal human unity or human sympathy; and thus, sinning against these things, it would already have marred itself, and would no longer be perfect rightness. Still more with the man to whom 'to live is Christ' (Ph 1^{21}), or who in some other way is saturated with the realization of a personal God, the thought of a self-centred righteousness is difficult to entertain, even with an effort and for a passing moment. It belongs to a world which the long habit of dependence and communion has made strange to him. His highest conception of right is the doing of what is right by God, the doing, for the sake of God, of what is right in the sight of God.

A man would lose much by complete independence of his fellows, if such a thing were possible. (He would, of course, begin life as an adult. If he started as a child, his independence would be ruined at the start.) How would a man's character stand if he had never trusted another for help and never felt one thrill of gratitude for help received? If he had to the full the power to serve others without needing them, he would be only half human. And here again we have a contradiction in terms; for then he would not have the sympathetic insight which is necessary for the highest service and the truest justice. If it may be so put, there is nothing a man needs more than his needs. H. Weinel made a far-reaching remark when he said that St. Paul 'had the art of beautiful acceptance.' It expresses much of his charm and the whole of his religion. For it is in religion above all that a man's needs are the last thing he can afford to lose. With God there can be no possibility of a man serving and not needing. A completely self-centred righteousness is therefore, in dealing with Him, inconceivable from the outset.

It is often said that, since character can have reality only in interaction with other characters, and this is relative, self-contained righteousness is impossible. So it is; but, if the distinction may be made, a self-*centred* righteousness would still remain conceivable—interacting in the form of help bestowed on others, but not received from them, and owing to other characters, not its source, but merely an opportunity for outflow. 'I give tithes of all that I possess' (Lk 18^{12}) is not self-contained, since the speaker gives; but it is self-centred, since he speaks as if he receives nothing. What he 'possesses' is treated as an absolute starting-point (though in reality it was first accumulated from outside). On this assumption there is a centrifugal but not a centripetal movement. It was therefore necessary to show (1) that this flow in one direction only, though conceivable at the first blush, would not be the flow of a complete righteousness towards other men, since essential qualities like gratitude and some forms of loyalty and faith—to say nothing of humility and readiness for contrition—would be lacking; and further, to show (2) that in relation to God self-centred righteousness is out of the question entirely, except as a poor and pitiful fragment, and vitiated at that—in any case, something quite inadequate for acceptance before God and 'justification.' And, in practice, such a righteousness, lacking help human and divine, is likely to be a far greater failure than mere logic requires. If finally (3) we go behind such righteousness as the man really has, it turns out that, just as it is inadequate, so it was never original. We can trace the influences for good which formed its source. In regard to goodness, as in regard to goods, he has nothing which he has not received (1 Co 4^{7}).

If we look at the term 'self-righteous' in ordinary use, it is found to be employed with several different shades of meaning: (1) in condemnation of those who, in their own judgment, by reason of their superior character and deeds, are 'not as other men are' (Lk 18^{11}); it is implied by the critic that this self-approval is due to exaggerated self-esteem; (2) in (unjust) condemnation of those who maintain their own moral convictions when they differ from those around them; they may be personally humble, and even humble in an unusual degree; (3) in a distinctly religious reference, of those, such as the Pharisees, whose claims are concerned not so much with character in itself, or with moral principles purely as moral, as with their supposed standing in relation to God. Not only are they in enjoyment of superior knowledge of Him or favour with Him, but they have in some sense earned it. They are His servants, but they cannot help knowing that they are profitable servants (Lk 17^{10}). Usually they speak, and stand, and look as if they had never done a wrong; but, curiously enough, a similar state of complacency is sometimes attained by a man who, after an outstanding and degraded career as a sinner, has experienced an outstanding and distinguished conversion. He must have been singularly worth saving from the one career and for the other.

As regards all three, the ultimate question is that of God. (1) The man who really is better than his neighbour by the grace of God robs God if he obscures the fact. His self-righteousness is to assert the fact as of his own doing. His righteousness is to 'let his light shine before men,' and, when the question of credit arises, to insist that they give it all to the 'Father who is in heaven' (Mt 5^{16}). (2) It is righteousness, and not self-righteousness, to stand with quiet, lofty inflexibility by a truth which we did not make, but which has 'come' to us, most of all when it 'cometh down from the Father of lights' (Ja 1^{17}), and when our attitude is that we *cannot* be 'dis-

obedient unto the heavenly vision' (Ac 26^{19}). (3) The Pauline (and Christian) attitude is that native goodness, saintly heredity, preservation from falling, are all of grace, free and undeserved; that rescue after falling is also all of grace; and that there can never be a spark of self-righteousness in any man while he is giving grace its due. But its due is his absolute all. 'When ye shall have done all, say, We are unprofitable servants' (Lk 17^{10}).

The peculiarity of the Pauline position is its strong emphasis, founded deep in Paul's experience, on the utter impossibility in practice of real and full self-centred righteousness. Not only so, but the righteousness which is partly self-centred and (as in Paul's case) most earnestly religious is also doomed to tragic failure and disappointment. 'In me [that is, in my human nature] dwelleth no good thing' (Ro 7^{18}). Hence no amalgam of the God-given and the self-achieved will stand the tests of life or the final light of God. It must be grace, all grace, and nothing but grace.

It is a hard doctrine for men to grasp. Self-righteousness reveals its terrific strength in the form of the universal instinct of self-defence. Except when the admission of 'sin' is a mere convention, it is very rarely admitted while it can possibly be denied or while the question can possibly be shelved. In practice the everyday question is always: 'How can I justify myself?' If grace is ever to be triumphant, this attitude must be systematically undermined, not only in theology, but in philosophy and in life. And teachers of ethics might give serious attention to the question whether self-defence, take it for all in all—prejudiced and unscrupulous self-defence, as it nearly always is—should not rank as one of the deadly sins. Certainly it is the deadly enemy of repentance and of the Pauline Christianity of grace alone.

LITERATURE.—See artt. RIGHTEOUSNESS, EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian), FORGIVENESS (NT and Christian), GRACE, PHARISEES, and the literature there mentioned.

C. H. WATKINS.

SELF-SACRIFICE.—The subject of self-sacrifice is one which has many aspects and many developments. It is originally an instinct of human nature, the evolution of which can be traced from earliest data. Its power and manifold forms are demonstrated on every page of human history. It arrests our attention at the outset of our ethical inquiry. Its relation to the contrary instinct of self-preservation (*q.v.*) covers a large area in the field of ethical controversy. Its rational stimulation, direction, and control are of serious moral importance, while its relation to religion also shows us that it is of the profoundest significance and loftiest interpretation. In fact, there is hardly any limit to our search for indications of the working of the principle or to the application of its claims 'in heaven above or earth beneath.'

1. Primary facts.—To say that self-sacrifice is an instinct of the human race does not do full justice to the elementary facts. In the animal world also, side by side with instincts that are fierce and cruel, are those of parental, conjugal, or generic fidelities which make self-sacrifice necessary. Nay more; it is a law of nature itself: 'Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone: but if it die, it beareth much fruit' (Jn 12^{24}). Indeed, the daisy and the guelder-rose have been used as illustrations of the statement that floral beauty depends upon the principle, since the ray florets become neutral.[1] It is with the human aspect of self-sacrifice, however, that we are here concerned. Self-sacrifice lies at the foundation of our social institutions; for there is no relation into which a man can enter with his fellows which does not proclaim 'None of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself' (Ro 14^{7}). Not only so; in the limited range of a man's deeds, which seem at first sight to concern himself alone, life presents alternatives which require self-sacrifice in the choice of the higher, since that must be called self-sacrifice which surrenders the pleasure of the moment for nobler ends. In the most thorough or absolute sense of the word it may fairly be argued that there is no such thing as self-sacrifice or that, if there is, it is neither to be desired nor to be approved. There is always some interest or advantage larger or higher than that which short-sighted selfishness would choose, and with this the Ego, or self, identifies its own. Consequently the controversy originating with Hobbes and the Cambridge Platonists is transformed at last to the question, What is the legitimate meaning of self-realization? And we have to deal with the egoism of Nietzsche, as opposed to the social idealism of modern interpretations of Christianity. But it is clear that the essential contrast between selfishness and self-sacrifice remains. The question is, Why should a man forgo that which he naturally would prefer, and why should he voluntarily endure that which he naturally would avoid? And the actual facts of life show how differently men respond. Thus the alternative of following the higher or lower self is present from first to last. From prudential self-control we quickly pass to all the forms of altruistic conduct. Combined with these, or apart from these, there is the conscious aspiration after intellectual or spiritual excellence, for which a man will surrender the ease or pleasure, or even the safety, of the present moment. Even the miser or the ambitious man may be regarded as making a sacrifice of immediate self-pleasing; but in thinking of self-sacrifice we eliminate those cases which have no evidence of altruistic intention. There are innumerable occasions when no prudence is sufficient motive or explanation of conduct that is commendable. When there is obviously no coincidence with the natural desires of the man who does a heroic deed, we cannot deny the distinct character of his conduct.

2. Excessive forms.—We must not pass by the fact that psychologically the instinct has sometimes asserted itself irrationally, and that asceticism (*q.v.*) for its own sake has been judged to have merit. Eastern religions like Buddhism and Hinduism, as the result of theories of good and evil, have set out to achieve such self-renunciation that asceticism becomes a virtue apart from any social consequences. According to these theories, matter is the cause of evil and must be subdued in bodily life, so that spiritual exaltation is measured by neglect of the body and indifference to pain, or by such renunciation as leads to passive endurance. Through the influence of Alexandrian philosophy such ideas found their way into Jewish ethics in the customs of the Essenes (*q.v.*), and through these they found a place in early Christian thought. In monasticism (*q.v.*), with its fasting and celibacy, they have exercised a lasting influence.

But the sentient self is not necessarily evil, and severities such as those of St. John of the Cross and Suso are not reasonable. 'Negative mysticism' of this type is ethically pernicious.[1] Martyrdom may be sought with morbid desire, and even in ordinary life there may be an assumption that so-called unselfishness is in all cases saintly. It is this that gives to Nietzsche the opportunity to sneer at Christianity as slave-morality—so

[1] See Greville Macdonald, *The Religious Sense in its Scientific Aspect*, London, 1903, pp. 106–125.

[1] See W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902, p. 306; Illingworth, *Christian Character*, p. 184 ff.

necessary is it to remember that the social relation gives value to morality. Against either egoism or altruism alone the same criticism may be urged; for both alike tend to the futile isolation of the individual, by disregard of social relations. It follows, not that morality has no reference to ideals, or that the individual has not direct relation to such ideals, but that social value is the direct and necessary criterion of conduct, and that it must be the object of rational judgment.

3. **Rational forms.**—We have only to begin with the individual as a centre and pass to wider and wider circles of social life to discover how expansive may be the claims for self-sacrifice and the emotions that attend its manifestations.

(*a*) Within the limits of a man's own life, besides the self-control and self-denial whereby each one is normally fit for the ordinary duties of life, there are more special demands that may be made. It may be very difficult to decide in particular cases; but, so far as a man's self-development may be of service to his fellows, either by increased capacity or as an exceptional example, any renunciation he may make of part of life's possibility is worthy, whether as athlete, artist, or saint.

(*b*) In the family the mutual rights and obligations of parents to each other, of children to their parents, and of parents to children, of brothers and sisters, etc., may require, or give the occasion for, trivial and passing or constant and complete devotion. Without such recognition of mutual dependence, service, and sacrifice, these ordinary social ties soon become intolerable and destructive. Certain expectations are generally recognized; but the extent of such claims of one life upon another for its comfort or success, for relief of suffering, or even for its continued existence, is a problem ultimately decided in each case by the individual concerned with making the sacrifice. Such problems often require the sanest and most delicate moral judgment. They afford opportunities of stupidity or of nobility, but certainly of patience and of heroism, which have always been recognized as of supreme moral worth.

(*c*) Near akin to the relations of the family are those of friendship—the voluntary loyalties to which we commit ourselves in comradeship and in the accidental partnership of risks on land and sea. These again have certain obvious and acknowledged obligations; but the finest examples may be on the fringe of uncertainty.

(*d*) Next we may put the positive self-sacrifice required by our work or calling. To be fit for our tasks, in health as far as possible, in capacity as far as may be legitimately sought or expected, will mean for each one such self-direction in the employment of his time and energy that he will have to make sacrifice not only of his lower self, but also of his own tastes and pleasures, and even of those family and social engagements which otherwise might be not only harmless but praiseworthy. Duty involves self-sacrifice. It is part of the discipline of our social life; yet here again there are in different men different standards and different estimates of what is requisite in the discharge of duty. In some cases there is such a grudging submission to what is required that there is no ethical value of self-sacrifice at all. In others there is an exaggerated interpretation of what duty means, so that the most heroic fidelity has been modestly explained as only doing what was duty. Certain callings make greater demands than others—*e.g.*, those of doctor, nurse, sailor, or soldier. Further, the vicarious suffering involved in the risks of life hardly finds a place in an analysis of self-sacrifice; yet in the choice of a calling in which such risks are run, or which distinctly sets out to lessen them, there is at least potential self-sacrifice. It does not follow that all engaged in such callings—*e.g.*, the life-boat and fire-brigade services—are actuated by such motives; but it must be recognized as a possibility.

(*e*) Besides the occupations of life there are also actual citizenship and concern for the welfare of the State, in which a man may be so disinterested as not only to forgo ease and prosperity, but, sacrificing all the rewards of ambition, to endure cruelty, shame, and obloquy, either from the external foes of his country or from those within the State itself who do not understand or do not share his purposes. This may lead to pain and hardship, and even to death itself. Paulsen[1] endeavours to show that Regulus might have acted as he did for his own sake; but it does not amount to more than showing that the sacrifice was made by reason of self-identification with all that promoted the highest honour of Rome. The same analysis or explanation might be made in all such cases.

A. B. Bruce[2] elaborates the thought of progress by sacrifice, as an outstanding law of social life.

'Sacrifice is the cost of progress; it is the instrument of redemption; not otherwise is real advance attainable.' Renan is quoted: 'There are always voluntary victims ready to serve the ends of the Universe.'[3]

'The social mass stagnates, clings tenaciously to old ways however barbarous or bad, obstinately resists movement; whence comes suffering in some form to the man who urges it to move. He suffers because he belongs to a social organism, or closely knit brotherhood, in which the pulse of a common life beats. He cannot escape from the vital influence of the corporate body. It will either assert its power over his soul, controlling his thoughts and affections, or, if his spirit be free, it will act vindictively in the sphere of his outward lot. He must either be a comrade in full sympathy with his people sharing their prejudices, errors and vices, or he must be a victim, suffering for their ignorance and sin. . . . All this is portrayed in Isaiah liii. It is He who is brought as a lamb to the slaughter who divides the spoil with the strong. But when one has grown to many, the power of resistance, if not the noblest conceivable, is the one which most readily suggests itself to brave, fearless and conscientious men. He, who came not to send peace but a sword, knew the sacrifice involved in such struggles. It is better to die fighting for liberty than to live the life of a slave.'[4]

(*f*) Philanthropy provides a distinct group of cases; it may be apart from patriotism or civic sentiment. Sympathy with any sort of sufferers has caused men and women to endure hardship and make sacrifice of all that is desirable or dear to the human heart. Children, slaves, prisoners, lepers, the poor, the sick, the dying, have evoked such devotion. When philanthropy has been associated with moral and religious enthusiasm, it has produced reformers, missionaries, and martyrs whose stories are the pride of the Christian Church.

Thus from earliest intimations of a great law of our being which may be instinctively and blindly obeyed we see there has been evolved a more and more conscious and deliberately rational acceptance of the necessity for self-sacrifice. The intellectual insight and foresight may vary immeasurably and be out of all proportion to the volitional and emotional elements in the acts of obedience.

'To preach to a man not to devote himself is like preaching to a bird not to make a nest, and not to nourish its young.'[5]

This may be true of many natural forms of self-sacrifice, and of the man who has accepted the position with passionate response to the demand; but it does not follow that we are to withhold our appreciation of such conduct, or that we are capable of passing judgment on the merit of any particular case. It certainly is a fact that a greater self may be developed with loftier aims than personal pleasure, and that there may be a rational acceptance and interpretation of the necessity for

[1] *System of Ethics*, Eng. tr., London, 1899, p. 247.
[2] *The Providential Order of the World*, London, 1897, ch. xii.
[3] Cf. Carlyle's Essay on Burns.
[4] See Bruce, p. 359; cf. on war F. D. Maurice, *Social Morality*, London, 1869, lect. xi.; P. T. Forsyth, *The Christian Ethic of War*, do. 1906.
[5] Renan, *Dialogues et fragments philosophiques*, Paris, 1876, p. 32.

the self-sacrifice involved which greatly enhances its moral value.

It is this growth of the 'conjunct self,' or social self, this over-self, or cosmic self, which tends to a reconciliation between egoism and altruism.[1]

'There is some *affirmation* in every act of sacrifice and no man can make a fine sacrifice until he has a true value of himself.'[2]

Asceticism is the mystic search for self-realization gone astray in introspection and become self-destructive, parasitic. Its search is justified, but its aim must be positive, not negative, comprehensive, not exclusive, cosmic, not ascetic.

4. Significance.—The great facts of self-sacrifice cannot be gainsaid or explained away. No cynical interpretation of human nature can reduce them to forms of natural egoism. Altruism is established. Egoistic hedonism long ago surrendered to larger views of utilitarian and evolutionary ethics of the social organism. From H. Spencer, L. Stephen, and S. Alexander to H. Rashdall, G. E. Moore, and modern socialists the well-being of the community is emphasized. Individualism from Goethe to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche has always implicit reference to an external order which after all holds the individual in tyrannous necessity, while idealism from Kant to Eucken has its kingdom of ends or its constructive endeavour. We may not agree with the pragmatist that truth and goodness are identical, or that the value of goodness is an experiment; but its humanistic note is unmistakable, and the self-activity, whether of Bergson or of Eucken, whether creative or spiritual, whether pluralistic or monistic, is far too great to be self-centred or to exclude what we mean by self-sacrifice. This is not the place to do more than indicate the bearing of the subject on general philosophical and ethical inquiry; but its significance cannot be overlooked. We do not commit the interest of morality to merely emotional instincts, any more than we leave the definition of its goal to the pure rationalist. It is when the intellectual concept of duty has supervened upon the mere emotional impulse of primitive man that morality begins. It is the rational estimate of social content that is the task of moral consciousness. Whereas certain generalizations are established, and some have crystallized into laws, it is in the individual consciousness that the questions of casuistry arise. Morality is not simply subjective. Its objective reference or goodness is the basis of its value.

'To arrive at a perfectly truthful moral judgement as to the rightness or wrongness of particular acts, we should form a conception of human life as a whole, and then ask what mode of action in any given circumstance will promote that true good.'[3]

The difficulty is, How far is every man bound to make sacrifice for the good of others? That is a matter of moral vocation. And vocation is determined partly by a man's external circumstances and the needs of human society, partly by his moral and intellectual capacity.

5. Christian emphasis. — The objectivity of moral values must ultimately lead us to metaphysical problems which are beyond the scope of the present article; but those interests which conflict with our own immediate pleasure arm themselves, so to speak, with the sanctions of religion; and it is an indisputable fact that the Christian religion is pre-eminent in its treatment of this aspect of conduct. It is not in providing rewards and penalties whereby selfishness may be restrained and self-sacrifice encouraged that the ethical value of Christianity is discovered. It is in its treatment of the moral conflict as a whole that we understand its message.[4]

By the supreme demand for faith and love, and the truths which justify that demand, Christianity seeks to overcome the natural antagonism between selfishness and self-sacrifice. Its apparently complete and exacting thoroughness of demand is intelligible only in view of the willing espousal of the interests, or 'universe,' of the Kingdom of God. The renunciation of worldly goods is required if earthly possession prove an impediment to a man's rising to the plane of character to which Christ sought to lift men (Lk $14^{15ff.}$). Any loss, even of eye or hand, is preferable to any faltering in choice between the call of the Kingdom of God and earthly or merely material pleasure or gain. Natural relations are second to those which have spiritual value (Mt 12^{48}). Worthiness for discipleship is tested by this superiority of attachment (Mt 8^{22} 10^{37}). All is focused in fidelity to Christ, which, while it may mean conflict (10^{35}), yet has abundant recompense (19^{29}). Such self-denial was to be to the uttermost, 'even to the scaffold' (10^{38}), while on four distinct occasions is recorded the utterance, 'He that loveth his life shall lose it; but whoso shall lose his life for my sake the same shall find it' (10^{39}, Lk 9^{24} 17^{33}, Jn 12^{25}). Christ's own death was a free act of love and surrender in the fulfilment of a divine purpose. It was not an irresistible destiny (Jn $10^{10.18}$, Mt 26^{53}); yet there was oneness with the Father's will in His eternal purpose. Personal love which Christ inspires is the great lever or dynamic of self-sacrifice among His followers (2 Co 5^{14}, 1 Jn 3^{16}, Ph $2^{4ff.}$, etc.). In Christ's sacrifice of the Cross are the pledge and promise of the victory of divine love and wisdom in the affairs of men and the assurance that in all self-sacrifice and suffering purposes of divine wisdom are supreme.

LITERATURE.—It is difficult to attempt a survey of the literature on this subject. On the elementary forms of temperance or self-control precepts abound among all sorts of moralists.

Plato's teaching on *σωφροσύνη* and the sacrifice of the individual to the State may be sought in his works, and in books that deal directly with his teaching. Of his works see esp. *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Philebus*, and the *Republic*. See also Aristotle's teaching on self-restraint (*ἐγκράτεια*) in *Nicomachean Ethics*, iii., vii., x.–xii., and also on friendship. The relation of pleasure to moral rightness runs through the whole history of ethics. The Roman Stoics rise to a high level in their teaching of self-control and endurance.

The *Imitatio Christi* of Thomas à Kempis is a typical and familiar example of the more distinctly religious aspect of self-denial from the Christian point of view; but ascetic ideas of fasting, chastity, dress, etc., are to be found in the practical advice of Christian writers in apostolic and mediæval times. Benevolence as a specific Christian virtue is continually emphasized. As indicating the controversy originating in Hobbes, reference may be made to his and his opponents' works (see art. ETHICS) and to the subsequent writers on egoism and altruism down to the present time, esp. H. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, new ed., London, 1906; L. Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, do. 1882; S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, do. 1889; H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*[6], do. 1901; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1907; G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, 1903; B. Kidd, *The Science of Power*, London, 1918; E. Westermarck, *MI*, ch. xxxiv., 'The Altruistic Sentiment.'

For writers on Christian ethics see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Christian). The following may be added: J. Seeley, *Ecce Homo*, new ed., London, 1905; J. Stalker, *The Ethic of Jesus*, do. 1909; R. L. Ottley, *Christian Ideas and Ideals*, do. 1909; J. R. Illingworth, *Christian Character*, do. 1904; C. F. D'Arcy, *Christian Ethics and Modern Thought*, do. 1912; W. S. Bruce, *Formation of Christian Character*, Edinburgh, 1902; F. G. Peabody, *The Approach to the Social Question*, New York, 1909; H. C. King, *Ethics of Jesus*, do. 1910; A. E. Balch, *An Introd. to the Study of Christian Ethics*, London, 1905; W. N. Clarke, *The Ideal of Jesus*, Edinburgh, 1911; A. B. D. Alexander, *Christianity and Ethics*, London, 1914; R. M. Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World*, New York and London, 1904; H. S. Nash, *Genesis of Social Conscience*, New York, 1902; also J. B. Baillie, 'Self-sacrifice,' *HJ* xii. [1914] 260 ff.; H. Walker, 'Triumph and Tragedy,' *ib.* xiv. [1915] 135 ff.; C. L. Maynard, 'Love and the Law,' *ib.* xv. [1917] 479.

A. E. BALCH.

SELF-SATISFACTION.—In every volition man seeks self-satisfaction; so many have contended. Thus T. H. Green says:

'If it is a genuine definition that we want of what is common to all acts of willing, we must say that such an act is one in

[1] See art. ALTRUISM.
[2] R. M. Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 103; cf. M. Maeterlinck, *Wisdom and Destiny*, London, 1908, § 63 ff.
[3] H. Rashdall, *Ethics*, London, 1913, p. 71.
[4] See *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Self-surrender.'

which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realization of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self-satisfaction.'[1]

A voluntary act 'is the putting forth of the man or self in desire,' and desire is distinguished from a 'mere solicitation,' such as the hunger impulse, which a man may have in common with animals, by this, that in desire the man identifies himself with the impulse.[2] The object which a man desires and aims at is, therefore, 'an idea of personal good,'[3] 'a better state of himself,' 'a certain idea of himself—of himself doing or himself enjoying,'[4] 'a good of himself *as himself*.'[5] In all conduct to which moral predicates are applicable, whether it be virtuous or vicious, a man is 'an object to himself.'[6] So every form of self-satisfaction appears good to the man who seeks it. True good is true or abiding self-satisfaction, *i.e.* 'the satisfaction of the fully realized or perfected self.'[7] J. H. Muirhead likewise maintains that the object of desire and volition is 'a form of self-satisfaction':[8]

'It is only as involved in one's own that one can desire one's neighbour's good: it is only as his good enters as an element into *my* conception of *my* good that I can make it an object of desire and volition.'[9]

In form this is an egoistic view of human nature,[10] and may be classed with psychological hedonism.[11] For, according to the latter also, a man always seeks his own satisfaction in the form of pleasure or avoidance of pain. Green and those who agree with him, however, maintain that the true good of the individual is a common good and non-competitive. Hence true satisfaction can be attained only by such a life as increases the true satisfaction of other members of the community.

The 'egoistic' psychology in its various forms has been called into question. Most writers on psychology and ethics seem to accept the general contention that volition involves the satisfaction of desire;[12] that desire implies the idea of an object to the realization of which we have an impulse; and that desire arises when there is an interval between the consciousness of the impulse and its realization, or a delay to its satisfaction. But the following are highly disputable propositions: (1) the idea of self is present to consciousness whenever we have a desire; (2) the self identifies itself with every desire; (3) every desire is for the satisfaction of the self.

Green lays great stress on the unity of the self; he often writes as if the self were a single principle always more or less completely present in the consciousness of a man; that all his desires and volitions are consciously related to it; and that consequently the idea of self is a constituent element in each of them. But the unity of the self should be conceived rather as an ideal—an ideal which becomes actual only through the progressive organization of its constituent instinctive tendencies, emotions, and ideas. The latter conception is to be found in Green, and it is the conception most characteristic of his system, especially when he discusses the moral ideal.[13] But the disputable propositions mentioned seem to depend on the former abstract conception of its unity.

Now the self-regarding sentiment—an organization of emotional dispositions with their impulses about the idea of self[1]—is rarely, if ever, so comprehensive and thorough as to embrace all the desires of the mind. Until this comprehensive sentiment is formed, however, it cannot be said that the idea of self is present whenever a man desires anything; nor can it be said therefore that he identifies himself with the object of desire; still less is it true that every desire is for the satisfaction of the self, and that the good sought is the good of the self. The adult mind is capable of forming a multitude of sentiments[2] into which the idea of self does not enter, and any particular desire may find a place in, or be taken up by, one or more of these. Sometimes a desire owes its origin not to any single impulse, but to the organized dispositions forming a sentiment. And, unless the precise relations of a desire to these dispositions is discovered, its constituent elements cannot be known. Consider, *e.g.*, the following series: a simple desire for food, a desire for food for myself, a desire for food for my child, a desire for food for a stranger. These are evidently different desires on account both of the ideas that determine them and of the impulses to the realization of the ideas. The idea of self enters as a determining factor into the second and third; it need not enter into the first and fourth. The impulse that necessarily enters into the first is the hunger impulse, and this is usually the only one if the impulse is satisfied without delay. Into the second there may enter, in addition to the hunger impulse, some of the other conations organized in the sentiment which is excited by the idea of the self—*e.g.*, the impulses to enjoy the pleasure of eating, to preserve life, to render myself efficient. The hunger impulse does not enter into the third, nor does any one of the conations just mentioned. Other impulses related to my idea of myself are brought into play, such as the impulse springing from my sense of responsibility as a father, my self-respect, my concern for the approbation of others, etc. Into the fourth, the desire to procure food for a stranger, not one of the impulses mentioned above need enter. The motive force may spring from affection for children with its impulse to protect and succour. It may even spring from hatred of a man whom I consider responsible for the child's destitution, or from the thought that my enemy will be annoyed by such behaviour on my part. The emotions, with their attendant impulses, which are organized in the self-regarding sentiment are not excited in these cases. Of course it may be said that all these emotions spring from my own being; they are elements in what is called my total self; but to say that is very different from saying that the idea of my self-satisfaction is the object of desire sought in volition. It is indeed possible for hatred of enemies and affection for children to be included in the self-regarding sentiment. A man can take pride in the thought of himself as one who hates enemies and has affection for children. When this happens, the self-regarding sentiment may be stimulated by the sight of any hungry child. Whether this wider sentiment is actually stimulated in any particular case will depend on certain conditions.

(1) The first of these is the existence of a sufficient motive. If, *e.g.*, the need of the child can be satisfied with comparative ease, there will exist no motive for putting the wider sentiment into operation. But, if food is difficult to obtain, and if it is

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, § 154.
[2] *Ib.* § 146 f. [3] *Ib.* § 115. [4] *Ib.* § 95.
[5] *Ib.* § 112. [6] *Ib.* § 115.
[7] *Ib.* §§ 171, 234. There are expressions in Green's works suggesting a conception different from this, and inconsistent with it. For a detailed examination of Green see H. Sidgwick, *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau*, London, 1905.
[8] *The Elements of Ethics*[3], London, 1910, § 18.
[9] *Ib.* § 67. [10] Cf. art. EGOISM.
[11] See artt. HEDONISM and ETHICS, § 6.
[12] Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*, pp. 78–80, for a different view of some deliberate volitions.
[13] See *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. iii.

[1] See art. SELF-ASSERTION AND SELF-SUBJECTION.
[2] For an account of this specialized use of the term 'sentiment,' meaning an organized system of emotional dispositions about the idea of some object, see art. SENTIMENT; A. F. Shand, in *Mind*, new ser., v. [1896] 203 ff., xvi. [1907] 477 ff., and *The Foundations of Character, passim*; W. McDougall, *An introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913, ch. v. f.

necessary to face discomfort or danger to obtain it, affection or hatred may be an insufficient motive. There will then be need for reinforcement of the will by the thought of a man's reputation, his honour, his self-respect. (2) Another condition is opportunity for deliberation. This implies sufficient time and concentration of attention to realize the situation fully and to call up the forces organized in the self-regarding sentiment. 'Falling into temptation' is not infrequently due to insufficient deliberation. (3) The third condition is the thoroughness of organization of the self-regarding system. If the system is loosely constructed its strength will be small, and what strength it has will not be effectively mobilized to reinforce its constituent desires at need.

Perhaps it is possible for the idea of self to be so comprehensive, and so completely articulated, as to include every good that the individual considers he ought to seek, and the self-regarding sentiment consequently to be so systematically and thoroughly organized as to determine all his fully deliberated volitions. Still opportunity would be lacking, and motive would be wanting, to call it into operation to determine every volition. Hence it is incorrect to define volition 'as the supporting or the re-enforcing of a desire or conation by the co-operation of an impulse excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment.'[1] This definition would apply only to fully deliberate action—*e.g.*, 'action along the line of greatest resistance.'

It may be contended nevertheless that, although a man does not always aim at self-satisfaction, he ought to do so; he would be acting on a sound ethical principle in doing so. For, it may be urged, the true good for any individual is the abiding satisfaction of the perfect self, a good which is not only his own, but the good of others also. To realize this good, he ought constantly to aim at organizing all his impulses in relation to such an ideal of self as will bring his life to complete unity. Moreover, the sentiment organized about this ideal is an emotional system powerful enough to give a man mastery over all the vagrant solicitations of desire, and the only one that is powerful enough.

Now it must be admitted that an ethical principle of this type has obvious merits. A man inevitably seeks his own satisfaction in some measure. Could he be led to seek this in a way that increases the satisfaction of others, there would be great gain. Especially desirable is the idea of enlisting the strongest force in human nature—the self-regarding sentiment—in the service of every virtue. But, in the first place, is what appears good to men in every stage of their life a good common to all, and non-competitive? In a world of men developing ideally this might be the case. But is it true of the world as we know it? And, if it is not, is a man likely to live the best life by aiming always at satisfying himself? In particular, is this ideal likely to be a good principle of guidance for a man in process of forming his character? Is it possible for him to include in his idea of what will satisfy himself all the ends at which he should aim, and in the right proportion or degree? He will often be called upon to act with others and for others. Have we good ground for thinking that what will satisfy them will agree with his conception of what will satisfy him? If it does not, may not the judgment of many of his associates be superior to his own during his immature years?

Again, how is a man to obtain right conceptions of the virtues, of the ends, and of the ideals which he and others should seek, except by submitting to the instructions, the suggestions, the approbation and disapprobation of others—except, in other words, by striving to satisfy them and by bringing his own satisfaction into line with that of others? A more adequate general rule of conduct is Kant's maxim:

'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.'[1]

And it should follow that their satisfactions should be treated as ends in themselves. Indeed, it is because their satisfactions are recognized by him as ends in themselves, and therefore independently good, that concern for them can be included by a man in his self-regarding sentiment.

[1] McDougall[7], p. 249.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the literature already cited, reference may be made to B. Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*, London, 1897, lectures vii.-ix.; F. H. Bradley *Ethical Studies*, do. 1876, essays ii., vii.; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, vol. i. bk. i. ch. ii.; A F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, London, 1914, *passim*; see also artt. CONSENT, SELF-REALIZATION.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

SEMI-ARIANISM.—Semi-Arians is the name given to a party in the Arian controversy who, in spite of their name, were less Arian than Athanasian, and eventually by their mediating policy reconciled those who, at heart orthodox, were divided by mutual suspicion due in part to misunderstanding of their respective terminology. In the Arian dispute the Creed of Nicæa failed to reconcile the 'conservatives' of the East to the theologians of Alexandria and Rome, because the use of the word ὁμοούσιος, besides being unscriptural, appeared to countenance the Sabellian heresy that the Trinity was an 'economic' manifestation of three aspects of the Godhead. This was the real cause of the downfall of the Nicene party, which culminated in the expulsion of Athanasius from Alexandria in 356. But the triumph over Athanasius did not give the bishops who had opposed his teaching the position to which they had aspired. On the contrary, they found themselves supplanted by the genuine Arians, who had used them to condemn Athanasius in the interest of extreme subordinationism. It became evident that the creed to which the Church would be called upon to submit would pronounce the Son not merely inferior to the Father, but essentially unlike Him (ἀνόμοιος). The supporters of this view, Eunomius and Ætius, were called Anomœans, and those more cautious in expressing their views Homœans because they declared the Son like (ὅμοιος) the Father. The word οὐσία, which with its compound ὁμοούσιος had appeared in the Nicene Creed, was proscribed, and its use in defining the Godhead forbidden. These decisions, emanating in 357 from Sirmium, where the emperor Constantius was at this time, provoked the bishops of Asia Minor, under the guidance of Basil of Ancyra, to assemble under his presidency in 358 at Ancyra, where the synod in its letter condemned ὁμοούσιος or ταὐτοούσιος ('of identical essence') as Sabellian, but declared the Son to be of like essence with the Father (ὁμοίας οὐσίας). Hence is derived the word ὁμοιούσιος as opposed to ὁμοούσιος of Nicæa;[2] and those who adopted it are popularly known as the Semi-Arians.

The leaders of this party were George of Laodicæa, Eustathius of Sebaste, Eusebius of Emesa, and Basil of Ancyra; and to them the wiser of the Nicene supporters extended a friendly hand because they perceived that the *homoiousian* doctrine often expressed what they themselves really meant. The labours of Hilary of Poictiers in Asia Minor during his exile, and the publication of the *de Synodis* by Athanasius, did much towards bringing about a mutual understanding. In addition to this, the Arianizing policy of Con-

[1] *The Metaphysic of Morals*, § ii., tr. T. K. Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*[6], London, 1909.

[2] See art. ARIANISM, § 3 ff.

stantius during the last two years of his reign alarmed the Semi-Arians and drove them to make common cause with the orthodox. It was clearly recognized that the surrender of the Nicene formula by the Westerns at Ariminum and by the Easterns at Seleucia had made Homœan if not Anomœan Arianism possible as the creed of the Empire and had thereby put those who upheld the complete divinity of the Son, though questioning the Athanasian mode of expression, at a disadvantage; and after the Synod of Constantinople, in 360, the Homoiousians found themselves a persecuted party. Constantius died in Nov. 361, and the Homœan settlement was upset by the return of the banished bishops at the accession of Julian.

For the next twenty years the Arian question was being settled in favour of the Nicene Council, mainly by the efforts of a new generation whose leaders were the three Cappadocian fathers, Basil of Cæsarea and the two Gregorys (of Nyssa and Nazianzus). The point of issue among modern scholars is the manner in which the difficulty of explaining the relation of the Son to the Father was ultimately solved. Harnack maintains:

'It was not the *Homoousios* which finally triumphed, but on the contrary the *Homoiousian* doctrine, which fixed on the terms of agreement with the *Homoousios*. The doctrine which Hosius, Athanasius, Eustathius, and Marcellus had championed at Nicæa was overthrown.'[1]

In other words, the so-called Semi-Arians really triumphed over the fathers of Nicæa at Constantinople in 381 by allowing the word ὁμοούσιος to stand explained as the equivalent of ὁμοιούσιος. This view has been strongly opposed by J. F. Bethune-Baker in his *Meaning of 'Homoousios,'* a reply to the theory advocated by Harnack in his *History of Dogma*. The argument which Harnack adduces in support of his theory is as follows:

The first step towards union was the publication of Athanasius' *de Synodis*, written in 359. Here he shows his true greatness; for, whilst he concedes nothing, he shows himself concerned not for formulæ but for principles. He recognizes that whoever grants that the Son is in nature of *like* quality with the Father and springs from the substance of the Father is not far from the ὁμοούσιος, but he is too keen-sighted not to point out that ὁμοιούσιος either involves an absurdity or is dogmatically incorrect. In 362 Athanasius held the small but very important Council of Alexandria, at which it was decided that all who accepted the ὁμοούσιος should be admitted to the Church, whatever their past errors might have been. In addition it was declared in the *Tomus ad Antiochenos* that, provided the ὁμοούσιος was acknowledged, the question as to whether there were three ὑποστάσεις in the Trinity or only one might be left open. This, according to Harnack, was probably the largest concession that Athanasius ever made. It marked a complete change; for, whereas the old orthodoxy had started from the substantial unity of the Godhead in which was a mysterious plurality, it was now permissible to make the threefold nature of the Godhead the starting-point and from its unity to arrive at the conclusion that the God is one. This distinction is expressed by the terms ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος respectively; and thus, by permitting both views to be held by those who professed to be Homoousians, the Homoiousians, whose opinions were really expressed, obtained a footing in the Church.

The decision at Alexandria satisfied the followers of the scientific theology of the day who admired Origen, notably Basil of Cæsarea and his friends. In his letter to Apollinarius Basil declares that he prefers the words 'unchangeably alike in essence' (κατ' οὐσίαν) to ὁμοούσιος; but Apollinarius convinced him that ὁμοούσιος is more correct. Basil, however, does not use the word in the Athanasian sense, nor is he particularly desirous to employ it. But the great contribution of the Cappadocians was that the Trinity consists of persons (ὑποστάσεις) who partake of an οὐσία which they hold in common.[2] The unity of the Godhead, as the Cappadocians conceived it, was not the same as the unity which Athanasius had in his mind; for, while Athanasius, like Augustine, thought of a personal God living a threefold life, the Cappadocians certainly thought of three quite distinct persons sharing a common οὐσία as men do. They preserved the unity by insisting on the monarchy of God the Father. Thus through them the influence of Origen was exerted on the side of a 'scientific' orthodoxy, which triumphed over the arid and formal Aristotelianism of Eunomius; but it was a triumph of Neo-Platonism rather than of the Athanasian system.

The Meletian schism[1] at Antioch was due to the compromising attitude of the Synod of Alexandria; for Meletius represented the Homoiousians and was for this reason distrusted by the Alexandrians and Westerns, always suspicious of the τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις of the Cappadocians. The Arianizing policy of the emperor Valens (364–378) brought the supporters of the old and new orthodoxy of the East together, and, after delegates had been sent to Liberius at Rome, a union was effected at Tyana in 367. In 370 Basil became bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia and the leader of the Christians of Asia, and succeeded in blending the orthodoxy of Athanasius with the science of Origen, commending both by his support of the ascetic life. The basis of all his work, to quote Harnack, was 'to unite the orthodoxy of the East and the West on the basis of the *Homoiousian* interpretation of the *Homoousion*.' The death of Valens and the accession of Theodosius as emperor of the East (19th Jan. 379) was marked by the triumph of orthodoxy; nevertheless at the Council of Constantinople (381) Meletius of Antioch, though distrusted by Rome and Alexandria, acted as president and was highly honoured by the emperor. At this council the Nicene Creed gained an unqualified victory so far as terms were concerned; but, again to quote Harnack:

'The community of substance in the sense of equality or likeness of substance, not in that of unity of substance, was from this time the orthodox doctrine of the East.'[2]

The Council, as is well known, accepted the baptismal creed of Jerusalem. It assuredly did not put it forward as a new creed; and till the Council of Chalcedon there is no mention of it as a synodal creed, though it appears in the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius, published 374. It was the work of Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, whose experiences it appears to reflect. Eventually it superseded the creed of the Council of Nicæa, and became the liturgical creed of the Church. The point on which particular stress is laid is that the explanation of μονογενῆ—τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός—is omitted, though ὁμοούσιος is retained. It is argued that the words ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας were far more offensive to the half-friends of the ὁμοούσιος than the word itself, as encouraging a Sabellian theory of the Sonship of Christ; that the omission of the obnoxious phrase, together with the anathemas appended to the Nicene Creed, expressed the real belief of Christian neo-orthodoxy; and that 'the Christological formula in the Creed of Jerusalem . . . is thus almost homoiousian even although it retains the ὁμοούσιος.'[3]

Such, then, is Harnack's opinion, to controvert which Bethune-Baker published in 1901 a contribution to the Cambridge *Texts and Studies* on *The Meaning of 'Homoousios' in the 'Constantinopolitan' Creed*. In dealing with the opinions of Basil of Ancyra, Bethune-Baker labours to show that this bishop was at heart in agreement with Athanasius, and that his formula ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα was in reality equivalent to ὁμοούσιος in the Athanasian sense, nor have the Cappadocians any reason to be ashamed if this Basil is the father of their theology. Turning to Meletius, who was chosen to preside over the Council of Constantinople but died before its conclusion, Bethune-Baker shows that as early as the Council of Antioch in 363 he accepted the word οὐσία in the Athanasian sense, and, before the council in 381, he and his party were in full agreement, so far as doctrine was concerned, with Damasus of Rome and Ambrose. After this comes a careful discussion of the correspondence between Basil of Cæsarea and Apollinarius, which Basil explains was between two laymen, before he was a bishop or Apollinarius a declared heretic (*c.* 358–362).

[1] *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., iv. 82.
[2] See art. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY.
[1] See art. MELETIANISM. [2] iv. 97. [3] See *ib.* p. 99.

Basil appeals for guidance. His exact words, as rendered by Bethune-Baker, are these:

'Now to express this conception [of the οὐσία of the Son] it seems to me that the term ἀπαραλλάκτως ὅμοιος ("like without any variation") is better suited than the term ὁμοούσιος.'[1]

Here, however, the stress is not on the 'likeness,' but on the unchangeability. 'In this,' says Bethune-Baker, 'he is but following in the steps of Athanasius,' who maintained that ὁμοιούσιος + ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας = ὁμοούσιος. Basil was careful never to confuse φύσις with οὐσία, and he expressly repudiates the notion that 'likeness' can describe the relation between the three ὑποστάσεις and one οὐσία of the Godhead. As regards the omission of ἐξ οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός from the Creed, Bethune-Baker points out that it is really identical with ἐκ θεοῦ, and that, when the danger of Arianism had passed, the phrase could be dropped without injuring the faith. He sees consequently no evidence that the creed of the Church changed between the Council of Nicæa and that of Constantinople, or that Athanasius represented the old, and the three Cappadocians the new, orthodoxy. To decide between opinions so divergent as the above is no easy task, as they represent two view-points so different. Bethune-Baker, however, does not seem to do sufficient justice to the fact that the Cappadocians represent a progress on the crude Athanasianism which the bishops of the East found difficult to accept till explained philosophically. The history of Semi-Arianism shows that the Arian controversy was one of the few which were decided by reason rather than authority. If the Creed of Nicæa prevailed, it was not because it was backed by the authority of the first general council, but because—granted the premisses accepted on both sides—it gave the best logical explanation of the point at issue. But, even when the correctness of the Nicene formula is admitted, it is evident that at its first appearance it gave rise to great and not unwarranted difficulties. Certainly it was in some cases impossible for some ardent Nicenes, notably Marcellus and Photinus, to free themselves from the charge of Sabellianism. It was not till the Creed of Nicæa was proved, after repeated experiments and failures, to be the only possible explanation of the relation of the Son to the Father that it was finally accepted; and the clearing up of obscure and contradictory doctrines connected with the Creed was due in no small degree to the Semi-Arian party.

LITERATURE.—Epiphanius, *Hær.* lxxiii.; Athanasius, *de Synodis, Tomus ad Antiochenos*; correspondence between Basil and Apollinarius in J. Dräseke, *Apollinarios von Laodicea: sein Leben und seine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1892 (*TU* vii. 3), p. 100 ff.; letters of Athanasius and Basil; Gregory of Nyssa (*PG* xlv.); Gregory of Nazianzus, *The Five Theological Orations*, ed. A. J. Mason, Cambridge, 1889; the Church historians: Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Rufinus; H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], Cambridge, 1900; T. Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, Gotha, 1867; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, iv.; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *The Meaning of 'Homoousios' in the 'Constantinopolitan' Creed* (*TS* vii. no. 1), Cambridge, 1901; A. Robertson, *Prolegomena to St. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters*, in 'Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers,' Oxford, 1892; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Dogmengeschichte*, Halle, 1906; G. Krüger, *Lucifer, Bischof von Calaris*, Leipzig, 1886.

F. J. FOAKES JACKSON.

SEMINOLES.—The Seminoles (Creek for 'wanderers,' 'runaways'), now numbering about 600, and living in the Everglades, a swamp, or, rather, shallow sea studded with islets, in the southern portion of the State of Florida, belong to the American Indian stock of Muskhogeans (*q.v.*). Originally inhabiting what is now the State of Georgia, they broke away from the Creeks in 1750, and migrated to their present home, having been pressed farther and farther south by the whites.

1. Religious beliefs.—The Seminole believes in a Supreme Being; he also believes in God's Son (obviously the result of Christian teaching centuries ago), that the Son of God came on earth 'long time ago to live with the Indians and to make them good Indians and to prepare them for the "big sleep" when E-shock-e-tom-e-see (God) calls them hence'; he believes that the Supreme Being lives above the clouds, and that, when the Great Spirit calls him hence, his spirit will make its last journey to the happy hunting-grounds of his fathers, winging its way over the seven-coloured rainbow of the heavens, which is the 'highway of the Great Spirit.' The Seminole believes in a future existence, In-li-ke-ta (heaven or home), to which the Indians go after death. Here they may 'hunt, hunt, hunt, plenty deer, plenty turkey, plenty bear find and cool water ojus (plenty) all the time. Bad Indians, after big sleep, hunt, hunt, hunt deer, turkey, bear—no find 'em, hot water drink all the time.' The Seminole regards the Supreme Being as the 'giver and taker of life.' His religion is sacred to him and is based on the Indian's unwritten code, 'not to lie, not to steal, not to kill, and to think with God.'

Missionaries have attempted to work among the Everglade Seminoles; they receive most respectful attention, for their reverence to God will not permit the Seminoles to laugh at these messengers; their language contains no oath nor any word to express disrespect to the Great Spirit. Their idea of the Bible, however, is vague, because it is regarded as the work of the white man. 'Injun no make book—me think good Injun find happy hunting-ground all right.' No converts have been made by the white missionaries, and the Seminole clings tenaciously to his own religion.

2. Festivals.—The festivals of the Seminoles are all of religious interest, the principal one being the Green Corn (maize) Dance, which occurs annually in June at the time of the full moon. All men who have violated their laws may be reinstated at this time by undergoing certain ordeals. The transgressors appear before the council a short time before the dance, and, if they are forgiven, they are allowed to join in the feasting and dancing. The 'black drink,' which is an emetic made from herbs, is taken by all the tribe on the first day of the dance. This cleanses them and enables them to celebrate the feast to the fullest extent; its purpose may be to remove from the body all substances that may interfere with the full working of the rite which is to be celebrated.

A picturesque feature of this festival is the dancing and playing round the festal pole, which serves as a goal. The players take sides, both men and women participating in the game. The object of the game is to strike the pole with the ball, which is knocked with a racket of bent hickory having a netted pocket made of deer thongs. The ball is tossed and caught in the netted pocket, and then hurled at the pole. The opposing side endeavour to prevent the ball from touching the pole. When the ball strikes the ground beyond the line of play, the scamper for it causes great excitement, the victor having the next play. A score-keeper stands by the pole, keeping a record of the play. As the twilight falls, the players end the game. Then the feast begins, the men, women, and children each having a position designated for them—a peculiar arrangement which is employed at no other time. The joyous ball game is followed by the dance on the night of full moon, when the men and women dance from dark until sunrise. When this dance is over, the circle about the pole is perfectly symmetrical and a well-defined pathway is made by the running and dancing. It probably has some symbolical meaning—*e.g.*, to help the sun to revolve, to assist the growth of the crops.

Another festival of importance is the Hunting Dance, which occurs in cycles—once every four years. The festival is for sorrowing, rejoicing, and purifying. Old fires are allowed to go out; not a spark must remain. New fire is produced artificially; this is the sacred fire and must be made with the ancestral flint-rock. The new fire is presented from one band to another as a token

[1] P. 41.

of friendship. Then they assemble round the fires, singing and dancing.

On the nights of this festival men, women, and children gather at the council lodge. Camp fires burn round the dancing square, in the centre of which is the sacred fire, and at each corner a pole, where the dancers assemble. The leader starts a weird melody, as the Owl Song, and from the shadows of the oaks emerge the dusky forms of the Seminoles in the most fantastic dress. Yards and yards of brightly-coloured ribbons float from the head, neck, and shoulders of the women and children. The men likewise are in brilliant coats and enormous turbans, and wear leggings gracefully adorned with thongs of deerskin, with moccasins fresh and new. Nor are the children neglected; with swirling ribbons and bright red dresses that reach to their slim ankles, they come bubbling with joy and laughter, ready to be assigned their places in the dance circle. The dancers lock hands, and mark time as they take up the chant.

All members of the festival must work. They must leave the camp at daybreak and hunt or work till noon. The men hunt large game; the boys go for hares and squirrels; while the women pick potatoes or hunt hogs, and the very small children 'hunt' water and bring in wood.

3. Mythology.—The Seminole tradition of God's Son coming to live with the Indians is that the Son of God (E-shock-e-tom-e-see-e-po-chee) stopped at the most southern point of Florida, where He was met by three medicine-men, who carried Him on their shoulders, while He sowed the seeds of the *koonti* root, which the Seminole regards as God's gift to His red children. The *koonti* is found only in this southern section of Florida, and grows luxuriantly; it resembles the sago-palm, and from its roots a starch-like substance is prepared which makes delicious little cakes. According to the legend, the Indians were in a starving condition; the ground was parched, no corn grew, and the game had all left. While the Indians waited for the *koonti* to grow, God rained down bread, 'heap plenty,' which the Seminoles gathered and ate. In describing this bread, which came down each morning, the chieftain said: 'Littly bread; white man's biscuit all the same, good, every Indian eat plenty.'

The Seminole's conception of the creation is as follows:

'Long time ago, E-shock-e-tom-e-see (God) took seeds and scattered them all around in a rich valley bordering a river. By-and-by, God saw fingers coming up out of the ground and many people, "heap too many," came up from out of the sand. Some went to the river and washed, washed, washed "too much"; it made them weak and pale; this was the *es-ta-had-kee* (white race). Others went to the river and washed *not* too much; they returned full of courage, "strong heap"; this was the *es-ta-chat-tee* (red race). The remainder, "no wash, lazy too much"; *es-ta-lus-tee* (black man).'[1]

4. Marriage and burial customs.—The Seminoles, like other American Indian tribes, are classified by *gentes*. The lineage is traced through the mother. The child belongs to the *gens* which the mother represents, and, should a squaw and her husband separate for any cause, the children belong unconditionally to the wife. A young brave dare not marry a girl from his own *gens*; he must select one from another clan. The young Seminole is shy and bashful in his courtship, and, having resolved to marry, he conceals his first overtures with all the cunning of his race. His intention is secretly conveyed to the girl's parents, and, should there be no objection, the young woman is at liberty to accept or reject—no Seminole girl is forced into marriage. The lover with permission to woo shows some token of affection. The sending and receiving of a present constitutes betrothal, and the bride-to-be shows her appreciation by making a shirt or tunic and presenting it in return. Marriage with the Seminoles is an affair of the heart and not of the purse. The day is fixed by the parents of the girl; the groom goes to the bride's home at the setting of the sun, and, taking her by the hand, he agrees to maintain her and to live at her camp. When the young couple build their own wigwam, they must build it at the camp of the wife's mother, and not among the husband's relatives. Marriage laws are held sacred, but divorce is permitted where some incompatibility of temper is found. Either party may marry again, but the marriage must meet with the approval of the council.

Separation by death has its laws: a squaw losing her husband must abstain from matrimony for one year, during which she must remove her heavy strands of beads and must live with dishevelled hair; her long black tresses, worn over her face and shoulders, cause her to present a pitiable, forsaken appearance. On the death of his squaw a husband may not hunt for four days, and for four moons must appear in mourning, *i.e.* without his many neck-cloths and his turban.

When a member of the band dies, the body is carried by two men to the place of interment at sunrise the following day. The corpse is placed on a base of logs with the face to the rising sun, and a pen of logs is built over it. The rifle and accoutrements are placed by the side of the dead man, and a bottle of *sofka* (the Seminoles' tribal dish) is buried with him, that he may eat on his last journey. Into the keeping of the Great Spirit, who lives above the clouds, the mourners commend the bivouac of the dead, making a sacred fire at each end of the grave. They then return to the camp, the women loudly wailing and tearing their hair.

5. Tribal organization. — The government among the Seminoles is largely in the hands of the medicine-men, who are important personages among all bands. According to their legends, Christ was sent to live with the Indians 'to make them good Indians,' but, when the Son of God was killed by the wicked Spaniards, as their traditions tell them, it became the duty of the medicine-men to teach the Indians and to impart the Great Spirit's wishes to His red children. The medicine-men act as advisers, priests, and doctors. The Spartan spirit is supreme; each camp has its council, and no event having any connexion with the good conduct and life of the members is allowed to go without the advice and verdict of the council. In the case of the Everglade Seminoles so strict has been the obedience of the tribe that the amount of crime has been infinitesimal, involving only minor punishments. Their laws, though unwritten, are well understood, undeviatingly enforced, and unmurmuringly obeyed.

The Seminole squaw is entitled to first claim as an American suffragist. She is a good counsellor in the camp life, and has a voice in the tribal laws; she has absolute control over the children, and is supreme in the management of the home. The money which she makes is hers to do with as she likes. If a squaw wishes to divorce her husband and can prove that she has just cause to do so, she can not only divorce him but name his punishment.

6. Character, dress, and food.—The Seminoles are gentle, kindly, and hospitable. They live a life of utmost purity, for the death penalty would follow any breach of virtue. The women are as chaste and modest as perhaps are the women of no other race to-day. Not a drop of the white man's blood courses through the veins of an Everglade Seminole.

In personal appearance the Seminole is far above the average. Many of the men are more than six feet in height, but so symmetrically proportioned that one loses sight of their height. Their features are good, their hands and feet remarkably small, their voices soft and low.

The Seminole dress consists of a tunic, highly decorated with narrow bands of red, close-fitting leggings, and moccasins. The turban, picturesque and oriental in its effect, is the insignia of the race and is worn almost constantly. It is made from enormous handkerchiefs or small woollen shawls, wrapped round and round the head and held in position by a band, often of beaten silver, encircling the whole. Another char-

[1] See M. Moore-Willson, *The Seminoles of Florida*, ed. New York, 1919, p. 163.

acteristic of the dress is the numerous handkerchiefs worn knotted loosely about the neck—the more handkerchiefs worn, the greater pride does the Seminole feel in his costume. The women, on the other hand, wear no head-dress or moccasins. Beads of many colours—and many pounds in weight—are the Seminole woman's badge of distinction, and she never appears without them. When the little papoose is one year old, she is given her first string with its 'first-year bead.' This bead is always larger than the rest and of different colour. A string of beads is allowed for each year until she marries, and at her marriage her mother gives her many new strands. A string of beads is always a reward for any prowess, and a mother is allowed two strings for each child born. In full dress many of the squaws wear from twenty to thirty pounds of glass beads, the colours of which blend in perfect harmony. When the squaw reaches middle life, she begins to take off her beads, one string at a time, until only one string is left. She is now an old squaw, too old to work, and the single strand is made up of the life beads and is buried with her.

Sofka is the tribal dish of the Seminoles: it is a stew containing the nutriment of many foods. The *sofka* spoon or ladle, made of wood, is a valued household article, and the authority of the women is seen again here, for a spoon cannot be sold or taken from camp without their consent. The different households have differently shaped and carved spoons, each band having its own particular style, or Seminole 'coat of arms.'

LITERATURE.—Clay MacCauley, 'The Seminole Indians of Florida,' in *5RBEW* (1887), pp. 469–531, art. 'Seminole' in *HAI*; Minnie Moore-Willson, *The Seminoles of Florida*, New York, 1910, [2]1916. M. MOORE-WILLSON.

SEMI-PELAGIANISM.—See PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM.

SEMITES.—

'Semites' is a term applied to a group of nations, partly living and partly dead, who live or have lived in Western Asia and Eastern Africa. The name is based on the fact that several of these nations or parts of them are said in Gn 10 to be descended from the patriarch Shem. While the name was suggested by Genesis, the classification of modern scholars does not coincide with that of Genesis, but is based on linguistic and racial characteristics. Thus in Genesis Elam is classed as a son of Shem, but the Elamite language shows that the Elamites belonged to a different race. Canaan is in Genesis classed with the sons of Ham, but linguistically and racially the Canaanites are now known to be Semites. Through a confusion of the Egyptian *keš* (Nubia) and the Babylonian *kaš* (the Kassite country) the author of Genesis was led to class the Babylonians as Hamitic, but we now know that the Babylonians were at least half Semitic. The peoples counted as Semitic are the Akkadians,[1] Assyrians,[2] Amorites, Canaanites (*q.v.*), Aramæans,[3] Phœnicians (*q.v.*), Carthaginians, Hebrews,[4] Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, Nabatæans, Arabs, Sabæans (*qq.v.*), or South Arabs, and Abyssinians.[5] Whether the Egyptians should be counted as Semitic is a moot question.

The languages of these peoples, excepting the Egyptians, are very closely related—as closely as French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese are to one another. Notwithstanding considerable racial mixture in some of the nations speaking those languages, as in Babylonia and Abyssinia, there is a good degree of similarity in their physical and mental characteristics. This similarity is, however, difficult to define. The attempt of Renan[6] to define them has been criticized by Nöldeke,[7] because it attributed to the whole Semitic race characteristics of Hebrews and Arabs. In Assyria and N. Africa[8] some of these supposed characteristics, such as inaptitude for political and military affairs, have not manifested themselves. The Semitic nations possessed skulls of similar shape, and all exhibited intensity of faith.

1 See art. SUMERO-AKKADIANS.
2 See art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS.
3 See art. SYRIANS. 4 See art. ISRAEL.
5 See art. ABYSSINIA.
6 E. Renan, *Hist. générale des langues sémitiques*, pp. 7–17.
7 *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Semitic Languages.'
8 Islām has carried the Arabic language over N. Africa, where it is now spoken by many peoples who are non-Semitic.

1. Relation to the Hamites.—The problem of the origin of the Semites, as well as the question whether the Egyptians were Semites, is closely bound up with the relation of the Semites to the Hamites.[1] According to the Africanist Meinhof,[2] 47 Hamitic languages, comprising 71 dialects are spoken in Africa to-day. Through the labours of Reinisch, Stumme, Motylinski, and others the structure of several of these languages is known to the scholarly world. The tribes speaking them are scattered over N. Africa and penetrate the central Sahara to its southern side, and over E. Africa along the Red Sea through Abyssinia and Somaliland. One school of philologists count ancient Egyptian and its daughter, Coptic, as belonging to this group[3]—a view shared by certain anthropologists.[4] Friedrich Müller divides them into (1) the Egyptian group (Egyptian and Coptic), (2) the Libyan group (Tamesheq), and (3) the Ethiopic group (Bedza, Galla, Somali, Saho, Chamir, etc.). Sergi classifies them as follows:

I. *Eastern branch.*	II. *Northern branch.*
1. Ancient and modern Egyptians (Copts, Fellahin), excluding the Arabs.	1. Berbers of Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Sahara.
2. Nubians, Bejas.	2. Tebus or Tubus.
3. Abyssinians.	3. Fulahs or Fulbés.
4. Gallas, Danákal (Dankali), Somalis.	4. Guanches of the Canaries
5. Masai.	
6. Wahuma or Watusi.	

It should be noted that the Abyssinian language (Ethiopic) is not properly included in this group, since it and its daughters (Amharic, Tigre, Tigrena, and Harari) are clearly Semitic tongues. Fulbé was classed by Müller as a Nubian language, but Meinhof claims that it is partly Hamitic, forming a bridge between the Nubian and Hamitic groups.[5] W. Max Müller holds[6] that Sergi's Northern group should be classed as Libyan languages rather than Hamitic, while Erman and his school[7] claim that Egyptian (with its descendant Coptic) must be counted a Semitic language that has suffered great deterioration from contact with African dialects. That there is kinship with Semitic is, no doubt, true, but it is a question whether it is confined to Egyptian, and whether it cannot be more satisfactorily explained on the basis of a common Hamito-Semitic ancestry than by the theory of a pre-historic Semitic invasion of Egypt. The kinship of the Semitic and Hamitic peoples is revealed by the following phenomena of language:

(1) The pronouns, which in the languages of the world are the most *sui generis* of all the parts of speech, are in these two groups so nearly akin as to be practically identical. This identity is common to the Semitic tongues, to the Libyan and Berber dialects, to the dialects of Somaliland, and to early and late Egyptian and Coptic. The Egyptian pronoun is no more pronouncedly Semitic than that of the other Hamitic tongues. Indeed, the pronoun in early Egyptian texts is not so similar to the Semitic as is that found in the later texts, whereas, on the theory of Erman, the exact reverse should be the case.[8]

(2) The Semitic languages possess but two tenses, one formed by affixing pronominal particles to a verb stem, to express completed action, and one formed by prefixing pronominal particles, to express incomplete action. In Arabic five forms of this second or imperfect tense are known, in Ethiopic and Assyrian two, while in Hebrew and Aramaic sporadic instances of a second form survive. In Assyrian (and Akkadian) the so-

1 The term 'Hamite,' like 'Semite,' was suggested by Gn 10, but in modern parlance is applied to a group of peoples whose languages are related. The group is only partially identical with the Hamitic nations of Genesis.
2 *An Introd. to the Study of African Languages*, map opposite p. 159.
3 *E.g.*, F. Müller, *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*, Vienna, 1876–84, iii. 226 ff.
4 G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, p. 41.
5 P. 47.
6 *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Hamitic Races and Languages.'
7 Cf. A. Erman, in *ZDMG* xlvi. [1892] 93–129, and *Ägyptische Grammatik*[3], Berlin, 1911, p. 1; also A. Ember, *ZA* xlix. [1911] 87 ff., l. [1912] 86 ff., li. [1913] 110 ff.; J. H. Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*[2], New York, 1909, pp. 7, 25, 26.
8 Cf. F. Müller, pp. 253 ff., 353 ff.; or the comparison made by the present writer in *JAOS* xxxv. [1915] 215 ff.

called perfect form—that which originally expressed completed action—has been relegated to the expression of states of being, and completed action is expressed by one of the imperfect forms. In other words, in Assyrian and Akkadian the so-called perfect may be seen in process of elimination.[1]

In the Hamitic languages, for nearly all of which we possess no ancient literature, there is considerable variety. Somali, Afar (Dankali), Saho, and Kabyle have preserved both the perfect made by affortmatives and the imperfect made by preformatives.[2] The Galla has preserved only the perfect form, modifying it to express different shades of meaning.[3] Bedauyé, Shilhish, and R'edamès have eliminated the perfect, as the Akkadian and Assyrian were doing, and express the various shades of thought by modifications of the imperfect.[4]

Egyptian, like Galla, has entirely lost the imperfect. All its verb formations are made on the analogy of the Semitic perfect, by affixes to the verb stem. There is a considerable number of these, and one of them, the so-called pseudo-participle, is a survival of the real Semitic perfect.[5] In the Pyramid Texts it is used as a transitive verb like the ordinary Semitic perfect; in the texts of the Middle Kingdom it has become an intransitive or passive, like the perfect form in Akkadian and Assyrian; in the later language it is often replaced by other constructions.[6] These constructions consist primarily of a verbal noun to which the suffix form of the pronoun is appended: thus *śedemi*, 'I will hear'; *śedemk*, 'thou wilt hear.' The participial form of the verbal stem imparts to the combination a future meaning. Other meanings are obtained by variations of this norm. *Śedemenef* has an aoristic significance; *śedemwf* a passive meaning; *śedemynf* is also a passive; *śedemḥarf* expresses resultant action; *śedemk'f* expresses wishes.[7] These forms, made on the analogy of the Semitic perfect, have entirely displaced the imperfect, and, in the later language, the perfect. The so-called pseudo-participle (perfect) is practically unknown in Coptic. Erman and Ember explain this phenomenon in Egyptian on the supposition that there was a pre-historic invasion of Egypt by Semites from Asia, who for a time imposed their language on the Egyptians, and in course of time this Semitic tongue was largely submerged by African tendencies of speech furnished by the pre-Semitic elements in the population. The argument from the comparison of general grammatical forms is reinforced by comparisons of the Egyptian and Semitic vocabularies, by which it is proved that the roots of many Egyptian words are identical with the roots of many Semitic words. As the roots by which these same meanings are expressed in the other Hamitic tongues are quite different, the argument from vocabulary appears at first sight to have considerable force.

In reality the argument from vocabulary is fallacious. For the other Hamitic dialects we have no literature for the early time. It is all modern—millenniums later than the Egyptian. In all living languages words become obsolete, giving way to others. There is no evidence that Semitic roots did not appear in the other Hamitic dialects 4000 or 5000 years ago; or that they would appear in Egyptian, if Egyptian had remained a non-literary language, and we knew it only as a spoken dialect to-day. The argument from vocabulary must, therefore, be discarded.

If, now, the verbs of the two groups of languages are viewed broadly, it appears that it is not necessary to posit a Semitic invasion of Egypt in order to explain the existence there of the pseudo-participle. Another explanation seems more natural. Had there been such an invasion, it is difficult to explain why it should not have imparted to Egyptian the Semitic imperfect as well as the Semitic perfect. There is no early Semitic dialect from which the imperfect is lacking, and Semites entering Egypt must have carried this with them. On the other hand, the presence of the perfect form in other Hamitic dialects, and the analogy of the Galla language, which has lost the imperfect formation, show that the phenomena of Egyptian are paralleled in Hamitic, though not in Semitic. The phenomena find a more satisfactory explanation on the supposition that the Semites and Hamites are descended from a common stock, and that the Egyptians are a branch of the Hamitic stock.

This view of the matter receives confirmation from a consideration of the larger aspects of the verbal stems in Semitic and Hamitic. There are indications in Coptic that certain Egyptian stems formed an intensive by doubling the middle radical, as do the Semitic languages.[8] This formation has survived in the Berber dialect of R'edamès,[9] where it is employed to express habitual action, and in Bilin[10] and Chamir,[11] at the other extreme of the Hamitic territory, where it expresses intensity as in Semitic. These dialects of Somaliland also, like Hebrew, form *pilpels*. Again, Egyptian forms a *niphal*,[1] like Hebrew, Arabic, and Assyrian, by prefixing the letter *n*. A similar form is found at the two extremes of the Hamitic peoples in Saho[2] and Shilhish.[3] In Tamesheq,[4] the dialect of R'edamès,[5] Bedauyé,[6] and Saho,[7] the *n* is changed to *m* (in most languages the two sometimes interchange). The formation is also present in Bilin,[8] where the *n* is changed to its kindred liquid *r*. Egyptian also forms causatives in *s*, like the Semitic,[9] but this is paralleled in Bedauyé,[10] Bilin,[11] Chamir,[12] Saho,[13] Tamesheq,[14] R'edamès,[15] and Shilhish.[16] It seems to the present writer, therefore, that we are justified in regarding the Egyptians as a Hamitic people. It seems also clear, however, that the Semites and Hamites were, at some remote epoch, one stock.

2. The Semitic cradle-land. — At least five different theories as to the cradle-land of the Semites have been put forward.

(1) Babylonia has been regarded as the earliest home of the Semites by von Kremer,[17] Guidi,[18] and Hommel.[19] Von Kremer noted that the word for 'camel' is common to all the Semitic dialects, whereas they have no common name for the date-palm or the ostrich. He concluded that in remote antiquity the Semites migrated from the great central table-land of Asia near the sources of the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and first settled in Babylonia, whence they were by migration scattered to the other Semitic lands of history. Similar linguistic arguments led Guidi and Hommel to fix the first centre of Semitic life in Babylonia, though Hommel afterwards shifted it to Upper Mesopotamia. Driver[20] was at one time inclined to accept this view. Linguistic considerations, especially those based on vocabulary alone, form, however, too insecure a basis of induction for the solution of so large a problem.

(2) The most widely accepted theory at the present day is that Arabia was the cradle-land of the Semites. This theory was defended in 1861 by Sprenger,[21] and was afterwards advocated by Sayce,[22] Schrader,[23] de Goeje,[24] and Wright.[25] It is based on the observed facts that mountaineers do not become nomads, and that people do not migrate from a fertile country like Babylonia to a sterile land like Arabia. From time immemorial wave after wave of Arabs has poured forth from Arabia to the more fertile contiguous lands, and there is no evidence that the course of migration was in a large way ever in the other direction. Moreover, the Arabic language has preserved a far larger proportion of the peculiarities of primitive Semitic speech than the other Semitic tongues.

(3) A third theory, which may be regarded as a modification of the second, is that the original home of the Semites is to be sought in Africa, and that Arabia was the earliest Asiatic home and

[1] Cf. H. Zimmern, *Vergleichende Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen*, Berlin, 1898, p. 82 ff.; or C. Brockelmann, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen*, Berlin, 1907–12, i. 504 ff.

[2] Cf. L. Reinisch, *Die 'Afar-Sprache*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1886–87, *Die Sprache der Irob-Saho in Abessinien*, do. 1878; H. Stumme, *Handbuch des Schilhischen von Tazerwalt*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 55.

[3] Müller, p. 291 f.

[4] Reinisch, *Die Beḍauye-Sprache in Nordost-Afrika*, 4 vols., Vienna, 1893–94; Stumme, *op. cit.*; and A. de Calassanti-Motylinski, *Le Dialecte berbère de Rédamès*, Paris, 1904.

[5] Erman, *Ägyp. Grammatik*[3], § 280.

[6] K. Sethe, *Das ägyptische Verbum*, Leipzig, 1899, ii. 1.

[7] *Ib.* §§ 278–324. [8] Sethe, p. 344.

[9] Calassanti-Motylinski, p. 33.

[10] Reinisch, *Die Bilin-Sprache in Nordost-Afrika*, Vienna, 1882, p. 21.

[11] Reinisch, *Die Chamirsprache in Abessinien*, Vienna, 1884, p. 46.

[1] Erman, § 271; Sethe, § 357.

[2] Reinisch, *Sprache der Irob-Saho*, p. 7.

[3] Stumme, p. 70. [4] F. Müller, p. 278.

[5] Calassanti-Motylinski, p. 33.

[6] Reinisch, *Beḍauye-Sprache*, p. 130.

[7] Reinisch, *Sprache der Irob-Saho*, p. 7.

[8] Reinisch, *Bilin-Sprache*, p. 27.

[9] Erman, § 270; Sethe, § 350.

[10] Reinisch, *Beḍauye-Sprache*, p. 126.

[11] Reinisch, *Bilin-Sprache*, p. 22.

[12] Reinisch, *Chamirsprache*, p. 46.

[13] Reinisch, *Sprache der Irob-Saho*, p. 6.

[14] F. Müller, p. 270. [15] Calassanti-Motylinski, p. 33.

[16] Stumme, p. 69.

[17] Cf. his 'Semitische Culturentlehnungen aus dem Pflanzen- und Thierreiche,' in *Das Ausland*, iv. [1875] nos. 1 and 2.

[18] Cf. his 'Della sede primitiva dei popoli Semitici,' in the *Proceedings of the Reale Accademia dei Lincei* for 1879.

[19] *Die Namen der Säugthiere bei den südsemitischen Völkern*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 406, and *Die semitischen Völker und Sprachen*, do. 1881–83, i. 63.

[20] *Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew*, Oxford, 1881, p. 250 n.

[21] *Leben und Lehre des Mohammad*, Berlin, 1861–69, i. 241 ff., and *Die alte Geographie Arabiens*, Bern, 1875, p. 293.

[22] *Assyrian Grammar*, Oxford, 1872, p. 13.

[23] *ZDMG* xxvii. [1873] 397–420.

[24] *Het Vaderland der semitische Volken*, Leyden, 1882.

[25] *Lectures on the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages*, Cambridge, 1890, p. 8.

distributing centre of this race. This theory has been advocated by Palgrave,[1] Gerland,[2] Bertin,[3] Nöldeke,[4] Brinton,[5] Morris Jastrow,[6] Keane,[7] Ripley,[8] and Barton.[9] It is based in part on the linguistic evidence of relationship between the Hamitic and Semitic languages already discussed, in part on similarity of physical characteristics (such as the form of the jaw and the slenderness of the calf of the leg), and upon data secured by an ethnographic study of the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. In the opinion of the present writer, this is the most probable theory, and accounts best for all the facts.

(4) Another theory, which is an extension of the second hypothesis and reverses the third, is that Arabia was the original home of the Semites and that the Egyptians were formed by Semites who migrated to Africa and mingled with an earlier Negroid population of the Nile valley. This view has been advocated by Wiedemann,[10] de Morgan,[11] Erman,[12] Breasted,[13] and Ember.[14] It is based, as already explained, on the fact that old Egyptian has a form of the verb which corresponds to the Semitic perfect, and that the vocabularies of Egyptian and its daughter, Coptic, are much more nearly related to Semitic vocabularies than are those of other Hamitic languages. As already pointed out, these linguistic facts are more satisfactorily accounted for in another way.

(5) A. T. Clay is the protagonist of the view that the cradle-land of the Semites was Amurru (also read in cuneiform, *Uru*), a region which lay between Syria and Mesopotamia.[15] His arguments are based mainly on his interpretation of proper names. He contends that the names of antediluvian patriarchs in Babylonia — Kalumum, Zagugib, Armû, Etana, Piliqam (=Peleg), Lugalbanda, Dumuzi, Bilqa-mesh (Gilgamesh), and Enkidu—are Semitic names. He also claims that it can be shown that Humbaba (Humba) is not an Elamite god, but a despot whose palace was in the cedars of Lebanon.[16] Clay also contends that the prominent Babylonian gods are of West Semitic origin, viz. Adad, Amurru (Uru), Anu, Antu, Ashur, Dagan, In-Urta, Ishtar, Mash, Shamash, Urru, Zababa, etc. He further holds that, apart from the eruption of Muhammadans from Arabia in the 7th cent. A.D.—the impetus of which was to plunder the world—there have been no examples of spilling-over from Arabia into the fertile lands.[17]

With reference to this theory three observations seem to be necessary. (*a*) The positive evidence for it is of the most unsubstantial philological character. It is based on possible phonetic changes in proper names. The wider and more fundamental linguistic phenomena, which point to kinship between the Hamites and Semites, and which must be taken into account in any adequate theory, are ignored. (*b*) The contention that the Islâmic eruption from Arabia is the only historical one is scarcely true to the facts. That was the most spectacular, but, as is well known to those who have lived on the border of the desert, the migration from Arabia to the more fertile lands has been silently going on from time immemorial, and is in progress still. (*c*) Even if the theory were true, it does not prove that Arabia was not the cradle-land of the Semitic race; it would only localize that cradle-land in that part of N. Arabia that may have at one time been called Amurru, or the land of the Amorites.

3. **Relation to Indo-Europeans.**—It was formerly assumed (and the view is still widely held) that all human beings were descended from a single pair. Where this view prevails, it is naturally supposed that at some time, not too remotely anterior to the dawn of history, the Semites and the Indo-Europeans formed one people. It is unnecessary to say that there are many problems connected with the origin of both the Indo-Europeans and the Hamito-Semitic stock that are still unsolved; but, in spite of this, the advance in knowledge that is made from decade to decade tends to show that there is no demonstrable relationship between the two divisions of the human race. A comparison of their languages points to this negative conclusion. It seems probable that triliteral roots (*i.e.* roots consisting of three consonants, vowels being disregarded) were the basis originally of all Hamito-Semitic words. To the Indo-European mind this peculiar method of conceiving a vocal root appears most peculiar and foreign. There is no uniform tri-literality to Indo-European roots, and no such disregard of vowels. Indo-European roots sometimes consist of a single letter, and that a vowel.

Again, the whole interest in the actions of persons and the method of expressing that interest are different. To the Indo-European mind the time of an action is important; hence in the languages belonging to this group the tense-system is well developed. It is in these languages possible to make it clear whether an act is still going on, began in past time and is just reaching completion, was completed in past time, was completed in the past before some other event in the past, is still to happen, or will be completed in the future before something else happens. In some of the languages a seventh tense, expressive of momentary or timeless action, also exists. In contrast to this, the Hamito-Semitic languages had but two tenses, and primarily neither of these expressed time. One indicated that an action was complete, the other that it was incomplete. To make a narrative vivid a speaker might use of a past action the form of the verb denoting incompleteness; or to make a future deed seem certain he might employ the verbal form denoting completed action. The interest of the Hamito-Semitic mind in the time of an action was of the slightest. While the Hamito-Semite cared little for the time of an action, he was intensely interested in other phases of human activity. Whether a deed was done simply or under such strong emotion that the act was intensive, whether one did it of his own free will or some one else caused him to do it, whether he did it for himself or on himself, whether he was caused to do it for or on himself—these were the things that to the Hamito-Semitic mind seemed important. In the verbs of the languages of these races there are forms for the expression of all such shades of meaning. The Arabic, in which the most elaborate system for the expression of such shades of thought has survived, has no fewer than fifteen forms or 'stems' of the verb for this purpose. Six of them are of comparatively infrequent occurrence, it is true, but the existence of any such form is indicative of a different interest, a different psychological make-up, and a radically different method of conceiving and expressing thought from that which underlies the Indo-European verb-system. If we suppose that the two groups of races formed one people after the development of human speech (or, at least, after the development of any of the existing families of languages), it is

[1] *EBr*[9], *s.v.* 'Arabia.'
[2] *Iconographic Encyclopedia*, i., *s.v.* 'Ethnography.'
[3] *JAI* xi. [1882] 431 ff.
[4] *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Semitic Languages.'
[5] *The Cradle of the Semites*, and *Races and Peoples*, p. 132.
[6] See his art. in Brinton, *Cradle of the Semites*.
[7] *Ethnology*, p. 392, *Man, Past and Present*, Cambridge, 1899, p. 490.
[8] *The Races of Europe*, p. 376.
[9] *A Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*, ch. i.
[10] In J. de Morgan, *Recherches sur les origines de l'Egypte*, Paris, 1897, i. 219, 225, 228.
[11] *Ib.* p. 196.
[12] *SBAW* xix. [1900] 350 ff., and *Ägyptische Grammatik*[3], p. 1 f.
[13] *Hist. of Egypt*[2], pp. 7, 25, 26.
[14] *ZÄ* xlix. 87 ff., l. 86 ff., li. 110 ff.
[15] See, *e.g.*, his *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites, Miscellaneous Inscriptions from the Yale Babylonian Collection*, New Haven, 1915, and *The Empire of the Amorites*, New Haven, 1919.
[16] *Empire of the Amorites*, p. 87 f. [17] *Ib.* ch. ii.

hardly conceivable that they should have differed so radically in the conception and expression of thought, or should have transformed the daughter-tongues of a once common speech into languages that differ so widely in the most fundamental elements of speech. The conclusion seems forced upon us that, if there is any kinship between the Indo-European group and the Hamito-Semitic group, the ancestors of the two must have separated far back in the history of *homo alalus*, before the beginnings of language. We can trace the Hamito-Semitic stock to the great Mediterranean race. The origin of the Aryans is far less clear. It is probable that, wherever the human species originated, whether, as Haeckel and others think, in a continent that once occupied the area of the Indian ocean, or, as Quatrefages thought, on the roof of the world north of the Himalayas, or, as Gerland and Brinton held, in the Mediterranean basin, or, as Giddings holds, in 'a tropical or sub-tropical zone which reached half-way around the earth from Java north-westerly to England,' it had spread over most of the globe before human speech was developed. In that case the Aryan speech and the Hamito-Semitic speech are entirely independent developments in different centres. Probably there were other independent centres of development also. The older custom of classing all non-Indo-European and non-Hamito-Semitic languages together and calling them 'Turanian' was based largely upon our ignorance of such languages.

4. **Classification.** — Classifications of Semitic nations are based by scholars upon peculiarities of their languages when compared with one another. The languages fall into five groups, as follows:

1. The Mesopotamian group.
   (1) Akkadian (spoken in Babylonia).
   (2) Assyrian.
2. The Aramaic group.
   A. East Aramaic.
      (1) Babylonian Aramaic (Babylonian Talmud).
      (2) Mandæan.
      (3) Syriac.
      (4) Modern dialects spoken in Kurdistan and Urumia.
   B. West Aramaic.
      (1) Dialect of Samal and Ya'di.
      (2) Inscription of ZKR.
      (3) Jewish Aramaic (Biblical).
      (4) Palmyrene (inscriptions).
      (5) Nabatæan (inscriptions).
      (6) Jewish Palestinian (Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan, Jerusalem Talmud, Targumim and Midrashim).
      (7) Christian-Palestinian Aramaic.
      (8) Samaritan.
      (9) Dialect of Ma'lula in the Lebanon.
3. Canaanitish group.
   (1) Phœnician.
   (2) Hebrew:
      (*a*) Biblical.
      (*b*) Mishnaic.
   (3) Moabitish.
4. The Arabic group.
   A. North Arabic.
      (1) North Arabic inscriptions.
      (2) Classical Arabic.
      (3) Modern dialects (innumerable).
   B. South Arabic.
      (1) Minæan and Sabæan (inscriptions).
      (2) Mehri.
      (3) Soqotri.
5. Abyssinian.
   (1) Abyssinian inscriptions.
   (2) Ethiopic (*Ge'ez*).
   (3) Modern dialects:
      (*a*) Tigre, Tigrina.
      (*b*) Amharic.
      (*c*) Hariri, Guraghe.

A comparison of these groups of tongues seems to most scholars to show that groups 1, 2, and 3 are more closely related to one another than they are to groups 4 and 5, and that there is a closer kinship between groups 4 and 5 than there is between either of these groups and 1, 2, and 3.

Most Semitic scholars, therefore, divide them into Northern Semites and Southern Semites. The Northern Semites, according to this classification, fall into three groups:

Eastern.	*Central or Aramæan.*	*Western or Canaanite.*
Babylonians	Syrians	Amorites
Assyrians	Damascenes	Canaanites
	Nabatæans	Phœnicians
	etc.	Carthaginians
		Hebrews
		Ammonites
		Moabites
		Edomites.

The Southern Semites are the Arabs, South Arabians, and Abyssinians. This classification rests on a sound linguistic basis. The South Semitic languages have some peculiarities, such as broken or internal plurals, that are entirely wanting in North Semitic. The grouping of the Northern Semites also rests on the fact that the languages of each group, while differing in many respects from those of the other groups, form among themselves only dialects of the same language.

Another classification has been adopted by some scholars—*e.g.*, Hommel[1] and Clay[2]—who divide the Semitic nations into East Semites and West Semites, the former embracing the Babylonians and Assyrians, and the latter including all the others. This division rests upon the fact that the Babylonians are supposed to have separated from the rest of the Semitic stock long anterior to any other division among the Semites, so that their language, having a longer time in which to develop peculiarities, differed (according to hypothesis) more widely from the primitive Semitic norm than any other Semitic language. This classification is not so satisfactory as the other. While it is true that the languages of the East Semites have some peculiarities that are *sui generis*, they are on the whole more nearly related to those of the Aramæan and Canaanitish Semites than to those of Arabia and Abyssinia.

5. **Characteristics.**—It is not easy to sum up the characteristics of an individual; it is well-nigh impossible accurately to sum up those of a race. Sayce, *e.g.*, declared the Semitic characteristics to be intensity of faith, ferocity, exclusiveness, and imagination. It is doubtful, however, whether Semites have ever been more ferocious than other peoples who were at the same stage of civilization as the Semites when they committed the atrocities that impress the modern man. Ferocity is characteristic of all ancient nations and of all barbarous nations. As to the other characteristics mentioned, the Aryans of India—to cite but one example—have probably surpassed the Semites in intensity of faith, in imagination, and in exclusiveness.

We shall tread on safer ground if we note certain features of Semitic social organization, religion, and art, and seek from these to discover characteristics.

(1) *Social organization.*—(*a*) The earliest social organization of the Semites was of a matriarchal type. Marriage was polyandrous, and the relations between the sexes were, from a modern point of view, ill regulated.[3] This organization was in a sense forced upon them by the sterile environment of their cradle-land, Arabia, where the struggle for existence was most intense, driving them into a barbarous sort of civilization in advance of other savages, but making a high civilization impossible. Mentally developed by this struggle earlier than all other peoples except their Hamitic kinsmen, they were prevented by their surroundings for centuries from attaining the highest civilization. Their desert and oasis environment impressed

[1] F. Hommel, *Die semitischen Völker und Sprachen*, i., 'Die sprachgeschichtliche Stellung des Babylonisch-Assyrischen,' in *Études archéologiques, linguistiques et historiques dédiées à C. Leemans*, Leyden, 1885, pp. 127–129, and *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, Munich, 1892, pp. 92–128.

[2] Clay nowhere makes a clear statement on the subject, but in *Amurru* and *The Empire of the Amorites* (*passim*) speaks of the 'West Semites' as though he took the classification for granted.

[3] Barton, ch. ii.

their minds with the great contrast between the fertile oasis and the sterile desert. Nothing seemed to them so divine as the power to give life, either vegetable or animal. They deified that power. A matriarchal society led them to regard the chief deity of fertility as a goddess. She gave the date-palm; she gave children; she gave the increase of the camels, goats, and sheep. Every act that in this rudely organized society tended to create life was sacred to her. The name of this goddess as Ishtar, Ashtar, Ashtart, Attar, Ashtoreth, or Athtar is the one divine name that is universal among Semites. No other deity commanded the devotion of all Semites as she did. She was on the side of life; the desert was death. Her worship continued in all Semitic lands far down into historical times, though in S. Arabia and Abyssinia she was transformed into a god. The less well regulated and barbarous sexual customs and orgies of the earliest times were protected by the reverence and devotion felt for her, and so were continued as sacred services in all Semitic countries well into the historical period. In Israel they were eradicated only by the ethical teaching of the prophets, reinforced by the providential disasters that befell the nation at the hand of Assyria and Babylon.

The worship of mother-goddesses and the matriarchal organization were not peculiar to the Semites; the former has been found in all parts of the world; the latter was coupled with it among the Hittites, Cretans, Celts, and others. The peculiarly sterile cradle-land of the Semites gave to the Semitic mind a stronger bent in this direction than is found among most other peoples. At its worst this manifested itself in such sexual orgies as the prophets denounced, though these could be paralleled, if not exceeded, by those of the Saivites of India. At its best this tendency is seen in that delight in offspring and devotion to family that is characteristic of the Jews to this day. It is this which also makes every Arab jubilant at the birth of a son. Among all peoples the perpetuation of race has become at some stage of development a chief care. Among Semites this care has been, for the reasons mentioned, more all-pervasive and persistent.

(*b*) While the Semites made considerable advance in the earlier forms of social organization, they contributed little, if anything, to the larger forms of political organization that build up successful and stable empires. Their long struggle for existence as small units in the desert led them to work out several forms of clan organization and developed in them a strong clan spirit. These organizations allowed the individual a good degree of freedom. The *shaikh*, or leader, was only *primus inter pares*. He had only such authority as the public opinion of his clan was willing to enforce. When more favourable circumstances permitted the construction of empire, Semites proved themselves capable warriors and despots, able to establish temporary dominion over an extensive territory. Examples of this are to be found in the empire of Sargon of Agade, that of the first dynasty of Babylon, that of Assyria, that of the Neo-Babylonians, and the various dominions of the Muhammadan khalifahs. In a lesser degree the empire of King David of Israel also illustrates it. These empires were built up by cruel and bloody conquest (though not more cruel than other conquests equally ancient) and were absolute monarchies. It has been well said that the 'Semitic form of government was a despotism tempered by assassination.'[1] There are inherent weaknesses in such a political order. Everything depends upon the energy and character of the despot. Weakness in him causes immediate decay of the State. For this reason every Semitic state has led a chequered career, and the Semites have contributed little to the political philosophy of the world. In making this statement it is not forgotten that in modern European countries Jews here and there have proved themselves able and far-seeing statesmen, and have made contributions to sound political philosophy. They have done this, however, under the stimulus of a non-Semitic environment, and it is hardly proper to credit their achievements to their Semitic ancestry.

The failure of Semites to make a large contribution to the advanced political development of the world may be attributed in part to the early period in human development during which Semitic states flourished. There is, however, little in their history to lead one to suppose that, had they held the hegemony of the world at a later and more advanced period, the case would have been different. The aptitude for such leadership, except under outside stimulus, was apparently not theirs. The Code of Ḥammurabi, however, and some of the laws of the Jewish Pentateuch exhibit an aptitude for working out certain primary problems of social justice. The Pentateuch at least has had extensive influence upon Western civilization. If, then, they have lacked ability to develop a broad political philosophy, they have made a valuable contribution to the realization of social justice.

(2) *Art.*—In the field of art the productions of the Semitic peoples are on the whole not of the highest rank. While there are one or two exceptions to be noted below, broadly speaking, wherever we find the work of pure Semites, unstimulated by contact with other races, it is crude; it lacks artistic beauty. This is true of Semitic architecture, of Semitic modelling, and of the arts generally. It is true that pottery, bronze work, and the silver vase found at Telloh (Lagash) in S. Babylonia[1] are as excellent as any work of the kind known to us from a time equally ancient, but these were produced, if not by pure Sumerians, by Semites with a large admixture of Sumerian blood. The same remark applies to the busts, stelæ, and beautifully carved seal cylinders of the kings of Agade. Similarly, the art of the Muhammadan Arabs is in many respects very fine.[2] The mosque of 'Umar at Jerusalem is wonderfully beautiful, and the Alhambra of Spain—to mention but one example of Muhammadan art in that land—is one of the artistic wonders of the world. Such creations were not, however, the work of unaided Semitic genius, but were due in large measure to the genius of Persians and others, whom Islām had absorbed. When Phœnician civilization was at its height, Phœnician art attained a degree of barbaric finish, but it was seldom beautiful and probably never original. The Phœnicians were the carriers of the Levant for a time, and their artistic impulses were derived from Egypt or Mesopotamia. The OT echoes with the praises of the beauty of the temple of Solomon, and undoubtedly it was, like the temple of Melkart at Tyre described by Herodotus, a building of barbaric splendour. Could it be restored, however, the modern architect would not find it beautiful. Its reputation is due largely to the fact that it was the grandest building that the Hebrews, whose buildings lacked all artistic beauty, had ever seen. Whatever beauty the buildings with which Herod the Great adorned Palestine may have possessed (and their remains prove that they were beautiful), it must be remembered that Herod drew his inspiration from Hellenic models and probably employed Hellenic architects.

[1] C. H. Toy, in his lectures at Harvard University.

[1] See art. ART (Assyro-Babylonian).
[2] See art. ART (Muhammadan).

The one real exception to the inartistic character of Semitic work is found in the figures of animals from the palaces of the Sargonid kings of Assyria (722–626 B.C.), especially those from the palace of Ashurbanipal (668–626 B.C.). Here animals in action are not only carved more successfully than elsewhere in the ancient world up to that time, but they commend themselves for their beauty and success when judged by modern standards. The action of horses, wild asses, lions, etc., the pose of their bodies, and the delineation of their straining muscles leave little to be desired. The great artistic ability of many Jews in modern times, in music, painting, etc., is not a real exception to the general artistic inaptitude of the Semites, for such artistic production is due to the stimulus of their modern, non-Semitic environment. In general, then, it must be said that, though Semites all through their history have proved apt pupils whenever stimulated by the artistic achievements of other peoples, when left to themselves they are characterized by artistic inaptitude.

(3) *Literature.* — In literature Semitic talent shines more brightly than in art, though aptitude is not manifested for all varieties of literature. Semitic literatures were produced only by the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Hebrews, and the Arabs.[1] While the Babylonians developed a large mythological literature and constructed at least two epic poems, they produced nothing that takes rank among the literary masterpieces of the world. These poems are remarkable for their antiquity, but are the literary productions of men who were still in the childhood of the race. How much of them is due to Semitic and how much to Sumerian genius it is often difficult to tell. There is a certain art in Assyrian chronicle-writing, but there are also great faults which exclude these productions from the realm of literature. Neither the Babylonians nor any other Semitic people produced dramatic poetry. Neither the book of Job nor the Song of Songs in the OT constitutes an exception to this statement. These Hebrew compositions, which have often been claimed as examples of Semitic drama, really belong to other classes of literature. The Semite was too serious and matter-of-fact in his make-up to enjoy acting. The real contribution of the Semites to the universal literature of the world was made in quite another realm —the religious. The literature of the Hebrews that has survived is contained in the OT. This, along with the NT, is the most widely circulated book in the world. It is not of equal literary merit in all its parts. Some of its books, such as Leviticus and Chronicles, contain little in themselves to attract the general reader. The Psalter, the book of Job, and parts of the prophetic books are, however, among the literary treasures of the race. They constitute the gems of Hebrew poetry. The great Hebrew poets possessed the art of simple, direct expression. In terse phrases they set forth emotional experiences with a power almost unequalled. Their figures, drawn from the homely things of common life, are of universal appeal. No other book of religious devotion has been employed by so many people of widely different races, circumstances, and civilizations to voice the confessions, praises, and aspirations of worship as the Hebrew Psalter. To have given this to the world is in itself a great achievement. It is not, as is popularly supposed, the work of one great poet; in it the work of unknown and unnumbered poets is enshrined. Different in character as the work of these bards often is, different as are their points of view, in the Psalter their work is blended into a whole of wonderful richness and beauty, forming a book that is at once the model and the despair of all subsequent writers of devotional poetry.

Of Arabic literature taken as a whole it must be said that much of it was composed by Muhammadans of Persian stock. There is, however, one book, the *Qur'ān* (*q.v.*), the greatest contribution to the world's literature in the Arabic tongue, that is purely Semitic in origin. Its author, Muhammad, was an Arab of the Arabs. Such outside stimulus as he had came from Jews and the OT—purely Semitic sources. While, as judged by the standards of literary form, the *Qur'ān* leaves much to be desired, it possesses in the original a certain rhythm and assonance that is not unpleasing and that is regarded by the Arabs as remarkable. This is, of course, untranslatable, and the subject-matter and arrangement (or rather lack of it) are such that in translation the *Qur'ān* seems confused and often incoherent. Nevertheless the book is treasured by about one-sixth of the inhabitants of the world as their supreme book, so that, whatever a non-Muhammadan may think of it, he must confess that its author possessed in a marvellous degree the genius to interpret life to men of a certain stage of culture.

As creators of religious literature which appeals to all sorts and conditions of men, the Semites are without peers among the nations of the world.

(4) *Religion.* — Behind religious literature lies religion, of which literature is the expression. As Semites have given the world its best religious literature, it is not surprising that they have given it its best religion. Of the four monotheistic religions of the world — Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Muhammadanism, and Christianity—three are of Jewish origin. Zoroastrianism, the fourth, is the least satisfactory and successful. Renan held that the Semites possessed a racial tendency to monotheism, but it has long been recognized that this claim is unfounded. Among primitive Semitic tribes a kind of henotheism is found, but this by no means denies the existence of other spirits and gods, or leads to a disinclination upon occasion to worship them. When tribe conquered tribe in that clash of interests through which larger states are built, polytheism as gross and uninspiring as any in the world flourished among Semites. That they have become the religious teachers of the world is due to the character, inspiration, and genius of a few individuals. But, just as it is the immortal glory of the Greeks to have produced Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Phidias, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, so it is the glory of the Semites to have produced Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Muhammad, Jesus, and Paul. Such men do not spring from a religiously barren soil or flourish in a wholly hostile environment. If it be objected that Jesus was not altogether of the earth, it should be remembered that nevertheless He was 'of the seed of David according to the flesh,' and His mission would have been fruitless had not the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets prepared the way for Him. Even though the Semites possessed no general tendency to monotheism, they produced individuals who had the vision to perceive this truth and the ability to lead a goodly number of their fellows to accept it. This monotheism as taught by Jesus and Paul, and later in a less exalted form by Muhammad, has created two of the religions of the world that make a universal appeal. Men of almost every race are found in the ranks of Christianity and Muhammadanism. No other monotheism has been able to do this. Buddhism, the other religion that aims at universality, is unstable in its conception of God. Primitive Buddhism worshipped no deity. Some later Buddhists practically worship many gods; some revere a philosophical Absolute.

[1] See artt. LITERATURE (Babylonian) and (Jewish).

To sum up in a definition the religious possibilities and tendencies of the Semites is impossible. We can only say that in one Semitic people (and in another in a far lesser degree) they possessed the power of transmuting the dark mire of primitive Semitic nature-worship, often gross in its forms, into the pure white lily of the world's best religion.

LITERATURE.—E. Renan, *Hist. générale des langues sémitiques*[3], Paris, 1863; A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, Cambridge, 1896; D. G. Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, New York, 1890, *The Cradle of the Semites*, Philadelphia, 1890; T. Nöldeke, art. 'Semitic Languages,' in *EBr*[11]; A. A. Gerland, art. 'Ethnography,' in *Iconographic Encyclopedia*, i.; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894; W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, New York, 1900; G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, London, 1901; G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*, New York, 1902, 'Tammuz and Osiris,' in *JAOS* xxxv. [1915] 215 ff.; A. Erman, 'Die Flexion des ägyptischen Verbums,' in *SBAW* xix. [1900] 317–353; A. T. Clay, *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites*, Philadelphia, 1909, *The Empire of the Amorites*, New Haven, 1919; C. Meinhof, *An Introd. to the Study of African Languages*, London, 1915. GEORGE A. BARTON.

SENĀPANTHĪS.—The Senāpanthīs were an Indian Vaiṣṇava sect, an offshoot of the Rāmāwats, having been founded by a barber named Sena or Senānanda (usually shortened familiarly to Senā), one of the twelve apostles of Rāmānanda.[1] Their tenets did not differ from those of other Vaiṣṇavas, and their existence as a separate sect is due to the fact that Senā himself and his descendants exercised considerable influence as family *gurus*, or religious preceptors, of the then rājā of Bāndhogarh, or Rīwā, in Bagheikhand, and his successors. According to tradition, the rājā was Bīr Singh, who reigned A.D. 1500–40. But Senā's teacher, Rāmānanda, flourished in the 14th cent.,[1] and the alleged dates of master and pupil are therefore incompatible. Either Rāmānanda lived later than is supposed—which is unlikely—or else it was not Bīr Singh, but some predecessor, to whom Senā acted as *guru*.

The story of the rājā's acceptance of Senā as his *guru* belongs to the group of Vaiṣṇava legends, of which there are many examples, in which the deity is represented as impersonating a devotee in order to save him from some censure or other calamity.

Senā, a devout Vaiṣṇava, was originally the rājā's barber. One day, intent on his duty of showing hospitality to wandering holy men,[2] he neglected to attend his master at the usual time for the performance of the necessary tonsorial functions. Rāma himself accordingly took his form, appeared before the rājā, and did Senā's work, without the rājā being aware of the change of identity. Subsequently, when Senā, knowing nothing of what had occurred, arrived and began to apologize for being behind time, the rājā discerned the true state of affairs, and, falling at Senā's feet, elected him as his spiritual guide.

The sect is believed to be now extinct.

LITERATURE.—Nābhā Dāsa, *Bhaktamāla* (63), with Priyā Dāsa's commentary; the best ed. is that of Sītārāmaśaraṇa Bhagavān Prasāda, Benares, 1905, p. 765 ff. A summary of the statements in the *Bhaktamāla* is given by H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, ed. R. Rost, London, 1861, p. 118 f. GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

SENECA.—

1. Life and character.—L. Annæus Seneca (4 B.C.–A.D. 65), the second of the three sons of the rhetorician Annæus Seneca, was born at Corduba in Spain. He received a considerable inheritance from his father, and by the favour of Nero amassed enormous riches, the disposition of which was the cause of much heart-searching.[3] Among his teachers he mentions particularly Sotion,[4] the pupil of Sextius, from whom he learnt to follow the recommendation of Pythagoras by becoming a vegetarian.[5] Subsequently, after practising the habit for a year, he abandoned it at his father's request.[6] The chief impulse to Stoicism came from Attalus, of whom he speaks with profound respect.[7] In due course Seneca became an advocate and passed through the initial stages of official life with success.[1] In the year 41 he incurred the enmity of Messalina, and was banished to Corsica, where he lived in exile for eight years. In 49 Agrippina procured his recall and employed him at court as tutor to the young Nero.[2] His subsequent career as imperial minister, the decline of his influence after the death of Burrus, his withdrawal from court, his implication in the conspiracy of Piso, and his forced suicide, belong to Roman history and do not require a more particular description.[3] He devoted the last few years of his life entirely to literary labours, whereby he essayed to promote the practical lessons of Stoicism.[4]

His character is variously estimated. While we cannot feel for Seneca the whole-hearted respect which he might have earned by a more unswerving courage, it should be remembered that the age in which he lived and the position which he occupied made it impossible for a Stoic to remain in public life without abating somewhat the rigidity of his principles. In order to retain his influence over Nero he may have thought it necessary to acquiesce in certain of his proceedings which it was impossible to restrain.[5] In this spirit, that it is useless to strive after the unattainable, Seneca declares that Zeno's recommendation of political activity does not apply when the State is so depraved as to be past healing. The wise man's motive is the service of his fellow-man, and in favourable conditions public life offers a wider opportunity than is open to the private citizen. If that avenue is closed, he will endeavour to be useful to his neighbours, or at least to improve himself.[6] Even his most bitter enemies admitted that Seneca's administration was honest and his advice inspired by a desire for good.[7] Tacitus, in describing his death, leaves us in no doubt of his admiration,[8] and his own writings sufficiently demonstrate the sincerity of his ardour in the pursuit of virtue.

2. Relation to Stoicism.—Seneca's influence in the history of human thought is due to his position as the earliest exponent of Roman Stoicism.[9] Although Cornutus and Heraclitus are represented by writings which are still extant, their subject-matter was of comparatively trivial value, whereas Seneca's works gave a fresh impetus to the spread of philosophy among the educated classes by laying stress upon its supreme importance as a practical guide for conduct, so that he became the forerunner of the movement which was subsequently developed by Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. The framework of the Stoic system was taken over bodily, and it is beyond question that, though claiming a nominal independence,[10] he did not originate any fresh development on the strength of his own authority.[11] The theoretical side of Stoicism was to be cultivated at most as a legitimate object of curiosity, and for the purpose of stimulating its students to struggle onwards in the pursuit of virtue; the establishment of exact scientific knowledge was a matter of secondary interest.

Adopting this attitude, he was at liberty to express his profound contempt for the subtleties of logic on which Chrysippus had toiled so laboriously. He devoted one of his letters[12] to the discussion of the Stoic paradox that wisdom (*sapientia*, φρόνησις) is a good, but the possession of wisdom (*sapere*, φρονεῖν) is not. Holding that nothing but the corporeal exists, the Stoics nevertheless made an exception in favour of the incorporeal notion (λεκτόν, including φρονεῖν) which is intermediate between the corporeal utterance on the one hand and the corporeal mind on the other. This position was defended by a process of artificial reasoning which Seneca expounded but refused to follow. He brushed aside the distinction between *sapere* and *sapientia* as repugnant to common sense, and apologized for having spent so much time in discussing it. 'Let us pass by these ingenious triflings and hasten to pursue what will be of some profit to us.'[13]

3. Physics and metaphysics.—A much greater value is attributed to physics, which, though it

1 See art. RĀMĀNANDĪS, RĀMĀWATS.
2 See *ERE* x. 570[b], note 2.
3 J. E. B. Mayor on Juvenal, x. 16, in *Thirteen Satires*, 2 vols., London, 1888–93
4 *Ep.* xlix. 2.
5 *Ib.* cviii. 19.
6 *Ib.* 22.
7 *Ib.* 13.
1 *Dial.* xii. v. 4.
2 Tac. *Ann.* xii. 8.
3 *Ib.* xiv. 52 ff.
4 *Ep.* viii. 1–3.
5 Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 2.
6 *Dial.* viii. iii. 3.
7 Dio, lxi. 4.
8 *Ann.* xv. 62 ff.
9 See art. STOICS.
10 *Dial.* vii. iii. 2. Seneca claimed to be an eclectic and was ready to accept even from Epicurus what he himself approved. See *Ep.* xii. 11, with Summers's note.
11 R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, London, 1910, p. 14.
12 *Ep.* cxvii.
13 *Ib.* cxvii. 30.

does not directly assist the formation of character, nevertheless elevates the mind by bringing it into contact with the majesty of divine truth, whereas logic shrivels and contracts the mind without sharpening it.[1] In a similar spirit he propounded a discussion on the nature of causality, defending the Stoic conception of its unity against the plurality of Aristotle.[2] He met the objection that such controversies do not assist us to extirpate emotion, which is the final aim of moral action, by saying that, so long as they are not employed pedantically, they elevate the mind by freeing it from its earthly burdens. 'Would you forbid me to claim a share in heaven? Must I live with my head bowed to the earth?'[3]

Among the works of Seneca which have been preserved are the *Naturales Quæstiones* in seven books, which deals chiefly with the phenomena of meteorology. This work is not the product of independent research. It is derived largely from Posidonius,[4] and the perfunctory method of treatment suggests that the actual results were regarded as comparatively unimportant. Seneca professed that his interest in physical science arose from its value in strengthening moral convictions and purifying the soul.[5] He was always ready to pass from the merely material explanation of natural objects to the evidence which they afforded in support of Stoic pantheism. The similarity of the microcosm to the macrocosm and, in particular, the correspondence of God's relation to the world with that of the soul to man[6] were themes on which Seneca never wearied of expatiating.[7] The philosophic expression of these ideas treats God as a material air-current (*πνεῦμα, spiritus*), which permeates every part of the universe[8] and is the ultimate source of every variety of life and movement.[9] Hence the importance attached to the theory of tension as the peculiar characteristic of the action of spirit, giving at once unity to our bodies and growth and vigour to trees and crops.[10] Thus, we need not raise our hands to invoke an absent deity. No good man is apart from God: 'nay, he is close at hand, he is with you, he is within you.'[11] The divine origin of our souls explains the Stoic belief in immortality. After its release from the body the soul is gradually purged of the taints received in its mortal career,[12] and rises to the purer region of the celestial æther, where it enjoys daily converse with other blessed spirits.[13] Finally, at the period of the world-conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*), when everything is resolved into the fiery essence, the immortal souls, sharing in the general effacement, are absorbed in the divine unity.[14] Concerning the fate of those souls which have become debased through wickedness we have no certain information. Seneca, as we might expect, will have nothing to do with the mythical horrors of Tartarus;[15] on the other hand, he recognizes the moral value attaching to a belief in a system of future rewards and punishments.[16] He was entirely in accord with the rest of the school in refusing to condemn the observances of the State religion, but he was keenly alive to its abuses.[17] It is the inward spirit, rather than the outward ceremony, that counts. The futility of prayers to the gods as ordinarily rendered is expressed by Seneca as vigorously as by Juvenal;[1] but the value of prayer as an act of resignation to the will of heaven and of self-examination before retiring to rest is abundantly acknowledged.[2] The sum of our religious duty is to seek out the divine will, to mould ourselves in the likeness of the gods, and to submit unhesitatingly to their decrees.[3] No act of ours can deflect the unchangeable progress of destiny in fulfilment of God's purpose. Therefore, according to the lesson conveyed in Cleanthes' verses,[4] which Seneca rendered into Latin,[5] true piety consists in a willing surrender of what the stubborn must yield perforce.[6] This attitude of mind is expressed by Seneca in terms of epigram: 'I do not obey God but agree with Him';[7] 'True liberty is obedience to God.'[8] In his conception of the divine nature Seneca did not deviate from the lines prescribed by the early Stoics, as when he declared that our constitution is a unity identical with God, whose partners and members we are,[9] or that Nature, Fate, and Fortune are merely different names for God, corresponding to the various manifestations of His power.[10] His attitude differed from that of the early Stoic masters in so far as he laid a greater stress on the ethical bearing of theology, on the care of God for man, and on the duty which man owes to God. Thus, by dwelling insistently on the opposition between body and spirit, by describing the body as a prison-house from which the spirit is eager to escape, or as an adversary with whom a perpetual struggle must be maintained,[11] he speaks in a style which reminds us forcibly of Plato.[12] He even goes so far as to abandon the Stoic doctrine of the soul's unity by reverting to Plato's triplicate division, with the same splitting of the irrational element into the passionate and the sensual.[13] It should be remembered, however, that Seneca was here reproducing the teaching of Posidonius, who restricted his adherence to Platonism by assigning to the soul a separation not of parts but of faculties.[14]

4. Ethical teaching.—We may now pass to the ethical side of Seneca's teaching, to which he attached the highest importance on the ground that conduct rather than theoretical conviction is the proper aim of philosophy.[15] In this branch Seneca repeats, without any sign of faltering, all the most characteristic of the Stoic doctrines. Virtue is realized in a course of life directed with uniform consistency, which is impossible without a scientific knowledge of nature.[16] The perfect control of the inner man is shown by harmoniousness of action.[17] Yet the act itself is unimportant except as a token of the purpose which inspires it; no action can possibly be virtuous unless it proceeds from a healthy and upright will.[18] The modified degree of value (*ἀξία*) assigned to health, riches, family, reputation, and the like, which, though essentially indifferent and even on occasion harmful, are deserving of general preference (*προηγμένα, producta*), is recognized by Seneca; if he loosely called them 'goods,' he was for the moment using popular language, and was well aware that they have no claim to be so described.[19] But this qualified approbation of

1 *Ep.* cxvii. 19. 2 *Ib.* lxv. 2 ff.
3 *Ib.* 20.
4 A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, Berlin, 1892, p. 14, n. 5.
5 *Nat. Quæst.* iii. præf. 17 f.
6 *Ep.* lxv. 24. 7 Schmekel, p. 401 ff.
8 Frag. 16.
9 *Dial.* vii. viii. 4, *Nat. Quæst.* iii. xv. 1.
10 *Nat. Quæst.* ii. vi. 6. 11 *Ep.* xli. 1, lxxiii. 16.
12 *Dial.* vi. xxiv. 5. 13 *Ib.* xxv. 1.
14 *Ib.* xxvi. 6; E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 268.
15 *Dial.* vi. xix. 4. 16 *Ep.* cxvii. 6.
17 *Nat. Quæst.* ii. xxxv. 1, *de Benef.* i. vi. 3.

1 Arnold, p. 235; see art. Prayer (Roman).
2 *Dial.* v. xxxvi. 1–3. 3 *Ep.* xcv. 47–50.
4 H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1903–05, i. 527.
5 *Ep.* cvii. 11. 6 *Dial.* i. v. 4–6.
7 *Ep.* xcvi. 2. 8 *Dial.* vii. xv. 7.
9 *Ep.* xcii. 30. 10 *De Benef.* iv. viii. 3.
11 *Ep.* lxv. 16, 21 f., *Dial.* vi. xxiv. 5.
12 *Phæd.* 66 B ff., 79 C, *Rep.* 611 C.
13 *Ep.* xcii. 8.
14 Schmekel, p. 257; E. Zeller, *Hist. of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy*, tr. S. F. Alleyne, London, 1883, p. 65 f.
15 *Ep.* xx. 2. 16 *Ib.* xxxi. 8.
17 *Ib.* lxxiv. 30. 18 *Ib.* xcv. 57.
19 *Ib.* lxxiv. 17.

externals does not derogate from the absolute sufficiency of virtue for happiness, on which Seneca unhesitatingly insists.[1] The earlier Stoics had exalted the figure of the wise man as an ideal portrait for imitation. Admitting that the instances of his actual appearance in life were very few,[2] they pointed to the traditional accounts of Heracles and Odysseus, and to the examples set by Socrates and Diogenes. Seneca proudly adds that nowhere could so complete a pattern be found as in the life and death of Cato the younger.[3] He even went so far as to approve the paradox that there is a sense in which the wise man is superior to God: the latter owes His freedom from fear to the bounty of nature, the former to himself.[4]

Notwithstanding the vehemence with which Seneca advocated these lofty principles, his paramount interest was to extract from them the stimulus which they might afford to the self-improvement of his readers. His writings are not to be regarded as philosophical treatises whose chief aim was to instruct. They rather resemble the utterances of a popular preacher—moral essays circulated to assist a propaganda in favour of Stoicism. They belong to that branch of philosophy—held by some to be a useless excrescence—which was known as advisory (*παραινετική*), being intended to mark out the course of conduct prescribed for the various contingencies encountered in actual life.[5] At the same time Seneca devotes a long letter[6] to the support of his contention that these particular recommendations are insufficient unless they are accompanied by a statement of the broad principles of philosophy upon which their validity depends. To such considerations must be traced his constant refusal to put too severe a strain upon human weakness. The emphatic manner in which he enlarges on the advantages of wealth to the wise man, and admits that the younger Cato made no attempt to conform to the standard of frugality set by his elder namesake,[7] exhibits a temper far removed from the Cynical proclivities of Zeno.[8] Cato himself, in spite of his claim to the possession of the highest wisdom, is blamed for the useless sacrifice of his life to his principles.[9] In their relations with the court or with other persons in authority, Seneca recommends to his readers a degree of complaisance not far removed from servility.[10] He recognizes that all emotion is sinful, and should be extirpated rather than moderated;[11] and he consequently accepts the view that in the infliction of punishment pity must give way to reason. He who spares the evil injures the good.[12] But Cicero's mockery of the rigidity and inhumanity of Stoicism[13] has no relevance to one who could write: 'Wherever there is a man, there is room for benevolence,'[14] or: 'Make yourself beloved by all while you live and regretted after your death.'[15] Another illustration may be taken from the discussion of the question when suicide is expedient (*εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή*). Here, as is well known, the Stoics had framed rules to meet particular cases, based upon the moral indifference of life and death.[16] Seneca's writings show that in his time, even if suicide could occasionally be justified, there was more frequently a danger that Cato's example would encourage a morbid craving for death; and his manly protest in favour of a healthy endurance of hardship[17] cannot fail to earn approval.

1 *Ep.* lxxiv. 26, lxxxv. 57. 2 *Ib.* xlii. 1.
3 *Dial.* II. ii. 1. 4 *Ep.* liii. 11.
5 *Ib.* xciv. 1. 6 *Ib.* xcv.
7 *Dial.* VII. xx. 3, 4.
8 Frag. 168 f. (von Arnim, i. 239, 268).
9 *Ep.* xiv. 13. 10 *Dial.* IV. xxxiii. 1, *Ep.* xiv. 7.
11 *Ep.* cxvi. 1. 12 Frag. 114.
13 *Pro Mur.* 60 ff. 14 *Dial.* VII. xxiv. 3.
15 *Ib.* v. xliii. 1. 16 Von Arnim, iii. 768.
17 *Ep.* xxiv. 25.

It is unnecessary to trace the signs of Seneca's moderation and humanity which pervade his discussions of the varied duties of daily life (*καθήκοντα*); the examples already given are sufficiently typical. But a single remark on the method of teaching morals is worth recording. The teacher is advised to exaggerate the severity of his precepts from consideration of the fact that human weakness is certain to fall short of the standard proposed.[1] Thus the occasional practice of asceticism was recommended as a countercheck to the growth of luxury,[2] in the same way as Apollodorus described the adoption of the Cynic life as a short cut to virtue.[3]

The practical outlook of Seneca's philosophy is nowhere more clearly shown than in the care with which he analyzes the conditions of progress towards virtue. Starting from the dogma which contrasted the wise man as the sole possessor of virtue with the multitude of fools,[4] and being forced to admit that the appearance of a wise man was as rare as the birth of the phœnix,[5] the Stoics were bound to admit the value of an approximation towards the ideal, if any practical advantage was to issue from their system. This was not a development in the later history of the school, but was clearly recognized by its earliest masters, Zeno and Cleanthes.[6] In Seneca it is hardly too much to say that it has become the central point of his teaching. The true end of philosophy is not to convince of ignorance by force of reason, but to heal sickness and weakness by patient discipline. We do not aim at virtue as a distant goal; rather, the effort itself is inseparable from the attainment.[7] The task of philosophy is, by means of continual admonition as well as by general precept,[8] to prevent the inborn capacity for good from becoming choked and blinded by adverse influences. Virtue is not the gift of nature, but the product of art.[9] It is not to be won by passive acceptance of the truth, but conviction must be strengthened by obedience to its particular behests. By the ingathering of the fruit of self-knowledge the mind of the postulant must be transformed in its outlook upon virtue.[10] Seneca more than once distinguishes the various grades of progress without fixing any strict lines of demarcation. In one passage[11] he speaks of those who are entirely untrained as subject to continual storms of passion resembling the Epicurean chaos. They are contrasted with those who have made progress in the right direction and are described as sometimes rising aloft in their heavenward journey and again sinking to the earth. There is a third class, comprising those who have reached the confines of wisdom: they are in harbour—to change the metaphor—but not yet on dry land. In another place[12] the three classes of apprenticeship are differently described. The highest grade are those who have mastered their passions, but are as yet inexperienced in the practice of virtue. They have ceased to fear a relapse into evil, but are not yet confident in their security. The second class have conquered the greatest evils, but are not yet secure against relapse. The third class consists of those who have only partly overcome their temptations. They may be free from avarice, lust, and inordinate desire, but they are still subject, wholly or partly, to the domination of anger, ambition, and fear.

Seneca's ethical treatises may be described as follows. (1) Twelve books of *Dialogues*, addressed

1 Arnold, p. 364. 2 *Ep.* xviii. 5 ff.
3 Diog. Laert. vii. 121.
4 Zeno, frag. 148 (von Arnim, i. 216).
5 *Ep.* xlii. 1. 6 Hicks, p. 89.
7 *Ep.* lxxxix. 8. 8 *Ib.* xciv. 31 f., xcv. 36.
9 *Ib.* xc. 44. 10 *Ib.* vi. 1, xciv. 43.
11 *Ib.* lxxii. 9 f. 12 *Ib.* lxxv. 8 ff.

to various friends and relatives, treating of such subjects as providence, anger, and happiness, and comprising three on consolation. The name 'dialogues' is a misnomer, for the only trace of a debate is the occasional appearance of *inquis, inquit*, etc., which are found also in the other works. (2) The three books on *Clemency* dedicated to Nero, and the seven books entitled *de Beneficiis*. (3) A collection of 124 moral *Letters* addressed to Lucilius. These brief moral essays belong to the period subsequent to Seneca's retirement from court (A.D. 62) and contain the ripest fruit of his experience and wisdom.

LITERATURE.—The works of E. V. Arnold, R. D. Hicks, and A. Schmekel have been mentioned above. For Stoicism in general see E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, tr. O. J. Reichel, London, 1880. For the Roman period C. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'empire romain*7, Paris, 1900, and S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, London, 1904, may also be consulted. The best editions of Seneca's ethical treatises are: *Epistolæ*, ed. O. Hense, Leipzig, 1898, *Dialogi*, ed. E. Hermes, do. 1905, *de Beneficiis et de Clementia*, ed. C. Hosius, do. 1900. The *Naturales Quæstiones* have been edited by A. Gercke, do. 1907. A. C. PEARSON.

SENECA INDIANS.—See IROQUOIS.

SENSATIONALISM. — Sensationalism is a theory of knowledge which regards the mind as a passive receptacle, deriving its entire content from the senses, or from some foreign agency through the senses; also called 'sensualism' (Germ. *Sensualismus* regularly), though the latter term is oftener used to denote the kindred theory of ethics, and still oftener a particular moral disposition. As a theory of the origin and growth of knowledge, sensationalism in modern philosophy is combined with associationism,[1] which gives an account of the processes by which the materials given in sensation are built up into knowledge. As a theory of the validity of knowledge, it merges into empiricism (*q.v.*), which, though it may admit other elements in knowledge, allows only those ideas to be true or valid which are certified by sense-experience. As a doctrine concerning reality, it becomes phenomenalism, the view that nothing can be known except that which appears to the senses, which involves the denial of all knowledge 'in the strict sense of knowing,' either agnosticism (*q.v.*) or scepticism. In its less critical form, however, it may be allied with dualism (*q.v.*), the view being that a real external world communicates a knowledge of itself through the senses to an otherwise empty mind; or with materialism (*q.v.*), where the mental processes are identified with the physical.

1. Primitive thought.—Before the rise of philosophical reflexion man knew no other way by which knowledge could enter the mind than by the senses. Even knowledge of spiritual beings and of mysterious things not normally in contact with the senses, but derived in some extraordinary way, as in dreams and visions, was regarded as communicated through the senses.

'As with souls, so with other spirits, man's most distinct and direct intercourse is had where they become actually present to his senses in dreams and visions. The belief that such phantoms are real and personal spirits, suggested and maintained as it is by the direct evidence of the senses of sight, touch, and hearing, is naturally an opinion usual in savage philosophy, and indeed elsewhere, long and obstinately resisting the attacks of the later scientific doctrine.'[2]

The sensationalist view of revelation could be abundantly illustrated from the earlier history of all religions. Biblical revelation is generally represented as communicated through the senses. Isaiah received his prophetic message, first at least, as a vision of the 'Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple' (Is 6[1]); and St. Paul treasured memories of 'visions and revelations of the Lord' (2 Co 12[1]). 'The word of the Lord' conveyed to the ear was a still more familiar form of revelation. It is, however, open to question how far these expressions had come to be used metaphorically. But in ordinary, unphilosophical thinking it is still assumed that all knowledge comes into the mind under some form of sensation. And, in this respect at least, modern spiritism (*q.v.*) is a reversion to primitive and popular thought.[1]

2. Indian philosophy.—On the whole the Indian systems of philosophy are monistic and mystical, but some reactions to sensationalism have also issued from them.

The Buddhist doctrine of the soul is thoroughly atomic and phenomenal, and all its knowledge is derived through the senses, though consciousness as something distinct from the senses seems also to play a part.

'Sensations, perceptions, and all those processes which make up the inner life, crowd upon one another in motley variety; in the centre of this changing plurality stands consciousness (viññâṇa), which, if the body be compared to a state, may be spoken of as the ruler of this state. But consciousness is not essentially different from perceptions and sensations, the comings and goings of which it at the same time superintends and regulates: it is also a Sankhâra, and like all other Sankhâras it is changeable and without substance.'[2]

The Lokāyata (*q.v.*), the doctrine of the Chārvākas or Nāstikas, combined a thorough-going sensationalism with materialism.

'Their views were revived in more recent times by a sect who named themselves Çunyavadins, or nihilists, their one comprehensive doctrine being, all is emptiness.'[3]

3. Early Greek philosophy.—Speculative philosophy in the West applied itself at first to questions of being rather than of knowing, to inquiry into the material cause of the world as object. But the mind could not long reflect upon this problem without stumbling upon the question of its own powers to discover the truth as to external reality. When Heraclitus said that reality was a process of ceaseless becoming, and Parmenides that it was bare identity or pure being, philosophy was on the threshold of the problem of knowledge, for the world as it appeared to the senses was in each case contrasted with the philosopher's conception of its truth and reality, which must therefore have arisen from some other source than the senses, and it involved a presumption that the witness of the senses was unreliable or at least insufficient. In this way the earlier Greek philosophers arrived at a distinction between thought and perception which should, and in the main did, lead away from sensationalism. All thought or knowledge of truth was participation in the common world-reason, the λόγος of Heraclitus or νοῦς of Anaxagoras. The Pythagoreans, by their identification of knowledge with numbers, were the first to make a clear distinction between 'thought' and 'perception.' Yet in effect the distinction did not amount to much, because all mental processes, whether of thought or of perception, could as yet be defined only in physical terms. The common world-reason was thought of as fire or atoms or a kind of fluid in motion, and it could enter the mind of each individual only through the senses, though there must be a response of like to like in the mind. Perception was a purely physical process, the movement of effluxes (ἀπορροαί) from external objects (through the air) to the senses, through which they entered the mind. Although the pre-Socratic Greek writers were undoubtedly feeling

[1] See art. ASSOCIATION.
[2] E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], London, 1891, ii. 189.
[1] See, *e.g.*, Oliver Lodge, *Raymond, or Life after Death*, London, 1916.
[2] H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, p. 253 (cf. p. 231 ff.); cf. G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, i. 292 f.
[3] Moore, p. 323 f.; cf. M. Monier-Williams, *Hinduism*, London [1897], p. 224 ff.; G. S. Brett, *A Hist. of Psychology Ancient and Patristic*, do. 1912, p. 202 f.; cf. art. MATERIALISM (Indian).

after a theory of knowledge which did justice to the original contribution of the mind itself, the disability which their materialistic categories imposed upon them rendered it impossible for them to define any real difference between thought and perception, and compelled them therefore to derive the whole content of the mind from outside through the senses. 'These metaphysical rationalists maintained all of them in their psychology a crass sensationalism.'[1]

4. **Protagoras and Aristippus.**—The first sensationalist philosophy consciously advanced as such was apparently that of Protagoras (*c.* 480–411 B.C.). It was but a short and obvious step from the position of his predecessors to eliminate altogether the distinction between thought and perception, and to reduce the whole mental process to perception, which, again, was only a kind of mutual motion between the object and the mind. But, if perception is the whole of knowledge, and if it is only a motion between the mind and its object, a *tertium quid* which is different from both, there can be therefore no knowledge either of the perceiving subject or of the perceived object. Knowledge then means only the perceptions of the moment in any individual mind, and it may be called indifferently true or false, for it can have no reference to any universal standard. Man, the individual at any moment, is the measure of all things. Such at least is the interpretation of this famous saying of Protagoras given by Plato. The identification of knowledge with sense-perception is seen to lead to the relativity of all knowledge and to scepticism as to the possibility of any valid universal knowledge.[2] But the perception included not only the cognitive elements in the mind, but also its feelings and desires; and the individual and momentary states of the mind become the criteria of ethical and social values. Aristippus the Cyrenaic seems to have been the first to develop the ethical implications of sensationalism and to teach that the pleasure of the moment is the sole criterion of moral action and the only good. Afterwards it became a commonplace of this school that sensations and feelings are one class of mental facts, and that they constitute alike the motives and criteria of action and the content and criteria of thought.[3]

5. **Sensationalism and materialism.** — While Socrates and Plato were endeavouring to disentangle knowledge from the relativity of perception, and to set up a realm of ideas eternally true and valid, the atomists, Leucippus and Democritus (*c.* 460–360 B.C.), turned in the opposite direction, and sought for truth and reality in the atomic elements of sense-perception. Little is known of the former, but Democritus (*q.v.*) taught that objects and minds alike were composed of atoms, and all their relations, including perception and thought, were the mechanical motions of atoms. The only difference was that the mind was composed of a finer, smoother kind of atoms than the body, which were called the fire-atoms. And, although Democritus distinguished between thought and perception, and between the genuine or clear (*γνησίη*) knowledge of the primary qualities and the obscure (*σκοτίη*) knowledge of the secondary qualities (and also apparently opposed the relativist doctrine of Protagoras, holding that 'in the apprehension of the ultimate properties of the atoms we have objective knowledge'),[4] yet he had no means of making these distinctions effective on the basis of his doctrine of atoms. In fact he fell back upon the old doctrine of effluxes (*ἀπορροαί*) for his explanation of both perception and knowledge. Objects sent forth images or copies (*εἴδωλα, δείκηλα*) of themselves, which were thus impressed upon the fire-atoms of the soul. The only difference between sensation and thought lay in the form of the atoms and their rate of motion. The coarser atoms, moving more violently, produced sensation, while the thought-atoms are finer and their motion is more gentle. This may not be literally sensationalism, but in principle it is, for the mind itself is only a vague kind of sensorium which receives impressions directly from the external world.[1]

Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, though he did not share the materialistic tenets of Democritus, seems to have held a theory of knowledge, not unlike his, which may be designated 'atomic realism.'

He is said to have conceived 'existence as made up of isolated individual elements, corresponding to which were isolated indivisible acts of apprehension. Psychologically these acts of apprehension were of the nature of perception.'[2]

The Epicureans (*q.v.*) were, however, the true heirs of Democritus. They adopted the doctrine of effluxes along with his theory of atoms. The soul is only a body made of finer and more mobile atoms, and as such it is capable of receiving impressions from other bodies. Its sensations are the effects produced upon it by the effluxes or images that emanate from other bodies and impress themselves upon it quite literally. All differences in sensations and in their qualities are due to differences in the form and motions of the external atoms in other bodies. It has been suggested that Epicurus seems to admit, in an obscure way, some original motion or self-determination of the mind. He also recognizes some objects, such as gods and apparitions, as being of too fine a texture for the senses to perceive them, and as being able to impress themselves directly upon the mind. But these points and their significance are rather obscure in Epicurus, and his teaching seems to come as near as possible to pure sensationalism. Morality as well as knowledge rests upon sensation, for feeling is a kind of sensation, and conduct should be determined so as to secure the most pleasurable or undisturbed state of feeling (*ἀταραξία*).[3]

6. **Stoics and sceptics.**—Although Plato and Aristotle had strongly criticized the whole sensationalist theory, and had developed an alternative view of knowledge as being the product of the self-activity of the mind or reason, yet materialistic metaphysics, with the accompanying theory of knowledge through sense-images, persisted down to the later periods of Greek philosophy, more through the influence of the Stoics than of the Epicureans.

The Stoics (*q.v.*) generally, though with some exceptions, held that the soul as well as the body was material. While their theory of knowledge is more complex and indefinite than those already noticed, involving not only reason and sense-perception, but many intermediate stages, yet they allowed no absolute distinction between sense-perception and reason, and made all knowledge to rest on sense-perception. The human mind is originally a *tabula rasa*. Its first ideas are derived from the impressions or stamp (*τύπωσις*) made by the external world upon the soul through the senses. Out of these sense-impressions the mind builds up its intuitions or preconceptions, and its notions, which constitute its store of ideas. Yet some kind of activity is also attributed to the mind itself, and some of its presentations (*φαντασίαι*), or ideas, are the product of that activity, and not derived from the senses. It is

[1] W. Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1893, p. 65.

[2] For a discussion of Plato's interpretation of Protagoras see John Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*[2], Glasgow, 1898, p. 303 ff.; cf. R. Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, Edinburgh and London, 1908, p. 71. See also art. PROTAGORAS.

[3] Brett, p. 63 f.

[4] Adamson, p. 66.

[1] Windelband, p. 114 f.

[2] Adamson, pp. 79-83.

[3] Lucretius, *de Rerum Natura*, iv. 725 ff.; Brett, p. 182 ff.

characteristic of the Stoic philosophy that it wavers between materialism and spiritualism, and its theory of knowledge reveals the same inconsistency. Zeno and Cleanthes seem to have regarded the mind as purely passive until sensations made their impressions upon it, as seal upon wax. But Chrysippus taught that 'the result of sensation was not an impression but a modification of the mind.'[1] And the mind exercises further activity in retaining the sensations, and, by a kind of association, working them up into preconceptions (προλήψεις), which constitute a body of common or innate ideas that become the common heritage of men, the universal λόγος at the basis of all human knowledge, and the criterion of truth. But the Stoics had another test of the truth of an idea, which was also an original contribution of the mind, in the doctrine of conviction—the view that certain ideas (φαντασίαι καταληπτικαί) carried with them the evidence of their own truth. All these original activities of the mind of course carried the Stoic philosophy far beyond the sensationalism with which it began its explanation of knowledge.

Some of the sceptics (*q.v.*), such as Arcesilaus and Carneades, while generally opposed to Stoicism, and rejecting in particular its doctrines of conviction and of innate ideas, yet developed, from the initial Stoic sensationalism, their own doctrine of suspense of judgment and of the uncertainty of any truth. All knowledge was derived from the senses, and, since the senses were relative to changing conditions, they were unreliable, and all knowledge derived from them was likewise unreliable.[2] While the sceptics from Pyrrho downwards questioned the trustworthiness and validity of both conception and perception, their general line of attack was the relativity of the senses, and the consequent uncertainty of all ideas as being derived from them. The ten τρόποι, or points of view, for the criticism of knowledge enumerated by Sextus Empiricus, which Diogenes Laertius referred to Pyrrho, but which may have been collected and perfected only by Ænesidemus, nearly all turn upon the uncertainty of the senses.[3]

7. Asclepiades and Galen.—The later medical schools of the Greeks, in so far as they dealt at all with the problem of knowledge (and most of them attached themselves to some school of philosophy), naturally recognized the full significance of the senses; and some of the best known writers derived knowledge primarily or entirely from the senses. Asclepiades adopted the Epicurean philosophy and identified the soul with 'the activities of the senses taken collectively.'[4] Galen, though an eclectic in philosophy generally, leaned towards the Stoics in his epistemology and adopted their doctrine of spirit and of reason (νοῦς) as regulative principle; like them also he practically identified reason with sensation, derived its material content from sensation, and placed the initiative to knowledge in sensation; but again he also recognized some element of attention as being original in mind and a condition of knowledge.[5]

8. Ecclesiastical writers.—The natural dualism of common sense, fortified by the Platonic philosophy, persisted down to modern times, and with it therefore the obvious tendency to derive all knowledge of the external world through the senses. On the other hand, the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of the λόγος, which had been developed more especially in the schools of Alexandria, and amalgamated with Biblical doctrines of revelation, provided for a knowledge of spiritual things and of ultimate reality in supersensible ways, whether by the participation of the human mind in the universal λόγος, by inspiration of the Hôly Spirit, or by immediate vision of God, so that we find but few traces of theoretical sensationalism in the writings of the Church Fathers.

Tertullian, however, was influenced by the Stoic philosophy; he adopted the doctrine of the corporeity of the soul and with it a partially sensationalist theory of knowledge, but he combined with it a supernatural doctrine of revelation. He maintains a distinction between the intellect and the senses, but only to the extent of the difference of their objects, corporeal things being the objects of sense and incorporeal ones the objects of the intellect. Both are alike faculties of the mind, and the intellect can obtain its knowledge of the incorporeal only through the sensations of the corporeal.[1] No very precise theory can be derived from Tertullian's writings, and his sensationalism was even less thorough-going than that of the Stoics. For he held the soul to be rational in its natural condition. God had endowed it with common intelligence, and, when it was true to itself, it ever bore witness to the fundamental truths of religion.[2] Moreover, the Christian revelation contains truths supernaturally conveyed to the mind, which are contrary to all sense and reason, and which are to be believed because they are impossible.[3]

The same mingling of opposite tendencies appears, but rather more obscurely, in Arnobius. He affirms, in opposition to Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, that man acquires all his knowledge from outside, and that, if left to himself, he would ever remain as ignorant as a block of stone. Yet he also emphasizes the supernatural character of Christian truth.[4] His disciple Lactantius, while revealing traces of Stoic influences, has divested himself entirely of its sensationalism.

The position of the Christian Fathers may then be stated summarily as follows: they all rejected Epicureanism and pure sensationalism; most of them adopted the Platonic philosophy with its idealist theory of knowledge in the form of the λόγος doctrine, but a group of early Latin writers followed the Stoic teaching and in some cases adopted their modified sensationalism, though they coupled with it an emphatic supernaturalism—Tertullian's Montanism is an outstanding illustration—and so they anticipated the theory of Hobbes and others who would make sensationalism the basis of a rigid theological orthodoxy. The soul could receive ideas of God and the truth of religion only through authoritative revelation. Yet it was the Platonic philosophy that predominated in the thought of the early Church and formed the basis of the prevailing orthodoxy, which was scarcely challenged until the rise of modern philosophy. But the principle of authoritative orthodoxy is essentially the same as that of sensationalism. It requires that the mind should passively receive its content from outside. The Platonic doctrine of immanent reason was submerged by a naive, popular, unarticulated sensationalism, which, rather than any philosophical theory, asserted itself in Catholic orthodoxy.

The sacramental doctrines of the Church, which are also sensationalist in principle, implying that all grace, power, and virtue enter into the soul from outside through the senses, may reveal the more direct influence of Tertullian, for they are largely the product of the West, whose thought he mainly influenced.

[1] Brett, p. 168.
[2] E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, Eng. tr., London, 1870, ch. xxiii.
[3] A. Schwegler, *Hist. of Philosophy*[2], Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1868, p. 135 f.
[4] Brett, p. 285.
[5] *Ib.* p. 287 ff.

[1] *De Anima*, xviii.
[2] *De Carne Christi*, 5.
[3] *De Test. Animæ*, 2, *Apol.* 7.
[4] *Adv. Gent.* ii. 17 ff., 74 ff.

'Tertullian makes grace reach the soul through the body and the corporeal media . . . Tertullian's sacramental theory follows the lines of his theory of knowledge, which like Locke's emphasises the creative action of matter upon mind.'[1]

Subsequent developments of the doctrine and practice of the sacraments only tended to increase the dependence of the soul upon external agencies.

Ecclesiastical ethics also became predominantly hedonistic, though the pleasures and pains which should regulate conduct were largely relegated to another world.

9. **Nominalism and sensationalism.**—The mediæval Church therefore presents this paradox, that its doctrines are derived from a spiritual revelation and the life that it inculcates should issue from the communion of the soul with God, while its method of teaching and practice involves that the soul should be the passive receptacle of truths and virtues communicated to it from outside by physical agencies through the senses. Mysticism (*q.v.*) was a practical protest against this view, and the prevalent philosophy, traditional and contemporary, was its antithesis. The only significant and, in the present connexion, relevant development in mediæval thought was the controversy about the reality of universals. The realist view generally accepted preserved the Platonic tradition and maintained that *genera*, or universals, were substantially real. The mind therefore by its general concepts directly apprehended ultimate reality. Roscellinus in the 11th cent. criticized this view, and held that individual things alone are real. It is doubtful whether he went so far as to maintain that universals were mere sounds (*flatus vocis*), as Anselm declares that some of his contemporaries did. But this theory is an epistemological atomism which, naturally if not necessarily, leads to sensationalism. If the individual reals are exclusively found in the world of sense, then they can be known only through the senses. And thorough-going nominalism,[2] if such there ever was, would necessarily identify all conceptions with sense-perceptions, for names are only heard or seen. Both Anselm and Abelard state that 'there were men who allowed their thinking to go on entirely in corporeal images,' 'but who these men were, and how they carried out their theory, we do not learn.'[3] Nominalism was revived in the 14th cent. by William of Ockham in the form called terminism. And he overlaid the sensationalism which is the obvious result of his terminism with intellectual scepticism. Real things are still held to be singular. Universals exist only in the mind (subjectively); they are related to real things only as signs or symbols representing them, and these symbols alone are the objects of knowledge. There are indeed two orders of such signs—direct signs of individual things (*intentio prima*), *i.e.* sensations, and the indirect or general sign (*intentio secunda*), *i.e.* the universal concept, built up by the mind from the direct signs. Knowledge consists of these universal concepts, which are the creation of the intellect rather than the contribution of the senses, but it is therefore not knowledge of the real world. The objective world lies outside the mind and is in contact with the senses, but the senses cannot convey it to the mind. Knowledge, being therefore a very uncertain representation of reality, was easily forced to make way for dogmatic orthodoxy.[4]

It is uncertain whether there were in mediæval times recrudescences of pure sensationalism. It has been alleged that the Cathari and the Albigenses reproduced the materialistic atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius.[1] But enough has been written to show that for the mediæval mind sensationalism was on the whole an alien theory. Scholasticism (*q.v.*), in so far as it was philosophical, was, on the contrary, inspired by confidence in the reasoning powers of the intellect to demonstrate all the fundamental positions of theology.[2]

10. **Transition to modern philosophy.** — The chief conditions of the new beginnings of philosophic inquiry in the 16th and 17th centuries, from which modern philosophy as such issued, were, on the one hand, a realization of the barrenness of the dogmatic and scholastic methods as instruments of knowledge, and, on the other, a determined search for a more fruitful method. The problem of knowledge has therefore been always central in modern philosophy, and the progress of philosophy has consisted mainly in the increasing realization of the import of this central problem. Modern philosophy is humanistic; man has realized that the world is primarily his own experience, and his search has been for the meaning or value of that experience. At first that meaning seemed to appear in certain ideas in the mind, and more particularly in certain general ideas.[3] But, as there were ideas in the mind which clearly were not true, the problem was to discover a criterion by which true or valid ideas could be distinguished from false. Some sought such a criterion in the ideas themselves, in their clearness or consistency or in some other self-evidencing quality. Others sought it in the origin of the ideas or in their causal relation to a reality beyond them or in their correspondence with that reality, thus reverting to the old division between thought and reality. Sensationalism was one of the answers given to the latter form of inquiry. All ideas were derived from sensations; they were copies of impressions made upon the mind by the external world. Or, if there were still a doubt about external reality, the ideas were just the sensations and their copies, and no criterion of truth could be found; the inquiry must end in scepticism. This theory was the most characteristic contribution of British thought to philosophy from the 17th to the 19th century. It also determined the nature of the most important movements of French philosophy during the same period.

11. **Humanism.**—As a tendency in thought and literature humanism (*q.v.*) preceded and conditioned the rise of modern philosophy. It is not therefore strange to find some anticipations of the sensationalist theory in the transition stage. The return to nature through human experience necessarily brought the sensations into prominence as media of knowledge. The new interest in the study of nature and in the development of physical science led to a new appreciation of such knowledge as seemed to enter the mind by way of the senses. At first this new kind of knowledge was regarded as an addition to the dogma of the Church, subordinate to it, and, in all cases of apparent contradiction, to be corrected by it.

Two representative Roman Catholic writers who held such views were Telesius (1508–88) and Campanella (1568–1639). Both were interested in the development of natural science and held that such knowledge could be derived only from the senses. Campanella taught that God spoke to us by two codes—the living book of nature and the written book of Scripture. We appropriate the contents of the latter by faith and of the former

[1] J. V. Bartlet and A. J. Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, London, 1918, p. 165 *f.*

[2] See art. REALISM AND NOMINALISM.

[3] Windelband, p. 297.

[4] R. Seeberg, art. 'Ockam,' in *PRE*[3] xiv. 260 ff.; M. de Wulf, *Hist. of Mediæval Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1909, pp. 168–198, 420–425.

[1] De Wulf, p. 219.

[2] H. O. Taylor, *The Mediæval Mind*[2], London, 1914, ii. 450 ff., 463 ff.

[3] See art. IDEA.

by observation through the senses. Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), another Roman Catholic, revived the Epicurean philosophy generally and with it the sensationalist view of knowledge. Erdmann states that 'the later sensationalists in England and France have borrowed much from him.'[1] Yet he was no thorough-going sensationalist, for as a priest he acknowledged the authority of the Church in religious matters, and even in his philosophy he seems to regard both the imagination and the intellect as independent contributors to knowledge.[2] But the Roman Catholic writers of this period had not as yet defined the line of demarcation between theology and science, between dogmatism and empiricism, between knowledge acquired by faith or belief and that derived through the senses. Nor is it easy to estimate the significance of their submission to the Church or to faith side by side with their pursuit of philosophical empiricism, how far the former is purely formal, and how far the latter is regarded as the whole of knowledge, 'in the strict sense of knowing.'

12. **Bacon.**—Francis Bacon ([*q.v.*] 1561–1626) occupies his unique position as a pioneer of modern thought because he consciously set himself to define the sphere of scientific knowledge and insisted upon the empirical and inductive method of inquiry as the only source of scientific knowledge. He did not, however, analyze the psychological processes involved in such inquiry, and still less the epistemological problem; but, from his comparison of his method to the activities of the bee, which both gathers and constructs, rather than to those of the spider or the ant, it may be inferred that he was neither an *a priori* rationalist nor a sensationalist, but an empiricist in the present sense of the term. Moreover, he leaves the whole field of religious knowledge as such to authority and revelation. Yet his teaching is not irrelevant to the present subject, for his exaltation of empirical knowledge tended to enhance the importance of the senses as organs of knowledge and prepared the way for subsequent developments along sensationalist lines.

13. **Hobbes.**—Thomas Hobbes ([*q.v.*] 1588–1679) emancipated himself completely from all scholastic and theological admixture with his philosophy. He was the first modern writer to propound a thoroughly sensationalist theory of knowledge, and he based it upon an atomic, mechanical, and materialist view of the mind.

'The thoughts of man . . . are every one a *representation* or *appearance*, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. . . . The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been forgotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.'[3]

Sensations are produced by the impressions made by external bodies or objects upon the organ proper to each sense, and this impression, which is itself a motion, sets up a motion in the body which permeates inwards to the brain and heart, and produces there a reaction which, because it is directed outwards, seems to be some matter without, and this seeming or fancy is that which men call 'sense.' It is, however, not the object, nor any image of the object, but the effect of the interaction of the object and the organ; it is an idea, phantasm, or fancy, and therefore quite subjective. Hobbes rejected the old Greek and scholastic view of the image or species or form as proceeding from the object through the sense-organ to the mind. The whole content of the mind is derived from these effects of the impact of the objects upon the sense-organs.

They re-appear first in imagination, which is 'nothing but decaying sense,' or sense weakened by the absence of the object, and, 'when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory.' When these imaginations or thoughts follow one another, either casually, 'unguided, without design, and inconstant,' or 'as being regulated by some desire and design,' they are called mental discourse. But it is only imaginations that have been associated together in sense that can become associated in thought. 'We have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses.'[1]

This is the general principle which was later developed into the doctrine of the association of ideas, but Hobbes did not analyze further the principle of association. Up to this point he regards the mental processes of man and beast as being alike. But man by the invention of speech has the means of summing up many experiences and sequences in a few signs, which therefore render it possible to combine them voluntarily in a variety of ways other than this natural order; and this is reasoning and science.

'For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but *reckoning*, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts. . . . Reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE.'[2]

Thus Hobbes derives the whole of man's faculties and knowledge from the senses and 'study and industry.' But why ideas should be associated and assertions connected by any rule he does not explain, nor does he seem to have been aware that they needed to be accounted for. It was by overlooking this problem that he was able to make his theory so complete. Concerning any knowledge of the super-sensual Hobbes was frankly agnostic.

'Therefore there is no idea, or conception of anything we call *infinite* . . . the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible . . . a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense.'[3]

So the field of religion was free for the temporal ruler to impose upon all citizens his authoritative dogmas.

Several minor writers in the 17th cent. resemble Hobbes in their tendency to subordinate reason to sensation, to adopt the formula, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit,' to cast doubt upon both sensation and reason, and so to exalt religious faith and authority—*e.g.*, François de la Mothe le Vayer (1588–1672), Pierre Daniel Huet (1630–1721), Pierre Bayle (1647–1706). It does not follow that these were influenced by Hobbes, nor did they work out the theory with the thoroughness and fullness of Hobbes.

14. **The doctrine of ideas.**—But the main current of modern philosophy, from Descartes (1596–1650) to Spinoza (1632–77), was rationalist and dogmatic. The most important elements in knowledge and in the mind were regarded as original, innate, and independent of sense-experience. The philosophy of Hobbes seemed to be isolated and barren. Yet in one respect the Cartesian philosophy shared with it the function of preparing the way for British empiricism and its French offshoots. It supplied that 'system of ideas' which became the starting-point for Locke and his followers. Cartesians and empiricists held in common that the unit of the content of consciousness was the 'idea' or 'image,' regarded as individual, atomic, a *tertium quid* between subject and object, representing the latter to the former. For both schools the problem of know-

[1] J. E. Erdmann, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1891, i. 605.
[2] G. S. Brett, *The Philosophy of Gassendi*, London, 1908, pp. 125–141.
[3] *Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. 1 (*English Works*, ed. W. Molesworth, London, 1839–45, iii. 1).

[1] *Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. 2.
[2] *Ib.* pt. i. ch. 5.
[3] *Ib.* pt. i. ch. 8.

ledge was to discover the origin, validity, and relations of these ideas as they made up the content of the mind.

15. **Locke.**—John Locke ([*q.v.*] 1632–1704), though himself neither a sensationalist nor intending to be one, was the true originator of modern sensationalism. For Hobbes had no successors, and, notwithstanding similarities in their theories, Locke regarded himself as the antagonist rather than the follower of Hobbes. But he recognized his affinities with Descartes and some indebtedness to him, and the sensationalism that developed from his teaching stands rooted in the idealism of Descartes rather than in the materialism of Hobbes.

Besides the dualistic assumption common to Descartes and Locke, and their common recognition that the problem of knowledge is the starting-point of philosophy, 'we are certainly justified in seeing the influence of Descartes in the presupposition which Locke accepts as axiomatic, needing neither discussion nor defence, that apart from the unique presence of the mind to itself, and the cognisance of self which results therefrom, the only immediate objects of the understanding are "ideas"; while these ideas are apprehended by the mind to which they are present as signs or representations of a world of things beyond it.'[1]

It was when Locke inquired into the nature of the mind and the validity and origin of its ideas that he diverged from Descartes and laid the foundation of empiricism and sensationalism. For Descartes's abstract conception of the mind as a thinking substance he substitutes conscious experience, and whereas Descartes regarded most, and in a sense all, ideas as innate, Locke made them all dependent on sense-perception. His problem was to discover what knowledge was certain as distinct from opinion or error; as he puts it, 'to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.'[2]

He first examines and rejects the whole doctrine of innate ideas and principles, as it had survived from scholasticism, in Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and contemporary philosophical schools.[3] This doctrine assumed certain general ideas as being originally present in the mind and therefore true, and providing the foundation from which all knowledge can be deduced. Such ideas, if they exist, must then be universally given, and Locke's first line of attack was to show that these ideas are not universal, and therefore neither innate nor certain. Having thus disposed of the prevalent criteria of certainty, he seeks a new criterion and discovers it in the origin of all ideas from sensation. He supposes the mind to be a *tabula rasa*, 'a white sheet of paper, void of all characters'; it then passively receives all the materials of knowledge from experience, either as ideas of sensation or as ideas of reflexion, which is 'the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got,'[4] and which might be called an internal sense. He adds:

'The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.'[5]

'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit.' So far Locke's system seems to be purely sensationalist. But, as T. H. Green has elaborately demonstrated, Locke could not build up his system of knowledge merely out of these abstract ideas of sensation and reflexion in an otherwise empty and passive mind.[6] Yet it does not seem that this was Locke's intention. Besides ideas, he recognizes many original capacities and permanent activities of the mind.

'The first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it.'[1]

'Notice' or attention is affirmed as a condition of sensation and reflexion, and in the formation of complex and general ideas such processes as 'compounding,' comparison, and abstraction are required and affirmed. Locke's assumption of the knowledge of two substances, of an intuitive knowledge of the self, of demonstrable knowledge of God, and of the abstract principles of mathematics and morals implies much that he did not profess to derive from the senses. His importance in the history of sensationalism therefore comes out clearly in the use which his successors made of his new way of ideas.[2]

16. **Partial developments from Locke.**—Two Irish bishops were among the first to attempt to reduce Locke's doctrine of ideas to consistency, but in opposite directions.

(1) Peter Browne, bishop of Cork (†1735),[3] adopted Locke's doctrine of the *tabula rasa* and the principle 'Nihil est in intellectu,' etc., but saw that the original powers and intuitive knowledge which Locke attributed to the mind were not consistent with these. He therefore reduced all psychical functions to sensation; the impressions made upon the senses were the only original elements of knowledge, and everything else was built up out of these. Supersensible knowledge we can obtain only by analogy, by transferring sensible relations to the supersensible. Browne has been regarded as a link between Locke and both the British associationists[4] and the French sensationalists.[5]

(2) George Berkeley (*q.v.*), bishop of Cloyne (1685–1753), set himself to reduce Locke's system to self-consistency and at the same time to turn it into a polemic against materialism. He broke down the traditional epistemological dualism, and argued that, since ideas were the objects of knowledge, there was no reason for supposing any such objective external substance as the Cartesians and Locke had assumed from scholasticism to be the cause of sensations. He would thus remove the occasion for making the mind dependent upon matter and for drawing materialistic inferences from Locke's system as some were doing. There is nothing but mind and its ideas.

Human knowledge consists of 'either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else ideas perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.'[6]

These correspond to Locke's ideas of sensation and of reflexion, simple and complex. But these ideas are themselves the objects of knowledge. We can have no knowledge or evidence of any substance behind them which causes them.

'Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind—that their *being* is *to be perceived or known*.'[7]

But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something

1 James Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 222.
2 *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1690, bk. ii. ch. i. § 2.
3 Gibson, p. 41. 4 *Essay*, II. i. 4. 5 *Ib.* II. i. 5.
6 *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1878, General Introd. i. 1–130.

1 *Essay*, II. i. 24.
2 A. Seth [Pringle-Pattison], *Scottish Philosophy*[2], Edinburgh, 1890, pp. 15–32.
3 *The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding*, London, 1728.
4 Windelband, pp. 440, 454.
5 R. Falckenberg, *Hist. of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, p. 246; Erdmann, *Hist. of Philosophy*, ii. 137 ff.
6 *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 1, in A. Campbell Fraser, *Selections from Berkeley*[6], Oxford, 1910, p. 32 ff. *Works*, ed. Fraser, new ed., Oxford, 1901, i. 257.
7 *Principles*, § 6.

which knows or perceives them[1]—*i.e.* the mind or spirit—and there is no other substance. Berkeley's whole world therefore consists of perceiving minds and their ideas. It was he who brought out explicitly the fact that sensationalism is essentially subjective, that mere sensations and their copies could give no knowledge of any reality beyond themselves. But he did not think it possible to interpret experience by means of sensations or ideas alone, for he assumed the spiritual substance or mind which perceives, and especially the divine spirit who causes our ideas and gives them objective order and reality.[2] Of these, however, we can have no ideas, but only notions; and here Berkeley introduces terms and principles that contradict and transcend the doctrine of abstract, passive ideas.

17. Spread of sensationalism.—At this point it will be simpler to abandon the chronological order and to trace separately the main lines of the development of sensationalist theory, in France and Britain. Very few traces of the theory are found elsewhere.

Windelband mentions some followers of Spinoza, 'both physicians and natural scientists, such as the influential *Boerhaave* of Leyden,' in Holland, who developed tendencies to materialist sensationalism on the basis of the master's parallelism of attributes. In Germany 'as early as 1697, a physician named Pancratius Wolff taught in his *Cogitationes Medico-legales* that thoughts are mechanical activities of the human body, especially of the brain, and in the year 1713 appeared the anonymous *Correspondence concerning the Nature of the Soul* (*Briefwechsel vom Wesen der Seele*), in which, screened by pious refutations, the doctrines of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes are carried out to an anthropological materialism.'[3] But the general trend of German philosophy has been remote from sensationalism.

In Italy the traditions of humanism were strengthened by the introduction of Locke's ideas through the teaching of Antonio Genovesi (1712–69) and the translations of Francesco Soave (1743–1816). 'The translations of the writings of Bonnet, D'Alembert, Rousseau (?), Helvetius, Holbach, de Tracy, and above all, the philosophical works of Condillac gave a powerful impulse to the doctrine, and the philosophy of the senses became predominant in the universities and colleges of the Peninsula.'[4] Condillac resided in Italy from 1758 to 1768, and his teaching was propagated in a modified form by his disciples Melchiorre Gioja (1767–1829) and Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761–1835).[5]

In America Locke's philosophy, though not unknown, found no outstanding advocate. The important contributions of American thought to philosophy are deeply influenced by British empiricism, but they belong to its post-sensationalist stage.

18. French materialistic philosophy.—In France the theory assumed its crudest form and developed into naive materialism. Starting from Locke, it took the opposite turn to Berkeley's idealism, eliminated the subject, and at last identified consciousness with the material object.

(1) Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Voltaire ([*q.v.*] 1694–1778) brought with them from England in 1729 the ideas of Locke and his circle, and applied them, the former mainly to politics, and the latter to general religious and moral doctrines.

(2) Condillac (1715–80) and Charles Bonnet (1720–93) developed the doctrine of ideas into sensationalism. Both taught that sensations are the whole content of the life of the mind. Both employed the illustration of the statue, which, through being endowed successively with one after another of the five senses, became a conscious being, and thus showed how all our ideas could be derived from outside through the senses. Both urged that Locke's ideas needed to be supplemented by principles of association in order to construct them into a mind. Both held the mind to be inactive and devoid of ideas in itself, and until it is affected by sensations. But Bonnet's analysis of the mental processes was more thorough, and his account of them is at once more adequate and less coherent. He recognizes original and ultimate elements of mind and body which are incompatible with his sensationalist theory of knowledge. He affirmed the self-conscious unity of the Ego, which distinguishes it from matter, and held that the soul, though it derives all its ideas from sensation, has for its essence the capacity of thinking (*cogitabilité*) which responds on the occasion of sensation.

'On the other hand, he emphasizes more strongly than Condillac the dependence of psychical phenomena on physiological conditions, and endeavours to show definite brain vibrations as the basis not only of habit, memory, and the association of ideas, but also of the higher mental operations.'[1]

Neither of these writers, however, discovered these doctrines to be inconsistent with their religious beliefs.

(3) A more sceptical turn was given them by the Encyclopædists (*q.v.*) Diderot (1713–84) and D'Alembert (1717–83), who popularized Locke's theories in France and modified them in a materialistic direction. Diderot at last reduced all psychology to physiology of the nerves. Helvetius (1715–71) inferred from Condillac's theory (*a*) that self-love is the only motive of human action, and (*b*) that man is morally a creature of his environment. All men are the same in self-love and sensibility, and differences between men are entirely due to the impressions made upon them through the senses. Hence the importance of such education and legislation as will make the desired impressions.

(4) J. O. de la Mettrie (1709–51) was the first to transform the sensationalist theory into an unqualified dogmatic materialism. He identified mind with brain and reduced all psychical activities into mechanical functions of the brain proceeding inward from the senses.[2] Similar ideas, reducing thought and volition to sensation, sensation to motion, and all existence to matter, were propounded as a polemic against all religion by Baron d'Holbach (1723–89).[3] Essentially the same views are found in the writings of A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy (1754–1826) and Pierre J. G. Cabanis (1757–1808), with the difference that the latter regarded mental processes as chemical rather than mechanical processes. The universal prevalence of these views in the cultured circles of France in the 18th cent. cannot be better illustrated than by the following summary statement of Cabanis:

'Nous ne sommes pas sans doute réduits encore à prouver que la sensibilité physique est la source de toutes les idées et de toutes les habitudes qui constituent l'existence morale de l'homme: Locke, Bonnet, Condillac, Helvetius, ont porté cette vérité jusqu'au dernier degré de la démonstration. Parmi les personnes instruites, et qui font quelque usage de leur raison, il n'en est maintenant aucune qui puisse élever le moindre doute à cet égard. D'un autre côté, les physiologistes ont prouvé que tous les mouvemens vitaux sont le produit des impressions reçues par les partis sensibles: et ces deux résultats fondamentaux rapprochés dans un examen réfléchi, ne forment qu'une seule et même vérité.'[4]

(5) Mention should also be made here of Maine de Biran (1766–1824), who started from the standpoint of Condillac, but developed a theory of immediate consciousness of the Ego as a more fundamental element in knowledge than sensations, and was thus led from sensationalism to mysticism.

19. Positivism. — The French sensationalist-materialist tradition passed down through the 'ideologist' F. J. V. Broussais (1772–1838) and the phrenologist F. J. Gall (1758–1828) to Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the founder of the positive philosophy.[5] Gall's main thesis was the complete dependence of all mental processes on brain conditions; hence his attempt to localize psychical processes and characteristics in particular parts of the

[1] *Principles*, §§ 2, 7.
[2] *Ib.* § 26 f.; cf. *Selections*[6], p. xxxiii.
[3] Windelband, p. 454; F. A. Lange, *Gesch. des Materialismus*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 260–270.
[4] Vincenzo Botta, in F. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1874, ii. 481.
[5] *Ib.* p. 483 ff.

[1] Falckenberg, p. 249.
[2] *L'Homme machine*, Leyden, 1748.
[3] *Système de la nature*, London, 1770.
[4] *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme*[3], Paris, 1815, i. 72.
[5] See art. POSITIVISM.

brain. Yet he rejected materialism, and did not inquire into the nature of mind or body, but confined himself to phenomena. Nor was he a complete sensationalist. He held that connate tendencies, both intellectual and affective, belonged to the organic structure of man. Yet the basis of those tendencies was physical, and all ideas and feelings were causally dependent upon physical processes, though not identical with them.[1] Comte followed Gall in making psychology a branch of biology, and to some extent he accepted phrenology as the science of mind. But he enunciated no clear view of the process or criterion of knowledge. He rejected the method of psychological observation of internal consciousness as being impossible. Beyond the biological study of physiological conditions of thinking, we can know the human mind only by observing other people. But he is emphatic that all knowledge is in its nature phenomenal and relative. The positive philosophy is the complete system of the sequences and co-existences of phenomena. Knowledge therefore must be co-extensive with sense-experience, though it is not necessarily identical with sense-experience. But in his sociological doctrine Comte derives all mental characteristics from the physical environment, which again presupposes the sensationalist theory. On the other hand, his polemic against empiricism as a collection of isolated facts, his demand for method and unity in knowledge, for philosophy as distinct from science, and especially his conception of humanity as a universal whole, stand in contradiction to the epistemological atomism implied in his phenomenalism.[2]

20. **Final scepticism.**—David Hume ([*q.v.*] 1711–76) took his stand on the central position of Locke, on the doctrine of ideas, and proceeded carefully to eliminate all *a priori* assumptions. The epistemological dualism of Descartes and Locke is worked out to its logical issue in the scepticism of Hume. Berkeley had shown the futility of assuming an external substance of which nothing could be known. Hume applied the same logic to the spiritual substance or self (assumed by Berkeley) and to all its qualities, and he therefore reduced the human mind to 'perceptions'—a term which corresponds to 'ideas' in Locke and Berkeley. Of these there are two kinds:

'Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.'[3]

Both impressions and ideas may be either simple or complex.

'All ideas are deriv'd from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of them.'[4]

Hume is careful to point out that by the term 'impression' he does not mean to express the manner in which the lively perceptions are produced.[5] The only difference between impressions and ideas consists in the greater force or liveliness of the former.

'That our senses offer not their impressions as images of something *distinct*, or independent, and *external* is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of anything beyond.'[6]

The mind knows nothing but the perceptions themselves. Yet Hume sometimes unguardedly assumes some cause of our impressions of 'sensation,' but insists that its nature is unknown. 'Sensations arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes.'[1] Again, the mind itself is nothing but perceptions.

'When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.'[2]

All general ideas, such as substance, self, and causation, are therefore nothing but the customary association of ideas. Hume thus modified the sensationalist theory in two important respects. (*a*) In the endeavour to render it consistent, to eliminate all *a priori* assumptions, he made its inherent scepticism explicit and complete. There can be no knowledge of any ultimate reality.[3] And (*b*) in the search for some principle of order and unity among ideas he enunciated the famous doctrine of the association of ideas. General ideas, such as substance and causation, cannot be derived from impression; they are due to an illusion of the imagination, which arises in turn from the customary connexion of ideas in the mind—*i.e.*, ideas that have often occurred together tend to recur in the same relation and order.

'The qualities from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, *viz.* Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect.'[4]

But here again sensationalism breaks down, for these principles cannot be derived from the atomic perceptions which alone were supposed to be the original data of consciousness.

They are a kind of attraction whose 'effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.'[5]

The same argument applies to the philosophical relations which Hume attributes to intuition.[6] It has been suggested that his purpose was not so much to maintain the sensationalist theory as to afford 'a *reductio ad impossibile* of accepted philosophical principles'—*i.e.* of the Cartesian and Lockian system of ideas. At least, he did not regard it as a possible working philosophy of life. He takes it for granted and as practically necessary that, whatever influence his sceptical argument may have on his reader's mind, 'an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world.'[7]

21. **The associationists.**[8]—So far were Hume's successors, however, from recognizing any contradiction between his analytic and his synthetic principles that they developed and applied the doctrine of the association of ideas in detail to demonstrate and perpetuate the sensationalist theory of the origin and nature of ideas.

(1) David Hartley (1705–57) related the law of association to corresponding nerve processes. He substituted it for Locke's ideas of reflexion as the constructive function of the mind. Though affirming a correspondence between the 'vibrations' of the nervous system and the sensations, ideas, and motions of the mind, he would not dogmatize on the relation between mind and body, nor reduce the one to the other.

'It is sufficient for me that there is a certain connection of one kind or another between the sensations of the soul, and the motions excited in the medullary substance of the brain.'[9]

Yet in making the external impression upon the sense-organs the primary cause of sensation, and therefore of all ideas, he gave his system a materialist bias.[10]

[1] G. H. Lewes, *The Hist. of Philosophy*[3], London, 1867, ii. 394–435.

[2] E. Caird, *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*[2], Glasgow, 1893, ch. ii.; *The 'Positive Philosophy' of Auguste Comte*[3], freely translated and condensed (from the *Cours de philosophie positive*), by Harriet Martineau, 3 vols., London, 1896; J. S. Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*[3], London, 1907.

[3] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Green and Grose, i. 311.
[4] *Ib.* p. 327. [5] *Ib.* p. 312, note. [6] *Ib.* p. 479.

[1] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, i. 317; cf. Seth, p. 46.
[2] *Ib.* p. 534. [3] *Ib.* p. 505.
[4] *Ib.* p. 319. [5] *Ib.* p. 321.
[6] *Ib.* p. 373. [7] *Ib.* p. 505; cf. Seth, pp. 66–70.
[8] Cf. art. ASSOCIATION.
[9] Quoted by Lewes[3], ii. 350.
[10] *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations*, 2 vols., London, 1749; cf. Lewes[3], ii. 348 ff.

(2) Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) and Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802) advocated Hartley's theory of association, but pushed the general doctrine of ideas in a materialistic direction. Priestley identified psychical with physical processes and sought to reduce psychology to nerve physiology.[1]

(3) Thomas Brown (1778–1820) identifies consciousness with 'a variety of sensations and thoughts and passions, as momentary states of the mind, but all of them existing individually, and successively to each other.'[2] These atomic elements are built up into knowledge by means of 'suggestion' or association of ideas. Knowledge of both mind and matter is relative.[3] Yet, inconsistently, Brown under the influence of Reid recognizes certain 'instinctive' or 'intuitive principles' from which he derives such conceptions as identity and uniformity.

'These principles of intuitive belief . . . are as it were an internal, never-ceasing voice from the Creator and Preserver of our being.'[4]

Here the doctrine of ideas and Reid's principles of 'common sense' stand side by side without any such attempt as Kant had made to merge them into a living unity.

(4) James Mill[5] (1773–1836) produced 'the most systematic attempt that has been made to explain all mental phenomena by the association of ideas.'[6] He reveals no doubt or scruple, such as Hume and Brown had, that by sensations, ideas, and association he has given a complete account of consciousness, without leaving a remainder. He might be called the only complete sensationalist. Consciousness consists of sensations, ideas, and trains of ideas.

Sensations are those feelings 'derived immediately from our bodies, whether by impression made on the surface of them, or unseen causes operating on them within'; ideas are 'the feelings which, after the above mentioned feelings have ceased, are capable of existing as copies or representatives of them.'[7]

The entire content of consciousness, all principles of knowledge and morality, are built up of those two kinds of feelings, by means of the one principle, 'the grand comprehensive law,' of the association of ideas by contiguity. If anything resists such analysis, it is due to no defect in the principles, but to our ignorance—'the term instinct, in all cases, being a name for nothing but our own ignorance.'[8]

(5) John Stuart Mill (1806–73) applied these principles of his father's psychology to the problem of knowledge in a more thorough fashion in his *System of Logic*,[9] and to ethics in his *Utilitarianism*.[10] 'His work contains the most thorough-going exposition of empiricism as a theory of knowledge which has ever been written.'[11] The two positive principles of his exposition are sensations and association, but he found it necessary to admit certain 'inexplicable' principles, which could not be derived from those two. All knowledge of the external world as a 'permanent possibility of sensation' is derived from sensations, association, and expectation; and the last element is 'both psychologically and logically a consequence of memory,' but whence is memory? In explaining the mind's knowledge of itself he makes memory fundamental and original, and both it and the self which it constitutes (and therefore also the expectation derived from it) are admitted to be original principles that cannot be derived from sensations.

'That there is something real in this tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of thought without any fact corresponding to it, I hold to be indubitable. . . . But this original element, which has no community of nature with any of the things answering to our names, and to which we cannot give any name but its own peculiar one without implying some false or ungrounded theory, is the Ego, or Self.'[1]

Thus, while the sensationalist or (as Mill calls it) the psychological theory is put forward as the only possible explanation of the phenomena of knowledge, of both subject and object, it is admitted that it does not explain the most fundamental conditions of all knowledge, the self and its unity, and the unity and reality which the self bestows upon objective experience. Mill had moved from the traditional atomism of his school to the affirmation of the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness as the basic fact in experience and knowledge.

22. **Evolutionary psychology.**—The theory of evolution led to new emphasis being laid on the organic unity of the mind. On the other hand, some empiricists thought that it gained time for sensationalism. Factors in experience which it was now admitted could not be analyzed into sensations and their copies in one individual consciousness might be so analyzed if sufficient time was allowed for their development, and the new theory provided indefinite time.

(1) Herbert Spencer ([*q.v.*] 1820–1903), while adopting the main principles of sensationalism and associationism, under a somewhat changed terminology, for the explanation of the phenomena of the mind, definitely affirms a new position as to its metaphysics. The mind as observable consists of feelings or sensations and their relations or ideas, 'each with their varying degrees of relativity, revivability and associability.'[2] He emphasized the organic unity and continuity of all mental phenomena, from the lowest to the highest, both in the individual and in the race. But he recognizes much in mind that cannot be derived from experience. (*a*) Instincts, intuitions, general forms of knowledge, and principles of morality cannot be derived from the experience of the individual, but they are the product of the long experience of the race. They are *a priori* for the individual, but *a posteriori* for the race.

E.g., 'the belief in an external world is the outcome of reflex intellectual actions established . . . during that moulding of the organism to the environment which has been going on through countless millions of years.'[3]

(*b*) The criterion of truth, which he calls 'the inconceivability of the opposite,' is laid down as an abstract principle without any attempt to derive it from experience. Indeed, by its nature, it stands as a judge above all the deliverances of experience.[4] (*c*) The mind itself, as the substance of which consciousness is a modification, is unknown and unknowable; yet it has to be assumed as the reality of which feelings and ideas are but symbols.[5]

The last two factors Spencer does not profess to derive from experience. He rather exaggerates the distinction and separation that are now made between psychology and the metaphysical problems of epistemology and ontology.

In respect of the first point 'Spencer is open to his own objection to empiricism when he assumes that the race at any stage of its development could be subject to external influences in the absence of any existing organisation to receive these influences and determine their results.'[6]

Spencer and others of his school, while denying all knowledge of ultimate reality and affirming a dis-

[1] In *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principles of the Association of Ideas*, London, 1775, and other works.
[2] *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*[19], Edinburgh, 1858, lect. xi. p. 67.
[3] *Ib.* lects. vi. and ix. pp. 34, 55.
[4] *Ib.* p. 79.
[5] In *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 vols., London, 1829, new ed. with notes by J. S. Mill, do. 1869.
[6] H. Höffding, *A Hist. of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1900, ii. 371.
[7] *Analysis*, new ed., i. 223.
[8] *Ib.* i. 376.
[9] London, 1843, [9]1875.
[10] London, 1863, [12]1891.
[11] Höffding, ii. 404.

[1] *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*[3], London, 1867, p. 256; cf. chs. xi., xii.
[2] *The Principles of Psychology*[5], 2 vols., London, 1890, §§ 65–128, 475*c*, 480 ff.
[3] *Ib.* § 475*j*.
[4] *Ib.* §§ 413–433.
[5] *Ib.* §§ 58–63.
[6] Höffding, ii. 476.

tinction between mental and material phenomena, show a marked tendency, notwithstanding, to assimilate psychical phenomena to physical processes. Spencer calls the primitive unit of consciousness a 'nervous shock,' and at least supposes the possibility of regarding it as a molecular motion.[1]

(2) T. H. Huxley (1825–95) reveals this tendency most clearly. He accepts in the main Hume's account of the mind.[2] The ideas, however, are 'symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organs.' While agreeing with Spencer that we can know nothing of the substance of mind or body, he prefers the materialistic terminology, 'for it connects thought with the other phenomena of the universe.'[3]

(3) Alexander Bain ([*q.v.*] 1818–1903) carried forward the empiricist tradition of the Mills, but he consciously and deliberately repudiates the old theory that sensations alone, even with the aid of association and evolution, can account for knowledge, whether of the individual or of the race. He for the first time drew a clear distinction between the psychological and the epistemological aspects of the problem. Since his time the psychological study of consciousness has been pursued as a pure science without raising the questions of the ultimate origin and validity of ideas or of the ultimate nature of mind. These have been left to metaphysics. He thus defines the empirical theory of the origin of ideas:

'All ideas may be accounted for by our ordinary intellectual powers, co-operating with the senses; not confining ourselves, of course, to the individual lifetime. In fact, the empiricist, in adopting the *nihil est in intellectu* etc., would take along with it, as an essential of the dictum, the amendment of Leibniz—*nisi intellectus ipse*. Nay, more; he would also postulate as being equally co-present, all the emotional and volitional workings of the mind; and, having done so, he would endeavour to dispense with every other pretended source of our ideas.'[4]

What he contends for is that ideas are valid only when certified by sense-experience.

'The empiricist may not quarrel with intuitive or innate ideas; his quarrel is with innate certainties[5] . . . the *apriorist* and the empiricist part company, not so much on the fact of intuitive suggestions, as on their value as truths. Intuition, if it means anything, implies that its suggestions are true of themselves, are their own evidence, without the verification of experience, and may therefore be made to override experience[6] . . . the empiricist's test of Validity, and the only test that he can acknowledge . . . is consistency, or, *the absence of contradiction, throughout a sufficiently wide range of conscious experience*.'[7]

Sensationalism, as a theory either of the origin of ideas or of the content of the mind, is no longer maintained. And the empiricism that posits sense-experience as a criterion of truth does not rely on the senses alone, nor does it regard sensations and ideas as abstract and individual elements of thought. Present-day theories of consciousness in one essential respect all stand at the opposite pole from sensationalism, in that they regard consciousness, not as an aggregate of atomic feelings or ideas, but as an organic unity; and this living *intellectus ipse* with all its powers, conscious and subconscious, is the starting-point of all current theories of knowledge.

23. Wider implications of sensationalism.—(1) In relation to religion the theory may involve the denial of all religious values, when it assumes a materialistic form, or it may lead to the denial of religious knowledge 'in the strict sense of knowing,' which has been its more usual effect.[8] (2) For its ethical significance see art. HEDONISM.

[1] *Psychology*[2], §§ 270–272, 475.
[2] T. H. Huxley, *Hume*, London, 1879, pt. ii. ch. ii f.
[3] J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], London, 1903, i. 19, 179; for a trenchant criticism of the whole sensationalist philosophy in its later developments see vol. ii. pt. iii.
[4] *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics*, London, 1903, p. 135 f.
[5] *Ib.* p. 134. [6] *Ib.* p. 140. [7] *Ib.* p. 142.
[8] See artt. MATERIALISM, AGNOSTICISM.

(3) In social philosophy and politics the theory has been adapted to different and even opposite purposes. Naturally and logically it leads to individualism (*q.v.*) and in an extreme form to anarchism (*q.v.*). Hobbes, however, combined an anarchist view of society in its natural state with the doctrine of the social contract to bolster up State absolutism. With Comte the paradoxical combination of sensationalism with an organic and absolutist conception of society was an accident of history, because he had inherited his mental philosophy from Condillac and his social ideals from the Roman Catholic Church. More recent tendencies to combine naturalism (*q.v.*) with socialism (*q.v.*) or with absolutism (*q.v.*) are equally illogical. Condillac's philosophy found its appropriate expression in the French Revolution. Locke's doctrines were the *apologia* of the English Revolution. The Mills were the prophets of 19th cent. radicalism.

'The doctrines of individual freedom and human equality . . . [were] interpreted and formulated in terms of abstract individualism, by men who had been bred on the philosophy of pure sensationalism which dominated the eighteenth century. . . . Reducing experience to isolated impressions and ideas, this philosophy treats society as an aggregate of mutually exclusive units, each pursuing as sole end his own individual pleasure.' 'Through the influence of Hegel and of Comte, and partly through the reaction of biological conceptions upon philosophy and general thinking, the nineteenth century has seen the definitive abandonment of the individualistic or atomistic view' of the relation of the individual to society.[1]

LITERATURE.—Besides the histories of philosophy and other works named in the course of the article: R. Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1903; G. M. Stratton, *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle*, London, 1917; H. Siebeck, *Gesch. der Psychologie*, 2 vols., Gotha, 1880–84; D. C. Macintosh, *The Problem of Knowledge*, London, 1916; L. J. Walker, *Theories of Knowledge*, do. 1910; T. M. Forsyth, *English Philosophy*, do. 1910; G. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, Eng. tr., do. 1903; J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, do. 1917; A. Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*[4], do. 1894, *The Emotions and the Will*[3], do. 1880; Thomas Reid, *Works*[3], with Notes and Supplementary Dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1852; P. Janet and G. Séailles, *Hist. de la philosophie*, Paris, 1887, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1902.

T. REES.

SENSE.—'Sense' is the name for the receptivity of living organisms to external physical impressions, resulting in what are called sensations. The organism of which it is composed is called the 'sensorium,' and is located in the periphery of the body in the case of most of the senses, though there are internal organs of sense which represent similar functions and reactions. In all cases it represents the organism which reacts against external stimuli of some kind. The brain-centres are the points to which impressions or physiological actions are communicated before sense responds, and may be a constitutive part of sense in the exercise of function, though they are not the usually accepted part of sense physiologically understood. As a function of the organism, however, sense denotes a process of mental action distinguished from the acts of inner consciousness or the reflective function of the mind. With the organism which connects the inner with the outer world, it implies the actions by which knowledge of this outer world is obtained.

Physiologically sense, or the sensorium, is divided into six separate organs: the organs of vision, of hearing, of touch, of taste, of smell, and of temperature. Until recently it was supposed that the senses were limited to five, but the thermal sense has been added to the other five as having a distinct neural organism of its own, and it has been suspected that even the feelings of pleasure and pain have their own separate sensorium. Six senses, however, have been fully established. Each of these has its own peculiar

[1] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals and other Essays*, London, 1907, pp. 63 f., 42.

stimulus or cause for its action. Undulations of light affect vision; undulations of the air and material objects affect hearing; contact of objects affects touch, and the same affects taste; and smell seems variously affected by corpuscular emanations and other modes of stimulation; while the thermal sense is affected by the supposed undulations of ether that constitute heat. The structure of each sense is adapted to its specific stimulus and responds accordingly. Hence the various ways in which the external world appears to the same subject of consciousness.

Sense is the source of our knowledge of an external world. It may not be the sole function involved in that knowledge, but it is the primary function in the occurrence of it, and we can only suppose either that all knowledge of the external world would be excluded without sense or that it would be different from what it is if any other source were substituted for sense. But, whatever the facts, as things are at present constituted, sense is the intermediate agency in affecting our knowledge of reality, though it is accompanied by other mental functions of an interpreting kind. Sense is thus the portal through which knowledge comes, even though it does not determine the whole of its nature. In the Lockian system sense was the only original source of knowledge; in the Kantian system this source was supplemented by the active and constructive functions of the understanding, which, though they added nothing to the matter of knowledge, determined the form which it would take. In both, sense-experiences represented the limitation of all knowledge; *i.e.*, the material of all knowledge came through sense, but the processes for systematizing it were in the intellectual functions.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Mackendrick and W. Snodgrass, *Physiology of the Senses*, London, 1893; Michael Foster, *Text-book of Physiology*[6], 4 pts., London, 1888–91, pt. i.[6], 1893, pt. ii.[6], 1895, pt. iii.[7], 1897. JAMES H. HYSLOP.

SENSIBILITY. — Sensibility has two important meanings. The first denotes the capacity for receiving sensory impressions, and the second denotes the emotional function of the mind. It is indicated in the division of mental functions into intellect, sensibility or emotion, and will. The former meaning of the term is exhausted in the definition, but the latter refers to one of the most important of the mental functions.

Considered as the second division of mental functions, the sensibilities are of two general kinds: those which accompany or follow the exercise of function and those which precede and influence action. The first type we may call reflexive emotion or feeling, and may subdivide into pleasures and pains. The second type may be called impulsive emotion or passion, and may be subdivided into desires and repulsions. Pleasures, normally considered, are reflex concomitants of healthy function; pains, of unhealthy function. This characterization, however, is only general, and describes those feelings which the normal person has to keep in mind when adjusting his life to its best tendencies. Desires are impulses or longings towards the possession or attainment of objects, and repulsions are antipathies towards them. They are the immediate motives to action or restraint. The main service of the reflexive emotions is their part as indices, in their normal action, of our adjustment to environment, and hence they serve as guides to the actions which are directly associated with welfare. The impulsive emotions serve as incentives to the realization or prevention of consequences in this environment, and so are initiatives of volition, as pleasures and pains are the consequences of it.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, ii., 'Feeling and Will,' New York, 1891; G. F. Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1896–97, ch. xii.; W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*[2], 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1860.
JAMES H. HYSLOP.

SENSUALISM.—See ETHICS AND MORALITY.

SENTIMENT.—As used in everyday speech, this word (from *sentire*, 'to feel') refers to the emotional sources of our more complex ethical and social judgments. It covers a wide range of spiritual meanings which exercise a powerful influence in the individual and collective life of mankind; for in a real sense it may be said that 'sentiment' controls judgment in many questions of manners and morals, making us alive to the bane or blessing of life's contacts and loyalties. The more precise definition of the word carries us into the field of the psychological and ethical sciences, especially in their sociological relations, where the description and explanation of the phenomena involved are more fully set forth. The main facts are as follows.

(*a*) The psychological genesis of sentiment is involved in the mystery that surrounds the beginnings of our more developed forms of feeling and emotion—*e.g.*, love, hate, admiration, etc. On the one hand, it is to be differentiated from sensation and perception, but partakes of their nature, like other psychical reactions, for mental life develops in the unity of the Ego. Sensation, in its origin, is a form of feeling, but, as it develops, is almost wholly confined to the activity of the physiological mechanism of sensibility. Perception, in its elementary manifestations at least, depends partly on the senses and partly on the understanding. Sentiment, however, in all its forms, involves an element of judgment, inchoate indeed in its simpler forms but nevertheless real, into which values, deeply tinged by the more complex emotions and even by passion, enter, these values centring about objects, either real or ideal, that appeal to us on the ground of their abstract truth, beauty, or goodness. Consequently our sentiments will always be found to possess a predominant tone of pleasure or pain. This is true, of course, of all psychical reactions called judgments. But the pleasure-pain feature of sentiment differs from other phases of mental activity in this: it is induced, in the self-development of the individual, by association with objects about which we have come to feel strongly, or about which we have formed judgments, or which have proved acceptable and agreeable to all persons of culture. This will become clearer as we proceed with our analysis. Meanwhile, it is obvious from this general statement that the nature of sentiment, from the purely descriptive point of view, is extremely complex, and its genesis obscure.

(*b*) Following the clues afforded by sympathetic and careful insight, A. F. Shand[1] called attention to a fact which long eluded the notice of psychologists, namely, that our sentiments are really highly organized systems of emotions, arising in us in connexion with the various classes of objects that excite them; that as systems, and not merely vague emotional reactions, they possess an exceedingly complex structural or psycho-physical disposition, in which function and structure are continuous. On this point W. McDougall observes:

'The structural basis of the sentiment is a system of nerve-paths by means of which the disposition of the idea of the object of the sentiment is functionally connected with several emotional dispositions. The idea, taken in the usual sense of the word as something that is stored in the mind, may therefore be said to be the essential nucleus of the sentiment, without which it cannot exist, and through the medium of which several

[1] See 'Character and the Emotions,' *Mind*, new ser., v. 203–226.

emotional dispositions are connected to form a functional disposition.'[1]

In other words, the object which occasions the sentiment is, subjectively, organically connected with our emotional life and with the processes of ideation. Continuing, McDougall says:

'The oftener the object of the sentiment becomes the object of any one of the emotions comprised in the system of the sentiment, the more readily will it evoke that emotion again, because, in accordance with the law of habit, the connexions of the psycho-physical dispositions become more intimate the more frequently they are brought into operation.'[2]

Illustrations abound in the ethical and religious life. Thus the sentiments aroused and appealed to in ritual, religion, and art are so strong because they depend in so large a measure upon truth, beauty, and goodness, and the repetitive forms of memory which, structurally, are only applications of the laws of habit. On that ground alone they are among the most powerful reinforcements of the moral life—'allies,' as William James calls them, of the soul.[3] Of this truth the persistence of religious systems is sufficient proof. In the same way the collective principle in social law, with its strong imitative tendency, may also be viewed as the medium for the development of the sentiments and their inbred emotional dispositions, and at their least valuation serve the practical purpose of providing the emotions with a bridge between mechanical routine and the higher creative ideals or sentiments of the mind.

(*c*) This very complexity of sentiment, however, precludes a naturalistic interpretation of a function which so obviously depends on our judgments of value. While somatic reactions, or systematically organized 'dispositions,' form the more or less fixed structural basis of sentiment, it would not be in accordance with the facts of common experience to say that they adequately explain its essential nature. As spiritual forms of feeling, the sentiments clearly contain certain highly abstract ideal elements, freed at times from immediate dependence on the bodily organism and its reflex actions. For not only have our sentiments, as already stated, a predominant tinge of pleasure and pain; not only does this feeling-tone depend on emotional dispositions organized about objects (or ideas), towards which we have learned to react in a habitual manner; they also involve vision of a creative sort. Thus the patriot may be said to love his country; this love is a sentiment entering into all his thoughts; pain and pleasure, love, pride, admiration, etc., are evoked by the object, entering into the warm psychoses which arise in him as he thinks of it. But, in addition to these reactions, he has a vision of still higher values. He thinks of his country, not merely as the concrete collective medium of his own self-preservation, but, under the influence of sentiment, as right and true, nay, as perfect and good. This may sometimes be an exaggerated estimate, to be modified by more mature reflexion, but sentimentally that is his deliberate judgment—the vision inspired by a passion of love which is creative of ideals. Sentiment, in this higher sense, is an ideal feeling closely akin to the artist's feeling for beauty, to the feeling of moral approbation, and to other more or less abstract or mystical emotions of religion.

No complete list of the sentiments can be made without reference to these fundamental creative ideals, or judgments of value, such as the intellectual sentiment, the æsthetical sentiment, the ethico-religious sentiment, and their combinations. In mentioning them in this connexion it must be borne in mind that they are also active in the general conditions and adjustments that underlie the normal development of mental life; that temperament, culture, and environment also qualify the expression of the sentiments as of other mental elements and products. The point is that there are also ideal elements in all our sentiments which do not necessarily involve the activity of self-reference—*i.e.* do not refer to specific organized objects, but arise in us through intuition or vision, direct or indirect, of ideals, and exercise a profound influence in their evolution. Of course, the particular form of self-reference which sentiment proper reveals is found only when an emotion has acquired strength or value by reason of the object or idea with which it is associated; but, in this total complex, ideals of truth, beauty, perfection, and goodness are ever creatively at work.

(*d*) A final word may be said on the relation of sentiments to character. If character be the product of the total effort of self-realization (*q.v.*), it is undoubtedly true that the sentiments, organized into a harmony or system under ideals, constitute a large part of what is properly called character. The sentiments alone do not, of course, constitute the whole of character; that would be sentimentalism. Will, feeling, intellect—in a word, self-control—must enter in and often modify and direct sentiment, or at any rate supplement it with ideals. If, as W. Hartsen says truly, 'a man without feeling would certainly have no intellect as well,'[1] it is equally true that a man without sentiment would have no character. Yet character is not wholly a matter of sentiment. That would be equivalent to reducing character to our organized dispositions and emotions; but character depends on conation and will, on the complete fashioning of the personality in the light of some ideal of conduct higher than routine, which has become strongly entrenched and has acquired a habitual predominance in the personal life. A sentiment, it is true, may become so strong as practically to control the will, but this would not result in a well-rounded personality; it might conceivably lead to a narrow, selfish, or mean type—the tyrant or dictator, *e.g.*—which could hardly be called moral. For the higher results of character the sentiments must be brought into the service of a concrete ideal and organized under the control of the will. This ideal must also attain to such a predominance by sheer force of love that conflicting inhibitions or interfering unorganized desires will be overcome. Character thus grows in strength and beauty, and approximates to perfection and goodness. A sentiment, therefore, may well be a controlling motive of behaviour, but character depends, ultimately, on the habit of self-control and loyalty. We cannot therefore be too careful in selecting the sentiments, or the single sentiment, which is to attain the dignity of a fixed habit through the choice of the will. The reinforcement of religion will be found necessary to the realization of the ideal self, because it is in God we live and move and have our being. If to this we add the sentiment of love, proclaimed the rule of conduct by Jesus, we have the aim and motive of all true character clearly indicated, in which sentiment and character become one.

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H. DAVIES.

[1] *Introd. to Social Psychology*[4], p. 126 f. [2] *Ib.*
[3] Cf. J. E. Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, ch. vii.

[1] *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, Berlin, 1874, p. 19 f.

SEPARATIST SOCIETY.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

SERAPHIM.—See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Hebrew).

SERINGAPATAM (Skr. Śrīrangapattana, 'city of the holy pleasure-place').—Seringapatam is a city in Mysore District, Mysore; lat. 12° 25′ N.; long. 76° 42′ E.; situated on an island in the river Kāverī. In the earliest times Gautama Ṛṣi is said to have had a hermitage here, and he worshipped the god Ranganātha, 'lord of pleasure,' whose temple is the principal building in the fort. The earliest temple is said to have been erected by Tirumalaiya, under the Gangā dynasty, A.D. 894. About A.D. 117 the whole site was granted by one of the Chola kings to Rāmānujāchārya, the celebrated Vaiṣṇava apostle, and in 1454 the Ranganātha temple was enlarged, the materials of 101 Jain temples being used for the purpose. The place is remarkable for the two famous sieges in 1792 and 1799, the British forces being under the command of Lord Cornwallis and General Harris; in the latter attack the Sultān Tīpū was slain. His remains and those of his father Haidar 'Alī rest in a mausoleum (*gumbaz*) in the garden known as the Lāl Bāgh, where prayers are still offered.

LITERATURE.—B. L. Rice, *Mysore*, rev. ed., London, 1897, ii. 294 ff.; F. Buchanan, *A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, do. 1807, i. 60 ff.; M. Wilks, *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, Madras, 1869, ii. 241 ff., 358 ff.; G. B. Malleson, *Seringapatam; Past and Present*, do. 1876; *IGI* xxii. 179 *f.*

W. CROOKE.

SERPENT-WORSHIP.

Introductory (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 399.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 411.
Teutonic and Balto-Slavic (E. WELSFORD), p. 419.

SERPENT-WORSHIP (Introductory and primitive).—The cult of the serpent exists in many forms, whether of a single serpent or of a species, of a serpent embodying a spirit or god, of a real or imaginary serpent represented in an image, of a serpent as associated with a divinity (a chief god or one of many), or of a purely mythical reptile. All these may be traced back to the cult of actual serpents, which, however, easily become a fitting vehicle for a spirit or god. The origin of the cult is to be sought in the effect which all animals more or less had upon the mind of early man—a feeling that they were stronger, wiser, subtler than he; in a word, uncanny. This was especially true of the serpent because of its swift yet graceful and mysterious gliding motion without feet or wings, unlike that of any other animal,[1] its power of disappearing suddenly, the brilliance and power of fascination of its eye, its beauty and strength, the sudden fatal consequences of its bite or of its enveloping folds, the practice of casting its skin, which suggested its longevity or even immortality. All these contributed to arouse feelings of wonder, respect, fear, to produce worship, and also to make the serpent a fit subject of innumerable myths. In the various forms of the cult there is often found a sense of the animal's beneficence, probably because myth easily attributed to it wisdom, secret knowledge, magical power, healing properties, and inspiration. As an animal dwelling in holes in the earth, its chthonic character was suggested—it was the cause of fertility (also because it was thought to give or withhold water), and became the embodiment of a fertility daimon or earth-spirit; hence also a guardian of hidden treasure or metals.[2] In so far as the serpent is a revealer of the arts of civilization, this is probably because, where it was worshipped, it was often grafted on to a mythic culture-hero or eponymous founder. Totemism sometimes lent its aid as a factor in developing respect for serpents, if not actual cult. Ancestor-worship also assisted, in so far as certain snakes haunting houses or graves were associated with the dead. Myth connected the serpent with the waters, either because some species lived in or near them or in marshy ground, or because the sinuous course and appearance of a serpent resembled those of a river, or with the lightning, because of its swift, darting motion and fatal effects. Some serpents are harmful, others are harmless; and perhaps this is one main reason why both in cult and in myth some are objects of fear and their evil traits and appearance are exaggerated or associated with demoniac beings, while others are beneficent and helpful.[1]

Man's fancy and man's dreams about such an animal as the serpent must also be taken into account in considering the origins of the cult.

This is illustrated by an account from Papua, where a native recently dreamt that a large snake living on a volcano accused him of killing snakes and alligators and offered, if he promised never to do so again, to give him a herb to cure all diseases. The native went about announcing this, but some natives still disbelieved and shot an alligator, which remonstrated with them. Snakes and alligators now go unharmed.[2]

Here the common fancy of the solidarity of animals leading them to avenge the death of a single animal and the consequent respect paid to them are seen. This and other fancies are embodied in a dream, and might easily be the origin of a cult, as they actually are of a prohibition.

Classical writers had various theories as to the origin of the cult, from that of Diodorus that the snake was worshipped because he figured in banners or was figured on banners because he was a god, to the shrewder remarks of Philo Byblius quoted by Eusebius (see § 1 (*i*)).

Practically every aspect of serpent-worship, myth, and legend, and of human attitude to the serpent, is shared by other reptiles—*e.g.*, the crocodile, to some extent the lizard, and here and there large eels.[3]

While some form of awe or reverence for the serpent is wide-spread, the actual worship varies in intensity in different regions. Fergusson supposed the cult to have originated among the Turanian peoples of the lower Euphrates and to have spread thence to every part of the old world where a Turanian people settled, while no Semitic or Aryan people adopted it as a form of faith, its presence among these being 'like the tares of a previous crop springing up among the stems of a badly-cultivated field of wheat.'[4] Fergusson's

[1] Cf. Pr 30[19].
[2] Perhaps also because the lightning (=serpent) was supposed to produce gold.

[1] See, however, C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 68 ff.
[2] G. Murray, *ARW* xv. [1912] 628.
[3] See *ERE* i. 430[b], 509, 514[a], ii. 352, iii. 563, vii. 230[a], viii. 357[b], ix. 279, 341[a], 346[a], 511[a], 528[a]; J. F. McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 2nd ser., London, 1896, pp. 272, 274, 409; Hose-McDougall, *loc. cit.*; R. B. Dixon, *Oceanic Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vol. ix.), Boston, 1916, pp. 55, 120; E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*[2], London, 1856, pp. 57, 73; W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, do. 1900, p. 282 ff.; H. Callaway, *The Religious System of the Amazulu*, do. 1884, p. 217; H. Ling Roth, *JAI* xxii. [1893] 27; W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the S. Pacific*, London, 1876, p. 77.
[4] J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, p. 3.

theory is hardly borne out even by the facts known to him, still less by newer knowledge now available. More recently Elliot Smith suggests a theory of migration by which, along with megalith-building, terrace culture, and many other things, serpent-worship originated in Egypt about 800 B.C., was spread thence by the Phœnicians to India, the Far East, and the Pacific islands, and eventually reached America.[1] Investigation along the line of this new theory may have fruitful results.

1. **Worship of the serpent.** — The distinction should be noted between the worship of the animal itself and its worship as the embodiment of a god or spirit. Sometimes also a god appears as a serpent, or the animal is the symbol or attendant of a god who is probably the anthropomorphic form of an earlier serpent, such as is often the guardian of a sacred place or temple.

(*a*) *Australian.* — In Australia the serpent is often a totem and occurs in myth, but is not worshipped, except perhaps by the Warramunga tribe of N. Central Australia.

The Wollunqua is a huge mythical totem-snake, father of all snakes, and lives in a water-hole, whence it may emerge to destroy men. The men of this totem do not call it by its real name, lest they should lose their power over it, and they perform ceremonies like those used by others for increasing their totems. By these rites the Wollunqua is pleased and will not come forth to destroy. A large keel-shaped mound, resembling it, is made. The men walk round it, stroke it, and then hack it to pieces. At a visit paid to the water-hole the men, with bowed heads, solemnly begged the Wollunqua to do them no harm. Here something approaching worship, with prayer and ritual, is indicated.[2]

Some New South Wales tribes believe in the existence of two snakes, 40 miles long, found on the way to the other world or in it. They are killed and eaten by the dead, but are immediately reproduced. The blacks fear them.[3]

But among the Australians generally and other low races—Veddas, Andamanese, and Fuegians—to judge by the reports of the best observers, there does not appear to be any cult of the serpent.[4] Bushman paintings show huge snakes and other animals, sometimes with humps, on which baboons, men, and mythical creatures are painted, but we do not hear of a cult.[5]

(*b*) *Palæolithic.* — How far serpent-worship existed in pre-historic times is uncertain. Serpents are found among the animals figured by artists of the Palæolithic period. Two figured on *bâtons de commandement* may possibly be eels.[6] But in other instances even the species is recognizable. One of these occurs on an armlet, perhaps as a charm;[7] another is surrounded by an ornamental border.[8]

It is hardly likely that these animals were represented, as in S. Reinach's theory of Palæolithic art, in order to attract them, but the representations might have been for some such magical rite as that of the Arunta. The serpent with the ornamental border might suggest that the reptile was the object of a cult. N. Pinsero,[9] while disbelieving that Palæolithic man had a religion, found religious sentiments in anthropoid apes, which, he held, worship serpents and bury them with a supply of insects in their graves as a provision for a future life! In Mesolithic times the serpent had become a symbol, as on the painted pebbles of Mas d'Azil.

(*c*) *African.*—All over Africa the serpent is worshipped either in itself or as the embodiment of a god.

The cult of the snake at Whydah, Dahomey, may be taken as typical of W. Africa. The heavenly serpent Dañh-sio or Dañh-gbi, the rainbow, confers wealth on men, and is represented by a coiled or horned snake of clay in a calabash. It is also represented by the python. The monster python, grandfather of all snakes, dwelt in a temple or 'snake-house,' containing many snakes, and to it kings and people made pilgrimages with many costly gifts. The python-god is immortal, almighty, omniscient; valuable sacrifices and prayers are offered to it and oracles are received from it; and, with the exception of the priests, only the king can see it, and he but once. It is invoked for good weather, fertility of the crops, and increase of cattle. The whole species was reverenced, and a man who killed such a snake was put to death. The god had a thousand snake-wives or priestesses, and all girls of about twelve whom the older priestesses could capture at the time of millet-sprouting were kept in seclusion and taught the sacred rites, and figures of serpents were traced on their bodies. The serpent was said to have marked them. Later they were put into a hut, where the serpent was supposed to visit and marry them. Girls and women attacked by hysteria were supposed to have been touched by the serpent and thus inspired or possessed. The people had also smaller serpents, not so powerful as Dañh-sio, but adored by them.[1]

A similar cult exists among the Brass River people, where the tribal- and war-god Ogedigа was a python, and pythons were so sacred as to be allowed to commit all kinds of depredations, while by an article of the treaty of 1856 white men were forbidden to kill them. The python is the tribal- and war-god and has a numerous priesthood, and is supposed to contain one of the many spirits.[2] The local god Djwij'ahnu among the Tshi appears as a serpent attended by other snakes, and human sacrifices were formerly offered to him. If he did not appear, special sacrifices were made to propitiate him.[3] The cult also exists among the Mpongwes, Bakali, Ashanti, and Niger tribes. In Fernando Po the chief god is represented by a cobra, which can inflict disease or death, give riches, etc. A skin of one is hung up annually in the market-place, and children are made to touch it, perhaps to put them under its care.[4]

Among the Baganda the god Selwanga was represented by a python with priests and mediums. It was kept in a temple, fed with milk by a woman, and then a medium, possessed by the god, gave oracles interpreted by a priest. Sacrifices were made to it, and sterile women obtained children through its power. The wife of the chief god Mukasa was a pythoness, sister of Selwanga. The Bageshu had a similar cult of a serpent Mwanga in a temple on a hill, visited by childless women.[5] Many other African tribes have a serpent cult.[6] In Madagascar serpents are looked upon with superstitious fear and are supposed to be emissaries of the god Ramahalavy.[7]

The Voodoo serpent-cult in Haiti and elsewhere reproduces these W. African cults, one of the names of Dañh-sio being Vodunhwe. The will of the god is communicated through a priest and priestess, and the cult takes place at night when the serpent is shown in a cage; offerings are made to it; the worshippers implore its aid; and the priestess, standing in the cage, becomes inspired and gives oracles. Dances and an orgy follow, and sometimes a child is sacrificed—'the goat without horns.'[8] The Bush Negroes of Dutch Guiana reverence a good divinity in the snake Papagado, which must not be hurt in any way, and the snake generally occupies a prominent position in their thoughts.[9]

(*d*) *Polynesian.* — In New Zealand and other Polynesian islands the snake is seldom met with,

[1] G. Elliot Smith, *The Migrations of Early Culture*, Manchester, 1916, *The Influence of Ancient Egyptian Civilization in the East and in America*, London, 1916.

[2] Spencer-Gillenb, pp. 226 ff., 495

[3] E. Palmer, *JAI* xiii. [1884] 291.

[4] No reference to it occurs in such works as the following: A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904; C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911; E. H. Man's exhaustive art. on the Andaman Islanders in *JAI* xii. (1883) 69 ff., 117 ff., 327 ff.; P. Hyades and J. Deniker in *Anthropologie et ethnologie* (=*Mission scientifique du Cap Horn*, vol. vii.), Paris, 1891.

[5] G. W. Stow, *The Native Races of S. Africa*, London, 1905, pp. 32, 202; R. N. Hall, 'Bushman Paintings in the Ma-Dobo Range,' *Geographical Journal*, xxxix. [1912] 594. The snakes have giraffe heads, and similar snakes are also incised on rocks. The paintings are said to be sacred.

[6] T. Wilson, 'Prehistoric Art,' in *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1896*, Washington, 1898, pp. 388, 400.

[7] Cf. below, § 4 (*a*).

[8] E. Piette, *L'Anthropologie*, vi. [1895] 408, xv. [1904] 149, 174.

[9] *La psicologia dell' uomo preistorico*, Palermo, 1895, quoted in *L'Anthropologie*, viii. [1897] 334.

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, pp. 60, 148 f.; J. A. Skertchly, *Dahomey as it is*, do. 1874, p. 54 f.; C. de Brosses, *Du Culte des dieux fétiches*, Paris, 1760, p. 25 f.; W. Bosman, *A Description of the Coast of Guinea*, Eng. tr., in J. Pinkerton, *General Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808-14, xvi. 493 ff.; R. F. Burton, *A Mission to Gelele, king of Dahome*, do. 1864, i. 59 f., ii. 92; J. C. M. Boudin, *Etudes anthropologiques*, pt. ii. p. 57 ff.

[2] Burton, i. 61; M. H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, London, 1899, p. 483; letter of Bishop Crowther, cited in McLennan, p. 524; A. G. Leonard, *The Lower Niger*, London, 1906, p. 329.

[3] Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 41.

[4] T. J. Hutchinson, *Impressions of W. Africa*, London, 1858, p. 196 f.

[5] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, pp. 318, 322, 335, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 188.

[6] See *ERE* i. 57[a], 166[a] (Agaos), ii. 511[b] (Berbers), vi. 491[b] (Galla).

[7] C. S. Wake, *Serpent Worship*, p. 88.

[8] Boudin, p. 78 ff.; S. B. St. John, *Hayti, the Black Republic*, London, 1884, p. 185 ff.

[9] L. C. van Panhuys, *Actes du iv^e Congrès internat. d'hist. des religions*, Leyden, 1913, p. 55.

but in Tonga the water-snake is the embodiment of a god and is reverenced.[1]

(*e*) *Melanesian.*—There are traces of snake-worship in Melanesia.

Among the Koita of British New Guinea harmful mythical beings called *tabu* are seen as snakes, corresponding to the beings called *paipai* which cause sickness among the Koro-speaking tribes. Snakes are also used by sorcerers.[2] In Fiji the supreme god Ndengei had a serpent as his shrine, and was thought to exist as a vast serpent in a cave, fed by an attendant. Hogs and human victims were formerly offered to him, and he gave oracles through a priest and sent rain. Ratu-mai-Mbulu also lived as a serpent in a cave, where food was offered to him yearly.[3] A *nitu*, or spirit, in the form of a mythic snake Bunosi, to some extent a creator though born of a human mother, is holy and is worshipped with sacrifice in Lavelai in the Solomon Islands.[4]

In San Cristoval *figona* (spirits) have serpent incarnations, and one of them, Agunua, is supreme and creator. Other snake *figona* are female. Firstfruits are offered to a snake called Kagauraha, a representative of Agunua, while there are other rites and prayers for relief from sickness, from bad seasons, for growth, etc. Kagauraha and her brood live in a special house, from which women are excluded. A pig or human sacrifice is offered, and the serpent gives oracles. In other places certain *figona* incarnate in serpents are worshipped, but are said to be local representations of Agunua, who is 'all of them.'[5]

(*f*) *Dayak.*—Among the Dayaks the serpent embodies an *antu*, or spirit, and is occasionally worshipped. When a spirit enters into a snake, the animal becomes a deity and spirit-helper of an individual, but there is no tribal cult.[6] The Kenyahs of Borneo regard Bali Sungei as embodied in a serpent in a river, causing it to swirl and capsize boats. Hence he is feared.[7]

(*g*) *Ainu.*—Among the Ainus the cult is directed to a mythical snake-king, father of all snakes. Snakes cause the evils of child-birth, and their spirits may possess one who has slain them. Madness is caused by a snake entering the body, and women bitten by snakes become subject to hysteria, and sometimes act as witch-doctors.[8]

(*h*) *American Indian.*—The American Indians believe in a huge serpent, sometimes worshipped,[9] but among the northern tribes mainly the subject of myths.

He is horned or feathered,[10] the horn being the thunder-bolt, and he is generally malevolent, though not always so. Sometimes he is a personification of the lightning, more often of the waters, ruling them and their powers, and in Chippewa myth he is connected with the flood. More beneficent beings are in conflict with him, and sometimes slay him—the Great Hare (Algonquins),[11] the Thunderer who hates all noxious beings (Iroquois),[12] Manibozho (Chippewas).[13] Sometimes he is placated to avoid his malignancy, as with the Musquakies, with whom the great Rain-Serpent is the cause of drought and ancestor of all snakes, and to whose fish-totem clan he is propitious.[14] But in the drier regions he is the Rain-Serpent who sends the needed rain to fertilize the maize, and he is one of the gods.

With the Zuñi dramatic ritual symbolizes the coming of Kóloowisi, the Plumed Serpent, of whom an image is carried in procession. Water and grain are made to drop from it, and the water, symbolizing rain, is drunk by candidates for initiation; the grain is planted separately from the rest of the seed.[15] Among the Hopi the serpent is called Palülükon, and the fertilizing of the maize by him is dramatically represented.[16]

Corresponding to the Rain-Serpent is the snake Sisiutl of the Kwakiutl (N.W. Pacific coast)—a serpent with a horned head at each end of its body, and a human horned head in the middle. To touch, see, or eat it is certain death, but it brings power to those who enjoy supernatural help. It is frequently represented in carving and painting.[1]

Most of the tribes pay some form of cult and give offerings to the rattle-snake, the species almost exclusively honoured and universally represented in early and later art.[2] Where it is not actually worshipped, it is respected and not killed.

The Delawares, Lenin Lenapé, and others call it 'Grandfather,' and among the Algonquians it was the king of snakes, who gave prosperous breezes and was the symbol of life in their picture-writing.[3]

The most curious aspect of snake-worship is that of the Hopi and kindred tribes. Perhaps originally a form of totem-ancestor-worship, the cult is now a dramatic prayer for rain and growth, but the worship is paid to mythic ancestors, the snake-youth and snake-maid, Tcuamana, who are personated in the rite.

Rattle-snakes, the elder brothers of the snake-clan, are collected and ceremonially washed after prayer. Symbols representing clouds, rain, and lightning, and corn and other seeds are set out in the *kiva*, where a secret ceremonial is performed with hundreds of snakes. In the public ceremony the priests of the snake fraternity carry the snakes in their mouths, and these are sprinkled with sacred meal as a prayer-offering. The snakes are then sent off to the cardinal points, in order that they may carry the prayers for rain to the powers below. The members of the clan claim immunity from snake-bite, because the snake is their totem. This snake-dance has no connexion with the cult of the Plumed Serpent already referred to.[4] The Natchez also venerated the rattle-snake as a form of the Great Spirit and placed its image in the temple of the sun.[5]

Among the animal mounds of Wisconsin one represents a serpent, 1000 ft. in length. It is conspicuously situated, and, like all the other mounds, was fitted for the performance of ceremonies before a large multitude.[6]

(*i*) *Mexican.*—In Mexico, before and after the Aztec immigration, the snake was an important religious symbol.

Living rattle-snakes were kept in the temples and fed with the flesh of human sacrificial victims.[7] Several of the higher gods were partially of serpent origin or had been associated with older serpent-gods. Huitzilopochtli, an anthropomorphic humming-bird deity, was born of Coatlicue, whose name signifies 'serpent,' and snakes were associated with his image and ritual.[8] In times of danger his image was covered with a snake-skin, and the priest carried a wooden snake as his symbol on his festival. The walls of his temple had snakes carved in relief, and its circuit was called *coatepantli*, 'the circuit of snakes.'[9] Perhaps the snake-aspect of this god was derived from the serpent-cult of the Otomis, whose highest god, Mixcoatl, was a serpent-divinity.[10] In one of his aspects Quetzalcoatl seems to be identical with the Plumed Serpent of the Hopi, and a snake-god of Yucatan, Cuculcan, may have been merged into him. His name means 'feathered serpent'; his image had a snake beside it; and the entrance to his temple represented the gory jaws of a huge serpent. When he left Mexico for the fabled land of Tlapallan, he journeyed in a boat of serpent skins.[11] At the feast of the god Tlaloc little hills of paper and wooden snakes were placed on his altar, and his image held a golden serpent.[12] The goddess Cihuacohuatl, or 'serpent woman,' was said to have borne twins at the beginning of the fourth world-age, from whom the earth was peopled. Hence twins were called 'snakes.' She was also called Tonantzin, 'our mother,' and was represented with a great male serpent beside her.[13]

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[1] W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, London, 1817, ii. 139; J. Williams, *Narr. of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands*, do. 1838, p. 547.

[2] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 183, 302.

[3] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 114; T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, do. 1858, p. 217 f.; cf. *ERE* vi. 14[b]. For the cult in Banks Islands and the New Hebrides see *ERE* viii. 533[b] and cf. ix. 387[b]; in New Guinea, ix. 346[a]; in New Caledonia, ix. 338.

[4] G. C. Wheeler, *ARW* xv. [1912] 348 ff.

[5] C. E. Fox and F. H. Drew, *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 185 ff.; cf. *ERE* viii. 533.

[6] H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British N. Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 188; Hose-McDougall, ii. 90 f., 114.

[7] Hose-McDougall, ii. 15; for Annam see *ERE* i. 541[b].

[8] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, pp. 301, 356 ff.; *ERE* i. 251.

[9] See *ERE* i. 324[b].

[10] For horned snakes and their rationale see *ERE* iii. 508[b], 568[b], vi. 793[a].

[11] H. B. Alexander, *N. American Mythology* (= *Mythology of all Races*, vol. x.), Boston, 1916, p. 44.

[12] J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikan. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 47.

[13] E. G. Squier, *American Review*, new ser., ii. [1848] 392 ff.; Müller, p. 131.

[14] M. A. Owen, *Folk-lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, pp. 36, 110 f. For the Rain-Serpent revered by the Kickapoos see *ERE* i. 324[b].

[15] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], p. 94 ff.

[16] See *ERE* vi. 785[b], 786[a], and, for such divine serpents among the Huichols, vi. 829[a].

[1] F. Boas, 'Social Organization and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians' (*Report of U.S. National Museum*), Washington, 1895, p. 371.

[2] D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*[3], Philadelphia, 1896, p. 130; W. H. Holmes, *2 RBEW* [1883], p. 289.

[3] Brinton, p. 142.

[4] J. G. Bourke, *The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona*, London, 1884; J. W. Fewkes, *JAFL* xvi. [1901] 82 f., *15 RBEW* [1897], p. 304, *19 RBEW*, pt. 2 [1900], pp. 624, 965 ff., 1005 ff.; M. C. Stevenson, *11 RBEW* [1894], for the dance among the Sia. Cf. *ERE* vi. 785 f.

[5] Müller, p. 62.

[6] G. F. Wright, *The Origin and Antiquity of Man*, London, 1913, p. 148 ff.

[7] Bernal Diaz, quoted by Southey, notes to *Madoc* in *Poetical Works*, London, 1860, v. 432; F. Lopez de Gómara in S. Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, Glasgow, 1905-07, xv. 536.

[8] Joseph Acosta, in Purchas, xv. 312 f.

[9] *Ib.* p. 319 f.; *NR* iii. 321.

[10] Müller, p. 485.

[11] W. Prescott, *Hist. of Mexico*, London, 1909, i. 383; Müller, pp. 486, 577 ff.; *NR* iii. 281, 449; Lopez de Gómara, in Purchas, xv. 547.

[12] Müller, p. 502.

[13] *Ib.* pp. 484, 514; Brinton, p. 143; *NR* iii. 352.

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(*j*) *Mayan.*—The Mayan god Votan was probably in one aspect a variety of the Plumed Serpent, and his image represented him as a bird above and a serpent below. This culture-god was said to have built 'the city of the serpents' and to have written a book proving that he was one of the Chanés, or serpents.[1] In Mayan MSS and carvings the rattle-snake alone is represented as a symbol and is called the 'serpent-king.'[2]

(*k*) *Central American.*—Among the peoples of Central America living snakes were worshipped.

Human victims are said to have been offered to a living serpent-god by the Zacatecas.[3] Near Uxmal is a spring where, according to Indian belief, an old woman sits and exchanges water for little children, whom she gives to a serpent to eat. She is perhaps the anthropomorphic form of a serpent-god to whom children were offered.[4] All over this region, in Honduras and Nicaragua, the remains of temples show colossal feathered serpents, sometimes with a human head in the jaws, as at Uxmal, sculptured on the walls and cornices, and sometimes running the whole length of the building. Quetzalcoatl or Cuculcan is also depicted holding feathered serpents or with these coiled round his body. Such serpents are also seen painted on rocks in Nicaragua.[5]

(*l*) *Peruvian.*—In Peru the pre-Inca race venerated serpents and painted them on temples and houses, and offered human hearts and blood to them. They were also represented on the temples of the Inca kingdom, where reverence for snakes was wide-spread, and the spotted wood-snake was kept in the temple of Pachacamac.[6] The god of riches, Urcaguai, was regarded as a snake, in which form he was said to have appeared, and his snake-image in the form of a horned and hairy rattle-snake was revered in a building called the 'snake-house.'[7]

(*m*) *S. American Indian.*—The native Indians of S. America have always shown certain reverence for serpents.

Among the Caribs, who believed that the spirits of the dead transmigrated into snakes, images of snakes existed. Rakumon, one of the men drawn from the thigh of the first man and god Loguo, became a snake with a human head and twined himself round trees, the fruit of which he ate and gave to others. Afterwards he became a star. Star and snake are connected in Carib myth—the star shows by its position the time of the year's fruitfulness, the snake symbolizes the renewing of vegetation through the fertilizing rain.[8] The serpent is also a common symbol in the ruins of the old temples of the more civilized tribes—*e.g.*, the Muyscas, among whom the priests in processions wore masks of snakes and crocodiles.[9] The Chibchas believed in a large snake which issued from a lake, and they made offerings of gold and emeralds to it. A snake-cult was also observed by neighbouring tribes, and the Canari believed themselves descended from a snake dwelling in a lake, to whom offerings of gold were made.[10] The great boa was worshipped by tribes in Brazil, and one tribe living near the borders of Peru kept one in a pyramidal temple, fed it with human flesh, and prayed to it.[11] Of the snake called the manima a 16th cent. traveller in Brazil says that the natives to whom it showed itself regarded themselves as blessed and believed that they would live long.[12] The tribes of the Issa-Japura district believe that the anaconda is evil and the embodiment of the water-spirit, the *yaca-mama*, mother of the streams, who bars their passage. Hence they go in fear of the reptile, which occupies in Amazonian folk-belief the place of the sea-serpent elsewhere.[13] Many myths and tales about serpents exist among the various tribes.[14]

(*n*) *Chinese.*—In China serpents, like other animals, occasionally have temples dedicated to them, this cult being apparently connected with the belief in metamorphosis;[15] but on the whole they are feared.

[1] Müller, p. 487 *f.*; *NR* v. 159.
[2] Brinton, p. 130. [3] Müller, p. 483 f.
[4] J. L. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Central America*, London, 1841, p. 425.
[5] E. G. Squier, *Nicaragua*, New York, 1852, i. 317 *f.*, ii. 36; Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Yucatan*, London, 1856, i. 302, ii. 304 ff., 312; T. Gann, *19 RBEW*, pt. 2 [1900], p. 663 ff. See also *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 17 ff. For other Central American serpent-gods see *ERE* iii. 808[a].
[6] Acosta, in Purchas, xv. 307, 388; Garcilasso de La Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, ed. C. R. Markham, London, 1869–71, *passim*.
[7] Müller, p. 366; Brinton, p. 142.
[8] Müller, pp. 210, 221.
[9] J. B. von Spix and C. F. P. von Martius, *Reise in Brasilien*, Munich, 1823–31, iii. 258, 1272; Müller, p. 436.
[10] T. A. Joyce, *South American Archæology*, London, 1912, pp. 28, 66, 156.
[11] Müller, p. 258; Garcilasso de La Vega, in Purchas, xvii. 388.
[12] Purchas, xvi. 497.
[13] T. W. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, p. 231.
[14] E. Nordenskiöld, *Indianerleben: el Gran Chaco*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 110, 288; cf. *ERE* ii. 836[a], 837[b].
[15] J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religion of the Chinese*, New York, 1910, p. 124.

Their forms are frequently the embodiments of evil spectres, which cause misfortune, illness, and death, or are instruments of punishment. Snakes cause illness by sending their souls into the bodies of men, and sick people are alleged to vomit vipers. The serpent is also a common wer-animal;[1] in early times snakes with human or partly human form—a human face, a wolf's body, birds' wings, and moving like a snake—were known. Transformation of men into snakes and of snakes into men is a very old belief. In many stories, however, in spite of the generally evil aspect of the serpent, apparitions of snakes have proved to be propitious.[2] The dragon as the giver of rain is worshipped in time of drought, and also in spring and autumn by certain mandarins by command of the emperor. He has a temple in Peking, and is regarded as a great benefactor and the venerated symbol of good. In the ritual, when rain is prayed for, a large image called the 'Dragon King' is carried in procession, and incense is offered to it. Boats in the shape of a dragon also play an important part in the Dragon Boat festival and in the procession of the Five Rulers. The symbol of the dragon is a common religious and artistic *motif*: the five-clawed dragon was the emblem of the imperial power, the protecting deity of the emperor, whose body was called the dragon's body, his throne the dragon's throne, etc. The true dragon is never all visible at once, but only his head or tail, the rest of his body being enshrouded in clouds.[3]

(*o*) *Japanese.*—The Japanese frequently worship the serpent as a mysterious being, often the embodiment of a spirit or god.

It has an important place in mythic history as progenitress of the Mikado's ancestry. Myth hardly distinguishes between snake and anthropomorphic god, the forms being interchangeable. Some divinities still assume serpent form—*e.g.*, the goddess Bentem, to whom certain snakes are sacred and are her servants and confidants—and where certain snakes live famous temples have been built.[4]

(*p*) *Cretan.*—There are traces of a former serpent-divinity in Crete.

Images of a goddess, with snakes twined round the body and head-dress, have been found. Sometimes votaries holding snakes dance before her. She is probably an earth-goddess, lady of the wild creatures, and an anthropomorphic transformation of an older serpent-divinity. It is unlikely that the figures represent snake-charmers, as has been supposed.[5] On the Mycenæan cylinders of Cyprus the goddess of Paphos is associated with a pillar entwined by a serpent, and Pausanias describes an image of Artemis holding serpents.[6]

(*q*) *Egyptian.*—Among worshipful animals the serpent predominated in Egypt, either because of its supposed good qualities or through fear of some species; and the cult of the cobra and asp occurs in the earliest times.

The figure of the serpent appears as a personal or house-protecting amulet all through Egyptian history. The cobra or *uræus* was a symbol of fire or the solar disk; hence this serpent decked the forehead or crown of the solar god and of kings, his representatives, was carried by priests and priestesses of Ra, or itself occurred crowned on standards. It was identified with the flaming eye of the god; hence 'eye' and 'asp' became synonymous, and two eyes or serpents were called 'daughters of the sun-god.'[7] The sun-god is also figured as a serpent or a double asp, and, like the solar orb, the *uræus* was sometimes represented with wings. Serpents guarded the groves and gates of Amenti, breathing fire against the wicked, as well as the pylons of the heaven of Osiris. A serpent was the embodiment of certain goddesses—*e.g.*, Rannut, goddess of fertility and the harvest, perhaps because snakes found in corn-fields were regarded as local spirits in snake form and were fed; Mertseker, goddess of the necropolis at Thebes; Buto and Nekheb, guardians of Upper and Lower Egypt. It was associated with Isis and Nephthys, because these goddesses were later identified with Uazet, the *uræus*-goddess, who was gradually absorbed into all the goddesses. Hence all goddesses were adorned with or represented by the *uræus*, or as a serpent a goddess is associated with a god.[8] Qeb, god of the earth, was master of snakes and had a serpent's head.[9] Live serpents were kept as guardians or sacred animals in shrines and temples behind a sacred veil or in a small cell. These serpents were mummified

[1] See art. LYCANTHROPY, § 1.
[2] De Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, iv. 215 *f.*, v. 626 ff.
[3] J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, London, 1866, i. 281, 292, ii. 55 *f.*, 117, 264 f.
[4] W. E. Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, London, 1895, p. 31 *f.*; *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain, Yokohama, 1883, *passim*; *ERE* ix. 238[b].
[5] *BSA* x. [1904] 223; *PEFSt* [1916] 207; C. H. and H. B. Hawes, *Crete the Forerunner of Greece*[2], London, 1911, pp. 102, 123, 139; S. Reinach, in *L'Anthropologie*, xv. [1904] 274; cf. *ERE* i. 142.
[6] Paus. VIII. xxxvii. 4.
[7] W. Max Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vol. xii.), Boston, 1918, p. 29.
[8] E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 92, 100, 441 f.
[9] Max Müller, p. 42.

or, like those sacred to Amon, buried in the temple.[1] Offerings of fruit, cakes of flour and honey, flowers, and incense were made to serpent-divinities. *Uræi* figured as temple-guardians, often in the form of a cornice or frieze. In heaven was supposed to exist the serpent Sati or Bata, the serpent 'of millions of years,' into which the soul of the dead identified with Osiris could transform or identify itself.[2] Divine beings have sometimes a serpent's head. The serpent was much represented in later times as its cult increased, sometimes in pairs, and then often with the heads of Sarapis and Isis. Stars were regarded as snakes or these were their symbols.[3] Generally the serpent was regarded as an ἀγαθὸς δαίμων connected with life and healing. So even now 'it is believed that each quarter in Cairo has its peculiar guardian-genius or Agathodæmon, which has the form of a serpent.'[4] In early times dwarf figures like Bes tear up and devour serpents—symbols of hostile powers; and the heavenly gods are said in one myth to have left the earth because of the serpents who drove them away—primeval reptiles of the abyss or a serpent of the earth-god or a serpent created by Isis.[5] There is also a confused reference here to a serpent of great size embodying darkness and evil, enemy of Ra and the gods and destroyer of souls. This is Apap, referred to from early times, and probably a reminiscence of the python.[6] Apap dwelt in the ocean over which travelled the divine boat of Ra, which he sought to upset, or in that part of Hades through which the god travels daily. Ra daily attacks and slays him, and the destruction is described with grim realism.[7] The dead fought Apap and other demoniac serpents with Ra's aid, and protected by amulets and formulæ of repulsion.[8] In other forms of the myth gods (often with serpents' heads) attack and bind Apap under the earth or sea. Apap tended to be identified with Set, attacked by Horus. These myths may be connected with the Babylonian myth of Bel and Tiamat. Apap was also devourer of the souls of the wicked, and was head of all powers hostile to the sun. Serpents of demon aspect met the soul on its way to the other world, but against those the *Book of the Dead* provided a way of escape. Horus, as protector against venomous snakes, was called 'stopper of snakes' and is represented holding snakes in his hand. Hence amulets of the god in this aspect were worn as protectives.[9]

(*r*) *Babylonian.*—In Babylonia there is little trace of worship of the serpent.

Herodotus[10] speaks of a live serpent worshipped there, but this may be a reminiscence of the conquest of Tiamat by Bel-Merodach.[11] Ea had the serpent as symbol and was called 'god of the river of the great snake'—*i.e.* the deep or the Euphrates. The names of the river in early inscriptions show the connexion of the serpent with Ea and also with Innina, his daughter, whose name is interchangeable with that of the snake, the anthropomorphic transformation of which she probably was.[12] Serpents abounded in marshes at the mouth of the river. Serakh, god of corn, was a snake-god. Sala, consort of Rimmon, had a name meaning 'goddess of reptiles.' Certain goddesses associated with the under world are depicted with serpents in their hands.[13] Among what appear to be emblems of gods on boundary-stones recording sales of land a snake is a prominent figure—possibly symbolizing Ea.[14]

On the whole the serpent tended to assume or already generally had an evil aspect in Babylonia.

This is seen especially in the myth of Tiamat, of Sumerian origin, and in 'the evil serpent' or 'serpent of darkness,' often identified with her, or 'the great serpent with seven heads.' Tiamat represented the primeval, anarchic waters, as a monster dragon or raging serpent, which Merodach conquered and slew or, in another version, subdued and bound.[15] Among her forces were 'the dragon, the great serpent, the devouring reptiles.' Traces of this myth are found in the OT as a survival or borrowing. The serpent is associated with the deep, is called by various names—Leviathan, Behemoth, Rahab, as well as dragon or serpent—and is represented as conquered by Jahweh,[16] or as bound by Him or set in the sea and again to be conquered.[17] This being is apparently identified with historic nations (Babylon, Egypt, Assyria), and is sometimes duplicated,[1] and it has many heads. Other references to 'the dragon that is in the sea' may imply Tiamat's consort, Kingu.[2] Monstrous forms of reptiles and serpents are mentioned by Berosus as existing in early times in Babylon. Horned serpents occur in Chaldæan monuments, and winged dragons on the lintel of a doorway of the palace of Sennacherib. The demoniac or evil aspect of the serpent is seen also in the myths of Labbu and of Etana, and in the serpent which steals the plant of life from Gilgameš, while demons were often given a serpent form.[3] The seal with an erect serpent between two seated figures on either side of a sacred tree still lacks interpretation, though some have supposed it to represent a Babylonian version of the Fall story.[4] Serpents were believed to guard holy places and were set up on entrances of temples and palaces.

(*s*) *Canaanite and Hebrew.*—In Canaan serpents of brass or terra-cotta and actual serpents' heads have been found. These suggest a cult, and perhaps a pit in which was a serpent of brass may have been a serpent shrine.[5]

Ashtart, like the Cretan goddess, is represented with serpents in her hands. These brass serpents recall the Hebrew brazen serpent, which has been variously explained as a pre-Israelite image of a serpent embodying the spirit of a well,[6] adopted by the Hebrews; as an early Hebrew image connected with healing worshipped down to the days of Hezekiah, who destroyed it; as a totem of the family of David,[7] or the symbol of a serpent tribe; or as originally a representation of Tiamat, later misunderstood and associated with healing.[8] Was it the image of an actual serpent or of a spirit (*jinn*) embodied in a serpent? Probably the latter, as the fiery serpents of the ætiological myth explaining its origin[9] suggest demoniac beings in serpent form, such as are still believed in by the Arabs. The cult of every form of creeping thing and abominable beast portrayed on the walls of the Temple may have been a recrudescence of an earlier Hebrew cult or a borrowing from exterior sources.[10] Serpents or dragons, as in Arab belief, were doubtless also connected with wells, giving or withholding the waters, and in Syria springs are named after serpents, or as in Palmyra a female serpent-demon dwells in a spring and can hinder its flow.[11]

The fiery flying serpents of Nu 21[8] and Dt 8[15] are still known to Eastern superstition, and are mentioned by Herodotus[12] as inhabiting the desert. A serpent of this kind is threatened against Philistia, and is mentioned as a creature of the land of trouble and anguish.[13]

The talking serpent of Gn 3 represents a primitive stage of thought, while the story supplies an ætiological myth answering the questions, Why are serpents and men at enmity?, and Why does the serpent crawl instead of walk? It is doubtful whether the serpent was intended in the original story to be evil. More likely he was a divine being, with superior knowledge and a kindly desire to help man to knowledge denied him by other divinities. A later recension made his act have evil consequences, and therefore he himself had evil intentions. The story doubtless arose with a people to whom the serpent was sacred, and who were impressed with its wisdom.

Frazer connects the story of the Fall with myths of the origin of death (the 'perverted message' group) and of the cast skin (the serpent casting its skin renews its youth and never dies, and hence was considered immortal).[14] He assumes that in the earlier form of the story there were two trees, one of life and one of death. God wished man to eat the former and so become immortal, but man, misled by the serpent, ate the fruit of the other tree and so forfeited immortality. The serpent ate of the tree of life and so lived for ever.[15]

The connexion of the serpent with the devil is nowhere hinted at in OT, but appears first in Wis 2[24], and was a Rabbinic conception,[16] with profound influence on Christian and Gnostic thought. The idea of a chaotic force, personified—*e.g.*, as a dragon (Tiamat)—hostile to creative divinities, was more or less combined with this. Hence such a conception as Rev 12, esp. v.[9]. Here is also the idea of a dragon hostile to a heavenly goddess and her son (Leto, Apollo, Pytho; Isis, Horus, Typhon or Set; Marduk, Tiamat—here the goddess is lacking). These various ideas recur in Christian and Gnostic literature, and language is exhausted to express the evil character of the devil-serpent or dragon. Partly because of the myth of the

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[1] Ælian, *de Nat. An.* x. 31, xi. 17; Herod. ii. 74.

[2] H. Brugsch, *Religion und Mythologie der alten Ägypter*, Berlin, 1885–88, p. 180; W. R. Cooper, *Trans. of Victoria Institute*, p. 340; Budge, ii. 377.

[3] A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 71; Plut. *de Is. et Osir.* 74.

[4] E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, London, 1836, i. 289.

[5] Max Müller, pp. 62, 64, 76 *f.*, 79 *f.*

[6] G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 34.

[7] *Litany of the Sun*, ch. 2; *Hymn to Ra*; *Books of the Overthrowing of 'Apop*; cf. *ERE* viii. 266[a].

[8] *Book of the Dead*, ch. 32, 39.

[9] See, further, *ERE* v. 245. [10] v. 23.

[11] Cf. H. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos*, Göttingen, 1895, p. 320 *f.*

[12] A. H. Sayce, *The Religion of the Babylonians* (*HL*), London, 1887, pp. 134, 139, 234; cf. *ERE* viii. 636[a] for Ea as 'the great serpent of heaven.'

[13] Perrot-Chipiez, ii. *Chaldée et Assyrie*, pp. 367, 804; Diod. Sic. II. ix. 5.

[14] H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI*, London, 1870, iii. pl. xlv.

[15] See *ERE* iv. 128[b], 598. [16] Ps 74[14], Is 51[9 f.].

[17] Ez 32[2 f.] 29[3 f.]; cf. Job 38.

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[1] Is 27[1].

[2] These mythical references are still found in Rev 12[3] (possibly influenced also by the Greek myth of Pytho and Leto) 13[2. 4. 11] 16[13] 20[2].

[3] *ERE* ii. 315 *f.*, vi. 644[a]; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 262 *f.*

[4] See *ERE* v. 714[b]; Perrot-Chipiez, p. 97.

[5] H. Vincent, *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente* Paris, 1907, pp. 117, 174 *f.*; *ERE* i. 792[b]; *PEFSt* [1903], pp. 42, 222, [1906], p. 119.

[6] Cf. the serpent stone at a well (1 K 1[9]).

[7] W. R. Smith, *JPh* ix. [1880] 99. [8] *EBi.* col. 3388.

[9] Nu 21[8 f.]. [10] Ezk 8[10]; cf. Wis 11[15].

[11] W. R. Smith[2], p. 168 *f.* [12] ii. 75.

[13] Is 14[2] 30[6]; cf. 2 Esd 15[29]; for the connexion with the seraphim see *ERE* iv. 595[b].

[14] See § 6 (*f*).

[15] J. G. Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, London, 1918, i. 45 ff.

[16] A. F. Gfrörer, *Gesch. des Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart, 1838, vol. i. pt. i., 'Das Jahrhundert des Heils,' p. 388.

dragon cast into the abyss, partly because of the existing conception of death as a devouring monster, Hades is often described or depicted as a dragon.

(*t*) *Phœnician and Arabian.*—For the Phœnicians we have the evidence of Eusebius, quoting Philo of Byblus:

Taautos (the Egyptian Thoth), and after him the Phœnicians and Egyptians, divinized dragons and serpents, because they of all reptiles have the strongest respiration and a certain fiery nature. Their swiftness and variety of movements, in spite of possessing no feet, their longevity, their power of renewing their youth, all contributed to the respect in which they were held. The Phœnicians called the serpent Agathodaimon, and it was adopted into the mysteries and temples. Sacrifices were offered to serpents, and they were regarded as great divinities and mediators.[1] This evidence is supported by the fact that Tyrian coins show the serpent in connexion with trees, pillars, and altars,[2] while Asklepios, the Greek serpent-god of healing, was identified with Eshmun, a Phœnician god with similar functions.[3]

In Arab belief the *jinn* are embodied in snakes, especially those haunting houses and thickets, appearing and disappearing suddenly.[4] The prophet says in the book *Mishkâta 'l-Maṣabîḥ* that such snakes are *jinn*, some infidels, some believers. They must be asked to leave; if they refuse, they are infidels and may be killed.

(*u*) *Greek.*—In Greece serpents were regarded as guardians of graves, sanctuaries, and dwellings, and were kept there or represented in symbol.

Snakes were sacred because heroes or the dead generally might appear as serpents; certain gods had once been snakes or might become visible as such; and snakes were associated with them in myth, ritual, and art. The snake as a chthonian animal—'a son of the earth'[5]—was associated with fertility, and had been early reverenced as house-spirit, οἰκουρὸς ὄφις, or earth daimon, or ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, promoting fertility, and hence worshipped or at least fed.[6] Eponymous founders regarded as heroes were thought of as snakes or as having twy-nature, like Cecrops,[7] Kychreus of Salamis,[8] and Erechtheus of Athens.[9]

The presence of snakes in sanctuaries and in the rites of certain divinities suggests that these had once been worshipped as snakes.

Snakes were kept in shrines sacred to Asklepios (whose name may be connected with ἀσκάλαβος, ἀσκάλαφος='snake')[10] and were fed by virgin priestesses. They gave omens of health and plenty.[11] In these shrines the snake (=the god) suggested a cure to the sufferer in dreams or gave fruitfulness to women, and the child was believed to be begotten by the god. Asklepios appears as a snake in myths and art as well as in the sorcery of Alexander of Abonoteichos,[12] and in stories of the founding of temples. The snake is also his symbol, twined about his staff, or side by side with him. Asklepios had once been a divine snake, giving fertility and health before he became anthropomorphous. He was brought from his sanctuary at Epidauros to Sicyon in the form of a snake, and an embassy went from Rome to Epidauros and brought back a serpent which caused a plague to cease and received divine honours.[13]

In some of his aspects Zeus had snake form, as certain bas-reliefs show—Zeus Ktesios, the fertility-giver, Zeus Meilichios, and Zeus Sosipolis, who as a child was placed by Eileithyia before the army of Elis when the Arcadians invaded it, and vanished into the ground as a snake. A sanctuary was afterwards built on the spot.[14] Snakes fed by a naked virgin priestess lived in Apollo's shrine at Epirus and were said to be descended from the Pytho, and to be play-things for the god. If they took the honey-cakes with which they were fed, the year would be fruitful; if not, the reverse.[15] Demeter had the snake Kychreus as her attendant at Eleusis, probably an old local snake-god, and as goddess of the Phigalians in Arcadia she had snakes twined in her hair, and her chariot was drawn by winged snakes. The Erinyes, as chthonic beings, are called δράκαιναι, and had the form of snakes, or snakes were coiled in their hair.[16] In so far as they originated from ghosts, their snake form is obvious.

Zeus as a serpent violated Persephone, who then gave birth to Dionysus (Sabazios),[1] a god with occasional snake form,[2] in whose rites women put snakes in their hair or round their bodies, or rent them asunder.[3] The god was doubtless embodied in the snakes, for 'the symbol of the Dionysiac orgies is a consecrated serpent.'[4] In Roman myth the parallel was the violation of the Bona Dea by her father Faunus, and a consecrated serpent was placed beside her image in her ritual.[5] Sabazios, the god of Asia Minor kindred to Dionysos (or some personal name of whom was read in Greek as 'Dionysos'), was represented as a snake along with Cybele.

Some divine beings were represented as partly snake in form—besides those already mentioned, Typhon, Boreas, Hecate (also with serpents in her hair), and the giants.[6]

Snakes kept in shrines were fed with honey or honey-cakes, as the ghosts were also propitiated with the same food.[7]

(*v*) *Roman.*—Among the Romans a serpent-cult is mainly connected with the animals as embodying the genius, and snakes were kept in large numbers in temples and houses.[8] The Greek cult of the serpent Asklepios probably influenced the Romans, as the embassy to Epidauros just mentioned suggests. A more native aspect of the cult is seen in the serpent-cave at Lanuvium, whither virgins were taken yearly to prove their chastity. If the serpent accepted the offerings brought by them, their chastity was proved and also a fertile season ensured, as at Epirus.[9]

A survival of an older cult or totem-clan rite is probably to be seen in the yearly procession of men with coils of live serpents before the image, hung with serpents, of St. Domenico of Foligno at Cocullo, near the territory of the ancient Marsi snake-clan. The people claim immunity from snake-bite as well as power over serpents, as did the Marsi.[10]

(*w*) *Celtic.*—Among the Celts details of a serpent-cult are lacking.

A horned serpent is figured with twelve Roman gods on a Gallo-Roman altar, and the serpent frequently occurs along with images of Celtic gods who hold serpents in their hands or present a torque to two ram-headed serpents.[11] These gods are probably all forms of an underworld god; hence the chthonic character of the animal as his symbol or vehicle may be suggested. The ram-headed serpent accompanies a goddess of fertility on a monument at Epinal.[12] What myth was told of such twy-natured serpents is unknown, but the ram has been supposed to be connected with a cult of the dead or with the god of the under world.[13] Serpents were entwined round oaks in the Druidic grove described by Lucan. The serpent also occurs on a group of Scottish monuments regarded as of the Christian period, either alone or with the doubly bent rod.[14] These symbols are probably derived from the pagan period, but their meaning is unknown.

W. Stukeley, in his works on Avebury and Stonehenge, advocated the theory that the megaliths there were connected with serpent-worship, but archæologists see no reason for dissociating these from similar remains known to be burial-sites. A similar theory has been connected with a so-called 'serpent-mound' near Oban.

Dragons and serpents are mentioned frequently in Celtic myth and story in association with lochs or sacred trees, and in many saintly legends they are overcome by the saints. A white serpent is king of the snakes in Celtic lore.[15]

(*x*) *Ophite.*—Reference may here be made to the cult or symbolism of the snake among the groups of Gnostics collectively known as Ophites.

With some of these the serpent was a symbol of evil. This was the case with some groups described by Irenæus, with

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1 Philo, *ap.* Eus. *Præp. Evang.* i. 10.
2 T. Maurice, *Indian Antiquities compared with Persia, Egypt, Greece*, London, 1796–1806, vi. 273.
3 W. W. F. von Baudissin, *ZDMG* lix. [1905] 459 f.; see also art. PHŒNICIANS.
4 W. R. Smith[2], pp. 120, 129, 133; E. W. Lane, *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*, London, 1883, pp. 28, 35; cf. *ERE* i. 669[b].
5 Herod. i. 78.
6 Cf. J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 288; cf. *ERE* vi. 404[b].
7 Aristoph. *Wasps*, 438; see *ERE* iii. 270.
8 Paus. i. xxxvi. 1.
9 See Herod. viii. 41; *Vita Apollon.* vii. 24; *Orph. Hymn.* xxxii. 11.
10 O. Gruppe, *Die griech. Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1897–1906, ii. 1444.
11 Ælian, *de Nat. An.* xi. 2. 12 See *ERE* i. 306[b].
13 Paus. II. xi. 8, III. xxiii. 7; Ovid, *Metam.* xv. 5; Livy, x. 47.
14 Paus. VI. xx. 3, 5. 15 Ælian, *de Nat. An.* xi. 2.
16 Eur. *Iphig in Taur.* 286; Æsch. *Eum.* 126, *Choeph.* 1044 ff.

1 Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 2; Arnobius, v. 21; Diod. Sic. iv. 4, v. 75.
2 Eur. *Bacch.* 1017.
3 *Ib.* 101, 687; Athen. v. 28; Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii. 12; Galen, *de Antid.* i. 6, xiv. 45.
4 Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii. 12.
5 Macrob. I. xii. 24; Plut. *Cæsar*, 9.
6 Hyginus, *Fab.* 166; Lucian, *Philops.* 22; Paus. v. xix. 1, VIII. xxix. 3.
7 Herod. viii. 41; Paus. IX. xxxix. 11; Aristoph. *Clouds*, 506; Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* iii. 2; Philostr. *Vita Apollon* viii. 19.
8 Pliny, *HN* xxix. 72.
9 Ælian, *de Nat. An.* ix. 16; Propert. *Eleg.* iv. 8.
10 M. C. Harrison, *FL* xviii. [1907] 187; Pliny, *HN* vii. 2.
11 *RA* xxx. [1897] 313, xix. [1882] 322.
12 J. L. Courcelle-Seneuil, *Les Dieux gaulois, d'après les monuments figurés*, Paris, 1910, p. 80.
13 See J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 166.
14 J. Romilly Allen, *The Early Christian Monuments of Scotland*, with introd. by J. Anderson, Edinburgh, 1903, pt. i. p. xxxiii, and plates.
15 For the serpent's egg in Celtic lore see *ERE* iii. 297[a], 413[b].

whom the son of Ialdabaoth was Nous διφυέμορφος, from whom were derived spirit, soul, and mundane things, and the cause of all wickedness. Hence, as the enemy of mankind, he was not honoured by these groups of Ophites.[1] In the system of Justin, Naas, or the serpent, is the principle of evil, commits adultery with Eve, and afflicts the spirit of Elohim in man.[2] The Severians also regarded the serpent as evil and the vine as the product of intercourse between it and earth — perhaps the reflexion of a pagan myth.[3]

Others regarded the serpent as good, thus reverting unconsciously to the belief adumbrated in the Semitic Fall myth of the wise serpent, because his action produced good results in disobedience to the Demiurge, or he represented an intelligent principle—*e.g.*, in the case of the sect which identified Sophia and the serpent.[4] To the Peratæ the Son and the serpent were identical, and the Naassenes worshipped Naas as the moist principle which is good and in which all things subsist.[5] An actual cult of a serpent was probably limited to a few extremists —*e.g.*, some described by Epiphanius; the others regarded the serpent merely as a symbol of higher powers.

Epiphanius says of this group: 'They keep a living serpent in a chest, and at the time of the mysteries entice him out by placing bread before him. The door being opened, he comes forth and having ascended the table he twines himself round the bread. This they call a perfect *sacrifice*. They not only break and distribute this among the votaries, but whoever desires may kiss the serpent. This they call the Eucharist, and they conclude by singing a hymn through him to the Supreme Father.'[6]

On Ophite gems the serpent is frequently represented in various aspects; *e.g.*, the Egyptian god Chnubis, identified with Iao Sabaoth, is depicted as a serpent with a human head.

In the apocryphal *Acts of Philip* the apostle is said to have preached in Ophioryma (Hierapolis), 'where they set up images of serpents and worshipped them,' and his persecutors are 'children of the serpent,' or Echidna, who is identified with the devil. Finally Philip and John expel the serpent—a distorted reading of fact, for the serpent-cult must have continued in Hierapolis long after apostolic days.[7] This serpent-cult was probably connected with that of Cybele. On coins of Hierapolis snake-emblems appear, or Cybele presents a cup to a snake, and in the *Acts* serpents are called 'sons of the goddess'—*i.e.* her sacred animals or representatives. Wine was offered to a viper in the temple.[8] Possibly the Gnostic reverence for the serpent was influenced by the pagan cult of a goddess associated or identified with a snake.

2. The serpent as embodiment of the dead.—Certain snakes haunt houses and burial-places, and partly for this reason they are thought to embody ghosts of the dead, returned to their old abodes or lingering round the grave.

(*a*) *Lower races.*—This is a common Bantu belief, and with the Zulus the *amatongo* are the dead in snake form, the reptiles having come out of their bodies. If a man sees a snake on his son's grave, he says, 'This is my son,' and snakes in houses are identified with the dead by marks or scars once borne by these. They cause a happy feeling to the living, who sacrifice to them and feed them with milk.[9] Among the Thonga woods where ancestral chiefs are buried are tabu, and the dead frequently appear as snakes. Sacrifice is made to them from time to time.[10] Among the Eastern Bantu spirits sometimes take this form for mischief. Such a snake is killed, because this slays the ghost or prevents its further embodiment, but an apology is made to it.[11] The Suk regard the appearance of a snake in a house as denoting that the ghost is hungry, and that, if it is not fed, all in the house will die. But such a snake may be killed outside the hut.[12] The El Kiboron, a Masai tribe, think that the bones of married men become a snake and return to the hut, where they are fed with milk.[13] Ghost-snakes are fed with honey and milk by the Akikuyu, and, if one is accidentally killed, the elders are summoned, a sheep is killed, and all must partake of it, the culprit wearing part of the skin lest his wife and children die.[14] The Nandi kill snakes in houses, but, when one is found on a woman's bed, it is the spirit of an ancestor and an omen that her next child will be safely born. It is fed with milk.[15] Among the Bahima the bodies of dead princes and princesses are thought to produce snakes, which are cared for in temples by the priests.[1] The Kafirs venerate the python, because it embodies the spirit of a dead chief; to slay a python was punishable by death.[2] Medicine-men and the rich among the Masai become snakes when the body decays, reappear in their huts, and are fed with milk.[3]

The belief occurs sporadically in N. America, the Moquis holding that men of the Rattle-snake clan become rattle-snakes at death, and the Apaches that snakes are connected with the elders or dead men of the tribe.[4] The snake is sometimes identified with the soul, as when seen coming out of a dead person's mouth. Several S. American tribes also have this belief. Women who look upon the Jurupari mysteries of Brazilian tribes become serpents or crocodiles at death, instead of going to paradise.[5]

Among the Tami of New Guinea spirits may be called up as snakes which give oracles through a seer, and among the Papuans of Geelvink Bay, who make images of the dead in which the spirit resides and communicates with the living, those of dead women are represented holding a serpent with both hands.[6] In Kiriwina (E. New Guinea) a chief may appear as a snake in a hut and is honoured but also asked to go, as his appearance is a bad omen.[7] In central Melanesia the dead may appear as snakes—*e.g.*, in a sacred place—and are held sacred, and in the Pelew Islands such snakes are never killed. According to New Britain belief, the dead are men by day and snakes by night.[8]

In Indonesia soul-substance, as distinct from soul, may animate snakes which come out of holes from the under world.[9] The Dayaks believe that spirits (*untu*) appear as snakes, and, if they enter a house, it is to carry off the living. But they are fed, and anything found in their mouths is kept as a charm.[10] With the Ibans of Borneo, who believe in a man's *ngarong*, or secret spirit-helper, usually an ancestor, the *ngarong* may be a snake, and all of the same species are reverenced by the individual who is helped.[11]

(*b*) *Japanese, Chinese, and Arabian.*—Ancestral snakes are also believed in by the Chams and Assamese,[12] and in older Japan and China there are legends of snakes appearing from graves or in coffins, as if the belief also existed there.[13] This is also an occasional Arab belief, for in Upper Egypt at Shaikh Haredi, the tomb of a saint of that name, in cases of sickness a virgin was sent to it and a serpent came forth, hung about her neck, and was carried to the sick man's bedside. Another account says that several women visit the place once a year, and the serpent twines round the neck of the loveliest.[14] In ancient Egypt it was the privilege of the dead to assume any form by means of 'words of power,' and among them were those of serpent or crocodile.[15]

(*c*) *Greek and Roman.*—Among the Greeks the snake was the symbol of the grave and of the spirit contained in it, especially spirits of worshipful heroes, often represented in art and tradition as snakes or accompanied by snakes, their doubles. The idea was doubtless derived from the fact that snakes haunted tombs. In legends snakes were seen close to the dead or crawling from their beds, or the dead turned into snakes (Cadmus and Harmonia).[16] There was also a theory that the marrow of the dead became a snake.[17] A woman or goddess (Hygeia, daughter of Asklepios) feeding a snake with milk is a common Greek artistic *motif*, recalling the savage custom of thus feeding spirit-snakes and perhaps arising from a similar custom in Greece. Analogous to this among the Romans was the symbolizing of the *genius* or *juno*—the guardian-spirit or other self—as a snake, and the keeping of tame snakes in large numbers in temples and houses.[18] The snake is already figured on Etruscan monuments, and it was painted on the walls of Roman houses, sometimes approaching

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1 Iren. *adv. Hær.* I. xxviii. 3 (ed. Harvey).
2 Hippolytus, *Refut. omn. Hær.* v. 20 f.
3 Epiph. *adv. Hær.* 45. 4 Iren. I. xxviii. 8.
5 Hipp. v. 11 f.; v. 4.
6 Epiph. i. 37; cf. art. OPHITISM.
7 *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*, ed. R. A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet, Leipzig, 1891–1903, ii. pt. 2; W. M. Ramsay, *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Oxford, 1895–97, i. 87.
8 *Acta Ap. Apoc.* II. ii. 51.
9 Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, pp. 8, 12, 196 ff., etc.; E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1859, p. 246; D. Leslie, *Among the Zulus and Amatongas*[2], Edinburgh, 1875, pp. 47, 120.
10 H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, ii. 351 ff.
11 D. Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 62; J. Macdonald, *JAI* xxii. 114.
12 M. W. H. Beech, *The Suk*, Oxford, 1911, p. 20.
13 M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 202; cf. also *ERE* viii. 482[a].
14 C. W. Hobley, *JRAI* xli. [1911] 408.
15 A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1909, p. 90.

1 J. Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 101 f.
2 Stow, p. 148.
3 Hollis, p. 307. For the belief, resembling the Egyptian (see below), see *ERE* ix. 420[b].
4 J. G. Bourke, *FL* ii. [1884] 435 f.
5 *ERE* i. 383[b], ii. 836[a].
6 G. Bamler, in R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 516; J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, p. 308.
7 G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 238 f.
8 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 178 f.; P. Rascher, *AA* xxix. [1904] 209 f.
9 *ERE* vii. 238[b].
10 E. Dunn, *Anthropos*, i. [1906] 182.
11 Hose-McDougall, ii. 90; E. H. Gomes, *Seventeen Years among the Sea Dyaks of Borneo*, London, 1911, p. 143.
12 E. Aymonier, *RHR* xxiv. [1891] 267; *ERE* i. 538[a], iii. 348[b].
13 *Nihongi*, tr. W. G. Aston, London, 1896, i. 210; De Groot, *Rel. System of China*, iv. 218.
14 F. L. Norden, *Travels in Egypt and Nubia*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1757, ii. 28 f.; R. Pococke, *A Description of the East*, in Pinkerton's *Voyages*, xv. 269.
15 E. A. W. Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, London, 1899, p. 230.
16 Plut. *Cleomenes*, 39; Porph. *Vita Plot.* 103, ed. Didot; Ovid, *Metam.* iv. 563 f.
17 Plut. *loc. cit.*; Ovid, *Metam.* xv. 389; Pliny, *HN* x. 84 [64]; cf. *ERE* vi. 653[a].
18 W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic*, London, 1899, p. 104; Pliny, *HN* xxix. 72; Servius, *ad Æn.* v. 95.

an altar. Doubtless all this was connected with an older belief in the ghost embodied in a snake. Æneas, seeing the snake coming out of his father's tomb and tasting his offering, was perplexed as to whether it was the *genius loci* or an attendant on his father.[1] In some cases life was supposed to be dependent on the safety of the house-snake; *e.g.*, when the tame serpent of Tiberius was devoured by ants, he drew the augury from it that he must guard against attack from the multitude.[2]

(*d*) *Russian.*—In Russia the presence of snakes in a cottage is a good omen. They are fed with milk, and to kill them is a sin. This is apparently a relic of the time when a belief in ancestral snakes existed among the Slavs, Lithuanians, and Wends.[3]

3. Serpents in the mysteries.—The ritual use of a serpent in Asiatic and Greek mysteries is connected with the aspect of certain divinities as snakes.

In the initiation to the rites of the Phrygian Sabazios, whose symbol and embodiment was a snake, a golden snake was let down into the bosom of the candidate and taken away again from the lower parts. Clement of Alexandria calls this 'the serpent gliding over the breast'—this serpent crawling over the breasts of the initiated being the deity.[4] This rite was also adopted in the Dionysiac mysteries.[5] In these a snake was carried in a *cista*, the snake being the god himself. The *cista*, with the snake emerging from vine leaves, is represented on coins of the cities of Asia Minor of the Roman period, and Clement speaks of the *cista* in which was a snake, the symbol of Dionysos Bassareus, having previously spoken of the box in which the Kabeiroi exhibited the φαλλός of Dionysos to the Tyrrhenians to worship.[6] In the Arretophoria, performed for the fertility of women and fields, 'sacred things which may not be named were carried about, made of cereal paste, *i.e.* images of snakes and of the forms of men,' viz. φαλλοί.[7] Snake and φαλλός are here parallel as symbols of a deity, under both of which Dionysos was represented.[8] In the Eleusinia, according to Clement of Alexandria, some object was taken by the initiate from a *cista*, put into a basket, and from the basket again put into the chest.[9] This object has been conjectured to be a φαλλός, for a representation of the mystic basket shows a φαλλός among fruit, and Dieterich thinks that what was done with the snake—drawing it through the bosom—was also done with the φαλλός.[10]

The rite was one expressive of sexual and mystic union with the god, as Zeus or Sabazios as a serpent had entered εἰς κόρης κόλπον. The god was hailed as ὑποκόλπιε, according to an Orphic hymn. 'In relation to the god both men and women were as female.' In such a rite snake and φαλλός were one and the same, and women imitated the divine action. Such rites may have given rise to the stories of sons born of human mothers by divinities in the form of a serpent.[11]

The *cista* of the mysteries of Isis may also have contained a snake.[12]

Besides the above, certain facts point to the connexion between serpent and φαλλός.[13] In Algonquian myth, at creation, the φαλλός of Geechee Manito-ah being in his way, he wrung it off and threw it into the bush, where it became Wau-kau-thee, the Rain-Serpent.[14] Elsewhere in America the φαλλός 'was correlated or identical with the serpent.'[15] If the boundary-stones in Babylon were phallic, the presence of the serpent wreathed round them is significant. The figure of Nergal as a monster on a Babylonian plaque shows the φαλλός as a serpent, and 'the serpent of conception' is spoken of in certain texts.[16] In India the serpent—*e.g.*, in the Śaiva cult—is associated with sexual powers, and in the temple of Viśveśara at Benares the *liṅgam* is sometimes represented with a serpent coiled round it.[17] C. Schoebel, following certain Talmudists, Agrippa of Cologne, and others, identifies the tree of knowledge, serpent, and φαλλός in the narrative of Gn 3.[18] The connexion of snake and φαλλός is perhaps one reason, added to the snake being regarded as an earth-spirit, why it is so commonly associated with fertility, as so often noted above.[1]

4. The serpent in magical rites.—It is not surprising that such a mysterious animal as the serpent should be used in magical rites, and in some languages the word for 'serpent' has derivatives or cognates referring to magic or intercourse with demons, while the serpent is often a symbol of culture-gods and gods of wisdom, and is connected with healing.

(*a*) The common idea that the representation of a noxious being will drive off that being or other noxious creatures is perhaps one explanation of the brazen serpent story in Nu 21[6ff.].

In Egypt a serpent-head amulet guarded its wearer from snake-bite in this world and the next. The *uræus* on the crown was supposed to throw itself on the king's enemies, and to have compelling power over the gods when the *uræus* crown was placed by Nut on the head of the deceased.[2] In Athens snake-amulets are placed on the newly-born to protect them against snake-demons.[3] Perhaps the golden serpents which Clement of Alexandria condemns as a female decoration were really worn as amulets.[4] Gregory of Tours tells of a bronze serpent found in a Paris sewer on the removal of which snakes infested the city.[5] Among savages, too, amulets resembling snakes, or a snake tatued on the body, protect against snake-bite.[6] In Romagna serpents, head downward and interlaced, are painted on walls to keep away the evil eye.[7]

(*b*) The skin of the snake forms a part of the American Indian 'medicine-bag,' and medicine-men among the Nandi receive power from snakes carried in their bag.[8] A wand in the form of a snake was used by Egyptian magicians, and also in the death ritual to heal the wound made by the adze in opening the eyes and lips of the deceased. Buried with him, such a wand gave him power over the dead.[9] The skin of a serpent is also mentioned as a magico-medical remedy by Marcellus in the 4th cent., and it has still such properties in modern Tuscany.[10]

(*c*) Eating a serpent's flesh, or anointing with its fat, or applying part of its body to the wound, was a remedy against snake-bite among Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Jews, American Indians, Abipones, Thonga, and other races, and is also found in folk-medicine in many lands still—an example of the principle that like cures like.[11]

Hence fennel cured snake-bite because snakes ate it.[12] Again, part of the war medicine of the American Indians was a fragment of a serpent, to give skill in war. Its blood was given to women in child-bed, because, the snake being immortal, the blood had vital influences.[13] Here, too, the virtue of the 'serpent's egg' and of the so-called adder's stone may be noticed.[14]

(*d*) The serpent is associated with healing rites over a wide area, for no very obvious reason, but perhaps because of its supposed wisdom.

This is seen in the case of the Greek Asklepios and other divinities and in the Semitic association of serpents with healing springs. In Madagascar a god of healing was patron of serpents, and his priest carried a serpent in the procession of the god.[15]

As the snake sloughed its skin, this became a folk-explanation of its connexion with Asklepios. The sloughing symbolized the healing art.[16]

(*e*) Omens are often drawn from the sight of serpents, and it is often considered unlucky to see one, as among the Kenyahs and Thonga and many other peoples.[17]

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[1] Verg. *Æn.* v. 84; cf. F. B. Jevons, *Plutarch's Romane Questions*, London, 1892, p. xlvii f.; *ERE* ii. 24[b].

[2] Suet. *Tiberius*, 72.

[3] See art. SERPENT-WORSHIP (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

[4] Arnobius, *adv. Gentes*, v. 21; Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii. 16; Firmicus Maternus, *de Err. prof. Rel.* 11; cf. Justin Martyr, *Apol.* i. 27.

[5] See art. MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), § x (*c*).

[6] L. Anson, *Numismata Græca*, London, 1911, pt. i. p. 936; Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii. 19; cf. Plutarch, *Alex.* 2.

[7] Schol. on Lucian, *Dial. Mer.* ii. 1; cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, London, 1903, p. 122.

[8] Gruppe, p. 1423. [9] Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii. 21.

[10] Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, p. 125 f.

[11] Cf. Dieterich, p. 123 f., *de Hymnis Orphicis*, Marburg, 1891, p. 38; Gruppe, pp. 866, 1423; Ramsay, i. 94, 293; see also below, § 6.

[12] Cf. Ovid, *Amor.* ii. 13; Juvenal, vi. 537; see also art. MYSTERIES (Egyptian).

[13] Cf. E. Gerhard, *Griech. Mythologie*, Berlin, 1854–55; *ERE* v. 829.

[14] Owen, p. 36.

[15] Brinton, p. 177, *Nagualism*, Philadelphia, 1894, p. 49 f.

[16] See § x (*r*); Perrot-Chipiez, p. 363 f.; *ERE* ii. 644, note ‖.

[17] Crooke, *PR*[2] ii. 124; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 439; J. H. Rivett-Carnac, *JASB* lii. [1879] 13.

[18] *Le Mythe de la femme et du serpent*, Paris, 1876.

[1] See art. PHALLISM.

[2] See art. CROWN, vol. iv. p. 341; H. M. Tirard, *The Book of the Dead*, London, 1910, p. 28.

[3] Gruppe, p. 902. [4] Clem. Alex. *Pæd.* ii. 13.

[5] Greg. of Tours, *Hist. eccles. des Francs*, French tr., Paris, 1874, viii. 33.

[6] See *ERE* iii. 395[b], i. 538; cf. Brinton, p. 133.

[7] Leland, p. 168. In Annam serpents are painted on the body to prevent snake-bite (*ERE* i. 538[b]).

[8] Hollis, p. 51. [9] Tirard, p. 26.

[10] Leland, p. 283.

[11] Pliny, *HN* xxix. 71; Gruppe, p. 1274; *ERE* viii. 258[a] (Arabs); *JE* xi. 203 (Jews); M. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, Eng. tr., London, 1822, ii. 290 f.; Junod, ii. 317, 419.

[12] Pliny, *HN* xix. 23. [13] Brinton, pp. 133, 140.

[14] See *ERE* iii. 297[a], 113[b]. For love-philtres made from serpents' flesh see *ERE* i. 542[a].

[15] J. Sibree, *The Great African Island*, London, 1880, p. 268.

[16] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, London, 1898, iii. 66; see also art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE.

[17] Hose-McDougall, ii. 73, 79; Junod, ii. 482; *ERE* i. 526[b], 541[b].

(*f*) Power over snakes is sometimes ascribed to sorcerers, or the snake is used by them as a 'sending'—a creature sent forth to produce disease, to wound, or to kill.[1]

Serpents were thus sent as agents of his anger by the Malagasy deity already mentioned.[2] In Calabar a tribe levied toll on all who passed. Refusal to pay resulted in a snake being sent after them, which tied their legs, and the people then came and robbed them. Medicine-leaves also protect houses in Calabar, and fetishes among the Baganda; and, if any robber approaches, snakes rush out at him.[3] Bushmen sorcerers are said to be able to whistle up snakes, which coil round their neck in the presence of spectators.[4] The Chiriguano believe that they would never die unless, *inter alia*, bitten by a snake—really a sorcerer in that form.[5]

(*g*) Charms and magic formulæ are often used as remedies for snake-bite or as protection against snakes.[6]

(*h*) As certain snakes are susceptible to musical, rhythmical sounds or movements, these are used by snake-charmers to exhibit their power over them.

This has occurred in Africa and in many Eastern lands from ancient down to modern times; among the American Indians charming was used by magicians to prove their intercourse with unseen powers and the power given them by these so that they handled snakes with impunity.[7] Possibly snake-charmers produce some cataleptic or hypnotic state in the animals.[8] The supposed immunity of the charmer should be compared with that seen in the case of the Hopi, the devotees in the Dionysiac mysteries, the Psylli and Ophiogenes, and the *kebeet* among the Abipones.[9]

5. Demoniac and mythical serpents and dragons.—Although the serpent is frequently worshipped, its harmful character and the repulsion which it arouses, its frequent large size and strength, and the mystery of its movements have often caused a sinister character to be given it, and made it an embodiment of demoniac powers. Because of the brightness of its eye and its power of fascination over animals the serpent was commonly supposed to have the evil eye. The larger species, possibly also the dim memory of extinct species or species no longer found in any region, affected man's imagination, and both fear and fancy gave rise to a belief in mythical serpents or dragons of vast size and powers, and often the cause of various natural phenomena. They have frequently many heads; they have wings and feet; and they breathe fire and smoke. Demoniac and mythical serpents are often the object of belief where a cult of serpents exists, showing that very different emotions are aroused by serpents of various kinds.

Some examples of demoniac and mythical serpents have already been referred to. The Sea Dayaks of Sarawak tell of a huge snake which came down from heaven and fed on the rice. A man slew it and ate its flesh; the result was the deluge.[10] Another myth tells how the python was once the most poisonous of snakes, and killed a man who took fish from its fish-pond. Thinking afterwards that he had come to life, it vomited its poison into the sea, where a snake, Ular Berang, swallowed some of the poison, and the sea-snakes took the rest. The Ular Berang is rarely seen, but is very dangerous.[11] Certain snakes, like other animals, possess *badi*—*i.e.* a bad spirit or mischief of a dangerous kind—while the *badi* of some large trees is a more individual spirit which may appear as a snake.[12] Both in Burma and in Borneo dangerous snakes are held to be embodiments of evil spirits.[13] Among the Negrito tribes of Borneo eclipses are caused by a python trying to swallow sun and moon or to embrace the latter.[14] According to the Ibans, the Flood was the result of men's wounding a huge python. Soon after the rain caused a flood which drowned every one except a woman.[1] The American Indian myth of the great horned serpent[2]—the embodiment of lightning or of the waters, and slain by a god or hero—is perhaps a variant of the myth of chaos, represented by a monster, and overcome by a god. In Musquakie myth a huge snake with hard, white scales, deer's horns, and spitting fire, rose from a lake, but was vanquished by the hero, Hot Hand.[3] In the arid south-west region, where the cañons are quickly flooded, men are said to have lived underground at one time, but to have been driven to earth's surface by a huge snake which caused a deluge.[4] In other American Indian myths (Ojibwa, etc.) serpents who have slain the hero's brother cause a deluge when the hero avenges them.[5] On the other hand, in British New Guinea, Raudalo, king of snakes, put an end to the deluge by pursuing the waters to their accustomed bed.[6] A Toba Battak myth tells how a great serpent lay on the primeval ocean and engulfed the earth at its creation by turning it over. But the Heavenly Maid caused eight suns to dry up the waters and then pinned the serpent to a rock.[7] The Thonga believe in the vast snake, Buwumati, dwelling in lakes invisibly and heard crying when rain falls. If any one should chance to see it, he dies.[8] The Mexican sun-god Tonatiuh cut in pieces the coloured wood-snake, as Manco Capac in Peru and Bochica in Bogota slew the serpents of the waters.[9] The Ayni believe that evil spirits are incarnated in serpents, as do also the Ibibios of S. Nigeria.[10]

The monstrous demoniac serpents of Babylon and Egypt have already been described.[11] But Egyptian myth knew also of a beneficent serpent, its body overlain with gold, and 30 cubits in length, living on an island, where it apparently was the guardian of the dead, just as serpents guarded the under world and are figured on tombs as guardians. A human-headed *uræus* of large size is sculptured on an Ethiopian temple.[12] In Greece Typhon, son of Tartaros and Gaia, was demon of the whirlwind and possessed 100 serpent-heads. He attacked Zeus, who felled him with a thunderbolt and set Ætna upon him. His consort was Echidna, half-woman, half-serpent, whose progeny were the Sphinx, Chimæra, Hydra, and the Dragon of the Hesperides.[13] Hydra, with nine heads, dwelt in the swamps of Lerna, laying waste all the land till Heracles slew it. Heracles also slew the dragon or snake of the Hesperides, which is represented as twined round a tree from below which issues a well; therefore it is guardian of the waters.[14] Jason, Perseus, and Cadmus were also slayers of dragons in Greek myth. Python, a dragon born of Gaia, sought to kill Leto because he learned that her son would be fatal to him. Zeus interfered, but Leto's son Apollo slew the Pytho at Delphi, where he buried the body and instituted the Pythian games.

Behind this lies the myth of the cult of a prophetic snake at Delphi, embodiment of a goddess. The combat with Apollo has been explained as the seizing of the oracle by a tribe of Apollo-worshippers, who changed the shrine to his. The shrine in N. Greece where serpents, the god's play-things, were fed by virgin-priestesses may also have been an ancient shrine of a snake-goddess.[15]

Ancient Persia, in its dualistic scheme, regarded some animals—*e.g.*, the serpent—as of the evil creation, while certain others were created to destroy them. It also embodied the evil power in a mythic dragon created by Angra Mainyu to destroy the faithful—the dragon Azi Dahâka, three-headed and immensely strong, sometimes also identified with Babylon (Bawri) or the Arabians.[16] He was conquered by Atar, son of Ahura Mazda, a personification of fire,[17] or, in another myth, by Thraêtaona, who bound him on Mt. Demavend. At the end of time he will escape and destroy a third of mankind, cattle, and sheep, as well as water, fire, and vegetation, but will be slain by Keresâspa.[18]

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[1] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 282; Junod, ii. 467 (Thonga); *ERE* i. 251a (Ainus); de Groot, *Rel. System of China*, v. 851 (China); cf. art. LYCANTHROPY, vol. viii. p. 218a.

[2] Sibree, p. 268.

[3] From information supplied by the Rev. J. K. MacGregor; Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 15.

[4] T. Hahn, *Tsuni-||Goam*, London, 1881, p. 80.

[5] G. E. Church, *Aborigines of S. America*, London, 1913, p. 237.

[6] Tirard, p. 99; Seligmann, *The Veddas*, p. 197 f.

[7] Brinton, p. 131; Müller, p. 277 (Brazil); *ERE* i. 792b.

[8] Cf. *ERE* i. 434b. [9] Dobrizhoffer, ii. 67.

[10] I. H. N. Evans, *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 469 f.; E. Dunn, *Anthropos*, i. 17.

[11] N. Annandale and H. C. Robinson, *Fasciculi Malayenses*, London, 1903–06, pt. i. p. 88.

[12] *Ib.* pp. 100, 104. [13] *ERE* iii. 25a, vii. 250b.

[14] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 203, 224. A dragon-like monster is supposed to swallow candidates for initiation in New Guinea (see *ERE* viii. 826a, reff.).

[1] Hose-McDougall, ii. 144; cf. H. Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, i. 301.

[2] See § 1 (*h*).

[3] Owen, p. 4; cf. *ERE* vi. 885a for a Huron mythical serpent.

[4] Alexander, *N. American Mythology*, pp. 161, 299 ff.; cf. *ERE* iv. 547b.

[5] *Ib.* pp. 274, 301; Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, i. 302.

[6] A. Ker, *Papuan Fairy Tales*, London, 1910, p. 80; cf. W. W. Gill, *Journ. of the Polynesian Soc.*, xxi. [1912] 61 (Cook Island version); G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago*, London, 1884, p. 288.

[7] J. Warneck, *Religion der Batak*, Leipzig, 1909, p. 28; cf. *ERE* vii. 796a for the dragon of the Laos. The Bunun of Formosa have also a myth connecting a huge serpent with a deluge (Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, i. 232).

[8] Junod, ii. 318. [9] Müller, p. 566.

[10] *L'Anthropologie*, iv. [1893] 431; P. A. Talbot, *Geog. Journal*, xliv. [1914] 296.

[11] For a Hittite mythical serpent see *ERE* vi. 725b.

[12] W. M. F. Petrie, *Egyptian Tales*, London, 1895, ii. 818; G. Maspero, *Contes populaires de l'Égypte ancienne*, Paris, 1882, p. 133 f.

[13] Hyginus, *Fab.* ch. 151, 152.

[14] J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 431.

[15] *Ib.* pp. 428, 433, 436; L. R. Farnell, *CGS* iii. 9 f., iv. 181; W. S. Fox, *Greek and Roman Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vol. i.), Boston, 1916, p. 178; *ERE* ix. 493b.

[16] *SBE* iv.[2] [1895] 258 f., xxiii. [1883] 60.

[17] *Yasht*, xix. 47 f.

[18] *SBE* v. [1880] 119; *Dinkart*, ix. 13. 5; cf. ix. 15. 1 ff.; *Bundahis*, xxix.; cf. Rev 8[7f.] 9[16] 20[2. 7f.]; see also *Yasna*, ix. 11; *Yasht*, xix. 40 f.

In Firdausi's *Shāh Nāmah* Azi Dahāka is an Arab king with a dragon-like face and two snakes on his shoulders, the product of the kisses of Iblis. These were fed with human flesh. The poem follows closely the Armenian Zoroastrian version of the myth, in which Hruden (Thraētaona) is the conqueror of Azi.[1]

Dragons exist frequently also in Hindu, Teutonic, Slavic, and Celtic myth and folk-tale, in Mandæan and Manichæan mythology—in both cases derived from Babylonian or Persian belief—and also in Gnosticism.[2]

In the *Pistis Sophia* the disk of the sun is described as a great dragon with his tail in his mouth—an Egyptian conception;[3] and dragons form the rudder of the ship of the moon. The outer darkness, where souls incapable of redemption are cast, is a great dragon encircling the earth, with its tail in its mouth, and containing twelve chambers of punishment. So in a Gnostic system described by Epiphanius[4] the archon of the lowest heaven is a dragon encircling the earth and swallowing souls which have not knowledge. Both in Gnostic and in Catholic prayers for deliverance of the soul on its upward way there is mentioned the opposing dragon or serpent. The dragon as Hades in *Pistis Sophia* is probably a reminiscence of the Egyptian Apap. In the *Apocalypse of Baruch* there is a huge dragon in the third heaven and also in Hades. Its belly forms Hades, and the dragon devours the wicked.[5]

The Gnostic idea of the dragon or serpent as an evil world-principle, identical with the devil, encircling the earth and holding it in his power,[6] may be referred to in the *Hymn of the Pearl*, ascribed to Bardesanes. The pearl is in the sea, hard by the serpent.[7] The sea is the mythic chaotic deep, which, encircling the world, is sometimes compared in Babylonian mythology to a snake—'the river of the snake.'[8] This idea is also found in Egypt, where the myth of Apap bound in the deep is also figured as that of the ocean itself representing Apap bound, girdling the earth and keeping it together, yet ever trying to burst his bands and destroy it.[9] A Ptolemaic writer, Horapollo, says that the Egyptians represented the universe as a serpent devouring its tail—a subject depicted also in Gnostic gems.[10] In Rabbinic belief Leviathan was coiled round the earth, and the sea appeared to Alexander, when carried into the air by griffins, as a snake encircling the earth.[11] So, too, the *mið-garðs-ormr* of the Edda, the serpent encircling the earth, is probably the ocean.[12] The Sia believe in cosmic serpents, one for each quarter and one for each earth and heaven.[13] The serpent was one of the symbols of the elements in Mithraism.[14]

6. Myths about serpents.—(*a*) *Earthquakes.*—The previous idea of the serpent coiled round the earth is perhaps connected with a series of myths in which earthquakes are caused by serpents or dragons which support the earth or swell underground, and whose movements shake the earth.[15]

In Polynesian myths the sea-serpent, by standing erect, raised the sky from the earth—the two having previously cleaved together.[16]

(*b*) *The serpent and the waters.*—In many myths a dragon or huge serpent lays waste the land, until the king offers his daughter in marriage to the knight who will slay it. Or a maiden must be given to it at intervals; at last it is the turn of the king's daughter, and then the monster is slain by a hero or saint or divinity. In some of these tales the serpent lives in a lake and keeps back the water-supply. In others a water-spirit does this, or the spirit is embodied in a serpent. Such tales are found in ancient Babylon and Greece, in all European countries, as well as among Negroes, Mongolians, Japanese, Ainus, Kabyles, Eskimo, and American Indians.[17] They have a basis in fact—in the terror inspired by huge serpents, perhaps propitiated by human sacrifice. Instances of such sacrifices occur sporadically, and divine serpents fed with human flesh have already been referred to. The association of huge serpents with water is in accordance with wide-spread belief.

Bushman belief connected a monstrous horned snake with the waters, and in Hottentot myth fountains contain a snake, and they dry up if it is killed.[1] Arab belief associated the *jinn* in serpent form with medicinal waters, and in Neh 2[13] a 'dragon's well' is mentioned, probably a sacred pool with serpent guardian.[2] In the Greek myth of Cadmus the dragon guarded the well of Dirce, and the Styx was also believed to be guarded by dragons. In Annam the spirit of the waters appears as a serpent, which also takes human form.[3] Celtic myth knows of dragons and serpents in lochs,[4] just as in Guiana and Zuñi tales a serpent lives in a pool sacred to him.[5]

Other myths speak of a serpent-race, like the Indian Nāgas, dwelling under water, and capable of assuming human form.[6] The *dracs* of French folk-lore and water-dwelling snakes in Montenegrin belief are hostile to men, like those of Cambodian and Laotian belief.[7]

(*c*) *The serpent and creation.*—Sometimes the serpent figures as the origin of the world (cf. the Tiamat myth) or as creator.

In the Netherland Islands the serpent which pushed up heaven from earth was cut in pieces, which became the islands, and its blood the stars. In Bushman myth snakes were struck by Cagn and became men. A Saliva myth tells how the Caribs sprang from the flesh of serpents. Among the S. Massim a huge snake cut to pieces is said to have been changed into the reefs.[8]

In the Solomon Islands Kahausibware, a spirit in snake form, made men and animals, but was chopped to pieces by a woman, when good things became bad and death entered. The Sioux myth of the first men tells how their feet grew in the ground like trees till a great snake set them free as men.[9]

(*d*) *Origin.*—The origin of snakes themselves is sometimes mythically related.

They were made from fragments of the god Angoi, slain by another god (S.E. Borneo); from the breast of the child of a sky-maiden and a mortal, cut in two (Ifugas of the Philippines, Mandaya); or from a bark-cloth twisted and filled with thorns (E. Africa).[10]

(*e*) *Rainbows and eclipses.*—The rainbow is regarded as a great snake among the Semang (who think that the places where it touches earth are unhealthy to live in), the Shoshone, the Australian aborigines, the Dahomans, the ancient Persians, and many other races.[11] Eclipses are often regarded as caused by the efforts of a serpent or dragon to swallow the sun or moon.[12]

(*f*) *The serpent and immortality.*—The serpent was believed to have no fear of old age,[13] or to be immortal, because it casts its skin,[14] apparently renewing its life. According to many 'origin of death' stories, man was meant to be immortal by the same process, but the serpent received the boon because the messenger sent to man told the serpent this secret, or snakes heard the message and men did not, or because the creator was angry with them.[15] Hence the cast skin of a serpent is a powerful 'medicine.' Among the Lenguas of Para-

1 Cf. *ERE* i. 800[a], iv. 620[b]. 2 Cf. § 1 (*x*).
3 Cooper, p. 375. 4 *Adv. Hær.* 26. 40.
5 See, further, art. MOUTH, vol. viii. p. 869[a].
6 Cf. *Acts of Thomas*, in *Apoc. Gospels, Acts, and Revelations*, Edinburgh, 1873, p. 407; Origen, *c. Celsum*, vi. 25, 35.
7 A. A. Bevan, 'The Hymn of the Soul,' in *TS*, vol. v. no. 3, Cambridge, 1897.
8 Sayce, p. 116.
9 Max Müller, pp. 104, 106. 10 Cooper, p. 335.
11 *EBi*, col. 1132; J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1882–88, ii. 794.
12 Grimm, *loc. cit.*
13 Stevenson, *11 RBEW*, p. 69.
14 *ERE* viii. 758[b]; see 355[a], 359[b], 360[a], for a Malay cosmic snake.
15 *Ib.* i. 491[b], v. 128[b], vi. 14[b]; *ZE* xvii. [1885] 32 (Bogobos); J. E. Erskine, *Journ. of a Cruise among the Islands of the W. Pacific*, London, 1853, p. 47 (Fiji).
16 Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 284, 288, 292.
17 *ERE* vi. 645[b] (Bab.), 855 (Japan); Ovid, *Metam.* iv. 662 f. (Perseus and Andromeda); the numerous variants are cited in MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 331 ff.

1 Stow, p. 131; Hahn, pp. 53, 77.
2 W. R. Smith[2], p. 168; cf. Jos. *BJ* v. iii. 2.
3 E. S. Hartland, *LP* i. 121 f.; cf. *ERE* vii. 796[a] (Laotians).
4 MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, p. 188.
5 See § 7 (*a*), (*b*).
6 W. R. S. Ralston, *Russian Folk-tales*, London, 1873, p. 116 (Slavic); P. Rascher, *AA* xxix. 234 (New Britain); Keysser, in Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, iii. 202.
7 Gervase of Tilbury, *Otia Imperialia*, in G. W. Leibnitz, *Scriptores Rerum Brunsvicarum*, Hanover, 1710, i. 987; M. E Durham, *JRAI* xxxix. 97.
8 A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*[2], London, 1899, i. 170 (Bushman); J. Gumilla, *Hist. naturelle, civile et géographique de l'Orénoque*, Avignon, 1758, i. 152 (Saliva); Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 382.
9 *ERE* viii. 536[a] (Solomon Islands); see also § 1 (*e*); G. Catlin, *The N. Amer. Indians*, new ed., London, 1876, i. 280.
10 Dixon, p. 176 f.; Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 294.
11 Skeat-Blagden, ii. 203, 224; Howitt, p. 431; Alexander, *N. Amer. Mythology*, p. 139; Crooke, *PR*[2], ii. 144; Purchas, xv. 304 (Peru).
12 See *ERE* i. 492, viii. 360, also art. PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS; for the snake as the bridge to paradise see *ERE* ix. 457[b].
13 Plutarch, *de Is. et Osir.* § 74.
14 See § 1 (*t*).
15 The tales are found in New Britain, Bismarck Archipelago, Annam, Borneo, among the Arawaks and the Tamanachiers of the Orinoco; see Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, p. 69 f., *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, i. 66 ff.; I. H. N. Evans, *JRAI* xliii. 426; Dixon, p. 117 f.

guay all animals, except fish and serpents, are thought to share immortality with men.[1]

In a wide-spread myth a hero restores a friend by using a plant which he has seen a serpent use to bring back another serpent to life, as in the Greek story of Polyidus and Glaucus.[2]

(*g*) *The serpent and the language of birds.*—A common belief existed that eating the flesh or heart of certain snakes, especially of a fabulous white snake, gave the eater wisdom or a knowledge of beast language. As the serpent was regarded often as an embodiment of supernatural wisdom, to eat its flesh caused transference of that to the eater. The serpent was supposed to know beast and bird language, as Democritus thought, because it was generated from the mixed blood of birds.

This belief forms the theme of innumerable folk-tales and existed in ancient times. The gift could also be conferred by a grateful serpent licking the ear of a man, as in the Greek myth of Melampus, or in other ways.[3] In many quarters the snake is believed to give inspiration through its spirit, or to cause possession,[4] and in all parts of the world—Central America, Mexico, among the Haidas and Tlingits, in New Ireland, New Zealand, and the Solomon Islands—representations of a man holding a snake, a lizard, or a frog with its tongue to his tongue are found.[5] The idea is probably that of receiving inspiration from the animal.

(*h*) *The serpent and the magic stone.*—There is a wide-spread belief in the king of serpents who wears a jewelled crown—a magical possession which men try to win.[6]

On such a huge serpent wearing a golden crown the earth was founded, according to a Borneo myth.[7] That the serpent has in its head a jewel or magic stone much coveted by adventurous men, who try to obtain it, is the subject of many tales in India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and among the American Indians.[8] In Sinhalese myth the stone is dropped by the serpent to give it light; in a similar Nigerian myth, to attract its prey, when the seeker is able to obtain it by craft.[9] Among the Roro-speaking tribes of British New Guinea a sorcerer obtains a black stone from a snake after ritual preparation and by worrying it till it drops the stone, when he runs off with it, pursued by the snake. The stone kills any one touched by it. This bears some resemblance to the Gaulish method of obtaining the 'serpent's egg.'[10] Other tales speak of a magic ring in a serpent's mouth which, once obtained, grants every wish.[11] The Dayaks keep anything found in the mouth of an ancestral snake as a charm.[12]

Somewhat analogous is the Andamanese belief that a small snake produces streams of oxide of iron and white clay by emitting a fluid when disturbed.[13]

(*i*) *The serpent and treasure.*—Another common belief is that dragons lie upon gold, or guard treasure, or have magic possessions—a common Teutonic and Scandinavian belief, shared by the Arabians (the winged serpents guarding incense-trees), and by the Greeks (the dragon-guardian of the golden apples of the Hesperides), Romans, Chanés of S. America, and the tribes of E. Africa.[14]

Because of this mythical connexion with treasure, as well as because deities or heroes with some serpent-attribute—Quetzalcoatl, Kneph, Ea, Indra, Cadmus—were pioneers of civilization and taught men mining and agriculture, A. W. Buckland thought that serpents may have played some part in aiding man to discover metals, and hence were worshipped.[1]

(*j*) In a number of stories having a very different provenance, but showing a certain parallelism, a small worm or snake taken into a house grows to monstrous form and is with difficulty got rid of.[2] Or the snake enters the body of a person, causing great discomfort.[3]

7. Woman and the serpent.—In folk-tale and myth, and occasionally in ritual, woman is brought into relation with the serpent, which is often her lover or husband. This is but one aspect of the world-wide myths in which an animal marries a woman, though frequently the animal is a god in disguise or a being now human, now animal, often as a result of enchantment. But in many instances, especially among savages, the snake is a snake *sans phrase*, because of the method of thought by which no clear distinction is drawn between human and animal forms,[4] possibly also because of the connexion of snake and *φαλλός*.

(*a*) Of the first series the European examples are mainly variants of the Beauty and the Beast cycle, and the serpent is a youth bewitched to serpent form till a maiden releases him from the enchantment by kissing him or burning his snake-skin.[5]

Greek mythology contains similar stories, though here the serpent is usually a god in disguise.[6] A similar myth was told of Faunus in Roman mythology, possibly because serpents were kept in the temple of the Bona Dea.[7] Both Greek and Roman legend related that gods as serpents were fathers of well-known personages by human mothers.

Olympias, wife of Philip, was approached by the god Ammon as a serpent, and gave birth to Alexander the Great. A serpent was found lying by her as she slept, and, as Olympias was given to the cult of Dionysos, in which serpents figured, the germ of the legend may be found in this.[8] The mother of Aristomenes had united with a god in serpent-form, as also the mother of Aratus. In her case the serpent was Asklepios, and a figurine of her sitting on a serpent existed in the temple of Asklepios at Sicyon.[9] Augustus was the son of a serpentiform deity, and his mother could never get rid of the spots left by the serpent on her body.[10] A similar legend was told of the mother of Scipio the elder.[11] Possibly all such stories arose from the use of serpents in the cult of Dionysos, or from the fact that barren women visited the temple of Asklepios.[12]

According to Athenagoras, Kore, daughter of Rhea, had a monstrous aspect and horns. Then he tells how Zeus did violence to Rhea, who changed herself to a *δράκαινα* to escape him, when he now became a dragon. In that form also he violated Kore.[13] Reinach sees here two parallel traditions, and thinks that Zeus and Kore had both serpent form and that Zagreus was hatched from an egg as a horned serpent.[14] Parallels from savage folk-tales exist.

In a New Guinea tale a youth is enabled to take serpent form and obtains a girl, afterwards resuming human shape. Or a serpent can take human form and marry human brides.[15] In a Zuñi tale Kóloowisi, the serpent-god, catches a girl, but takes human shape, renouncing his serpent-skin.[16] In Polynesian legend such tales are told of a huge eel which can take human

[1] W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, London, 1911, p. 125.

[2] Hyginus, *Fab.* 136; Pliny, *HN* xxv. 5; Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*[9], Berlin, 1870, no. 16; for numerous variants see *CF*, p. 82; J. Bolte and G. Polívka, *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- und Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm*, Leipzig, 1913, i. 126 ff.; Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 66.

[3] Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* i. 20, iii. 9; Pliny, *HN* x. 70; Apollodorus, i. 9. 11; for folk-tale variants see Bolte-Polívka, i. 131 ff.; Frazer, *AR* i. [1863] 166 ff.

[4] See § x; Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 318 ff.

[5] W. H. Dall, 'On Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs,' *3 RBEW* [1884], pp. 103, 111 ff.; A. W. Buckland, *JAI* xxi. [1892] 29.

[6] Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ii. 686 f., 1219 f., *Household Tales*, tr. M. Hunt, London, 1884, ii. 77; F. S. Krauss, *Sagen und Märchen der Südslaven*, Leipzig, 1883–84, nos. 62, 107; *ERE* i. 526[b].

[7] Dixon, p. 159 f.

[8] Crooke, *PR*[2], ii. 143; Dixon, p. 328; Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 303; De Laborde, *Relation des Caraïbes*, Paris, 1674, p. 7; *ERE* i. 526[b], iii. 395[a], 503[b].

[9] W. L. Hildburgh, *JRAI* xxxviii. [1908] 200; Leonard, *The Lower Niger*, p. 192; cf. Grimm, iv. 1492.

[10] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 282; cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Celtic), vol. iii. p. 412.

[11] Dixon, p. 168. [12] E. Dunn, *Anthropos*, i. 182.

[13] E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. 155.

[14] Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ii. 689 f., iii. 978 f.; Herod. iii. 107; Phædrus, iv. 19; Nordenskiöld, p. 288; Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 360.

[1] A. W. Buckland, *Anthropological Studies*, London, 1891, p. 104 f.

[2] W. Mapes, *de Nugis Curialium*, ed. T. Wright, London, 1850, dist. ii. cap. 6; F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 66; W. Henderson, *Notes on the Folk-Lore of the N. Counties of England*, London, 1879, p. 287; F. H. Cushing, *Zuñi Folk-tales*, New York, 1901, p. 93; G. Turner, *Samoa*, p. 243; Codrington, p. 403.

[3] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 382 (New Guinea); Junod, ii. 229 (Thonga).

[4] See art. METAMORPHOSIS, § 3.

[5] W. Webster, *Basque Legends*[2], London, 1879, p. 167; A. de Gubernatis, *Novellini popolari*, Milan, 1883, no. 14; Ralston, *The Songs of the Russian People*, London, 1872, p. 174, *Russian Folk-tales*, p. 116; J. H. Knowles, *Folk-tales of Kashmir*, London, 1888, p. 491.

[6] Arnobius, *adv. Gentes*, v. 22; Diod. Sic. iv. 4, v. 75.

[7] Macrob. i. 12. 24; cf. Plut. *Cæs.* 9.

[8] Plut. *Alex.* 3; Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 13; cf. *ERE* viii. 193[a].

[9] *Paus.* II. x. 3, IV. xiv. 7.

[10] Suet. *August.* 94; Dio Cass. xlv. i. 2.

[11] Livy, xxvi. 19; Aul. Gell. vii. 1. [12] See § x (*f*).

[13] Athen. *Leg. pro Christianis*, ch. 20; Clem. Alex. *Protr.* ii.; cf. C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, p. 547 ff.

[14] S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions*, Paris, 1905–12, ii. 60.

[15] H. H. Romilly, *From my Verandah in New Guinea*, London, 1889, p. 78; Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 397.

[16] Cushing, p. 93.

form.[1] Similar tales of snakes that can take human shape and marry girls are told among the Kafirs, Formosans, and Negroes of Jamaica.[2] A Rabbinic idea was that, through intercourse of the serpent with Eve, her descendants were corrupted, the serpent having then almost the form of a man.[3]

(*b*) **In the second group the serpent has no human form, and the tales, mainly of savage provenance, are extremely realistic and disgusting.**

Examples occur among the tribes of New Guinea, the Admiralty Islanders, Eskimo, American Indians, and Guaranos.[4] Echoes of such stories are found in early Christian literature—*e.g.*, the *Acts of Thomas*, where a dragon or snake loved a girl. In the *Visio Pauli* faithless virgins must endure the embraces of serpents in hell.[5]

(*c*) **These tales may be connected with actual custom and belief.**

The python god Dañh-gbi of the Ewe has many priestesses, and is supposed to marry young novices secretly. According to one writer, the girl is placed in a pit with serpents and told that one will take human form—really one of the priests.[6] The Onyckolum compel a woman to marry, saying that, if she does not, she will marry the great snake Aké.[7] Among the Akikuyu, at the worship of the snake-god, who requires wives, women and girls go to the huts built for him, where, however, the priests visit them. The children are fathered on the god.[8] Girls at initiation among the Basutos are taken to a stream where they are told a great serpent will visit them.[9] The Hottentots believe in a serpent with human organs which visits women in sleep, and a somewhat similar belief is found among the Macusi.[10] A 16th cent. treatise on Brazil says that barren women among the Indians were struck on the hips with a snake, with which soothsaying was also observed, as a means of their having children.[11] Some Australian tribes believe in a serpent which attacks women.[12] In many other instances the serpent seems to be associated with the fruitfulness of women[13]—*e.g.*, in Greece women slept in the temple of Asklepios and thought themselves visited by the serpent-god in their dreams, and their offspring was believed to be the result of this visit. Again, virgin or married priestesses are often associated, though not exclusively, with serpent shrines or ritual, in some instances probably because the serpent representing an earth-goddess was best served by women. The shrines of the pre-Apollonic Pytho and of Gaia, later consecrated to Apollo in N. Greece, the shrine at Lanuvium, that at Shaikh Haredi in Egypt, the temple of the python in Uganda, as well as the ritual of the Thesmophoria, and the wives of the serpent in Dahomey, are cases in point. The ritual with serpents in the Dionysiac mysteries and 'the snake gliding over the breast,' with the meaning already referred to, doubtless give rise to some of the Greek myths. It is also certain that women had serpents as pets among the Greeks and Romans, and that lascivious practices were followed with them. Perhaps these snakes as well as those at Dahomey were trained to these practices.[14]

(*d*) **Conversely a man is sometimes the lover of a snake-mistress.**

The Koranas believe that the first man and a snake lived together.[15] In Hudson's Island the sea-serpent as woman and earth as man united, and their progeny was the race of men.[16] The Snake clan of the Pueblo Indians is believed to be descended from a snake (alternatively snake and woman) and a man who gained access to the *kiva* of the Snake people. When they assumed snake form, he seized the fiercest, which changed to a beautiful girl, the Snake Maid—a personification of underworld life which fertilizes the maize. The snakes to which she gave birth changed to men and women, ancestors of the Snake clan.[1] In Japan stories of men's wives that are also serpents or dragons at times exist in the early mythology and in popular belief.[2] So in the Greek story the mistress and bride of Menippus is a lamia or serpent, and disappears when discovered by Apollonius.[3] In some folk-tales and ballads a girl is enchanted so that she appears as a reptile until a youth kisses her, when she is retransformed, as in the parallel tales where the hero is thus bewitched.[4] Hindu folk-lore has examples of beings (*e.g.*, the *nagas*) who are women by night and serpents by day.[5] In other instances we have a composite being, half-woman, half-serpent in the lower part of the body. Herodotus cites a myth regarding the origin of the Scythians, progeny of Heracles and Echidna, who was a serpent from the waist down.[6] Such composite beings are known also in India, but the typical example is found in the well-known tale of Mélusine, who, married to Raymond, asked that she should spend one day each week in seclusion. One day he spied upon her and saw her in a bath, half-woman, half-serpent, and, when he called her 'odious serpent,' she left him for ever. In one version she had been cursed by her mother, a fay, to assume this form every Saturday.[7] The story belongs to the 'supernatural bride' cycle, but Mélusine has parallels in Greek nymphs who are serpents from the waist downwards, in Egyptian art, and in the sirens—half-woman, half-fish—the form also of the Semitic Derceto or Atargatis, of Triton, and of Oannes.[8]

The converse form, in which divine beings have snake-faces, is of frequent occurrence in Egypt, as well as *vice versa*. They are also referred to in the so-called Mithras liturgy; and in some mediæval representations of the Fall the serpent has a human head and arms, or even two such heads, to address Adam and Eve at once.[9] Among the Araucanos the servants of Pillan, the chief god, are snakes with men's heads.[10]

(*e*) **The fondness of snakes for milk has perhaps given rise to a belief in their sucking the breasts of women, but in certain cases the practice may have been an erotic perversion.**

The Hottentots believe that serpents come by night for women to suckle them, and bite them if they refuse.[11] The Mayas believe in an imaginary snake Ekonell which glides into houses of nursing mothers, covers their nostrils with its tail, and sucks their breasts.[12] In Welsh tradition the wings of mythical flying snakes arose because they had drunk women's milk spilt on the ground and had eaten sacramental bread.[13] The story of Caradoc, which forms part of the French Perceval cycle, relates how a serpent fastened on his arm and sucked away his life. He was saved by a young maiden presenting her breast to the serpent, which took the nipple in its mouth. Cador then cut off its head, but with that also the nipple, which was magically replaced by one of gold.[14] A close parallel exists in a Gaelic folk-tale, and less close in a Scots ballad,[15] but it is probable that the source is Celtic, as the name of the wife of the Welsh Karadawe is Tegau Eurfron, Tegau 'with the golden breast.' The Egyptian goddess Neit is represented with a crocodile at either breast, and in French mediæval architecture serpents are represented sucking the breasts of women. Women are seen by visitors to hell suckling serpents as a punishment for refusing nourishment to their children.[16] Some frescoes in Byzantine churches show a parallel to this.[17] Lucian says that in Macedonia women pressed serpents in their hands and gave them the breast.[18]

(*f*) **In some instances menstruation is ascribed to the bite of a reptile or other animal.**

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[1] Gill, p. 77.

[2] G. N. Theal, *Kafir Folk-lore*, London, n.d., p. 29, cf. p. 47; *FLJ* v. [1887] 152 f. (Formosa); W. Jekyll, *Jamaican Song and Story*, do. 1907, p. 102; cf. *ERE* i. 321.

[3] *JE*, *s.v.* 'Fall.'

[4] Romilly, pp. 107, 120; J. Meier, *Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 654; H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Edinburgh and London, 1875, p. 186 ff.; C. G. Leland, *Algonquin Legends of New England*, Boston, 1885, pp. 266, 274 ff.; E. Petitot, *Traditions indiennes du Canada nord-ouest*, Paris, 1886, pp. 16, 407; *ERE* i. 321[b]; W. H. Brett, *Legends and Myths of the Aboriginal Tribes of British Guiana*, London, 1880, p. 64. Cf. also H. L. Joly, *Legend in Japanese Art*, London, 1908, p. 140; Ælian, *de Nat. An.* xii. 39; cf. vi. 17; Ralston, *Songs*, p. 173 f.

[5] C. S. Boswell, *An Irish Precursor of Dante*, London, 1908, p. 231, suggests an origin of these ideas in travel tales of Indian serpents, preserved by Greek naturalists.

[6] W. W. Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, p. 540; see § 1.

[7] *JAI* xxix. [1899] 22.

[8] Cf. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 67 f.

[9] Casalis, p. 283.

[10] Hahn, p. 81; H. H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib*[8], Leipzig, 1905, ii. 334.

[11] Purchas, xvi. 457.

[12] A. Featherman, *Social Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1881–91, ii. 75.

[13] See above, § 1.

[14] Boudin, p. 68 ff.; C. A. Böttiger, *Sabina*, Leipzig, 1806, ii. 188 f.

[15] Hahn, p. 62.

[16] Turner, *Samoa*, p. 288.

[1] Bourke, *Snake-Dances of the Moquis*, p. 177; Fewkes, *16 RBEW* (1897), p. 304.

[2] Joly, p. 377; *Kojiki*, ed. Chamberlain, p. 127.

[3] Philostratus, *Vita Apollon.* bk. 4; cf. Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. iii. sec. 2, mem. 1, subs. 1; and Keats, *Lamia*.

[4] See E. S. Hartland, *The Science of Fairy Tales*, London, 1891, p. 240 f.; MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 257; W. Scott, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, London, 1839, p. 345 f.

[5] Crooke, *PR*[2], ii. 137; J. F. Campbell, *My Circular Notes*, London, 1876–79, ii. 186.

[6] Herod. iv. 8.

[7] T. Keightley, *The Fairy Mythology*, reprint, London, 1900, p. 480 f.; S. Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, do. 1584, p. 471 ff.

[8] J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 231; *A Guide to the Egyptian Collections in the British Museum*, London, 1909, p. 273; *ERE* ix. 843[a]. Cf. the third world-power in the Gnostic system of Justin (half-female, half-serpent), and Error (half-woman, half-serpent) in Spenser's *Fœrie Queene*, I. i. 14.

[9] Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, pp. 12 f., 71; A. N. Didron, *Christian Iconography*, Eng. tr., London, 1886, ii. 140.

[10] R. E. Latcham, *JRAI* xxxix. 347.

[11] Hahn, p. 81. [12] *FLJ* i. [1883] 256.

[13] E. Owen, *Welsh Folk-Lore*, Oswestry, 1896, p. 349.

[14] Gaston Paris, 'Caradoc et le Serpent' in *Romania*, xxviii. [1899] 214 ff.

[15] J. F. Campbell, *Popular Tales of the W. Highlands*, Edinburgh, 1890, i., Introd. p. lxxxix; F. J. Child, *English and Scottish Popular Ballads*, Boston, 1882–98, pt. i., p. 176 f., no. 301.

[16] In the *Apocalypse of Peter*, *Apoc. of Esdras*, and *Apoc. of Mary*.

[17] L. Heuzey, *Annuaire de l'Assoc. pour l'encouragement des études grecques*, Paris, 1871, p. 118.

[18] Ploss-Bartels[8], i. 484 ff.

This is shown by images from New Guinea in which a crocodile or snake enters or emerges from the female organ.[1] Among the Chiriguanos, at a girl's first menstruation, women try to drive off with sticks 'the snake which has wounded her.'[2] Among the Macusi girls at this time are not allowed to go into the woods lest they be amorously attacked by serpents. Basuto girls at this period dance round the image of a snake.[3] Certain families at Kumano in Japan send their female children to the mountains to serve the god Susa-no-wo. When they show signs of puberty, a dragon is said to come and glare at them.[4] In Portugal menstruation is traced to a serpent, or women are thought liable to the bite of a lizard at this period.[5] Cognate with these beliefs is the superstition current in Germany in the 18th cent. that the hair of a menstruous woman, if buried, becomes a snake, and the gypsy custom whereby unfruitful women become fruitful by spitting on and sprinkling with menstrual blood the place where they have seen a snake.[6] It is also believed among the Orinoco tribes that serpents try to have connexion with menstruous women; hence they are forbidden to go into the forest. Such a woman who died of jaundice was believed to have thus exposed herself to the attack of a snake.[7] Among the Matacos a cure for snake-bite is to drop menstrual blood into the wound.[8]

Reinach suggests that the hostility between the serpent's seed and the seed of the woman, *i.e.* the daughters of Eve (Gn 3^{15}), originally referred to some such myth of the origin of menstruation.[9] The rationale of such myths is probably to be found in the connexion between snake and φαλλός, the latter drawing blood at devirgination; menstrual blood was supposed to be produced by a similar wounding by a snake.

8. Children and serpents.—The test of the legitimacy of children by the Psylli[10] is paralleled by Greek myth.

When Alcmene bore Heracles and Iphicles, respectively sons of Zeus and Amphitryon, the latter placed two serpents in the bed to see which was his son. Iphicles fled—a proof that he was son of a mortal.[11] In another version Hera sent the serpents to destroy the infant Heracles, who strangled them.[12]

In many tales which suggest a source for these myths serpents appear friendly to children, and visit or play with them.

Pausanias tells how a prince at Amphiclea, suspecting a plot against his child, put him in a vessel. A wolf tried to reach him, but a serpent coiled round the vessel and kept watch. The father killed it; but, learning the truth, he made a funeral-pyre for it.[13] Vopiscus[14] tells of a snake attached to a boy and regarded as his familiar, and Spartianus[15] has a similar tale. Pliny tells a story of an asp in Egypt regularly fed. The son of the house died through the bite of one of its young ones, whereupon the asp killed it.[16] O. W. Holmes[17] cites some 17th cent. instances of the alleged friendliness of snakes for children. In Calabar a woman found a snake in her child's cradle, which the priests declared to be Ölaga, a local god.[18] House-snakes in Germany were supposed to watch infants in the cradle and sip milk out of their bowl.[19] Numerous parallels to Grimm's *Märchen* with this incident of the snake and child exist and are doubtless connected with the fact that house-haunting snakes are regarded as spirits of ancestors.[20]

9. Serpent origin of men.—Tribes, clans, and rulers were sometimes supposed to be descended from serpents, as in the instances of the Hopi Snake clan and the Scythians, already cited.

The Psylli were an African clan known to classical writers; in their bodies was a virus deadly to serpents, its smell rendering them senseless. To test the legitimacy of their children, they exposed them to serpents, and, if these did not avoid them, the children were illegitimate, *i.e.* not of the clan. Serpent-descent is indicated here.[21] In Senegambia there is a Python clan, and each child is supposed to be visited by the python within eight days after birth.[1] In the case of the El Kiboron clan of the Masai, who do not kill snakes, and the married men of whom are supposed to become snakes after death, it is believed that snakes never bite members of the clan—another indication of serpent descent.[2] A clan in Phrygia was called Ophiogenes, because they were descended from the eponymous goddess Alia and a serpent—probably the god Sabazios in that form.[3] At Parium another clan bore the same name, probably for a similar reason, and the males of the clan could heal a person bitten by a snake by touching him. The saliva of some of them had the same effect.[4] Whether the name Ophiusa, formerly applied to Rhodes and Cyprus, and the stories that Tenos, Crete, and Seriphus once swarmed with serpents, denote that serpent clans dwelt there is uncertain. The Caribs were descended from a water-spirit, with both human and serpent form, and a girl, whose child was ancestor of the Carib race.[5] The Hudson Bay islanders believe that men are descended from earth (the male) and a serpent.[6] If the name Eve (Ḥavvah) is equivalent to 'serpent,' the belief in serpent descent may have been held by the Hebrews or some branch of them.[7]

Probably such legends are connected with totemism, since, where this exists, the snake is often a totem, and the immunity from snake-bite attributed to some of the clans referred to may be explained from the belief that the snake species would not hurt its fellow-clansmen, who also would protect it. The healing of snake-bite by such people,[8] as well as their power of handling snakes with impunity (as among the Hopi), is curious. But some of the myths may be related to a cult of a serpent as chief god, from whom men believe themselves descended.

The Peruvians were progeny of the divine sun-serpent and his consort, and a similar myth existed among the Mexicans.[9] Kings and rulers also had a serpent origin in some instances—from a serpent-god or an ancestor conceived as a serpent. In Abyssinia the royal line began with the serpent Arwe; the semi-human serpent Cecrops was first king of Athens and ancestor of the Cecropidæ; and the Mikados of Japan were also believed to have serpent descent.[10]

These myths should be compared with those of serpent and woman unions,[11] with others in which a serpent has human children,[12] and with a third group telling how serpents and other reptiles were once men, afterwards transformed to reptile shape.[13] In others, again, women give birth to snakes, and in the Welsh laws of Hoel (A.D. 928) a woman declaring a man to be father of her child says, 'May I be delivered of a snake, if it be not true.'[14]

LITERATURE.—Articles in *ARW*, *passim*; W. W. von Baudissin, *Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1876–78, i. 255 ff.; J. C. M. Boudin, *Études anthropologiques*, 'Culte du serpent,' pt. ii., Paris, 1864; P. Cassel, *Drachenkämpfe*, Berlin, 1868; W. R. Cooper, 'Observations on the Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt,' in *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, London, vol. vi. (1872); J. B. Deane, *The Worship of the Serpent traced throughout the World*[2], do. 1833; J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, do. 1868; A. de Gubernatis, *Zoological Mythology*, 2 vols., do. 1872; T. Hopfner, *Der Tierkult der alten Ägypter*, Vienna, 1914; E. Küster, *Die Schlange in der griech. Kunst und Religion*, Giessen, 1913; C. F. Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, London, 1905, *Ophiolatreia*, do. 1889; F. L. W. Schwartz, *Die altgriech. Schlangengottheiten*, Berlin, 1858; E. B. Tylor, *PC*[4], 2 vols., London, 1903; C. S. Wake, *Serpent Worship and other Essays*, do. 1888; A. Wiedemann, *Der Tierkult der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1912. See also artt. ANIMALS, vol. i. p. 525 f., FALL (Ethnic), vol. v. p. 714 f.

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SERPENT-WORSHIP (Indian).—I. Importance and variety of the cult.—The cult of the serpent in India is of special importance; in no

1 Ploss-Bartels[8], i. 484 ff.
2 *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, new ed., Paris, 1780–83, viii. 333.
3 H. H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, London and Philadelphia, 1897–1910, ii. 237.
4 W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 206.
5 Ploss-Bartels[8], ii. 484; H. H. Ellis, ii. 237.
6 H. H. Ellis, ii. 237; H. von Wlislocki, *Volksglaube und religiöser Brauch der Zigeuner*, Münster, 1891, pp. 66, 133.
7 F. S. Gilig, *Saggio di Storia Americano*, Rome, 1780–84, ii. 132 f.
8 Nordenskiöld, p. 107.
9 *Cultes, mythes et religions*, ii. 398.
10 See below, § 9.
11 W. S. Fox, *Greek and Roman Mythology*, p. 79.
12 Hyginus, *Fab.* 30. 13 Paus. x. xxxiii. 5.
14 *Aurelianus*, c. 4. 15 *Severus*, c. 1.
16 Pliny, *HN* x. 96 [74].
17 *Elsie Venner*, Cambridge, Mass., 1861, ch. xvi.
18 Communicated by Rev. J. K. MacGregor.
19 Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ii. 686; cf. Olaus Magnus, *Hist. de gentibus septentrionalibus* (1555), bk. xxi. cap. 48.
20 Grimm, *Household Tales*, ii. 76. For the variants see Bolte-Polivka, ii. 459.
21 Varro, in Priscian. x. 32; Pliny, *HN* vii. 14.

1 *REth* iii. [1885] 397. 2 Merker, p. 202.
3 Ælian, *de Nat. An.* xiii. 39; Ramsay, ii. 593.
4 Strabo, XIII. i. 14. 5 Brett, p. 64.
6 Turner, *Samoa*, p. 288.
7 Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xlii. [1888] 487; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidenthums*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 154; H. Gressmann, *ARW* x. [1907] 359 f.
8 See art. NUBA, vol. ix. p. 402[b].
9 McLennan, p. 527; see also above, § 1.
10 Fergusson, p. 33; Diod. Sic. i. 28; Griffis, p. 31.
11 See above, § 7.
12 Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 408 (S. Massim).
13 Leland, p. 110; cf. *ERE* i. 320[b]; Skeat, pp. 54, 285; Lang, i. 170, ii. 36.
14 Wheeler, *ARW* xv. 348 (Solomon Islands); De Groot, *Rel. System of China*, iv. 217; Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 397 (S. Massim); A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Eccl. Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, Oxford, 1869–78, i. 253.

other part of the world is it more widely distributed or developed in more varied and interesting forms. This results from the wide distribution of the reptile.

India is the only country in the world inhabited by all the known families of living snakes. The chief characteristic of the reptile fauna of the Indian region is the great variety of the generic types and the number of their species, the latter amounting to no fewer than 450, which is nearly one-third of the total number of species known in the world, referable to about 100 genera, of which the majority do not range beyond the limits of India.[1]

2. Origin of serpent-worship.—The abundant distribution of these reptiles and the serious loss of life caused by them sufficiently explain the fear with which they are regarded and the respect and worship paid to them. The animal is dreaded and revered on account of the mysterious dangers associated with it, its stealthy habits, the cold fixity of its gaze, its sinuous motion, the protrusion of its forked tongue, and the suddenness and deadliness of its attacks. It haunts houses, old ruins, fields, and pools. It is particularly dreaded by women, whose habits of walking barefoot in fields in the early dawn and groping in the dark corners of their huts render them specially exposed to its malice. Its long life and its habit of changing its skin suggest ideas of immortality and resurrection, or of purification, one festival being held at the time when its skin is sloughed.[2]

Attempts have been made to prove that serpent-worship was introduced into India by Scythian and other invaders from Central Asia. J. Tod,[3] relying on authorities now obsolete, traced its origin to a so-called Tāk or Takshak tribe of Central Asia. But an examination of the latest authority on the Scythians [4] shows that, while a serpent barrow and the use of the snake as an ornament or symbol are found among this people, there is no indication of a general cult of the reptile. On the whole, the wide distribution and loss of life caused by the snake in India warrant the conclusion that the cult is probably local.

3. Distribution of serpent-worship.—During the census of 1891 some attempt was made to collect statistics of the numbers of the followers of the various serpent-cults, but without much success, because these merge in other types of animism prevailing among the lower classes.

In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh 35,366 persons were recorded as worshippers of the *nāga*, and 122,991 as worshippers of the snake-hero, Gūgā Pīr, with other groups less numerically important; in the Panjāb 35,344 persons were said to worship Gūgā [5] The results from other Provinces equally failed to indicate the wider distribution of the worship.

Some of the more important types of cult, according to their local distribution, are the following.

(*a*) *North-West Frontier.*—

In Abisāra, the modern Hazāra country, Strabo speaks of two enormous snakes, probably kept in a temple as objects of worship.[6] A Kāfir legend tells of the destruction by Imra of an enormous snake in the Bashgul valley, whose tracks are to this day indicated by some light quartz veins, which show distinctly against the darker ground of the rocks; a tarn was formed by the blood flowing from the snake's severed head.[7] In Baluchistān the mountain known as Koh-i-Mārān, 'peak of snakes,' and the petrified dragons of Bisūt and Bāmiān indicate an ancient cult.[8]

(*b*) *Kaśmīr.*—In Kaśmīr and the neighbouring hills there is evidence of wide-spread worship.

[1] G. Watt, *Dict. of the Econ. Products of India*, London and Calcutta, 1889–93, vi. i. 429; *IGI* i. [1907] 269 ff.; J. Fayrer, *The Thanatophidia of India*, London, 1874.

[2] J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*[2], p. 259; *PR*[3] ii. 123 ff.

[3] *Annals and Antiquities of Rājasthān*, popular ed., London, 1914, p. 86.

[4] E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*, Cambridge, 1913, pp. 328 f., 410, 427 f. and other passages noted in the Index.

[5] *Census of India, 1891*, xvi. *N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Allahabad, 1894, pt. i. 211 f., xix. *Punjab*, Calcutta, 1892, pt. i. 104 f.

[6] xv. 28; J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described in Class. Literature*, London, 1901, p. 34 f.

[7] G. S. Robertson, *The Kāfirs of the Hindu-Kush*, London, 1896, p. 388.

[8] A. W. Hughes, *Balochistan*, London, 1877, p. 5; C. Masson, *Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, the Panjab*, do. 1842–43, ii. 357, 395.

The early legends are full of tales of snake-gods, especially in connexion with water-springs.[1] The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (or Yuan Chwang) states that, as Kaśmīr is protected by a dragon, it has always assumed superiority among neighbouring people.[2] Abul Faḍhl, the historiographer of Akbar, records that 'in seven hundred places there are graven images of snakes which they worship and regarding which wonderful legends are told.'[3] Legends still abound of dragons, particularly in connexion with springs.[4] It was at one time supposed that all Kaśmīr temples were originally surrounded by artificial lakes as abodes for the Nāga water-deities, but this theory is now abandoned.[5]

(*c*) *The Panjāb.*—In the Panjāb, both in the plains and in the hill country, snake-worship has prevailed from ancient times.

Ælian [6] tells how Alexander the Great found in many places snakes kept in caves and worshipped; the people implored the king to spare them, and he consented to do so; one of enormous size is described.[7] The city of Taxila (Skr. *Takshaśila*, 'hewn stone,' or more probably 'rock of Takshaka,' the great Nāga king, or 'rock of the Takkas,' a snake-worshipping tribe) was apparently the site of a snake-cult which has been localized at a fountain near Ḥasan Abdāl.[8] The tradition of snake-worship still exists among the Gaur Ṭagā tribe of N. India, which claims descent from the Takkas.[9] Another centre of the snake-cult is Safidon in the Jind State, the name of which is supposed to mark the snake holocaust by Janamejaya (Skr. *sarpa-damana*, 'snake-subduing').[10] Serpents, again, are connected with the widely spread legends of Rājā Rāsālū and Niwal Dāī.[11] The famous iron pillar at Delhi, erected about A.D. 415, is said to have sunk into the earth so as to rest on the head of the serpent Śesa, which supports the world; the king Prithivī Rājā, to make its position certain as a pledge of the permanence of his dynasty, ordered it to be taken up, when blood and flesh of the snake's head were found adhering to it—an omen which foretold his ultimate defeat.[12] In the Panjāb plains snake-worship is widely spread.[13] In the Chambā State it is associated with the cult of Devī, the mother-goddess; she is not connected with springs like the *nāgas*, or serpent deities, but it is common to find a Nāga and a Devī temple side by side and common attributes are assigned to both. There is in Mandī, another hill State, a close connexion between the cult of Śiva and that of the *nāgas*, the latter being his, or Kālī's, favourite servants. In Kulū the rainbow is called Budhī Nāgan or Nāgin, 'the old female snake,' which points to the *nāga* being regarded as a rain- or water-god, as is usually the case in the Simla hills; but in Chambā he is described as a whitish-coloured snake that frequents house-walls, is said to drink milk; and, being regarded as a good omen, he receives worship (*pūjā*) and incense is offered to him.[14] In the Panjāb hills the cult of the cobra, and in one place that of harmless snakes, is prevalent. The Nāga temples, according to C. F. Oldham, are not dedicated to the serpent, but to the Nāga Rājās, the ancient rulers of the race.[15] The Gaddis, Ghirths, and the people of Churāh worship the snake; the people of Kanaur pray thus to Nāges Deotā: 'O thou, who livest within the wall, who livest in holes, who canst go into a vessel, who canst swiftly run, who livest in the water, on the precipice, upon trees, in the waste land, among the meadows, who hast power like the thunderbolt, who livest within the hollow trees, among the rocks, within the caves, be victorious!'[16]

(*d*) *United Provinces.*—In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh among the chief centres of the cult may be named Mathurā, Ahichhatra, and Benares.

Mathurā was a scene of *nāga*-worship, as is indicated by the local statuary and the legends of Kṛṣṇa as a slayer of dragons.[17]

[1] Kalhaṇa, *Rājatarangiṇi*, tr. M. A. Stein, London, 1900, i. 6, 37 f., ii. 462.

[2] S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, London, 1884, i. 148; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1904–05, i. 261.

[3] *Āin-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 354.

[4] W. R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmīr*, London, 1895, pp. 170, 289, 294 f., 299 n.; cf. § 7 (*a*).

[5] Lawrence, p. 170; V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 46.

[6] περὶ ζώων ἰδιότητος, III. xxi. [7] McCrindle, p. 145.

[8] McCrindle, *The Invasion of India*[2], London, 1896, p. 343; Beal, i. 137; Watters, i. 241 f.

[9] H. M. Elliot, *Supplement to the Glossary of Indian Terms*, Roorkee, 1860, p. 420 ff.

[10] R. C. Temple, *Legends of the Panjāb*, Bombay, 1884, i. 414 ff.

[11] *Ib.* i. Introd. xvii; *FLJ* iii. [1885] 61.

[12] W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, Oxford, 1915, p. 499; H. C. Fanshawe, *Delhi, Past and Present*, London, 1902, p. 264 f.

[13] D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 114 f.

[14] H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province*, i. [Lahore, 1911] pp. 331, 400, 419.

[15] *The Sun and the Serpent*, p. 84 ff., with numerous photographs of snake-shrines.

[16] H. A. Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 269, 294, 214, 454; *NINQ* ii. [1884–85] 91; *Census of India, 1901*, xvii. *Punjab*, pt. i. pp. 119 f., 129; *do. 1911*, xiv. pt. i. p. 120.

[17] Smith, p. 138 f.; F. S. Growse, *Mathurā*, Allahabad, 1883, p. 57 f.

At Jait, in the Mathurā District, there is an image of a five-headed *nāga*, whose tail was said to extend seven miles underground, until the belief was dispelled by excavation.[1] Ahichhatra, 'umbrella of the dragon Ahi,' the great ruined city in Rohilkhand, like many other places of which the names are connected with the *nāgas*—Nāgpur, Nāgaur, Nāgod, etc.—has a legend of an Ahir whose claim to kingship was attested by a snake shading him with its expanded hood.[2] In Benares Śiva-Mahādeva is worshipped as Nāgeśvar, 'Lord of *nāgas*,' with a serpent twined round his image; the Nāg Kuān, or 'serpent-well,' lies in one of the oldest parts of the city and is surrounded by snake symbols.[3] In Dehra Dūn the local folk-lore is full of tales of the *nāgas*.[4] The Agarwālā caste of traders perform the worship of Āstika or Āstīka Muni, a sage descended from the snake, and call themselves *nāga-upasāka*, 'snake-worshippers.'[5] Similar worship is performed by many other castes and tribes.[6] In Oudh Nigohan, in the Lucknow District, is a centre of the cult.[7] There are numerous traces of *nāga*-worship in the Himālayan districts of the United Provinces, but now chiefly connected with the special cults of Viṣṇu and Śiva.[8]

(*e*) *Bengal.*—

In Bengal the goddess Manasā (Skr. *manas*, 'mind'), or Bishahri (Skr. *viṣahari*, 'remover of venom'), holds the foremost place. If her worship is neglected, some one in the family is sure to die of snake-bite; she is worshipped by placing an earthen pot marked with vermilion under a tree; clay images or snakes are arranged round it, and a trident is driven into the ground; sometimes the plant named after her is taken as her emblem; sometimes she dwells in a *pīpal*-tree (*Ficus religiosa*); in places where snakes abound a special shrine or a separate room is dedicated to the goddess; her sister, Jagat Gauri, has also power over cobras and other snakes, and Ananta Deb is king of the snakes in Orissa.[9]

(*f*) *Central Provinces and Central India.*—In the Central Provinces and Central India the snake-cult is widely spread.

At Sāgar worship is offered to Nāg Deo, the serpent-god, sometimes at a shrine, sometimes at the snake's hole, by adoring him and making an image of him with butter and cow-dung on the house wall; people of the Nāth tribe carry about snakes during the Nāgpañchamī[10] festival and receive fees for allowing them to be worshipped.[11] The Kawars greatly dread a mythical snake with a red crest on its head, the mere sight of which is believed to cause death; it lives in deep pools in the forest known as Seṣakuṇḍa, and, when it moves, it sets fire to the grass along its track; if a man crosses its path, he becomes black in colour and suffers excruciating pains, which end in death, unless he is relieved by the *baiga*, or medicine-man; in one village where the reptile recently appeared the owner never dared to visit his field without first offering a chicken.[12] The cobra is specially worshipped by the *barais*, or betel-growers, who associate the tendrils of the plant with Vāsukī, queen of serpents; and the cobra is the tutelary god of the nomadic Kaikāris.[13] In Central India almost every village has a platform built over a snake's hole, to the occupant of which is offered a wicker cover which protects the snake; a brilliant coloured picture represents the snake when it is absent; some persons tie a thread of fourteen knots round the wrist and arm and go to worship at the abode of the snake, making an image of the reptile in sacred grass, which they worship; Bhils and Bhilālas worship the python and never injure it; there are legends of families said to be immune from snake-bite and able to cure it.[14] In the month of June, the first month of the rains, snakes frequently appear; in this month the Gonds try to kill a cobra, and will then cut off the head and tail, and offer them to Nāg Deo, inside the house, while they cook and eat the body, supposing the eating of the snake's body will protect them from the effects of eating any poisonous substance throughout the year.[1] In Berār the cult prevails more among the people of the plains than among those of the hills, metal or clay images of snakes are worshipped, sometimes on an ant-hill, and, should a cobra be seen, it is regarded as a good omen; twigs of sacred trees are fixed round the ant-hill, a yellow thread is wound round them, and within the circle offerings of grain and milk are laid; the simplest form of worship is pouring milk on an ant-hill.[2]

(*g*) *Assam.*—In Assam the most remarkable form of serpent-worship is that of U Thlen, a gigantic snake which demands to be appeased by the sacrifice of human victims, and for whose sake, even in recent times, murders have been committed.

It lived once in a cave near Cherrapunjī, and was tamed by a man who used to place lumps of meat in its mouth. Finally this hero, having heated a piece of iron red-hot, induced the reptile to devour it, and so killed it. He cut up the body, and sent pieces of it throughout the country, with orders that the people were to eat them. Wherever this edict was obeyed, the land became free of the *thlens*. But one small piece remained which no one could be induced to eat, and from this sprang a multitude of *thlens*, which still infest the neighbourhood.

When a *thlen* takes up its abode in a family, there is no means of getting rid of it, though it occasionally departs of its own accord, and often follows property when it is given away or sold. The *thlen* attaches itself to property, and brings wealth to its owner, but on condition that it is supplied with human blood. The murderer cuts off the tips of the hair and the finger-nails of the victim with silver scissors, and extracts in a bamboo tube a little blood from the nostrils, which is offered to the *thlen*. This offering must be constantly repeated. In order to drive it from a house, all the money, ornaments, and other goods must be thrown away, and no one dares to appropriate such things lest the *thlen* should follow them. Persons who are supposed to keep *thlens* are regarded with awe, and no one will even mention their names lest ill luck should follow. The superstition is probably of very ancient date, and it is supposed to be connected with the primeval snake-cults of Eastern and Further India.[3]

Among the Meitheis the ancestor of one clan, Pākhangba, manifests himself as a snake. 'When it appears it is coaxed on to a cushion by the priestess in attendance, who then performs certain ceremonies to please it.' Among the same tribe the *nōngshā*, or stone-dragons, symbolize the luck of the State.[4]

Among the Lusheis a man acquires the right to heaven by slaying certain animals; when a snake coils round the antlers of a *sāmbhar* stag, the man sitting on the coils is conveyed to heaven.[5] The Rabhās worship a serpent-god which once dwelt in a cave and was propitiated by the annual sacrifice of a boy and a girl.[6]

(*h*) *South India.*—In no part of India is the cult more general than in S. India.

Here we find the *kāvu*, or snake-grove, which resembles the *nāgavana* of N. India.[7] 'A clump of wild jungle trees luxuriantly festooned with graceful creepers is usually to be found in the S.W. corner of the gardens of all respectable Malayālī Hindus. The spot is left free to Nature to deal with as she likes. Every tree and bush, every branch and twig is sacred. This is the *vishattum kāvu* (poison shrine) or *nāgakotta* (snake shrine). Usually there is a granite stone (*chitra kuṭakallu*) carved after the fashion of a cobra's head set up and consecrated in this waste spot. Leprosy, itch, barrenness in women, deaths of children, the frequent appearance of snakes in the garden, and other diseases and calamities brought about by poison, are all set down to the anger of the serpents. If there be a snake shrine in the garden, sacrifices and ceremonies are resorted to. If there be none, then the place is diligently dug up, and search is made for a snake stone, and if one is found it is concluded that the calamities have occurred because of there having been a snake shrine at the spot, and because the shrine had been neglected. A shrine is then at once formed, and costly sacrifices and ceremonies serve to allay the serpents' anger.'[8]

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[1] Growse, p. 74 f.

[2] Cf. § 7 (*e*); A. Führer, *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions in the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Allahabad, 1891, p. 28. For other examples see E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, London, 1914, p. 323.

[3] M. A. Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus*, London, 1868, pp. 75, 87 ff.

[4] *IGI* xi. [1908] 212.

[5] W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, i. 18 f.; *NINQ* ii. 157, 202.

[6] Crooke, *TC* i. 109, 122, 131, iv. 352.

[7] *NINQ* iii. [1893–94] 179, iv. [1894–95] 130.

[8] E. T. Atkinson, *The Himalayan District of the N.W. Provinces of India*, ii. [Allahabad, 1884] p. 835 f.

[9] *Census of India, 1901*, vi. *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 195 f.; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*, London, 1887, p. 225 f.; *NINQ* i. [1891–92] 166; H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes in Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 41, 84; W. Ward, *View of the Hist., Lit. and Religion of the Hindoos*[2], Serampore, 1815, ii. 140 f.; J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, London, 1883, pp. 138, 219, 260.

[10] See below, § 13 (*f*).

[11] *Saugor Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1907, i. 43.

[12] *Eth. Surv. Central Provinces*, vii. [Allahabad, 1911] 44; R. V. Russell, *Tribes and Castes of Central Provinces*, London, 1916, iii. 399.

[13] *Eth. Surv. Central Provinces*, i. 8, iv. 27; Russell, ii. 195 f., iii. 299.

[14] Russell, iii. 25, 483 f.

[1] Russell, iii. 101.

[2] *Report on the Census, 1881, Berar*, p. 48.

[3] P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*[2], London, 1914, pp. 98 ff., 175 ff.; *Census of India, 1901*, iv. *Assam*, pt. i. 49; *FL* xx. [1909] 419; *PNQ* i. [1883–84] 63.

[4] T. C. Hodson, *The Meitheis*, London, 1908, p. 100 ff.

[5] *Census of India, 1911*, iii. *Assam*, pt. i. p. 140 f.

[6] *Ib.* i. 145.

[7] Somadeva, *Kathā-saritsāgara*, ed. C. H. Tawney, Calcutta, 1880, i. 312.

[8] W. Logan, *Manual of Malabar*, Madras, 1887, i. 183. For references to snake shrines and stones in S. India see E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, ii. 206, v. 173, vii. 385 (with a photograph); J. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 641 f.; T. K. Gopal Panikkar, *Malabar and its Folk*[2], Madras, 1904, p. 145 ff.; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, do. 1910–12, ii. 81 ff. (with illustrations); P. Percival, *The Land of the Veda*, London, 1854, p. 207 ff. (with illustrations); *FL* viii. [1897] 284 f.; V. Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, Trivandrum, 1906, i. 169, ii. 59; *Census of India, 1901*, xxvi. *Travancore*, do. 1903, pt. i. 99; C. Achyuta

Serpent-worship in S. India is of early date, if the Aioi of Ptolemy[1] take their name from Skr. *ahi*, 'a snake.'[2] An inscription at Banavāsī, in Kanara, records the erection of a cobra stone in the middle of the 1st century A.D.[3]

In Tanjore the worship of the cobra is common at the present day. People of the higher castes consider it a sin to kill a cobra, this offence being followed by childlessness, while children may be obtained by its worship. The Vellālas make an old woman cry aloud in the backyard that a sacrifice will be offered to the cobra next day, with a prayer that the offering may be accepted. Generally in the evening cooked jaggery, rice, and an egg, with a burnt offering of butter, are laid out for its acceptance.[4] In Bellary the worship was formerly more common than at present; snake stones may be seen in every village, but few of them seem to receive much attention. Vows, however, are made before them to procure children, and, if a child is afterwards begotten, it is given an appropriate name—Nāgappa, Nāgammā, etc.[5]

(*i*) *The Deccan and W. India.*—In the Deccan and W. India the cult assumes various forms.

One of the favourite guardian-deities in the Deccan is Nāgobā, 'father snake.'[6] In Gujarāt, to make amends for chance injury to a snake resulting in barrenness or loss of children, childless women worship an image of the serpent on the bright fifth of every Hindu month; this is done for one or three years, and at the final service a cobra is drawn on the ground with rice, and a silver snake is laid on the drawing; the woman and her husband bathe, dress in white clothes, and worship; after this the wife buries an iron image of a cobra at a place where four roads meet.[7] At Thān in Kāṭhiāwār the twin snake-brethren are worshipped.[8] Khāmbda in Kāṭhiāwār owes its fame to the shrine of the Khambdio Nāg, or snake; it is supposed to guard the village, which therefore needs no gates; snakes are frequently seen near the gateway and are never molested.[9] Bhuj, the chief town of Cutch, is said to take its name from the 52-yard snake which the people used to worship and feed every day with rice and milk.[10]

(*j*) *The forest tribes.*—As will have been seen from instances already given, the worship is common among the forest tribes.

The Gonds in Chhatīsgarh worship images of snakes every three years by setting out a vessel of milk for the cobra.[11] Members of this tribe are said to have always appeared naked before the shrine of their god Sek Nāg or Seṣa Nāga.[12] The cult is common among the tribes of the Vindhyan ranges.[13] Some Bhils, however, in W. India are reported to kill snakes when they have the chance, and the Khalpās of Gujarāt are reported not to reverence them.[14]

4. The Nāgas.—The chief serpent-worshipping race in ancient India is known as the Nāgas, who appear both in history and in folk-lore, and to whom much vague speculation has been devoted.

(*a*) *The Nāgas in history.*—One of the latest authorities, C. F. Oldham, distinguishes between the Nāga demi-gods in heaven and the Nāga people on earth, the former being assumed to be the deified ancestors of the latter. He concludes that the Asuras and the Sarpas, 'serpents,' of the *Rigveda*, the Asuras and Nāgas of the *Mahābhārata* and Manu, and the Asuras, or demons, of Brāhmanical tradition all represent hostile tribes, who opposed the Aryan invaders, and that the Asuras were Dravidians.[1] Others regard the race of Nāgas as of trans-Himālayan origin who adopted the snake as their national emblem, and hence gave their name to the cobra.[2]

'The great historical fact in connection with the Nāgas . . . is the fierce persecution which they suffered at the hands of the Brahmans; the destruction of serpents at the burning of the forest of Khandava, the terrible sacrifice of serpents which forms the opening scenes in the Mahābhārata, and the supernatural exploits of the youthful Krishna against the serpents sent to destroy him, are all expressions of Brahmanical hatred towards the Nāgas. Ultimately this antagonism merged into that deadly conflict between the Brahman and the Buddhist, which after a lengthened period of religious warfare terminated in the triumph of the Brahman. From these data it would appear that the Nāgas were originally a race distinct from the Aryans and wholly without the pale of Brahmanism; that those who became Buddhist were either crushed or driven out of India during the age of Brahmanical revival, and that the remainder have become converts to Brahmanism and appear to be regarded as an inferior order of Kshatriyas.'[3]

Much of this is little more than speculation, and all that can be stated with confidence is that the Nāgas appear to have been a foreign, perhaps non-Aryan, people, found chiefly in N. India, but occupying other parts of the country.[4] They were powerful in Central and S. India.[5] Castes like the Maravans, Agamundaiyans, and Kallans in Madras are possibly descended from them.[6]

(*b*) *The Nāgas of folk-lore.*—In Buddhist tradition, folk-lore, and art we have frequent references to the Nāgas, personages half-human, half-divine. In the legends chiefs and kings are mentioned who displayed special reverence for Buddha; his alms-bowl was their gift; their kings approach and consult the Master.[7] The folk-tale collections of Somadeva, *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*, and the *Jātaka*[8] abound in tales of the Mélusine and other types in which Nāgas figure.

The king of the Nāgas dwells amidst dance and song in a happy land; 'filled with troops of Nāga maidens, gladdened constantly with their sports day and night, abounding with garlands and covered with flowers, it shines like the lightning in the sky. Filled with food and drink, with dance and song and instruments of music, with maidens richly attired, it shines with dresses and ornaments.'[9] Their palaces are under water, or beneath the roots of a great tree, or under the Vindhyan hills.[10] Their king wears a magic ring and he spits fire;[11] he is offered honey, fried grain, and frogs, but dares not eat them;[12] the erection of ancient buildings is attributed to them, apparently because they were regarded as foreign artificers.[13]

5. The historical development of serpent-worship.—Serpent-worship in a fully developed form does not appear in the *Rigveda*, but it is found as an element of religion in the *Yajurveda*.[14]

'But there can be no doubt that a belief in serpents had its origin in the Veda, though the serpents meant there were at first the serpents of the dark night or the black clouds, the enemies of the solar deities, such as the Aśvins, and not yet the poisonous snakes of the earth. The later development of these serpents and the idea of pacifying them by sacrificial offerings is likewise, as has been well shown by Dr. Winternitz, thoroughly Aryan, nor is there any necessity for adopting that laziest of all

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Menon, *Cochin State Manual*, Ernakulam, 1911, p. 190; B. L. Rice, *Mysore, a Gazetteer compiled for Government*, Westminster, 1897, i. 454 ff., *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, London, 1909, p. 202 *f.*; for the Komatī cult of *nāgas* see H. V. Nanjundayya, *Ethnographical Survey, Mysore*, monograph no. vi. p. 29.

[1] i. 9.

[2] J. W. McCrindle, *Anc. India as described by Ptolemy*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 54.

[3] *BG* xv. ii. [1883] 261; for early snake images and inscriptions in Mysore see B. L. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, pp. 15, 115, 202 (with illustrations).

[4] *Tanjore Gazetteer*, Madras, 1906, i. 70.

[5] *Bellary Gazetteer*, Madras, 1904, i. 64.

[6] *BG* xiv. [1882] 397, xviii. iii. [1885] 386.

[7] *Ib.* ix. i. [1901] 379 *f.*; cf. below, § 7 (*b*).

[8] J. Burgess, *Report on Ant. of Kāṭhiāwād and Kachh*, Bombay, 1876, p. 87 ff.

[9] *BG* viii. [1884] 510; for other snake-shrines see *ib.* pp. 558, 663.

[10] *Ib.* v. [1880] 216 n., 218; Marianne Postans, *Cutch*, London, 1839, p. 100 ff., describes the rite.

[11] *JASB* lviii. [1890] iii. 281.

[12] J. F. Hewitt, *Ruling Races of Prehistoric Times*, London, 1894–95, i. 87 *f.*; for Gond serpent-worship in the Central Provinces see *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, Nagpur, 1870, Introd. lxvi; *NINQ* i. 98.

[13] *NINQ* i. 146.

[14] *BG* ix. i. 305, 346.

[1] Pp. 31, 45, 55.

[2] E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1884, p. 373 *f.*

[3] J. T. Wheeler, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–81, i. 147, 411, ii. 630.

[4] *BG* ix. i. 450 n., 458 n., where they are identified with immigrants from Central Asia.

[5] *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, introd. lxviii; V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1904, p. 39 ff.; Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*, i. 274, 454.

[6] *Trichinopoly Gazetteer*, Madras, 1907, i. 120. For further accounts and speculations regarding the Nāgas see A. Cunningham, *The Stūpa of Bharhut*, London, 1879, p. 23 ff.; F. O. Maisey, *Sanchi and its Remains*, do. 1892, p. 60 ff.; B. H. Baden-Powell, *The Indian Village Community*, do. 1896, pp. 95 ff., 169 n.; Oldham, p. 53 ff.

[7] A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, London, 1901, p. 43 ff.; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, do. 1903, p. 220 ff.

[8] Cambridge, 1895–1913.

[9] *Jātaka*, vi. 150.

[10] *Ib.* iv. 281; Somadeva, ii. 149.

[11] C. H. Bompas, *Folklore of the Santal Parganas*, London, 1909, pp. 90, 130; *Jātaka*, i. 206.

[12] *Jātaka*, vi. 95.

[13] *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, Rangoon, 1900, i. i. 279; Grünwedel, p. 208.

[14] A. A. Macdonell, *A Hist. of Sanskrit Lit.*, London, 1900, p. 182.

expedients, that of ascribing all that seems barbarous in Indian religion to the influences of the aboriginal inhabitants of the country of whom we know next to nothing.'[1]

E. W. Hopkins remarks that in Vedic times 'serpent worship is not only known, but prevalent.'[2] We meet with references to Ahibudhnya, the serpent of the deep, and to Ahi, another designation of the demon Vṛtra; in the later *Saṁhitās* the serpents (*sarpaḥ*) are a class of divine beings.[3] The post-Vedic Rāhu, the eclipse demon, is, in modern belief, a serpent.[4] The *Atharvaveda* contains numerous charms against serpents and a rite of propitiation on the full-moon day of Mārgaśīrsha; they are recognized as gods, and called euphemistically 'biting ropes.'[5] In later tradition many legends are connected with them, like that of Nahusha, turned into a serpent because he insulted the Ṛṣi Agastya.[6] A series of tales describes the enmity between Garuḍa, the chief of the feathered race, and the Nāgas.[7] Garuḍa has been compared with the Simurgh of Persian and the Rukh, or Roc, of Arab tradition, the latter of which attacks snakes,[8] and with the Hebrew Cherub.[9] It has also been suggested that the bird was the totem of tribes hostile to the Nāgas.[10] In the *Brāhmaṇas* serpents, as developed objects of cult, occupy a prominent place, and in the *Mahābhārata*, amidst a mass of folk-tradition, the divine snakes are grouped with other celestial powers.[11]

6. Serpents in the later orthodox cults.—The serpent is closely associated with Brāhmanical Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism.

(*a*) *Brāhmanical Hinduism.*—

The association of the snake with Śiva's symbol, the *liṅga*, is very intimate.[12] A brazen serpent surrounds the great *liṅga* at the Rājput shrine of Eklinga.[13] As symbols of Śiva's energy, they appear in the remarkable Naṭarāja image.[14] In the Himālaya Bhairava, one of the Śaiva group of deities, is represented by a coloured stick in the form of a hooded snake, and Śiva himself, as Rikheśvar, lord of the Nāgas, is surrounded by serpents and crowned with a chaplet of hooded snakes. If, in ploughing, the share injures or kills a snake, a short ritual is prescribed to appease the lord of the snakes. Gaṇeśa, the Mātṛis or Mother-goddesses, and Kṣetrapāl, the field guardian deity, are first worshipped on the spot; then the figure of Śiva in his form as Mṛityuñjaya, 'he that overcomes death,' is drawn on cloth, and with it that of the snake-god; both are worshipped, the snake spell (*sarpamantra*) is recited, and a fire-sacrifice (*homa*) is made.[15] The Liṅgāyats (*q.v.*), as Śaivas, naturally worship snakes.[16] Other deities are also associated with the serpent. At Ter, probably the ancient Tagara, the hooded snake accompanies an association of Śiva, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, and Sūrya, the sun-god, and Śakti Devi, impersonation of the female energy at Chitrārī in the Chamba State, bears a bell and snake in her right hand.[17] At Jaipur, in Orissa, Kālī is represented with her hair brushed back under a snake fillet and surmounted by a distended head of a cobra,[18] while in S. India Bhadrakālī's image, with two wings, is covered with serpents.[19] Probably in commemoration of his feats as a dragon-slayer, a living snake guards Kṛṣṇa's shrine, and at Pandharpur his consort, Rādhā, holds snakes in her hands.[1] Viṣṇu resting on Ananta or Śeṣa, the world-serpent, is a common subject in religious art. He sleeps upon the serpent whose heads support the world, during the intervals of creation.[2] In his form Nārāyaṇa, at Bālaji in Nepāl, his image has a snake-hood projecting over the water.[3]

(*b*) *Buddhism.*—The records of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims supply numerous examples of the serpent-cult in Buddhism, particularly as guardians of trees and springs.

Two dragon-kings washed the infant Buddha; the dragon grants a site for monasteries in his lake; the Nāga Rājā, Muchilinda, protects Buddha with his folds.[4] On the Bodh Gaya rails the *nāga* spreads his hood, and at Bharhut a king with a five-headed snake-hood kneels before an altar behind which is a tree.[5] At the Sarpa (or serpent) cave, excavated about the time of Aśoka, a three-headed serpent of a very archaic type appears.[6] In W. India the Śaiva Buddhist converts preserved their original snake-worship.[7] In the records of the Chinese pilgrims we find Buddhist *śramanas* worshipping the *nāga* and conducting rites at *nāga* shrines.[8] A favourite gift at modern Buddhist pagodas in Burma is a representation in gold of the Lord Buddha, with a hooded snake raising itself over him.[9]

(*c*) *Jainism.*—

In Jainism the symbol of the Tīrthakara Pārśvanātha is a serpent (*sarpa*).[10] The colossal statue of Gomatesvara at Śrāvana Belgola (*q.v.*) is surrounded with white ant-hills from which snakes emerge.[11] The Nāgamalai, or snake-hill, is said to be the remains of a great serpent formed by the magic art of the Jains, and prevented by the power of Śiva from devouring the Śaiva city of Madura, and at the Rāmatīrtha stands a Jain image covered by a cobra with expanded hood.[12]

(*d*) *Sikhism.*—Sikhism also has associations with the snake.

Guru Har Gobind, as a child, destroyed a cobra sent by an enemy to attack him, and he killed a monstrous python which in its previous birth had been a proud *mahant*, or prior, who embezzled the property of his disciples; Guru Har Rai acted in the same way to a python which in a previous existence had been a *paṇḍit* who used falsely to vaunt the power of the Vedas.[13]

7. The serpent in its various manifestations.—The snake-cult assumes many forms.

(*a*) *Controlling water.*—The belief that serpents live in, guard, and control water—lakes, springs, and rivers—is a belief common to many races.[14]

In the records of the Chinese pilgrims a *nāga* rides on the winds, passes through space, and glides over the waters; another brings fertilizing rain; on a mountain pass 'there are poison dragons, who when evil-purposed spit poison, winds, rain, snow, drifting sand, and gravel-stones'; other wicked dragons are restrained from sending rain-storms; people resort with their shamans to the tank of the Nāga Rājā Elāpātra, and by cracking their fingers and praying they obtain rain or fine weather.[15] Many lakes and tanks in N. India are sacred to serpents.[16] All the wells in Kaśmīr, especially hot springs, are associated with snake-worship.[17] The Nāga Mahāpadma is the tutelary guardian of the largest Kaśmīr lake, the Vulur.[18] The sinuous motion of the snake suggests its connexion with rivers, as in Burma, where three snakes, one of which is cut into three pieces, produce three rivers and four canals, and in Sikkim, where the course of the river Tista is straight because the king of serpents led it into the plains.[19]

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[1] F. Max Müller, *Contrib. to the Science of Mythology*, London, 1897, ii. 598 *f.*

[2] *The Religions of India*, ed. Boston and London, 1902, p. 154, quoting *Rigveda*, xi. 9, viii. 6, 7, where it is combined with tree-worship (see below, § 12*a*).

[3] A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, pp. 72, 148, 152; J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1868–70, i. 95 *f.*

[4] Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.*, p. 160; E. Thurston, *Ethnog. Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 289; cf. W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 235.

[5] *SBE* xlii. [1897] 151 ff., 425, 487, 552 ff., 605, 640, 43, 119, 126, 162, 147.

[6] Muir, i. 67 ff.

[7] Somadeva, i. 182 *f.*, ii. 312; *Jātaka*, vi. 93, 102.

[8] R. F. Burton, *Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*, ed. London, 1893, iv. 357 *f.*

[9] *HDB* v. 644; art. HINDUISM, § 5 (*b*).

[10] Oldham, p. 81 f. [11] Hopkins, pp. 251, 376.

[12] J. R. Rivett-Carnac, 'The Snake Symbol in India, especially in Connection with the Worship of Śiva,' *JASB*, 1879, i. 17 ff.

[13] Tod, popular ed., i. 427.

[14] V. A. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art*, p. 251.

[15] Atkinson, ii. 777, 851, 918.

[16] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iv. 257.

[17] *Arch. Surv. Rep.* 1902–03, pp. 201, 241.

[18] W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 269.

[19] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, ii. 406.

[1] G. Oppert, *On the Orig. Inhabitants of Bharatavarsa or India*, London, 1893, p. 138; *BG* xx. [1884] 463.

[2] H. H. Wilson, *Vishnu Purana*, London, 1840, p. 205; V. A. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art*, p. 162 f.

[3] P. Brown, *Picturesque Nepal*, London, 1912, p. 181.

[4] Beal, i. Introd. l., i. 149, ii. 128; Watters, ii. 128 f.

[5] J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1910, i. 105 n., 107 n., i. 33.

[6] J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 69.

[7] *BG* xi. [1883] 336 n. [8] Beal, Introd. xli.

[9] Shway Yoe [J. G. Scott], *The Burman: his Life and Notions*, London, 1882, i. 189.

[10] J. G. Bühler, *On the Indian Sect of the Jainas*, Eng. tr., London, 1903, p. 71; Oldham, p. 177.

[11] V. A. Smith, p. 268 f.; E. Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 135.

[12] *Madura Gazetteer*, Madras, 1906, i. 7; *Vizagapatam Gazetteer*, 1907, i. 335.

[13] M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, iii. 39, iv. 188, 282.

[14] J. A. MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 258 n.; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, v. 44 f.

[15] Beal, i. 25, 64, Introd. xxix, xli, i. 122, 187.

[16] *PR*[2] i. 43 f.; Somadeva, ii. 225, 415.

[17] Lawrence, p. 22; F. Drew, *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, London, 1875, p. 130.

[18] Kalhaṇa, i. 174, ii. 424.

[19] *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, i. ii. 504; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, London, 1899, p. 111.

(*b*) *The chthonic snake.*—The snake living in crevices of the earth is often identified with deceased ancestors and is regarded as chthonic.[1]

Marmots in the Himālaya are credited with the power of producing storms because they live in the bowels of the earth with the *nāgas* that cause thunderstorms.[2]

In the *Brāhmaṇas* 'they chant the verses (seen) by the Queen of the Serpents (*sarpa-rājñī*), because the earth is the Queen of the Serpents, for she is the Queen of all that moves (*sarpat*).'[3]

Thus the snake becomes associated with fertility and eroticism.[4] Therefore the cult is largely in the hands of women.

Among the Komatīs of Mysore women worship snake images set up in performance of vows, and believed to be specially efficacious in curing sores and giving children.[5]

Hence snake-worship is often performed at marriages, as among the Bedars of the Deccan by married women, by Brāhmans in Kanara, by Lambādīs in Madras.[6] The cult of earth fertility-goddesses, like Ellammā or her impersonation, the Mātangī, is accompanied by snake symbols.[7] This is specially the case with the house-snake, which is regarded as the family-genius.[8]

(*c*) *Snakes representing ancestors.*—The conception of the snake as a fertilizer is, again, connected with the belief that the spirit of an ancestor, which takes shape as a snake, is re-embodied in one of the successors.[9]

In the Central Provinces Sonjharā women will not mention the name of the snake aloud, just as they refrain from naming their male relatives.[10] When Mandalay was founded, the king of Burma ordered that a pregnant woman should be slain in order that her spirit might become the guardian *nat* of the city; offerings of fruit and food were made to her spirit, which was supposed to have taken the shape of a snake.[11] In the Central Provinces it is said that a man had three wives, who were cremated with his body. 'While they were burning, a large serpent came up, and, ascending the pile, was burnt with them. Soon after another came up and did the same. They were seen by the whole multitude, who were satisfied that they had been the wives [of the deceased] in a former birth, and would become so again after this sacrifice.'[12]

When Chitor was stormed by the Muhammadans (A.D. 1313), the Rājputs, with their wives and children, perished by fire in an underground chamber. 'Superstition has placed as its guardian a huge serpent, whose venomous breath extinguishes the light which might guide intruders to the place of sacrifice.'[13]

(*d*) *Snakes guardians of treasure.*—The chthonic snake is naturally guardian of treasure buried in the earth. This incident often appears in folk-lore.[14] J. Forbes tells a ghastly tale of a snake which actually occupied a cavern in which treasure was supposed to lie.[15]

(*e*) *Snakes identifying and protecting kings or heroes.*—The basis of this belief, according to one suggestion, is that, as representing the ancient rulers, they naturally protect their successors.

The Nāgasiās of the Central Provinces derive their name from the *nāg*, or cobra, and assert that a cobra spread its hood to protect the tribal hero from the sun.[16] The claim to the throne of Sanga, the hero of Mewār and Kehar of Jaisalmer, was recognized in the same way.[17] The same tale is told of the great chief Holkar,[18] and of the infant Buddha, whose image at Sārnāth represents him sheltered by the coils and hood of a three-headed snake.[1] The world-snake, Śeṣa, protected the infant Kṛṣṇa from a rain-storm.[2]

(*f*) *The snake as a healer.*—Throughout India the *nāga* is invoked to heal disease of all kinds, particularly loathsome sores. Hence parts of its body are valued as remedies.

Among the Taungthas 'there is but one medicine current, the dried gall bladder and the dung of the boa-constrictor, which is supposed to be, and is used as, a remedy for everything.'[3]

In the Garo hills the skin of a certain snake, when applied to the part affected, cures pain.[4]

(*g*) *The snake-jewel.*—The snake has in its head a jewel possessing magical powers.[5]

'It is sometimes metamorphosed into a beautiful youth; it equals the treasure of seven kings; it can be secured only by cowdung or horsedung being thrown over it; and if it is acquired the serpent dies. . . . Its presence acts as an amulet. . . . It protects the owner from drowning . . . allowing him to pass over rivers dry-shod.'[6]

Snakes make precious stones, like those in Malabar, which are formed by divine serpents blowing on gold in the depths of the earth.[7]

8. Places immune from snakes.—Like Sardinia, Ireland, and other places, certain localities in India are immune from snakes.[8]

It is believed that no poisonous snakes exist in those parts of the Kaśmīr valley from which the peak of Harāmak is visible.[9] On the Ratnagiri and Talaimalai hills venomous snakes are said to be innocuous.[10] The family saint of the Kaliār Rājputs in the Panjāb is Kāla Sayyid; any one sleeping near his shrine must lie on the ground lest he be bitten by a snake; but, if a snake bites a man on a Kaliār's land, he will suffer no harm.[11]

9. Snakes and totemism.—The worship of the serpent seems to have originated independently of totemism.[12] Descent from the snake, the use of its name as a sept title, the tabu which prevents its slaughter, and the respect paid to it when dead all appear in India.

(*a*) *Descent from the snake.*—

The Muāsīs and Nāgvansīs of the Central Provinces claim descent from a male and female snake, and the Hajjām barbers of Bombay from the world-serpent, Śeṣa.[13] Some Nāgar Brāhmans in Nimar are said to be the offspring of Brāhmans and Nāga women; some Brāhmans for this reason refuse to eat with them, and in Baroda they call their women Nāg-kanyā, 'snake-maidens.'[14] In Burma there are people who say that they are descended from the egg of a *nāga*.[15] The Gandhmālis believe their ultimate ancestor to have been a cobra; hence they specially observe the Nāgpañchami festival[16] and eat no cooked food on that day.[17] A group of Vellālas in Madras say that they spring from a Nāga-kanyā;[18] and the ruling family of Chota Nāgpur claim their origin from the serpent Pundarīka Nāg.

(*b*) *Septs and sub-castes named after the snake.*—Nāg is a common title of caste-sections in Bengal, Madras, and other parts of India.[19]

(*c*) *Tabu against killing snakes.*—This is partly general and partly confined to groups which claim descent from the serpent.

According to Manu, killing a snake degrades the offender into a mixed caste, and a Brāhman must give a spade of black iron.[20] In Madras a cobra is popularly believed to be a Brāhman;

1 *CGS*, Oxford, 1896, i. 290, v. 37; *JHS* xix. [1899] 205.
2 Waddell, p. 219.
3 *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, ed. M. Haug, Bombay, 1863, ii. 358 f.
4 A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 192 ff.
5 *Eth. Surv. Mysore*, vi. [Bangalore, 1906] 29; Thurston, *Omens*, pp. 124, 133, 128.
6 *BG* xxiii. [1884] 96, xv. i. [1883] 171; Thurston, *Omens*, p. 136.
7 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iv. 306, 300.
8 E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909–10, i. 169, 172; J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 259 f.
9 *PR*[2] i. 179; Hartland, i. 169, 176; Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 288, 294 f., *Totemism and Exogamy*, do. 1910, ii. 634.
10 Russell, iv. 510.
11 *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, i. ii. 35.
12 W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections*, p. 29.
13 Tod, popular ed., i. 215.
14 *Jātaka*, i. 179, ii. 214; F. A. Steel and R. C. Temple, *Wide-awake Stories*, Bombay and London, 1884, p. 295; Bompas, p. 158; T. K. Gopal Panikkar, p. 59; *BG* i. i. [1896] 461.
15 *Oriental Memoirs*[2], London, 1834, ii. 18 ff.
16 Russell, iv. 258.
17 Tod, popular ed., i. 236, ii. 203.
18 J. Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, London, 1823, i. 144.

1 *Arch. Surv.* 1904–05, p. 85.
2 *Vishnu Purana*, ed. Wilson, p. 503.
3 T. H. Lewin, *The Hill Tracts of Chittagong*, Calcutta, 1869, pp. 78, 98.
4 *Asiatic Researches*, iii. [London, 1799] 41.
5 MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 41; J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1882–88, iii. 1220, iv. 1686.
6 *PR*[2] ii. 143 f. 7 Gopal Panikkar, p. 59.
8 Frazer, *Pausanias*, v. 325 f. 9 Lawrence, p. 155.
10 *Trichinopoly Gazetteer*, 1907, i. 5, 285.
11 Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 441.
12 Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 500 ff., iv. 35 f.
13 *Chhatīsgarh Gazetteer*, 1909, pp. 117, 309; *Census of India, 1911*, vii. *Bombay*, pt. i. 261.
14 *Nimar Gazetteer*, 1908, i. 66; *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. 308.
15 *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, ii. ii. 135; H. H. Risley, *The People of India*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 101.
16 See below, § 13 (*f*). 17 Russell, iii. 19.
18 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, vii. 382; Sarat Chandra Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, Calcutta, 1912, p. 136 ff.; for similar legends of descent from a snake-god see *GB*[3], pt. iv. *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 80 ff., pt. iii. *The Dying God*, do. 1911, p. 132 f.
19 Risley, *TC* ii. 120; Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, v. 134 f.
20 *Laws*, xi. 69, 134.

it is a deadly sin to kill it, and the offence necessitates an extreme form of penance.[1] The Badagas of the Nīlgiri hills will not kill a snake nor pass near a dead one.[2] In W. India, in spite of its destructive nature, a cobra is never killed; when one appears in a house, the people bow to it and pray it not to harm the inmates; at the most, if it is caught, it is put in an earthen jar, and this is laid in a lonely spot; the Vāṇis of Aḥmadnagar, if they wish to get rid of a cobra, have it caught with round wooden scissors and set at large in a neighbouring field.[3] One penalty for killing a snake is leprosy, and this disease attacks any one who destroys its eggs by disturbing the ground in which it dwells, or by setting on fire jungle or grass in which it lives and breeds.[4]

Among the Khatrīs of the Panjāb a snake was once born to one of the Abrolā sept, and another fed the ancestor of the Chhotrās; both septs worship and will not kill the reptile.[5] In the Central Provinces the Hatwās are descended from a snake, belong to the *Nāg gotra*, will not kill a cobra, will save it from death at the hands of others, and sometimes pay snake-charmers to release those which they have captured; an oath by the snake is their most solemn form of affirmation.[6] The same tabu prevails among the Nāgesh sept of the Kaltuyās in Bengal and the Nāgbel sept of the Nāhals in the Central Provinces.[7]

(*d*) *Respect paid to dead snakes.*—

In the Central Provinces, if a Parjā of the snake sept kills one accidentally, he places a piece of new yarn on his head, praying for forgiveness, and deposits the body on an ant-hill where snakes are supposed to dwell.[8] In Travancore, if a dead cobra was found, it was burned with the same ceremonies as a man of high caste.[9] In W. India a special rite (*nāgabalī*) is performed by those who desire children, by those who suffer from bodily disease, who have killed a snake, or whose nearest relative has died from snake-bite.[10]

10. Persons dying from snake-bite.—The person dying of snake-bite is considered tabu, because his body has been occupied by the snake-god. Hence the corpses of such persons are usually disposed of in a way different from that observed by the group.

Among the Sāgars of Bombay those who die of snake-bite are cremated on the village common, probably in the hope that the spirit may depart at once, and, if this is not done, it is said that they will fail to receive absolution.[11] The Jātapu Kandhs generally burn their dead, but those dying of snake-bite are buried.[12] In parts of the Central Provinces, if a person has died by hanging, drowning, or snake-bite, his body is burnt without any rites, but, in order that his soul may be saved, a fire-sacrifice (*hom*) is performed after the cremation.[13] In N. India a person dying in this way is believed to be re-born as a snake in the next life. In order to avoid this, an image of a snake is made of silver, gold, wood, or clay, offerings are made to it, a Brāhman is fed, and a prayer is made to Vāsuki Rājā to release the soul.[14]

11. Magical cures for snake-bite.—

In Baroda an expert is summoned who applies charmed cowdung ashes to the bite, and, with a charm, ties knot after knot on a thread; if the patient is restless, he dashes some handfuls of water on his eyes, and tries to force the snake to leave his body; after this treatment the snake explains why it bit the man; if the injury which prompted the snake to bite was trivial, it agrees to leave the patient; if severe, it refuses to leave, and death follows; members of a Nāgar Brāhman family are expert in this treatment.[15] In the *Atharvaveda* there are numerous charms for the exorcism of snakes from houses or against snake-bite; a central feature of such charms is the invocation of the white horse of Pedu (Paidwa), a slayer of serpents.[16] A favourite means of cure is by the 'snake-stone,' which is supposed to suck the poison from the bite.[17]

Certain clans, families, and individuals claim the power of curing snake-bite or are closely identified with the snake.[1]

Such are the Kir of the Central Provinces,[2] the Snake-tribe in the Panjāb,[3] and the Bodlās in the same province.[4] Ghāsīdās, the founder of the Satnāmī (*q.v.*) sect, is said to have been gifted in the same way.[5] Among the Todas certain men have a reputation for curing snake-bite; the limb bitten is bound in three places with a cord of woman's hair; with a piece of a certain tree the healer strikes the limb, repeating an incantation.[6]

Various charms are used to repel the attacks of snakes. These are often made in the shape of the reptile.

Such is the *nāgapatam*, the most primitive form of ornament worn by Nāyar women in S. India, which represents a hooded snake.[7] Men and women in Vizagapatam are very fond of wearing earrings of brass or gold wire twisted to symbolize a snake, with one end flattened out and pointed to represent the head.[8] The head ornament of a Marāthā Brāhman woman bears in the centre an image of a cobra erect, representing Śesa Nāga, the serpent-king.[9] Ladākhī women wear, as their national head-dress, a snake-shaped plaited strip of red cloth.[10] In Bengal a *karabi* root (*Nerium odorum*), pulled whilst the breath is held, on the night when the snake-goddess, Manasā, is worshipped, protects the wearer from snake-bite, but its efficacy lasts only one year.[11] A rosary made of the vertebræ of snakes is used in Tibet for necromancy and divination.[12]

Many sacred places are in repute for the cure of snake-bite.

In the Central Provinces a visit to the shrine of Bhīlat Bābā, a local saint, cures possession by devils and snake-bite.[13] That of Mahā Siddhā, 'the great saint,' has the same reputation in Berār.[14]

With the same object *ex votos* in the form of snakes are often dedicated.

Brāhmans in Madras offer images of snakes to appease the wrath of Rāhu during an eclipse, and in Tamil temples models of snakes, especially those coiled *in coitu*, are offered to propitiate serpents.[15] Coiled snakes are constantly represented on Indian temples.[16]

12. Tree- and serpent-worship.—The connexion between tree-worship and serpent-worship has probably been overstated by J. Fergusson;[17] but some instances are forthcoming.

In Buddhist times 'the tree-deities were called Nāgas, and were able at will, like the Nāgas, to assume the human form; and in one story the spirit of a banyan tree who reduced the merchants to ashes is called a Nāga-rājā, the soldiers he sends forth from his tree are Nāgas, and the tree itself is "the dwelling-place of the Nāga."[18] This may explain why it is that the tree-gods are not specially mentioned in the Mahā Samaya list of deities who are there said by the poet to have come to pay reverence to the Buddha.'[19] On the Bharhut *stūpa* are various reliefs of *nāgas* engaged in worshipping sacred trees or possibly the Buddha immanent in them.[20] A similar subject from S. India is described by Tod.[21]

In Mysore 'the stones bearing the sculptured figures of serpents near every village are always erected under certain trees, which are most frequently built round with a raised platform, on which the stones are set up, facing the rising sun. One is invariably a sacred fig, which represents a female, and another a margosa, which represents a male; and these two are

1 Thurston, *Omens*, p. 124; Dubois, p. 114 ff.; cf. *GB*[3], pt. ii. *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 221 ff.
2 J. W. Breeks, *An Account of the Primitive Tribes and Monuments of the Nīlagiris*, London, 1873, p. 104.
3 *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. 67; *BG* xvii. [1884] 40.
4 Thurston, *Omens*, p. 124.
5 Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 516, 519. 6 Russell, i. 367.
7 *Census of India, 1901*, vi. *Bengal*, pt. i. 415; Russell, iv. 350.
8 Russell, iv. 373.
9 Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 21, quoting J. Canter Visscher, *Letters from Malabar*, p. 162; Thurston, *Ethnog. Notes*, p. 288.
10 J. M. Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, p. 366 ff.
11 *Eth. Surv.* no. 113 [Bombay, 1908], p. 4.
12 *Census of India, 1901*, xv. *Madras*, pt. i. p. 157.
13 *Jubbulpore Gazetteer*, Nagpur, 1909, i. 137.
14 *NINQ* iv. [1894–95] 130.
15 *Census of India, 1911*, xvi. *Baroda*, pt. i. 67 f.
16 *SBE* xlii. 425 f., 27 f., 461, 487, 552 ff., 605 f.; for other remedies of the same kind see Thurston, *Omens*, p. 95; *PR*[2] i. 239; *FL* xxi. [1910] 85.
17 H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], London, 1903, p. 847 ff.

1 Cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 133.
2 Russell, iii. 483 f.
3 *PNQ* ii. 91; cf. *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 316 f.
4 Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 115.
5 *Raipur Gazetteer*, 1909, i. 80.
6 W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 267.
7 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, v. 366; *Census of India, 1901*, xxvi. *Travancore*, pt. i., p. 325; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, ii. 101.
8 *Vizagapatam Gazetteer*, i. 69.
9 *Eth. Surv. Central Provinces*, viii. [1911] 95; *BG* xviii. i. [1885] 54.
10 *Census of India, 1911*, xx. *Kashmir*, pt. i. p. 61 n.
11 *Mem. ASB* i. [1905] 233.
12 L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 209.
13 *Hoshangabad Gazetteer*, 1908, i. 291.
14 *Berar Gazetteer*, Bombay, 1870, p. 192; *PR*[2] i. 220 ff.
15 Thurston, *Omens*, pp. 43, 100, *Ethnog. Notes*, p. 353 f.
16 *Asiatic Researches*, vi. [1801] 389 (with illustrations); *PNQ* ii. 73. For similar offerings of images of snakes and phalli see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 266; Somadeva, i. 8; for *ex voto* offerings, in Himālayan snake-shrines, Oldham, p. 101 f.
17 *Tree and Serpent Worship*[2]. 18 *Jātaka*, iv. 221 ff.
19 Rhys Davids, p. 232, with illustration of Buddha preaching to *nāgas* in a sacred tree.
20 Cunningham, p. 26 f., plates xxviii., xxix.
21 Popular ed., i. 462.

married with the same ceremonies as human beings. The bilpatre [*vilva-bilva-pattra*] (*Ægle marmelos*), sacred to Śiva, is often planted with them.'[1]

In Bellary it is said that the five Pāṇḍava brethren concealed their arms on a *sami*-tree (*Prosopis spicigera*), and that their weapons turned into snakes and remained untouched till they returned.[2]

13. Worship and propitiation of snakes.—The worship and propitiation of snakes are so closely connected with orthodox and unorthodox cults that it is often difficult to disentangle them.

(*a*) *Worship of the living snake.*—

A snake temple at Calicut contains several live cobras, which are fed by priests and worshippers; they are carefully protected, and allow themselves to be handled and made into necklaces by those who feed them; they are venerated as representing the spirits of ancestors.[3] The worship of living snakes is also found in Mysore and at Vaisarpadi near Madras, where crowds of votaries assemble, generally on Sundays, in the hope of seeing the snakes preserved in the temple-grounds.[4] In the island of Nainativoe, Ceylon, consecrated snakes used to be tenderly reared by the Pandāram priests, and fed daily at the expense of their votaries.[5] At Bhāṇḍak, in the Central Provinces, a cobra appears in the snake-temple on all public occasions, and similar cases are reported from Rājamundrī, Sambalpur, and Manipur.[6]

(*b*) *Snake temples.*—Temples in which snake-worship is performed are numerous.

At the most ancient temple in Bilāspur and in Chhattīsgarh the only image is that of the cobra.[7] At Nāgarcoil, in Travancore, is a temple of the snake-god containing many stone images of snakes; snake-bite is not fatal within a mile of the temple; at Mannarsala the sacred enclosure contains several living cobras.[8] At Nimbargi, in Bijapur, a woman saw her cow dropping its milk on a serpent's hole; she was ordered in a dream to build a temple over it, and to close its doors for nine months; but in her impatience she opened it prematurely, and found that a half-finished image of Sītārām and a *liṅga* had sprung from the ground—a legend obviously invented to explain the form of the image.[9] Among the Jādejā Rājputs of Kachh the chief procession is that of the Rāv to the snake temple in Bhuj fort.[10] A curious illustration of the fusion of Islām with animism is found in the snake mosque near Manarghāṭ, at the foot of the Nīlgirī hills, where an annual festival is held and alms are collected for the mosque.[11]

(*c*) *Snake-worship at ant-hills.*—Snake-worship is often conducted at ant-hills supposed to be the home of snakes.[12]

The Dhangars of the Central Provinces say that the first sheep and goats came out of an ant-hill, and, to stop the damage which they caused to crops, Śiva created the first Dhangar; hence they revere ant-hills, never remove them from their fields, and at the Divāli, or feast of lights, worship them with offerings of rice, flowers, and part of the ear of a goat.[13] Some tribes in Madras worship snakes by pouring milk on ant-hills.[14] The worship of the ant-hill at marriages and the custom of bringing the lucky earth from them are possibly connected with the fertility cult of snakes or of ants, because they multiply in great numbers.[15]

(*d*) *Propitiation of snakes.*—

In N. India the Agarwālā branch of traders, who have a legend of snake-descent, have an annual rite for propitiation of snakes at which various ceremonies are performed, and sesamum charmed with a spell is sprinkled in the house to preserve the inmates from snake-bite.[16] In Central India, to propitiate the snake-god Nāgdeo, milk is placed by Bhīls near the hole of a cobra.[17] A solemn annual service to propitiate the Nāga rain-deities is held in Tibet.[18] In an important cycle of folk-tales a monster or dragon is appeased by the periodical sacrifice of a victim, often a girl, who is finally rescued by a hero.[1] Frazer regards the tales as reflecting a real custom of sacrificing girls or women to be the wives of water-spirits, who are often conceived as great serpents or dragons.[2]

In the worship of serpents it is important to note that the offerings made to *nāgas* are not such substances as are usually eaten by snakes, but things suitable for the food of men.[3] In S. India among the rites performed by the twice-born classes are *nāga-pratishṭha*, the worship of the cobra in the form of a carved stone image, and *nāgabali*, or the performance of the obsequies of a dead cobra with all the formalities observed in ordinary funeral-rites.[4]

(*e*) *Worship of snake-heroes.*—Many deified snake-heroes are found in India.

Such are Gūgā or Guggā Pīr in the Panjāb and Rājawa and Soral in Hoshangābād.[5] In the Central Provinces the Bharias worship Karuā, 'the black one,' the cobra who, they say, was born in the tribe; he hid in the house-oven because he happened by accident to see one of his brothers' wives without her veil, was burnt to death, and is now deified by the tribe.[6] Another worthy of the same class is Bhīlat, a deified cowherd, whose disciples are believed to be able to cure snake-bite with the long sticks which they carry.[7]

(*f*) *Snake-festivals.*—The chief snake-festival is that known as the Nāgpañchamī, 'dragon's fifth,' in N. India and Nāgara-panchamī in S. India, because it is held on the 5th day of the light half of the month Srāvana, or Sāvan. Its occurrence in the rainy season is possibly connected with the power of the snake to give rain.

In S. India, on the eve of the festival, worship is rendered with offerings of flowers and incense at snake-holes, and milk is poured into them; the stone images of snakes under sacred trees are visited with reverence; on the day of the feast these images are washed, milk, curds, etc., are poured on them, flowers are presented, and other offerings made.[8] In the Central Provinces, during the month of Śrāvaṇa, a man must be sent on a certain day to eat cakes at the shrine of the snake-god and return; if this is neglected, the family will be attacked by cobras.[9] In other parts of the Province Brāhmans on the day of the feast must not cut vegetables with a knife, but only with a scythe, and may not eat bread baked on a griddle; the priest comes to the house in the morning, and, if he tells the owner to do something ridiculous, he is bound to do it; on that day every guest who eats in the house must be branded on the hind-quarters with a burning stick, the host doing this stealthily; schoolmasters take their boys to a stream, where they wash their slates, worship them, come home, and eat sweetmeats.[10] Wrestling contests are held on this day, and it is suggested that this is done because the movements of the wrestlers resemble the writhing of a snake.[11] In the Deccan, on the first day of the feast, images of snakes are painted on the walls of the house, worship is offered to them, and an old woman recites a legend explaining the origin of the rite.[12] In the Himālayan districts of the United Provinces Śiva is worshipped under the title of Rikheśwar, as lord of the *nāgas*, in which form he is represented as surrounded by serpents and crowned with a chaplet of hooded snakes; the people paint figures of serpents and birds on the walls of their houses, and seven days before the festival steep a mixture of wheat, grain, and pulse in water; on the morning of the Nāgpañchamī they take a wisp of grass and, tying it up in the form of a snake, dip it in the water in which the grain has been steeped, and place it with money and sweetmeats before the pictures of the serpents.[13]

At the temple of Jagannāth (*q.v.*) at Puri 'the supremacy of Vishnu is declared in the festival of the slaughter of the deadly cobra-da-capello, Kāli-damana, the familiar of Śiva and his queen.'[14] Viṣṇu, in the form of Ananta, 'the infinite,' the snake-god Śeṣa, is worshipped at the feast of the Anant Chaudas, on the full moon of Bhādon, which, like other snake-festivals, falls in the rainy season.[15] A remarkable rite in N. India is that of the *guruī*, when girls go to a tank or stream and float dolls, which are beaten by the boys with long switches, possibly a purgation, fertility, or rain cult.[16] A similar rite is known as

1 Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*, i. 455.
2 *Bellary Gazetteer*, i. 64.
3 M. A. Handley, *Roughing it in S. India*, London, 1911, p. 70 f.
4 Rice, i. 455; Thurston, *Ethnog. Notes*, p. 283.
5 J. E. Tennent, *Ceylon*[2], London, 1859, i. 373.
6 *IGI* viii. 59; *Census Rep. Berar, 1881*, p. 48.
7 *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, Introd. lxv. 86.
8 Thurston, *Omens*, p. 92; Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, iii. 589.
9 *BG* xxiii. 667 f. 10 *Ib.* ix. i. 136.
11 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, vii. 105 f.
12 For rites at conical mounds compare the Greek *omphalos* and other sacred mounds (Harrison, *Themis*, pp. 384, 396 ff.; Frazer, *Pausanias*, v. 314 ff.), and the bell-shaped mound in marriage and other rites among the pagan Malays (Skeat-Blagden, i. 189, ii. 57, 67, 72 ff., 83).
13 Russell, ii. 480.
14 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, i. 196, ii. 256 f., vi. 236, 356.
15 *Eth. Surv. Mysore*, ix. 6, xxii. 8, xiii. 8; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, ii. 376.
16 *NINQ* ii. 202. 17 *Eth. Surv.*, 1909, p. 30.
18 Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 508; for a similar rite among the Pullavans of S. India see Anantha Krishna Iyer, i. 153 f.

1 E. S. Hartland, *LP* i. chs. i.–iii.; Frazer, *Pausanias*, v. 143 ff., who gives Indian parallels.
2 Frazer, *Lectures on the Early Hist. of the Kingship*, London, 1905, p. 184; *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, ii. 155 ff. For human sacrifice in snake-cults see above, § 3 (*g*).
3 Oldham, p. 29 f.
4 Above, § 9 (*d*); *Census of India*, *1911*, xxi. *Mysore*, pt. i. p. 89.
5 *PR*[2] i. 211 ff., ii. 140; for a full account of the cult of Gūgā see Rose, i. 143 ff.
6 *Eth. Surv.* iii. [1907] 33; Russell, ii. 247.
7 *Nimar Gazetteer*, 1908, i. 59.
8 *Eth. Surv. Mysore*, *s.v.* 'Besthas,' p. 11; Thurston, *Omens*, p. 124.
9 *Damoh Gazetteer*, 1906, i. 88.
10 *Chhindwāra Gazetteer*, 1907, i. 55 f.
11 *Nagpur Gazetteer*, 1908, i. 94.
12 Balaji Sitaram Kothare, *Hindu Holidays*, Bombay, 1904, p. 24 ff.
13 Atkinson, ii. 851. 14 Hunter, i. 131.
15 *Mem. ASB* i. 174 f. 16 *NINQ* i. [1891–92] 78.

godhan in Bihār.[1] In other parts of N. India people go about begging during the rainy season for two and a half days, during which time they do not sleep under a roof or eat salt; the object is said to be to avert the danger of snake-bite.

14. The snake in Hindu religious art.—Representations of the snake and its worship appear throughout Hindu religious art.

Figures of the Nāga Rājā, often in connexion with those of Buddha, appear in many cave-temples.[2] The figures of the *nāgas* at Ajanta (*q.v.*) are specially interesting.[3] A favourite subject is Viṣṇu as Nārāyaṇa resting on the world-snake, Śeṣa.[4]

15. The snake in folk-lore.—The snake naturally plays a leading part in the folk-lore of India. Here only a few instances can be given.[5]

The snake knows the powers of life-giving plants, and the language of birds and animals can be acquired by eating some part of the flesh of a serpent.[6] According to Philostratos of Lemnos, their hearts and livers were eaten in India, and knowledge of the language and thoughts of animals was thus attained.[7] According to the Santāls, the power of understanding the speech of animals is given by Manasā, king of serpents.[8] In another Santāl tale a snake teaches a woman an incantation which, if used when dust is thrown into the air, will cause the person against whom it is aimed to be burned to ashes.[9] Omens are naturally taken from snakes. In Madras a person should postpone his journey if he sees a cobra or a rat-snake; and in Kumaun, when a snake crosses a man's path, he must tear a rag from his clothing and place it on the trail of the reptile; if he fails to do so, he falls sick or suffers some other evil.[10] In Madras any one who dreams of a snake is considered to be proof against its bite; if a man dreams of a cobra, his wife or some other near female relative has conceived.[11] If a man has marks of a snake on his right foot, or a woman on her left, they are incarnations of some deity.[12] In the Panjāb some snakes which drink buffaloes' milk are so swift as to be able to bite a galloping horse; two-headed snakes are common; there is a snake which poisons the breath of a sleeper, strikes him with its tail, and is able to remove from the bedside sticks which might be used against it.[13] The Sanskrit names for the snake, *dṛig-visha*, *dṛishti-visha*, 'having poison in the eyes,' imply that it can poison by a mere glance.[14] The hamadryad is supposed to pursue its victim over hill, dale, and water.[15] Among the Todas a person whom a snake has bitten must not cross a stream; if it is absolutely necessary that he should cross, he must be carried over it.[16] The same people explain eclipses by the fact that a snake once hunted a hare, which took refuge in the moon; the moon promised to protect it. 'The snake still goes sometimes to catch the hare in the moon, and when he goes the moon becomes dark and some people fire guns and send up rockets and the Todas shout.'[17]

The Kadu Gollas of Mysore believe that, if a woman in her courses enters the house, they will be bitten by snakes or stung by scorpions.[18] In N. India a snake is said to become blind on seeing a pregnant woman.[19] In the Konkan the bite of the rat-snake is poisonous on Sunday, but harmless on other days; if it is in a field with a buffalo, whichever sees the other first will survive, while the one first seen will die; when buffaloes bathe, this snake sucks their milk under water.[20] One snake in Ratnagiri can kill people by merely casting its shadow on them from a tree or the roof of a house.[21]

LITERATURE.—To the knowledge of the writer no comprehensive monograph on serpent-worship in India has been published. Some aspects of the subject have been investigated by J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship, or Illustrations of Mythology and Art in India*[2], London, 1873; C. F. Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, do. 1905; W. Crooke, *PR*[2], do. 1896, ii. 121 ff.; A. de Gubernatis, *Zoological Mythology*, do. 1872, ii. 388 ff. For other references see *EBr*[11] xxiv. 676 ff. Some of the abundant and scattered literature on the subject has been quoted in the article.

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1 G. A. Grierson, *Bihār Peasant Life*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 400.
2 Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples of India*, pp. 156 f., 306, 317, 325, 331, 343, 421; Grünwedel, pp. 29, 94, 106 ff., 133.
3 Grünwedel, p. 48 ff.
4 *Arch. Surv. Rep.* 1905-06, p. 114; J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and Eastern Arch.*, i. 341; Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art*, p. 162 f. For other sculptures see A. Cunningham, *The Stūpa of Bharhut*, and *The Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854; F. C. Maisey, *Sanchi and its Remains*.
5 See *PR*[2] ii. 141 f.
6 *GB*[2], pt. iv. *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, i. 186, pt. v. *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 146; J. A. MacCulloch, *Rel. of the Anc. Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 149 n.
7 McCrindle, *Anc. India in Class. Literature*, p. 194.
8 A. Campbell, *Santāl Folk-tales*, Pokhuria, 1891, p. 22.
9 Bompas, p. 153.
10 Thurston, *Omens*, p. 25; *NINQ* ii. 136; for other omens from snakes see J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 288 ff.
11 Above, § 7 (*b*); Thurston, *Omens*, p. 20.
12 *NINQ* v. [1892-93] 17.
13 Malik Muhammad Din, *Rep. Bahawalpur State*, Lahore, 1908, p. 8 f.
14 Cf. *FL* xvi. [1905] 150.
15 H. Yule, *Narr. of the Mission to the Court of Ava*, London, 1858, p. 100 n.; Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, vii. 136.
16 Rivers, p. 267. 17 *Ib.* p. 593.
18 *Eth. Surv.* xiv. [Bangalore, 1908] 14.
19 *NINQ* v. [1895-96] 70.
20 *BG* XVIII. i. 75. 21 *Ib.* x. [1880] 50.

SERPENT-WORSHIP (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic). — I. *TEUTONIC.* — **1. Lombard snake-worship.** — In the 7th cent. St. Barbatus melted down the golden image of a viper, which the Lombards worshipped in secret. Unfortunately we know nothing further of this cult.[1]

2. Wisdom and healing powers.—The Teutons, like most other peoples, believed in the wisdom of the serpent and in his powers of giving health and strength.

Hother, the adversary of Balder, came to his enemy's camp, and heard that 'three maidens had gone out carrying the secret feast of Balder. . . . Now they had three snakes, of whose venom they were wont to mix a strengthening compound for the food of Balder, and even now a flood of slaver was dripping on the food from the open mouths of the serpents.' The eldest maiden refused to give the food to Hother, 'declaring that Balder would be cheated, if they increased the bodily powers of his enemy.'[2]

Saxo also tells us how Roller saw his mother preparing a meal for himself and his step-brother Eric. 'He looked up at three snakes hanging from above . . . from whose mouths flowed a slaver which dribbled drops of moisture on the meal. Now two of these were pitchy of hue, while the third seemed to have whitish scales . . . Roller thought that the affair looked like magic. . . . For he did not know that the snakes were naturally harmless, or how much strength was being brewed for that meal.' Eric chooses the broth made from the dark snake, 'judging the feast not by the colours but by the inward strengthening effected,' and so he attains 'to the highest pitch of human wisdom,' knowledge of animal language, and success in war.[3]

Somewhat similar results come from the eating of the heart of the snake or dragon, Fáfnir, by Sigurd the Volsung.[4] We find a parallel for this superstition of the potency of the snake's slaver in the Lithuanian custom of putting their sacred house-snake on the table and letting him touch their food.[5]

3. The snake and the soul.—The cult of the house-snake probably prevailed at one time among the Teutons.

'Plenty of old tales are still told of *home snakes* and *unkes*. On meadows and pastures, and even in houses, snakes come to children when alone, sip milk with them out of their bowl . . . they watch infants in the cradle, and to bigger children they shew treasures: *to kill them is unlucky*. . . . If the parents surprise the snake with the child, and kill it, the child begins to fall away, and dies before long.'[6]

'In some districts they say every house has two snakes, a male and a female, but they never shew themselves till the master or mistress of the house dies, and then they undergo the same fate.'[7]

The cult of the house-snake is a wide-spread religious practice, and seems to be a form of ancestor-worship, arising from the notion that snakes embody the souls of the dead. In some Teutonic legends and superstitions the snakes appear to embody the souls of those who are still alive—a survival perhaps of the primitive belief in the 'external soul.'

Paul the Deacon tells the story of King Gunther, whose 'soul crept out of his mouth in the shape of a snake . . . passed a little brook and entered a mountain, afterwards returning again to the mouth of the king. . . . The king in the meantime had dreamt that he crossed a bridge over a river, and arrived in a mountain full of gold. The treasure . . . was afterwards actually lifted.'[8]

Several Northern stories appear to contain reminiscences of the custom of rearing house-snakes.

Thora, daughter of Herodd, king of Sweden, at the command of her father, 'endured to rear a race of adders with her maiden hands,' which grew until they became a public nuisance and were killed by her wooer, Ragnar Lodbrog.[9] According to the version of the story in the *Saga of King Ragnar Lodbrok*,[10] the

1 Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. Stallybrass, ii. 684.
2 Saxo, tr. Elton, p. 93. 3 *Ib.* p. 158 f.
4 *Volsunga Saga*, in *Die prosaische Edda*, ed. Wilken, p. 182.
5 See below, § 11. 6 Grimm, ii. 686. 7 *Ib.* p. 687.
8 See Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, p. 297.
9 Saxo, p. 364 f.
10 *Fornaldar Sögur Nordrlanda*, Kaupmannahöfn, 1829, i. 237 f.

princess kept a snake in a box, with gold under him. The snake grew until he encircled the whole room, and the gold grew with his growth.

Both snakes and dragons (which often play a very similar part in popular belief) are frequently supposed to bring wealth or guard gold.

Fáfnir was originally human, but guarded his treasure by lying on top of it, in the form of a great snake or dragon.[1] The dragon in *Beowulf* kept watch over treasure in a burial-mound.

It is probable that originally the dead man was thought to appear in the form of a snake or dragon guarding the treasures that were buried with him in his grave.

Saxo tells of another snake-rearing princess:

'Siward, the king of the Goths, is said to have had . . . a daughter Alfhild, who showed almost from her cradle such faithfulness to modesty, that she continually kept her face muffled in her robe. . . . Her father banished her into very close keeping, and gave her a viper and a snake to rear, wishing to defend her chastity by the protection of these reptiles.'[2]

Saxo has probably misunderstood the king's motive. Sacred snakes are often tended by virgin priestesses, who are supposed to be their wives, the fundamental belief being that women 'can conceive by the dead in the form of serpents.'[3] A legend recorded by Grimm[4] is noteworthy in this connexion:

'Once, when a woman lay asleep, a snake crept into her open mouth, and when she gave birth to a child, the snake lay coiled tightly round its neck, and could only be got away by a milk-bath; but it never left the baby's side, it lay in bed with it, and ate out of its bowl, without doing it any harm.'

4. The snake in the other world.—Saxo gives a detailed account of Thorkill's visits to the other world:

After crossing the bridge which divided the world of men from the world of monsters, he came to the dwelling of Geirrod where 'the flooring was covered with snakes.' Afterwards Thorkill and his companions went to visit Utgarda-Loki. They came at last to a cave of giants, situated in a land of eternal night. 'The entrance was hideous, the door-posts were decayed . . . the floor swarming with snakes.' Then in another cavern 'he beheld a number of iron seats among a swarm of gliding serpents. Next there met his eye a sluggish mass of water gently flowing over a sandy bottom. . . . Again . . . a foul and gloomy room was disclosed to the visitors, wherein they saw Utgarda-Loki, laden hand and foot with enormous chains. . . . They could scarcely make their way out, and were bespattered by the snakes which darted at them on every side.'[5]

We may compare this with the description of the place of punishment in the Prose Edda:

'In Corpse Strand there is a great and evil hall, and the doors face the north; it is all wrought of snake-backs, but the snake-heads look into the house, and breathe out poison, so that the poison-streams run along the halls, and oath-breakers and murderers wade those rivers as it is here said:

'"I know a hall standing
Far from the sun
In Corpse Strand,
The doors face north
Poison drops fall
In from the windows."'[6]

'There Niðhöggr devours
The corpses of the departed.'[7]

Niðhöggr lives with a great number of snakes in the spring Hvergelmir under the great World-Tree, the Ash Yggdrasil.

'The Ash Yggdrasil,
Suffers hardships
More than men know . . .
Niðhöggr crawls underneath.'[8]

'More snakes lie
Beneath the Ash Yggdrasil
Than unwise fools can think of . . .
I think they will always
Be spoiling the boughs of that tree.'[9]

The conception of the universal tree was perhaps suggested by tree-sanctuaries such as the Upsala sanctuary and the great Romove sanctuary of the Baltic peoples.[1] The above-quoted lines point to the conclusion that at one time it was customary to keep snakes in these sanctuaries; we know that a sacred serpent was kept at Romove.[2] Snakes evidently appear in the other world because they embody the souls of the dead. Two of the snakes who gnaw Yggdrasil's Ash are called Ofnir and Svâfnir—names which are also given to Odin, the god of death.[3]

5. The world-snake.—Just as the sacred tree seems to have given rise to the idea of a universal world-tree, so probably the sacred snake gave rise to the idea of Miðgarðsormr, the great world-snake, which lies in the sea, coiled round the whole earth.

Miðgarðsormr, Hell, and the wolf Fenrir are children of Loki and adversaries of the gods. At the end of the world Miðgarðsormr will come up on to the land, breathing out poison. Thor, the thunder-god, will do battle with him and be killed by his poisonous breath.[4]

6. Conclusion.—We know something of the beliefs about snakes prevalent among the Teutonic peoples, but practically nothing about the ritual of the snake-cult. The Teutons seem to have regarded the snake as possessed of special gifts of knowledge and healing power; but on the whole its malignant aspect seems to be predominant. The snake is clearly regarded as an embodiment of the soul, and so comes to be connected with death, the land of the dead, and the powers of destruction.

II. *Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian.*—1. The house-snake.—The cult of the house-snake was one of the 'almost incredible things' which Jerome of Prague related to the Council of Basel (1431–37) when describing his experiences as a missionary among the Lithuanians. Each *pater-familias* had his own serpent in a corner of the house, to which he gave food and did sacrifice.[5]

In the middle of the next century Joannes Meletius (Menecius) gives similar evidence:

'Moreover the Lithuanians and Samogitæ keep snakes warm under the stove, or in a corner of the steam-room where the table stands. These snakes they worship as they would a divine being; and at a regular season of the year the sacrificers summon them forth to share the meal. They come out and climb up over a clean cloth and sit on the table. When they have there tasted the several dishes, they go down again and hide themselves in their holes. When the snakes have gone away the men gladly eat up the dishes of which they have had a first taste, and expect that for that year all things will turn out happily for them. If, however, the snakes have not come in answer to the prayers of the sacrificer, or have refused to taste the dishes placed on the table, then they believe that in that year they will suffer some great calamity.'[6]

About thirty years later Alexander Guagnini describes the worship of house-snakes, which was still kept up by many of the country people in Samogitia.

They reverenced a particular kind of snake 'with four tiny feet, like lizards, and black and fat in body, called in their native tongue *givojitos*.' Guagnini tells the story of a pagan, living in a village near Vilna, who, having been persuaded by a Christian to kill his sacred snake, was horribly deformed, because, as he said, he 'laid wicked hands on the serpent, his domestic god.'[7]

The Letts also were in the habit of rearing and worshipping house-snakes, which were so tame that they could not harm man or beast belonging to the house; even the children would play with them and have them in their beds.[8] It was the duty of the Lettish goddess Brehkina to cry out to all who entered: 'You must leave the milk-

1 *Volsunga Saga*, ed. Wilken, p. 175.
2 P. 274.
3 J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], London, 1914, i. 90; cf. *ib.* pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, do. 1912, ii. 17 *f.*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, ii. 149 *f.*; C. F. Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, do. 1905, p. 154.
4 ii. 686.
5 Pp. 344–356.
6 *Völuspá*, 38.
7 *Gylf.* iii. 88.
8 *Grimnismál*, 35, quoted in *Gylf.* ed. Wilken, p. 28.
9 *Ib.* 34, quoted in *Gylf.* p. 23.

1 Cf. art. Nature (Teutonic); H. M. Chadwick, in *JAI* xxx. [1900] 30.
2 See below, § II.
3 *Grimnismál*, 54, in *Die Lieder der älteren Edda*, ed. Hildebrand and Gering, p. 93.
4 *Gylf.* xxxiv. 37 *f.*, li. 82.
5 *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, 5 vols., Leipzig, 1861–74, iv. 239.
6 *FL* xii. [1910] 298.
7 *Respublica sive status regni Poloniæ Lituaniæ Prussiæ Livoniæ*, Leyden, 1627, p. 276.
8 *Scriptores Rerum Livonicarum*, Riga and Leipzig, 1848, ii. 441.

mothers [*i.e.* house-snakes, toads] unharmed in the house.'[1]

Matthæus Prætorius quotes from Bretkius a detailed description of the consecration of the house-snake.

'A *weidulut* or *maldininks* is called, who brings with him one or more snakes. Thereupon the table is laid, and a *kauszele* [*i.e.* bowl] full of drink, and a can of beer set out.' The *weidulut* prays and the snake creeps up on to the table. 'Soon he makes a circle round the snake, which thereupon lies as if dead, until the *weidulut* has finished his prayers, which are many. Then the snake is sprinkled with beer out of the consecrated *kauszele* and after that it moves again, and, on the command of the *weidulut*, touches some of the food and gets down from the table by means of a towel. The *weidulut* notices the place that the snake will occupy and hallows it by prayer. Thereupon the snake establishes itself in its place. The host, however, with the *weidulut* and the inmates of his house, is joyful and concludes this consecration with much drinking and all manner of amusements.'[2]

Erasmus Stella and Guagnini call the sacred serpents of the Baltic peoples *penates*. It is almost certain that here, as elsewhere, the cult of the house-snake was a form of ancestor-worship. The Lithuanians named their house-snakes *givojitos*, *givoitos* (cf. above), 'the living ones' (cf. Lith. *gyvatë*, 'snake,' derived from Lith. *gyvas*, 'living'). It is therefore highly probable that they shared the almost universal idea that the snake, owing to his power of sloughing his skin, is immortal and a fit embodiment for the spirit of the dead, the ever-living ancestor.[3] The association of the *paterfamilias* with a special snake, and the Lettish term *peena maates* (cf. below), point to the same conclusion.

The snake as household god or ancestral spirit would naturally further the interests of his own family at the expense of others. The Letts, we are told by Fabricius, reared huge serpents which would steal milk-pails from neighbouring herds and bring them back to their own people.[4] From the same authority we learn that these people knew how to injure their enemies' crops by magic arts, but he does not state that they used snakes for the purpose. Prætorius, however, gives an interesting piece of evidence for such practices among the Lithuanians in the 17th century:

A certain man who had been a servant in Insterburg, near Lithuanian Georgenburg, told how various villages in the neighbourhood still kept (though in great secrecy) a *monininks*. At certain times in the year, usually spring or autumn, this *monininks* called the people together and collected various snakes through magic prayers, and charmed them by certain magic characters. The table was then laid, food and drink set out, a special place prepared for the snakes, and milk set out for them. The snakes were brought up on to the table, and at the command of the *monininks* touched all the food, after which the feast took place and was concluded with much drinking. After the meal each person present told the *monininks* the name of his enemy, and how he wished him to be injured. 'If some one wished his enemy's grain to be injured in the field, the *weideler* took a snake in his two hands, charmed it anew, prayed again some magic prayers, and let it dart away to the door or window, with these words: *Szmiksst per Esze*, *i.e.*, Go through the fields . . . thereupon the specified corn, and other grain in the field was injured through hail. . . . If the *weideler* said: *Szmiksst per arnida*, then the supply of bread was injured.'[5]

This seems to be a survival of beliefs and practices connected with the house-snake.

2. The sanctuary-snake.—The serpent cult was not confined to the house. In Samland, it seems, large numbers of snakes were reared in an oak-wood in honour of the gods.[6] Prætorius[7] explains that *zaltones* were snake-charmers, who had charge of the snakes consecrated to Padrympus. This information, however, can scarcely be drawn from personal observation, as Prætorius tells us elsewhere that in his day Padrympus was no longer invoked by name.[1] Padrympus, or Potrimpus, was one of the deities to whom the famous Romove sanctuary was consecrated. In his honour a snake was kept in a large jar, crowned with sheaves of corn, and fed with milk by virgin priestesses.[2] Grunau's account of Old Prussian beliefs has perhaps been regarded with undue scepticism. In this case his statement is supported by the evidence of comparative religion. In diverse parts of the world snakes are tended by virgins, who apparently are considered as their wives.[3] The custom of giving milk to serpents is even more universal, most likely because milk is the food of children. The fundamental idea seems to have been that the dead could be born again into their own families. We find traces of this belief among the Scandinavians and elsewhere.

'Behind the Greek notion that women may conceive by a serpent-god seems to lie the belief that they can conceive by the dead in the form of serpents.'[4]

Hence the snake's influence over human fertility. The term *peena maates*, 'mothers of milk,' suggests that some such conception prevailed among the Letts. The word *maates*, 'mothers,' is due to the Lettish preference for female deities.

It is easy to understand why the snake was the peculiar treasure of Potrimpus.

Among the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast 'a close connexion is apparently supposed to exist between the fertility of the soil and the marriage of these women to the serpent. For the time when new brides are sought for the reptile god is the season when the millet is beginning to sprout.'[5]

Snakes are commonly credited with power over the weather and the crops; Potrimpus is an agricultural deity—one of the many agricultural deities whose cult was ultimately merged into that of Zemynele (Lettish, *semmes maat*, 'mother of earth'), the great earth-goddess. It is worth noting that the name Potrimpus may be connected with Old Prussian *trumpa=fluvius*, and that David tells us that 'flowing waters were appropriated to him.'[6] Water-spirits are often thought to have the appearance of snakes, and, like Potrimpus, they 'have an especial taste for human blood.'[7] Possibly Potrimpus was originally a water-snake deity. This, however, is mere conjecture.

It is not improbable that at one time the serpent was a common feature of Northern sanctuaries, but here again we have no conclusive evidence.[8]

3. The god of healing.—Michalo, a Lithuanian writer of the 16th cent., believed that his nation was of Italian origin on account of the striking similarity of Lithuanian and ancient Roman rites, 'especially on account of the cult of Æsculapius, who is worshipped in the form of a serpent—the same form in which formerly he migrated from Epidaurus to Rome.'[9] This serpent-god can be none other than the Ausschauts who in the 16th cent. was still worshipped by the Sudavians in Samland, and who is equated with Æsculapius in the *Constit. Synod. Evangel.* of 1530. His name occurs in various forms:

'Auscentum deum incolumitatis et aegritudinis.'[10] Auschleuts (also Auschkauts) 'der Gott aller Gebrechen, Krankheiten und Gesundheit.'[11] 'Auszweitis, nach Bretkius Auszweikus, ein Gott der Kranken und Gesunden, von sweikas gesund, sweikata Gesundheit.'[12] This derivation is probably correct.

[1] *Mag. der lettisch-literärischen Gesellschaft*, VI. xiv. 144.
[2] *Deliciæ Prussicæ*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871, p. 35.
[3] See J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 302 ff., pt. iii., *The Dying God*, do. 1911, p. 86, *The Belief in Immortality*, do. 1913, i. 60, 69 ff., 74 f., 83.
[4] *Script. Rer. Livon.*, ii. 441. [5] Cf. *Delic. Puss.*, p. 36.
[6] Lucas David, *Preussische Chronik*, ed. E. Hennig, Königsberg, 1812, i. 62.
[7] P. 46.

[1] P. 18.
[2] Simon Grunau, *Preussische Chronik*, ed. M. Perlbach, Leipzig, 1876–77, i. 28.
[3] Cf. *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 17 f., pt. i., *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, ii. 149 f.; Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, p. 154.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], London, 1907, i. 76 f.
[5] *Ib.* i. 59. [6] i. 87.
[7] See *GB*[3], pt. i. *The Magic Art*, ii. 150, 155 f.
[8] Cf. above, § 1.
[9] *Respublica Poloniæ Lituaniæ Prussiæ Livoniæ*, p. 265.
[10] Meletius, *Epist. ad Sabinum* (*FL* xii. 296).
[11] David. i. 91. [12] Prætorius, p. 27.

David gives us a further piece of information about Ausschauts. He describes in detail the usual harvest festival at which four special gods were invoked.

'If, however, the harvest was unsuccessful, the priest prayed to their excellent and most mighty god Auschkaut, that he would intercede for them with the above-named four gods: Pergubrius, Perkunus, Schaystix and Palwittis.' Every one must then contribute some barley, for the brewing of the beer, and atonement must be made for every breach of village law. The women then brought bread (made from the first crop of wheat) for them to eat at their consecrated feast. The festival lasted until all the beer had been consumed.[1]

There is a parallel to this in the customs of the Ewe-speaking people.

'They invoke the snake in excessively wet, dry, or barren seasons; on all occasions relating to their government and the preservation of their cattle; or rather, in one word, in all necessities and difficulties in which they do not apply to their new batch of gods.'[2]

4. The mythical serpent. — The worship of actual, living snakes may develop into the belief in an imaginary, idealized serpent, and so give rise to snake- or dragon-myths. Some such process may be traced in the customs and superstitions of the Letts, recorded by Fabricius and Paul Einhorn.

'Some of them rear dragons, in their houses, which steal crops, which they bring back to their own people; others nourish huge serpents, etc.'[3]

Paul Einhorn seems to have been much puzzled as to the true nature of the Lettish house-dragon, of whose appearance and habits he gives a detailed description:

'This nation has also had just such an evil and horrible god of wealth [*i.e.* as Pluto], whom they call Puke . . . but the Germans . . . call him the dragon.' This dragon was still kept by many people even in Einhorn's day. He would steal riches and crops and bring them to the people who entertained him. 'He is fiery-red in appearance and flies quietly through the air like a burning fire.' 'He is red when he is hungry; when he is well-fed with the corn he has stolen, he is quite blue and horrible to see. If any householder wishes to keep him and gain wealth through his services, he must prepare a special chamber for him . . . which must be kept perfectly clean . . . nobody must enter there, except the master of the house, and those whom he will have within . . . not every one must know what sort of a chamber it is.' He must always have the first share of all beer and bread and other food, otherwise he will consider himself insulted and burn down the house. He is often to be seen in the evening, but those who keep him do so in great secrecy, and either cannot or will not say much about him.[4]

The Lettish *puke* may be compared with the Lithuanian *aitwars*. Opinions seem to have differed as to the appearance of this being.

'The Aitwars, or Incubus, is described by the Nadravian peasant as having human shape, but with incredibly large hands and feet.'[5]

The Nadravians draw a distinction between the *aitwars*, the *barzdukkas*, and the *kaukuczus*, who bring wealth and crops to people.

'The Barsdukkai live beneath, the Aitwars above, the earth. These Barsdukkai look like men, but the Aitwars *has the appearance of a dragon or great snake, with fiery head.*'[6]

The *aitwars*, like the *puke*, sometimes does good and sometimes ill to those with whom he lives. He is in the habit of stealing. He flies through the air. He must have the first taste of all food. Occasionally he burns down the house in which he lives.[7] It is dangerous to have an *aitwars* in the house during a thunder-storm, because Perkunus, the thunder-god, is likely to strike him for being too familiar with men, and, since it is owing to men that he is punished, he will revenge himself by burning down their home.[8]

5. Conclusion.—We have some detailed descriptions of the ritual, but little direct information as to the ideas which lay behind the serpent-cult of the Letts, Lithuanians, and Old Prussians. To a certain extent we can supply this gap in our knowledge by comparison with the beliefs and rites of other peoples, there being no important feature of Baltic serpent-worship for which we cannot find parallels elsewhere. The Lithuanians, Letts, and Old Prussians seem to have credited the snake with healing powers and with influence over the weather, crops, and human fertility. The souls of the dead were probably thought to be incarnate in snakes. The serpent, in its malignant aspect, seems to have played little part in Baltic religion, unless, perhaps, we may trace it in the superstitions connected with the *aitwars* and the *puke*.

III. *Slavic.*—The Slavic snake-cult was probably very similar to that which prevailed among the Baltic peoples.[1]

According to Afanasief, Russian peasants 'consider it a happy omen if a snake takes up its quarters in a cottage, and they gladly set out milk for it. To kill such a snake would be a very great sin.'[2]

Popular superstition preserved the belief that the snake brings wealth and has the gift of healing. In Slavic fairy-tales the power of the snake depends on its possession of 'living waters.'[3]

Certain features of the old cult of the house-snake survive in the superstitions connected with the *domovoy*, a house-spirit not unlike the Lithuanian *aitwars* and the Lettish *puke*.[4] The *domovoy* lives behind the stove, but may be found wherever fires are lighted. He hides behind the stove in the daytime, but comes out at night and eats the food that has been left out for him. He is in the habit of robbing neighbouring peasants for the sake of his own people; occasionally he even harms those of his own household, sometimes going so far as to burn down the house. His close connexion with the domestic hearth, and the fact that he appears at times in the likeness of the master of the house, show that he is really an ancestral spirit. He is usually thought of as in human shape, but

'in White Russia the Domovoy is called *Tsmok*, a snake, . . . This House Snake brings all sorts of good to the master who treats it well and gives it omelettes, . . . if this be not done the snake will burn down the house.'[5]

Dlugosz, in his *History of Poland* (15th cent.), mentions a certain 'deus vitae quem vocabant Zywie.'[6] Brückner[7] suggests that this Zywie, and also perhaps 'Siwa dea Polaborum' mentioned by Helmold, may be really the house-snake. Both names may be derived from *zivb* (cf. Lith. *gywas*, 'living'; cf. Lith. *gywâte*, 'snake').

The snake, as the 'living one,' was often supposed to embody a dead man's soul, and so came to be connected with death, and to assume a malignant character. It is this aspect of the snake that appears in Slavic fairy-stories.

'In that kingdom in which Ivan lived there was no day, but always night: that was a snake's doing.'[8] 'The Serpent [Zmyei] is described in the stories as "winged," "fiery," "many-headed" . . . he is spoken of as guarding treasures of bright metals and gleaming gems, and as carrying off and imprisoning fair maidens.' He is the great antagonist of the hero. 'In some of the stories he bears a surname which points to his connexion with the Deity of the Hearth, being called Zapechny, or Zatrubnik, or Popyalof—from *pech* [the stove], or *truba* [the stove-pipe or chimney], or *pepel* [ashes].'[9]

The snake seems to be similar to, or even identical with, other evil beings who figure in the stories, especially 'Koshchei the Immortal' and the flying witch, or Baba Yaga.

1 David, i. 92.
2 W. Bosman, 'Description of the Coast of Guinea,' tr. from Dutch in J. Pinkerton, *General Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–14, xvi. 494.
3 Cf. above; Fabricius, in *Script. Rer. Livon.* ii. 441.
4 'Ein christlicher Unterricht,' *Script. Rer. Livon.* ii. 624.
5 Prætorius, p. 13. 6 *Ib.* p. 29.
7 *Ib.* p. 30. 8 *Ib.* p. 21.

1 See above, § II.
2 W. R. S. Ralston, *The Songs of the Russian People*[2], p. 175.
3 *Ib.* p. 174 f.
4 See above, § II., and art. Demons and Spirits (Slavic).
5 Ralston, p. 125.
6 *Historiæ Polonicæ*, Leipzig, 1711–12, i., *Opera*, ed Cracow 1873, x. 47 f.
7 *Archiv für slav. Philologie*, xiv. [1892] 179.
8 Ralston, p. 176. 9 *Ib.* p. 174.

'In the Ukraine the flying witch is usually called a snake; in a Slovak tale the sons of a Baba Yaga are described as "baneful snakes" One of the tastes which characterize the snake of fable is sometimes attributed to the Baba Yaga also. She is supposed "to love to suck the white breasts of beautiful women." Like the Snake, also, she keeps guard over and knows the use of the founts of "Living Water"—that water which cures wounds and restores the dead to life. . . . But, as a general rule, the Baba Yaga is described as a being utterly malevolent and always hungering after human flesh. According to some traditions, she even feeds on the souls of the dead. The White Russians, for instance, affirm that "Death gives the dead to the Baba Yaga, with whom she often goes prowling about."'[1]

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II. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], Index, *s.vv.* 'Serpent,' 'Snake'; C. F. Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, London, 1905; *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Serpent-Worship'; *Mag. herausgegeben von der lettisch-literärischen Gesellschaft*, VI. xiv. [1868]; see artt. OLD PRUSSIANS and NATURE (Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian) for further literature.

III. W. R. S. Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*[2], London, 1872; A. Brückner, 'Mythologische Studien,' iii. in *Archiv für slav. Philologie*, xiv. [1892].

ENID WELSFORD.

SETTLEMENTS.—1. Origin and development.—Settlements (university, college, public school, or generically social) represent an attempt made by the Christian spirit in the latter part of the 19th cent. to obviate one of the gravest moral and social dangers attendant on the growth of great cities. In the days of small towns all classes—the feudal chief or lord of the manor, the leading citizens, the tradesmen, the working people—were housed not very far apart. In the cluster of villages which afterwards expanded into the metropolis there was a similar juxtaposition of the various social grades. This meant always the possibility, and often the reality, of neighbourly relations. Rich and poor, high and low, were personally known to each other and could be mutually helpful. But the expansion of the town and the absorption of the adjoining villages almost entirely swept away the old neighbourliness. The well-to-do chose for their residence the most desirable regions, where the soil, the elevation, the salubrity of the atmosphere, made for the general amenity of life. The less desirable areas were left to the inflowing tide of the wage-earning poor. Thus arose that menace to civic stability and negation of Christian neighbourliness known as the residential separation of the classes. Revolutionary Paris had shown what fearful evils might result. It was to bridge over the social chasm thus formed that the settlement came into being. It was the direct outcome of the Christian spirit.

The first modern settlement practically began when the Rev. Samuel Barnett and his well-to-do bride decided to accept the living of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, which the then Bishop of London described as the worst parish in his diocese, inhabited mainly by a criminal population, and one which had, he feared, been much corrupted by doles. Animated by as profound a spirit of Christian self-sacrifice as any Francis or Damien, the pair who were married on 28th January 1873 entered on their work in Whitechapel on March 6 of the same year. Two years later they paid their first visit together to Oxford, when they talked over to the men 'the mighty problems of poverty and the people.' Mrs. Barnett writes: 'We used to ask each undergraduate as he developed interest to come and stay in Whitechapel and see for himself: and they came, some to spend a few weeks, some for the Long Vacation, while others took lodgings in East London.' Among these men was Arnold Toynbee (1852-83), who stayed with the Barnetts rather oftener than the other men, and once for a few weeks took rooms in Commercial Road; but his health was too fragile to bear the pain and strain of residence, and the experiment soon ended.

[1] Ralston, p. 162 f.

It was in the rooms of Mr. Cosmo Lang (afterwards Archbishop of York) that the undergraduates in Oxford 'first gathered to support the founding of a settlement to enable men to live with the poor.' After eleven years of service at St. Jude's in Whitechapel, the settlement premises having been built, Canon Barnett consented to become its Warden. On the anniversary of Arnold Toynbee's death, 10th March 1884, when Balliol Chapel was filled with men to do honour to his memory, and after Barnett had spoken on Arnold's example, the idea came to Mrs. Barnett and to Mr. Bolton King, 'Let us call the settlement Toynbee Hall.' So the first settlement began in the spirit of Arnold Toynbee. And of him Benjamin Jowett wrote:

'The "imitation of Christ" was to him the essence of Christianity; the life of Christ needed no other witness. His labours among the poor were constantly sustained by the conviction that some better thing was reserved both for them and for us: he saw them as they were in the presence of God; he thought of them as the heirs of immortality.'[1]

Thus, prompted by the ethical and religious motive, the first university settlement at Toynbee Hall was founded in 1884. The aim of this, as of every true settlement, was to heal the breach between the classes, to bring at least representatives of all classes into helpful contact, to create a better mutual understanding, to promote by personal friendship and social study a truer civic synthesis. In other words, the settlement is designed to bring those who have many social advantages, such as education, influence, leisure, or wealth, into touch with those who have few social advantages or none, to become acquainted with the real needs of the people, to supply where lacking the elements of social leadership, and to smooth down the rough edges of social antagonism.

This general idea is capable of vast variation. There are in the British Isles nearly 50 settlements; in the United States, it is reckoned, more than 400. Kindred institutions have sprung up in Paris, Berlin, and other cities on the Continent. Almost every settlement has developed differently. The two chief causes of difference are the difference of the neighbourhood and the difference of the staff. Some settlements are pre-eminently academic; they have become a permanent resident society for university extension. Others have been intensely ecclesiastical in motive. Others, again, have been what may be termed broadly religious, shading off into merely ethical or cultural centres. A number of settlements, particularly in America, have been chiefly training schools for social workers. American settlements are often on a larger scale than British. With characteristic munificence money is poured out on large buildings and in many salaries. Perhaps the most important work of the American settlements has been the development of a common spirit and of a civic unity amid the crowd of different nationalities and languages among which they were planted.

Women's settlements, both in England and in America, have done excellent work, chiefly among women and children, in tending invalid children, in providing children's country holidays, maintaining maternity societies, co-operating with employment exchanges and care committees, training and shepherding domestic servants, health visiting, relief committee work, and training of social workers. Where the women's settlement works in conjunction with the men's settlement, the effect

[1] Arnold Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution*[3], London, 1887, prefatory memoir, p. xvii.

upon the neighbourhood is greater. Greatest of all is that produced by settlements in which the residents are men and women, and sex is regarded as no barrier to co-operation.

2. Religious motive.—The religious motive is undoubtedly dominant in the chief workers. Graham Taylor, president in 1918 of the National Federation of American Settlements, reports:

'If the Settlement undertook either to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Churches or to show preference for any one cult or creed by maintaining religious services itself, it would forfeit its own prerogative of being common ground for all, and might be promptly and disastrously ostracized. We seem to be shut up to one of two courses: either to take the whole crowd along with us together as far as they will go, stopping short of religious divisive points; or to take far fewer as much further as we would like to, and run the risk of having no following at all as the racial transformation becomes more rapid and radical. We increasingly feel and express the broadly religious spirit, which seems to actuate Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jew and Ethical Culturist alike. But it would be impossible to agree upon any creed or ritual which would be a common denominator among us.'

A worker in the oldest settlement in Great Britain says that the dominant note in the founders was religious, in the majority of the first residents ethical.

'Religion is easy in a strictly denominational Settlement, hard in an undenominational or inter-denominational, unless the Head, like Samuel Barnett or Jane Addams, has sufficient spiritual force to give unity and expression to the various impulses and goodwill of the residents. Without such a Head, religion and even ethics evaporate.'[1]

3. Schemes of residence. — The scheme of residence is varied. The common idea of a post-graduate sojourn in the slums, to enable university men and women to learn, in a few months, how vast masses of their fellow-countrymen live, was soon found to be insufficient. Permanent residents were needed to secure permanent effects, and to introduce to the general life of the neighbourhood those residents who stayed for a shorter period. Much is to be said for the ideal expressed in the homely phrase that resident households should be scattered over the neighbourhood to be helped 'like currants in a cake.' The difficulty is to get households in sufficient number and of sufficient courage to settle in the derelict district. Experience proves that such families are few. The combination of permanent settlers with a succession of sojourners has been found to be the most useful. The influence of residents is saved from becoming occasional, haphazard, or sporadic by the continuous presence of the permanent staff, who, again, are saved from sinking into the merely parochial rut by the continual advent of fresh life, with different horizons and new points of view.

4. Methods.—There is no limit to the methods employed by the settlements in their endeavour to integrate the local society. The general principle is that, wherever the settlement comes upon an unsatisfied need, it aims, so far as its resources in friends and funds permit, to meet that need. Almost every form of educational appliance has been used, from university extension to the humblest kindergarten. Some settlements have been almost exclusively educational, partaking more of the nature of a polytechnic than the usual social colony.

All kinds of social clubs for men, for women, for youths, for girls, for boys, for children; boy scouts, girl guides; lectures and discussions on all social topics; reading circles; study circles; organizations for promoting thrift, co-operative purchase, co-operative travel; adult schools, brotherhoods; concerts, art exhibitions; classes for instruction in almost every subject; 'people's drawing-rooms'; in seasons of distress, distribution of relief; medical missions, hospitals, old age homes, holiday homes, lodging houses are among the variegated forms of service undertaken by settlements. Residents very often take some part in local government, as town councillors, poor law guardians, school managers, members of care committees and distress committees.

[1] Letter to Mrs. Barnett from private secretary of Canon Barnett.

5. Results.—(*a*) *Social and civic.*—A generation of settlement service permits one to speak of its results. Settlements have created, in almost every district where they have been at work, a better social atmosphere. They have brought higher ideals into active touch with most sides of local life. They have done much to purify and humanize most of the forms of local administration. In American cities, where civic corruption had flourished, the work of the settlements has been in this direction vigorous and effective. Hull House, which is one of the greatest settlements in the United States, has, under the intrepid leadership of Jane Addams, rendered exceptional service in checking local abuses, and in preparing the way for the civic regeneration of the Lake City. Settlements have been especially useful as social laboratories wherein experiments have been carried out that have afterwards been taken over by the municipalities.

The cripples of London, *e.g.*, had been entirely overlooked by the metropolitan education authority. But the Passmore Edwards Settlement, under the direction of Mrs. Humphry Ward, the Bermondsey Settlement, and the Browning Settlement took up the care of cripples in their neighbourhoods, gave them the only training that they had received, and together brought such pressure upon the London School Board that in its last days it began the work of providing for the instruction of cripples. The work was continued under the London County Council on lines that had been initiated by the settlements. Similarly, the vacation schools were introduced into London under the Passmore Edwards Settlement by Mrs. Humphry Ward. In the most central district of London they were developed by the Browning Settlement, with the aid of the municipal tramway, into a method of transporting the children of the slums day by day, for the whole day, to the school-houses, parks, and commons of the more salubrious suburbs. From this experiment the settlement has developed a further suggestion (and won for it before the war influential support) that, except for infants, there should be no schools provided in the central districts, but that boys and girls should be carried out every day by the municipal tramways to schools provided for them in the more healthy outskirts, where their playground would be the common or the heath. The holiday schools have first been recognized, and to some extent imitated, by the education authority, besides being widely copied in other cities of Great Britain. The feeding of necessitous children, carried out on scientific lines by some of the London settlements, supplied a valuable precedent and experiment to the London County Council before it finally decided to adopt the Act of Parliament. Settlements have been frequently visited and studied by municipal authorities, when devising schemes for the welfare of their school-children and of the poor in general. The more active settlements are continually engaged in making different kinds of experiments. The fittest that survive the crucial ordeal of practice are then commended for adoption by local authorities.

As settlements came into being to remedy the evil consequences of the residential separation of the classes, it is specially worthy of note that the measures that promise the ultimate extinction of slums have received their chief currency under settlement auspices.

It was from a settlement that the idea was launched that improved locomotion offered the first step to meeting the housing difficulties of our great cities, and from the same centre this idea was pressed, in a series of conferences, upon the municipal bodies of the metropolitan area as well as upon the general public. As a consequence, the fatal idea of increasing the central congestion by erecting residential barracks in the heart of great towns, where the site would be much more profitably employed for industrial and commercial purposes, was abandoned; and electrical and other improved forms of transit have not merely relieved the congestion of the central districts, but have brought all parts of the urban area into closer and easier touch with one another, have made possible a wise reconstruction at the centre, and have offered opportunity for judicious town-planning in the new suburban areas into which the population is flowing. A garden suburb, with dwellings let at rents ranging from the lowest to the highest figure, so that members of all classes can reside near each other, is a fitting culmination of the career of Mrs. Barnett, one of the initiators of the settlement movement. If only the population now being dispersed by swifter and cheaper means of transit round the circumference of our great cities were housed under these conditions, then the chief menace to the life of great cities would be removed.

(*b*) *Political.*—In the political life of the nation settlements have left their enduring mark. Many statesmen have owed much of their new outlook on life to the months or years they spent as re-

sidents in a settlement; and with this new social sense they have infected their comrades in Parliament and Cabinet. First-hand acquaintance with the needs of the people has also impelled settlements to seek and press for practicable measures that will meet these needs, and as a consequence settlements have done much to supply what has been termed the 'raw material of legislation.' As distinguished from the academic socialism of certain middle-class societies and from the revolutionary visions promulgated under the red flag, the demands of settlements for legislation bear the impress in almost every point of an actual social environment and of the reaction of that environment on minds continually handling concrete facts.

In Great Britain, before there were many representatives of organized labour in the House of Commons, the needs of the unemployed were voiced chiefly by settlements, and it was in response to a settlement's appeal that Queen Alexandra initiated the Queen's Fund for the Unemployed (1905), which first provided work for the workless on a national scale. From a settlement resident in a poor law union, noted as the classic instance of aged poverty, sprang the national movement which resulted in the enactment of old age pensions. This achievement was the more remarkable in that it followed the practical abandonment of the reform by both the historic parties in the State, as one that involved insuperable difficulties, financial and other. By stripping it of its partisan associations, and by an appeal characteristic of settlements to all good citizens, notably to organized labour and to organized religion, a measure was carried through with the practically unanimous support of the entire nation. It was also the experience of a settlement in its own homes for the aged which proved that it cost much less to provide the aged with a pension and with homes of their own than it did to sustain them in the workhouse with its attendant disfranchisement and degradation. The bill to establish national old age homes in place of the workhouse bore the mark of the settlement which initiated it, in that it was backed by representatives of the five parties then existing in the House of Commons. Unexpectedly and unintentionally national old age homes were made legally possible by the Housing Act (no. 2, 1914), passed without opposition shortly after the European war began.

(c) *Influence on Church and Labour.*—On ecclesiastical life the influence of settlements has been pronounced. A large number of ministers of religion have, as residents, acquired an intimate knowledge of the conditions under which the poor live, with inevitable reaction upon their teaching and the attitude of the Church. There has been in consequence a greater emphasis laid on the social teachings of Christianity. The present Bishop of London (Dr. Ingram) bears the ineffaceable marks of the experience which he acquired as head of Oxford House in Bethnal Green. What is known as the Institutional Church (*q.v.*) in its distinctive methods owes much to the settlement. It has been humorously described as a settlement that does not require from its workers residence on the spot. Central missions in great cities have adopted many forms of social service first introduced by the settlement. The new religious synthesis implicit in settlement life has not yet found widely recognized expression in theology.

Graham Taylor does not think that settlements have affected the religious, much less the theological, development of the United States. But the whole social movement in which they have their part does influence the thinking, the teaching, and the methods of the Church, especially through its nurture and evangelism, both of which, however, are very predominantly individualistic.

The settlement may be regarded as the outcome of that drift in English religious life roughly known as the Broad Church movement. The spirit of Frederick Denison Maurice (*q.v.*), operating through Charles Kingsley and his fellow-workers, took effective shape in Samuel Barnett and the settlement. But the spirit of social cohesion, which is the essence of the settlement, could not be restricted to any one ecclesiastical compartment. It has found expression in groups that are High Church, Roman Catholic, Quaker, and Congregational.

Constrained by its working-class environment, the settlement has been brought into ever closer and closer touch with the leaders of Labour and with their religious inspirations. But the leaders of the working-classes in Great Britain have for the most part sprung from that great religious awakening of the people which swept through all the Churches and may be broadly described as the Methodist movement. The lay preachers whom it inspired became the spokesmen and artificers of the new industrial democracy. Under the pressure of the social needs, which they most keenly felt and most ardently strove to meet, the individualistic tendencies of Methodism were corrected, and their religious demands assumed a social tinge entirely akin to the spirit that actuated the settlements. So at one of the London settlements were held for a number of years (1910–15) a series of 'Labour Weeks,' in which the first seven days in May were devoted to a series of appeals for personal religion by Labour members of Parliament. The speakers comprised nearly all the most important and influential Labour legislators. Visitors from over-seas spoke of the meetings as 'a revival of the old primitive Christian enthusiasm,' and remarked upon the distinctive stress laid by all speakers on personal devotion to Jesus Christ and on the ideal of the Kingdom of God on earth. The proceedings were published in English, Danish, Finnish, Spanish, and German, and have been circulated round the world. They were welcomed with a chorus of approval by the archbishops and other leaders of Churches in England, Scotland, and the Continent. Invitations were arriving, asking the settlement to organize similar 'Labour Weeks' in Norway, Finland, and in different parts of Germany, and in some cases preparations were in train, when the war broke out. It was felt that here was something more than either Methodist or Broad Church movement had advanced. Here was veritably vocal and manifest the *Labour movement in religion.* The series before the war culminated in an 'International Labour Week' (1915). Among the speakers then were M. Vandervelde (the elective head of Continental socialism), Jean Longuet (the grandson of Karl Marx and a French socialist deputy), Einar Li (a delegate from the social democratic parties of Norway and Sweden), and Hans Wirz (the editor of the official organ of the Swiss social democracy). They joined with their English colleagues in extolling the religion of Jesus Christ, in varying notes, from that of reverent agnosticism to the full assurance of evangelic faith. After the war the movement was resumed at Browning Hall in September 1919, when an International Conference on Labour and Religion endeavoured to elicit and make explicit the religion implicit in the Labour movement.

6. Effect of the war.—The seismic changes consequent upon the war will inevitably produce great transformations in the social landscape, and correspondingly affect the future of settlements. The claims of the war having intercepted the supply of

residents, both men and women, settlements have been reduced to carrying on their work with the minimum of assistance; and they are necessarily affected by the general uncertainty as to what will happen in the future. The trend of legislation and administration suggests the happy prospect of the eleemosynary work of settlements being abrogated or undertaken entirely by the State. In Great Britain, if the reforms promised by the Government are carried out in respect of education and housing and the elimination of the liquor traffic, a large part of the previous work of settlements will be ultimately no longer necessary.

In the transitional period of reconstruction the social experience and local knowledge of the settlements ought to make them of priceless value to the nation. The social situation which will follow the time of transition is too uncertain to be sketched in any probable forecast. Even if the dreams of Labour were fulfilled, or if our great cities were so designed and rebuilt as to make each of them a magnified garden suburb, wherein all classes dwell together in nearness and neighbourliness—which most people will consider a very remote possibility—there would still remain important functions for the settlement to discharge. It would still be needed as a social and equal meeting-ground of all classes, of all economic grades, of differing degrees of culture, of varying schools of opinion, of all the religious bodies. Mrs. Barnett considers that the war has made the work of settlements more than ever valuable as centres of union of classes. The social unity which has been precipitated by the war needs to be made permanent by the settlements. The warden of an East End settlement[1] feels that amidst all social changes the settlement should remain as a sort of civic bishopric, a centre of local synthesis, a spiritual counterpart to the administrative unity which centres in the town hall or county council chamber, wherein all the local endeavours to supplement and spiritualize the action of the State, as well as all forms of independent religious and educational activity, might find a congenial home, an exchange of ideas, and a common centre for local initiative and propaganda. The head of a Chicago settlement[2] judges that the initiative, interpretation, and common denominator furnished by such little groups of well-qualified personalities as are found in settlement residence promise to be indefinitely necessary. Another leader in the movement in Great Britain[3] suggests that, however radically political action may readjust the interior relations of society, the settlement will for generations yet have a great part to play in bringing the inspiring influences of art and the teaching of history into the life of the people. Certain it is that those who have had the greatest experience of settlements are most ready to admit that the defects in our social system which the settlement is intended to remedy are likely to persist for generations yet to come, and that consequently it will be long before it can be said that the occupation of the settlement is gone. Whatever be its place in history, the settlement has supplied another chapter in the annals of high purpose and resolute self-sacrifice and what has been termed 'social chivalry.'

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F. HERBERT STEAD.

SEVEN DEADLY SINS.—Greek philosophy tended to regard evil as a necessary defect of human nature rather than as moral wrong. Christian thought, on the other hand, though not uninfluenced by Greek speculation, followed the guidance of Hebrew Scripture and inclined more to the view of sin as a principle of rebellion on the part of free agents against the divine will. Christian teachers, brought face to face with actual cases of delinquency, naturally became more concerned with the relations of sin to the Church's creed calling for disciplinary rather than speculative treatment. At an early period in ecclesiastical history an attempt was made to fix and classify those faults of conduct which were subversive of the law of the Church and perilous to the salvation of its members. These, though their number was not at first defined, came to be called 'the deadly sins.' They occupy an important place in the order and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church and, along with the cardinal virtues, constitute its moral standards and tests. As several of these vices are separately treated in this work,[1] this article will be confined to a consideration of (1) the nature, (2) the history, (3) the unity, and (4) the general influence of the classification on literature and life.

1. Definition and nature.—Mortal, or 'deadly,' sins were so named in contradistinction to 'venial,' or pardonable. They are such as wilfully violate the divine law, destroy the friendship of God, and cause the death of the soul. In this they differ from venial sins, which, though tending to injure the higher life, do not of themselves involve eternal death. Mortal sins cut off the perpetrator entirely from his true end; venial sins only impede him in its attainment. According to Stoic teaching, all sins are equally heinous, and without distinction in regard to nature and consequences. The early Church, however, in accord with Scripture, contended that, in respect both of character and of effects, some sins are graver than others. Augustine affirms that he who commits a mortal sin transgresses (1) in regard to a grave matter, (2) with clear knowledge of the evil, (3) with deliberate desire ('deliberata complacentia').[2] The distinction between mortal and venial sins was based on 1 Jn $5^{16f.}$. Though the apostle clearly recognizes a difference in the character of sins, it is questionable if the passage can justify the inferences which the later usage of the Church has deduced from it. But this passage does not stand alone. In the letter of the apostolic council to the Gentile

[1] Douglas Eyre of Oxford House, Bethnal Green.
[2] Graham Taylor, [illegible] [3] Mrs. Barnett.

[1] See artt. ACCIDIE, ANGER, COVETOUSNESS, ENVY, PRIDE.
[2] *De Gen. c. Man.*, ii. 14. 21, viii. 19. 20, *Enarr. in Ps.* 129[6]; Kachnik, *Ethica Catholica Generalis*, p. 368; *Catech. Aust.*, qu. 762.

churches (Ac 15) four things are forbidden: believers are to abstain from things offered to idols, from fornication, from things strangled, and from blood (murder). These constantly reappear as an outline of a scheme of sins so grave as to exclude the sinner from communion. In other portions of the NT are lists of condemned actions—Mt 15^{19}, Mk $7^{21f.}$, Ro 1^{29-31}, Gal $5^{19ff.}$, 1 Co 5, 2 Co 13, Rev 21^{8}. In these it is difficult to find a principle of selection. The vices mentioned by Paul in Romans may be regarded as falling under the heads of selfishness, malice, pride, indifference to others. In other Pauline passages works of the flesh are emphasized—impurity, impiety, hatred, excess—while in Revelation falsehood, idolatry, unfaithfulness, impurity, and cowardice are mentioned. In general, it may be said that the sins of the NT are the ordinary vices likely to be prevalent in a semi-pagan society. The NT doctrine of sin (*q.v.*) is clearly ethical rather than ecclesiastical.

2. Origin and history.—As the Church grew in variety and complexity of character, it became necessary to define more clearly the difference between various sins. By some of the early Fathers (Clement and Hermas) the question was raised whether there were not some kinds of sin which, if committed after baptism, could never be forgiven.

(*a*) *Treatment of early Fathers.*—Hermas is the earliest writer who offers any sort of classification. In one passage[1] he gives a list of twelve virtues with their corresponding vices. The parallel is, however, not exact. The significance of his classification is (1) that it indicates within the Church a growing sense of the ethical as distinguished from the ecclesiastical import of sin; and (2) that it names some vices which suggest the germs of the classification of deadly sins as afterwards defined—*e.g.*, ἀπείθεια, ἀπάτη, and λύπη. To Tertullian, a severer moralist than Hermas, we owe the earliest recognition of the distinction between mortal and venial sins. Cyprian, an ecclesiastic rather than a moralist, adds little to the systematic treatment of sin, and is naturally more interested in the bearing of the Church's discipline upon offences. Not till we come to Augustine, the greatest authority upon the problem of evil, do we find the nature and variety of sin treated with fullness. But even he affords no fixed classification. The meaning and origin of evil, rather than its legal or judicial aspect, chiefly concern him. Moral guilt, he tells us, depends entirely on the will and takes its shape from the character of the individual offender. You cannot formulate a definite law for all forms of evil. Sins generally are of three kinds, he says—those which arise from infirmity, those flowing from ignorance, and those depending upon innate viciousness. In one passage he recognizes three principal types—*voluptas carnis*, *superbia*, and *curiositas*.[2] In another passage he traces all sin to *cupiditas* and *timor*,[3] while in a third he divides vices into three general classes—sins of thought, of word, and of deed, ascribing all alike to *concupiscentia*.[4] The germs of the list, as it was ultimately fixed, are undoubtedly latent in the writings of Augustine, but neither in his nor in those of Basil or Chrysostom, who have much to say of the evils of their age, is there any direct reference to the sevenfold hierarchy of sins.

(*b*) *Influence of monasticism.*—The earliest mention of the classification comes from the monks of the Egyptian desert. In the intense struggle with the flesh of which the cloister was the arena the catalogue of principal vices which afterwards held an established place in mediæval ethics was first framed. Although the *peccata capitalia* were eight or more (sometimes regarded as eight 'states' or 'motions' of the soul), the fascination for mystical interpretations characteristic of mediæval thinking, and especially the sanctity attached to the number seven by Oriental peoples, led to its adoption as the perfect circle both of virtues and of vices. In a passage in Origen's *Hom. in Jeremiam* the seven nations of Palestine whom Israel overcame are spoken of as types of the sins of the soul. Cassian[1] refers to this as the view entertained by Serapion, a hermit of Egypt. According to Serapion, there are really eight *principia vitia*, but he explains that the seven nations of Canaan typify the seven deadly sins. On being asked why, if there are only seven nations, there are eight sins, he replies: besides the nations of Canaan there is Egypt itself, which 'stands in the elementary condition of the soul under the influence of sin'—the basis of all evil, the conquest of which gives entrance into the true monastic life. The seven others constitute the elements of the after ascetic conflict. The list as mentioned by Cassian is essentially a list of vices besetting the monastic life. The ascetic character of the deadly sins long prevailed in the East. In the West, however, largely under the influence of Gregory the Great, the deadly sins lost their monastic limitation. Their scope was widened, and they were regarded as tests of life generally. Alcuin, a follower of Gregory, maintained that laymen not less than monks ought to strive after a life of virtue, and that to all men those sins were perils.

3. Unity and relation of sins.—From Gregory's time onwards, while there are differences in the number and names, the list of the *principia vitia* is practically fixed. Gregory himself generally speaks of seven, separating *superbia* from the others as the root or 'leader' among the powers of darkness. The catalogue is commonly notified by the catchword, *saligia*, composed of the initial letters of the following: *superbia* ('pride'), *avaritia* ('covetousness'), *luxuria* ('lust'), *invidia* ('envy'), *gula* ('gluttony'), *ira* ('anger'), *acedia* ('sloth'). Gregory is not content with describing the seven 'rulers' or 'spirits of wickedness,' as Nilus of Sinæ calls them; he sets forth their unity and connexion. They are to be regarded as successive stages in a downward course of evil. Pride comes naturally first, since it is really the source of all the others. Selfishness or egoism is the root of all sin. Pride leads to vainglory, vainglory to envy, envy to anger, anger to melancholy, and that again to avarice. Gluttony and lust follow as natural consequences. Thomas Aquinas discourses with great fullness and acuteness upon the seven deadly sins,[2] which he places over against the seven cardinal virtues. After his time most scholastic writers treat of them, though the list does not always occur in the same order, and sometimes different interpretations are given to different sins. *Superbia* is variously explained. By some it is regarded as vainglory; for others it stands for selfishness generally. So also *tristitia* has sometimes been substituted for *acedia*, in regard to the interpretation of which there has been considerable difference of opinion.

It is hard to say on what principle the classification has been made. The list is somewhat arbitrary and can hardly be regarded as exhaustive. It is strange that 'lying' does not occur. *Timor*, 'fear,' is mentioned by Aquinas as a defect of the virtue of courage, implying a lack of fidelity. It is obviously a grave fault, and heads the list of evils in Rev 21^{8} which exclude from God and His salvation; yet it has no place in the catalogue of mortal sins. So, too, it is difficult to understand

[1] *Sim.* ix. 15. [2] *Enarr. in Ps. 8*, § 18.
[3] *Enarr. in Ps. 79*, § 13.
[4] *C. duas epist. Pelag.*, i. 13. 27.

[1] *Collationes*, v. [2] *Summa*, II. ii.

why luxury and gluttony are classed as co-ordinate vices with envy, sloth, and avarice. There is a sense in which all sins are spiritual and psychical; but some are more purely mental, while others are more immediately carnal or fleshly. These are indiscriminately mixed in the classification. At first sight it may not be obvious why *acedia*, 'sloth'—the thankless distaste of life, the general feeling of apathy and irritation arising from a low bodily tone—should be regarded as a sin, and especially as a fault so grave as finally to separate the person affected by it from God. But, as we come to examine this state, we see that, even more than an outbreak of passion or coarse excess, it may be the outcome of deep-seated selfishness and the cause of alienation from, and rebellion against, God, which proves that sin in its most selfish form has been gradually though unconsciously eating into the heart.

It has been said that the classification reveals its monastic origin, but, though the separate sins are such as could be dealt with in a definite legal way, they do not represent outward acts alone. They really stand for moral conditions of the soul by no means exclusively connected with the monastic life. They cannot be regarded as laying special emphasis upon ascetic practices. All of them have a social aspect and may be considered as the perils and tests of every one, whether he be a monk or a layman living his life among the ordinary conditions of the world. The classification can hardly be said to bear witness in any excessive degree to a special age or particular order of ecclesiastical life. It includes the obvious and common sins which belong to all men and to all times and traces them back to pride of self, the source from which all other forms of sinfulness really flow—that self-assertion which is the point at which the human will breaks away from allegiance to God.

4. Influence on literature and life.—It is not wonderful that 'the seven deadly sins' have deeply impressed the consciousness of Christendom and left their mark upon literature and art. Our own poets—Chaucer, Shakespeare, Dunbar, Burns, and others—allude more than once to the familiar catalogue, and every reader of Dante knows that the 'mortal vices' enter largely into the texture and framework of the *Divina Commedia*.[1] Though the use of the list disappeared in England after the Reformation, Protestant divines of every Church and ethical writers of Britain and the Continent have acknowledged the spiritual importance of a classification of sin reached after centuries of discussion by some of the acutest intellects of the race.

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SEVEN SLEEPERS.—1. Content of the legend.—The legend of the Seven Sleepers is one of the most wide-spread and pleasing of hagiographical legends. The elements of the story common to the earliest texts are briefly as follows:

The emperor Decius comes to Ephesus and there revives the worship of idols, commanding that all, and especially the Christians, should offer sacrifices to them; some Christians abjure the faith, others remain steadfast and suffer tortures. Seven youths (or, according to some texts, eight),[2] who live in the imperial palace and whose names are variously given,[1] are accused of being secretly Christians, and, when brought before Decius, refuse to sacrifice to the idols. In the hope that they may waver in their resolution, Decius grants them a respite and then leaves Ephesus. The youths leave the city and hide in a cave in the neighbouring Mount Anchilus.[2] One of them, Diomedes (or Iamblichus), disguised in rags, goes down into the city, to inquire about what was happening in it and to buy food. Decius, returning after a short time to Ephesus, orders the youths to be conducted to his presence. Diomedes informs his companions of the order; sadly they take food, and then they all fall by divine Providence into a deep, long sleep. When Decius cannot find the youths in Ephesus, he summons their parents, who try to excuse themselves for the flight of their sons, and tell that they are hidden in a cave on Mount Anchilus. Decius orders the entrance of the cave to be blocked with large stones, so that the youths may be buried alive. Two Christians, Theodore and Rufinus,[3] write the story of the young martyrs on metal plates, which they place under the stones closing the cave. After 307 years,[4] in the reign of the emperor Theodosius II., a heresy breaks out, led by a bishop Theodore,[5] denying the resurrection of the dead, and the emperor is greatly perturbed. Then God suggests to Adolius, the proprietor of the field where the cave is, to build a sheepfold for his flocks; for this purpose the workmen use the stones which close the entrance of the cave and thus the cave is reopened. God awakens the youths, who think that they have slept only one night, and exhort each other in turn to suffer martyrdom at the hands of Decius, if need be. Diomedes goes down to Ephesus as usual, and is so surprised to see the cross over the gates of the city that he asks a passer-by if it is really Ephesus. He is anxious to return to his companions with the news, but first he buys food, paying for it with the money he had about him, which was of the time of Decius. The vendor and the market-people, seeing the ancient money, think that the youth has found a hidden treasure and wish to share it with him; they drag him with threats through the city; many people assemble, and the youth looks in vain among them for some one of his acquaintance. The bishop and the governor question Diomedes, who narrates the whole story, and invites them to come to the cave and see his companions. They climb the hill and find the two tablets of lead, which confirm the youth's story; they then enter the cave and find his companions alive and shining in appearance. Theodosius is informed of what has happened and comes to Ephesus to the cave. One of the youths, Maximilian (or Achillides or others), tells him that, in order to demonstrate the truth of the resurrection, God had caused them to fall asleep and then resuscitated them before the Judgment Day: after this the youths fall asleep in death. A basilica was erected on the spot.

The legend in this form is clearly Christian, but it is strange, as Heller observes, that in many points, and especially in regard to the resurrection, the references are rather to the OT than to the NT.

2. Diffusion.—The legend occurs in numerous Oriental and Western texts, showing the close intellectual relations between the East and the West, but it is not always easy to arrange the texts in definite groups, and to determine exactly their interdependence.[6]

(*a*) *Oriental.*—(1) *Christian.*—The Christian Oriental literatures in which the legend occurs are: Syriac, Coptic, Arabic, Ethiopian, and Armenian. The most ancient texts are the Syriac, which are divided into two groups: (i.) *Acta* and prose accounts, (ii.) poetical elaborations. The second group is represented by a homily by James of Serûgh, which has reached us in two somewhat varying forms. Of the *Acta* four distinct texts are known; the earliest seems to be one, half of which is contained in a codex of the British Museum, belonging to the latter part of the 6th century. Since James of Serûgh died in 520 (there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the homily), and it is natural to suppose that the *Acta* were earlier than the poetic elaboration, we may believe that the Syriac prose account arose at the end of the 5th or, at latest, at the beginning of the 6th century.

Only a single fragment of the legend is known in Coptic so far; it represents about a quarter of the complete text. There are various indications that the Coptic text is closely related to the Syriac *Acta*, though not directly, but through the medium of a Greek text.[7]

[1] *Purg.* xviii. 132, *Infer.* vii. 123, etc.
[2] Cf. M. Huber, *Die Wanderlegende von den Siebenschläfern*, p. 91 ff.
[1] Huber, pp. 91, 492.
[2] For variant names see Huber, p. 97.
[3] *Ib.* p. 99.
[4] For variants (353 years, etc.) see Huber, p. 100 f.
[5] *Ib.* p. 101.
[6] *Ib.* pp. 104 ff., 509, 527 f.
[7] *Ib.* p. 549.

Two MSS are known in Arabic Christian literature, showing two distinct texts;[1] but the Ethiopian translator (see below) had at his disposal a third and better text. The Ethiopian translation,[2] two codices of which may be traced back to the 15th cent., must have been made at the beginning of the 15th or perhaps at the end of the 14th cent., and it forms one of that rich series of hagiographical texts whose translation from the Arabic was inaugurated by the metropolitan Salāmā.[3] The general fact of the Ethiopian literature in its second period, viz. that hagiographical texts of no local saints were translated from the Arabic, and, in particular, the change of letters in the proper names—changes which are easily explained by supposing the Arabic script—leave no doubt that the Ethiopian text is derived directly from an Arabic text.

There are two Armenian texts, the shorter one certainly not later than the first half of the 13th cent., the other, much longer and more important, appearing in the *Sufferings* (*Labours*) *and Martyrdom of the Saints*, attributed to Gregory Vgayasēr, the second Armenian patriarch of this name[4]—a work belonging to the second half of the 11th cent. and probably dependent on Syriac and Greek sources.[5] Gregory's legend of the Seven Sleepers is probably to be traced to a Greek text.

The present writer does not know whether the Georgian literature, closely connected with the Armenian, possesses a text of the legend.

Besides these full accounts there is more or less brief mention of the legend in many later historical and hagiographical works of the same literatures.[6]

(2) *Muhammadan.*—In the Arabic Muhammadan literature the legend appears in two quite distinct forms: (i.) in the Qur'ān[7] and (ii.) in the later literature. (i.) The Qur'ān account is short and disjointed, omitting important points and adding details which are wanting in the other text. Its source is undoubtedly oral tradition; it goes back probably to Christian monks, and from them directly or indirectly the story reached Muhammad, who attached great importance to it because of its value for the belief in the resurrection—a belief often inculcated in the Qur'ān. A certain resemblance to the homily of James of Serūgh, which must have been very well known and often repeated among the Syrian monks, confirms this supposition. The passage in the Qur'ān has given rise to much research among the Arabs, and many exegetical, historical, and geographical texts attempt to settle a point about which great uncertainty prevailed, viz. the whereabouts of the cave. (ii.) The later legend agrees generally with the ancient Christian texts, viz. the Syriac *Acta*, except for the inevitable contaminations occasioned by the Qur'ān account. Considering the peaceful relations which existed between learned Muhammadans and Christian Syrians (who possessed the *dhimmah*, 'protection'), it is natural that the former should have received the account from the latter.

The long Muhammadan text starts for the most part from Muhammad b. Ishāq (†768).[8] In other texts—*e.g.*, the *al-Kisā'i*—the legend is mixed and confused with others.[9] There are noteworthy Haggadic elements, especially in the Arabic texts.[10] The legend is mentioned more or less briefly in many Muhammadan (Arabian, Persian, etc.) literary works, but they generally merely copy or abridge the above-mentioned sources.

(*b*) *Byzantine and Western.*—In the Byzantine literature the legend is merely mentioned by Theophanes (758–816), but it is narrated at length, in a form corresponding to the Syriac, in a MS of the 9th century. There are three distinct texts published critically by Huber.[1] The story occurs in Photius[2] and afterwards in the *Menaea* and other texts.[3]

In the Latin West there is a very short account in the *de Situ Terræ Sanctæ* (520–530) of the deacon Theodosius,[4] while Gregory of Tours († 593 or 594) narrates at length the *Passio* of the Seven Sleepers and says: 'Quam Syro quodam interpretante in Latinum transtulimus,' giving thus his authorities.[5] But the long Latin legend is already found in MSS which go back to the 9th cent. and have been frequently copied—which shows the great popularity of the legend in the West; it is also narrated more or less shortly in many subsequent writings.[6] Huber[7] concludes, contrary to all probability, that the legend was written originally in Latin, though he does not exclude the possibility of its being a translation from the Greek—which is far more probable. Thanks to the Latin text, the legend found its way into the mediæval literature of the West, first in the homily and *Passio* of Aelfric (bet. 1020 and 1025).[8]

Texts are found in Anglo-Saxon, mediæval and modern English, mediæval and modern High German, ancient Norse, Swedish, French, Italian, Spanish; there is also a mediæval Irish translation from the *Passio* of Gregory of Tours. These texts are partly prose and partly verse, and some (Spanish and Italian) are in dramatic form. There is also a dramatic elaboration in Latin *senarii* by an author of the 17th century.[9]

3. **Cult.**—The Seven Sleepers have taken a place in Christian worship as much in the East as in the West, giving rise to short liturgical texts, hymns, and commemorations in the martyrologies,[10] but the day of their commemoration varies greatly.[11] According to the legend, a church was erected above the cave by the emperor Theodosius; a church dedicated to the Seven Sleepers was built at Rome, on the Appian Way, and several in Germany.[12] Marseilles[13] and other cities boasted of possessing their relics.[14] There are miniatures representing them in the *Menologion* of the emperor Basil II. in the Vatican library, but the celebrated Vettori gem, now lost, does not seem to have represented them.[15]

Muhammadans also venerate the Seven Sleepers,[16] and their names occur, more or less disfigured, on amulets.

4. **Parallel myths and legends.**—A characteristic motive of the legend—the long sleep[17]—is of wide occurrence in ancient myths and legends, such as the myth of Endymion, of the Nine Sleepers of Sardinia recorded by Aristotle,[18] and especially the story of Epimenides.[19] But a greater resemblance to the story of the Seven Sleepers appears in the Talmudic legend of Onias (Honi) Ha-Me'aggel,[20] who sleeps for 70 years and is convinced of the

[1] Huber, p. 17. [2] *Ib.* pp. 36, 542.
[3] See E. Littmann, in *Gesch. der christl. Litt. des Orients*[2], Leipzig, 1909, p. 205.
[4] Huber, pp. 37, 544.
[5] See F. N. Fink, in *Gesch. der christl. Litt. des Orients*[2], p. 113; R. Graffin and F. Nau, *Patr. Orient.* v. [Paris, 1910] 350.
[6] Huber, pp. 6 ff., 17 ff., 36 f. [7] xviii. 8–26.
[8] Cf. Huber, pp. 18–32, 537. [9] *Ib.* p. 251 ff.
[10] R. Heller, *REJ* xlix. [1904] 190–203; Huber, p. 453.

[1] *Beitrag zur Siebenschläferlegende*, ii. There is nothing to justify the doubt that Zacharias of Mitylene has narrated the legend in Greek and that this ancient text has been lost (Huber, pp. 10, 37). As for John of Ephesus (native of Amid or Diarbekr), he wrote his story in Syriac, not in Greek.
[2] *Bibl.* cod. 253. [3] Huber, p. 38 ff.
[4] *Ib.* p. 84. [5] Cf. *ib.* pp. 59, 499 ff. [6] *Ib.* p. 72.
[7] *Ib.* p. 568. [8] *Ib.* p. 155. [9] *Ib.* pp. 155–214.
[10] *Ib.* pp. 1, 7, 36 f., 85, 90, 136. [11] *Ib.* p. 136.
[12] *Ib.* p. 142 ff. [13] *Ib.* p. 154. [14] *Ib.* pp. 145, 153.
[15] *Ib.* p. 139. [16] *Ib.* p. 308. [17] *Ib.* p. 376 f.
[18] *Phys. ausc.* iv. 11.
[19] For other analogous legends see Huber, pp. 128–136, 395 ff., 435, 443.
[20] *Ib.* pp. 403, 418.

truth of Ps 126[1], and in the story of Abimelech,[1] whom God caused to sleep for 66 years, to spare him the sight of the destruction of the Temple under Nebuchadrezzar. The legends of men translated alive to the other world also show some connexion.

5. **Criticism of the legend.**—The historicity of the story of the Seven Sleepers was first questioned by Baronius († 1607) and then by Tillemont and others, against whom Assemani tried to defend it. Recently many have come to the conclusion that the legend is simply derived or developed from ancient Indo-Germanic myths.

It was generally maintained that the earliest text was Greek and of Greek provenance, but in 1886 Nöldeke produced evidence that the Greek was a translation of an original Syriac text; and this was confirmed by the observations of Ryssel and Heller.[2] As arguments against the Greek origin of the legend we may notice (1) that the earliest texts of any length are Syriac, going back perhaps to the end of the 5th cent.; (2) that it seems impossible that in an important region at the very heart of the Eastern Empire there would be narrated with imaginary circumstances (such as heresy), and with the gravest anachronisms, facts which had happened not more than a half century before and which would be remembered by many of the men of the time. Besides, the legend had a definite aim—to inspire belief in the resurrection of the body, an aim which would in such circumstances be totally missed; further, the topographical data are not accurate for Ephesus. The same applies in the main to other localizations, such as Arabissos[3] and Palestine.[4] On the other hand, the anachronisms and the historical and topographical mistakes are not surprising in Syrians who lived in the distant confines of the empire or beyond it, and it is noteworthy that the first historian to narrate the legend, John of Ephesus, was a native of Âmid. Moreover, from the witness of Aphraates[5] it can be proved that the oriental Syrians, from the first half of the 4th cent., believed that the dead did not enter into reward or punishment until after the resurrection and the judgment; that, while in death the 'heavenly spirit' received at baptism returned to God, the 'animal spirit' remained buried with the body in a sleep, tranquil for the just and troubled for the sinner. For men accustomed to this order of ideas the re-awakening of the Seven Sleepers had an evidential value which it could not have for others. And we may suppose that the 'heresy' was some local dissension among the oriental Syrians. Further, although the legend is clearly Christian, it is not improbable that parallel legends of long sleep, etc., and especially the Jewish stories of Honi and Abimelech, both inspired the author of the legend and procured for it the belief of the people; the influence which Judaism had in Mesopotamia (Adiabene) from the beginnings of the Syriac literature agrees with this.

LITERATURE.—The two special works dealing with the legend of the Seven Sleepers—John Koch, *Die Siebenschläferlegende, ihr Ursprung und ihre Verbreitung: eine mythologisch-literaturgeschichtliche Studie*, Leipzig, 1883; and I. Guidi, 'Testi orientali inediti sopra i Sette Dormienti di Efeso,' *Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei*, Classe di Scienze morali stor. e filolog., 3rd ser., vol. xii., Rome, 1885—are carefully considered and epitomized in Michael Huber, *Die Wanderlegende von den Siebenschläfern*, Leipzig, 1910 (valuable for its rich material of every kind, sometimes not closely connected with the legend; but the hypotheses and conclusions of the author cannot be accepted without great reservations. On p. 214 is a complete bibliography, from C. Baronius and S. Le Nain de Tillemont, down to the various articles of T. Nöldeke, V. Ryssel, B. Heller, M. J. de Goeje, J. Clermont-Ganneau, etc.; to this bibliography the reader may be referred).

I. GUIDI.

SEVEN VIRTUES (or GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT).

—The mediæval Church not only formulated the 'seven deadly sins' as the sources from which all other sins might be derived, but also enunciated the seven chief virtues as the main types of all possible excellences.

1. **The cardinal virtues in Greek philosophy.**—The 'classification of the virtues' dates from Greek times. The Greeks named four virtues only—wisdom, courage, temperance, justice—as fundamental. Plato, in whose *Republic*[1] they first definitely appear, implies that they were already traditional in his day. Though not invented by Plato, it was his rare insight that singled out these qualities, already current in popular thought, as constituting the central core of morality. Plato attempts to show that these virtues are primary or 'cardinal' (*cardo*, 'hinge') because they correspond to the natural constitution of the soul, and therefore form the four sides of a symmetrical character. Virtue, according to Plato, is the health or harmony of the soul. As the soul is composed of three powers—intellect, feeling, will—so corresponding to these are the virtues of wisdom, temperance, and courage. These three qualities, however, have reference more particularly to the individual life. But, as man is also part of an organism, justice is conceived as the social virtue — the virtue which regulates the others. Aristotle[2] opposed the theory of Plato that virtue is innate; it is acquired by habit, and is not the same for every man, but is determined by the circumstances of the individual. Aristotle therefore considerably enlarged the list of the principal virtues, and specially includes in their number 'magnanimity,' or generosity. He drew a sharper distinction than Plato between the intellectual virtues and those dependent upon the emotions. The Stoic school followed Plato, conceiving the cardinal virtues as constitutive of 'the life according to nature.' Since Plato's day his theory has been generally accepted by moralists, though from time to time other virtues have been added, and a place has frequently been found for 'benevolence.' Among ethical writers benevolence was first prominently mentioned by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th cent., there taking the form of love and being placed, as we shall afterwards see, with the other two of the Pauline triad, faith and hope, above Plato's list. It was early felt, especially by those influenced by monotheistic thought, that, while the will is strong for courage and temperance, and the insight of the intellect just and wise, true morality is not less a matter of the heart and feelings. However keen the mind and strong the will, there is no security that they can compass moral action unless emotion be their

[1] Huber, pp. 407, 422.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 457, 460, 469. The same conclusion can be drawn from passages where, corresponding to a regular expression in the Syriac, there is an unusual expression in the Greek; *e.g.* (P. Bedjan, *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum*, Paris, 1890–96, i. 306)

ܡܥܒܕ ܠܝ ܡܠܟܐ ܐܠܗܐ ܕܫܒܝܢ ܠܟ ܫܢܝܢ ܐܠܗܐ ܗܐ ܡܢܝܢ ܐܠܗܐ ܕܥܒܕ ܠܟ ܡܠܟܐ ; (Huber, *Beitrag*, ii. 31) ἐπειδὴ ἐξεκόψατε ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μεγίστων θεῶν ξένοι ξστε ἀπὸ τῆς μεγαλοσύνης τῆς βασιλείας μου; (Bedj. 314) . . . ܕܒܥܝ ; (Hub. 40) πιεζομένοις ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ; (Bedj. 317) ܒܝܡ ܟܡ; (Hub. 44) εἰς τῷ ἐνί; (Bedj. 219) ܟܠ ܡܟܠ; (Hub. 46) ὧδε καὶ ὧδε, etc.

[3] M. J. de Goeje, *K. Akad. v. Wetensch.*, Afdeeling Letterk., IV. iv. [Amsterdam, 1901] 13–33; Huber, p. 233.
[4] J. Clermont-Ganneau, *Comptes-Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr. et Belles Lettres*, 4th ser. xxvi. [1898] p. 564–574; Huber, p. 235.
[5] Graffin, *Patr. Syr.*, Paris, 1894–1907, i. 396, 402, 294.

[1] Tr. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Oxford, 1871, iii. 306 ff.; see also v. 200 ff. (*Laws*), i. 142 (*Protagoras*).
[2] *Nicom. Ethics*, bk. ii. 1, beginning.

ally; and indeed, where the mind and will alone rule and the heart is denied expression, the moral character lacks completeness; as Paul says, 'Love is the fulfilment of the law.' Like the other cardinal virtues, 'benevolence' has been variously interpreted, being identified by early monotheism with charity, and only later receiving a larger significance. It has been maintained, however, by some that the Platonic list is adequate and compact, covering the whole field of morality. There is no need for the special mention of benevolence or charity, since a proper conception of justice involves all forms of generosity. It is true, we must 'be just before we are generous.' But there is no such thing as bare justice. He who is just naturally recognizes the claims of others; and benevolence, charity, and even kindness and mercy are the implicates of true justice.

2. Virtues of NT.—The NT does not elaborate a system of ethics. Christ and His apostles deal with moral questions as circumstances dictate. While several passages set forth a catalogue of virtues (Mt 5^{1-16}, Ph 4^{8}, Gal $5^{22f.}$, 1 Co 13, Col $3^{12f.}$, 2 P 1^{5-7}), these summaries are not systematic or formal, though they are characterized by a remarkable similarity in spirit and tone. They usually emphasize what have been called the 'amiable graces,' and derive all excellence of character from the spirit of love. Conspicuous among the moral ideas constantly recurring in the apostolic writings are the three virtues of faith, hope, and charity (1 Co 13, 1 Th $1^{2f.}$, Col $1^{4.5}$, Ro 5, 1 P, He 10^{22})—which suggests that these were regarded as moral conditions of the Christian life. They connect man with God and form the mainspring of the type of character which Christ sought to create. These graces are not set in opposition to the classical virtues. Paul at least, who had some acquaintance with Stoic philosophy, was not likely to be ignorant of the place that the latter held in Greek and Roman morals. There is no repudiation of them in the NT. All are mentioned, at least separately if not in conjunction, and indeed strongly commended.

3. Recognition by the Church of the cardinal virtues.—When Greek philosophy began to exercise its influence in early Christianity, it is not surprising that the cardinal virtues, so long regarded as the basal elements of character, should gradually find a place in Christian ethics. But the early Fathers, being persuaded that these virtues had reference to man's mundane life alone, added to them the Pauline graces as expressive of man's relation to the spiritual world. The four first were consequently called 'natural,' the three last 'supernatural' or 'theological' virtues. The adoption of the cardinal virtues did not come about immediately. The problem before the Church was a complex one. Though Christianity might be willing to acknowledge what was good in the moral teaching of the ancient world, it could not ignore the associations which clung to many of the ideas and practices of pagan times. If, then, the Church was to assimilate any of the existing data of morals, it was bound to impose upon them its own interpretation and to bring them into harmony with its own system of belief. Only gradually, therefore, did there come about a spirit of mediation between the old morality and the new. The earliest sub-apostolic writers were disposed to emphasize the contrast and to repudiate everything that savoured of pagan ethics. Among the first to draw attention to the importance of the cardinal virtues was Origen, who, though mentioning them as indispensable to the moral character, made no attempt to give them a distinctively Christian significance. With Ambrose, whose *de Officiis*—practically a reproduction of Cicero's book bearing the same name—is the first real treatise on Christian ethics, a change of attitude becomes apparent. An effort is now made to connect the Platonic virtues with Christian ideas. 'Wisdom,' he maintains, is primarily theological as having God for its object. 'Fortitude,' or courage, is essentially firmness in withstanding the seductions of the world. But, strongly influenced by OT notions, Ambrose does not relinquish the narrower martial view of the term. 'Temperance' retains the Stoic meaning of 'observance of due measure' in all conduct, while also the Stoic idea of justice, as the union of all human interests, is enlarged to embrace the notion of Christian benevolence.

4. Transformation under Christianity.—There are undoubtedly indications in this earliest treatise on Christian ethics of the transforming influence of Christian thought, but it is in the writings of Augustine, Ambrose's greatest pupil, that the decisive step is taken of Christianizing the virtues. The old names frequently recur, but they are now employed in a new sense and are directed to a new object—viz. the vision of and devotion to God. Faith, hope, and love are now introduced and regarded by Augustine as the formative factors of Christian virtue, while the four earlier virtues are but the different aspects in which the love of God manifests itself.

> Thus he defines fortitude as 'love cheerfully enduring all things for the sake of God; temperance, love keeping itself entire and inviolate for God; justice, love serving God only and therefore controlling all else that is subject to man; prudence, or wisdom, love discriminating between those things which assist and those things which retard its approach to God.'[1]

Under the influence of Ambrose and Augustine the cardinal virtues henceforth form a generally accepted scheme for the Christian treatment of systematic ethics. The triad of Christian graces is frequently simply placed at their side. Sometimes the 'seven gifts of the Spirit' enumerated by Is 11^{2} are added, while over against them are arrayed under the head of the 'seven deadly sins' (*q.v.*) the forces of wickedness. It is possible to trace the effects of Augustine's teaching upon the writings of Gregory the Great, who by his frequent use of allegory prepared the way for scholasticism. But it is when we come to the schoolmen themselves, and particularly to Thomas Aquinas, that we discover the full effect of Augustinian thought. The scholastics go back to the old sources of moral speculation. Aristotle is *par excellence* their 'master.' In Aquinas Aristotle reappears; but it is Aristotle read in the light of Augustine. The Aristotelian division of the soul and the doctrine of the 'mean' are preserved, but the cardinal virtues are now referred to the supernatural end of man and are derived from the divine gifts of love.

Thus, in the development of Christian truth, the cardinal virtues have come to hold an acknowledged place. But they have undergone a marked transformation. The Christian cannot afford to neglect them. They stand as essential qualities. But, baptized into the spirit of Christ, they are endowed with a new meaning and worth. The religion of Jesus has so profoundly modified the moral ideas of the past that they have become new creations. The old moral currency was still kept in circulation, but it was gradually minted anew.[2] Courage is not disparaged, but it is shown to be not less real when evinced, not on the battlefield, but in the conflict of the soul. Temperance is still the control of the physical passions, but it is widened out to embrace the right placing of the affections. Wisdom is no longer the selfish cal-

[1] *De Mor. Eccl.* 25.
[2] Strong, *Christian Ethics*, p. 189 ff.

culation of worldly prudence, but the true interpretation of the things of God. Justice involves, as before, the suppression of self in conflict with the rights of others; but the source of it lies in giving to God the love which is His due and in finding in the objects of His regard the subjects of our thought and care.

5. **Unification.** — Can the virtues be unified? May it not be shown that the various aspects of the 'good' are but different manifestations of one principle? Augustine was the first to recognize the great Christian truth that it is man's relation to God that gives cohesion and unity to the moral life; and he was but true to the spirit of the NT when he re-affirmed the Pauline triad—faith, hope, and charity—as the primary and co-ordinating elements of Christian character. According to him and later moralists, these qualities were not simply added to the classical virtues, but so fused and incorporated with them as to create the spiritual disposition which penetrates the entire personality and qualifies its every thought and act. So essential are these graces to the Christian life that, as we have seen, they were called 'the theological virtues'; because, as Aquinas says, 'they have God for their object, they bring us into true relations to God, and they are imparted to us by God alone.'[1] They are but different manifestations of one virtue, three facets of one gem, the supreme passion of the soul and lord of its emotions; and, like justice in the Platonic theory, the intimate spirit of order alike in the individual and in society, harmoniously binding together all the other virtues. Faith, hope, and love are one, and are at once the root and the fruit of all moral excellences. They constitute the attitude and spirit of the man whom Christ has redeemed. But, if they are to be called 'virtues,' it must be in a different sense from what the ancients understood by virtue. They are not elements of the natural man, but spiritual states which come into being with a changed moral character. They connect man with God and constitute him a member of a new spiritual order. Hence these graces must not be considered as outward adornments merely. They are radical and inherent in the Christian. They claim the whole man. They re-create and transfigure all his powers of mind and heart and will. They do not supersede or render superfluous the natural virtues. They transmute and complete them, giving them coherence and purpose by directing them to a divine object.

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A. B. D. ALEXANDER.

SEX.—1. Phenomena of sex. — The general phenomena of sex as exhibited by the higher animals are familiar to all. The individuals of a species are divisible into two groups, males and females. Biologically the essential property of the male is that he comes to carry a certain type of minute cell known as the spermatozoon. So also is the female the bearer of a peculiar form of cell known as the ovum. Death is the lot of these cells except of such as chance to fuse one with another. Through the fusion of two gametes, a sperm with an ovum, the combined product, the zygote, receives an impetus to growth, and a new individual results. The bearing of one or other of the two types of gamete is the fundamental distinction between the two sexes, and in some of the lower animals—*e.g.*, sea-urchins—no other is to be found. But in the higher animals the sexes are further differentiated in a number of ways. Appropriate ducts and glands, differing in the sexes, facilitate the transference of the sperm from the male to the female, while in the latter sex further elaborate mechanisms are often found, serving to nourish the embryo before and after the time of birth. Besides such sexual differences as are directly subservient to the needs of the developing zygote, and are generally termed 'primary' sexual characters, there are many others of a less essential nature. The gayer plumage and the song of cock-birds, the mane of the lion, the horns of the stag, and the beard of man are well-known examples of a host of features in which the male sex differs from the female. Characters of this sort, not directly concerned in the formation and nutrition of the embryo, are termed 'secondary' sexual characters. They offer special problems of their own, especially in man, where mental characters as well as physical are doubtless to be included in this category. Owing to their social and ethical importance, a more detailed account of them is given below.

2. The reproductive process.—The process by which a new individual results from the fusion between two gametes—spermatozoon and ovum—is frequently termed 'sexual reproduction,' but from a comparative standpoint the term is not strictly accurate. Reproduction in most of the lower and smaller forms of animals is brought about by division. In the most minute forms, such as the protozoa, the whole animal divides into two portions of equal or nearly equal size, each of which becomes a fresh individual. In more complex yet still lowly animals, such as polyps and certain worms, the division is unequal, resulting in the production of one or more smaller portions or buds which eventually grow up into the adult form. In forms of life which are yet more complicated, in which the various organs are more highly differentiated, the place of the bud is taken by a single cell, the egg. Reproduction consists in the formation of numbers of eggs, which in some species develop straight away into fresh individuals of the species. In some cases only one sex is known, and reproduction may be regarded as the formation of numerous internal buds which sever their connexion with the parent while still in the unicellular stage. In higher animals the eggs are incapable of further development under normal conditions unless they fuse with another cell, the spermatozoon, though, as will appear later, even the eggs of such highly organized creatures as the frog can be artificially stimulated to develop without the intervention of the male. Reproduction has been accomplished with the formation of the eggs and sperms; the fusion with the sperm, by which the eggs are stimulated to develop, is a distinct phenomenon. It is comparable to the curious and complicated process known among the protozoa as conjugation, of which the biological significance is still a puzzle. The discovery of this phenomenon, coupled with the pronounced speculative tendencies prevalent among zoologists at the close of last century, led to the production of much literature on the question of the

[1] *Summa*, II. ii. qu. 62, art. 1.

origin of sex. With the fashion then in vogue of arranging comparable phenomena in a series from what was judged the most primitive to that considered the most highly specialized, it was inevitable that attempts should be made to construct a scale with the simplest protozoon at one end and man at the other. Moreover, it was argued how each step in the scale should theoretically confer an advantage on the species which took it, thus bringing the whole process into line with natural selection operating upon the required variations of which the existence was assumed. But, while biologists remained so ignorant of the nature of variation, these essays failed to carry conviction among the more critically minded; and with the renewal of interest in the experimental study of variation and heredity, they have for the present been relegated to the background. The feeling prevalent among biologists to-day is that, if attention is concentrated upon the experimental analysis of the nature of sex, the question of its origin, in so far as there can be certainty in this matter, will gradually solve itself.

3. Parthenogenesis.—Parthenogenesis (*q.v.*), the development of an egg without fertilization by a sperm, is a phenomenon which invites attention in connexion with sex. Various experiments show that even in the vertebrate the egg alone may contain all the constituents necessary for a fresh individual, provided that the appropriate stimuli are forthcoming. Eggs which are naturally parthenogenetic usually differ from normal eggs in extruding one polar body instead of two, and it was suggested by Weismann that the retention of the second polar body was a form of auto-fertilization. In view of the facts of artificial parthenogenesis, this thesis can hardly be maintained, since development occurred after the extrusion of both polar bodies. Moreover, in the honey-bee the eggs which produce the drones are undoubtedly parthenogenetic, and at the same time form two polar bodies.

4. Importance of the ovum.—The study of parthenogenesis suggests the question whether the gametes found in the two sexes are of equal value in so far as the next generation is concerned. The matured ovum can be induced to develop without the sperm. Can the sperm be induced to develop into a fresh individual without fusing with an ovum? So far no medium has been found in which the sperm will develop except the cell protoplasm of the egg. Boveri's experiments[1] showed that a fragment of egg protoplasm is all that is required in certain species. But, until the sperm can be shown to develop in some other medium, it is possible to maintain the view advocated by some writers that the ovum is the all-important gamete, the sperm an accessary which is not always essential. There are certain characters which, on this view, are carried independently by either egg or sperm, and such characters generally exhibit some form of Mendelian heredity. But the essential characters which determine the capacity for existence reside in the cell protoplasm of the ovum, and there alone. The factors which determine the colour of the eyes or hair, the shape of the nose, or perhaps the grade of mental ability, are to be found in either ovum or sperm. But the factors which decide the existence of lungs or a backbone reside only in the cell protoplasm of the egg. In short, as one writer has expressed it, we are vertebrates because our mothers were vertebrates.

5. Mendelian nature of sex.—With the outburst of experimental work that followed the rediscovery of Mendel's paper on heredity,[2] attention was early turned to analyzing the nature of sex by the new methods. Indeed Mendel himself had suggested in his letters to Nägeli that the inheritance of sex might follow the same lines as that of other characters. The heterozygous dominant mated with the recessive gives equal numbers of heterozygous dominants and recessives. In such matings these are the only two forms of individual produced in so far as a given character is concerned. If therefore one sex could be regarded as a heterozygous dominant and the other as a recessive, the rough equality of numbers in which the two sexes are usually produced, as well as the normal absence of transitional forms, would receive a simple explanation. For since, from the nature of the case, the mating must always be of the same type, viz. heterozygote × recessive, only males and females of the same constitution can be formed. The question then arose which sex was to be regarded as the heterozygous dominant and which as the recessive. The matter was decided by a study of the inheritance of certain characters which have been termed 'sex-linked' or 'sex-limited.' As an example of this type of heredity, we may take the following case from poultry:

In certain breeds of fowl the plumage is completely black; in other breeds, such as the Plymouth Rock, the plumage is 'barred.' Across each individual feather run alternating transverse bands of black and white, the sum total of which give the bird its characteristic barred appearance. 'Barring' (*B*) behaves as a simple dominant to black (*b*). Barred cock × black hen produce barred offspring of both sexes; and, when these are mated together, the F_2 generation consists of barred and black in the ratio 3 : 1,[1] thus establishing the recessive nature of black. But the remarkable fact of the case is that all the blacks are females. The explanation now generally adopted is that the female is heterozygous for a sex factor (*F*) which the male does not possess. When a female which is heterozygous for the barring factor, and therefore in constitution *FfBb*, comes to form gametes, the cell division is of such a nature that the factors *F* and *B* will not enter into the same gamete. The gametes which are formed in such a bird are therefore of the two kinds *Fb* and *fB* only. The heterozygous male (*ffBb*) forms gametes of the two kinds *fB* and *fb*. It is clear, therefore, that every F_2 bird which is homozygous for *b* (=*bb*) must at the same time be heterozygous for *F*, *i.e.* must be a female. This view of the case is confirmed by the result of mating barred hens with black cocks. In every case, no matter how 'pure-bred' the barred hen was, this mating has given barred cocks and black hens only. The barred hen, however bred, is always heterozygous for the barring factor (*B*), and, since she transmits this factor only to her sons, never to her daughters, it must be supposed that her gametes are of two sorts from the point of view of sex, viz. those which give rise to males and those which give rise to females. There is at present no evidence from experimental breeding for regarding the spermatozoa as other than of the same type from the point of view of sex—in other words, the male may be considered as homozygous. Breeding experiments have shown that the same holds good also for pigeons and for certain moths.

6. Experiments with Drosophila.—There is, however, another group of cases where the breeding evidence points to the converse condition holding good—the male is the heterozygous and the female the homozygous sex.

The little pomace-fly (*Drosophila ampelophila*) normally has red eyes. Some years ago a white-eyed variety appeared, at first only in the male sex. Breeding experiments showed that white was recessive to red. From the cross red-eyed female × white-eyed male all the offspring were red-eyed. When these F_1 flies were mated, the F_2 generation was found to consist of reds and whites in the ratio 3 : 1, but all the whites were males. Subsequently white-eyed females were produced, and these, when mated to any red-eyed male, gave only red-eyed females and white-eyed males. The case is the converse of that of the barred poultry. The male must be regarded as the heterozygous and the female as the homozygous sex for some factor, transmitted along Mendelian lines, upon which the manifestation of sex depends. Many other characters in *Drosophila* have recently been shown to follow the same type of inheritance as that of the white eye.

This type of transmission is of special interest owing to the fact that it is found in man also. The heredity of certain human defects, notably hæmophilia and colour-blindness, appears to be precisely parallel to the series of sex-linked *Drosophila* cases, and, so far as the evidence goes, we are forced to conclude that in man also the male is the heterozygous and the female the homozygous sex.

[1] Cf. below, § 9.

[2] Cf. art. HEREDITY, § 7.

[1] Cf. art. HEREDITY, § 7.

These two groups of cases, the bird-moth group and the man-fly group, at present stand sharply apart. It is, however, difficult not to believe that future work will reveal them as forming part of some more general scheme. Indeed, attempts have already been made to effect this synthesis by the assumption of selective fertilization. On this view, the difference between the sexes would depend upon more than one factor, the male and the female being heterozygous respectively for different factors. This involves the assumption of two classes of sperms and two classes of eggs, such that the sperm of class *A* would fertilize the ova of class *A* to give females, and the sperm of class *B* would unite with the ova of class *B* to give males. In the absence of direct evidence, however, any attempt at explanation based on selective fertilization cannot be regarded as having more than a suggestive value. Nevertheless, the idea that the manifestation of sex depends upon definite factors distributed among the gametes along the well-known Mendelian lines of segregation is an idea that is already firmly based upon a secure foundation of fact.

7. The X chromosome.—During the past few years a notable advance in our knowledge of the phenomena of sex has been made by American workers, among whom should be mentioned more especially E. B. Wilson and T. H. Morgan. It was discovered that in many insects the number of chromosomes in the individual cells is different in the two sexes. Where this was the case, the number and arrangement in the female were symmetrical, so that all the ova formed were alike in these respects. In the male, however, the number was less, and asymmetry occurred, so that two classes of sperm were formed. The sperms with the lower number of chromosomes united with the ova to form the number characteristic of males, while the sperms with the higher number, on fusing with ova, gave the number characteristic of females. The deduction was made that the males were heterozygous for sex, forming two classes of sperm which were male-determining and female-determining respectively. This conclusion has been strengthened by recent work on *Drosophila*, where microscopical examination of the germ cells has accompanied experimental breeding. In this fly there is a certain type of chromosome, the so-called X chromosome which, like all the other chromosomes, is duplicated in the cells of the female, but represented by a single number only in the cells of the male. Every gamete formed in the female therefore contains an X chromosome, whereas one half of the sperms contain it and the other half are without it, its place being taken by a chromosome of a different type. This accords with the breeding work on the pomace-fly, which, as already stated, indicates that the female of this species is homozygous and the male heterozygous for sex. The two kinds of gametes produced by the same individual male and differing in their sex-determining properties, which are postulated to explain the results of breeding experiments, have been shown actually to exist as the result of independent histological work, and we are led to suppose that the factor upon which the manifestation of sex depends can be definitely identified as attached to a particular element in the gamete—the X chromosome. It may be mentioned that Morgan and others are inclined to take a quantitative view of sexual difference and to suppose that the formation of a female results when the zygote receives two X chromosomes (normally one from each gamete), and a male when the X chromosome enters from one side only. Whether this hypothesis will hold good generally must be left for future work to decide.

8. Sex-determination.—The problem of sex-determination—a problem which for centuries has excited deep interest—may be regarded as in large measure solved by the results of recent work. We now know that the sex manifested by any given individual depends upon the nature of the two gametes through whose conjugation the individual was formed. This is decided at the moment of fertilization, and there is no reason for supposing that any subsequent event can influence the fundamental sexual nature of the zygote produced, though, as will appear later, extrinsic influences may lead to modification of secondary sexual characters. The various attempts before the present century to solve the problem were largely based on the assumption that external influences (exerted either upon the parent or upon the developing offspring at an early stage) could determine the sex to which the latter was to belong. This assumption was not unnatural at a time when the most critical technique available was unable to distinguish any sexual difference in the early embryos of mammals and other animals. The newly-formed creature was regarded as indifferent with respect to sex, differentiating into male or female only at a somewhat later stage. In attacking the problem, the method adopted was generally statistical. A possible cause affecting the determination of sex was suggested, and statistics of births were collected when the suggested cause was in operation, to be contrasted with similar statistics brought together when the cause was operating either slightly or not at all. Since the greater part of available statistics refer to man, it was for this species that most of the work was done. Many authors have seen in nutrition the determining cause of sex; and it was held that a richer and more abundant nutrition of the embryo tended to lead to the production of females, while underfeeding the mother, in the case of mammals, tended to increase the output of males. Many statistics have been collected on this point, but, while some of them appear to offer support to the contention, others are directly opposed to it. Nor does the experimental evidence that exists for smaller vertebrates, such as rats, mice, and frogs, indicate that nutrition appreciably affects the sex ratio. That it should do so is not inconceivable, even though sex is determined at fertilization, for it is possible that different conditions, particularly unfavourable ones, may be better resisted in the earlier embryonic stages of one sex than of the other. On this view, a change in the external conditions would not have affected the determination of sex, but would have brought about an alteration in the sex ratio through an increased mortality among the early embryos of one sex as compared with those of the other.

9. The theory of auto-regulation.—Among the theories of sex-determination based upon statistical data mention may be made of Düsing's theory of auto-regulation. The assumption is made that the newly-formed gametes of either sex tend to produce individuals of the same sex as that from which they are sprung, whereas older gametes tend to produce the opposite sex. Thus the more freshly produced sperm has a greater tendency to give rise to male individuals than older sperm which has been for some time in the ducts. A stallion whose services are much utilized should produce more male offspring than one which is more rarely put to the mare. The fewer the males in a species, the oftener they serve the females, and in consequence the younger are the sperms they emit; and, as the younger sperms give rise to more males, the tendency is for a dearth of this sex in any generation to be compensated for by an increase in the next. The net result is an auto-

regulation of the sex ratio, which is maintained at the level that is most advantageous to the species.

The leading idea in Düsing's theory, that the determination of sex depends upon the relative maturity of the gamete, was borrowed from Thury, though by him it was applied to the female sex only. According to this author, ova freshly liberated from the ovary have a stronger tendency to produce females than ova which have become staler; the latter more often give rise to males. When first enunciated, the few statistics available strongly supported the idea, and 'Thury's law' had an immediate vogue; but, as fresh and unconformable data came to hand, it fell into disrepute. More recently, however, the idea has been revived in connexion with certain experimental work. Richard Hertwig and his pupils have shown that it is possible to raise the proportion of males in frogs by delaying fertilization of the ova. As they became staler, the ratio of males increased, and in some cases the offspring were all of this sex. It is possible that in stale ova the chromatin, in which the sex-determining factors presumably reside, becomes impaired, while the cell protoplasm as a whole retains its vitality. If this were so, the sex would be determined by the entering sperm alone; and, if we suppose the male sex in the frog to be the recessive one, the resulting offspring would be male. Such a view receives some support from the work of Boveri on the fertilization of sea-urchins. By shaking the eggs it is possible to fragment them so that some pieces are produced which contain no chromatin. Boveri found that such pieces were penetrated by the sperm with the production of normal though undersized larvæ. The chromatin of the male alone is sufficient for the production of a new individual, though the sperm cannot develop except in unison with the cell protoplasm of the egg. There appears to be good evidence in some cases for an alteration in the sex ratio when the ova are stale, but whether the explanation suggested will be found to hold good can be decided only by fresh observations.

10. Secondary sexual distinctions.—Throughout the animal kingdom the primary distinction between the sexes—the bearing of either ova or spermatozoa—is nearly always accompanied by other differences of a more or less deeply seated nature. In some of the lower animals the sexes are so unlike as to have been regarded as belonging to entirely different groups. Among the vertebrates, with which we are chiefly concerned, the secondary sexual distinctions are often striking enough. They vary greatly from species to species, being very marked in some and practically non-existent in others. In pheasants and in many breeds of poultry the cock is totally different in appearance from his hens, while in pigeons it is often exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the sexes by means of external features. But, remarkable as these sexual differences often are, they were for long taken as a matter of course, and excited little attention until an explanation of the forms of life in terms of evolution through natural selection was formulated by Charles Darwin. Then it began to be felt that some of these secondary sexual characters offered a difficulty. The mane of a lion or the antlers of a stag might conceivably be brought about by natural selection acting within the species. Both may be serviceable in combat, and the better endowed male is enabled to drive off his rivals and satisfy his sexual instinct, leaving progeny which tend to inherit and transmit their father's advantages. But of what conceivable use was the gorgeous plumage of the male bird of paradise or of the cock pheasant in a stern struggle for existence? Would not the possessor of such adornments rather be placed at a disadvantage? The theory of natural selection demands that, if a thing exists, it must exist in virtue of its utility either to the individual or to the species. It was in terms of the species rather than of the individual that Darwin put forward his subsidiary theory of sexual selection. Beauty appeals to the æsthetic taste of the female. Beauty in the male excites her and renders her more apt for mating. Though the more gorgeous male may, through his striking beauty, be at a disadvantage in the struggle for existence, yet this is more than counterbalanced by the exciting effect which his superior attractions exert upon the female. She is the more readily induced to mate and to leave progeny, whereby the species gains, even though the more conspicuous male runs greater individual risks. Moreover, if the æsthetic ideal of the female is high, variation in the direction of more pronounced beauty of plumage or song will always meet with its reward, and the cumulative effect of sexual selection will constantly heighten sexual distinctions. The reality of sexual selection turns upon the exercise of choice by the females, and, though Darwin assiduously collected all the facts that he could, it cannot be said that the theory is firmly based. In some cases, such as that of the black-cock (*Tetrao tetrix*), observations on the courtship habits favour the idea that the female exercises a definite choice. On the other hand, there are many observations which tell against the theory. In some species of birds, such as peafowl and turkeys, the male is conspicuous from the female in plumage as well as in the persistence with which he parades his plumes in the breeding season; yet it is a matter of common observation that the hens show no apparent interest in the performance. Again, many of the characteristic so-called courtship actions of the male, as well as the exercise of his song, frequently commence after mating has already taken place. Among lepidoptera, where most marked sexual dimorphism is often found, there is some experimental evidence against its being in any way concerned with a choice exercised by the female. Males deprived of the wing scales, or painted with a colour to obscure their characteristic pattern, have been found to be just as acceptable to the female as normal ones.

Since the publication of Darwin's book more attention has been paid to the behaviour of animals in relation to the breeding period. Particularly has this been the case with birds, where courtship actions are usually more marked and observation is less difficult. Fresh facts suggested that these actions doubtless serve as an aphrodisiac, by means of which the male advertizes his readiness to mate and attempts to stimulate the female to a like condition. A more brilliant coloration in the male may serve to enhance the display, but it is not a necessary condition. The male of the little sober-coloured warblers, where the sexes are alike, goes through postures similar to those found in species such as the sun bittern (*Eupyga helias*), where the beautifully marked cock is quite distinct from the hen. On the other hand, it seems certain that in many cases the elaborate display does not serve as a direct incentive to pairing. An excellent example of this is afforded by the great crested grebe, recently studied with much care by J. S. Huxley and others. Many curious and definite posturings take place continually in this species during the breeding season. As both sexes take part in them, the term 'mutual display' has been applied to these performances. They are quite distinct from the posturings which lead up to the act of coition, and Huxley has suggested that, if we are to attribute to them a purpose, we may

suppose that they serve to keep the two individuals of the pair together during the mating season. Whether this speculation be adopted or not, it is clear that these peculiarities of behaviour are dependent upon the enhanced activity of the sexual glands and probably upon the hormones [1] secreted in greater abundance during the breeding period of the year. They are of interest in showing that alterations in the metabolism of these glands may act as a stimulant to performances which, though not directly connected with reproduction, are normally in abeyance. They open up a suggestive line of inquiry on the influence of the hormones produced by the sex glands in stimulating phases of mental activity usually regarded as outside the sphere of sexual influence.

11. Wallace's view of sexual diversity.—Wallace, who put forward the theory of natural selection at the same time as Darwin, definitely rejected the theory of sexual selection. He took up a totally different standpoint with regard to sexual diversity, and considered that it is due rather to the female having diverged from the male than *vice versa*, as Darwin held. On his view, the female is less brilliantly coloured than the male owing to greater need of protection. The hen pheasant on the nest is less conspicuous in her own dress than if she were decked out in the plumes of the cock. The more sober her costume, the less likely she is to attract the attention of enemies. Her coloration is protective, and, having a utility value, it can be supposed to have been brought about through the action of natural selection. On Wallace's view, natural selection represses in the female the brilliant colours and patterns which survive only in the male. He leads us to infer that in earlier times the female was as splendid as the male, but he cannot offer, in terms of natural selection, any satisfactory explanation why these magnificent and conspicuous colours should ever have arisen in the first place. It is true he suggests that they are correlated with greater vigour, and that this has a selective value which more than counterbalances the dangers due to increased conspicuousness; but this can hardly be regarded as more than a conjecture.

12. Goodale's experiments.—When we turn from theories regarding the origin of secondary sexual characters to the nature of the characters themselves, we are met with a considerable body of facts which have been accumulated for the most part during the present century. In studying these characters the first point to be decided is the extent to which their manifestation depends upon the sexual glands themselves. An obvious method of attacking this question is to remove the glands and note the effect produced on the secondary sexual characters. Experimental castration has been performed in a number of animals, for the most part domestic ones, and on the whole more frequently in the male sex than in the female. The results are not always free from ambiguity, due to the difficulty of removing the gland completely; for even a small piece of testis or ovary will often proliferate and invalidate the experiment. Perhaps the most interesting and instructive operations are those which have been performed on domestic poultry and on ducks by Goodale in America. This observer took the precaution of using pure breeds, in which the secondary sexual differences are very marked. The testes and the ovary were in certain cases successfully and completely removed, the latter being an operation of considerable difficulty. The breeds used were the Brown Leghorn in poultry, a race very similar both in the males and in the females to the wild *Gallus bankiva*, while in ducks recourse was had to the Rouen, a variety very like the wild mallard in both sexes. In both of these species castration of the male was practically without effect upon its plumage. The Rouen drake, however, did not assume the 'eclipse plumage' which is normally exhibited for a short time at the close of the breeding season. In the Brown Leghorn the comb failed to reach the size characteristic of uncastrated cocks, and there was a tendency to develop the brooding instinct—a fact well known where caponization is practised. In neither species, however, was there any evidence for the acquisition of female plumage as the result of the operation. The removal of the ovary from the hen offered a sharp contrast to these results. The Rouen duck assumed more or less completely the characteristic plumage of the drake, even to the small curly sex feathers of the tail. And not only did she acquire the male breeding plumage, but, in one case at any rate, she moulted annually into the male eclipse plumage, as does the normal male. The Brown Leghorn hen also assumed the totally distinct and far more gorgeous feathering of the cock with its flowing hackles and tail sickles, but the comb remained small, and the general build of the body remained that of the hen. The result of this work is to show that removal of the sex gland in the female leads to the assumption of the male plumage, whereas the normal male plumage is retained when the testes are taken out. The significance of this will be referred to below.

13. Effects of castration.—Striking results have also been obtained in other animals. The stag, with its great antlers, obviously invites experimental treatment, and castration work has proved that the development of these structures is dependent upon the presence of the genital gland. The precise result obtained depends upon the age at which the operation is performed. Castration of the young fawn before the formation of the frontal tubercles completely prevents the growth of the horns. If development of the antlers has already begun, the operation hinders further growth. They remain covered by the velvet and are never shed. Castration of the adult stag results in the precocious shedding of the antlers. They may be replaced by small imperfect ones, and these are never shed again.

In Herdwick sheep, a breed with horned rams and hornless ewes, castration of the young ram prevents the further growth of horns. On the other hand, castration of the ewe does not lead to the formation of horns, from which it must be inferred that this case is not strictly comparable with those of the duck and the fowl.

In man castration is an operation rarer to-day than in times gone by, though it is still practised in China and among certain sects in Russia. The principal effect is to arrest sexual development, and its consequences depend upon the stage at which it is performed. Generally speaking, apart from its effect in stunting the sexual organs themselves, it results in a deposition of fat over certain parts of the body; the skeleton is modified without, however, becoming feminized; the larynx does not develop normally, and the voice fails to break if the operation takes place early enough. The hair is also affected. It fails to develop in the axillary and pubic regions, while on the head it is abundant and falls out less readily than in normal men. With the possible exception of this last point, it cannot be said that eunuchs show a tendency to develop female characters as the result of castration.

The influence of the sex gland upon the development of secondary sexual characters among mammals and birds is confirmed by what is known for certain lower vertebrates. The dorsal

[1] Cf. below, § 14.

fin of the male newt and the thickened skin pad on the thumb of the male frog are characters which are also affected by castration. It would appear, therefore, that among the vertebrates the dependence of these characters upon the sex gland is a general feature, and the recognition of this has recently led to a physiological explanation.

14. **Hormone production.**—One of the most interesting and striking advances in modern physiology is that connected with what are termed 'internal secretions.' Certain glandular structures occur in the human body which, though evidently forming a secretion, are unprovided with a duct to carry it away. The function of these bodies, among which the most conspicuous is the thyroid gland of the neck, long remained a puzzle. They were known to be affected in the case of certain diseases. Cretinism, *e.g.*, was found to be associated with an abnormal condition of the thyroid gland, while an unhealthy state of the adrenals was closely connected with Addison's disease. The function of these glands was eventually elucidated by the experimental method. It was found that removal of the thyroid quickly led to death. Death, however, could be averted either by transplanting another thyroid into the patient—whether in the original or in some other position did not matter—or else by injecting an extract of the gland. The experimental results made it clear that these ductless glands elaborate various substances essential to the life of the organism. These substances leave the glands by means of the blood stream instead of through proper ducts, whence the application of the term 'internal secretion.' The active principle in the secretion is spoken of as a 'hormone,' referring to the changes which their output awakens in the organism. Later experiments have shown that hormones are produced not only by the ductless glands but also by glands possessing a more obvious function. The pancreas, *e.g.*, in addition to elaborating a digestive secretion which flows into the intestine, produces a hormone of which the cessation leads to symptoms of acute diabetes in the patient.

15. **Hormones and sexual structures.**—Not the least important of the hormones are those set free from the genital gland, and it is to them that we must look for the link which connects the secondary sexual characters with the sex gland itself. The ovary and testis are not merely the organs in which the germ cells mature. They also contribute substances which exercise a profound effect upon the general metabolism of the individual. In the testis the hormone is probably elaborated by the so-called interstitial cells, the packing material in which the sperm tubules lie embedded. This, however, cannot be ascertained through direct experiment, because it is at present impossible to remove these cells without removing the whole testis. In the ovary, however, the inquiry as to the seat of hormone production has been pushed a stage farther. When an ovum matures in a mammal, there is formed round it from the follicle cells of the ovary a comparatively large vesicle known as the 'Graafian follicle.' After the rupture which accompanies the liberation of the ovum this vesicle, which is on the surface of the ovary, becomes transformed into a body known from its colour as the *corpus luteum*. The subsequent fate of this body depends upon what happens to the liberated ovum. If this is not fertilized, the *corpus luteum* is rapidly absorbed. If, however, fertilization occurs, the *corpus luteum* increases in size and persists during pregnancy. Recent researches have shown that this body is to be regarded as a temporary gland producing an internal secretion of which the action is twofold, viz. to bring about changes in the wall of the uterus which allow of the formation of a placenta, and to stimulate the mammary gland to increased activity.

It is clear that the genital glands give rise to hormones which produce a marked effect upon the sexual structures in the female that are directly concerned with the development and nutrition of the fœtus. How far their influence stretches to secondary sexual characters is not easy to determine in mammals, where these differences are not so marked as they frequently are in birds. Ovariotomy in the human female might be expected to yield interesting data, but, as the operation is of comparatively recent origin, and is resorted to only in abnormal cases after the adult state is attained, not much is yet to be learned from it. Though satisfactory instances of complete removal of the ovary are rarely available for study, there are many cases on record where the gland has atrophied through either old age or disease. The human female under such conditions may exhibit male characteristics in the gruffness of the voice and in the development of hair on the face. So also the hind may develop horns, and the mare may acquire the development of the canines which is a normal feature of the stallion. It is interesting that among such birds as fowls and pheasants the assumption of male plumage to a greater or less degree is known to accompany degeneration of the ovary through disease or old age.

16. **Transplantation experiments.**—Besides the method of castration, the method of transplantation has also been used in connexion with these studies. Castrated male rats can be distinguished from normal males. If, however, the testis of another individual be grafted into the body of a castrated animal at an early age, it is stated that such animals exhibit the characters and instincts of a normal male. Steinach, to whom we owe these observations, made some further experiments which are of the highest interest and importance. Into the young male rat he transplanted, after castration, the ovaries and oviducts of the female. It is stated that the graft succeeded, and that the animal became literally feminized. The quality of the hair and the adiposity were feminine; the mammary glands were such as are found in the young female; even the instincts were more or less inverted so that the impression of a female was produced on other rats.

One other transplantation experiment deserves mention here as illustrating a different method of attacking the problem. In the experiments just outlined the gland of one sex was grafted into the body of the other and the effects on the sexual characters were noted. In the following experiment the reverse procedure was adopted, and a structure showing a secondary sexual character was grafted on to an individual of the opposite sex. In the male newt the dorsal fin enlarges during the breeding season and becomes markedly serrated. When the dorsal fin of the female, which normally undergoes no alteration at this period, is grafted on to a male, it can produce the characteristic serrated edge, doubtless under the influence of the testis.

17. **Castration of insects.**—While the intimate connexion between the sexual glands and secondary sexual characters is beyond doubt in vertebrates, this connexion is by no means so certain in another of the great groups of the animal kingdom—the insecta. Several investigators have studied by the method of castration the common gipsy-moth (*Lymantria dispar*). The subject is a favourable one, for the sexual dimorphism is marked, the male being far smaller and darker than the female, and having also the peculiar feathered antennæ

characteristic of many male moths. The sex glands are already differentiated in the caterpillar. Removal of them at this stage produces no apparent effect on the metamorphosed insect. For, though it is not possible to distinguish the sexes in the larval stage, the insects derived from castrated caterpillars were all either normal males or normal females in appearance. Further, transplantation of the sex glands in the larvæ failed to produce any effects on the adult insects. By this method were obtained females normal in every way—in the complicated sexual ducts as well as in the secondary sexual characters—but with a testis in place of an ovary. Similarly others of the operated insects turned out to be normal males, except that they contained ovaries instead of testes. Since the castration and transplantation was done in the larvæ before any sexual characters had appeared, it seems natural to conclude that they are independent of any hormone produced by the sex glands. In support of this view are the results of some experiments with crickets (*Gryllus campestris*). Removal of the sex glands, at a stage before the adult condition was reached, had no effect upon any of the structural features peculiar to either sex. More noteworthy was the absence of any change in the sexual instincts and behaviour. Both sexes after castration attracted the opposite sex and mated, and the female took the same care of her empty egg-capsules as the normal female does of her full ones. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the secondary sexual characters may be affected by castration in bees. Certain species of *Andræna* are at times attacked by the little parasitic insect *Stylops*. The parasite does not prevent them from leading their normal active life, but affects the sex gland and renders them sterile. As the result of this 'parasitic castration,' as it has been called, definite changes are produced in the female bee, such as the reduction of the pollen-brushes, but the most noteworthy change is in the clypeus above the upper lip. This, which is normally black in the female, may assume the yellow colour characteristic of the male. Since the parasite does not attack the bee until after the metamorphosis, this change is brought about after the adult state has been reached.

18. Sex transformation in crabs.—Parasitic castration is not uncommon among certain crabs, in which it is brought about by another crustacean belonging to the group Rhizocephala. The results, which were discovered by A. Giard and studied later in more detail by Geoffrey Smith, are of remarkable interest, and are at present unparalleled in any other group of the animal kingdom. The effect of the parasite on the female is a reduction of the sexual modifications characteristic of this sex. The abdomen becomes narrower, and the biramous abdominal appendages, with the long hairs to which the eggs are stuck, become much smaller. But the animal is obviously a female and shows no approximation to the male. In the male, however, parasitic castration produces a very different effect, for it brings about a strong tendency towards the development of female characters. The large male claws diminish to the size of the female ones; the peculiar intromittent organ—a modified appendage—is much reduced; the biramous hairy abdominal appendages, normally absent in the male, are more or less strongly developed. Most remarkable of all is the fact that such males, on getting rid of the parasite and once more developing a sex gland, may form an ovary in place of a testis. Briefly, the effect of the parasite is to change a male into a female.

Castration experiments, so far as they have gone, serve to bring out certain points in connexion with the nature of sexual characters. In the first place, there are good grounds for supposing that different groups of the animal kingdom are not all on the same footing. In vertebrates both the primary sexual characters, such as the genital ducts, and the secondary sexual characters are intimately connected with the functioning of the sexual gland. This is also true of the crustacea, with this difference, that, whereas in the vertebrates the female may take on the secondary sexual characters of the male, among the crustacea it is the male which can assume the sexual characters of the female. Among insects, on the other hand, it appears that both the primary and the secondary sexual characters are developed independently of the sex glands.

19. The stage of differentiation.—Since experimental work of the kind outlined above is directed primarily towards an analysis of the constitution of the two sexes, we may inquire how far these may be supposed to have been brought into line with one another—how far sexual characters are due to a fundamental difference in hereditary constitution, and how far they are due to different hormones acting specifically upon a similar constitution. It is well known that among vertebrates each sex possesses in a rudimentary condition the primary sexual characters which are well developed in the other. Embryology has shown that the genital organs are laid down upon a common plan. It is not until a certain stage is reached that the female elements predominate in an individual which is to become a female, and the male elements in one which is to become a male. In the earlier stages the embryo is hermaphrodite in so far as the sexual characters are concerned. It is tempting to suppose that the one essential difference in the earliest stages is that of the sex gland itself, that this is decided at fertilization, and that, as it develops and produces its internal secretions, it stimulates one portion of the originally hermaphrodite set of sex characters and inhibits the development of the other. Though there are difficulties at present in putting this view to the experimental test, nature herself has performed a most interesting experiment which bears upon the point. Animals that normally produce a single offspring at a birth not infrequently produce two. Where these are not twins proper—*i.e.* enclosed in the same chorion, of the same sex, and presumably derived from a single ovum—they are most frequently one of either sex. Cattle, however, rarely produce a male and a female at a birth. Where one of the two is a normal male, the other is commonly what is called a 'free martin,' an animal which in its sexual characters is predominantly male, but is always sterile. Since described by John Hunter more than a century ago, the free martin remained a puzzle to the biologist, and its nature has only just been unravelled through the observations of F. R. Lillie. It now seems certain that it is really a female which develops abnormally owing to a connexion established at an early stage between its blood-vessels and those of the male embryo that lies beside it in the uterus. It is suggested that the testis of the male develops more rapidly than the ovary of his sister, so that its internal secretions reach the latter through the vascular connexion just referred to, inhibit the development of the ovary and its secretions, and stimulate the growth of the male portion of the originally hermaphrodite sexual apparatus. But, though the secretions affect all the sexual characters, they cannot change the fundamental nature of the sexual gland. The ovary is inhibited in its growth; but it remains an ovary and not a testis. It would clearly be of great interest to determine whether the influence of ovarial hormones acting at an early stage would

ead to the development of the female portion of the genital ducts in a male embryo. At present there is here a serious gap in our knowledge.

20. **Inhibitory factors.**—If we regard the embryo as potentially a hermaphrodite with regard to the primary sexual characters, of which the ultimate form is determined by the activity of the sex gland itself, we are naturally led to inquire whether we can regard the secondary sexual characters in the same light. Does the young chicken of either sex, *e.g.*, contain the same complete set of factors for such characters, and is the different result in the two sexes due to the stimulation of different parts of the set by the ovary and testis respectively? Though this may be true in respect of some of the secondary sexual characters, such as the size of the comb and wattles, which are definitely altered in the male as the result of castration, there is probably a simpler explanation for the plumage. The facts given are in accordance with the view that both sexes contain the same set of characters for plumage, but that the female in addition contains a factor which inhibits the development of the male type. If the action of this inhibitor is dependent upon an ovarian hormone, we can understand why the castrated female should develop male plumage.[1] Plumage in the fowl offers a further point of interest in that the female feathering is found in the males of certain breeds, notably Sebright Bantams, Henny Game, and Campines. In heredity henny plumage in the cock behaves as a simple dominant to normal cock plumage. In terms of the 'presence and absence' theory,[2] the henny cock must be supposed to contain an additional factor which acts as an inhibitor just as it does in the hen. This view is supported by castration experiments, for removal of the testes from a henny cock causes him to develop normal cock plumage. The inhibitor of cock plumage, when present, must be supposed capable of being activated by a hormone which is found in both of the sex glands. Normally the factor for inhibition, *i.e.* the factor upon which the secondary sexual difference depends, is linked with a factor for femaleness, so that the characteristic male plumage is repressed only in this sex. If this inhibitor did not exist, it is probable that the fowl, like the pigeon, would not exhibit sexual differences in the plumage.

The great interest of this poultry case is to demonstrate that a secondary sexual character may depend upon one or more distinct hereditary factors, transmissible at times independently of sex, inoperative unless stimulated by a hormone from the sexual gland, but activated through the gland of either sex indifferently. Such sexual characters are on a different footing in the organism from those which develop from a common hermaphrodite basis through the differential activation by one or other of the sex glands. In the latter the difference is brought about by a different sex gland acting through its hormones on similarly constituted individuals; in the former the difference depends upon an unlikeness in constitution which can be expressed in terms of hereditary factors.

21. **Transference of sexual characters.**—To what extent the interpretation of the case of the fowl's plumage will be found applicable to cases of secondary characters in other vertebrates it is not yet possible to say, for in no other instance has the analysis of such a character been pushed so far. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of the transference of sexual characters from one sex to the other that is so distinctive a feature of the poultry case. It has already been mentioned that certain male characters may appear in the female as the result of degenerative changes in the ovary through old age or disease.[1] Cases are also on record where male characters make their appearance in females presumably normal as regards the state of the ovary. The hens of poultry and pheasants are sometimes spurred; excessive development of hair on the face may occur in women; antlers are occasionally found on the hind, a condition normal in the reindeer. Among sheep the horns, which in certain breeds are a sexual character of the ram, are in others common to the ewe. Conversely, the cock is sometimes spurless; the stag may fail to develop antlers; there are breeds of sheep in which the ram is hornless like the ewe; the smooth face of the woman is not infrequent in the man, and at times he may show the mammary development of the opposite sex. Many striking cases occur among birds, where habits generally characteristic of one sex may be found in the other. Thus the male ostrich shows the brooding instinct as well as the female, and this is occasionally found in the uncastrated cock among domestic poultry. More remarkable still is the case of the Phalarope, in which the more gaily coloured female does the courting, while the male attends to the duties of incubation. Such instances of transference could be largely added to, but those given serve to illustrate the point that at any rate a substantial proportion of so-called secondary sexual characters depend upon specific hereditary factors which may at times be transmitted independently of the factor for sex.

22. **Gynandromorphism.** — The phenomena of gynandromorphism and of hermaphroditism among animals in which the sexes are usually separate afford some further material for the analysis of sexual characters. Gynandromorphs are most common among insects. An individual may be completely male on one side and completely female on the other, which often results in a striking appearance where the sexes are markedly different. Both sex glands may coexist in the same body in a normal state, nor does this condition appear to affect the sexual characters. This lack of influence is in accordance with the evidence already given in connexion with castration experiments.

Complete lateral gynandromorphism probably depends upon some abnormality either in fertilization or in an early cleavage stage. One suggestion put forward is that fertilization is delayed till after the first cleavage, and that only one of the first two cells is fertilized. The female part of the gynandromorph is then regarded as derived from the fertilized half, and the male part as developing parthenogenetically from the unfertilized half. Another suggestion is that the egg is penetrated by two sperms, one of which unites in the normal way with the egg-nucleus, while the other develops independently. Besides lateral gynandromorphism, insects may exhibit a form of gynandromorphism in which the secondary sexual characters of the two sexes are jumbled up together. In the gipsy-moth, *e.g.*, insects occur with the wings presenting a mosaic of the darker male and the lighter female patterns. In such individuals the sexual glands and ducts are normal, and fertility is unimpaired. These mosaic forms are normally produced as the result of the mating between the European form (*Lymantria dispar*) and the Japanese one (*Lymantria japonica*), and the proportions in which they appear can be brought into line with Mendelian principles. Goldschmidt, who made numerous breeding experiments with these species, offers an interesting interpretation of his results. While the factors for the secondary sexual characters are hereditarily independent of the sex factors themselves, those derived from *Lymantria japonica* are

[1] Cf. § 12. [2] Cf. art. Heredity, § 8.

[1] Cf. § 15.

more potent than those from *Lymantria dispar*. When the secondary sexual factors of *Lymantria japonica* come to be associated with the sex factors of *Lymantria dispar*, or *vice versa*, the normal equilibrium between the two sets of factors is disturbed and gynandromorphous individuals result.

Lateral gynandromorphism is extremely rare in vertebrates, and never so complete as among insects. In view of the influence exerted on sexual characters by the sex glands, this is not surprising. For, since the hormones circulate freely in the general blood stream, a difference in the sexual characters of the two sides of the body would be very remarkable. It is not improbable that, when we know more of the functions of the sympathetic nervous system, the few cases on record will eventually receive a somewhat different explanation. Partial gynandromorphism is, however, not rare among vertebrates. One of the commonest forms which it takes is the association of the external genitalia of the female with the male gland and ducts. In such cases the testis generally fails to descend with the scrotum, nor does it contain ripe spermatozoa. The gynandromorphism may be less marked, taking the form known as hypospadias. The male is then generally fertile, and there is evidence that the condition is hereditary. It may be that some abnormality of the sex gland, such as the failure to develop this or that particular hormone, lies at the bottom of the various forms of gynandromorphism. Again, it may be that the sex gland itself is normal, and that some hereditary factor has been dropped out from the complex which is concerned with the sexual characters. Which view is to be taken must depend largely upon the results of future experimental work.

23. Mentality and sex.—For social and for ethical reasons the experimental analysis of sex is of fundamental importance. Recent research has demonstrated that there is reason for supposing that mental qualities are inherited on the same lines as physical ones. Owing to the newness of the methods involved and to the difficulties in procuring satisfactory data, little progress has yet been possible, but there is good evidence already in existence for regarding some forms of feeble-mindedness and musical sense as recessive to the normal condition. There is no doubt that, as time goes on, the analysis of mental qualities will be placed upon a more satisfactory basis, though, as this analysis must be based upon human material, the time will necessarily be long. Mentality, as every one knows, differs profoundly in the two sexes. A vast amount has been written on this subject; endless speculations have been devoted to it; but little of value has been evolved. To-day we begin to recognize that what is required is experimental analysis—analysis of mental traits on the one hand, and analysis of the sexual mechanism on the other. Consider, *e.g.*, the case of intellectual achievement by the two sexes, upon which so much has been written. Achievement of the first rank stands almost without exception to the credit of the male sex. In the things of the intellect the male is the creative sex. The fact is beyond dispute; but, when we seek to explain why it is so, we obtain very little satisfaction from those who have discussed it. Before we can begin to understand it, we must have some analysis of the nature of intellectual activity—whether it depends upon definite hereditary factors, like so many other qualities, and, if so, in what way these factors are transmitted. Are they sex-linked, as is known to be the case for colour-blindness, and is the woman of outstanding intellectual attainment rare for the same reason that a colour-blind woman is rare? Or are they dependent upon the activity of the sex gland, either directly or indirectly through the influence of some inhibitor which itself is activated by the gland? Again, are they acted upon differently by the ovarial and by the testicular hormones? Until we can answer such questions as these, further discussion is idle.

LITERATURE.—Works dealing with the nature of sex in its biological aspect are very numerous. Ample bibliographies are given in several of the volumes of the appended brief list, which, either from authority or modernity, will be found of especial value to those who wish to inquire further on this subject: C. Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, 2 vols., London, 1871; L. Doncaster, *The Determination of Sex*, Cambridge, 1914; P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson, *The Evolution of Sex*[2], London, 1901; T. H. Morgan, *Heredity and Sex*[2], New York, 1914. To these may be added the following list of books or papers more especially mentioned in this article: E. Bataillon, *Arch. de Zool. Exper.* xlvi. [1910] 101–135; K. Düsing, *Jenaische Zeitschrift*, xvii. [1884] 593–940; R. Goldschmidt, *Zeitschr. für induktive Abstammungs- und Vererbungslehre*, viii. [1912] 1–62, xi. [1914] 280–316; H. D. Goodale, Publ. no. 243. Carnegie Inst. of Washington, 1916; O. Hertwig, *Arch. für mikroskop. Anat.*, lxxxii. [1913] pt. ii. pp. 1–63; J. S. Huxley, *The Auk*, xxxiii. [1916] 142–161, 256–270; F. R. Lillie, *Journ. Exp. Zool.*, xxiii. [1917] 371–452; J. Loeb, *Artificial Parthenogenesis and Fertilization*, Chicago, 1913; G. W. Smith, 'Studies in the Experimental Analysis of Sex,' pts. i.–xi., *Quart. Journ. Micr. Science*, 1910–1914; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, London, 1889.

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SHADOW.—See SOUL.

SHAFI'ITES.—See LAW (Muhammadan).

SHAHĪDS.—As applied to Sikhs the term *shahīd* means 'martyr,' just as it does in the case of Muhammadans, and it appears to have been in use as early as the time of Guru Govind Singh.[1] The Shahīds are first found as an organized company in 1734 as one of the five which constituted the Ṭarū Dal, or young army of the Sikhs. Its leaders were Dīp Singh, Natha Singh, Gurbaksh, and others.[2] But among the Sikhs the name Shahīd is generally confined to the disciples and followers of Dīp Singh and Sadā Singh. Dīp Singh was a Khāra Jāṭ of Pohupind in Lahore and became one of the Khālsa's earliest adherents. He fought under Guru Govind Singh and Banda. At Damdama he acquired learning, and Sadā Singh became his disciple. At this time the imperial governor of Lahore had set a price upon the Sikhs' heads, but Dīwān Kaura Mal Khatri warned them of an impending attack. Dīp Singh dismissed all his followers who had earthly ties, and only 60 men remained with him. With these he encountered the imperial troops till all the Sikhs had fallen, Dīp Singh continuing to fight even after his head had been struck off. Thereby he earned the title of Shahīd, and the imperial governor, alarmed by a dream, sought his pardon and bestowed Pohupind in *jāgīr* upon his sister Mālan. The place where she burned the bodies of the fallen at Amritsar is still known as the Shahīd Bunga. Other accounts connect the story with Sudhā or Sadā Singh, and make Karm Singh and Dharm Singh, Sindhū Jāṭs, his disciples.[3] According to Khazān Singh, this Shahīd was killed fighting with the governor of Jullundur.[4] Khazān Singh also says that Shahīd Dīp Singh took possession of the Siālkot tract in 1759, and made it over to his disciples Diāl Singh and Natha Singh, who eventually assigned it for the maintenance of the shrine of the Ber of Bābā Nānak at that town. Sudhā Singh, who succeeded Dīp Singh as head of the *misl*, was killed in 1762, and Karm Singh was then elected its head. In 1763 he occupied Shāhzādpur and other tracts in

[1] M. A. Macauliffe, 'The Rise of Amritsar and the Alterations of the Sikh Religion,' in *Calcutta Review*, 1881, p. 74, or *Selections from the Calcutta Review*, 2nd ser., Calcutta, 1896, p. 100.

[2] Khazān Singh, *Philosophic Hist. of the Sikh Religion*, Lahore, 1914, i. 237.

[3] D. G. Barkley, in *PNQ* ii. [1884] 1110; cf. Lepel Griffin, *The Rajas of the Panjab*[2], Lahore, 1873, p. 461, and W. Wynyard, *Ambāla Settlement Report*, Lahore, 1859, § 83.

[4] i. 231.

Ambāla, and in 1778 the *nawāb* of Rānia assigned him twelve villages for the maintenance of his shrine, on condition that the Sikhs should abstain from raiding his territory. On Karm Singh's death in 1794 he was succeeded by his son Gulāb Singh, and the territories of the *misl* in the neighbourhood of Shāhzādpur became hereditary in his family.

For Muhammadan *shahīds* see art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Muhammadan in India).

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted in the footnotes.

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SHAIKH.—See PIR.

SHAKERS.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

SHAMANISM.[1] — Shamanism is the name given to the native religion of the Ural-Altaic peoples from Bering Straits to the borders of Scandinavia. Weakened through the progress of Buddhism, Islām, and Christianity, it still exists even among tribes professing these faiths. On the whole, it is in a more or less moribund condition; and, although its nature was everywhere much the same, its development varied in different tribes. Analogous phenomena are found among the Eskimo, and also among many American Indian tribes, whose medicine-men are often called shamans by investigators. How far it exists elsewhere, either as a system of religion or with its various aspects more or less reproduced, is discussed below.

The word 'shaman' appears to be derived from the native Tungus name for the priest or medicine-man, *samán*, used also with other names among the Buriats and Yakuts. *Samán* has been thought to be an adaptation of the Pāli *samana* (Skr. *śramaṇa*), a Buddhist monk or mendicant, through the Chinese *sha mên*, but evidence is lacking. Still less likely is the derivation from Persian *shemen*, an idol or temple. Other native names are: Yakut, *oyun*, fem. *udayan*; Buriat, *bö*, fem. *odeyon*, *utyyan*; Altaian, *kam*; Ostyak, *senin*, fem. *senin*; Samoyed, *tadibei*; Lapp, *noid*.

1. What is shamanism?—The primitive religion of these tribes is polytheism or polydæmonism, with strong roots in nature-worship, and generally with a supreme god over all. While the shaman exercises certain priestly functions, his main powers are connected with healing and divination. These he exercises by virtue of his intimate relations with the supernatural world. Certain spirits aid him, possess him, are at his command. He has direct intercourse with spirits, and actual (bodily or spiritual) access to the spirit-world. With the aid of these he obtains knowledge superior to that of ordinary men, and can overcome or drive out hostile spirits or powers. All his magical acts are done by virtue of his power over or influence with spirits. And generally, during the exercise of his powers, the altered mental state of the shaman is in evidence. Through auto-hypnotism, caused by different methods, a state of trance or alternate personality is produced. The initiation of the shaman has also distinctive features. Though his functions and methods are more or less paralleled in many other regions, there are differences. The medicine-man of other tribes may use other methods, on the one hand as far as magic is concerned, on the other as far as an empirical medical science is concerned—sweat-baths, herbal remedies, crude surgery, and the like. And, while the shaman has priestly functions, the priests of other faiths have characteristics and functions in which they differ from him. On the whole, the Ural-Altaic shaman, as priest but much more as magic-wielder, is distinguished by his active relation to the spirit-world and by his regular consecration to his office. He is a mediator between gods and spirits on the one hand and men on the other. He knows the secrets of gods and spirits, often malevolent, and the well-being of all depends on his power to cajole or overcome them by various actions, rites, and sacrifices. By these he can enlist the services of spirits. Among the Yakuts a shaman has an *emekhet*, or guardian-spirit, a divinity or the spirit of a dead shaman, who aids and advises him. In other cases he may have many spirits in his control, and the more of these he has the more powerful he is.

2. The shaman.—In some tribes (Samoyeds, Ostyaks) the office is hereditary; in others a predisposition to it suffices. The youth shows signs of it in childhood, which are thought to prove that he has been chosen by the spirits[1] (Tunguses, Yakuts, Altai tribes). Among the Buriats, while any one may become a shaman or be chosen by the gods, the office is usually hereditary. Both systems are also found among the Lapps. Yet, whether hereditary or selected, the youth generally shows a predisposition to the office. He is nervous, moody, irritable, dreamy, given to hallucinations and trances, or he is epileptic. The Tungus youth declares that a dead shaman has chosen him in a dream as his successor, but he also shows himself crazy, timorous, and stupefied. Similarly among the Yakuts he gabbles like a maniac, takes to the woods, jumps into fire or water, injures himself with weapons. Among the Ostyaks the shaman chooses one of his sons according to his fitness, but the youth then spends his time in practices which irritate the nervous system and excite the imagination. The Buriat hereditary shaman shows special signs as a child: he is subject to fits and trances, has visions, and is fond of solitude, and it is then thought that his soul is with the spirits, being trained by them. On the whole, the shaman is abnormal, neurotic, and epileptic; his functions are based on his abnormal qualities and aggravate these in turn. But in any case a period is devoted to training and austerities. The youth may live for a time in the woods in a half-crazy state, practising austerities or shamanist exercises.[2] In addition he is usually taught for a longer or shorter period by an old shaman regarding the different kinds of spirits and the manner of summoning them.[3] Thus the whole preliminary period is given up to methods which augment the abnormal state and still more separate the postulant from other men. These methods, including aggravation of the nervous system, trances or fits, austerities, communion with spirits, visits to the spirit-world in trance, acquisition of knowledge from the spirits, are reproduced in the rites of the shaman, once he is consecrated to his office.[4]

Then follows the consecration to his office.

'The shaman assumes an exceptional position, takes vows upon himself, becomes the property of spirits who, though subject to his summons, have yet full power over him.'[5]

Among the Yakuts an old shaman takes him to a hill or an open field, clothes him in shaman's dress and gives him the tambourine and drum-stick, and, setting him between nine chaste youths and nine chaste maidens, makes him promise that he will be faithful to the spirit who will fulfil his prayer. He tells him where the spirits dwell, what diseases they cause, and how they may be appeased. Then, having killed a sacrificial animal, he sprinkles the candidate's dress with the blood. The spectators finally feast on the flesh.[6]

Among the Buriats the ceremony is much more elaborate, and has already been fully described.[7]

3. Functions of the shaman.—The shaman may be regarded as one whose priestly, prophetic, and magico-medical functions have not been differenti-

[1] For particular forms of shamanism see artt. BURIATS, OSTYAKS, SAMOYED, TUNGUS, YAKUTS.

[1] See *ERE* x. 281. [2] *ERE* x. 124ᵃ.

[3] Cf. *ERE* iv. 777ᵇ.

[4] A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 158.

[5] V. M. Mikhailovskii, 'Shamanism in Siberia and European Russia,' tr. O. Wardrop, *JAI* xxiv. [1895] 90.

[6] Mikhailovskii, p. 86. [7] See art. BURIATS, § 30.

ated. As to his priestly functions, while he acts occasionally as sacrificer and takes part in public and family sacrifices, his presence as priest and sacrificer is of secondary importance to his other functions.' He performs sacrifices from time to time, and at these carries on dialogues with the gods, but there are many sacrifices at which his presence is not essential, and which are offered, *e.g.*, by the elder of a tribe or head of a household. As far as the shaman is concerned, his connexion with sacrifice is mainly the fact that he knows what sacrifices will be pleasing to the gods on any particular occasion and the right means of appeasing them, since they are most particular about the form of sacrifice and prayer. Sacrifice is an important part of the shamanistic rites of healing and divination, but the shaman merely directs the nature and method of the offering from his knowledge of the gods and spirits. In healing, after the magical ceremonies, aided by the presence of spirits, it is indispensable to appease the gods who have relieved the patient, and the shaman decides what offerings are to be made to them.

The priestly functions of the shaman, and their connexion with magic, may be seen from his actions at the great sacrifice to the god Bai-Yulgan among the Altai.

On the first evening a *yurta* is prepared in a place selected by him, and a young birch-tree, with the lower branches lopped, is set up in it. A cattle pen is made outside, and a horse is chosen, which is held by a man called 'the holder of the head.' The shaman waves a birch twig over it, thus driving its soul to the gods, accompanied by the holder's soul. Then he assembles the spirits in his tambourine, sits on the image of a goose, and is supposed to be pursuing the soul of the horse upon it. Having captured the soul, he blesses it, and with the aid of assistants slays the horse. The bones and skin form the offering; the flesh is eaten by the shaman and the company. Next evening, having fed the spirits in the tambourine, he cleanses the souls of all present by certain rites, and prepares the head of the household to understand the prophecies which he is about to utter. In a state of ecstasy he describes how he is mounting the heavens on the soul of the victim or on the goose. He describes what he sees in the heavens, prophesies and utters secrets learned there, and, finally, having reached the ninth or even the tenth or twelfth heaven, he invokes Bai-Yulgan, learns whether he accepts the sacrifice, and obtains information regarding the coming weather, the harvest, etc., as well as the sacrifices which will then be required. He now falls exhausted. Frequently a third day is devoted to feasting and libations to the gods. The number of heavens scaled by the shaman depends upon his powers.[1]

In this rite the prophetic powers of the shaman are seen, and these, as well as his healing powers, distinguish him from a regular priest. While divination may be practised by means of a shoulder-blade, a stick covered with runes, or the flight of arrows, the method of foretelling the future, supplying information regarding the winning of success or averting of misfortune, or explaining the perplexities of inquirers is the *séance*, or what is locally known as *kamlanie*.

In this the shaman, his assistants, and the spectators are collected in a darkened hut. The dress necessary to the occasion is donned. The shaman beats his tambourine, summoning the spirits, and collects them in it. He sings, dances, cries out, converses with the spirits, and by these means proves his inspired state. He rushes round till he falls fainting and produces delirium. While he is in this state, the spirits reveal their will to him or give him the desired information.[2] He foretells the future and declares the will of the gods. When he awakens, he remembers nothing of what has passed. During the performance voices and noises of various kinds are heard, and these are believed to be produced by the spirits. Or, again, the shaman will allege that he is rising through the heavens, pushing aside the stars, and he describes his experiences. Rhythmic songs, prayers, and adorations are used by the shaman in the *kamlanie*.

The healing powers of the shaman, while they are partially medical, are mainly connected with the belief that diseases are caused by spirits which have lodged themselves in the sufferer. Hence the purpose of the ceremonies is to placate them or drive them out.

[1] V. V. Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*, ii. 20 ff.
[2] Cf. *ERE* x. 124[b], 125[a].

The shaman may take over the spirit causing the disease into himself, and indicate the necessary sacrifice, into which he now conveys it; or he may decide that the patient's soul has left his body or been carried off to Erlik's realm. Wherever it is, during the course of the performance he pursues it, even to its prison with Erlik, who may release it for certain sacrifices or may demand another soul in its stead. This soul is ensnared by the shaman and taken to Erlik, and its owner now dies. Such a performance is lengthy and expensive. Or, again, after much smoking, tambourine-playing, noise-producing, and singing (by which the shaman brings down his guardian-spirit), he dances and sings, and, having discovered the cause of the illness, is assured of the help of powerful spirits. Still dancing and beating the tambourine, he approaches the patient, expels the possessing spirit or sucks it out, and drives it away. Finally, sacrifice is offered to propitiate the gods who have relieved the sufferer. Among the Samoyeds, if it is thought that the supreme deity Num has sent the illness, the shaman refuses to oppose the divine will, but in other cases he will persuade a *tadebtsi* (spirit) to go and implore Num to lend his aid.[1]

At all such *séances* the spectators are much impressed by the whirling, dancing, singing, screaming, tambourine-playing, and ecstatic behaviour of the shaman, and believe that spirits are present. Equally they believe in all that he is asserting—his flight through the air or into the heavens and his visits to distant regions. They are terror-struck, and their nerves are much affected. Frequently the shaman proves his power by conjuring tricks, or by being bound and then released by the spirits whom he has summoned, or by thrusting knives into his body. But this 'does not exclude the possibility of a profound conviction on the part of the shamans that they are chosen by the spirits, have intercourse with them, and possess a mysterious power over the forces of nature.'[2]

In the south of Siberia mystery-plays in which the shamans are the actors are common. Among the Altaians the shaman's supposed journey to Erlik's realm is acted in the most dramatic fashion. This dramatization is also found among the Buriats, the shaman acting the part of the deity and other personages.[3] At the *séances* the dialogues carried on by the shaman with the spirits—their voices being produced by himself—are also of a highly dramatic character. Here we approach what is fully developed among many American Indian tribes—the dramatization of the life of the gods by members of a mystery-cult who represent the various divinities.

4. **The shaman's dress and accessaries.**—At his ceremonies the shaman wears a special dress—a coat hung with iron, rattles, rings, and representations of mythical animals, or with twisted handkerchiefs representing snakes, a mask, a breast-plate, a hat, and embroidered stockings. All these have a definite meaning and purpose, and often a mystic character. Among the accessaries are a tambourine and a drum-stick. The tambourine has a cross-bar hung with rattles and is decorated with figures of a symbolic kind, intimately connected with shamanistic beliefs and mysteries. The spirits give this tambourine to the shaman, and spirits are called up by it and collected in it, while on it he is carried through the air. Horse-staves of wood or iron, specially prepared and decorated, are also used in the rites, and on them the shaman flies to heaven.[4]

5. **Organization.**—Shamans do not appear to be organized into an ecclesiastical caste or hierarchy, but they have varying grades and are held in differing degrees of respect according to their powers and their relation to the gods and spirits. Among the Buriats there is a distinction between hereditary shamans and those who have become shamans for some accidental reason. Among the Buriats also there are 'white shamans,' *i.e.* those who serve the good *tengris* of the west, and 'black shamans,' *i.e.* those who serve the evil *tengris* of the east. The former are honoured as those who can help men through their influence with beneficent powers; the latter are feared, because

[1] M. A. Castrén, *Reiseerinnerungen*, Petrograd and Leipzig, 1853, p. 194 ff., quoted by Mikhailovskii, p. 143; cf. art. OSTYAKS, vol. ix. p. 580[b].
[2] Mikhailovskii, p. 138.
[3] Cf. art. BURIATS, § 27.
[4] For details of all these see artt. BURIATS, vol. iii. p. 16[b], OSTYAKS, vol. ix. p. 580[b], DRUM, vol. v. pp. 90[b], 94[a]; Mikhailovskii, p. 78 ff.

through the evil spirits they may work ill to men —*e.g.*, steal their souls—and they are sometimes murdered for their evil deeds. Their lore is of a much more secret character than that of the white shamans, and there is a standing feud between them. Female shamans are also found among the Tunguses, Ostyaks, Buriats, and Yakuts, though with the last they are regarded as inferior to the male shamans, yet are preferred for the cure of mental disease. Among the Kamchadals the place of the shaman was usually taken by specially gifted old women.[1] The importance of the shaman is sufficiently upheld by the nature of his training and experience, his consecration, and the ceremonies performed before awed spectators. Usually implicit faith is put in him, except among the Chukchis, where his functions are limited to healing and conjuring.[2] The ideas concerning a shaman's death also reveal the manner in which he is regarded. Possessed by spirits, shamans do not die by the will of the gods, but by their demons being sent to kill each other. The elaborate nature of the funeral continues these ideas. Their burial-places in groves are inviolate and sacred, and dead shamans are the objects of a cult with sacrifices, while the dead shaman protects his people against the spirits of hostile shamans.

Although shamanism is described as moribund, it still exercises considerable power both in Buddhist Tibet and among nominally Christian tribes.

6. The shaman among the Eskimo.—The position and function of the so-called shaman among the Eskimo are analogous to those just described. The shades of the dead and supernatural beings called *tunghât* are controlled or owned by certain men, and even women, among the Eskimo of Bering Strait. The more of them each shaman, or *tun-gha-lik*, can subject to his will, the more powerful does he become. Usually a man becomes aware of spirit-power by remarkable circumstances in his life. He then goes to an old *tun-gha-lik*, in order to secure control of powers sufficient to enable him to announce himself as a *tun-gha-lik*, or he practises his art in private. In some districts he causes the death of a new-born child, steals its body, dries and preserves it, thus gaining control of its shade as a very powerful helper. Through his power over the spirits he drives off evil influences, or joins with other shamans in doing so if these influences are too strong. Both shades of the dead and shades of animals come at his call, and he claims to journey to the land of the dead and reports what he has seen there, the shades and spirits being visible to him. Like the Asiatic shaman, he knows what rites and sacrifices will be acceptable to the shades and spirits; hence his instructions are usually followed in the observance of festivals and ceremonies. He can change the weather, and cure the sick by means of incantations and performances. He is feared, and his advice is usually obeyed; but, if he uses his powers for bad ends or fails in what he sets out to do, the results may be fatal for him. Amulets and fetishes possess virtues which are secured to them by his means.[3]

Similarly among the Central Eskimo the *angakok* (plur. *angakut*) is protected by the spirits, especially by the spirit of the bear, which is acquired by a mysterious ceremony. These spirit-helpers, the indwellers of things, or *inue*, are known as *tôrnak* (plur. *tornait*). The chief office of an *angakok* is to discover the cause of sickness, misfortune, or death.

Within a darkened hut he sits down, his body shakes, and inhuman sounds are heard. He invokes the *tornait* with singing and shouting, and then announces what the atonement must be. Questions are also asked of the *tornait* regarding the cause of sickness. Ventriloquism appears to be used in such *séances*. Or the *tôrnak* is heard approaching, the hut shakes, and the *angakok* is supposed to fly with the spirit to distant regions. Or, again, the *angakok's* body is tied up, while he invokes the *tornait*. His body remains motionless, while his soul flies off, and on its return the thongs are found untied. In the Sedna feast, as in shamanistic rites, the *angakok* allows, or pretends to allow, his body to be pierced with harpoons. Sedna and other spirits come while the *angakok* is busy praying. He falls into a trance, and on awakening promises the help of the good spirits against the *tupilak*. The hardest task is to drive away Sedna, and this can be done only by the most powerful *angakut*. The *angakok* performs jugglery, and in the songs and incantations uses a sacred language. Most of the *angakut* believe in their powers, and in the *séances* go into ecstasy and trance.[1]

Among the Greenland Eskimo the *angakut* are said to obtain power by applying to an exalted spirit, who makes the *inue*, or invisible rulers, become their *tornait*, or helping and guardian-spirits. The *angakut* give counsel on all supernatural affairs, as well as in matters of daily life, and procure good weather or success in hunting by invoking a *tôrnak* and conciliating the *arnarkuagsak*. They cure the sick by extraordinary actions, give oracles, and use conjuring. The spirit *séance*, with use of the magic drum, and the bodily or spirit flight of the *angakok* are also found here. The *angakut* are the authorized teachers and judges in all questions of religious belief.[2]

7. The American Indian shaman.—Among the American Indians the most complete parallel to Asiatic shamanism is found among the tribes of the north-west, the priestly character being also here combined with it. The shaman performs religious functions and is also healer through being possessed by a supernatural being. He bears the name of this spirit and imitates its appearance. At a *séance*, by throwing himself into an ecstatic condition, he learns from the spirit the cause of sickness (which is then got rid of by blowing upon the patient or by other methods) or things and events hidden and future. The shaman has also the power of recovering the soul; he proves his powers by a variety of conjuring tricks. Yet, even where shamanism was strongest (Tlingit, Haida, Kwakiutl, Tsimshian), the chief was apt to act as priest—*e.g.*, in secret society performances.[3] On the whole, the shaman of the north-west tribes is still less of a priest than he is in Asia.[4]

The greatest development of shamanism is found among the Tlingit, with whom the shaman's spirit-helpers are many, as compared with the single helper of the Haida shaman. He has several masks, each representing one principal spirit, together with lesser spirits for each feature. He is specially aided by the spirit of the crest-animals of the family to whom these emblems belong. In the treatment of the sick the shaman draws out the material object which caused the sickness, not a spirit tormenting the patient. This method, including sucking out the disease, is also followed among the Haida, Tsimshian, Songish, and other tribes,[5] but the *séance* as used by the Asiatic shaman is lacking. Where the disease is judged to be caused by the absence of the soul, after singing, use of the rattle, dancing, etc., the shamans go to the place where the soul is supposed to be, or one of them sends his *tl'k'ā'yin*, or guardian-spirit, after it (Songish), or dispatches his

[1] Mikhailovskii, p. 68. [2] *Ib.* p. 131.
[2] E. W. Nelson, 'The Eskimo about Bering Strait,' *18 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. pp. 388, 427 ff.

[1] F. Boas, 'The Central Eskimo,' *6 RBEW* [1888], pp. 592 ff., 604.
[2] H. J. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1875, pp. 39, 59 ff.; F. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1893, p. 283.
[3] J. R. Swanton, *HAI* ii. 523.
[4] A. H. Keane, *Man, Past and Present*, Cambridge, 1899, p. 376.
[5] F. Boas, 'First General Report on the Indians of British Columbia,' in *Report of 59th Meeting of British Association*, London, 1890, pp. 848–855.

own soul to catch it (Chiliwack).[1] The soul is then restored to the patient. The Tlingit shaman can put spirits into material objects and send these out to do mischief. He locates supplies of food, aids in war, and fights hostile shamans by means of the spirits. The succession is from uncle to nephew, the nephew receiving his uncle's spirit in a trance after the burial. Offerings are made at the graves of shamans, and their houses in the forest are avoided lest the intruder should be made sick. The shaman's power is more dreaded among the Tlingit than among the Haida.[2]

With the Chinooks gods are invoked by the shaman for the cure of the sick, and the search for the soul by the souls of shamans is also practised. Here also, not an invading spirit, but a material object, causes sickness and is removed.[3]

Among the Dénés shamanism of this type is prevalent, with the curious addition (found also among the Eskimo to some extent) of the patient's confession of sins to the shaman.[4] With the Cherokees the type of shamanistic methods of healing resembles those already detailed, but there is appeal to the spirits to aid the shaman rather than compulsion or control over the spiritual world.[5]

Among many tribes the shaman's functions were divided among different kinds of shamans. With the Maidu (among whom all the children of a shaman must become shamans, else the spirits would kill them) there are a class of curative shamans and another class known as dreamers, who hold communion with spirits and ghosts. During the winter the latter have *séances* in darkened houses, when they hold converse with spirits. One who has not a shaman for his father goes to the mountains and there performs certain ceremonies, as do also shamans who wish to obtain more powerful spirits.[6] Or, again, as with the Ojibwa, there is the *midē'wiwin*, or society of the shamans, in which the candidate for admission is supposed to die and come to life again full of spirit-power. The members use incantations and exorcisms and administer remedies. There are, again, the *jĕśsakĭds*, prophets or jugglers, who speak with the *manidōs* in a hut at a *séance*. The hut shakes violently, and the voices of the spirits are heard from it. There are also *wâbĕnōs* (who prepare charms) and herbalists, but only the *midé* are combined in a society. A similar division is found among the Menomini—the *mitäwit* (society of shamans), the *tshiśaqka* (jugglers), and the *wâbĕnō*. The magical feats of the *midé* and *mitä'e* are done by the help of their *manidōs*, the power possessed by the shaman's 'medicine,' which typifies his tutelary spirit. The *jĕśsakĭds* at the *séance* obtain information from the spirits—*e.g.*, regarding sickness, the person causing it, its cure, etc. They also remove the substance causing sickness by sucking, after singing incantations and using the rattle.[7] Divisions of a similar kind are found among the Chippewas and Delawares.

With the Chippewas the method of healing included a fast on the part of the shaman and the erection of a medicine-lodge for him, into which the patient was brought. The shaman chanted to his tambourine, causing a spirit to descend. The spirit entered the patient and removed his sin, already confessed to the shaman, and also inserted his soul which had escaped. Sucking out the material cause of disease was also used.[1]

These mystery-societies are found among all but the lowest tribes, and the aim of their ceremonies is physical and spiritual well-being. The rites are frequently shamanistic in character.[2]

Among the tribes of the eastern plains the shaman is merged in the priest. There are societies which work at healing and use definite remedies, yet invoke supernatural powers. There is also a limited number of men who conduct the national rituals.[3] In more advanced tribes the shaman gives way to the priest, or is merely a medicine-man or wizard—*e.g.*, in the Navaho, Hupa, Apache, Choctaw, Hopi, and other Pueblo tribes, and the Natchez. Here the priest's authority is not based on individual action. He works for the tribe, or is associated with a society. But here, too, these priest-healers perform long ceremonies and medicine-dances for healing or life-giving, as in the mystery-societies of other tribes.[4]

In general, except among the tribes of the north-west (where possession of or by spirits as the fundamental fact in healing and wonder-working marks the true shaman) and in the case of mystery-societies where shamanistic methods are in vogue, the medicine-man is more in evidence than the true shaman. While not always unaided by spirits, he uses more empiric methods than those found among the Asiatic tribes—*e.g.*, the sweat-bath, bleeding, bathing, sucking, noises, and gestures. Even the north-western shaman has little to do with directing sacrifices, and the general belief that illness is caused by sorcery rather than by a spirit possessing the patient divides both the theory and the method of cure from those used in Asia.

A somewhat closer parallel to the Asiatic shaman is found among some S. American tribes. With the natives of Guiana the office of *piai* or *paje* is usually hereditary; but, if there is no son, the *piai* chooses a boy, preferably an epileptic, and subjects him to a course of fasting, vigils in the forest, drinking tobacco liquor, and lessons in ventriloquism. He is now able to work himself into a mad frenzy, to converse with *kenaimas*, after invoking them by chants, and to overcome them. By drinking tobacco-juice he falls into a trance, in which he believes that he is received into the company of the spirits and consecrated by them to his office. He also learns the tribal traditions and the properties of plants. His insignia consist of a rattle, various crystals, a kind of doll, and other things, which are tabu, and would lose their power if profaned. All evil is produced by *kenaimas*, human or superhuman, and by his power over them the *piai* gains great influence. He can call up and question the spirit of any Indian or dispatch his own spirit to question an absent tribesman or to speak with spirits. In cases of illness, where blowing off the evil spirit is not sufficient, other methods are resorted to. A healing *séance* is held in a dark hut, where fearful noises are produced for hours. Winged creatures seem to approach the house, enter by the roof, and fly off again. These are the *kenaimas* coming and going, and each one must give an account of itself and promise not to trouble the patient. At a later time the *piai* produces, *e.g.*, a caterpillar, which represents the possessing *kenaima*. In curing, the *piai*, by singing to them, calls up spirits to aid him. They are his friends, who inform him whence the disease

[1] Boas, 'Second General Report on the Indians of British Columbia,' in *Report of 60th Meeting of British Association*, London, 1901, p. 579 ff.

[2] J. R. Swanton, 'Social Conditions, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationship of the Tlingit Indians,' *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 463 f.; see also art. HAIDA, § 11.

[3] Cf. art. CHINOOKS, §§ 1, 5, 6.

[4] E. Petitot, *Traditions indiennes du Canada nord-ouest*, Paris, 1886, p. 278; see also artt. DÉNÉS, CARRIER INDIANS.

[5] See art. CHEROKEES, §§ 6, 7.

[6] *HAI* ii. 523.

[7] W. J. Hoffman, 'The Menomini Indians,' *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. i. p. 66 f., *7 RBEW* [1891], p. 149 ff.; R. M. Dorman, *The Origin of Primitive Superstitions*, p. 363; cf. art. OJIBWA.

[1] Petitot, p. 434.

[2] H. B. Alexander, *North American Mythology* (=*The Mythology of all Races*, vol. x.), Boston, 1916, p. 270 f.

[3] *HAI* ii. 523; see artt. ALGONQUINS, vol. i. p. 323b, and HURON, vol. vi. p. 385b.

[4] Cf. art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (American), § 4; see also G. B. Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk Tales*, London, 1893, p. 350 f., for a similar distinction between priests and shamans.

comes, whether from another spirit or a wizard. If from a bad spirit, he gets one of the helpful spirits to remove it. The *piai* is also employed to drive off *kenaimas* from a village. He fixes the appropriate times for attacking enemies, and can transform himself to animal shape or make himself invisible. The natives firmly believe in the powers of the *piai*, he believes more or less in them himself, and he exerts his influence in autocratic ways and shares with the headman the authority in a village. He is respected and feared, as arbiter of life and death, and when dead his spirit is propitiated.[1]

In other tribes the methods used are less clearly those of a shaman and more those of the medicine-man.[2] But in some tribes a regular priesthood exists, the members of which also practise medicine and cure, and have spirits in their service.[3]

8. The shaman in Malaysia. — Among the different peoples of the Malay Archipelago and Malay Peninsula shamanistic methods are common, and both sexes act as shamans. Priests, *i.e.* officiants in purely religious services, are sometimes a separate class, but they sometimes also act as shamans.[4] The office of shaman is often hereditary; it may also fall to men to whom spirits have revealed themselves or whom spirits have chosen, and who have been trained by another shaman. Some are self-created and do not possess a familiar spirit. To prove their calling, the shamans fast or use other means, by which they pass into trance, ecstasy, or an abnormal mental state, acting as if possessed.

The process of initiation in the case of a Dayak *manang* includes the committing to memory of the traditional lore and incantations; his treatment as a sick man by other *manangs* (he thus learns how to feel a disease in the body and to apply charms); the alleged taking out of his brains by the *manangs*, in order to wash them and give him a clear mind to penetrate the mysteries of evil spirits.[5]

The methods of curing sickness, which is caused by spirit-possession or by an object in which a spirit resides, are various: sometimes the spirit is extracted from the patient in the usual fashion of the medicine-man and propitiated by prayer and sacrifice; sometimes the shaman falls into a trance or ecstasy, and then ejects the spirit with the help of his familiar spirit; or sometimes the familiar spirit indicates the method of treatment to the shaman. When the sickness is caused by the wandering of the soul, the shaman recaptures it by a variety of means—*e.g.*, by sending his soul, when in trance or a dreamy state, after it to Hades or wherever it may be. He describes its wanderings while it is absent, and on reviving shows the soul (or a small object), which he pretends to replace in the patient.[6] Spirits are also driven off by chanting or by the familiar spirit of the shaman. Oracular messages are also obtained through conversation and communion with spirits or gods. To some extent the Malaysian shaman, male or female, acts, like the Asiatic shaman, as mediator between men and the supernatural world.[7]

The native names of the shaman are numerous—*e.g.*, Malay, *pawang*; Dayak, *belian*, *basir*; Iban, *manang*; Battak, *sibaso*; Kayan, *dayong*. Most of these use the 'sending'[8] to kill or harm others, and can change themselves into tigers.

9. Shamanistic methods elsewhere.—One of the main aspects of shamanism, viz. possession (*q.v.*) by spirits or divinities for a particular purpose, is of wide occurrence. Among the Ainus the wizard or medicine-man, when called in to explain the cause of illness, works himself into a frenzy, falls into a trance, and tells why the disease has come and who sent it. He makes charms to be worn by the patient in order to drive away the possessing demon. In a state of trance he also prophesies as the mouthpiece of the gods.[1] Zulu diviners in their performances sometimes use the trance and are the mediums through which the spirits speak in a whistling voice, explaining the cause of illness or whatever is inquired about. The spirits go to secure the buried poisons causing the illness and fight with the spirits of the place where they are buried.[2] In other parts of Africa the phenomena of possession, often in connexion with rites of an elaborate and prolonged kind, are reproduced by priests, priestesses, medicine-men, or magicians, or, as among the Baganda, by mediums associated with the priests or particular gods, for healing the sick or giving oracles.[3] The Maori *tohunga*, or priest, was similarly possessed or inspired; and in Polynesia generally, where the priests were called 'god-boxes' because possessed by the gods, they used the method of frenzy, which proved their possession, in order to discover the cause of illness or in announcing the will of the gods.[4] In Fiji and other parts of Melanesia similar methods were in use, often in connexion with a *séance*.[5] The Vedda *kapurale* has the necessary power to call the *yaku*, or spirits, to accept the offerings. He invokes them, dances round the offerings, and then, in a semi-trance condition, he becomes possessed by them. They speak through him, announcing their acceptance of the offerings, and promise success in hunting. Others present may also become possessed by them.[6] In the religion of many Dravidian tribes, with their cult of spirits and demons, these possess the frenzied magician for the time being and utter their communications through him.[7] Such are only a few examples drawn from a wide field; the phenomena are met with in many of the higher religions also.[8] Sometimes, too, persons not specially marked out as priests or medicine-men become possessed or simulate the phenomena, and hold converse with spirits.

10. Conclusion.—The phenomena of possession are to a large extent based on the theory that sickness and diseases, especially those of a nervous and epileptic character, result from a spirit having entered the patient and speaking through him. He was regarded therefore as inspired, and in some cases such persons themselves become shamans—to use the word in a wide sense. It was easy then for others either to simulate the

[1] W. E. Roth, 'An Inquiry into the Animism and Folk-lore of the Guiana Indians,' *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 328 ff.; E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, pp. 211, 224, 328 ff.; cf. art. PAMPEANS, vol. ix. p. 598a.

[2] See art. PATAGONIANS, vol. ix. p. 669b.

[3] See artt. CHILE, vol. iii p. 548a, BRAZIL, vol. ii. p. 836a.

[4] H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British N. Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 282; cf. *ERE* viii. 347b, 364b.

[5] Ling Roth, i. 280 f.

[6] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 29 f.

[7] See Ling Roth, i. 259 ff.; Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, London, 1862, i. 199 ff.; artt. MALAY ARCHIPELAGO, § 2, MALAY PENINSULA, § 14.

[8] See art. LYCANTHROPY, § 5.

[1] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-Lore*, London, 1901, p. 308, *The Ainu of Japan*, do. 1892, p. 197.

[2] H. Callaway, *The Religious System of the Amazulu*, London, 1884, pp. 259 ff., 280, 343 f.; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, do. 1898, p. 75.

[3] R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, London, 1904, p. 72 f.; D. Macdonald, *Africana*, do. 1882, i. 61; J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, do. 1911, p. 278; see also artt. BANTU AND S AFRICA, § 6, NEGROES AND W. AFRICA, § 4.

[4] *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori (F. E. Maning), London, 1863, p. 137 f.; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], do. 1832-36, i. 372 f.; W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the S. Pacific*, do. 1876, p. 35; G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians* do. 1910, pp. 224, 246; cf. artt. POLYNESIA, § 15, POSSESSION (Introductory and Primitive), § 7.

[5] T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, London, 1858, i. 224; R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 219 f.

[6] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 209 f., 230, 'The Vedda Cult of the Dead,' *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the Hist. of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, i. 62 f.

[7] T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, London, 1870, pp. 215, 242, 285, 301; cf. artt. DRAVIDIANS (N. India), § 3, BENGAL, § 24.

[8] See artt. POSSESSION, and PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD.

phenomena of possession or, by a special training for the purpose, to reproduce them and to believe themselves (and to be believed by others) possessed by spirits and their mediums of communication. Such persons are probably often mentally unstable and subject to hysteria.[1] The main aspects of the Asiatic shaman's procedure as well as the idea of possession by spirits are found to be of well-nigh universal occurrence in connexion with healing, discovering the will of spirits or gods, or prophesying. One may occur without the others, or, again, all are found as parts of the practice of a wonder-worker. This suggests, therefore, that the shamanism of the Ural-Altaic tribes is but a specialized and highly elaborated form of a universal practice—a form associated with a full and varied religion, polytheism and polydæmonism, of which it is an essential and central part, and connected with sacrifices and the use of liturgical prayer, chant, and hymn formulæ. It probably formed the religion of the early Mongol-Tatar peoples, and others akin to them—*e.g.*, in China and Tibet, where much of it is still reproduced—and it is still very largely connected with the religion of the Malaysian tribes. Whether among the Eskimo and certain American Indian tribes it is a native growth, or has been the result of influences from Asiatic peoples, or has been brought thence in early times, is uncertain.

Keane says that the American Indian medicine-man is 'a sort of Asiatic shaman in embryo, arriving in the late Stone Age, and afterwards diverging in various directions from his Siberian prototype.'[2]

While retaining the word 'shamanism' as descriptive of the religion of the Ural-Altaic tribes, we must none the less admit that the practices of the shaman are found in greater or less completeness over a wide area. At the same time the methods of the medicine-man and the magician, as distinct from the shaman, are also found everywhere, and frequently enter into shamanistic practice. While the shaman's methods are connected with the cult of spirits, and are therefore semi-religious and not fundamentally magical, but rather mysticism of a primitive kind, seeking intimate communion with the spirit-world, those of the medicine-man are partly magical, partly empiric with the use of naturalistic modes of healing, and are not necessarily connected with spirit-help, though they may be used against hostile spirits. No doubt the differing methods are often interchangeable, and, as often, the various functions of shaman, medicine-man, and magician are shared by different classes of men in one tribe. Priests, too, sometimes combine these various functions in themselves, apart from their purely religious work. On the whole, it is better to use the word 'shaman' to denote one whose procedure is based on the fact that he is *en rapport* with spirits or has them at his command, and to consider the medicine-man as one who acts generally by methods in which the aid of spirits is not essential. The Asiatic shaman is a highly specialized user of shamanistic methods.

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J. A. MACCULLOCH.

SHAME.—Shame is an emotion of self-abasement experienced by one who is conscious of acting contrary to, or below, the standards which he approves and by which he knows others judge him. This sense of self-abasement is stronger than in the related states with which it is often confused—modesty, bashfulness, shyness, and coyness. These are marked rather by hesitation, caution, and inhibition. They arise through consciousness of being under the gaze of others whose attitude is that of curiosity or superiority or searching criticism. But shame involves a sense of unworthiness and demerit. Like these kindred states, it may arise in connexion with matters of sex, but it is also found in a great variety of situations not concerned with sex. The sense of shame consists in the consciousness of failure and exposure before other persons in connexion with a point of honour or of strong self-esteem.

Darwin discussed blushing as an expression of this emotion. Other accompanying signs are the drooping of the body, lowering of the head, and averting the gaze. The subject tends to hide, to escape notice, and, in extreme cases, to inflict injury upon himself as a kind of self-imposed retributive punishment. Modern psychologists have shown that all emotions involve more or less of a conflict of opposing impulses. McDougall has treated shame in terms of the conflict between positive and negative self-feeling. He says:

'Shame, in the full sense of the word, is only possible when the self-regarding sentiment has become well developed about the idea of the self, its attributes and powers. Then any exhibition of the self to others as deficient in these powers and attributes, which constitute the self in so far as it is the object of the self-regarding sentiment, provokes shame. The self may appear defective or inferior to others in all other respects and no shame, though perhaps bashfulness, will be induced.'[1]

W. James noted this fact and pointed out[2] that the man who has great proficiency as a pugilist or as an oarsman may be shamed to death if there is one rival in all the world who can excel him. On the other hand, a puny little fellow who has no athletic prowess or ambition is not depressed by the fact that every one can surpass him. In the fraction of self-esteem represented by success over pretensions shame results when success is inadequate to the pretensions.

Interesting manifestations of the outward behaviour expressive of shame in man may be seen in the lower animals. An observer noticed that on more than one occasion when he was approaching his home after an extended absence his dog would rush towards him, barking threateningly as he would at a stranger. When he came nearer, the dog would suddenly lower his head to the ground, rub his nose with his paw, and, after a moment, bound forward with all his usual signs of friendliness. Children reflect their environment and training in the acts and circumstances in which they show shame. Apparently there are no innate endowments determining the feeling. In well-regulated homes children shrink from being discovered with muddy clothes, dirty faces, holes in their stockings, and the like. A child is ashamed to be seen with a nursing-bottle after having learned to eat. A boy of fourteen was willing to stay at home from school and assist his mother, but was painfully humiliated when his school-mates found him in the house washing dishes. Sensitiveness to awkwardness, to social blunders, and to one's appearance in the eyes of others, particularly of the opposite sex, is greatly intensified in adolescence, and hence

[1] See artt. MALAY ARCHIPELAGO, § 2, POSSESSION (Introductory and Primitive), § 1.

[2] *Man, Past and Present*, p. 378 *f.*

[1] *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], p. 147 *f.*

[2] *Psychology*, New York, 1890, i. 310.

the sense of shame is often greatly deepened. It is doubtless on account of the dawning consciousness of sex in this period that capacity for shame in these matters is so much increased as compared with the earlier years.

The Freudian psychology has thrown new light upon the conflict of such impulses as those involved in shame. In this view, normal persons are subject to the play of many antagonistic tendencies. In their waking life the upper stratum of consciousness, representing the higher self, acts as a censor to exclude from the stream of thought ideas of a baser sort. But in dreams the suppressed tendencies may be released and 'arouse the upper personality to feelings of horror and remorse.'[1] At times this actually happens in waking life; a person's lower tendencies get expressed, the evil deed is committed, and the better self suffers keen remorse and shame.

Social psychology emphasizes the fact that one's social group furnishes the determining influences in forming an individual's standards of taste and conduct. The infringement of the conventions, or *mores*, is likely to be accompanied by shame. The divergencies among races in reference to the situations in which they experience this emotion are astonishing and give weight to the impression that education and environment are the chief factors.

'Though the Bakairi of Central Brazil have no feeling of shame about nakedness, they are ashamed to eat in public: they retired to eat, and hung their heads in shamefaced confusion when they saw him [the white man] innocently eat in public.'[2]

Sumner gives many illustrations from various sources.

LITERATURE.—C. R. Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions*, London, 1872; T. A. Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions*, Eng. tr., do. 1897; W. McDougall, *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], do. 1913; E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics*, New York, 1915; W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Boston, 1906; Vladimir Solovyof, *The Justification of the Good*, London, 1919.

E. S. AMES.

SHAMMAI.—Shammai was a famous Jewish teacher of the 1st cent. B.C., the most distinguished contemporary of Hillel (*q.v.*), to whose views on Halākhāh as well as on many a point of general Jewish theology he was almost invariably in diametrical opposition. The two men are usually coupled together in the Talmud, and the antithesis between them was reproduced, often with actual violence, for a considerable period after their lives, in the two opposing schools which they founded and which figure prominently in Rabbinical literature as Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai. The influence exerted by these schools on the subsequent evolution of Jewish legalism is paramount.

According to the Mishnāh,[3] Shammai held the office of vice-president (*ab beth din*), whilst Hillel was president (*nasi*) of the Synhedrion—Shammai having succeeded a certain Menaḥem, who, according to Josephus,[4] was a great sage endowed with prophetic power, and in his childhood had foretold that Herod would one day rule over the Jews. The Talmud, however, makes no mention of this point. Graphic emphasis is given in the Rabbinic records to the marked contrast between the hasty, excitable, and uncompromising temper of Shammai as compared with the imperturbably sweet and patient nature of Hillel. In T.B. *Shabbāth*, 31*a*, three analogous illustrative anecdotes are given of this:

(*a*) A heathen comes to Shammai and Hillel in turn with the request that he be admitted as a convert to Judaism, whilst believing only in the 'written' and not in the 'oral' Law. Shammai reproachfully shows him the door, whereas Hillel by his kindly treatment wins him over to Judaism and a belief in both 'Laws.' (*b*) A heathen wishes to be taught the whole 'Law' (and thus become a proselyte to Judaism) whilst 'standing on one foot,' *i.e.* in a very brief space of time. Whereas Shammai, before whom he first appears, gives him a sound trouncing with a builder's measuring-rod that he happens to be holding in his hand at the moment, Hillel receives him into the Jewish faith with the advice, 'That which is hurtful to thee do not unto thy neighbour. This is the whole Tōrāh. All the rest is commentary. Go and learn.' (*c*) A heathen is desirous of becoming converted to Judaism, with the object of ultimately becoming eligible for the office of high-priest. Shammai rejects him outright, whereas Hillel admits him, whilst at the same time tactfully convincing him of the futility of his ambition to become high-priest. It was Shammai's bad temper, says the Talmud in summing up, that 'put this man out of the universe' (*i.e.* made him forfeit the bliss reaped by a convert to Judaism), whereas it was Hillel's meekness that brought him near to dwell beneath the wings of the Shekhinah.

In all probability the truest interpretation of these contrasts is to say that they point to the rigid, uncompromising attitude of Shammai towards the things of religion exclusively, and that they have no reference to his personal temper or character. That the latter was by no means so bitter and misanthropic as is popularly imagined is proved by the motto ascribed to him in *Abhōth*, i. 15, 'Receive all men with a cheerful countenance.' A statement in T.B. *Bābhā Bathrā*, 134*b*, shows that Shammai could, on occasion, show real meekness even towards subordinates such as his disciples. Shammai was the redoubtable upholder of inherited custom, a relentless follower of the old beaten tracks, to depart from which was to call forth his measureless rage.

Further striking instances of Shammai's exceptionally stringent veneration for the letter of the Law are the following:

Mishnāh *Sūkkāh*, ii. 8, relates that, when once his daughter-in-law gave birth to a son on the Feast of Tabernacles, Shammai pierced a hole through the roof of the chamber in which she lay, thus converting the room into a ritual *sukkāh* ('booth') so as to enable the new-born infant to fulfil the religious precept of Lv 23[42], 'Ye shall dwell in booths seven days; all that are home-born in Israel shall dwell in booths.' This was opposed to the dominant Rabbinic view, which maintained that the obligation did not become incumbent upon a child until he had reached at least some rudimentary stage of reasoning power.

To similar effect is the story in T.B. *Yōmā*, 77*b*, which relates that Shammai on a certain Day of Atonement refused to handle food even in one of his hands in order to feed his young son (who was exempt from the ordeal of fasting by reason of his tender age), because such handling of food would entail the preliminary ritual washing of the hand in question. The sages, however, out of a feeling of sheer humanity, 'decreed' that it was his duty to perform the ritual washing of both his hands in order to feed the child and avoid risking its life through so long an abstention from food.[1]

That, nevertheless, such instances of uncompromising obedience to traditional formulæ can consist with a fine and lofty idealism in religious outlook is proved by a Baraita in T.B. *Beṣa*, 16*a*, as follows:

'They said concerning Shammai the Elder that throughout all his days whatever he ate was in honour of the Sabbath. Should he alight upon a fine beast, he would say "Let this be for the Sabbath." Should he afterwards find a finer one, he would leave it and partake only of the first.'

The observance of the Sabbath was to Shammai the welcome opportunity of the soul's joyous union with God. Hence the smallest act performed during the week was felt to have some bearing upon the Sabbath's sanctified joy.

The Mishnāh *Eduyōth*, i. 1–4, mentions three Halākhic questions disputed between Hillel and Shammai. These refer to (1) *niddah* (laws concerning female impurity), (2) *ḥallah* (laws concerning the priest's share of the dough, as alluded to in Nu 15[17-21]), and (3) *mīkveh* (laws relating to the ritual bath). The views taken by Shammai on some of the points in connexion with these show that he was, at times, capable of adopting the more lenient standpoint in Halākhāh.[2]

There is an interesting allusion in *Sifrē*, Deut.

[1] E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics*, p. 15.
[2] H. H. Ellis, 'The Evolution of Modesty,' in *Psychological Review*, vi. [1899] 137.
[3] *Ḥagīgāh*, ii. 2. [4] *Ant.* xv. x. 5.

[1] Cf. *Tōseftā*, ed. M. S. Zuckermandel, Magdeburg, 1877; *Yōmā*, *ad loc.*
[2] Cf. Mishn. *Ḥagīgāh*, ii. 2; T.B. *Shabbāth*, 15*a*; T.B. *Niddah*, i. 1.

§ 203,[1] to three Halākhic laws which Shammai deduced exegetically from the words of Scripture, one of which is that a ship going on a long voyage should not start later than three days previous to the Sabbath.[2] This he deduced from Dt 20[20].

Many of Shammai's teachings and maxims are probably incorporated in those handed down in the name of the school which he founded—the Beth Shammai. The Halākhic decisions of this school reflect all the stringency of their founder. In all the 316 controversies between it and its rival, the Beth Hillel, as alluded to spasmodically throughout the domains of the Rabbinic literature, the Shammaites took the lenient view in only 55 cases. The Mishnāh generally prepares the reader for these 'leniencies' of the Shammaites by an introductory remark such as 'The following are of the lenient views of Beth Shammai and the stringent views of Beth Hillel.'[3] Judæa was, at the period of the existence of these schools, the storm centre of much political faction; and the Shammaites, as was perhaps natural, carried their religious austerities into the arena of the current politics. They particularly hated the Roman domination and the Roman system of taxation. They were merciless in their opposition to all intercourse with Romans or with Jews who showed countenance to Roman laws and practices. In order to carry these views into effect, they sternly forbade Jews to buy any article of food or drink from their non-Jewish neighbours. Such bitter hostility did these and other Shammaite stringencies arouse in the minds of the conciliatory Hillelites that, as the Talmud relates in many parallel passages,[4] 'the day on which the Shammaite enactments gained the ascendancy over the Hillelites was as unfortunate for Israel as the day on which the golden calf was worshipped.'[5]

The Talmud nowhere affixes a date to the beginning or ending of these disputes; but internal evidence shows that they were carried on for some time after the destruction of the Temple by Titus. The 'war of the schools' resulted in victory for the Hillelites over the Shammaites.[6] The Halākhāh was fixed in accordance with the Hillelite view, and ratified by all subsequent Rabbinic codifiers.

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J. ABELSON.

SHANS.—See BURMA.

SHAPE-SHIFTING.—See METAMORPHOSIS, LYCANTHROPY.

ASH-SHA'RĀNĪ or Sha'rāwī, Abū-l-mawāhib 'Abd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Anṣārī ash-Shāfi'ī ash-Shādhilī, rarely al-Aḥmadī ash-Shinnāwī al-Ash'arī (MS Leipzig-Vollers, no. 353), was born in the month of Ramaḍān, A.H. 898 (899) near Qalqashanda, in the delta of the Nile, and spent his youth in Sāqiyet Abū Sha'ra, in the same neighbourhood. He traced his genealogy back to the rulers of Tilimsēn (Tlemcen) in the times of the saint Abū Maaldyan (Médine), about A.H. 600, and even to the Khalīfa 'Alī. An ancestor is said to have migrated from Tilimsēn into Upper Egypt, where ash-Sha'rānī was born near Behnesa, according to another account. At the age of twelve he went to Cairo, where he studied seventeen years in the mosque of al-Ghamrī; from there he betook himself to the *madrasa* of the mosque Umm Ḫawand. Egypt had passed in 923 (1517) into the hands of the Ottomans, and the writings of ash-Sha'rānī often speak of the condition of the country, which became worse and worse under the new rule. It was his life in the mosque Umm Ḫawand that made him famous. He won friends, and made enemies who were jealous of his reputation. About this time, in the year 931, began also his literary activity. The report that he was a weaver in private life is due to a misunderstanding on the part of Von Kremer. His whole life was consecrated to devotional exercises and to teaching. He repeatedly made the pilgrimage to Mecca, first in the year 947, then again in 953 and 963. He mentions only one journey undertaken by him in Upper Egypt. His reputation grew extraordinarily when a Coptic patron founded for him (with unjustly gotten money!) a school and a house for the poor, where ash-Sha'rānī worked to the close of his life (cf. *Description de l'Egypte*, 'Plan du Caire,' fig. 8; Baedeker's plan, D 2). His popularity became boundless; great officials consulted him on important matters; the pious multitudes filled his school and environment; even the theologians (*'ulamā*) who were hostile to him were forced to change in great part their attitude. In the year 960, as he felt his death draw near—he believed like other pious people that he would die at the age of sixty-three like the Prophet—he began to write his autobiography (see below). But he lived ten years longer, and died in Jumādā I. 973. His funeral was as magnificent as only a popularly venerated saint could receive. He was buried in the basin (*fasqīya*) of his mosque-school, which later was named after him and still exists. He was four times married—successively, it would seem, not simultaneously. Of his sons, Ḥasan seems to have died early, but 'Abd ar-Raḥmān survived him, and died A.H. 1011.

The extraordinary significance of ash-Sha'rānī lies in the fact that he was practically and theoretically a mystic of the first order, and at the same time a prominent and original writer in the field of theology and jurisprudence. His writings number over seventy. Among these he names twenty-four that were entirely original (*ibtikār*), their central idea having previously been treated by no one. The fields of his literary activity were, first, mysticism, *i.e.* Ṣūfism (*at-taṣauwuf*), then law, dogmatics, the Qur'ān, tradition, poetry, and even grammar and popular medicine. The most characteristic feature of his nature, both from a theoretical and from a practical standpoint, is mysticism. His teachers and patterns in the practice of Ṣūfism were Afḍaladdīn, Ibrāhīm al-Matbūlī, 'Alī al-Ḫauwāṣ al-Burullusī, and 'Alī al-Marṣafī—especially al-Ḫauwāṣ. Like him, ash-Sha'rānī claimed the gift of miraculously hearing *all* things, and thus of knowing also the secrets of his fellow-men, of foreseeing things to come, and of warning like a prophet. In his youth ash-Sha'rānī gave himself to an austere asceticism, hunger, watching, scourging, miserable food and clothing. Like the Christian Stylites, he used often to climb the mast (*ṣārī*) of the mosque al-Ghamrī and remain swinging there, to escape sleep. He distinguishes three degrees in the Ṣūfī life: the beginner (*murīd*), the *shaikh*, and the saint (*walī*). But the highest rank of the *walī* is still far from the lowest rank of the prophet. Within the domain of the Ṣūfīs he distinguishes a narrower (esoteric) and a broader (exoteric) circle,

[1] Ed. M. B. J. Friedmann, Vienna, 1864, p. 111*b*.
[2] Cf. Tōs. *'Ērūbhīn*, iii. 7; T.B. *Shabbāth*, 19*a*.
[3] See Mishn. *Edruyōth*, iv. 1.
[4] Cf. Mishn. *Shabbāth*, i. 4; T.B. *Shabbāth*, 17*a*; T.J. *Shabbāth*, i. 3*c*; Tōs. *Shabbāth*, i. 16 *f*.
[5] T.B. *Berakhōth*, 36*b*; T.B. *Beṣah*, 11*b*; T.B. *Yebhamōth*, 9*a*.

and a stricter and a looser practice. The great multitude of them, that is without understanding, is called by him *al-qaum*, 'the people'; the non-Ṣūfī multitude is called, with a synonymous expression, *al-ḫalq*. We must not communicate to the *qaum* all truths and mysteries; that would be to throw pearls before swine. Also in ethical and ritual things we must allow them a certain latitude (*taḫfīf*), because they cannot bear everything. The austere manner of life (*tashdīd*) is only for the strong. The Ṣūfīs must lead a solitary, despised, and modest life; the Prophet (as he was in the Meccan period of his life) must be their comforting pattern. They must as a rule have no intercourse with the great ones of the world; only few have the gift of safely doing so. Envy and jealousy reign among the *ḫalq*, and disputing (*jidāl*) among their men of learning; peace, harmony, forgiveness, humility, patience, on the contrary, rule among the *qaum*; they know nothing about learned disputes, because they have full certainty. The Ṣūfī mode of life is necessary for the attainment of holiness; but the highest gifts, ecstasy (*jadhb*) and revelation (*kashf*, *fatḥ*), cannot be attained through actions, but only through divine grace.

A main point which separates Ṣūfīs from orthodox Muslim men of learning (*'ulamā*) is their conception of revelation. While the *'ulamā* regard revelation as closed with the Qur'ān and content themselves with explaining the tradition founded by the Prophet and built up by the great masters (*mujtahidīn*), the Ṣūfīs believe in the possibility of a continuous God-given revelation (*ilhām*, *kashf*). Thus an ever-flowing mystical knowledge and verity (*ḥaqīqa*) stand here over against the law (*sharī'a*), which rests on tradition and is closed. The *'ulamā* confine themselves to speculation and rational thinking (*naẓar*, *fikr*); the Ṣūfīs by their path attain full contemplation (*shuhūd*) of the truth. The *walī* assumes the rôle of the *mujtahid* of the more ancient times. The *'ulamā* reject all this as sorcery (*siḥr*), madness (*junūn*), and heresy (*zandaqa*). The Ṣūfī hermeneutics also are determined by this conception of revelation. The sense of a passage of the Qur'ān may be not only external (*ẓāhir*), but also internal (*bāṭin*). The inner sense may take as many as seventy forms. It is intelligible, then, how the belief in miracles among Ṣūfīs assumes fantastic forms even in a man of such high standing as ash-Sha'rānī. When he was a child he was saved from drowning by a crocodile, which took him on its back. Another time he scared a crocodile away by jumping into the water. Like the Prophet (*Qur.* lxxii.), ash-Sha'rānī received from God the privilege of having the *jinn* (cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Muslim]) as hearers at his lectures. Many of his works were occasioned, in apocalyptic fashion, by visions; among others, *Kashf al-ḥijāb war-rān* was suggested by a *jinnī* in the shape of a dog, who delivered a letter to him. On the authority of 'Abd al-Ghaffār al-Qūṣī, he tells as a perfectly credible story that a man who had spoken disrespectfully of the Khalīfas Abū Bakr and 'Omar was transformed by God into a swine. In A.H. 923, he had a trance (*jadhb*) in Cairo, in which he received the gift of hearing and distinguishing all voices (like his teacher al-Ḫauwās); he also perceived how the animals and the stones and the fishes of the Mediterranean praised God (cf. St. Francis of Assisi). The gift of having a share in such wonders (*karāmāt*) rests on Ṣūfī theory and practice; the *'ulamā*, therefore, cannot attain thereto. On the question of the freedom of the will and its relation to the omnipotence of God, he contends against the Mu'tazilites; God 'creates' the actions of men; only the 'appropriation' (*al-iktisāb*) is left to them.

He regards al-Junaid (d. A.H. 297) as the greatest representative of the earlier mysticism, because he knew how to reconcile the law (*sharī'a*) with his views. Ash-Sha'rānī himself belonged to the brotherhood (*ṭarīqa*) of ash-Shādhilī (d. 656), which is still widely spread in Egypt and in the Maghrib. He quotes very frequently from the works of the principal Ṣūfī writers (al-Qushairī, al-Yāfi'ī, Ibn al-Jauzī, etc.). The epithets cited above from a Leipzig MS hint at his pattern, Aḥmad al-Badawī, the great saint of Ṭanṭa, at his teacher Muḥammad ash-Shinnawī, and at al-'Ash'arī (*q.v.*), the great theologian of old Islām. He names such men, for example, as Ibn Taimīya and Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī as antagonists of mysticism.

How numerous his writings are has already been pointed out. A good many data have come down to us concerning their order in time, but these do not all agree. It would seem that many writings existed in different editions. His earliest work is apparently a methodology for lettered Ṣūfīs (*Al-anwār al-qadsīya*), composed in 931. His activity closed with a collection of biographies of all famous Ṣūfīs, and with his own autobiography (*Laṭā'if al-minan*). Several MSS have been preserved of most of his works, and even autographs of some of them are still extant.

As would naturally be expected, most of his works are devoted to mysticism. But almost all which deal with other topics, like law or dogmatics, serve the interests of mysticism in so far as ash-Sha'rānī endeavours to harmonize his mystical ideas with the other ruling views. His attitude is partly an apologetic and defensive one, meeting the objections brought by the *'ulamā* against the Ṣūfīs, and partly one of reconciliation, showing that the doctrines of the Ṣūfīs, far from contradicting 'the law,' are rather its completion and development. Through these efforts ash-Sha'rānī evolves such ideas as are far above the average level of Islāmic theology, and secure for him an abiding place in the history of religion. He touches the principle of Protestantism, when in his 'Hodegetics' (*Ad-durar al-manthūra*) he exhorts his readers to study the earlier, shorter original texts dealing with the sciences rather than commentaries and later works of a diffuse verbosity. Several of his writings are marked by a far-reaching doctrinal and practical tolerance. Instead of treating Christians and Jews with the usual scorn and haughtiness, he praises their modesty and presents them as good examples to the Muslims. Although he himself was a member of the Shāfi'ite 'school' (*madhhab*), yet two of his most significant writings, *Al-mīzān* and *Kashf al-ghumma*, seek to harmonize the four great *Madhāhib*, and to demonstrate that all four are justified and stand on a common basis. Similarly his main dogmatic work (*Al-yawāqit wal-jawāhir*) seeks to reconcile the conceptions of the Ṣūfīs (*ahl al-kashf*) and of the dogmatists (*ahl al-fikr*). He would contend only against philosophers and heretics, who shake the foundations of the law (*sharī'a*). Several of his other works (*Lawāqiḥ al-anwār*; *Sawāṭi' al-anwār*; *Al-qaul al-mubīn*; *Al-kibrīt al-aḥmar*) deal with the great mystic Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 638). Two others (*Al-jawāhir wad-durar* and *Durar al-ghauwāṣ*) deal with the sayings of his master al-Ḫauwās; two similarly of his teacher al-Matbūlī; in the *Tanbīh al-mughtarrīn* the morals and manners of the good old times are held before his lax contemporaries as a mirror; his *Mashāriq al-anwār* exhorts to a greater moral strictness. The above-mentioned biographical work, *Lawāqiḥ* (*lawā'iḥ*) *al-anwār*, generally known under the simpler name of *Aṭ-ṭabaqāt* (*al-kubrā*), had also a pedagogical aim, in that he portrays in it 426 (in the last edition 442) of the pious of the past, from Abū Bakr and the

Companions of the Prophet down to his own times. He composed also a mystical *Dīwān*, which has not yet been sufficiently investigated. It is owing to his tolerance and fear of God that he often warns against *takfīr*, *i.e.* charging a fellow-man with being an unbeliever (*kāfir*). He gives evidence of true courage when in his *Baḥr al-maurūd* he dares to attack the cupidity, the ostentation, the office-seeking and moral indifference of the *'ulamā*. In the same work he rises above the prevailing ideas of Islām by declaring monogamy to be better than polygamy, and in his autobiography he demands of men chastity before marriage. His conception of brotherly love among believers does not differ at all from that of primitive Christianity; and he reaches the highest summit of theological thought when he looks for a progressive perfection of Islām at the hands of theologians who have a real calling to this task.

The influence of ash-Sha'rānī over his contemporaries and upon the ages after him has been extraordinarily great. And yet his doctrinal and ethical requirements were too ideal to inspire faith in their practical realization, and his mystical views were altogether too subjective to encourage any one to maintain and develop them. It is not quite correct to speak of a 'sect' of Sha'ranians, as some do; but the number of those who have fed on the riches of his ideas is immense. He was still living when his writings had spread as far as the regions of Takrūr (central Sūdān, Wadai, Dārfūr), and at present they are studied in the Maghrib with a perhaps greater devotion than in Egypt. The best evidence for his Maghribite extraction is his fervour for theological questions, and the close affinity of the bent of his mind with that of the people of the West. He was a reforming spirit such as Islām has seldom seen.

His biography was written soon after his death by al-Munāwī (d. A.H. 1031). MSS of it are preserved at London in the British Museum, and at Berlin. Another account is preserved in the *Shadharāt adh-dhahab* (MS at Cairo, iv. 808–811). Many of his works have been printed at Cairo, among them the 'Balance' (*Al-mīzān*), the 'Dogmatics' (*Al-yawāqīt wal-jawāhir*), his biographical work (*Aṭ-ṭabaqāt*), several times his autobiography (*Laṭā'if al-minan*).

LITERATURE.—G. Fluegel, 'Scha'rānī nach d. Yawāqīt wal-jawāhir,' *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 1–48, xxi. [1867] 271–274; Perron, 'Balance de la loi musulmane ou esprit de la législation islamique et divergences de ses quatre rites jurisprudentiels par le Cheikh El-Charani,' *Revue Africaine*, xiv. [1870] 209–252, 331–348. J. D. Luciani published from the papers of Perron a fragmentary and freely rearranged translation of the 'Balance' (*Mīzān*), Algiers, 1898; A. von Kremer, 'Notice sur Sha'rany,' *JA*, 1868, vi. 11, 253–271; F. Wüstenfeld, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Araber und ihre Werke*, Göttingen, 1882, no. 530; K. Vollers, 'Sa'rāwi und Sa'rāni,' *ZDMG* xliv. [1890] 390 ff.; 'Alī Mubārak, *Al-ḫiṭaṭ al-jadīda*, Cairo, A.H. 1305, v. 34, xiv. 109–113; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, Weimar and Berlin, 1898–1902, ii. 335 ff.; D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903, pp. 279–283.

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SHAVING.—See TONSURE, HAIR AND NAILS, HEAD.

SHEBA.—See SABÆANS.

SHEEP.—See ANIMALS.

SHEKINAH.—'The majestic presence or manifestation of God which has descended "to dwell" among men' is known as the Shekinah.[1] The word as well as the conception originated after the close of the Hebrew canon,[2] and is characteristic of Jewish theology. The term is first used in the Targum, where it forms a frequent periphrasis for God, considered as dwelling among the children of Israel. Jewish philosophy regards the Shekinah as a suitable expression for a divine intermediary between God and the world.[1] In the Talmud the Shekinah is regularly the source of inspiration. The Rabbis affirm that the Shekinah first presided in the Tabernacle prepared in the wilderness by Moses, into which it descended on the day of its consecration, in the figure of a cloud.[2] It passed then into the sanctuary of Solomon's Temple on the day of its dedication by this king in Israel, where it continued till the destruction of the Temple and Jerusalem by the Chaldæans,[3] and was not afterwards seen there any more.

There are innumerable references to the Shekinah in the Talmud. According to the Rabbis, 'the Shekinah is omnipresent.'[4] This contention is inferred from the phrase, 'Behold the angel that spake with me went forth and another angel went forth to meet me.' Since it is not said 'after him,' but 'to meet me,' it shows that the Shekinah is omnipresent, and, therefore, sends his messengers from wherever they happen to be. Again, tradition teaches that Rabbi Josi said:

'The Shekinah has never descended below, nor have Moses and Elijah ever ascended on high; for it is said (Ps 115[16]): "The heavens, even the heavens, are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men."'[5]

The context explains that the Shekinah in the Temple stopped short ten handbreadths of the earth, and Moses and Elijah a similar distance from the heavens.

There are several conflicting theories regarding the Shekinah among the Israelites. According to several Rabbinical theories, the Shekinah rested continuously upon Israel throughout her wanderings.[6] In the first place the Rabbis tell us:

'In three[7] places did the Shekinah rest upon Israel: in Shiloh, Nob or Gideon, and the everlasting house (the Temple), and all these three were in the portion of Benjamin; for it is said (Dt 33[12]): "The Lord shall cover him (Benjamin) all the day long."'

And again we read:

'In the days of Ezra, the Shekinah did not rest (visibly) in the Temple; for it is written (Gn 9[27]): "God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents[8] of Shem." Although God enlarged Japheth (*i.e.* counted his descendants, the Persians, worthy of building the Temple), yet the Shekinah rests only in the tents (built by the descendants) of Shem.'

And thirdly:

'Rabbi Simon ben Yoḥi said: "Come and see how beloved Israel is by the Holy One, blessed be He. Wherever they are banished, there the Shekinah[9] is with them"; as it is said (1 S 2[27]): "Did I (God) plainly appear unto the house of thy father when they were in Egypt?" etc. When they were banished to Babylon, the Shekinah was with them; as it is said (Is 43[14]): "For your sake I have sent to Babylon." And when they will be redeemed the Shekinah will be with them, as it is said (Dt 30[3]): "Then the Lord thy God will return with thy captivity"; it is not said: He will cause to return, but He will return.'

Rav Ḥisda says:

'The Shekinah used to rest with each individual Israelite

[1] Maimonides, *More Nebuchim*, i. 28; also P. Volz, *Der Geist Gottes*, Tübingen, 1910.

[2] *Bereshith Rabbāh*, iii. 9; so also Num. *Rabbāh*, xiii. 6; *Shabbāth*, 87*b*; *Sanhedrin*, 103*b*; Gen. *Rabbāh*, lxxx. 12.

[3] Targ. to Hag 1[8]; Jerus. *Ta'ānith*, 65*a*.

[4] *Bābhā Bathrā*, 25*a*; *Berākhōth*, 10*a*; so also *Mehilta* on [illegible] (ed. Friedmann, Vienna, 1870); *Bereshith Rabbāh*, lxviii.; Deut. *Rabbāh*, ii. 10; Lam. *Rabbāh*, i.; *Yalquṭ* on Is 6; *Qiddushin*, 31*a*.

[5] *Sukkāh*, 5*a*; cf. also variant in *Yalquṭ* of Zechariah, p. 77 (ed. E. G. King).

[6] Midrash on Ps 89; *Yalquṭ*, § 833; *Sōṭāh*, 5*a*; *Rōsh Hashshānāh*, 3*a*; *Megillāh*, 29*a*; cf. also *Yalquṭ* on Ca 6[2]; *Ta'ānith* (Jerus. Talmud), ch. ii.

[7] *Zebahim*, 118*b*. [8] *Yōmā*, 9*b*.

[9] *Meg.* 29*a*; Num. *Rabbāh*, vii. 10. It might be well here to compare the somewhat fanciful and imaginative interpretation found in Lam. *Rabbāh* (Introd. xv.), and to note a Rabbinic inconsistency as shown in a passage in Lam. *Rabbāh* (Introd. xxix.), where a different interpretation is given: 'Before Israel was redeemed from Egypt they dwelt by themselves and the Shekinah dwelt by itself. When they were redeemed, the Shekinah and Israel became one. *But when Israel went into captivity the Shekinah again separated from them.*'

[1] *JE* xi. 258; see also Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 38.

[2] See *HDB* iv. 487.

before Israel sinned, for it is written (Dt 23[14]): "For the Lord thy God walks in the midst of thy camp." But after they had sinned, the Shekinah departed from them[1] (individually), as it is said (Dt 23[14]): "That He see not the nakedness of anything in thee, and turn away from thee."'

Rabbi Ḥanina, however, held a different view.

He insisted 'that the Shekinah rested among the Israelites in the midst[2] of their uncleanliness,' for our sages tell us that, when a certain Sadducee remarked to him, 'Now surely the Temple is no more and you cannot cleanse yourself from your uncleanliness, you are defiled, and therefore, God no longer dwells with you; for it is written (La 1[9]): "Her filthiness is (abideth) in her skirts,"' he replied: 'Come and see what is written concerning them (the Israelites) (Lv 16[16]): "Who (God) remaineth among them in the midst of their uncleanness"'; *i.e.*, even when they are unclean the Shekinah rests among them.

Again, other Rabbis contend that the Holy Spirit disappeared from Israel only after the death of the last prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi; the Holy Spirit departed from[3] Israel, but they were still availing themselves of the daughter (echo) of a voice for the reception of divine communications.

The wrong administration of justice causes the departure[4] of the Shekinah from Israel, for it is said (Ps 12[5]): 'On account of the oppression of the poor and the sighing of the needy, now will I arise (*i.e.* depart), saith the Lord.'

'Whoever prays behind his Rabbi and whoever salutes or returns the salute of his Rabbi,[5] and whoever contends against the school of his Rabbi, or broaches anything which he had not heard from his Rabbi, he causes the Shekinah to depart from Israel.'

'The righteous in the[6] presence of the Shekinah are compared to a rushlight in the presence of a torch.' But, 'compared with Shekinah, man is the same that an ape is[7] compared with man.' '"And I praised mirth" (Ec 8[15]) teaches that the Shekinah does not rest with people when in a melancholy mood, in illness,[8] hilarity, levity, when gossiping, or when indulging in idle talk, but with those who rejoice in the performance of a work which is alike meritorious and joyous.' Again, it is said that 'the Shekinah rests only upon one who is wise, physically strong, materially rich, and of high[9] stature.'

'Whoever passes from the synagogue to the debating-room, and from the debating-room to the synagogue, is worthy to[10] receive, and does receive, the presence of the Shekinah; for it is said (Ps 84[7]): "They go from strength to strength; he shall be seen unto God in Zion."' Whoever 'engages in the study of the Law[11] by night has the Shekinah before him; for it is said (La 2[19]): "Arise, cry out in the night . . . pour out thy heart like water before the Lord."'

Rabbi Pinḥas ben Yair said:

'The study of the Law leads to circumspection, circumspection leads to diligence, diligence leads to freedom from guilt, freedom from guilt leads to asceticism (or Esseneism), asceticism leads to purity, purity leads to sanctity of life, sanctity of life leads to meekness, meekness leads to the fear of sin, fear of sin leads to holiness, holiness leads to the acquisition of the Holy Spirit,[12] the Holy Spirit leads to the resurrection from the dead; but the greatest of all is sanctity of life.'

Yet Rabbi bar Rav Ada said[13] in the name of Rav Yiṣḥak:

'Whence is it proved that God is present in the synagogue? From the text (Ps 82[1]): "God stands in the congregation of the mighty."'

This text further proves that the Shekinah rests with ten people who join in prayer,[14] for the ten spies are called a congregation (Nu 14[27]). And whence is it proved that the Shekinah rests with a judicial tribunal consisting of three? From the text (Ps 82[1]): 'He judgeth among the Gods.' And whence is it proved that the Shekinah rests with two[15] who are engaged in studying the Law?

From the text (Mal 3[16]): 'Then those that fear the Lord will converse one with the other, and the Lord will listen.' And whence is it proved that the Shekinah[1] rests even with one who is engaged in the study of the Law? From the text (Ex 20[24]): 'In every place wherein I shall make mention of my name I will come unto thee (singular) and bless thee.' Yet our Rabbis taught[2] that a priest who does not speak by the Holy Spirit, and upon whom the Shekinah does not rest, should not be consulted oracularly. Abaii said:

'In every generation there are never less than thirty-six righteous men, who receive the presence of the[3] Shekinah; for it is said (Is 30[18]): "Blessed are all those who wait upon Him."'[4]

Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina said:

'When God causes His Shekinah to rest upon anyone, He chooses for that purpose[5] only distinguished families in Israel; for it is said (Jer 31[1]): "At that time, saith the Lord, I will be a God to all the families of Israel." It is not said: "to all Israel," but, "to all the families of Israel."'

'Puah' (Ex 1[15]) is another name[6] for Sarah. She was so called because she spake intuitively by the Holy Spirit (from 'to observe,' or 'to perceive'); as it is said (Gn 21[12]): 'In all that Sarah saith unto thee, hearken unto her voice.' Whoever pronounces the blessing over the[7] new moon at the appointed time receives, as it were, the presence of the Shekinah. Whosoever gives his daughter to a disciple of the wise is as if he clings to the[8] Shekinah.

'Whoever is present at a banquet to which a disciple[9] of the wise is invited, enjoys, as it were, the effulgence of the Shekinah.'

That the Shekinah[10] supports the sick is proved from the text (Ps 41[3]): 'God will support him upon the bed of illness.' Any one coming to visit a sick person should not sit either on the couch or on the footstool or on a chair,[11] but should sit wrapped up (a sign of reverence) on the ground, because the Shekinah rests above the couch of a sick person; as it is said (Ps 41[3]): 'God will support him upon the bed of illness.' The hospitable reception[12] of strangers is preferable to that of the Shekinah.

Rabbi Yitsḥak says:

'Whoever commits[13] sin in secret, presses, as it were, against the feet of the Shekinah: for it is said (Is 66[1]): "The earth is my footstool."'

He that strikes the cheek[14] of an Israelite strikes, as it were, the cheek of the Shekinah; for it is said (Pr 20[25]): 'He that strikes a man, strikes the Holy One.'[15] He that gives way to anger makes no account[16] even of the presence of the Shekinah; for it is said (Ps 10[4]): 'The wicked, when his anger arises, cares for nothing; not even God is in all his thoughts.'

'Four sets of men receive not[17] the presence of the Shekinah: the set of scoffers, the set of mendacious, the set of hypocrites, and the set of slanderers.' 'And Hannah answered and said: No, my lord' (1 S 1[15]). Illa said: 'Some think that[18] Rabbi Yosi bar Hanina said it: that Hannah spake in the following sense: "Thou art neither lord, nor does the Holy Spirit rest upon thee, because thou dost suspect me in this matter, and hast formed such an uncharitable opinion of me. . . . Neither the Shekinah, nor the Holy Spirit is with thee."'

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1 *Sōṭāh*, 3*b*; cf. *Sifre*, 120*b*; *Abhōth de R.N.* I. 58*a*; *Yalquṭ* on Ezk 36; Ex. *Rabbāh*, xv. 5, xxiv. 3; *Sifre* on Dt 32[5]; cf. also *Yalquṭ* on La 3[3].

2 *Yōmā*, 57*a*; cf. *Sanh.* 107*a*, however, which disputes the above contention; cf. also *Targ.* to Jer 33[5].

3 *Yōmā*, 9*b*.

4 *Shabbāth*, 139*a*; Midrash *Teḥillim*, 12[2] (ed. Buber, Wilna, 1891); *Sifra*, 91*a* (ed. Weiss, Vienna, 1862).

5 *Berākhōth*, 27*a*; so also 17*b* and 5*b*.

6 *Pesāḥim*, 8*a*; cf. 117*a*. 7 *Bābhā Bathrā*, 58*a*.

8 *Shab.* 30*b*; cf. also *Sanh.* 102*b* and 103*a*.

9 *Shab.* 92*a* and 92*b*; cf. also Lev. *Rabbāh*, vii.; *Tanna d'be Eliahu*, p. 104 (ed. Friedmann, Vienna, 1900).

10 *Mō'ēd Kāṭon*, 29*a*.

11 *Tamid*, 32*b*. 12 *'Abōdah Zārāh*, 20*b*.

13 Cf. *Yalquṭ* on Ps 87[3]; *Ber.* 7*a*.

14 *Ber.* 6*a*; *Ab.* 3, 9. 15 *Ab.* iii. 3; *Yalquṭ* on Ps 82.

1 *Suk.* 28*a*; cf. also *Ab. Zar.* 3*b*; *Yalquṭ* on Is 31[6]; Num. *Rabbāh*, xix. 4; *Yalquṭ* on La 3.

2 *Yōmā*, 78*b*. 3 *Sanh.* 97*b*; so also *Suk.* 45*b*.

4 The numerical value of 'Him' is thirty-six.

5 *Qiddūshin*, 70*a*. 6 *Sōṭāh*, 2*b*.

7 *Sanh.* 42*a*. 8 *Qid.* 31*a*.

9 *Ber.* 64*a*. 10 *Shab.* 12*b*.

11 *Nedarim*, 40*a*. 12 *Shab.* 127*a*.

13 *Qid.* 31*a*; *Ber.* 43*b*; *Ḥagigāh*, 16*a*.

14 *Sanh.* 58*b*.

15 Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek translation gives a satisfactory rendering of this verse. The present writer has therefore translated it somewhat differently from the ordinary rendering of the AV, translating מוקשׁ as a derivative of the Talmudic נקשׁ 'to smite,' 'to strike,' and taking יל' in a figurative sense as well in order to bring out the meaning of the Rabbis.

16 *Ned.* 22*b*. 17 *Sanh.* 103*a*.

18 *Ber.* 31*b*.

'And Esther stood in the inner court[1] of the king's house' (Est 5[1]). Rabbi Laive said: 'When she reached the chamber of the images, the Shekinah departed from her; she then exclaimed (Ps 22[1]): "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Dost thou perhaps judge inadvertent and compulsory transgression in the same way as thou dost[2] presumptuous sins? Or is it because I called him (Ahasuerus) dog?" as it is said (Ps 22[20]): "Deliver my soul from the sword, and my darling from the dog." She then (by way of making amends) called him lion, as it is said (Ps 22[21]): "Save me from the lion's mouth."'

'For a period of six months[3] David was afflicted with leprosy; for it is said (Ps 51[7]): "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." At that time the Shekinah departed from him; for it is said (51[12]): "Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation." And the Sanhedrin kept aloof from him; for it is said (119[79]): "Let those that fear thee turn unto me." That the affliction lasted six months is proved from 1 K 2[11], where it is said: "And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years: seven years reigned he in Hebron, and thirty and three years reigned he in Jerusalem"; whereas in 2 S 5[5] it is said: "In Hebron he reigned over Judah seven years and six months." The reason why these six months are omitted in Kings is, because during the period he was afflicted with leprosy.'

The Talmud proves that the Shekinah did not exist during the second Temple in the following way:

Why is it that the word וְאִכָּבֵד, 'And I will be glorified' (Hag 1[8]), is without the letter ה, whilst another reading has it? It intimates the absence of five things from the second Temple, which existed in the first,[4] viz. (1) the Ark, the Mercy Seat, and the Cherubim; (2) the fire from heaven upon the altar; (3) the visible presence; (4) the Holy Spirit; (5) the Urim and Thummim.

LITERATURE.—*JE* xi. 258; *HDB* iv. 487–489; J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, London, 1912, chs. iv.–xii.; G. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, Leipzig, 1898; F. Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*[2], do. 1897; S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, London, 1909, ch. xiv.; lexicons of **Buxtorf, Levy, Kohut,** and **Jastrow.**

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SHEOL.—See **ABYSS, ESCHATOLOGY, STATE OF THE DEAD.**

SHEWBREAD.—

1. **Terms.**—In the older sources, 1 S 21[6] (Heb. 7), 1 K 7[48], we find לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים, 'bread of the face (or presence [*i.e.* of God]),' EV 'shewbread,' RVm 'presence-bread.' This term is also used in the Priestly Code (P), Ex 25[30] (לֶחֶם פָּנִים) 35[13] 39[36], and in 2 Ch 4[19]. In Nu 4[7] it is abbreviated into *happānīm*. In 1 Ch 9[32] 23[29], Neh 10[33] (Heb. 34), we have לֶחֶם הַמַּעֲרֶכֶת, EV 'shewbread,' AVm 'Heb. bread of ordering'; in 2 Ch 13[11] *ma'ărekheth leḥem*; in 1 Ch 28[16], 2 Ch 2[4] 29[18], we have *ma'ărekheth*, and in Ex 40[23] *leḥem*. *Ma'ărekheth* is from עָרַךְ, 'to set in order,' and is used in the concrete sense of 'row' or 'pile.' As the Babylonian monuments show sacred tables with piles of bread, it is probable that *ma'ărakheth* means 'pile.' In Lv 24[6] the shewbread consists of two *ma'ărakhōth*, EV 'rows,' RVm 'piles.' Hence, *leḥem hamma'ărekheth*, etc., mean 'pile-bread' or 'row-bread.' In 1 S 21[5] (Heb. 6) the shewbread is called לֶחֶם קֹדֶשׁ, EV 'holy bread,' as distinguished from לֶחֶם חֹל, 'ordinary,' EV 'common bread.' In 2 Ch 2[4] (Heb. 3) we have תָּמִיד לֶחֶם הַמַּעֲרֶכֶת, *ma'ărekheth*, continually present,' and in Nu 4[7] *leḥem hattāmīdh*, EV 'the continual bread,' as being always on the table.

In NT the shewbread is ἄρτοι τῆς προθέσεως, Mt 12[4], Mk 2[26], Lk 6[4]; and in He 9[2] ἡ πρόθεσις τῶν ἄρτων, 'bread of the setting out,' 'the setting out of bread,' EV 'shewbread,' in He 9[2] RVm, 'Gr. the setting forth of the loaves.' These are LXX renderings of *leḥem hamma'ărekheth*, etc., and also of *leḥem pānīm*, though the latter is also rendered by the LXX literally ἄρτοι τοῦ προσώπου and ἄρτοι ἐνώπιοι, 'loaves of the face.' Other LXX renderings are οἱ ἄρτοι οἱ προκείμενοι, Ex 39[18], 'the loaves set forth,' and οἱ ἄρτοι τῆς προφορᾶς, 'bread of the offering,' in 3 K 7[34] (Heb. and Eng. 1 K 7[48]). Vulg. follows LXX with *panes propositionis*, 'the loaves of setting forth,' etc.; Luther has *Schaubrot*, hence probably 'shewbread' in Tindale's NT (1526), He 9[2], and in other English versions. This rendering may be due to the idea that the loaves were set forth to be shown to God.

With two exceptions the shewbread is said to be placed upon a 'table'; but in 1 K 6[20. 22], Ezk 41[22], we read of an altar which is clearly the table of the shewbread and not the altar of incense, which does not appear till the latest strata of the Priestly Code. In Mal 1[7. 12] 'the table of Jahweh' may be the table of the shewbread, but is more probably the altar of burnt-offering, or may include both.

2. **Nature.**—The shewbread consisted of two rows or piles, each containing six loaves or cakes of bread made after a special recipe (Lv 24[5-9] P). The post-Biblical Jewish authorities, Josephus, Philo, Mishnāh, and Talmud,[1] state that the shewbread was unleavened, and in view of Lv 2[11] P, which prescribes that a *minḥāh*, or bloodless offering, shall always be unleavened, it seems likely that this was the case with the shewbread, at any rate after the Exile, though possibly not in primitive times. In one passage in the Priestly Code, according to our present text, the shewbread is spoken of as אִשֶּׁה. This term is explained by J. G. Wetzstein[2] as for *'insheh*, from *'enosh*, 'man,' and this view is accepted by König;[3] but it is rejected by the *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon* and most scholars. *'Ishsheh* is usually explained as EV 'offering made by fire,' which would imply that the shewbread was burnt; it could hardly be called a 'fire-offering' because it had been baked. But there is no suggestion elsewhere that it was burnt, and the idea is inconsistent with the statements everywhere else that it was eaten. In the immediate context, Lv 24[7], the incense placed with the shewbread is called *'ishsheh*; probably some confusion between the shewbread and the incense led to a slight corruption of the text, the original having merely stated that the incense was *'ishsheh*.

The shewbread was placed upon a table or altar and was renewed weekly (Ex 26[35] 40[22], 1 S 21[6] (Heb. 7), 1 K 6[20-22]). Probably the original text of 1 K 6[20-22] stated that the table was cedar (Ezk 41[22], 'altar of wood'), and this may very well have been the case in the pre-Exilic sanctuaries, 1 K 7[48] being late and the Chronicler, as usual, antedating the conditions of his own times.[4] In the description of the table in Ex 25[23-30] it is made of *shittīm* (acacia) wood and overlaid with gold. Probably this was the case with the table in the post-Exilic temple; it is not likely that the statements of 1 K 7[48] and Jos. *Ant.* VIII. iii. 7, to the effect that there was a table of solid gold, are literally true. According to Ex 25[29], there were various utensils on the table, and, according to Lv 24[7], incense on, or by the side of, the loaves. In Lv 24[6], 2 Ch 13[11], the epithet *ṭahor* is applied to the table; as this term is frequently applied in P to the gold used for the tabernacle, it is probably applied to the table as being overlaid with 'pure' gold.

3. **History.**—The antiquity of the shewbread is shown by the mention of it in 1 S 21[6] (Heb. 7), where it appears in the sanctuary at Nob in the time of Saul. In this passage it seems that the shewbread was placed hot upon the table, and that the stale bread, after it had been removed from the table, might be eaten by any one in a state of ceremonial cleanness, and not merely, as in later times, by the priests. This passage belongs to one of the older sources of S, compiled some time before 750.

We next meet with the shewbread in the Temple of Solomon (1 K 6[20-22] 7[48]; the former of these passages belongs to an early source, before 700, and establishes the presence of the shewbread in Solomon's Temple). From analogy we may conclude that it was also a feature of the sanctuary at Shiloh and other early Israelite shrines. Ezk 41[22] includes the table in the specifications for the restoration of the Temple; no doubt the temple built by Zerubbabel had such a table; there is

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[1] *Meg.* 15*b*. [2] *Sanh.* 107*a*.

[3] *Yōmā*, 22*b*; Jerus. *Ta'an.* 65*a*; the hyssop is presented for the purification of lepers.

[4] The numerical value of the letter ה is five.

[1] Dillmann, *Exodus und Leviticus*[3], p. 653 ff.

[2] In an excursus to F. Delitzsch, *Bibl. Commentar über die Psalmen*[4], Leipzig, 1883, p. 889, Eng. tr., London, 1889, iii. 435 ff.

[3] *Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum AT*, Leipzig, 1910.

[4] Cf. C. F. Burney, *Notes on the Heb. Text of the Book of Kings*, Oxford, 1903, p. 73 f.

positive evidence for its presence in the post-Exilic temple somewhat later. It is mentioned in Neh 10^{33} (Heb. 34); 1 Mac 1^{22} mentions it among the spoils carried off by Antiochus Epiphanes; 1 Mac 4^{49} tells us that Judas Maccabæus replaced the table when he cleansed and refurnished the Temple. The statement of 2 Ch 4^{8} (cf. 1 Ch 28^{16}, 2 Ch 4^{19}, 'tables') that Solomon made ten tables is an example of the Chronicler's passion for exaggerating numbers. A writer whom Josephus quotes under the name of Hecatæus of Abdera,[1] apparently belonging to the 3rd cent. B.C., speaks of a golden altar in the Temple, doubtless the table of the shewbread. The pseudepigraphal *Letter of Aristeas*,[2] variously dated from about 200 B.C. to after A.D. 33,[3] gives an elaborate account of a table of gold and precious stones said to have been presented to the Temple by Ptolemy Philadelphus (285–247 B.C.). The incident and the table are both imaginary, but they may add something to the evidence for a table of gold in the Second Temple. The table is mentioned in Philo[4] and Josephus.[5] There are also details and discussions concerning the table and the shewbread in the Talmud and other post-Biblical Jewish literature. No doubt the table and the rite continued till the final destruction of the Temple by Titus; the table is shown on the Arch of Titus, as part of the spoils taken by him from the Temple. There is no mention of shewbread in connexion with the temple at Heliopolis or that at Elephantine, but, as the available evidence is scanty, it is possible that the rite may have been observed in either or both of these sanctuaries.

4. Significance.—There is no official or even express statement as to the significance of the rite. The terms are got from the arrangement of the loaves (*ma'ărekheth*) or the position of the table (*pānīm*). There is no ground for the view sometimes held that the loaves were called 'presence-bread' because they symbolized the presence of God with His people. P speaks of them as *qōdesh qodāshīm*, 'holy of holies,' *i.e.* as belonging to the group of most sacred things, probably partly because of proximity to the inner shrine, the Most Holy Place, partly because of the ancient and unique character of the rite, as far as the Temple worship was concerned.

In the absence of any express statement we can only attempt to deduce the significance of the shewbread from analogy and other *a priori* considerations. The setting out of food on a table in a temple before the shrine or image of a deity is found in many religions.[6] Jer 44^{19} etc. speaks of the cakes (*kawwanim*) baked by Jewish women for the Queen of Heaven (*q.v.*); and Is 65^{11} of those who set in order (*'arakh*) a table for a deity Gad, RV 'Fortune.' There were at Rome *lectisternia*, or festivals at which banquets were spread for the gods—a practice perhaps introduced from Greece. Babylonian ritual included the setting forth of loaves—twelve or a multiple thereof—before the deity; these were to be sweet, *i.e.* unleavened, and made of a special kind of meal.[7] No doubt the rite in Israel was a survival from the time when the deity was thought of as actually consuming the food offered to him. Even Lv $21^{8.17}$ H speaks of the sacrifices as *leḥem 'Elōhīm*, 'the bread of God,' doubtless metaphorically. It has been suggested that hot bread (1 S 21^{6} (Heb. 7)), fresh from the oven, was used so that the deity might enjoy the fragrance. But would there be any agreeable fragrance at the end of a week? The idea that Jahweh consumed the food would be obsolete long before our documents were composed. In historical times the shewbread was an ancient established fact, accepted as a matter of course, part of the divinely prescribed worship, and therefore binding and efficacious, apart from any explanation or justification. For most that would be sufficient, but thoughtful men would find the rite significant in the different ways in which it appealed to them. To Philo[1] it seems to symbolize the earth, as the lamp-stand does heaven; *i.e.*, the presence of the loaves symbolizes the dominion of Jahweh over earth and heaven. Josephus says that the twelve loaves denoted the year with its twelve months.[2] Cyril of Jerusalem treats the shewbread as a type of the Eucharist.[3]

LITERATURE.—A. Dillmann, *Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus*[3], Leipzig, 1897, pp. 653 ff.; S. R. Driver, *The Book of Exodus*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 203 f., 272 ff.; A. H. McNeile, *The Book of Exodus*, London, 1908, pp. xc, 164 ff.; A. R. S. Kennedy, *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Shewbread'; I. Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie*, Freiburg i. B., 1894, pp. 387, 397, 401, 425, 432, 443; W. Nowack, *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Archäologie*, do. 1894, ii. 207, 241.

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SHI'AHS.—1. The name.—The term 'Shī'ah' is a collective term meaning 'party' or 'following,' which has been applied to the partisans of the family of 'Alī, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muḥammad, since the early days of Islām, when they first constituted themselves a sect. The full name would be Shī'ah 'Ahlu-'l-Bait, 'followers of the Prophet's kindred.' Much more frequently used in the beginning was the term ''Alīite'—a term which is primarily of political implication as referring to the claims of 'Alī's family to the khalīfate. 'Shī'ahs' to-day has a directly religious reference. It describes the smaller of the two great divisions of Muhammadanism, which adheres to the twelve (or seven) *imāms* of the family of 'Alī. For the Shī'ahs these *imāms* are infallible religious leaders. The Shī'ahs are found at the present time in large numbers only in Persia and in India.

2. Origin.—Despite the claims of the Shī'ahs and the traditions offered in proof of them, there is no reliable trace of any utterance by the Prophet which points to 'Alī or his descendants as his successors in the leadership of Islām. The Shī'ahs assert that Muḥammad definitely nominated 'Alī and his descendants at the Pool of Al-Ghadīr and that on different occasions he indicated his preference for 'Alī. Veiled references in the Qur'ān, when interpreted allegorically (*ta'wīl*), are made to place 'Alī next to the Prophet in excellence and far above all other men. The Prophet is the sun and 'Alī is the moon. The course of events in the days of the Prophets and afterwards so strongly contradicts these arguments that they may be set aside, and the development of the 'Alīd claims may be studied in the light of historical facts.

Muḥammad refused to name his successor, and the two first khalīfahs, Abū Bakr and 'Umar, were elected by the Muslim community (*Ijmā'*), the latter on the nomination of his predecessor; the third choice was indecisive, and the khalīfate was offered to 'Alī on condition that he pledged loyalty to the traditional interests of Islām. In his answer he was uncertain, and the choice passed to 'Uthman. Meanwhile, 'Alī's wife, the Prophet's daughter Fāṭimah, had presented a claim to Abū Bakr for some crown lands as her inheritance from her father's estate. The claim had been refused

[1] *C. Apion.* i. 22. [2] §§ 52–72.
[3] H. T. Andrews, in R. H. Charles, *Apoc. and Pseud. of the OT*, Oxford, 1913, ii. 100 ff.
[4] *Vit. Mos.* iii. 10, etc. [5] *Ant.* III. vi. 6, etc.
[6] W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 225 f.
[7] Cf. the *soleth*, EV 'fine flour,' of Lv 24^{5} (*KAT*[3], pp. 600, 629; A. Jeremias, *OT in the Light of the Anc. East*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, ii. 114, 135).

[1] *Vit. Mos.* iii. 10.
[2] *Ant.* III. vii. 7; similarly Zimmern, Jeremias, etc., connect them with the twelve signs of the zodiac (see reff. above).
[3] A. Plummer, *HDB* iii. 145.

by the khalīfah Abū Bakr, and the family of 'Alī felt aggrieved at the treatment shown them. When 'Uthman was elected, the umpire of the election, Abd-ar-Rahmān, warned 'Alī against using his nearer kinship to the Prophet as a basis for special consideration. This probably marks the emergence of a claim in favour of the 'Ahlu-'l-Bait. The weakness and failure of 'Uthman's reign ranged the stronger forces of Islām against him, and among them 'Alī and his friends. 'Uthman's governor in Syria, Mu'āwiyah, was of Umayyad descent like the khalīfah himself. In the natural course of things he very probably would have seized the power from 'Alī on 'Uthman's death in any case. But, when 'Alī and his party lent their countenance to the conspiracy which robbed 'Uthman of his life, Mu'āwiyah gave himself out as the avenger of 'Uthman's blood. Even then, when the way was once more open for him to be elected khalīfah, 'Alī was not willing to stake anything on his legitimist rights. He would have evaded election had it been possible. The rebels and his friends almost compelled him to accept. Up to this point, therefore, events make it clear that no belief in a divine right of the 'Ahlu-'l-Bait to succeed the Prophet existed, and consequently there could be no Shī'ah or party which held that belief. It is also clear that the causes at work after 'Uthman's death were tending to produce a violent schism in Islām. On the one hand there was a powerful usurper, Mu'āwiyah, with the irresistible appeal of blood-revenge and the vindication of the khalīfate—the holiest authority which Islām possessed. On the other were arrayed the partisans of democratic rights, who were prepared to resist Mu'āwiyah's usurpation, and standing with them the duly elected khalīfah 'Alī, whose supporters were now forging arguments looking towards the establishment of the divine right of 'Alī and his family to rule over the Muslim community. The two sides came into armed conflict. Mu'āwiyah cursed 'Alī in the Friday service at Damascus, and 'Alī denounced Mu'āwiyah at Kūfa. The decisive clash came at the battle of Ṣiffīn (36 A.H. ; A.D. 657), and at that time the bungling management of a golden opportunity by 'Alī's representative, Abu Mūsā, left 'Alī without the support of the democratic rights party and legally deposed in the eyes of his own friends. The former withdrew from the army and gave themselves to anarchist excesses which were a constant hindrance to 'Alī's cause. The withdrawal of these Khārijites,[1] as they called themselves because of their protests against both khalīfahs, left 'Alī's supporters a homogeneous party, a Shī'ah. The party was sufficiently formed to hold together from this time forwards. The assassination of 'Alī (40 A.H.) greatly diminished its political hopes, but the total reaction of the events gave added strength to the spirit and numbers of the group.

3. **The Shi'ah imāms.**—With the death of 'Alī the khalīfate ceased to be an attainable end for the Shī'ahs. For a few brief months al-Ḥasan, the elder of the two sons of 'Alī and Fāṭimah, maintained a shadowy rule in Kūfa and then resigned (41 A.H.) and betook himself to Medīna. In 61 A.H. the younger son, al-Ḥusain, yielded to the flimsy assurances of the Kūfans and left Mecca on the fatal adventure which, they said, was to set him upon the throne in Kūfa. The overwhelming of his little host by the troops of the Umayyad khalīfah, Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiyah, at Kerbelā extinguished the 'Alid hope of political dominion. The Shī'ahs made the best of necessity and gave themselves now to an ambition for religious leadership. The representatives of the house of 'Alī became the indispensable religious heads of Islām, the *imāms* of the believers. The history of the centuries that followed the death of Ḥusain is a history of intrigue actuated by religion. The 'Alids, when they acted on their own motive, were not often successful, but their claim to religious leadership gathered about them a following and made them useful instruments in the hands of men opposed to the existing form of government. In Persia they lent themselves at an early date to the nationalist movement, which in time displaced the Arab domination by purely Persian rule. In this way Shī'ism ultimately became the national religion of Persia.

[1] See art. KHAWĀRIJ.

(1) Al-Mukhtār in 64 A.H. is the first adventurer to employ the Shī'ahs for his own purposes. He gave himself out as the avenger of the martyred 'people of the House' and professed allegiance to a son of 'Alī, Muḥammad ibn al-Hanafīyah, whose mother was one of the wives taken by 'Alī after the death of Fāṭimah. Al-Mukhtār declared Ibn al-Hanafīyah to be the Mahdī (*q.v.*), the founder of a new order of justice and peace. The direct heir to the imāmate, 'Alī ibn Ḥusain, Zainu 'l-'Ābidīn, was but a child, and it seems to have been agreed that Ibn al-Hanafīyah should be recognized for the time being. In 68 A.H. the Shī'ahs were admitted to standing at the *hajj* in Mecca and Ibn al-Hanafīyah was acknowledged as their *imām*. Thus within a few years of al-Ḥusain's death the Shī'ahs were an acknowledged sect of Islām along with other sects or parties. Al-Muhktār's effort was shattered by his defeat at Kūfa in 67 A.H. He had championed the cause of the Persian Muslims (Mawālī) and had been supported by the Shī'ahs. His defeat bound the interests of the two groups much more closely together than they had been.

(2) The second important instance of a use of the Shī'ahs to serve the ends of designing politicians is found in the campaign of Abu Muslim, the chief agent in bringing about the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty and the accession to power of the 'Abbāsids. Abu Muslim, the general of the revolting army in Khorāsān, while ostensibly conducting a revolution on behalf of the 'Alids, was really the agent of the family of 'Abbās. By kindling the hopes of the 'Alids he gained the support of the Persian Muslims and fought a campaign which brought Arab control in Persia to an end; but, instead of winning the ascendancy for the house of 'Alī, he secured the throne for Abu 'l-Abbās and settled the khalīfate in the keeping of the 'Abbāsids for 500 years.

(3) A third illustration of the ease with which the religious preoccupation of the Shī'ah leaders placed them at the mercy of political schemers is afforded by the case of the eighth *imām*, 'Alī ibn Mūsā ar-Riḍā, who was a favourite of the khalīfah al-Mamūn, was named his successor, and was married to his daughter. Al-Mamūn admired his piety and valued his counsel, but these qualities were quite second in importance to the opportunity afforded of extending his influence and strengthening the support of the reigning dynasty. The motive of policy which led him to exchange the colour of his royal standard from its traditional black to the 'Alid green was the motive which led him to show favour to the leading representative of the 'Alid family. This was made clear when public dissatisfaction became acute, and he took an early opportunity to get rid of the *imām*—the Shī'ahs say by giving him with his own hand a bunch of poisoned grapes.

(4) The most startling instance of this use of the religious aims of the Shī'ahs is perhaps that supplied by 'Abdallah ibn Maimūn, the founder of the Ismā'īlian sect of the Shī'ahs (260 A.H. ; A.D. 873–874). This man of far-reaching political vision laid plans to found a world-empire by destroying the power of the spiritual authority existing in Islām and, on the basis of a more rigorous and unified religious authority, securing that unquestioning obedience which would be the factor of might in the new state. As a starting-point for carrying this plan into effect, he made use of a small unaggressive sect of the Shī'ahs who insisted on recognizing as the seventh Shī'ah *imām* either Ismā'īl ibn Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq or Ismā'īl's son, Muḥammad. With the seventh *imām*, whichever it might be, the succession was thought to end, and because of that fact the seventh *imām* was said not to have died and thus brought the imāmate to extinction, but to have withdrawn into concealment and to exercise his indisputable authority as a 'Hidden *Imām*' through chosen representatives in each generation. The Hidden *Imām* was also the Mahdī who at the end of the age would regenerate the world. 'Abdallah ibn Maimūn claimed for himself and his successors the position of a chosen legate of the Mahdī. He thereby put forward the highest claim to exercise spiritual authority. The discipline which he formulated for the novitiate of the new order was thoroughly adapted to secure the obedience that he wished to obtain. The Ismā'īlians, as they had previously existed, were absorbed in the re-organized sect and became a mere pedestal to serve the vaulting ambition of the Maimunīyah group and its leader.

Within the history of the Ismā'īlian sect the political purpose of revolutionary leaders has been prompt to avail itself of Persian mysticism in some of its Shī'ah modifications. The sect of the Ḥashīshīn, or Assassins (*q.v.*), in the 12th and 13th

centuries A.D., the Carmaṭians (*q.v.*), who were contemporary with the first century of Ismā'ilian history, and the Fāṭimids of N. Africa, who established their new capital, al-Mahdīyah, in A.D. 909, are all instances of the point in question, viz. that religious Shī'ism lent itself to the ambitious ends of political leaders all too readily. The succession of the Shī'ah *imāms* is shown as follows:

(1) 'Alī (35 A.H.–40 A.H.), (2) al-Ḥasan, (3) al-Ḥusain, (4) 'Alī, Zainu 'l-'Ābidīn, (4) Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyah, (5) Muḥammad al-Bāqir, (5) Abu Hāshim, (6) Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq, (7) Mūsā ibn Ja'far, (7) Ismā'īl ibn Ja'far or Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl, (8) 'Alī ibn Mūsā ar-Riḍā, (9) Muḥammad al-Jawād, (10) 'Alī al-Hadī, (11) Al-Ḥasan al-'Askarī, (12) Muḥammad al-Mahdī (disappeared in A.D. 878).

These, except 'Alī and his sons and Riḍā, were not men of note in public affairs, but, as being in the line of succession to the imāmate, they all are reputed to have possessed in pre-eminent degree the character and gifts of saints.

The Hanafīyah imāmate comprises only five *imāms*. The last of the five is reported on 'Abbāsid authority to have transferred his claim to the imāmate to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī the 'Abbāsid. His father, Ibn al-Hanafīyah, is regarded by his followers as the Hidden *Imām*.

The Ismā'īlī imāmate includes only seven *imāms*, the seventh becoming 'the Hidden One.'

The regular Shī'ahs, who form a very large majority of the whole number, are designated as the Ithnā-'asharīya ('Twelvers'), to distinguish them from the Ismā'īlians, who, as they hold to only seven *imāms*, are called Ṣab'iya ('Seveners'). The 'Twelvers' are generally called the Imāmīyah.

The law of succession in the imāmate has been fairly consistent. The *imām* inherits the grace of his office from 'Alī as the legitimate successor of the Prophet and is, as well, the heir of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭimah. He is of the descendants of Ḥusain, the younger son of 'Alī and Fāṭimah. He is regularly the eldest son of his father. It was the departure from this rule that caused the Ismā'īlian schism. The imāmate of Ibn al-Hanafīyah claims to be legitimate, though it has no connexion with Fāṭimah. It deems the connexion with 'Alī sufficient. The Zaidīyah sect of Shī'ahs seem to have a better argument in claiming that the imāmate need not be restricted to the line of Ḥusain and need not observe the law of primogeniture. Their own founder, Zaid, a grandson of Ḥusain, was not a first-born son.

4. **Later history of the Shī'ahs.**—The early Abbāsid khalīfahs were disposed to be friendly towards the Shī'ahs. Their attitude towards foreigners and foreign learning was sympathetic and their view and outlook liberal towards those who differed from them. By profession they were Sunnites, but in practice their attitude was much more generous than that of the orthodox leaders of their day. In the khalīfate of al-Manṣūr, the second of the 'Abbāsid rulers, the Mu'tazilite school of thought took its rise. It was the Persian response to the cultures of the East and West as these began to make their influence felt in Persian Muslim circles. It cultivated the spirit of criticism and encouraged the testing of traditional views by an appeal to reason. The Mu'tazilah flourished especially in the reigns of al-Mamūn, al-Mu'tasim, and al-Wāthiḳ (198–232 A.H.; A.D. 813–847). In the bitter rivalry between the Sunnites on the one hand and the Mu'tazilah and Shī'ahs on the other it was assumed that the two last shared the same opinions, and Sunnī orthodoxy opposed the one in proportion as it opposed the other. Both schools were essentially Persian and both refused to be bound by the Tradition and Consensus as held by the Sunnīs. They both favoured speculation and the dialectic method of proof. Unfortunately, the apologetic industry of the orthodox party showed a zeal in creating an effective literature and in organizing a propaganda, while their opponents trusted in the intrinsic reasonableness of their views. In the conservative reaction which set in under al-Mutawakkil (232 A.H.) both Mu'tazilites and Shī'ahs suffered severely; and they seemed to be put at a still greater disadvantage when the great tradition collections of the Sunnīs were put in circulation. Al-Bukharī issued his *Ṣaḥīḥ* before 256 A.H. (A.D. 870) and Muslim his collection with the same title a few years afterwards. These works constituted the foundation of all later works of law and seemed to afford a body of proof which could not be controverted. The Mu'tazilah and Shī'ahs alike suffered when Abu'l Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (*q.v.*), who had been trained under Mu'tazilite teachers, turned their own weapons against the Mu'tazilah (*c.* 300 A.H.) and framed his system of doctrine along traditional (*i.e.* Sunnite) lines. His formulation of orthodoxy became the standard throughout Sunnite Islām and has maintained its position down to the present time. Such Mu'tazilism as remained at the close of the 4th Muslim century has been absorbed by the Shī'ahs, and scholars are disposed to find in modern Shī'ism a fair representative of the old speculative and dialectical spirit of the Mu'tazilah.

The Shī'ahs enjoyed a period of prosperity when the Buwaihids came to assume the real power under the khalīfate of al-Muṭī' (334 A.H.; A.D. 946). These princes were of Shī'ah faith, and Shī'ism was protected and encouraged by them while they retained their power in Baghdād (until 447 A.H.; A.D. 1055). During the Buwaihid régime there appeared an interesting propagandist organization which seems to have aimed at a more rational and systematic presentation of Islām as it was understood by the Mu'tazilite-Shī'ah scholars. This society was known as the 'Brethren of Purity' (Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā). Their views were set forth in a series of treatises numbering about 50 or 51 in all. These treatises were widely known, if we may judge from the number of copies which still survive.

The Shī'ah faith had suffered from lack of political prestige in Persia until the entrance of the Buwaihid princes upon the scene, and after their time Shī'ism again suffered eclipse as the Seljuks, who were Sunnites, assumed control. The brilliant triumph of the Safawid Shāh Ismā'īl (A.D. 1499–1502) established a new order of things and made the Shī'ah religion what it has continued to be since that date—the national religion of Persia. The one ruler who seriously threatened the secure hold of Shī'ism on the country was Nādir Shāh (A.D. 1736), whose aims were purely secular. With an eye to the control of a vast empire, he proposed to abolish the distinction between Sunnites and Shī'ahs, have both regarded as equally orthodox, and Shī'ism placed upon the same footing as the great schools of Sunnite Islām, as a fifth school alongside the four already accepted as orthodox. The proposal met with vigorous opposition and was given up, though Nādir Shāh's treatment of the Shī'ah hierarchy in Persia to the end of his reign showed that he was very little concerned with the prosperity of the Shī'ah or any other form of religion.

The accession of the Safawids brought to the throne a line of Ṣūfī[1] saints—a fact which suggests a strong reason for the persistence and spread of Shī'ism. The Ṣūfī mysticism has had a specially close relation to Persia and the Shī'ah form of Islām, and the sects of the Shī'ah have taken much of their distinctive character from Ṣūfism.[2]

[1] See art. Ṣūfīs.

[2] Cf. the emphasis laid on *gnosis* in the Ismā'īlian sect and the complete submission to authority which the Shī'ah sects make prominent in their requirements.

An even more important factor in the growth of Shī'ism is found in the features of the system which provide for powerful emotional revivals of religion. The Shī'ahs have always lived in the emotional atmosphere of martyrdom. The memory of the martyred founders of the sect, of the sufferings of the *imāms*, and of the confession witnessed by the great saints is much cultivated, and the annual feasts of commemoration are marked by demonstrations of feeling observed nowhere else in Islām. The greatest of all these memorial feasts is the *Muḥarram*, which is specially devoted to the martyrs of Kerbelā, pre-eminent among them the *imām* Ḥusain. The feast in honour of 'Alī at Nejef and that observed at Meshed for the *imām* Riḍā are impressive by reason of the outward show of ceremonial and even more because of the display of intense feeling. Another factor calculated to excite interest and enthusiasm to a marked degree is the Mahdist expectation which has been constantly present in Shī'ah circles. It is not confined to the Shī'ahs, but has been specially active among them. The fanaticism of the Ismā'īlian movement was stimulated by Mahdist hopes which centred in the seventh *imām*. The Carmaṭian excesses were connected by the Carmaṭians themselves, in some part at least, with the service of the Mahdī. The Fāṭimid empire in the Maghrib was founded by Sa'īd ibn Aḥmad, who claimed to be the Mahdī, and Mahdist fanaticism promoted its extension. Other instances might be adduced. Generally speaking, the alleged withdrawal of the *imām* and his continued existence as al-Ghāib ('the Hidden *Imām*') have contributed to make the hope of the Mahdī an abiding incentive to religious interest.

The most important outgrowths of the Shī'ah party are: (1) the Zaidīyah sect; (2) the Ismā'īlians; (3) their offspring, the Carmaṭians; (4) the Fāṭimids; (5) the Druses (derived from the Fāṭimids); (6) the Hashīshīn, or Assassins (a development within the Ismā'īlian sect); (7) in quite modern times the Shaikhī sect and its derivatives, the Bābīs and Bahāīs.

(1) *Zaidiyah.*—The Zaidiyah (*q.v.*) professed to follow Zaid, the grandson of al-Ḥusain, as their *imām*. They established a principality in Tabaristān and ruled there as *imāms* from A.D. 864 to 928. They were then driven out by the Sunnite Samanids. Another division of the Zaidites organized a Shī'ah state in Yemen with its centre at Ṣa'da and later at Ṣan'ā. The date of the foundation was 280 A.H. (A.D. 892), and the independent Zaidī state still exists. The Zaidites demand that the *imām* shall be a descendant of Fāṭimah as well as of 'Alī, but otherwise they are the most liberal of the Shī'ahs and in many ways are indistinguishable from the Sunnites, though they do not desire to be known as Sunnīs. Unlike other Shī'ahs, they admit the validity of the election of the first two khalīfahs, Abū Bakr and 'Umar. They provide also for the possibility of there being two *imāms* in a given age, in order to meet the needs of regions far removed from one another. The liberal attitude of the Zaidiyah is a survival of early Mu'tazilite teaching.

(2) *Ismā'īlians.*—Reference has been made in passing to the Ismā'īlian sect, or 'the Seveners.' The movement was started by 'Abdallah ibn Maimūn, al-Qaddaḥ ('the Oculist'), who died in 261 A.H. (A.D. 874). He gave himself out as the representative or 'helper' of the Hidden *Imām*, Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl. He professed to be inspired and to have the power to perform miracles. His professed mission was to prepare a people for the Hidden *Imām*, who was to return to visible manifestation shortly and, as the Mahdī, remove wickedness and bring righteousness on earth. To realize his mission, he sent out missionaries (*du'ā*, sing. *dā'ī*), who were to disguise their purpose, take up an ordinary calling, and cultivate acquaintance with as many as they could reach. With a view to winning confidence, they were instructed to profess sympathy with the beliefs of those whom they approached. They were then to raise questions and suggest difficulties. When the new-found acquaintance showed anxiety for further light, the missionary was to hint at the possibility that a source might be found which would give the desired explanations and lead on to fuller knowledge. Gradually the inquirer was brought to ask that he might be led to the coveted teacher and was induced to pledge secrecy and unreserved acceptance of the teacher's authority. The conversion to the Ismā'īli attitude was readily realized when an inquirer had advanced thus far, and ere long the head of the sect had added to his subjects another who was bound to him in full submission until death. The discipline of the novice came to have a fixed and elaborate order of stages, of which only those leading to the self-surrender of the candidate to the Ismā'īlī head are known. These comprise the first four and leave the remaining three or more to be guessed. The latter are thought to have led to the complete renunciation of all positive belief and worship and to a sole devotion to the *imām* and his earthly representative.

(3) *Carmaṭians.*—'Abdallah ibn Maimūn made his headquarters finally at Salamīya in Syria, and to that point the numerous *du'ā* made their reports. One of these men secured the conversion of Ḥamdan Ḳarmaṭ, who started the sect known as the Carmaṭians (*q.v.*) in Irāq before 277 A.H. They were Ismā'īlians with immediate obedience to their own chiefs but a more comprehensive submission to the *imām* Mahdī. Their ravages continued to terrorize Islām for a century, when they were finally crushed. Their attack on Mecca and seizure of the Black Stone is one of the acts in history which are regarded with horror by all Muslims. Nor is the sacrilege regarded as having been made right by the return of the Black Stone (A.D. 949) some twenty years after it had been taken away. The spoilers claimed to be acting in obedience to the Mahdī in both the removal and the restoration of the stone. The power of Mahdism to secure obedience to authority is thus illustrated.

(4) *Fāṭimids.*—Among the missionaries sent out from Salamiya was Abu 'Abdallah, who was to prepare the rude tribes of the Maghrib for the reign of the Mahdī and the acceptance of his 'helper.' This man, Abu 'Abdallah, in 289 A.H. sent word that the Berber tribes were ready to take up arms in the cause of the Mahdī. The head of the Ismā'īliyah at Salamiya, Sa'īd ibn Aḥmad, a grandson of 'Abdallah ibn Maimūn, led an expedition to N. Africa, and after a period of conflict succeeded in establishing himself as the Mahdī, giving himself out as the lineal descendant and heir of Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl, the Hidden *Imām*. As such, he took the name Ubaidallah. The new capital which he founded was called the city of the Mahdī, al-Mahdiya. These are the steps which culminated in the foundation of the Fāṭimid dynasty. It was the most ambitious and enduring of the Shī'ah dynasties, as the foundation is dated from the foundation of al-Mahdiya (297 A.H.; A.D. 909), and the empire continued until Saladin, a Sunnī Kurd, entered Cairo as a conqueror (567 A.H.; A.D. 1171). The Fāṭimids had been ruling in Cairo since 450 A.H. (A.D. 1058). They held the throne for 270 years altogether; the Safawid dynasty in Persia is the only other great Shī'ah line of rulers. It lasted for 234 years (A.D. 1502–1736).

The Ismā'īlite views of the Fāṭimid rulers did not take root and spread in the Maghrib and Egypt. The Kabyles and *fellahīn* assimilated the clear-cut appeal to traditional authority which the Sunnite system offered more readily than they did the Ismā'īlite theosophy. To-day Egypt follows the school of ash-Shafi'ī, while the Maghrib is Mālikite in its views.

(5) *Druses and Nusairiyah.*—A noteworthy development within Shī'ism under the Fāṭimids is represented by the Druse sect. The khalīfah al-Ḥākim (386–411 A.H.; A.D. 996–1021) was a strange and probably unbalanced individual who alternately favoured and persecuted Shī'ahs, Jews, and Christians, and finally, under the influence of Ḥamza and Darazī, two Ismā'īlī emissaries, gave himself out to be God incarnate, who had appeared in the flesh in order to establish an entirely new order of things in the world. He sought to impose his view upon the people of Egypt, but the attempt provoked violent revolt. Al-Ḥākim disappeared mysteriously in A.D. 1021, and his lieutenants were driven out of Egypt. Darazī picked up a following in the Lebanon region of Syria and a sect of Ḥākim-worshippers, borrowing its views and practices from Muslim, Christian, and pagan sources, was formed. This sect assumed the name of its organizer, Darazī—a name which the West has slightly modified into Druzes or Druses. They are not generally counted as Muslims; they are distinguished from Shī'ahs and Ismā'īlians, and are sometimes reckoned as a Christian sect.

The Nusairiyah, who have long been found in the Lebanons between Tripoli and Antioch, are of Shī'ah origin, but the heathenism of their environment has been rank and persistent and has over-grown the Islāmic elements to such an extent that the sect is frequently regarded as a development of paganism rather than of Islām. They are worshippers of the natural forces for whom 'Alī is the moon-god and the 'commander of the heavenly host' (stars). The family of 'Alī constitute the supreme objects of worship. Muḥammad is only a 'veil,' though with 'Alī and Selmān he forms the Nusairī trinity. The sect accepts the Qur'ān, but adopts an extravagant allegorical interpretation (*tawīl*).

(6) *Assassins and Metāwile.*—Much more important from the historical standpoint is the order of the Hashīshīn, or Assassins (*q.v.*), which arose within the Ismā'īlian sect in the 11th Christian cent. and continued to spread terror throughout Persia and Syria until they were destroyed by the Tatars under Hulagu Khan in A.D. 1256. The Assassins held the opinions of the Ismā'īliyah and seem to have been organized to assist any who might be favourably disposed towards their sect and to do away with such as were opposed to them or their friends. The Grand Master, or Shaikh of the Mountains (*Shaikh al-Jebāl*), exercised complete authority over all the ranks under him and was served with blind fidelity, in particular by the *fedāis*, or rank-and-file, who executed the Master's commands without being informed as to their motive or aim and often with fearful consequences to themselves as well as to their victims. The crushing of these militant Ismā'īlians left the sect an ineffective body and robbed it of its savage spirit. There are still followers of the Ismā'īlī faith in Syria, Persia, and India, all recognizing the noble head of the order, the Aga Khan, who claims descent through the Assassin leaders from Fāṭimah, the Prophet's daughter. The seat of the Aga Khan was formerly in Persia, but is now located

in Bombay. Some of the Indian Ismā'īlians, the Khojas, are not, strictly speaking, 'Seveners.' They have been described as followers of the 'twelve' *imāms*.

The Metāwile, who form a considerable body in the Lebanon region at the present day, are the descendants of an old Shī'ah colony, possibly of Persian origin. They display the exclusiveness of the Shī'ahs, marry among themselves, receive instruction and religious ministrations from the Sayyids (professed members of the family of 'Alī) who have been trained in Irāq, and exhibit physical and social characteristics which distinguish them from their orthodox neighbours. These 'friends of 'Alī,' as their name describes them, live in small communities, and their places of worship and ceremonial are of a modest character.

(7) *Shaikhīs*.—The Shaikhī sect took its rise in Persia in the early years of the last century. They are Ithna-'asharīyah ('Twelvers') by profession, but hold an exaggerated belief in the divinity of the *imāms*, especially of the *imām* Mahdī. The sect is of interest because from it sprang Mirza Muḥammad 'Alī, the founder of the Bābī sect—an eclectic religious enterprise which renounced connexion with conventional Islām and struck out a path for itself. From Bābīism has sprung in its turn Bahāism, which aims at being a universal religion. Bābīism was founded in 1844–45, and Bahāism in 1892. These sects are not recognized or tolerated by the Shī'ahs.[1]

5. Shī'ah doctrines.—The cardinal tenet of Shī'ahs is that of the imāmate, and the chief duty is the acknowledgment of the true *imām*. Shī'ism centres religious authority in an inspired person, whereas the Sunnīs find their authority in the Qur'ān as interpreted by the Sunnah and the Consensus, or *Ijmā'*. The *imāms* of the Sunnīs are the four orthodox founders of schools, Abu Hanīfa, Malik ibn Anas, ash-Shafi'ī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. They are infallible interpreters of the Qur'ān and Sunnah and represent the Consensus of Islām. This Sunnite teaching the Shī'ahs criticize as advocating dependence upon the fallible opinion of men for whom no claim of inspiration is made, who lived several generations after the Prophet, and whose several presentations of the agreed opinion of the Muslim community are vitiated by serious discrepancies. The Shī'ahs claim that the presence of the inspired *imām* is the only sure guarantee of right guidance. Nor is the fact that the last *imām* has withdrawn and is now the 'Hidden One' a bar to the effective exercise of his authority. He is still in the world and in contact with his chosen agents, who have the right to pronounce *ex cathedra* an opinion on any matter affecting the *shar'*, or canon law. They are the media whose voice correctly interprets the view and will of the *imām*. In theory the Shī'ah doctrine of authority should be more satisfactory than that of the Sunnites. It unifies authority and makes it consistent. Neither the Sultān as khalīfah of the Sunnīs nor the Shāh of Persia has religious authority except as an executor of ecclesiastical decisions and a purely civil administrator.

The contest between the Shī'ahs and the Sunnīs turns largely on their different modes of choosing their religious authority. The Shī'ahs assert that the imāmate is settled on the basis of divine right inhering in the family of the Prophet, and that 'Alī, as the cousin of Muḥammad and the husband of his daughter Fāṭimah, was the first *imām* by divine right. After him his sons al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusain inherited the right in order, and after them the *imāms* descended from them in order down to the 'Hidden One,' who left no visible successor. There are variant theories of the imāmate according as the line of al-Ḥasan is admitted as eligible, or the Hashimite family in the more comprehensive sense, or Ismā'īl ibn Ja'far, or as the use of the mode of popular election when necessary is allowed; but in all these cases the Shī'ahs hold to the special *a priori* right of the individual chosen. It is because of the right that he is chosen. The Sunnite explanation is that the khalīfah of the Prophet is 'the commander of the community of believers,' but not an infallible source of religious direction, and that he is chosen by the suffrages of the Muslim community (*Ijmā'*) and finds his right to office in that fact.

Along with this legitimist claim, the Shī'ah *imāms* are declared to have a right by virtue of the nomination of 'Alī and his house by the Prophet at Kum Ghadīr. With this goes the further claim that the celestial light substance which was lodged in Muḥammad was likewise received into the souls of the *imāms* in succession. This was the substantive basis of their dignity, prophetic insight, and infallibility in matters of religion. They were sinless, and, because of the 'light' within them, some deemed them incorruptible and immortal. Their character and divine mission in a world like ours brought upon them persecution, wickedly inflicted, but borne for the sake of others, and availing to atone for the sins of penitent believers.

The extreme sect of the Shī'ahs exaggerated the enduement of the *imāms* and claimed that some or all of them were of divine nature or incarnate manifestations of God. In this belief they offered to them divine honours. Among the Ismā'īlians the Ghulā, or Ghālia ('Exaggerators'), group were more common than elsewhere. We have seen how easily such views develop in connexion with Mahdist movements. Commonly the leaders of such movements make claims for themselves that imply a superhuman origin and nature. The 'Alī Ilahīya sect, which still has followers in Persia and India, takes its name from its belief in the deity of 'Alī.

The imāmate among the Shī'ahs is officially represented in Persia by the *mujtahids*. When Sir John Malcolm wrote his *History of Persia* (1815), there were in that country very few of these final authorities on canon law. This was probably due to the action of Nādir Shāh in the 18th cent. in confiscating for state purposes the ecclesiastical funds and lands, thus diminishing greatly the income available for the maintenance of the Shī'ah hierarchy. At the present time the former sources of income have been restored to a large extent, and the number of *mujtahids* has been greatly augmented. In some of the large cities there are as many as four or five. Their interpretation of the canon law, or *shar'*, is accepted, and the *mujtahids* are careful to respect the decisions of the members of their own order, so that conflict of interpretation on points of importance is not common. The *qaḍīs* and *shaikhs ul-Islām*, who are responsible for the administration of the customary law, or *'urf*, accept the word of the court of *shar'a*, and the Shāh, who imposes or confirms the sentence in important cases, acts as the canonists have recommended, unless the vague distinction between the functions of the canon law and the customary law gives him an excuse for exercising his personal authority. The exceptions are numerous, and all the weight of public sentiment in favour of the *shar'* and its venerated interpreters, the *mujtahids*, has been needed to check in some measure the despotic exercise of the prerogative of the Shāh. The constitution of 1905, as placing restriction upon the autocratic power of the throne and the alleged exclusive rights of the hierarchy in Persia, has been resisted by both and at the present time has little regulative force in the politics of the country. The *mujtahids* are chosen by the people and appointed by the Shāh. They are therefore men of outstanding reputation and held in esteem by the laity. It is required that they shall have had a long and thorough training in the schools of the law, including a period of many years at the best known of the Shī'ah schools at Kerbelā. Exhaustive knowledge of 'seventy sciences' and study extending through 'eighteen years' is the way in which popular report phrases the prerequisites of the *mujtahid's* office. These higher clergy are

[1] See art. Bāb, Bābīs.

expected to maintain a reputation for sanctity, humility, and reverent gravity. They speak little and affect meditation habitually. Those well able to judge regard them as probably sincere, but professionally or conventionally pious. Apart from their activity as jurisconsults and judges, they have an important place in state functions and the greater religious ceremonies; they are also available for private ceremonies and legal transactions where the parties are of some social significance.

The inferior religious functionaries are the *mullās* (*q.v.*). They include a large number of men of excellent legal training and of sincere character, but as a class the *mullās* are not held in high respect, and a great many impostors are found. They have no fixed stipend and must depend on what they can collect in fees for their services, on gifts, and on charity. They execute deeds of sale, contracts, documents connected with marriage, and wills. They also perform the marriage ceremony, conduct funerals, and perform other minor religious rites. They are consulted by those needing advice and officiate at public prayers. In small places and among the nomad tribes in Persia they try cases and adjudicate disputes, their decision being subject to revision by the nearest higher authority such as the *qadī* or *shaikh ul-Islām*.

The Sayyids among the Shī'ahs are the nobility who trace their descent from 'Alī and Fāṭimah. They draw stipends from the state in Persia, and in other places are regarded as entitled to support by the gifts of the faithful.

In their legal usage there is little difference between the Shī'ahs and the Sunnīs on the whole. The most pronounced variation is found in the permission of *mu'ta* marriage. This has its justification for the Shī'ahs in *Qur'ān* iv. 28: 'It shall be no crime to make agreements over and above the law' (of marriage)—a verse which the Sunnīs contend was later abrogated by the Prophet. The Shī'ahs deny this. The prohibition of *mu'ta* marriage attributed to the khalīfah 'Umar is not recognized as having any authority with them, as they deny the validity of 'Umar's claim to his office. This form of marriage permits a man to enter into a legal contract with a woman that they should live as man and wife for any period of time upon which they may agree. The sum of money is paid over, and all obligations on either side cease when the term of the contract has expired. The lawful offspring of such marriages are reckoned to the father. Divorce is not permitted. The women who lend themselves to this kind of union are of humble social standing and in many cases of indifferent reputation. The custom seriously affects the happiness and purity of the marriage relation and tends to degrade the character of those who participate in it. At the same time, as having full legal status with the Shī'ahs, it is not viewed as discreditable by the lower clergy, who themselves practise this mode of marriage.

The sanction of equivocation in the religious life is carried out systematically by the Shī'ahs. Muḥammad had approved *taqīyah* under special and extreme circumstances. The Shī'ahs regard the practice of it as a positive obligation. The term implies that, where one is likely to suffer or the safety of religion requires it, the believer should suitably protect himself or his faith by accommodating his profession of religion to the views of those with whom he has to deal. This practice of *taqīyah* or *kitmān* ('concealment') is the result of the early persecution of the Shī'ahs in Persia and has been confirmed ever since by their ill-treatment when present in Mecca and Medīna for the ceremonies of the *ḥājj*. The advocacy and practice of such a principle as this have a decidedly damaging effect upon the Shī'ah character.

The mutual hatred of the Sunnīs and Shī'ahs is of long standing. It is tending to diminish on the Shī'ah side with the growing contact of the Persians with foreigners and is now not so noticeable in large cities and in parts where Christian churches are conducting missions as it is in more remote parts. One fruitful cause of friction has been the Sunnīs' use of the Sunnah against the Shī'ahs. It has been claimed that the Sunnī traditionists have falsified some traditions and forged others, in order to prove their own position and discredit their opponents; but as a matter of fact the Sunnah which the Shī'ahs profess to follow is commonly adjudged unreliable. The standard collections of traditions were prepared to oppose the great Sunnī collections and were compiled at a late date. The evidences of manipulation are unmistakable.

The ablutions before prayer (*wuḍū*) are somewhat different from the Sunnī practice. The feet are not washed, but wiped, while the hands and arms are washed in an upward direction, towards the elbow, and not downward towards the finger ends. There is a slight change in the formulas of prayer and the order in which they occur.

The laws of marriage, inheritance, and slavery are not in all details the same as the Sunnī laws.

The *ḥājj* may be performed by proxy among the Shī'ahs, and much more practical importance is attached to the *ziyārah* ('visitation') to the tombs of pre-eminent Shī'ah saints than to the Meccan pilgrimage.[1]

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SHILLUK.—1. Geographical and general.—The Shilluk country forms a narrow fringe on the west bank of the Nile from Kaka (between 10° and 11° N.) in the north to Lake No in the south. From Kodok to Taufikia the Shilluk also occupy the east bank, and their villages extend about 35 miles up the Sobat river, principally on the north bank. Their territory is almost entirely a grass country; hence cattle are their wealth and principal care, and, although a considerable quantity of dura is grown, not enough is harvested to provide fully for the really dense population, and scarcity is by no means unusual. A census taken in 1903 gave a population of nearly 40,000 possessing over 12,000 head of cattle and nearly 64,000 sheep and goats. No doubt the number of cattle returned was unduly low, but, making all allowances, the Shilluk are poorer in cattle than the Dinka.

The Acholi, or Gang, and the Lango of Uganda speak dialects of Shilluk, but it is not clear whether the Shilluk migrated northward from the neighbourhood of Lake Victoria or their 'cradle-land' lay between the lake and their present territory, emigration taking place in both direc

[1] See also art. LAW (Muhammadan).

tions. The latter hypothesis is perhaps the more probable.

The Shilluk are tall long-headed Negroids, usually with coarse features and broad noses, but it is not uncommon to meet men, especially members of chiefs' families, with shapely features, including relatively thin lips, noses that are anything but coarse, and well-modelled foreheads. While it would be premature to assert that the Shilluk aristocracy represents a conquering, predominantly Hamitic stock, there is little doubt that, as far as the Nilotic tribes are concerned, the maximum of Hamitic blood is to be found among the Shilluk—a matter worth remembering when comparing their social organization and religious ideas with those of kindred tribes such as the Dinka. The Shilluk are probably the best-organized people in the Anglo-Egyptian Sūdan; they alone of the black tribes offered a constant and determined opposition to the Mahdī and his followers; their king is absolute head of a state, whose territory is divided into districts, each administered by a chief directly responsible to the sovereign and acting as his proxy.

On account of the important part played by the king in the Shilluk religion, it is necessary to give some account of the royal family and its relation to the general organization of the people. The aristocracy of the Shilluk nation consists of the king (*ret*), his children (*niăret*), his grandchildren (*ni'ăret*), and his great-grandchildren (*kwaniăret*). Royal descent is not recognized beyond four generations. Nyakang was the first of the Shilluk kings, and all subsequent rulers are his descendants, the present king being his twenty-fifth successor in the twelve generations that, according to the royal genealogy, have existed since his time. The Shilluk have always paid their king high honour, so that even now he keeps up considerable state and has much authority. He usually rides a donkey, and never moves without a body-guard of from twelve to twenty men, more or less well armed, and all ready to obey his commands implicitly. In the old days his word was law, and his decisions are still obeyed in all matters coming before him; *e.g.*, the fines of cattle that he imposes are paid with reasonable speed.

Polygamy is prevalent, and a large number of the *tukl* in Fashoda—the royal burgh—are the residences of the king's wives, who are very numerous. His sons, too, take many wives, but the royal daughters must remain unmarried, the alleged reason being that it is unfitting that the daughter of a king should marry a commoner, while she could not marry a *niăret*, since this would be incest. When one of the king's wives is pregnant, she remains at Fashoda until the fourth or fifth month; she is then sent to a village, not necessarily her own, where she remains under the charge of the village chief until the child is weaned, when she probably returns to Fashoda. She usually takes a certain number of servants and cattle with her to the village in which she will be confined, and these are generally left there after her departure, becoming the property of the child, who is invariably brought up in the village where it is born, in which it should also be buried. This rule applies equally to all royal children of either sex, in whatever part of the Shilluk territory they may happen to die.

2. The Shilluk high god.—The Shilluk recognize a high god whom they call Juok. He is formless and invisible, and, like the air, is everywhere at once; he is far above Nyakang (in whom the Shilluk religion centres[1]) and men alike; nevertheless, it is only through Nyakang that men can approach him, performing the sacrifices to Nyakang which cause him to move Juok to send rain. Although the name Juok occurs in many greetings —*e.g.*, *Yimiti Juok!*, 'May Juok guard you!'— and although a sick man may cry *Er ra Juok?*, 'Why, O Juok?', it seems doubtful whether he is ever worshipped directly; and, although some Shilluk may vaguely associate the dead with him, this feeling does not appear to imply any dogma concerning a place of the dead or their condition. It should be noted that Westermann[1] gives a prayer to Juok, but the ritual accompanying it is the same as that practised in the case of possession by one of the early divine kings of the Shilluk, while the words of the prayer seem to reflect a common enough confusion between Nyakang, his son Dag, and Juok.

[1] Cf. below, 3.

3. The cult of Nyakang.—J. K. Giffen[2] gives the following account of the origin of Nyakang:

> In the beginning Juok created a great white cow, Deung Adok, who came up out of the Nile. She gave birth to a man child, whose grandchild, Ukwa, married two sisters, of whom one, Nikalya or Nyakai, whose lower parts were those of a crocodile, gave birth to Nyakang, who inherited his mother's saurian attributes.

In spite of the animal element attributed to Nyakang in this legend (apparently collected on the Sobat), the writer feels confident that the majority of Shilluk think of Nyakang as a divine or semi-divine being, entirely human in form and physical qualities, though, unlike his recent successors, he did not die, but disappeared. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the objects kept in his shrine are fit for the use only of a creature with a human body, the writer is convinced that to many of his worshippers, including some at least of his priests, Nyakang, though the founder of their nation, is now essentially a spiritual being.

It is convenient to begin a description of the cult of Nyakang by considering certain shrines which exist in many Shilluk villages, but which are not shrines of Nyakang. These consist of groups of two or more huts of the same circular form and much the same size as those of which the village is composed, but they are more neatly thatched, and their miniature spires terminate in an ostrich egg from which there projects the blade of a spear; moreover, the fence surrounding them is kept in specially good repair. These huts, with the enclosed area, are sacred; for, with the exception of the old people concerned in keeping them clean, no one enters the enclosure, or even approaches it, without due cause. Each enclosure constitutes a shrine, sacred to a dead king, one of the huts being built over his grave, while the others are used by those who attend to the upkeep of the shrine. Nyakang and his son Dag, who did not die but disappeared, have many shrines called 'graves'; Nyakang has no fewer than ten, the most celebrated being at Akurwa and Fenikang. The former consists of two huts, the latter of five. The shrines of Nyakang do not differ in appearance from the grave-shrines of the later Shilluk kings, and they are all spoken of as *kengo Nyakang*, 'the grave of Nyakang,' although it is well known that no one is buried in them.[3] The *kengo Nyakang* are looked after by certain men and old women, the real or reputed descendants of the companions of Nyakang. All are responsible for keeping the shrines clean, but in addition the men act as priests, killing the sacrifices and disposing of the bones, which they cast into the river. The contents of the *kengo* vary, but they always

[1] *The Shilluk People*, p. 171.

[2] *Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, London, 1906, p. 197.

[3] The word *kengo* is applied only to the graves of kings and their children, the graves of commoners being spoken of as *roro*; a similar verbal distinction is made with regard to the death of kings, who are said not to 'die' but, like their ancestor Nyakang, to 'go away.'

include certain sacred spears called *alodo*, representing those used by Nyakang and his companions. At Akurwa the shrine contains the effigy and stool of Nyakang.[1]

The shrine at Fenikang, as already mentioned, consists of five huts; one of these is in a special sense the house of Nyakang, which, in his spirit form, he is thought to inhabit. It is distinguished by a number of very rough paintings on its outer wall, some of which could be recognized as representing animals, but the writer could not learn that the paintings had any special significance. Before the door of this hut are a number of elephant tusks, the broad ends of which are thrust into the ground; within it there are skins on the floor as if for Nyakang to rest upon. Some of the sacred 'spears of Nyakang' appear to be kept in the hut, and there is an extremely sacred stool in this shrine, which seems to be kept there, though it may perhaps be preserved with some of the sacred spears and a number of elephant tusks in one of the other huts of the shrine. The other huts are used by the guardians of the shrine and for storing the dura brought as offerings when the crop is cut.

The graves of the kings and the *kengo Nyakang* are alike the site of the performance of certain ceremonies which show the intimate relation, amounting sometimes to confusion, which exists between Nyakang and subsequent kings. Thus it is usual for the harvest ceremony to be performed at the royal grave-shrines as well as at the shrines of Nyakang, though it is recognized that this is not absolutely necessary. Again, each king soon after his installation sends, or should send, presents to the grave-shrines of his predecessors, treating these in the same way as he treats the shrines of Nyakang, though the presents need not be so lavish. Finally, sick folk send animals to be sacrificed as offerings at the shrines of their kings, just as they do at the shrines of Nyakang.

The writer may now anticipate the conclusions to which the remainder of this article will lead, and point out that the actual working religion of the Shilluk is a cult of Nyakang depending upon the acceptance of the following beliefs: (i.) the immanence in each king (*ret*) of the spirit of Nyakang, simply spoken of as Nyakang; (ii.) the conviction that the king must not be allowed to become ill or senile, lest with his diminishing vigour the cattle should sicken and fail to bear their increase, the crops should rot in the fields, and man, stricken with disease, should die in ever increasing numbers.

It follows that the *ret* of the Shilluk must be numbered among those rulers whom J. G. Frazer has called 'divine kings,' and, though, as in many instances in other countries, every precaution is taken against accidental death—*e.g.*, they may not take part in battle—the Shilluk kings are (or were) killed, in order to avoid those disasters which their senescence was thought to bring upon the State.

4. The killing of the king and the transmission of the divine spirit.—Although there is not the least doubt that the kings of the Shilluk were killed ceremonially when they began to show signs of old age or ill health, it is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what was done, and there is no doubt that a good deal of Shilluk folk-lore is enshrined in the accounts commonly given of the killing of the *ret*. According to these, any *niăret* has the right to attempt to kill the king, and, if successful, to reign in his stead. The killing could take place only at night, for during the day the king would be surrounded by his friends and his body-guard, and no would-be successor would have the slightest chance of harming him. At night the king's position was very different. Alone in his enclosure with his favourite wives, and with no men to protect him, except a few herdsmen whose huts would be at a little distance, he was represented as passing the night in constant watchfulness, prowling fully armed, peering into the shadows, or standing silent and watchful in some dark corner. Then, when at last his rival appeared, the fight would take place in grim silence, broken only by the clash of spear and shield, for it was said to be a point of honour for the *ret* not to call the herdsmen to his assistance.

Many commoners will give some such account as the above, and, though nothing of the sort occurred during the recent period before the Mahdia, it is probable that these tales reproduce with tolerable fidelity a state of affairs which once existed among the Shilluk, or among their ancestors before they occupied their present territory. One survival of the conditions outlined does, indeed, seem to remain. It is commonly believed that the king keeps awake at night and sleeps only by day, and the sleepy condition of the king on the few occasions on which the writer saw him seemed to confirm this report.

In recent times the leading part in the killing of the *ret* has been assigned to the members of certain families called *ororo*, said to be the descendants of the brothers of Oshalo, the third king of the Shilluk. It is generally believed among well-informed Shilluk that their fourth king, Duwad, was the first to be killed ceremonially, but, according to one account, Tugo, the seventh king, was the first to suffer. Absolutely reliable information concerning the actual killing of the *ret* during recent times is not forthcoming. It is said that the *ororo* and some of the chiefs announce his fate to him, after which he is taken to a hut specially built for the occasion, and strangled. The reasons determining the *ororo* to act are said to be the ill health of the *ret* or his incapacity to satisfy his wives, which is regarded as an undoubted sign of senescence. Concerning this there are two popularly received accounts. One states that his wives would themselves strangle the *ret*, but this is incorrect; the other is to the effect that the wives notify their husbands' shortcomings to some of the chiefs, who tell them to inform the *ret* of his approaching death. It is widely believed that this is done by spreading a piece of cloth over his face and over his knees as he lies sleeping during the afternoon. If we ignore these discrepancies and recent practice, there is little doubt that the old custom was to take the *ret* and a nubile maiden (or perhaps two) to a specially built hut, the opening of which was then walled up so that the inmates, left without water or food, died of starvation and suffocation. This practice was said to have been given up some five generations ago on account of the sufferings of the *ret*, who was so distressed by the stench arising from his companion's body that he shouted to the people outside the hut commanding them on no account to leave his successor to die slowly in such a manner.

For a long time no public announcement of the king's death is made, but the news spreads gradually. As already stated, no information was obtainable as to who actually killed the king, or by whom and under what circumstances he was brought to his birthplace where he would be buried and his grave-shrine erected. It must, however, be remembered that Fashoda has not always been the home of the king, for, although it is uncertain how the change was brought about, there is no doubt that formerly each Shilluk king reigned and was buried in the village in which he was born and in which his afterbirth was buried. Some months after the king's death, when decomposition was judged to have proceeded so far that little but the bones would be found, the hut was broken open by the *ororo*, a grave was dug, and the bones of the king

[1] Cf. below, 4.

and of his companion were placed in it, after being wrapped in the skin of one of the oxen sacrificed. A hut was built over the grave, and one or two others were put up within the enclosure for the attendants on the new shrine which had thus arisen. Westermann[1] states that this ceremony was the public notification that the king had disappeared, and he describes the sacrifice by drowning of a man and woman, who were placed in a canoe with many spears, cattle, bells, beads, and pottery vessels. The canoe with its load was towed into the middle of the river and sunk.

During the interregnum which occurs after the death of a *ret* the most important chiefs decide all comparatively small matters, great affairs standing over until the appointment of a new king. The election appears to be in the hands of not more than eight or ten men, none of whom are *ororo*; the evidence is not clear whether their choice is thought to be inspired, but certain portents might occur if the wrong man were chosen. The king-elect and a number of big chiefs wait for the return of two or three chiefs, who go to Akurwa near the northern limit of the Shilluk country to bid the Akurwa people bring the sacred four-legged stool from the shrine of Nyakang in their village, and also his effigy called 'Nyakang,' which is kept wrapped in a piece of *dammur*, *i.e.* the common cotton-cloth of the Sūdan. The effigy and the sacred stool are carried southward towards Fashoda; each night the effigy is placed upon the sacred stool, but by day the objects are borne upon men's shoulders, and as they march the men sing songs that Nyakang has commanded them to sing.[2] The party bearing the sacred objects may seize anything they like on the way, but it seems that their wants are so freely provided for in the villages which they pass that they scarcely exercise their prerogative.

There is a shallow, generally dry, *khor* near Kwom, which is the scene of a sham fight between the Akurwa men bringing the effigy and the folk waiting with the newly-elected *ret*, in which the former are victorious. No reason could be given for this 'old custom,' as it was called, but immediately after it the king-elect is escorted to Fashoda. Certain of the Akurwa men now enter the shrine of Nyakang with the stool, and, after a short time, come out and place it on the ground outside the entrance to the shrine enclosure; they now place the effigy of Nyakang on the stool, the king-elect holding one leg of the stool while an important chief holds another. Near him stand two of his paternal aunts and two of his sisters, while he is surrounded by a crowd of *niăret*, *niăr-et*, *kwaniăret*, and *ororo*. The Akurwa men carry the effigy into the shrine, and the *ororo* lift up the king-elect and place him upon the stool, on which he remains seated for some time, perhaps till sunset, when the Akurwa men take the sacred stool into the shrine and the *ororo* escort the new king to three new huts specially built for him. The king stays in one of these, or perhaps within the enclosure, for three days; on the fourth night the *ororo* take the king quietly, almost stealthily, to the royal residence. The three newly-built huts which were occupied by the king are broken up (perhaps by the *ororo*) and their fragments thrown into the river.

5. **Reverence for trees.**—Special regard is paid to trees that grow near the shrines of dead kings. This is not remarkable, for the Shilluk country is in the main bare, with few shade-trees, so that any tree growing in or on the outskirts of a village is preserved and the ground becomes to some extent a meeting- and squatting-place. But the Shilluk attitude to trees growing near the grave-shrines of their kings appears to be something more than an appreciation of the grateful shade, though there is no regular cult. When a tree has grown, or is believed to have grown, near a shrine shortly after its erection, *i.e.* within a few months or years of the burial of a 'divine king,' it is thought that the tree has sprung from one of the logs used in making the grave, and in such cases the connexion between the tree and the dead king is one that would easily suggest itself.

In the case of an old tree at Kodok which grew near the grave of Nyadwai, the ninth king, a 'big' sacrifice was made when it fell down, and its trunk and all its fragments were carefully thrown into the river. This is not done to produce rain or to influence the crops, but it was said that, if any one burned the wood of this tree, even accidentally, he would sicken. In this connexion reference may be made to the fact that the bones of certain sacrifices are carefully gathered and disposed of in the same way. There was (1911) no hut over the grave of Nyadwai, probably because it is situated some little distance from the present native village and is surrounded by Government offices and houses, but it had a fence round it, and a young tree that had appeared at some distance from the stump of the old tree was regarded with respect. The old tree did not really spring from the grave of Nyadwai, since it was admitted that during his lifetime it stood near his house, and that he would often sit under it; nevertheless, there is a general feeling that it is associated with his grave, and this feeling is so strong that many Shilluk at one time or another spoke of Nyadwai being buried under the tree, though his grave must be nearly a hundred yards away. It should be remembered that the due growth of the crops, *i.e.* of the most important part of the vegetable world, depends on the well-being of the 'divine' king, so that there is nothing surprising in a strong, almost religious, feeling for any tree growing near a shrine.

6. **The appearance of the Shilluk kings in animal form.**—Nyakang, Dag, and Nyadwai all appear as a white bird called *okak*, or rarely as a giraffe; if the animal comes straight towards the village in which the shrine stands, exhibiting no sign of fear, it is concluded that it is a spirit animal, and the attendants at the tomb sacrifice a sheep or perhaps even a bullock. Father Banholzer[1] adds 'long-bodied grasshoppers' and 'a kind of snake called *red*' as forms in which Nyakang appears. The writer is indebted to Dr. Lambie of the American Mission for pointing out that unusual behaviour on the part of almost any land animal will lead the Shilluk to look upon the creature as a temporary incarnation of Nyakang.

Thus, 'if a little bird flies into the midst of a crowd of people and is not frightened, or attracts some one's notice in a special manner, they say "Nyakang."'[1]

Occasionally Nyakang appears as a bull. A very old Shilluk of the royal family said that, when he was a youth, fifty or more years ago, Nyakang appeared as a white bull; the king ordered sacrifices to be made in addition to those already offered by the local chief. Dr. Lambie adds that unusual behaviour on the part of a water animal will be put down to the animal containing the spirit of Nikaiya (Nyakai).

Reference may here be made to the Shilluk attitude towards the crocodile. This animal is generally spared, as some of the worst man-eaters are believed to be men whom other crocodiles have taken, and very dark coloured crocodiles are supposed to be either man-crocodiles or their descendants. Further, there is a firm belief in the crocodilian attributes of the ancestors of Nyakang already recorded.[2] Nikaiya lives in the river, and is definitely associated with the crocodile, and, though in old days she would assume human form, and at times come to the village by night in all friendliness, she might seize a man or woman and bear him or her off to her home in the river, and there change her victim into a crocodile to be a

[1] P. 136.

[2] Nyakang appears in a dream to one of the guardians of the shrine at Akurwa and prescribes the songs to be sung; further investigation will probably show that songs play an important part in the tribal lore of the Shilluk, and that there is a sort of epic commemorating the great deeds of the royal family.

[1] In a personal communication to the present writer.

[2] Above, § 3.

spouse to one of her crocodile relatives. Nyakai brings luck to those whom she visits by night to ask for fire; if a barren woman bears a child after such a visit, it will be called Nyakai, and the father will take a sheep and kill it and throw it into the river. Nyakai is known by her short, stout figure and great muscular development, and by the fact that she 'eats' (mouths) her words. That the river is the true home of Nyakai, even in her most spiritual form, is shown by the sacrifice made to her on another occasion. Just as a sacrifice would be made at the shrine of Nyakang, or at the grave-shrine of any king, if Nyakang or one of the Shilluk kings had appeared in a dream, or if one of the kings had 'possessed' a man, causing him to become ill, so, when Nyakai takes up her abode in a man or woman, the sacrifice is made by throwing a live sheep with its legs tied together into the river.

The Shilluk do not eat the flesh of the lion, leopard, hyena, a species of monitor lizard (*varanus*), and a fish called *shuro*. The last prohibition is directly attributed to Nyakang, who told his people to bring him all the fish that they caught in the river. Although they brought him many fish, they kept back one, and Nyakang, who knew this, as in a dream men know things happening at a distance, told his people that this fish should always be unlawful food to them.

7. Oaths.—Oaths are sworn by Nyakang or on one of the holy spears from a shrine of Nyakang. Westermann[1] notes that the latter form is used only in judicial procedure. A sheep is killed and both parties are smeared with its blood, after which they swear by the spear, perjury being followed by death. In swearing by Nyakang his name is often coupled with that of one of the villages in which he has a shrine; *e.g.*, a man may swear by 'Nyakang of Akurwa.' The early kings may also be invoked by name, especially Dag.

8. General remarks.—Juok, the high god of the Shilluk, must not be confused with the *jok* (ancestral spirits) of the Dinka (*q.v.*), whose worship is so important a part of the Dinka religion. It is at first sight somewhat surprising that, although in the case of important men the funeral customs are by no means short or lacking in ceremony, there is no considerable cult of the dead among the Shilluk. The explanation is no doubt to be sought in the development of the cult of Nyakang and the divine kings in whom his spirit is immanent. Thus, while the Dinka commonly attribute sickness to the action of an ancestral spirit, the Shilluk regard the entrance into the body of the spirit of one of their kings as the commonest cause of sickness. Probably only the early kings are thought to produce illness in this manner, and the few cases with which the writer became familiar were held to be possessed by Dag, the son and successor of Nyakang.

One of these cases, a woman who recovered after two sheep had been sacrificed to Dag, wore bead anklets, and amidst the beads there were threaded small pieces of the ear lobes of the sheep. These anklets were considered protective against future possession by Dag. A chief who had been badly used and imprisoned by the king was treated in exactly the same way. On his release his friends brought him beads, sheep were killed, and he now wears the beads and pieces of the ears of the sheep in exactly the same manner as the woman.

The men and women called *ajuago*, though they too have immanent in them the spirits of the early Shilluk kings, seem to form a class apart. They have the power of healing the sick and do a brisk trade in charms, of which almost every Shilluk seems to wear a considerable number. When a man first becomes *ajuago*, he is taken ill, perhaps waking up trembling and agitated from a dream (in which he may afterwards say the spirit came to him). He consults an *ajuago*, who may tell him, 'No, you are not ill; you have the spirit of Dag within you.' A long and complicated ceremony is then performed in order that the spirit may not affect him so severely, for without this ceremony the spirit would be so strong in his body that he would not dare to approach his women. It was impossible to discover with certainty the exact nature of the change effected by the ceremony, but the informant, one Akon Achol, who had in him the spirit of Dag, seemed to think that, after the ceremony, the spirit which had previously attacked his body in the rudest fashion became attached rather to his spirit or soul.

[1] P. xliii.

One ancestral spirit may be immanent in many *ajuago* at the same time, often passing at the death of an *ajuago*, or shortly afterwards, into one of his children, who thus becomes an *ajuago* like his or her father. It was said that *ajuago* of the female sex should not marry if they were unmarried at the time that the spirit came to them; they would be allowed to take lovers, but, like the king's daughters, they should not bear children. But it seemed that women very seldom became *ajuago* in their youth, and it is certain that married women who are *ajuago* do not leave their husbands, and continue to bear children. The following information on this matter was volunteered by a usually reliable informant: the husbands of women who are *ajuago* have access to their wives only during the dark half of the month, for 'Nyakang and Dag only come during that half of the month when the moon is bright.' Unfortunately the writer was unable to follow up his information or even to verify it.

LITERATURE.—P. W. Hofmayr, 'Religion der Schilluk,' *Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 120 ff.; C. G. Seligmann, *The Cult of Nyakang and the Divine Kings of the Shilluk* (*Fourth Report of the Wellcome Research Laboratories*, vol. B.), Khartum, 1911; D. Westermann, *The Shilluk People, their Language and Folk-lore*, Philadelphia and Berlin, 1912.

Since this article was written, an officer of the Sudan Civil Service who witnessed the installation of the Shilluk king Fafite wad Yor on Jan. 17, 1918, has published an account of what he saw (F. Munro, 'Installation of the King of the Shilluks,' *Sudan Notes and Records*, Khartum, 1918, vol. i. no. 3). The author gives further details, the chief discrepancies noted being that an effigy of Dag is brought from Akurwa with that of his father Nyakang, and that the mock battle with dura stalks takes place after the installation.

C. G. SELIGMAN.

SHINS.—See art. DARDS. Here it may be noted that, since the art. DARDS was written, it has been ascertained that the correct spelling of this name is 'Shin,' not 'Shīn.' Similarly, their language is Shiná, with the stress-accent on the last syllable, not Shīnā. G. A. GRIERSON.

SHINTO.—1. Early history and general features.—Shinto, *i.e.* 'the way of the gods,' is the old native religion of Japan before the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism. Its affinities, as the analogy of race and language would lead us to expect, are with the religions of Northern Asia rather than with the ancient Chinese cult. Shinto agrees with the former in making the sun the chief object of worship, though this is in itself by no means conclusive, as sun-worship is common to most nations in the barbaric stage of development. It is more significant that it has nothing to correspond with the two chief deities of ancient China, the personal Supreme Deity called *Shangti* and the more impersonal *Tien* or Heaven. In Japan, Heaven is not a god, but the region where the gods reside. There are more definite indications of a connexion between Shinto and the old religion of Korea. Some Shinto gods are of Korean origin, and others have Korean associations.

Writing was practically unknown in Japan before the 5th cent., and the myths and rituals of Shinto were transmitted by oral tradition only, chiefly by the Nakatomi and Imbe, hereditary priestly corporations attached to the Mikado's court. We also hear of *katarihe*, or reciters, who recited 'ancient words' at the *Ohonihe*, or coronation ceremony, and doubtless on other occasions. In A.D. 712, a quasi-historical work called the *Kojiki* was compiled by Imperial order. It contains much mythical matter. The *Nihongi*, a

similar compilation, completed in 720, is our other chief authority for the myths of Japan (see the Literature at the end of this article). The prayers and rituals of Shinto were not committed to writing until the beginning of the 10th century. The *Yengishiki*, compiled at this time, describes the chief ceremonies, and gives the text of a number of prayers called *norito*. The picture of Shinto presented by these and other less important works is tolerably complete, and has the great advantage for us of having been drawn by the Japanese themselves.

When we compare Shinto with the great religions of the world, it must be deemed perhaps the most rudimentary cult of which we have an adequate written record. It has not advanced beyond a crude polytheism; its personifications are vague and feeble; there is little grasp of the conception of spirit; it has scarcely anything in the shape of a moral code; it practically does not recognize a future state, and generally gives little evidence of deep thought or earnest devotion. It is, nevertheless, not the religion of a primitive people. Long before Shinto had assumed the shape in which we know it, the Japanese had possessed a settled government and a fair degree of civilization. They were already an agricultural nation, a circumstance which has profoundly affected their religion. The degree of their material civilization is indicated by the mention in the old records of bridges, iron, copper, mirrors, bellows for smelting metal, weaving, silk culture, and brewing. Their degree of mental culture may be gathered from the fact that Chinese learning had reached Japan early in the 5th century, if not sooner, and Buddhism towards the middle of the 6th century. The Shinto of this early period is a State religion. We hear but little of the popular beliefs and practices.

It is impossible with Herbert Spencer to refer all classes of deity to one origin, namely, the worship of humanity, as ghosts or ancestors. As Pfleiderer, d'Alviella, and other Continental scholars have clearly pointed out, there are two currents of deity-making thought. One is the personification of natural objects and phenomena, the other the deification of men. Shinto, which has been described as exclusively a cult of ancestors and deceased sovereigns, has in reality little of this element. It is in the main a worship of nature. The man-deities are of more recent origin and of minor importance. These two classes of deities may each be subdivided into deities of individuals, of classes, and of qualities, all of which are exemplified in Shinto. The sun-goddess is a deified individual object; the gods of trees and herbs represent classes; the god of growth (*Musubi*) is a personification of an abstract quality. *Temmangu* is a deified statesman; *Koyane* is the deified type of the Nakatomi priestly corporation; *Ta-jikara no wo* ('the male of hand-strength') is a human quality personified and raised to divine rank.

The Japanese word for God is *Kami*. It means 'above,' 'superior,' and may therefore be compared to the Latin *superi* or *cælicoli*, the Greek *ὑπερίωνες*. It suggests the theory that celestial objects were the first deities. Motoöri, the great modern Shinto theologian, says:

'The term *Kami* is applied in the first place to the various deities of Heaven and Earth who are mentioned in the ancient records, as well as to their spirits (*mi-tama*) which reside in the shrines where they are worshipped. Moreover, not only human beings, but birds, beasts, plants and trees, seas and mountains, and all other things whatsoever which deserve to be dreaded and revered for the extraordinary and pre-eminent powers which they possess, are called *Kami*. They need not be eminent for surpassing nobleness, goodness, or serviceableness alone. Malignant and uncanny beings are also called *Kami*, if only they are the objects of general dread. Among *Kami* who are human beings I need hardly mention Mikados. . . . Amongst others there are thunder (in Japanese *Naru kami* or the Sounding God); the dragon, the echo (called in Japanese *Kodama*, or the Tree-Spirit), and the fox, who are *Kami* by reason of their uncanny and fearful natures. The term *Kami* is applied in the *Nihongi* and *Manyōshiu*, a collection of ancient poetry, to the tiger and wolf. Izanagi gave to the fruit of the peach, and to the jewels round his neck, names which implied that they were *Kami*. . . . There are many cases of seas and mountains being called *Kami*. It is not their spirits which are meant. The word was applied directly to the seas or mountains themselves, as being very awful things.'

There may be recognized in Shinto, as elsewhere, three successive stages of the conception of divinity in nature. First, the god, a natural object as the sun, is regarded as sentient, and direct worship is paid to it. This is probably what Comte meant when he described the first stage of religion as fetishism. But the word 'fetish' has been used of so many things, notably of the material object representing a deity, that its use is undesirable when precision is aimed at. Secondly, the god is thought of as an anthropomorphic being; and, thirdly, it is conceived, not as the natural object itself or its presiding deity, but as a spiritual emanation (*mitama*) from him, which resides in his temple on earth and otherwise exercises an influence there. There is much confusion in all mythologies between these different stages. The first and second are confused in the Shinto sun-myth. When we are told that the sun-goddess by retiring to the rock-cave of Heaven caused darkness all over the world, it is evidently the sun itself that is intended. Yet in the same story she does many things which have no meaning, if not said of a purely anthropomorphic being.

The passage just quoted from Motoöri illustrates another kind of confusion, namely between the god and his *mitama*. The doctrine of the *mitama* (the *Shekinah* of the Jews) is plainly of secondary origin. It is due to the attempts of thoughtful men to reconcile such facts as the presence of the sun-goddess at the same time in the sky and in her temple at Ise. It is a step towards the conception of the omnipresence of Deity. But it is not prominent in Shinto. On the whole, the ancient Japanese gods (like Homer's) are very material beings, modelled, not on ghosts or spirits, but on living men. There is a myth in which the god *Oho-na-mochi* has an interview with his own *mitama* or spiritual double, resulting in the latter being settled in the shrine of Miwa. But the people disregard this distinction and speak of the god worshipped here simply as Oho-na-mochi. A god may have two *mitama*, one in his beneficent, the other in his sinister, aspect, or many, according to the number of shrines at which he is worshipped. The special place of residence of the *mitama* is the *shintai*, or god-body, which is a sword, a stone, a mirror, or other material object deposited in the shrine, usually in a box which is rarely or never opened. Some ignorant worshippers confound the *shintai* with the *mitama*, just as in France the peasant speaks of the host as 'le bon Dieu.'

Shinto has practically no idols, not because the ancient Japanese were specially enlightened, but because they had no art before sculpture and painting were introduced from China, and because they realized very feebly the personal character of Divinity. The deities are very numerous, as is always the case in nature-worship. For, although a monotheistic nature-worship, as, for example, of the sun, is conceivable, yet in practice the same feeling leads inevitably to the cult of other natural phenomena as well. The number of Shinto deities is constantly fluctuating. Some are forgotten, and are re-established under new names. Or wholly new gods may be added to the pantheon. A deity is frequently cut into two by a fissiparous process: or, on the other hand, two distinct deities may come to be regarded as identical. Their character is very ill-defined. A well, a tree, or a mountain

may have worship paid to it without having an individual name or any indication of sex or number. Japanese grammar greatly neglects these two distinctions. The wind-god is sometimes a single male deity and sometimes a married pair; the sea-god of Sumiyoshi is either one or three. The rain-storm god, *Susa no wo*, has in modern times been made into a sort of trinity. *Musubi*, the god of growth, was split up into several deities.

The general character of the Shinto deities is beneficent. But even a good deity may send plague or disaster if offended by neglect or disrespect. There is no evil deity, though Susa no wo, the rain-storm, shows some tendency to represent the evil principle generally. Their functions also are very much confused. Generally speaking, the nature-god in course of time acquires the functions of a providence that watches over human affairs. The sun-goddess is not only looked up to with gratitude for warmth and light, but is supposed to grant bodily health and success in business to her devotees. She also gives protection from foreign invasion, and many other blessings which have no conceivable relation to her nature-functions. *Inari*, the grain-god, is in one place the patron-god of swordsmiths. At another, he has a reputation for recovering stolen property. Very often a god is worshipped simply as the deity of a particular shrine, nothing more being known of him. Few people are aware that the very popular *Suitengu* of Tokio is in reality three several deities of widely different origin and character. Shrines may have their deity changed, as was the case with the well-known *Kompira* of Shikoku, without detriment to their popularity.

2. Ancestor-worship.[1]—The worship of ancestors in Japan is an importation from China, and has no place in the older Shinto. There are, however, in the *Nihongi* cases of the worship (whether divine or otherwise is not clear) of deceased Mikados by their successors, and at a later date they were certainly regarded as *Kami*. Even living Mikados claimed a titular divinity, though without miraculous powers. We may probably trace these practices to Chinese influence. When a modern Japanese says that Shinto is ancestor-worship, he is no doubt thinking of the *ujigami* cult, which unquestionably formed an important part of it. In ancient times the local chieftainship and the offices of the central government were hereditary in certain families. The result was that the official designation came to be equivalent to a family name. These families or clans had each its special deity, called *ujigami*, or 'surname-deity,' for whose worship the members were from time to time convened. The *ujigami* might be and often was a nature-god. But even when he was a man-deity he was in most cases not a deified individual, but only a type. *Koyane* and *Futodama*, for example, are simply personifications of the families or clans whose ancestors they were feigned to be. They correspond to such conceptions as John Bull and Tommy Atkins. This is not true ancestor-worship.

3. State of the dead.—A land of Yomi or darkness is frequently mentioned in the ancient myths. Several of the gods are said to have gone there at death. In the old times Yomi was probably only a sufficiently transparent metaphor for the grave. There is little to show that the ancient Japanese believed in a future state of existence. A story in the *Nihongi* implies that the question was an open one, but that some people believed that the dead could execute vengeance on those who were their enemies during life. It is true that in pre-historic times it was the custom to sacrifice wives and attendants at the tombs of deceased Mikados. To some this will appear a conclusive proof of a belief in their continued existence in another state. But if we reflect on the motives of our own funeral observances, we may see reason to doubt this. Was the sacrifice of a wife to a Mikado intended for his personal satisfaction any more than the primroses laid before Lord Beaconsfield's statue are meant for the gratification of his sight and smell? The rituals make no mention of a future state. There are no prayers that after this life we may enjoy eternal felicity.

4. Animals in Shinto.—Animals may receive worship for their own sakes as terrible or uncanny beings. It is for this reason that the tiger, the serpent, and the wolf are called *Kami*. But they have no temples and no regular organized cult. They may also be honoured for their association with some deity as his servant. The deer, the monkey, the pigeon, the tortoise, etc., are held sacred to various deities. The gods in myth often assume the form of animals, as the cormorant, the *wani* (dragon or sea-monster), the deer, the snake, etc. There is no definite evidence that totemism was known.

5. Supreme Being.—Shinto has no Supreme Deity. There has been, however, a tendency to exalt some of the gods to a supreme position. The sun-goddess is described as the most exalted of all the gods. Especially in modern times she has received an increasing degree of honour as a general providence, her special solar quality being left in the background. There was once an attempt to raise *Kuni-toko-tachi* to the position of Supreme Deity, simply because he is the first god in point of time of the *Nihongi*. Infinite knowledge and power are not recognized as attributes of Shinto deities.

6. Myths.[1]—The chief religious ideas embodied in the myths of Japan are, firstly, the conception of various parts and aspects of the material universe as sentient beings, or presided over by sentient beings; and, secondly, the doctrine that reverence and obedience are due to the wise sovereign, whose rule confers on his people blessings comparable to the sun's warmth and light. This, we take it, is the real meaning of the story which traces the descent of the Mikados from the sun-goddess. The *Nihongi* begins with a philosophical essay of later date, which bears manifest traces of Chinese inspiration. It describes the evolution of Heaven and Earth from a chaotic egg-shaped mass which contained germs. The purer part became thinly diffused and formed Heaven, while the grosser element sank down and became Earth. Thereafter divine beings were produced between them.

There is great confusion in the various versions of the myths in regard to the earlier deities. The *Nihongi* calls the first god *Kuni-toko-tachi* ('land-eternal-stand'), and says that he was produced by the transformation of something in form like a reed-shoot, which was brought forth between Heaven and Earth. The other mythical records give different names to the first deity. *Kuni-toko-tachi* was succeeded by a number of other deities of whom little is known. Most of them, from their names, seem to be nature-gods.

It is not until the seventh generation that Japanese myth really begins with the creator pair, *Izanagi* and *Izanami*. At the behest of the other gods, these two stood on the 'floating bridge of Heaven' (the rainbow), and, thrusting down the 'jewel-spear of Heaven' (a phallus, according to some), groped with it in the chaos below. The brine from the spear-point coagulated and formed an island, upon which the divine pair descended and built a house with one central pillar. Then, the male deity turning by the left and the female deity turning by the right, they went round this central pillar until they met at the other side.

[1] See art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Japanese).

[1] Cf. art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Japanese).

The female deity thereupon spoke first and exclaimed, 'How delightful! a lovely youth!' The male deity was displeased at the woman for having spoken first, so they went round the pillar a second time; and, having met anew, the male deity spoke first and said, 'How delightful! a lovely maiden!' Thereupon they became united as husband and wife. Another account says that, in consequence of the ill-luck produced by the female deity having been the first to speak, the child which was born to them was a leech, which they placed in a reed-boat and sent adrift. The author of this story probably had in mind an ancient marriage rite. The house built by them is the hut specially erected by the ancient Japanese for the consummation of a marriage. Izanagi and Izanami then proceeded to procreate the various islands of Japan, the deity of trees, the deity of herbs and grasses, the sun-goddess, the moon-god, the god *Susa no wo* (by one account), the earth-goddess, the water-goddess, the wind-gods, the food-goddess, the fire-god, and others. In giving birth to the last-named deity, Izanami was injured so that she died. Izanagi, in his rage and grief, drew his sword and cut the newborn fire-god into pieces, a number of other deities being generated by his doing so.

On her death, Izanami went to the land of Yomi or Hades. She was followed thither by her husband. But he was too late to bring her back, as she had already eaten of the cooking-furnaces of Yomi. She forbade him to look at her, but he disregarded her prayer. Breaking off the end-tooth of the comb which he had in his hair, he made of it a torch, and looked in where his wife was lying. Her body was already putrid and swarmed with maggots, and the 'Eight Thunders' had been generated in various parts of it. Izanami was enraged at her husband for exposing her nakedness, and sent the 'Eight Thunders' and the 'Ugly Females' of Yomi to attack him. Izanagi took to flight and used various expedients to delay his pursuers. He first flung down his head-dress. It became changed to grapes, which the 'Ugly Females' stopped to gather and eat. Then he threw down his comb. It turned into bamboo-shoots, which the 'Ugly Females' pulled up and ate before continuing their pursuit. Izanami herself overtook him at the 'Even Pass of Yomi,' where the formula of divorce was pronounced by Izanagi, and their final parting took place. On returning from Yomi, Izanagi's first care was to bathe in the sea, in order to purify himself from the pollutions which he had contracted by his visit to the Land of the Dead. A number of deities were generated by this process. The sun-goddess was born from the washing of his left eye, and the moon-god from that of his right, while *Susa no wo* (the rain-storm) was generated from the washing of his nose. To the sun-goddess Izanagi gave charge of the 'Plain of High-Heaven,' and to the moon-god was allotted the realm of Night. Susa no wo was at first appointed to rule the sea; but he preferred to rejoin his deceased mother Izanami, and was therefore made the Lord of Ne-no-kuni, *i.e.* the Root or Nether Country, another name for the Land of Yomi. Susa no wo, before proceeding to take up his charge as Ruler of the Nether Region, ascended to Heaven to take leave of his elder sister the sun-goddess. By reason of the fierceness of his divine nature, there was a commotion in the sea, and the hills and mountains groaned aloud as he passed upwards. The sun-goddess, in alarm, arrayed herself in manly garb, and confronted her brother armed with sword and bow and arrows. The pair stood face to face on opposite sides of the River of Heaven. Susa no wo then assured his sister of the purity of his intentions, and proposed to her that they should each produce children by biting off and crunching parts of the jewels and swords which they wore and blowing away the fragments. Eight children born in this way were worshipped in after-times as the Hachōji or eight princely children. From one of them was descended Hoho no Ninigi, who came down from Heaven to rule the world (*i.e.* Japan), and became the ancestor of Jimmu Tennō, the first Mikado.

Susa no wo's subsequent proceedings were very rude and unseemly. He broke down the divisions between the rice-fields belonging to his sister, sowed them over again, let loose in them the piebald colt of Heaven, and committed nuisances in the hall where she was celebrating the solemn festival of firstfruits. The climax to his misdeeds was to flay a piebald colt of Heaven and to fling it into the sacred weaving-hall where the sun-goddess was engaged in weaving the garments of the deities. She was so deeply indignant at this last insult that she entered the Rock-cave of Heaven and left the world to darkness. The retirement of the sun-goddess to the Rock-cave of Heaven produced great consternation among the heavenly deities. They met on the dry bed of the River of Heaven (the Milky Way) and took counsel how they should entice her from her seclusion. By the advice of *Omoi-kane no Mikoto* ('the thought-combiner' or 'counsellor-deity'), the long-singing birds of the Eternal Land (cocks) were made to utter their prolonged cry before the door of the cave. *Koyane no Mikoto*, ancestor of the Nakatomi, and *Futo-dama no Mikoto*, ancestor of the Imbe, dug up by the roots a five-hundred-branched true Sakaki tree of Heaven, and hung on its higher branches strings of jewels, on its middle branches a mirror, and on its lower branches pieces of cloth. Then they recited their liturgy in her honour. Moreover, *Ame no Uzume* ('the dread female of Heaven') arrayed herself in a fantastic manner and, standing on a tub which resounded when she stamped upon it, performed a (not very decent) mimic dance and gave forth an inspired utterance. The sun-goddess wondered how Ame no Uzume and the other gods could be so jolly while the world was wrapped in complete darkness, and peeped out from the half-opened door of the cave. She was at once seized by *Ta-jikara no wo* ('male of hand-strength') and prevented by main force from re-entering, to the great joy of all the deities.

Susa no wo was then tried by a council of gods, who mulcted him in a fine of a thousand tables of purification-offerings. They also pulled out the nails of his fingers and toes, and banished him to the land of Yomi. Finally, *Ame no Koyane*, the ancestor of the Nakatomi, recited his *Oharai* or great purification liturgy. After his banishment Susa no wo went to the province of Idzumo. Here, like another Perseus, he slew the eight-headed serpent of Koshi (having first made him drunk) and delivered his intended victim, a young maiden who subsequently became his wife. Eventually he entered the Nether Land.

Susa no wo had 181 children. One of these was *Oho-na-mochi* ('great-name-possessor'), also called *Oho-kuni-nushi* ('great-country-master'). He dwelt in Idzumo, and with the aid of his *mitama* reduced to order this part of Japan. Associated with him was the dwarf-deity *Sukuna-bikona*, who came floating over the sea in a tiny boat, clothed in bird-skins. To these two is attributed the origin of the art of medicine and of charms against the powers of evil. The dynasty of Susa no wo was not recognized by the Gods of Heaven, who sent down several other deities to subdue and govern the world, *i.e.* Japan. Ultimately Oho-na-mochi and his son *Koto-shiro-nushi* ('thing-know-master,'

or 'governor') agreed to yield the government to *Hoho no Ninigi*, a grandchild of the sun-goddess, who accordingly descended to earth on a mountain in the western island of Kiushiu. He was attended by the ancestors of the five *be*, or hereditary government corporations, viz. the Nakatomi, the Imbe, the Sarume, the mirror-makers' *be*, and the jewellers' *be*, to which some accounts add several others.

Hoho no Ninigi took to wife the daughter of a deity whom he found there. When the time came for her delivery, she shut herself up in a doorless shed, which, on the birth of her three children, she set fire to, with the object of clearing herself from certain suspicions which her husband had entertained of her fidelity. 'If,' said she, 'the children are really the offspring of the Heavenly Grandchild, the fire cannot harm them.' The children and their mother came forth unhurt, and were thereupon recognized by Hoho no Ninigi as his true offspring and wife. One of these children, named *Hohodemi*, was a hunter. He exchanged his bow and arrows for the fish-hook of his elder brother, but lost the latter in the sea. This led to his visiting the palace of the sea-god *Toyotama-hiko*, and marrying his daughter. A child of this union was the father of Jimmu Tennō, the first human sovereign of Japan. With him history is supposed to begin. But in reality the annals of Japan for nearly a thousand years longer are deeply permeated by legend.

7. **The pantheon.**—(i.) *NATURE-GODS.*—(*a*) *The sun-goddess* is the most eminent of the Shinto deities. She is called the Ruler of Heaven, wears royal insignia, and is surrounded by a court of ministers and functionaries. Yet she is hardly what we should call a Supreme Deity. All important celestial matters are determined not by her fiat, but by a council of the gods. The sea and the land of Yomi are beyond her jurisdiction. Her Japanese name is *Ama-terasu no Oho-kami* ('the Heaven-shining Great Deity'). She is also called *Ama-terasu hirume* ('Heaven-shining-sun-female'), or, more briefly, *Hirume*. Another name is *Ama-terasu mi oya* ('Heaven-shining-august-parent'). In modern times Tenshō-daijin, the Chinese equivalent of Ama-terasu no Oho-kami, is more common. Under this name her solar quality is practically forgotten, and she is simply a great deity whose seat is at Ise. The *shintai* or material token of the sun-goddess is a mirror, called the *yata-kagami* ('eight-hand-mirror') or *hi-gata no kagami* ('sun-form-mirror'). It is kept in a box in the great shrine of Ise, and is treated with the greatest reverence, being even spoken of as 'the great God of Ise.'

The *yata-garasu*, or 'eight-hand-crow,' is a bird sacred to the sun. It is identified with the Chinese *yang-wu*, a three-legged crow of a red colour which inhabits the sun. Ama-terasu is only one of many solar deities mentioned in the old records. *Waka-hirume* ('young-sun-female,' probably the morning sun) and *Hiruko* ('sun-youth') may be given as examples. *Hiruko* may also mean 'leech-child.' Hence the legend according to which the first child of Izanagi and Izanami was a leech.

Susa no wo, a name which has been interpreted variously as the 'male of Susa' (a place where he was worshipped), and as the 'impetuous male,' has been the subject of much speculation. Dr. Buckley of Chicago has shown that he is a personification of the rain-storm. This explains the violent character given to him in myth, and his quarrel with the sun-goddess. Hirata identifies him with the moon-god; and it is true that myth often associates the darkness of the storm with the gloom of night—represented by its presiding deity, the moon. This view may be correct; but if so, it had been forgotten in the time of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, which distinguish clearly between the moon-god and Susa no wo. Susa no wo appears in a beneficent aspect as the rescuer of a Japanese Andromeda from a great serpent, and as the provider of fruit and other useful trees for mankind.

Tsukiyomi, the moon-god, is not one of the greater gods of Japan. The name means 'moon-darkness,' or perhaps 'moon-reckoner.' There is a myth in which he is represented as the murderer of the food-goddess, and therefore alienated from his sister, the sun-goddess. His *shintai* is a mirror. Star-worship is hardly known in Shinto.

(*b*) *Earth-worship.*—There are several cases in which the earth is worshipped directly, without attributing to it sex or distinct personality, or the addition of name or myth. The *Ji-matsuri* ('earth-festival') is a ceremony by which it is sought to propitiate a plot of ground selected for building or for bringing under cultivation. A secondary phase of earth-worship is where the deity is a god who rules, or who has made the country. Oho-na-mochi, the great god of Idzumo, is the chief deity of this class. His name means 'great-name-possessor,' a merely honorific title. He is also called *Oho-kuni-nushi* ('great-land-master'), or *Oho-kuni-dama* ('great-land-spirit'). His temple ranks next in importance after the shrines of Ise, and is supposed to be visited by all the other gods annually in the tenth month. His *shintai* is a necklace of jewels.

(*c*) *Mountain-gods.*—Most mountains have their deity, but few have more than a local importance. The deity of Fujiyama, *Sengensama*, and that of Mount Aso in the province of Higo are the best known.

(*d*) *Sea-gods.*—A triplet of sea-gods was produced by Izanagi when he washed in the sea after his return from Yomi. They are named *Soko-tsu wata-dzu-mi* ('bottom-sea-body'), *Naka-tsu wata-dzu-mi* ('middle-sea-body'), and *Uha-tsu wata-dzu-mi* ('upper-sea-body'). They are frequently spoken of and depicted as if they were only one deity. Their chief shrine is at Sumiyoshi, near Osaka. They are prayed to for prosperous voyages.

(*e*) *River-gods* have no individual names. They are called generically *Midzuchi* or 'water-father.' As in other countries, they are usually conceived of as having the form of snakes or dragons. Two rain-gods are mentioned in the *Nihongi*. They have also dragon-form. But any god may be prayed to for rain. All wells are more or less deified. Offerings are made at the present day to the house-well on the morning of New Year's day. The wells from which water is drawn for the great ceremonies of Shinto are worshipped. The element of water is also deified on account of its use in sacrifice.

(*f*) A *wind-god* is mentioned in the *Nihongi* as having been produced from Izanagi's breath, but the *norito* or rituals recognize two wind-gods, male and female. They were much prayed to for good harvests.

(*g*) The *fire-god*, *Kagutsuchi* ('radiant father') or *Ho-musubi* ('fire-growth'), is worshipped at Atago, a hill near Kioto, and other places. He is supposed to protect against conflagrations. *Futsu nushi* is probably another fire-deity. He it was who was sent down from Heaven to prepare Japan for the advent of Hoho no Ninigi, the grandchild of the sun-goddess. His chief shrine is at Kadori in Eastern Japan. Associated with him in myth and worship is a god called *Take-mika-tsuchi*, whose shrine is at Kashima, also on the east coast. Take-mika-tsuchi ('brave-dread-father') is a personification of thunder. But in modern times both these gods are universally recognized as *war-*

deities. Futsu nushi's material token or *shintai* is a sword. There is a separate worship of *thunder* under the name of *Naru-kami*, or the 'sounding-god.' The domestic *cooking-furnace* is worshipped as a god all over Japan. Sometimes it is a single deity, sometimes a married pair. There is no *shintai*. The furnace *is* the deity.

(*h*) Next after the sun-goddess, the *goddess of food* is the most important deity of Shinto. To her the outer shrine of Ise is dedicated. She is called *Uke-mochi* ('food-possessor'), or *Uka no mitama* ('spirit of food'), with numerous aliases. The *sake-god* is sometimes identified with the food-goddess (*sake* is brewed from rice), and at others is a distinct deity. Notwithstanding the difference of sex, *Inari* or the rice-god may be regarded as a variant of *Uke-mochi*. Every village and many private houses have small shrines in honour of him. He grants his worshippers agricultural prosperity; but, as is so often the case with nature-deities, his functions have been extended so as to cover many things which have nothing to do with grain, such as the restoration of stolen property, wealth, domestic harmony, etc. The *shintai* varies. Very often it is a round stone, which has the advantages of being cheap and durable. The fox is associated with him as his messenger or servant, and the vulgar regard the figures of this animal which are set up before his shrine as the deity himself.

(*i*) *Tree-gods.*—Individual trees of great age and size are universally worshipped. A *Kami-gi* ('god-tree') is frequently planted before shrines, not, however, as a god, but as an offering. The older records mention a god of trees named *Kukunochi* ('trees-father'), and a deity of herbs and grasses called *Kaya no hime* ('lady of reeds'). These gods were prayed to before cutting wood or reeds for building or thatching.

(*j*) The *house* is deified, sometimes as one, sometimes as two, deities. A special sanctity attaches to the central pillar—corresponding to our 'king-post.' There is also a god of the *privy* and of the *gate*. The latter had some importance in the palace. One of the *norito* is addressed to him or them—the number is uncertain.

Izanagi and Izanami, who occupy so conspicuous a place in myth, are in ritual comparatively unimportant deities. The present writer regards them as personifications of the Chinese *yin* and *yang*, or positive and negative principles of nature. They are therefore of later date than the gods whose parents they are feigned to be. *Musubi*, the god of growth, represents the conception of a god immanent in the Universe, and not, like Izanagi and Izanami, external to it. Musubi became split up into two deities, *Kami-musubi* ('divine growth') and *Taka-musubi* ('high growth'), supposed by some to be a married pair. Subsequently a still further subdivision took place. Their worship at one time flourished, but is now almost extinct.

(ii.) *MAN-GODS.—Take minagata*, the very popular deity of Suwa in the province of Shinano, is one of the few ancient gods who, with some probability, may be assigned to the class of deified individual men. He was a son of Oho-na-mochi, who refused allegiance to the sun-goddess's grandchild, and fled to Shinano, where he was afterwards worshipped. The present high priests are regarded as his descendants and incarnations. There is no shrine, but only a rock-cave—perhaps a dolmen. The war-god *Hachiman* is also stated to be a human being deified, viz. the Mikado Ôjin, a very legendary personage. The authority is an oracle delivered hundreds of years after his death. This god is unknown to the Shinto of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*. Other legendary heroes who were deified in subsequent times are: *Jimmu*, the first Mikado; *Jingo*, the empress who is supposed to have conquered Korea; her counsellor, *Takechi no Sukune*; and *Yamato-dake*, the hero-prince who subdued eastern Japan. The best known indubitable example of a deified human being is *Temmangu*, who presides over learning and caligraphy, and is the special god of schoolboys and pedagogues. He was a statesman, born A.D. 845. Owing to slanderous accusations by a rival, he was exiled to Kiushiu, where he died. Great calamities followed. To propitiate his angry ghost, a cult was instituted in his honour, which continues to this day. It may be suspected that the worship of Confucius in China had much to do with that of Temmangu in Japan.

The man-gods of the older Shinto are not deified individuals, but types. The sun-goddess is represented as attended by the gods of the five *be* or hereditary government corporations. These included Koyane, the so-called ancestor, but really a type, of the Nakatomi priestly gild; Futo-dama ('great offering'), the ancestor of the Imbe who prepared the sacrificial offerings; and Toyotama ('rich-jewel'), the ancestor of the jewel-makers. *Sukuna-bikona*, a dwarf deity who is associated with Oho-na-mochi in worship and myth, is probably also a deified type—a sort of Æsculapius or father of medicine.

The *phallic deities* are the chief representatives of the class of deified human qualities. Originally a symbol of the procreative power, the phallus came to represent lusty animal vigour generally, the foe to death and disease. Hence its use as a magical appliance to repel pestilence. It is mainly in this prophylactic capacity that it figures in Shinto, where it is deified under the name of *Kunado no kami* ('god of the come-not place'), and has a special ritual. Kunado no kami had no shrines, but in the shape of a natural phalloid boulder or carved wooden pillar was worshipped by the roadside, especially at cross-ways. Hence he came to be regarded as the god of roads and the guide and protector of travellers. The honours still paid to the *Dōsojin* ('road-ancestor-deity') are a survival of this cult, which, in spite of official discouragement, is not quite extinct in eastern Japan. The kteis is represented by the peach, the bean, and the rice-grain, which are used magically to keep off diseases or—what is the same thing—demons. The peach flung by Izanagi to drive back the 'Thunders' which pursued him from Yomi was deified for its services.

8. Priesthood.—Herbert Spencer's saying (*Sociology*) that 'in early stages of social evolution the secular and the sacred are but little distinguished' is well illustrated by Shinto. The *Jingikwan*, or 'department of religion,' whose officers discharged the chief religious functions of State Shinto, was simply a Government bureau like any other, though it took precedence of the rest, and its proceedings were as much matters of State as the collection of taxes or the administration of justice. The very word *matsurigoto* ('government') is only another form of *matsuri* ('a religious festival'). Hirata says that 'the worship of the gods is the source of Government, nay, it *is* Government.'

The chief priest of Shinto is the Mikado himself. In some of the most important ceremonies he takes the leading part. But from the most ancient times his religious functions have been delegated. In the Jimmu Tennō legend we are told of a *michi no omi*, or 'Minister of the Way,' who acted as 'ruler of a festival' in honour of the god Taka-mi-musubi. The chief vicars of the Mikado were the family, or rather hereditary corporation, called the Nakatomi, of which the Fuji-

wara, so famous in later times for the number of poets, statesmen, and empresses which it furnished, was a branch. The Nakatomi held the chief offices of the Jingikwan, and exercised a control over the local priesthood, if we may call them so. The *Imbe* were another hereditary corporation. Their chief business was to prepare the offerings for the State ceremonies. The name *Imi-be*, or 'religious purity department,' has reference to the care with which they avoided all ritual impurity in doing so. The *urabe*, or diviners, correspond to the Roman college of augurs. Their business was to divine, by means of the marks on a scorched tortoise-shell or deer's shoulder-blade, all matters which might be referred to them by the higher religious officials. The priests of local shrines were called *Kannushi*, that is, *Kami-nushi* or 'God-master.' Their duty was to recite the usual prayers, and to attend to the repairs of the shrine. The *Kannushi* are not a caste, though some of the most important posts are usually held by Nakatomi. They are not celibates, and wear their distinctive dress only when engaged in worship. Even this is not a sacerdotal costume, but only an old official garb of the Mikado's court.

There were several kinds of priestesses. The highest in rank was the *saiwō*, a princess of the Imperial blood, who was consecrated at the beginning of every reign to the service of the sun-goddess at Ise. A similar appointment was made to the shrine of Kamo near Kioto, where the Mikado's *ujigami* ('surname-god') was worshipped. Both these offices have long been extinct. At all the principal shrines young girls called *Kamu no Ko* ('God-child') or *miko* are consecrated to the service of the gods. They dance the *kagura*, cook the food for offerings, and occasionally become the medium of inspired communications. The greater shrines had also *Kami-be* attached to them. These were peasants who tilled the glebe-lands. Recent statistics give the number of Shinto priests as 14,766. Their duties are light and their emoluments scanty. Many of them have other sources of income.

9. **Worship.**—In Shinto, as in other religions, the forms of divine worship are, with scarcely an exception, adaptations of the forms of respect to living men. The most common of these is obeisance. The Shinto worshipper bows twice before and after he makes his offering. Kneeling is also known. Clapping hands, primarily a sign of joy, became first a general form of respect to sovereigns and others. More recently it has been confined to divine worship. The number of hand-clappings is minutely prescribed in the rituals. Offerings 'in token of respect,' as one of the rituals has it, by way of bargain for future blessings, or as a ransom for ceremonial shortcomings, consisted of food or drink, as rice, salt, *sake*, flesh, fish, fruit, vegetables, etc.; offerings of clothing, whether in the shape of woven fabrics, of yarn, or of garments, of hemp, and mulberry-bark fibre or silk, held a very important place. They were represented in later times by the *ohonusa* or 'great offerings,' which consisted of two wands placed side by side with hempen fibre depending from the one and strips of paper from the other. The latter are made of mulberry-bark fibre, and represent the cloth which was formerly made of that material. The well-known *gohei*, which consist of one wand with paper strips attached to it, are a simplification of the *ohonusa*. The assertion so often made, that the white colour of the paper is symbolical of purity, has no foundation. The *gohei* are in modern times the objects of much superstition. The god on ceremonial occasions is supposed to descend into the *gohei*; they are flourished in order to avert evil influences, and even placed in the domestic shrine and worshipped. *Gohei-katsugi* ('*gohei*-bearer') is the Japanese phrase for a superstitious man. Swords, jewels, and mirrors are offerings of a more permanent character. The *shintai*, which in so many cases consist of these objects, were doubtless originally simply offerings. *Human sacrifice* formed no part of the Shinto State religion as described in the ancient records. But there is evidence that such offerings were not unknown, especially to the river-gods. In the *Yengishiki* lists of offerings we also find mention of agricultural implements, slaves, horses, and carriages, or rather palanquins.

10. **Shrines.**—The Shinto shrine is by no means a costly edifice. Many of the smaller ones are quite portable. In 771 a 'greater shrine' had only 18 feet frontage. The more important shrines have usually a number of smaller edifices attached to them, such as a gallery of votive pictures, a small oratory where the envoy of the Mikado performs his devotions, a stage for the *kagura* or sacred pantomimes, and *massha* or shrines for dependent or associated deities. The *Yengishiki* enumerates 3132 official shrines. At the present day there are nearly 200,000 Shinto shrines in Japan, of which but a small proportion have priests or revenues. The well-known *tori-i* or honorary gateway seen before them is no doubt an imitation of the Chinese *pailoo* and the Indian *turan*. It is not mentioned in the *Kojiki* or the *Nihongi*.

11. **Prayer.**[1]—Of private individual prayer there is little mention in the old records. But a considerable collection of the religious formulæ called *norito*, read at festivals and other occasions by officials on behalf of the Mikado, have come down to us from a great but unknown antiquity. They are addressed sometimes to individual deities, sometimes to special categories of deities, and sometimes to the gods generally. They comprise petitions for rain, for good harvests, for preservation from earthquake and conflagration, for children, for health and long life to the sovereign, and peace and prosperity to the empire. Moral and spiritual blessings, or happiness in a future state, are undreamt of. There are also announcements of the appointment of a priestess, or of the beginning of a new reign. At the present day the Shinto gods are prayed to when a new piece of ground is reclaimed, on building a house or sowing a rice-field. There are prayers for prosperity in trade and for domestic happiness, making under Buddhist influence vows to give up drink, gambling or profligacy, thanking for escape from shipwreck or other danger.

12. **Rank of deities.**—In the 7th century a system of official ranks was introduced into Japan from China, and applied to gods as well as men. A curious result was that many gods stood lower in the hierarchy than the higher grades of officials. There is a case of a volcano-god being propitiated with the equivalent of a D.S.O. In the 11th and 12th cents. there were wholesale promotions of deities. A few of the greater deities, as the sun-goddess and food-goddess, did not share in these honours.

13. **Kagura** is a pantomimic dance commemorating some incident of the mythical narrative. Important shrines have stages and corps of girl dancers for this purpose.

14. **Pilgrimages**[2] are common to Ise, where are the shrines of the sun-goddess and food-goddess, Idzumo (Oho-na-mochi and Susa no wo), and to various mountains, as Fujiyama, Nantai, Kompira, etc.

[1] See art. PRAYER (Japanese).
[2] See art. PILGRIMAGE (Japanese)

15. Purity and morals.[1]—It cannot be doubted that the ancient Japanese had some ideas of morality. There is evidence that theft, lying, and adultery were condemned by them. But there is scarcely anything in Shinto by way of a moral code. There is no direct moral teaching in its sacred books. A schedule of offences against the gods, to absolve which the ceremony of 'Great Purification' was performed twice a year, enumerates: incest (within narrow limits of relationship), bestiality, wounding, witchcraft, and certain interferences with agricultural operations. The other offences mentioned are of a purely ceremonial character. Shinto therefore would appear to be an exception to the rule stated by Pfleiderer (*Philosophy of Religion*), that 'the beginnings of all social customs and legal ordinances are directly derived from religion.' The ceremonial purity of Shinto greatly resembles that of the Mosaic dispensation. Actual personal dirt was considered disrespectful to the deities, and hence bathing and putting on fresh garments are constantly prescribed among the preliminaries of worship. The consummation of a marriage produced defilement, and a separate hut was built for this purpose so that the dwelling might not be rendered unclean. Shinto has no marriage ceremony. There is a modern custom of sousing with buckets of water on New Year's day men who have been married during the previous year. Virgins were selected as priestesses. There is a case of a princess's appointment as such being cancelled for unchastity. Menstruation and childbirth caused uncleanness. The death of a relative, pronouncing or executing a capital sentence, touching a dead body, eating food prepared in a house of mourning, disease, wounds, leprosy, or sores involved various degrees of ritual impurity. These ideas were inconsistent with religious rites at funerals. The Shinto burial service, much heard of during the Russo-Japanese war, is a modern innovation, dating after the Restoration of 1868. Eating flesh was in ancient times not regarded as causing uncleanness, but later, under Buddhist influence, it became so. Impure food communicated its uncleanness to the fire with which it had been cooked. To avoid chances of such impurity, fire was made afresh with a fire-drill for use in the more important sacrifices. Certain calamities, such as snake-bite and the stroke of lightning, were regarded as indicating the displeasure of the gods, and therefore as unfitting the victim for their service. At one time when a man's house was destroyed by fire he became temporarily unclean. There was a special avoidance (*imi*) of impure things for a specified term in preparation for the festivals.

Lustration, the most natural and universal means of restoring purity, is well known in Japan. The use of salt is another. Spitting (there was a god of spittle) is a symbolical expulsion of impurity. Breathing on an object, such as a garment or a human figure, which is then cast into the sea, has the same result. The idea of ransom is also implied in the last ceremony.

16. Ceremonies.[2]—These are combinations of the elements of worship described above. The greatest Shinto ceremony is the *Ohonihe* or *Daijowe*, which corresponds to our coronation. It is the solemn religious sanction of the Mikado's sovereignty. The kernel of this rite was the offering by the Mikado in person to the gods, represented by a cushion, of rice and *sake*, which were then partaken of by himself and subsequently by the court. The rice came from two provinces selected by divination. Everything in the Ohonihe ceremony was in duplicate, so that, if one part was vitiated by some accidental impurity, the other might escape. *Urabe* or diviners from the capital superintended the ingathering of the rice, which was done with great ceremony by a staff of local officials. It was then brought to the capital, where special buildings had been erected for its reception and for the accommodation of the very numerous officials concerned. Here, too, everything was done in duplicate. The ceremony included frequent purifications, prayers to the eight gods, which included amongst others the harvest-gods, the god of growth, and the food-goddess, and the recital of 'ancient words' and *norito* of blessing.

The *Niki-name* or 'new tasting,' when the rice of the new season was first partaken of, was the same as the Ohonihe, except that it was performed annually and with much less pomp. Something of the same kind was performed by the local officials and also by the people. Conscientious persons would not eat the new rice until after this celebration. The *Ahimbe* and *Kanname* were different forms of the same ceremony. The festival of *Hirano* is believed to have been in honour of Image no Kami ('the goddess of new food') and of the gods of the kitchen boiler and cooking-pan. In later times the sun-goddess, the hero Yamato-dake, and the Mikados Chiuai and Nintoku were recognized as the deities of Hirano.

The *Toshigohi* ('praying for harvest') was a very important festival. It was in honour practically of all the gods, and was celebrated in the chapel of the Imperial palace by a Nakatomi as representing the Mikado.

The *Tsukinami* is described as a 'thanksgiving service for the protecting care of the gods.' The name means 'monthly,' but it was really performed only twice a year. It resembles the Toshigohi.

The *Kiü* ('praying for rain') was addressed to the gods of 85 shrines, and included the usual offerings of cloth-stuffs. To a few a black horse was offered in addition, no doubt symbolical of the black clouds which usher in rain.

Other ceremonies were for 'the offering of clothing' to the sun-goddess at Ise, on the occasion of the rebuilding of the Ise shrines; for 'blessing the great palace'; in honour of the sacred mirror preserved in the palace; and for 'calming the august spirit,' in other words, for long life to the Mikado.

The *Ohoharahi* or 'Great Purification' ceremony, by which the nation was solemnly absolved twice a year from its ceremonial sins, was one of the most important and ancient of the Shinto rites. It is mentioned in the *Nihongi* under the date A.D. 200, which, although legendary, implies a great antiquity. The *Ohoharahi* consisted in the recital by a Nakatomi on behalf of the Mikado of a *norito*, which recounts the divine origin of the dynasty and the authority given to the sovereign to absolve his people from all offences to be committed by them. These offences are enumerated and their absolution is declared:

'As the many-piled clouds of Heaven are scattered by the breath of the Wind-Gods: as the morning breezes and the evening breezes dissipate the dense morning vapours and the dense evening vapours: as a huge ship, moored in a great harbour, casting off its stern-moorings, casting off its bow-moorings, drives forth into the great sea-plain: as yonder thick brushwood is smitten and cleared away by the sharp sickle forged in the fire,—so shall all offences be utterly annulled.'

The reading of this formula was accompanied by the offering of ransom-objects, which after the ceremony were taken away and thrown into a river, where certain gods took delivery of them and dispatched them to the sea. Thence they were ultimately transferred to the land of Yomi. In the case of the purification of the offences of individuals, the culprit was obliged to supply the needful offerings, which thus became the equivalent of a fine.

[1] Cf. artt. PURIFICATION (Japanese), ETHICS AND MORALITY (Japanese).
[2] Cf. art. MAGIC (Japanese).

The *Michiahe* ceremony was in honour of the phallic Sahe no Kami (preventive or prophylactic deities). The *norito* of this rite called upon them to prevent evil spirits (diseases personified) from entering the capital from the Nether country, *i.e.* the land of Yomi. Offerings of cloth-stuffs and food are made to them for this purpose.

The *Mikado no Matsuri*, or festival of the august gate, was addressed to the guardian deities of the palace gates, adjuring them to prevent the entrance of noxious things.

The *Hoshidzume* ('fire-quieting') ceremony was performed on the last day of the sixth and twelfth months. The *Urabe* kindled a fire by means of a fire-drill, and read a *norito* in which the fire-god was reminded of the divine authority of the Mikado, and of the means provided for his coercion and control by his mother Izanami. This intimidation is followed by bribery: 'To the end that thou mayest control thy transports against the Palace of the Sovran grandchild, I offer thee bright cloth,' etc.

The above by no means exhausts the list of Shinto ceremonies. In modern times there are many local celebrations much resembling in character the carnivals of Southern Europe. Fun and jollity are more prominent here than religion.

17. Magic.[1]—There are two kinds of magic in Japan, the religious and the non-religious. The latter is probably the first in order of time. It is closely associated with medicine. Sometimes a magical procedure, non-religious in itself, acquires a religious character by being represented as taught or practised by a god. The novelist Bakin, writing early in the 19th century, applies the term *majinai* ('magic') indiscriminately to exposing books in the sun to keep away bookworms, to curing a toothache by turning over a pebble on the road, and to swallowing the ashes of an old almanac as an antidote to poisonous fish. 'If,' he says, 'the master of a house before going to bed goes round calling out, "Beware of fire," the spirit of the words will fill the house, and it will be preserved against fire and robbery.' The principle of 'sympathetic magic,' described in Frazer's *Golden Bough*, is illustrated by the case of a round stone (supposed to be the *shintai* of a rainfall-god) which causes rain to fall when water is poured on it. Whistling to raise the wind is another example. If a married woman is childless, the old women of the neighbourhood assemble and go through the form of delivering her of a child, represented by a doll. Relief from local ailments is obtained by rubbing the corresponding part of a god's image. The well-known witchcraft of ill-treating a figure of the intended victim with the intention of making him suffer accordingly is common in Japan, and may be practised either with or without the assistance of a deity. There are no pacts with demons or coercion of spirits in the older Shinto literature.

The magical power of the symbol, as if it possessed some of the actual powers of the thing it represents, is also exemplified. Roof-tiles are impressed with a pattern of bubbles—suggestive of water—as a preventative against fire. The talismans used for various purposes may have been originally symbols, though we cannot now trace their origin. The sea-god gave Hohodemi a tide-flowing and a tide-ebbing jewel, by which he could make the tide flow and ebb at pleasure. The waving of a magic scarf had the effect of keeping off snakes and centipedes. The modern witch twangs a small bow in her magical summoning of spirits. The *shime-nawa*, a cord made of rice-straw which has been pulled up by the roots, is well known as a preventative of evil spirits. It is suspended before shrines, round sacred trees, and at the New Year in front of every dwelling-house. Some superstitious people wear one on their persons. The magic use of set forms of speech independent of their meaning is illustrated by the recital of the numerals from one to ten as a safeguard against disease. A Japanese in a thunderstorm calls out, *Kuhabara*! ('Mulberry grove!'). Here, however, the idea is to suggest to the thunder-god that the place is a mulberry grove—which is never struck by lightning. Some magic is condemned by Shinto, not for its want of efficacy, but for the evil purposes to which it was put.

Divination[1] is magic which has the special purpose of revealing the unknown. It may be either religious, or, like our palmistry, non-religious. The modern Japanese writer Hirata defines it as 'respectfully inquiring the heart of the gods.' The 'Greater Divination,' practised in the olden times, consisted in drawing conclusions according to certain rules from the lines which appear in a deer's shoulder-blade when scorched by fire—a practice known to the Chinese, Kalmuks, the ancient Greeks and Germans, and even in Scotland, where it is called 'reading the speal.' In later times a tortoise-shell was substituted for the deer's shoulder-blade. The religious element of this divination consisted in a prayer to Koyane, the diviner's god, to grant a true result of the procedure. *Tsuji-ura* ('cross-roads divination') was performed by going out to the highway, planting a stick to represent Kunado, the phallic deity of roads, and then interpreting the casual utterances of the passers-by as an answer. The *mikayu-ura* ('august-gruel-divination') consisted in plunging reeds into a gruel made of rice and red beans, and divining from the way in which the rice grains entered the reeds the crops which it would be best to sow. *Caldron-divination* predicts good or ill fortune from the sound made by a boiling caldron. *Omens* are frequently mentioned in the old histories. Earthquakes, floods, and storms were supposed to portend war. White animals and three-legged birds were lucky. The *ordeal* of boiling water is frequently mentioned. *Dreams* reveal the future; but, like Pharaoh's, they usually require interpretation.

18. Inspiration.—We have no record of the circumstances under which such grains of divine truth as Shinto contains became known to the Japanese. Most Shinto oracles, however well intended, bear the plain stamp of imposture. Inspiration is called in Japanese *kangakari* ('God-attach'). This term implies that the god takes possession of the prophet, or oftener prophetess, and uses him or her as a mouth-piece. The oracles were very often used for political purposes. The empress Jingō was inspired by a god to advise her husband to invade Korea. By another ancient oracle, the sun-goddess directed that a shrine should be erected to her in Ise. In A.D. 672 warning was given by certain gods of the approach of a hostile army. The deities concerned were rewarded by an increase of rank. In A.D. 1031 certain abuses in the management of the Ise shrines were condemned by a virgin priestess when in an inspired condition. The Buddhist priests who converted Shinto to their own purposes made large use of oracles. The circumstances as noted leave no doubt that by *kangakari* or inspiration the hypnotic trance is meant. It is still practised in Japan. The *miko*, or young virgins attached to the shrines, give inspired utterances; and there are strolling mediums of indifferent character who will fall into a hypnotic state, real or assumed, and for a trifle communicate

[1] Cf. art. MAGIC (Japanese).

[1] Cf. art. DIVINATION (Japanese).

messages to their clients from any gods or spirits of deceased men that may be desired.

19. Later history.—Shinto and Buddhism at first held aloof from one another, or showed a mutual antagonism. But in the 8th cent. the Mikado Shōmu, when about to found the Buddhist temple of Tōdaji at Nara, sent a Buddhist priest named Gyōgi to the shrine of the sun-goddess at Ise with a present of a Buddhist relic. Gyōgi brought back an oracle, which was interpreted to mean that the sun-goddess identified herself with the Buddha Vairochana—described as the personification of essential *bodhi* and absolute purity. This was the first case in Japan (the same principle had already been applied in China to Lao-tse and Confucius) of the recognition of the *Kami* as Buddhist *avatars* or incarnations. Systematized, it formed the basis of the teaching of a new sect called *Ryōbu* Shintō. Its chief founder was the famous Kōbō Daishi (died A.D. 835), a Buddhist saint to whom is ascribed the invention of the Hiragana Syllabary, and writings and paintings innumerable. The Ryōbu had great vogue down to the end of the 18th century. It is really much more Buddhist than Shinto. The only Shinto deity it gives importance to is Kuni-toko-tachi, a very colourless personage, to whom the *Nihongi* gives the first position in point of time. The *Yuiitsu* Shinto was a branch of the Ryōbu. It was established about the end of the 15th cent. Other sects were the *Deguchi* and *Suwiga* Shinto, both of which arose in the 17th century. The former introduces into Shinto the principles of the *I-king*, a Chinese book of divination, while the latter is penetrated with principles derived from the Chinese Sung dynasty philosophy.

The encroachments of Buddhism were not confined to doctrine. Buddhist priests took charge of all the Shinto shrines except a few of the most important, such as those of Ise and Idzumo. Many elements of Buddhist ceremony were combined with the native rites. The architecture and ornaments of the shrines were given a Buddhist character. For many centuries most of the Mikados, the high priests of Shinto, assumed the Buddhist tonsure. In the 17th cent. there was a great revival of Chinese learning in Japan, much to the neglect of Buddhism, by the educated classes. It reached a climax towards the end of the 18th cent., when a reaction set in, which Mabuchi, Motoöri, and Hirata took advantage of to recall the attention of the nation to the old pure Shinto of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*. They succeeded to some extent, especially in discrediting the Ryōbu and other Buddhist forms of Shinto. But this was in reality a reactionary movement. The older faith was wholly inadequate to meet the spiritual wants of a nation long familiar with the religious thought of India and China—both far richer in spiritual and ethical purport than Shinto. Their propaganda, however, did much to reanimate the old belief in the Mikado's divine descent and authority, and undoubtedly contributed to bring about his restoration in 1868 to his position as a *de facto* sovereign.

In the last century two popular forms of Shinto —so-called—sprang up. One of these is called the *Remmonkyō* ('lotus-gate-doctrine'), because, like the lotus growing in the mud, it remains pure in a wicked world. The other is the *Tenrikyō* ('teaching of the Heavenly Reason'). It has high moral aims. Both these sects have made rapid progress, and claim great numbers of adherents. They are not really Shinto, but owe whatever vitality they possess to elements borrowed from India and China. At the present day, Shinto as a religion is practically extinct. It cannot compete with Buddhism, which has of recent years awakened to new life. And now there is a new and still more formidable rival in the field—Christianity—which has already about 130,000 followers, and is spreading every day. Shinto is kept alive mainly by the popular festivals and pilgrimages, of which religion forms but a small part. To Shinto also belongs the religious element in the cult of the Mikado, and the sensibility to the divine in Nature, which is characteristic of the Japanese nation.

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W. G. ASTON.

SHIPS AND BOATS.—

The art of navigation often has a religious or magical aspect. The building and launching of vessels may be accompanied by definite rites at various stages of their progress, and ships and boats are often used in ceremonies connected with social events, especially in connexion with death. Boats also come occasionally into rites of divination and medicine. In some places certain ships or boats are sacred or parts of a vessel may have special sanctity. Religious and magical motives often influence the decoration of vessels and may be the cause of features of their construction.

1. Rites of building and launching.—These take place in many parts of the world, varying from such relatively simple ceremonies as accompany the launching of a large vessel among ourselves to prolonged rites accompanying every important stage in the building and preparation of a vessel for use.

In the island of Ambrim in the New Hebrides, ceremonies take place at the felling of the tree from which the canoe is to be made, at the beginning of the hollowing of its trunk, when the outrigger is affixed, and on other occasions. Ceremonial feasts are held every five days during the process of construction, and, when the canoe is ready, it is taken in stages spread over several days to the clearing in the forest where all the important religious rites of the people are held. Both here and on other occasions the maker of the canoe calls upon the ghosts of canoe-makers of former times, asking them to take the canoe under their protection, and certain of the pigs killed during the rites are believed to serve as food for these ghosts.

When the canoe is launched, rites are performed, in one of which a procession marches five times round the canoe, and the contents of coco-nuts are poured over various parts of it. The canoe is taken on ceremonial visits to neighbouring villages, where pigs are killed and ceremonies take place. When the canoe returns after being launched, fruits are thrown at its occupants. This seems to be the degenerate remnant of ceremonial combats which in the neighbouring Banks Islands form an important feature of ceremonial voyages of the canoe round the island where it is made.[1]

In New Caledonia ceremonies take place during the building of a large canoe and also when it is launched, and those who take part in the rites have to be continent.[2] During the construction of a canoe in Eddystone Island, in the Solomons, various rites are performed to give speed and durability. In one of these leaves are hung over the canoe and creepers tied to it, and insects are placed in the caulking, both leaves and insects being used in groups of four. Prayers are uttered similar to those of other religious rites of the island, in which

[1] W. H. R. Rivers, *Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 171.

[2] R. P. Lambert, *Les Missions catholiques*, xii. [1880] 215.

the appeal is probably to the ghosts of former canoe-makers.[1] In several of the Solomon Islands slaves are killed or the heads of enemies are taken in connexion with the building or launching of a new canoe. In Fiji human victims were killed and eaten when a canoe was launched.[2]

In some parts of the Papuan Gulf of New Guinea a beheaded corpse is held over the bow of a new canoe so that it is covered with blood, while elsewhere man-killing raids take place when a new canoe is made, and in some cases the blood of the victim is used to 'paint' the canoe. In the Namara district they kill a pig and a cassowary before killing the human victim. In the north of Papua no human victim is killed, but the canoe is painted red before it is launched. A formula is sung continuously as a canoe is being made and a feast is held on its completion. Conchs are blown at the launching, after which the owner is paddled about sitting on the platform of the canoe. When the Binandele fell a tree from which to make a new canoe for a raid, they address it in the name of a dead man, saying that they are cutting it down to be able to visit his slayers.[3]

In Polynesia the whole process of making a canoe had a ceremonial character. Songs were chanted as it was adzed, and in Tahiti any slip, such as an inaccurate stroke or the use of an implement on the wrong side, would not merely be enough to stop the work temporarily, but might lead to the permanent abandonment of a canoe when almost finished. A fault, even a hesitation, on the part of the canoe-maker in the utterance of his formulas would have the same result.[4] Feasts to gain the favour of the *atua* were held before cutting down the tree from which the canoe was to be made, and at the beginning and at every important stage in its construction. A special canoe was made as an offering to the *atua* and a human victim sacrificed.[5] In the Austral Islands the god Poere, who filled the springs with water, was invoked with offerings of fish when a canoe was launched,[6] and the Maoris performed rites at the launching of a canoe by means of which it was placed under the protection of the gods.[7] In the Hawaiian Islands the choice of a suitable tree was determined by the dream of a priest (*kahuna*) while sleeping before the shrine. Before the tree was cut down, pigs, coco-nuts, fish, and kava were offered to the gods with prayer, and the whole process of building was accompanied by rites.[8]

Among the Kayans of Borneo the operation of boat-building is preceded by the taking of omens, and is liable to be stopped if these are inauspicious.[9]

Similar rites have been recorded from various parts of Africa. Thus among the Baganda an oracle is consulted before the tree to be used in the making of a canoe is felled, and rites take place during this process, one feature of which is the necessity for continence on the part of the makers. The owner together with the builders eats the meat of the sacrificed animal on the shore near the canoe. When it is launched, a hut is built as a shrine for the spirit of the canoe. Goats or fowls are killed so that their blood may run along the keel, and this blood mixed with beer is placed by the side of the hut which serves as a shrine for the canoe-spirit. The first journey of the canoe is to the shrine of a god.[10] Among the Banyoro a man or an ox is eaten before the tree, while the body of a human victim is left by the tree-roots. When the canoe is ready to be launched, a sheep or fowl is killed so that the blood runs into the vessel.[11] Among the Baronga of S. Africa sacrifices must be made to the ghosts of ancestors buried in the forest before a tree therefrom is cut down to serve as material for a canoe.[12]

Both in Oceania and in Africa the rites of building and launching are definitely connected with spiritual beings. In Melanesia these are certainly the spirits or ghosts of dead ancestors, who form the basis of the religious cult of this part of the world. Both in the New Hebrides and in the Solomons there is evidence that the ghosts are those of former canoe-builders, probably starting with that of the original introducer of the art. In Africa the spirit to which offerings are made during the processes of building and launching is clearly connected with the tree from which the vessel is made. The spirit of a large canoe is thought to be the spirit of the tree, which clings to the timber, and especially the keel.[1] Among the Baronga, another Bantu people, the necessity of offerings is connected with the dead who have been buried in the forest from which the tree used for the canoe is taken. This suggests that the tree- and canoe-spirits of other Bantu peoples may have been derived from the spirit or ghost of the dead.

A similar connexion between a canoe and the spirit of the tree from which it is made occurs in Polynesia. In the Hervey Islands the songs chanted while a canoe is being made are said to have been addressed originally to the tree-spirit;[2] and the necessity for the propitiation of the tree-spirit in Samoa is seen in the case of a tree which had been cut down as suitable for the keel of a canoe not being used through fear of the *aitu* of the grove in which the tree was growing.[3] It may be that this was the original belief of the canoe-makers of Melanesia, and that it has since been replaced by the propitiation of ancestors which is characteristic of the religion of that region.

The ship or boat is often the object of religious or magical ritual after it has been built and launched, but it is usually difficult to tell how far such rites pertain to the vessel itself and how far they form part of the ritual of warfare, fishing, or other purpose for which the vessel is to be used. In Eddystone Island rites are performed during the making of a canoe which are designed to promote success in the fishing for bonito, which is one of the favourite pursuits of the islanders; and in many places the nature of rites in which a boat is concerned shows that they are designed to promote the success of fishing or warfare rather than the safety of the vessel. Among the Baganda, however, fish are definitely offered to the canoe; they are killed in the vessel with the words 'This fish we offer to you,' and, if the fishing fails after the omission of this offering, a propitiatory ceremony is held in which fish are offered with a confession of wrong-doing.[4]

2. **Death-rites.**—In the rites so far considered the vessel itself is the main purpose. Ships and boats also frequently enter into rites the purpose of which is wholly different. Thus the use of boats is very frequent and prominent in death-rites.[5]

In Melanesia the bodies of the dead are often placed in canoes at some stage of the funeral-rites or the dead are interred in their canoes. In the New Hebrides a canoe is loaded with objects which may be of use to the dead and is then sent adrift during the course of the death ceremonies; and a similar proceeding takes place as part of the highly complex and prolonged ceremonial in which initiates gradually rise in rank as members of a fraternity connected with a cult of the dead.

In New Britain the corpse of an important man is laid in a boat which, with its contents, is sunk far out at sea. The dead were also sent out to sea in canoes in several islands of Polynesia, such as Samoa and Niué. In other cases the corpse, while undergoing desiccation, was left in a canoe or placed on the platform of a double canoe. In other islands of Polynesia a body was interred in a canoe or in a hollowed log of wood representing a canoe.[6] In the Lau region of the Fijian archipelago the bodies of chiefs were placed in great canoes and dragged to almost inaccessible caves.[7]

The Malanau, a Klemantan people of Borneo, put the property of a dead man and sometimes the corpse also in a canoe and send it out to sea.[8]

The use of a canoe is frequent in the death-rites of America, especially in the southern continent, the bodies of the dead being frequently interred in canoes.[9]

In Asia there are only a few traces of the use of boats in death-rites. In the Nicobar Islands the dead are sometimes

[1] A. M. Hocart, MSS.
[2] W. T. Pritchard, *Polynesian Reminiscences*, London, 1866, p. 372.
[3] A. C. Haddon, in a personal communication.
[4] J. A. Moerenhout, *Voyages aux îles du Grand Océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 501.
[5] W. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the S. Pacific, 1796–98, in the 'Duff,'* London, 1799, p. 377 ff.
[6] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1833, iii. 364.
[7] Elsdon Best, *Trans. and Proc. New Zealand Institute*, xlviii. [1915] 452.
[8] David Malo, *Hawaiian Antiquities*, Honolulu, 1903, p. 168 ff.
[9] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, i. 202.
[10] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 386.
[11] Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 79 f.
[12] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, ii. 20.

[1] J. Roscoe, in a personal communication.
[2] W. W. Gill, *The Southern Pacific and New Guinea*, Sydney, 1892, p. 22.
[3] J. Fraser, *Journ. and Proc. Royal Society of New South Wales*, xxiv. [1890] 203.
[4] Roscoe, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 56.
[5] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory and Primitive), vol. iv. p. 430.
[6] See Rivers, *Hist. of Melanesian Society*, ii. 269.
[7] T. R. St. Johnston, *The Lau Islands*, London, 1918, p. 23.
[8] *TES* ii. [1863] 32.
[9] G. Friederici, *Die Schiffahrt der Indianer*, Stuttgart, 1907, p. 110.

buried in the hull of a canoe.[1] Pieces of reed in the walls of Indian tombs are said to serve as boats;[2] and the Ainus of Japan say that an object which looks like a spear, placed over a grave, is really a boat-oar.[3] A double canoe was used in the death-rite of a king of Kandy, but only as the means of taking a horse or an elephant on a river in order that its rider should deposit the ashes of the king in the stream.[4]

In Africa the use of boats in funeral-rites is less frequent than in Oceania or America. The Egyptians from the Vth to the XIIth dynasty included models of ships among the furniture of a tomb. The Bakongo use an old canoe as material for a coffin;[5] and a priest of the Ibo in the Asaba district on the Niger is buried in a canoe or a model of a canoe is put into his coffin, the practice being accompanied by a prohibition against the use of a canoe by a priest while he is alive.[6]

The use of ships in funeral rites was very prominent in ancient Scandinavia. The vikings used a ship as a funeral pyre. They put the body of a dead leader in his ship and sent it out burning to sea. The ship was also used for interment. Funeral-mounds have been found to contain large sea-going vessels on which the bodies of the dead had been placed, together with numerous animals and other objects for the use of the dead. One such vessel found at Oseberg contained the bodies of two women, one probably of high rank and the other her attendant. Around the Baltic old stone burial-places occur in the form of boats. Models of boats, sometimes in gold and often in large numbers, are found in the ancient interments in this region.[7]

3. Boat-processions.—Ships or boats sometimes took an important place in ceremonies.

In Greece, at the general Panathenaic festival, held every fourth year, a ship on wheels was taken in procession with a robe fastened to its mast to be presented to Athene. At Smyrna, during the feast of Dionysus in the spring, a sacred ship steered by a priest of the god was carried aloft round the market-place.[8]

There is no direct evidence of similar processions in ancient Egypt, but a ship was prominent in the rites of Isis, and representations of boat-shrines on sledges in ancient tombs and a golden model of a boat on wheels from the XVIIth dynasty point to the occurrence of processions similar to those of Greece.[9] Such processions still take place in modern Egypt. Three take place every year in Luxor, the chief of which is in honour of Abu'l Heggag, a *shaikh* who is said to have journeyed from Keneh to Cairo in a stone boat about 700 years ago. A procession in which a boat is used occurs in a Sinhalese ceremony performed by the Muhammadan Moormen of Ceylon.[10] Ship-drawing cavalcades occurred in Europe in the Middle Ages and were forbidden by a proclamation at Ulm as late as 1530.[11] Relics of such processions survived in Suabia until the middle of last century.[12] Boats burned in China to carry away evil influences are previously carried through the streets in procession.[13]

4. Boat-races.—In several parts of the world boat-races seem to have or to have had a religious significance.

In Siam regattas are held from the results of which prognostics are drawn,[14] and in China races of dragon-boats are believed to produce rain.[15] In Hermione in Attica boat-races were held in honour of Dionysus of the Black Goatskin, and races were held at Sunium. Races rowed in sacred boats round the promontory of Piræus formed part of the training of the Athenian youth.[16] Boat-racing took place also at the Isthmian and Panathenaic festivals.[17]

5. Divination by means of boats.—In several islands of the Solomons the swaying of a canoe forms a means by which the people determine whether their ancestors favour an enterprise that they are about to undertake, the movement doubtless depending on automatic movements of the occupant of the canoe similar to that of table-turning. In one part of Eddystone Island the movements are believed to be produced by a crocodile, and in others by a shark or by a mythical octopus-like creature.

6. Boats and medicine. — In some parts of Indonesia rites are performed to cure disease, especially epidemic disease, in which small vessels, often elaborately constructed, are sent out to sea and are believed thus to carry away the disease.

In Sarawak such a boat is made of sago-pith, and an image in human form is placed therein. A 'sorcerer' is then called upon to discover the abode of the evil spirit who is causing the disease and the place propitious for sending the boat adrift. The sorcerer takes the image from the boat and instructs it what to say to the spirit. After spitting betel juice on the image, he replaces it in the boat, which is allowed to float away.[1] A similar practice occurs in Eddystone Island, where a leaf resembling a canoe, in which ashes, some thatch, and shells are placed, is sent out to sea to carry away an epidemic disease.

Thanksgiving offerings may also be floated out to sea.[2] In China the boats which are burned on the sea-shore in order to take away evil influences[3] have the form of dragons.

It is noteworthy that the custom of banishing disease by sending it to sea in a boat occurs in Indonesia and Melanesia. In both those regions the dead or their property are sent out to sea in boats. The relation between the two practices raised by their common distribution is reinforced by the custom of Sarawak in which an image placed in the disease-boat is instructed to speak to the spirit. It suggests that the spirit or ghost to whom the occurrence of epidemic disease is ascribed is that of a dead ancestor or hero who lives across the water, to whom a message is sent by means similar to those by which he himself is believed to have travelled after death.

7. Sacred ships and boats.—In several of the rites which have been described special sacred vessels are used.

In Melanesia only certain canoes are tabu to women, thus showing some degree of sacred character, and canoes are often also tabu to women in Polynesia. In the Duke of York Island in the Bismarck Archipelago sacred canoes called *pidik* were formerly made with much ceremony, and leaders of the *Dukduk* or ghost-cult of that region were carried in it to all the surrounding villages.[4] Sacred canoes form a definite feature of Polynesian religion. In Tahiti certain canoes, apparently made by the chiefs, were specially dedicated to the *atua*. They were called *marae*, the word otherwise used for 'temple'; a human victim was sacrificed when they were launched, and they were not allowed to touch any soil but that of the *marae* to which they were carried from the sea. They had a platform, also called *marae*, on which were laid the bodies of those slain in warfare.[5]

In ancient Greece a sacred vessel went every year from Athens to Delos. During its absence Athens was in a state of purification and no criminal could be killed; this occasion was the means of delaying the death of Socrates. When the vessel started on its voyage, its bows were crowned with flowers by the priests of Apollo.

The doge of Venice had a sacred galley, the *Bucentaur*, from which was performed at the feast of the Ascension the ceremony of marriage with the sea, into which a ring was thrown.

In two widely separated parts of the earth, Scandinavia and China, vessels were used, more or less sacred in character, which took the form of dragons, and similar vessels are represented in the sculpture of ancient India.[6] It is a question whether the *dreki*, or dragon-ship, of the vikings had a special build or differed from other vessels only in having a dragon-head at the bow and a 'tail-fin' at the stern. Vessels of this kind were especially associated with the chiefs, and it was in them that dead chiefs were buried or cremated. The Veneti of Brittany appear to have had similar vessels.[7] The dragon-boats of the Chinese also had a sacred character and were apparently believed to be associated with rain-making.

1 W. Campbell, *My Indian Journal*, Edinburgh, 1864, p. 442.
2 See *ERE* iv. 475b, 479a.
3 J. Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 209.
4 J. Davy, *Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, London, 1821, p. 162.
5 J. H. Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, London, 1913, p. 317.
6 N. W. Thomas, *JRAI* xlvii. [1917] 183.
7 G. H. Boehmer, *RSI* for 1891, p. 557 ff.
8 Pausanias, i. xxix. 1. 9 *ERE* iii. 226, v. 243b, 856.
10 C. G. Seligmann, in *Essays and Studies presented to W. Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 452 ff.
11 O. Schade, *Die Sage von der heiligen Ursula*, Hanover, 1854, p. 81.
12 E. Meier, *Deutsche Sagen, Sitten und Gebräuche aus Schwaben*, Stuttgart, 1852, p. 374.
13 M. W. de Visser, 'The Dragon in China and Japan,' *Verhandelingen der koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, Afdeeling Letterkunde, xiii. 2 [1913] 70.
14 *ERE* v. 887b. 15 De Visser, p. 85.
16 Pausanias, II. xxxv. 1.
17 P. Gardner, *JHS* ii. [1881] 90, 315; J. E. Harrison, *ib.* vi. [1885] 26.

1 W. M. Croker, *Sarawak Gazette*, nos. 120 and 121, quoted by H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo*, London, 1896, ii. 284.
2 Hose-McDougall, ii. 134. 3 See above, § 3.
4 G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 92.
5 Moerenhout, i. 526.
6 F. C. Maisey, *Sanchi and its Remains*, London, 1892, p. 58.
7 E. Magnússon, *Notes of Shipbuilding and Nautical Terms of Old in the North*, London, 1906, p. 42.

Tradition in several places tells of stone boats.

The *shaikh* in whose honour boat-processions still take place in Egypt[1] is reported to have travelled in a stone boat, of which relics are still shown. Stone boats are prominent in the stories of Irish and British saints.[2] Petrified boats occur in the legends of Indonesia;[3] and one of the legendary heroes of Ruviana, in the Solomon Islands, is said to have turned his war-canoe into stone.

8. Sacred parts of vessels.—In several places the hinder end of a vessel has a sacred character.

In the Maori canoe the stern-thwart might be occupied by the priests, and this part was also believed to be occupied by the spirit under whose protection the vessel had been placed. In the Marquesas the image of a god was placed in the hinder part of the canoe.[4] In the boat-burials of the vikings the dead were placed in houses erected behind the mast, and the Roman war-galley had a portion of the stern set apart as a temple.

In other cases sacred objects of various kinds are placed in the bows, suggesting a more or less sacred character of this part of the vessel.

In the island of Dobu in the D'Entrecasteaux group (S.E. New Guinea) the bow of a canoe is dedicated to war and the stern to peace. If a canoe of any size were brought to a place bow first, it would mean war.[5]

Among the Baganda sanctity appears to attach to the keel. The spirit of the tree from which the canoe is made is believed to cling especially to the keel, and the blood of the goat killed at the launching is allowed to run along this part of the vessel.[6]

The decoration of ships and boats often has, or has had, a religious significance.

Sometimes, as in Samoa, the figure-head in the form of an animal may indicate the village or district to which the canoe belongs, but more often (and perhaps also in Polynesia) the human being or animal represented is believed to protect or guide the vessel. The natives of the north-west coast of N. America adorned the bow and stern of their canoes with elaborate totemic patterns in painting or carving.[7]

The presence of an eye upon the bows, which in ancient Egypt portrayed the eye of Osiris, seems elsewhere in the Mediterranean, India, China, and N. America to have become a mere decoration, but it is possible that it still possesses a religious significance. Objects placed in the bows, such as the head of an albatross, sharks' tails, horse-shoes, etc., may in some cases be only trophies, but more frequently they are amulets designed to ensure a fair wind or other benefit.

The intense conservatism of sailors, which has done much to perpetuate special types of vessels and details of their structure, is probably connected with the belief in the religious or magical significance of the objects that they have preserved. On the other hand, the strength of the religious sentiments connected with boats has in some cases led to the disappearance of all means of navigation. There is little doubt that the complete absence of sea-going vessels, even in certain islands where they would seem to be indispensable, is due to the sacred character of the art of boat-building. When those who knew the appropriate formulas and rites have died, the people have forgone the highly useful art of navigation rather than make vessels destined to misfortune owing to the absence of the due religious rites.[8]

LITERATURE.—See the authorities quoted in the footnotes.

W. H. R. RIVERS.

SHOES AND SANDALS.— Most savage peoples wear no covering on the feet, except where the climate is excessively cold—*e.g.*, among the Eskimo, Samoyed, and Gilyaks (but not the Fuegians). How soon the custom of covering the feet arose in pre-historic times is uncertain, as the perishable nature of the material used would not tend to its preservation. Increasing civilization led to the use of some form of sandals, but even among the early Greeks these were not always worn, and among cultured Hindus a foot-covering, especially of leather, is disliked. Clement of Alexandria wrote that bare feet are in keeping for a man, except when on military service, and he quotes the Greek proverb, *ὑποδεδέσθαι τῷ δεδέσθαι*.[1] We have to consider here the use of sandals and shoes in religious ritual.

1. Ritual putting off of shoes.—On two occasions in the OT a command is given, 'Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground'—first to Moses, second to Joshua, on both occasions in presence of a theophany, making the surrounding place holy or tabu.[2] The priests also probably officiated in the Temple with bare feet.[3] Parallels from other religions may be cited before suggesting the rationale of the custom.

No one was permitted to enter the temple of Britomartis in Crete unless barefooted, and a similar prohibition forbade the carrying of shoes into the holy place of Alectro at Ialysos in Rhodes, and into the temple of the Tegean mother.[4] Several other instances from Greek ritual might be cited, and the custom was a general one.[5] Worshippers at Rome went barefoot in honour of Cybele, and also in the cult of Isis, as pictures at Herculaneum show.[6] While nothing is said of the priests in Roman sacrificial ritual, the suppliant offering a sacrifice to obtain a favour required to have his feet bare and hair dishevelled.[7] Ovid cites an instance of a place where formerly stood a sacred grove, still approached with naked feet—an instance of the tenacity of custom.[8] In Egypt the priests, when officiating in the temples, frequently removed their sandals.[9] A similar custom holds in India, where, *e.g.*, at the temple of Dākor in Gujarāt a visitor must remove his shoes before ascending its steps.[10] The practice is also found with the Muslims, who remove their shoes at the door of a mosque, carrying them in the left hand, sole to sole.[11] Similarly, on entering a house, Muslims leave their shoes on the *durḳā'ah*, or lower part of the floor, before stepping on the *leewān*, or upper part, and they also remove them before stepping on a carpet or mat.[12] In some instances the sacredness of the threshold demands that it be not touched with the foot when crossing it; hence among other rites that of taking off the shoes is sometimes found.[13]

The sandals or shoes which have been in contact with common ground must not be brought into contact with sacred ground, first, lest any dirt or the contagion of the outer secular world should be brought in, and probably, as a secondary reason, to avoid carrying away the sacredness of the holy place upon them. The latter would, of course, prevent their being used afterwards in ordinary life. For the former reason the feet are washed also where shoes are not ordinarily worn as well as where they are, before entering a sacred place.[14] These customs are parallel to the precautions taken among savages to remove the outward contagion from a stranger before admitting him to the village or house.[15] But the question of archaic

[1] See above, § 3.

[2] C. Plummer, *Vitæ Sanctorum Hiberniæ*, Oxford, 1910, i. Introd. p. clv and p. 227.

[3] W. J. Perry, *The Megalithic Culture of Indonesia*, Manchester, 1918, pp. 45, 48, 124.

[4] Elsdon Best, *loc. cit.*

[5] W. E. Bromilow, *Rep. Austral. Ass.*, vol. xii. p. 470.

[6] J. Roscoe, in a personal communication.

[7] A. P. Niblack, *RSI* for 1887–88, p. 295; G. Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery*, London, 1798, ii. 303.

[8] W. H. R. Rivers, 'The Disappearance of Useful Arts,' *Festskrift til E. Westermarck*, Helsingfors, 1912, p. 109.

[1] Clem. *Pæd.* ii. 12.

[2] Ex 3^5, Jos 5^{15}; cf. Ex 19^{12}, **Ec** 5^1.

[3] See art. FEET-WASHING, § 1.

[4] W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscr. Græcarum*[2], Leipzig, 1898–1901, no. 357; Solinus, *Collectanea rerum memorabilium*, ed. T. Mommsen, Berlin, 1874, xi. 8; Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 629.

[5] See O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1897–1906, p. 912; C. A. Lobeck *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, i. 249; J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. viii., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 45.

[6] Prudentius, *Peristeph.* 154; W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*[3], London, 1890–91, *s.v.* 'Calceus.'

[7] A. Réville, *Prolegomena of the Hist. of Religions*, tr. A. S. Squire, London, 1884, p. 126.

[8] Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 395 ff.

[9] J. G. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, ed. S. Birch, London, 1878, ii. 336.

[10] M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 144.

[11] E. W. Lane, *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*, ed. S. Lane-Poole, London, 1883, p. 146, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[8], do. 1846, i. 118.

[12] Lane, *Modern Egyptians*[8], i. 55.

[13] See art. DOOR, § 1 (*c*).

[14] See art. FEET-WASHING, § 1. The Talmud directs that no person should approach the Temple with dirt on the feet (*Yebamōth*, 6*b*).

[15] See Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 102 ff.; A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 35 ff.

usage also must be considered. Before any foot-covering was worn or in the period of transition (*e.g.*, in Homeric Greece) all religious rites must have been performed barefoot, after washing the feet. Hence it may have been thought wiser to continue the practice after sandals were in common use, and the cause just considered would also affect the practice. In the same way stone knives continued to be used ritually long after metal was used in ordinary life.

In some magical rites sandals had to be laid aside and the feet washed.

Ovid relates that they were removed by the man who threw beans as a ransom for himself and his friends from the ghosts at the Lemuria.[1] Horace describes how Canidia practised her rites of sorcery with bare feet and dishevelled hair, and Pliny says that *selago* was gathered in Gaul by one who went with newly-washed unshod feet, and who wore a white robe.[2]

This putting off of shoes, in conjunction with wearing the hair unbound and also a loose robe, points to the fear of hindering the magical action through any knot or constriction. In the same way all garments had to be loose in Greek sacrificial ritual.[3]

Another reason for putting off the shoes or sandals was that this was a sign of grief or mourning, and hence the right attitude in those who approached the gods and their sacred places in humility. The custom is found in religious ritual where grief or humility was to be shown.

The women in the procession through the town mourning with Demeter went unshod, and so did the Locrian virgins (who served as slaves) in approaching the *βωμός* of Athene.[4] In drought a procession and ritual called *nudipedalia* was intended to propitiate the gods by this token of humiliation and sorrow.[5] Many other instances of this are known.[6] In actual mourning rites going barefoot was used by both Greeks and Romans; *e.g.*, Suetonius describes how the young nobles who removed the ashes of Augustus from the pyre were barefoot.[7] Bion describes Aphrodite wailing for Adonis as *ἀσάνδαλος*, and Autonoe was unshod at the death of Actaion.[8] It was also a token of distraction, as when the Roman vestals fled from Rome with the sacred utensils.[9] Among the Hebrews to go bare-footed was also a sign of mourning.[10]

2. Ritual wearing of special shoes.—Dress could be washed before visiting a sacred place, but this was impossible for sandals or shoes, unless these were merely of linen, as in a rite described by Herodian.[11] Hence they were removed, as we have just seen, or special shoes were worn in the sanctuary or sacred place. These as well as a special dress might be there provided for the worshipper, unless he was rich enough to supply them for himself.[12] This is found in savage as well as in ancient custom.

At the annual ceremony of the new fire among the Creek Indians the priest wore a pair of new buckskin moccasins instead of going barefoot. These were made by himself, and were stitched with the sinews of the animal from whose hide the material was procured. They were kept carefully in the sacred enclosure and used only at the festival.[13] In Mexico the woman representing the goddess Iyacatecutli wore white sandals, and sandals fastened with buttons and cords were worn by the victims sacrificed to Huixtocihuatl, and so also in other instances.[14] In old Chinese ritual a great officer, on leaving his state and crossing the boundary, had to prepare a place for an altar and there wore shoes of untanned leather and special garments.[15] Persons consulting the oracle of Trophonius, after being washed and anointed, put on a linen shirt and shoes of the country—*ὑποδησάμενος ἐπιχωρίας κρηπῖδας*.[1] In the procession at the Andanian mysteries the sacred women had to wear no other shoes than those made of felt or of the skins of the sacrificial victims.[2] Similarly at a late Syrian rite in which boys were initiated they wore slippers made from the hide of a sacrificed animal.[3] As a customary foot-gear the wife of the *flamen Dialis* wore shoes made of the skin of a sacrificial victim or of one killed, never of one dying a natural death.[4] Herodotus says that the Egyptian priests were not allowed to wear any other shoes than those made from papyrus—*ὑποδήματα βύβλινα*. In other cases they were made of leaves of palm.[5]

The last examples have perhaps some connexion with rites in which at a sacrifice the worshipper stood or knelt on the victim's skin.[6] In the Greek, Roman, and Egyptian instances the reason for wearing special shoes or sandals, not of leather, was connected with the idea that anything made of the hide of animals dying a natural death—*i.e.* not slain or sacrificed—would defile a sacred place. This is expressly stated by Ovid and Varro,[7] and it also would be a reason for going unshod where the feet were not covered with some other material. The skin of sacrificed animals might be used, as some instances have shown.

In ancient India, where probably, as in modern India, it may have been the usual custom to go barefoot because of the supposed impurity of leather,[8] the king who had performed the *rājasūya* rite must never stand on the earth with bare feet.

'From the throne-seat he slips into the shoes and on shoes (he stands), whatever his vehicle may be, whether a chariot or anything else. For verily he who performs the Rāgasūya is high above everything here, and everything here is beneath him;—therefore this is for him a religious observance: as long as he lives he does not stand on earth (with bare feet).'[9]

Here the real reason probably was connected with sacredness as a result of the rite, which must not be contaminated by direct contact with the ground. Another rite in connexion with a king's consecration ordained him to wear shoes of boar's skin at the investing.

The reason assigned is that the gods once produced a boar from a pot of *ghī*. Hence 'cows readily take to a boar,' because 'it is their own essence (life-sap, blood)' to which they are taking. Thus the king 'firmly establishes himself in the essence of the cattle: therefore he puts on shoes of boar-skin.'[10]

The Parsi sacred books ordain that 'walking with one boot as far as four steps is a *Tanāpúhar* sin,' or forbid this lest grievous harm should happen to the soul. The true reading here appears to be 'without boots,' or 'with only a single covering on the feet'—*i.e.* inner boots of thin leather over which an outer pair were worn out-of-doors. Modern Parsis understand it as walking without boots.[11] In another passage the reason is clearly stated—one is not to walk without boots because, if one treads on dead matter while wearing them, he is not polluted.[12] Touching the ground—*i.e.* unconsecrated ground—with bare feet is most offensive to the Parsi and a sinful act:

'It is not desirable for those of the good religion . . . to put a bare foot upon the ground, because it is a sin, and injury occurs to Spendârmad, the archangel.'[13]

3. Removing one shoe.—In some instances in Greek ritual we find that one shoe was removed.

Ovid describes Medea, before her invocation of the powers which will help her to obtain herbs for the renewal of youth, as having her feet—probably one foot—bare, hair and garments

[1] Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 432.
[2] Hor. *Sat.* I. viii. 23; Pliny, *HN* xxiv. 11 (62).
[3] J. Potter, *Antiquities of Greece*[12], London, 1832, i. 236; cf. art. KNOTS.
[4] Callimachus, *Hymn.*, vi. 124; Plutarch, *de Sera Numinis Vindicta*, 12.
[5] Tertullian, *Apol.* 40.
[6] See Gruppe, p. 912, for other refs.; C. Weinhold, 'Zur Gesch. der heidn. Ritus,' in *Abh. der königl. Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1896, p. 17.
[7] Suet. *Aug.* 100; cf. *ERE* iv. 506a.
[8] Bion, i. 20; cf. Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, v. 374.
[9] Flor., I. 13. [10] Is 20[2f.], Ezk 24[17. 23], 2 S 15[30].
[11] Herodian, v. v. 10; W. R. Smith[2], p. 453.
[12] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, London, 1894, v. 202.
[13] J. Adair, *The Hist. of the American Indians*, London, 1775, p. 82.
[14] *NR* ii. 336, 396 *f.*
[15] *Li Ki*, II. i. 10; *SBE* xxvii. [1885] 104.

[1] Paus. IX. xxxix. 8.
[2] *Ib.* IV. i. 5 *f.*; Dittenberger, no. 888.
[3] W. R. Smith[2], p. 438.
[4] Servius on Vergil, *Æn.* iv. 518; Festus, p. 191, ed. C. O. Müller, Leipzig, 1839.
[5] Herod. ii. 37; cf. Apul. *Metam.* 2.
[6] Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 59; W. R. Smith[2], p. 438; for other examples see Lobeck, i. 244.
[7] Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 629; Varro, *de Ling. Lat.*, vii. 84.
[8] Monier-Williams, p. 396.
[9] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, v. v. 3 (*SBE* xli. [1894] 128).
[10] *Ib.* v. iv. 3.
[11] *Shâyast-lâ-Shâyast*, iv. 12 (*SBE* v. [1880] 288); *Dînâ-i Maînôg-i Khrat*, ii. 37 (*SBE* xxiv. [1885] 11); cf. *Dînkart*, ix. 1 (*SBE* xxxvii. [1892] 182).
[12] *Shâyast-lâ-Shâyast*, x. 12 (*SBE* v. 320).
[13] *Sad-dar*, xliv. 1 (*SBE* xxiv. 307).

floating loosely.[1] Vergil's account of Dido assisting at the rites ordained by the sorceress before her death is in the same terms —'unum exuta pedem vinclis, in veste recincta.'[2]

The purpose here seems to be, as in parallel instances, to permit the free action of magical influences by loosening all knots (*q.v.*) and bonds which might be conceived to restrain it, though why one foot only should be unshod is not clear. Greek ritual of purification sometimes prescribed that the right foot should be bare and resting on the skin of the sacrificial victim, probably in order that there might be free communication between the suppliant and the sacrifice.[3] A similar custom of having one foot bare existed among the warriors of the Aetolians and the Anagnini.[4]

The latter, as described by Vergil, fought entirely naked, but the right foot was shod in the raw hide of a bull.[5] Thucydides also tells how 200 men of Platæa, having only one foot shod, surprised the Spartans and broke their line.[6] Similarly Perseus, in attacking the Gorgon, wore only one shoe.[7]

Possibly the account given by Herodotus of the occasional appearance of Perseus among the Chemmitæ within his temple near Neapolis, when a sandal worn by him, two cubits in length, was sometimes found there, may have some connexion with this custom. After its discovery all Egypt flourished.[8]

Frazer considers this warrior custom to be a form of consecration or devotion observed by men in great danger, and cites also an instance of the pagan Arabs cursing with one foot bare.[9]

The story of Jason relates that, when he was crossing a swollen stream, one of his sandals stuck in the mire. He proceeded on his way to the house of the usurper Pelias, who recognized that he was the man with one foot shod by whom it was announced that he should die. This is probably a legend arising out of the ritual act in question.

The story of Rhodope, whose shoe, taken by an eagle, was dropped by it in the bosom of Psammetichos, who sought its owner through all Egypt,[10] is a version of the myth of Aphrodite and Hermes, and an early variant of the well-known folk-tale of Cinderella or Aschenputtel, of which there are innumerable examples.[11]

Hermes fell in love with Aphrodite, but to his grief she proved obdurate. Zeus, in pity for Hermes, sent an eagle which took her shoe while she was bathing and brought it to Hermes. Aphrodite sought it, and eventually Hermes won her.[12]

Gruppe connects this story, as well as those of Jason and Perseus, with such rites as have been referred to, and in particular with some mystery-legend and a mystery-ritual in which the sandal is a badge, as it is the token of recognition in the folk-tales. The rite or rites may also explain the numerous representations of Aphrodite or Hermes binding or loosing their sandals, or of Aphrodite chastising Eros with a sandal. Hermes himself might be considered as *μονοκρηπίς* like Jason,[13] and possibly in the story the eagle is the god himself, since Zeus transformed him to that shape, according to one version of the myth of Leda. The rite may also account for such place-names as Sandalion and the like.[14] As a token of recognition sandals, armour, and weapons were placed under a stone by Aigeus where Aithra might show them to her son by him, Theseus, when he was of age.

Sandals were often consecrated both to Aphrodite and to Hermes.[15] In art and myth the sandals of Hermes are winged and 'carry him over sea and the boundless earth, with the blasts of the wind.'[16] Perseus and Pan also had winged sandals. The shoes of swiftness, 'seven-leagued boots' of many folk-tales, transporting the wearer swiftly from one place to another, resemble Hermes' winged sandals. They are magic properties of the gods appropriated by men, or imaginative exaggerations of the primitive sandal protecting the foot of the swift runner. In a Norse tale they are made by Hermodr from the skin of the soles of her feet.[1]

4. Magical rites with shoes.—The supposed dislike of spirits to leather,[2] as well as the magical virtues attributed to the shoe itself, accounts for its use in various magical rites.

It is placed heel upwards on the top of a house in India by the poor to ensure protection; and hailstones are beaten with a shoe by a wizard during a hail-storm to cause it to cease.[3] Again, the origin of throwing a shoe at a wedding for luck may be traced to some idea of scaring off demons who might cause barrenness, or of enhancing fertility.[4] According to a German superstition,[5] shoes placed wrong-wise at the head of the bed prevent the *alp*, or nightmare, from pressing one during the night. The shoes, or one shoe, are often untied at a wedding, with the idea that the unbinding of the knot will counteract evil influences.[6] Other superstitions are of a very varied kind. If the wife puts on her husband's slippers on the wedding-day, she will have easy labour, in Teutonic belief.[7] In Sicily shoes made out of wolf-skin for a child render it lucky and courageous.[8] An ancient Greek method of bringing back a faithless lover was to get a witch to fumigate his sandals with sulphur and to use incantations over them.[9]

The sandal of Perseus was a relic in Egypt and, when found, ensured the prosperity of the land.[10] So the dervishes at Old Cairo preserve a huge shoe as that of their founder.[11] Sandals and shoes of Christian saints have also been reverenced as relics.

5. Symbolism of the shoe.—Among the Hebrews putting off the shoe was a confirmation and symbol of a renunciation or transference of rights. It was removed from a man by the widow of his brother when he refused to take her as wife, as an act of contempt, and his family was known as 'the house of the unsandalled one.'[12] On refusing to redeem land the shoe was removed by the man himself, and apparently the seller of land gave his shoe to the buyer as a symbol of the rights given up by him.[13] In Arab usage a man divorcing his wife said, 'She was my slipper and I cast her off.'[14] If the phrase, 'Over Edom will I cast my shoe,'[15] signifies a symbol of taking possession of the land, this would also be a Hebrew custom, resembling one reported from Abyssinia, and parallel to putting the foot on the neck of a captive, or placing the figure of a captive on the lining of a sandal, as in ancient Egypt, signifying that he was trodden under foot.[16] But the meaning of the phrase, by analogy with 'Moab is my wash-pot,'[17] may rather be that of throwing a shoe to a slave to carry or clean.

6. Shoes of the dead.—As the dead were frequently supposed to take a long and rough journey to the other world, they were often provided with shoes. This is already found in later pre-historic times, and it continued as a general custom in various parts of Europe.[18] It also occurs

[1] Ovid, *Met.* vii. 182.
[2] Verg. *Æn.* iv. 518.
[3] J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 311.
[4] Macrobius, *Satur.* v. xviii. 13 *f.*
[5] *Æn.* vii. 689.
[6] Thuc. iii. 22.
[7] Artemid. *Oneir.* iv. 63.
[8] Herod. ii. 91.
[9] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 312; I. Goldziher, *ZDMG* xlvi. [1892] 5. Is there any connexion between this custom and that of cursing while standing on one foot? (see *ERE* iii. 300[b], 413[a]).
[10] Strabo, xvii. 1; Ælian, *Var. Hist.*, xiii. 32.
[11] J. and W. Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*[9], Berlin, 1870, no. 21; J. Bolte and G. Polivka, *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- und Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm*, Leipzig, 1913, i. 165 ff.; R. Köhler, *Kleinere Schriften*, Weimar, 1898–1900, i. 274; and M. R. Cox, *Cinderella*, London, 1892, give the variants of the story.
[12] Hyginus, *Astronomica*, ii. 16.
[13] Artemid. *loc. cit.*
[14] Gruppe, p. 1332.
[15] *Ib.*
[16] Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 341 *f.*

[1] J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, ii. 871, iv. 1569; MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 221, note 3; J. Arnason, *Icelandic Legends*, tr. G. E. J. Powell and E. Magnússon, London, 1864–66, p. 397.
[2] See artt. CHANGELING, vol. iii. p. 359[b], INCUBUS, vol. vii. p. 202[a]; Crooke, *PR*[2] ii. 34.
[3] Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 80, ii. 34.
[4] Cf. E. S. Hartland, *LP* i. 171.
[5] Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iv. 1795.
[6] T. Pennant, *A Tour in Scotland*, in J. Pinkerton, *A General Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–14, iii. 91; C. Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1884–86, iii. 232.
[7] Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iii. 1175.
[8] Gruppe, p. 805, note 2.
[9] Lucian, *Dial. Meret.* 4. For other superstitions see Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iv. 1805, 1809; R. Hunt, *Popular Romances of the West of England*[3], London, 1881, p. 409; Crooke, *PR*[2] ii. 34. For divination with a shoe see J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 236. For German betrothal-customs with the shoe see Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, i. 214.
[10] Herod. ii. 91.
[11] G. Rawlinson, *Hist. of Herodotus*[3], London, 1875, i. 147.
[12] Dt 25[9].
[13] Ru 4[7]; for Arab usage see refl. in *EBi* iv. 5196.
[14] W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, Cambridge, 1885, p. 269.
[15] Ps 60[8].
[16] Wilkinson, ii. 337.
[17] Ps 60[8].
[18] See *ERE* ii. 19[a], iv. 417[b].

sometimes among savage tribes, among whom generally no shoes are worn.

Some of the tribes of lower California put shoes on the feet of the dead, so that they may be ready for their long journey.[1] In Scandinavian and Teutonic regions such shoes were known as *hek-skó* (Old Norse) or *Todtenschuh*—the latter name surviving as a general one for the funeral-rites long after the custom itself had ceased.[2] In some cases, as in Yorkshire, it was thought that one who gave a pair of new shoes to a poor man during life would meet an old man after death who would present him with the same shoes at the edge of Whinnymuir, the region full of thorns and furze—'ower flinty steeans, thruff monny a thorny brake,' which otherwise the spirit would have to traverse 'wi' shoonless feet.' This belief is illustrated by the 'Lyke-Wake Dirge,' various versions of which are sung in the north of England.[3] Elsewhere—*e.g.*, in Brittany—Death personified is supposed to grease the boots of the man whom he comes to fetch, like a good servant, so that he may travel along Death's high-road.[4] Lucian's story of the ghost of the dead wife who appeared to her husband and complained that one of her slippers had not been burned on the funeral pyre is interesting in this connexion.[5]

7. Concealing the shod or unshod foot.—In China and among the Chuvashes (Turks of the Volga) it is considered indecent to show a foot unshod or without stockings. This idea is connected, in China, with the enforced smallness of the feet, which has probably an association with sexual attraction.[6] Clement of Alexandria recommends the women of his time to wear shoes, as it is not fitting for their feet to be shown naked.[7] In Spain, whence it passed into Italy, it was considered immodest for ladies to show their feet even when shod, and several 16th and 17th cent. writers refer to this—*e.g.*, Brantôme, who maintains that a beautiful foot 'portoit une telle lasciveté en soy,' and Madame d'Aulnoy.[8]

LITERATURE.—There is no special work dealing with this subject. See also art. DRESS. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

SHRINES.—See SAINTS AND MARTYRS.

SHROVE-TIDE, SHROVE TUESDAY.—

I. *SHROVE-TIDE.*—The name Shrove-tide is given to the week before the First Sunday in Lent. Shrove Tuesday is the day before Ash Wednesday, and it gathered up in itself in the later Middle Ages the customs and the practices which formerly characterized the whole week. Shrove-tide was the season of confession, absolution, and reconciliation before the solemnities of Lent and Passion-tide and Easter, a time of purification and of joy.

The name is derived from Anglo-Saxon *scrifan*, 'to shrive.' There is a passage in the *Capitula incerti authoris* printed by Spelman from a Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, MS which illustrates both the practice of Shrove-tide and the origin of the name. The *Capitula* follow upon the Canons of Ælfric, and may belong to the same period, *i.e.* the 10th century. The Anglo-Saxon text is only a paraphrase of the Latin. The Latin text reads:

'Haebdomeda prima ante initium Quadragesimae, confessiones Sacerdotibus dandae sunt, poenitentia accipienda, discordantes reconciliandi, et omnia jurgia sedanda, et dimittere debent debita invicem de cordibus suis, ut liberius dicant, *Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris*: et sic ingredientes in beatae Quadragesimae tempus, mundis et purificatis mentibus ad sanctum Pascha procedant.'

The Anglo-Saxon paraphrase begins thus:

'On thaere nyhstan wucan ær halgan nyht scealge hwa to his scrifte gan, and his dædum ge andettan and his scrift him sceal swa scrifan swa he thonne on his dædum gehyreth.'[1]

The Latin *capitulum* states clearly that confessions are to be made in the week before the *initium Quadragesimæ*. There is a liturgical difference between the *caput jejunii*, the title of Ash Wednesday, and the *initium Quadragesimæ*, the title of the First Sunday in Lent. The original fast of 36 days began on the Monday after the First Sunday in Lent. After the time of Gregory the Great Ash Wednesday became the first of the four supplementary fast-days with the title *caput jejunii*.

F. Cabrol explains the difference:

'Tommasi explique du reste cette apparente contradiction en disant que le carême antique avec ses trente-six jours de jeûne commençait en réalité le lundi de la première semaine; le premier dimanche était, en ce cas, le commencement du carême, d'où la secrète de ce dimanche: *sacrificium quadragesimalis initii solemniter immolamus.*'[2]

The First Sunday in Lent in the *Gelasian Sacramentary* is called 'Dominica in Quadragesima [V æ] Inchoantis initium.' This is preceded by the Shrove-tide prayers: 'Orationes et preces a Quinquagesima usque ad Quadragesimam.' Wednesday has the title, 'In Jejunio. Prima Statione. Feria iv.,' and the prayer, 'Inchoata jejunia, quaesumus, Domine.' There is no reference to Thursday. Friday has the title 'Feria vi. in Quinquagesima,' and the prayer, 'Da, quaesumus, Domine, fidelibus tuis jejuniis paschalibus convenienter aptari.' Saturday has the title 'Feria vii. in Quinquagesima,' with the prayer, 'Observationis hujus annua celebritate laetantes, quaesumus, Domine, ut paschalibus actionibus inhaerentes, plenis ejus effectibus gaudeamus.'[3]

These prayers and titles illustrate the liturgical difficulty involved in the throwing back of the Lenten fast to Ash Wednesday and the breaking up of the week of Quinquagesima. The Shrove-tide customs are a witness to the earlier use, and the *gaudeamus* of the Saturday prayer preserves the note of joy even in the shadow of Lent.

The double tradition of the beginning of Lent is witnessed in the terms 'Carnisprivium Vetus' and 'Carnisprivium Novum,' which are found in documents illustrating the history of Dauphiné at the close of the 13th century.[4]

The terms 'Shrove-tide' and 'Shrove Tuesday' are still in common use. The following note in a curious Cambridge record, *Bedell* (*Matthew*) *Stokys' Book*, written about 1557, gives the name of Shrove Sunday to the First Sunday in Lent. It 'describes the Cambridge Ceremonies in Lent' and illustrates the older tradition when the Shrove-tide customs were not confined to Shrove Tuesday.

'Ashwenssdaye:—First, the Bedels erlye in the mornynge, every one in their severall Coursis, shall toll or cause to be tolled in every Colledge, Howse, Hall or Hostell, where eny determiners be, the bell to gather the Companye together, and so shall brynge them to St. Maries Churche before viii. of the Clocke etc. etc. . . . Item, All the determiners dothe sytte in the New Chappel within the Schooles from i. of the Clocke untyll five, upon the Mondaye, Twesdaye, Wensdaye, and Thursdaye in the weeke before Shrove Sondaye . . . and from three to 4 all they have a Potation of Figgs, Reasons, and Almons, Bonnes and Beer, at the charge of the said determiners.'[5]

The Monday before Ash Wednesday was called Collop Monday or Shrove Monday.[6] And in a Latin and English Vocabulary printed from a

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1 *NR* i. 569.
2 Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ii. 835 f., iv. 1550.
3 Sir W. Scott, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, London, 1839, p. 299 f.; *County Folk-Lore*, ii., *Examples of Printed Folk-Lore concerning the North Riding of Yorkshire, York and the Ainsty*, collected and ed. Mrs. Gutch, do. 1901, p. 224 ff.
4 Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ii. 844.
5 *Philops.* 27.
6 H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib*[8], Leipzig, 1905, i. 178 ff.; O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, do. 1908, pp. 44 f., 621 f.; S. Reinach, 'Pieds pudiques,' *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, Paris, 1905–12, iv. 105 ff. See art. AUSTERITIES, vol. ii. p. 234.
7 Clem. *Pæd.* ii. 12.
8 P. de B. de Brantôme, *Vies des dames galantes*, ed. H. Vigneau, Paris, n.d., 3me discours; Comtesse d'Aulnoy, *Relation du Voyage d'Espagne*, The Hague, 1715, p. 125 f.; Reinach, *loc. cit.*

1 H. Spelman, *Concilia*, London, 1639–64, i. 610 f.
2 *DACL*, *s.v.* 'Caput jejunii.'
3 *The Gelasian Sacramentary*, ed. H. A. Wilson Oxford, 1894, pp. 15–17.
4 Du Cange, *Glossarium*, Paris, 1733, *s.v.*
5 C. Wordsworth, *The Ancient Kalendar of the University of Oxford*, p. 29 f.
6 J. Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, ed. H. Ellis and J. O. Halliwell, i. 62.

Trinity College, Cambridge, MS of the 15th cent. there is the word 'Shrofday':

'Carniprivium . . . shrofday, quia a tunc privamur carnibus.'[1]

The name 'Carniprivium' is given to Quinquagesima Sunday.[2]

The Shrove-tide rhymes recorded by Brand from the neighbourhood of Salisbury show that 'shroving' was as popular a custom in the early part of the year as 'souling' was, and is still, in the Midlands in November.

'Shrove Tide is nigh at hand,
And I am come a shroving;
Pray, Dame, something,
An Apple or a Dumpling,
Or a piece of Truckle Cheese
Of your own making,
Or a piece of Pancake.'[3]

The observation of Shrove-tide has affinities with the Continental carnival.

II. *SHROVE-TIDE REVELS.*—Shrove-tide was a season of revelry and sport in court, college, and country-side.

1. Court.—Fungoso, a court aspirant in Ben Jonson's *Every Man out of his Humour*, refers to those revels in a letter to his father.

'I desire you likewise to be advertised, that this Shrove-tide, contrary to custom, we are always to have revels; which is indeed dancing, and makes an excellent shew in truth.'[3]

In the same play Carlo Buffone, speaking of Macilente, says:

'Ay, this is he; a good tough gentleman: he looks like a shield of brawn at Shrove-tide, out of date, and ready to take his leave.'[4]

This is evidence for the year 1599. There were costly revellings at Hatfield in 1556:

'In Shrovetide, 1556, sir Thomas Pope made for the lady Elizabeth, all at his own costs, a great and rich masking in the great hall at Hatfield, where the pageants were marvellously furnished.'[5]

For 28th Feb. 1587–88 we have the following information:

Francis Bacon 'assisted in getting up the masque which was presented to the Queen by the gentlemen of Gray's Inn.'[6]

These revels were well rooted in the observance of the court. In 1512 there is a notice in the *Percy Household Book*:

'The Clergy and Officers of Lord Percy's Chapel performed a play before his Lordship upon Shrowftewesday at night.'[7]

The ruder sports were also encouraged in still earlier times by the court and the nobles. Among the royal household accounts of Henry VII. there is this entry under date 2nd March, 1492:

'Item to Master Bray for rewards to them that brought Cokkes at Shrovetide, at Westmr. xxs.'[8]

And in a MS Life of Thomas Lord Berkeley (1352–1417), among his recreations, we are told:

'Hee also would to the threshing of the Cocke, pucke with Hens blindfolde and such like.'[9]

2. College and school.—In a British Museum MS entitled *Status Scholæ Etonensis* (1560) it appears that Shrove Tuesday was kept as a holiday. The cook brought in the pancake (*laganum*) and fastened it to a crow. The meaning is obscure.

'Die Martis Carnis-privii luditur ad horam octavam in totum diem: venit Coquus, affigit laganum Cornici, juxta illud pullis Corvorum invocantibus eum, ad ostium Scholae.'[10]

There was also a Shrove Monday custom at Eton, called Bacchus. The upper form boys wrote poems 'either in praise or dispraise' of Bacchus. The poems were fastened to the inner doors of the College.[1] The revels at Merton College, Oxford, are described by Anthony Wood under date 1647–48:

'Shrove-Tuesday, Feb. 15, the fire being made in the common hall before 5 of the clock at night, the fellowes would go to supper before six, and making anend sooner than at other times, they left the hall to the liberties of the undergraduate, but with an admonition from one of the fellowes (who was then principal of the undergraduates and postmasters) that all things should be carried in good order. While they were at supper in the hall, the cook (Will. Noble) was making the lesser of the brass pots ful of cawdle at the freshmen's charge, which after the hall was free from the fellowes was brought up and set before the fire in the said hall. Afterward every freshman, according to seniority, was to pluck off his gowne and band and if possible to make himself look like a scoundrell. This done, they were conducted each after the other to the high table, and there made to stand on a forme placed thereon: from thence they were to speak their speech with an audible voice to the company: which if well done, the person that spake it was to have a cup of cawdle, and no salted drinke: if indifferently some cawdle and some salted drinke; but if dull nothing was given him but salted drinke or salt put in college bere, with tucks to boot. Afterwards when they were to be admitted into the fraternity, the senior cook was to administer to them an oath over an old shoe, part of which runs thus: "Item te jurabis quod penniless bench non visitabis."'

A note adds: 'This was the way and customs that had been used in the college, time out of mind, to initiate the freshmen: but between that time and the restoration of K. Ch. 2 it was disused, and now such a thing is absolutely forgotten.'[2]

W. Huddesford[3] refers to similar customs prevailing in the university about 1772. Thomas Hearne, in his *Reliquiæ*,[4] mentions customs of this kind at Brasenose and Balliol.[5]

The grammar schools were not behind the colleges in their observance of Shrove-tide. The sports were rougher, and were similar to those of the country-side. Stowe, on the authority of W. Fitzstephen, refers to the ancient practice of cock-fighting and playing at the ball or bastion.[6] Sir John Sinclair in his *Statistical Account* produces a witness for Scotland, the minister of the parish of Kirkmichael, Perthshire:

'Foot-Ball is a common amusement with the School-boys, who also preserve the custom of Cock-fighting on Shrove-Tuesday.'[7]

In Lancashire and Cumberland the 'Cock-penny' formed a part of the stipend of grammar school masters. At Lancaster Grammar School and at Burnley, Clitheroe, Whitehaven, and Millom this gratuity was paid by the scholars at Shrove-tide. The Yorkshire rhymes may refer to this custom:

'A nick and a nock,
A hen and a cock,
And a penny for my master.'

In Scotland the schoolmaster claimed the 'fugees,' or runaway cocks.[8]

Joseph Addison, in the year 1684 or 1685, took part in another Shrove-tide custom at Lichfield Grammar School. This was known as 'barring-out' the master. It was a custom practised at Christmas and Shrove-tide, and links the Bacchanalian customs of Shrove-tide with the Saturnalian licence of Christmas.[9]

3. Country-side.—(1) *The Holly-boy and Ivy-girl.*—This custom is one of the most important links in the chain of evidence for the origin of the Shrove-tide revels. It survived in Kent at the close of the 18th century. It is described in *The Gentleman's Magazine* for 1779:

'Being on a visit on Tuesday last [Shrove Tuesday] in a little obscure village in this county, I found an odd kind of sport

[1] Thomas Wright, *Anglo-Saxon and Old English Vocabularies*, ed. R. P. Wülcker, London, 1883, pt. i. col. 571.
[2] Brand, *loc. cit.*
[3] *Plays of Ben Jonson*, 'Every Man's Library,' vol. 489, p. 106.
[4] *Ib.* p. 119.
[5] J. Nichols, *Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth*, London, 1788–1805, ii. 19, quoted by Lucy Aikin, *Memoirs of the Court of Queen Elizabeth*[4], do. 1819.
[6] J. Spedding, *Account of the Life and Times of Bacon*, London, 1878, i. 32 f.
[7] Brand, i. 65.
[8] *Ib.* i. 79.
[9] *Ib.*
[10] *Ib.* i. 83.

[1] Brand, i. 62.
[2] *Life and Times of Anthony à Wood, described by Himself*, Oxford, 1891–1900, i. (Oxford Hist. Soc. Publications, xix.) 138.
[3] *Lives of those Eminent Antiquaries, Leyland, Hearne and Anthony à Wood*, ed. T. Warton and W. Huddesford, 2 vols., Oxford, 1772.
[4] *Reliquiæ Hernianæ*, ed. P. Bliss, 2 vols., Oxford, 1857.
[5] *Life and Times of Wood*, i. 140, n. 8.
[6] J. Stowe, *Survey of London*, ed. J. Strype, London, 1720, i. 247.
[7] *Statistical Account of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1791–95, xv. 521
[8] Brand, i. 70, 72.
[9] *Ib.* pp. 70 f., 441–450.

going forward: the Girls, from eighteen to five or six years old, were assembled in a crowd, and burning an uncouth effigy, which they called an *Holly-Boy*, and which it seems they had stolen from the Boys, who, in another part of the village, were assembled together, and burning what they called an *Ivy-Girl*, which they had stolen from the Girls: all this ceremony was accompanied with loud huzzas, noise, and acclamations. What it all means I cannot tell, although I inquired of several of the oldest people in the place, who could only answer that it had always been a sport at this season of the year.'[1]

There is a reference to a similar custom in Barnaby Googe's translation of Naogeorgus's *Popish Kingdome* (1570):

'Some others make a man all stuft with straw or ragges within,
Apparayled in dublet faire, and hosen passing trim.

They hurle him up into the ayre, nor suffring him to fall,
And this they doe at diuers tymes the citie over all.'[2]

(2) *Cock-fighting.*—This was one of the most widely prevalent sports on Shrove Tuesday. The Cumberland practice is described by W. Hutchinson:

'The party whose Cocks won the most battles was victorious in the Cock-pit; and the prize, a small silver bell, suspended to the button of the victor's hat, and worn for three successive Sundays. After the Cock-fight was ended, the Foot-Ball was thrown down in the Church-yard.'[3]

The monasteries did not favour these sports. Cock-fighting is forbidden in the *Customary of St. Augustine's, Canterbury*:

'Nec interesse luctis, pugnis, vel duellis hominum, animalium vel avium.'[4]

(3) *Throwing at cocks.*—The question is asked in *The British Apollo*: 'How old and from whence is the custom of throwing at Cocks on Shrove Tuesday?'[5] An epigram by Sir Charles Sedley, 'On a Cock at Rochester,' in *The Gentleman's Journal* of Jan. 1692–93 suggests a sacrificial origin, veiled under later lore:

'May'st thou be punish'd for St. Peter's crime,
And on Shrove Tuesday perish in thy prime.'[6]

The custom was retained at Heston in Middlesex on Shrove Tuesday in 1791:

'The owner of the cock trains his bird for some time before Shrove Tuesday, and throws a stick at him himself, in order to prepare him for the fatal day, by accustoming him to watch the threatened danger, and by springing aside avoid the fatal blow. He holds the poor victim on the spot marked out by a cord fixed to his leg, and at the distance of nine or ten yards, so as to be out of the way of the stick himself. Another spot is marked, at the distance of twenty-two yards, for the person who throws to stand upon. He has three *shys*, or throws, for twopence, and wins the cock if he can knock him down and run up and catch him before the bird recovers his legs.'[7]

The word 'cock-shy' is a survival of this brutal sport. In the parish accounts of Pinner in 1622 is the entry: 'Received for Cocks at Shrove-tide, 12s. 0d.' The money collected was applied in aid of the poor rate.[8]

(4) *Thrashing the hen.*—In Robert Baron's *Cyprian Academy*[9] this practice is referred to as a Shrove-tide sport:

'By the Maskins I would give the best Cow in my yard to find out this Raskall. And I would thrash him as I did the Henne last Shrove Tuesday.'

Thomas Tusser, in his *Five Hundreth Pointes of Good Husbandrie* (1573), says:

'At Shroftide to shroving, go thresh the fat Hen,
If blindfold can kill her, then give it thy men.'

Tusser Redivivus has a note explaining these lines:

'The Hen is hung at a fellow's back, who has also some horse-bells about him; the rest of the fellows are blinded, and have boughs in their hands, with which they chase this fellow and his Hen about some large court or small enclosure. The fellow with his Hen and bells shifting as well as he can, they follow the sound, and sometimes hit him and his Hen.'[11]

(5) *Stone-throwing.*—This was a custom in the Scilly Isles. When the cock-shying was ended, boys threw stones against the house-doors. Heath, the authority on whom this rests, says that it was practised also in Cornwall and in Spain.[12] This may be compared with the custom of 'Lent crocking' in Dorset and Wilts.[13]

(6) *Pancakes.*—This remains in most parts of England the only relic of the old Shrove-tide customs. In *Poor Robin's Almanack* (1731) it gave its name to the day:

'St. Taffy is no sooner gone
But *Pancake day* is coming on.'[14]

At Baldock, in Hertfordshire, it was called Doughnut day.[15] *The Gentleman's Magazine* for 1790 refers to the 'pancake bell.'[16] In a tract of 1690 it is said that at York 'all the apprentices, journeymen, and other servants . . . had the liberty to go into the Cathedral, and ring the Pancake-bell.' This bell had originally been rung to call the people to church for the confession of sin.[17] In Scotland, according to Frederick M. Eden, crowdie used to take the place of pancakes.[18] Brand and Ellis give several versions of the pancake rhymes.

(7) *Carting.*—In 1555 'an ill woman who kept the Greyhound in Westminster was carted about the city.' In 1556 'were carted two men and three women.' This seems to have been a recognized punishment for persons of ill-fame. In a comedy, *Tottenham Court*, written by Thomas Nabbes in 1638, we find:

'If I doe, I have lesse mercy than Prentices at Shrove-tide.'[19]

(8) *Football.*—The Derby football play is described in *The Penny Magazine* for 6th April, 1839. A similar Shrove-tide custom was practised in Perthshire:

'Every year on Shrove Tuesday the bachelors and married men drew themselves up at the Cross of Scone, on opposite sides. A ball was then thrown up, and they played from two o'clock till sunset' . . . One goal was the so-called 'dool' on the moor, the other was the river. The game in early times covered the whole town.[20]

(9) *Rope-pulling.*—In 1846 this was an old Shrove-tide custom at Ludlow. The tug-of-war was between the Corve Street Ward and the Broad Street Ward, and lasted from four o'clock till sunset.[21]

III. *FOLK-LORE ANALOGIES.*—The Christmas customs are acknowledged to be survivals in part of the old Saturnalia. The 'servants' holiday' in N. Staffordshire has points of contact with the liberty and licence allowed by masters to their slaves in the midwinter revels. Dekker, in his *Seven Deadly Sins of London* (1606), refers to the same licence at Shrove-tide.

'They presently (like Prentices upon Shrove Tuesday) take the lawe into their owne handes and do what they list.'[22]

In the records of Norwich mention is made of the Shrove-tide revels as the closing of the revels of Christmas:

'John Gladman . . . on Tuesday in the last ende of Crestemesse [1440] viz. *Fastyngonge Tuesday*, made a disport with hys neyghbours, havyng his hors trappyd with tynnsoyle and other nyse disgisy things, corroned as Kyng of Crestemesse, in tokyn that seson should end with the twelve monethes of the yere.'[23]

This name 'Fastyngonge Tuesday' recalls the Scotch 'Fasten's Eve' and the German *Fastnacht*.

1 D. Hilman, *Tusser Redivivus: a Calendar of the Twelve Months*[2], London, 1744, p. 80; Brand, i. 80.
2 Brand, i. 81.
3 R. Chambers, *Book of Days*, i. 239.
4 Brand, i. 81. 5 *Ib.* p. 83.
6 P. 953. 7 Brand, i. 85.
8 *The State of the Poor*, London, 1797, i. 498.
9 Brand, i. 89 f.
10 *Statistical Account of Scotland*, xviii. 88; Brand, i. 91.
11 Brand, i. 92. 12 *Ib.* p. 88.
13 F. Blomefield, *Topographical Hist. of Norfolk*, ed C Parkin London, 1739–75, ii. 111; cf. Brand, i. 68.

The German form dates only from the 18th cent., and is a corruption by assimilation of *Fasenacht, vasenaht, vaschane*, preserved in the form *Fasching* in Bavaria and Austria. It is derived from *fasen, faseln* = 'Possen treiben zu Grunde,' *i.e.* an end of all trifling and farcing.[1]

In Germany the Monday in Shrove-tide is called *Rosenmontag* and *Hirsmontag*, the latter name derived from the revellers masquerading as deer.[2] The Sunday before is called the *Grosser Fastelabend* or *Rinnetag* or *Funkensonntag*. The writer adds:

'Die dort üblichen Lustbarkeiten, Maskeraden, Tänze, Schmausereien und dergl. wurden bald . . . ausgedehnt, schliesslich durch Verbindung mit den üblichen Frühlings-, Neujahrs- und Dezemberfasten noch weiter zurück auf die Zeit von 7 Januar ab oder (z. B. in Venedig) seit dem 26 Dezember, doch so, dass sich das Hauptleben in den letzten Wochen oder Tagen vor dem Aschermittwoch abspielt.'[3]

The Holly-boy and Ivy-girl of Kent are the most important links with the German *Fastnachtsmann*, or *Prinz Karneval*—itself a memory of the Saturnalian king who, after a reign of 30 days, was burnt as a sacrifice to Kronos (Saturn):

'Es wirken aber hier wie anderswo noch ältere Sitten nach; die Fastnachtsbräuche erinnern nicht selten an die an den römischen Saturnalien, den altitalischen noch lange in christlicher Zeit bestehenden Luperkalien und den germanischen Frühlingsfesten üblichen Lustbarkeiten. Wenn z. B. hier und da der Fastnachtsmann oder "Prinz Karneval"—eine Strohpuppe—öffentlich verbrannt, geköpft, oder gesteinigt und am Aschermittwoch begraben wird, . . . so sieht man darin teils die Nachwirkung eines älteren gemein-germanischen Balder-Kultus, teils das Fortleben des Saturnalienkönigs, der 30 Tage lang als Spottkönig herrschte und dann dem Kronos als Opfer dargebracht wurde.'[4]

Zscharnack adds:

'No wonder that the Church protested as much against these revels as against those of the New Year.'

It is to be noted that in Italy Liber, the Latin Dionysus, has a female deity Libera as his associate. The Kentish Holly-boy was accompanied by the Ivy-girl. The Liberalia were held in Rome on 17th March;

'Old women, crowned with ivy, sold cheap cakes (*liba*) of meal, honey, and oil, and burnt them on little pans for the purchasers.'[5]

The English evidence from the Ivy-girl and the pancakes adds support to the suggestion of Zscharnack as to the affinity of the Shrove-tide revels with the earlier cults.

The association of cock-shying with some national event, the feud between the English and the Danes,[6] or the long wars between the English and the French,[7] will not stand the test of the wider study of folk-lore. N. W. Thomas, in his study of the folk-lore of animals, says:

'The cock is one of the most important sacrificial victims. . . . The cock figures in spring ceremonies in Europe. . . . The cock is sometimes used in the expulsion of evils. Modern Jews sacrifice a white cock on the eve of the Day of Atonement. We may probably interpret in the same sense the numerous European customs in which a cock or hen is hunted or beaten.'[8]

Thus the throwing at the cock, the thrashing at the hen, and the punishment of persons of ill-fame seem to be different aspects of the spring rites of purification. The cock was also associated with the Celtic god Sacellus and with the Gaulish Mercury. It was tabu to the ancient Britons. There may thus be a link with the ancient rites of Gaul and Britain.

The presence of conflation of primitive cults in the Shrove-tide revels—the traces of different strands of ritual tradition—does not weaken the argument for affinity. Every custom is important to build up the evidence. It will then be found that folk-lore has the last word in our old English sports and revels.

1 *RGG*, *s.v.* 'Fastnacht.'

2 Cf. the Abbot's-Bromley horn-dance in Staffordshire and a similar horn-dance at Mohaçs on the Danube. They may be traceable to the cult of the Celtic god Cernunnos, of whom there are vestiges from the Danube to Brittany. The legend of Herne the hunter in Windsor Park may perhaps be akin to the same ancient cult.

3 *RGG*, *s.v.* 'Fastnacht,' vol. ii. col. 839. 4 *Ib.*

5 A. O. Seyffert, *Dict. of Class. Ant.*, ed. H. Nettleship and J. E. Sandys, Oxford, 1891, art. 'Dionysos.'

6 Brand, i. 73. 7 *Ib.* p. 78. 8 *ERE* i. 515b.

LITERATURE.—J. Brand, *Observations on Popular Antiquities*, new ed. by H. Ellis, with additions by J. O. Halliwell, 3 vols., London, 1849; W. Hone, *The Every-day Book*, 2 vols., do. 1830; R. Chambers, *The Book of Days*, 2 vols., do. 1863–64; *DACL*, Paris, 1908–11, art. 'Caput jejunii'; Christopher Wordsworth, *The Ancient Kalendar of the University of Oxford* (Oxford Hist. Soc. Publications, xlv.), Oxford, 1904; *RGG*, Tübingen, 1909–13, *s.v.* 'Fastnacht,' vol. ii. col. 838.

THOMAS BARNS.

SIAM.—The kingdom of Siam (Mu'āng Thāi, Sāyām Pra:thet[1]) occupies the centre and includes the greater part of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. It extends from 20° to 6° N. lat., and covers an area of 600,000 sq. kilometres, although it has hardly 7,500,000 inhabitants. It is bounded on the north by the Shan States (under English rule) and the kingdom of Laos (under French rule); on the east by the Mekong river, which is the frontier between it and French Cambodia; on the south by the Gulf of Siam; and on the west by British Malaysia and Burma. Mountainous on its northern and western confines, it is simply the valley of the beautiful Menam river, which waters and fertilizes it.

Politically and historically it is divided into three parts:

(1) Siamese Laos, including the upper valley of the Menam and the right bank of the middle Mekong with the entire basin of its tributary, the Sĕ-Mun, is a mountainous district through which flow rivers unsuitable for navigation owing to rapids, and which is very rich in timber and dye-wood, and sparsely peopled by about 2,000,000 inhabitants, almost all Laotians and closely related ethnographically and linguistically to the Siamese.

(2) The Siamo-Malay peninsula (and islands) between British Burma and Malaysia, which has only 1,106,640 inhabitants, of whom some are Siamese, the majority Malay, and the rest the débris of aboriginal and semi-civilized populations (Semangs, etc.), is a mountainous country, cut up by rugged cliffs, poor in vegetation, but very rich in deposits of tin, argentiferous galena, wolfram, coal, and gold; its chief exports are swallows' nests, the feathers of rare birds, tortoise-shell, fish, elephants, and oxen.

(3) Siam proper, extending from 13° to 18° N. lat., is formed by the middle and lower valley of the Menam. It is in this vast plain, composed of limestone hills, furrowed by navigable rivers, and indented with ports and creeks, that the pure Siamese element is concentrated. Its population totals about 4,000,000. It is the open door for the kingdom of the Thais to the free seas of China and India, affording it communication with the Far East on the one side and Europe on the other. There also is found the capital of Siam, Bangkok, between the two branches of the Menam at its mouth in the Gulf of Siam, and 40 kilometres from the sea. In 1909 Bangkok had 628,675 inhabitants, of whom 200,000 were Chinese, Annamese, and Cham, and 1600 European. The Venice of the Far East, as it has been rather pretentiously called, is built on piles in numerous canals and arms of rivers from 200 to 300 metres broad and 10 to 12 deep, and is dotted with thousands of barges, steam-boats, junks, and sailing-boats—not to mention the cargo-boats and merchant vessels anchored in its port. The general appearance of its bamboo huts forms a contrast with the brilliance of its gilded pagodas and multi-coloured pyramids, but it is gradually being transformed into a modern town: it is entirely lit by electricity and already has 120 kilometres of coach-roads,

1 In this art. Pallegoix's system of transcription for the native names has been followed (except that his *j* has always been rendered *y*); if it is not the best, it is at least the best known.

some of which are very beautiful, and 40 kilometres of electric tramways.

1. **Origin.**—The Siamese are a branch of the ethnic family of the Thais, 'free men,' whose other branches are the Shans, the Laotians, the Lus, the Pou-Thais, and other Thai races in the north of Tongking. They all seem to have come down from the high plateaux of Tibet and Yunnan into the Indo-Chinese plain and towards the sea, following the valley of the rivers Menam, Mekong, and Song-Khoi. Gradually, but irresistibly, they drove the aboriginal races before them and forced towards the coast the other Indo-Chinese races — Annamese, Chams, Cambodians (Khmers), Peguans (Mons), and Burmese. The Siamese branch passed from the upper valley of the Mekong to the middle valley, which it disputed for centuries with the Laotians and the Khmers, then to the entire basin of the Menam, where it became permanently settled—not without mixing with numerous Chinese, Malay, Khmer, Mon, and Burmese elements.

2. **History.**—The early history of Siam is not very well known. According to the annals and chronicles of Siam, it may be divided into two periods. The first, rather legendary, extends from the beginning to the founding of Ayuthia (*c.* 1350). A collection of fables and traditional legends dating back to the 5th cent. B.C. give as the ancestors of the present kings some of the Buddha's first disciples. In this period the names of dynasties and capitals are very variable, facts being constantly mingled with supernatural interventions. Even at this early period the Siamese princes who were vassals of the kingdom of Cambodia were trying to escape from its power, and at one time they were at war, at another in union, with China; their contests with the Laotians were even more lively.

With the foundation of Ayuthia, although the date given by the Siamese annals (A.D. 1350) is now disputed, we come upon more real history. In 1514 Ayuthia was reduced to ashes by a fire which lasted three days. In 1532 conquered Cambodia became tributary, and its capital Lovêk was occupied; but a new and much more dangerous enemy, Pegu, appeared against Siam. In 1543 the king of Pegu laid waste the whole of Siam, besieging Ayuthia in vain. In 1555 he seized the whole of Siam and Ayuthia after nine months of siege, devastating it to such an extent that only 1000 inhabitants remained. But in 1558 the Siamese throne was occupied by a talented young Phra: Nârêt prince, who freed his country from the Peguan yoke, restored Ayuthia, conquered the whole of Laos and Cambodia, and in his turn took possession of Hangsavada, the capital of Pegu. He died in 1593.

His successors became embroiled in intrigues and bloody strifes. In 1656 one of them, Phra: Narai, tried to restore the kingdom with the help of a European prime minister, a clever Greek adventurer Constance Phaulkon (or Falcon). At his instigation Phra: Narai opened his ports to Spanish, Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French merchants, and sent two embassies to Louis XIV. to ask for a commercial treaty and an alliance based on mutual help which would enable him to modernize his subjects by force if not with their consent. A plot of Siamese mandarins, who were anxious about their privileges and jealous of the rights accorded to strangers, ended in the death of the king and the massacre of Constance Falcon.

Intrigue and civil war began once more. The king of Ava, taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded, came with his Burmans, laid waste the whole of Siam, and took Ayuthia, which was burned down, while its vanquished ruler died of hunger and despair in the surrounding woods. A clever usurper, Phaya Tak, rallied the Siamese at Chantabun, delivered Siam, and took his stand in the present capital Bangkok (or Thanaburi). He recaptured Laos and a part of the peninsula of Malacca, and overcame the Burmans on several occasions, but the mandarins became suspicious of his influence and had him assassinated. The ancient dynasty regained power; the king of Vieng Chang (Laos) was beaten and put into an iron cage at Bangkok; the Cochin-Chinese were conquered.

In 1851, when King Mongkut, who had been long confined in a monastery to save his life from the jealousy of a usurper, ascended the throne, he set himself to restore Siam by bold modernization. He learned the European languages, surrounded himself with European counsellors, and, after purifying and reforming his clergy, removed the most notorious abuses of his mandarins; he also tried to enrich his country by increasing its production of rice and by concluding friendly and commercial treaties with the great European Powers. This one-time monk was the real creator of modern Siam. His son, Chulâlongkorn (1868–1910), educated like a European and having travelled extensively in Europe, continued his work. With the help of his younger brother, Prince Damrong, he multiplied schools, benevolent institutions, works of public utility, and modern processes of agriculture and industry. His son Vajirâvudh, who succeeded him in 1910, and has been brought up with equally broad views, is continuing the work of his father and his grandfather in close friendship with the two European Powers established in Indo-China, viz. Britain and France.

3. **Physical features.**—In spite of frequent admixtures with neighbouring peoples, the Siamese race preserves a distinct type. The Siamese is of medium height, and has a supple body, vigorous and well-proportioned. Both sexes are olive-coloured, with narrow upper-foreheads, broad faces with thick lips, and black well-lacquered teeth. Their hands are well-shaped but rather large, and they have long red-coloured nails. Their hair is glossy black, but coarse and not very thick; the men have their heads shaved, except a big tuft on the top, and they always shave their beards. The women also shave their heads except a big tuft which they wear on the top, not so high as that of the men, and which they comb, pomade, and perfume carefully. This method of wearing the hair is still seen, but the Siamese of both sexes now tend to copy the Cambodians and wear their hair cut short. Among the upper classes, in imitation of the Europeans, the men wear their hair quite short, or even have their heads shaved, while the women let their hair grow long and twist it up behind. The children of both sexes still have shaved heads, except for a pretty lock of hair on the top which their parents adorn with small garlands of flowers and large gold or silver pins. This lock of hair is shaved with great ceremony at puberty.

4. **Dress.**—Except in the case of very small children, the Siamese do not allow nakedness. Both men and women wear a *langûti*, or lower garment, arranged in the form of wide breeches, the material of which (cotton, silk, etc.) varies according to means; the breast is covered with a vest with sleeves, or among the women by a scarf worn crosswise over the shoulders. All go barefooted as a rule, except princes and mandarins, who wear embroidered slippers. The custom of wearing European shoes is gradually spreading. People in good circumstances shade themselves from the sun with a parasol; ordinary people content themselves with huge hats of palm-leaves. Both men and women have a passion for jewels.

5. **Character.**—The Siamese character has been variously judged. Pallegoix, who perhaps knew them best because of his long residence in Siam, credits them with a spirit of charity, humanity, and gentleness, not only towards men, but towards animals, and a happy, timid, thoughtless, irresolute, and rather childish disposition; they have a horror of shouting and quarrelling, and are fond of amusement; they are great beggars, but also willingly give to those who ask from them. They have great respect for authority and old age and deep reverence for their kings. As regards the accusations made against them that they are fonder of borrowing than of repaying, that they are humble with the powerful and harsh towards the weak, that they sometimes prove too clever in business, and that they are dishonest and glory in their dishonesty, as is exemplified by the Siamese proverb, 'Trade is the business of the Dutch, arts and industry that of the Chinese, war that of France, and cleverness that of the Siamese,' it is only fair to remark that similar accusations have been made, and not always justly, against many European races; lastly, the worst faults of the Siamese seem to be those of the despotic government under which they are bowed down rather than those of the race itself.

6. **Dwelling-places.**—As a rule the Siamese live in bamboo huts built on piles and covered with a roof of interlaced palm-leaves; they are poor and simple, but often very clean. They are raised about a metre from the ground, with access by a bamboo ladder. The hut itself is divided by bamboo partitions into two or three compartments; and under it are kept the supplies of rice, household utensils, and domestic animals. Merchants prefer to build their huts on a bamboo raft so that they can be removed at pleasure; many of the canal- and river-dwellers have house-boats. The rich build their houses in the Chinese style of wood or brick with pillars of iron-wood and floor and framework of teak; they require two or three houses in order to afford separate accommodation to their family, slaves, and cooks.

Before building a house, the Siamese must first consult the diviner to find out in what direction he must build. He must avoid a place with piles sunk in the earth—the debris of a former building; he must not use pillars of teak, and among the pillars of iron-wood he must avoid those with exudations of resinous oil. The rungs of the ladder, the doors, windows, rooms, partitions must all be of odd number. Every house that violates these rules is unlucky and should be demolished.

The furniture consists of thin mats and cushions for lying on, benches, some boxes, earthenware articles, baskets, hampers, and knives. The rich, however, especially since the modernization of Siam, have carved beds, mattresses of floss silk, armchairs, tables, furniture inlaid with mother-of-pearl, tapestries, curtains, and carpets, costly weapons, as well as vases of valuable workmanship or material, cups of all shapes and materials, sometimes beautiful plate, a great many clocks, musical-boxes, pianos, gramophones, and other inventions of modern genius.

7. **Food.**—The Siamese are as a rule very temperate, like all the natives of the Far East: they live on rice, fresh or dried fish, and fruits; they season their dishes with a sauce or curry made with red allspice. They eat very little meat, but all kinds—poultry, water-birds, stags, buffalo- or ox-flesh dried in the sun, tortoises, frogs, crocodiles, bats, serpent-boas, rats, etc.—and drink pure water or tea, and sometimes arak or rice-brandy.

8. **Arts and trades.**—The Siamese are good cultivators and good sailors in smooth water, but disinclined to coasting either from headland to headland or close to the shore; they also fish and hunt. Intelligent, skilful, and manageable, they would make excellent workmen if their sense of initiative had not been killed by the custom of the court and the mandarins of monopolizing them at a ridiculous price as soon as they possess any manual skill. Some do artistic wood-carving and metal-working; others make barges and canoes; the women weave materials for clothing. During the reigns of the last three kings efforts have been made to develop national industry.

9. **Tobacco and opium.**—The Siamese smoke tobacco, and, in spite of the stern edicts of King Chulâlongkorn, many are still addicted to opium. This the authorities combat very strongly, although they do not always set an example of abstinence.

10. Religion: Buddhism.—The Siamese are one of the most religious races of the religious East. Their religion, like that of Cambodia, is Southern, or orthodox, Buddhism, with Pāli as its sacred language, and called Sinhalese Buddhism. Under this very deep-rooted Buddhism there still remain traces of Brāhmanism and innumerable animistic survivals. Buddhism seems to have been introduced into Cambodia and thence into Siam in A.D. 422 (965 of the Buddhist era). For many years the whole Buddhist theology of Siam was based on the *Trai Phûm*, 'The Three Places,' which is not an original Pāli work, but a compilation in Siamese of works and commentaries on the Buddhist Pāli canon, composed at the request of King Phaya Tāk (1767–80). The *Trai Phûm* is divided into three parts: (1) the first treats of the universe in general and the earth in particular; (2) the second of the heavens and their inhabitants; (3) the third of the hells and their various punishments. Since the theological reform carried out in the 19th cent. under the auspices of King Mongkut the *Trai Phûm* has had very little orthodox value.[1]

The fervour of the Siamese is shown by the multiplicity and richness of their pagodas, the number of their monks, and the esteem in which they are held. The pagodas, especially those of Bangkok, are most impressive with their forests of bell-turrets, above which towers a central pyramid 60 to 80 metres high, their trunks of white elephants at the corners, their coverings of polished tiles, their gilding, and their coloured porcelains. But connoisseurs find in them a too evident intrusion of Chinese statuary and decorative art. They are high colonnaded buildings, with recurved roofs, the walls, painted in fresco on the inside, sheltering great statues of the Buddha as well as *stūpas* of various dimensions. As a rule the pagodas are veritable monastic towns built in the middle of beautiful gardens dotted with ponds; their principal ornament is one or more temples dedicated to the Buddha. The monastic enclosure also contains a funeral-pile for burning the dead, rooms for preaching and for the temporary accommodation of pilgrims and strangers, out-houses, and hundreds of little wooden and brick houses where the *bonzes* of the pagoda live.

The monks, usually called by the earliest European travellers *talapoins* (*tala:pāt*, the fan which they always carry) or *bonzes*, and by the Siamese *phra:*, 'great,' *chão thāi*, 'lords,' *phīkhu* (Pāli *bhikkhu*), *phīsu* (Skr. *bhikṣu*), 'mendicants,' are more than 100,000 in number, attached to about 20,000 monasteries throughout the whole of Siam. The rule to which they conform is, as in Cambodia, the 227 articles of the *Patimôk* (Pāli *Patimokkha*) and the commentaries of the *Phra:Vināi* (Skr. *Vinaya*). At their head is the *sângkhārāt* (Skr. (*saṅgharāja*), nominated by the king, who is the 'protector and preserver of Buddhism' in the kingdom. The *saṅgharāja* has jurisdiction over all the monks in Siam, but interferes as little as possible in their affairs; it is he who decides, in agreement with the king, in all religious controversies and litigations; and he presides at the assembly of the chiefs of pagodas when the king convokes it to discuss theological reforms. Under the *saṅgharāja*, but independent of him, are the abbots (*somdet chao*) of the royal monasteries, also nominated by the king. Each abbot governs his monastery assisted by a vicar (*chao khûn pālat*) and a chief secretary (*chao khûn sāmu*). Under them are the *bonzes* who have been ordained, and under them, again, the *nen* or *sama:nén* (Pāli *samaṇera*), novices under twenty years of age, who wear the yellow robe, but are not yet obliged to observe more than the eight Buddhist commandments.[1]

The pagoda in Siam is not only the sanctuary of prayer; it is also the centre of culture. This culture is essentially Indian, as, until the arrival of the first Portuguese navigators, Siam was completely within India's sphere of influence; it received its first civilization from the Brāhmans of India, and then from merchants from Malabar and Coromandel, and, along with Cambodia and Laos, it remained permeated with this Indian civilization until the east coast of Indo-China accepted Chinese civilization. There are still extant noteworthy archæological witnesses of this primitive Hinduization of Siam in the monuments of its former capitals, Savankhalôk, Sukhôkai, and Lopburī. The former and present religion of Siam (Brāhmanism and Buddhism), its sacred language (Pāli), its civil institutions, its writing, its arts, and its literature come from India. In the 13th cent. the Thai alphabet, the prototype of the present alphabet, was invented by the help of Brāhman *gurus* on the model of the Indian writing already in use in the country. All this civilization has been preserved and diffused up to the present day by the monks, who are as a rule the educators of the people, as the Christian monks were in Europe in the Middle Ages. The *vāt* (monastery) is still the only school in isolated villages, although in the large towns modern schools have been established, with special teachers to initiate the Siamese into Western culture. In spite of the welcome given to this culture, every boy, from the humblest subject to the king, still continues to go to the pagoda at the age of puberty to receive a Buddhist initiation, with religious and domestic ceremonies which recall the first Christian communion. The Buddhist monastery, on the whole, has always maintained in Siam, even during the most troubled times, the inclination for spiritual life and culture. It is naturally more concerned with the boys than with the girls, although in 1767 there were convents of *bhikkhunī* ('nuns') flourishing in Ayuthia, in which a great many women and girls received an elementary education; at the present day wealthy families, especially those of court officials, give a very good education to their daughters, some of whom are fairly elegant Siamese writers.

11. Reforms of Buddhism.—The establishment of Christian missions in Siam introduced Western culture, which was received, especially at court, with genuine enthusiasm, particularly the astronomy and mathematics taught by the Jesuits. So also the preaching of Christianity, as well as that of Islām, always received complete tolerance, except when it was believed to be a cloak for dangerous political designs. The embassy of Louis XIV. was so well received that for a moment that monarch thought that the whole of Siam would be converted to Christianity; young Siamese were sent to the Louis le Grand College, and one of them there sustained a thesis in Latin at the Sorbonne. In 1767 the destruction of Ayuthia and the dynasty reigning there aroused a violent reaction; Siam became a hater of foreigners. But with the establishment of the present dynasty in 1787, with Bangkok as its capital, the former Siamese civilization revived, and the kingdom was opened to the influence of Western civilization. The great author of this double evolution—at one and the same time traditional and modernist—was King Mongkut. But this former *bhikkhu* remained at the same time a proud nationalist and a fervent Buddhist, who longed for a revival of Buddhism

[1] For the facts concerning Siamese Buddhism cf. the artt. CEYLON BUDDHISM and CAMBODIA.

[1] See art. MONASTICISM (Buddhist).

in Siam. He reformed the monastic discipline in an orthodox sense, grounding himself on the original sources; and he organized the teaching of Pāli in the monasteries with examinations in sacred hermeneutics and theology. He attempted more—the modernization of Buddhism—in concert with his minister the Phra: Klan Chao Phaya Thipakon. In 1869 the latter published a work entitled *Kichanukit*, 'Book explaining Things clearly,' in which he posits four truths (pain, the origin of pain, destruction of this origin, and the way leading to this destruction), which are in germ all the teaching of the Buddha. He denies the authenticity of the *Jātakas* and the five stories of the *suttas* forming the *Suttapiṭaka*. For him there emanate from the Buddha only the Four Noble Truths (enumerated above) and the *Paramattha, i.e.* the substance of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, or superior doctrine.

This doctrine as well as a royal plan of reform based thereon caused uneasiness among the traditionalists of Siamese monasticism, but, though not in reality very workable, at least it had the excellent effect of forcing the Siamese theologians to learn Pāli scientifically, to get closer to the texts of the Buddhist canon, and to renew their theology.

King Chulālongkorn continued the work of his father by printing and editing at his own expense the whole of the Pāli *Tipiṭaka*,[1] copies of which were lavishly distributed among the scholars and scientific establishments of Europe and America. Under the direction of his brother, Prince Damrong, the Vajirañana National Library regularly publishes Pāli texts, works on Buddhism, and researches on the historical and religious past of Siam after the best European methods.

Thus Siam is taking possession of its glorious past at the very time when it is turning towards a brilliant future in conjunction with the great European nations, enlightened by their civilization, but anxious to keep politically independent of them.

12. **Brāhmanism.** — Although Brāhmanism has not played such an important part in the history of Siam as in that of Cambodia, it has had great influence. An inscription engraved on an ancient statue of Śiva tells of a curious attempt to restore this ancient religion in Siam: in 1510 the king of Kāmpheng-Phĕt, Dharmāśoka, in spite of his ultra-Buddhist name, substituted the worship of Śiva for that of Buddha in his states. Probably this religious transformation in a vassal principality of Ayuthia was specially designed to make final a declaration of independence of the rebel vassal prince. But it is not to this factitious action that the important remains of Brāhmanism on Siamese soil are due, whose living witnesses are the *phrams*, or Brāhmans of the king of Siam, similar to the *bakus* of the king of Cambodia. They are said to be descended from the persecuted Brāhmans of India who fled first to Pegu and then to Siam during the course of the 5th and 6th centuries of our era. They are believed to preserve their primitive type; and there are only about 80 of them living near their special temple, the Vat Bŏt Phram, or 'pagoda of the sanctuary of the Brāhmans'—a collection of three miserable brick buildings in an enclosure. The main ornament of this temple consists of colossal statues of the Hindu *trimūrti*; their chief is called in Siamese Phra: Mâhâràxàkhruvitthi (Skr. Mahārājaguruviddhi). They marry, and wear their long hair tied behind; they worship the Brāhmanic deities, and once a year they ceremonially parade through the town with them amid the ignorant respect of the people. Their rôle in the royal palace is exactly the same as in Cambodia, but not so influential. They compose in Sanskrit the official names of the princes, mandarins, towns, temples, palaces, and elephants. In the great ceremonies of the palace, clad in white robes, with long conical caps on their heads, and carrying their Brāhmanic statues in their hands, they occupy as honourable a position as the *bonzes*; they also preside at coronations; and they consecrate the water which is drunk every year as a sign of fidelity by the great mandarins and high officials. Certain of them, called *hôn*, *hôra* (Skr. *horā*; cf. Gr. ὥρα), are the astrologers and diviners of the king, charged with astronomical and astrological computations, announcing rains or drought, and lucky or unlucky hours and days. Besides the *phrams* we must also mention the *àcàr* (Skr. *ācārya*), the lay teachers of the pagodas.

13. **Popular religion.** — Although the Siamese are excellent Buddhists, they preserve a mass of survivals of ancient animism. To whatever class of society they belong, all believe in good and bad spirits (*phí*); and the spirits in whom the people are most interested are those which do not seem to have any connexion with Buddhist mythology. The malignant or formidable *phís* are much more numerous and more venerated than the good spirits. Among the latter the best known are the *phí nang mâi*, female tree-spirits who dwell in certain beautiful forest-trees. It is said that those good fairies often fill the alms-bowls of monks on pilgrimage when they lay them at the foot of the trees which the spirits inhabit.

Evil spirits are divided into three classes: (1) the 'autogenous' *phí*, those which are not derived from any human being, although some human beings, especially sorcerers, may succeed in keeping them in their power; (2) the *phís* which are the spirits of the dead (spectres, ghosts, demons, etc.); (3) the *phís* belonging to other worlds, which cannot be seen on earth, but which for many people exist as really as if they were seen and heard.

The most common and the most dangerous of all are the second class—the *phí lok*, or spirits of the dead. Having escaped from the body at death, they inhabit abandoned houses and ruins, always on the outlook for living beings to harm or frighten. They can make themselves visible or tangible. They nearly always take up their position at the foot of a person's bed, trying to pull him from it, seizing him by the big toes, etc. One of them, whom many people claim to have seen, is the *phí pret*, from 10 to 16 metres in height, who is the spirit of a malefactor. Having a mouth as small as the eye of a needle, he is constantly in a state of inanition, and looks like a skeleton. He appears at night and, instead of speaking, gives a low whistle. The *phí tai hông* are the spirits of persons who died a sudden or violent death or of still-born children. They are often confused with the *phí tai ha*, who are rather the ghosts of people who have died from cholera or a sudden illness. They are all horrible and malignant, and yet the people do not always avoid the places where they are said to be, because the possession of a *phí phrâi* (the 'essence' of a *phí tai hông*) is a formidable power. To get this a sorcerer goes by night to the place haunted by the *phí tai hông*, conjures him up by incantations, and immediately puts a lighted torch under his chin, so that the heat may cause the grease to flow from his chin into a vessel. This grease, mixed with perfumed oils, forms a magic pomade, by means of which the sorcerer can make people go mad or become amorous, ruin them, or bring dangerous illness upon them. According to the Siamese, a man possessed with a *phí phrâi* suddenly becomes mad, shouts, gesticulates, and tries to break everything round about him; ordinary means being powerless to calm him, they send for the sorcerer to exorcize him; the sorcerer takes a nail and applies the point of it to the big toe of the victim, who begins to shout, although the point has only pressed against the skin; the sorcerer presses with the nail a little more to make the place untenable by the *phí phrâi*; then he drives his nail into a piece of wood, so that the *phí phrâi* feels itself pierced through or is forced to enter the nail; the patient begins to howl, then after a quarter of an hour he quietens down, and is normal and cured. The *phí kŭman* (Skr. *kumara*) is the spirit of a fœtus or of a child dying at birth; the greatest precautions must be taken to bury this abortion to prevent the spirit from returning to haunt the body of the mother and cause her death. The little corpse is folded in two, enclosed in a large pot for cooking rice, covered with paper and leaves on which have been written charms (*mantras*) in Pāli, and buried in the wood; or it may,

[1] 39 vols., Bangkok, 1893.

after being enclosed in the vessel, be given to a sorcerer, who, armed with a sword, carries it to the bank of a river, loads it with imprecations, and then, after breaking it in two with a stroke of the sword, abandons it to the current. The *phí kra:sû* selects as its home the body of certain women (sorceresses), which it leaves at night to look for food, eating the very stones. According to some, it is inoffensive; according to others, it is very dangerous, devouring embryos in the womb. Some claim that these *phís* are the spirits of women who have died in the jungle and come back to haunt the place. The *phí ka:hâng*, which appears in the form of a man with the wings and tail of a bird, is also an evil spirit. So also is the *phí pong khang*, a kind of vampire like a black monkey, which dwells in the jungle and sucks the blood from the big toes of sleeping people. The *phí kaong koi* does the same; so that any one who wishes to sleep in the jungle is recommended to keep hold of his feet. These spirits may be forced to obey certain clever sorcerers, who send them to torment their enemies. The *phí pâ*, special invisible demons of the jungle, cause fever or dysentery in those who rest there during the night. The *phí khâmôt*, a kind of will o' the wisp, in the form of a red star seen in desert places at night, causes mirages and makes people fall into a hole which they take for a house; it also loves to deceive boatmen with its false light and wreck them. The *phí âm*, the night-mare ghost, sits on the chests of sleepers, especially travellers in the *salas*,[1] and makes them utter inarticulate cries. There are also several wandering spirits, *chão phí, thepharâk* (Skr. *devarakṣa*), for whom the people erect small brick and wooden buildings, called *śan chão*, 'house of the master.' People living near a *śan chão*, both men and women, are often possessed by the *phís* who have chosen to dwell in them, and they deliver oracles, cure illnesses, etc.

The *kûn* (Skr. *guṇa*) is a sort of possession compelling its victim to throw away outside a piece of meat or skin, which forces itself into the body of some person, and harms him if he is not freed from it by means of incantations. Both the bewitched person (*tuk kûn*) and the bewitcher, moreover, may find themselves in a very bad state if they do not paralyze the malignant effect by periodical and regular incantations.

A certain spirit, the *thân vêt suvân*, is regarded as the chief of all; he resembles a *yâk* (Skr. *yakṣa*), or fierce giant, inhabits the sky, is armed with a heavy iron club, and is believed to send smallpox to children.

Among the 'autogenous' *phís* we may mention the *phí ru'en*, the guardian angel or spirit of the house. There is one for each house, and it is sometimes heard whispering to itself; it may be seen in the shape of a man; a small building is dedicated to it in every house.

The water-spirits (*phí nâm*) are also very much respected. Small rafts are frequently seen, bearing figurines representing a family with a man, woman, children, offerings of betel, rice, and flowers, dotted with little tapers, floating on the surface of the rivers; this is a tribute of the faithful to the water-spirits. During serious epidemics it is to the spirits of the cross-roads that offerings are dedicated. Of course in Siam, as in Cambodia, a whole series of spirits of a purely Buddhist character are worshipped—the *pisat* (Skr. *piśacha*), the *pret* (Skr. *preta*), the *yâk* (Skr. *yakṣa*), the *raxsi* (Skr. *rakṣasa*), the *khrût* (Skr. *garuḍa*), and the *nâk* (Skr. *naga*). It is evident also that, with some differences in names, the system of superstitious beliefs is identical in the two countries.

14. Amulets.—Rich and poor wear amulets: these are sometimes *phâ pra:chiet*, or bands of cloth which they roll round the head and neck, sometimes necklaces made of seven amber or gold beads, sometimes *ka:krût*, or small gold or silver plates engraved with diagrams or sacred formulas and worn on consecrated cords (this is in fact the only clothing of very young children), sometimes circles of thin artistically woven bamboo thongs. All these objects are intended to ward off illnesses and all kinds of witchcraft; and there are also *kayâ sith* (Skr. *kāya+siddhi*?), amulets of invisibility, and *ka:phan*, talismans of invulnerability. The women also wear across their shoulders necklaces soaked in lustral water by the *bonzes*; among the poorer classes strings of consecrated cotton thread are substituted.

15. Sorcerers.—Sorcerers (*môdu*), sorceresses (*thao*), and diviners (*mothai*) are consulted in all the important actions of life. They are believed to be able to command certain spirits, to send them into the bodies of human beings, or to chase them away. The spirit by their enchantments hides itself in a buffalo-skin reduced to the size of a pea, which the enemy is made to swallow; soon, under the effect of the spirit's power, the body of the bewitched man expands, swells, and bursts, unless another sorcerer counteracts the witchcraft.

The sorcerers practise spells by means of tiny clay figurines (*pha:yon*) representing the person whom they wish to harm; they stick a pin or a nail through the heart or the head and then bury them. A person can thus either free the victim from an illness or give him an illness from which he will die in a very short time. These sorcerers are also skilled in making love-philtres (*sâne, ya phêt*). It is held that they often make alliance with thieves, facilitating burglaries by causing the whole family to sleep soundly by means of a spell. Most of the formulas used by the sorcerers are in distorted Pāli and are often incomprehensible even to the person who utters them.

16. Medicine.—Siamese medicine originated in India, and tradition says that it was introduced by Khomarabhacca, who lived in the time of Buddha. He wrote medical treatises which were regarded as sacred and to-day are translated into Siamese in the pagodas under the name of *Rôkha:nithan* (Skr. *Roghānidāna*). Being essentially Indian, this science is philosophical and theoretical. The human body is supposed to be composed of four elements (wind, water, fire, earth), and health depends upon the equilibrium or non-equilibrium of these elements in the body. Nowhere in these books do we find systematic descriptions of diseases; there is no real knowledge of anatomy, physiology, or surgery, which is in the hands of timid bone-setters, with dressings of coconut-oil and cotton. Midwifery is not quite so rudimentary; but the barbarous and unhygienic custom of keeping a fire burning near the lying-in woman persists in Siam, as in Burma, Cambodia, Annam, and the whole of Indo-China. Except in the case of women of high rank, with whom everything is done in the European fashion, every pregnant Siamese woman is laid on a small bed near a fire in a dark room with no outlet for the smoke; she remains there thirty days for the first child, twenty-five for the second, ten for the third, and five for the others. The women are keenest to maintain this cruel custom, thinking that it improves the beautiful pale yellow colour of their skin.

Knowing their superstitious disposition, we are not surprised that the Siamese attribute the non-equilibrium of the four elements and hence their illnesses to spirits, and consult the sorcerer rather than the doctor; besides, the sorcerer is often the ordinary doctor. They also believe that illnesses are the consequences of deeds, either in this life or in a previous one, and that the best of remedies is to do good works (*thâm bûn*, Skr. *puṇya*). In all serious illnesses two tapers are offered to the god of medicine.

The Siamese also practise Chinese medicine. The Chinese system consists in taking the pulse and using bundles of medicinal plants; the Siamese system makes drugs of powders and pills of flowers, roots, and medicinal woods dissolved in lukewarm water. The most extraordinary substances, like those to be found in ancient pharmacopœias, abound in Siamese medicine.

In a word, Siamese medicaments, whether of mineral, vegetable, or animal origin, aim at adding to or taking away from the constitutive elements what they lack or what they have in excess. In a single prescription, therefore, the Siamese doctor may use more than a hundred substances all mixed together.

The doctors (*mô*) are divided into *mô luang*, or royal physicians, and *mô râtsâdon* (Skr. *rāja+dāna*?), or people's physicians. The royal doctors (physicians and surgeons), with a chief at their head, are divided into squads, who in turn remain in the palace and follow the king and court. They all receive a salary from the king, and their office passes to their children. Their knowledge must

[1] Shelters at the entrances to villages for the use of strangers and travellers.

have been very much enriched by the European scientific information which the Wang Lang Medical College (*văng lăng* = 'palace') provided at Bangkok for students. The doctors of the people, who are numerous and specialized, and often take up their art without the slightest medical preparation, include the *mó nŭet*, or masseurs, and the *mó phí*, or exorcists.

17. **Superstitious beliefs.**—(*a*) *General.*—The superstitions of the Siamese are as numerous as those of the Cambodians (which they resemble in the most curious way).

One of their chief preoccupations is to make themselves invulnerable: they claim that a ball of solidified mercury—probably an amalgam of lead or tin—carried on the person protects against all weapon-wounds; princes and nobles always carry this in their girdles; eaglewood beads are also considered a good preservative.

Rice has a lucky character and plays an important part in all domestic and official ceremonies. It is the symbol of fecundity in the marriage rites, and of happiness in others. The Siamese bestow on the rice-goddess, a second Ceres, worship based on the belief that she presides at the sprouting of this cereal in the fields; the children are taught to reverence her before meals, and in many families they even murmur a prayer in her honour before eating.

Agriculture has always been an object of great reverence, and gives rise to the rite (as in China) of ceremonially tracing a furrow at the beginning of the agricultural year (*rèk na*). Formerly it was the king himself who performed this rite; to-day it is the minister of agriculture. It takes place at the beginning of May—the period fixed for the cultivation of rice throughout the whole kingdom. Harvest takes place without ceremony, but it is closed by a sacrifice in which as an offering to the deities very well-filled ears of rice are burned. With the rice-ceremonies we may connect the burlesque festival of the *ôkya khăo*, 'king of the rice,' which also takes place in May–June. While the real king remains within his palace, a mock king usurps his prerogatives for three days amid joy and feasting. The subjects of the new king scatter themselves over the port and the town, laying violent hands on the Chinese junks and ships that happen to be there, entering houses and bazaars, and taking possession of all that they find unless the owners make haste to buy everything back from them. But—most interesting of all—this rice-king goes into a field in the middle of the town and traces a furrow with a gilded plough. Above this field there has been erected a high swing; the minister of agriculture, who accompanies the ephemeral sovereign, takes his stand on the swing, amid the silence of the crowd, and balances himself in it in order to invoke celestial blessings on the field and all the crops of the year.[1] The rice-king mounts it in his turn and balances on it amid the laughter, shouting, and tom-tom beating of the people. The 'king' also leans against a tree-trunk, standing on his left foot and holding his right foot up as high as his left knee. Then a cow is brought, before which are spread rice, potatoes, beans, etc.; the food towards which it first turns will be scarcest and most expensive during the year.

Certain trees are worshipped on account of their antiquity or the Buddhist memories which they recall—*e.g.*, the *phô*-(= Skr. *bodhi*)tree (*Ficus religiosa*)—or because they are regarded as the dwelling-place of a powerful *phí*.

To the Buddhist beliefs must be attributed the pity that all the Siamese have for animals and the horror that they feel at their slaughter even by the laity; the rich buy barges full of fish at certain times in order to throw them back into the water, or cages full of captive birds which they set at liberty in the precincts of a pagoda. From a similar motive every eighth and fifteenth day of the month hunting and fishing are strictly forbidden, and on those days nobody would dream of selling, buying, or eating flesh.

(*b*) *White elephants.*—The best known of the Siamese superstitions connected with animals is the veneration of white elephants (*xang phw'ek*). It still seems entirely Buddhist, recalling the white elephant in which the Buddha became incarnate. Monkeys and 'white' sparrows (*i.e.* albinos) are also treated with respect, but not to such a degree as the white elephant, the possession of which is a promise of happiness for the king and the whole kingdom. During the 16th and 17th centuries the kings of Siam, Cambodia, Pegu, and Laos waged unending wars with each other for the possession of white elephants.

When a white elephant is discovered in the kingdom, the person who captures it is exempted by the king from royal corvées until the third generation, and receives a number of gold pieces; then a deputation from the court along with musicians goes with ceremony to fetch the majestic luck-bringer to Bangkok, on a raft garlanded with flowers, where it is fed with cakes and sugar-canes and receives from all sides so much respect that European travellers thought at one time that the Siamese worshipped the white elephant. Its arrival in the capital is the sign for great festivities. The Brāhmans bathe it with lustral water and choose the pompous Sanskrit name by which it will henceforth be called, for, on entering the royal stable it also receives the title of 'great mandarin.' Its covers are of velvet; it eats and drinks from a gold or silver basin fruits and choice herbs; its teeth are hooped with gold, and it often wears a precious diadem; a whole suite of slaves and followers bustle round it, and, when it takes a bath, it is shaded under a sumptuous red and gold parasol. Its slightest ailments are tended by the royal physicians; its death puts the whole court and kingdom into mourning. Servants suspected of having been careless with it are mercilessly put to death. The figure of the white elephant adorns the Siamese flag at the present day.

The tiger, which is very much dreaded by the Siamese because of its power and its ferocity, is always addressed with respectful fear, but is put to death whenever possible. An enormous fresh-water lizard (*Monitor elegans*) is believed to bring misfortune to any one who meets or touches it.

(*c*) *Portraits.*—The Siamese are afraid to see a painting or a photograph of themselves; they think that it may be made use of in black magic. It is most probably this superstition, which is almost universal in the Far East, that is responsible for the non-existence of coins bearing the representation of the sovereign in Brāhmanic India, thus depriving us of valuable historical evidence. King Mongkuṭ has done much to modify this prejudice against portraits: he has been photographed on several occasions with the dignitaries of his court, and he has had coins struck with a representation of himself. It is only fair to mention that in 1686 the Siamese who were sent as ambassadors to the court of Louis XIV. were not afraid to allow their portraits to be painted, for the picture of the whole embassy is still to be seen at Versailles; but these men—their voyage itself proves it—were exceptional.

(*d*) *Treaties.*—When a treaty is signed between the king of Siam and another party, the latter must immediately take charge of the copy of the treaty signed by the king without letting it remain in any intermediary dwelling-place for fear of bringing misfortune to the place.

18. **Human sacrifices.**—In Siam, as in Cambodia and Burma, tradition claims that the foundation of a new town always required a human sacrifice: when the walls were almost completed,—just when the gate was being put into position—it is said, the voluntary or involuntary sacrifice of one or even of three victims had to be obtained. As voluntary victims were usually not to be found, a great mandarin accompanied by guards used to post himself near the gate repeating his future name in a loud voice; if a passer-by, thinking that he was being summoned, turned his head in their direction, he was regarded as designed by fate, and he was seized and taken away. After a short retreat and a sumptuous banquet the victim or victims thus obtained were solemnly taken to the gate and buried alive under a foundation beam.

19. **Festivals.**—See art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Siamese).

20. **Organization of family life.**—(1) *Relations of the sexes.*—Marriage in Siam takes place early, usually at 15 years of age for girls and 17 for boys. The law allows polygamy, and the rich take full advantage of it; following the king's example, they have regular *harīms*; but the poor are almost always monogamous. Moreover, only one of the numerous wives of a Siamese holds the rank of legitimate spouse, the one who was first wedded according to the solemn betrothal (*khan māk*), and brought a dowry instead of being bought. Even if others are afterwards wedded with similar ceremonies—which is very rare—they are, as com-

[1] This swing-rite seems to signify, as in India, the alternation of the seasons.

pared with the first wife (*miâ luâng*, 'chief wife'), only 'little wives.' As a rule it is the chief wife who chooses the wives of the second rank; the husband always asks her advice and her approval on this point, and she treats them as young sisters or as docile servants; even the favourite takes care not to go against the traditional dignity of her who is the only 'mistress of the house.' Further, only the chief wife and her children can inherit from the husband. It is therefore the position of the woman rather than that of the man that determines the legal status of the children.

(2) *Betrothal.*—Marriages are often arranged by the parents, but often also the young man makes his choice and then speaks to his parents. If his choice is approved, his parents request two trustworthy friends to sound the girl's parents. Though they are well received, it does not follow that they at once obtain a decisive answer; it is proper for the parents of the girl to ask leave to consult her, to reflect, not to appear in too great haste; it is only at the third of the requests, repeated at regular intervals, that they decide to agree. Then the conditions are discussed: the future husband must give a sum of money which his future parents-in-law will either keep for themselves, if they are poor, or give to the girl as a dowry to help her when she begins housekeeping. He must also present to his fiancée jewels according to his wealth, and sometimes also a house or a barge. When all this is settled, the betrothal (*khan mâk*)—always very solemn—takes place; the young man, accompanied by his friends, all dressed in their finest clothes, enters a barge, decorated with flags, to convey to his fiancée's house appropriate gifts, such as betel, areca, and rice-cakes; on his arrival he greets all his future family, the dowry is counted, and the wedding-day fixed.

(3) *Marriage.*—This is a purely domestic ceremony; the State never interferes with it, and religion only occasionally by prayers and aspersions of lustral water on the young couple by the *bonzes* if they have been invited. The marriage is primarily a kind of 'wedding-party,' at which the parents and friends assemble at the house of the girl's parents to eat, drink, and be merry for one or two days according to the wealth of the couple. During a certain time, from one to three months, the young couple as a rule live near the girl's parents in a cottage which the man had to build for the purpose before the marriage. As the Siamese law gives parents absolute control over their children, and a greedy father might often take advantage of this to sell his daughter, under the pretext of marriage, to a man whom she hated, there is a custom to counterbalance this; when a pair of lovers cannot obtain their parents' consent, they elope, and go and live together some distance away; their union being thus affirmed, they return, preceded by two trustworthy friends to intercede in their favour, and ask their parents' forgiveness. The young man then presents his parents-in-law with the usual gifts and the marriage is concluded. If the parents persist in refusing, the young people repair to the judges, who generally arrange things in their favour. Marriage is forbidden between near relatives except in the case of kings, who are allowed to wed their half-sisters to maintain the purity of the royal line.

Although in Siam the wife never goes out with her husband, she is quite free to go and come indoors and out, is seen at the theatre, carries on business if need be, and is almost always consulted by her husband in all important undertakings. Legally the husband has the right to sell a wife whom he has bought; he cannot sell the chief wife, who brought him a dowry, except when the woman, having consented to the contracting of the debt, has thus become surety for it; but both cases are very uncommon.

(4) *Divorce.*—Divorce (*yâ*) exists, but is seldom practised. It cannot take place until after an attempt at reconciliation before the seniors. The guilty husband must sign a written agreement to alter his conduct; if he does not improve, divorce is granted. In cases of adultery (much rarer than in Laos) the man may send his wife away after giving her a letter of divorce (*nang-sŭ'yâ*) with his seal upon it. Divorce almost always takes place by mutual consent; the woman takes back her dowry; the common property and the children are divided—unless the children are grown up and show a preference for father or mother. When there are no children, the man returns to his parents.

(5) *Birth.*—The birth of a child is accompanied by various superstitious rites. Whenever it is born, it is washed, its arm is bound with bands of consecrated cotton, its horoscope is taken, and the name given is always an ugly one so as not to arouse the jealousy of the evil spirits; in the event of illness the name is changed in order to baffle the *phí* who is angry; the child is always breast-fed; every month its head is shaved; its body is washed daily, and is left naked except for one or two gold or silver necklaces, with small metal plates bearing mysterious characters and serving as amulets; girls also wear another gold or silver, or sometimes copper, plate, shaped like a heart and hung on a chain or string round the waist. At the age of four or five years a little tuft of hair is allowed to grow, which in the case of both sexes is shaved at the age of puberty in a great ceremony which is both religious and domestic.

(6) *Shaving of the fore-lock.*—After the diviner has fixed the most favourable day and hour for the ceremony of shaving the fore-lock (*kón chuk*), the parents send cakes and flowers to all relatives and friends to invite them to the festival. A gunshot or petard-reports open the ceremony. The *bonzes* come and recite prayers on the head of the child, who is decked with all the jewels procurable; he is sprinkled with lustral water, then one of his near relatives shaves his fore-lock, while hired musicians play their most lively tunes. All the guests congratulate the newly-tonsured boy on his entrance into the world of young men, and place money for him in a plate; this is put aside to buy jewels for the boy's fiancée, unless the parents are very poor, when they use it themselves. Then, for a day or more, they eat, drink, smoke, play, and attend cock-fights or theatrical shows in honour of the new young man or woman.

At the tonsure of a royal prince (Pâli *cûlâ-kantana mangala*, 'festival of the shaving of the fore-lock') all Bangkok goes on holiday. On the appointed day the prince, dressed in a red *langûti* covered with jewels, and surrounded by armed soldiers and a long procession of children of his own age of all nationalities, wearing their national costume and each carrying a lotus-flower in his hand, goes in a gilded palanquin to the king's apartments. He prostrates himself before his father, who raises him up, and leads him by the hand to prostrate himself before the ashes of his ancestors in the temple of the palace. For three days in succession the same ceremonies are repeated; on the fourth day, in front of the ancestral tombs, the Brâhmans sprinkle him with lustral water, and divide his fore-lock into three locks (in allusion to the Hindu *trimûrti*); the king cuts the locks, and almost immediately the Brâhmans shave the boy's head. At the last stroke of the razor two Brâhmans sound the conch. Then the prince, accompanied by the king, goes in procession to a gilded pavilion on the top of an artificial mountain of pyramid shape, which symbolizes Mount Kailâsa, the famous peak of the Himâlayas whither the god Śiva repaired at the shaving of the fore-lock of his son, Ganeśa. In this pavilion, in the presence of the royal family and all the high court officials, the prince purifies himself in a bath which seems to represent the Ganges; then he is sprinkled by the king and the highest persons in the assembly on the head, shoulders, and the whole body with five ewers of lustral water (in allusion to the five great rivers that issue from the Himâlayas). The musicians at the foot of the mountain play a triumphal march; a Brâhman wipes the prince's face, and a crown of pure white cotton is placed on his head. Everybody descends, and the religious ceremony is over. The secular festivals now begin, and last for several days. The whole ceremony of shaving the top-knot is a Brâhmanical survival in a population for centuries Buddhist, which Buddhism not only has tolerated, but has made an effort to preserve. On the day after the shaving of the top-knot the young people usually enter the pagoda as novices, tradition requiring that all, even the kings, should have worn

the yellow robe for a time. Although King Mongkut spent years in the monastery, his son, King Chulâlongkorn, imbued with Western ideas, would not stay more than three days, and would not have his eyebrows and his head completely shaved—which scandalized the most pious of his subjects.

Girls, after the shaving of their top-knot, return until marriage to the shelter of their parents' homes.

(7) *Parents and children.*—The relations between parents and children in Siam are as a rule marked on the one side by affectionate care and on the other by profound respect and deference. Infanticide is almost unknown, and the idea of parricide never enters their minds. Of course the law gives parents complete power over their offspring; although a man cannot sell his chief wife as a slave to pay his debts, unless she was aware of the contracting of these debts and had agreed to it, he can at any time sell his daughter as a slave temporarily or permanently to settle any kind of debt; this happens most frequently in the case of gambling debts.

(8) *Disposal of the dead.*—The most general method of disposal of the dead in Siam is cremation. When a Siamese is so ill that he cannot swallow rice, he is regarded as dying, and monks are summoned to his bedside to sprinkle him with lustral water, and to prepare him for death by the reading of sacred texts on the vanity of human things. His friends shout in his ears, '*Arahang! arahang!*', 'The saint! the just!' (Pâli *arahaṃ*, 'the saint,' 'he who has obtained lasting happiness'), in order to procure for him a better future lot. At his last breath his family and friends weep and mourn aloud for half an hour; then the corpse is bathed, and a *tical* (piece of money) is put into the mouth; the body is wrapped in a piece of white cloth and put into a coffin, covered with gilt paper and bits of glass, and dotted with little tapers. After two days it is taken down into the street by an opening at the side of the house—not by the door—and they carry it round the house running; the dead man has now become a dreaded spirit; it is their aim to make him forget the road from his house in order that he may not return to torment the living. Then the coffin is placed on a catafalque, and to the sound of plaintive flutes it is conveyed, amidst the relatives and friends in pure white mourning dress and with shaved heads, by barge or by land, to the funeral pile of the pagoda where it is to be burned. There, after renewed prayers, the person whose duty it is to burn the corpse washes its face with coconut-water and then places it on the pile, where it is consumed, while all present mourn. The few bones that are left after cremation are put into an urn, which is placed in the house, near the little altar of the household gods. The funeral ends with a banquet and entertainments of all kinds, including even theatrical performances. Among the rich these festivals may last for three days; many poor people ruin themselves in order to do things well on such occasions.

The funeral of a prince or a king requires no less than ten or twelve months' preparation; it costs enormous sums and gives occasion for rejoicings which the people long remember. The corpse is slowly dried by injections of mercury and placed in a golden urn; a huge pavilion of teak-wood is erected, on which the urn is to be placed and which symbolizes Mount Meru; its pillars, framework, and roof are covered with gold and silver leaves and inlaid with glass-work. Under the roof of the central pavilion there are other pavilions or kiosks for the king, princes, monks, high officials, and eminent strangers invited to the ceremony. The king's one is very large and contains reception-rooms and special apartments—even a bathroom. Under a special verandah are the valuable gifts which the king presents to the monks or to the other persons invited—sometimes including European agricultural machinery of the most up-to-date kind.

The cremation begins in the interior of the palace by a solemn procession of the relics of the Buddha and the ashes of the royal ancestors, to which strangers are not admitted. The relics of the Buddha are then enthroned on an altar situated above and in front of the remains that are awaiting cremation; the ashes of the royal ancestors are placed in the royal pavilion. Then the monks recite the whole day sacred texts in Pâli, holding the silver cord by means of which they communicate with the urn containing the mortal remains. The people outside share in the festival, receiving gratuitous refreshment and entertainment.

On the following day the monks again recite Pâli texts, while holding the silver cord; outside the people are being entertained to scenes from the *Râmâyaṇa*, Chinese shadow-plays (*nang*), marionettes (*hùn*), and Peguan dances; but they also attend sermons preached by the monks, before scrambling for the lemons containing pieces of silver which the king throws to the crowd—one of the great attractions of the ceremony.

Next day, to the sound of guns and plaintive music, the mortal remains leave the pagoda, followed by a procession of great magnificence. They are carried three times round the pyramid and laid on the gilded throne or altar in the central pavilion; four groups of monks recite texts from the *Abhidharma*; outside the entertainments continue for four nights and four days.

At the end of the fifth day the gilded altars are removed from the throne of the central pavilion, or *phra:man*, and the provisional altars which are to be burned are substituted; on these are laid the bodies in sandalwood caskets amid sweet-scented flowers. The king sets fire to the pile for his near relatives by means of a fire kept perpetually burning in the pagoda. Then all the great personages throw sweet-scented wood and gilt-paper ornaments into the pile. Outside the games continue.

Next day the ashes are collected and in procession are thrown into the river from the top of a pagoda. The bones which have not been entirely consumed are placed inside a golden urn and returned to the pyramid on the altar which was set up for the purpose.

On the following day the relics of the Buddha, the remains of the royal ancestors, and the debris of the new cremation are again taken in procession along the road to the palace and the pagodas—their fixed dwelling-place.

For the last twenty years or so, after funerals, when they appear traditionally in white, with shaved heads, the princes have adopted the custom of wearing black mourning-clothes, like Europeans.

There is another method of disposing of the dead which is sometimes required by the most fervent Buddhists, viz. the partial offering of their bodies to vultures. If it is arms or legs that are to be offered, the part is, in the case of a prince, cut up into small pieces, put on a golden plate, and presented thus in the Vat Sakêt of Bangkok to the swarms of vultures which fly incessantly round this sacred charnel-house.

21. Political and civil organization. — (1) *King.*—Siam is governed by an absolute king, supreme judge and legislator, 'owner of the earth and its inhabitants,' whose despotism is moderated only by the mildness of Buddhist beliefs, secular traditions, and popular revolts. This king is called the *phra:*, 'the august,' 'the divine,' 'the sacred'; his subjects, whatever their rank, approach him on their knees and elbows and speak without daring to raise their eyes. The crown is hereditary; nevertheless within the space of 450 years, thanks to popular revolutions and court intrigues, Siam has been governed by four different dynasties. The order of succession is badly regulated; in theory the crown comes to the eldest son of the queen or the first wife; in reality the king appoints his heir; if he fails to do so, the great mandarins and ministers choose a king from the royal family.

(2) *Second king; royal family.*—Next to the king comes the second king, corresponding to the *uparâja* or the *obbarac* of Cambodia; he is a brother of the king, and has insignia, several attributes of royalty, special revenues, a house, and a court of his own. In time of war he used to be made generalissimo; this led certain European travellers to call him the 'war-king.' His authority is very slight, and even the officials of his palace are nominated by the real king. In reality the second king is the first and most respected of the twelve *krom*, or princes of high blood, brothers of the king, who surround the sovereign. Beneath them are ranged 200 or 300 other members of the royal family, with high titles, low revenue, and no authority whatever. At the fifth generation the descendants of royal race return to the common mass of subjects.

(3) *Mandarins.*—Nobility is not hereditary in Siam, so that the king can choose his mandarins or ministers. In former days their rank was indicated by the shape of their betel-box, the shape and material of the gold or silver crowns encircling their ceremonial *mokot* (Skr. *mukuṭa*), a sort of astrologer's peaked cap of white cloth, the arrangement of their *balon* (a highly ornamented shore-boat), the adornment of their swords, and the number of slaves who followed them; and they formed six classes. At the present day they are headed by the two *somdet chao phra:ya*—three words meaning 'lord,' 'king,' 'prince'—or great ministers, the one generalissimo (the *chakkra*), and the other admiralissimo (the *kra:lahôm*). Under them come five secondary ministers, *chao ph(r)a:ya*, who govern the palace, and look after the sacred and royal storehouses (*phra:khlâng*), agriculture (*phŏlläthèp*, Skr. *bāladeva*), law-suits, and the Peguans and other Asiatics not belonging to Siam. These ministers, assisted by more than 20 *pha:ya* or *phya*, are placed at the head of the important services of the capital. The governors of provinces are lower still, with the generic title of *chao mu'âng*, 'lords of the country,' and with great powers. They are both prefects and high judges, treasurers and controllers of taxes. They are nominated and dismissed at will by the king. All those officials are obliged to drink the water of allegiance twice a year. Great oppressors of the people, they are restrained only by the fear of royal punishment.

(4) *Justice.*—As in Cambodia, justice is slow and costly, although, according to the code, all cases ought to be settled in three days. At the foot of the scale justice is administered by the village-chiefs (*kăm năn*), then by the governor of the province, to whom one may appeal from them. From him one may then go to Bangkok to the *lakhonban* (Skr. *nagarapāla*), presided over by the minister of justice. A special tribunal deals with European cases.

(5) *Codes of laws.*—Since the time of King Phra: Nărèt the Siamese codes have been collected into four volumes. This compilation, which is strikingly similar to the Cambodian one, is divided into three parts: (*a*) *Phra:tămra*, a list of officials, their prerogatives and duties; (*b*) *Phra:thămnun*, a collection of ancient Siamese institutions; and (*c*) *Phra:ràxă kămnot*, 'Book of Royal Ordinances,' the laws promulgated or revised under Phra: Nărèt. Divided into *lakkhăna*, or sections, they treat of theft, slaves, marriage, contracts and debts, trials and disputes, and inheritances. In all these laws, which are wise and well suited to the customs of the country, there are few specially Hindu traits.

A methodical modernized revision, in the light of European and Neo-Japanese codes, has been made of the *corpus* of Siamese laws under the excellent supervision of King Chulālongkorn; he himself has written the preface. The work is in course of publication, and European translations of it are beginning to be produced.

(6) *Ordeals.*—Trial by ordeal is still adopted in some cases—*e.g.*, trial by clay.

In order to discover a thief, a sorcerer asks two *ticals* (about two francs) from the person who has been robbed. He lights a candle and places one of the coins at either side; then he mutters a magical formula, and, taking a bar of clay, raises it several times above his head, reciting formulas. He then measures it with his little finger and breaks it into pieces a little over three centimetres long; he gives one piece to each of the suspected persons and orders them to chew it and then spit. The one who cannot do so is declared guilty.

There are also ordeals by water, boiling oil, melted tin, fire, etc.

(7) *Penalties.*—There is a great variety of penalties, including, besides imprisonment,—for life or for a time—public exhibitions, ignominious parades, corporal punishment (flagellation, mutilation, etc.), and death by beheading or by drowning. Old authorities tell that a popular punishment was 'frying' the culprits in a huge copper filled with coconut-oil. The death penalty cannot be pronounced except after royal approval. Crimes of *lèse-majesté* and *lèse-religion* call forth the direst punishments.

(8) *Slavery and statute labour.*—In former times the slave was a slave by birth; now he becomes a slave by voluntary contract, by sale (of a daughter by her parents), or because of insolvency, conviction, or legal confiscation. Since 1890 children born in slavery become exempt from law on their twenty-first birthday. All free healthy men subjected to the 'royal service' are liable to statute labour. On his accession every sovereign orders all adult males to be tatued on the wrist with a special sign. At the age of seventeen they are registered. They owe three months per annum of statute labour for the execution and repair of public works, but this must never occupy more than one month per quarter, so as not to hinder their agricultural operations. They may redeem themselves by means of a payment of 50 francs per annum; they have much to put up with from the bad faith and the greed of the royal officials. The hereditary serfs are undoubtedly the descendants of ancient criminals; the crown reserves them for its service. They have one month of work, during which they are fed, one month's rest, and so on. Often they can buy back their service for a certain sum. Their person is inviolable, and therefore their insolence is often great; they can run into debt and become the slaves of their creditors. The Asiatic 'slaves'—Peguans, Annamese, Cambodians, Chams, Laotians, and descendants of former prisoners of war—owe three months of military service in the year, and never leave the kingdom. Others are simply paid in money or in kind. The Chinese, duly inscribed in a special list and undergoing certain civil formalities, are subject to only one tax, the payment of which is certified by a wax seal applied to a string round their wrists.

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ANTOINE CABATON.

SIBERIA, SIBIRIAKS, SIBERIANS.—I. *SIBERIA.*—1. Origin of the name.—The name Siberia is usually considered to be derived from one of two sources: either from the Russian term for 'north,' Sievier, Sivir, Sibir, or from Sybir-Isker, the name of the chief town of the Tatar dominion which the Russians found in Siberia at

the time of her conquest. But as a matter of fact the first hypothesis seems superficial, since the early Russians knew Siberia under the name not of North but of Yugra. By this term must be understood the land which in the 9th and 10th centuries stretched from the river Vychegda in the west to the Upper Irtish in the east. In the 15th cent. the geographical boundaries of Yugra changed; it was confined to the eastern side of the Ural, between the rivers Sygva, Konda, and Lower Ob (*i.e.* the lands north of 58° N. lat.). It is only after the 15th cent. that the Russian chronicles begin to abandon the name Yugra for that of 'Siberian lands.' Meanwhile the name Sybir as capital of the Tatar khanate appears on old maps of 1367 (unknown origin) and 1459 (Fra. Mauro); and under the last Tatar khan, Kuchum, in the 16th cent., the name was also used for the whole khanate. When, in 1583, Isker or Sybir was taken by the Cossacks of Yermak, the Russians adopted the name Sybir for the whole of the conquered territory, including Yugra. A new derivation of the word Siberia has been suggested by E. Blochet. He considers that the people known in the ancient Chinese annals as the Jwen-Jwen were the same as the people called Ib-Ib, Ibim, Ibil, Ibir, and that the last word is identical with Sybir.[1]

2. Geographical position.—By the name Siberia is understood the country between the Arctic shore and the Central Asiatic mountains and steppes from north to south, and the Ural Mountains and the Pacific Ocean from west to east. Under the administrative division of the Russian Government up to 1917 it denoted a much smaller territory, viz. the governments of Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, Yakutsk, and Trans-Baikal. All the lands east of these were called the 'Far East Country.' From a geographical and ethical point of view, however, this division is artificial, and we shall here take Siberia to include the Far East country, *i.e.* as being composed of the governments of Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, Yakutsk, Trans-Baikal, Amur, the sea-coast, and the island of Sakhalin. The Caspian-Aral steppe country, with Turkestan and Transcaspia, forms under this division Russian Central Asia.

3. History.—The material relating to the earliest history of man in Siberia and the adjacent countries is only beginning to be unearthed. Whether palæolithic man existed there is still unproved, though the Russian archæologist Savyenkoff declares the stone implements found by him along the Middle Yenisei to be of palæolithic types.[2]

The earliest epoch that is fairly well defined is that of neolithic kitchen-middens and pictographic writings on the cliffs, which are probably of the same date. These are met with chiefly in S.W. Siberia, between the rivers Ishim, Tobol, Yenisei, Abakan, and Kemchik.

The bronze age remains discovered in the Minusinsk country in S.W. Siberia and the Altai come next in antiquity. Besides bronze implements, the graves of this period contain implements of copper and gold and burial masks of gypsum.

While the neolithic remnants can be associated with the people whom one can call the Palæo-Siberians, who are even now living to a large extent in a neolithic state of culture, it is very doubtful whether they had anything to do with the highly developed culture of the bronze age. It is more probable that Central Asiatic influences are responsible for it, either 'Aryan' or 'Turanian' or both.

Following on the bronze age we find remnants of the iron age spread over a much wider area: in fact all S. and W. Siberia is rich in iron implements and weapons, and also in memorial stones with Turkic-Uigur inscriptions. These can be ascribed without hesitation to the Neo-Siberians of Turkic (Turanian) affinities.[3] One of these Turkic tribes, the Yakut, are even now in the stage of iron culture, owing to their isolation since they migrated to the north-east.[4] It is difficult to ascertain what was the distribution of the Palæo-Siberians at the time of the Minusinsk bronze culture, but it is fairly certain that it was the iron age people who were responsible for the forced migration of the Palæo-Siberians to the north-east; some of the tribes to whom the introduction of iron has been ascribed still survive in S. Siberia and Central Asia. These are the Kirghiz called by the ancient Chinese 'Khakas.'

Politically, S. Siberia was from time immemorial directly or indirectly subject to China, till in the 7th cent. A.D. the Turkic khans became strong enough to free themselves from Chinese supremacy and to deprive the Palæo-Siberians in the north of their freedom. In the north-west Siberia had been in the power of the Yugra and the Samoyed and then under the domination of Turks, and in the south and east under Turks, Chinese, and Mongols when the Russians appeared there as conquerors in the 16th century. Moreover, the peaceful migration of the Finnic and Great Russian tribes to W. Siberia, as far as the Ob, had been in progress since the 10th and 11th centuries. This natural colonization was stopped for the time being when in the 13th cent. Russia was over-run by the Turkic Tatars; but soon after the fall of the Golden Horde the Russian attitude changed again from defensive to offensive. In the 15th cent. the Yugra lands were subdued by Moscow, and in the 16th cent. W. Siberia as far as the Ob. Between 1613 and 1648 the Russians moved from the Ob to the Pacific. This conquest was not effected by the sweeping advance of an imperial army like that of Alexander the Great or Jenghiz Khan, but was the result of successful raids by small bands of Cossacks, which were the more effective since the aboriginal tribes, with the exception of the Turkic khanate of Siberia and the Kirghiz and Kaizak states, had no strong State organization and unity. Thus all opposition came from the Neo-Siberians of the steppe country and W. Siberia. The Samoyed, Tungus, Yakut, Buriat, and Palæo-Siberians could offer hardly any resistance to the invasion. It was not the efforts of the Cossacks and the regular army, however, that won Siberia for Russia, but the unceasing and steady stream of emigrants from the Volga to the Ob and the Yenisei. This voluntary migration never reached as far as the Pacific, and that is why the Russian domination of the Pacific was due to strategical and political methods rather than to colonization.

Though the first Russian reached Amur in the 17th cent. (Okhotsk was founded in 1647), it was not till the time of the governor Muravieff-Amurski, in the middle of the 19th cent., that the Far East was conquered from both a strategic and a diplomatic point of view. Forcible colonization followed, but even after railways were constructed the Sibiriak and Russian workmen could not nearly hold their own in numbers against the overwhelming preponderance of yellow labourers.

4. Exploration.—The information about Siberia found in Chinese historians is still very little known and needs much interpretation; these historians are concerned chiefly with E. Siberia. Again, mediæval travellers like Marco Polo knew of Siberia only by hearsay. The first modern traveller who explored Siberia was Herberstein in the 16th cent. and then Messerschmidt (1719–27), who included in his party the Swede von Strahlenberg. The MSS of Messerschmidt have never been printed or fully used. Next come Dutch, English, and Danish travellers, whose explorations were confined to the sea-route between Asia and Europe, and Asia and America. In fact, from the time of the Novgorod Republic the northern sea-route from the West to Siberia was a matter of constant experiment. This route was established in the 16th cent. by the Muscovites, the Dutch, and the English. For a short period all colonization followed this route, and an international trade-station was established along the river Taz, east of the Bay of Ob, early in the 17th century.

The first study of the customs and religion of the aborigines we owe to Gmelin, Steller, Pallas, and Georgi, all of whom visited Siberia in the 18th century. But it is the travellers of the 19th cent., especially Middendorff, Radloff, Adrianoff, Schrenk, Czekanowski, Klements, Bogoras, Jochelson, Sternberg, and others, who have collected information which enables us to understand the present religious systems of Siberia.

5. Classification of inhabitants.—From the historical survey of Siberia it follows that we can find there representatives of all the peoples who at various times dominated the whole or part of this vast country, viz. the Palæo-Siberians, the Neo-Siberians, the Chinese, the Russians, and the Japanese.

(*a*) By the name *Palæo-Siberians* we mean the most ancient stock of Siberian aborigines who were pushed to the north and north-east by the

[1] 'Les Noms des Turcs dans l'Avesta,' *JRAS*, 1915, pp. 305–308.

[2] I. T. Savyenkoff, *The Palæolithic Epoch in the Neighbourhood of Krasnoyarsk* (in Russian), Krasnoyarsk, 1892.

[3] M. A. Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia*, Oxford, 1918, pp. 97–108.

[4] See art. YAKUT.

Neo-Siberians advancing from Central Asia, especially the Finnic and Turkic peoples.[1] The Palæo-Siberians are also known as Northern and North-Eastern Palæo-Asiats.[2] Neither of these terms is intended to indicate absolute community of race or linguistic identity between the various peoples who formed the original population of the country. We find among them both the hairy Ainu and the beardless Chukchi; and we include here also the Eskimo, who in physical type, language, and culture form a wedge between the Palæo-Siberians living in Asia and their kinsmen in America who are known as the north-western Amerinds. Hence this grouping of remnants of different races is merely justified historically and geographically, though to a large extent culturally as well.

This group contains the following tribes:
(1) The Eskimo, on the Asiatic shore of Bering Strait, (numbering 1415 in 1911); also the whole of Arctic America from Alaska to Greenland. Their total number is 25,000.
(2) The Aleut, in the Aleutian Islands and Komandor Islands (1232).
(3) The Gilyak, near the mouth of the Amur and in the northern part of the island of Sakhalin (4298).
(4) The Ainu, in the island of Yezo and the southern part of Sakhalin (1457).
(5) The Kamchadal (Itelmen), southern part of Kamchatka (2182).
(6) The Chukchi, on the Chukchi Peninsula, between the Anadyr river and the Arctic Ocean (12,968).
(7) The Koryak, south of the Chukchi, between the Anadyr river and the central part of Kamchatka (7943).
(8) The Chuvantzy, on the Upper and Middle Anadyr (569).
(9) The Yukagir, between the Lower Yana and the Lower Kolyma rivers (about 723).
(10) The Ostyak of the Yenisei, the most westerly of all, on the Lower Yenisei, between the Lower and the Middle or Stony Tunguska (1021).[3]

To this day 92 per cent of the Palæo-Siberians know no language but their own, and only 40 per cent of them are nominal Christians. They are said to be dying out only in cases where they have given up their native industries and taken up the life of a Russian colonist.

(*b*) The term *Neo-Siberians* will cover the peoples who, from a linguistic standpoint, made up Castrén's[4] 'Ural-Altaic people'; but the people speaking Ural-Altaic languages are not limited to Siberia. By Neo-Siberian, therefore, we mean those of the Ural-Altaic peoples who originally came from Central Asia or E. Europe, but have been in Siberia for at least the last 1000 years, and are now sufficiently differentiated from the kindred peoples of the region of their origin to deserve a generic name. The Neo-Siberians include:

(1) The Finnic tribes of Siberia, viz. the Vogul between the Ural Mountains, Berezoff, and Tobolsk, and the Ugrian Ostyak between the mouth of the Ob, the Yenisei, and Tomsk.
(2) The Samoyedic tribes, living along the Arctic shore between Cheskaya Bay in European Russia and the Khatonga river in Siberia, extending southward to the Abakan steppes.
(3) The Turkic tribes, inhabiting S.W. Siberia, and represented by one of their nations, the Yakut, in E. Siberia.
(4) The Mongolic tribes, including the Western Mongols or the Kalmuk, the Eastern Mongols or the Khalka, and the Northern Mongols or the Buriat of Baikal.
(5) The Tungusic tribes, scattered all over E. Siberia as far west as the river Taz and as far south as the southern frontiers of Manchuria.[5]

The native population, both Palæo- and Neo-Siberian, formed in 1911 only a small percentage of the total number of inhabitants—in Siberia proper 10·9 per cent, and in the Far East country 20·6 per cent (in the Aral-Caspian steppe country 60 per cent). This means that the number of Palæo-Siberians in 1911 was 32,000; of Neo-Siberians, 949,000 in Siberia and the Far East (and 2,200,000 in the steppe country); while the European or semi-European colonists number some 8,000,000 in Siberia and in the Far East (and 1,500,000 in the steppe country). Thus, while in the steppe country the native element predominates, in Siberia it forms a quite unimportant percentage from an economic point of view. The strength of the Russian colonists lies in their birth-rate. Statistics of 1910 show that for each 100 Russian colonist women 11 children were born, while in the Turkic tribe of Yakut, which is supposed to be the most prolific of the native tribes, the number of children for the same number of women was only 9 and among the Kirghiz only 6.

(*c*) The name *Sibiriak* is used for those Siberian colonists who have lived in the country for at least one or two generations, and have won the name of 'old settlers,' 'Starojily' (*stary*, 'old,' *jil*, 'lived'). The new emigrants are called 'Novosiely' (*novy*, 'new,' *sielo*, 'village'). Several E. European nations have a share in the composition of the Sibiriak nation. The largest infusion is of Great Russian blood, and then Little Russian or Ukrainian, but it also includes Finns, Poles, White Russians, various Caucasian natives, and many Neo-Siberian peoples, especially those of Turkish blood.

Generally speaking, the ethnical classification corresponds to the distribution of the chief religious creeds. The Palæo-Siberians are in the main shamanists, and have only begun to be converted to the Russian Orthodox Church on the borders of their territory.

The Neo-Siberians are Muhammadans in W. Siberia, Lamaists in E. Siberia, shamanists in inaccessible parts of the country, and Russian Orthodox only where they are fused with the Sibiriaks. The farther south we go into Central Asia, the more general becomes the Muhammadan religion. The Sibiriaks are followers of various Christian Churches. Christianity in Siberia is represented chiefly by the Russian Orthodox Church (about 8,000,000 members in 1911); then by various Russian schismatic sects numbering at least 350,000; the third place is occupied by the Roman Catholic Church (about 90,000 in 1911).

These statistics, however, must be taken with some reserve. They are based on the general census of 1897 and on the additional census of the local statistical committees. Since the political purpose of this work was to show the success of the Russian Orthodox Church and to depreciate all other Christian Churches as well as the schismatics from Orthodoxy, it may be taken as certain that the number of the schismatics is about ten times greater than it appears. Moreover, to belong officially to the Russian Orthodox Church in Siberia in many cases means merely to combine the superstitious beliefs of shamanism with some of the ritual of the Russian Orthodox Church.

II. *THE SIBIRIAKS.*—While emigration from Russia to Siberia since the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway has followed a definite plan, and was, in a way, compulsory, the same cannot be said of the early emigration. Thus, inquiring into the origin of 776 districts of the Yeniseisk government, we find that 674 of them were started by free emigrants and only 102 arose as the result of the old Russian Government order—*i.e.* were composed of political and criminal exiles and those Russian peasants who were brought by the Government Immigration Committee. The first category is called 'Po-volye' ('of free will'); the second category consists of those who came 'Po-nyevolye' ('not of free will').

[1] M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, Oxford, 1914, p. 15 *f.*
[2] L. von Schrenck, *The Natives of the Amur Country* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1883, pp. 255–257; see also Germ. tr., *Die Völker des Amur-Landes*, St. Petersburg, 1891.
[3] Cf. artt. AINUS, ALEUTS, ESKIMOS, GILYAKS, OSTYAKS.
[4] M. A. Castrén, *Reiseberichte und Briefe aus den Jahren 1845–49*, St. Petersburg, 1856.
[5] See artt. BURIATS, FINNS (Ancient), FINNO-UGRIANS, IMAGES AND IDOLS (Lapps and Samoyeds), KOREA, MONGOLS, OSTYAKS, PASTORAL PEOPLES, SAMOYED, TUNGUS, TURKS, and YAKUT.

1. **Colonization.**—The earliest colonists are to be found in W. Siberia. We can trace a remarkable regularity in the free and undirected colonization of the pre-railway period. The inhabitants of the steppes of S. Russia moved to the steppe regions of Siberia, while the people from the forest region settled in the *taiga* (dense forest). The government of Tomsk has received immigrants chiefly from the governments of Kursk, Voronej, Tamboff, Chernigoff, and Poltava. The government of Tobolsk has been peopled chiefly by the natives of the governments of Vitebsk, Mogileff, Chernigoff, Orel, and Poltava. Again, the steppe country is almost entirely populated by the immigrants from the southern or steppe provinces of European Russia, the governments of Poltava, Tavris, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Thus it may be seen that Siberia, especially W. Siberia, has been peopled by the Great Russians no less than by the Little Russians or Ukrainians. The Far East contains but few old settlers, with the exception of the Siberian Cossacks; the Russian element there consists chiefly of peasants brought straight from Russia in the middle of the 19th cent., called, in contradistinction to the Starojily and Novosiely, by the name of 'Starosiely.'

Of all the inhabitants of Siberia the least susceptible to assimilation are perhaps the Cossack communities. Their origin is different from that of the European Cossacks, who were once in the 15th and 16th centuries national units. The Siberian Cossacks were formed as voluntary regiments composed of the most adventurous elements of the Russian State, and were used for the purpose of conquering Asiatic lands, safeguarding the frontiers, or keeping watch over the people exiled to Siberia. They are more devoted to the Orthodox Church, except those who belong to the Muhammadan creed, than the Sibiriaks.

The Siberian Cossacks met the European Cossacks when the latter were sent as political exiles after each of their national risings, and through this contact the Siberian Cossacks adopted some of the national traditions and the schismatic spirit of the European Cossacks. Up till 1917 the social position of the Siberian Cossacks was better than that of either the colonists or the natives, since they were richly endowed with land and lived under their special Cossack organizations, and hence formed a community within a community. They are made up of eight units: (1) the Yenisei unit, with its centre at Irkutsk (numbering 30,000 members of both sexes); (2) the Ussuri unit, with its centre at Vladivostok (34,000); (3) the Semirechie unit, with its centre at Viernyi (45,000); (4) the Amur unit, with its centre at Blagovyeshchensk (50,000); (5) the Siberian unit, with its centre at Omsk (180,000); (6) the Trans-Baikal unit, with its centre at Chita (270,000); (7) the Orenburg unit, with its centre at Orenburg (530,000); and (8) the Ural (Yaik) unit, with its centre at Uralsk (900,000). The half-breeds of Russian-Buriat blood form a special group called 'Karymy.' Among the ethnological curiosities of the Siberian colonial world are the people who live in 17 villages of the Bukhtarminsk district in the Altai. In the middle of the 17th cent. all people of Russian origin who were wanderers and had no identity books were banished there. They formed a colony of their own, called themselves 'Bezimyennye,' *i.e.* 'nameless,' intermarried with the Altai Turks, adopted their culture and beliefs, and became practically independent of the Russian Government. Towards the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th cent. they were compelled to become Russian subjects again, but under the same conditions as the local aborigines—*i.e.*, their own 'steppe Duma' was their direct administrative body. In this way they enjoyed more freedom than the other Sibiriaks.

We do not find many Russian old settlers in the steppe country or in Turkestan. The Russian element is represented there by Russian officials, who seldom became amalgamated with the local population, and by the Cossacks. One class of the old Russian administration, the Orthodox clergy, included a fairly large number of Sibiriaks.

Within the Sibiriak group the class distinctions of European Russia are unknown, since the institution of serfdom never penetrated beyond the Urals. According to their occupation, the Sibiriaks are divided into town people, country people, and Cossacks. The Cossacks number some 2,000,000 (in all Asiatic Russia). The Sibiriaks have some mental qualities in which they differ from the Great and Little Russians even more than they do from a physical point of view. These are a sense of equality, a national tolerance, energy and enterprise, and the power of becoming wealthy. They lack the great religious feeling and mystical attitude to Church and State so often found in European Russia. The Sibiriak attitude of tolerance has played a large part in the racial history of the nation. Peoples who seldom, if ever, intermarried on the other side of the Urals—*e.g.*, the Poles, Letts, and Great Russians—mix freely with one another in Siberia. Many Neo-Siberians, especially the Yakut, the Buriat, and the Tatars, merge willingly with the Sibiriaks. Even some of the Palæo-Siberians, especially the Chukchi and the Kamchadal, have begun to take part in this great fusion.

On the other hand, if it is difficult to find in European Russia a representative of a fairly pure Great Russian type, it is easy to find this in the colonies of 'Old Believers'[1] in the Southern Altai and Trans-Baikal, since their religious beliefs have evolved a custom of endogamy and have protected them from any foreign admixture. On the other hand, among the Orthodox colonists in some cases the administrative orders of the Russian Government have made forced inter-racial marriages—*e.g.*, the ukase of 11th Feb. 1825, which ordered the local officials to buy children of the female sex from the aborigines for wives for the colonists in view of the preponderance of the male over the female population among the Russian colonists.[1]

2. **Religious life.**—There is scarcely any evidence of the religious life of the early settlers in Siberia. Many of them must have been Christians already, but they do not seem to have been imbued with the missionary spirit, nor have they left material relics in the way of churches and eikons. The official propagation of Orthodoxy supported by the military and material help of the Russian Government began in the 16th and was at the height of its development in the 17th century. In 1620 the archbishopric of Siberia and Tobolsk was founded at Tobolsk.

The Raskol,[2] or schism from the Russian Orthodox Church, has had unusual success in Siberia from its very beginning (17th century). The first serious supporter of Raskol, Bishop Avvakum, was exiled in the second part of the 17th cent. to Siberia, where he was so earnest in propagating his ideas and opposing the official translation of the Bible (under supervision of the patriarch Nikon) that he was exiled still farther away into Dauria. To convert the heathen, and still more to effect the conversion of the schismatics, the Russian Government built as many as 32 monasteries in Siberia alone, 17 of which still exist; and in 1727 a bishopric of Irkutsk was founded. As regards the aborigines, their conversion has often been effected by such material means as freedom from *yassak* (tribute) or provision of flour and clothing. At the same time there are records of some true missionaries of real Christian spirit who acquired native languages (Tatar, Kalmuk, Yakut, and Buriat) for the purpose of spreading the gospel, and who incidentally have also added to ethnological literature. The number of Siberian saints and holy eikons does not correspond to the enormous numbers of monasteries and churches. In the 19th cent. there were added some 34 religious houses to the 11 administrative divisions of the Siberian Church, of which 21 were nunneries.

Among the few local saints of whom Siberia can boast is St. Innocent, the first bishop of Irkutsk, who was an active missionary among the Buriat and Tungus; 26th Nov. is celebrated as his day. His tomb was opened 70 years after his death, and the body was said to have been found unchanged. At present his remains (*moshchi*) are kept in the Voznesensky monastery in Irkutsk. This monastery is usually compared by the Sibiriaks to the Kieff-Pecherskaya Lavra at Kieff in European Russia.

Another patron saint of Siberia is Simeon of Verkhoturye. The son of a boyar at the court of Tsar Boris Godunoff, young Simeon migrated across the Urals and settled in the village of Merkushino near Verkhoturye. He was a wandering tailor by profession, spreading the gospel among the people for whom he worked. It was chiefly for the holiness of his character that he was beloved during his life and proclaimed a saint after his death. He died in 1642, and in 1704 his corpse, apparently still uncorrupted, was carried to Nikolayeff monastery in Verkhoturye. Many miracles are said to have been performed at his tomb.

The third patron saint of the Sibiriaks is the only one with whom a story of martyrdom is associated. He is Basil of Mangazeya, once an important trading station on the river Taz, west of the Yenisei. He was a merchant's assistant, and his master, wrongly suspecting him of theft, tortured him to death and flung his body on to the

[1] See art. RUSSIAN CHURCH, vol. x. p. 871b.

[1] In the Far East there are even now about 650 women to every 1000 men.

[2] See art. SECTS (Russian).

tundra. Then a religious youth, who had not met Basil in life, living along the Yenisei, was ordered in a vision by the Holy Spirit to bring Basil's body to the monastery of Turukhansk. Awakening from his sleep, the youth arose, went alone across the cold country, and brought back the body. It was found that Basil had been martyrizing himself by wearing an iron-bond ring round his waist. His body is an object of worship to all N. Siberians.

Thus a bishop, a pilgrim of noble birth, a merchant's assistant, and a later saint, the old man Daniel of Achinsk (1845), a holy hermit sometimes identified with Tsar Alexander I., complete the number of local patron saints for the Orthodox Sibiriaks.

Besides the tombs of the saints, there are in Siberia places recognized as holy on account of the eikons they possess. The eikon of Abalak, some 25 versts from Tobolsk, has an especial attraction for pilgrims, not only from Siberia but also from European Russia. It represents Mary the Virgin with child, and has a drawing of St. Nicholas in the right corner, and one of Mary of Egypt in the left. It originally came from S. Russia, but its early history is rather vague. All the other eikons which are regarded with peculiar reverence are copies of this eikon—*e.g.*, those in Kurgan, Tomsk, and Omsk.

The sect known as the Old Believers is spread in groups all over Siberia, but is most numerous in the Verkheudinsk district of the Trans-Baikal territory (where they are called 'Semyeynye,' from *syemya*, a 'family,' because they were exiled in whole families in the reign of Catherine II.), in the Barnaul, Biisk, and Zmeinogorsk districts of the Tomsk government, in the southern districts of the Tobolsk government, and in the Blagovyeshchensk district of the Amur territory. The Old Believers of the Altai region of the Tomsk government are called 'Polaki,' which is the Russian name for Poles, since they, not unlike the Poles, live in communities apart. The Old Believers form for the most part the most stable and best organized element, and, together with the political exiles, though but a small percentage of the 8,000,000 Sibiriaks, exercise a great moral influence and have contributed some of the best qualities of the Sibiriak nation.

III. *THE PALÆO-SIBERIANS.*—Some of the Palæo-Siberians are dealt with under separate headings;[1] here we shall confine ourselves to those who, before the publication of the results of recent ethnological research, were practically unknown in scientific literature—*e.g.*, the Chukchi, the Kamchadal, the Koryak, the Yukagir, and the Aleut.

The first four tribes have more in common racially and culturally than the other Palæo-Siberians, and are also more akin to the American Indians on the other side of the Bering Straits, called the North-Western Amerinds. The North-Western Amerinds are commonly divided into: (1) Northern tribes: the Tlingit, Haida (*qq.v.*), and Tsimshian; (2) Central tribes: the Kwakiutl and Bellacoola;[2] and (3) the Southern tribes: the Coast Salish,[2] Nootka,[3] and Chinook (*q.v.*). The Eskimo form culturally a wedge between the Palæo-Siberians and their American cousins. A short examination of the points of similarity between them will not only prove their cultural affinity, but also throw some light on their religious beliefs and practices. Whether further investigations will decide that the original home of these two groups was N. America or N. Asia, and will accordingly call them all Palæo-Americans or Palæo-Siberians, does not alter the fact that their affinity is closer than can be ascribed to the influence of mere environment. The Palæo-Siberians, *e.g.*, are more like the people on the other side of the Bering Straits than they are like those Neo-Siberians (Tungus and Yakut) who live under the same climatic and geographical conditions.

1. **Cultural affinity with N.W. Amerinds.**—Culturally there is a resemblance between the boats and dwellings of the peoples on both sides of the Bering Sea. Their large skin boats are of the same structure and material, though the Koryak boats, with 'their flaring sides and semi-circular stern and bow,' and the Kamchadal wooden dugouts are of different types. The dwellings of the Palæo-Siberians are of two main types. The first is the 'jawbone house,' the skeleton of which is composed of the ribs and jawbone of a whale or of driftwood and trees, where such material is available. These are covered with sods and earth, forming a house half underground. It is divided into three compartments inside, and has a square entrance through the roof and through two underground corridors, one for summer and one for winter. It was universal round the Bering Sea, but is now found only among the Koryak, Kamchadal, some Chukchi, and some of the Amerinds on the borders of the forest. But remnants of these underground houses can be found among all N.W. Amerinds, and mention of them is made in their myths. At present the Tlingit, Tsimshian, and Haida have quadrangular log huts. The second kind of house is typical of the Chukchi, and is called their 'genuine house.' It is a double skin tent, round outside and square inside. The Eskimo snow house is not found among other tribes, though the Koryak 'jawbone house,' when covered with snow for winter, may appear to be similar outwardly. Of all the peoples of these two groups the Koryak possess the richest mythology, just as they excel in the art of engraving human and animal figures in motion. In mythology the most characteristic feature of both groups is the Raven myth cycle, which appears in Eskimo mythology only in imported incidents.

The Raven or Big Raven was sent to the earth by the Supreme Being, who is identified with the sun or thunder. Big Raven married a young girl, called Miti, who was abandoned by her father, the Twilight, and their children were the ancestors of the Koryak. Big Raven is supplicated and propitiated only in the supreme crises of life for protection from malicious spirits.[1] In Chukchi mythology the Raven is called 'one self-created.' His wife becomes a woman and gives birth to four sons. Then Raven decides to create the earth, and does so by throwing his excrement down below him. Afterwards he teaches the people on the earth how to live and multiply.[2] Almost all the Koryak and many Tlingit myths deal with the life, travels, and adventures of Big Raven and his family.

Another point of resemblance between the peoples of the N. Pacific culture is their tradition relating to the remote era when there was no difference between men and animals. There are, however, some Asiatic elements among the Palæo-Siberians unknown to the N.W. Amerinds—*e.g.*, religious dualism and the sacrifice of reindeer and dogs to the chief deities. Again we find evidence of the great influence of the American Indian culture in general on the N.W. Amerinds in their totemic poles, ceremonial masks, and in the variety and richness of their facial painting, all of which are peculiar to totemistic people and hence do not exist among the Palæo-Siberians.

If we take into consideration the fact that the Palæo-Siberians make reindeer breeding their chief occupation and are merely incidentally hunters and fishermen, and the fact that the art of reindeer-

[1] See artt. AINUS, ALEUTS, ESKIMOS, GILYAKS, and OSTYAKS.
[2] See art. SALISH.
[3] See art. VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS.

[1] W. Jochelson, 'The Koryak, Religion and Myths,' in *Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History: The Jesup North Pacific Expedition*, vol. vi. pt. 1, Leyden and New York, 1908.
[2] W. Bogoras, 'The Chukchee,' *Jesup N. Pacific Exped* vii. pt. ii. [1910] p. 155 ff.

breeding is unknown (and seems impossible) on the American continent, we shall here find the essential economic explanation of the difference between the religious ceremonies of these two groups. In any case the N.W. Amerinds must have separated from the Palæo-Siberians before the appearance of the Eskimo along the Bering Straits. At what time and whence the migration of the Eskimo to the Pacific shore took place is difficult to determine, but traces of a long influence of Arctic geographical environment on their culture point to the conclusion that they must have been settled there for many centuries.

The question whether the Palæo-Siberian languages (with the exception of the Ostyak of the Yenisei) are nearer the N.W. American than the Ural-Altaic tongues has not been sufficiently studied because we cannot find any similarity even between the Indian languages which were formerly believed to exist. The Indian languages used to be called polysynthetic and incorporating, in contradistinction to the Ural-Altaic group; but it is now known that there is great grammatical variety among them. All the same, incorporation and polysynthetism, as well as the division of substantives into animate and inanimate, are features especially strongly marked in N.W. American as in Palæo-Siberian languages.

As to their physical type, F. Boas[1] thinks that the colour of the skin and of the hair, and the shape of the head and of the face, are remarkably alike in these two groups, and he even suggests that the physical type of these Indians is nearer to that of their Asiatic brethren than to that of the Californian or Mississippi Indians. The materials of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition that have as yet been worked out have shown that the Chukchi, who are the nearest neighbours of the N.W. Amerinds, resemble them more than do the other Palæo-Siberians. So, *e.g.*, the Ainu and the Yukagir are short-statured, the Kamchadal and Koryak under medium stature, while the Chukchi and the N.W. Amerinds are above medium stature. The Ainu, Yukagir, Koryak, and Kamchadal have medium-sized heads, the Eskimo are long-headed, while the Chukchi and the N.W. Amerinds are comparatively broad-headed. The colour of the skin of the N.W. Amerinds is much lighter than that of the other Indians and more like that of the Palæo-Siberians, and their noses, though prominent, do not resemble the typical eagle-like nose of the American Indian and are again more of the N. Pacific type.

The chief difference between the Neo- and Palæo-Siberians, besides the stature and the head-form (the Neo-Siberians are taller and more broad-headed), is that the Mongolian flat bridge to the nose and the Mongolian fold in the inner corner of the eyelid occur more often among the Neo- than among the Palæo-Siberians. Then the Neo-Siberians have the Mongolic straight black hair and sparse beards and moustaches which are not allowed to grow, while the Palæo-Siberians have often wavy hair and beards which they always encourage to grow.

2. The Chukchi country and people.—Of all the people of N.E. Asia, the Chukchi form both in physical type and in culture the essence of what is called Palæo-Siberian. We shall therefore consider them primarily and deal with the other Palæo-Siberians only so far as they differ from the Chukchi.

The name Chukchi is derived from Chuchu, 'rich in reindeer,' but this name is used of both the Reindeer Chukchi and the Reindeer Koryak, while Lyiyilylyt, 'those of genuine language,' is the name used by Chukchi alone, whether Reindeer or Maritime.[2] According to the Chukchi traditions, they were formerly a coast people, who, however, always had domesticated reindeer. But the facts that they keep so many dogs without making practical use of them as most of the Arctic people do, that the snake appears so often in their folk-tales (there are no snakes in their present abode), and that the climatic names of the months do not correspond to the changes of climate in their present locality seem to point to their original home being farther south. The Chukchi are, generally speaking, not a coast people; out of a total of 12,000 only some 1100 live on the Pacific and some 2000 on the Arctic shore. Hence three fourths of them are reindeer-breeders and only one-fourth live by maritime industries.

The Chukchi live in the far north-east of Siberia from the river Indigirka to Bering Straits in the east and to the Anadyr and even as far as Kamchatka in the south. But east of the river Omolon they are found only sporadically on the coast of the Bering Sea, and the Asiatic Eskimo (1600) occupy part of the shore, while south of the Anadyr the land is really Koryak. Farther within Chukchi territory to the south-west of Chaun Bay lives the tribe of Chuvantzy (probably the same as the half-mythical Chaachet), who are intermediary between the Chukchi and the Yukagir. Another people who are probably mixed with the Koryak more than with the Chukchi are the Lamut of the Tungus group. The Tungus group divides on the Middle Kolyma the Yukagir from the other Palæo-Siberian peoples.

It is perhaps owing to the splendid physical health and great fertility of the Chukchi[1] and their great reindeer wealth, partly also to the persistence of their language, which they have imposed not only on the Koryak of Kamchatka and the Asiatic Eskimo, but even on the Russians on the Anadyr, that the Chukchi occupy the predominant position among the natives of N.E. Siberia.

The so-called 'Chukchi Territory,' which has never been forcibly subdued by the Russians and hence enjoys a fictitious legal autonomy, lies west of the rivers Chaun and Anadyr to the river Omolon, and was probably the whole extent of the Chukchi land in the 17th century. If we believe Wrangell,[2] the Asiatic Eskimo formerly occupied a much larger space on the Arctic shore, but were driven away by the Chukchi. After the advent of the Chukchi it is probable that they migrated towards the Pacific Coast and also north-eastwards. Possibly it is to the latter event that those traditions are due which are common to all the peoples of N. Siberia, about the tribes which migrated north. Some native tribes believe that an unknown people live in Wrangell Land and the other islands; others that they are extinct as the half-mythical Shelagi from whose name is derived Cape Shelagsky on the Arctic coast. The Shelagi are said to have been Chukchi, while other extinct tribes of N.E. Siberia (Omoki, Khodyntsy, Anauli, Kongenyty) were clans of the Yukagir tribe.[3] Bogoras[4] gives a list of village names from the Arctic and Pacific Coast Chukchi, which indeed are Eskimo in sound and in a sense support the theory that the Eskimo were formerly more widely extended, spreading east as well as west. The Chukchi land stretches to the tundra and northern fringe of the forest country; its climate is dry and cold, the average winter temperature being 31° F. (Nijne-Kolymsk), and the average summer 52° F. On the Pacific the climate is less dry, the average in winter being 8° F. and in summer 54° F.

We can take the Chukchi as physically the most free from foreign admixture among the Palæo-Siberians, and in this connexion it is interesting to consider the anthropometric results obtained by the Jesup North Pacific Expedition.[5] The average height of the men is 162·2 mm., and their cephalic index averages 82. Their cheek bones are much less prominent than those of the Tungus or Yakut, and the low Mongolian nose bridge and Mongolian eyelids occur only very rarely. Their hair—and in this respect the Koryak can be put in the same class with them—is wavy and sometimes even curly. Beards are more frequent than among the Tungus and Yakut, and, contrary to the customs of the latter, are allowed to grow freely. The colour of their hair is less dark as the Pacific is approached, while their complexion is bronze-red, and their ideal is to be as 'red as blood.'[1]

3. Material culture.—The elements of four cultures can be observed in the Palæo-Siberian tribes: the Asiatic, the N. Pacific, the Eskimo, and the American Indian.

The domesticated reindeer is a purely Asiatic element, common to Neo- and Palæo-Siberians. Among the Palæo-Siberian reindeer-breeders one sometimes finds a light portable tent, similar to the tent of Neo-Siberians. The underground houses are a N. Pacific element. The skin boats and harpoons are of Eskimo origin, while the

[1] 'Physical Types of the Indians of Canada,' *Annual Archæological Reports*, Toronto, 1905, p. 84.
[2] Bogoras, p. 11.
[1] In 1897, 10 per cent of the families had no fewer than five children living (Bogoras p. 35).
[2] *Journey to the North Coast of Siberia and to the Arctic Sea, 1820–24* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1841.
[3] W. Jochelson, 'The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirised Tungus, *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. ix. pt. i. [1910] p. 18.
[4] P. 22. [5] *Ib.* p. 33.

dug-outs, the basket- and rug-making, and the occasional ceremonial masks are of American origin.

With the exception of the Ainu all the Palæo-Siberians are reindeer-breeders. In most of their legends—*e.g.*, those of the Chukchi—they always appear as owners of reindeer. Now many of the Gilyak, Chukchi, and Koryak have reindeer no longer and rely on hunting and maritime industries for their livelihood. Together with the reindeer we find the dog used for draught purposes and to provide clothing.

4. Social organization.—The social structure among the Palæo-Siberians is of a less regular character than among the N.W. Amerinds. We do not find here the strictly exogamous, totemistic clans of the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian, but rather organizations resembling those among some Salish and Athapascan tribes in N.W. America. On the whole, the family is the most regular unit. Only the Gilyak have now a distinct clan organization, though the Yukagir and Chukchi might have had such an organization in the past. The Chukchi live in local groups based on community of economic interests, reindeer-breeding, hunting, fishing. The reindeer-breeders are naturally more nomadic than the maritime people. Thus there is no word for 'family' among the Chukchi, and the people living together are called 'those in the house.' There is, moreover, the term *varat*, meaning 'those who are together,' which relates to those who take part in blood-revenge, but, as this unit changes its members very often in practice, it is the relatives in the paternal line, and, failing them, those on the maternal side, or 'group-marriage' companions, that are held to the duty of taking revenge for blood. The Koryak family is organized on the principle of seniority, the father being the head of the family. On the whole, all Palæo-Siberians, with the exception of the Ainu, are patriarchal. Even what looks like a matrilocal arrangement, when the bridegroom goes to live for a time or permanently in his father-in-law's house, is seen by closer study to be merely the way of procuring a wife by 'serving' for her.

The Gilyak clan is called *khal*, 'foot-sack' (used in travelling), and is a group of people united by marriage ties, common cult, responsibility for blood-revenge, or its compensation, and common tabus. The clan is divided into three exogamous sub-clans. Clansmen prefer to live together, and the relationship within the clan is classificatory. They carry on together bear-hunting, trapping of sables, and fishing.

5. Marriage.—On the whole, marriage among the Palæo-Siberians tends to be endogamic. The Gilyak marriage regulations are the most complicated. Within the clan they are endogamic, while the sub-clans are exogamic. Cross-cousin marriage seems to have been the original custom, and the third clan originated probably when one of the two sub-clans could not produce the necessary number of females.

The people who are in the relation of *angey* (wife) and *pu* (husband) have the right of sexual intercourse, if the individual husband is away.[1] This 'group-marriage' arrangement is questioned by some investigators, who think that it amounts to this, that, if a woman betrays her husband with her 'potential' husband, it is considered less blameworthy than if she had done so with a stranger.[2]

Another kind of 'group-marriage' is to be found among the Chukchi. It is in the nature of a supplementary union. Several men married individually join a group, and each man belonging to such a group may exercise the right of a husband when visiting the camp if a husband is away. No two brothers can belong to the group, but the people joining the group, if not relatives before, become so and call themselves 'companions in wives.' Some marriage rites are performed on this occasion, though shorter than in the case of individual marriage. These supplementary unions are seldom arranged between people living in the same camp. The custom of levirate is common among most Palæo-Siberians.

In some respects marriage customs among all the Palæo-Siberians are similar. Thus they all tend to endogamy, with the exception of the Gilyak at present and possibly the Yukagir in the past. The *kalym*, or bride-price, which occurs occasionally, was introduced by the Neo-Siberians, since it is by serving for her that the wife is obtained among most Palæo-Siberians. In connexion with this custom the bridegroom goes to live permanently or temporarily in his father-in-law's house, and his position in the family and the name by which he is called are secure only after the first child is born. Among the Koryak, Kamchadal, and Kuril the ceremony which gives the husband full rights to his wife is the act of 'seizing' her. It is different from marriage by capture and consists in a fight of the bridegroom with the bride and several other women, in the process of which the bridegroom must tear the clothes of the bride, who is carefully wrapped up for the occasion, and touch her sexual organs with his hand. This symbolic ceremony has been compared[1] to the somewhat similar ceremony of the Lillooet and Thompson Indians in N.W. America. According to recent investigators[2] of this region, the most essential marriage ceremony in these tribes is for the bridegroom to touch the bride's naked breast or heel, for, since the usual sitting position is squatting on the heels, touching these practically corresponds to touching her sexual organs. This symbolic action, together with the preliminary attack on the man by the women, may possibly be placed in the same class as the tortures during the initiation of the youth. In all these cases the men are entering on a new phase of life, and have to pass through a period of probationary sufferings, which in the case of couvade are merely symbolic.

6. Religion.—The Palæo-Siberians are typical shamanists. By shamanism (*q.v.*) is meant a religion based on animistic and pre-animistic conceptions in which the person of the shaman, or medicine-man, plays an important rôle. The shamanism of the Palæo-Siberians differs from that of the Neo-Siberians in its (*a*) religious conceptions, (*b*) ceremonies, (*c*) shamanistic accessaries, (*d*) ideas of gods and spirits.

(*a*) *Religious conceptions.*—The pre-animistic beliefs, *i.e.* beliefs in a somewhat chaotic unpersonified supernatural power, are more often met with among the Palæo-Siberians, especially among the Chukchi and Koryak, than among the Neo-Siberians, with perhaps the exception of the Samoyed, who are the most primitive of the Neo-Siberians.[3] Thus the Palæo-Siberians are, as it were, at a more primitive evolutionary stage of their beliefs, and their objects of worship are

[1] L. Sternberg, *The Gilyak* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1905, pp. 32–35.
[2] A. N. Maksimoff, *Group-Marriage* (in Russian), Moscow, 1908, p. 41.

[1] A. N. Maksimoff, 'Concerning a Certain Marriage Ceremony,' *Etnograficheskoe Obozrénie*, no. 79 (in Russian), reprint, Moscow, n.d.
[2] J. Teit, 'The Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. i. pt. iv. [1900] p. 323 ff., 'The Lillooet Indians,' *ib.* vol. ii. pt. v. [1906] p. 268; F. Boas, 'The Indian Tribes of the Lower Fraser River,' *Report of the British Association*, 1894, p. 458.
[3] See art. SAMOYED.

slightly different, corresponding to the difference of geographical environment. The worship of the sun and sky is not as developed as among the Neo-Siberians, and the animals which play a part in their religious belief are pictured fantastically, not realistically.[1] It is curious and hard to explain why the reindeer, which plays such a unique rôle in the life of the Palæo-Siberians, is neither worshipped nor venerated, and does not in any way enter into the religious life of the people except as a sacrificial animal. In the case of the horse, which occupies a similar position among the inhabitants of Central Asia, it is quite the reverse.

Animism among the Palæo-Siberians is in the highest state of development.

'Even the shadows on the wall constitute definite tribes and have their own country where they live in huts and subsist by hunting. The rainbow and sun-rays have "masters" who live above on the highest part of the rainbow and at the place where the sun's rays emanate, and descend to earth along these paths of light.'[2]

Even such things as the voice of an animal, the sound of the drum, or human speech, have an existence independent of the object which produces them.[3] Anything which formed part of a body—*e.g.*, a lock of hair which has been cut off or even the human or animal excrement—has a soul of its own, or, as the Chukchi say, it is 'having a voice.' These objects 'having a voice' do not entirely lose their qualities as material objects.

'A stone endowed with a "voice" would simply roll down and crush a man against whom it had a grudge.'[4]

It is not quite clear, however, whether objects belonging to one man, as household utensils, have an independent life like natural objects or whether they are spirit-guardians of the family to which they belong. For it is stated by Jochelson that among the Koryak these household objects may warn the people of the house of danger and attack their enemies.[5]

(*b*) *Ceremonies.*—In their religious ceremonies the Palæo-Siberians differ from the Neo-Siberians in that their prayers are simpler and less regularly offered. Reindeer and dogs are usually slaughtered for sacrifice, and occasionally a substitute for reindeer is made of willow-leaves or even of snow. In this respect and in the method of slaughtering the sacrificial animal the Palæo- and Neo-Siberians do not differ very much. The bear ceremony which is such a feature of N. Asia seems to have originated among the Palæo-Siberians, since nowhere is its ritual so rich and complicated as among the Ainu and Koryak. The bear ceremony has a dual nature: the bear is the sacrificial animal and at the same time receives the sacrifice.

Before the bear is slaughtered, women perform a ceremonial dance round his cage, and ceremonial food is given to him. Then the woman who acts as the bear's foster-mother performs a little drama of sorrow at his departure. Again, after the animal is slaughtered for the sacrifice to the spirit of the wood, a series of sacrifices to the victim are made.[6]

Bear-sacrifice and the sacrifice to the fire or new fire are common to all the Palæo-Siberians, whether living on the coast or farther inland. Another ceremony common to them all is the wolf-sacrifice, though the latter is more often found among the Reindeer people. But the wolf-sacrifice has not the dual character of the bear-sacrifice, since no sacrifice is made to the wolf.

After the wolf has been killed, food is presented to him and a ceremonial dance is performed to the beat of the drum. Its meaning is expressed by the prayer addressed to the High Being on such occasions by the Koryak: 'Be good; do not make the wolf bad.'[1] Further, the festival does not end, as the bear-festival or the whale-festival performed among the Palæo-Siberians, with equipment for the homeward journey and the invitation to repeat its visit the following year. The wolf, which does not serve as food and is a danger to the reindeer herd, needless to say, is not encouraged to return, but, the spirit of the dead wolf being particularly malignant, must be carefully propitiated at the ceremony.

The wolf-festival therefore must be looked upon, not as a fertilization ceremony, but as a preventive measure. Together with the wolf, a reindeer is killed, and the bodies of both are placed on a high platform. This symbolizes that the High Being is propitiated that he may not allow the wolf to attack the reindeer.

In comparing the ceremonies of the Palæo- and Neo-Siberians, we must first note the lack of maritime ceremonies among the latter. Of these ceremonies the most important are the whale-festival, celebrations connected with the launching of the boats in the summer, and putting them away for the winter—all known to the Koryak, Chukchi, Eskimo, Kamchadal, and Aleut. Then each maritime tribe has its own conception of the spirit of the god-owner of the sea or of the sea-animals. The Chukchi have even two conceptions of such a god. One is the powerful old woman who lives at the bottom of the sea, called 'the mother of the walrus'; her mouth was adorned with two walrus-like tusks, one of which got broken; and she was so angry that she limited the number of sea-animals. Sad to say, when her other tusk breaks, all sea-animals will perish.[2] This goddess bears a faint resemblance to the goddess Sedna of the Eskimo, but, as the picture of the latter goddess is fuller, it is probable that the Chukchi borrowed her from the Eskimo. The chief 'being of the sea' of the Chukchi, Keretkun, is an old man with a family. A similar idea is attached to the Kachak of the Asiatic Eskimo, who possibly borrowed the god and the ceremonies connected with him from the Chukchi. The Keretkun ceremonies are more detailed and elaborate. The ceremonies last at least three days, and an image of Keretkun is made which is burnt at the end of the ceremonies. Feasts shamanizing, exchange of presents, and finally an orgiastic dance between the members belonging to the 'additional' marriage group, complete the proceedings. The 'group marriage' arrangements are usually made at this ceremony.[3]

The annual ceremonies of the Reindeer Palæo-Siberians are not unknown to Neo-Siberian reindeer-breeders. The economic rôle of the spring and autumn boat ceremonies of the maritime peoples corresponds to the fawn ceremony in the spring and the ceremonies attending the return of the herd from the summer pastures in autumn. But, though there exists a faint conception of a god-owner of the reindeer, he does not occupy the position of Keretkun, nor are there any special ceremonies connected with him. The fertility of the reindeer herd apparently depends more on keeping certain tabus during the spring and autumn festivals as well as permanent tabus connected with reindeer-breeding than upon sacrifices to the god or spirit of the reindeer.

The annual ceremony of sacrifice to the fire is performed to gain two objects: (*a*) to obtain the new fire or the continued welfare of all those who gather round it, and (*b*) to consecrate a new fetish representing the hearth, which fetish is considered the protector of the hearth and herd, and is anointed with the sacrificial blood and fat.

Though the Palæo-Siberians obtain fire by the use of a flint and steel, the sacrificial fire is obtained by the drilling method, which may point to the fact that that was the original way of ob-

[1] M. A. Czaplicka, 'The Influence of Environment upon the Religious Ideas and Practices of the Aborigines of Northern Asia,' *FL* xxv. [1914] 84 ff.
[2] Bogoras, p. 281.
[3] Jochelson, *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. vi. pt. i. p. 117.
[4] Bogoras, p. 280.
[5] Jochelson, *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. vi. pt. i. p. 117.
[6] B. Pilsudski, 'Bear Festival among the Ainu,' *Sphinx*, May, 1908.

[1] Jochelson, p. 89 f. [2] Bogoras, p. 315 f.
[3] Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, p. 292 ff.

taining fire among them. The fire-board, on which the drill is turned by means of the bow, is usually made of dry wood and shaped in human form. This fire-board acquires magical power after the new fire is obtained on it, but, to make this magic power work to protect the hearth which it symbolizes, it is necessary that bloody sacrifices of animal victims be offered to it and that an incantation be pronounced over it. The implements used in this ceremony are considered sacred, and even the dust obtained by the drilling is carefully gathered up, 'for it is considered a sin to scatter it.'[1]

(*c*) *Shamanistic accessaries.*—The Palæo-Siberians differ from the Neo-Siberians more in the accessaries used at the religious ceremonies by the shamans than in their religious conceptions or in their actual ceremonies. This again is to a great extent due to the influence of geographical environment, since in the accessaries of the Neo-Siberian shaman the influence of the Central Asiatic environment can still be traced. The ceremonial dress of the shaman—*e.g.*, the ceremonial drum—and the representations of the gods and spirits are very often adorned with or made of metal among the Yakut or Tungus, but not among the Palæo-Siberians, unless of course the latter have borrowed it from the former, as the Yukagir have borrowed it from the Yakut. On the other hand, the form of the drum shows an independence of environment and expresses the tribal individuality. The Chukchi and Eskimo drum is round and its diameter is only from 40 to 50 centimetres. It is very light and has no rattles, which are such an important part of the Neo-Siberian drum. The typical Neo-Siberian drum is of course oval in shape and much greater in diameter, and has protuberances on the outer circle of the rim, which, according to the Yakut, represent the horns of the shaman's spirit. Needless to say, the shamanistic garments of the Palæo-Siberians are, on the whole, much simpler than those of the Neo-Siberians.

(*d*) *Ideas of gods and spirits.*—The highest gods of the Palæo-Siberians are less anthropomorphic than those of the Neo-Siberians. They all have animal characteristics, for the line of demarcation between the human and animal worlds is very obscure. Thus, *e.g.*, the Raven (called, in Chukchi, Kurkil, in Koryak, Kutqi, in Kamchadal, Kutq) takes the form of an animal more frequently than that of a man. He is certainly worshipped as a god by the Koryak, and was worshipped by the Kamchadal till their religion decayed under the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. But there is also a name in Koryak for the Supreme God, identified with the universe, with the dawn, and with strength. He seems to be above Big Raven and to have sent Big Raven to earth to arrange human affairs. It is Big Raven, therefore, who is considered creator and plays the chief part in religious ceremonies. Among the Chukchi and N.W. Amerinds the Raven has not such a high position and is of more importance in myths than in religious ceremonies.

Religious dualism, so well marked among the Neo-Siberians, is here less defined. There are spirits, as the *kelet* of the Chukchi or *kelau* of the Koryak, who are mostly malicious, and bring disease, death, and all sorts of misfortune. The half-mythical giants dwelling on distant shores and endangering the existence of the Chukchi are also called *kelet*, but the shamanistic spirits are apparently *kelet* too, and these obviously cannot be definitely malicious, at least towards the person on whose behalf they are used by the shaman. So *kelet* may after all mean only 'spirits'; and there is another class of spirits, *vairgit*, which are often benevolent, but *agam-vairgit* means 'bad spirits,' the same as *kelet*, which seems to point to the fact that *vairgit* also is the name of a class of spirits without a well-defined character. All the celestial bodies are *vairgit*, but, while the sun is a benevolent *vairgin* (singular of *vairgit*) imagined as a man in a radiant garment, the moon is a malicious *vairgin* and could be called a *kele* (sing. of *kelet*), assuming that this class of beings is more malicious than the *vairgit*. Of all the celestial bodies the Polar Star is held in the highest esteem. Her house is in the zenith, higher than the other stars, and she is called 'Motionless star' or the 'Sole-stuck star.' *Kelet* and *kelau* are fond of the human liver, which accounts for that part of the Chukchi funeral rites which demands the opening of the abdomen of the corpse and the search, especially in the liver, to discover which *kele* has killed the man. At the same time the Chukchi believe that the chief soul (*uvirit*, 'belonging to the body') resides in the liver, though other parts of the body have their own souls. A disease in any part of the body is supposed to be caused by lack of a soul in that particular part. The Koryak have no conception corresponding to that of the Chukchi *vairgit*. The soul of a dead man goes to a world above or below the earth, but the soul of a man who was strangled or had otherwise a violent death resides, according to the Chukchi, in the *aurora borealis*. A shaman can easily wander from our world to a world above or beyond ours or anywhere else, for there are many other worlds. All the celestial bodies are inhabited by people. In the time of Big Raven, *i.e.* when he was sent from the sky to create the world and man, and afterwards when he lived among the peoples and taught them industries, every one had the power to pass from one world to another.

[1] Jochelson, *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. vi. pt. i. p. 33.

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SIBYLLINE ORACLES.—1. The Sibyl.—

The *Sibylline Oracles* form one of the curiosities of ancient literature. The belief that certain women are possessed with an occult power, however derived, that enables them to predict the future is indeed common to many races of men. But the Sibyl was no ordinary witch, or prophetess, or 'damsel possessed with the spirit of divination'; rather she seems to have gathered into her person all the mystery and reverential awe which attach to a communication from an unknown and intangible world. Not that she was ever regarded or worshipped as a goddess. In her essence she was always an old woman compelled by some hard fate to be the organ of communication between some god and man. She was venerated, but she was never envied; and the children's game of question and answer, 'Sibyl, what would'st thou?' 'I would I might die,' sums up the strange mixture of awe and pity with which she was regarded. But it was not so much the Sibyl herself as her message that aroused the curious interest of the

ancient world. She might appear in person, as she did to Tarquin, but her great importance to men lay rather in the collections of her writings, which were looked upon as providing in some inscrutable way superhuman answers to all kinds of questions, when approached with due reverence and ceremony.

There are Sibyls connected with many different towns and localities. The earliest is undoubtedly that of Erythræ[1] in Asia Minor; she is connected by tradition with Apollo, and her prophecies dealt with Helen and the Trojan war. It may be, indeed, that the Sibylline tradition originated in a kind of rivalry with the cycle of Homeric poems. The most famous Sibyl next to the Erythræan is that of Cumæ in Campania.[2] She it was who in the well-known story appeared to Tarquin, and of whom Vergil wrote in *Eclogue* iv. and *Æneid*, vi. The Sibyl third in importance was associated with Delphi.

2. Classical Sibylline verses.—It is probable that Sibylline verses, when once they had obtained a vogue, multiplied rapidly, and in course of time collections were made. Their general character seems to have been more or less stereotyped. As befitted an old woman who had seen a good deal of the seamy side of life, the tone of the Sibyl was generally pessimistic, and prophecies of disasters in different places formed her stock-in-trade. This is plainly brought out by the testimony of Heraclitus, as cited by Plutarch,[3] who specifies among the 'many mirthless things' prophesied by the Sibyl 'many revolutions and transportations of Greek cities, many appearances of barbarian armies, and deaths of leading men.' Another special device was the division of the history of the world into generations, usually ten in number, sometimes corresponding with the metals, or assigned to various gods.[4]

As far as can be ascertained, all Sibylline verses were written in Greek, and there were undoubtedly early collections in Greece. The Erythræan Sibyl had various imitators, among the most famous of whom was a certain Musæus of Athens, whose writings were collected, at Pisistratus's command, into one book by Onomacritus. Aristophanes has several allusions to the Sibyl scattered through his writings, and Plato speaks of her with distinct respect. But it was at Rome that the influence of Sibylline writings as a political force was most pronounced. Their history begins with the visit of the old woman to Tarquin, and his purchase of three of the nine books which she brought. These were buried in the ground for safe custody, probably in the temple of Capitoline Jove. They were consulted first of all at rare intervals, but later every three or four years. In 82 B.C. the Capitol was destroyed by fire, and the Sibylline books perished entirely. Seven years later three men were sent out on a special mission to Erythræ to bring back any Sibylline verses that they could find. A thousand lines or so were discovered, and others were brought from other places, and out of the materials thus collected the *xv viri sacris faciundis* were deputed to make a selection.[5] This selection was in later years subjected to a searching criticism by Augustus, who rejected all but a small residuum. This was carefully guarded, but the best days of the *Sibylline Oracles* were over, and they became more and more neglected; and, although they enjoyed a temporary revival of popularity under Aurelian and later under Julian, they never really regained their hold over the credulity of man. They were finally burned by Stilicho in the principate of Honorius.

3. Jewish adaptations.—If the history of the *Sibylline Oracles* had been confined to Greece and Rome, it would still have been a very curious and interesting phenomenon in the ancient world. But their main interest to the modern student lies in the fact that their form and, to a considerable, though uncertain, extent, their substance were copied by Jewish, and later by Christian, writers mainly for the purpose of propaganda. It says a good deal for the influence of the ancient Sibyl that such a device should have been put in practice, and it says still more for the credulity of the ancient world that it should so largely have served its purpose. The Jew who first hit upon the expedient of borrowing the authority of the Sibyl for the propagation of his national faith lived in Egypt, and probably in Alexandria, in the first half of the 2nd century B.C. He was therefore a contemporary of the author of the book of Daniel, and of that of the original section of the book of Enoch. His work is seen in the main portion of bk. iii., beginning at line 97. His method of procedure is worthy of note for its strange mixture of OT history and ancient legend, the latter probably borrowed from ancient Sibylline writings. So the destruction of the Tower of Babel is followed by the reign of Cronos, Titan, and Iapetus, and the birth of Zeus. Then, after passing summarily over the rise of different world-powers, he comes to his main theme in Jewish history. This is all put in the future tense as representing a prophecy of the Sibyl. In the rest of the book there is a strange mixture of ancient oracles, more or less contemporary history, eschatological details, and especially extravagant praise of the Jewish nation, and a description of the happiness of the members of it.

How far these Jewish Sibylline writings had a direct value as a proselytizing force we have no means of knowing. But at a time when Greek culture and the study of Greek literature were more and more coming into vogue, when superstition was rife, and when there was a good deal of scepticism abroad as to the value of the gods of Rome, it is not hard to imagine that the indirect influence of these Sibylline verses on cultivated minds may have been considerable. The Romans seem to have been always impressed with the Jewish religion ever since their first contact with it, and there may well have been many who would be disposed to view with sympathy the suggestion that in the ancient and venerable Sibyl might be found a point of union between the austere and moral religion of the Jews and the literature of ancient Greece, which was being increasingly studied and adapted. At the same time we must remember that till 82 B.C. the official collection of Sibylline verses was being preserved with the utmost secrecy at Rome. It is probable, therefore, that the Jewish portions were studied in Eastern lands, and more especially at Alexandria.

4. Christian Sibyllines.—But the chief argument for the success of the Jewish Sibylline verses as a means for proselytizing lies in their imitation by Christian writers. As the Christian writers of the 1st and 2nd centuries, following St. Paul's line of argument, boldly took over as the heritage of the Christian Church the special privileges given of old to the Jews, so the Jewish Sibyl was impressed into the service of the Christian faith. In the books that have come down to us we have therefore three elements: (*a*) fragments of oracles of unknown antiquity, possibly stretching back into a remote past; (*b*) Jewish oracles of the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries A.D., dealing partly with contemporary history put in

[1] Pausanias, x. xii. The Sibyl's head appears on ancient Erythræan coins.
[2] Justin, *Cohort. ad Graecos*, 37, gives a description of the Sibyl's grotto at Cumæ.
[3] *De Pyth. Or.* vii. (561).
[4] Servius, on Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 4.
[5] Tac. *Ann.* vi. 12.

the form of prophecy, partly with Jewish teaching and propaganda, and partly with the eschatological conjectures that played so conspicuous a part in the thought of that transitional age; (*c*) Christian writings, sometimes a few lines sandwiched in between Jewish or pagan writings, sometimes extending to long continuous sections, as in bk. ii. and especially in bk. viii. These Christian writings deal largely with the life and work of Christ, but in them also eschatology plays a leading part. Bk. vii. is evidently tinged with Gnostic thought.

It cannot be said that the Christian Sibyllines have made any marked contribution of their own to the general literature. And yet the early Fathers laid very great stress on the witness of the Sibyl to Christ. For the most part they regarded her as undoubtedly inspired, but they drew a distinction between her and the prophets of the OT. The latter were, to some degree at any rate, conscious interpreters of the message of God, though exactly how far their human thought and language had moulded their message was not always clear. But the Sibyl was but a mouthpiece—by her own confession an unwilling mouthpiece—of the oracle of God;[1] and consequently her testimony was all the more striking as being anything but spontaneous. It will readily be seen than an argument like this, in so far as it appealed to the critical instinct of the time, would have a real apologetic value. To our minds it may well appear strange that verses which seem obviously so late should be regarded as possessing the reverence of hoary antiquity. But we must remember the Sibylline tradition stretching back into centuries far away, the air of mystery which had always surrounded it, and above all the credulity of the average man in the matter of literary records.

The first mention of a Sibyl in a Christian writer appears to be in Hermas.[2] The writer sees an old woman splendidly arrayed, holding in her hands a book from which she reads. He takes her to be the Sibyl, but is told that she is the Church. The passage is interesting as showing the idea of the Sibyl's personality. According to Justin,[3] Clement of Rome referred to the Sibyl's prophecy that the world should be judged by fire. Justin himself has several allusions to her,[4] and does not doubt that she spoke under divine inspiration. Theophilus is the first to preserve fragments i.–iii. Athenagoras has at least one quotation from the fragments. Clement of Alexandria cites freely from most of the books, but it is noticeable that he never mentions the specially Christian bk. viii. He could hardly have omitted to do so had it been extant at the time, or had he not had suspicions of its genuineness. Soon after his time the Christians fell under the suspicion of coining oracles in their own favour. Celsus[5] roundly accused them of interpolating and faking many passages in the ancient and genuine Sibylline writings, and Lucian makes merry over the idea of Christian oracles, and produces some very clever parodies. Here is one on the gematria of the *Sibyllines*:

> Εὐξείνου πόντοιο παρ' ἠιόσ' ἄγχι Σινώπης
> ἔσταί τις κατὰ Τύρσιν ὑπ' Αὐσονίοισι προφήτης
> ἐκ πρώτης δεικνὺς μόναδος, τρισσῶν δεκάδων τε,
> πένθ' ἑτέρας μόναδας καὶ εἰκόσαδα τρισάριθμον
> ἀνδρὸς ἀλεξητῆρος ὁμωνυμίην τετράκυκλου.

The name is Ἀλέξανδρος (A=1, Λ=30, *e*=5, ξ=60).[6]

The force of these onslaughts upon the Christian teaching of the Sibyls will be felt when it is remembered that some Christian writers went so far as to make St. Paul himself appeal to the testimony of the Sibyl.

[1] Cf. *Sib.* iii. 3–7, etc. [2] *Vis.* ii. § 4.
[3] *Quæst. et resp. ad Orthodoxos*, 74.
[4] *Apol.* i. 20, 59. [5] Orig. *c. Cels.* vii. § 56.
[6] For such puzzles in the *Sibyllines*, cf. i. 140–146, 326–331.

> ἐπεὶ ὅτι καθάπερ Ἰουδαίους σώζεσθαι ἐβούλετο ὁ θεὸς, τοὺς προφήτας διδοὺς, οὕτω καὶ Ἑλλήνων τοὺς δοκιμωτάτους, οἰκείους αὐτῶν τῇ διαλέκτῳ προφήτας ἀναστήσας, ὡς οἱοί τε ἦσαν δέχεσθαι τὴν παρὰ θεοῦ εὐεργεσίαν. τῶν χυδαίων ἀνθρώπων διέκρινε, δηλώσει πρὸς τῷ Πετροῦ κηρύγματι ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγων Παῦλος· Λάβετε καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς βίβλους, ἐπίγνωτε Σίβυλλαν, ὡς ὁηλοῖ ἕνα θεὸν καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι.[1]

After this there are few allusions to the Sibyl in the Greek Fathers. But among Latin writers there are frequent quotations. Lactantius is a mine of Sibylline verses. Constantine's speech to the elders at Nicæa, as recorded by Eusebius, abounds in allusions. Augustine discussed seriously the Sibyl's claim, and, finding nothing in her whole poem that advocated the worship of false gods, he decided that she must be included in the number of those who belong to the City of God.[2]

5. **MSS.**—The great majority of MSS of the *Sibylline Oracles* date from the 15th cent.; only two appear to belong to the 14th, and none are earlier. The first printed ed. is that of Xystus Betuleius (Basel, 1545), containing bks. i.–viii. 485. The first ed. to contain the whole of bk. viii. is that of Johannes Opsopœus (Paris, 1599). The last four books were discovered by Angelo Mai and published in 1817, in his *Scriptorum veterum nova collectio*. The fragments, six in number, are preserved in Theophilus, *ad Autolycum*, and in Lactantius.

Of the many edd. of the *Oracles* special mention should be made of the monumental work of C. Alexandre (*Oracula sibyllina*, 2 vols., Paris, 1841–56) and of the most recent ed., that of J. Geffcken (Leipzig, 1902). Geffcken built upon the unpublished work of Mendelssohn, and both in this ed. and in various magazine articles he has rendered valuable service to the problem of the text.

6. **Contents.**—A brief summary of the different books is subjoined. Of the fragments only the first and third are of any considerable length. They are quoted by Theophilus as occurring 'at the beginning of [the Sibyl's] prophecy,' and therefore it is possible that they formed an introduction to bk. iii. They are certainly of early date, and their theme is the majesty of God, especially as seen in the works of creation, the folly of idolatry, and the wisdom of worshipping God.

First and second books.—Bks. i. and ii. are best treated as a unity, the division between them being found in no early MS. The general scheme is to give a summary of the world's history from the earliest times to the end. This purpose is not fully carried out. Bk. i. indeed recounts six generations, up to and including the Flood, but then a new generation (of Titans) arises, and the intervening history is omitted till the coming of Christ. Bk. ii. begins with a short introduction, and then describes the coming of the tenth generation, which is to witness the breaking down of the dominion of Rome. There is to ensue a period of deep peace, and afterwards Christ is to appear, heralded by a star, and is to distribute rewards to those who have proved themselves worthy. At this point 92 lines are inserted, mostly from pseudo-Phocylides, which have no obvious connexion with what precedes or follows. Four transitional lines intervene, and then commences a new section which is occupied principally with eschatological details. Many of these details are closely parallel to the descriptions in the Apocalypse of Peter.

The most probable view of these books is that in their original scheme they form a Jewish work dealing with the ten generations of man, but that this scheme was for some reason abandoned half-way through, and the interest of the writer passed to eschatology. The book, being thus left as a kind of medley, was further confused by the insertion of various Christian elements. In its present form it is therefore late, and is to be ascribed probably to the 2nd cent. A.D. The section from pseudo-Phocylides (ii. 56–148) is obviously an insertion, and has possibly displaced iii. 1–92.

Third book.—Bk. iii. is the most important, and in some ways the most perplexing, of the Sibylline writings. It is obviously composed of several different elements, but great uncertainty exists as to the exact character of them. The following division of the book is suggested:

1–62.	An introduction written by a Jew living probably in Palestine about 80 B.C.
63–92.	A Jewish or Christian eschatological section from the end of the 1st cent. A.D.; a very much later addition to the book.
93–96.	A Jewish or Christian fragment.
97–161.	A passage overworked from the Babylonian Sibyl.
162–294.	A Jewish passage dating from 140 B.C. or a little earlier.
295–488.	A collection of prophecies on the whole Jewish and anti-Roman. The bulk deals with the years 170–140 B.C., and seems to have been composed about the latter date, though some sections may be much

[1] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi. 5. [2] *De Civ. Dei*, xviii. 23.

earlier. Lines 464–488 are considerably later and may be dated about 80 B.C.

489–829. Another Jewish collection incorporating several ancient oracles, but dating on the whole from 140 B.C., or very near that time. The eschatological element is strongly marked towards the end, and the hortatory tone is more noticeable. The ending bears signs of interpolation.

Lines 1–96 can hardly be homogeneous in themselves. One section (46–62) appears to belong to the same date as the section 464–470, *i.e.* about 80 B.C. But lines 62–92 are obviously late and cannot be placed earlier than the 1st cent. A.D. Indeed their eschatology is to be compared with ii. 165 ff. The first part (8–45) comes nearest in thought to frag. i., while 92–95 seem to be, like v. 256–259, a Christian interpolation.

The middle section (295–488) is mainly historical in its allusion and has very little direct teaching. The history has to do partly with Antiochus Epiphanes and the struggles of his successors, but partly with the events of the next century. Lines 350–355 seem to refer to the Mithradatic war, and 464–470 bring us in all probability to the stirring times of Sulla. But more ancient writings are incorporated—*e.g.*, 401–418, 419–432—and oracles on various lands are interspersed. The view of Rome is interesting. She is regarded with bitter hatred, and the writer looks forward with savage joy to her discomfiture at the hands of Asia. This goes far beyond the unfavourable view of Rome expressed in the first of the three divisions (175 ff.).

There is no sign of any special interest in Egypt, though the struggles between the brothers Ptolemy, Philometor and Euergetes, seem to be alluded to in line 316. The writer seems to belong to Asia, and perhaps to Phrygia.

With regard to the question of date, lines 97–294 and 489–829 represent, with possible interpolations, the oldest portions of the book and reflect very much the same date, though lines 97–294 are probably a little earlier. The standpoint of this section is that of an Egyptian Jew of about 140 B.C., who sees in the recent troubles of his nation a parallel to the Babylonian captivity, and in their reviving fortunes under Simon Maccabæus a type of their former deliverance under Cyrus. Imbued with the same kind of spirit as that which prompted Aristobulus some twenty years before to maintain that all the flower of Greek philosophy and poetry was in some way dependent on the Jewish Scriptures, he begins with an ancient Sibylline writing (97–154), which he introduces by a few lines dealing with the Flood and the Tower of Babel, and then goes on with an account of the fortunes of the Jews and the prosperity that is in store for them. Certain other nations are mentioned, but only one at any length. The Romans have already made their mark in Eastern history and have inspired terror of their arms. The moral obliquities ascribed to them in line 184 ff. may be out of place here, or they may be grossly exaggerated. But we cannot say certainly that they were entirely unfounded.

In line 489 *ad fin.* the country most in the writer's mind is not Rome, but Greece. In true Sibylline style he leads up to his main theme by allusions to various other lands, but Greece forms evidently his main theme. A great disaster has lately overtaken it. A barbarian land has laid it waste, and its long history seems to have closed in irretrievable catastrophe. This can hardly refer to anything but the expedition of L. Mummius in 146 B.C., which was crowned by the capture and destruction of Corinth. Other allusions make for the same date (*c.* 140 B.C.); these will be found in 607–615, 732–740, and in the general idea of the renewed prosperity of the Jewish race. The writer is a patriotic Jew, well-versed in OT prophecy. His interests are largely eschatological. He believes intensely in the coming of Messiah, he foresees further troubles and a fresh determined onslaught on the Holy City by the evil powers of the world; but beyond that he looks forward to a reign of peace and happiness, in which the nation shall dwell contentedly around its restored Temple, and the peoples of the world shall bring their gifts and offer their sacrifice of praise. The whole spirit of this writing seems to reflect the exuberant hope of the days of Simon Maccabæus.

Fourth book.—Bk. iv. deals with the same kinds of subjects as bk. iii., but in much shorter compass. The history of man is divided into twelve generations, and catastrophes on various cities and countries are foretold. Among these catastrophes earthquakes play a noticeable part, and it is probable that the severe earthquake which ruined Laodicea in A.D. 60 is comparatively fresh in the writer's mind.[1] The destruction of the Temple is presupposed (116 ff.), and the curious belief in the return of Nero points to a date not long after A.D. 70. We may with considerable confidence assign the book to about A.D. 80. The author appears to be chiefly interested in Asia Minor. His religious position is marked by (*a*) rejection of temples or shrines, (*b*) rejection of sacrifices, (*c*) belief in the imminence of a final judgment, to be followed by a reign of the just upon earth, (*d*) insistence on ceremonial washings. Formerly the author was widely believed to have been a Christian, but the prevailing opinion now sees in him a Jew, possibly an Essene.

Fifth book.—Bk. v. falls into two unequal divisions: (*a*) 1–51, (*b*) 52–531. In section (*a*) the writer goes through a list of the Roman emperors, whom he identifies by their initials, as far as Hadrian. Section (*b*) is for the most part taken up with the regular Sibylline prophecy of woes on various lands and cities, but there are certain sections which seem to stand out as striking a different note. Such are 228–246, an address to Ὕβρις, 260–285, a panegyric on Judæa, and 256–259, a Christian interpolation.

The characteristic of section (*b*) is bitter hatred against Rome and a strong vein of patriotism for Judæa. Mingled with the hatred for Rome there is also a marked bitterness against Egypt, where there had apparently been a recent persecution of Jews. Lines 411–413 refer to the belief, attested elsewhere, that Titus, on his way home after the capture of Jerusalem, would die the moment he set foot on Italian soil.

The expectation of the return of Nero appears in both sections, but in 33 f. Nero is still the historical personage, while in 137–154 and 361–385 he is invested with superhuman traits.

Section (*a*) appears to date from the middle years of the principate of Hadrian, when Rome could be regarded with favour by a patriotic Jew. Section (*b*) is the work of a Jew living in Egypt, and writing shortly after the suppression of the rebellion of Bar Cochba in A.D. 132.

Sixth book.—Bk. vi. is a short hymn describing the ministry and death of Christ. Its date is probably towards the end of the 2nd century A.D. The following may be reckoned as peculiar features: (*a*) the appearance of fire at the Baptism of Christ (line 6); (*b*) the dove at the Baptism specified as white (7); (*c*) the reference to Adam and Eve having seen Christ (18); (*d*) the taking of the Cross into heaven (27). The anti-Jewish feeling is noticeable. Judæa is called the 'land of Sodom' (21).

Seventh book.—Bk. vii. has come down in a fragmentary condition. It falls into three divisions, 1–50, 51–95, 96–162, each beginning with detached oracles of woe and passing on to some definite religious teaching. The author is deeply tinged with Gnosticism. He believes in three towers in heaven, which are the dwelling-place of the three 'Mothers of God'—Hope, Piety, and Worship (71–73). He enjoins quaint ceremonies, prayers, and incantations (76–91). He is familiar with the Gnostic ogdoad (140). His eschatology is marked by sternness. Fire is to play an important part at the end of the world, and the torments of the ungodly are apparently to be eternal. The date may be tentatively placed in the first half of the 3rd cent. A.D.

Eighth book.—Bk. viii. is the most definitely Christian of all. It falls into two main divisions at line 216. The first is marked by a bitter hatred against Rome, whose miserable end is expected at a definite day, *i.e.* A.D. 195. This date is arrived at by counting the numerical value of the letters of ΡΩΜΗ=948, and reckoning from the foundation of the city. The theme of the fall of Rome leads on to eschatology, in which special features are the return of Nero Redivivus and the dominion of a woman apparently regarded as the incarnation of evil. A 'holy son' is to slay the wicked woman by launching upon her the waters of the great deep, and is to save mankind in a second ark. In the resurrection that is to follow there is to be a perfect life of communism and happiness. The author is probably a Christian, though there is little distinctively Christian in his outlook.

The second division is frankly and avowedly Christian, and contains the famous acrostic on ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΧΡΕΙΣΤΟΣ ΘΕΟΥ ΥΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ ΣΤΑΥΡΟΣ, the five first letters of which form another acrostic, ΙΧΘΥΣ: hence the common symbol of the fish for Christ as noticed by Tertullian and Augustine.[1] This acrostic is the basis of the whole division, and it is expanded by various details of the life and especially of the death of Christ, and rounded off by an eschatological section. Between 358 and 455 there is inserted an independent section dealing with the nature of God and the worship due to Him. There are no certain marks of date in this division of the book, but it may be placed somewhere in the 3rd cent. A.D.

The last four books.—The last four bks., xi.–xiv., are mainly historical, and of less interest. Bk. xi. begins with the Flood, dated in the fifth[2] generation, and proceeds at once to the story of the Tower of Babel in the tenth generation. Then comes a rapid survey of successive empires beginning with Egypt and the Exodus. The second half of the book deals principally with Rome, especially in its connexion with Egypt.

The writer is evidently an Egyptian patriot, who traces his country's history down to the loss of her independence. He is probably an Alexandrian Jew, and perhaps a proselyte. His chief model is bk. iii., especially in its historical portions. The latest mark of date is the reference in line 160 to the extension of the Roman empire to the Tigris and Euphrates, which occurred in the principate of Hadrian.

Bk. xii. follows a simple scheme. Beginning with eleven lines taken bodily from the commencement of bk. v., it proceeds to give a short history of the Roman emperors from Augustine to Elagabalus, each emperor being indicated by the numerical value of his initial. The history is usually straightforward, though there are occasional inaccuracies—*e.g.*, in the statement that Caligula was put to death in an outburst of feeling occasioned by the execution of a Vestal Virgin, and that Vespasian was murdered. There are a few Christian passages; *e.g.*, 30–36 speak of the Incarnation, and 196 ff. refer to the story of the Thundering Legion. But the religious side is not emphasized. The writer is little more than a versifier of history. His date is probably in the reign of Alexander Severus (A.D. 222–235).

Bk. xiii. continues the history from the reign of Alexander Severus to about the reign of Tacitus (A.D. 275). After a

[1] Cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 27.

[1] The acrostic is quoted in Eusebius, *Const. Or. ad Sanct. Coet.* xviii., and a Latin tr. is found in Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xviii. 23.

[2] Reading *πέμπτην* (so Rzach) for *πενίην* in line 7.

stereotyped introduction the book begins so abruptly that it is evidently mutilated. The history is narrated so allusively that the identification of the references is frequently attended with great difficulty. There is much more of the Sibylline woes on various places than in the preceding book. The religious teaching is again very slight. The writer seems to be a Jew rather than a Christian, and possibly he is an Alexandrian. He writes under the spell of the consternation caused by the capture of Valerian by Sapor, the Persian king, and the troubles and upheavals of the second half of the 3rd cent. are faithfully reflected in his lines. But throughout all the enumeration of troubles there runs a vein of hope and confidence. The writer by no means despairs of the Roman empire (contrast 46–49 with viii. 148–150).

The style is somewhat conventional, but not without a certain vigour. There are allusions to earlier books, and the vocabulary is 'Sibylline,' but we find no such patchwork of borrowed fragments as in the preceding book.

Bk. xiv. evidently sets out to be a continuation of bk. xiii., and therefore it starts with the death of Odenatus (lines 12–17) and the reign of Aureolus (18–20). But after this no scheme of history has been propounded that can be adapted to the allusions to the names of emperors. It is possible to pick out one or two here and there that seem to fit, but in the general chaos of the book it appears to be an unprofitable task to do so. Either the writer lived about the 6th or 7th cent. A.D. and had a very inaccurate knowledge of history or, if he is writing about A.D. 300, he is giving rein to a very vivid imagination. In either case his work can hardly be pronounced worthy of serious study.

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SICKNESS.—See DISEASE AND MEDICINE.

SIDGWICK (HENRY). — 1. Life. — Henry Sidgwick was born in 1838 at Skipton in Yorkshire, where his father, the Rev. William Sidgwick, was headmaster of the Grammar School. He came of Yorkshire stock, and there is a tradition that in the last generation one might hear this family referred to in the neighbourhood of Skipton as 'the good and great Sidgwicks.' William Sidgwick's wife was Miss Mary Crofts, also of Yorkshire descent, and it is told of her that she was a beauty and a wit. Her third son, Henry, the subject of this article, was three years old when his father died. Henry's sister, Mary, became the wife of her cousin, E. W. Benson, afterwards archbishop of Canterbury, and his youngest brother Arthur, a brilliant classical scholar, was Reader in Greek in the University of Oxford. Henry Sidgwick's life is most admirably set before us by his brother and his wife, Arthur Sidgwick and Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick, in *Henry Sidgwick: a Memoir by A. S. and E. M. S.*

In Sept. 1852 Henry Sidgwick went to Rugby, and from there, in Oct. 1855, to Trinity College, Cambridge. He won the Bell and Craven Scholarships—the latter the 'blue ribbon' among Classical scholarships at Cambridge—and in Jan. 1859, having taken both the Classical and Mathematical Triposes, he came out 33rd Wrangler and Senior Classic, and also won the first Chancellor's Medal. In October of the same year he was elected a Fellow of Trinity. Henry Sidgwick felt at that time no difficulty in making the declaration required from all Fellows of Colleges on admission, that he was a member of the Church of England, and he was appointed an assistant tutor in Classics, being then a little over 21 years of age. Thus began that life of academic teaching which he carried on for over forty years.

In an autobiographical fragment dictated in his last illness, which is included in the *Memoir*, Sidgwick, referring to his membership of 'The Apostles,' says:

'In the Michaelmas term of my second year an event occurred which had more effect on my intellectual life than any one thing that happened to me afterwards: I became a member of a discussion society—old and possessing historical traditions—which went by the name of "The Apostles"' . . . [The spirit of this Society] 'gradually absorbed and dominated me. I can only describe it as the spirit of the pursuit of truth with absolute devotion and unreserve by a group of intimate friends, who were perfectly frank with each other. . . . Absolute candour was the only duty that the tradition of the society enforced.'[1] 'It came to seem to me that no part of my life at Cambridge

[1] P. 34.

was so real to me as the Saturday evenings on which the apostolic debates were held; and the tie of attachment to the society is much the strongest corporate bond which I have known in life. I think, then, that my admission into this society and the enthusiastic way in which I came to idealise it really determined or revealed that the deepest bent of my nature was towards the life of thought—thought exercised on the central problems of human life. But many years elapsed before the consciousness of this led me to embrace the study of philosophy as my life's work.'[1] In the same fragment he describes the 'central and fundamental aim' of his life as 'the solution, or contribution to the solution, of the deepest problems of human life. The peculiarity of my career has been that I have sought light on these problems, and that not casually but systematically and laboriously, from very various sources and by very diverse methods.'[2]

In 1869 Sidgwick had come to feel that he could no longer honestly declare himself to be a member of the Church of England. His secession from the Church was perhaps a foregone conclusion, but his future life seemed only the more deeply devoted to an unwavering passionate allegiance to truth. He resigned his Fellowship. His reasons for doing so were recognized and respected, and he retained the post of college lecturer. It was considered that this action of Sidgwick's was one of the influences which led to the removal of religious tests in the University in 1871.

In 1885 he was re-admitted a Fellow of his college, having been elected to the Knightbridge Professorship of Moral Philosophy two years previously. In 1876 Sidgwick had married Miss Eleanor Mildred Balfour, sister of Mr. A. J. Balfour.

To attempt to give here anything like an adequate list of Sidgwick's occupations and activities would be out of place, but three main directions of sustained and fruitful activity—in addition to his philosophic or moral sciences work—must be mentioned, each of which would in itself have made a good life's record. These are (1) his work for the education of women, chiefly in connexion with Newnham College—work crowned with most signal success; to him women's education in Cambridge owes an immeasurable debt; (2) his work in University matters generally; he was, as has been said, one who led the leaders, and he took his full share of ordinary business. It may be noted how excellent his work in this connexion was—how accurate, able, and thorough. He was one who 'sought peace and ensued it,' but he always stood up for the right and strove valiantly for it, and in this

> 'His strength was as the strength of ten
> Because his heart was pure.'

(3) His interest in psychical research must also be referred to. There is perhaps no part of Sidgwick's work which shows in a more marked measure the initiative and courage which were so characteristic of him. His was a brave and candid spirit—in bondage to no fears, no weaknesses, no hypocrisies. Psychical research was, as Sidgwick indicates, to some extent connected with that search after enlightenment, that study of the central problems of human life, to which he had deliberately chosen to consecrate his chief effort. To this choice he remained true, with an unswerving devotion, an inexhaustible patience.

We must regard as an important part of this study and devotion the labour which he bestowed upon the affairs of the Moral Sciences Tripos and all connected with it. Philosophy was his main interest; and among philosophical subjects it was ethics that had the first place in his thought, and in ethics that his most successful and influential work was accomplished.

In May 1900, in the full vigour of mental power, with so much accomplished, yet so much still to do, with life so full of interest, happiness, and promise, Sidgwick received his death-warrant from his physician—with grief and pain indeed, but with an indomitable sweetness and unselfishness and 'a most moving courage.'

'For nearly a fortnight he told no one but his wife. It was easier to carry on life in a normal manner when no one knew. But he began to set his affairs in order.'[1]

He wrote for the Oxford Philosophical Society a promised paper on T. H. Green, which, said one of those who heard it read on 19th May, was 'the most lucid, sincere, and impressive piece of philosophic criticism it had ever been my privilege to hear.'[2] And so, fulfilling his ordinary engagements, doing what he could to prepare against the contingency of an unfavourable result of the operation which he decided to undergo, comforting his friends, he bore the suffering and weakness of the last stage of life with 'unbroken patience and the simplest unselfish fortitude.'[3] He died on 28th Aug. 1900 at Terling Place, Essex, and was buried in the village churchyard at Terling.

2. Writings and philosophy.—We may begin our account of Sidgwick's main ethical doctrines and conclusions with a summary in his own words of the scope of the subject:

'The subject of Ethics, most comprehensively understood, includes (1) an investigation of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general and particular species of (*a*) Virtue or (*b*) Pleasure, and the chief means of realising these ends; (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or the Moral Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue); (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognised and, more generally, into the part taken by Intellect in human action, and its relation to various kinds of Desire and Aversion; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. It is connected with Theology, in so far as a Universal Good is recognised, inclusive of Human Good, or analogous to it; and again, so far as morality is regarded as a Code of Divine appointment. It is connected with Politics, so far as the wellbeing of any individual man is bound up with the wellbeing of his society; and again with Jurisprudence—if this is separated from Politics—so far as morality is identified with Natural Law. Finally, almost every branch of ethical discussion belongs at least in part to Psychology.'[4]

In his great work, *The Methods of Ethics* (1874), Sidgwick has given us a full and lucid discussion of these topics, and has gathered up the results of previous ethical thought; and both in that book and in the *History of Ethics* we have a dispassionate, penetrating account of the work of earlier moralists, from the pre-Socratics down to Herbert Spencer, T. H. Green, and German post-Kantians. This critical history, brief as it is, is unique and invaluable. But it is to *The Methods of Ethics* that we must go if we are to learn, as fully as we can, the doctrine of this great English moralist.

Of the three questions, (1) What ought I to do?, (2) How do I know what I ought to do?, (3) Why should I do what I see to be right?, it is as an answer to the second that Sidgwick has laid out his scheme of treatment in *The Methods of Ethics*; hence the title of the book.

'My object,' he says, 'in the present work is to expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of Ethics that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning; to point to their mutual relations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much as possible.'[5]

In his view, until the logical question, the question of method, is answered, it is not possible to offer a reasoned answer to the primary question, What ought I to do?

'In deciding what they ought to do,' he says, 'men naturally proceed on different principles, and by different methods. There are two *prima facie* rational Ends, Excellence or Perfection and Happiness. . . . It is also commonly thought that certain Rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior consequences. The Methods corresponding to these different principles reduce themselves in the main to three, Egoism, Intuitionism, Utilitarianism. These methods we are to examine separately, abstracting them from ordinary thought, where we find them in

[1] P. 35. [2] P. 33 f.

[1] *Memoir*, p. 584. [2] *Ib.* p. 586, n. 1.
[3] *Ib.* p. 598.
[4] See *Outlines of the Hist. of Ethics*[5], p. 10 f.
[5] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 14.

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confused combination, and developing them as precisely and consistently as possible.'[1] The end of egoism is the happiness of the agent; the end of utilitarianism is the general happiness. The method which proceeds on the assumption that 'certain rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior consequences' is called intuitionism—more precisely, dogmatic intuitionism.

It is this common-sense ethics—the dogmatic intuitionism of popular morality—that Sidgwick examines in bk. iii., in ch. xi. of which he sums up his results, and concludes that the maxims of common sense do not possess the characteristics required in scientific axioms; for they are sometimes tautological, sometimes vague, sometimes inconsistent with one another—to every rule, or almost every rule, exceptions are allowed.

'The maxims of Wisdom and Self-control are only self-evident in so far as they are tautological: nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the Affections: and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them: and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent First Principle . . . similarly with other virtues . . . The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance, but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms.'[2]

The search for rules which can be accepted as scientific axioms, for 'some deeper explanation *why* . . . conduct commonly judged to be right is so,' for 'some rational synthesis' of commonly accepted precepts, leads the inquirer from dogmatic intuitionism to that phase of intuitionism called philosophical—

a method which, 'while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound, still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer; to get one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications.'[3]

Such principles Sidgwick finds in Kant's Categorical Imperative: 'Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature,' and in Samuel Clarke's rule of equity and rule of love or benevolence. Kant's Imperative gives the *form* of a law or general rule: 'What is right for me is right for anyone else in similar circumstances.' The Rule of Equity is:

'Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me; that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I *in the like case* should do for him.'[4]

This maxim is simply a precise statement of the 'Golden Rule' of the gospel: 'Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you.' The Rule of Universal Love or Benevolence declares:

'Every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the Good it can to all its fellow-creatures: to which end universal Love and Benevolence is . . . plainly the most direct, certain, and effectual means.'[5]

'Love your neighbour as yourself' perhaps sums up the Rules of both Equity and Benevolence. The Maxim of Prudence, or rational self-love, is that 'one ought to aim at one's own good on the whole.' These maxims are among those 'absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest.'[6]

'Hereafter *as such* is to be regarded neither less nor more than *Now*'[7] is a self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the Maxim of Prudence. It is self-evident too that 'whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances.'[8] As regards the Rule of Equity, Sidgwick says of it:

'Common Sense has amply recognised the practical importance of the maxim: and its truth, so far as it goes, appears to me self-evident.'[1] 'And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as it is attainable by my efforts.'[2]

It is found (*a*) that of the commonly received maxims of duty most, when closely examined, 'contain an implicit subordination to the more general principles of Prudence and Benevolence: and (*b*) that no principles except these, and the formal principle of Justice or Equity, can be admitted as at once intuitively clear and certain; while, again, these principles themselves, so far as they are self-evident, may be stated as precepts to seek (1) one's own good on the whole, . . . and (2) others' good no less than one's own, repressing any undue preference for one individual over another. Thus we are brought round again to the old question with which ethical speculation in Europe began, "What is the Ultimate Good for man?"—though not in the egoistic form in which the old question was raised. When, however, we examine the controversies to which this question originally led, we see that the investigation which has brought us round to it has tended definitely to exclude one of the answers which early moral reflection was disposed to give to it. For to say that "General Good" consists solely in general Virtue,—if we mean by Virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality of Common Sense—would obviously involve us in a logical circle: since . . . the exact determination of these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on the definition of this General Good. . . . For example, Common Sense may seem to regard Liberality, Frugality, Courage, Placability, as intrinsically desirable: but when we consider their relation respectively to Profusion, Meanness, Foolhardiness, Weakness, we find that Common Sense draws the line in each case not by immediate intuition, but by reference either to some definite maxim of duty, or to the general notion of "Good" or Wellbeing. . . . Other qualities commonly admired, such as Energy, Zeal, Self-control, Thoughtfulness, are obviously regarded as virtues only when they are directed to good ends.'[3] Again, 'Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to Good: Benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called "doing Good": Justice (when regarded as essentially and always a Virtue) lies in distributing Good (or evil) impartially according to right rules. If then we are asked what is this Good which it is excellent to know, to bestow on others, to distribute impartially, it would be obviously absurd to reply that it is just this knowledge, these beneficent purposes, this impartial distribution.'[4]

What, then, is the Good, that which is ultimately and intrinsically good—good in itself?

This—the question debated in the ethical controversy of ancient Greece—assumed that any 'rational individual would make the pursuit of his own good his supreme aim: the controverted question was whether this Good was rightly conceived as Pleasure or Virtue, or any *tertium quid*.'[5] . . . 'Which of the objects that men think good is truly Good or the Highest Good?'[6]

As we have just seen, the commonly accepted rules of virtuous conduct involved a reference to good otherwise determined. There remain, therefore, pleasure and the *tertium quid* (if any).

Now, pleasure is 'Feeling which is *in itself* desirable, and which is apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it,' and happiness is pleasure and the absence of pain. At the end of ch. ix. of bk. i. in which the meaning of good is closely discussed, Sidgwick reaches this conclusion:

In the view of common sense 'beauty, knowledge and other ideal goods, as well as all external material things, are only reasonably to be sought by men in so far as they conduce either (1) to Happiness or (2) to the Perfection or Excellence of human existence.'[7]

Other objects of pursuit do not seem to be in themselves intrinsically and ultimately good. Fame, *e.g.*, which is so eagerly pursued, is not 'an object which it is reasonable for men to seek for its own sake. It only commends itself to reflective minds either (1) as a source of Happiness to the person who gains it, or (2) a sign of his Excellence, moral or intellectual, or (3) because it attests the achievement by him of some important benefit to society, and at the same time stimulates him and others to further achievement in the future . . . a man is commonly thought to benefit others either by making them happier or by making them wiser and more virtuous.'[8] Similar considerations are recognised in the case of other commonly accepted sources of happiness—*e.g.*, health, wealth, social position.

As to human perfection or excellence, it is not 'in accordance with Common Sense to regard Subjective Rightness of Will, or other elements of perfection as constituting Ultimate Good.' Subjective rightness of will—a man's will to do what he thinks is right—is compatible with the most

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. xxiii.
[2] *Ib.* p. xxxii. [3] *Ib.* p. 102.
[4] *Boyle Lectures* (1705), London, 1719, p. 67.
[5] *Ib.* p. 72.
[6] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 379.
[7] *Ib.* p. 381. [8] *Ib.* p. 379.

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 380. [2] *Ib.* p. 382.
[3] *Ib.* p. 391 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 393. [5] *Ib.* p. 92.
[6] *Ib.* p. 106. [7] *Ib.* p. 114. [8] *Ib.* p. 9

mistaken views as to what *is* right. A fanatic may be a most dangerous and mischievous person.

'And what has been said of Virtue seems . . . still more manifestly true of the other talents, gifts, and graces which make up the common notion of human excellence or Perfection. . . . Reflection shows that they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable conscious life in which they are . . . actualised, or which will be somehow promoted by their exercise.'[1]

'What is ultimately good or desirable must be desirable Consciousness,' *i.e.* either (1) happiness or (2) relations of the conscious subject to something objective, something that is 'not merely consciousness'—*e.g.*, the relation of the mind to truth (in cognition), to beauty (in contemplation of beauty), to freedom or virtue (in volitions to realize virtue or freedom). To Sidgwick it seems clear that such objective relations of conscious subjects are not in themselves ultimately and intrinsically desirable.

In bk. iii. ch. xiv. he appeals first to the intuitive judgment of the reader, 'after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it: and secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me at least it seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable; any more than material or other objects are, when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence. Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness: it still seems to me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we "sit down in a cool hour," we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings.

The second argument, which refers to the common sense of mankind, obviously cannot be made completely cogent; since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc.—not to speak of Virtue—are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements of "ideal good" are productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of Beauty; and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal: it is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of Freedom, or any form of social order, would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The case of Knowledge is rather more complex; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge, when its "fruitfulness" has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote: and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds; both as furnishing to the inquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this last, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort; so that the meed of honour commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed, as in the . . . case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis.'[2]

Though it has to be allowed that common sense is disinclined to admit happiness (=sum of pleasures) to be the ultimate Good, yet this can be explained by considering (1) that the term 'pleasure' is very commonly used in a bad sense and with a restricted scope; (2) that many pleasures depend on our experiencing desires for other things than pleasures; (3) that, when happiness is taken as the ultimate Good, it is often supposed that what is meant is that each individual should pursue only *his own* happiness; (4) 'from the universal point of view no less than from that of the individual, it seems true that Happiness is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted.'[3]

As the result of this appeal to common sense, Sidgwick concludes that we are justified in considering that common sense is disposed to accept happiness as the ultimate Good.

It may seem almost superfluous to insist on men's ineradicable belief in the value of happiness. Our desire that virtue should be rewarded—rewarded with happiness, that is—that there should be a heaven for the good, answers some of the deepest demands of our nature. We are convinced that the 'wages of virtue' ought not to be 'dust.' What we wish to those we love is 'long life and *happiness*,' 'many *happy* returns,' and so on. Long life without happiness is not desirable, and an hour, a day, a week, of torturing pain, or even of simple discomfort or mere indifference, is in itself entirely undesirable.

Sidgwick's argument has eliminated every alternative except happiness; and he points out that the acceptance of cognition of objective truth, contemplation of objective beauty, and so on, as ultimate Good, instead of happiness, would leave us without any 'criterion for determining the comparative value of different elements of "Good".' He concludes that 'the Intuitional Method rigorously applied yields as its final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism.' Thus the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill is provided with that intuitional basis which it had previously lacked, and the effort of thought which has so fully explained and systematized the maxims of common sense has also accomplished a further great constructive achievement, and has succeeded in unifying intuitionism and Benthamite utilitarianism. The 'consilience' is very impressive.

The problem that occupied the ethical schools of Greece is thus solved: it is seen that virtue consists in the promotion of happiness (pleasure and absence of pain); as far as human conduct is concerned, the practice of virtue is the best means to the general happiness, and 'that most excellent of all practical principles, the active principle of benevolence,' as Butler calls it, the principle which aims at the happiness of others, is the root and support of common-sense morality. And not only so, but—since this fundamental principle is in essence no other than the Golden Rule of the Gospels—we have here the coalescence of intuitional hedonism with Christian ethics. This unification, though recognized by Sidgwick, was not emphasized by him; but it furnishes a striking confirmation of the view which he reached as the result of systematic and profound reflexion on ethical thought.[1]

This is perhaps the most convenient place for some further consideration of that doctrine of the dualism of practical reason to which reference has already been made. This dualism is regarded by Sidgwick as the final ethical difficulty—'the profoundest problem of Ethics.'[2] He accepts as intuitively certain the maxims of reasonable self-love and of rational benevolence, but he does not find in his moral consciousness 'any intuition, claiming to be clear and certain, that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished,' though he feels a 'desire, apparently inseparable from the moral sentiments, that this result may be realised.'[3] He has not been able to reach the desideratum of the practical reason—a reconciliation of the individual with the universal reason. There seems to be no clear and certain intuition that the action most conducive

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 395.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 400–402.
[3] *Ib.* p. 405.

[1] A most interesting autobiographical account of the steps by which Sidgwick arrived at his 'Utilitarianism on an Intuitional basis' is to be found in the preface to the sixth and subsequent edd. of *The Methods of Ethics*, and in *Mind*, new ser., x. [1901] 287 ff.
[2] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 886, note 4.
[3] *Ib.* p. 507.

to the agent's good *is* always coincident with that most conducive to the good of others, no convincing and indisputable metaphysical or theological proof. Again, it is not found that such invariable coincidence is supported by an appeal to experience, that 'inseparable connection between Utilitarian Duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it' can 'be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds.'[1] His conclusion is:

The discussion of the 'profoundly difficult and controverted question' with which we are here concerned 'belongs rather to a treatise on General Philosophy than to a work on the Methods of Ethics: as it could not be satisfactorily answered without a general examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs. Those who hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises, may reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If on the other hand we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs,—it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics, without opening the door to universal scepticism.'[2]

We may observe that it is practical dualism which alone among ethical doctrines clearly sees, honestly recognizes, and fairly faces the claims (for the individual agent) of both self and others, and it gives a clue to the mixture of good and evil that is in men, and does not leave us with a hopeless puzzle—self-love and benevolence are recognized as both natural and both rational.

There is another consideration, which is not insisted on by Sidgwick, but which appears to be of great interest and importance in its bearing on the dualism of practical reason. It is this. Whoever accepts the end of rational benevolence—*i.e.* the happiness of others—can accept it only on the ground that each individual's happiness is *to him* ultimately and intrinsically valuable, valuable in itself, and, since a man cannot directly experience any happiness but his own, this belief in the value for others of their own happiness must be based on his recognition of the value for himself of his own happiness. The reasonableness of benevolence implies the reasonableness of self-love. If we start from rational benevolence, we are irresistibly led back to self-love as our starting-point, and in the precept 'Love your neighbour as yourself' we find the same implication that love of our self is logically prior to, and sets the standard for, love of our neighbour.

On the other hand, as Sidgwick points out, the egoist who 'puts forward, implicitly or explicitly, the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is Good, not only *for him* but from the point of view of the Universe . . . may be brought to accept Universal happiness or pleasure as that which is absolutely and without qualification Good or Desirable.'[3]

This reciprocal implication of the 'two chief or superior principles' of conduct is striking, and is another instance of the 'consiliences' which are so impressive in Sidgwick's ethical construction.

Sidgwick's account of the relation between ethics and politics is highly interesting and important. The two are in his view so closely connected that they are in fact parts of one whole—*i.e.* the science of conduct, of what ought to be done.

'Ethics aims at determining what ought to be done by individuals, while Politics aims at determining what the government of a state or political society ought to do and how it ought to be constituted.'[4]

The relation between ethics and politics is in the utilitarian view particularly close, and must in any case be such that some common measure can be applied in both departments; otherwise hopeless confusion will result. It is imperative that any satisfactory theory of ethics should have a corresponding theory of politics, and that any theory of politics should be considered in relation to ethics. Further, the two must be harmonious; for, unless they have a common principle and the same conception of ultimate human good, they cannot pretend to divide between them, and to regulate without inconsistency, the whole region of human conduct.

In *The Elements of Politics* Sidgwick has given us an indispensable supplement to the ethical work published seventeen years previously, accepting the same fundamental principle—the principle of rational benevolence, the supreme aim of which is the promotion of the general happiness. The aim is all-embracing—'the happiness or well-being of humanity at large.' In the preface to the *Politics* Sidgwick explains that what he has tried to provide is 'a book which would expound . . . the chief general considerations that enter into the rational discussion of political questions in modern states.'

'The Theory of Politics as here expounded is concerned with human societies regarded as possessing Government. Its primary aim is to determine what the constitution and action of Government *ought* to be: accordingly its method is not primarily historical, but deductive, based on psychological propositions not universally and absolutely true, but approximately true of civilised men. It has two main divisions: one concerned with the Functions of Government, internal and external, and the other mainly with its structure.'

The part played by the dualism of the practical reason is different in politics from what it is in ethics.

According to this dualism, 'Reasonable Self-love and Conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man, because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if either of those is.'[1]

In the case of the individual agent it seems to be theoretically possible that the good of the agent may conflict with the good of the whole, and experience seems to confirm this view. Common sense admits the possibility and the actuality of self-sacrifice. A man may give his life for others; many a man has done this and more.

The statesman as such is not subject to this division in the counsels of practical reason. He exists for the good of the governed in the political community to which he belongs. The promotion of the good of his community (with of course a due regard to the good of the larger whole of which it is a part) in his *raison d'être*.[2] But for him too the dualism is, from a different point of view, momentous. Though as statesman he is not liable to be faced with the conflict (which emerges primarily as a conflict of motives) between interest and duty, between the happiness of self and the happiness of others, yet, since the community which he administers consists of individuals who are one and all liable to this conflict, it is his business to reconcile the conflict to the utmost of his power, to make it for the interest of individuals to do that which, if they would do it, would be for the good of the whole—to furnish at any moment motives sufficiently strong to induce individuals at that moment to do what is for the general good. In proportion as the attainment of happiness for self and the attainment of it for others are—so far as the power of government extends—made coincident in any community, in proportion as they are promoted by the same course of action, in that proportion is the community well organized and well governed, to that extent do the members of the community enjoy what Kant calls the 'Supreme Good'; they are both virtuous and happy. The great problem for rulers, as for teachers, is to promote this coincidence of well-doing and well-being. Herein lies much hope for the future—the reduction for the individual agent of the conflict between self-love and rational benevolence does

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 508.
[2] *Ib.* p. 508 f.
[3] *Ib* pp 420, 421.
[4] *Ib.* p. 15.

[1] We have seen why Sidgwick would here substitute rational benevolence for conscience.
[2] See essays on 'Public Morality' and 'Morality of Strife' referred to below, p. 505[a].

seem to be to a very considerable extent in the power of rulers and educators.

Sidgwick's posthumously published *Development of European Polity*, which is 'an evolutionary study of the development of polity, within the historical period in Europe, beginning with the earliest known Græco-Roman and Teutonic polity and carried down to the modern state of Europe and its colonies as the last result of political evolution,' has an interesting relation, complementary and illustrative, to *The Elements of Politics*; and in this connexion mention may also be made of three admirable essays on 'Public Morality,' 'The Morality of Strife,' and 'Luxury,' in the volume entitled *Practical Ethics: a Collection of Addresses and Essays*.

These exemplify the 'practical' effort of the author 'to bring into a more clear and consistent form the broad and general agreement as to the particulars of morality which we find among moral persons, making explicit the general conceptions of the good and evil in human life, of the normal relation of a man to his fellows, which this agreement implies.'[1]

Besides the books already mentioned, four volumes on philosophical subjects were published after Sidgwick's death, namely, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations* (1902), *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau* (1902), *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and other Philosophical Lectures and Essays* (1905), and a volume of *Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses* (1904), selected from already published work.

The lectures on Green, Spencer, and Martineau are to some extent supplementary to *The Methods of Ethics*, as the early editions of that work were published before Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883), Spencer's *Principles of Ethics* (1879–93), and Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* (1885).

The Kant volume contains lectures on 'The Metaphysics of Kant,' 'The Metaphysics of T. H. Green,' 'The Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer,' and five reprinted essays. The *Lectures on Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, were intended as an introduction to the study of philosophy, an 'attempt to define the Scope of Philosophy and its relation to other studies' and that relation between theoretical and practical philosophy which Sidgwick regarded as the profoundest of philosophical problems.

This volume exemplifies the stress on comprehensiveness and articulation of view which pervaded Sidgwick's teaching as well as his writings, and is of such exceptional importance in the moral sciences.[2] Although his writings on metaphysical topics are of great value and interest, he never published any book on the subject; he had not formulated any metaphysical system. In addition to the books referred to above, Sidgwick published (between 1860 and 1900) a large number of articles, reviews, and pamphlets, a list of over 130 of which is given at the end of the *Memoir*. One of these was the article on 'Ethics' in the *EBr*[9], which was expanded later into the *Outlines of the History of Ethics*; and among them we find a remarkable series of ethical reviews and articles which are models of philosophical criticism and literary form. The range of topics of the other articles is very wide, taking in history, classics, literature, psychology, logic, biography, economics, psychical research, education, theology, law, and sociology. It may be permitted to make special mention of three—(1) 'A Dialogue on Time and Common Sense' (reprinted in the Kant volume from *Mind*, new ser., iii. [1894] 441 ff.), which is a gem both as philosophy and as literature; it is very characteristic—full of wit and wisdom, graceful and subtle—and gives a very suggestive idea of what Sidgwick's talk was like; (2) 'The Ethics of Religious Conformity,' and (3) 'Clerical Veracity' (both in the volume of *Practical Ethics*)—which are for a different reason of particular interest, since they deal with a difficulty which is poignant and many-voiced in the Anglican Church.

3. Appreciation.—We find in Sidgwick's work a rare combination of learning and originality, of imaginativeness together with good judgment, sense of perspective, and comprehensiveness of view, of unsparing pains and intense and vivid interest. It would not be too much to say that he took great joy in his work. We find, too, a generous capacity of intellectual sympathy and appreciation and an extraordinary freedom and boldness. Thought was to Henry Sidgwick his native element—a medium in which he moved at ease. Hence his swiftness and sureness of mind, his analytical and critical power, his insight and constructive force. He never misses the point, never fails or falters. In *The Methods of Ethics*, *e.g.*, there are no slack places, no confusions slurred over, no difficulties shirked—the whole is as coherent as a living organism. Analysis and comparison only serve to bring into greater relief the articulation of the parts and the living thought which animates them. No summary, not even the author's own admirable analytical summaries of contents, no quotations even, can convey an adequate idea of the excellence and interest of the work, which is perhaps the best extant treatise on ethics, a classic for all time. The book is difficult, but it repays the closest study, and that it receives full meed of recognition as indispensable for students of philosophy is evidenced by the fact that since its publication in 1874 a steady demand for it has continued, and an eighth edition was published in 1914.

What one feels in reading not only *The Methods of Ethics* but also Sidgwick's other writings (we may indicate in particular here *The Elements of Politics*, *The Principles of Political Economy*, and *Outlines of the History of Ethics*) is that confusion and muddle have been cleared away, dark places illuminated, logic and coherence introduced. *The Methods of Ethics* gives the clue to all Sidgwick's work; in it method—logical procedure—is fundamental.

To a close student Sidgwick's ethical writings reveal, as perhaps no other records of him do, the spirit and mind of their author. They are his most considered intellectual output—his great and lasting monument. They breathe throughout absolute sincerity, a steady belief in goodness and enthusiasm for it, an unrelaxing pursuit of truth, with a grasp, insight, and fullness of knowledge in which the student learns to place a confidence that is never betrayed. His writings are educative in the same sense as his oral teaching and his work as an examiner were. They compel inquiry, and stir honest effort in the learner from first to last. A full and interesting account of Sidgwick's lecturing is given in ch. v. of the *Memoir*. We may extract a few sentences from a speech there quoted of F. W. Maitland, one of Sidgwick's most distinguished pupils:

'I feel safe in saying that within the field [of teaching] that was most properly his own Sidgwick's work has borne excellent fruit. . . . I believe that he was a supremely great teacher. . . . I believe that no more truthful man than Sidgwick ever lived. I am speaking of a rare intellectual virtue. However small the class might be, Sidgwick always gave us his very best . . . as the terms went by, we came to think of lecture-time as the best time that we had in Cambridge; and some of us, looking back now, can say that it was in a very true sense the best time that we ever had in our lives. . . . The matter of the lectures, the theories and the arguments, might be forgotten; but the method remained, the spirit remained, as an ideal—an unattainable ideal, perhaps, but a model of perfect work.'[1]

Sidgwick's letters, as given to us in the *Memoir*, help, in a delightful fashion, to fill out our picture of him—they reveal his thoughts and moods of the moment, the growth of his opinions, his changes of view; they show how constant and loyal and affectionate he was, how friendly with his friends, how full of fun and of interest in current life and thought, especially university matters, politics, and of course books, how vivid and active, how unselfish and generous in small things and in great. They bring home to us in unexpected ways how large-minded he was and how large-hearted; and they are so sympathetic and so responsive that they often seem to tell us as much about his correspondent as they do about himself. His was a soul touched with divine fire, and men felt in him a purity of heart which no evil could invade. Truth and right were to him the 'pearl of great price,' and he had the crowning happiness of a wife like-minded with himself.

[1] P. 8.

[2] It may be pointed out that the 'moral sciences' at Cambridge included moral philosophy, *i.e.* ethics and politics, metaphysics, psychology, logic, and—previous to 1905—political economy.

LITERATURE.—The following is a list of Sidgwick's published books: *The Methods of Ethics*, London, 1874, [2]1877, [3]1884, [4]1890, [5]1893, [6]1901, [7]1907, [8]1914; Supplements to *The Methods*

of Ethics, to 1st ed., 1877, to 2nd ed., 1884; *The Principles of Political Economy*, do. 1883, [2]1887, [3]1901; *The Scope and Method of Economic Science* (presidential address delivered to the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association at Aberdeen, and republished in *Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses*), do. 1885; *Outlines of the Hist. of Ethics for English Readers*, do. 1886, [2]1888, [3]1892, [4]1896, [5]1902, reprinted 1906, 1910, 1916; *The Elements of Politics*, do. 1891, [2]1897, [3]1908; *Practical Ethics: a Collection of Addresses and Essays*, do. 1898; *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations: an Introductory Course of Lectures*, ed. James Ward, do. 1902; *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau*, ed. E. E. C. Jones, do. 1902; *The Development of European Polity*, ed. Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick, do. 1903, [2]1913; *Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses*, ed. Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick and Arthur Sidgwick, do. 1904; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and other Philosophical Lectures and Essays*, ed. James Ward, do. 1905. (The last five books were published posthumously.) A list of articles, reviews, pamphlets, etc., is given in the *Memoir*, pp. 617–622.

The biography written by his brother and his wife, *Henry Sidgwick: a Memoir by A. S. and E. M. S.*, London, 1906, gives a detailed account of Sidgwick's life, consisting largely of extracts from his own letters. It does not include any description or evaluation of Sidgwick's ethical and other philosophical writings. At the end of the *Memoir* (p. 623) is a list of the biographical notices of Sidgwick which had appeared previous to 1906.

Objections to Sidgwick's utilitarianism (sometimes referred to by him as utilitarianism on an intuitional basis) have been summarized and replied to by E. E. C. Jones in art. 'Rational Hedonism,' in *IJE* v. [1894–95] 79 ff., and 'Discussion on Same,' *ib.* pp. 218 ff., 376 ff., and art. 'Professor Sidgwick's Ethics,' in *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, new ser., iv. [1903–04] 32 ff.

E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

SIDHE.—See FAIRY, CELTS.

SIEVE.—1. Sieves used in rain-making ceremonies.—Sieves, and especially winnowing-fans,[1] are frequently employed by primitive peoples for magico-religious purposes, such as rain-making.

Among the Ainus, *e.g.*, when rain is urgently needed, the people are gathered together and the master of the ceremonies appoints certain men to head small companies to execute particular functions. It is the duty of one of these parties to take sieves and scatter water about with them,[2] just as Buddhist monks, during the ceremonies to promote the fertility of the earth, 'pour water into little holes in the floor of the pagoda as a symbol of the rain which they hope Buddha will send down on the rice-fields.'[3] In comparatively recent times (1868) Russian peasants in the Tarashchansk districts are known to have dug up the corpse of a Raskolnik (Dissenter), and to have beaten it, exclaiming, 'Give us rain!', while others poured water on it through a sieve in imitation of a shower of rain.[4] In times of drought in S. India the Kāpu women 'tie a frog alive to a new winnowing fan made of bamboo. On this fan they spread a few margosa leaves, and go singing from door to door, "Lady frog must have her bath. Oh! rain-god, give a little water for her at least." This means that the drought has reached such a stage that there is not even a drop of water for the frogs. When the Kāpu woman sings this song, the woman of the house brings a little water in a vessel, pours it over the frog which is left on the fan outside the house, and gives some alms. The woman of the house is satisfied that such an action will soon bring down rain in torrents.'[5]

2. Sieves used as cradles.—It was a regular custom among the Greeks and many other people to employ a winnowing-fan as a cradle for infants.[6]

In Java the midwife places the newly-born child in a bamboo basket like the sieve used for separating the rice from the chaff. As she does this, she knocks with the palms of both hands on the basket in order that the child may not be timid. Then she exhorts the child, saying, 'Cry not, for Njai-among and Kaki-among [two spirits] are watching over you.' Next she addresses the two spirits, saying, 'Bring not your grandchild to the road, lest he be trampled by a horse; bring him not to the bank of the river, lest he fall into the river.' The object of the ceremony is said to be that these two spirits should always guard the infant.[7]

Similarly in Laos, when a child has been born in a house, it is laid upon a rice-sieve and placed by the grandmother or other near female relative at the head of the staircase or ladder leading to the house. There the woman calls in a loud voice to the spirits to come and take the child away or for ever to let it alone, stamping on the ground violently to make it cry. The precaution, however, is taken of tying strings round its wrists on the first night after birth, lest the spirits should take the invitation too literally. If the infant should fail to respond to the treatment, it is regarded as an evil omen. If, on the other hand, it behaves naturally and lifts up its voice, all will be well. 'On the day after its birth the child is regarded as being the property no longer of the spirits, who could have taken it if they had wanted it, but of the parents, who forthwith sell it to some relation for a nominal sum—an eighth or a quarter of a rupee perhaps. This, again, is a further guarantee against molestation by the spirits, who apparently are regarded as honest folk that would not stoop to take what has been bought and paid for.'[1]

The same notion of rescuing a new-born infant from the power of evil spirits is seen in the Panjāb custom of putting a new baby into an old winnowing-basket (*chhaj*) with the sweepings of the house and dragging it out into the yard. After this has been done, the child will bear the name of 'Winnowing-basket' (Chhajju) or 'Dragged' (Ghasītā). The object of this procedure is probably to deceive the spirits by rendering the child unrecognizable. The same may perhaps be the intention of a ceremony employed among the Gaolis of the Deccan. As soon as a child is born, it is bathed and then laid on a sieve for a few minutes. On the fifth day the sieve, with a line and *pan*-leaves on it, is taken outside the house and, after the worship of Chetti has been performed, is thrown away.[2]

In Upper Egypt a newly-born child is merely dried, not washed, and immediately laid upon a corn-sieve; beside its head the knife with which the umbilical cord has been cut is laid, and corn is scattered round about. This is intended to drive away the *kasina*, the child's evil brother or sister from the spirit-world. On the morning of the seventh day the child is again placed on a sieve, tapers are fixed on metal plates and on the point of a sword, and the child is carried in procession through the whole house, while the midwife scatters wheat, barley, peas, and salt for the wicked spirits. The child is then shaken on the sieve, in order that it may lose fear for the rest of its life.[3]

Children born in an unlucky month (Faosa) among the Tanala people of Madagascar are either buried alive in the forest or placed in a winnowing-fan along with certain herbs and washed in water medicated with some of the same herbs. The ceremony is thought to avert the threatened ill-luck. Similarly the Chinese of Foo-Chow set a lad suffering from smallpox in a large winnowing-fan, placing a piece of red cloth on his head and on the cloth some parched beans. The beans (whose name in the local dialect is identical with the name for smallpox) are allowed to roll off to represent the passing away of all traces of the disease from the boy's body.[4]

3. Sieves used in marriage-rites.[5]—Among the Naoda, a caste of ferrymen in the Central Provinces of India, a winnowing-fan together with certain other articles is passed by the mother in front of the bridegroom to keep off evil spirits and scatter them to the winds like chaff. The Rajjhars in the same district exorcize the bridal pair by touching the head, breast, and knees of the bridegroom with a winnowing-fan, a pestle, and a churning-stick.[6]

4. Divination by sieves.—There was an early form of divination known as coscinomancy (*κόσκινον*, 'sieve'; *μαντεία*, 'divination'), or, as it is described in *Hudibras*, 'the oracle of sieve and shears, that turns as certain as the spheres.' A sieve was suspended, held by a thread or by the points of a pair of shears stuck into its rim; the movement, turning, or fall of the sieve at the naming of the person suspected of a crime, coupled with the repetition of an incantation or other magic formula, decided the guilt or innocence of the person.

In the Highlands of Scotland, on Hallowe'en, the young people until recently assembled in one of their houses for the express purpose of ascertaining future events by divination. In the Lowlands also similar customs prevailed at this season. In order to cause the apparition of a future husband or wife, it was necessary to visit a barn alone and secretly, taking care to open both doors or, better still, take them off their hinges, to guard against complications that might arise on the arrival of the stranger. Having done this, the diviner takes a sieve (*wecht* or *waicht*) and goes through the action of winnowing corn. After this has been done three times, the 'future husband or wife will pass through the barn, entering at the windy door and passing out at the other.'[7]

5. Conclusion.—From the foregoing examples it would seem that the sieve or winnowing-fan

[1] See art. FAN.
[2] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 333.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 251.
[4] *Ib.* p. 236.
[5] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Madras, 1909, iii. 245.
[6] The *mystica vannus Iachhi* is fully treated in art. FAN, § 2.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 6.

[1] Carl Bock, *Temples and Elephants*, London, 1884, p. 258 ff.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, i. 7.
[3] C. B. Klunzinger, *Upper Egypt: People and Products*, Eng. tr., London, 1878, p. 185 ff.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, i. 9.
[5] For the use of the *liknon* see art. FAN.
[6] R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iv. 284, 407.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 236.

figures in magico-religious cults primarily as a symbol of fecundity. Sieves in the Stone Age appear to have been simply jars pierced with holes, and therefore they may have been used for carrying water. In this way their connexion with rain-making ceremonies is readily explained, since the dripping of the water from the vessel would be calculated to suggest to the primitive mind the falling of rain. Thus the instrument would soon come to be regarded as a means of controlling the weather.[1] But the custom of carrying water in a sieve was apparently also anciently connected with virginity and a fertility cult,[2] and, consequently, at a very early period the implement may have been used to promote fertility and growth. This view is supported by the connexion between the sieve and the winnowing-fan—an article intimately associated with corn, the symbol of growth and fertility.[3] Moreover, when a winnowing-fan is used as a cradle, it is not infrequently surrounded by corn or fruit to emphasize the desire to communicate to the infant the power of fecundity and growth. The sowing of seed was unquestionably regarded by the ancient Greeks and other primitive people as analogous to the begetting of children, just as in Germany barley and flax seed are sown over stunted children to make them grow.[4] It seems, therefore, that infants were cradled in sieves and winnowing-fans originally to promote fertility, and that the notions of rescuing them from evil influences and of purification are only later interpretations (suggested by the separating function of the fan) that have arisen to explain the custom. In the Bacchic ritual the earlier conception is clearly indicated on the monuments by the appearance of the implement filled with fruitage together with the male organ of generation.[5] Here the winnowing-fan, from which Dionysus derived his surname, is unmistakably represented as the emblem of creative energy. In the Athenian marriage ceremonies the fact that the boy who carried the *liknon* was obliged to have both parents alive suggests that the basket was a fertility charm to induce the birth of children and natural wealth. The symbolism of the *liknites*, of fruit, and the child point to the same conclusion. It is not without significance that the implement has been used in recent times in Scotland as a means of producing an apparition of a future husband or wife.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

SIKHS.—1. History.—One of the most striking of the creeds in India, which, arising on its own soil, protested against her dominant Brāhmanism, is the Sikh religion. Socially and politically as well as in religion Sikhism opposed the influence of the Brāhman and the system which he taught and represented. Its founder, Nānak (*q.v.*), the first *guru*, was born in A.D. 1469, fourteen years before Luther; the traditions of his earlier life picture him as leading the life of one meditatively careless of the things of this world until he received a definite call to a divine mission as the expounder of a new doctrine. Teaching that Hindu and Muhammadan differed in no essentials of faith, he set out on a series of pilgrimages to the four points of the compass and made a fifth and last allegorical visit to the saints (*siddhs*) of Gorakhnāth (*q.v.*). These pilgrimages may have extended far beyond the confines of modern India, and indeed it is claimed that he visited not only Ceylon and Kashmīr, but also Russia, Turkestan, and Mecca. His preaching was intensely monotheistic and largely directed against the pretensions of priestcraft. He reproached his Hindu compatriots who lived upon alms wrung from the people, and he taught the dignity of labour. He composed religious hymns, being thus the first contributor to the *Granṭh* (*q.v.*), but his teaching had no political aims.

Before his death in 1538 Nānak had installed as his successor Angad, like himself a Khatrī by caste, and his disciple, but not of his kin by blood. Angad invented the Gurmukhi alphabet[1] and enlarged the *Granṭh*, but he remained a humble religious teacher, earning a livelihood by twisting coarse twine into rope. He died in 1552 or 1553.

Angad installed as *guru* Amar Dās, who began to organize the new sect and develop its teaching. He divided the country into 22 sees (*manja*, lit. a couch or large bed), and maintained a public refectory at which all ate without distinction of caste. He also reformed the Brāhmanical rites at marriage and death, forbade pilgrimages and similar extravagances, pronounced against *sati*, and separated the Sikh recluses, or Udāsīs (*q.v.*), from the laity. Having added largely to the hymns of the *Granṭh*, he bestowed the apostolic succession on his son-in-law, Rāmdās.

Guru Rāmdās succeeded in 1574, and is said to have entered into closer relations with the emperor Akbar than his predecessor. The biographers of that tolerant ruler do not indeed allude to the *gurus* or their teaching, but his broad-minded policy doubtless encouraged the new sect to develop its religious activities, while it gave it no provocation to enter the political arena. Rāmdās founded Rāmdāspur, later known as Amritsar, the sacred capital of the Sikhs, and in 1581 he was succeeded by his youngest son, Arjan Dev. With his accession Sikhism entered on a new phase. He laid aside the garb of a *faqīr*, dressed in costly attire, and organized a system of tithing his followers. His energy succeeded in sending disciples to trade and spread the faith as far afield as Turkestan, and it gained many adherents in Kābul and Kandahār as well as in India generally. Nevertheless Arjan Dev was able to maintain amicable relations with Muhammadans like the famous saint Miān Mīr, and his chief opponents were a Hindu, finance minister to the Mughal governor of Lahore, and his eldest brother, Prithi Chand,[2] who never forgave him his own supersession in the *guru*ship. Unfortunately he entered into an obscure conspiracy with Khusro, son of the emperor Jahāngīr, and expiated his assistance to the rebel with his life.

In 1606 Rāmdās's only son, Hargobind, succeeded him. He rejected for good the tokens of a *faqīr* and wore two swords, one denoting *faqīrī*, or spiritual, the other *amīrī*, or secular, authority. He built the first Sikh stronghold, and many whom want and misgovernment had driven from their homes flocked to his standard. But, if he was the first of the *gurus* to take up arms against the Mughals, he met with scant success as a leader, for Jahāngīr is said to have kept him a prisoner at Gwalior for twelve years until that emperor's death in 1628. Even then he obtained his liberty only by sacrificing his treasures.[3]

Hargobind died in 1645 and was succeeded by

[1] Cf. art. RAIN.

[2] J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 621 f.

[3] *Ib.*

[4] W. Mannhardt, 'Kind und Korn,' *Mythologische Forschungen*, Strassburg, 1884, pp. 351–374.

[5] See art. FAN, vol. v. p. 755[b], fig. 3; Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 518 *ff.*, *JHS* xxiii [1903] 296; L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896–1909, v. 243.

[1] This alphabet is derived from the Śarada, through the Tākrī alphabet of the Panjāb hills and the Landa of the Panjāb (G. A. Grierson, *JRAS*, 1916, p. 677).

[2] The founder of the Mīna sect.

[3] The Sikh accounts represent Miān Mīr as having reconciled him to Jahāngīr, and this is the version of the *Dabistān* (tr. A. Troyer, Paris, 1843, ii. 274), which adds that he continued in the imperial service under Shāh Jahān.

his grandson, Har Rai, his son, Gurditta, having entered the Udāsī order and thus being disqualified to succeed to a secular office. He too entered into relations with a rebellious scion of the Mughal dynasty, Dārā Shikoh, and on his defeat he sent his son, Rām Rai, to Delhi to negotiate a pardon. The lad was still a hostage in the hands of Aurangzīb when his father died, and either on that account or because he had in fear of ill-usage misquoted a verse of the *Granṭh* he was disqualified by his father, who designated his second son, Har Kishn, as his successor. This son too was summoned to Delhi, where he died after vaguely appointing as his successor one 'at Bakāla,' a village on the Biās river.

No fewer than 22 Khatrīs of the Sodhī sept claimed the *guru*ship, but it was awarded to Tegh Bahādur, the only Sodhī who divined that a devout follower had not fulfilled a vow made in distress. He was duly installed, but, saying that he was unworthy to wear his father's sword, he proclaimed his ambition to be styled Degh Bahādur, or 'lord of the vessel,' the *degh* which symbolizes the world. His accession led to many dissensions. Rām Rai had founded a sect of his own, which still endures in the Dehra Dūn. Dhīr Mal, probably an older brother of Guru Har Rai, who had refused to acknowledge his accession, had possession of the *Granṭh* and supported Rām Rai's pretensions to the *guru*ship. This opposition from his own kin compelled Tegh Bahādur to seek a refuge in the Jaswān Dūn beyond the Siwālik hills, and there in 1665 he founded Anandpur. Nevertheless he was able to make progresses through the Mālwa of the southern Panjāb, the Kurukshetra, eastern and lower India, while his influence extended even to Ceylon. But the intolerance of Aurangzīb led to his seizure and execution at Delhi in 1675.[1]

We now come to the 10th and last *guru*, Govind Singh, founder of the militant Sikh theocracy. Born at Patna in 1666, and installed at Anandpur in 1676, he made momentous changes in Sikh ritual and polity. His policy was to raise the Sikhs to one and the same high caste, the Khālsa. To this end he chose five faithful followers, whom he initiated with the *khanda pahul*, 'whetting by the two-edged dagger.' These five in turn initiated the *guru* himself, and he thus placed initiators and candidate on the same level.

In this rite the candidate bathes and dons clean clothes. He is seated in an assembly generally convened for the purpose, and a Sikh who is regular in his observance of Sikh rules of conduct stirs with a dagger some sugar in water in an iron basin, while chanting verses from the *Granṭh*. This solution is called *amrit* (whence the rite is sometimes called *amrit chhuknā*, 'to be filled with nectar') and is sprinkled on the candidate's hair and body. He is also given some of it to drink and is made to repeat certain vows which constitute the *rahat*, or Sikh rules of conduct. The *amrit* is believed to confer immortality and to make the initiate a son of Govind Singh and a Singh ('lion') or true Kṣatriya. He also becomes a son of Mātā Sāhib Devi, the childless wife of that *guru* who was promised the motherhood of the whole Khālsa. The *pahul*, erroneously derived by J. D. Cunningham[2] from the Greek πύλη, 'gate,' is generally regarded as a baptismal rite, but the bathing is merely to obtain ceremonial purity. The use of the dagger is doubtless intended to communicate soldierly qualities to the initiate. The Baloch have at birth a very similar practice. The *amrit* confers immunity in battle. The *charn pahul* (see below) conveys the sanctity of the *guru* to his disciple.

The *guru* assumed the suffix of Singh instead of his Hindu affix, Rai, at initiation, and all initiates take that suffix. His five initiators were a Khatrī and four men of castes generally regarded as Śūdras who had offered their heads in his service. Various versions of this choice of the *panj piāras*, 'the five beloved ones,' of the *guru* are current. That of the *Panth Prakāsh* relates that the *guru* called for Sikhs willing to offer their heads for his sword, the goddess, and five came forward. The *guru* took them one by one into his tent, and, emerging with his sword dripping with the blood of a goat, tested their devotion by pretending that he had killed each in turn.[1] But the Sikhs who seek to retain the cult of Devi and to reconcile it with the *gurus*' monotheism say that one of the five was actually sacrificed to the goddess at Naina Devi, and this is the version current in the Simla hills, where Sikhism never found a footing.[2] In requital the Devi promised him the success of his sect. Guru Govind Singh was a man of considerable learning. A Gurmukhi, Sanskrit, and Persian scholar, he deputed five Sikhs to learn Sanskrit at Benares, and had many important Sanskrit and Persian works translated into the *bhāsha*, or vulgar tongue. In accord with his democratic policy, he abolished the system of collecting tithes through *masands* (collectors), which Guru Arjan had organized, and the system was maintained only by some dissident Sikh sects. He was, moreover, a military leader of parts. His refusal to pay tribute in any form to the *rājā* of Bilāspur, from which state Tegh Bahādur had purchased the site of Anandpur, led to his first battle. He defeated the *rājā* in 1682, but his victory cost him the hostility of many of the hill states in the mountainous country which forms the north-east corner of the Panjāb. Among them he found some allies, but his teaching made no headway among the ancient Hindu polities of those states, and his only effective ally was the *rājā* of Sirmūr, a state lying west of the upper Jamna, who allowed him to found Paonta in the Kiārda Dūn of that state in 1684. Had Sikhism succeeded in winning over the hill people, its history might have been different, but the influence of their Rājpūt overlords and Brāhmanical priests was too firmly planted to allow a democratic theocracy to make converts among them. Guru Govind Singh sought support in other directions. He enlisted 500 Muslim Pathāns, but they failed him at a crisis, as did the Udāsīs whom he had fostered. His military position was weak. It lay in the *dūns*, or valleys, of the outer Himālayas; behind him were the hill *rājās*, jealous of one another, but still more jealous of a plainsman preaching a new creed. On his widely extended front he was opposed to the decadent but still organized and powerful authority of the Mughals. He was not without supporters among the Muhammadans of the plains, notably the *pīr* of Sādhaura and other spiritual notables. But the Mughals, by a well-conceived campaign in conjunction with the hill *rājās*, drove the *guru* out of Anandpur, and in the flight of the Sikhs his children were captured. They were buried alive at Sirhind, and their martyrdom made that thriving city for ever accursed in the eyes of the Sikhs. The *guru* himself escaped to the south of the Sutlej and, on Aurangzīb's death, threw in his lot with Bahādur Shāh, whom he helped to defeat Prince 'Azim. This ensured him tolerance, if not favour, but in 1708 he was treacherously stabbed by a Pathān who had been reared in his family, and he died soon afterwards.

[1] Recent research has shown that the network of Sikh organization had been spread by Tegh Bahādur's predecessors as far east as Patna and even Dacca, which became a *huzūr sangat*, or provincial *sangat*, at first under the pontifical throne at Anandpur and later under the *takht*, or archiepiscopal throne, at Patna. When Tegh Bahādur visited Dacca in 1666, he found prosperous *sangats* at Sylhet, Chittagong, Sandīp, Lashkar, and elsewhere, and by the time of Guru Govind Singh Dacca had earned the title of 'the home of Sikhism.' The *takhts* were four, viz. Anandpur, Amritsar, Patna, and Nander (in the Nizām's Dominions, Deccan [Gurbakhsh Singh, *Sikh Relics from Eastern Bengal*, Dacca, 1915, p. 225 f., 1916, p. 376 ff.]).

[2] *Hist. of the Sikhs*, p. 74 n.

[1] Gokal Chand Narang, *Transformation of Sikhism*, Lahore, 1912, p. 79.

[2] *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, 'Bilāspur,' p. 13 f.

Before his death a new and devastating force had arisen in 'Banda, the Bairāgī.' Born at Rājauri, the capital of an ancient principality in the Jammū hills, Lachhman, as he was first named, became a Bairāgī and then a Yogi with the style of Madho Dās, and in the latter character he acquired skill in the occult sciences. Meeting Guru Govind Singh on the Godāvārī in S. India, he became his slave (*banda*), but not his disciple, with the title of Banda Bahādur, 'the lord slave.' On him the *guru* bestowed his own sword, bidding him observe strict continence and truthfulness and avoid schism, the use of a cushion in the Sikh temple, and the title of *guru*, but enjoining on him brotherly love and peace with the Singhs. These behests Banda did not obey. He married, and started a sect of his own, the Bandāī Singhs; he substituted for the *khanda pahul* the *charn pahul*, in which the initiate drinks water used in washing his *guru's* feet; and for the war-cry of the true Singh, '*Fatih wāhe-guru jī kī*,'[1] he enjoined the cry, '*Fatih daras* (or *darshan*) *fatih dharma*,' 'Victory to religion and the faith!' He donned royal dress and lorded it over the Sikhs, instead of regarding himself as merely an equal and a brother. He also ceased to enforce the Singh rule against cutting the hair, and exhorted the Sikhs to abstain from flesh, though Govind Singh had encouraged its use for military reasons. But this does not complete the tale of Banda's backslidings. The Sikh *gurus* had been installed by a special rite, in which five pice and a coco-nut were placed before the *guru*-designate, while his predecessor and appointer circumambulated him four times. By this rite the spiritual light of Guru Nānak had been transmitted to his successors, and on the forehead of each in turn the *tilak* (coronation mark) was made by a member of a family of cultivators in which the office was hereditary.[2] Guru Govind Singh had installed the sacred *Granth* itself as his sole successor, but Banda claimed to be the eleventh *guru*. This and his other heresies in the end alienated the true Singhs, and, though in his earlier years as a soldier-saint Banda had won notable successes against the Mughal government, even taking Sirhind and sacking it with merciless slaughter of the Muslims, his career ended in defeat and failure. At its zenith in 1714 he had convened a royal *darbār* at Amritsar and assumed kingly robes with an aigrette in his turban, and the country from Lahore to the banks of the Jamna had passed into the possession of the Singhs. Banda had also succeeded in extorting some kind of allegiance from the hill *rājās*, and indeed he found in the hills a refuge in time of stress and a retreat for religious meditation, to which he seems to have abandoned himself at critical moments when he might have followed up a success or organized territory already won. But his character lacked consistency. While, on the one hand, he chastised the heretic Rām Rāias, on the other, he dealt mercilessly with Muhammadan towns whose inhabitants had befriended Guru Govind Singh. The true Singhs, the Tat Khālsa, the elect of the elect, separated themselves from Banda, who left them Amritsar and retired to Gurdāspur, nearer the hills, where his strength lay. Thence he carried on a predatory warfare until the Tat Khālsa reluctantly appeared in arms with the Muhammadans against him. This ensured his downfall, and in 1716 he was probably captured and put to death at Delhi. Tradition says that he was executed with every circumstance of cruelty, but it also avers that by a mental process he triumphed over his physical sufferings, resuscitated himself, and retired to the banks of the Chenab in his native state of Jammū. There his tomb is still held by his descendants, and his followers are still to be found in the Panjāb under the name of the Banda-panthis.

Banda's death left the Singhs without a secular leader, and, though most of the Bandāīs rejoined the true Khālsa, they had no definite policy. Their forays provoked reprisals, and a price was offered for every Sikh head. Farrukhsiār attempted to conciliate them and assigned tracts of territory to some at any rate of their leaders. One of them, Kapūr Singh, accepted (contemptuously, some say) the Muhammadan title *nawāb*, and he with many of the other leaders formed what was known as 'the veteran army' (*budhā ḍal*), while the younger (*taṛū ḍal*) organized itself into five companies, the Shahīds (*q.v.*), Amritsarias, Dallewālīās, Rāmdāsīās, and another. The *budhā ḍal* clung to Amritsar, and many of both *ḍals* settled down to cultivation, but the younger generation found itself pressed for subsistence, and sought an outlet in Rājpūtāna. The Muslim governors seized the occasion to harass the veterans, and in revenge the two *ḍals* recombined and ravaged the whole of the northern Panjāb. Upon the distracted province fell Nādir Shāh's invasion of 1738–39. The Sikhs did not respond to the Mughal governor's request for aid to oppose him, but they harassed him on his retreat and refused to surrender their booty. This led to fresh persecution, and Ahmad Shāh's inroads found the province still more rent by internecine strife than those of his predecessor. Finally the Mughal governor, Adīna Beg, sought Sikh aid and with it recovered a fraction of the province, but, distrusting his allies, he called in the Marāthās, who overran it, driving the Durrānis across the Indus, in 1757. On Adīna Beg's death, in the following year, the Sikhs killed his principal minister and made themselves independent in the central and north-eastern Panjāb.

By this time their old division into two armies had disappeared, and of the five companies only one, the Shahīds, remained, twelve new *misls* (confederacies) having taken the place of the five companies. Of these twelve, however, four are more correctly to be described as *dehras* (militant orders), like the Shahīds, who formed the oldest and at one time the most important *dehra*. No attempt had been made to revive the *guru*ship, but Nawāb Kapūr Singh, who was childless, bequeathed his honours and the leadership of the Khālsa to Jassa Singh, Ahlūwālīā, saying that he was destined to be a *bādshāh*, 'king,' a title subsequently accorded him by his own followers. Yet, although he had been treated by Mātā Sundri, a widow of Guru Govind Singh, as her own son, he did not aspire to any authority over the Khālsa and was content to be elected head of the Ahlūwālīā *misl*, although he struck coin in the old Mughal mint at Lahore with the inscription in Persian: 'Struck in the world by grace of the Everlasting: Jassa, the Kalāl,[1] seized Ahmad's country.' Initiation by him was highly prized, and Rājā Amr Singh of Patiāla was one of his initiates. Ālā Singh of Patiāla consented to take the province of Sirhind on lease from Ahmad Shāh in 1767, with the title of Rājā-i-rājagān Mahindar Bahādur, the Muhammadan chiefs of Māler Kotla and Raikot fearing the Sikhs too much to undertake its charge. This paved the way for the

[1] The form usually given is '*Wāh Gurū ji kā Khālsa, Wāh Gurū ji ki fatih*' (Narang, p. 120; but cf. Khazān Singh, *Philosophic Hist. of the Sikh Religion*, p. 219).

[2] Its founder, Bhāi Budhā, was so named by Guru Nānak when he expressed fear of an early death. Owing to the *guru's* prophecy or gift of long life, he survived to install the first five successors of Guru Nānak. The 'light' of the *gurus* is sometimes called *bargat*, a term borrowed from Islām.

[1] Kalāl = Ahlūwālīā; see below.

organization of the Sikh territories south of the Sutlej into Sikh kingships, the principal being the Phūlkiān states (Patiāla, Nābha, and Jīnd), Farīdkot,[1] Kalsia, and the now extinct chiefship of the Bhāīs of Kaithal. But Muhammadan states like Māler Kotla, Raikot, and many religious institutions whose incumbents had befriended the Sikhs from time to time, were tolerated and protected.

Meanwhile to the north of the Sutlej the introduction of a monarchical system (for which Kapūr Singh and Jassa Singh had paved the way) and the authority of the *Granth* materialized, as it were, in a *gurumaṭṭa*, or cabinet. This institution is by some ascribed to Guru Govind Singh, who had declared that wherever five orthodox Singhs were assembled the *guru* must be deemed present. But probably the first *gurumaṭṭa* as a council of state was held at Amritsar in 1762. It was convened by the *granthis*, or exponents of the *Granth*, or, according to others, by the Akālis (*q.v.*). Its precise functions were ill-defined, but it certainly exercised some judicial powers. In 1765 a national council held at Amritsar proclaimed the Khālsa the supreme religion and minted coins with the Persian legend: *Degh wa Tegh wa Fatih nusrat bedrang — Yāft az Nānak Guru Govind Singh*, 'Guru Govind Singh received from Nānak the *degh*, the sword and unfailing victory.' Thus the Sikhs marked their rule as a theocracy, democratic in principle and owning no allegiance to an earthly king. The failure of Ahmad Shāh's last invasion in 1767 left them masters of the Panjāb from the Jamna to the Indus.

With these events the religious development of Sikhism may be said to have closed. The next phase in its political history is the transformation of the *misls* into hereditary chiefships or clans. The ruling family of the Kapūrthala state is descended from Jassa Singh, 'Bādshāh'; that of Kalsia from the elected chief of the Karori-Singhi, or Panjgaṛhia, *misl*; and those of the Phūlkiān states and other fiefs from Phūl, the founder of the *dehra* of that name. The Rāmgaṛhia *misl* founded by another Jassa Singh, who was a carpenter by caste, gives its name to the Sikh carpenter caste generally, just as all Sikh Nebs or Kalāls aspire to be called Ahlūwālīās. The founders of the Nishānānwāli *misl* were the standard-bearers of the Khālsa, but its chiefship soon became hereditary and Ranjīt Singh extinguished it in 1808. The Dallewālīā *misl* was founded by a Khatrī surnamed Rāthor on account of his valour, and from his village it took its name, but a Jāṭ was elected its chief, his descendants divided its territories, and their disunion enabled Ranjīt Singh to annex nearly all its possessions.

The secularization of the possessions of the Khālsa and the inveterate tendency of the leaders of *misls* to treat their territories as private estates paved the way for the rise of Mahārāja Ranjīt Singh, chief by inheritance of the Sukarchakīā *misl*. Its territories, which were considerable, lay in the north of the province, but of his fellow-chiefs several were more powerful, and it was only by the exercise of great natural abilities, astuteness, and good fortune that he was able to weld the Sikh states north of the Sutlej into a kingdom. He extended its power to the Afghān frontier beyond Peshāwār, conquered Kashmīr, and effectively reduced the hill states to submission. He also extended his power over the south-west Panjāb, but south of the Sutlej a British protectorate of the cis-Sutlej states barred his ambitions. Autocratic though his power was in reality, he continued to mint coins bearing the Khālsa legend, and, while he appointed Muhammadan *qāzīs* and *muftīs*, he upheld Sikhism as the State religion.

2. Theology and ritual.—The distinctive tenet of Sikhism is monotheism, and, though the existence of the countless gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon is not denied, their worship is not inculcated and may be said to be implicitly condemned. The *Granth* repeatedly condemns idolatry. Nevertheless the masses worship the *Granth* itself in almost the same way as Hindus worship images. It is, however, difficult in India to draw the line between worship and reverence. Sikh theology is somewhat nebulous. Guru Nānak's idea of God is pantheistic rather than theistic, but he displayed an utter disregard of form and formal theology. He respected every religion so far as its real essence was concerned, but despised mechanical worship in any aspect. Guru Govind Singh made Sikhism more formal. He forbade smoking and cutting of the hair at any period of life. As a uniform he prescribed the wearing of the five *k's*, viz. the *kes* (long hair), the *kachh* (short drawers ending above the knee), the *kara* (iron bangle), the *kripān* (sword),[1] and the *kangha* (comb).

The Sikh retains the Hindu reverence for the cow, but is generally a meat-eater and disregards most of the Hindu ceremonial in the preparation of food. A merciful regard for animal suffering, however, makes him eschew all flesh not killed by a single stroke of the sword or jerk of the neck.[2] Female infanticide was sternly prohibited by the *gurus*, and Sikh women are permitted to acquire education, especially in the semi-sacred Gurmukhi script. At weddings the Hindu ritual is discarded, no Brāhman need be employed, and Vedic texts are dispensed with. The worship of Ganesh and the planets is not allowed, and in recent years an agitation for an independent marriage ritual led to the passing of the Anand[3] Marriage Act (Act I of 1909). In this rite the *Ādī Granth* is circumambulated in lieu of fire, and texts from it are recited to sanctify the union as emblematical of that between the soul and the Supreme. Metempsychosis is a cardinal tenet in Sikhism, and each successive *guru* was Nānak; indeed Guru Hargovind so signed himself. Where Sikhism has failed as a social force is in the abolition of the caste system. Nānak did not attempt its condemnation. He observed its rules and was content to preach that God cared not for a man's caste but for his deeds. Guru Govind Singh abolished it in theory, but in practice Sikhism fully recognizes caste distinctions, though at initiation, and in theory after it, all Singhs may be equal.

3. Sects and orders.—Sikhism is rent by schisms so that it is difficult to enumerate all its sects and movements. Two great groups may be distinguished: the Nānakpanthis,[4] or Sikhs of Nānak, are merely Hindus who follow Nānak's teaching; the Sikhs of Guru Govind Singh are the Singhs, the Khālsa or Tat (wā) Khālsa.[5] With the Nānakpanthis may be roughly equated the Sahijdhāri,[6] 'easy-going' Sikhs; and with the Khālsa the Kesdhāri Sikhs, *i.e.* those who wear the long hair (*kes*). These two groups are tending to separate, though a Kesdhāri will still take a Sahijdhāri girl to wife. The Rām Rāīās[7] have not much following in the Panjāb. The Hindālis,[8] once influential,

[1] Some authorities give the *khanda* (steel knife), but this is an error, due to the use of the *khanda* in the *pahul* rite.

[2] *Jhaṭka*, a sudden shake, a jerk; cf. *jhaṭ*, a moment, snatch, or sudden attack.

[3] *Anand* means 'joy,' and is the equivalent of the Urdu *shādi*. Used at first by the lower classes in widow re-marriage and similar non-ritual unions, the tendency is now to bring it into vogue among the higher classes.

[4] H. A. Rose, *Glossary of Panjab Tribes and Castes*, Lahore, 1914, iii. 152 f. They are to be distinguished from the Nānakputras and the Nānakshāhis (*ib.* p. 155).

[5] *Ib.* p. 460.

[6] *Ib.* iii. 343.

[7] *Ib.* p. 307.

[8] *Ib.* ii. 325.

lost ground by throwing in their lot with Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, and they are now called Narinjani, or 'worshippers of the Bright One (God).' The Nirankārīs,[1] a modern sect, revived Nānak's teaching, though they respect the later *gurus* also. The Gangūshāhis,[2] who refused initiation from Guru Govind Singh, the Mīnās,[3] or 'deceitful' followers of Prithi Chand, and the Dhirmalias,[4] founded by Dhir Mal, elder brother of Guru Har Rāi, are all schismatical sects. The Sanwal-Shāhis[5] are followers of a disciple of Guru Nānak, and are found chiefly in the south-west Panjāb; the Sewapanthis[6] are confined to the Sindh Sāgar Doāb. The Kūkas[7] are an extremist sect whose tenets are kept secret, but they disclaim female infanticide. Orders rather than sects are the Dīwāna Sādhs,[8] or 'ecstatic saints,' the Nirmalās and Udāsīs (*qq.v.*). The term 'Rāmdāsi'[9] has various meanings, but it is usually applied to a weaver or tanner who has been converted to Sikhism. Mazhabi[10] is similarly applied to a converted sweeper.

4. Present conditions.—The Sikhs have now a central association, called the Chief Khālsa Dīwān, with its headquarters at Amritsar and local societies (Singh Sabhas) all over the Panjāb and at some places beyond it. They have also at Amritsar the Khālsa College, and at Tarn Tāran and Gujrānwāla two theological seminaries receive grants from the Dīwān. They possess 33 girls' schools, a newspaper (the *Khālsa Advocate*), orphanages, a tract society, and a Khālsa Young Men's Association, besides a Sikh Bank. Attempts are also made to help the depressed classes.[11]

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the text and especially Khazān Singh, *Philosophic Hist. of the Sikh Religion*, 2 vols., Lahore, 1914; M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, 6 vols., Oxford, 1909; J. D. Cunningham, *A Hist. of the Sikhs*, London, 1849, reprinted, Oxford, 1918; Sewarām Singh Thapar, *Sri Gurū Nānak Dev*, Rawalpindi, 1904; Rup Singh, *Sikhism, A Universal Religion*, Amritsar, 1911, *Bhai Mahnga or the Search after Truth*, do. 1911. The Gurmukhi literature is now very voluminous.

H. A. ROSE.

SIKKIM.—Sikkim is a small country lying between Nepāl and Bhutān and between Tibet and India, and consists of the larger part of the mountain valley of the Tīsta river. It is a land of steep and lofty ridges and peaks and of deeply cut valleys. The area is only 2818 sq. miles, and, while its lowest elevation, at the junction of the Tīsta and the Rangīt, is about 700 ft., its highest, the top of Kinchinjunga, is 28,146 ft. This range of elevation implies an immense variety of vegetable life and also of insect and bird life. Other animal life is rather restricted in both individuals and species, most probably by the influence of the hordes of leeches which infest the jungles and roads in the rainy season. The rainfall is abundant, and the forests are thick, but from 2000 to 5000 ft. these have been to a great extent cleared to make way for cultivation. Apart from agriculture there are no industries, though an attempt is now being made to develop the mineral resources (mostly copper) of the country.

The population at the 1911 census numbered 87,920. It also is varied, but consists principally of immigrants from Nepāl. There are 20 Nepālese castes (many of which are really tribes) represented. Besides these there are Tibetan and Bhutānese tribes, and Lepchās, the so-called aborigines of Sikkim. Nepālis, Tibetans, and Bhutānese are described elsewhere.[12] It need only be said here that the Nepālis profess Hinduism of the type found in Nepāl. They are recent immigrants and have not had time to develop any peculiar features or to build any but insignificant shrines. The Bhutānese, migrant herdsmen, are very few. The Tibetans came into the country in the 17th cent. and usurped the government. They have now much Lepchā blood in them, which, however, has not sufficed to improve them. They brought Lāmaism (*q.v.*) with them, with Lāmaistic literature, and introduced the elements of civilization. It has been said that it was a tribe of robbers that entered Sikkim as the first colonists, and it is easy to believe this. They are a dishonest race in speech and act, given to bullying and violence, but thorough cowards, filthy in their persons, habits, and conversation, and generally tainted with venereal disease. Both polygamy and polyandry are common among them. Needless to add, they are priest-ridden to a degree, and their priests are, with some exceptions, exemplars to the flock in all their vices. There are over 40 monasteries and nunneries.

The origin of the Lepchās (in their own speech Rong, 'valley men') is not known with certainty. They are thought to have come from somewhere on the borders of Tibet and Burma. According to their own traditions, they came to Sikkim from the east in company with the Jimdars (who went on to Nepāl and who share this tradition) and the Mech (who settled in the plains at the foot of the hills). The Lepchās settled in Sikkim, which they called Ne-lyang (='cave country'), and lived a primitive life in its deep forests, keeping no cattle and cultivating very little, but living mainly on forest produce. They claim yet to be able to live wherever the monkey lives. The Lepchā is gentle, inoffensive, and timid, fond of solitude, with no peculiar arts or industries; indeed he is not at all fond of work. His speech is Mongolian and monosyllabic, though during years of Tibetan dominance many Tibetan words have been introduced. His faith and his folklore are, like his speech, certainly Mongolian, and now more or less Tibetan. Lāmaistic Buddhism of the unreformed Nying-ma-pa is generally attributed to him, but it is its animistic, not its Buddhistic, elements that appeal to him. There is still extant a tradition of a former religion in which the Lepchās believed in a good spirit, but preferred, for prudential reasons, to worship bad ones. One may also hear sometimes of Lepchā scriptures, written by a king of Rokangkorung, in which the king appears as a kind of Lepchā prophet. But, as the Lepchā alphabet is the Tibetan one slightly modified by an early Tibetan king of Sikkim, this tradition is of doubtful value.

It is very difficult to say how much of the folklore is originally Lepchā and how much is Tibetan. Many of the stories of jackals and tigers are common to the two peoples. It is interesting to note that there was a tribe of very foolish Lepchās like our wise men of Gotham. But the inquirer is sure to be informed that these 'great fools' are extinct. One of their achievements was to build a tower meant to reach the sky. When it was very high, the builders on the top called down for more stones and those below thought they were being told to cut away the foundations. They did so, and the tower fell and killed half the tribe. The site and ruins are still shown. There is also a flood tradition, in which a Lepchā family is saved by the mountain Tendong ('the uplifted horn') elevating its summit, on which they were perched, above the rising waters. As the flood passed away, the uplifted horn again contracted.

LITERATURE.—J. W. Edgar, *Report on a Visit to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier*, Calcutta, 1874; C. Macaulay, *Report on a Mission to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier*, do. 1885; *The Gazetteer of Sikkim*, do. 1894; J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, 2 vols., London, 1854; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism*

[1] H. A. Rose, *op. cit.* iii. 171.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 178.
[3] *Ib.* iii. 104.
[4] *Ib.* ii. 238.
[5] *Ib.* iii. 380.
[6] *Ib.* p. 397.
[7] *Ib.* ii. 500.
[8] *Ib.* p. 243.
[9] *Ib.* iii. 306 *f.*
[10] *Ib.* p. 75.
[11] J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915, p. 340 f.
[12] See artt. NEPĀL, TIBET, BHUTĀN.

of Tibet, or Lamaism, do. 1895, *Among the Himalayas*, do. 1899; J. Claude White, *Sikhim and Bhutan*, do. 1909; L. S. S. O'Malley, *Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Sikkim*, Cambridge, 1917; P. Brown, *Tours in Sikkim*, Calcutta, 1917.

W. G. MACKEAN.

SILENCE.—Silence, as an aid to worship or as a method of preparing the soul for spiritual experiences, has been practised among larger or smaller groups in almost all periods of religious history and in almost all parts of the world. It was given an important place in the Pythagorean societies and probably also in the Orphic circles in Greece. Pythagoras is said to have made silence the form of initiation into his religious order, requiring the initiate to remain silent and listen for an entire year—some say even three years. Socrates, at least the Socrates of Plato, refers frequently to the importance of silence, and he appears to have practised silence as a form of inward culture. One striking account of Socrates in an intense long-continued silent meditation is given in the *Symposium*.[1] Plutarch, too, pronounces silence the best way to wisdom and far superior to speech.

The OT contains many references to the value of silence as a preparation for spiritual vision or revelation. Many of the prophets and leaders of Israel were prepared for their mission by the discipline of silence, and the voice in the stillness was felt to be a clearer revelation of God than earthquake, fire, or storm. The most emphatic passages on the value of silence, however, are to be found in the Psalms and in the later period of Hebrew literature, *i.e.* after the Exile:

'Be still, and know that I am God' (Ps 46^{10}); 'Praise is silent for thee, O God' (65^{1}); 'Keep thou silence at the presence of the Lord God' (Zeph 1^{7}); 'The Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him' (Hab 2^{20}); 'Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God; for to draw nigh to hear is better than to give the sacrifice of fools [*i.e.* talk] . . . Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God' (Ec $5^{1f.}$).

The later uncanonical books show an increasing appreciation of silence. One passage from the book of Wisdom ($18^{14f.}$) must suffice:

'When all things were in quiet silence and night was in her swift course, Thine Almighty Word, O Lord, leaped down from heaven.'

The practice of silence is implicit rather than positively explicit in the NT. Christ prayed frequently apart alone, and sought the opportunity for quiet communion. He also enjoined upon His followers the practice of retreat from noise and disturbance to the silent closet for solitary prayer. There seem to have been periods of silence in the meetings of the primitive Christian Church, though this is implied rather than overtly stated or emphasized in the accounts. The worshippers of Mithra, as was true of the initiates in all the mystery religions, exalted silence. The preparatory instructions to these initiates contained these directions:

'Lay thy right finger on thy mouth, and say Silence! Silence! Silence! Symbol of the living, imperishable God.'

Egyptian mystical worshippers called God 'the Lord of the silent' and addressed Him thus:

'Thou sweet Well for him that thirsteth in the desert; it is closed to him who speaks, but it is open to him who is silent. When he who is silent comes, lo, he finds the well.'[2]

Many of the Christian Fathers encouraged the practice of silence and appreciated its value as a way of cultivating the spiritual life. Ignatius of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa especially dwell upon its use. Gregory of Nazianzus says:

'To speak of God is an exercise of great value, but there is one that is worth much more, namely to purify one's soul before God in silence.'[3]

Augustine refers in many places to the need for retirement, solitude, and silence, if the soul is to find God. The most impressive passage on the effect of silence is the famous one in the *Confessions* describing 'the sweet communion' which he and his mother, Monica, had at Ostia just before her death:

'When in one's body the storm of the flesh is silenced, when the voices of land and sea are hushed, and the canopy of heaven is silent; when the soul is mute within itself; when the dreams and fancies of the imagination are silent; when every tongue, and every sense, and all that is perishable, is silent; and when the Creator speaks, not through any of these, but speaks Himself directly, and we thus hear His voice, not from any man's lips, and not from the lips of angels, not in thunder and darkness, and not in unintelligible parable, but hear Him whom we adore in these things, Himself alone apart from them all, even as we have risen above them, and, in rapturous flights of thoughts, have reached the eternal wisdom which is highly exalted above them all; if then this condition could be a lasting one, and all other thoughts and imaginings of a different nature could be banished for ever, and the beholder were thus carried away, consumed, swallowed up in joy, and the soul's yearning satisfied, would not then this be the moment to which these words apply, "Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord"?'[1]

Mystics in all ages, whether Christian, Neo-Platonic, Persian, Indian, Arabic, or mediæval Jewish, have made large use of silence and have considered it a way to find God. A well-known passage from Hierotheus—a pseudonym for a Syrian mystic of the 5th cent.—furnishes a good example of the Neo-Platonic attitude:

'To me it seems right to speak without words, and understand without knowledge, that which is above words and knowledge; this I apprehend to be nothing but the mysterious silence and mystical quiet which destroys consciousness and dissolves forms. Seek, therefore, silently and mystically, that perfect and primitive union with the Arch-Good.'[2]

Thomas à Kempis in the *Imitation* expresses in striking words what all Christian mystics say in one form or another:

'In silence and in stillness the religious soul grows and learns the mysteries of Holy Writ. There she finds rivers of tears wherein she may wash and cleanse herself night after night that she may be more familiar with her Creator, . . . Whoso, therefore, withdraweth himself from his acquaintances and friends, God will draw near unto him with His holy angels. . . . Shut thy door behind thee, and call unto thee Jesus thy Beloved. Stay with Him in thy cell: for thou shalt not find so great peace elsewhere.'[3]

The Roman Catholic mystics of the Counter-Reformation and the Quietists of the 17th cent. show an increased appreciation of silence, and they made the practice of the presence of God in silence the very centre of their religion.

In the monastery silence was a large element of the religious life. St. Benedict made very strict rules regarding the practice of silence for the monks of his order, and all other monastic orders laid strong emphasis upon it and set apart periods of 'great silence.' The Cistercians were especially strict in their observance of silence, while the Reformed Cistercians, or Trappists, carried their demands for silence to excessive lengths of strictness, some of them taking perpetual vows of silence. The Carthusian monks, in their periods of purity and strictness, lived as contemplatives and spoke little.

The members of the Society of Friends (*q.v.*) have given a greater place to silence than any other Protestant sect. They took from the 'Seekers' (*q.v.*) of the English Commonwealth period the custom of sitting silent in meetings for worship, and they considered silence essential to worship and a preparation for all public service. George Fox, their founder, practised silence and solitary meditation during his long period of search for light on his own path, and, when he went out to gather others to the truth which he had found, he insisted that those who gathered about him should first learn to sit still and listen.

[1] 220 B.
[2] Quoted from J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 356.
[3] *Orat.* xxvi.

[1] Bk. ix. ch. 10.
[2] Quoted from W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, London 1899, p. 103.
[3] Bk. i. ch. 20.

On one occasion he sat in silence for 'some hours,' in order 'to famish' the people 'from words.' At last he 'was moved of the Lord to speak,' and the people were 'reached by the Lord's power, and word of life.'[1]

Robert Barclay, the most distinguished of the early defenders and interpreters of Quakerism, wrote from his own experience a striking account of the power of this Quaker silence. He says:

'Sometimes, when there is not a word in the meeting but all are silently waiting, if one come in that is rude and wicked, and in whom the power of darkness prevaileth much, perhaps with an intention to mock or do mischief, if the whole meeting be gathered into the life, and it be raised in a good measure, it will strike terror into such an one, and he will feel himself unable to resist; but by the secret strength and virtue thereof, the power of darkness in him will be chained down: and if the day of his visitation be not expired, it will reach to the measure of grace in him, and raise it up to the redeeming of his soul. . . . For not a few had come to be convinced of the truth after this manner, of which I myself am a true witness, who not by strength of arguments, or by a particular disquisition of each doctrine, and convincement of my understanding thereby, came to receive and bear witness of the truth, but by being secretly reached by this life. For when I came into the silent assemblies of God's people, I felt a secret power among them, which touched my heart, and as I gave way unto it, I found the evil weakening in me, and the good raised up: and so I became thus knit and united unto them, hungering more and more after the increase of this power and life, whereby I might feel myself perfectly redeemed.'[2]

After the writings of the Continental Quietists, Molinos, Madame Guyon, and Fénelon, became the favourite books in Quaker circles, and as a result of this influence the whole Society became permeated with quietistic ideals, especially in the period from 1760 to 1830, Friends came to regard this silence as the essential mark of spiritual life and as the one way to communion with God. The favourite texts of the Bible for Friends of this period were those on silence and stillness, and silence seemed almost to possess magic power. Many meetings were held year after year without any interruption of the silence, and the only public vocal utterances in many Quaker communities were heard when visiting ministers came from a distance on itinerant service. This Quaker quietism largely yielded place before the evangelical wave which swept over the Society of Friends in the first half of the 19th cent., the great exponent of this movement being Joseph John Gurney of Norwich (1788–1847).

In recent times silence as a method of communion has been given a new and growing place in the Church of England. This modern practice of silence had its beginnings in New Zealand, was transmitted to London, was taken up in many churches in England, and later became a feature in some of the Episcopalian churches of America.

Carlyle, in rhapsodical manner, has expressed an appreciation of silence which has many parallels in literature but which may be taken as a striking literary estimate of the moral and spiritual value of silence:

'Silence and secrecy! Altars might still be raised to them (were this an altar-building time) for universal worship. Silence is the element in which great things fashion themselves together; that at length they may emerge, full-formed and majestic, into the daylight of Life, which they are henceforth to rule . . . do thou thyself but hold thy tongue for one day: on the morrow, how much clearer are thy purposes and duties; what wreck and rubbish have those mute workmen within thee swept away, when intrusive noises were shut out! Speech is too often not, as the Frenchman defined it, the art of concealing Thought; but of quite stifling and suspending Thought, so that there is none to conceal. . . . Speech is of Time, Silence is of Eternity. Bees will not work except in darkness; Thought will not work except in Silence.' . . . 'Silence, the great Empire of Silence: higher than the stars; deeper than the Kingdoms of Death! . . . The great silent men! . . . A country which has none or few of these is in a bad way. Like a forest that has no roots; which had all turned into leaves and boughs;—which must soon wither and be no forest.'[1]

LITERATURE.—Joan M. Fry, *The Communion of Life*, London, 1910; Cyril Hepher, *The Fellowship of Silence*, do. 1915, *The Fruits of Silence*, do. 1915; L. Violet Hodgkin, *The Surrender of Silence*, do. 1915; Charles Courtenay, *The Empire of Silence*, do. 1916; L. Violet Hodgkin, *Silent Worship*, do. 1919.

RUFUS M. JONES.

SILENOI.—In the recently discovered *Ichneutæ* of Sophocles Silenos is the leader of the Satyr-Trackers. Though the art-form, origin, and exact connotation of the Satyr are still open to question, the nature and art-form of the Silenoi have, thanks to recent investigations, been clearly defined. In fig. below, from the François vase,[2] are represented and, happily, inscribed three Silenoi. They form part of the cortège of Dionysos, who brings back to Olympus Hephaistos, mounted on a mule; they are characteristically employed: one carries a wine-skin, another plays the double-flute, and the third harries a nymph. These inscribed Silenoi have characteristic equine ears, up-springing tail, and hooves. This leaves no doubt that,

whatever be the art-form of the cognate Satyrs[3] (*q.v.*), the Silenoi are in the 6th cent. B.C. horse-daimons. In horse-breeding countries the horse is a familiar 'daimon of fertility'—witness the October-horse of the Romans and our own hobby-horse. On the original of fig. above the Silenoi are markedly ithyphallic.

Happily the explanation of Silenoi horse-daimons is now confirmed by philology. O. Lagercrantz[4] has solved the long riddle. Σίληνός with its by-form σίλανός is derived from the Indo-Germanic **kēl*. The word σίληνός is Thraco-Phrygian, a 'satem' language, so the sigmation of the velar-guttural is all in order. The Greek cognate κήλων naturally preserved the guttural, and clinches the argument. According to Hesychius, κήλων = ὀχεύτης, the horse as stallion; according to Archilochos,[5] the he-ass

ἡ δέ οἱ σάθη
ὡσεί τ' ὄνου Πριηνέος
κήλωνος ἐπλήμμυρεν ὀτρυγηφάγου.

[1] *Journal*, ed. Norman Penney, Cambridge, 1911, i. 28.
[2] *Apology*, London, 1678, prop. xi. sect. 7.

[1] *Sartor Resartus*, bk. iii. ch. 3, *On Heroes*, Lect. iv.
[2] In the Museo Greco-Etrusco, Florence; see *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1883, Taf. 3; and A. Furtwängler and K. Reichhold, *Griech. Vasenmalerei*, Munich, 1904–09, i. 58, Taf. 11 and 12. Fig. above is reproduced from J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, fig. 116, p. 376.
[3] This difficult question is fully discussed by E. Kühnert, in Roscher. The best résumé and resolution of the problem is in A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 695–705.
[4] 'Zur Herkunft des Wortes Silen,' in *Sertum Philolog. Carolo Ferdinando Johansson oblatum*, Göteborg, 1910, pp. 117–121; for other suggested derivations see P. Kretschmer, *Glotta*, ii. [1910] 398.
[5] Bergk, *Poetæ Lyrici Græci*, Leipzig, 1878–82, frag. 97.

In Thraco-Phrygian *κήλων* attained the semi-divinity of a capital letter, Silenos in Greek never.

That originally the Silenoi were ass-daimons as well as horse-daimons is abundantly clear from the myths of the two arch-Silenoi, Marsyas and Midas. S. Reinach[1] has shown that the flaying of the flute-playing Silenos, Marsyas, was in its origin not the savage punishment of a rival, but the sacrifice of a sacred ass. The skin was preserved for its magical properties, and shown at Celænæ in the time of Aelian.[2] He further suggests, though the etymology is not quite certain, that the name Marsyas is connected with *μάρσυπος*, from which comes our 'marsupial.' Marsyas became human in Græco-Roman art,[3] and carried his own hide in the form of a wine-skin—a figure exactly parallel to the first Silenos in fig. above. The skin of Marsyas may well be the origin of the famous 'peau d'âne' of French literature.[4]

Even more unimpeachable is the evidence of King Midas, who judged the case of the Silen Marsyas and who caught 'Silen' in his rose-gardens. Midas, says Philostratos[5] in telling his story, 'had something of the race of satyrs about him, witness his ears.' By the time of Philostratos the word 'satyr' is loosely used to cover any half-animal daimon. The asses' ears mark Midas for us as a Silen, in ass- not horse-form. We think of the ass as the patient burden-bearer, and it surprises us that he should figure as fertility-daimon side by side with the splendid horse, but to the ancient Greek (as to the modern) it was the mule that was beast of burden; the ass was primarily sire of the useful mule and ever prone, as Simonides of Amorgos[6] says, *πρὸς ἔργον ἀφροδίσιον*. It may well be, as Reinach[7] suggests, that the ass-daimon was the primary basis of the Silen, and that the horse-form was due to a later blend with the popular horse-Centaur. The connexion of ass and Silen was remembered down to Alexandrian times. In the great Dionysiac procession of Ptolemy II. Silens and Satyrs alike are mounted on asses, not horses.[8]

Midas in popular legend is a Phrygian, but Herodotus[9] knew that his real home was in Europe, not Asia. The Macedonians claimed that Silenos was caught by Midas in his wondrous rose-gardens overshadowed by Mt. Bermios. The magic roses as fodder for the ass live on in Apuleius.[10] The spring in which Midas mixed the wine to snare Silenos is placed by Athenæus[11] (on the authority of Bion) on the borderland between the Mædi and the Paonians. Its name was *Ἴννα*, and the name is instructive; *ἴννος* is Greek for a mule, the sire being a stallion, the dam a she-ass.[12] Silenoi are constantly associated with springs and rivers; the old interpretation[13] was that they simply *were* springs; but the ass- and horse-form points to a wider fertility connotation.

Midas, the ass-eared Silen, is a Phrygian, and, like all other Phrygians, before he passed from Europe into Asia, he was a Brigian[14] of Indo-European stock, but, like Dionysos, Thracian, not Greek. It is now clear why the word 'Silenos' is from the Thraco-Phrygian 'satem' form of an Indo-Germanic root. The sanctity and sacrifice of the ass—so strange to the Greeks—were familiar to the Thraco-Phrygians. A portion of the Thraco-Phrygian stock dwelt about the great snow peak of Bora[1]—the modern Nidje, 2000 ft. high, the highest point between Haliakma and the Axios; hence its name, which means simply 'mountain,' the guttural form surviving in Russian *gora*, 'mountain.' Here was the home of the Silenoi; witness the coins of Macedonia. It was to these Hyperboreans that Apollo, and Perseus before him, fared and saw them 'sacrificing splendid hecatombs of asses.' In these feasts, Pindar[2] tells us, Apollo took special joy and—most instructive for our purpose—'the god laughed aloud to see the romping licence of the monstrous beasts.'[3] The Silen is dissolute even in old age; and yet as flute-playing Phrygian, countryman of the Thracian Orpheus, he is redeemed always by the spirit of music and mysterious prophetic wisdom. It was not for his snub-nose only that Socrates was dubbed Silen.

LITERATURE.—In the Lexicons of Roscher and Daremberg-Saglio Silenos must be sought under 'Satyroi'—a serious defect in method tending to confuse the known with the uncertain. O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1897–1906, discusses Silenos under 'Pan, Satyroi, Silenos.' The same defect must be noted in the present writer's discussion of the horse-shaped Silenoi in *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 380, 389. In the articles of the Lexicons will be found full references to the older literature, in which the Silenoi are explained as either *Quell-* or *Berg-daimonen*. The references for the new view are given more conveniently in the text. Indispensable to the study of the ass- and horse-forms, though not dealing directly with the Silenoi, is A. B. Cook, 'Animal Worship in the Mycenæan Age,' *JHS* xiv. [1894] 81–169. He there figures (fig. 1) the ass-demons of Mycenæ which are the nameless ritual ancestors of the Silenoi.

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SILENT TRADE.—See GIFTS (Primitive and Savage).

SILVER.—See METALS AND MINERALS.

SIMON MAGUS.—Simon Magus, the subject of an episode in the first evangelization of Samaria recorded in Ac 8[9-24], appears in ecclesiastical tradition under three aspects: (1) as a false Messiah, who practised magical arts and subsequently attempted, by the aid and with the sanction of Christianity, to set up a rival universal religion; (2) as the founder of a Gnostic sect; (3) as a travesty of the apostle Paul. Our information about him is derived from three distinct types of early Christian literature—the heresiologists of the 2nd to the 5th cent. A.D., the Clementine literature, and the apocryphal *Acts of SS. Peter and Paul*. The first two features of the tradition are present in a greater or less degree in each of those sources; the last occurs with certainty only in the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions* and possibly in the apocryphal *Acts*.

1. **The narrative of Ac 8[9-24].**—In Acts Simon is described as a man who had bewitched the people of Samaria by his sorcery, 'giving out that himself was some great one: to whom they all gave heed, from the least to the greatest, saying, This man is the great power of God.' At the preaching of Philip, Simon believed and was baptized; but later, when Peter and John came down to Samaria to confer the gift of the Holy Ghost upon Philip's converts by the laying on of hands, he offered the apostles money, saying, 'Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost.' Peter cursed him for his presumption and bade him repent; the

1 'Marsyas' in *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, Paris, 1905–12, iv. 42.
2 *Var. Hist.* xiii. 21.
3 See coin of L. Marcius Censorinus representing a statue of Marsyas in the Forum (Roscher, *s.v.* 'Marsyas,' p. 2444, fig. i.).
4 Reinach, p. 44.
5 *Vit. Apoll.* vi. 27. 2.
6 7 [8]. 49.
7 P. 37.
8 Athen. v. 31, p. 200.
9 viii. 138.
10 *Metam.* iii. 85; and in Lucian, *Lucius*, 54.
11 ii. 23, p. 45 C.
12 Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogerman. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 534, *s.v.* 'Maulthier.'
13 L. Preller and C. Robert, *Griech. Myth.*[4], Berlin, 1894, i. 729 ff., followed even by Lagercrantz, p. 117, though his own new derivation shows the inadequacy of the old view. O. Jessen, in his art. 'Marsyas' in Roscher, still holds that Marsyas is merely a *Quell-dämon*.
14 Herod. vii. 73.

1 O. Schroeder, 'Hyperboreer,' *ARW* viii. [1905] 83.
2 *Pyth.* x. 31 ff.
3 *γελᾷ θ' ὁρῶν ὕβριν ὀρθίαν κνωδάλων.*

incident concluded with Simon's request for the apostles' prayers on his behalf.

The authenticity and integrity of the narrative in Acts are suspect on several grounds. (1) The text shows traces of interpolation. In v.[11] *προσεῖχον* and *ἐξεστακέναι* look like an echo of *ἐξιστῶν* in v.[9] and *προσεῖχον* in v.[10a], and the verse simply repeats the sense of the foregoing narrative. (2) The commotion caused by Simon in Samaria, resulting in the adhesion of the whole city and the declaration that he was the great power of God, must be an exaggeration, since it is quite out of proportion to the importance of the representative of a common type of impostor. (3) There is no close to the story: nothing is said as to what became of Simon after his repudiation by the apostles. (4) It has been urged that the theory implicit in vv.[14-18], that the power of conferring the Holy Ghost belonged exclusively to the apostles, is an unhistorical transference of the ideas of a later age into the conditions of the primitive Church.

According to the theory that the text has been interpolated, Simon was at first represented merely as desirous of acquiring Philip's miraculous powers. His acclamation by the people as the great power of God, his confronting with Peter, and the suggestion that his purpose was to purchase equality with the apostles are relegated to a later version of the story, whose motive has thus been fundamentally recast.

2. Simon in ecclesiastical tradition.—(*a*) *Justin.*—In the 2nd cent. A.D. a cycle of legends concerning Simon's doings in Rome grew up as a sequel to the story of Acts. Justin Martyr[1] is our earliest authority, and his evidence should carry considerable weight, since he was a native of Nablus (Shechem) in Samaria,[2] though allowance must be made for misrepresentation natural to a champion of orthodoxy and an apologist of the Church. Justin describes Simon as a native of Gitta in Samaria, who was acknowledged almost universally by his fellow-countrymen as the transcendent God 'above all principality, power, and dominion,'[3] but does not definitely connect him with the impostor of Acts. He was the master of the heretic Menander of Capparatæa,[4] who taught in Antioch that his followers should never die, and was accompanied in his travels by a woman named Helena, who had formerly been a prostitute and whom he declared to be 'the first intelligence' proceeding from himself. For Simon claimed to be and was accounted a god both in Samaria and elsewhere. He had won the favour of Cæsar (presumably Claudius),[5] and a statue was erected to him as god on an island in the Tiber by command of the Senate,[6] bearing the inscription 'Simoni Deo Sancto.'

Justin has confused Simon with the old Sabine deity Semo Sancus, who presided over compacts.[7] His mistake can be checked with absolute certainty, thanks to an accident of Roman archæology. In the year 1574 the base of a statue was discovered on an island in the Tiber, with the following dedication inscribed on it:[8]

'Semoni | Sanco | Deo. Fidio | Sacrum | Sex. Pompeius. S.P.F. | Col. Mussianus | Quinquennalis | Decur. | Bidentalis | Donum. Dedit ℔.'

(*b*) *Tertullian and Origen.*—The ecclesiastical writers of the next two generations add little but detail to Justin's account. His story of the statue which the Romans dedicated to Simon became part of tradition and is repeated by Irenæus and almost all later authorities. Tertullian[9] identifies Simon the heretic with the Simon who had been cursed and expelled by the apostle Peter, attributes his magic art to the service of angels, as Justin had ascribed it to the help of demons, and says that he ransomed Helen of Tyre to console himself for the loss of the powers which he had desired to purchase of the apostles. Origen,[1] like Justin, places Simon in a series of pretenders to divine honours, who had appeared since the ascension of Christ, and puts him in the line of the Samaritan Messiahs—Theudas, Dositheus, and Cleobius.

3. The tradition of Simon's conflict with St. Peter in Rome.—Hippolytus is the first ecclesiastical writer to connect the tradition of Simon's sojourn in Rome with the tradition of St. Peter's presence there. Justin alludes to the disillusionment of the Roman people,[2] but Hippolytus gives the earliest extant version of the legend of Simon's conflict with Peter, his final defeat, and death.[3] His narrative, however, disagrees completely with the legend of Simon's flight and fall from heaven in the presence of the emperor Nero, which was accepted later. Hippolytus makes no reference to the conflicts of Simon and Peter in Syria, and only in passing mentions the opposition of the Apostle in Rome. Simon taught sitting under a plane-tree and, in order to convince his hearers and to escape exposure, promised that, if he was buried alive, he would rise again the third day. A trench was dug and Simon was buried, but the test failed. This version of the legend of Simon's death is perhaps parodied in the apocryphal *Acts of SS. Peter and Paul*[4] by the story of Simon's undertaking before Nero to rise again after he had been beheaded and of his successful imposture by substituting a ram for himself.

The earliest connexion of the death of Simon with the incident of his attempted flight extant in ecclesiastical tradition is found in Arnobius (fl. *c.* 310).[5] Peter invoked the name of Christ, and Simon was precipitated from his fiery chariot. This account varies from later tradition in that Simon does not die outright as a consequence of his fall, but is conveyed to Brunda (=Brundisium) and there, overcome by his sufferings and by shame at his failure, casts himself down a precipice. The pre-Catholic *Actus Petri cum Simone*[6] agrees with Arnobius in prolonging Simon's life after his fall, but attributes his death to the assistance of the physicians of Terracina. This writing must belong to the earlier part of the 3rd cent. A.D., since Commodian[7] (fl. 250) alludes to the dog which, being made to speak by Peter's command, betrayed Simon's presence in the house of Marcellus and prophesied his overthrow. The *Syriac Didascalia*,[8] which was later expanded into the *Apostolic Constitutions* and is dated about the end of the 3rd cent., *i.e.* slightly earlier than Arnobius, describes Simon's attempted flight, but seems to imply that he survived his fall, from which he suffered a broken ankle, since it relates that, while many turned away from him, others clave to him. The same document and also Eusebius[9] refer to a previous contest between Peter and Simon Magus in Palestine, but there is no reason to suppose that either had any other source of information than the narrative of Acts. Eusebius's account of Simon's overthrow is ambiguous. Philaster[10] (*c.* 380) is the earliest writer who definitely alludes to previous conflicts in Palestine other than that recorded by St. Luke: he mentions the flight of Simon from Jerusalem to Rome and his challenge to Peter before Nero, ascribes his fall to the intervention of an angel at the prayer of Peter, and makes his death immediate. Philaster apparently did not derive this information from his chief source, the lost syntagma of Hippolytus (*c.* 200). Cyril of Jerusalem[11] is the earliest of the Fathers to attribute the fall of Simon to the joint prayers of the apostles Peter and Paul, as it is recorded in *Passio Petri et Pauli*.[12] The author of the work *de Excidio urbis Hierosolymitanæ*[13] draws upon the apocryphal *Acts* for a number of incidents in his account of Simon. The *Apostolic Constitutions*[14] weaves together all the strands which were finally combined in the legend of Simon Magus.

4. Difficulties in identifying Simon the Gnostic with the Simon of Acts.—From Irenæus onwards the Fathers of the Church are unanimous in ascribing to Simon Magus the origin and author-

1 *Apol.* i. 25, 26, *Dial. cum Tryph.* cxx. 16.

2 *Dial. cum Tryph.* cxx. 16: *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους τοῦ ἐμοῦ λέγω δὲ τῶν Σαμαρέων, κ.τ.λ.*

3 *Ib.*: *ὃν θεὸν ὑπεράνω πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως εἶναι λέγουσι.*

4 *Apol.* i. 26.

5 Cf. *Dial. cum Tryph.* cxx. 16, *Καίσαρι προσομιλῶν*, with *Apol.* i. 26, *ἐπὶ Κλαυδίου καίσαρος.*

6 *Apol.* i. 56: *τὴν ἱερὰν σύγκλητον.*

7 See Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 213.

8 The inscription is given in Baronius, *Annales*, Lucca, 1738–46, ad annum 44, i. 302 Tillemont doubts this solution (*Mémoires*, Paris, 1693–171*2*, ii. 482).

9 *De Idol.* 9, *de Fuga*, 12, *de Anima*, 34, *Apol.* 13.

1 *C. Celsum*, i. 57, vi. 11.

2 *Apol.* i. 56. 3 *Phil.* vi. 20.

4 *Passio SS. AA. Petri et Pauli*, ed. R. A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet, Leipzig, 1891–1903, chs. 32, 57.

5 *Adv. Nationes*, ii. 12.

6 Lat. version, ch. 32; Gr. version, ch. 3.

7 *Carmen Apologeticum*, i. 613; cf. *Actus Petri cum Simone*, chs. 9, 11, 12.

8 vi. 8, 9 (p. 100 *f.*, ed. P. A. de Lagarde, tr. A. C. Headlam, *HDB* iv. 521, *s.v.* 'Simon Magus').

9 *HE* ii. 13 f. 10 *Hær.* 29.

11 *Catech.* vi. 14. 12 52–55.

13 iii. 2, ascribed to Hegesippus, but probably by Ambrose.

14 vi. 7–9.

ship of heresy.[1] But, in addition to his character as the progenitor of heresy in general, the authorship of a particular Gnostic system is also attributed to Simon. There are serious difficulties in accepting the tradition that the Simon of Acts was the founder of the sect called by his name and professing these doctrines.

Simon's attempt to purchase the power of the apostles occurred in the reign of Claudius; but Hegesippus[2] asserts that Gnosticism arose in the times of Trajan, after the sacred choir of the apostles had ceased. The heretic Menander is universally represented as the disciple of Simon, and Justin Martyr[3] in the reign of Antoninus Pius (A.D. 152) mentions that some of Menander's followers were still alive. One of the sayings attributed to their founder by the Simonians, which has every appearance of being genuine, is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is the Simon of Acts. The Gnostic Simon[4] claimed to have appeared as the Son in Judæa, where he simulated death, to have descended in Samaria as the Father, and to have visited the Gentiles as the Holy Spirit. He seems to have held the doctrine of metempsychosis; but his claim of identity with Jesus rules out the possibility of his reappearance as an incarnation of the Father in the reign of Claudius. Moreover, writings were current in this sect under the name of Simon in which two passages from St. Paul's epistles are quoted (1 Co 11^{32}, Eph $6^{14ff.}$), and allusion is made to the parable of the lost sheep.[5] If the identification of the Simon of Acts with the founder of the Simonian sect is maintained, his system would be distinguished from all other Gnostic sects in this respect, that it arose before St. Paul had re-interpreted Christianity to the Gentiles; yet the speculations attributed to Simon are in their main outlines closely akin to the Gnostic systems of the 2nd cent. A.D., except that Simon himself is substituted for Christ in the part of the Redeemer. Simon is the subject of the Gnostic speculations current in the Simonian sect and cannot be regarded as the author of them, at least in their developed form. Nevertheless, after Justin the Fathers agree in identifying the leader of the Gnostic sect with the Simon of Acts and in making Samaria the scene of his first activities.

5. **Sources from which our knowledge of Simon's doctrine is derived.**—Two independent traditions profess to preserve the teaching of Simon, the one betraying the influence of Alexandrian allegory (Hippolytus), the other of Syrian and Babylonian religion (Irenæus, Epiphanius, Theodoret). The former survives only in the fragments of a book ascribed to Simon and entitled *The Great Announcement*, which are preserved by the author of the *Philosophumena*.[6] The contents of this work, which is written in the form of an allegorical commentary on the Pentateuch, consist chiefly of cosmological speculations. The latter tradition is derived ultimately from a lost treatise of Justin against all heresies,[7] which is the common source underlying the account of Simon's doctrines given by Irenæus, Epiphanius, Theodoret, and pseudo-Tertullian. Epiphanius seems to have had access to the original document whence Justin drew his information, since by an awkward transition he twice introduces Simon as speaking in the first person. Hippolytus was also acquainted with this treatise of Justin and supplemented his use of *The Great Announcement* by quotations from it. *Phil.* vi. 19 f. repeats the story of Helen's deliverance as given by Irenæus, sometimes with verbal coincidences. The central theme of this tradition is a myth of redemption.

6. **Cosmogony of 'The Great Announcement.'**—*The Great Announcement* professes to solve the riddle of the universe by a theory of emanations.

The principle of all things is fire,[1] a boundless power so compounded of two natures, the one hidden and the other manifest, 'that the hidden are concealed in the manifest portions of the fire, and the manifest derive their being from the hidden.' The cosmos, or ordered universe, originated as the self-realization of the unbegotten fire and is arranged in a series of three successive worlds, in which the lower is a reflexion of the one above. An intermediate world mirrors the primal world and is itself the paradigm of the lower world of sense. It is difficult to decide whether Simon conceives of the three worlds as co-existing together or simply as stages in a process of evolution. For the infinite and self-existent Power is the source of all finite and manifold existence, since it includes all things potentially within itself from eternity. 'This,' says Simon,[2] 'is one power, divided above and below, generating itself, making itself grow, seeking itself, finding itself, being mother of itself, father of itself, sister of itself, spouse of itself, daughter of itself, son of itself, μητροπάτωρ, the root of the entire circle of existence.' The originating principle of the universe is styled 'the Standing One,' ὁ ἑστὼς, στάς, στησόμενος.[3]

The highest world was unfolded from the Unbegotten Fire by means of three pairs of roots called respectively Mind (Νοῦς) and Thought (Ἐπίνοια), Voice (Φωνή) and Name (Ὄνομα), Reason (Λογισμός) and Desire (Ἐνθύμησις).[4] In each of the six roots the infinite Power resides simultaneously and in its entirety, potentially but not actually: the roots are regarded as aspects of the Supreme, having no independent existence of their own, while their addition together is necessary to complete the fullness of his being.[5] Together with their source these six roots, which are named 'Powers' (δυνάμεις), constitute a hebdomad. The intermediate world is also composed of a hebdomad, the head of which answers to the boundless Power of the primal world and is similarly styled 'the Standing One.' He, like his prototype, is both male and female and generates a similar chain of three pairs, or syzygies, of emanations, which are named Æons. The roots of this second world—Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, Air and Water[6]—correspond to the hierarchy of abstract principles in the primal world and form the archetypes or ideal patterns of the phenomena of the sensible world. The lower world came into being from chaotic matter quickened by the breath of the seventh Power of the intermediate world, who is identified with the Spirit wafted over the face of the waters, 'an image from an incorruptible form which alone reduces all things to order.'[7] The angels and authorities were charged with its government.

By obscure and confused imagery *The Great Announcement* attempts to explain the procession of the two upper worlds from their sources.[8] In the bisexual nature of Power Silence, the female element, which alone possesses the power of conceiving and producing new beings, was originally concealed within the male element, as the thought is concealed within the mind, and was called 'Silence invisible, incomprehensible,' because she has no independent existence until her emission as Thought, just as the thought conceived by the mind becomes comprehensible only by utterance. Each of the roots, like the principles from which they proceed, has a double aspect and is both male and female, since each is the offspring of, and therefore the cause of conception to, that which is above it, and each controls and is a source of being to the Power or Æon below.[9]

Simon's system has been called an 'anthropological pantheism.'[10] In attempting to explain the presence of a multiplicity of being within the indivisible and all-embracing unity of the supreme principle of the universe, he has recourse to the analogy of the processes of human consciousness. In this respect the Gnostic doctrine of emanations anticipates the later theology of the Church, which sought to illustrate the distinctions within the Trinity from the traces of the divine image in man's constitution.

7. **Doctrine of redemption in 'The Great Announcement.'**—The anthropology of *The Great Announcement* is developed in a paraphrase of the Bible narratives of the Creation and the Fall.

[1] Iren. *adv. Hær.* I. xxiii. 2 (Massuet)=I. xvi. 2 (Harvey): 'Simon autem Samaritanus ex quo universæ haereses substiterunt'; cf. Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 20; Eus. *HE* ii. 13; Cyril Hier. *Catech.* vi. 14; Epiph. *Hær.* 21; Augustine, *Liber de Hær.* 1; Theodoret, *Fab. Hær.* i. 1; pseudo-Tertullian, *adv. Omnes Hær.* 1.

[2] Eus. *HE* iv. 7. [3] *Apol.* i. 26.

[4] Iren. *Hær.* I. xvi. (xxiii.) 1; Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 19; Theodoret, *Fab. Hær.* i. 1: καὶ Ἰουδαίοις μὲν ὡς υἱὸν φανῆναι, πρὸς δὲ Σαμαρείτας ὡς πατέρα κατεληλυθέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔθνεσιν ὡς πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐπιφοιτῆσαι. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* vi. 14) says that Simon claimed to have appeared as the Father on Mt. Sinai, as Christ Jesus in seeming but not in the flesh among the Jews, and afterwards as the Paraclete whom Christ promised to send. He has misquoted his authority, confused possibly by some reminiscence of Sabellianism or Montanism.

[5] Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 3; Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 14.

[6] Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 7–20.

[7] Justin, *Apol.* i. 26. 8: σύνταγμα κατὰ πασῶν τῶν γεγενημένων αἱρέσεων.

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7. **Doctrine of redemption in 'The Great Announcement.'**—The anthropology of *The Great Announcement* is developed in a paraphrase of the Bible narratives of the Creation and the Fall.

[1] Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 9 (p. 247, Cruice).

[2] *Ib.* vi. 17 (p. 259, Cruice).

[3] The same designation occurs for Simon's supreme God in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 11, p. 456: τὸν Σίμωνα τῷ ἑστῶτι, ὃν σέβουσιν, ἑξομοιοῦσθαι τρόπον βούλονται.

[4] Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 18 (p. 251, Cruice). Both Irenæus and Epiphanius call the second partner in the first pair of roots Ἔννοια, Hippolytus Ἐπίνοια (=Afterthought).

[5] *Ib.* vi. 17 (p. 258, Cruice).

[6] *Ib.* vi. 14. [7] *Ib.* vi. 15.

[8] *Ib.* vi. 18 (p. 261 f., Cruice). [9] *Ib.* vi. 13.

[10] Kreyenbühl, *Das Evangelium der Wahrheit*, i. 240.

The seventh Power of the intermediate world, the Father of all, moulded man by taking dust from the earth and fashioned him after His own image and likeness. The image of the Father is the organizing principle in man, since by it alone he attains actuality, just as the Spirit wafted over the face of the waters, *i.e.* Ἐπίνοια, with which it is identified, is the organizing principle of the world of sense.[1] Hence man was originally compounded of two elements—a spiritual and an earthly—and was both male and female, reproducing the nature of the Father, in whose likeness he was made. The primal man, as the image of God and the microcosm, remains in the intermediate world; he is the ideal copy of the men of earth, whose present condition explains their need of redemption. For they are in a fallen state and no longer reflect the perfection of their archetype, since the sexes have been separated. Redemption was apparently represented as the reunion of the sexes, *i.e.* the renewal of man in his original likeness to the Father. Unfortunately the doctrine of redemption survives only in an isolated and very obscure fragment of *The Great Announcement*.[2] Man's nature is the theatre of a conflict arising from the combination within him of two mutually hostile elements, the divine spark both animating and at the same time striving against the previously existing matter from which he was fashioned. Lest it should free itself by returning upwards to its source, whither it continually tends, the soul was divided, and the two parts were imprisoned in male and female bodies. The soul, thus maimed and entangled and subject to changeable generation, is powerless to raise itself into the upper world, until after passing into many bodies it discovers and is conjoined with its affinity. Redemption consists in the deliverance of man from slavery to finite things and his restoration to his original home, and is effected by the gradual reunion of the sexes; the completion of the process would coincide with the regeneration of all things.

8. **Affinities of 'The Great Announcement' with Greek philosophy and pagan religion.**—The system of *The Great Announcement* is an attempt to reconcile two incompatible things. The popular theology and science of Hellenism provide the matter, but the form of its presentation is determined by reverence for the inspired traditions of its author's nation. In order to commend alien doctrines to his countrymen, he had to discover them in their Scriptures, and allegory supplied the means of penetrating beneath the surface to the deeper meaning which they enshrined. But this device has scarcely modified the substance of the thought, though the violent expedients of interpretation required, while heightening the sense of mystery, have rendered its presentation unnecessarily obscure. As Hippolytus points out,[3] in affirming that fire is the principle of the universe 'Simon' is following Heraclitus, and his teaching about the manifest and hidden properties of which it is composed is simply an echo of Plato's speculations concerning the intelligible and the sensible and Aristotle's distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. The theory of redemption by the reunion of the sexes is borrowed from the *Symposium*[4] and assimilated by taking Plato's irony seriously. In adopting the method of allegory to reconcile the Jewish Scriptures with Greek science Simon had a forerunner in Philo, and therefore coincidences of thought as well as of expression are not surprising in the two writers. Philo also designates God 'the Standing One'[5] and interprets the story of Adam's creation by reference to the myth of a primal man[6] who is a hermaphrodite. But the use of allegory also opened the door for the immediate influence of Græco-Oriental religion and mythology. For the pretensions of *The Great Announcement* to scientific culture are merely superficial. The history of Greek philosophy had completed a circle. Having arisen as an interpretation of mythology, it had once more become the handmaid of a religion which discovered in primeval tradition a revealed wisdom anticipating all the conclusions of science. The ultimate source of the speculations of *The Great Announcement* is to be found in the cosmogonies of the Greek and Oriental religions modified by astrology. In Orphic speculation the bisexed Phanes begot Heaven and Earth of Night, who as the child and companion of Zeus corresponds to Ἐπίνοια. Zoroastrianism differentiated a hierarchy of personal attributes within the Supreme and depending from Him like links in a chain. And the Egyptian priests, by combining native speculations with Plato's theory of ideas, interpreted the myth of Isis and Osiris as a parable of creation, the child Horus representing the perceptible world which is the image and reflexion of the κόσμος νοητός.[1] The prevalence of Chaldæan astrology, which named the planets after the most important gods of the nations and, by thus identifying the stars with persons, reinforced its teaching as to the influence of the stars on the destiny of the world, made it possible to ascribe personality to cosmological potencies as the rulers of this world (ἀρχαί), each of which presided over particular periods of time (αἰῶνες), while the pessimism which it fostered drove men to depreciate the world of sense as a derivative reflexion of the world of abiding realities under the tyranny of apostate angels.

9. **The myth of Helen.**—The myth of Helen's redemption, which forms the common tradition of the heresiologists, appeals to the authority of the Greek legend of Helen of Troy, in the shape in which the sceptical mock reverence of Stesichorus[2] developed it. Justin once refers to his lost account of the Simonian doctrine, when he relates that Simon was worshipped as 'the god above all principality, power, and dominion.' Irenæus, Theodoret, and Epiphanius[3] agree in identifying Simon with the supreme God and Helen with Ἔννοια, the first conception of His mind and His agent in creation. Through her He created the angels and archangels, who in turn created the world of men and were charged with its government. Her fall, and consequently the origin of evil in the world, was due to the rebellion of these spirits. For, as she was proceeding forth, they seized her and detained her on earth by imprisoning her in a human body and subjecting her to a series of transmigrations. The motive of the angels is variously given in our different authorities. Irenæus attributes their act to jealousy, because they were unwilling to be looked upon as the progeny of any other being, Epiphanius to concupiscence. In the course of time Ἔννοια passed into the body of Helen of Troy; according to his interpreters, Simon wished to signify by this that Ἔννοια 'was the object of universal pursuit and the eternal cause of strife, wasting the life of her foes until they recant.'[4] Helen was identified with the lost sheep of the parable; for at each new incarnation her ignominy increased until she passed into the body of a prostitute at Tyre.[5] Meanwhile the angels misgoverned the world in their rivalry for pre-eminence. And therefore the supreme God descended, deceiving the successive ranks of the world-ruling angels who barred His passage by 'transfiguring himself in the form of the dwellers of each heaven,' until at last He appeared in the similitude of a man among men and was deemed to have suffered death in Judæa. Simon rescued Helen from her shame and was thus reunited to his affinity, who throughout the ages was awaiting the advent of her consort and redeemer.[6]

10. **The conception of salvation.**—The myth of Helen is only vaguely connected with the salvation which Simon brought his adherents. Hippolytus declares that Simon, having purified Helen, brought salvation to men by his own discernment (διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιγνώσεως).[7] Epiphanius records that Simon interpreted the story of the wooden horse as a symbol of the self-destruction wrought by the ἄγνοια of the Gentiles.[8] Salvation therefore consists in γνῶσις. It is possible that the descent of

1 Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 14.
2 *Ib.* vi. 9 (p. 247, Cruice).
3 Plato, *Symp.* 17 f.
4 *De Nominum Mutatione*, i. 586 (Mangey).
5 *Legg. Allegor.* i. 49 (Mangey).
6 *Ib.* vi. 17 (p. 259 f., Cruice).

1 Plutarch, *de Is. et Osir.* 53–56.
2 Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 19 (p. 265, Cruice).
3 Iren. *Hær.* i. xvi. (xxiii.); Theodoret, *Fab. Hær.* i. 1; Epiph. *Hær.* xxi.
4 Cf. Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 19; Renan, *Les Apôtres*, Paris, 1866, ch. xv.
5 Eus. *HE* ii. 13; Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 19; Iren. *Hær.* i. xvi. (xxiii.) 2.
6 Philaster, *Hær.* 29; 'expectabat artem virtutem aliam, id est Magi ipsius Simonis præsentiam.'
7 *Phil.* vi. 19 (p. 263 f., Cruice).
8 *Hær.* xxi. 3: ἔθνη . . ἔλκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν ἀπώλειαν.

the Supreme through the ranks of the angels was regarded as initiating a process of redemption; for it was necessary that the redeemer should assume every form of creation that harmony might be restored to the world. In the end Simon promised to bring the world to naught along with the angels. But the dissolution of the world is anticipated by Simon's followers and salvation is partially realized as an already present boon. Origen says that Simon took away from his followers the fear of death, but has probably confused him with his disciple, Menander, who promised his followers that they should never die.[1] The promise of an indefectible salvation sanctioned an antinomian ethic.[2] Simon taught that the precepts of the law and the prophets were inspired by the angels in the desire to reduce men to slavery, but those who believed on him and Helen, since they were delivered from the sinister tyranny of the law, were free to act as they would. For men are saved by his grace and not by good works. The antinomianism of the Simonians issued in libertine conduct and a compromise with heathenism,[3] possibly also in licentious rites.[4] Their docetic theory of the Saviour's passion presupposed that matter was irredeemably corrupt. The soul of the redeemed could contract no pollution from the deeds of the body, and therefore purity of life was a matter of indifference. 'All earth is earth and it makes no difference where any one sows, provided he does sow.'[5]

11. **Pagan sources of the myth of Helen.**—Epiphanius, when he ascribes the imprisonment of Helen to the concupiscence of the angels, probably has in mind the story of the seduction of the daughters of men by the Watchers, to which the book of Enoch[6] attributes the origin of sin and the fall of mankind. The fundamental ideas of Gnosticism were probably derived from Jewish apocalyptic; but it appealed to the sympathies of the pagan world by the tolerant eclecticism which allowed it to adopt and combine elements from the most diverse religions. The original of Simon's Helen is the moon-goddess of Syria and Babylonia. In the *Clementine Recognitions* Helena is always translated 'Luna.'[7] The theory that Simon was accustomed to borrow from paganism is corroborated by the assertion of the Fathers that he and Helena were worshipped by their sect with the attributes of Zeus and Athena and received the cult-title *κύριος* and *κύρια*.[8] Baur suggests that Simon transferred to himself and his consort the cult of the Phœnician sun-god and moon-goddess, Melkart and Astarte; it only required a slight alteration to confuse his own personal name, which was formed from the same root, with that of the former (עשׁתּ). But, apart from this theory, there existed a wide-spread cult of the moon-goddess (*σελήνη*) in Syria and Egypt under the name of Helene; she was identified with Aphrodite, Atargatis, and the Egyptian Isis, who was often represented with horns to betoken her relation to the moon.[9] One feature of the myth of Helen can be traced to the very ancient connexion of the religion of Osiris with Syria (especially with Byblus).[10] According to legend, Isis spent ten years in a brothel at Tyre during the course of her wanderings in search of the scattered limbs of her husband.[11] The imprisonment of Helen is thus only a variant of the many myths relating the degradation of the Queen of Heaven, which all originally symbolized the waning of the moon. The orbit of the moon was, according to the astronomy of the time, the boundary between the realm of light and freedom and the realm of fate. Helen therefore, as the moon-goddess, was suited to be the source of all the distress of the sublunar world.

12. **Relation of the myth of Helen to 'The Great Announcement.'**—There is no reason to doubt the trustworthiness of Hippolytus or to discredit the authenticity of his quotations from *The Great Announcement*. Writings[12] purporting to be the composition of Simon were certainly current in the sect called after him. And the two traditions of his teaching, though divergent, show unmistakable points of contact. At the head of both systems stand the same pair of beings, the Supreme God with His companion Ἔννοια οἱ Ἐπίνοια, who acts as His agent in the creation of the lower world; and the theosophical speculations of *The Great Announcement* provide a cosmic setting in which the drama of Helen's redemption can be enacted. The greatest divergence appears in the conceptions of salvation respectively characteristic of the two traditions. Whereas *The Great Announcement* regards redemption, consisting in the reunion of the sexes, as the goal to which all things tend and as a universal process whose completion will result in the salvation of all men, in Justin's account the deliverance of Helen is indeed brought about by reunion with her affinity, but this is not co-ordinated to the redemption of the believer as either symbolizing its method or guaranteeing its fulfilment. For salvation is acquired for Simon's adherents simply by faith in himself and his companion. Nevertheless the fundamental idea is the same in both conceptions. The visible world is in a state of distress and tension owing to the mixture of two incompatible elements, and harmony can be restored only by retrieving the spiritual essence which belongs to the upper world from its captivity in the alien kingdom of matter. Just as the imprisonment of Helen, who is the animating breath of God, symbolizes the bondage of the spirit, so her deliverance typifies the redemption of the soul from thraldom to matter and fits her to act as a medium by which her children can regain freedom.

The assertion of Hippolytus[1] that Simon concocted the myth of Helen to conceal his shame from his adherents can be dismissed as a calumny, since, if his disciples followed the example of their master's licence, as the same author states, such a device would be gratuitous. Perhaps the speculations of *The Great Announcement* may be taken as the esoteric doctrines of the sect, the myth of Helen as the popular teaching intended to attract adherents. The allusion to a Greek legend and the adoption of a heathen cult were calculated to appeal to the Hellenized and semi-pagan inhabitants of Samaria; the obviously symbolical form in which this teaching was cast would awaken curiosity by suggesting the possession of deeper mysteries to be imparted later. Eusebius[2] distinguishes the cult of Simon and Helen from *τὰ ἀπορρητότερα*, the more secret mysteries of the Simonian sect; Epiphanius[3] has distorted the charge that the sectaries were initiated into delirious doctrines by imputing to them the practice of licentious rites.

13. **Date and place of composition.**—We possess no exact criterion for determining which of these two forms of teaching is prior to the other in date. Since both refer to the NT, both, in the form in which they reached the knowledge of the ecclesiastical writers, must have been composed long subsequent to Simon's historical activities in Samaria. And therefore, since the hypothesis that the leader of the Gnostic sect is a distinct person from the Simon of Acts is entirely unsupported by any proof, both *The Great Announcement* and the myth of Helen must be regarded as products of the Simonian sect fathered on its reputed founder. The starting-point of these speculations was probably the universally attested tradition that Simon claimed divine honours and associated with himself a woman named Helen, whence his followers were sometimes known as the Helenians.[4] Much of the substance of the myth of Helen possibly goes back to the Samaritan

voluminibus scripta dimittens: Ego sum sermo Dei, ego sum speciosus, ego paracletus, ego omnipotens, ego omnia Dei'; *Apost. Const.* vi. 8: οἴδαμεν ὅτι οἱ περὶ Σιμῶνα καὶ Κλεόβιον ἰδίωδη συντάξαντες βίβλια ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ περιφέρουσιν εἰς ἀπατήν; *Præfatio Arabica ad Concilium Nicænum*: 'Sibi autem perfidi isti Simonitae Evangelium effinxerunt quod in quatuor tomos secantes, librum quatuor angulorum et cardinum mundi appellarunt.'

1 *C. Celsum*, vi. 11.
2 Origen, *c. Celsum*, vi. 11.
3 Hipp. *loc. cit.*
4 Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 4.
5 Iren. *Hær.* I. xvi. (xxiii.) 2.
6 *Ethiopic Enoch*, chs. vi.–ix.
7 *Rec.* ii. 5–15; cf. *Hom.* ii. 23. John the Baptist's 29 male disciples, with Helena, who counts as half a day, symbolize the 29½ days of the lunar month.
8 Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 20; Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 3; Iren. *Hær.* I. xvi. (xxiii.) 3; cf. *Hom.* ii. 23.
9 Plutarch, *de Malignitate Herodoti*, 12; Pausanias, III. xix. 10; Strabo, xvii. 1; cf. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, p. 78 ff.
10 Cf. Cyril Alex. *Comment. in Isaiam*, xviii. 1 ff.
11 Epiph. *Ancoratus*, 104.
12 Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 3, mentions writings current under the name of Simon; cf. *Clem. Rec.* ii. 38: 'tuis scripturis propriis'; Jerome, *in Mat.* 24[9]: 'Haec quoque inter caetera in suis

1 *Phil.* vi. 19.
2 *HE* ii. 13.
3 *Hær.* xxi. 4.
4 Celsus, *ap.* Origen, *c. Celsum*, v. 62.

Simon himself. For the two references to the NT, by which Helen is compared to the lost sheep and St. Paul's description of the Christian armour (Eph $6^{14ff.}$) is adduced to justify her identification with Athene,[1] may very well be portions of the propaganda of his later followers embodied in the traditional exposition of his teaching. *The Great Announcement*, on the other hand, must have been composed later than the 1st cent. A.D., since its quotations[2] from the NT (1 Co 11^{32}, Mt 3^{10}) are an integral part of the text. There is no difficulty in accepting Samaria as the place of its composition, in spite of its use of Alexandrian allegory, since the Samaritans readily adopted the methods by which the Jews of the Dispersion attempted to reconcile their religion with Greek culture.[3] Just as they imitated the pragmatism of such apologetic historians as Eupolemus and Artapanus[4] in harmonizing the traditions of their race with Greek mythology,[5] so some unknown Samaritan perhaps borrowed from Philo the science of allegory to transform the Pentateuch into a vehicle of Hellenistic theosophy.

14. Relation of the Simonian system to other forms of Gnosticism.—Harnack regards Simon as the founder of 'a new religion, and that a world-religion, upon the principle of embodying all the important articles of the older ones.'[6] Lipsius dismisses the system attributed to Simon as 'an obvious adaptation of the earlier popular Christian Gnosticism, as it was propagated in Syria about the time of Trajan.'[7] The Simonian in its main outlines resembles other Gnostic systems, but is an early and original version of the common type.

Apart from his character as the author of heresy in general, Simon is regarded by the Fathers as in particular a heretic from Judaism. Hegesippus places him at the head of a list of Jewish heresiarchs.[8] Tertullian[9] contrasts him with Marcion and Valentinus and classes him with Hebion, as a typical representative of Jewish and Samaritan heresy. His hostility to Judaism is manifested chiefly by his disparagement of the prophets and his rejection of the moral law. Epiphanius[10] attributes to Simon's followers the doctrine that the God of the Jews was one of the angels of the lower world who created man; but this doctrine, if it ever found a place in the teaching of the sect, is not one of the original tenets of Simonian Gnosticism, and must have been introduced later, probably owing to the influence of Marcion. For Simon's sense of the antagonism between the law and grace did not issue in the antithesis of a just God, the creator of the lower world, and a good God, the creator of the world of light. And just as he is less logical than Marcion, so his hostility to Judaism is less radical than that of the Ophites. The strained interpretation of Scripture characteristic of Simon's system is not peculiar to him, and his use of a pagan legend is parallel to the Gnostic Justin's allegorical interpretation of the myth of Heracles by which Herodotus prefaces his account of the Scythians.[11] But he accepts the Pentateuch as containing a true revelation, and does not read it backwards like the Ophites, who worshipped the serpent as a benefactor for persuading men to taste of knowledge and reverenced the sinners of the OT as saints.

Nevertheless the Simonian system is most closely akin to Ophitism and to Valentinianism, in which the leading characteristics of primitive Gnosticism tend to recover their central position. It must be assigned to a comparatively early date in the history of Gnosticism, since its dualism is by no means absolute. The origin of evil is subsequent to creation; the lower world was willed by the supreme God, and His immediate companion was charged with the task of bringing life to quicken it. And, just as the creation of the lower world is not attributed to the malice of a subordinate demiurge, low in the scale of divine being, or to an act of rebellion in heaven, so the conception of a mediator in redemption is absent: the Most High Himself descends to seek and redeem His companion. In respect of the doctrine of a primal man, Simon's system is closely similar to that of the Ophites. For in that system primal man, who in Simon's system is the image of the Supreme, is identified with the supreme God Himself, and His immediate companion, second man, is His thought[1] (*ἔννοια*). Simon, however, unlike the Ophites, practises a rigid economy in the number of persons whom he brings upon the stage; this simplicity indicates an early date by contrast with the many differentiations of God among whom the successive parts in the drama of redemption were distributed by the later Gnostics. The actors are reduced to the two essential persons—the fallen deity and the saviour, Helen and Simon; and therefore primal man plays no part in the fall or in redemption, as in the system of Valentinus. But Helen (*Ἔννοια*) is a variant of the fallen female principle whom Valentinus named Sophia or Achamoth. The Fathers were quick to notice points of similarity: pseudo-Tertullian identifies Helen with Sapientia;[2] Simon himself is reported to have called her *Προύνικος* and Holy Spirit.[3] The earthly degradation of Helena emphasizes the thought that the exile of the fallen goddess here below, as the thrall of her own creation, itself calls for a redeemer. In the system of Secundus,[4] a disciple of Valentinus, Sophia is distinguished from her abortive offspring Achamoth, and remains throughout in the upper world, where she is redeemed by becoming the saviour's bride. This transference of scene from the earthly to the celestial world is the product of reflexion and marks the Valentinian as a later version of the myth of a fallen goddess.

The points of contact with the earlier forms of Gnosticism are more frequent in the case of the myth of Helen than in that of the system of *The Great Announcement*. The device, *e.g.*, by which Helen's redeemer escaped the notice of the world-ruling angels resembles the descent of Jesus, as it was sung by the early Naassene sect of the Ophites;[5] the theory of emanations in *The Great Announcement* resembles Valentinus's developed doctrine of syzygies. The doctrine of transmigration does not play so conspicuous a part in most Gnostic systems as in *The Great Announcement*, where it is represented as a process by which the seeds of divine light are sifted and purified from their imprisonment in evil matter; perhaps the theory was originally employed to justify the one feature which is absolutely peculiar to this system. For the identification of the supreme God and His consort with historical persons distinguishes the doctrine of the Simonians as unique in the many forms of Gnosticism.

1 Iren. *Hær.* I. xvi. (xxiii.) 2; Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 3.
2 Hipp. *Phil.* vi. 14, 16.
3 According to *Hom.* ii. 22, Simon Magus was educated at Alexandria.
4 Cf. fragments preserved by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* ix. 18, 27.
5 Cf. the fragments of a Samaritan historian preserved by Alexander Polyhistor, in J. Freudenthal, *Alexander Polyhistor (Hellenist. Studien*, I. ii.), Breslau, 1875, p. 82.
6 *EBr*[9] xxii. 80[b].
7 *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden*, ii. 36.
8 *Ap.* Eus. *HE* iv. 22. 9 *De Præscr.* 10.
10 *Hær.* xxiv. 1, attributed to Basilides borrowing from Simon.
11 Hipp. *Phil.* v. 25; cf. v. 7 for a similar use of Homer by the Ophites.

1 Iren. *Hær.* I. xxix. 2 Ps.-Ter. *Hær.* i. 1.
3 Epiph. *Hær.* xxi. 2. 4 Iren. *Hær.* I. xi. 2.
5 Hipp. *Phil.* v. 10.

15. **Simon Magus in the character of a Gnostic in the 'Clementines.'**—The chief catchwords of Simonian Gnosticism were known to the author of the original work which underlies the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions*. Both versions of this early Christian romance give accounts of Simon's history,[1] which agree so closely that they must have been derived from a common source.

Simon, a native of Gitta in Samaria, was educated in Alexandria, where he learned the wisdom of the Greeks and became an adept in magic. He later became a disciple of Dositheus, the successor of John the Baptist, and supplanted him in the leadership of the sect. He announced himself to be the highest Power, exalted above the creator of the world, and called himself 'the Standing One,'[2] signifying that he would be established for ever and would never see corruption. He associated with himself Helena, who is called Luna in the *Recognitions*, and had been the only female disciple of John the Baptist. According to his account, she had come down from the highest heavens and was Wisdom, the mother of all things; the Greeks and barbarians who fought at Troy were contending for an image of the truth, being ignorant that she was the consort of the one and only God, with whom she dwelt in heaven.

The *Clementines* are acquainted with the distinctive catchwords of Simonian Gnosticism in each of its forms; but, since this acquaintance is only superficial, no attempt is made to avoid confusion with other similar systems. Helen is confused with the Sophia of Valentinus, and her identity with Helen of Troy is explained by the theory that the object of contention between the Greeks and barbarians was a phantom of the celestial Wisdom, not by the theory of transmigration. The claim that Simon himself was the supreme God is confused with the distinction between the supreme God and the subordinate creator, which is characteristic of later forms of Gnosticism, but is not original in the Simonian. Subsequently in the romance Simon expounds the doctrine of an unknown and perfect God and contrasts Him with the creator, whose imperfection and weakness are manifest.[3] St. Peter is the champion of the Monarchian theory in the form in which it was developed early in the 3rd cent., and especially at Rome in the controversy of the Church with Gnosticism. Moreover, doctrines similar to those taught by his historical disciple, Menander, are placed in the mouth of the Simon of the *Clementines*. Menander promised his followers that they should never die. Similarly Simon is represented as denying a future resurrection, since the knowledge of its heavenly origin makes the soul at once superior to its bodily prison.[4] Simon is attacked in the *Clementines*, not as the leader of a particular Gnostic sect, but as the author and typical representative of Gnostic heresy in general.

16. **The attack on St. Paul under the mask of Simon Magus.**—In addition to this hostility to Simon Magus as the representative of Gnosticism, which is the fundamental characteristic of the disputes between St. Peter and Simon described in the *Clementines*, there are undoubted traces of a veiled attack on St. Paul, most frequently in the disguise of Simon, but in one instance under cover of the designation 'the enemy' (ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἄνθρωπος). St. Paul is attacked (1) for having stirred up persecution against the infant Church; (2) on account of his claim to equal authority with the apostles in virtue of the personal call heard in the vision on his way to Damascus; (3) for his opposition to the original apostles and their emissaries, in particular for the rebuke which he administered to St. Peter at Antioch.

(1) In the *Recognitions*[5] Paul the persecutor is referred to as 'the enemy'; and, since the section in which this designation is used in the *Recognitions* also occurs in the table of heads given in the last chapter of the third book, it must also have stood in the lost *Circuits of Peter*, which underlies both the *Homilies* and the *Recognitions*. St. Peter describes how an enemy raised a tumult in the temple and thus interrupted the preaching of James, when the conversion and baptism of the people at Jerusalem was imminent; after throwing James headlong from the top of the steps, this man was dispatched with a mission from Caiaphas to Damascus. The designation does not occur in the *Homilies*, but in the epistle[1] prefixed to the book St. Peter, its putative author, attributes the rejection of his own preaching to the lawless and babbling teaching of the enemy. This is an allusion to St. Paul, not in the character of a persecutor of the Church in his unconverted days, but as the apostle of the Gentiles.

(2) In other portions of these works, when the disguise of Simon is adopted, the hostility to St. Paul is much more covert. In one passage of the *Homilies*,[2] in which this hostility is generally more violent than in the *Recognitions*, St. Peter refutes Simon's contention that revelation in visions is more certain than that given in personal intercourse. There is an obvious allusion to St. Paul's vision on the road to Damascus and to the claims to an equal apostolate which he based upon it. After suggesting that the real purpose of his vision of Jesus was to confound him as the adversary of the faith, St. Peter proceeds: 'But if he made you an apostle after a brief discipleship in a single vision lasting but an hour, prove it by preaching His message, by interpreting His doctrines, by loving His apostles, by not contending against me, His companion.' But St. Paul supported his authority not merely by the single vision on the road to Damascus; he also claimed to have visions[3] subsequent to his conversion. This claim is perhaps disparaged in the *Recognitions* by words put into the mouth of St. Peter,[4] when disputing with Simon concerning the power of imagination to rise above the apprehension of things perceived by the senses: 'But if you think that there is easy access for your mind above the heavens, and that you are able to conceive the things that are there and to apprehend that immeasurable light . . .' The miracles which St. Paul wrought are perhaps discredited by ascribing Simon's ascendancy over his followers to his skill in magic.[5]

(3) (*a*) During the earlier part of his mission to the Gentiles at least St. Paul was involved in bitter controversy with opponents who claimed to be emissaries of the apostles, and sometimes even with the original apostles. His opponents accused him, on the one hand, of undue laxity in dispensing his converts from fulfilling the obligations of the Jewish law and in allowing them to compromise with heathenism by eating meats offered to idols, and, on the other hand, of a desire to establish his own authority and to make capital out of an insincere profession of Christianity by preaching himself rather than Christ,[6] which issued sometimes in undue severity in the exercise of the power to which he pretended.[7] Some of their taunts are quoted in St. Paul's apologias. He was accused of pleasing men and not God,[8] and was referred to as an 'enemy' (ἐχθρός)[9] and a 'deceiver' (πλάνος).[10] Similarly, according to the *Clementines*, it is Simon's whole mission to commend himself under shelter of his professed allegiance to the truth which the apostles teach; St. Paul's supposed laxity in the matter of meats offered to idols is parodied in an episode at Tyre, where Simon is reported to have entertained the people to a feast on sacrificial flesh;[11] Simon is also called the 'enemy' and the 'deceiver,' who misleads his converts into receiving him as a friend and a preacher of the truth.[12]

(*b*) St. Paul perhaps sometimes provoked his opponents by the strong terms of condemnation with which he retaliated. 'I would,' he says, 'they were even cut off which trouble you';[13] and he pronounces a curse on any one, though an angel from heaven, who should preach any other gospel than that which he had preached.[14] In the *Homilies* and *Recognitions* the charges levelled by St. Paul at his opponents are retorted on Simon Magus. Just as he called them 'false apostles . . . transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ,'[15] so St. Peter denounces Simon as a false apostle, who opposes the true (ψευδαπόστολος).[16] In the *Recognitions* there is an echo of the phrase which St. Paul used to expose the seductions of these false teachers: 'for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light.'[17] Simon, since he is the Devil's minister, is described as 'the Evil One transforming himself into a splendour of light.'[18] On one occasion St. Paul denounced one of the original apostles himself. The passage in the *Homilies*[19] in which St. Peter confutes Simon's theory of the greater certainty of a revelation obtained in visions is a counterpart to St. Paul's withstanding St. Peter at Antioch.[20] St. Peter says that Simon had pitted himself against a solid rock, the foundation of the Church, and was slandering the preaching which he had heard from Christ, and then, referring to a phrase used by St. Paul to the Galatians,[21] he proceeds, 'or

[1] *Hom.* ii. 22–26, *Rec.* ii. 5–15.
[2] ὁ Ἑστώς (*Hom.* ii. 22, *Rec.* ii. 7, 72).
[3] *Rec.* ii. 38–70, esp. 53 ff.; cf. *Hom.* ii. 2, xvi. and xviii.
[4] *Rec.* ii. 13, 57, *Hom.* ii. 22.
[5] *Rec.* i. 70–73 ('homo inimicus').

[1] *Ep. Petri*, 2.
[2] xvii. 19.
[3] 2 Co 12[2-4].
[4] *Rec.* ii. 65.
[5] *Ib.* ii. 9, x. 66.
[6] 2 Co 5[11] 4[5] 11[3].
[7] 2 Co 1[24] 2[1] 10[8] 13[10].
[8] Gal 1[10].
[9] Gal 4[16].
[10] 2 Co 6[8].
[11] *Hom.* vii. 3.
[12] *Ib.* ii. 18: καὶ ὁ ἐχθρός ὡς φίλος ἀποδέδεκται. . . . καὶ πλάνος ὢν ὡς ἀληθεύων ἀκούεται; cf. *Hom.* xviii. 10 for Simon's pleasing of men: ἐπειδὴ ἀρεσκόντως τοῖς παρούσιν ὄχλοις οὕτως ἔφης.
[13] Gal 5[12].
[14] Gal 1[8].
[15] 2 Co 11[13].
[16] Cf. *Hom.* xvi. 21, *Rec.* iv. 24: 'pseudoprophetas et pseudoapostolos.'
[17] 2 Co 11[14].
[18] *Rec.* ii. 18.
[19] xvii. 19.
[20] Gal 2[11-21]
[21] Gal 2[11]: κατεγνωσμένος.

if you call me "condemned," you accuse God who revealed the Christ to me.'

St. Paul in the person of Simon is attacked not for repudiating the law, but for his opposition to the original apostles, which he justifies by a claim to equality with them. It is true that St. Peter, in the epistle prefatory to the *Homilies*, describes his doctrine as lawless; but his real sin is the assumption of the right to expound the law in opposition to the twelve apostles whose peculiar prerogative it is, as the custodians of the teaching of 'the True Prophet' and His personal disciples.[1] It is the mission of St. Peter to resist the false apostle, Simon Magus, as Moses resisted the magicians in Egypt,[2] and to warn his hearers not to listen to any preacher who has not received a testimonial from James, the Lord's brother. The offence of this false gospel is recognized as inevitable; for the True Prophet in His last charge to His apostles had foretold that a preacher of error must necessarily precede the true gospel in order that by his overthrow the truth might be the more clearly established.[3] Simon Magus, like St. Paul, is a chosen vessel, but of the Evil One.[4] He is the deceiver who is chosen by the Devil to go as St. Peter's forerunner to the Gentiles with a counterfeit gospel.[5] Simon Peter, according to the *Clementines*, is the real apostle to the Gentiles, who brings them the salvation to which they have been called by following in the footsteps of Simon-Paul and correcting the errors which he teaches.[6] The contest between St. Peter and his adversary in both forms of the romance ends in the complete defeat of the latter, when Faustinianus, the father of Clement, in the form of Simon publicly recants his errors at Antioch in language reminiscent of St. Paul's style.[7] The sham Simon confesses that he was brought to make this avowal because an angel of God had scourged him by night; this is an allusion to the affliction which St. Paul attributed to an angel of Satan sent to buffet him.

In the episode of the *Recognitions* which describes the persecution of the Church by St. Paul in his unconverted days the future apostle, under the designation of 'the enemy,' is clearly distinguished from Simon, since he himself denounces the apostles as disciples of the magician.[8] Moreover, the theory that Simon plays a providential part in the dissemination of the true gospel as the false forerunner of the apostles is only a particular application of the Helxaistic doctrine, generally characteristic of the *Homilies*, that good and evil necessarily go in pairs.[9] But there can be no doubt that St. Paul is attacked under the mask of Simon Magus; for, whereas elsewhere in these books Simon does not believe in Jesus at all, in these passages he is represented as falsely claiming to have received a commission from Christ in opposition to the claims of the original apostles.

17. Modern critical theories based on the equation Simon = Paul.—Starting from the evidence which the *Clementines* afford of a veiled attack on St. Paul in the person of Simon Magus, inspired by Jewish-Christian or Ebionite hatred of the Apostle of the Gentiles, Baur put forward the theory that the figure of the arch-heretic and false apostle Simon Magus was simply invented by his opponents as a caricature of St. Paul, and that the traditions of a conflict between St. Peter and Simon Magus had their origin in the contest between St. Peter and St. Paul. Baur was followed by the critics of the Tübingen school—Volkmar, Hilgenfeld, Lipsius, Zeller, and others. And more recently his thesis has been defended by Kreyenbühl, Krenkel, Preuschen, and Schmiedel. The theory consists of two main contentions: (1) the story of Simon Magus in Acts is a modification of a Jewish-Christian tradition, whose original anti-Pauline tendency has been forgotten; and (2) the ecclesiastical traditions of St. Peter's travels and labours among the Gentiles, and especially of his martyrdom at Rome, are unhistorical and had their origin in the journeys and labours of St. Paul.

(1) The story of St. Peter's resistance to Simon Magus at Samaria was originally intended as a counterpart to St. Paul's condemnation of St. Peter at Antioch,[1] representing the victory of the Prince of the Apostles and the complete discomfiture of his opponent. The rapid conversion of Simon is intended to question the genuineness of St. Paul's sudden change from a persecutor to a disciple. The personal pretensions of Simon Magus are distortions of the claims of St. Paul. Simon Magus proclaiming himself to be some great one, and acclaimed by the Samaritans as 'the great power of God,' is St. Paul claiming that he lives by the power of God, or that the power of Christ rests upon him, or that his gospel is the power of God.[2] St. Paul's pretensions to equality with the apostles are caricatured in the request of Simon to receive the power of conferring the Holy Spirit by the laying on of hands. For Simon offering money for this power is really St. Paul attempting to purchase the apostleship by the contributions of the Gentile churches to the poor saints in Jerusalem.[3] St. Peter's rebuke to Simon is understood only when it is seen to be a reflexion on the conduct of St. Paul. 'Thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter' is a refusal to acknowledge his right to the κλῆρος τῆς ἀποστολῆς.[4] 'I perceive that thou art in the gall of bitterness' is an allusion to his bitterness in controversy. This theory presupposes that tendency in an opposite direction is also present in the Acts; that St. Luke in fact wrote the work as a pamphlet in defence of St. Paul, suppressing some facts and modifying others, with the object of representing the relation of the original apostles to his master as always harmonious. He has inadvertently preserved legends of an anti-Pauline tendency owing to the fact that their original purpose has been forgotten.

(2) Lipsius maintained that the tradition of St. Peter's mission to the Gentiles and martyrdom at Rome was an Ebionite fabrication, whose motive was a desire to detract from the glory of St. Paul's labours by misrepresenting him as the false forerunner of the preacher of the true gospel, which corresponded to the standards of Jewish-Christian orthodoxy. St. Paul is already subordinated to St. Peter in Acts, since the latter is there represented as initiating the mission to the Gentiles. The legend of St. Peter's visit to Rome was later adopted in a Catholic sense, when it was realized how easily it might be used to subserve the interests and ambition of the Roman Church. Its intention was thereby fundamentally transformed. Whereas originally the purpose of St. Peter's presence in Rome was represented to be the final discomfiture of the false apostle, *i.e.* Simon-Paul, in the Catholic version of the legend St. Paul is introduced as co-operating with him in the foundation of the Roman Church and as his second in the contest with Simon.

18. Arguments used in support of the Tübingen theory. — Three arguments have been chiefly urged in support of Baur's thesis that the legend of Simon Magus originated in a distortion of St. Paul: (1) there is evidence of a bitter polemic against St. Paul in his lifetime, emanating from Jewish-Christian circles; (2) the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions* embody traditions of a time much earlier than the date of their compilation; (3) all the versions of the apocryphal *Acts of St. Peter* betray a similar hostility to St. Paul under the mask of Simon Magus, and go back to the same cycle of legends as the *Clementines*, since the legend of St. Peter's travels in Palestine and the legend of his visit to Rome presuppose each other.

(1) That St. Paul was engaged during his lifetime in bitter controversies with opponents who disparaged his claims to be an apostle and appealed against him to the authority of the original apostles is sufficiently attested by the evidence of his own epistles. The internal evidence of his own writings is corroborated by external evidence. Epiphanius[5] mentions certain fictitious discourses current among the Ebionites, in which St. Paul was accused of being the son of a Greek father and mother and which ascribe to him an exaggerated hostility to the law, due, as they assert, to his disappointment in failing to obtain the hand of the priest's daughter in marriage, after he had become a proselyte. Evidences of an attack on St. Paul, sometimes veiled and sometimes open, have been discovered in the Apocalypse, in the Gospels, and in certain incidents recorded in Acts. It is ultimately against him that the condemnation of the Nicolaitans is directed in the Revelation of St. John;[6] his laxity had led men to violate the commands of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem, to eat things sacrificed to idols, and to commit fornication; his phrase, 'the depths of God,' is parodied in the condemnation of those of Thyatira 'who know not the depths of Satan.'[7] St. Paul is the enemy in the parable, who oversowed the wheat with tares.[8] St. Luke in the Acts has attempted to wrest to St. Paul's honour certain episodes invented to discredit him, but their original

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1 *Rec.* ii. 55, iv. 35. 2 *Rec.* iii. 56, iv. 35.

3 *Hom.* xi. 35, ii. 17 f.: πρῶτον ψευδὲς δεῖ ἐλθεῖν εὐαγγελίον ὑπὸ πλάνου τινός. St. Peter is ὁ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἐληλυθώς, καὶ ἐπελθὼν ὡς σκότῳ φῶς, ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ γνῶσις, ὡς νόσῳ ἴασις.

4 *Rec.* iii. 49: 'Et ideo magis defendus est Simon, quod vas electionis factus est maligno'; cf. Ac 9[15], σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς.

5 *Hom.* xi. 35, ii. 17 f., *Rec.* iv. 34.

6 *Rec.* iii. 65, 68. 7 *Rec.* x. 61, 66 = *Hom.* xx. 13, 19.

8 Cf. *Rec.* i. 70.

9 *Hom.* ii. 15, 33, xix., xx. *passim*; cf. *Rec.* iii. 59–61, viii. 53.

1 Gal 2[11ff.]. 2 2 Co 12[9] 13[4], Ro 1[16], 1 Co 1[18].

3 Ac 11[29] 24[17], 1 Co 16[1], 2 Co 8[4], Ro 15[25], Gal 2[10].

4 Cf. Ac 1[25]. 5 *Hær.* xxx. 16.

6 Rev 2[6. 15]. 7 Rev 2[24]; cf. 1 Co 2[10]

8 Mt 13[25].

intention can be detected; *e.g.*, the incident of his deification at Derbe[1] originally parodied his claims to speak with the authority of Christ; his champion goes out of his way to explain the reasons of St. Paul's light imprisonment under Felix,[2] which was probably urged against him to his reproach. The story of St. Paul's contest with the sorcerer Elymas or Bar-jesus in Cyprus[3] is introduced to counterbalance the story of St. Peter's conflict with the magician Simon, and 'thus anticipates the later apocryphal legends in which St. Paul in alliance with St. Peter combats a caricature of himself.'[4]

(2) It is contended that the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions* preserve the earliest form of the legend of St. Peter's conflict with St. Paul in the disguise of Simon Magus, and therefore embody a Jewish-Christian myth of the 1st cent. all but contemporary with the first generation of Christians. The *Homilies* and the *Recognitions* relate the story of the wanderings of Clement of Rome in Egypt and Palestine in search of the lost members of his family, during which he accompanies St. Peter and witnesses his conflict with Simon Magus at Cæsarea and Laodicea. Neither gives the romance in its original form, but both are recensions of a common written source, the *Circuits of Peter*, known to Origen[5] (*c.* 240), which itself had an archetype in the *Preachings of Peter* (*c.* 200). Whether any of these versions was made at Rome has not been decided; there is a general tendency among recent critics to accept the opinion that they were all composed in Syria. The *Circuits of Peter*, fragments of which have been preserved by Epiphanius,[6] presents no very definite sectarian features, and the view has been maintained (*e.g.*, by C. Bigg) that the *Homilies* represent a recast of an orthodox work by an Ebionite editor. But it is probable that the Ebionite features, including the hatred of St. Paul, were present in the *Preachings of Peter*, the earliest known ancestor of the whole literature. Lipsius proposed to bridge the gulf of over 100 years which separates this work from the 1st cent. A.D. by conjecturing the existence of an earlier Ebionite *Acts of Peter*, and supported his hypothesis by the contention that the account of Simon Magus given in the *Apostolic Constitutions* is a summary of the contents of this book. But the discovery of the *Syriac Didascalia* disproved his hypothesis; for this work (the earlier form of the *Apostolic Constitutions*), the composition of which was contemporary with that of the *Preachings of Peter*, contains no reference to a visit of Simon Magus to Cæsarea. Lipsius's attempt to reconstruct an original 1st cent. romance relating the contest between St. Peter and Simon has since been abandoned, and the champions of the Tübingen theory now have recourse to the hypothesis of an oral tradition. The *Homilies* are undoubtedly composite and embody elements of the tradition not contained in the *Circuits*—*e.g.*, the dispute with Apion concerning idolatry; the hypothesis of an oral source, it is maintained, would explain the confusion of characteristics in the person of the Simon of the *Homilies* and *Recognitions*.

(3) The legend of St. Peter's contest with Simon at Rome and his subsequent martyrdom is given in a series of apocryphal *Acts*. The earliest of these, the *Actus Petri cum Simone*, is a heretical composition; the *πράξεις Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου*, preserved in two recensions, is an orthodox recast of the legend.[7] St. Paul appears in both forms of the legend: in the earlier he departs from Rome for the evangelization of Spain, before St. Peter's arrival; in the latter he acts as St. Peter's second in the dispute with Simon and is martyred with him.

(*a*) These books preserve traces of a polemic against St. Paul under the mask of Simon similar to that carried on in the *Clementines*. In the *Actus Petri cum Simone* St. Peter denounces Simon as a cheat and an impostor,[8] using the very same term (*planus*) with which Simon was stigmatized in the *Clementines*, and St. Paul by his opponents. Moreover, this term of reproach is used of St. Paul himself and coupled with that of *magus* by apostate Christians,[9] who had been misled by Simon. Simon is also called 'the enemy.'[10] Traces of hostility to St. Paul are more numerous in the Catholic *Acta*, which perhaps represents an orthodox recension of a document of distinctly anti-Pauline tendency, since Paul is associated with St. Peter to combat his own caricature. St. Paul in the disguise of Simon is attacked for his inconsistent attitude to the question of circumcision.[11] Simon warns the emperor Nero against the apostles, because they are circumcised. The apostles answer that Simon himself is circumcised and suggest that his object is to deceive souls by his strict conformity to the Jewish law. The favour which Simon enjoys with Nero is perhaps a reflexion on the mild treatment which St. Paul was supposed to have secured during his captivity at Rome by his recommending obedience to the power of the emperor. The pretended beheading of Simon and his trick of substituting a ram for himself[1] are possibly malicious perversions of the legend of St. Paul's martyrdom. The story of Simon's attempted flight perhaps originated in St. Paul's claim to have been caught up into the third heaven in a vision. For in the *Actus Petri cum Simone*[2] the object of Simon's flight is not to regain his ascendancy over the people by a proof of his magical powers, but to manifest his divinity by ascending to God, whose power he is.

(*b*) The conflicts between Simon and St. Peter are located in the Clementine literature entirely in Palestine and Syria; in the apocryphal *Acts* in Rome. But the Roman contest is not a mere echo of the Syrian. For the books of apocryphal *Acts* presuppose earlier conflicts in Palestine; the *Clementines* foreshadow a final conflict in Rome. The *Clementines* regard St. Peter's commission to follow and refute Simon as the divinely appointed method of bringing salvation to the Gentiles. St. Peter continually contemplates Rome as the goal of his travels,[3] and his adversary prophesies that Rome will be the scene of his crowning glory, when he will be adored as a god.[4] The apocryphal *Acts*, and especially the *Actus Petri cum Simone*, mention a previous victory of St. Peter over Simon in Judæa and give details of one incident[5] which place it beyond doubt that these allusions do not refer exclusively to the contest recorded in Acts.[6] Lipsius found in this agreement of the *Clementines* with the apocryphal *Acts* an argument in support of his hypothesis of 1st cent. Ebionite *Acts of St. Peter*; but, now that this hypothesis has been abandoned, the original oneness of the tradition underlying these two classes of literature is still urged in support of the theory that the veiled attack on St. Paul under the mask of Simon Magus in the *Clementines* derives from a 1st cent. legend orally handed down, since the anti-Pauline interest seems to be the basis on which they agree.

19. The theory that Simon-Paul = Simon of Cyprus.—The attempt to answer the objection, Why was the name Simon adopted to conceal St. Paul?, has given rise to an ingenious theory. Originally it was supposed that the name was given him to contrast him with St. Peter as the false Simon with the true. But later the suggestion was made that it was given him at the time of his imprisonment under Felix. Josephus[7] mentions a courtier of Felix, a Jew of Cyprus, named Simon, whom he used as a go-between in his intrigue with Drusilla, the wife of Azizus, king of Emesa, since he pretended to be a magician. It is just possible, though very improbable, that this person may have been the same as Simon of Gitta, Josephus having confused his native place with Kition, *i.e.* Cyprus. But that St. Paul was ever accused of using the disguise of this man's name for the purpose of doing such a favour for Felix is out of the question. Those who maintain the theory disagree as to who were responsible for the calumny, Kreyenbühl attributing it to the Jews who accused St. Paul before Felix, Krenkel to his Jewish-Christian opponents.

20. Criticism of the Tübingen theory.—Pushed to its logical conclusion, this theory amounts to a denial that the Samaritan sorcerer ever existed; he originated as a caricature of the apostle Paul, and his later characteristics either arose out of the *rôle* which the Apostle of the Gentiles was represented by Jewish-Christian hatred to have played in the early history of the Church or were added when his connexion with St. Paul had been forgotten and the tradition had been adopted by the Catholic Church. Simon Magus became the father of heresy, because St. Paul was attacked in his person as the typical false apostle, whose mission is to oppose the true; since Gnosticism was the most serious danger to the Catholic system in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D., it was inevitable that the arch-heretic should be represented as a teacher of Gnostic error.

Preuschen[8] has discovered the origin of the conception of Antichrist as a false teacher—as opposed

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[1] Ac 14[11-13].
[2] Ac 24[22-26].
[3] Ac 13[6].
[4] Krenkel, *Josephus und Lucas*, p. 186.
[5] *In Matth.* iii. 894 (Delarue), 'Petrus apud Clementem.'
[6] *Hær.* xxx.
[7] *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*, i., ed. R. A. Lipsius and M. Bonnet, Leipzig, 1891–1903.
[8] Ch. 12: 'planum et deceptorem.'
[9] *Ib.* ch. 4: 'Et magis Simone se exaltante in quibus faciebat . . . Paulum magum vocantes, alii planum, et tam magnae multitudinis constabilitae in fide omnes dissoluti sunt.'
[10] *Actus Petri cum Simone*, ch. 5: 'inimicus'; *Passio SS. AA. Petri et Pauli*, ch. 43: πρόδηλος ἐχθρός ('hostem et inimicum domini').
[11] *Passio SS. AA. Petri et Pauli*, ch. 42 ff.

[1] *Passio SS. AA. Petri et Pauli*, chs. 31 f., 56.
[2] *Actus Petri cum Simone*, ch. 31.
[3] *Hom.* i. 16, *Rec.* i. 13, 74; iii. 64 f., 69; *Epistle of Peter*, 1 (St. Peter chosen as the fittest to evangelize the West).
[4] *Rec.* ii. 9, iii. 63.
[5] *Actus Petri cum Simone*, chs. 5, 9, 17.
[6] *Ib.* ch. 17 (the imposture practised on Eubola). The allusion to conflicts in Judæa, Palestine, and Cæsarea in *Passio SS. AA. Petri et Pauli*, ch. 28, is of course a reference to the *Clementine Recognitions*.
[7] *Ant.* xx. ii. 3.
[8] In *ZNTW* ii. [1901] 169 ff

to the earlier conception of him as a persecuting monarch—in the figure of Simon-Paul, and appeals to the evidence of the Christian apocalypses. Simon Magus is detected in the Antichrist of the Christian *Apocalypse of Elias*, in the second beast of the Revelation of St. John,[1] who deceived the people of the earth by his signs and caused men to worship an image of himself, and also in a false teacher prophesied in the *Sibylline Oracles*.[2] The latter foretell the advent of a beast (Βελίαρ) from the Sebastenes, who would mislead three classes of men—the elect, the lawless Hebrews, and the Gentiles. If the mention of the Sebastenes (*i.e.* the people of Augustus) alludes to Samaria (Sebaste), the passage must be an interpolation, since it is inserted in a context which probably refers to the triumvirs and Cleopatra, *i.e.* to a time before Octavian had assumed the name Augustus, though it is possible that allusion is made to the events of A.D. 70. But it is improbable that, even if Simon is a caricature of St. Paul, he was so important a figure at this early date as to be identified with Antichrist. The passage more probably alludes to the worship of the emperor. Most of the defenders of Baur's thesis, while still maintaining that St. Paul is attacked in the disguise of the sorcerer, have been convinced that Simon was a historical personage, whether they identify him with the Samaritan impostor whose doings are recorded in the earlier uninterpolated version of the story in Acts or with the hypothetical 2nd cent. leader of a Gnostic sect.

Nevertheless it is still contended that the Pauline features in the composite figure of the Simon of the *Clementines* are older than the Gnostic, and are in fact the cause of the vitality of his legend. By the time that the earliest Clementine romance was written St. Paul's peculiar contribution to the development of Christianity had been forgotten, and the uniqueness of the part that he had played in the mission to the Gentiles was obscured by the growing reverence of the Catholic Church for St. Peter. And yet it is just this claim of St. Paul to be the Apostle of the Gentiles that is traversed and distorted in the controversy of St. Peter with Simon Magus. The *Clementines* repeat the reproaches which were made against St. Paul in his lifetime. Schmiedel[3] thinks it 'a psychological impossibility' that any one should venture to attack the memory of a now revered apostle in the 3rd cent. A.D. But this is exactly what the author of the *Recognitions*, at least, has done; the allusion to St. Paul's persecution of the Church is too obvious for the writer to have repeated it without realizing that he was bitterly attacking the memory of the Apostle of the Gentiles under the name of 'the enemy.' Moreover, the currency among the Ebionites of writings which attacked St. Paul without any disguise is well attested for a period much later than the date of the composition of the *Clementines*.[4] It is more probable to suppose that the terms with which St. Paul is reproached—'the deceiver' and 'the enemy'—were handed down in the Ebionite sect through long generations of conscious hatred, against the adversary of their sectarian narrowness, than that they survived because they were embedded in a tradition whose original intention was no longer understood. The intensity of the hatred manifested against St. Paul in the *Clementines* is due to the fact that it was still felt; their inability to make any progress or to forget any prejudice was the distinguishing characteristic of the Ebionites. The intense hatred manifested against Simon Magus as the representative of Gnosticism is self-explained.

[1] Rev 13[11-16].
[2] ἐκ δὲ Σεβαστήνων ἥξει βελίαρ μετόπισθεν (*Orac. Sibyll.* iii. 63).
[3] *EBi* iv. 4549. [4] Epiph. *Hær.* xxx. 16.

The figure of the champion of Gnostic error was chosen as a disguise for St. Paul, probably because certain tenets characteristic of this heresy—*e.g.*, the antinomianism—were supported by an appeal to his epistles and arose from an exaggeration of his doctrines. An Ebionite of the 2nd or 3rd cent. could justify the long cherished hatred of his sect and discredit its object by pointing to the results of his teaching. Moreover, whenever the figure of Simon Magus was adopted as a disguise of St. Paul, he was most probably regarded as a distinct historical person, since the sting of caricaturing an adversary under the name of another consists in the historical infamy associated with that name.

The *a priori* improbability of the theory is corroborated by a closer examination of the evidence on which it rests. In the dispute at Laodicea described in the *Homilies*, where the attack on St. Paul is most violent, Simon is the mouthpiece of the doctrines of Marcion. An innuendo against St. Paul would not be out of place, since Marcion's antithesis of the law and grace was simply an exaggeration of Paulinism. In the apocryphal *Acts of Peter* Simon, so far from representing a rebellion against Jewish-Christian exclusiveness, is a champion of Judaism in its controversy with the Church. This work probably belonged to the Leucian collection, and, if so, there is positive evidence that it could not possibly have been written under Ebionite influence; according to Photius,[1] the Leucian *Acts of Peter* taught that the God of the Jews was evil and that Simon was his minister. Moreover, the contention that St. Paul was introduced into the later recensions of the Acts with the object of distinguishing him from Simon is untenable, since the tradition of his association with St. Peter at Rome, mentioned by Dionysius of Corinth,[2] is older than the tradition of St. Peter's encounter with Simon at Rome, of which Hippolytus gives the earliest extant account. Justin Martyr's authority for the visit of Simon to Rome is weakened both by his mistaken conjecture about the statue and by the confusion which makes him date it in the reign of Claudius. Probably the story of this visit is entirely legendary, and the later traditions about it arose by the transference from Syria to Rome of the scene of St. Peter's victory in the conflict with Simon. For both the *Clementines* and the earliest extant version of the *Acts of Peter* reproduce Justin's story of the statue,[3] just as they are both acquainted with some of the catchwords of the Gnostic system ascribed to him.

21. The real Simon Magus.—In each of the three types of early Christian literature from which our information about Simon Magus is derived he is represented to have claimed divine honours and to have set up a rival religion to Christianity after his encounter with the apostles, by attempting to transfer to himself the worship which men paid to Jesus.

The founder of the Gnostic sect of the Simonians himself claimed to be the supreme God, and this claim distinguishes the system attributed to him from all other forms of Gnosticism. Justin's mistake about the statue was probably suggested by his knowledge of this claim. Simon and his consort were worshipped by their followers with the attributes of Zeus and Athene. The *Clementines* represent the object of his journey to Rome to have been that he might there be adored as a god. The story of Simon's flight was perhaps invented

[1] *Bibliotheca*, cxiv.
[2] *Ap.* Eus. *HE* II. xxv. 8; ταῦτα καὶ ὑμεῖς διὰ τῆς τοσαύτης νουθεσίας τὴν ἀπὸ Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου φυτείαν γενηθεῖσαν Ρωμαίων τε καὶ Κορινθίων συνεκεράσατε, κ.τ.λ.
[3] *Rec.* ii. 9, iii. 63; *Actus Petri cum Simone*, ch. 11 (Marcellus erects a statue 'Simoni Juveni Deo'), ch. 4 (the acclamation of his followers, 'Tu es in Italia deus').

with the purpose of ridiculing his pretended apotheosis. In the *Actus Petri cum Simone* Simon undertakes to fly to God, after he had been exposed by St. Peter, and leaves the earth with this invocation to the Father:

'Me, the Standing One, thy son, they wished to overthrow; but having refused to agree with them, I have come to thy self.'[1]

The self-immolation of Peregrinus Proteus[2] on his pyre at the Olympic games had familiarized the Christians of the 2nd cent. with the pagan craze for deification. The details of the episode were probably suggested by an anecdote of Suetonius;[3] at games held in the presence of Nero an acrobat personated Icarus and, when he fell, besprinkled the emperor with his blood.

Origen[4] tells us that the Simonians never confess Jesus as the Son of God, but say that Simon is the power of God. It is difficult to understand why Simon was ever regarded as a Christian heretic. For, though he claimed that Jesus was an incarnation of himself, he is more frequently represented as rivalling the religion of Christ's followers and travestying His passion. Simon's promise to rise again the third day, after he had been buried or beheaded, which is related with variations in detail both by Hippolytus and in the apocryphal *Acts*, is a parody of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and is the early version of the story of Simon's death which was later superseded by the legend of his attempted flight. His aspect as a false Christ is older than his aspect as a false apostle.

Considering the independence of the three classes of documents to which we owe our information about Simon, there is a strong presumption that the points in which they agree contain the original kernel of truth. And these points of agreement tend to vindicate the authenticity of St. Luke's account of his doings. The author of Acts probably obtained his information about this incident in the early history of the evangelization of Samaria from Philip the Deacon, to whom its inception was due, while staying in his house when accompanying Paul to Jerusalem.[5] Simon Magus was a Samaritan Messiah similar to Dositheus and Cleobius, with whom he appears to have had some connexion; he assumed some of the cognate traits of the pagan *θεῖος ἄνθρωπος*. Celsus[6] had seen such enthusiasts in Samaria and heard them proclaim their gospel:

'I am God, or the Son of God, or the Divine Spirit. The dissolution of the world is at hand, and I come. . . . I desire to save and ye shall behold me again coming in the power of heaven. Blessed is he, whoso pays me reverence now, but on the rest I will cast everlasting fire.'

Later, when he came into contact with Christianity, Simon conceived the idea of using the new movement for his own ends. The gospel of the Samaritan saviour already contained in germ the peculiar doctrines of Gnostic salvation, and it was natural that his later followers approximated more and more to the common type of Christian Gnosticism, with which it had always had close affinity; but this approximation never entirely obscured the original relation of the sect to its founder or the central place which he occupied as the object of worship. Simon probably owed his reputation as the father of heresy to the fact that he is the only heretic mentioned in the NT and that he opposed the apostles, to whom, according to the theory of the 2nd cent., was committed the custody of the catholic and apostolic faith.

22. Subsequent history of the Simonian sect.—According to the Fathers, Simon was succeeded in the headship of the sect by his disciple Menander.

[1] *Actus Petri cum Simone*, ch. 31.
[2] Lucian, *de Morte Peregrini*; cf. Tertullian, *ad Martyras*, 4: 'Peregrinus qui non olim se rogo immisit.'
[3] Suetonius, *Nero*, 12; cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* xxi. 9.
[4] *C. Celsum*, v. 62. [5] Ac 21[8ff.]
[6] *Ap.* Origen, *c. Celsum*, vii. 9.

The Simonians were also known as the Helenians[1] and the *Ἑστυχηταί*.[2] They were ill famed for their practice of magical arts.[3] The author of the tract *de Rebaptismate* says that they made fire to appear on the water when they administered baptism.[4] The history of the sect is a record of dwindling numbers. Justin Martyr mentions a school of Simonians existing in Rome in the time of Antoninus Pius. Theodoret[5] asserts that they spread chiefly in Syria, Phrygia, and Rome. Origen[6] says that in his time (c. A.D. 230) Simon had no followers anywhere outside Samaria, and not more than 30, if that, in his native land. But his evidence must be discounted, since Eusebius[7] speaks of them as still numerous in the reign of Constantine, though compelled to conceal themselves or to dissemble their faith. Epiphanius[8] says that Gitta had by his time sunk from a populous town into a village, and that there were still some Simonians in existence.

23. The survival of the legend of Simon Magus.—The encounter of Simon Magus with the apostles in Samaria was quoted by the canons of the Church as the stock instance of the sin of attempting to purchase or confer spiritual gifts or preferment in return for money, and 'simony' (*q.v.*) became a technical term of ecclesiastical law. Simon's reputation as the author of heresy lived on long after the last remnant of his sect had vanished. In a Byzantine Psalter of the 9th cent. A.D. the overthrow of Simon Magus by St. Peter is depicted as the Biblical prototype of the triumph of orthodoxy won over the errors of the iconoclasts at the 7th Ecumenical Council of Nicæa.[9] The story of Simon Magus survived in the popular mythology of the Middle Ages and contributed some elements to the legend of Faust. Faust, like Simon, enjoyed the companionship of Helen of Troy, and the incident of the *homunculus* which he made by chemistry originated in the legend that Simon had fashioned a boy from air and, having slain him, used his soul for the purposes of magic.[10]

LITERATURE.—(1) On Simon generally the articles in the dictionaries: R. A. Lipsius, in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*, v. 301 ff.; W. Möller, in *PRE*[2] xiv. [1885] 246 ff.; H. Waitz, in *PRE*[3] xviii. 351 ff.; G. Salmon, in *DCB* iv. 681 ff.; A. C Headlam, in *HDB* iv. 520 ff.; P. W. Schmiedel, in *EBi* iv. 4536 ff.; A. Harnack, in *EBr*[9] xxii. 78 ff.; St. George Stock, in *EBr*[11] xxv. 126 ff.; J. E. Roberts, in *DAC* ii. 493 ff.

(2) On the Gnostic system attributed to Simon: A. Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums*, Leipzig, 1884; F. Legge, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, London, 1916, vol. i. ch. vi.; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907.

(3) On the Tübingen theory: (*a*) F. C. Baur, 'Die Christuspartie in Korinth,' in *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1831, pt. iv. p. 116 ff.; A. Simson, *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, xi. [1841] 15 ff.; G. Volkmar, in *Tübinger Theologische Jahrbücher*, xv. [1856] 279 ff.; R. A. Lipsius, *Die Quellen der römischen Petrus-Sage*, Kiel, 1872, *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden*, Brunswick, 1887, ii. 28 ff.

(*b*) Later developments: E. Preuschen, *ZNTW* ii. [1901] 169 ff.; J. Kreyenbühl, *Das Evangelium der Wahrheit*, Berlin, 1900–05, i. 174–234; M. Krenkel, *Josephus und Lucas*, Leipzig, 1894, pp. 178 ff.

(4) On the *Clementines*: G. Uhlhorn, *Die Homilien und Recognitionen des Clemens Romanus*, Göttingen, 1854; A. Hilgenfeld, *Die clementinischen Recognitionen und Homilien*, Jena, 1848; F. J. A. Hort, *Notes Introd. to the Study of the Clementine Recognitions*, London, 1901; C. Bigg, 'The Clementine Homilies,' in *Studia Biblica*, ii. [1890] 157 ff.; A. C. Headlam, in *JThSt* iii. [1901] 41 ff.; G. Salmon, in *DCB*, *s.v* 'Clementine Literature,' i. 567 ff.

[1] Celsus, *ap.* Origen, *c. Celsum*, v. 62.
[2] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vii. 17.
[3] Iren. *Hær.* I. xvi. (xxviii.) 3.
[4] Pseudo-Cyprian, *de Rebaptismate*, 16.
[5] Theodoret, *Fab. Hær.* i. 1 f.
[6] Origen, *c. Celsum*, vi. 11, i. 57; in vi. 11 Origen says that Simon had no followers anywhere in the world, and Dositheus only 30.
[7] Eus. *HE* ii. 13. [8] Epiph. *Hær.* xxi.
[9] The Barberini Psalter in the Vatican; cf. J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of the Eastern Roman Empire, A.D. 802–867*, London, 1912, p. 432.
[10] *Hom.* ii. 26, *Rec.* ii. 15.

(5) On Simon and the Faust legend; T. Zahn, *Cyprian von Antiochien und die deutsche Faustsage*, Erlangen, 1882, esp. pp. 110–116. G. N. L. HALL.

SIMONY. — 1. **Definitions.** — 'Simony' is a word of somewhat varied meanings. The most general definition of it perhaps is 'buying or selling spiritual gifts or offices'; and it is named from Simon Magus (*q.v.*), who, when he 'saw that through the laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Ghost was given'—some outward manifestation seems to have accompanied the gift, over and above the laying on of hands—offered them money that they might give him the same power (Ac $8^{18ff.}$). The evil here mentioned has proved to be of wide ramifications in the Christian Church, and it may safely be said that no age and no country has been quite free from it; when it is suppressed in its more obvious forms, it takes a veiled form and becomes the more difficult to overcome.

In its primary sense simony is the buying or selling of sacraments or sacramental ordinances—*e.g.*, the exacting or paying of money for baptism or the Eucharist, or especially for the conferring or receiving of holy orders, including the episcopate. But the term was soon extended so as to include more indirect forms of the same evil, such as the buying or selling of ecclesiastical offices, and the exacting or giving of undue promises in order to obtain ordination or preferment, even if no money passes, and the improper procuring of presentations to benefices. At a somewhat later date distinctions were made between *munus a manu*, when money or something of value is given or received, *munus ab obsequio*, when promises are exacted or given for the performance of the duties of a benefice in some way which the particular Church has not prescribed, and *munus a lingua*, when preferment is given or procured, not because of the merits of the person presented, but because of the influence of an outside party.

2. Early period.—The earliest known instance of simony after NT times is that of Paul of Samosata in N. Syria, bishop of Antioch A.D. 260–270, and a celebrated Monarchian heretic.[1] Simony certainly appears to be included in the charges made against him by the bishops in their letter quoted by Eusebius.[2] Paul enriched himself at the expense of the Church, but no doubt this was chiefly owing to his holding the office of *ducenarius* under Zenobia, queen of Palmyra, and to his selling justice in that capacity. There was, however, not much temptation to simony as long as the Church was poor, and suffering under persecution. In the 4th cent. the evil began to show itself in widely separated parts of the Christian world. At the Council of Elvira or Illiberis in S. Spain (*c.* A.D. 305) fees for baptism were forbidden; the gift received gratuitously by the priest (*sacerdos*) was not to be made a gain of.[3] The practice of exacting baptismal fees was also blamed in the East. Gregory of Nazianzus in Cappadocia[4] (A.D. 381) refers to candidates for baptism being kept back thereby; he says that baptismal offerings are not necessary, for the real offering is oneself. The *Apostolic Constitutions*, a Syrian work written *c.* A.D. 375, speaking of Simon Magus and of his trying 'to obtain the invaluable (ἀτίμητον) grace by purchase,' bids its readers avoid oblations to God's altar which do not come from a good conscience;[5] and this is found, expressed less explicitly in the *Older Didascalia* (3rd cent.) from which the later writer borrows.[6] The *Apostolic Canons* (*c.* A.D. 400, from the same school as, or perhaps compiled by the author of, the *Constitutions*) forbid giving or receiving the episcopate, presbyterate, or diaconate for money, and mention Simon Magus.[1] The Council of Sardica (the modern Sofia in Bulgaria; *c.* A.D. 347) denounces bribery in the election of a bishop,[2] and forbids the translation of bishops from one see to another, as this (it says) is always done from avarice, for 'no bishop has been found to go from a better to an inferior see';[3] translations were evidently common in practice. But the genuineness of these canons is disputed.

An extension of simony already appears in the 4th century. At the Council of Antioch *in encæniis* (A.D. 341) a bishop is forbidden, even on his deathbed, to appoint his successor;[4] and in the *Apostolic Canons*[5] a bishop is forbidden to give the episcopate to his brother, son, or other kinsman, or to ordain those whom he himself desires (so explicitly the Latin, and less plainly some texts of the Greek), for the gift of God may not be sold by him or made a matter of inheritance.

From the 5th cent. onwards we have numerous indications of the prevalence of simony. At the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) not only is ordination for money to any order (including those under the diaconate) strenuously forbidden, for it is turning the grace which cannot be bought (τὴν ἄπρατον χάριν) into merchandise, but equally are those who give or accept bribes for appointments to Church stewardships and other ecclesiastical posts condemned, as well as the middlemen who negotiate these transactions.[6] The *Novellæ* of the emperor Justinian I., issued A.D. 534 to 565, prescribe an oath against simony to be taken at the consecration of a bishop by the elect and by the electors.[7] A large number of councils deal with the subject.[8] A Roman synod under Pope Symmachus, held A.D. 499 soon after his election, forbade canvassing and promises of votes before papal elections in the life-time of the reigning pope[9]—an early instance of what became a notorious evil in the Middle Ages. The 2nd Council of Orleans (A.D. 533 or 536) forbids ordination for money.[10] The 3rd Council of Braga (in Portugal, A.D. 572) forbids bribes for ordination, and the exaction of fees for baptism, chrism (confirmation), and the consecration of a church.[11] At the Council of Rheims (*c.* A.D. 625) a bishop is forbidden to take anything from another Church for his own advantage or for that of his Church.[12] At the 4th Council of Toledo in Spain (A.D. 633) bishops are forbidden to appropriate Church property;[13] and the 8th (A.D. 653) strongly condemns simony.[14] At the 11th (A.D. 675) the demanding, or even accepting, of fees for baptism, chrism, and ordination is forbidden.[15]

Nor was the East less emphatic. The 'Trullan' Council of Constantinople (A.D. 691 or 692) forbids ordination for money or the demanding of compulsory fees for the Eucharist.[16] The 2nd Council of Nicæa (A.D. 787) was strong against simony,[17] whether in the case of a bishop demanding money or the like from other bishops or clergy or monks or in the case of any one obtaining a position in the Church by payment.

[1] See art. SAMOSATENISM.
[2] *HE* vii. 30.
[3] Can. 48.
[4] *Orat.* xl. 25, 'de Bapt.'
[5] iv. 7.
[6] F. X. Funk, *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum*, Paderborn, 1905, i. 226 f.

[1] Can. 29 [30]; these canons are probably based on earlier regulations.
[2] Can. 2.
[3] Can. 1.
[4] Can. 23.
[5] Can. 76 [75].
[6] Can. 2.
[7] cxxiii. 1, cxxxvii. 2.
[8] Most of the following references may be seen in C. J. Hefele's *Hist. of the Councils of the Church*, Eng. tr., 5 vols. Edinburgh, 1872–96, and all in J. D. Mansi's *Sacrorum Conciliorum . . . Collectio*, 31 vols., Florence and Venice, 1759–98.
[9] Hefele, iv. 51.
[10] Can. 3, 4.
[11] Can. 3, 4, 5, 7.
[12] Can. 21.
[13] Can. 33.
[14] Can. 3.
[15] Can. 8, 9.
[16] Can. 22, 23.
[17] Can. 4, 5.

But perhaps the writer in the early period who deals most with the subject is Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590–604). In his epistles he constantly speaks of it, especially with reference to ordination. He declares that in parts of Gaul and Germany no one was ordained without a fee,[1] and so also in Achaia[2] and Epirus.[3] He exhorts Brunichild, queen of the Franks, to prevent ordination for money, and 'selling the Holy Spirit.'[4] Gregory declares in his letter to Isaac, patriarch of Jerusalem,[5] that he has heard that in the Churches of the East no one is ordained without bribes. In ii. 23 he urges an Illyrican bishop not to allow any ordinations for money or entreaties (here we have the *munus a lingua*), but only for merit. In ii. 48 he says that the Donatists bribed a Catholic bishop in Numidia to allow one of their own bishops to be appointed in the place where he lived; and in iii. 48, writing to the same correspondent (Bishop Columbus), he strongly deprecates the ordination of boys, and all venality in ordination or 'influence or entreaty.' In iv. 27, writing to Januarius, bishop of Cagliari (Calaris) in Sardinia, he forbids the receiving of any fee for ordinations, marriages of clerics, or the veiling of virgins (nuns), unless it is voluntarily offered. A Roman synod under Pope Gregory (A.D. 595) forbade any compulsory payment for the pallium—the vestment sent by the papal see to archbishops, at least from the 6th cent. onwards.[6]

Accusations of simony against individuals in this period must be received with some caution. It was very easy to charge a theological opponent with this crime. A few instances may be mentioned. For that of Paul of Samosata see above. Ambrose accuses the Arian bishop, Auxentius, of simony.[7] At Chalcedon Ibas, bishop of Edessa, was accused (falsely) of taking money for ordinations, as well as of spending the money of the Church on himself.[8] Maximus, bishop of Salona in Illyricum (Dalmatia), was accused to Gregory the Great of having been consecrated bishop by simony,[9] but was afterwards declared innocent. In many such cases it is obvious that a charge of simony was a convenient weapon when the real accusation was one of heresy or schism.

Most of the prohibitions of the Councils in this period on the subject of simony were embodied in the *Corpus juris canonici*.

3. Mediæval period in the West.—The form of simony which chiefly gave trouble in the Middle Ages was the buying and selling of ecclesiastical preferment. But two councils in the 12th cent. deal with compulsory fees: that of Tours (1163) forbids the exaction of payment for the admission of monks, or for appointments to monastic or clerical posts, or for burials, chrism, and unction with holy oil;[10] the 3rd Lateran Council (1179), for enthroning bishops, installing abbots, instituting presbyters to benefices, burials, benediction or marriages, or for the other sacraments.[11] Thomas Aquinas[12] (1226–74) treats of simony at some length. He defines it as buying or selling anything spiritual or annexed to what is spiritual (*spirituali annexum*), since spiritual grace, being freely given, cannot be equated to any earthly price.[13] It is therefore simony to give or accept anything for the sacraments as a price, though not as a stipend for priest's sustenance.[14] It is clear from the objections which Aquinas answers that it was the common practice to exact money for the sacraments—for baptisms and masses, for absolutions under the name of penance, for ordinations, marriages, and so forth. And a widely spread practice such as this perhaps prevented the 'angelic doctor' from showing with his usual perspicacity the real distinction in these cases between simony and an innocent offering. A priest might demand fees for baptism on the plea that it was the only way by which he could get his living, but the demand would be simoniacal; if the fee is exacted as a condition of giving the sacrament, it comes under the head of simony, though a free-will offering is permissible and laudable. Aquinas goes on[1] to observe justly that accepting and giving anything for the support of those ministering spiritual things is not simony unless there is any intention of buying or selling. Here comes in the same distinction as that made above. In art. 4 Aquinas explains what he means by buying or selling things which are 'annexed to what is spiritual,' and gives as an example that a bishop who demanded as a condition of collating a person to a benefice that part of the income thereof should be paid to himself would be guilty of simony. He then goes on[2] to deal with *munus ab obsequio* and *munus a lingua*, terms which had been in use long before his day; both these, he says, are simoniacal just as if money were received and paid.[3] Finally Aquinas deals[4] with the proper penalty for simony, for which see below, § 6. It is noteworthy in view of the history of the times that the question is raised whether the pope can commit simony. Aquinas answers[5] that the pope can incur the guilt of simony like any other man, for the higher the place filled, the greater the sin. The things of the Church are his only as dispenser, not as possessor.

That in England simony was considered a grave offence during this period is seen from the *Salisbury Cathedral Statutes* of 1392,[6] which, though only mentioning these cases incidentally, refer them expressly to the cognizance of the bishop himself. It was one of the regulations at Salisbury that the clergy were not to receive the oblations of the laity on Easter-day even after Mass, because it indicated avarice;[7] this was to prevent simoniacal exactions (see below). The extent of simony in mediæval England is seen by the denunciations of Chaucer (*c.* 1340–1400) in his *Canterbury Tales*. The 'Persones Tale' (*de Avaritia*) says:

> It 'is the gretteste sinne that may be, after the sinne of Lucifer and of Antecrist' . . . 'be it by catel, be it by procuringe, or by fleshly preyere of his freendes,' *i.e.* by *munus a lingua*, of which Chaucer says that, if the nominee is worthy, it is not simony.

There were, indeed, many exceptions. Not all the clergy were guilty in this respect. Of the 'poore persone of a toun' Chaucer says:

> 'Ful looth were him to cursen for his tythes,
> But rather wolde he yeven, out of doute,
> Unto his poure parisshens aboute
> Of his offring, and eek of his substaunce.
> He coude in litel thing han suffisaunce.'[8]

The evil of simony had been prevalent all over the West under Popes Boniface IX. (1389–1404) and John XXIII. (1410–17), and the Council of Constance on 21st March 1418 decreed the vacation of offices obtained thereby; but the decree was half-hearted, and had little effect.[9] Offices in the curia were openly sold under Innocent VIII. (1484–92);[10] and the elections to the papacy of Alexander VI. (1492), and of Julius II. (1503) were openly

1 *Ep.* v. 53, 55, 57.
2 *Ib.* v. 58.
3 *Ib.* vi. 8.
4 *Ib.* ix. 11; see also, for ordinations in Gaul, ix. 106, 109, 110, xi. 55, 59, 61.
5 *Ib.* xi. 46.
6 Hefele, iv. 427.
7 *C. Auxent.* 21.
8 Hefele, iii. 362.
9 Gregory, *Ep.* vi. 3, etc.
10 Can. 6.
11 Cap. 7.
12 *Summa Theol.* II. ii. qu. c.
13 *Ib.* art. 1.
14 *Ib.* art. 2.

1 Art. 3.
2 Art. 5.
3 See above, § 1.
4 Art. 6.
5 Art. 1.
6 Ed. C. Wordsworth and D. Macleane, London, 1915, p. 304.
7 W. H. Frere, *The Use of Sarum*, Cambridge, 1898–1901, i. 162.
8 *Prologue*, i. 485 ff.
9 M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy*, London, 1882–94, i. 402, 418.
10 *Ib.* iii. 154.

promoted by bribes.[1] A stronger effort to abolish the evil was made by the Council of Trent in the 16th century. Bishops were forbidden[2] to receive money for ordinations or for letters dimissory, or the like, though their notaries might charge certain fees; and so[3] with regard to benefices and other ecclesiastical posts, and the making of conditions (the *munus ab obsequio*; see above, § 1). The council in sess. xxii. ('Decr. de observandis et evitandis in celebratione missae') forbids the importunate exaction of alms for masses as being simoniacal.

The extension of the meaning of 'simony' is illustrated by some chapters of the *Scotichronicon* of the Scottish historian John of Fordun, written *c.* A.D. 1385.[4] Thus an abbot who gained his office by undue persuasion, and another who procured the succession to his office for his nephew,[5] are judged to have been guilty of simony, even though no money passed. And this name is even given to the offence of a layman of Richard Cœur de Lion's court who received gifts from Saladin. It is also applied to the case of a monastery of women which would admit only nuns who brought a certain dowry to the community.

In mediæval Scotland offerings by parishioners came to be regarded as dues, and were exacted in spite of explicit regulations to the contrary, that 'neither sacraments nor sacramentals' (*e.g.*, sprinkling of the people with holy water or benediction by the priest at Mass) 'were to be sold.'[6] It was the custom (though explicitly forbidden by law) for the priest to retain the host in his hand on Easter-day till the communicant paid his dues.[7] Offerings for masses, baptisms, burials, confession (called in England 'shrift-silver'), and the churching of women were common, and were exacted as of right, the priest refusing otherwise to officiate or to absolve.[8] A relic of a quasi-compulsory offering by women when churched is still found in the last rubric of that office in the Book of Common Prayer; the woman 'must offer accustomed offerings' (in 1549 'her chrism [chrisom, the white garment of the baptized child], and other accustomed offerings'). The exaction of 'kirk richts and Pasche offrands' and the withholding of the sacraments till they were paid was denounced at the last provincial synod of the unreformed Church in Scotland, held in 1558.[9] In 1483 a Scottish Act of Parliament was passed to prevent money being taken out of Scotland to pay for promotion and for pleas in Rome; for no ecclesiastic could expect preferment without paying the cardinals and officials in Rome. A striking instance is the appointment of a bishop of Brechin in 1488, the deeds relating to which are printed in the appendix to the *Registrum Episcopatus Brechinensis*.[10]

4. The East.—As the Church in the West became richer, the form which simony took had reference chiefly to the presentation to benefices. But in the East, especially in the Far East, it seems that the ecclesiastical authorities have had to deal with the evil chiefly in connexion with the exaction of what are called in England 'surplice-fees'—the exaction, not as a matter of free-will offering, but of right, of money for baptisms and other offices. In many cases the Eastern clergy have had to live principally on those fees. And, it is to be feared, the exaction of money for ordination (under whatever name the fees are charged) has been very common. Yet the decisions of the *Apostolic Canons* (which were believed to have apostolic authority) and of Chalcedon[1] are held to be still binding.

In Egypt simony was first introduced as a regular system by the Coptic patriarch Michael (Chail) III. (A.D. 881–884), who exacted large sums from bishops-elect to meet the demands of the Musalmān government, and this system continued for several hundred years.[2] In India, among the Christians of Malabar, one of the efforts of the Synod of Diamper under the Portuguese (1599) was directed towards the extirpation of simony.[3]

With regard to the other minor Eastern Churches, it may suffice to quote the canons of two of them. The West Syrian (Monophysite or Jacobite) canons given by H. Denzinger[4] say that a bishop may not receive a gift for ordination or for giving judgment; for in this and similar communities the civil authorities allow the bishop to be somewhat of a judge in ecclesiastical or quasi-ecclesiastical matters, such as marriage and divorce. Further, priests and deacons are forbidden to receive a gift from those to whom they distribute the sacraments;[5] and those who confer or receive the priesthood by payment of a gift are to be submitted to the penance of adulterers and fornicators.[6] The East Syrian (Nestorian) *Sunhadhus*, or Book of Canon Law, deals with ordinations to the episcopate, presbyterate, or diaconate, effected by bribes,[7] and with improper appointments to the episcopate of persons who have been under penitential discipline;[8] and forbids the exaction of fees for baptism, 'because baptism is spiritual circumcision,' though it allows the giving of voluntary offerings.[9] In spite of canons, however, bribery for ordination has always been the bane of the Far Eastern Churches. A particularly bad case occurred in the 6th cent., when one Abraham was consecrated through simony bishop of Beith Lāphat in the south of Persia, with the result that he and his three consecrators were excommunicated by two succeeding patriarchs.[10]

5. Modern Anglican regulations.—After the Reformation simony comes into view in England almost entirely with regard to preferment, but the statute 31 Elizab. cap. 6 imposed fines on those who conferred or received holy orders simoniacally, as well as voiding presentations to benefices so made. In the English canons of 1604 an oath is directed to be taken by those who are about to be admitted to office, that they have not obtained it by simoniacal payment, contract, or promise.[11] This applies to ordinations as well as to admissions to benefices and other ecclesiastical offices. The same oath is prescribed in the present canons of the Church of Ireland.[12] Under modern conditions this regulation serves indirectly to protect the clergy from undue pressure by patrons of livings to make promises not required by the Church for the performance of their duty (the *munus ab obsequio*). This is seen very clearly in the canons of the Episcopal Church in Scotland. A provision of long standing enacts that no promise

[1] *Hist. of the Papacy*, iii. 159 f., iv. 60; for many other instances see B. Platina's *Lives of the Popes*, ed. W. Benham, 3 vols., London, 1888.
[2] *Canones et decreta*, sess. xxi. 'de Reform.' § 1.
[3] Sess. xxiv. 'de Reform.' §§ 14, 18.
[4] viii. 35–38; ed. W. Goodall, Edinburgh, 1759, i. 486 ff.
[5] See above, § 2.
[6] J. Robertson, *Concilia Scotiæ: Statuta Ecclesiæ Scoticanæ*, Edinburgh, 1866 (Bannatyne Club), ii. 52; J. Dowden, *The Medieval Church in Scotland*, Glasgow, 1910, p. 179.
[7] *Registrum Episcopatus Aberdonensis*, Edinburgh, 1845 (Spalding Club), ii. 33.
[8] Dowden, p. 180.
[9] *Ib.* p. 183; this chapter has many other interesting instances of the simoniacal exaction of fees.
[10] Edinburgh, 1856 (Bannatyne Club); Dowden, p. 328.

[1] Above, § 2.
[2] M. Fowler, *Christian Egypt*, London, 1901, pp. 76, 93.
[3] G. B. Howard, *The Christians of St. Thomas and their Liturgies*, Oxford, 1864, p. 39.
[4] *Ritus Orientalium*, Wurzburg, 1863–64, i. 488, can. 124.
[5] *Ib.* i. 493, can. 29. [6] *Ib.* i. 495, can. 32 f.
[7] viii. 6. [8] viii. 5. [9] vi. 6, can. 7.
[10] W. A. Wigram, *An Introd. to the Hist. of the Assyrian Church*, London, 1910, p. 193 f.
[11] Can. 40. [12] Can. 25.

other than the ordinary canonical subscriptions is to be required or given in the case of an episcopal election as a condition of the election, or of the confirmation of the election by the comprovincial bishops.[1] Another, dating from 1911, forbids (with certain reservations) any bishop, priest, or deacon about to be admitted to an office or order to make any promise, or to lay himself under any obligation inconsistent with his retaining his lawful liberty of judgment in performing his duties.[2]

But there is a danger of simony, direct or indirect, to which any system of ecclesiastical patronage is liable unless stringent precautions are taken. The sale of advowsons and of next presentations has given much trouble in the Church of England. The prohibition of the sales *in toto*, if the system of patronage is maintained—and there are at least equally great dangers in popular election of the clergy by the parishioners—would lead to the patronage in many cases being held by persons who had no interest in the parish. On the other hand, if patronage is bought and sold indiscriminately, simony must be the result. One way in which this has in the past been the case is by exacting a resignation bond from the presentee to a benefice—*i.e.* a promise to resign after a definite period. General resignation bonds have long been forbidden, but a statute of the early part of the 19th cent. (9 Geo. IV. cap. 94) allowed such a bond to be given if it were in favour of some person named in the bond. The great reform in this matter was effected in England in 1898, when the English Benefices Act, among other provisions, required sales of advowsons to be registered, forbade sales of next presentations, or sales by auction of any right of patronage except as part of an estate, and invalidated agreements to exercise a right of patronage in favour of a particular person. The new declaration against simony was of a very stringent character.[3] For this reform the Church of England is chiefly indebted to the persistence of Archbishop E. W. Benson, who, however, did not live to see the Act passed.[4]

6. Penalties for simony.—In the earlier authorities the penalty prescribed, in the case of all parties concerned, was excommunication for laity and monks (who at first were almost always laymen, and therefore judged under that category), and, in addition, deposition and deprivation for the clergy. But, as time went on, the penalty of excommunication seems by degrees to have been relaxed. Aquinas in his *Summa*[1] says that the proper penalty for simony is for a man to be deprived of that which he has got thereby, as is laid down in canon 2 of Chalcedon.[2] And the Nestorian *Sunhadhus*[3] decrees deposition,[4] and only in some cases excommunication.[5] In England the Elizabethan statute[6] imposes fines and voidance of the benefice.

But the Council of Chalcedon,[7] saying that a layman or monk who has been guilty of simoniacal transactions is to be anathematized, and that the cleric is to be deposed, says also that the bishop who receives the money endangers his own office (βαθμός). Excommunication is also prescribed in the Sardican canons;[8] in the *Apostolic Canons*,[9] expressly for both giver and receiver 'as Simon Magus [was excommunicated] by Peter';[10] also at the 3rd Council of Braga.[11] Subsequent practice, however, varied. The 2nd Council of Orleans orders deposition of a priest ordained simoniacally, without mentioning the punishment of the ordainer;[12] the Council of Rheims orders deposition of a bishop appropriating the property of other Churches, saying that he is to be deposed 'as he cannot be excommunicated.'[13] The 8th Council of Toledo[14] adds imprisonment in a monastery to excommunication ('anathema'); the 11th[15] in some cases adds a flogging. The 'Trullan' Council mentions only deposition,[16] and so the 2nd Council of Nicæa[17] in some cases, though in others[18] excommunication is added. The Council of Tours[19] only says that simoniacs will have their portion with Simon [Magus]; so the third Lateran, substituting Gehazi for Simon.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the course of the article.

A. J. MACLEAN.

SIN.

American (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 528.
Babylonian (S. H. LANGDON), p. 531.
Buddhist (T. W. and C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS), p. 533.
Celtic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 534.
Chinese (J. DYER BALL), p. 535.
Christian (H. R. MACKINTOSH), p. 538.
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Greek (A. W. MAIR), p. 545.
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Hindu (A. B. KEITH), p. 560.
Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 562.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 566.
Muslim (E. SELL), p. 567.
Roman (J. S. REID), p. 569.
Teutonic (S. G. YOUNGERT), p. 570.

SIN (American).—There is, of course, no such thing as an aboriginal critique, or science, of conduct in America. Accordingly, among the American Indian peoples there is no conscious demarcation of classes of offence with respect to responsibility and object, such as is represented by the civilized man's conception of crime as offence against law, vice as offence against society, and sin as offence against the divine in nature or in human nature. Sin, vice, crime, pollution, and even misfortune, are, for the American Indian, all embraced in the category of evil; the range of the things which he recognizes as evil (and also as good) is, in the broad, equivalent to the range of things evil (and good) recognized by other races of men; but he did not, aboriginally, make a reflective separation of these things into classes. For this reason, it is impracticable to treat the native Americans' conceptions of sin except as related to their general notions of morality, of which subject this is a special continuation.

1. Pollution.—It is a commonplace of the study of primitive thinking that the notions of spiritual and material, of psychical and physical, are not clear-cut, and that the distinction is, therefore, no more significant than it was to those Ephesians whom Heraclitus satirized for their purifications by blood. It is, indeed, perfectly natural to the animistic or pantheistic frame of mind to conceive

[1] Can. III. 17. [2] Can. xii. 2.
[3] A. C. Benson, *Life of Edward White Benson*, London, 1900, ii. 103 n.
[4] For an account of the opposition in Parliament to the proposals, and of the whole movement for reform, see *ib.* ii. 92 ff.

[1] Above, § 3. [2] Above, § 2. [3] Above, § 4.
[4] viii. 6. [5] vii. 5. [6] Above, § 5.
[7] Can. 2. [8] Can. 1, 2. [9] Can. 29 [30].
[10] So Can. 76 [75].
[11] Can. 3: 'anathema sit danti et accipienti.'
[12] Can. 4. [13] Can. 21; see above, § 2.
[14] Can. 3; above, § 2.
[15] Can. 8. So, perhaps, Gregory the Great, *Ep.* iv. 27
[16] Can. 22, 23; above, § 2.
[17] Can. 4. [18] Can. 5. [19] Above, § 3.

physical nature as susceptible of giving or of receiving spiritual taint, and hence to imagine that the spiritual taint may be removed by physical purifications. This notion of uncleanness and its medicine, as pertaining both to men and to things, is as universal as is religious ceremonial. Nor can it be dismissed as mere superstition while we repeat—and with reason—that cleanliness is next to godliness.

The American Indian does not differ from the rest of the human race in respect of this confusion of spiritual and physical. Notions of pollution and purification are a part of his habit of mind and the explanation of much of his ritual. Birth and death, the functions of sex, preparation for war, for great hunts, for sowings and reapings, and above all for the great clan and tribal festivals, are everywhere attended with purificatory ceremonies —among which are abstinences, fastings, sacrifices, catharsis and emesis, and dedicatory rites such as painting of the body and face with symbols, bathings, aspergings, anointings, and sacramental feasts. The Indian stands before his lodge at the dawn in order that the young and growing sun may strike him with the rays of its vigorous youth, and make him strong; he strokes his child with green vegetation that its life may be green and flourishing.

'The old Indians,' writes a missionary to the Sioux, 'continuously bathed their feet in dew and snow, and their bodies in snow and rain and "sacred living water." The purpose of this was more to "keep the perceptions keen" than to keep the body clean.'[1]

The rite of baptism as practised by some of the Plains tribes, by the Aztec, and by the Maya was governed by a similar motive.

Thus, in the *Hako*, the officiating elder 'makes certain wet lines on the face of the child.' These signify that the sustaining of life through the power of water comes from Tira'wa atius, *i.e.* from Father Heaven.[2] Bishop Landa says of the Yucatec that they named their baptismal rite *caputzihil*, meaning to be 'born anew'; and he adds that 'they have such a respect for it that those who have sins on their conscience or who feel themselves inclined to commit a sin, confess to the priest in order to be in a state to receive baptism. . . . They believe that they receive therefrom a disposition inclined to good conduct, that it guarantees them from all temptations of the devil, with respect to temporal things, and by means of this rite and a good life they hope to secure salvation (*gloria*).'[3] Another most interesting rite described by Landa[4] was the feast of 1 Zac (February), in which expiation for the shedding of blood in the chase was made: 'for they regarded as abominable all shedding of blood apart from sacrifices.'

Pollution of places and things is, of course, recognized along with pollution of persons. The destruction of old utensils and the preparation of new for new undertakings or for the new year is connected with such a conception, of which perhaps the clearest symbol is the sweeping of sacred or festival precincts—a feature of the Creek *Busk*, and of numerous festivals of the Pueblo, Aztec, Maya, Inca, and other tribes with elaborate rituals. One of the most affecting anecdotes of the Mexican Conquest is related by Bernal Diaz.

A few days after Cortes' entry into Tenochtitlan a group of the Spaniards were conducted by Montezuma to the summit of the great *teocalli* overlooking the market-place. There the Mexican monarch first proudly indicated the wealth and populousness of the rich valley over which he ruled, and then brought the strangers into the presence of his gods. Cortes seized the occasion to demand permission to erect there a Christian cross. 'You will see,' he said in effect, 'how these symbols of the devil which you have placed here will wither before the symbol of the true faith.' Montezuma indignantly refused, upbraiding the Spaniards for their impiety; and when they departed he remained behind to perform expiation and cleanse the temple of the sin wherewith it was tainted.[5]

2. Vice and crime.—Even among peoples with a scientific ethics the conception of vice (as a social offence punishable by public opprobrium) and of crime (as physically punishable, by law) is not wholly distinguished from the conception of sin (as offence against God or nature). Vices and crimes, though they may be punishable evils, are not regarded as sins when there is no guilty motive; and sin, at the other extreme, exists where there is temptation to guilt, entertained without resistance, even though it may eventuate in no vicious or criminal action. Nevertheless, in the great mid-realm of conduct most offences are regarded as having the twofold character of social offence punishable by society and sinful offence to be answered by the mercy of God or by the conscience. The practical problem of the distribution of responsibility is so complex that it forms to-day one of the greatest and least-settled fields of ethical controversy.

Such being the case among the more advanced, it is certainly not to be expected that primitive peoples should make any clear distinction between the two types of offence—least of all, in view of the fact that primitive societies, almost without exception, are theocratic in their sanctions: a people whose customs are regarded as established and sustained by tutelar or patron gods, or by ancestral heroes become divine, must inevitably regard offences against society as offences against divinity, and all social offences, therefore, as sins. This is the prevalent American Indian notion. Murder is punished for the appeasement of the *manes* of the murdered rather than for injury to the tribe. Impurity, and especially sexual perversion, was regarded in many localities as an abominable impiety, to be atoned only by bloodshed (though it may be suspected that the charge of this offence was sometimes brought, as by the Aztec against the Huastec and by the Inca against the Yunca, mainly as an excuse for bloody conquest). Disobedience to tribal custom has all the taint of blasphemy, and Indian legends abound with incidents of supernatural retributions for tabus defied.

Perhaps as clear a notion as may be gained of the range of Indian moral ideas is suggested by native terms for types of persons.

Thus the Omaha tribe have words to designate: (*a*) on the side of good: an unselfish person, a self-controlled person, a straightforward or truthful person, a willing, a sympathetic, a courteous, a hospitable person; (*b*) on the side of the bad: a liar, a thief, a quarreller, a glutton, a meddler, a libertine, a boaster, a talebearer, a beggar, and, again, an impudent, an obstinate, a stingy, a discourteous person. 'Religion and ethics, closely interwoven, pervaded the life of the tribe, and in judging the evidences of constructive thought on these topics one should not consider them apart from the natural and social environment of the people.'[1] Of the kindred Sioux Beede says that the old Indians made much of humility (*iglukuniciye*) and charity (*wacantkiye*), and in another connexion he gives the interesting information that the soul of 'a willful suicide cannot dwell in any living object; a suicide, who does his deed willfully, is painless and hopeless, sole, alone and exclusive, an "aristocrat" in all but the ability to make others serve him.'[2]

Both the virtues and the offences give an enlightening glimpse into the Indian's conception of the spiritual sociality of the world. Moral standards and moral enlightenment varied, and still vary, greatly from tribe to tribe; but it is probably true that everywhere the maintenance of custom rested upon the entirely theological grounds given to Knud Rasmussen by the old Eskimo:

'We observe our old customs, in order to hold the world up, for the powers must not be offended. We observe our customs, in order to hold each other up; we are afraid of the great Evil. . . . Men are so helpless in the face of illness. The people here do penance, because the dead are strong in their vital sap, and boundless in their might.'[3]

[1] A. McG. Beede, *Toward the Sun*, Bismarck, 1916, p. 63.
[2] *22 RBEW* [1904], pt. 2, p. 217.
[3] *Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan*, Paris, 1864, ch. xxvi.
[4] Ch. xl.
[5] Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *Hist. Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España*, Madrid, 1632, ch. xcii.

[1] A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, 'The Omaha Tribe,' in *27 RBEW* [1911], p. 603 f.; cf. also F. Boas, 'Tsimshian Mythology,' in *31 RBEW* [1916], pp. 443–453, one of the fullest analyses of the moral and religious ideas of an American Indian tribe, as shown in its myths.
[2] Pp. 79, 141.
[3] K. Rasmussen, *The People of the Polar North*, London, 1908, p. 124

3. Sin, confession, and penitence.—The conception of sin in the more precise sense, as offence against divine powers, calling for repentance and inner regeneration, is by no means absent from the Indian consciousness. In a number of localities, and especially in the more civilized native states, confession and penance under priestly supervision were important rites in pre-Columban times. Nor can we suppose that the institution of these rites in Christian forms by the first missionaries would have received the hearty and conscientious favour which the mission relations attest, had there not been in the aboriginal disposition some natural intuition of their significance. As a matter of fact, impiety, blasphemy, and a willingness to do evil were thoroughly reprobated; while, on the converse side, the Indian sought by every means to find favour and enlightenment from the higher powers by which he deemed himself to be surrounded and sustained. Probably no human race has laid such general stress upon the significance of visions, won in fast and solitude, as a form of inspiration; in many tribes it was the common practice for a man or woman in trouble to seek help and consolation by this means, while it was no less general for each individual, on approaching maturity, to conduct a similar quest of his life's helper, making a kind of consecration of his strength to the tutelar power.

There are stories, not a few, of pagan Indians, visited by remorse for some crime, and expiating it even by self-inflicted death; stories, too, of entire change of character as a result of vision or of some similarly intimate experience. But for the more doctrinated conception of sin and responsibility it is necessary to turn to the ritualized religions of the semi-civilized nations—at least, for pre-Columban practices. Thus, Las Casas, describing the religion of the Guatemalans, whom he knew intimately, presents their compunctions and penitences as worthy examples of piety to the Spaniards themselves,[1] while the similar practices of the Yucatec and Mexican peoples are described by Landa, Sahagun, and other writers. Of the Yucatec Landa says:

'The Yucatec knew naturally evil when they committed it, and they believed that it was in punishment for sin and evil that death came to them, as also illness and suffering. They had the custom of confession, and when they were in the mind for it, it was made in the following manner. When, in consequence of illness or something else, they were in danger of dying, they confessed their sins; but if they forgot to think thereof, their nearest relatives or friends reminded them of it. Thus they told publicly their sins to the priest, if he were present; if not, to their fathers and mothers, wives to their husbands, and husbands to their wives. The faults of which they most commonly accused themselves were theft, murder, weaknesses of the flesh, and false testimony. But it often happened, when they came to recover, that there arose quarrels between husband and wife, because of their infidelities, and with those who had caused them. Men confessed their delinquencies (*flaquezas*), except those which they had committed with their slaves, for they said that it was permitted to use those who belonged to them as they willed. They did not confess sins in intention, although they regarded such as evil; and in their counsels and preachings they preached their avoidance.'[2]

Sahagun gives many prayers which are penitential or confessional in tone, and describes the numberless penitences imposed by the priests. Formal confession, it appears, was made primarily to the god Tezcatlipoca, 'Smoking Mirror,' the invisible and impalpable deity who penetrates all things and sees even into the recesses of the heart.

'Thou, Lord, who art father and mother of the gods and oldest of divinities, know that hither comes thy vassal, thy slave; weeping, he approaches with great sadness; he comes plunged in grief, recognizing that he has fallen into error, that he has fallen into vile sins and grave derelictions meriting death; he comes deeply pained and oppressed with all this. Our merciful master, who art the sustainer and defender of all, receive in penitence and hearken to the anguishes of thy slave and vassal.'

After this prayer the priest exhorts the penitent to tell all, omitting nothing for shame or weakness; and, when the confession is made, he assigns the penance according to the gravity of the sin. Sahagun says that the confessors kept secret what was confessed to them, stating that it was not to them but to their god that the sin was confessed: 'they had not confessed to man, but simply to God.' Nevertheless, it appears that confession and penance relieved the culprit from civil penalties (again an instance of the confusion of crime and sin); and, when Spanish priests replaced the native with the Christian confession, the Indians expected the certificate of confession, which they asked of the fathers, to satisfy any legal complaint against their conduct. As in Yucatan, confession was not frequent, but only with approaching age or fear of calamity; but they at least 'believed themselves obliged to confess once in their life, and this, *in lumine naturali*, without having any previous notion of the faith.'[1]

The narratives of the French Jesuits and other Roman Catholic missionaries to the wilder tribes uniformly describe the enthusiasm with which the confessional was welcomed by the Indians, and their willingness to undergo penance for their faults. This, of course (though there is some evidence for a pagan practice of confession even among very primitive Indian tribes),[2] does not argue any previous acquaintance with the rite, but it does indicate a ready comprehension of its meaning—for which there is some analogy in such pagan customs as that described in the 'Relations' of the mission to the Hurons:

'They address themselves to the Sky, paying it homage; and they call upon the Sun to be witness of their courage, their misery, or of their innocence. But, above all, in the treaties of peace and alliance with foreign nations they invoke, as witnesses of their sincerity, the Sun and the Sky, which see into the depths of their hearts and will wreak vengeance on the treachery of those who betray their trust and do not keep their word. So true is what Tertullian said of the most infidel nations, that nature in the midst of perils makes them speak with a Christian voice,—*exclamant vocem naturaliter Christianam*,—and have recourse to a God whom they invoke almost without knowing him,—*Ignoto Deo*.'[3]

The 'Relation of 1653–54' contains a number of affecting narratives of Indian conversions, and in the midst an account of the reception of the confessional rite, not without its amusing features. Says the good father:

'When winter expires in giving birth to spring, all our hunters betake themselves, with all their goods, to the banks of the great river, at the cove or harbor which we call Tadoussac; and here, a public confession is held, without gehenna [rack], without torture, and without any coercion. There is said to be a country where the cold is so great as to freeze all words uttered there; and, when spring approaches, upon these words thawing out, there is heard, almost in a moment, all that was said during the winter. Whatever may be the foundation of this story, it is true that all the evil that has been committed during the winter in these great woods is told to the father publicly in the month of April. The first-comers recite aloud the confessions of those who follow, and this from a zeal which they feel for Christian justice.'[4]

Incidents of zeal for confession and baptism are related by many missionaries, and often in connexions that leave no manner of doubt that the candidates conceived the religious significance of the rite correctly, judged by the standards of the Church; *i.e.*, the purification sought is clearly conceived by the Indian as an inner and spiritual change, not as a mere release from external taint and public obloquy. In the older native rites there are many elements that represent a conception of regenerated life. In most cases, it is

[1] *Apologética Historia de las Indias*, ed. Serrano y Sanz Madrid, 1909, ch. clxxx. p. 473.
[2] Ch. xxvii.

[1] B. de Sahagun, *Hist. general de las cosas de Nueva España*, Mexico, 1829–30, bk. i. ch. xii.
[2] See *9 RBEW* [1892], p. 465, note 8.
[3] *Jesuit Relations*, xxxiii. ['Lower Canada, Algonkins, Hurons, 1648–49'] 225.
[4] *Ib.* xli. ['Lower Canada, Iroquois, 1654–56'] 189 ff.

true, the native prophet or preacher promises material as well as spiritual advantages; but the latter are nearly always present. The Indians have learned lessons of religion from both Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and their native prophets have adopted elements from both forms of Christianity, but obviously because of a distinctly native foundation upon which to build.

'Long time I knew nothing—just like an animal,' said one convert to such a semi-Christian native creed. 'I was a drunkard, was a thief, and a robber. When I joined this religion, I was told to be good. . . . I prayed and was sick—my soul was sick. I prayed to God and he pays me for that. . . . A good Christian man in the dark sees a light toward God. God makes a fog—a good Christian man goes straight through it to the end, like good medicine. I believe this religion. It helps poor people.'[1]

The form of the idea underlying this expression is Christian, but its substance is the universal one of a human conscience, first oppressed by the sense of sin, then redeemed by an intimate and buoyant consciousness of grace received.

4. The origin of sin.—Theology is, of course, no primitive science. Nevertheless, the problems with which the theologian must deal are too elemental in human life not to have appealed to the minds of men in all grades of reflective advancement. Among them no problem is more universally felt than is that of the origin of evil: how comes it that men are tried with suffering, and above all oppressed by their own inescapable shames? This is the problem of the tales of Pandora and Eve, of Job and of Œdipus, as well as of the Epistles of St. Paul; and it is the problem at the heart of many of the most ancient myths of the aboriginal peoples of the New World.

Not infrequently in American myth an age of innocence preceded the present condition of men. Thus the Cheyenne tale of the 'Great Medicine'[2] tells of a paradisal age when men were naked and innocent, amid fields of plenty, followed by a period in which flood, war, and famine ensued upon the gift of understanding. In the usual N. American stories death and evil come into the world as the result of sortilege, but there are many examples in which moral motives enter—as in the Eskimo tale in which man is given choice between eternal life in eternal darkness or mortality blessed by the light of day, and chooses the latter. Probably the most beautiful of all these tales is the Wintun story of 'Sedit and the Two Brothers Hus.'[3]

Olelbis, the creator, caused the demiurgic brothers Hus to make a road to heaven, at the top placing two springs, one for internal and one for external purification. Mortals growing old could mount to these springs and there renew their youth. But Coyote—also a demiurgic power—opposes this: 'Joy at birth and grief for the dead is better,' he says, 'for these mean love.' So the road is destroyed.

Of course, in the great number of tales, it is a broken tabu that first brings the disaster of evil into the world.

But certainly, of all native American beliefs, that of most extraordinary interest in this connexion is the Aztec conception. In Mexican and Mayan myth alike the origin of the world is represented as occupying a series of cycles or ages, each, as it were, an experimental creation, and each, up to the present, destroyed cataclysmically to make place for a better effort. The present age—or 'Sun,' of the world, as the Aztec conceived it—endures by reason of the continual expiation, self-maceration, and sacrifice of human hearts, offered to gods who had made of themselves the first great sacrifice. The fullest version of this remarkable myth is in the anonymous *Historia de los Mexicanos por sus Pinturas*, though it is to be found also in the *Anales de Cuauhtitlan*, fragmentarily. The idea underlying the myth is apparently related to the notion of Anaximander that individual life (even of gods) is in some sense an arrogance and injustice to be atoned for, and a great part of the ceremonial of Mexican religion was devoted to acts of atonement. How completely the idea dominated the Mexican mind is most impressively shown by the prayers recorded by Sahagun, for the whole sixth book of the *Historia* is virtually an elaborate ritual of penitence—not so much for individual sins as for the presumptuousness of living.

See artt. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American), ETHICS AND MORALITY (American), PRAYER (American).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited above, see J. Mooney, 'The Ghost-Dance Religion,' in *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. 2; *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, 73 vols., ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, 1896–1901; *Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean de Smet, S.J., 1801–1873: Missionary Labours and Adventures among the North American Indians*, 4 vols., New York, 1905. For a survey of Indian myth and full bibliographies see H. B. Alexander, in *The Mythology of All Races*, x., 'North American,' Boston, 1916, and xi., 'American (Latin),' do. 1919.

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SIN (Babylonian).[1]—Free will was completely assumed by both Sumerian and Semite in Babylonia. Although the tendency to sin is attributed to man as a natural inheritance, the theologians never raise the problem of its ultimate origin in the divine order of things. The attitude of the Babylonian in this regard may be described as one of perpetual humility and concern for his frail human will, which is never sufficient to attain to the divine standards of purity. To introduce the subject in its general aspect, we cannot do better than quote from a Sumerian bilingual confessional (*erśaghunga*):

'Oh lord, my wrongdoings are many, great are my sins.[2]
Mankind is dumb knowing nothing at all.
Mankind, as many as bear names, what do they know?
Whether he has acted shamefully, whether he has acted well, he knows not at all.

Oh my god, my wrongdoings are seven times seven, forgive my wrongdoing.'[3]

The penitential psalm from which this selection is taken is perhaps the best statement in cuneiform literature concerning the naturally sinful state of man, his abject foolishness compared with the wisdom of the gods, and his inability to avoid sin, even though his desire be set upon righteousness. Another prayer, probably employed in a magic ritual of atonement, has been recently discovered and throws more light upon the general aspect of the problem of sin:

'Who is there who forever [*is sinless?*]
Mankind as many as there be [*commit*] sin.
I thy servant have sinned and . . .
Before thee I stand and I turn . . .
Rebellious things I plot, I have set free the wicked.
I have spoken what is not good; but whatsoever is wicked thou knowest.
The food that belongs to god I have eaten.
I have trodden on the interdicted thing; evil I have done.
Upon thy vast possessions I have lifted a [covetous] face.
Unto thy precious silver my greed goes up.
I have lifted my hand and touched what should not be touched.
In my uncleanness I have entered into thy temple.
I have thus committed thy mighty abomination.
I have transgressed thy borders,[4] a thing which is obnoxious to thee.
In the wrath of my heart I have cursed thy divinity.
Wrong known and unknown I have committed.
I go about, I behold, and before me shame I obtain.
Oh my god, it is enough, may thy heart repose.
Oh Ishtar, who hast been enraged, may it be pardoned.

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[1] *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. 2, p. 754 f.

[2] *Anthropological Series, Field Columbian Museum*, ix. [1905] 84 ff.

[3] Jeremiah Curtin, *Creation Myths of Primitive America*, Boston, 1898, p. 163 ff.

[1] See the artt. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian), vol. v. p. 637 ff., and PRAYER (Babylonian), vol. x. p. 159 ff.

[2] H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. (London, 1891) 10*a*, 36.

[3] *Ib.* 10*b*, 29–45. See also M. Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, ii. 103.

[4] *e-te-te-ḳi a-ḫat-ka.*

Oh deliver, thou who hast wrought thy heart to a mighty rage.
Thy favour which I have rehearsed be unto me for welfare.
Verily many are my wrongdoings, oh sever my bonds.
[Seven times] seven are my disgraces, but may thy heart repose.'[1]

The inborn sinful nature of man is not only due to the weakness of the will, but may be inherited.

'Oh great lord Marduk, merciful god,
Mankind as many as bear names,
Who among them learns anything by himself?
Who has not been negligent, who has not acted despicably?

The penalty of my father, of my grandfather, of my mother, of my grandmother,
Of my family, of relations through brothers and sisters,
May it not come nigh me, but may it go elsewhere.

. . . . . .

O ye gods that dwell in heaven, absolve my penalty.
The great wrong which from my youth I have committed,
Oh scatter and seven times absolve.'[2]

Babylonian conceptions of sin passed through various stages of religious and ethical values during the long period covered by the Sumerian and Semitic sources. Sumerian and Babylonian doctrines concerning transgression may be divided into two great groups—(1) religious and ceremonial sin, and (2) ethical sin. The former group is naturally the more fundamental and original.

1. **Religious and ceremonial sin.**—A term frequently employed in religious texts for transgression is *ăg-gig*, *ág-gig*, Semitic *ikkibu* (loan-word) or *an-zillu*. The fundamental meaning of these words is 'forbidden thing,' 'sacred possession of a deity.'[3] It was apparently first employed for the food assigned to a deity or to the holy places consecrated to deities. To eat of such food or to tread upon such places without proper purification and habit constituted one of the greatest of sins.

'Have I eaten the forbidden thing[4] of my god unknowingly?
Have I trodden on the interdicted place of my goddess[5] unknowingly?'[6]

Here we touch upon the most ancient Babylonian conception of sin, an unconscious violation of the ceremonial regulations. By metonymy 'to eat interdicted food' came to mean to commit an abomination, and hence both *ikkib* and *anzillu* became synonymous with 'abomination,' 'desecration.' The terms connote always a most serious religious transgression, and in the psalm translated above the sinner connects the violation of divine law with 'thy mighty abomination I have done.'

As in Hebrew, so also in Babylonian the principal words for sin, both noun and verb, are derived from the root חטא, 'be faulty,' 'be defective,' 'fail,' 'sin.' The verb is *ḫaṭû*, and the noun *ḫiṭṭû*, *ḫiṭṭitu*. The Sumerian equivalent is *šebida*, whose original meaning is unknown. In Sumerian this word invariably denotes a religious sin which entails the anger of the gods and a stain upon the soul. Hence the ritual of atonement must be employed to free man from the deadly effect of this transgression.[7] This form of sin is often contrasted with *namtag*, 'overturning,' violent transgression of civil laws and social customs. The Semitic equivalent is *annu* or *arnu*, which is best rendered by 'wrongdoing.' The discussion of this term falls under ethical sin (§ 2). The essential difference between these two categories may be best illustrated by repeating a line from the well-known 'psalm to all gods':[8]

'Oh lord, my wrongdoings are many, great are my sins.'[1]

The spiritual and religious aspect of sin is almost invariably denoted by the words *ḫaṭû*, *ḫiṭû*, *ḫiṭṭitu* in Babylonian. 'The sin which I have committed' is expressed by *šebida dib-ba-mu*, 'the stigma which I have laid upon myself' in Sumerian.[2] The ethical and religious contrast of these terms is indicated by a line of a liturgy:

ta nam-tag-ga ta nam-še-bi-da
minû annu-ma minû eǵi-ma,
'What was the wrongdoing? What was the sin?'[3]

Here the Semitic root חטא, 'sin' (in a religious sense), is employed. The verb *egû* has the same force in Babylonian as *ḫaṭû*, and the grammatical texts explain one by the other. The ceremonial character of sin conveyed by *egû* is illustrated by the passage, 'Who has sinned against Esagila (temple of Marduk)?' The noun *egîtu*, 'desecration,' 'ceremonial sin,' must always be interpreted in this sense.[4] In one passage *šebida* has been rendered into Semitic by a verb (*šâṭu*) which means 'be negligent,' *i.e.* neglect the rules and ceremonials of religion.

'Where has the wise not been negligent, and not committed despicable deeds?
Where has he who acted cautiously not been afflicted?'[5]

These terms are frequently employed for ethical sins, political disturbances, and law-breaking, but, when so employed, they obtain a weakened sense and become synonymous with *annu*, *arnu*, and similar words.[6]

2. **Ethical and political sin.**—The Sumerian noun for this type of sin, *namtagga*, means 'perversion,' 'violent disturbance of the legal order'—meanings almost invariably assigned to the Semitic translations of this word, *annu*,[7] *arnu*, *šertu*.[8] These terms may be described as denoting both wrongdoing and the punishment for wrongdoing. *Arnu* is probably a phonetic variant of *annu*, and both words appear to have been derived from a root meaning 'oppose,' whence is derived the word *anantu*, 'hostility,' 'conflict'; *šertu* has probably the meaning 'perverseness,' 'treachery,' 'dishonesty.'[9] *Arnu* and *šertu* are, therefore, the words recognized in legal procedure for violation of ethical standards and civil law; *e.g.*, a woman treacherously seeking to break a contract sues another woman concerning property; the judges convict her of *šertu*, *i.e.* treachery.[10] Another record of a lawsuit of the period of Ḥammurabi,

[1] *Bêlum annû-a ma'da rabâ ḫiṭû-a*, where the Semitic version properly distinguishes the nature of *annu* and *ḫiṭṭu*, *ḫiṭu*, by the selection of its adjectives.

[2] Rawlinson, iv. 10*a*, 44, *b* 39.

[3] G. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896, p. 119, rev. 5.

[4] The original meaning of the verb *egû* is perhaps discovered in the obscure phrase of the fifth tablet of Creation, l. 7, *ana la epiš anni la egû manama*, 'That no one of them do wrong or go astray (?),' said of the stars. It is difficult to explain why the verbs *ḫaṭû* and *egû* ordinarily came to convey the deeper aspect of sin.

[5] *BASS* v. 640, 15–18.

[6] The terms usually employed for each type of sin cannot be brought under definitions which have no exceptions. Terms of each class are found conveying the sense of their opposite class. The rules given above are almost invariably true with respect to the Sumerian words, but the Semites employed their terms more loosely.

[7] Semitic root probably ענן, 'oppose,' after Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, p. 13. Derivatives of the same root are *enunu* (found as yet only in the sense of penalty for sin) and *ennitu*, which is employed in the sense opposed to its cognate *annu*, as a synonym of *ḫiṭu*, 'religious sin.'

[8] Employed occasionally for 'religious sin' (*Šurpu*, ii. 32; Ebeling, p. 90, rev. 3 *f.*).

[9] Note that in *Šurpu*, iii. 12, *kittu*, 'honesty,' is contrasted with *šertu*, where a variant text has *ṣartu*, 'trickery.' The 'Chicago Syllabary' published by D. D. Luckenbill in *AJSL* xxxiii. [1917] has an entry *emedup=suḫtu* ('forgery') and *šertu*.

[10] The phrase is *šertam emêdu*, 'to lay (the decision of) treachery upon.' See M. Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, Leipzig, 1913, p. 267, 7; see also p. 313, 33, *šertam lâ immidu-niaši*, 'Verily they convict us of falsehood.' The words *šertu* and *annu*, when employed with *emêdu* in legal documents, do not mean 'penalty,' as Assyriologists render them, but 'falsehood,' 'error,' 'wrongdoing.'

[1] E. Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur*, Leipzig, 1915, no. 45.
[2] L. W. King, *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896, no. 11. See also J. Hehn, *BASS* v. [1903] 364; H. Zimmern, *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. [1905] p. 18.
[3] The Sumerian *ăg-gig* is an abstract noun derived from the root *gig*, 'exclude,' 'divide off,' 'separate.'
[4] *Ikkib ili-ia=dg-gig-ga dimmer-mu.*
[5] *Anzil ilat Iš-ta-ri-ia=amaḫ Innini-mu dg-gig-ga.*
[6] Rawlinson, iv. 10*a*, 32–35.
[7] *Sêbida asilal-la-e-ne=ḫiṭṭi duppiri*, 'Oh remove my sin'; P. Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1882, p. 117, 7.
[8] Rawlinson, iv. 10*a*, 36.

in which a man sues another for possession of a house, will illustrate the similar use of the word *arnu*. The judges arrange the legal proceedings, investigate the case, and convict the plaintiff of wrong or error.[1] *Arnu* is the official term employed in the great Code of Ḥammurabi and is there employed regularly in its original and legal sense, 'error,' 'wrong.' The Code also employs *arnu* in the sense of penalty for error, but not so frequently.

It is not always easy to determine the kind of sin or wrongdoing which many other terms of the Babylonian religious texts convey, such as *sillatu*, 'slander,' 'impudence,' *ḳillatu*,[2] 'contemptible conduct,' *limuttu*, 'wickedness.' The result of sin,[3] however, at least in the later period, was invariably the same. Man's protecting god abandoned him; he became the prey of disease and the prisoner of the demons. Hence elaborate rituals of atonement came into use to free mankind from the effects of religious, ceremonial, and ethical sins. These rituals have been defined and described in the art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian). In the more important rituals of atonement the penitent recites long lists of the sins which he may have committed, usually of an ethical character; *e.g.*, the second tablet of the *Šurpu* series has the following confession said for a sinner by a priest:

'Has he failed to free a prisoner and not loosed the bound?
Has he not caused him in prison to see the light?
Has he said concerning a captive, "Seize him" or concerning the bound, "Bind him"?
Is there some unknown falsehood toward god, some unknown contrariness against goddess?
Is his wrongdoing against his god, is his perversity against his goddess?
Is there hostility to the *ancestors*, hatred toward the elder brother?
Has he despised father and mother, behaved disgracefully toward the elder sister?
Has he given in littleness and *received* in largeness?
For "No" has he said "Yes"?
For "Yes" has he said "No"?'

This tablet continues the enumeration of ethical sins in such manner that it really forms a good source for an estimation of the moral standards of the Babylonians. Ceremonial sins are then recorded in detail:

'Has he strode toward a man under a curse?
Has a man under a curse strode toward his face?
Has he slept in the bed of a man under a curse?
Did he lie upon the divan of a man under a curse?'

Recitations of this kind appear to have been called 'the tablet of sins,' the tablet, according to the imprecation of one passage, being destroyed as an act which symbolized the annihilation of the demons and the expiation of sin.

'The tablet of his wrongdoing, of his sins, of his disgraceful conduct, of his curses, of his bans, be thrown into the water.'

In another ritual the penitent prays, 'Verily let be broken the tablet of my wrongdoings.'[4]

LITERATURE.—J. Morgenstern, *The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion*, Berlin, 1905; H. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, Leipzig, 1885, *Die Beschwörungstafeln Šurpu*, do. 1896, *Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschwörer und Sänger*, do. 1900; briefly in *KAT*[3], pp. 510–512; K. L. Tallqvist, *Die assyrische Beschwörungsserie Maqlû*, Leipzig, 1895; R. Campbell Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, 2 vols., London, 1903–04; W. Schrank, *Babylonische Sühnriten*, Leipzig, 1908; S. Langdon, 'Babylonian Magic,' in *Scientia*, xv. [1914] 222–240; M. Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 2 vols., Giessen, 1905–12 (brief references to sin; see Index, p. 1097). The penitential psalms, which are the chief source for the study of this subject, are discussed in the art. PRAYER (Babylonian); P. Dhorme, *La Religion assyro-babylonienne*, Paris, 1910, p. 231 ff.

S. H. LANGDON.

SIN (Buddhist).—The doctrine of sin, as held in Europe, is a complex idea of many strands. One or two of those strands may be more or less parallel to statements found in the earliest Buddhist texts or to ideas expressed in Indian pre-Buddhistic texts. But the doctrine as a whole, in any one of its various forms, is antagonistic to the Indian, and especially to the Buddhist, view of life.

To the Buddhist the universe is a cosmos, under the reign of law; whatever happens is a detail in an unending chain of cause and effect. The gods are as subject to this law as men. It holds good equally in the moral sphere and in the physical. Every wrong deed or word, every evil thought must work out its result, its effect; and that of its own force, quite independent of any deity. It is absolutely impossible for any conscious being to escape this result of his own act or thought, or, to phrase it in Indian fashion, of his *karma*. The application of this theory to details, and the explanations of the method in which *karma* worked, differed greatly at different times and places in India and among the different religious communities and philosophic schools that arose there.

Much has been written on the subject of *karma*. Most of it is vitiated by the erroneous assumption that there was only one theory, and that a statement in a work, say, of the 4th cent. A.D. is good evidence of beliefs held universally, say, in the 4th or 6th cent. B.C. The doctrine of *karma* is referred to as a great mystery in documents just earlier than the rise of Buddhism. It receives its first elaboration in detail in the older portions of the Pali Buddhist canon,[1] but in certain of the later portions,[2] in the 3rd cent. B.C., the point of view has changed. There is a good deal of evidence to be collected from the Sanskrit literature, both Hindu and Buddhist, dating from the 2nd to the 6th cent. A.D. No attempt has yet been made to deal with the history of the doctrine as a whole or even to collect and sift the evidence as to its form at any one particular period. E. W. Hopkins has several suggestive historical remarks on the last of the above-mentioned periods;[3] and the present writers have discussed the amount of truth that lies at the basis of the general theory.[4]

No one holding the doctrine of *karma*, in any one of its various forms, could accept the doctrine of sin. What the European calls 'sin' he would call 'folly,' a result of ignorance. And there cannot be, in his view, any forgiveness of sin; it must work out to the bitter end, and of itself, its own fruit. This is cosmic law, from which there can be no escape—not even with the help of the most powerful deity, for that deity would himself be subject to the law. Again, another implication in the European use of the word 'sin' is that of an offence against a personal deity. This a Buddhist believer in *karma* would find difficult even to understand. To him no personal deity ever made the moral law. Should a deity erroneously think he did, and then take offence against some mortal because the mortal had broken the law that he (the deity) had made, then that would be an evil deed, and would work out its effect to the shortening of the life, as deity, of the person who wrongfully took offence. Even a Buddha cannot lay down the moral law, the *Dhamma*, as something devised or created by himself. He can but interpret a law that he finds existing[5]—a law ante-dating the existence of any personal lawgiver.

The Buddhist would equate the abstraction 'sin' by every kind of collision, individual and social, with that cosmic moral law. Such collisions he would call evil, wrong, bad, demeritorious, corrupt (*pāpa, michchhā, akusala, apuñña, saṅkiliṭṭha*). And he would call them so because, as collisions or infractions, they threw back the in-

[1] *Arnam imâu-šu-ma*; Schorr, p. 262, 9; see also pp. 264, 7, 266, 21; Code of Ḥammurabi, § 172.

[2] Not to be read *ḫablatu*.

[3] Excepting, naturally, purely political errors or wrongdoings.

[4] See Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1901, pp. 23, 58 f. (corrected after Ebeling, no. 67) and p. 125, col. iii. 8.

[1] *E.g.*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, iii. 202, 207.

[2] Namely, portions of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, especially the *Jātaka*.

[3] *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, and 'Modifications of the Karma Doctrine,' in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 581 f.

[4] T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism: its Hist. and Literature* (American Lectures), New York, 1896, Index, *s.v.* 'Karma,' and *Buddhism*[22], London, 1910, Index; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, ch. v.

[5] *Saṃyutta*, ii. 105; tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in *Buddhism*, p. 83 f.

dividual in his long and, mainly, painful pilgrimage to higher, happier experience.

To the handicap imposed on each individual which is known among us as 'original sin' the doctrine of *karma* lends emphasis. From what has been said it is clear that no son of man can be born into the world free from the heavy mortmain of the follies and misdeeds of past lives, so far as these have not been already redeemed by unpleasant experiences. The same teaching, however, is equally insistent in the matter of the inheritance of a *plus* quantity of happy experience resulting from what we might call 'original virtue.' No lovely deed, word, or thought but brings its future reward, mundane or supramundane.

It should not, however, be concluded that sound Buddhist doctrine recognized, in the experiences of any given individual life, a mere gathering in of a predestined harvest of mixed crops, pleasant and painful, sown in previous lives.[1] That doctrine viewed every individual as a growth, or growing thing, both physically and spiritually. And all growth, while it is, on the one hand, the outcome of conditions (favourable or unfavourable to desirable growth), is, on the other hand, essentially creative. In the efforts at self-expression that we call 'creation' lay the capacity, and in the environing conditions the opportunity, of each individual to slough off the latent vices (*anusaya*) of his lower nature (called collectively the *kilesa's*), and mould for himself, *i.e.* the resultant of his present self, a lighter burden of 'original sin,' a brighter heritage of future destiny.

LITERATURE.—The foregoing remarks are gleaned from countless passages in Buddhist canonical and early commentarial literature, most of which are as yet untranslated into English. But *Aṅguttara*, i. 173 f. is discussed by Ledi Sadaw, 'Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine,' *JPTS*, 1913–14, p. 117 f., and other texts in C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1912, ch. v.

T. W. and C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SIN (Celtic).—In the Celtic sections of the artt. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (§ 3) and CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (§ 1) it has been shown that the Celts had clear notions on the subject of the gods' being offended by neglect, whether of an individual or of a community. Their wrath manifested itself in illness, calamity, defeat in battle, and the like; and it had to be propitiated by sacrifice, usually of human victims, for the Celts considered that, unless man's life were given for man's life, the majesty of the immortal gods could not be appeased.[2] The proof of this is found in the passages from classical observers cited in these articles.[3] How far the idea of sin against the gods had an ethical colouring we do not know, but this was probably not lacking, as the kind of crimes included among those punished by society suggests. In Gaul, too, the Druids acted as judges, and there, apart from punishment by death, excommunication from religious rites, especially sacrifice, was in common use in the case of those who would not submit to their decision. This was equivalent to outlawry, and the offender was regarded as impious and wicked.[4]

These statements receive further illustration from various mythical stories, mainly in Irish MSS. Though these have been redacted in most cases by Christian scribes, there is little doubt that, in so far as they describe the action of the gods or ideas purely pagan, they have undergone but small change through colouring by Christian conceptions. Even in such a Welsh legend as that of Nynnyaw and Peibaw transformed into oxen by God for their sins it is likely that the legend was a pagan one and that a pagan divinity was the punisher of the culprits.[1] In the euhemerized account of the relation of the Milesians to the Tuatha Dé Danann, *i.e.* of the pagan Irish Celts to their gods, the latter are said to have destroyed the corn and milk of the Milesians. To prevent this in future these made friends with Dagda, the chief of the Tuatha Dé Danann, and now their corn and milk were safe.[2] This story appears to reflect the idea that corn and milk depend upon the gods, and may be withheld or destroyed by them because of man's misdoings. The compact with Dagda suggests the fresh covenants made with Jahweh by His worshippers in the OT after they have been punished by Him for their sins. The story of the yearly destruction by fire of the fort of Tara by Aillen mac Midhna of the Tuatha Dé Danann may be based on some idea of human guilt thus punished. Aillen made every one in the fort sleep through his fairy music and then set it on fire, until he was destroyed by Fionn.[3]

The gods punished the taking of things dedicated to them, or tabu, and this may have been the subject of current stories known to classical writers. These speak of their own gods punishing the Celts for taking things devoted to them, perhaps applying to their divinities the anger of native Celtic gods.[4] Such breach of tabu was also punished with torture by the ministers of justice.[5] Trespass upon a sacred place was also obnoxious to the gods, and this is illustrated by several stories.

In one of these Eochaid, having encamped on a meadow, was told by the god Oengus, in disguise, to remove from it. He disobeyed, and Oengus sent plagues upon him, killing his cattle and horses, and threatening to slay his household if he would not go.[6] This resembles the tales of the bursting of a sacred well and its waters overwhelming an impious trespasser. Boand, wife of Nechtain, went to the fairy well which her husband and his cup-bearers alone might visit, and, when she further showed her contempt for it, the waters overwhelmed her. They now flow as the river Boyne. Similarly Sinend was destroyed for trespassing on Connla's well, the pursuing waters now forming the river Shannon.[7]

Myths of origins are here mingled with myths of punishment by the spirit or divinity of a sacred well, meted out to women to whom a sacred place was tabu. In other tales women who are the guardians or priestesses of sacred wells, and must keep them covered save when water is drawn, are similarly overwhelmed by the waters bursting forth when they fail to put the cover on, thus neglecting the ritual of the well.[8]

The breach of personal tabus, or *geasa*, is frequently described as punished by destruction or death. Heroes like Cúchulainn or Fionn broke the tabus which they had hitherto observed carefully, and this led to disastrous events culminating in death. These results are sometimes regarded as the inevitable operation of a kind of fate. The *geasa* are put upon one person by another, perhaps framed as an incantation or spell; he must obey; if not, disaster followed as it might do in the case of a curse. But the punishment, automatic though it might be, was also regarded as divine vengeance for wrong done to the gods, not always by the victim, but sometimes by his ancestors.

[1] *Aṅguttara*, i. 173 f.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16.
[3] See also art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 277 f.
[4] Cæsar, vi. 13.

[1] *Mabinogion*, i. 302, tr. J. Loth, in H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de littérature celtique*, vols. iii. and iv., Paris, 1889.
[2] *Book of Leinster*, Dublin, 1880, 245*b*.
[3] S. H. O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, 2 vols., London, 1892, ii. 142 f.
[4] C. Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 96.
[5] Cæsar, vi. 13.
[6] Rennes *Dindṡenchas*, in *RCel* xv. [1894] 482; cf. xvi. [1895] 152; J. O'B. Crowe, *Journal of the Royal Historical and Archæological Association of Ireland*, 4th ser., i. [1871] 94 f.
[7] Rennes *Dindṡenchas*, in *RCel* xv. 315, 457. For further instances of punishment for the misuse of wells see P. Sébillot, *La Folk-Lore de France*, Paris, 1904–06, ii. 192; W. J. Rees, *Lives of Cambro-British Saints*, Llandovery, 1853, pp. 520, 523.
[8] Giraldus Cambrensis, *Topographia Hibernica*, ed. T. Wright, London, 1867, ii. 9; S. H. O'Grady, i. 233; J. A. MacCulloch, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 192.

The best illustration of this is found in the long, tragic Irish story of *The Destruction of Da Derga's Hostel*,[1] in which the *sid*-folk (beings of a fairy type who represent the older gods) avenge themselves upon Conaire for wrong done by his ancestor Eochaid to the god Mider. Conaire was told by Nemglan, a divinity who can take the form of a bird, of the tabus which he must observe. He became king, and at first all went well with him, and the land prospered. But the vengeance of the god began to work. Through fate or circumstances which he could not resist Conaire broke one tabu after another, until at last he was defeated in battle and himself slain. The events leading up to the final vengeance are told with great detail and realism, and Conaire is clearly shown to be the innocent victim of a divine vengeance which he could not resist.

So also the story of *Da Choca's Hostel* tells of the destruction of Cormac for breaking his *geasa*.[2] Another curious story tells how Corrchenn of Cruach slew the god Dagda's son Aedh for seduction of his wife. Dagda punished him for this by making him carry the corpse on his back until he had found a stone for the grave as long as Aedh's body.[3]

In Irish Celtic belief the fruitfulness and prosperity of the land depended largely upon the king's observing his *geasa*; this also kept misfortune from him. But this was changed into the idea that the king's goodness or the reverse affected the fertility of the country. Probably there was not much difference between the two conceptions, though some of the *geasa* detailed are of an arbitrary and, to us, unmeaning character. In any case some idea of obeying what were really divinely appointed rules seems to be implied, though perhaps the king, looked upon as a divinity, subject himself to rules, had been regarded as the source of fertility.[4]

How far the conception of retribution after death for wrongdoing was known to the pagan Celts is uncertain. Possibly cowards may have been regarded as doomed to miss the joys of the after life, since the hope of these made warriors face death without a tremor. Some characteristics of hell in Irish Christian visions of the other world and in folk-belief may be derived from pagan belief—*e.g.*, the sufferings of the wicked from cold.[5] But they may equally be of Christian origin. As the idea of transmigration after death was not unknown to the Celts, the later folk-belief that souls of the wicked appear after death as ravens, crows, black dogs, and the like may be derived from some earlier pagan myth of retribution, though here again transmigration without retribution is quite as likely as not to have been believed in.[6]

The idea of sinlessness, *i.e.* innocence from particular sin or from sin in general, occurs now and then in the mythic tales, not apparently as a reflexion of Christian ideas.

When Bran on his voyage met the god Manannan mac Lir, the latter described to him the Elysian land, on which his coracle seemed to be sailing, and its people. They were immortal and sinless, unlike Adam's descendants, and they made love without crime.[7] In another tale, cited below, the son of a sinless couple is required as a sacrifice, and he turns out to be the son of the inhabitants of such a divine land as Bran saw.

Other tales show that the gods could punish members of their own group for wrongdoing.

Aoife transformed her step-children into swans, in the pathetic story of *The Children of Ler*, and for this the god Bodb punished her by transforming her into a demon of the air.[8] In another instance the god Manannan, having fallen in love with a mortal maiden, Tuag, sent a divine Druid, Fer Figail, to bring her to him. He brought her from her home and left her slumbering on the shore while he sought a boat to carry her to Elysium. There a great sea wave sent by the god, or the god himself in that form, overwhelmed her, and Fer Figail was afterwards slain by Manannan.[1] The cause of offence is not stated, but doubtless it was that the Druid had forestalled Manannan in his love for Tuag. In another tale the goddess Becuma was banished from the gods' land because of her sin with Manannan's son. She came to earth and by spells induced Conn, king of Ireland, to succumb to her wiles and to banish his son. During the year that he remained in dalliance with her there was neither corn nor milk in Ireland—an example of the idea of a bad king causing disaster to his land (itself a divine punishment). His Druids told Conn that nothing could save the land but the sacrifice of the son of a sinless couple. This was the son of the queen of an Elysian region. She came to rescue him, bringing a cow, which was sacrificed in his stead, and she told Conn that he must renounce Becuma, else Ireland would still lose a third of its corn and milk.[2]

On the whole, the ideas which these stories reveal suggest breaches of religious ritual and custom, and of customary law, passing over, however, into more ethical conceptions, while all through bringing the gods into relation with men as punishers of their wrongdoing.

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the footnotes. See also the chapter on 'Divine Enmity and Punishment' in J. A. MacCulloch, *Celtic Mythology* (=*The Mythology of all Races*, vol. iii.), Boston, 1918.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

SIN (Chinese).—The knowledge of sin in China has developed in the course of her long religious history. The Chinese have always possessed 'a sense of sin and its consequences.'[3] Man is described by Chaú Chí (2nd cent. A.D.) as differentiated from the brute creation by 'the knowledge of righteousness.'[4] Mankind is thus endowed with a moral sense.[5] The emperor Tang (176 B.C.) said, 'The Great God has conferred on the common people a moral sense.'[6] But man is prone to err.[7]

1. Earliest ideas. — In the early period of Chinese history, prior to 221 B.C., sin or crime was 'the disturbance of celestial routine,' 'the celestial order forming a human guide.'

'Offences against the gods or the spirits in a vague sense were often spoken of.' 'Sin was only conceivable in the sense of an infraction of nature's general laws.'[8]

Though sin was 'a moral and spiritual delinquency,'[9] and transgressions would call down divine retribution, yet at the same time the idea of sin was vague, and the opinion has been expressed that it might be said to have no well-defined existence at all.[10]

Time and again tyrants and evil rulers have received condign punishment at the hands of those who, in accordance with the will of Heaven, overthrew their thrones and rescued the country from their misrule. Their names, sins, and crimes are set forth in the Chinese classics and histories as terrible examples of the retribution which sins or crimes against high Heaven produce.[11] The punishment for sin was a material one, meted out in this life. There was no hell or purgatory known to the early Chinese. There were some hazy ideas about a state of bliss where the good and even the bad went.

2. Terms used.—There are three principal words used for sin, *tsui*, *ok*, and *kwo*. *Ok* means evil, bad, vicious, etc.; *kwo*, to transgress, to go beyond what is right. Among the 'wealth of distinctive terms'[12] for sin, evil, transgression in Chinese the nearest to the idea of sin is *tsui*, but it also means

1 Ed. W. Stokes, *RCel* xxii. [1901] 27 ff.
2 *Ib.* xxi. [1900] 149 f.
3 Rennes *Dindṡenchas*, in *RCel* xvi. [1895] 42.
4 *Leabhar na g-Ceart, or the Book of Rights*, ed. J. O'Donovan, Dublin, 1847, p. 3 ff.; see also art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 301a.
5 Examples in A. Le Braz, *La Légende de la mort en Basse-Bretagne: Croyances, traditions et usages des Bretons armoricains*[2], Paris, 1902, ii. 91; J. Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies and Ghost World*, London, 1895, p. 146.
6 Le Braz, ii. 82, 86, 307; Rees, p. 92.
7 *The Voyage of Bran*, ed. A. Nutt and K. Meyer, London, 1895–97, i. 2 f.
8 Ed. E. O'Curry, *Atlantis*, iv. [1863] 115 ff.

1 W. Stokes, 'The Bodleian Dinnshenchas,' *FL* iii. [1892] 510 f.
2 *Eriu*, iii. [1907–08] 150 ff.
3 W. E. Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, London [1913], p. 250.
4 J. Legge, *The Religions of China*, London, 1880, p. 97.
5 Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, vol. iii., *The Shoo King*, bk. iii. pt. iv. p. 2.
6 *The Chinese Recorder*, xxviii. [Shanghai, 1897] 483.
7 Legge, *Religions of China*, p. 102, and *The Shoo King*, bk. ii. pt. ii. p. 2.
8 E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, London, 1905, p. 24, and *Ancient China Simplified*, do. 1908, p. 55.
9 Soothill, p. 251.
10 *Ib.* p. 247; Parker, *Ancient China*, p. 55.
11 See Legge, *The Shoo King*, bk. iii. *passim*.
12 *Chinese Recorder*, xxiv. [1893] 52.

a crime, punishment, penalty, to treat one as a criminal. Further it means a violation of order, to give occasion for blame, a wrong, fault, or iniquity, and is also applied to a violation of decorum, a breach of the laws of etiquette. It is used in a phrase nearly equivalent to 'I beg your pardon.' The ethical force of meaning of the word is thus greatly dissipated by the breadth of ideas connoted. It has been said that the task of tasks is to bring home to the native mind the sense of what sin is. Nearly all writers on the religious and ethical side of Chinese nature draw attention to this, though there are some who have found notable instances to the contrary.[1]

3. Confucian ideas.—There is not much light thrown on the subject of sin in the sayings of Confucius. He was not inclined to split hairs upon the vexed question of sin, or even to speak of sin except in connexion with the practical affairs of life. He considered that there were five capital sins besides theft and robbery, viz. malignity, perverseness, mendacity, vindictiveness, and vacillating weakness.[2] He said that of the 3000 offences against which the five punishments were directed there was not one greater than that of being unfilial.[3] This is the sin of sins. Confucianists declare that their sage was perfect and did not need to repent of any errors, and that any statement by him which might be construed to the contrary was due to his humility, but the sage had a better knowledge of himself, for he dared not rank himself with 'the man of perfect virtue.'[4] Confucius never expressed any opinion as to a future state or as to rewards and punishments for sin.[5] The Confucian doctrine of man's nature is that he is naturally formed for virtue. There is no acknowledgment of a universal proneness to evil. All Chinese scholars have not, however, subscribed to the doctrine of a sinless nature. Suen believed that the nature of man was evil.[6]

Thus Confucianism has but little room for sin in its outlook on human life. 'All fundamental views of Confucianism are optimistic, human depravity and sin are not taken into account.'[7] Sin is therefore to a great extent outside the purview of Confucianism. Virtue can be practised and evil-doing given up by all. Reformation is a sufficient panacea for sin, even for one who sins against Heaven and 'who has nowhere left for prayer,' as Confucius once said.[8] Reformation is urged by both Confucius and Mencius. The former said, 'When you have faults [or bad habits],[9] do not fear to abandon them.' The latter said that all dispatch should be used in putting an end to what one knows as wrong.[10] These and similar passages in the Classics are used as proverbs by the Chinese.[11] Confucianism considers that 'the perfecting of knowledge and the influence of some good examples is sufficient to produce a good character.'[12]

Heaven was distinctly and directly cognizant of the actions of men whether good or evil. The great Chinese philosopher Chu Hsi (12th cent. A.D.) thus wrote:

'Heaven knows all our good and all our crimes [sins]. It is as if Heaven noted them down and numbered them up. Your good deeds are all before God, and my evil deeds will also be before Him.'[1]

'Sin to the Confucianist is an offence against the majesty of Heaven, a departure from law. It is constantly spoken of as error, deflection, something to be grown out of by self-culture. . . . There is no consciousness of the deep guilt of sin, no conception' of its 'deceiving, blundering, destroying power. All men have strength, if they would only use it, to overcome the tendencies to evil. . . . Sin becomes a kind of external tarnish, that obscures the lustre of the naturally bright virtues, that can be easily brushed aside, when these virtues assume their original brilliancy.'[2]

4. Buddhist ideas.—The influence of Buddhism in China in the religious sphere has been great. In place of a hazy notion of a future state it introduced a complete system of future rewards and punishments. The description of its heavens and hells, couched in realistic terms for the common man, met a crying want in the Chinese conceptions of a future state. There was thus introduced for the first time into Chinese religious thought a definite doctrine of the future punishment of sin committed in the present life.[3] The religious terms and the new conceptions which Buddhism infused into existing terms all widened the outlook of men on sin and its consequences. The Chinese by the worship of ancestors had developed what amounted to not much more than a shadowy faith in something like ghosts. There was apparently no strong conviction about the future life, and sin had no connexion with it. A certainty took the place of vague hopes. This life was linked on to the next. A future life was the inheritance of every living being, and the happiness or misery of this future life was within the power of every one to enjoy or suffer, for rewards or punishments were conditioned by the conduct of each in the present life. The chanting of liturgies, repentance, meritorious actions, the life of an ascetic, will produce the forgiveness of sins, according to popular Chinese Buddhism.

Yet, with all that Buddhism introduced into China, the absence of a strong conviction of sin among the Chinese is doubtless due in a measure to the negative view of virtue which this religion presents. With its lack of inspiration towards goodness and its inability to strengthen man in a struggle against evil, it has had the effect of obscuring the idea of sin and has exerted a weakening effect on the moral nature. For sin, viewed from its standpoint, is more a calamity or a misfortune than a moral evil.[4] Even in the best sects of Buddhism, such as that of the Paradise of the Western Heavens, it is not deliverance from a world of sin that its followers look forward to, but deliverance from the 'bitter seas' of sorrow and suffering in this world and rescue from almost interminable births and *nirvāṇa* itself by a rapid transfer to the Land of Peace by faith in Amitabha Buddha and salvation through his name. But even in this abode of bliss sin is mentioned as being absent.

5. Taoist ideas.—In the ideal state of pristine perfection which Lao-tse (born *c.* 604 B.C.) describes, and to which mankind would revert were his philosophy carried out, good and evil were unknown. All suffering is due to a departure from this state. Chuang-tse, his eminent follower, a few centuries later also spoke of primitive innocence. In that Golden Age the people were upright and correct.[5] There was no room for sin to enter into such an Eden. But Taoism has become

[1] *Reports of the World Missionary Conference*, Edinburgh and London, 1910, iv. 48.
[2] Parker, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, London, 1910, p. 210.
[3] *Chinese Recorder*, xxxi. [1900] 392.
[4] *Ib.* xxix. [1898] 386, xliv. [1913] 289, 732; Legge, *Chinese Classics*, i., *The Confucian Analects*, bk. vii. ch. 33.
[5] Parker, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, p. 211.
[6] See Legge, *Chinese Classics*, ii., *Works of Mencius*, 'Prolegomena,' ch. ii. p. 82 ff.
[7] E. Faber, quoted in *Chinese Recorder*, xxxiii. [1902] 166.
[8] See Soothill, p. 256 f.
[9] Legge, *Confucian Analects*, bk. i. ch. 8, v. 4. The same word is used for 'transgressions.'
[10] *Ib.* vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. 3, v. 3.
[11] See J. Dyer Ball, *Pith of the Classics*, Hongkong, 1905, pp. 2, 28.
[12] E. Faber, *Hist. of China*, Shanghai, 1902, Introd. by P. Kranz, p. 7.

[1] *Chinese Recorder*, xxviii. [1897], 517.
[2] *Ib.* xvii. [1886] 374.
[3] See *ib.* ix. [1878] 286.
[4] See E. J. Eitel, *Three Lectures on Buddhism*², London, 1873, pp. 59, 63, 73; also *Chinese Recorder*, ix. [1878] 292; J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*², London, 1893, p. 366; cf. art. SIN (Buddhist).
[5] Soothill, pp. 48, 62, 64, 65; see Legge, *The Texts of Taoism* [*SBE* xxxix., xl.], Oxford, 1891, pt. i. p. 325; H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzu*, London, 1889, p. 152.

debased, superstitious, and idolatrous; among its devotees evil and sin are constantly present, and the consequences of sin have to be guarded against in this world and the next. The idea of sin is the same in Taoism as in Confucianism to a considerable extent. But, while an approving conscience is what Confucianism aimed at, the Taoist desires virtue to be rewarded by material benefits, such as long life, wealth, health, official rank, and many descendants.[1] In the fundamental doctrine that 'every creature is good in its essence' Confucianism and Taoism are at one and opposed to Buddhism. While Confucianism has simply its plane of action in the present life, Taoism 'looks beyond this world' and aims at purifying 'the heart [and the body] by special methods.'

The influence of Buddhism on Taoism has been most marked, especially in its doctrine of future rewards and punishments for sins committed in this life.

'A hell, with many apartments for multifarious tortures, has been adopted . . . as also many means, derived from the same source, for escape from the torments there. A system of merit and demerit and of retribution through spiritual agents in this life and hereafter was developed.'[2]

Through Buddhism, Taoism has borrowed the Hindu ruler of the dead, King Yama, and he presides over the nine other judges in the hell mentioned above. This development in the ideas of a future state where sin was thus dealt with took place in the 11th cent. A.D. One Taoist notion also accepted by some Confucianists and indigenous in China is of a conditional immortality. The good souls, but only they, inherit heaven, a place of happiness.

Sin, thus practically unknown in Taoism's early days, has now a definite position in its later elaborated system of beliefs. This position is shown in the popular religious tracts and books in which Taoist beliefs are the *motifs*, though, of course, tempered in some by Buddhist ideas. At the same time the latter religion is responsible for the inception and development of many of the statements figuring as Taoist. This literature has a wide circulation, and many of the tracts are very popular. One of the most widely read and best known is *Actions and Recompenses*, probably written by an unknown author in the 10th century. One passage in it is as follows:

'Transgressions, great and small, are of several hundred kinds. He who wishes for long life must first attend to strictly avoiding all these sins.'[3]

Nor is the sinner left in doubt as to what his sins are, for categories of them are given in books of this sort. They are very full, as the following will show:

'Blasphemy, simply ridiculing and breaking images of the gods, undutifulness to parents, oppression of the people, deception of the prince, lewdness of all sorts, careless scattering about of the five kinds of grain, slaughtering oxen and dogs for food, the use of false weights and measures, injuring others to benefit oneself, cheating of the good by the wicked, ill-treatment of the poor by the rich, aggravated forms of covetousness, crimes of violence, house-breaking, selling adulterated goods, cheating the simple in buying and selling, trampling lettered paper underfoot, deceiving the aged and despising the young, breaking off marriage contracts, striking and cursing grandparents,' etc.[4]

It will thus be seen that relations between the gods and mankind, dutiful regard to parents, rightful and just intercourse between mankind, business relationships, and charity, as well as offences against the laws, are all thought of in this list of sins and crimes which would subvert family order and civil life. These and similar transgressions bring their retribution according to their heinousness, for life is shortened by twelve years for great ones, and one hundred days for small ones. A regular system of accounts is adopted, and evil deeds and faults are entered to the debit of the keepers of these registers, and to their credit good actions are entered, a numerical value being assigned to each entry according to its position in the scale of virtue or evil. That the introspection, in some cases at all events, is most searching is shown by the following statement in one of these religious books:

'The most of what you do, what you say, the thoughts you think . . . are on the side of evil.'

The conflict between sin and the good in our own hearts is most strikingly stated in a philosophical work issued about the beginning of the 18th cent., and reminds one of St. Paul's reference to the subject in Ro $7^{7ff.}$:

'When you have advanced sufficiently in knowledge of yourself, you will find it a grief. There will be, as it were, two men in your bosom. When you desire to do good, evil will come between. Again, when you wish to do wrong, a sense of shame will oppose you. Thus a battle goes on within you.'[1]

Some of the gods even are not perfect or free from sin. The gemmeous ruler of Taoism had a covetous heart, so one of his three souls had to become incarnate in 'the dusty, troublesome world.' Again, the Neptune of Taoism, the Sea Dragon, was disobedient, and his son was a drunkard, and the god of fire (originally a Buddhist god) committed theft. These stories are recounted in Taoist books published a few centuries ago.[2]

The Chinese, thanks largely to the moral teaching of Confucius, are remarkable, in comparison with many other non-Christian nations, for the purity of their religions. Yet the baser elements of human nature are to be found occasionally, so that not only are the everyday needs of life as well as riches, honours, health, prosperity, and offspring sought for from the gods, but there are a few deities worshipped by those who hope for help from them for the commission of sins and the carrying out of evil deeds. There is a small temple on the hill-side over the eastern portion of the city of Victoria, Hongkong, near some rocks which are believed, by the Chinese, to exert an evil influence on the morality of the city.[3] The goddess of this temple is the patroness of prostitution.[4] The present writer found on inquiry that the powder rubbed on the face of the image was supposed to make the worshippers who earned their living by that vice fair and attractive. There are also gods of gamblers[5] and of thieves,[6] gods of revenge[7] and of cruelty.[8] The drunkards even take as their patron saint Li Tái-pò, an anacreontic poet of former times.[9] Some men of former times who have been renowned for their evil deeds have been even deified and worshipped owing to an idea that it is well to propitiate them for fear of what they may be able to do to the living.[10] The tendency is, however, more to canonize the good.

6. Present-day popular beliefs.—The resultant of all the preceding influences is that, with his eclectic attitude towards all these elements of belief, the average Chinese has evolved a blend or amalgam of the whole as regards the religious side of his life—his ideas of sin and forgiveness of sin and all else connected with his spiritual life.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

J. DYER BALL.

1 See J. Edkins, *Religion in China*, London, 1878, p. 140.
2 Faber, in *China Review*, xiii. [Hongkong, 1884–85] 244 ff.
3 *Chinese Recorder*, xxviii. [1897] 586.
4 *Ib.* xiii. [1882] 303.

1 *Chinese Recorder*, xxix. [1898] 240.
2 See Dyer Ball, 'Scraps from Chinese Mythology,' *China Review*, xi. [1882–83] 203 ff., 282 ff., xiii. [1884–85] 75 ff., xii. [1883–84] 190 f.
3 See E. J. Eitel, *Feng Shui, or the Rudiments of Natural Science in China*, Hongkong, 1873, p. 53; also J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, New York, 1866, i. 292 f.
4 See H. C. Du Bose, *The Dragon, Image, and Demon*, London, 1886, p. 340, for a description of one of the goddesses of prostitution.
5 *Ib.* p. 340; also Doolittle, i. 271 f.
6 See *Chinese Recorder*, xli. [1910] 324.
7 *Ib.* 8 *Ib.* 9 *Ib.*
10 See Du Bose, p. 341 ff.

SIN (Christian).—This article in large measure presupposes what has been written in the artt. FALL and ORIGINAL SIN. It confines itself to a discussion of the Christian view or doctrine of sin as a state or power actually present in the developed moral consciousness of man. Since a modern interpretation must rest on the history of thought, our first task is to study the teaching of the NT and of great Christian minds.

1. **The New Testament.**—(*a*) Jewish literature of the 1st cent. B.C. and A.D. takes a sombre view of man. Constant allusion is made to the all but universal corruption, and, as man's relation to God is construed in essentially legal terms, the prevailing temper is fear of utter condemnation. Though sin may be inherited, moral freedom is intact, and man can choose whether he will or will not live righteously. The heart, not the flesh, is the seat of the inborn evil impulse (*yezer hara*); but at least the flesh makes sin intelligible, and, as Holtzmann puts it, 'there is no clear agreement whether the flesh represents a power ethically indifferent or one that somehow leads to sin.'[1] At the same time exceptional cases of sinless life are known. Each sin is an individual act, which can be weighed and numbered. Much responsibility for sin belongs to evil spirits which tempt men even to apostasy from God. But isolated offences can easily be expiated by penitence. Thus the Rabbinic mind swings between despair and pride. 'Far better were it for us,' says 4 Ezra, 'that we had not to face judgment after death' ($7^{68f.}$); on the other hand, the busy acquirer of merit thanked God that he was not like the rest of men (Lk 18^{11}). Sin is never put in relation to the love of God. Even by John the Baptist it is viewed solely as contumacy or rebellion. God is creditor, judge, king; man is debtor, culprit, subject.

(*b*) Jesus has no doctrine of sin in general; it was not abstract considerations creating an intellectual problem that He fastened on, but concrete sins. He does not speak of the Fall. But sin is a terrible fact, which is always committed against God, not merely against fellow-men (Lk 15^{18}), and the sinner is guilty. It has been said that Jesus dispersed the old morbid consciousness of sin like mist before the sun, but, if this means that He took it lightly, it is untrue. He does speak freely of good men and bad, and in the Beatitudes He implies the existence of those whom they describe. But He does not regard 'sinners' as merely one class of men among others; 'the righteous' are named so ironically. 'If ye then, being evil' (Mt 7^{11}), is one of His most arresting phrases; Peter is rebuked as 'Satan' for attempting to hold Him back from the Cross and told that he thinks like men; 'no one is good' (19^{17}), He replies to one questioner. Men must look like that to One who bids them love God with their whole heart and strength (22^{37}). The call to repent, with which Jesus' ministry opens, assumes that all have sinned, and more than once this call is repeated. All must be merciful, for all need pardon, and all will perish unless they show a change of mind. It is the man who cries 'God, be merciful to me a sinner' who is justified (Lk 18^{13}). The preaching of Jesus begins with individual acts of sin, but in addition He points to the corrupt heart which underlies them, for it is out of man's inner life that everything capable of defiling proceeds. Unless the heart is single, all is wrong. The sources of actual sin are this evil heart, stumbling-blocks put in the way by others (Mt 18^{7}), and the temptation of the devil (13^{39})—all of them influences which man can perceive and oppose. But no necessary determination to sin is even glanced at. The kinds of sin against which Jesus specially warns men[1] are unkindness, which will come up at the Last Judgment (Mt 25); the passions of anger and lust, the impure look and desire being equally wrong with the impure act (Mt 5^{28}); self-deception and unreality of thought ('Thou blind Pharisee,' 23^{26}); and moral indecision (Lk 9^{62}). Sin develops; the inner treasure of the heart becomes evil (Mt 12^{35}), and men, growing worse and worse, come to resemble a bad tree bearing fruit after its kind. God punishes sin, but far greater is the truth that men can repent and that all sins can be forgiven except that which connotes final hardening and therefore entangles men in guilt for ever (Mk $3^{28f.}$). It is when He is speaking of forgiveness that we can perceive how much sin means to Jesus. Guilt in His eyes is the heaviest of all loads, as is clear from the episode of the paralytic (Mk 2); men need pardon constantly (Mt 6^{12}); and in God's sight even disciples are laden with an overwhelming debt calling for the sheer mercy of the Father ($18^{23ff.}$).

(*c*) St. Paul, unlike Jesus, offers the data for a doctrine of sin in the sense that sin (oftenest used in the singular) is generalized from a profound interest in its nature and significance as a whole. Broadly it means what is opposed to the law of God—His will expressed in commandments—and through law man becomes fully aware of it (Ro 3^{20} 7^{7}). But law too can be generalized; it is present not merely in the Law of Moses, though its embodiment there rose most naturally in the apostle's mind, but in man's heart everywhere. All are under law; all have violated law; hence all are under sin. The sin manifested in individual acts is a power, a universal condition or tendency of human life, a principle confronting men which St. Paul virtually personifies, though it does not possess objective existence for him as 'a power in *rerum natura* but not in this or that will.' The personification is half poetic, just as in the case of death, law, or flesh. But the meaning is a terrible reality; there is a system of sin, to which all are hopelessly enslaved, their only wages death. Except for the counter-activity of the Spirit of God or Christ, human life is sinful through and through. The manifestations of this principle are variously named—transgression, unrighteousness, lawlessness, disobedience, etc.

St. Paul proves the universality of sin by several considerations: by inspection of the life of Jews and Gentiles (Ro 2 and 1); by citation of the OT (Ro 3); by deduction from the universality of death, its penalty; by regressive inference from Christ's atoning death, which implies a universal need; finally by what is to all intents and purposes a metaphysical argument about the compelling power of the flesh. This universality he does not hesitate to call a divine ordinance. The law was intended to multiply transgressions by provoking the natural antipathy of the flesh (Gal 3^{19}), and thus to lead sinners to despair of attaining righteousness otherwise than through Christ and faith.

The original element in St. Paul's teaching does not lie in what he says regarding the various types of sin, or its moral character, or its effect on man's relation to God, who reacts upon it in the doom of death. He seldom touches the connexion of sin with Satan or demonic powers, though we must not forget phrases like 2 Co 4^{4}; 'The god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers.' His originality in contrast to Rabbinic thought lies in his explanation of the necessity of sin. To many scholars he seems to offer two unreconciled theories. First, the necessity is due to Adam's fall—a familiar Judaistic conception made impressive by its insistence on the unity of the race

[1] *Neutest. Theologie*[2], i. 67.

[1] T. R. Glover, *The Jesus of History*, London, 1917, ch. vii.

for which Adam stood (Ro $5^{12ff.}$). But for St. Paul this scarcely had the importance which it came to possess for historic theology; he really glances at it by way of illustrating the solidarity of believing men with Christ. 'Sin entered the world by one man' (5^{12}) may mean that Adam created for posterity the conditions of sinning, or it may only mean that Adam's was the first sin of history. St. Paul may have conceived of him as but the first instance of the sin inherent in man's fleshly nature, which brings up the second theory. This is that the flesh is radically antagonistic to God: as has been said, it represents for St. Paul 'the virulence and constitutional character as well as the omnipresence of sin.'[1] The will of the flesh and the will of man are one thing, the tie between the two being so close that there occurs in Ro 8^3 the phrase 'flesh of sin.' It is because he is in the flesh that man does sin and can do no other. This is not a Jewish conception; according to the OT and Judaism, the flesh, so far from being the point of departure, rather by its frailty extenuates the sinner's guilt, and in any case entails no hopeless compulsion to evil. Nor is the theory traceable to the dualistic psychology of Hellenism, in which matter is opposed to mind—a view far too intellectual for the moral passion and despair of St. Paul. He does not equate sin and evil matter, or sin and sensuality, for there are spiritual sins, and he never forgets that God has created the flesh and can make it the abode of Spirit. A careful linguistic inquiry has led E. D. Burton to the following result:

'Neither the evidence of contemporary usage nor that of the New Testament itself warrants us in finding in Paul . . . the notion that the flesh is by reason of its materiality a force that makes for evil, or that a corporeal being is by reason of that fact a sinful being.'[2]

We must then believe that to St. Paul the flesh is a power productive of sin not because it *is* sin, but because sin, seated in the flesh as an alien power, utilizes it as organ and instrument. Till Christ came, the empirically sinful fleshly principle ruled; ever since, the counteractive Spirit has been victoriously on the ground. For the man who lacks the Spirit and lives on the soil of law the flesh must always be the gateway through which sin, in the shape of lust, invades experience, but this inevitable revolt against God leaves responsibility undiminished. Man's state is revealed to him by conscience, not to furnish him with an excuse, but to prove that no way to righteousness is open except God's.

(*d*) The doctrine of sin in the Johannine writings has been described as accidental or even almost wholly absent. For the writer of the Fourth Gospel, it is held, sin is a mere privation, which in itself involves no moral culpability; it is 'the natural incapacity of man to possess himself of the higher life.' It is true that we cannot identify the Johannine teaching with the Pauline. The former allows more for degrees of sin (19^{11}). Sin is indeed universal, but some men are, as it were, naturally of the truth (18^{37}) or of God (8^{47}). At the other extreme is unbelieving Judaism; in fact the sin in which the writer of the Gospel, from his historical and apologetic purpose, is chiefly interested, and upon which he generalizes, is disbelief in Christ with its inevitable judgment. It is on this ground that the Spirit convinces of sin (16^9). Those who sin purely out of blindness may come to faith if they are given sight, but the bulk of men have this condemnation resting on them that they preferred darkness to the Light now present in the world (3^{19}), and this because light, by exposing evil acts, incurs the hatred of all whose practices are corrupt. Their blindness is guilty. Such unbelievers are children of the devil, that murderer and liar from the first, in whose power the whole world lies (1 Jn 5^{19}); they have learned of their father and do his will. Not that Christians are sinless, though in principle they have broken with moral evil (3^9); on the contrary, they need pardon constantly (1^8), and are in danger of self-deceit and lovelessness; nay, such deadly sin is possible as may not bear being prayed for (5^{16}). This last almost certainly means apostasy from the faith. Obstinately disbelieving mankind make up 'the world'—a hostile system confronting God and His people which is undivine in origin and quality, though no effort is made to explain how it arose in a universe created by God. This world hates Christ because He does not belong to it (Jn $15^{18f.}$), as indeed it hates God, whom it has not known ($15^{23f.}$). Sensuality and pride are characteristic of it (1 Jn 2^{16}). This opposition of faith and worldly unbelief is primarily one of experience, but it hardens into something like a static or timeless and irreconcilable antagonism; the world cannot receive the Spirit (Jn 14^{17}), and in nature is identical with the devil. Yet, on the whole, the Fourth Gospel leaves us faced by an antinomy; on the one hand, Jesus will not pray for the world (17^9), on the other, the prospect of its being brought to faith in Christ's mission is left open (17^{21}). Such a sentence as the last, or the great prophecy that Christ will draw all men to Himself (12^{32}), could hardly have been written by one whose mind finally rested in a metaphysical or gnostic dualism.

2. History of doctrine.—Church teaching about sin is much less concerned than Scripture is with the meaning of sin in experience and under the light of Christ. Roughly, two-thirds of its interest has been given to original sin—*i.e.* the sin of Adam in its consequences for the spiritual condition and fate of mankind, this first sin having as its foil an alleged state of original righteousness on which Scripture has little to say. Yet what most troubles the Christian conscience is neither sin committed by the first human pair nor the sin with which we are born, but the actual sinfulness of our acts and persons. Abstracting so far as possible from original sin, we shall seek to indicate the main trend of thought in the Church with regard to sin as found in normal adult experience.

(*a*) Among the more important questions canvassed in the 2nd cent. were the persistence of sin in the Christian life, and the rigoristic demand that lapse into grave sin should be viewed as involving the loss of salvation—a demand eventually rejected by the great Church even in face of Tertullian's unwillingness to readmit those who had been guilty of mortal sins (fornication, idolatry, murder). East and West conceived of sin differently, though at first both held that moral evil springs out of freedom, and that freedom cannot be lost. To the Greek mind not guilt but sensuality and decay were the essential features of the misery entailed by Adam's fall. The idea of original sin was largely foreign to the East as late as the 5th century. Not even the universality of sin was a fixed point, though Origen affirmed it speculatively; Athanasius distinctly says that there were many sinless lives before and after Christ. It was universally held that baptism remits all previous sin, but the terms on which later sins were pardoned caused much difficulty.

(*b*) The greatest of all controversies over sin is that between Augustine and Pelagius. In opposition to the Manichæans, Augustine insisted on the voluntary nature of sin, which is not a natural (*i.e.* automatic) but a moral fact. An act is not sin at all if it be not voluntary. But he was the first Church teacher to declare that none the less

[1] J. Denney, in *Exp*, 6th ser., iii. [1901] 209.
[2] *AJTh* xx. [1916] 506.

it is due to a pitiful necessity. Man, cut off from God the source of all good, is impotent to do good actions. As a psychological indeterminist Augustine conceded that man may freely prefer a less evil to a greater; as a theological necessitarian he denied that without grace any right act is possible. It is sheer frivolity to talk, as Pelagius did, of pure freedom of choice as man's inalienable prerogative; the sinner's will is in the last resort the will of a slave. Not merely particular acts, but the nature, disposition, and affections of man are sinful and guilty throughout, incapable of any good. No terms can be made with Pelagius's doctrine that sin consists of individual actions only and leaves the will and nature unaffected, or that children are born sinless, or that the universality of sin (if a fact) is due to bad example or defective education, or that divine grace is requisite only in the form of instruction and the example of Christ. All this was gathered up in Augustine's religiously profound and logically rigorous doctrine of original sin together with its implications.

Sin he defines as *spontaneus defectus a bono*,[1] but (apparently in answer to the Manichæan doctrine, which made sin a substance) he describes it further as merely negative in the sense that it is a *privatio boni*. Good is being, evil is not something positive but a loss or lack of being, which needs no efficient but only a deficient cause. This privative conception of sin, never really accepted by the Church, was probably meant by Augustine to guard against the mistake of viewing sin as essential to human nature and *eo ipso* created by God. God, like one who strikes an untuned harp, is the cause of man's activity, but not of its discord with the law of righteousness. Sin at bottom is pride, while the form which the perverted will takes in every human being is concupiscence or lust. Any sin is 'mortal' in which the will turns away from God. Men are born not merely sinful but guilty, subject to God's wrath, and meriting eternal damnation. The thought of inherited guilt is no longer convincing, and must tend to evacuate guilt of its proper sense, but the religious power of Augustine's teaching as to the solidarity of mankind in sin will always make its own impression. The Church settled thereafter for centuries in a semi-Pelagianism, or, from another point of view, a semi-Augustinianism, which left the sinner with a capacity to assent to grace.

(*c*) In the following centuries also the emphasis moved by degrees from act to disposition, and mortal sin became equivalent to love of the creature instead of God. In the 9th cent., while venial sins were atoned for by a paternoster, mortal sins were changed to venial by the satisfactions of penance. Anselm made an advance of great moment by bringing out indisputably the guilt of sin, previously obscured by a tendency to construe sin as a defect and in large measure to overlook its personal relation to God; and yet even Anselm's view of guilt leans to the negative side. It is our failure to perform a duty, and the full spiritual relationship of the sinner to God is not made clear; a deficient thought of God so far concealed the full blameworthiness of sin. The older idea of sin as formally a *carentia*, or lack, persists in scholastic theology; it is what we have lost in comparison with Adam; materially it is concupiscence, though, according to Duns Scotus, this, as but the *fomes peccati*, is not itself sin.

(*d*) The Reformers strove most of all to accentuate the religious and personal character of sin as interpreted by the light of revelation. As for content, sin is want of faith, the failure to fear and love and trust God. Luther never tires of saying that mistrust of God is the gravest manifestation of our corrupt nature. He marked his opposition to the externalized doctrine of scholasticism by thus identifying sin with the 'faithless heart.' Thus the personal significance of sin was forced in upon conscience, despite the fact that in most ways the Augustinian tradition, which made original sin primary, still persisted. How inherited guilt can be reconciled with the new sense of moral responsibility is left dark; Zwingli alone protests that we cannot speak of sin (which for him embraces guilt) except when the individual will has appropriated the corrupt heritage. In the Protestant scholasticism of the 17th cent. much is said of the consequences of sin, viz. guilt (*reatus culpæ*) and punishability (*reatus pœnæ*). The penalty is death in the most comprehensive sense: (1) *mors spiritualis*, or the loss of the divine image; (2) *mors corporalis*, including sickness and outward evils as well as actual dissolution; (3) *mors æterna*, or exclusion from everlasting life with God.

The preoccupation of orthodoxy with Adam's transgression and its fruits led to undue neglect of the social power of sin. Modern thought, instead of linking our inborn evil constitution to our first parents, speaks rather of a sinful race or community in whose evil we share, and insists that in this field the idea of inheritance means that we infect those who come after as well as receive infection from our ancestors. Not only so; it is rightly held that sin spreads in other ways than by heredity, viz. through bad training, unworthy example, and tempting provocations. We must advance to the conception of the whole complex sin of humanity, in which inherited sin is only an element. The traditional idea of total depravity, while no doubt indicative of the fact that no part of our nature is unstained and that we cannot of ourselves do what is in the highest sense good, is nevertheless unscriptural and untrue to life if taken to mean that non-Christians are 'utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.'[1]

(*e*) Socinian and Arminian criticism of a tradition so deeply influenced by Augustine bears chiefly on original sin, but from the Socinian definition of the essence of sin as voluntary transgression of the law it is clear that sin as such is for the Socinians a narrower idea than for orthodoxy. The later supranaturalists held that sin is imputable only when free will has failed to fight and overcome the difficulties of a nature disordered by sensuous impulse. At a wider remove from orthodoxy, 18th cent. Rationalism taught that man is characterized by a certain weakness of the will to good and a certain disposition to evil, while at the same time, though in consequence of his finitude only by degrees, he is perfectible, *i.e.* can develop the feeble inborn germ of good and rise above the tyranny of desire into true liberty of spirit. The interest and importance of Kant in this field largely rest on his efforts to supply what may be called a philosophic analogue to the Church doctrine of original sin—that radical evil in man as man the timeless origin of which is symbolized by the Biblical story of the Fall. But this we must pass over. Schelling gives his own philosophic form to the antinomies of tradition, holding that, in spite of a universal necessity rooted in the dark bases of God, evil is man's choice, and every creature falls by its own guilt. To Hegel the Adamitic fall is a mythic representation of an eternally necessary process; for man, good by nature (*i.e.* ideally spirit or rationality), must, in order to realize the life of

[1] A fuller definition is this (*de duab. Anim.*): 'Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere.'

[1] *Westminster Confession*, vi. 4.

spirit, pass by a dialectically inevitable movement from innocence to sin and from sin to virtue. The transition from innocence to sin is due to the necessity of transcending mere nature, which, *qua* absence of will, is bad; the transition from sin to virtue is mediated by retribution and amendment. This, as McTaggart points out,[1] means that sin is not only a necessary concomitant of virtue, but a necessary element in it. Sin must lead to virtue, and there is no virtue which is not based on sin. But it will naturally be asked whether this point of view is not more æsthetic than moral, and wrong even so; whether it can be taken seriously in moments of self-scrutiny and penitence; whether, provided the actual evil of life is part of its perfection, to replace vice by virtue is not simply a blunder; and whether the conception of goodness as rooted in badness has any relevance to Jesus, His personal holiness, and His revelation of the Father against whom all sin is done.

Modern theologians have determined the concept of sin variously, yet with an all but unanimous rejection of Pelagian tenets. Schleiermacher, reporting, as he held, on the Christian consciousness, defined sin as the positive struggle of the flesh against the spirit. Man's sensuous development gets ahead of his spiritual development, and, this being God's ordinance, we can avoid making Him the author of sin only by concluding that the consciousness of guilt, which *we* trace to sin but God does not, has been given us to stimulate the desire of redemption. Schleiermacher vacillates between the view that sin is non-existent for God and that it is caused by Him; he grounds it in human nature and finds this an enhancement of its gravity, yet he is tempted to explain it as a necessary outcome of our sensuous nature. Sin, he declares, is a social fact, being 'in each the work of all, and in all the work of each.' In contrast to this conception of sin as sensuality may be placed the view, notably exemplified in Julius Müller, that it is selfishness, though in Müller's case this was supported by a curious speculation, reminiscent of Origen and Kant, according to which finite selves have not so much pre-temporally as timelessly and primordially torn themselves loose from God and made self the principle of life. This theory of sin as being in principle selfishness has had great vogue, not in conservative quarters only. Ritschl too subscribed to it, but is chiefly meritorious for his insistence on the religious character of sin. Its real nature, range, and evil are only revealed fully by the Gospel; religiously it is the lack of reverence and trust towards God, while in a moral aspect it is antagonism to His Kingdom. His contention that all forgivable sin is in God's eye sin of ignorance has been severely criticized as abolishing guilt, though Ritschl's own main charge against original sin is that such sin could not be reckoned guilty. But it has been rightly felt that, as sin is not *all* ignorance, Ritschl's formula is misleading, and gives encouragement to the notion that deliberate open-eyed transgression is too great for God to pardon. Another of his valuable ideas is that of a 'kingdom of sin,' which is not in the least a futile effort to account for sin by the universality of sin, but a clear indication of the fact that the wrongly used freedom of the individual is relative to an environment — co-extensive in the last resort with human life—in which sin already prevails.

The most important English discussion of sin in recent years is that of F. R. Tennant,[2] who argues that we ought to substitute a plurality of concepts, developmental not static, for the rigid idea of sin with which theology has usually operated. Sin is one thing, imperfection another; and imperfection is sin only when at the same time it is volitional. 'Man is conscious before he is self-conscious, impulsively appetitive before he is volitional, and volitional before he is moral,'[1] so that natural and organic propensities provide the raw material out of which the will constructs sin. Sin and guilt are correlative and co-extensive. Penetrating and illuminative as Tennant's work is, it may be doubted whether his 'logically perfect' concept of sin will be approved by those who hold with St. Paul and Augustine, not to speak of numerous modern students of society, that men are ethically as well as physically involved in the unity of the race, and that we desert experience if we ignore either aspect of sin, the voluntary or the constitutional.

3. **The doctrinal interpretation of sin.**—Certain points, such as the universality of sin, have been sufficiently treated of above, but we may now consider from a theoretic point of view some larger topics which have been referred to only incidentally.

(*a*) Sin may be defined as indifference or opposition to the will of God, the refusal of faith and love. And, if the will of God be fully revealed in Jesus, it follows that the Christian estimate of sin is a new and creative one. For it declares that sin is what it is in virtue of its relation to holy love. Elsewhere sin is folly, ugliness, or sickness, not mistrust or rebellion against a love measured by the Cross. The difference is not superficial, but radical, inasmuch as it results from a new thought of God. Sin, then, is the explicit or implicit claim to live independently of God, to put something else, be it the world or self, in His place. In a moral aspect this fundamental godlessness or God-forgetfulness appears as selfishness and sensuality.

At bottom sin is a religious idea, which for that reason cannot be properly defined otherwise than by putting it expressly in relation to God. In a formal point of view the same consideration disqualifies the proposal to define it as selfishness. All selfishness is of course sin, but neither logic nor (the present writer would hold) experience justifies us in converting this proposition *simpliciter*. It is indeed very questionable whether some sins are not quite disinterested, involving no pursuit of egoistic ends at the cost of others. Thus the family affection which produces the family vendetta, or suicide committed to save the reputation of a friend, or the most odious forms of religious persecution are not obviously selfish and may actually demand true loyalty and unlimited self-sacrifice.

To define sin as sensuality is even more inaccurate. Many of the worst sins—hate, cruelty, lying, irreverence—have no close connexion with the senses; they run their course within the mind. It is of course recognized by those who prefer this definition that deliberate surrender to the force of bodily craving is not *per se* sinful; no man sins merely by taking food to satisfy hunger or by going to sleep; sensuality is the wrong gratification of bodily impulse, in contravention of higher demands. At the same time, to identify sin with sensuality, to make the two an equation, is more or less to extenuate its badness by deducing it from the natural conditions of human life. An illegitimate interpretation of the theory of evolution has probably rendered this view of sin more popular to-day than ever. Sin, it is held, is just the brute-inheritance; we move upwards by working out the beast. But every biologist who thinks clearly will grant the necessity of distinguishing two things that differ—the enlargement of faculty

[1] *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge, 1896, p. 151 ff.
[2] See his *Origin and Propagation of Sin*[2] and *Concept of Sin*.

[1] *Concept of Sin*, p. 155.

whereby man becomes more than an animal, and the voluntary commission of evil known to be such. But it is the first, not the second, that constitutes a rise in the scale of being. In other words, the willed commission of sin is an anti-evolutionary fact. Sin and the consequent disorder cannot be exhibited as the consistent prolongation of natural processes of development or as progressive adaptation to environment. As well might we call poverty a result of good trade, or error an example of compliance with the rules of logic. Doctrines of human development can in some real degree construct for us the probable situation —whether of race or of individual—in which sin is first committed; they can do nothing to explain its actual emergence or its religious or moral meaning once it has emerged. The argument of a few evolutionary writers, on quasi-Hegelian lines, that experience of moral evil is necessary to prepare men to appreciate good may sound imposing as a generalization, but breaks down completely when applied to definite persons and definite sins.

Men become aware of sin, first of all, as an episode, a definite evil act in which a higher will is thrust aside. As it has been put, 'it is *a* sin of which man accuses himself—a disobedience which he can isolate in his life, regarding it as a blot, a stain, an exceptional phenomenon to be dealt with by itself.'[1] But behind this is next discovered a motive or disposition which gives the act meaning and out of which the act rises; and, by His condemnation of the murderous thought and lustful desire, Jesus made an end of the conventional idea that the sinner is merely one who commits so many wrong acts. Still deeper reflexion points to a permanent character or state of personal life affording unity and basis to varied acts and dispositions or attitudes. The falsest of all heresies is Pelagianism; if life is built on atomic lines, nothing like religion or morality is thinkable. No spiritual significance can be predicated of an act if it is a bare, accidental, unrelated point, but only if it carries with it a theory of its own origin in a certain articulated character from which it springs and on which it reacts. Nor is it true to say that this is but to use a collective name for the sum of our particular sins. Character is more than its past manifestations: in scholastic phrase, *peccatum actuale* does go back and down to *peccatum habituale*. Finally it is realized that the sinful individual life is part of a wider context of vitiated social life. The sins and sinfulness of a man require for full valuation this reference to the sin of the whole race.

(*b*) Christian theology must operate with an idea of guilt which is drawn from fully conscious moral experience. The idea is not confined to individual experience, but individual experience supplies our point of departure. Guilt is personal accountability and blameworthiness attaching either to a voluntary infringement of the will of God, in so far as that will is known to us or might have been known except for previous sin, or to a condition of personal life directly or indirectly consequent on such infringements. In strictness guilt is predicable not of acts, but of persons. No act, *qua* occurrence in space and time, is in itself wrong; ultimately moral quality belongs solely to the agent and his motives. Not only so, but acts pass, while persons remain somehow identical with their own past.

In this field we must first distinguish between guilt and sin in the sense of imperfection or badness. A young child may have acquired habits of lying or dishonesty through evil training in years prior to the normal awakening of full moral consciousness; in so far it is bad or imperfect, and it would be paradoxical to describe the child as without sin, for sin is whatever contradicts God's revealed will for human life. But the child's guilt may be small.[1] There can be no sin without guilt, but in such a case by far the greater portion of guilt attaches to others. In other words, guilt does not vary directly with sinfulness, except when we contemplate the race as a whole; collective human guilt is co-extensive and co-terminous with collective human sin. When the distinction just insisted on is wholly overlooked, guilt loses meaning and gravity; though it is undeniable that the religious mind does retrospectively predicate 'unworthiness' or the quality of being unpleasing to God of acts or states which at the time, from lack of enlightenment, could not have been other than they were. A second needful distinction is that between guilt as a feeling and as a fact. The consciousness of guilt cannot be taken as an exact or trustworthy index of actual guiltiness, for many wicked men have no bad conscience to speak of, and the worst and most hardened of men, feeling his guilt the least, and hardly conscious of the reproach of God or of his personal ill-desert, might otherwise be reckoned the least guilty. Our sense of guilt ought to be proportioned to our guiltiness; we cannot assert that in fact it is so.

To be guilty, a man must have moral knowledge or appreciation of right and wrong as they concern his action; where this pre-condition is lacking, as in imbecile or infant, guilt cannot be. But the knowledge in question need not be in the present consciousness of the sinner, for we should not cease to call a man guilty whose moral perceptions had been darkened by persistent wrong-doing. Further, guilt presupposes power in the moral agent to have acted otherwise. The sin must have been avoidable. If the liar had no option but to lie, because the constitution of things forced the lie from his lips, self-reproach is out of place. In all probability the modern habit of rightly bringing action into the closest possible connexion with character tends to obscure this real avoidability of guilty sin. How, it is asked, can we be responsible for what is the necessary outcome of character? Conscience imputes guilt to me on the ground that my character, being bad, inevitably expressed itself in just this way. But this appears to be out of harmony with the utterances of the moral consciousness. What I feel in moments of penitence is not that I am bad because I could act only in this sinful fashion, but that the badness of my disposition is revealed by the fact that I could do, and did, this evil thing. My sin is not an inevitable manifestation of me, but it is an actual manifestation of those elements in me which I might have suppressed and did not. No form of determinism can consistently assign to guilt the significance it has for specifically Christian thought. Whether it be physical determinism, as in Lucretius, which makes the soul one kind of mechanical force working along with and in the midst of other forces of the same kind; or psychical determinism, as in Mill, for whom the self forms an organic mental unity, reacting according to law, like other organic unities, on the stimuli of the environment; or idealistic determinism, as it may be called, which ascribes to the self, besides this vital reaction, the logical capacity to co-ordinate and combine the motives present in consciousness—in every case the *sui generis* quality of personal action is lost sight of. Choice is confused with what is not choice at all—be it a physical event or a judgment of the understanding—whereas in fact it is the experience in which,

[1] J. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, London, 1894, p. 80.

[1] And in principle this is the case of all; there is no young life which sinful infection has not touched long before the attainment of true moral personality.

by distribution of attention, we take up a selective attitude to the moral alternatives before us. We will to take this attitude when we sin; it is not taken for us by any interior psychical clockwork. Moral freedom is expressed in the valuation of motives, and in the last issue guilt is a word with only legal but no ethical sense unless the will produces actions without being itself produced. This is not to say that freedom is unconditioned. On the contrary, as it has been put, in all life there is involved a 'synthesis of two moments which it is wrong to take as real in themselves, the moment of necessity or acceptance of the situation and the moment of freedom or free action in the situation.'[1] Freedom, that is, is the correlative of data provided in part by our temperament and circumstances, in part by our previous moral history. We are candidates for freedom rather than completely free, but moral liberty in some real though varying measure is an essential presupposition of that culpable responsibility to God which religion names guilt. That, in spite of this real liberty, men sin so habitually is due to the accumulated power of evil impulses which they have nourished or failed to eradicate and to the incessant pressure of sin-charged social forces.

(*c*) The genesis of sin within the individual life is a problem so intricate that we must bear well in mind that no conclusion or lack of conclusion regarding the origin of sin can in the least affect our actual consciousness of its nature. Sin is on the ground, but we cannot watch it rising out of hypothetical antecedent conditions. Yet if, as we have seen, it is our own moral act, or a moral condition of our being which apart from our moral act would have no existence, the origin of sin must lie in the abuse of freedom. As it has been expressed, 'in the secret places of the human spirit takes place that strange change by which the non-moral is transformed into the immoral. We face here a mystery which we cannot explain, yet may not deny.'[2] Such abuse of freedom, however, does not occur *in vacuo*. The spontaneity of consciousness is a spontaneity of response to given factors in the world of presentation. What these factors are in this case may in part be understood if we recollect that our moral life has roots in animal nature, and is at first unformed—the process of our becoming being suffused from the very outset with a naive egoism operating in the midst of a chaotic strife between higher and lower impulses, a strife inseparable from each life's growth.[3] This confused mass of impulse, shot through by incipient movements of self-creation, is played upon by tainted social influences. These are the occasions and provocations of sin, but when we ask how they are translated into actuality the only answer is, 'By free choice.' This will seem inadequate only to minds obsessed by the idea of mechanical causation, which explains every phenomenon by some other. The will is not caused. Yet to refer moral evil to the free activity of will is less an explanation in the proper sense (all true explanation being teleological) than an implicit admission that sin is radically unintelligible—the one thing in the universe rightly to be called 'irrational,' as not merely an irreducible fact but the negation of all rationality. But, if freedom is an ultimate, we can see that the pre-condition of disobedience is also the pre-condition of obedience and of redemption. If God is love, it was necessary that sin should be possible.

[1] H. J. Paton, *Mind*, new ser., xxiii. [1914] 430; cf. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1919, ch. xvii.

[2] W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 276.

[3] See especially the works of F. R. Tennant.

(*d*) Nothing in sin can be so important for the Christian mind as its relation to God. He assuredly is not the author of sin, in the sense either that it forms for Him a personal experience or that His will is equally fulfilled through human sin and human obedience. Otherwise we should need to be redeemed not by Him, but from Him. When sin, however, has once become real, like other real things it falls under the sweep of divine power and is made to serve the purpose of holy love. Thus it is permitted to expose itself in all its vileness and misery, pre-eminently at the Cross, this progressive self-revelation of evil being accompanied and more than impeded by a parallel disclosure of good. Again, sin is condemned by the divine holiness; on this subject the believing mind attains a certitude which admits of no dispute, including the insight that what religion calls the wrath of God—*i.e.* the reaction of His holiness against sin—is, in face of sin, a necessary aspect of love. This reaction takes shape in punishment; to ask whether God *must* punish sin is otiose, in view of the fact that He invariably does so. True, the old distinction of natural and positive divine penalties is unreal. Natural penalties, it was held, flow from sin by ordinary causation, habitual intemperance, *e.g.*, leading to disease; positive penalties by their striking and unusual character compel the sufferer or onlookers to ascribe them to divine agency. But all divine penalties are positive in the sense that God's will imposes them, and the fact that their incidence may be mediated by ordinary finite causes does not alter this in the least. Sin's proper punishment lies, as it were, within sin itself. It consists in the self-stultification of the evil will (for, in McTaggart's vivid phrase, sin is like drinking sea-water to quench thirst), in the persistence of evil desire, in weakness of character, in the sense of guilt, above all and decisively in estrangement from God. And, if to lose communion with God be sin's worst penalty, it is no paradox to say that no one is punished for sin as the Christian is. The social consequences of sin, like lovelessness and dispeace, are directly proportioned to the moral evil prevailing in society as a whole. But we cannot fix a proportion between sin and suffering for the individual life (Jn 9^3). Sin always brings pain, but the pain, as the experience of Jesus proves, may strike the most innocent of all. Not only so, but to the reconciled heart external evil, instead of being annihilating judgment, may be fatherly chastisement which opens the way for a fuller revelation of divine love and thereby for the blessing of others. To the experience of death, which literature in every age proves to have been felt as the greatest of all ills, sin imparts a new penal character, which in some solemnizing measure it may retain even for the Christian, despite his recognition of it as appointed by the Father's love.

Closer to the heart of faith lie the great divine counteractives to sin, of which life and history are full. All ethical institutions which minister to community in the largest sense, such as the family, law, and the State, are here to be reckoned in; still more the emergence of great prophetic souls, deepening and refining the moral insight of the race. Above all, Jesus Christ has been here, and in the light of His person the drift of divine redeeming activity has become apprehensible by faith. His sin-conquering power is still made ours in the Holy Spirit, ever available in prayer and energizing divinely in the will of the believer, so enabling him to overcome sin and transform it into its opposite. The cardinal truth about sin is that it can be so forgiven as to be replaced by Christian goodness, and that in His Son the Father has interposed to put it away by the sacrifice of Himself.

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H. R. MACKINTOSH.

SIN (Egyptian).—**1. Conceptions of sin.**—An idea, by no means complete, of what the Egyptians regarded as sins is afforded us by the two 'Assertions of Innocence' in ch. 125 of the *Book of the Dead*.[1] The acts and qualities therein repudiated by the deceased are murder, robbery, theft, oppression, impiety towards the gods and the dead,[2] lying, slander, dishonesty, avarice (*wn-ib*), hasty temper, pride, loquacity, eavesdropping, adultery, and masturbation. From statements in moral treatises and other literary compositions, and in the biographical inscriptions of feudal lords and officials, we learn that to the sins enumerated in those two distinctly haphazard lists must be added injustice, partiality, disrespect for the aged and for parents, disobedience, contentiousness, rancour, ingratitude, selfishness, and drunkenness.

Some conception of the varying degree of reprobation in which the different sins were held—*i.e.* to what extent they were classed as greater or lesser offences against the gods or the community—can be gained from a study of the two artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13, and RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), §§ 2, 3, 4 (2), 5.

2. The origin of evil.—The Egyptians at a very early date seem to have had some conception of a Golden Age, when the sun-god ruled over the earth and when sin and evil did not yet exist.[3]

Already in the *Pyramid Texts* mention is made of 'those belonging to that first generation of the company of the righteous, that was born before anger arose, born before clamour arose, born before blasphemy arose, born before tumult arose, before the eye of Horus was wrenched out (?), before the testicles of Sēth were torn away (?).'[4]

To explain the origin of evil in the world is perhaps one of the aims of the so-called *Destruction of Mankind*.[5]

According to this tale, the sun-god Rē' (the god who was characterized by his righteousness and hatred of evil[6]) ruled at a remote age over gods and men. When he grew old, men thought blasphemously of him, so he sent down his eye in the form of the goddess Ḥathor to destroy them. After Ḥathor had for a whole day revelled in slaughter, Rē' relented and saved men from total extermination. But he henceforth refused to dwell any longer on earth, and withdrew himself to the sky.

In this legend men themselves seem to be regarded as the originators of sin, for it was as the result of their folly that the earth ceased to be under the direct rule of the perfectly righteous god.

Possibly also the above-quoted passage from the *Pyramid Texts* refers, in its original form, to this rebellion against the sun-god.[1] The reference to the quarrel between Horus and Sēth is apparently a later addition. But he who inserted it evidently held the view that all the sin and misery that prevail in the world originated, not in the acts of men, but in Sēth's murder of Osiris and his subsequent conflict with Horus.

3. The punishment of sin.—(1) *After death.*—The Egyptians had various conceptions of the punishments meted out to those who failed to obtain a favourable verdict at the posthumous trial.[2] The majority of these are sufficiently described in the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (1) (i.), (iii.), (v.). According to the *Second Tale of Khamuas*, the unrighteous dead were tortured.

'Setme saw . . . one man in whose right eye the pivot (?) of the door of the fifth hall (of Amenti) was fixed, while he prayed and uttered loud lamentation.'[3]

The man in question had been great and wealthy during his life, but after his death 'his evil deeds were found more numerous than his good deeds that he did upon earth.'[4] We read in the same tale that those who were improvident[5] during their lives suffered the pangs of hunger, while those who had led stupid, aimless existences—'the kind of men on earth whose life is before them, but God diggeth a pit at their feet to prevent them finding it'—had food, water, and bread hung over them, but as 'they were hastening to take it down . . . others dug pits at their feet to prevent their reaching it.'[6]

A point overlooked in the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (1), may here be noted. According to the above-quoted *Second Tale of Khamuas*, the actively virtuous are granted a higher award than the moderately good:

'As for him of whom it shall be found that his good deeds are more numerous than his evil deeds, he is taken among the gods of the council of the Lord of Amenti, his soul going to heaven with the noble spirits. And he of whom it shall be found that his good deeds are equal to his evil deeds, he is taken amongst the excellent spirits that serve Sokari-Osiris.'[7]

The high ethical tone of this tale (the existing version dates from the latter half of the 1st cent. A.D.)[8] is most remarkable.[9] We find no trace in it of the idea that justification after death could be attained by means of spells and ceremonial ablutions;[10] on the contrary, a man's fate in the hereafter is represented as entirely dependent upon how his life on earth had been spent. It may be pointed out at the same time that an equally high ethical standard is displayed in the description of the posthumous judgment in a composition of the feudal age, quoted in the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (1), (iii.), and also in the well-known passage occurring in one of that special group of hymns discussed below in § 6:

'Amun-Rē' who judgeth the earth with his finger . . . He assigneth him that sinneth against him to the fire, and the just to the West.'[11]

(2) *In this world.*—The Egyptian moralists warn the evil-doer that his sins will bring misfortune upon him or an untimely death.[12] The gods 'who will not ignore the deed of any person' are often represented as directly responsible for the sinner's doom.[13] A very ancient philosophical treatise informs us that the tongue of Ptaḥ 'gives life to the peaceful, death to the guilty.'[14]

[1] See artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 8; RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 3.

[2] Cf. artt. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), v. 8 (*a*); RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 3 (6); ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (10), (11), (18), (19).

[3] See J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 211 ff.

[4] K. Sethe, *Die altägyptischen Pyramidentexte* (hereafter cited as *Pyr.*), Leipzig, 1908–10, § 1463.

[5] E. Naville, *TSBA* iv. [1876] 4 ff.; A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 29 ff.

[6] See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 6.

[1] Cf. its phraseology with that of certain passages in A. H. Gardiner, *The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 44, 78, 84, the whole aim of the sage here being to contrast the prosperous rule of the righteous sun-god with the disastrous rule of the weak Pharaoh whom he is addressing.

[2] See below, § 4.

[3] F. Ll. Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 46.

[4] *Ib.* p. 49.

[5] See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (1), (iv.).

[6] Griffith, pp. 45, 49 f.

[7] *Ib.* p. 47 f. [8] *Ib.* p. 14.

[9] *Ib.* p. 46, note on l. 6, p. 48, notes on ll. 8, 10; see also Erman, *Handbook*, p. 230 f.

[10] See under § 4; see also Griffith, p. 46 f., note on l. 6.

[11] *Select Papyri in the Hieratic Character from the Collections of the British Museum*, London, 1841–44, pl. lxviii. = *Pap. Anastasi*, 2, vi., ll. 5–7.

[12] See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (3).

[13] *Ib.*

[14] A. Erman, 'Ein Denkmal memphitischer Theologie,' in *SBAW* xliii. [1911] 940.

4. The necessity for being sinless.—As has already been stated in the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), §§ 5, 9, the attainment of bliss by the dead depended upon the verdict which they obtained at their posthumous trial. The judge of the dead, whether Rē' or Osiris, was characterized by his righteousness and hatred of wrong, as were also the members of the assistant judicial council. The deceased, in order to find favour in the sight of these gods and so obtain the verdict upon which his happiness depended, had also to be righteous, *i.e.* be able to show that he had led an absolutely sinless life on earth. Even an Egyptian would have regarded that as an achievement beyond the power of most men. Accordingly several ways were found of overcoming what must have appeared a very serious obstacle to salvation.[1] These were: (*a*) ceremonial ablutions, which, whether performed by or on behalf of a man during life or after death, cleansed him from his sin and made him righteous; (*b*) going on pilgrimage to Abydos or otherwise participating in the Osirian mysteries; (*c*) the recitation of magical formulæ, by means of which things alleged (*e.g.*, that the speaker was free from sin or had performed or participated in this or that ceremony), however untrue they might be, became actualities.[2]

5. The unwillingness of the Egyptian to acknowledge himself a sinner.—The nobles, officials, and private persons of the Old and Middle Kingdoms and early New Empire never seem to weary of asserting in their biographical inscriptions that, in respect of their character and conduct, they were models of perfection. To own that they were sinners or even imperfect never seems to have occurred to them. In fact they mention a fault only in order to deny that they were ever guilty of committing it.[3]

What looks like the most amazing spiritual pride may possibly be accounted for by the prevailing belief in the magical efficacy of formulæ, written or recited.[4] This belief, coupled with the idea that ceremonial purity and freedom from sin were their sole passports to posthumous happiness, naturally deterred the Egyptians from owning themselves sinners in any documents, particularly in ones so closely connected with their existence after death as were inscriptions on their tomb-chapel walls or on their funerary stelæ.[5] To allow there that they were anything but absolute perfection would be to jeopardize their chances of salvation. Indeed, if a man felt that he could not attain happiness in the hereafter unless by some means or other he convinced his divine judges that he was free from all moral and ceremonial defects, he might well have shrunk from admitting that he had any such defects even to himself.

(1) The claim of the Egyptian to moral perfection was also prompted by his desire to win the goodwill of visitors to his tomb-chapel, so that they might be ready to present him with food and drink-offerings or in lieu of these recite certain spells.[6]

(2) Those who accuse the Egyptians of unexampled spiritual pride must bear in mind that, though in accordance with custom the narrative containing these self-adulatory assertions is put into the mouth of the deceased, it was often composed under the direction of a pious son or some other surviving relative.[1]

(3) Such assertions in process of time became a convention, the stereotyped way of describing a deceased[2] or living[3] person's character, or even one's own.[4]

6. Acknowledgment of sin.—As has been pointed out, it was characteristic of the Egyptian to deny that he was guilty of sin. But certain hymns of the XIXth dynasty,[5] written on papyri or inscribed on votive stelæ, display a religious sentiment hitherto unknown in Egypt and not met with again until Christian times. The persons who wrote the hymns, or for whom the hymns were written, speak of themselves as 'humble'[6] folk, 'afflicted,'[7] 'distressed,'[8] 'in bondage,'[9] 'wearied.'[10] They confess that they are sinners deserving punishment at the hands of this or that divinity;[11] but they throw themselves on the mercy of the divinity, pleading that they are 'ignorant and foolish, not knowing good from bad,'[12] and 'disposed to commit sin.'[13]

'Punish me not for my many sins,' exclaims a suppliant of the god Amūn, 'I am a witless man. I am a man without understanding. All day I follow after my own dictates, as the ox after the fodder.'[14]

The divinities addressed are represented as chastising men for their sins.

A certain Nekhtamūn, we learn, 'lay sick unto death,' and was '[under] the might of Amūn by reason of his sin.'[15] Nefer-'abu 'was a just man upon earth,' but he 'wrought the transgression' against the Peak of the West (a Theban goddess) and she chastised him. This goddess, we are told, 'smites with the smiting of a savage lion, she pursues after him that transgresseth against her.'[16] The moon-god Thōth is said in one hymn to have punished a man for swearing falsely by him.[17] According to another, a man was smitten with blindness for a similar offence against Ptaḥ.[18]

But these divinities are always addressed as compassionate and ready to forgive.

'Be merciful to me!' cries a suppliant of Ptaḥ, 'look upon me, that thou mayest be merciful.'[19] Another suppliant appeals to Thōth as 'Merciful one, who art able to take this (punishment in the form of sickness) away.'[20] Amun-Rē', we are told, 'comes at the voice of the distressed humble one.'[21] He is as 'disposed to mercy' as is his petitioner to sin.[22] In answer to the prayer of a friend, this god heals a man whom he had smitten with sickness; for 'he passeth not a whole day wroth. His wrath is finished in a moment and nought is left.'[23] Similarly the Peak of the West is merciful to him who transgressed against her, when he turned to her in penitence.[24]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the text and footnotes.

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SIN (Greek).—Sin may be defined, for our present purpose, as all conduct which by omission or by commission, in overt act or inner meaning, is offensive to the supra-human Powers.

[1] See Breasted, p. 167.
[2] See Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1906–07, ii. §§ 767–769.
[3] See Gardiner, *Egyptian Hieratic Texts*, Leipzig, 1911, pt. i., p. 6.
[4] *Ib.* p. 7.
[5] See Erman, 'Denksteine aus der theban. Gräberstadt,' in *SBAW* xlix. [1911] 1086 ff.; B. Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. [1916] 81 ff.
[6] *E.g.*, Erman, *Denksteine*, pp. 1088, 1091 f.
[7] *Ib.* pp. 1088, 1105. [8] *Ib.* pp. 1088, 1091.
[9] *Ib.* p. 1091. [10] *Ib.* p. 1103.
[11] *E.g.*, 'Righteous was Ptaḥ, Lord of Truth, towards me, when he chastised me' (*ib.* p. 1102).
[12] *Ib.* p. 1098. [13] *Ib.* p. 1094.
[14] *Select Papyri in . . . the British Museum*, pl. lxxii. = *Pap. Anastasi*, 2, x., l. 7–xi., l. 1.
[15] Erman, *Denksteine*, p. 1092 f.
[16] *Ib.* p. 1098 f. [17] *Ib.* p. 1102 f.
[18] *Ib.* p. 1101 f. [19] *Ib.* p. 1102.
[20] *Ib.* p. 1103. [21] *Ib.* p. 1088.
[22] *Ib.* p. 1094. [23] *Ib.* p. 1092 ff.
[24] *Ib.* p. 1099. For a complete and accurate translation of many of these hymns, and for an admirable discussion on the question as to what influences were responsible for the unusual sentiments that the hymns display, see B. Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. 81 ff.; see also A. Erman, *Handbook*, pp. 78 f., 82 ff.; J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 349 ff.

[1] See Griffith, p. 46, note on l. 6.
[2] For details see artt. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § v. 2, 8 (*b*), RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 10, SALVATION (Egyptian), § 2.
[3] See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 2.
[4] See § 4 (*c*) above, and Griffith, *loc. cit.*
[5] See Breasted, p. 167 ff., and esp. p. 169 f. It should be pointed out in this connexion that similar statements to those that follow the second 'Assertion of Innocence' in ch. 125 of the *Book of the Dead* (*i.e.* 'I have done what men command and that wherewith the gods are pleased . . . I have given bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, a ferry-boat to the boatless. I have made offerings to the gods, and ablutions to the blessed dead') frequently occur in the tomb-inscriptions and on stelæ of the feudal age; see, *e.g.*, art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), §§ 2 (1), 3, 9 (6).
[6] See art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian), § 9 (6); Breasted, p. 169.

1. Early conceptions.—(1) *Sin and crime.*—We are accustomed to draw a distinction between sin and crime.

'All crimes,' says Hobbes,[1] 'are indeed sins, but not all sins crimes. A sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man can take notice.'

Hobbes thus founds his distinction entirely on the difference between the overt act and the inner meaning. But it would be more in accordance with usage to define crime as an offence against the law of the State and sin as an offence against the law of God. Now in an early stage of society, when the sanction of the laws of the State is mainly their inherent validity as the ordinances of the Deity, however conceived, such a distinction could hardly emerge. But, when it does emerge, we shall find that it is by no means the case that all crimes are sins.

Thus, when Antigone buries her brother Polyneikes in defiance of the prohibition of the State, she sharply contrasts the law of man, which makes it a crime to bury her brother, and the law of God, which makes it a sin to leave him unburied. She deliberately makes her choice: she makes herself amenable to the penalty of death by committing a 'sinless crime'[2] on the ground that she owes a longer allegiance to the dead than to the living, and that the human law which she breaks is of inferior validity to the 'unwritten and unshakable laws of heaven.'[3]

And this distinction between the laws of man, which society has made for its own preservation, and the 'unwritten laws' (*νόμοι ἄγραφοι*) of heaven is one of much importance in the Greek doctrine of sin. The contrast is discussed in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, iv. 4, where we find that they differ in several ways. The 'unwritten laws' are of universal validity and their enactment must therefore be ascribed not to men but to the gods; they concern the fundamental facts of social life; they carry their own punishment with them and the penalties of their violation cannot be avoided, as the penalties established for the violation of human laws may be and are; in them that which is 'lawful' (*νομικόν*) is invariably also 'just' (*δίκαιον*). Mr. Bumble's immortal dictum applies only to man-made law.

(2) *Objective conception.*—To modern ideas the decisive criterion of sin is the consciousness of wrongdoing. An act may be foolish and mistaken, disastrous in its results to the doer and to others; but, if the doer acted with right intention and according to his best judgment, then, however we may characterize him or his act, we should certainly not employ, seriously, the terms 'sin' and 'sinner.' But from the earlier point of view the act alone is regarded. The sinner is in the position of a man who has incurred a debt. His sinfulness is not a matter of inner meaning, but an objective relation. Given the deed, the doer is a sinner, and a sinner he remains until the sin is expiated or condoned—precisely as the debtor remains a debtor until his debt is either discharged or remitted.

From this point of view it becomes even irrelevant to inquire whether the sin was incurred voluntarily or involuntarily, knowingly or unknowingly, with the best intentions or the worst.

This point of view is familiar to us in the OT. Thus, though 'Jonathan heard not when his father charged the people with the oath' (1 S 14[27]), yet, because he did taste a little honey with 'the end of the rod that was in his hand,' he was condemned to die. So 2 S 6[6]: 'Uzzah put forth his hand to the ark of God, and took hold of it; for the oxen stumbled. And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Uzzah; and God smote him there for his error; and there he died by the ark of God.'

We meet the same type of thought in Greek mythology. Thus Oineus sinned against Artemis by neglecting to perform sacrifice to her,[4] and the poet leaves it an open question whether his neglect was due to mere forgetfulness or was intentional:

ἢ λάθετ', ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν· ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ.

(3) *Sin and punishment.*—Closely connected with this objective conception of sin and the absence of conscious wrongdoing is the fact that the inference of sin is drawn from the punishment which sin is assumed to have evoked. As sin is inevitably punished, and punished according to early ideas directly and materially here and now, so the primitive mind easily infers that, if a man suffers signal misfortune, he must have sinned; whether knowingly or unknowingly, he must by omission or by commission have offended the Deity.

This type, again, is well known in the OT. In 1 S 14[38ff.], when Saul asked counsel of God and God refused to answer him, Saul at once inferred that a sin had been committed: 'Draw nigh hither, all ye chiefs of the people: and know and see wherein this sin hath been this day.'

Precisely so in Homer, when Lycaon falls into the hands of Achilles, he says: 'Now again hath deadly fate delivered me into thy hands: surely I must be hateful to father Zeus, since he hath given me a second time to thee!'[1] So Odysseus attributes his detention to some sin that he had unwittingly committed: 'Not willingly am I detained, but I must have sinned against the deathless gods.'[2]

Just as material prosperity implies that a man is well-pleasing to the gods, so material adversity—poverty, childlessness, physical affliction—implies that he has offended them.

(4) *Collective guilt.*—Again, the guilt of the sinner is not, according to early ideas, a merely individual matter. The burden of the sinner's guilt may involve an innocent community in the wrath of heaven. Unexpiated sin cries for expiation. It may be that, only when the penalty of sin—plague or famine or both—falls upon the community, it first becomes aware of the guilt, or first has its attention called to it. Just as we read in 2 S 21[1] 'There was a famine in the days of David three years, year after year; and David sought the face of the Lord. And the Lord said, It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he put to death the Gibeonites,' so in Greek literature we find repeatedly that, when some signal affliction falls upon a city, it is immediately interpreted as a judgment of an angry heaven, and it is inferred that some sin has been committed which demands expiation, and an oracle is consulted as to the nature of the unknown sin and the manner of its expiation.

The story of Oedipus may serve as an illustration. Son of Laios, king of Thebes, and Jokasta, he is exposed in infancy, is adopted and reared as son of Polybos, king of Corinth. Doubts having been cast upon his parentage, he goes to Delphi to consult the oracle. Learning that, if he returns to his home, he is doomed to slay his father and to marry his mother, he resolves not to go back to Corinth but to become a wanderer. Precisely this resolve leads him to meet his real father Laios on the road. Him he slays in ignorance, and, going on to Thebes, he marries the widowed queen, his mother, and by her has children. All this is done in ignorance. Yet the vengeance of outraged heaven visits the city with plague and barrenness of earth and beast and man. Oedipus sends to consult the oracle at Delphi and learns that the unknown murderer of Laios is in the land, and that it is the blood of Laios which occasions their affliction, and that the city must be purified either by banishing the murderer or by slaying him.[3] Thereupon Oedipus pronounces solemn sentence of outlawry upon the unknown murderer. As we shall have to recur to this point, the words in which Sophocles puts the denunciation of Oedipus, and which follow the actual formula employed in such cases, may be here quoted: 'This man, whoever he be—I forbid that any in this land whereof I hold the throne and sovereignty, either entertain or speak to him or make him a partner in prayers to the gods or in sacrifices or give him of the holy water (*χέρνιψ*) but all shall drive him from their homes, as he is our pollution (*μίασμα*)[4] . . . and I pray that he who did the deed, whether the unknown be one or hath accomplices, may evilly as he is evil (*κακὸν κακῶς*) wear out his hapless life. And I pray that, if with my knowledge he should share my hearth, I myself may suffer the curses which I have now invoked on these.'[5]

From the modern point of view Oedipus, inas-

[1] *A Dialogue of the Common Laws* (*English Works*, ed. W. Molesworth, London, 1839–45, vi. 37).
[2] *ὅσια πανουργήσασα* (Soph. *Antig.* 74).
[3] *Ib.* 450. [4] *Iliad*, ix. 533 ff.
[1] *Il.* xxi. 82 ff. [2] *Od.* iv. 377 f.
[3] Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 100 ff.
[4] *Cf. ib.* 97: *μίασμα χώρας.* [5] *Ib.* 236 ff.

much as he acted unwittingly, is guiltless. It was his very endeavour to avoid his awful doom that led him into it. But to the earlier conception of sin that does not at all alter the position. His acts have placed him in the position of a guilty person, and the innocent community which unwittingly harbours him shares his guilt and his punishment. The vengeance of heaven requires his expulsion (*ἐλαύνειν*) from the community whose gods he has offended.

It is important here to raise the question, Is the guilt which rests upon the people merely their failure to expel the guilty person, or is the community actually regarded as polluted by his presence? Obviously the answer must affect the whole conception of sin which is implied in the procedure. Now, however the matter may have been conceived in later times, there seems to be no doubt that at one period the people were regarded as actually polluted by the presence of the murderer. He is regarded as a plague-spot, a centre of contagion. He cannot take part in the worship of the gods, cannot enter the homes of the citizens without bringing contamination. If this were not already implied by such expressions as *μίασμα, καθαρμός*, etc., it seems to be clearly shown by such procedure as was adopted, *e.g.*, by the Athenians in the case of the murderers of Kylon.

Kylon, an Athenian noble, attempted to make himself tyrant of Athens. He seized the acropolis, where he was besieged. He and his brother made their escape. His followers were forced to capitulate. They sought sanctuary in the temple of Athene Polias, which they left only when the archons guaranteed their lives. At the instigation of Megakles they were nevertheless put to death. This brought a curse upon the city, and, in order to remove it, *αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἔφυγεν ἀειφυγίαν. Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρὴς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν*—*i.e.*, those of the actual murderers who were already dead were exhumed and cast beyond the borders of Attica; the family (*γένος*) of the Alkmaeonids was banished in perpetuity; and after that Epimenides of Crete purified the city. Thus clearly the innocent community was regarded as being itself polluted by the presence of the accursed (*ἐναγεῖς*).[1]

(5) *Procedure in cases of murder.*—The same sort of conception lies at the root of the Greek procedure in the case of murder and homicide. Our information is naturally fullest about that of Athens, which may be taken as typical. The legislation of Draco (*c.* 621 B.C.) appears to have amounted in general to a codifying of customary law, and his enactments appear to have possessed a quasi-religious sanction, as is already implied in the term applied to them—*θεσμοί*.[2] His laws relating to murder (the effect of which seems to have been to discriminate definitely between intentional and unintentional murder, and to emphasize the right of the State to exact punishment[3] instead of leaving it to the aggrieved individual) were not abrogated by the legislation of Solon (594 B.C.), who abolished his other enactments.[4] Severe as his regulations seemed to a later age—their severity Aristotle[5] considers to be their one notable feature[6]—they survived many revolutions and are the foundation of the ideal legislation in the *Laws* of Plato. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this article to examine these regulations in detail. But the significant point is that alike in Athenian law and in Plato all shedding of blood, whether voluntary or involuntary, requires, where the death penalty is not exacted, exile for a longer or shorter term, together with the performance of a ceremony of purification.

A curious procedure is that adopted in the case of a person who, being already exiled for involuntary homicide, is charged with committing another murder or with wounding with intent. Being a polluted person, he was not allowed to set foot in the land, but pleaded his case from a boat, lying off shore: *ἐὰν δὲ φεύγων φυγὴν ὃν ἀρεσίς ἐστιν, αἰτίαν ἔχῃ ἀποκτεῖναι ἢ τρῶσαί τινα, τούτῳ δ' ἐν Φρεάττου δικάζουσιν, ὁ δ' ἀπολογεῖται προσορμισάμενος ἐν πλοίῳ.*[1]

A similar procedure is enjoined by Plato in the case of an involuntary homicide who is driven to land by stress of weather: 'if he be wrecked and driven on the coast against his will, he shall encamp, wetting his feet in the sea, and wait for an opportunity to sail.'[2]

The procedure in the case of murder committed by a person or persons unknown is of interest as affording a comparison with Hebrew practice. The reader will remember the regulations laid down for such a case in Dt 21[1ff.]:

'If one be found slain in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee to possess it, lying in the field, and it be not known who hath smitten him: then thy elders and thy judges shall come forth, and they shall measure unto the cities which are round about him that is slain: and it shall be, that the city which is nearest unto the slain man, even the elders of that city shall take an heifer of the herd, which hath not been wrought with, and which hath not drawn in the yoke; and the elders of that city shall bring down the heifer unto a valley with running water, which is neither plowed nor sown, and shall break the heifer's neck there in the valley: and the priests the sons of Levi shall come near . . . and all the elders of that city, who are nearest unto the slain man, shall wash their hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the valley: and they shall answer and say, Our hands have not shed this blood, neither have our eyes seen it. Forgive, O Lord, thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood to remain in the midst of thy people Israel. And the blood shall be forgiven them.'

It seems an adequate explanation to say that the measuring 'unto the cities which are round about' had for its object merely to determine which community was to bear the expense of the purification. All analogy indicates that the nearest city was regarded as being actually contaminated by the murder.

Now let us compare the Greek procedure in a similar case. Aristotle, describing the duties of the archon basileus, says:

'If the actual offender is unknown, the writ runs against the doer of the deed' (*οἷον δὲ μὴ εἰδῇ τὸν ποιήσαντα, τῷ δράσαντι λαγχάνει*).[3]

The same sort of procedure is instituted by Plato:

'If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be discovered, the same proclamations shall be made as in the other cases, the death sentence shall be passed on the guilty person (*τῷ δράσαντι*) and proclamation shall be made in the market-place that he who has slain so and so and is guilty of murder, shall not set foot in the temples or at all in the country of the slain man, under penalty of being put to death if he appear and is known and being cast unburied beyond the borders of the country of the slain man.'[4]

The Hebrew rite is to be performed 'in a valley which is neither plowed nor sown'—*i.e.*, the guilt is to be transferred from the community to a no man's land.

Precisely so suicides are 'to be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land'—as in this country they used to be buried at the crossways—'in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their burial.'[5]

(6) *Guilt of animals and things.*—Guilt, again, may attach, according to early ideas, to the lower animals and even to inanimate things. To the case of the lower animals we cannot do more than allude here, as it is not very prominent in Greek records and is susceptible, perhaps, of more than one explanation. That such guilt was recognized in Greece and that animals which had caused a person's death were solemnly tried is a well-attested fact:

'And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening in the public games, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and

[1] Arist. *Constitution of Athens*, 1. [2] *Ib.* 4.
[3] See art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Greek), § 6.
[4] Arist. *Const.* 7. [5] *Pol.* II. ix. 9.
[6] Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 23; Aul. Gell. xi. 18.

[1] Arist. *Const. of Athens*, 57; cf. Suid., Harpocrat., etc.
[2] *Laws*, ix. 866.
[3] *Const. of Athens*, 57; cf. Pollux, viii. 120: *τὸ ἐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ δικάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων κἂν ὅσιν ἀφανεῖς.*
[4] *Laws*, ix. 874. [5] *Ib.* 873.

let the beast, when condemned, be slain by them and cast beyond the borders.'[1]

And we know that elsewhere similar prosecution and punishment of animals was common in the Middle Ages.[2] But, as such punishment is capable of being explained as a mere exhibition of revenge or retaliation, it may be left out of account here.

Even more striking is the procedure against inanimate objects which had caused a man's death:

'The king and the tribe-kings also hear the cases in which the guilt rests on inanimate objects and the lower animals.'[3] 'And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods—whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border.'[4]

The same, so to say, mechanical conception of guilt or impurity meets us repeatedly in the OT.[5] And precisely the same conception underlies the old English legal usage of *deodand*—the statutes of which were abolished only in 1846—whereby chattels such as carts and wheels which had caused the death of a man were forfeited to God, *i.e.* to the king, God's lieutenant on earth, to be distributed in works of charity for the appeasing of God's wrath.

(7) *Contamination by contact.*—Similar ideas lie at the root of many other well-attested Greek practices. The contamination incurred by contact with death or with birth is well known. Thucydides describes how the holy island of Delos was purified by the Athenians in the winter of 426 B.C. in conformity with the injunction of an oracle:

'The same winter the Athenians purified (ἐκάθηραν) Delos in accordance with a certain oracle. Pisistratus had purified it previously—not all of it, but so much of the island as was visible from the temple. But on this occasion the whole was purified in the manner following. They took up all the graves of the dead that were in Delos and made proclamation that in future no one should die in the island or give birth in it, but they must be conveyed across to Rheneia.'[6]

(8) *Unconscious communal sin.*—A further illustration of unconscious sin, which becomes known only when attention is directed to it by the affliction occasioned by it, is one of a type which is very common in Greek literature. A city is visited by a plague or famine or similar calamity. It is at once inferred that the city has somehow incurred the anger of heaven. Oracles are consulted and it is discovered that some hero belonging to the city lies dead in an alien land where his spirit cannot rest: his bones are to be brought home for burial in his own city, when all will be well.

Thus in Pindar[7] the motive which Pelias gives for the Argonautic expedition is that the soul of Phrixos cannot rest in the alien land of Colchis; he says to Jason: 'Thou canst take away the anger of the Chthonians. For Phrixos bids us go to the halls of Aietes to bring home his soul' (ψυχὰν κομίξαι). We have a historical example of this type in the case of Theseus. According to tradition, Theseus died in Skyros at the hands of Lycomedes, king of that island. When in 474–473 B.C. the island was conquered by Kimon, son of Miltiades, what were supposed to be the bones of Theseus were discovered there, and were solemnly conveyed to Athens for burial. 'The bones being conveyed home by Kimon on a ship of war, the delighted Athenians received them with splendid processions and sacrifices as if it were Theseus himself returning to the city.'[8]

(9) *The scapegoat.* — The same physical or mechanical conception of sin is implied in the wide-spread custom of the scapegoat. Just as the guilty individual, according to primitive notions, pollutes the innocent community, so the sin of the community may be put upon an individual, who then becomes excommunicate, no longer entitled to the rights and the security which belong to other members of the community. The position of the scapegoat is in most respects analogous to that of the banished murderer; only he suffers not for his own individual sin but for the sins of the community as a whole. This conception is, of course, familiar in the OT. In Lv 16 we have the ritual of atonement, in which two goats are selected and assigned by lot, one to Jahweh and one לַעֲזָאזֵל. The orthodox modern interpretation makes this mean 'to Azazel,' a devil or spirit of the waste. There does not appear to be any convincing evidence, linguistic or other, for rejecting the LXX version τῷ ἀποπομπαίῳ. Doubtless those 'outcasts' belonged to the spirits of 'the wild.' But such a dualism as the modern interpretation assumes, by which the individual Azazel could be balanced against Jahweh, seems foreign to the Pentateuch. The Greek φαρμακός is led 'beyond the borders,' and just this is the lot of the Hebrew scapegoat: וְשִׁלַּח אֹתוֹ לַעֲזָאזֵל. If the mysterious Azazel was thus early capable of being opposed as an individual to Jahweh, it is strange that no reference is made to him in Lv 14 or 17.

In Greece, anyhow, there is no question in the case of the φαρμακός of anything of the nature of a sacrifice or offering to devils. The ritual, as we know it in the case of the Thargelia, is that two men—in later times two malefactors—are solemnly 'led forth' (ἐξάγονται), *i.e.* expelled from the community.[1]

2. Homer.—So far we have been dealing with certain early conceptions which, stereotyped and formalized in ritual and custom, continue to be, as it were, the substratum or the background of far more advanced ideas. When we turn to the literature of Greece, we find already in Homer a conception of sin which is, on the whole, remarkably advanced; and this is only another way of saying that the conception of divinity which is implied in the Homeric poem is a relatively high one. It need scarcely be emphasized that here, as elsewhere, we must distinguish between the account of the gods which is given in mythology, or their behaviour as mere *dramatis personæ*, and that conception of them which is implied in their relation to the conduct of the individual or of the community. The mythology or theogony will always preserve fossil and formal elements which reflect an earlier stage of belief. And the general history of religion shows abundantly how easily such primitive elements maintain themselves alongside of far more advanced ideas. They are not formally rejected or repealed: for many minds they do not appear to demand rejection or repeal; but in relation to the ordinary business of life they no longer correspond to the living beliefs, inasmuch as they no longer constitute the determining motives of human conduct.

(1) *Standards of duty and right.*—Duty or right action is in Homer expressed chiefly by two terms: θέμις and δίκη. These terms are not mutually exclusive, nor are they even very sharply distinguished. It is true of both words that they sometimes have no deeper significance than 'way,' 'custom,' 'use,' 'wont.'[2] But it is an easy step to the notion of 'right way,' righteousness, or duty. If we had to state broadly the difference between δίκη and θέμις, we should say with reasonable accuracy that δίκη sums up man's duty to his fellows, θέμις man's duty to the gods; or, to put it

[1] Arist. *loc. cit.*; Plato, *Laws*, ix. 873 E.

[2] E. P. Evans, *The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals*, London, 1906.

[3] Arist. *loc. cit.*

[4] Plato, *Laws*, ix. 873 E; cf. Demosth. xxiii. 76; Æschin. iii. 244; Paus. I. xxviii. 10; Suid., Harpocr., etc., ἐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ; *Etymologicum Magnum*, 362. 55; I. Bekker, *Anecdota græca*, Berlin, 1814–21, 311. 15; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 36.

[5] Cf. Lv 5^{11}, Ex $29^{36f.}$ 30^{26-29}, Lv $5^{14f.}$ 11^{33-35} 15^{12}; cf., in NT, Mk 7⁴.

[6] iii. 104; cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Zeus*, 11 ff. (the place in Arkadia where Zeus was born is holy: ἔνθεν ὁ χῶρος | ἱερός, οὐδέ τι μιν κεχρημένον Εἰλειθυίας | ἐρπετὸν οὐδὲ γυνὴ ἐπινίσσεται); for the same idea cf. Aristoph. *Lys.* 742: ὦ πότνι' Εἰλείθυι', ἐπίσχες ῥοῦ τόκου. So Æschylus in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes (1080 f.) is made to reproach Euripides with introducing τικτούσας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, who are put on the same level with those who are guilty of incest.

[7] *Pyth.* iv. 158 ff.

[8] Cf. Plutarch, *Thes.* 36.

[1] See art. Scapegoat (Greek).

[2] Thus δίκη in *Od.* iv. 691, xi. 218, xiv. 59, xix. 43, 168, xxiv. 255; θέμις in *Il.* ix. 134, etc.

other words, *θέμις* is at most the religious aspect of *δίκη*. The individual judgments which constitute *θέμις* are called *θέμιστες*, which are regarded as being of immemorial antiquity and as, indeed, deriving their sanction ultimately from Zeus, whose ordinances they are. Thus the Διὸς *θέμιστες* of *Od.* xvi. 403 are exactly the Διὸς *ἐφετμαί* of *Il.* xviii. 569 f., and the same term is applied to the divine will as revealed in oracles.[1] In a special sense the king is the guardian of these *θέμιστες*.[2]

The *θέμιστες* are regarded as of universal validity and as regulating the conduct of all civilized men. They may be crookedly interpreted by the unjust judges,[3] but they are recognized by all men who are not beyond the pale of civilization.

Thus it is characteristic that the Kyklopes, who are otherwise outside civilization, are described as *ὑπερφίαλοι, ἀθεμίστοι*,[4] are in fact savages.[5] And precisely so 'wild War, who breaks the converse of the wise,' is described as a doer of *καρτερὰ ἔργα* —the works of Might, not of Right—and a fool or madman *ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα*.[6]

The transgression of these *θέμιστες* is in Homer described by the terms *ἀλιτέσθαι, ἁμαρτάνειν*.

(2) *Offences against the gods and men.*—We have now to consider what offences are regarded in Homer as sins, *i.e.* as offensive to and exciting the anger of the gods. These, we find, may be broadly classified as follows.

(*α*) Man owes certain specific duties towards the gods—certain duties which do not concern his relations to his fellow-men—the neglect of which is sin. (*α*) He must offer prayer and sacrifice. Neglect of this duty excites the anger of heaven.[7] To commence any important undertaking without due sacrifice is to court disaster.[8] (*β*) But, apart from the specific duties of prayer and sacrifice, man owes to the gods the general homage of deference and humility. Man must not seek to overstep the boundary which separates gods and men. Disregard of this boundary, encroachment on the prerogatives of heaven, is sin.

Thus Thamyris boasted that he could defeat the Muses in song and was punished by blindness.[9] So Lycurgus suffered for his insolence to Dionysos,[10] Bellerophon for his attempt to fly to heaven,[11] Ajax the Locrian because he defied Athene.[12]

(*γ*) Deliberate disobedience to the will of heaven as revealed by signs and portents is sin.[13] (*δ*) Lastly, the gods must be approached with due purity.[14]

(*δ*) There are offences which are not primarily direct offences against the gods but are a violation of social duties. Briefly enumerated, these are the following: (1) the conduct of the wooers in devouring the substance of Odysseus in his absence,[15] (2) reckless or indiscriminate slaughter in war,[16] (3) use of poisoned arrows,[17] (4) adultery,[18] (5) breach of the law of host and guest,[19] (6) neglect of suppliant,[20] (7) unfilial conduct,[21] (8) insulting the dead by maltreatment[1] or by boasting over them,[2] (9) murder,[3] (10) perjury.[4]

(3) *The ethical standpoint.*—In considering the Homeric conception of sin the first feature which strikes one is the prominence of the ethical as opposed to the specifically religious standpoint. The grounds on which certain conduct is regarded as displeasing to the gods are in the main such as appeal to the general conscience of men, not any mysterious or, so to say, magical reasons which are understood only by the priest or other possessor of esoteric knowledge. Just this feature constitutes the healthy-mindedness of the Homeric religion. Nothing could less suggest the religion of a priest-ridden people. When Hector declares to Polydamas his confession of faith,

'Thou biddest me to put my trust in winged birds, which I heed not at all nor care whether to the right they fly toward the morning and the sun or whether to the left toward the misty dark. Let us put our trust in the counsel of mighty Zeus, who rules over all mortals and immortals. One bird [omen] is best—to fight for fatherland!',[5]

he is speaking in a spirit which is hardly other than the prevailing spirit in Homer.

Entirely consonant with this is the Homeric view of the nature and origin of sin. Here again the prevailing note is ethical. Sin is, indeed, a mystery, but only as evil in general is a mystery; and the genesis of sin in nations and individuals is clearly enough conceived. Put in the simplest terms, the Homeric conception of the genesis of sin is this. There is developed in man a spirit of reckless self-confidence or wantonness, *ὕβρις*, which may be the outcome of sudden or excessive prosperity or the mere rashness and impetuosity of youth and strength. This *ὕβρις* is at all points the antithesis to *αἰδώς*: *αἰδώς* is the spirit of reverence which in conduct respects the rights of others, which looks before and after and considers not what is best at the immediate moment but what is best in the end; *ὕβρις* is the spirit of irreverence, pride, wantonness, which disregards the rights of others and grasps the lust of the moment in the scorn of consequence. Hence *αἰδώς* is the spirit of *εὐνομία*, of law and order; *ὕβρις* the spirit of *ἀνομία*, anarchy. The consequence of this spirit is an obscuring of moral values, a blindness of soul, *ἄτη*, which directly leads to the commission of sin.

We need not examine in detail the use of *ὕβρις* and synonymous or associated words in Homer. It will be sufficient to say that the whole conduct of the wooers in the absence of Odysseus is denoted by this term;[6] so Agamemnon's taking away of Briseis from Achilles;[7] so the conduct of the comrades of Odysseus.[8] It is coupled with *βιή*, might or violence, in *Od.* xv. 329, xvii. 565; and this characteristic of *ὕβρις* furnishes the standing epithet *ὑπέρβιος* applied to it in *Od.* i. 368, iv. 321, xvi. 410, etc. The phrase which occurs in *Od.* xiv. 262, xvii. 431, *οἱ δ' ὕβρει εἰξαντες, ἐπισπόμενοι μένεϊ σφῷ*, well illustrates the Greek conception of *ὕβρις* as passion uncontrolled by reason or reflexion. Hence *ὕβρις* is opposed to *εὐνομία*, or the reign of law.[9] Other terms of similar connotation are *ἀτάσθαλος, ἀτασθαλίαι, ὑπεροπλίαι, ὑπερηνορέων, ὑπερηφανέων, ὑπερφίαλος*. *ἄτη* is rather moral blindness or infatuation than mere intellectual ignorance. It is a misjudging of moral values induced by *ὕβρις*. Thus in *Il.* i. 412 Agamemnon is to be made by suffering to realize his 'blindness' in dealing unfairly with Achilles. It is in fact the characteristic of *ἄτη* that it is not so much ignorance as heedlessness (*ἀφραδίη*), and, when the sinner's eyes are opened, remorse comes, as with Bellerophon.[10] So it is sometimes termed 'foolishness,' *ἀφροσύνη*—thus of the wooers.[11] Ares is called *ἄφρονα τοῦτον . . . ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα*.[12] That it is not mere intellectual ignorance is illustrated by *Od.* xxii. 287 ff.: *μήποτε πάμπαν | εἶκων ἀφραδίης μέγα εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖσιν | μῦθον ἐπιτρεψᾶι· ἐπειὴ πολὺ φέρτεροί εἰσιν*, and xxiv. 457 ff.: *ὑμετέρους παῖδας καταπανέμεν ἀφροσυνάων· | οἳ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεξαν ἀτασθαλίῃσι κακῇσιν*.

1 *Hom. H. Apoll.* 394. 2 Cf. *Il.* i. 238.
3 *Il.* xvi. 387. 4 *Od.* ix. 106.
5 Cf. *Od.* ix. 215, where *ἄγριον* is equivalent to *οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα, οὔτε θέμιστας*, *i.e.* recognizing no law human or divine.
6 *Il.* v. 761.
7 *Ib.* i. 65, v. 178, viii. 236 ff.: the due performance of these duties entitles a man to expect a recompense from the gods; cf. xii. 6 ff.: the Greeks built their wall without first sacrificing to the gods.
8 Cf. *Od.* iv. 351. 9 *Il.* ii. 595 ff.
10 *Ib.* vi. 129 f. 11 *Ib.* vi. 200 f.
12 *Od.* iv. 503, xi. 307; cf. v. 119, xi. 582, 576, 593, *Il.* vii. 445 ff., xvii. 98 f., xxiv. 25 ff., 607.
13 *Il.* iv. 381, iv. 408 f.; so the companions of Odysseus who devoured the oxen of Helios in defiance of an express warning, *αὐτῶν . . . σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο*.
14 *Il.* vi. 266 ff.
15 *Od.* i. 376, ii. 64, xiv. 81, xx. 394, xxii. 38, xxiii. 63, xxiv. 351.
16 *Il.* ix. 63 f., v. 757 f. 17 *Od.* i. 259 ff.
18 *Ib.* i. 46; cf. iv. 261, xxiii. 218.
19 *Il.* xiii. 623 ff., vi. 167.
20 *Il.* xxiv. 156, 569, ix. 269, 477, xiii. 213, *Od.* xiv. 283, 405, vi. 422, xvii. 475, xxi. 27.
21 *Il.* ix. 451, xv. 204, xxi. 412, *Od.* ii. 135.

1 *Il.* xxiv. 53. 2 *Od.* xxii. 412, *Il.* xxii. 354.
3 *Il.* xxiv. 480.
4 *Il.* iii. 298, iv. 158, 235 ff., 270, vii. 351 f., xix. 259 f., 264 f., xxiii. 585–595.
5 *Il.* xii. 237 ff.
6 *Od.* iv. 627, xvii. 169, xxiii. 64, etc.
7 *Il.* i. 203, 214. 8 *Od.* xiv. 262, xvii. 431.
9 *Ib.* xvii. 487.
10 *Il.* vi. 201; cf. *Od.* iv. 261: *ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον*, and *Od.* ii 281–284
11 *Od.* xvi. 278; cf. xxiv. 457. 12 *Il.* v. 761.

The remark must be interpolated here that the doctrine of *ὕβρις* and *ἄτη*, as we have stated it, appears to give a one-sided view of the origin of sin as arising from excessive prosperity, sudden success, youth and strength and beauty—in a word, the goods of this life—and takes no account of the sin which springs from the ills of life. Now it must be said at once that the sins arising from prosperity are far more emphasized in Greek literature than those which arise from adversity. And the reason, we imagine, is that they struck the imagination more as being illustrated in the fortunes of great and noble houses and thus formed a more natural theme for the poet or the moralist. The sins to which *ὕβρις* leads have as a rule a certain splendour of audacity or magnificence of disaster which makes them memorable. Hence Aristotle, while he notes that the wealthy tend to be '*ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι*, being affected by the acquisition of wealth; for they feel as if they possessed all good things,' says that their crimes are not those of the malefactor, 'but crimes of wantonness or licence, as, *e.g.*, assault and adultery.'[1] He notes, too, that, while *εὐτυχία*, or success, tends, like wealth, to make men *ὑπερηφανώτεροι καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι*, it has one excellent effect in that it tends to make men religious,[2] since they attribute to the providence of heaven what is really an accident of fortune. But the effect of what we call the force of circumstances in causing sin was not ignored by the Greek moralist, and the rôle of what the Greeks call *ἀνάγκη* in the sphere of ethics has not had the attention paid to it which it deserves.[3]

In his *Greece and Babylon*[4] L. R. Farnell writes:

'Both [Greece and Babylon] reveal the phenomenon that marks an early stage of social morality: as the tribe of the family are one flesh, one corporate unit of life, so the members are collectively responsible, and the "sins of the fathers are visited on the children." This was the familiar law of old Hellas, and we may say of the ancient Mediterranean society; the first to make the momentous protest against it, and to proclaim the responsibility of the individual conscience, was Theognis for the Greeks and Ezekiel for the Hebrews.'

This statement is capable of misleading if it were taken to imply (1) that Theognis maintained that the children do *not* suffer for the sins of the children; on the contrary, he insists most strongly that they do; he deplores it, but he insists that it is a fact; (2) that Homer does not recognize personal responsibility. This of course is not the case. In Homer the punishment of the innocent for the guilty hardly amounts to more than that the slighted goddesses, Hera and Athene, wreak or attempt to wreak their vengeance for the judgment of Paris upon the innocent Trojans,[5] and the sin of Agamemnon in taking the daughter of Apollo's priest is visited by a plague upon the Greek army. In Homer it is always the individual sinner who is primarily responsible for his sin and only quite secondarily, if at all, his family or clan or country. There is more to be said for the vicarious doctrine, perhaps, in the case of the Hebrews. But it must be pointed out that long before the eloquent protest of Ezekiel[6] the individual sinner was primarily responsible,[7] and only in the case of the immediate sinner being unavailable does the punishment fall upon his descendants.[8] And to explain this much of family solidarity we do not need to invoke the social theories of Durkheim. The point of view is explicitly recognized by Aristotle in the much misunderstood passage in *Nicomachean Ethics*, i. 10, where he says that it would be absurd to discount the fortunes of his posterity in estimating the fortunes of the individual.[1] When Homer says of the violators of an oath,

'Even if the Olympian fulfil it not immediately, yet late he fulfils, and they pay with a heavy price, with their own heads and their wives and their children,'[2]

there is no immediate reference to the posthumous punishment of the sinner's children. And, if there were, it has to be pointed out that the leading feature of an oath was the invocation of a curse by the oath-taker upon himself and his family, and the belief in the efficacy of the curse by a blood-relation on his relatives was valid down to the latest times of which we shall here take cognizance, and it remained part of the regular formula of oath-taking.[3] Nor is there anything more surprising in this than the inclusion of innocent children in the sentence of disfranchisement on a father.[4] The special potency which belongs to the curses—and the blessings—of parents was always recognized.[5]

It is true that we have in Homer certain passages which appear to disclaim personal responsibility. In *Il.* xix. 86 ff. Agamemnon says:

ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠερόφοιτις Ἐρινύς,
οἵτε μοὶ εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἐμβάλον ἄγριον ἄτην,
ἤματι τῷ, ὅτ' Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.
ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ.

And then follows the well-known personification of Ate,

πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτη, ἣ πάντας ἀᾶται,
οὐλομένη· τῆς μέν θ' ἁπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὐδει
πίλναται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἧγε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει.
βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· κατὰ δ' οὖν ἕτερόν γε πέδησεν,

which, however, adds nothing whatever to our conception of Ate, since the account of Zeus as being the victim of Ate, when Hera deceives him,[6] is a mere bit of mythology. Again, in *Il.* iii. 164, Priam chivalrously excuses Helen and blames the gods —*οὔτί μοι αἰτίη ἐσσὶ θεοί νύ μοι αἴτιοί εἰσιν*—but that does not deliver her from the bitterness of self-reproach,[7] any more than her own ascription of her infatuation to Aphrodite saves her from remorse—

ἄτην δὲ μετέστονεν, ἣν Ἀφροδίτη
δῶχ', ὅτε μ' ἦγαγε κεῖσε φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης.[8]

Such pleas are, at most, pleas for the weakness of mortality. There is no thought of really repudiating personal responsibility or personal guilt. If in the OT (Ex. 9[12]) we read 'the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh,' we also read (v.[34]) that 'Pharaoh . . . sinned yet more and hardened his heart,' and the guilt implied in the one formula is no greater and no less than that implied in the other. So Xanthos, the horse of Achilles, says:

ἀλλά τοι ἐγγύθεν ἦμαρ ὀλέθριον· οὐδέ τοι ἡμεῖς
αἴτιοι, ἀλλὰ θεός τε μέγας καὶ Μοῖρα κραταιή.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμετέρῃ βραδυτῆτί τε νωχελίῃ τε, κτλ.,[9]

which merely means that the horses have done their best and better was not to be. If there were no question of personal responsibility, what point would there be in the protest of the river Xanthos in *Il.* xxi. 370 that he is not so guilty as the other rivers which assist the Trojans?

(4) *Punishment of sin.*—The penalties for sin, like the rewards for virtue, are normally conceived as material and are consummated here and now. Normally the good prosper, the wicked perish. The vengeance of the gods may linger, but it is sure,[10] and temporary prosperity does not shake men's confidence in the justice of heaven, though the signal punishment of the wicked is hailed as a welcome evidence of the activity of the gods.[11]

The purpose of punishment, according to Homer, is retributive and deterrent. The retributive intention is sufficiently attested by the verb which is regularly employed in reference to punishment —*τίνω* (*ἀποτίνω*), 'pay,' of the sinner; *τίνυμαι* of the avenger.[12] The deterrent intention is illus-

[1] *Rhet.* ii. 16.
[2] *Ib.* 17.
[3] It will be enough here to refer to Æschylus, *Agam.* 211: *ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον*, and to the admirable analysis of social and political unrest in Thucydides, iii. 82.
[4] Edinburgh, 1911, p. 152.
[5] *Il.* iv. 31 ff., xxiv. 25 ff.
[6] 14[12ff.] 18.
[7] 2 K 3[27] 14[6], 1 K 2[5. 31ff.].
[8] 2 S 21[1ff.].

[1] See art. LIFE AND DEATH (Greek and Roman).
[2] *Il.* iv. 160 ff.
[3] *E.g.*, Andoc. i. 126: *λαβόμενος τοῦ βωμοῦ ὤμοσεν ἢ μὴν μὴ εἶναι . . . ἢ ἐλάδλη εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν*; Antiphon, v. 11; Demosth. xxiii. 67: *διομεῖται κατ' ἐξωλείας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας, κτλ.*
[4] *E.g.*, the law in Demosth. *c. Meid.* 113: *ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου.*
[5] *E.g.*, Plato, *Laws*, xi. 931 B; cf. Lycophron, *Alex.* 125: *καὶ πατρὶ* (Poseidon) *πέμψας* (Proteus) *τὰς ἐπηκόους ἀρᾶς.*
[6] *Il.* xix. 95 ff.
[7] *Il.* iii. 172 ff.
[8] *Od.* iv. 261.
[9] *Il.* xix. 409 ff.
[10] *Il.* iv. 160.
[11] *Od.* xxiv. 351.
[12] Cf. *παλίντιτα ἔργα* (*Od.* i. 379, ii. 144, xvii. 51).

trated by *Il.* iii. 351 ff., where Menelaus prays to Zeus:

'O Lord Zeus, grant me to take vengeance (τίσασθαι) on him who hath first done me evil, even Alexandros, and overcome him by my hands, so that another, even among men of after time, may shudder to do evil to the host that hath shewn him kindness.'

Nägelsbach[1] compares Dt 19[19ff.]:

'Then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his brother: so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee. And those which remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil in the midst of thee. And thine eye shall not pity; life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.'[2]

Here, as in Homer, we have the retributive and deterrent intentions combined.

(5) *Retribution in a life to come.*—But, while normally sin is punished by material affliction in this life and virtue rewarded by material benefits, it is clear that the Homeric poet was familiar also with the conception that punishment or reward awaits men on the other side of the grave. The Homeric attitude to immortality does not appear to be quite fairly represented in much modern writing. But the fact is that for Homer there is no question of immortality. The survival of the soul after death is a certainty for Homer, just as much as this present life. And, if the picture of the after life which he presents is a ghostly one, that is only because the after life cannot be imagined but in one of two ways: either (1) as a duplicate of the present life, only that pain and conflict, parting and renunciation, are done away and transience has given place to permanence, or (2) in terms of the immaterial. And, precisely as we cannot visualize an immaterial existence, our picture must be a mere suggestion of a realm of shadows.

Now, when Homer says 'hurled to the house of Hades many valiant souls (ψυχάς) of heroes and made themselves (αὐτούς) to be the prey of dogs,'[3] or when he says that the ghost of Patroklos, as it appeared to Achilles,[4] was 'altogether like himself in stature and beautiful eyes and voice,' it is actually argued, and apparently quite seriously, by some scholars that for Homer the real man, the man himself, was the living material body, of which the soul was a mere faint *Doppelgänger*. On the same principle we could easily prove precisely the same conception for even the most orthodox of Christian writers. The man we know and love is doubtless the living human presence, the immortal soul inseparate from its mortal bravery; and doubtless we cannot imagine the man himself except in the garment of mortality. Even the sincerest Christian cannot easily conceive his dead, if the dead came back, as other than disturbers and intruders on the banquet of life, as uncanny presences with whom he could not hold comfortable and familiar converse. And it is no paradox to say that the poet above all, by the very conditions of his art, is necessarily driven back upon the realm of material things, disguise it how he may, and, in exact proportion as he seeks to give to the ideal the semblance of reality and of life, he is compelled to render the ideal by the images of sense. And the society of Homer, beyond all others, is a society which seeks to avert its eyes from the unseen and mysterious dominions of the dead, and to turn them to the familiar scenes of human life and activity. But not the less the Homeric age knew that the grave is not the end—'sunt aliquid manes: letum non omnia finit'—and that, so far from the body being the man himself, it becomes, so soon as the soul leaves it, mere 'dumb dust' (κωφὴ γαῖα)[5] which must be reverently dealt with, not for what it is, but even because it was once the tenement of a beloved soul.

[1] *Die homer. Theologie*[3], p. 320.
[2] Cf. Dt 20[18ff.].
[3] *Il.* i. 3 ff.
[4] *Il.* xxiii. 66 *f.*
[5] *Il.* xxiv. 54.

But, of course, the relation which the after life as conceived by Homer bears to the present life was wholly different from that which Christian teaching conceives to exist. For the Christian this life is but a preparation, whether propædeutic or probational, for a better and fuller life to come; this life is transient and mortal; the reality is the eternity which lies beyond. For the Homeric Greek they are both alike realities, and they differ only in that this life is certainly transitory, that may possibly be eternal; this life certainly holds within it many things desirable, what the after life holds can only be a dim conjecture.

Within these limits the belief in the soul's survival after death could scarcely fail to have some bearing on the doctrine of sin. Where a man had refrained from all signal wickedness, he had nothing to fear from the world of the dead nor in it. Where he had distinguished himself beyond his fellows, whether for good or for evil, he might hope for a correspondingly exceptional felicity or woe beyond the grave. Our literature naturally says little of the hopes of the common man, and the 'tiresomeness of an over-peopled heaven'[1] would have been felt with more than ordinary force by the Homeric heroes. But that the terrors of the unseen world were a very real thing in the Homeric age is abundantly clear. The evidence can be neither ignored nor explained away.

Take the case of perjury. This, like other sins, may bring its punishment immediately. The violation of the truce by the Trojans is conceived as bound to lead to their defeat in battle.[2] Yet we have an unmistakable reference to the punishment of perjury after death in the under world.[3] But, we are told, the idea of posthumous punishment is non-Homeric. The examples of Tityos, Tantalos, and Sisyphos, in *Od.* xi. 576–600, occur in a late interpolation. Heroic endeavours are made to explain away the *Iliad* passages as meaning that the powers under earth punish men *in this life*, or the passages are simply excised as spurious. This is a proceeding as misleading and unscientific as it is on linguistic or other grounds unjustifiable. The truth is rather that, while in general the living have no occasion to fear any evil either from the dead or in death, yet, whenever they come into collision with the great sanctities of life—when they commit murder or sin against the fundamental ties of family—then they have to fear punishment not only in this life but also in the life to come. And in taking an oath, which is an essential and basal feature of any early system of law, the gods of the under world are directly and solemnly challenged, and it would be indeed strange if their jurisdiction were limited to this world. Surely it is not an accident that Pindar takes as the type of the happy dead those who ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις,[4] or that Hesiod says ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.[5]

(6) *Atonement for sin.*—We have next to consider the mode in which atonement is made for sin in the Homeric age. The first essential feature is that the wrong conduct is intermitted, and where possible restoration or reparation is made to the aggrieved party.

Thus the daughter of Apollo's priest is restored to him.[6] Odysseus stays the anger of the gods by performing a neglected sacrifice.[7] So Agamemnon makes amends to Achilles by gifts of tripods, female slaves, etc.[8]

The next essential thing is prayer and sacrifice to the offended deity.[9] The intention of the sacrifice is purely propitiatory, and precisely the same

[1] W. James, *Human Immortality*, London, 1898, p. 83.
[2] *Il.* iv. 159.
[3] *Il.* iii. 278 *f.*
[4] *Ol.* ii. 72.
[5] *Works and Days*, 283.
[6] *Il.* i. 97.
[7] *Od.* iv. 581 ff.; cf. *Il.* ix. 119 *f.*
[8] *Il.* xix. 243 ff.
[9] *Ib.* i. 98 ff.

procedure is followed to avert impending evil.[1] Hence, too, the sacrifice may be substituted by a vow,[2] and accompanied or rather followed by hymns.[3]

The usual term for 'propitiate' is ἱλάσκεσθαι, *i.e.* to render the god ἵλεως, 'well-pleased' or 'at peace' with the worshipper. The same idea is expressed by ἀρέσαι,[4] ἀρέσασθαι.[5] The propitiatory prayer is especially called λιτή; to pray is λίτεσθαι.[6]

(7) *Ceremonial purification.* — It is sometimes said that the ceremonial or symbolic ritual of purification, which in forms more or less repulsive we know to have been practised in later Greece and which is attested all over the world, was unknown to the Homeric age. No one, however, can maintain such a doctrine who does not approach the question with eyes wilfully shut to the obvious meaning of several Homeric passages. These are noticed in art. PURIFICATION (Greek) and need not be repeated here. But even had there been no actual reference to such practices in Homer, we should have been abundantly justified on *a priori* grounds in assuming that they existed.

The case of Theoklymenos in *Od.* xv. 223 ff. is constantly quoted as supporting the opposite opinion. This appears to be a misunderstanding of the position of a suppliant. So far as the present writer knows, the blood-guiltiness of a suppliant was inoperative outside his own country. If this were not so, how could the guilty man ever begin the process of recovering his status? The very first step in that process is usually for the suppliant to seat himself at the hearth of some person beyond the borders of his own country. If his blood-guiltiness were operative, how could he approach the holy of holies, *i.e.* the hearth of his host?[7] Usually the suppliant does not even reveal his identity before he has been a guest for some time. If his presence carried pollution beyond his own borders, could this have been tolerated? Once beyond his own land, he becomes, so far as concerns outsiders, possessed of all the rights of the suppliant; in his own land to slay him is the duty of his victim's kindred; outside his own land for an alien to slay him is a crime which brings down the vengeance of Ζεὺς ἱκετήσιος.

The well-known case of Orestes might, of course, be quoted. The festival of Pitchers (Choes), which formed part of the Anthesteria, was peculiar in that each participant drank his pitcher of wine separately. The reason given was that, when Orestes with his mother's blood upon him came to Athens during the festival, the Athenian king, not wishing to be inhospitable but unwilling to contaminate the worshippers, ordered separate pitchers of wine to be given to each.[8] But that is a quite peculiar case. It is precisely to the *Semnai Theai* at Athens that Orestes is sent by Apollo to make his peace with them.

The banishment of the suppliant, moreover, does not prevent him from offering prayer and sacrifice even to the Deity, whose sanctuaries in his own land he may no longer enter. But he must make himself an outcast, and then from beyond the pale solicit re-admission.

So we would interpret the curious instructions given to Odysseus.[9] He has offended Poseidon. He must therefore seek a land where men know not the sea nor eat food mixed with salt, who mistake the farmer's shovel (scull) for the seaman's oar (scull)—*i.e.*, he is to travel beyond the sphere of the sea-god, and there he is to make his propitiatory offering to Poseidon.

3. **Hesiod.** — The general framework of ideas which we have sketched in Homer is to be presumed in our study of the conception of sin in the later Greek authors. For in the history of religious ideas each new development does not cancel or repeal all that went before. Custom, with the force of an almost religious sanction,[1] is nowhere more powerful than here. The old and the new tend to persist side by side, each acting and re-acting upon the other. The present article can only aim at noting the more important points of departure and illustrating the leading tendencies.

The terminology of Hesiod is similar to that of Homer. Righteousness is δίκη,[2] and means that conduct which is in conformity with a divinely established order, which is careful of the rights of others, whether God or man. Unrighteousness is ὕβρις, ὑπερβασία, σχέτλια ἔργα, and is the conduct which ignores the rights of others and transgresses the laws of the divinely established order. The generally sober colouring of the poet's creed is redeemed from pessimism by his firm conviction that the Judge of all the earth is righteous and will not suffer unrighteousness to prevail finally.

'Now may neither I nor son of mine be righteous among men: for it is an ill thing to be righteous if the unrighteous shall have the greater right. But that I deem not that Zeus the hurler of the thunder will bring to pass.'[3]

Punishment of unrighteousness may not follow immediately after the unrighteous act, and the wicked may prosper for a time, but in the end the moral order of the world triumphs:

'It is better to pass by unrighteousness and to pursue righteousness. Righteousness in the end is better than unrighteousness, and the fool learneth it by suffering.'[4]

Dike is the daughter of Zeus, honoured and revered by the gods who keep Olympos,[5] and the observance of δίκη is the sovereign distinction whereby the race of men is divinely marked off from the lower animals, for whom the law of might (βία) is the only law.[6]

When we compare the specific sins which Hesiod enumerates with those of Homer, we are struck by the greater prominence of those which have no obvious ethical significance and are more of the nature of unreasoning tabus. On the one hand, we have the Homeric sins: perjury,[7] falsehood,[8] theft,[9] covetousness,[10] dishonouring parents,[11] unjust judgments,[12] injury to the fatherless,[13] injury to suppliant or the stranger within the gates,[14] taunting the poor with his poverty,[15] lying with brother's wife,[16] neglect of prayer and sacrifice,[17] praying with unwashed hands,[18] to which we may add idleness.[19] On the other hand, we have a whole catalogue of 'sins' which, if not severely reprobated, are at least 'unlucky,' which have no parallel in Homer—cutting the nails at a festival of the gods,[20] sitting on tombstones or other 'unmovables' (ἀκίνητα),[21] contact with water which has been used by a woman,[22] muttering at a sacrifice,[23] placing a ladle across the mixing bowl,[24] leaving the wood of a house unplaned,[25] eating from unconsecrated vessels,[26] performing certain private operations indiscreetly,[27] bringing the contagion of death into contact with birth.[28] To find in these prohibitions traces of Orphic and Pythagorean teaching, as Fick does, seems wholly mistaken. These ideas are of a type universally attested in early thought, and, if they do not appear in Homer, it is not so

1 *Il.* vi. 86 ff., 115, *Od.* xvi. 184 f.
2 *Od.* xii. 346.
3 *Il.* i. 472.
4 *Ib.* ix. 120, xix. 138.
5 *Od.* viii. 396, etc.
6 See artt. PRAYER (Greek), § 1, PROPITIATION (Greek), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Greek).
7 Cf. Aristotle, *Oec.* 1344a. 11: ὥσπερ ἱκέτην καὶ ἀφ' ἑστίας ἠγμένην.
8 Athen. x. 437 C; Callimach. *Aitia*, in *Oxyrh. Pap.* xi. 1362; Eurip. *Iph. in Taur.* 947 ff.
9 *Od.* xi. 121 ff.; cf xxiii. 265 ff.

1 Cf. 2 S 13[12]: לֹא־יֵעָשֶׂה כֵּן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
2 θέμις (*Works*, 137).
3 *Ib.* 270 ff.
4 *Ib.* 216 ff.; cf. 333.
5 *Ib.* 256 ff.
6 *Ib.* 276 ff.
7 *Ib.* 190, 194, 282 ff.
8 *Ib.* 322, 709.
9 *Ib.* 320, 352.
10 *Ib.* 315 f.
11 *Ib.* 185 ff., 331.
12 *Ib.* 260 ff.
13 *Ib.* 330.
14 *Ib.* 327.
15 *Ib.* 718.
16 *Ib.* 328 f.
17 *Ib.* 737.
18 *Ib.* 723 ff.
19 *Ib.* 303 ff., 309.
20 *Ib.* 742.
21 *Ib.* 750.
22 *Ib.* 753.
23 *Ib.* 758.
24 *Ib.* 744.
25 *Ib.* 746.
26 *Ib.* 748.
27 *Ib.* 727, 733.
28 *Ib.* 735.

much that they are unknown as that they are ignored.

The specific duties which Hesiod recognizes are mainly those of Homer: oath-keeping and honesty, worship of the gods by prayer and libation and sacrifice.[1] We need only notice the new dignity which he gives to work as a duty which wins the approbation of the gods,[2] who have appointed work as the lot of humanity.[3] The practice of righteousness is, moreover, given a practical or prudential intention which is less obvious in Homer:

'Work, foolish Perses, the works which the gods have appointed unto men, lest one day with children and wife thou hast to beg thy bread among the neighbours and they heed thee not.'[4]

'According to thy power do sacrifice unto the deathless gods . . . that they may have a gracious heart and mind toward thee, that thou mayst buy another's estate, not another thine.'[5]

'Take just measure from thy neighbour and give him just return, with the same measure or yet better if thou canst, that even so afterward in thy need thou mayst find him a sure help.'[6]

So the scarlet woman[7] is to be avoided for prudential reasons.

The punishment of sin is by way of temporal affliction in this life:

'Whoso ensue evil insolence and froward works, for them doth Zeus decree justice. . . . On them doth the Son of Kronos bring from heaven a grievous visitation, even famine and plague together, and the people perish. Their women bear not children: their houses decay by devising of Olympian Zeus: or anon he destroyeth a great host of them within a wall if may be, or the Son of Kronos taketh vengeance on their ships at sea.'[8]

So the righteous are rewarded by temporal prosperity:

'Their city flourisheth and the people prosper therein. And there is in their land peace, the nurse of children, and Zeus doth never decree war for them. Neither doth famine ever consort with men who deal straight judgments, nor doom, but in mirth they tend the works that are their care. For them earth beareth abundant livelihood, and on the hills the oak's top beareth acorns, the oak's midst bees: their fleecy sheep are heavy with wool: their wives bear children like unto their parents: they flourish with good things continually, neither go they on ships, but bounteous earth beareth fruit for them.'[9]

The punishment of the wicked may, of course, involve the innocent:

'Oftentimes a whole city reapeth the recompense of the evil man who sinneth and worketh the works of foolishness.'[10]

We have seen in Homer how the vengeance of Zeus may involve the sinner's wife and children.[11] So in Hesiod:

'Whoso of his will sweareth false witness and lieth, and wrongeth justice and sinneth beyond redemption, his race is dimmer in the after days; but the race of him that keepeth his oath is better in the time to come.'[12]

But this does not seem to mean much more than is already necessarily implied in the solidarity of the family, and is at any rate no such explicit doctrine of the hereditary curse as we shall find in Theognis.

As to the special agency by which retribution is effected, we have Horkos, who attends on crooked judgments (*Rechtsbeugung*)[13] and punishes perjury;[14] the Erinyes as avenging spirits;[15] Dike, who informs Zeus of the wickedness of men:

'Whenever any injureth her with crooked slighting, straightway she sitteth by Zeus the father and telleth of the unrighteous mind of men till the people pay for the folly of their kings who with ill thoughts wrest aside judgments, declaring falsely.'[16]

But we have a specially interesting development in the idea of a sort of spirits intermediate between men and gods whose function is to act as 'watchers' (*φύλακες*) of mortal men:

'The immortals are nigh among men and remark them that with crooked judgments oppress one another, taking no heed of the anger of the gods. Yea, thrice ten thousand immortals are there on the bounteous earth, who keep watch over mortal men: who watch over judgments and froward works: clad in mist, faring everywhere over the earth.'[1]

In Homer it is the gods themselves who 'in the likeness of strangers from another land visit in divers guises the cities of men and watch the unrighteousness (*ὕβρις*) and righteousness (*εὐνομίη*) of men.'[2]

Historically these Hesiodic *φύλακες* seem—but this is matter of opinion—to reappear in the *φύλακες* of Plato's *Republic*.[3] They seem to be rightly equated with the spirits of the golden race who, in Hesiod's account of the fall, in the form of *δαίμονες*,[4] exercise just this supervision over men.

The reader who turns from Homer to Hesiod is conscious of a change of atmosphere. The radiant gaiety of the Homeric world has given place to a world of most sober colouring, where the lights burn low and the shadows deepen. There is but a hint in Homer of an earlier age, a lusty springtime of the world when men were mightier than their degenerate descendants. 'As men are now'[5]—so the poet contrasts his own with the earlier age. But the contrast is merely of physical prowess. In Hesiod, on the other hand, we find a fully developed doctrine of a lost Golden Age from which men have through their folly and sin declined.[6]

4. **Solon, Theognis, etc.**—In the Greek poets of the period between Hesiod and the end of the 6th cent. B.C. the general conception of the nature and consequences of sin remains much as we have described it in Homer and Hesiod; *κόρος*, satiety, begets *ὕβρις*, wantonness, whence springs *ἄτη*, moral blindness, sin, or the consequences of sin:

τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.[7]

Or, again, as in Homer, *ὕβρις* may arise from the mere thoughtlessness of youth:

ἦβη καὶ νεότης ἐπικουφίζει νόον ἀνδρός, πολλῶν δ' ἐξαίρει θυμὸν ἐς ἀμπλακίην.[8]

There is the same profound conviction of the moral order of the universe:

'O Zeus, father Zeus, thine is the dominion of heaven, and thou dost watch the works of men, lawless and lawful, and takest heed of the righteousness and unrighteousness of beasts' (*σοὶ δὲ θηρίων ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει*).[9]

There is the same certainty that sin must be followed by punishment:

'Unrighteous is the mind of the rulers of the people: for them there is prepared much suffering by reason of their great insolence. For they know not to restrain satiety (lust) . . . They wax wealthy by unrighteous deeds: they spare neither holy things nor public things; they steal and rob here and there; they take no heed to the august foundations of justice, who, though she is silent, knoweth the things that are and that were afore, and in time verily she cometh to repay.'[10] 'None ever wronged stranger or suppliant and escaped the knowledge of the immortals.' Sin may prosper for a little, but 'the end is woe, and the counsel of the gods prevails.'[11]

The punishment of the guilty, we have seen in Homer and Hesiod, may involve the affliction of the sinner's connexions, his wife, his children, his city: the people pay for the sins of their rulers.[12] But now we find it explicitly stated that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. And this is, indeed, but the natural corollary of the conception that sin is inevitably followed by affliction. Since it appears that in this life the sinner frequently escapes punishment, while there was no lively conviction that there is any punishment after death, it was natural to conclude that the punishment must fall upon his descendants.

1 *Works*, 135, 336 ff., 465.
2 *Ib.* 299 ff.
3 *Ib.* 397.
4 *Ib.* 397 ff.
5 *Ib.* 336 ff.
6 *Ib.* 349 ff.
7 *Ib.* 373: *γυνὴ πυγοστόλος.*
8 *Ib.* 238 ff.
9 *Ib.* 227 ff.
10 *Ib.* 240 f.
11 *Il.* iv. 162.
12 *Works*, 283 ff.
13 *Ib.* 219.
14 *Th.* 231.
15 *Works*, 803, *Th.* 185, 472 f.
16 *Works*, 258 ff.

1 *Works*, 249 ff.
2 *Od.* xvii. 485 ff.
3 374 D, and *passim*.
4 *Works*, 122.
5 *οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσι* (*Il.* v. 304, xii. 383, 449, xx. 287).
6 For the details of Hesiod's account of the fall the reader is referred to the art. HESIOD. Here it will be sufficient to say that in the *Works* we have two versions of the legend: (1) lines 42–105 and (2) lines 109–201.
7 Solon, frag. 4. 3; cf. Theognis, 153 f.
8 Theognis, 629 f.
9 Archilochus, frag. 84.
10 Solon, frag. 2. 7 ff.
11 Theognis, 201 f.; Solon, frag. 12. 7 ff.
12 Hesiod, *Works*, 260.

Otherwise the doctrine of the eternal and infallible justice of heaven becomes vain. God, it is inferred, takes long views. He bides His time until the cup of iniquity is full. The sword of justice may linger, but it will surely fall, if not upon the sinner himself, then upon the heads of his children or descendants.

'Not long abide for men the works of unrighteousness. Zeus beholdeth the issue of all things, and sudden as the wind that scatters the clouds in spring . . . is the vengeance of Zeus. He is not swift to anger at each thing like a mortal man, yet he who has a sinful heart escapes not his notice for ever, but is surely revealed in the end. One pays the penalty immediately, another after. And if they escape themselves and the doom of the gods overtake them not, yet surely it cometh afterward: the innocent pay for their deeds, their children or their descendants after them.'[1]

'These things [the apparent escape of the sinner from retribution] deceive the mind of men; for not at the moment of each act do the gods punish sins, but one pays the ill debt himself nor hangs woe over his dear children in the aftertime: another justice overtaketh not; ere that relentless death alights upon his eyes, bringing doom.'[2]

The doctrine seemed to be the natural issue of the doctrine of the inflexible justice of heaven. And genuine examples of the unrighteous prosperity of one generation being succeeded by signal calamity in another were common enough. Popular fancy would manufacture others, and by an easy paralogism infer a general principle. How deeply ingrained in Greek belief it was is shown by the fact that in a formal curse—*e.g.*, that pronounced by the herald at the opening of the Ecclesia and the Boule—the descendants and family of the transgressor were included:

ὃν ἐκείνοις εὔχεσθ' ἐξώλη ποιεῖν αὐτὸν, καὶ γένος, καὶ οἰκίαν.[3]

And Aristotle[4] implicitly justifies the doctrine, if regard be had only to the individual's reckoning with heaven. But, from the point of view of the innocent sufferer, it is manifestly unfair that he should pay the penalty for sins in which he had no part. The injustice of it was bound to strike every serious man.

As David cried: 'Lo, I have sinned, and I have done perversely: but these sheep, what have they done? let thine hand, I pray thee, be against me, and against my father's house,'[5] so Theognis cries: 'O Father Zeus, would that it might please the gods that he . . . who works the works of foolishness and taketh no heed of the gods might himself pay for his evil doing and that the sins of the father should not afterward be an evil for his children: that the children of an unjust father who do righteously, reverencing thine anger, who among their townsmen have loved justice from the beginning, should not pay for any transgression of their fathers. Would that this were well-pleasing to the gods: but now the doer escapes, and another afterwards bears the evil';[6] and again: 'O Zeus, I wonder at thee: thou art lord of all: . . . how can thy heart count the sinner and the unrighteous alike? . . . There is no sure sign given to men by the gods nor any certain way wherein one may walk and be well-pleasing to the gods. The sinners enjoy untroubled prosperity, while those who refrain their hearts from wickedness have poverty for their lot.'[7]

It must be emphasized that Theognis is not questioning the fact, nor is he impugning the justice of heaven, which indeed he is concerned to maintain—precisely as Jeremiah[8] makes the righteousness of God his justification for reasoning with Him:

'Righteous art thou, O Lord, when I plead with thee: yet would I reason the cause with thee: wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? wherefore are all they at ease that deal very treacherously?'

There in fact is the difficulty. If God is a just God, why does the sinner not pay for his sins immediately so that the anger of God should be unmistakably revealed? Why, if God is just, does the sinner sometimes escape punishment in this life altogether? If it be answered that God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, then God is again unjust, in that He visits the guilt of the sinner upon the innocent. From this dilemma there could be no escape without a new conception of the meaning of life—that is to say, a new conception of the destiny of the soul.

That new conception of the soul, which for convenience we may call the mystic or Orphic conception, profoundly influenced the Greek doctrine of sin from the 6th cent. onwards, and the remainder of this article is chiefly concerned to illustrate the traces of that influence to be found in Greek writers of the 5th and 4th centuries before Christ.[1]

5. **Pindar.**—The genesis of sin is in Pindar conceived on familiar lines. Great prosperity (*ὄλβος*) is a temptation or incentive to sin. The effect is likened to that of overfeeding: satiety (*κόρος*) breeds insolence (*ὕβρις*). When *ὕβρις* finds expression in action, it leads to woe (*ἄτη*).

Thus Ixion:

εὐμενέσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις
γλυκὺν ἑλὼν βίοτον, μακρὸν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλβον, μαινομέναις φρασὶν
Ἥρας ὅτ' ἐράσσατο, . . .
. . . ἀλλά νιν ὕβρις εἰς αὐάταν ὑπεράφανον
ὥρσεν.[2]

So Tantalos:

καταπέψαι
μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ' ἕλεν
ἄταν ὑπέροπλον.[3]

It may be noted that *κόρος* and *ὕβρις* come to have practically identical meanings, so that Hybris appears as mother of Koros,[4] thus reversing the Solon-Theognis version, which makes Hybris daughter of Koros.

No Greek poet lays more emphasis than Pindar does upon heredity.[5] And nowhere do we find the solidarity of the family, whether for weal or for woe, more vividly realized. The family is like a field which is fruitful or fallow in alternate generations.[6] The 'family fortune' is of great moment always.[7] Hence it is natural for Pindar to think of the destiny of a given generation as conditioned by the conduct of earlier generations—to conceive, in fact, the sin or the righteousness of the fathers being visited upon the children. But now, in several remarkable passages of Pindar, we have the nature and destiny of the soul presented in a light which alters the relative values of life and death. Unfortunately the fragmentary character of some of these passages makes their interpretation a matter of the utmost difficulty. Yet the general outlines seem sufficiently clear.

In frag. 131[8] we find a definite contrast between the destiny of the 'body (*σῶμα*) which followeth overmighty death' and the 'likeness of life' (*αἰῶνος εἴδωλον*) which 'remaineth yet alive: for it alone is from the gods. It sleepeth when the members are active, but to them that sleep in many a dream it revealeth the coming judgment for weal or woe.'

The soul, then, and the soul alone, is divine in its origin. It is a 'likeness of life,' that is to say, it is conceived as resembling the living man in such a way as to preserve its identity: it can be known among other souls as being the soul of such and such a person. It is a prisoner in the body, which hampers and impedes its activity. Its still small voice cannot be heard amid the thunder of fleshly energies; only in sleep, when these energies are hushed and stilled, it regains for a season its full efficiency. Life, this present life, is less a boon than a thorn: 'Man is well done with it soon as he's born.' Only by death can the temporary release of sleep become a permanent emancipation.

And, if one incarnation, why not many? It is an easy step to conceive the soul as undergoing a series of probationary incarnations, until it has again become worthy to be united with the divine, to return to heaven, which is its home. The

[1] For details the reader may be referred to the articles on MYSTERIES (Greek, etc.), NEO-PLATONISM, etc.

[1] Solon, frag. 12. [2] Theognis, 203 ff.
[3] Demosth. *Falsa Legatio*, 71.
[4] *Eth. Nic.* i. 10. 1100[a] 29: *ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἑπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν.*
[5] 2 S 24[17]. [6] 731 ff. [7] 373 ff. [8] 12[1].

[2] *Pyth.* ii. 25. [3] *Ol.* i. 55.
[4] *Ol.* xiii. 10 (cf. Oracle in Herod. viii. 77).
[5] *τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν* (*Ol.* ix. 100).
[6] *Nem.* vi. 8 ff., xi. 37 ff.
[7] *κρίνει συγγενὴς ἔργων περὶ πάντων* (*Nem.* v. 40; cf. *Pyth.* v 17; *Isth.* i. 40; *Nem.* iii. 40).
[8] Preserved by Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apollon.* ch. 35.

number and the nature of its incarnations must depend upon its previous conduct:

'From whomsoever Persephone accepts atonement of ancient sorrow, the souls of these she sends again in the ninth year into the upper sun: from these spring glorious kings, and men excellent in strength and mightiest in wisdom: who in future time are called by men holy heroes.'[1]

How, then, can the individual best assist the emancipation of his soul? In two ways: (1) he must endeavour to abstain from unrighteousness; (2) he must be initiated in the mysteries which not merely teach him what lies beyond, but actually show him the *φέγγος ἱερόν*,[2] the holy light, the light that never was on land or sea. Then he shall know that the same heaven from which the soul came at first shall also be her final home. He sees the light and whence it flows.

'Happy is he who has seen these things ere he goes beneath the earth: he knows that the end of life is with God, even as from God was its beginning.'[3]

What now is the bearing of this doctrine of the soul upon the conception of hereditary guilt? Pindar seems to answer this question in the *2nd Olympian*.

The victor whom he celebrates is Theron of Acrapas, who as one of the Emmenidai is a descendant of the sinful house of Laios, king of Thebes. Now, even from the time that Laios was slain by his fatal son (*μόριμος υἱός*), Fate (*Μοῖρα*) has so guided the family fortune, on the whole a happy fortune,[4] that together with heaven-sent prosperity they have also endured 'woeful reverse at other times.' But 'wealth adorned with deeds of excellence . . . is a most sure light,'[5] if the possessor 'knoweth that which is to be: that the helpless souls[6] of the dead pay the penalty immediately here, while the sins done in this realm of Zeus one judges under earth, pronouncing doom by hateful constraint.' 'But equally by night as by day'—the same emphasis and order as we have noted above—'the good receive a life more free from trouble,[7] vexing not the earth with the might of their hands nor the waters of the sea, in that ghostly life. But with the honoured of the gods, even those who rejoiced in keeping their oaths, they live a tearless life, while those others endure trouble beyond beholding. But whoso have endured unto three times on either side to refrain their souls utterly from iniquity, rise by the way of Zeus unto the tower of Kronos; where round the planets of the blest the ocean breezes blow, and flowers of gold are glowing,' etc.[8]

Thus God is not unjust: if He seems so, it is 'because we see not to the end.' Sin, in the end, must be punished. The sins of the fathers affect the destiny of the children. But it is not without hope that each generation travels. And the path which each must thus hopefully travel is the same—to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with their God.

6. Æschylus.—Æschylus is much occupied with the hereditary curse, as illustrated especially in the royal house of Atreus, in which one murder is avenged by a new murder, and the new murder by yet another, and so on, seemingly without end. At times the ineluctability of fate becomes overpowering.

'Taunt answers taunt, and things are hard to read. The spoiler is spoiled, the slayer pays, and it abides, as Zeus abides upon his throne, that he who does must suffer; for so it is ordained. Who shall cast forth from the house the bread of curses? The race is glued to woe.'[9]

Indeed, if punishment is viewed in its merely retributive aspect, and if we take short views of justice, there is no seeing where the process is to stop. The last sufferer must in any case be unavenged. It is only when she is weary of the unending play of tit-for-tat[1] that Klytemnestra is fain to conclude an amnesty with the *δαίμων*, or ancestral spirit, of the Pleisthenidai, upon the basis of the *status quo*.[2]

But the retributive aspect of sin is to Æschylus merely an incident in the larger motive, which is educative. He is never tired of insisting that the end of suffering is to teach men *σωφροσύνη*, which is precisely the antithesis of *ὕβρις*.

'It is good to learn wisdom by sorrow.'[3] 'Zeus who guides men to be wise, Zeus who hath established it as valid law that by suffering men shall learn.'[4]

We have seen that Pindar conceives the soul as most active in sleep. So the Psalmist[5] says: 'My reins instruct me in the night seasons.' So Æschylus conceives that it is in the watches of the night, when the bodily energies are hushed, that the still small voice of conscience is heard, or, as he expresses it in the physiological language of his time,

'There droppeth before the heart (*καρδία*) sad memory's pain, and wisdom (*σωφρονεῖν*) cometh to men against their will.'[6]

This he describes as a *δαιμόνων χάρις βιαίως*, a favour which the gods force upon men.[7] He conceives then that the gods 'will not that any should perish,' and, so conceiving, he rejects quite definitely the old notion that mere prosperity excites the anger and the vengeance of heaven. He proclaims his 'lonely faith' (*μονόφρων*) in memorable words:

'It is the impious deed that gives birth to other deeds after it in the likeness of its kind, but the house of the righteous is blessed in its children for ever.'[8]

Prosperity is doubtless a temptation; it is no less hard a task to 'thole'[9] prosperity than to 'thole' adversity. But the good man wins through. So the ancestral curse is not a compelling cause of crime; it may aid and abet,[10] but it does not render sin unavoidable or excuse the sinner.

Æschylus is familiar with the larger faith which regarded the present life as only the gateway to a fuller life beyond. Preoccupied as he was with the problem of sin and suffering, he dwells on the unseen world mostly as a place of retribution.

'The gods are not heedless of them whose hands are steeped in blood. The dark Erinyes *in time*, when a man has prospered without righteousness, with reversal of his life's lot make him dim, and when he is among the unseen there is no avail.'[11] 'Not even in the house of Hades when he dies shall he who doeth these things escape the guilt of his sin. There too, it is said, another Zeus judges among the dead men's sins in a last judgment.'[12]

7. Conclusion.—Here we must end our study. Henceforth the Greek doctrine of sin develops in two main directions. On the one hand, sin becomes identical with ignorance, righteousness with knowledge: *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός*.[13] And this, indeed, may not unfairly be described as the characteristically philosophic doctrine. Conceiving moral rightness as essentially a matter of right knowledge, they held it to be unthinkable that a man should know the better and yet deliberately choose the worse. And, if this theory proved manifestly out of harmony with the facts, as Aristotle says,[14] that was because right knowledge was wholly or temporarily obscured by vicious appetite, and none the less the ideal to be pursued was knowledge. It did not greatly trouble the philosopher that on this view the gates of heaven were barred to the general mass of toiling mortality and that no weight was given to the great non-intellectual virtues of patience and humility and charity, all

1 Frag. 133 (Plato, *Meno*, 81 B).
2 Aristoph. *Frogs*, 445.
3 Frag. 102. O. Kern in *ARW* xix. (1919) 2–3, p. 434, is mistaken in thinking that the *ἀρχά* here refers to 'die Wiedergeburt des Mysten aus dem Mutterschosse der Unterweltsgöttin,' as if a *vita nuova* which the *mystes* has attained by contact with the objects in the holy *cista*. 'Deshalb steht *ἀρχά* ausdrücklich hinter *τελευτά*.' But the position of *ἀρχά* is due to the natural emphasis—'the end is even as the beginning' (*cf. Pyth.* x. 10: *γλυκὺ δ' ἀνθρώποιν τέλος ἀρχά τε δαίμονος ὀρνύντος αὔξεται*, where the emphasis and the order are precisely the same).
4 *πατρώιον τὸν εὔφρονα πότμον* (65 f.).
5 *ἐτυμώτατον φέγγος* (101 f.).
6 *ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες* (105), *i.e.* those who have committed *ἀνήκεστα, ἀνίατα*, and are not yet redeemed.
7 *ἀπονέστερον* (110); they are not yet wholly emancipated.
8 *Ol.* ii. 58 ff. 9 *Agam.* 1537 ff.

1 *τύμμα τύμμασι τίσαι* (*Agam.* 1430).
2 *Ib.* 1534. 3 *Eumen.* 520. 4 *Agam.* 176 f.
5 167. 6 *Agam.* 178 ff. 7 *Ib.*
8 *Ib.* 737.
9 *φέρειν* is regular in the double sense.
10 *πατρόθεν δὲ συλλήπτωρ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐλάστωρ* (*Agam.* 1508).
11 *Ib.* 460 ff.
12 *Suppl.* 228 ff.; *cf.* 415; also *Eumen.* 267 ff., 335 ff.
13 Plato, *Timæus*, 86 D.
14 *Eth. Nic.* vii. ii. 2, 1145b 25.

that we sum up as 'otherworldliness.' But to others it seemed as if this doctrine could lead at best only to a practical or 'political' righteousness. If the soul is indeed a wanderer from God who is her home, if her final destiny is indeed reunion with God, then knowledge such as is attainable by ordinary means seemed insufficient. The finer spirits yearned, as Plato yearned, for an ὄχημα βεβαιότερον, a λόγος θεῖος, in which to make the voyage of life, in place of the poor raft (σχεδία) of merely 'human' knowledge.[1] If the soul alone is divine, if this tenement of clay be in truth a prison, as the mysteries taught, then man must wean the soul from association with the body, must accustom her to be, so far as is now possible, 'alone with herself,' must accustom her to contemplate the things beyond, so that, when she leaves the body and arrives there, she will not gape and be dizzy,[2] but will feel at home in her surroundings.[3] If it be only in moments of exaltation and ecstasy that the embodied spirit can obtain even a glimpse of disembodied felicity, the seeker after truth cries: ὦ Μανία, ξύλλαβε.[4] The foolishness of men may be wisdom with God.

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SIN (Hebrew and Jewish).—**1. Terms.**—We need not concern ourselves here with the numerous words denoting particular vices or with words of such wide significance as רַע, *ra'*, and its cognates (used for every variety of vice or misfortune, of moral or material evil). We confine ourselves to the ordinary, general words for 'sin.'

There is a group of terms from the root חטא—חַטָּא, חַטָּאָה, חַטָּאת, usually translated 'sin.' The verb is also used in the purely secular sense of 'missing one's way (or aim)' (Job 5[24], RV, Pr 8[36], RVm, Job 41[25] (Heb. 17), RV). פָּשַׁע and פֶּשַׁע are usually translated 'transgress,' 'transgression.' The verb is also used in the secular sense of 'rebel.' עָוֹן, *'āwōn*, אָוֶן, *'āwen*, and עָוֶל, *'awel*, are all translated 'iniquity.' The usage of similar roots in cognate languages suggests that *'āwōn* and *'awel* may have had originally the concrete sense of 'going astray.' The concrete sense of *'awen*, 'sorrow,' 'trouble,' is still in use in the OT. רָשַׁע, רֶשַׁע, and רִשְׁעָה are usually translated 'wicked,' 'wickedness.' The original meaning of the root is doubtful; but these words and the corresponding denominative verb are regularly used in the forensic sense of 'being guilty of a crime,' 'being in the wrong in a lawsuit' (Ex 23[1]). The use of these terms in the ethical and religious sense, 'wicked,' is an extension of the forensic usage. In LXX derivatives of *ḥṭ'* are rendered *inter alia* in various passages by ἀδικία, ἁμαρτία, ἀνομία, or the verbs, nouns, adjectives, etc., corresponding to these words. The same is true of derivatives of *p sh'* and of *r sh'*, and of the words *'āwōn*, *'āwen*, and *'awel* themselves, except that *'āwen* and *'awel* are not rendered by ἁμαρτία or its cognates. The derivatives of *ḥṭ'*, however, are usually rendered by ἁμαρτία and its cognates. *'Āwōn* is translated in roughly equal proportions by ἀδικία, etc., ἁμαρτία, etc., ἀνομία, etc., and seldom by anything else. *'Awel* is usually rendered by ἀδικία and, less frequently, ἀνομία. *'Awen*, on the other hand, is usually rendered by ἀνομία and, much less often, by ἀδικία, when understood in ethical and religious senses, otherwise by words denoting 'toil,' 'trouble,' etc. The derivatives of *p sh'* are rendered usually by either ἁμαρτία, etc., ἀδικία, etc., ἀνομία, etc., or ἀσέβεια, etc., or ἀθετέω. The derivatives of *r sh'* are most often rendered by ἀσεβής and its cognates, but also frequently by ἁμαρτωλός and cognates, occasionally by ἀδικία, etc. The Latin renderings of the Vg. are also very varied. The most common rendering for the *ḥṭ'* terms is *peccatum*; for *pesha'* and *'āwōn*, *iniquitas*, but sometimes *scelus* for *pesha'*; for *r sh'* terms, *impius*, etc. The Vg. renderings have been influenced by those of the LXX. It is noteworthy that *ḥēṭ'*, *ḥaṭṭā'āth*, *'āwōn*, and *pesha'* are, each of them, used alike for 'sin,' 'guilt,' and 'punishment,' and that *ḥaṭṭā'āth* and *pesha'* are also used for 'sin-offering.' Although the *ḥṭ'* terms are mostly used of sin against God, they occasionally denote wrong done to man; *'āwōn* and the *p sh'* terms are used of conduct, etc., either to God or to man.

A somewhat different feature is the frequent use in connexion with sin and sinners of *nābhāl*, *nebhālā*, EV 'fool,' 'folly,' LXX mostly ἄφρων, ἀφροσύνη, Vg. various; and other words of similar meaning.

Other terms for 'sin' peculiar to particular writers or periods will be noticed below.

2. General considerations suggested by the terminology.—We do not learn much from the etymology; it is often uncertain. When a word is fairly launched on its career, its meaning in actual usage is little influenced by its original etymology unless this is conspicuously obvious, and not always then. Sometimes, however, an original concrete usage persists side by side with the abstract sense derived from it, as in the cases of *'āwen*, and the roots *p sh'*, *r sh'*, and probably *ḥṭ'*. In these cases the concrete usage might continue to determine in some measure the sense of the abstract terms; *e.g.*, it would be tempting to suppose that the *ḥṭ'* words implied that sin was a futile blunder, the *p sh'* words that it was rebellion against God, and the *r sh'* words that the sinner put himself in the wrong, and to some extent this may have been the case. The fact that the LXX almost invariably renders the *ḥṭ'* words by ἁμαρτία and its cognates shows that these terms were regarded as specially denoting sin *qua* sin. Otherwise the facts in § 1 indicate that by the time the LXX was made there was no sense of any marked difference between the leading terms for sin.

It should be noticed that both the etymology and the LXX renderings indicate that sin was regarded as negative. Both *ḥṭ'* and ἁμαρτία are failure to reach an ideal standard—it is suggested that the *a* in ἁμαρτία, though aspirated, is privative. *R sh'* and ἀδικία are divergence from a legal standard. Both the *ḥṭ'* and the *r sh'* terms are contrasted with the צדק ('righteous') terms (Pr 10[2] 13[21]).[1] *P sh'* is rebellion against a lawful authority; *'āwōn* and *'awel* are divergence from the straight course; *'awen* is the absence of what is worthy or desirable.

Another feature is the use of the same terms for sin, guilt, punishment, and sin-offering. The usage arises out of a primitive psychology as to which it is dangerous to be dogmatic. It seems natural, however, to see in these facts an indication that sin was thought of as automatically including and working out its own fatal sequel. The terms might be extended to sin-offering as a kind of penalty. 'For the Jews sin is a power which brings ruin to sinners, because it is fundamentally identical with punishment.'[2] Sin is personified in the literature, which probably implies that it was sometimes popularly regarded as a person, a kind of evil deity. In Gn 4[7] sin (*ḥaṭṭā'th*) crouches like a wild beast lying in wait for its prey. Parallel to the familiar phrase *ne'um YHWH*, 'oracle of Jahweh,' we have in Ps 36[1] '*ne'um pesha'*,' 'oracle of sin.' In Zec 5[5ff.] wickedness (*rish'a*) appears as a woman.[3] In Sir 27[10] a lion lies in wait for prey as sin (ἁμαρτία) for evil-doers.

3. Primitive ideas.—Obviously many of the Israelite ideas as to sin were held by them in common with other peoples, especially other Semitic peoples. This is most of all the case in the earlier period, before the time of Amos, *c.* 750 B.C. In this period the ideas suggested by the etymology of the terms and their concrete use would be prominent—*e.g.*, that of sin as a power automatically working out punishment. Closely connected with this is the view that suffering and misfortune, especially exceptional misfortune, are indications that the sufferer has been guilty of heinous sin. Thus in 2 S 21[1] a grievous famine leads David to ask of what sin it is the punishment.

Further, we must bear in mind that the idea of sin in its earliest form is neither moral nor spiritual; sin is simply that of which the deity or deities disapprove. It is, indeed, often said that sin, at a primitive stage, is merely the violation of national or tribal custom.

[1] Cf. art. 'Righteousness' in *HDB* and *ERE*.

[2] R. Smend, *Lehrbuch der AT Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, 1893, p. 481; cf. p. 196 and W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 423.

[3] Cf. Is 64[6f.] (Heb. 5f.).

[1] *Phædo*, 85 D.
[2] *Gorgias*, 527 A.
[3] οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα (*Phædo*, 108 A).
[4] Aristoph. *Frogs*, 1345.

'In the earliest parts of the Old Testament, sin is almost invariably presented to us as nothing more than disobedience to the statutes regulating religious, social, and civil life in Israel, and a violation of the good customs in vogue among this people.'[1]

There is a large measure of truth in this view, but it is not inconsistent with what was said above. At this stage of religious development there is a very close organic connexion between deity and people; the customs and rules of national life are under religious sanction; they are the will of the deity. Men's ideas of sin depend upon their thoughts of God; for primitive peoples the deity has largely the character of an arbitrary, self-willed tyrant. There is no knowing what may please or anger Him, or what He may think fit to demand, what He may approve as piety, or what He may condemn as sin. Man may only discover that he has sinned through the punishment that crushes him.

Thus Moses is on his way to Egypt to fulfil the mission with which Jahweh has entrusted him; he is unconscious of anything that should rouse the divine anger against him. Yet Jahweh makes an onslaught on him and seeks to kill him, because he had not circumcised his son, although there is no previous command to circumcise in the document J, to which the passage belongs (Ex $4^{24ff.}$). David, when persecuted by Saul, thought it possible that, for some unknown reason, he had incurred the ill-will of Jahweh, that Jahweh had stirred up Saul against him, but might be appeased by a gift (1 S 26^{19}).[2]

Again, in the early period, the idea of sin is objective; sin consists in the performance or neglect of certain external acts.

'No occasion is taken to inquire more deeply into the nature of sin as affecting man's inner life.'[3] 'Sin is action antagonistic to God (*gottwidrige*) without any reference whatever to the question whether the actor is conscious of this quality of his action. A man does not become a sinner through the purpose of his act but through his objective doings.'[4]

The conditions of satisfactory relations with God are largely material and physical—various rites, regulations as to food and 'cleanness and uncleanness' generally, all sorts of tabus. Although most of the Levitical ordinances come to us from a later period, they probably represent very fairly the conditions of earlier times. This is implied, *inter alia*, by the prophetic denunciations of ritual. If we could compare the system of the Priestly Code with the practices in early Israel, the advantage would be with the Code. Thus the distinction with which we meet later between 'secret' sins, or 'errors' (שְׁגִיאוֹת), and 'presumptuous' sins (זֵדִים [Ps $19^{13f.}$]), or sins 'with a high hand' (Nu 15^{30})—*i.e.* between unconscious, unintentional sins and those which were conscious and deliberate—is, as we have seen in examples already referred to, ancient and primitive. The exact interpretation of ordinances as to ritual, etc., would often be known to the priests alone; moreover, the ordinances as to what was clean or unclean might easily be broken unwittingly.

In early times the principle of the solidarity of the family, tribe, or nation was strongly held; guilt attached to the kindred and fellow-tribesmen of an offender—as in the case of Achan (Jos $7^{1.\ 24f.}$) and of Saul and the Gibeonites (2 S 21). The guilt of fathers and ancestors attaches to children and descendants.

The punishment of sin may involve the death of the offender—*e.g.*, the sons of Eli (1 S 2^{34})—or some minor misfortune, as in the case of David (2 S $12^{13f.}$). Sacrifice (*q.v.*) played a large part in establishing, maintaining, and restoring right relations between God and man, but the cancelling of sin might also be effected by a suitable punishment, and partly by the spontaneous forgiveness of God.[1]

Moreover, in early times, religion was largely a matter of the tribe or nation; accordingly, as the nation incurred divine displeasure through the sin of one of its members, it could also be purged of guilt by his punishment—*e.g.*, the incident of Achan.

It is natural to see in the story of the Fall (Gn 3) an account of the origin of sin, but sin is present in the serpent before it arises in Adam and Eve; the story rather gives the first sin as the origin of suffering. The first sin is typical of the primitive idea: it is an external act, the violation of an arbitrary command. Moreover, the story of the Fall was probably borrowed from a non-Israelite source, though no very close parallel to it has yet been found. It does not seem to have had much influence on early Israelite thought, which does not assert the corruption of human nature or the alienation from God that NT and later theology attribute to the Fall.[2]

The question as to what in the way of commission or omission was reckoned sin is too large to be dealt with here; it rather belongs to OT ethics.

'This ethical ideal of the ancient Israelites is far from perfect. The patriarchs use deception toward the stranger, as if it were a lawful practice. Polygamy is not considered an evil, nor intemperance in eating and drinking a vice. Great licence in morals is tolerated. Barbarity is practised in war, and generally towards adversaries, as the case of David himself proves. Suicide does not appear culpable.'[3]

4. **The period from c. 750 B.C. to c. 586 B.C., with special reference to the prophets of the 8th cent., to Deuteronomy, and to Jeremiah and (in part) Ezekiel.** — The various ideas as to sin already mentioned persisted in this period; and in cases where nothing is said about them in this section it may be understood that they were held by the prophets, etc., of this period.

Probably there is little in the prophets that was absolutely new; even ideas which appear for the first time in the literature of this period may not have been new to the hearers of the prophets. The most important novelty was a change of emphasis arising out of an advance in the doctrine of God. Sin is still that which God disapproves, but the ethical nature of God is much more clearly and fully held. He is no longer concerned chiefly with material gifts and external homage—the strict observance of the etiquette of His divine court. He desires sincere loyalty and heartfelt affection from His people. He is concerned for their material, moral, and spiritual well-being, and desires that His worshippers should further His purposes by mutual goodwill and beneficence. This is summed up in Hos 6^6: 'I will have benevolence (*hesedh*) rather than sacrifice, and the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings.' Sin has now come to mean failure as to these matters. The prophets may not actually condemn ritual, but, if they do not, they regard it as altogether subordinate. One cardinal sin is social wrong-doing, the corrupt administration of justice, the exploiting of the resources of the community in the interests of a privileged few (Am $2^{6f.}$, Hos 4^1, Is 1^{10-17}, Mic $2^{2.\ 8f.}$). Deut., indeed, has regulations as to ritual, clean and unclean things, etc., but its main interest is to provide for the needs of the poor.

Hosea's phrase, 'the knowledge of God' ($4^{1.\ 6}$ 6^6; cf. Is 5^{13}), includes what we should call fellowship and religious experience; the primitive view, as we have seen, held that sin arose from the ignorance of external ritual. Hosea and Isaiah

[1] H. Schultz, *OT Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, ii. 281.
[2] Cf. the episodes of the Gibeonites and of the census (2 S 21, 24).
[3] Schultz, *loc. cit.*
[4] Cf. Smend, p. 106 f., and W. Staerk, *Sünde und Gnade*, p. 25: 'The conception of sin in older Judaism was very external and lax.'

[1] Cf. again David, in 2 S $12^{13f.}$.
[2] Cf. K. Marti, *Gesch. der israelit. Religion*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 198 ff.
[3] C. Piepenbring, *Theology of the OT*, Eng. tr., New York, 1893, p. 36.

hold that sin arises from ignorance of the character of God and His ethical demands. Isaiah uses the old ritualistic language and speaks of that which is unclean (*ṭāmē'*) as sin, but the term is no longer merely physical, and now denotes what is morally and spiritually unsatisfactory. He also emphasizes the idea that sin is rebellion against God (1[2-4]).[1]

As regards punishment, these prophets are concerned chiefly with the judgment on the nation, though occasionally they deal with specific individuals (Am 7[17], Hos 1–3, unless those chapters are entirely figurative [Is 22[22ff.]]). Isaiah also discriminates between classes within the nation: it is well with the righteous, but woe to the wicked (3[10]); the nation is doomed, but a remnant will escape (10[20]).

These prophets are for the most part so absorbed in the guilt and punishment of Israel that they mostly say nothing as to forgiveness or treat it as impossible (Jer 13[23]). The great exception is Hosea; according to him, Jahweh pleads with His people to repent, and offers them a free forgiveness (11[8f.]). There is no reference to sacrifice or any ritual conditions of forgiveness.

Ezk 18 repudiates the doctrine that children suffer for the sins of their parents.[2] Both Jeremiah and Ezekiel insist on the total and universal depravity of their fellow-countrymen in their own time, and Ezekiel extends this to Israel throughout its history (Jer 5[1-5] 8[6], Ezk 16, 20).

These prophets also deal with the sins of Gentile nations. We have already mentioned the emphasis which they laid on social wrong-doing; they also denounce idolatry and other superstitions, whether connected with the worship of Jahweh or with that of foreign deities.

5. **Exilic and post-Exilic Judaism.**—*(a) Biblical, together with the Wisdom literature of the Apocrypha (in part).*—The Priestly Code and the later prophets are by no means indifferent to the ethical and spiritual aspects of sin, but we find in this literature a special interest in sins against the ritual laws (Ezk 40–48, Hag 1[9], Zec 6[13] 14[16-21], Jl 1[9], Mal 1[8] 3[3-10]).

It is often said that the special attention given to sin-offerings in the Priestly Code is due to the deepened sense of sin in this period, but this is doubtful. In all times the idea that sacrifice atoned for sin was common; what was new in the Priestly Code was the limitation of atoning value to special sacrifices and of the efficacy of these sacrifices to sins that were not conscious or deliberate (Lv 5).

The sense of sin, of the unhappy alienation from God arising out of sin, together with the feeling of penitence, finds fuller expression in the confessions and aspirations of the Psalter, etc., than in the earlier literature—*e.g.*, Ps 51, Neh 1. On the other hand, some of the Psalms breathe a spirit of self-righteousness which seems to argue a defective sense of sin (Ps 18[20-24]). Probably, however, in such passages the writer is thinking of Israel as the loyal servant of Jahweh, in contrast to the idolatrous heathen, and is not claiming absolute righteousness for himself.

The literature of this period shows in many ways a raising of the moral and spiritual standard. A comparison of the narratives in the Priestly Code and in Chronicles with the corresponding narratives in the earlier literature, J, E, Samuel, Kings, shows that after the Exile the Jews regarded as sinful much that was not condemned in earlier times; *e.g.*, 1 K 11[1-8] does not seem to see anything amiss in the populousness of Solomon's harem; what was wrong was that many of the women were foreigners; but the Chronicler has suppressed this account of the harem; as far as he is concerned, one might suppose that Solomon had only one wife, Pharaoh's daughter. A high ethical standard is set in Ezk 18, Job 29, 31.

The universality of sin is asserted (Ps 14, Pr 20[9]), though Ezk 14[14] suggests that exceptionally righteous men, like Noah, Daniel, and Job, might be saved by their own righteousness.[1]

The OT does not develop any formal doctrine of the origin of sin, but explains sins variously according to the circumstances of individual cases. Human nature is such that man sins through the influence of different motives and causes—the pride engendered by prosperity, the distress arising from poverty (Pr 30[9]), indolence (26[13ff.]), lust (27[20]), persuasion by men (1[10]), etc. Sometimes, indeed, God Himself is spoken of as causing men to sin (Is 44[18] 63[17], Ezk 20[25]); but probably this is a rhetorical way of saying that God has ordained that indulgence in sin should make men more prone to sin—to put the idea in modern terms. Whether there is any real difference between the two forms of expression may be doubtful.

The literature of this period is much occupied with the relation between sin and suffering. In Dt 30, etc., Ezk 18, etc., Ps 1, etc., the doctrine is taught that a man's external circumstances correspond to his character and conduct: the righteous prospers, the sinner is unfortunate; accordingly, suffering and misfortune are indications of sin. Many of the Psalms suggest that suffering had awakened a sense of guilt in the writers—*e.g.*, 32[4f.], 119[67]. On the other hand, the book of Job, Ps 73, 37, etc., repudiate the view of close correspondence between a man's conduct and his external fortunes. Isaiah 53 represents the sufferings of the righteous as providing salvation for sinners, and as borne willingly—teaching on a much higher level than the old idea that the guilt of the sinner was shared by his kin and his fellow-countrymen, but yet in a way a development from it, involving the principle of the vicarious efficacy of suffering.

It is a natural characteristic of the Wisdom literature that it should lay stress on the moral and spiritual value of 'wisdom,' and speak of sin as 'folly.'[2]

(b) Apocrypha (in part) and Apocalyptic literature.—In spite of Job, the doctrine of inherited guilt persisted; Tobit prays that he may not be punished for the sins of his fathers.[3]

As regards the origin and causes of sin, there is as little formal theory and as great a variety of treatment as in the literature dealt with in the last section. Sin is due to the wilfulness and evil self-will of man (Sir 15[11-20], a passage which expressly controverts the teaching found elsewhere [2 Es 3[20]], that it is due to God); it is an inheritance from Eve (Sir 25[24]), from Adam (2 Es 3[21-26]—a suggestion of the doctrine of original sin; it is due to fallen angels and demons (*En.* 9[6] 15[11]); the wide-spread belief in demoniac possession inevitably led to the ascription of much wrong-doing to this cause. The idea of the tendency to sin being inherited from Adam—*i.e.* of original sin (2 Es 4[30]) as distinguished from the later Augustinian doctrine, which is really one of original guilt—regards this inborn tendency as the cause of sin, and inclines to limit the responsibility of the individual. On the other hand, the doctrine of transmigration (Wis 8[19f.]) maintains responsibility, even though the tendency to sin is held to be inborn.

As to its nature, sin is still regarded as rebellion against God (Wis 3[10]), as that which is contrary to the will of God; since God had made known His

[1] Cf. Smend, p. 206; O. C. Whitehouse, *Isaiah I.–XXXIX.* (*Century Bible*), Edinburgh, 1905, p. 56.
[2] Cf. Jer 31[29f.], but, on the other hand, see 15[4].

[1] Cf. Schultz, ii. 295 *f.*
[2] See Prov., Ec., Wis., Sir., etc., *passim*; cf. also above § 1.
[3] To 3[3-5]; cf. 13[5], Jth 7[28], Dn 9[4ff.], Bar 1[15–3[8].

will to the Jews in the Pentateuchal law, sin for them consisted largely in breaking that law (Sir., Prologue, 41^3 49^4, Mac., *passim*). Wisdom, following Hosea on the one hand and Plato on the other, sees salvation in wisdom (9^{18}) and sin in ignorance and folly ($2^{21f.}$ 3^{11} 5^{4-6}). The Apocalyptic literature, again, implies that a special sinfulness attaches to men of power and wealth, kings, nobles, princes (*En.* 38^5 54^2 67^{8-13} 94^8).

The idea of the universality of sin is found in 2 Es 3 7^{46-56} 8^{35}:

'For in truth there is no man among them that be born, but he hath dealt wickedly.' In 3^{35}, however, there is a qualification: 'Thou shalt find that men who may be reckoned by name have kept thy precepts, but nations thou shalt not find.'

Similarly, in the Prayer of Manasses:

'Thou therefore, O Lord, that art the God of the just, hast not appointed repentance to the just, as to Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, which have not sinned against thee.'

Further, we find frequently in Sir. (*e.g.*, 7^{16} 8^{10}) the contrast between 'sinner' and 'righteous' which is common in Psalms and Proverbs, implying that, however universal sin may be, practically men differ so much in this respect that some may be styled righteous and others sinners. But a closer investigation shows that the distinction is often what we should call sectarian rather than moral or spiritual: the professed worshipper of Jahweh is righteous; others are sinners. Sin becomes merely the lack of external adherence to certain sectarian views and practices.

The growing belief during this period in a future life, in resurrection, and in a judgment after death gave a larger importance to the consequences of sin, extended its punishment to an indefinite period, if not to eternity, and invested it with all the terrors of supernatural torture (Jth 16^{17}, 2 *En.* 10^6, 4 Mac 12^{12}).

By this time sin was largely regarded as concerning the individual, but the idea of national sin, sometimes arising from wrong-doing by only a part of the people, still survives (*Ps. Sol.* 2).

According to 4 Mac 5^{20}, all transgressions of the law, whether small or great, are equally sinful; but *Jub.* $7^{21f.}$ mentions three sins as the special cause of the Flood: fornication, uncleanness, and all iniquity; there is a general tendency in this literature to lay special stress on sexual sins. This may be seen in the various lists of vices and crimes which summarize the ethical position (Wis 14^{25}, *Gr. Bar.* 8, 13, *Test. Jud.* 16–19; cf. *Test. Reub.* 3).

6. Pharisaic, Sadducaic, and Rabbinic Judaism.—It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that Orthodox Judaism, at all times and even now, has laid undue stress on external observances; sin has largely consisted in the neglect or breaking of external laws, often concerned with matters of mere ritual. Witness the supreme importance attached to the Pentateuch and the Talmud, and the extent to which these, especially the latter, are preoccupied with the details of the ceremonial law. Naturally this tendency is exaggerated among the less advanced Jewish communities—*e.g.*, in Russia and Poland. Yet such a tendency is not necessarily incompatible with a high morality; there is an advanced ethical standard in the law and the Talmud, if only it can maintain itself side by side with zeal for ritual. Moreover, these works do not ignore the inner and spiritual side of religion. C. G. Montefiore is justified in saying:

'The Law was not a mere external law, fulfilled from fear of punishment and for hope of reward. It was the Law of the all-wise and all-righteous God, given to Israel as a sign of supremest grace. It was a token of divine affection, and in its fulfilment was the highest human joy.'[1]

This statement could be supported by quotations from Jewish writers of every period. Thus

[1] *The Synoptic Gospels*, London, 1899, ii. 503.

I. Abrahams tells us, 'Sin is uncleanness.'[1] Doubtless physical, ceremonial uncleanness was often thought of as sin; but, on the other hand, uncleanness is often a figure for spiritual corruption. There is a similar combination of the ritual and ethical in *Ábhôth*, v. 10 f., which names as the seven main transgressions neglect in the matter of tithes, of the offering of the dough-cake, and of the seventh-years fruits; corrupt administration of justice; profanation of the NAME; idolatry; incest; murder; and failure to observe the Sabbatical year. Heretical exegesis of the Pentateuch is apparently included under the corrupt administration of justice. Again, we find in *Ábhôth*, iv. 5, the pregnant saying:

'The reward of precept is precept, and the reward of transgression is transgression.'

So far we have been speaking of orthodox Judaism; such sects as the Ḥasidim and the various bodies of Reformed Jews lay less emphasis on the ritual law and more on the ethical and spiritual features of Judaism.

As regards the origin and causes of sin, later Judaism has inevitably been influenced by general speculative thought. Already in Job 9 f. it is suggested that God is responsible for injustice and wrong-doing. Later writers are often occupied with the problems which we connect with the terms 'free will' and 'divine sovereignty.'

According to Josephus, the Sadducees emphasized man's control over his actions: 'God is not concerned in our doing or not doing what is evil . . . to act what is good or evil is at men's own choice.'[2] The Essenes, on the other hand, asserted that 'fate governs all things,'[3] or that 'all things are best ascribed to God.'[4] The Pharisees occupied an intermediate position; thus, 'when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament (κρᾶσις, rather 'combination') whereby what He wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously.'[5] Or, as *Ábhôth*, iii. 24, puts it: 'Everything is foreseen (יִדְעָה), and freewill (רְשׁוּת) is given. And the world is judged by grace; and everything is according to work.'[6]

Later Judaism, with the exception of a measure of antinomianism in some of the Jewish mystics, has always asserted responsibility and ethical obligation, but there has also been a tendency to lay some of the responsibility for human sin upon God. Sin is partly due to the *Yeṣer hara'*, יֵצֶר הָרַע, the evil nature in man; and this was implanted in him by God. The phrase is often rendered 'evil impulse' (or 'tendency'), and this is according to its usage.

'The extraordinary thing about this theory of the origin of sin is that, in the last instance, God is the cause of Sin; for, as Creator of all things, He created the *Yetser hara'* in Adam, the existence of which made the Fall possible (*Bereshith rabbah*, c. 27). . . . The Almighty is made to say: . . . "It repenteth me that I created the *Yetser hara'* in man, for had I not done this he would not have rebelled against me (*Yalkut Shim. Beresh.* 61)."'[7]

A similar view was held by Baalshem, the founder of the Ḥasidim: 'We should thus regard all things in the light of so many manifestations of the Divinity.'[8] In the Kabbala, too, God is the author of evil, seeing that He created both the just and the unjust, and formed man of a spirit of good and a spirit of evil.[9] Such teaching implies the universality of sin; the Talmudic statement that children of a year old are free from sin need not be taken literally.[10]

As Abrahams tells us, 'Rabbinic Judaism took over from the Old Testament a belief that disease was a consequence of sin.'[11]

Both Philo and the Rabbis follow the OT in teaching that God's desire to forgive and the divine provision for forgiveness anticipate and stimulate

[1] *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Cambridge, 1917, p 41.
[2] *BJ* II. viii. 14.
[3] *Ant.* XIII. v. 9.
[4] *Ib.* XVIII. i. 5.
[5] *Ib.* XVIII. i. 3.
[6] Cf. Ph 2^{12}.
[7] W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], p. 268.
[8] S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, p. 27.
[9] A. E. Waite, *The Secret Doctrine in Israel*, London, 1913, p. 81.
[10] *Yôma*, 22*b*, *ap.* Abrahams, p. 119.
[11] Abrahams, p. 108.

man's repentance.[1] The conditions of forgiveness are confession, repentance, amendment or good works. Since the final destruction of the Temple there has been no question of sacrifice, but to some extent, especially with the less enlightened, the ceremonies of the Day of Atonement have been credited with atoning value.[2] On the other hand, the prayers for forgiveness in the liturgy of the Day of Atonement illustrate the ethical and spiritual character of the Jewish doctrine of sin.

LITERATURE.—The relevant articles and sections in Dictionaries of the Bible and *JE*; the relevant sections in treatises on the theology of the OT and on Jewish theology; the art. 'Righteousness' in *ERE* and *HDB*; also F. Bennewitz, *Die Sünde im alten Israel*, Leipzig, 1907; C. Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, Göttingen, 1897; J. Herrmann, *Die Idee der Sühne im Alten Testament*, Leipzig, 1905; J. Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade im relig. Leben des Volkes Israel*, Munich, 1905; W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Jewish Doctrine of Mediation*, London, 1910; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], do. 1911; S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, do. 1896; W. Staerk, *Sünde und Gnade nach der Vorstellung des alten Judenthums*, Tübingen, 1905.

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SIN (Hindu).—1. Vedic.—As in the *Rigveda* is found the most developed expression in Vedic literature of the concept of righteousness, so that *Saṁhitā* contains the most elevated expression of the sense of sin and the desire to be set free from it. Varuṇa is the god to whom the sinner addresses himself, as Varuṇa is the god who is omniscient, and who of himself or by his spies knows the thoughts of men. In the hymn VII. lxxxvi. the poet with unusual earnestness asserts his anxiety to be at peace with Varuṇa, of whose anger with him he is convinced by the testimony of his friends. He assures the god that the sin which he has committed, whether his own or inherited from his father, is not deliberate; heedlessness, drunkenness, dicing, passion, and thoughtlessness are pleaded as excuses; even sleep may produce wrong-doing, and the older may be involved in the sin of the younger. The god is therefore invoked to set free the sinner from his bonds, as the calf is released from the rope which fetters it. The hymn itself does not reveal the cause of the poet's appeal, and it is most probable that the sense of sin must be considered to have been brought home to him by disease, as is admitted freely in the later hymn VII. lxxxix., but even on this assumption the hymn is not without moral value. It confesses sin, even if it seeks to explain it; it assumes the justice of the divine anger, which it seeks to remove by supplication, probably accompanied by offering, though the hymn does not expressly say so. On the other hand, it is impossible to find in it any great depth of moral feeling, and it is certainly unnecessary to see in it proof of the influence of Semitic religion on early Indian belief.[3]

Beside this comparatively elevated conception of sin as an offence against the divine majesty there appears, freely enough in the *Rigveda* and predominantly in the *Atharvaveda*, the more primitive conception of sin as a pollution which can be removed by physical means. It is not difficult to trace remains of this earlier view in the hymns to Varuṇa: from VII. lxxxix. it is plain that the sinner was afflicted by dropsy, and the watery nature of the disease can hardly have failed to suggest connexion with Varuṇa, who is even in the *Rigveda* closely connected with the waters. Nor is it unlikely that Varuṇa's power to loosen the bonds of sin is derived ultimately from the cleansing power of the waters. In another hymn the waters themselves as goddesses[4] are entreated to carry away the sin and untruth of the poet. So Agni is asked to loosen the bonds of the sinner,[1] for fire by itself is potent to destroy, by burning, evil. In place of the more complicated conception of fetters imposed by a god, the sin itself is regarded as the fetter.[2] The same conception of sin as a kind of disease is implicit in the view of inherited sin or sin which comes from contagion: sin can be obtained not merely from the father, but from the mother and other close kindred.[3] In other cases the kinship of sin to a pollution is more evident: the black bird, the harbinger of Nirṛti, the goddess of misfortune, by its excrement creates guilt on the person affected; the wailing of the women in the house of the dead creates a pollution on the kin; the lowing of the victim at the sacrifice lays on the sacrificer the burden of a sin which he must expiate.[4] Even the sins of other men may pass over to a guiltless man,[5] and in this category perhaps must be reckoned the mysterious sins caused by the gods which appear in the *Yajurveda*.[6] Sin, therefore, it is legitimate to suppose, was to the Vedic Indian primarily the actual pollution of disease present in his body, and only by a gradual process of moral development was the disease interpreted as the punishment inflicted for an act, or thought, or word, displeasing to gods who exacted obedience to moral laws.

In the methods prescribed for the removal of sin, of which the later *Saṁhitās* give full details, the material character of sin and its spiritual nature are constantly recognized in close union. The former aspect is prominent in the simple process of sin-transfer, which is one mode of removing guilt: the gods themselves set the example by transferring the guilt of the blood of the sacrifice to one man after another until it rested finally with the slayer of an embryo, the most guilty of sinners.[7] So a man seeks to transfer his own sins to others.[8] At the end of the *aśvamedha* the sins of the sacrificer are removed by an offering made on the head of a bald repulsive-looking man who stands in the water of the concluding bath; this man at the end of the whole rite is driven away into the forest, bearing with him the sins of the village out-castes.[9] Another version[10] attributes to the water of the bath, after the sacrificer has bathed in it, the power to drive away sin from those who have offended, although they themselves have taken no part in the sacrifice. Even more elaborate is the scheme of the *varuṇapraghāsas*,[11] one of the four-monthly sacrifices. The wife of the householder is enjoined to confess to the priest what lovers she has had, the declaration serving as a mode of expiation; cakes in platter form are baked, one for each member of the household, and offered in the fire, thus removing the sins of the members of the house, which are deemed to be transferred to the cakes; the ceremony is closed by a bath in which husband and wife wash each other, clearly as a species of purification, while the moral side is brought out in a prayer to Varuṇa for forgiveness for any sin committed by the sacrificer and his household, in public or in private. In the ritual of the *soma*-sacrifice there is a curious rite: the priest offers in the fire splinters of the post to which the animal victim has been tied, and with each he utters a formula asking remission

1 Abrahams, § xix.
2 Cf. art. SACRIFICE (Jewish).
3 As suggested by H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 195, n. 1.
4 I. xxiii. 22.
1 V. ii. 7.
2 I. xxiv. 9, VI. lxiv. 3.
3 *Atharvaveda*, V. xxx. 4, VI. cxvi. 3, X. iii. 8.
4 *Ib.* VII. lxiv., XIV. ii. 59 f.; *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, III. i. 4. 3.
5 *Rigveda*, II. xxviii. 9, VI. ii. 7.
6 *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, iii. 48, viii. 13; *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, III. ii. 5. 7.
7 *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, IV. i. 9.
8 *Rigveda*, X. xxxvi. 9.
9 *Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, XVI. xviii.; A. B. Keith, *JRAS*, 1908, p. 845 ff.
10 *Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, XX. viii. 17 f.
11 See A. Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur* (=*GIAP* iii. 2) Strassburg, 1897, p. 114 f.

of the sin which has emanated from the gods, from men, from the fathers, and from one's self.[1] But cases occur also in which an ordinary sacrifice is offered to remove sin, without recourse to magic, such as the expiation of a false oath by an offering to Agni Vaiśvānara prescribed in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*.[2]

This external view of sin, which clearly was the most prevalent in Vedic thought, explains the failure to rise to any distinction between neglect of ceremonial duties, natural defects, and real offences against the moral law. The only difference which is ever recognized in the texts of this period is in the relative gravity of crimes: in the *Yajurveda*[3] we find a list (varying in detail in the different *Saṁhitās*) which exhibits a scale of offenders ascending in heinousness, from the man who has allowed the sun to rise before he has performed a ritual duty, or to set before he has completed such a duty, through the man with black teeth or bad nails, the man who has married before his elder brother and the latter (ranked, however, as the more guilty), the slayer of a man, and the slayer of a Brāhman, to the slayer of an embryo. In accord with this the *Gṛhya* and *Dharmasūtras* reveal no trace of distinction between ceremonial and moral duties, though they differ for the better from the ritual of the Avesta by observing, as a rule, some degree of moderation in the penalties which they impose on sins of either kind. Naturally the tendency to invent remedies for every form of sin was developed by the priest, who found profit in these performances, and already in the Vedic period in such works as the *Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa* appears a literature of *prāyaśchitta* rites intended to avert the evil consequences of error, moral, social, and ritual, by processes which in the main are those of magic, eked out with prayers and confession of fault.

It would be natural to expect to find in the *Upaniṣads*, which on the whole represent a decided reaction against the ritualism of the *Brāhmaṇas*, a careful examination of the real nature of sin and a distinction between ceremonial and morality. But the outlook of the *Upaniṣads* is almost wholly intellectual; the problem of conduct is not raised as the starting-point of discussion and inquiry, which is instead the question of the relation between the individual and the absolute, and the fundamental doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, which merges the individual at death in the absolute, renders it difficult to find a place for considerations of moral action in the seeker of true knowledge with its resulting release from the bonds of transmigration. In contrast to knowledge, all action is of inferior worth, since it leads to rebirth. To the older view, which rewarded good deeds with heaven and punished evil with hell, there is now added the doctrine that all actions lead to their deserved fruits in the form of rebirth on earth, with or without an interval; but the moral value of this principle is greatly diminished, not merely by the fact that all action is ultimately regarded as evil, but also inasmuch as no criterion is proposed by which a man may discriminate between acts good and evil, the distinction being left to the ordinary views of men. Moreover, there does appear, though in an isolated passage,[4] the dangerous and immoral doctrine that the most evil deeds are annulled by the possession of true knowledge.

2. Post-Vedic.—In its attitude to sin Jainism is a faithful exponent of the prevailing view among the ascetics of the Brāhman community at the time when the system of Mahāvīra took definite shape. The ideal aimed at by the ascetic is to suppress all natural desire, and to Mahāvīra belongs the distinction of carrying the principle to its most complete extent. Such a doctrine, however, clearly precludes in theory the development of a sound ethical system, since it rests on the twofold basis of pure egoism and of a conception of the Ego which regards all its desires as evil and its true aim as the negation of all earthly interests. Thus Jainism has accumulated an extraordinary system of complicated restrictions, violation of any of which is a sin to be expiated; these restrictions so cover the field of human action that a layman bent on following the path of salvation must not practise agriculture or make a living by military service, a trade, crafts, teaching, singing, or music; and the avoidance of taking insect life is carried to an excess which is burdensome and irrational. But Jainism avoids the possibility inherent in the view of the *Upaniṣads* which allows knowledge to outweigh sin; its restrictions on conduct are an essential part of the system, and obedience to them is an integral element of the effort to attain enlightenment and freedom from transmigration.

In early Hinduism, as expressed in the *Mahābhārata* and the earlier *Dharmaśāstras*, such as those of Manu and Yājñavalkya, the principle is accepted that each deed brings its recompense, sometimes on earth, but more normally in a future birth; but no effort is made to set out a rationale for the distinction between meritorious and evil acts. Nor is the doctrine of *karma* without exception; there are traces of the old belief in sin-transfer: the evil king must bear responsibility for the sins of his subjects;[1] the priestly guest who meets with scant hospitality transfers to his host his evil *karma*.[2] More important is the doctrine of the effects of parental sin: it is expressly asserted that a deed may not bear fruit at once, but may defer its effect until it bears fruit in a son, grandson, or other descendant,[3] and a modification of this idea ascribes to the child a character derived from father or mother or both.[4] A wife too absorbs *karma* from her husband, and does not stand necessarily on her own merits—a doctrine expressly asserted in the *Rāmāyaṇa*[5] and implied in Manu.[6] Moreover, the epic mentions cases where the justice of the rule of retribution is assailed. Thus Kṛṣṇā asserts[7] that her misfortunes are due to the grace (*prasāda*) of the creator, who has thus recompensed an error against the gods committed by her in childhood, in a way clearly out of all proportion to the sin, while the sage Māṇḍavya[8] is so incensed by the action of Dharma, the personification of justice, in causing him to be impaled by the king as retribution for his ill-treatment of an insect in his childish days that he curses Dharma to be reborn as a Śūdra. In strict accord with this imperfectly ethical view of sin is the multitude of means by which it can be atoned for. All the sin of a king's conquest of the earth can be wiped out by sacrifices, if accompanied by large gifts to the priests such as cows and villages; and presents to a sacred bull expiate a king's breach of his oath.[9] Confession and penance avail to remove sins, even intentional crimes, but the same effect is accomplished even more simply by gifts to the priest and resort to places of pilgrimage.[10]

A further conception of the destruction of sin is

[1] W. Caland and V. Henry, *L'Agniṣṭoma*, Paris, 1905–07, ii. 388.
[2] ii. 6. 2.
[3] See B. Delbrück, *Die indogermanischen Verwandtschaftsnamen*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 200 ff.
[4] *Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad*, iii. 1.

[1] *Manu*, viii. 304, 308.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 100.
[3] *Mahābhārata*, xii. cxxxix. 22, i. lxxx. 2 f.
[4] *Ib.* xiii. xlviii. 42 f.
[5] ii. xxvii. 4 f.
[6] v. 166, ix. 29.
[7] *Mahābhārata*, iv. xx. 7 ff.
[8] *Ib.* i. cvii. f.
[9] *Ib.* iii. xxxiii. 78 f., xxxv. 34, ii. 57
[10] *Manu*, xi. 146, 228, 240 f.

developed in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), from which it passes over into the sectarian religions as a common property. The *Gītā* in effect enunciates the doctrine that the grace (*prasāda*) of the lord, coupled with the antecedent loving faith (*bhakti*) of the devotee, has power to cancel the results of actions committed in a previous birth. This doctrine attained favour through Rāmānuja (11th cent. A.D.), but he left the question of the exact relation between the devotion of the worshipper and the grace of god to become the basis of the distinction between the Tengalai sect and the Vadagalais. To the latter the process must begin with the act of the man who seeks liberation, while the former make grace proceed spontaneously from the god. The latter view is clearly the more common opinion of the sectarian cults generally, but, even when effort is demanded from the devotee, in no case is there an attempt to devise a moral code binding on the devotee as an essential preliminary to the exercise of grace, and the doctrine of grace in effect overthrows the whole rationale of the *karma* theory, without substituting for it any basis of a moral system.

The defect in the religious systems is not remedied by the philosophies, which in their intellectualism approach the doctrine of the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, that knowledge avails to counterbalance any and every crime. To Śaṅkara the recognition of the identity of the self with the absolute and the unreality of the whole empirical universe from the Īśvara downwards is essentially an action which cannot be explained by causal categories above which it stands, and all action alike, good or bad, is therefore in no essential relation to this knowledge. The empirical world remains, indeed, and Śaṅkara accepts it fully as real for conventional purposes, but the fact that its reality was conventional was doubtless sufficient to prevent him from seeking to examine the nature of moral judgments as actually formed by men. The other systems were equally indifferent to questions of conduct.[1]

The result of this negative attitude on the part of religion and philosophy alike can be clearly seen in the later Hinduism of the *Purāṇas* and the law digests which devote their energies to multiplying the number of sins, ceremonial, social, and moral, between which they make no distinction, but at the same time regard all these offences, of whatever degree, as capable of expiation by *prāyaścittas*, of which doubtless the most important point was often the profit to be derived by the priest by whom the penance was enjoined and under whose direction it was carried out, or by the saving grace of a sectarian deity whose favour can be won by acts of pilgrimage or devotion of purely formal character—doctrines wholly incompatible with the development of any deep moral sense of the heinousness of wrong-doing in itself. Characteristic of this period is the glorification of all manner of sacred places, mere presence within whose limits is enough to remove all sin; there is practically no limit to the creation of *māhātmyas*, legendary accounts of the origin of the sanctity of these places and celebration of their powers, though few of them have attained such wide celebrity as the Ganges, which has sanctity above all other rivers. The mere reading of *Purāṇas* and hearing them read destroys sin—a doctrine which brings from Kabīr the indignant protest[2] that a man cannot be freed from the guilt of killing by hearing scores of *Purāṇas*. Equally efficacious, and less troublesome than pilgrimage, is the repetition of the names of the god, and *Aṣṭottaraśatanāmans* and *Sahasranāmans*, claiming to be parts of *Purāṇas*, exist for all the greater and even some of the minor deities. Nor is it merely a man's own evil deeds that can thus be undone: prayer and offerings avail to rescue ancestors and descendants from the effects of their own actions. A true Vaiṣṇava, according to the doctrine of the *Brahmavaivarta-Purāṇa*,[1] who is thoroughly devoted to Kṛṣṇa, not merely acquires all knowledge and virtue, enjoys on earth superhuman powers, and goes to the world of Kṛṣṇa on death, but liberates from rebirth seven generations before and after himself. Any person who meets him on the road is cleansed by the mere fact from all the sins committed in seven previous existences, and to attain this position no course of religious exercises or devout penances is necessary; all that is requisite is the love of Hari or Kṛṣṇa and constant thought of him, subject, however, to the condition that the necessary initiatory *mantra* has been acquired from the teacher, whose profit is thus adequately secured.

[1] See A. B. Keith, *The Sāṅkhya System*, London, 1919, pp. 37 f., 99 f.
[2] *Sākhi*, ii. 209.

LITERATURE. — See authorities under art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Hindu), and V. Henry, *La Magie dans l'Inde antique*[2], Paris, 1909; E. W. Hopkins, artt. on 'Modifications of the Karma Doctrine,' in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 681 ff., 1907, p. 665 ff.; the views of the different schools of *bhakti* on the comparative value of works and faith are given by A. Govindāchārya, *JRAS*, 1910, p. 1103 ff.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

SIN (Iranian). — **1. Introductory.** — Speaking generally, it is chiefly in the matter of the respective teaching about sin (though also in some other momentous points of doctrine) that the Iranian stands in marked contrast to the Indian religious systems and approaches near to the general Christian idea. In the last we find certain well-defined elements as necessary constituents of the theory of sin. These are: (1) the idea of a Supreme Being, endowed with a will, which will requires certain acts to be performed on our part and other acts to be refrained from; (2) consequently, the idea of a moral law, which is the expression of this divine will, formulated and delivered to us as a complete system by which we, as creatures, are bound; (3) the idea of a creature having also a will, endowed with freedom of choice, *i.e.* having the power to choose between willing obedience to the moral law (or divine will) and its opposite.

Sin is nothing but a refusal, on the part of the free choice of the human will, to conform to the divine will. If one or other of these conditions is wanting, we cannot be said to have the Christian acceptation of the term 'sin.'

Here it must be noted that the moral law and the will of God are taken as identical terms. To express the idea in a familiar way, we may say that a thing is good because God wills it, and God wills it because it is good. In other words, God could not will a thing unless it were good in itself, and no thing could be good unless it were in accordance with the will of God.

It is evident that some of the Oriental systems recognize one or other of the elements of this conception of sin. But, on the other hand, we find that there are some in which the fundamental idea is a supreme law, though one that is impersonal—a blind force—yet eternal and unconscious, a kind of *fatum* or *μοῖρα* over-ruling the gods themselves, to which these divinities, even those in the highest rank, are subservient, and only agents. This law, influencing alike the physical and the moral order of things in the universe, evidently cannot be taken as the equivalent of the supreme and conscious will of a God who is the creator and governor of the worlds. Being unconscious, this law does not presuppose a personal will.

It will be readily understood that all such religious systems, in fact, are either entirely founded on a basis of pantheism or incline towards pantheism. It is precisely in pantheism that the

[1] See H. H. Wilson, *Works*, London, 1861–77, iii. 107 f.

'order' of things—physical and moral alike—the constant march of nature, or of the great All, to which belong and from which proceed the gods and lesser beings, perforce becomes a 'law,' a 'wheel,' an impersonal and unconscious 'way of life.'

Again, no system which fails to recognize the free choice of the human will as a necessary basis of morality can be said to possess such a conception of the idea of sin as Christians have. Such religions are nothing but systems of fatalism or systems with the tendency towards fatalism.

These remarks are true of all the Indian religions from the Vedic downwards. The striking exception is the very limited and early-forgotten system connected with the Vedic deity Varuṇa, essentially the deity of the moral law, whose *dhāman* (decree) and *vratāni* (wills or laws) are the foundations of the moral (as of the physical) law. Sin is the breaking of these laws;[1] 'we men daily do violence to thy will.'[2]

All this is singularly like the Iranian moral doctrine in both its more ancient and its more recent forms, and has been the main reason leading many scholars, from Darmesteter onwards, to equate, if not to identify, the Vedic Varuṇa with the Iranian Auramazda — Ahura Mazda.[3] But, whether the deities themselves be identified or not, it is clear that their ethical systems, especially as regards the doctrine of sin, are practically the same.[4]

Passing now to consider the Iranian system, we remark that the doctrine of sin in all its aspects plays a very large, we may say—at least with regard to the later epochs of its history—a preponderating, part in the Mazdayasnian or Mazdean religion and philosophy. We may consider this doctrine in three presentments: (1) in the Old Persian inscriptions of the Achæmenian kings, (2) in the sacred books of the Avesta—*Gāthās* and later Avesta, (3) in the Pahlavi exegetic and theological literatures.

2. The religion of the Achæmenian kings.—Extremely limited in extent and brief in expression as are the religious beliefs preserved in the rock-cut inscriptions of the great Darius and his successors (532–336 B.C., approximately), they yet clearly contain the notion of sin, *i.e.* of evil as a transgression of the will of the supreme deity, the creator Auramazda.

'Oh man!', says Darius, 'despise not the commands of Auramazda. Turn not away from the right path. Sin not.' The last sentence, *ma starava*,[5] contains the verb *star*, meaning 'to sin,' which occurs frequently also in the Avesta.

Of all the sins condemned by the morality of the Achæmenids the most serious is undoubtedly the lie (*drauga*). On this point the truths expressed in the inscriptions are in wonderful accordance with the notions on the subject given by Greek historians, and also with Iranian tradition itself.

E.g., Darius cries out: 'O thou who shalt be king after me, keep thou from lying! Should a man be found to be a liar, deal thou with him severely, if thou desirest to keep thy kingdom whole.'[6] All evils are attributed to lying. Darius tells us that during Cambyses' absence in Egypt 'the people became hostile and lying became widespread in the land.'[1] In another verse the same king, relating how a rebellion had taken place in many of the provinces of his vast empire, states that 'these provinces had broken into rebellion; it was lying that had made them rebellious.'[2] Therefore the king prays to Auramazda to guard his kingdom from lying, as it was one of the three chief scourges of a people: 'May A. protect this land from the hostile inroads, from bad harvests, and from lying.'[3]

Indeed the importance attached to this evil of the lie led J. H. Moulton to the belief that we may regard Drauga as a proper name and as representing the Angra Mainyu, or Evil Spirit, of the Avesta, whose absence from the royal inscriptions has been urged as one of the objections to the identification of the Achæmenian with the Zoroastrian faith.[4]

The other sins condemned by the kings are, on the one hand, rebellion of the subject against authority, on the other, despotism or cruelty on the part of the ruler.

Thus does Darius break forth with pride and say: 'A. has been my help . . . for I have neither been a liar nor a tyrant.'[5]

3. The Avesta.—Whether the form of Mazdeism preserved in the Avesta was a religion exactly identical with that of the Achæmenian kings or a different one, it is certain that the worship of the god Ahura Mazda is its most essential feature, and that Zoroaster and his followers have as good a right as the Persian kings to boast of being 'Ahuramazdeans.' This Avestic religion—especially in its most ancient form, as preserved in the *Gāthās*—is essentially a religion founded on a basis of morality, in the sense which we apply to the term. In spite of the dualism which is its most notable characteristic, the Avestic system of morality differs but little from what we term the Christian conception. Evil, it is true, is conceived as produced, in the moral and physical order alike, by an independent principle, an evil creator, eternal, and independent of the good God, and termed Angra Mainyu. But the good law is that of Ahura Mazda, as revealed by him to man. The Avesta contains the whole of this code, in both its moral and its ritual aspect. Besides, there is a special and technical term continually used to describe moral good, holiness, purity, conformity to the good law (*vaŋuhi daēnā*): the term is *asha*, which, according to phonetical rules, is etymologically identical with the *ṛta* of the Vedas.[6] The opposite term *anasha* gives the adjective *anashavan*, as in the Vedic *anṛta*.

The Avesta treats the whole life of man, and the whole history of the world, as a 'spiritual combat.' Man is born endowed with free will, and at the start finds himself in the presence of two hostile armies, one of which is that of the good God, the other that of the Spirit of Evil. He must choose which of these he will serve, precisely as St. Ignatius Loyola pictures the Christian placed between the 'two camps,' or 'two standards,' of Christ and Satan. The whole life of man is a warfare, a perpetual struggle in the choice between good and evil. The Spirit of Evil may even tempt man, as he tempted the prophet Zarathushtra himself, by calling upon him to renounce the good Mazdayasnian law, and promising him a great reward, even the sovereignty of the world:[7]

'No,' the Prophet replies, 'I will not renounce the good law, not even if soul and body and life shall part.'[8]

Here we have clearly the picture of the free will

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[1] *Tava dharmā yuyōpima* (*Rigveda*, VII. lxxxix. 5).
[2] *Ib.* I. xxv. 1.
[3] Cf. J. Darmesteter, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, Paris, 1877; E. Hardy, *Die vedisch-brahmanische Periode der Religion des alten Indiens*, Münster, 1893; H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894; also R. Roth, *ZDMG* [1853] vi.
[4] Cf. A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, pp. 16–18. But W. Geiger writes: 'Ich wüsste auch nicht leicht ein Volk, das unter gleichen oder ähnlichen historischen Bedingungen zu einer solchen Höhe der ethischen Erkenntnis gelangte. In manchen Varuna-hymnen leuchten wohl auch derartige Ideen von Sündenschuld und Versöhnung des Gewissens mit der Gottheit auf; aber das sind doch nur vereinzelte Gedankenblitze, während wir es im Awesta mit einer festen und bestimmten Lehre zu thun haben, welche Gemeingut aller ist oder werden soll' (*Ostīrānische Kultur im Alterthum*, Erlangen, 1882, p. 334).
[5] Formerly read *stakava*. [6] *Dar. Bh.* col. 4, § 37, 40.
[1] *Dar. Bh.* col. 1, § 34. [2] *Ib.* col. 4, § 33, 34.
[3] *Dar. Pers.* D., § 3.
[4] See his *Early Zoroastrianism* (*HL*), London, 1913, and *The Treasure of the Magi*, do. 1917.
[5] *Dar. Bh.* col. 4, § 63, 64.
[6] The curiously exact analogy existing between *Khā ṛtasya*, 'source of justice' (cf. *Rigveda*, II. xxviii.), and *ashahe Khāo* of the Avesta (*Ys.* x. 4) has often been remarked.
[7] *Vend.* xix. 23 (xix. 6 in *SBE* iv. [1895] 211).
[8] *Ib.* 25, 26 (7 in *SBE* iv. 212).

making a choice between the divine law and sin. In fact, the whole of the Avesta bears witness to this doctrine.

The Vedic names for sin (*ēnas*, 23 times in the *Rigveda*, *āgas*, 18 times) in the Varuṇa cycle scarcely appear at all in the Avesta: *aenanh*,[1] *aghem* (only in derivatives, perhaps in *aghem vimanōhim*, 'sin of unbelief').[2] But the more recent Iranian languages (see below) lead us to conjecture also the existence of a term **vināsa*. The verb *star*, 'to sin,' which occurs in the inscription of Darius quoted above, is frequent in the Avesta, whilst a substantive *stara*, 'sin,' seems to have existed.[3]

Throughout the Avesta we find specific sins enumerated with the punishment which they involve and (in the later Avesta) the temporal penances which can expiate them.

It must be noted that the moral law of the Avesta extends not only to external acts and words, but also to thoughts. This is very rarely the case in ethnical religions. It is also the reason why it is so frequently expressed in the sacred texts by the well-known formula: *humata*, *hukhta*, *huvarshta* ('good thought, good word, good deed'). Sin, on the other hand, is described by the three opposite terms: *duzhmata*, *duzhukhta*, *duzhvarshta* ('bad thought, bad word, bad deed').

Certain sins which are reckoned as of peculiar heinousness in the Avesta are said to render the one who commits them *peshōtanus*, or *peretōtanus* —a term variously explained as signifying 'whose body (*tanu*) is steeped in iniquity or has morally perished' (de Harlez), 'one who pays with his own body' (Darmesteter), or 'one whose body is forfeit, *i.e.* guilty of a sin for which there is no atonement' (Bartholomae, Moulton). The word reappears in Pahlavi in the inverted form *tanāpuhar*. What kind of sin is this, for which, be it noted, the *maximum* penalty is 200 stripes? In *Vendīdād*, xv. 1–8, we are told that there are five sins which, unconfessed and unatoned for, make one *peshōtanu*. It is a strange list indeed: teaching one of the faithful another religion; giving bones too hard or food too hot to a dog; striking, frightening, or kicking a bitch with young; having intercourse with a woman during menstruation; having intercourse with a pregnant woman. But, heinous as these sins are, they can be expiated; whilst the *anāperaθa* sins are inexpiable:

'For such there is no punishment, no expiation, no purification; for these acts are inexpiable for ever, for eternity.'[4]

As such are reckoned both burning and burying dead bodies, eating of the carcass of a man or a dog, unnatural sin, self-pollution. Probably these sins, at least in the beginning, were punishable with immediate death here and eternal punishment hereafter. Otherwise it seems strange that capital punishment seems indicated for a very few sins, such as throwing a corpse into the water, carrying a corpse alone, illegally attempting to carry out a ritual purification. The guilt of other sins is reckoned in terms of the number of stripes by the *aspahē ashtra* (horse-goad) or *sraoshō-carana* ('obedience-maker') arranged in ascending scale from five for a simple *āgerepta* (act of violence) through graver assaults up to 200; breaches of contract (*mithrō druj*), up to 1000; violations of mortuary rites, up to 1000; sexual sins, 30 to 1000; ill-treatment and killing of animals, 50 to 1000; and, most astounding of all,[5] killing an otter, 10,000.[6] Whether these 'stripes' were ever inflicted or not, they had become little more than the degrees on the thermometer, indicating the comparative guilt of various sins.[1]

4. **The Sasanian religion.**—Instead of becoming weaker, as might have been expected, by the lapse of time, the moral system of post-Avestic Mazdeism developed further. The principal points are these:

(1) The basis of all morality is to be sought for in man's intellectual nature, and consequently in his free will. This is why children who have not yet come to the use of reason and adults bereft of reason are irresponsible. The age of reason varies from seven to eight years, inasmuch as before that time of life 'sin does not take root.'[2]

(2) All which is not according to the will of Ahura Mazda is sin.[3]

(3) Man is naturally created good, but Aharman (the Spirit of Evil) blinds him, hiding from his sight future retribution.

(4) It is owing to the fact of the soul being in the body during life that, not seeing future retribution, it commits sin; otherwise it would not commit it for any earthly consideration.[4]

(5) Aharman deceived the first human couple, *Māshya* and *Māshyōī*, and led them to commit sin by persuading them to eat the flesh of animals. So with every sinner. Thus the life of man is a spiritual conflict, an unceasing warfare.[5]

A system of moral theology and casuistic science grew up in the Sasanian schools. Here were compiled long lists of virtues including a code of duties for every state of life, as well as classified lists of sins.

For sin the generic term is *vanas*, from which is derived *vanaskar*, 'sinner,' words which have passed into the Armenian language, as *vnas*, *vnasakar*. In modern Persian and in Kurdish the word *vanas* appears, according to phonetic law, in the form *gunāh*, borrowed in the Arabic of the Qur'ān as *junāh*.[6]

The summary of the contents of the original *Nasks*, or parts of the Avesta now lost,[7] shows that some of the *Nasks* were veritable treatises of moral theology and of criminal jurisprudence, for in the Mazdean, as in other Oriental religions, no distinction is made between sin and misdemeanours of even purely civil or ceremonial nature. Hence endless chapters containing enumerations of such transgressions, their effects, and their appropriate chastisements, whether of a spiritual or of a civil nature. The enumerations of sins of all kinds are so constant and of such great length in the various Pahlavi writings that it would be tedious to repeat or even summarize them. A few examples must suffice.

One list of 30 sins is found in the *Maīnōg-ī Khrād*, xxxvi., as follows:

(1) Sodomy, (2) pederasty, (3) murder of a just man, (4) the destruction of *khvētūk-das* (next-of-kin marriage), (5) unfaithfulness towards an adopted son, (6) destruction of the sacred fire, (7) destruction of the otter, (8) idolatry, (9) religious indifferentism, (10) violation of trust, (11) support of wickedness, (12) laziness, (13) heresy, (14) witchcraft, (15) apostasy, (16) demon-worship, (17) theft and abetting thieves, (18) violation of promises, (19) maliciousness, (20) oppression in order to obtain another's goods, (21) persecution of the righteous, (22) slander, (23) arrogance, (24) adultery, (25) ingratitude, (26) falsehood, (27) persecution of the helpless (or the dead?), (28) pleasure in distressing the good, (29) abetment of sin and hindering of good work, (30) regret at having done good to others.

A shorter and somewhat more intelligible list is that of *Dīnkarṭ*, III. cix. 3:

Avarice, fraud, ingratitude, discontent, disobedience, violence,

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[1] *Ys.* xxxi. 13. [2] *Vend.* i. 7.
[3] See C. Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1904, *s.v.*
[4] *Vend.* iii. 39. [5] *Ib.* xiv.
[6] This seems inexplicable—'de haute fantaisie,' says Darmesteter. The only explanation (surely an improbable one) we have seen suggested is that of V. Henry (*Le Parsisme*, p. 104) that perhaps the ancient Iranians tamed the otter and used it to catch fish! See also *Vend.* iv., xiii., xvi., xviii., etc.

[1] See art. Law (Iranian).
[2] *Dīnkarṭ*, IV. clxx. 2; Casartelli, *Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme*, p. 137.
[3] *Zāḍ-Sparam*, i. 13 (*SBE* v. 157).
[4] *Dīnk.* IX. xvi. 3 (*SBE* xxxvii. 200).
[5] Casartelli, p. 138 f. [6] *Ib.* pp. 141–150.
[7] Contained in bks. VIII. and IX. of the *Dīnkarṭ*; tr. first by West in *SBE* xxxvii. and, more recently, published for the first time in the Pahlavi text with a new tr. by Dārāb Peshotan Sanjana, in vols. xv. [1916] and xvi. [1917] of the great ed. of the *Dīnkarṭ* (Bombay, London, etc., 1874–1917).

mercilessness, tyranny, heresy, spiritual blindness (*kīkīh*), spiritual deafness (*karafīh*), opposition to the law (*adātīh*), 'and other faults.'

The *Mainōg-ī Khrāt*, lix., has an interesting division of predominant sins according to the four primitive 'castes' or classes of the population.

Thus the characteristic sins (1) of the *priests* are hypocrisy, negligence, idleness, attention to trifles, religious indifference; (2) of *warriors*, oppression, violence, unfaithfulness to promises, encouragement of evil, ostentation, arrogance, insolence; (3) of *agriculturists*, ignorance, envy, ill-will, malice; lastly (4) of *artisans*, unbelief, ingratitude, improper talk, moroseness, abusiveness.

Certain sins specially condemned are pride and contempt of others, adulteration of food-stuffs, unjust weights and measures, cruelty to animals, useless destruction of cattle. Intemperance and drunkenness are condemned, curiously enough, because excess in drink causes excess in eating, and the latter hinders the recitation of the *Gāthās*.[1]

Two mysterious sins or faults often mentioned in the last-quoted book and other treatises are *fraēbūt* and *aībībūt*. It is not clear what these are, though great importance is evidently attached to them. According to the *Dīnkart*, the former is intellectual pride ('I know no one superior to myself'), the latter contempt of others ('This other person knows nothing, he is backward and infirm,'[2] which recalls the Pharisee of Lk 18[9-12]). Quite different explanations are given by other writers. Attempts are made at other classifications of sins; thus two classes are distinguished, one of sins which injure one's neighbour (entitled *hamēmālān*) and one of sins which injure only one's own soul (*rūbānīk*);[3] or, again, 'antecedent vices,' such as concupiscence and anger, and 'consequent vices,' such as idleness and murder—apparently what we may term internal and external sins.

5. **Trend of Mazdean teaching.**—Glancing over the whole mass of Mazdean teaching, Avestan and post-Avestan, concerning sin, we cannot fail to notice that, whilst that ethical system condemns practically all those forms of moral evil which we and, we may say, mankind generally hold to be deserving of reprobation, there are other acts which to us seem strangely out of place. Of course some of them are violations of religious or ritual precepts, to which the Avesta and the Mazdean priesthood attach great importance. Under this head we can easily understand why it is sinful to let the sun shine on the fire.[4] Other apparently grotesque or at least puerile condemnations of actions as sinful are those of walking with only one boot,[5] or barefooted,[6] or, still stranger, 'uno pede stando mingere'[7]—for which crimes Artā-ī Vīrāf, the 'Persian Dante,' saw a man suffering atrocious torment in hell,[8] as well as another tortured for eating whilst talking.[9] Of these it may be said that possibly they were originally condemned for hygienic reasons. But the most astounding condemnation as of one of 33 most heinous sins, second only to unnatural lust and murder, is that of 'breaking off a *khvētūk-das*,' *i.e.* a next-of-kin (to us incestuous) marriage.[10] This of course is only in strict accordance with the exaltation of that abominable practice, at least in post-Avestan times, to the rank of one of the most meritorious good works.[11]

(*a*) *Merit and responsibility.*—Exact ideas were held as to merit and demerit and the responsibility of the sinner. Good deeds done unconsciously or on the spur of the moment have little if any merit. The sacrifices offered in divine worship are always productive of merit (*kerfak*). Should the minister, by reason of want of attention, fail to receive any merit, the merit finds its way into a treasury of merits (*ganj*), placed in the hands of the spirits (*yazdān*), who have the power to bestow the contents on the souls of the just. The merit of good deeds, lost by sin, can be born anew in the soul after the confession, contrition, and good resolutions of the sinner. Parents are responsible for their conduct towards their children, husbands for their wives, superiors for those under them, in the event of their failing to instruct and correct them. A just man is also bound to instruct his fellow-man who is a sinner; otherwise he shares the latter's guilt and will incur great shame at the judgment;[1] similarly the husband who does not correct his wife.[2]

Proper fasting is fasting from sin, not from food[3]—a maxim in thorough agreement with Mazdean views on mortification and asceticism.

In cases of doubt as to sin the high-priest is to be consulted.[4] Elsewhere, when one is in doubt whether an act is a sin or not, the act must not be done.[5]

(*b*) *Effects of sin.* — Sin produces demons. 'Various new demons arise from the various new sins the creatures may commit,' and apparently these demons even introduce confusion into the heavenly bodies and here on earth.[6] All ruin and misery among mankind and animals come from man's sinfulness.[7] It would even appear that grievous sin could actually turn men into actual demons; a case in point was that of the wicked Afrāsyāb (the Avestan Franrasyan, the great Turanian foe of Īrān), who thus became a *dēv* and will not be saved at the end of creation.[8] Very wicked men, who have only the name of humanity and whose lives are all sinful, are called 'demi-*dēvs*.'[9]

(*c*) *Punishment in hell.*—After death the unrepentant sinner is punished in hell (Av. *daožahva*, from *duz-*, 'evil,' *ahu*, 'being,' 'life'; Pahl. *dūšahū*). Whether this hell was considered as eternal is doubtful; certainly many of the later schools contemplated its final destruction at the end of all things, and apparently the purification of those suffering in it. But in the earlier Avesta such epithets are used—especially *yavōi vīspāi*,[10] *utayūiti*—of both heaven and hell as seem to leave little doubt that the original idea was that of a real eternity of misery.[11]

In the post-Avestan literature it is the celebrated 'Inferno' of Artā-ī Vīrāf, with its minute and crude description of the gruesome sufferings of the damned in hell and its enumeration of the sins for which they are tortured, that supplies the most complete summary of late Mazdean teaching about sin and its chastisement.[12]

(*d*) *Contrition and confession.*—The means by which sin and its fatal consequences can be got rid of are contrition, purpose of amendment, and confession. True repentance (*patītīh*) is necessarily both internal and external. External duty, it is said, requires that the sin which the penitent knows that he has committed should be specifically confessed in words (*barā gūbishnō*); mental duty

1 *Dīnk.* I. ix. 2 *Dīnk.* III. civ.
3 *Shāyast lā-Shāyast*, viii. 1 (*SBE* v. 300).
4 *Sad-dar*, 69 (*SBE* xxiv. 334).
5 *Bund.* xxviii. 13 (*SBE* v. 107).
6 *Shāy. lā-Shāy.* x. 12 (*SBE* v. 320); *Sad-dar*, 44 (*SBE* xxiv. 307).
7 *Sad-dar*, 56 (*SBE* xxiv. 317); cf. *Vend.* xviii. 40 (*SBE* iv. 201), and Ammianus Marcellinus, xxiii. 6.
8 *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak*, xxv. 9 *Ib.* xxiii.
10 *Mainōg-ī Khrāt*, xxxvi. 7 (*SBE* xxiv. 71).
11 See art. MARRIAGE (Iranian), § 2.

1 *Bund.* xxx. 11 (*SBE* v. 123).
2 *Artā-ī-Vīrāf Nāmak*, lxviii.
3 *Sad-dar*, 83 (*SBE* xxiv. 337). 4 *Ib.* 27 (*SBE* xxiv. 290).
5 *Shāy. lā-Shāy.* x. 27 (*SBE* v. 328).
6 *Bund.* xxviii. 43–45 (*SBE* v. 113 f.).
7 *Dīnk.* VII. xvi. 2 (as quoted from Avesta *Nask* x.).
8 *Ib.* III. cx. 13.
9 *Mainōg-ī Khrāt*, xlii. 12–16. 10 *Ys.* xlvi.
11 See Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, pp. 173–175.
12 Cf. art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Iranian).

consists 'in his renouncing it': 'in future I will sin no more.'[1] There are two formulæ of confession, called *patēts*; one is the great *patēt*, the other the little *patēt*. Sins must be confessed in detail, according to the manner in which they have been committed, whether 'by thought, by word, or by deed' (*minishnīk, gūbishnīk, kūnishnīk*).[2]

LITERATURE.—The ideas connected with sin permeate so widely the whole Mazdean system, Avestan and post-Avestan, that it suffices to indicate all the translations of the scriptures and the commentaries upon them, and especially the *Pahlavi Texts* of E. W. West, in *SBE* v. [1880], xviii. [1882], xxiv. [1885], xxxvii. [1892], xlvii. [1897]. A useful brief summary of the chief points is V. Henry, *Le Parsisme*, Paris, 1905 (esp. ch. vi.); see also L. C. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884, and Eng. tr. by Firoz Jamaspji, Bombay, 1889, as quoted in text, esp. chs. vi. and vii. L. C. CASARTELLI.

SIN (Japanese). — **1. Definition.** — The old Japanese word expressing the idea of sin is *tsumi*. But *tsumi* is both less and more comprehensive than our word 'sin': on the one hand, the deeds which the most ancient Shintō enumerates as *tsumi* form only a short list, which does not cover the vast field of the actions which we regard as sins; on the other hand, the notion of *tsumi* includes three distinct categories, viz. *kegare*, 'uncleanness,' *ashiki waza*, 'ill deeds,' and *wazawai*, 'calamities.' The *ashiki waza* category corresponds in a certain degree to our idea of sin. But from the mere fact of the combination of those three things under the single word *tsumi* we see that the ancient Japanese drew no clear distinction between ritual impurities, moral faults, and certain calamities. Ritual impurity—*e.g.*, being dirty in body and clothing—was a want of respect for the gods; and calamities were regarded as signs of the displeasure of the gods for some offence, conscious or unconscious. Thus impurities and calamities became combined under the same title as actual sins, for the psychological reason that they were equally displeasing to the gods.

2. Different kinds of tsumi.—The chief sins of the oldest Shintō are enumerated in the following passage of the *Oho-harai no Kotoba* ('Words of the Great Purification'):

'As for the various sorts of offences which may be committed either inadvertently or deliberately by the heaven's increasing population, that shall come into being in the country, a number of offences are distinguished as heavenly offences: (viz.) breaking down the divisions of the rice-fields, filling up the irrigating channels, opening the flood-gates of sluices, sowing seed over again, planting wands, flaying alive and flaying backwards, evacuating excrements; these are distinguished as heavenly offences. As for earthly offences, there will be forthcoming a number of offences: (viz.) cutting the living skin, cutting the dead skin, white men, excrescences, the offence of (a son's) cohabitation with his own mother, the offence of (a father's) cohabitation with his own child, the offence of (a father's) cohabitation with his step-daughter, the offence of (a man's) cohabitation with his mother-in-law, the offence of cohabitation with animals, calamity through crawling worms, calamity through the gods on high, calamity through birds on high, killing the animals, the offence of performing witchcraft.'[3]

According to this text, the sins that might be committed by 'the heaven's increasing population' (*ame no masu hito-ra*, 'heavenly-surplus population,' a very old expression meaning the Japanese people, the origin of which appears in one of the most ancient myths of the *Kojiki*)[4] are divided into two large classes, viz. *ama tsu tsumi*, 'heavenly sins,' and *kuni tsu tsumi*, 'earthly sins.'

The seven *ama tsu tsumi* here enumerated are grouped under this generic title because they are the crimes which, in the mythology, were committed in heaven by the wicked god Susa-no-wo against the sun-goddess. This is easily seen from a simple comparison with the accounts in the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, which, although differing in some minor details from each other and from the list in the Ritual of the Great Purification, are none the less essentially in agreement with this list. Breaking up the narrow embankments which separated the rice-fields and at the same time served as dams for keeping back the water, filling up the channels which conducted the water (indispensable to native cultivation), opening the ponds where it was most carefully preserved till the proper time—those were the most execrable crimes for a population of agriculturists; and that is why they put those crimes at the head of their list. No less hateful is the sowing, on a field already sown, of bad seed which will ruin the harvest.[1] The planting of wands (in the rice-fields) has already been explained.[2] As to the crime of flaying an animal alive, from the tail to the head, it is no doubt condemned not on account of its cruelty, but because of some magical reason which remains obscure, perhaps because of the evil use which might be made in sorcery of the skins thus obtained. However that may be, this crime, as well as that of evacuating excrements (*i.e.* in places not meant for the purpose) appears also in the number of wicked deeds committed by Susa-no-wo against his sister.

'He broke down the divisions of the rice-fields laid out by the Heaven-Shining-Great-August Deity, filled up the ditches, and moreover strewed excrements in the palace where she partook of the great food.' And again: 'As the Heaven-Shining-Great-August Deity sat in her awful weaving-hall seeing to the weaving of the august garments of the Deities, he broke a hole in the top of the weaving-hall, and through it let fall a heavenly piebald horse which he had flayed with a backward flaying.'[3]

The *kuni tsu tsumi*, according to the Japanese commentators, are those which have been committed since the time of Jimmu Tennō, the first legendary emperor; and it is almost certain that the difference between them and the *ama tsu tsumi* rests on a mythological basis. This explanation, if we interpret it historically, may be connected in a very real way with the diversity of races that appear successively at the origin of the Japanese people.[4] In any case we cannot agree with the simple explanation of W. G. Aston, who did away with the difficulty by attributing to the author of the Ritual a rhetorical device, viz. the breaking up of 'the long list of offences into two balanced sentences.'[5]

The list of sins in this second category comprises, first of all, 'cutting the living skin' (*iki-hada-tachi*), which includes murder and wounding; it should be noticed also that every effusion of blood meant pollution, even for the victim. The sin of 'cutting the dead skin' (*shini-hada-tachi*) is easily understood when it is remembered that, according to primitive ideas, it was particularly impure to touch a dead body, and much more so to cut it up. The next two offences concern two diseases which are repulsive and therefore displeasing to the gods: 'white men' (*shira hito*), *i.e.* doubtless men afflicted with white spots on their skin, like lepers, and also albinos; and 'excrescences' (*kokumi*, 'superfluous flesh,' 'proud flesh'), a disease which we cannot specify more definitely from the text—unless we accept the interpretation of a Japanese commentator, who combines the two crimes into one, *shira-hi toko-kumi*, 'cohabitation in broad daylight' (*shira*, 'white'; *hi*, 'day'; *toko*, 'bed'; *kumu*, 'to unite,' 'to interlace');

[1] *Shāy. lā-Shāy.* viii. 8 (*SBE* v. 303).
[2] Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse*, p. 161.
[3] See Karl Florenz, 'Ancient Japanese Rituals,' in *TASJ* xxvii. pt. i. [1899]; cf. E. Satow, 'The Mythology and Religious Worship of the Ancient Japanese,' in *Westminster Review*, July 1878, p. 27 ff.; and M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*[4], Paris, 1919, p. 25 ff.
[4] See *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain[2], Tōkyō, 1906, p. 40; and cf. art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 166[b], and Revon, p. 41.

[1] Cf. Mt 13[24f.].
[2] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 298[a].
[3] *Kojiki*, p. 61 f.
[4] See Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, Paris, 1907, p. 338 ff., esp. p. 353.
[5] *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905, p. 200.

this view gains support when it is recalled that even the emperor could not have sexual intercourse except in the depth of night, before the first glimmer of dawn had appeared. The obscurity of the writing of those texts, in which the Chinese characters may be taken sometimes in their ideographic meaning and sometimes phonetically to represent Japanese words, prevents any elucidation of this point. There follow various kinds of incest and the sin of bestiality.[1] Then come several 'calamities,' viz. 'through crawling worms' (*hafu mushi*), *i.e.* the bite of serpents, millepeds, and other venomous creatures, all the more to be feared as the primitive hut had no floor; 'through the gods on high' (*taka-tsu-kami*), *i.e.* especially being struck by lightning; and 'through birds on high' (*taka-tsu-tori*), because, entering by the holes which every house had for the escape of the smoke from the fire, they could defile the food.[2] Next there is mentioned 'killing the animals' (*kemono tafushi*), *i.e.* not animals in general, as in Buddhism, but only the domestic animals of one's neighbour, perhaps by means of evil spells; and lastly comes witchcraft (*maji-mono seru tsumi*)[3]—a prohibition which becomes particularly clear when we think of the story in the *Kojiki* which shows that the casting of spells was known in the most ancient Japanese magic.[4]

Those are the essential sins according to the primitive Japanese conception. Obviously this list does not include all possible crimes; *e.g.*, in the case of heavenly sins, if the *Kojiki*[5] is not so complete as the Ritual, on the other hand we notice some additional sins of the same kind in the mythical accounts of the crimes of Susa-no-wo, as they are given in the *Nihongi*.[6] But the list in the Ritual is the one which authentically represents the real tradition, as is sufficiently proved by the fact that it corresponds exactly with the list of heavenly sins given in a third important book of mythology, the *Kogoshūi* (A.D. 807), a work compiled by Hironari, a Shintōist priest belonging to the old sacerdotal family of the Imibe. On the other hand, it is obvious also that Japanese morality did not condemn these few crimes only; the study of the oldest criminal law shows that its field was much wider;[7] and there is a sure proof that, besides the old religious offences, the social conscience prohibited numerous deeds not mentioned in the Ritual, viz. the fact that a single individual who at the same time had violated both the divine law and the human law was logically condemned both to a ritual expiation and to a civil punishment.[8] But, lastly, in this necessarily vague domain of morality it is the text of the Ritual explained above that gives us the most original and at the same time most correct idea of the notion of sin in pure Shintō.

3. Avoidance of sin.—*Tsumi* may be avoided by the means corresponding to the notion of *imi*, antagonistic to that of *tsumi*. This conception of *imi*, 'avoidance,' 'abstinence,' and the various religious practices connected with it, have already been explained.[9]

4. Deliverance from sin.—When once *tsumi* had been committed, deliverance from it could be obtained by the magical proceedings indicated in the Ritual of the Great Purification itself.[1] And, in fact, since the *tsumi* were regarded as infractions which must be expiated whether there was any evil intention or not (see the beginning of the text cited above), the Japanese thought that such sins must be cleansed, not by inward repentance, but by external rites, *i.e.* magical rites.

The notion of purely moral sin, as we conceive it, did not gain supremacy in Japan until Buddhism was introduced, which, along with the mystic doctrines of a superior religion, brought to the distant archipelago a new morality founded no longer on ancient magic, but on the discriminations of conscience, and thus revealed the true idea of sin, which consists not in actions but in intentions, which man avoids by virtue and atones for by repentance.

LITERATURE.—The references are given in the footnotes.

MICHEL REVON.

SIN (Muslim).—There are various words used in the Qur'ān to express the ideas of fault, crime, sin. The shades of meaning with which they are used seem to vary with the context. Thus, *sayyāt* means evils which may happen to a man.

'So God preserved him from the evils they had planned.'[2]

It expresses the evils which God's punishment brings.[3] It also expresses moral guilt.

'Whoso doeth evil and is encompassed with his iniquity, they shall be the companions of hell fire.'[4]

The word *dhanb* expresses all forms of unbelief and wrong actions proceeding from such unbelief. The commission of a *dhanb* constitutes one a *khāṭī*, or sinner.[5] The word *ithm* seems to imply a wrong attitude to others and so injustice.

'Avoid frequent suspicion, for some suspicions are a crime.'[6]

It denotes a wrong attitude towards God.

'He who united the gods with God hath devised a great wickedness.'[7]

The Qur'ānic idea of sin seems to be that it is pride and opposition to God. Thus Satan (Iblīs), who refused to obey the command to prostrate himself before Adam, is described as swelling with pride and becoming an unbeliever.[8]

The punishment of this rebellious pride is that those who possess it must remain in it.

'The unjustly proud ones of the earth, will I turn aside from my signs, for even if they see every sign they will not believe them.'[9]

This opposition to God may lead a man to be an atheist, a polytheist, or a simply careless irreligious person. Man does not inherit a sinful nature, but simply a weak one. Sin is not so much a disposition as a habit which men acquire because of their weakness. The willing desire of the natural heart to sin is referred to in what Joseph says of himself:

'Yet I hold not myself clear, for the heart is prone to evil, save those on whom the Lord hath mercy.'[10]

The Qur'ān marvels at the sin of man, his obstinate disobedience, and calls upon him to exercise faith and repentance, but it is deficient in its call for a broken and contrite heart.

'All through the Qur'ān, the message is that while repentance must be sincere, it is a very easy matter, while forgiveness is a question scarcely worth troubling about, so simple is its attainment. Muḥammad nowhere displays anguish of heart and contrition in the sight of a pure and holy God, and therefore does not demand that others should experience that of which he himself had no knowledge.'[11]

According to Muslim theologians, sins are of two kinds, little (*saghīra*) and great (*kabīra*). This distinction is based on the text:

'To those who avoid the great sins and scandals, but commit

1 These correspond to Lv 18[7. 17. 15. 8. 23].
2 Cf. the 8th Ritual, art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 297[b].
3 *Ib.* p. 298[a].
4 *Ib.* p. 300; and cf. Revon, 'L'Envoûtement dans le Japon primitif,' in *Bulletin de la Société d'Ethnographie de Paris*, Oct. 1913.
5 P. 61 f.; and cf. p. 286.
6 Tr. Aston, London, 1896, i. 40 ff., esp. p. 48 f.
7 See Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, p. 367 ff.
8 *Ib.* p. 368.
9 See art. ASCETICISM (Japanese); cf. also art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. pp. 297 (8th Ritual), 298[b] (14th Ritual), 299[a] (23rd Ritual), 299[b] (27th Ritual), and art. SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 22[a].

1 See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. pp. 297[b], 298[a], (10th and 11th Rituals); cf. art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Japanese and Korean), vol. vi. p. 857[a], and, for a practical illustration of Great Purification, art. POSSESSION (Japanese), vol. x. p. 131[b].
2 xl. 48. 3 xxx. 35. 4 ii. 75.
5 xii. 29, 98. 6 xlix. 12. 7 iv. 51.
8 xxxviii. 74; see also vii. 73–74. 9 vii. 143.
10 xii. 53.
11 W. R. W. Gardner, *The Qur'ānic Doctrine of Sin*, p. 40.

only the lighter faults, verily the Lord will be diffuse of mercy.'[1]

Lesser sins, mere faults and imperfections such as are inherent in human nature, are all forgiven, if some good act is done.

'Observe prayer at early morning, at the close of day and at the approach of night: for the good deeds drive away the evil deeds.'[2]

Opinions vary as to the number of greater sins, but in all lists there occur: infidelity or the ascribing of partners to God, murder, theft, adultery, unnatural crimes, neglect of the Ramaḍān fast and of the Friday prayers, magic, gambling, drunkenness, perjury, usury, disobedience to parents, false witness, defrauding orphans, despair of God's mercy, continued commission of little sins, and cowardice on the field of battle before an infidel enemy. The last, however, is said not to be a sin if the enemy outnumber the Muslims by more than two to one. It is said, further, that the number of great sins has not been definitely laid down, so that men may exercise the greater caution.

If a learned man commits a little sin and thereby misleads those whom he should guide, it becomes great. If small sins are repeated inadvertently, they do not become great; but, if knowingly, they change into great sins. The greatest of all sins is the associating of another with God (*shirk*). Other sins may be pardoned, but not this. A Muslim, although he commits sins small and great, will not be left in hell for ever, provided he does not commit this sin, or declare lawful what God has forbidden.

Sins require no atonement; repentance immediately after the commission of the sin is enough.

'They who, after they have done a base deed or committed wrong against their own selves, remember God and implore forgiveness of their sins—and who will forgive sins but God only?—and persevere not in what they have willingly done amiss: as for these, pardon from their Lord shall be their recompense.'[3]

True repentance implies sorrow for sin, full purpose of amendment and restitution if wrong has been done to another. If, after repentance, a man again sins, the repentance is not lost, for sins repented of are no longer reckoned. Some deny the validity of repentance at death; others say that God accepts it even then. Infidels may be forgiven:

'Say to the infidels, if they desist [from their unbelief], what is now past shall be forgiven them; but, if they return to it, they have already before them the doom of the ancients.'[4]

With some theologians, when an infidel becomes a Muslim, the act of conversion is equal to repentance. Others say that repentance is a separate action and must be separately and definitely made. A believer who commits a mortal sin does not, in the opinion of the orthodox, become an infidel.[5]

An interesting question arises with regard to the sinlessness of prophets. The orthodox belief is that they are free from sin. The Ash'arites hold that even the power of sinning does not exist in them; the Hashāmiyyah, a sub-section of the Shī'ahs, in order to exalt the *imāms*, hold that prophets can sin: 'The prophets sin, but the Imāms are pure.'[6] The Mu'tazilites deny this, but admit that they possess some quality which keeps them from sin. All are unanimous that prophets do not commit the greater sins. As regards the lesser, some say that they may commit these before inspiration (*waḥy*) comes upon them; others that they may do so even after inspiration has come, but that such little sins in them are mere frailties and slight imperfections not really amounting to sin. To a Muslim this disposes of a difficulty in the Qur'ān itself, for there the greater prophets are spoken of as sinning. Adam's fall is referred to thus:

'And we said, O Adam, dwell thou and thy wife in the garden, and eat ye plentifully therefrom wherever ye list, but to this tree come not nigh lest ye become of the transgressors; and Satan made them slip from it, and caused their banishment from the place in which they were.'[1]

But it is said that Adam did not really sin; he only committed a slight fault, which after all proved beneficial to mankind; for, had he remained in paradise, the world would not have been peopled, and the will of God, 'I have not created men and *jinn* except for worship,' would not have been fulfilled.[2] Further, Adam and Eve, on being convicted of sin, said:

'O our Lord, with ourselves have we dealt unjustly: if thou forgive us not and have not pity on us, we shall surely be of those who perish.'[3] Noah said: 'Unless thou forgive me and be merciful to me, I shall be one of the lost.'[4] Abraham said: 'When I am sick, He healeth me, and who will cause me to die and quicken me, and who, I hope, will forgive me my sins in the day of reckoning!'[5] Moses killed a man—an act described as a work of Satan. He repented and said: 'O my Lord, I have sinned to my own heart, forgive me.'[6]

The references to sins committed by Muhammad are numerous:

'Be thou steadfast and patient, for true is the promise of God; and seek pardon for thy sin.'[7]

Various explanations are given of this verse. Some say that it refers to remissness in the propagation of Islām; others to neglect in rendering thanks to God; but one popular explanation is that the Prophet was to seek pardon for sin merely as an act of worship and as an example of that confession of sin which was to be a portion of the worship rendered by his followers.[8] If this explanation is not enough, then it is said that the word for sin (*dhanb*) conveys the idea of a fault only, or what is technically called a little sin. The objection is that this word (*dhanb*) is used to describe the sin of ordinary people.[9] It is quite clear, in general, that the word used to describe the sin of Muhammad does not denote a mere trivial offence, but a great sin. Again, 'Ask pardon for thy sin and for believers both men and women'[10] is similarly explained. The Prophet was ordered by God to ask pardon for his sin, not because he really had committed any sin which needed pardon, but because, if he thus asked, then, in accordance with the principle that his actions form the *sunnah*, or rule of faith and practice, it would become the duty of all Muslims to confess their sins and seek pardon.[11] Another passage is:

'Verily, we have won for thee an undoubted victory, in order that God might forgive thee that which went before of thy fault and what followed after.'[12]

This reference to an earlier and to a later fault has led to many ingenious explanations, such as the fault before and after the descent of inspiration (*waḥy*); before and after the taking of Mecca; before and after the revelation of this verse. But all these still leave the fault with Muhammad; so a further explanation is given. The 'former sin' refers to the sin of Adam when Muhammad was yet in the loins of his great ancestor and the 'later sin' refers to the sin of the followers of Muhammad. Both are connected with the Prophet, as Adam was forgiven by the blessing of Muhammad and Muslims will be pardoned through his intercession. The traditions also record the fact that Muhammad prayed for the pardon of his sins. On the authority of 'Ā'isha it is said that Muhammad used often to say: 'By thy praise O God, pardon me'; 'O God,

[1] liii. 33. [2] xi. 116. [3] liii. 129. [4] viii. 39.
[5] Ibn Khallikān, *Biographical Dictionary*, London, 1842–71, iii. 343.
[6] Ash-Shahrastānī, in *Milal wa'n-Niḥal*, ed. W. Cureton, London, 1846, p. 142.

[1] ii. 33 f. [2] E. Sell, *Faith of Islām*[2], p. 245.
[3] vii. 22. [4] xi. 49. [5] xxvi. 82.
[6] xxviii. 15; see also Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Leyden, 1862, iii. 194.
[7] *Qur'ān*, xl. 57.
[8] See also Baiḍāwī, ed. H. O. Fleischer, Leipzig, 1848, ii. 214
[9] *Qur'ān*, ix. 103, xxviii. 78, xii. 29.
[10] xlvii. 21.
[11] Tafsīr-i-Ḥusainī, quoted in Sell[2], p. 246.
[12] xlv.ii. 1 f.

I ask pardon of thee for my offence, and I ask of thee thy mercy.' On the authority of Abū Huraira it is recorded that Muhammad said: 'I ask pardon of God and repent (return) towards Him more than seventy times a day.'[1] It is said that Muhammad felt such remorse when he had committed slight faults that he called them sins when they were not really such. The reply to this is obvious. From a Muhammadan standpoint, the Qur'ān is the word of God and not of man; so it is God and not Muhammad who speaks of the Prophet's sin. Whilst, however, the Qur'ān lends no countenance to the idea that prophets cannot sin and indeed refers to their sins, there is no mention whatever of sin in connexion with Jesus Christ. He is the one sinless prophet of Islām.

The Muhammadan view of sin looks upon it as the neglect of the arbitrary decrees of an absolute Ruler rather than as an offence against an immutable moral law of right or wrong. This is the real defence for many of the actions of the Prophet. In other men they would have been sin, but they are not to be considered so in him, as God commanded him to perform them. This also accounts for the absence of any moral gradation of the great sins. Adultery is a great sin, but so is flight from a field of battle; murder is a great sin, but so is the neglect of a fast. All this shows how the Muhammadan conception of God as a despotic ruler, who lays down laws for no apparent reason but that He wills so to do, has led to a false notion about the real nature of sin. *E.g.*, associating others with God in worship is the first and greatest of the great sins, yet the angels were ordered to worship Adam. Iblīs (Satan) refused and was, in consequence, driven out of paradise.[2] The sin here did not consist in the breach of the eternal law that worship belongs to God alone, but in disobedience to a command, arbitrary in its nature and contrary to the great law of man's relation to God. Again, sin is looked upon as a weakness of human nature. The sinner is not much to blame, and God is merciful. The spirit of fatalism also deadens the conscience and makes a man accept even his failings as decreed for him. The sensual descriptions of paradise, looked upon by a few purer-minded Muslims only as allegorical, deaden the moral sense. It is difficult for the man inclined to give way to his passions to see that what is right in heaven is wrong on earth. Sin, also, is too often regarded as an external pollution which the performance of certain good actions and attention to the prescribed religious ritual can cleanse. The giving of alms is said to 'do away sins.'[3] The ceremonial ablution before the stated prayers is such a meritorious ceremony that the Prophet said: 'When the Muslim performs his ablutions, all his sins will be forgiven him.' The *hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca, 'cleanses the hearts of men and makes them innocent like new-born babes.'[4] There are numerous traditions[5] on the subject of sin, the result of belief in which has been to lessen the idea of its evil nature and to make the means for its removal very mechanical. Doubtless there are Muslims who have a deeper sense of sin and who believe in repentance and amendment of life, men who place little faith in all the puerile stories handed down by tradition; but the tendency of the whole system of belief and practice, of the dogmatic statements and of the alleged usage of the Prophet, is to make the Muslim attitude to sin mechanical, with outward formalism as the general rule and inward spiritual experience the rare exception.

[1] *Miskātu'l-Masābīh*, ed. Bombay, 1878; for many other similar traditions see W. St. Clair Tisdall, *The Path of Life*, London and Madras, 1912.
[2] viii. 10. [3] ii. 273.
[4] Maulavi Rafi'ad-dīn Aḥmad, in *Nineteenth Century*, xlii. [1897] 522.
[5] *Meshkāt*, bk. i. ch. ii., quoted in *DI*, p. 595.

LITERATURE.—W. R. W. Gardner, *The Qur'ānic Doctrine of Sin*, London and Madras, 1914; T. P. Hughes, *DI*, London, 1895; E. Sell, *The Faith of Islām*[2], do. 1907; D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, do. 1903, Appendix 1, *The Religious Life and Attitude in Islām*, Chicago, 1909, lect. x.

EDWARD SELL.

SIN (Roman).—Sin, in the Christian world, implies a personal and moral relation between man and the divine power which was never realized in anything like the same degree in ancient Roman life. The sinner is to moderns not only a breaker of superhuman law, but a contemner of the majesty of a divine person. The sense of being at enmity with superhuman forces was of course conspicuous in primitive Roman religion, as in primitive religions of all ages and all lands. The condition of hostility is declared by the god against the human being for some offence which may have been given by him quite unwittingly; but the punishment which he suffers is not the less believed to be merited. Although the tragic conception of the Greek ἄτη is foreign to native Italic and Roman beliefs, yet they included the persuasion that divine vengeance often falls on a human being for some merely mechanical error apart from blameworthiness of a moral character. In the Roman *ius diuinum* of early days, as in the secular law, a casual slip in ceremonial action or utterance might entail dire consequences, comparable to those assigned to arrogant defiance or neglect of the deity. The rigidity of the religious formula was parallel to that of the legal formula, and the maxim of the Twelve Tables, 'uti lingua nuncupassit, ita ius esto,' applied in both spheres. In the field of early ancient civilization deities were realized as essentially civic, and as concerned only with the members of particular communities. It was natural therefore that offences against them should be on the same level with the offences against secular law. Each man was related to the divinities of his city rather as a citizen than as a mere person. When deities came to be conceived as non-local, the idea of offences against them grew to be larger and more refined. The old civic cults were felt by the most cultivated spirits to be crampingly formal and narrow, and men turned away from them, finding satisfaction for their needs in those more emotional and spontaneous forms of worship which spread from East to West and to a large extent supplanted immemorial civic usage. In Italy the new influences were first felt among the Greek settlements, but they had so far affected the Italic peoples that in 186 B.C. the Roman senate, as the supreme religious authority in Italy, felt constrained to suppress those 'Bacchic' brotherhoods which were regarded as constituting a 'conspiracy' against society and the State. The decrees then issued are contained in the famous extant inscription.[1]

It may be said, however, that to certain offences of special enormity the notion of sinfulness did attach in very early days among Romans, as among Greeks. An offender guilty of a crime to which the vague but awful penalty 'Sacer esto' was assigned was outlawed and might lawfully be slain, as odious to the gods, by any man's hand.[2]

The consciousness of personal defilement, as caused by the perpetration of acts forbidden by the deities, was stimulated in Italy by the Græco-Oriental worships, which became ever more popular. A feeling spread that for the welfare of the soul it was needful to seek reconciliation with heaven and deliverance from the bondage of error, by

[1] *CIL* i. 196. [2] See art. ROMAN RELIGION.

special services and practices which would ensure divine pardon and relief from the stains contracted by the soul. The mysteries, as a special means of escape, never held the same importance in Roman culture as they acquired for the Greeks.[1] In the West the conception of sin was vivified in a high degree by the prevalence in late antiquity of the Stoic philosophy, which drew much of its spiritual effectiveness from the mystical religions of the East, transmitted through a Greek atmosphere. The ethical aspects of philosophy became dominant over the speculative teaching in the Stoic as in all the late schools of Hellas. The idea of sin was especially developed by the Stoics (*q.v.*), whose ethical doctrines took a strong hold of the later culture of Rome as of Greece. These philosophers, paying little heed to many insuperable antinomies, contrived to combine a pantheism which was technically materialistic with the conception of a personal relation to a Supreme Being, and to tinge with emotion an intellectualism which in some of its aspects remained as dry and barren as it could well be. The Stoic law of life for the individual was summed up in unswerving loyalty to a divine order of the universe, and in the composure of the will to perfect harmony with the will of God. A healthy state of the will, according to the Stoics, ensures happiness, while a recalcitrance against the divine purposes, as expressed in the ordered universe, brings misery. The Stoics brought into general use the terms for 'sin' which established themselves in the Greek world, viz. ἁμαρτία and ἁμάρτημα, and these were rendered in Latin by *peccatio* and *peccatum*, which passed into the language of Latin Christian theology. The whole duty of man was declared by the Stoics to lie in self-discipline, to the end that the will might be brought into complete accord with the will of God. A religious fervour was thus infused into the pursuit of virtue, which was a new influence in culture, and the sway of Stoic religious and moral teaching over the civilization of the Roman Empire, with its action on early Christian thought, was incalculably powerful. This was achieved in the paradoxical manner of the Stoics, in spite of their theoretic doctrine that sin has its origin in erroneous intellectual judgment. The whole field of education in imperial Roman times was permeated by a Stoic colouring, which entered deeply into early Christian literature and into all the later developments of philosophy, in which the corruption of the human soul and the need for a divine deliverance were accepted as axiomatic. This great practical achievement of Stoicism in the Roman world was accomplished in spite of some doctrines which might have been expected to work against general acceptance. Opponents of the school ridiculed their admission that the appearance in the world of the perfect man had been rarer than that of the phœnix. Again, the Stoic thesis that 'all sins are equal' (*i.e.* are of the same heinousness) was difficult to accommodate to ordinary life, and indeed it was more or less ignored in Stoic literature, as may be seen in the writings of Seneca (*q.v.*). The attractiveness of man's proper aim, in the Stoic view, was great enough to overcome the weight of the paradoxes which encumbered it. Many utterances are to be found in the later classical literature, above all in the Stoic, relating to the subject of sin, which have an almost Christian ring. The idea of 'salvation' from sin is often found in connexion with the different divinities who were customarily designated as 'saviours' (σωτῆρες). The notion of a 'new birth,' so eminently Christian, is encountered in connexion with the ceremony of the *taurobolium* (*q.v.*), whereby, as one inscription records, a man was 'reborn for everlasting life' ('renatus in aeternum').

[1] See artt. MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), MYSTERIES (Roman).

LITERATURE.—Information on this subject is widely scattered in works bearing on ancient philosophy and religion. Specially may be mentioned E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, iii., 'Nacharistotelische Philosophie[4],' Leipzig, 1903–09, and E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge, 1911, ch. xiv. 'Sin and Weakness.'

J. S. REID.

SIN (Teutonic).—In the old Teutonic languages, especially in the Gothic, there is no clear concept of sin as a conscious nonconformity to, or transgression of, an ideal standard of right or duty as revealed in conscience or divine law.[1] The word *syn* entered the North from western Germany. It was a derivative from *sun*, a root of several compounds with the implicated idea of a denial or an apology. Its meaning when used in cognate languages was rather uncertain. In the Salic Law[2] it was used in establishing a plea of 'Not guilty' before the court, while later it came to stand as a technical and abstract expression for the matter of the accusation itself, as we notice in *Heliand*, the Old Saxon epic of the Saviour from about 825. In the Northern languages this usage also became established by way of accommodation as Christianity was introduced. The word generally used for sin in Ulfilas' translation of the New Testament, from about 350, was *fra-vaurhts*, 'misdeed'—an idea which was readily comprehended by the Gothic peoples among which he worked as a missionary.

Thus, while it must be granted that it is difficult exactly to make out the early Teutonic idea of sin in a manner which would meet the philosophical and religious requirements of our times, and even if we allow that Teutonic literature reveals character rather than principles of conduct, this does not mean that the Teutons were callous to moral requirements. Their convictions about right and wrong were very decided, at least on certain points. With them blasphemy, *e.g.*, was a great sin, as were also perjury and adultery. There is therefore evidently a moral value placed upon man's conduct as noticed in the *Völuspa* and other Eddic songs, in the *Gylfaginning*, and in the Northern and Icelandic sagas. In the *Nibelungenlied*, the great German epic from the Middle Ages, there are few traces of strictly moral sentiments, for, while this *Lied* in its subject-matter has much in common with the *Eddas*, it brings out less of the humane character and more of the valiant and heroic.

With the earlier Teuton, as known to Tacitus, the case was different. When treating of crimes and courts he says:

'The nature of the crime determines the punishment. Traitors and deserters they hang on trees. Cowards and those given to debauchery they smother in filthy bogs and fens, casting a hurdle over them. In these different punishments the point and spirit of the law is, that crimes which affect the political organization may be exposed to public notoriety, while the infamous vice and the debauchee cannot too soon be removed from the light of day.'[3]

The classification which is here brought out could be arrived at only from a moral point of view. That cowards were counted infamous is evident to every student of Teutonic life and literature. Cowardice was the sin of all sins, for which there was no pardon.[4]

The eschatological views which are abundant in the later songs of the *Edda*, in the *Gylfaginning*, and in the sagas agree entirely with the grouping of sins and punishments as obtaining in this life. In Saxo's *Danish History* the place where the condemned are kept and tortured is described in the most repulsive terms, while the

[1] Moritz Heyne, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, iii. 916.
[2] J. F. Behrend, *Lex Salica*[2].
[3] *Germ.* xii. [4] *Ib.* vi.

inmates are depicted accordingly.[1] In the *Gylfaginning* we have it set forth that the consequences of all misdeeds and crimes will follow the sinner after death, and that he will have to meet with due punishment in Nastrand, one of the dismal halls below Niflheim, where Hel rules.[2] Those who arrive at their dreadful destination are sinners of various descriptions and classes, of which nine or ten are enumerated in the *Song of the Sun*—if this poem, standing almost on the border-line between heathendom and Christianity, may be taken as a witness. From it as well as from many other records, some of undisputed heathen character, we learn that enemies of the gods, desecrators, the unmerciful, perjurers, murderers, adulterers, the covetous, the proud and the arrogant, violators of laws, and breakers of covenants are doomed to Niflhel for ever, or at least for a very long time.[3]

In the *Vǫluspa*[4] Nastrand and its woeful prisoners are described as follows:

'She saw a hall standing,
far from the sun,
in Nastrand;
its doors are northward turned,
venom-drops fall in
through its apertures:
entwined is that hall
with serpents' backs.
She there saw wading
the sluggish streams
bloodthirsty men
and perjurers,
and him who the ear beguiles
of another's wife.
There Nidhögg sucks
the corpses of the dead;
the wolf tears men.
Understand ye yet, or what?'

From all this it seems perfectly clear that the concept of a coming retribution in another world was fostered and entertained by the Teutons and especially by those of the north. It also goes without saying that man's moral responsibility had to be reckoned with, even though the very idea of sin was not altogether like ours. It referred less to the religious life itself—something of which we know very little in regard to the Teuton—and more to the external behaviour. The reaction upon the sinner himself from the evil deed in the first place made him an outcast from his own people and an object of punishment, while in the second the doom will follow him after death and into the dismal regions of Hel, where he will be chastised according to his deserts. Sin as a condemnation will cleave to him for ever. In the light of this, those two well-known strophes from *Hávamál*[5] may be easier of interpretation as presenting the Teutonic summing-up of the value of man's deeds and the result of his entire life:

'Cattle die, kindred die, we ourselves also die;
but the fair name never dies of him who has earned it.

Cattle die, kindred die, we ourselves also die;
but I know one thing that never dies,—
judgment on each one dead.'

LITERATURE.—Moritz Heyne, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, iii., Leipzig, 1895; *Lex Salica*, ed. J. F. Behrend[2], Weimar, 1897; Tacitus, *Germanica*; Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, books i.–ix., tr. O. Elton, London, 1894; *The Elder Edda*, tr. Benjamin Thorpe, do. 1866; R. B. Anderson, *The Younger Edda*, Chicago, 1880; A. Olrik, *Nordisches Geistesleben*, Heidelberg, 1908; R. Hildebrand, *Recht und Sitte auf den primitiveren wirtschaftl. Kulturstufen*[2], Jena, 1908; J. A. Enander, *Vara Förfäders Sinnelag*, Stockholm, 1894; C. Rosenberg, *Nordboernes Aandsliv fra Oldtiden till vore Dage*, Copenhagen, 1877–78; V. Grönbeck, *Helligheden og Helligdom*, Copenhagen, 1912; see also literature to artt. SACRIFICE (Teutonic) and SALVATION (Teutonic).

S. G. YOUNGERT.

SIN (Original).—See ORIGINAL SIN.

[1] Saxo Gram., Eng. tr. ed. Rasmus B. Anderson, New York, 1905, ii. 217 f.
[2] *Younger Edda*, ch. 34.
[3] *Song of the Sun*, st. 53–68; *Sig. Fafn.* ii. 4.
[4] *Vǫluspa*, st. 42 f. [5] St. 76 f.

SIND, SINDH.—The province of Sind forms the extreme north-west portion of the Bombay Presidency, consisting of the lower valley and delta of the Indus, with an area of 46,968 sq. m. and a population of 3,513,435.

1. Name.—It takes its name from Skr. *sindhu*, probably connected with the root *syand*, 'to flow,' 'the ocean,' afterwards specially applied to the river Indus.

'Sindhu in the Rigveda and the Atharvaveda often means "a stream" merely, but it has also the more exact sense of "the stream" *par excellence*, the Indus. The name is, however, rarely mentioned after the period of the Saṃhitas, always then occurring in such a way as to suggest distance.'[1]

2. History.—Sind formed an early Aryan settlement and a seat of trade with E. Africa and the Persian Gulf (*c.* 1000 B.C.), was conquered by Darius Hystaspes (521–485 B.C.), by Alexander the Great (326 B.C.), formed part of the Mauryan empire, and was occupied by the Ephthalites or White Huns in the 7th cent. A.D. It was the first part of India occupied by the Muhammadans under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Qāsim (A.D. 712). Maḥmūd of Ghaznī occupied the valley (1024–26). After this it became the seat of a Hindu dynasty, that of the Sūmras (1053), who were overthrown by Alāu-d-dīn Khiljī about the end of the 13th century. They were followed by another Hindu dynasty, the Sammās. Finally (1592), the Mughal Akbar united the province to the empire at Delhi. Towards the end of the 17th cent. the Kalhorās rose to power in the lower Indus valley, and ruled it till the invasion of Nādir Shāh (1739). Subsequently it was held by local princes, the Tālpur Mīrs, who were defeated by Sir C. Napier at the battle of Miānī in 1843, when the whole valley, with the exception of the Khairpur State, was annexed to the British dominions.[2]

3. Ethnology.—The province is distinguished from other parts of India by the great predominance of Muhammadans, who, at the census of 1911, amounted to 75·14 per cent of the total population, Hindus being 23·83 per cent, and the balance being made up of animists, Christians, Parsis, Jews, and the so-called Hindu-Muhammadans, who follow both creeds.[3] The Sindis may be regarded as descendants of the original Hindu population, who were converted to Islām during the reign of the Umayyad *khalīfahs*. When the province was invaded by Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, there was a large and flourishing Hindu kingdom, provided with an efficient army.[4] The foreign elements are represented by Sayyids, Afghāns, Baloch, Jāt, Meman, Khwāja, and African slaves.[5] The Hindus occupy a position analogous to that of the Musalmāns in the rest of the Presidency, being in a minority and greatly influenced by the former predominance of Musalmān ideas and culture. The Brāhmans, consisting of Pokharnās (or Pushkarnās) from Rājputānā and Sāraswats from the Panjāb, are illiterate and depraved. There are no Kṣatriyās, those claiming that position being generally Banyās who have partly conformed to Sikhism, and are really heterodox.[6] The most important Hindu caste is that of the Lohānās, of whom the 'Āmil section are clerks and writers, early immigrants from the Panjāb, as is shown by their language and its alphabet. They wear the Brāhmanical cord (*janeo*), worship the god of the Indus, Viṣṇu, or Śiva, or follow the faith of Nānak Shāh (*q.v.*). The other important Banyā caste is that of the Bhātiās, who are strong in Gujarāt and Cutch.[7] There are few castes of the Śūdra group, those that exist wearing the Brāhmanical cord, applying the Hindu sectarial marks to their foreheads, and in all other respects imitating Banyās. They generally worship Śiva and his consort Devī, and employ Brāhman priests. The Sikhs include the Akālī Khālsā, or pure Sikhs, and the Lohānās. The former imitate the Panjāb devotees—never cut their hair, eat various forbidden meats, such as the domestic fowl, have the usual tabu against tobacco, anoint their hair with butter instead of

[1] A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, ii. 450.
[2] See Aitken, *Gazetteer*, p. 85 ff.; *IGI* xxii. 394 ff.
[3] *Census of India, 1911*, vii., *Bombay*, p. 58.
[4] Hughes, *Gazetteer*, p. 86. [5] Burton, *Sindh*, p. 233 ff.
[6] *Ib.* p. 313. [7] *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 116 ff.

oil, and eat flesh only when the animal has been killed according to the ritual (*jhaṭkā*).[1] The local Hinduism is thus of an impure type, only a few Brāhmans studying Sanskrit, while the popular faith is mixed up with Islām and Sikhism.[2]

4. The fusion of Islām with Hinduism.—We find Islām and Hinduism amalgamated here in a more remarkable way, perhaps, than in any other part of India. The Hindu will often become the disciple (*murīd*) of a Muslim, and *vice versa*; not only are the same saints respected by members of both religions, but each faith uses a different name for the same holy man. The Hindus know the river-god under the name of Jind Pīr (*zindah*, 'the living one'), while Muhammadans call him Khwājah Khiḍr; in the same way Uddhero Lāl of the Hindus becomes the Musalmān Shaikh Tahir and Lālā Jasrāj becomes Pīr Mangho. The Hindus, probably with justice, claim these worthies as their own, and the Musalmāns have only applied new names to them.

5. Worship of saints.—The distinguishing feature of Islām in Sind is the wide-spread worship of saints (*pīr, walī*).[3] This is largely due to the influence of Ṣūfism (*q.v.*), and is opposed to the original form of the faith. But, though they may have lost touch with orthodoxy, the Musalmāns are a religious people.

'The mass of the Sind peasantry, though they may be unacquainted with the cardinal articles of their faith, are careless or ignorant of its precepts; but, upon the whole, they strike a stranger as being more religious according to their lights than Musalmāns of almost any other part of India. They are also pre-eminent for abject devotion to Pīrs and Sayads, living or dead.'[4]

The most eminent of these saints are Lāl Shāhbāz and Pīr Mangho, or Mango.

Lāl Shāhbāz, the head of the Jalālī order, whose original name was 'Usmān-i-Merwandī, from his birthplace, was a qalandar and a rigid celibate who died at Sehwān in 1274. He was called Shāhbāz, 'the red falcon,' because, as in the legend of Abraham,[5] his colour was changed to red by his penance of sitting in an iron pot over a broiling fire for a year.[6] His tomb is much respected, and every year a girl of the Khonbatī, or weaver, caste is married to his tomb, with music, dancing, and other solemnities. She is never allowed to contract a real marriage. The rite of initiation into the order is made as humiliating as possible, in order to prepare the religious mendicant (*faqīr*) for the life which he is about to adopt. All hair on his person is removed; the tomb attendants blacken his face, hang a cord round his neck, show him a looking-glass, and ask him how he likes his appearance. He replies, 'Very much.' Then his shoulder is seared with a hot iron, his body is stripped and smeared with cowdung, and he is told to go forth into the world and beg his bread.[7]

The cult of Pīr Mango at Magar Talāo, or the Crocodile Tank, near Karāchī, is more remarkable. In the tank a number of tame crocodiles (*Crocodilus palustris*) are kept, and goat's flesh is given to them by pilgrims. Here, about the middle of the 13th cent., a Musalmān hermit caused a stream to trickle out of the rock, and Lāl Shāhbāz in like manner produced a mineral spring. Pilgrims visit the tomb of Pīr Mango, and Hindus venerate the place out of reverence for the warm water.[8]

6. Worship of the river Indus.—The cult of Khwājah Khiḍr, or Khiẓr,[9] is common in Sind, where the saint is regarded as the *numen* of the Indus. His shrine at Rohrī is said to have been built A.D. 925 by a Delhī merchant, whose daughter a wicked king tried to abduct; when she prayed to the saint, he changed the course of the river and saved her honour.[10] He is known as Jendā, or Jindā, 'the living' (*zindah*) saint. Closely connected or identical with him is Uddhero Lāl, known as Vadherā Lāl in the Panjāb, said to be prime minister (*wazīr*) of the Khwājah. A long tale is told how he saved the Hindus from persecution by a *qāzi*, or law officer, in the time of the emperor Aurangzīb. He is also known as Shaikh Tahir, and is much respected by Musalmāns, who deny that he has any connexion with the Hindus. In another story Uddhero Lāl was an incarnation of the river Indus who rose from the water in the form of a spearman, mounted on a white horse, and was then reborn from a Banyā, or merchant woman. He overcame the Musalmāns in a religious controversy and was honoured by an annual fair.[1] This saint, in his various manifestations, is worshipped by a sect of river-worshippers (Daryā-panthī) by means of water and lights; a lamp always burns at his shrine; and at the new moon he is worshipped at the river, canal, or any piece of water, with offerings of rice, sugar candy, spices, fruits, and lighted lamps.[2] Worship of this holy man is common among the Jhabēl, a Panjāb fishing caste, and among the Lohānās of Cutch, because he is said to have saved them when they fled from Multān.[3]

7. Magical powers of saints.—Saints in Sind are regarded as workers of miracles.

They cure barrenness and diseases usually incurable by ordinary means, the remedy being to give the patient a drop of water to drink, or to pass the hand over the part affected at the shrine; they cause prayers to be granted; protect mariners and traders; appear to a person at a distance to save him from some unseen danger; calm storms, especially those that are distant; change female into male children; convert sinners and infidels to the true faith; turn men's hearts by a look, thought, or word; compel inanimate objects to act as if they possessed life and volition; benefit friends and destroy foes; exercise dominion over beasts, birds, fishes; make youths' beards grow and restore vigour to aged men; raise the dead; put the fiend to flight, and summon angels and spirits; cause trees to produce butter and honey; refine sensual to spiritual love; know men's thoughts and plans; break chains, fetters, doors, and walls; live without food, drink, or sleep; cause a single pot of water to support a caravan without sensible diminution; commute the death of a person by providing a substitute; give learning to fools.[4]

The method of venerating a saint is as follows:

The votary comes to the sepulchre (*turbat*) and makes the invocation: 'O Qalandar! O thou with a great name, well-known in both worlds! Thou listener to thy friends! Only grant me my desire, and I propose to distribute a pot (*deg*) of rice-flour, cooked with sugar and butter, to the poor in thy honour!' He visits the shrine morning and evening, and, if his need be urgent, takes up his abode at the spot, because his only chance of success lies in his perseverance, and the saint needs to be reminded of the wants of the suppliant.

LITERATURE.—*IGI* xxii. 389 ff.; E. H. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, Karāchī, 1907; A. W. Hughes, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*[2], London, 1876; R. F. Burton, *Scinde: or, the Unhappy Valley*, 2 vols., do. 1851, *Sindh, and the Races that inhabit the Valley of the Indus*, do. 1851, *Sind Revisited*, 2 vols., do. 1877; T. Postans, *Personal Observations on Sinde, the Manners and Customs of its Inhabitants and its Productive Capabilities*, do. 1843; E. B. Eastwick, *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*[3], do. 1851; D. Ross, *The Land of the Five Rivers and Sindh*, do. 1883.

W. CROOKE.

SIN-EATING.—Sin-eating was an ancient custom at funerals in Wales and the Welsh Marches. The earliest allusion to it is by John Aubrey in the reign of Charles II. He says:

'In the County of Hereford was an old Custome at funeralls to hire [have] poor people, who were to take upon them all the sinnes of the party deceased. One of them I remember lived in a cottage on Rosse-high way. (He was a long, leane, ugly, lamentable poor raskal.) The manner was that when the Corps was brought out of the house and layd on the Biere; a Loafe of bread was brought out and delivered to the Sinne-eater over the corps, as also a Mazar-bowle of maple (Gossips bowle) full of beer, wch he was to drinke up, and sixpence in money, in consideration whereof he tooke upon him (ipso facto) all the Sinnes of the Defunct, and freed him (or her) from walking after they were dead. . . . This Custome (though rarely used in our dayes) yet by some people was observed [continued] even in the strictest time of ye Presbyterian goverment: as at Dynder, volens nolens the Parson of ye Parish, the kinred [relations] of a woman deceased there had this ceremonie punctually performed according to her Will: and also the like was donne at ye City of Hereford in these times, when a woman kept many yeares before her death a Mazard-bowle for the Sinne-eater; and the like in other places in this Countie; as also in Brecon, *e.g.* at Llangors, where Mr. Gwin the minister

1 Burton, p. 317 ff. 2 *Ib.* p. 325.
3 See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Muhammadan in India).
4 Aitken, p. 159. 5 *Qur'ān*, xxi. 68 f.
6 Burton, *Sind Revisited*, ii. 185 ff.
7 Burton, *Sindh*, p. 211 f.
8 Burton, *Sind Revisited*, i. 92 ff.
9 See art. KHIḌR. 10 Hughes, p. 681.

1 Burton, *Sindh*, p. 329, *Sind Revisited*, i. 294 f.
2 Aitken, p. 165 f.
3 H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911, ii. 380; *BG* v. [1880] 55, ix. pt. i. [1901] 349 f.
4 Burton, *Sindh*, p. 229 f.

about 1640 could no hinder y^e^ performing of this ancient custome. I believe this custome was heretofore used over all Wales. . . . In North-Wales, the Sinne-eaters are frequently made use of; but there, insted of a Bowle of Beere, they have a bowle of Milke.'[1]

Again, writing of offertories at funerals, he says:

'These are mentioned in the Rubrick of y^e^ ch. of Engl. Coffon-Prayer-booke: but I never sawe it used, but once at Beaumaris, in Anglesey; but it is used over all the Counties of North-Wales. But before when the corps is brought out of Doores, there is Cake & Cheese, and a new Bowle of Beere, and another of Milke with y^e^ Anno Dni ingraved on it, & y^e^ parties name deceased, w^ch^ one accepts of on the other side of y^e^ Corps; & this Custome is used to this day, 1686, in North Wales.'[2]

Aubrey is also related to have given to a Mr. Bagford the following account of the ceremony as practised in Shropshire:

'Within the memory of our Fathers, in Shropshire, in those villages adjoyning to Wales, when a person dyed there was notice given to an old Sire, (for so they called him), who presently repaired to the place where the deceased lay, and stood before the door of the house, when some of the Family came out and furnished him with a Cricket, on which he sat down facing the door. Then they gave him a Groat, which he put in his pocket; a Crust of Bread, which he eat; and a full bowle of Ale, which he drank off at a draught. After this he got up from the Cricket and pronounced, with a composed gesture, *the ease and rest of the Soul departed, for which he would pawn his own Soul.*'[3]

In more recent times Matthew Moggridge of Swansea gave an account to the Cambrian Archæological Association, at their meeting at Ludlow in 1852, of the custom as lately surviving in the neighbourhood of Llandebie, about twelve or thirteen miles from Swansea.

He related that, 'when a person died, the friends sent for the Sin-eater of the district, who on his arrival placed a plate of salt on the breast of the defunct, and upon the salt a piece of bread. He then muttered an incantation over the bread, which he finally ate, thereby eating up all the sins of the deceased. This done, he received his fee of 2s. 6d., and vanished as quickly as possible from the general gaze; for as it was believed that he really appropriated to his own use and behoof the sins of all those over whom he performed the above ceremony, he was utterly detested in the neighbourhood—regarded as a mere Pariah—as one irredeemably lost.'[4]

Moggridge's account was afterwards challenged by Canon Silvan Evans and others. But, if we turn again to N. Wales, we find a ceremony there described corroborating Aubrey's account. In the *British Magazine*, vii. [1835] 399, there appeared a description said to be taken 'from a MS. book of a bishop of St. Asaph' written about a century earlier, which runs as follows:

'When the corpse is brought out of the house and laid upon the bier, and covered before it be taken up, the next of kin to the deceased—widow, mother, daughter or cousin (never done by a man)—gives cross over the corpse to one of the poorest neighbours two or three white loaves of bread and a cheese with a piece of money stuck in it, and then a new wooden cup of drink, which some will require the poor body that receives it immediately to drink a little of. When this is done, the minister (if present) saith the Lord's prayer, and then they set forward towards church.'

Pennant, writing about the year 1780, describes the same custom as practised in Carnarvonshire. He apparently uses the source used by the writer in the *British Magazine*, but adds details of his own.[5] In 1820 Robert Jones, a Calvinistic Methodist minister of N. Wales, describes it also, adding that the poor man to whom the loaf, cheese, and beer had been given over the corpse 'in return blessed and prayed fervently and earnestly with [or for] the dead man's soul.'[6] Twenty years earlier Bingley speaks of the custom, which he assigns to Carnarvonshire and some other parts of N. Wales, as having been diverted to a gift of money for procuring slips of yew, box, and other evergreens to strew over and ornament the grave during a certain period after the interment.

But still the money was 'given to the person on a plate at the door of the house where the body is standing on a bier. The gift is called *Diodlys*, for formerly, instead of it, the person used to receive from the hand of the female relative a cheese with a piece of money stuck in it, and some white bread, and afterwards a cup of drink, but this practice is now entirely discontinued; the gift however still retains its old name.'[1]

The word *diodlys* refers to the gift of the drink, as also do other Welsh words for the custom: *diawdlestr* or *diodlestr*, *diodlifft* (which Sir J. Rhys conjectured to be partly English, meaning the drink lifted over the dead), and *cwpan y meirw*, the cup of the dead.

What appear to be remains of the practice have lately been found in Herefordshire and Derbyshire.

A resident in the neighbourhood of Hay 'was invited to attend the funeral of the sister of a farmer near Crasswall [Herefordshire], and to his surprise was invited to go upstairs to the room where the body was lying. He went, with the brother and four bearers. At the bottom of the bed, at the foot of the coffin, was a little box with a white cloth covering it. On it were placed a bottle of port wine, opened, and six glasses arranged around it. The glasses were filled, and my informant was asked to drink. This he refused, saying that he never took wine. "But you must drink, sir," said the old farmer; "it is like the sacrament. It is to kill the sins of my sister." Traces of this custom are to be found at Walterstone; and near the Welsh border from Hay to Longtown port wine is drunk, exactly as described, by the bearers in the room where the body lies. Finger biscuits are provided.'[2] 'At a funeral in Derbyshire wine is first offered to the bearers who carry the corpse. This custom is strictly maintained, the guests not receiving any wine until the funeral party has returned from church.' Addy, who reports this, was told by the daughter of a farmer near Newark, formerly residing near Dronfield, 'When you drink wine at a funeral, every drop that you drink is a sin which the deceased has committed. You thereby take away the dead man's sins and bear them yourself.'[3]

In Yorkshire the custom was long preserved (and perhaps still is) of handing round wine and a special kind of sponge-cakes known as 'avril-bread' to friends attending the funeral, immediately before the procession starts from the house for the churchyard.[4] The word *avril* is derived by Skeat from *arval*, 'succession-ale,' 'heir-ale,' the name of the feast given by an heir on succeeding to property in Iceland. The shape of the biscuits differed according to locality. They were often wrapped up, that the guests might take them home, in paper printed on the outside with coffins, cross-bones, skulls, and similar emblems of mortality,[5] or (probably under the influence of the Evangelical Revival) with pious verses. The custom seems to have spread even as far afield as the island of Antigua, in the West Indies, where species of pastry called 'dyer-bread' and 'biscuit-cakes' are said to have been formerly handed round at Negro funerals, enveloped in white paper and sealed with black wax.[6] It is not known how or whence the custom was introduced. In Wales a custom is described of giving to the guests before proceeding to the churchyard spiced ale in pewter vessels somewhat larger than those used in the administration of the Lord's Supper. It was administered 'just as the Lord's Supper is administered and almost with the same reverence' to the company, all of whom took their hats off as soon as it made its appearance.[7] The custom was also observed on the Shropshire border, and in addition cakes, wrapped up in black-edged paper as in Yorkshire, were handed round.[8]

[1] *Remaines of Gentilisme and Judaisme, 1686–87* (first published for the Folk-lore Society, London, 1881), p. 35 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 23.
[3] J. Brand and H. Ellis *Observations on Popular Antiquities*, London, 1813, ii. 155, quoting Bagford's letter, dated 1st Feb. 1714–15, from Leland's *Collectanea*, London, 1715, i. 76.
[4] *Archæologia Cambrensis*, new ser., iii. [1852] 330.
[5] *Tours in Wales*, ed. J. Rhys, Carnarvon, 1883, iii. 150.
[6] *Drych yr Amseroedd*, Llanrwst [1820], p. 50.

[1] N. Bingley, *A Tour round N. Wales*, London, 1800, ii. 233.
[2] Mrs. E. M. Leather, *The Folk-lore of Herefordshire*, London, 1912, p. 121.
[3] S. O. Addy, *Household Tales, with other Traditional Remains collected in the Counties of York, Lincoln, Derby and Nottingham*, London, 1895, p. 123 f.
[4] J. C. Atkinson, *Forty Years in a Moorland Parish*, London, 1891, p. 227.
[5] *Manners and Customs* (Gent. Mag. Lib.), London, 1883, p. 70.
[6] *Antigua and the Antiguans* (anon.), London, 1844, ii. 188.
[7] *Cymru Fu Notes and Queries*, ii. [Cardiff, 1891] 271, quoting Rhys Lewis.
[8] *Ib.* p. 275.

A foreigner, describing a nobleman's obsequies which he witnessed at Shrewsbury in the early years of Charles II., states that the minister made a funeral oration in the chamber where the body lay, and 'during the Oration, there stood upon the Coffin a large Pot of Wine, out of which every one drank to the health of the deceased. This being finished, six Men took up the Corps, and carried it on their shoulders to the Church.'[1]

At Cwm Yoy, in the Black Mountain, on the way to Llanthony, the people have at a funeral what they call 'the Last Sacrament.' The coffin is brought out and placed on trestles, and beer and cake are then partaken of by the guests and persons assembled (evidently in the immediate presence of the corpse), before the funeral procession starts.[2]

The interpretation of the custom has been much discussed. Analogues are found in other countries. In the Highlands of Bavaria, when the corpse had been enswathed in a linen shroud and placed on the bier, the death-chamber was carefully washed out and cleaned. The housewife then used to prepare the corpse-cakes. Having kneaded the dough, she placed it on the dead body to rise. When it had risen, the cakes were baked for the expected guests. To the cakes so prepared the belief attached that they would contain the virtues and advantages of the dead man, and that thus his vital power was transferred to the kinsmen who consumed the corpse-cakes and so was preserved to the kin.[3] Here the identification of the food with the dead man is not merely symbolic, as in the Welsh custom; the dough in rising is believed actually to absorb his qualities, which are transmitted to those of his kin who partake of the cakes. Moreover, the consumption of the food thus identified is not confined to one official; it is extended to the kinsmen who are present, and, as might be expected in such a case, it is held to be beneficial to them; they partake for their own advantage; they run no risk on behalf of the dead.

In India, however, the official practice of taking over the sins of another is well known.

When the king of Tanjore died in 1801, his corpse was cremated as usual, together with two of his wives chosen by the Brāhmans. A portion of his bones which had not been entirely consumed was reduced to powder, mixed with some boiled rice, and eaten by twelve Brāhmans. This act 'had for its object the expiation of the sins of the deceased—sins which, according to the popular opinion, were transmitted to the bodies of the persons who ate the ashes, and were tempted by money to overcome their repugnance for such disgusting food.'[4] About the year 1884, when the funeral party of a *ranī* of Chamba reached the burning ground some *ghī* and rice were placed in the hands of the corpse and consumed by a Brāhman on payment of a certain sum.[5] A British official was informed by a Brāhman at a village near Raipur 'that he had eaten food out of the hand of the Raja of Bilāspúr after his death, and that in consequence he had for the space of one year been placed on the throne at Bilāspúr. At the end of the year he had been given presents, including a village, and then turned out of Bilāspúr territory, and forbidden apparently to return. Now he is an outcaste among his co-religionists, as he has eaten food out of a dead man's hand.'[6]

The object of eating food from the corpse's hand is not stated in these cases. In the latter the Brāhman seems to have been thought to have become possessed by the soul of the deceased, as in Bavaria the qualities of the deceased are transmitted to the kinsmen who eat the corpse-cakes.

Among the lower castes and tribes in India an offender against the ritual prescriptions of his people is expelled, but may be re-admitted on submission and the provision of a feast for his caste-fellows or fellow-tribesmen.

Among the Oraons of the Central Provinces the head of the caste *panchāyat*, or council, is called the *panua*. When an offender is reinstated, the *panua* first drinks water from his hand and takes upon himself the burden of the erring one's transgression.[1] A woman belonging to the wandering tribe of the Kaikāri, in the Central Provinces, who goes wrong with a man who is not a member of the tribe is excluded. But she may be re-admitted after being purified by a ceremony, part of which consists in being seated under a wooden shed having two doors. She enters by one of these, and the shed is then set on fire. She must remain seated until the whole shed is burning, when she may escape by the other door. A young boy of the caste then eats from her hand, and, thus purified, she is re-admitted to social intercourse.[2]

Usually the official or body re-admitting the offender eats and drinks with him. By so doing he or they take the burden of the sins of which the offender has been guilty.[3]

In Oudh, when female infanticide is practised, the infant is destroyed in the room where it was born, and there buried. The floor is then plastered over with cow-dung, and, on the thirteenth day after, the village or family priest must cook and eat his food in that room. This is considered as a *hom*, or burnt-offering, and by eating it in that place the priest is supposed to take the whole *hatia*, or sin, upon himself, and to cleanse the family from it.[4]

The ecclesiastical dominance of the Brāhmans in India has probably affected more or less all castes and tribes of the population, rendering prominent the idea of sin and practices for its removal. If we turn elsewhere, we find similar customs in reference to the dead explained as in Bavaria.

The savage tribes inhabiting the valley of the Uaupes, a tributary of the Amazon, bury their dead beneath the floor of the communal house. About a month later the survivors 'disinter the corpse, which is then much decomposed, and put it in a great pan, or oven, over the fire, till all the volatile parts are driven off with a most horrible odour, leaving only a black carbonaceous mass, which is pounded into a fine powder and mixed in several large *couchés* (vats made of hollowed trees) of a fermented drink called *caxiri*; this is drunk by the assembled company till all is finished; they believe that thus the virtues of the deceased will be transmitted to the drinkers.'[5] The like practices are reported of other S. American tribes, either at the present day or up to quite recent times. Among these the Cobeus are expressly said to observe the custom for the purpose of incorporating in their own persons all the energy of the deceased. The Caribs do so for a similar reason. Some of the Brazilian tribes hold that the soul dwells in the bones, and by means of this proceeding the departed live again in those who thus drink up the bones.[6]

So among the tribes of the Darling River, in Australia, in the course of the funeral ceremonies a piece of flesh is cut from a corpse, 'taken to the camp, and after being sun-dried is cut up into small pieces and distributed among relatives and friends of the deceased: some use the piece in making the charm called *Yountoo*; others suck it to get strength and courage, or throw it into the river to bring a flood and fish, when both are wanted.'[7] A European informant in whom A. W. Howitt had full confidence told him 'that when a boy he saw two old men secretly roasting and eating fat taken from a dead blackfellow, and they observed to him that now they would have the strength of the other man.'[8] Among the Melanesian population of the Banks Islands a morsel of a corpse would be stolen and eaten by one who desired communion with the ghost. Such an one would then become a *talamaur*; the ghost 'would join in a close friendship with' him and by its aid he could afflict any one whom he desired. 'The same name, *talamaur*, was given to one whose soul was supposed to go out and eat the soul or lingering life of a freshly-dead corpse.'[9]

In these cases the object seems to have been magical. The intention evidently was, by consuming a portion of the corpse, to appropriate some power or quality of the deceased and add it to that of the survivor. The belief in the possibility of acquiring qualities, mental as well as physical, by means of food is wide-spread in the lower culture.

[1] R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iv. 320.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 301.
[3] *Ib.* ii. 514, iii. 164, 199, 402; *Census of India, 1911*, vol. i. pt. i. p. 390.
[4] *PNQ* iii. [1886] 179, quoting W. H. Sleeman, *Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh*, 2 vols., London, 1858.
[5] A. R. Wallace, *Narr. of Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro*, London, 1890, p. 346.
[6] *AE* xii. [1899] 83; J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1867, pp. 209, 289; *TES*, new ser., iii. [1865] 158, 193; *Anthropos*, vii. [1912] 215; W. E. Roth, *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 158; D. G. Brinton, *American Race* [Philadelphia, 1891], p. 267.
[7] F. Bonney, *JAI* xiii. [1884] 135.
[8] *Ib.* xvi. [1887] 80.
[9] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 222.

[1] Quoted in Brand and Ellis, ii. 153, note.
[2] Verbal communication to the writer by Mr. Illtyd Gardiner, Registrar of the County Court at Abergavenny.
[3] *Am Urquell*, ii. [Lunden in Holstein, 1891] 101.
[4] J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], ed. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906, p. 366.
[5] *PNQ* ii. [Allahabad, 1886] 93, quoting *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 7th March, 1884.
[6] *Ib.* i. [1883] 86.

Among the Kiwai at the mouth of the Fly River, New Guinea, sharks, because of their ferocity, are held to be the proper kind of food for warriors in war-time; other fish are 'too soft.'[1] When a youth is initiated, among the Thonga of S.E. Africa, as a diviner, a vulture's heart is cooked with other drugs and given to him, so that he 'will be able to dream of things which are far away and go straight to them.'[2] The Omaha give a boy a turtle's heart to make his heart strong (like the shell of a turtle?); the fat about a buffalo's heart was given to children that they might have strong hearts, *i.e.* be courageous; a buffalo's liver eaten raw was said to make a man courageous, and to give him a clear voice.[3] The children of the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco are forbidden milk, whether of the cow, goat, sheep, or mare, 'because it is supposed that the milk upon which they are nourished will influence them physically as well as in character, and the Indians have no desire that their children should in any way acquire the natures of such animals.'[4] The Caribs eat neither hog nor turtle, though both are plentiful on their islands, lest their eyes become small like those of the former, or lest they themselves become clumsy and stupid like the latter.[5] On the other hand, the Ekoi of S. Nigeria hold that the manatee's flesh confers magical properties on those who eat it.[6] The Suk of the Highlands of British E. Africa sometimes give the fat and heart of a lion to children to eat, so that they may become strong.[7] The men of various Dayak tribes eat no deer-flesh lest they thereby acquire the shy, timid character of the deer.[8] On the contrary, among the Macassarese the blood of the deer is much drunk by hunters, with or without palm-wine, apparently with the object of becoming fleet as a deer. At all events it is expressly asserted of the Torajas that their chiefs always drink in war a little blood of the foe whom they have slain, in order to become valiant and strong.[9]

But the qualities desired can also be obtained by appropriating and wearing the spoils of the dead.

The Araucanos, we are told, 'imagine that any portion of the body is endowed with the qualities of the whole. Here we have the reason of their wearing the skins or heads of wild animals: that of the puma to give them strength and valour; of the fox for cunning; of the snake to enable them to crawl unseen among their enemies; eagles' feathers to make them rapid and fearless in attack. They believe that the wearing of these articles endows the wearer with the qualities they represent.'[10] The belief is by no means confined to the Araucanos. It is probable that in the old Armenian Church the priests clothing themselves even at the altar in the hides of wolves, foxes, and other animals did so in order to invest themselves with the sanctity of the animals from which the hides were taken.[11] This seems to have been a continuation of an old heathen rite.[12]

The wearing of the spoils is, however, only one method of substitution for the more complete rite of eating the creature, whether human or non-human, in order to appropriate its qualities. Of all varieties of cannibalism (*q.v.*) the eating of dead relatives is likely to be the earliest discarded. In such a case various devices would be adopted for securing the aim of the practice.

On the island of Vate in the New Hebrides the aged were put to death by burying them alive. A hole was dug, and the victim placed within it in a sitting posture, a live pig tied to each arm. Before the grave was closed, the cords were cut, and the pigs thus liberated were killed and served up at the funeral feast. In this way they seem to be identified with the corpse.[13] Among the Todas and the Kotas of the Nilgiri Hills, at a funeral, a buffalo is killed and brought into contact with the corpse. It is afterwards eaten at the feast.[14] In Kanaur, on the Upper Sutlej, at the annual feast (*śrāddha*) in honour of the dead, a he-goat, reared in the dead man's name, is dressed in his clothes, sacrificed, and eaten by members of his kindred.[15] The Dhāngars and Basors of the United Provinces, after burying a corpse, return to the dead man's house, kill a hog, and, after separating the limbs to be cooked for the funeral feast, bury the trunk in the courtyard of the house, making an invocation to it as the representative of the deceased, and ordering him to rest there in peace and not worry his descendants.[1] In the Balkan pen. ısula cakes, called by the Greeks *kolyva*, made of boiled wheat and other ingredients, are eaten at funerals. These are either carried, as in Albania, in the funeral procession and eaten on the tomb or, as elsewhere, eaten at the funeral feast immediately on the return to the house. In many places they bear the image of the dead stamped upon them. It is sinful to indulge in expressions of sorrow while eating them. As each mourner takes his share, he says: 'May he (or she) be forgiven!' or 'God rest him!' In Calymnos, among the Greeks, the *kolyva* cakes are carried the day after the funeral from the house of death to the tomb, on which they are set to be distributed. The eating of *kolyva* cakes is repeated with similar ceremonies on the third, ninth, and fortieth days and again at the end of three, six, and nine months and of one, two, and three years after death, when the death rites cease.[2] In Sicily annually, on the festival of All Souls, sweetmeats impressed with images of skulls, bones, skeletons, souls in purgatory, and the like, are eaten. This is called 'eating the dead.'[3] There is a similar custom at Perugia and probably at other places in Italy.[4] Elsewhere the intention is hardly less manifest. It is customary among the Letts to serve the relatives, on the grave itself, with bread and cheese, or with beans and peas, beer and brandy.[5] In the government of Smolensk, White Russia, when the grave is filled, a white cloth is spread over it, on which a paste composed of flour, poppy, and honey is served, every one taking a spoonful.[6] In Brunswick—where the funeral meal is regarded as a pious duty to which the departed has a right, the last honour that can be paid to him—the tables are laid by ancient custom on the very spot from which the coffin has just been removed.[7] An Armenian custom, witnessed by Rendel Harris some years ago at the village of Archag, goes further, and reminds us of the Bavarian corpse-cakes. He saw there a corpse lying in the midst of the church, laid out for burial the following day. Two large flat loaves had been placed upon the body. On inquiry he learned, after some difficulty, 'that in former days the custom was to eat the bread, dividing it up amongst the friends of the deceased'—a custom which the people were apparently beginning to outgrow.[8]

The custom of sin-eating, therefore, would seem to be derived from that of eating the corpse. In all the customs just cited there is an attempt to identify the ritual food with the deceased. The same attempt is obviously made in both the British and the Bavarian customs, although the effect of consuming the food is differently interpreted. Under ecclesiastical influence, and specifically in Great Britain under influences derived from the Mosaic legislation, prominence has been given both in India and in this country to the idea of the scapegoat (*q.v.*), which is absent from the ritual elsewhere. There can be little doubt that this idea has been imported into the custom, which is probably represented much more nearly to its original form by the Bavarian rite. A funeral meal is a common incident everywhere. It is the reunion of the kin after the shock of the severance of one of its members. It does not everywhere suggest a primitive feast on the corpse itself; rather it takes the form in most cases of a feast at which the deceased is, though unseen, one of the convives—a feast given to speed the parting soul. Such may have been the feast in classic times provided at the tomb, and that at Argentière, in the department of the Hautes Alpes, France, where the table of the curé and the family is still placed in the cemetery upon the grave itself, and after the meal every one, led by the next of kin, drinks to the health of the departed.[9] But where a special kind of food or drink is provided, and where it is brought into immediate connexion with the corpse, the case is different, and we may reasonably conclude that it represents the flesh of the dead, especially where it is expressly believed

[1] G. Landtman, *JRAI* xlvi. [1916] 323.
[2] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, London, 1912–13, ii. 517.
[3] A. C. Fletcher, *27 RBEW* [1911], p. 332.
[4] W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, London, 1911, p. 137.
[5] W. E. Roth, *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 297.
[6] P. A. Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, London, 1912, p. 2.
[7] M. W. H. Beech, *The Suk, their Language and Folklore*, Oxford, 1911, p. 11.
[8] A. C. Kruijt, *Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel*, The Hague, 1906, p. 51.
[9] *Ib.* p. 56.
[10] R. E. Latcham, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 350.
[11] F. C. Conybeare, *FL* xviii. [1907] 432.
[12] A large collection of cases in J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], *passim*.
[13] A. Featherman, *Social Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, II. i., 'Papuo- and Malayo-Melanesians,' London, 1887, p. 74.
[14] E. Thurston, *Madras Gov. Mus. Bull.*, i. 179, 197, 204, iv. 11.
[15] H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911, ii. 449.

[1] W. Crooke, *PR*, 1896, ii. 58.
[2] L. M. J. Garnett, *The Women of Turkey and their Folklore*, London, 1890–91, ii. 264; A. Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 451; Hartland, *LP* ii. 288.
[3] *Rivista delle Trad. Pop. Italiane*, i. [1893] 239.
[4] *Ib.* p. 322.
[5] *ARW* xvii. [1914] 488.
[6] *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903], 717, citing *ZE* xxv. 650.
[7] R. Andree, *Braunschweiger Volkskunde*, Brunswick, 1896, p. 227.
[8] *FL* xv. [1904] 440.
[9] Laisnel de la Salle, *Croyances et légendes du centre de la France*, Paris, 1875, ii. 81.

that some qualities, good or bad, of the deceased are transmitted to the eater.

Cannibalism of the kind referred to—namely, the eating of dead kinsmen—is reported from Asia, Africa, Australia, S. America, and the E. Indian Archipelago. In Europe it is reported by Strabo[1] of the ancient Irish, though he admits that his evidence is not wholly satisfactory. Nor was it always customary among peoples who practised it to await the convenience of the aged to die. They were slain and devoured. Herodotus[2] attributes this custom to the Massagetæ. Savages all over the world have been wont to put to death the aged and infirm. The traditions of the 'holy maul,' with which the son was said to knock on the head his old and useless father, point to this custom as once practised in Western Europe. There is no direct evidence to connect it with the eating of the dead. But there is a custom in Scandinavia, which was witnessed by Du Chaillu at Husum, whereby the son formally dispossesses his father and takes his place at the head of the table in spite of the father's pleas and protests. That the ceremony is performed at the table prior to partaking of a common meal is noteworthy in this connexion.[3]

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited in the footnotes reference may be made to a lengthy correspondence in *The Academy*, 9th Nov. 1895–23rd May 1896, in which the evidence on which the Welsh custom rests was fully considered; and E. S. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, London, 1894–96, ii. ch. xiii. See also the art. CANNIBALISM, and the authorities there cited.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

SIOUANS.—While the tribal units of the Siouan family of American Indians have many ethical and religious traits in common, yet each separate tribe possesses certain highly individualized characteristics, often not at all in keeping with the views of its nearest relatives and associates. For convenience we may divide the Siouans into three great cultural groups: (1) the Plains division, including the various sub-tribes of the Dakota, Assiniboin, and Crow; (2) the village Siouans, made up of the Mandan and Hidatsa; and (3) the Southern Siouans, the principal component tribes of which are the Omaha, Ponca, Osage, Iowa, Oto, and perhaps the Winnebago.

1. **Ideas of deity.**—Among all these groups there are found certain fundamental concepts, which indeed are not confined to the Siouans alone. While none of them, *e.g.*, have anything corresponding to the true European thought of God, yet all hold ideas of a great supernatural power or complex of powers which controls the universe. The Dakota believe in a celestial hierarchy made up of the sun, sky, earth, and rock, each of which is called *wakan tanka*, and each has control over certain things necessary to the existence of mankind. Among the Omaha, however, the cognate term *wakonda* has a different meaning. It is used with reference to all objects or phenomena which are regarded as supernatural, and at the same time this term is also applied to the sacred and mysterious omnipresent power which animates them. This power is not infrequently personified, and is addressed in prayer as the 'power that moves,' for movement and life are to the Omaha synonymous. There can be little doubt that these ideas permeate the religious beliefs of all the Southern Siouans, and are closely related to the Algonquian *manitu* concepts.

The various agents through which the American Indian believes mysterious power to be manifested are termed *wakanda*, or, among the Dakota, *wakan*. These include a host of beings of greater or less importance, chief among whom are the Thunderbird, Whirlwind, Tree-dwelling elf, and the panther-like Water-monster. These beings are able to transfer their supernatural power to mankind, under certain conditions.

The method of approaching these deities is the same among all the Siouans. At the age of puberty the aspiring youth retires to some solitary spot, where he proceeds to fast, and in some cases, as among the Dakota, to mortify his flesh by undergoing self-torture and even mutilation accompanied by incessant prayer. This period of self-castigation is prolonged for several days, generally not ending until the supplicant has brought on a vision in which one of the *wakanda* appears to him and offers to grant him certain privileges, usually concerned with success in war and the chase. In return for this, the recipient is enjoined to observe certain tabus and always to carry about some memento of his guardian-spirit, such as the skin of the animal in whose form it appeared, or a small symbolic trinket. This object itself now becomes the seat of much, if not all, of its owner's *wakanda*, and its loss renders him helpless and no more than a common man. It also receives sacrifices and feasts and even the prayers of its owner, as being the abiding-place of his *wakanda* and the symbol of, if not the intermediary with, his dream-guardian.

It sometimes happens that an individual receives from his guardian instructions that affect the religious life of the whole tribe.

An Oto now (or very recently) living was ordered by a *wakanda* in a dream to make a shrine in which were to centre certain ceremonies that were to benefit the entire people. Accordingly, the shrine was made and the songs, prayers, and dances which this Siouan received from his mysterious source were introduced into the ceremonial and religious life, not only of his tribe, but among the Iowa and others as well. Thus have grown up societies and ceremonies of a religious nature throughout the entire Siouan stock.

2. **Religious ceremonies.**—Among the Siouan tribes forming the Prairie group the great religious ceremony is the Sun-dance. This function is divided into a secret and a public performance. The former takes place in a secluded *tipi*, where the priests gather for the holding of their rites, such as praying, fasting, and making ready the objects which are to form part of the paraphernalia of the participants in the public ceremony, or are to be used on the altar in the Sun-dance lodge.

On the last day of the secret observances a great ceremonial structure is erected in the centre of the camp circle; the obtaining and bringing in of the material is attended to by certain warrior societies of the tribe, the selection of the centre pole being peculiarly the task of the braves; and all is accomplished with many ritualistic observances. When completed, the structure is a huge roofless enclosure of circular form with a tall central pole. The priests now come out of their seclusion and enter the lodge, which is dedicated by elaborate rites, generally including parades by the societies of warriors. The next day the altar is set up on the west side of the lodge. Its construction differs from tribe to tribe. Among the Ponca it is a mere buffalo-skull placed with a pipe on a rectangle of clean earth from which the sod has been cut. Among the Mandan, in their cognate *okipa* ceremony, it is a large symbolic structure made in reference to mythic incidents. When the altar is completed, the priests decorate the bodies of the dancers with paint and wreaths of sage or willow-leaves about the neck, waist, head, wrists, and ankles. The performers then dance in line, gazing at the sun and incessantly blowing on eagle-bone whistles, while the dance music is sung to the tune of a drum placed near the south side of the lodge. The dancers usually fast during the entire ceremony. They also submit to painful forms of self-torture. The commonest types of this ordeal consist of slitting the skin of the breasts and inserting skewers to which thongs are attached, the thongs being made fast to the central lodge pole, and the victim then endeavouring to tear himself loose. Others drag buffalo-skulls, fastened to their backs in the manner described. The Crow, in particular, chop off joints of their fingers as offerings to the sun. These practices reached their greatest development among the Mandan, who carried the torture to great lengths. Among them individuals were often suspended from the top of the lodge by thongs and skewers. Other less physically painful sacrifices were made—*e.g.*, throwing away blankets, clothing, and other goods.

The Crow Sun-dance, unlike that of the other

[1] iv. 5. 4.
[2] i. 216.
[3] P. B. Du Chaillu, *Land of the Midnight Sun*, London, 1881, i. 393.

Siouans, was not a periodical ceremony. It was held only when a mourner was especially eager to avenge the murder of a close relative by the death of a member of a hostile tribe. He was first obliged to obtain a vision of a conquered foe, which was an implied promise of his success. He was able to have this vision only through the aid of a sacred doll, which was the most important object in the entire ceremony. The owner of one of these dolls (there were several in the tribe) was hired by the person desiring to hold the dance, to take charge of the ceremonies.

Among the Southern Siouans there are many esoteric religious societies. Of these the chief was the Medicine-dance society, as it is known among the Iowa, Oto, Winnebago, and Eastern Dakota. It corresponds closely to the Midē'wiwin of the Central Algonquians. The Omaha form of this society is called Wacicka, and is based on a ritual founded on a long secret origin-myth. The object of the society is to teach its members how to secure long life on earth through the knowledge of healing herbs and medicines, and to secure their safe arrival in the hereafter through ethical and religious teachings.

The tribal religious rites of the Omaha were called *wewacpe*, a term which had reference to bringing the people into thoughtful composure. These rites partook of the general nature of prayer, and were intended to be intermediaries between the Omaha and *wakan*. An error could be adjusted only after a ceremony of contrition and retribution, as they believed that any interruption of the prescribed order of a ceremony made the culprit liable to divine punishment. All *wewacpe* rites were considered institutional and were distinct from individual rites. They were both private and public. Except for the ceremonies of the *hoⁿbe watci*, or night-dance, the performances of the esoteric societies of the tribe were not looked upon as *wewacpe*. The *wewacpe* ceremonies included those for corn or maize, those pertaining to the yearly buffalo-chase, the introduction of a child to the supernatural powers, the consecrating of male children to the thunder, and the calumet ceremony.

3. Eschatology.—Siouan beliefs as to a future existence vary greatly. The Omaha have certain theories in common with the Central Algonquians. The Dakota think that each person has four spirits: one resides in the body, and dies with it; the second always remains near the body; the third accounts for the deeds of the body, and travels south after death; the fourth always lingers with the lock of hair which the mourners cut from the head of the deceased; this lock is kept until the opportunity offers itself to the mourners to throw the bundle away in the enemies' country, when the spirit becomes a wanderer sowing death and disease among the foe. From this theory arose the custom of wearing four eagle-plumes for each enemy killed in war, one for each spirit. There are some Dakota who claim the right to wear a fifth feather for another spirit which transmigrates to the body of a child or an animal. The Dakota seem to have no theory as to what is the final abode of the four spirits, except that they travel to the south.

The Hidatsa, on the other hand, believe that, when one of their people dies, his spirit stays four nights around the camp or settlement where he breathed his last, and then goes to the lodge of his departed relatives in the village of the dead. When he has arrived, he is rewarded for his conduct on earth with the same things as are valued in this life. The 'village of the dead' is located under the earth, but, in order to reach it, the soul must cross a broad swift river on a narrow pathway. Those whose life has been evil slip off and are hurried into oblivion. In the other world the shades pursue and kill the shades of buffalo and other animals that have died.

With the Omaha the belief was held that spirits travelled over the Milky Way to the hereafter, which was a land where the environment resembles that of this world. The journey required four days and as many nights, so the mourners kept a fire burning on the grave for four nights after the interment of the deceased, that its light might cheer and guide the departing soul on its way. After a toilsome trip the spirit came to a fork in the road of the dead, where sat an old man closely wrapped in the folds of a buffalo-robe. If the deceased had been a righteous and peaceable person, the road-keeper directed him a short-cut to the hereafter. If, on the other hand, the soul was that of an evil-doer, it was sent over a rough and dreary road, where it wandered on for ever. By exception, however, the souls of the members of the two Omaha buffalo gentes were supposed to return to their eponymic ancestors.

4. Disposal of the dead and mourning customs.—While many of the Siouan tribes practised scaffold-burial, the Omaha buried their dead on hill-tops, placing the corpse in a flexed position on its side and erecting a mound over it. Some of the belongings of the deceased, such as the knife, tomahawk, or club, kettle, and the like, were placed in the tomb. In some cases a horse was strangled over the grave. Food was also placed near by. Often the male mourners met in a lodge near that of the deceased, and cut the flesh of their arms and thrust willow-twigs into the wounds. Then, with the blood dripping from their cuts, they went to the wake and sang certain funeral-songs. They then withdrew the twigs and threw them on the ground. Mourners often went on the war-path to obtain relief from grief. A man who had lost a child carried its little moccasins and placed them at the side of the body of a fallen foe, whom he had killed, in the belief that the soul of his slain enemy would guide the spirit of the dead babe to its relatives in the hereafter.

LITERATURE.—J. O. Dorsey, 'A Study of Siouan Cults,' *11 RBEW* [1894], pp. 351–544; Alice C. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, 'The Omaha Tribe,' *27 RBEW* [1911], pp. 15–654; Alanson Skinner, 'Societies of the Iowa, Kansa and Ponca Indians,' *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, vol. xi. [1915] no. ix.

ALANSON SKINNER.

SIRENS.—The symbolism of the sirens, Σειρῆνες, in literature and art is of more significance for the history of moral ideas than the etymology of the name or the pre-historic origin of the myth would be, even if we could ascertain them. We cannot. The prevailing view is that they are primarily 'the stranglers,' 'würgende Totengeister,' akin to the Keres, Erinyes, and Harpies. This, like many prevailing views of the science of mythology, is confirmed by over-stressing the evidence of Greek vases and by the assumption that the fragmentary testimony of Alexandrian and Roman writers always preserves the genuine pre-Homeric popular belief.[1] Already at their first appearance[2] the two[3] Sirens embody a conscious allegory,[4] as Cicero[5] and Horace[6] perceived. Ruskin's explicit

[1] See G. Weicker, 'Die Seirenen,' in Roscher, where all the testimonia are collected.

[2] Homer, *Od.* xii. 39, 165 ff.

[3] Dual in *Od.* xii. 167; for the three or more of later tradition, their transparent names, and varying genealogies, see A. C. Pearson on Sophocles' frag. 861; G. W. Mooney on Apollonius Rhodius, iv. 893 ff.; and Weicker, p. 602 f.

[4] See F. M. Stawell, *Homer and the Iliad*, London, 1909, p. 150, where, however, the rendering 'a spirit had put the waver to rest' is fanciful.

[5] *De Fin.* v. 18.

[6] *Ep.* I. ii. 23; cf. *Sat.* II. iii. 14.

allegorization of their song as the lure of the thirst for unsanctified knowledge and the immodesty of science,[1] for all its modern sound, is merely a development of what Homer and Cicero tell us—that they promised Odysseus, not love or pleasure, but knowledge. The notion of the fatal songstress, the lurer, the temptress, the Lorelei,[2] arises naturally in the human mind, and we cannot now recover the particular association of ideas that first clothed it for the Greek imagination in the form of the Sirens. In the earliest Greek vases that represent the scene from the *Odyssey* they are portrayed with the wings and body of a bird and a woman's head.[3]

It was a plausible hypothesis, then, that they were originally birds, symbolizing either the widespread association of the fleeting soul with the wings of a bird or the magic of the bird's song,

'that tells us
What life is, so clear.
—The secret they sang to Ulysses
When, ages ago,
He heard and he knew this life's secret
I hear and I know.'[4]

Or as singers they may signify the spell of all song and eloquence, and for this reason perhaps the image of a Siren was later placed on the monuments of poets and orators—*e.g.*, Sophocles and Isocrates.[5]

Again, they are in a sense sea-nymphs inhabiting a lonely ocean isle, somewhere in the western fairyland of Odyssean adventure.[6] And the treacherous lure or the magic spell of the smiling sea was a commonplace of Greek poetry and has been familiar to the human imagination from Lucretius'

'Subdola cum ridet placidi pellacia ponti'

to Keats'

'Magic casements, opening on the foam
Of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn.'

Or, again, the Sirens may have blended in the Greek imagination with the wailing women who sang laments for the dead at funerals. Weicker confirms this connexion of ideas by the regret with which the souls of Homeric heroes leave 'the warm precincts of the cheerful day.'[7] It would be far more pertinent to Homer to quote Gray's *Elegy*, the last line of the *Æneid*, Matthew Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum*, and John Masefield's *August, 1914*. However that may be, the association with death opens up infinite possibilities for speculation and sentiment. 'Before Plato could speak, the soul had wings in Homer,' says Sir Thomas Browne.[8] The primitive conception of the soul-bird is the theme of a modern monograph.[9] The analogy of the Harpies has also been used in confirmation of this association.

None of these fancies admits of proof, but their suggestions for the poetic and the moral imagination can never pass away. The name of one of the Sirens on the British Museum amphora, *ἱμερόπα*, recalls Alcman's 'maidens with voices that wake desire,' and Dante's 'siren of sensual pleasure' repeats in verse of more than Greek loveliness the inscription ΣΙΡΗΝΕΙΜΙ on the Tyrrhenian Hydria, Louvre E 803:

'Io son cantava io son dolce sirena
Che i marinari in mezzo mar dismago.'

The Sirens are not mentioned except by modern inference in Hesiod, the Homeric hymns, Pindar, or Æschylus. In the Greek lyrics they are named only in Erinna's reference to the Sirens on the tomb of her companion Baucis, and in frag. 7 of Alcman, and a new fragment of Archilochus. Sophocles speaks of them as the 'songstresses of death' and 'daughters of Phorkys.'[1] Euripides' *Helena* invokes them as 'winged maidens, daughters of earth,' to sing her sorrows.[2] And in his *Andromache*[3] 'Sirens' speeches' is rhetoric for the words of the women who lead Hermione astray.

In the fragments of Greek comedy (Epicharmus, Theopompus) it is perhaps they who tempt the famished Odysseus with descriptions of a Gargantuan feast, while he checks the eagerness of his companions by the remark that their flute-playing is rotten (*σαπρά*).

In Plato's *Republic*[4] the music of the spheres is produced by the concerted notes of eight Sirens, one on each circle. Plato's *Cratylus*[5] allegorizes the myth in what Ruskin[6] calls 'the divine passage in the Cratylus of Plato about the place of the dead,' which he renders exquisitely:

'And none of those who dwell there desire to depart thence, —no, not even the Sirens; but even they, the seducers, are there themselves beguiled, and they who lulled all men, themselves laid to rest—they, and all others—such sweet songs doth death know how to sing to them.'

Ovid[7] merely says that the Sirens were playmates of Proserpine, and that the gods granted them wings that they might continue their search for her over the sea also. In the legend of the Argonauts, as the mythographs Apollodorus[8] and Hyginus[9] tell us, Orpheus sang against the Sirens who, being defeated, cast themselves into the sea and were transformed into hidden rocks.[10] This is the origin of the long modern literary tradition, from Samuel Daniel to William Morris's *Life and Death of Jason*, in which Orpheus (or Odysseus) sings the song of virtue against the allurements of the Sirens of temptation. In the language of the LXX (Job 30^{29}, Is 34^{13} 43^{20}, Jer 50^{39}) Siren is a synonym for the wild creatures and spirits that inhabit waste places. The AV renders it by 'owls' or 'dragons.' The Christian Fathers variously allegorized these passages, and also interpreted Odysseus lashed to the mast as a symbol of the Christian clinging to the Cross of Christ to resist the allurements of the world. Bacon pronounces Orpheus' remedy of song better than Ulysses' device of stopping the ears of his crew with wax:

'For meditations upon things divine excell the pleasures of the sense, not in power only but also in sweetness.' Light and conscienceless literature aims 'at taking the wings away from the Muses' crowns and giving them back to the Sirens.'[11]

In Daniel's *Ulysses and the Siren* Ulysses answers the Siren in this edifying strain:

'Fair Nymph, if fame or honour were
To be attain'd with ease,
Then would I come and rest me there
And leave such toils as these.'

Though not expressly named, the Sirens are clearly meant in the *Faerie Queene*[12] by the mermaids who

'fondly striv'd
With th' Heliconian maides for maistery,'

and who invite Sir Guyon to find his 'Port of rest' in

'The worlds sweet In, from paine and wearisome turmoyle.'

1 *The Eagle's Nest*, § 74.
2 'Illectos suo cantu in naufragia deducebant' (Servius, on *Æneid*, v. 864).
3 Amphora, Brit. Mus. E. 440, reproduced in Weicker's article, p. 606. This article is now the most convenient repertory of the monumental evidence. But much of it can be found also in A. Baumeister, *Denkmäler des klass. Altertums*, 3 vols., Munich, 1884–88, and in the full and learned article of C. Michel in Daremberg-Saglio.
4 R. Browning, *The Englishman in Italy*.
5 *Vita Soph.* 9, *Vita Isoc.* 13.
6 Their original home shifts with the localization of the Homeric story. The late testimonia are collected by Weicker in Roscher, p. 606. Strabo, v. 246, tells of a cult of the Siren Parthenope at Neapolis.
7 *Il.* xvi. 856, xxiii. 362.
8 *Urn Burial*, ch. iv.
9 G. Weicker, *Der Seelenvogel in der alten Literatur und Kunst*, Leipzig, 1902.

1 Frags. 852 and 861, Jebb-Pearson.
2 *Helena*, 167.
3 Line 936.
4 617 B.
5 403 D.
6 *Time and Tide*, xxiv. § 166.
7 *Metam.* v. 552 ff.
8 i. 9.
9 *Fab.* 141.
10 See Apollonius Rhodius, iv. 893.
11 *Wisdom of the Ancients*, xxxi.
12 II. xii. 31 f.

This is a favourite motive of Renaissance epics, recurring in various forms in Ariosto, Camoëns, and Tasso. The *Sea-Fairies* of Tennyson is a lyric development of the same theme with touches taken from Catullus' *epyllium* of Peleus and Thetis. The appeal of Matthew Arnold's *New Sirens* is to scepticism and emotionalism—

'Only, what we feel, we know.'

Lowell's Sirens echo Tennyson's sea-fairies and his lotos-eaters, and their lure is

'To be at rest for evermore!'

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted in the footnotes.

PAUL SHOREY.

ŚIVA.—See ŚAIVISM, DRAVIDIANS (North India).

ŚIVA NĀRĀYAṆĪS.—The Śiva Nārāyaṇīs, or Sio Narānīs, are a monotheistic sect of N. India, having their centre in the Districts of Ghāzīpur and Baliā. They profess unqualified monotheism, have no formal ritual, and pay no regard to the objects of Hindu and Musalmān veneration. Their worship consists in the members gathering at a *dhām*, or monastery, where one of their *Granths*, or sacred books, is read. Adoration is then offered to the Para Brahma, or the Supreme, and offerings are made, which are devoted to the upkeep of the establishment.

They accept converts from all classes of the community—Hindus, Muslims, or Christians—and many of these adhere outwardly to the forms of their original beliefs. It is specially reported that some Indian Christians of the District of Shāhābād belong to the sect. At the present day most of the members are low-caste Hindus, but the chief *sants*, or leaders, are generally Rājpūts or Brāhmans. According to Risley,[1] the large majority of Bengali Chamārs belong to it.

The acceptance of a convert is a matter of small ceremony. No *guru*, or spiritual guide, is required. A few Śiva Nārāyaṇīs assemble to meet the postulant, sweetmeats which have previously been deposited on one of their holy books are distributed, a few passages are read from the book, and the ceremony is complete.

The sect was founded in the reign of the emperor Muḥammad Shāh (A.D. 1719–48) by one Śiva Nārāyaṇa, a Naraunī Rajpūt of the village of Chandrawār in the present Baliā District. He is said to have written sixteen Hindī works,[2] viz. *Lava Granth*, *Sānt-vilās*, *Sant ō jān Granth*, *Sānt-sundar*, *Guru-nyās*, *Sānt-āchārī*, *Śāntōpadēś*, *Śabdāvali*, *Sānt-parwāna*, *Sānt-mahimā*, *Sānt-sāgar*, *Barā stōtra*, *Barā parwāna*, *Pati parwāna*, and *Barhō Bāṇī*. The most important of these are the *Guru-nyās* and the *Sānt-vilās*. The former, compiled from the Sanskrit *Purāṇas*, gives an account of the ten incarnations of Viṣṇu, and is subdivided into fourteen chapters, of which the first six treat of the author, of faith, of the punishment of sinners, of virtue, of a future state, and of discipline. The latter is a treatise on moral sentiments. The opening lines are: 'The love of God and His knowledge are the only true understanding.'[3] In addition to these fifteen there is one more, sealing the whole, which has not yet been divulged, and which remains in the exclusive charge of the head of the sect.

The unitarianism of this sect is of the straitest kind. They acknowledge one Supreme Deity, the creator (*kartā*), whom they call the Niraṅkār Par Brahm (*i.e. nirākāraṁ paraṁ Brāhma*) and the Sant Puruṣ (*Sat-puruṣa*), on whose nature 'light was thrown by Śiva Nārāyaṇa.' The moral virtues of truth, temperance, and mercy are inculcated, polygamy is prohibited, and sectarian marks are not used.

They claim that the emperor Muḥammad Shāh was one of Śiva Nārāyaṇa's converts and that he gave him a seal. This is still possessed by the sect, and used on *parwānas*, or precepts, issued by the heads to the faithful.

Crooke[1] and Risley[2] identify the Śiva Nārāyaṇīs with the Rai Dāsīs (*q.v.*), but this is not borne out by inquiries made by the present writer. The Rai Dāsīs are all Chamārs, but among the Śiva Nārāyaṇīs all sects are admitted. Quite possibly the Rai Dāsīs, whose tenets are not dissimilar, claim to be Śiva Nārāyaṇīs, but they by no means form the whole sect.

LITERATURE.—Except the articles of Risley and Crooke above mentioned, the only published account of this sect which has been seen by the present writer is that contained in H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus* [vol. i. of *Select Works*, ed. R. Rost], London, 1861, p. 358f. The present art. is based on this, but his statements are corrected and supplemented by inquiries specially made from the head of the sect at Ghāzīpur; see *JRAS*, 1918, p. 114ff. H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 178, and W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, do. 1896, ii. 185ff., describe at length the Śiva Nārāyaṇi customs, as those of the Chamār Rai Dāsīs. The practices described differ in a few details from those given above.

G. A. GRIERSON.

SKIN.—The significance of the skin for the history of religion springs from three principal sources: (*a*) its natural pigmentation, (*b*) tatuing, etc., (*c*) sacrificial rites.

(*a*) The colour of the skin affords one of the most obvious tests of racial difference. Three recognizable pigments are found in the mucous layer between the dermis and the epidermis, viz. yellow, reddish-brown, and black.[3] But any classification of the many varieties of skin-colouration must be more or less arbitrary. A typical scheme is that of Paul Topinard,[4] who enumerates ten varieties, by dividing the white into pale, florid, olive-white, the yellow into clear, olive, and dark, the dark into coppery-red, chocolate-brown, sooty-black, and coal-black. In some countries the colour-distinction is still of great social and political importance; this may help us to realize the religious influence of colour in earlier periods.

'The Sanskrit word for caste is *varna*, that is "colour"; and this shows how their distinction of high and low caste arose.'[5]

As a precise morphological distinction, the colour of the skin is of secondary value.

'Used alone . . . the test of colour will lead to serious misapprehension of the real relations of various races.'[6]

(*b*) The alteration of the appearance of the skin by tatued marks and patterns is a very wide-spread custom. Lubbock[7] collects a number of examples, ranging from simple ornament to serious mutilation. He remarks that 'ornamentation of the skin is almost universal among the lower races of men.' Some would regard all these customs as springing primarily from a desire for ornamentation. Thus Westermarck says:

'We have seen how savage men and women in various ways endeavour to make themselves attractive to the opposite sex:—by ornamenting, mutilating, painting, and tattooing themselves. That these practices essentially subserve this end appears chiefly from the fact that the time selected for them is the age of puberty.'[8]

The motive to which he refers is certainly contributory, but hardly primary. It is safer to agree with Achelis, who says:[9]

[1] *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 178.

[2] Wilson says twelve. In the above list the last four are not mentioned by him. He calls the *Sant ō jān Granth* the *Vajan Granth*.

[3] Risley, i. 178.

[1] *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, ii. 185ff.

[2] i. 178ff.

[3] W. L. H. Duckworth, *Morphology and Anthropology*, Cambridge, 1904, p. 348.

[4] Quoted by Duckworth, p. 353.

[5] E. B. Tylor, *Anthropology*, new ed., London, 1904, p. 69.

[6] Duckworth, p. 352.

[7] *Origin of Civilisation*[6], London, 1902, pp. 59–66. See also art. TATUING.

[8] *Hist. of Human Marriage*[3], London, 1901, p. 541.

[9] P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, in *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*[3], Tübingen, 1905, i. 46.

'There is no doubt that the operation has a religious significance; it is performed by the priests during the chanting of religious songs, and its origin is ascribed to the gods. . . . The custom stands in close relation to Totemism, especially since the incised figures so often represent animals: snakes, lizards, fishes, birds.'

We may also note that 'the marks or scars left on legs or arms from which blood had been drawn were probably the origin of tattooing.'[1]

(*c*) With totemism (*q.v.*) we may also connect the various sacrificial ceremonies in the ritual of which some use is made of the skin of the slain animal. A typical case is that reported by Herodotus in his account of the festival of Zeus at Thebes. He gives the current legend of an appearance of Zeus to Herakles in the disguise of a ram's fleece, with the ram's head held in front, and proceeds:

'The Thebans then do not sacrifice rams but hold them sacred for this reason; on one day however in the year, on the feast of Zeus, they cut up in the same manner and flay one single ram and cover with its skin the image of Zeus, and then they bring up to it another image of Heracles. This done, all who are in the temple beat themselves in lamentation for the ram, and then they bury it in a sacred tomb.'[2]

Here the legend has obviously sprung from the annual institution of killing the animal totem, or (if we doubt, with Frazer, the totemistic stage in this case) from the institution of killing the divine animal.[3] Frazer compares with the example given by Herodotus a custom once existing among the Indians of California of preserving the entire skin and feathers of their sacred bird, the great buzzard, when one was slain annually, to make a festal garment, also a W. African custom (Fernando Po) of hanging the skin of the sacred cobra-capella on a tree to be touched by all the children born during the previous year. It has been suggested that the OT reference to 'the horns of the altar,' in connexion with the application of the blood and the right of asylum, should be traced back to the custom of spreading the skin of the victim, with the horns still attached to it, over the altar.[4] In these and many similar practices[5] we can trace two principles of primitive thought: (1) the sacred animal is conceived as standing in the most intimate relation to the life and prosperity of the worshippers; (2) the skin is thought to contain within itself a portion of the life of the animal even after separation from the body. With such premisses, it is quite natural to reason that closer communion with the animal-god can be gained by the priest or the worshipper putting on the skin of the flayed animal as a sacred garment.[6] Robertson Smith[7] traces a survival of this in the coming of Jacob to his father in the skins of kids. Frazer[8] points out a similar use of human skin in the Mexican ritual. The chorus of the Greek tragedy were originally called 'goats' (τράγοι), and wore goat-skins to show their close relation with the goat-god,[9] whilst it was the custom even of certain Christian catechumens to stand bare-footed upon a goat-skin.[10] We may see the same circle of ideas extended to divine inspiration and divination; thus the god Faunus was supposed to reveal the future through dreams to such of his votaries as slept within his precincts upon the fleeces of sacrificed lambs.[11] A further extension of these ideas may be seen in the outstanding institutions of marriage and burial, so closely and universally linked with religion. In the Roman marriage ceremony known as *confarreatio* the skin of the slain victim was stretched over two seats, on which the bride and bridegroom had to sit;[1] Hartland[2] refers to cohabitation upon a cow-hide in connexion with a Transylvanian gipsy tribe. In ancient Palestine burial in a sheep-skin seems to have been customary.[3]

In recent years, when the king of the Shankalla tribes (Abyssinia) died, 'he was sewn up in a green hide bag in a sitting position. . . . One tribe had a custom of sewing chance strangers up in green hides and leaving them to be killed by the contraction of the skins.'[4]

The original idea of such practices is clearly to secure a closer union with the deity represented by the skin, whether for protection or for the more efficient offering of a victim. A late survival of these primitive customs among civilized peoples may be seen in the harvest custom of slaying a goat and wearing the skin to cure pains in the back;[5] this may be paralleled with the making of the skin of the totem-animal into a medicine-bag among the Mosquito Indians.[6]

Frazer suggests that the use of images may have arisen through the habit of preserving the skin of the sacred animal.

'The skin in fact was kept as a token or memorial of the god, or rather as containing in it a part of the divine life, and it had only to be stuffed or stretched upon a frame to become a regular image of him.'[7]

An example of this may be seen in the manufacture of an image in human form from the skin of some animal by the hands of the Samoyed shaman.[8] Another interesting transitional case, which seems to support Frazer's suggestion, is seen in the practice of the pearl-fishers of the Persian Gulf:

'Each boat has a sort of figure-head, called the *kubait*, generally covered with a skin of a sheep or goat which was sacrificed when the boat was first launched.'[9]

There can be little doubt that the belief in the psychical qualities of the skin, which forms the connecting link in the religious customs exemplified, has operated in many instances less easy to detect, such as the shining of the skin of the face of Moses (Ex 34^{29}), and the general attitude to skin diseases such as leprosy, in ancient times.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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SKY AND SKY-GODS.—1. Universality and antiquity.—Through endless transformations and disfigurements (mythological or functional) the sky-god is found to be at the base of all the systems of the great civilized religions of the classical Mediterranean and Oriental worlds. He occupies the same place in the great systems of Asia and in the semi-civilized religions of pre-Columban America. As we find him in all the groups of so-called non-civilized religions without exception, we may safely presume that the concept of sky-god belongs to the most ancient period in the history of religious feeling, and that it is at least as ancient as primitive naturism and animistic fetishism. Whether it is even pre-animistic in its fundamental aspect is a question which must be reserved in the meantime.

The nature, rôle, and characteristics of this

[1] F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 172.
[2] ii. 42, tr. G. C. Macaulay.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 169–172, 174 f.
[4] E. Kautzsch, in *HDB* v. 620.
[5] Cf., *e.g.*, A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, new ed., London, 1899, ii. 233; W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[3], do. 1894, pp. 435–439; Jevons, p. 338.
[6] Cf. Jevons, p. 102 f. [7] P. 467.
[8] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 288, 290, 294 f., 296 ff., 301 f.
[9] Jevons, p. 351.
[10] H. von Schubert and W. Moeller, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, Tübingen, 1902, i. 742.
[11] A. O. Seyffert, *Dict. of Classical Antiquities*[9], London, 1906, p. 235; cf. Gideon's fleece (Jg 6^{36-40}); see also art. FLEECE.

[1] Servius, *ad Æn.* iv. 374; cited by W. W. Fowler, *Social Life at Rome*, London, 1909, p. 136.
[2] *LP* i. 124, note (1).
[3] S. A. Cook, *The Religion of Ancient Palestine*, London, 1908, p. 35.
[4] Reported in *The Tribune*, 25th April, 1906.
[5] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, i. 285; the instance is from Grenoble.
[6] Jevons, p. 183.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 173.
[8] A. Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1860, ii. 129; cf. ii. 257.
[9] S. M. Zwemer, *Arabia: the Cradle of Islam*, Edinburgh and London, 1900, p. 101.

universal sky-god may be concealed under the most diverse forms, but he is always more or less clearly recognizable to the historian of religions and always identical in essential definition. America shows him in the mythologies of the Toltecs, the Mayas, and the Incas,[1] as well as in Brazil, in the Andes, among the Caribs, in Tierra del Fuego, and at the extreme north among the Eskimo. The shamanist groups of N. Asia and the cosmogony and dualism of the Ainus show him (Pase-Kamui) similar to the sky-god (much more distinct) of the religions of China (Ti-en) and of primitive Japanese Shintō. He is related to the ancient Pulugu of the Andamans, to the Varuna of primitive India, and, towards the west, to all the pantheons of the ancient classical East. Towards the south, Australia, Polynesia, and Melanesia sometimes present deformed characteristics, as in the myths of N. America, but comparative study soon disentangles his fundamental characteristics, which are those found long ago in Chaldæa and in the Semitic and proto-Semitic world. But nowhere does his physiognomy appear more distinctly than in Africa—whether in the pantheons of ancient Egypt or in the many savage religions of the black continent. From the great Kilima of the Bantu groups to the Negritian Mahu we recognize him as always the same under a hundred different names: Ibantzu of the Congo among the Bangala, Fidi Mukulu ('the supreme being') of the sky among the Basonga, Kalaga among the Warega, Uletit among the Kuku, Kabedya Mpungu and Vilye Mukulu among the Baholos and the Balubas, etc. Dzakuta, the 'thrower of celestial stones,' of the Yorubas is only another aspect of the same sky-god; so also Waka of the Gallas is the thunder aspect of the sky-god; and Lubari is the rain aspect of the sky-god, just like Dengdit among the Dinkas, Iankupong among the Aquapins, Ropi on the Gold Coast, Oloron in Benin, Ngangmo on the Ivory Coast, and hundreds of others (Ituri in Kilimanjaro, the Bumba of the Bushongo, the great Kongola of E. Africa, the Mutabani of the Batutsi, the Kafir Inhu-Ankulu, the M'ba of the Ababua, etc.). If we ascend to the cold regions of the Finnish races, we find him again under the names of Yumala (Lapps), Yuma (Cheremiss), Yubmel (Samoyed), Tengri (Mongol), Bonga (Tunguses), and Uklo (Esthonian).

The sky-god has reigned everywhere; his kingdom still covers the whole of the uncivilized world. No historical or proto-historical motive can be assigned as the cause, and neither the migrations of races nor the diffusion of myths and folk-lore affords the slightest justification of this fact. The universality of the sky-god and the uniformity of his essential characteristics[2] are the logical consequence of the constant uniformity of the primitive systems of cosmogony. The sky-god is connected with the most ancient ideas on the composition of the world and its forces (not the universe, which is too vast for the mind of the savage, but the corner of earth which is for him the whole world). Now, everywhere we find the sky conceived in the same way—as a huge liquid mass, supported above the earth by a solid transparent substance, below which are the air, the winds, and then the terrestrial plane. Frequently this liquid mass is thought to surround the solid earth also and to form another liquid abyss below it. It is not within the scope of this article to enumerate the secondary varieties of this general structure, such as 'upper and lower abysses, vaulted skies, with superimposed compartments, divided into quarters,' etc. But, in order to understand the subject, we must emphasize the constant bond that materially united the waters of the sky either to the sea or to the fabled sources of the great rivers; so that finally all water, as well as the liquid masses which fall from the clouds, is a product of the celestial plane. The function of rain-god and water-god (sea or river) and of so many sky-gods is thus explained. The essential rôle of water in the general life of nature justifies the attributing to the sky-god of all the great natural phenomena. The power and the remarkable characteristics of the various meteorological phenomena of which the sky is the theatre are a secondary, though not less efficient, cause of the pre-eminent part assigned to it by all primitive religions.

There is such close resemblance between the sky-god and the vital manifestations of the sky that, according to the various peoples, we find the same linguistic root meaning simultaneously the material sky, the rain, the clouds, and the sky-god (or meteorological phenomena and the sky-god), or, again, the storm, the thunder, and the sky-god (cf. Jupiter Pluvius and Ζεὺς Κεραυνός in classical mythology).

Alongside of the single sky-god we find in several systems two or more gods—*e.g.*, a god of the upper sky and a god of the lower sky (*i.e.* on the terrestrial plane); or four (or more) sky-gods in charge of quarters or geometrical divisions of celestial space; or several sky-gods, each having one of the superimposed skies as his kingdom. The study of these different systems shows that they are not primitive. Some are the product of astrological speculations or very refined astral myths; others are the result of historical circumstances having agglomerated into a single political civilization religious groups which were at one time distinct (*e.g.*, Chaldæa, Egypt, Mexico). In such cases syncretism tends to amalgamate these gods into a single being (*e.g.*, Hathor-Maut-Nut-Neith-Isis for Egypt); or theology attributes distinct characteristics and functions to each of them. Thus, among the Aztecs the sky-god Tezcatlipoca, Tlaloc, the Quetzalcoatl of Cholotlan, and the Huitzilopochtli (blue sky) of the Temochcas were originally single sky-gods, peculiar to the peoples subdued by and incorporated in the empire of the conquerors.

2. Nature and personality.—If the importance and antiquity of the concept of the sky-god are explained by the importance of the material sky, is the conception of sky-god itself explained by an exclusive application of the processes of pure and simple animism or by the usual mechanism of naturism? Neither animism nor naturism entirely explains the particular nature of the sky-god. Animism may bestow a personality on the most varied natural phenomena or on any inanimate object in nature, from hunger, plague, or a mountain-peak to a spring, a water-spout, a cyclone, or an artificially manufactured object. The sky is something more than simple matter personified.[1] Naturism in itself would only partly explain the nature of the sky-god. It has long been observed that the personal beings emanating from naturism have often a special aspect quite distinct and different from the objects or phenomena of which they are the personifications (*e.g.*, the waters, winds, sun, etc.). Personification, in its fundamental *processus*, starts from the idea that under the appearance and within or behind the material exterior there exists a being or, rather, a personal force (of course it cannot yet be conceived as immaterial), closely bound to the substance of which it is the energy and the life, unable to exist without this substance, but distinct from it and, if necessary, separable from it—at least momentarily. The sky-god is therefore radically different from the substance which forms the material sky. He lives in it; he lives by it; he is mingled with it; the physical sky is not merely his habitat—it is his very substance; but the personification of a substance is distinct and separable from the substance which it animates; it is superior to it, and yet the substance is indispensable to its existence, for without it it would return to the vortex of the impersonal forces of chaos. Does this imply that

[1] See below, § 6. [2] See below, § 5.

[1] See art. PERSONIFICATION (Introductory and Primitive).

primitive man imagines a time when, as the sky was not yet in existence, the sky-god could not exist? This vital question cannot be definitely answered in the present state of ethnological information. Numerous myths of savage and semi-civilized races seem to show a sky-god existing even in primordial matter and releasing the sky by his effort. But are those myths primitive? Can primitive reasoning reach the problem of the origin of the sky? Provisionally and with great reserve, we may suggest the following solution: in the formless mass of impersonal forces there spontaneously appeared forces endowed with personal consciousness; the most efficient of these released the liquid mass from the universal chaos and formed the material sky, which has ever since been its vital substance and its special property. Such an outline, however, must be subject to constant revision, for no savage tribe has formulated the theory in explicit abstract terms; and it requires for basis the exposition of a great mass of myths, folk-lore, theogony, cosmology, and even traditional ceremonial.

3. **Rôle and functions.**—It is much easier to draw up an inventory of the functions and attributes of the sky-god. The essential characteristics are constant throughout, and this identity, both in characteristics and in evolution, is one of the points most firmly established by the comparative method in the study of religions.

The data of primitive man's actual experience and the exercise of rational (or pseudo-rational) search for its causes logically led to the series of functional attributes of the sky-god. The physical phenomena of the sky and their ascription to the personality living in the material sky were always and everywhere the starting-point, the only variations resulting from local geography and climatology.

Rain and its effects on the terrestrial surface are naturally in the first rank. As a logical result, the rôle of giving the rain, and with it the storm, thunder, lightning, and their consequences, led men to conclude that the sky-god was the author of a certain number of manifestations of life and death. Several mythologies, civilized and savage, ascribe the ownership of life (regarded as breath or as a force) to the sky-god. Sometimes they even reach the stage of regarding him as the source of every vital principle, although frequently also he shares this ownership with the earth-god. The question of death is more obscure. Primitive man does not imagine *one* death; to him there are as many kinds of death as there are material manifestations of the destruction of living things. We may say, briefly, that death as a rule is not the work of the sky-god. It is an impersonal force, superior to him, like fate; and he often seems even to oppose it. As an almost absolute rule, only death by lightning is his direct action.[1] Beyond this, the rôle of the sky-god in ordinary life approximates to the type of 'the otiose supreme being.' As a matter of fact, to his activity as first cause is ascribed all that is inexplicable, beyond the capacity of such-and-such a special spirit, all that is abnormal or specially impressive. But in practice the constant search of the human spirit for the explanation of the unknown and the infinite always tends gradually to strip the sky-god of his prerogatives or special qualities in favour of more definite and more accessible beings of secondary rank. A universal result of this is the paucity of definite worship and the almost complete absence of liturgy, sacrifices, and sacerdotal organizations connected with him, because the religious systems which have reached this stage of organization address themselves to deities already more specialized in definite functions.

Nevertheless, by the contrary phenomenon, which, however, is very logical in its consequences, the same progressive human reflexion results in attributing more and more the origin of the sensible world (or rather the organization of animate matter) to the old sky-god. By this means the conception of the creator sky-god was reached, who, once his task is finished, seems to lose interest in it and leave to other beings the duty of governing and controlling the struggling mass of living beings and the whole world of nature.

The word 'create,' of course, must here be understood in a simple and unphilosophical sense. The very idea of this restricted 'creation,' understood in the sense of modelling, making, and vivifying matter, is not a primitive speculation. It developed slowly, by the gradual addition to the original stock of the sky-god's powers of a series of new acts as reasoning and the growing search for the principle of causality established new connexions and made new deductions therefrom. The creation of the sky-god never appears as complete or absolute. He is the oldest demiurge, but he is neither anterior to nor the author of all life.

The nucleus around which has gradually accumulated the mass of facts which combine to constitute a creation seems, in the majority of cosmogonies, to be the double operation of (1) separating the luminous mass from the dark mass, light and darkness being henceforth distinct and opposed, and (2) releasing the solid elements from the liquid mass—these two operations being, in a sense, quite naturally suggested by the material appearance of the sky and the successive luminous phenomena observed by man in it, and by the universal belief in the liquid consistency of the sky resting on the transparent but solid vault of the firmament. This first series of acts of creation has a paramount influence afterwards on the appearance of the first dualistic systems.[1]

A list of the sky-gods regarded as the authors of the creation (quasi-complete or partial) of the universe would involve an enumeration of all known mythologies. To give an idea of them as briefly as possible we shall adopt the following classification.

(*a*) *Systems in which the sky-god is regarded as the sole agent in creation.*[2]—These systems may be conveniently divided into three chief groups. (1) Those in which the sky-god is asexual and has, simply on account of grammatical termination, a tendency to be conceived as a male principle. To this group belong the most elementary cosmogonies, in which living beings are supposed to be the direct product of some portion of the physical substance of the sky-god. The myths of savages all over the world, both at the present time and in the past (*e.g.*, Egypt), give us all varieties of the supposed processes: the beings are the product of the sweat of the god, of his tears, of his humours, of his vomit, etc. We have to come fairly high up to find systems that conceive the sky-god as creating by means of action, forming matter, and communicating to it by his material breath a portion of his vital substance.

(2) Those in which the sky-god is positively regarded as being of the male sex. In such cases the isolation of the god leads to the necessity of imagining that the 'creation' issues from his substance, either by drops of blood or, more frequently, by the effusion of the seminal fluid (*e.g.*, the Egyptian Tum and the Bumba of the Bushongo).

(3) Those, much more developed, in which living beings (in whole or in part) are derived by childbirth from the womb of the sky-deity—which presupposes the deity to be female. Sometimes this birth takes place directly for all (*e.g.*, the myths of the Upper White Nile); sometimes it takes place in two stages, the goddess giving birth to a

[1] Sometimes death by drowning is assimilated to death by celestial fire, chiefly in the systems in which the sea or the river is regarded as a dependent of the material sky.

[1] See artt. DUALISM, and below, § 5.

[2] It must be noted, of course, that 'to create' always means essentially to organize and vivify or fashion already existing substances. Creation *ex nihilo* is unknown to the intellect of primitive and semi-civilized man and even of civilized man at the stage of the ancient religions of the classical East.

certain number of agents, who, in their turn, couple and reproduce the chief classes of beings (*e.g.*, the Egyptian sky-goddess Hathor). This seems to be the most frequent type. We must mention that in every case the sky-goddess conceives of her own accord, without the help of a male principle (cf., *e.g.*, the most ancient Sumerian conception). Her animal or human form[1] has nothing to do with the question.

This initial position leads, in advanced religions, to the most subtle theological theories when the work of the sky-goddess has to be reconciled with the necessity of a vivifying principle anterior to her and fecundating her. The inextricable difficulties of the sacerdotal account of Theban Egypt, with Rā, the bull-god, as husband of his mother, borne by her and continually fecundating her, give a sufficient idea of these systems, whose outlines we find in more than twenty known religions.[2]

(*b*) *Systems in which the sky-god is associated with another god in the work of creation.*—Without examining the question of simultaneity or later appearance, we find a second important series of religions, in which the sky-god, in order to accomplish his work as demiurge, has associated his activity with that of another being, usually the earth-deity. We may distinguish two chief groups.

(1) The first (and the most numerous) includes cases in which the sky is a god and the earth a goddess. The world is born from their union. This is the type of the Polynesian myths of Rangi and Pépé, that of Tangaroa, and that of the Greek Gaia and Ouranos.

(2) In the second group the sky is regarded as the matrix in which beings are formed, and the earth is the fecundating principle—a sky-goddess and an earth-god (*e.g.*, Seb and Nut of the Egyptian myth, etc.).

A great number of secondary types suggest the demiurge sharing his task with several companions. He himself is sometimes relegated to the very beginning of the work in the most vague rôle (*e.g.*, in N. American cosmologies, in which the elaboration of the world seems to belong specially to certain animals, often of low species; these systems require careful study and often appear on analysis to be composite and deformed products of earlier mythologies).

We must pass over the cosmogonies in which the sky-god creates or organizes the world without producing it directly from his substance, fashioning its various substances by means of his word alone, which seizes and models the different formless energies vibrating and trembling in the universe (*e.g.*, creation by the words of the Egyptian Thōth). Those belong to a period when the sky-god no longer possesses his specially celestial characteristics and is rather a supreme god.

In order to understand the sky-god, we must notice a result of the constant confusion of the primordial celestial water with the water of the sea. In a great number of religious systems, both savage and advanced, the sky-god is confused with the sea-god, whether he takes up his abode in the sky or the sea indifferently, or whether he unites in his person sky-myths and sea-myths. This phenomenon is very marked, *e.g.*, in the Indian mythology of Varuṇa and, among savage races, in the aquatic sky-god of the Ainus (*q.v.*) and in the dogfish-god of the Benin; it is conjectured also in the Chaldæan Oannes and in the various fish-deities of the E. Mediterranean (*e.g.*, Aphrodite, mother of the world). The sea is in every case regarded as bound to the celestial mass. The latter is separated from it only above the terrestrial plane by the vault of the firmament (the 'firmament' of Genesis). The same reasoning leads uncivilized man in the interior of the continents to believe that certain large expanses of water, lakes and rivers, are derived from the celestial water (*e.g.*, the Egyptian Nile, the Congo, the Welle, the Zambesi). The sky-god, the creator of the world, often therefore dwells in the bed of their waters. In the extreme west of Africa we find the sky-god living in the lagoons on the coast, and the Ibanza of the Bangala living at one and the same time in the sky and in the depths of the river; so also Kilima in the Welle of the Monbuttu or the Ababua, etc. Such were the crocodile Sebek of ancient Egypt and the crocodile of the Shilluks or Dinkas of the present-day White Nile.

The confusion of the sky-god with the chthonian gods, which is rarer, is more difficult to explain and would require too long treatment. It is traceable in New Zealand and Polynesian myths, but its mechanism appears more clearly in Africa—*e.g.*, Kalaga of the Warega and the sky-god (at the same time the volcano-god) of the Ituri, according to the (distorted) myth of the Imandwa secret society. To put it briefly, the bond between the celestial world and the chthonian world is due to water (deep sources), fire (volcanoes), and celestial metal (iron).

4. Specific aspect and representations. — (*a*) *Natural phenomena.*—The most remarkable visible manifestations of the activity or power of the sky-god seem everywhere to have been chosen for the material expression of the god (we must say 'material expression' and not 'image'). Exceptional manifestations have naturally been in the first rank. As a matter of fact, we find lightning (all known religions), thunder (*passim*), the rainbow (*e.g.*, the Ababua), the *aurora borealis* (Eskimo), St. Elmo's fire (classical Mediterranean), the zodiacal light (eastern Egyptian delta), etc. These natural manifestations have gradually tended to become 'aspects' of the sky-god, and are the starting-point of fetishistic representations, in which the object, sometimes natural, sometimes of human manufacture, is not yet regarded as the image of the god, but as his habitat, or rather as a material covering sympathetically bound to the essential force of the 'spirit.' Such objects naturally are of infinite variety, according to the human group and the geographical position. In general, we may say that in the choice of fetishes the reasoning has been the same all the world over: the principle of material expression, *e.g.*, may be the representation of the effect to express the cause (or *vice versa*), or perhaps the part for the whole (or *vice versa*), either in time or in space. It is a curious fact that fetishistic expression has almost everywhere obeyed the same laws which separated the magic ideogram from simple pictography and thus created all over the world the first written characters based on magical value.

The most important class of natural phenomena is found in the supposed effects of the material action of the sky-god. Thus the sacred fire, the emblem of this god, is supposed to be lighted by him; detached rocks and sharp mountain-peaks are supposed to be caused by the thunder in direct relation with the force of the sky-god; and translucent stones, rock crystals, and precious stones are regarded as fragments of the celestial vault (the same principle later connected gold and silver with the solar and lunar gods). Hence also—and this throughout the whole world—the cult of the sky-god as manifest in meteorites, 'thunder-stones,' fragments of shooting-stars, 'eagle-stones,' in the meteorite fire supposed to be detached from the sky, and, by extension, in stones supposed to have fallen from the sky, standing-stones, etc. (*e.g.*, menhirs). Belief in the presence of celestial fire (and consequently of the sky-god) in flint, combined with the notions about aerolites or meteorites, gives rise later to the world-wide cult of palæolithic or neolithic tools, weapons, and instruments which are worshipped as having fallen from the sky and which become emblems of the sky-god. Two equally interesting developments are the stones on mountain-summits becoming the first altars for sacrifice to the sky-god and the worship of sacred trees regarded as celestial trees.

(*b*) *Idolatrous representations.*—(*a*) *Aniconic.*—We now pass to the representations of the sky-god by modelled or drawn imitations of his activity—*e.g.*, mimetic signs meant to reproduce the zigzags of the lightning, the contours of the sky, the triangular projection of the zodiacal light, etc. In

[1] See below, § 4.

[2] Some Polynesian mythologies avoid the problem by imagining that the single deity tears from his sides the first matter necessary for making beings.

the same connexion we find strings with curls, knots, twists, etc., and gradually there develop the thousand different forms of aniconic representations of the sky-god by magical symbolism. The fetishes formed by combinations of substances connected with celestial forces vary infinitely. Among representations of a higher character we may cite the axe, the emblem of the sky-god (*e.g.*, Minoan Crete), and the mirror, image of the sky-goddess (Japan).

(β) *Iconic.*—The representation of the sky-god tends in this way gradually to become the reproduction of characteristics regarded as those of the material spirit (if we may be allowed to use such an expression). But iconic representation began, in every place where it can be verified, by a process of pictographic expression (the term 'symbolic' is beyond the conception of primitive man) of his power or his nature, embodied in an animal figure. We cannot trace here the evolution of the zoolatrical cults. But, as far as the sky-god is concerned, we may state that his zoomorphic representation has always been the product of conventional speculation and not of a crude idea that he bore the special form of such-and-such an animal. We may suggest, with great reserve, the possibility that this god may have been invested momentarily and under certain circumstances with the aspect of the animal. But this is never his absolute and permanent material form.

It is impossible to give the animal representations of the sky-god *in extenso* here. The chief groups may be conveniently classified according to the supposed sex of the world-creator sky-god.[1] We find (i.) the great inhabitants of the celestial heights—*e.g.*, the vulture (conceived in Egypt as exclusively female and bearing without the help of a male), the female eagle (classical Mediterranean), the condor (S. America), etc.; (ii.) the females of domestic animals, and in the first place, universally adored, the celestial cow; (iii.) in the domain of sea, lake, or river (*i.e.* the aquatic region) the female shark or crocodile, the female serpent, and especially the fish. All these representations ended in hybrid forms, the best-known types of which, in the advanced religions of the classical world, are the Chaldæan Oannes, half-man and half-fish, and the Asiatic Aphrodite, Derceto, etc.

The sky-god regarded as of the male sex has given rise to identical series, also too long to enumerate. Among the most wide-spread we may mention the hawk or eagle (Egypt, classical Greece and Italy, Asia Minor, Central America, etc.), and the goat or ram (Egypt, Sudan, N. India, Dahomey, etc.). The constant association of the eagle or the ram with thunder, lightning, etc., is one of the religious phenomena most generally found in iconography.

In the composite forms the symbolic animal form remains necessary as the plastic means of expressing the rôle and power of the sky-god, but it is combined with the human aspect. The well-known series of the classical East (Egypt, Chaldæa, Assyria, Asia Minor, Greece) recur among savage and semi-civilized races all over the world. According to the usual process, all merge in two series of representations: (*a*) those in which the sky-god is gradually confused with the solar, lunar, and astral forms;[2] (*b*) the anthropomorphic pure and simple, which corresponds to an already high type of religious civilization. The sky-god, purely male or female in form, is, however, rare, precisely because one of the effects of this development of religious civilization is to relegate him to second or third rank in the divine hierarchy.[3]

5. **Characteristics.**—The comparative study of savage races proves that the characteristics of the sky-god (as they appear to-day among semi-civilized or as they crop up sporadically in advanced religions) are everywhere identical.

Naturally the question whether he is uncreated or self-created is beyond the scope of savage thought. It is the same with the conception of eternity. 'Indefinitely renewable duration' seems the extreme limit of the primitive mind. Even Egypt, saying of Atum Kheperā 'I am yesterday; I am to-morrow,' did not reach the theoretical definition of eternity.

Nor by definition is the sky-god anterior to any other god, spirit, or demon. The creation, partial or complete, of the material universe does not in any way imply that of the forces embodied in the names of gods, spirits, genii, demons, etc. He is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, but simply stronger or cleverer in certain special spheres. Certain gods or spirits may fight against him, and often successfully. His victory in the event of a struggle does not preclude future defeat. The most remarkable characteristic of such a sky-god is that, in all the cases that have been examined, he is manifestly weaker than a certain mysterious, impersonal, diffuse force, which among primitive races often has a name analogous to what we mean by destiny.[1]

In principle the sky-god has no moral characteristics; by definition he is indifferent. Nevertheless his constant association with the rain and the light has the universal result of giving him a beneficent aspect. At first disinterested and inaccessible or deaf to all prayer, he sometimes becomes susceptible of intervention in human affairs, and man strives to develop and define this intervention. Dualism, organizing the strife of darkness and light, of drought (or death) and fertilizing water (or life), gives him a much more definite character in more advanced religions. Nevertheless, as a general rule, the sky-god takes no interest in the material world produced by his activity and never controls the progress of this earth's various elements or the struggles of its inhabitants. Again, the development of dualism frequently results in giving him a gradually more precise activity. At this stage, however, in the progress of knowledge of the forces of the world and the principles of causality the sky-god tends to be robbed of his activity or to be divided up into new beings.

6. **Evolution.**—If we carefully consider the nature and character of the primitive sky-god, we find that, on the whole, he is the incarnation of the sum of primitive man's ignorance and inexperience, combined with his knowledge that the other material beings (whether they are called genii, gods, spirits, or any other name) are not powerful enough to govern the world, to have formed it, or to direct its great forces (celestial, meteorological, and hydrological phenomena, death, etc.).

The study of magic and of primitive rites leads to more definite knowledge of the forces retained by the sky-god and of the rudiments of cosmogonies explaining the mechanism of creation, and gives everywhere identical results: (*a*) the acts of the sky-god become separate personalities and gradually dismember his personality, which was originally formed of vague elements; the clearest example occurs in the series of thunder-gods taking the place of the sky-god in the rôle of 'father of beings' (*e.g.*, the Ζεὺς Κεραυνός of Hellenic myths, the Mahu of Dahomey, etc.); (*b*) the beings produced by the celestial energy—sun, moon, stars—tend to take the place and the rôle of light (conceived originally as something quite independent of them, and the direct product of the sky-god) and relegate to the background the beneficent rôle of the sky; (*c*) on the terrestrial plane the activities of various spirits and of their representations (fetishistic or iconic) take a more and more conspicuous part in the world's struggles. Their actions and the relations of cause and effect belong to the domains of water, air, earth, and under-earth rather than to the sky. But by these activities they grow in importance; their cults and magic tend to be established; organized polytheisms become possible, and they capture a portion of the vague attributes belonging as yet to the old sky-god. (Two good examples may be given: (1) among primitive races the system of

[1] See § 3 (*a*) (3), above. [2] *Cf.* below, § 6.
[3] Cf. below, § 6.

[1] The terms *mana* and *orenda*, largely employed by ethnological sociology, cover only a part of this conception.

the Bushongo in Africa, (2) in advanced religions the system of the Toltecs.)

The result of these three elements is that, at different rates according to the different peoples and according to the proportion in which the elements are found, there is a constant tendency to the suppression and gradual disappearance of what constituted the very distinct physiognomy of the primitive sky-god. The most striking proof of this weakening or gradual dispossession is seen in the cosmogonic and creator rôle. The progress of the religious system almost always results in substituting for creation by the sky-god the organization of the world by the sun-god, the moon-god, or one of the stellar gods. Sometimes in fact the sun-god is supreme creator. Ancient Egypt presents a very complete schema of this type of evolution. It tends to substitute Rā (the sun) for the sky-gods (such as Atum, Hor, Nut, Hathor, Anhur, Sebek, etc.); but it does not completely realize this evolution, and consigns to the more or less vague beginning the primitive activity of the sky-god. The general process in the various religious systems is from the rôle of light, the direct emanation of the sky-god, to that of the stellar groups, substituted for the initial force of this god, then to that of the separate stars, and finally to the sun, the last arrival in the series of author-gods of the world and of life.[1]

The same evolution, with the same effects, recurs when there appears, with dualism, the first representation of a moral or quasi-moral world. The sky-god, stripped of his definite beneficent activities, is superseded in the struggle against evil by the sun or by an anthropomorphic aspect of himself (usually his son—*e.g.*, the Osirian myth). The details of this evolution would require a whole volume. One of the most remarkable examples of it is the myth of Heitsi-Eibib of the Khoi-Khoin, of whom we have accounts by ethnologists as early as the year 1655. We find in him all the characteristics of the primordial sky-god rôle of rain-god, aniconic worship of rude stones, fetishism of a lithic kind, etc. Then he becomes associated with the dawn; and mythology invents a terrestrial incarnation for him. Similarly we can follow the confusion of the sky-god with the lunar cults. We find, as in the case of the Osirian myth, a later confusion with the parallel myth of Tsuni-Goab. Just as we see the dualist myth developing in Egypt under the double form Rā-Apèpi and Horus-Set, so we see the sky-god Heitsi-Eibib struggling with Gaunab, who has become the principle of darkness and evil, while Heitsi-Eibib becomes the light which dies each day and is reborn in the east. He finally incarnates the good principles struggling against evil. This parallelism with ancient Egypt proves decisively the general direction which the evolution of the concept of the sky-god is bound to take in similar cases all over the world.

On the other hand, where circumstances have hindered this higher transformation, the rôle of the sky-god has gradually disappeared. His primordial creative activity has become as vague and fluid as the pale distant figures of Saturn, Ouranos, or Chronos in classical mythology.

In a word, after having united in himself the attributes of a supreme being, of an elementary kind, the sky-god had two chief fates—either, transformed and brought nearer to us under other names, he became the main resort of the divine activity of this world or he retained his primitive physiognomy, and his importance and his worship have been in inverse proportion to the progress of man's conceptions of the sensible world.

[1] Cf., *e.g.*, the Peruvian system and the evolution of the Chaldæan system.

LITERATURE.—There is no monograph on the subject. Observations of a general character in ancient ethnological and anthropological literature should be examined—*e.g.*, A. Bastian, *Beiträge zur vergleichenden Psychologie*, Berlin, 1868; E. B. Tylor, *PC*[4], 2 vols., London, 1903; and A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1887. For details the reader should consult the articles in the present Encyclopædia under the names of the different nations and races.

GEORGE FOUCART.

SLANDER.—Slander has been defined as 'the utterance or dissemination of false statements or reports concerning a person, or malicious misrepresentation of his actions, in order to defame or injure him,'[1] the term being used to denote not only the act itself, but also the statement circulated, and even the consequential discredit suffered. The last meaning is, however, now commonly conveyed by the word 'scandal,' of which 'slander' is etymologically[2] only a variant form, though in modern usage 'the word [scandal] differs from the etymologically identical "slander" in not implying the falsity of the imputations made.'[3] With slander as a technical term in law we are not concerned; we shall consider only its ethical use and import.

Instances of the word are found in English books as early as A.D. 1270. In the *Lay Folks Catechism* (1375) we read of 'Sklandre for to fordo a mannes gode fame,' and in Chaucer's *House of Fame* of 'His other clarioun | That hight sklaundre in every toun.' The term has substantially the same meaning in Shakespeare, *Much Ado*, II. i 143: 'His gift is in devising impossible slanders'; the corresponding verb occurs in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, III. ii. 31: 'The best way is to slander Valentine | With falsehood, cowardice, and poor descent'; while of the derived adjective a forcible example is found in Milton, *Par. Lost*, xii. 538: 'Truth shall retire | Bestuck with slanderous darts.' Jeremy Taylor (1613–67), who in *The Great Exemplar* speaks of 'killing a man's reputation by calumnies or slander or open reviling,' elsewhere (*Serm.* xxii.–xxiv.) defines slander, properly so called, as 'the inventing evil things, falsely imputing crimes to our neighbour.' This he co-ordinates, as one form (*d*) of calumny, with (*a*) tale-bearing, (*b*) detraction proper, (*c*) railing or reviling, and (*e*) cursing; calumny, or slanderous and detracting speech in general, being in his view one species (ii.), co-ordinate with (i.) idle speech, and (iii.) flattery, of that 'corrupt communication' which, as reprobated by St. Paul (Eph 4[29]), forms the text of his trilogy of sermons 'On the Good and Evil Tongue.'

These quotations will suffice to indicate how slander, as understood by classical English authors, stands related to, and how far it can be distinguished in meaning from, such terms as 'calumny,' 'detraction,' and 'evil-speaking.' While no two of these terms are exactly synonymous, it is hardly possible to mark off their several denotations by any fast line. They are to a large extent interchangeable, especially 'calumny' and 'slander,' which, as distinguished from 'evil-speaking' and 'detraction,' imply falsehood in addition to more or less of either positive malevolence or reckless indifference to the injurious effect of defamatory words. Even to slander and calumny it is perhaps not essential that the allegations made should be definitely known by the speaker or writer to be false. A man is none the less a slanderer if he utters and disseminates regarding his neighbour injurious matter which he has no reason whatever, or no approximately sufficient reason, for believing to be true. If, on the other hand, it is true, he is not a slanderer, though the utterance, if superfluous and unprovoked, may still be fitly accounted 'evil-speaking,' and reprehensible as such. And it nearly always is superfluous, if it is not likely to do any positive good, or if no third party would be wronged or discredited by silence. The latter condition is, indeed, apt to be overlooked; and denunciation of indefensible conduct is often improperly censured as evil-speaking, when in reality reticence or disbelief regarding it would be grossly unfair to some wholly innocent, and perhaps actively beneficent, and deeply injured, person.

[1] *OED*, *s.v.*
[2] Skeat, *Etymol. Dict.*[4], Oxford, 1910, *s.v.*, and *OED*.
[3] *OED*, *s.v.* 'Scandal.'

Thus, on the whole, disclosure of ascertained truth is morally safer than a timid reticence, though often legally perilous. While, however, the actual truth of a statement is (on the whole and subject to important exceptions) a good reason morally for not withholding it on occasion, a mere belief on the part of the speaker that it is true is, if it be in fact untrue, a very poor defence. There is indeed a measure of malevolence, if not of dishonesty, in all readiness lightly to believe what is evil concerning one's neighbour, though there is scarcely less in perversely disbelieving palpable evidence of grievous wrong inflicted upon an inoffensive, or clearly well-intentioned, neighbour by another who is manifestly unscrupulous. In practice the false belief and the perverse disbelief are apt to go together. The same person, *i.e.*, who readily slanders a good man will often be stolidly blind to the atrocious deeds of the evil-minded. It is of the essence of slander to call good evil; and this normally finds its complement in calling evil good.

The act, or habit of thought and speech, denoted in English by 'slander' was in the languages and literatures of Græco-Roman antiquity, which were so large a factor in the constitution of European morals, represented most completely by the Greek word διαβολή. This word, in the sense of false charge or slanderous imputation, was used by the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, by the poet Euripides, by Isocrates and other orators, and somewhat scantily by the philosophers Plato,[1] Aristotle,[2] and Cleanthes the Stoic. The corresponding verb-form had a similar range. In no instance would the term seem to be technical. For purposes of ethical study the most interesting occurrences of the word are the few cited from the philosophers, and more particularly that from Cleanthes, who wrote:

'There is nothing, that ever was, more mischievous than slander (κακοῦργότερον οὐδὲν διαβολῆς ἐστί πω); secretly deceiving the man whose ear it has won, it works up odium against the guiltless.'[3]

A more trenchant epitome of the vice could hardly be given. Three centuries later Plutarch[4] writes of the fellow-countrymen of an exiled, but prosperous, statesman as 'from envy' (διὰ τὸ φθονεῖν) readily accepting the various 'slanders' (διαβολάς) circulated concerning him, thus incidentally marking what has been perhaps the most frequent, though by no means the universal, motive of calumnious allegation.

Meanwhile the term διαβολή had been employed by Greek translators of the Hebrew Scriptures and other Hellenistic writers to represent a type of speech and intention which, though not covered by any one Hebrew name, is recognized in the OT as eminently sinful, and which might be described as meditated and systematic violation of the spirit of the Ninth Commandment. The noun occurs in Nu 14^{37} (Aq.), Ps 31^{13} (Sym.), where Eng. AV gives 'slander' (PBV 'blasphemy,' RV 'defaming'), 2 Mac 14^{27}, and six times in Sir (19^{15} 26^{5} 28^{9} 38^{17} $51^{2, 6}$), the verb (διαβάλλειν) in Dn 3^{8} 6^{24}. The noun, which is thus fairly frequent in the Greek OT and in the English versions is often (Sir 19^{15} 26^{5} 51^{6}), though not uniformly, rendered 'slander,' is not found in the NT. The corresponding adjective (διάβολος) is, however, used thrice in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Ti 3^{11}, 2 Ti 3^{3}, Tit 2^{3}), where RV, following the precedent of Wyclif in the last passage, rightly restores 'slanderers' for the less exact 'false accusers' of AV and most previous versions, while the same word, with the article prefixed, is of frequent occurrence and appears in the English versions as 'the devil.' It is probable that we may safely connect with this fact the exceptionally stern warning of Mt 5^{22}, and the still more tremendous language (Mk 3^{29} = Mt 12^{31} = Lk 12^{10}) touching 'blasphemy of the Holy Spirit'—an extreme form of wickedness, which, it would appear, consists in a set and wilful determination to call good evil, in despite of evidence that to any heart not utterly depraved from honesty is overwhelming. For 'blasphemy' (βλασφημία), though not identical with, is nearly akin to, 'slander.' Actually it is the more general term, signifying generically 'evil-speaking.' It becomes theological blasphemy when it has as its object God or the manifestations of His will and beneficence. And this occurs whenever works of love and mercy, due to the agency of His Holy Spirit, are perversely and malignantly attributed to the agency of the powers of evil. If, then, slander be regarded as evil-speaking envenomed by falsehood, the worst conceivable slanderer will be a personality uniting consummate ability in falsehood with unlimited readiness to speak evil of the Holy Spirit of God. While it does not fall within the scope of this article to discuss the personality of the devil, it is relevant to note that 'the devil' of the NT is before all things a 'slanderer,' an intensely malevolent perverter of truth and fabricator of untruth.

It follows that in any system of ethics claiming to be distinctively Christian no form of evil practice can be thought graver or more deadly than that of habitually traducing and slandering the guiltless and the beneficent. Nevertheless it found no place among the 'seven deadly sins' of mediæval theology, and so apparently escaped being denounced either by the scholastic doctors of Latin Christendom or even by Dante. All the more is it to the credit of English moral insight that in the last of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* 'the Parson' brings in 'backbiting or detraction' as a specific sin bred by the recognized 'deadly sin' of envy, and sets forth tersely and with perspicuity the several shapes that it may assume. But, notwithstanding the efforts of individual moralists, it has at no time either officially or in popular estimation ranked, as it should, with breaches of the sixth, seventh, and eighth Commandments as sin of the first magnitude. Theory apart, experience of life, justly interpreted, might warn us that, as civilization becomes more complex and more highly equipped, the slanderer's capacity for evil becomes more terrible. It may be true that modern institutions have improved the means of combating and disproving calumny. But the rapid multiplication of opportunities for censorious and derogatory comment outside the peril of the law has more than countervailed that advantage. And there has certainly in the last 200 years been no amelioration of the virulence either of envy or of other passions prompting to calumny. On the contrary, in the 18th cent. we find Butler, a singularly cautious observer, in his sermon 'Upon the Government of the Tongue,'[1] holding that a main source of much 'evil-speaking' was nothing more than 'unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech,' which, however, 'is often of as bad effect upon the good name of others, as deep envy or malice.' And a century later Thomas Brown († 1820) taught that 'defamation' and slanderous talk arise less often from envy and malice than from 'mere flippancy' and 'the necessity of filling up with amusement of some sort a conversation that' else 'would flag.'[2] This was probably true of his own, as of Butler's, age—an age of 'conversation.' But in the present age of relentless competition and equally relentless pleasure-seeking slander has once again become, as of old, a serious

[1] *Apol.* 19 A, 20 D, E. [2] *Rhet.* i. 1. 4, ii. 4. 30, iii. 15. 1.
[3] Frag. 586 (von Arnim). [4] *Them.* 4.

[1] *Serm.* iv.
[2] *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*[15], p. 567.

business, now often elaborately organized, needing therefore to be vigilantly detected and refuted, alike in public and in private life, by all lovers of truth and justice. From the individual heart the vice, or vicious propensity, whether originating in envy or, as not seldom, in contempt, or in the mere pleasure of saying pungent things, calculated to attract attention or amuse, can be extirpated only by the counteracting presence and prevalence of a love which honours one's neighbour as oneself, and, in the words of St. Paul, 'rejoiceth not in unrighteousness, but rejoiceth with the truth' (1 Co 13[6]).

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities quoted in the art. see Ja 3[2-8]; Jeremy Taylor, *Course of Sermons*, London, 1650, nos. xxii.–xxiv.; J. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature*, do. 1726, no. iv.; T. Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*[15], Edinburgh, 1845, lect. 84, pp. 566–570; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], Oxford, 1886, vol. ii. bk. i. ch. 5, § 2, pp. 172–174.

J. M. VAIZEY HOPE.

SLAVS.—I. *DEFINITION OF THE TERM.*—The term Slav, Slavic, Slavonic, does not correspond to the term German, which denotes a group of people united by cultural and national ties, but to the term Germanic or Teutonic, which is applied to all people speaking Germanic tongues, irrespective of nationality or culture. Comparative study of the Slavic peoples and their neighbours shows that neither in physical type nor in culture and religion have the Slavs, either in modern days or in the earliest times, formed a unit or shown a greater likeness than that which is manifested by any neighbours living under the same geographical and historical conditions.

The name Slav is derived by Western writers from *sclavi*, 'slave.' This derivation, however, does not hold good in Slavic languages, and the Slavic name for Slav, *slavianin* (Russian) or *slowianin* (Polish), is more obviously derived from *slowo*—a word meaning all people who use the same words.[1] Still another derivation is suggested from *slawa*, 'glory.' The first historical mention of the Slavs does not call them Sclavi, but Vinithi, Veneti, Venethæ; the south-eastern Slavs were known as Antæ, Antes; not till the 6th cent. A.D. do we meet the name Sclavini. It is difficult to decide whether the Romans imposed the name Sclavini on the Slavs or whether the Slavic name coincided with the Roman, in sound if not in meaning. There are no proofs that the Slavs were ever subjected to the slave-trade to the extent that the Greeks or the people of Asia Minor were, and the fact that, as T. Peisker[2] explains, some Slavic tribes were ruled by the Scandinavian vikings (Slavicized into *vitez*, *vitiaz*) or Turkic leaders (*zupan*) does not necessarily imply that they were slaves to their kings, any more than any other subjects were slaves of their king at the beginning of European history.

II. *HISTORY.*—Historical mention of the Slavs, as of other European nations outside the Mediterranean area, is not found much before the Christian era, but the archæological evidence reaches much farther back. Still, it is very doubtful whether we have remnants of any Neolithic culture among the Slavs, or much evidence even of the Hallstatt period. We find the first historical reference to the Slavs in the *Naturalis Historia* of Pliny the Elder (1st cent. A.D.), who mentions the Venedæ or Venedi, who were undoubtedly Slavs; but it must be remembered that there are also theories connecting the Scythians with the Slavs, as well as the Neuri, Budini, and Sauromatæ of Herodotus, which, if accepted, will take the historical Slavs back to the 5th cent. B.C. But what we know about these races will not stand scrutiny by the searchlight of modern ethnological study, so we shall count the whole period before Pliny as forming part of the archæological era. In this way the history of the Slavs, or rather the history of the people speaking Slavic tongues, will be subdivided into the following periods: (1) the archæological period, to the 1st cent. A.D.; (2) the classical period, from Pliny to the 6th cent.; (3) the Byzantine period, from Procopius to the 7th cent.; (4) the period of independent Christian Slavic states, from the 7th to the 13th cent.; (5) the period of political dependency, from the Turko-Mongol invasions and the subjugation of the Eastern and Southern Slavs by the Turks to the middle of the 19th cent.; (6) the period of the realization of various Slavic-speaking peoples, from the national revivals to the present day.

[1] After the great migration of the Slavs in the 7th cent., we find the name Slav in almost the same form near Novgorod (Slovyene), in N. Hungary (Slovatsu), in Pomerania (Slovinsu), and in the Balkans (Slovyenu).

[2] 'The Expansion of the Slavs' (*The Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge, 1911–13, vol. ii. ch. xiv.).

For the purposes of this article we need consider only the four first periods, when the Slavs had more than mere linguistic community through their early religious beliefs and customs. In the last two periods the history of the Slavic peoples runs in separate national channels which became racially less Slavic, and politically and culturally farther apart, if we take the successive Pan-Slavist movements as springing entirely from the imperialistic propaganda of the various governments. Without going into the history of the last two periods, we shall, however, deal with the folk-lore of the Slavic people to the present day.

1. **The archæological period (to the 1st cent. A.D.).**—In 1837 appeared the monumental work of P. J. Šafařík on *Slavonic Antiquities*,[1] in which he gives a picture of the Slavs of the archæological period. This work marks the beginning of scientific investigation of the early history of the Slavs, as all former works on the subject were full of serious misinterpretations. It is still a subject of discussion which of the old tumuli in Central and Eastern Europe can be ascribed to the Slavs. None of the Stone Age tumuli have any peculiarly Slav characteristics, least of all the dolichocephalic skulls found in them. The so-called Slav period of these tumuli begins in the 9th century. According to Pytheas, in the beginning of the 3rd cent. B.C. Germanic tribes were already round the Baltic, so it may be assumed that the Slavic branch of the Aryan linguistic family had then already separated from the Germanic branch, and their separation from the Iranian branch of this family must have occurred even earlier, at least before the Scythian period (5th–3rd cent. B.C.). While the Slavic archæology of this period has not been sufficiently investigated to allow us to draw conclusions from it, and is bound up with the early archæology of the Aryans in general, the historical evidence of the period is only one degree better.

(*a*) *The Scythian problem.*—We find no mention of the Slavs as such in B.C. times, and can only conjecture their existence under the name of various tribes belonging to the Scythian or Sarmatian political units. Hence the early history of the Slavs is closely connected with the Scythian problem. The somewhat debatable assumption that the Scythians or Sarmatians must have left some descendants or other, and that 'there was no more obvious ancestry for the Slavs to be discerned among nations mentioned by ancient writers,'[2] is the chief ground on which the Scytho-Slavic theory is based. On the other hand, as Minns justly observes, 'this theory naturally appealed to the tendency of chroniclers to push the ancestry of their own nation back as far as possible.'[3]

Broadly speaking, the following solutions have been suggested for the Scythian problem:

(1) That all the Scyths were Turanian.—Suggested first by B. G. Niebuhr, *Kleine Schriften*, Bonn, 1828–43, i. 352 ff.; supported by K. Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, Berlin, 1855; George Grote, *History of Greece*[3], London, 1851, iii. 216–243.

[1] *Slovanské Starozitnosti*, 2 vols., Prague, 1837, Germ. tr., *Slawische Alterthümer*, Leipzig, 1843–44.

[2] E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 98.

[3] *Ib.*; see also art. SCYTHIANS.

(2) That the Scythic nation was an artificial product evolved from the nomads of the steppes.—R. W. Macan, *Herodotus*, London, 1895, ii. 12.

(3) That all the Scyths were Iranian.—Originated by K. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, Munich, 1837; supported by A. Schiefner, 'Sprachliche Bedeuten gegen das Mongolenthum der Skythen,' *Mélanges Asiatiques*, ii. [St. Petersburg, 1856] 531 ff.; K. Müllenhoff, 'Ueber die Herkunft und Sprache der pontischen Scythen und Sarmaten,' *MBAW*, 1866, p. 549 ff., reprinted in *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Berlin, 1870–1900, iii. 101 ff.; M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, Eng. tr., London, 1877–82, iii. 228–246; W. Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten über den skythischen Norden,' i. 'Ueber das arimaspische Gedicht des Aristeas,' *SWAW* (Phil. hist. Classe), cxvi. [1888] 715–780, ii. 'Die Nachrichten Herodots über den skythischen Karawanenweg nach Innerasien,' *ib.* cxvii. [1889] 1–70; A. von Gutschmid, 'Die Skythen,' in *Kleine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1889–94, iii. 421 ff. (his art. 'Scythia, Scythians' in *EBr*[9] is an epitome of this).

(4) That the Scyths were an Aryan people who have now disappeared.—G. Rawlinson, *Hist. of Herodotus*[2], London, 1862, iii. 157 ff.

(5) That the Scyths were Germans.—L. Wilser, *Internat. Centralblatt für Anthropologie*, vii. [1902] vi. 353, and 'Skythen und Perser,' in *Asien: Organ der deutschen asiatischen Gesellschaft*, ii. [1902]; J. Fressl, *Die Skythen-Saken die Urväter der Germanen*, Munich, 1886.

(6) That the Scyths were Slavs.—J. G. Cuno, *Forschungen im Gebiete der alten Völkerkunde*, Berlin, 1871; J. E. Zabyelin, *Hist. of Russian Life* (Russ.), Moscow, 1871, i. 243; D. J. Samokvasov, *Hist. of Russian Law* (Russ.), Warsaw, 1884, pt. ii. pp. 1–69.

(7) That the Eastern Scyths were Mongolian and the Western Scyths Iranian and possibly ancestors of the Slavs.—V. T. Miller, 'Epigraphic Traces of Iranian Population on the North Coast of the Euxine,' *Journ. Min. Edu.*, St. Petersburg, 1886, p. 232; T. I. Mishchenko, 'Concerning the Geography and Ethnology of Herodotean Scythia,' *ib.*, 1888.

(8) That the Eastern Scyths between the Dnieper and the Don were Iranian, while the Western Scyths between the Dnieper and the Carpathians and the Lower Danube were Slavs.—P. J. Šafarik, *Slavonic Antiquities*.

Recent study of Scythian archæology and customs makes it more and more clear that the Scyths were a political unit composed of various ethnical elements. The distinction of three different kinds of Scythians had already been made by Herodotus, besides which he distinguishes various other tribes which he considered non-Scythian. Recognizing his distinctions, and assuming that the W. Scythians were Slavs, we find it impossible to class as Slavic the non-Scythian tribes of Herodotus, as, *e.g.*, the Neuri. In this case the Neuri must be considered as one of the neighbours of the Slavs, probably the Letto-Lithuanians. This, however, is not realized by Šafarík, who considers the W. Scythians and Neuri, as well as others, to be Slavs. Such inconsistencies deprive his Scytho-Slavic theory of any profound historic or ethnological value. Another argument against identifying the Slavs and W. Scythians is brought forward by T. G. Braun.[1] He says that the first historical mention of the Slavs in Pliny, Tacitus (1st cent. A.D.), and Ptolemy shows them far away from the Lower Danube. Pliny says that they live east of the Vistula,[2] Tacitus places them somewhere between the Valdai hills near Novgorod and the Vistula,[3] Ptolemy (2nd cent.) places them on the Vistula, in Sarmatia, and along the shores of the Venedic gulf (the Gulf of Danzig); but he also speaks of the Venedic mountains, probably meaning the N. Carpathians.[4] Further, if we bear in mind that the territory of the W. Scythians was the battle-ground of every tribe migrating southwards, we can see that it would not be a very good nursery for a rapidly increasing race which was to overrun half Europe by the 6th century.

But, if we are not to find ancestors of the Slavs among the Scythians, we have still to consider whether they are to be found among the non-Scythian tribes described by Herodotus, such as the Neuri and Budini.

(*b*) *The Neuri.*—Herodotus (5th cent. B.C.) tells us that the Neuri live along the rivers Hypanis (Bug) and Tyras (Dniester), north of the Scythian Aroteres;[1] and that they had been driven from their land a generation before by a plague of snakes, and had taken refuge with the Budini.[2] In the same place he tells us that once a year they became wolves for a short season. Of the land which lay beyond them he confesses his ignorance, but believes it to be desolate. Ephorus of Cyme[3] (2nd cent. B.C.), quoted by Scymnus Chius,[4] follows Herodotus, saying that they live beyond the Aroteres, and that the country beyond them is desolate. Pomponius Mela[5] (1st cent. A.D.) mentions the Neuri as living on the Tyras. He also relates the wolf-story. Claudius Ptolemy[6] (2nd cent. A.D.) speaks of the Ναύβαροι or Ναύαροι as inhabiting S. Podolia. Ammianus Marcellinus[7] (4th cent. A.D.) says that they live in the mountains north of the land of the Borysthenes (*i.e.* near Kiev).

Šafarík was the first to propose the identification of the Neuri with the Slavs.[8] He considers that their territory was just where the Wends (Slavs) originally settled. He is supported by L. Niederle,[9] Braun,[10] Tomaschek,[11] and Minns.[12]

(*c*) *The Budini.*—In iv. 21 Herodotus tells us that the Budini are living in the great country north of the Sauromatæ, east of the Tanais (Don); in iv. 108 that they are a powerful nation, with blue eyes and red hair. With them live a people called the Geloni, whom Herodotus believes to be fugitive Greeks. These people have built for themselves a town of wood called Gelonus, with temples and shrines in which they worship gods whom Herodotus believes to be Greek. Pomponius Mela[13] also mentions this wooden town of Gelonus in the land of the Budini. Rawlinson[14] gathers from the data given by Herodotus that the Budini inhabited the region round about Zadonsk and Woronetz (Saratov).

Many theories are suggested concerning the ethnology of the Budini. Rawlinson[15] holds that the Budini were either the ancestors of the Germans or else a remnant of the Cimmerians, whom he believes to be Celts. F. Lenormant[16] considers the town Gelonus to be the Asgard of Scandinavian mythology. C. Ritter[17] goes so far as to say that Budini is a religious title, and that the Budini were Buddhists. Minns[18] thinks that they were probably Finns of the branch now represented by the Votiaks and Permiaks. Of course Šafarik[19] regards the Budini and Geloni as both Slav peoples, and derives their name from *voda*, 'water' ('waterfolk'). Grote[20] supports this view. E. H. Bunbury[21] suggests that Herodotus' informant may have confused Greek and Slavic methods of worship in his account of Gelonus. Niederle[22] is also inclined to think that the Budini were a Slavic people. It is certainly more likely that the Budini were Slavic.

(*d*) *The Sauromatæ, Sarmatæ, etc.*—Herodotus[23] says that the Sauromatæ were living on the east bank of the Tanais (Don), which divided their land from that of the Scythians. They stretched northwards from Lake Mæotis (Sea of Azov) to the forest land belonging to the Budini. He relates the legend that they were descendants of Amazons conquered by the Greeks on the Thermodon, who, having been embarked for Greece, slew their

1 *Researches in the Sphere of Gotho-Slavonic Relations* (Russian), St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 74–77.
2 *HN* iv. 13 (27), 97.
3 *Germ.* 46, ed. H. Furneaux, Oxford, 1894, p. 120 *f.*
4 *Geog.* iii. 5.

1 iv. 17, 51. 2 iv. 105.
3 Frag. 78.
4 Frag. 73 (*FHG* i. [Paris, 1841] 237).
5 *De Situ Orbis*, ii. 1, ed. J. Reynolds, Eton, 1761, p. 26.
6 *Geog.* iii. 5 (P. Bertius, *Theatrum Geographiæ Veteris*, Leyden, 1618–19, ii. 82).
7 *Rer. Gest.* xxii. 8 (C. Nisard, *Collection des Auteurs latins*, Paris, 1878, ii. 176).
8 *Slovanské Starozitnosti*[2], Prague, 1862–63, i. 224 *f.*
9 *Slovanské Starozitnosti*, Prague, 1902, i. 266.
10 P. 247. 11 *Kritik*, ii. v. 247.
12 P. 102 *f.* 13 i. 22, ed. Reynolds, p. 22.
14 *Herodotus*[2], vol. iii. p. 79. 15 *Ib.* p. 78.
16 *Manual of the Ancient Hist. of the East*, Eng. tr., London, 1869–70, ii. 134.
17 *Die Vorhalle Europäischer*, Berlin, 1820, p. 381.
18 *EBr*[11], s.v. 'Budini.'
19 *Slawische Alterthümer*, i. 10, 185–195.
20 *Hist. of Greece*[3], iii. 325 note.
21 *Hist. of Ancient Geography*, London, 1879, i. 193–196
22 i. 275. 23 iv. 21.

captors, and drifted to Kremni on the shores of Lake Mæotis, whence they advanced up the Tanais. Hippocrates[1] (468 B.C.) places them on the shores of Lake Mæotis. The *Periplus* of Scylax, dated by K. Müller about 338 B.C., mentions in § 69[2] a tribe of 'Syrmatæ' in Europe close to the Tanais; but in § 70[3] the Sauromatæ are still in Asia on the eastern side of the river. In connexion with this we may note that Stephanus Byzantius cites this rare form 'Syrmatæ' from Eudoxus of Cnidos (4th cent. B.C.), and says that it is identical with 'Sauromatæ,' 'Surmates,' etc. The first definite mention of the Sauromatæ as in Europe is that of Polybius[4] (210 B.C.), where Γάταλος ὁ Σαρμάτης joins a great league of states in Asia Minor on the shores of the Euxine. This is the first occasion on which the term Σαρμάτης takes the place of the form Σαυρομάτης. Ephorus (2nd cent. B.C.), quoted by Scymnus Chius,[5] says that they live on the shores of Lake Mæotis. Strabo (2nd cent. B.C.)[6] has the Iazyges Sarmatæ on the Ister (Danube). His Sarmatian tribes are Iazyges-Sarmatæ, Royal Sarmatæ, and Uirgi, and the Rhoxolani, Aorsi, and Siraci beyond the Tanais. Ovid (1st cent. B.C.)[7] places the Iazyges on the Danube and the Sauromatæ in W. Sarmatia. Diodorus Siculus (1st cent. B.C.)[8] says that the Sauromatæ are still on the Don, and that they come from Media.

Before going on to the notices in writers of the Christian era, it is well to remark that it is not clear exactly when the Sauromatæ crossed the Don. In the 4th cent. B.C. the Sauromatæ were either east of the Don or just crossing. After that we get no definite information for a century and a half. Minns[9] suggests that the reason of this is that the Scyths were then fighting a losing struggle with the Sauromatæ. The Scyths, contrary to the opinion of Herodotus,[10] were good neighbours to the Pontic Greeks, but it was not safe to travel near the Euxine when the Sauromatæ were first in the ascendant. We may also notice two main divisions of Sauromatæ by the 1st cent. B.C.—the Iazyges-Sauromatæ, Royal Sauromatæ, and Uirgi on the Danube, and the other division, Sauromatæ, Rhoxolani, Aorsi, and Siraci, on the Don and the shores of the Sea of Azov and in the Caucasus.

In the 1st cent. A.D. Pomponius Mela[11] places Sarmatia between the Vistula and the Danube. Pliny the Elder[12] has the Hamaxobii (or Aorsi) and Rhoxolani on the Danube and Herecynthian Marsh, and the Iazyges in Dacia, having previously driven out the Dacians. This is confirmed by Tacitus, who tells, in *Hist.* i. 79, how the Rhoxolani, having occupied W. Sarmatia, which had been left vacant by the Iazyges, made an unsuccessful raid into Mœsia in A.D. 70.[13] In *Ann.* xii. 29 he has the Iazyges-Sarmatæ in Pannonia.[14] In *Germ.* 1 the Iazyges-Sarmatæ are between the Danube and Theiss, having driven out the Dacians,[15] and in *Germ.* 43 we find the Sarmatæ imposing tribute on the Osi in Pannonia.[16] In the 2nd cent. A.D. Ptolemy[17] has the Sarmati along the coast of Lake Mæotis, and the Iazyges Metanastæ between the Theiss and the Danube, but this is probably, as Minns points out,[18] the result of combining information of two different dates. Another 2nd cent. historian, Polyænus,[19] tells the story of Amage, queen of the Sarmatians, who reigned on the shores of the Pontus. She allied with the Chersonesians against their neighbours the Scythians. In the 4th cent. A.D. the *Hist. August. Scriptores* tells us of war waged against the Sauromatæ by Hadrian, Marcus, Maximus Regalianus, and others.[1] The 4th cent. historian Olympiodorus[2] shows that the Sarmatæ have overrun Thrace and Illyricum. Jordanes[3] (6th cent. A.D.) says that Dacia was *formerly* bounded on the east by the Rhoxolani, on the west by the Iazyges, on the south by the Sarmatæ and Bastarnæ, and on the north by the streams of the Danube. In the *de Get.* xxxvi. we find the Sarmatians on the side of the Byzantine Romans against Valentinian, emperor of Rome.[4] Procopius, however, in the 6th cent. A.D., merely mentions the Sauromatæ as a tribe of Scythians.[5]

Of the customs of the Sauromatæ Herodotus has a good deal to say. In iv. 110 ff. he tells us that the Sauromatian women hunted, went to war, and wore the same clothes as the men. Every woman had to kill a man in battle before she could marry. They spoke a language which Herodotus believed to be broken Scythian. These customs put together amply account for the myth of Amazonian origin.

Hippocrates[6] notes the difference between the Sauromatæ and the other 'Scythian' tribes around them. He gives the same account of the activities of the Sauromatian women as Herodotus, adding that they were not allowed to take part in religious ceremonies till they were married, and that they had no right breasts, since it was the custom of their mothers to cut these off in early childhood, to make their right shoulder and arm stronger by concentrating the strength there. When married, they gave up riding in general, but were still liable to be called up when a crisis necessitated universal tribal service. This is interesting, since these two accounts must have come from independent sources.

Ephorus[7] gives the same account of the Sauromatæ as Herodotus, from whom, most probably, he got his information.

Strabo gives a very full account of their customs. In *Geog.* ζ. 2,[8] he says that they are a mare-milking, milk-drinking, simple people, who have mixed with the Thracians and Bastarnæ beyond the Ister. In *Geog.* ζ. 17[9] he says that they are mostly nomads, though some practise agriculture, and he gives a detailed account of the Rhoxolani. They wear very little armour, and are almost naked. Their helmets and breastplates are made of ox-hide, their shields of wicker-work. They also use spears, bows, and swords. On the top of their waggons are fastened felt tents. They eat milk, cheese, and meat. They winter in the marshes round Lake Mæotis, and move up to the steppes in summer.

Diodorus Siculus[10] says that women ruled among the Sauromatæ, and he gives the usual account of their habits.

Tacitus[11] gives an account of the Rhoxolani: they use swords and poles of an extraordinary length, and wear coats of mail made of steel plates and ox-hide; they are almost impregnable to a charge, but, if knocked over, they cannot get up again. In *Germ.* 17 he says that the Sarmatæ have flowing garments like the Parthians; in *Germ.* 46 that they live in waggons, and are dirty and lazy.

Pomponius Mela says that the Sarmatians are rather like Parthians, their greater roughness being accounted for by the greater harshness of their climate; they are nomads and very fierce. He also mentions the strange habits of their women.

Nicolaus Damascenus[12] (1st cent. A.D.) tells that the Sauromatæ have a habit of eating hard for three days till they are full up.

Pausanias[13] (late 2nd cent. A.D.) gives an account of the Sarmatian breastplate, which was made of pieces of horses' hoofs. He says that the Sauromatæ, though the most isolated of the barbarians, were skilful craftsmen. They had no iron in their country and did not import any, so they used bone for the tips of their arrows and spears. They used to lasso their enemies in battle. They were nomads, and had many horses, which they used to eat and sacrifice to the local gods. In VIII. xliii. 6[14] he says that they were warlike and wicked and relates how Antonius II. punished them for wantonly breaking the peace.

Many scholars, including Šafarík and Rawlinson, have believed the Sauromatæ to be Slavs; but this theory seems weakened by the ample evidence as to the Turanian character of the Sarmatian people.

1 *De Aer.* 17 (*Opera*, ed. H. Kuehlewein, Leipzig, 1894–1902, i. 59).
2 K. H. Klausen, *Hecatæi Frag.*, Berlin, 1831, p. 209.
3 *Ib.* p. 211.
4 *Hist.* xxvi. 6, 13, ed. L. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1866–68, iii. 436.
5 Frag. 78 (*FHG* i. 257).
6 *Geog.* VII. ii. 17, ed. A. Meineke, Leipzig, 1852–53, ii. 421.
7 *Trist.* ii. 191 ff.
8 *Bibl.* ii. 43, ed. F. Vogel and C. T. Fischer, Leipzig, 1886–1906, i. 240.
9 P. 118. 10 See iv. 76.
11 iii. 4, ed. Reynolds, p. 51.
12 *HN* iv. 12 (25), ed. C. Mayhoff, Leipzig, 1906–09, i. 337.
13 See Tac. *Hist.*, ed. W. A. Spooner, London, 1891, p. 179.
14 Ed. H. Furneaux, Oxford, 1885, p. 37.
15 Ed. Furneaux, p. 37. 16 *Ib.* p. 112.
17 *Georg.* III. vii. 5. 18 P. 121.
19 viii. 56, ed. I. Melber, Leipzig, 1887, p. 417.

1 See ed. H. Peter, Leipzig, 1865.
2 Ch. 27 (*Hist. Græc. Minores*, ed. L. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1870–71, i. 461).
3 *De Get.* xii., ed. C. A. Closs, Stuttgart, 1861, p. 54.
4 Ed. Closs, p. 134.
5 *De Bell. Got.* iv. 5, ed. D. Comparetti, Rome, 1895–98, iii. 26.
6 *De Aer.* 17, ed. Kuehlewein, i. 59.
7 Frag. 78 (*FHG* i. 257).
8 Ed. Meineke, ii. 407. 9 *Ib.* p. 420.
10 ii. 44, ed. Vogel and Fischer, i. 241.
11 *Hist.* i. 79.
12 Ch. 16 (*Hist. Græc. Min.*, ed. Dindorf, i. 147).
13 I. xxi. 5, ed. F. Spiro, Leipzig, 1903, i. 53 ff.
14 Ed. Spiro, ii. 365.

Moreover—a fact which Šafařík ignores—it is impossible to regard both Scyths and Sauromatæ as Slavic, since Herodotus most definitely distinguishes the Sauromatæ from the Scyths. They have all the characteristics of the Turkic nomads of the steppes, milking mares, living on meat, milk, and cheese, wearing flowing garments, living in waggons, and using felt tents. On the other hand, that important characteristic of the Turkic people, the use of iron, is lacking.

2. The classical period (1st–6th cent. A.D.).—We have very little information about the Slavs from the classical authors. Pliny mentions them under the name of Venedi or Venedæ.[1] He only says vaguely that they, among other tribes, are reported to live east of the Vistula. He also mentions the Sirbi (Serbs), who, he says, live with the Cimmerians.[2] Tacitus[3] mentions the Venedi as living near what H. Furneaux[4] considers to be between the Valdai hills near Novgorod and the east bank of the Vistula. He hesitates whether to call them Germans or Sarmatians, but is inclined to class them with the former, because they have fixed houses, use shields, and are swift of foot—all very un-Sarmatian characteristics. He also says that they are dirty and sluggish by nature. We must remember, however, that in this case the reading of the MS is 'Veneti.' In the 2nd cent. A.D. Ptolemy[5] places the Venedæ on the Vistula, in Sarmatia, and along the shores of the Venedic gulf, which seems to have been the Gulf of Danzig. He also mentions the Veltæ on the Baltic, the Sudini and Saboci in Prussia, which tribes Minns[6] considers Slavic. Minns suggests that Ptolemy's 'Stavani,' which he places in Prussia, might be read 'Stlavani.' Ptolemy[7] also mentions the Serbi, whom he places in Asiatic Sarmatia between the Ceraunian mountains and the river Rha.

3. The Byzantine period.—The first definite use of the word Sclavini is to be found in the pseudo-Cæsarius dialogue[8] early in the 6th cent. A.D. The first account of the Slavs under the name of Sclaveni is given by Jordanes.[9] He says that the Winidæ, Sclaveni, and Antes live in Dacia, from the town of Noviodunum and Lake Mursianus to the Danaster (Dniester), and northwards to the Vistula. They dwell in woods and marshes instead of houses. The Antes are the bravest tribe, and live round the shore of the Pontus from the Danaster to the Danaper (Dnieper). Farther on he says that the Winidæ, Antes, and Sclavi formed part of the subjects of Hermanreich; they were very warlike tribes, who were then subdued, 'but now range wheresoever they will through our neglect.'[10]

The most useful of the authorities is Procopius (6th cent.). His important remarks on 5th and 6th cent. Slavic institutions are worth quoting.

'For these tribes, the Antes and Sclaveni, are not ruled by one man, but have lived from olden times under democratic rule, and for this reason they deliberate in public all that concerns their weal and ill. Both these peoples have the same laws and customs. . . . They live in miserable hovels very far apart from one another and often change their abode. They go to battle on foot and charge the enemy with small shields and javelins in their hands. Some wear neither tunic nor cloak when going to battle, but merely short breeches. They all speak the same barbarous language, and are very like one another to look at. Their mode of living is hard and uncultured like that of the Massagetæ; they are always dirty. They are not malicious or deceitful, but have something of the simplicity of the Huns. At one time the Sclaveni and Antes had only one name, for they were called the Spori in ancient days, because, I take it, they were scattered so sporadically over the land they lived in; indeed they inhabit the greater part of the banks of the Danube. That is all I have to say about these people.'[1]

Procopius also gives a good deal about the history of the Slavs.

The Slavs during the 5th and 6th centuries are constantly trying to cross the Danube, and becoming more and more successful each time: the Slavs cross the Danube, and overrun Illyricum as far as Dyrrhachium;[2] Slavs again cross the Danube and Eurus. They divide into two bands, one of which ravages Illyria and the other Thrace. The latter take the town of Toperos on the Thracian coast, and commit horrible atrocities there.[3] A number of Slavs larger than had been seen before cross the Danube and attack Naisos with the intention of invading Thessalonica. Through fear of the Germans, however, they leave Thessalonica untouched, going through the Illyrian mountains to Dalmatia.[4] As time goes on, the Romans are less able to repel them. In iii. 14[5] Justinian offers the Antes the town of Tourris and land on the Danube, if they will protect the empire from the advance of the Huns. In iii. 40,[6] however, they are in the pay of Totila, the Hun leader, and attacking the empire. Towards the end of the 6th cent. they have overrun the whole of Greece, and are in such numbers that the Romans can make no way against them.[7] In fact, in iii. 14 Procopius admits that since the death of Chilbudinus (5th cent. A.D.) nothing has been able to protect the empire from the barbarians.

Towards the end of the 6th cent. Menander tells us that the Slavs made a raid into Thrace.[8] The next year (A.D. 578) they were ravaging the whole of Greece. Tiberius, the Roman, not having sufficient forces to meet them, persuaded Baianus, leader of the Avars, to attack them in their own country, and so force them to go back and defend it. Baianus accordingly crossed the Danube and burnt the Slav villages there, whose inhabitants had fled to the caves and woods. Baianus was the more ready to attack the Slavs since he had a private grudge against them; for they had refused to pay him tribute and killed his ambassadors shortly before.

Mauricius[9] (6th cent.) has much to say on the characteristics of the Slavs. Physically they are strong, well able and accustomed to endure cold and lack of clothing and food. They have great reverence for the laws of hospitality, and are very kind to strangers and prisoners. They are armed with two javelins, wooden bows, and small poisoned arrows; some use shields. Their method of attack is by sudden raids and incursions; they rarely fight a pitched battle. They are supreme in the art of defence; when pursued by enemies or suddenly attacked, they dive under the water, and, lying on their backs at the bottom, breathe through a long reed, and so escape destruction. They live in a continuous state of defence, having several exits to their houses and burying all their superfluous goods.

Thus, in the 6th cent., we have the Slavs definitely settled in large numbers north of the Danube. There were also Slavs in the Mark of Brandenburg.[10]

There were Serbo-Croats in Dalmatia and Pannonia, invited there by the emperor Heraclius (610–640) to protect them from the Avars.[11] The Danube Slavs were making constant raids into Greece, and had practically conquered N. Illyricum.

Nicephorus Patriarchus (8th cent. A.D.) is our chief authority for the fate of the Slavs in the 7th and 8th centuries. In 626 the Avars, with large numbers of Slav auxiliaries, attacked Blachernæ in Thrace. A number of Slav women were found to be in the forces.[12] In 679 the Boyars subdued the Slavs living in Mœsia and Thrace,[13] and in 688 the Slavs who had conquered parts of

1 *HN* iv. 13 (27), 97. 2 vi. 7. 3 *Germ.* 46.
4 *Germ.* p. 120 f. 5 iii. 5. 6 *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Slavs.'
7 v. 8. 8 *Dial.* ii. 110 (*PG* xxxviii. 986).
9 *De Get.* v. (Nisard, 429).
10 Cf. xxiii. (Nisard, 444).

1 *De Bell. Got.* iii. 14, ed. Comparetti, ii. 292–294.
2 iii. 29, ed. Comparetti, ii. 383.
3 xxxviii., ed. Comparetti, ii. 445–450.
4 iii. 40, ed. Comparetti, ii. 457.
5 Ed. Comparetti, ii. 294. 6 *Ib.* p. 465.
7 *Hist. Arcan.* § 18, *Opera*, ed. J. Haury, Leipzig, 1905–06, vol. iii. pt. i. p. 114.
8 Ch. 24 (*Corpus Script. Hist. Byzantinæ*, ed. I. Bekker and B. G. Niebuhr, Bonn, 1829, p. 327 c).
9 *Strategicum*, xi. ch. 5, ed. J. Scheffer, Upsala, 1664, p. 272.
10 Procopius, *de Bell. Got.* ii. 15.
11 Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, *de Administ. Imperio*, ch. 31–33, ed. I. Bekker in *Corp. Script. Hist. Byz.*, Bonn, 1829–40, iii. 152.
12 *De Reb. Gest.* 13 A, in *Corp. Script. Hist. Byz.*, Bonn, 1829–55, ii. 20.
13 *Ib.* p. 24 (p. 40).

Thessalonica submitted to the power of the Romans.[1] The same author tells us that in 763 a large number of Slavs crossed the Euxine and settled at the mouth of the river Artanes.[2]

Fredegar tells us of the foundation of a Slav state in Thuringia under Samo, a Frank, in the early 7th century.[3]

The period called Byzantine, because the chief authorities for it are the Byzantines, is the most important in Slavic history; in fact, it is the only period in which we can treat the Slavs as one race, though already varying according to locality and having different names in different places. It is certain that the rapid spread of the Slavs over the Eastern Empire was facilitated by its weakness, resulting from the incursions of bearded invaders from the north under Alaric and Odovacer, and beardless hordes from the east under Attila. Whatever region it was in which the Slavs first broke away from the Aryan stock, they must have been somewhere in the forest region of the western part of E. Europe outside the route of the Asiatic steppe invaders immediately before their invasion of the Roman Empire. About the 5th cent. they had spread over the lands of the W. Scythians, Sarmatians, and Celts, and so encroached upon the territories of the Eastern Roman Empire, and later upon the Frankish Empire. In the west they crossed the Rhine and got as far as Spain; in the south-east they reached Asia Minor a century and a half later. In the north-east they were on the northern shores of the Baltic in the 1st cent., and on the Dnieper in the 6th cent. (the Antes).

Pending further archæological discoveries, there is no exact information as to the date when the Slavs began to spread westwards. This lack of information has given certain Slavic scholars the opportunity of advancing a theory that the Slavs of the Elbe region were autochthonous.[4] The views of the most prominent German scholar may be summed up by the following quotation:

'. . . From the beginning of the fifth, and indeed for the greater part from the end of the third century, A.D., the country westward to the Oder and southward to the Riesengebirge was abandoned by its old German inhabitants. . . . It must be admitted that the Slavs found everywhere scattered remnants of the Germans, because they merely adapted the German names, *Oder*, *Elbe* (*Albi*), *Moldau* (*Walth ahva*), etc., to their own mouths (*Odra*, *Laba*, *Vltava*). For certain times and in certain districts there was a mixed population, and it is to be particularly noticed that even in the sixth century the Germans, who had long withdrawn to the South, did not admit that the East as far as the Vistula had definitely passed to the Slavs. It had not been conquered by them—only occupied by loose bands of settlers.'[5]

Since Peisker gives us a great deal of valuable historical information in this chapter on the expansion of the Slavs, it is the more important to point out where his preconceived ideas have vitiated his facts.

The axioms on which he bases his theory are: (1) that the rapid Slav conquest was due to either a Germanic or a Turanian (Avar) admixture, since the Slavs were merely the passive party; (2) that the organization of the early Slavic states was due to these two elements.

(1) His first argument is based on a quotation from Theophylactus' 'spy story': 'Three captives were brought before the Emperor Maurice having neither swords nor any other weapon, but only citharas with them. Being questioned they answered that they were Slavs from the coast of the northern ocean [Baltic Sea], whither the Khagan sent envoys with presents to ask for auxiliaries. They brought back an answer to the Khagan that he could expect no help from such a distance—they themselves had been fifteen months on the journey—and their people were absolutely peaceable. They played on the zither because they were unacquainted with weapons, their land produced no iron and therefore they lived there still and peacefully, and as the war trumpet was not understood there they played on the zither. These were obviously spies, but the fiction of their entire harmlessness could only deceive the Emperor when the story of the Khagan's embassy to the Baltic Slavs appeared natural. The whole mystification produced the widespread story of the *dove-like nature of the Slavs*.'[1]

Since Theophylactus himself considers the Slavs not so blameless as they seemed, this will hardly support his theory. Against it we have the testimony of almost all the other writers that the Slavs are good warriors, especially in defensive warfare. Nor are they lacking in savagery. Peisker ignores this evidence, however, and, when he deals with the pre-Avar conquests of the Slavs in the west, he says that the Germans for some unknown reason voluntarily abandoned their territories. Again, when he tells of the Rügen Slavs predominating over the Danes, he ascribes it[2] to the 'remarkable fusion of the viking pirates, Altsian herdsmen and Slav peasants on the island of Rügen' in 1168.

(2) As to the founding of Slavic states which took place at the end of the Byzantine period, it is true that Samo, the founder of a Slavic state bordering on Thuringia, at the beginning of the 7th cent., was a Frank, but the 'empire' was a short-lived adventure, which played no rôle in Slavic history. Peisker ascribes to it the deeper significance of a rebellion of Slavic peasants against their foreign masters, but it was equally a rebellion of the Frank chief against his own king, Dagobert. All the Slavic states which were at all permanent — as the Carinthian (7th cent.), the Croatian, Serbian, Bohemian (Lemusi), and Polish (Lakhy)—were states developed from purely local origins, and could scarcely owe much in that direction to the Avars, who, like all other Asiatic invaders, were better fighters than statesmen. The Bulgarian-Asiatic element among the Slavs who adopted this name must have been very insignificant, if the original Bulgarians changed their language and adopted Christianity so soon after settling down (9th cent. under Simeon and Samuel). Very little greater numerically was the Scandinavian element in the Kiev state, for in the third generation it amounted to the foreign dynasty, which, as is known from modern history, usually adopts the nationality of its subjects. Still Scandinavian influence in the formation of the Novgorod and Kiev states had been undoubtedly great, but its strength was due to the fact that the first Scandinavian Russ soon became Slavicized.

In the one case where Germanic influence was not sporadic, but permanent, it does not seem to have had the effect of forming a centralized state. This was the case of the most westerly Slavs, neighbours of the Germans, who lived between the Danube and Mecklenburg—such as the Sorbs of the Saale and Elbe, and the Lyutitsi and Obodritsi farther north—who never formed a state of any importance. Considering the constant disturbances coming from the steppe, we cannot but wonder how the Slavs succeeded in organizing their states, and providing at such an early period such large collections of native law based on legal proceedings rather than force.

It may be questioned whether the Avar invasion made a cleavage between the Slavs, dividing them into Northern and Southern, or whether it helped to accentuate a division already there.

4. The period of independent Christian Slavic states (7th–13th cent. A.D.).—There are two sources of evidence for the period—historical and archæological. The history of the Slavs during this period can be gleaned from local authorities of the 10th cent. or later. Among these are the Germans, Thietmar of Merseburg (10th cent.), Adam of Bremen (11th cent.), Helmold (12th cent.), and Otto of Bamberg (12th cent.), and the Danish Saxo Grammaticus (12th cent.), Fredegar, and the *Knytlinga Saga*. Others are Slavic, such as the S. Russian chronicler Nestor (12th cent.), the Bohemian Cosmas, bishop of Prague (12th cent.), the Polish-Latin *Homilies* (12th cent.), and the Polish chroniclers, Marcianus Gallus (11th–12th cent.), Vincentius Kadlubek of Cracow (13th cent.), Yanko of Czarnkov (14th cent.), and Dlugosz (15th cent.). The chroniclers, though of a later date, deal with the period which we are now considering. Besides these local sources, the Arabian travellers, al-Mas'ūdī (10th cent.) and Ibrāhīm ibn Vāsīfshāh (12th cent.), and a Spanish Jew called Ibraham ibn La'qūb (10th cent.) contribute interesting information which is much more impartial and free from bias than the Germanic and Slavic contributions.

From a historical and archæological point of view, this is the most 'Slavic' period in the history of the race, since at that time, between the advance of Attila and that of Jenghiz Khan, there were no invasions of any importance from the east or from the west—*i.e.*, there was no great infusion of Turanian blood to the Slavic stock, since the Avars were a

[1] *Ib.* p. 24 c (p. 41). [2] *Ib.* p. 44 c (p. 77).
[3] *Chron.* 48 (*PL* lxxi. 636 f.).
[4] E. Boguslawski, *Proofs of the Autochthonism of the Slavs in the Territories occupied by them in Mediæval Times* (Polish), Warsaw, 1912.
[5] Peisker, in *Cam. Med. Hist.* ii. 435.

[1] Peisker, p. 438 (Theophylactus, vi. 2). [2] *Ib.* p. 456.

military and political power, and did not amalgamate with or absorb those whom they conquered. In the west, though the Germans were by this time pushing the Slavs back before them, they were only politically supreme over the Elbe Slavs, who had never united to form a strong Slavic state, but lived in small village communities as Slavic islets in a Germanic sea.

III. *DISTRIBUTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE SLAVS UP TO THE PRESENT DAY.*—In dealing with the early Slavs we get more important evidence from archæological remains than from the actual notices of ancient and Old German historians. The Slavic graves in Germany and Austria have now been thoroughly studied, and a map of their distribution was made by C. Toldt.[1] They date from the 7th to the 12th cent. and are characterized chiefly by metal ornaments of the shape of the letter S (*Schläferinge*), worn probably on the cap, which are not to be found in the graves of W. Germany, France, or Great Britain.[2] The graves not possessing this characteristic ornament have small urns without ears, ornamented with a design imitating waves. Rings are found chiefly in the graves in what is now Germany, the island of Rügen, Austria, as well as in Bohemia and Moravia, and less in Poland or White and Little Russia. Some 169 skulls have been found in the Slavic graves on the territory of what is at present E. Germany, and of these 151 are dolichocephalic and only 18 brachycephalic. As to the 'Slavic' graves of Austria, 46 out of 148 were dolichocephalic, but it is not certain how many of these can be described as Slavic. Some archæologists, among them Niederle, suppose that the Slavs formed the bulk of the population of the Danube, Styria, and Carinthia; others (chiefly Germans) think that the Slavs formed small groups among Roman, German, and Illyrian elements.

From the Elbe to the Volga in 8th cent. graves we meet with Arabian silver coins, which R. Virchow[3] considers particularly associated with the Slavic graves.[4]

The skulls from Slavic graves in the territory of the present-day Russia were also dolichocephalic, but it is difficult to say which of them can be ascribed to the E. Slavs and which to the Finns, who lived in that district before the Slavs. The population of Little Russia was dolichocephalic until the Tatar invasion. The dolichocephals of Great Russia, whether of Slavic or of Finnic origin, were affected in modern times by a fair brachycephalic 'Valdai' type from Polesia and a dark brachycephalic Little Russian type.

IV. *LANGUAGE.* — The relation of the Slavic languages to the other European tongues was clearly defined for the first time by F. Bopp,[5] but, even before, other philologists had noticed points of likeness between the Slavic tongues and Latin, Greek, German, Celtic, Letto-Lithuanian, etc. Since the publication of Bopp's work it has been generally recognized that the Slavic family of languages has developed from the original Indo-European (Aryan) common language, just as the Germanic, Celtic, Italic, Letto-Lithuanian, Albanian, Greek, Armenian, Indian, and Iranian branches did.

V. *RELIGION.*—When we speak of the religion of the Slavs, we mean their religion at the time when the term 'Slavs' meant more of a unity of language, customs, and beliefs than now—in other words, before they adopted Christianity.

1. **Sources.**—There are no Slavic records written in the pre-Christian era of the beliefs which the Slavs held before they became Christians, but the Slavic chronicles of the 11th–15th centuries frequently refer to the earlier religion. These chroniclers, however, were already looking at things from the point of view of either Byzantine Christians (in the case of the E. Slavs) or Roman Christians (of W. Slavs), and hence they purposely depreciated the pagan era of Slavic history. This is true of the earliest Slavic chronicler Nestor of the Russ (a proto-Russian people), and also of the Czech chronicler Cosmas of Prague, and the Pole Gallus. Even more biased are the references in the early German and Danish chroniclers—*e.g.*, Thietmar, Adam of Bremen, Saxo Grammaticus, Otto of Bamberg—and in the *Knytlinga Saga*. Further notices are found in the Eastern historians, Byzantine or Arabian, such as Procopius, Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, or Mas'ūdī, and Ibn Fadlān, but the latter often confused the E. Slavs with the Scandinavian Variags, and possibly with the Finns and Turks.

In a sense more valuable evidence may be obtained from the existing folk-lore, such as the customs connected with the change of the seasons which may be called communal, and those connected with *rites de passage* in the life of the individual. Then there is linguistic evidence, which, however, has little value unless it is connected with a survival of ritual or belief; *e.g.*, it will not do to conclude, with some folk-lorists, that, merely because *Bug*, the name of two different rivers, means in all Slavic languages 'God,' the two rivers were therefore objects of special worship. There is one more source of evidence, viz. the church records dealing with pagan practices which pass into Christian ritual, but these must be treated with no less reserve than such documents in other countries. Thus it is folk-lore with all its modes of expression — songs, sayings, epics, sculpture, drawing, dances, or games—that provides us with the most satisfactory material. This material has only begun to be utilized since the publication of Šafarik's monumental work, *Slavonic Antiquities*, in 1837, and from the very beginning the study of the past of the Slavs has been impeded by national and racial prejudices. The German scholar Peisker starts his study of the past of the Slavs with the assumption that they are nomads of Scytho-Turanian religious conceptions, while almost all Slavic scholars take for granted that, because the Slavic languages belong to the Indo-Germanic group, their religion must have been also like that of the other Indo-Germanic speaking peoples. Further, their assumption that a distinct Slavic linguistic group corresponded to a distinct Slavic race led them to expect an equal originality in the early religion of the Slavs and their present folk-lore. These ready-made assumptions prevented collectors of Slavic folk-lore from presenting it comparatively with the folk-lore of other peoples, and, on the other hand, from seeing the variety of the Slavic beliefs; *e.g.*, the god Svietovit (spelt in various ways), known exclusively to the Slavs of Rügen, was ascribed to Slavdom, and so was also Perun, who was the Scandinavian Thor, brought by them to Novgorod and Kiev.

2. **Gods.**—The names of the ancient Slavic gods have almost all been gleaned from Russian, Polish, or foreign authors; the Czech and S. Slav writers have contributed little to our knowledge of names famous in Slavic mythology.

All the foreign writers on the ancient Slavs

[1] 'Altslavengräber in Deutschland und Oesterreich,' *Korrespondenzblatt der deut. Gesellschaft für anthrop. Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, xl. [1911].

[2] M. Wawrzeniecki, *Słowianie doby przed i wczesno historycznej* (Polish), Warsaw, 1910.

[3] 'Über das erste Auftreten der Slaven in Deutschland,' *Korrespondenzblatt*, xxxi. [1900] 1–12.

[4] The duty of Charlemagne on silver from the other side of the Elbe stopped the penetration of these coins to W. Europe.

[5] *Vergleichende Grammatik*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1833–35, Eng. tr. E. B. Eastwick, London, 1845.

mention some names of deities that they came across among the Slavs whom they have known; *e.g.*, Saxo Grammaticus speaks of the gods of the Slavs of Rügen—Rugevit, Porevit, Porenuch, and Svyetovit; Helmold mentions Syetovit, Prove, Biel-Bog, and Cherno-Bog.

The authors of the 16th and 17th centuries, curiously enough, have a much larger collection of Slavic gods; thus Michaeli Frencelli (1658) describes a far greater number of gods than were known to the native and foreign travellers of the earlier period when their worship might still have been tolerated in the newly Christianized states. Frencelli describes Perun, Martsyana, Didila, Zolotaga-Baba ('golden woman'), Perenuch, Perovit, Biel-Bog, and Cherno-Bog. It is probable that the writers of the later period were influenced by the writings of the Polish historian Dlugosz, who was himself so influenced by classical mythology as to be tempted to find parallels to it in the mythology of the Slavs. Even before Dlugosz, Cosmas of Prague found a likeness between the classical and Slavic Olympus, so that in speaking of the Slavic gods he does not give them their Slavic names, but calls them Jupiter, Mars, and Bellona. Dlugosz was the first to give the Slavic equivalents, most of which do not appear in the Slavic or foreign writers before him. It is open to doubt whether any pagan cult still existed in the time of Dlugosz, 500 hundred years after the introduction of Christianity to Poland; but his deductive genius may have revealed to him from contemporary folk-lore, which must have still been very rich in his time, evidence which escaped the notice of the earlier writers. Historians of a later date merely repeat and seldom amplify his assertions.

Some Russian authors (Gizel, Popov, Glinka, etc.) believe that there were a great number of Slavic gods, and divide them into high gods, secondary gods, and spirits. Others (Nestor, Stroyev, Russov, Prigezjev, etc.) believe that there were only seven chief gods among the primitive Slavs. These were (1) Perun, the chief god, ruler of the lightning; (2) Volos (Veles), god of cattle; (3) Dajd-bog, god of wealth and success; (4) Stribog, god of wind and sometimes war; (5) Semargla (Zimtserla), goddess of cold and frost; (6) Khors (Hrs), god of sickness, sometimes of hunting and libations; (7) Mokosh (Mkosh), god of trade, often a 'gossiper.' The supporters of the seven-god system mention mostly the high gods known chiefly among E. Slavs; the supporters of Slavic polytheism mention sometimes as many as 59 (Glinka) gods and spirits, of the various Slavs, as well as names whose meaning they could not explain, and to which they could not assign any individuality—*e.g.*, Didilia, Prono, Yassa, Krado, etc.

The Russian historian N. M. Karamzin says that the old Slavs worshipped Biel-Bog ('white god') and Cherno-Bog ('black god'). This is the repetition of a statement made by Helmold that the W. Slavs made a distinction between a good and a bad god, and called the latter Cherno-Bog ('black god');[1] but we may look in vain for evidence of the cult of either of these gods in the archæological remains or in the present folk-lore. According to the great Russian folk-lorist Sakharov, who tried to introduce some system into this host of meaningless names of Slavic gods, the seven Slavic gods mentioned by Nestor ought to be called Eastern or Russ Slav gods. He attributes to the Lett or Polish Western Slavs the names of the following gods: (1) Mya, whose temple was in Gneran, (2) Gassa, (3) Lada, (4) Dzila, (5) Zyevanna, (6) Zivalo, (7) Lel, (8) Polel, (9) Pogoda, (10) Pohvist. He further considers that Svyetovit was worshipped by the Slavs of Rügen and the Wends, while the god Perkun originated with the ancient Prussians and Letts.

We may now consider the early authorities' accounts of these gods and their ritual.

The first authority to give a definite account of Slav religion is Procopius; he, of course, speaks of E. and S. Slavs. Of these people he says:

'They worship one god whom they conceive to be creator of the thunder and maker of all things; to him they sacrifice cattle and other victims. They do not recognize "Destiny," nor do they admit that she has power over men, but when death seems near them, whether it be that they are attacked by pestilence or force of arms, they vow that, if they escape, they will straightway make a sacrifice to the gods in payment for their lives. Then if they do escape, they sacrifice as they promised to do, and believe they have bought their safety by the sacrifice. However, they reverence rivers, nymphs, and other spirits, and sacrifice to them all; from these sacrifices they divine the future.'[2]

Our next authority is Thietmar, bishop of Merseburg, in the 10th cent., who speaks of the Elbe Slavs. He gives an account of the town of Riedegost, with its three gates surrounded on all sides by sacred woods and its wonderful wooden temple, the foundations of which are made of the horns of different kinds of beasts. Inside this temple are images of gods and goddesses with armour which makes them terrible to behold, and foremost among them is the chief god, Zuarasici. They have banners, which are never moved save when they lead the way to battle, and specially appointed priests to guard the gods and their treasures. When the time comes to appease or supplicate these gods, the priests sit down—the congregation stands—and, muttering spells and incantations, take lots. Then, with accompanying prayers, spears are fixed in the ground, and a sacred horse is led through them. If he steps through them, well and good; if not, trouble is imminent. The results of this augury are compared with the lots first obtained, and, if the omens agree, their fulfilment is inevitable. Thietmar goes on to say that there are as many temples in these parts as there are districts, and many single images of gods are worshipped by the people, but the city of Riedegost is the centre of the cult. Human sacrifice to appease the wrath of the gods is common.[3] Thietmar also mentions a sacred and inviolate grave at Zutibure,[5] and a sacred stick at Silivellum, in which place the people worship and sacrifice to *penates*, or domestic gods.[4] At Glomuzi was a sacred well which produced blood and ashes when war was impending.[6]

Adam of Bremen (11th cent.) gives an account of the city of Rethre (Riedegost) which is probably based on that of Thietmar. He calls the chief god 'Redigost.'[8] He also mentions the town of Iumne inhabited by Greeks, Slavs, and barbarians, where Olla Vulcani and Neptune are worshipped.[7] He tells us that in Great Estland the people worship dragons with wings, to whom they offer sacrifices of men without blemish, buying them from merchants for the purpose.[8]

Cosmas of Prague gives us information about the religion of the Czechs. He tells us that they worshipped Oreads, Dryads, and Hamadryads. Some worshipped streams, some fires, and some groves, trees, or stones. Some prayed to mountains or hills.[9] He also mentions the cult of *penates*.[10]

Helmold and Saxo Grammaticus are the chief authorities for the cult of Svantovit, who was worshipped by the people of Rügen. His temple was at Arkona on the island of Rügen. Saxo Grammaticus describes the image as having four heads and necks, two facing to the front and two behind. The beards of these heads were shaved and their hair was cut short, as was the custom of the people of Rügen. In his right hand the image held a horn of divers metals, and in the left a bow. He wore a tunic of wood reaching to the knees. Saxo describes the cult as follows. 'Once every year, after the harvest, a motley crowd from the whole island celebrated a ceremonial feast before the temple of the image and sacrificed animals as peace-offerings. The priest of the image, who was conspicuous for the length of his hair and his beard, which he wore longer than is the custom in that country, on the day before that on which

[1] *Chronica Slavorum* (*MGH*, Script., xxi.), Hanover, 1869, p. 156.

[1] *De Bell. Got.* iii. 14.
[2] Thietmar, *Chron.* vi. 17 f. (*MGH* iii. 812).
[3] vi. 26 (*MGH* iii. 816). [4] vii. 50 (*MGH* iii. 858).
[5] i. 3 (*MGH* iii. 735).
[6] *Gesta Pontif. Hammaburg. Eccles.* ii. 18 (*MGH* vii. 312).
[7] ii. 19 (*MGH* vii. 312). [8] iv. 17 (*MGH* vii. 374).
[9] *Chronicæ Bohemorum*, i. 4 (*MGH* ix. 34).
[10] i. 8 (*MGH* ix. 38).

he was to celebrate, carefully cleaned out with a broom the sanctuary, which he alone was allowed to enter. He was careful not to breathe in the building, and, as often as he was forced to inhale or exhale, ran to the door lest he should contaminate the presence of the god with the pollution of mortal breath. The next day, while the people watched before the doors, he took the horn from the hand of the image and looked at it carefully; if any of the liquid in it had disappeared, he judged that this portended a scanty harvest next year. With this knowledge he ordered the people to preserve their present corn for future need. If it seemed to be as full as it usually was, he predicted that the next harvest would be a good one. So then, according to the omen, he advised them to use their corn in the coming year lavishly or sparingly. Having poured the old wine at the feet of the image as a libation, he filled the empty cup with fresh wine and adored the image, pretending to be its cup-bearer. Thus doing, he prayed for an increase of wealth and victories for himself and his country in a set form of words. When he had finished he drained the cup dry at one draught with overmuch haste, and, refilling it with wine, put it again in the hand of the image.

Mead cakes were also brought forward as offerings, round in shape and almost as tall as a man. The priest put one of these between him and the people, and asked the people whether they could see him. If they said they could, he expressed the wish that they might not be able to see him next year. Then he greeted the people in the name of the image, and exhorted them to prolong their worship of the god with diligent sacrifice, promising them certain reward for their husbandry and victory by land and sea.

When these ceremonies were over, they wasted the rest of the day in luxurious banqueting, striving to turn the very sacrificial feast into conviviality and serving the victims consecrated to the god with intemperance. In this feast it was considered a religious act to get drunk, and impious to restrain oneself.'[1]

The temple of Svantovit was made of wood; it was gaily painted, and had two enclosures, the innermost having magnificent curtains instead of walls. Among the appurtenances of the god were a bridle, a saddle, and a wonderfully embossed sword. There was also a white horse, sacred to the god, which could be ridden and tended only by the priest. Since it was found covered with mire in the morning, it was concluded that Svantovit rode it during the night. Omens were taken by means of this horse in a way similar to that in which the worshippers of Zuarasici took omens with the sacred black horse; but in this case the omen was good if the horse stepped on the spear with the right foot first, and *vice versa*. Like Zuarasici, Svantovit had sacred banners which led his people to victory, the most revered of these being called *Stanitia*. Svantovit had 300 men-at-arms and horses attached to him, and always received one-third of their spoil. He was identified by the Christian monks with St. Vitus of Corvey.

Saxo Grammaticus mentions other deities in the island of Rügen closely connected with Svantovit. Such were Rugievitus at Karentia (Gazz), who had seven faces and eight swords, and was so tall that Bishop Absalon could only reach his chin with his axe; Pore-Vitus, who had five heads and no weapons; and Porenutius, who had five faces, one of which was in his bosom. Rugie-Vitus was believed by the people to have the powers of Mars.[2]

Helmold also mentions Zvantevith, god of the Rugiani, and says that he is the pre-eminent deity of the N. or Elbe Slavs. In comparison with him, they consider the rest demigods. Every year a Christian is chosen by lot and sacrificed to him.[3] The king is held in very moderate estimation compared with the priest of Svantovit.[1] Merchants from abroad were not allowed to sell their goods in the market till they had offered part of them to the god.[2]

Herbord[3] (12th cent.) mentions a god Gerovitus who had his shrine at Hologost, and was worshipped by the Pomeranians; he was said to have the attributes of Mars. Ebbo[4] mentions his enormous shield which must not be touched by mortal hands, and could be moved only in case of war. He is most probably an analogue to Svantovit.

Another god who is considered to have affinities with Svantovit is Triglav of Stettin. There were four temples in Stettin, one of which was far more important than the others. It had on its inner and outer walls such wonderful embossed figures of men, birds, and animals that they seemed to live and breathe. The colours of these paintings could not be dimmed by rain or snow. The temple was full of valuables, such as drinking-cups of gold and silver, horns decorated for the purpose of drinking or made into musical instruments. One-tenth of all the booty was stored in this temple. The three other temples were less ornate, and had in them tables and chairs for meetings, for on certain days and hours the inhabitants were wont to assemble there to drink, play games, or discuss matters of importance. Near the temples were a sacred oak and a sacred fountain. The image of the god had three heads and was made of gold. Its eyes and lips were covered with a veil. This god had a sacred black horse. Divination was made in the usual way with nine lances. If the horse, when led three times across them, did not touch them, the omen was favourable.[5]

Ebbo[6] tells the story of another image of this god from Wollin, which was saved from the iconoclasm of St. Otto by the Slav priests, who gave it to a woman to hide in a lonely part of the country. He also tells us[7] that the three heads of the god denote his three kingdoms—the heavens, the earth, and the under world. Triglav was also worshipped by the Slavs of Brandenburg.[8]

Helmold also mentions the names of several other gods, such as Prove, god of the land of Aldenburg, of whom there was no image.[9] He had a secret grove surrounded by a fence, where at a certain time the people assembled with their priest and ruler for judgment.[10] This grove was so sacred that even those in peril of death could not take refuge there. Then there was Siwa (Syuna), goddess of the Polabi, and Podaga, an image which was worshipped at Pluna.[11]

Helmold says that at feasts the Slavs prayed to a divinity of evil as well as to one of good, 'professing to receive prosperity from a good god, and adversity from a bad one. Therefore in their language they call the bad god Diabol or Zcerneboch, which is Black God.'[12] He adds: 'Indeed, among the many forms of the gods to whom they attribute fields, woods, sorrows, and pleasures, they do not deny that one god rules over the others in the skies, who cares only for celestial things, the rest performing their various functions, proceeding from his blood, and enjoying distinction in proportion as they are nearer to that god of gods.'[13] He does not, however, give the name of this god.

Dlugosz[14] attempts to identify the old Slavic gods with the Greek and Roman deities. Jessis he identifies with Jove. He is the highest god, from whom is all temporal good and protection from one's enemies. Honour is paid to him above all other gods and he is worshipped with more frequent sacrifices. Liada corresponds to Mars; he is a leader and god of war. Men pray to him for triumphs over their enemies and that their hearts may be fierce; they propitiate him with a very rude sort of worship. Dzidzielia is the same as Venus, the goddess of marriage and fertility. To her men pray for sons and daughters. Nüa, or Pluto, is worshipped as god of the under world and of souls when they leave the body. He is propitiated to persuade him to admit souls to the more favourable parts of his domain. Pogoda (Zylvie, Dziewanna) is like Diana. She is worshipped as a woman and virgin by wives and

[1] *Historia Danica*, bk. xiv., ed. P. E. Müller and I. M. Velschow, Copenhagen, 1839–58, i. 822 ff.
[2] *Ib.*
[3] *Chron. Slav.* i. 52 (*MGH* xxi. 52).
[1] ii. 12 (*MGH* xxi. 96).
[2] i. 6 (*MGH* xxi. 16).
[3] *Vita Ottonis Episc Bamberg.* iii. 6 (*MGH* xii. 804 f.).
[4] *Ib.* iii. 8 (*MGH* xii. 865).
[5] *Ib.* ii. 31 f. (*MGH* xii. 793 f.).
[6] *Ib.* ii. 13 (*MGH* xii. 851 f.).
[7] *Ib.* iii. 1 (*MGH* xii. 589).
[8] Pulkawa, *Chronicon Bohemiæ* (*Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, Prague, 1893, v. 89), quoted by J. Máchal, *Slavic Mythology* (= *Mythology of all Races*, iii.), p. 853.
[9] i. 52, 83 (*MGH* xxi. 52, 78).
[10] i. 83 (*MGH* xxi. 75).
[11] i. 52, 83 (*MGH* xxi. 52, 75).
[12] i. 52 (*MGH* xxi. 52).
[13] i. 83 (*MGH* xxi. 75).
[14] *Hist. Polonicæ*, i. 36 f.

virgins, and as Ceres by settlers and those engaged in agriculture, who try to make corn grow by sacrifices. She is also venerated as goddess of the weather under the name Pogoda ('giver of a favourable wind'). Marzanna was, like Ceres, worshipped as the mother and goddess of corn, and held in very special reverence. Dlugosz goes on to say that those deities had shrines, images, sacred precincts, and priests allotted to them, and were offered as sacrifices cattle, sheep, baggage-animals, and even human victims taken in battle. They had religious games at regular intervals, which survived in the form of the Polish celebration at Pentecost and the 'Stado' after fully 500 years of Christian influence.

3. **Spirits.**—(*a*) *Spirits of the dead.*—Leo Diaconus (10th cent.) gives an interesting account of the funeral rites of the Danube Slavs of his period. He describes the scene after a battle:

'Now had night begun, and when the moon shone full, they went out over the plain and sought their dead. These they burnt beside the wall with much fuel in heaps, and with them many captives, both men and women, whom they slaughtered after the manner of their nation. Thus did they feast the infernal deities, suffocating babes unweaned and cocks in the Ister, drowning them in the waters of the river. For they say that these people take part in Greek orgies and make sacrifices and offer libations to the departed after the manner of the Hellenes, having been initiated in these mysteries by Anacharsis and Zamolxis, their own philosophers, or else by the "Comrades of Achilles."'[1]

The Arabian traveller Ibn Fadlān gives an interesting description of the obsequies of a Russian chieftain:

'When a nobleman died, for ten days his body was laid provisionally in his grave, where he was left until his shroud was prepared for him. His property was divided into three parts, one-third was given to the family, another served to defray the funeral expenses, and the remainder was spent on intoxicating drinks which were served at the funeral banquet. On the day appointed for the final obsequies, a boat was taken out of the water, and round it were placed pieces of wood shaped to the form of human beings. Then the corpse was removed from its provisional grave and, being clad with a costly garment, was seated in a boat on a richly ornamented arm-chair, around which were arranged the weapons of the deceased together with intoxicating beverages; while not only bread and fruit, but also flesh of killed animals, such as dogs, horses, cows, cocks, and hens, were put into the boat. Then one of his wives, who had voluntarily agreed to be burned together with her dead husband, was led to the boat by an old woman called the "Angel of Death," and was stabbed at the side of the corpse, whereupon the wood piled up under and around the boat was set on fire. After the boat with the dead bodies and all the other articles placed upon it had been consumed, the ashes were collected and scattered over the cairn, and a banquet, lasting for days and nights without interruption, closed the ceremony.'[2]

Similar evidence is given by Mas'ūdī.[3] Testimony is supplied by V. Kadlubek[4] that young girls tore their hair, matrons their faces, and old women their garments.

It is obvious from these few notices that ancestor-worship at a remote period was widely spread among the Slavs, who looked upon their dead ancestors as beings deeply interested in the fortunes of their children. Evidence of the persistence of this belief is to be found in the *dziadys* of White Russia and the *zadusnica* of Bulgaria in modern times. The drowned and suffocated children mentioned by Leo Diaconus are the origin of the *rusalky*, or water-spirits, of modern Russia.

(*b*) *The penates.*—Helmold[1] says that, 'besides groves and household gods (*penates*) in whom the fields and towns abounded, there were powerful gods, etc.,' alluding to the cult of *penates* among the ancient Slavs. Cosmas of Prague[2] relates the story of Czech who carried the *penates* on his shoulders to the new country, resting on the mountain of the Rzip and saying to his followers: 'Come, good comrades, and make sacrifice to your *penates*, for it is by their help that ye have been brought to this new country destined for you by Fate of old.' The Slavic name for them (*ded*, *dedik*, *deduska*, etc.), meaning 'grandfather,' shows that they had their origin in ancestor-worship. Survivals of this cult are the Russian *domovoy*, the Little Russian *didko*, the Bohemian *setek*, the Polish *skrzatek*, the Bulgarian *stopan*, and the *ludki* of the Lusatian Sorbs and Slovaks.

(*c*) *Genii of fate, the woods, water, etc.*—Of these we have few notices in the contemporary and early authorities. Procopius,[3] as we have seen, denies that they pay any reverence to 'Destiny,' but affirms that they worship rivers, nymphs, and other spirits, and even make sacrifices to them. Cosmas of Prague,[4] as we saw above, says:

'Oreads, Dryads and Hamadryads are objects of adoration and worship to this foolish and silly people'; and again: 'Some worship streams, some fires, some groves, trees, or stones. Some pray to mountains or hills.'

The modern Slavs have *genii* of fate, *rodjenice* (Croatia) and the Russian *dolya* (Serbian, *sreća*); *vily*, nymphs; *lesig*, Dryads, and the *poludnica*, who is almost an Oread. The Russian *vodyanik* is a sort of Slavic 'old man of the sea.'[5]

LITERATURE.—Modern authorities on the religion and mythology of the Slavs include the following: A. Brückner, 'Poczatki Kultury Slowianskiej,' in *Encyklopedja Polska*, vol. iv. pt. 2, Cracow, 1916; J. Dlugosz, *Historiæ Polonicæ*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1711–12; J. Máchal, *Slavic Mythology* (= *Mythology of all Races*, iii.), Boston, U.S.A., 1918; P. J. Šafařik, *Slovanské Starozitnosti*, 2 vols., Prague, 1837, Germ. tr., *Slawische Alterthümer*, Leipzig, 1843–44; T. R. Georgevitch, 'Parthenogenesis in Serbian Popular Tradition,' *FL* xxix. [1918] 58 ff.; N. M. Karamzin, *Hist. de l'empire de Russie*, French tr., 11 vols., Paris, 1819–26; I. P. Sakarov, *The Story of the Russian People* (Russ.), 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1841–49. See also R. J. Kerner, *Slavic Europe: A Selected Bibliography*, Harvard and Oxford, 1918; E. Kolodziejczyk, *Bibliografja Slowianoznawstwa Polskiego*, Cracow, 1911.

M. A. CZAPLICKA.

SLAVERY.

Primitive (A. N. GILBERTSON), p. 595.
Christian (L. D. AGATE), p. 602.
Greek (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 612.
Hindu (J. JOLLY), p. 618.
Jewish (J. ABELSON), p. 619.
Roman (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 621.

SLAVERY (Primitive).—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—1. **Definition and scope.** — The most generally accepted definition of slavery is that it is a social system in which one person is the property of another. Westermarck takes exception to this definition:

'The owner's right over his property, even when not absolute, is at all events exclusive, that is, nobody but the owner has the right to dispose of it,' whereas 'the master's right of disposing of his slave is not necessarily exclusive; custom or law may grant the latter a certain amount of liberty, and in such case his condition differs essentially from that of a piece of property.'[6]

Now those who speak of a slave as property admit that restrictions on the exercise of the master's power are indeed common, but would say, with Nieboer:

[1] *Hist.* ix. 6 (*Corp. Script. Hist. Byz.*, Bonn, 1828, pt. xi. p. 149 f.).
[2] *Ibn Foszlan's und anderer Araber Berichte über die Russen älterer Zeit*, tr. C. M. Frähn, St. Petersburg, 1823, pp. 10–21, quoted by Máchal, p. 233 f.
[3] *Les Prairies d'or*, Paris, 1861–69, ii. 9, iii. 62 f., quoted by Máchal, p. 234.
[4] *Script. Hist. Polon.*, Danzig, 1749.

[1] i. 52 (*MGH* xxi. 52).
[2] *Chron. Bohem.* i. 2 (*MGH* ix. 33).
[3] *De Bell. Got.* iii. 14. 3. [4] i. 4 (*MGH* ix. 34).
[5] The writer would like to acknowledge the collaboration of Miss A. B. Finch White, of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, in preparing this article.
[6] *MI* i. 670.

'Any restriction put upon the free exercise of his power is a mitigation of slavery, not belonging to its nature.'[1]

By 'property' this Dutch writer, who is the foremost authority on the economics of primitive slavery, means

'a power that, however leniently exercised in many cases, is in principle unlimited.'[2]

We are reminded of the following rule in Roman and Romanized modern law:

'The proprietor has had the right to do with his property whatever he is not by special rules forbidden to do.'[3]

Property in a human being, *i.e.* slavery, is equivalent to a right to all the labour of the slave.[4]

The view which regards a slave as the property of the master is not then, it seems, inconsistent with Westermarck's own position, that the essence of slavery is to be found in the compulsory nature of the slave's relation to his master; in other words:

'Slavery is essentially an industrial institution, which implies compulsory labour beyond the limits of family relations.'[5]

All would agree with the statement of this authority:

'The master has a right to avail himself of the working power of his slave, without previous agreement on the part of the latter.'[6] 'Voluntary slavery, as when a person sells himself as a slave, is only an imitation of slavery true and proper; the person who gives up his liberty confers upon another, by contract, either for a limited period or for ever, the same rights over himself as a master possesses over his slave. If slavery proper could be based upon a contract between the parties concerned, I fail to see how to distinguish between a servant and a slave.'[7]

We may combine the two kinds of definition and define a slave as a human being who is the property of another and subject to compulsory labour, beyond the limits of the family.

The expression 'primitive' is difficult to define with precision. By 'primitive peoples' we may understand certain ethnic groups which occupy a relatively little advanced position in the scale of cultural development. The groups included in the present survey will be confined to those which live in 'tribal society'—*i.e.*, that have kinship (a social relation not always synonymous with physical consanguinity) as the basis of membership in the group (clan, gens, phratry, tribe), in contrast to citizenship in political states. Admission of an outsider into the group is by 'adoption,' in contradistinction to 'naturalization.' Another criterion is the possession or lack of literary records, of history in the strict sense. Under 'primitive' will be included not only 'savages,' but also groups in a state of 'barbarism.' Our present discussion will not embrace the early stages of nations that have developed into 'civilization.' We shall consider as primitive, not only hunting tribes, but most pastoral and many agricultural societies.

2. Slavery distinguished from similar phenomena.—(*a*) *Subjection of wives.* — The status of wives among primitive peoples is often referred to as 'slavery.' Without considering here the question whether the subjection of women, particularly of wives, in primitive society is as abject as is popularly supposed,[8] it may be said that slavery as a social institution and industrial system does not exist when there are only female slaves. When women only are enslaved, the reason probably is that they are valued as women rather than as labourers; otherwise men also would be enslaved.[9]

(*b*) *Subjection of children.*—In primitive societies every family has its head, who exercises more or less authority over its members, including, of course, the young. But, no matter how complete this subjection may be, it cannot be called slavery, which, as a social institution, has a very different origin and function. Slavery is a relation beyond the limits of the family, as stated in Westermarck's definition given above.[1]

(*c*) *Subjection of members of a society to its head.* —The subjects of a despotic ruler are sometimes called his slaves. To this use of the term it is to be objected that, in order to have slavery, it is necessary that the master's power should be recognized by the society.

'The whole group must approve of the custom and must enforce it; otherwise it cannot exist.'[2]

The slave lives in a society that recognizes him as a slave; slavery can exist only where there is a society of freemen. The head of a community, no matter how great his power may be, is not as such a master of slaves. Of course, a chief, like other freemen, may keep slaves of his own.

(*d*) *Subjection of tribes, provinces, or classes.*— Where a population or territory is subject to an external power, this is not slavery. The latter is the subjection of men individually and a subjection which includes the whole personality of the slave. A slave cannot live in tribal relations; he would to that extent be free. J. K. Ingram observes:

'The lowest caste may be a degraded and despised one, but its members are not in a state of slavery; they are in collective, not individual, subjection to the members of the higher classes.'[3]

This is true also of subjected tribes. Subjection of tribes as such sometimes serves as a substitute for slavery proper, making the latter superfluous.

(*e*) *Serfdom.*—Ingram says:

'The transition to serfdom took place in civic communities when the master parted with or was deprived of his property in the person of the slave, and became entitled only to his services, or to a determinate portion of them.'[4]

This is a correct statement, with this important exception, that the right, not to the services of the labourer, but to 'a determinate portion' of them, is the real differential of serfdom. For, as Nieboer points out, he who is entitled to all the services of another is his owner:

'The slave-owner may do with his slave whatever he is not by special laws forbidden to do; the master of the serf may require from his man such services or tributes only as the law allows him to require.'[5]

It may be remarked that, while it is necessary, for the purposes of discussion, to draw theoretical lines of demarcation, practically there is not a single social institution that is strictly separated from kindred institutions. The student of social phenomena still recognizes the truth in Spencer's observation:

'As the distinctions between different forms of slavery are indefinite, so must there be an indefinite distinction between slavery and serfdom, and between the several forms of serfdom. Much confusion has arisen in describing these respective institutions, and for the sufficient reason that the institutions themselves are confused.'[6]

II. *ORIGIN AND EARLY GROWTH OF SLAVERY.* —**1. Extra-tribal slavery in relation to war.**— Slavery in early society may be divided into intra-tribal and extra-tribal, depending on whether or not the slave belongs to the same kinship-group as the master, *i.e.* to the 'in-group' as distinct from the 'out-group,' to use Sumner's terminology.[7] Extra-tribal slavery is first both in time and in extent. In the primitive group all members are on a footing of equality; they are 'all-one-flesh,' and practice conforms to theory. 'Custom everywhere, as a rule, forbids the enslaving of tribesmen.'[8] It is only in extraordinary cases, and after slavery of the extra-tribal form has become

[1] *Slavery as an Industrial System*, p. 3.
[2] *Ib.* p. 37.
[3] See also L. Dargun, 'Ursprung und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Eigenthums,' *ZVRW* v. [1884] 3.
[4] Nieboer, p. 37; see also below, under 'Serfdom,' I. 2 (*e*).
[5] *MI* i. 670.
[6] *Ib.*
[7] *Ib.* i. 671.
[8] See *MI* i. ch. xxvi.
[9] See Nieboer, p. 23.

[1] See *MI* i. ch. xxv.; also art. CHILDREN.
[2] Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 262.
[3] *Hist. of Slavery and Serfdom*, London, 1895, p. 3.
[4] *Ib.* p. 262.
[5] P. 37.
[6] *Principles of Sociology*, iii. 472.
[7] P. 12.
[8] *MI* i. 675.

prevalent, that a person is permitted to enslave a member of his own community.

All available evidence confirms the view, held by all students of the subject, that slavery is a sequence of war, that the earliest slaves were captives in war.[1] Now it is necessary to revise radically the traditional view that war is the constant and normal state of earliest human society. The data from pre-historic archæology (implements, art, etc.), as well as from the ethnology of latter-day 'savages,' indicate a decidedly peaceable life among primitive mankind. This is even more true if we distinguish, as it is often difficult to do, between blood-feuds and wars of communities as such. In the correlation made by Hobhouse and his collaborators it is found that the groups under the heading 'no war' were confined mainly to the lowest grade of hunting tribes.[2] As one would expect, the same groups are among those in which slavery is quite unknown.[3] When war had become a feature of the relations of human groups, the rights and immunities which prevented the enslavement of tribesmen would not operate in favour of captives from hostile bands. While there are at times mitigating circumstances, in the main it is true that 'the defeated enemy is rightless, and is treated as best suits the victor's convenience.'[4] Quarter may be refused altogether and the vanquished foes exterminated. Or, if prisoners are taken, they may be tortured, eaten, adopted, ransomed, exchanged, liberated, or enslaved. In the actual practice of existing tribes there are instances of all these modes of treatment.

Adoption, a custom which is especially common among the N. American Indians,[5] is the main exception to the rule that the life of the captive is spared in order that he may become a slave. It may be remarked here that a distinction is often made between the adult males among the enemy on the one hand and the women and children on the other. The men may be killed, while the women and children are adopted or enslaved. Adoption is probably intimately related to the beginnings of slavery. According to the theory of J. W. Powell,[6] for which there is much to be said, the latter institution is a development of the practice of adoption. The motives for keeping captives alive are not likely to have been, in the beginning, the shrewd calculations usually ascribed to primitive man, as in the following statement of Hobhouse:

'There comes a time in social development when the victor sees that a live prisoner is after all better than a dead one.'[7]

Nieboer's criticism is much to the point:

'It is not to be supposed that men, convinced of the utility of some new kind of labour, began to procure slaves in order to make them perform this labour; or that, finding some work tedious, they invented slavery to relieve themselves of this burden. Modern psychology does not account for psychical and social phenomena in such a rationalistic way.' 'Social institutions are sometimes made; but this is the exception; generally they grow.'[8]

Whatever the primary motives for enslaving vanquished enemies may have been, it is doubtless true that slavery marks 'a humanitarian improvement in the laws of war.'[9] Also, as Hobhouse observes:

'The vindictive passions must be sufficiently held in check to prevent their gratification in the moment of victory.'[10]

2. **Internal conditions of the growth of slavery; occurrence in various states of culture.**—No matter what may be the external relations of the group, slavery could not exist unless it conformed to the requirements of the social life of the tribe both in its purely economic and in its more distinctly moral aspects. This appears clearly from the study of the actual appearance and distribution of slavery among the uncivilized peoples of various cultural grades.

(*a*) *Among hunting tribes.*—Human societies in the hunting stage hardly ever keep slaves. Among 'lower hunters,' the representatives of the real 'primitive man,' slavery is entirely unknown.[1] Even among 'higher hunters' it is extremely rare; and its occurrence is due to certain extraordinary circumstances. Of the 83 hunting groups analyzed by Nieboer there are 65 negative and only 18 positive cases. Of the latter 15 are Indian tribes on the N.W. Pacific coast of N. America (see below). The remaining three are the Tehuelches and Abipones in S. America and the Kamchadales in Siberia.[2]

The reasons for these facts are not far to seek. As Westermarck says:

'Slaves are kept only where there is employment for them, and where the circumstances are otherwise favourable to the growth of slavery.'[3]

Now the economic state of hunting societies is decidedly unfavourable to the development of slavery.

'In the absence of industrial activity, slaves are almost useless; and, indeed, where game is scarce, are not worth their food.'[4]

In the desperate daily struggle for existence it is necessary for every man to exert his powers to the utmost, and each man, even then, can produce barely enough for himself and his family. Hence slaves, even if they were as efficient as their masters, could not produce any surplus for the use of the latter. But slave-labour is essentially inefficient in work, such as hunting, which requires great skill and application.

As Nieboer expresses it, 'a compulsory hunting system cannot exist. If a man is to exert all his faculties, there must be other motives than mere compulsion.'[5] Spencer also observes that 'the relative lack of energy, the entire lack of interest, the unintelligent performance of work, and the greater cost of supervision, make the slave an unprofitable productive agent.'[6] So too J. S. Mill: 'It remains certain that slavery is incompatible with any high state of the arts of life, and any great efficiency of labour.'[7]

This applies equally to the primitive hunting life and to modern industrialism; it is a striking instance of the correspondence between extremes.

But, even if slaves were profitable, it would be very difficult to keep them in subjection or prevent their escape. Hunting supposes a nomadic life, and the hunter who roams over vast stretches of country in pursuit of his game has not much chance to watch over the movements of his slave. And, if the slave himself were set to hunting, as he would have to be (all men being needed in that work), this difficulty would amount almost to impossibility. Moreover, a hunting slave will be much more inclined to run away than a soil-tilling slave; for the latter, during his flight, has to live upon the spontaneous products of the land, whereas the former can continue hunting, just as he has done before; his flight would not be of the nature of a flight.

Another cause for the non-existence of slavery is that primitive hunters generally live in small groups—at the most, of a few hundred persons.[8] Now such a small group would not be able to develop coercive power sufficient to keep in sub-

1 See, among many others, Spencer, iii. 459, 470; *MI* i. 674.
2 *Material Culture and Social Institutions*, p. 228.
3 *Ib.* p. 30.
4 Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, i. 244.
5 See J. N. B. Hewitt, art. 'Adoption,' in *HAI* i. 15 f.
6 'On Regimentation,' *15 RBEW* [1893–94], p. cxii.
7 i. 252. 8 P. 193 and footnote.
9 Sumner, p. 262. 10 i. 252.

1 Under this head are included the Australians, Tasmanians, Andamanese, Negritos, Veddas, African Pygmies, Bushmen, Kubus, Botocudos, and Fuegians. They correspond to A. Vierkandt's *unstäte Völker* ('Die Kulturtypen der Menschheit,' *AA* xxv. [1898] 67 ff.). See Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, p. 30; Nieboer, p. 186 ff.
2 P. 187 ff. 3 i. 671. 4 Spencer, iii. 459.
5 P. 195. 6 iii. 470.
7 *Principles of Political Economy*[5], London, 1862, i. [illegible].
8 See A. Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898, i. 360.

jection slaves introduced from foreign parts. A fugitive slave would very soon be beyond the reach of his master's tribe, and a relatively small number of slaves would be a danger to the power of the free tribesmen.

But there are still other, more psychical, reasons militating against the introduction of slavery among primitive hunters. Both in emotional interest and in social evaluation hunting is an agreeable and noble occupation.

Nieboer describes it as 'occupying the whole soul and leaving no room for distracting thought; offering the hunter a definite aim to which he can reach by one mighty effort of strength and skill; uncertain in its results like battle, and promising the glory of victory over a living creature. . . . It is not a work fit to be imposed upon men who are deprived of the common rights of freemen and are the property of others.'[1]

Not only the intrinsic character of the work of the hunter, but also its social worth, takes it out of the forms of labour suited to enslaved persons. Among a primitive hunting people hereditary nobility is unknown and wealth does not exist; personal qualities are the only basis of social differentiation. Besides generosity, hospitality, and wisdom in council, strength, courage, and skill form the primitive patent of nobility. The activities in which these qualities are expressed and demonstrated are hunting and (though not universally) warfare.[2] Now, to admit slaves as hunters and warriors would be to place them on a footing of equality with freemen. Public opinion could not consider as slaves those who are successful in the noble occupations of hunting and fighting; and without public opinion the masters would be unable to keep them in subjection. And a poor hunter would be of little or no use as a hunting slave.

This attitude of respect for the hunter prevents the growth of intra-tribal slavery, for no member of the tribe is so superior to any other member that he can reduce him to a state of complete subjection, unless perhaps the latter is a physical or mental weakling, in which case he would be of no value as a hunting slave. It also tends to prevent extra-tribal slavery, though here what Sumner has called 'ethnocentrism,' with the common accompaniment of contempt for people who do not belong to the 'we-group,' would act as a neutralizing force in many cases; it would be a case of contempt for the enemy and stranger against respect for the hunter and warrior. There are, however, not a few instances on record where enemies, though they are hated and feared, are not despised. Among the Indians of the central parts of N. America captives were, as a rule, either killed or adopted; in the latter case they were regarded and treated as members of the tribe.

The study of the life of the simplest grades of human society leads to the conclusion that, in the strictest sense of the word, slavery is not a primitive institution; its appearance and growth depend on social conditions which are absent in the lowest forms of human association to-day, as they undoubtedly were during by far the greater portion of the time that man has existed upon the earth.

Attention is again called to the fact, noted above, that 15 out of the 18 positive cases of slavery among tribes in the hunting stage, according to Nieboer's tabulation, are found among the Indians of the N.W. Pacific coast of N. America. Now, while these tribes are classed in the general economic and cultural grade of hunting groups, on the negative ground of their being unacquainted with cattle-breeding or agriculture,[3] they have some very important characteristics which mark them off rather sharply from hunters in the strict sense. The principal and underlying characteristic is that they get their subsistence from fishing, not from hunting land-animals. The study of these particular aborigines is of special value in that it brings out, in a notable way, several of the general causes which account for the growth of slavery. They possess many features of economic and social life the absence of which tends to prevent or retard the growth of slavery among hunting peoples. Food is abundant and easy to procure. They have fixed habitations and live in comparatively large groups. They are enabled to do so by preserving food for future consumption. Also a settled life makes the escape of slaves more difficult. Living in larger groups brings about a higher organization of freemen, and hence greater coercive power. And the preserving of goods demands additional labour, which is fit to be performed by slaves, as it does not require much skill and has to be done in or near the dwellings, so that supervision is easy. Moreover, as Nieboer remarks: 'The hope of partaking of the stored food is a tie that binds the slave to his master's house, in much the same manner as a modern labourer is bound by having a share in the insurance funds of the manufactory.'[1] Slave-trade is carried on. This facilitates the keeping of slaves. Captives taken in war usually belong to neighbouring tribes and have more opportunity to escape to their native parts than have purchased slaves, who have often been brought from a great distance. Fishing implements have been brought to a high degree of perfection; fishing has become more remunerative; and the product of a fishing slave's labours exceeds his primary wants. The more freemen devote themselves to trade and industry, the more need is there for slaves to do the ruder work of fishing, rowing, cooking, etc.

(*b*) *Among pastoral tribes.*—Pastoral nomadism has been considered favourable to the growth of slavery. There is 'the mystical belief,' as Nieboer calls it, 'that the taming of animals naturally leads to the taming of men';[2] *i.e.*, it is supposed that the nomadic herdsman who has learned to domesticate animals begins also to domesticate, to enslave, men.

Thus J. Lippert holds that slavery 'first arises in the patriarchal communities of pastoral peoples'; the slaves 'were the object of an appropriation entirely similar to the appropriation of the domestic animals.'[3]

A study of the actual origin and distribution of slavery dispels speculations of this kind. Nieboer's survey shows that only one-half of the pastoral tribes of the globe keep slaves. It may be noted here that the positive cases are all found in a few definite areas, mainly N.W. and N.E. Africa, and a few tribes in the Caucasus and Arabia, while the pastoral nomads of Siberia, Central Asia, India, and S. Africa do not have slaves.[4]

The fact is that slavery is of little moment to pastoral peoples as such; among some of the slave-keeping tribes slaves are kept as a mere luxury. The chief reason for this is that, in pastoral life, subsistence depends almost entirely on capital, *i.e.*, cattle, and comparatively little on labour, and for the small amount of labour demanded free labourers are available.

'Among people who live upon the produce of their cattle, a man who owns no cattle, *i.e.*, no capital, has no means of subsistence. Accordingly, among pastoral tribes we find rich and poor men; and the poor often offer themselves as labourers to the rich.'[5]

But, on the other hand, Nieboer continues:

'There are no causes preventing them from having slaves. These tribes are, so to speak, in a state of equilibrium; a small additional cause on either side turns the balance.'[6]

The most important of such additional causes favouring the growth of slavery are the slave-trade and the neighbourhood of inferior races. It is found that the regions mentioned above as being those to which slavery among pastoral tribes is confined are exactly those where the slave-trade has for a long time been carried on on an extensive scale. The slaves are often purchased from slave-traders, and in several cases they belong to races with an inferior culture.

(*c*) *Among agricultural tribes.*—Three stages in the development of agriculture may be distin-

[1] P. 198. J. Dewey points out that 'game and sport are still words which mean the most intense immediate play of the emotions, running their whole gamut' ('Interpretation of Savage Mind,' in *Psychological Review*, ix. [1902] 217; this art. is an admirable study of the nature and effects of the mental life of the hunting stage).

[2] For a study of the *mores* of a typical hunting people see A. N. Gilbertson, 'Ethical Phases of Eskimo Culture,' *Journ. of Religious Psychology*, vi. and vii. [1913–14].

[3] See Nieboer, p. 174.

[1] P. 205. [2] P. 292.

[3] *Kulturgesch. der Menschheit*, Stuttgart, 1886–87, pp. 522, 535.

[4] For list of tribes and detailed description see Nieboer, p. 261 ff.

[5] Nieboer, p. 199. [6] *Ib.* p. 292.

guished in the tribal societies coming within the field of our present consideration: (1) in the first stage agriculture holds a subordinate place, subsistence being derived chiefly from other sources (hunting, fishing, gathering wild-growing plant food);[1] (2) tribes in the second stage carry on agriculture to a considerable extent, but not to the point of exclusive dependence upon it; (3) the third stage is that in which agriculture is by far the principal source of subsistence; the other, more primitive, means of livelihood hold such a subordinate place that, if they were entirely wanting, the economic state would be practically the same.[2]

A survey of the agricultural tribes of the world shows that slavery prevails extensively among them. On the other hand, there are many agricultural tribes without slaves, so that the practice of agriculture does not necessarily lead to the keeping of slaves. It is found, furthermore, that slavery is much more common among such tribes as subsist chiefly by agriculture than among the incipient agriculturists, who still depend to a considerable extent on hunting or fishing. In the first stage of agriculture a minority of tribes has slaves; the more agriculture develops, the more common slavery becomes, until in the third stage it exists in the great majority of tribes. Now it may be noted that agricultural societies of the most primitive stage bear a strong resemblance to tribes of the more specifically hunting type. Generally the business of the men is still largely hunting and warfare; the tilling of the soil is carried on mainly by the women.[3] This division of labour does not in principle differ much from that which prevails among such hunting peoples as the Australian aborigines, where the women gather fruits and dig roots. These primitive agricultural tribes are often nomadic.[4] When the products of the fields are scarcely ripe, they reap them and move on to some other place. Or they may sow something in a favourable spot as they pass, and return later to reap the fruits. The best examples of this type of agriculturists are found among some of the Indian tribes of S. America.[5]

Where agriculture is carried on without the aid of domestic animals, subsistence does not demand much capital. Where the population is scarce, as it generally is, only the most fertile and most accessible grounds are cultivated; very primitive implements are used; even the plough is used by very few tribal societies; they usually content themselves with a hoe or pointed stick.[6] And, even where agriculture is carried on in a more skilful manner, as by means of irrigation, it is not capital that is wanted, but labour. The construction of irrigation works may be a long and laborious task, but the materials cost nothing. Since subsistence is independent of capital and easy to procure, nobody offers his services to another.

'All freemen in new countries,' says Bagehot, 'must be pretty equal; every one has labour, and every one has land; capital, at least in agricultural countries (for pastoral countries are very different), is of little use; it cannot hire labour; the labourers go and work for themselves.'[1]

Hence, under such conditions, if a man wants another to work for him, he must force him to do so—in other words, he must make him a slave. This holds true of most primitive agricultural communities, *i.e.* of all those that have at their disposal more fertile land than is needed for cultivation, in order to support the actual population. But this state of things does not always exist.

In some areas every piece of arable land has been appropriated. In that case a man cannot procure his subsistence independently of a landlord. Hence 'free labourers' are available, slaves are not wanted, and slavery is not likely to exist. And, even where there are no poor persons, but every one has a share in the resources of the country, the use of slaves is not great when all land has been appropriated. When there is free land, a man can, by increasing the number of his slaves, increase his income to any extent. But, where the supply of land is limited, a landowner can employ only a limited number of labourers. As soon as there are hands enough to till his land, an increase in the number of labourers would be unprofitable. Perhaps the operation of this economic principle in primitive societies is best illustrated by conditions in Oceania, where slavery is confined to a few islands. The fact that all land had been appropriated led to a state of things inconsistent with slavery as a social and industrial system.[2]

It has been pointed out above that the need of skill and application, the intrinsic interest and excitement, and the social worth of the occupation are among the forces preventing or retarding the development of slavery among hunters. These forces are absent in agricultural life. As compared with hunting or sea-faring or even manufacture, agriculture is likely to be rather dull work, requiring patience rather than strength or skill. And there is not a single instance discovered of influence or power depending on agriculture (as distinct from ownership of land). It is an occupation that has been regarded as especially fit for women and slaves. These facts, together with the more material causes, tend to make the social life of agricultural groups favourable to the existence and growth of slavery.

3. **Intra-tribal slavery.**—After slavery had come to exist in its original form of extra-tribal slavery, it was extended also to some classes of cases in the in-group. The two principal causes of intra-tribal enslavement are debt and crime. In some exceptional cases a debtor who cannot pay is put to death. Much more frequently he becomes the slave of the creditor. Often, though not always, the debtor-slave or pawn has a right to become free again by paying his debt. Such is the case with the debtor-slaves (known by the Dutch name of *pandelingen*) in the Malay Archipelago. Here the creditor cannot refuse to accept the money.[3] In some cases a man will pay a debt by giving one or more of his kindred, usually children or women, into slavery to the creditor.

Slavery may be imposed as a punishment for crime, either directly or when the compensation (*wergild*) is not paid. Members of the offender's family may likewise be liable to enslavement.[4]

III. *POSITION AND TREATMENT OF SLAVES.*—While slavery may in principle involve an absolute power of the master over his slave, in practice there are undoubtedly many and marked limitations on the exercise of this power. It is found also that slaves may have certain 'rights,' determined by custom or public opinion, which the master is bound to respect. With regard to 'the power of life and death,' it may be expected that, when the slaves are war captives, the right of killing an enemy would pass into the right of killing the

[1] The tribes in this stage are the *Jägerbauern* ('hunting agriculturists') of Dargun (*ZVRW* v. 60).
[2] See Nieboer, p. 175; Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, p. 235.
[3] Woman's work as the primitive agriculturist is one of the most important chapters in the history of human civilization; see O. T. Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, New York, 1894, esp. ch. ii. 'The Food-Bringer.'
[4] This feature of primitive culture is noted by W. Cunningham (*The Growth of English Industry and Commerce*[5], Cambridge, 1915, i. 31 ff.); he remarks that 'primitive agriculture is perfectly consistent with a very migratory life' (p. 33).
[5] See Nieboer, p. 297.
[6] The *Hackbau* of E. Hahn (*Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft der Menschen*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 388 ff.) as distinguished from agriculture proper or *Ackerbau*.

[1] *Physics and Politics*, London, 1872, p. 72.
[2] Nieboer, p. 315 ff. [3] Nieboer, p. 38.
[4] See S. R. Steinmetz, *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, 2 vols., Leyden and Leipzig, 1894.

slave; and this seems to have been true to a great extent. Yet it is to be noted that, while in descriptions of primitive peoples one repeatedly finds it stated that the master may kill his slave at pleasure, or that he is not accountable for killing him, as Westermarck says,

'This seems to mean rather that, if he does so, no complaint can be brought against him, or no vengeance taken on him, than that he has an unconditional moral right to put to death a slave whom he no longer cares to keep.'[1]

In many cases the master is expressly prohibited from killing his slave at his own discretion.[2] The slaying of another man's slave is regarded largely as an offence against the property of the master, but not exclusively so. Where the master himself is not permitted to kill his slave, the slave has the right of life, sometimes with little difference in this respect between him and a freeman.

In a surprisingly large number of instances the master does not have even an unlimited right to sell his slave. This is true especially of slaves born in the house; sometimes he may sell at will only slaves captured in war or purchased. In several instances a slave, especially if he be a domestic slave, can be sold only if he has been guilty of some crime. The cases, referred to by Westermarck,[3] where the master is entitled only to a limited portion of the services of the slave would come more strictly under the head of serfdom, though we have here border-line phenomena hard to fit into a theoretical system. Sometimes a slave is said to have the right to possess property of his own; in some of these cases he may buy his own freedom. Among several peoples it is even permissible for a discontented slave to change masters. In other instances a slave, in order to secure a new master, needs only to cause a slight injury to some one's property or commit some trifling offence, and he must then be surrendered to the 'injured' person.

'It is astonishing,' says Westermarck, 'to notice how readily, in many African countries, slaves are allowed by custom to rid themselves of tyrannical or neglectful masters.'[4]

In some places a slave becomes free by simply leaving his master, or, if he escapes from one master and selects another, it is presumed that he has been badly treated by the first one, and consequently cannot be reclaimed.[5]

On the treatment of slaves by their masters in tribal society descriptions and opinions vary widely, and there are no doubt marked actual differences among various peoples in this regard. Thus we find this judgment by two American sociologists:

'No pen will ever record the brutal history of primitive slavery through generations and even centuries of which mankind was taught to labor. The bitterest scenes of an *Uncle Tom's Cabin* would be an agreeable relief from the contemplation of the stern realities of this unwritten history.'[6]

While undoubtedly cases could be found of which such a description might be given, taken as a generalization about primitive slavery, it is a gross exaggeration. More consistent with a far greater mass of data are these words of Spencer:

'The current assumption is that of necessity a slave is a down-trodden being, subject to unlimited labour and great hardship; whereas in many cases he is well cared for, not overworked, and leniently treated. Assuming slaves everywhere to have ideas of liberty like our own, we suppose them to be intolerant of despotic control; whereas their subjection is sometimes so little onerous that they jeer at those of their race who have no masters. Assuming that their feelings are such as we should have under the same circumstances, we regard them as necessarily unhappy; whereas they are often more light-hearted than their superiors.'[7]

[1] i. 422. [2] See references, *ib.*
[3] i. 677. [4] i. 678.
[5] This phase of the subject is discussed at length in A. H. Post's works, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, 2 vols., Oldenburg, 1894–95, and *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, 2 vols., do. 1887; also by S. R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903.
[6] J. Q. Dealey and L. F. Ward, *Text-book of Sociology*, New York, 1905, p. 90 f.
[7] iii. 456 f.

It appears from the available evidence that the condition of slaves in primitive culture is certainly better on the whole than in civilized states, ancient or modern, especially in the negro slavery of recent centuries; of the last Westermarck says truly:

'This system of slavery . . . at least in the British colonies and the Slave States surpassed in cruelty the slavery of any pagan country, ancient or modern.'[1]

Concerning the slave among the lower races we can accept the conclusion of this authority that as a rule 'he is treated kindly, very commonly as an inferior member of the family.' Of the slavery among the fishing tribes of the N.W. coast of N. America we are told that it was of a rather mild type.

'Slaves, as a rule, were well-fed and well-treated, as was natural with valuable property' (a significant remark, of wide application). 'The condition of the bondman indeed seems generally to have been little inferior to that of his master.'[2]

After considering the evidence with regard to slavery on the Gold Coast of Africa, Westermarck declares:

'The lot of a slave is not generally one of hardship, but is on the whole far better than that of the agricultural labourer in England.'[3]

These conclusions could be confirmed by evidence from other parts of the globe.

A difference has been observed in the treatment of slaves captured in war or purchased from outside the tribe and that of slaves born within the group, especially in the house of their master. It appears that the latter are generally better treated than the former. Thus, in Central Africa, slavery is more severe in character among pastoral than among agricultural tribes, because the slaves of the former are for the most part war-captives, whereas those of the latter are slaves mostly by inheritance. Domestic slaves seem to be more favoured than slaves employed in the fields. Sumner's statement with regard to slavery in Africa would be equally true of other areas of primitive culture:

'Whenever slaves live in a family, sharing in the family life and associating freely with the male members of it in their work, religion, play, etc., the slavery is of a very light type and implies no hardship for the slave.'[4]

We may give just one typical case, outside of Africa, in N. Borneo:

'In most cases [the slaves] have been brought up as ordinary members of the family, and have no wish to leave their home. Cases of unkind treatment are very few and far between.'[5]

IV. *Effects of slavery.*—The effect of slavery upon human life is well expressed by Sumner, when he says:

'Slavery, wherever it has existed, has affected all the *mores* of the society. . . . When adopted into the folkways it has dominated and given tone and color to them all.'[6]

We can speak here only of a few of its many far-reaching effects.

One result of slavery which has often been emphasized—perhaps too much so—is that, in the words of the same writer, slavery has been 'the great schoolmaster to teach men steady work'; 'slavery is a part of the discipline by which the human race has learned to carry on industrial organization.'[7] Now, while it may be true that 'man is naturally inclined to idleness,' this, as Westermarck points out, is 'not because he is averse from muscular activity as such, but because he dislikes the monotony of regular labour and the mental exertion it implies.'[8] Now, outside of hunting and fighting, and to a certain degree trading, the labour in primitive times, as in later

[1] i. 711.
[2] H. W. Henshaw, art. 'Slavery,' in *HAI* ii. 598.
[3] i. 678 f. [4] P. 269 f.
[5] Dorothy Cator, *Everyday Life among the Head-hunters*, London and New York, 1905, p. 198.
[6] P. 262. [7] *Ib.*
[8] ii. 268; cf. G. Ferrero, 'Les Formes primitives du travail,' *Revue scientifique*, ser. iv. vol. v. [1896] 331 ff.

civilizations, was monotonous and uninteresting. Men preferred to be idle if they could compel other persons to work for them, nor would any one do it unless compelled.

'The original problem,' Dealey and Ward hold, 'was how to make men work,' and they add that 'nothing short of slavery could ever have accomplished this.'[1]

In another place, however, Ward criticizes the view expressed by Spencer[2] that without slavery the stage of discipline is never reached:

'The constant spur of want is sufficient of itself to accomplish this, as is evidenced by non-slaveholding industrial societies.'[3]

It may be agreed that slavery played an important rôle in disciplining men to uninterrupted labour, but some prevalent theories as to the transmission of this capacity cannot be accepted.

Thus the sociologists just quoted set forth the view that the stronger and more adaptable persons, who could bear and survive the burdens of their enslaved existence, could 'transmit some small increment of their new-found powers of endurance to their posterity. For the capacity to labour is a typical "acquired character," that has been transmitted in minute additions from parent to offspring and generation to generation of slaves, until great numbers of men were at last born with a "natural" or constitutional power to apply themselves to monotonous tasks during their whole lives.'[4]

Now it should be observed that the contrasts so often drawn between native aptitudes of men in primitive life and in civilization are, to say the least, very questionable.[5] Even if any such difference should be established, it could not be explained in the manner set forth by Dealey and Ward. The trouble with their position is that, on their theory, capacity to labour is an acquired character, and hence, biologically considered, its transmission through inheritance is very unlikely. If there are any innate differences in regard to capacity for labour between contemporary mankind and our earliest ancestors, a more plausible kind of explanation would be found in the operation of a principle of selection, by which the more industrious type of man survived and those unfit for steady and irksome toil were, partially at least, eliminated.

The great fundamental effect of slavery on the economic activities of mankind, and through them on other social traits, is the division of labour. It is the original differentiation of human society into a governing and regulating and a governed and operating class.

Slavery 'creates a set of persons born to work that others may not work, and not to think in order that others may think.'[6]

Thus was made possible the leisure class, released from constant toil, and the historical function of this class, whatever that may have been.

'Leisure is the great need of early societies, and slaves only can give men leisure.'[7]

That the keeping of slaves furthered the augmentation and accumulation of wealth, with all the power and prestige that go with it, need hardly be said.

A further consequence of this division of labour and the social distinction based upon it is a contempt for manual labour, domestic and agricultural, and, in later stages of economic development, industrial.

To give but two typical instances: in Uganda the prevalence of slavery 'causes all manual labour to be looked upon as derogatory to the dignity of a free man,'[8] and in Dahomey 'agriculture is despised because slaves are employed in it.'[9]

[1] P. 89 f.
[2] In his *Study of Sociology*[9], London, 1880, p. 192.
[3] *Dynamic Sociology*, New York, 1883, i. 541.
[4] *Text-book of Sociology*, p. 91.
[5] See on this point F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, New York, 1911, esp. ch. iv. 'Mental Traits of Primitive Man and Civilized Man.'
[6] Bagehot, p. 73. [7] *Ib.* p. 72.
[8] C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan*, London, 1882, i. 186, quoted in *MI* ii. 272.
[9] R. F. Burton, *A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahomey*, London, 1864, ii. 248, quoted in Spencer, iii. 460.

V. *SLAVERY AND RELIGION IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE.*—Slavery, like other features of the *mores* of a people, has had the sanction of the prevailing religion. It is scarcely necessary to remind ourselves how recently slavery was not only recognized by the governments of leading nations professedly Christian, but also championed by eminent theologians as an institution of divine sanction and even prescription.

An interesting phenomenon in primitive slavery—how wide-spread has not been determined—is the securing of freedom by a slave through his devoting himself to some deity.

Among the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast of W. Africa, *e.g.*, 'according to custom, any slave who takes refuge in a temple and dedicates himself to the service of a god, cannot be reclaimed by his owner,' but, we are told, 'as by paying a fee to the priests the owner can close the doors of all the temples in the neighbourhood to his fugitive slaves, this provision of an asylum for an ill-treated slave is more apparent than real.'[1]

A parallel to this is found in the emancipation of a serf in mediæval Europe through his taking holy orders.

A curious view of the relation between slavery and religion was put forth by A. Comte,[2] which would scarcely deserve attention or require refutation at the present time, except for the fact that it seems still to have adherents and has been repeated with approval by J. K. Ingram in his valuable work on the *History of Slavery and Serfdom*.[3]

Since, so this theory has it, the rise of polytheism was contemporary with or soon followed the formation of sedentary communities, it is concluded that that religious system was coincident in time with the system of slavery. To quote Ingram: 'There is, in fact, a natural correlation between them, as there is between fetichism and the massacre of captives, and between monotheism and liberty'; *i.e.*, 'fetichism, as a strictly local religion, tended to the extermination of prisoners, because it could not establish any spiritual tie between the victors and the vanquished sufficient to check the impulse to destruction. But each form of polytheism being of a receptive and accommodating nature, and not absolutely excluding the others, the conquerors and the conquered had sufficient community of religious ideas to admit habitual harmony, whilst there was yet a sufficient difference to maintain a certain distance between them. The submission of the vanquished implied an admission of the inferiority of his deities, and the acknowledgment sufficed to consecrate his permanent subordination.'

While there is an element of truth in these speculations, especially in the sentence last quoted, as an explanation of the cause of slavery it is wholly inadequate.

VI. *DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVERY AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS.*—Slavery is unknown in aboriginal Australia. In Oceania it is found in only a few islands and districts, being confined, in Melanesia, almost entirely to W. New Guinea, and, in Polynesia, to Tahiti and New Zealand; it probably does not exist at all in Micronesia. There is no clear evidence of slavery among the wild tribes of the Malay Peninsula, while it is of frequent occurrence in the Malay Archipelago and the Philippines. In the last-named group the most primitive and probably the aboriginal race, the Negritos, have no slaves. It is found among a considerable number of the aboriginal tribes of Indo-China and India; it is unknown among such very primitive groups as the Todas and the Veddas. In Central Asia and Siberia its existence has been proved only in the case of the natives of Kamchatka; some of the Bedawîn of Arabia and N. Africa keep slaves.

Slavery was a well-established institution in the civilized states of the American continent, in Mexico, Central America, and Peru, before the European conquest, but was very uncommon among the other aborigines. In N. America it appears to have been unknown outside of the Pacific Coast area from Bering Strait to N. California. The institution is wholly foreign to Eskimo life,

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, p. 220.
[2] *Cours de philosophie positive*, 6 vols., Paris, 1830–42 leçon 58.
[3] P. 7

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though in Alaska it has, in a few instances, been borrowed from neighbouring Indian tribes. Its occurrence has been reported from a few scattered Central and S. American tribes.

Africa is intimately related to the institution of slavery, not only by its being the great source of supply of the slave-trade of modern European and American nations, but also by its being the continent where slavery prevails most extensively among native peoples of a primitive culture. Leaving out of consideration the civilized and semi-civilized peoples of N. Africa, Nieboer finds only two districts where there is no clear positive evidence of the practice; these are S. Africa south of the Zambesi, and the region about the Upper Nile to the south-west of Abyssinia. Particularly large aggregations of slave-keeping tribes are found on the coast of Guinea and in the district formed by Lower Guinea and the territory bordering on the Congo. It occurs equally among Sudanese and Bantu peoples. It does not exist among the Pygmies and the Bushmen, and there is no definite evidence of its occurrence among the Hottentots.[1]

LITERATURE.—The following books will give more extended discussions of the subject and references to most of the literature: H. J. Nieboer, *Slavery as an Industrial System: Ethnological Researches*, The Hague, 1900, ²1910 (references in this art. are to first ed.); E. Westermarck, *MI*, 2 vols., London, 1906–08, esp. ch. xxvii.; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2 vols., do. 1906, esp. pt. i. ch. vi.; L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: An Essay in Correlation*, do. 1915; W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Boston, 1911, esp. ch. vi.; H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, London, i.⁴, 1893, ii.², 1893, iii. 1896 (esp. pt. viii. ch. xv.).

ALBERT N. GILBERTSON.

SLAVERY (Christian). — **1. Introductory.** — Slavery has existed from very early times and is hardly extinct in the world to-day. Few institutions have produced greater evil, and, though in primitive and semi-barbarous communities it may have been for a time and in certain places a necessary step in human progress, in its more developed forms in the Roman empire and the New World it has been the cause of an enormous amount of suffering, most of which must be unrecorded. The causes of slavery are at first sight manifold. It may be the result of capture in war; it may be a punishment for crime or debt; or a man who is starving may sell himself or his children to buy food. But, the more we examine the subject, the more we find that the primary cause is capture in war, particularly when the war is between different races. (We shall see presently that the racial element accounts for the perpetuation of slavery or the lingering of legal and social anomalies where they would otherwise probably have disappeared.) A stronger race captures a weaker, but does not exterminate it, and the vanquished become the thralls of their victors. Only as a substitute for slaughter can slavery be said to have been a step forward in moral progress. It must be considered historically and in relation to law, economics, ethics, and theology; and the Church, in this as in other things, affected and was affected by the social and political institutions among which it grew.

2. In the Old Testament. — Slavery existed among the Hebrews, as among all the peoples of antiquity, but it appears in milder forms and was inspired by a more humane spirit than in either Greece or Rome, and there was nothing in Israel to correspond to the vast pyramids of Egypt or buildings of Assyria reared by the ceaseless labour of thralls working under the lash of their oppressors.[2] In the Semitic foreworld slaves were probably captives in war. The Israelites from being sojourners became bondmen in Egypt and owed their deliverance to Moses. Here, as elsewhere, what is properly called slavery shades off imperceptibly into what is not. The Hebrew עֶבֶד is used of the service of servants and of slaves to their masters, of subjects serving their king, and of serving God. Its cognates in other Semitic tongues have a like variety of meanings.[1]

The OT legislation as to slavery is given in art. SLAVERY (Jewish).

3. In the New Testament.—There is no explicit condemnation of slavery in the teaching of our Lord. It would even be difficult to say how much He refers to it, as the Greek can mean 'slave,' 'bond servant,' or 'servant.' The later differentiation into free, half-free, and unfree, or free man, serf, and slave, was not definitely evolved. But it remains true that the abolitionist could point to no one text in the Gospels in defence of his position, while those who defended slavery could appeal at any rate to the letter of Scripture. Our Lord accepted the political and social conditions of His time, leaving His teaching to work out its consequences in the Christian Church and in the course of history.

In St. Paul we find more explicit references and a more developed doctrine of the relation of man to man. Thus in 1 Co 12[13] 'were we all baptized into one body,' εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, and in Gal 3[28] 'there can be neither bond nor free . . . for ye all are one in Christ Jesus.'[2] But it is in the Epistle to Philemon that St. Paul's teaching is most clear. Onesimus was a runaway slave whom the apostle was sending back to his master Philemon.

The names Onesimus and Philemon are both Phrygian, and 'for some reason or other Phrygian slaves were regarded with contempt': Φρὺξ ἀνὴρ πλαγγεὶς ἀμείνων καὶ διακονέστερος was an old saying.[3] The name Onesimus is frequent in inscriptions.

St. Paul asks that Onesimus may be forgiven, that he may be received as he himself would have been (v.[17]). But there is no condemnation of slavery. Nevertheless it has been rightly said that 'St. Paul does not seem quite to like the relation.'[4] Why was it that he and others were slow to condemn an institution fraught with so much evil to mankind? Three reasons may be assigned: (1) our Lord left the implications of His teaching to be worked out in time, as we saw above; (2) the immediate abolition or attempted abolition of slavery in the Roman empire would probably have led to the collapse of the fabric of society;[5] (3) the early Church was buoyed up with the hope of the immediate second coming of Christ; hence earthly things did not matter so much, and, whatever a man's condition in this world, it was generally better for him to remain in it, and be faithful to his duties towards those with whom he found himself in relation whether as a master or as a bond-servant.[6]

The more closely we examine the thought of the NT writers and understand the conditions under which they lived, the less shall we be inclined to

[1] A distribution-map is given at the end of the second edition of Nieboer's work.

[2] For slavery in ancient Babylonia see C. H. W. Johns, *The Oldest Code of Laws in the World* (Code of Ḥammurabi, king of Babylon, 2285–2242 B.C.), Edinburgh, 1903.

[1] See O. C. Whitehouse, in *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Servant, Slave, Slavery.'

[2] Cf. also Col 3[11].

[3] Wallon, *Hist. de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*, ii. 61*f.*; W. O. E. Oesterley, in *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, iv. [1910] 207, 'The Epistle to Philemon.'

[4] H. M. Gwatkin, *Early Church History*, London, 1909, i. 233, n. 1.

[5] Perhaps this has suggested the use of the term 'Spartacist' by the extreme socialists of the present day, as Spartacus was a leader of slave revolt.

[6] Cf. Eph 6[5-9], Col 3[22-4:1], 1 Ti 6[1], Tit 2[9f.], 1 P 2[18]. We may probably infer that St. Paul felt that there was some danger lest the new sense of spiritual dignity, and of spiritual relation between Christians of all conditions, should tend violently to destroy the old social order; he is afraid lest the conduct of Christian men should bring discredit or suspicion upon the religion of Christ.

be surprised at their attitude towards this and other social questions.

It is a mistake to say that St. Paul consciously addressed himself to the task of abolishing slavery by urging those aspects of the gospel which, in their practical application, he knew would eventually undermine it. 'It is not likely that he saw the way to its destruction at all.'[1] But this does not mean that the Apostle thought that slavery was right in itself, and a thing so anti-Christian in its nature could not permanently continue.

4. In the early Church.—There are few references to slavery in the Apostolic Fathers.

St. Ignatius says that slaves ought not to be despised, nor ought they to be puffed up: Δούλους καὶ δούλας μὴ ὑπερηφάνει· ἀλλὰ μηδὲ αὐτοὶ φυσιούσθωσαν, ἀλλ' εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πλεῖον δουλευέτωσαν, ἵνα κρείττονος ἐλευθερίας τύχωσιν. Μὴ αἱρέτωσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, ἵνα μὴ δοῦλοι εὑρεθῶσιν ἐπιθυμίας.[2]

St. Barnabas does not wish slaves to be commanded with bitterness: Οὐ μὴ ἐπιτάξῃς παιδίσκῃ ἢ δούλῳ σου ἐν πικρίᾳ, τοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζουσι, μήποτε οὐ φοβηθήσῃ τὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις Θεόν· ὅτι ἦλθεν οὐκ ἐπὶ πρόσωπον καλέσαι, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οὓς τὸ Πνεῦμα ἡτοίμασε.[3]

The Fathers of the Church make frequent reference to slavery and generally show pity for the slave without condemning the institution. In many cases a common faith must have drawn master and slave together closer than would have been possible had one or both been heathen, for in Christ they shared a higher unity. This was intensified during persecution, when the humblest slaves amazed the Roman populace by showing a fortitude as great as that of any saint or hero.

At the persecution of Lyons and Vienne in A.D. 177 it was said of the torture of the slave girl Blandina, 'Never woman in our time suffered so much as this one.'[4] Likewise at the martyrdom of St. Perpetua in 203. 'There is something here even more significant than the lofty courage of Perpetua, which forms the front of the story. From first to last she never dreams that Revocatus and Felicitas are less than her equals and companions in Christ. Enthusiasm might have nerved the matron and the slave apart: but no mere enthusiasm could have joined their hands in death. The mischievous eccentricities of Montanism are as dust in the balance while we watch the mighty working of the power of another world in which not only the vulgar fear of death is overcome, but the deepest social division of the ancient world is utterly forgotten.'[5]

With the end of persecution Christianity was not put to so severe a test in its members, and so there was always a tendency to slip back into the standards of a world still largely heathen at heart, for the structure of ancient society lasted beyond the conversion of Constantine, though several forces were combining to shake it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Church, and the Fathers who were her spokesmen, tended to palliate and even to compromise with, rather than to oppose, the evils of slavery, and that the thought of a spiritual society in which all earthly distinctions are of little account was not so clear to the minds of a later generation as it was to St. Paul, or to master and slave who died together in the Roman amphitheatre. It was easier to say, therefore, that the 'true slavery is the slavery of sin' than to grapple with the evils of an institution inseparable from ancient society.

As the doctrinal system of Christianity became more explicit, it may seem remarkable that its moral implications did not become more explicit too. A few quotations will show the attitudes of the Fathers, though here, as elsewhere, they vary as the spirit of each is that of a mystic, a dogmatist, an administrator, or a lawyer.

St. Irenæus says that before redemption there was no difference among men: 'Significans quoniam secundum carnem ex liberis, et ex servis Christus statueret filios Dei, similiter omnibus dans munus Spiritus vivificantis nos.'[6]

Clement of Alexandria protests against unfair treatment of slaves, quoting the proverb: Οἷα γὰρ δέσποινα τοιάδε χ' ἁ κύων,[1] and states the equality of master and slave before God. He draws out the Pauline teaching that it is the duty of slaves to obey their masters and of wives to obey their husbands, and, if those in authority are bad, the duty of submission remains the same.

Origen recalls in what terms Celsus had reproached the first Christians with the number of slaves they counted amongst them: τούτους γὰρ ἀξίους τοῦ σφετέρου Θεοῦ αὐτόθεν ὁμολογοῦντες δῆλοι εἰσιν, ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἠλιθίους καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀναισθήτους καὶ ἀνδράποδα, καὶ γύναια, καὶ παιδάρια, πείθειν ἐθέλουσί τε καὶ δύνανται.[2] Christians ought to show their slaves how, while having a free spirit, they can be ennobled by religion.

Justin Martyr recalls the forgotten spirit of universal brotherhood.[3] Tertullian invokes the same spirit of world-wide charity: 'Unam omnium rempublicam agnoscimus mundum. . . . Fratres autem etiam vestri sumus, jure naturae matris unius, etsi vos parum homines, quia mali fratres.'[4]

Arnobius enforces the same truth: 'Idcirco animas misit, ut . . . expugnarent atque everterent civitates, servitutis opprimerent, et mancipiarent se jugo, et ad ultimum fierent alterius altera potestatis natalium conditione mutata.'[5]

This equality of all mankind is asserted many times. St. Jerome remarks: 'Aequaliter omnes nascimur, et imperatores, et pauperes: aequaliter et morimur omnes; aequalis enim conditio est.'[6]

St. Ambrose says: 'Eadem enim natura omnium mater est hominum; et ideo fratres sumus omnes, una atqua eadem matre geniti, cognationisque eodem jure devicti.'[7]

St. Cyril of Jerusalem does not think that slavery in itself is bad: οὐχ ὅτι αἰσχύνη ἡ δουλεία, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ δοῦλον ὄντα, ἐλευθερίαν πλάττεσθαι, κακόν.[8]

Again, the relation of master and slave is compared by St. Cyril of Alexandria with that of the maker and the thing made: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν τῷ δεσπότῃ φορίσῃ τὸ δοῦλον, οὐδὲ τῷ ποιήσαντι, τὸ ποιηθέν.[9]

Despite the timidity of some of the Fathers, the instinct of the Church was against slavery. It is significant that no early Christian epitaph bears the inscription 'slave.' Three Roman bishops, Evaristus, Anicetus, and Calixtus I., had been slaves. The tendency of the Fathers certainly was to urge the slave to be obedient, rather than to urge the master to set him free.

St. Augustine writes: 'Etiam sermo mihi est ad vos, servi, quicumque dominos carnales habetis, cuicumque servitii conditionem debetis. Obedite dominis vestris, diligite ex corde, non ad oculum servientes, sed ministerium ex amore facientes: quia et illos Deus constituit ut vobis dominentur, et vos ut serviatis. Bene serviate propter Deum quia de bono servitio mercedem habebitis. Si boni fueritis, meliores eritis dominis malis: quia apud Deum anima uniuscuiusque non est discernenda nobilitate, sed opere, nec genere, sed actione.'[10]

Augustine thinks that the state of slavery is the result of human sin. He discusses the question in the *de Civitate Dei*, xix. 15.

The decrees of Councils and Canons are sometimes interpreted as favourable, sometimes as unfavourable, to the slave. Did the Church hasten the powers of gradual emancipation which without her would not ultimately have borne the fruit that it did, or did she retard a change which but for her would have gone farther and achieved its end more quickly? The right view is between the two, though the truth is on the whole more favourable to the Church than otherwise. The spirit of Christianity, like leaven working within human society, always tended towards freedom; but individual Christian writers and the official decrees of Councils erred on the side of a nervous fear of disturbing established institutions. The same tendency which we see in St. Augustine in the West appears in the East in St. Gregory and St. Basil. A church of Cappadocia by common consent elected for bishop a slave of Simplicia, a rich matron, generous towards the poor, but suspected of heresy. Gregory and Basil consecrated him on the prayers of the people, but they do not boldly claim that it is right to ordain a slave without the consent of his master. That

[1] M. R. Vincent, *The Epistles to the Philippians and Philemon* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1897, p. 166.
[2] *Ad Polycarp.* iv. 3. [3] *Ep.* xix. 7.
[4] Gwatkin, i. 163. The account of her martyrdom is in Eus. *HE* v. 1 (*PG* xx. 416).
[5] Gwatkin, ii. 127.
[6] *Contra Hær.* iv. xxi. 3 (*PG* vii. 1046); ed. W. W. Harvey, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1857, ii. 227.

[1] *Pæd.* iii. 11 (*PG* viii. 649).
[2] *Contra Cels.* iii. 44 (*PG* xi. 977).
[3] *Apol.* ii. 1. [4] *Apol. adv. Gentes*, 38 f.
[5] *Adv. Gentes*, ii. 39; for these and other references to the Fathers see Wallon, iii. 295 ff.
[6] *In Ps.* lxxxi. § 4. [7] *De Noe et Arca*, 26.
[8] *Cat.* vi., *de Uno Deo*, 26.
[9] *Argumentorum de S. Spiritu capita* (*PG* lxxv. 1133).
[10] *De Tempore*, sermo vii. 12.

a slave had to gain that consent has generally been the rule in Catholic Christianity. But in Catholic Christianity properly understood the sacraments must be great levellers, though the implications of this were not fully perceived. So St. Gregory Nazianzus extols the nobility conferred by baptism.[1]

As regards the monastic life there was less difficulty than about ordination. Free men or slaves were subjected to three years' probation.[2] If a slave fled from a monastery and sought to live elsewhere, his former master could claim him. The simple fact of sojourn in a monastery in order to enter there suspended servitude.[3]

As regards marriage, canon law annulled a marriage of slaves contracted without the knowledge of their servile conditions on the part of the priest; if this was known, the marriage remained valid. Pope Hadrian IV. (1154–59) proclaimed anew the validity of a marriage contracted without the assent of the master, but the slave must continue to serve him.

The general impression left by the study of the attitude of the Church is that it tended to make slavery milder, though not to abolish it, and, owing to its excessive care for the rights of the masters, even to perpetuate what would otherwise have passed away. But in patristic literature we meet with the exhortation to masters to treat their slaves kindly. Despite the worldly compromises with existing institutions, here as elsewhere the spirit of Christ was at work.

5. Slavery and imperial law.—It was, however, not only in the working out of the gospel precepts of the spiritual equality of all men that slavery was modified, but also because of its place in the fabric of ancient society. Slavery was the worst abuse of the Roman empire.[4] It was a heritage from ancient times vastly increased in its evil nature and its extent, and made worse by contact with the corrupt elements of Greek and Oriental life. That the slave was often better educated than his master led frequently to additional evils, for it was his interest to pander to his master's lowest vices, and he had no rights of body or soul against his owner. The existence of a large class of freedmen was a further misfortune, for their freedom was not entire—it took several generations to remove the stigma of slavery, and the freedman still retained many of the vices of the slave. After Trajan the progressive manumission of freedmen was always resisted by the enlightened emperors as a permanent conspiracy against Roman society, but, when the freedman no longer had the taint of slavery or servile vices, the danger was removed. Christian influence on imperial legislation is seen as early as Constantine, who authorized manumission in the presence of Christian people. Those who had been enfranchised in church were to enjoy the full rights of Roman citizenship. Clergy were enabled to give by their wills complete liberty to their slaves in whatever terms they pleased. Constantine elevated from the enjoyment of the Latin right to the full Roman citizenship those who had been freed in church and subsequently converted to Christianity. One of his enactments declared free a slave who should denounce a ravisher. The work of Constantine was carried on in the East by his successors at Constantinople, while in the West it was profoundly modified by the barbarians.

6. Slavery in the Eastern Roman empire.—The legislation of Justinian here, as elsewhere, was important.

'We can perceive that between the age of Gaius and the age of Justinian the feeling that man is naturally free has become stronger, and this feeling was in the spirit of Christianity. Florentius said that liberty was a natural faculty whereas servitude was a constitution contrary to nature; and this view is adopted by Justinian in his Institutes.'[1]

Justinian re-enacted the legislation of Constantine which made a master who killed or ill-treated his slave liable to punishment. Slaves who became criminals were punished more severely than were free men. He declared that slaves could not refuse enfranchisement, and forbade any Jew, pagan, or heretic to have an orthodox slave.

Basil the Macedonian (867–886) ordered the marriage of slaves to be celebrated with the benediction of the priest.

Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (945–959) fixed the price to be paid for a slave who had been brought back.

Alexius Comnenus (1081–1118) re-enacted that the blessing of the Church should be given to a slave marriage; unless this was given, he decreed that the newly-married slaves be freed. This seems to indicate that the slaves also believed themselves freed by the ceremony. But Alexius declared that in the eye of God all men are equal.

Dreadful punishments might be inflicted on the slave—mutilation of the nose and ears, or gouging out of the eyes. But slavery was less rigorous in new than in old Rome, for with the consent of his master a slave might enter the army and thereby become free.

Various terms are employed by Greek writers for slaves and slavery. Δοῦλος was, of course, the usual word; sometimes ἀνδράποδον was employed, as the equivalent of the Latin *mancipium*, or ψυχάριον, or ἀνδράκιον; *domesticus* was represented by οἰκέτης. After the 9th cent., δοῦλος is generally the equivalent of *famulus*. Constantinus Porphyrogenitus relates how the Venetians, asked by Louis I. (814–840) to recognize his suzerainty, refused, asserting ὅτι ἡμεῖς δοῦλοι θέλομεν εἶναι τοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασίλεως, δοῦλοι here being subjects. Παιδαρίσκη is used for *ancilla* (the ordinary feminine of *servus*). From the 10th cent. we find a new term, Σκλάβος. The fact that mediæval Greek, like modern English, took its word for 'slave' from the Slav peoples shows that Slavs were often captured and made use of as slaves, as they seemed to possess the toughness and docility which fitted them for servile work. (Σκλάβοι was apt to be confused with Σέρβλοι, 'Servians,' as *servi* with *Servii*.)

Slavery proper disappeared from the Eastern empire in the 13th cent.; but, as in Western Europe, serfs, not personally chattels, but tied to the land, had existed from the time of Justinian. The regular word was γεώργος, *colonus*. The emperor Nicephorus Phocas in 963 forbade religious communities to build new houses or monasteries or to acquire property with ground rents, for these estates were worked by οἰκέται, who were bought as true slaves independent of the land, but they soon came to be serfs or colons paying a fixed amount, as this was more convenient for monasteries than to work them as slaves, needing continual supervision.

The emperor Manuel Comnenus (1143–1180) prohibited all forced labour, and so seems to have abolished the colonate throughout his dominions, like Louis X. of France.

Domestic slavery disappeared by degrees because of the Christian doctrine of the spiritual equality of all men, and at length by special laws forbidding the sale of an individual freeman and punishing the homicide of a slave like that of a free man.[2] Slavery certainly had as a rule merged into serfdom from the time of Justinian, though its disappearance may not have been as complete as is sometimes supposed. It was hastened by the

1 *Oratio*, xl., 'In Sanctum Baptisma' (*PG* xxxvi. 396 f.).
2 *Novella*, v. 2. 3 *Code of Justinian*, I. iii. 38.
4 Cf art. SLAVERY (Roman).

1 J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire, from Arcadius to Irene*, London, 1889, i. 371. The emperor regarded himself as the protector of liberty: 'pro libertate quam et fovere et tueri Romanis legibus et praecipue nostro numini peculiare est' (quoted by Bury).

2 For slavery in the Eastern empire see H. J. Roby, in *Cambridge Medieval History*, ii. 62–66 (a convenient summary of Justinian's legislation); E. Biot, *De l'Abolition de l'esclavage ancien en Occident*, p. 207 ff.

turmoils of the Latin empire in the East. The war against the infidel was responsible for the perpetuation of slavery. In 1344 the empress Anne agreed that the sultan Orkhan should export as slaves captives belonging to the party of Cantacuzenos.[1] It was against both the theory and the practice of the time to sell Christians as slaves to an infidel.

An interesting document quoted by Finlay records the freeing of a serf of Duke Antonio of Athens in 1437:

'Ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστω σοι Φράγγος ἐλεύθερος καὶ παιδία τῶν παιδίων σου ἀπὸ πάσης ὑπαροικίας τε δουλοσύνης ἀπὸ τε ἐγγαρίας κανισκίων, μονστοφορίων, ἐλαιοπαρουχίων καὶ ἑτέρων ἄλλων τοιαύτης ὑπαροικίας προνόμιον.

7. Slavery in the Greek Church.—A few references to the attitude of the Church in the East further illustrate slavery in E. Europe in the Middle Ages.

If a slave is made a eunuch, he is to be freed and never to be sent back into slavery[2]—a nomocanon of Photius, patriarch of Constantinople († 891).

'We do not permit slaves to be called to office without their master's knowledge, to the annoyance of the masters who possess them, for such a thing works the overthrow of households. But if a household slave ever appear worthy of obtaining a further appointment, such as our Onesimus appeared to be, and the masters agree to set him free, and send him forth from the house, so let it be.'[3]

There are various regulations about fugitive slaves in the time of Justinian.[4]

A slave shall be freed if he make known the rape of a virgin.[5] Those compelled to do something shameful shall be freed by the bishop.[6] If any one teach a slave to despise his master, let him be anathema.[7]

During the Latin empire the soil was generally cultivated by serfs, as is shown by a letter of Pope Innocent III. to the archbishop of Patros in 1209.[8]

8. Slavery and the barbarians.—The coming of barbarian tribes naturally had an effect on slavery as on other institutions, both before and after the fall of the Western empire. The small proprietor had become more and more depressed and the slave gradually emancipated, so both tended to coalesce into the serf, or *colonus*. The process was gradual and imperfect, as pure slavery did not in the West any more than in the East cease as early or as universally as has sometimes been assumed, and serfdom and slavery went on side by side for many centuries. In the disorder of the fall of the Western empire captives of war were bought and sold; so another contributory cause of slavery was added; through anarchy and privation many men were driven to sell themselves as slaves. The captives of war taken by Clovis after the defeat of the Alemanni, by Charles the Great after the defeat of the Saxons, and by Henry the Fowler and his successors after the defeat of the Slavs were sold as slaves or sometimes settled on the land as colons.

Barbarian legislation forbade Christian slaves to be sold to pagans or Jews, but otherwise tended to recognize slavery as a normal institution. In the West the marriage of slaves with the benediction of priests was refused, as it was generally interpreted to mean freedom.

The distinctive sign of slavery was short hair, and the Salic law forbade cutting the hair of individual freemen, as likewise did a capitulary of Charles the Great.

A few extracts from barbarian laws will illustrate the legislation.

The *Lex Alemannorum*, of Lothair II. (*c.* A.D. 613–622):

'XVIII. 1. Si [libera dimissa] fuerit per cartam aut in ecclesiam et post haec servo nupserit, ecclesiae ancilla permaneat.

2. Si libera Alemanna servum ecclesiae nupserit et servitium opus ancilla contradixerit, abscedat.

3. Si autem ibi filios vel filias generaverit, ipsi servi et ancillae permaneant, potestatem ad exiendum non habeant.

4. Illa autem mater eorum, quando exire voluerit, ante tres annos liberam habeat potestatem. Si autem tres annos indurauerit opus ancillae et parentes eius non exadoniauerunt eam ut libera fuisset, nec ante ducem nec ante comitem nec in publico mallo transactis tres Kal. Marcias: post haec ancilla permaneat in perpetuum et quidquid ex ea nati fuerint servi et ancillae sint.'[1]

'XXXVIII. 1. Ut die dominico nemo opera servilia praesumat facere, quia hoc lex prohibuit et sacra scriptura in omnibus testatur.

2. Si quis servus in hoc vicio inventus fuerit, vapuletur fustibus.'[2]

The *Lex Alemannorum* (*c.* 817–823) decreed that, if a slave fled to a church, he was to be returned to his lord. If the slave could not be found, another or his value was to be given to his lord.[3] If a man killed the slave of any one else, he was to compound with another slave or the value of the slave.[4] Any one killing a royal or ecclesiastical slave was to compound with 45 instead of 15 *solidi*.

The *Lex Bainivariorum* of Lothair II. fixes the amount of compensation for various injuries to a slave; for killing him the amount was 20 shillings.

Dagobert I. (622–638) decreed that, if a slave was sold and, unknown to his lord, had a *peculium*, this became the property of the lord.[5]

An illustration of the amelioration of slavery into serfdom is seen in the decree that slaves of the Church shall work three days a week on the demesne and three for themselves.[6] According to the *Decreta Synodorum Bavaricarum* of uncertain date, though not later than the 11th cent., a freeman who has committed sacrilege has to get 72 men to 'do judgment' for him, while a slave has the ordeal of walking over twelve red-hot ploughshares or carrying a hot iron.[7]

In the *Leges Burgundionum* of *c.* A.D. 500 we read (II. *De homicidiis*): '3. Si servus inconscio domino hominem ingenuum occidere fortasse praesumpserit, servus tradatur ad mortem; dominus vero reddetur indempnis. 4. Si dominus huius facti conscius fuerit, ambo tradantur ad mortem. 5. Si servus ipse post factum defuerit, dominus eius pro pretio servi 30 solidos parentibus occisi cogatur exsolvere: simili de servis regis secundum qualitatem personarum circa interfectores conditione servata.'[8]

In the *Lex Frisionum* of the 8th cent. tit. I. [E. Frisia only]: '13. Si servus nobilem, seu liberum, aut litum, nesciente domino occiderit, dominus eius, cuiuscunque conditionis fuerit homo qui occisus est, iuret hoc se non iussisse, et mulctam eius pro servo, bis simplum, componet. 14. Aut si servus hoc se iussu domini sui fecisse dixerit, et dominus non negaverit, solvat eum sicut manu sua occidisset; sive nobilis, sive liber, sive litus est.'[9]

The stern side of slave legislation comes out in tit. XX. 3: 'Si servus dominum suum interfecerit, tormentis interficiatur; similiter et litus.'[10]

The general tone of this legislation can hardly be said to favour the slave, as an injured slave was viewed as a damaged piece of property rather than a wronged man. Christian influence is shown especially in the marriage laws. Thus the law of the Lombards forbade the breaking of marriages between slaves of different masters,[11] quoting Mk 10^9. The Council of Châlons of 813 permitted the marriage of slaves, but always with the consent of their masters. Marriage, or even intercourse, between a free man or woman and a slave was sometimes punished with death. The condition of offspring of these mixed marriages varied, but was generally servile. In England it usually followed the status of the father[12] (in Cornwall one child was free, while another was a slave), while the Lombard law followed the Roman in making the child take the status of the mother.

The attitude of the Church was to encourage a

[1] G. Finlay, *Hist. of Greece*, ed. H. F. Tozer, iv. 166 ff.
[2] See G. A. Rhalles and M. Potles, Σύνταγμα τῶν Θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων, Athens, 1852–59, i. 55.
[3] *Ib.* ii. 105 ('Canons of the Holy Apostles').
[4] *Ib.* iv. 403.
[5] *Ib.* i. 215 (Patriarch Photius).
[6] *Ib.* i. 325.
[7] *Ib.* iii. 102.
[8] *Epistolæ Innocentii Papæ III.*, ed. E. Baluze, Paris, 1682, vol. ii. bk. xiii., esp. no. 159.

[1] *MGH*, 'Leges,' iii., ed. G. H. Pertz, p. 50 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 57.
[3] *Ib.* p. 129.
[4] *Ib.* p. 133.
[5] *Ib.* p. 322.
[6] *Ib.* p. 280.
[7] *Ib.* p. 486.
[8] *Ib.* p. 533.
[9] *Ib.* p. 657 ff.
[10] *Ib.* p. 672. With this Pertz would compare *Leg. Salicam*, XIII. 4 (ed. P. J. Merkel): 'si puer regis vel letus ingenuam feminam traxerit, de vita componat'; and 'si servus aut libertus incestum commiserit, vapuletur plagis multis' (*MGH*, 'Leges, i. 29).
[11] See Biot, p. 269, quoting L. A. Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicæ medii ævi*, Milan, 1738–42, i. 838. Muratori thinks that marriage without consent of the lord was punished, though not declared null.
[12] See H. de Bracton, *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliæ* (Rolls Ser. lxx.), 6 vols., London, 1878–83, ii. 1: 'De Connubiis servorum.'

master to manumit his slave, but, if the slave fled of his own accord, the rights of the master were protected. It was decreed by canon law that a slave could not be ordained without the consent of his lord. Had the Church protected the fugitive slave in all cases, a great step towards emancipation would have been made.

9. **Disappearance of slavery in Western Europe.**—In France the transition from slavery to serfdom took place from the 4th to the 10th cent.,[1] while serfdom went on to the Revolution. Before A.D. 1000 there are many references to slavery, but afterwards only a few.[2] It lasted longer in northern than in southern France. A charter of 1113 contains a donation pure and simple of a woman and her child to a monastery. In southern France the words *servi*, *ancillæ*, *mancipia* are not found later than the 10th cent., and even then there was no sale of individuals separate from the lands on which they worked.

In Germany a scheme of punishment was set forth by the statutes of the Council of Cologne in 1083, while the first privilege of liberty for fugitive slaves was granted by Frederick I. to Bremen in 1186. In 1220 Frederick II. pronounced against refuge in imperial towns for serfs and slaves, but in 1230 he granted it to Ratisbon and Vienna; his charter to Ratisbon leaves to the masters a period of ten years in which to reclaim fugitive slaves. But terminology is rather vague; in 1243 a donation is signed by many *servi*, but these were serfs. In the 12th and 13th centuries personal slavery tended to be extinct in western Germany. Domestic slavery was totally extinct by 1300 at the latest.

In Spain slavery was a prominent feature of mediæval society. Among the Goths slaves were employed in the army and in administrative posts. Here, as elsewhere, the Church was a slave-owner. Donations of *mancipia* were made in 812 and 891 respectively by Alphonso the Chaste and Alphonso III. to the church of Orviedo. In 966 a Count of Barcelona freed in his will all the slaves acquired by him. Wars among the lords and against the Moors led to the abolition of domestic slavery, and it seems to have disappeared from Castile in the 13th century. The marriage of slaves was independent of the will of the master.[3] Excommunication was launched against the sellers of men by tit. 24 of the national Council of Valladolid in 1322. In 1491 Moorish captives were set free, and in 1501 they were driven from Spain altogether. In 1558 an ordinance of Philip II. decreed the expulsion from Spain of Jewish slaves and those recently made Christian. Those whom Ferdinand and Isabella ejected were admitted into Portugal by John II. on the condition of emigrating after seven years under penalty of slavery. Many could not emigrate and became slaves. In 1626 all slaves were obliged to embrace Christianity, and the Moorish slaves diminished, but the slave traffic continued. Christian slaves were found in the 18th and serfdom continued to the 19th century.

The end of slavery came slowly also in Italy. The tumults of the 10th and 11th centuries prolonged personal slavery and drove small proprietors into the position of serfs. The Italian republics had Greek Saracen slaves, and the ancient annals of Venice show her as a mart of slaves bought in the East or exchanged into Eastern lands, and among these must be reckoned Christians who had been enslaved. From the 7th and 8th centuries they brought back slaves from Africa, whom they sold to other Africans or to the Moors established in Spain. This traffic went on despite the prohibition of the Church.

It is recorded in the life of Pope Zacharias (741–752): 'Contigit plures Veneticorum hanc romanam advenisse in urbem negociatores, et mercimonii nundinas propagantes multitudinem manciporum, virilis scilicet et femini generis emere visi sunt, quos et in Africani ad paganam gentem nitebantur deducere. Quo cognito idem sanctissimus pater fieri prohibuit, datoque eisdem Veneticis pretio, quod in eorum emptione se dedisse probati sunt, cunctos a jugo servitutis redemit.'

Towards 840 the emperor Lothair I. promised to prevent his subjects from making slaves in the duchy of Venice, keeping them, or selling them to the pagans. About the year 800, under the doge Urso Participato, this species of commerce was forbidden under severe penalties, but the prohibition was little respected.

Sometimes the slavery was qualified, as in one case at least the consent of the slave to be transferred from one master to another was granted.[1]

In the 14th and even in the 15th cent. Venetians bought slaves in their colonies of Istria and Dalmatia. In 1323 the explorer Marco Polo freed one of his slaves by his will. There is a contract of 1428 for the sale of a young Russian woman of thirty-three, and a law of 1446 forbade the sale of slaves to the Ragusans and Dalmatians because they sold them again to the Musalmāns. The Venetians bought and sold slaves in Asia and Africa; they were only forbidden to sell Christians to Musalmāns. The existence of slavery and especially of the practice of mutilation was one of the causes of the moral corruption of Venice, and thus probably contributed in the long run not only to the decay of the moral stamina of her people, but also to the decline of her prosperity.[2]

Not only Venice but also Pisa and Amalfi traded in slaves. The *Opuscula* of Pope Celestine V. (1294) contain various regulations; *e.g.*, the Jews can have only slaves that have been reared in the house—if they are Christians, they become free; if a priest has married a free woman, the children become slaves of the Church, which has been injured by the sin of their father. At Bologna enfranchisement was achieved in 1283; in Florence there are still traces of personal slavery in the 14th century. The statutes of Florence of 1415 permitted citizens to have slaves 'qui non sunt Catholicae fidei et Christianae.' The statutes of Lucca of 1537 declare that the master of a female slave can force one who has had intercourse with her to buy her at double the price which she cost, besides paying a fine.

In the kingdom of Naples rural slavery had been converted into the colonate which continued under Greek domination and was found there by the Normans.

So a rescript of the emperor Otto II. in 985 speaks of free men who, in default of slaves, 'ex inopia servorum,' are established as colons in the domain of the Church 'in locis ecclesiastic patrimoniis.'

In the 11th and 12th centuries many small cultivators of Naples and Bologna surrendered themselves to powerful proprietors. In Sicily slavery was disappearing in the time of Frederick of Aragon (1296–1337). His *Capitula Regis Siciliæ* order the master of a slave baptized by him to treat him as a brother and to baptize him soon after birth; if he fail to do so, the slave is to be baptized in church and declared free; female slaves must not be prostituted. Biot acutely observes:

[1] P. Allard, *Les Origines du servage en France*, p. 3.

[2] Biot, p. 336.

[3] Traces of ancient barbarity appear—not only does the father enjoy all his life the goods of his son, but he is authorized to eat him, if he finds himself in danger of dying of hunger—so it was not remarkable if a child could be sold (Biot, p. 417).

[1] B. Gamba, *Serie degli scritti impressi in Dialetto Veneziano*, Venice, 1832, p. 32, 'Instrumento di vendita d' uno schiavo scritto l' anno 1365.'

[2] See Pierre Daru, *Hist. de la République de Venise*[3], Brussels, 1840, bk. xix. § 6 f.; also, for Italian slavery in the later Middle Ages, Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*[3], tr. S. G. C. Middlemore, London, 1892, p. 296 f.; Muratori, *Antiq. Ital. medii ævi*.

'Ces divers exemples nous montrent l'empreinte permanente des habitudes orientales sur le caractère italien.'[1]

It is clear, therefore, that slavery was not extinct in Europe at the close of the Middle Ages, but that commercial interests and the strife between Christian and Saracen or Turk had perpetuated it in the eastern Mediterranean. When Elizabethan adventurers and their contemporaries of other lands explored America and exploited Africa, they only transferred to fresh soil an institution which they found ready to hand. This perpetuation of a decayed ancient and mediæval abuse and its re-erection on a far vaster scale than ever before is one of the most remarkable and deplorable instances of historical continuity. Thus, when the emperor Charles V. took Tunis in 1535, thousands of men and women were killed or led away into slavery.[2] Christians and Muhammadans alike employed prisoners of war as galley-slaves. By this time negroes had already been brought from Africa to America. But slavery was destined to continue on the widest scale in English-speaking countries. In England, as in N. Europe generally, there is a gap in the institution between mediæval and modern times.

10. Slavery in Britain.[3]—The early history of slavery in Britain is obscure as everything else in primitive development, but it seems clear that slavery existed not only from Celtic but also probably from pre-Celtic times. When slaves appear, they are probably the relics of subject races. Thus it may be conjectured that the conquering Celts reduced to servitude some of the aboriginal Iberians, but it is not probable that this process was thorough-going, and more would be kept in a half-free condition or allowed to mingle with the conquering races. Early Celtic customs show us a number of slaves, but the structure of society is not really that of a slave economy, and at the English conquest of Britain slavery was rather a survival. There was hardly the clear-cut division between bond and free which marks the slavery of ancient Athens or Rome, or of the United States in modern times.

'It appears that the arrangement of society on the basis of slavery or serfdom is not so easily carried out as many suppose, and that it is, perhaps, a more complex result of historical development than even primitive democracy.'[4]

So in the undeveloped polity of pre-Conquest England slavery, though frequent, was not the economic basis of society. Slave-owning, therefore, became limited to kings and other important persons.

'With the rest of the inhabitants of Scotch and Welsh mountains and of Irish bogs, slaves might be an exceptional commodity, female slaves might even be specially sought for different purposes; but there could be no slave-holding husbandry arrangements.'[5]

We do not know enough of the details of the English conquest of Britain to be sure how the English dealt with those whom they conquered. The theory of the almost complete displacement by slaughter or driving west of the Celtic tribes is now exploded—perhaps a larger number were made slaves than is often assumed, and, if so, this would account for the longer continuance of slavery in England than on the Continent, for slaves are continually mentioned alike in Old English literature and legislation and must have been fairly numerous at the Conquest. The old English term was *þeow*, and sometimes *esne*. The story of Pope Gregory the Great and the sale of beautiful English slave-boys in the Roman Forum is too well known to need repetition,[1] but it shows that English slaves found a ready market abroad. Till after the Conquest Bristol was the chief port for the sale of slaves. But how far was Old English slavery an inheritance from early Britain and how far an importation from the Continent? Roman masters had lorded it over British slaves at Colchester and elsewhere.[2] Slavery among Teutonic tribes is described in the *Germania* of Tacitus; it is disputed whether the English tribes brought over large numbers of slaves with them to England.[3]

As the Celtic tribes were driven west, some men would doubtless be enslaved, and the survival of remnants of a former race would explain some anomalies, such as the half-free *laets* of Kent, whose exact nature is not known.[4] Many points indeed of early English slavery remain obscure. The greater number of slaves were probably in bondage to landowners.[5] Various regulations are given in the *Penitentiary* of Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury (669–690). A father compelled by necessity can hand over his son to slavery for seven years, but, if for longer, only with the consent of the son. In Alfred's laws it is decreed that slaves should not have the same holidays as free labourers, only the Wednesdays in the four ember weeks.

In a bilingual dialogue written in the 10th cent. the slave complains of his thraldom, 'Ha! ha! hard work it is, hard work it is, because I am not free' (*'hig, hig, micel gedeorf ys hyt, geleof micel gedorf hit ys, ferþam ic neom freoh'*).[6]

The ravages of the Danes seem to have forced some monks to escape starvation by becoming slaves on large estates.

The manumission of slaves was common, being often done in a will—and, of course, at other times.[7]

Bishop Wilfrith, on receiving a grant of Selsey from Cædwaelha of Wessex, manumitted 250 slaves.[8] A letter of Archbishop Brihtwald to Forthere, bishop of Sherborne, begs him to order Beorwald, abbot of Glastonbury, to release a captive girl.[9]

What percentage of the population were slaves is not known, but there were probably more just before the Norman Conquest than in the other countries of W. Europe.

'If we turn to the Old English charters we shall have to recognize that up to the eleventh century, slavery and manumission from slavery are playing a most important part in social life.'[10]

Domesday Book shows 25,000 slaves in England. These were spread over the country in very unequal proportion—none in Yorkshire or Lincolnshire, 9 per cent in Kent, 24 per cent in Gloucestershire, and 18 per cent in Devon.[11]

[1] P. 441.

[2] See *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. iii. ch. 4, 'The Height of the Ottoman Power,' by Moritz Brosch. For the attitude of Muhammadan to Christian slaves see D. S. Margoliouth, *Early Development of Mohammedanism* (*HL*, 2nd ser.), London, 1914, and for Jewish traffic in Christian slaves H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, 3 vols., London, 1863, iii. 207–219.

[3] See P. Vinogradoff, *The Growth of the Manor*, London, 1905, *Villainage in England*, Oxford, 1892, and *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, London, 1908; F. Seebohm, *The English Village Community*, do. 1883; J. E. Lloyd, *Hist. of Wales*, 2 vols., do. 1911; B. Thorpe, *Diplomatarium Anglicum ævi Saxonici*, 3 vols., do. 1865; I. Jastrow, *Zur strafrechtlichen Stellung der Sclaven bei Deutschen und Angelsachsen* (in 'Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats und Rechtsgeschichte,' ed. O. Gierke), Berlin, 1878; F. W. Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond*, Cambridge, 1897; J. M. Kemble, *The Saxons in England*, 2 vols., London, 1849.

[4] Vinogradoff, *Growth of the Manor*, p. 27.

[5] *Ib.* p. 27.

[1] The narrative is in Bede, *HE* ii. 1.

[2] Hodgkin, *Political Hist. of England*, i. 39.

[3] Tacitus (*Germ.* 40) describes the immolation of slaves 'to ensure' secrecy in the worship of the goddess Herthus by the Continental Angli, in a 'hallowed grove' on an island, perhaps Rügen (see art. EUROPE, vol. v. p. 593). The slaughter of slaves may also have been part of the ceremony itself (see Tac. *Germ.* [cf. ed. of H. Furneaux, Oxford, 1894] *ad loc.*).

[4] See Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond*, p. 27.

[5] A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, iii. 202.

[6] Seebohm, *English Village Community*, p. 65. His ambition is to get an outfit of oxen from his lord and become a *gebur* instead of a *þeow*.

[7] Thorpe, *Diplomatarium*, pp. 621–651; *Crawford Collection of Early Charters and Documents, now in the Bodleian*, ed. A. S. Napier and W. H. Stevenson, Oxford, 1895, p. 132 (will of Alfwold, bishop of Crediton, † *c.* 1012).

[8] Bede, *HE* iv. 13. [9] Haddan and Stubbs, iii. 284.

[10] Vinogradoff, *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, p. 465.

[11] Vinogradoff, *Growth of the Manor*, p. 373.

But personal slavery was beginning to disappear into villeinage, and the villein was half-free; he was generally free as against all men except his lord, only attached to the land and not able to leave it. Instead of constantly watching slaves and spending care and thought in organizing their unwilling labour, the upper classes of mediæval society levied dues and services from villeins who were attached to the soil and held in order by the interests which they had in their own households.[1] Slavery properly so called became extinct in England in the 13th cent., though it still seems to have been possible from a legal standpoint. But the rural population was still 'largely unfree,' and in 1313 the bishop of Durham manumitted a scholar of the city.[2]

One feature differentiates the disappearance of slavery in England and in the Roman empire—that in England there were no *libertini*, or freedmen, though Vinogradoff thinks there may be some trace of them in the *coliberti*.

The gradual change from slavery to villeinage was accomplished by the elimination of slavery, as for a time the two institutions had existed side by side; villeinage was swept away finally at the Restoration, though it had been nearly extinct for some time before.[3]

A statute of 1547 (Edward VI.) ordered a runaway or one who lived idly for three days to be brought before two justices of the peace, marked V with a hot iron in the breast, and adjudged for two years the slave of him who bought him. The slave was to be fed, and punished if he refused to work; if he absented himself for fourteen days, he was to be marked with an S on the breast and be his master's slave for ever.

Villeins in the 13th and 14th centuries comprised a large class including not only the villeins of early times but also the degraded freeman and the half-emancipated or now nearly freed slave.[4] About 1240 there is a grant of freedom to the population of the vill of Kirby in Kendal who had previously been unfree.[5]

11. Slavery in the East Syrian Church.—Directions about slave-holding are found in the works of Ebedjesus († 1318), metropolitan of Nisibis, or Zoba.

He directs that, if any one have manumitted some of his slaves and not manumitted others, those still under the yoke shall be manumitted. If a non-manumitted slave dies, his lord shall be his heir.

This plainly shows that the slave could acquire property, presumably like the *peculium* of the Roman slaves. If the slave had sons, it would go to them, but, if not, then to his lord—not to the slave's other relatives.[6]

Mar Gregor of Melitene, known as Bar-Hebræus or Abulpharagus (primate of the Jacobites in Chaldæa, Assyria, and Mesopotamia, 1261), issued instructions on the manumission of slaves:

If a lord shall say to his slave, 'O my lord,' or to his slave woman, 'O my lady,' or 'O my sister,' or 'O my wife,' the manumission shall not be confirmed by these phrases. But, if he shall say to the slave, 'O free man,' and to the slave woman, 'O free woman,' they shall be freed. He who is sick cannot free a slave whose price exceeds a third part of his goods. If a slave belong to two lords and both say to him, 'When we die, thou art free,' he shall not be freed by the death of one, but only the half of him shall be free.[1]

The slavery here referred to may have been of a modified kind, as the slave was not devoid of property, but it is further evidence for the continuance of the institution in W. Asia in mediæval times.

12. The revival of the slave-trade in modern times.—It is remarkable that the Renaissance, which brought the minds of men back to the literature of classical antiquity, re-established in newly-discovered lands the classic institution of slavery. The first offenders were the Portuguese, but it is unlikely that the slave-trade would have developed as it did, if men had not been familiar with it in the Ottoman empire and the Mediterranean. In 1442 Gonzales brought back ten slaves and some gold dust to Prince Henry of Portugal. In 1443 Nunez Trestan sailed on an expedition to Africa and brought back fourteen slaves.

The African natives naturally resented slave-raids and resisted with all their might, but without much effect. European traders then tried to foment disputes among the natives as an excuse for making raids. In 1511 Ferdinand the Catholic gave permission to import slaves from Africa into Hispaniola. The Spaniards were led to import African slaves into America by the unsuitability of American Indian natives for labour in the mines, and also because the horrible barbarities which the Spaniards had committed nearly exterminated the American Indians in many places. The emperor Charles V. urged the importation of Africans 'because the work of one negro was more than equal to that of four Indians.' In 1517 he granted a patent to a Flemish gentleman allowing him to import each year 4000 Africans into Hispaniola, Porto Rico, Cuba, and Jamaica.

The Dominican friars in S. America protested against the cruel treatment of the slaves, but the Franciscans defended it. Pope Leo X. (1513–22) in a bull declared that 'not only the Christian religion, but nature herself, cried out against a system of slavery.'

In 1562 Sir John Hawkins sailed to Guinea, obtained 300 negroes, sold them in Hispaniola, and came back to England. Queen Elizabeth told him that, 'if any Africans should be carried away without their free consent, it would be detestable and call down the vengeance of Heaven upon the undertaking.' The French, Dutch, and Spaniards continued the trade, but there do not seem definite instances of English trading in slaves till the charter of Charles I. to the African Company in 1631, supplying negroes to the British settlements in the West Indies. In 1640 Louis XIII. issued an edict by which 'all Africans whatever who came into the French colonies, under any circumstances, were to be made slaves.' In 1655 Cromwell took Jamaica from the Spaniards and found there about 1500 whites and 1500 negroes—the natives had been exterminated. The Third African Company was established in 1622 to supply the British West Indian colonies with 3000 slaves annually, and in 1672 the Fourth African Company, but it has been estimated that at the time the Dutch trade in slaves was ten times greater than the English. Between 1679 and 1689 about 4500 slaves were imported annually to British colonies. The French supplied the Spaniards with African slaves.[2]

Francis Crow, an ejected minister who had emigrated to the West Indies, wrote from Port Royal in Jamaica (7th March

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1 Vinogradoff, *Growth of the Manor*, pp. 332–336.

2 F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *Hist. of Eng. Law before Edward I.*[2], 2 vols., Cambridge, 1898, i. 415.

3 For villeinage see Vinogradoff in *EBr*[11], artt. 'Serfdom' and 'Villenage,' and *Villainage in England*; C. Petit-Dutaillis, *Studies and Notes Supplementary to Stubbs' Constitutional History*, Eng. tr., London, 1908–14, ii.; H. L. Gray, 'The Commutation of Villein Services in England before the Black Death,' in *English Hist. Review*, xxix. [1914]; E. E. Power, 'The Effects of the Black Death on Rural Organisation in England,' in *History*, iii. 10 [1918] p. 109 ff.; illustrations of servile conditions of Church lands may be found in *Cartularium Monasterii de Rameseia* [Ramsey, in Huntingdonshire], ed. W. H. Hart and P. A. Lyons (Rolls Ser., lxxix.), 3 vols., London, 1884–93.

4 Vinogradoff, *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, p. 454.

5 *A Boke of Recorde or Register, Kirbie Kendell, 1575*, ed. R. S. Ferguson, Kendal, 1892 (Cumberland and Westmorland Antiq. and Archæological Society).

6 'Ebedjesu Metropolitæ Sobæ et Armeniæ,' in A. Mai, *Scriptorum veterum nova collectio e Vaticanis codd.*, Rome, 1838, vol. x. pt. i. p. 64.

1 'Ecclesiæ Antiochenæ Syrorum Nomocanon, a Gregorio Abulpharagio Bar-Hebræo, ch. 32, 'de Manumissione Servorum,' in Mai, x. 206–210.

2 For the abolition of the slave-trade see Bandinel, *Some Account of the Trade in Slaves from Africa.*

1687): 'The greatest trade of this place lies in bringing these poor creatures from Guinea hither, to sell them to the home plantations, and to the Spanish factors that buy them at 20*l.* per head or thereabouts. They come as naked as they were born, and the buyers look in their mouths, and survey their joints as if they were horses in a market. We have few other servants here but these slaves who are bought with our money, except some from Newgate.'[1]

In 1713 the Asiento contract was signed between England and Spain. England agreed to supply Spain with 4800 slaves a year for 30 years. England was to advance 200,000 crowns and to pay a duty of 33½ crowns on each slave, and the monarchs of England and Spain were each to have a quarter of the profits. From 1713 to 1733 the number of slaves annually exported by the English from Africa was 15,000, of whom a third to a half went to Spanish colonies; from 1733 to 1753 it was 20,000. England, however, did not derive much profit from the Asiento, for in 1739 the English company was owing Spain £68,000. War intervened, but by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) the Asiento was to be allowed to continue four years more. By the convention of 1750 George II. gave up the privilege of continuing the treaty for £100,000.

In 1755 the negro slaves in the British West Indies numbered 240,000, while the white population was only 90,000. About 1761 feeling began to be stirred in England against the trade; the Quakers were prime movers in the agitation. In 1766 Bishop Warburton preached a sermon against the slave-trade, which 'infringed all human and all Divine law.' In 1769 Granville Sharp brought an action to decide whether a man could remain a slave in England, and it was decided in 1772 that a slave, if he set foot in England, became free. In 1787 William Clarkson, William Wilberforce, Granville Sharp, and others formed themselves into a private committee to try to abolish the slave-trade. It was soon joined by others such as William Paley and John Wesley. At this time and earlier various writers had protested against the trade, including Baxter, Pope, Sterne, and Adam Smith. In 1788 the king by an order in council directed that the Board of Trade 'should take into consideration the present state of the African slave-trade, the purchasing and obtaining slaves on the coast of Africa.' The feeling in favour of abolition gradually grew and was supported by Pitt, Fox, and Lord Grenville. In 1788 a bill was brought in for lessening the horrors of the 'Middle Passage'—the first Act of Parliament which checked the trade. It was estimated that then the annual export of slaves from Africa was 200,000, about 100,000 being sent from Africa to America and the West Indies, the remainder from the east coast of Africa to Persia and the East Indies and partly from the interior of Africa to Turkey and Egypt. In 1789 Wilberforce described the horrors of the slave-trade in the House of Commons, again emphasizing the suffering of the slaves and the loss of life in the 'Middle Passage' —about one-third of the slaves were lost *en route*. Some legislative improvements were effected in the West Indies, as public feeling had been aroused in England, but the planters resented much in the way of change.

In 1791 a Sierra Leone Company was started by Wilberforce, Granville Sharp, and Henry Thornton. The object was to form a colony of liberated slaves. Zachary Macaulay[2] went out to the colony and became governor in 1793. On his return he became secretary to the company. He was editor of the *Christian Observer*, the periodical of the 'Clapham sect,' from 1802 to 1816. This was specially devoted to the abolition of the slave-trade at home and abroad.

The motion for abolishing the trade was rejected several times by a small majority between 1795 and 1799. Opposition was strong in various quarters.

[1] *The Monthly Repository*, 1811, p. 451.
[2] See his life in *DNB*.

Thus Lord Nelson in a letter addressed to a friend in Jamaica (10th June 1805) declared himself 'a firm friend to our colonial system,' which he was prepared to defend 'against the damnable and cursed doctrine of Wilberforce and his hypocritical allies.'[1]

In March 1807 the 'Bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade' passed both Houses of Parliament and received the royal assent. A fine of £100 was decreed for each slave dealt in.

At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the various Powers agreed to abolish the slave-trade. But France 'was allowed to carry on a five years' traffic of insult and injury and rape and murder on the coast of Africa.'[2] The abolition took effect in 1820 and the following years, Portugal being the last in 1836. But, even after the trade was supposed to be abolished, it went on; like other evil customs, it died hard, and slavery itself was still a firmly-rooted institution.

In May 1823 Fowell Buxton in the House of Commons spoke of the 'inconsistency of British laws which permitted slavery while they prosecuted the slave-trade.' He moved that 'the state of slavery is repugnant to the principles of the British constitution and the Christian religion; and that it ought to be gradually abolished throughout the British colonies.' Canning moved in favour of the amelioration and ultimate abolition of slavery. The anti-slavery feeling was increased by the fact that the colonial legislatures had not carried out the views of Parliament for the amelioration of slaves.

Thomas (afterwards Lord) Denman said in the House of Commons that 'judicial oppression is the hardest of all evils to bear by civilized man, and in Jamaica it had reached the highest pinnacle of its power; the most horrible atrocities were consequently perpetrated with impunity in open day.' He adverted to one case in which a female slave's head was absolutely twisted off in the presence of many persons; the offender escaped conviction because the witnesses were but slaves, and their evidence could not be legally taken.[3] Two negroes were sentenced to be suspended in chains and starved to death.[4] In Barbados there was a protest of the colonial assembly against concessions to slaves.

At length in 1833 the bill for the total abolition of slavery was passed, and the slave-holders were granted 20 millions sterling compensation. On 1st Aug. 1834 slavery came to an end throughout the British empire, and 770,280 slaves became free.

An instance of a slave-holder's mentality is related by Southey. A planter 'describes the refined and elegant manner in which the operation [of branding a slave] is performed, by way of mitigating the indignation which such an usage ought to excite. He assures us that the stamp is not a branding iron but a silver instrument; and that it is heated not in the fire, but in spirits of wine.'[5]

13. In the United States.—The history of slavery in the United States of America cannot be treated here in detail.[6] The British colonies before the Declaration of Independence were all slave-holding, and it was unhappily to the mother-country that this state of things was due, for it was to her profit that slaves should be sent thither, though the colonies themselves protested.

Thus in 1760 S. Carolina prohibited further importation of slaves; the Act was rejected by the Crown, and the governors of all other colonies were warned against such legislation in future.

In the North slaves were the luxury of a wealthy few, though they were treated with great severity at times. After the slave insurrections of New York in 1712 and 1741 the culprits were broken on the wheel or burned alive. In the South, on the other hand, slave-labour was a part of the economic system. The Declaration of Independence was founded on the principle of the equality

[1] *The Monthly Repository*, 1807, p. 203.
[2] *Ib.* 1815, p. 262. [3] Bandinel, p. 204.
[4] *Ib.* p. 208.
[5] *The Christian Reformer*, 1829, p. 285.
[6] See further art. NEGROES (United States), and *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii. *passim*, esp. ch. xiii., 'State Rights (1850–60),' by Woodrow Wilson.

of men. Did this apply to the slave? Two points seem clear: (1) that the founders of the new republic did not quite approve of slavery, while not seeing their way to abolish it; (2) that equality could be quite thorough-going only among whites, as the negroes were an inferior race. Soon after the Declaration it seemed as if slavery might be abolished, and again early in the 19th cent., but in each case it revived, only to gain greater power in the decade before its abolition. By then it was clear to many men that slavery could not continue indefinitely, but it was a complicated question for several reasons: (1) it was left by the constitution for each state to settle the question for itself, though the word 'slavery' was never mentioned; with the founding of new states, the question inevitably arose; (2) but it was much easier to abolish slavery in the North than in the South, as the number of slaves was so much smaller, and they were simply sold to Southern slave-holders; (3) the anti-slavery agitation became extraordinarily bitter, and the pro-slavery party was very violent. There was certainly something to be said for the slave-holders. They were not responsible for the institution, since it was an inheritance which they could not avoid. They naturally resented being viewed as blood-thirsty tyrants. If slavery was abolished, what was to be done with the blacks? If they were given the same rights as white men, Southerners naturally dreaded the result; if not, they might create equally a social, economic, and political difficulty. Slavery had become part of the fabric of Southern society, and it was very difficult to alter it.

But the abolition movement would never have gained the strength which it did nor have ultimately succeeded, had not the abuses of slavery been wide-spread and inevitably bound up with the system. No doubt many, probably most, of the Southern planters were humane men, but the slave had very little redress. He could not generally be a witness, and it was a crime to teach him to read and write. Slave insurrections occurred from time to time, though they were not frequent.

One in Virginia in 1831 was led by Nat Turner, in which 58 whites were killed. Turner was not an ill-used slave, but a religious fanatic. Greater strictness in the administration of the slave laws naturally resulted.[1]

As the cotton industry increased, slave-labour was more and more demanded. Continual difficulties arose when new states were founded—Texas (1845), Missouri (1845), Kansas and Nebraska (1854)—and a compromise was arranged. But the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was much more of a concession to slavery than to its opponents, for escaped slaves who imagined themselves to be in safety were ruthlessly hunted out from non-slave-holding states. In the ten years before the Civil War (1850–60) slavery, though more actively threatened, became stronger than ever, and, when war was declared, it was the avowed intention of the Confederate States to erect themselves into a slave Power. Abolitionists in the South were not allowed the right of free speech, so it is not surprising that at times their language became exaggerated. A few examples may be given of the attitude of divines on both sides.

W. E. Channing, the Unitarian anti-slavery leader, said: 'No power of conception can do justice to the evils of slavery. They are chiefly moral, they act on the mind and through the mind on the body. As far as the human soul can be destroyed, slavery is that destroyer.'[2]

Theodore Parker, also a Unitarian, wrote to Miss Frances Power Cobbe: 'You in England, I think, do not see how slavery corrupts everything. Politics, theology, literature, trade, it is the *bête noire* which threatens to devour all the flock.'[1] His position is described thus from the pro-slavery side: 'Rev. Theodore Parker supposes the case of a man who aids a slave to escape from his master and who is brought to trial for an offence against the law. He assumes he has taken the oath as a juror to try the man, and says, "If I have extinguished my manhood by my juror's oath I shall do my business and find him guilty, but if I value my manhood I shall say not guilty; then men may call me forsworn and a liar, but I think human nature will justify the verdict." We have fallen upon evil times when the teachers of our holy religion thus debase themselves and their pulpits to a level with the lowest rum-shops and their frequenters.'

Other pro-slavery utterances are remarkable, and it must not be forgotten that the ministers and members of orthodox churches in the South held slaves to the number of at least 660,000.

A Southern slave-holder wrote to Theodore Parker in 1848: 'The Bible is either inconsistent—the Almighty a changeling—or you are a horrid monster of infidelity or blasphemy in your execrable spirit of Yankee conceitedness against the South.'[2]

Robert N. Anderson, a Presbyterian minister, said: 'If there be any stray goat of a minister among you tainted with the bloodhound principle of abolitionism, let him be ferreted out, silenced, excommunicated, and left to the public to deprive him in other respects.'[3] Joel Parker, of Philadelphia, was credited with saying: 'What then are the evils inseparable from slavery? There is not one that is not equally inseparable from depraved human nature in other lawful relations.'

The slave-holding South managed to get the Christian Church, on the whole, on its side.

Were the evils of American slavery as great as is popularly supposed? No doubt the exploits and execution of John Brown and the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* aroused popular feeling in America and in Europe almost to fever pitch. The evils were exaggerated in that the exceptional was too often taken as normal. It was sometimes asserted that slavery was beneficial to the African as introducing him to Christianity and civilization. But in some states of the South slave-labour simply meant that the slave was worked to death, as it was most profitable to the slave-holder to use up his slaves quickly. Nothing, however, can alter the fact that American slavery meant very real abuses and was dangerous morally both to the slave-holder and to the slave, and, so long as it continued, all real progress, moral, social, and political, was impossible.

Slavery was abolished for ever in the United States in 1862, and negroes were declared completely equal with whites in 1870.

14. **The final disappearance of slavery.**—The abolition of the slave-trade in the British empire was followed by its abolition in other countries. Since the discovery of the New World slavery had continued in the French colonies. The *Code Noir* of Louis XIV. was more lenient to the slaves than were the codes of most British colonies. All slaves were to be baptized and instructed in the Catholic faith.[4] But many cruelties were perpetrated here as elsewhere. J. B. Labat[5] described the abuses of French colonial slavery. Spaniards seem to have been gentler and more successful in dealing with slaves than either the English or the French, and the Portuguese were often kindly in dealing with natives in Africa. But there probably was not any considerable difference between one nation and another. The *Code Noir* punished the first desertion on the part of the slave with ear-cropping and the mark of the fleur-de-lys on the left shoulder, the second with a fleur-de-lys on the right shoulder and the cutting of the leg sinew, the third with death. Slavery in French colonies was drastically reformed in 1845 and abolished in 1848. Other countries followed; the Dutch West Indies abolished it in 1863, Porto Rico in 1873, Cuba in

[1] See W. S. Drewry, *Slave Insurrections in Virginia (1830–1865)*.

[2] *Memoir of William Ellery Channing*, ed. by his nephew, 3 vols., London, 1848, vol. iii. p. 149.

[1] John Weiss, *Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker*, 2 vols., London, 1863, i. 463.

[2] *Ib.* ii. 79.

[3] Eliza Wigham, *The Anti-Slavery Cause*, p. 55.

[4] Mary Bateson, in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii. ch. iii., 'The French in America,' p. 101 f.

[5] *Nouveaux voyages aux îles de l'Amérique*, 6 vols., Paris, 1722.

1886, Brazil in 1888. It lingered longest in Portuguese colonies and in Africa — which was natural, as Africa was the source of slaves. The Republic of Liberia for free blacks was founded in 1822. Slavery was suppressed in Zanzibar in 1897, though there has been sporadic slave-raiding in the Congo Free State and probably elsewhere since then. The later 19th cent. saw practical slavery revived in the South Sea islands by Queensland adventurers till it was put down in 1884, and the Putumayo atrocities in S. America also involved practical slavery.

15. Slavery in Slavic countries. — As the very word 'slave' is of Slavic origin,[1] it is not surprising that slavery and serfdom lingered longer in Slavic lands than in W. Europe. It has been asserted by some Russians that there were no pure slaves in Russia in early times, but there were actually three classes in the rural population: (1) slaves, (2) free agricultural labourers, and (3) peasants. In the 18th cent. these were welded together into the slave class, and even then serfs were often more like slaves, as they were regularly bought and sold and advertised for sale. An extract from the *Moscow Gazette* of 1801 shows this:

'To be sold: Three workmen, well trained and handsome; and two girls, one eighteen and the other fifteen years of age, both of them good-looking, and well acquainted with various kinds of handiwork. In the same house there are for sale two hair-dressers—the one twenty years of age, can read, write, play on a musical instrument, and act as huntsman; the other can dress ladies' and gentlemen's hair. In the same house are sold pianos and organs.'[2]

Alexander I. (1801–25) prohibited advertisements of this sort, and Nicholas I. (1825–55) repressed them.

Again, the Turks raided Russian and Polish territory and sold their captives as slaves in the Crimea, till it was conquered by Russia in 1783. The men especially were badly treated and fed on putrid flesh; the women were employed to amuse their captors.[3] They were sold to Saracens, Persians, Indians, Arabs, Syrians, and Assyrians.

In Poland serfdom in the 14th cent. became harsher and practically developed into slavery. It lasted till the 19th century. In Serbia slavery was legal, though serfdom was more common in the Middle Ages.[4]

16. Slavery and law. — The legal aspect of slavery is clearly of great importance, and, if we are right in the definition that a slave is a human being treated as a chattel, it is obvious that the question must arise: Should he ever be regarded in the light of a human being? Primitive jurisprudence did not always see clearly the exact position of the slave. To treat a person as if he were legally a thing requires a step in legal metaphysics of which a very undeveloped mind is incapable. If a slave is only a thing, his master cannot be punished for ill-treating or killing him; if he is a thing, the slave cannot be punished either; but most codes have punished a criminous slave with severity. If a slave is once fully recognized to be a person, slavery is doomed. So the mediæval jurists regarded it as contrary to natural law and as an institution of the *jus gentium* or *jus civile*.[5] Slave codes show how far the rights of man and the facts of human nature can be perverted in the interests of selfishness.

17. Slavery and ethnology.—Where slavery has persisted, it has often been owing to the survival of a subject race, imperfectly assimilated. Where two races have been widely different and one has been subject, it has been most difficult to abolish. Thus in the United States the question still remains: How far can white and black men live happily side by side? Intermarriage of two races which are not meant to mingle, and the consequent existence of mulattoes and quadroons, only leads to further difficulties. These legacies of slavery exist to-day.

18. Slavery and economics.—This is largely outside the scope of this article, but the question arises: Is a system which puts society on a false basis likely to be economically sound? It seems clear that slavery has sometimes been the most profitable economy for the time, though the wastage of labour and of men generally brought its result in the long run; the economy of the Southern States of America before abolition was wasteful, and still more so was that of ancient Rome.

19. Slavery and morality.—In the long run slavery must have evil results alike in the master and in the slave, because it lowers the dignity of human nature, and because no man can fittingly be entrusted with absolute power; he will not always use it aright even if it is to his own interest to do so. Thus a favourite argument of slave-holders collapses.

In the narrower sense of sexual immorality slavery has been productive of untold evil. A master has power to gratify his lusts on his chattels, and it is to the interest of the slave to play up to the vices of his master. The very phrase 'The White Slave Traffic' is significant, and suggests what did and must take place under actual slavery. The corruptions of life under the Roman empire and the abuses of American slavery show that, while purity is always hard for man, slavery makes it much more difficult, and the evils which resulted from this aspect of it alone would have justified its abolition.

20. Slavery and war.—We have seen that conquest has been one of the first causes of slavery and that war has led to its recrudescence at various times. The deportations from Belgian and French towns carried out by the Germans in 1916–18 meant a species of enforced labour which may be called serfdom and seems akin to slavery.

21. Slavery and Christian theology.—Man is a spiritual being akin to his Maker. St. Paul says 'In Christ is neither bond nor free.' Can then slavery be right? It can be shown to be contrary to the spirit of Christ's gospel, though the Church has often been too timid to deal drastically with it.[1] It was sure sooner or later to disappear, and only traces of it now survive. Though it may have been a necessary step in human progress at certain times and places, and though the wickedness of slave-holders as individuals or as a class is often exaggerated, a detailed study of its records leaves the impression that it has been definitely evil, productive of untold misery for the slave, and of deep-seated corruption alike for the slave and for his master. But even slavery may not have run its evil course in vain, if its varied fortunes and final disappearance have shown that to treat a man as if he were no man but a beast is theologically false, morally wrong, economically unsound, and politically and socially disastrous, and that there is an essential unity of aim and principle between the moral and theological precepts of the gospel and the freedom and welfare of mankind.

LITERATURE.—1. *ENCYCLOPÆDIAS*, etc.—Artt. in *HDB* ('Servant, Slave, Slavery'), *DCG*, *DAC*, *EBi*, *EBr*[11] ('Slavery' and

[1] See above, § 6.
[2] D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1905, ii. 114.
[3] *Ib.* i. 289 ff., quoting a Lithuanian author, Michalonis Litvani, *De Moribus Tartorum Fragmina*, Basel, 1615.
[4] H. W. V. Temperley, *Hist. of Serbia*, London, 1917, p. 87.
[5] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, p. 83.

[1] An instance of ecclesiastical timidity is the view of Theodore of Studium, who wrote that a monk ought not to possess as a slave a man made in the image of God, and then spoils it by saying that this, like marriage, is only for seculars (quoted by Sirmondus, *Opera Varia*, Venice, 1728, v. 66). St. Thomas Aquinas compares the relation of master and slave to that of father and son (*Summa*, II. ii. qu. lvii. art. 3).

'Serfdom'); P. Larousse, *Grand Dict. universel*, Paris, 1866–90; *DACL* ('Esclavage'); *CE*; C. du F. Du Cange, *Glossarium*, ed. C. Du Fresne, Niort, 1884, 'Servus,' 'Servitium'; *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Jena, 1908 ff.

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iii. *PAMPHLETS.*—A vast number of pamphlets, especially those by anti-slavery reformers, are a most important source of information, though they may contain overstatements. Many volumes of *Tracts on Slavery* will be found in the Cambridge University Library and doubtless elsewhere. Among the most interesting are the following: Stephen Fuller, *Two Reports from the Committees of the Honourable House of Assembly of Jamaica*, London, 1789; John Jeremie, *Four Essays on Colonial Slavery*, do. 1831; Hannah More, *The Feast of Freedom; or, the Abolition of Domestic Slavery in Ceylon*, do. 1827 (a curiosity of literature); *Representation of the State of Government . . . in the Mauritius*, by a resident, do. 1830; John Kay, *The Slave Trade in the New Hebrides*, Edinburgh, 1872.

iv. *ANNUAL PUBLICATIONS.*—Statistics of the slave-holding countries in America can be found in the various volumes of the *Almanach de Gotha*, published annually (also in German as the *Hof-Kalendar*).

v. *BIBLIOGRAPHY.*—Works on American slavery will be found in the bibliographies to *Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge, 1902–12, vol. vii., esp. chs. 15 and 16. Much MS material must still exist in the British Colonies and also in America, and in print in the *Acts of the Privy Council* and *Calendars of State Papers, Colonial Series*.

Works noted above are either important works of reference or monographs, or are interesting from some special point of view. Other authorities are referred to in the text.

LEONARD D. AGATE.

SLAVERY (Greek).—**1. Introduction.**—Slavery arose in Greece, as elsewhere, from two main causes—want and war, the one operative chiefly within the community, bringing about the subjection of individuals or whole families to other individuals or families of the same community,[1] the other producing the same result mainly as between different communities. The tendency to spare life in view of ulterior advantage would vary with the stage of culture.[1] A slave is of little use to the hunter, besides being troublesome to guard; he cannot earn his keep. In this stage the victor will mostly slay his enemy out of hand, though he may retain some of his captured women as wives, *i.e.* for domestic servitude. In the pastoral stage both male and female captives, even young children, can earn their keep by tending cattle and working up their products.[2] In proportion as the sedentary agricultural stage is reached, with its hard and more continuous toil at definite seasons, the demand for 'labour' becomes more insistent. The disadvantage is that in the slack seasons the slave is 'eating his head off.' Only as the industrial stage is reached is a more continuous and economical use of such 'living machines' possible. Moreover, it is in communities strongly organized for war that forced labour or slavery attains its highest development and importance, as it is at once a main product and a main support of military organization and activities. Applying this to ancient Greece, we find that in the historic period Greece is predominantly agricultural, but with pronounced local symptoms of transition into the mercantile and industrial phase, the whole being strongly overlaid by militarism of a somewhat aimless though highly specialized type.[3] Under the conditions of ancient life, in which one must be either hammer or anvil, military organization was inevitable[4] as a standing condition of existence itself; so that slavery in some shape was apparently equally inevitable. Sparta, the state which exhibited military organization in its most intense and logical form, was therefore constituted practically as a standing army supported by what was essentially slave-labour for the most part. Even in the ideal communities sketched by the Greek thinkers, military and servile institutions together constitute the very warp and woof of the entire fabric—though this fact is kept out of sight, partly by not calling things by their true names.[5]

If the special conditions and temper of a people be such as to allow it to devolve its military obligations upon some agency (mercenaries), in order to be free for wealth-production (*e.g.*, Carthage), the result will be still the same. For, if the conditions be favourable, no limits, except such as are purely temporary in view of greater ultimate

[1] Cf. art. SLAVERY (Primitive).

[2] Cf. Herod. iv. 2: Skythians keep blinded slaves (cf. Jg 16[21]: Samson blinded and kept at the mill; the Skythians would of course have other slaves, not blinded) to churn the milk—'for they are not tillers of the soil, but nomads.'

[3] 'It was of necessity an organization of society in which, to use the forcible words of Bagehot, "every intellectual gain was made use of—was *invested* and taken out—in war"' (B. Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilisation*, London, 1902, p. 175, quoting W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, do. 1872, p. 49). Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 626 A.

[4] Ar. *Pol.* ii. 7 = 1267 A: *ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἰσχύν.*

[5] This is especially the case in Plato's *Republic*, which never mentions slaves as constituent elements of the construction, though Plato nowhere impugns the principle of slavery, as applied to *βάρβαροι*, who are *πολέμιοι φύσει* (*Rep.* 470 C). But the non-appearance in the *Republic* of the precise legal status and name of slavery matters little; the essential point is that of the real relationship between the elements—a dominant class set over against an inferior, and deliberately using the latter for purely self-regarding ends. No intrinsic excellence of those ends has any bearing upon the morality of such construction. Nor, again, can it be moralized, as it were by a side wind, by pretending that it involves an educative process both for the individual and for the race, or the like, which is just Aristotle's line of defence of openly recognized and confessed slavery—a defence which had not even the merit of novelty, having been invented by Perikles in the interest of the Athenian empire as a whole (see Thuc. ii. 63, and 35 f.). To say of Plato and slavery that 'in his ideal *Republic* he abolishes it silently by merely constructing a state without slaves' (G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[2], London, 1911, p. 37) is simply to forget both Aristotle's warning, *δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν* (*Eth. Nic.*, I. vi. 1), and what Plato himself said, *ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ* (*Rep.* 595 C). The lowest class in Plato's ideal state is practically a serf class.

[1] Thuc. i. 8 (speaking of primitive Greece). Cf. the experience of Attica before Solon (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* ii. 2; Plutarch, *Sol.* 13).

advantage, are set to production—save by such factors as are themselves beyond human control.[1] Of controllable factors, one of the chief is the amount of labour available; and the problem of its supply is solved by the reduction of masses of men to serfdom, or by the importation of labourers either forced or only nominally free.

Military power, then, and the accumulation of material wealth both led, in the ancient state, directly to the satisfaction of the unceasing hunger for a fully exploitable form of labour, *i.e.* slavery.[2] This demand is everywhere strongly reinforced by the almost universal natural distaste of men for the severer forms of labour, especially for those in which the activity demanded is of a sustained, monotonous, and unexhilarating type. As a matter of fact, in whatever parade of economic logic or philosophy of social evolution the historian may indulge about it, even sometimes to the extent of defending it, the institution of slavery, for the individual slave-owner, had its *raison d'être* in his own idleness and desire for self-indulgence,[3] seeking gratification through the ruthless exploitation of the strength and capacities of others whom circumstances permitted him to control absolutely, without attendant responsibilities, except such as mere possession of a damageable property involved. As Aristotle puts it, if the shuttles could have set to work of themselves, we should have had no need of slaves.[4] It is this claim of one man to exploit another to the utmost, under a converse minimum of obligation, that constitutes the fundamental vice of the institution of slavery.

2. Slavery in Homer.—Slavery is found already established as an immemorial usage in the Homeric period, and slaves of both sexes are a staple commodity to which the victorious warrior looks for his profit, just as he will on occasion replenish his flocks and herds by foray.[5]

The Homeric slave has no rights, and is powerless against the caprice and fiat of his owner.[6] Odysseus does actually execute his erring maids without reference to any other authority. Yet, as in historic times, custom has so far ameliorated the lot of the Homeric slave as to allow him to amass property on sufferance.[7] The promise of Odysseus to give a wife and house and *κτήματα* to the loyal Eumaios and Philoitios[8] must be regarded as merely an extension of this customary tolerance, not as an indication of a practice of legal emancipation;[9] at best it would mean elevation to the status of serf. The patriarchal character of Homeric society doubtless ameliorated the servile status, but without altering its legal aspect or essential nature.[10] Though he draws these charming pictures of kindly social intercourse, Homer has also uttered one of the most truthful and famous judgments on the real significance of slavery in *Od.* xvii. 320 f.:

'Thralls (δμῶες) are no more inclined to honest service when their master's control is gone . . . for Zeus takes away half the worth (ἀρετή)[11] of a man when the day of slavery (δούλιον ἦμαρ) comes upon him.'

External appearance and demeanour alike were affected by servile status, in the popular conception.[1] This was also the historical Greek view, as formulated by Xen. *Mem.* IV. v. 2.[2]

3. Types of slavery in historical Greece.—In historical times Greece shows two main types of unfree status—imported slaves (*δοῦλοι*,[3] *ἀνδράποδα*, *οἰκέται*, often simply *σώματα*), and indigenous serfs (Εἵλωτες in Laconia, Πενέσται in Thessaly; other names elsewhere) — which are associated typically with Athens and Sparta respectively. Although the historical origin of Greek serfdom was identical with one of the main sources of true slavery, viz. war, the primary distinction between the two types was that, while the slave was an alien without legal rights, who could be bought and sold at will, the serf was a descendant of an earlier population settled in the land 'before the Conquest,' and was permanently and legally attached, with customary and legal rights, to what had been his ancestral soil (*ascriptus glebæ*). The two types were in general mutually exclusive, in fact though not in law. The Lacedæmonian social and political organization based upon serfdom hardly knew slavery in its ordinary sense, whereas in Attica, where there were thousands of bought slaves (*ἀργυρώνητοι*), serfdom was unknown — though the 7th cent. B.C. had come very near evolving and perpetuating its institution.[4] In Greece, the distinction tended to coincide with that between agriculture (carried on by serfs) and industry (carried on by slaves).

(*a*) *The Helots.*—The Helots of Laconia and Messenia (Εἵλωτες, Εἱλῶται)[5] are the best known representatives of the serf class. They were state slaves (*δοῦλοι τοῦ κοινοῦ*),[6] cultivators attached as perpetual hereditary appendage to the lot (*κλῆρος*) assigned to individual Spartiates. Hence the individual in whose interest they laboured could neither emancipate nor sell nor slay the Helots on his lot, and was bound under a curse not to exact more than the specified annual amount of produce, which was paid in kind as a first charge on the estate, the balance belonging to the serfs. The state also had a paramount claim to the service of Helots in war as light-armed troops or as rowers, or even on occasion as heavy infantry,[7] and sometimes emancipated them for good service.[8] Helots were also liable for all manner of personal service to their lords in peace and war.[9] They enjoyed, however, by customary right, if not by express convention made at the time of the conquest, their own household and family life, with a large degree of personal freedom and power of amassing wealth.[10] As they were the economic basis of the whole Spartan organization, it was imperative that they should be allowed to propagate and live in a certain measure of comfort, though doubtless there was no lack of cases of oppression.[11] The general attitude of the Spartans towards them was one of

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[1] Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* i. 8=1256 B: ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας 'πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.'

[2] Cf. Herod. i. 66; Paus. IV. xiv. 4.

[3] Cf. Thuc. iii. 82 and ii. 63 f.; Xen. *Sym.* iv. 36; H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr.[3], Edinburgh, 1888, ii. 373.

[4] *Pol.* i. 4=1253 B.

[5] *Il.* xviii. 28, *Od.* i. 398; cf. *Il.* xi. 677 f., *Od.* xxiii. 356 f.

[6] Cf. *Il.* ix. 449, *Od.* xix. 91 f. (Penelope threatens her maid Melantho with death).

[7] *Od.* xiv. 449 f. (Eumaios has a bought slave of his own, *νόσφι δεσποίνης*—whatever that may mean).

[8] *Ib.* xxi. 213 f.; cf. xiv. 62 f.

[9] Though so understood by Plut. *Quæst. gr.* 14.

[10] Cf. *Od.* vi. 84 f. (Nausikaa superintends the family washing and takes part in it with the slave *ἀμφίπολοι*), xvii. 256 f. (Melanthios the goat-herd sits and eats with the suitors). See also *Od.* xviii. 322 f. xv. 363 f.

[11] 'Αρετή, not to be taken here specially of moral qualities, but in the sense in which we say a man is 'no good' for a thing,

meaning in respect of efficiency; certainly not here 'manhood,' as rendered by G. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*[2], p. 37, any more than it is true to say that Homer 'speaks always of slaves with a half-puzzled tenderness' (*ib.*)—pure imagination. Cf. D. B. Monro's note *in loc.* (*Homer's Odyssey*, bks. xiii.–xxiv., Oxford, 1901)—'probably the sense [of *ἀρετή*] is very general'; 'Zeus takes out half the *good* of a man'; cf. *Od.* xiii. 45.

[1] Cf. *Od.* xxiv. 252: 'There shows nothing of the slave about thy face and stature.'

[2] Cf. Theogn. 535, and Aristotle's half-pathetic lament that Nature after all often blunders in her stamp (*Pol.* i. 5=1254 B).

[3] For the etymology of the word δοῦλος see M. Lambertz in *Glotta*, vi. [Göttingen, 1914] 1–18, and E. Assmann, *ib.* ix. [1917] 94 f.

[4] Cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* ii. 2: ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες.

[5] The name was, by the ancients, derived from the town of Helos in lower Laconia (Strabo, p. 365), but is more probably connected with ἕλος, 'fen,' or with the root of ἑλεῖν, 'to capture.'

[6] Paus. III. xx. 6.

[7] Xen. *Hell.* VI. v. 28.

[8] Thuc. v. 34.

[9] Cf. Herod. vii. 229, ix. 10.

[10] Cf. Plut. *Kleom.* 28.

[11] Cf. Athen. 272 A.

suspicion and perpetual watchfulness.[1] They felt that they held a wolf by the ears, for the Helots, says Aristotle, were ever on the alert to take advantage of any national disaster.[2]

(*b*) *True slavery in Greece.*—As known from the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, Greece is a land of free peasant cultivators, slavery, though a familiar institution, being of comparatively little economic importance, confined chiefly to female domestic slavery, so that the Greeks themselves easily imagined a Greece which once knew no slavery.[3] Even Hesiod appears not yet to know rural slavery as a fact of any great importance in the social stratum with which he is chiefly concerned. For, in enumerating the items of capital outlay for the peasant, he mentions first the homestead, next the wife, and then the ox for the plough, and finally the 'things,' *i.e.* gear.[4] This is in accord with the historical development, for Bœotia, as well as Lokris and Phokis, was predominantly a land of free farmers even in the 5th cent. B.C., as was also the Peloponnese.

Chios had the dubious honour of inaugurating the slave-trade on a large scale.[5] It spread rapidly to the rising industrial and trading states of the Saronic gulf. As early as 600 B.C. Periander tried to check it in Corinth, probably in the interests of native labour;[6] but in vain, for the Corinthians soon earned their mock-name of *χοινικομέτραι*.[7] In Greece, therefore, slavery as a factor of prime importance in the national life was intimately connected with the economic revolution of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. The transition from the agricultural to the industrial and mercantile system of national life, undermining the old static aristocratic society and the privileges of birth, and substituting a social stratification according to wealth expressed in terms of coinage (except in those states which, like Sparta, Crete, or Thessaly, applied special safeguards of the old régime), opened innumerable avenues for exploitation and stimulated a demand for cheap docile labour. The free citizen was ill adapted to meet this demand, by reason of his rapidly developing political freedom and his equality before the law with his employer.[8] He did not readily accept the subordination implied by the relationship of employer and employed.[9]

The case stood quite otherwise with the slave—an alien, and therefore without legal rights, a mere live tool (*ἔμψυχον ὄργανον*), in some respects indeed the more valuable just because it was alive, yet with almost as little power of protest as a lifeless instrument.[10] Hence the use of slaves became ever more prevalent, the heavier forms of labour being definitely abandoned to them (*e.g.*, the mines), and slaves becoming a lucrative and favourite form of investment; for here was found a solution of one of the great problems of ancient life, viz. how to invest savings profitably and safely. Hence prosperity and the employment of slaves went hand in hand, as mutually cause and effect.[11] The essence of the demand was not for workers who were in a legal sense slaves, that is to say, not for slavery as an institution *per se* desirable, but for cheap, docile, and fully exploitable labour; and such was to be had, in any degree of perfection, only in the form of forced alien labour.[1] The slave class, therefore, held in the ancient industrial organization precisely the place held in modern times by free labour working under contract.

4. Sources of supply.—The sources of slave supply were chiefly war and commerce.

(1) *War.*—In dealing with a conquered town, whether Greek or foreign, Greek practice was to kill all bearing or capable of bearing arms, and to enslave the rest of the population without exception.[2] It marked, therefore, some advance when Philip in 348 B.C., instead of slaughtering the men of the Chalcidic cities, sold the population *en masse*, and when Alexander in 335 B.C., upon the capture of Thebes, sold its 30,000 inhabitants into slavery.[3]

(2) *Commerce.*—Supply of slaves through war was of the nature of a windfall. There was in addition a systematic slave-trade catering for the constant demand. The market was fed chiefly from lands on the fringe of the Hellenic world,[4] especially the hinterland of Asia Minor (Lydia, Phrygia, and Galatia), and the countries bordering the Euxine (Pontos and Paphlagonia, and above all Thrace). Syria, Egypt, Æthiopia, and even Italy,[5] were also taken in toll. The great slave marts were Samos, Chios, and Ephesus for Asia, Pagasai and Byzantion for the Balkan area; Delos and Cypros were the *entrepôts* for the human freights of the pirates and kidnappers working the eastern Mediterranean, while Corinth and Athens were the main emporia in Greece proper.[6] Probably there were regular agents in frontier towns buying whatever was offered in this line and asking no questions. War and rapine among the hill-tribes, sale of families by natives,[7] casual kidnapping, and apparently even the organized slave-raid, kept up a fairly steady stream of supply, which gradually attained enormous dimensions. It savours of irony to find that the sacred island of Delos became ultimately, perhaps as the most central, the main slave mart, so that a saying arose: 'Put in, skipper, unload—all's sold.'[8]

(3) Minor sources were: (*a*) natural increase among the slaves themselves, the status being hereditary; this was important mainly in later times; (*b*) sale of children—tolerated generally in Greece (but not in Athens, though an Athenian father might, and seemingly often did, refuse to rear a child, especially if a female,[9] and expose it); (*c*) sale into slavery, even of adults, due to the action of the law; *e.g.*, before Solon's time an insolvent Athenian could be sold into slavery by his creditor (as in Rome), or he might be retained as a bond-slave on his estate.[10]

5. Employments of slaves.—One of the most striking differences between ancient and modern slavery is the great variety of *skilled* employments for which slaves were trained in Athens, apparently with success.[11] Besides their employment, to a moderate extent, as personal attendants (*ἀκόλουθοι*, both in and out of doors),[12] slaves of both sexes were used for all manner of domestic service and domestic production.[13] Naturally, agriculture

1 Xen. *Resp. Lac.* xii. 4; Thuc. iv. 80, v. 14.

2 *Pol.* ii. 9=1269 A; cf. Thuc. i. 132; Xen. *Hell.* III. iii. 6.

3 Herod. vi. 137; Timaios, *ap.* Polyb. xii. 6; cf. Athen. 264 C (true enough if referred to the sudden development of industrial slavery from the 7th cent. onwards).

4 Hes. *Works*, 405 f. 5 Athen. 265 B.

6 Nic. Dam. frag. 59.

7 Athen. 272 B—as though their chief occupation was to issue slave rations; cf. Herod. ii. 167: *ἥκιστα δὲ Κορίνθιοι ὄνονται τοὺς χειροτέχνας*, of whom a large porportion was servile.

8 Cf. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 192.

9 Instructive case in Xen. *Mem.* II. viii. 5; cf. *de Vect.* iv. 22.

10 Cf. Xen. *Mem.* II. vii. 6.

11 Cf. Diod. xi. 72 (Sicily); cf. Herod. v. 31 (Naxos).

1 Cf. Meyer, p. 197; Ar. *Œc.* i. 5. So Polybius, describing the advantages of Byzantion, says: 'For those commodities which are the first necessaries of existence, namely cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied by the districts round the Pontos in greater profusion and of better quality than by any others' (iv. 38).

2 Cf. Hom. *Il.* ix. 591 ff.; Xen. *Cyrop.* vii. 5. 73.

3 Diod. xvii. 14; but contrast his savage treatment of Tyre (*ib.* 46), and of Gaza (Arr. *Anab.* ii. 27).

4 Cf. Jl 3[6] (Phœnicians sell Jews to the 'sons of the Grecians' [RV]), Ezk 27[13] ('Javan . . . traded the persons of men,' with Tyre [EV]).

5 Livy, xxxiv. 50; Plut. *Flam.* 13 (Romans taken prisoner by Hannibal held as slaves in Achaia in 194 B.C.).

6 Cf. Paus. x. xxxii. 15 (fair held at the temple of Asklepios near Tithorea in Phokis).

7 Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* VIII. vii. 12. 8 Strabo, p. 668.

9 See Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, iii. 474.

10 Ar. *Ath. Pol.* xii. 4; cf. Dem. xxv. 57, lix. 17.

11 Cf. Xen. *Œc.* xiii. 8 f., *Mem.* II. vii. 6.

12 Cf. Theophr. *Char.* 23. It is a sign of vulgarity when Meidias 'swaggers through the Agora with three or four footmen' (Dem. *Meid.* 158).

13 Cf. Xen. *Œc.* vii. 41.

claimed many.[1] A large number were employed in all grades of public service[2]—*e.g.*, 1200 Σκύθαι as city police in Athens. At one end of the scale are slaves employed in the higher professions and skilled trades (doctors, teachers, bankers, and business-agents), at the other those doomed to the tragic horror of the Laurion silver mines. This last class it is that stands closest to Roman as well as to modern prædial slavery; the former class, on the other hand, stands very close, in external aspect at any rate,[3] to that of the free alien, or even the free citizen. Artisan slavery was, in fact, a main factor in the development of Athenian industrialism and commerce in the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.; it is here that the most important, and at the same time most obscure, problems in the economics of ancient slavery lie, viz. in the co-existence of a free and a servile artisan population, working side by side in unrestricted competition.

A peculiar and early development, best known to us from Athens, was that of a class of slaves known as οἱ χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες. These slaves 'living apart' were allowed by their master to work in quasi-independence, living upon the proceeds of their labour, under condition of paying him regularly a fixed sum (ἀποφορά).[4] Sometimes a group of such slaves worked together, under a foreman, himself a slave, mutually sharing the profits after paying the stipulated ἀποφορά.[5] These slaves, therefore, lived in practical independence, and were able to amass money, and so might ultimately be allowed to purchase their freedom. Legally, the master's rights remained unimpaired; the permission so to live was revocable, and the slave retained his earnings (so far as we can see) purely on sufferance. The system relieved the owner of responsibility, while guaranteeing him regular and high interest on his capital outlay; between him and loss of income through trade depression there stood the savings of the slave, and in the last resort the market value of the slave himself.

6. The economic problem.—Here arises a problem of particular interest, viz. that of the economic relation of slave-labour to wage-labour in Greek states, and the degree to which the latter was affected by the competition of a servile class probably greatly superior in numbers, and at least its equal in skill. Here it is necessary to avoid the exaggerations widely current in much popular exposition. Statements such as that of J. P. Mahaffy—'for each freeman with a vote there were at least three or four slaves. . . . Even very poor Athenians kept a slave or two'—belong to a pre-scientific age.[6] Equally unscientific is the sentimentalism of the 'New Hellenism,' which is bent upon 'clearing the name of Athens from one cruel reproach which has clung to it ever since the human conscience began to concern itself with these questions,' teaching that it was only late in the history of Athens, 'when the structure of her civilization became too heavy to be sustained by her own unaided efforts, that slaves and free immigrants crowded in to co-operate in the task. And these she treated in most cases, not as mere living instruments, but as "fellow-workers" with her citizens and free partners in the Empire.'[7]

We can only glance at the problem thus raised. How fundamental slavery appeared to its contemporaries, and how universally the social and economic effects which it entailed were accepted as part of the natural order of things, is shown by the fact that the most serious crisis in Athenian economic history originated in the pre-Solonian age, *i.e. before* the great development of industrial slavery in Attica.[1] It is true that 'the ultimate controlling fact in Greek politics of the 5th and 4th centuries is the evil economic condition of the lower classes, due to the competition of slave labour';[2] but analysis of social and economic facts in this regard was almost impossible, because neither in dress nor, above all, in colour were Athenian slaves marked off from the free community. Hence the standing poverty of the middle and lower class in Athens—a poverty which co-existed with a high degree of prosperity of the state as a whole[3]—is rarely, if at all, traced to its real root in slave competition.[4] From this point of view we may say that the expansion of artisan slavery, which by cheap labour took the bread out of the mouth of the free worker and threw him upon the street to subsist upon state pay,[5] with a large margin of leisure, but hardly any of wealth, closely resembled in its working the introduction of machinery into modern industry. But the bitter class war in ancient Greece[6] is waged not as between starving free artisans and their servile competitors; rather, the slave is the sign and source of the wealth which the lower classes covet, and for which the cry of γῆς ἀναδασμός and χρεῶν ἀποκοπή is raised. Hence the constant tendency of the lower classes actually to look for allies in the slave class, for the one partner desires freedom and the other wealth—both by the same means, and at the expense of one and the same foe.[7] The discussion of slavery arises, therefore, as an ethical, not as an economic, question; it originates with poets and philosophers, not with the political champion of popular rights (προστάτης τοῦ δήμου)—and this is in fact quite characteristic of the Greeks.

7. Treatment of slaves.—The readiness with which Greek slaves ran away is not to be taken as evidence of their general ill-treatment.[8] For the mere natural instinct of freedom will impel the slave to flight, often aimlessly. The Greek prædial serfs, a permanent immobile population, speaking a common language and inheriting a common tradition of national life, older and richer than that of their lords, and, above all, sharing in the essentials of contemporary Greek culture equally with them as a recognized element in the political structure, though without political rights, found life upon the whole more intolerable and more offensive to dignity than was the case with slaves proper; hence the danger of Helot insurrection was a constant and notorious factor in Lacedæmonian politics.[9]

Demosthenes[10] says that, if the barbarians who supplied the Greek slave marts could be told how civilized and humane the Greeks were[11] in their treatment of slaves, they would officially constitute the Athenians their public protectors! Apart from the singular and intolerable bathos of the orator's conclusion, it is to be remarked that his statement is an example of those naive delusions which in all ages pass current among peoples concerning themselves;[12] it is, in addition,

[1] Cf. Thuc. iii. 73; Xen. *Hell.* vi. ii. 6 (Corcyra), iii. ii. 6 (Elis); see Polyb. iv. 73 ('Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese').

[2] To this class really belong the courtesans (ἱερόδουλοι) serving at the temples—*e.g.*, at Corinth, or at Eryx; cf. Strabo, p. 272.

[3] Xen. *Resp. Ath.* 10 f. [4] Ct. Is. viii. 35.

[5] Cf. Æschines, i. 97.

[6] *Problems of Greek History*, London, 1892, p. 88; Mahaffy's statement is disproved by Ar. *Pol.* viii. (vi.) 8=1323 A: τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ὥσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν). 'There can be little doubt that in almost all democracies a majority of the citizens were ἄποροι' (Newman, *Pol. of Ar.* iv. 568; cf., for Athens, Plut. *Per.* 11: ἐπανορθούμενος τὰς ἀπορίας τοῦ δήμου).

[7] A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*[1], p. 389.

[1] Cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* ii. 2.

[2] G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the Hist. of his Age*, London, 1911, p. 106.

[3] Athens was the only state with a gold reserve (cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* xxiv. 1: χρημάτων ἠθροισμένων πολλῶν).

[4] But see Athen. 264 D (criticism levelled at Aristotle's friend Mnason because his thousand slaves meant that an equal number of Phocians was displaced).

[5] Cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* xxiv. 3, *Pol.* vii. (v.) 8=1309 A.

[6] Isocr. *Archid.* 77 f.; Polyb. iv. 17, xxxix. 8.

[7] Cf. Thuc. iii. 73; Strabo, p. 646; Diod. xiii. 48.

[8] Cf. Dio Chrys. x. 143. [9] Thuc. iv. 80, v. 23.

[10] *Meid.* 580. [11] Cf. *Phil.* iii. 8.

[12] Culminating, among the Greeks, in the insolent speech of Jason to Medea (Euripides, *Medea*, 536 ff.) in which he explains her indebtedness to him for bringing her within the pale of Greek civilization.

deliberate sophistry, for Demosthenes well knew that the intention of the law which he quotes, and of which he makes so much, was quite other than the advantage of the slave as such—*i.e.*, it protected him as another's property, not as being himself a person with inherent rights. Nevertheless, the comparative humanity of the Greek, and especially of the Athenian, treatment of slaves is indisputable.

The law protected the slave against ill-treatment by strangers, by allowing an owner to bring a prosecution for assault (γραφὴ ὕβρεως)[1] against the assailant. The slave is protected as a chattel of his owner. Further, having no legal personality, an Athenian slave could not put the law in operation in his own behoof.[2] Although a slave was his master's absolute property, to be disposed of by sale, gift, or bequest at his pleasure, a death penalty could be inflicted upon him, even for murder, only by a legal tribunal.[3] If a master killed his slave, he was subject to religious obligations of purification—which in practice meant little more than financial outlay.[4] Against inhuman treatment by his owner the Athenian slave could get a doubtful and temporary measure of protection by taking asylum, if he could, at the temple of Theseus, or in the precinct of the Semnai, and perhaps there obtain the good offices of the priest to induce his master to sell him to another.[5] It is clear, however, that the practical amount of legal protection was but slight, the only real restraining force being the owner's self-interest, reinforced by natural humanity, and to a certain extent by religion, which in Athens as elsewhere was very chary of interference with rights of private property.[6] The lot of the state slaves was in this respect probably more tolerable than that of the ordinary slave, as being less exposed to individual caprice; and the state employees, of various grades, naturally tended to acquire a certain independence by virtue of their official status.[7]

8. Modes of punishment.—(1) The commonest naturally was flogging.[8] This could easily become a death penalty (and is so used in Plato, *Laws*, 872 B, in cases of wilful murder of a free man by a slave). Flogging is very often the statutory penalty for slaves in the inscriptions, usually 50 strokes.[9] Sometimes flogging is combined with a fine, touching the slave's *peculium*, or with ἀπεργασία, 'working off the penalty.'[10]

(2) Short rations, and confinement of various types and degrees of painfulness.[11] Shackling was so ordinary a precaution as hardly to be classed as a punishment.

(3) Branding, applied especially to runaways.[12]

(4) Hard labour, at the mill, or, worse still, at the mines—reducing the culprit to the lowest grade of chattel-slave and practically dooming him to death.[13]

(5) Doubtless also tortures privately administered were not unexampled in the households of masters callous to public opinion.[14] But Athens seems to have known little or nothing of the hideous scenes of private torture and capricious cruelty with which Rome was familiar.

But there was nothing of the kid glove about the generality of Greek slave-owners.[1] Plato is dissatisfied with the older, patriarchal (*i.e.* Homeric) method, in which slaves were treated 'gently yet firmly'; he would have them kept in their place, 'not admonished as if they were freemen, which only makes them conceited.'[2]

9. Slave-torture.—Here falls to be mentioned the Attic rule, 'almost grotesque in its absurd cruelty,'[3] under which the evidence of a slave was inadmissible in a court of law unless it had been extracted on the rack by responsible officials (δημόκοινοι)[4]—themselves of course slaves.[5] Slaves who were themselves suspected of, or charged with, crime were tortured to secure a confession, but this sort of torture, frequent in all ages, even in the case of free men, needs no further remark here. Again, a master was free to torture his own slaves for his own ends, but the answers so obtained did not constitute legal evidence. The torture here in question is that applied to slaves of the parties in a suit. The views of the orators on the value of such evidence depend entirely upon the needs of the argument. Sometimes it is dismissed as worthless, but in general it is spoken of as final and unimpeachable, indeed as preferable to that given by a freeman, even under oath.[6] That citizens were exempted by Attic law from such torture[7] may indeed prove the 'superior humanity of the Athenians,'[8] but hardly in respect of their slaves.

10. Emancipation.—Aristotle, in flat contradiction of his own theoretical creed—for clearly a 'natural' slave, according to his definition, could only lose by being freed—recognized that the prospect of ultimate freedom was the slave's most powerful incentive to zeal and loyalty;[9] and the author of the Aristotelian *Economics* says: 'Slaves are willing to take trouble when freedom is the prize and the time is fixed.'[10] This principle was well established in popular usage, and various methods of emancipation were in vogue. The characteristic of these is their want of precision and the vagueness of the idea of personal freedom upon which they were based. Hence no universal legal forms were evolved, and the practical result in many cases was the highly illogical one of creating a class intermediate between those of the pure slave and the free citizen, subject to all degrees and kinds of servitudes. With all their imperfections, however, these more or less regularized, easily available, and constantly employed methods of creating free or semi-free status constitute one of the principal features of distinction between ancient and modern slavery.

(*a*) *By the state.*—The state itself sometimes conferred freedom on individuals, or even on considerable numbers, for special services, especially those rendered in defence of the country.[11]

(*b*) *By individuals.*—Emancipation by a private owner, either as an act of grace or upon payment by the slave of a sum agreed upon out of his *pecu-*

[1] Cf. Æschin. i. 15.
[2] Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 483 B.
[3] Antiph. v. 48.
[4] Cf. Antiph. vi. 4.
[5] Cf. Plut. *de Superst.* iv. 166: ἔστι καὶ δούλοις νόμος ἐλευθερίαν ἀπογνοῦσι, πρᾶσιν αἰτεῖσθαι. Only certain temples were available for such asylum for slaves. The whole subject is very obscure (see M. H. E. Meier, G. F. Schömann, and J. H. Lipsius, *Der attische Process*, Berlin, 1883–87, ii. 625).
[6] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* II. iv. 3 f.
[7] Cf. Æschin. i. 54.
[8] Cf. Dem. xxiv. 167.
[9] *E.g.*, *CIA* ii. 841. 10; in Dittenberger[2], 680. 4 (Syros) it is 100 strokes.
[10] *E.g.*, at Andania (Dittenberger[2], 653. 75 f.).
[11] Cf. Ar. *Œc.* i. 5.
[12] Cf. Aristoph. *Birds*, 760, *Lysistr.* 331.
[13] Cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* xiv. 233.
[14] A choice list in Aristoph. *Frogs*, 618 ff.

[1] As is clear from such passages as Xen. *Œc.* i. 22, *Mem.* III. xiii. 4, II. i. 17 (κολάζω πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω).
[2] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 549 A, *Laws*, 778 A.
[3] J. P. Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*[3], London, 1898, p. 241.
[4] Isocr. 361 D.
[5] Of course such torture, if ever applied, did not take place in court, but in the preliminary hearing.
[6] Is. viii. 12; cf. a remarkable passage in Antiph. vi. 25; Ar. *Rhet.* i. 15.
[7] Andoc. i. 43.
[8] J. W. Headlam, in *CR* vii. [1893] 1 ff., where he seeks to prove that 'the appeal to the Question was not a means of collecting evidence for a jury; it was an alternative method of trial; it was a kind of *ordeal*.'
[9] Ar. *Pol* iv. (vii.) 10=1330 A. [10] 1344 B.
[11] Cf. Xen. *Hell.* I. vi. 24 (slaves on the fleet at Arginusai in 406 B.C. freed); Diod. xvii. 11 (Thebes), xx. 84 (Rhodes); cf. Dittenberger[2], 329. 49 (Ephesus); see A. Croiset, 'L'Affranchissement des esclaves pour faits de guerre,' in *Mélanges Henri Weil*, Paris, 1898, p. 67 f.

lium, was effected either *inter vivos* or by testament.[1] Manumission *inter vivos* naturally involved publication, as by announcement in a law-court (*ἐν δικαστηρίῳ*)[2] or other public place.[3] Proclamation by the herald in the Athenian theatre before the people became a fashionable nuisance which had to be checked by the severest penalty.[4]

(*c*). *Through a deity.* — In many places the favourite method was manumission under the form of dedication to a deity, the slave thus becoming the god's property (*ἱερόδουλος*). This was perhaps historically the oldest method. Properly and originally it was not manumission, but substitution of ownership; and originally perhaps the slave was actually transferred to the service of the temple—certainly always lighter than that of a private owner.

By far the largest and most instructive class of manumission inscriptions is that dating generally from the end of the 3rd cent. B.C. to the 2nd cent. A.D., in which the deity named appears not merely as accepting or witnessing to a dedication made to himself, but as one of the principals in a purely commercial transaction, *i.e.* as himself purchasing the slave, not to retain him as *ἱερόδουλος*, but to set him free[5]—his freedom being generally conditioned in the instrument of sale by certain obligations towards his old master. Many hundreds of such records having survived, a study of them tends to dissipate all illusion as to the real significance of slavery among the Greeks. The sale to the deity is not fictitious, for real money passes into the master's pocket[6]—perhaps the full market-price of the slave, hardly less, as agreed between slave and owner; the purchase money is of course provided by the slave himself from his *peculium* or sufferance savings. As the slave, having no legal personality, could not enter into any legal contract with his master, he must rely upon the god to act for him, *i.e.* he must entrust his priest both with the purchase money and with the carrying out of the entire transaction (*καθὼς ἐπίστευσε τῷ θεῷ τὰν ὠνάν* is the phrase used). Thus the owner could not touch the money deposited by the slave with the priest without first parting with his property in the slave to the god, under a legal contract of sale providing adequate secular safeguards against its breach. The transaction was profitable to the temple indirectly, and perhaps also directly; the owner secured his own price for his living property, and the slave got just what he was able to wring from a situation in which, in the last resort, he was absolutely powerless.

It is clear that this method of sale into freedom was simply a means of getting hold of the bulk of the slave's *peculium* and retaining his services during his best years, and of throwing him upon the world at the end of his days to fend for himself; neither humanity nor religion had much real significance in this connexion. The method is applied almost wholly in the interest of the vendor, who of course could have found no purchaser so complaisant as the deity with whom he deals. The vendor retained in effect what he professed to sell.[1]

11. **Freedmen.** — In Roman history freedmen (*ἀπελεύθεροι*, *ἐξελεύθεροι*) play a great part, but not in Athens or Greece generally. In Greece, freedmen were indistinguishable from ordinary domiciled aliens (*μέτοικοι*). Even as early as Kleisthenes freedmen seem to have been numerous in Athens, for he made many of them citizens.[2] Like ordinary domiciled aliens, freed slaves of Athenians must put themselves under a patron (*προστάτης*—their old master), and must observe certain obligations of service and respect towards him, details of which are unknown, and must pay to the state the alien's annual tax (*μετοίκιον*), with an additional three obols, besides performing all required military service by land or sea.[3] Standing thus to the state as a metic, and to his former owner as a client, the Athenian freedman was worse off than the Roman freedman, being in a condition intermediate between slavery and complete freedom as a citizen—an ambiguity characteristic of the Greek incapacity for clear legal conceptions, and illustrative of the extreme difficulty of naturalization in the ancient state, with its inherent conception of exclusive citizenship. If a freedman was false to his obligations, he was liable to prosecution (*δίκη ἀποστασίου*), and, if condemned, sank again into slavery, or in the other event became finally freed of obligation towards his former master—*i.e.*, he became a free metic, with freedom of choice as to his patron. A special vote of the assembly alone could elevate him to citizenship.

12. **Slavery and Greek thought.**—A discrimination between lower social functions (those of husbandman, artisan, trader, and the like) and higher social functions (those of administration, legislation, and war) is characteristic of Greek sentiment, though not everywhere made in practice. Of rigid coincidence of theory and practice, indeed, solitary examples were presented by Crete and Sparta, which 'sorted' the elements of the state with a thorough-going doctrinairism that appealed powerfully to the philosopher, but found itself, in Greece at large, with the exception of particular coteries, at ever greater variance with the facts of life. Nevertheless, even in such states as admitted the industrial and commercial classes to political power, popular sentiment, in its usual illogical and snobbish way, was thoroughly contemptuous of the so-called *βαναυσικαὶ τέχναι*.

To do manual work, even of such sort as did not obviously impair health and vigour, and especially to do it for pay, implied acceptance of a relation of subservience,[4] incompatible with the independence and leisure of a free man, and breeding a mean and sordid spirit. The real difference of intellectual and ethical level between some vocations and others was the solid core of truth upon which Greek philosophic thought seized, from which with merciless logic it developed a distinction between a professional ruling class and all such as engaged in the 'necessary' functions of trade and the manual arts. A separate class, or classes, must needs exist in the state for the discharge of these lower functions, and those so employed must, unless justice is to be infringed, be capable of nothing higher. The existence, in adequate numbers, of such a class is essential to

[1] See Aristotle's own will, in Diog. Laert. v. i. 9; cf. Dio Chrys. xiv. 440: *οἱ δέ τινες τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν καταβεβλήκασι τοῖς δεσπόταις*, and xxxi. 326.

[2] Dion. Hal. v. 596.

[3] Cf. Suid. *s.v.* Κράτης (*ἐπὶ βωμὸν ἀρθεὶς εἶπεν·* Κράτης ἀπολύει Κράτητα).

[4] Æschin. *Ctes.* 41.

[5] Hence the confusion of thought and phrase in the formula in use: *ὡς ἐλεύθερον ὄντα καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ*, 'free and yet the god's property.' Doubtless this method was a development of a transaction in which the god, *i.e.* his priest, with the god's own money (the temple treasure), bought in open market the slaves, male or female, required for service about the temple. Many, if not most, of the slaves donated to a temple as hierodoules must have been, or must eventually have become, too old and feeble to be of much use; but the god could no more reject such dedications, or cast them adrift, than he could refuse the cheap and flimsy offerings of the poor. Hence the Greek temples in this way served as almshouses.

[6] Cf. the almost constant formula *καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔχει*, or *ἀπέχει πᾶσαν*, asserting this.

[1] This is not to say that there may not have been numerous instances in which the transaction was genuine in spirit and form.

[2] Ar. *Pol.* iii. 2=1275 B: *πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους* (see Newman's note *in loc.*, and vol. i. p. 231).

[3] Dem. *Phil.* i. 36.

[4] *διακονία* (Plato, *Laws*, 919 D); cf. Ar. *Pol.* i. 13=1260 A: *ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἕξει δουλείαν.*

the realization of the highest type of society, just as the household must consist of both slaves and free.[1] Unless, however, there was to be frankly accepted a dichotomy of the Hellenic race itself, such as would be fraught with the gravest menace of national disruption and chaos, there was nothing for it but to adopt the old standing division of humanity into Hellene and non-Hellene,[2] and to find therein the philosophic justification of the institution of slavery, while doing what could be done for the slave himself. The 5th cent., less troubled than the 4th with doubts, had not discovered the comfortable doctrine that slavery might be actually good for the slave, enabling him, under the mild yoke of the exponents of culture, to lead a higher sort of life than was otherwise possible for him.

The bias of Aristotle being, in general, to accept, with his own amendments, the institutions and views in which the collective experience of the Greek race had crystallized, he retains slavery in his ideal state, but retains it in an ideal form which would make it spiritually as well as practically advantageous to the highest capacities of both master and slave. The slave is an article of household property, an indispensable animate instrument,[3] of a superior sort—an instrument not of production, but of action, *i.e.* not coming solely within the sphere or purview of economics, but within that of ethics;[4] being an article of property, he belongs wholly to his master. The facts of the world show that there is a natural, and therefore just, because actually existing, principle of rule and subordination, or scheme of co-ordination in nature, both animate and inanimate.[5] There is, then, a 'natural slavery' (*φύσει δοῦλον*), in which the slave's bodily strength is complementary to the master's intelligence and 'virtue,' just as the union of male and female is necessary for purposes of reproduction and continuance of the species.[6] The natural slave is as far inferior to his master as the body is to the soul, or as the lower animals to man generally, so that the relation of rule and subordination which obtains between soul and body, or between men and animals, is applicable here also. The only difference, indeed, between such men and animals is that the former can listen to reason; but their best function is the obedient expenditure of their physical strength,[7] making noble life (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) possible for their master. The moral possibilities of the institution of slavery justify it—justified as it is indeed already by the mere fact of its existence as part of the teleological scheme of things. Paradoxical as it may sound, it was not every one who could be a slave in the true sense,[8] for the status properly connoted a certain spiritual as well as physical aptitude. It is less therefore upon the social or economic necessity for slavery than upon the moral benefits which through it arise for both master and slave that Aristotle insists, and he postulates for the master an intellectual and moral endowment as high as that of the slave is low. Thereby, in effect, was condemned a great deal of current slavery, in so far as it included captives, not a few even of Greek blood, taken in war, *i.e.* men in whose case mere brute force was the basis of the status. The true test of just freedom and just slavery, according to Aristotle, lay in the relative goodness and badness, *i.e.* the intellectual and moral capacities, of men. Constituted on such lines, slavery would be, for the slave, no such one-sided bargain as in actual fact it was.

Aristotle's theory, though it started from fact and claimed to return to fact, yet made shipwreck upon the rock of fact. For, in the first place, there were in Attica tens of thousands of slaves who, being in no genuine sense elements of a household, were yet in mental and moral capacity and actual output fully on a par with the free citizens who owned them and claimed the main part of the fruits of their intelligence and conscientious labour. In the second place, the ultimate basis of their status, let the theorists say what they would about laws of nature and existent right, was mere force and violence enlisted in the service of idleness and greed, and worse. Lastly, the actual moral effects of slavery, alike for slave and for slave-owner, were as a rule very conspicuously different from those desiderated by Aristotle; yet, if the institution was natural and right just because it was an objective fact, how could its fruits be logically condemned? The task of moralizing an essentially immoral institution was beyond his powers. Then as now rapacity and selfishness were apt to define right strictly from their own standpoint, and men were not slow, with grandiloquent phrase and fitful exhibition of capricious benevolence, to gloze national wrongdoing.

The noteworthy points are, not the precise amount of truth in Aristotle's attitude, but, firstly, the fact that 'the Greeks are characteristically the first human beings who felt a doubt or scruple about slavery' and that it was 'in Greece alone that men's consciences were troubled' by it, so that Aristotle found himself driven to defend the position with what forces of argument he could muster; secondly, that he makes little or no point of any supposed indispensability of slavery to the maintenance of the economic fabric of his age. And practical philosophy itself was soon to demonstrate the illusoriness of his fundamental axioms. Kleanthes was none the less a 'wise' man though he earned his living by the sweat of his brow in nightly toil as a drawer of water and kneader of bread, both reputed servile employments.[1] The Stoics demonstrated that virtue and happiness were independent of social condition,[2] thus making it clear that slaves were not essential by way of bolstering up virtue in order to save supposed higher natures from deterioration through contact with the crudities of life; thus 'slavery lost its Aristotelian *raison d'être*.'[3] Aristotle perceived clearly enough that slavery is incompatible with full human dignity, but, his thought being conditioned always by the vicious aristocratic antithesis of Hellene and *βάρβαρος* (though Plato could have taught him better),[4] he was unable to go on to perceive also that the concept of human dignity is either universally valid or everywhere equally worthless. He is honest enough, however, to confess that nature has left us without any practical criterion by which to distinguish the noble from the ignoble;[5] for the obvious criterion of colour, to which men in more modern times were fain to appeal, was to the Greeks unknown, or at least insignificant, and he was unwilling to fall back upon the 'verdict of history' as given by war, for that, as all Athenians knew to their sorrow, often proves far too much.

For the influence of Stoicism on slavery see art. SLAVERY (Roman).

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SLAVERY (Hindu).

—Slavery is an institution fully recognized in the Sanskrit lawbooks of India. The Code of Manu (viii. 415) names seven causes of slavery, viz. capture in war, voluntary submission to slavery for a maintenance, birth from a female slave, sale, gift, inheritance from ancestor, and condemnation to slavery by way of punishment. Manu adds that wives and sons, like slaves, can have no property of their own,

[1] Ar. *Pol.* i. 3=1253 B: *οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.*

[2] *βάρβαρος*; cf. Ar. *Pol.* i. 2=1252 B: *ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν*, and Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 1266.

[3] Ar. *Pol.* i. 4=1253 B; cf. *Eth. Nic.* viii. xi. 6.

[4] *Pol.* i. 4=1254 A: *ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησίς ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν.* So William Morris: 'We must see industry not simply as a process of production but as a form of association,' etc., simply echoing Aristotle. See A. E. Zimmern, 'Progress in Industry,' in *Progress and History*, ed. F. S. Marvin, Oxford, 1912, p. 212 f.

[5] *Pol.* i. 5=1254 A: *ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον.*

[6] *Ib.* i. 2=1252 A.

[7] This is just the point at which Aristotle comes within hail of modern systems of 'scientific management,' such as the notorious Taylor system, the inventor of which in his defence thereof (as is pointed out by Zimmern, *loc. cit.*) unconsciously paraphrases Aristotle's defence of slavery.

[8] *Pol.* i. 5=1254 B: *ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι.*

[1] Diog. Laert. 168.

[2] Cf. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* i. x. 8.

[3] Newman, i. 156.

[4] Cf. Ar. *Pol.* iv. (vii.) 7=1327 B for Aristotle's own well-known comparison of Hellenes and Asiatics, the valuelessness of which is shown by comparing what Isocrates says on the same subject (*de Antid.* 293); cf. Plato, *Polit.* 262 D. But Plato's formal profession of faith in this matter is just as uncompromising as Aristotle's (see *Rep.* 470 C).

[5] *Pol.* i. 5=1254 B.

and that Śūdras, even when emancipated by their master, are not therefore released from servitude, because the state of dependence is innate in them. The perpetual slavery of the Śūdra class is one of the axioms of Brāhmanism, and may be traced back to the *Puruṣasūkta* hymn of the Ṛigveda (x. 90), in which it is stated that the Śūdra issued from the feet of Puruṣa, the primeval male, feet meaning service. Nārada (v. 25 ff.) gives some further details regarding slavery, and enumerates fifteen kinds of slaves: one born (of a female slave) in his master's house, one bought, one received by gift, one obtained by inheritance, one maintained during a general famine, one pledged by his rightful owner, one released from a heavy debt, one made captive in war, one won in a stake, one offering himself for a slave, an apostate from asceticism, one enslaved for a stipulated period, one becoming a slave for maintenance, one enslaved on account of his connexion with a female slave, and one self-sold. The difference between these various slaves and the class of hired servants, according to Nārada, lies in this, that the former, but not the latter, do impure work, such as removing urine and ordure, attending their naked master, handling cows, cleaning the house and the road. The first four in the above enumeration of fifteen slaves, likewise an apostate from asceticism and one self-sold, can never be released from slavery except by the favour of their owners, but the others may obtain their release by giving a compensation in money or providing a substitute. One intending to emancipate his slave has to take from the slave's shoulders a jar with water and smash it, sprinkling his head with the water, and thrice declaring him free. One superior in caste cannot be the slave of his inferior, nor is it legal slavery when a man has been sold after having been captured by robbers, or has been enslaved by force. Here it should be observed that the ancient Hindu law contains important relics of the practice of selling children for slaves which obtained amongst ancient societies. Thus it is stated by Vasiṣṭha (xv. 2) that the father and the mother have power to give, to sell, and to abandon their son, and the son bought is generally mentioned among the various substitutes for a real legitimate son. It is true that Āpastamba (ii. 13. 11) does not recognize the right to buy or sell a child, and the secondary sons generally were abolished in the more recent lawbooks, excepting the adopted son (*dattaka*; see art. ADOPTION [Hindu]). Adoption itself may be regarded as the survival of an archaic institution which owed its origin to the principle of slavery, whereby a man might be bought and sold, given and accepted, or relinquished in the same way as a cow or horse. The statements of the lawbooks on the subject of slavery are corroborated by the historical records, and V. A. Smith in his *Early History of India* observes that prædial and domestic slavery of a mild form seems to have been an institution in most parts of India from very remote times. In the time of J. A. Dubois (in India, 1792–1823), the Pariahs 'were looked upon as slaves by other castes, and treated with great harshness' (see art. PARIAH). Under British rule, slavery was not abolished at once, but gradually. Regulation x. of 1811 prohibited the importation of slaves from foreign countries into the British territories. This rule was by Regulation iii. of 1832 extended to the provinces which subsequently came into the possession of the British Government. Later on was passed Act v. of 1843 prohibiting all officers of Government from recognizing slavery. And it was finally abolished in 1860 by the Indian Penal Code, which declared the equality of all men, and provided punishment for buying or selling any person as a slave.

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SLAVERY (Jewish).—Slavery was one of the features of ancient and mediæval Jewish life, and there is a large crop of Jewish legislation on the subject. It is noteworthy that among the Jews treatment of the slave was never debasing or cruel. The Mosaic legislation, with its insistence upon the rights possessed by the bondman or bondwoman and its consequent limitation of the master's power over them, inculcated the duty of clemency in the master—a virtue which colours their mutual relations in all subsequent epochs. Besides this, the Jew at every turn was confronted with such injunctions as those in Dt 5^{15} 15^{15}, where the law of kindness to the slave is brought home to the Israelite by the duty to recollect how much his own ancestors had suffered during their serfdom in Egypt.

1. **In OT literature.**—Gn 14^{14} speaks of Abram 'arming his trained men, born in his house, three hundred and eighteen.' These 'trained men' were most probably hereditary slave property. That such slaves were, even in this early epoch, something more than the chattels of ancient Greece and Rome is evidenced by Gn 17^{23}, where 'all that were born in his [Abraham's] house, and all that were bought with his money' underwent the rite of circumcision—a clear proof that the master owed some sort of family obligation to the slave. Similarly in Ex 12^{44} the circumcised slave, by becoming a member of the family, and thus sharing its religious duties and privileges, is permitted to eat of the Passover. But the fountain-head of ancient Jewish slave legislation is Ex $21^{2\text{-}27}$. A clear distinction is here drawn between the Israelitish and the non-Israelitish bondman or bondwoman, a distinction which held in all succeeding ages. An Israelite could buy a fellow-Israelite for six years only. In the seventh year he automatically received emancipation, unless he voluntarily decided to remain. Gentile slaves, however, whether male or female, could gain their freedom only if they had previously been the victims of certain specified acts of cruelty by the master. In the year of jubile[1] all Israelite slaves together with the children born to them during serfdom were, according to Lv $25^{39f.}$, to be liberated without exception; but, if the children were born of a Gentile mother, then they, like her, must remain in slavery (Ex 21^{4}). According to Lv $25^{50f.}$, the Hebrew slave of a non-Hebrew master had also to be freed in the year of jubile, although he should previously be redeemed, if possible, by his kindred or by his own money, the redemption price being reckoned in accordance with the number of years that had still to elapse before the arrival of the jubile. That the traffic in slaves led to numerous abuses, religious, moral, and economic, is seen from Jer $34^{8\text{-}22}$, where the princes, priests, and people of Judah are divinely warned of the dire punishment which will overtake them as a result of their breach with the ordinances of the Mosaic slave legislation. There are numerous points, both of resemblance and of contrast, between the Mosaic slave laws and those of the Code of Ḥammurabi.[2]

2. **In Rabbinic literature.**—The status, rights, privileges, and manumission of slaves are subjects of elaborate discussion in the Talmud as well as in the subsequent mediæval code-books, such as—to mention the two principal ones—the *Mishneh Tôrāh* of Maimonides (*q.v.*) and the *Shûlḥān 'Arûkh* of Joseph Qaro (*q.v.*). From Lv 25^{39}, 'And if thy

[1] See art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew), § I. iv. a.
[2] See art. LAW (Babylonian), vol. vii. p. 818.

brother . . . be waxen poor, and be sold . . .,' the Talmudic authorities deduced the injunction that a Jew should sell himself into slavery only as a very last possible resort, as such an act was a stigma upon the honour of the Jewish religion, which declared through Lv 25[55] that the Israelites were to be servants of the divine, and not of any human, master. He should not sell himself to a woman or to a convert or to a Gentile; but, should he do so, the sale is valid, and it then becomes the religious duty not only of his family but also of the Jewish community to effect his redemption. Such an act was always considered a highly meritorious one, and the social life of the mediæval Jews is studded with instances of it on the part of individuals and communities in different parts of Europe—although it should here be said that the Synagogue forbade the traffic in Jewish slaves at quite an early stage, but placed no bar on the commerce in heathen slaves. The master was religiously bound to have his non-Jewish slave circumcised. In default of this, it was the duty of the ecclesiastical authorities to have the circumcision performed. But, should such slave have been purchased from a non-Jewish master, then circumcision was optional to the slave, who, if he refused to undergo it, was not allowed to be kept longer than twelve months, after which it was incumbent upon the Jew to sell him to a non-Jewish master.[1] The object of laws like these was to make the slaves an integral part of the Jewish community. Once circumcised, they were regarded as being 'received into the fold' and bound by all the 'negative' precepts of the Tôrāh and by such 'affirmative' precepts as apply 'to stated times only.' But they were never more than a subordinate and inferior part of the community, as is proved by the limitations imposed by the Talmud and all the later codes upon their rights of intermarriage with the general Jewish population. When, however, as in the Middle Ages, the act of making Jewish converts was fraught with danger at the hands of Christian authorities (who in many places officially prohibited such conversions), the duty of circumcising slaves was entirely abrogated. According to the Talmud,[2] the master of a Jewish slave was compelled to accord him the same home comforts as he himself enjoyed.

As the *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh* puts it, 'It is the quality of saintliness (*ḥasīdūth*) and the way of wisdom for man to be merciful to his slave, not to make his yoke heavy nor to distress him, but to give him to eat and drink of all manner of foods, not to contemn him either by deed or word, not to multiply complaints and anger against him but rather to speak gently to him and lend a kindly ear to his grievances.'[3]

Self-redemption for the slave, whether Jewish or not, was always permitted, the conditions governing such an act on the part of a female differing in many material ways from those attaching to a male.

Jewish legislation, like all other systems which legalized slavery, refused to slaves all title to independent property. As the Rabbis laconically phrased it, 'Whatsoever the slave hath acquired, the master hath acquired.'[4] Whatever he may receive from others, or find by the way, belongs to the master. Should he be assailed and injured, the damages—which were a five-fold compensation for (*a*) the blow, (*b*) the pain caused, (*c*) the cost of healing, (*d*) loss of time, (*e*) the indignity—were to be paid to the master.

A subject elaborated at great length in the Talmud and the mediæval codes is the manumission of the non-Jewish slave, which became compulsory on the master's ill-treatment of him in certain specified respects. A deed of manumission had to be drawn up, and, should the master refuse to sign it, he was excommunicated. It had to be handed to the slave in the presence of two witnesses; and, should the master have expressed a merely oral intention to manumit, he could not retract, as his words were binding, and the court could compel him to write out the official deed. A curious law is the following: if the master married his slave to a freewoman, or if he put phylacteries on his head, or if he bade him read three verses in a scroll of the Law before the congregation, or if he asked him to do any of those precepts which only a freeman might perform, the slave became free and the master was compelled to give him a document of manumission.[1] To write in the future tense 'I shall manumit' was ineffectual. It must be in the past tense, 'I have manumitted.' According to Lv 25[46], it is the Jew's duty to retain his non-Jewish slave and transmit him as a heritage to his children. Hence it was that the Rabbis said that to manumit a 'Canaanite' (*i.e.* non-Jewish) slave was to infringe a negative precept.[2] An exception, however, was made in the case of manumission *lidbar mitzvah*, *i.e.* for the purpose of fulfilling a precept, as, *e.g.*, to complete the number of ten males required for the celebration of public worship. Should the slave express a wish to go to Palestine, the master was compelled to go with him or to sell him to some one who would consent to take him there. If a slave fled from anywhere to Palestine, he might not be brought back into serfdom; and the master was bound to manumit him. This law is based on Dt 23[15], 'Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee.' He who, living in Palestine, sells his slave to a master outside Palestine thereby enables the slave to get his freedom, as the second master is compelled to manumit him.[3] Should a Jew sell his slave to a non-Jew, the slave thereby acquires his freedom.

3. **Jews and the slave trade.**—The mediæval Church's objection, from the time of Constantine, against the ownership of Christian slaves by Jews did not prevent the latter from becoming, at certain epochs, the chief traders in this class of traffic. Indeed, Christians openly defied the Church by co-operating with Jews in this commerce. In the reign of Louis the Pious the Jews imported large numbers of Christian slaves into Spain and N. Africa. Likewise they acted as middlemen, supplying Christian slaves to the Muslim world and Muslim slaves to the Christian. At the zenith of the Jew's prosperity in Spain (from the 10th to the end of the 15th cent.) many of the most wealthy Spanish-Jewish families amassed large fortunes by the importation of slaves from Andalusia.[4] The circumcision of slaves often incensed the mediæval Church authorities, and bitter protests were frequently heard. As the practice was looked upon as an infringement of the law prohibiting Jews from making converts, the Rabbinical authorities made the rite of circumcision optional on the part of the bondman.

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[1] See T.B. *Yᵉbhāmōth*, 48*b*.
[2] T.B. *Qiddūshin*, 20*a*.
[3] 'Yōreh De'āh,' 'Hilkōth 'Ābādīm,' sect. 267, 17.
[4] T.B. *Bābhā Mᵉṣi'ā*, 12*a*; T.B. *Qiddūshin*, 22*b*.

[1] *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh*, 'Yōreh De'āh,' sect. 267, 70.
[2] T.B. *Gittin*, 45*b*.
[3] *Ib.* 45*a*.
[4] H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, vol. iv. ch. 3.

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SLAVERY (Roman). — Slavery among the Romans differs from slavery in Greece in respect of the scale and the application of the institution. To these differences must be added that of greater range in time, so that the historical development of Roman slavery is both more apparent and more complex than is the case in Greece. In spite of these differences, however, the essential nature and general characteristics of the institution remain the same, so that much of what is said under the head of Greek slavery is true here also.

I. *FIRST PERIOD.*—We must distinguish three periods in the history of Roman slavery. The earliest, a comparatively brief phase, is that of what Mommsen calls 'the old, in some measure innocent, rural slavery,'[1] under which the farmer tilled his moderate holding in person, assisted by his sons and his slaves, and occasionally by hired hands—a system under which the slaves were comparatively few, and mainly of Italian or at least Etruscan origin. They were either war captives or born of such. There was thus 'no striking distinction, and often no distinction at all, of race, appearance, speech, or manners, no instinctive repulsion between owners and owned, which, in other regions, have supplied some of the most painful chapters in the history of human relations. Chattels at law, ritual included them not only within the pale of humankind, but to a limited extent even of the family, and the simple households of earliest Rome may have witnessed little difference in the treatment of slaves and sons.'[2]

Traces of this older humanity of relations between master and slave still linger in the household of the elder Cato in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C., though he belongs in reality to the following period.[3] Like the housefather and landholder of old time, Cato shared the labours and coarse fare of his slaves,[4] and his wife—'if she allowed her children to be suckled by female slaves, she also allowed their children[5] in return to draw nourishment from her own breast; one of the few traits which indicate an endeavour to mitigate the institution of slavery by ties of human sympathy—the common impulses of maternity and the bond of foster-brotherhood.'[6]

II. *SECOND PERIOD.* — The second stage of Roman slavery was entered upon early in the 4th cent. B.C., when the national economy of Italy began to experience a revolution, the earliest evidence of which is the enactment of the law of 367 B.C., compelling a landholder to employ along with his slaves a certain proportion[7] of free labourers. The centralized farming on a big scale which began after the Hannibalic war was probably derived from the Carthaginian slave plantation-system,[8] with which the Romans came in contact in Africa and Sicily; perhaps also, as Mommsen suggests,[1] it was not unconnected with the recent introduction of wheat-growing. The result was the rapid expansion of slave-owning as a mode of investment—a process which simply repeated the industrial development seen in Greece two centuries earlier. The new system 'was pervaded by the utter regardlessness characteristic of the power of capital,'[2] and was 'just like that of America, based on the methodically-prosecuted hunting of man.'[3] Concomitantly, special factors were at work to divert attention from agriculture to cattle-rearing as being at once easier, more profitable, and apparently capable of unlimited development, besides being more immediately available and lending itself to the spirit of an age in which the display and spending of wealth (in some respect actually enforced by law[4]) was more congenial than the making of it by personal industry, as in the old days.[5] But, in whatever direction speculation applied itself, 'its instrument was without exception man reduced in law to a beast of burden.'[6] This expanded slave-system was applied in two main forms—to pastoral husbandry carried on by means of armed, often mounted, slave-herdsmen on great ranches,[7] and to the plantation-system proper, *i.e.* cultivation of huge estates (*latifundia*) by means of gangs of slaves,[8] working often in shackles and always under the supervision of overseers, slaves like themselves. To these types a third may be added, that of domestic industry carried on for the profit of an owner by slaves skilled in various arts or trades, or by freedmen working in part for the profit of their *quondam* master.[9]

Thus from the latter part of the 2nd cent. B.C. the slave-system of the Republic reached its acme. An enormous increase in the slave trade was the consequence of the sudden and universal demand for cheap labour—'occupiers of State land required shepherds; the contractors required labour for public works or military equipment;[10] the State required it for the public services; traders for the crews of their ships; the wealthy for domestic service or for gladiatorial shows; small proprietors and the middle class generally to relieve them of the more distasteful part of their daily work.'[11] There can be no question that the work controlled by the public companies was done mainly by slaves, and that their operations were unhampered by the organized claims of free labour; they were therefore able to choose their instruments solely with a view to efficiency. For the more technical side of the various activities in request the Roman citizen was in general never sufficiently well educated, while for the life on the great cattle-runs and sheep-walks he was if possible still less adapted. Moreover, the frequent calls to military service, 'the real industry of the Roman freeman,'[12] made it undesirable, from the employer's point of view, to use citizens even for such labour as they might be willing to undertake.[13]

The inherent viciousness of the situation was hardly felt at all at first.[14] For, while the continual wars of plunder bred and fostered a capitalistic class crying ever for labour and yet more labour, they also directed towards Italy a ceaseless and, as it seemed, inexhaustible stream of the cheapest labour in the world,[15] in the tens of thousands of slaves torn from all parts of the Mediterranean area and the north. There was perhaps hardly

[1] The *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. tr., new ed., London, 1901, iii. 305.
[2] C. W. L. Launspach, *State and Family in Early Rome*, London, 1908, p. 63; cf. Plutarch, *Coriolanus*, 24; see also the directions of Varro to make a place for the slaves to stroll about in and sleep (*de Re rust.* i. 13).
[3] Mommsen, iii. 117 *f.*; see G. Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, Eng. tr., London, 1907–09, i. 30.
[4] Plut. *Cato Maior*, 3.
[5] Probably to be understood not of the ruck of the slaves, but of the permissive family of the *villicus* (cf. Varro, *de Re rust.* i. 17. 5).
[6] Mommsen, iii. 118.
[7] One-third, in the law as revived by Julius Cæsar (Suetonius, *Julius Cæsar*, 42). Appian, *de Bellis civilibus*, i. 8, is the only authority referring this provision back to the Licinian law.
[8] See Mommsen, iii. 307; cf. ii. 138.
[9] *Ib.* iii. 71.
[10] *Ib.* iii. 306.
[11] Mommsen, iii. 120.
[12] *Ib.* iii. 307.
[13] This pastoral husbandry on slave-manned ranches or sheep-runs was rapidly extended to the provinces as they became available for exploitation; *e.g.*, Dalmatia in 155 B.C. was no sooner acquired than the Roman capitalists began the rearing of cattle there on a big scale. T. Pomponius Atticus possessed enormous cattle-runs in Epirus (Cornelius Nepos, *Atticus*, xiv. 3). It was the vast military needs of the time that made these so profitable.
[14] Especially in Etruria (Plut. *Tib. Gracchus*, 8, and cf. Ferrero, iii. 302 *f.*).
[15] Cf. the case of Crassus, who made much of his wealth by buying unskilled slaves and having them trained to various professions (Ferrero, i. 203 and 340; A. H. J. Greenidge, *Hist. of Rome*, i. 56 *f.*).
[16] For the enormous development of the contract system in this age see Polybius, vi. 17.
[17] Ferrero, i. 28.
[18] Cf. Dion. Hal. ii. 28.
[19] Cf. App. *de Bell. civ.* i. 7; see Ferrero, i. 28.
[20] Cf. Greenidge, i. 65.
[21] *Ib.* p. 82. See *ib.* p. 83 for prices; also Dio Cassius, lv. 21; Tacitus, *Annals*, xiii. 31.

any branch of trade better organized than the slave trade itself, the foster-mother of all other trades of the time.

1. **Sources of supply.**—'The Negroland of that period was western Asia,[1] where the Cretan and Cilician corsairs, the real professional slave-hunters and slave-dealers, robbed the coasts of Syria and the Greek islands.'[2] To such a pitch was the hunting pursued that about 100 B.C. the king of Bithynia pleaded, as a reason for his inability to supply the required military contingent, the ravages of the Roman revenue-farmers among the able-bodied population of his kingdom.[3] At the great slave-mart in Delos, where the Eastern dealers disposed of their human cargoes to Italian middlemen, as many as 10,000 head were said to have been landed and sold off in a single day.[4] Many regions must thus have been permanently depopulated and permanently depressed below the margin of cultivation.

After the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom at the battle of Pydna Æmilius Paullus, under the senate's orders, sold into slavery, *i.e.* to the speculators or wholesale agents (*mangones*) who accompanied Roman armies for that purpose, 150,000 free inhabitants of 70 communities in Epirus which had sided with Perseus.[5] The defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones contributed a like number to the Roman slave-market.[6] Cæsar on a single occasion sold into slavery 53,000 of the Aduatuci;[7] and similarly, at the opposite extremity of the empire, Cicero, after his own petty campaign in the Taurus and the capture of the hill-fort of Pindenissus, writes to Atticus telling him how much the sale of the captives brought.[8] Titus sold 90,000 Jews into slavery in the conquest of Palestine.

2. **Legal position.**—In law the slave was a chattel; he was the one human being who could be owned. He is not only a chattel (*res*), but is treated constantly in the legal texts as the typical chattel. Under the republic there were no legal limitations to the master's power; *iure gentium* his rights were unrestricted. Public opinion,[9] however, and self-interest, combined with the religious sentiment connected with family life, exercised a powerful influence to the slave's advantage at a time when slaves were few and in closer relations with the master than was the case in later ages. The censors could also take note of outrageous cruelty to slaves as of other conduct unworthy of a citizen. In political and civic life the slave had no share; he could hold no public office nor sit in any public assembly; nor could he serve in the army.[10]

3. **Public slaves.**—A considerable number of slaves were employed in various public departments in subordinate duties. These formed a class standing somewhat apart from the rest of the slaves, and were known as *servi publici populi Romani*. They formed in fact a sort of rudimentary lowest grade of a permanent civil service, as at Athens, serving as messengers, magistrates' attendants, clerks, servants in temples,[11] assistants in the fire, water, and sewerage services, under the control of the ædiles.[12] Under the empire the employment of *servi publici* diminished, and they were superseded by freemen, except within the capital, as early as the time of Augustus.

4. **Status in religion.**—The exclusion of slaves from the public cults was not due to any denial of their claim to divine protection, but simply to the fact that the gods were divinities of certain special groups, *gentes*, etc., to which slaves neither did nor could belong. Hence they could not share in the *sacra* of the *gens* of their master. But slaves had a special cult of Diana, and were given special consideration at the festival of the *Saturnalia*, the most remarkable feature of which was the temporary licence granted to slaves in the household—slaves and free for the nonce exchanging rôles.[1] Within the household, slaves shared in the worship of the Lares and Penates. In the burial customs their common humanity is fully recognized, and the grave of the slave is declared as sacred as that of the freeman; he rests there with the other departed members of the family of which he was the humblest element. Hence memorials to slaves are among the commonest of funeral inscriptions. Slaves are also members (with their master's consent) of burial clubs[2] (*collegia*).

5. **Marriage.**—Legally slaves were incapable of marriage, but it is abundantly clear from the literary and legal texts that they habitually entered into permanent unions, which were marriage in all but their legal aspect, and were in general respected as such by their masters; and the names of legal relationships arising through legal marriage—*uxor*, *pater*, *filius*, *frater*, and the like—were freely applied in the case of slaves, even in the legal texts, but, as is expressly said, by analogy only and without legal significance. In strictness, however, any such connexion between male and female slave, or between slave and free, could only be 'cohabitation' (*contubernium*), not *matrimonium*. Hence, in the case of free persons, enslavement of either party broke the marriage tie.

6. **Torture.**—A slave could not be party to civil proceedings, either to sue or to be sued; this must be done through his master. Nor could a slave be accuser in a criminal case;[3] but he could 'inform,' *i.e.* make *delationes* of criminal offences, though not against his master (except, from the time of Severus, for certain specified offences; cf. the rules regarding slaves' evidence against their masters).

As a rule, the evidence of slaves was not admissible in civil cases, but there were some exceptions. Where it was admissible, it had to be taken under torture (*quæstio*), as in Greece; but recourse was not to be had to such evidence unless there was already independent evidence before the court. In criminal cases also the evidence of slaves must be elicited by torture, conducted out of court under the supervision of the *quæsitor*; it might be applied more than once.[4] But a slave could not be examined under torture to elicit evidence against his own master, or, in the case of jointly-owned slaves, against either joint-owner.[5]

7. **The peculium.**—Though slaves were *pro nullis* in the eye of the civil and the prætorian law,[6] they were in practice far from being nullities. Practical needs compelled recognition of a slave's individuality, and suggested those illogical com-

1 Slaves from that region were regarded as being specially fitted for slavery owing to their great powers of endurance. Plautus commends the Syrians ('genus quod patientissimum est hominum' [*Trinummus*, 542]). Sardinians, on the other hand, were little worth (cf. Cicero, *pro Flacco*, 27 [65]; Festus, p. 322: 'Sardi venales, alius alio nequior').

2 Mommsen, iii. 306.
3 Diodorus, xxxvi. 3.
4 Strabo, p. 668.
5 Livy, xlv. 34; Strabo, p. 822.
6 Livy, *Epit.* 68.
7 *de Bell. Gall.* ii. 33; cf. iii. 16.
8 *ad Att.* v. xx. 5.

9 So even under the empire (see Sen. *de Clem.* i. 18).

10 Death was the penalty for enrolment; cf. Livy xxii. 33 for the crucifying of 25 slaves, 'quod in campo Martio coniurassent' (see Pliny, *Epp. ad Trajanum*, 29 and 30). The state itself could of course override this rule, as was said to have been done after Cannæ.

11 Livy, ix. 29; Tac. *Hist.* i. 43.

12 Cf. *Lex Coloniæ Genetivæ Juliæ*, 62 (in E. G. Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters*, Oxford, 1912).

1 See *GB*[3], pt. vi. *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 307 f.; and cf. Seneca, *Ep.* xlvii. 14: 'honores illis in domo gerere, ius dicere permiserunt et domum pusillam rem publicam esse iudicaverunt.'

2 The *Lex collegii Lanuvini* of A.D. 133 has survived, and shows slaves as members (C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris romani antiqui*[7], Tübingen, 1909, i. 388 f.; see S. Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 251 f.).

3 Hence, to save the principle, Hadrian enacted that complaints lodged by slaves, of cruelty on their master's part, were not technically 'accusations.'

4 Valerius Maximus, viii. 4: 'octies tortus.'

5 Tac. *Ann.* ii. 30.

6 But not at natural law (Ulpian, *Digest.* L. xvii. 32: 'Quod attinet ad ius civile, servi pro nullis habentur; quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt'). Slavery is the only case in which, in the extant sources of Roman law, a conflict is declared to exist between the *ius gentium* and the *ius naturale*. It is part of the *ius gentium* because it originates in war. The Romans therefore frankly admitted that slavery was inconsistent with the highest ideals of human society. The thesis of Aristotle, on the contrary, was that slavery realized the purpose of nature as formulated in those ideals.

promises which are inherent in the Roman conception and law of slavery, and in the Greek also, though there less striking because of the paucity of documentary evidence. In Rome, as in Athens, almost any industry now carried on by free men might be and was carried on by slaves;[1] in imperial times it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Roman commerce was mainly in the hands of slaves; they carried on business (*e.g.*, banking) for their master, or were partners in firms; the whole sphere of private trading was shared by slaves in competition with free men, freedmen, and *peregrini*, before the development of the free *procurator*, or agent. It is this activity of slaves in the higher walks of mercantile and professional life—an activity which is at variance with the strict law of their status—that constitutes one of the most striking, and indeed hardly comprehensible, differences between ancient and modern slavery. For these activities demand for their exercise precisely those qualities of intelligence, industry, integrity, and mutual respect which in the conventional literary estimates of the slave are *totidem verbis* denied, and seem to moderns, partly on the basis of experience and partly through mere prejudice, incompatible with a status so degraded.

The institution which enabled the rich Roman to engage in commerce without that personal intervention which would have offended the social prejudices of his age, and at little risk, was that of the slave's *peculium*. The *peculium* was a fund which masters allowed slaves to hold and, within certain limits, to deal with as they pleased; in law it was the master's, but *de facto* it was the slave's. Originally it was simply the small savings of food and such like that a slave had a mind to make by stinting himself. Under the empire it might imply a great sum and be in any form, even including other slaves (*vicarii*) and their *peculia*, to a total value greater than that of the principal slave in whose *peculium* they were held, and whose stock-in-trade they constituted. In dealing with it commercially the slave appears as quite distinct from his master, though his capacity is purely derivative from him, ostensibly and in ordinary parlance dealing for himself, but in the eye of the law for the master's account. The *peculium* was thus a sort of property of the slave, so that upon his manumission by a living master, whether *vindicta* or informally, he took the *peculium*, unless it was expressly reserved;[2] by manumission by will it did not pass to the slave unless expressly given in the will. But alienation of the slave did not carry with it the *peculium* unless it was expressly so granted.

8. Treatment.—The mutual goodwill and even familiarity of intercourse marking the earlier domestic slavery of the Romans gradually gave place to harshness and cruelty, though the legal position of the slave remained in essentials unchanged. Life, however, does not necessarily move always on the lines of strict logic and law, and it is always open for the individual to rise above the standard of his age, so that the actual position of the slave was no doubt very often much better in fact than it was in theory.[3] In this later period also examples of happy relations between slave and master are not unknown, such as those between Cicero and his slave (later his freedman) Tiro[4]—though Cicero's general views on slavery seem to have been on all fours with those of Aristotle.[5] Such also were the relations between Atticus and his slave Alexis,[6] and between the younger Pliny and his *libertus* Zosimus.[7] But such humanity was purely personal, or at best confined to limited and cultured circles,[8] and represented neither the law nor average opinion and practice.

[1] Cf. Cicero, *de Officiis*, i. 42.

[2] In Greece apparently the rule was that the master manumitting or selling took the *peculium* unless he expressly waived his right (L. Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, Leipzig, 1891, p. 382).

[3] Cf. G. Boissier, *La Religion romaine*[2], ii. 315 *f.*

[4] See Boissier, *Cicéron et ses amis*[7], Paris, 1884, p. 113 *f.*; R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser, *Correspondence of Cicero*[2], Dublin, 1885, i. 106 f.

[5] Cf. *de Rep.* iii. 24; *de Off.* i. 42, ii. 7, and compare *ad Att.* i. xii. 4.

[6] 'Imaginem Tironis' (Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 10).

[7] *Ep.* v. 19; and cf. viii. 16. [8] Cf. Boissier, *Cicéron*, p. 118.

For with the economic revolution and the resultant broad distinction between the *familia urbana* and the *familia rustica*[1] a greater distance had been put between master and slave.[2] The slaves working on the estate, the stronger, rougher, less cultured and less tractable element, with which the master had as a rule little personal concern or contact,[3] came to stand, in comparison with the slaves of the town house, somewhat as a penal establishment, degradation to which could be held *in terrorem* over the heads of the more favoured class.[4] The fact that the slaves on the country estate were now controlled by a *villicus*, himself a slave, was probably but an aggravation of their condition.

Cato expressly advised the sale of old, worn-out, or sick slaves for what they would fetch—the system he applied to cattle and the inanimate tools.[5] Rations of sick slaves, he suggests, should be docked—a maxim adopted on other than hygienic grounds.[6] The practical application of this advice must generally have meant the callous abandonment of ailing slaves to their fate. A slave, Cato held, should either be at work or be asleep, *i.e.* he must as far as possible be reduced to the condition of a machine.[7] Though he ate with his household slaves, his after-dinner leisure was devoted to administering to peccant slaves 'the proper number of lashes with a thong wielded by his own hand.'[8] In the same business-like spirit he allowed indeed the union or quasi-marriage (*contubernium*) of his slaves, but only at a tariff, paid out of their *peculium*—a practice which doubtless would not lack imitators.

What in Cato's régime was the outcome of a mean and unsympathetic nature was in later times the calculated product of systematic policy.[9] Although it was universally recognized that harshness and injustice failed of their end,[10] the very numbers of the slaves led to the adoption of extreme cruelty in their punishments[11] and the application of the harshest methods of control.[12] No limits were set by law, until long after republican times, and very wide limits by custom and the tone of society, to the lengths to which caprice, passion, fear,[13] or innate love of cruelty might go in punishing even the most trifling offences.

Among other things, the use of chains, no longer as a penal measure,[14] but as a normal and constant precaution, and that not only for the slaves when at work in the fields under the eye of overseers, but also when they were herded at night in the fetid *ergastulum*, and even for women, became common.[15] In Ovid's time even the house-porter was, by old custom, a chained slave.[16]

Against such treatment the slave was, until the empire brought him a measure of relief,[17] quite impotent. Flight within Italy was in general hopeless,[18] and, even if effected, could at best but

[1] The distinction between the *familia urbana* and the *familia rustica* was one of occupation (and therefore of type of slave) rather than of place (*Dig.* L. xvi. 166: 'urbana familia et rustica non loco, sed genere distinguitur').

[2] Cf. Wallon, *Hist. de l'esclavage*, ii. 229. For monstrous exaggeration of demeanour towards slaves by the upstart freedman see the behaviour of Pallas (Dio Cass. lxii. 14; Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 23).

[3] Cf. Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 170: 'longa sub ignotis extendere rura colonis'; cf. Petronius, *Sat.* 37 and 48.

[4] Hor. *Sat.* II. vii. 117 f.; Sen. *de Ira*, iii. 29. Condemnation to the mill (*pistrinum*) was perhaps as bad, to the quarries much worse (Plautus, *Captivi*, 998 f.). The extremity of misery was reached by the slaves condemned to labour in the mines (cf. the mines at Laurion, and see Strabo's account of the Pontic mines, p. 562).

[5] Cato, *de Agric.* ii. 7: 'boves vetulos, armenta delicula, oves deliculas, lanam, pelles, plostrum vetus, ferramenta vetera, servum senem, servum morbosum, et si quid aliut supersit, vendat.'

[6] *Ib.* ii. 4.

[7] Plut. *Cato Maior*, 21.

[8] *Ib.*; Mommsen, iii. 118.

[9] Greenidge, *Hist.* i. 46.

[10] Cf. Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 33.

[11] Cf. Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*[4], ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1906, i. 39.

[12] Cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 44: 'postquam vero nationes in familiis habemus, quibus diversi ritus, externa sacra aut nulla sunt, colluviem istam non nisi metu coercueris.'

[13] Cf. Greenidge, *Hist.* i. 88.

[14] Their original purpose (Colum. i. 8; cf. Mommsen, iii. 70, note 1).

[15] Cf. Pliny, *HN.* xviii. 4.

[16] Suet. *de claris Rhetoribus*, 3; cf. Ovid, *Ars amat.* I. vi. 1: 'Janitor, indignum! dura religate catena'; but perhaps this was a mere fashionable pretence at rich houses.

[17] Through the right of asylum at the emperor's statue (Tac. *Ann.* iii. 36).

[18] The laws concerning *fugitivi*, and the legal interpretation of the term *fugitivus*, were very severe (see Buckland, *Roman Law of Slavery*, p. 267 f.). *Fugitivi* were pursued by hue and cry, their description being circulated and reward offered. Professional *fugitivarii* were employed to hunt them

lead eventually to the violent end of the highwayman,[1] and, if unsuccessful, to the doom of the arena or the cross, or to the more fearful forms of private execution which were among the grim secrets of the slaves' prison.[2] Mommsen has summed up the facts of this later slavery:

'The abyss of misery and woe, which opens before our eyes in this most miserable of all proletariates, may be fathomed by those who venture to gaze into such depths; it is very possible that, compared with the sufferings of the Roman slaves, the sum of all Negro sufferings is but a drop.'[3]

9. Gladiatorial slaves. — Amid the general misery of this slave world two classes, doomed to a yet blacker depth, are to be distinguished—(1) the wretched property of the *leno* ('qui cogit invitas pati stuprum'),[4] and (2) the gladiators of all varieties, kept either by private persons or by a *lanista*[5] in his training-school (*ludus*).[6] They were bound to their master by an oath (*auctoramentum gladiatorium*) to endure burning, bonds, flogging, and death by the sword, or anything else that the master ordered.[7] Prisoners of war, slaves, and criminals (especially brigands and incendiaries) condemned to death formed the bulk of the class, which numbered in its ranks also a proportion of voluntary combatants (often freedmen).[8]

Men even of the type of Cicero[9] and the younger Pliny[10] speak approvingly of the gladiatorial combats as an education in bravery and contempt of death. 'Even a man of high moral tone like Tacitus, while he condemns Drusus for gloating over his gladiatorial shows, has only a word of scorn for the victims of the butchery.'[11] Among the Romans Seneca here also showed himself far in advance of his age, and a noble exception to its lust for cruelty.[12]

The rewards of the successful gladiator were great, exceeding even those paid in modern times to men of thews and sinews and skill of this sort—the *popularis aura*, the praises sung by famous poets,[13] and the favours of fair admirers.[14] His fighting days over, the champion gained the wooden foil (*rudis*) of honourable retirement—fortunate if he escaped the honour of dying by the hand of a lunatic emperor;[15] more often in a last unlucky contest he heard the blood-maddened crowd roar '*Habet*' as some younger and more agile arm got home, and saw the pitiless thumbs give the signal for the fatal stroke.[1]

10. Murder of a master.—Not infrequently ill-treatment or an overpowering sense of degradation drove a slave, or even an entire household, to a desperate and bloody revenge.[2] 'As many foes as slaves' was held to be a truism,[3] even by a naturally merciful master. This led to the atrocious rule that the death of a master by the hand of one of his slaves was the signal for the summary execution of every slave in the house.[4]

Apparently this rule was so far modified that there was substituted a general liability to torture with the object of discovering the murderer, who thereupon alone would be executed. Hadrian definitely limited the torture to such slaves as had been under the same roof, or hard by, or actually in the slain man's company—those who had presumably been near enough to render help ('armis, manu, clamore et obiectu corporis').[5]

A fearful instance of the operation of the old practice was given in Nero's reign, upon the murder of the city præfect Pedanius Secundus in A.D. 61. The monstrous horror of the proposed wholesale execution of the *familia urbana* of the slain senator—400 slaves of both sexes—caused an outbreak of popular sympathy.[6] By this date a large proportion of the *plebs sordida* of Rome was tainted with servile blood. Although apparently the actual perpetrator was known to have acted alone on purely personal grounds, the senate refused to make an exception, and Nero was compelled to guard by troops the route of the condemned slaves to the place of butchery.

11. Servile revolts.—Slave conspiracies directed against the state itself, as distinguished from outbreaks against the tyranny of individual owners, were familiar to the Romans from an early date. In respect of both kinds of servile outbreak the history of Rome is in striking and instructive contrast with that of Athens.[7] Tradition carried back servile unrest even to the 6th cent. B.C.[8] and to the social and political struggles of the Roman Commons[9]—just as at the end of the republic the warring factions relied in part upon slave support. As time went on, servile insurrection became ever more possible, and ever more dangerous, through the increase in the servile and semi-servile classes.[10]

It was in Sicily, where the prædial slavery was seen in its most hateful operation, that servile revolt on a really great scale took place. The island was full of slaves herded in great gangs, branded like cattle, overworked under the lowest possible conditions of life, and in part expected or even urged to maintain themselves by violence and rapine, as was also the case on the great pastoral domains in Italy.[11] At the same time, the measure of precaution inculcated by Plato and Aristotle,[12] against bringing together men of the same race, had been quite neglected; for the great mass of Sicilian slaves were of Syrian, or at least Asiatic, origin—a source which was reputed moreover to furnish the hardiest type of slave. The rising under Eunus, in 133 B.C., was suppressed by the consul P. Rupilius only after three years of warfare and the slaughter of over 20,000 slaves.[13] Then came the great slave war in Sicily, lasting five years, under Tryphon (Salvius) and Athenion, from 103 B.C.[14] Even more formidable was the insurrection of gladiatorial slaves[15] under Spartacus, in Italy.

12. Slaves in the civil wars.—Naturally, the slave resources of powerful houses became an instrument of political warfare also, as waged in the

down (cf. Petron. *Sat.* 97). When caught, they were branded on the forehead (*ib.* 103) or maimed or sent to the arena (cf. the story of Androcles [Aulus Gellius, v. 14]).

1 Cf. Petron. *Sat.* 111. 2 Sen. *de Ira*, iii. 3, 6.
3 iii. 308. 4 See art. PROSTITUTION (Roman).

5 Isidore of Seville (*Orig.* 10) says this is an Etruscan word meaning 'butcher' or 'executioner.' The gladiatorial spectacles were introduced from Etruria; they were a survival of the practice of immolating slaves and prisoners at the tomb of a chieftain; at Rome also they were for long confined to funerals. Even Atticus invested in gladiators (as did others) to let out or to sell again to the ædiles for the public games, or to such as wanted a gang of roughs as bodyguard (cf. Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 4, *ad Q. Fratrem*, ii. 4, 5).

6 Cf. Quintilian, *Decl.* ix. 21: 'in ludo fui, qua poena nullam graviorem scelera noverunt, cuius ad comparationen ergastulum leve est.'

7 Cf. Hor. *Sat.* II. vii. 58; Petron. *Sat.* 117; Sen. *Ep.* xxxvii. 1 f., lxx. 17 f.

8 Petron. *Sat.* 45.

9 *Tusc. Disp.* ii. 17 (41): 'oculis nulla poterat esse fortior contra dolorem et mortem disciplina'; though Cicero in this passage adds the words: 'crudele gladiatorum spectaculum et inhumanum nonnullis videri solet, et haud scio an ita sit, ut nunc fit.'

10 *Panegyricus*, 33.

11 Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 234; Tac. *Ann.* i. 76: 'vili sanguine nimis gaudens.'

12 See *Ep.* vii. 3 f., xcv. 33: 'Homo, sacra res homini'; *de Brevitate Vitæ*, 13 f. Among the Greeks, when the Athenians were meditating the establishment of such shows, the gentle Demonax bade them first overthrow their altar of Pity (Lucian, *Demonax*, 57); cf. Dio Chrys. *Orationes*, xxxi. p. 385, ed. L. Dindorf; Plut. *Reip. ger. pr.* 29; Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* iv. 22—a remarkable passage, if true.

13 Cf. Martial, *Epigrams*, v. 25.

14 Petron. *Sat.* 126; Juv. *Sat.* vi. 103 f.—some of them were eager to emulate their exploits (Juv. *Sat.* vi. 246 f.; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 32; Dio Cass. lxxv. 16).

15 Cf. Suet. *Caligula*, 32.

1 Juv. *Sat.* iii. 36 f.

2 Sen. *de Clem.* i. 26; see the fate of the *superbus et sævus dominus*, Largius Macedo, in Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 14; cf. Sen. *Ep.* iv. 8; Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 44; Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 14, § 5.

3 Sen. *Ep.* xlvii. 5: 'totidem esse hostes quot servos. Non habemus illos hostes, sed facimus.'

4 Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 42; cf. the letter of Servius Sulpicius to Cicero in 45 B.C. (*ad Fam.* iv. xii. 3).

5 Spart. *Hadr.* xviii. 11.

6 Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 42: 'usque ad seditionem ventum est.'

7 See art. SLAVERY (Greek), § 7. 8 Dion. Hal. v. 51.

9 Livy, iii. 15; Dion. Hal. x. 16.

10 Cf. Livy, xxxii. 26, xxxiii. 36, xxxix. 29—all falling within the period from 198 B.C. to 185 B.C.

11 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 27 f., xxxviii.; cf. G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, London, 1864–74, i. 113 f.

12 Plato, *Laws*, 777 D; Aristotle, *Œconomica*, i. 5; *Pol.* iv. (vii.) 10=1330 A; so also Plut. *Cato Maior*, 21.

13 Orosius, v. 9; details in Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 2 (5) f.; Greenidge, *Hist.* i. 89 f.; Mommsen, iii. 309 f. See also J. P. Mahaffy, in *Hermathena*, xvi. [1890].

14 See Diod. Sic. xxxvi. 3 f.; Mommsen, iii. 383 f.; Long, ii. 76 f.

15 The history of this has to be pieced together from App. *de Bell. civ.* i. 116 f.; Plut. *Crassus*, 8 f., *Pompeius*, 21; Livy, *Epit.* 95 f.; Florus, ii. 8; and the fragments of Sallust's *Histories* (see B. Maurenbrecher, *Sallust. Crisp. Hist. Reliquiæ*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1891–93, *passim*); see also Mommsen, iv. 357 ff.

streets and environs of Rome by men like Milo and Clodius.[1] Clodius controlled the streets and the Comitia by means of his *operæ*, or 'gangs.' In 58 B.C. he legalized the so-called *Collegia Compitalicia*, or religious gilds of the lower orders, to which slaves also were admitted;[2] these received a semi-military organization.[3] In the civil wars slaves also were called into play, as by Saturninus (100 B.C.), who tried to rouse them by the offer of freedom.[4] 'The turning of slaves into soldiers is the proper work of civil war. . . . This is the final desperate act of a political party.'[5] Sulla relied largely upon the 10,000 slaves whom he had called to freedom and citizenship.[6]

The last desperate throw of Milo was his attempt to raise the pastoral slaves of S. Italy.[7] The senate itself, at the time of Catiline's conspiracy, determined to call out the gladiators of private citizens.[8] Cicero goes out of his way to boast of the protection afforded himself by the gladiators bought by Milo.[9] The assassins of Cæsar were guarded by the gladiators of Decimus Brutus.[10] In the struggle between Octavian, Antonius, and Pompeius gladiators and other slaves were freely employed, and were not seldom tricked to their destruction when they had served their purpose.[11]

III. *THIRD PERIOD.*—The second period of Roman slavery extends into imperial times for about a century. It passes insensibly into the third period, which is marked by the cessation of the military expansion of Roman power,[12] and consequently by a partial failure of the sources of slave supply. Being thus to a great extent thrown back upon the human resources already accumulated, the Roman slave-owners 'were reduced to the milder but more tedious method of propagation,'[13] and to a more careful conservation of their human property. Hence the prominence now assumed by questions of status where one or other parent was a slave. This enhanced interest in the practical problems of slavery, to which the legal genius of Rome had always given much thought, is from henceforth further complicated by the new factors calling for recognition. The result is that legislation in regard to slaves exhibits a sort of ebb and flow of humanitarianism. Although there is observable under the earlier emperors a tendency to ameliorate the servile status by legislation punishing various forms of cruelty to slaves (*e.g.*, the decree of Claudius in reference to the exposure of sick slaves), yet the legislation of Trajan was in this respect distinctly reactionary—a fact which may perhaps be connected with his renewal of external conquest. It is in Hadrian's time that the new spirit of humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism—that great social and spiritual change of so deep significance for the future of the world—in the main an outgrowth of Stoicism (*q.v.*), becomes a real factor in legislation. Hadrian is the first imperial representative of this new spirit, the operative principles of which had long before been formulated by Seneca (*q.v.*) and put in practice by that 'noblest type of a true Roman gentleman,'[14] Pliny the younger. Of Seneca it has been truly said that 'no modern has more clearly discerned the far-reaching curse of slavery.'[1]

It is significant of the seminal quality of the mind of Hellas that, although the first reasoned utterance of her philosophy on the slave question had been in defence of the 'peculiar institution,' a development of that philosophy in the fullness of time enunciated just as clearly and unmistakably the moral principles upon which the humanitarian legislation of Hadrian and the Antonines in this field was based; for these principles were no discovery of Seneca's, but had been in the air for generations before they find expression in the 'Stoic sermons'[2] addressed to Lucilius or in the earliest documents of the Christian Church. They are of course but the simple development of that assertion of the natural equality of bond and free, upon the common plane of rational humanity, which had been promulgated by the unnamed critics against whom Aristotle argues. By them slavery had been attacked, not on grounds of its inexpediency, whether social or economic, but on those of a natural justice which slavery violated or definitely impugned.[3]

1. **Stoicism and slavery.**—The theory of life elaborated by Stoicism was that of a spiritual city with a spiritual law, a city not made by hands, the citizenship of which was gained through spiritual insight, whether of bond or of free. Thus the classical and Aristotelian position was abandoned in two directions: the πόλις yielded place to the cosmopolis, the κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων, and slavery, the basis of the ancient city, gave place to equality of all men in the 'dear city of God.'[4] That Roman conquest had made the Mediterranean area for the first time an actual political unity simply rendered things easier for the Stoic, by creating out of the multiplicity of city- and nation-states the single world-state, or something very like it.[5] But the same kind of opposition that is observed between Stoicism and the narrower social ideals of Aristotle is found also when Stoicism is transplanted to Italy. For the fundamental difference between Stoicism, or the religion of humanity, and early Roman thought is that the former maintained the existence of a bond of unity among mankind which transcended all the distinctions of the actual political and social organization.

2. **Amelioration of slavery.**—When the tramp of the legions had reached its destined limits, and the empire, in obedience to the obscure laws of its own evolution had ceased to expand, there began that slow economic process by which, through the intermediate stage of serfdom, the servile status of the producing class was changed into one of legal freedom.[6] How far the different emperors in their legislation furthering these changes, as by protecting the slave against his master, facilitating manumission, and elevating the freedman, were working with prescience under a definite conception of the economic and social tendencies of their age is a problem far too obscure to be lightly answered.[7] Here, being concerned with the bare facts, and among them with such only as are significant for culture, we must content ourselves with tracing

1 Dio Cass. xxxix. 7 f.

2 They would require their master's permission; the master would generally be glad thus to secure the support of the roughs of his quarter for his political occasions.

3 Cf. Dio Cass. xxxviii. 13. 4 Val. Max. viii. 6. 2.

5 Long, i. 461; cf. Ferrero, ii. 185.

6 App. *de Bell. civ.* i. 100.

7 Cæsar, *de Bell. civ.* iii. 21 f.; see *ib.* i. 14 for an attempt of the consul Lentulus to turn the tables on Cæsar by freeing and enrolling Cæsar's own gladiators against him. For a similar proposal, rejected by the British Government, to arm the negroes of the Southern States, and thus abolish slavery at a stroke, see W. F. P. Napier, *Life and Opinions of Gen. Sir Charles J. Napier*, London, 1857, i. 370.

8 Sall. *Catilina*, 30.

9 *De Off.* ii. 17; cf. 'manus illa Clodiana, in cæde civium sæpe victrix' (*pro Sestio*, 37 [79]).

10 App. *de Bell. civ.* ii. 120.

11 Cf. Tac. *Hist.* ii. 11. 12 Cf. Tac. *Ann.* i. 11.

13 Gibbon, ed. Bury[4], i. 40.

14 J. B. Lightfoot, *Colossians and Philemon*[9], London, 1890, p. 317.

1 S. Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 12, quoting Sen. *de Ira*, iii. 35: 'deinde idem de republica libertatem sublatam quereris quam domi sustulisti.' 'Seneca has never risen higher, or swept farther into the future than in his treatment of slavery. He is far in advance of many a bishop or abbot or Christian baron of the middle age' (*ib.* p. 328).

2 Cf. W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[8], London, 1888, i. 243.

3 Aristotle, *Politics*, i. 3=1253 B.

4 Marcus Aurelius, iv. 23.

5 Cf. Plut. *de Alexandri Virtute*, 6.

6 The history of the rise and development of serfdom, which falls outside the limits of this article, is given by F. de Coulanges, *Recherches sur quelques problèmes d'histoire*, Paris, 1885, and B. Heisterbergk, *Die Entstehung des Colonats*, Leipzig, 1876.

7 Cf. Ferrero, i. 365: 'The law of life was the same then as it has been in all ages. The great men of that day were just as ignorant as their fellows of the historic work of which they were at once to be the instruments and the victims'; see also what is said by J. B. Bury with reference to Justinian and his work (*Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, London, 1889, i. 354). So speaking of Constantine, J. B. Carter (*The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, do. 1912, p. 116) says: 'He accomplished an extraordinary number of fateful things, yet we feel that these things did themselves through him rather than that he did them.'

the general tendency of imperial enactments and legal rules in favour of freedom.

Something was done to check subsidiary sources of slave-supply by the prohibition of the exposure or sale of children or the giving of them in pledge for debt. A *lex Petronia* of the 1st cent. A.D. forbade masters to punish slaves by sending them to fight with beasts in the arena, except with the assent of a proper court. Hadrian made it illegal for a master to kill his slave, except after judgment before a magistrate;[1] Antoninus Pius held a master who killed his slave just as liable for homicide as if the slave had belonged to another. He further laid down the rule that a slave badly used might take sanctuary at a temple (*fana deorum*) or the emperor's statue[2] and thus initiate a magisterial inquiry into his case; if his complaint of excessive cruelty[3] were made good, the slave was to be sold *bonis conditionibus* to another master.[4] A series of enactments had by the time of Justinian gradually limited the master's right of punishment to reasonable castigation. Protection to the morality of slaves was strangely slow in developing. Domitian forbade the commercial castration of slaves,[5] under penalty of forfeiture of half the offender's property; Hadrian increased the stringency of the law, and allowed the slave to lodge a complaint. Justinian confirmed all this in his *Novellæ*, 142, and punished all concerned in the perpetration of the act, on whatever pretence, and declared the slave free. Protection to the chastity of female slaves was similarly long delayed, and very imperfect. Not until A.D. 428 was it made penal for *lenones* to employ their slaves in prostitution. Justinian made rape of an *ancilla aliena* a capital offence; but there is no penalty laid down for seduction of an *ancilla* by her own master.

As regards the natural relationships which arose between slaves, the marked distinction between the rules of law and the practice of everyday life has been noticed.[6] Here also law tended to recognize the validity of practice informed with natural equity. Constantine laid it down that upon division of a property the slaves were to be so distributed as to keep together parent and child, brother and sister, husband and wife, thus recognizing not only the tie of marriage but also that of blood. Justinian went farther, and not only restricted the master's freedom of action so as to benefit the slave, but gave certain rights of succession to the issue of servile or semi-servile marriages, when one or other parent was manumitted.

Here may be mentioned the mass of legislation designed in the interests of orthodoxy, from the time of Constantine onwards. Its purpose was to crush heresy and prevent proselytism to the non-Christian cults tolerated by the empire (especially was it directed against Judaism). This legislation culminates in that of Justinian consolidating earlier efforts. It provided that no Jew should acquire a Christian slave by any title whatsoever, and that, if he did acquire one and circumcised him, or indeed if he circumcised any non-Jewish slave, Christian or not, he should be capitally punished, and the slave be free. Further, no pagan, Jew, Samaritan, or unorthodox person was allowed to hold a Christian slave, but such slave was to be free, and the man was to be fined. Lastly, if any non-Christian slave or heretic joined the Christian Church, he *ipso facto* became free, without compensation to his master. This must have operated powerfully to foster the idea of the Christian faith as constituting an order within which the victims of oppression of various kinds found protection and privilege.[7]

[1] Hadrian exiled for five years a Roman lady who treated her slaves with atrocious cruelty on slight occasion (*Dig.* I. vi. 2; cf. Juv. *Sat.* vi. 490 f.).

[2] In later times of course the Christian Church superseded these (cf. *Codex Theodosianus*, ix. 44. 1).

[3] This was held to cover not merely bodily violence or starvation rations, but also *infamis iniuria*, which would probably cover attempts to debauch an *ancilla*.

[4] Cf. the Attic rule; Gaius, iii. 53: 'si intolerabilis videbatur dominorum saevitia cogantur servos suos vendere.'

[5] Suet. *Domitianus*, 7. [6] Above, II. 5.

[7] Cf. artt. SLAVERY (Christian) and (Jewish).

3. Influence of Christianity.—It is evident from the above that, while the legitimacy of slavery continued to be firmly held, humanitarianism made its first conspicuous advance under Hadrian and the Antonines; and that the two hundred years following the first Christian emperor were comparatively barren in this respect. The legislation of Theodosius and Justinian marked a second advance, by its abolition of the restrictions on enfranchisement and the amelioration of the condition of freedmen, and its regulations in connexion with slave marriages (through the repeal of the *Senatus-consultum Claudianum*) and the status of exposed children. But *per contra*, even under Constantine, the rights of property were still so strictly guarded that, even for crimes, slaves were forbidden to lay information against their own master—a rule to which Constantine allowed no exception, but enacted that in all such cases the slave proffering information was to be crucified unheard.[1] The emperor Gratian, under whom orthodox Christianity for the first time became dominant in the empire, improved upon this by a law 'which may rank among the most atrocious of Paganism.'[2] It provided that, if a slave accused his master of any crime, except treason, the justice of his charge was not to be examined, but the slave was to be burnt alive;[3] the same terrible punishment, under Constantine, was laid on the slave guilty of intercourse with his mistress. Even Justinian's legislation, though it is no doubt influenced by the new religion, yet has nothing to say about slavery being opposed to either the spirit or the letter of Christianity; its guiding principle is expressed in a formula that is Stoic rather than specially Christian: 'pro libertate quam et fovere et tueri Romanis legibus et praecipue nostro numini peculiare est.'

The change in sentiment and policy of which the above modifications of the law are significant, so far as they go—which is indeed not very far—was of much earlier date than the official recognition of Christianity, and even antecedent to its introduction into the empire at all.[4] Perception of this fact gives the corrective of the exaggerated estimate, or rather the false historical perspective, in which the influence of Christianity upon the slave system of the empire is sometimes presented.[5] Partly the change was the fruit of philosophy or higher thought of the time, partly it was the natural adaptation of sentiment to the existing economic facts. 'While we cannot deny that Christianity tended to discourage slavery, and to lessen the evils of slavery by humanizing the relations with masters, it is certain that the economical conditions which changed the slave system into the colonate and serf system were the chief cause. Beliefs and sentiments generally adapt themselves to facts, and facts are in turn modified by beliefs.'[6] Such humanitarian sentiments and attitude were not the exclusive property of Christianity. 'What is a Roman knight, or a *libertinus*, or a slave?', Seneca asks. 'They are mere titles, born of ambition or of wrong.'[7] '"Slaves!",' he says in one of his finest letters. 'Nay, rather they are men. "Slaves!" No, comrades. "Slaves!" No, they are lowly friends, yea our fellow-slaves. . . . Remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, and lives, and dies.'[8] 'Virtue is fenced against none, but is open to all, admits all, calls to all—freeborn, freedmen, slaves, princes, exiles.'[9] In such passages as these 'Seneca preaches, with the unction of an evangelist, all the doctrines on which the humane legislation of the Antonine age was founded, all the principles of humanity and charity of every age.'[10]

[1] For fragment of this law see Bruns, *Fontes*[7], i. 266.

[2] Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism in Europe*, London, 1887, ii. 238.

[3] *Codex Theodos.* IX. vi. 2.

[4] Cf. J. Muirhead, *Hist. Introd. to the Private Law of Rome*[2], London, 1899, p. 355: 'It may well be that that spirit [of natural right] was intensified and rendered more active with the growth of Christian belief; but not until the latter had been publicly sanctioned by Constantine, and by Theodosius declared to be the religion of the State, do we meet with incontestable records of its influence.'

[5] Cf. H. Schiller, *Gesch. der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883–87, i. 455; Boissier, *Cicéron*[7], p. 118; R. D. Shaw, *The Pauline Epistles*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 313.

[6] J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, i. 370.

[7] *Ep.* xxxi. 11. [8] *Ib.* xlvii. 1, 10.

[9] *De Ben.* III. xviii. 2.

[10] Dill, p. 190; cf. Sen. *de Clem.* I. xviii. 3, *de Ben.* III. xxviii. 3.

Pliny the younger is like him in feeling that his slaves are of the same flesh and blood as himself,[1] and that towards them he has moral duties transcending the legal conventions of his time. His kindly letter on behalf of the repentant freedman of his friend Sabinianus[2] has often been brought into comparison with that of St. Paul addressed to Philemon on behalf of the runaway slave Onesimus.[3]

It has been pointed out[4] that the services of Christianity in this sphere were of three kinds. (1) The ceremonies and discipline of the Church ignored class distinctions; slave birth was no bar even to priesthood. This, however, is no innovation of the Christian brotherhood, for such equality of membership is found in the mystery-religions and other social-religious unions.[5] And, as in them, so in the Christian Church the obliteration of the distinction between bond and free is confessedly limited to those who come within the sacred pale; for those outside the Church, social and legal distinctions are left untouched, and therefore implicitly valid. Precisely the same attitude is forced upon the Church in modern times in dealing with similar conditions (often in deference to purely political considerations). That is to say, it has to be content to 'wait upon God,' in the sense that it must await the slow operation of what, humanly speaking, are secular causes. (2) In so far as Christianity imparted moral dignity to the servile class, by insistence upon the moral worth of just those qualities which were especially open for a slave to cultivate—obedience, fidelity, gentleness, patience, and resignation—it was but reinforcing the higher secular teaching of the time; and, like that, it found itself precisely herein most at variance with current conceptions and popular ideals of character. It would probably be correct, however, to see here the most profound and far-reaching influence of Christianity upon the social history of the empire; and not improbably much of the social hostility towards it was inspired by a perception of this fact of the inner sympathy of the new faith with the discredited and submerged sections of the population.[6] (3) The claim that the Church gave a special impetus to the movement of enfranchisement does not seem to be borne out as fully as one would wish.[7] It is at least a curious commentary thereon that the ecclesiastics 'were among the last to follow the counsels they so liberally bestowed upon the laity,'[8] and Christians continued to own slaves like their pagan neighbours. The historical fact is that slavery lasted in Europe for nearly 1000 years after Constantine—so slow is the working[9] of the moral leaven, even when, as here, economic factors conspire with religious motives in effecting the ultimate freedom of labour.

The truth is that much of what is said on this topic fails for want of historical knowledge, or through actual *suppressio veri* in the interests of prejudice. We can hardly with justice claim that the Church in its infancy and youth, advancing not by jumps but by and through human volition conditioned always by immediate facts and the forces of inherited tendency and circumstances, should have seen things more clearly than proved to be the case nearly 2000 years later when the 'three or four absolutely virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations' were written—written, moreover, largely in blood. Its action was not so much definitely official and mandatory as steadily influential for good, a *causa causans* in the heart of the individual slave-owner.[10]

4. Manumission.—Hardly anywhere better than in connexion with the manumission of slaves is the fundamental selfishness and meanness of antiquity observable. The emancipator never lost by his act, but probably in most cases stood to gain much.

Among the Romans manumission was 'less an act of liberality than an industrial speculation, the master often finding it more for his interest to share the profits of the trade or commerce of the freedman than to assert his title to the whole proceeds of the labour of his slave.'[11]

Manumission was of two kinds—regular (*iusta*), and informal (*minus iusta*). Of the former class there were three varieties.[1]

(*a*) *Census.*—This was essentially connected with the republican constitution and forms, and was probably a very ancient mode. Under the empire, with the extinction of the censorship, it is practically obsolete. In form it was simply the censor's enrolment of the slave, under a name of Roman type, on the list of citizens,[2] with his owner's assent. The slave became free and a Roman citizen. No conditions could be attached, though by means of a preliminary oath taken by the slave such could in practice be imposed.[3]

(*b*) *Vindicta.*—This mode was really a fictitious litigation or collusive action, in the form of an action brought by an *adsertor libertatis*, who claimed the slave before the presiding magistrate as a free man; the part of *adsertor libertatis*, in later times, was usually played by a *lictor*, who touched the slave with his wand (*vindicta*, or *festuca*), which gave its name to the method. As the point of the method lies in the official declaration that the slave is a free man, the freedom conferred is absolute; *i.e.*, it cannot be suspended or made conditional either expressly or tacitly, though doubtless there were ways of circumventing this difficulty so as to safeguard the claims which the master wished to retain over the services of his freedman. It was not unusual to exact from the slave to be manumitted an oath before manumission covering such services; repudiation of the oath rendered the freedman liable to penalties as a *libertus ingratus*.[4]

(*c*) *Testamento.*—This mode, by far the most important, is as old as, and therefore probably older than, the XII Tables. It differs from the preceding methods in that it is not based on fiction. It takes effect only upon the operation of a valid will, so that in general manumissions by this mode stand or fall with the will itself. Further, this manumission may be conditional or deferred (pending the event the man is a *statu liber*); the subject in the interim, until the arrival of the stated time or the occurrence of the condition, is exposed to the ordinary incidents of slavery, sale, etc., but he may not be brought into a worse condition or be deprived of his conditional right to freedom. Once effective, his liberty is irrevocable, subject to his performance of his duties as freedman.

(*d*) These were the only forms of manumission recognized as valid under the republic; but there were in use certain other less formal modes. Of such there were several varieties—*e.g.*, voluntary declaration *inter amicos*, or *per epistolam*. Such declarations were legally void, but towards the end of the republic the *prætor* intervened to protect slaves who had been declared free in this way, so that they enjoyed freedom *de facto*, though not *de iure*.[5]

(*e*) To these forms of manumission must be added one in use from the time of Constantine—the *manumissio in sacrosanctis ecclesiis*. A constitution of Constantine in A.D. 316 says that it had long been allowed for masters to free slaves *in ecclesia catholica* before the people, in the presence of the priests. By a constitution of 321 such manumission is declared to give also the *civitas Romana*. Hence it is surmised that this method was at first informal—a development of the manumission *inter amicos*. Justinian seems to have added the provision that there must also be a document signed by the master *vice testium*. This method appears to be in part a descendant of

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1 Cf. Juv. *Sat.* xiv. 16; Pliny, *Ep.* v. 19.

2 *Ep.* ix. 21.

3 Tr. of Pliny's letter in Lightfoot, *Colossians and Philem.*[9], p. 316.

4 Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[8], ii. 66 f.

5 Cf. Schiller, i. 455.

6 Cf. 1 Co 1[26].

7 When, in reference to St. Paul's Epistle to Philemon, Lightfoot says, 'The word "emancipation" seems to be trembling on his lips' (p. 321), we must hold that to be purely imaginary. The letter contains not the slightest hint that Philemon ought to set Onesimus free. The hope that he will receive him as a brother means only that the old tie should be beautified by the new relation of Christian fellowship. Certainly the phrase of v.[16]: οὐκέτι ὡς δοῦλον, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ δοῦλον, cannot be twisted to signify manumission. There is no evidence that the thought of an ultimate general abolition of slavery being possible or desirable had ever occurred to St. Paul (cf. A. C. McGiffert, *Hist. of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, Edinburgh, 1897, p. 376).

8 Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[8], ii. 71.

9 'The power of tradition in the blood is quite strong enough, often indeed is so powerful as to make progress but slow and doubtful, and to prevent the intrusion of new ideas' (P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, London, 1899, p. 500).

10 Cf. A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, London, 1910, p. 290; H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1885, ii. 469; cf. also art. SLAVERY (Christian).

11 Mommsen, ii. 84.

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1 Cf. Cic. *Top.* 2: 'si neque censu, nec vindicta, nec testamento liber factus est, non est liber.' The origin of Roman manumission is unknown; it is already an established institution at the time of the XII Tables (450 B.C.). Dion. Hal. (iv. 22) credits the law about it to Servius Tullius, but little weight attaches to this.

2 Cf. Cic. *de Orat.* i. 183.

3 This mode could be applied only in Rome, where alone the true Roman *census* was held. Strictly the entry of the name did not confer the *civitas*; it was the fictitious renewal of the record that the man was a citizen, under his proper class; but the legal mind of the Romans detected here a nice problem.

4 Cf. Cic. *ad Att.* VII. ii. 8; Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 26.

5 Hence such could not dispose of their *peculium*; cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 27.

the Greek mode of manumission by dedication in a temple to a deity.[1]

M. Aurelius and his brother authorized or regulated the purchase of freedom by slaves. This must have been an old practice in Rome, just as in Greece it was apparently the usual practice. The slave arranged with a third party to purchase him from his master, with money supplied by the slave, and then manumit him. The source of the purchase-money was immaterial, whether it came from the slave's *peculium* (which in law belonged actually to the vendor, his master) or from a loan advanced by a friend or even by the purchaser by arrangement with the slave. A slave so purchased was said 'suis nummis emi.'[2] The purchase was fictitious (*imaginaria*), but was winked at by the law.

IV. *FREEDMEN.*—Upon formal manumission by a valid method a slave became a freedman (*libertinus*, if spoken of with reference to class; *libertus* [=*liberatus*] in relation to his former *dominus*, who now becomes his *patronus*). In business relations with the world he was his own man,[3] but towards his old master and his family he continued to stand in a semi-servile relation,[4] under certain ties recognized by custom and law.

1. **Social position.**—Liberated slaves were perhaps usually set up in business or industry by their old master, who indeed in most cases liberated them to that end, and they continued to act as his confidential agents in financial undertakings, and as managers of businesses in which the *patronus* was sleeping partner. A man was thus able to profit by trade while avoiding the social stigma of direct management, and, if he was a senator, he was thus enabled to evade the Claudian law of 218 B.C., forbidding senators or their sons to engage in commerce—an enactment which drove them partly to invest their money in land, *i.e.* in slave-worked estates, partly to defeat the law in various ways through business slaves and freedmen. The Claudian law thus indirectly encouraged manumission.

Freedmen, though citizens, were in an inferior position, as they had not *connubium* with free persons, or the *ius honorum* (right of office or of sitting in the senate); nor could they as a rule serve in the legions[5] or among the equites. Their political rights were really annulled by their being restricted to enrolment in the four city tribes.[6]

2. **Importance under the empire.**—One of the most remarkable features of the empire was the swift rise of freedmen to wealth and power,[7] and the extraordinary importance to which individual freedmen attained, not only in the business world, but in that of imperial administration, in spite of the most violent prejudice and hatred felt towards them by aristocrats and plebeians alike. The inscriptions bear testimony to the extent to which wealth drifted into the hands of this class, just as in previous centuries it had tended to concentrate in the hands of a comparatively small section of *ingenui*, the great noble and the great contractor, and to be almost wholly withdrawn from the peasant and artisan. Since a freedman had no social standing to lose, the whole field of industry and trade, to which he had been trained as a slave, was open to him; so that he became, from the economic point of view, the greatest enemy of the pure-blood Italian. Not only were the lower walks of trade and industry invaded by freedmen, but as capitalists and landowners on the largest scale, both in Italy and in the provinces, they became a power in the land, and were conspicuous for their liberalities to *collegia* and municipalities. It is to this class that we must turn if we wish to trace the rise of a free industrial and free mercantile element divorced from the social and political traditions of the ancient world.

'They began to be regarded as the natural free workers of the community, who surrendered a portion of their profits to their superiors to maintain the upper and middle-class Italians in a luxurious idleness.'[1]

Trimalchio, the self-made man depicted by Petronius, is in many of his traits typical of the class—of its opulence, its vulgar consciousness of success, and its utter lack of all traditions or standards, except such as were expressible in terms of money.[2]

It is under Sulla that, in the person of Chrysogonus, there first comes into view 'the artful Greek freedman . . . a sinister figure, destined to reappear again and again in the days of the Empire as an instrument of administration, and to wield enormous power.'[3] The regular use of slaves and ex-slaves as public officials began under Julius Cæsar, who installed slaves of his household as officers of the mint.[4] But the practice must go back to a still earlier date, to the time of C. Gracchus, who 'concentrated the most varied and most complicated functions of government in his own person.'[5] In these multifarious activities Gracchus must have relied upon the skill and devotion of educated slaves and freedmen, just as did the great companies of *publicani*. 'The houses of politicians like Pompey, Crassus and Cæsar were miniature government offices where numberless freedmen and slaves from the east were engaged on their master's work.'[6] It is of this class above all, both under the later republic and under the empire, that Ferrero's words hold good when he says that 'in the pages of too many modern historians the mighty host of the workers lies concealed and contemned behind the dominant personality of a few soldiers and politicians.'[7]

3. **The imperial freedmen.**—The system of employing in the imperial administration the household talent of the reigning emperor was a necessary concomitant of the empire itself; for theoretically the emperor was only the first citizen, and his administrative staff was simply that of his private house, with its hierarchy of slaves under departmental heads who were themselves also either slaves or freedmen.[8] He had neither ministers of state nor a trained civil service, but was in theory his own secretary of state, chancellor, and minister of foreign affairs. It was not until the reign of Claudius, however, that the 'household of Cæsar' was confounded with the commonwealth, and his freedmen placed 'on a level with himself and the laws';[9] the political importance of the emperor's personal administrative staff increased, so that his freedmen became really ministers of state, responsible solely to him, and presiding over new departments, or acting with increased power and independence abroad.[10] The three great departments of controller of accounts (*a rationibus*), presided over by Pallas,[11] secretary

[1] Cf. Mitteis, pp. 100, 376.

[2] Cf. Suet. *de illust. Gramm.* 13.

[3] A slave, having no legal name, had to have one made for him on manumission. He took the name (*nomen* and *prænomen*) of his old master, adding his own slave name as cognomen; cf. Cic. *ad Att.* IV. xv. 1.

[4] A slave liberated by will was called *orcinus libertus*, and the patron's rights fell to the children of the deceased.

[5] This was the strict rule under the empire, so that a freedman, before he could be enrolled in the army, must have *ingenuitas* conferred upon him by the exercise of the imperial prerogative. But *libertini* were always freely employed in the fleet.

[6] Mommsen, i. 396 *f.*; details in his *Staatsrecht*, Berlin, 1874–88, iii. 436 f. Cicero in reference to this approves of the action of T. Gracchus, censor in 169 B.C., saying that otherwise 'rempublicam quam nunc vix tenemus, iam diu nullam haberemus' (*de Orat.* i. 9 [38]). Cicero, of course, exhibits all the narrow prejudices of the *municipalis eques*.

[7] Cf. Petron. *Sat.* 38: 'sed liberti scelerati, qui omnia ad se fecerunt.' In Martial's day 'freedman's wealth' has become proverbial (Mart. *Epigr.* v. xiii. 6; cf. Sen. *Ep.* xxvii. 4: 'et patrimonium habebat libertini et ingenium'); see also Juv. *Sat.* i. 102 *f.*, xiv. 305 *f.*

[1] Ferrero, i. 340.

[2] Cf. Petron. *Sat.* 77: 'Credite mihi: assem habeas, assem valeas; habes, habeberis,' and 43: 'Ab asse crevit et paratus fuit quadrantem de stercore mordicus tollere.'

[3] Heitland, *Roman Republic*, ii. 499.

[4] Suet. *Jul. Cæs.* 76: 'peculiares servos praeposuit.'

[5] Mommsen, iii. 355.

[6] Ferrero, i. 341. [7] i. 347.

[8] Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 67. 'It was a standing anomaly of the constitution that many offices which in a modern state would be important departments of the civil service were regarded as no more than posts in the chief citizen's household, unworthy of the dignity of any person above the rank of a freedman' (H. Furneaux, *Taciti Annalium*, ii. 38). Even under the republic 'the domestic transaction of official business was very large at Rome, for the State had given its administrators not even the skeleton of a civil service' (Greenidge, *Hist.* i. 15).

[9] Tac. *Ann.* xii. 60.

[10] *E.g.*, Felix, brother of the freedman Pallas, 'quem cohortibus et alis provinciaeque Iudaeae praeposuit, trium reginarum maritum' (Suet. *Claud.* 28; Ac 24[24]), who 'exercised the power of a king in the spirit of a slave' (Tac. *Hist.* v. 9).

[11] Tac. *Ann.* xi. 29.

(*ab epistulis*), presided over by Narcissus,[1] and receiver of petitions (*a libellis*), presided over first by Callistus and then by Doryphorus[2]—all these being private freedmen of the emperor—originated or took their importance in this reign. The rule of these powerful and wealthy freedmen was one of the bitterest memories of the outraged aristocrats[3]—as though it had been the work of a set of mere menials rather than of men at the highest level of capacity and education. In spite of their many gross and obvious vices, the ability and immense energy of these freedmen are undeniable. The disadvantage of their use was that, for all their efficiency and fidelity to their imperial master, they were not legally state officials at all, and their actual position was a standing offence to the social prejudices of their time.

4. The augustales.—The strict exclusion of *libertini* from magistracies and priestly offices, and from a seat on the municipal senates, was a public loss, as it debarred from public life and the constant distribution of wealth entailed by office precisely the richest and most enterprising class in the municipalities. To the problem of associating this class with the social and political ideals and organization of the empire Augustus early devoted attention. To this end he opened to the ambition of freedmen a field in the municipalities of Italy and the west by means of a new institution—that of the *Augustales* and the *Seviri Augustales*.[4]

V. *ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS.*—Investigation of the economic effects of slavery upon the Roman community is at once one of the most important and most difficult chapters in the history of the institution. To what degree did slave labour interfere with the development of free industry? An answer to this question would involve primarily an accurate estimate of the number of slaves found in Rome at a given moment, and the proportion they bore to free adults.

We have no statistics as to the number of urban slaves, public and private; much less can we discover the total slave population of Italy or the number of freedmen. Both slaves and freedmen are spoken of vaguely as a vast multitude, so great as to awaken alarm in the mind of any one who faced the facts.[5] The statement of Athenæus[6] that 'very many' (πάμπολλοι) Romans possessed 10,000 and even 20,000 slaves is no doubt an exaggeration. The freedman, C. Cæc. Claud. Isidorus, under Augustus, lost much property in the civil wars, but left at his death 4116 slaves;[7] Pedanius Secundus had 400 slaves in his city establishment.[8] But there is no doubt that in Rome as in Athens the vast majority of the people possessed no slaves at all. A reasonable estimate puts the urban slaves at 800,000 or 900,000.[9]

'The history of the Roman Republic is largely the history of the wealthier classes.'[10] Of the poorer classes we know little, as we hear of them only in the mass, and generally only as a political instrument in the hands of the demagogues. They must have had some means of livelihood other than the cheap corn distributed by the government (which indeed was not distributed gratis until 58 B.C.). This applies still more forcibly after the number of recipients was ruthlessly cut down from 320,000 to 150,000 by Julius Cæsar,[11] to a little over 200,000 by Augustus.[12] The continued existence of the trade gilds (*collegia opificum*) in the last century of the republic (though then largely misused as instruments of anarchism, *collegia sodalicia*) must, it seems, indicate that some freemen at least, in spite of the prejudice against small industry and retail trading,[1] made their living by such labour. Some indeed have gone so far as to maintain that even under the early empire a freeman could always obtain work if he wanted it[2]—in spite of the competition of slaves, and of *libertini*, who, as bound to their *patronus*, must in this connexion be reckoned with the true slaves. A large number of urban slaves worked within the great houses of the rich,[3] making them to a great extent self-supporting, but not directly competing with the small freeman, though undoubtedly restricting the field of his enterprise. Probably still larger in the aggregate was the class of slaves employed by contractors for public and private works, for public shows, and for all the activities of the various classes of *publicani*. Many of these slaves had been specially trained for their work.[4] This is the class which directly competed with free labour, for the free citizen either was not sufficiently well educated for these posts or was too independent for manual labour, apart from the fact that the stigma attaching to labour, other than agriculture, was very pronounced.[5] It was obviously as easy to hire from his master the sort of slave one wanted as to hire the services of a freeman from himself, without any certainty that he was capable of doing the work. The slave, it was certain, would do the work—his master would see to that. Hence both the skilled and the unskilled forms of labour would appear by a natural law to have been almost wholly in slave hands, except in so far as freedmen and their children, having gained special skill and habits of industry in slavery, retained a place in the industrial world. The whole tendency of the later republic and the empire was in the direction of 'permanent endowment of the unemployed.'[6] As regards the country estates, the tradition had always been that the farm should be as far as possible self-supporting;[7] but this had not implied that it should be run solely by slave labour.[8] Hired free labourers[9] were called in when extra hands were wanted, as at hay-harvest-time, or for the gathering of olives, and the vintage; Varro[10] also recommends the use of hired labourers rather than one's own slaves in unhealthy districts. Nevertheless the tendency was to make such properties more and more self-contained and self-supporting, so that even Varro's farming, which stands midway between the small farming of early times and the later plantation system, is essentially slave-farming and leaves little room for free labour. Upon the cattle-runs of S. Italy the work was apparently entirely in the hands of the half-wild herdsmen,[11] and here the economic system had sunk to a more primitive level; the same was true of Etruria also.[12] Here the exclusion of free labour

1 Suet. *Claud.* 28. 2 Dio Cass. lxi. 5.

3 Cf. Pliny, *Paneg.* 88: 'civium domini, libertorum servi'; Tac. *Hist.* i. 37, ii. 95.

4 See J. S. Reid, *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 511.

5 Cf. Tac. *Ann.* iii. 53: 'familiarum numerum et nationes,' iv. 27: 'urbem iam trepidam, ob multitudinem familiarum, quae gliscebat immensum, minore in dies plebe ingenua,' and xiv. 44; cf. also Sen. *de Clem.* i. 24; and Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 27, in reference to freedmen.

6 vi. p. 272. 7 Pliny, *HN* xxxiii. 135.

8 Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 43.

9 See Furneaux, i. 90; J. Beloch, 'Die Bevölkerung Italiens im Altertum,' in *Klio*, iii. [1903] 471 f.

10 Heitland, iii. 139. 11 Suet. *Jul. Cæs.* 41.

12 Dio Cass. lv. 10; *Monumentum Ancyranum*, 15.

1 Cf. Cic. *de Off.* i. 42 (150); Livy, xxii. 25.

2 L. Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengesch.*[5], Leipzig, 1881, i. 264.

3 Sall. *Cat.* 12: 'domos atque villas in urbium modum exaedificatas.'

4 Cf. the case of Crassus, from whom almost any kind of specially trained slave could be hired (Plut. *Crass.* 2).

5 Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* v. 104: 'quos singulos sicut operarios barbarosque contemnas.'

6 Heitland, iii. 451.

7 Cf. Varro, *de Re rust.* i. 22: 'quae nasci in fundo ac fieri a domesticis poterunt, eorum nequid ematur.'

8 It is curious that Vergil in his *Georgics* never mentions slaves. Perhaps the reason is that given in Sen. *Ep.* lxxxvi. 14: 'Vergilius noster, qui non quid verissime, sed quid decentissime diceretur adspexit nec agricolas docere voluit, sed legentes delectare.'

9 *Mercenarii, operarii* (Cato, *de Agric.* iv.), *conducticii* (Varro, *de Re rust.* i. 17).

10 *De Re rust.* i. 17. 11 *Ib.* ii. 10; Cic. *pro Tullio*, 14 f.

12 Plut. *Tib. Gr.* 8.

must have been absolute, for life on the cattle-run was below the culture level of the Roman populace.

Two remarkable facts stand out in this inquiry. (1) The Roman proletariat, so far as appears, never at any time complained of the competition of slave labour as depriving them of bread, though the Roman populace wanted bread badly—even Cicero, superficial as are his social and political judgments, admits that the corn-law of Gracchus was necessary.[1] (2) The Roman slave-owners, though the shrewdest men in the world, never seem to have had any doubts about the comparative advantages of slave labour. Both classes—and the same is true of Greece—persist, the one in acquiescence in, and the other in an application of, a system which is now held condemned not only in its moral basis but also in its economic results. Yet the Roman proletariat showed itself all through its history by no means unready to proceed to the most violent measures in relief of its grievances; and, on the other hand, we have no right to assume on the part of the Roman capitalists a stupid inability to gather from experience in what direction their maximum profit lay. It is undeniable that the Roman grandees found their account in the slave system as actually worked; only when the financial conditions altered, under the later empire, did slavery give place, in obedience to the law of maximum profit, to a new economic form, which indeed is very old—that of serfdom. In this connexion it must be noted that the Gracchan movement would be entirely wrongly interpreted as a protest of free labour against a slave system which deprived the freeman of the right to live by his toil. When Tiberius Gracchus cried that the beasts had their lairs, but nothing was left to Roman citizens save the air and the sunshine, that those who were styled masters of the world had no longer a clod they could call their own,[2] he was protesting, not against the slave system as such, but against a vicious system of land-distribution and of land-tenure, and his aim, like that of his brother, was not to revive the free labourer, but to re-establish the free peasant proprietor; the anonymous appeals to him were not that he should abolish the slave, but that he should restore to the poor their share of the public lands.[3] The failure of the Gracchan legislation, so far as it did fail—in proving unable to check the influx of the country population to the capital—was due to the fact that it 'offended against social ideals rather than against economic tendencies.'[4] Yet it is accepted almost as an axiom that it was the slave system, and the slave system alone, that ruined the Italian middle class of small proprietors and created the urban proletariat.

It is of course on the moral and spiritual ground, not on the economic, that slavery must ultimately be judged. That wide and deep demoralization which results for both master and slave is sufficiently obvious in the case of Rome also. On the one hand, the slave-owners, with no feeling of responsibility, except that of mere self-interest towards those who were absolutely at their mercy, fell into that despotic temper which found its logical but unexpected final expression in the insane cruelties of the successive masters of the Roman world. On the other hand, the existence in Italy of tens of thousands of men for whom all ties of race and kindred and home had been snapped at a stroke, for whom no moral standard thenceforth held good but that of their master's will, for whose conduct the only sanction was corporal punishment in its most debasing forms, for the vast majority of whom life offered no faintest prospect of moral or social independence and development, meant, at its lowest valuation, a permanent and terrible menace to the whole community. The evil was accentuated by the fact that this poisoned reservoir was not fenced off by the law, nor guarded by nature's colour-signal, which only those for whom the claims of their native race and culture already stood for little dared disobey; on the contrary, from this tainted source an ever-flowing stream was directed into the free population by the way of manumission. The condition of social progress, viz. the gradual elimination of class inequality, was certainly in a degree achieved thereby, and the decay of the native population to some extent made good;[1] but it was unfortunately from the most corrupted and most pernicious class—that of the urban slaves—that the freedmen who were the active agents in transmission of the blood-taint were mainly derived.[2] The steady stream of manumissions meant that the blood of the lower and middle classes of Latin stock was, generation after generation, losing its purity and becoming contaminated into a mongrel mixture of blood derived from nearly every race in the empire—and that only after its purveyors had been for a longer or shorter time submitted to all the deleterious influences of slavery. At a comparatively early date the effect of this process was manifest.[3] To argue that such qualitative distinctions are historically and philosophically invalid, and to point to the fact that in the fullness of time the blood which Scipio reviled was destined to produce a new race,[4] is not permissible, for it was after all true that, in comparison with Thracians, Gauls, Germans, and Asiatics, the Italian peoples had been and still were the vehicles of higher culture, and that, in so far as the elements assimilated through manumission were derived from Greece, it was nevertheless from a Greece decadent and debased.[5] The criticism rightly taken, however, is directed not against the mere fact of incorporation of diverse alien material, but against the ill-regulated and fortuitous way in which the incorporation proceeded, and the absence of any selective process worthy of the name, the whole field being in fact abandoned to a capricious and haphazard operation which gave no guarantee that only those most deserving of the honour attained it—a process entirely contrary to that lengthy education through which the larger political groups within the Italian peninsula itself had been incorporated with the republic. It is surely passing strange that aliens were freely admitted to citizenship provided that they entered by the door of slavery, whereas the incorporation of individual foreigners on grounds of personal merit was the rarest thing[6] and mostly the result of jobbery. Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the time of Augustus gives remarkable expression, as the result of his own experience, to the

[1] Cic. *de Off.* ii. 21 (72): 'frumentaria largitio . . . plebi necessaria.'
[2] Plut. *Tib. Gr.* 9. [3] *Ib.* 8.
[4] Greenidge, *Hist.* i. 269.

[1] Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* vii. 32. [2] Cf. App. *de Bell. civ.* ii. 120.
[3] See the well-known utterance of Scipio: 'cum omnis contio adclamasset, "Hostium," inquit, "armatorum totiens clamore non territus, qui possum vestro moveri, quorum noverca est Italia!"' (Vell. II. iv. 4); Val. Max. VI. ii. 3: 'Orto deinde murmure "Non efficietis," ait, "ut solutos verear, quos alligatos adduxi"'; cf. Petron. *Sat.* 122 (165 f.): 'Mercedibus emptae | ac viles operae, quorum est mea Roma noverca'; Lucan, *Phars.* vii. 404: 'nulloque frequentem | cive suo Romam, sed mundi faece repletam.'
[4] Cf. E. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, Halle, 1910, p. 212.
[5] Cf. Juv. *Sat.* iii. 58 f.; Cic. *pro Flacco*, 27 (65); *de Orat.* ii. 66 (265).
[6] Julius Cæsar, however, tried to encourage immigration of skilled labour (Suet. *Jul. Cæs.* 42: 'omnesque medicinam Romae professos et liberalium artium doctores, quo libentius et ipsi Urbem incolerent, et ceteri appeterent, civitate donavit'). On the other hand, he sent out a large number of *libertini* to the colony at Corinth (Strabo, p. 381).

evil effects of this indiscriminate system of manumission, with suggestions of a remedy.[1] But the collapse of the empire was not brought about by slavery,[2] but partly by the inclusion of undigested masses of barbarians[3] (who play on a larger scale within the empire the rôle previously played by slave-masses within the body politic of Italy), and partly by the vicious non-productive economic system of the empire itself.

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W. J. WOODHOUSE.

SLEEP.—See DREAMS AND SLEEP.

SMĀRTAS.—1. The Smārtas are an important sect of Brāhmans, found mostly in the south of India, their chief seat being in the Mysore State. There are also many in the Central Provinces. They derive their name from *smṛti*, 'what was remembered,' or tradition, as distinguished from *śruti*, 'what was heard,' inspired or revealed truth, only orally and audibly transmitted. As Manu[4] explains it, *śruti* means the Veda, *smṛti* 'the institutes of the sacred law.'

The Smārtas worship the triad of Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu under the mystic syllable *Oṃ*, and, while admitting them to be equal, exalt Śiva as their chief deity. They hold the pantheistic Vedānta doctrine of *advaita*, or non-dualism, which means that the universe is not distinct from the supreme soul. The leading tenet of the sect is the recognition of Brahma Para-Brahma as the only existing being, the sole cause and supreme ruler of the universe, and as distinct from Śiva, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, or any individual member of the pantheon; to know him is the supreme good. The attainment of complete wisdom results in *mukti*, or liberation, and re-union with the divine essence. But, as the mind of man cannot elevate itself to the contemplation of the inscrutable first cause and only soul, he may be contemplated through inferior deities and sought through the prescribed rites and exercises. This creed thus tolerates all the Hindu deities, and the worship of the following was, by Śaṅkarāchārya's express permission, taught by some of his disciples: Śiva, Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Sūrya, Śakti, Gaṇeśa, and Bhairava. The distinctive marks of a Smārta Brāhman are three parallel horizontal lines, of pounded sandalwood or of the ashes of cow-dung, on the forehead, with a round red spot in the centre. The Daṇḍīs of the north of India are an outcome of the Smārtas; they are mendicants.

The founder of the sect was Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarāchārya (*q.v.*), the celebrated Hindu reformer of the 8th cent., and apostle of the Uttara Mīmāṁsa or Vedānta. Their *guru*, or spiritual head, is the Śṛngeri Swāmi, designated the Jagad Guru, or priest of the world. He is a man of eminent learning and an ascetic of great sanctity, trained for his office from boyhood. His claims to reverence are admitted by all votaries of Śiva, whether of the Smārta or of any other communion. The enormous sums obtained from the piety of his disciples during his tours, on which he is often away for several years, are spent with a lavish hand in hospitality and works of charity so called. Śṛngeri, Śṛnga-giri, or Ṛishya-Śṛnga-giri, the site of the monastery, is a most picturesque and fertile spot on the bank of the Tungā river, sheltered by the Western Ghāts, in the Koppa *tāluq* of the Kadūr District of Mysore. The *jāgīr*, or landed estate, is about 8 miles long by 6 wide.

[1] *Ant. Rom.* iv. 24. [2] Cf. Meyer, p. 210.
[3] Cf. *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge, 1911 ff., i. 544.
[4] ii. 10.

2. Subdivisions.—The following are some of the subdivisions of the Smārtas, in certain of which are also included some members of the Mādhva (*q.v.*) sect. The Baḍaga-nāḍ had their origin in the northern (*baḍaga*) districts (*nāḍ*) and speak Kannaḍa. The Deśastha are immigrants from the Mahratta country and mostly retain the use of Mahratti. The Babbūr Kamme, Kannaḍa Kamme, and Ulcha Kamme nearly all speak Kannaḍa, a few Telugu also. The Kamme country seems to have been to the east of the Kolar District. The Muliki-nāḍ or Muriki-nāḍ are from the Kaḍapa District and speak Telugu. The Hoysaṇiga, also called Vaiśaṇiga, derive their name from the old Hoysala or Hoysaṇa kingdom and of course speak Kannaḍa. The Aruvelu, or the Six Thousand, speak both Kannaḍa and Telugu. The Aruvelu Niyogi are a branch of them who are *laukikas*, or devoted to secular callings. The Chitpāvan are Mahrattas. The Havika or Haiga are immigrants from Haiga, the ancient name of N. Kanara, and they are almost entirely confined to the west of the Shimoga District. They are now principally engaged in the cultivation of areca-nut gardens. They lay claim to original descent from the north of India. The small communities of Kandāvara, Kavarga, Koṭa and Koṭiśvara, Kuśasthala, Śiśuvarga (properly Śiṣyavarga), with the Śivalli, are all Tulu Brāhmans, immigrants from S. Kanara, the ancient Tuluva, and mostly located in the western districts. They engage in agriculture and trade and speak Tulu and Kannaḍa. The Karāḍe or Karhāḍe are Mahrattas from Karhāḍ. Some are employed in the Revenue Survey. The Konkaṇastha are also Mahrattas, from the Konkan. The Nandavaidika are from the Telugu country and speak Telugu and Kannaḍa. The Prathamaśākhe or Madyāndina also speak Telugu and Kannaḍa. The Sahavāsi are immigrants, like the Chitpāvan, from the Mahratta country. The Sanketi are from Madura and speak a corrupt mixture of Tamil and Kannaḍa. There are two branches—the Kauśika and the Beṭṭadpur, so named from the places in which they first settled, which are in the west of the Hassan and Mysore Districts. The Sanketi reverence a prophetess named Nāchārāmma or Nangiramma, who seems to have been instrumental in causing their migration from their original seats. The Haḷe Siranāḍ speak Kannaḍa and probably derive their name from Sira in the Tumkūr District. The Vengipuram all speak Telugu. So do the Velnāḍ, who resemble the Muriki-nāḍ. They are mostly in the south and east. The Vegi-nāḍ speak Kannaḍa.

3. Śṛngeri.—The fortunes of Śṛngeri, of such vital importance to the Smārtas, have had their ups and downs. It is worthy of note that the same neighbourhood was the cradle of two great states, thus proving it to be what is called 'heroic soil.' It was the birthplace of the Hoysalas, who developed into a first-rate power, arrested the Chola invasion in these parts, and finally drove the Cholas out of Mysore, thus becoming rulers of the whole country. But on the collapse of the Hoysala kingdom through Musalmān invaders from the north, in the 14th cent., an interregnum was created. Advantage was taken of this by the head of the Śṛngeri *maṭh* to aid two princes who had been connected with the Hoysalas to found a new kingdom, which before long expanded into the great Vijayanagar empire, embracing the whole of S. India. Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāraṇya, 'forest of learning,' the abbot of Śṛngeri, himself became the first minister, and after him the capital was first called Vidyānagara, eventually changed to Vijayanagar, 'city of victory.' It was now that the *maṭh* was endowed with lands and entered on a prosperous career. But Vijayanagar fell a prey in 1565 to a confederacy of Musalmān powers, and evil times overtook Śṛngeri. It was reduced to ruins, and its lands were seized by any one who could get hold of them. Meanwhile the Keladi or Bednūr kings in the north-west of Mysore had been extending their power and absorbed all Kanara and Malabar, with regions beyond to the north. They, in common with all the neighbour-

ing states, had adopted the new Vīra Śaiva or Lingāyat (*q.v.*) faith, which had spread with great rapidity throughout the Kannada and S. Mahratta countries. To them, nevertheless, the *guru* appealed in person and was successful in enlisting their support. The ruined buildings were rebuilt and the lands restored. At the same time, the *guru* judiciously resolved to recognize the Lingāyats, as being votaries of Śiva, though they would have nothing to say to Brāhmans. Since that time the place has been in safety, and, after the Keladi or Bednūr kingdom was subdued, has been liberally maintained by the Rājas of Mysore.

4. Other maths.—Other *maths* besides Śringeri were established by Śaṅkarāchārya in various parts, which are still in operation. The most notable is the Badarikāśrama at Kedarnāth in the Himālayas. This is where he died, at the early age of 32. The temple there is to this day always served by a Nambūtiri Brāhman (known as the *rāwal*) from Malabar, which was Śaṅkarāchārya's native country. Other *maths* are at Dwāraka in Kathiawar, Jagannāth in Orissa, and Kumbakonam in Tanjore. There was thus one at each cardinal point of the compass.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, ed. Rost, London, 1862; John Dowson, *Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion*, etc., do. 1879; L. Rice, *Mysore*, revised ed., i., do. 1897. LEWIS RICE.

SMOKING.—1. Smoking to produce rain.—In primitive society, where the food-supply is governed directly by the rainfall, the attitude of man is intensely practical and calculated to produce states of emotional intensity. The emotions must find vent somehow; this they do in representative and emotional ceremonies to produce the desired result. When primitive man wants rain, he does not imitate it, but endeavours actually to make it.[1] He has learnt by observation that the gathering of clouds presages the fall of rain, and consequently, he argues, to make clouds is the equivalent of making rain. Now nothing would more readily suggest to his mind the phenomena of clouds than smoke, and it is therefore not surprising that this substance frequently figures in rain-making ceremonies.

Thus the Bechuanas burn the stomach of an ox at evening because they imagine that the black smoke will produce rain-clouds,[2] just as the Tarahumare Indians of Mexico envelop the whole country in smoke in the spring by burning the grass, in order to gather rain-clouds. Likewise the Zuñi Indians of New Mexico set fire to the grass and trees at the summer solstice in order to make a great cloud of smoke, while bull-roarers are swung and prayers offered imploring the rain-makers to water the earth.[3] Every four years in August, when the corn is a foot high, a sacred dance is performed by Zuñi maidens carrying baskets of corn, while a man of the Frog clan smokes a cigarette of native tobacco over vessels of water and stalks of green corn. The object of the rite is to ensure a supply of rain and the growth of corn.[4]

Among the Omahas of N. America, when the first thunder is heard in the spring, the Elk and Bear clans assemble in a sacred tent belonging to the Elk gens. There one of the Bear people takes a pipe from a sacred bag and hands it to one of the Elk men with tobacco from an elk bladder. Before the pipe is smoked, it is held towards the sky and the thunder-god is addressed. After the pipe has been smoked, the rain always ceases.[5]

2. Smoking to produce trance.—It not infrequently happens that various psychological experiences are produced by inhaling the smoke of certain plants—a fact that has led primitive man to regard smoking as a means of getting into communication with the spirit world. Thus in the Hindu Kush the *dainyal*, or sibyl, inhales the smoke from the smouldering sacred cedar with a cloth over her head, till she is seized with convulsions and falls to the ground.[1] The smoke of the same wood is also inhaled by the prophet among the Takhas on the border of Kashmīr in order to keep off evil spirits before he utters his oracle.[2] The sacred laurel was inhaled by Apollo's prophetess before she prophesied,[3] and in Madura the woman who is to act as the medium of a spirit inhales the smoke of incense, sitting with her head over a smoking censer. Gradually she falls into a trance, and her utterances are regarded as oracular.[4] By smoking tobacco the sorcerers of Brazilian tribes raise themselves to ecstasy in their convulsive orgies and see spirits. The Bororo Indians (Brazil), *e.g.*, bless the new maize by an *aroetorrari* (medicine-man) working himself into a frenzy by dancing, singing, and incessant smoking, and in this condition biting into the husk and uttering shrieks from time to time.[5]

Among the Baganda of Central Africa a priest is set apart as the vehicle of the manifestation of the late king's spirit. The royal tomb is visited five months after the death of the king by his successor's uncle, three chiefs, and a few soldiers. One of the party enters and severs the head from the late king's body, brings it out, and puts it in a heap for insects to eat off the flesh. The skull is then washed and filled with wine and later with milk, after the former has been drunk by one of the priests. The lower jaw-bone (*lwanga*)—the special portion of the body to which the ghost of the deceased clings—is put into a separate house shaped like a bee-hive. This 'temple' containing the jaw-bone and umbilical cord (*mulongo*) of the king is divided into two compartments—an outer one, into which the ordinary people are admitted, and an inner one, where the spirit of the departed king is said to dwell. In front of the partition is a throne covered with lion- and leopard-skins, and in front of this is a rail of spears and shields and knives, keeping the entrance to the throne sacred. When the *mandwa*, or priest, who is to be possessed by the king's spirit wants to converse with the people in the king's name, he first comes to this throne and speaks to the spirit inside the inner room, telling it the business of the people. He then smokes one or two pipes, and after a few minutes he begins to rave, being possessed with the spirit, and speaks in the tones of the late king.[6]

3. Smoking to produce guardian spirits.—Young men of the Blackfeet tribe of N. America use pipes in a ceremony for acquiring a guardian spirit. They 'go up on to a hill, and cry and pray for some animal or bird to come to them. . . . They take with them a pipe and tinder and flint, and a native weed or bark for smoking (not matches or tobacco). When the pipe is filled, they point the stem to the sun and say, "Pity me, that some animal or bird may come to me!" Then they address the trees, the grass, the water, and the stones in the same manner.' The animal or bird that appears to them in their dreams becomes their guardian spirit.[7]

4. Smoking as a means of propitiation.—Smoking is employed in ceremonies to propitiate gods, animals, and stones. (*a*) *Gods.*—The Osages of N. America begin an undertaking by smoking a pipe with a prayer: 'Great Spirit, come down to smoke with me as a friend! Fire and Earth, smoke with me and help me to overthrow my foes!'[8] The Comanches of the prairies send the first puff of tobacco-smoke to the Great Spirit, and the second to the sun. The Creeks, who regard the sun as a symbol of the Great Spirit, send him the first puff of the calumet at treaties, and the Natchez chief smokes towards the east at sunrise.[9] Among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia, when the first tobacco of the season is gathered and smoked, an elderly man assembles all the inhabitants of each lodge, arranging the smokers

1 Cf. art. RAIN, § 8.
2 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 291.
3 M. C. Stevenson, 'The Zuñi Indians,' *23 RBEW* [1904], pp. 20 f., 158 ff.
4 *Ib.* pp. 41, 48, 51–57, 180 ff.
5 J. O. Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' *3 RBEW* [1884], p. 227.

1 J. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, Calcutta, 1880, p. 97.
2 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 383.
3 Lucian, *Bis accusatus*, 1; Plutarch, *de E apud Delphos*, 2.
4 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 384.
5 V. Frič and P. Radin, 'Contributions to the Study of the Bororo Indians,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 392.
6 J. Roscoe, 'Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 129 f., xxxii. [1902] 45 f.; cf. *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 283.
7 E. F. Wilson, 'Report on the Blackfoot Tribes,' *Report of 57th Meeting of Brit. Assoc.*, London, 1888, p. 187.
8 *PC*[3] ii. 383. 9 *Ib.* pp. 287 f., 343.

(male and female) in a circle while he stands in the middle. He then addresses the company, cuts up some of the tobacco, and, after mixing it with bear-berry leaves, fills a large pipe, lights it, and hands it to each of the individuals in turn, following the sun's course. Every one takes a whiff and, holding up his hands, blows the smoke between the fingers and over the breast, praying to the Tobacco Chief to be kept from sickness and death.[1]

The Hañga and Iñkĕ-sabe, or Black Shoulders clans, of the Omahas are in possession of two pipes made of red pipe-stone and decorated with porcupine quills. According to Anbahebe, the aged historian of the Omahas, the old men made seven pipes and carried them round the circle formed by the tents of the tribe. They gave the first pipe to the head of the Iñkĕ-sabe gens, and then passed on to the Hañga, to whom they handed a firebrand with which to light the pipes for the chiefs. The Bear, Blackbird, and Turtle people received no pipe because they feared them. The Eagle people, however, not being feared, were given a pipe, and the remaining five pipes were distributed among the 'good' sections of the other clans. This tradition is based on the belief that these seven pipes are symbols of peace.[2] On ceremonial occasions the two pipes kept by the Iñkĕ-sabe are brought out of the sacred bag in which they are kept with the other tribal relics, and solemnly cleaned and filled by Ictasanda men, who, while performing these functions, recite certain formulæ. They are lit by a member of the Hañga clan, and are passed round the circle of the chiefs assembled in council on tribal affairs. Both pipes are smoked by the chiefs, who blow the smoke upwards, saying, 'Here, Wakanda, is the smoke.' This is done because they say that Wakanda gave them the pipes and he rules over them.[3]

(*b*) *Animals.*—Before setting out on a bear hunt, the American Indians 'offered expiatory sacrifices to the souls of the bears slain in previous hunts. When a bear was killed, the hunter lit his pipe, and putting the mouth of it between the bear's lips, blew into the bowl, filling the beast's mouth with smoke. Then he begged the bear not to be angry at having been killed and not to thwart him afterwards in the chase.[4] The Assiniboins address prayers to the bear and offer to it sacrifices of tobacco, belts, and other valued objects. The head of the animal is often kept in camp for several days and ornamented, the pipe is offered to it, and prayer made that the natives may be able to kill all the bears they meet without harm to themselves.[5] The trader Alexander Henry has described the apologies offered by the Ojibwas to a bear which he killed near the winter camp in 1764. The animal was reminded that it was an Englishman who had done the deed and was requested not to lay the fault upon the natives. The next day the head of the bear was placed on a new stroud of blanket, pipes were lit, and tobacco-smoke was blown into the nostrils to appease her anger.[6] A similar ceremony was performed in the same district when an Englishman killed a rattlesnake. It was addressed as grandfather and smoked over, and its protection was sought for the Indians and their families.[7]

(*c*) *Stones.*—The Huron Indians of Canada offered tobacco to certain rocks, such as the one called Tsanhohi Arasta (the abode of Tsanhohi, a kind of bird of prey), which apparently stood at one time on the bank of the St. Lawrence. This stone is said to have once been a man, and it was thought that in the hollows of the huge boulder a demon dwelt. In consequence tobacco was deposited in one of the clefts of the rock by the natives as they paddled up and down the river, and the spirit was addressed thus: 'O demon, who dost inhabit this place, here is some tobacco which I offer to you. Help us, save us from shipwreck, defend us from our enemies, cause us to do good business and to return safe and sound to our village.' Likewise every spring the Mandan Indians approached a thick porous stone some 20 ft. in circumference, 'and solemnly smoked to it, alternately taking a whiff themselves and then passing the pipe to the stone.' The following morning certain marks (secretly painted on the stone during the night) were examined and deciphered.[1]

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

SNEEZING.—See NOSE, § 4.

SOBRIETY.—The relation of sobriety[2] to temperance and moderation (*qq.v.*) has been variously understood. Aquinas regards sobriety as a part of temperance.[3] Jeremy Taylor, on the other hand, says that sobriety 'hath within it [includes] the duties of temperance, chastity, humility, modesty, and content.'[4] The fact is that the word in its widest sense is equivalent to moderation.

'Nomen autem sobrietatis sumitur a mensura: dicitur enim aliquis sobrius, quasi *briam*, id est, mensuram, servans.'[5]

But, inasmuch as it is 'chiefly praiseworthy' to observe moderation in the matter of drink, since drink in a greater degree than food impedes the use of reason, sobriety may be regarded as a 'special virtue' designed to guard against 'the special impediment of reason' which is involved in excessive use of strong drink.[6]

1. As a special virtue, sobriety is a duty particularly enjoined upon the young, on women, and on the Church-ruler.[7] Speaking generally, Scripture is far from discouraging or prohibiting the use of wine. It was, indeed, forbidden to the priests at the time of their ministration and to the Nazirite during the period of his separation,[8] but generally 'wine' is regarded as the symbol of all that is most generous and joyous in human life. Its good effects, however, depend upon strictly moderate use, and St. Paul's words in Ro 14^{21} imply that there may be cases in which total abstinence is a way of showing true brotherly love; in other cases it may be a condition of personal perfection.[9]

2. In the NT use of the word *νηφάλιος* we see a gradual extension of the word 'sobriety' to other spheres. In 1 Th $5^{7f.}$ the word *νήφειν* is opposed to *μεθύσκειν*, but *νηφάλιος* in 1 Ti 3^{2} is evidently understood by early commentators to imply something more than abstinence from the disabling use of strong drink. Thus Chrysostom[10] says: *νηφάλιον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἱερέα . . . διορατικόν, καὶ μυρίους πανταχόθεν κεκτῆσθαι τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.* He adds that the multiplicity of cares and worldly business usually hinders the growth of this grace.[11] The wider use of *νήφειν* appears also in 1 P 1^{13} 4^{7} 5^{8}. It is used in these passages metaphorically to mean calmness of temper, watchfulness, and self-control.[12] Thus in

[1] J. Teit, *The Thompson Indians of Brit. Columbia*, New York, 1900, p. 349.
[2] *3 RBEW*, p. 221 ff. [3] *Ib.*
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 224.
[5] P. J. de Smet, *Western Missions and Missionaries*, New York, 1863, p. 139.
[6] J. Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' *19 RBEW* [1900], pt. i. p. 446.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 218.

[1] J. G. Frazer, *Folk-lore in the Old Testament*, London, 1918, ii. 69 f.
[2] On the use of the word and its different Greek equivalents in the NT see *HDB*, *s.v.*
[3] *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxliii. [4] *Holy Living*, ch. ii. § 1.
[5] Aquinas, *Summa* II. ii. qu. cxlix. art. 1, resp.
[6] *Ib.* art. 2. [7] 1 Ti $3^{2.}$ ^{11}, Tit $2^{2ff.}$, etc.
[8] Lv 10^{9}, Nu 6^{3}. [9] Aquinas, *loc. cit.* art. 3 ad 3.
[10] *De Sacerd.* iii. 241. [11] *Ib.* 244.
[12] Cf. 2 Ti 4^{5}, *νῆφε ἐν πᾶσιν.*

1 P 1[13] the duty of 'soberness' is closely connected with that of girding up 'the loins' of the mind, checking the vague wandering of thought and speculation, etc.

Sobriety in this sense 'guards men against the "intoxication" of false prophets, against false views of ἐλευθερία, against moral and doctrinal caprices.'[1]

In the same way, St. Paul opposes to intoxication the duty of being 'filled with the Spirit.'[2] The word, however, that is more frequently used in this connexion is the verb σωφρονεῖν; the adv. σωφρόνως is also found,[3] and σωφροσύνη at least once, in this sense.[4] The grace of sobriety corresponds to the actual condition of the world, and to the fact that human life necessarily involves warfare and struggle, demanding the vigilance of a soldier and the endurance of an athlete.[5]

(1) According to the teaching of the NT, sobriety thus includes watchfulness against the great enemies of our salvation,[6] and against the danger of being overcome by the intoxicating draught of pleasure, the pressure of worldly care, the example of an evil world. This is the temper enjoined by our Lord in Mt 24[42-51], Lk 12[35-48] and 21[34-36]; the wakeful heart, the girded loins, the lighted lamp are symbols of the spirit which should animate the Christian in a world full of hidden snares, deceits, and allurements.

(2) Sobriety also includes a moderate and temperate use of creatures, 'a moderate delight and satisfaction in prosperity,'[7] the temper that does not expect too much of life and is not inordinately dismayed or depressed by adversity. Bernard speaks of sobriety as the counterpart of two forms of intoxication:

'Ebrietas exterior voluptatum effusio, interior curiositatum occupatio.'[8]

Sobriety accordingly involves restraint in the matter of pleasure,[9] and the curbing of curiosity. Practically the duty of sobriety in this aspect is identical with temperance (*q.v.*).

'The sobriety of the soul consists in humility, and in being content with necessaries.'[10]

(3) A very important part of sobriety is a just self-estimate. So St. Paul insists,[11] having regard to the general needs of the community and the necessity that each individual should realize his true function and place in it.[12] Sobriety in this sense is equivalent to 'the philosophic mind' which comes with years.

'As we grow older . . . we take more and more our right place in the social organism. . . . We recognize that we are members one of another. That is a fact which involves a claim—the claim that we should love our neighbour as ourselves. We recognize that one member cannot suffer without the other members suffering with it. . . . We come to accept our limitations, internal as well as external. . . . It is only in middle age that most of us are able to say calmly of our rivals: "he must increase, but I must decrease."'[13]

(4) Finally, sobriety is the temper that results from a particular view of the world and of life—a view everywhere implied in Scripture, and equally removed from shallow optimism and from pessimism. There is a frame of mind which perhaps finds its typical embodiment in men like Bishop Butler.

'We should,' he says in a characteristic passage, 'propose to ourselves peace and tranquillity of mind, rather than pursue after high enjoyments. . . . The miseries of life brought home to ourselves by compassion . . . would beget in us that moderation, humility, and soberness of mind, which has been now recommended: and which peculiarly belongs to a season of recollection,[1] the only purpose of which is to bring us to a just sense of things, to recover us out of that forgetfulness of ourselves, and our true state, which it is manifest far the greatest part of men pass their whole lives in.'[2]

This temper is characteristic also of Wordsworth and the whole 'Romantic' school of poets. Christianity sanctions and encourages it, in so far as it frankly recognizes the presence and power of evil in the world, and the close relation that exists between physical and moral evil. The Christian habitually bears in mind the inevitable limitations of human nature in respect of knowledge, power, and character. The spirit described in 2 Co 6[10] 4[8] is this: 'sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing, perplexed, but not in despair.'[3] This is a temper which, as we have said, corresponds to the facts of life, and which is not unmindful of the divinely ordained regenerative forces which are at work in the world, counteracting the disturbing and disintegrating elements introduced by sin, sorrow, and death.[4] It is a temper which finds its characteristic view reflected in the Bible, which 'looks on the world as God's world,' and with severe truthfulness takes account of the stern and sombre aspects of human life,

'the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world.'[5]

Hence Bishop Wilson enjoins as 'our greatest wisdom' 'a constant seriousness of temper; an universal care and exactness of life, an indifference for the world; self-denial, sobriety, and watchfulness.'[6]

The Christian character is a union of opposites. The sobriety described above is quite compatible with fervour of spirit,[7] 'joy and peace in believing,'[8] and cheerful thankfulness 'for all things.'[9] In a world like ours all things

'Do take a sober colouring from an eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality';[10]

but the reign of God is a truth which countervails the impression made on the heart by the stern and sombre facts of life. The site of St. Peter's martyrdom at Rome is marked by an obelisk bearing the inscription:

'Christus vincit; Christus regnat; Christus imperat;
Vicit Leo ex tribu Juda.'

Sobriety is the temper which has great things in view, and which, because it believes in the victory of God, learns to 'use the world as not abusing it.'

LITERATURE.—J. Butler, *The Analogy* and *Sermons*; T. Wilson, *Sacra Privata*, and *Maxims of Piety and Morality*, vol. v. of *Works* (in 'Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology'), Oxford, 1847–60; Comm. on the Pastoral Epistles.

R. L. OTTLEY.

SOCIALISM.—Socialism, with all that it implies and reveals of the desires and possibilities of human life in this world, stands in thought and history as gathering into itself tendencies, ideals, impulses, visions, and activities, theoretical and practical, which are as profoundly significant as any in our modern civilization, and the power and worth of which for the future of mankind no one would be justified in estimating on a low scale. By enthusiastic believers socialism has been described as in itself a religion; and the fact that for thousands of earnest men and women, feeling themselves crushed in the tangle and welter of human existence, something called 'socialism'—often something crude, indefinite, tinged with the violence of discontent—has been indeed substituted for religion, and made the goal of effort and the standard of

1 C. Bigg, *The Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1901, p. 112.
2 Eph 5[18]. 3 Tit 2[12].
4 Ac 26[25], where it is opposed to 'madness.'
5 Cf. 1 Co 7[29-31] 9[25]. 6 1 P 5[8].
7 G. Bull, *Serm.* xvi. (*Works*, Oxford, 1846, i. 409).
8 *Serm.* 53 (*Opera*, ed. J. Mabillon, Paris, 1839, i. 2478).
9 Cf. Aristotle's definition of σωφροσύνη: μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς (*Eth. Nic.* iii. 10).
10 Wilson, *Sacra Privata* (*Works*, v. 146).
11 Ro 12[3].
12 See W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans*[5] (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1902, p. 355.
13 W. R. Inge, *Truth and Falsehood in Religion*, London, 1906, pp. 85, 88; see art. HUMILITY.

1 The sermon was preached on the First Sunday in Lent.
2 *Serm.* 6, 'Upon Compassion'; cf. *Anal.* pt. i. ch. 4.
3 Cf. Ro 8[28].
4 Cf. H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (*General*), Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1885, §§ 51–58; T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics* (Romanes Lecture), London, 1893, p. 29 ff.
5 Wordsworth, *Tintern Abbey*, 39.
6 *Sacra Privata* (*Works*, v. 147).
7 Ro 12[11]. 8 Ro 15[13]. 9 Eph 5[19].
10 Wordsworth, *Intimations of Immortality*, 201.

conduct, is an indication both of the passion and the enthusiasm for humanity which lie behind all socialistic theories, even the crudest, and of the failure on the part of religion, as usually understood, to meet desperate problems and high aspirations in the life and thought of modern men and women. It would be unwise and unworthy to present socialism as an insignificant thing, whether we deal with it as a theory or complex of theories about existence, as a vision of what human society might be and perhaps ought to be, or as a comprehensive ideal to be achieved in the future. Socialism belongs to the big things of human history and endeavour.

As practically all writers on the subject have confessed, socialism is difficult to define with accuracy and brevity in such a way as to cover all that the term contains, still more all that it means for those who most sincerely and devotedly use it. Socialism has been called a religion. In modern history it stands before the observer as distinctly a 'movement,' something with its ground and origin in life rather than in thought, in the factory, the workshop, and the slum rather than in the study. But it appears equally as a theory, or more truly a complex of theories, economic and political, concerned with social existence and organization. On occasion it may advance to the rank of a philosophy. It has been described as the 'economic philosophy of the suffering classes.' Again and again, by upholders and opponents alike, it has been set in contrast with the philosophy of individualism (*q.v.*), however that may be defined. In the later years of the 19th cent. socialism became an organized political force in all Western States, with its programmes, national and international, its representatives in legislative assemblies, its parties, and its press. Socialism may, therefore, be considered in any or all of these aspects, and attempts at definition made accordingly. Further, it may be treated simply as an ideal and defined or described under the form of a Utopia. A definition that shall cover all the possibilities seems beyond attainment. The best way of approach is probably through a study of the history of socialism, as a theory and as a political force, with a steady and sympathetic eye upon the actual conditions of human existence out of which the theories developed and within which alone they could be turned to weapons of practical endeavour.

I. *HISTORICAL SURVEY OF SOCIALISTIC IDEAS.*—In this article it is impossible to treat the history of socialism with any completeness of detail. Only a survey sufficient to bring out the chief characteristics, and this mainly in the region of socialistic ideas rather than socialistic effort, will be attempted.

i. SOCIALISM A MODERN DEVELOPMENT.—It is important to recognize from the outset that socialism, as a historical fact, both in its theoretical aspects and as possessing political and practical importance, is a modern development. If socialism were so indefinite as to be only the philosophy, explicit or latent, of the suffering classes of mankind, or if we include under it any and every attempt at emancipation on the part of people in economic and social enslavement, or again any vision at any time of a better social future for humanity, any ideal 'Republic' or 'Civitas Dei' or 'Kingdom of Heaven' that imagination has bodied forth, then there has always been socialism; but it is rhetorical exaggeration to push back socialism beyond the limits of the modern period. Those limits are fairly definite. They may be taken to be, on the one hand, the French Revolution and, on the other, with less accuracy as to delimiting dates, that series of changes, in the social and economic structure of civilization, from the basis of feudalism, the land, and economically individualized production, to the basis of commercialism, capital, machinery, and collective production, which is summed up under the phrase 'the Industrial Revolution.' We need look no farther back than the last quarter of the 18th cent. for the beginnings of socialism.

ii. EARLY SOCIALISTIC THOUGHT ILLUSTRATED: ITS SOURCES.—J. T. Merz[1] points out that the historian Michelet opens his *History of the Nineteenth Century* 'by introducing three great Socialists.' It is a significant beginning, and reveals profound insight into the deeper currents of 19th cent. life and into the importance of socialism. The socialists whom Michelet names are Babeuf (1764–97), Saint-Simon (1760–1825), and Fourier (1772–1837).

These men, he says, 'emerge about the same time from the prisons of the Terror. Their ideas, to begin with, are in no wise discordant; they have the same point of departure: humanity, pity, the outlook on extreme misery. . . . Whatever opinion one may form of the three famous Utopists, we must admit that their systems, even their eccentricities, sprang from an admirable emotion, from the rising of a most generous feeling. Babeuf asks only for the division of deserted lands, abounding everywhere, in order to make them productive: *Right* is the single basis, the universal right of men to a sufficient living. Saint-Simon desires *Progress* . . . Fourier raves for *Harmony*.'[1]

Far more important than the 'systems' which these men desired or the practical demands which they made are, as Michelet suggests, the motives underlying their writings, the controlling ideas with which they worked, and the assumptions on which they rested. They aimed, in the end, at nothing less than an entire reconstruction of society, a radical alteration in the whole method and manner of human living. In so doing they established from the outset a characteristic of socialism which it has always retained, and lapse from which may truly be regarded as lapse from genuine socialism. Both as theory and as movement, socialism seeks to envisage and to establish an order of social existence totally different from that which is characteristic of modern industrial civilization. The order of social and economic life which the Industrial Revolution induced was accompanied from its inception by the demand for an altogether new order. In a sense, though not quite in the sense intended by him, the contention which, as we shall indicate, Karl Marx insisted on as so important, to the effect that the capitalistic order of life contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction, is true enough. Revolt has been with modern industrialism all along, its second self, its perpetual shadow. The mind and heart of modern life, which in the French Revolution, despite awful failures and disillusionment, received so rich an emancipation, have ever been in conflict against machinery, the peculiar force in the Industrial Revolution; and socialism represents in no small degree the persistent struggle of mind and heart against machinery. Feelings of pity, a sympathetic enthusiasm for humanity, belief in equality and brotherhood and the rights of man, distrust of 'civilization,' a strong sense of the injustice and ugliness of poverty and misery—these emotional and spiritual qualities, so potent in producing the mighty upheaval in France, lived on into the era of the factory and the machine as perpetual incentives to criticism and discontent; they are the moral springs of every consciously elaborated socialistic theory, even the most apparently materialistic, and they are the real sources of energy in every socialist movement. It is, therefore, significant that men like Saint-Simon and Fourier, who influenced socialism in the beginning, were more Utopian than scientific, more akin to the poets than to the sociologists or economists, more open to the logic of the heart than to that of the philosophy of history.

1. Saint-Simon.—If socialism seeks a beginning in the thought of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and their followers, we must admit that it originates from men who had a geniune passion for humanity. They sought after a complete reorganization of society which should allow human beings full opportunity to develop and display the qualities of humanity which they possessed; they believed in the natural goodness of man, in his natural ability to achieve absolute truth, and in his natural and inalienable right to full and satisfying life. The systems which they imagined as likely to give

[1] *History of European Thought in the XIXth Century*, Edinburgh, 1896-1912, iv. 472 ff.

[1] Michelet, *Hist. du XIXe siècle*, i. 1, quoted in Merz, *loc. cit.*

human nature the best chance to be itself would hardly pass muster now as in accord with received socialistic theory. Saint-Simon, *e.g.*, who directed his sense of revolt mainly against the ancient régime and viewed the approaching change to industrialism as good in itself, seems to contemplate an ordering of society in which spiritual power shall be vested in men of science, and temporal power in representatives of the property-possessing class, leaders of the new industrialism—a disastrous heresy, viewed from a later standpoint. The contrast between labour and capital, so prominent in subsequent theory, is not present to him. In the writings of his later life his interest, it is true, becomes more and more fixed on the question of the condition of the poorest classes in society. In his *New Christianity* (1825) he emphasizes this aspect of the matter repeatedly and develops the view that the main function of society is the betterment of the moral and physical existence of the poorest class: society ought to organize itself in the way best adapted for attaining this end. This was Saint-Simon's final interpretation of the Christian ethic, a true philosophy of the suffering classes, and an attempt, not noticeable in his earlier works, to place his social theories on a religious basis and present them indeed as a necessary fulfilment of Christian truth. Saint-Simon's writings contain many fruitful and brilliant ideas, and there are few of the great social problems of modern life on which he does not touch; but his schemes have historical interest only. His main contribution was to present plainly the truth that the crucial problem of the new modern world which he saw opening before him would be nothing less than the ultimate organization of society as a whole. Among his more immediate followers, in the midst of many extravagances which brought the whole complex of his ideas into disrepute, we find notions which were destined to play a great part in later socialistic thought. The definite attack on private ownership, soon to become one of the cardinal characteristics of socialism, finds emphasis, and there is development towards doctrines of extreme communism, whilst the conception that the principle of association (co-operation) must be fundamental in social organization becomes prominent; we get the first hints of the emancipation of women and of the doctrine of the political and economic equality of the sexes as necessary to worthy social life.

2. Fourier. — The underlying assumptions on which Fourier, a clearer and more systematic though less influential thinker, rested his views were much the same as Saint-Simon's. He believed in the ultimate, native goodness of human nature, and desired a social organization that should give freedom for full exercise of every individual's capacity and desire. Set free from restraints, human nature, he believed, would inevitably work towards harmony. The social system which he imagined as adequate to meet the need for freedom is interesting as representing a tendency in socialism opposed to the corresponding dominant tendency of the Saint-Simon school. Whereas Saint-Simon looked rather to centralization and what we might call bureaucratic government, by scientific experts, as the way of social salvation, Fourier envisages a tremendous development of the small, autonomous group—a kind of village commune with full local self-government—as the basis of social organization. He thought that such an arrangement would allow a greater measure of real freedom to the individual than any other method, freedom for the individual being the object of social organization.

These two tendencies, the one towards centralized government and the absolutizing of the State, the other towards group-organization and decentralization — the spreading of autonomous power over as wide an area as possible—appear again and again throughout the history of socialism and might even be taken as differentiating schools of socialist thought one from another. Saint-Simon represents one tendency, Fourier the other. Intellectually and spiritually the one thinker belongs to the camp of the bureaucrats, the other to that of the anarchists. Socialism knows both.

These early French thinkers, and we may say practically all who can be described as socialistic thinkers throughout the first half of the 19th cent., developed their ideas on the basis of a profound belief in human reason and in an underlying natural law, natural right, natural harmony of created things, due to the goodness of God or of Nature, which it was the highest business of reason to discover and to accept. In their view the ultimate principle of reality, God or Nature, had intended an orderly and harmonious creation, and as part of that creation an orderly and harmonious human society, in which man could be happy. The principles of that natural social harmony and organization existed *in rebus æternis* and only required looking for. 'Has not Nature,' exclaims Cabet, a typical socialistic thinker of the time, 'endowed us with intelligence and reason with which to organise happiness, society, and equality?' True social organization is a matter of knowledge and perception; only reveal the underlying natural principles of society to mankind, educate men's minds, and their reason will accept and act on them and all will be well.

3. Rousseau.—In all this belief in reason and natural right and order, which had and still has so much to do with the vitality of socialistic speculation, there is clearly discernible the influence of the spiritual forces that helped to bring about the French Revolution, and particularly the influence of Rousseau (*q.v.*), the father of so many of the greatest ideas in modern thought. It was very largely from Rousseau and kindred sources that the early socialistic thinkers learnt their belief in the goodness and perfectibility of human nature, their distrust of civilization and consequent demand for a new start in history, a complete change, their conviction that mankind needs and must have, and can rationally devise, a political constitution and an economic and social structure that shall give the individual full freedom of personal life, and their optimistic faith in progress and education.[1] Convinced, thus, that man was intended for happiness and was by nature a social being, and yet seeing all around them unhappiness, misery, crimes, disorders of all kinds, they could only conclude that the laws of nature had been defied or misunderstood, and that the way out of the morass was a new application of reason to the discovery of these laws and a complete reorganization of society on the basis of them. The fact that other thinkers of the period also believed in a 'natural' order for society, and thought that they had discovered that natural order in industrialism, free competition, and capitalism, does not seem to have troubled the pioneers of socialism very much. Views opposed to their own belonged, no doubt, to what Owen called 'the irrationality and insanity of the past and present state of the human race.' Although the systems of the first socialists differ considerably from one another in detail, the authors of them are agreed in the conviction that the rational order is different from the one in which they lived, and tend to reach agreement also in the belief that among the natural principles of social harmony and organization there may be found at least two which are to be regarded as axiomatic: (1) that *common property is natural* and therefore necessary to happiness,

[1] All the early socialists were great believers in propaganda and had a remarkable faith and trust in mankind's power of understanding. They thought that men had only to be shown the truth in order to act upon it.

(2) that *labour is the only title to property*. All socialistic economics may be said to be variations on these fundamental themes.

4. Robert Owen.—A very interesting and remarkable illustration of socialistic ideas, of the rationalist and Utopian kind, is to be found in the writings and the practical activities of Robert Owen (1771–1858).

Owen was a man of extraordinary capacity and great personality. His career was a varied and amazing one; in the course of it he rose to wealth and European reputation as a successful manufacturer with novel ideas of treating his workers, and sank to poverty and ill-repute as an advocate of extreme communism, a supporter of social change and militant trade unionism, and an experimentalist in communist settlements. As a 'model employer' in his famous factory at New Lanark he introduced reforms, amenities, privileges, opportunities of education, for his work-people, which showed on his part a deeply humane insight into the social problems and sadness of the new industrial era, and also laid down the lines that were later followed in many respects when legislation had to step in, perforce, to remedy some of the worst evils of competition and mechanical industry. The direction and character of his later activities may be illustrated by such facts as these: in 1825 he established, at his own expense, a communist society at New Harmony, Indiana; in 1832 he attempted, on a small scale, the establishment of 'an equitable labour exchange system, in which exchange was effected by means of labour notes, the usual means of exchange and the usual middlemen being alike superseded';[1] in 1834 he was mainly responsible for the appearance, with amazing though short-lived success, of the 'Grand National Consolidated Trades Union,' with syndicalist ideals, in 1835 for the 'Association of all Classes of all Nations,' a premonitory sign of socialistic internationalism.

Owen's socialistic thought, which chiefly concerns us, set forth mainly in his *New View of Society* (1813) and *The Book of the New Moral World* (1836), is based on the familiar belief in reason and natural right and in ultimate principles of natural social order and social harmony which reason can discover. Those principles Owen thought he had discovered, and in his writings he undertakes to explain them for the benefit of his fellows. Give, first of all, freedom to human nature, and it will develop a form of society in harmony with natural law. Systems of restriction are due to the stupidity of man refusing to follow reason; they prevent human nature doing its proper work. The present social system is a monstrous imposition which must be got rid of; enlightenment of reason and education will achieve its destruction. Owen apparently believed that there once was historically a true social order, in accordance with nature, and the new order which he desiderated was a reproduction of that first paradise. The eternal principles of natural social order were communistic. By natural right, property is common. Therefore the institution of private property must be abolished. Owen contended (and the contention has been repeated in socialist teaching time and again) that the institution of private property is the root of all divisions and separations in society, the basis of economic poverty and of the difference between rich and poor, and the source of all jealousies, rivalries, strifes, and wars; private property, he maintained, is not necessary to meet human needs, nor is competitive industry, based on private property, the best way of satisfying legitimate human wants. Co-operative labour, aided by science and machinery, would produce so much wealth that not only would all needs be supplied, but there would be abundance beyond all wants or wishes, so that 'any desire for individual accumulation or inequality of condition' would cease. This communism of the natural order Owen carried to some lengths with regard to the institutions of marriage and the family, making marriage an easily terminable contract, whilst his extreme belief in the necessity for the free play of individual preferences and feelings and his equally extreme distrust of man-made laws led him far, though with inconsistencies, in the direction of anarchism.

[1] Cf. Kirkup, *Hist. of Socialism*[4], p. 67.

Owen was not content with preaching his socialistic communism; he made valiant attempts to practise it, obsessed somewhat by the heroic, though mistaken, idea, which appears over and over again in socialist history, that the best way of destroying the present evil social order and establishing the new natural and good order is to start out at once and build 'communities' within the existing fabric of society, on the basis of the laws discovered by reason. Owen tried this method and failed, though not before he had created considerable interest and set going a stream of potent influence. A recent socialist writer has said that the promulgation of Owen's ideas on the 'community' forms a landmark and may be reckoned as the beginning of modern socialism. The claim is extreme; but without doubt the ideas which Owen expounded have played a tremendous part in socialist thought, whilst the sentiments from which his ideas drew their inspiration are characteristic, both in their good points and in their defects, of every socialistic Utopia that has been imagined, portrayed, or attempted.

Another not unimportant aspect in socialistic thought which finds remarkable illustration in the ideas of Owen may be mentioned here. He seems to have perceived with great clearness that the troubles of social existence under the new régime of machines and factories were economic rather than political; he was concerned more with the worker at his work than with the citizen in the larger life of the community. He was among the first to envisage the social situation definitely from the point of view of the economically enslaved workman. As a result, he and his followers were often thought to be lukewarm towards the agitations for political reform and the securing of the franchise, which aroused much popular enthusiasm at the time. Owen did not believe that the way to the social, and still more the economic, revolution which he desired lay through the controlling of political and parliamentary power. Political democracy appeared to him 'quite secondary to Industrial Democracy, or the co-operative ownership and control of industry answering to the economic co-operation in all industrial processes which had been brought about by machinery and factory organization, and which had removed manufacture irrevocably from the separate firesides of independent individual producers. . . . Owen and his more enthusiastic disciples were persuaded that a universal voluntary association of workers for productive purposes on his principles would render the political organization of society of comparatively trivial account.'[1]

When his isolated communities of producers failed to realize his dream, Owen hit on the idea of turning the trade unions, defensive combinations of workmen, into the voluntary communistic associations, 'National Companies,' as he called them, which should supersede both the capitalist manufacturers and the State. All that the workers had to do was to combine into such associations of producers as Owen imagined, and the capitalistic system was doomed. Just how the associations of producers were to secure the transfer of industries from the existing proprietors Owen does not seem to have made clear; he does not appear to have approved of violence, and the concept of the 'general strike' is not adopted by him, although that method was advocated by contemporaries.

In various forms this idea of voluntary co-operative associations of producers has appeared frequently in socialistic thought and effort.[2] But the notion of turning the trade unions into such associations was distinctly an inspiration on the part of Owen himself, and, as the quite recent history both

[1] Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Hist. of Trade Unionism*, new ed., p. 139 f.

[2] We may instance the social workshops—associations of workers provided with capital by the State—conceived and attempted by Louis Blanc in France about 1848 (see his *Organisation du travail*, Paris, 1839). Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of German socialism as a political force, advocated associations of producers working with capital supplied by the State, as a practical method of advance. We may compare also the self-governing workshops favoured by the 'Christian Socialists' in England.

of trade union theory and of socialist theory has shown, a much bigger and more fruitful idea than some of Owen's critics have allowed. The point, however, to be emphasized here is that Owen's ideas in this respect sprang from the fact that, in envisaging the social and economic problem of his time, he fixed his attention on the worker as producer, the worker at his work, more than on anything else. Freedom for the individual in his industrial life, the power of self-government and self-control there, was what Owen wanted to secure. The fact is that, like most of the Utopians of his time and since, he begins his socialism with the individual. There is another school of socialist theory which begins definitely with the concept of 'the State,' the community as a whole, 'society' as such, the 'social organism,' and so forth. The difference is very great, with regard both to the way in which the socialistic Utopia is envisaged and to the methods by which it is to be achieved.

There has been a tendency in some socialistic writers to treat almost with contempt all this earlier socialist speculation. Marx and Engels described it all alike as 'Utopian,' a term not overburdened with respect, in contrast with their own 'scientific' socialism. Others have quarrelled with it because it has no real philosophy of history, no sense of historical evolution, above all no concept of 'the State,' whilst its criticism of social conditions is rejected as sentimental. The sources of its intellectual origin in the rationalism of the 18th cent. are suspect. Its inclination towards extreme communism in economic theory and voluntaristic anarchism in political theory makes it repugnant to some types of mind. But no one can really hope to understand socialism without consideration of its early Utopian period. Ideas characteristic of all socialistic thought were then and there developed, or at least set going. But, even more significantly still, these early Utopians—and this feature is characteristic of all others like them—reflected and expressed the usually voiceless feelings and aspirations of oppressed masses, and particularly of the crushed and enslaved individual, out of which socialism most truly springs, and they never failed to waken the passion for freedom and individuality without which socialism is unrecognizable. In default of a philosophy of history and a sense of historical evolution they had faith in humanity, belief in the perfectibility of man by education, and a strong apocalyptic idealism, leading them to expect the dawn of a new era, as it were, on the morrow.

iii. EARLY SOCIALISTIC THOUGHT AND RISING DEMOCRACY. — Socialism can never be properly appreciated in any of its aspects unless it is seen in intimate connexion with the life of the working-classes of society, and its best exponents have been just those who, either through actual experience or through sympathetic imagination, have entered most fully into the feeling and passion of the working life of working people. The early pioneers of socialistic thought were the voices of new forces and new classes in society, above all of that characteristic product of the Industrial Revolution known commonly as 'the working-class,' described more technically as 'the proletariat.'

1. **Emancipation of the proletariat.** — Werner Sombart defines socialism as 'the intellectual embodiment of the modern Social Movement,' and the 'Social Movement' he takes to be the totality of 'all the attempts at emancipation on the part of the proletariat.'[1] That definition brings out the fact, which it is important to emphasize, that socialism is and always has been, theoretically and practically, a movement in thought and life intimately concerned and connected with certain particular social classes, roughly the wage-earning classes, economically the most insecure and menaced members in the social whole. The more modern, and so-called 'scientific,' way of regarding socialism, which would elevate it to the position of a political philosophy, or a doctrine of society, as it were, in its own metaphysical right, is really mistaken and historically incorrect. In the sources of its vitality, and in the general scope of its most characteristic ideas, socialism might not inaccurately be described as the philosophy of an oppressed social class, which was itself the product of a particular series of economic developments and a particular kind of economic organization.

The Industrial Revolution, which we have pointed to as one of the limits beyond which it is needless to look for socialism, created new social forces and social classes. Especially, it created, on the one side, the social class possessing capital and the power to employ labour and, on the other side, the social class possessing nothing but power to work, and dependent on the capitalistic class for opportunity to exercise that power, and so to live. There had been land-less men before: there were now capital-less men—men possessing power and skill to labour, but destitute of the economic facilities for utilizing their labour and making it productive. That was the root fact of the new situation created by the change to industrialism; it is the dominating social fact of the 19th cent. and of modern civilization. The coming of machinery, the application of science to industry, the collectivization of production by the factory system, and in the early years of the new era the amazing rapidity with which wealth was gained, affording temptation and opportunity to unscrupulous greed and selfishness, speedily intensified the new class divisions and deepened the misery of the non-possessing members of society. The story of that evolution is well known; the social history of England for certainly the first half of the 19th cent., if not more, illustrates the condition of things only too well.[1] Admittedly the new era produced 'suffering classes' and there was need and room for 'an economic philosophy of the suffering classes.' Socialism rose to answer that need. Socialistic ideas were the intellectual formulation of desires, aspirations, half-conscious longings and stirrings after freedom, fuller and better life, felt by these economically subordinate social classes. Often it is difficult to say whether a socialistic idea owed its origin to an independent thinker and was accepted by the proletariat, or whether the man who formulated the idea first discerned it germinating in the mind of the struggling proletariat itself. Socialism, at any rate, has been a live force only when there has been close interaction between its intellectual formulation in the realm of ideas and the instinctive thought and feeling of the proletariat, or, if we like the phrase better, the heart of the people.

2. **The Chartist movement.**—We may illustrate what we have just said, and also, perhaps, bring out some further characteristic ideas of socialism by a brief consideration of the remarkable Chartist movement which largely constituted the life of the English working-classes for a

[1] *Socialism and the Social Movement*, Eng. tr., Introd. p. 1.

[1] The pitiful story of these years has been told frequently, perhaps nowhere better, at any rate for the first thirty years of the century, than in the social studies of J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832*, London, 1911, and *The Town Labourer, 1760–1832*, do. 1917. The terrible indictment drawn by Karl Marx in *Das Kapital*, 3 vols., Hamburg, 1867–95, will always be classic. The novels of Kingsley and Dickens tell the same story, and there is a mass of other evidence.

quarter of a century, and the actual connexion of which with socialistic thought has not been as fully recognized as it ought to have been.[1]

The Chartist movement was the most complete expression of the revolutionary temper of the English working-classes, developed in them, slowly and painfully, by the bitter actual experience of what the Industrial Revolution meant in their lives. It was not the work of agitators, but the spontaneous outburst of oppressed men and women, no longer to be restrained. It was a movement of the new industrial proletariat, the first of its kind that the world had seen. Just as the Industrial Revolution itself ran its opening stages earlier and more quickly in England than elsewhere, so, quite naturally, it there earlier than elsewhere revealed within itself the power of provoking resistance and opposition inherent in its constitution; the capitalistic, competitive mode of social organization *creates* a class of people whose only hope of endurable existence consists in destroying the creature that begat them.

'The Industrial Revolution,' it has been truly said, 'obliged everybody whom it affected to think about the problems it raised, and when they addressed themselves to these problems the rich and the poor started from different standpoints: the rich from the abstractions of property, the poor from the facts of their own lives. As a result there developed two different systems of morality. For it makes a great deal of difference whether experience is passed through the sieve of hypothesis and theory, or whether hypothesis and theory are passed through the sieve of experience. The upper-class explanations ceased to be satisfying to men and women who wanted to know why they were starving in the midst of great wealth.'[2]

Instinctively and subconsciously, driven by pressure of experience, the working-classes of the new society were making, on the basis of their own needs and suppressed desires, a philosophy of social life and an economic theory which were bound to be different from those of the possessing classes. The unpropertied man *cannot* think and feel like the propertied: his psychology is different; he sees life from a totally different angle. Chartism is, historically, the first clear pronouncement of the instinctive political philosophy and economic theory of propertyless and unprivileged human beings, awakening, on the one hand, to the sense of enslavement and, on the other, to their capacity for visions and ideals. The fundamental demand of Chartism was for a total change in social and economic organization. It was a revolutionary movement, in the strict sense of being a movement not for 'reform,' leaving the basis untouched, but for radical change involving alteration of basis. It is true that Chartism is frequently presented as a movement merely for political enfranchisement, conditioned by the dissatisfaction of the working-classes with the results of the Reform Act of 1832; and undoubtedly it was a movement of demand for political democracy. The famous 'Six Points' of the Charter were all concerned with matters political, and contained no hint of economic and social demands. But the reason why Chartism, as a political programme, spread like wildfire is not contained in the political programme itself, but in the conceptions which the proletariat had now begun to cherish of the uses to which political power might be put. Political democracy was not desired for its own sake; it was desired as means to an end, and it was the thought of the end beyond the means that created enthusiasm. For twelve years at least prior to 1837, when the Charter appeared, the movement behind it had been fermenting and developing, and examination of contemporary Chartist literature seems to show conclusively that the aim of the deeper movement was nothing other than the revolutionizing of Britain in a complete socialistic sense, and further that this aim represented, not something given to or foisted upon the working-classes from outside, but their own instinctive, and now partly conscious, reaction to the conditions in which they were placed. The idea of social revolution — radical social and economic change — which gave to Chartism its emotional force was born from the heart of the proletariat. The demand for political power covered the determination to use such power, if acquired, to reconstruct society on a new basis. Democratic parliamentary reform was only a step to the larger goal. Chartism, it is true, was not an uninterrupted movement, nor systematically developed, nor were its intellectual foundations and sources the same as those of more modern socialistic-democratic thought. There was no unanimity in regard to the salient characteristics of the social revolution desired or in the envisagement of the ultimate goal. But in the course of the Chartist movement, and especially during the years of its greatest intellectual activity (1831–34), almost every permanently important socialistic idea found expression, and, more significantly, response from the working-classes, whilst the characteristic proletarian criticism of modern civilization was published in the newspapers and pamphlets of the movement.

We are not concerned here with the course of the Chartist movement itself,[1] but only with the ideas lying behind it and their relation to socialistic thought. What were the most prominent of those ideas? (1) Chartism makes evident the presence and operation of the concepts of class-consciousness, class-interest, and class-war. In the literature of the movement we find the doctrines enunciated that the working-class must stand alone and work out its own salvation, that there must be no alliance with the property-owning classes, that the interests of labour and capital are essentially irreconcilable, and that the only solvent for the misery of existence is the democratic organization of society on the exclusive basis of labour as the only title to rights, possessions, and privileges of any kind. The outburst of revolutionary trade unionism (really to be considered part and parcel of the Chartist movement) which followed the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1825, and in which Robert Owen was influential, rested on conceptions such as these. The concept of the 'general strike' as a way towards social revolution appeared, and ideas of the ownership and control of the means of production in each industry, not by the community at large, but by the workers engaged in the industry—ideas which were to have a remarkable resurrection in syndicalism—were put forward.

(2) The economic theory behind all this ferment of ideas was determined by the doctrine that labour is the real source of wealth, the only ground of possession, and that consequently the labourer has inalienable right to the whole produce of his labour. This doctrine, in various forms, had been derived by unorthodox economists like William Thompson (1783–1833) and others as an amplification of the reasoning of Ricardo, from whom the economics of unfettered capitalism and free competition also professed their origin. By thinkers drawing their inspiration from the rationalism of the 18th cent. and the theories of natural law and natural right—notably, *e.g.*, William Godwin (1756–1836)—the doctrine of the 'right of labour' had also been enunciated. But it was received by the working-classes only because it corresponded to their own instinctive reactions towards private ownership, their own sense of what was naturally right, and their own painful experience of continually toiling at the production of great wealth and receiving next to nothing of it in return. Quite clearly, if the propertyless producer of wealth achieves an economic theory at all, it will inevitably contain some proposition to the effect that the man who produces is also the man who ought to own the product, that the only title to wealth is that a man has worked for it. Equally inevitably and naturally, when it is observed that only a very small portion of the wealth produced by labour, or *ex hypothesi* so produced, is enjoyed by labour, whilst the residue goes off elsewhere into interest, rent, and profits, this departure of the product appears to be a taking away from labour of its rightful due, and almost, in fact, robbery. *That* doctrine, and economic criticism of capitalistic society, also found expression in the Chartist movement, but in the more polite form of the theory of 'surplus value,' later to be made by Karl Marx a cardinal theory of socialist economics, and to be elaborated by him with great acuteness and skill. Again, the doctrine is part of the instinctive economics of the

[1] The best treatment of the Chartist movement in its relationship to English socialism will be found in Max Beer, *Gesch. des Sozialismus in England* (far the best history of socialistic thought yet produced). Another illuminating study of Chartism is that of Mark Hovell, *The Chartist Movement*, Manchester, 1918.

[2] J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer, 1760–1832*, p. 289.

[1] See art. CHARTISM.

proletariat. About 1835, in the *Poor Man's Guardian* and elsewhere, the declaration is to be found that, under the modern system, whilst the worker produces all the wealth, he receives only the barest minimum needed for subsistence, and sometimes not even that, whilst all wealth over and above that, the surplus, goes to the capitalist, who, with the aristocracy and priests and gentlemen, lives by the toil of the workers.

(3) The aspirations of the proletariat in the Chartist movement turned partly in the direction of desire to socialize the land of Great Britain and organize life on a basis of communistic colonies—a desire frequent enough in early Utopian socialism; partly in the direction of preparing the workers, by parliamentary reform, political organization, and education, to revolutionize and control the country in a political sense, making them ready for economic power through use and exercise of political power; and partly, again, in the direction, as we have already suggested, of the ownership and control of industry and the means to industry by the associated workers themselves—a kind of syndicalism. These aspirations received little systematic expression, but their undoubted presence illustrates characteristics of the mind of the workers in revolt on which socialism has always depended, if not for its theories, at any rate for the vigour of its practical effectiveness.

(4) Another significant feature in the movement is found in the differences of method advocated as likely to secure the desired goal. Chartism had a 'moral force party' and a 'physical force party'—names which sufficiently indicate the nature of the methods proposed. For our purpose the matter has importance as showing how thus early, in the first real movement of the modern proletariat towards social redemption, what we might almost call the two wings of socialism in all stages and in all countries make their appearance—on the one side, the tendency towards violence, insurrectionary revolution, anti-parliamentarism, distrust of politics, and ultimately a loose, communistic, group-organization of society, with suggestions of anarchism; and, on the other side, the tendency towards political reform, change by constitutional legislation and parliamentary action, evolutionary socialism, as it was called later, and ultimately a centralized, rather bureaucratic social organization.

3. **Revolt against machinery.**—It is not necessary to recapitulate the ideas that we have found present in Chartism. The parallelism between them and the ideas of early theoretical socialism is obvious, and it is important to notice that actual experience of misery on the part of the proletariat led, not only to the acceptance, but also to the instinctive discovery, of the same kind of ideas concerning social life and organization as had been prompted in the minds of theorists by contemplation of and sympathy with that misery. Still more significantly, just as theoretical, Utopian socialism was animated by a genuine passion for humanity and a deep sense of human beings as persons, so this proletarian, instinctive socialism, as manifested in Chartism, was everywhere fanned into a flame by a sense of outraged personality. That was the deepest motive in it; it was inspired, we may say, by hatred of the machine. For the men and women concerned in the Chartist movement machinery was the monstrous symbol of the new social and industrial and economic order in its totality.

> They felt passionately that the new power 'was inhuman, that it disregarded all their instincts and sensibilities, that it brought into their lives an inexorable force, destroying and scattering their customs, their traditions, their freedom, their ties of family and home, their dignity and character as men and women.'[1]

Proletarian socialism is a characteristic form of the revolt of mind against machinery which is the innermost thing in modern history; and the right way to see socialism is not as a system in economics or as a political philosophy, but as a movement of humanism and personalism in life, especially in the life of the working-classes.[2]

[1] Cf. J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, p. 18.

[2] We may add here two observations: (1) the Chartist movement collapsed about 1850, in failure so far as its main objects were concerned. But the ferment that it created and the ideas that were disseminated during it led to lasting results in the social life of Great Britain: we may instance the co-operative movement, and the movement for education of the people which led to the great Acts of 1870 and 1871, and, also, noticing here the special influence of Robert Owen, the legislation for the control of factories and the employment of women and children, which helped to remedy some of the worst abuses of the early years of industrialism. So far as British socialism is concerned, it is usually said to have died, at any rate as a movement, about 1848, and not to have revived again till 1880, except for the labours of the so-called 'Christian Socialists,' chief among whom were F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley, with their abortive efforts at 'self-governing workshops.' (2) In other countries, where capitalism has pursued a similar course, the connexion of socialistic ideas with movements of emancipation on the part of the proletariat was not unlike that illustrated by the Chartist movement, especially in the concentration of the first proletarian efforts everywhere to secure wider political power. Socialistic ideas became connected with efforts to secure political democracy, whilst industrial unrest among the workers tended to find expression in socialistic visions and efforts. That is the usual story. The years round about 1848 were years of proletarian unrest and revolt throughout Europe, and these years witnessed a vast spread of socialistic thought, thereafter soon to induce definite socialist political movements and parties, organized, national, and international.

iv. 'SCIENTIFIC' SOCIALISM. — Many writers, following Marx and Engels, have spoken of the first period of socialistic thought as 'Utopian,' and of the second as 'scientific,' though the changes are often represented as much deeper than they really were. Socialistic thought, as we shall see, has never wholly lost the characteristics of its humanistic and, if we will, Utopian origins. Still, there were changes, made inevitable by various causes operating in the world of intellectual, social, and political development generally. The long-continued influence of the rationalism of the 18th cent. disappeared, about the middle of the 19th cent., before the advance of the evolutionary, scientific, and developmental point of view; historical realism displaced *a priori* speculation in regard to the problems of human life and society; political theory and philosophy were subjected to scientific method, with consequent departure from all conceptions of a 'natural order' of society and a possible displacement of the existing order by reversal at the instigation of the human will. On the continent of Europe also, at any rate, if not in Britain, the philosophy of the State, centralized and organized, as the real social entity, became prominent, whilst in Britain itself, the special home of political individualism, by the beginning of the last quarter of the century, the older view of the State in relation to the individual was dying, if not dead, and the social sense, the social conscience, the feeling of corporate and collective responsibility, were everywhere growing apace. Further, the endeavour of the working-classes to secure emancipation from industrialism became actively and prominently involved in the development of political democracy; socialism, in some form or other, became the programme of political parties, organized and forceful; and this fact also affected socialistic thinking.

Under these and similar influences, socialistic thought, as we are now to consider it, appears much more definitely than before as systematic economic theory and political philosophy. It develops a distinctively economic, rather than a purely humanistic, criticism of modern capitalistic society. Socialism is now presented not simply as a desirable social change to be striven for by those who will to strive for it, but as a necessary stage in the evolution of society, an order of social life that must supervene on the present order. On its theoretical side, in some aspects, it loses touch with the heart of the proletariat and tends to become even academic, drifting often from its original and indeed essential character as a revolutionary movement and appearing frequently as little more than an impetus towards evolutionary, gradual, and politically-engendered social reform.

1. **The Communist Manifesto.**—The characteristic language of this new level of socialistic thought is heard for the first time with concentrated power and the force of genuine eloquence in the famous *Communist Manifesto*, which has been called the charter of independence of modern socialism, and which is described by Werner Sombart as 'a unique document in the literature of the world.' We shall get to the heart of the most

effective and most wide-spread socialistic thought of modern times, and of working-class life even to-day, by considering the leading ideas in this *Communist Manifesto*.

After a challenging preamble, describing the fear which the spread of communism, *i.e.* socialism, is creating throughout Europe, the *Manifesto* begins by laying down the principle that all history, since the days, at any rate, of primitive tribal community of property, is the history of conflict between social classes, created by economic conditions, and distinguished from each other by the possession or non-possession of economic independence and power.

'The modern bourgeois society,' says the *Manifesto*, 'that has grown from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, with two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.'

The development, characteristics, and achievements of capitalistic civilization, under the dominance of the social class distinguished by the possession of capital, are next described, with full regard for the amazing endeavours and results of modern industrialism.

'The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole Continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground —what earlier generation had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?'

Under the new industrial régime economic existence, production and consumption of wealth, has become cosmopolitan, international. Home industries, national industries, are displaced everywhere by new industries which 'no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.' This means, according to the *Manifesto*, the breaking down of national barriers and exclusivenesses, and the rise of 'a universal interdependence of nations'—a real internationalism of intellectual creation and a common form of civilization. But unrestricted competition rules in the realm of consumption and distribution of created wealth: there is competition on the one hand to secure markets in which the goods produced can be disposed of, and on the other hand to secure raw material to which the new vast productive forces can be applied. This means perpetual instability in economic existence. Driven by insatiable competition, the capitalistic methods of production and distribution must exploit every corner of the globe; the instruments of production are constantly being revolutionized; productive capacity overleaps itself and its opportunities, periodic crises occur, 'epidemics of over-production,' which destroy 'a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces,' and threaten the whole fabric and existence of society. All this is really due to a contradiction inherent in the nature of capitalistic, competitive civilization itself —a contradiction between socialized, or collective, production, and individualistic, competitive appropriation, which tends of itself to destroy the capitalistic order of civilization, by creating conflict between the productive forces at the disposal of society and the conditions, of private ownership of capital and free competition, on which the actual existence of bourgeois, capitalistic society depends.

This inherent contradiction—and it is on this point that the *Manifesto* chiefly insists—is reflected, and indeed represented, in the struggle between the classes, bourgeoisie and proletarian, of which the one stands for the factor of individualistic ownership and appropriation, the other for the factor of socialized labour and collective production. These social classes are created by economic conditions and are differentiated from each other by economic characteristics. The bourgeois, possessing class is marked by ownership of the means of production, with consequent economic independence and control of economic power, on which follows control of political power, the institutions of government, and the organization of the State. The proletariat, on the other hand, is marked by lack of economic power and independence, concentrated in the fact of wage-labour, the basis of capitalistic exploitation, the essence of which is the compulsion placed on the wage-earning class to sell their labour-capacity, in order to subsist, at a price not only dependent on the will of the possessing class and capitalist controllers of industry, but (according to the doctrine of the *Manifesto*) tending always, by 'iron law' of the economic system itself, to approximate only to the level of the cost of subsistence needed to keep the wage-earner in being as a productive agent. Between the two classes thus characterized there is and must necessarily be mortal antagonism: their interests are opposed; their function in history is different; their destiny is not the same. As capitalistic society develops, this antagonism deepens and intensifies, capital tends to become concentrated and centralized in fewer and fewer hands, with the steady advance of large-scale organization in industry, whilst, on the other hand, the proletariat tends to be numerically constantly increased by a mass of individuals, resting at the bottom on complete unemployment and poverty, who benefit not at all by the progress of industry and the increasing facility of production, but sink deeper into misery.

'The modern worker,' says the *Manifesto*, 'instead of rising with the advance of industry, sinks deeper and deeper because of the conditions which his own class imposes upon him' (*i.e.*, because of the compulsion of the wage-system and the competition for existence among the workers). 'The worker becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops even more quickly than population or wealth.'

Such an ever-widening gulf between classes, with the steady pauperization of one class as the condition of the enrichment of the other, constitutes an inherent criticism of social organization which must in the end be disruptive. This inherent conflict 'makes it abundantly clear that the bourgeoisie [the condition of whose existence is private ownership of the means of production] is incapable of remaining the ruling class in society, and of forcing society to accept the conditions of its own existence as a general law regulating the existence of society as a whole. The bourgeoisie is incapable of bearing rule because it is unable to ensure for its slaves a bare existence, because it is forced to place them in a position where, instead of maintaining society, society must maintain them.' The only way to escape from the impasse is to resolve the fundamental contradiction in the system—viz. the contradiction between collective, socialized production and private appropriation, ownership, and control. This means either reverting to individualized production, which in view of the progress of industry is impossible, or advancing to socialization, not only of production, but also of appropriation, ownership, and control. This means, again, socialization of the means of production, abolition of private property in these respects—in a word, appropriation, ownership, and control of the socialized means of production by the socialized producing agents, *i.e.* by the proletarian class.

The rôle of the proletariat in social evolution is

to represent and work out, in unity and solidarity, the negative side of the contradiction inherent in capitalistic organization—to turn that negative into the positive of the new social order by taking over the ownership and control of the means of production, thereby emancipating itself, overthrowing class society, and compassing the real social revolution, which is not only to accord with the desire and will of the workers for freedom, but also to be a necessary fulfilment of the inherent conditions of economic development itself. The very progress of capitalistically organized industrial society creates the conditions of change and the class by which change is to be brought about; it accumulates misery, which breeds revolt, and it compels the proletariat more and more towards self-protective unity and solidarity, by which revolt can be directed to its appropriate end. The class struggle represents the developing economic situation; the main duty of the proletariat is to spread and intensify that struggle, and to hasten the inherent economic development, by cultivating class-consciousness, the sense of their destined historical function, solidarity of intention and aim, and unity.

The *Manifesto* ends with the famous appeal for unity; and, because the conditions are in essence identical wherever capitalistic industrial organization prevails, the appeal for unity is made to all workers everywhere, the call to socialism becomes international: 'The workers have nothing to lose but their chains: they have a world to gain. Workers of all lands, unite!'

2. Influence of Karl Marx.—This *Communist Manifesto*, drawn up in 1847 for a relatively small society of revolt in Brussels, calling itself the 'Union of the Just,' and in principle repeated in 1864 as the basis of the 'International Workingmen's Association,' the real beginning of international socialism, was the work of two men, Karl Marx (1818–83) and Friedrich Engels (1820–95), mainly the former. These two names are indelibly associated with modern socialism in all its aspects, and wherever it has found acceptance. Marxian socialism moulded and dominated the socialistic thought of the Continent almost completely, and, till a relatively few years ago, almost without question. Its influence has been less in Britain than elsewhere, though socialism in Britain was in some measure reborn from the study of Marx which occupied certain acute minds about the year 1880.[1] Marx has the greater fame, and he was a more erudite and accomplished thinker than Engels, but he owed much to Engels, and especially to the knowledge which the latter possessed of the development of industrialism in Britain. Marx, in *Das Kapital*, may be truly said to be theoretically diagnosing and formulating, in his own metaphysical and economic terms, the history of capitalistic industrial organization in Britain, and peculiarly the proletarian reaction manifested in the Chartist movement, whilst his indebtedness to English political economists, and again especially to the economists of Chartism, is well known. The leading ideas in the *Communist Manifesto* are the ideas to the elaboration of which Marx devoted his splendid intellectual faculties, and to the practical organization and spreading of which he gave his energy and his life.

(1) From amongst these ideas we may single out, firstly, the so-called *materialistic conception of history*. Marx was a student of philosophy and belonged to the extreme left wing of the Hegelian school, being influenced especially by Feuerbach. From Hegel he accepted the monistic and systematic interpretation of life and history and the (Hegelian) evolutionary theory of development, but he rejected Hegel's ideal principle of reality and substituted a naturalistic or purely materialistic principle, which he further identified with the economic factors of existence. For the Hegelian dialectic of the Absolute Idea Marx substitutes a dialectic of economic conditions and economic development: it is economic changes that determine all else, whilst the ideal elements in man's nature and life are reflexes only, or reflexions, of alterations, movements, in the play of material conditions and economic forces. History, says the *Manifesto*, is the record of the struggles of social classes; but the main point is that the existence and character of these social classes are determined by economic factors.

'The materialist conception of history,' writes Engels, expounding Marx, 'starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders, is dependent on what is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.'[1]

Unrest of any class or group of human beings against the conditions of their existence—*e.g.*, proletarian unrest against capitalistic society—is only a reflexion of an unstable and changing condition of things, a lack of equilibrium of forces, in the economic system itself, which is pursuing the laws of its own being towards a new stage. There is, thus, determinism in the process, a certain fatality of events, which the will of man cannot finally hinder, though it may conceivably help. In any condition of social existence there is always development going on, and at some point a climax will come when the existing economic and social order will give way to another. If, at any given moment, the character of the economic forces at work in social life can be discerned and understood, if observation can lay bare the hidden dialectic of any given economic system, reveal the stage of its movement and the contradictions which it contains, then the character of the next stage, the direction of the changes implicit in the existing system, can be predicted, and, as it were, the programme and policy of human life arranged accordingly. This was the metaphysic behind the *Communist Manifesto*; it was this view of history that led Marx to the conviction that socialism could be made scientific and displayed as scientifically necessary; it was this that prompted him to search out the secret of capitalistic industrial organization, to undertake what Engels called 'the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production.' This materialistic conception of history, and the consequent conviction of some intimate connexion between socialism and science, had for socialistic thought certain ethical implications of importance which are noticed below (§ III.). For the moment we leave the theory with two observations: (*a*) it clearly serves to emphasize the undoubtedly great importance of economic, and in so far material, conditions in human history and existence, and sometimes the thoroughly deterministic power of the economic factor is overlooked; (*b*) in the applications which Marx made of his theory, especially with regard to the enhancing of the historical rôle of the proletariat, it is very difficult to decide whether he made these by virtue of scientific and impersonal loyalty to the theory or by virtue of a temperamental,

[1] *E.g.*, H. M. Hyndman, who was mainly responsible for the founding of the Social Democratic Federation in 1881, and E. B. Bax, who did much to popularize socialism. The group of brilliant and adventurous thinkers who established the Fabian Society in 1883 studied Marx, though after, rather than before, reaching socialistic ideas, and to many Marxian ideas they became strongly opposed.

[1] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, Eng. tr., p. 45.

revolutionary strain in his nature which, resting on profound sympathy with human misery and hatred of oppression, made him from the outset of his career a champion of the socially subordinate and politically impotent classes.

(2) The *Manifesto* next reveals the fundamental Marxian *economic criticism of capitalistic society*. This criticism is really a restatement of the older, Utopian, humanistic criticism in terms of socialistic economics. Three intimately associated strands may be discerned in it: (*a*) the well-known doctrine of 'surplus value,' (*b*) the concept of a contradiction between collectivistic production of wealth and individualistic control and appropriation, and (*c*) the focusing of interest on the human agents in production, on the worker as a person.

(*a*) *Doctrine of surplus value.*—In the *Communist Manifesto* the main economic criticism of the wage-system, the basis of capitalistic production, is drawn, not in terms of the theory of surplus value, but in terms of the cognate doctrine of the 'iron law' of wages.[1] The general form of this doctrine, familiar enough in socialistic thought, is to this effect, that from the produce of labour only so much is distributed among the workers as is required for their maintenance, with reference to their qualities and needs not as persons but only as producers, and that the amount thus distributed is determined by the varying number of workers to be maintained, or by the number required at any given moment by the conditions of capitalistic production. By the operation of this law, it is said, the workers are permanently and necessarily excluded from participation in any increase of productivity in their own labour; under capitalism their position can never become better, but, as their number grows, must inevitably become worse, until a point of collapse is reached, when the capitalistic system must topple over through sheer inability to maintain the wage-labour on which it rests. In passing, we may remark with reference to this doctrine that, whilst it has been severely criticized by modern political economists, and whilst some of the conclusions based on it—*e.g.*, the steady pauperization of the proletariat and the approach to collapse—do not seem so far historically justifiable, it has an ethical value often overlooked. The sting of it, and its persistent appeal, as a criticism of capitalistic society, are to be found in the fact that, viewed from the side of the wage-earners, the distribution of wealth does appear to be decisively dependent, not on any principle of justice, but only on the necessity for keeping them alive—if they were not needed, they would receive nothing—and the level of wages, whatever the reasons in economic theory may be, appears to the worker practically variable only in accordance with variations in the cost of living and the demand for labour. No mere economic criticism of a doctrine like this will ever shake its force amongst people who instinctively feel that they are not receiving a fair share of the wealth which they conceive themselves to be producing. The fact is that socialistic economics, in so far as they have life in them, are not drawn from theoretical political economy, but are interpretations, in economic terms, of instinctive ethical reactions of the mind of the proletariat to the conditions of its existence.

(*b*) *Production and appropriation of wealth.*—The doctrine of the 'iron law' of wages, taken in connexion with the further doctrine that labour is the source of all value and so of all wealth that can be distributed,[2] leads to the discovery of a contradiction in the economic system between the production of wealth and its appropriation, and to the further doctrine that the surplus of wealth produced by labour, over and above the portion distributed to it for its maintenance, is held by the capitalistic class unjustifiably and to the detriment of the worker. It is this doctrine of surplus value that Marx makes central in his economic criticism of capitalistic production, and to the development and exposition of which he devotes a considerable part of his chief work, *Das Kapital*. Marx starts out definitely to analyze economic conditions on the basis of a theoretical political economy, beginning with an analysis of the concept of value. By subtle and frequently very difficult definition and argument he seeks to show that the essence of capitalistic commercialism consists in the appropriation of value, due to the expenditure of labour-power, but in excess of what is needed to replace that labour-power itself and maintain it. Into the economic intricacies of the argument we shall here make no attempt to follow him, more especially as, in effective socialistic thought, it has always been the general significance of the doctrine much more than the precise Marxian economics that has been prominent. And that general significance is clear enough, and has already been indicated.

(*c*) *The worker as person.*—More important in Marxian socialism than the doctrine of surplus value are (1) the insistence on a contradiction in capitalistic society itself, and (2), in the analysis of the significance and meaning of labour-power, the emphasizing of the worker as producer, and the concentration of interest on him and his class as dominant social facts—a concentration of interest made poignant by Marx's exposures of the iniquities of competitive industry.[1] Marx urges again and again that the disastrous peculiarity in modern industrialism is the contradiction between socialized production and individualistic appropriation. In an earlier stage of economic development, when individualized production was the rule, the worker had, in general, been himself the owner of the means to make his work effective, and consequently had exercised control over the conditions of his industry and the disposal of its product. The great change to modern industrialism meant the divorce of the worker from the means of making work effective, and consequent loss of all control over conditions of industry and disposal of the product. The workers, no longer their own masters, were driven by the exigencies of advancing conditions, on the one hand, and the fear of starvation, on the other, to accept socialized production—*i.e.* factory-labour, large-scale industry, and so forth—and dispose of their labour-power to the owners of the means of production in return for wages. Wage-labour became the rule and basis of all production, and, though nominally one of the conditions of wage-labour is that the worker shall be a free person, able to dispose of his labour-power to the highest bidder, he ceases to be free in reality—for two reasons: (1) because he no longer exercises control over the conditions of his industry and has no say in the disposal of the product of that industry, and (2) because the tendency of the competitive system itself is to exert a compulsion which makes 'free contract' impossible, whilst, inasmuch as labour-power, though treated as a commodity, is inseparable from the personal life of the worker, the loss of freedom *within* industry inevitably detracts from the free personality of the worker away from his work. This is the contradiction viewed from the side of the workers; socialized production, dependent on wage-labour, along with individualist ownership and appropriation, means the inevitable failure of society to allow and provide for the full development of free personality.

All the economic criticism of the *Communist Manifesto*, all the Hegelian theorizing and subtle economic analyzings of Marx, rest really on this fundamentally *ethical* indictment of modern industrial existence. Once more it is the sense of outraged personality, full and free development of life denied, that makes real and vital the proletarian-socialist criticism and economics. The class-consciousness of the proletariat, the unity and solidarity by which alone, according to Marx, they can put themselves in alliance with developing historical economic conditions, and accomplish, at the destined moment, the revolution which is to replace capitalist society by a new order, must rest on the realization of the fact that they are being robbed of their freedom as persons.

Marx has been subjected to severe criticism on many points, and much that he regarded as true and vital has been discarded by socialists everywhere, but no one can overestimate the value of his work. He it was who gathered up into the form of a coherent and systematic theory, with its metaphysical background (whether true or false we do not now say), its connexions with historical evolution, its scientific outlook, and its technical economics, all the hitherto mainly instinctive reactions of the proletariat mind to its new surroundings, and its hitherto mainly unsystematic and disconnected aspirations. He limited social-

[1] This doctrine originates with the physiocrats of the 18th century. Turgot, *e.g.*, writes: 'In every sort of occupation it must come to pass that the wages of the artisan are limited to that which is necessary to procure him subsistence' (quoted in Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, p. 201). Wages are determined by natural law and tend to approximate only to the bare level of subsistence. Adam Smith and Malthus give countenance to the doctrine, whilst Ricardo often seems to accept it. It can be used, and was used, as a justification of poverty, and its general acceptance is certainly one of the reasons why the possessing classes in the early days of industrialism were content to see their fellows starving and in misery. But by unorthodox economists the doctrine was used as a severe criticism of capitalistic society and as a reason for abolishing that order. Ferdinand Lassalle, following Rodbertus, made this doctrine one of the bases of his socialism.

[2] This doctrine appeared, as we have seen, in the economics of the Chartist movement. The orthodox economists, including Ricardo, are cited as authority for it. William Thompson, to whom Marx was indebted, drew practical socialistic conclusions from it in his *Principles of the Distribution of Wealth most conducive to Human Happiness*, London, 1814. The history of the doctrine is treated fully in Anton Mengers, *Das Recht auf den vollen Arbeitsertrag in geschichtl. Darstellung*, Stuttgart, 1886. The doctrine has the form of the general proposition that labour is the source of all wealth—*i.e.* other than natural resources—and the more technical form that the exchange-value of commodities, on which production for profit depends, is the result of labour expended.

[1] Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1887, pt. iii. ch. ix. f., pt. iv. ch. xv., 'Machinery and Modern Industry.'

ism, as Sombart says, 'to the movement of one particular social class, the proletariat,' and this was of the greatest importance; 'he inspired the proletariat with self-consciousness, with a trust in their own strength, and with a belief in their future'; he gave them a historical rôle and a function in the social life of to-morrow; he set before them a simple and definite goal; and he gave them, also, weapons of criticism which, though they may change their form, do not change their incisiveness and force.[1] They were to accomplish their own salvation and that of society by resolving the fundamental contradiction in modern life; socialized production must be accompanied by socialized ownership and control of the means of production; collective labour necessitates collective capital. Ownership of the means of production in industry, and control over the conditions of industry, by the workers themselves—that was the Marxian goal. That was the 'social revolution,' and the first step towards it was the development of class-consciousness and unity, and the realization of international solidarity[2] amongst the workers of the world. For fifty years Continental socialism held by Marx, in essentials, and the 'revisionist' attempt to get away from him was very soon met by the cry, 'Back to Marx!', and the discovery in him of yet more truth.[3]

v. SOCIALISTIC CONCEPT OF 'THE STATE': RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF REVOLT.—The programmes of modern socialistic parties frequently contain, along with some statement of principles and of the goal to be reached, a series of demands for 'reforms' to be undertaken by 'the State.' The *Communist Manifesto* contained such demands, but it contained no theory of the State; socialism was there approached not from the point of view of society as a whole, but from the point of view of a class.

1. **Marxian theory of the State.**—Marx, despite his Hegelianism, made little use of the concept of the State in thinking out his socialism. The social revolution, for him, consists in the proletariat taking over the ownership and control of the means of production. One way of their doing this (though not for Marx the only way) is for them to acquire political power, through the development and right use of the democratic franchise and representative institutions, and to use that power for the purposes of the social revolution. What happens to the State after the revolution is not very clear. If we are to accept Engels as expressing Marx's views on the point, we must conclude that both regarded 'the State' as a product of class-society and as always in reality representing only the dominant social class, by whom its mechanism is used to subject and exploit subordinate classes. Inasmuch, then, as the proletarian social revolution abolishes all classes and class-distinctions, it of necessity 'abolishes also the State as State.' The State loses its essential function as a weapon of subjection and so ceases to exist.[4] If, behind this, anything at all is envisaged with regard to the future form of social organization, it can only be some ordering of society under 'groups,' determined by economic factors, which are autonomous and at best only loosely federated into a larger whole for certain purposes. The internationalism of Marx, and his doctrine that the proletarian has no country, would emphasize this. The political ideas involved in this view are evidently not those which emphasize the State as the main functioning organ of social life, insist on the priority of society to the individual, regard sovereignty as necessarily concentrated in a central authority, incline strongly towards the theory of centralized government and control by experts, and tend to view the 'rights' of groups and individuals, not as constituted by the effective will there present and the purposes contemplated by the groups or the individuals themselves, but as granted only or substantiated only by the sovereign power of the State as such.[1] On the Continent, where Marxian influence was strongest, however, the apparently inevitable connexion of socialism with political democracy, as evidenced in the growth of all socialistic parties everywhere, and the notion of achieving a socialist régime through acquiring and developing political power, naturally caused the idea of the State to loom large in socialistic thought; and the consequent tendency to formulate an appropriate theory of the State and society was strengthened, on the one hand, by the practical development, especially in Germany, of the absolutism of the State and, on the other hand, by the general spreading of political, and especially of sociological, views which emphasized the organic character of society and asserted, in one way or another, the priority of society over the individual.

2. **British collectivism.**—But it is to Britain that we have to look for the most complete development and formulation of the theory of the State in explicit connexion with socialism; and indeed the idea of collectivism, or State socialism, may be regarded as the characteristic contribution of Britain to socialistic thought, the product of a national temperament not prone to revolutionary feeling, and of a country with highly-developed political sense and long training in political traditions, and in which the working-classes, for various reasons, never have shown, save for the spasmodic outburst in Chartism and the revolutionary trade unionism of brief periods, many signs of strongly developed class-consciousness.

We cannot here discuss the intellectual and spiritual influences that have moulded British socialism and given it sources of origin very different from those elsewhere.[2] We can only

[1] Cf. *Socialism and the Social Movement*, Eng. tr., p. 60f.

[2] It was Marx who gave to socialism for ever the vital concept of internationalism.

[3] About the year 1900 German socialism, under the influence of E. Bernstein, showed a tendency to break with the Marxian tradition, but it was more than counterbalanced by the appearance at the same time of syndicalism in France and Italy—which professed to be, and in no small degree was, a return to pure Marxism. Cf. Georges Sorel, *L'Avenir socialiste des syndicats*, Paris, 1898, and *Réflexions sur la violence*, do. 1908.

[4] Cf. Engels, pp. 75–77.

[1] The profound importance of the differences in political philosophy here briefly suggested, not only for socialistic thought but also for the whole future of mankind, cannot at the present moment be overestimated. Differences of opinion as to the respective significance of society and individual, and as to the meaning of sovereignty and the functions of the State, not only divide socialistic theory into opposed parts, but actually rend the whole world.

[2] Socialistic thought in Britain experienced a revival about the year 1880. Chartism failed and perished in 1850, leaving echoes only in the co-operative movement and in a tendency towards revolutionary trade unionism which was spasmodically displayed in recurrent industrial unrest and strikes between 1850 and 1880. Christian socialism maintained, to a certain extent, the Chartist criticism of competitive society, but exercised no wide influence on either Church or State. Political philosophy and economic theory in Britain were dominated by individualism and *laissez-faire*. On the other side, as influences making for a socialistic revival, must be set (1) the literary and humanistic criticism of the dominant philosophies with which the names of Carlyle and Matthew Arnold are prominently associated; (2) the work of Ruskin and his Platonizing; (3) the social theories of Comte and positivism (*q.v.*), which incidentally link British socialism with Saint-Simon, whose disciple Comte was; (4) the movement in the realm of political economy away from individualism to collectivism, to which the great authority of John Stuart Mill contributed much; Mill had not only committed himself to the view that the distribution of wealth is an artificial matter controllable by the State, but in his late writings had more than sympathized with the idea of collective ownership and control of capital; (5) the study of Marx already referred to; (6) above all, the by now manifest failure of *laissez-faire* in political life and the continued growth of State interference, coupled with the rapid development of the sense of society as an organism and the rise of a social conscience. All these influences gave British socialism its peculiar

touch briefly on its characteristic ideas; and we select, more or less arbitrarily, only a few points. Orthodox British socialism, if we may use the term, has been predominantly collectivistic, evolutionary, and parliamentary or political. Its ideal has been State socialism, the ownership and control of the means of production, land, and capital, in the interests and service of the whole community, by the community as a whole, operating through the organs of its political life, *i.e.* through a central government and officials, responsible to a representative parliament democratically elected, and, locally, through the same essential organs on a smaller scale—the State for national, the municipality for local concerns. The ideas dominating such collectivism are familiar enough.

'The essential contribution of the century to sociology,' says a leader of collectivistic thought, 'has been the supersession of the Individual by the Community as the starting-point of social investigations. Socialism is the product of this development, arising with it from the contemporary industrial evolution. On the economic side Socialism implies the collective administration of rent and interest, leaving to the individual only the wages of his labour, of hand or brain. On the political side, it involves the collective control over, and ultimate administration of, all the main instruments of wealth production. On the ethical side it expresses the real recognition of fraternity, the universal obligation of personal service, and the subordination of individual ends to the common good.'[1]

The point of view behind this is that of society as a whole rather than that of an oppressed social class. The controlling thought is of society as an organism, itself conferring individuality on its members; the law of individuality is service to the community as opposed to self-interest and self-assertion, and it is the very fact of society that provides opportunity for such service and so for the development of true individuality. Ethically society, the social organism, is the essential and necessary co-operator with the individual, and indeed the major partner and influence, in the building of a good and valuable personal life. And as the case stands ethically, so should it stand economically. Wealth, like morality, is in the end socially created; without society wealth, like morality, would be impossible; and so the wealth really created by the whole society ought to be 'owned and administered by the whole society.' The ethics and economics of collectivism both depend on the organic conception of society. As the organ of practical administration and the exercise of government, which in theory is to be self-government, collectivism envisages 'the State,' but the State as purely and completely democratic. It seeks to equate State ownership and State control with the notion of ownership and control in industry by the workers themselves, by assuming, and working towards, a fully democratic State in which the State shall be the workers, and the workers the State. Socialization of the means of production and democracy must advance together if socialism is to be realized. Although collectivistic socialists have been prone at times to regard any and every transfer of property or control of industry from private hands to the national government or the municipality as a move towards socialism, it must be said in justice to the true collectivistic theory that only when the State or lesser organ of administration concerned is truly democratic and representative of an enlightened democracy, only when and in so far as the State ceases to be oligarchical and the bulwark of a superior economic class, or an entrenched bureaucracy, can changes from private to public ownership and control be regarded as genuinely socialistic. It is, indeed, just in the slowness of the advance towards real democracy, and the failure of the organs of collective government and administration to correspond to the ideal of enlightened and educated democracy, that collectivism finds its most serious obstacles and the source of criticism most damaging to it. The upholders of collectivism have been, more often than not, primarily interested in the problems of the administration of wealth and its distribution rather than in the problems of its production, and so more concerned with the efficiency and good order of the social structure as a whole than with the individual life and personal freedom of the worker in his working existence. They have tended, therefore, almost inevitably, to lean towards uniformity in social life, to strongly centralized government, necessitating, because of the magnitude of the powers and issues involved, the continued existence of a governing class, trained in administration—in a word, a bureaucracy—and the maintenance of practically coercive authority. Like other socialistic theories, collectivism has been inspired by sympathy with oppressed social classes, but collectivism differs from other socialistic thought in the extent to which this underlying sympathy has been dominated by a highly philosophical theory of society, the social organism, and the State, which, whatever other values it may have, finds little place in the instinctive reactions of the minds of the workers to their surroundings.

The most recent developments in socialistic thought have made this fact clear. Collectivism is evidently adapted to the political mind and suitable to a purely political form of socialistic thought and activity. The approach to it as goal is evolutionary and gradual, and depends on the acquiring of political power by the workers. The reflexion of collectivism in the world of politics is parliamentary (and municipal) socialism, with its repudiation of violent and revolutionary action, its belief in constitutional methods, and its faith that the social revolution can be accomplished by stages of 'reform.' From all this, recent socialistic thought has diverged in directions which significantly mark the reappearance, of course in more highly developed shape, of earlier, original, and, as we should hold, more fundamental socialistic ideas. The divergence is best illustrated by syndicalism and guild socialism, or the theory of national guilds.

3. Syndicalism.—The true home of syndicalism is France. It is the product of a revolutionary national temperament, and of a country in which revolutionary hope and fervour have always lived in the working-class mind, and where socialistic thought has been prevailingly influenced by anarchist-communist ideals.[1] Syndicalism, with its persistent distrust of parliamentary socialism, revives and emphasizes the conviction that only the workers can emancipate the workers. It holds that the social revolution must be the product of the energizing will of the industrial classes,

collectivist tone and colouring. It sprang to life again as in a highly special sense a philosophy of society and the State, in opposition to individualism, with a fitting ethics and economics; and it was in proportion far less a movement originating in instinctive reactions of the working-classes. Collectivism, with all its outlook and terminology, is decidedly a product more of the study than of the factory—a theory resting much more on intellectualist bases than on the inherent aspirations and desires of a social class. And this difference is very significant.

A full, and probably final, treatment of this topic is contained in Max Beer, *Gesch. des Sozialismus*, referred to above.

[1] Sidney Webb, *Socialism in England*, London, 1890, p. 9 f.

[1] The historical origin and general significance of French syndicalism is best treated, among English writers, by G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour*, and *Self-Government in Industry*. Syndicalism was born and developed within the French trade union movement which made rapid and remarkable progress during the two decades before and after 1900. The inspiring personality in the movement was Fernand Pelloutier, whose *Hist. des bourses du travail*, Paris, 1902, was the chief literary influence in forming syndicalist thought. Pelloutier was a philosophic anarchist, of the school of Proudhon and Bakunin, and his whole outlook was swayed by the concepts of voluntary association of producers, group-organization with federation, and the local commune. The philosopher of syndicalism is Georges Sorel, whose chief works have been mentioned already.

operating possibly only through a 'conscious minority,' clear as to goal and method, swaying the mass. But in any case social freedom must come as result of the desire for freedom and the will to freedom, and cannot be imposed by organization from above or ensured by government. The workers must create their own society and do so by act of their own will. The end is still the fundamental socialistic end—the socializing of the means of production—but new methods are upheld. Not parliamentary but trade union activity, not political but industrial organization, not the franchise but the general strike—this is the newer socialism. The concept of the class war is rejuvenated and brought into prominence. Socialism once more is presented as the peculiar and exclusive doctrine and ideal of working-class life. The socialistic order of society must be made by the workers, through their own natural organizations, and especially through their trade unions. The divisions between social classes must be not only kept intact but deepened, intensified. Already a new society, with its own institutions, its own morality, its own point of view, is growing amongst the workers, and nothing must be done to impede that growth, but everything to aid it. Class-consciousness and the 'will-to-revolt' must be kept alive and fostered in every possible way. The goal is freedom, individual and social, and only intense desire for freedom, and the sense of freedom filched away, can lead towards that goal.

Syndicalism envisages the form of the future society as based upon group-organization, groups being determined by economic and industrial functions, workshops, factories, and industries without 'masters,' private or collective, democratically constituted, owning and controlling the means of production, and bound together by a system of local and national federation. The State as central organ of administration disappears, and power is distributed throughout a series of autonomous though interdependent industrial groups. The controlling impulse in the whole outlook is to get back closer to the individual worker in and at his work, and to move outwards to association, determined by the will of the workers and the purposes to be achieved. Syndicalist criticism of capitalistic social and industrial organization is characteristically drawn in terms of the personal life and personal freedom of the worker.

4. **Guild socialism.**—In Britain the parallel of syndicalism is to be found most theoretically complete in guild socialism, or the theory of national guilds, the latest of all developments in socialistic thought, and still in its early stages.

> Guild socialism, says one of its leading exponents, 'sets before itself the ideal of finding that form of social organisation which will afford to the individual the fullest and freest power of self-development in an organised community. It wants men to be free, not merely in order to get good administration, but because freedom is in itself a good thing and the greatest of good things.'[1]

It believes that the State, 'in the sense of a governing authority claiming supreme power in every sphere of social organization,' is the negation of self-government. It contemplates, therefore, an organization of society on the basis of self-governing industrial groups, determined by industrial function, each democratically organized throughout, and federated into larger wholes for certain defined purposes. That form of social grouping called 'the State' will not cease to exist, but it will become one only of many groupings, divested of all intrinsic sovereignty, and with its value and significance determined simply by the purposes of man's free spirit which it can adequately and conveniently serve and by the functions of collective life which it can conveniently and adequately discharge.[1] The practical steps towards realization of this type of socialism consist mainly in the development of the existing characteristic products and organs of working-class life, viz. trade unions, the transformation of these into industrial groups (guilds), covering and including all engaged in any industry or common service, and the transference of control, with regard to all the conditions of labour, in workshop, factory, and elsewhere, from the 'employer' to such democratically organized groups of workers—a transference which, passing inevitably from socialized control of the conditions of production to socialized ownership of the means of production, would expropriate the capital-possessing class and bring about the social revolution. The only conceivable ethical justification for the existence of a capitalistic class—viz. the management and control of the conditions of production—would be gone, and the system would collapse. The main criticism of existing society by upholders of guild socialism is drawn in terms of an investigation of the moral significance of wage-labour, and a setting forth of what the inevitable condition of dependence for livelihood on the will of a possessing class means for the personality of the worker in his work, and outside—a kind of criticism which has appeared frequently throughout this article. The desire and intention behind guild socialism is to secure for the worker in his work 'the greatest chance for individual self-expression and for local initiative and experiment,' thereby increasing indefinitely his personal value, both in his working-life and outside it.

> Both syndicalism[2] and guild socialism are fundamentally motived by interest in the personal freedom and life, the true individuality, of the worker. The evil of society for both is at bottom an ethical evil, and no economic solution can be adequate unless it carries with it an ethical solution, and is indeed determined by the categories of individual freedom and personal worth as supreme for human life. Once more, in syndicalism and guild socialism the source of socialistic aspiration and theory becomes the definite sense of oppression and lack of freedom; the atmosphere of revolutionary discontent is restored; and with the emphasis again on class-consciousness and class-antagonism, in the form of the irreconcilability of the interests of labour and capital, and the conviction that the working-classes must work out their own salvation and be themselves architects of their own future, socialism resumes its character as definitely a movement of emancipation on the part of economically subordinate, and consequently ethically unfree, social classes.

II. *WHAT, THEN, IS SOCIALISM?*—We must now try to gather together the central points revealed in our endeavour to trace and illustrate historically the characteristics of socialistic thought, and this we shall do in the form of a series of propositions stated without criticism or amplification.

1. **A feature of modern civilization.**—Socialism is a characteristic fact, element, and feature in modern industrial civilization, and is recognizable throughout its history as an attack upon the economic, and, in so far, the ethical, bases of that civilization.

2. **A revolt against capitalism.**—Socialism is a movement of revolt against capitalistic, competitive, industrial and social organization, and its significant demand is for a new order of society

[1] G. D. H. Cole, in a letter to the present writer.

[1] It should be noted that in the theory of national guilds the philosophy of the State, its meaning and function, is not yet adequately agreed upon.

[2] Syndicalism, which we have treated as a characteristic product of French socialistic thought, has what may be called parallels not only in guild socialism but also in 'industrial unionism,' as promulgated, *e.g.*, by the society known as the 'Industrial Workers of the World' (the 'I.W.W.'), strong in America, Australia, and elsewhere. The common element in all these modern movements of revolt is the predominance of the ethical idea of freedom as corner-stone of doctrine, and the transference in economics of interest from consumption and distribution (the main concerns of collectivism) to production and the democratic control of conditions of production. Their envisagement of the future organization of society depends on the historical and economic national life and development in which they appear.

resting on new economic bases and emphasizing new ethical values. It is a continual criticism of the existing order, from the point of view conditioned by vision of a new order and desire for radical change. Socialism demands the complete reorganization of social and industrial existence, and is, therefore, strictly revolutionary in intention and aim, whether violent in method or not.

3. A demand for collective ownership.—Though varying in many details, socialistic theories are united in the conviction that the root of economic evils is to be found in the private and individualistic ownership of those things without which our human ability to labour is unproductive and uncreative, or by which that ability to labour can be utilized more effectively, made more productive, and given greater freedom in creativeness. Socialism seeks the abolition of private possession and individualistic ownership in respect of what may be called fundamentally communal goods—*e.g.*, land and capital, including under the former the material resources of nature, and under the latter all the means and instruments of production by which human labour can be more efficiently applied to those natural resources. Nothing is recognizable as socialism which does not contemplate and strive towards some radical change, not merely in the distribution of wealth, but also in the ownership of wealth and the means to wealth, and consequently some radical change also in the economic fact and the ethical concept and value of 'property' and private possession. Socialistic theories and visions of Utopia show many variations with regard (*a*) to the standards, methods, and manner of distributing created wealth among the working members of society, and (*b*) to the extent and meaning of private ownership, consumption, and enjoyment of the portion of wealth thus acquired by the individual, but all are agreed that private ownership in the definite means of production must cease, and that its place must be taken by communal or collective ownership in some shape or form.

4. An ideal of a juster order.—Socialism, in so far as it is a vital movement and is not turned into a merely academic philosophical theory, a political or economic dogma, and not too much entangled in parliamentarism and party politics, is a revolutionary criticism of modern society, an ideal and vision of a possible more just and equitable order of life, and an aspiration towards fuller freedom, all engendered by the division of the social structure into separate classes marked off from each other by economic differentiations. Socialism is the characteristic product of the mind, heart, and will of those social classes distinguished by the fact that they in the end own and possess nothing but ability to work, reacting towards the inevitable conditions of their existence under such a limitation. In other words, socialism, at its deepest and in its most vital elements, is the instinctive reaction of working-class thought and emotion towards an economic environment felt to be ethically evil, restrictive, and oppressive, combined with a steadily growing realization of personal worth and consequent desire for personal freedom and self-expression, to be achieved in an environment of greater economic liberty, more complete equality of opportunity, and wider, more satisfying fellowship.

5. An ever-changing theory. — Socialistic theories, political and economic, are formulations of these instinctive reactions. No socialistic theory in all its details is ever to be regarded as final or made into a dogma. Socialistic theory undergoes many changes and exhibits many variations, in accordance partly with general changes in the contemporary intellectual and moral outlook, but more especially in accordance with definite advances in education, culture, opportunity, and the sense of power, among the workers themselves. Socialism itself continues and will continue, finding expression in theory, in visions of Utopia, and in efforts to secure radical change, so long as the division of the social structure into economically differentiated classes remains, and so long as that division, or any similar division, is felt by any straitened and subordinate class to be a restriction on freedom and a curtailment of personality—in other words, so long as economic differentiation is felt to have an evil ethical content and significance.

6. An ethical criticism of economic system.—Socialism, although frequently in its theories it has expressed the truth the wrong way round, always contains the conviction that economics, economic systems, and economic theories have ethical significance, ethical meaning and value, and must be judged ultimately by ethical standards. Consequently, always, its economic criticism of society rests and depends upon an ethical criticism, implicit or explicit, and the deepest motive in all socialism is an ethical motive. It may be sympathy with the oppressed, belief in the value of humanity, faith in human nature, the desire for freedom and self-realization, the sense of personality cramped and crushed, the seeking after fellowship, or some similar motive or combination of such motives; but no economic or political theory of socialism, and no action of men under the socialistic impulse, can be rightly judged or appreciated unless it is seen continuously against the background of ethical motive. This is why the economics of socialism has, again and again, received support from quarters where the fundamental, and frequently the only, criticism of modern life has been ethical.[1] The paradoxical truth is this, that the innermost power and quality of all vital and vivid socialism is and always has been something which we can only call 'personalism,' the conviction of supreme ethical values resident in persons, and the certainty that the meaning of life is the realization of these ethical values through and by individual freedom, development, and self-expression. Not any theory of 'the State' or of the 'social organism,' nor any metaphysic of history, nor any economic theory, is the ultimate in socialism, the source of vitality and power, its root and ground in life, but always the conviction of personality, the sense of cramped and fettered existence, nay the very urge of life itself towards personality, freedom, and fellowship; and all this operating mainly, though not exclusively, through particular social classes, created during a particular period of history by arrangements in the social structure largely determined by economic factors. Socialism, as we said at the outset, is a form of the perpetual conflict of in-

[1] This significant truth can be best illustrated by the socialism of a man like William Morris, whose criticism of and revolt against modern society were fundamentally ethical, and whose socialism was born of his experience as craftsman, poet, and artist. In this article we have deliberately refrained from appealing to or noting the tremendous import of socialism of the William Morris type. It must always be remembered that behind and deeper than all political and economic socialism there is somewhere present, giving vitality to the theory, just that criticism of life, that demand for freedom and beauty, that craving for fellowship and joy in creative work, that revolt against sordidness, misery, and ugliness of a cramped existence, which Morris so gloriously and with such magnificent humanity expressed. Morris had the heart of socialism, and no critic has answered him yet. In another direction this bringing of support to economic socialism from a purely ethical criticism of society might be illustrated by the influence on socialistic thought of great individualist ethical thinkers like Tolstoi, Carlyle, and even Nietzsche, and indeed of every philosophy and movement in modern times which has insisted on the significance of life as against mechanism, and on the value of personality.

dividual mind against the tyranny of mechanical existence—a ceaseless criticism carried on by life itself against the outward forms of its manifestation, inspired by vision of new and better forms.

III. *SOCIALISM, ETHICS, AND RELIGION.*—Much energy has been wasted by socialistic writers and even more by critics of socialism in discussion concerning the relations of socialism with, and the effects of socialism upon, morality and religion, with these latter elements ill-defined or not defined at all.

1. **Ethical value of socialism.**—So far as socialism and ethics are concerned, the underlying purpose of this article has been to reveal the fact that, historically, socialism springs from definitely ethical motives and ethical sentiments, has an ethical value, and must be regarded as a moral force. It is the fact, also, that in all socialistic writings the dominating ethical note is that of altruism, brotherhood, love for one's neighbour, service of the community, sympathy with the oppressed. On the other hand, it is true that socialistic theorists have often seemed to favour unusual, and therefore in the eyes of many people 'immoral,' experiments, arrangements, and possibilities, with regard to certain established institutions of human life—*e.g.*, marriage and the family. It is, however, mere obscurantism to confound socialism with anything and everything that socialistic writers may have chosen to say. The issue is really simple. The motive behind the socialistic demand for a radical change in social organization is ethical. What the effect on 'morality' of such radical change as is desired would be depends on what the ultimate ethical result might be of the abolition of private property in the means of production. In so far as existing customary ethical valuations and ethical relationships depend, as they undoubtedly to a considerable extent do depend, upon the method of ownership and distribution of property and wealth, socialism with its radical change in that direction would inevitably induce many alterations and differences. Other causes—as, *e.g.*, the adoption and putting into practice of a full ethical Christianity—might produce equally noticeable changes and differences in morality. But it is obviously impossible to predict in any detail what such alterations and differences would turn out to be. Socialism is to be judged, not by any imagined consequences that might follow from its actualizing, but by the character of the need and the demand which have called socialistic theory, hope, and vision into existence. If that demand and need are really vital, if they represent and accord with the fundamental, instinctive movement of life itself, consequences must be risked. But it should always be remembered by socialists and their critics that in all probability, despite Marx and the materialistic conception of history, the ethical life of humanity, as the story of socialistic hope and theory itself actually reveals, is a deeper and more fundamental reality than the economic or political form of society, and that this ethical life is continually following its own laws of development under influence of many forces other than the strictly economic or political.

2. **Variable ethical results.**—Within socialistic theory itself intelligent anticipation of ethical effects and results will vary in accordance with the type of ultimate socialistic organization contemplated. The ethical results, *e.g.*, of a highly-centralized, bureaucratic, State socialism, with primary emphasis on the concepts of society, efficient order, the good of the community, the authority of the whole body, and so forth, will not be the same as the ethical results of a socialism tending towards distribution of sovereignty, decentralization, group-organization, and determination of forms of fellowship and co-operation from the effective will of the individual working outwards to wider association in conformity with purposes initiated and approved by the individual will. It is along the lines of these quite characteristic and indeed ultimate differences regarding the final form of socialistic organization that the question of the effects of socialism on morality should be discussed, allowing always, in all cases, for the extreme difficulty of prediction, and the independent movement of the ethical life in humanity itself.

3. **Ethical determinism.**—The tendency of much socialistic thinking and theorizing to support, often with startling inconsistencies, ethical determinism and to place exaggerated insistence on the importance of environment,[1] should be noted. Much socialism, as a result of this tendency, has, by an almost perverse devotion to abstract and now largely discredited deterministic theory, both obscured the genuinely ethical character of its origin and aim and given its opponents a ground of criticism which has served only to confuse and complicate the real issues of socialistic thought and aspiration. For this singular and, as we hold, altogether unfortunate obsession by ethical determinism there is a historical reason, which explains not only this but other curiosities of socialism as well.

4. **Socialism and religion.**—This reason becomes more obvious and pertinent when we consider the relations of socialism with religion. During its history socialism has been marked by very varying relations to religion and Christianity, whether as individual profession or as organized institution. The majority of professing socialists to-day would probably assert that religion is an individual and private affair outside the purview of socialistic theory; they would oppose any State organization of religion, State maintenance, or provision for religious teaching by the community, and they would contemplate religious organizations only on a purely voluntary basis, and altogether without temporal authority; it is doubtful whether many would trouble to identify their socialism with a denial of the religious hypothesis, whilst some certainly would individually accept that hypothesis. Many of the earlier Utopian socialists rested their socialism on belief in God, and strove to identify socialistic theory with Christian ethic and the gospel of Jesus. Similar efforts have been frequently made, whilst from the side of accepted religion and Christianity attempts in the same direction have been not uncommon, though, with few exceptions, what is called 'Christian socialism' has been content with criticism of conditions and advocacy of reform, or the infusing of the Christian spirit into existing institutions, stopping short of the full socialistic demand.[2]

Socialism and Christian ethic, or the gospel of Jesus, are not essentially related, either historically

[1] Robert Owen expounded and adhered to an almost naive form of materialistic determinism in ethics. Consciousness, for him, is a product merely of material organization and determined wholly by external stimulation, whilst the notion that the individual is in any way responsible for his character he regarded as vicious error. It is of course difficult to reconcile this with Owen's distrust of government, on the one hand, and his belief in education, on the other. The sources of his materialism are to be found in certain well-known aspects of 18th cent. rationalism. In later socialistic thought materialism has other origins. It is often as naïve and extreme, but differently based.

[2] The socialism of Maurice and Kingsley was of the reformative type. The advanced Roman Catholic understanding of Christian ethic tends in the direction of a social organization containing socialistic elements, though officially Catholicism is mortally opposed to socialism. The only definitely Christian organization which to-day seems to advocate a full and strictly revolutionary socialism is the Church Socialist League. A desire for 'social reform' is not socialism.

or intellectually. The existence of the gospel and the Christian ethic has, no doubt, directly and indirectly, influenced and contributed to the existence of socialism, and some interpretations of Christian ethic might, and indeed would, lead to conclusions very closely similar to socialistic theory and demand; but many of the premisses and the line of argument would be different. Christianity, in its ethic, contains a social philosophy which can be and ought to be worked out independently of historical socialism. One of the mistakes of professing Christians with socialistic sympathies has been a too great readiness merely to accept a formed socialism and try by various devices to fit it into their Christian ethic or their ethic into it, whereas they should have been occupied in developing independently the social implications of their faith and gospel and in working its ethical principles out into detailed application.

5. Socialistic faith.—But modern socialism, as most widely accepted and existing as a political force and organized power, has been, especially on the Continent, almost uniformly hostile to organized Christianity, partly through theoretical antipathy to the religious hypothesis in general, but more significantly because, in practical matters, it has been thought, and not unjustifiably, by upholders of socialism that organized Christianity, in modern times at any rate, has little to its credit in the way of sympathy for the struggle of the non-possessing against the possessing classes, and much to its discredit as being a habitual supporter of the established social order and a bulwark of the existing state of things.

The theoretical antipathy of socialistic thought to the religious hypothesis in general is important. Admittedly, such antipathy has been widely prevalent in socialistic writing and thinking, especially since the time of Marx. One reason for this antipathy is obvious: socialism is primarily and indeed absolutely concerned, in all its forms, with the destiny of mankind on this earth and within the sphere of historical time. It contemplates an order of society realizable by men in earthly conditions, and to be entered upon at a date not impossibly distant by generations which will reap the fruit of present sowing. From this point of view, socialism is clearly committed to a high and indeed extreme form of ethical altruism, since any labour for socialism undertaken by an individual must be undertaken without expectation of individual reward and for the sake only of some future hour of realization in which he cannot hope to share. Thus, paradoxically and unwittingly, socialists have frequently demanded and lived by a faith (in the historical future of mankind) more difficult than most accepted religious faiths; but this exclusive interest in historical time has induced a certain blindness among socialists to some valuable aspects in the characteristic religious concepts of eternal life, the future of the soul, and man's spiritual and otherworldly destiny, whilst the feeling that interest in personal immortality and a life beyond this life may become a preoccupation leading either to disregard of this life's problems or to contentment with 'things as they are' has caused socialists again and again to turn altogether away from these necessities of religion.

6. Marxian materialism.—But there is a deeper and more subtle reason for the antipathy of much socialism to the religious hypothesis. This reason is to be found mainly in the teaching of Marx. The materialistic conception of history is obviously hostile to all theories of a spiritual origin and destiny for man and the universe, and Marx accepted the extreme materialism of the Hegelian Left with its denial of all independent spiritual values and reduction of religion to a man-made illusion. When, as was frequently the case, this Marxian materialism became confused with scientific materialism and determinism, having in reality a quite different origin, the antipathy to religion was only strengthened. But the story of this antipathy does not end there. Far more potent than the materialistic conception of history was the conviction of Marx and Engels that they had made socialism 'scientific.' In that fact lies the final secret of all the antipathy to religion and all the ethical determinism which is to be found in socialistic thought. It was and has been repeatedly assumed that between socialism and 'science' there is intimate connexion, and this assumption has been interpreted to mean that socialism must accept without question all that 'science' may say. If 'science,' therefore, declares for a materialistic hypothesis of life and the universe, socialism must follow suit; if 'science' stands for moral determinism, socialism must accept that view too, and so on all through; only very slowly has socialism begun to emancipate itself from subservience to 'science,' and to realize that between the fundamental socialistic hypothesis and demand and the utterances of 'science,' so often science overstepping its proper limits, there is no necessary connexion. The process of emancipation has been aided by the deeper understanding of its place and function which modern science has achieved for itself, and by the realization within the region of socialistic thought that in any case socialism, in one necessary aspect, is an ideal, a vision, and a hope, and so demands for its acceptance and service a measure of 'faith,' and that determinism and materialism are not the best ground on which to nourish an ideal and faith in that ideal. The most recent movements in socialistic thought show the change clearly. They, although systematic, display little respect for the earlier devotion to so-called 'scientific' argument and talk of the 'necessary truth' of socialism, and so forth, but reveal instead a new intensity of feeling, a belief in human freedom, and a dominating appeal to the power in man of creating ideals and of living and working for them in pure faith, and with an enthusiasm which, it is now recognized, a cold scientific materialism and determinism inevitably destroy.

7. Conclusion.—Socialism is one of the significant movements of modern life, naturally affected by all the varying currents of thought and feeling which go to the making of that complex modern life; and the question of the relations of religion or Christianity, and of ethics, to socialism is really part of the wider question of the relations of these things to modern existence and thought generally, and their place therein. From all such questions the fundamental issues of socialism can be, and for purposes of true appreciation should be, separated, and taken in and for themselves. Then socialism appears, as we have already defined it, as a movement, vision, hope, theory, and ideal, generated by modern conditions, motived in the deepest intent and meaning of it by ethical impulse and inspiration, and issuing in a characteristic demand for the economic reconstruction of society along well-defined lines, and in the anticipation of an earthly order of existence, based on new economic and industrial arrangements, inspired by new motives and purposes, and intended to provide a fuller and richer opportunity for the development of individual freedom, powers and qualities of personality, in a life of more intense, real, and satisfying fellowship than, thus far, the world has seen. The vital points are two: (1) understanding of the fundamental economic demand and effort

involved in all socialism, viz. the abolition of private possession in the means of production, and (2) understanding of the ethical ground, need, and desire out of which that demand issues. Everything else in socialism, both in the setting forth and in the criticism of it, is subsidiary, and often merely incidental and largely irrelevant, to these two considerations.

LITERATURE.—The literature of socialism in its various phases is vast and extraordinarily dispersed. Much of the best work has taken the form of tracts and pamphlets. It has been possible only to select a very few books, more as being suggestive than as really covering the field.

i. *Historical.*—Thomas Kirkup, *A Hist. of Socialism*[4], London, 1909; Karl Diehl, *Über Sozialismus, Kommunismus und Anarchismus*[2], Jena, 1911; Max Beer, *Die Gesch. des Sozialismus in England*, Stuttgart, 1911, *A Hist. of British Socialism*, London, 1919; Werner Sombart, *Socialism and the Social Movement*, Eng. tr. from 6th German ed. by M. Epstein, do. 1909; J. T. Stoddart, *The New Socialism*, do. 1909 (with good bibliography); A. V. Woodworth, *Christian Socialism in England*, do. 1903; Morris Hillquit, *Hist. of Socialism in the United States*[5], New York, 1910; Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, new ed., London, 1902, *The Hist. of Trade Unionism*, new ed., do. 1920.

ii. *Theoretical.*—F. Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, tr. E. Aveling (Social Science Series), London, 1892; Jean Jaurès, *Etudes socialistes*, Paris, 1902; E. Vandervelde, *Essais socialistes*, do. 1905; E. Bernstein, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, Stuttgart, 1906; J. R. MacDonald, *Socialism and Society*, London, 1905, *The Socialist Movement*, do. 1911; A. Schäffle, *The Quintessence of Socialism*[9], tr. B. Bosanquet, do. 1906; L. B. Boudin, *The Theoretical System of Karl Marx*, New York, 1911; *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, ed. G. Bernard Shaw, London, 1889; K. Kautsky, *Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren*[8], Stuttgart, 1903.

iii. *Special.*—*Syndicalisme et socialisme* (essays by various authors), ed. J. Lagardelle, Paris, 1908; A. D. Lewis, *Syndicalism and the General Strike*, London, 1912; A. R. Orage, *National Guilds*, London, 1914; G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour*, do. 1915 (good bibliography), *Self-government in Industry*, do. 1917; G. D. H. Cole and W. Mellor, *The Meaning of Industrial Freedom*, do. 1918.

iv. *Critical.*—A. Schäffle, *The Impossibility of Social Democracy*, Eng. tr. (Social Science Series), London, 1892 (pt. ii. of *Quintessence of Socialism* by the same writer); Robert Flint, *Socialism*[2], do. 1914 (good references to literature of socialism); W. H. Mallock, *A Critical Examination of Socialism*, do. 1908.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

SOCIETAS PERFECTA.—A *societas perfecta* is a society that contains within itself all means sufficient for its support. The use of the term is derived from Aristotle, and came to mean in the Middle Ages no more than a sovereign and independent community. The term became important in the later Middle Ages, on all topics connected with the relations of Church and State. From Aristotle through St. Thomas Aquinas it filtered into Roman Catholic political theory. In the discussions that arose in consequence of the great schism at the end of the 14th cent. we find it argued that it must be possible for the Council to depose a pope, otherwise the Church would not be a perfect society, *i.e.*, if it could not get rid of an impossible ruler, or had no organ to do so. The point is that a perfect society must have within itself all sufficient means to exercise its own functions and needs no extraneous help. Therefore it must provide implicitly or explicitly for every emergency. In the period succeeding the Reformation the term became more common in regard to the relations between Church and State. We find the argument used on behalf of whichever of the two powers is at the moment depressed. Church controversialists like Bellarmine claimed all kinds of rights for the Church on the ground that it is a perfect society. When these were extended by the papalist party in such a way as practically to deny the independent existence of the State, the secular writers used the argument on their side. John Barclay,[1] *e.g.*, frequently uses this argument—the State is a perfect society no less than the Church. At that date no Roman Catholic thought of denying that the Church was a perfect society; therefore the State had within itself all powers and did not require ecclesiastical sanction or approval; therefore the deposing power claimed for the pope is iniquitous, and so forth. It was the recognition of something like this position for the State that caused the development of the doctrine of the indirect temporal power of the papacy. In theory this doctrine is very different from that of the direct power. The doctrine of the direct power of the papacy is expressed, *e.g.*, in the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII., or in the writings of Augustinus Triumphus or Bozius, who asserts that the State is a part of the Church, and that kings are servants of the papacy. The doctrine of the indirect power proclaimed by Bellarmine and Suarez allows the State an independent existence as being in some sort a perfect society, but claims an indirect power for the Church in cases in which its own interests might be concerned. The former doctrine has relation to the mediæval notion of the whole commonwealth as one society with its two departments, temporal and spiritual. The other looks forward to the modern doctrine of Church and State as two separate societies. In the 19th cent. the extreme claim of the civil power, especially in France after the Restoration, led to the development of modern ultramontanism (*q.v.*), and it was necessary to maintain the independence and inherent reality of the Church as a society. For this purpose there was the doctrine of the *societas perfecta* to hand. It was developed with great elaboration by two Jesuit writers, Tarquini and Palmieri. Later we find the official recognition of the doctrine in the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII., *Immortale Dei* (1885). Therein it is stated that the Church no less than the State is a *societas genere et jure perfecta*. The admission in regard to the State shows how different is the condition from that contemplated by Boniface VIII. The following passage from a 16th cent. papalist Simanca illustrates the way in which the doctrine was employed in controversy:

'Cum respublica spiritualis perfecta sit et sibi sufficiens, ut se ipsam indemnem servet, potest ea omnia facere, quae necessaria fuerint ad suum finem consequendum exercendo etiam jurisdictionem in eos qui in rebus temporalibus alioqui sibi subjecti non essent, quod quidem naturali jure cuicumque Principi facere contra aliorum rempublicam licet.'[1]

LITERATURE.—Aristotle, *Politics*, I. ii. 8; Aquinas, *Summa*, I. ii. qu. xc. art. 3, shows how the theory comes out of St. Thomas. Much use is made of doctrines of *societas perfecta* by Suarez, *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore*, Antwerp, 1613, iii.; see also C. Tarquini, *Juris Ecclesiastici Publici Institutiones*[8], Rome, 1875; D. Palmieri, *Tractatus de Romano Pontifice*[4], Prato, 1902. Discussion of the conception is found *passim* in A. Robertson, *Regnum Dei* [*BL*], London, 1901; and in J. N. Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius*, do. 1916, pp. 208 ff. and 264 (12).

J. N. FIGGIS.

SOCIETY ISLANDS.—See POLYNESIA.

SOCIETY OF JESUS.—See JESUITS.

SOCINIANISM.—Socinianism is the term applied to a critical and reconstructive theological movement of the post-Reformation decades, with consequent ideals of faith and morals. It was named after its master spirit, Fausto Paolo Sozzini (latinized into Socinus), a man of commanding intellect, supreme organizing ability, and unfaltering will. He led and inspired a succession of able expositors who developed and articulated his tenets. Among these the names of Völkel (his amanuensis), Schmalz, Moscorovius, and Ostorodt, who were his contemporaries, followed in later years by Johann Crell, a most prolific writer, Schlichting, Ludwig von Wolzogen, and Andrew Wiszowaty (grandson

[1] *Pietas, sive . . . pro regibus ac principibus . . . vindicia*, Paris, 1612.

[1] *De Papa*, printed in J. T. Bocaberti, *Bibliotheca maxima Pontificalia*, Rome, 1695–99, xiii. 277.

of Socinus), deserve a place in the record. The most important of the Socinian writings were gathered together in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, edited by Wiszowaty, the first two volumes of which contain the treatises of Socinus. In the *Racovian Catechism*, issued first in Polish in 1605, the year after the death of Socinus, at Rakow in Poland, where the Socinians had a strong church and a noted college, there is to be found the most compact and clearly developed scheme of the doctrines. It is a marvel of clear, orderly, and definite statement in a time of intellectual confusion and doctrinal debate. Socinianism was an intellectual and rationalist system of Christian doctrine on a supernatural basis. It was a species of Unitarianism. The name Unitarian came into general currency through the admission on the title-page of the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*—'quos Unitarios vocant.' It asserted the necessity and the fact of a divine revelation, maintained that the Scriptures are its authoritative record, and declared that the reason—the moral and religious nature—is the sole and final arbiter of truth. But in the beginning it was rather anti-Trinitarian than entirely sympathetic with the opinions of the Unitarian teachers of its day. Harnack, in his *History of Dogma*, ranks it, along with Tridentine Catholicism and Protestantism, as one of the three final stages of dogma. That may seem to be an exaggeration of its importance. But, when we look broadly at the historic developments of Christian doctrine, and remember how many schools of Christian thought are sympathetic with the conclusions of Socinianism, Harnack's classification is justified. The teaching of Socinus and his followers was a distinct variant from both the Roman and the Reformed doctrines, and churches of that variant remain to this day.

1. **Historical setting.**—The historical setting of Socinianism is of the first consequence. In every European country which was quickened by the religious and theological ferment of the Reformation a new sense of individuality, a clear realization of the discrepancy between the dogmas of the Church and the Christian experience of the times, combined with an intense moral passion, issued in a contempt for all stereotyped forms of doctrine. There was a wide-spread outbreak of independent and adventurous thought and speculation. Its expression and advocacy depended, in great measure, on the attitude of the civil rulers. Where the authorities were sympathetic, or where any measure of religious liberty prevailed, the truths which had laid hold on men's minds were publicly proclaimed, openly debated, and, when accepted, rigorously enforced upon the community. For this reason Switzerland, Transylvania, and the then large and powerful country of Poland became the haunts and sheltering homes of refugees from intolerant and persecuting lands. In Italy, under the rule of the papacy, with the merciless eye of the Inquisition watching every heretic, the expression of conviction was perilous to both life and fortune. But in Italy, as elsewhere, there were men for whom religious liberty was the breath of life. Foremost among these was the patrician family of the Sozini (as they spelled their name). They had been distinguished as jurists and canonists for several generations. They were as notable for nobility of character as for intellectual energy and dialectical skill.

Lelio Francesco Maria Sozini (1525–62), a jurist whose legal studies had led him on to researches in Hebrew and Biblical literature, broke openly with what he called 'the idolatry of Rome.' He sought the larger liberty to be found only beyond the borders of Italy. He visited all the Reformation lands and won the respect of all its leaders by his wide knowledge and sincere piety, while he gained their friendship by his personal charm. He lived at Wittenberg for a time on intimate terms with Melanchthon. He made the acquaintance at Geneva of Calvin, whom, however, he 'shocked' by the audacity of his speculations. His eager and subtle mind canvassed all the doctrinal problems of the day, reaching at last, through the confession and fate of Servetus, the central doctrine of the Trinity. Returning from his travels to Zürich, he spent three quiet years there, when his brief career was closed by his early death in 1562.

Lelio Sozini is of interest chiefly because of his influence upon his nephew, Fausto Paolo Sozzini. Lelio was the father of the doctrine, but Fausto was the moulder of the theology and the founder of the Church. To his nephew Lelio bequeathed all his property. His most precious legacy was a number of MSS and exegetical notes. His nephew acknowledged his indebtedness in generous terms. He declared that his conversations with his uncle imbued his young mind with a moral passion for the things of salvation and with a true conception of its method. He confessed that he learned from him a fair interpretation of Scripture, and he makes the express statement that Lelio's exegesis of Ἐν ἀρχῇ in Jn 1^1 as 'In the beginning—*of the gospel*' was the fruitful hint for a method of a new Christology.

Fausto Sozzini was born in Siena in 1539. There he spent his youth and received his education. On coming of age, he left Italy, living first at Lyons and then at Geneva, where he was enrolled as a member of the Italian congregation. In 1565 he returned to Italy, conformed to the Roman Catholic Church, and, after the custom of the time, entered the service of Isabella de Medici in Florence, who bestowed upon him both office and honour. He always referred to these twelve years as the wasted period of his life. Yet his mind had not been dormant, although he made no open sign. It is now known that the fear of losing his patrimony kept him silent. After Isabella's death he left Italy and settled in Basel to give himself entirely to the study of the Bible. There he became a centre of theological inquiry and discussion. The first outcome was seen in his treatise *de Jesu Christo Servatore*, a polemic against the evangelical teaching of the Reformers. It was written anonymously and privately circulated. A copy reached the hands of Blandrata, who was court physician in Poland, with an ambition to regulate the religious life of the people. Italians had always been welcome in Poland, where their genius in both literature and art had been admired. The religious tolerance of the rulers had made Poland a land of desire. When Blandrata sent for Socinus, he eagerly accepted the invitation, and his theological learning and deftness in practical affairs found their fitting sphere. Despite his alien birth and his hampering deafness, he so busied himself with his pen, and in debate in conferences, that he impressed himself and his convictions on the religious thought of the people. The Unitarian doctrines held the minds of the ruling classes. Socinus won them to his protest against the doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus, and, on the other hand, overcame their objection to invoking Christ's help in prayer. The Unitarians became *invocantes—non adorantes*. The Anabaptists, with their urgent and enthusiastic zeal for individualism in religion and their imperative demand for re-baptism, had enlisted the sympathy of the masses. He purged the Anabaptists from their unreasonableness in doctrine and their excesses in morals. His writings were published pseudonymously. But, when he found himself settled in Poland, married into one of its families, and cut off from his patrimony in Italy, he acknowledged their authorship. This issued in a revolt of the masses against him, and in 1598 he was expelled from Cracow. He found shelter with friends, but the intense toil and strain of his life had prematurely aged him, and he died on 4th March 1604. It is

open to question whether or not the Minor Church, as it was called, with its clear-cut and subtly argued scheme of doctrine from the hand of Socinus, might not have become supreme in Poland. But the authorities at length took up a position of keen antagonism, which issued in active persecution. Its teachers and people were scattered throughout Western Europe, finding shelter in Holland and in England, and giving birth to schools of Unitarian theology. It is only among these Unitarian communities that the modified tenets of Socinus and of his earlier followers are to be found openly avowed, but the influence of his teaching is more pervasive than is commonly realized.

2. Outline of doctrines.—The doctrines of Socinianism, because wrought out into a well-knit scheme, can be given an orderly statement. The point of view from which they should be approached is that of a theory of salvation. In this Socinus had caught the spirit of his age. That was the subject of his first treatise written in Basel. The focus of its critical attack was the orthodox doctrine of the Atonement, and to this day all churches and schools who look back to Socinus level their lance at the evangelical interpretation of the death of Christ. The most strenuous pages of the *Bibliotheca* and the most pungent sentences of the *Racovian Catechism* deal with the meaning of the sacrifice on the Cross. To stand with Socinus at his conception of the death and resurrection of Jesus as a centre enables us to sweep round the whole circle of his system.

(*a*) *The basis.*—The first feature which emerges is its basis in the Scriptures. The NT, whose authenticity, sufficiency, and perspicuity are postulated rather than argued, is the text-book. Its rational and balanced exegesis will yield proofs of its authority as a divine revelation. The witness of tradition, the declaration of creeds, and the authority of the Church are summarily set aside. All that is required is the use of 'right reason' to discover, understand, and apply the things which belong to the faith and its salvation. The OT has no authority in itself. It has a certain value for its illustrative and devotional features. But it is entirely dependent for its authentication and interpretation upon the NT Scriptures. One of the by-products of the teaching of Socinus was his method of a balanced and scholarly exegesis, and the ban which he placed on dogmatic interpretations was a service of exceeding value to Christian scholarship.

(*b*) *The doctrine of God.*—On this basis there was raised the superstructure, and its first article, in order, is concerned with the doctrine of God. Here Socinus was influenced and even controlled by his Scotist conception of the divine nature. Philosophically Socinianism was a throwback to the Scotist demand for concrete and evidenced reality, and a protest against a metaphysic which would not yield itself to almost entirely natural categories. As a consequence, the conception of God in the mind of Socinus was somewhat external, and His attributes are those which are essential to His being, rather than inherent in His character. Socinus, therefore, defined God after His nature and His will. In His nature God is 'the supreme Lord of all.' Omnipotence is not His only attribute, but it rules every other. God is an *absolutum Dominium*. There can be no question raised against God, who, however, will do no evil. Still more, as the finite cannot be a measure for the infinite, all human conceptions of the nature of God must be considered as inadequate grounds on which to base a critical or condemning judgment. It follows that God's will is an *arbitrium imperium*, a will entirely free, bound by no law that the human mind can formulate, and able to will God's pleasure, in obedience to His purposes, in ways hidden from the human mind.

'God's dominion comprises a right and supreme authority to determine whatsoever He may choose (and He cannot choose what is in its own nature evil and unjust) in respect to us and to all other things, and also in respect to those matters which no other authority can reach; such as are our thoughts though concealed in the inmost recesses of our hearts—for which He can, at pleasure, ordain laws, and appoint rewards and punishments.'[1]

Thus God is simply the great omnipotent free will, the supreme individual personality, over against whom man is also an individual personality as free in will but impotent in fact. It at once appears evident that such doctrines as predestination, original sin, the necessity of imposing a penalty or of adhering to any doctrine of forgiveness in relation to law, are swept away. God stands above all compulsion, over against man, who also is endowed with a free will to obey or to disobey. From this position it is an inevitable step to the unity of God. God is the absolute arbitrary One. 'There cannot be more beings than one who possess supreme dominion over all things.' To speak of three persons, by which Socinus always means three individuals, is to speak irrationally. Yet the Socinian doctrine was careful to utter a caveat and to suggest a limitation, with a view to giving room for its Christology. As against the personality of the Holy Spirit, there is no hesitation. The Holy Spirit is only an energy. But God may delegate His power or may share it, as He has done pre-eminently in one instance. Yet He remains single, alone, supreme, so that the Socinian argument is always unfalteringly anti-Trinitarian.

(*c*) *Doctrine of Christ.*—The Christology of Socinus is set out in regard to Christ's person or 'nature,' and His work or 'offices.' Jesus was truly a mortal man while He lived on earth, but at the same time the only-begotten Son of God, being conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of a virgin. He was separated from all other men, distinguished by the perfect holiness of His life, endued with divine wisdom and power, and was sent by the Father with supreme authority on an embassy to mankind. By His resurrection He was begotten a second time and became, like God, immortal. He was therefore glorified by God, that He might be made the chief director of our religion and salvation—in which office are comprised His supreme authority and dominion. These positions are supported by a comprehensive citation, with a confident exegesis of the relevant passages and types and symbols in the Scriptures. The strenuous and subtle argument, with its occasional violence of denial, indicates the strain clearly felt in dealing with the words of Christ and the witness of the Epistles, as these are accepted by the Church Catholic. A similar pathetic note can be heard in the protests of Martineau under the stress of the same exegetical contest. The 'offices' of Christ are three—the prophet, the high-priest, and the king. But the offices of the high-priest and the king are dismissed briefly, and the whole stress is laid upon His prophetic ministry. Jesus is our high-priest, not because of His sacrifice at Calvary, but because of His mediation and intercession after His resurrection to heaven. Jesus is the king because God has 'placed Him at His right hand and given Him all power in heaven and on earth, that He might at His own pleasure govern, protect, and eternally save those who believed in Him.' In His prophetic office Jesus has manifested and confirmed the knowledge of the hidden will of God, and His work was consummated in the new covenant, as it is found in He 8^8 and 1 Ti 2^5. In that covenant, interpreted by Jesus, are stored the perfect pre-

[1] *Rac. Cat.*, § 3.

cepts and perfect promises of God, with the modes and grounds of our obedience to them. The precepts are both moral and ceremonial. Some of them were additions by Jesus. Others were interpretations, and a quickening of the inwardness of OT laws. The ceremonial ordinances are baptism by immersion, simply as a rite of initiation, although Socinus himself remained indifferent to the use of this sacrament, and the Lord's Supper, which is nothing more than a feast of remembrance. Through these observances the Christian believer lays hold on eternal life and receives the gift of the Holy Ghost. But Christ's prophetic office fulfilled its supreme function in His confirmation of the divine will by His perfect innocence, His miracles, and His death. With the meaning and efficacy of Christ's death Socinus wrestled in the fullness of his strength. The one thing of which he is sure is that Christ's death is not an atoning sacrifice. Christ indeed suffered for sin rather than for sinners. He was a victim of sin, a witness to its guilt, a deliverer from its power, and, therefore, He willingly 'underwent a bloody death as an expiatory sacrifice.' Because of this willing submission to the rage and fury of sin, men have a right to the remission of sins, and a new hope in God. They are drawn to Christ as their Saviour and see Him to be God's witness to His own boundless love to the human race, and are therefore led into reconciliation with Him. Every other view is rigorously analyzed. The doctrine of satisfaction, which the Reformers urged, is keenly canvassed and its difficulties are set out in an animated dialectic. The conclusion reached is that God, whose will could have chosen any mode of forgiveness which is not foreign to His nature, chose to make acceptance (*acceptatio*) of Christ's death at Calvary, but especially of its offering in heaven, the ground of forgiveness. The forgiveness of God is, therefore, not *propter Christum* and not even *per Christum*, but *gratuito*, because God was willing to accept this sacrifice. Its power consists in its revelation of the will of God and its consequent moral influence on the heart of man.

(*d*) *Doctrine of faith.*—This theory of salvation is matched by a corresponding doctrine of faith. Faith is an attitude of attention to the promises and an obedience to the precepts of God. It may be of two kinds. 'A bare assent alone of the mind whereby we acknowledge the doctrine of Jesus Christ to be true' is not attended by salvation. The faith required is that 'we trust in God through Christ, and give ourselves up wholly to obey His will.' In spite of the wide gulf between these limiting definitions and the breadth and depth of the Pauline conception, Socinus felt himself compelled to relate his conclusion to the Pauline doctrine of justification. But his reference is slight, and his logic renders his use of Paul's master word unreal, if not unmeaning. The whole system is completed by an ethical demand of high seriousness and even of austerity, although it lacks the glow and colour of an obedience which is the outflow of the adoring gratitude of the redeemed.

3. **Critical estimate.**—When we turn to a critical examination of the doctrines of Socinianism, we find that the contest ranges along the whole front. Socinianism has been condemned both by the judgment of history and by the witness of almost universal Christian experience. The Roman Church, with its adherence both to the method and to the content of the early creeds, and through its passionate loyalty to Augustinian doctrine, dismisses the teaching of Socinus with an unflinching denial. But it troubled the Reformed theologians of the 17th cent. and invaded all their communions, so that they grappled with it as the subtlest and strongest enemy of evangelical truth. The Christian thought of to-day no longer fears its assault, for it has discarded, once for all, the Socinian method of approaching Christian doctrine, but it maintains and must maintain its protest against its chief conclusions.

The first broad remark to make is that Socinianism was a school rather than a Church. Its congregations were associations for Christian learning rather than communions for Christian worship and service. This is confessed in the opening sentence of the *Racovian Catechism*:

> 'The Christian religion is the way of attaining eternal life which God has pointed out by Jesus Christ and it may be learned in the Holy Scriptures, especially in the New Testament.'

But the Mediæval Church and the Reformers held that the Church was a religious fellowship, a society of divine origin, founded by Christ through His atoning work for men. Within its communion and by its offices sinful men found the way to God. The Church was more important than, and prior to, the individual believer. To the Church God fulfilled more abundantly His promise of the Holy Spirit. Through its message men were called of God, and by its sacraments were sealed to His service and to communion with Him and their fellow-men. Had Socinus and his followers ever entered into this truth, they would have realized how insufficient was the basis, and how external was the structure, of their scheme of doctrine.

The view that Scripture is merely a source of information about doctrines and precepts is a shrunken conception of what both the OT and the NT have been to the Christian mind and conscience. Scripture is a means of grace, a channel through which the message of God passes to the soul of man, a meeting-ground where God and man stand, spirit in touch with spirit. Scripture has a divine power to enlighten, to quicken, to rebuke, to comfort, to give peace. The Reformation doctrine of the witness of the Spirit to the word, which is affirmed not only by Scripture itself but also by universal experience, was never upon the horizon of the Socinians, and that casts a blight upon much of the skilful exegesis of their scholars and commentators. In the same way in their doctrine of God they never rise to the height of the thought that He is the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, and is so regarded, so known, and so confessed through the power of the Holy Spirit. He is not even a moral Ruler of a moral universe with laws unalterably righteous, to which He has set His seal. He is simply an 'All Highest,' for whom creation and providence and, finally, the redemption of men are simply acts of His mere pleasure, the exercise of His will. He is never a holy love, with a necessity to create and redeem, because of a self-sacrificing passion for men and a desire for their fellowship and service.

When we realize the insufficiency of the Socinian doctrine of God, we understand the reason for the limited and depreciatory doctrine of Christ's person and work. Jesus was not the Word made flesh. He was the man whose life in the flesh achieved victory over sin for Himself, whose resurrection, not by His own power but by the will and power of God, made that victory a means of salvation to men. We realize in a moment with what tremendous energy the Reformers did battle with this, as they deemed it, dishonouring conception of the incarnate and redeeming Christ. They pointed out not only that the ecstatic sentences of the NT were inconsistent with these formal statements of Socinian theology, but also that this conception was a throwback to the discredited Pelagianism of the past. They remarked upon the fact that no self-forgetting consecration and no impassioned

devotion were to be found in the hymns and prayers of the still life within the Socinian churches. The truth was clear that the Socinians had no sufficient doctrine of sin. It was neither a transgression of a holy and indefeasible law nor a state of enmity to God. It was the offence of an individual man against an individual God, a private injury which God might pass by on any conditions that He might choose to impose. As a consequence the Atonement is really superfluous. All that can be said is that God has chosen to accept it in the exercise of His will as an offering through which He will be reconciled. The motive of the love of God as the source and spring of the Atonement, the fact of the divine reaction against sin, the solemn truth that a holy law cannot be broken without the breach of much else, and the necessity of a reason in righteousness for Christ's death for sinners, all lie outside the narrow path of Socinian theology. The issue of all this is that both faith and obedience, both the relationship to God and its ethical issues, are bleached of their colour. It is not accurate to say that the Socinian conception of faith is only *assensus*. That is denied, with good reason. But it is fair to say that faith never became a full-orbed and adoring *fiducia*. It never attained to a simple, unquestioning confidence in God and in His grace revealed and made potent in Christ. It never reached to that vision of His love, that venture upon His mercy, and that victory over the world which constitute the secret of the Lord. It never evoked that love which casts out fear. The final issue is seen in the fact that the ethics of the Socinian churches in all time never rise to that abandonment of joy, that quenchless zeal for Christ and His kingdom, and that glow of devotion which make up the atmosphere of believing churches and believing men. The Socinian ethics lacks the dynamic of a faith in the love of a divine Redeemer who gave Himself for men. It is unlikely that Christian theology will ever hark back to the way of the Socinian. It will never build either with his intellectual method or upon his narrow and scholastic bases. But there is a possibility that, through the application of similar methods to the self-consciousness of Christ, there may be a reaction to anti-Trinitarianism, and from that men may stand again with the Socinian to utter their denial of the deity of Jesus and all that that implies.

LITERATURE.—The reasoned apologetic of Socinianism is to be found in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, Amsterdam, 1656. Vols. i. and ii. contain the letters of Socinus as well as his chief controversial works. Of these his treatise *de Auctoritate Sanctæ Scripturæ*, Rakow, 1570, which is said to be his earliest writing, and his *de Jesu Christo Servatore*, Basel, 1594, state and defend the basis of his system, and the stress-point of his thinking. In the latter it is the work, and not the person, of Christ that is expounded and argued. The simplest and clearest statement is to be found in the *Racovian Catechism* issued in Polish in 1605, published in Latin in 1609, and translated into English by John Biddle in 1652. It was afterwards revised and enlarged and reached its final form in 1680. From this ed. Thomas Rees published his Eng. tr., with a sympathetic historical introd., in 1818. A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99 (vols. v.–vii.), gives a full account of the historic development and theological trend of the system. Albrecht Ritschl, *Critical Hist. of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1872, deals critically with its chief features; T. M. Lindsay, *Hist. of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1906–07, ii., shows its historic setting and relationship to the Reformation. The standard German work is that of O. Fock, *Der Socinianismus*, Kiel, 1847. The biographies of Socinus are of especial value. The earliest (1636) by S. Przypkowski is prefixed to his works. In 1653 it was rendered into English by John Biddle (1615–62), who has been called, significantly, 'the father of English Unitarianism,' whose sufferings in an intolerant age indicate the antipathies aroused by Socinianism. A sympathetic Eng. tr. by Joshua Toulmin, with a historical introd., was published in 1777 under the title *Memoirs of the Life, Character and Writings of F. Socinus*. An illuminating study, embodying the result of recent researches, is A. Gordon, 'The Sozzini and their School,' *Theological Review*, July 1879. The various histories of Unitarianism in England and in the United States trace its connexion with Socinianism, and point out the criticism and redaction of its conclusions and the difference between their points of view.

W. M. CLOW.

SOCIOLOGY.—1. The field.—Sociology is the study of human society, which means in its most general sense the tissue of relations into which human beings enter with one another. The name suggests friendliness and co-operation, and it is true that a certain ultimate community of aim and of character underlies those relations between men which are continuously active and permanent. But these are in fact blended with dealings and feelings of a hostile or indifferent character, and, for purposes of investigation, all or any dealings of man with man, anything that conditions or proceeds from such dealings, is a social fact. 'Envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness'—the unsocial or anti-social elements in one sense of the term—are unfortunately relevant to the study of social facts in the widest sense. The social relation, again, may be direct, personal and conscious, or it may be indirect and unknown or ill understood by those whom it affects. In the complexities of the world market a good harvest in the Argentine may affect the fortunes of a Norfolk farmer and possibly the employment of a labourer who would be puzzled to point out the Argentine on the map. The effect is just one element in the operation of a tissue of social relationships of which perhaps no one but the student of this particular market possesses any adequate knowledge, and it is a part of any sociological inquiry to bring to light relations of social cause and effect which without systematic investigation remain quite obscure even to those whom they most intimately affect. Thus the social relationship is potentially as wide as humanity and as various as life. In the simpler societies, it is true, physical barriers separate off different tribes and peoples so that their lives may have little or no contact with one another, but, as material civilization advances, such barriers are scaled and the range of direct and still more of indirect social interaction is progressively widened. In the study of society we may deal with anything which interests us within the whole range of this interaction, and it will be seen that by 'society' we mean something different from *a* society. Society is something universal and pervasive, a tissue, as we have called it, of relations of which it is difficult to find the beginning or the end. A society, on the other hand, is a definite collection of people united by certain special relations with one another and in some way marked off by these relations from others who do not enter into them, possessing in fact a certain unity and in general a structure and what for want of a better metaphor we are accustomed to call a certain life of its own. The formation of societies—their growth, structure, and decay, their inner history and their mutual relations—constitutes the principal part of the study of society, but not the whole. Behind societies there is always society, and the door is opened to serious fallacies if we forget the distinction. Broadly we may express the relationship by saying that it is one of the general characteristics of society that it engenders societies. Out of the tissue of social relationships emerge collections of people constituted each with a definite structure of its own distinguishing it, but by no means severing its relations with others. If society is the tissue of relationships between men, a society may be defined as a structure of which the elements are human beings living in certain enduring and defined relations to one another. Any given human being is as a rule a member of many

societies—*e.g.*, family, house of business, trade union, Church, and State—and those societies may either be concentric (the smaller group being members of the larger) or intersect (*e.g.*, a world Church or an international labour organization cuts across State divisions). Running through and beyond all these societies are the social relationships that have not thrown up any organized structure. Thus the influence of science, philosophy, art, and literature is international and extremely pervasive, but, though we speak of the republic of letters or of science, this is no more than a metaphor. The mutual influence of thought and discovery among the peoples is of old standing and is very great, while such organization as it has attained in the shape, *e.g.*, of world congresses is recent and very partial. Nevertheless the tendency of social relationship to take shape in some definite organization is interesting and important here as elsewhere.

Ideally the complete subject of sociology is the entire field of these social relationships organized or unorganized. Any study is sociological which concerns itself with any branch of them, and, as human faculty is limited and the field of society vast, it is in practice necessary to divide the subject into a number of specialisms. Necessary, but a necessary evil. For one of the few generalizations that can be laid down with confidence about society is that all its different parts, however clearly distinguishable for thought, are in their actual development interwoven. The religious, the ethical, the legal, the scientific, the economic relations of life are rightly distinguished, and, if any results are to be attained, each must be studied with the minuteness and accuracy that are possible only to specialism. Yet change in any one of these relations may affect all the others, and the specialist who becomes so concentrated on his particular branch that he ignores the rest is liable to serious errors, such as, *e.g.*, disturbed for a time the development of economics. There is no fundamental difference in this respect between sociology and other sciences, particularly sciences which deal with living beings. A pathologist may specialize with success on the eye or the ear or the liver, though all these organs are part of one organism and are affected in their functions by changes in other organs. What the social specialist has to do is to cultivate his own garden without forgetting the larger field of which it forms a part and from which weeds, let us say, may spread to his own patch. Or, to drop the metaphor, he may make generalizations within his own department, but must bear in mind that these results are conditional on freedom from disturbance by influences emanating from other departments. These things are so obvious that they would hardly be worth stating if it were not for a certain pride of specialism which tends to erect the particular branch, whatever it may be, that the student has chosen into the main stem of society. Thus the economist is apt to see in the industrial and commercial relationships the true and solid foundation of society, the groundwork of its development, the root of its diseases and decay. The political philosopher is convinced that the State is society—not merely the governmental organization which serves as a shell, but the essence and spirit of society itself. The religious man will find all that is of real account in the character of the beliefs current among a people. The biologist sees racial characters everywhere, and the historian of thought is inclined to the view that intellectual development is the sole cause of profound changes in civilization. Against all these tendencies to bias sociology has to make its protest. Its fundamental thesis is that all parts of society interact, and that no pre-eminence over the remainder can be claimed *a priori* for any one element of social life. What is the extent of the influence of each is a very difficult problem to be solved inductively, and probably is destined to receive a different answer in relation to different societies and different periods.

Perhaps a single illustration may be given of the interlocking of cause and effect and the impossibility of assigning the palm of influence to a single factor. Some economists, the Marxians in particular, represent history as an economic process proceeding by an inherent dialectic determining and not determined by the rest of the social structure. But it must be apparent that the industrial structure of our own time is more and more determined by scientific discoveries; nor in the 19th cent. would the electric telegraph—one of the key processes—have arisen but for the experiments of Gauss and Weber stimulated by a theoretical interest, and derived in their turn from the purely intellectual work of Volta and many others. In our own time wireless telegraphy, a commercial innovation of the highest importance, owes its origin to the work of Hertz, which is affiliated to the purely theoretical researches of Clerk-Maxwell. So far the economic factor is dependent on the intellectual, but, if any one thinks that the intellectual factor alone determines the application of science to industry, let him ask himself why the principle of the steam engine, known to Hero of Alexandria, had to wait for the second half of the 18th cent. for its fruition. It is clear that in the 1st cent. B.C. there were men capable of devising practicable steam engines if the conditions had created a demand for them.

It would be easy but superfluous to follow the illustration farther. Let us put the point in this way. The development, say, of science is primarily self-dependent, one discovery leading on to another, but it is conditioned by many elements in the social order—*e.g.*, by religious freedom, the facility of intercommunication, and the social appreciation of intellectual work. Social prejudices, moreover, affect the fashions of scientific thought; *e.g.*, political passions have encouraged theories of race and of the struggle for existence, and national prejudices play their part. So again religion has its own evolution, but is vitally affected by science. Ethical evolution is not the same as religious, but is closely interwoven with it. Law is distinct from either, but cannot violate the ethical or the religious standard with impunity. National evolution has its own roots, but plays upon and is played upon by religious, ethical, and economic influences and even by scientific or pseudo-scientific theories of race. The existing sum of sociological knowledge includes all the scientific studies of all these departments of society. The ideal sociology which has yet to be created would be the synthesis correlating and correcting their results.

Ultimately, then, sociology is a synthesis of the social studies. In the meantime the immediate task of the sociologist is humbler and yet difficult enough. Having in mind the interconnexion of social relations, it is his business to discuss and expose the central conceptions from which a synthesis may proceed, to analyze the general character of society, examine the action of social development, and distinguish the permanent factors on which society rests and from which social changes proceed. In a wider sense sociology may be taken to cover the whole body of sociological specialisms. In a narrower sense it is itself a specialism, having as its object the discovery of the connecting links between other specialisms. In this sense the problem of sociology is the investigation of the general character of social relations and the nature and determining conditions of social development.

2. Social science and philosophy.—So much controversy has arisen as to the method of such investigation as to have in large measure blocked the path of investigation itself. The greater part of sociological treatises is apt to be taken up with questions of the logic of the science. In point of fact every science has found out its own method by experiment, and it is only by investi-

gating social phenomena that we shall learn to distinguish between the fruitful and unfruitful methods of approaching them. Nevertheless to define the relation of sociology to other inquiries that cover or even touch the same field is to make some advance in our main problem of clearing up fundamental conceptions, and we must deal here briefly with the main issues that have been raised.

(*a*) *Questions of fact and questions of value.*— Historically the systematic investigation of social life began as a branch of general philosophy. Plato's *Republic* is a treatise on metaphysics, ethics, æsthetics, psychology, education, and political theory in one. For Aristotle ethics and politics in the narrower sense are two branches of a more widely conceived political inquiry, and are together subordinate to his conception of nature and man's place therein. To the Stoic the city of Cecrops was a microcosm within the wider cosmos which was the city of Zeus. In modern times the study of social affairs began with the criticism of political authority and was dominated by the conception bequeathed to the world by the Stoics of a law of nature, and down to our own day among the followers of Hegel the metaphysical theory of the State (*q.v.*) retains its influence. The simpler and truer view of the relations between social science and philosophy is due to the Utilitarians. For them moral philosophy was devoted to the study of the ultimate ends of human action, which they declared to be the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number of those whom action can affect. Political and in general social theory were concerned with the actual relations of man in society, and this investigation would be the servant of ethics, as it would reveal what institutions made for and what were prejudicial to the general happiness. We thus get a clear distinction between three inquiries which are apt to be confused: (1) the inquiry into the nature of the good, a discussion of values; (2) the inquiry into the actual relations of human beings, a discussion of facts; (3) the inquiry into the means of utilizing our knowledge of the facts in the service of the good, the application of ideals of value to the discovered truth as to facts, the art of social improvement.

Certain fundamental questions may be raised here as to the distinction of value and fact. It may be that value (*q.v.*) is also a fact, an element in reality. We shall not pursue the discussion here, as we should be far from denying the ultimate co-ordination of all thought—a co-ordination in which the conception of what is desirable must play a part along with the knowledge of what is actual. But, in whatever sense the actual and ideal are related, they are also distinct, and of any specific inquiry we must know whether it is dealing with the one or the other. We may appropriately use the term 'philosophy' for the discussion of value, whether it be the value of methods of attaining truth or the value of modes of life and conduct, and the term 'science' for the investigation of facts and the interconnexions of fact which we seek to exhibit as laws. As social life is the medium in which all that we most value has its being, it is clear that it falls within the purview of philosophy as here described, and, if we call the study of value ethics, it follows that any social philosophy is a branch or application of ethics, as the Utilitarians justly conceived. But it is also clear that the application cannot be usefully attempted without knowledge of the facts of society, the systematic exhibition of which is the object of a social science. So far we have a justification for both the philosophic and the scientific treatment of our subject. A complete sociology would therefore embrace a social philosophy and a social science. But it would be a synthesis, not a fusion, of the two inquiries.

It is necessary to make this clear because the distinction has in fact been too often ignored. If we turn to any treatise on social philosophy, we shall find an examination of many of the elementary social institutions—government, law, property, the family, international relations, etc. These are all existing facts, institutions varying endlessly in detail and often in most essential elements from case to case. If we examine these institutions in order to discover what is in fact common to them or how they in fact differ, we are in the region of science. If we examine them to discover how far, or in which of these specific forms, they conduce to the good of man, we are in the region of philosophy. The fundamental defect of the metaphysical treatment of society, however, has been precisely that it has not distinguished these questions and that in analyzing the actual constitution of society it has seemed at the same time to determine what is and to lay down what ought to be. As against this method it must be maintained that the analysis of institutions is either an analysis of values in subordination to some explicit system of ends or an analysis of their actual form of operation in a given society. Both inquiries follow a characteristic method of general philosophy in that they examine those elementary conceptions which ordinary thought takes for granted. Both cover a good deal of the same ground. But their final goal and consequently their continuous interest is different. One thinks constantly of the good which an institution subserves, the other of the precise form which it assumes at a given time, the evolution through which it assumed that form, its interaction with other institutions, and similar questions of fact. Grave confusions arise when issues of fact are coloured by judgment of value; but, when the facts are completely and accurately stated, it is reasonable to essay their valuation, and this is the proper task of social philosophy.

Thus the whole field of society can and should be treated scientifically, and, when scientifically understood, can and should be reviewed philosophically. There is no objection to either method in itself, but only to a confusion of the two. A complete sociology, indeed, aims at a synthesis in which the two parts, though always distinct, are brought into definite relation.

The confusion of method may be illustrated by the uncritical use of terms like 'progress,' which, if it means anything, means a change to something better, a change which therefore we approve, which accords with our standard of ethical valuation. If this meaning had been kept in mind, it would have been impossible for the conception of progress as involving an unmitigated brute struggle for existence to hold its own for a day. In the scientific part of our work we had better avoid terms of distinctively ethical colouring, and with that object, in place of social 'progress' and 'retrogression,' we shall speak of 'development,' 'arrest,' and 'decay.' It may be objected that these terms still carry ethical associations, particularly if we speak, and we shall have to speak, of 'higher' and 'lower' developments. As shown farther on, there is, however, a precise and unambiguous meaning to be attached to these terms which is independent of any ethical valuation; they import differences in the internal vitality, efficiency, and extension of social organization. Whether such organization is on the whole a good or a bad thing is another question. On the method here proposed the question of the nature and conditions of social development becomes a question of social science proper, the question of the social ideal one of ethics, and the question whether actual development has been or is or may be so guided as to conform to the ideal one of the application of ethical principles to scientific results. The present article deals in some detail with the definition of social development, and only briefly indicates the ethical ideal by which the facts should be valued.

(*b*) *Law and freedom.* — Another philosophical conception which has given trouble in the scientific study of society is the conception of law. It is maintained that the object of sociology as a science is to achieve generalizations which presuppose the

existence of law in the life of society, and it is questioned whether law involving necessary connexion prevails in the field of human action determined by the human will. The metaphysical question of freedom which emerges here has been generally held to be of critical importance to the status of sociology as a science. But this is an error. It is forgotten that in all sciences the 'laws' which investigation reveals are conditional. They tell us what will happen under given conditions, and enable us to predict what will actually happen at a given time and place only on the tacit supposition that our knowledge of the conditions then and there existing is adequate. Even the astronomer who predicts an eclipse for a given hour and minute speaks with the tacit reservation that the solar system remains unchanged by the irruption of a comet or other disturbing body. Whenever we apply science to practical affairs, the possibility that our enumeration of the relevant conditions is incomplete becomes a serious consideration, and the judgment of the practical man is required to round off and apply the conditional predictions of the specialist. The pathologist lays down the normal course of a disease. The family doctor, using the pathologist's results and knowing the history of the patient, forms by the union of the two a prognosis which is valuable in proportion to his discernment but is not matter of demonstrative certainty. Similarly, what sociology tells us or hopes to tell us is what will happen under given conditions. The economist, *e.g.*, shows that, if supply is reduced while demand is constant, prices will rise. This is a result reached by legitimate reasoning from certain postulates, generally verified in the workings of a modern market. But, if a food controller intervenes, or even if there is a strong appeal to patriotism or a wide dislike of 'profiteering,' a new condition is introduced and the conclusion will not hold. The motives that may stimulate the will are so various, and the complications of social life so intricate, that on any theory of the will all our sociological generalizations must be conditional in character. If people act in certain normal ways conformably to our analysis of human nature, confirmed perhaps by statistical records of actual behaviour, then on given conditions certain results will follow. Even if we assume the strictest philosophical determinism, we could not get farther than this until we knew all the possible motives to action which all possible situations might throw up. If, on the contrary, we assume an indeterminism in the old and strict sense, we are for the present no worse off. We shall still be able to say that, if the mass of men act as they ordinarily do, the results will follow. The difference would emerge only at a much later stage than sociology has reached. For, if there is a strictly indeterminate element in the will, then there is a factor which not only is not known but never can be known. In that case, while other sciences might, ideally, complete the study of their subject-matters and succeed some day in transforming their hypothetical predictions into categorical generalizations in which all relevant conditions should be known, sociology and psychology would have to leave a gap where the undetermined will operates. None the less on both sides of the gap the territory could be explored, and the generalizations obtained would be valid conditionally on a statable operation of the will.

But even this distinction admits a little too much. It overlooks the power of statistical method. If there is an element in the operation of the will which is *bona fide* indeterminate, we are in the region of 'pure chance.' Among a thousand persons confronted with a certain conflict of motives it is even odds whether any individual chooses this or that, accepts, let us say, or refuses. To deny this evenness is to take away the indifference of the will, and inclines us one way or the other. Now in such an event it is quite impossible to determine how any one of the thousand may act, but of the thousand as a whole statistical theory will tell us what the probabilities are. It will tell us that probably the number of acceptances and refusals will be approximately equal, and it will give us a precise measure of the improbability of their diverging by more than a specified amount from equality. If there are many sets of a thousand in question, a divergence in the same direction in all of them becomes increasingly improbable. The approach to certainty is asymptotic, but it is the business of inductive science to yield not only certainties but also measured probabilities, and this is possible to sociology by the use of statistics even on the assumption (which one may take as almost excluded by philosophy) of a strictly indeterminate element in volition. In fact, if the indeterminateness of the will is clearly grasped and the conception rigidly applied, it results that, while the conduct of any individual in a given case is absolutely unpredictable, the average of conduct in a large number of cases will be exactly what it would be if the indeterminate element of choice were non-existent. On the average men will act in accordance with the predominant motive. If, on the other hand, the unknown element does not act indifferently now one way and now another, it ceases to be indeterminate, and, if its effect is studied over a large number of cases, it must become measurable.

(c) *The element of individuality.* — It may be objected that the individual decision may be just the critical event — the turning-point on which great things depend. There are moments in which a single man holds issues as great as those of peace or war in his hands, and the whole future of a community will be different as he decides this way or that. The scientific view of society has sometimes been too hasty in dismissing this objection. Carried to an extreme, indeed, the objection develops with the 'great man' theory of history, the sufficient answer to which is the careful study of the careers of great men. Such study shows that in the realm of action such men have been very narrowly circumscribed by their surroundings and have attained their conspicuous position far more by clever adaptation to the movements of their time than by the power of sheer creation. On the other hand, it is false science to limit the importance of individuals on the strength of any *a priori* preference for the general and the uniform. All social cause and effect runs through the medium of individual character, and it is simply matter of empirical fact that individuals differ and that character is more strongly marked in some than in others. It is also matter of fact that the structure of all societies gives the immediate decision on various issues, sometimes issues of great magnitude, to particular persons in particular positions. In such cases the character of the individual will count. It will not count for as much as appears on the surface, for the large social causes will operate and will be sure to narrow down the choice to a fine point, but none the less at that point the attitude of the individual will be a makeweight, and it may be just the makeweight which turns the balance. There is nothing in this to conflict with the 'reign of law.' A tumbler rolls along a table, coming slowly to rest at the edge. A breath, a tremor, decides whether it stops or falls over and is smashed to atoms. Whichever happens, all is in accordance with uniform and

indeed, in this example, perfectly mechanical laws, but to the tumbler the difference is catastrophic. The most rigidly mechanical view of society cannot ignore these perilous edges, and in general any one who has seen public affairs from the inside, particularly if his position is that of a critic rather than an actor, must have learnt that, while public men are much less free in the range of their choice than appears on a superficial view, yet at every stage of a movement personalities count. The vanity of one highly-placed person, the private enmities of another, the fortunes of a Cabinet intrigue, the fears of this man for his seat in Parliament, the regard of that man for his consistency, the coldness of Mr. A. to a cause which his rival Mr. B. has made his own—all these the onlooker has noted with despair as palpable influences in matters on which great public interests depend.

The European War was long attributed popularly in Britain to the Kaiser. Wilhelm II. could no more have made the war by his single decision than he could have waged it single-handed, but the gradual gravitation of his mind towards war so subtly described by M. Cambon reflected the new distribution of multitudinous psychological forces in Germany during 1913, and a decision was taken in July 1914 in which the scales wavering between very nearly equal weights moved finally to one side and at that moment the weight of the Kaiser's personality and position was amply sufficient to decide the turn.

Individuality, then, counts for something, and its effects are not altogether smoothed out by compensations into simple laws of averages because there are moments and points of turning when individuality—possibly through its weakness as much as through its strength—switches a society on the line to the left instead of on the line to the right, and great consequences ensue. This fact introduces an element of uncertainty into any science based on and resting in social generalization. But to some thinkers it is accordingly fatal to the pretensions of sociology as a science. Indeed many see in it only an illustration of a much wider truth applying not only to sociology but to all sciences that pretend to deal with life. Science, they say, deals with the universal and the measurable. It is or is destined to be mathematical in its final shape. It must have exact likenesses or graded and scaled differentiations, so that it can generalize, formulate, and predict. But life is neither uniform nor differentiated only by degrees measurable in scale. It is individual, and in each of its cases there is something unique and unseizable by the intellect—creative of essentially novel, and therefore unpredictable, developments. Even if the idiosyncrasies of individuals could be in some measure reduced to law by the fiction of averages, the life of a society to which millions of individuals contribute each in individual ways is so unique that no generalizations apply to it, and there are not those large numbers of societies which make possible the use of statistics for the calculation of average results. What we can know about a community is its history as a living organism, just as what we can know about a man is his biography. The history and the biography may be written with greater or less fullness and truth, but, the nearer they come to the real springs of life, in either case the more they will reveal these as unique, incapable of being inferred from any parallel case because there is no parallel case, incapable of revealing their own future activity because they are essentially creative in such a sense that the future need in no way resemble the past.

So far as this argument touches the claim of sociology to be a science, it may be sufficient to reply that the sphere of science is too narrowly conceived when it is identified with generalization and prediction. The function of science is to examine and describe facts impartially, accurately, and systematically. If it finds any of its facts unique, it is its business to say so. But it is only from systematic comparison that true uniqueness will emerge. If we test the action of a living organism by mechanical principles, we do or do not find a correspondence. Either the circulation of the blood corresponds to that of a liquid forced through elastic tubes, in which case the physical analogy holds and we are right in regarding the process as mechanical, or there is a measurable divergence, in which case we know what is due to the organic elements involved. It is a residual phenomenon which we identify, even if we do not explain it, only when we have contrasted the organic with the known behaviour of the inorganic. If the vitalist is right, there will always, when the physical and chemical explanation has been carried through, be such a residue, but what this residue amounts to can be known only by carrying the physical explanation as far as it will go and no farther. Similarly it is only when we have applied all the generalizations which we can legitimately make to the life of a given society that we can ascertain and measure the value of that factor, if any, which is its own peculiar individual self. Individuality, if real, will display itself as the result of scientific inquiry. We suspect its force just because we do not find uniformity. To know it, we must find out accurately what uniformity means, to what expectations it would lead us, and how far the reality differs from these anticipations. The individual is not withdrawn from our knowledge. On the contrary, knowledge begins with individuals. Generalizations are drawn from them and concern them, and the limits of generalization in turn display and delimit the field of individual differences. We come back to the caution which we advanced at the outset. Generalizations in all science are conditional, with this addendum that it is in the failure of generalizations that we discover residual phenomena.

(*d*) *Law and will.* — Scientifically, generalizations have become popularly known as laws. It is not the best of all possible metaphors, and in sociology it raises peculiar difficulties. Sociological laws are sometimes crudely confused with the law of the land. In fact, they correspond only in so far as the law of the land formulates the ways in which ordinary people do ordinarily act. Scientific laws have not the force of commands and do not impose penalties, but to seize this contrast is at once to come perilously near to a mistake of the opposite kind. If it is thought that, because sociological law is not an ordinance imposed upon the will, it is therefore something necessarily independent of the will and, if valid at all, must express something which will and must happen in the life of society, no matter what the human beings who constitute that society may think or desire, social development comes to be conceived as something proceeding fatally and even mechanically, which human beings can neither arrest, accelerate, nor modify. In opposition to that view, it must be maintained that social laws rest on and express the ways in which human beings act in their relations to one another together with the consequences of such actions. But, as human beings are capable of that reflective and deliberate action which we call the action of will, sociological laws, far from being independent of the will, must consist largely of statements of the ways in which human wills act. It follows that the mere knowledge of such laws and of the tendencies to which they lead introduces new data for consideration and possible new motives.

Malthus's law of population, *e.g.*, by showing how, under given conditions, population must increase faster than the

means of subsistence, had a profound and far-reaching effect upon opinion, and finally upon action, which seriously contributed to the arrest of the increase of population. Such an effect is falsely described as a defeat of Malthus's law. It is a defeat of the tendencies which Malthus found in operation through the apprehension of the results which Malthus predicted. The law, properly stated, is a conditional generalization. If, and so long as, people act in a certain way guided by certain conditions, population will increase faster than the means of subsistence. When they take this into account, new motives come into play and the condition under which the law holds is removed.

Sociological laws therefore do not necessarily formulate processes that must occur independently of our will, but rather indicate the ways in which men act under assignable conditions and the consequences of such action. The knowledge so obtained is the necessary condition of a fuller control of the life of society by the deliberate will of human beings.

To sum up. Sociology as a science does not involve the negation of the freedom of the will, nor does it negate the individuality of societies or the uniqueness of national history. Its business in general is to give an articulate, impartial, and systematic description of the facts of social life. In these it finds features that recur and features that are unique, events attributable to widely prevalent social conditions and events attributable to the action of this or that individual; and the elements of uniformity it sums up into generalizations which hold conditionally on the character of that complex of circumstances which constitutes the individual life of a society at a given time. These generalizations express the ways in which human beings act in accordance with the promptings of human nature and the consequences of such actions; but they do not hold good if other motives come into play than those which they have taken into account. They display social life as made by man for man, not as imposed on man by a superincumbent necessity.

3. **The social structure.**—(*a*) *Types of society.*—We have described a society as a structure of which the units or elements are human beings living in certain more or less durable and dependable relations to one another. The definition is intended to fit a family or a State, a literary society, or the 'society' of a town or a neighbourhood. In the last case the conditions of durability and definiteness may be sometimes said to recede towards the vanishing point, and the limits which mark out one such society from another become correspondingly vague. Yet even within a society of this kind people exercise mutual hospitality in certain recognized ways and within observed limits, and the relations between them endure sometimes through a lifetime. But, when the term 'society' is used in so large a sense, very little can be said of it in general. If we want to be more precise, we must distinguish different kinds of societies, and in particular those which rest on the deeper needs of man and play the larger part in his life. Of these we may perhaps distinguish three types: (1) the effective kindred[1] growing out of the ties of parenthood and sex, forming a structure of a definite and durable kind deeply rooted in human impulses; (2) the community, which is the entire society occupying a certain territory[2] as long as it is united by certain connective relations[3] that do not extend beyond its borders; (3) what we shall call the 'association,' by which is meant not one society only or even one species of society, but rather a genus including all societies which are based on specific purposes and needs of man. Some such societies are temporary and superficial as the purposes they serve. But some are based on profound needs and must rank with those of the greatest importance to the sociologist. Of these the Churches are the most conspicuous instance. Professional and trade organizations, political parties and leagues, and finally 'institutions,' universities, colleges and schools, even great businesses and government departments, are all societies existing primarily to meet certain needs and often possessing a life and character of their own which profoundly affect the individuals who join them, and react on the other societies with which they are in contact and on the community or communities to which they belong.

(*b*) *The community.*—The centre of these three types is the community. For the family is normally, if not universally, a part of a community and intimately attached to its structure and its fortunes, while the association is by definition hardly capable of an independent life, but requires either a community or communities as its background and support. Sociology therefore is right in making the community the centre of its inquiry, though it goes wrong if it forgets that society is wider than any community and that very essential relations may transcend the communal limits.

What we have called the connective relations constituting the community consist mainly in (1) the observance of a common system of rules regulating the ordinary intercourse of life, and (2) mutual protection against both external enemies and internal breaches of the peace. Among many of the simpler peoples these two functions fall apart, the second particularly in internal relations falling rather to the kindred or quasi-kindred (*e.g.*, the totemic group). The community here consists of people who live in habitual intercourse regulated by customs which are generally observed but not necessarily enforced by organized collective action. Moreover, if there are some rules so enforced, they are often not such as ensure the protection of individuals, which is a matter for the kindred or some other constituent group. Even for purposes of external defence or aggression the community as a whole may be very slightly organized. In larger and more organized communities the enforcement of rules and the protection of its members as well as the maintenance of its own being and perhaps the extension of its borders become essential features of the community and are the first function of a distinct organ, the State (*q.v.*).

A civilized community is, in fact, always organized as a State, but the State and the community are not to be identified. By the community we understand the people in the entire fabric of their life, including their family relationships, their industry, commerce, religion, art, and relaxation. The State is the organized fabric supporting law and government. It is more than mere government—with which it is sometimes identified—while it is less than the community. It includes the executive and judicial system (with the public forces, police and military) on the one side, and the constituent authority on which government is based on the other. In a very democratic country the State may be regarded as the community as organized for those collective purposes which involve compulsion as an ultimate resort. In undemocratic countries the State is not the whole community and may be alien and unfriendly to a greater or less part of it. In many simple communities there is no government and no State. Community and State therefore are different forms of society, and on the whole the State belongs to the type of society which we have called association. It exists to meet specific needs, and it becomes confused with the community because in large and developed societies it is the organ and outer expression of its unity. Questions of the basis, origin, and development of society in general, of the community, and of the

[1] By the term 'effective kindred' the present writer means the kindred to the limit within which its tie is an actually operative force—a limit that varies remarkably among different peoples, and even in different families.

[2] Or (in the case of nomads) habitually moving in association.

[3] If a community is loosely organized, individuals or other communities like gypsies may occupy or move about in the same territory without entering into connective relations with it. Firmly organized communities, of course, bring all such relationships under control.

State should therefore be distinguished. The community is a form of society, and the State is an organ of the community. Man builds society as naturally as the bee builds the honeycomb because isolated man is an incomplete being, and societies vary in every possible way because man's nature is so various, and on all or almost all sides needs the social relation to complete its expression. As social beings the men whose lot is cast together build communities, but in the formation, maintenance, and development of these permanent structures the differences of human qualities make themselves felt. The distinction which we drew between social relations in the wider and narrower sense comes into play, and it is only so far as the tendencies making for co-operation overcome those of antagonism that the community extends, and only so far as the former gain at the expense of the latter that it can develop. Thus the conditions—psychological, historical, or environmental—that make for co-operation determine the life and character of the community, and the abstract fact that man is a social animal is only the first step in explanation. The State reflects the life of the community, in part its conscious or half-conscious need for organization, in part the actual superiority which organization confers in the struggle for existence. It is natural neither in the sense of issuing immediately from man's primitive impulses nor in that of spontaneously expressing his matured perfection. On the contrary, at all known stages it requires effort and criticism to adjust its control, whether to the lower or to the higher nature of man.

As a durable society a community is, in accordance with our definition, a structure of which the unitary elements are human beings living in defined and permanent relations with one another. It may include many subordinate societies, even the simplest communities, *e.g.*, generally including several families (at least in the narrower sense of the term). What is generally necessary to the maintenance of the community is that the several relations between individuals, families, and associations within it should be compatible with one another. However complex, they must, taken together, be self-maintaining; economically, *e.g.*, the relationship between motive and effort must so work out that the community produces enough to maintain itself. On the side of law and order its members must on the whole know what they may expect of others and what others expect of them. Even a game cannot be played without this much of mutual understanding, still less the complex business of running social life. Thus, from the simplest people upwards, every community known has its web of traditional custom, which as a whole makes up a fabric that with less or more of friction will somehow work. Thus a community is not only a structure but a self-maintaining structure—one of which the parts are always in movement and action, but on such lines that by movement and action the structure is on the whole maintained. This description is suggestive of the life of an organism, and not the less so if we consider that the structure may not only be maintained but also develop, and not only develop but also perhaps decay and even perish, so that what might seem to be an objection to our general postulate of self-maintenance falls into place as an exception which proves the rule. How far is this comparison a metaphor, and how far does it express the real essence of communal life?

The objection commonly made is that an organism is a unity possessing a life and consciousness as a whole and not in its several parts, whereas, whatever unity the community may have, the life and consciousness are manifested in its individual members. Our consciousness in its normal functioning is unitary, and we know nothing of any consciousness in our component cells. In the community, on the other hand, each component individual is a conscious being, and we know nothing of any central consciousness unless it be either (*a*) that of a ruler, who is after all one member of the community, or (*b*) the common councils and decisions of many or all members of the community acting in co-operation. Here, we may agree, is a material difference which disposes of any attempt to treat the community as a species of living organism, if that means a species of animal.

(*c*) *The organic principle.*—But there is another and more effectual way of using the term. We may define the organic in general terms and treat living beings, societies, and perhaps other things (*e.g.*, works of art) as species falling within it. An organic whole, then, is a system with a distinct character and mode of action of its own constituted by the conjoint action of parts, each in turn with a distinct character and mode of action of its own, but conditioned in the maintenance of their character and the pursuit of their activity by their mutual requirements as members of the union. The relation of whole and part requires no external agency to create or maintain it. This differentiates it from a mechanical whole in which something essential to the formation is always external. It must be said further that organic unities differ in two principal respects. (1) Some are more and some less thorough-going and intimate. In some the parts cannot exist without the whole; in others they survive its destruction, but modified or crippled in greater or less degree. Among the higher animals a cell removed from the body rapidly dies; among the lower it may survive permanently with some change of form. Viewed under this aspect, some social relations are seen to be very intimate. Indeed the sum-total of all the social relationships in which a man stands must be regarded as so deeply affecting his whole nature that, if we suppose them all cancelled, it may be doubted whether he could still be called human. Any given society, however, may embody only a fraction of these relationships, and its dissolution might not greatly affect the individual. We cannot say *a priori* how it will be in any given case but merely note that on this side the intimacy of the organic union varies in every possible degree. (2) There is, further, a variation of kind, according as the union is harmonious or constrained. Each part is so far distinct as to have its own tendencies and potentialities. It may find in the other parts the co-operative conditions necessary to fulfil these, or it may find forces which in greater or less degree distort and cramp it. Such mutual constraint—the price, so to say, of mutual development—is of common occurrence in organic unions, but necessarily involves a loss of energy and, if carried far enough, entails the risk of a break-up. The organic principle is pure or harmonious in proportion as the constraint involved diminishes.

To apply these principles to a community, it may have many constituent groups, each with a certain internal life, and these in turn are composed of individuals, each with his capacities which may or may not be fulfilled. It will suffice to consider the community in relation to the individual. What do we mean by fulfilment of capacity? Human life rests on impulses which in their higher and more definite form become purposes. Any attainment of a purpose is *pro tanto* a fulfilment of some element in our nature. But purposes may be distracted and conflicting, so that the fulfilment of one may be the frustration of

others, and there is no fulfilment of the self as a whole. Hence, conversely, if there is any fulfilment of the self as a whole, it must lie in the realization of a comprehensive purpose or in a coherent system of purposes. Now, one purpose might be pursued through life to the disregard of all others. There would then be consistency of action, but no fulfilment of the mass of impulses or purposes. But, conversely, the purpose or system of purposes might be such as would give to all manner of impulses and purposes the greatest scope compatible with mutual consistency. It might indeed be a summing up of such purposes as seem in relation to one another. This would yield the most complete possible fulfilment of the self as a whole. The process of such fulfilment is the development of personality, which is thus seen to rest on the free scope of each part conditioned only by the harmony of the whole.

What is true within the single personality applies *mutatis mutandis* to the plurality of persons in a society. If we conceive a common purpose, or system, embracing all purposes of all individuals so far as they are mutually consistent, the realization of such a system would be the completest fulfilment of the life of a community. Ideally such a system would be one which should lay all elements of our nature under contribution, informing them with a spirit of unity rather than limiting them by constraint. It is clear that such a harmony could be expressed only in a religious ideal setting before humanity as a whole the meaning and value of its life. Of such an ideal all that can be said here is that the two conditions on which it rests are those which we have called harmony and freedom—fullness of scope for our many-sided nature conditioned at the lowest by the requirement of mutual consistency, or at a higher grade inspired by conscious relation to a harmonious whole.

A community will be harmonious or organic in the purest sense in proportion as it realizes these conditions—*i.e.*, as it rests upon and calls forth the personality of its members in all respects in which they are in fact capable of harmonization. Thus it will repose upon the social qualities in the narrower of the two senses given to that term. It will not admit any quality or activity incompatible with the consistent working of the whole, nor allow the restraint or stoppage of any development except on the score of such incompatibility.

Unfortunately, as we saw at the outset, the term 'social qualities' has a much wider sense; the human beings of whom society is composed do not with their whole being enter into harmonious co-operation: they are centres of independent life with interests of their own, in the pursuit of which they impinge on one another, crossing each other's paths. The various groups which they form act with a similar collective selfishness, so that we are faced by centrifugal tendencies and begin to wonder how it is that the community is kept together at all. Thinkers who start from these tendencies have, in fact, formed two main theories of the origin of social union.

(*d*) *The principle of force.*—One school rests the State upon force. Now it is true that organized society has never yet been able to dispense with force, but force itself as applied in social life is a conception requiring analysis. Where more than two or three are gathered together, force cannot be effectively exerted by a single man. It may no doubt be wielded, directed in detail, by the will of a single chief. But essentially it rests on discipline and organization, and organization involves a delicate psychological balance. Even in a disciplined army there must at bottom be a widely diffused will to obey, and, if there comes a point at which for any reason that will is shaken, the whole fabric may, as the world has seen, suddenly crumble. In a slave society there must be union among masters and overseers or privileged slaves. In an aristocratic society compromises and shifts are adopted to prevent trouble with the mass, and 'charity' plays a large part in substitution for justice, while the power of the governing class rests on an energetic development of a common will. In short, if organization involves force, it is still more true that force rests on organization, and organization on response of mind to mind, will to will. There may indeed be a large class of slaves, serfs, or subjects who have 'nothing to do with the laws except obey them,' but even here, as we get closer to the facts, we generally find that it is easier to proclaim laws than to enforce them if they are definitely out of keeping with the ingrained tendency of the mass. Repression may unfortunately play a very large part in social organization, and many of the vital social impulses may be inhibited, but there must be some seed of social co-operation, even if it is limited to a small section of the community which conceives its common good as conditioned by the subordination of the remainder. Force is not the basis of the State as such, but is the element in State organization which is the exact antithesis of the organic principle, expanding or contracting as that principle contracts or expands, but incapable of extinguishing the last germs of its life without resolving the structure into a chaos of centrifugal elements.

(*e*) *The principle of self-interest.*—Other thinkers have founded the community on self-interest, and this theory has taken two main forms. In one the organized community, the State, is based on a contract. Individual self-seeking, unable to get its way, comes to terms with others, 'so as neither to do nor suffer injustice,' and the result is an agreed system of general rules and an accepted government to enforce them. This theory, viewed in broad principle and without regard to the ingenuities of its historical exponents, covers a part of the facts. It is true that on the balance the interests of each man are in general better served by some sort of order than by anarchy, and a vague sense of this truth may even operate as a true psychological factor in securing consent to government. But as a principle the theory of contract errs by omitting the entire common interests of mankind and with it the manifold and complex relations into which human beings enter spontaneously through the development of their own impulses. Compact, express as well as implied, plays its part in public as in private life. Public transactions are affected by reciprocity, and men favour or disfavour a project of laws which does not directly touch them from a sense that the same principle might be applied in a way that would directly touch them. Indeed in this manner there is an element of self-interest in the assent nominally given to law itself. But the part played by calculating egoism is very secondary to that of the various impulses that constitute the Ego. It is true that men are more moved by something that might easily have happened to themselves than by things more remote, but this is largely because such things necessarily lie within the range of their experience and are the more readily realized in imagination. Pity is not a fear lest the like misfortune befall oneself. It is quite another kind of emotion. But it is more easily stirred by a situation in which one can readily imagine oneself or others near to one to be placed. Both for good and for evil our relations to others rest primarily not on egoistic calculation, but on direct and spontaneous impulses and

emotions, and the organized life of the community represents rather the adjustment of such impulses and their reduction to order and system than a precarious balance of purely self-centred interests.

The second form of this theory played an important part at one stage in the development of economics. It was conceived that in a community in which every man was free to pursue his own interests, and enlightened enough to understand its true conditions, the play of economic forces would suffice to secure the common good. Since each knows where his own shoe pinches, it is the free purchaser in the free market who is most likely to get the shoes to fit his own feet. The workman who can sell his labour freely works to the best advantage. The employer who can secure labour freely finds the best man for the most paying job, and the most paying job is that for which at the moment there is the widest demand. Thus demand and supply, operating in a world of free, equal, and intelligent beings, adapt the efforts of each to the maximum needs felt in that world, and there is a natural harmony of interests on which the statesman should rely for the promotion of order and progress. On this theory only two comments are required here. The first is that it postulates freedom, enlightenment, and equality of opportunity, which, if obtainable, are so only by a complete system of restraint on the oppressive use of personal or class ascendancy—*i.e.*, it postulates after all organized action for the common good. The second is that this theory simulates a harmonic view of society, but is really different in principle. For in the harmonic view the interest of one is in the welfare of others. In this view the interest of each one is merely served by the others as instruments, and the correspondence assumes a kind of 'pre-established harmony' which is little short of miraculous. We must distinguish sharply between a harmony growing out of social impulses and expressed in a common purpose and a harmony resting on a mechanical coincidence of self-centred desires from which the social interest is eliminated. But, though these two forms of harmony are distinct in idea, they have something more than the name in common. It is a very important truth that even as self-centred individuals men have a certain community of interest—*e.g.*, that in the long run the trader gains by the prosperity of his customer, that high wages may mean cheap production, and so forth. These relations testify to underlying conditions of harmony in human life, whether men are aware of them or not, and the old economic theory had at least a glimpse of the truth. On the other hand, to bring these conditions to light and make them the basis of social organization a very different psychology is required.

(*f*) *The blending of distinct principles.*—Thus we find different and even opposed principles operating in the life of the community. But we must not imagine those principles either as lying side by side or as in continual conflict with one another. Men adapt themselves to their conditions, and under a system of constraint some tendencies atrophy and others develop and take a firmer hold, and one may become in time a loyal and willing slave, while another takes it as a natural right that he should be master. The actual system of society may be far from harmonious, but may be very deeply rooted in the minds of the members as they have come to be under the pressure of generations of historic development and may be strongly resistant to changes which would in fact liberate many of its suppressed potentialities and yield a fuller and more harmonious life. Such a community is highly organic in the sense that its members are deeply penetrated by its spirit, though it may be of low grade from the point of view of the harmony which it secures.

It would seem then that to define a community as an organism would be to simplify our problem too much. A community has more or less of organic character as the case may be, or sometimes more of one organic character and less of another, and is accordingly less or more subject to internal (or external) constraints. If, then, the community is not as such an organism, may we call it an organization? The term has been proposed to avoid the analogy of the animal organism, but it carries with it converse suggestions which are hardly less objectionable. All communities are no doubt more or less organized, in that they are structures in which people stand in fairly definite and durable relations in virtue of which they so act as on the whole to keep the structure in being. But the term 'organization' is apt to suggest that this structure is intelligently planned for a purpose and imposed for that purpose on an otherwise unordered people. Such organization of course plays its part within most communities at one point or another, but in the main the community grows out of the needs, and indeed the purposes, of individuals, but not out of a common purpose, while, if it achieves a common purpose, that is rather the flower of its high development than the originating cause of its being. We may speak of 'the organization of a community' in a neutral sense, leaving its base and character, whether organic or mechanical, purposive or impurposive, to be further determined. But we had better avoid defining the community as an organization. Generically a community—we fall back on our first account—is a self-maintaining structure, composed of individuals with lives and purposes of their own, but in perpetual interaction with one another. This interaction modifies the individual so far that the normal community settles down to an accepted order. How far in such order the development of individuals is subject to restraint, distorted, and suppressed, how far it is full, harmonious, and free, are questions to which the answer must differ from case to case, and in each case it tells us how far that community is in the full sense a completely developed organism.

Whatever the relative importance of the co-operative or the repressive principle in its life, the communal structure is a whole, constituted by those elements of character which its constituent individuals contribute, while it modifies those individuals to the extent to which it draws forth from them or represses the characteristics which in a different social *milieu* would have had a different history. So understood, the common life is precisely the sum-total of the individual lives as actually lived in the community.

4. The development of the community.—Structures which maintain themselves in continual process, through the interaction of their parts and by dealings with their physical or social environment, may be said to differ from one another in one or more of three principal points, and it is by such differences that we measure their development. These points are (*a*) the efficiency of their operation, (*b*) their scale or scope, (*c*) the basis or principle of their organization.

(*a*) *Efficiency.*—The term suggests an end or purpose. How far purpose can be attributed to communities as such is, as has been hinted, a doubtful question, and it cannot be discussed here. But, whether of clear purpose or otherwise, the community somehow maintains itself, and that not like a stock or stone by dull inertia, but like an organism (it does not matter for the moment whether the likeness is superficial or fundamental) by unceasing metabolism. It protects itself against

enemies and against internal disorder. Its members supply themselves, largely if not principally by mutual service, with the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life. All this, though it may not be planned by any common will or by any single will on behalf of the community, may obviously be in fact performed with greater or with less efficiency. It is the requirement of efficiency that gives rise to the division and combination of effort, the articulation of social functions, all that we are accustomed to call organization in the narrower sense of the term. The farther differentiation proceeds, the greater is the need of some supreme regulation based on recognized principles. But without assuming a common purpose to be universal, we may say that every community in maintaining its being exhibits a degree of efficiency, high or low.

(*b*) *Scale or scope.*—Communities differ in scope. This has two principal meanings. In the first place, they differ in mere size. A living organism may consist of a single cell or of millions of cells, a community of three or four families or of a hundred million men; and it may be remarked that unity and size are not, generally speaking, easy to reconcile. Great organizations generally contain small organizations within them, and sometimes the smaller organization is the more effective unity of the two. Thus the cell is more efficiently organized than the life of some of the metazoa which are aggregations of cells acting normally as one being but capable of independent life. Many of the larger human communities have been loosely compacted, and the smaller units composing them have in history shown more vitality, more power of keeping together and maintaining themselves, than the whole to which they belonged. In the simpler societies the tribe is often a feeble and ill-organized community, as compared with the clan which is its immediate component.

But there is a less obvious sense in which communities differ in scope. They cover a larger or smaller sphere of life and activity. The total output of human energy may be relatively great or small, poor and narrow or rich and many-sided in its development. As the scientific, the religious, the imaginative interests develop, as callings are differentiated and wealth and industry grow, the scope of life extends. The metabolism that sustains the social structure is more intense, the outlook is wider, the pace faster. There always arises the question whether the old bottles will hold the new wine, or, to drop metaphor, whether the sum of the activities, at once extended and intensified, will still maintain itself as a unity or suffer disruption. The success of the community in absorbing manifold and divergent developments into the unity of its life is the measure of its scope.

(*c*) *The base or principle of organization.*—Communities differ in spontaneity. As we have seen, organization may be imposed upon elements which are indifferent to its purposes from without. The elements are then subdued, for their energies are directed by the superincumbent force into channels into which they would not naturally flow. With time their original impulse may be crushed, or it may be simply held in check to re-assert itself when the pressure is removed, while, so long as the organization remains mechanical and in proportion as it is mechanical, it is alien to the elements which are made to serve it, and herein there must be necessarily a net loss of efficiency, because by hypothesis some portion greater or less of the inherent energy of the parts is indifferent or even hostile to the purpose for which it is being used. On the other hand, the structure may spring from and express the inherent energies of the parts themselves, which spontaneously respond to one another, each eliciting from the other the output of its inherent energy for the fulfilment of its capacity. Such a structure differs from every other in that it has the root of self-maintenance and development in itself, diffused through all its parts. It is in accordance with our definition organic. As applied to society, it is easy to recognize in this description the ideal life of a community, and it is as easy to see that it is an ideal which is very imperfectly realized in any existing community, and one that is not readily reconcilable with the imperfections of human nature. It results, however, that communities are organic in proportion as their life is based upon spontaneous co-operation, and that a free co-operative commonwealth, however difficult to realize, has within it the foundations of a more complete and stable unity and of a higher efficiency than the most complete mechanical organization. It is also clear that it has within it the power of attaining a very much wider scope than the mechanical organization which is by hypothesis repressive, and which, while it may be exceedingly efficient for one purpose, must cramp human nature on other sides. Could there be co-operation in freedom, on the other hand, it would be a co-operation on all sides of life which are capable of social or harmonious expression.

But, though co-operation may be based on freedom, it would be a mistake to suppose that the most completely organic society could dispense with positive institutions, or that there could be harmony of manifold impulses without limitations and restraints. The best impulses require direction and co-operation, and even a community of saints would need a definite order in which the special functions of each person on each occasion should be indicated. The problem of freedom is not that of dispensing with all guidance and all restraint, but that of finding the lines upon which the manifold social qualities of man can develop in harmony, with the result that the restraints involved are voluntarily accepted and self-imposed. Nor is the problem of organic construction that of engendering the social impulses, which are born and not made, but that of so adjusting the framework of institutions that such impulses have free play and scope for development. This is the truth expressed by T. H. Green when he says that the direct object of legislation is to create not the common good—conceived as the free operation of a spiritual principle—but rather the conditions under which the common good may develop. Legislation cannot make men honest on principle, but commercial law may be such that honesty is the road to ruin, while it may be so reformed that the honest man becomes capable of holding his own. Industrial law may enable the harsh employer to beat down prices by sweating, and so render it impossible for any one who refuses to employ others except on a living wage to remain in the trade. When such a law is amended, it does not force anybody to be truly and spontaneously considerate in his dealings—in this sense no one can be made good by Act of Parliament—but it does enable the considerate man to play his part as an employer in industry. Thus it is no more possible to create an organic spirit than it is to make a living thing, but it is possible to open the channels along which the vitalizing fluid may run and thereby gather energy and volume. What we call free institutions are institutions which on the whole rest for their stability on this vital principle, and provide the lines upon which it can move without obstruction.

Communities, then, differ in the three essential respects of efficiency, scope, and spontaneity, nor do they tend to vary concomitantly in the three relations; *e.g.*, a community may be organically one—its common life a 'spontaneous' expression

of character—but very small and very limited in the scope of its activity. Thus a little clan may stand together as one man to protect every one of its members, its unity based on spontaneous and deep-seated feeling. On the other hand, it contains only a few score of individuals, and its notions of life may be exceedingly narrow. Again, a large community may be efficiently organized upon the basis of military despotism. It is then an exceedingly formidable force in the world, and may defeat and destroy rivals who have cared more for the development of individuality and less for discipline and order. This is the victory of mechanism over the spirit which is the recurrent tragedy of human history.

Again, the life of a community may be many-sided and so rich in scope, but the greater amplitude conditioned by freedom may be purchased at the expense of organic unity. There may be an order like that of the Roman empire superimposed on heterogeneous peoples allowing great latitude for internal movements such as are illustrated in the rich religious growth of the imperial period. Such states do a service for civilization, though not quite the highest service, and their weaknesses are easy to see.

Lastly, the organic principle may be strong and penetrating, but not pure or harmonious, resting, *e.g.*, on the strong mutual development of certain qualities and a certain attitude of mind which represses other qualities of personality. Such organic character will often be found in small communities of very simple mode of life, and sometimes even, through the strange adaptability of mankind, in larger communities supporting essentially repressive systems of authority.

Thus these three features of social organization vary independently, and development may be measured by the advance in any one of them. But, considered in its fullness, it is measured by the advance in all three taken together. That is to say, the most developed community would be that which effectively achieves the most complete synthesis of the widest range of human activity, including within its membership the largest number of human beings, but in such wise as to rest most completely upon their free co-operation, thus expressing the whole of their vital energies as far as these are capable of working together in harmony. Judging by this standard, we may speak of one society as more highly developed than another, and we have in this conception a general criterion of advance in organization.

5. Complete development and the ethical ideal.—Now, the final term of development in these three respects accords with the ideal of a rationalistic system of social ethics. For, whatever the view taken in detail by the ethical rationalist, his general principle is that right conduct must form a rational system. A rational system is one applicable to all humanity in all the varied relations of its life, and its demand is for a practical consistency in character and conduct. By practical consistency, again, is meant a system of purposes which in their operation do not conflict with but support and require one another, forming a whole within which they are distinct but interdependent parts.[1] Thus such a system constitutes an organic whole, as it has been here defined, and one that embraces the whole of human life and activity. Thus for a rational ethics the good life, if actually realized in society, would form a perfectly organic unity of the widest possible scope. It follows that at bottom the ethical and the organic principle are the same thing. Thus, when we speak of 'higher' and 'lower' development in the senses here set out, the ethical implication of these terms is fully justified from the point of view of a rational ethics. But it is important to remark that the terms 'higher' and 'lower' may be used of organization without an ethical reference, implying merely the greater or less completeness, efficiency, or extent of the organization itself. From this point of view, the three characteristics here taken are the essentials. For organization, to be complete, must rest on an internal principle, and will be more or less complete in proportion as it is saturated with that principle. The principle must be efficient in governing the parts and in controlling their activities, and, completeness being thus assured, extent is measured by size and what we have called scope. Thus we arrive at the result that in fundamental principle development in social organization, considered in its fullness, coincides with ethical development as conceived by a rationalistic system. This is the fundamental proposition in the relation between sociology conceived as a science of facts and sociology as a philosophy of values. Partial developments may diverge from ethical requirements in any degree.

From this point the further treatment of the subject, which cannot be pursued here, divides into two branches. The first is philosophical and consists (*a*) in the justification of the ethical theory here laid down, and (*b*) in its expansion and application to social institutions. This is the task of social philosophy proper. The second is scientific and consists in ascertaining the condition of development, the correlation of its different branches, the causes making for its furtherance, arrest, or decay, and the principal phases of its partial achievement in the course of historic civilization.

[1] It may be objected that the requirements of a rational system would be satisfied by the subordination of all purposes to one supreme end, so that in place of a system of ends distinct but interdependent rational conduct would be of the nature of a mechanism in which every detail is a mere means to a single end. This conception can be shown to rest on an imperfect view of rationality, but in relation to ethics it is sufficient to remark that it involves a denial of all intrinsic value to personality—*i.e.* at once of conscience, of love, and of justice.

LITERATURE.—The term 'sociology' is due to Comte (see art. POSITIVISM), and the modern treatment of the subject has been greatly influenced by his work and that of Herbert Spencer. To Comte his *General View of Positivism*, Eng. tr. by J. H. Bridges, new ed., with introd. by F. Harrison, London, 1908, is the best introduction. Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*[6], London, 1900, is now mainly of historical interest, but his *Study of Sociology*[9], do. 1880, is a brilliant introduction which retains a value.

Sociological literature since Spencer's time has been exceedingly voluminous, but the subject has been pursued more successfully in its special aspects than as a whole. For this reason any adequate bibliography would be of unmanageable dimensions. Perhaps the best recent treatise, professedly sociological in aim, is R. C. MCIVER, *Community: a Sociological Study*, London, 1917, to which the present writer must express his obligations. Numerous text-books and introductory volumes have appeared in America, among which F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1898; L. F. Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, do. 1898; J. Q. Dealey and L. F. Ward, *Text-book of Sociology*, do. 1905; F. W. Blackmar and J. L. Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, do. 1915; Albion W. Small, *General Sociology*, Chicago, 1905; E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, 1905; and C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, do. 1913, illustrate various methods of treatment. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, was also published in America (New York, 1911). The *American Journal of Sociology*, *Sociological Papers*, and the *Sociological Review* published by the (London) Sociological Society are the principal serial publications in English. The first volume of the *Sociological Papers* contains a valuable art. on 'The Origin and Use of the Word Sociology' by V. V. Branford. In French E. Durkheim's works, especially *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*[6], Paris, 1912, and the volumes of *L'Année sociologique* are important, and the volumes of *La Science sociale* incorporate the principal work of the school of Le Play. In German G. Simmel, *Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1908, is a voluminous treatise, and P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, do. 1897, a very valuable résumé. Müller Lyer, *Phasen der Kultur*, is of interest to the student of comparative sociology. The *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie* may be consulted. In England the general subject has been approached mainly from the philosophical point of view. E. J. Urwick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, London, 1912, and J. A. Hobson, *The Social Problem*, do. 1901, are of value to the general student. J. H. Muirhead and H. J. W. Hetherington, *Social Purpose*,

London, 1918, and J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, do. 1918, are representative volumes (Mackenzie's *Introd. to Social Philosophy*, Glasgow, 1890, retains its value). Westermarck, *MI*, 2 vols., London, 1908, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, rev. ed., London, 1915, and A. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, 2 vols., do. 1898, are in the main works on comparative sociology on the side of custom and ethics. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, London, 1914, is indispensable to the student of social psychology, to which the works of Ross (New York, 1908) and W. McDougall (London, 1915) under that title are suggestive contributions. L. T. HOBHOUSE.

SOCRATES.—1. Chronology.—Socrates was put to death in the archonship of Laches (Ol. xcv. 1=400–399 B.C.). The date was given by Demetrius Phalereus in his *Register of Archons* (ἀρχόντων ἀναγραφή), which was based on official records, and is the only fact about Socrates that may be regarded as beyond the reach of controversy. The year of his birth was obtained by calculation. Plato made Socrates say that he was seventy[1] or over seventy[2] at the time of his trial, and the ancient chronologists counted back seventy archons from Laches inclusive, which brought them to the year of Apsephion (469–468 B.C.). As, however, Socrates was condemned at the beginning of the Delian festival, which appears to have fallen in March, it is safer to go back at least to 470 B.C. In any case, that year cannot be far wrong.[3] The dates show that Socrates was essentially a man of the Periclean age, and that he grew up in that wonderful time when Athens, conscious of having saved Greek liberty, became the centre of a free artistic and intellectual development that has never been surpassed. He must have seen the first performances of the *Antigone* and the *Hippolytus* and watched the building of the new Parthenon from start to finish. On the other hand, Plato and Xenophon, the writers who have most to say about him, were not born till after the high hopes of the Periclean age had been bitterly disappointed, and their youth was spent in years of disaster which ended, by the time Plato was twenty-three, in the fall of Athens and the loss of her leading place among the states of Greece. It is obvious that, if we are to understand Socrates, we must try to replace him among the surroundings of his own generation, and to do that we must carefully weigh all contemporary references to his youth and early manhood. It is only when we have done this that we shall be in possession of a test which we can apply to the evidence of men who knew him only in his old age.

Plato was born in 428–427 B.C., when Socrates was already over forty. It used to be supposed that Xenophon was older, and this is the real explanation of the general disposition to regard his evidence as particularly valuable. The early date given in older books for the birth of Xenophon is solely due, however, to an uncritical acceptance of the calculations of ancient chronologers. They fixed his ἀκμή, or *floruit*, in 401–400 B.C., the date of the *Anabasis*, and equated the *floruit*, as usual, with the fortieth year of his life. From the *Anabasis* itself, however, we learn that Xenophon must have been well under thirty in 399 B.C.[4] He insists a great deal on his youth as compared with the other generals,[5] and Proxenus was only thirty. We may confidently infer that Xenophon was younger than Plato. It is also to be remembered that he left Athens before the death of Socrates, so that he was only a lad when he knew him. His Socratic writings belong to a later date, when those of Plato, Antisthenes, and Æschines were already well known. None of the most recent writers on Socrates regard Xenophon as a first-hand authority, though they differ considerably as to his sources.

2. Early references to Socrates.—The earliest reference to Socrates now extant probably comes from a time before the birth of Plato, and certainly from a time before he was ten years old. In a book of memoirs entitled *Visits* (ἐπιδημίαι) the tragic poet Ion of Chios said[1] that Socrates in his youth visited Samos in the company of Archelaus. If we had the context, we might be able to fix the date of this; but, even as it is, we may be fairly sure. We know[2] that Ion met the poet Sophocles (who was one of the generals) at a dinner-party at Chios during the Samian War (441 B.C.), and it is natural to suppose that his meeting with Archelaus and Socrates was about the same time. At any rate, Plato makes Socrates say in the *Crito*[3] that he had never left Athens but on military service, with the single exception of a visit to the Isthmus, and there does not seem to be any other occasion than this on which he could have been at Samos on military service during the life-time of Ion, who is referred to as already dead in the *Peace*[4] of Aristophanes, which was produced in 421 B.C.

Now this reference of Ion's is very important for what it implies. Archelaus was, in the first place, an elegiac poet, who belonged to the circle of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and the *Consolation* on the death of Cimon's wife, which survived to a later date, was attributed to him.[5] Ion of Chios belonged to the same circle, to which he was introduced when quite a lad, and certainly before the ostracism of Themistocles.[6] It may be taken for granted, then, that Archelaus was an old acquaintance of his; and so, when he mentions Socrates as being in his company, he must mean that there was a close relation of some kind between them. There is independent testimony to this, though from a later and less trustworthy source. Aristoxenus of Tarentum wrote a scandalous account of Socrates, based on the recollections of his father Spintharos, and he said that Socrates attached himself to Archelaus at the age of seventeen and followed him for many years.[7] The tittle-tattle which accompanied this may be disregarded, but it could hardly have arisen unless the relations of Socrates with Archelaus had been notorious. Now Archelaus was not only an elegiac poet, but the disciple and successor of Anaxagoras, who had introduced Ionian science into Athens immediately after the Persian Wars, but had been forced to take refuge at Lampsacus about the middle of the century.

For the date of the trial and flight of Anaxagoras see A. E. Taylor's article in the *Classical Quarterly*, xi. [1917] 81. The idea that it took place just before the Peloponnesian War is due solely to Ephorus, whose chronology is well known to be arbitrary. All the data we have point to the residence of Anaxagoras at Athens having lasted from about 480 to about 450 B.C. It is quite distinctly implied in Plato's *Phædo*[8] that Anaxagoras had left Athens before Socrates was old enough to take an interest in science, and that Socrates never had any personal relations with him. It is also clear that the earlier date is alone consistent with the statement of Plato and Isocrates that Anaxagoras was the teacher of Pericles,[9] and the fact that he was succeeded by Archelaus, who had written a poem for Cimon. Plutarch's statement about this comes from Didymus.[10]

If, then, Socrates became a disciple of Archelaus about 450 B.C., or a little earlier, it means that he was then interested in Ionian science. It would have been strange if he had not been so; for, according to all accounts, he was a man of boundless curiosity, and Ionian science flourished exceedingly at Athens in those days. We need not, however, suppose that Anaxagoras had already

1 *Crito*, 52 E.

2 *Apol.* 17 D (according to the reading of T): πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα.

3 For the chronological questions involved see F. Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik* (*Philol. Unters.* xvi.), Berlin, 1904, p. 284 ff.

4 C. G. Cobet, *Novæ Lectiones*, Leyden, 1858, p. 534 ff.

5 iii. 1. 14, 25. For the age of Proxenus see ii. 6. 20.

1 Frag. 9 (*FHG* ii. 49). This is quoted in the *Life of Socrates* by Diogenes Laertius. The suggestion of Wilamowitz that it refers to another Socrates has now been withdrawn (*Platon*, Berlin, 1919, p. 96).

2 Frag. 1 (*FHG* ii. 46). 3 52 B. 4 836.

5 Plutarch, *Vit. Cim.* 4, where Panætius is referred to for the authorship of the poem.

6 Cf. frag. 4 (*FHG* ii. 47).

7 H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1912, 47 A 3.

8 97 B ff.

9 Plato, *Phædrus*, 270 A; Isocrates, Περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, § 235.

10 See E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Gesch.*, Halle, 1892–99, ii. 43.

developed the subtle theory of substance by which we know him best. That was more probably the work of his old age at Lampsacus, and we can see from Euripides, who was also influenced by him, that it was rather what Theophrastus calls 'the philsophy of Anaximenes'[1] that Anaxagoras had brought to Athens in his youth. According to this doctrine, the primary form of matter is 'air' (*i.e.* vapour), which becomes 'æther' and fire when rarefied, and which becomes visible in clouds when condensed, passing ultimately into water and earth. The earth was regarded as flat and as supported by the air, and the formation of the world and everything in it was explained as due to an eddy or vortex (*δίνη*) in the original 'air.'

3. **The comic poets.**—We have no further contemporary reference to Socrates till 423 B.C., when, for some reason we can only guess at present, he was burlesqued in two of the three comedies produced that year, the *Connus* of Amipsias and the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. We do not know much about the *Connus*, which takes its name from the musician Connus, the son of Metrobius, whom Socrates speaks of as his music-master in Plato's *Euthydemus*[2] and in the *Menexenus*.[3] The *Clouds* is named from its chorus, and that is composed of clouds just because of their importance as a visible form of 'air' in Ionian science. There is one very striking coincidence between the two plays. The chorus of the *Connus* consisted of 'thinkers' (*φροντισταί*), while in the *Clouds* Socrates is represented as inhabiting a 'thought-factory' (*φροντιστήριον*) with his disciples. It seems to follow that Socrates and his associates used *φροντίς* and its cognates in a way of their own, and that this amused the Athenians. Now in Attic the words *φρονεῖν*, *φροντίς*, and *φροντίζω* are employed in certain special connexions, and cannot be used in the general sense of 'think' or 'thought,' but in Ionic it was different. A glance at the Index to Diels' *Vorsokratiker* will show that *φρονεῖν* and *φρόνησις* were used by the early philosophers for *thought* as opposed to *sense* (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*, *αἴσθησις*), and we may reasonably infer that Socrates was already occupied with the distinction between sensation and intelligence at this date. From the *Clouds*[4] we learn a little more about *φροντίδες*. A 'thought' has to be born like a child, and any disturbance may cause a miscarriage. This implies that the *μαιευτική* of Socrates was already well known to the Athenians when Plato was four years old.

Plato uses the word *φροντιστής* only once, and that in a direct allusion to the comic poets.[5] Xenophon[6] makes one of his characters address Socrates as *ὁ φροντιστὴς ἐπικαλούμενος*, which is doubtless a literary reminiscence too. We may infer that Socrates had dropped the Ionic word in later life when he had given up Ionian science. In that case the *φροντίζων τι ἔστηκεν* of Plato, *Symp.* 220 C, which refers to 431 B.C., is a fine historical touch.

The *Clouds* is in no sense an attack on the 'sophists' in the sense in which that word is now commonly used. What is really attacked in the play is Ionian natural science, and Socrates is taken as the representative of that because, as every one knew, he had been the disciple of Archelaus, who was the successor of Anaxagoras. That was quite legitimate, and every one who has studied the science of those days must admit that Aristophanes was quite well informed about it, and that his caricature is based on a perfectly accurate view of its general character.

It is usual to say with Diels that the system caricatured in the *Clouds* is that of Diogenes of Apollonia.[7] He too was an adherent of 'the philosophy of Anaximenes,' and it is quite natural that there should be coincidences between him and Archelaus. The main things were common to the whole school. Specially noteworthy are the oath of Socrates by Respiration, Chaos, and Air,[1] and the references to the vortex.[2] If Socrates had been a disciple of Archelaus, these are perfectly correct allusions to the system in which he had been brought up.

There is, however, another strain in the Socrates of the *Clouds*, which has nothing to do with Archelaus or Ionian cosmology. Socrates is represented not only as a votary of science but also, and even more, as an ascetic and a teacher of strange doctrine about the soul. His disciples are pallid 'semi-corpses,' and the initiation of Strepsiades is an obvious parody of some Orphic or Corybantic ceremony. The grotesque picture of the *φροντιστήριον* is intelligible only on the supposition that Socrates was popularly regarded as the director at once of a scientific school and of a religious conventicle, and that combination inevitably suggests a Pythagorean *συνέδριον*. There can be no doubt that Pythagorean influences had reached Athens by this time. About the middle of the century the Pythagoreans had been expelled from the cities of Magna Græcia; they had tried to continue their society at Rhegion, and, when they left Rhegion, they established themselves at Thebes (Philolaus, Lysis) and Phlius (Echecrates). There were many Pythagoreans at Athens in the 4th cent. B.C., as we know from the fragments of the comic poets, who burlesqued them very much in the same way as Aristophanes had burlesqued Socrates and his associates; but our knowledge of the Periclean age is so fragmentary that it is difficult to find contemporary evidence of their presence at Athens then. It is certain, however, that Athens had concluded an alliance with Rhegion in 433 B.C., ten years before the *Clouds*, and that Rhegion was then, or had lately been, the chief seat of the Pythagorean society. It is also certain that in 428 B.C. Euripides, in his *Hippolytus*, put on the stage a study of an Orphic saint. What is still more significant is that, even before the *Clouds*, Cratinus in his *Panoptæ* had burlesqued the science of the time in the person of Hippo, who was certainly a Pythagorean. His doctrine, so far as we know it, was not indeed very orthodox, but Pythagoreanism produced many heretics, and he is called a Crotoniate, a Metapontine, and a Rhegine as well as a Samian, and that can hardly mean anything else than that he was a Pythagorean. Nor is there any real reason to doubt the genuineness of his epitaph, which is quoted by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Clement of Alexandria,[3] in which we are told that Fate had made Hippo 'equal to the gods in death.' Of course the Athenians called him an 'atheist' for that, but it is sound Pythagorean doctrine all the same. It is also credible that the quotation from him made by the learned Claudianus Mamertus of Vienne (5th cent. A.D.) is genuine; for it distinguishes soul and body in terms which strongly suggest the 5th cent. B.C.[4]

In view of this, it is noticeable that the word *ψυχή* is used very curiously in the *Clouds*. The 'thought-factory' is inhabited by 'wise souls,'[5] which would only suggest to the average Athenian the meaning 'clever ghosts.' In the *Birds*[6] Socrates is spoken of as one who practises necromancy (*ψυχαγωγεῖ*), and his disciple Chærepho plays the part of the ghost. It was clearly well known before Plato was ten years old that Socrates taught strange doctrine about the soul.

Now we are told by the scholiast on the *Clouds*[7]

1 J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], London, 1908, § 122.
2 272 C, 295 D. 3 235 E. 4 137.
5 *Apol.* 18 B: *Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ . . . μετέωρα φροντιστής.*
6 *Symp.* vi. 6. 7 Burnet, § 186 f.

1 627: *μὰ τὴν Ἀναπνοήν, μὰ τὸ Χάος, μὰ τὸν Ἀέρα.*
2 379: not Zeus, *ἀλλ' αἰθέριος δῖνος*, 1471: *δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακώς.*
3 Diels, 26 B 2.
4 Claudian. Mamert. *de An.* 7, p. 121, 14, ed. A. Engelbrecht (*CSEL* xi.): 'longe aliud anima, aliud corpus est, quae corpore et torpente viget et caeco videt et mortuo vivit.' See art. SOUL (Greek). For the variation in nationality ascribed to the Pythagoreans see Burnet, § 185, n. 1.
5 94. 6 1555 ff. 7 96.

that the allusion to men who teach that the heavens are an oven (πνιγεύς) was taken from the *Panoptæ*, where it was expressly referred to Hippo, so it appears that Aristophanes thought it plausible to attribute Italian as well as Ionian scientific ideas to Socrates. We must always remember that these two divergent views of the world met on common ground at Athens, where they set up an intellectual ferment which was of far more importance than the excitement produced by the occasional visits of the distinguished teachers to whom the name of 'sophists' is commonly applied. They were here to-day and gone to-morrow, but the scientific schools and the religious associations were firmly established.

Of course the whole plot of the *Clouds* turns on the belief of Strepsiades that the Socratics keep on the premises two λόγοι, a weaker and a stronger, and that they can make the weaker prevail over the stronger, though its case is a dishonest one. That is a perversion of Protagoras, but it does not follow that Aristophanes attributed it to Socrates. On the contrary, much of the fun of the play depends on the fact that, when Strepsiades has been initiated, he finds himself let in for something quite different from what he had expected. The idea is that the ordinary Athenian knew there was some talk of λόγοι in the school of Socrates and took for granted that it was just what Protagoras had made familiar some years earlier. Aristophanes knew at least that it was something different, though he may not have troubled to find out exactly what it was.

It appears also from the comic poets that Socrates had somehow become impoverished about this time. They allude to his want of a new cloak and the shifts he was put to to get one. Amipsias said he 'was born to spite the shoemakers,'[1] but that only refers to his practice of going barefoot, which Aristophanes attributes to the whole school.[2] Amipsias, in the same fragment, calls him 'a stout-hearted fellow that, for all his hunger, never stooped to be a parasite.' Two years later Eupolis spoke of him[3] as 'a garrulous beggar, who has "thoughts" about everything (τἄλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν) except where to get a meal'—another reference to the *φροντιστής*.

4. Antisthenes and Æschines.—So far we have made no use of any evidence later than Plato's childhood; we must now look at certain writers of Socratic dialogues who were his contemporaries. There is not much to be learnt from the remains of Antisthenes, who seems to have been considerably older than Plato and to have been attracted to Socrates mainly by the strength of his character. The most important contribution he makes to our knowledge of him is that he spoke of foreigners being attracted to Athens by the renown of Socrates (κατὰ κλέος Σωκράτους). It is important to observe that this cannot have happened at any time after the outbreak of the war. Socrates must therefore have had a Hellenic reputation before Plato was born. Antisthenes told the story about Socrates saving the life of Alcibiades, which we know from Plato's *Symposium*, and he also mentioned the fact that Socrates yielded the ἀριστεῖα to Alcibiades, but he referred the incident to the battle at Delium instead of to that at Potidæa.[4]

If we could be quite sure that Æschines of Sphettus was independent of Plato, his testimony would be of the greatest importance. Plato makes Socrates mention him as one of his followers in the *Apology*,[5] and in the *Phædo*[6] we are told that he was among the company present at his death. Whether he was older or younger than Plato we have no means of knowing. In any case it seems in the highest degree improbable that Æschines and Plato should have conspired to misrepresent what must have been notorious facts in their day, and Æschines had no philosophy of his own to commend by representing it as that of Socrates. We may therefore regard his evidence as trustworthy, so far as it goes. For our purpose the most important of his dialogues are the *Aspasia*, the *Alcibiades*, and the *Telauges*, and we fortunately know a good deal about them. In the first of these dialogues Socrates was represented as taking lessons in the art of love from Aspasia, and as recommending Callias to send his son Hipponicus to learn politics from her. Moreover, he was made to maintain that the goodness (ἀρετή) of a woman is the same as that of a man—a point which he illustrated, not only by the case of Aspasia herself, but also by that of the Persian warrior maiden Rhodogune. Plato has little or nothing to say about Aspasia, though she is represented in the *Menexenus*[1] as the instructress of Socrates in the art of rhetoric. It will, however, be observed that Æschines confirms the account given by Plato in the *Republic* of the views held by Socrates with regard to women. The *Alcibiades* is even more instructive, and, thanks to a recent discovery of Grenfell and Hunt, we now possess a considerable continuous fragment of it. In this dialogue Socrates made Alcibiades feel that he was insufficiently prepared for the ambitious projects that he entertained, and made him weep in despair 'with his head on his knees' by proving to him that he was foolish (ἀμαθής) and therefore wretched (ἄθλιος), and, still worse, ugly (αἰσχρός). What he had neglected was 'care for himself' (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ). Socrates himself has no ἐπιστήμη and cannot therefore impart any to others, and certain characteristic expressions, such as θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἐνθουσιᾶν, ἔρως occurred. The main purpose of the dialogue appears to have been to show that Alcibiades was not, properly speaking, a disciple (μαθητής) of Socrates, as had been alleged—a point made also by Plato,[2] Isocrates,[3] and Xenophon.[4] There is, of course, a striking resemblance between the dialogue and what Plato makes Alcibiades himself confess in the *Symposium*.[5] In the *Telauges* Socrates was represented in conversation with a Pythagorean of that name who seems to belong to the circle of Philolaus. He is an associate (ἑταῖρος) of Hermogenes, and Cratylus also appears to have been introduced. So far as can be made out, Socrates expostulated with Telauges for his exaggerated asceticism. Here, then, we have further confirmation of the existence of Pythagorism at Athens at this date and of the relations of Socrates with it. Æschines also confirms Plato in representing the attitude of Socrates to the extreme asceticism of the doctrine as one of comparative detachment, while Aristophanes, for his own purposes, chose to ignore the distinction between him and such persons as Telauges. Perhaps Chærepho was more thoroughgoing than his master in this respect.

5. Plato.—Up to this point we have endeavoured to picture Socrates without making use of Plato except for a few hints. We have seen that in his youth he was a follower of 'the philosophy of Anaximenes,' then represented at Athens by Archelaus, and that he was also influenced by contemporary Pythagorism. We have seen that he was believed to have belonged to the circle of Aspasia and that he did his best to influence Alcibiades. We have also seen that he had become a comparatively poor man some time shortly before 423 B.C. At that date he was known chiefly as one who taught some new doctrine about the soul and

[1] Frag. 9. [2] *Clouds*, 103. [3] Frag. 352.

[4] This is far less probable; for Socrates would be more likely to have deserved the ἀριστεῖα when he was under forty than some years later, when he was nearly fifty.

[5] 33 E. [6] 59 B.

[1] 235 E, 249 C. [2] *Apol.* 33 A. [3] *Busiris*, § 5.

[4] *Mem.* i. 2. 12 ff. [5] 215 A ff.

about the birth of thoughts (*φροντίδες*) from it. Plato was still only a child, but we can hardly doubt his statement that his uncle Charmides had already made the acquaintance of Socrates. Apart altogether from what he may have learnt by personal intercourse with Socrates himself, Plato had every opportunity of hearing about him from the older members of his own family.

We learn, then, from Plato that Sophroniscus, the father of Socrates, had been a close friend of Lysimachus, the son of the great Aristides, who belonged to the same deme of Alopece, about a mile and a half from Athens.[1] Socrates himself had a lifelong friend in his contemporary, the wealthy Crito, who belonged to the same deme.[2] The name of his mother, Phænarete, has an aristocratic sound, and so has Patrocles, the name of her son by another husband, Chæredemus.[3] This is not in the least inconsistent with the fact that she exercised the profession of a *μαῖα*.[4] Such offices were performed by women of good family, and the translation 'midwife' is quite misleading. There is no good evidence that either Socrates or his father was a statuary or a sculptor. Xenophon, at least, had never heard of such a thing, or he could hardly have avoided mentioning it when he related the advice given by Socrates to the sculptor Clito.[5] The impression left by all our best authorities is that Socrates came of a well-to-do family, that he had no definite trade or occupation, and that he associated on terms of perfect equality with all the 'best people' at Athens, and especially with the Periclean circle. His poverty belonged only to his later years; for he served as a hoplite at Potidæa (431), Delium (424), and Amphipolis (422), and must therefore have had some property of his own.

The close relations of Socrates with the family of Aristides are presupposed in the curious story of 'the bigamy of Socrates.' He is said to have been married to Myrto, the daughter or grand-daughter of Aristides, as well as to Xanthippe. This story is given on the authority of Aristotle in his Περὶ εὐγενείας. We know that Socrates married Xanthippe late in life; for his three sons were all young when he died, and one of them was a baby; and A. E. Taylor has shown it to be quite possible that he was then a widower, having married and lost Myrto in his youth. We must remember, however, that the age of tittle-tattle had begun by Aristotle's time, and the story in the form quoted from him by Diogenes Laertius is plainly impossible. Surely too, if Plato had known the story, and if Lysimachus had been the brother-in-law or the uncle by marriage of Socrates, he would not have made him call him simply *πατρικὸς φίλος*. The first appearance of the statement that Socrates was a statuary or stone-cutter (λιθοξόος or λαξόος) is in Timon of Phlius,[6] who belongs to the 3rd cent. B.C. and is a very unsafe authority for anything. It appears to have arisen from an almost certainly false interpretation of his references to Dædalus as the ancestor of his family.[7] The Attic hero Dædalus had nothing to do with stone-cutting or marble sculpture, but was primarily a worker in metals, and secondarily the reputed artist of wooden *ξόανα*. He was sprung from the line of Erechtheus, and the Dædalidæ were not, as sometimes asserted, a trade gild, but an Athenian *γένος*, which had given its name to a deme not far from Alopece. The whole chapter of Xenophon referred to[8] contrasts Socrates with *οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἔχοντες καὶ ἐργασίας ἕνεκα χρώμενοι*, and the point of it is clearly that he himself was not a professional man. In the *Apology* Plato makes Socrates address himself to the δημιουργοί as to a hitherto unexplored class. Plato's repeated allusions to the intimacy of Socrates with Damon confirm the tradition that he was intimate with the uncle of Pericles.

Plato has very little to tell us of the early interest of Socrates in Ionian science, which is natural enough, seeing that it had ceased to be of much interest in his time, and that he knew Socrates only after he had given it up as hopeless. It is all the more remarkable that, in the autobiographical sketch which he puts into the mouth of Socrates on the last day of his life, his youthful enthusiasm for science is made quite prominent.[9] It seems unthinkable that Plato should have invented a purely fictitious account of his revered master's intellectual development, and inserted it in an account of his last hours on earth. We are told that Plato himself was not present on this occasion,[1] and we have no means of knowing whether Socrates did, as a matter of fact, say these things, but we are surely bound to believe that Plato thought they were substantially true. Such arguments do not, however, appeal to every one, and there are fortunately others of a more objective character. The whole passage has obviously been written with the greatest care. After saying how eager he had been in his youth for the kind of knowledge called natural science (*περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*), Socrates enumerates the problems that had interested him. They were such as whether the earth is flat or round, and whether 'what we think with' is air or blood, and the like. There were also problems about the nature of the unit and what is really meant by addition and subtraction. Now it can be proved in detail that all the questions raised in this passage were eagerly discussed in the middle of the 5th cent. B.C. at Athens, and that they could hardly have excited so much interest at any other time or place. There is not an anachronism in the whole passage, and a very slight knowledge of the state of science in those days is enough to show that what is represented as puzzling Socrates is just the opposition between the Ionian theories, 'the philosophy of Anaximenes,' and the Italiote doctrines, that is to say, the Pythagorean and Eleatic systems. It was just in the Athens of Pericles and nowhere else that these came into contact. Plato does not mention Archelaus by name, though a doctrine which we know to have been his is clearly described. Socrates felt (or professed to feel) quite helpless in face of this diversity of opinion, and he came to the conclusion that he had no gifts that way. That, of course, is his 'accustomed irony.' At last he heard 'some one [Archelaus?] reading a book, as he said of Anaxagoras,' in which mind was said to be the cause of all things, but the expectations this raised in him were disappointed when he got the book for himself and found that it really assigned no causality to mind at all, but only to 'airs' and 'æthers' and the like. He determined accordingly to strike out a line of his own. All this is confirmed by the burlesque of it in the *Clouds*.[2]

In another dialogue, the *Parmenides*, Plato supplements this account of the intellectual struggles of the youthful Socrates. It is a report of a discussion between him and Parmenides of Elea, who was visiting Athens along with Zeno, and the discussion turns on the difficulties which attend the conception of sensible things as 'participating' in the forms (*εἴδη*). There is no chronological difficulty whatever,[3] and the actual occurrence of the discussion is referred to as a fact in two other passages of Plato.[4] We know that Zeno was at Athens for a considerable time, and that Pericles 'heard' him there. We also know that Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, studied under him and that other Athenians paid him large sums of money. If we remember the growing interest of Athens in the West at this date, it will not appear surprising that Parmenides, who was not only a philosopher but also a statesman and legislator in the Ionic colony of Elea, should have visited Athens along with his favourite disciple. Now it is, of course, obvious that Plato was not in a position to give an accurate report of a conversation which took

[1] *Laches*, 180 E.
[2] *Euthyd.* 297 E.
[3] *Mem.* iii. 10. 6.
[4] *Thæt.* 149 A.
[5] Frag. 25 (Diels).
[6] *Mem.* iii. 10.
[7] *Euthyphro*, 11 C, 15 B.
[8] *Apol.* 33 D.
[9] *Phædo*, 96 A ff.

[1] *Phædo*, 59 B.
[2] For the details see the notes on *Phædo*, 96 A ff., in the present writer's edition of the dialogue (Oxford, 1911). The view that Plato is describing his own intellectual development in this passage is ludicrous. These questions were no longer of any interest even in his youth.
[3] Burnet, § 84.
[4] *Thæt.* 183 E, *Soph.* 217 C.

place more than twenty years before he was born, but it should also be obvious that he was not likely to represent a theory of his own as the subject of a rather damaging criticism in that conversation. It is, therefore, important to notice that the criticism of Parmenides is not specially directed against the so-called 'theory of ideas,' but rather against the view that these 'intelligible forms' can somehow be 'present' in the things of sense, or that the things of sense can 'partake of' them—a view which Plato expressly ascribes to Socrates in the autobiographical sketch of the *Phædo*,[1] though he indicates at the same time that Socrates was not clear that 'presence' or 'participation' was the right name for the relation between the sensible and the intelligible which he postulated. It is, fortunately, unnecessary to pursue this subject farther here. We are not bound to discuss whether Plato himself proceeded to 'separate' (*χωρίζειν*) universals from particulars or not, or whether Aristotle thought he did so or not. What is quite certain is that he never represents Socrates as 'separating' the forms from the things of sense, and that the difficulties he gets into in the *Parmenides* are due solely to his insistence on the participation of sensible things in the forms, and his refusal to take the easiest way out of these difficulties by adopting the theory of 'separation' (*χωρισμός*).[2]

Now in the *Phædo* it is just this coming into being and passing away (*γένεσις καὶ φθορά*) of particular things that interests Socrates. It never occurs to him or any of his associates from first to last to question the reality of the world of being (*οὐσία*); that is the postulate (*ὑπόθεσις*) which they all accept. The only question is the cause of becoming, and the new method by which Socrates proposed to attack it was what he called 'examination in arguments' (*σκέψις ἐν λόγοις*). That was, in fact, the method which had proved so successful in geometry already, and which Zeno had turned into such a deadly weapon against the Pythagorean geometry itself. What was new was its application to the consideration of other than arithmetical and geometrical problems, and in particular to the good and the beautiful. The importance of λόγοι in the work of the 'thought-factory' was well known to Aristophanes, as we have seen, though he carelessly or deliberately mixed it up with the teaching of Protagoras about making the weaker argument the stronger—a point which he still further developed when he introduced the righteous and the wicked argument in the second edition of the play. The Athenian public would certainly not distinguish the two things, and, as a matter of fact, there was something in common between them. Protagoras said that on every subject there were two λόγοι opposed to each other, and that was exactly what Zeno had shown in another sphere. The method of Socrates was to follow out the consequences (*τὰ συμβαίνοντα*) of these λόγοι, to 'follow wherever the argument led him,' and he transferred this method to matters of right and wrong, fair and foul. There still exists a curious document written in the Doric dialect, in which this application of the method is plainly exhibited, and which must have been composed under Socratic influence.[3]

[1] 100 D.

[2] It is worth noting that Proclus, who was familiar with both the Academic and the Peripatetic tradition, has no hesitation in saying that Aristotle ascribed the 'theory of ideas' to Socrates. He says (*in Platonis Rempublicam*, i. 259, ed. G. Kroll, Leipzig, 1899–1901): *περὶ γάρ τοι ταῦτα καὶ διέτριβεν ὁ Σωκράτης τὰ ὁριστὰ εἶδη, καὶ ὅ γε Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς διατριβῆς εἰς ἔννοιαν τῶν εἰδῶν ἀναδραμεῖν.*

[3] For the so-called διαλέξεις see Diels, 83, and A. E. Taylor's chapter on the δισσοὶ λόγοι in *Varia Socratica*, 1st ser., Oxford, 1911, p. 91 ff. The Peloponnesian War is referred to as the most recent, which dates the dialogue within fairly narrow limits. The Dorian dialect at once suggests Megara, where Euclides was developing the Eleatic doctrine under Socratic influence.

6. Early reputation of Socrates.—In the *Clouds*, as we have seen, Socrates is represented as the head of a regular school. The picture of the *φροντιστήριον* would be quite pointless on any other supposition, and the most natural thing is to assume that he succeeded Archelaus. His work must have been much interrupted, however, by the war. Plato makes a great point of his bravery in the field. We know that Socrates served at Potidæa, Delium, Amphipolis, and probably elsewhere, and we may take it for granted that these experiences made a deep impression on him. It is clear that he was already a celebrated man. We saw that Antisthenes spoke of foreigners being attracted to Athens 'by the renown of Socrates,' and we know who some at least of these were. There were the Eleatics Euclides and Terpsion from Megara, the Pythagorean Echecrates from Phlius, Aristippus from Cyrene, and doubtless many others (Cebes and Simmias, the disciples of Philolaus, from Thebes, and Phædo of Elis belong to a later time; for they are quite young in 399 B.C.). No one has ever disputed these facts, and they imply a great deal which is not yet generally recognized. In particular, we must remember that the attachment of the scattered Pythagoreans to Socrates must have begun in those early days before Plato was born. He had also devoted disciples among his fellow-citizens, of whom the best known to the Athenian public was the enthusiastic and eccentric Chærepho. It was he who, somewhere about this time, actually asked the oracle at Delphi whether there was any one wiser than Socrates. The oracle of course replied that there was not, and, according to Plato, Socrates at his trial attributed his mission to the Athenians to his desire to refute or confirm the truth of this oracle. He was conscious of knowing nothing except that he knew nothing, and he found at last that he was wiser than others only in this, that he knew he knew nothing, while they knew nothing either but thought they did know something. That, of course, is Socratic 'irony'; his mission was a much more serious thing, as we shall see. What is important for our present purpose is to observe that his reputation for 'wisdom' was well established before he entered on his mission at all.

To this period we must also assign the rivalry of Antiphon the sophist with Socrates, of which Xenophon has preserved some notices from an unknown literary source. He tells us[1] that Antiphon endeavoured to rob Socrates of his associates (*τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι*). He pointed out to him that he lived a life no slave would put up with, that he wore a cloak which was not only shabby, but the same in summer and winter, that he went barefoot and shirtless, and he argued that he was really a teacher of unhappiness. That was why he charged no fee. Here Socrates is clearly depicted as the head of a voluntary association of ascetics, much as he is in the *Clouds*. Socrates answered him as was to be expected, and he goes on to describe the way he spent his time with his associates.[2]

'I unroll in common with my friends the treasures of the wise men of old, which they have left behind written in papyrus volumes, and if we see anything good in them, we extract it, and think it great gain if we become friends to one another.'

This is not like anything else in Xenophon, or even in Plato, and must refer to the date of the institution which Aristophanes burlesqued as the *φροντιστήριον*.

It is impossible that Xenophon can be speaking here from his own personal recollections. We have no means of dating Antiphon the sophist, but the style and matter of the fragments which we possess[3] make it clear that he belongs to a time before Xenophon was born.

7. The mission of Socrates.—It is evident that

[1] *Mem.* i. 6. 1 ff. [2] *Ib.* 14. [3] Diels, 80 B.

the early years of the Peloponnesian War marked a crisis in the life of Socrates, though we can determine its nature only from stray indications and inferences drawn from his later life. As we have seen, his military record was exceptional, and Plato has been careful to make Alcibiades and Laches (no mean judge) bear witness to his coolness in the face of danger and his admirable qualities as a soldier. As we have seen, Antisthenes confirms Plato's account of his saving the life of Alcibiades and declining the distinction of the ἀριστεῖα to which he was fairly entitled, though he transfers the incident (probably wrongly) from Potidæa to Delium. The discrepancy suggests that we are dealing with independent testimony, and it would have been difficult for Plato to put into the mouth of Laches such a handsome tribute as he does[1] to the conduct of Socrates at Delium,[2] unless his military reputation had been firmly established. That is an aspect of Socrates which should never be overlooked. We saw also from the fragments of the comic poets that Socrates had been impoverished by the war, like so many other Athenians. He cannot, however, have been reduced to real poverty before the battle of Amphipolis (422 B.C.); for he was serving as a hoplite there, which proves that he still possessed, or was deemed to possess, the property-qualification required for this service.

In the *Apology*[3] there is a much more illuminating account of the nature of the mission undertaken by Socrates than the half-serious story of the oracle already referred to. Socrates is made to say that God (not specially the god of Delphi) had assigned a certain duty to him—that of living in 'philosophy' and exhorting every one, and especially his fellow-citizens, young and old, not to care for their bodies or for money so much as for their souls, and how to make them as good as possible. To disobey that order would be to desert his post in the face of the enemy. It seems impossible to doubt that this was his real conviction. Socrates believed in his divine vocation, and the military language in which he describes it is probably due to the fact that he was on active service when the call came to him.

Now Alcibiades in the *Symposium*[4] is made to give a very circumstantial account of how Socrates at Potidæa remained in a 'rapt' for twenty-four hours, from one sunrise to the next, and we can hardly be wrong in connecting this with the mission to which he devoted himself from about this time. He was now nearly forty years old, and, though it is not to be supposed that he gave up his school at once, it is probable that the 'writings of the wise men of old' did not occupy so much of his attention as formerly. He believed himself to have received illumination from above and to be under the orders of God, and his whole life was now to be consecrated to their fulfilment. There are other indications that Socrates possessed the temperament which renders men receptive to such influence. From childhood[5] he had a 'sign' or 'voice' which seemed to be more than human. It came to him on quite trivial occasions (πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς) and opposed his doing something that he was about to do, but it never told him to do anything. It had to do, so far as we can see, only with the disadvantageous consequences of acts in themselves indifferent, and it is never appealed to on questions of right and wrong. Socrates naturally spoke of it as something superhuman (δαιμόνιον), and it must be remembered that the Pythagoreans held the doctrine of guardian spirits. On the other hand, the attitude of Socrates to it, as to most things of the kind, is one of humorous half-belief (εἰρωνεία). He is made to say that the 'voice' was always right, and it is possible that he had a genuine belief in revelations of this kind. That only illustrates his temperament, however. The command which he now believed to have been laid upon him by God had nothing to do with the δαιμόνιον. That only warned him off undesirable actions; this issued a positive order. That might be treated lightly; this was something that he must obey even if it cost him his life, as in fact it did.

It is only from Plato that we get any intelligible account of the 'divine sign.' Xenophon[1] maintains that it gave positive directions as well as negative, and we may well believe that many followers of Socrates made much more of it than he did himself. The *Theages*, a dialogue included in the Platonic *corpus*, is evidence of that. The most important thing to notice is that he had the 'voice' from childhood, while the divine command came to him only in middle life.

We know in a general way what the mission of Socrates was. It was to convict his fellow-men of their ignorance and sinfulness (which for Socrates was the same thing), and his method was that of searching questions. Æschines and Plato agree that Alcibiades was one of those on whom he exercised his powers, and this is confirmed by the charge made later that he had 'educated' Alcibiades or that Alcibiades was his 'disciple.' Plato makes it clear that Socrates had known Alcibiades intimately when he himself was quite young and when Alcibiades was a small boy. At the time of the incident at Potidæa Alcibiades must have been twenty at least, as he was on military service, so there cannot have been more than eighteen years' difference of age between him and Socrates, and there may have been less. Charmides, Plato's uncle, was also one of the first of the lads whom Socrates sought to convert. Plato himself was not yet born.

8. The soul.—In the *Apology*[2] the burden of Socrates' preaching is that every man must 'care for his soul.'[3] The startling novelty of this requirement can be made clear only by an examination of the history of Greek ideas about the soul.[4] Here it will be enough to point out that the soul had never yet been recognized as 'the thing in us which has knowledge and ignorance, goodness or badness'; it had never been identified with the normal consciousness or character of a man. This, then, was the great discovery of Socrates, the thing which entitles him to be regarded as the true founder of the 'spiritual' view of knowledge and conduct. It is hardly necessary to insist on the importance of this for all subsequent religion and ethics.

In the *First Alcibiades*, attributed to Plato, the idea is fully developed. The first stage is 'care of oneself' (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ), and then the question arises, 'What is oneself?', the answer being that it is 'soul.' There are some reasons for believing that the *First Alcibiades* (which can hardly be Plato's) was based to a considerable extent on the *Alcibiades* of Æschines.

9. Goodness is knowledge.—The best-known Socratic doctrine, that goodness is knowledge, becomes at once intelligible in the light of this new view of the soul as the seat of both. Of course Socrates did not mean to deny the patent fact that a man may do what he knows, in the popular sense of the word, to be wrong. The question is what we mean by knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and Socrates has no difficulty in showing that what commonly passes for knowledge is only belief (δόξα). Of course it may be a right belief (ὀρθὴ δόξα), and in that case it will be sufficient in

[1] *Lach.* 181 B.
[2] *Apol.* 28 E, 29 D ff.
[3] Cf. *Symp.* 221 B.
[4] *Symp.* 220 C ff.
[5] *Apol.* 31 C ff.

[1] *Mem.* i. 1. 2–5, iv. 8. 12–13, 8. 1.
[2] *Apol.* 29 E.
[3] For ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς cf. especially *Apol.* 29 D and 30 A. It is no invention of Plato, but genuine Socratic doctrine; for it was found in Antisthenes also. Cf. also Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 4: ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν . . . τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη, and the *Alcibiades* of Æschines referred to above.
[4] See art. SOUL (Greek).

ordinary circumstances to keep a man on the right road; but it cannot be trusted to do so in every case and in all circumstances, because it is not secured by a 'reasoned account of the cause' (*αἰτίας λογισμῷ*), as all scientific knowledge must be.[1] The man who really *knows* knows that everything worth doing is only so 'for the sake of the good,' which is the only thing it is really possible to wish for.[2] Now the only man who knows the good is the philosopher, and he is the man whose soul is in complete union with it, so that it is impossible for him to do wrong. It seems impossible to doubt that Socrates spoke in the language of passion of the love of the soul for the good and of its mystical union with it, and that the speech he is made to attribute to Diotima in the *Symposium* represents his real teaching on the subject. Such things were, of course, beyond the range of Xenophon, who had read Plato's *Symposium* without discovering what it was about, if we may judge from his own composition of the same name. We would give much for a glimpse of Plato's relations with Socrates, but he has kept himself out of the Socratic dialogues completely.

The present writer believes that we are bound to regard all the dialogues in which Socrates is the leading speaker as primarily intended to expound his teaching. This by no means excludes the possibility that Plato may have idealized his hero more or less, or that he may have given a turn of his own to a good many things. That would only be human nature, but it would not seriously affect the general impression. The principal ground for holding this view is that, at a certain period of his life, Plato began to feel that it was inappropriate to make Socrates the chief speaker in his dialogues. He is present in all of them except the *Laws*, which makes the secondary position assigned to him in the later dialogues all the more remarkable. If Plato had made Socrates the mere mouthpiece of his own speculations in the *Symposium*, it is difficult to see why he should not also have credited him with the logic of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* and the cosmology of the *Timæus*. The *Philebus*, one of Plato's latest works, is just the exception that proves the rule. Its theme is the application of Pythagorean principles to questions of morals; and, if we believe Plato, that was just the chief occupation of Socrates.

10. Trial and death of Socrates.—Though he performed all his duties as a citizen, and especially as a soldier, Socrates took no part in public life till the year 406 B.C., when the very existence of Athens was at stake. In that year he allowed himself to be nominated for the Council of Five Hundred; the lot fell upon him, and he took office. It was in the prytany of his tribe, the Antiochis, that the illegal proposal was made to condemn the generals who were accused of failing to recover the dead after Arginusæ collectively, instead of deciding each case by itself. Socrates stood alone in opposing the proposal and would not even take any responsibility for putting the question to the vote. There is no reason for supposing that he was in any way disloyal to the democracy, but he had seen it become more and more anarchical and tyrannous, and, if we may trust Plato's *Gorgias*, he now saw that Pericles himself had started it on this course. To him it was quite as repugnant that the people should act contrary to the laws as that a despot should do so, and he was bound by his deepest convictions to resist anything arbitrary. It is not therefore surprising that, when the democracy fell, Socrates did not feel obliged in any way to identify himself with its cause by leaving Athens. It may have seemed quite possible at first that the Thirty, several of whom had been among his associates, would restore the legal State. We know now that there was no chance of that, but it was not so clear then. Xenophon, who may have been in Athens at the time, has a story[3] of how Critias and Charicles called Socrates before them and told him that he must obey the law which had been ordained forbidding any one to teach 'the art of arguments' (*τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην*). Socrates replied by arguing in his customary manner with them. That was not very serious, but the affair of Leon of Salamis, twice repeated by Plato,[1] was more so. The Thirty were anxious to implicate as many people as possible in their crimes, and they sent for Socrates with four others and ordered them to bring Leon over from Salamis to be put to death. The others obeyed, but Socrates simply went home, for which he would have been put to death, if the Thirty had not been overthrown in time. That may have made him popular with the restored democracy for a little and so delayed the inevitable end, but of course Socrates remained faithful to his principles, and, when the democracy began to fall away from its original moderation, we may be sure that he did not spare his criticisms. To the men now at the head of the State he must have seemed dangerous, as a cause of disaffection among the younger men. The amnesty made it impossible for them to accuse him for his acquiescence in the rule of the Thirty, so something else had to be found to try him for. The actual accusation contained two counts: (1) irreligion (*ἀσέβεια*), which was explained to consist in his failure to recognize the gods recognized by the State and introducing new ones; and (2) corruption of the young. The first charge was based on the old story of his unorthodoxy contained in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. That may seem to be going a long way back, but it must be remembered that the men who had flocked to him from all parts of Greece in the days of the *φροντιστήριον* were now free to visit him once more; and Plato indicates that at least Euclides of Megara, Theodorus of Cyrene, and Cebes and Simmias from Thebes actually did so. Most of these men had just recently been 'enemy aliens,' and their views were doubtless shocking to the orthodox. It was not, therefore, strange that the old scandal should be revived at this time. As to 'corrupting the youth,' that really meant encouraging them to criticize the new régime. It is not to be supposed that Anytus really wished Socrates to be put to death; he only wished him to leave Athens. Socrates, however, refused any compromise of this kind. He was not found guilty by a large majority, and it is clear that, if he had cared to propose banishment as an alternative penalty to death, as it was open to him to do, that would have been accepted. As it was, he proposed free entertainment in the Prytaneum for life, with the natural result that the majority for the sentence of death was greater than that for the verdict of guilty. Owing to the Delian festival, a month passed before he could drink the hemlock, and he spent it in conversation with his friends. Some of them were eager to get him out of prison and away from Athens, but he would not stultify himself by breaking the law. He had been legally condemned, however unjustly, and he must abide by the sentence, and so, he added, must his accusers. It is particularly noteworthy that most of the Athenians who were present at the last were men whom we know to have been associates of Socrates in earlier days. The rich young men, whom he was supposed to have corrupted, were not there. On the other hand, there was a remarkable company of foreigners—Eleatics from Megara and Pythagoreans from Thebes. It was very natural in these circumstances that Socrates should revert to the topics which had occupied him in earlier days. His mission was over, and there was no need to talk of that any more. He spoke, therefore, of the soul and its destiny, and Plato makes us feel how far he had gone beyond his former associates in his view of it. The older men say nothing at all, and Cebes and Simmias, the young Pythagoreans, though ready to be convinced, are frankly critical and inclined to

[1] *Meno*, 97 A ff. [2] *Gorg.* 466 D ff.
[3] *Mem.* i. 2. 33 ff.

[1] *Apol.* 32 D, E, *Epp.* vii. 324 E.

scepticism. When the talk was over, Xanthippe, who had been resting after sitting up with her husband the night before, was sent for to say farewell to him, and to receive his last instructions in the presence of Crito. The last scene of all is one of the great things of European literature, and must be read to be felt. Plato had ample opportunities of hearing the death of Socrates described in detail by men who were present, and it is impossible to doubt that he tried to record it as accurately as he could. The world has never quite forgotten the message that was left to it on that spring day of 399 B.C.

LITERATURE.—The Socratic problem was correctly formulated by F. D. E. Schleiermacher, *Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen* (*Werke*, Berlin, 1834–64, sect. III. vol. ii. p. 287 ff.). His canon was: 'What *may* Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without, however, contradicting the traits of character and principles of life which Xenophon definitely sets up as Socratic; and what *must* he have been to give Plato the occasion and the right to represent him as he does in his dialogues?' Unfortunately, this canon was overshadowed by the dictum of G. W. F. Hegel (*Vorlesungen über die Gesch. der Philosophie*, Berlin, 1832, ii. 69) that 'we must hold chiefly to Xenophon in regard to the content of his knowledge, and the degree in which his thought was developed.' This became untenable as soon as the date of Xenophon was settled, and the slight character of his acquaintance with Socrates was realized. K. Joel, *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1901, tried to find a test by which to judge between Plato and Xenophon in the statements of Aristotle, but this has not been generally accepted, since Aristotle did not come to Athens till a whole generation had passed away since the death of Socrates, and he could have had no firsthand knowledge about him. The literary problem was well discussed by Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen*, Berlin, 1896. A. E. Taylor has discussed a number of points in *Varia Socratica*, 1st ser. (*St. Andrews University Publications*, no. ix.), Oxford, 1911, and a similar standpoint is adopted in the Introduction to J. Burnet, *Plato's Phædo*, Oxford, 1911. The most recent discussions are those of H. Maier, *Sokrates, sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*, Tübingen, 1914, and A. Busse, *Sokrates*, Berlin, 1914, which agree in rejecting the testimony of Xenophon and Aristotle in favour of Plato's. Their other results are criticized in the present writer's article on 'Ancient Philosophy' in *The Year's Work in Classical Studies, 1915*, ed. Cyril Bailey, London, 1916.

JOHN BURNET.

SODOMY.—Sodomy is sometimes defined as 'unnatural sexual relations, as between persons of the same sex, or with beasts.'[1] The word 'sodomy' meant originally the kind of wickedness practised by the inhabitants of the city of Sodom. That this was sexual intercourse between persons of the same sex is an inference based on the words of the men of Sodom to Lot (Gn 19[5]): 'Bring them [the men] out unto us that we may know them.' If 'know' (ידע) be given here a sexual meaning, as in Gn 4[1], the reference would be to unnatural intercourse. There is no actual necessity, however, for so interpreting the word 'know.' It may mean no more than 'get acquainted with,' and the wickedness which Lot is said to have anticipated that the men of Sodom contemplated may have been no more than to give the strangers a beating.

The translators of AV understood the word to cover any immoral sexual intercourse, for they rendered Dt 23[17]: 'There shall be no whore of the daughters of Israel, nor a sodomite of the sons of Israel.' The 'whore' of this passage was a *hierodoulos* (קדשה), or sacred prostitute,[2] and the sodomite was her male counterpart (קדש). The Bishops' Bible translated: 'There shal bee no whore of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there bee a whore keeper of the sonnes of Israel.' It is clear, therefore, that in Elizabethan English sodomy was not restricted to sexual intercourse with the same sex and with beasts, but was applied to intercourse between unmarried human beings also. In this article we shall assume that the term has the breadth of meaning that it had when AV was made.

1. Hebrews.—Among the Hebrews sodomy of both types existed. A law in Ex 22[19] reads: 'Whosoever lieth with a beast shall surely be put to death.' Just as a prohibition law implies that traffic in liquor has been known, and has even been customary, so the prohibition recorded in this law testifies to the existence of the thing prohibited. Similarly Lv 18[22], 'Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination,' is evidence that the second form of sodomy included in the *Century Dictionary's* definition at one time existed among the Hebrews. To what extent such unnatural indulgence was practised we do not know. Fortunately the veil of oblivion has fallen over the details. Sodomy of the second kind (immorality practised by men consecrated to a deity, and practised in the precincts of a temple in the service of religion) also existed in Israel down to the reform of Josiah. The term קדש, by which a sodomite is designated, means 'holy' or 'consecrated,' and indicates that he was especially devoted to a deity for that purpose. In 1 K 14[24] it is said that these sodomites 'did according to all the abominations of the nations which Jahweh drove out before the children of Israel.' This implies that men consecrated to similar service were connected with the sacred places of other western Semites. This is what we should expect, and is doubtless true. Asa, king of Judah, endeavoured to expel sodomites from the temple in Jerusalem (1 K 15[12])—a work which Josiah accomplished (2 K 23[7]). According to the most probable reading, in Job 36[14] it is said of the wicked: 'They die in their youth and perish like sodomites.' This parallelism implies that the life of sodomites was proverbially short, possibly from the fact that they contracted venereal disease. It may, however, simply refer to the destruction of sodomites by Josiah, though the first interpretation seems more probable.

The purpose of these officials is somewhat obscure. It seems probable, however, that they represented the life-giving power of the deity interpreted in a physical sense. If this were the case, barren women and perhaps also brides would resort to them.

2. Babylonia.—That behind the Babylonian civilization there lay a condition in which the type of sodomy defined by the *Century Dictionary* existed is proved by the Gilgamesh Epic, one of the heroes of which, Enkidu, is said to have eaten grass with the gazelles, with the cattle to have quaffed drink, and with the creatures of the water to have delighted his heart.[1] As the Epic goes on to tell how by intercourse with a *hierodoulos* he was enticed away from his animal companions, the narrative means, apparently, that before the coming of the woman he had satisfied his sexual appetite with the animals.

Of the existence of the equivalent of the Hebrew consecrated sodomite (קדש) there is no certain trace known to the present writer, though there is mentioned in the Code of Ḫammurabi an official who was probably a sodomite. This official is designated by a Sumerian term usually read *NER-SE-GA*, which a syllabary defines by the Semitic *manzaz pani*. The *NER-SE-GA* is first mentioned in § 187 of the Code, where it is said:

'One may not bring claim for the son of a *NER-SE-GA*, a temple guard (*manzaz ekallim*), or a sacred harlot (*SAL-zikru*).'

Again, in § 192 it is said:

'If the son of a *NER-SE-GA* or the son of a sacred harlot says to the father that brought him up or to the mother that brought him up, "Thou art not my father" or "Thou art not my mother," they shall cut out his tongue.'

The point of importance to our subject in these laws is that the children of the *NER-SE-GA* are treated exactly like the children of the sacred

[1] *Century Dictionary*, *s.v.*
[2] See art. HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian), § 5.

[1] Cf. P. Haupt, *Die babylon. Nimrodepos*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 9, line 39 ff.

harlot, or *hierodoulos*.[1] If the *NER-SE-GA* claimed his child, no one—not even the legal husband of the child's mother—could lay claim to the child. If the *hierodoulos* chose to bring up her child, no one—not even its real father—could deprive her of it. If, on the other hand, one adopted the son of a *NER-SE-GA* or the son of a *hierodoulos*, and the child repudiated the adopted father or mother, his tongue was to be cut out. The parallelism makes it probable that the *NER-SE-GA* was the male counterpart of the *hierodoulos* (*SAL-zikru*).

In the first of the two laws quoted the son of a *manzaz ekallim* is placed on a par with the sons of the other two. *Manzaz ekallim* has been sometimes translated 'palace guard,' but *ekallim* means 'temple' as well as 'palace,' so that the term may refer to another class of sodomites.

What is the meaning of *NER-SE-GA* and its equivalent *manzaz pani*? Muss-Arnolt defines *manzaz pani* as 'foremost place, dignitary, magnate';[2] Delitzsch as 'Frontplatz, dann als Titel: Ranghöchster, der die erste Stellung bekleidet, höchster Würdenträger.'[3] This interpretation seems to be confirmed for the later time by the phrase *manzaz pani šarri*, 'place before the king.'[4] It is, however, doubtful whether this was the original meaning either of the Sumerian expression or of its Semitic equivalent. Scholars have transliterated the Sumerian, *NER-SE-GA*; in the writer's judgment it should be read *GIR-SIG-GA*. *GA* is simply a phonetic complement. *GIR* is the sign for 'foot';[5] *SIG*, the word for 'pour out.'[6] When we remember the way in which 'feet' is employed in Hebrew as a euphemism for *pudenda*, as in Ru 3[4,7] and Is 7[20], the possibility presents itself that this phrase may originally have had a meaning quite consonant with the office of a sodomite. In that case *manzaz pani* would not be a literal translation of it, but a paraphrase. It is by no means certain, however, that *manzaz pani* always means 'foremost place.' The uses of *pani* in Akkadian and Assyrian are closely parallel with the uses of *panîm* in Hebrew, and in Ex 33[14f.] *panîm* is employed in the sense of 'presence,' or, as we should say, 'person.' The meaning is that Jahweh said to Moses: 'I will go with thee in person.' If we might apply this analogy to our phrase, *manzaz panîm* would mean 'in place of the person,' and would appropriately designate a priest who impersonated a god, or who represented to the worshipper the functions supposed to be performed by a deity. If sodomites represented the life-giving functions or the fertility of a deity, as we have supposed, this would be a fitting designation of them. Herodotus tells how in the temple of Marduk in Babylon there was a couch on which the wife of the god slept at certain times, and that the oracle came only when she occupied the couch.[7] This appears to be confirmed by a text in the British Museum,[8] which speaks of the presentation of a couch for the *ziqqurat*.[9] From what we know of ancient oracles, it is hardly conceivable that at such times the god was not represented by a priest or *manzaz panîm*, one who took the place of his person.

This view of the religious character of the *manzaz pani* of a god or a temple seems to be warranted by the fact that the *manzaz pani* of a king seems to have been the representative of the monarch in overseeing public work, and the *manzaz pani* of a temple was the representative of the god in looking after the affairs of the temple. Thus a pay-roll of the time of the Ur dynasty was certified to by the *GIR-SIG-GA* of the *patesi*, or ruler;[10] quantities of wool presented to the temple of Eanna at Erech were certified to by the *GIR-SIG-GA* of the temple.[11] In the year that Ibi-Sin, the last king of the dynasty of Ur, became king quantities of grain were paid as wages in behalf of the *patesi* of Girsu by a certain *GIR-SIG-GA* who acted as overseer.[12] There is no reason, however, why, just because a man was a representative of the king, there should be any irregularity in the birth of his children so that the Code would need to provide that no claim should be brought against them. It seems probable, therefore, that it is necessary to distinguish between two classes of *GIR-SIG-GA*, one of which impersonated the god in functions parallel to those of the sacred harlot, while the other impersonated or acted as the representatives of earthly rulers. It is probable that the *GIR* which occurs so often on the business documents of the dynasty of Ur as the official who *visèed* or authenticated the documents represents an abbreviation of *GIR-SIG-GA*.[13]

These etymologies represent possibilities only. While it seems probable that the *NER-SE-GA* (*GIR-SIG-GA*) was a sodomite, full proof is lacking.

3. India.—In India there seems to have been among the native races a wide-spread belief that the greatest manifestation of divine power was in the generation of life. The organs of generation consequently became to them the most revered symbols of deity. In course of time this view made its way into some forms of the religion of the Aryans. In present-day Hinduism it is most generally found among the Śaivite sects, though some of the Vaiṣnavite sects also have adopted it. In Śaivite temples the deity is usually represented by the *liṅgam*, or phallus; the *yoni*, or vulva, is also a common religious symbol. Wherever such ideas prevail, sodomy is, or was at some time, a feature of religious services.

It is reported that in India there is a class of *faqîrs* who go entirely nude, and live apart from the people, but are held in the highest reverence. When they approach a village, the people flock about them, and the women lay aside all modesty in their intercourse with them. Especially those who desire to rid themselves of the reproach of barrenness kneel before the *faqîr*, take his private member in their hands, and kiss it.[1]

Another manifestation of sodomy is found among the Śaivite secret societies called Śaktas. To one another the members of these societies call themselves 'the perfect' and speak of outsiders as 'beasts.' Such is the ill repute of these societies at present that no respectable person will admit connexion with them. Their rites are set forth in texts called *Tantras*, in which the initiated are instructed. In one of these texts Śiva says to his wife Durgā: 'All men have my form and all women thy form; any one who recognises any distinction in caste in the mystic circle has a foolish soul.' At their secret meetings a naked woman, the wife of the chief priest, sits in the middle of the 'holy circle'—a circle composed of men and women sitting promiscuously without regard to caste or kinship. After partaking of meats, fish, parched grain, and various kinds of wines and liquors, each man is for the time Śiva and each woman Durgā. They freely copulate without regard to caste or the risk of incest. To give in detail the ceremonies of different societies would be but to repeat such indecencies.[2] The theory which underlies these societies is that man is a creature of passion, that passion is poison, but a poison that can be cured only by poison. On the principle 'Similia similibus curantur' they indulge in these orgies in order to cross the region of darkness to union with Śiva.

4. Australia.—In Australia, among a number of tribes, the conceptions out of which sodomy grew still prevail, though the customs in which they are embodied are different; *e.g.*, when a girl reaches the marriageable age (fourteen or fifteen), an initiation ceremony is performed upon her, which consists in cutting open the vagina.

Among the northern Arunta and Ilpirra the man to whom a girl has been assigned takes her, along with his father's sister's sons, and, accompanied by other men of the tribe who might have been her lawful husbands, and by a mother's mother's brother, they go out into the bush. The mother's mother's brother (who, of course, is an old man) then 'performs the operation with a stone knife, after having touched the lips of the vulva with Churinga, so as to prevent excessive bleeding.' Afterwards the old man who performed the operation, the father's sister's sons, and the other men have intercourse with the girl in the order named. The girl is then decorated and

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[1] See art. HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian), § 1.
[2] *Assyrisch-englisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch*, Berlin, 1905, p. 562a.
[3] *Assyrisches Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 457a.
[4] H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv[2]. [1891] 48, 4b.
[5] G. A. Barton, *The Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing*, Leipzig, 1913, no. 400[24].
[6] *Ib.* no. 175[24]. [7] i. 181 f.
[8] K. 164. [9] Cf. *BH* ii. 635 f.
[10] Cf. *Cuneiform Texts, etc., from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1899–1901, vii. 50, no. 19984.
[11] *Ib.* ix. 37, no. 21399. [12] *Ib.* x. 48, no. 12245.
[13] This is evidently the view of Myhrmann, who in discussing the phrase *GIR-SIG-GA* (which he reads correctly) has accumulated a number of references, many of which turn out to be simply *GIR* written alone; cf. *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, Series A: Cuneiform Texts*, ed. H. V. Hilprecht, iii., Philadelphia, 1910, p. 82.

[1] Quoted in *Phallism*, p. 49, from Barthélemy d'Herbelot's *Bibliothèque orientale*, Paris, 1697.
[2] Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 343; Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 491.

taken to the camp of her allotted husband. At least once afterwards he is very likely to send her back to the same men.[1]

Similar customs are found with varying details among other tribes.

In the Illiaura, after the operation is performed by the mother's mother's brother, first he, then the elder brothers of the husband, then his younger brothers have access to the girl in the order named. 'In the Kaitish tribe the operation is performed by an elder sister of the girl,' after which mother's mother's brothers, elder and younger brothers (but not in blood), mother's brothers, and those who might have been lawful husbands have access to her.[2]

In the Warramunga tribe the husband lies down with a brother on each side of him; the girl is laid across them by an elder sister; the operation is performed by a father's sister's son in the presence of all the men and women of the camp. She then goes to the camp of the man to whom she is allotted, but he has no intercourse with her for two or three days. After this she is lent for two nights to mother's mother's brother, father's sister's sons, paternal grandfather, elder and younger brothers (but not in blood), and to those who might lawfully have been her husbands. 'After this she becomes the property of the man to whom she was assigned.'[3]

The customs of the Worgaia, Bingongina, Wulmalla, Tjingilli, Umbaia, and Walpari tribes are in substantial agreement with the Warramunga customs, except that, as a general rule, the husband's father performs the operation.[4]

If the husband dies and the woman is handed over to one of his younger brothers, he lends her for a day or two to other men.[5]

In addition to the practices connected with puberty and marriage, there are in Australia other occasions on which intercourse with women other than those allotted to them is permitted to men. While certain of their ceremonies are being performed, large numbers of natives are gathered together and marital rules appear to be set aside for the time being.[6] The native name for such gatherings is *corrobboree*. In some tribes a woman is told off each day or each night to attend at the *corrobboree* ground, and all the men, except fathers, elder and younger brothers, and sons, have access to her.

Among the Arunta, when an ordinary *corrobboree* is in progress, an elder man will send his son-in-law into the bush with the elder man's wife to collect material for decoration. Ordinarily it would be unlawful for the younger man to speak to the woman or to come near her. Now he is expected to have intercourse with her, in order to cause the ceremonies to go more smoothly and to prevent the decorations from falling off. Towards night, when all is ready, the women who have spent the day at the men's camp are painted with red ochre and go to summon the other women and children for the festal night.[7]

In some tribes such sexual intercourse is much more common than in others. Among the Warramunga, *e.g.*, it is carried on night after night during the performance of sacred ceremonies. The lending of women follows certain rules which vary according to tribal conditions. Under certain circumstances women are lent only to men belonging to another division of a tribe; on other occasions only to men belonging to a man's own division of it.

An instance is recorded where, because the men of one moiety of a tribe had built a mound for another moiety, the head man of the moiety for whom the mound had been built brought his wife up near to the other group, secreted her in the bush, and escorted the head man of the other group out to have intercourse with her.[8]

On other occasions women in the Warramunga tribe are lent to men who ordinarily would not be permitted to approach them—*e.g.*, men who are sent out to bring in the bones of a dead person before the ceremony connected with the rites of burial. On this occasion the father of the dead person, or in his absence some tribal father, lends the woman. Often messengers are sent out with dead men's bones to summon other groups to the performance of some ceremony; on such occasions not only are women lent to the messengers, but a general interchange takes place. In some tribes the messengers will take women with them. When they have delivered their message, they leave them a little way out in the bush, where they are visited by men of the other group, who, irrespective of class, have intercourse with them. It is, however, a prerequisite to such intercourse that they should have accepted the invitation of the messengers or should have agreed to the request that they bring. When men of one group go to exact vengeance of another group by killing a man, it is customary to offer to the messengers the use of women. If the offer is accepted, it is a sign of reconciliation; if it is rejected, it is a sign that full vengeance will be exacted.[1]

Except in the Urabunna tribe, where group-marriage prevails, the men have individual wives. Under ordinary circumstances for a man to have intercourse with a woman who does not belong to his group of lawful wives would be a very grave offence, liable to be punished by death. It is only in connexion with ceremonies and the sending out of messengers that irregular intercourse is allowed. In a few special cases the lending of women may be explained as a return for some service rendered, but in most cases it is clearly due to another motive. It is supposed to have some supernatural potency.[2]

1 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 134. 2 *Ib.*
3 *Ib.* p. 134 *f.* 4 *Ib.* p. 135. 5 *Ib.* p. 136.
6 *Ib.* p. 136 *f.* 7 *Ib.* p. 137. 8 *Ib.* p. 138 *f*

LITERATURE.—S. R. Driver, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1895, p. 264 *f.*; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, London, 1896, p. 491 *f.*; *Phallism: a Description of the Worship of Lingam-Yoni* (anonymous), London (privately printed), 1889, p. 48 *f.*; G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, New York, 1913, Edinburgh, 1914, i. 343 *f.*; Spencer-Gillen[b], ch iv.; W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 386 *f.*; E. Buckley, *Phallicism in Japan*, Chicago, 1898.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT.—

The Solemn League and Covenant was the formal undertaking entered into in the late autumn of 1643 by the Scottish General Assembly and Estates on the one part, and the English House of Commons and House of Lords on the other, with a view to making common cause against Charles I. in his civil and ecclesiastical policy. The agreement took the form of a religious covenant by the strong desire and insistence of the Scots,[3] who had become familiar with this more serious form of agreement in their recent ecclesiastical history. Bands had not been unknown in Scottish civil matters, the most noted being the Douglas Band and the band for the murder of Darnley in 1567. But from the era of the Reformation onwards covenants had been common and stringent. The first Covenant[4] was signed on 3rd Dec. 1557 by Argyll, Glencairn, Morton, Lorne, and Erskine of Dun. Between this date and 1643 almost twenty bands were signed or planned,[5] the most famous, perhaps, being the band of 27th April 1560 and the National Covenant of 1638. They were kindred in several respects. They were all purely Scottish in bearing and reference, and they were definite and emphatic in repudiation of Roman Catholic doctrine and practice. But the Solemn League and Covenant, while it had great similarity to those earlier bands in its strong anti-Romanism, differed in a marked way from them in its international character and in its international purpose. It was 'a Solemn League and Covenant for Reformation and defence of Religion, the Honour and Happinesse of the King, and the Peace and Safety of the three Kingdomes of Scotland, England, and Ireland.'[6]

The special form of it was not of English devis-

1 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 139 *f.* 2 *Ib.* p. 140 ff.
3 Robert Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, *1637–42*, Edinburgh, 1841–42, ii. 90.
4 A. R. MacEwan, *A Hist. of the Church in Scotland*, London, 1913–18, ii. 79.
5 D. Hay Fleming, *The Story of the Scottish Covenants in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1904.
6 A. Peterkin, *Records of the Kirk of Scotland from 1638 to 1650*, Edinburgh, 1838, p. 362.

ing; the substantial agreement was of English seeking. It took form comparatively late in 1643, but various steps towards it had been taken as early as the beginning of 1642. The earliest movements towards common action between the English and Scottish Puritan leaders are not known. But in the beginning of 1642, after the outbreak of rebellion in Ireland, 'the English Parliament agreed to pay both English and Scottish troops' to serve there.[1] The promise to the Scots was not kept, owing to the outbreak of the Civil War. The Scottish sympathizers with the Parliament had to find means in Scotland to defray the cost of food, clothing, and pay of the Scottish army. In Feb. 1643 voluntary contributions were asked for, and the response was general, Argyll giving £1000 sterling, and Alexander Henderson, the Covenanting leader, 1000 merks. That there were negotiations for closer relations between the English Puritans and the Scottish Covenanting party appears from emphatic protests made by Charles I. himself to the Scottish Privy Council. In these protests is to be found a strange mixture of self-deception and clear reading of the aims of the English Independents in their little sympathy with fundamental Scottish religious ideas. Thus, on 21st April 1643, the king reminds his Scottish subjects:

'Wee require our good subjects there to consider that the persons who have contrived, fomented, and doe still maintaine these bloodie distractions and this unnaturall civill warre, what pretence soever they make of the true reformed Protestant religion, are in truth Brownists, Anabaptists, and other independent sectaries, and, tho they seeme to desire a uniformitie of church governement with our Kingdom of Scotland, doe no more intend, and ar als farre from allowing the church governement by law established there, or indeed anie church governement quhatsoever, as they ar from consenting to the episcopall.'[2]

Various proposals were made to the Scottish States and General Assembly from time to time. At length, in Aug. 1643, a decisive step was taken when the English Parliament formally dispatched commissioners to Edinburgh to ask for an alliance with the Scots. The commissioners landed at Leith on 7th August. Even then the situation was singularly indefinite. 'One night all were bent to go as Redders (mediators) and friends to both, without syding altogether with Parliament.' Baillie was of the number who favoured this proposal. 'But Waristoun, his allone, did show the vanitie of that motion, and the impossibilitie of it.'[3] Alexander Henderson is usually credited with the authorship of the Solemn League and Covenant, but this assertion requires to be qualified, if not altogether put aside. The English commissioners yielded to the Scottish pressure for a religious covenant—a concession the more easily made because of the English Parliament's necessity, and because of the serious sentiments of the early Reformers both in England and in Scotland when leading statesmen saw the need not only of an alliance between the Protestants of the two countries but also of their giving this alliance a religious basis.[4] But difficulties arose after this preliminary agreement.

'When they were brought to us in this, and Mr. Henderson had given them a draught of the covenant, *we were not like to agree on the frame*; they were more nor we could assent to, for keeping a door open in England to Independencie. *At last some two or three* in private accorded *to that draught*, which all our three Committees from our States, our Assemblie and the Parliament of England did unanimously assent to.'[5]

Henderson, indeed, was spokesman for the League and Covenant in the Assembly. It 'was well prefaced with his most grave oration.'[6] But a leading spirit in the composition, if not the author of the whole document, was Archibald Johnston of Waristoun, whose *Diary* has this entry under Sunday, 22nd June 1651:

'My soule blesseth Him for making use of me in the draughte of the National Covenant, Solemn League and Solemn Acknowledgement, whereof the first scroll was from Him to me.'[1]

Hay Fleming goes so far as to suggest that the Solemn League and Covenant 'may have been entirely from Waristoun's pen.'[2] Waristoun was supremely loyal to it; and 'he looked on the Covenant as the setting Christ on his throne.'[3]

While the English commissioners were in Edinburgh, no serious changes were made in the agreement, although it was seen, as Baillie has noted, what the main drift of Vane and his associates was. On their return to England with the Scottish proposals Parliament on 28th Aug. 1643 remitted the League and Covenant to the Westminster Assembly of Divines 'to take into consideration the lawfulness of it.' Certain alterations were made.

Thus for 'according to the Word of God' was substituted the more guarded expression 'as far as in my conscience, I shall conceive it to be according to the Word of God.' There was discussion upon the undertaking 'to extirpate Popery,' 'it being a very nice business to know what Popery is, and what is meant by extirpation,' but no change was made in the clause.[4] Prelacy had an explanation added 'that is church-government by Archbishops, Bishops, their Chancellors, and Commissaries, Deans, Deans and Chapters, Archdeacons, and all other ecclesiastical Officers depending on that hierarchy.'[5]

On the main contention in the Solemn League and Covenant the contracting parties were agreed.

They condemn 'the treacherous and bloody plots, conspiracies, attempts and practices of the enemies of God . . . ever since the reformation of religion.' They discriminate the condition of the three countries. They see a remedy for the several degrees of mischief in the different countries. 'They are to endeavour to bring the Churches of God in the three Kingdoms to the nearest conjunction in religion, confession of faith, form of Church government, directory for worship and catechising.'[6]

After conjoining in milder condemnation prelacy, as above defined, with popery, the Covenanting representatives in both countries pass to a different and civil subject of treaty.

They are not only 'to endeavour mutually to preserve the rights and privileges of the Parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdomes,' but, strangely enough, considering the proximate end of the Solemn League, 'to preserve and defend the Kings Majesties person and authority, in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the Kingdomes; that the world may bear witnesse with our consciences of our loyalty, and that wee have no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesties just power and greatnesse.'[7]

The matter of the Covenant was so far adjusted that by 22nd Sept. it was sworn by both Houses of Parliament, and by 25th Sept. 1643 it was solemnly sworn to, in St. Margaret's, Westminster, by the Assembly of Divines and 112 members of the House of Commons. Plainly, in spite of the grave seriousness of the language and solemnity of all the procedure, there was room for conflict over the bond of union itself. The Scottish signatories did not see the irreconcilable character of particular provisions, nor the loop-holes in the portion which appeared to provide for one great international Presbyterian Church. The English representatives forgot that they were consenting to the realization of this Presbyterian ideal in spite of what they regarded as verbal safeguards. There was a certain lack of sincerity on both sides. Baillie tells us that he counselled eschewing 'a public rupture with the Independents till we were more able for them'—an advice 'which even Henderson

[1] *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1877–1913, vol. viii., introd. p. viii.
[2] *Ib.*, vol. viii. p. 435.
[3] Baillie, ii. 88 ff.
[4] MacEwan, ii. 113.
[5] Baillie, ii. 90.
[6] *Ib.*

[1] Waristoun's *Diary*, p. 72, ed. D. Hay Fleming, for Scot. Hist. Society, Edinburgh.
[2] *Some Subscribed Copies of the Solemn League and Covenant*, privately printed, Edinburgh, 1918 (from the papers of the Edinburgh Bibliographical Society).
[3] Bishop Burnet, *Hist. of His Own Time*, London, 1724, i. 28.
[4] John Lightfoot, *Journal of the Proceedings of the Assembly of Divines* (*Works*, ed. J. R. Pitman, London, 1824, xiii. 10 *f.*).
[5] Peterkin, p. 362.
[6] *Ib.*
[7] *Ib.* p. 362.

applauded.'[1] There was on the part of many of the English dislike of the Scots and antagonism to their persistence in clinging to the letter of the Covenant. 'The Independents laughed at the Solemn League and Covenant as an old almanack.'[2] Cromwell spoke 'contumeliously against the Scots intention of coming to England to establish their Church government on which Cromwell said he would draw the sword against them.'[3] The English were so clear-sighted and the Scots so idealistic, in spite of recent experience of unfulfilled promises, that the signing of the League and Covenant was followed by an undertaking to send an army into England for which the English Parliament was to pay. This led to difficulties altogether different from the theological or ecclesiastical. Early in 1644 the Scottish army crossed the Border and materially assisted the cause of the Parliament in the north of England, especially in the battle of Marston Moor on 2nd July 1644. In less than a year came the further defeat of the Royalists at Naseby, and the English Parliamentary leaders ceased to regard the Scots as necessary for the purpose of beating Charles I. and his following. Their doctrinal impatience was intensified by their growing sense of practical freedom, and their comparative political liberty led to a neglect of their pledged word in the treaty which followed upon the League and Covenant. The Puritan leaders had accepted the Covenant and the ideal of an enlarged Presbyterianism as the condition of receiving military aid, but, as the need for the latter grew less, the price to be paid seemed indifferent, not imperative. How genuine this grievance was, and how cruel, appears from complaints made to the House of Lords and from the *Records of the Commission of the General Assembly*, where the neglect of the Scottish forces was emphasized by the serious fact that the same indifference was not shown to their English fellow-soldiers. A. F. Mitchell, who, with J. Christie, edited *The Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies* (*1646–1649*),[4] dwells upon the discouraging effects of this calculated niggardliness, and quotes from S. R. Gardiner[5] to the same purpose:

'Though the hard work thus devolved upon the Scots, nothing had been done to pay or to supply them. An assessment, indeed, had been made upon certain English counties for the support of their army, but not a penny had been raised, whilst Fairfax's troops received their pay fortnightly with the utmost regularity.'

The deliberate withholding of pay and supplies from the Scottish army was doubtless connected also with the Scottish attitude to Charles I. For not only was this exasperating in its marked divergence from the English Puritan antagonism; it could not be reconciled with the treatment which the Scottish leaders meted out to Charles himself. To satisfy them he was to become a covenanted king. Yet the feeling that he was a specially Scottish sovereign, who had a right to homage and reverent national sentiment, did not fail, although Scottish 'dourness' would make no concession which might imply failure to honour the Solemn League and Covenant. A striking illustration of this somewhat illogical but very real feeling about the king, which prevailed from the negotiations about this agreement until the death of Charles and afterwards, is found at the close of a declaration of the Scottish Parliament on 21st April 1648:

'And in particular this Kingdom of Scotland will now make it evident as they often declared, That their quietness, stability and happiness doth depend upon the safety of the kings Majesties Person and maintenance of his greatnesse and Royal Authority, who is Gods Vice-Gerent set over us for maintenance of Religion and ministration of justice; Having so many bands and ties of duty and subjection to his Majestie and his government, who is our native King, from a longer series and discent of his Royall Progenitors than can be paralleld in Europe, That we resolve constantly and closely to adhere thereunto, as also to all the ends of the Covenant.'[1]

The beginning of the end of Scottish Covenanting idealism in its first stage may be said to have appeared with special significance when the English Parliament, on 19th May 1646, voted that the Scottish army was no longer needed. This led the way to that most mischievous cleavage which separated Scottish and English Puritanism. But this was augmented by the other severances which accompanied it. The Roman Catholics could not possibly have any feeling but hostility to the champions of a Covenant which bound its defenders to extirpate the whole system of popery, which looked only to the least worthy of its representatives in the 16th cent., having no regard (to speak of Scotland alone) to men like Wardlaw, Kennedy, Elphinstone, Turnbull, and Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney, and which lived in constant suspicion of something that would rival the massacre of the Eve of St. Bartholomew. Adherents of the Church of England and of Episcopacy in Scotland were considered to be little better than papists because they tended to the same doctrines and practices, and offended Covenanters by their worldliness and political subservience. The worst blow but one came when the meditated unity and approximate uniformity disappeared before Cromwell's Independent triumph, when the chosen home of Presbyterianism and the Covenant was tyrannically governed by the arch-Independent himself. Absolutely the worst calamity emerged, although it was not seen to be such, save by clear-sighted saints like James Fraser of Brea, when Charles II. was compelled to sign the Solemn League and Covenant—which his father never would do—and when the leaders of the Covenanters accepted the signature, well knowing that it was false in fact and in spirit.

The Restoration gave victory to the men and the forces most hostile to the principles which were embodied in the Solemn League and Covenant, and, as these open and determined opponents were joined by weak and sometimes worthless and worldly-minded men who had themselves been Covenanters, the ruin of the scheme of the Solemn League and Covenant was for the time assured. Baillie pathetically records the closing disaster in May 1661:

'But when the House of Commons did not only vote the Bishops into the House of Lords, but the Solemn League and Covenant to be burnt with the hand of the hangman, all our hopes were turned in despaire.'[2]

This was the burning of the body of the Covenant. The spirit was not destructible. For a quarter of a century and more there were brave Scottish men and women who laid down their lives for the ideal which it embodied, and those who had marked only the errors and exaggerations of its defenders saw in the Revolution of 1688 a modified triumph of what had been contended for.

The Revolution Settlement was a modified triumph, but it was a triumph. Yet the glory of the Covenant, in the cloud of witnesses from 'the Killing Time,' long haunted the Scottish mind, and the influence of the age of the National Covenant and of the Solemn League and Covenant, consciously associated with that slightly later time of martyrdom, did much for the preparation of the

[1] Baillie, ii. 117.
[2] John Aiton, *The Life and Times of Alexander Henderson*, Edinburgh, 1836, p. 534.
[3] Baillie, ii. 245.
[4] 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1892–1909 (Scot. Hist. Soc., xi., xxv., lviii.).
[5] *Hist. of the Great Civil War*, *1642–49*, new ed., London, 1904–05, ii. 228.

[1] *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies* (*1648*) xi. [1892] 471.
[2] iii. 470.

Disruption of 1843, which, with some admixture of frailty and fallibility, did more for Scottish religion than any other event since the Reformation.

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted in the footnotes.

ALEXANDER LAWSON.

SOLIDARITY.—Solidarity is a bond which welds together living, especially human, beings, when they belong to the same whole or are mutually dependent upon each other. It is first of all a fact. (*a*) It is a *physiological fact.* As we advance in the scale of beings, we observe an ever more perfect co-ordination of all the parts of living organisms: primitive organisms are aggregates of relatively independent parts, while more perfect organisms are made up of parts which mutually condition each other. (*b*) It is a *social fact.* There is a bond between the child and its parents (at least between the child and its mother, since among some peoples paternity does not count), between the members of a family, a tribe, or a nation. As civilization advances, individuals, as Herbert Spencer shows, specialize and become dissimilar, but society becomes more coherent, because those specialized individuals require each other. Attempts have even been made to prove that society is an organism, similar to physical organisms, with a brain, digestive system, etc. But that is ingenious comparison rather than scientifically demonstrable truth. Not only do men of the same generation depend upon each other, but each generation depends upon those which preceded it, inherits their possessions, and profits from their labours, discoveries, struggles, and sufferings; it also suffers for their vices, mistakes, and ignorance. We owe to our ancestors the language which we speak, our customs, our religious ideas, and our artistic and scientific heritage. Besides general social solidarity, which is based on the family, nation, state, and sometimes even on larger groups, there are special solidarities—*e.g.*, that based on community of religion or profession. As a general rule, the smaller the group of men, the stronger is the bond of solidarity; but the opposite is also sometimes the case; *e.g.*, the religious bond uniting men of several nations may be stronger than the bond of national solidarity.

As is clear from what has just been said, the fact of solidarity arises both from causes which are independent of human will (this is the case especially in the natural groups) and from the voluntary action of man (*e.g.*, we create or extend a bond of solidarity by creating or extending a political or a religious organization, although the idea of establishing a new solidarity is not necessarily the predominating *motif* of these creations or extensions). In proportion as exchanges of all kinds and means of communication multiply, a bond of solidarity tends to unite the whole of humanity.

The fact of solidarity has become the starting-point of various metaphysical, theological, and moral theories.

1. Metaphysics.—One of the chief tasks of philosophy has always been to show the bond which exists between all beings, even beyond the confines of humanity. Pantheistic systems all end in a universal solidarity, since all beings are merely the manifestation of a single being, the deity. The Brāhmanic philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*, in particular, is summed up in the famous *Tat tvam asi*, 'That art thou,' which forms the foundation, adopted by Schopenhauer, of an altruistic ethic, *i.e.* in the fundamental identity of all beings.

2. Theology.—(*a*) The idea of original sin, and more particularly that of original guilt, rests on that of the solidarity of humanity with its first father. As the result of his fall, humanity has become sinful and guilty. The sin is transmitted from generation to generation as a fatal heritage. These doctrines and their history are discussed in special articles.[1] Here we shall merely observe (1) that the conception of original sin is sometimes metaphysico-physiological, as in St. Augustine, and sometimes rather juridical and moral; (2) that the way is prepared for these doctrines in the OT, where the idea of punishment inflicted on children for the faults of parents, on a people for those of its chiefs, is so prevalent that on certain occasions the prophets, especially Ezekiel, expressly attack it; this idea is also met with among a great many races; (3) that the idea of hereditary guilt is self-contradictory, but that, on the other hand, it is certain that sin is not only an individual fact, but also a collective fact, and that the sins of some are often the cause of the sins of others. The degree of guilt is to be reckoned from that of the sin, but it very often happens that habitual or present sin is imputable not so much to the one who is affected by it or who committed it as to others who, consciously or unconsciously, have determined his moral condition.

(*b*) The work of Jesus Christ has also been considered from the point of view of solidarity, not so much when it is regarded as a vicarious satisfaction (*i.e.* when emphasis is laid on the punishment of the Man-God accepted by God as the equivalent of that of all sinners) as when the idea of expiation is emphasized (*i.e.* the fact that Jesus is a member and the chief of humanity, and that, as such, He, the innocent one who had no penalty to fear, freely accepts that which sinful humanity deserved). The idea of expiation rests completely on that of the solidarity between the guilty and the innocent which makes possible the substitution of the latter for the former; and, when we say that a man is expiating his own sins, we are, in our imagination, somehow making two persons of him—a guilty man and a man who, after having admitted and regretted his sin, frees himself from it by consenting to his punishment, who freely takes upon himself the condemnation deserved by the former and blots out his mistake by sanctioning the moral law which he has violated. It is in this sense that Kant, *e.g.*, tried to rationalize the doctrine of the expiation accomplished by Jesus Christ. According to this theory, Christ became, as it were, the personification of the idea of the repentant sinner who accepts his penalty. The idea of an expiation accomplished by an innocent person for guilty ones, with whom he is connected by some kind of bond, is not specifically Christian, but Christianity has in a manner transferred it from the objective to the subjective mode, by showing that it is not the exterior fact of the suffering of an innocent one that saves the guilty, but the moral revolution that this fact produces in the heart of the latter.

3. Ethics.—The fact of solidarity has been very frequently, especially in recent times, taken as the *point d'appui* for ethical theories. Léon Bourgeois especially, in a book entitled *Solidarité*, has shown the interdependence of men in society, and the difference that exists between the distribution of the advantages which it ensures to its members and the real services rendered by one class or another to the common good. These services form between those who render them and those who receive them what in juridical language is called a quasi-contract, *i.e.* a state similar to that which results from certain contracts. The moral duty of society and its members therefore would consist, above all, in observing this quasi-contract and in paying to each the debt contracted with it. Morality, thus understood, would realize true justice and would also have the advantage of possessing a scientific character and of thus resting

[1] See artt. ORIGINAL SIN, SIN (Christian).

on a solid foundation. It may be objected to this theory that the fact alone does not create the law, and that the idea of a quasi-contract is not sufficient to produce the latter from the former. The relations between men are far too complex and unstable, their value far too much subject to discussion, to apply the idea of quasi-contract to them and to disentangle the consequences which they involve. It is impossible to triumph over all the iniquities which are included in numerous explicit contracts. Moreover, this idea of a social debt resting on a quasi-contract is much too external to become the principle of an ethic. It argues from a fact, simply as a fact, but, considered thus, it is incapable of transforming the conscience or stirring the heart. Of itself it will not prevent any one from trying to reduce his debt as much as possible, and, then, once he believes that he has paid it, allowing himself to be ruled by egoism; it at least limits as much as extends altruistic activity. Similar remarks apply to the theory of reparative justice developed by A. Fouillée in his *Science sociale contemporaine*. This philosopher insists mainly on the solidarity between the different generations of men and on the fact that this holds of the poor classes especially, because in the past they did not receive the property to which they were entitled or get the remuneration for their services which was their due. He asks, therefore, that these injustices should be redressed, but he himself recognizes the great difficulty that there is in determining the subjects of the rights which he proclaims and in determining what is due to such or such a person on account of past injustices. Thus in practice he reduces reparative justice almost to conferring the benefit of education on all, in order to put within their hands the means of rising in the social scale.

In presence of these theories we may affirm that solidarity can supply a principle of morality only if it is accompanied by a sentiment, as in the case of family or national solidarity, and to a certain extent of other solidarities also (*e.g.*, that of the members of a religious society), or if it is considered in the light of a principle of justice, it being previously understood that this principle is purely rational (*e.g.*, that of the equality of all men, from which it follows that there must be equality in their exchanges of services), or that it is a religious principle (*e.g.*, that of the love of one's neighbour for the love of God).

According to the principle which we adopt, we shall take more or less account of the fact of solidarity, and we shall consider ourselves more or less obliged to extend existing solidarities, to tighten their bonds, to obtain from them only results that are beneficial to other men, and to avoid the unfavourable consequences that might also be deduced from them in certain cases. It is only under these conditions that solidarity can pass from the state of a simple fact to that of a moral principle.

In Christian social circles the idea of solidarity is greatly insisted on as helping to persuade men to perform their duty towards the disinherited of this world. The name 'solidarities' has even been given to certain schemes which are concerned with grouping either members of a parish or all kinds of persons, rich and poor, for the purpose of mutual aid, both spiritual and material. But in these circles solidarity is regarded not as a simple social fact, but as a divine law which is specially shown forth in Jesus Christ, and that is why we are able to obtain the practical results that we do from it.

In the economic world the idea of solidarity is shown in the creation of all kinds of associations, co-operating in production, distribution, credit, etc. Some of these associations, it is true, are concerned only with the interest of the participants, and as a result they endeavour merely to create a new fact of solidarity, profitable to their members alone, not to transfer solidarity in the name of justice and love from the condition of a fact to that of a moral principle; but others endeavour to accomplish the education of their members in the sense of developing the spirit of solidarity even outside the bounds of any given association. If the principle of justice and love summons us to extend and increase the benefits of solidarity, it also summons us to suppress all its unpleasant results—*e.g.*, to wage war upon hereditary vices and diseases and get rid of all unjustified responsibilities in our laws and customs, especially in the penal law which formerly (and, in our own time, among savage races) often punished the innocent along with or for the guilty.

Solidarity is frequently contrasted with fraternity (a word which denotes merely a vague sentiment) and with charity (which implies the humiliating idea of dependence of the weak and the poor on the powerful and the rich). It is certain that the feeling of sympathy which accompanies certain facts of solidarity, and the feeling of obligation which arises from the connexion of the fact of solidarity with the principle of equal justice for all, is stronger than the general sentiment of human fraternity. As regards charity, it always retains its place alongside of solidarity, for it alone takes an interest in the unfortunates who have not the right, in certain cases at least, to invoke any solidarity, and especially the guilty ones who have disregarded it.

Perhaps, in order to avoid confusion, it would be better to keep the word 'solidarity' for the simple fact of the various bonds which unite men, and to designate the feeling which accompanies it or the principle which applies to it by the terms 'sympathy' and 'obligation,' founded on solidarity, or other equivalents.

LITERATURE.—See the sociological and moral treatises and manuals, works on Christian dogmatics, Biblical theology, and history of religions; also E. Bersier, *La Solidarité*[2], Paris, 1870; C. Secrétan, *La Philosophie de la liberté*[3], do. 1879; H. Marion, *De la Solidarité morale*, do. 1880; A. Fouillée, *La Science sociale contemporaine*, do. 1880; N. Recolin, *Solidaires*, do. 1894; R. Worms, *Organisme et société*, do. 1896; I. Izoulet, *La Cité moderne*[2], do. 1895; L. Bourgeois, *Solidarité*[7], do. 1912; C. Andler, 'Du Quasi-contrat et de M. Léon Bourgeois,' in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1897, p. 520; A. Darlu, 'Réflexions d'un philosophe sur une question du jour, la solidarité,' *ib.* p. 120, and 'Encore quelques Réflexions sur le quasi-contrat,' *ib.* 1898, p. 113. See also artt. SOCIOLOGY and ORIGINAL SIN.

E. EHRHARDT.

SOLIPSISM.—1. History of the term.—It is not known who invented the term 'solipsism' and introduced it into philosophical terminology. In 1652 an apostate Jesuit, Giulio Clemente Scotti, published under the title of *La Monarchie des Solipses* what purports to be a translation of a tract called *Monarchia Solipsorum* by one Melchior Inchofer. Crétineau-Joly[1] attributes the authorship to Scotti himself. The tract is a satire on the self-seeking policy pursued by the Jesuit order. The 'Kingdom of Self-Aloners,' *i.e.* self-seekers or egoists, is, on the model of Sir Thomas More's Utopia, described as a distant island, and an account is given of the constitution, manners, and customs of its inhabitants. The name 'solipses' is alleged to mean 'dans le langage des Magogues' the people living under the providence of many gods, the allusion being to the skill with which the Jesuits secure everywhere the favour of the powers that be. It is also punningly connected with *soleil*. Subsequently the term *solipsiste* seems to have been a current label in France for the Jesuits, with

[1] *Hist. religieuse, politique et littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 6 vols., Paris, 1844–46.

reference to their selfishness. *Solipsismus* is found for the first time in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* as the Latin *terminus technicus* for the German *Selbstsucht*. The passage runs:

'All the inclinations together (which can be reduced to a tolerable system, in which case their satisfaction is called happiness) constitute *self-regard* (*solipsismus*). This is either the *self-love* that consists in an excessive *fondness* for oneself (*philautia*), or satisfaction with oneself (*arrogantia*). The former is called particularly *selfishness*; the latter *self-conceit*.'[1]

W. T. Krug[2] follows Kant's usage in identifying solipsism with moral egoism ('making one's own self the end of all one's actions'), but gives no references. This identification is still repeated as late as 1890 by F. Kirchner.[3] Meanwhile, some time during the 19th cent., solipsism was transferred from moral or practical egoism to theoretical (either epistemological or metaphysical) egoism, *i.e.* to the theory that I can know nothing but my own ideas and that I and my ideas are all that exists. This view was called simply 'egoism' by Wolf (who treats it, rightly, as an extreme species of idealism), Mendelssohn, Tetens, and other 18th cent. writers. The distinction between practical and theoretical egoism is clearly made by Schopenhauer.[4] Reid, Hamilton, and other English writers use the terms 'egoism,' 'pan-egoism,' 'egoistical idealism' like Wolf, as did Überweg in Germany, most of them representing metaphysical egoism as the logical consequence of Berkeley's views. Who was the first to substitute 'solipsism' for 'egoism' in this metaphysical sense cannot be determined. Campbell Fraser is said to have used the term in his lectures as early as 1874–75. It certainly became current in philosophical lecture-rooms and books in the seventies and eighties in England, Germany, and France. Its first appearance in English print is in A. Barratt's *Physical Metempiric*[5] (1883), where it is used as a familiar term. In 1892 the metaphysical sense is given exclusively in Alexis Bertrand's *Lexique de philosophie*.[6] In 1893 F. H. Bradley devotes a chapter to its refutation in *Appearance and Reality*.[7] In Italian *semetipsismo* and *psiconomismo* appear as synonyms. Nowadays it is in the theoretical sense alone that the term is used among philosophers.[8]

2. Metaphysical solipsism.—To follow in detail the development of the metaphysical theory which is now called solipsism is unnecessary. Its origins have been traced to Descartes's 'Cogito ergo sum,' to Malebranche's remark, 'Les sensations pourraient subsister sans qu'il y eut aucun objet hors de nous,'[9] to Berkeley's 'Esse est percipi.' One of the earliest and most complete formulations of it may be found in Fénelon:[10]

'Non seulement tous ces corps qu'il me semble apercevoir, mais encore tous les esprits, qui me paraissent en société avec moi . . . tous ces êtres, dis-je, peuvent avoir rien de réel et n'être qu'une pure illusion qui se passe toute entière au dedans de moi seul: peut-être suis-je moi seul toute la nature.'

Modern discussions of solipsism have been needlessly embarrassed by the paradoxical habit which many philosophers have of expressing the theory in the first person plural. 'Have we any reason to believe in the existence of anything beyond our private selves?', asks Bradley, and he goes on to use such phrases as 'our private self' (*sic*). That each of us believes in the existence of other selves, and generally of a world beyond his private self, is of course a fact. But, when the *right* to that belief is challenged, as it is by the solipsist, the scales are unfairly loaded against the challenger, if the examination of his thesis is conducted in terms which assume the truth of the belief. Solipsism appeals to the individual, and the individual must argue the pros and cons out with himself, addressing no audience until he has gained the right to believe that there is an audience to address. The thesis, then, to be examined is this: I alone exist, and all I experience and know is my own self. What, on this view, becomes of the distinction between mine and thine? Will it be possible for me to distinguish, *e.g.*, between my own body and the bodies of others? Must I claim that all things are mine? that the manifold sounds I hear are all my own voice? that I am the owner of all there is? In so far as solipsism denies the reality of others, consequences such as these might be held to follow, and a quick, if somewhat painful, refutation of it might be secured by putting the theory into practice. But the point of the questions is not to secure a cheap *reductio ad absurdum*, but to bring out, for clearness' sake, the fact that the solipsistic argument is not conducted with reference to the legal and social relations between individuals. It does not move at all in the context of 'inter-subjective intercourse.' Hence the meaning which solipsism gives to the terms 'I' and 'myself' must be quite different from the sense which these terms bear in social experience. This point is most important. There are, we may say, at least two senses of the terms 'I' and 'myself.' There is, first, the sense appropriate to the experience of living as a self among other selves, of being a member of a world of selves mutually recognizing each other. This sense, and the experience on which it rests, the solipsist in effect denies by his thesis. Hence it is not in this sense that he can use the terms in stating his thesis. What, then, is this second, solipsistic, sense of 'I'?

The answer is that 'I,' 'myself,' and all similar terms, in the solipsist's mouth, can denote only what 'this,' 'here,' 'now,' and such terms denote, viz. immediate experience in its present 'that' and 'what.' They are mere demonstratives, pointing to or expressing the feelings, perceptions, thoughts, etc., which are present in me. 'In me' here does not have the force of distinguishing my feelings from yours or another's. It is only another way of saying, 'These feelings here and now.' In short, the whole and sole point of solipsism is to declare the exclusive reality of immediate experience and to deny the possibility of transcending that experience. It is nothing but an argument for immediacy and against transcendence. To affirm that 'I alone exist' thus means that 'my,' *i.e.* 'these,' present feelings, sensations, thoughts, as bare psychical facts, are all there is. To affirm that 'I can experience or know only myself' means that these present feelings do not imply, point to, mean anything other than themselves, are not a fragment of a vaster world transcending them in existence and character. It cuts down the universe to the 'this—here—now' of immediate experience. Of modern writers no one has seen this more clearly than Bradley:

'The "this" and the "mine" are names which stand for the immediacy of feeling. . . . There is no "mine" which is not "this," nor any "this" which fails, in a sense, to be "mine."'[1]

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[1] *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and other Works on the Theory of Ethics*[6], tr. T. K. Abbott, London, 1909, p. 165.

[2] *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften*[2], 5 vols., Leipzig, 1832–38.

[3] *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe*[2], Heidelberg, 1890: 'Der Solipsist handelt als ob er allein auf der Welt wäre.'

[4] *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*[3], Leipzig, 1859, i. § 19.

[5] P. 25.

[6] An unusual sense appears to be given to the term 'solipsism' by certain French philosophers referred to in Élie Blanc's *Dictionnaire de Philosophie*, Paris, 1906, who are said to oppose solipsism to monism 'pour désigner tout système qui admet un grand nombre d'êtres individuels, substantiellement distincts.' Leibniz's monadism would be solipsistic in this sense.

[7] Ch. xxi.

[8] For solipsism in the ethical sense see artt. EGOISM, SELF-LOVE.

[9] *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, vol. i. ch. i. (*Œuvres*, Paris, 1871).

[10] *Traité de l'existence de Dieu*, pt. ii. ch. i. (*Œuvres*, Paris, 1787–92, ii. 188).

[1] Ch. xix., p. 223 of 5th ed. (1908); his chapter on 'The This and the Mine' (ch. xix.) is essential to his argument against solipsism (ch. xxi.).

To deny transcendence is to deny any reality beyond the momentary thrill of experience. It is to deny past and future except as present felt acts of remembering or anticipating. It is to deny the existence of material things, of the physical world or nature, except for this moment's colours, sounds, touches, and other sense-data. These fleeting presences are all there is of 'nature'; they are not signs or glimpses of a stable, enduring, orderly world of which they are parts. It is to deny the existence of other minds or selves, *i.e.* of centres or complexes of immediate experience other than this present one which calls itself 'I.' In short, the denial of transcendence is a denial of all inference and interpretation, nay of all judgment. For every judgment, as involving a universal, transcends the 'this' in its bare givenness or immediacy.

These sweeping denials might of themselves be regarded as sufficient to discredit solipsism. Yet many writers have been content to say that solipsism, though it carries no conviction, is theoretically irrefutable, and to justify the fact that neither in theory nor in conduct does any one proceed as if solipsism were true, by appeal to an ultimate act of faith or to a venture of the will—whether rational or irrational remaining a moot point. The pragmatist certainly has an opening here to say that the venture 'works' and is 'made true' by its success.[1] Others, like Bradley, have marshalled elaborate dialectics for refutation. Bradley certainly scores a point when he argues that the solipsist has no right to say, 'Only I and my ideas exist,' or, 'The world as I know it consists only of states of my own mind,' for immediate experience contains no such division into subject and object, into an 'I' and its ideas, into a mind and its states. These formulæ already transcend the given—the one thing which the solipsist is committed not to do, if he can avoid it. The rest of Bradley's refutation boils down to variations on the theme, 'He cannot avoid it.' He cannot, because immediate experience does not stay immediate. It transcends itself. 'I' have no choice in the matter. The right to transcendence, which the solipsist challenges, is thus ultimately justified by appeal to the fact of transcendence. But, if it comes to that, had we not better at once say with Hegel: 'The "I" is thought and the universal. When I say "I," I let fall all particularity . . .'?[2] In other words, immediate experience, the solipsist's 'I' and 'self,' is always both 'that' and 'what,' both 'this' and 'such,' both particular and universal, and it is the universal in it that ever carries it beyond itself—the life in it of the whole of which it is a part.

3. Methodological solipsism.—A few present-day philosophers advocate solipsism, not as a metaphysical thesis, but as a principle of method. Bertrand Russell, arguing that physics, if it is to be a genuinely empirical science, must begin and end with sense-data, puts forward the ideal of constructing physics on a solipsistic basis. The main point, in practice, would be the exclusion of the testimony of 'others.' The only evidence admitted would be, for each physicist, his own sense-data. A similar methodological solipsism, the point of which, however, is directed, not towards the distinction between my own experience and that of others, but towards the distinction between actual phenomena and hypothetical entities assumed as causes or grounds for phenomena ('metaphysics'), has been developed by Hans Driesch. Defining logic as 'the theory of order,' he claims that it may be 'founded solipsistically,' being concerned with the ordering of what I am immediately conscious of:

'Solipsism is the only basis of philosophy that is not dogmatic; for, let it be well understood, solipsism does not say that I "exist" as a "substance" or something else, but it only analyses the fundamental pre-phenomenon: *I have something consciously*. And this is the only fact—though not a "fact" in the usual sense—that is beyond any doubt.

Solipsism, then, is *not* dogmatic, not even in a negative manner. It does *not* say: What I consciously have is *nothing but* my phenomenon. It merely says: What I consciously have is *certainly* my phenomenon—whether it "be" anything else or not.

But now, for reasons that cannot be explained here in full, the ordering Ego tries to go beyond the limits of a pure theory of order and to establish the concept of a something that "is" *not* merely in so far as it is consciously possessed or possibly possessed in some way. Thus, for reasons of order, the theory of order gives itself up and asks for metaphysics.'[1]

The methodological solipsism of Russell and Driesch concerns, thus, only the starting-point of knowledge. Both admit the necessity for transcendence, Russell in the form of 'logical constructions,' Driesch in the form of metaphysical hypotheses.

LITERATURE.—Besides the references in the text see: J. M. Baldwin, *DPhP*, *s.v.*; R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*[3], 3 vols., Berlin, 1910; C. von Wolf, *Psychologia rationalis*, Frankfort, 1734, § 38; F. Erhardt, *Metaphysik*, Leipzig, 1894, vol. i., ch. x.; M. Keibel, *Werth und Ursprung der philosophischen Transcendenz*, Berlin, 1886; R. von Schubert-Soldern, *Grundlagen einer Erkenntnisstheorie*, Leipzig, 1884, ch. iii.; T. Reid, *Works*, ed. Sir William Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1846, Notes B and C; J. S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, London, 1865, ch. x. ff.; Hans Driesch, *The History and Theory of Vitalism*, do. 1914, p. 233 ff., *Ordnungslehre*, Jena, 1912, p. 2; Bertrand Russell, 'Sense-Data and Physics,' originally published in *Scientia*, vol. xvi. no. xxxvi.-4 [1914], reprinted in *Mysticism and Logic*, New York, 1918 (see esp. p. 158).

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ.

SOLOMON ISLANDS. — This large archipelago lies in the western Pacific and consists of a long chain of islands extending from 150° 40′ in a south-easterly direction to 162° 30′ E. The larger islands are mountainous, the highest point of Guadalcanar reaching to 10,000 feet. All have a volcanic basis; the island of Bougainville in the north-west has an active volcano, and the small island of Savo was also actively volcanic when the islands were visited by the Spaniards in the 16th century. This discovery was made after crossing the Pacific in the search for the source of gold and other precious objects in early times, and the islands were named after King Solomon in the idea that they may have contributed to his wealth. Many of the individual islands, such as San Cristoval, Florida, and Ysabel, still bear the names given to them by the Spanish voyagers in the 16th century. After the discovery the islands passed out of sight until last century. In 1914 the archipelago formed a British protectorate with the exception of the islands of Bougainville and Buka, which fell within the German sphere of influence. The interior of several of the larger islands is still unexplored, but the smaller islands and most of the coastal districts are now under European influence and are the seat of large plantations, chiefly for the production of copra.

1. Somatology.—In physical character the inhabitants fall into two groups sharply divided by a line passing through Manning Strait and the Russel Islands. To the north-west of this line the people are very dark, and on the whole negroid characters are more pronounced here than to the south-east, though many natives of this region combine with excessive blackness wavy hair and noses almost of European dimensions. The difference in colour and general appearance is so pronounced that natives of the two regions can be distinguished at a glance even by the most casual observer. These physical differences on the two sides of the dividing line are accompanied by definite differences in dress, especially of the women. To the east of the line the women, if they are not completely nude, wear grass petticoats, while in Ruviana, Eddystone Island, and

[1] See art. PRAGMATISM.

[2] *Philosophy of Right*, Introd., § 4, Add. (see tr. by S. W. Dyde, London, 1896).

[1] *Problem of Individuality*, London, 1914, p. 75 f.

Vella Lavella to the west they wear a remarkable garment resembling a knapsack both in appearance and in function, but covering the buttocks instead of the shoulders. These differences in physique and dress mark out the Solomons into two distinct regions which will be spoken of in this article as the Eastern and Western Solomons respectively.

Surrounding the main islands there are a number of small outliers, such as Bellona, Rennell Island, Sikaiana, and Lord Howe's Island (or Ongtong Java), in which the people are Polynesians in physical characters, but in some cases with evident indications of Melanesian mixture.

a. Language.—In most of the islands the languages are characteristic examples of the Melanesian family with few such aberrant forms as are frequent in the Santa Cruz Islands and the New Hebrides. In a few islands, such as Savo, Vella Lavella, and some parts of Bougainville, the languages belong to a wholly different family. They differ widely not only from those of the Melanesian stock, but also from one another. In certain respects, such as the position of the genitive, they resemble the non-Melanesian languages of New Guinea and have in consequence been assigned to the Papuan family. The people who speak these Papuan languages do not differ appreciably in physical character or general culture from their neighbours who speak languages of the Melanesian family. These exceptional languages are generally regarded as survivals of such an early linguistic diversity as is still present in New Guinea. It is supposed that these early languages have in all but a few islands been replaced by languages belonging to the general Austronesian stock and that the languages so introduced have taken on the form characteristic of the Melanesian family.

In the small outliers in which the people resemble the Polynesians in physique the language is also Polynesian in character.

3. Social organization.—The special form of social system in which the community is divided into two exogamous moieties with matrilineal descent occurs at each end of the group, in San Cristoval and at the northern end of Bougainville. In San Cristoval the dual organization occurs in the central part of the island. It is believed that the people of the moieties differ in physical and mental characters, and there is a definite tradition of hostility between the two. One of the moieties is held to be superior to the other; its members may not be enslaved or beaten, or subjected to other indignities, and its name is Atawa, which means 'seafarer' or 'foreigner.' These differences provide definite confirmation of the view that the dual system has arisen out of the fusion between two peoples. There is evidence that the dual system was once universal over the whole of the Eastern Solomons, but there is no sign of its presence in the Western Solomons until one comes to the northern end of Bougainville, where it occurs again in its characteristic form and closely related to the similar organizations of New Britain and New Ireland.[1]

The totemic form of social organization is more widely distributed. In San Cristoval it occurs in Santa Anna and Santa Catalina at the eastern end of the island and again at the western end, but with the striking difference that the totems of the eastern islands are mainly aquatic, while the western totems are almost exclusively birds. In each case descent within the clan is matrilineal. There are similar matrilineal clans in Ulawa, though with one or two exceptions they have no names and no totems. In Florida, Ysabel, and the western end of Guadalcanar the totemism is less definite. There are matrilineal clans each of which is connected with certain animals, often birds, but these animals are grouped with other sacred objects under the term *tindalo, tindadho,* or *tinda'o,* which is also the term for the ghost of a dead ancestor. In Ruviana, Eddystone Island, and Vella Lavella there is no trace of totemic organization, but this is found again in the Shortland Islands and Bougainville, where the totems are universally birds, and here again descent is matrilineal.

[1] *ERE* ix. 336.

A third form of social organization occurs in Ruviana, Eddystone Island, and Vella Lavella, and probably in parts at least of Choiseul. Here there is no form of clan organization, but the social organization is founded on kinship or genealogical relationship.[1] In Eddystone Island a man calls all those with whom he can trace relationship his *taviti,* and it is this relationship by which marriage is regulated, a man not being allowed to marry any woman to whom he is related through either father or mother. The *taviti* of different persons form groups which overlap, and there is nothing which corresponds accurately to the descent of the dual and clan organizations.

In San Cristoval there is a remarkable form of adoption in which a boy is adopted, not as a son, but as a father, a mother's brother, or a grandfather, while a girl may be adopted as a mother or a grandmother. A child so adopted assumes the name and status of the person whose place he takes, the motive assigned for the practice being to 'keep green' the memory of a deceased person. By this process of adoption a child comes to be called father or grandfather, and it is possible that this practice accounts for certain peculiarities of the nomenclature of relationship, such as the use of a common term for the elder brother and the son's son, which elsewhere have been explained by peculiar forms of marriage.[2] These anomalous marriages, such as that with the wife of the father's father, however, occur in San Cristoval, and probably form, as in other parts of Melanesia, the starting-point of the peculiarities of relationship.

Definite hereditary chieftainship is general in the Solomons, with patrilineal succession, even where descent is matrilineal.[3] The concept of 'chief' has been much modified by European influence owing to officials expecting chiefs to take an important part in government. In their original state this seems to have been largely foreign to the ideas of the people, the main functions of chiefs being to see that ceremonies were properly carried out and that duly abundant feasts were provided on these occasions. In recent times certain chiefs, especially in Ruviana, have acquired great authority and have extended this beyond the confines of their own island or district, and it may be that these were examples of a native tendency to extend the functions of a chief to other spheres than the religious, but in most cases these functions have almost certainly been due, directly or indirectly, to external influence. In Eddystone Island chiefs and men who had taken ten heads in warfare were allowed to have a second wife.

An organization called *Matambala,* similar to the *Sukwe* and *Mangge* of the New Hebrides,[4] is known to have been present in Florida in the Eastern Solomons fifty years ago, but it appears to have been in process of degeneration and soon disappeared under European influence. There is no trace of the presence of such organizations in New Georgia, the Shortland Islands, or southern Bougainville, but they reappear as the *Rukruk,* allied to the *Dukduk* of New Britain,[5] in the northern part of Bougainville, and occur here in conjunction with the dual form of social organization. In Santa Anna the members of different totemic clans may not eat food cooked at one fire—a rule which in other parts of Melanesia holds good of the grades of the *Sukwe* and *Mangge.*

4. Religion.—This has an elaborate character in

[1] *ERE* vii. 700.
[2] *Ib.* viii. 426.
[3] *Ib.* viii. 853.
[4] *Ib.* ix. 353[b].
[5] *Ib.* ix. 336[b].

which rites take place in connexion with sacred beings of many different kinds. These beings fall into two main classes: (1) the ghosts of the dead and (2) spirits which are not known to have had human form. These two classes are definitely distinguished in nomenclature, though the native classification so formed does not always correspond with the distinction between ghosts and spirits.

(1) Of the two cults that of ghosts lies more on the surface and takes the more important place in the lives of the people. In general the ghosts who form the object of the religious rites are those of near relatives of the person by whom or on whose behalf the rites are performed, but occasionally certain ghosts have become the object of a general cult. Thus in San Cristoval a ghost named Harumae is propitiated by the slaughter of a pig when the people are going to war. In Eddystone Island many of the *tomate*, or ghosts, are those of men long dead whose names are uttered in the prayers and other formulas, and these are probably the men who originally introduced the rite and those who succeeded them in the knowledge of the ritual. In this island offerings to ghosts take place in connexion with most of the events of life—the firstfruits of both gardens and nutting, the first catch of bonito, the building of canoes and houses, the healing of disease — at various stages of war, and in connexion with many other ordinary events. The more important rites are known only to a few men, and this knowledge forms a kind of property which is communicated to another only on the payment of money. In the Shortland Islands offerings with formulas expressing appeal are made to the ghosts of the dead on several occasions, including a feast of firstfruits at the beginning of the nut season, the making of a new meeting-house, and the occurrence of sickness. When the offerings are made to dead kinsfolk, any person may officiate, but on important occasions the chief should carry out the ceremony.

The religious rites usually take place at special shrines. In the Western Solomons offerings of firstfruits, etc., are made at shrines containing the skulls of dead relatives. In Eddystone Island these are usually in the form of half a miniature house, divided longitudinally along the roof-ridge, and are made sometimes of stone, sometimes of the usual materials of the house. In Ruviana they often have human or animal forms, and receptacles of skulls made in the form of animals occur in other parts of the Solomons. The offerings at these shrines usually consist of puddings made of yam, taro, nuts, etc. In some cases these puddings are hung up at the shrine, while in others they are burnt. In Eddystone Island there are also shrines of a different kind consisting of heaps of stones including one which stands upright like a miniature monolith. It is especially at these shrines that prayers are uttered which contain the names of men long dead, and it is possible that these shrines are the burial-places of some of the men whose names are thus preserved in the ritual.

(2) Concerning the cult of the spirits which are distinguished from ghosts we have information only from two localities, San Cristoval and Eddystone Island. In the former the non-human spirits are called *figona*, *higona*, or *hi'ona*. Pools, rocks, waterfalls, large trees, or any places which excite awe are thought to be the abode of *figona*, but these are not seen and are not the object of any special cult, though it is believed that the *figona* can take captive human souls and thus produce illness. The *figona* which take an important place in the religion have the form of snakes. C. E. Fox has recently discovered that the being who forms the object of a special esoteric cult in Ulawa, Hatoibwai, is a winged serpent. These *figona* can become stones, and sacred stones are especially associated with them. Prayers are offered to the *figona* to restore health to a sick man, to give rain in a drought, and to increase the crops. One of the serpent *figona*, Agunua, is more important than the rest. Agunua is believed to have created all things. An annual ceremony occurs when nuts are first gathered and yams dug in which offerings of firstfruits are made to Agunua at a sacred grove, various symbolic rites being performed in order that such arts as house-building, mat-making, and wood-felling may be blessed by the *figona*. The most frequent offerings are puddings made of yam or nuts, which are partly burnt, partly eaten by the participants in the rites. Pigs are also offered and occasionally a human sacrifice.

The people of Eddystone Island believe in the existence of several kinds of sacred beings which are distinguished from the *tomate*, or ghosts. The most important of these are the *tamasa*, of whom there are two main kinds—the *tamasa vuvua*, who have to do especially with crops, and the *tamasa vambule*, who are concerned with the weather. These beings made man and the land, brought in new rites and inventions, and are still believed to make the crops grow and to control the weather. They are generally associated with special localities, and at each of these there is an ancient tree-stump, called *rengge*, with worn-away branches on which arm-rings and other offerings hang. The most important of these *tamasa* is Vanavana, or the *tamasa* of Momara. He created man without any organs and with legs which would not bend, and called in a being styled *tuturu* to make hands, feet, eyes, mouth, nose, and genital organs with a stone implement. At present this *tamasa* is believed to live underground and cause earthquakes. The next *tamasa* in order of importance, a female, has her seat at Nyatuloki. The crocodile, shark, and centipede are sacred to her. She is a *tamasa vambule* and produces the north-west wind. Several of the *tamasa* are connected with animals, and a number of animals such as the shark, crocodile, sting-ray, sea-snake, and various species of ant are sometimes spoken of as 'little *tamasa*' or 'children of *tamasa*.'

The *tamasa* of Eddystone are especially connected with the district of Narovo, the home of the bush-people of the island, and most, if not all, of them are reputed to have come originally from Ruviana. They exert less influence on the lives of the people than the *tomate*, but they are much revered and their rites are elaborate.

The chief of these is the *votu tamasa*, which is performed at irregular intervals, especially when the crops fail. The people go to Momara with offerings of arm-rings and food, among which a special kind of banana is essential; they sing and wail, and, as they approach the spot, call out the names of all the plants which are used as food. Rings are hung on the *rengge* and the people feast. The *tamasa* is asked by means of the ring method of divination[1] what has made him angry and led him to interfere with the food-supply. The ritual has several special features. Whenever food or other objects pass from one person to another they must be thrown; nuts must be wrung off the bunch and not pulled, and the coco-nuts used must be carefully lowered from the tree and not allowed to fall. The officiants, called *iama*, are men specially consecrated by being rubbed with certain leaves and nuts.

The association of the *tamasa* with definite localities suggests that, though they are not in general known by the people to have been human, they are the representatives of men who introduced certain arts, such as agriculture and the knowledge of rites to control the weather. One *tamasa*, Magoana, was certainly a man, his thigh-bones being still preserved, and the human nature of the *tamasa* is supported by evidence from Vella Lavella, where beings evidently equivalent to the

[1] See below, § 7.

tamasa are called *mbangara*, the Eddystone word for 'chief.'

Most of the *tamasa vambule* are sharks; it is their function to make calm weather and also to protect men from being drowned or eaten by sharks. The rites are of various kinds; in one the officiant ties the stem of a plant round a leaf taken from the shrine of the *tamasa*, walks into the sea with arms extended, and bales water as if in a canoe, uttering a prayer that the sea shall be still.

In many of the formulas the names of beings are mentioned who are known as *tomate-tamasa*. They are said to stop at the skull-shrines and were certainly once living men. There is little doubt that they are the ghosts either of the men who introduced the *tamasa*-cult or of men of a later time who were especially skilled in the knowledge of its rites.

It may be noted that there are several points of resemblance between the *tamasa* of Eddystone and the *figona* of San Cristoval. Both care for agriculture and the weather, but, while the *figona* are chiefly snakes, the snake is only one of many animals associated with the *tamasa*. There is some evidence of the association of the *tamasa*, and especially of the weather-*tamasa*, with morality. The *tamasa* of Momara twists the limbs of an adulterer. All the weather-*tamasa* are angered by adultery and, by raising a storm, break the canoes of the offenders, whom they eat.

In Vella Lavella, where the beings corresponding with the *tamasa* are called *mbangara*, those connected with the weather seem to be the more important, and offerings are regularly made to them when the people go on the sea. The *tamasa vuvua* of Eddystone are also represented and seem to be especially connected with the cultivation of taro. Sharks are *mbangara*, or are connected with *mbangara*, but there is no evidence that other animals are so regarded.

Another sacred being of Eddystone Island whose cult is also found in Vella Lavella is Mateana. This being is associated with the meteor, shooting-star, and rainbow, and is believed to carry a spear by means of which disease or death is inflicted on any who come in its way. Mateana has come to be associated, probably by a secondary process, with the institution of tabu.[1] In some cases the injury it inflicts follows the infraction of this tabu, but disease or death is also ascribed to chance encounters with the spirit. In Vella Lavella Mateana is propitiated by offerings on the top of the house.

A somewhat similar being of Eddystone is called Sea, which is much feared and seems to be a personification of some form of wandering light which is regarded as dangerous. Sea is believed to carry a club, the old weapon of the island, in place of the spear of Mateana, and probably represents an indigenous belief, while the cult of Mateana is of more recent introduction.

Another disease-producing agency, distinguished from both the *tamasa* and *tomate*, is Ave, to whose activity epidemic colds, and possibly influenza, are ascribed. Ave is associated to some extent with shooting-stars and the rainbow, but is quite distinct from Mateana. When an epidemic ascribed to Ave visits the island, the natives attempt to ban it by sending out to sea an imitation canoe which is believed to carry away the evil influence. There was some doubt whether Mateana and Ave are individual spirits or names for classes of spirits. The *kita*-spirits, which are believed to produce a wasting disease accompanied by sores, are certainly a class. Certain men are believed to have the power of inciting the *kita* to action. After ascertaining by means of the arm-ring method of divination whether the *kita* are willing to act, they perform rites with prayer that the victim shall exhibit the wasting, sores, or other symptoms of the disease.

[1] See below, § 5.

Two other classes of spirits are associated with the bush: (1) the *tuturu*, or mad spirits, supposed to inhabit the bush, where they live upon fruits and nuts, are believed to drive insane any person who falls into their power; they seem to be to a large extent the ghosts of men or women who, having become insane, have fled into the bush and died there; the original nature of the *tuturu* belief is doubtful, but that these beings are believed to have formerly taken an important place in the spiritual world of the island is suggested by the part assigned to a *tuturu* in the legend of the creation of man;[1] (2) the *tomate munggomunggo*, or ghosts of the bush, of which one called Tambukoma is especially malignant, include the ghosts of people who have suffered violent death in certain ways, as by falling from trees, and of women who have died in child-birth; it is possible that they also include the ghosts of the indigenous bush-people of the island, though it is more probable that these are represented by the *tuturu*.

Similar beings of the bush are found in San Cristoval, where they are classed with the ghosts as *ataro hasimou*. The people of this island believe in similar malevolent ghosts called *adaro ni matawa*, beings of the sea, half-human and half-fish, who shoot men with flying fish. It is possible that these are the ghosts of men who have been drowned at sea or whose bodies have been cast into the sea after death.

Throughout the Solomons there is a belief in another class of malevolent being which assumes the guise of a person of the sex opposite to that of the human being it encounters. If the latter succumbs to temptation, his or her fall is followed in a few days by death. These beings are called *ataro here* in San Cristoval, *anggemate* in Eddystone Island, and *sanggemate* in Vella Lavella.

5. **Tabu and medicine.**—In Eddystone Island, and probably in other parts of the Solomons, the relation between religion and medicine is very close. In Eddystone nearly all forms of disease are ascribed to the intervention of ghosts or other spiritual beings such as Mateana, Ave, or Tambukoma. In some cases it is believed that disease comes because the victim has accidentally intruded into the haunts of the disease-bearing spirit, but the cause to which illness is most often ascribed is the breaking of a tabu placed upon the fruit of certain trees, and especially upon the coco-nut, the areca-nut, and the betel-vine. A large number of diseases are recognized, each of which is connected with a special kind of tabu, and there is a more or less definite relation between the rites by which the tabu is imposed or removed and those by which the leech cures the illness which results from its infraction. The ritual connected with each tabu is known only to a small group of men, or it may be to only a single man; and, if this knowledge is imparted to another, the rites will be efficacious only if money is given at the time, the novice acquiring his new powers only through the payment of money. As a rule knowledge of the rites by which the tabu is imposed or removed is acquired at the same time as that of the rites designed to cure the disease associated with the tabu. When trees are tabued, a sign distinctive of the tabu in question is placed on or by the trees. This usually consists of certain leaves and creepers, but it may also include stones, shells, fungi, a branch of a tree made in the form of a bow, etc., the leaves or other objects being usually in sets of four. When the sign is set up, a prayer, often of considerable length, is uttered which in many cases includes the names of men, sharks, or other beings through whose agency the tabu is thus made effective. The tabu is removed by a

[1] See above, p. 682b.

rite of a simpler kind in which the tabu-sign is usually stroked with certain leaves, these movements with the accompanying formula being designed to remove from the sign the spiritual influence to which the efficacy of the tabu is due. Another kind of rite is carried out when it is desired to use the fruit of a tree protected by a tabu.

When a person falls ill, it is necessary first to discover the nature of the disease, and, if the symptoms do not make this obvious, the cause may be ascertained by the ring method of divination. Usually a number of diagnoses are made, each followed by the appropriate remedies. If it is diagnosed that a tabu of a certain kind has been broken, a man who knows the tabu carries out the appropriate treatment. This is of various kinds, the most frequent measures being to stroke or rub the body or limbs with certain leaves, usually four in number, and to spit chewed roots or tubers over the patient. The leaves used in the treatment are afterwards worn by the patient, usually suspended from a creeper round the neck. Creepers are often placed over one or other shoulder of the patient and of other people present, and similar creepers may be worn as armlets or anklets. In all cases prayers are uttered desiring that the sick man may be made well, the words used often indicating a belief in the presence of some influence within the sufferer which it is the object of the rites to expel. Usually the rites extend over four days, on the third of which nothing is done by the leech, this day being left in order to give the *tomate* or other spiritual beings an opportunity for action. Some forms of treatment should be carried out only during the waning of the moon, and in these cases the treatment is usually carried out in four successive months. When a cure has been effected, an offering is made of puddings, usually four in number. These may be burnt or put in the thatch of the house, and pieces of another pudding may be eaten by both patient and leech.

In some cases the tabu and associated treatment are connected with a shrine, but it does not appear that any ceremony connected with the tabu is performed at the shrine, though rites of other kinds may take place there.

When disease is ascribed to the agency of other spiritual beings the curative rites are much like those which follow the breaking of a tabu, the motive in most cases being the expulsion from the body of some spiritual agent by which the sufferer is possessed.

The breaking of a tabu corresponds with what we should ordinarily call theft, and there is little doubt that the institution of tabu came into being in Eddystone as a means of protecting property. There is thus in this case a definite relation between religion and morality.

6. Head-hunting.—The practice of head-hunting, which exists in Ruviana, Eddystone Island, Vella Lavella, Choiseul, and the Shortland Islands, is closely connected with the skull-cult and with the cult of ghosts. A head-hunting expedition is accompanied throughout by rites of a religious kind which begin a year or more before a proposed expedition in connexion with the new canoes which are made for the occasion. Various talismans and amulets are placed in the canoes during the expedition, and formulas are uttered and other rites performed which have definite reference to the cult of ghosts. Similar rites accompany the return of an expedition. This is followed at intervals by ceremonial dances which seem to have a definite religious character. The heads which are taken in the expedition are placed in a house constructed in a special manner, but, after they are so disposed, they are not the object of any special rites. Captives are also taken in the head-hunting expeditions. When brought to the island, these captives are adopted into families, of which they are treated as members. They may marry native women and have children. In Vella Lavella they may even become chiefs, but they are always liable to be killed to supply heads when these are needed. These *pinausu*, as they are called, are also chosen to take the leading part in certain ceremonies which are believed to be accompanied by danger, as when it is necessary in the construction of a new skull-house that the skulls shall be touched by human hands in being transferred to their new resting-place. The heads are needed at the building of a new house or a new canoe, and their use is almost certainly the survival of a former practice of human sacrifice.

7. Divination.—Divination for various purposes is practised by two chief methods. (1) In one the diviner holds an arm-ring in his hand and puts questions to the ghosts, who give an affirmative answer by movements of the arm which carry the ring round and round in a circle. This method of divination is especially frequent in religious rites, and it is by this means that those with special knowledge of disease discover what tabu has been broken or the nature of any other act by which a ghost or spirit has been offended. Before performing a rite designed either to produce or to cure an illness, the officiant will ascertain by means of the arm-ring whether the being by whose power the disease has been produced is willing to cause or cure the sickness. (2) The other method is by swaying movements of a canoe. Thus, if anything goes wrong on a head-hunting expedition, the canoe stops and its crew put questions to it, taking the swaying of the vessel to indicate an affirmative answer. It is believed that these movements are produced by a shark, crocodile, or octopus, and in Eddystone Island by a special octopus called Ngganggai. In this island these animals are *tamasa*, and there is some reason to connect this form of divination with the *tamasa vambule*, the beings by which the weather is controlled. These two kinds of divination almost certainly depend on the occurrence of movements produced without any witting intention on the part of the holder of the ring or the occupants of the canoe. They are of the same order as the automatic movements of the table-turner or the dowser.

8. Disposal of the dead.—There are many different methods of treating the bodies of the dead, over twenty varieties having been noted by C. E. Fox in San Cristoval alone. At the western end of this island, in the district of bird-totemism, the leading practice is cremation, the other chief method being to preserve the body in the house, the bones being collected when the flesh has disappeared. In other cases the body is exposed on a platform or on a rock. In San Cristoval and other islands at this end of the Solomons the body of a chief is placed in a canoe or food-bowl and buried in a square or oblong mound, called *heo*, 50 ft. or more in length. The dead body is placed in a cavity on the top of the mound, and sometimes this cavity is closed except for a shaft leading from the exterior of the mound. Sometimes there is a dolmen on the top of the mound, under which at a later stage the bones are placed. On the mound there is often a small statue of coral or stone, into which the 'soul' of the dead man is believed to go. Behind the head of these images there is an object like a pig-tail going down to the seat on which the image is represented as sitting.

Cremation and preservation of the body occur also at the eastern end of Malaita, where the body of an important man may be kept in the house enclosed either in a canoe or in a model of the sword-fish. In Florida inhumation with later disinterment of the skull is general, while in Savo this method is used only for chiefs, the bodies of the common people being thrown into the sea. In Eddystone, Ruviana, and Vella Lavella the usual method is to expose the body on a rock or small island till the skull can be removed and placed in one of the shrines already described. If a man so desires, his body can be thrown into the sea. In the Shortland Islands the bodies

of ordinary people are either interred or thrown into the sea, while those of chiefs are cremated, and this is the habitual practice in the district of Buin in Bougainville. In both places the bones are collected from the ashes. In the Shortland Islands they are thrown into water, each totemic clan having its own site for the purpose, and it is believed that they are swallowed by fishes or other animals. In other cases the bones are interred, and this is the habitual practice in Buin. In Choiseul the body is either burnt or treated as in Eddystone, the practice of this island being said to have come from Choiseul.

The beliefs concerning the nature of the soul and of the existence after death vary much in different islands. The people of San Cristoval believe in two kinds of soul which in one part of the island are called *aunga* and *adaro*, the former being compared with the shadow from the sun and the latter with the reflexion from water. When a man dies the *aunga* leaves the body either at the fontanelle or by the mouth and goes to a distant place called Rodomana, of which the people have but a vague idea. The *adaro*, on the other hand, remains for some time with the body and then goes either into the jaw-bone or into a sacred stone, or, in the case of the chiefly clan, into the stone statue which is put upon the funeral mound (*heo*). In Florida the soul, called *tarunga* in life, leaves the body at death and becomes a *tindalo*, or ghost. In Eddystone Island the soul is called *ghalaghala*. It leaves the body at death, soon after which a ceremony is performed in which it is caught and put under the ridge-pole of the house. Soon after this another ceremony is performed in connexion with which the ghost is believed to go to a cave near the highest point of the island. On the eighteenth day after death the *ghalaghala* is transferred by means of another ceremony to the shrine in which the skull is kept, and still later the *ghalaghala*, now called a *tomate*, or ghost, goes to the home of the dead called Sonto, which is located in the island of Bougainville. In Vella Lavella it is believed that the ghost, here called *njiolo*, goes to the cave in Eddystone Island which furnishes a temporary resort for the *ghalaghala* of that island. In the Shortland Islands the soul, called *nunu*, is identified with both the shadow and the reflexion. When a man dies, the *nunu* becomes a *nitu*, or ghost, and goes to a place in Bougainville which is the site of a volcano. There it recovers from the effect of cremation, and with restored body returns to its own island, where it dwells in a special district. In some cases this is a place where the bones are buried after cremation. The soul in Buin is called *ura*, a word which also denotes the shadow, the reflexion, and a dream. The *ura* leaves a man when he is ill and flies in the form of a bird to the under world, where there is a tree the leaves of which represent human lives. If the soul-bird plucks the leaf representing the man whose body it has left, this man dies and the soul-bird stays in the under world. This home of the dead of Buin is the same volcano which is the temporary home of the dead of the Shortland Islands.

In all cases the life in the world of the dead differs little from that of the living. The ghosts eat, drink, dance, marry, and have children, and in some cases it is believed that they die. The nature of the life after death seems to be in no way influenced by the kind of life the man has lived, though it may be influenced by ceremonial omissions. Thus, if a man of the Shortlands had nothing burnt with him at his cremation, he would have no present to give to a being who meets him on the way to the home of the dead in Bougainville, and either he would fail to reach the place or his arrival would be delayed.

In several parts of the Solomons it is believed that pigs and inanimate objects have souls. When an object is burnt or broken at the funeral rites it is believed that the soul of the object goes with the deceased to the home of the dead.

9. **Magic.**—Malignant magic is less prominent than in the more southerly parts of Melanesia. In Eddystone Island, where it is called *mba*, the power of bringing disease or death by this means is ascribed to a few men and women who are also known as *mba*. They act by obtaining a portion of the food of their victim, which is then enveloped in a covering and called *penupenu*. This is kept in the clothing of the sorcerer or placed in the hot air of one of the fumaroles of the island, the motive in each case being to keep the *penupenu* warm and thus assist the occurrence of fever. When a person falls ill and it is suspected that he is suffering from the action of *mba*, the worker of the magic is discovered by divination with an arm-ring, and formerly the person indicated was slung by one arm in a tree till he confessed and revealed where the *penupenu* was to be found. Now the magic parcel is discovered by certain men who are believed to act through friendly spirits known as *tomate kuri*. These spirits know how to find the object by which the disease is being maintained in activity. It is believed that the malignant influence of the object once connected with the victim is due to the action of a spirit, which is almost certainly the ghost of a former *mba*. This variety of magic, which in many other parts of the world is supposed to depend on some virtue inherent in the magical ritual, is here ascribed to a spiritual agency, and this kind of agency is even more definitely involved in the process by which the illness so produced is cured. In the same island the injurious power of the evil eye is also ascribed to certain men and women called *njiama*, who have the power of flying from place to place and produce by means of their look a disease accompanied by bleeding from the throat which is nearly always fatal. Here again the power of the *njiama* is ascribed to the agency of a *tomate njiama*, or ghost of a dead possessor of the evil eye.

LITERATURE.—H. B. Guppy, *The Solomon Islands and their Natives*, London, 1887; A. Penny, *Ten Years in Melanesia*, do. 1887; C. M. Woodford, *A Naturalist among the Head-Hunters*, do. 1890; R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891; Carl Ribbe, *Zwei Jahre unter den Kannibalen der Salomo-Inseln*, Dresden-Blasewitz, 1903; G. C. Wheeler, *ARW* xv. [1912] 24, 321, xvii. [1914] 64; R. Thurnwald, *Forschungen auf den Salomo-Inseln und dem Bismarck-Archipel*, i. and iii., Berlin, 1912; W. H. R. Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1914; C. E. Fox and F. H. Drew, 'Beliefs and Tales of San Cristoval (Solomon Islands),' *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 131, 187; C. E. Fox, 'Social Organisation in San Cristoval (Solomon Islands),' *JRAI* xlix. [1919] 94.

The facts concerning Eddystone Island are drawn from unpublished material of the Percy Sladen Trust Expedition to the Solomon Islands by A. M. Hocart and the present writer.

W. H. R. RIVERS.

SOMA.—*Soma*, an intoxicating plant of N.W. India which was pressed (Skr. *su*, 'press,' *soma*, 'the pressing') and allowed to ferment, is supposed to be the *Asclepias acida* or *Sarcostemma viminale*, 'the expressed juice of which produces a peculiarly astringent, narcotic, and intoxicating effect.' As such it was regarded as a divine power, and, as in Mexico and Peru the *octli* and similar intoxicating plants were deified, so in India and in Persia the *soma*, identical with the Zarathushtrian *haoma*, was regarded as a god. Whether in later times the plant called *soma* was really the same as the Vedic *soma*, and whether this in turn was actually one with the *haoma* of the Avesta and the ὅμωμι mentioned by Plutarch,[1] is questionable. It may be that the names (indubitably identical) were retained when substitutes for the plant were used. We know that in the later period a 'substitute plant' was used in the Hindu *soma*-ritual, and the plant called *haoma* by the Zoroastrians was not the *soma* of the later cult. But originally both names and plants were the same. As early as the *Sāmaveda* it was recognized that there was a white as well as a yellow *soma*, and the latter is said in the *Rigveda*[2] to grow upon Mt. Mūjavat, where it is fostered by the storm-god. The eagle, on the other hand, is said to have brought it 'from the sky.'[3] It was mixed with water, milk, butter (*ghī*), and barley, and offered to the gods. It was at first drunk not only by the gods and the priests but also by other Aryans, and perhaps by all. Later, as the cult became more regulated, only the three upper castes were permitted to drink

[1] *De Is. et Osir.* 46. [2] x. 34. 1.
[3] *Rigveda*, ix. 86. 24.

soma, withal only as a religious ceremony, while *surā*, a rice-brandy, became the popular intoxicant. So important was the *soma*-cult that one whole book (bk. ix.) of the *Rigveda* is devoted to hymns in its honour. It is called the soul of the sacrifice and the delight of gods and men. It strengthens the weak, inspires the poet, prolongs life, and gives divine power to the gods. Especially is Indra (the god of strength and battle) the enjoyer of *soma*, which (or who) is regarded as his inspirer and friend. As god, Soma, like Indra, frees from danger and conquers foes, and brings wealth to the Aryan from sky and earth and air.[1]

'Soma is addressed in the highest strains of adulation and veneration; all powers belong to him; all blessings are besought of him.'[2]

Even the juice, as it filters through the sieve for purification, is addressed in terms of divine worship. Besides the ninth book of the *Rigveda* and hymns found also in other books, the *Sāmaveda* is devoted to its praise. From the descriptions it is evident that it was the yellow *soma*-plant that was used by the Vedic priests; this also is the colour of the Persian *haoma*. In the (much later) medical treatises no fewer than 24 varieties of the plant (then called) *soma* are mentioned.

Before the end of the *Rigveda* period this yellow plant (which was plucked by moonlight and bathed in water and milk, and which also had the property of 'swelling' as it was thus 'purified') became esoterically identified with the yellow, swelling, and water-cleansed moon, and in some of the latest hymns of the *Rigveda* there is no question that *soma* means the moon. From this time onward *soma* was thus used in two senses, either of the divine plant or of the moon-god, until, as in the epics, unless expressly the plant, the word *soma* means the moon. It is the moon-god as Soma who is portrayed in the *Mahābhārata* as a great warrior-god, ancestor of a race of heroes, etc. There is, however, even in this later period, the consciousness that *soma* is both plant and moon; it is no longer an esoteric doctrine, but one generally recognized; and in some mysterious way the 'moon-plant' is both moon and plant. The divine power of the Vedic Soma, who also is a war-god, made this identification easy. It has even been urged that, in the earliest period, Soma was already the moon. This is the contention of Alfred Hillebrandt, who, in the first volume of his *Vedische Mythologie*, has presented the thesis with great ingenuity. In this volume will be found the most complete analysis of the position and character of the Vedic *soma*, both as a plant (the different ways of fermentation are here described) and as the moon-god. Yet it does not seem to be proved by this treatise that Soma was at first the moon. The Iranian conception is distinctly that of a plant alone, and in most of the Vedic passages the conception is also that of a plant, albeit a divine power. The wild hyperbole of Vedic utterance permits many expressions which appear to be impossible when used of a plant, but some even of these are not applicable to the moon. Thus it is said that Soma gives the sun his light,[3] and it is not necessary to infer from this or other extravagant phrases that Soma is the moon. Soma is also said to create all things, which applies to neither plant nor moon, but is only one of innumerable lauds given to sundry gods, any one of whom at any time may be called creator, preserver, light-giver, etc., as the henotheistic poet is inspired to wilder flights of praise. Hillebrandt's main thesis, that 'everywhere in the Rig-Veda Soma means the moon,'[4] is itself an exaggeration, which he has not hesitated to carry to its logical conclusion and so predicates a lunar Haoma in the Avesta. In the *Rigveda* the prevailing thought is that the plant *soma* as an intoxicant stimulates Indra, the war-god, to slay enemies, human and divine, and, as stimulator, Soma himself may be said to be the 'foe-killer.' In one hymn Indra explains that he has drunk *soma* and is thereby nerved to do great deeds in a semi-intoxicated condition. This *soma* is the 'sharp-horned bull' (which Hillebrandt interprets as 'horned' moon), as it is said: 'Like a bull with sharp horns is thy brewed drink, O Indra,'[1] and the reason for the simile is given as 'because it bellows,' alluding to the roaring flood of juice pouring noisily into the vat. A further argument against Hillebrandt's interpretation is that the ancient name for moon (*mās*, identical with *μήν*, *mēs*) is never applied to Soma. The allusion in *Rigveda*, x. 85. 3, to 'the Soma known to the priests, whereof no one eats' implies that the esoteric interpretation, to which allusion has been made, has finally in this late hymn identified plant and moon. The late *Atharvaveda* also speaks of 'the god Soma who, they say, is the moon.'[2] This is in line with the gradual mystical tendency which appears fully developed in the *Brāhmaṇas*. It is also analogous to the mystic character of the vine-worship or Dionysiac cult of Greece. Euripides says of Dionysos: 'Born a god he is poured out in libations to gods; through him men receive good.'[3] So Soma is poured out to god, being himself a god, and he gives goods and cures woes, as Dionysos in the same passage is said to be the 'cure (*φάρμακον*) for all woes.' 'We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal,'[4] says the Vedic worshipper, who 'knows the gods'—much like a Greek mystic.

The later moon-Soma is fabled to have married 33 (later 27) daughters of the creator-god Prajāpati (later Daksha) and to have roused the jealousy of the others by excessive devotion to one of them called Rohiṇī. The others went back to their father, who permitted Soma to take them again only on condition that he associated equally with them all. He agreed, but broke his promise, and hence was punished with a waning sickness or consumption, which causes the moon to diminish every month. This fable of the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*[5] is popular in all later literature. The 'wives' are the signs of the lunar zodiac. As moon, Soma in the epics and *Purāṇas* is 'lord of stars and planets, of priests and plants, of sacrifices and of devotions.'[6] In this later mythology Soma is son of Atri or of Dharma, or is produced from the ocean-churning. His great exploit was the rape of Tārā, wife of Bṛhaspati, which caused the war of the gods described at length in the epics and *Purāṇas* and constantly alluded to in classical literature. According to these later legends, it was the son born of this intrigue who as Budha, *i.e.* the planet Mercury, became the ancestor of the lunar race and so, eventually, of Kṛṣṇa. The later moon-mythology gives Soma several new names or titles, the best known of which are 'crest of Śiva' (Śiva carries on his brow the crescent moon), 'hare-marked' (the Hindus see a hare in the moon), and 'lord of the lotuses.' The moon-Soma is represented as drawn in a three-wheeled chariot by ten white horses.

See also art. HAOMA.

LITERATURA. — The chief literature is contained in several notable articles of which the content is now available in the books mentioned below. It will be necessary to refer only to the masterly artt. of F. Windischmann, 'Ueber den Somacultus der Arier,' in *Abhandlungen Münch. Akademie*, iv. [1846]; and R. Roth, in *ZDMG* xxxv. [1881] 681, xxxviii. [1884] 134. The subject is treated at length by A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische*

1 *Rigveda*, i. 91. 7 and ix. *passim*.
2 W. D. Whitney, *JAOS* iii. [1853] 299 f.
3 *Rigveda*, vi. 44. 23.
4 Pp. 340, 450.

1 *Rigveda*, x. 86. 15.
2 xi. 6. 7.
3 *Bacchæ*, 272 f.
4 *Rigveda*, viii. 48. 3.
5 ii. 3, 5.
6 *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. xxii.

Mythologie, Breslau, 1891–1902, i., 'Soma'; and very fully (with copious extracts from preceding literature) by J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1858–72, ii. 469, v. 258. For the Vedic Soma, A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Stuttgart, 1897; and, for Soma in the epics, E. W. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, do. 1915 (both in *GIAP*), may be consulted; also Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, London, 1896, p. 112 *f.* (with preceding literature, p. 579), where, as in Muir, some of the hymns to Soma are translated and a fuller discussion may be found.

E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

SOMALIS.—See ABYSSINIA, HAMITES AND E. AFRICA.

SOMNĀTH, PATAN SOMNĀTH.—Somnāth (Skr. *Somanātha*, 'lord of *soma*' [*q.v.*], the famous sacred plant[1]), an ancient town in the State of Junāgarh, Kāthiāwār, Bombay (lat. 20° 53′ N., long. 70° 28′ E.), is noted as the site of the famous temple of Somnāth, the scene of the destruction of the Yādava tribe in an internecine struggle, and of the death of Kṛṣṇa, who seems to have been in this place the object of a cult independent of that of the hero of Mathurā.[2] Little is known of the famous temple before its destruction by Maḥmūd of Ghaznī (A.D. 1024–26).

According to Khondamīr in the *Habību-s-siyār*, 'Somnāt was placed in an idol-temple upon the shore of the sea. The ignorant Hindus, when smitten with fear, assemble in his temple, and on those nights more than 100,000 men come into it. From the extremities of kingdoms, they bring offerings to that temple, and 10,000 cultivated villages are set apart for the expenses of the keepers thereof. So many exquisite jewels were found there, that a tenth part thereof could not be contained entirely in the treasury of any king. Two thousand Brahmans were always occupied in prayer round about the temple. A gold chain weighing 200 *mans*, on which bells were fixed, hung from a corner of that temple, and they rang them at appointed hours, so that by the noise thereof the Brahmans might know the time for prayer. Three hundred musicians and 500 dancing slave-girls were the servants of that temple, and all the necessaries of life were provided for them from the offerings and bequests for pious usages.'[3]

'Sultān Maḥmūd, having entered into the idol-temple, beheld an excessively long and broad room, insomuch that fifty-six pillars had been made to support the roof. Somnāt was an idol cut out of stone, whose height was five yards, of which three yards were visible and two yards were concealed in the ground. Yamīnu-d-daula, having broken the idol with his own hand, ordered that they should pack up pieces of the stone, take them to Ghaznīn, and throw them in the threshold of the Jāmi' Masjid [cathedral mosque].'[4]

The common tale that the 'idol,' when broken, was found to be hollow and stuffed with diamonds and other precious stones is obviously a fable; it was really a *liṅga*, or symbol of Śiva, and such stones are never hollowed in this way.[5] The present ruined temple was built by Komārapāla in A.D. 1169, and was the second reconstruction of the temple destroyed by Maḥmūd.[6]

Another legend told that Maḥmūd carried off to Ghaznī the carved gates of the temple. At the close of the Afghān war of 1842 Lord Ellenborough, the governor-general, directed that these gates should be brought to India, and he addressed a pompous proclamation to the chiefs announcing that 'the insult of eight hundred years had been avenged.' The gates are now deposited in a room in the Zanāna court-yard of the Agra Fort. They clearly have no connexion with Somnāth, being made of Ghaznī *deodār* pinewood, bearing no resemblance to Hindu work, and being decorated with an Arabic inscription relating to the family of Subuktigīn, ruler of Ghaznī (A.D. 977–997).[7]

[1] For the discussion on the identification of the plant see G. Watt, *Dict. of the Economic Products of India*, Calcutta and London, 1889–93, iii. 246 ff.; on the post-Vedic application of the name to the moon see A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (*GIAP* III. i.), Strassburg, 1897, p. 112 ff.

[2] J. Kennedy, 'The Child Krishna, Christianity, and the Gujars,' *JRAS*, Oct. 1907, p. 951 ff.

[3] H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India as told by its own Historians*, London, 1867–77, iv. 181.

[4] *Ib.* iv. 182 *f.*

[5] M. Elphinstone, *Hist. of India*[6], London, 1874, p. 336.

[6] *Progress Report of the Arch. Survey of W. India, 1898–99*, Calcutta, 1899, p. 8.

[7] *Archæological Report, 1903–04*, Calcutta, 1904, p. 17; E. B. Havell, *Handbook to Agra*, London, 1904, p. 62 *f.*

LITERATURE.—Besides the authorities quoted above, see various accounts of the place: *IGI* xxiii. [1908] 74 *f.*; *BG* viii. [1884] 607 ff.; *The Ain-i-Akbarí*, tr. H. Blochman and H. S. Jarrett. Calcutta, 1873–94, ii. 246 *f.*; H. Yule, *The Book of Marco Polo*[3], London, 1903, ii. 400 *f.*; J. Tod, *Travels in Western India*, do. 1839, p. 328 ff.

W. CROOKE.

SOOTHSAYING. — See DIVINATION, PROPHECY.

SOPHISTS.—The sophists with whom this article deals are the paid teachers who undertook to prepare young men, by lectures or private tuition, for a public career in the city-states of Greece. Such were Protagoras and Isocrates (*qq.v.*).

1. Lives and writings.—It should always be borne in mind that the writings, save a few fragments, are lost and the sophists themselves for the most part known by the testimony of their opponents. **Prodicus** of Ceos, a countryman of the poets Simonides and Bacchylides,[1] frequently visited Athens. We read of one occasion when his speech before the Athenian senate (presumably as the envoy of Iulis, the township in Ceos to which he belonged) won great admiration, while his public lectures attracted the young and brought him large sums in fees.[2] There are allusions to the scale of payment, which ranged from half a drachma to fifty drachmas.[3] In order probably that his pupil might acquire a good prose style, Prodicus laid great stress on the accurate use of terms[4] and the careful discrimination of synonyms.[5] That his distinctions were not always logical is clear from the criticisms of Aristotle[6] and of Alexander of Aphrodisias.[7] But, besides grammar and rhetoric, he also gave instruction in ethics. One of his works, the *Horæ*, as we know from the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 361, contained a famous apologue, which is referred to by Plato[8] and happily preserved to us in substance by Xenophon.[9] Pleasure and virtue personified appear to the young Hercules, urging their conflicting claims on his allegiance until he decides to forgo the allurements of ease and follow the toilsome path of duty. From this it appears that Prodicus upheld the orthodox Greek morality of his day, as enforced by the poets.[10] Remarks of Prodicus on the right use of wealth are quoted in the dialogue *Eryxias*.[11] But the author of the *Axiochus* is probably mistaken when he puts into the mouth of Prodicus the well-known Epicurean maxim that 'death is nothing to us, since it does not concern the living and the dead no longer exist.'[12] From Aristophanes' *Birds*, 692, and the scholiast *ad loc.*, it may be inferred that Prodicus had somewhere sketched a cosmogony, though of its contents we are ignorant. In *Clouds*, 360, he is called a *μετεωροσοφιστής*, a term which there seems the counterpart of *φυσιολόγος* as used by Aristotle of the Ionians and other early physicists. Like them, he certainly wrote a work *περὶ φύσεως*,[13] of which Galen has preserved a single fragment dealing with human physiology.[14] Of his views on religion we know a little more. Philodemus the Epicurean,[15] in agreement with Cicero,[16] Sextus,[17]

[1] Plato, *Protagoras*, 339 E.
[2] Plato, *Hippias Major*, 282 C.
[3] Plato, *Axiochus*, 366 C, *Cratylus*, 384 B; Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 14, 1415 *b* 15.
[4] Marcellinus, *Vit. Thuc.* 36.
[5] Plato, *Prot.* 337 A–C, 340 A, B, *Meno*, 75 E, *Euthyd.* 277 E, *Laches*, 197 B, D, *Charmides*, 163 A, B, D.
[6] *Top.* ii. 6, 112 *b* 22. [7] *Comm. in Top.* 181. 2.
[8] *Symp.* 177 B. [9] *Mem.* II. i. 21–34.
[10] Cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 285 ff.; Plato, *Phædo*, 68 D ff., *Rep.* ii. 363 A ff.
[11] 395 E, 396 E, 397 D. [12] 369 B, C.
[13] Galen, *de Elementis* (*Opera Omnia*, ed. C. G. Kühn, Leipzig, 1821–33, i. 487).
[14] *De Virt. Physic.* ii. 9, iii. 195 (G. Helmreich).
[15] *De Piet.* ch. 9. 7, p. 75 *b*.
[16] *De Nat. Deorum*, i. 42 (118); cf. i. 15 (38).
[17] *Adv. Math.* ix. 18, 52.

and Themistius,[1] names Prodicus as the first to base an explanation of religious rites and belief in the gods on a definite rationalistic theory. It would seem, Prodicus thought, that those natural objects which benefit us and sustain life were conceived as deities—sun and moon, rivers and springs, fields and fruits of the earth, fire and water, corn and wine. Most religious rites would then be closely connected with agriculture. This theory was more than once restated, notably by the Stoic Persæus.

Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, a pupil of the Sicilian Empedocles, holds a very important place in the development of Greek prose style and forensic rhetoric.[2] He wrote a treatise on *Nature or the Non-Existent*, which in the manner of the Eleatic Zeno proved up to the hilt (1) that nothing exists; (2) that, if anything existed, it could not be known or conceived by man; (3) that, if anything existed and were known, it could not be divulged to another. Of this *tour de force* we have a detailed account in the treatise *De Xenophane, de Zenone, de Gorgia* (as it is wrongly entitled) in the Aristotelian Corpus[3] besides an abstract in Sextus Empiricus.[4] Despite this scepticism, Gorgias seems to have adopted and extended his master's hypothesis of perception by means of 'pores' or channels.[5] In ethics he upheld a plurality of virtues, which are differently developed under different conditions of age and sex.[6] However, unlike other sophists, Gorgias did not undertake to teach virtue,[7] but rhetoric, which he declared to be the first and most indispensable of all arts.[8] Yet his admission[9] that the art of persuasion deals with right and wrong, the just and the unjust, shows that some recognition of moral judgments, some outline, at least, of ethical theory, is required from the orator.[10] In the famous discussion with Socrates on the question whether it is better to suffer than to do wrong Gorgias stands aside: it is his pupil, the light-minded Polus of Agrigentum—'colt by name and colt by nature'—who is the opponent of Socrates. To Polus the prosperous career of the usurper Archelaus seems enviable, for have not his crimes brought him power, with its attendant wealth and fame?[11]

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon is another sophist who devoted himself to teaching rhetoric. His writings were confined, so far as we know, to speeches and an important treatise on the Art (*ἡ μεγάλη τέχνη*). In this direction his services were conspicuous. Critics were disposed to attribute to him rather than to Isocrates the introduction of the intermediate or mixed style, which eventually superseded both the high-flown and the bald.[12] We are told that he was rash and combative in argument, as his name suggests,[13] and this may be the reason why Plato chose him in the first book of the *Republic* to play an arrogant and offensive part in support of the definition of justice as the interest of the stronger.[14] A literary artist like Plato was not likely to miss the opening afforded by such a definition, with which we may well credit the historical Thrasymachus. But, as the dialogue proceeds, Thrasymachus becomes tamed, and at last we hear with no great surprise that Socrates and Thrasymachus have never been enemies and are now very good friends.[1] In this connexion it should not be forgotten that we have a very different sentiment cited from a speech of Thrasymachus:

'The gods take no notice of human affairs; otherwise they would not have overlooked justice, which we see every day violated.'[2]

The spirit of this utterance is that of the book of Job. A specimen of his style is preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[3]

Hippias of Elis, like Prodicus and Gorgias, travelled about Greece, acquiring wealth and celebrity by giving lectures and taking pupils.[4] As Prodicus represented Iulis at Athens, so Hippias seems to have been the political agent of Elis at Sparta.[5] His accomplishments were varied; besides arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, he was versed in poetry, music, mythology, philology, and history. To historians of mathematics he is known as the discoverer of a curve, called after him 'the *quadratix* of Hippias.'[6] Further, he acquired no mean skill in manual arts, if, as we are told, he appeared at Olympia with every article that he wore made by his own hands,[7] even to the signet-ring, which he had himself engraved, and the curry-comb and oil-flask of his own manufacture. He is also said to have invented a mnemonic system. That he was a learned antiquary is attested by his writings, of which the register of Olympic victors (*Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγραφή*) was perhaps the most important. His mode of instructing his pupils is criticized as too nearly akin to the curriculum of schoolboys.[8] As he claimed to be at home in all the learning of the age, he sought to popularize different branches of it, but the instruction so given must often have been superficial. By Xenophon[9] and by Plato (or whoever wrote the two dialogues *Hippias Major* and *Hippias Minor*) he is represented as discussing with Socrates such subjects as justice, beauty, and the peculiar Socratic thesis that injustice when voluntary is better than when involuntary. Hippias is made to appear conceited and ridiculous, but the opinions he defends—sometimes against quibbling or downright fallacy—in no way diverge from those approved by popular Greek morality.

There is little ground for supposing **Critias** the sophist to be any other than the Athenian politician who took part in the revolution of the Four Hundred and was chief of the Thirty Tyrants—that extreme oligarchical faction which, after the fall of Athens in 404 B.C., attempted to extirpate democracy by a reign of terror. It is not easy to imagine this ruthless doctrinaire giving lessons, but he certainly was a prolific writer both of verse and of prose. In the play entitled *Sisyphus*, probably by him, though some authors refer it to Euripides,[10] one of the characters sets forth speculations on the origin of the belief in the gods. The lines quoted by Sextus Empiricus[11] describe how in the beginning men lived a mere animal life without law and order; how, to prevent violence and oppression, severe penalties were enforced; but, as these could only check open crime, secret wrong-doing went unpunished until some man, shrewder than his fellows, thought to discourage

1 *Or.* 30, ed. W. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1832, p. 422.
2 See R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators*, London, 1876, i. p. cxxiii ff.; F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*[2], Leipzig, 1887, i. 47–91.
3 979 *a* 11–998 *b* 21.
4 *Adv. Math.* vii. 65 ff.
5 *Meno*, 76 A–E; Theophrastus, *de Igne*, § 73.
6 Plato, *Meno*, 71 D ff.; Aristotle, *Politics*, i. 13, 1260 *a* 27.
7 Plato, *Meno*, 95 B, C.
8 *Philebus*, 58 A, C, *Gorgias*, 449 A, 456 B ff.
9 *Gorgias*, 454 C.
10 *Ib.* 456 C, 460 A f., 482 C.
11 *Ib.* 470 D ff.
12 Dion. Hal. *Judicium Demosthenis*, 3
13 Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 23, 1400 *b* 19
14 *Rep.* i. 338 C ff.

1 *Rep.* vi. 498 C.
2 Hermias, *In Platonis Phædrum Scholia*, ed. P. Couvreur, Paris, 1901, p. 239, 21.
3 *Loc. cit.*
4 Plato, *Apol.* 19 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 281 A ff., 282 D ff., 286 A.
5 *Hipp. Maj.* 281 A, B.
6 P. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*, Paris, 1887, p. 247; T. L. Heath, *Euclid's Elements*, Cambridge, 1908, i. 266.
7 *Hipp. Min.* 368.
8 Plato, *Prot.* 318 D, E.
9 *Mem.* iv. iv. 5 ff.
10 Aët. i. vii. 2 (Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin, 1879, p 298); cf. Athenæus, xi. 496 B.
11 *Adv. Math.* ix. 54.

it by proclaiming the existence of mighty and immortal beings, who see all that is hidden and hear all that is said in secret. In order to heighten the dread of them, he placed their abode in the sky, whence came the terrible thunderbolt and the beneficent rain.

These are the more eminent among the older sophists, whom we know from our chief authority, Plato. There were, however, some whom he does not mention by name, as **Xeniades** of Corinth, who, according to Sextus,[1] taught thorough-going scepticism. On the other hand, **Antiphon** the sophist, who was not the same person as Antiphon the orator,[2] was constructive, even dogmatic, and his claim to rank as a philosopher is not disputed by Philodemus the Epicurean, *εἴτ' οὖν ῥητορικὸς εἴτε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἠβούλετ' εἶναι*.[3] He was obviously interested in and familiar with the physical inquiries of his predecessors. He wrote a work *On Truth* in two books, the one dealing with first principles, the other with physics and anthropology. This work, if we may judge by citations of single words in Harpocration and Pollux, must have been widely read and studied. From the first book a few fragmentary utterances are cited:

'For the Word or Logos all is one. Once understand this, and you will know that for the Word nothing exists singly either of the things seen by the farthest reach of the eye or of thoughts conceived by the farthest stretch of the mind.'

'Hence it needs nothing and accepts not anything of any, but is infinite and self-sufficient.'

'The mind leads the body in the direction of health and disease, or whatever else it may be.'

Time he held to be 'a conception or measure, not a real substance.'[4] His proposal for the quadrature of the circle is criticized by Aristotle,[5] by Simplicius, *ad loc.*,[6] and by Themistius.[7] In the second book he dealt with the sun, moon, eclipses, the saltness of the sea, and other physical phenomena.

The sun he described as 'fire traversing the moist air which encircles the earth, setting when it leaves the air enkindled, rising to renew the attack when the air has again grown damp.'[8]

In spite of Anaxagoras, he adhered to the old view that the moon shone by her own light, being put out by the approach of the sun, because a stronger fire tends to put out a weaker one, and in like manner the other stars are obscured by the sun.[9] Samples of his style are furnished by Stobæus.[10] Of his ethics we can only judge by fragments of a treatise *On Concord*, which emphasize the importance of education and marriage, or point a moral against injustice and cowardice.

The anonymous sophist whom we know from Iamblichus[11] resembles Antiphon (with whom some would identify him) in his treatment of ethical and social questions. He, too, insists on the need of training to supplement natural endowment. Only by practice, begun early and long continued, can men become virtuous or successful, or acquire fair fame. The same advantages become good or evil according as they are used well or ill. Every man should practise especially two forms of self-control: (1) his honesty should be proof against bribes; (2) his courage should not shrink even from the sacrifice of life for his country. A truly good man seeks reputation, not by external distinctions, but by his own goodness. We must not think obedience to the laws cowardly or the use of might for aggression something valiant and noble. Men cannot live in isolation; they must come together in society if they are to get even a bare living; nor will this suffice if there be lawlessness, which entails worse evils than life in isolation. Hence it follows of necessity that law and right are the bonds of civil society. Imagine a superman, invulnerable in body, exempt from disease and suffering, of iron will, who might be supposed competent to use his strength for aggression and defy the laws with impunity; still, even he, if there were such an one, which is impossible, would be safe only so long as he upheld the laws; for the rest of mankind, given discipline in their superior numbers, could by force or fraud overcome him. The writer sets forth at length the contrast between the blessings of an orderly government—the confidence and security which it affords when men have leisure to attend to their private concerns and are free from alarm of civil strife or foreign war—and the opposite evils which come in the train of lawlessness. It is in such a state of anarchy and disorder that the tyrant or usurper springs up.

The fragmentary treatise entitled *Twofold Arguments* (*δισσοὶ λόγοι*) has been called a specimen of early eristic, but is rather a storehouse of special topics, Aristotle's *εἴδη*,[1] suitable for controversy, whichever side the orator or disputant may take. It cannot have been the show-piece (*ἐπίδειξις*) of a wandering sophist, but, as Diels says, a formal school-lecture to his pupils by one settled in a town where the dialect spoken was Doric; and it follows from i. 8 that its date is about 400 B.C.[2]

The method is to take certain pairs, good and bad, fair and foul, right and wrong, true and false, and argue in the case of each pair: first, that there is not any absolute distinction between its two members; and then, again, that there is, the conclusion in the latter case being generally reached by *reductio ad absurdum*. Thus the famous antithesis of nature and convention is presented in several distinct forms. The next theme so treated is that there is no difference in the conduct of the sane and the insane, the wise and the foolish; the next, that wisdom and virtue cannot be taught, because (*a*) one cannot impart a thing to another and keep it himself; (*b*) if they were teachable, there would be a recognized class of teachers of wisdom and virtue, as of music; (*c*) again, the sages of old would have made their sons wise, which is not the case; (*d*) many pupils of professed sophists have got no good by their instruction; (*e*) many have become eminent who never studied under sophists. Against (*a*) we can appeal to experience; schoolmasters and teachers of the lyre do both impart their special knowledge and retain it; (*b*) we answer that there is a special class of teachers, the so-called sophists; as to (*c*), there is the case of Polyclitus, who taught his own son to be a statuary; as to (*d*) and (*e*), the instances are admitted, but the inference is irrelevant. There is such a thing as natural endowment, *φύσις*, and, if one has enough of this, he can dispense with education. I do not say, adds the author, that virtue and wisdom can be taught, but the proofs alleged to the contrary do not satisfy me. Other arguments follow against the institution of the lot (arguments in its favour are wanting) and in support of the position that the best theorist is also the best practitioner of any art. Here negative arguments are wanting.

Of sophists eminent as dialecticians **Euthydemus** and **Dionysodorus** are familiar figures through Plato's dialogue named after the former. There were also **Bryson** of the Pontic Heraclea, a circle-squarer like Antiphon, whose pupil **Polyxenus** was asserted by Phanias to have been the author of the 'third man' argument against the theory of ideas,[3] and **Lycophron**, who held that law, so far from directly promoting civic virtue, was merely a guarantee to citizens of their mutual rights, *ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων*,[4] and denied the reality of the distinction between the noble and the low-born.[5] Of rhetoricians besides **Theodorus** of Byzantium, **Evenus** of Paros, and **Licymnius** of Sicily, all three mentioned in Plato's *Phædrus*,[6] there was the Athenian **Polycrates**, whose pamphlet *The Indictment of Socrates* was written at least six years after the death of the latter, since it referred

1 *Adv. Math.* vii. 53.
2 Suidas, *s.v.*; Hermogenes, *de Ideis*, ii. 11. 7.
3 *De Poëm.* col. 187. 3 (*Voluminum Herculanensium*, Collectio altera, Naples, 1862–76, vi.).
4 Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[3], 80 B, frags. 1. 10, 2. 9.
5 *Phys. A.* i. 185 *a* 14; cf. *Soph. El.* 11. 172 *a* 7.
6 *In Phys.* 54. 12. 7 *Phys.* 4. 2.
8 Diels, *Doxographi*, 351. 9 *Ib.* 358.
10 *Florilegium*, III. xvi. 30, lxviii. 37, xx. 66.
11 *Protrepticus*, ch. 20.

1 *Rhet.* i. 2, 1358 *a* 31.
2 *Frag. der Vorsokratiker*[3], ii. pt. 1, p. 635 note.
3 *Ap.* Alex. Aphrod. in *Arist. Metaph.* i. 9, p. 84, line 16.
4 Aristotle, *Politics*, iii. 9, 1280 *b* 10.
5 Aristotle, frag. 82, 1490 *a* 10.
6 266 E ff.

to events of 393 B.C.[1] **Alcidamas** of Elæa in Æolis in his Messenian oration advanced the thesis that God and nature have left all men free, whence it would follow that slavery is unnatural and indefensible.[2]

2. Doctrine; general estimate.—In the history of popular education the sophists themselves mark an epoch. Before their time the schools taught music and gymnastics, reading and writing, but, except for the severe military training at Sparta or the peculiar discipline of Pythagorean brotherhoods in S. Italy, there was nothing beyond—no means of acquiring general culture. The recognition of the need for liberal studies and the effort, however unsystematic, to supply that need were the first-fruits of the age of aspiration and enlightenment which followed the Persian wars, when, under the leadership of Athens, literature and art blossomed anew. Among the diverse methods adopted by individual initiative the chief was the oral lecture (for which a fee was charged) on some topic of importance or interest, the theme being sometimes chosen by the audience. Under such conditions the lecturer was not only bound to be a good speaker, in order to attract hearers; he also needed much skill and practice in replying to questions and taking part in any discussion at the close. The lectures were often on language or diction or the interpretation of the poets or other matters closely connected with literature. The pupils of a Protagoras or a Prodicus were thus taught by precept and example to admire literary excellence and form a prose style of their own. In other words, they received an elementary, but indispensable, grounding in the humanities. When we reflect that the period from Gorgias to Isocrates saw the gradual fashioning and perfecting of prose, whether written or spoken, and that the names of Tisias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus[3] mark definite stages in this process of evolution, we may fairly estimate the services of the sophists to literature as second only to their services to education. For the rest, there was a continuous change of programme, owing to the necessity of arousing interest by novelties. At different times four varieties of instruction may be distinguished. The literary and political essays of Protagoras made way for forensic rhetoric, which Gorgias brought from Sicily in 427 B.C. on his first visit to Athens, where its theory and practice became firmly established. Eristic, again, or the art of controversy, though it dates back to the Eleatic Zeno, came into prominence later than rhetoric, largely under the influence of Socrates and his disciples. Lastly in 392 B.C. arose the school of Isocrates, who, while he specially taught political rhetoric and the principles of politics, imparted to a wider circle a more comprehensive culture, not limited to any single professional routine, avoiding barren subtleties and technicalities. Some such reaction was advisable after the over-specialization which had gone on in forensic rhetoric and eristic, if the sophists were to free themselves from the charge that their whole stock-in-trade consisted of oratorical tricks and logical fallacies, with which their pupils might impose upon a jury or entrap an unwary disputant. It is not strange that great influence was exerted at the outset by teachers who awakened intellectual interests and worked upon the native Greek passion for excelling (*αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων*). In the 'art of words' they could offer their pupils an incomparable weapon for use in public debate or private discussion. But grammar and rhetoric were the sole studies which owed much of permanent value to the sophists. Elsewhere, as will be seen, preoccupation with the popular and the practical unfitted them for the work of original thinkers.

(*a*) *Ethics and politics.*—Quite apart from the absurdity of postulating for the sophists in common a distinctive ethical doctrine, as if the members of a whole profession ever agreed on controversial questions, or as if the rest shared the views of Lycophron on nobility or those of Alcidamas on slavery, there is little evidence that the sophists, as such, specially interested themselves in scientific ethics. For one thing, their ignorance of psychology was profound and is adduced as the cause of their errors in the theory and practice of rhetoric.[1] The opinions on morality cited as coming from them cannot always be credited to individual sophists as thinkers; they may be put forward by them as litigants or disputants. Then, again, other views have been ascribed to the sophists upon inference only; *e.g.*, their conception of the end of human action (it might be maintained) was success (*οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν*), but this is vague, unless we know what use is to be made of success. The undertaking to teach virtue implies, it may be said, a definite view of education, as the process by which information is imparted, just as liquid is poured into an empty jar, and not, in Plato's words, as 'the turning round of the soul's eye to the light.' It also implies the conception of virtue as something teachable, which may be thought to resolve it into a sort of knowledge. Here, again, no general conclusions are warranted, for Gorgias did not teach virtue, and Isocrates decided that it could not be taught. The apologue of Prodicus recommends the virtues or, rather, courage and temperance as means to an end, and on utilitarian grounds. Neither Prodicus nor Protagoras could define virtue itself, or any of the virtues, in a way to satisfy dialecticians like Socrates and Plato, who for that reason pronounced both to be ignorant of virtue; this was the cardinal defect of their ethical opinions. What havoc it worked can best be seen if we consider justice. How could the common good be reconciled with individual interest? The myth of Protagoras[2] rightly makes this virtue (*αἰδὼς καὶ δίκη*) to be insensibly imparted in a civilized state by the interaction of individuals living in society, growing up to obey the laws and gradually recognizing in them the voice of the State. Such views are quite in harmony with Greek tradition, which derived morality from law and law from nature or God or the divine legislator. This harmony is rudely broken by the maxim 'Man the measure,' by the divergence between the code of one state and that of its neighbours, and by the conflict of human and divine law which Sophocles had emphasized.[3] Protagoras, however, still adheres to his position[4] that the State is the ultimate authority from which the citizen derives his views of morality, holding that to be just which the law at a given time and place ordains to be just; but there is this reservation introduced, that it is no longer absolute justice, but merely relative justice, which different states from time to time lay down in shifting ordinances. Although this is a lame defence, such inquiries, whether of a Protagoras or of a Machiavelli, deal with real problems, which must be faced. If the source of law, and therefore of morality, is not divine, it follows that it is merely human; then ought men to follow the example of Hippias and refuse obedience to all but the unwritten laws of nature?[5] Polus, Thrasymachus, and Callicles—the last not a sophist, but a politician and a pupil of sophists—like the author of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, made great play with the antithesis of

[1] Diog. Laert. ii. 38 f.
[2] Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 13, 1373 *b* 18, and schol. *ad loc.*
[3] Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 34, 183 *b* 29.

[1] Plato, *Phædrus*, 270 D ff.
[2] *Prot.* 320 D ff.
[3] *Antigone*, 450 ff.
[4] *Theæt.* 167 C ff.
[5] Xen. *Mem.* IV iv. 19.

the natural and the conventional (or the legal, *νόμῳ*). It shocked the Greek mind to be told that institutions hallowed by old associations had merely a conventional value, and that the immutable alone was natural. If the rules of existing society are merely conventional, it may fairly be argued that obedience to them is a slave's part; the able and intelligent, the masterful and vigorous, will rise in revolt and disregard them. Therefore Polus admires the tyrant Archelaus; Critias and others plotted the overthrow of the demos at Athens; for, the constitution being part of the laws, if might makes right, a claim to rightful rule rests upon force. Or the same result can be reached in another way, by considering the effects of a revolution which has put an oligarchy or a tyrant in power. The laws will no longer be fetters imposed by the multitude on the powerful individual, nature's born ruler; they will be laid down by such a ruler for a community where he has gained the upper hand, and thus again we arrive at the definition, 'Justice is the interest of the stronger.'[1] Between these two lies the opinion formulated by Glaucon[2] of a social compact based on the recognition that all men desire to do injustice, which is good, but fear to suffer injustice, which is evil: hence the compromise of positive laws which forbid both the doing and the suffering of wrong. Lycophron, as mentioned above, also restricted the province of law to the same narrow function of guaranteeing mutual rights. When a similar problem is presented by Anonymus Iamblichi,[3] he, unlike Polus or Thrasymachus, decides that the unprincipled adventurer will be thwarted in the long run, provided the State be well-ordered and the citizens loyal. Before we condemn the sophists for corrupting youth, it will be well to remember that the doctrine that might makes right was publicly advocated by Athenian politicians and orators in the Peloponnesian War, whether the tyrant city[4] was punishing revolt at Mytilene,[5] threatening neutral Melos,[6] or justifying an aggressive policy in Sicily.[7] In short, Plato is right when in a famous passage[8] he declares that it is not individual sophists, but that arch-sophist, the public at large, that corrupts youth. For the sentiments engendered as men sit side by side in the assembly, the law-courts, or the theatre—forces against which reason is powerless—may not be, as Protagoras supposed, relatively true and right, but absolutely erroneous and dangerous. Now the discourse of Protagoras, as reported by Plato, and the fragments of Antiphon and of Anonymus Iamblichi rather suggest that these sophists in handling commonplaces presented popular morals, wherever possible, as modified by the progressive spirit of the age; *e.g.*, the deterrent purpose of legal penalties is recognized by Diodotus,[9] as well as by Protagoras,[10] and the panegyric on orderly government (*εὐνομία*) of Anonymus Iamblichi partly covers the same ground as the Funeral Oration of Pericles.[11] In such moral harangues it was the lecturer's or writer's interest to keep an eye on his clientèle, the parents and guardians, relatives and friends, of his scholars, and not wantonly to offend their susceptibilities.

(*b*) *Philosophy and religion.*—If sophists were not scientific moralists, far less were they logicians or metaphysicians. Preceding philosophers—Ionians, Pythagoreans, Eleatics, or pluralists—had their crude theories of physics and ontology, with which the older sophists appear to have been acquainted. At any rate, the treatises of Prodicus and Gorgias on nature (*περὶ φύσεως*), and the explanations of celestial and physical phenomena—motions of sun and moon, eclipses, hail, the saltness of the sea (which are cited from Antiphon's treatise *περὶ ἀληθείας*)—as well as the more famous incursion of Protagoras into the domain of epistemology, prove that these authors were not disinclined to pursue such studies, or, at least, as receptive rather than original thinkers, to advertise the discoveries of others. Possibly, if such a demand had been made by their pupils, they would have taught physics. This impression is strengthened by the prominent place which burlesque of physical investigations takes in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, where the typical sophist, Socrates, swings in a basket for the better observation of things celestial (*ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον*) and directs experiments to measure exactly the length of a flea's jump. From the time when this play appeared (423 B.C.), or even earlier, the study of physics declined. The Socrates of the *Phædo* says that in his youth he was acquainted with speculations, some of which we recognize as those of Alcmæon, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Diogenes of Apollonia, but that he had long since ceased to be interested in them. Presumably contemporary sophists would have made much the same admission. If anything can be predicated of the sophists as a whole, it is that their bent was not theoretical but practical. The name they bore, when we examine its history, confirms this. Before it became specialized to designate the class of paid teachers, it had been used (by Pindar, the tragedians, and Herodotus) in a wider sense, but exclusively applied to practical men, whose wisdom had been tested by experience. To the wise bards Homer and Hesiod, to artists or experts in any department, from cooks and diviners to musicians and generals, not only to Pythagoras, Thales, and Solon, but to those shrewd men of affairs, statesmen or rulers, who were known in Greece as the Seven Sages, such as Pittacus or Periander, the name *σοφιστής* was thus given. There is one point, however, where the practical teacher and the original thinker were thoroughly at one, viz. their attitude to religion. From the time of Heraclitus and Xenophanes all philosophical systems had broken with the popular creeds and the legends which offended the moral standard of the time. In the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, as Plato calls it, the sophists were on the side of the philosophers. Protagoras was an agnostic, unable to decide whether there are gods or no, and, if there are, what is their nature. Yet Hippias, according to Xenophon's report, believed the gods to be the authors of the unwritten laws, one of which enjoined worship of the gods.[1] The rationalistic speculations of Prodicus and Critias, noticed above, clearly assume that the popular creed has been set aside, for they deal with the further problem, how it originally arose. Nor must it be forgotten that in his burlesque Aristophanes presses the charge of atheism again and again, as when he makes Socrates, his type of the sophist, say, 'Vortex is king; Zeus has been dethroned.'[2] Similarly the aged Plato traces crimes of violence and insolence to the impiety of certain wise men (*σοφοί*) who maintain that religion and morality are mere convention, and that the highest right is might.[3] Other indications of the gradual change in public opinion are afforded by a comparison of Herodotus with Thucydides. Where the former is credulous, as regards divination and oracles, the latter is sceptical, for he had witnessed fruitless appeals to

1 *Rep.* 338 E.
2 *Ib.* 358 E ff.
3 Diels, *Frag. der Vorsokratiker*[3], 82. 6, p. 632.
4 Thuc. ii. 63; cf. iii. 37.
5 *Ib.* iii. 37–40.
6 *Ib.* v. 105; cf. 85–111.
7 *Ib.* vi. 82–87.
8 *Rep.* 492 B.
9 Thuc. iii. 45.
10 Plato, 324 A.
11 Thuc. ii. 37 ff.

1 Xen. *Mem.* iv. iv. 19.
2 *Clouds*, 828; cf. 264, 365, 367, 627, 1241 ff., 1509.
3 *Laws*, x. 889 A ff.

divine justice by victims of oppression, the undeserved success of perjury and treachery, the influence of fortune in thwarting the wisest calculations.[1]

3. Charges against the sophists.—In a matter of much controversy notice must be taken of divergent views, particularly the attacks and aspersions from which Grote endeavoured to vindicate the sophists. Whatever the cause, the fortunes of the sophists declined; the second generation was not equal to the first, the pupils were less brilliant and eminent than their teachers, or, like Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, attained to a bad eminence; in the 4th cent. B.C. a liberal education was sought elsewhere, in the Lyceum or the Academy; soon the very name became a term of abuse. Isocrates so applied it to the Eristics and to Plato; Lysias to Æschines (the Socratic) and to Plato; Androtion and Æschines (the orator) to Socrates, who took no fees. For one thing, the practice of charging fees touched a strong Greek prejudice, as if it meant prostitution of the mental powers.[2] This prejudice we moderns, who regard the intellectual as well as the manual labourer as worthy of his hire, can barely understand, much less share. Again, not only Aristophanes, but many worthy citizens like Anytus, a leader of the restored democracy in Athens, mistrusted what seemed to them the revolutionary tendencies of such teaching.[3] Public opinion, too, shifted, and the sophist, once hailed as a prodigy of wisdom and knowledge, an invaluable aid to the political aspirant, came to be despised as a needy adventurer, often a foreigner; if a citizen, doing little, if any, service to the State.[4] Isocrates, ensconced in his own flourishing school near the Lyceum, while claiming that what he himself taught was philosophy and culture, could afford to sneer alike at the Eristics as vendors of fallacies, who denied the possibility of falsehood or contradiction, and at those Socratics who said that courage, wisdom, and justice were identical, that none of these virtues was innate, but that there was a single science of them all.[5] With these facts before us it is impossible to agree with Grote that the name 'sophist' was brought into bad repute mainly by the persistent and acrimonious attacks of Plato and Aristotle on a deserving profession. Plato was born in 427 B.C., and in the *Clouds* (423 B.C.) the term 'sophist,' originally neutral, was well on its way to be stereotyped *in malam partem*. Very rarely has prejudice been so completely successful in changing the connotation of a word: the paid teacher became the needy adventurer, the incompetent pretender, the charlatan, or trickster, the last implication being firmly embedded in our modern words 'sophism,' 'sophistical,' 'sophistry.' In the main, however, Grote is justified in his contention[6] that the sophists were not a sect or school of conscious impostors, flattering rich youths for personal gain and corrupting general morality. Nor, on the other hand, were they, as others have imagined, systematic philosophers who based upon reasoned scepticism an anti-social ethics, sanctioning lawless aggression in politics and freeing the individual from all conventional restraints. The latter hypothesis takes something for granted at every stage, its chief error being the assumption of a school with common doctrines, an assumption no more valid for Greek sophists than for modern journalists. Nor, again, is the charge of indifference to truth justified, except in so far as it corresponds to the old count of making the weaker side the stronger (*τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*). This, it should be remembered, is the aim of every advocate; he appears in court, not to judge his client, but to defend him. If in so doing he does violence to his conscience, if his act is immoral, it is the fault of a system, which neither he nor the sophists devised. The supposed pernicious effect of dialectic and eristic in accustoming the disputant to take either side indifferently admits of a similar answer; and, if the objection be to the use of fallacies, surely they ought not to pass unexposed and unrefuted.[1] Plato's opposition is grounded on his metaphysics. He calls sophistry at one time the sham counterpart of legislation, which is one branch of politics,[2] while in the dialogue devoted to the dissection of the sophist the latter is ultimately defined as the counterfeit of the philosopher, the pretender who, juggling with words in private, dissembles his own ignorance and entangles his hearer in self-contradiction.[3] This amounts to saying that the sophist was, like Isocrates, content with appearance and opinion (*δόξα*) and had not gone farther in quest of reality and science (*ἐπιστήμη*). There were these two educational theories, and the champion of the one was bound to condemn the other. Yet we note that six at least of Plato's provisional definitions[4] imply no discredit. If the sophist purged away false opinions, if he imparted information wholesale, retail, or pedlar-fashion, if he was a brilliant athlete in controversy, and ever on the hunt for fresh scholars to teach, he was doing the State some service; for these are traits not unworthy of the world's great educators, from Socrates to Pestalozzi.

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SOPHOCLES.—In studying the religious content of dramatic poetry, it is well to distinguish between (1) what is traditional or contemporary; (2) what is adapted to the dramatic situation; and (3) the poet's own contribution in thought and feeling.

1. In Sophoclean drama the gods of the national worship are still living powers, to whom contemporary piety accords an implicit belief. But special stress is laid on the universal supremacy of Zeus and the oracular truth of Apollo. Athene also holds a conspicuous place. Ares and Aphrodite are regarded chiefly as authors of destruction and misery. The Eleusinian mysteries are by this time fully recognized as belonging to the religion of the State; and Dionysus, the immediate patron of the drama, is an object of affectionate reverence. The religion of the family, coming down from patriarchal times, is prized as of the first import-

[1] R. C. Jebb, *Essays and Addresses*, Cambridge, 1907, p. 406 ff.
[2] Xen. *Mem.* I. vi. 13. [3] Plato, *Meno*, 91 A ff.
[4] *ἔργα σοφιστῶν λίαν ἀχρήστων καὶ σφόδρα βίον ἀτιμένων* (Lysias, *Or.* xxxiii. 3).
[5] Isocr. *Or.* x. 1; cf. *Or.* xiii. 1–8.
[6] *Hist. of Greece*, ch. lxvii.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Protag.* 350 C, D.
[2] *Gorgias*, 465 C. [3] *Sophist*, 268 E.
[4] *Ib.* 218 B–237 A.

ance. Not only blood-guiltiness between kinsmen, but all breaches of domestic harmony are looked on with abhorrence, and to vindicate the honour of one's kindred is an imperious duty. It is this which gives inviolable sanctity to the laws of burial, and it is in connexion with family religion that reference is made to those unwritten laws which are of immemorial antiquity. In upholding these, Greek tragedy seems to enforce the religion of Eleusis; for, in language very similar to that of Sophocles' *Antigone* (lines 453–457), Pericles is reported to have spoken of 'those unwritten laws on which the Eumolpidæ based their instructions, laws which never may be abrogated, and of which no man can tell the origin' ([Lysias] 6. § 10; cf. Thuc. ii. 37. § 4; also Æsch. *Suppl.* 707 f.). The scene is still haunted with fears of divine jealousy or envy (*Νέμεσις, Φθόνος*; see art. GOD [Greek]), and God is still imagined as causing infatuation, and thus occasioning the crimes which He punishes. The sovereignty of Zeus spares none whose folly, inspired by hope and desire, misleads them (*Ant.* 604 ff.). Hence life sometimes appears a tissue of miseries from which death is the release (*Œd. Col.* 1225 ff.; cf. Herod. vii. 46). That rule is inexorable, but piety never loses its reward (*Phil.* 1444, 1445). Fate, more distinctly than in Æschylus, is identified with an inscrutable Divine Providence of which the oracles are the exponents, above all the oracle at Delphi (*Œd. Tyr.* 1329, 1330).

2. Such are the main features of traditional and contemporary religion as represented in Sophoclean drama, and to the poet's unquestioning acceptance of them he owes that high repute for piety which was awarded to him by the unanimous voice of antiquity. But the exact phase of polytheism that is reflected in each drama depends largely on *the situation*; and if the later epics on which the plays are founded had been preserved to us, it would be possible to account more fully for certain variations. Thus, while in the two *Œdipi* and in the *Electra* the Delphian Apollo is all-important, in the *Trachiniæ* the prime mover is the Dodonæan Zeus, whereas, in the *Ajax*, Athene is the chief agent, and in the *Philoctetes* the knot is solved by Heracles. And in the last-named play it is observable that the sacred place of Chrysa, the allusion to Hephæstus of the volcano, and to the Lemnian Zeus, the invocation of the earth-goddess as the great mother, and the prayer to the nymphs of stream and meadow help to complete the local colouring, while the thought of Heracles on Oeta, of the river-god Spercheius, and the Melian nymphs adds reality and verisimilitude to the person of the hero. Athene, too, while retaining her Athenian attributes (*Νίκη πολιάς*, l. 134), is in a special sense the guardian of Odysseus, as she is in the *Ajax*, where the Salaminian mariners by their invocation of Pan recall the islet which he made his peculiar haunt (Æsch. *Persæ*, 418). Ajax himself, on the other hand, combines with the longing for his father's hearth a deep sense of the sacredness of the rivers and other divine presences of the Troad.

In the *Œdipus Tyrannus* there is a remarkable blending of Athenian and epic with local Theban worships. Athene, *more Homerico*, is the daughter of Zeus; but it is not forgotten that she has two ancient shrines in the Cadmean city. Artemis at once presides over the Theban Agora and with her brother Phœbus roves the Lycian hills. Apollo is the Pythian prophet of Zeus, and he is also the epic far-darter. His local worship as Lyceius, the protector of the home, and as the prophet by the Ismenus, are separately mentioned. Dionysus is *par excellence* the Theban god; but Ares, to whom the Theban women in Æschylus appeal as the founder of their race, is here identified with the viewless enemy who has visited the city in the form of the plague. In the *Œdipus Coloneus*, Polynices speaks of his father's Erinys, apparently without identifying her with the dread goddesses of Colonus.

3. Behind all such associations, and shining through them, is *the religious thought of the poet*, less original and far-reaching than that of Æschylus, but in some ways more sober and mature. The 'unwritten ordinances' of the Eumolpidæ are developed in the central ode of the first *Œdipus* into the vision of an eternal law of integrity in thought and action whose violation, conscious or unconscious, leads the way to ruin. 'God sees and visits soon or late when one leaves hold of divine principles and turns to madness' (*Œd. Col.* 536 f.). Yet—it is added in a later strain of reflexion—when the error has been involuntary, though it inevitably results in suffering, the very power that punishes holds forth a better hope. The life that is crushed in this world finds acceptance in the end, is itself blessed, and becomes a source of blessing. Even destiny has a human aspect, for it is the outcome of a divine purpose, which, however incalculable, is not, as a previous generation had thought, wholly malignant. Athene, to protect her favourites and to rebuke the pride of Ajax, brings down on him a fatal blight. But her anger, had he but known it, was only for a day, and she prepares the mind of Odysseus, his rival and supposed enemy, to vindicate his honour after death. The clear and steady vision of the poet, holding firmly by the facts of experience (he lived through the Peloponnesian War), forbade him to extenuate the sadness of life, yet he saw a light beyond. The loyal heart of Antigone, the love of Deianira, the brotherhood of Teucer, the essential purity and public spirit of Œdipus, the faithful endurance of Electra, the incorruptible truth of Neoptolemus—these belong to the eternal things, however, on this 'narrow isthmus' of mortality,[1] they may be frustrated or obscured. Even the dark end of the *Trachiniæ* and the agonized reclamation of Hyllus could not hide from the Athenian audience the certainty of the glory that should follow.

The poet's sympathies are enlisted for 'the noble living and the noble dead.' Great souls by their own or others' fault may be overclouded or broken, but in the end they shall be purified and justified. Ajax is provoked into a fatal outburst, but his valour shall be held in everlasting remembrance. The innocent but rash spirit of Œdipus is unwittingly involved in a tangle of guilt from which there is no recovery in this world. But, though rejected by his kindred and nation, his end is peace, and he bestows a blessing on the after time. The same motive, the divine acceptance of inherent greatness that is rejected by men, appears once more in the *Philoctetes*.

Yet this exalted view of the divine purpose in humanity is subject to a certain limitation. The greatness admired is not that of outward position; it is essential greatness and nobility of nature. But noble qualities are still more or less associated with the accident of birth. Sophocles has not the Æschylean breadth and universality of sympathy. The inherent nobleness of Ajax, notwithstanding his offence, is vindicated by his captive bride, his illegitimate brother, and his opponent and rival, whom he suspects of being base-born. But Tecmessa was originally a princess, Teucer's mother likewise was the daughter of a king, and Odysseus was the true son of Laertes by his lawful queen. Antigone scorns Creon for his violation of eternal law, but she also despises him because he is not of the Cadmean race.

[1] Soph. frag. 146: *βίου βραχὺν ἰσθμόν.*

Closely akin to this limitation is the frank, untempered presentation of vindictiveness. Love and hatred in ancient life were equal powers. When Achilles drags Hector round the body of Patroclus, and kills twelve Trojan prisoners at his friend's funeral, the comment of the Greek mind would be, 'Behold, how he loved him!' So Electra's love for her father and her brother is measured by the exhortation to 'give a second stroke,' and to expose the dead Ægisthus to the dogs and birds. Ajax does not feel, as the heroic maiden in Æschylus' *Choephori* felt, that the curse he utters 'mars his perfect prayer.' Odysseus has been taught only that hatred is not to be carried beyond the grave. The peaceful end of Œdipus is not prevented, but only delayed for a moment, by the renewal of his curse against his sons.

In what remains to us of the work of Sophocles there is hardly any trace of Orphism, and the lyric poetry of the 6th cent. had comparatively little influence on his work. His materials are drawn chiefly from the epic cycle. On the subject of immortality his position is intermediate between Homer and Plato. That the Eleusinian mystic alone lives happily in Hades is strongly asserted in one fragment (753). But the feeling of Antigone is rather that of the pathetic funeral monuments in the Ceramicus. Affection looks beyond the tomb. Souls meet again in that still realm, and 'longer is the time which we shall spend with them than with the persons who surround us here' (*Ant.* 74, 75). Although the language is not consistent, the continuance, not of a mere shadow, but of the conscious self in the unseen world is on the whole anticipated. Not the body, as in Homer, but the soul is *αὐτός*. And while the place of departed spirits is generally spoken of as 'Hades,' in one passage, according to a later mode of thought, the dead are imagined as entering the 'vast æther' (*Ajax*, 1192; cf. the inscription over the Athenians who fell at Potidæa, B.C. 432, *αἰθὴρ μὲμ ψυχὰς ὑπεδέξατο*). The case of Œdipus is peculiar. He lives, like Amphiaraus, a semi-divine life, in the darkness beneath the ground. Amphiaraus, too, retains in that under world the fullness of his mind, *πάμψυχος ἀνάσσει*.

It remains to speak of the dramatist's conception of irreligion. Creon's impiety, like that of the generals in the *Ajax*, consists in his defiance of the burial rite. But Jocasta's case is more typical. She and Laius had disobeyed the oracle, and then sought to evade it by an unnatural deed. For a moment she tries to smother her own and her husband's anxiety by a conventional act of worship. But when her hopes are revived by false intelligence, she defies not only the prophecy but the gods who gave it, until, on the sudden revelation of the dreadful truth, she dies in despair.

Some recrudescence of pessimism, such as we find in Euripides, is reflected in some passages of the latest plays. Philoctetes, when at the lowest of his fortunes, complains that in praising divine attributes one finds evil in the gods (*Phil.* 451, 452); and the elders of Colonus descant upon the vanity of life and the infirmities of age (*Œd. Col.* 1225 f.). But these depressing sentiments are contradicted by the main tenor of both dramas.

In the last *Œdipus* there is a depth and range of religious feeling which is not equally present in the other tragedies. The magnanimity of Theseus discards the superstitious fears and scruples of the elders of the deme. Not the ritual itself, but the prayer accompanying it, is the important thing. Not the details of the ceremonial, but the pure intention of the ministrant, secures divine acceptance. Innocence of heart commends itself, in spite of involuntary pollution. And the great spirit, in passing from the upper air and light of day, is surrounded with an atmosphere of religious peace.

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SORCERY.—See MAGIC, SHAMANISM, WITCHCRAFT.

SOTERIOLOGY.—In the article SALVATION (Christian) an attempt was made to trace the experience of salvation to its origins in the religion of Israel, and to depict it in the life of the disciples of Jesus and of the members of the Christian community during the apostolic age. In this article an attempt will be made to trace the idea of salvation as it manifests itself in successive periods in the history of Christian thought.

I. *THE FACT OF THE CHRISTIAN SALVATION.*—Salvation as presented in the NT consists fundamentally in a work wrought by God through Jesus Christ. In Him God gave the perfect revelation of Himself, and through Him fulfilled His saving purpose towards mankind. The saving work of God, however, is not complete as a bare fact of history. It operates as an abiding power in the experience of men, under the condition of trustful surrender to Jesus Christ, the personal Saviour and ever-living Lord. Certain features of this experience as presented in the NT are noteworthy, and determine essential elements in the Christian conception of salvation.

1. **The continuity of this experience.**—It stands in direct succession to the religion of Israel, not distinguishable from it in any other sense than consummation is from the earlier stages of one vital process. It begins a new development of God's saving work, whose centre and spring is always the same, viz. the exalted and living Lord; nor can its bounds be delimited, because they are conterminous with nothing less than the holy love of God. Christianity is to be identified, not by the intellectual or institutional forms with which it has been in different ages accompanied, but by the experience of salvation, which has been evoked, maintained, and furthered by trust in Christ as Redeemer and Lord. The life of the Church in salvation is continuous and forms a unity recognizable in variety. Its power of development is renewed, maintained, and defended by 'a constant spiritual return to Christ.'

2. **Its differentia as a religious experience.**—It is sharply distinguished from two forms of the higher life of man: (1) moralism, in which salvation is achieved by man through diligent obedience to the moral imperative; (2) mysticism, in which salvation, conceived as immediate union with God, is achieved by man through special exercises of soul which vary from the magical to the contemplative. In deep contrast with these divergent types, the Christian salvation is grounded in, and warranted by, the divine initiative and the divine sufficiency. Its origin is in the love of God, conceived as a ruling purpose aiming at a kingdom or realm in which the holy will of God shall be done. This love appears in human experience as grace, *i.e.* the action of God, in the history of the race and the individual, directed towards the salvation of man. This salvation is not the work of man, but the work of God in man, and always it evokes in man, not self-congratulation, but the sense of constraint, as of those who find themselves in a bondage which is, nevertheless, perfect freedom (2 Co 5^{14}). At the same time, this attitude towards

the divine salvation is the very reverse of quietism. Its distinguishing note is the sense of power. The OT and NT alike present a picture of life thrilling with activity and crowned with victory. Out of this experience there arises a twofold interest or passion: a passion for righteousness and a passionate longing for fellowship with God. Moralism and mysticism alike come to their rights in Christianity. They take their place within the Christian salvation. They are its expression and its outcome. They are not an achievement of man; but they manifest what human life may become through the saving action of God in man.

3. Its goal: the Kingdom of God.—Salvation is never, in the Biblical literature, statically conceived. It is always described in terms of power and action. It is true that salvation consists in a transition from one state or condition to another; and descriptions abound of the misery of the one and the blessedness of the other. But both states are conceived as determined by a power governing and animating human life. The one is the condition of man in 'the world,' or the present 'age.' Here man is subject to a power of evil, which masters him, drives him, and holds him in bondage. The other is the condition of man in the Realm of God (Col 1^{13}). Here man is subject to the sovereignty of holy love and penetrated by the power of the Holy Spirit. This realm of power and love is conceived as a divine reality, a supernatural order, which is not, however, abnormal. It is nature, human nature, which is in an abnormal condition, and in this abnormality physical nature shares (Ro 8^{19-22}). The divine order is the truth of man and the universe, and overhangs this spatial universe, impinges upon it, and is ever ready to intervene in it, if we may use figures, which, however, wholly fail to combine ideas that are really disparate, viz. a world above time and sense, and a world conditioned by time and sense. The Realm of God, being thus conceived as a fact of a divine supersensuous order, has three aspects: it is present, progressive, and future.

(*a*) It is present to the need and the faith of men. It is to be received as an immediate gift of grace, and entered in deep humility (Mt 18^{3}), through such a reversal of aim in life as amounts to a new birth (Jn $3^{3.5}$) or a new creation (2 Co 5^{17}).

(*b*) It is progressive as an enterprise to which God has devoted Himself and all His resources, and in which His honour is involved. To a share in this enterprise He summons all who will be saved. They are to serve it to the last limit of devotion, counting all things but loss for the glory of this achievement. Apart from a service which springs out of death to the old world and the old nature and may involve actual suffering and death at the hands of the enemies of God, there can be no salvation. Those who in one aspect are 'saved' in another are 'being saved.'

(*c*) It is future inasmuch as its victory depends on an act of divine intervention. It is impossible to omit this from any picture of salvation as an object of Christian faith and hope in the 1st cent., or in any subsequent age of the Church's history. Men cannot build the Kingdom. The Kingdom comes. Questions of time and manner are secondary and not essential to the Christian faith. The first generation of believers thought of the Kingdom as immediately to appear, and framed pictures of a literal millennium, mistaking symbolism for prediction. The point of value is that the Realm of God exists as 'the highest order of life and power in the universe.'[1] In endeavouring to represent the relation of this spiritual order to the world of time and space, it must always be conceived as imminent and described as 'at hand.' The Christian enterprise, which is, fundamentally, the vindication of the divine sovereignty in the whole domain of human life, derives from this imminence its source of urgency and its note of confidence. In preaching the gospel, in perfecting holiness in the fear of God, in waging war on behalf of righteousness, Christian men are not striving to win a salvation which is in doubt. They are building, not on the sands of human fancy, 'but on the bedrock of that Order which, however deeply it is hidden from common observation by the course of outward events, yet stands to religious faith as the most secure and final truth' (Mt $7^{24f.}$).[2] Salvation, therefore, lies always above and beyond and before the Christian. The paradox of a Kingdom 'come' and 'coming,' a salvation at once possessed and expected, may defy logical solution, but has never seriously perplexed those who, moving through the world of time and space, have seen and entered a region of values and powers where earthly measurements do not apply.

II. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.*—In the Hellenic-Roman world, at the time when Christianity began its missionary career, there was proceeding what cannot be termed less than a revival of religion. The religious worship of the Olympian deities had lost whatever moral and spiritual power it ever possessed. That devotion to the city which was 'the real religion of the 5th century'[1] necessarily passed away when the independence of the city-states perished under the might of a world-empire. But religion itself never perishes. Where ancient forms of religious life have failed, the demand of the human spirit for a satisfying salvation is only the more intense and urgent.

In the 1st cent. of our era men were going behind the more formal and cultured religions to the practices and ideas of primitive times. It seems a terrible relapse into barbarism that the inheritors of the splendid Hellenic culture should seek salvation in the blood of a divine bull. Yet, in a sense, this return to a cruder and less sophisticated age was really an advance. There was a wide-spread 'failure of nerve,' as Gilbert Murray has phrased it.[2] But, when man reaches the depths of his helplessness, he is near the sources of religious strength and hope. He turns passionately to any religion, however crude its ceremonial or outrageous its mythology, which will offer confidently enough the great boon without which life is unendurable—salvation. The mystery-religions and the Gnostic sects are all of one religious type. They are avowedly religions of salvation. They are dissociated from race or nationality. They pass through the organized forms of civic or political life and reach down to the single soul. They are at once individualistic and universal. They are not so much separate religions as, at bottom, the ultimate religious need and susceptibility of man, turning away from traditional and stereotyped forms and plunging into depths of psychic experience where the human and the divine seem to be blent, or perhaps confused, in a unity too mysterious for thought or speech. While they are thus rooted in mystery, they share certain views of the nature of God and man and the world, of sin and evil, and of deliverance and blessedness which amount in fact to a fairly coherent doctrine of salvation.

(i.) God, or the divine nature, is conceived or felt to be a being or substance, far beyond apprehension or determination by human thought. He is not personal and cannot be named. Only this is certain, that, if the human spirit could attain to oneness with this ultimate divine nature, it would be emancipated from all ill and would enjoy an ineffable experience of peace and freedom and rest. (ii.) Beneath or over against God is the world, to which He stands in no living relation. It is occupied by powers which reign in the whole region inhabited by man and hold him in subjection, so that the soul is haunted by fear, and life becomes one great cry for deliverance. (iii.) Man carries within him a seed of the divine. He is at once greater and less than these sub-divine principalities and powers—greater because he is himself divine and holds, as it were, a fragment of the divine nature in himself; less, because he, *i.e.* the divine in him, is enclosed in a material fabric, which holds him at an immeasurable distance from God and is subject to all the influences which govern and tyrannize over the material world. Salvation, on its negative side, means deliverance from matter, from sense, from all that is not God. (iv.) The powerlessness of man requires a helper, redeemer, saviour. Such an one appears in all these religions, with a various ancestry, with cloudy mythologies, decorated with titles of honour, but always claiming victory over the powers that hold man in bondage. (v.) The method by which this victory is won is variously depicted in the myths. Deep through them all, however, is the thought of life won through death. The old religion of nature, glorifying the succession of winter's death and spring's resurrection, returns with fresh power to hearts weary of the artificialities of state ceremonial. Such primitive conceptions,

[1] G. F. Barbour, *A Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, Edinburgh and London, 1911, p. 203.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 204.

[1] Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 96.
[2] *Ib.* ch. iii.

too, relate themselves to profounder and more ethical ideas, of lives surrendered to shame and death and yet found again in the increased values of the welfare of the community. (vi.) Our sympathy with the mystery-religions up to this point is deep and our expectation great. It is disappointing to find that, when we ask under what conditions the individual was supposed to reach union with the divine, the reply flings us back, not merely on symbolism, but on magic, not merely on self-discipline, but on semi-physical ecstasy. The commonplace of Greek religion through this whole period is the process whereby the spark of divinity in man is reunited to its source: (*a*) ceremonial, making keen appeal to the emotional and sensuous nature; (*b*) ascetic practices, aiding the religious susceptibilities and repressing (it was hoped) the urgency of lower instincts; (*c*) ecstasy, produced by fulfilling certain physical and psychic conditions and superinducing a state of sub- or supra-consciousness in which the soul knows itself to be united to God, sunk in God, and filled with God. These are the outstanding features of the way of salvation opened to seeking souls in the mystery-religions, which were the 'forerunners and rivals of Christianity.' (vii.) When we examine the salvation itself, the result is disappointingly meagre. In phrase it is magnificent, 'deification.' In reality it disappears in vagueness. Negatively it is deliverance from mortality; positively it is union with the divine, conceived mainly as a blending of a particle of being with its abysmal source. Experimentally salvation is the mystic state, bearing the marks which William James has noted—ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, passivity. This is the real heart of the mystery-religions.[1]

Applying the ethical standard, the only valid test, we must assign to these mystery-religions a very moderate value. Their emphasis is not on morality at all, but on escape from elemental powers, a flight of the soul to the divine, which is conceived mainly through negations. In this deliverance morality is only a step, valuable not in itself, but as an introduction to a condition in which moral good does not survive, being succeeded by some psychic state which is held to be the highest blessedness of which man is capable. Morality, too, even in this secondary position, is left without dynamic. There is no inner constraint, no self-forgetful inspiration. A man is to be pure, and just, and chaste, in order that he may reach a state beyond the sphere of moral values altogether. We should not deny that the mystery-religions served religious ends in the experience of multitudes of adherents. The salvation they offered was a fragment, an element, or an instalment, of the true good. They expressed a demand and increased a desire, preparing the way for a religion which more perfectly uttered the one and responded to the other.

When we compare the ideas of salvation set forth in the mystery-religions and in Christianity respectively, we are impressed with the features common to both.

(i.) Both conceive man's highest blessedness as union with God. (ii.) Both trace man's distress to separation from God. (iii.) Both take a lofty view of one side of man's nature, as indicating affinity with the divine. (iv.) Both present the radiant figure of a Deliverer to the fainting spirit. (v.) Both trace life to its roots in death. (vi.) Both connect the deepest religious experiences with certain ritual acts. (vii.) Both place salvation in the return to God.

To infer, however, from these undoubted resemblances that Christianity was itself no other than a mystery-religion is a mistake. The hypothesis of borrowing, or even of unconscious infiltration, is not required by the facts, which, at the same time, make impossible the conception of Christianity as a bare revelation, standing naked and alone in the history of the human spirit. All religions spring from sources deep in the nature of man. Historically, however, the great religions have followed separate paths. The mystery-religions represent the highest point reached on one line of development. Christianity is the culmination of another and wholly distinct line. It is the religion of Israel, growing by continuous evolution out of the experiences of the prophets and of those, their associates and successors, who received and responded to the actings and communications of the divine love in its redeeming, saving work. The primary fact in the NT Church is the experience of salvation entered into by its members; and that experience is unique and distinctive. Its implications are essentially different from those of the mystery-religions. It is *sui generis* and cannot be explained as a composite. Christian missionaries borrowed in the 1st cent., as they do in the 20th, phrases of speech and forms of thought. How else were they to be intelligible? But they did not borrow their message; and they did not copy from foreign sources the religious experience which they sought to evoke and deepen in the lives of their converts. Between Christianity, with its distinctive view of man's case, its own special message, and its typical experience, and the mystery-religions at their highest and best there is a deep line of demarcation. On the one side, the deepest concern is ethical and personal, and the highest result is a character conformed to that of God, conceived as the impersonation of love and holiness. On the other side, the problem is primarily ontological or cosmological, and the solution is found in an experience in which the ethical and the personal are subordinated to the psychic and the ineffable. The Christian missionaries accepted the challenge presented by the mystery-religions, or rather they availed themselves of the opportunity offered in these noble and pathetic approaches towards God. Their claim was that what they had to offer took up into itself all that was best in these religions; and they invited every seeker to share in a good which satisfied a need deeper than the mystery-religions ever knew. Each point of contact noted above reveals also the breadth of separation.

(i.) *The idea of God*: to the mystery-religions a vague, remote, impersonal, unknowable, divine nature; to Christianity a living Being, with a character and purpose, personal in His actions and manifestations, known in history as loving and righteous, achieving by His own doing and suffering the redemption of man.

(ii.) *The distress of man*: to the mystery-religions mortality and subjection to hostile influences in or above the world—a separation conceived almost locally and physically; to Christianity a moral separation from the holy God, produced by man's own act involving guilt and judgment and ruin.

(iii.) *The dignity of man*: to the mystery-religions the possession in mortal frame of a veritable spark of divinity, which ever seeks reunion with its source; to Christianity a moral likeness to God, which has been defaced by sin, and yet is capable of being renewed, so that man can be restored to divine uses and fellowship.

(iv.) *The person of the Deliverer*: to the mystery-religions a mythical figure, supra-human, whose history moves in a non-human region of endeavour and achievement; to Christianity a real human being, with a genuine human experience, the reality of whose life and death constitutes the gospel, inasmuch as they are the means through which God in Him redeemed the world.

(v.) *The method of redemption*: to the mystery-religions a death which belongs to another region than that in which men suffer and die; to Christianity a death real and tragic, an actual dying, in which the utmost need of man is felt and met by One in whom divine love fulfils its redeeming function.

(vi.) *The conditions of salvation.*—In the mystery-religions there is no living relation between what the Deliverer effects for men and what men achieve for themselves. The process of salvation in reality does not need a Mediator at all. It consists in experiences which are evoked by sacraments or dramatic symbols. Such experiences are effective in proportion as they pass beyond conscious apprehension or articulate expression; and they culminate in an ecstatic state, in which the desired union with God is attained. The difference between this and the way of salvation provided in Christianity is horizon-wide. The Christian message concerns a saving action of God, which is carried out by His Son Jesus Christ. It concentrates the salvation of men in the person of Christ. The one essential condition of salvation on the part of men is that they receive, with trustful surrender, the love of God as it reaches them in Christ. This is what the Scriptures of Christianity, whether OT or NT, mean by faith. It is not a mystic state. It is radically different from ecstasy. It is not ineffable; for it is genuine only as it makes confession of its inward experience. It has 'noetic quality' only in the sense that it 'knows' by experimental acquaintance the living object of its trust. It is not 'transient,' but is the constant energy of life. It is not 'passive,' but is the inspiration of service. Everything in salvation is controlled by this exercise of faith. The ultimate object is always God. If Christ is designated as the object of saving faith, it is because God is not known at all in His saving

[1] See, further, art. MYSTERIES.

power apart from Him, and because He is inseparable from God in the believing apprehension of those who are the subjects of the divine salvation. The experience in which man, in his need, commits himself to the God who comes to him in Christ is the deepest, richest, and most fruitful of which the human spirit is capable. It embraces the whole complex of human power. It cannot, therefore, be unemotional. Precisely at this point Christianity and the mystery-religions approach most nearly and at the same time stand most widely apart. The Christian, like the devotee in the mysteries, has moments in which great tides of feeling sweep through his being, sometimes elevating him to a region of truth and reality too sacred to be disclosed to any human being. The difference lies in the source and quality of such emotional experiences. To the Christian they are privileges granted as helps to faith; but they are not, in themselves, identified with faith. They are states; faith is an action. They are products, by-products, of faith, and are not to be confused with it or prized as though they were more precious than it. The expression 'faith-mysticism' is, strictly, a self-contradiction. The act of faith is incompatible with the impersonality which is the characteristic note of the mystic state. The degree to which emotion will be the accompaniment of faith's activity will vary endlessly in individuals. The occasions too will vary. Ordinarily, however, feeling will be stirred when in symbolic action the objective saving deeds are presented to the view of believers. The so-called 'sacraments' of the Christian Church and the rites performed in the mysteries belong to different universes of religious thought and practice. Symbolism in Christianity has reference to a historic redemption and is meant to ratify the message of the divine salvation. It becomes effective in experience only on condition of faith directed to God. It has no saving power in itself. No doubt, already in NT times, there were adherents of mystery-religions who, in entering the Church, carried with them ideas of the *ex opere operato* virtue of ritual actions. But it is certain that such were not the views entertained by the leaders of the Church. W. Morgan, who is not slow to assign large influence to the mystery-religions in the developing theology of the Church, denies that the apostle Paul held any such idea of the ordinances he prized so highly. 'A memorial of Christ's sacrificial death, a means of proclaiming it—that and that alone is what the Supper signifies for Paul.'[1] The aim of the ordinances is to express and confirm faith, not to produce an ecstatic state in which self shall be absorbed in God. Paul, who was an expert in practical psychology, valued highly the raptures of religious feeling, but he was well aware of the dangers attendant upon them; and he bequeathed to the Church such a careful evaluation of the emotional element in religion as saved Christianity from being merged in the mystery-religions and from sharing their moral impotence and subsequent doom.

(vii.) *The scope and contents of salvation.*—The mystery-religions break down at this point. Escape from sense, deliverance from demons, final absorption in God are not themes which permit of enlargement. Salvation as thus conceived cannot be articulated—for the simple reason that there is nothing in it. In wide contrast, Christianity moves in a world of historical fact and ethical values. On one side, salvation is the wealth of the divine love, unfolded and conveyed in the Christ of history. On the other side, salvation is the progressive appropriation of what divine love means in life. This is all, and this is everything. There is no divine beyond that which operates in Christ. He is the Pleroma. He is not a step towards a union with God which, in its metaphysical abstraction, is supposed to be superior to the concrete spiritual realities of forgiveness, reconciliation, and moral renewal. No doubt, the people who pressed into the Church were obsessed with fear of demons and of death, and it was certainly part of the Christian salvation that they should be delivered from such torment; but this, like every other benefit, was only an issue of the new relation in which men stood to God through faith in Christ. There is no getting to an end of what may be possessed in faith; and there is no getting beyond Christ. The convert was taught that all things belonged to him, because he belonged to Christ, and Christ belonged to God. Paradoxically, Christianity, which offered a full salvation for immediate acceptance, did not proclaim itself to be the final stage of God's redemptive acting. The salvation of the mystery-religions was at once individualistic and final. Christianity, true to its Hebrew origin, was social and dynamic. Its ideal is still the Kingdom of God. Till that Kingdom shall have come, salvation is not complete. Christianity, therefore, is bound to the conception of a coming of the Redeemer to which there is no real parallel in the mystery-religions. The belief in the Parousia is an element in the essentially historical character of the Christian religion. It is a religion of the acts of God, and these acts are not closed. The greatest of them is yet to come. It will be the climax of a great redemptive movement, and in it humanity will be reconstituted and the Realm of God established in an environment suited to its divine nature.

These, then, are the elements in the Christian conception of salvation which distinguish it from that entertained in the mystery-religions—the personal, the historical, the ethical, the eschatological. To them Christianity owed its superior power and attractiveness and its final victory over its forerunners and rivals. Whether, in generations following the period of the first missionary enterprise of the Church, the mystery-religions did not win an unmarked but very real triumph, by entering into Christianity and giving it a distinct mystic quality, is another question. But that the religion whose literary record is found in the NT has its own essential qualities, placing it in a class apart from the contemporary mystery-religions and giving it religious and moral superiority over them, seems to be an ascertained historical judgment.

[1] *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, p. 224.

III. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.*—**1. Pre-Socratic.**—Reviewing the course of Greek philosophy in its three main periods, we note that pre-Socratic thinkers have scarcely faced the problem of their relation to religion. Their attitude towards the popular religion is scornful, as illustrated by the contempt poured by Xenophanes upon the polytheism of his day. This, however, means no more than that the Olympians were losing whatever divinity they had ever possessed and were passing to their doom of unreality. Philosophy itself is making direct contribution to the religious and theological inheritance upon which both Greek and Christian entered in succeeding ages. The idea of God, in Xenophanes and Parmenides, has already assumed the form which has clung to it to this day. The unity of God has become a fixed point for all subsequent reflexion—a unity conceived as the negation of all differences, an absolute principle, into which the whole intelligible world, and even the intelligence itself, is resolved and lost. Greek thought, in its first stage, has not realized the place of the self-conscious subject and has not found a spiritual unity to explain the fullness of experience and give man a position of independence and lordship in the world which hems him in.

2. Idealist constructions.—The second period of Greek philosophy is introduced by the great name of Socrates (*q.v.*). Socrates has been described as a 'philosopher by accident'; and yet he gave to philosophy and to theology at once the problem and the principle by which their course was to be determined for all time coming. He is the discoverer of reason, he gave to human subjectivity its rights. At the same time he is the fountain-head of an intellectualism which made the Greek solution of the problem of life one-sided and inadequate. Difficulties arise when we press for vindication of the positive proposition that virtue is the fruit of knowledge. It is a commonplace that knowledge in things ethical is not power; else why do we constantly approve the better and do the worse? A deeper source of difficulty is the implied relation of reason to what may be termed the raw material of the moral life—the instincts and impulses of the individual and the common practices of men acting together in society. Is there such a deep gulf between them that morality and religion will spend themselves upon a task which can never be finished, viz. the reconciliation of elements of experience which are fundamentally disparate? It can be foreseen that on such a dualism thought will ultimately break itself to pieces. Precisely this is the endeavour and the tragedy of Greek philosophy—to overcome dualism by the sheer force of dialectic and, when the task is seen to be hopeless, to appeal to supra-rational sanctions and to plunge into irrational experiences. The ethic of Socrates, illustrated by the splendour of his death, has all the nobility of a protest against unreason, all the significance of a fresh starting-point in the history of the human spirit. The individual is now the problem. His salvation becomes the vital concern, not only of religion, but of philosophy.

Plato and Aristotle (*qq.v.*) take the torch from Socrates' falling hand and bear it into regions

which he never presumed to enter. The conception of an end determinable by reason bringing order into the moral life is by them extended to experience as a whole. Intelligence is treated as the ultimate source of all knowledge and all being. The ethic of Socrates is transmuted into cosmology, metaphysics, and theology. The problem of the individual, accordingly, is not explicitly central; and yet it is by reference to the individual that the grand sweep of Platonic and Aristotelian thought will ultimately be tested. Philosophy, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, reflects a form of life in which the individual personality has not yet received full recognition. Therefore the question of an adequate life for the individual remains unanswered, because it has not been asked with sufficient thoroughness. In this respect, therefore, Plato and Aristotle are not true Socratics. Their encyclopædic systems are, in a sense, a brilliant episode of thought. The true succession passed from Socrates to the era of individualism which succeeded that phase of life of which the idealism of Plato and Aristotle is the splendid record. At the same time that idealism was a necessary stage in the evolution of Greek thought; it stood as a final demonstration of the sufficiency or the insufficiency of intelligence to unify human experience and to be the dynamic of the moral and religious life of man.

In the Platonic view of knowledge and of life there are two movements—one towards concrete idealism, the other towards dualism and mysticism, the latter being proof that the former has failed to reach its goal. (*a*) Plato seeks to reach a principle of unity which will really underlie and explain the variety manifest in the universe. With respect to human life, the Platonic ideal is an organic unity, in which each individual will find his place and function and reach the perfection possible to him, through conscious identification with the dominant idea of the whole. On this side of his great effort Plato did not need to face the problem of individualism. The individual is simply found in the great whole and finds himself when he realizes where he is. There is no problem of salvation. (*b*) The other movement of Plato's thought, however, suggests quite a different view of man's place and destiny. It would appear now that the unity aimed at is not found in the differences. The ultimate reason is not wholly intelligible. The goodness of God is not adequate to its tasks, being confronted by unconquerable necessity; and this recalcitrant material makes evil an abiding quality of the scheme of things. Thus dualism and pessimism haunt an idealism which has over-emphasized the intelligence and turned it against the practical details of knowing and doing. As soon as dualism makes itself felt, the question of the individual and his salvation emerges; and its solution in one way—the way of negation and mysticism—becomes inevitable. Dualism and mysticism follow a beaten path—whether in the East or in the West, whether Indian or Greek or Christian. The rubric may vary; the essential mystery is the same, and, it cannot be too plainly stated, it is essentially different from the core of that religion whose literary expression is the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The true nature of man is oneness with God. His present position is that of imprisonment within an irrational and material envelope. Immediately salvation becomes his primary concern and forms the supreme business of his life, and this salvation must always take shape as a purification (*κάθαρσις*) of the soul, its deliverance (*λύσις*) from the chains which bind it to earth and sense, culminating in that vision of the divine (*θέα τῶν ἄνω*) which is, in the very act, its reunion with the source of its true being. Phrases like these repeat themselves unendingly in the literature of mysticism. They revolve round one central idea, a universal that is abstract, without contents, union with which is denial of all the positive experiences of life. Over against this whole conception stands the Biblical idea of salvation as fellowship with the living God, realized in faith and love, manifesting itself in character and ministry, and culminating in a social order of which God is at once the head and the indwelling life.

The effort to overcome dualism fails even more conspicuously in Aristotle than in Plato. The moral life, as Aristotle portrays it, is simply a rescript of the best Greek life he knew, not ignoble by any means, but essentially narrow, and confined to a class which bases its wealth and power and leisure on the labour of those who can never share its culture and privileges. A really dominant unity ought to constitute humanity as an organism; but such an idea is repellent to the Greek spirit and is exhibited in Aristotle's social ideal. Reason uses the irrational and cannot transmute it. And, even when this ideal, such as it is, is reached, the irrational still clings to it. Virtue is not knowledge. The virtuous man has to deal with conditions which are not the creation of reason, and accordingly he can only do his best and reach, on the whole, a balance between reason and unreason. He can attain an art of living; but to reach the perfection of reason he must cease to live the normal life. It is a far cry from Athens to the Thebaid, and a farther still to Luther, doubting if he can save his soul in the world. But the abstract opposition of form and matter, of reason and sense, of the theoretical and the practical, is the philosophy which lies behind monachism and asceticism; and it is the bequest of Greek dualism, even in the hands of so concrete a thinker as Aristotle, to the Occidental world. A negative salvation achieved by flight is his message, which subsequent generations accepted only too submissively.

Plato and Aristotle reflect the life of the Greek city-state, which, already when they wrote, was showing that it could not be permanent. Its passing left the problem of the individual and his salvation in explicit and definite form. The mystery-religions met the need of the age with their own message and methods. Philosophy pursued its own path to a goal now distinctly discerned. If the great synthetic systems are gone, with the form of life they interpreted, if there is no outward organism in which the individual can find himself, there is nothing for him to do but to pass inward into his own inner life and endeavour to satisfy himself with that which he shall find therein. Here the Greek dualism suffers shipwreck. The elements which Plato and Aristotle had masterfully held together fall apart and are made the prize of opposing dogmatisms. Suppose the inner life yields us its secret and rational principle, which is also discernible as the very life of nature, then the result will be an individualism which is also a cosmopolitanism, and even a pantheism, and will be essentially religious. Suppose, however, the secret of the inner life be no more than sense and its satisfaction, the result may be delicate and beautiful, the joy of a cultured élite, or it may be gross and vile, the shame of the reckless and profligate; but it will conform to no standard of values which can approve itself objective and universal; and, whatever form it takes, it will be essentially non-religious. Between these two views of what the inner life could yield the thought of the age was divided. The latter was really a denial of the deepest demand of the human

spirit. The former became the real religion of all who sought the higher life of the soul, and did afford a standing-ground and a safeguard in the midst of an alien world.

3. Stoicism.—The Stoic conception of the universe and human life is essentially religious; and the great Stoics are men with a message to the world of their day which is the outcome of a genuine and very noble religious experience. Philosophically they are monists. They surmount the dualism which even an Aristotle could not exorcize by the denial of one of its alleged constituents. The difference between form and matter is, in point of fact, unreal. It is true that the universe may be read in terms of matter; but matter is spirit and life, and the material universe is spiritual to the core. It forms a unity, in the sense that there is but one element of being—not two elements confronting one another in irreconcilable opposition. The Stoic solution of the problem of life, accordingly, is greatly simplified. The universe manifests the presence and operation of the λόγος σπερματικός, a germinative principle, which is immanent in individual existences, or rather is so one with them that they are really parts of it. The Stoic has advanced beyond Heraclitus, from whom the Logos (*q.v.*) conception is derived, in that he defines it after the type of that reason which in man is reflective and self-conscious. The universe reveals the control of a Divine Providence, the constant energy of a universal life. In God all things live and move and have their being. Man has this privilege, beyond all other beings, that he can recognize the Logos as identical with his own true self. He can make himself the willing organ of a universal principle. He can rise above the separation of his mere individuality and, ceasing from all selfish endeavour, see himself to be member of a community which includes all human beings. In this vision of himself, which he reaches by leaving behind the mere externalities and accidents of his environment and entering into the secret of his individuality, he really attains spiritual universality and lives by the impulse of the broadest philanthropy. By accepting his place in the universe he transforms fate into freedom and enjoys an independence and integrity of which no outward circumstances can deprive him. This, then, is the Stoic 'salvation.' It turns from a world which no longer provided a rational life for man, and centres the whole interest on the individual. In him it finds the presence of the same reason which is the soul of the universe. It bids him awake to the consciousness of what he is, adopt that as the will of his life, and live in entire consistency with it, *i.e.* at once with universal reason and with his own nature, for these two are one. He thus stands secure against the assaults of unreason, whether they take the form of the fury of blinded men or the stirrings of blind passion. Even those losses and afflictions which belong to an existence in time and space do not greatly move him. He is pure reason; and all things, other or less than rational, remain outside the citadel of his soul. The task of his life is simple. Positively, it is to will the universal; negatively, it is to confront the irrational with absolute refusal. The Stoic saint is an ethical absolutist; and his moral judgments admit of no qualifications. It is altogether intelligible that the Christian salvation should show affinity with Stoicism, while with Aristotle and Plato the relation is almost wholly one of contrast. The metaphysical dualism of the Greek philosophies has no true parallel in the Biblical literature; neither the problem nor the solution enters into the Christian idea of salvation. But an ethical dualism and an active victory over it, which are the central interests of Stoicism, form the very stuff of Christian experience. The incisiveness, the strenuousness, even the ethical intolerance, of a Stoic have their parallels both in Jesus and in Paul. Stoic virtue, at its sternest and most assured, might have recognized its counterpart in those 'who endured the cross and despised the shame.' A high-minded man, in the years when Stoicism and Christianity competed for the winning of souls, could have no other alternative. He must commit himself to the one or the other. Yet the defect of its Greek origin clung to Stoicism and turned its strength to weakness. After all, though it is a monism, it is born of dualism. Its unity is the unity of one element, which does not really transmute its opposite, and can do nothing with it but reject it. At its best Stoicism has the strength and weakness of asceticism. It can repress, but it cannot construct. It can command, but it cannot create. It has no inward spring of action, capable of continuous transformation of character and endless service of the ideal. It is law, not gospel. Like all honest legalists, the Stoic was bound to end in pessimism.

4. Philo and Plotinus.—The conclusion is that, since in Stoicism the guiding clue of Greek philosophy has failed us, we must seek some other. Plainly some deeper principle is wanted than reason, which can never subdue its opposite. The human spirit must seek for the ultimate unity, *i.e.* for God, not in the outer world of the universe or the inner world of the soul, but in a region that transcends both. It must cease to rely on pure thought as the instrument of its endeavour or the method of its approach. God must be held to be essentially transcendent. He cannot be immanent in it. His connexion with it cannot be immediate, but must be maintained through intermediaries. The Logos must be dethroned from its position of Lord of all and become at best the greatest of those intermediaries. Man cannot find God even by the highest form of spiritual energy hitherto practised. Philosophy itself can bring us no farther than the threshold, which can be crossed, if ever, only in ecstasy. Such an experience leaves even the purest contemplation hopelessly behind, and implies the death of the very self which irresistibly craves this final blessedness. This is the religion—it would be improperly called a philosophy—in which the Greek spirit finally sought satisfaction. It closes an epoch. In the same period Christianity is inaugurating a new experience and giving a new statement and solution of the age-long problem. These two forms of spiritual endeavour are contemporaries. Their interrelations dominate the subsequent history of thought. Greek philosophy does not stand alone at the point which it has reached. Indeed, it may be regarded as the expression of a movement which filled the Hellenic-Roman world. God was not to be found in the stereotyped religions and the systematic philosophies. He was in a beyond which must be reached, as it were, in a kind of desperation. This is the significance alike of the mystery-religions and of the closing period of Greek philosophy. The same stage, moreover, had been reached by a race whose mental qualities were widely different from those of the Greek. The religion of Israel stands apart from the theological conceptions of the Hellenic spirit. Its problem is primarily and essentially moral. It concerns the relation of man with a God who is not afar off, as a unity above all differences, but near in His righteous and merciful actions. He is not an Idea, with the impotence of impersonality, but a living Being, known in His doings. No Hebrew ever dreamed of discussing either the existence or knowableness of God—He has made Himself known; He is acting

in the history of His people. What is left for man to do is to read the lesson of history and enter into the redeeming purpose of God as it grows through the centuries. There came a time, however, when it was not so easy to hold the idea of God as living, active, and close at hand. The historical revelation ceased with the destruction of Israel as a separate nationality. The voice of prophecy is still. Its place is taken by a sacred book. In it is written down the absolute truth of God. Man's business is to learn the contents of the book and hold, and do, what is therein prescribed. But God Himself is not there. He is in a heaven above. From thence He will come in a great day and vindicate Himself and establish His sovereignty. The idea of God in His bare transcendence takes growing hold of the Jewish mind. The Jew has reached the point where the Greek mind stood after the failure of Stoicism was becoming manifest. Dualism, which had been alien to his religious consciousness, has laid its malign spell on him. He, like the Greek, has somehow to bridge the chasm between the absolute and the relative, the infinite and the finite, a principle of unity and the manifold of experience. He, too, has to provide a way of salvation whereby the exiled spirit of man may regain its home in God. When he reaches this point, the Jew becomes the pupil of the Greek and takes over the Greek solution of the problem, which is common to both. The Hellenizing of an Isaiah is unthinkable. The Hellenizing of Philo Judæus was inevitable. In point of fact, dualism arrives in the natural movement of the human mind. When it is stated in its metaphysical form, there is only one solution, after philosophical reflexion has sunk exhausted under a task too heavy for it. The solution consists fundamentally in two conceptions—mediation between the transcendent God and the finite world, and ecstatic communion between man and the God who cannot be reached by exercise of rational faculty. The scheme of religious thought, accordingly, throughout three centuries has the same outline, whether we study it in a Jewish or in a Greek representative. The details, of course, vary widely, but they come under three heads; (*a*) the idea of God as transcendent; (*b*) the relation of God to the world through intermediaries; (*c*) the salvation of man through an ascent, which culminates in ecstasy.

Philo, born about 20 B.C., represents the Jewish movement, while the Greek development has its finest exponent in Plotinus (A.D. 203–269). A brief summary will illustrate the resemblance between them.

Philo.—(i.) *The idea of God.*—The transcendence of God finds in Philo[1] such strong emphasis as at once imperils His connexion with the world and His relation to man. Anthropomorphism must be scrupulously set aside. In pure and reverent thought we rise to the conception of God as One who is wholly removed from all relations, and therefore cannot be defined. We know that He is. What He is can never be apprehended in thought. He has no attributes, and such predicates as we apply to Him express only the gulf which separates Him from the sphere of things relative and finite and His removal from the grasp of our thought—ἁπλοῦς, ἄρρητος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἄτρεπτος, ἀΐδιος, ἄφθαρτος. He is the simply existent (ὁ ὤν, τὸ ὄν); He is self-sufficient (ἑαυτῷ ἱκανός) and cannot directly sustain relations with any finite being.

(ii.) *The idea of mediation.*—Between a God thus conceived and the finite world some link must be found. God is not identical with the world, nor can His pure essence be brought into immediate contact with the world. Philo finds the bridge built for him, both in Greek thought and in Jewish theology. God operated on the world in virtue of powers which are His and yet in some sense are separable from Him. For the Jew these powers are personified attributes of God. For the Greek they are the Ideas which Plato held to be the truth of things, and which later thought tended more and more to hypostatize. These intermediaries Philo concentrated in the Logos, the one mediator between the transcendent God and the finite world. The Logos is all in all for Philo. Without the Logos there could be no knowledge of God, nor any relation of God to man. The Logos is the first-born Son of God, or even the second God; and, from the other side of the contrast between God and the world, the Logos is the Heavenly Man, the Intercessor, the High Priest on behalf of man. To the Logos belong the great OT types of the divine presence and power, the manna, the living stream, the cloud, the rock in the wilderness.

The same great name, the same honorific titles, and the same typology are to be found in the NT; but the difference between Philo and the NT writers is profound. In Philo the problem is metaphysical and cosmological. The Logos links ontological opposites together. The Philonic Logos presupposes a distant Deity. In the NT the problem is moral and personal. The Logos crosses a far deeper than an ontological chasm, viz. that which yawns between two moral beings who were meant to live in harmony, one of whom has rebelled against the love which ought to have been his inward constraint and impulse. The NT Logos presupposes a God so near to man that He entered into the situation sin has made, and, as man, achieved the reconciliation. The problem is set to the divine love and to the human conscience, and it is solved not in idea, but in historic fact. The Logos of the NT is not a shadow cast by God, but the brightness of His glory, the express image of His person, not a vague speculative figure of which it is impossible to say whether it is God or other than God, personal or impersonal, but an historic personality, Jesus of Nazareth. It is with a kind of triumph not quite unmixed with scorn that the NT writers fling back on Alexandrian Judaism its august yet empty formula. The Logos? Certainly, we have heard and seen that word—not an empty name, but the living voice of a present redeeming God. 'The Logos became flesh, and tarried among us.' 'It is of what existed from the very beginning, of what we heard, of what we saw, of what we witnessed and touched with our own hands, it is of the Logos of life—it is of what we heard and saw that we bring you word, so that you may share our fellowship, and our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ.' This is not philosophy at all. It is life, rising out of historic fact, fulfilling itself in experience.

(iii.) *The idea of salvation.*—On principles of dualism there is only one source of man's distress—his body, which is the tomb or prison of his soul. From the body, therefore, man must be delivered, and also from the whole activity of the soul as that is occupied with things finite; and, as action is necessarily occupied with things finite, deliverance can be accomplished only where the soul has sunk into passivity and yielded itself to the rapture of the beatific vision. The stages of this salvation are, practically, stereotyped for all these centuries. Philo named them ἄσκησις, διδαχή, φύσις, 'moral discipline,' 'contemplation,' 'ecstasy.' This is the way of salvation as conceived throughout the whole Hellenic world. There is in it no conception of an historic redemption wrought for men. Indeed, even the Logos ceases to be necessary and may be left out of account in the final step that brings emancipation. There is no call for faith, as an act of trustful commitment or as a life of personal loyalty. The contents of the Philonic salvation do not include the peace of forgiveness, the joy of reconciliation, the gladness of filial confidence.

Plotinus.—(i.) *The idea of God.*—The transcendence of God finds final expression in Plotinus[1] What is present in Plato almost, as it were, against his will, what is the last result of Aristotle's great endeavour to present a truly organic view of the universe, what the Stoics were driven back upon, as they fought a rear-guard action against the irrationality of their environment, what Philo robed in the pieties of the OT, is for Plotinus the crown of religion and philosophy, the heart of his message to a world determined to reach God at any cost. As an idealist he climbs 'the steep ascent to heaven,' rising above every stage of existence and thought that is still mingled with the finite and the relative, seeking continually the unity which shall escape from difference. Then, when he has reached the top of the ladder, he finds it too short to reach the higher sphere, where the Absolute dwells inaccessible and unknowable. The Absolute is beyond existence, beyond good, beyond knowledge, beyond will. In the most literal sense the Absolute is ineffable. Even to ascribe unity to what is not an object for thought is an improper procedure, for to predicate is to limit. The Hebrew redeemer God says, 'I am that I am.' The Absolute of Plotinus, if He could declare anything, would say, 'I am not anything that can be expressed in any word that is intelligible to the ears of man.' The only truth that can be affirmed of such a God is that we can affirm nothing. This ultimate negation is not the humility of a worshipper, nor is it the despair of the agnostic; it is the voice of philosophy itself, declaring that unity cannot be found in differences, a philosophy which proclaims itself the ultimate, the only possible, religion. It is the voice of an epoch, finding utterance through its finest representative. This is the secret thought of the mystery-religion. All the philosophical and religious endeavours of the day have attained their utmost in thus raising an altar Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ; and on this the race of men has laid as an offering its aspiration and its hope.

(ii.) *The idea of mediation.*—Plotinus is not a pantheist; the finite does not live in God, though, apart from God, it would not be. It is; yet, if we are to reach God, we must leave it behind. Out of God, in some sense, it comes. Yet God cannot have any direct connexion with it, either to make it or to sustain it. The relation of a transcendent God to the world cannot be conceived except through spatial metaphors. If God is

[1] See art. ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY.

[1] See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

the beyond, plainly a bridge is wanted to connect Him with what is on the hither side. It is at this point that Plotinus shows himself to be no true Platonist and to be the exponent of a new Platonism, which is fundamentally a misapprehension of Plato. It is true that Plato did not succeed in showing that the two elements with which he worked implied each other, and that to separate them was to make the solution of the problem of knowledge impossible; but he did not mean to place truth in one region, spatially separate from phenomena. 'For him, as for modern Idealism, all reality and being fall within experience, if not indeed within knowledge, and the distinction which he accepts is plainly shown by his terminology to be a distinction of aspects within the intellectual or real world.'[1] Plotinus does what Plato and Aristotle were too concrete in their thought to do: he separates truth from the world of experience and then has to build a bridge between them. For a conception of the divine immanence he substitutes a scheme of subordination, as follows: (1) the Unknowable Absolute; (2) the intelligence; (3) the world-soul; (4) the phenomenal world; (5) unknowable matter. It sounds mythological. It is mythology. It is the expedient to which a thoroughgoing dualism is necessarily reduced. When the extremes are held apart, an intermediary must be found which is not a real principle of union, but a third being externally related to each. This subordinationism pervaded the thought of the day. The attempt to make it the form of Christian thought regarding God, man, and salvation well-nigh wrecked Christianity itself.

(iii.) *The idea of salvation.*—It is difficult on principles of mysticism to understand the descent of man. But, waiving this, we can see what salvation of soul must be. It must be an ascent of man passing upward towards the fountain of truth and reality, which arises 'beyond existence.' Plotinus has nothing to add to the way of salvation which is common to all who seek to cross the chasm wrought by a dualistic view of God and the world. Its steps are stereotyped: (1) morality, conceived ascetically as purification of the soul; (2) contemplation, which thinks away all difference and apprehends the unity of the self and God; (3) ecstasy, the state, not necessarily accompanied by physical disturbances, in which the mind concentrates itself on God and reaches a condition which is indescribable, just as God Himself is ineffable. This is the beatific vision of which no report can be given, except that it is the 'life of the gods, and of godlike and blessed men, a release from all else here below, a life that takes no pleasure in earthly things, a flight of the alone to the alone.' This, then, is the highest that men can do. It is, at the same time, the exhaustion of the human spirit and the confession of its despair. The religious situation of the Western world in the first three centuries of our era presents a threefold choice: (*a*) unmitigated paganism, materialism, barbarism, in which the soul is 'lost' with an unmistakable and lamentable destruction; (*b*) the movement, of which the mystery-religions are the popular examples, and Neo-Platonism the final philosophical expression, offering a salvation for the soul, which is essentially an ecstatic experience of union with a blank and indeterminate divinity; (*c*) Christianity, the gospel of a divine love historically manifested in a human life and death, the experience of that love in the lives of men, reconciling them to God, forgiving their sins, binding them together in an organism indissoluble by force of persecution, by tyranny of space, or by the incident of death. It is true that Christianity conquered; that it still endures; and that, when the same alternatives are presented, it always wins. But it is also true that, in those very centuries in which it was winning its triumphs, it was being profoundly modified in the direction both of the mystery-religions and of Neo-Platonism. Its conception of salvation is never wholly lost. The personality of Jesus and the realism of His Cross make that an impossibility. Yet the simplicity of the gospel and the fulness of Christian experience are at once overlaid and impoverished by alien elements. Christianity becomes a mystery-religion, and theology owes more to Plotinus than to Paul.

IV. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN GREEK THEOLOGY.*—Recall the Greek non-Christian philosophy, which by this time was also the religion and theology of the cultured.[2] There is a wide contrast between it and the Christian religion of redemption. The NT is fully aware of this contrast. In the writings of Paul, in Hebrews, and in the Fourth Gospel we have the standpoint of men who were sufficiently acquainted with Greek thought to know that it belonged to a wholly different type of religious experience. They were perfectly willing to use its characteristic forms, if by this means they could win a hearing and present their Christ as the reality after which the best of the Greeks had earnestly sought. But they must be allowed to fill the forms with their own special message. Thus the Greek forms on Christian lips have little in common with the philosophy from which they are derived except the bare terminology. The heart of the NT is not a Logos Christology, but a soteriology that is historical and experimental to the core. The case, however, is altogether different when we pass from the NT to the scientific theology which arose in the 2nd cent., grew for three hundred years to a portentous elaboration, and created a fabric of dogma within which the Church has dwelt even to this day. The authors of it did not perceive the chasm that separated Greek philosophy from Christian experience. The form of their thinking was Greek; the matter of it was Christian. Now, when form and matter are disparate and the attempt is made to bring them together, one or other of two things will happen—either the matter will break up the form and force its way towards some higher and more adequate category or the form will subdue to itself the matter and deeply alter its value and significance. The latter alternative describes the course of Greek theology. It was meant to expound and defend the faith. It is true that it did sweep from the field all intellectual rivals; but it is not true that the faith remained victorious. The faith itself was profoundly modified; and the idea of salvation that emerges is certainly not of the NT type, while it conforms closely to prevalent Greek conceptions. The ruling ideas which we have noted in Philo and Plotinus as representative of the whole movement repeat themselves in the leading Greek theologians.

1. **The idea of God.**—That conception of God with which Greek philosophy terminated, viz. the Absolute, the Transcendent, the Indeterminable, governs unquestioned in the domain of Christian thought. The Fathers fall back on this abstract notion, with which to interpret the Christian faith in God, who is known in Christ, whose children believers in Christ are. It is a metaphysical envelope, in which is enclosed a religious experience. A metaphysic, essentially dualistic, is used to express and interpret a life whose glory consists in ethical oneness with the God to whom through Christ there is direct access, and of whom in Christ there is immediate knowledge. This metaphysical conception of God prevailed in Greek theology till the Council of Chalcedon closed that epoch of constructive work. It has remained to this day in spite of the reversion to the NT which marked the Reformation, in spite of that destruction of dogmatism with which Kant inaugurated the modern age; and still it confuses the issues for men who have travelled far from the conditions of Greek thought. God, as thus described, even by men who are seeking to defend Christian monotheism—Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, Origen—is not, in the forms they use, the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the God whose very essence is love, who by the inner constraint of His character must needs appear in human history and work out there in action and suffering the great salvation. Love and holiness, with the action and passion arising therefrom, are lacking to the Greek idea of God, and this defect makes that idea unsuited to act as the governing category of Christian soteriology.

2. **The idea of mediation.**—The shape which the problem of mediation will take is necessarily determined by the idea of God. With the Greek idea of God in their minds, the Greek theologians gave to the problem a distinctly cosmological character; and their solution took a predominantly metaphysical form. They have not indeed forgotten the human interest in salvation and the conviction of faith regarding the Saviour. But they have given soteriology a decidedly cosmological cast and have supposed that, if they could

[1] B. Bosanquet, *A Companion to Plato's Republic*[2], London, 1895, p. 248.

[2] See above, § II.

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solve the problem of *being*, they had met the need of *salvation*.

The question, as they conceive it, is, How can God be connected with the world? In this question the whole of Greek dualism is involved, because 'God' is regarded as an entity of one kind, and the 'world' as a substance of so utterly diverse a kind that God can have no direct dealing with it, and therefore also man, as sunk in matter, can have no direct access to God. The only possible solution of such a problem is the building of a bridge between God and the world, and the question that divides the different schools, Greek and Christian, is as to the composition and structure of this bridge. Both schools indeed use one word: the bridge, or at least its central span, is the Logos. The differentia of the Christian answer is that the Logos is Christ. The main concern, therefore, of Christian theology is to contend that Christ, as Logos, is divine enough to reach the farther shore, where the Absolute dwells in the lonely splendour of His ineffable being. But by the logic of that dualism which was ineradicable in Greek philosophy it was impossible to say that the Christ Logos was *quite* God. Even supposing the distinction of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός were adopted, and a dwelling of the Logos in God were affirmed, yet the Logos appearing in the soul of Jesus cannot be on an equality with God. Lofty as is the rank of the Christ Logos, He is still one remove from the Absolute. There must be a subordination of Christ to God in respect of being, and therefore also of value. Precisely here, however, Greek dualism, even in Christian guise, found Christian faith sensitive, alert, and armed. The common sort of believers were perfectly certain that the Logos (whatever that might be in philosophy) was Jesus, and that Jesus, as Saviour, was as divine as God. This was a 'value-judgment' of faith, whatever theology might make of it. Yet faith had this inherent weakness, when it tried to say what God is, and what by consequence the Logos-Saviour is: it had no other idea to work with than the Greek conception of the remote and lonely Absolute. By such a presupposed dualism of God and the world, of form and matter, and by such conflicting interests of head and heart, the course of Christian thought is determined, till Nicæa, nominally at least, drove Greek philosophy from the field. The oft-told story runs in three chapters.

(1) *Subordinationism in control.*—Christ is an intermediary needed to connect God with the world. Christian faith, indeed, rejoiced to think of Jesus as the Son and Servant of God, entering the world on a redemptive mission and carrying out the Father's will of love, in life and death, thereby securing forgiveness, reconciliation, and fellowship. But, when taken up into Greek metaphysical and dualistic philosophy, this truth of religion attested in experience is turned into a doctrine of the person of Christ, which makes Him second from God in rank of being; and this is precisely the reverse of what faith meant to say. The Logos Christology is not the implicit faith of the NT, brought into clear consciousness by its own inherent logic. It is that faith stated, with the best intention, in a logic which did not belong to it. It is found in the apologists, to whom the Logos as a separate existence is numerically distinct from God, a second God, to be worshipped indeed, but not to be regarded as in the fullest sense God, subordinate to God, a kind of 'depotentiated God.' The point of these assertions is that they are not reached through a study of the inner life of Jesus and are not an attempt to enter into the secret of His self-consciousness. They are constructions based on an *a priori* conception of God which was not critically examined or experimentally evaluated. They are deductions of what the Logos must be; not a picture of the Jesus of history, who, for NT Christianity, is the Jesus of faith. Irenæus's doctrine of the person and work of Christ displays closer contact with the NT thought and life. He is clear on the fundamental Christian convictions 'that the Creator of the world and the supreme God are one and the same' and that 'Christianity is real redemption . . . effected by the appearance of Christ.'[1] But the atmosphere of the day cleaves to him. He is still operating with categories supplied to him by the last phase of Greek philosophy, with their parallels in the mystery-religions. Salvation requires participation in the being of God, and it is primarily because this being is brought within reach by the Incarnation that Christ can be Saviour. Irenæus's account of the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις is poetic and suggests truth deeper than he knew; but in him it has Neo-Platonic connotation and runs out into sacramentarianism and mysticism. The presuppositions are still ontological. Christ 'was made as we are in order that He might make us to be as He is.' It is still salvation by participation in divine essence, and to that extent it is Greek rather than Christian.

In the great Alexandrians we have the same combination of intense Christian conviction with the Greek metaphysic and the Logos Christology. Clement's description of God is as defective as anything in Philo or Plotinus. God is 'formless and nameless, though we sometimes give Him titles, which are not to be taken in their proper sense, the One, the Good, Intelligence, or Existence, or Father, or God, or Creator, or Lord'—a truly 'appalling definition.'[1] Appalling though it be, it is the climax of centuries of Greek thought, and, when it is used as starting-point, a satisfying Christian doctrine of God and of salvation becomes impossible. It is quite true that nothing was farther from Clement's mind than to attribute to Christ a reduced divinity. He desired to bring Him as close to God as possible—as close, say, as the Nous, or intelligible world, in Plotinus's trinity. Yet in the last resort Christ is not God Himself, in His own proper person, acting, suffering, saving on man's behalf. The Logos may be the immanent reason of the universe, and Clement is the typical 'Broad Churchman' rejoicing in a revelation of God to Greek as well as to Christian. But this reason has always God, in His essence unknowable, behind it. Subordinationism attends on the Greek idea of God, like its shadow. Thoroughly Greek, too, is Clement's conception of the work of Christ. Clement has not entered Christianity through the moral discipline of the OT. He is through and through intellectualist, in his views at once of need and of salvation. He 'himself had passed through no spiritual crisis; enlightenment rather than the need of forgiveness, intellectual unrest rather than an accusing conscience, drove him to the Christian faith.'[2] The source of man's distress is ignorance; hence comes the disease of sin, and man is doomed to death. The work of Christ, therefore, though Clement employs the classic language of sacrifice, is to give knowledge. This throws the actual experience of humanity into the shade, and Clement is constantly slipping towards docetism. All that is needed, from a Greek point of view, is enough humanity to convey ideas to men. Real identification with men is not needed, though, from a Christian point of view, it is the *sine qua non* of salvation.

Origen's loyalty to the full divinity of Christ is beyond question, but his scheme of thought is Greek, and it is through the Greek *a priori* conceptions that he apprehends the statements of Scripture. He is no avowed subordinationist; and yet the all but inevitable issue of his thought is subordinationism. His God is the Absolute, whom, however, after Plato, he conceives as good with inward *nisus* towards self-communication. Between this God and the world there are (i.) the Logos, produced by the will of God supra-temporally in an ineffable act of generation; (ii.) the Logos united with the pre-existent holy soul of Jesus; (iii.) these two inhabiting an incontaminate body, born of a virgin; (iv.) along with the Logos, but without any inherent necessity, the Spirit, an adjunct, borrowed from Scripture and subordinate with the Logos, though superior to all other holy beings. This is not the Christianity of the NT. It is Christianity stretched on the rack of Greek thought.

The logic of subordinationism becomes explicit in Arianism. The issue of the Greek metaphysical conception of God is now made plain. Let God be conceived as the Absolute. Let Christ be regarded as the Logos, between God and the world, and the result is inevitable—a distortion of the Christian idea of salvation and an emptying of Christian experience of its rich ethical and religious contents. Clement and Origen were great believers; but they were too much under the dominance of Greek thought to do full justice to the Christian faith in Christ or to unfold and verify the Christian experience of salvation. In Arius we have a thinker who had gone one worse than any of his predecessors. In the guise of a Christian ascetic, he is plain Greek and pagan. In him the Greek religious philosophy, in this its latest phase, is making its final stand. It understands that it must make terms with Christianity. Its terms are these: it will accept Christ as of divine rank and will apply to Him any honorific title that may be proposed, and set Him far above all men and all angelic beings, at the head of the whole creation, but it will not, either as a philosophy or as a religion, treat Him as Himself God, or a real incarnation of God, or God living and working out man's redemption. He is at His greatest a κτίσμα still; at best, a cosmological principle, but no Saviour from sin's guilt and power. This is the old heathenism, whatever its disguise. Christianity was at the crisis of its fate. To have accepted Arianism would have meant absolute defeat, the arrest of the whole movement of the human spirit Godward.[3]

(2) *Monarchianism, in vigorous defence of Christian monotheism.*—Monarchianism (*q.v.*) takes its rise as a protest against the attempt to make Christ an Æon, or intermediate being, and asserts the prevailing Christian interest in the unity and

[1] Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1894-99, ii. 237.

[1] Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 63.

[2] John Patrick, *Clement of Alexandria*, Edinburgh and London, 1914, p. 119.

[3] Cf. artt. ARIANISM, SUBORDINATION.

supremacy of God. It rightly sees that salvation is God's act only, and that to transfer the mighty work to any Saviour, divided, however faintly, from the only God, is to invalidate it and leave faith no security. But this Christian interest was defeated by the Greek idea of God. The Monarchians too are Greeks. They are working with Greek categories—the Absolute, the Monas, and the like. They set themselves a task which was really impossible—to combine the divinity of Christ with that Greek conception. A choice of paths appeared to them. They might hold the individuality of Christ and regard the divine in Him as a quality or force; or they might hold the divinity of Christ in the fullest sense, but regard it as the very presence of the absolute God. The former alternative looks at Jesus as a man inspired by God, and so, by a special line, leads round into subordinationism and makes salvation a human achievement, accomplished by moral endeavour. The latter is much more fitted, in one sense, to express Christian conviction and might seem to be no more than what adoring faith will ascribe to its divine object. In point of fact, however, when traced to its Greek original, it is an almost complete denial of the Christian verities. Here is no living God, but an expanding and contracting Monas; no Mediator between God and man, Himself man, no living Saviour and Lord. The Son has no life of His own, and, when His temporary manifestation is over, He is retracted into the Monas and lost to faith. Tertullian's vigorous protest was of value in asserting the necessity of the historic Christ for the security of the Christian salvation. But Tertullian's own Christology is still caught in the Logos scheme and assigns to Christ no more than a *portio* of the Godhead.

(3) *The victory of Nicæa.*—The intolerable consequences of Greek dualism are met by Athanasius with a flat denial. For three centuries Greek thought has assumed that God could not be brought into direct communication with anything so low as a material universe, but needed intermediaries. Christian thought had not ventured to declare that this was pure *a priori* prejudice, but gave a religious turn to Greek philosophy by declaring that Christ was such an intermediary, who, by the logic of this movement, would not be quite what God is. Athanasius is brave enough to say that the long-accepted dualism is no necessity of thought. God can create directly. There is no need of a *tertium quid*. It is true that God uses the instrumentality of His Son in the act of creation, but this is a secondary matter. The central function of the Son is not cosmological, but redemptive. His central significance in theology, as in Christian faith, is His agency in salvation. The object of the Christian worship is not the Logos of the philosophers, but the Son of God, the historic Christ, who was born, and lived, and died, and rose again. In Him God Himself entered into humanity. Therefore no phrase must be used which shall permit Him to be thought of as a creature, however near to God, or howsoever adorned with epithets. Human salvation demands that there shall be more than a bridge by which man shall pass to God; that there shall be in humanity a divine Being in becoming one with whom man shall reach oneness with God and so be saved. This, in fact, is the Christian message of salvation. 'He was not man, and then became God, but He was God and became man and that to deify us.' The Son, accordingly, is not to be thought of as an intermediary, a second God. He must be regarded as having the same substance with the Father and constituting with the Father a unity. The symbol of Nicæa makes this position explicit: 'Begotten from the Father as only begotten God from God, *i.e.* from the very being of the Father (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*), sharing one being with the Father (*ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί*).'

Thus the long history of Greek philosophy is brought to a close by an intuition of faith discerning the value of a fact of history. Christ is the Son of God. No cosmological scheme can content the believing heart which has found in Christ, not an introduction to God, but God Himself in the fullness of the Godhead. A cosmological bridge does not meet the need of salvation. Suppose we climb to the end of the span formed by the Logos, what guarantee have we that it will really abut on God? Rather, it is certain that, if Christ be not truly God, there will still be a chasm to cross. Well might Athanasius say, 'We are fighting for our all,' when he stood against an Arian world. Therefore historians and theologians of every shade of orthodoxy have sympathized with Athanasius and have admitted that a diphthong may mark the whole difference between Christianity and paganism.

To do this, however, and even to accept *ex animo* the Nicene Creed as a confession of faith, does not mean to be satisfied with it as a doctrine of God or of Christ or of salvation. The use of the word *οὐσία* has unconsciously and unintentionally reintroduced the very philosophy it was meant to exclude. God viewed as *οὐσία* is a static Deity, such an 'unmoved mover' as Aristotle reached through his dualism of matter and form, such an Absolute as Philo or Plotinus set in immobile and immortal blessedness beyond the manifold of experience. Such a God does not really live. He never acts. He cannot suffer. He has an *οὐσία* all His own. The Son shares that with the Father. Thus the affirmation of faith, that Christ is as divine as God, is construed to mean that He had a divine essence which is not man's. And, as soon as this passes into common belief, we have left NT ground and are occupying the position of the mystery-religions and of Neo-Platonism, viz. that salvation means participation in the divine Being, a participation that is effected in a supra-rational manner by vision or ecstasy. The victory which faith won at Nicæa was thus in great measure nullified by the metaphysic which remained uncorrected in the language of the creed. Faith is quite sure that Christ the Lord is as divine as the Father, whose Son and Servant He is, and as human as those whom He came to save. In that assurance there is implicit a view of divinity and humanity which thinks of them not as opposites or disparate essences, but as so related that a divine Being may have a human experience and be in the fullest sense God, being in the completest sense man, while manhood is perfected in the human experience through which God attains the ends of His holy love. This view, however, was rendered impossible by the metaphysical view of God which remained in the minds even of believing theologians, wholly uncriticized and uncorrected. The result was a theological *impasse*. The dualism which wrecked Greek philosophy has returned and has inserted itself in the doctrine of the person of Christ and in the conception of salvation bound up therewith. The Christological discussions of the 4th cent. represent the mind of man exhausting itself in alternative escapes from an impossible situation. Take the Apollinarian road and mutilate the humanity so that divinity may have room to act; take the pathway of Nestorius and place divinity side by side with its opposite and bind them together with a phrase; follow Eutyches and absorb the humanity in the divinity—in each case Greek dualism is driving faith whither it would not go, and, as soon as faith becomes aware of the coercion of logic, it revolts and, in defiance of logic, returns to its basal convictions. It cares nothing for logic; its one interest is salvation. If that be endangered, it will expel as heresy the most carefully devised Christology. This is, of course, what faith did in the symbol of Chalcedon.

'The definitions of ancient creeds . . . were an attempt to stake off the limits of that area which the Church had come to claim as reserved for faith and sacred to it; marking it off by certain assured points which she believed to be guaranteed at once by the witness of Holy Scripture and by her own consciousness of salvation in Christ.'[1]

Our estimate of Chalcedon repeats that of Nicæa. It is a victory for faith, rendered fruitless by the employment of categories useless and misleading, if employed beyond the bare purpose of negating error. They are steeped in metaphysical dualism and are unfit to bring into clear consciousness an experience in which the supposed opposites of philosophy are held together in the grasp of a living synthesis. In the article just quoted Dykes thus sums up his review of the Chalcedonian formula:

'A Being who combines in an inscrutable fashion Divine with Human properties, and of whom consequently contradictory assertions may be made, whose single Person is Divine, while His dual natures hold an undefined relation to one another: this is not a scheme to satisfy either head or heart.'[2]

In point of fact, neither the head nor the heart of the Church was satisfied with the Chalcedonian orthodoxy. When divinity and humanity are placed in juxtaposition, without any real unity

[1] J. Oswald Dykes, *ExpT* xvii. [1905–06] 7.
[2] *Ib.* p. 10.

between them, both mind and heart will place the emphasis on divinity. The primal need is for God. It is God in Christ who saves. If, therefore, God be defined in terms which make a human experience for Him impossible, the inevitable result will be that the humanity of the Saviour sinks in value and reality. Cyril had the interests of salvation at heart. But he so conceived of God that salvation was imperilled, lost its distinctively Christian character, and took a specifically Greek form. Monophysitism, expelled in name, returns in power. Christ is so one with God that He shares the divine transcendence. Hence arises a double dualism: (*a*) within the person of Christ, between His divinity and His humanity, the latter being rendered by orthodoxy more and more unreal and ineffective; (*b*) in the sphere of salvation, between the divine Christ and human beings, who find it now as hard to get to Christ as ever Neo-Platonist did to reach the absolute Deity. Christianity had appealed to Greek philosophy, and it had received its reward. The God it had found in Christ was removed to an intolerable distance; and Christ, who was one with God, shared the remoteness of the Absolute. Once more the chasm yawned; once more a bridge had to be built, or, rather, the bridge reared by the speculative genius of Plotinus was still standing. This, therefore, the human spirit was constrained to use, giving it only a new facing of Christian forms and usages, not knowing or not heeding that, in so doing, it was reverting to something that lay farther back than Neo-Platonism, in the obscurities of primeval religious feeling, and was transmuting Christianity into a revived mystery-religion.

3. **The idea of salvation.**—The Greek scheme works out as follows. (*a*) *Man and sin.*—In his innermost essence man belongs to the sphere of the divine. As in Plotinus individual souls belong to the world-soul and are one in essence with it, so in the Christian application of this thought all souls are divine in being. Their reality and their blessedness consist in their participation in the divine nature. Their separation from it would be destruction, and their salvation would be reunion with it. The whole movement is apart from ethical relationship. The goal is a good that is above moral good. The salvation, in like manner, is a process which may have morality as a stage, but reaches towards a metaphysical issue, accomplished not through rectification of moral relations, but through changes affecting essence and being. This distinction between moral values and metaphysical reality goes deep into the Greek idea of salvation and marks it off from the NT region of thought. From a pristine state of oneness with the divine nature human souls have fallen. In harmony with the Platonizing thought of his day, Origen had held the pre-existence of souls. Whether in this theory or in that of creationism, the fall of souls is wholly unintelligible. Plotinus could not give a reason for the irrational. The descent was simply part of the working of his scheme—a far-off result of the distinction of matter and form, observable in all experience. In Christian thought the Greek regard for the determining power of reason is uppermost. Greek theology remains true to the freedom of man, conceiving it as bare power of the rational nature, a power inherent, incapable of being lost. In any case the descent has been made by Adam and is made by practically every individual soul. The descent, as in Greek thought, is into the region of matter and sense and mortality. In this position freedom cannot indeed be lost, but is considerably weakened, and the soul would need assistance of some sort in its upward way, as it seeks its home in the supersensuous sphere and returns to its divine original. It is a simple and obvious situation, precisely that which Greek thought had been dealing with for centuries. Man is sunk in sense, with all its concomitant evils—mortality and subjection to demonic power. The one problem is the ascent of man. It is not the situation as the NT, with its roots in the OT, conceived it. For a mind trained in Hebraic modes of thought, for a conscience disciplined by the revelation of the divine holiness, the situation is that of man's revolt, in the pride of self-assertion, against the will of a holy, loving, and sovereign God. Greek theology is singularly lacking in its sense of the righteousness and holiness of God; and its soteriology suffers accordingly. Its captivity to Greek forms is conspicuous and disastrous.

(*b*) *Redemption.*—Plainly, what is needed by man, thus immersed in a region so foreign to his true being, is reinstatement in the sphere to which he belongs, *i.e.* the divine. The descent must be replaced by ascent, and the successful accomplishment of this process is termed 'deification.' Man must be lifted to the place to which he belongs and become what God is in His essential nature—*i.e.* immortal, free from all taint of sense. The central significance of this deification is the quality that is assigned to the divine essence. There is no rich ethical content filling the thought. Greek speculation defines God mainly by negations; and thus its conception of deification is also mainly negative. The aspiration of the soul is set on a mode of being of which nothing can be said, save that it is at the opposite pole from matter. True, this higher state is conceived as the only reality, for matter, in genuine Platonic fashion, is conceived as non-being. But, after all, mere being is scarcely a richer thought than non-being. Deification reaches being, and that is reckoned blessedness; but the contents of that blessedness are, like God Himself, beyond predication. Salvation, thus conceived as deification, can be only partial, as long as the soul has any material integument. It can never therefore be a possession. It is not, as in the NT, by a paradox, both possession and inheritance. It lies in the beyond only. Its instalments are not itself. They are only steps towards it. Only when the dead lift is complete, and the soul escapes from matter, does it reach salvation. The method of this deliverance is determined by the goal. The question for Greek thought is how to get the divine nature so near to man that man can unite himself with it and share its blessedness. There is no question of atonement and reconciliation, of a moral estrangement overcome by love, and a new moral relationship entered upon in faith. Baptized into Christianity, Greek thought proclaims the Incarnation to be the method of salvation. The divine life is in Christ—not indeed in His flesh: He has no more relation to flesh and blood than will allow the divinity, which is His only real being, to become accessible to man. The ruling thought is transformation of man's being, till he become what God is. Greek theology makes everything of the Incarnation. Yet the most damaging criticism upon it is that it does not make enough of incarnation. Deity retains its transcendence and remoteness even within the veil of flesh. It is in flesh only that man may be deified. There is no thoroughgoing human experience on the part of the Logos Christ. Even the *recapitulatio* of Irenæus, though it brings him in some aspects close to the gospel, is at bottom Greek. It means that the Incarnate One brings to actuality the divine mode of being, which is God's original plan for humanity, so that now human nature may be deified by being taken up

into it. Origen shows the real drift of the tendency, for, while recognizing rather than teaching various theories of atonement, he passes beyond them to conceive of salvation as consisting in being 'interwoven with the divine essence'—a condition reached by knowledge, revealed by Christ in His capacity as teacher and hierophant. Athanasius has rejected Greek cosmology. His profoundest concern is salvation, and this requires the full deity of the Redeemer. But, at bottom, the idea of salvation and the means of deliverance are Greek. Man's distress is his mortality. Repentance alone, therefore, cannot deliver him. Life must be brought to him, that he may partake of the very nature of the Deity. Athanasius is able to give a real place in redemption to the death and resurrection of Christ, but it is not the place assigned to them in the NT. It is still the question of deliverance from mortality with which he is dealing. In the death of Christ the law of death is abrogated, and in the resurrection of Christ incorruption is guaranteed.

'By death immortality has reached to all . . . for He was made man that we might be made God, and He manifested Himself by a body that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father, and He endured the insolence of men that we might inherit immortality. For while He Himself was in no way injured, being impassible and incorruptible and very Word and God, men who were suffering, and for whose sake He endured all this, He maintained and preserved in His own impassibility.'[1]

It is devout and very Christian in its sense of debt to Christ,[2] but its metaphysic, theology, Christology, and soteriology are Greek and not NT.

The condition under which salvation viewed as deification is obtained by men is necessarily union with Christ—*i.e.* oneness in being with His divine being. There is no question here of faith committing itself to Christ and receiving in the act His unsearchable riches. There is no union of two living personalities to be mutually possessed in love, each entering into the experience of the other. It is, in the precise sense of the age-long religion of Hellas, a mystical union, a participation not in the 'benefits of Christ,' but in His very being.

(*c*) *The process of salvation.*—In a way Greek theology was more dualistic, at least after the overthrow of subordinationism, than Neo-Platonism and more at a loss to produce an effective salvation. The divine in Christ has been so completely identified with the absolute Godhead that it cannot form the link between God and man. With the practical triumph of Monophysitism, the dualism is now as much between Christ and man as it ever was in Greek thought between God and the world. The chasm is still there. The question now is, How shall the divine Christ be made accessible to man? Where and how shall man find Christ and be made one with Him? The answer comes straight from the heart of Greek religion—that primitive religion which preceded and outlasted the intellectualized Olympians of the middle period of Greek development, and which in the last stage of Greek life and thought was found mingled in a confused syncretism with all manner of Oriental cults. The very word which carried the whole meaning of Greek religion with it is employed to designate the central element in the Christian salvation. Christ is brought to man in the 'mysteries,' of which the Eucharist is the chief. No theory of His presence as yet holds the field. The crudity of popular imagination, which regards the consecrated elements as the actual flesh and blood of Christ, is below the subtlety of Greek symbolism; and transubstantiation, as an attempt to make the mystery intelligible, is still far off. No theory is needed. Suffice it that in the rite, with the aid of all well-devised circumstances, the mind of the worshipper is subdued, the emotions are stimulated, reason is silent, and the unknown Divine, too wonderful for intellectual definition, is felt to be somehow, inexplicably, there. At this point the function of the Church becomes manifest in all its soul-subduing sanctity. The Presence depends on the rite, the rite depends for its efficacy on the celebrant, and the celebrant depends for the due performance of the rite on his place in the Church. Behold the bridge between heaven and earth, the only link that can bring Christ and man together! Where is Christ? On the altar. What brought Him there? The power of the hierurge. All that Christ can do for the soul is done in the Eucharist. It is the medicine of immortality, the instrument of deification. Rapt in spirit before the altar, severed from all things of sense, in deep emotion beyond all processes of reason, almost above consciousness of self, the soul tastes salvation and almost enjoys the beatific vision, which will one day, in a moment, admit him to the immortal life and give him the object of his passionate aspiration—participation in the divine nature. This is the core of the Christian experience. Christianity stands forth confessed a mystery-religion.

It is not necessary to deny to this 'mystery' a definite religious value. Any one who has given sympathetic attention to the Russian Eucharist must have thrilled to the sense of the unseen conveyed by a ceremonial more splendid and more surcharged with inexpressible suggestion than even the Roman rite. Still it has to be noted that its ancestry is not in the NT, but in primitive Greek religion, as that was reproduced in the mystery-religions, and that its intellectual equivalent is not the teaching of Jesus or any of His apostles, but Greek philosophy, in the last stage of its development, when, as Neo-Platonism, it offered itself to every cultured intelligence as a revelation of God and a way of salvation. It is impossible also not to note the danger which haunts it—the danger that besets all mysticism—viz. the emphasis laid on the metaphysical and the reduction of the ethical to a secondary place and value. The salvation which does not find its climax in duty and virtue needs no theological acuteness to criticize it. It is condemned already.

The process of salvation, looked at from the human side, exhibits the same thoroughgoing Greek character. The question is, How shall the soul fit itself for the great moment of its deification? The answer keeps close to Neo-Platonic lines. The first step is morality. At this point Christianity presents itself as a new law; and its morality is a baptized Stoicism. The second step is knowledge. Here Christianity takes up into itself the older Greek idea of salvation by wisdom. The third step is that in which the soul goes beyond morality, and even beyond knowledge, and makes its transition from things earthly in an ecstasy. In this procedure two points of contrast with NT Christianity are to be noted. (1) There is no place for faith. The NT knows no other condition of salvation than trust in God. Whatever psychological concomitants it may have, it is a definite conscious act of the human personality in the exercise of its highest powers. A scheme which omits this trustful commitment of the sinner to the sin-bearing and sin-forgiving God is not Christian. (2) The relation of morality to salvation is inverted. Self-purification is, in Christianity, not a stage which is left behind in the final attainment; it is the issue, the consequence, and the test of the Christian salvation. A writer who has been held responsible for mysticism in Christianity declares: 'This is how we may be sure we are in Him: he

[1] *On the Incarnation*, liv. 3.
[2] So most eloquently in §§ 4, 5.

who says he remains in Him ought to live as He lived' (1 Jn 2^{6}). A practical result of this inversion is seen in the two grades of Christians now recognized within the Church. The one remains in the world, to continue the race and carry on its business. The other devotes itself to the pursuit of salvation by those paths which are shut to ordinary traffic. Greek theology requires the solitary for the successful prosecution of the way of salvation devised by the Greek spirit. He alone can direct his soul, in entire withdrawal from sense, upon the divine, so as to obtain the vision of it and become one with it. And here is a strange, yet inevitable, thing. For the crowning experience the historic Christ and the actual Cross are no longer necessary. They themselves belong to time and sense and matter, and all these things are transcended. Salvation is gained in ecstatic contemplation, and that permits no object to be before it save the Absolute Deity. Unneeded, too, by the expert solitary is the Eucharist itself. Beyond all such things, linked as these are to the external, the soul passes inward and upward, till it is absorbed in God. When we have reached this point, we see that Christianity has lost all distinctiveness as a historical religion. It has ceased to have reference to persons or deeds. Even one unique Person and one atoning deed cease to have interest for it. It is manifest mysticism; and mysticism is identical in all its forms, whether Greek, Hindu, Muslim, or Christian.

V. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN LATIN THEOLOGY.*—The Western Church accorded to the East its special place and function as thinker and interpreter. In the controversies which marked the progress of dogma the West intervened, not as a rival specialist in speculation, but as a calm and just moderator. Chalcedon, though a settlement of Greek controversies, is a product of the Western mind, which is not versed in metaphysical subtleties, but is quite sure of the facts of faith and quite competent to say exactly what it stands for. The Greek conception of God, accordingly, passes over into the West uncriticized and unrevised. It lies behind Latin theology and its descendants and revives even after the Reformation has pointed out a more Biblical and more excellent way of thinking regarding God. That, moreover, which goes with the Greek idea of God—the conception, namely, of a salvation which consists in deification and is attained in ecstasy—remains as the highest grade of religious attainment. However elaborate the dogma, however rigid and detailed the discipline, however magnificent the cultus, the ideal of the finest religious experience remains as the mystic oneness of the soul with God, to which, ultimately, dogma and discipline and cultus are alike secondary and even indifferent. The solitary still stands above and apart from ecclesiastical Christianity and represents the highest type of the religious soul as such.

All this being presupposed and regarded as sacrosanct, Latin theology proceeds to interpret Christianity by means of its own characteristic modes of thought. These are political and social in their nature. If Greek theology was created by Greek philosophy, Latin theology was created by the Roman empire and had for its governing category the Roman imperial idea. While the idea of God, in formal Latin orthodoxy, is the Greek Absolute, taken over without revision, this empty notion is filled with contents derived from the person and authority of the Roman emperor. God is the Emperor of the universe. This is not merely a poetic image; it is a ruling principle in theology and religion, and consequences logically derived from it are binding upon mind and conscience. God is essentially will. Will takes the place of being as the deepest element in the idea of God; but it is will regarded as bare sovereignty. No doubt the Emperor of the universe will administer its affairs as the best type of Roman emperor managed his vast dominions, in the highest interests of His subjects; but the chief object of man's regard, as he contemplates God, is the tremendous operative force of His absolute will. If the universe, in one sense, is the sphere of God's imperial sway, in another the Church is His real and proper empire. As within the Roman empire, and there alone, peace and security prevailed, so only in the Church was there possibility of salvation from the evil forces that raged around it and from the unspeakable doom which awaited all beyond its pale. The heart of the empire grew chill at the thought of the barbarians, whose stroke, in those last days, had reached even the imperial city. In like manner the heart of the Christian was moved at the terror of a judgment that would surely befall him but for the sheltering walls of the city of God. His religion was a religion of fear; and salvation was deliverance from the power of Satan here and hereafter. The constitution of the Church, accordingly, becomes of first-rate religious importance. The Founder of the Church, its first great Imperator, could make no mistake. He fixed once for all its mighty ramparts. To touch them is not merely to cherish a wrong opinion, but to strike at the will of God and the very safeguards of salvation. The great security of the Church is the historic episcopate. The Scriptures, the cultus, the sacraments, all stand within the guardianship of the bishop and from him derive their salvation value and their spiritual effectiveness. The souls of men are his peculiar care. He is responsible for them to the great Head of the Church. They, for their part, have but one duty with respect to him, and that is obedience. The emperor has his double hierarchy—State officials from the loftiest to the lowliest, and the priests of the imperial worship duplicating the offices of government. So Christ has His hierarchy—bishops and presbyters, like the priests and Levites in the Jewish Temple, who are at once State officials in the ecclesiastical empire and the only celebrants in the action of Christian worship. Beneath stand the laity submissive and adoring.

Further developments follow inevitably. Salvation depends on obeying the laws of God, as they are administered by the Church. Sin means breach of these laws. Strictly speaking, sin is crime committed against the imperial majesty of heaven. Sin, therefore, like crime, must be punished, while obedience, at least if it reach large proportions, may be rewarded. Penalty and merit are brought into the relations of man to God. A man pays for his disobedience by the penalty he endures. A man's obedience is the price he pays for his security. Ominous phrases begin to be heard, 'satisfacere Deo,' 'placare Deum.' The whole system no doubt—the Church and its penitential discipline—has been brought into existence by the mercy of God. But within the system juridical and forensic principles and methods bear sway. Members of the Church live under a legal administration and have their spiritual state adjudged in terms of crime and penalty, good works and merit. In all this the NT does not come into consideration. Christianity has become the religion of the empire; but still more it has become an imperialism. We are moving throughout in a politico-legal atmosphere. The creator of the ecclesiastical soteriology is the heathen empire. In defence of the Latin theologians and churchmen it may be urged that they could scarcely help themselves.

'With the flood of new proselytes the Church acquired a constituency which could only be dealt with on legal principles: and such principles could be applied only in the way of enjoining

certain observances. That alone could be practically intelligible to the mass. The assumption followed, that when these observances were passively accepted, at least without disbelief or contradiction, they would do their work, would confer and accomplish the Christian salvation. On any other view, what must become of the mass of recognized Christians? The theory which this implied settled on men's minds like a fate. Christ has furnished us with a system of church ordinances which, if reverently complied with, do mysteriously effect salvation.'[1]

This way of salvation is expounded in Tertullian and Cyprian—the one a great apologist for the faith, the other a martyr; yet the scheme itself is not Christian. Gwatkin's blunt verdict on Cyprian exhibits the relation of a Church statesman to the ideas of his day:

'Saint he is, and martyr; and the Christian Church is justly proud of him; yet his general conception of religion is much more heathen than Christian. There is no sign that he ever troubled himself to think out the ideas on which it depends. Like a practical man, he takes them from the air about him, and assumes them to be not only true but self-evident, and concerns himself only with their practical applications.'[2]

In Latin theology proper, forensic forms are confined to the application of salvation to the souls that need it. The provision of salvation is not yet brought under these forms. The ominous *satisfactio* is not applied to the work of Christ either by Tertullian or by Cyprian. This extension of the idea, however, lies close at hand; and, when Latin theology merges into mediæval, this borrowed conception will begin its career as the key to the work of Christ.

Latin theology is systematized by St. Augustine, whose magnificence none will dispute; though, if we may adopt the expression of a much-tried Scottish king, employed by him in another connexion, he has been 'a sair sanct' to the Christian Church, whether Protestant or Catholic.

In Augustine's thought we have the blending of four great influences: (i.) a deep Pauline experience, (ii.) an experimental acquaintance with the truths of Scripture, (iii.) the dominance of Neo-Platonism, (iv.) the authority of the Church. It may be predicted that a system built up under this fourfold control will be suggestive rather than satisfying and will give rise to divergent streams of thought and life. From Augustine's experience and his sympathetic reading of Paulinism there have flowed evangelical experience and evangelical theology. The appeal to experience and the grounding of salvation in the love of God may well go back to Augustine, as Augustine went back to St. Paul, and St. Paul went back to the Cross of Christ. But, when Christian experience is interpreted both through Greek dualism and through Roman imperialism, we may be certain that its characteristic features will be distorted out of knowledge.

1. The idea of God.—The idea of God takes on the qualities of its double origin: God is the Greek Absolute and the Roman Will, in either aspect, beyond the reach of man's knowledge. God is the only real. Things that exist do so only by 'participation' in the divine nature. Reality is not in time and space. History is not real development; it is simply the translation into time of the immutable will of God. The Augustinian 'predestination' is simply the Greek affirmation of the transcendence of God, brought *ab extra*, and imposed on Christian experience. The conviction of the NT believer that salvation does not depend on human initiative, but on the everlasting mercy, belongs to a totally different region of thought and cannot properly be interpreted through a Greek category.

2. The idea of sin.—Sin is explained on the old lines that go back to Plato and were ineradicable in Greek thought. Augustine was keenly aware of the guilt of sin; but his experience and the whole bent of his disposition led him to view it mainly in the aspect of disease, defilement, and moral impotency, to connect it with the body, and to lay enormous emphasis on carnality. His agony as a sinner was that he could not sever the bonds that held him, till he 'put on the Lord Jesus Christ.' Salvation was emancipation, and is interpreted chiefly as power. His problem as a man, a pastor, and a theologian is, How shall the slave of sin be set free and brought into a freedom which consists in identity with the will of God? It is because an exercised Christian knows this true liberty of the soul that Augustine defeated Pelagius; and it is because the semi-heathen knows nothing of it that Semi-Pelagianism is the working creed of a half-Christian Christendom. Yet the problem, as Augustine put it, is not stated in its real depth, and his solution is marred by intellectual puzzles.

3. The idea of the Church.—The Church confronts the soul that knows by bitter experience the helplessness of its will-power and the incapacity of its intellectual faculty. Augustine is recapitulating in his own mind the history of Greek philosophy. By the logic of Greek thought, reason is incapable of reaching God and so solving the problems of life and mind. The situation thus created demands an extra-rational authority, which shall meet the mind in its impotency, lift it into participation in the divine nature, and imbue it with divine power. This authority presented itself to Augustine and to the Latin mind in the guise of the Church, Catholic and Roman. It is the authority of God. Nothing has rights over man that is not in the hands of the Church. The gospel itself meets man with the *imprimatur* of the Church; and all redeeming and emancipating powers reach the soul through the channel of the Church's ordinances. Such a conception may be magnificent, but it is simply Roman imperialism, adapted to a use for which it is utterly unfitted and made the key to the salvation of man. It contains, too, an inconsistency with which the common man did not need to concern himself, viz. between predestination and the idea of the Church as the sphere and instrument of salvation. Augustine himself made various attempts, by distinction of the Church invisible and the Church visible and by referring all the elect to the membership of the Church, to overcome a difficulty which is really on the premisses insurmountable. Predestination and the saving power and absolute authority of the Church cannot be combined. Protestants had perfect logical right to use the one to destroy the other. In practice, however, the Church remains in the imperial position which Augustine gave it, for all who come to it with his *a priori* presuppositions.

4. The idea of salvation.—The way of salvation, as Augustine defined it, is plain and will be easy or hard in proportion to the seriousness and sincerity of the traveller. The principal points to be considered by him who would understand this matter of salvation are:

(*a*) *The idea of grace.*—This is conceived, in Greek fashion, as a divine substance or energy coming from above, descending into human nature, and working there as omnipotence in the sphere of things finite. Grace, in short, is a thing, and not a person—a thing almighty and mysterious, but still impersonal, as things are in distinction from forces personal and historic. Augustine is using a philosophical abstraction to cover the phenomena of a spiritual experience; and, in so doing, he has done all in his power to destroy it. As soon as grace is isolated in thought and regard from the historic Redeemer, the nerve of the

[1] R. Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church*, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 521.
[2] *Knowledge of God*, ii. 167.

Christian salvation has been cut. After that we may get an intense religious experience, bearing fruit of its own, but it will have its roots outside the NT, and its real parallel will be found in non-Christian religions.

(*b*) *The sacraments.*—These are taken over from Greek theology, as Greek theology took them from the mystery-religions. They are the vehicles by which the divine vivifying substance reaches the dead soul. Theologians will discuss afterwards with endless subtleties the relations between this substance and the Eucharistic elements. No ordinary man need occupy himself with these scholastic disputes. The mystic fact remains that he gets that substance, with its divine energy, into his lips and somehow into his soul. The whole transaction is at once physical and supra-rational and impersonal.

(*c*) *Faith.*—The nature and function of faith are defined by the relation of the soul to the Church. The Church is the object with which the soul has primarily to concern itself. The redeeming powers which will effect its salvation are administered by the Church. What the soul has to do, therefore, is to commit itself to the Church. This act of self-committal is faith. Self-commitment is, indeed, the very essence of faith, as described in the NT. But in the NT the object of faith is the personal Saviour. In Latin theology it is the Church.

(*d*) *Love.*—When faith attaches itself to the Church and devoutly employs the sacraments, grace is infused into the soul, the process being understood under the analogy of the healing art. That thing, salvation or energy, called grace is imbibed and passes into the system with healing and renewing powers. The sum and substance of these powers is love. What faith does in the NT love does in Latin theology. It is the medicament of the soul. In the strength of it the impotent man can arise, take up his bed, and walk. Nerveless before, he can now do works acceptable to God, which may properly be rewarded by the divine justice and crowned with the gift of salvation. Here is legalism to all intents and purposes. True, grace comes from without and gives power, revived from time to time in the sacraments. But the scheme itself is distinctly unevangelical and amounts to salvation by merit.

(*e*) *Mysticism.*—After all, legalism is only a stage, which suffices indeed for those who are in the world and must remain there. Their salvation is looked after by the Church. Experts, however, like Augustine and Monica, may go much farther. It is strange that the Christian salvation, as Augustine outlined it, was the introduction to an experience which is taken over from the religious philosophy which was Christianity's most powerful rival. The highest reach of religion is not attained by faith, and is even ultimately independent of the sacraments. It is taken in the final step, by which the soul abandons all earthly things, and even its own characteristic powers and exercises, and is taken out of itself in rapture. Quoting the great passage in which Augustine describes his last conversation with his mother, Edward Caird comments:

'How deeply Neo-Platonism must have sunk into the spirit of St. Augustine, when, in describing the highest moments of his religious experience, he adopts almost verbally the language in which Plotinus tries to depict the mystic ecstasy of the individual soul, as it enters into communion with the soul of the world!'[1]

It would appear, then, that there are just two religions, properly so called, in the world. The one is mysticism, and the other is NT Christianity. The one offers a salvation which consists in mystic communion with the Absolute—salvation by ecstasy. The other offers a salvation which consists in reconciliation to the living God and in a life of ethical harmony with Him in His character and redeeming purpose towards mankind—salvation by faith. Augustine presents the strange spectacle of a man who seeks to follow both religions and enjoy both salvations. The attempt is necessarily a failure. Evangelical faith has to be debased into legalism before the expert is free to enjoy his mystic blessedness. The common man is condemned to the one, that the religious specialist may concentrate on the other. The lamentable result is that Christianity, which was meant to reconcile men to God and to reconstitute humanity as a living organism, becomes the parent of endless dualism—the Church and the world, clergy and laity, secular clergy and the monks and solitaries. Instead of a salvation that is at once possession and inheritance, gift and task, there is presented a salvation from which the vast bulk of mankind is for ever excluded, to which those only can attain who isolate themselves from the very life which the divine purpose of mercy designed to redeem, regenerate, and restore.

From the point of view alike of mysticism and of predestination, there was no real need for a historic deed of atonement as the ground of salvation; and Augustine has not concentrated his mind on the work of Christ for men as he has upon the operations of divine grace in man. The exigencies of the Pelagian controversy absorbed his energies. Yet, as a sincerely Christian mind, he adoringly recognized Christ as the Mediator, and attributed saving power to what He did. His deepest thought here is the humility of Christ, in which the love of God seeks to subdue to itself the pride of man. But his attempts at a theory are vague and wavering. He accepts the impossible idea that the Devil had rights over fallen men. These rights the Devil forfeited when he killed Christ. So those who believe in Christ are freed from the power of the Devil, for over Christ the Devil had no right. Along with this he treats the death of Christ forensically and attributes to it penal significance, but, like Tertullian, without constructing a 'satisfaction' theory. As an inheritor of Greek theology, he also retains the idea of the Word sharing our mortality, that we may be made to share in His divinity. Along these lines, however, his constructive thought does not travel. The way to a view of divine action in the redemption of man is blocked by his ruling ideas of predestination and miraculous grace; and these are due to the strain of Neo-Platonism which enters so deeply into his thought.[1]

VI. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN THE MEDIÆVAL CHURCH.*—The interest belonging to that great stretch of European history from Gregory I. to the close of the 15th cent. can never be exaggerated or exhausted. Nations are being born with much travail. Vast experiments in political organization and social structure are being made at enormous cost of life and suffering. The human mind is being aroused out of decadence, or awakened out of unconsciousness, and prepared for undreamed-of enterprises. The destiny of the human race is being determined amid a welter of controversy and battle, the participants in which know not the aim and guess not the issue of the conflict.

The clue, however, to these multitudinous and confused happenings is, as ever in the history of the human spirit, a religious need, together with its doctrinal expression. 'Dogmatically expressed,' says Harnack, as the story draws to its completion, 'there was a seeking for a sure doctrine of salva-

[1] *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii. 288.

[1] Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, p. 423.

tion.'[1] The records of this quest cover the whole period, and the details are innumerable. The stages or aspects of it may be classed as three: (1) the function of the Church, (2) the problem of the work of Christ, and (3) the protest of mysticism.

1. **The function of the Church.**—This is twofold, in part political and in part specifically religious, though, in its political aspirations, it was striving to reach avowedly religious ends. (*a*) In the first place, then, the Church succeeded to the place and work of the Roman empire. The empire had been, in a very real sense, the saviour of the world. It was the barrier behind which human life could be carried on, secure from threatening destruction at the hands of barbarism and anarchy. Its splendour, its wealth, its power, its venerable age, gave the impression of superhuman dignity and seemed to be the operation in the material world of the sovereignty of God Himself. When it began to decay, men were stricken with fear. Its impending doom hung over their souls. This doom was delayed in the East for many centuries by the founding of New Rome. Because the Eastern empire stood, there was no room or need for the Church to take its place and assume its functions. The Church was confined to its hierurgical functions, and Christianity remained no more than a mystery-religion. The State, accordingly, remained supreme over the Church—a position which it maintained in Eastern Europe till the fall of the Russian autocracy set the Church at liberty; and the problem is yet unsolved as to how it will use its unaccustomed freedom. The situation in the West was very different. The empire was manifestly passing away. The later emperors did not live in Rome. Finally, even the shadow of the Western empire passed away. Nominally, the civilized world had but one head, the emperor who lived in Constantine's capital. Really, the Western world was without political unity and had no central authority. In those centuries when the empire was on its death-bed, its prestige and power began to pass to the Church. Its spirit was born again in the Church. The key to the course of European history from Gregory the Great (pope 590–604) to the dawn of the Reformation is the doctrine of the Church. In the NT the Church is a spiritual fellowship of believers with their Lord and with one another. The Church of those long and terrible centuries is a political organization framed on the model of the banished empire, controlling men by a legal system, administered by a highly centralized government. The task before it was one of appalling magnitude. On the one hand, it had to preserve whatever was of permanent value in the culture of the ancient world, while penetrating it with new ethical and religious ideas. On the other hand, it had to face the barbarian menace, to subdue those untutored races which were breaking through the crumbling walls of empire, and make them subjects of a supreme Holy Will, which might restrain their passions and renew their natures. It was, in fact, the missionary task of every age. If we can imagine India, the seat of an immemorial civilization, ringed round with savage forces threatening its destruction—an India without any British rule to hold back the enemy beyond the frontiers and to keep the peace within them—and can picture what the work of the Christian Church would be in such circumstances, we have some conception of the situation of the Church in Western Europe when the sceptre had dropped from the nerveless hands of the last Roman emperor.

Now, if the spirit of the first missionary to Europe had shaped the missionary policy of the Church at this time, it is certain that the Church would not have adopted the method of political supremacy, but would have trusted to that power of the gospel of Christ on which St. Paul relied absolutely. But St. Paul's method of evangelism had long been forgotten. Externalism had had an increasing vogue for centuries. The Church had gone to school to the empire and had learned the imperial style. No other method was thought of than to oppose force to force—the force of Roman authority to barbarian force of terror and destruction. The only possible policy was supposed to be that of gathering the world under the dominion of Rome, binding the yoke of law more securely than ever upon Rome's old subjects, and riveting it on the new races that were occupying her domain and holding all alike for ever in bondage and tutelage. There is nothing ignoble about this dream of conquest and subjugation. The dreamers of it were among the greatest of men, noble in their devotion to an end which was power, but not selfish aggrandizement. Two remarks, however, are historically justified.

(i.) This conception of the salvation of mankind differs absolutely from that set forth in the NT: in the NT salvation by faith; in the mediæval Church salvation by political domination and legal discipline; in the NT a salvation that operates from within by love and hope; in the mediæval Church a salvation that acts from without by force and terror. The one is the outcome of a long religious growth in which redemption is accomplished by a God so close at hand that He can be man and bear human burdens and gather humanity to Himself in a living fellowship, of which He is the inspiration, the energy, and the unifying principle. The other has its roots in Greek dualism and Roman imperialism and is effected by a God afar off, governing, controlling, subduing through the might of the pope, His earthly representative. We can see, by considering the course of events and the influences at work, how the one type came to be substituted for the other: but we are not warranted in concluding that the one evolves out of the other by an inherent logic, or that the mediæval Church is what Christianity was bound to become as it grew out of its NT germ.

(ii.) The dream was never quite realized, and the hour of the Church's greatest triumph preceded its final downfall. From the beginning the Church realized the need of a secular instrument in dealing with the brute forces which had to be met and coerced. Accordingly, she called into existence a secular empire, to be the counterpart, on a lower level of spiritual value, of her own imperial constitution. The empire of the universe was to be governed by a world-priest and a world-king, each holding office and exercising authority under God, the unseen Emperor. Ideally, these two authorities ought to have operated in harmony. Practically, they never did. The true genius of the Church required its absolute supremacy, the secular State, even though nominally holy and imperial, being no more than the instrument to carry out the divine sovereign Will of whose behests the Church was the depository and revealer. Such a position the empire declined to take. The Middle Ages were filled with the strife of empire and papacy. In the end victory lay with neither. The empire was destroyed by the greater skill of its papal enemies. The Church lost its imperial position in less than a century after its most violent, and even grotesque, expression—if we may credit the story of Boniface VIII. with his brandished sword and his exultant cry, 'I am Cæsar, I am Emperor.' The rising spirit of nationality would not permit absolutism, whether imperial or papal. The Church had preserved much of the past. It had formed the beginning of a new world. But it had not saved Europe, and it had destroyed itself. The failure of the Church, in its political and social endeavour, is to be traced to its radical misapprehension of the religious need of man. On presuppositions of dualism, religious and philosophical, nothing better, probably, could have been devised than the papal system. The Middle Ages are proof, on a large scale, of the inaccuracy of the diagnosis and of the failure of the remedy.

(*b*) In the second place, the Church assumed the function of mediator of salvation to the individual soul. The way of salvation, as marked out by the mediæval Church, presents the curious spectacle of contact with NT ideas together with complete inversion of them. The NT Church is the communion of saints, *i.e.* the fellowship of believers, the individual being taken by his relation to Christ out of his isolation and made a member of a living organism, in which he finds his place and work, and is disciplined, trained, and helped in knowledge and virtue. The mediæval Church is an institute of salvation, by whose machinery heathen men are made Christians, and sinners are enabled to escape eternal punishment, and even, in rare cases, to

[1] vi. 117.

attain saintship. It stands, in its divinely imparted powers and its divinely designed mechanism, apart from and above the individual and proceeds to operate upon him with a view to his salvation. The NT Church summons men to yield themselves to Christ. The mediæval Church summons men to yield themselves to its authority. It incorporates them in its organization, supplies them with divine grace, and legislates for them as they proceed to work out their salvation.

'In the mediæval Church, the individual, *qua* individual, had little or no place. His salvation was conditioned from first to last by his belonging to a corporation, in whose privileges and functions he shared, through whose sacraments his life was nourished; by whose graduated hierarchy, though but the meanest servant of the Church, he was linked to the supreme Head; whose saints shielded him by their "merits," or helped him by their intercession. Through this corporation alone was he brought into touch with his Saviour. Outside the corporation his soul was lost.'[1]

In this mediæval conception of salvation there is the practical and exquisitely skilful application of ideas which have occupied theologians from the days of Neo-Platonism, and of theories which have prevailed since Latin theology was constructed by Roman lawyers. The Church is the old Neo-Platonic 'bridge' over which the soul passes to the Absolute. The mediæval Christian knows nothing of immediate access to God. He is confronted at every turn by the Church, the mediator. All divine influences, regenerative, educative, directive, come through the medium of the Church, with whom alone the ordinary Christian has ever directly to do. Grace is not, as in the NT, a saving, operative, love of God to sinners, but a substance, as Augustine conceived it, capable of being communicated after the analogy of food or medicine, with physical and hyperphysical results of a magical kind. With such presuppositions, the process of salvation is elaborate, but quite intelligible and workable.

(i.) Grace is infused into the soul in the sacrament of baptism and the Eucharist. In the one, life is communicated, first of all, to a soul conceived of as dead. In the other, renewed communications of life are made from time to time. Properly speaking, the celebration of Mass should be accompanied by communion. But mysticism with its own logic intervenes to make non-communicating attendance a means of grace. The mystery becomes one for eye and ear, for æsthetic emotion and rapt adoring contemplation, and in this the union of soul with the divine is effected. Still the Eucharist holds its own as the peculiar medium through which the divine life is maintained in the believer; the dead soul, being now quickened with divine energy, is able to perform good works. These are meritorious in the sight of God, and by their practice the sinner is transformed into a righteous person. This progressive sanctification is crowned by justification. The way of salvation stretches before the mediæval Christian, arduous indeed and indefinitely prolonged, but plainly in view. Legal directions are abundant. A priestly director is always available. This way, accordingly, has strong attractions for pure and earnest souls who keenly desire the blessedness of union with God, are deeply aware of their ignorance and weakness, and are glad to pay the price of a humbled reason and a surrendered will. The difficulty lay in the nature of the authority to which the soul was required to bow. It was an external authority, and the method of salvation was legal and even commercial. It might well happen, therefore, to an earnest and determined spirit, as to Paul in earlier days and to Luther in the following age, that despair should settle down in darkness, unless a more excellent way were found. That way had been forgotten by the theologians of the Church. As far as mediævalism was concerned, the only alternative to legalism was mysticism—the way that plunges over a precipice into the deeps of the unknown divine.

(ii.) Grace, when it becomes exhausted through human weakness and error, has to be restored. The loss of grace is an ever recurring fact. Machinery for its recovery is a pressing need. This need was met in the sacrament of penance (*q.v.*), which, for obvious reasons, becomes of prime importance in this institute of salvation, and, in fact, is practically the salvation itself for all ordinary believers. Suppose, then, that a soul has fallen into mortal sin, and so has lost the grace infused into it at baptism or Eucharist, what must be done that the loss may be recovered? First, there must be sorrow of heart, preferably *contritio*, though *attritio* with certain conditions appended might suffice; then confession to the priest, guided by interrogatories, in which psychological skill, gained by long dealing with the secrets of human nature, aids the halting self-knowledge of the penitent; then the priestly absolution, wiping off the guilt of sin and delivering the soul from eternal damnation; next, the 'satisfaction' (*q.v.*), or the task imposed by the priest, whereby the justice of God, pursuing sin with temporal punishments in this world or the next, is 'satisfied.' By absolution, granted in view of the satisfactions which are to follow, the soul is returned to a spiritual condition which makes it fit for further infusion of grace, and the interrupted course is resumed—grace, good works, merit, justification.

A serious complication is introduced into the scheme by the granting of 'indulgences' (*q.v.*). These are the remission of the temporal punishments by authority of the pope, to whom is committed the wondrous treasury of the merits of the saints. This addition to the scheme was necessary to make it tolerable. Indulgences express the pitiful heart of the Church, refraining from legal exaction and devising means whereby God's banished ones may be restored to Him. At the same time, an indulgence, in the midst of legalism, is fraught with moral peril; and of this the practice of indulgences in the last years of the 15th cent. contains ample illustration. The mistake did not lie in the intention of the Church, but in the invincible dualism which externalized all the relations of God and man and in the end made salvation a compromise between justice and mercy.

As the centuries rolled on, the limitations of the mediæval Church became more and more evident. Profound dissatisfaction and wide-spread unrest characterized the religious life of the closing period of the Middle Ages. But deeper than discontent with the incidental features of the ecclesiastical system was the demand for a revision of the theological presuppositions on which that system rested and for a reversion to the primal redemptive forces in the might of which Christianity from its birth-hour had gone forth conquering and to conquer.

2. The doctrine of the work of Christ. — Doctrine always follows experience, reacting upon it and giving it a stereotyped form. The mediæval doctrine of salvation, accordingly, is the mediæval practice rationalized, illuminated, and fixed.

The idea of God which governs mediæval soteriology is that philosophical abstraction of being or substance, blent with the idea of political absolutism, which we have seen at work in Latin theology. The one element is Greek—the unconditioned and transcendent nature of God. The other is Roman —the will of an absolute monarch. A God of this character stands outside of His world, which is entirely dependent upon Him, while its coming into existence at all remains inexplicable. Its relation to Him, at any point of its career, is that of an empire to a distant, inscrutable, and almighty prince. In His regulation of the affairs of His dominion God is governed by no other considerations than His own absolute will. This He utters in the form of law, and the maintenance of law He delegates to designated ministers — *i.e.* the hierarchy of the Church—whom He suitably endows and equips for the unique responsibility.

Breaches of law are crimes. To meet the case of those who are guilty of breach of law but who are nevertheless the objects of the inscrutable election of the divine mercy, the penitential discipline of the Church has been divinely instituted. In the 'satisfactions' rendered by the penitent law is upheld and the conscience is awakened to a reverential sense of its demands. At the same time, this is procedure merely. It is a dealing with individuals only, and is, so to speak, empirical, and not absolute or final. Upon what does the penitential discipline rest? It must be warranted by, and be an application of, the divine dealing with the whole empire of God. That storehouse of merit, upon which the sinner ultimately depends for forgiveness and sanctification, cannot be left liable to depletion. It must be secure and inexhaustible. There must be an absolute and final vindication of the divine law and the divine honour by which God's government of the universe can be made inviolable and His preferential dealings with individuals be ratified. God, it was plain, must intervene in the history of His world so as once for all to exhibit the supremacy of His law, the unassailable dignity of His name. What

[1] Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, p. 190.

is that act which possesses such momentous import? Experimental faith had always fastened on the death of Christ. Tradition enshrined the Passion of the Redeemer in the central articles of the Creed. Once the question, therefore, was raised as to the validity of the Church's procedure in granting absolution to sinners, it could be answered only in one way: The Cross is the act which vindicates the divine law and honour and validates the Church's procedure. The awakening mind of man, however, as it seeks to make faith conscious and clear, is not content with the bare fact. It presses for a theory. What gives the Cross of Christ this amazing significance? The difference between this question and that which was the central problem of Greek theology has to be carefully noted. The Greek question is: How shall man, corrupt and dying, be united to, and made participator in, the divine nature, and so be 'deified'? The question which Latin thought made inevitable, and which now in mediæval theology was asked in the most searching form, was this: How shall man, a convicted criminal, escape the doom which follows inevitably upon transgression in the court of divine inexorable justice? Putting the matter broadly, Vernon Bartlet and Carlyle say of the Latin temper:

'Its typical product was not metaphysics but jurisprudence; and it was from this standpoint that man's relations even to God were regarded.'[1]

And these writers proceed to illustrate by quotation from Sir Henry Maine:

'Almost anybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system, the Roman theory of the obligations established by Contract or Delict, the Roman view of Debts and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmuting them, the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by Universal Succession, may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution.'

With special reference to the problem of salvation, the required form lies close at hand. For offences against law there must be satisfaction. The wrong-doer must make amends. This, however, in the nature of the case is impossible. Man is finite; but his offence is infinite, for it has been committed against an infinite Being. Infinite, therefore, must be the satisfaction. The need of satisfaction is met in the person and work of Christ. He is divine, and therefore His work has the required note of infinitude. He is human, and therefore His work can be viewed as rendered to God by man. His redemptive work is His death—a deed of superabounding merit; and this, since the Son has no need of it for His own purposes, is available for those whose own merits so sorely need to be supplemented. The issue of this abounding satisfaction is twofold: Godward, it makes ample amends to the divine honour—the Lord of the whole earth has made His Name to be had in reverence of all His creatures; manward, it supplies what is needed to enable the sinner, impotent in himself, to do good works, to obtain the reward of merit, and to become progressively sanctified and in the end justified. The death of Christ creates the treasury of grace and fills it with an inexhaustible supply of merit. Grace is a transferable quantity, which God employs for the benefit of His elect. By means of it He first starts them on the way to sanctification, in the sacrament of baptism; and then from time to time, in the sacrament of penance, He replenishes this store. Thus does the theory of satisfaction, as applied to the work of Christ, arise from and return to the praxis, as observed in the Church. The one interprets the other. The mediæval mind found in the satisfaction theory the very mirror of itself, a Christianity intelligible to it, because it was simply the universal practice of piety, expressed in terms of thought. Precisely at this point, however, a danger threatened the theory and indeed ultimately dissolved it. Reason has undertaken to give a rationale of the work of Christ. But what are the rights of reason? It may be the handmaid of faith, or the equivalent of faith, or a power independent of faith; and, if reason be ever pitted against faith, the human spirit will be divided within itself. This is, historically, the course of scholasticism as a whole and of the satisfaction theory in particular.[1] In Anselm the satisfaction is a necessity flowing from the relation of God to the world. In Aquinas it is a method, not strictly necessary, but the most suitable for the end in view. In Duns Scotus it is grounded only in the absolute will of the Supreme Being; and the death of Christ has just the value which God chooses to put upon it. The defects of the mediæval satisfaction theory are obvious. They all flow from the non-Christian idea of God which mediæval thinkers took over from Greek thought. Mediæval thought is penetrated by dualism and is congenitally incapable of yielding an adequate interpretation of Christian experience. Its God is the Absolute and cannot act within His world. He must have a delegate. What is achieved by this Other is presented to Him, and He enjoys the satisfaction rendered to Him. He is shut out of the sacrifice He demands. Its Christ is monophysite; and incarnation is so delimited as to be made unreal. Christ is just human enough to be able to die. The sole point of interest is His death, the death of an infinite Being, from which His life falls apart, neither giving value to the death nor receiving significance from it. This whole drama of divine redemption goes on apart from humanity. It is set in operation at the Cross and is maintained in action by the Church. The Church is the proximate object of the sinner's regard. With Christ he has nothing directly to do. Faith is directed to the Church; it is assent to an outward authority conceived as the delegated authority of God; it is not a direct relation of the soul to the Saviour. The Christian life, accordingly, is treated legally. Forgiveness is not the *prius* and the motive of the believer's experience, but its difficult and precarious goal. Union to Christ is sacramental and occasional, not abiding as inward spring and energy. It belongs only to the higher substance of which man is composed and can be reached only when the dualism of matter and form has been conquered by the suppression of the one and the sole survival of the other. So closely are mediæval piety and mediæval theology bound up with a philosophy which was radically alien to the spirit of Christianity.

The satisfaction theory did not pass unquestioned even in the Middle Ages. Abelard has been much praised and also severely blamed for rejecting it and substituting for it a 'subjective' or 'moral influence' theory. He has been regarded as far in advance of his time. When all is said, however, he remains mediæval still. He has not critically revised the idea of God, which remains still involved in the dualism in which Aristotle, as well as Plato, left it. His God is still transcendent. It is true that Abelard reacts strongly against the idea of law. Over against law he sets love. But the function of love is simply the function of law with respect to the world. It is a device to secure the submission of men. The satisfaction theory keeps the world going by means of a legal discipline. For the legal discipline Abelard substitutes the exhibition of the divine love. An appeal is made to the tenderest emotions of the human

[1] *Christianity in History*, p. 420.

[1] See artt. SATISFACTION, SCHOLASTICISM.

heart. That appeal reaches its utmost poignancy in the Cross. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Abelard's personal response to the love of which he discourses so movingly. At the same time, he is still within the sphere of mediæval praxis and mediæval piety. The merit of Christ —*i.e.* the love manifest in His death—stimulates human action and makes possible merit of the same sort. Yet, of course, such merit is never sufficient and has to be supplemented by the intercessions of the Redeemer. In truth, so long as the idea of God remains where Greek thought had placed it, the theological account of redemption must remain arbitrary and unreal.

3. The protest of mysticism.—The term 'mysticism,' commonly employed to denote any religious experience which is very intense and emotional and cannot be formulated in intellectual utterance, properly implies a dualistic metaphysic—the effort to reach a unity which shall rise high above both the elements which have been set in mutual contrast.

'God, for the Mystic, is the One who is presupposed in all, God as God, as the unity above the difference of subject and object, to which everything is related and which itself is related to nothing . . . for Mysticism, the negative so decisively preponderates over the positive relation, that God and the world cannot be included in one thought.'[1]

The religion based on this philosophy gained classical expression in Plotinus and entered, essentially unchanged, into Christianity. It governed the theology of the Church. When, accordingly, we observe the phenomenon of mysticism arising in the Middle Ages, we are not to imagine that it is a protest against the piety of the mediæval Church. It is that piety in its purest form. Every mediæval Christian has before him the mystic experience of a union of substance with the divine—a union which he can never effect by any effort except the effort which is the cessation of all action; an experience which is supra-rational and supra-ethical, ineffable and incommunicable. The experience belongs to an inner region, where the soul, withdrawing from all finite things, matter, the world, the Church, and its own separate existence, finds God and is content. A mystic is out of place in any religious communion which does not ground its theology in the Neo-Platonic idea of God. Yet even that communion is not his resting-place. He will be in it and use its sacramental system. But his goal is beyond the Church and its institutions.

The mediæval Church, however, was Latin as well as Greek. If its goal is a mystical salvation, it had a legal discipline to serve as a stage on the way. The exigencies of life compelled the ordinary type of believer to remain the slave of an external system. The Church, too, was bound to keep the vast majority of its subjects in this servile condition. If every soul was a solitary, how could the Church rule the world? The Church, therefore, as the institute of salvation in the midst of a lawless world, was bound to be a legal system, holding down the individual by constraint of an external authority. But such suppression of the individual is, in essence, profoundly irreligious, for it surrenders the idea of bringing the ordinary man into immediate relation to God. The protest against externalism is mysticism, which is 'religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form . . . that attitude of the mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of the soul to God.'[2] The mediæval Church, accordingly, held within itself, side by side, legalism and mysticism —both alike the products of a non-Christian conception of God. The mediæval theologian's philosophical presuppositions rendered him helpless.

[1] Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii. 213.

[2] *Ib.* p. 210.

VII. *THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMATION AND IN SUBSEQUENT THOUGHT.*—Scholasticism reached the height of its power in Scotism, and thence began its long decline. The history of four centuries of Christian life and thought is filled with one long endeavour to remove the static Absolute from its supremacy in philosophy and theology and to find some conception of God more adequate to the realities of religious experience. The details of this history are multitudinous. The main line, however, can be followed plainly enough; and the great epochs stand out clearly. They may be named and briefly characterized in their relation to central Christian experience as follows.

1. The return to experience.—While mediæval dualism was subjecting all human interests to the control of an absolute authority, which was held to express the sovereignty of God, these interests themselves were growing in value and were demanding a more ample recognition and satisfaction. In every department of human life and action the feature of a confident and exulting appeal to experience is most marked. Nature stands out in its endless wonder and charm, with promise of amazing rewards to all who will diligently seek them. Eager explorers give the world to humanity as the sphere of action and achievement, wherein the mind of man may grow to its maturity. Human history thrills with interest, as it records the attainments and the triumphs as well as the agonies and tragedies of real men. Nations become conscious of themselves, not as pupils of Church and Empire, but as independent personalities with careers of their own. Above all and deeper than all, the human spirit seeks to break through forms which were ostensibly means of access to God, but had proved to be barriers. Formally, the movement we know as the Reformation (*q.v.*) was an effort to purge the Church of abuses, clear away its mythology, and rectify certain points in its theology. Really, it was something other, and more, than an intellectual, or even an ethical, demand. It was a quest for reality, and the direction of this quest was towards the New Testament. In essence the Reformation was a revival of that primitive Christianity which had, indeed, never wholly faded from the Christian consciousness. Along with the piety whose roots lay in the old mystery-religions there had come down through the ages a religion whose gospel was the Gospels, whose salvation was the historic Christ, the living Lord, whose creed centred in the redemptive facts of His life, death, and resurrection, whose piety was an immediate access to Him and an endeavour to be like Him.

When absolutism, ecclesiastical and dogmatic, proved untenable, this religion became aware of itself, found human voices in which to utter its message, and stood forth out of the wreckage of the past as essential Christianity, changeless as the unchanging love of God. Such a religion reaches back to ultimate unities of history and of experience which no dualistic logic can express. The Christianity of the NT, long overlaid by dualism, is a synthesis of elements that are intelligible only when grasped in their interrelations. Its note is always unity, the unity of life. Salvation comes to the individual when he finds himself in this unity, not absorbed or lost or suppressed, but lifted out of a false separation, and so, for the first time, justified in his individuality and guaranteed in the fullness of his personality. This salvation is seen in Christ. We find God in Christ. Christ is the incarnate love of God. He is the divine forgiveness, operating in the completeness of God's moral character amid the conditions of human sin and misery. He is this because of what He actually

was, and did, and suffered. Yet His existence and His power are not limited to a few years of time. He meets men always at the point where their need of God is deepest. Christianity is the historic Christ, but the historic Christ is timeless. The salvation thus presented in Christ is possessed in faith. What faith meant in Christian experience could not be understood by a theology governed by Greek and Latin presuppositions. In such a theology faith was only a preliminary step to a salvation carried on by a legal procedure and issuing finally in the beatific vision. But faith, as it deals with the personal Redeemer, is an action neither mainly intellectual, as in assent, nor emotional, as in ecstasy. It is the action in which a soul, in full self-consciousness with sober self-judgment, commits itself trustfully to the everlasting mercy, conveyed in the person and work of Christ. It is the act in which a soul passes from self-assertion to self-realization, through surrender to, and identification with, the love which, in the life and death of Jesus, authenticates itself as divine redemptive efficacy. No activity of the human spirit could be more unlike surrender to a system or ecstatic plunge into a sea of being. It has no affinities with Roman legalism or Neo-Platonic mysticism. It implies a historic revelation and a personal relation to God. It permits no machinery of mediation and has no use for either hierurgy or hierarchy. In it the soul has immediate access to the Son of God and in Him finds the Father. This experience is the direct gift of God in Christ and confers on men that priestly privilege which non-Christian religions, and the mediæval Church after them, had confined to a special and narrow caste. Without any apparatus of mysticism, the exercise of faith carries with it the blessing which is the eternal quest of the human spirit—union to God; and that not as an impossible blending of substances, but as a relationship in which the man who gives himself to God gains fullness of personal life, while he draws increasing wealth of knowledge and power from the communications of the divine Word and Spirit. Faith is generically distinct from passivity. It is an energy of the soul. It is the whole energy of the soul in the moral sphere, needing no supplement to make it a condition in man of the experience of salvation. Faith sets the soul on that moral enterprise whose goal is the accomplishment of the purpose of divine love, revealed and guaranteed in Christ. The relation of faith and works is not a problem for faith. There can be no faith which is not a dynamic issuing in service. There can be no gift of salvation which is not at the same time the summons to a redemptive task.

This salvation is accomplished as a life in the Spirit. Neither Greek mysticism nor Latin legalism had any room for the work of the Spirit. Theology added a *locus* regarding the Spirit, because of a clause in the baptismal formula and because of certain texts which it was impossible to ignore. But the application of dualism to Christianity made the NT idea of the Spirit, with its intensely Hebraic associations, utterly unintelligible. What philosophy ruled out and theology could not interpret Christian experience grasped as the simplest, divinest fact. To believe in Christ is to have the Spirit. The Spirit is not a proposition to be admitted; it is a power to be received and exulted in. In the reception of the Spirit the Christian apprehension of God reaches its deepest religious truth. God, and Christ, and the fellowship of believers are included in an experience of which the indwelling Spirit is the source and power. The Christian life is not lived outside of God, in a region where human effort is occasionally reinforced by infusion of grace. It is not drawn into the divine Being or Substance, so that a unity is reached by the suppression of man's individuality. It is lived in God as the career of a personality which has a moral function in God's universe and is called on to discharge it with entire consecration, the energy for fulfilment being supplied continually by the immanent Spirit of God. It is a life of intense and growing intimacy with God, in which self-realization becomes complete in proportion as God is discovered to be the source and sum of all moral values and powers.

The NT is full of the boldest synonyms, equivalences, and correspondences, which Greek theology could make nothing of, in which, however, Christian experience finds at once its interpretation and its nourishment. God and Christ; Christ and the Spirit; the Redeemer and the redeemed; the love which is God giving Himself to man, and faith which is man answering the approach of God; forgiveness and the new life; reconciliation and sanctification; salvation and service; salvation, present and to come—all such seeming contrasts, or even contradictions, are held together in the unity of a living experience. From the point of view of any logic known to the ancient world, Christianity was one vast paradox, an absurdity with which it was difficult to deal seriously. When, accordingly, that logic was adopted by the Church as the instrument of its self-expression, the result could not be satisfactory. The incompatibility of that logic with Christianity is registered in Chalcedon, makes Augustine the fountain-head of divergent streams, and turns the mighty structure of mediæval theology into an intolerable burden. The disappointing thing in the theology of the Reformation is that this incompatibility was not discerned, and no effort was made to substitute for the older forms others more adequate. The new life which was moving in the Church of the 16th cent. 'would have required a wholly new theology to match it, but to the production of such a theology the Protestant Church was for the time unequal.'[1]

2. The continuity of mediæval forms of thought.—Of the two strands of systematic thought which formed the traditional dogma it may be said, broadly, that in Lutheranism we have the continuation of Greek and Alexandrian theology, while Calvinism continues the line of Latin theology. In Lutheranism we have the mystical union of Christ and the believer, the *communicatio idiomatum* as a theory of Christ's person, the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, all conceived in the vein of Greek theology. In Calvinism we have the governing principle of the divine sovereignty, conceived in the style of Roman imperialism. By means of this organizing idea a systematic theology was constructed which appealed to the interest of dogmatic completeness and was able to meet Roman dogma with a dogmatism as finished and masterful. In virtue of this conception also an ecclesiastical polity was devised which carried into the new age the old idea of the Church as an independent and imperial body, representing in spiritual things the supremacy of God, strong to resist aggression and insistent in its claim, not merely to be supported by the State, but to give to the State guidance and rule in all things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.

Lutheranism, with its individualistic and mystical tendencies, made the Church, as in the old Greek empire, subservient to the State, with portentous results in the history of Germany. Calvinism made men and nations strong to resist despotism and created nations whose passion is liberty. The retention by Calvinism, however, of the Latin idea of God made impossible any thorough revision of dogma. In the history of the

[1] Denney, *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 92.

attempt to make mediæval thought serve the purposes of Reformation experience there are three leading phases.

(*a*) *The 'satisfaction' theory.*—This is intended to solve that central problem of soteriology which Anselm was the first to face explicitly: *Cur Deus homo?* Particularly, why was the Cross necessary or, at least, divinely chosen, to meet the situation created by sin and form the warrant of human salvation in face of the judgments of a holy God and the sentence of an accusing conscience? The category of *satisfactio*, supplied by the old Latin theology and applied by mediæval theology to the work of Christ, is taken over by Calvinism without any sense of its inadequacy to represent NT truth and life. Indeed, the Calvinistic use of it is more rigidly Latin even than that common in mediæval theologians. In Anselm satisfaction is not punishment, is indeed an alternative to it. In Aquinas satisfaction is punishment of a sort. In Calvin the satisfaction made in the suffering of the Redeemer is explicitly and fully penal. The imagery is that of a court of justice—in this case divine justice—absolutely unerring and altogether inexorable in judgment. We must not allow the terror of this scheme to confuse us as to its moral quality. A Roman emperor, administering the affairs of the world in accordance with a system of law which he has ordained, is a far better God than an oriental despot whose will is caprice, or a feudal monarch punctilious as to his honour, or a pope dispensing grace for a consideration. Calvinism is making thorough work of the forensic form of thought. The real demand raised by the logical perfection of the Calvinistic scheme is for a reconsideration of the idea of God. Is the God of Jesus a magnified Roman emperor? Is this the God whom the penitent and the believing find in Christ? Is salvation purchasable by punishment or by any other device known to law? Is the Redeemer a divine Being, who is just human enough to transact business with God on a basis of strict legal satisfaction? Is justification so forensic that sanctification is only a required addendum to be carried on, out of court, by extra-legal directions and incentives? The Christian consciousness awakening to such questions will leave the scheme as such on one side, go back to the NT, live over again the experience of the first believers, and make a new discovery of Jesus, and of God in Him.

(*b*) *The Socinian criticism.* — Historically, the most acute and yet the most fruitless criticism of the forensic theology comes from Socinianism (*q.v.*). Socinianism is the continuation of mediæval thought in its last stage of abstractness and formalism. Its God is the Scotist impersonation of *dominium absolutum*. His will operates in a moral vacuum. Sin is no more than a private debt. Atonement is superfluous. The Socinians are simply Scotists who have no barrier of ecclesiastical authority to prohibit them from pursuing the logic of mediæval thought to its bitter end. Their system is mediæval orthodoxy turned inside out. Socinian criticism of the satisfaction theory accordingly is directed from the point of view of that absolutist view of God which was behind the Latin theology, and had not been questioned in the Reformation theology, and is a formally consistent application of it. But, since that idea is not the Christian idea of God, the Socinian criticism does not touch the heart of the Christian experience. It may be formally correct to say with Socinianism that satisfaction and remission exclude one another, that grace and merit are contradictories, but no man has experienced the divine forgiveness apart from the love that suffered on the Cross; and all the redeemed grasp in the unity of experience the *gratuito* and the *propter Christum*. It may be logically absurd to say that God made satisfaction to Himself when Christ suffered on the Cross. But the faith that receives salvation is profoundly aware that God is in that action and passion and is charging Himself with the cost of redemption. The satisfaction theory may commit the grave ethical and theological error of holding the divine attributes apart, and specially of pitting holiness and love against one another; but an experimental knowledge of God passes by all such impossible dissection and sees in Christ the whole character of God, holy in love and loving in holiness. Socinianism is individualism. Its method is that of formal logic, deducing its conclusions from assumed premisses. The strength of the satisfaction theory was its sense of the necessary relations of God and man in a moral universe. Its weakness lay in its conception of that universe as an imperial realm, governed by an absolute monarch and administered by strict judicial procedure. The Christian consciousness has accepted this conception in lieu of a better, because it has felt that here, rather than in Socinianism, moral values and redemptive forces were secured.

(*c*) *The Grotian compromise.*—Grotius (*q.v.*) sets out to defend the Catholic doctrine of satisfaction against the Socinian criticism. Yet he shares with Arminianism the Scotist conception of the *dominium absolutum*. God is under no obligation to inflict punishment for breach of His law. Grotius rejects the category of private right, according to which sin was a debt which it was open to God to remit at His own discretion without satisfaction. But he remains within the circle of Latin thought in regarding God under the analogy of head of the State. The State, however, is not an empire, and God is not a feudal lord; He rules with enlightened and constant regard for the welfare and happiness of His subjects. Wisdom and benevolence determine His dealings with His people. They sin, no doubt, but their sins cannot really injure God; neither His honour nor His justice requires that He shall punish sin; but, as a beneficent ruler, He cannot allow the presence of sin in His dominions. He employs penalty, accordingly, simply as the proper means towards the end in view. That end is the preservation of order and the restraint of transgression. The whole conception exactly reproduces the ideal of statesmanship, when absolutism in politics is giving way to the modern conception of a well-ordered realm, where human life and happiness are reasonably secure. It belongs to God's surpassing wisdom that He did devise an adequate scheme, by which the benefits of penalty could be secured to His realm, without the odious necessity of inflicting the extreme penalty of the law upon law-breakers. Suppose His Son, the heir to the divine dominion, Himself guiltless of any offence, were to receive in His person, not, of course, punishment, but such pains as might be a vivid and awful symbol of punishment, would not this make such a profound impression on the mind of beholders, conscious of what was appointed them by the law of the State, that they would recoil from sin and avoid those dreadful consequences of law-breaking which had received in the passion of the Redeemer so tremendous an illustration? Faith can draw nourishment from faulty metaphors and ill-drawn pictures. But surely there never was a worse doctrine of salvation than that which represents the Cross as a triumph of administrative wisdom, securing a condition of public order in which people may live leisured and pleasant lives, undisturbed by the malign activities of criminals and revolutionaries. The worst features of the Greek and the Latin conceptions of God, with the Abelardian impressionism thrown in, are reproduced in the Grotian

reading of the satisfaction theory. Analogy for analogy, that of civil government is worse than that of the court-room. The latter suggests at least the inevitableness of a moral order. The former is coloured by the changeableness of political expediency. The obvious criticism upon both is that they are mere analogies, or metaphors, or illustrations, which do not and cannot express the whole Christian truth.

3. The disintegration of dogma.—The Grotian theory is the death-knell of scholasticism, whether mediæval or Protestant. It represents the exhaustion of forms of thought which had come down through the ages uncriticized and unrevised. The great upheaval of the Reformation is beginning to tell in the region of doctrinal reflexion. At first, however, the endeavour after a new theology takes destructive form. The disintegration of the dogmatic system constructed under Greek and Latin influence proceeded along various lines of thought with intensifying force, till Kant's drastic criticism re-stated the whole problem of man's relation to God and the world and demanded a new solution. Three movements within this period are of special interest and importance.

(*a*) *Pietism* is a peculiarly Continental phenomenon, which has its English parallel in Revivalism. Pietism is a revolt against three forces which had oppressed the human spirit and had hindered the deepening of Christian experience: against intellectualism, which had turned faith into the acceptance of dogmatic propositions; against institutionalism, which had subjected the individual to an external authority; against professionalism, which had made theology the province of experts and had excluded the lay mind from the privileges and responsibilities of reflective thought. It demands piety as the test of Christian standing. It asserts the need of an individual relation to God and the right of the individual to the dignity of a child of God and a freeman in the realm of spiritual realities. It stands independently related to dogma and places upon it a pragmatic valuation, according as it ministers to the wealth of the soul's inner life. In all this pietism was occupying Reformation ground. At the same time, it did not occupy precisely the same position towards dogma as did the theologians of the Reformation. They believed in systematization and were consciously constructive in their efforts. The pietists disregarded system and concentrated on those doctrines which were distinctly experiential in their import and were susceptible of psychological exposition. If they had generalized this method, they would have anticipated modern thought in a remarkable degree. As it was, their chief interest lay in the experiences of the individual soul; and their main theological work was done in connexion with the fact of conversion and the process of sanctification.

The merits and defects of pietism and its English equivalents in more recent times are patent. They awoke the conscience and appealed for faith with prophetic fervour and power. They inspired magnificent evangelistic and missionary enterprises. They set in operation humanitarian work, which endured long after the special religious conceptions that attended its beginning had been forgotten. At the same time, their conception of salvation was narrowly subjective and tended to concentrate attention on states of the soul's inner experience and to erect as standard of Christian perfection æsthetic and emotional delights rather than righteousness and truth. Such a salvation omits three-quarters of life from its purview and makes duty and virtue an annex to Christian experience rather than its product and its verification. This subjectivism has resulted, too, in a lowered conception of the Church as the sphere and instrument of the Christian salvation and in a tendency to revert towards separatism and quietism (*q.v.*). The result has been to deprive the Church of its richest and most vital elements and to condemn it to barrenness and futility. Men have been repelled alike by the narrowness of an individualistic piety and by the abstractions of dogmatic theology and institutionalized Christianity.

(*b*) *Mysticism.*—Formalism and externalism in all ages produce mysticism, and the essence of mysticism is ever the same. Accordingly, when we note the ominous development of Protestant scholasticism, we eagerly await the appearance of the mystic protest. Nor are we disappointed. Mystics confront the Protestant ascendancy and invite elect souls to draw apart from institutional Christianity and find God in the depths of their own souls. The most interesting and influential of these intense spiritual individualists were, undoubtedly, the Quakers, who found in a Scotsman, Barclay of Ury, their ablest systematic thinker. This Aberdeenshire laird dared to oppose the Calvinism which held the great majority of his fellow-countrymen in what he believed to be gross darkness. He did not mean, indeed, to deny the objective ground on which the traditional orthodoxy, Roman and Reformed alike, had based the fact of salvation. But he placed alongside of the historic fact an inward mystery, whose singular value tends to make the other unnecessary.

> There is a 'two-fold redemption'; the first 'performed and accomplished by *Christ for us* in His crucified body without us,' the other 'wrought by *Christ in us*, which no less properly is called and accounted a redemption than the former.' By the first 'we are put into a capacity of salvation.' By the second 'we witness this capacity brought into act.' The historically procured 'capacity,' however, is really not needed. God has given Christ as a Light which 'enlighteneth the hearts of all for a time, in order to salvation . . . and would work out the salvation of all if not resisted.' This Light is 'a spiritual substance which may be felt in the soul and apprehended.' This Light is seen in the historic Christ, yet the history and the mystery of Christ fall apart. 'The history is profitable and comfortable with the mystery and never without it; but the mystery is and may be profitable without the explicit and outward knowledge of the history.' 'In regard Christ is in all as in a seed, yea, and that he never is nor can be separate from that pure and holy seed and light which is in all men, therefore may it be said in a larger sense, that he is in all.' Salvation, therefore, is not bound up with any historic facts; and Christ becomes other than the Jesus of history. He is the λόγος σπερματικός of old Greek thought. 'As many as resist not this light, but receive the same, it becomes in them an holy, pure and spiritual birth, bringing forth holiness, righteousness, purity, and all those other blessed truths which are acceptable to God.' 'This inward birth of Christ in man' is that by which we are 'made just' and so justified; for justification means 'making one just, and not reputing one merely such, and is all one with sanctification.'[1]

The good laird's interest in righteousness is deep and true, and his protest against the 'satisfaction' theory is intelligible. But the background of his thought is none other than Neo-Platonism. His conception of salvation would be as blank and empty as the mystic plunge into the Absolute, were it not for the accident that Barclay was a devout believer in Christ, deeply exercised in Christian experience. Quakerism has lovely fruits and has a strong fascination for all who have felt the fruitlessness of intellectualism. But in itself it has the instability and incommunicableness of the mystic rapture. The Christian salvation cannot be separated from the redemptive action of God in history. Mystics abound throughout Christendom during the 17th and 18th centuries. They provide a refuge in the midst of that dogmatism which their influence tended to destroy. They are intensely interesting personalities. But there is no advance in their thought beyond the point reached

[1] *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, London, 1678, prop. vii. § 3 f.

by Plotinus, and the differences between them do not obscure the identity of their central positions.[1]

(*c*) *Rationalism.* — Reflective thought has a necessary function in reference to religious experience. This function it does not exercise alone, but always in conjunction with conscience, feeling, and will.

Knowledge in the NT is 'not an abstractly intellectual view of Christianity . . . not only a deeper comprehension of the Christian revelation itself, but a deeper insight into its practical significance and obligations. . . . Some such thing—not in the sense of a speculation *a priori*, without ethical inspiration, but in the sense of an expression and interpretation of Christian faith, which shall be pervaded throughout by the spiritual virtue of that faith—seems to be set before us by the NT writers as the ideal of "knowledge."'[2]

Suppose, however, the intellectual element in this complex function of the mind were isolated from all other elements and erected into a standard of the truth and value of a living religious experience, it is plain that the result would be defective. The tendency to such false isolation and elevation of intellect lies close at hand, and theology in all ages has felt it as a temptation. When the temptation is yielded to, the result is rationalism (*q.v.*). Practically, it means 'salvation by wisdom.' Religion is cast into propositional form. The acceptance of this form is treated as the condition of salvation. Salvation is intellectualized and thereby, of course, emptied of its vital force. In post-Reformation thought prior to Kant rationalism reigned supreme. On the one side, it assumed the form of dogmatic orthodoxy and professed to be a formal and systematic presentation of saving truth. The more rigorously the logic of the understanding was applied to the fullness of religious life, the more elaborate the system became, and the less able it was to sustain its own weight. Controversies broke out, sects multiplied, weapons of mutual exclusion were employed, and salvation was disfigured by the very process that was meant to defend it. On the other side, rationalism appears as criticism of dogma. At first the movement is not directed against the content of the Christian revelation. Men like Baxter among the Nonconformists or the Cambridge Platonists among the Anglicans are in full sympathy with evangelical Christianity. But they are repelled by the Protestant scholasticism. The Cambridge men, in particular, occupied the position of the Alexandrian theologians. They are seeking to do a genuinely constructive work in theology. They have borrowed their ruling principles, however, from the Alexandrians—just as the Alexandrians borrowed from prevalent Greek modes of thought. They did not estimate correctly the nature and issues of the principles they were thus assuming, and they were brought near the result that ever haunts Greek thought, viz. the undervaluing of the historical basis of redemption and the relapse into mysticism. Their Platonism is really Neo-Platonism. Their chief value is that they created an atmosphere in which the Christian soul might grow in sweetness of spirit and tolerance of judgment. After all, however, theirs was a cloistered virtue. They were not able to interpret Christianity afresh to a generation under the control of dogmatism. The critical process took further and more aggressive shape in the movement of which English Deism (*q.v.*) is the best-known representative. This movement is as intellectualist as the orthodoxy it combated. Its aim is not to dispense with dogma, but to reduce the dogmatic system to an easier compass. Christianity is still *gnosis*; but its propositions can be cut down to a few brief statements. Salvation is still by wisdom; but the opinions offered for acceptance are such as will find the minimum of opposition from the human understanding. Such reduction of dogma has no religious value. Rather, it accentuates the essential evil of all dogma. It accentuates that 'usurpation of the understanding' which makes rationalism so strong in its attack on orthodoxy and so useless as a contribution to the higher life of the spirit. Further, a rationalism that cleaves to a few dogmas is powerless against an application of its own rigorous method, which discards all dogma and delivers the human mind once for all from all bondage to external authority. Christianity was never so near extinction as in the period which began with the Protestant dogmatic and ended with dogmatic atheism. The root of all the evil is plain. Theology has lost touch with life. It has ceased to be a real soteriology. It has betaken itself to system-building and has forgotten its true task, the interpretation of the Christian salvation as an actual experience of living men.

4. **The movement towards reconstruction.**—In place of decadent scholasticism there came a great return to experience. In every department of thought there is an abandonment of scholastic methods and a recurrence to the facts of life. Physical science enters confidently into its kingdom. The historical method of study, critical in its approaches, constructive in its aim, governs procedure in philosophy and theology. Literature emerges out of pedantry and formalism and becomes vivid, human, free, and varied. Social and economic forces gain increasing practical and scientific recognition. Deeper and more influential than all these efforts after reality is the revival of religion which characterized the second half of the 18th cent., continued during most of the 19th cent., and spread through all lands occupied by daughter churches of the Reformation. As in that century when Christianity was born and in that which saw the collapse of mediævalism, so now men became deeply penetrated by a sense of the need of divine redemptive power to deliver them from the moral evils which afflicted them. All problems of life and thought were seen to run back to the ultimate problem of man's relation to God. Salvation, as in the 1st cent. and in the 16th, was an imperious demand of the human spirit. As in those two great epochs of religious history, the response to this need came in a new proclamation of the love of God, manifested in the life and suffering of the historic Redeemer. Christianity was, as it were, reborn in the consciousness of men, and something of the gladness and power of NT days re-visited the fainting Church.

Theology and philosophy in this period alike address themselves to constructive work. In such an endeavour the activities and results of the past could not be forgotten. All the greater forms of ancient thought are reproduced. Yet there are deep lines of demarcation which separate modern thought from those typical forms which, after eighteen centuries of dominance, perished under the criticism of Hume and the yet more thoroughgoing criticism of Kant. The broad distinction consists in this: that, whereas ancient thought, in its Greek and Latin forms and in its mediæval continuation, is governed by metaphysical dualism, modern thought, in all its forms, has abandoned the attempt to construct a universe out of two opposed elements. The Greek idea of an Absolute, out of relation to the finite, to be reached by a supra-rational endeavour of soul, is finally surrendered. The Absolute, however defined, must be conceived as manifesting itself in the fullness of life, to be apprehended, therefore, not by going outside of experience, but by penetrating to the heart of experience and reaching that which is at once the highest value and the supreme reality.

[1] *E.g.*, William Law and the Quakers; cf. J. H. Overton, *William Law, Nonjuror and Mystic*, London, 1881, pp. 418–420.
[2] Denney, *HDB*, art. 'Knowledge.'

The problem, in one word, is reconciliation. How is man to discern and appropriate the fundamental unity through which all human interests are to be reconciled and harmonized? It is the underlying problem of economics, of social and political science, as well as of philosophy in its broadest range and of theology in its specific task. Salvation is conceived as essentially functional and organic. The effort is made to combine two aspects of salvation which had been often held apart. The one is the objective and historic: the unifying of life cannot take place in idea merely; it must be wrought out for men in a history, if it is ever to be appropriated by men as an inspiration and a power. The other is the subjective and experiential: the action in which reconciliation is achieved cannot be an isolated historic incident. Salvation is not a transaction. It is an action indeed, but such an action as is continued in the experience of men and does really organize human life into a living unity. The 19th cent. is remarkable for its interest in history. It is the period of 'lives of Christ'; so confident is it that what it needs is to be found in Him, if only He were properly understood. It is remarkable, also, for its intense concern with human welfare. The constant political upheavals which mark its course are subordinate in importance to the goal of social improvement which they are supposed, often mistakenly, to attain. No way of salvation which does not issue in the moral uplift of the individual and of society can make successful appeal to the modern mind. Atonement must be real at-one-ment, of man and God, and of man with man. When from the standpoint of our own day we survey the field and note the many volumes and all their plans and schemes, we perceive that, amid this bewildering variety, there is one controlling quest, viz. for a secure doctrine of salvation. This does not mean that the modern mind will ever bind upon itself the intolerable yoke of a dogmatic system. Still, as it surveys a century of varied and intense activity, as it finds all gains and values imperilled in the great disaster of a world war, as it looks forward to an era of reconstruction, it does require that the forces of redemption shall be understood, so that humanity shall be saved with a salvation which shall atone for unspeakable wrong, repair intolerable waste and injury, and comprehend all nations in mutual service and helpfulness.

Success in the effort to reach a truly organic idea of salvation has been very varied. Certain types of doctrine may be distinguished in the leading thinkers of the period. Affinities with past conceptions may be noted, with a constant reaching out after more concrete modes of thought.

(*a*) *Salvation by wisdom.*—The old Greek intellectualism has its modern representatives in Hegel and the great English thinkers who carry on the idealist tradition. Let the idea of God be conceived as that of a self-differentiating unity. Let the element of difference appear in the individual's intense consciousness of himself, with separate rights and claims. It is plain, then, what sin and salvation mean. Sin is the turning of the self against the unity which alone gives it meaning. Salvation will be the dying to this selfish self and the affirmation by the self of its oneness with the universal Self, in whose completeness all elements of difference lose their separateness and are reconciled to one another. 'Die to live' is the gospel which each individual must preach to himself. In the act in which he thus dies he enters a new life. In the life thus reached by death his sin is seen to be lifted from him. It has been already borne by the universal consciousness, of which he is by nature a partaker, to which he owes both the possibility of sin and the power of redemption. Historic Christianity sees this unity with the divine exhibited supremely in the consciousness of Christ. The ordinary man will do well to attach himself to that great discoverer of the way of salvation. But the salvation is not dependent on Jesus, and there is no need or room for trust in Him. The salvation is the discovery by the individual of his oneness with God; and it is made by sheer force of thought.

No philosophy was ever more religious. It is Neo-Platonism purged of dualism. It is Platonism interpreted, corrected, enriched. But it is not Christianity. The dualism it supposes itself to have transcended is sunk too deep in human nature to be exorcized by a formula. God is more than an idea, even than 'the Idea.' Christ is more than an illustration of a process of thought. Salvation by wisdom is for an intellectual élite. It is neither universal, final, nor effective.

(*b*) *Salvation by feeling.*—Intellectualism never fails to produce the protest of feeling. Over against the makers of systems and the keen-witted destroyers of systems stand continually the great company of the mystics. Jacobi, stirred both by the success and by the failure of Kant's critical philosophy, maintains that the mere understanding can indeed bring us only to phenomena. The realities of God and the spiritual life are inaccessible to its procedure. They are not, however, on that account out of reach. Another faculty, which sometimes he calls 'faith' and sometimes 'reason,' conducts us to the supreme realities and gives us a direct perception of them. The same mystical vein is present in Schleiermacher (*q.v.*), combined with a strong sense of the value of the historic redemption in Christ and of the organic fullness of the Christian life. Religion is neither philosophy, nor theology, nor ethic. Its source is deep beneath intellect and will. It consists in a state of soul wherein ordinary activities are suppressed and the whole being is surrendered to the overwhelming sense of the presence of the Infinite. This condition is the very essence of salvation. The Christian religion owes its supremacy to the fact that in it this sense of the Infinite and the soul's absolute dependence upon it is evoked, and maintained, in a unique degree. Christ holds the central place in this religion because He lived habitually in this consciousness of God's presence. The Church, as the fellowship of those who trace their new life to the spirit of Jesus, is the organ whereby Christ's consciousness of God is to be disseminated throughout humanity. In Ritschl's words:

> 'Redemption is the actual liberation of believers from the sin that prevails in them, by communication of the power of His consciousness of God, which the individual receives in the fellowship of those who resemble Him.'[1]

Schleiermacher's message was life from the dead to a Church dying of intellectualism. It was pietism lifted out of a narrow groove and applied to the widest problems of philosophy and religion. It communicated an impulse to theology which has never ceased to act, recalling it to its real function as interpreter of the Church's life. It was a determined effort to deliver mysticism from the twin errors which continually haunt it—the undervaluing of history and the isolation of the individual. Christ and the Church are brought within the scope of the mystic experience and are made essential to it. Yet, after all, religion, as Schleiermacher conceives it, is essentially mysticism. It implies the dualism which is the presupposition of Neo-Platonism and which recurs even in Spinozism. The Infinite does in effect absorb the finite. Salvation does mean the dissolution of the soul in the rapture of its sense of

[1] *A Critical Hist. of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1872, p. 467.

the Infinite and the Eternal. The power in virtue of which man reaches the Infinite is not the intellect or the will; neither is it faith, in the NT and Reformation sense of *fiducia*. Religion is not action, nor does it urge men to activity. It is the soul feeling itself as one with God. God, in such an experience, is not viewed as personal. Schleiermacher, like all mystics, shrinks from the popular language which makes of God an individual like all other individuals, only bigger and stronger. But he carries this reverence to the characteristic mystical position that 'omnis determinatio est negatio'; and in this denial of predicates to God personality too is lost. With it there is lost also the conception of a divine end, and a divine historic action, and a redemption which is an achievement of love. In spite of the Christian doctrinal construction and the beautifully Christian spirit, we are still at the point where mysticism resolutely abides, at which salvation is an ineffable and incommunicable experience of the individual soul, not merely immediate, but unmediated by any Saviour or any saving deed. At this point mysticism and Christianity part company. It is significant that in the exhaustion which attended the close of the 19th cent., and the destruction of all institutional forms of life which has marked the second decade of the 20th cent., there has prevailed a deep and wide-spread interest in mysticism. Its historic representatives are being sympathetically studied. Its psychological elements are being analyzed. To it, as to the essence of religion, men are being recalled, and in it, it is hoped, they will unite in a community of soul which disregards divergences of ecclesiastical connexion. Sects are springing up in which—*e.g.*, 'Christian Science' (*q.v.*)—in spite of the grotesque ignorance they display, we can see that a mystic influence is at work, giving them any real value they may possess. The net result is the same as in any other era in which mysticism has arisen. Its value lies in its protest. Its weakness lies in its dualism and individualism. Its presuppositions are not those of Christianity, and its salvation is radically distinct from that with which Christianity meets the need of man—in the 1st cent., in the 16th, or the 20th.

(*c*) *Salvation by power of will.*—Stoicism, like mysticism, stands strong in a period of intellectual impoverishment and moral anarchy. It differs, at least in its primary form, by being the assertion, and not the despair, of self. Mysticism carries the denial of things finite one degree farther than Stoicism and denies the sufficiency of the finite subject. The lesson of the history of thought is that mysticism diagnoses the need of man more thoroughly than Stoicism. It is precisely within the self that the root evil lies. The self cannot be its own redeemer. Yet Stoicism has a nobility and valour of spirit lacking to mysticism. It acts as a moral tonic, when destructive criticism is rampant and religious feeling seems to have no care for the wounds inflicted by a ruthless logic. In the heart of the 18th cent. Butler proclaimed the autonomy and supremacy of conscience. Conscience is like a king issuing commands to turbulent and ill-conditioned subjects. Unfortunately, its authority is not combined with power. Any individual who chooses, however, may make conscience supreme in his own life, and, if he does, virtue will follow and be his reward. This idea of conscience is crossed in Butler with other ethical conceptions, as self-interest and the love of God. His attempt to combine them, however, would have required another psychology than was at his disposal and a different reading than he attained to of man's need and of divine redemption. As it is, he stands, a lonely figure, amid the crowd of destructive thinkers. The world of his day honoured him with a bishopric, but left his message severely alone. Not to him, but to John Wesley, on whom, it is to be feared, he looked with some degree of contempt, was the moral uplift of his generation to be due. Stoicism has no gospel, bids each man be his own Saviour, permits no objective mediation of salvation, stands erect, great, somewhat grim, and a total failure.

In Kant (*q.v.*) the destructive criticism of the 18th cent. is carried to its most drastic issues. The whole structure of dogmatism crumbles beneath his blows. He had finally demonstrated that that power of the mere understanding and that method of logical process by which the great dogmatic systems had been reared are incompetent to reach the sphere of things real. By the same rigid criticism he also demonstrated that the attack upon dogmatism is open to the same condemnation as dogmatism itself. If dogmatism is incompetent, so also is scepticism. Never was so great a destroyer. But, with him, destruction is only a preliminary step. In heart he is a builder. He belongs in intention to the period not of disintegration, but of reconstruction. He himself, however, scarcely advances beyond Stoicism; nothing is more interesting in him than his attempt to make Stoicism Christian, though, in effect, all that he does accomplish is to turn Christianity into a Stoic philosophy. Above the world of phenomena, to which alone the intellect conducts us, there is the region of ethical value, which is the sphere of reality. In the former man is an empirical object, and therefore not free. In the latter he is free, because freedom means the determination of the self by its own law; and the noumenal self gives the law to itself. Suppose, however (what is indeed the case) that man has ceased to be his real noumenal self and, by an act which on Kantian principles is really inexplicable, has allowed himself to be determined, not by the law of his real being, but by things sensuous and empirical, how shall he deliver himself? What shall he do to be saved? Kant has no answer to give except, 'Obey the moral law.' It is the law of the moral subject as noumenon. But it is his law only as an individual. It is not the revelation of God in him and in mankind. It has no regenerative force.

'Because he stops short of this latter conception, Kant necessarily rejects as Mysticism, or as involving the negation of moral freedom, that very idea which gives its great moral power to Christianity, viz. the idea of a real objective mediation, by which the individual is raised above himself.'[1]

It is deeply interesting to note how Kant employs Christian phraseology, 'Son of God,' 'substitute,' 'Redeemer.' But, with his presuppositions, all this is picture language only. There is no God but the good will, no gospel but the categorical imperative, no salvation save man's obedience to law, no Saviour but his own unaided power.

Kant's view of salvation suffers from his dualism, which involved a really unintelligible distinction between man noumenal and man phenomenal. It shuts man up to his subjectivity and makes impossible any real reconciliation of man to God and of man to man. Ritschl's view of Christianity is Kantian in its thoroughly ethical quality; but it seeks to get above the Kantian moralism in these two respects: it seeks to ground man's salvation in a work of God; and it exhibits salvation as fulfilment of a social task.[2] (*a*) God has before Him one purpose in His dealings with men—the creation of a Kingdom, which is the Kantian 'realm of ends,' treated not as a deliverance of the moral law, but as a fact of religious experience, and filled with the positive content of

[1] E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, ii. 619.

[2] See art. RITSCHLIANISM.

mutual relationships and service. (*b*) This Kingdom is constituted by obedience to the divine will. It is, accordingly, a synonym for salvation. Salvation, or justification, or adoption means moral harmony with God. (*c*) This Kingdom has a history, inasmuch as God does in all ages labour for its realization. In that history Christ has a unique place. He perfectly obeyed God, was entirely faithful to His calling as Son and Servant of God, and carried His obedience to the point of death rather than forgo His oneness of will with God. On His fidelity the Kingdom depended. It is due to Christ that it exists. Salvation is a fact in human experience, which owes its permanence to Christ's loyalty to His Father. Therefore humanity is in debt to Christ and is saved only through the grace of Christ—*i.e.* through Christ's perseverance in His vocation. (*d*) The individual is saved in and through His place in the Kingdom. Salvation is membership in the community which Christ gathered about Him, and which has existed ever since, the members of which share Christ's relation to God. The Kingdom, or salvation, is prior to the individual and is a gift to him. But it is his only as he makes it his task and devotes himself to doing the will of God, which will include serving his neighbour. Unquestionably, all this is moralism of a very noble kind. Its recoil from a hard, forensic, or transactional view of the work of Christ and of man's salvation is entirely intelligible and has proved most fruitful in all subsequent soteriology. When all is said, however, it remains moralism still. It does not view sin in the aspect which it has always borne for the Christian consciousness, as a fact of such overwhelming magnitude that it involved God in the unspeakable anguish of enduring it as a load upon His heart. For Ritschl 'the sin of the world is a separable accident of the mission of Jesus.'[1] Faith, accordingly, has not the note of trustful self-commitment to the mercy of God in Christ which is struck in the NT and re-echoed in the praises of the Church in every age. It becomes 'the permanent direction of the will to the final purpose of God and Christ which the believer for his own sake maintains.' A. E. Garvie, who quotes this passage, adds, 'Individual faith is social loyalty.'[2] Thus has Ritschl separated fruit from root. Or, rather, the fruit of character grows from the root of individual moral capacity and owes to Christ and His Church no more than indirect assistance. It is an unpleasant issue of Ritschlianism that a salvation, thus conceived as moral task, seems open only to those nations which inherit Western culture. What becomes of the rest of the world does not appear; and missionary enterprise does not seem to be one of the ministries of the Kingdom.

It is significant, too, that Ritschl has omitted any place or function of the Holy Spirit in the salvation of men. Yet so deep-seated an element in the experience of the NT Church ought surely to have been embraced in a theory which turns upon the fact of the Christian community. Where, however, the work of Christ for us, and upon us, or in us, is inadequately interpreted, because of invincible subjectivism, there can be no occasion for the idea of divine power operating directly within the human spirit. Ultimately man is self-sufficient in salvation.

(*d*) *Salvation by process.*—Throughout the whole movement towards reconstruction one characteristic is most marked, the recoil from the static view of God, which had reigned unquestioned in Greek and Latin theology. Even Hegelianism did not intend to present for acceptance a motionless and impassible God, but did desire to bring the facts of life and movement into the idea of the Absolute.

Two phases of recent thought have given voice to this reaction from a static view of God. One is the magnificent activity of science in unfolding the facts of development in the universe. The other is the emphasis which is increasingly laid on social facts, forces, and ideals. The governing idea of evolution, and the prevailing social emphasis, could not fail to have profound effects on theology and to produce far-reaching influence upon older conceptions of God and of salvation. When the first shock was over, it was thought that no great harm was done. It was hoped that theology could take into itself the evolutionary view of nature and yet retain all the advantages of the old absolutist view. In like manner, theology, it was considered, could be democratized and socialized, while God could still be worshipped in His solitary supremacy. Of late, however, it has become apparent that the theological revolution cannot be accomplished so smoothly. The static Absolute is not to be so easily transmuted. If the static view goes back to Parmenides, some of the leaders of the revolution are inclined to go back to Heraclitus. Instead of a universe rigid and fixed, we are invited to behold a growing universe and to discern at its heart a growing God.[1] Instead of a God conceived as an omniscient Planner and an omnipotent Doer, we are offered a finite God, not omnipotent, but doing the best He can to overcome forces hostile to Him and gradually, very gradually, with toil and pain, winning satisfactory results. A God of this kind, we are assured, is quite intelligible and much more adorable than the distant Divinity of older thought. Human salvation, accordingly, takes on a wholly different cast from anything we have believed in hitherto. It is not a victory of divine love already won, which we appropriate and carry out into issues which God had in view when He undertook the making of the world. It is a process in which God and man are both engaged, the issue of which is by no means a certainty either for God or for man. On the whole, there is reason for hope. If we cannot be optimists, we can at least be meliorists. Things are moving; and God has grown so wise and strong, and has increased so much in moral intuition and moral power, that we are reasonably sure He will win in the end, provided He gets the help of all high-minded persons. There can be no doubt that the intellectual atmosphere is charged with ideas like these. Even before the war men like William James and Hastings Rashdall were insisting on the worthiness of the conception of a finite or limited God, who is not the Absolute. To Ward the Absolute is 'God-and-the-world.'[2] McTaggart's Absolute is a society conceived after the analogy of a College![3] H. G. Wells harks back to the analogy of a hero King, 'a young and energetic God, an Invisible Prince growing in strength and wisdom, who calls men and women to his service, and who gives salvation from self and mortality only through self-abandonment to his service.'[4] The idea of a 'young God' suggests obvious questions. Did he then come into existence, and when and how? Is his present rate of progress fixed, or, with added experience, will he be able to increase his speed?

The difficulty of attributing growth to God is intensified, if we are meant to include in it development of character.

[1] R. Mackintosh, *Albrecht Ritschl and his School*, London, 1915, p. 154.
[2] *The Ritschlian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1899, p. 321.

[1] See art. PLURALISM.
[2] *The Realm of Ends* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1911, p. 241.
[3] *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge, 1901, p. 86.
[4] *God the Invisible King*, London, 1917, p. 114.

'It is not clear,' says Pringle-Pattison, 'whether this God is morally perfect to begin with—in which case the development and progress would consist simply in the moral enlightenment and betterment of human beings and similar races in other regions of the universe—or whether the finite God is himself conceived as growing in insight and in moral wisdom through the lessons of experience, and working out his own character as he proceeds with his beneficent work. In the latter case, one is at a loss to see why the title of God should be bestowed on an individual essentially of the human type, though, no doubt, on a larger scale and at a higher stage of development; and one is bound to conclude that such a developing demigod would give the same account of his own development as the moral and religious man among ourselves. He would describe it as a new insight into the nature of things, due to the leading of a higher God, who would be God indeed. It seems to me impossible to override the testimony of the religious consciousness on this point.'[1]

That testimony is unquestionably that God is the source of salvation, which is with Him an accomplished victory, which men presuppose in all their own moral warfare. Commenting on William James's description of his position as 'moralistic religion,' Pringle-Pattison says:

'However it may be with popular religion, the deeper experiences of religious faith and emotion—the utterances of the saints, the religious experts—appear quite irreconcilable with the pluralistic conception of a finite God, an unfinished world, and a dubious fight. In fact, it is not too much to say, with Mr. Bradley, that "to make the moral point of view absolute" is to have "broken with every considerable religion." The victory for which morality fights is for religion already, or rather eternally, won; and it is the assurance of this victory which inspires the finite subject with courage and confidence in his individual struggle. . . . As experience abundantly shows, the assurance of victory won and reconciliation achieved is the most powerful dynamic that can be supplied to morality.'[2]

The motives which prompt this hypothesis of a finite God are no doubt altogether admirable—the desire to give reality to man's moral history, and to God's sympathy with him in it, as well as the hope of clearing God's character in view of the miseries of mankind. And it may very well be that those ends cannot be served so long as we hold a static view of the Absolute. But is there no alternative to such a static Absolute except a finite growing God? It is certain that the alternative did not present itself to the saints and seers of the OT or NT. They believed profoundly in the sympathy of God with man and included suffering in the divine experience. But the background of this thought was not a demigod, fighting his way to a dubious issue. Rather it was a God of omnipotent love, realizing in time a purpose that is eternal, and doing so by Himself entering into human experience and achieving once for all the redemption of the world. Men enter on this redemption as a possession—they fulfil it in an experience of toil and suffering, in which they have the presence and sympathy of their Redeemer, and they inherit it as a completed salvation, a Kingdom that cannot be shaken.

Speculatively, the doctrine of the finite God depends on the success of Bergson's philosophy; and that stands or falls by his theory of time. It may be permitted to doubt whether that theory will hold the field against criticism. It seems as though, in his view of the future, Bergson himself has fallen a victim to the metaphor of space, and is thinking of time in the old way as a prolongation of a line into an unknown region where nothing is certain and anything may happen. Such, in any case, is the speculative implication in the theological idea of a young and energetic God, whose success is quite unpredictable. Suppose he were to fail! In that case he would himself need a Saviour, like any other beaten soul. In allowing that such a fate is thinkable we have abandoned the point of view of religion altogether and have arrived at a profound and comprehensive scepticism.

(*e*) *Salvation by historic redemption.*—We stand too near to our own period to expect co-ordinate work among the crowd of expert scholars and eager students, or to hope for such a comprehensive statement of results as shall express the Christian verities in a form adequate to the needs of men in this new age. The significant fact is that, within the generation which has not yet passed from the arena of conflict and endeavour there has been a prevailing Biblical idea of salvation, presented with careful exegetical work and with ample ethical and psychological emphasis.

Salvation is conceived broadly and deeply as personal and moral, including fellowship with God, the elevation of individual character, and the service of men in righteousness and love. This salvation, inexhaustible in redemptive and restorative power, is recognized as due to God's action in the historic Christ. The debt of humanity to Christ is regarded as unique and incomparable. By writers and preachers of every variety of theological opinion men are being summoned to Christ as the fountain-head of the influences which are to renew humanity at its centre and inaugurate, after the discipline of war, an era penitent, humble, and at the same time more wisely ordered and more hopeful. It is being perceived also, even more clearly, that God's revealing action in Christ must be accompanied by suffering. Any view of Christ which omits the element of suffering as essential to His vocation and to His abiding influence is recognized to be less than Christian. There is a growing impression that the suffering of love is the mightiest redemptive influence known to man, and that, in the winning of salvation by divine act, suffering must have the central place.

The doctrine of atonement, which modern intellectualism had neglected, is attracting earnest attention, and Christian thought is concentrating upon the Cross of Christ.

As we survey the work of Christian thinkers of the latter part of the 19th cent., to the verge of the Great War, we find that the death of Christ has been presented mainly in three aspects.

(*a*) *As a transaction.*—From this point of view, 'the atoning Christ acts on God for man.'[1] Hitherto this transaction has been described after commercial or forensic analogies. Grotius had led the way to a view of the work of Christ coloured by the idea of a modern State administered by a just and wise prince. This last type of thought harmonized with much that was burning in the hearts of Englishmen. The political revolution was proceeding. Democratic ideals were being realized. The conception of a State in which every citizen has his place and function guaranteed in law was being made the goal of practical politics. No man wrought harder in the cause of ordered liberty than R. W. Dale of Birmingham. It was natural, therefore, that his theological thinking should be controlled by the ideas which inspired his social and political action. His governing category is law, not made by man or exploited in the interest of individuals or classes, but a law of righteousness, without caprice or variableness, untouched by time or change. The Kingdom of Heaven is an eternal order. Human welfare depends on the maintenance of this order. 'In this kingdom Christ is the Moral Ruler . . . His voice is the voice of the eternal Law of Righteousness.'[2] Law, however, is threatened by the uprising of human pride and arrogance, which would upset the order and make life intolerable. Law must be vindicated, and there is no way of vindicating it save by the sequence in which suffering inevitably follows law-breaking. It belongs to the Moral Ruler in the Kingdom of Heaven to vindicate the

[1] *The Idea of God*, p. 382 *f.* [2] *Ib.* p. 395 *f.*

[1] J. K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 178.
[2] *The Atonement?*, London, 1878, p. xxxii.

law which is His own voice. He has done so, not, however, in the person of the offenders, but in His own, 'not by inflicting suffering on the sinner, but by enduring suffering Himself.'[1] This is the gospel. When we lie under conviction of sin's sinfulness and are feeling the pressure of the divine judgments, we are enabled to rest on the death of Christ as 'the perfect expression and fulfilment of that submission which we know ought to be manifested by ourselves. . . . He endured the penalties of sin, and so made an actual submission to the authority and righteousness of the principle which those penalties express.'[2] The redemption of man rests on the endurance by the Moral Ruler of the actual penalty of sin. The fact of sin is so real and terrible that only a fact as tragic in its agony and as measureless in its significance as the Cross of Christ can meet it. But whether the value of that death is adequately or even fittingly expressed in terms of law and penalty, and whether Christ's relation to the Kingdom of Heaven is properly stated where He is described as its Moral Ruler, may gravely be questioned. Dale himself strove earnestly to avoid the hardness of these forms by dwelling on the unity of Christ with God and His relation to men as their representative. But surely, if these true and great thoughts are to be present in a doctrine of the Atonement, they ought to be regulative; and, if they are made so, legal categories must not be treated as determinative. Something of the old dualism remains when the love of God is confronted by His law as a power to be reckoned with. Love does not break into an order constituted by law. It is itself the basis of the order and is supreme within it.

(*b*) *As a demonstration.*—From this standpoint 'the atoning Christ acts on man for God.'[3] If the 19th cent. was marked by a great movement towards political emancipation and the reconstitution of society, it was also characterized by an intense humanitarian instinct. Love, no less than justice, was its passion. Men were becoming imbued with the spirit of pity. The hapless lot of multitudes 'damned into this world' moved noble and self-denying souls to life-long ministries of compassion. Legislation was devoted to the improvement of the position of the less favoured masses. Criminals were regarded not merely as wrong-doers, but as unfortunate in the conditions of their birth, inheritance, and social environment, or even as themselves grievously wronged by the conditions of their life. The idea of punishment was reconsidered, and prison management was revolutionized. Discipline, and not penalty, became the regulative principle for society's dealing with its outcasts; and the great end was definitely conceived as the restoration of the offender to the ranks of citizenship. Political science, the system of education, church machinery and enterprise, were controlled by moral and social ends. Internationalism was scarcely yet born; but the ideal of an organized world was growing in the minds of statesmen and political thinkers. Thoughts like these could not fail to have a profound effect on theology. They are really occupied with the redemption of men; and that is the heart of the Christian faith. The Christian salvation can be nothing, if it is not ethical and social. The great doctrine of the Atonement, admittedly the very core of Christian thought, must be thoroughly moralized and must be interpreted through that spirit of love which has awakened to such glorious efficiency in modern society. The moral theory of the Atonement, accordingly, which had never ceased as a protest against legalism and particularism, was revived in richer form than could be found in Abelard or the Socinians.

What does the world need—so the argument runs—in its sorrows, agonies, sins, but a demonstration that God loves His wayward children to the uttermost? Once a soul is convinced of this, its hardness will melt; it will turn from its sins in penitence: it will respond in love to the appealing love of God. But what can produce this conviction? The answer is: The presence of Christ in the world, in the character that was His, in the life He lived, and the death He died.[1] The sight of Christ crucified produces in the beholder repentance; and repentance is regeneration. The Atonement is 'a moral atonement, offered to repentance.'[2] This state of soul, in which the sinner's heart is broken because of sin, 'is not a condition precedent to being forgiven; it is itself forgiveness—forgiveness which separates the sinner from his past self as far as the east is from the west.'[3] It is on the basis of this state of mind being genuine that God proceeds in forgiveness.[4] The Christian life, having been thus inaugurated, is carried forward under redemptive influences, which stream from the exalted Lord. Deeply Christian as this statement is, it does not seem to have made any doctrinal advance upon Abelard.[5] The question recurs: How does the death of Christ demonstrate the love of God? Surely the force of that demonstration must lie in itself, prior to, and independent of, our response to it; and that independent value can attach to it only if in the death of Christ the love of God deals effectively and finally with the fact of sin.

(*c*) *As an experience.*—Mozley's phrase in this connexion is: 'The atoning Christ acts on God as man.'[6] Deepest of all interests in the 19th cent. was the sacred mystery of personality. A dualistic philosophy was never able to do justice to the idea of personality, either in God or in man. It translated personality by individuality, concentrated selfhood in the bare act of self-assertion, arrayed the divine Self against the human self, and viewed the relations of God and man as those of two self-centred individuals. Proceeding upon individualistic presuppositions, theology could make no more of salvation than an arrangement between two individuals—one very great and powerful, the other very small and helpless—carried through by a third, who is externally related to each of these. The Atonement is a transaction in which God inflicts suffering on Christ, and Christ endures it, the result being assigned to man, or to some men, by divine decree. Plainly this is wholly inadequate to the Christian experience of redemption through Christ and leads to such perversities of thought as that God inflicted punishment on the Son of His love, and that there was a quantitative equivalence between the sufferings of Christ and the pains which sinners would otherwise have to endure. Individualism ran its course in the French Revolution and in the commercialism which exploited the idea of individual liberty. Most of 19th cent. thought has been an effort to get away from individualism. Much of it has been vague. The study of personality has not yet reached conclusions. Two points, however, may be regarded as fixed in modern thought, turned against individualism and absolutism respectively. The one is the individual's power of sympathetic self-identification with selves other than his own, making their concerns his, with an appropriating energy to which experience presents no limits. Individuality and finitude are only margins, which fade for ever before

[1] R. Mackintosh, *Essays toward a New Theology*, Glasgow, 1889, p. 2[illegible].
[2] *Ib.* p. 50. [3] *Ib.* p. 50. [4] *Ib.* p. 51.
[5] Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., vi. 79.
[6] *Loc. cit.*

[1] *The Atonement*, p. 392. [2] *Ib.* p. 423.
[3] Mozley, *loc. cit.*

the impulse of self-communicating love. This is the essence of personality. The other is the self-realization of the individual through this continuous surrender. He is not 'lost' in the process. He finds himself and reaches a fullness of being which is his own, an indefeasible possession, gained and retained in self-surrender. The self that is thus surrendered is inseparable from that to which, and for which, the surrender is made. Alone, it is a fragment whose existence is its doom. In union, it lives its own true life in power and joy. This idea of the personal life could not fail to be applied to the person and work of Christ. We need not apply to Greek or Latin theology to supply explanatory forms of thought. Love is its own interpreter. Within the experience of Jesus are to be found at once the fact and the interpretation of atonement. The key to the problem is as simple and as mysterious as sympathy—a perfect sympathy with God, and a perfect sympathy with man. This sympathy is found in Christ. This, in its manifestation and exercise, is the Christian salvation. There has been born into the heart of humanity One who gathered into His own soul the guilt of man and felt it as no sinner can, and at the same time held inviolate the holiness of God. His experience is the Atonement—a veritable sin-bearing, in which the whole character of God is at once expressed and satisfied, and through which the love of God moves triumphant over sin to its goal in the great redemption. The situation created by sin has been fully met. God in Christ has reconciled the world to Himself; and this accomplished reconciliation is offered to the acceptance of faith. The old distinction of objective and subjective, as descriptive of theories of atonement, no longer holds good. This is demonstration of love, by love's deed; but the deed is the experience of Jesus.

The often quoted language of McLeod Campbell is the classical expression of this theory of the Atonement, which, in the mind of its chief exponent, is not so much a theory as a reverent entrance into, and a devout valuation of, the experience of Him who passed through deepening pain to the supreme sacrifice of the Cross.

> Christ, in this experience, uttered 'a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man. . . . He who so responds to the divine wrath against sin, saying, "Thou art righteous, O Lord, who judgest us," is necessarily receiving the full apprehension and realisation of that wrath, as well as of that sin against which it comes forth into His soul and spirit, into the bosom of the divine humanity, and, so receiving it, He responds to it with a perfect response,—a response from the depths of that divine humanity,—and *in that perfect response He absorbs it*. . . . By that perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to divine justice which is its due, and could alone satisfy it.'[1]

With this insight into the conditions of redemption the history of the doctrine of salvation has reached its climax as far as our generation is concerned. Nothing of fundamental importance has been added to the ideas which McLeod Campbell suggested in his epoch-making book. Criticism attaches mainly to his description of the experience of Jesus as 'repentance'; but a defective phrase does not invalidate the truth of the description itself.

Commenting on this phrase, Denney, while admitting that it is an unhappy one, maintains the soundness of McLeod Campbell's central position:

> 'It is a description of facts in the experience of the Saviour, and of facts on which His power to reconcile us to God is essentially dependent. If He had not thus seen and felt what sin is to God, if He had not thus acknowledged God's justice in condemning it, we could never have been brought through Him to the same insight and sorrow, to the same confession and acknowledgment, apart from which the reconciliation of sinners to God is self-evidently an impossibility. For to be reconciled to God means at all events that God's mind about sin, which is revealed to us in Christ, through Christ becomes our own.'[1]

Later writers have supplemented McLeod Campbell at certain points: Moberley, by including the work of the Holy Spirit in the winning of the Christian salvation; Forsyth, by emphasizing Christ's confession of God's holiness as the element in His experience which gives it atoning value; Denney, by extending the experience of Jesus to include the act of dying, because short of this 'we do not get to that in the experience of Jesus which, as the most unfathomable proof of love, has both supreme value to God and supreme influence with men.'[2] All of them, however, are at one in their point of view. They hold all they conceive to have been valid in the older 'objective' theories, but they are seeking the ground of atonement, not in anything that happened to Jesus by mandate of an external power, but in the experience wherein He embraced the whole fact of sin and held fast the mighty and inseparable interests of the divine love and holiness. They are at one in seeking to get rid of the last remains of dualism and to exhibit the vital connexion between what was wrought for man on the Cross and what is wrought in man by the Spirit. They all vindicate the Christian salvation as being far more than the rescue of individuals, as being indeed the constitution of a redeemed humanity, in which, through the service and sacrifice of faith, individuals advance in fellowship with God and in likeness to Him. Together they express a universal human intuition that the sorrow of the world can be healed only by the infinitely greater sorrow of God.

VIII. *Conclusion.*—The impulse of Christian thought in every stage of its evolution has been the need of a secure doctrine of salvation. Theologians of the East and of the West, mediæval schoolmen, and men of the modern period have had no other task than to interpret the Christian experience of salvation through the eternal principles which make it valid, and so to vindicate its value and power in the redemption of humanity.

The broad lessons of this long history can scarcely be missed: a steady distrust both of intellectualism and of emotionalism; a constant return to experience and an earnest evaluation of its ethical significance; a confident appeal to Christ as the standard and test of the faith which He Himself awakens; the value to be ascribed to Scripture, because it presents a record of God's saving acts and searchingly exhibits both human need and the principles on which divine love proceeds in dealing with it; the validity of the historical method in the study of Christian doctrine for the correction of inadequacies and as an instrument of advance; and to these we may add the guidance to be got from a comparison between the Christianity of the NT and the religions which, in all places whither it has come, have met it as its rivals, and in part also its anticipations and its heralds.

In particular, it is plain that, in order to win a satisfying doctrine of salvation, thought will need to deal afresh with its great determining conception, viz. the Christian idea of God. Philosophic thought has been much concerned with the Absolute, the ultimate Unity, which may be conceived as holding together the manifold differences which appear in human experience. It has had before it, in constructing its idea of the Absolute, an ideal of logical simplicity: and so, in bold speculative adventure, it has conceived God as bare transcendence or as barren immanence—a Being so utterly above the finite that, in com-

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*[4], London, 1873, p. 116 ff.

[1] *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 259 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 270 f.

parison with it, the finite loses all meaning and value; or so completely unified with the finite that, in this identification, the Infinite loses all significance and power. In revenge upon these cold abstractions pluralism mocks at the Absolute and gives us a God who is frankly finite and growing. Christianity has suffered many things at the hands of philosophers and has been far too docile when they insisted on presenting to faith a ready-made idea of God. Its own primary concern has not been with the Absolute at all. Its own special problem is neither logical nor ontological; and it cannot afford to wait till speculative discussion has come to an end before proclaiming its remedy for the abiding distress of man. Yet it may well be that its own problem *is* the ultimate problem of the universe, and that its own salvation contains implicitly a philosophy of God's relation to the world.

Christianity begins with human experience in its concrete fullness. It does not separate elements supposed to be incompatible and then painfully put them together again. It starts with the fact of life. It asks: What is the meaning of life? What is the direction and goal of its endeavours? What is its inherent value? What hinders, and what may achieve, its consummation? If we care to call it a philosophy, it is a philosophy of value; and, in realizing ultimate values, it believes itself to have attained ultimate reality. Christianity is human experience interpreted and reproduced through the supremacy of its highest value. What is that value? Christianity has one clear and definite answer: The Cross of Christ—life won through death. The Cross is the sum of Christianity. It is the Christian salvation, as message, as experience, as doctrine.

Christianity does not seek for proofs that God is. Its vital interest is the character of God. It is confident that it can recognize God when it sees Him; and then proof of His existence will pass aside as needless. God, seen in the Cross, is recognized as love. God is, in His inmost character, One who lives in the energy of self-giving. Christianity has never entangled itself in precarious discussions as to time and its relation to eternity. But it is perfectly certain that, in the Cross, it has touched the eternal—yes, the absolute—being of God. God is love. What He does and endures in time is the outcome of the inexhaustible fountain of the divine love. Human life is the exploration of the divine being. Time is deeply significant, therefore, and history is a real movement. It is, on the one side, the progressive revelation of God and, on the other, the progressive discovery by man of the wealth of the divine character. In either aspect time is real; but in neither does it move away from God towards an unknown beyond His ken and man's. It lies within God and is comprehended by Him in its completeness in a manner untranslatable by us whose transient lives are part of its flow. But at any point, and in any experience, we touch the Eternal whose 'moving image' time is. Supremely in the Cross we reach God and know what He is in His eternal being. The epithets 'immanent' and 'transcendent' are a foreign language to Christianity. Yet, if 'immanent' means that God is always giving Himself to His world, and thereby sustaining it in whatever degree of reality belongs to its successive stages, then the God of Christianity is 'immanent,' with an intensity and seriousness which leaves Spinozism far behind. And, if 'transcendent' means, in plain words, that God knows what He is about, that He is preparing a world capable of receiving His perfect self-communication, then the God of Christianity is 'transcendent,' with a glory that belongs not to the Greek Absolute or the Roman Imperator. 'Personality,' in like manner, is a term which Christianity has not needed to express its thought of God, not because it was too concrete to apply to Him, but because it was not concrete enough. But, if by 'personality' we indicate a capacity, which men possess only in degree, of making each moment a stage towards the realization of the organic fullness of life, then the God of Christianity is personal, in a measure far above what is competent to any individual member of our race. God, understood through the Cross, is a Being capable of a human experience. His 'immanence' and 'transcendence' make Him capable of a human experience immeasurably richer and deeper than that of any individual man can possibly be. He can know what is in man as no man can know it. He can be man as no man can be. His progressive revelation is the fullness of His own inner life unfolded in and to the world. This revelation, in the very action of which God lives, makes possible, and requires for its completion, an experience of the life of man in its central depths. Incarnation is a divine necessity. Theology has never had, in connexion with this great mystery of love, the courage of its convictions. Through fear of Sabellianism it has ascribed the Incarnation to a Being who, after all is said, is not quite the same as God, and has excluded the Father, the very fountain of Godhead, from the possibility of love's supremest manifestation. Faith sees God in Jesus, 'the whole of God, who has kept nothing back which He could have given us. It is very doubtful whether the framers of the old creed ever grasped this thought. The great expounder of the old theology, Augustine, certainly did not. The failure to enter into it showed itself not merely in the doctrine of God, but also in the theories of grace.'[1] The doctrines of God, of the person of Christ, and of salvation come together at this point. The Atonement is God's experience of what sin is and of what it has wrought in His universe. This experience, which is the salvation of the world, He purchased on the Cross. In His pain, the agony of sin-bearing, the condemnation of sin is absorbed, and love flows uninterrupted to the sinner. This is God, the very God, God manifest in flesh, Himself making atonement, offering Himself a sacrifice, commending His own love, reconciling the world to Himself. Here are not two, dealing with one another across the prostrate figure of the sinner. Here is One only, the living and true God, who is love, who is wholly in Jesus.

God who thus bore the Cross did not, even in that supreme action, exhaust the possibilities of His love or cease from His immanence and retire into motionless transcendence. The same vein of thought as separated God and Christ removed the Spirit a degree farther away and made this third article in the creed an appendix rather than a climax. Yet, if we trust the NT as the classic of Christian faith, the Spirit is not separable from God. The Spirit is God in His deepest immanence and His most glorious transcendence. It is strange that to many minds the work of the Spirit is a superfluity of feeble piety, whereas in the NT writings 'the reception of the Spirit is the whole of Christianity.'[2] The blame must lie with those who sought to make the Greek Absolute do duty for the Christian idea of God. The moral universe, constituted in the love which achieved a final victory on the Cross, is sustained by the same divine energy. As God is in Christ, so God-in-Christ is in the Spirit. This is not a subtlety of the analytic Greek mind. It is the synthetic

[1] T. M. Lindsay, *A Hist. of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1907, i. 472.
[2] See art. 'Holy Spirit,' in *DCG*.

utterance of faith, which knows in one experience 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.'

To the idea of God as love there corresponds in man the function of faith. The idea of the Absolute drives religion into mysticism. The idea of God-in-Christ centres religion in the act of faith. Between the mystic state and the act of faith there is this radical distinction—that the former presupposes a God transcendent, incapable of incarnation; while the latter has for its object a God immanent, who, to be Himself, must needs enter human history and, in a sinful world, must needs be a suffering Saviour and hang upon a Cross. To speak of 'Christian mysticism' is, strictly speaking, to continue that confusion of Christianity and Neo-Platonism which has diverted Christian experience from its real fountain-head and given the Christian salvation a definitely non-Christian character.

If we are to keep to the Christian standpoint, we must regard the divine love in its action towards man and faith in its action towards God as being in the deepest sense correlative. All of God's saving action is concentrated in Christ. Upon Christ, accordingly, is concentrated the whole action of man in faith. All of Christianity, as the disclosure of God's being and character, is in Christ. All of Christianity, as a human experience, is in faith. Faith is fundamentally action, and is not to be defined through intellect or through feeling. The act of faith takes place when man meets God in Christ. In that supreme moment of life's discipline the love of God is revealed in Christ as the crown of all that is highest in human aspiration and the remedy of all that is deepest in human need. Man on his part makes reply by committing himself, in the fullness of his personal being, absolutely and for ever to this redeeming and perfecting love. This action is entirely simple. The analysis which resolves it into a complex of state and feelings disguises its true nature. It cannot be dissected because it is the man in action—the man in that action which sums up the full value of life. It is also all-inclusive, and underlies and comprehends the whole experience of salvation. Mediæval dualism had to add works to faith, if it was to make up the compound which was all it could think of as salvation. Protestant theologians even have anxiously explained that the faith that saves is a faith that 'works by love.' Of course it does! Not, however, as though the faith that works by love, and therefore is saving in its quality, were one among several forms of faith. It is faith itself, in the only sense which is possible in view of the saving action of God.

It saves because it carries the man from the standpoint of an individuality which strove to maintain itself apart from God to a position in which the individual, responding to the love of God, finds his need met, his nature satisfied, and the self which he has surrendered restored to him in fullness of power and certainty of victory. Faith is therefore an act which unites the man to Christ, in a sense deeper than mysticism can ever know. A union of being or substance, so far from being the loftiest and most religious of ideas, is one of the emptiest and least significant. The vital union is that of will and character, when man shares with God His thought, purpose, and power. And this union takes place, and can take place only, in faith. God gives Himself to man in Christ. Man gives himself to God in faith. Christ is the point of union.

The language of the NT outdoes mysticism in the daring with which it affirms the continuity of the divine saving action. Love saved the world once for all in sacrifice. Love saves the world still by the same sacrificial ministry. Faith never swerves from its acknowledgment of the finality of the Cross. But it never hesitates to declare that, in believing, the soul is united to the dying and undying Christ. The man who has given himself to Christ has been crucified with Him, and therefore he lives, with a life which is really the presence of the indwelling love. Therefore also he has this rank and function, that through him the redemption of the world is proceeding still towards its assured consummation. Love never loses its vocation. It is always redemptive, always vicarious and sacrificial. The salvation of the world is the sacrificial ministry of Jesus continued in those who in their persons 'make up the full sum of all that Christ had to suffer.'

The confidence that that divine sacrifice will be crowned by the fulfilment of God's eternal will of salvation is the religious ground of the hope of immortality and the expectation of the Parousia.

This idea of God and this function of faith are not forms of thought imposed by theology on the Christian salvation. They lie within it, as the very secret of Christianity. They came into the world in Christ. They created Christian experience in the 1st cent. and are renewing it in the 20th. The Great War, amid all its darkness and agony, illumines the eternal being of God and verifies the abiding conditions of man's salvation. The love of God, sealed in sacrifice and reproduced in sacrificial service, is the redemption of the world.

The deepening experience of the Church requires a new effort of thought to express its vital meanings. A new theology must be the issue of the growing experimental knowledge of God.

The theology of the Cross requires a reconstruction of doctrine, in which the great Christian ideas of God, Christ, the Spirit, the Atonement, Salvation, Grace, Faith, the Church, and the Last Things shall be re-stated under the governance of one principle—the love that lives in sacrifice. The reign of the Greek Absolute is over. The unity which is the perpetual problem of thought and the abiding demand of the heart is given in Christ, in whom God is present in His fullness. Through Him, also, there is open to man that union with God which is the abiding demand of the human heart, and the realization of which in the act of faith is the Christian salvation, as a present possession, an unfailing energy, and a sure and certain hope.

LITERATURE.—The student must consult the primary sources, dictionary articles, and monographs dealing with outstanding names. On the leading aspects of the theme the following will be found helpful:

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(ii.) *On the relations between Christianity and philosophy.*—E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1904; J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, do. 1907, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience (Gifford Lectures)*, 2 vols., do. 1912; E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*[6] (*HL*), London, 1897; W. R. Inge, art. 'Neo-Platonism,' in *ERE*, vol. x. p. 307[b], *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 2 vols., London, 1918;

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(iv.) *On the doctrine of the Atonement.*—W. Adams Brown, art. 'Expiation and Atonement (Christian),' in *ERE*, and literature referred to; J. K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, London, 1915 (a careful bibliography); R. S. Franks, *A Hist. of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, 2 vols., London and New York, 1918; J. Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, do. 1917.

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SOUL.

Primitive (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 725.
Babylonian.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).
Buddhist (C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS), p. 731.
Chinese.—See LIFE AND DEATH (Chinese).
Christian (H. W. ROBINSON), p. 733.
Egyptian.—See 'Semitic.'
Greek (J. BURNET), p. 737.
Hebrew.—See 'Semitic.'
Hindu (J. N. FARQUHAR), p. 742.
Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 744.
Jewish.—See 'Semitic.'
Muslim (T. J. DE BOER), p. 744.
Roman (W. WARDE FOWLER), p. 747.
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 749.
Teutonic (B. S. PHILLPOTTS), p. 753.

SOUL (Primitive).—The English word 'soul' (and its equivalent in cognate European languages), in its primary meaning, designates an entity conceived as the cause or vehicle of the bodily life and psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is assumed to exist as a spiritual substance, in rather sharp antithesis to material substances, thus giving form to the contrast of soul and body (as constituents of man) and the assumption of their separability. This is, of course, a metaphysical conception, for which, in the range of primitive culture, there is no precise equivalent. Nevertheless, there are among primitive men forms of belief (so nearly universal in occurrence that they may be said to exist by a kind of instinct of the human intelligence) closely analogous to the metaphysical conception of the soul. The contrast under regard, in the more primitive intention, is not that of material and spiritual substances (for neither of these categories is recognized), but it is very near to the reflective distinction between form and energy; the primitive man everywhere makes a quick discrimination between the perceptual aspects of things and their powers or strengths: of the former he is suspicious; the latter he fears or strives to control by magical suggestion, by persuasion, by his own occult force; everywhere his interest centres in the hidden powers of things, which are for him their prime realities, and it is no marvel to find that everywhere he figures these powers under some evanescent analogy of the senses (the blood, the breath, the shade). It is these analogic figures of the primitive imagination that bear the names usually transcribed by the word 'soul'—itself, doubtless, originally, like *anima* and other classical equivalents, a term of the same class. Nor is it surprising that beliefs so bodied forth should assume various and fantastic guise, somewhat distorting their real identity.

1. **Animism.**—In the animistic *fond* of human thought there is recognized in nature no aristocratic class of soul-possessing beings: everything dignified by thinghood has its own power or function—however insignificant—and therefore its own soul. Indeed, what is designated by the name of a thing, as distinguished from the perceptual image or sense-object, is in a fair sense always its soul; for the foundation of naming is the discrimination of characteristic functions or powers; so that, in the broad truth, the nouns of a language represent the congregation of those souls in nature which the people speaking it has come to recognize. This is no merely primitive trait, but is true of all practical thinking, as distinguished from speculative analysis.

There is nevertheless, even for the raw animist, a certain position of privilege for human souls. They are by no means the most powerful in nature, either for good or for bad; but they are distinctly of the most concern and the most precious to their possessors. Moreover, they are the measures of the qualities of all other souls. It is true that, in a degree, they are distorted by fantasy; but, if the essence of primitive thought be disengaged from its figures, it will invariably be found that the measures of all other spiritual activities are human psychical activities, which are in the very truest sense the substantial powers of the human soul. One might fairly say that the primitive interpretation of nature (perhaps the mature interpretation also) is best represented by a harmonic proportion in which three terms are known and one is deduced; of the known terms, the first extreme is man's mind (chiefly his conations), while the means are first his own body, as the instrument of desire, and second other bodies, or sense-objects, viewed as the instruments of those animating desires of all nature which form the inferred extreme. Indeed, it is in direct harmony with all that we know of human psychology to affirm that the immediate foundation of belief in souls is the disparity between desire and realization: the 'I' which wants what it has not is distinct from the 'I' which is engrossed in what is, and, if the latter is a physical reality, the former must be a spiritual. If the desires of the conative 'I' were never balked or obstructed, probably there would arise no conceptions of other than human souls—which, when they do arise, naturally take on the colour of what they oppose. The body itself, in its weaknesses, assumes something of this obstructive character, and thus tends to sharpen its own fission from the animating desires and idealities which define themselves as its soul, while, again, in a sort of fantastic by-play, it becomes, as it were, the host of a whole group of disharmonious spirits—animal, passional, intellective—each striving, with no small malice, for the mastery.

2. **Idea of the soul.**—The distinction of embodied soul and disembodied is no easy one. Even in speculative philosophies there is usually involved change of quality with the change of state—a distinction preserved, in general, by the differing connotations of the English words 'soul' and 'spirit.' There are, in fact, three groups of conceptions of the soul, differing in relation to the body. The embodied soul—variously imaged—forms the key to the first

group, the disembodied soul, or spirit, to the second, while intermediate between these is the twofold group, comprising the idols, or doubles, of living bodies and the ghosts, or haunters, of dead ones. All three are common to the most primitive stages of human thinking—among living races of men, at least. For the sake of convenience, and as having a natural priority, the embodied soul, which is in some sense the body's life, may be treated first, and primarily with reference to the figures by which it is most commonly imaged.

(*a*) *The life.*—Fundamentally, the soul is the 'life' of the body. In primitive thought this is shown in custom rather than in expression, and more particularly in those customs which show an inability to conceive soul and body in disunion. South America, Africa, and Australia contain the world's most primitive populations and most utter savages. Cannibalism is found in all three continents, and in all three it is associated with the conviction that he who eats of another man's body receives into himself the life or strength of his victim. The yet more repulsive custom of devouring the bodies of dead kinsmen (also found, sporadically, in the same continents) is based upon a similar notion, namely, that the life of the kindred is thus transmitted without loss from generation to generation. Innumerable funeral customs illustrate the primitive man's inability to separate in thought the visible body from its invisible life—indeed, the whole fact of burial or other funeral honours rests upon this confusion. John Fraser's monograph[1] gives a number of striking illustrations: a son was found supporting the body of his dead father on his chest and abdomen, for the purpose, as he explained, of keeping him warm; a mother bore the mummy of her son about with her for four years; another carried the dead body of her child until it fell into decay. These are but illustrations, at the savage extreme, of that feeling that the dead body is still not inanimate which must have underlain the burial impulses of palæolithic man, as it certainly did the elaborate rites of Egyptian funerals, and in some vague sense survives in modern consciousness.

(*b*) *The life-blood.*—One of the most natural of the tropes by which the 'life' is represented is the blood (*q.v.*), the 'fountain of life.' 'But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat' (Gn 9[4])—only, in most primitive societies, the command is the reverse, and for a sacramental reason: he who partakes of the blood, be it of man or of animal, thereby imbibes the life and the strength, and the enemy whose blood is drunk is totally conquered. It is the blood, again, that 'cries for vengeance,' and, according to the old belief, gushes from the murdered corpse at the approach of the murderer. Finally, exsanguinate shades from the world below and gods in the heavens above alike delight in the odours of blood—in good sooth a spirit, which serves to invigorate their paler being. This is the blood of sacrifice and the blood of atonement, which is, in fact, the blood of life. The most astonishing of all developments of this idea was that of the Aztec, who believed that the sun is maintained in its course and the world in its order solely by the unceasing effluvia of human blood drenching altars and shrines. Nor is there any idea more ubiquitous in literature than that of blood symbolism.

(*c*) *The heart.*—Probably closely related to the preceding trope, and equally physical, is the conception of the heart as the seat of life. Whether this is because it is the 'bleeding heart' or the throbbing heart is difficult to determine. Certainly in aboriginal American rites, where the ritual use of the heart attained its greatest extravagances, the association with the blood is very close. The burial customs of the Egyptians, with a special vessel for the heart, are only an example of a widespread custom which has survived down into civilized Europe. Of course, in later times, the added symbolism of the heart, as the seat of the higher emotions (courage, love), may be partially related to classical psychology; but the foundation of the image is certainly primitive and many-sourced. The heart is sometimes conceived as having a special soul of its own; the American Indian prophet Keokuk commanded from his followers prayers for the heart, along with others for the family, name, life, etc.

J. F. Cunningham[1] could find among the Manyema little trace of a belief in souls. 'All the Manyema would admit was: "We know there is something living in a man during his life, because we can hear it beat. If that something is the soul, we know it no longer exists in a man when he dies. That is all we know."' Walter Roth,[2] reporting on the Guiana Indians, says that among them 'originally, not only the shadow, but also the heart, the head, and the more perceptible of all the parts of the body where there is a pulsation of the arteries, as well as perhaps the blood, the spittle, the footprint, and the bone were each regarded in the light of a Spirit or Something that was part and parcel of the body, and took its departure at the material death. . . . The Warrau expression for the shadow is *amého-ko-i*, while *ak-ôbi* is their word for "heart" or for the heart's Spirit which, leaving the body at death, becomes their *Hebu*, or Bush Spirit. . . . The Island Caribs . . . held strong beliefs in a connection between spirits and an individual's heart- and pulse-beats: "they talked of the latter as the Spirit of the Hand; they spoke of the Spirit-something near the heart as Gonanni or Lanichi." This one at the heart was the principal one, which after death went to the sky in company with its Icheiri, or Chemin, to live there with other Familiar Spirits, and change into a young and new body. . . . Koch-Grünberg makes the interesting suggestion that certain procedures connected with some of the death festivals point to a belief in the bones constituting the real and final resting-place of the Spirit after the dismemberment (*Zersetzung*) of the body.' But the skeleton is more intimately connected with ghost-lore than with vital souls.

(*d*) *The breath.*—'And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul' (Gn 2[7]). That the conception of the life as the breath is one of the most universal is attested by the great number of terms (רוּחַ, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, *anima*, *spiritus*—to cite Hebrew and classical examples) for the soul having 'breath' or 'wind' as their primary meaning. 'To breathe' and 'to live' are virtually literary synonyms. The Roman custom of a kinsman catching the last breath of his dying kin is doubtless but a more refined form of the superstition which causes a number of groups of savages to devour sacramentally the bodies, or parts of the bodies, of dead kindred. The wind-like character of liberated souls is expressed everywhere in ghostly literature. Job 7[7], 'Oh remember that my life is wind,' surely has a double intention; as also Ezk 37[9], 'Prophesy unto the wind, prophesy, son of man, and say to the wind, Thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live.' Primitive equivalents are not far to seek. In many American rites the aspirate, as an element in ejaculation, appears to symbolize an intensification of the 'breathing life' which it represents. 'Heru! Hotoru. He!' is a Pawnee appeal to the winds. *Hotoru* is not the ordinary word for winds, but refers to them as supernatural powers.

'They are,' say the priests, 'from the breath of Tira'wa [Father Heaven] and they give life to man . . . they bring to man the breath by which he lives.'[3]

Even the universe, in some early philosophies, is conceived as having a windy soul.

The Tepehuane, according to C. Lumholtz,[4] place the seat of the soul between the stomach and the chest, and regard its

[1] *The Aborigines of New South Wales*, Sydney, 1892, sect. viii.

[1] *Uganda and Its Peoples*, London, 1905, p. 321.
[2] *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 152 *f.*
[3] A. C. Fletcher, *23 RBEW* [1904], pt. 2, p. 29 *f.*
[4] *Unknown Mexico*, New York, 1902, i. 434.

nature as breath. This is an interesting psycho-physiological belief for a primitive tribe. A Navaho legend tells of the creation of man and woman: 'It was the wind that gave them life. It is the wind that comes out of our mouths now that gives us life. When this ceases to blow, we die. In the skin at the tips of our fingers we see the trail of the wind; it shows us where the wind blew when our ancestors were created.'[1] Another legend tells of the death of a woman; the body was buried, but 'they all wondered what had become of her breath; they went in various directions to seek for its trail, but could find it nowhere.'[2] One of the most interesting passages in this connexion is in the myth of 'Isis and Yaulilik's Daughters.' Isis is told that his first child is dead. '"I don't want to live in this world. Bring me the other boy," he says. When the younger wife brought her child, Isis took it in his arms, put the top of its head to his mouth and drew a long breath. He took the breath out of the child and it was dead. He put the second child by the first, and said: "These children are half mine, and half yours. The breath is mine, the body is yours. I have taken the breath into myself. You can have the bodies."'[3] Very curious, for its suggestion of introspection, is an image in a Pima myth which likens sorrow to 'a wind four times twisting' about its object.[4]

These American examples might be paralleled from the lore of other races.

(*e*) *Flame.*—That the living body is warm and the corpse cold is a fact which in itself is sufficient to suggest that the 'life' is of the nature of fire.

'The life in your body and the fire in your lodge are the same and of the same date,' said the Shawnee prophet to his followers; 'if you suffer your fire to be extinguished, at that moment your life will be at its end.'[5]

The brand of Meleager is a Greek analogue, as, no doubt, is the sanctity of the hearth and its fire everywhere. Swamp-fires and other phosphorescences are almost universally objects of superstitious dread, being regarded as released souls. In sacred art the flammula, nimbus, and halo all come back to the notion that spirit is luminous; while the body lives, we speak of 'the fires of life' as burning, but the freed soul is as a tongue of flame. The Zuñi say of a death that the man's 'light is cut off.'

(*f*) *The shade or phantom.*—Considered as the body's life, life-blood, breath, or vital flame, the soul is not readily thought of as enduring in separation from its physical host; but, viewed (as almost universally it is) as the body's shadow (*σκία, umbra*) or as its phantasmic likeness (*εἴδωλον, simulacrum*), it is with difficulty that it is conceived except in some degree of separation, as the body's friendly companion (*hospes comesque corporis*) or as its bloodless and boneless shade, after death. In myth and in literature, from the classical onwards, such visualized images of the soul naturally play a large rôle, but there are multitudes of instances in superstition and in nomenclature indicating the like ideas among the most savage peoples. Tylor[6] gives Tasmanian, Algonquin, Quiché, Arawak, Abipone, Zulu, Basuto, and Old Calabar examples of identifications of 'soul' with 'shadow,' and this list might be far extended.

The Zulus, explaining, say that people have souls which are not entirely confined to the body; 'they may occupy the roof of a man's hut, and if he changes his abode his soul flits also. The people often use the word *zitunzela* (from *izitunzi*, "shadows") to express their ideas of human spirits.'[7]

Superstitions about shadows cast by the body in sunlight (noon is a particularly perilous hour, when the shadow is small) and reflexion shown in the water are common, and figure frequently in myth. Probably, also, superstitions about the eye—the evil eye of the living, the glassy eye of the dead—are intimately associated with the notion that the images caught or reflected therein are souls. It is only a developed phase of this belief which leads to veneration for crystals and the practice of mantic crystal-gazing, as well as to dread of the mechanical eye of the camera, or to pictured representation of one's form and features.

'Warraus assure me that on looking at a mountain for the first time the eyes are shut to prevent the person attracting or drawing the Shadow of the Spirit toward him. When one person looks at another, the former draws or drags the latter's shadow toward him, a principle on which these Indians explain the taking of a photograph. The Island Carib corpse is laid out with two weights on the eyes, that he may not see his parents, thus making them ill. Catlin gives an amusing instance among the Conibos of the Amazon of the local medicine-man preventing him painting any more portraits by exhorting the tribesmen as follows: "These things are a great mystery, but there you are, my friends, with your eyes open all night—they never shut: this is all wrong and you are very foolish to allow it. You never will be happy afterwards if you allow these things to be always awake at night. My friends, this is only a cunning way this man has to get your skins; and the next thing they will have glass eyes, and be placed among the skins of the wild beasts and birds and snakes." (The medicine-man had been to Para or some other place where he had seen the stuffed skins in a museum.) For a pregnant woman to look at the face of a corpse will draw trouble on her unborn child. It is possible that, perhaps on principles analogous to some of the preceding, most European races have adopted the practice of closing the eyes when in the attitude of prayer.'[1] Curtin gives a Modoc myth describing the resuscitation of a dead man: 'All the bones were dead but the eyes were living'[2]—and from this life the whole was reanimated.

(*g*) *The name.*—Superstitions about names and name-souls are as wide-spread as any. It should be observed that the name is quite as physical a thing for the unlettered as is the phantasm; it is an auditory or motor-auditory image, just as the phantasm is a visual image, and it possesses a perceptual reality quite different from that of the lettered symbol of book-learned peoples; *flatus vocis* is a nominalist phrase for a word, but it is just the vocal breath (above all in the chant) which is to the primitive one of the most powerful and compelling of all agents. Says J. W. Fewkes:

'When a Tusayan priest addresses a supernatural being of his mythology he believes he must do so through the medium of some object as a prayer bearer; he breathes his wish on meal and throws this meal to the god. The prayer bearer is thought to have a spiritual double or breath body which carries his wishes.'[3]

So the name is a kind of breath-body, though not so intimately joined to the man as the breath itself. Le Jeune[4] says that the Indians sometimes change their name on recovering from a severe sickness, and the Bellacoola believe that souls receive a new name, and speak a new language, when they reach the next world. Normally, children are not truly named until they reach a certain age and are capable of discretion. V. Stefánnson[5] gives a most interesting explanation of Eskimo beliefs connected with this custom:

'As the child grows up the soul with which he was born (the *nappan*) gradually develops in strength, experience, and wisdom, so that after the age of ten or twelve years it is fairly competent to look after the child and begins to do so; at that age it therefore becomes of less vital moment to please the guardian spirit (*atka*), and accordingly it is customary to begin forbidding children and punishing them.'

The guardian-spirit which controls the child previous to this age is supposed to be some ancestral soul, and all the child's words are the utterance of this soul up to the age when its own soul assumes sway, and it is called after a name of its own. Frequently it is supposed that the name of the guardian is known, and the young child is called by this name. One of Curtin's[6] Modoc myths tells of a babe that cried continuously until addressed by its true name. These beliefs are, of course, associated with the almost universal primitive belief in rebirth, especially of very young

[1] Washington Matthews, *Navaho Legends*, Boston and New York, 1897, p. 69.
[2] *Ib.* p. 78.
[3] J. Curtin, *Myths of the Modocs*, Boston, 1912, p. 37.
[4] F. Russell, *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 355.
[5] J. Mooney, *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. 2, p. 678.
[6] *PC*[3] i. 430.
[7] A. H. Keane, *Africa*, London, 1904, ii. 248; cf. *JAI* xx. [1891] 120.

[1] W. E. Roth, *30 RBEW*, p. 299 f. [2] P. 34.
[3] *Rep. Smithsonian Institution*, 1895, p. 689.
[4] *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, 1896–1901, xvi. 'Quebec and Hurons, 1639,' p. 203.
[5] *My Life with the Eskimo*, New York and London, 1913, p. 399 f.
[6] P. 6.

children (the Aztec, *e.g.*, had a special limbo for souls of babes, who alone can be born anew). Ancestor-worship is naturally closely associated with name-souls. Probably this was what was meant by the Indian who told Le Jeune[1] that 'the body has a soul of its own which some call the soul of their Nation.' In the far Orient the Annamites at least address prayers to the clan ancestor, to the spirits of parents and grandparents to three generations, and then collectively to the soul of the family as a whole.[2] Naturally all worship of the *manes* tends to become associated with the clan name. See artt. NAMES.

3. Psychology.—The course of historic psychology has been from a psycho-physiological (such as Aristotle's) to a predominantly psychological type of theory; older speculations on the constitution of man distinguished a group of souls (nutritive, passional, intellective, and the like) associated with the several parts of the body; later theories came to assert the unity of the spiritual substance and to make of psychology, not a description of the several souls for which the body acts as a single host, but an account of the several powers or 'faculties' of the single soul. Primitive theories belong to the older type: the whole man is looked upon as composed of a group of entities, physical and psychical, which disperse with the dissolution of his body. Death is rarely regarded as the liberation of an imprisoned spirit to a more glorified existence; rather the future existence of the immortal parts is at best a kind of mutilated existence, and not even Elysium is a fair compensation for the loss of that completer manhood which is truly realized only in the flesh. The very ancient and wide-spread notion that the souls of the departed await in a kind of neutral limbo the day of their reincarnation as men is surely a reflexion of the feeling that the disembodied is somehow dismembered, while the equally common conception of the ghost as vengeful and malicious but pictures its own dissatisfaction with its unhappy state. To the primitive mind the normal man is the physical man, whose souls (for he commonly owns several) are in the nature of more or less dispensable baggage—something that he *has*, rather than *is*.

In the passage cited from Roth's account of Guiana Indian beliefs[3] it is pointed out that along with the shadow there are souls for head, heart, blood, spittle, and even footprint. Indeed, there is hardly a part of the body that is not somewhere believed to own a spiritual double, which is its life, so that the whole bodily life may be said to be possessed, as it were, in severalty. The bones, the marrow of the bones, the eyes, the hair, the belly—all are parts with which a residential soul is found associated in primitive thinking. An interesting Iroquoian conception, recorded by J. N. B. Hewitt,[4] regards the brain as the seat of the soul, and death by braining is held to render the soul stupid, implacable, and capable of committing excesses. The Maoris of New Zealand are a Polynesian instance of a primitive people seating the soul in the head. Le Jeune[5] says of the Canadian Indians: 'They distinguish several souls in one and the same body. An old man told us some time ago that some savages had as many as two or three souls; that his own had left him more than two years before, to go away with his dead relatives—that he no longer had any but the soul of his own body, which would go down into the grave with him'—nor is it difficult to imagine that, to a desolate old man whose kindred and friends were gone, his life should seem but the soul-bereft shadow of what it had been.

Belief in a plurality of souls, as associated with the one body or forming the one person, is very wide-spread, and is, indeed, a natural consequence of the variety of tropes employed to designate the spiritual entity. The heart, the flesh, the life, the name, the family, were distinguished by Keokuk. The Iroquois have separate words for the mind, soul, ghost, life, strength, brain-soul. The Haida distinguish mind, ghost, discarnate soul, and have two words for embodied soul. These are sporadic American examples. Some of the Melanesians believe that a man possesses as many as seven souls, of differing types; and belief in the possession of two or more is frequent among the primitive. An amusing instance is the Bagobo notion that man has two souls, a good and a bad, which respectively pass to paradise and hell in the hereafter; we may suspect that the moral terminus comes as a result of foreign influence. Such ideas endure into higher cultural stages. The Egyptian is notable, with its distinction of *ka* (genius), *khaibit* (shadow), *khu* (life or intelligence), *ba* (soul proper), *ran* (name), together with something like animistic personification of the mummy, heart, strength, form. But hardly less complex is the old Persian spiritual dissection of a man into body, life, form, soul, and *fravashi* (genius); or the Roman, which in addition to the *genius* of a man (fem. *juno*), distinguished the tomb-haunting *umbra*, the *manes*, descending to Orcus, and the *spiritus*, climbing to its ethereal element above, and more or less identified with the mind-soul, *anima*. Even for near moderns 'the constitution of the soul . . . is conflate of the mind, spirit and animal soul, or idolum';[1] while there is to-day a degree of separation of psychic entities implied in the meanings of 'soul,' 'spirit,' 'mind,' 'consciousness.'

The converse of the idea of the possession of multiple souls is the notion of the existence of soulless men. This is by no means an uncommon primitive notion. There are tribes, especially in Africa, apparently with no belief in souls, at any rate as in any sense separable from the body; while in numerous African and Polynesian instances women and lower-caste people are regarded as soulless. Cunningham gives a humoresque incident:

'A chief pointed at a poor peasant and said: "He have an immortal soul? I cannot believe it; but I will admit that perhaps Wakoli or Luba had a soul. Wakoli had four hundred wives!"'[2]

Obviously, in cases of reported disbelief in souls among primitive men, what is commonly meant is disbelief in a separable entity endowed with immortal life; and as to this dogma primitive men are hardly more in agreement than are civilized. On the other hand, some discrimination of body and soul, or, more exactly, of the body and its indwelling life, is as universal as is the animistic apprehension of nature. Even among peoples like the Fuegian Yahgans, among whom there is no clear evidence of a belief in the existence of gods of any sort, there is still a lively apprehension of the wandering (and more or less physical) simulacra of men.

4. Discarnate souls.—It has been remarked above that the phantasmic soul, or double, is less intimately bound to the body than are other forms. Even during the life of the body it may journey abroad, appearing to those gifted with the second sight as the co-walker (fetch, wraith, double-ganger, idolum) of the living, and visiting in dreams those for whom its master has a message or upon whom he meditates inimical action. Shamans make great use of their souls as messengers, to seek information from places remote, while prophets use them for the similar purpose of visiting the abodes of the dead or the homes of the gods. It is even advisable at times for a man setting out on a perilous task to have his soul extracted by a competent shaman and kept at home to ensure his own safe return; while sickness is caused not only by the body's becoming the host of unwelcome foreign spirits (which the shaman must extract), but often by the inconsiderate *Wanderlust* of the patient's soul, which the medicine-man's own spirit must

[1] *Jes. Rel.* xvi. 192.
[2] *Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 966.
[3] *30 RBEW*, p. 152.
[4] 'The Iroquoian Concept of the Soul,' *JAFL* viii. [1895] 111.
[5] *Jes. Rel.* xvi. 191.

[1] S. Purchas, *Microcosmus*, London, 1619, ch. lviii. p. 568.
[2] P. 118.

hale home in order to ensure a cure. Sometimes, even, there are stationed on the road to the home of the dead, wardens whose business it is to turn back souls which are leaving the body before the appointed hour, while, again, a man may, by desperate effort, recover his own departing soul.

De Smet[1] gives a striking Chippewa story to this effect. A chief, left on the battle-field for slain, accompanies the war-band home, trying to make himself known to them, but all his solicitations and commands are unheeded. Arrived at the home camp, he finds his wife in mourning; he shouts in her ear, 'I am hungry! I am thirsty!' She thinks she hears a rumbling sound, but she sees no one. Frustrated in his attempts, he turns back to the battle-field, but, as he nears it, he finds a fire in his path, which moves as he moves, ever thwarting his approach. In despair he cries: 'I also am a spirit; I am seeking to return into my body; I will accomplish my design. Thou wilt purify me, but thou shalt not hinder the realization of my project. This day I will triumph over thee, Spirit of Fire!' And with a desperate effort he darts into the flame, to awake, as from a long trance, in his own weakened body.

But death itself does not result in a complete separation of soul and body—or perhaps it would be truer to say that the errant soul and the body-soul, or ghost, pursue different destinies. De Smet[2] says that many of the Indians believe in two souls, one of which is admitted to their paradise, while the other, the body-soul, hovers near the burial-place; and in another connexion he remarks that 'nothing but the hope of gain could ever induce an Indian to go alone in a burying-ground at night.'[3] Probably the original of the Bagobo belief in dual souls was of this nature—which is, in fact, the popular belief of uneducated Europeans. As among Europeans, too, it is common everywhere to find the ghost associated with the skeleton, or as wearing the pale or mutilated aspect of the dead body. Numerous tales have for their motive accounts of the commerce of the living with their dead kindred, who are skeletons by day but phantasmal ghosts by night. Not only do men meet and converse with these departed beings, but there are marriages between the dead and the living, and children are born to them, though never normal children. A Bellacoola tale of such a child describes it as a bodiless head which must never touch the ground; when it does so, it disappears into the under world. One of the most enlightening of these tales is recorded by F. Boas.[4]

A man visits the bones of the dead, which at night assume the forms of his kinsmen; their boats are full of holes and covered with moss, and they take in their nets dead leaves and twigs, which to them are fish. The man discovers that by speaking aloud—for the spirits all speak in low voices—he can reduce them to the condition of skeletons. This he does, to their annoyance, so that they send him back to the land of the living. But, disobeying their commands, he dies; and now, coming as a shade into the land of the dead, he finds that the ghosts, their canoes, and the fish that they take are like the full-bodied beings of the life that he has left.

This is an interesting effort, on the part of the aboriginals, to imagine the state of the dead, which to themselves is altogether like that of the living, and only from the standpoint of the latter is seen as a form of mutilated existence.

The notions that ghosts speak in whistling voices, that they nibble feebly at food left for them, that in stature they are manikins or doll-like, and that generally they are given to a kind of panic fear of embodied men are all found, not merely in Homer, but throughout the primitive world. Sometimes these ghosts are corpse-like in appearance; and this is especially true if the body has been mutilated. In such cases the ghost is usually vengeful, ready to wreak ill where it can. Often, however, the ghosts simply reflect the bodily condition, without any necessary malice.

[1] *Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean de Smet, S.J.*, 4 vols., New York, 1905, pp. 1047–1053.
[2] P. 1075. [3] P. 941.
[4] 'Doctrine of Souls among the Chinook Indians,' *JAFL* vi. [1893] pp. 39–43.

The Pawnee have a special class of ghosts of scalped men, who avoid the abode of the happy dead and the eyes of the living for the same reason—shame of their condition. They form a sort of society of disconsolates, and address one another by terms descriptive of their estate as 'One-Hair,' 'Forehead Hair,' etc. The Zuñi, more humanly, expect to see their ancestral spirits in their natural guise.

'The old men too feeble to walk will come leaning on a cane, the mother with her son walking before her, her child led by the hand, her younger child carried on her back, the infant in her arms, and her unborn child'[1]—all not in the flesh, but in the ghost-self, just as in nature.

Sometimes the ghost, or body-soul, hovers near the burial-place in the form of a bird, an insect, or a small animal. It is interesting to find the butterfly occurring as such an embodied soul in the lore of N.W. America.[2] The same insect is common in Aztec art as a symbol of the breath, or breath-soul, shown on the lips of goddesses. From such a notion to the conception of reincarnation in animal form is but a step—a step which has been taken by primitive men the world over. Nocturnal creatures, like owls and bats, or earth-dwelling animals, such as beetles, serpents, and even worms, are forms in which souls are likely to be re-embodied. In not a few tribes these re-embodiments go progressively down in the animal scale, and may end by final departure from the earth or utter obliteration. Here, however, we are encroaching upon the field of beliefs in the future state of souls, for which the reader is referred to the artt. BLEST (ABODE OF THE), ESCHATOLOGY, INCARNATION, STATE OF THE DEAD, TRANSMIGRATION.

5. **The powers of souls.**—The primary function of the soul is, of course, to keep the body in life; the soul *is* the life of the body; and, although soul and body may be temporarily separated, as in sleep or trance or even with the body still wakeful and active, with no damage incurred, none the less their lasting separation is death. Further, it would appear from a considerable variety of beliefs that the soul's comfort and the fullest exercise of its powers depend upon its connexion with some sort of body. Souls haunt, in ghostly forms, even mutilated and decaying bodies; they strive, in the form of familiars or demons, to obtain an entrance into and a partial control of the bodies of the living, from which they sometimes succeed in ejecting the native owner (for the plight in which Dante pictures Friar Alberigo—soul in hell while his devil-animated body still moves in the world of men—is no marvel to the primitive imagination); while, finally, discarnate existence in the other world is commonly represented as a kind of limbo in which the spirits await rebirth as full-bodied men; or, if it be an Elysium, there is in its pallid joys always an element of dissolvent illusion. Even artificial and substitute bodies which men supply—carven blocks and the like—are attractive to the unhoused spirits, who may be lured or charmed into them, there finding a new contact with the life of men, whose idols or tutelars they become. The Indians of the N. Pacific Coast occasionally carve portraits of deceased persons, as mortuary or other memorials;[3] and they are not without legends of spirits of the deceased taking possession of these. One such legend, truly affecting, is recorded by J. R. Swanton.[4]

A young chief had lost his wife, but kept by him, dressed in her clothing, a portrait image which, out of pity for his sorrow,

[1] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], p. 236.
[2] *ZE* xxiv. [1892] 398.
[3] See C. T. Emmons, 'Portraiture among the North Pacific Coast Tribes,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xvi. [1914] 59–67.
[4] *Bull. 39 BE* [1909], p. 181 f.

a carver had made for him. 'One day, while he sat mourning very close to the image, he felt it move. . . . At first he thought that the movement was only his imagination, yet he examined it every day, for he thought that at some time it would come to life. . . . One day, after the chief had had it for a long, long time, he examined the body and found it just like that of a human being. Still, although it was alive, it could not move or speak. . . . The woman moved around very little and never got to talk, but her husband dreamed what she wanted to tell him. It was through his dreams that he knew she was talking to him.'

This incident is surely illuminating, both as to the motives which lead to art among primitive peoples and as to those which lead to idolatry. Here it is clearly the power of love which lures the departed soul to the man-wrought body; the complementary form, where magical compulsion is the force employed, is best illustrated by the account given by R. E. Dennett[1] of the W. African making of a 'Fetish-into-which-Nails-are-Driven':

'A palaver is held, and it is there decided whose Kulu [soul] it is that is to enter into the Muamba tree and to preside over the fetish to be made. A boy of great spirit, or else, above all, a great and daring hunter, is chosen. Then they go into the bush and call his name. The Nganga priest cuts down the tree, and blood is said to gush forth. A fowl is killed and its blood is mingled with the blood that they say comes from the tree. The named one then dies, certainly within ten days. His life has been sacrificed for what the Zinganga consider the welfare of the people. They say that the named one never fails to die. . . . People pass before these fetishes (Zinkici Mbowu), calling on them to kill them if they do, or have done, such and such a thing. Others go to them and insist upon their killing so and so, who has done or is about to do some fearful injury. And as they swear or make their demand, a nail is driven into the fetish, and the palaver is settled so far as they are concerned. The Kulu of the man whose life was sacrificed upon the cutting of the tree sees to the rest.'

Mediumistic powers are nearly akin to the soul's yearning for embodiment. Virtually all primitive men believe in such powers, though it is commonly supposed that they come by special endowment and preparation—the latter often strenuous to a degree—in many instances through death and resurrection, as is assumed. Primitive mythology abounds in tales of men acquiring supernatural strength by the thorny road of bodily destruction and restoration. By such means the soul of the medium, or shaman, is supposed to acquire the faculty of direct intercourse with the world of spirits, and usually to have as his especial agent or 'control' a genius, tutelar, or familiar spirit, whose powers reinforce his own. Indeed, it is not a little remarkable to discover virtually all the phenomena of modern spiritualism (if it be modern) among savage peoples, remote in time and place. Le Jeune's description of a Montagnais shamanistic performance, written in 1634,[2] would hold, *mutatis mutandis*, for a spiritualistic *séance* in central New York: there is the medium's cabinet, the darkened room, the singing, the winds, voices, and 'physical phenomena,' and along with these prophecies of life and death. The shaman (although Le Jeune believed him to be a great rogue) was obviously sincere. 'Enter thou thyself into the tent,' he said, 'and thou wilt see that thy body will remain below, and thy soul will mount on high.' The Seneca Indians of New York State still continue similar practices,[3] as do the Chippewa tribes in their Midē' society.[4] The Zuñi have a curious belief that in the old times the souls of the dead used to return in the flesh to converse with the living, but their presence caused a great mortality; now they come as spirits, and only those gifted with a superior sight, their mediums, can see them.[5]

Apart from preserving the body in life, the important powers of the soul are curative and clairvoyant. As clairvoyant, the soul is a kind of scout, able to penetrate times, places, and substances closed to the body.

A curious Cree tale, narrated by de Smet,[1] tells of a war party being guided on its course by a girl with blindfold eyes; 'the manitou of war was supposed to guide her.' The Chippewa have an interesting legend of having once numbered among them a flying man, a powerful magician whose 'medicine' was a feather which he could cause to enter his body, thereby enabling him to fly and spy out the enemy.[2]

Crystal-gazing is suggested in numerous rites and myths.

The N.W. Coast Indians tell of a man to whom a serpent gave a transparent stone which led him through all lands; the Spanish chronicles tell of an obsidian mirror in which Montezuma saw ominous images; the Cakchiquel employed a similar stone in testing the guilt or innocence of accused men; the Inca Yupanqui is said to have been given a crystal by the sun, in which he saw whatever he desired to discover—these are widely separated American examples.

Belief in telepathy is evidenced in many tales: 'All spoke with their hearts; hearts spoke to hearts, and lips did not move,' is a Zuñi expression.[3] Stories of 'veridical hallucinations' and prophetic visions are numerous. Of the former J. S. Polack[4] gives a number of examples—but the account of savage instances of this phenomenon would be bulky. Prophecies by shamans or mediums are still more numerous in primitive lore: there is a whole group of legendary American Indian prophecies of the coming of white men and of disaster to the native life recorded in the Spanish annals; much of this may be supposed to be apocryphal, but it is at least striking that Cortes should have been discovered by watchers posted on the coast at Montezuma's orders, on the look-out for the coming of the prophesied god, and that the first presents which the emperor of the Aztec sent to the new-comer were mainly the appropriate apparel of this god, Quetzalcoatl. Gifted souls, however, see not only into the future, but also into the past; it is thus, at least, that Mohave shamans explain their knowledge of creation; they were present at the beginning of the world, as in a dream. This belief is, of course, entirely consonant with the theory of transmigration. Naturally, in the main, clairvoyant powers are called into play to satisfy more immediate interests: to discover the fate of the absent, to recover stolen property, to find food or treasure. Dreams are regarded as great aids in all this (for the soul journeys in dreams—this is the common explanation), but, when the search is difficult, the shaman is called into service, with his more potent or active faculties.

A striking example, where the seeker was a white man consulting a Zulu doctor, is given by David Leslie:[5]

The white man's eight hunters were overdue, having been long gone on an elephant hunt, and at the solicitation of his native servants he consulted the doctor. 'The doctor made eight little fires—that being the number of my hunters; on each he cast some roots, which emitted a curious sickly odour and thick smoke: into each he cast a small stone, shouting, as he did so, the name to which the stone was dedicated; then he ate some "medicine," and fell over into what appeared to be a trance for about ten minutes, during all which time his hands kept moving. Then he seemed to wake, went to one of the fires, raked the ashes about, looked at the stone attentively, described the man faithfully, and said: "This man died of fever and your gun is lost." To the next fire as before: "This man" (correctly described) "has killed four elephants," and then he described the tusks. The next: "This man" (again describing him) "has been killed by an elephant, but your gun is coming home," and so on through the whole, the men being minutely and correctly described; their success or non-success being equally so. I was told where the survivors were, and what they were doing, and that in three months they would come out, but as they would not expect to find me waiting on

[1] *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, London, 1906, p. 93.
[2] *Jes. Rel.* vi., 'Quebec, 1633-34,' p. 163 ff.
[3] 'Secret Medicine Societies of the Seneca,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xi. [1909] 161-185.
[4] W. J. Hoffman, 'The Midē'wiwin, *7 RBEW* [1891], p. 149 ff., also *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. i. p. 66 ff.
[5] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW*, p. 286.

[1] P. 520.
[2] F. Densmore, *Bull. 45 BE* [1910], p. 98.
[3] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW*, p. 52.
[4] *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, London, 1840, i. 268 f.
[5] *Among the Zulus and Amatongas*[2], Edinburgh, 1875, pp. 224-226.

them there so long after the time appointed, they would not pass that way. I took particular note of all this information at the time, and to my utter amazement it turned out correct in every particular. It was scarcely within the bounds of possibility that this man could have had ordinary intelligence of the hunters; they were scattered about in a country two hundred miles away.'

If this narrative is to be trusted, it certainly outdoes all that is ascribed to the tested clairvoyants of the civilized world.

The curative or psycho-therapeutic powers of souls appear in every variety of use of suggestion and hypnotism, and amid practically all peoples. These functions have their obverse use in the power to inflict disease, or even death, upon an absent or unconscious victim. All such practices are interbound with ritual and magical observances; and, indeed, they can hardly be dealt with except in connexion with such customs. See artt. DISEASE AND MEDICINE, DIVINATION, MANA, PSYCHO-THERAPEUTICS, SHAMANISM, SPIRITISM.

LITERATURE.—The literature dealing with primitive conceptions of the soul is enormous, being co-extensive with the study of primitive religion and superstition. In general, it may be said to fall into three classes: (*a*) reports on the beliefs and myths of particular tribes, from travellers, missionaries, and anthropological field-workers—abundant both in book form and in the ethnological journals (notably *JAI* [*JRAI*], *FL*, *JAFL*, *RHR*, *ZE*, and *Anthropos*); (*b*) critical and comparative studies of primitive religious ideas, of which the most important, probably in any language, are E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], 2 vols., London, 1891; A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*[3], 2 vols., do. 1899; and J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], 12 vols., do. 1911–15; with these should be named E. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1915; (*c*) briefer résumés of the subject in works on comparative religion and descriptive or comparative ethnology, few being better conceived than the introductory lecture of S. Reinach, *Orpheus: Hist. général des religions*, Paris, 1909, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1909. See also the 'Literature' and bibliographical references of the artt. cited in this art.; also 'Literature' of artt. ANIMISM, GOD (Primitive and Savage), PRAYER, COMMUNION WITH DEITY. Probably the most comprehensive study since Tylor's *PC*, centring upon the idea of soul in primitive religion, is A. E. Crawley, *The Idea of the Soul*, London, 1909, containing much bibliography. The volumes of *The Mythology of All Races* (Boston, 1916 ff.) will be found of use as giving conceptions classified by racial groups.

H. B. ALEXANDER.

SOUL (Buddhist).—Few words are more ambiguous than 'soul,' as any dictionary will testify. Nor is there any one word in the religious literature of Buddhism which can be said to coincide with it in either extension or intension. The principal terms in the canonical literature which translators have rendered, sometimes or always, by 'soul' are *jīva*, *attan*, *satta*, and in the Abhidhamma section *puggala*. In the somewhat later *Questions of King Milinda*, *jīva* is preferred, and with it the rare word *vedagū* ('sentient one'). The other three terms are used, in connexion with their contexts, only when canonical passages are quoted.[1]

Jīva is literally 'living thing.' It is a term imported from the staple terms of religious schools opposed to Buddhism, and occurs only[2] in the title of one among many debatable propositions classed as erratic or heretical:

'Is the *jīva* the same as . . . (or) . . . a different thing from the bodily frame (*aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ*)?'[3]

It may thus be fairly rendered by 'soul' in the Hebrew sense—'and man became a living soul.' But the Buddhist canonical books do not select the term *jīva* when they are uttering doctrines concerning man's spiritual nature as contrasted with his bodily and sensuous faculties. They choose one of the other three terms—*attan* (nom. case, *attā*), *satta*, *puggala*. The last two mean a (living, intelligent) being, a person, and are used in ordinary discourse simply to represent any fellow-being.[1] The first is also closely connected with 'living thing' in that it means breath (Skr. *ātman*; cf. πνεῦμα, 'spirit'). In ordinary discourse it means self,[2] and in the Abhidhamma *Piṭaka*, the *Milinda*, and the *Netti* it rarely occurs in any philosophical argument. But the earlier *Sutta*-literature uses *attā* repeatedly in controversial discourse concerning a right conception of what we should call soul or spirit. At the same time, the *Suttas* show an unhesitating acceptance of the term wherever we should say 'self.'[3] These contexts lead us to infer that such discourses were uttered at a period when the speakers were making a strong protest, not against man's spiritual nature, but against a certain religious or philosophical attitude in vogue in their time, concerning that nature viewed as *attā* or *ātman*. It needs but a glance into Vedāntic literature—*e.g.*, the *Upaniṣads*, notably those reckoned to be pre-Buddhistic, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*—to find everywhere a unique cult of *ātman* (called also *Brahman*). It was regarded as divinity universally immanent, but especially so in the human organism. Conceived materialistically as a fine substance, located in the heart, and compared as to size and shape to a variety of small objects,[4] this microcosm was held to possess, like the macrocosmic divinity, the essential qualities of permanence (quitting the impermanent body at death), immutability, bliss, and omnipotence. And to discern the essential identity of microcosm and macrocosm was to attain true insight.

E.g., 'in that subtle essence . . . all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou art it. . . . The infinite is bliss . . . is the self. He who loves the self . . . becomes a self-ruler; lord and master in all the worlds. The self is without decay, death, grief.'[5] 'The embodied one which is eternal . . . is not born, nor does it ever die . . . unchangeable, primeval . . . all-pervading, stable, firm.'[6]

It is on this point of soul or spirit or self, as a thing different in kind from the rest of the individual, that Buddhism joins issue with Vedāntism. To such a dualism it is in fundamental antithesis. Its philosophy of life may be said to be based on the axioms, *sabbaṃ aniccaṃ*, *sabbaṃ dukkhaṃ* ('all is impermanent,' 'all is [liable-to] suffering'). In no constituent of the living being was any exception to this rule of nature to be found. And, since *attā*, as currently taught, was essentially permanent, unchanging, blissful, powerful, there could be none of *attā* so conceived in the living being:

'What think ye then? Is body, is mind permanent, or impermanent?' 'Impermanent, sir.' 'Is that which is impermanent liable to suffering or not?' 'It is liable, sir.' 'But is it proper to say of that which is impermanent, liable to suffering and to change, This is of me; I am this; this is the soul (self) of me?'[7]

The individual is entirely phenomenal, governed by the laws of life. Were there in him a microcosmic emanation of the superphenomenal *ātman* or *Brahman*, he would have the power of deity to remould himself 'nearer to the heart's desire,' and thus at will to transcend those laws—

[1] *The Questions of King Milinda*, tr. Rhys Davids (*SBE* xxxv.), Oxford, 1890; on pp. 41, 48, 86, 132, *jīva* is used; on pp. 86, 111, *vedagū*; on p. 45, *satta* ('being'); on p. 67, *attā*; on p. 40, *puggala*. Three centuries or so later Buddhaghosa has reverted to the use of *attā* (cf. *Sumangala Vilāsinī*, i. 194 f.). The need for protest mentioned below may no longer have been pressing—he wrote in Ceylon—but he was commenting on canonical arguments. He also uses *vedaka*, *kāraka* ('feeler,' 'agent'), for the soul or self-entity (*Visuddhi Magga*, xvii., xx.).

[2] Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899–1910, ii. 359 f., uses *jīva*, but the Buddhist origin of this *Sutta* (*Pāyāsi*) is doubtful. Cf. the term in Jainism (see art. JAINISM, 4, i. (*b*)).

[3] *Dialogues*, i. 204, 254; *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, 215, 258, etc.

[1] Animals are never so referred to. They would be included under the yet wider name *pāna* ('breathing thing'). But *devas* (spirits, deities), who are for Buddhists reborn mankind, would be included.

[2] See art. SELF (Buddhist).

[3] *E.g.*, as prefix in compounds, and in oblique cases.

[4] Cf. Rhys Davids, 'Theory of Soul in the Upanishads,' *JRAS*, Jan. 1899.

[5] *SBE* i. [1900] 101 f., 123 f. (*Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad*, vi. 8 f., vii. 23 ff.).

[6] *SBE* viii. [21898] 45 (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, ii. 27 ff.).

[7] *Majjhima Nikāya*, iii. 19 f., and elsewhere.

'If the body . . . if any of the four mental factors were the soul (self), the body . . . the mind would not be subject to disease, and we should be able to say: Let my body . . . my mind be, or not be, so and so.'[1]

Into a complex or congeries of these five varieties of functionings or faculties called *khandhas* (Skr. *skandhas*), or groups, the individual can be analyzed without residuum. In fact, according to Buddhaghoṣa,[2] it was in order to effect an exhaustive analysis for the rejection of ātmanistic dualism that the teaching at its outset adopted this fivefold classification. And, living personality being thus resolved, the teaching proceeded to repudiate any identification or coincidence of an extra-phenomenal self or soul with any one of the five. Immanence was equally rejected:

'The well-taught disciple . . . regards not the bodily qualities as *attā*, nor that they have *attā*, nor are in *attā*, nor that *attā* is in them. Neither does he hold any of these views regarding the *khandha* of feeling, nor of perception, nor of mental activities, nor of consciousness. For him each one of these *khandhas* changes, becomes other, he does not get thoughts [which bring about] a recurrence of changing *khandhas*.'[3]

The *khandhas*, bodily and mental, were thus declared to be 'empty' (*suñña*) of any unchanging essence.[4] That which was wholly impermanent and liable to suffering was also inevitably *an-attā*, 'soulless,' or, as we should prefer to say, 'without *Ātman*.'

It should not for a moment be inferred, on this account, that Buddhist teaching countenanced any belief in a total annihilation of body and mind at death. Beside the error of eternalism (*sassatavāda*), or indwelling immutable entity, it set the error of annihilationism (*uccheda-vāda*).[5] Beside the doctrine of *anicca* it set that of *kamma*, or the transmitted force of the act, bodily and mental.[6] The self or soul *is* the *khandha* complex, ever changing but ever determined by its (or their) antecedent character. Hence the long-drawn-out line of life is a fluctuating curve of evolving and degenerating experience, into which it is logically unthinkable to intrude an immutable factor. But annihilationism was not as prevalent an error as was eternalism. Had it been so, we may feel confident that, to the oft-repeated trio, *anicca, dukkha, an-atta*, Buddhist teaching would have added a fourth, such as *punabbhāva* ('renewed becoming'), or the like. The future state of the living is constantly referred to, but the teaching is not so much that there will be rebirth as of what kind, because of the present life, it is likely to be. And the *an-atta* doctrine is logically so much a corollary of *anicca* that, had it not been for the exaggerated eternalism of the *ātman* doctrine, we should scarcely have found *an-atta* in the rank it occupies. It would have been overshadowed by, and taken up into, *anicca-vāda* and *kamma-vāda*. We may even venture to affirm that Buddhism, in the emphasis with which it combats a tendency at once mythological and mystical in the land of its birth, has weakened itself as a doctrine for all lands and all times by not building up a more positive teaching on the spiritual nature of man.

Be this as it may, Buddhism had no quarrel with any term for the living person as a whole—*attā, satta, puggala*—so long as in these terms we see labels, binding concepts, conventions in language, holding together, for economy in thought and word, the compound that a living person at any given moment, past, present, or future, is

'"Being"! (*satta*) Why dost thou harp upon that word?
. . . . . .
Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this.
No "being" can be here discerned to be.
For just as when the parts are rightly set,
The word "chariot" ariseth in our minds,
So doth our usage covenant to say
"A being" when the aggregates (*khandha*) are there.'[1]

'For these, Chitta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world.'[2]

In this way all these terms are frequently used in the *Suttas*. Wherever the individual was living, unless it was in the very dimly conceived spheres called the unconscious and the immaterial, he or she was still and was always a compound of *khandhas*, the body-factor varying in grossness or refinement and other qualities according to the sphere inhabited and the mental factors no less. Thus, if you were in the Brahmā heaven, you had to assume a grosser body before you could pass into and act in the lower heavens.[3] Ever the 'soul' *was* the compound, always changing, growing out from, and the inevitable result of the souls (or selves) that had been. And, so long as the earnest inquirer bore in mind this distinction between self, soul, spirit as the mutable, growing organism, revealed by philosophic truth (*paramattha-sacca*), and the name-label, *suggestive* of a fictitious immutable entity, as used in the social convention of language (conventional truth, *sammuti-sacca*),[4] he thought in conformity with the mother-tradition of his religion. The *Suttas* show no hesitation in using conventional language in connexion with man as surviving not one death only, but any number of dyings. Available words, in fact, were so utterly inadequate, during the early centuries of Buddhism (as they are still), to discourse of what is commonly called transmigration that practically no choice was left. Survival was spoken of, by Brāhman and Buddhist alike, in terms of bodily acts and states. We are at a loss to conclude which was the more remarkable—the reaching out by the mind of Gotama Buddha to ideas which it needed the philosophic growth of a later period to make more clearly articulate by new terms, or the apparent failure of his opponents to discern how very badly the current terms of transmigration, such as they used, applied to an immanent being who was eternal and immutable. In the latest book of the canon, the *Kathā-vatthu*, in the great opening discussion on the soul (*puggala-kathā*),[5] we find the materially conceived views of transmigration criticized with a mainly negative emphasis. Terms for a constructive theory seem to be still lacking.

E.g., after much discourse to show dialectically that it is impossible to find, among the ultimates of our conscious experience, a soul or person (*puggala*) apprehended as 'a real and ultimate fact,' the argument proceeds to reject any such ultimate in the mysterious but accepted procedure of rebirth:

'*Heterodox Qy.* Then is it wrong to say, "A soul (*puggala*) transmigrates from this world to another world, and from another world to this?"

Orthodox Ans. Yes',

the latter speaker having elicited the admission that there is neither an identical soul that is reborn, nor a different (*i.e.* quite other) soul, nor both, nor neither.[6]

Passing on to the *Milinda*, we find there the germ-doctrine of the founder—viz. that man, in his entirety, is never the same, yet ever the resultant of his fore-existing self,[7] stated with a growing maturity in thought and diction.

But it is not till the times of Buddhaghoṣa[8] and his successors that we find, grown out of the too negative conception of *anicca*, a positive view, made articulate by certain newly applied terms, of

[1] *Vinaya Texts, Mahāvagga*, I. vi. 38 ff. (*SBE* xiii. [1881] 100 f.).
[2] *Vis. Magga*, xiv., tr. in H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, p. 156.
[3] *Saṃyutta*, iii. 17 f. [4] *Ib.* iv. 54.
[5] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 27 f., 46 f.; *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, ii. 20 f.
[6] Cf. *e.g.*, *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, iv. 132: 'Kammaṇ,' with the three following Suttas.

[1] *Kindred Sayings* (*PTS*), London, 1917, p. 170.
[2] *Dialogues*, i. 263. [3] *Dialogues*, ii. 264.
[4] *Points of Controversy*, p. 63, n. 2; cf. artt. REALITY (Buddhist), TRUTH (Buddhist).
[5] *Ib.* p. 1 f.
[6] Tr. in *Points of Controversy*, p. 26 f.
[7] *SBE* xxv. 63 f.
[8] E.g., *Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna* (unedited).

the ever-changing being of man conceived as a causally determined series of forces and resultants, and as a growing series, in which the now passing moment is wrought up into the coming moment.

Even then, discussion on a subject so inaccessible and mysterious is still stiff and halting. Further knowledge of mediæval Pāli literature may reveal further advance in theory. But we know enough to show that Buddhist doctrine as to soul and survival has logically reconciled *anicca* and *kamma*. My 'self,' as changing constantly, undergoes at death but a relatively deeper change; my new 'body' (*rūpa-khandha*), determined by my *kamma*, becomes one fitted to that new sphere, wherever it be, in which my past thought and will have determined that my new thought, call it soul or spirit or mind, be renewed.

LITERATURE.—See references in footnotes; cf. also C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1912, chs. iii., v., and *Buddhist Psychology*, do. 1914, chs. ii., iii.; S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy* (*PTS*), do. 1915, p. 8 f.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

SOUL (Christian).—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—(*a*) The term 'soul' is, in this article, taken in its most comprehensive sense, as denoting the whole 'self' or personality, the essential principle of human nature, the basis of conscious, continuous, individual existence. It is clear that study of the Christian idea of the soul in this broad sense involves the psychological interpretation of all characteristic data of Christian experience. We may speak of this study as 'Christian psychology,' because there are particular groups of phenomena at different periods with which Christianity is specially concerned (notably those of the NT period), and because there are certain real or alleged aspects of human nature in which Christianity is specially interested. But the method of the study must be that of psychology in general, *i.e.* purely historical and scientific, without dogmatic presuppositions, though the ultimate problems of all psychology pass into the realm of metaphysic.

(*b*) The psychological terminology and ideas of the NT are, as we might expect, largely continuous with those of the OT and the subsequent Jewish literature. The relevant ideas of the OT may be summarized as follows:

'The idea of human nature implies a unity, not a dualism. There is no contrast between the body and the soul, such as the terms instinctively suggest to us. The shades of the dead in Sheol . . . are not called "souls" or "spirits" in the Old Testament; nor does the Old Testament contain any distinct word for "body," as it surely would have done, had this idea been sharply differentiated from that of "soul." Man's nature is a product of the two factors—the breath-soul [נֶפֶשׁ] which is his principle of life, and the complex of physical organs which this animates. Separate them, and the man ceases to be, in any real sense of personality; nothing but a "shade" remains, which is neither body nor soul. If this seems but a poor idea of human nature, we must set over against it the great redeeming feature, that there is an aspect of this nature [רוּחַ] which relates man to God, and makes man accessible to God.'[1]

The non-canonical literature of Jewish thought shows that this fundamental idea was subsequently modified in two primary ways, chiefly in relation to the new eschatological emphasis. One was the accentuation of individualism; the detachment of the individual from the corporate personality of his social group, already declared by Jeremiah and Ezekiel, was more sharply presented against the new eschatological background of moral retribution in the life after death. The other, closely related, was a clearer recognition of the ethical problems of human nature, such as those arising from the tendency to evil which is in all men as it was in Adam. On the other hand, the OT doctrine of the Spirit of God fell into practical neglect, to the great impoverishment of the doctrine of man. It is, in fact, through the recovery of this doctrine that the most characteristic advance of the NT anthropology is made (*i.e.* in the Pauline interpretation of Christian experience).

(*c*) It is necessary to emphasize the fact that the NT psychology is, in general, continuous with that of the OT and the Apocrypha, because some scholars (*e.g.*, Holtzmann, Lüdemann, Sokolowski) have tended to exaggerate the Hellenistic influences, especially in regard to the Pauline contrast of the inner and outer man. They interpret the contrast as a dualism, though this is essentially untrue to the Hebrew basis of Pauline thought. It is, of course, true that the reproduction of the Hebrew psychological terms through their Greek equivalents gave easier access to the Hellenistic influences of the age. But the resultant modification has been, in fact, much less than we might have expected. The Greek terms of the NT are filled with an essentially Hebrew content; the two new terms, *νοῦς* and *συνείδησις*, are really specializations from the psychological usage of 'heart' in the OT, and are not used with a Greek connotation.

II. *NEW TESTAMENT.*—1. **The psychological terms.**—The group of writings known as the NT, though emanating from a single generation, presents at least three types of psychological usage, viz. the Synoptic, approximating most closely of all to the OT; the Pauline, offering the most important and original development of the OT conceptions; and the Johannine, apparently dependent on the Pauline usage, but moving in a circle of its own. We may conveniently review the use of the chief terms in each group separately, reserving for a fourth class other noticeable occurrences in the NT. The chief terms to be considered, in order to reach the general NT idea of human personality, are four, viz. *ψυχή*, *πνεῦμα*, *καρδία*, and *σάρξ*, corresponding respectively to נֶפֶשׁ, רוּחַ, לֵב, בָּשָׂר, in the OT.

(The attached numbers signify the approximate number of cases of each usage.)

(*a*) *Synoptic.*—Ψυχή (37) denotes physical life (Mt 2^{20}), or the subject of emotional states (Mk 14^{34}), as in the OT, but in eleven cases (as Mt 10^{28}) it refers to the continuance of life after death, a usage to which there is nothing corresponding in the use of נֶפֶשׁ. Πνεῦμα (78) is used chiefly of the Holy Spirit (34, as Mk 1^{12}), and of demonic influences (32, as Mt 8^{16}), but in three instances it denotes the principle of life (Mt 27^{50}, Lk 8^{55} 23^{46}), and in seven the psychical side of life (Mt 5^3 26^{41}, Mk 2^8 8^{12} 14^{38}, Lk $1^{47.\ 80}$), though on a higher level than that denoted by *ψυχή*. Καρδία (49) is used especially of personality, inner life, and character (18, as Mk 7^{21}), also of emotional (2, as Lk 24^{32}), intellectual (12, as Mk 2^6), volitional (9, as Mt 5^{28}) life. Σάρξ (11) is used of the physical part of human nature, with the suggestion of weakness and limitation (Mk 14^{38}; cf. Lk 24^{39}), and thus in contrast with divine power (Mt 16^{17}). Except for the use of *ψυχή* in reference to life after death, all these usages could be directly classified under the corresponding OT terms, the connotation of which they continue, though the Christian emphasis on the inner life in contrast with the outer (cf. *καρδία*) is naturally marked in NT teaching.

(*b*) *Pauline.*—Ψυχή (13) is a term very little used by Paul; of the four instances with psychical content three denote 'desire' (Eph 6^6, Ph 1^{27}, Col 3^{23}), and one denotes simply the emotional side of consciousness (1 Th 5^{23}). His use of the adjective *ψυχικός* (1 Co $2^{14f.}$ 15^{44-46}) shows that for him the *ψυχή* is no more than the animating principle of the body of flesh, and the basis of its emotional experience. Πνεῦμα (146) is the most important word in his psychological vocabulary, whether as denoting supernatural influences (116, as Ro 15^{13}), or the higher nature of a Christian man under the influence of the Spirit of God (14, as 1^9), or a normal element in human nature (16, as 8^{16}). This distinction of *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* further develops the tendencies already noticeable in the later OT usage of נֶפֶשׁ and רוּחַ. Καρδία (52) denotes the inner life (15, as 1 Co 14^{25}), the seat of emotional (13, as Ro 9^2), intellectual (11, as 1^{21}), and volitional (13, as 2^5) psychoses, continuing directly the usage of לֵב in the OT, except that the two Greek terms *νοῦς* (21, as Ph 4[7]) and *συνείδησις* (20, as Ro 2^{15}), denoting 'mind' and 'conscience' (ethical judgment), cover usages which the OT would have expressed through לֵב. Σάρξ (91) is used to imply physical or intellectual weakness, or some limitation in value (19; see 2 Co 7^5, Ro 6^{19}, Ph 3[3]); in 35 instances there is some ethical reference to the connexion of 'flesh' and sin

[1] H. W. Robinson, *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, London, 1913, p. 83.

(Ro 7$^{6ff.}$), though not so as to involve a fundamental ethical dualism of 'flesh' and 'spirit.'

(*c*) *Johannine (Gospel and Epistles).*—Here the usage of ψυχή (13) offers no marked difference from that of the Synoptics, except that it once includes the inner life on its higher side (3 Jn 2), as נֶפֶשׁ also can (Job 16^{4}). Πνεῦμα (34) is almost confined to supernatural influences, whilst never used of demons. In one instance it is used of the principle of life (Jn 19^{30}), and in two psychically, of anger (11^{33}, RVm), and of trouble (13^{21}). Καρδία (11) follows the Synoptic usage. In the usage of σάρξ (16) the Synoptic contrast with πνεῦμα is further emphasized in the Pauline sense (1^{13} 3^{6} 6^{63} 8^{15}, 1 Jn 2^{16}), in accordance with the Johannine fondness for antithesis; the spiritual birth of the believer means the impartation of a principle of new life.

(*d*) Among other NT usages calling for notice, Petrine psychology (1 P) is interesting by its contrast with the Pauline. For Peter, ψυχή (6) denotes the whole personality, including its highest aspects (1^{22} 2^{11}); πνεῦμα (8) is used of the soul or spirit after death (3$^{18f.}$ 4^{6}); in one instance πνεῦμα denotes a meek and gentle 'disposition' (3^{4}), as imparted by the Holy Spirit, but never a normal element in human nature, as it does in Paul's usage. Καρδία (3) follows the usual Hebrew and Pauline usage, with reference to the inner life as contrasted with the outer; σάρξ (7) is used in a purely physical and non-ethical sense, unlike the Pauline characteristic connotation. The usage of terms in James follows that of the OT. In Hebrews ψυχή and πνεῦμα are named together as normal elements of human nature (4^{12}; cf. 1 Th 5^{23}), and πνεῦμα is used of 'spirits' (angels, 1^{14}, men, 12^{23}; cf. 12^{9}). The psychology of the Acts, like that of the Synoptics, shows clearly the general continuance of the OT thought and usage, apart from the use of πνεῦμα in the sense of a disembodied 'spirit' (23$^{8f.}$; cf. 7^{59}); ψυχή represents the more emotional (15^{24}), καρδία the more volitional (11^{23}; cf. 4^{32} for both) aspect of personality, whilst πνεῦμα is used like רוּחַ of the special 'energies' of personality (17^{16} 18^{25} 19^{21} 20^{22}).

From this survey it will be clear that the fundamental ideas of personality in the NT are derived from the OT; the most important advance is in the belief that essential personality, whether called ψυχή or πνεῦμα, survives bodily death. This continued personality, however, still implies a body (cf. the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul), whether the present body (its ghostly counterpart? Mt 5$^{29f.}$ 10^{28}) or the 'pneumatic' body of Pauline anticipation (1 Co 15$^{35-38}$), more adapted to the needs of the spirit (cf. the body of the Risen Christ, which possesses new powers). The body is conceived as an integral part of the personality, whose consciousness is diffused throughout it, and differentiated into the local consciousness of its particular members (1 Co 12$^{12ff.}$), as in Hebrew psychology. Thus the eye, hand, mouth, etc., have psychical and ethical qualities of their own; since the writers of the NT, like those of the OT, knew nothing of the nervous system, they could not link up sensory and motor phenomena with a central organ, as we do, or assign to the brain its true function. In regard to the psychical side of this unified life of body and soul, the survey shows that no hard and fast division was made by the NT writers; the inner life might be called ψυχή, πνεῦμα, or καρδία, though usually, and on the basis of Hebrew usage, with more or less suggestion of emotional, 'spiritual,' and volitional activity respectively. We are not warranted, therefore, in speaking of a 'trichotomy' of body, soul, and spirit, or even a 'dichotomy' of soul (spirit) and body; a soul (spirit) may be temporarily disembodied, but full personality ultimately involves the union of body and soul, here and hereafter.[1]

2. Spiritual influences.—Further light is thrown on the NT idea of the soul by relating it to its environment of general and Christian belief. First in importance ranks the belief that the soul is accessible to 'spiritual' influences of the widest range, from those implied in the crudest demonology up to the Holy Spirit as conceived in the Pauline doctrine. The cosmic environment of the soul is constituted by hosts of demonic powers, which seek to make it their battleground.[2] Christ has entered the world armed with spiritual powers (Ac 10^{38}, 1 Jn 3^{8}), to overthrow Satan and his hosts—'I, by the Spirit of God, cast out demons.' In fact, Origen ascribes the progress of Christianity up to his time to the decrease in the number of demons, owing to their defeat by Christ.[1] To an extent that we can hardly realize, the soul was conceived by the early Christian as the arena of opposing spiritual forces, so that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit claims a unique and primary place among the ideas of early Christian anthropology. We owe to Paul the fullest elaboration of this doctrine, though it is more or less common ground to the NT writers. In the Pauline anthropology the cruder demonology of the time is replaced by 'sin,' conceived as an objective and almost personalized force, enabled to enter the human personality through the relatively weaker resistance of the 'flesh.'[2] This is not conceived dualistically, as the source of evil, but as the 'base of operation' of sin (ἀφορμή [Ro 7$^{8, 11}$; cf. vv.$^{17, 18}$]). The full significance of this idea is apparent only when we remember the fact indicated already, viz. that the 'flesh,' including all the members of the body, is an essential part of the personality, possessed of a quasi-consciousness of its own. Against sin, then, operating through the flesh, the Holy Spirit wages unceasing war, working from the higher side of personality, whose essential spirituality (Ro 7^{22}) it successfully reinforces (8^{2}). The whole course of the victorious campaign in the arena of the soul, whose higher nature is linked with God through faith, produces Christian experience in regeneration and sanctification. Paul has thus lifted the function of the Spirit from the popular level of tongues and miracles of healing to the ethical plane, as is seen in his recapitulation of the 'fruit of the Spirit' (Gal 5$^{22f.}$). He is not concerned with the ethical and metaphysical problems of this moral development; it is enough for him that all is of God and all is of man (Ph 2^{13}); as Deissmann says:

'Determinists and indeterminists can [both] appeal to him; Paul himself was neither one nor the other: to him the oars meant as much as the sails.'[3]

The entrance of the soul into this higher experience is by its faith, accompanied as this is by the baptism of the Holy Spirit outwardly enacted in, or accompanied by, water-baptism. But this baptism implies a new relation to all baptized believers, who are thereby constituted the unity of the Church. In the 'corporate personality' of the Church, forcibly depicted in the Pauline parable of the human body (1 Co 12$^{12ff.}$), the old social consciousness of Israel re-appears. This corporate personality, whose vital energy is the Spirit of God, forms an essential factor in the NT conception of individual personality; the soul of the baptized believer is what it is by virtue of its relation to the whole, though the complementary truth must not be forgotten, that there is direct individual access to, and fellowship with, God through Christ in one Spirit (Eph 2^{18}; cf. 1 Jn 1^{3}).

3. Summary.—We may distinguish the essential features of the NT idea of the soul from the local and temporary forms of its expression by saying that this idea assumes the unity of human nature in its material and immaterial elements, which it does not so clearly distinguish as we are inclined to do; that it emphasizes the worth of human personality, especially by the appeal to its eternal destiny; and that it finds the realization of this worth in the moral values of a society

1 See art. Eschatology, vol. v. p. 385 ff.

2 For the copious evidence see Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums*^{2}, Leipzig, 1906, Eng. tr., London, 1908, bk. i. ch. iii.; J. Weiss, 'Dämonische,' in *PRE*^{3} iv. 411-419.

1 *Hom.* xv. 5, quoted by Harnack, i. 124, n. 2, Eng. tr., i. 143, n. 2.

2 See art. Sin (Christian).

3 *Paulus*, Tübingen, 1911, p. 126, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 188.

constituted through the corporate and individual surrender of personality to the Spirit of God (or Christ). The NT characteristically shows little consciousness of the problems inevitably arising within the circle of this idea of the soul, such as the method of the soul's origin, the relation of the soul's activity to God's (freedom and grace), the degree of moral development required for membership in the Church, the mediation of spiritual energies to the soul by institutions or truths respectively. The gradual emergence of these problems in the subsequent course of Christian thought has profoundly affected the history of the Church.[1]

III. *PATRISTIC AND MEDIÆVAL.*—When the Christian gospel passed out through the gate of the Jewish synagogue into the arena of the Roman Empire, an idea of the soul fundamentally Hebrew was transferred into an environment of Greek thought, with no slight consequences in the process of adaptation. Patristic thinkers were usually men trained in Greek philosophy, and they could make their apologetic and constructive work intelligible to a Greek-thinking world only through the established terms and conceptions of Greek psychology. The fundamental difference of outlook has been clearly stated by Siebeck:[2]

'For the Greeks, the soul is a product of the world, and the rational soul primarily exists to know the world as it is, and actively shape it; the soul was consequently the means to an end or ends assigned to it by the world. To the Christian, on the contrary, the world is a means for the end of salvation, which springs from the independent and characteristic nature of the soul; for him, accordingly, the soul is not a product of the world, but a creation of the transcendent God, conceived after the analogy of spirit.'

The transference brought both gain and loss—gain, in that a more scientific analysis of the Christian consciousness became possible; loss, in that some of the religious values conserved by the more primitive Hebrew and NT idea of the soul were more likely to be obscured. One general result was the development of a distinction between soul and body in marked contrast with the unity of the Hebrew idea (cf. Philo's dualism owing to similar influences), though this was usually accompanied by the retention of the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection of the body, which became an established Christian tenet.

1. **Tertullian and Origen.**—The influence of the Stoic and Platonic psychology on Patristic writers may be illustrated from Tertullian and Origen respectively. Tertullian (160–220), whilst naturally ascribing the soul of the first man to the divine inbreathing, follows Stoic teachers in asserting that the human soul is corporeal, and is handed on from parent to child, being begotten with the body (Traducianism). But the unity of the soul, with νοῦς as its highest function, stands over against the body, so that Tertullian is a 'dichotomist.' When the soul is seen in vision, it has the shape of the body, and even a certain tangibility. His formal definition may be quoted:

'The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its powers in various ways, free in its determinations, subject to growth by opportunity, in its faculties mutable, rational, supreme, endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one (original).'[3]

Origen (185–254), like the Alexandrians generally, follows the Platonic idea of the soul as incorporeal and eternal; he regards it as pre-existent to the present life. From Platonic influence comes also that 'trichotomy' which Greek thought could so easily, though without warrant, read into the NT reference to 'body, soul, and spirit' (1 Th 5^{23}). A third Patristic theory of the origin of the soul, which became dominant from the time of Jerome onwards, is creationism, according to which 'God is daily making souls,'[1] whilst bodies alone come by human generation.

2. **Augustine.**—Augustine (354–430), whilst deeply influenced by Neo-Platonism, claims a unique place in Patristic psychology by the originality and importance of his work. He is the first to realize fully and adequately that the inner life is *sui generis*, with its own intrinsic claims to introspective study; in his analysis of the mind as memory, intellect, and will he gives the primary place to the will, instead of to the intellect; his deep conception of the freedom realized through divine grace stands in sharp contrast with the superficiality of contemporary Pelagianism. His influence is supreme through the subsequent centuries until Scholasticism brings in the reign of Aristotle, and 'the Aristotelian conception of the soul as life-energy mingles with the Platonic idea of the body as the instrument of the soul.'[2]

3. **Aquinas.**—Aquinas (1224–75), the foremost representative of Scholasticism, combined the Augustinian anthropology with Aristotle's general idea of the soul[3] and rejected the Platonic dualism, but 'ecclesiastical dogma demanded such transformation of the Aristotelian distinctions as amounted to a religious dualism.'[4] In the elaborate system of Thomas man became a central point of contact between the two great realms of 'form' and 'matter'—the microcosm which unites them both.[5] Metaphysic thus gave support to the Christian doctrine of the soul's worth, though its formalism failed to do justice to the soul's content.

4. **Eckhart.**—Side by side, however, with the more rationalistic view of Scholasticism there is an approach to the realities of the soul made by mystical religion, which is of great significance for Christian thought. Thus Eckhart (1260–1327), gathering up the soul's powers into unity with God, holds that 'there is something in the soul uncreated and uncreatable,' through which the divine birth within man takes place (cf. the *synteresis* of Scholastic psychology).[6] In this return to God, involving, on the negative side, the withdrawal from sensational life, the soul's salvation consists. A natural outcome of such views would be pantheism, though Eckhart perhaps saves himself from this.[7] The insistence on the surrender of the soul to God as the source and unity (*unitas*) of its life is characteristic of mysticism (*q.v.*), and may be studied in the *Theologia Germanica*, which so profoundly influenced Luther. In fact, mediæval mysticism forms one of the principal tributaries of the Protestant Reformation, with its new emphasis on the experience of the individual soul and on the work of the Holy Spirit.

IV. *MODERN.*—1. **Lines of approach.**—From the Renaissance and Reformation onwards the characteristic feature of inquiry into the nature of the soul has been its specialization along different lines, pursued more or less independently; Christian thought tends more and more to concentrate on the religious significance of the soul.

(*a*) *Religious.*—The new emphasis on religious experience which characterized the Reformation illustrates the more subjective spirit of Protestant religion in general. The necessary objective complement of this was found in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as the supernatural basis of the soul's experience, though usually in intimate relation to

[1] Cf. artt. PELAGIANISM, DONATISTS, PROTESTANTISM.
[2] *Gesch. der Psychologie*, ii. 359. [3] *De Anima*, 22.
[1] Jerome, *ad Pamm.* 22. [2] Siebeck, ii. 426.
[3] See art. SOUL (Greek).
[4] Klemm, *Gesch. der Psychologie*, p. 22.
[5] Dessoir, *Abriss einer Gesch. der Psychologie*, p. 68.
[6] Cf. art. SYNDERESIS.
[7] Cf. Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, London, 1909, p. 233.

the canon of Scripture.[1] A wider application of the doctrine of the Spirit is to be found in the Quaker doctrine of the 'Inner Light,' which Barclay defines as 'a real spiritual substance, which the soul of man is capable to feel and apprehend, from which that real, spiritual inward birth in believers arises, called the new creature, the new man in the heart.'[2] From the teaching of George Fox[3] we can see that this meant the religious evaluation of the moral consciousness—a most suggestive contribution to modern apologetic.[4] At the other end of the scale of spiritual experience we find Wesley's doctrine of the 'witness of the Spirit.'[5] Between these two experiences—the sense of morality on the one side and the glow of Christian certainty on the other—are to be found the distinctive interests of Protestantism and the tribunal of its doctrines, to whatever degree the Scriptural record of similar experience remains the formal court of appeal. A new era in the study of the soul in its religious interests was initiated when Schleiermacher (*q.v.*) recognized this. The consequent emphasis on religious experience as the basis of inquiry into the soul is one of the most significant features of present-day theology, in full agreement with the contemporary scientific interest in the psychology of religion.

(*b*) *Psychological.*—The scientific interests of 17th cent. thought, seen in the philosophy of Descartes (1596–1650), Spinoza (1632–77), and Leibniz (1646–1716), and culminating in Locke (1632–1704), involved the differentiation of physiology from psychology, and of both from the religious or metaphysical ideas of the soul. Psychology acquired the character of a distinct science, and has tended more and more in recent times to confine itself as such to the study of the actual phenomena of consciousness, whilst remitting to the theologian and the metaphysician all theories of an alleged substratum or 'soul.' No objection can be raised to this limitation, provided that it be not construed as a denial of soul or personality, in the sense of the theological or ontological postulate of the states of consciousness which the psychologist studies. In this connexion it should be noted that the assumption by Locke of a 'closed consciousness,' accessible through the physical senses alone, still tends to create a prejudice against those spiritual influences which the Christian idea of the soul essentially maintains. Against this prejudice the modern study of telepathy has exerted a useful influence, by showing the possibility of mind influencing mind, apart from the normal link of sensational knowledge. Indeed, the study of abnormal psychology (hypnosis, multiple personality, dreams and visions) may still have important contributions to render to our knowledge of personality. The modern recognition of the 'sub-consciousness' has done much to clear up certain phenomena of normal life, quite apart from the further question of a subliminal self.[6]

(*c*) *Historical.*—In our own generation a further line of approach has been opened up by the comparative study of anthropology and religion. Australian totemism, African fetishism, the psycho-physiological ideas and practices of the ancient Egyptians, the demonology of Babylonia, the metaphysical ideas of the soul current in Indian religion—all these can contribute to a clearer knowledge of the Christian idea of the soul, if only by throwing into contrast its distinctive features. Before the rise of this modern study we were more or less confined to a Græcized approach to Biblical ideas, and, in particular, the psychology of the Hebrews was misunderstood. We can now see the alien origin of 'trichotomies' and other assumptions, and recognize the essential unity of man's nature in the Hebrew-Christian idea, and its contrast with Greek and other dualisms (Chinese, Zoroastrian); the emphasis of this idea on man's dependence on God, for creation, preservation, and salvation, in contrast with the scientific or philosophical interests of Greek thought; the fundamental Christian assumption of individuality, in contrast with the ultimate denial of this by Buddhism.

(*d*) *Philosophical.*—The history of philosophy in all periods shows how intimately its progress affects the theological ideas of God and man. In the modern period we may trace a growing approximation to, or recognition of, the demands of Christian faith, as seen in the rejection of materialism and naturalism, and the recognition of the reality of 'spirit.' The decline of absolute idealism, largely through its inadequate account of individuality, and the rise of personal idealism and of various forms of pluralism show that the Christian insistence on the value of the individual soul is not without its philosophic basis. The importance of the idea of 'personality' is more fully recognized in modern philosophy, and the Kantian emphasis on the essential reality of ethical experience harmonizes with the Christian claim that the moral side of personality is its highest development and supreme 'value.'[1]

2. Values and problems.—The essential features of Christian anthropology—the religious data or 'values' which any system of thought is called on to interpret—are 'its emphasis on the worth of man to God as spiritual personality, its practical recognition of an individual self, possessing moral freedom and responsibility, its condemnation of sin as that which ought not to be, its assertion of human dependence on divine aid for the realization of spiritual possibilities, its definition of personal development in terms of social relationship.'[2] The problems of the Christian idea of the soul gather chiefly around the primary postulate of the soul's reality, its relation to the body, and its relation to God.

(*a*) The term 'soul' must be taken to mean, not the unknown substratum of certain phenomena, but the spiritual entity which *is* in its distinctive activities and qualities. Such are its possession of a unique individuality, of the freedom of real initiative, of non-material content. Its development in time is part of its reality, though its ultimate nature may be conceived as timeless. Total human personality is obviously more than the self of self-consciousness at any moment, if only because of the fact of memory. Moreover, the relation of the Christian self-consciousness to other selves and to God may suggest that the soul is an entity larger than past or present experience exhibits.

(*b*) The relation of soul to body in the Christian conception of personality involves the rejection of dualism and the recognition of the body as integral to human nature, at least in the sense that the powers of the body belong to and are finally gathered up into the life of the soul. This, of course, does not mean that the soul depends on the body for its ultimate being, or dies in the physical dissolution of death, but simply that the connexion of soul and body is not artificial, temporary, and alien. The historic Christian conception of life beyond death has accordingly

[1] Cf., *e.g.*, the *Westminster Confession of Faith*.
[2] *Apology*, London, 1676, prop. v. and vi. § 14.
[3] *E.g.*, *Journal*[8], London, 1901, ii. 185.
[4] See art. FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.
[5] *ERE* iii. 329.
[6] See F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, 2 vols., London, 1903, *passim*.

[1] See, especially, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Oxford, 1917, *passim*.
[2] H. W. Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*[2], p. 344.

been based on the Hebrew doctrine of resurrection, rather than on the Greek doctrine of immortality. The non-Hebraic idea of pre-existence (*q.v.*) has failed to find a genuine home in Christian thought; as a speculation in regard to what lies beyond all experience, it hardly admits of proof or disproof. Christian emphasis falls on the theistic idea that soul and body alike owe their creation to God; the fact that they are in present experience so intimately interwoven suggests that they have been brought into existence together, and are complementary expressions (on different planes) of the one entity of personality. Such a view implies no surrender of the faith that the soul survives bodily death; the apparent cessation of intercourse with other embodied selves on earth would find sufficient explanation if the present relation of brain to mind be one of permissive or transmissive, not productive, function.[1] This view of the body as an integral factor, though not, in its present form, a permanent element, in the slowly-evolved self of personality, would agree with the whole evolutionary history of the world, in which human personality offers the highest values attained, and gathers up so many factors of the process. Philosophically, this implies the spiritualization of the body, as against the materialization of the soul; but both elements, body and soul, are real, and form a unity for Christian anthropology and ethics.

(*c*) The relation of the soul to God in Christian thought demands the rejection of any form of monistic absorption, as clearly as of naturalistic degradation. Notwithstanding the quasi-pantheism of some forms of Christian mysticism, and the adoption of quasi-pantheistic systems by some Christian thinkers, the normal testimony of the Christian consciousness is to a clear-cut individuality, carrying with it a real freedom, in upward as well as downward relations. On the other hand, the deeper experiences of Christian fellowship with God point to a relation of the soul to Him so intimate that the completer the surrender of the soul to its Creator and Redeemer, the fuller and richer is the soul's individual life. Whilst the process of salvation may be defined as 'God in us,' its goal is 'we in God.' The doctrine of the Holy Spirit (*q.v.*) here becomes of cardinal importance for Christian anthropology. Through 'the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus' human personality realizes its larger life by voluntary surrender to God:

'Psychologically, it is the setting of the mind on Christ, in the revelation of His graciousness and of the infinite love of God in it, that makes it possible for the Spirit of Christ to act unto the soul's complete deliverance.'[2]

The repeated discovery is made by the Christian that the true life of the soul is hid with Christ in God—*i.e.*, that it is waiting for personal appropriation. This truth of experience shows the significance of fellowship, human and divine; in practice and in theory corporate fellowship must be held to be fundamental to the life of the soul.

The Christian idea of the soul, whilst always implying a metaphysic, is not dependent on any particular system of metaphysics, past, present, or future. All that we are entitled to say is that a metaphysic of personality adequate to explain the Christian experience must, on the one hand, do justice to the moral freedom which alone gives reality to sin and guilt, and significance to the soul's surrender to God, and, on the other hand, show the soul's kinship with God, and its constant relation to the 'Father of spirits,' so that its whole development in time becomes at once a divine as well as a human activity. To develop such a metaphysic obviously lies beyond the scope of the present article.

[1] Cf. W. James, *Human Immortality*[2], London, 1906, p. 32.
[2] G. Steven, *Psychology of the Christian Soul*, p. 264.

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SOUL (Greek).—When we attempt to understand the development of Greek ideas about the soul (ψυχή), we are faced at once by the difficulty that there appears to be no bridge leading from the views implied in our earliest literary record, the Homeric poems, to the religious practices and beliefs of later ages. These are in many respects much more primitive, though it is also true that popular beliefs were much affected by Homer, since most Greeks were brought up on him from childhood. On the other hand, we find that the clearest thinkers among the Greeks, while they naturally rejected popular superstitions about 'souls,' were even more emphatic in their condemnation of the Homeric doctrine. In fact, the Homeric poems appear to be an intrusive and disturbing factor in the normal development of Greek belief. That is why, so long as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were regarded as primitive popular poetry, it seemed impossible to account for later Greek ideas about the soul except on some hypothesis of Oriental influences. At the present day, however, it is generally agreed that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are not popular poetry, but court poetry, and it is perfectly certain that they are not in any way primitive. Archæological research has shown that there was a highly developed civilization in the Ægean at least 2000 years before Homer, and it has also shown that the people to whom this civilization belonged were conquered, some centuries before Homer, by invaders who probably came from the north. The civilization which Homer describes is not the old Ægean civilization even in its latest period. The Mycenæ unearthed by Schliemann is not the Mycenæ of Agamemnon, but that of his predecessors of the older race. What Homer does

describe is the civilization of the new-comers, whom he usually calls Achaians, and of these only after they had already settled themselves firmly in the chief seats of the old Ægean kingdoms. It is clear, however, that these Achaians did not occupy the whole of what was afterwards called Hellas or Greece, and we may also assume that the new-comers would be numerically inferior to the older inhabitants almost everywhere, and would be gradually assimilated and absorbed. That is why, as becomes clearer every day, the later Greek civilization was in the main a revival and continuation of that which existed before the coming of the Achaians, though it was profoundly modified by Achaian influences. Hesiod was still conscious of the break. In his account of the ages of man[1] he interpolates a fifth age, that of the heroes who fought at Thebes and Troy, between the bronze age and the iron age, to which he himself belonged. That is the age with which Homer deals, and, if we remember that the heroic age is an interlude which stands by itself, it will be much easier for us to understand the development of Greek ideas about the soul. It has also to be borne in mind that Homer knows nothing of the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese, and that, in the time of which he sings, the region later called Ionia was still in the hands of 'barbarians.'

1. **Early beliefs and practices.**—It is, of course, obvious that we cannot know with any certainty what the old Ægean population thought of the soul, so long as their writing remains undeciphered. We can only draw inferences from the remains of tombs, etc., that have come to light, and these may easily be misleading. Even if the inscriptions could be read, we might make mistakes. It would not be safe to infer from the inscriptions in a Christian churchyard what is really believed about the soul to-day. Still, there are certain broad statements which may be regarded as assured. The kings of Cnossus and Mycenæ were buried in elaborate state, not cremated like the Achaians of Homer; and, in early times at least, that generally points to a difference of belief about the soul. The great distinction between such beliefs depends on the answer given to the question whether the soul remains attached to the body after death or goes to a place of its own. If this question is answered in the first way, we naturally find that the body is buried in such a manner as to secure it against corruption as long as possible, and that along with it are buried weapons, implements, etc., which may be of use to the soul in its life below the ground. There will also be a mortuary cult of some kind, the main purpose of which will be to provide the soul with appropriate nourishment. All these features are met with in the Mycenæan tombs,[2] and we may fairly infer that, in those days, the 'soul' was supposed to dwell in the tomb. This is the belief we know best from Egypt, where it was carried out with rigorous logic, and where great precautions were taken to secure the preservation of the body after death. At Mycenæ the face was covered with a thin gold mask, so that we still know the features of some of the old kings; and the Egyptians also tried to make their mummies life-like. It seems to have been felt that the outward appearance of the man was the essential thing, and, so long as that was preserved, the soul could still enjoy the offerings brought to the grave. In Egypt this idea was still further developed when the image of the *ka*, or 'double,' was placed in the tomb, but we have no clear indication of that in the Ægean. The sarcophagus of Hagia Triada does, however, furnish us with a representation of the mortuary cult, which seems to prove that a belief similar to the Egyptian prevailed in Crete, and we shall see that the later Greek practices and beliefs must have been developed from some such origin.

2. **Homer.**—When we come to Homer, everything is changed. The 'soul' is called *ψυχή* and is identified with the last breath, the 'ghost' which a man 'gives up.' That is obviously separated from the body at death, so there can be no question of trying to preserve the body or its likeness, or of a mortuary cult. On the contrary, it is desirable that the body should be destroyed as soon as possible, so that the 'soul' may be quite free to depart. It seems to be feared that, so long as the body is there, the soul will be in a measure bound to it. Cremation is an obvious corollary of this view, and there can be no thought of offerings at the grave.

It was not to be expected, however, that this belief should be developed to its logical conclusions in those early days, and there are a good many survivals in Homer of something more primitive. Above all, the soul is still thought of as in some sense a 'double' of the self, and the self is frankly identified with the body. The soul, however, must somehow retain the outward appearance of the man 'himself,' since it is obviously possible to dream of the dead. This comes out best in *Il.* xxiii. 106, where we are told that the soul (*ψυχή*) of Patroclus stood over Achilles all night long, 'and it was marvellously like himself' (*ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ*). Indeed, the whole funeral of Patroclus as here described, with its human sacrifices and libations, is quite unlike anything else in Homer and reads like a survival from earlier times, with this great difference, however, that it is not to be repeated, and that no mortuary cult is to be instituted, after Patroclus 'himself' has once been burned.

It is important to observe, in the next place, that the soul (*ψυχή*) is not of the slightest importance during life. Homer has many descriptions of conscious processes, whether of the nature of thought, will, or desire, and he has an unusually large psychological vocabulary, as we should call it. He uses words like *φρήν* (*φρένες*), *ἦτορ*, *κῆρ*, *νόος*, *βουλή*, *μένος*, *μῆτις* with considerable precision, but these things are all parts or functions of the body. There is not a single passage where any conscious process whatever is ascribed to the soul (*ψυχή*) of a living man. No doubt there are places where we may translate the word by 'life,' but even then it only means life regarded as a thing to be lost.[1]

As the soul is not the seat of consciousness in life, it follows that it can have no consciousness when it has left the body, and that is the normal Homeric view. The departed soul has no midriff (*φρένες*) and no heart, so it is impossible for it to be conscious. It is only real enough to be capable of appearing in the dream of a living man. The souls of the dead depart to a barren, gloomy region, called 'the home of Aïdes' (*i.e.* 'the unseen one'), which is thought of as lying in the far West, and there they have only a dream-like simulacrum of life. As Apollodorus put it in his work on the gods:

> Homer 'assumes that souls resemble the images appearing in mirrors and arising in water, which are made in our likeness and imitate our movements, but have no solid substance to be grasped or touched.'

That is why the departed souls are called 'shades' (*σκιαί*) or 'images' (*εἴδωλα*).[2]

[1] *Works and Days*, 108 ff.

[2] See art. Food for the Dead, vol. vi. p. 66[a].

[1] Cf. *Il.* xxii. 161: *περὶ ψυχῆς θέον*, *Od.* xxii. 245: *περὶ τε ψυχέων ἐμάχοντο*, *Il.* xiii. 763: *ψυχὰς ὀλέσαντες*. A Homeric hero fights for his *ψυχή*, or risks it or loses it, but he does not live by it. In *Il.* ix. 401 *οὐ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον* means 'no compensation for the *loss* of life.'

[2] The *locus classicus* is *Il.* xxiii. 104: *Ὢ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι | ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι*

All apparent exceptions to this normal Homeric doctrine of the soul are of the kind that prove the rule, since they are clearly attempts to adapt certain older ideas to it. The most remarkable is that of the seer Tiresias, whose departed soul is said to retain its consciousness. That, we are told,[1] however, was a gift of Persephone, who 'granted him a mind (*νόον*) even though he was dead.' It is, therefore, a special miracle, which only confirms the general rule. The whole story of the Nekyia in *Od.* xi. depends on the view that the souls must drink blood before they can become conscious. The blood gives them, as it were, a temporary body while it lasts, and therefore they can speak with Odysseus. Obviously, however, as Rohde says, the poet would hardly have thought of putting the matter in that way, if it had not been for the memory of the old blood-offering to the dead (*αἱμακουρία*). The most startling survival is the promise which Odysseus makes on the instructions of Circe[2] to offer a sacrifice to the dead when he gets back to Ithaca. According to the usual Homeric view, such a sacrifice would be altogether meaningless. We see, then, that even in Homer there are traces of an older theory of the soul than that which prevails in the poems.

The few favourites of heaven who are carried away to the Elysian field and the few great sinners who are punished in Tartarus form, on the other hand, no exception to the rule. They have been made immortal; but for Homer that means that they retain their bodies. They have become like the gods; but a god for the Greek is an 'animal' (*ζῷον*) and has a body. Neither the punishment of Tantalus, Tityos, or Sisyphus nor the delights of the Elysian field would be possible for disembodied souls. Immortality consists just in exemption from the separation of soul and body.

3. Hesiod.—In Hesiod we find, as might be expected, still more numerous survivals of earlier ideas. The men of the golden age became *δαίμονες* after death, while those of the silver age are called 'the subterranean blessed,' and we are expressly told[3] that they too 'are attended by honour' (*τιμή*). We are apparently to think of an earlier time, when men might become gods upon earth, and of a later time, when they might become chthonian divinities like Amphiaraus and Trophonius. All that, however, was very long ago, and no such lot is possible for souls now. The souls of the bronze age men went 'nameless to the dank house of chill Hades.'[4] Some of the souls of the next age, that of the heroes, share the same fate, while others are carried away to the 'isles of the blest,' which correspond to Homer's Elysian field.[5] So far as the present race is concerned, there seems to be no hope of any real life after death.

4. The cult of heroes.—When we come to times of which there is any real historical memory, we find everywhere a cult of 'heroes' subsisting alongside of the worship of the gods. These heroes are plainly souls which have their dwelling in the grave. It is impossible to believe that this is an innovation, or that the name 'hero' (*ἥρως*) has been adopted from Homer, who often uses it merely in the sense of 'free man.' It seems rather that the word has been secularized, as it were, by the Achaians, and that the cult had survived among the older population to emerge once more into the light of day when the invading Achaians had been absorbed. This view is confirmed by what we learn from Hesiod. As we saw, he knows that in distant days there were departed souls which received a cult, but he uses the word 'hero' in the Homeric sense, and therefore he cannot apply it to the 'subterranean blessed ones,' to whom it properly belongs. However that may be, the cult was always sharply distinguished from the worship of the gods. To sacrifice (*θύειν*) to the gods on an altar (*βωμός*) was to send the sweet savour (*κνίσα*) upwards, while to sacrifice (*ἐναγίζειν*) to the heroes on an *ἐσχάρα* was to permit the blood and libations to sink into the earth. The archæological evidence shows that the latter practice was known at pre-Homeric Mycenæ. It is quite plain that the heroes were regarded as the souls of departed men, though only a few of the departed become heroes. It is also clear that the cult of the heroes is localized at their graves, which implies that their souls dwell there. That is why the bones of heroes are transported from one place to another. The cult can take place only where they are.[1]

5. Conflicting ideas.—(1) At Athens, in historical times, we find great confusion of ideas about the soul. Attica had not been overrun by the invading northerners, and the older ideas had never been displaced by such theories as are implied in Homer. Accordingly, burial and not cremation was the orthodox Athenian method of disposing of the dead. It was prescribed and regulated in the laws of Solon, and it is the only practice strictly consistent with the due observance of the 'customary uses' (*τὰ νομιζόμενα*), *i.e.* the mortuary cult. On the other hand, all Athenians were brought up on Homer and necessarily had the Homeric beliefs impressed on their minds That may be the explanation of the fact that cremation was quite common at one period (7th cent. B.C.) and was always regarded as a possible and proper method of disposing of the dead. There was, in fact, a divergence between the things an Athenian did in connexion with departed souls and the things he believed about them. The mortuary cult implied that the souls were in the grave with the body, and we know from Plato's *Phædo*[2] that ghosts were believed to have been seen in the neighbourhood of tombs. At the feast of the Anthesteria departed souls or ghosts (*κῆρες*) were supposed to be released from their graves and to revisit the houses in which they had dwelt. They were solemnly dismissed at the end of the festival with the words, 'Out, ghosts, the Anthesteria is over!' (*θύραζε, κῆρες, οὐκέτ' Ἀνθεστήρια*). All that is quite primitive; but, if an ordinary Athenian had been asked what he believed about the soul, he would doubtless have answered by talking of its departure 'to Hades's' (*εἰς Ἄιδου*) and of Charon and the Styx—things which imply quite a different belief. This confusion is well marked by the representation of Charon and his boat, much as he is depicted in Lucian and Virgil, on a piece of black-figured pottery which must belong to the 6th cent. B.C. This piece of pottery was evidently intended for use in the mortuary cult, and yet it is ornamented with a scene quite inconsistent with the necessary presuppositions of that cult.[3] The fact is that we should have very little knowledge of the mortuary cult at all, if it had

πάμπαν. It must be remembered that Ἀΐδης (Att. Ἄιδης, whence Hades) is a person, not a place. The name of the place is Erebos ('Gloom'). The quotation from Apollodorus, *Περὶ θεῶν*, given above runs thus (*ap.* Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 420, ed. C. Wachsmuth, Berlin, 1884): *ὑποτίθεται τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις φαινομένοις ὁμοίας καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑδάτων συνισταμένοις, ἃ καθάπαξ ἡμῖν ἐξείκασται καὶ τὰς κινήσεις μιμεῖται, στερεμνώδη δὲ ὑπόστασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει εἰς ἐντίληψιν καὶ ἁφήν.*

[1] *Od.* x. 494.
[2] *Od.* xi. 29 ff.
[3] *Works and Days*, 142.
[4] *Ib.* 153.
[5] *Ib.* 167 ff.

[1] The point of view is well brought out by the account of the bringing of the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta. In Herodotus (i. 67 ff.). As late as 476 B.C. the bones of Theseus were brought from Scyros to Athens (Plut. *Cim.* 8, *Thes.* 36; Paus. III. iii. 7).
[2] 81 C.
[3] See A. Furtwängler, 'Charon, eine altattische Malerei,' *ARW* viii. [1905] 191 ff.

not been of importance in cases of inheritance, so that orators like Isæus had to mention it. The Athenian acquired such beliefs about the soul as he had from Homer, but he continued to honour his dead 'after the manner of his fathers' (*κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*).

(2) The Eleusinian mysteries were another source of confusion. It is not at all probable that any particular doctrine about the soul was originally implied in these; but, as Demeter and the Maid were both chthonian goddesses, it seemed natural that they should be able to secure for their votaries a more satisfactory existence in the under world than that of a Homeric 'shade.' We find that idea already in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, and it was obviously capable of development. On the whole, however, it does not appear that there was any mysticism in the 'mysteries,' and the nature of the life to come which they promised was clearly modelled on Homer's Elysian field. It will be seen that, strictly speaking, this would imply that the initiated retained their bodies after death, but it is not necessary to suppose that the average Athenian troubled himself on this point.

(3) So far, we have come to nothing that can rightly be called an immortal soul. The gods alone are immortal, and that is because they have immortal bodies. It was only with the spread of the worship of Dionysus that a new idea of the soul as essentially divine, though fallen, gradually emerged. The worship of Dionysus was distinguished by its insistence on divine 'possession' (*κατοκωχή, ἐνθουσιασμός*) and 'ecstasy' (*ἔκστασις*, 'stepping out' of the body). In that there is nothing startling or beyond the range of primitive peoples. What was new was that it suggested to some Greeks an entirely new view of the soul and its relation to God. We know from the Orphic gold plates discovered at Thurii and Petelia that the soul of the departed Orphic saint (*ὅσιος, καθαρός*) claimed actually to be a god and to have won release (*λύσις*) from the 'grievous wheel' of birth by strict observance of the precepts of purity. From this point of view it followed that what we call life is really death, and that the body is the prison or tomb of the soul. Now, the followers of Orpheus were certainly numerous at Athens from the time of Pisistratus onwards, and we have always to take account of their influence. It is not clear, however, that they really went much farther than primitive spiritism in their theory of the soul. At any rate, Pindar, who was certainly influenced by the doctrine and insists that the soul alone is 'from the gods,' also calls it 'an image of life' (*αἰῶνος εἴδωλον*) which survives death—a thing Homer might quite well have said—and he expressly lays down that it 'sleeps when the limbs are active' (*εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων*).[1] It is only in dreams that it shows its true nature during life, and it appears to be quite dissociated from the normal waking consciousness. It is not clear that an Orphic believer would naturally speak of his soul as 'I' before he died. It is rather a supernatural guest whom he entertains. The Orphic doctrine, then, is more important in this connexion for what it suggested to philosophers than for itself.

(4) Another influence, which began to make itself felt at Athens early in the 5th cent. B.C., was that of Ionian science. It must be remembered that Ionia was, comparatively speaking, a country without a past. There was no 'usage of the fathers,' as there was at Athens, to keep up the memory of older beliefs. The traditional doctrine of the soul was obviously unsatisfactory from the scientific point of view. It is true that the Ionians were led by a natural human impulse, which seems to have given rise both to science and to religion, to seek for something 'ageless and deathless' (a Homeric phrase adopted by Anaximander), but they looked for it in the world around them. Their central belief was that all the changing things of this world must be forms of one undying substance, which they called 'god'—a word which they had completely secularized. In its developed form Ionian science held that this primary substance was 'air' (*i.e.* vapour), and the soul was regarded simply as a portion of the boundless air which happened for the time being to be enclosed in a human, animal, or vegetable body. This is not, of course, to be identified with the dream-consciousness like the Orphic soul. Diogenes of Apollonia regarded the 'internal air,' which was 'a small portion of the god,' as the seat of our ordinary consciousness, and Heraclitus (who regarded the soul as fire) insisted specially on its identity with our waking life. On the other hand, it has no permanent reality of its own; it is nothing that can be called 'I' or even 'this.' It is introduced into the body by respiration, and, if it is called immortal, that merely means that it returns at death to the undying air outside us.[1]

(5) Neither the Orphic 'soul' nor the 'soul' of Ionian science was a *self* any more than the Homeric. So far as we can judge, it was Pythagoras who first regarded the soul in this way. If we are right in referring to him the doctrine of reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*) and connecting it with that of reincarnation (*παλιγγενεσία*), it seems to follow that he must have regarded the soul, which is the seat of knowledge, as something with a permanent individuality of its own. If so, however, his followers were not very faithful to their master's teaching. Those of them who emphasized its scientific side soon came to regard the soul as an 'attunement' (*ἁρμονία*) of the elements constituting the body, and of course such a theory is wholly inconsistent with its immortality, or even its individuality. The soul is simply a function of the body. Pythagoreanism, then, only added to the existing confusion of ideas.

In these circumstances, it is easy to see how it was that the Athenians of the Periclean age had no definite views about the soul at all. They continued to perform the customary rites of the mortuary cult, and they continued to use the wholly inconsistent language of Homer. Down to the very end of the century the word *ψυχή* is hardly found in any but its Homeric sense of life as a thing to be lost. Even in the passages where it seems to be used of the seat of feeling—what we call the 'heart'—the feelings attributed to it are always of the inarticulate kind which belong rather to the dream-consciousness than to the waking life. The idea of a real life of the soul after death is quite unknown. The orators sometimes use such phrases as 'if the departed have any consciousness of the things in this world'; but they speak very doubtfully, and it is obvious that they are thinking chiefly of the souls in the grave which were the objects of the mortuary cult. In the funeral orations delivered over those who had fallen in battle it was customary to introduce a 'consolation' for their parents, but it is never suggested to them that the souls of their sons have perhaps departed to a better life. Under the influences which have been described above, the only formula that seemed satisfactory was 'Earth to earth and air to air,' and that this was considered quite orthodox is proved by the fact that it was

[1] **Frag.** 131 (96), quoted by Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.* p. 120 D.

[1] Cf. Theophrastus, *de Sens.* 42 (of Diogenes of Apollonia): *ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ὂν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ.* For Heraclitus sleep was just being cut off from the surrounding fire.

employed in the epitaph on those who fell at Potidæa in 432 B.C. Plato, therefore, is historically justified when he represents the companions of Socrates as startled when they hear that their master believes the individual soul to be immortal. To them the very idea was quite unfamiliar.[1]

6. Socrates and Plato.—In the 4th cent. all this is changed. Isocrates speaks of the soul very much as we do, and it is freely identified with the normal consciousness. It is the seat of knowledge and ignorance, and it is the seat of character. It seems, then, that some one must have set forth a new view of the soul in the latter half of the 5th cent. B.C., and it is hard to think of any one who is likely to have done so except Socrates. Now it is certain from the jests of Aristophanes that Socrates was well known in 423 B.C. as a man who taught strange doctrine about the soul (ψυχή). His disciples are referred to in derision as ψυχαί in the *Clouds*,[2] and he himself is said to practise ψυχαγωγία in the *Birds*.[3] It is improbable that ψυχαγωγεῖ at this date can mean anything else than 'calls spirits' from the other world; and, unless the joke is to be regarded as intolerably frigid, we must suppose that Socrates was commonly known at this date (413 B.C.) to teach the immortality of the soul. Now, in the *Apology*, Plato makes Socrates state twice over[4] with great emphasis that the purpose of his mission was to get men 'to care for their soul' (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς) and to make it as good as they can. It does not seem possible that he could have made Socrates say this unless the fact had been well known, and it is certain that, if Socrates did say this, he was using the word 'soul' (ψυχή) in a sense it had not hitherto borne. We gather that he described it as 'that in us which has knowledge and goodness' or their opposites,[5] and that he insisted that it was our true self and demanded our best care (ἐπιμέλεια), 'not only for the time of this life, but for all time.'[6]

Such, at any rate, is the doctrine which Plato always ascribes to Socrates and which even Xenophon has tried to express in his own way.[7] Plato himself adopted it and gave it a scientific form. For him 'soul' was above all the source of motion (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως). It was the only thing which could move itself and other things without being itself moved by anything else. It was, therefore, 'prior to the body' (πρεσβύτερον τοῦ σώματος), and the efficient cause of everything good and bad. There are, as a matter of fact, bad things as well as good, and therefore there must be more souls than one. It is not easy to distinguish in Plato's dialogues those parts of the doctrine of soul which he inherited from the Pythagoreans and Socrates and those which reveal his own convictions, but the teaching of his immediate successors and the criticisms of Aristotle prove that the point chiefly emphasized by him was that the soul is the only 'self-mover.'

It is specially to be noted that the doctrine of the 'self-mover' does not occur in the *Phædo*, and this seems to indicate that it is Platonic rather than Socratic. On the other hand, Socrates is made to expound it in the *Phædrus*[1] with perfect clearness and precision. That, however, is in a strongly Pythagorizing passage, and it may be that the Pythagoreans had to some extent anticipated Plato's theory. That seems to be suggested by what we know of the doctrines of Alcmæon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, who taught that the soul was immortal because it resembled immortal things, and was always in motion like the heavenly bodies.[2] Plato implies in the *Phædo*[3] that Socrates had been interested in Alcmæon's view that the brain, rather than the heart, was the seat of sensation, so he must certainly have known his theory of the soul. We may infer, however, from the silence of the *Phædo* that this aspect of it did not appeal to him as strongly as it did to Plato. It is important also to notice that in Plato the soul is always distinguished from the 'forms' (εἴδη, ἰδέαι). It is just the existence of souls that makes it possible for the 'forms' to enter into the world of becoming.

If these views are correct, it follows that what is called the soul from the religious and ethical point of view was clearly apprehended for the first time by Socrates, and that it became the central thing in Plato's system. To him the existence of souls was the only possible explanation of the existence of a world. The movements of the heavenly bodies implied that there was a soul of the world, which was an animate creature (ζῷον), and God could be understood only if He were regarded as a soul. The soul of the world, the souls of the heavenly bodies, and the souls of men, animals, and plants were all created by God; but, once created, they would never be destroyed, because that would be inconsistent with the goodness of God, who can only desire that they should become as like Himself as may be. That is, in brief, the doctrine of the soul which we owe to Greece.

7. Aristotle.—It only remains for us to say something of the reaction which followed at first on the proclamation of this doctrine. It begins at once with Aristotle, though, as usual, we can distinguish two conflicting strains in his thought. He is, in the first place, an Ionian, and he therefore rebels against the spiritual interpretation of nature. On the other hand, he had been carried away, in spite of himself, by the teaching of Plato, and the beliefs he really cares about are just those which cannot be reconciled with the rest of his system or expressed in terms of it. He begins with the body, to which the soul is related as form to matter. It is not, however, a mere function of the body, and Aristotle will have nothing to do with the doctrine that it is an 'attunement' (ἁρμονία). On the contrary, the body is the instrument (ὄργανον) of the soul; for matter is only a potency and exists only in so far as it is necessary for the realization of a form. Even so, however, soul is inseparably bound up with body, and can have no life apart from it. So far it is easy to follow, but then we are told, without any real explanation at all, that, while the most developed form of soul is mind (νοῦς), this mind is purely passive. There is another sense of mind in which it is 'separable from matter,' and this alone is 'immortal and everlasting.' The conflicting interpretations of this doctrine given by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and St. Thomas do not concern us here. The fact remains that Aristotle himself gives no intelligible account of the matter, and that he puts us off with a metaphor, as he usually does when he has gone as far as his own system will take him without coming to the beliefs that he really cherished. Even the metaphor is instructive. He tells us that this

[1] For the hesitation of the Attic orators on the subject of the soul see H. Meuss, 'Die Vorstellungen vom Dasein nach dem Tode bei den attischen Rednern' (*Jahrb. für klass. Philologie*, v. [1889] 801 ff.). The usual phrase is 'if in any way the dead should acquire a consciousness of what is now happening' (εἴ τινες τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπῳ τινὶ τοῦ νῦν γιγνομένου πράγματος αἴσθησιν). This explains also the doubtful way in which Plato makes Socrates refer to the subject in the *Apology*. In this, as in other matters, he outwardly respects the conventions of the Athenian law-courts. No inference can be drawn as to his real beliefs about the soul, and in the *Apology* itself these are made sufficiently clear, as we shall see. The absence of all reference to a future life in the consolatory passages of the ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι was pointed out by C. Lehrs (*Populäre Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1856, p. 331). The epitaph on those who fell at Potidæa says simply (*CIA* i. 442) αἰθὴρ μὲν ψυχὰς ὑπεδέξατο, σώματα δὲ χθών, with which we may compare Eur. *Suppl.* 533: πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, | τὸ σῶμα δ' ἐς γῆν. For the surprise with which the companions of Socrates receive the announcement of his doctrine of soul cf. esp. *Rep.* x. 608 D: Οὐκ ἦσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; — Καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι ('staring at me') καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· Μὰ Δί, οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν; It is particularly to be noted that, in the *Phædo* (69 E, 70 A, 80 D), even the Pythagorean associates of Socrates are represented as quite incredulous. That is because they had adopted the view that the soul is the ἁρμονία of the body.

[2] 94.
[3] 1555 ff.
[4] 24 D and 30 A.
[5] Cf. e.g., *Crito*, 47 E.
[6] *Phædo*, 107 C.
[7] *Cyr.* viii. 7, 19 ff.

[1] 245 D ff.
[2] Arist. *de Anima*, 405a 30.
[3] 96 B.

mind comes 'from outside' (θύραθεν), which is a thoroughly Ionian way of speaking and is apparently derived from Anaxagoras. On the other hand, this doctrine lands Aristotle in a dualism which neither Anaxagoras nor Plato would have admitted. It is quite wrong to say, as Rohde does, that it is 'a mythological element derived from Plato's dogmatic system.' Even in his most mythological moods Plato never lost sight of the unity of the individual soul.

This point is frequently obscured by the stress laid on the doctrine of the 'tripartite soul,' which is used for dialectical purposes in the *Republic* and for mythological purposes elsewhere. It is almost certainly Pythagorean, and connected with the doctrine of the ἁρμονία. The three 'parts' of the soul were identified with the three intervals of the scale, the fourth, the fifth, and the octave. Even in the *Republic*, however, we are left in no doubt that the soul is really one. It is only when it is diseased that the three 'parts' seem to be independent of each other.

8. Stoic and Epicurean doctrines.—The Stoic and Epicurean doctrines are still more obviously reversions to the standpoint of early Ionian science, though they too admit inconsistent elements from other sources, such, *e.g.*, as the Stoic belief that individual souls (which were regarded as corporeal) survived till the next world-conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις). That was denied by Panætius, but reasserted by Posidonius, who adopted Platonic views wholesale. He is the source of the popular orthodoxy on the subject, as we find it represented in Cicero. For the Epicureans the atoms which composed the soul were blown away 'like smoke' at death, though Epicurus left careful directions for the observation of his mortuary cult. Such is the strength of inherited tradition.

As a matter of fact this cult was kept up more assiduously than ever, and the number of 'heroes' increased daily. The teaching of the Orphics and others had left its mark, and there were parts of Greece where almost every one seems to have been promoted to heroic honours after death. That, however, need not mean a real belief in the soul's immortality. Nor did the religious revival of the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D. really bring anything new, except the worship of strange gods. The ideas about the soul which these brought with them had long been familiar in Greece. On the other hand, there arose a strong feeling of dissatisfaction with traditional views, which the revival of Pythagorism did little to meet.

9. Neo-Platonism and its influence on Christianity.—It was only when the doctrine of Plato was again preached in its integrity by Plotinus that it once more became possible to hold a coherent doctrine of the soul. Neo-Platonism at its best owed nothing to exotic religions or popular superstition, and there is no reason to believe that Plato would have disavowed his later followers. At the end it was only the Academy among the schools of Greece that retained any vitality, and it was through the Platonists that the true Greek doctrine of the soul was passed on to Christian theology. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Augustine all learned in the school of Plato, and the direct influence of Aristotle was not to be felt for centuries yet. That was not what the Platonists designed. Plotinus ignored Christianity, and most of his followers were bitterly hostile to it. Nevertheless, it was on their teaching that the Catholic doctrine was based, and their teaching goes back, through Plato, to Socrates, Pythagoras, and the Orphics, who represent the genuine Greek doctrine of the soul far more than Homer or the Attic tragedians do. There are two sides of this which are essential to it. In the first place, the soul is immortal, and that is the Italiote contribution to the doctrine. In the second place, this immortal soul is just our ordinary consciousness; it is the seat of knowledge and error, of goodness and badness. That is the Ionian contribution. The two views were fused into one at Athens, the place where western and eastern influences met and reacted on one another, and this must have happened in the 5th cent. B.C.; for it was only then that the necessary conditions for such a fusion existed. The practical inference was that the soul which we know in our everyday waking life requires as much care (ἐπιμέλεια) as any Orphic votary had ever bestowed on the fallen divinity within him. Plato represents this as the burden of the mission of Socrates, and there does not seem to be any good ground for disbelieving him.

LITERATURE.—E. Rohde, *Psyche*[5-6], 2 vols., Tübingen, 1910 (this work supersedes all the earlier literature of the subject; its only defect is that it overlooks the importance of Socrates altogether, with the result that it fails to distinguish the Pythagorean and Socratic element in Plato's writings from his own scientific teaching on the subject); A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893; J. Adam, in *Cambridge University Prælections delivered before the Senate*, Cambridge, 1906, p. 29 ff., *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1908; J. Burnet, *Plato's Phædo*, Oxford, 1911, *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*, London, 1916, reprinted from the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vii. [1915–16] 235 ff. JOHN BURNET.

SOUL (Hindu). — From the very earliest moment at which we can trace the Aryan race which invaded India (perhaps in the second millennium B.C.), and became there the nucleus of the Hindu people, they already distinguished the soul from the body and believed that it survived death. The evidence is their ancestor-worship,[1] in which they laid out food for the souls of their dead ancestors to eat. The character of the food is sufficient proof that, at the time when the rite was formed, they still thought of the soul as being of the same nature as the body.

As in the case of other primitive races, their idea of survival was for long undefined; they had no conviction that the soul lasted for ever. But a change came after the rise of the heavenly gods (*devas*) among them:[2] they began to believe that the souls of their ancestors lived with or near these gods, and that was followed by the idea that some god conferred immortality on them, at least on those who had lived good lives on earth.[3] From that faith there would naturally spring the conviction that the soul was of such a nature as to be fit to live for ever.

At an unknown date, perhaps in the 7th or 8th cent. B.C., the belief in transmigration and *karma* (*qq.v.*) was formed among a small group of thinking men in N. India and gradually spread from them to the whole Hindu people.[4] The central idea of this doctrine is that of moral requital: man's soul lives many lives on earth, and reaps in a later the moral harvest which he has sown in an earlier life. As the happiness and misery of each existence are proof that the soul lived before and did good and evil actions, the theory compels the belief that the process of life and death can have had no beginning; and, as the actions of every life that is lived demand another life for their expiation, there is no escape from the conclusion that the process of repeated birth can have no end. The souls of men are thus eternal, have had no beginning, and can have no end. Each is *an indestructible eternal entity*. This is the first important idea in the Hindu concept of soul.

One element in the theory of requital is that a man who has lived a very good life may be born in his next life as a royal personage, a petty godling, or even one of the greatest gods, while, if he has lived a very evil life, he may be born in the very lowest grade of society, as a devil, an

[1] See art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Indian).
[2] See art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 31.
[3] A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 166
[4] H. Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, Göttingen, 1915, pp. 28, 105.

animal, or even a plant. Clearly this implies that *all souls*, whether now living as gods, devils, men, or plants, *are essentially the same*, the differences between them being only elements of their temporary status, which have come on them as a result of their actions. This is the second characteristic element in the Hindu concept of soul.

The contemporaneous Hindu polytheism is clearly reflected in this notable idea. There can be no doubt that the men who formed the theory of transmigration and *karma* were polytheists. If they had been theists, the concept of the Supreme, high above all men and ordinary gods, would have exercised an influence in several directions. The process of requital would have been conceived as under his control, and the idea of the human spirit would inevitably have been formed in relation to him, while the fact is that, from the beginning, the process of *karma* was regarded as automatic, and there was no thought of a soul of a higher order, all being conceived as on a single plane.

Yet it seems to be true that at the very time when the theory of transmigration and *karma* was formed, or even earlier, another concept, which was destined to produce immeasurable results in India, was gradually taking shape[1] in a small intellectual circle in N. India—the philosophic concept of the *Brahman-Ātman*, the earliest germ of the Vedānta philosophy. At first the idea seems to have been that within, behind, and beyond the whole visible and invisible universe of man's experience and beliefs there is a spiritual existence of the most exalted order, free, intelligent, joyful. It was called the *Brahman*, the *Ātman*, or the *Brahman-Ātman*. It was sometimes said to be the source of all gods and men and the universe; at another time it was identified with the all. One of the commonest statements about it is that it alone exists: 'One there is and there is no second.'

But it was not long before the theory of rebirth and *karma* provoked a reaction.[2] While the idea of just requital was felt to be a great gain, the finer spirits soon began to regard the prospect of an endless series of births and deaths as intolerable. The question was asked, Is there no means whereby one may be released from the necessity of rebirth? In response to this desire of the spirit, a whole series of philosophic theories, each one a theory of release, sprang into being. The earliest and most significant of these theories springs from the belief in the ever free and joyful *Ātman*. Some thinker reached the conviction that his own soul was the *Ātman*—not a product of it, nor a portion of it, but the whole; and he began to teach that he who knows that his own spirit is the *Ātman* is thereby released from all bonds, and therefore from the bondage of rebirth.

This theory of the identity of the divine and the human spirit is the root of the Vedānta philosophy and first finds expression in the early *Upaniṣads*. As the source of the conception lies in the original contrast between man, bound in the toils of rebirth and *karma*, on the one hand, and God, ever free and joyful, on the other, the contrast is very clearly developed in these writings. The idea that the *Ātman* has nothing to do with *karma* and rebirth is especially prominent. Since the *Ātman* is not burdened with *karma*, it must be completely inactive—completely apart from all the temptations and toils of the sense-world. Hence, although no definite system is taught in the *Upaniṣads*, there is a broad and very general tendency to describe the *Ātman* as being not only inactive but also (1) abstract intelligence rather than an intelligent personality, (2) thought rather than will, (3) above the petty distinctions of morality. Therefore, since this was the teaching of the earliest system of release (a system which has had an immeasurable influence in India), and since it taught the identity of man's soul with this abstract impersonal intelligence, the great stream of Hindu thought has always tended to conceive the human spirit as being essentially intelligence, to regard personality, will, and emotion as belonging to the lower reaches of human nature, because they are involved in action, which leads to *karma*, and to think of morality as a set of rules belonging merely to the social life of man and therefore having little or no relation to the nature of the soul.

This tendency has produced momentous results in Indian thought and religion. The almost total neglect of the will and the extreme weakness of ethics in Hindu philosophy, and the great emphasis laid on ritualism, or on knowledge, rather than on ethical change as the way of salvation in Hinduism, are all attributable to this cause.

In spite of this broad general tendency, the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* is by no means uniform. Lines of thought running in many directions may be found, from which divergent systems sprang at later dates. One of these is the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*) philosophy, which is a realistic dualism. There are two eternal existences, original nature (*prakṛti*) and an infinite number of individual spirits (*puruṣa*); there is no God. Each spirit is intelligence, but no more, merely a solitary, passive spectator of the operations of nature. This concept has clearly been formed from the common idea of the human soul already spoken of. But for our purpose the most interesting point is this—that in this philosophy there took shape a psychological theory which, with modifications, has been held in all forms of Indian religion. From *prakṛti*, besides the visible things of the world, there issues a series of subtle substances—*buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas*, 'intellect,' 'egoism,' 'mind,'—and also the senses, by means of which the functions of perception, generalization, and decision are carried out. In this physical series we have the fact made plain that, according to the Hindu idea, the human spirit is not an active power which thinks and feels and wills, but is the pure light of consciousness.

At a later date another philosophy was formed known as the Vaiśeṣika (*q.v.*), which recognizes the existence of many souls and the reality of the world. In this philosophy the concept of the soul is richer and fuller than in any earlier system. Feeling and will as well as thought are recognized as its functions.[1]

The central school of the Vedānta, with which the great name of Śaṅkarāchārya (*q.v.*) is linked, is monistic, *advaita*. It interprets with strictness both the leading declarations of the *Upaniṣads*, viz. that the *Ātman* alone exists, and that the human spirit is the *Ātman*. Consequently, its doctrine of the human soul is in accordance with these standards. In Deussen's words:

'To it are applicable all those negative characteristics whose purpose is to secure the conception of Brahman from all ideas by which His Being might seem to be limited. Therefore the soul is, like Brahman, (1) omnipresent, or, as we should say, spaceless, (2) omniscient and omnipotent, (3) neither agent nor enjoyer (or sufferer, as the case may be).'[2]

In the theistic sects, which were formed in the early Christian centuries, the central ideas of the Vedānta philosophy—that the *Ātman* alone exists, and that the human spirit *is* the *Ātman*—are held, but they are not interpreted so strictly as in the monistic Vedānta. These systems vary amongst

[1] Oldenberg, pp. 36–104; P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894, I. i. 159 ff.
[2] Oldenberg, pp. 124–147.

[1] J. C. Chatterji, *The Hindu Realism*, Allahabad, 1912, p. 102.
[2] *The System of the Vedānta*, Eng. tr., Chicago, 1912, p. 468.

themselves in some degree in their statement of the relation of the soul to God, four forms of theory being held, as follows: (1) *śuddhādvaita*: pure monism; this, though called pure monism, is not so strictly monistic as the *advaita*; (2) *viśiṣṭādvaita*: modified monism, identity with a difference; this is the commonest point of view; (3) *bhedābheda* or *dvaitādvaita*: the relation is both monistic and dualistic; (4) *bheda*, or *dvaita*: dualism.

Yet these differences are not of much practical import, except in so far as they modify the conception of the state of the soul after release. In the monistic Vedānta, the identity of the soul with God being held in the strictest possible way, the seeming individuality of the soul in life is interpreted as an illusion, and release means the disappearance of the illusion, the complete absorption of the man in God.[1] Of the theistic sects, on the other hand, while a few teach absorption, the mass believe in the actual reality of the soul, and teach that in release the soul either enters into a mystical union with God in which individuality is not lost or spends eternity in a fellowship with God which does not in the slightest impair personality. In their account of the nature of the soul they vary between the Sāṅkhya conviction that it is a spectator, but in no sense an agent or an enjoyer, and the Vaiśeṣika theory that it wills and feels as well as acts. Yet, even if they declare the soul an agent, all the active psychological functions are still ascribed to *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, and *manas*—the triple physical concomitant of the soul in Hinduism. Most of them teach that after release the soul is omnipresent and omniscient, but they differ in their account of its size, some declaring that it is atomic, others that it is infinite. The Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas, *e.g.*, the sect of Rāmānuja, teach that the soul is consciousness, but is also an agent, that it is atomic in size, and that in release it is omniscient, unrestricted in movement, and able to realize all its wishes.[2]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

SOUL (Iranian).—Little need be added under this heading to what has been said in the art. PHILOSOPHY (Iranian), especially under § 1 (*d*) and (*e*), and the latter part of § 2, concerning the psychological analysis of the human compound—so favourite a topic in both Avestan and later literature. Of the terms *urvan*, *ahū*, *baodah*, *daēna*, *fravaši*, and in later times *khrat*, *vīr*, *hōš*, which express various spiritual faculties or constituents of man's non-material nature, the first named, *urvan* (gen. *urunō*), is generally taken as expressing most closely what we mean by our word 'soul' in the widest sense. Its form and meaning seem to have come down practically unaltered from the *Gāthās* to the Pahlavi *rūbāno* and modern Persian *ravān*. It is generally admitted that it is that element of man which remains immortal after death and bears the responsibility of reward or punishment for his actions in this life. Hence it is commonly employed in contrast to *tanū*, the body. And in a broader sense the two opposed terms are used, at least in the later literature, to indicate the spiritual and the material worlds respectively. Thus in the curious diagram of the *Dīnkarṭ* reproduced in art. DUALISM (Iranian) the whole of being (*yehevūn*) is carefully divided into two opposed parts, *rūbāno* and *tanū*. It is not only of men that *urvan* is predicated, but also, though rarely, in both Gāthic and later Avesta, of animals.[3] The soul of the primeval ox (*gēuš urvan*) was taken up into heaven after its slaughter and became the well-known tutelary genius of cattle.

After a man's death, according to the famous description of *Vendīdād*, xix., and the *Hadokht-Nask*, the soul hovers above his head for three days, but on the fourth morning sets out on its journey towards the Chinvat Bridge, which leads to the next world, and on its way meets the strange female figure, the creation and personification of the man's deeds, words, and thoughts in this life—an exquisitely beautiful damsel in the case of the virtuous soul, a horrible hag in that of the sinful soul—who ushers it either to eternal happiness or to misery and punishment.

The relationship of the *urvan* to the *fravaši* (*q.v.*), in spite of all that has been written on the subject, still remains very obscure, and probably was never very clearly defined. The etymology of *urvan* is also uncertain. It is almost certainly from √*var*, 'to choose,' indicating the faculty of free will.

LITERATURE.—The art. 'Urvan' in C. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1904 (concise and full of useful information); all the ordinary translators and commentators, C. de Harlez, J. Darmesteter, etc.

L. C. CASARTELLI.

SOUL (Muslim).[1]—**1. In the Qur'ān and in popular belief.**—According to the Qur'ān,[2] Allāh, when He created the first man, breathed into him the soul (*nafs*) or the spirit of life (*rūḥ*). In Adam's soul were created the souls of all his descendants, and the act of endowing with life the embryo in the womb is thus a second creation.[3] The soul has its seat in the heart, and is accordingly often described in the Qur'ān by the phrase 'heart, hearing, and sight,' or 'hearing, sight, and heart.'[4] In particular, the heart is the abode of religious knowledge and of faith or unbelief. Should Allāh see good to leave a man in unbelief, He seals up or narrows his heart, closes his ears, and puts a veil upon his eyes;[5] on the other hand, He enlarges the heart of believers, and opens their ears to the divine revelation. As is usually the case in religious psychology, hearing is of more importance than sight, and as a rule precedes it in any mention of the two. Thus Allāh Himself hears and sees;[6] He is the hearer, the knower.[7] He expresses Himself by the eternal Word. By unanimous Muslim tradition, Muhammad received his revelation by the ear. It is by means of hearing that faith is imparted to the heart.

Besides heart, hearing, and sight, however, Allāh at the creation endowed the soul with two fundamental propensities, viz. wickedness and piety[8]—an impulse towards evil and an impulse towards good. Originally this may have implied simply that every soul has these two impulses, and that it was Muhammad's part to address his admonitions to the good impulse, the good side of the will. Gradually, however, the preaching of the Prophet comes to ignore the human will. Allāh alone has a will in the proper sense; man is a being who knows and acts, but has no volition of his own, and his whole duty is to be prudent, to give heed to God's word, and to obey it.

Moreover, as Allāh breathes the soul into the body from without, He can also separate the two, as in sleeping and dreaming or at death.[9] Of the soul's continued existence after death the Qur'ān says little to which we can attach a definite

[1] Deussen, *System of the Vedānta*, p. 478.
[2] A. V. Sukhtankar, *Teachings of Vedanta according to Ramanuja*, Vienna, 1908, p. 78 f.
[3] E.g., *Yasna* xxxix. 2 (of cattle) and 4 (of wild animals); *Vendīdād*, xiii. 15 (of the otter), and *Yašt* xiii. 74 (of all quadrupeds, aquatic and winged animals, etc. [though here the *urunō* seem identified with the *fravašis*]).

[1] For views of the soul among the Arabs of pre-Muhammadan times cf. art. ARABS (Ancient), vol. i. p. 659 ff., esp. 671 ff.
[2] xv. 29. [3] xxxix. 8.
[4] ii. 6, and *passim*, xvi. 80, etc., esp. xxxii. 8.
[5] ii. 6, xvi. 110. [6] iv. 61.
[7] ii. 121. [8] xci. 7f.
[9] vi. 60, xxxix. 43.

meaning. When the pious die, Allāh brings their souls near Himself, and keeps them there until He unites them again with their risen bodies at the day of judgment.[1]

These notices have been considerably amplified by the Tradition, and many elements have been added also by popular belief in the various Muslim lands. As it is impossible here to enter fully into details, we restrict ourselves to a few of the main features reflected in the popular theology.

As regards the pre-existence of souls, the Tradition supplies the following particulars. Between the first creation of souls in the soul of Adam and the second in the mother's womb they are kept by Allāh in His treasure-house or in a shrine attached to His throne. When their time has come, He transmits them from His heavenly realm into the human embryos. It is true that God creates a far larger number of non-human souls or spirits—those of animals, demons, angels, and devils—but it is naturally the human soul and its destiny that engage the supreme interest of man. Nor is the soul's pre-existence a subject of anything like so much concern as its future, its life after death. Here the dreams of eschatological fantasy are lavishly drawn upon. Just as here and now man is surrounded and attended by angels and spirits, so the souls of the dying are taken in charge by the angel of death, who conveys those of believers to blessedness and those of unbelievers to perdition. The soul departs from the body (on the most widely current view) by way of the mouth, while some hold that it leaves by the back of the head. Another very common belief is that the soul which at death has been carried to heaven is sent back again by God, and that it sojourns for a longer or shorter period beside the body in the grave. It is there subjected to an examination by the angels Munkir and Nakīr. If it asserts its belief in Islām—the great test is the creed, good works being of minor importance—the angels carry it aloft to heaven and set it upon a candlestick by the throne of God. The evil soul, the soul that does not know its Lord, is, on the other hand, tormented there and then, and also afterwards in hell. The souls of believers who have done evil pass into purgatory. A fairly prevalent idea is that the departed soul survives till the day of judgment in the form of a bird—the soul of the believer living in a green bird, that of the unbeliever in a black one. The souls of those who have been murdered sit beside their graves in the form of owls and cry for vengeance.

It is popularly believed that the departed soul has severed itself from the body greatly against its will; and it accordingly remains near the corpse as long as the latter is not wholly decomposed. This again affords grounds for the belief that intercourse may continue for a time between the dead and their surviving relatives. The prayers, alms, and good works of the living benefit the souls of the dead.

The synthesis of body and soul during man's earthly life is regarded as relatively loose. There is a great variety of belief as to the seat of the soul. There is no doubt, however, that the soul can leave the body during sleep. In its real nature it is known to God alone, and, as the Qur'ān says,[2] man knows but little about it. Nevertheless popular thought usually conceives of the soul as a material entity, and with this idea it conjoins speculations regarding the various classes of spirits—spirits or souls of the prophets, the angels, the *jinn*, the devils, human beings, and animals, and these in all their species and varieties. On the day of resurrection the souls of men, as belonging to their bodies, return, and enter into their renovated material frame, and thereupon Allāh assigns them for all eternity to paradise or hell, the joys or pains of which are represented, alike in the Qur'ān and in popular belief, as being of a physical rather than a spiritual character. The wicked are to burn for ever in hell without being consumed, while the good are to eat and drink for ever in paradise, and live there with beautiful youths and maidens, without weariness or satiety. The delights of paradise are accordingly those of men. As regards the blessedness that women are to expect in the beyond, the Tradition is altogether silent.

[1] lxxxi. 7. [2] xvii. 87.

2. In the theologians and the mystics.—The rudimentary notions of the Qur'ān and popular thought regarding the soul are found again in the conceptions of the theologians and mystics, there assuming, however, a number of forms varying from the grossest materialism of the masses to the extreme spiritualism of allegorical interpretation, and in part modified by the influence of Christian theology and philosophical speculation. In the theological systems too, as in ordinary thinking, the doctrine of the soul is concerned mainly with subjects like the hereafter, resurrection, hell, purgatory, and paradise. The theologians, however, are more interested than either the Qur'ān or the Tradition in the soul as a fact of experience, though they do not deal with it empirically. Their speculations regarding the nature of the soul, its properties and capacities, and its connexion with the material body are coloured throughout by views already current.

The earliest groups of Muslim theologians (*Mutakallimūn*)[1]—those of all schools, orthodox or heterodox—take a more or less material view of the soul. All that exists, from the divine spirit to the animal soul, is body or of bodily nature. With many of them this is simply the popular view, but in some thinkers—*e.g.*, Hishām—we probably must trace it to Stoic influence. Those who do not actually regard the soul as matter define it as an accident of material substance. We find this conception in the Muslim atomists,[2] according to whom the whole world consists of atoms and their accidents, and among these accidents they place souls, or the manifestations and activities of souls. Like the atoms, souls come into being and pass away again every instant. This denial of the independence and continuity of their essential nature does not impugn their immortality, but merely does away with the nexus of natural causality. It thus presents no analogy to the modern theory of actuality (Wundt, etc.). It might be more aptly compared with the Buddhistic conception, though the element of causality, which is the essential characteristic of the latter, is not recognized by the Muslim atomists. According to these thinkers, Allāh creates anew every moment the soul, or its phenomena and activities, as accidents of bodily substances (*i.e.* atoms), whether of the body as a whole, or of a number of atoms, or even of a single atom in the heart. Among those who stood apart from popular beliefs, among free-thinkers, and especially among physicians, the accidentalistic theory assumes a form in which the soul is regarded as a combination or a combining ratio of the bodily elements. On the other hand, the conception of the soul as a substance was very frequently conjoined with the doctrine of metempsychosis.

The doctrine of the soul as a purely spiritual substance constituting the essential nature of man was held by only a few of the earlier theologians—

[1] From about the 12th cent. most theologians adhere either to a mystical dualism or spiritualism, on the one hand, or, on the other, to a psychology that had developed under the influence of Aristotle.

[2] Cf. art. ATOMIC THEORY (Muhammadan), vol. ii. p. 202 f.

e.g., by Naẓẓām and his school. These regarded the connexion between soul and body as being effected by the spirit of life (*rūḥ*, *πνεῦμα*): it was only by the mediation of that spirit that the soul could operate upon the body. The body is a product of the soul, or is at all events dependent upon it. The soul, in its essential nature, is simply pure knowledge and pure volition. Naẓẓām and his school usually define the soul as inward volitional action—a view which must not be identified with voluntarism in the modern sense. What they mean is, on the one hand, that the external actions of human beings are all in the stream of natural causality, and, on the other, that the soul manifests its freedom in its inner volition, and is therefore not determined directly (as most theologians held) by the supreme will of God.

The spiritualistic tendencies of the view that the soul is a substance distinct from the body are found in many of the mystics, and, somewhat tempered in form, among the theologians who were influenced by mysticism. Al-Ghazālī[1] and al-'Arabī[2] may be mentioned as two of the most prominent representatives of this view. The mystics, in the first place, have a peculiar terminology, which, while showing affinity to the usage of the Qur'ān, has been coloured even more decidedly by Hellenistic *γνῶσις* and Christian theology. Thus *nafs*, the ordinary Arabic equivalent of *ψυχή*, they bring down to the sphere of physical life, giving it the sense of 'sensuous desire' (*ἐπιθυμία*, *ὄρεξις*). Conversely, they exalt the *rūḥ* (*πνεῦμα*, *spiritus*) by making it the immaterial psychic principle. They give a meaning identical with that of *rūḥ* to the term *qalb*, 'heart.' But, when they use *rūḥ* in the sense given to it in the philosophical and medical tradition,[3] they attach an adjective — e.g., *rūḥ ḥaywānī*, 'spiritus animalis.' As regards the actual facts of the mystical psychology, again, the more salient features may be summarized as follows. The soul (*rūḥ* or *qalb*) is an immaterial substance of divine or god-like nature; it is God's image in man, light of His light. The body is a thing of inferior worth—a view found in many varieties of form. It is the soul, however, that constitutes the essential nature of man, his distinctive character. Having been created by God, through the agency either of angels or of the world-soul, it seeks the way back to God with ardent yearning. The stages of this return, leading at last to ecstasy or the *unio mystica*, are very variously enumerated.[4] The individual soul can prepare itself for union with the Supreme Essence by pious exercises, meditation, absorption in the inner life—asceticism and good works are of secondary importance, or belong to one of the lower stages. The real union, however, the ecstatic state, the illumination, the revelation of divine mysteries—all this comes in a moment, not as the reward of human merit, but as Allāh's beatific gift of grace to the soul. While the psychology of the mystics assigns a large place to the emotional factor in religion—the affective states of the soul—yet the supreme end of man's life is always represented as a form of knowledge (*γνῶσις*) won by immediate experience of the divine. This crowning intuition is reached by way of self-knowledge, for 'he who knows himself knows also his Lord.'[5]

3. In the philosophers and the physicians.—The spiritual or mystical psychology described above is found also in many Muslim philosophers, though in a different context of thought and with some difference in expression. In point of fact, mysticism had felt the influence of philosophy, while, again, both philosopher and mystic were indebted to the same sources. The philosophers most closely related to the mystics are the so-called philosophers of illumination or revelation, who derive their doctrine from Hermes, etc. In their numerous devotional or hortatory works they inculcate the soul's withdrawal from the material world and its return to God. Even the more typical Peripatetics of Islām, however, import mystical elements into their doctrine of the soul, or crown the Aristotelian psychology with mysticism. In so doing, nevertheless, they differ in two respects from the theologians and the pure mystics: they speak more of the powers or faculties of the human soul than of creation, God's grace, or resurrection, and they allow greater scope to the empirical investigation of the soul. The latter is especially true of the medical savants. Taken as a whole, the philosophico-medical psychology is a syncretism of Platonic and Aristotelian views, and here a factor of the utmost importance was the influence of Galen. The earliest document typical of this school is a little work by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, a Syrian Christian (*c.* A.D. 835), dealing with the difference between spirit (*rūḥ*, *πνεῦμα*, *spiritus*) and soul. We are here told that the spirit spreads outwards from the heart as a subtle body and controls the functions of the organic frame. It is the breath, the spirit of life, animating the whole body, and ceasing to be when the body dies. It is likewise this spirit of life which, in a more refined form, effects the conservation, combination, and recollection of sense-perceptions in the ventricles of the brain. Thus the gathering together of sense-impressions (general sensation) and the process of representation or conception (*φαντασία*) are localized in the fore-brain; the appraisement of what is represented—reflexion and association—in the mid-brain; the faculties of memory (including recollection) and movement in the hind-brain. This spirit is quite distinct from the soul, the difference being one not of degree, but rather like that between matter and form. The soul is an incorporeal substance—the entelechy of the body conjoined with it; and, as simple substance, it is immortal. The *πνεῦμα* is its instrument, by means of which it animates the body and renders it capable of motion and perception.

These views were adopted, and even elaborated, by the Muslim philosophers of the 11th or 12th and later centuries, as well as by many theologians. Here we find in particular two characteristic developments, viz. the doctrine of the inner senses, and the doctrine of the *νοῦς* (*'aql*). As regards the former, while Galen had distinguished three inner powers of the soul as localized in the three cerebral chambers, Muslim philosophers enumerate these powers as three, four, or even five, and in the last case they find five inner senses corresponding to our five external senses. According to the dualism of the mystics and the philosophers of revelation,[1] the inner senses are to be regarded as higher spiritual faculties of the immaterial soul, while, according to the so-called Aristotelians of Islām (al-Fārābi [*q.v.*], Avicenna [*q.v.*], etc.), they stand midway between the external senses and the purely spiritual intellect (*νοῦς*, *'aql*). Schematically, the doctrine might be set forth as follows. The fore-brain is the seat of (1) general perception (*κοινὴ αἴσθησις*) and (2) the faculty of sense-presentation (Aristotle's *φαντασία*); the mid-brain that of (3) reflexion, which is not only reproductive, but capable of moulding the elements of perception and presentation into new forms by discrimination and combination (and therefore corresponding

[1] Cf. art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Muslim), vol. v. p. 508 f.
[2] Cf. art. MUḤYĪ AL-DĪN IBN AL-'ARABĪ, vol. viii. p. 907 ff.
[3] Cf. § 3. [4] Cf. art. ṢŪFIS.
[5] This saying is the inversion of an idea found in pseudo-Plato, *Alcibiades*, 129 ff.; it reached the Arabs through the medium of Neo-Platonism, and so passed into the general tradition.

[1] Cf. § 2.

partly to Aristotle's *φανταsια* and partly to Galen's *διανοητικόν*); in the hind-brain are localized (4) the faculty of sensuous judgment (*δόξα*), which deals with the particulars of perception and conception; and (5) memory, together with the faculty of recollection (*i.e.* Galen's *μνημονευτικόν*). Some philosophers regard (2) as recollection of the sensuous forms, and (5) as recollection of the meanings associated with these forms.

The intelligence or rational soul (*νοῦs*) is an immaterial principle, towering above the vegetative and animal soul, as above external and internal sense. The speculations of Muslim philosophers regarding it are almost entirely metaphysical or epistemological, and provide no fresh material for psychology. In the hands of Muslim thinkers the Peripatetic system becomes purely intellectualistic, and their doctrine of the soul virtually ignores the emotional and volitional aspects of human life. Their psychology as a whole shows little originality. Certain fresh developments, however, are found in the works of al-Haitham († 1038), who had an inkling of certain important results of modern experimental psychology (*e.g.*, laws of colour-mixture, Weber's law), and also knew something of the duration of perception and mental assimilation. His principal work deals with optics, and contains scattered observations on psychological points. He had unfortunately no successor in Muslim thought.

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T. J. DE BOER.

SOUL (Roman).—It is difficult to form any definite or consistent idea of the way in which the early Romans thought of the soul of man either during life or after it; this is owing to the want of an early Roman literature and to the uncertainty of archæological evidence up to the present time. There are, however, certain ascertained facts of the later period of kingly government (which is also the period of the earliest religious calendar) which help us in determining the Roman idea of the condition of the soul after death, and these may possibly be taken as some evidence for the idea of the soul in the living man. The words which in the literary or Græco-Roman age were used for the soul, such as *anima*, 'breath,' cannot with certainty be considered primitive. It is quite probable that, being under the influence of an organizing priesthood and ceremonial religion, the early Romans did not trouble themselves much about their own souls or realize as vividly as many peoples have done that they possessed such a thing; the soul was of slight importance during life. There is no trace of any speculation about the soul of the living man until we come to the last century of the Republic and the introduction of Greek philosophy.

The oldest evidence for the souls of the dead is a so-called *lex regia* attributed to Servius Tullius,[1] which enacts that the son who strikes his parent must be made *sacer* to the *di parentum*, where the word *di*, as in other similar expressions, evidently means spirits, while the word *parentum* is explained in another passage of Festus[2] as meaning, according to the lawyers, three generations of ancestors, beyond which apparently the memory was not expected to go.[3] The fact that the son who strikes a parent is made over as an offering to the spirits of his immediate ancestors shows that these are conceived as (1) active, (2) conscious of morality, (3) in some degree capable of receiving sacrifice, like fully developed *dei*. But how far they reflected the nature of the soul in the living man is by no means clear. We only know that these *di parentes* were the subject of an organized festival in the month of February, which has been described in the art. ROMAN RELIGION.[4] This worship, if we may call it so, of the dead (whether burnt or buried, for both practices undoubtedly existed)[5] outside the walls in the resting-place of the family suggests a pleasant idea of the survival of the soul, which, if properly cared for, could no longer take human shape or return to trouble its human relatives. As in the case of *dei* reclaimed from wild life by settlement in farm or city, the spirits of the departed might be effectually 'laid' by yearly renewed ceremonies, and need do no harm to the survivors; and, so far as we can discover, this belief remained unaltered throughout the republican period.

But in the oldest calendar[6] we find a festival of three days (May 9, 11, 13) called *Lemuria*, of which the object seems to have been to get rid of ghosts from the house; the only information which we have about it includes no public ceremony outside the private dwelling of a family.[7] How we are to interpret this festival of the dead, or even the word *Lemur* which gave it its name, is extremely doubtful. It is safer not to attribute it to a pre-Roman race. The present writer has always inclined to the belief that, if we consider the kind of life led by the various tribes of early Italy, in which death on the battle-field or far from home must have been at least as common as death in the peace of family life, the most likely interpretation is that by *Lemures* is meant the host of the *unburied* dead whose souls were always liable to endeavour to return to the house familiar to them.[8] It was not impossible to forget and ignore entirely relatives lost in this way, who had never been subjected to the processes which ensured their peace and goodwill towards the living; and those three days gave the survivors an opportunity of getting rid of them and forgetting them for the rest of the year. Thus they were thought of as hostile. True, Ovid, in the passage where he describes the father of the family expelling them from the house,[9] calls them *manes paterni*, and *manes* no doubt meant euphemistically 'the good

[1] Festus, ed. W. M. Lindsay, Leipzig, 1913, p. 260.
[2] *Ib.* p. 247.
[3] This probably reflects the practice of three generations living together in one house; and we may remember that this is a well-known feature of social life among certain peoples (see art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 23[b]).
[4] Vol. x. p. 826[b].
[5] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Roman).
[6] See art. ROMAN RELIGION, vol. x. p. 822[a].
[7] *Ib.* p. 826[b].
[8] Cf. *Æneid*, ix. 214,
'Sit, qui me raptum pugna pretiove redemptum
Mandet humo, solita aut si qua id Fortuna vetabit,
Absenti ferat inferias, decoretque sepulcro,'
where the word *solita* shows how common was the fate of the unburied even in Virgil's time.
[9] *Fasti*, v. 429 ff.

ones'; but the house-father may be supposed to be anxious not to irritate them. Here we may note a belief that the great host of souls (*manes*) dwelt in some doubtful sense within the earth, under the guardianship of a deity Orcus,[1] and were permitted to return to the upper world only on three days in the year, August 24, October 5, November 8. But it may be doubted whether this is really a primitive Roman belief;[2] and in any case it seems hardly possible to co-ordinate it in this form with the other beliefs which we have been considering.

From what has been said it will have been noticed that the Roman always spoke of his dead in the plural; and this is significant as showing how hard it was for him to think of the concept soul otherwise than collectively or to realize a soul in himself as an individual entity. There was, however, one exception to this, in the *genius* of the *paterfamilias*, which must be as old as the family itself. That the *genius* was in some sort a soul is not to be doubted;[3] and its peculiarity among the Latins is that it represents the mysterious power of the *paterfamilias* to continue the life of the family.

'The soul of a man is often conceived as the cause of life, but not often as the procreative power itself; and that this latter was the Latin idea is certain, both from the etymology of the word and from the fact that the marriage-bed was called *lectus genialis*.'[4]

This singularity is probably to be explained by the very early development of the idea of fatherhood, both physical and social, in close connexion with that of the continuity which the father alone could contribute to the family. Creative power was the function of the soul of the living man, if he were the head of the household; and it is possible that his wife too had a soul of the same kind, if her *Juno* is a primitive idea.[5] The connexion of snakes, both in the house and in the tomb, with the idea of *genius* need not be explained here.[6]

In what little survives of the earliest Roman literature we find no trace of thought about the soul till we come to Ennius († 169 B.C.). Ennius was a Greek of Calabria and well acquainted with Greek literature in general and with Pythagoreanism in particular; and, as in literature, so in thought, he revolutionized Rome, suggesting subjects of inquiry about which the Romans had never yet troubled themselves. One of these subjects was the nature of the soul, as Lucretius tells us:

'Ignoratur enim quae sit natura Animai;
Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur;
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta
An tenebras Orci visat, vastasque lacunas
An pecudes alias divinitus insinuet se,
Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno
Detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,
Per gentes Italas hominum quae clara clueret;
Etsi praeterea tamen esse Acherusia templa
Ennius aeternis exponit versibus edens,
Quo neque permanent animae, neque corpora nostra,
Sed quaedam simulacra modis pallentia miris.'[7]

Here the first reference to Ennius seems to allude to his Pythagorean idea of re-incarnation, the second to some exposition of the Homeric idea of the shades in the nether world, which are neither souls nor bodies, but are best described in the memorable words[8] which Lucretius took from Ennius and passed on to Virgil. The inference perhaps is that Ennius had no very definite belief himself, and infected the so far unthinking Roman mind with his own agnosticism. What did he mean when he wrote the famous couplet:

'Nemo me lacrumis decoret, nec Funera fletu
Faxit. Cur? volito vivu' per ora virum.'[1]

Does he mean simply that his literary reputation will survive in the mouths of men who will repeat his verses, or, as James Henry insists,[2] that he will actually flit before men's faces like one of the Homeric shades? Without a better knowledge of Ennius than we possess, it is impossible to say. However this may be, it is certain that from this time onwards the educated class at Rome, if they troubled themselves at all on the subject, held Greek ideas of the soul, the masses retaining the primitive notions as explained above. During a century and a half of war and money-getting the Roman educated man lapsed into a condition of mind mainly indifferent but partly sceptical about the soul, as also about the gods. If he took an interest at all in such questions, it was in the Stoic idea of the soul as a part of the universal Reason, which appealed to his legal and practical instincts[3] and did not trouble him with speculations about his soul and its fortunes after death.

From this indifferentism and scepticism there came a reaction in the age of Cicero, which took the form of a revival of Pythagoreanism, *i.e.* a fresh interest in the soul and its fate. This is first seen in the *Somnium Scipionis* of Cicero, in which we find the beginning of the belief that the good and great man's soul flies upwards at death —a belief afterwards more fully expounded in the *Tusculan Disputations*, bk. i. So far there had been no sign of a view of the soul as individual: the tombs of the Scipios are monumental only, preserving the memory of the man and his deeds. But just at this time we have the first occurrence of a sepulchral inscription 'Dis Manibus'—still in the plural, but commemorating an individual person; and Cicero's apotheosis (so it must be called) of his daughter Tullia points plainly in the same direction.[4]

Yet, in spite of this reaction, the spirit of agnosticism continued, and is a marked feature of the next two or three centuries. Cicero himself was normally a doubter;[5] Cæsar was believed to be so, though he was *pontifex maximus*;[6] Catullus wrote of death as 'nox . . . perpetua . . . dormienda';[7] Lucretius in his third book glories in the Epicurean doctrine that the soul is a material thing which is put an end to at death. So too under the Empire Tacitus expresses the general feeling in *Agricola*, 46:

'Si quis piorum manibus locus: si, ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore exstinguuntur magnae animae, placide quiescas.'

If we read through the chapter, it becomes fairly clear that what Tacitus really cared for was an immortality of good or great deeds. And a little earlier the elder Pliny had written of death[8] as the relapsing into the same nothingness in which we were before birth. In the sepulchral inscriptions of the Empire the note of doubt and melancholy is sounded again and again.[9]

'The funerary inscriptions leave the impression that, down to the final triumph of the Church, the feeling of the Romans about death was still in the main the feeling of their remote ancestors of the Samnite and Punic wars. It was a social feeling, in the prospect of a dim life dependent on the memory

[1] Cf. *Orci thesaurus* in the epitaph of Nævius (E. Baehrens, *Fragmenta Poetarum Romanorum*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 296).
[2] See *JRS* ii. [1912] 25 f.
[3] In art. Roman Religion, vol. x. p. 845[b], it is called the *numen* in the man rather than his soul; but this is simply because the Romans had no word of their own for soul in primitive times, so far as we can discover.
[4] Fowler, *Religious Experience*, p. 74; some parallel conceptions may be found in art. Aryan Religion, vol. ii. p. 24; A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 306; L. Lévy-Brühl, *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris, 1910, p. 90.
[5] See art. Roman Religion, vol. x. p. 825.
[6] Cf. art. Serpent-worship (Introductory and Primitive).
[7] i. 114 ff. [8] Line 123.

[1] Quoted by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. xv. 34.
[2] Commenting on *Æn.* xii. 234 f., in *Æneidea*, 5 vols., London, 1873–92.
[3] See Fowler, *Religious Experience*, ch. xvi.
[4] *Ib.* p. 335 ff. [5] *Ad Att.* xii. 18.
[6] Sall. *Cat.* 51. [7] v. 6.
[8] *HN* vii. 188.
[9] See Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, p. 26, note 2.

of the living, a horror of loneliness and desertion, the longing for a passing prayer even from a stranger.'[1]

This horror of being forgotten by the living, though it does not give us any direct evidence of what was popularly thought about the soul, is worth consideration here, and may be illustrated in two ways. (1) It appears in the Augustan literature and especially in Horace—*e.g.*, in the last ode of bk. iii., where in 'Non omnis moriar, multaque pars mei vitabit Libitinam,' etc., he is plainly thinking of a literary immortality;[2] (2) the primary object of a multitude of *collegia* in the first three centuries of the Empire was undoubtedly to preserve the memory of their members after death.

'It is pathetic to see how universal is the craving to be remembered felt even by slaves, by men plying the most despised or unsavoury crafts.'[3]

Here the one thing we should like to know constantly eludes us—whether the soul was thought of as in any real sense surviving, whether the survivors could hope to meet their loved ones after death. The truth is that the inscriptions betray a great variety of ideas, and most of these are dim and vague, or conventionally expressed. It remained for Christianity to shape these ideas into a definite belief.

The deification of the soul of an emperor after death implies a belief in the survival of the souls of great men; but this, though we meet with it here and there in the poets, especially in Virgil, is not rooted in Roman ideas.[4] What an emperor could himself think about his soul one may see in Hadrian's well-known lines, 'Animula vagula blandula,' etc., which express rather 'regret for the sunlight left behind than any hope in entering on a dim journey into the unknown.'[5]

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W. WARDE FOWLER.

SOUL (Semitic and Egyptian).—The ancient Semites recognized that man consists of two parts, an outer frame of flesh and bones and an inner impalpable part. This inner part they connected with the breath. Only gradually did they come to think of it as an entity that could exist apart from the body. In all the Semitic dialects the soul was designated by a noun derived from a root meaning 'breathe.'

Thus, in Akkadian-Assyrian, *napašu* = 'be wide,' 'breathe'; *napištu* = 'breath,' 'life,' 'soul.' In Hebrew *naphash* = 'take breath,' 'refresh oneself'; *nephesh* = 'breath,' 'soul,' 'life,' 'person.' In Arabic *nafas* = 'to injure by breathing upon'; *tanaffus* = 'to fetch a deep breath'; *nafs* = 'breath of life,' 'soul,' 'self.' In Aramaic *naphshā* = 'soul'; *ettapash* = 'breathe.' In Ethiopic *nephsa* = 'breathe'; *nephes* = 'soul.'

To what extent the soul was, in course of time, differentiated from the breath may be discerned by reviewing the conceptions entertained by the different Semitic peoples concerning the soul and its survival after death.

1. Babylonian and Assyrian.—In ancient Babylonia Semitic conceptions are inextricably interwoven with Sumerian. While it is probable that the Semites were first in the Tigris-Euphrates valley, the earliest literature is in Sumerian.

[1] Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 498; the whole of the chapter (bk. iv. ch. ii.) will be found instructive.
[2] Cf. IV. ix. 26 ff.: 'omnes illacrimabiles urgentur, ignotique longa nocte, *carent quia vate sacro*'; cf. Virg. *Æn.* ix. 446 ff., *Georg.* iii. 9, where there is a reminiscence of Ennius's epitaph.
[3] Dill, p. 258 ff.
[4] It is fully discussed in art. DEIFICATION (Greek and Roman).
[5] Dill, p. 503.

In Sumerian there are two equivalents of *napištu*—*ZI* and *Šl. ZI*, the one most commonly employed, is written by an ideogram which originally pictured a reed growing by running water. This expressed life—vigorous, abundant life. The ideogram for *ŠI* was the picture of an eye. The brilliance and flash of the eye suitably expressed the vigour of one's life.

While it may be that the reasons which led to the employment of these ideograms were phonetic, it seems probable that the appropriateness of the symbols to suggest life had something to do with it. The words *ZI*, *ŠI*, and *napištu* are, in the literature, employed as the equivalents of 'life'; it is not necessary to render them 'soul.' 'Life' was distinguished from the 'body' or 'carcass' (*šalamtu*), and was apparently conceived as having after death an independent existence apart from the *šalamtu*.

In none of the Semitic languages is the root for 'life,' 'soul,' employed as the verb 'to live.' This is expressed in Hebrew by the verb *ḥayā*; in Arabic, *ḥayī*; in Syriac, *ḥayā*; in Ethiopic, *ḥaywa*. It is the root from which in Hebrew the word for 'animal' is derived. The Akkadian and Assyrian dialects of Mesopotamia, on the other hand, employ as the verb 'to live' the root *balāṭu*—a root which in Jewish Aramaic signifies 'stand forth,' 'project'; in Syriac, 'shut the eyes,' 'bolt the gate,' or 'breed worms'; in Arabic, 'spread or pave a house with flag-stones' (the noun *balāṭ* meaning 'ground,' 'smooth ground,' 'surface of the ground'); in Ethiopic the only occurrence of the root known to the present writer, *bāluṭ*, means 'oak.' The Mesopotamian *balāṭu*, 'to live,' seems to have closer affinities with the Arabic root *bālada*, 'remain,' 'abide,' 'dwell,' than with the Arabic *balaṭa*.

The idea involved in the Babylonian conception of living would, accordingly, seem to have been, not the possession of a soul, but the ability to stand forth as a distinct being and to occupy a habitation.

We can best ascertain the Babylonian conceptions of the soul by studying their conceptions of the life after death.[1] In common with many other peoples who buried their dead, the Babylonians believed that those who had departed this life dragged out a miserable existence in a subterranean cavern. In this cheerless abode the departed were thought to assume the forms of partially decomposed bodies; this we learn from representations of certain demons from whom Babylonians thought it necessary to guard themselves and who were, as the texts which describe them clearly show, human beings who had died. It is easy to see how early men should think of the departed as assuming the forms of skeletons or partially decomposed bodies. The fact that they did so conceive them is proof that they did not think of the soul as an entity which was altogether independent of the body. The dead, living in the earth, were thought to long for the food and drink of living beings; the dust and clay of the lower world did not satisfy them. In order to so satisfy them that they should not haunt the living and afflict them with disease, the Babylonians from the earliest times presented offerings of food and drink to the dead. The technical term for this was *SI-A-NAK*, 'pouring water on the ground.' In addition to this, an initial supply of food and drink was placed at the time of burial in the tomb with the body. Records of such offerings to the dead are found in practically all periods of Babylonian history. Their object was to keep the dead contented with their lot, so that they would not return to torment the living. When dissatisfied departed spirits did so return, they were believed to form demons and to harm the living. The spirits that came forth from the under world to trouble men were (1) those whose bodies lay unburied, (2) those who had none to present offerings for them, and (3) spirits who had, while living, never been able to satisfy their normal human desires.

The first of these classes is in the Gilgamesh epic described by Engidu, after Gilgamesh had had him called forth from the under world, thus:

[1] See art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).

'He whose body is thrown on the plain,
Thou hast seen, I see;
His spirit rests not in the earth;
Whose spirit has no care,
Thou hast seen, I see;
The leavings of the dish, the remains of the food,
What is thrown into the street, he eats.'[1]

The second class is alluded to in an incantation which apostrophizes many kinds of spirits, thus:

'Or a spirit that has no care,
Or a spirit with none to make food-offerings,
Or a spirit with none to make libations.'[2]

The third class is described in the following:

Or a demon that has no resting-place,
Or a maid that died a virgin,
Or a man that died unmarried.'[3]

'A hierodoulos who has died of pestilence,
A woman who has died in travail,
A wailing woman who has died in travail.'[4]

'He who from hunger in prison died,
He who from thirst in prison died,
The hungry man who in his hunger
Its odour smelled not,
He who the dyke of a canal
Opened and was drowned,
He who on plain or marsh-land died,
He who on the plain a storm o'erwhelmed,
The spirit-maid that has no husband,
The spirit-man who embraced no wife.'[5]

All these, whose deaths were accidental or so untimely that the natural functions of life were not fulfilled or its legitimate desires satisfied, roamed the world and were dangerous to the living.

In general, then, we may say of the Babylonian conceptions of the soul that they were vague and for the most part ill-defined. It was recognized that each man possessed an impalpable something that made him a living being, but, so long as he lived, little attention was paid to this. After death this indefinable part of man demanded food and drink. If this were not given, it might return to annoy the living. This fear of the dead led to the conception of the soul as a form of wind—whirlwind or storm-wind. Such satisfactions as the soul received were to be obtained in this life only. If they were not attained before death, the spirit would come back seeking them. It was this in part that constituted the spirits of the departed a menace to the living.

2. Hebrew.—Among the Hebrews the word for 'soul,' *nephesh*, passed through a considerable development which gave it different shades of meaning at different times.

It is employed (1) to denote the principle of life—the thing that constitutes a living being. Thus it is said (Gn 2^{7}) that Jahweh breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life and man became a 'living soul' (*nephesh hayā*), a 'living being.' As denoting a living being, *nephesh* was applied to animals as well as men, and was believed to have its residence in the blood. Thus the Hebrews were prohibited from eating the meat of sacrifices until the blood of the animal had been poured out on the ground to God, for 'the blood is the life (*nephesh*)' (Dt 12$^{23\text{-}24}$; cf. also Lv 17$^{10\text{-}14}$, Gn 9$^{4f.}$). In 1 K 17^{22} 'soul' is employed to denote this principle of life, when it is said that the 'soul' of the child came into him again after Elijah had stretched himself upon him three times.

(2) 'Soul' (*nephesh*) is employed to designate the seat of the physical appetites. Thus in Dt 12$^{15.\ 20.\ 21}$ it is the seat of the appetite for meat; in Dt 23^{24} for grapes; in Nu 21^{5}, Job 33^{20}, for bread; in Ps 78^{18} 107^{18}, Ec 2^{24}, for food in general; and in Mic 7^{1} for figs.

(3) The 'soul' was also regarded as the seat of all kinds of emotion—pity for the poor (Job 30^{25}), joy (Ps 86^{4}), love (Ca 1^{7}), hate (Is 1^{14}), courage (Ps 138^{3}), purpose (Gn 23^{8}).

(4) It was also the seat of moral action and of the will. Thus in Gn 49^{6} a poet sings:

'O my soul, come not thou into their council;
. . . . . .
For in their anger they slew a man,
And in their selfwill they houghed an ox.'

In Dt 4^{29} the 'soul' is the seat of the will to seek God; in Job 7^{15}, of the purpose to die; in Ps 24^{4}, of deceit and fraud; in Ps 25^{1}, of trust in God; in Ps 119$^{129.\ 167}$, of obedience to law; in Jer 32^{41}, of the will to perform a beneficent act; in Mic 6^{7}, of sin; and in Hab 2^{4}, of pride. In some cases the 'soul' seems to be regarded as the seat of mental activity also; see Jos 23^{14}, Est 4^{13}, Ps 13^{2}.

(5) 'Soul' was also employed by the Hebrews to designate an individual man or person. Thus in Gn 14^{21} the king of Sodom said to Abraham: 'Give me the souls (persons), and take the goods thyself'; also in Lv 17^{12}: 'No soul of you shall eat blood'; Ezk 18^{4}: 'The soul that sinneth, he shall die.' From this usage it came to be employed in enumerations, as in Gn 46^{15}, where it is said that all the 'souls' of Jacob's descendants at a certain time were 33. Another result of the employment of 'soul' in the sense of 'person' was that with a pronominal suffix it came to denote 'self'; thus 'my soul,' 'thy soul,' 'his soul,' meant 'myself,' 'thyself,' 'himself.' By a curious extension of the use of 'soul' for 'person,' it came in time to denote also a person once living but now dead. This usage is found in the OT only in Leviticus, Numbers, and Haggai (see, *e.g.*, Lv 19^{28}, Nu 6^{6}, and Hag 2^{13}). Although the *nephesh* had clearly gone from the body, its long use in the sense of 'person' led to this curious application of it to a dead body.

Closely connected in usage with the term *nephesh* were the terms 'spirit' (*rūaḥ*) and 'heart' (*lebh*). Indeed some writers have held that the Hebrew conception of human nature was a trichotomy, consisting of body, soul, and spirit. This position, as the best scholars have pointed out, cannot be maintained; for, however different from 'soul' the terms 'spirit' and 'heart' may have been originally, they came in time, like the term 'soul,' to designate the whole inner, impalpable nature of man. Thus *rūaḥ* originally meant 'wind,' as in Ps 1^{4}; then it was employed to denote the 'Spirit of God,' as in Gn 1^{2}, and is extensively used in this sense throughout the OT; it was then applied to the inner life of man, and is often employed as a synonym for 'soul.' Thus the 'spirit' is the seat of various emotions—in Gn 26^{35}, of grief; in Gn 41^{8}, Ex 6^{9}, of anxiety; in Dt 2^{30}, of obduracy; in Jg 8^{3}, of hate; in Ps 32^{2}, of deceit; in Pr 18^{14}, of a lack of courage; in Jer 51^{11}, of courage; in Ezk 3^{14}, of anger; in Zec 6^{8}, of peace. Like 'soul,' 'spirit' is also regarded as the seat of moral and religious attributes or qualities: thus in Ps 34^{18} it is the seat of contrition; in Ps 51^{12}, of willingness; in Ps 51^{17}, of humility; in Is 26^{9}, of the will to find God; in Ezk 11^{19}, of teachableness; in Hag 1^{14}, of the will to work.

In late writers only *rūaḥ* ('spirit') is also employed of the seat of mentality; cf. Job 20^{3}, 1 Ch 28^{12}, Is 29^{24}, Ezk 11^{5} 20^{32}. It thus becomes clear that the uses of 'soul' and 'spirit' overlap one another. The Hebrews did not have a clear-cut psychology of the inner life of man with a well-defined terminology, but held a very simple view of the constitution of human nature and employed terms with a vagueness and an overlapping characteristic of popular unscientific thought.

The inner life of man was also by the Hebrews often designated the 'heart' (*lebh*). 'Heart' was more often employed to denote the seat of the mind or intelligence than either 'soul' or 'spirit' was; cf. Nu 16^{28} 24^{13}, Pr 6^{32} 7^{7}, etc. The heart is sometimes described as wise (1 K 3^{12}, Pr 16^{23}, Ec 8^{5}), sometimes as intelligent (Pr 14^{33} 15^{14} 18^{15}). It is also employed to designate the seat of emotions and of moral purpose: thus in Jg 16^{25} the heart is the seat of joy; in Neh 2^{2}, of sorrow; in Am 2^{16}, Ps 27^{14}, of courage; in Job 36^{13}, of godlessness; in Pr 11^{20}, of perversity; in Jer 14^{14}, of deceit; and in Pr 21^{4}, of pride. It is, therefore, like spirit, often but another name for soul.

As to the fate of the soul after death, the views of the Hebrews were akin to those of the Babylonians. The soul went with the body into the under world or Sheol, where the Hebrews before the Greek period believed that it dragged out a wretched existence (Is 14$^{9\text{-}11}$). It is implied that in Sheol the dead perform much the same functions as when alive. At least kings are represented as still sitting on their thrones, though worms cover them and are spread under them. The last idea is derived from the putrefaction of the body

[1] E. Schrader, *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, vi., Berlin, 1900, p. 264 f.
[2] *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum*, xvi. 10; cf. R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, i. 40 f.
[3] *Cuneiform Texts, loc. cit.*; Thompson, p. 38 f.
[4] P. Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1883, p. 88 f.
[5] *Cuneiform Texts*, xvi. 12; Thompson, p. 54 f.

Similarly in Ezk 32^{27-32} Sheol is portrayed as a great subterranean region where the dead of all the nations are collected. They lie in helplessness and gloom, though their kings are still kings and their princes still princes. The inhabitants of Sheol were called *rephaim, i.e.* 'helpless (or 'powerless') ones.' After a century or more of contact with the Greeks the conception of a longer and happier life, bordering on the idea of the immortality of the soul, was entertained in some sections of the nation. The earliest approximation to this idea appears in Enoch 10^{10} (before 170 B.C.), where it is said of certain wicked ones: 'They hope that they will live an eternal life, and that each one of them will live five hundred years.' The author of Enoch evidently regarded such a hope as presumptuous, for he declares in substance that this hope was vain. The author of Daniel, however, a few years later accepted the view which the author of Enoch repudiated, and definitely predicted a resurrection (Dn 12^{2}). Later writers who came under Greek influence accepted it also (cf. Wis 2^{23}), and it became the faith of the Pharisees, but nevertheless some of the later Psalmists adhered to the old view. One of them declares:

'The dead praise not Jahweh,
Neither any that go down into silence' (Ps 115^{17}).

A similar idea is expressed in Ps 88^{10}:

'Wilt thou shew wonders to the dead?
Shall the shades arise and praise thee?'

This view the Sadducees still held at the beginning of the Christian era. Jews who accepted the idea of a resurrection were not, however, able as a rule to dissociate the soul from the body; they held to the resurrection of the body.

Like the Babylonians, the early Hebrews believed that certain persons had the power of bringing the dead up from the grave. Such persons were said to be master or mistress of an *'obh*, though just what this was is unknown. It was probably a name for a departed spirit.

The classical instance of this sort of necromancy is the witch of Endor who was consulted by King Saul the night before he fell on Mount Gilboah. She brought Samuel from the earth, and when she saw him she said: 'I see a god (*elohim*) coming up out of the earth.' Saul asked her: 'What form is he of?' She answered: 'An old man cometh up; and he is covered with a robe.' Saul then perceived that it was Samuel (1 S $28^{13f.}$).

From this it appears that the Hebrews did not dissociate the soul from the body as much as the Babylonians did. Samuel is still in the form of an old man wearing his mantle. He is not, like Engidu, a whirlwind.

Such necromancy was practised in Israel down to the time of the Exile or later. Masters of *'ôboth* or *yidde'oni* (another term for departed spirits) practised it. They are mentioned in Is 8^{19} 19^{3}, 2 K 21^{6} 23^{24}, Lv 19^{31} $20^{6.27}$, Dt 18^{11}, and 2 Ch 33^{6}. King Saul had during his reign prohibited the practice of such necromancy, and Isaiah and the author of Deuteronomy protested against it, substituting prophecy for it as a means of ascertaining the future. While the Hebrew conceptions of the soul are somewhat more clearly defined than the Babylonian, especially on the moral and religious side, they are nevertheless vague and are not for the most part clearly distinguished from the mind and other aspects of the inner life.

3. **Jewish.**—In post-Biblical Judaism conceptions of the soul have varied according to the environment and intellectual outlook of Jewish thinkers. They may, however, be grouped in three classes: the Hellenistic, the Rabbinic, and the philosophical.

(*a*) *Hellenistic.*—In Jewish Hellenism the conceptions of the soul were shaped by Platonic ideas. Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of souls was accepted by the author of the *Secrets of Enoch* (23^{5}) and by his contemporary, Philo Judæus. Philo accepted also Plato's tripartite division of the soul, holding that one part is rational, the second spiritual, the third the seat of desire. This tripartite division relates in Philo's usage solely to the functions of the soul. When he speaks of its composition, he regards it as dual, composed of a rational and an irrational part. The rational soul (*νοῦς*) was divine; the irrational, corruptible. Not all souls created by God became incarnate; the purest of them inhabited the air and were never entangled in the corruptions of the flesh. The mind or rational soul, which dwelt in the head, was, Philo believed, akin to the incorruptible 'citizens of the air.' Like them, it was incorruptible and immortal. It is the instrument by which man comes into contact with the various objects of creation and makes its way to God Himself. It sends out its streams like a fountain, and pervades the whole body. The spiritual, he believed, inhabited the chest; the soul of the desires, the abdomen. When Philo treats of immortality, it is the rational soul only that occupies his thought. The mind of man came from God and, of course, would return to God. By implication this would be true of the spiritual soul also, but apparently not of the seat of desire. We must not, however, look for logical consistency in Philo; his twofold system of classifying souls and their powers, the dualistic and the tripartite, led him to inextricable confusion.

(*b*) *Rabbinic.*—Rabbinic Judaism, as represented by the Talmud and the related literature, retained the Biblical view of the dualism of human nature, consisting of body and soul.[1] Probably on account of the influence of Platonism, the Rabbis, although they rejected Philonism, believed in the pre-existence of souls.[2] They held, however, that it was taught in Gn 2^{7}, and consequently believed that their view was due to Biblical teaching rather than to philosophy. At the time of conception God, so the Rabbis taught, commanded an angel to bring Him such-and-such a spirit, and the spirit or soul entered the embryo by the head.[3] The spirits which were to descend to earth to inhabit bodies were said to be kept in Araboth, the lowest of the seven heavens.[4] The spirits of the righteous dead, on the other hand, were beneath the throne of God. There was a difference of opinion as to whether the soul descended from heaven at the moment of conception or after the embryo was formed.[5] Some held that God gave the Jew a new soul every Friday and took it back again at the end of the Sabbath.[6] The Talmud seems to consider the inner nature of man as consisting of soul and spirit, but there was in the thought of the Rabbis no clear division between the two. In their opinion the power by which man distinguishes between right and wrong and his inclination to one or the other are two distinct essences which God places in the soul. They are the *yeṣer ṭôb*, or 'inclination to good,' and *yeṣer hâra'*, or 'evil propensities.'[7] Over these the soul has control, and it is thus responsible for moral action. The connexion between body and soul was held to be of the slightest. In sleep the soul was believed to ascend to its heavenly abode, where it often learned important truths. It was this belief that gave dreams their oracular significance. Nevertheless some Rabbis believed that dreams were due to psychological suggestion.[8]

(*c*) *Philosophical.*—The Jewish philosophers, who were the pupils of Arabian masters, who had in

[1] Cf. *Berākhôth*, 10*a*, 43*b*; *Shabbāth*, 113*b*, 152*b*; *Yôma*, 30*b*; *Nedarim*, 32*a*; *Sanhedrin*, 91*a*, 108, 110*b*.
[2] *Sifrē*, 143*b*.
[3] *Niddah*, 30*b*.
[4] *Ḥagīgāh*, 12*b*.
[5] *Sanh.* 90*a*.
[6] *Beṣah.* 16*a*.
[7] *Sifrē*, 82*b*; *Berākh.* 61*a*; *Sanh.* 91*b*.
[8] *Berākh.* 56*a*.

turn learned their philosophy from the Greeks, thought of the soul in more scientific fashion. Se'adiah (*q.v.*), who died in Babylonia in A.D. 942, denied the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, claiming that each soul was created at the time of the creation of its body. The substance of souls resembled that of the 'spheres,' but was of finer quality, since it has the power to think and discern, which the 'spheres' lacked. The soul needs the body as its instrument or medium of activity. By its union with the body three powers latent in the soul are set free—intelligence, passion, and desire. These are not three separate parts of the soul, each having a seat in a different part of the body, but are powers of the indivisible spirit which has its seat in the heart. Without its union with the body the soul could not attain to eternal bliss, because this reward is granted it only as a recompense for obedience to the will of God, an obedience impossible without a body.

Notwithstanding the work of Se'adiah, *Sefer Emunoth we De'oth*, 'Book of the Articles of Faith and the Doctrines of Dogma,' in the sixth chapter of which his views on the soul are set forth, the Platonic views prevailed in a debased form in most of the Jewish schools during the 10th and 11th centuries. According to a work of this period attributed to Ibn Pakuda, man has three souls—the vegetative, the animal, and the rational. The first two are derived from matter. The vegetative soul creates the body. The attribute of the vegetative soul is chastity; of the animal soul, energy; of the rational soul, wisdom. These views were accepted with variations by Ibn Gabirol and Ibn Ziddik.

Maimonides (*q.v.*), who had come under the influence of Aristotle, fashioned his conception of the soul after that Greek master. According to him, the soul is a unit possessing five faculties—the nutritive; the sensitive, by which one perceives; the imaginative, by which it has the power to form images of the things impressed on it by the senses; the appetitive, or the ability to feel either desire or aversion; and the rational, by which it acquires knowledge and discerns right and wrong. Maimonides held that the soul is indissolubly bound up with the body and at death ceases to exist. Maimonides and Levi ben Gershon (*q.v.*) held that, in addition to the soul possessed by every one, it was possible to develop, as was done by some, an acquired intellect. These views were strenuously opposed by others.

In *Zôhār*, the most psychological of the treatises of the Ḳabbala, the Neo-Platonic theories of the soul asserted themselves.

4. Arabian.—See art. ARABS (Ancient), vol. i. p. 671 f.

5. Muhammadan.—See art. SOUL (Muslim).

6. Other Semitic races.—Our information concerning the conceptions of the soul entertained by the other Semitic nations is very fragmentary, but what there is of it goes to show that their ideas were practically identical with those of the early Hebrews and Arabs. A Phœnician inscription employs *nephesh* in the sense of 'person.'[1] The Nabatæans used the word in the same way, for there is a survival in one of their inscriptions of its employment to express the idea of self.[2] Another extension of this meaning, already traced in Arabia, was the employment of *naphsha* in the sense of 'memorial monument' or 'gravestone.' This is quite frequent.[3] It is also found among the Palmyrenes.[4] *Naphsha* had also, in the Nabatæan dialect, the meaning 'life.'[1] Of a deeper or more psychological meaning to the word among these peoples the sources reveal no trace.

The Syriac literature from the region of Edessa and the Ethiopic literature from Abyssinia are both Christian. The conceptions of the soul formally presented in these literatures are accordingly Christian. Nevertheless the usages of the languages in which the literatures are written testify that the heathen ancestors of these two sections of the Semitic race shared the views of the soul already traced in Israel and among the Arabs. In Syriac a verb formed from the root *n^ephash* meant 'to breathe,' also 'to desire.' Forms of the root were also employed in the meaning of 'natural life,' 'soul,' and 'self.'

In general the same is true of Ethiopic. *Nafsa* means 'breath,' 'blow'; *nefs*, 'soul,' 'living thing,' 'wind,' 'air'; *nafst*, 'body,' 'pudenda'; and *manfus*, 'spirit,' 'soul.' The methods of reasoning employed above enable us to deduce from these facts that the word stood for 'breath,' 'life,' 'soul,' 'person,' and 'self,' as among the other Semitic peoples.

7. Egyptian.—The Egyptian beliefs concerning the soul differed considerably from those of the Semitic peoples. It is generally held that they thought a concrete entity, invisible during life, had its residence in the human body. They called this *ba*, a word which never means 'life.' Life was denoted by quite a different word, *'ankḥ*. There is a verb *ba*, which means 'to cut in pieces,' and, if it had any connexion with the word for soul, the connexion is not apparent. There is also a denominative verb *ba*, 'to become a *ba*.' The *ba*, according to the usual Egyptian belief, dwelt in the body during life, but departed from it at death.[2] Some texts indicate that in parts the belief prevailed that only at death one became a *ba*. The Egyptians never developed philosophical ability; they did not form theories as to the inner composition or structure of the soul, such as were given to the world by Plato and Aristotle and were entertained by the peoples who came under the influence of these philosophers. In Egypt interest centred in the future fortunes of the soul. The conceptions on this subject at the beginning were bound up with myths which differed in different nomes. As time advanced and the establishment of the monarchy created syncretism, those myths and theories blended. They also in the lapse of time underwent development. Many of those views found expression in that medley of myths of the hereafter known as *The Book of the Dead*. Gods as well as men were thought to possess souls. The soul was the seat of strength, courage, and power in both gods and men. The favourite method of picturing the soul was in the form of a heron; in later times it was represented as a bird with a human face. Such representations on tombs enabled the survivors to place a portrait of the deceased over his grave.

In early times it was thought that, though the soul wandered abroad during the day through the under world or through the desert, on the borders of which cemeteries lay, it needed to return to the body at night or in moments of danger, as when attacked by hostile spirits. It was probably for this reason that such pains were taken to mummify and preserve the body. Departed souls were supposed to need the same kind of sustenance as in life; hence quantities of food were placed in the tomb. If a man had possessed wealth and servants in this world, he would need them in the after life. Hence, from the Vth dynasty onward, numerous servants preparing food and making all

[1] *CIS* I. i. 86. [2] *Ib.* I. ii. 147.
[3] *Ib.* I. ii. 115, 116, 162, 169, 192, 195, 196, 332, 333.
[4] G. A. Cooke, *Text-book of North Semitic Inscriptions*, Oxford, 1903, no. 146.

[1] *CIS* I. ii. 114.
[2] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

that was useful during life are pictured on the walls of the tombs. *Ushabti* figures were later introduced for the same purpose.

The Pyramid Texts, our oldest source of information, deal with the posthumous destiny of the king. The souls of other men were thought to remain in the under world or to wander in the desert; the king was, like Osiris, transferred to the skies and placed among the gods. The reception given him there is vividly portrayed. Feasts of geese, bread, and all delicious viands are provided for him; quantities of beer are furnished for him to drink; concubines for the gratification of his desires are not lacking. Sometimes, as he was, on his arrival in the sky, but a babe to the new life, he is represented as suckled at the breast of a goddess. Later the heaven of the sky was democratized, and it was believed that all good men went thither. Old beliefs that the dead returned to the tomb or revisited his former abode survived side by side with the beliefs in the soul's celestial destiny. Sometimes a little ladder or a boat was pictured, by which the soul could climb or sail away to the stars.

In course of time it came to be believed that on its arrival in the under world the soul must undergo an examination to see whether it was fit to go to heaven. While Osiris was believed to be the great judge, he was attended by 42 assessors—one for each of Egypt's nomes. These bore such terrifying names as 'Blood-drinker,' 'Bone-breaker,' 'Shadow-swallower.' Those who successfully passed the examination and could say at the end, 'I am pure,' were transferred to the sky, where they enjoyed a material paradise such as was, in the Pyramid Texts, the lot of kings. These promises were only for the worthy. The wicked were doomed to destruction by the myriads of demons who inhabited the under world. They might be torn in pieces by the 42 terrible judges, burned in furnaces, or drowned in the abyss. These souls might themselves become demons and return to torment the living with disease and death. Against them, as against other demons, magic spells were necessary.

It has often been stated that in addition to the soul (*ba*) the Egyptians believed that a man possessed another invisible entity or double, called a *ka*. The existence of the *ka* is beyond question, but its function has until recently been misunderstood. The *ka* was a man's double. On the walls of the temple of Luxor a sculpture of the 15th cent. B.C. depicts the birth of Amenophis III. By his side is another child of the same size and appearance.[1] This was the *ka*, which accompanied him through life. The *ka* was a corporeal comrade, though an invisible one. He accompanied a man through life, as a sort of guardian genius. The *ka* preceded a man to the realm of Osiris and prepared for his reception there. When a man died, therefore, it was said, 'He goes to his *ka*.' Lest the *ka* should mistake his *protégé*, the dead was given a peculiar garment by which the *ka* might identify him. The *ka*, united with the individual whom it had protected, lived a common life with him in the hereafter. Often it was said of the dead: 'How beautiful it is in the company of the *ka*!'

LITERATURE.—R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, London, 1903-04, i. pp. xxiv–xxxv; S. H. Langdon, 'Babylonian Eschatology,' in *Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects Gathered and Published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt.*, New York, 1911, pp. 141–162; F. Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, Giessen, 1892; J. Frey, *Tod, Seelenglaube und Seelenkult im alten Israel*, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 18–33, 188–228; C. Grüneisen, *Der Ahnenkultus und die Urreligion Israels*, Halle, 1900, pp. 97–100; C. H. Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*, Boston and London, 1890, pp. 174–176; C. Piepenbring, *Theology of the Old Testament*, Eng. tr., New York, 1893, pp. 160–167; A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament*, Edinburgh, 1904, pp. 199–203; E. D. Burton, *Spirit, Soul and Flesh*, Chicago, 1918, ch. ii.; J. Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, 2 vols., London, 1888, i. 318–357; F. Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*[2], Leipzig, 1897, pp. 211 ff., 225 f., 228, 341; K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, New York, 1918, pp. 213–217; I. Broydé and L. Blau, art. 'Soul,' in *JE*; E. A. Van Dyck, *A Compendium on the Soul*, Verona, 1906; D. B. Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, Chicago, 1909, pp. 53–61; J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 52 ff.; G. Steindorff, *The Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, do. 1905, p. 121 ff.; A. Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*[2], Berlin, 1909, pp. 44, 47, 55, 102, 103, 276; W. Max Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vol. xii.), Boston, 1918, ch. x.; E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, 3 vols., London, 1898.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

SOUL (Teutonic).—**1. The personal soul.—(*a*) *In life.***—The conception of a personal soul inherent in man during life and distinct from his body can be traced in popular beliefs of to-day in Germany, but the only evidence for it among the early Teutonic peoples comes from Scandinavia, and is singularly uniform in character. The mind (*hugr*) of a man is seen, on occasion, in the form of some animal usually thought to share the characteristics of the individual; thus a gallant chief will be represented by a bear, an eagle, or a bull, a blood-thirsty man by a wolf, a cunning man by a fox, a fair woman by a swan, and so on. This 'animal familiar' is called *fylgja* (fem. sing.; pl. *fylgjur*), 'something accompanying,' which we may render 'companion' or 'associate.' It can be seen (except in dreams) only by persons with second-sight, but it appears to have an objective existence.

Thus in an Icelandic story a boy stumbles over some obstacle unnoticed by him which an old man present sees to be the lad's own *fylgja*, a bear-cub (*þorsteins þáttr uxafóts*). After killing an enemy Eyjólf fell off his horse and was lamed for life; a wise man tells him that the reason of his fall was that he could not withstand the *fylgjur* of the slain man's kinsmen, whereupon Eyjólf asks: 'Do you think that their *fylgjur* are more powerful than mine and those of my friends?'[1] In another saga certain brothers are said to be awkward to contend against, as they have 'strong *fylgjur*.'

The *fylgja* has thus a protective character, and it precedes its owner on all critical occasions. Hence dreams of encounters with wild animals are taken as portending a fight with the individuals whose *fylgjur* the animals are supposed to be, and an alternative name for the *fylgjur* is 'men's minds' (*manna hugir*).

Thus a hero dreams that he is attacked by wolves, of which he kills two; the dream is interpreted next day: 'It is easy to see that these are men's minds hostile to thee,' and in the ensuing encounter he actually kills two of his opponents.[2] In *Njáls Saga* a man dreams of a great white bear entering his brother's house; he says on waking that the animal had no peer and must therefore be the *fylgja* of the peerless Gunnarr.[3]

The close connexion of this belief with that of shape-changing is obvious. When we are told that Böðvarr Bjarki fought as a bear while he sat inert in the king's hall,[4] it would seem that his *fylgja*, or animal-soul, was fighting for him; but, when the Icelandic chief Kveldúlf, of the 9th cent., is said to become a wolf at night, this appears to be rather a case of shape-changing.

So also in the case of Lára, who flew in the form of a swan above her lover in battle, chanting magic incantations so that none could wound him, until in swinging his sword he cut off the leg of the swan, and Lára dropped dead to the ground.[5]

In one essential point the conception of the external soul, or *fylgja*, follows closely that of the belief in shape-changing. The life of the *fylgja* depends on that of the individual, and dies when he dies. Though it is called his *hugr*, 'mind,' it is not the part of a man which continues a life after death. Its death is the portent of the death of its owner, and this not only when its death is seen in dreams. The freedman Thórð in *Njáls Saga*[6] sees a dead

[1] *Ljósvetninga Saga*, ch. 30.
[2] *Thorð. Saga Hræða*, ch. 6.
[3] *Njáls Saga*, ch. 23. [4] *Hrólfs Saga Kraka*, ch. 33.
[5] *Hrómundar Saga Greipssonar*, ch. 6 f.
[6] Ch. 41.

[1] Cf. A. Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*[2], p. 102.

goat, which is realized to be his *fylgja*, and he is killed the same day.

The animal-soul, or *fylgja*, which dies or disappears on the death of the body, must certainly be distinct from the *hamingja*, occasionally called *fylgjukona*, which is a kind of female tutelary genius, who on the death of one member of the family passes on to another. In an Eddic poem these are described as 'wise maidens.'[1] The practice of naming a child after a recently deceased grandparent appears to have originated in a desire to attach the family *hamingja* to his fortunes.[2] In one or two passages there is a confusion of terms, and this tutelary genius is called *fylgja*, but, as the word only means 'companion,' it is really as applicable to the *hamingja* as to the animal-soul. The *fylgja* proper, the animal-soul, is never called *hamingja*. A similar distinction between the ancestral soul and the personal soul is found in various races.

The Kafirs believe in the *idhlozi*, an individual soul unable to leave the corpse after death, and the *itongo*, a corporate soul, shared by various members of a family and making its home permanently with their descendants.[3] So among the Eskimo the individual soul of a child is distinct from the family guardian-spirit (*atka*), which is immanent in it in childhood.[4]

Ancient Teutonic literature has thus preserved to us no conception of the soul as a shade, or as a miniature, or as present in the breath or heart or blood. In modern popular superstition it is generally thought of as a butterfly, mouse, or other small creature, which issues from the mouth of a sleeper. This does not, however, resemble the Northern *fylgja*, for it survives the death of its human associate. In folk-tales it is often seen leaving its human habitation on the death of its owner.

(*b*) *After death.*—As we have seen, these *fylgjur*, or 'men's minds,' are not 'souls' in the sense of being that part of the individual which continues an existence beyond the grave. There is absolutely no mention of them in the realms of the dead, nor is there any hint that any particular part of man, such as the breath, is the seat of life both before and after death. Yet the popular belief in the Wild Huntsman and his companions, who are undoubtedly spirits of the dead, and the association of Odin (originally a god of the dead) with the wind,[5] must be connected with the idea that the spirit of man was breath or wind. Other conceptions of the realm of the dead show less consciousness of any difference between spirit and matter. It is true that the realm of Hel, the goddess of death, seems to have been somewhat shadow-like, since its guardian chides the living Hermóð for making more noise than five battalions of the dead, but, when the dead Balder gives Hermóð the ring which was burnt on his pyre, as a gift to Odin, and his dead wife sends a shift to Frigg, these articles are apparently still material enough to give satisfaction in the world of the living.[6] The practice of cremation must have originated in some definite belief about the soul's departure to another world, but Teutonic thought, like Chinese, seems to have been averse from admitting the dualism of spirit and matter, and literature gives us no hint that they can be separated. Moreover, the beliefs connected with cremation may have early crystallized into meaningless custom. When the German peasants in Voigtland put an umbrella and galoshes into the coffin of a departed friend, it is not to be supposed that they really believe these articles to be required in heaven, but merely that they have become part of the Sunday outfit in which it has always been customary to inter the body.

Constant references in ecclesiastical prohibitions show that the dead were still thought to require food and drink, and in some parts of Sweden the peasants still continue to lay such offerings in the saucer-shaped depressions on the rock slabs of ancient tombs. Neither the idea of Hel nor that of Valhöll could oust from the popular mind the older and more widely spread belief that the dead man lived on in his grave-mound. Icelandic sources show that certain families believed that they 'died into' hills, which they regarded as sacred, and a reference in *Landnáma* suggests that the young men of the family were conducted to this hill for the ceremonies associated with the attainment of manhood.[1] When continuing an existence in the neighbourhood of their burial-place, the dead seem to have been thought of as *álfar*, 'elves,' in Scandinavia, N. Germany, and the Netherlands. Sacrifice to these beings seems to have been practised in Sweden,[2] and it is once mentioned in Iceland.[3] That the continuance of the prosperity due to some fortunate king depended on the actual presence of his corpse is clear from the eagerness which different portions of his kingdom evinced for some part of the body of King Halfdán the Black,[4] and also from the story of Frode, who was embalmed after death and taken round his kingdom in a carriage.[5] In Norway the *haugbu*, or dweller in the grave-mound, is still regarded with veneration. In these cases, if the soul is thought of as separate from the body at all, it is evidently in close dependence on it. The importance of the corpse rather than the spirit is seen in the belief that dead bodies could be made by spells to utter prophecies, whereas there is no reference to calling up *spirits* to foretell the future. The refusal to distinguish between the corpse and its spirit is seen even more clearly in the beliefs about persistent ghosts—dead men who were evil in life. The ghost, if we may call it so, still possesses great physical power and can kill men; and its activities can equally well be put an end to by burning the corpse and scattering the ashes in the sea[6] or by overcoming the ghost and cutting off its head.[7]

If, as has been suggested, Jötunheim, the world of the giants, is originally a realm of the dead, and the word *jötunn* really means 'devourer,' it seems as if Teutonic thought had contemplated a world in which the dead are nothing but corpses, devoured by ogres.[8] This is a more crudely materialistic conception than most savages could boast of.

In Valhöll, which is probably a creation of the North, the *einherjar*, or warriors slain in battle and now living a new life under almost the same conditions as the old, must evidently be thought of as re-incarnated, since their dead bodies are not in Valhöll. But there is nothing spiritual about their fare of pork and ale, and their life after death is not an immortality, since they are doomed to fall again, with no further hope of renewed life, in the battle between gods and giants. We find the perpetual fighting dissociated from the belief in Valhöll in the story of Hild, who by her spells raised up the slain combatants in a great battle. At night they and their weapons turn into boulders, but every day they revive and fight, and so it shall continue till the end of the world.[9] This excessive activity on the part of the dead probably reflects the superabundant energy of the Viking age, and

1 *Vafþrúðnismál*, 48 f. 2 Cf. *Vatnsdœla Saga*, ch. 7.
3 Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, London, 1906, p. 281 ff.
4 See art. Soul (Primitive).
5 See art. God (Teutonic), § 2 (*a*).
6 Snorri's Edda, *Gylfaginning*, ch. 52.

1 *Landnámabok*, ed. F. Jónsson, Copenhagen, 1900, p. 158.
2 *Heimskringla*, ed. F. Jónsson, Copenhagen, 1893–1900, ii. 171.
3 *Kormáks Saga*, ch. 22. 4 *Heimskringla*, i.
5 Saxo, *Gesta Danorum*, ed. A. Holder, Strassburg, 1886, p. 171.
6 *Laxdœla Saga*, ch. 17; *Eyrbyggia Saga*, ch. 63.
7 *Grettis Saga*, ch. 35; Saxo, ed. Holder, p. 163.
8 Cf. O. Schoning, *Dödsriger i nordisk Hedentro*, Copenhagen, 1903, and *ARW* viii. [1904] 124 f.
9 Snorri's Edda, *Skáldskaparmál*, ch. 57.

is perhaps also the foundation of the belief that persons pre-eminent in their life are reborn.

It will be seen from the above that the early Teutonic peoples were less speculative about the relations of matter and spirit than many savages. No doubt, if they had been questioned as savages are to-day, they would have produced a philosophy, but in their literature as it stands there is no recognition of any distinction between body and soul. It is, however, possible that their perception of this dualism had been clearer in the pre-literary time, and had become blurred in the Viking age owing to its intense interest in this life, to its materialism, and, above all, to its acquaintance with different forms of burial and with conflicting beliefs as to the destiny of the dead. Whereas the conception 'spirit' is not expressed in heathen Teutonic literature, the traces of animistic belief still left from a more primitive age may perhaps justify us in believing that the idea had once been more clearly formulated. Only the more enlightened classes seem wholly to have abandoned animistic beliefs, in which 'souls' are attributed not only to living beings, but also to inanimate objects.

2. Animism.—The worship of waterfalls, springs, and rocks, common all over Scandinavia, England, and N. Germany, had probably an animistic basis, as also probably had the cult of the *landvættir*, spirits of the soil. Where literature fails, archæology may serve to show that in the period immediately preceding the Viking age the distinction between matter and spirit was more clearly realized. The intentional damaging of weapons and other objects before interment with their owners, practised in the 5th and 6th centuries, suggests that souls were ascribed to the objects as well as to their owners, and that it was believed that these souls could be set free to follow their dead owner only if they too were 'killed' in some way. So the sword of the Frankish king Childeric († 481) lay broken in the grave. Perhaps the most interesting illustration of this belief is given by such S. Scandinavian bog-finds as that at Vimose in Denmark, where some 4000 objects, mostly weapons and gear, are found to have been carefully damaged before being abandoned. The same idea of setting free the spiritual counterparts of objects can be traced in certain finds in Bornholm. These contain no corpses, but consist merely of a heap of intentionally damaged objects, the personal effects of some man whose body, probably because he fell at a distance, was not available for interment.[1]

LITERATURE.—Besides the literature mentioned in the footnotes, reference should be made to the section on souls in E. Mogk's art. 'Teutonic Religion,' in H. Paul, *Grundriss der german. Philologie*[2], Strassburg, 1898–1913, iii. 249 ff., and to other works on Teutonic religion and folk-lore mentioned in that art.; also to Rieger, 'Über den nordischen Fylgien glauben,' *ZDA* xlii. [1898] 277 ff.; G. Storm, 'Vore Forfædres Tro pa Sjælevandring og deres Opkaldelsesystem,' *Arkiv for nordisk Filologi*, ix. [1893] 119 ff.; R. Cleasby and G. Vigfusson, *Icelandic-Eng. Dict.*, London, 1874; J. Fritzner, *Ordbog over det gamle norske Sprog*, Christiania, 1867, *s.vv.* 'Fylgia,' 'Haminga'; J. Ihre, *Glossarium Sviogothicum*, Upsala, 1769, *s.v.* 'Fylgia.'

B. S. PHILLPOTTS.

SOUL-HOUSE.—This name is only a recent one for reference, as no original name is known. The Egyptians, like many other peoples, habitually placed food-offerings with the dead, from the time of the earliest pre-historic graves down to the present. Before the Ist dynasty it became usual to place additional food-offerings—probably at festivals—on one side of the surface mound, or *mastaba*, opposite to the slit where the soul was supposed to go in and out. The heaps of offering pottery still remain in place.[2] In other cases a mat was laid down to keep back the dust, and a pan of flour was placed on it; this was the origin of the sign *hetep* for any offering, satisfaction, or peace, a sign which appears among the earliest hieroglyphs, at the beginning of the Ist dynasty.[1] Next, a stone altar appears with a tank to hold a drink-offering (IVth dynasty), and, as sculptured offerings would never decay, the forms of cakes and other food were carved beside the tank. By the Vth dynasty the tank was looked on as a model of the living-house tank; one in the Cairo Museum has the months of high and low Nile marked on different steps. Various foreign influences came in at the collapse of IVth–VIth dynasty civilization, and it is not unlikely that African custom (see below) modified the altar of offering by providing a shelter for the soul, when it came out to feed at the tank-altar. Some time between the VIth and IXth dynasties various stages of shelters are found, modelled in pottery, about a foot across. At first it was like a Bedawi tent, a cover propped up with two sticks in front, and closed at the back and sides; in front of it is a courtyard, with a tank in the middle, and lying round this are the offerings of an ox head and haunch, round loaves, and bundles of vegetables. The tanks sometimes have holes at each corner, in which to set up poles for supporting a mat-shelter, to keep the water cool. The tent type soon passed into a colonnade with four columns, forming a verandah. Then a little box-shelter was added in the verandah, which soon developed into a back chamber. Steps were placed at the side to give access to the roof, and wind-openings to keep the interior cool. This point was reached at about the Xth dynasty.

The development continued by adding more back chambers; then small chambers on the roof, which grew into a complete second storey. The steps were continued up to reach the roof of the upper storey. Furniture was added—a chair, a couch with head-rest, an easing-stool. A servant grinding corn, and a recess for worship, are also represented. In short, we learn the exact arrangement of the peasants' houses of the XIth and XIIth dynasties. The details of construction were shown—elliptic brick-arch roofing, floors of poles and matting, mud-plastered, as at present, a flying staircase winding round curves, drip-hoodings over the windows, and crenellated walls exactly like those of the modern tombs in the same region.[2] A series of 150 examples giving every variety of development was found at Rifeh, south of Asyut. A few rather more elaborate are known elsewhere, but, as they have been imitated very skilfully by forgers, the further detail cannot be trusted.

The regular position of these soul-houses was on the surface of the ground, at the side of the grave, facing towards it, and most often at the north end. The period is from soon after the VIth dynasty, mainly about the Xth and XIth, and dying out in the XIIth dynasty. The region is at Gebeleyn, Erment, Thebes, Dendereh, and Rifeh, all south of Asyut, in the Thebaid. The most complete series of soul-houses is in the Manchester Museum.

Modern African parallels suggest that this idea came into Egypt from the south.

'Chipoka had been a person of importance . . . a ceremony was to take place for the purpose of propitiating the old chief's spirit . . . people were busied about a group of neat miniature huts, made of grass, about two feet high. The roofs of these huts, which had been finished separately, were not yet put on, and I could see that a couple of earthen jars were sunk in the

[1] Cf. K. Stjerna, *Frā filolog. föreningen i Lund: Spraki. uppsatser*, ii. [1902] 141, 154.

[2] W. M. F. Petrie, *Tarkhan II.* (*British School of Arch. in Egypt*), London, 1914, pls. xii.–xiv.

[1] Petrie, *Deshasheh* (*Egyp. Expl. Fund, 15th Memoir*), London, 1898, p. 35.

[2] Petrie, *Gizeh and Rifeh* (*Brit. School of Arch. in Egypt*), London, 1907, pl. xiv.–xxii. E, pp. 14–20.

ground inside each. These jars were now filled with beer, and then the roof was lifted on.'[1] 'Of things which the stranger can see for himself in passing through the villages, the most noticeable are the little spirit-houses . . . where sacrifices are presented from time to time.'[2]

'Homeless *idimu* [souls] remain in the air and haunt the neighbourhood of the village. . . . It is to provide accommodation for the *idimu* that small huts are built over graves, and a clever device to keep them from wandering at night is to kindle small fires in the huts, for, if this is done, the *idimu* will remain there and warm themselves.'[3]

Lastly, what is the motive for such offerings? Three attitudes toward the dead are found in different countries:[4] (1) fear, as with the Troglodytæ, who bound the body as tightly as possible, or in the various means of breaking connexion between the house and the grave; (2) comfort of the dead, as by giving food and drink; (3) honour of the dead, as in placing on the grave a light (as in Egypt) or flowers (Europe) in the present time. There seems no trace of fear of the dead in Egypt; in all ages weapons were placed with them, or models of weapons, and also sandals (or models in a pre-historic grave) to enable the dead to travel; and in Græco-Roman times the mummy was kept in the house for twenty or thirty years and there honoured, like the present African's offering to his father's head kept in the family circle. It seems therefore only consistent to regard the soul-house as being placed by the grave to comfort the soul when it came out, and provide shelter, food, and rest for it. W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

SOUTHCOTTIANS.—The Southcottians are the followers of Joanna Southcott (1750–1814), a Devonian. One of her followers, herself claiming to be divinely directed to write, describes her in 1907 in these words:

'(i) She was a woman chosen by God to stand at the end of the ages in perfect obedience to Him. (ii) She was to claim the Promise made in the Fall to the Woman, that her seed (Christ) should bruise the Serpent's head and thus put an end to evil. (iii) She was in a special sense to be the bride of Christ, not the only one, but set as a type until all become brides—both men and women—and give their supreme love to Him, standing in perfect obedience as His Church.'[5]

The same authority continues that the Holy Spirit revealed to Joanna things to come, and showed her plainly of the Father; that, as the woman's hand brought the evil fruit to man, so her hand is to bring to man the good; that woman is to be saved through child-bearing; that Joanna perfectly fulfilled Rev 12 in the spiritual birth of the man child; that the Church is finally to be the man child when filled with His Spirit.

Joanna, who was of Wesleyan extraction, began prophesying in 1792, and many of her predictions were fulfilled within a few months, as was verified by a local inquiry. Publications from 1800 onwards introduced her to a wider circle, and in 1801 Thomas P. Foley, rector of Old Swinford, brought friends who conducted a systematic trial of her gifts at Exeter, and, being convinced, were hailed as the 'Seven Stars.' In Aug. 1802 she retired for a seven-day dispute with Satan, which she published. Further trials ensued in 1803 and 1804, each widening her fame. She organized her adherents, enjoining on them the observance of certain Jewish laws, notably as to the Sabbath and as to clean meats. They were presented with a signed paper, 'The Sealed of the Lord—the Elect Precious Man's Redemption—To Inherit the Tree of Life—To be made Heirs of God and Joint-Heirs with Jesus Christ. Joanna Southcott.' This was bestowed only on those who had read and accepted at least two of her major works; within five years about 14,000 persons were 'sealed.' She then challenged attention by a personal letter to every bishop, peer, and member of the House of Commons, and by letters to the *Times* and the *Morning Herald* in 1813. Next spring she announced that she was pregnant with Shiloh, and much excitement was evinced, even in medical circles, fourteen doctors being invited to examine her. But she passed away two days after Christmas.

Samuel Sibley and John Ward sought to rally her followers, the latter being believed in as late as 1892. But George Turner, himself owned by Joanna as inspired, joined with Jane Townley, her most intimate friend, in holding together the main body. Between 1840 and 1850 a controversy broke out, leading to much publication, on the question whether a spiritual child was born at the end of 1814, or whether Joanna will return, complete the year foretold, and bear a literal child. Forty years ago the London adherents were but a handful in Walworth; but a revival has taken place. With 1902 Alice Seymour, deeply impressed by the annual service on New Year's Day 1901 (Old Style), the 'lifting up of hands,' near Manchester, felt drawn to renewed study, and came to the conclusion that the prophecies 'for ten years from the fourth of the century' applied to the 20th cent., not the 19th. She therefore published two volumes in 1909 which are the foundation for sane study, and thus prompted renewed interest. The coincidences in the five years since are certainly remarkable.

Two other movements have sprung out of the original. John Wroe of Bowling, near Bradford, was accepted as successor to George Turner of Leeds in 1822, and his new revelations broke fresh ground, so that the Christian Israelites, as his followers are called, are not to be classed as Southcottians. They hold that the Ten Tribes are dispersed throughout the nations, and are to gather on the basis of the four books of Moses and the four Gospels. Perfect obedience to the Mosaic Law will procure immortality, the body not seeing death. There is no ordained ministry; propaganda is carried on especially in the open air, with a large brass band rendering plaintive music; adherents may be recognized by their long unshorn hair. They reached New York in 1844, and have excited some curiosity in Australia.

In 1875 the Chatham group of Southcottians was joined by a soldier, James White, who, after his period of service in India, returned and took the lead locally, developing further the doctrines of Joanna and of Wroe, with a communistic tinge. The name 'New and Latter House of Israel' was assumed. Though he died in 1885, his widow continued the work, and an enormous mass of brickwork at Gillingham, strong as a fort, marks the house of Jezreel. Her death three years later caused financial chaos and a cessation of work. But adherents still exist in the United States, Canada, and Australia.

LITERATURE. — The sources are pamphlets by Joanna Southcott, complete sets of which are in the British Museum, the Bodleian, and the John Rylands Library, Manchester, totalling 4500 pages. Twice as much remains of her MSS, some in a peculiar shorthand, most sealed in a large case corded up till the next crisis of world-history. Her correspondence books are also preserved. The only long studies of her which are not caricatures are: Alice Seymour, *The Express, containing the Life and Divine Writings of Joanna Southcott*, 2 vols., London, 1909; Charles Lane, *Life and Bibliography of Joanna Southcott*, Exeter, 1912. W. T. WHITLEY.

SOVEREIGNTY (Divine).—1 Definition.—There are three senses in which the term 'divine sovereignty' may be used, two of which need little more than mention, as they are dealt with else-

[1] A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906, p. 47 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 50.
[3] E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, quoted by C. G. Seligman, 'Multiple Souls in Negro Africa,' in *Ancient Egypt*, 1915, pt. iii. p. 105.
[4] See artt. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.
[5] Alice Seymour, *The Express*, No. 1, page 27.

where; the third alone claims further treatment. (1) In polytheism (*q.v.*) we may speak of the divine sovereignty of the one god who is more or less exalted above the other gods. In Chinese religion T'ien or Shang Ti possesses an absolute pre-eminence over all gods and spirits. In Vedic religion the gods in succession are exalted by the worshippers in the type of piety which Max Müller[1] has called henotheism or kathenotheism.[2] Some of the hymns almost rise to the height of monotheism (*q.v.*). Of Varuṇa it is said:

'The mighty Varuṇa, who rules above, looks down
Upon these worlds, his kingdom, as if close at hand.'[3]

Even in Zoroastrian dualism Ahura Mazda, despite his conflict with Angra Mainyu, is assured of final triumph. It is questioned now whether Dyaush pitâ, 'Heaven-Father,' in spite of the linguistic equivalence, ever held the same place in the Vedic pantheon as Ζεὺς πατήρ in the Greek, or Jupiter in the Latin,[4] although the monarchy of these deities was very much limited by the wayward wills of the other gods. A similar position was attained among the Babylonian gods by Marduk, and the Assyrian by Ashur. The composite deity Amon-Rē was in like manner exalted in Egyptian theology, and the attempt of Amenhotep IV. to dethrone him in favour of Aten failed. This tendency to raise one god over others may be regarded as the movement from polytheism towards monotheism.

(2) In the monotheistic religions the divine sovereignty means not exaltation above other gods, but complete power over nature and man, though in the OT we can trace the process by which monolatry—the exclusive worship of Jahweh along with a recognition of other gods—passed into monotheism. In Am 1 and 2 Jahweh is Judge and Ruler of all nations even as of His people Israel. Assyria is the rod of His anger (Is 10^5). Cyrus is His anointed to fulfil His purpose (45^1). Monotheism was never as confident or challenging as in Is $40^{12\text{-}26}$. The omnipotence of God is the prevailing doctrine of the OT.[5] The same doctrine is assumed in the NT, as indeed it must be in any monotheistic religion. Into any details it is not necessary here to enter.

(3) It is the third sense of the term—the exercise of the will of God absolutely, unconditioned by the will of man—that claims special attention, since this view has been challenged and defended in the history of Christian theology, as the omnipotence of God has not been, unless in dualistic systems of thought.[6] Before dealing with the doctrine of divine sovereignty in this narrower sense in Christian theology, we must note the unqualified and unreserved assertion of God's sole sovereignty in Islām.

'There is no god but God—are words simply tantamount in English to the negation of any deity save one alone; and this much they certainly mean in Arabic, but they imply much more also. Their full sense is, not only to deny absolutely and unreservedly all plurality, whether of nature or of person, in the Supreme Being, not only to establish the Unity of the Unbegetting and Unbegot, in all its simple and uncommunicable Oneness, but besides this the words, in Arabic and among Arabs, imply that this one Supreme Being is also the only Agent, the only Force, the only Act existing throughout the universe, and leave to all beings else, matter or spirit, instinct or intelligence, physical or moral, nothing but pure unconditional passiveness, alike in movement or in quiescence, in action or in capacity. The sole power, the sole motor, movement, energy, and deed is God; the rest is downright inertia and mere instrumentality, from the highest archangel down to the simplest atom of creation. Hence in this one sentence, "La Ilâh illa Allâh," is summed up a system which, for want of a better name, I may be permitted to call the Pantheism of Force, or of Act, thus exclusively assigned to God, who absorbs it all, exercises it all, and to whom alone it can be ascribed, whether for preserving or for destroying, for relative evil or for equally relative good.'[1]

This doctrine is obtruded very frequently in its most offensive form in the Qur'ān:

'God misleadeth whom He pleaseth, and guideth whom He pleaseth aright.' 'We created man upright, and then caused him to be the vilest of the vile.' 'The fate of every man have we bound about his neck.'[2]

Such statements of the doctrine without reserve or restraint might have served as warnings to Christian theologians.

2. **The Pauline doctrine.**—While it is in the NT that the divine sovereignty is first dealt with controversially, the unconditionalness of God's action is already asserted in the OT. God's work shall not return to Him void, but it shall accomplish that which He pleases, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto He sends it (Is 55^{11}). In contrast to other gods, He is in the heavens, and 'hath done whatsoever he pleased' (Ps 115^3). He does good and evil, and creates darkness and light (Is 41^{23} 45^7 54^{16}, Am 3^7). For Him 'the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance' (Is 40^{15}). None can hinder His work, and from Him none can deliver (43^{13}). The impossible to man is possible to God (Zec 8^6). The relation of God's action to man's activity was a subject of controversy in the Jewish schools, although it is probable that Josephus was accommodating himself to Gentile readers in the account that he gives of the difference on this question:

'The Essenes taught an absolute fate, the Sadducees utterly denied fate, and the Pharisees struck out a middle path between the two.' For 'the very expression εἱμαρμένη, which is utterly impossible to any Jewish consciousness, proves that we have at least to deal with a strongly Hellenized colouring of Jewish views.'[3]

For fate the Jew would put the will of God. Paul, in his argument in Ro 9–11, takes the middle path in asserting both divine sovereignty and human freedom; as an *argumentum ad hominem* he assumes that his opponents grant the divine sovereignty while maintaining human freedom. Had Christian theologians recognized that Paul was fighting Jewish arrogance and exclusiveness with its own weapons, that the argument is to be treated as a whole, and a dogma must not be built upon its separate statements, and that the distinctively Christian contribution is the hope of a universal mercy, they would not have given to the doctrine of divine sovereignty the place that in their systems they have assigned to it, disproportionate to the teaching of the NT as a whole, and even inconsistent with the general trend of Paul's theology.

'The argument consists of three main propositions: (1) God is absolutely free to elect or reject individuals or nations according to His own will (ix. 1–29); (2) the Jewish people, by its unbelief, has deserved its present exclusion from the blessings of the gospel (ix. 30–x. 21); (3) this exclusion is partial and temporary, as it is God's purpose ultimately to include both Jew and Gentile in His grace (xi.).'[4]

In dealing with the first proposition 'he shows how in the history of the chosen people the principle of God's unconditional election has been again and again asserted, and repels the charge of injustice by appealing to God's own words, in which He claims freedom in all His acts. While rebuking the arrogance of the creature in questioning the acts of the Creator, he blunts the edge of his argument somewhat by showing that God has used His freedom to show mercy rather than judgment. The form of the argument is not beyond criticism; Paul's exegesis cannot be accepted as strictly historical.' But, as regards the substance, we cannot escape the difficulty by say-

[1] *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (*HL*), London, 1878, p. 271.
[2] See art. MONOLATRY AND HENOTHEISM.
[3] Monier Williams, *Hinduism*[14], London, 1901, p. 27 f.
[4] Max Müller, p. 216 f.; G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, i. 252, 411.
[5] H. Schultz, *OT Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, ii. 150 f.; also art. God (Biblical and Christian), vol. vi. p. 254 f.
[6] See artt. DUALISM.

[1] Quoted from W. G. Palgrave by S. M. Zwemer, in *Arabia: the Cradle of Islam*, Edinburgh, London, and New York, 1900, p. 172 f.
[2] Quoted in Muir, *The Coran*, ed. London, 1903, p. 52.
[3] Jos. *Ant.* XIII. v. 9; Schürer, *HJP* II. ii. 14 f.
[4] A. E. Garvie, *Romans* ('Century Bible'), Edinburgh, 1901, p. 206.

ing that Paul has in view only the historical fate of a nation, for he asserts unequivocally God's freedom in electing or rejecting individuals. We must insist that 'it is not the Christian conception of God which dominates the discussion'; that Paul does not carry out his principle with rigorous logic, since 'he shrinks from affirming that God fitted the vessels of wrath unto destruction, and admits that God endured them with much long-suffering,' and that 'the metaphor of the potter itself cancels the argument,' for 'the potter does not use the clay wilfully, but makes of each lump what it is fitted to become.'[1] Apart from this argument in Ro 9–11, there are passages in which Paul asserts 'a doctrine of election as regards Christian believers (Ro $8^{28f.}$, Eph 1[4]). . . . The aim of this teaching is, however, to give the believer assurance that his relation to God does not begin in time with his faith in God's grace, but is deeply rooted, firmly fixed, in the eternal will of God. . . . Paul does not teach that God foreknows, foreordains, or elects any man unto eternal death. The responsibility for that he throws on the man himself.'[2]

We must not ascribe to Paul the deductions of a too ruthless logic, which infers that whom God does not elect He rejects, as he was concerned not with the speculative problem of the relation of divine sovereignty and human freedom, but solely with the practical assurance of God's unchanging grace.

3. Augustinianism. — Neither Paul's theology nor even his personal experience accounts wholly for Augustine's position; his previous philosophical training must be taken into our reckoning. While, as with Paul, it is man's entire dependence on God's grace that He seeks to magnify, yet he, in his controversy with Pelagianism, develops this practical assurance into a speculative doctrine which virtually denies man all freedom, and even transforms constraining grace into compelling force, fixing man's destiny solely by the eternal will of God.

'Sinful man depends,' says B. B. Warfield, 'for his recovery to good and to God, entirely on the free grace of God; this grace is therefore indispensable, prevenient, irresistible, indefectible; and, being thus the free grace of God, must have lain, in all the details of its conference and working, in the intention of God from all eternity.'[3]

'From the sinfulness and impotency of all men,' says G. P. Fisher, 'Augustine deduced the doctrine of unconditional predestination. They who believe in the Gospel with a saving faith are not merely elected to be the recipients of the heavenly reward; they are elected to be the recipients of faith (*de Prædest. Sanctorum*, 37, c. 18). Faith itself is the gift of God. All others are left in their sins—left to perish. They are not predestinated to sin, but rather to the punishment which sin deserves, from which they are not saved by electing grace. The number of the elect is fixed (*de Corrept. et Grat.* 39, c. 13). It is predetermined in the plan of God. But not all believers are of the elect. Perseverance in the new, holy life is the gift of God, and is bestowed on that portion of believers to whom God in His inscrutable wisdom chooses to grant it.'[4]

While Augustinianism triumphed over Pelagianism, yet the Church did not accept it in its entirety, for this emphasis on free grace is in inherent antagonism to the Church's doctrine and practice of 'works.'

'As over against the Pelagians,' says Warfield, 'the indispensableness of grace was quickly established; as over against the Semi-Pelagians, its prevenience was with almost equal rapidity made good. But there advance paused. If the necessity of prevenient grace was thereafter (after the second Council of Orange, 529) the established doctrine of the Church, the irresistibility of this prevenient grace was put under the ban, and there remained no place for a complete "Augustinianism" within the Church, as Gottschalk and Jansen were fully to discover.'[5]

4. The Reformers.—Augustinianism was revived at the Reformation. Luther in his controversy with Erasmus 'affirmed in almost reckless language the impotence of the human will. God's agency was asserted to be the universal cause. His will was declared to be subject to no law, but to be the foundation of right. Predestination was declared to be unconditional and to include as its objects the lost as well as the saved.' He did not attack Melanchthon, however, when he propounded the doctrine of synergism (*q.v.*)—a co-operation, however subordinate, of the human will with divine grace in conversion. In truth he himself had not a consistent doctrine. On the one hand, he affirmed 'that God from eternity desires the salvation of all men,' and, on the other, the truth nearest his heart was 'that salvation is by divine grace, without merit,' which he used as a weapon against the Roman Catholic insistence on human merit.[1] The doctrine of predestination was not with Luther, as it was with Zwingli, the starting-point of his theology. It was in Calvin, however, that the doctrine of the divine sovereignty found its full expression in a logical system of theology.

'Calvin and Calvinism,' says Fisher, 'emphasize not only the freedom, the unmerited character, of grace, but equally the *sovereignty* of God in the bestowal of it. The idea is that apart from this sovereignty in the selection of the subjects of it, grace would not be grace. . . . The peculiarity of Calvin's doctrine of predestination is that it includes in it the decree of reprobation. This the Lutheran confessions exclude. . . . God has once for all determined "whom He would admit to salvation and whom He would condemn to destruction" (Calvin, *Institutes*, III. xxi. 7).'[2]

God does not merely foresee the hardening of the heart of the sinners; but Himself brings it about by the withdrawal of His Spirit and by using Satan to influence their minds and deeds. Why God does this we must not ask, as God's will is above all. Yet there is a good and sufficient reason for every divine decree.[3]

It has been disputed whether Calvin is to be regarded as a supralapsarian or a sub- or infralapsarian. The question at issue was this: Did the divine decree of election and reprobation precede (in divine thought, not in time) or follow 'the consideration of man as fallen'? While in the heat of controversy Calvin seems to commit himself to the former view, his more considered judgment inclines to the latter.

'Calvin,' says J. Orr, 'always viewed election as from a "mass" already in condemnation, while, of course, recognizing that the fall of man also was embraced in the providence of God.'[4]

5. Later doctrinal developments.—A modification of Calvinism which gave the doctrine of divine sovereignty less the appearance of arbitrariness was the doctrine of the Covenants, or the Federal Theology,[5] of which Cocceius in Holland was the leading exponent. A deduction from the doctrine of election, which Calvin himself did not make, was that the Atonement in Christ's death must be provided only for the elect. Arminianism asserted the universality of the Atonement, in God's intention, although it is not actually efficient in all. A compromise was attempted in Amyraut's 'hypothetical universalism': the Atonement is for all, and yet it is applied only to the elect; and this view found wide acceptance.[6] It is unjust to regard Arminianism as simply a revived Pelagianism, for it taught an election conditional on God's foreknowledge of faith in the individual, man's dependence on God's grace for the ability to exercise saving faith, the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit for good works, the indispensableness, but not irresistibility, of grace. It is not necessary to follow in detail the subsequent controversies. The 'hypothetical universalism' of Amyraut, however, was capable of further development. If the Atonement avails for all, can it be God's purpose that its efficacy shall be limited to the elect because the operations of the Holy Spirit in producing saving faith are limited to them? The universality of the Atonement led James Morison backward to the universality of the love of God and forward to the universality of the work of the Holy Spirit: the three universalities was the battle-cry of the movement in Scotland of which he was leader. He still affirmed, however, that man was free to choose o

[1] Garvie, *Studies of Paul and his Gospel*, London, 1911, pp. 241–243.
[2] Garvie, *Romans*, p. 224.
[3] Art. AUGUSTINE, vol. ii. p. 224^{a}.
[4] *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, Edinburgh, 1896, p. 191 f.
[5] *ERE* ii. 224^{a}.

[1] Fisher, p. 292 f. [2] *Ib.* p. 300. [3] *Ib.*
[4] Art. CALVINISM, vol. iii. p. 152 f.
[5] See art. COVENANT THEOLOGY.
[6] See art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian).

to refuse this universal salvation. Starting from the conception of God as Father, as given in the revelation of Christ, and applying the conception of divine sovereignty thereto with the same logical rigour as did Calvinism, we should at last reach universalism.

6. Fatherhood and sovereignty.—Every monotheistic religion must affirm the divine sovereignty. Apart from impossibilities, metaphysical, logical, and moral, God can do whatsoever He wills. But whatsoever He wills depends and must depend on what God is. As we conceive God, so must we think of the divine sovereignty. If we think of God as Father, we must think of His sovereignty as fatherly. A doctrine of divine sovereignty that ends, as do Augustinianism and Calvinism, in the election of the few and the reprobation of the many has evidently started wrong—not from the Christian conception of God as revealed in Christ, but from a conception of sovereignty that in every country to-day which enjoys any measure of constitutional liberty would be repudiated as false. Even a sovereign to-day does not wield absolute and arbitrary power. The doctrine of election, it is argued in its favour, has its roots in the sense of man's impotence, and his dependence on God for every good; but is it in a child's trust in the father or a subject's submission to a sovereign? Must we not admit that, while the former attitude was not absent, yet it was the latter that was dominant, when the religious assurance was developed into the speculative doctrine? But does not the religious consciousness need to be allied with the moral conscience, which no less clearly and firmly affirms man's responsibility and liberty? The conception of God's Fatherhood, which implies man's moral affinity as well as his religious community with God, involves that God will so exercise His sovereignty, on which man depends, as not to deprive him of his liberty. It is no abrogation of the divine sovereignty, but only an exercise of it accordant with His Fatherhood, if He allows the activity of His will in dealing with men to be conditioned by the acts of their wills. Such a view of the divine sovereignty forbids the deduction from God's Fatherhood made by universalism; but it does leave us the hope that the Father who created man in His likeness and for fellowship, despite man's sin, has such resources in Himself, rational, righteous, and gracious, as will at last, not by the compulsion of force, but by the constraint of love, make His Fatherhood sovereign in mankind.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

SPACE.—The various ideas which have historically prevailed regarding the nature of space are commonly regarded as so many detached views, independent of, and mostly in conflict with, each other. In this article we propose to consider them from a different standpoint, and to regard each of those opinions or doctrines as contributing an important factor or element in the one true conception of space. In point of fact, there is scarcely a view or theory which has been put forward regarding space that does not express some important aspect of the truth.

1. History.—(*a*) *Greek philosophy.*—In early Greek philosophy the concept of space is confounded with that of matter, at any rate by the Pythagoreans. J. Burnet says:

'The Pythagoreans, or some of them, certainly identified "air" with the void. This is the beginning, but no more than the beginning, of the conception of abstract space or extension.'[1]

It still remains true that the most recent discussions as to the nature of space turn upon the relations between the two concepts, space and matter, and the objects which they denote. In modern speculations it is no longer the air, it is the ether, that is confounded with the void.

The first important conception of space which we have to notice is that of Plato. It is not necessary, for this purpose, to enter upon a discussion of the different interpretations which have been given to the Platonic philosophy in recent times. Whether we adopt the objective view of the Ideas, as the hypostatization of the universal, attributed to Plato by Aristotle, or the more subjective interpretation of Henry Jackson and R. D. Archer-Hind, based on the later dialogues, or that older view of St. Augustine, and in modern times of Cousin,[1] which combines both these interpretations, in none of these cases is the interpretation of the Platonic space essentially affected. Plato in his speculations seems to have travelled a road the reverse of that travelled by Fichte. As the latter began with an Ego which was suspiciously finite, and ended with an Absolute which had very few of the characters of Ego-hood (*Ichheit*) about it, so Plato began with an Absolute which continued itself into a world of ideas, and ended in a world-soul and a demiurge.

Space Plato speaks of in the *Timæus* as 'the receptacle, and as it were the nurse, of all becoming.'[2] 'It behoves that which is fitly to receive many times over its whole extent likenesses of all things, that is, of all eternal existences, to be itself naturally without part or lot in any of the forms. Therefore the mother and recipient of creation, which is visible and by any sense perceptible, we must call neither earth nor air nor fire nor water, nor the combinations of these nor the elements of which they are formed; but we shall not err in affirming it to be a viewless nature and formless, all receiving, in some manner most bewildering and hard to comprehend, partaking of the intelligible.'[3] 'This being so, we must agree that there is first the unchanging idea, unbegotten and imperishable, neither receiving aught into itself from without nor itself entering into aught else, invisible, nor in anywise perceptible—even that whereof the contemplation belongs to thought. Second is that which is named after it and is like to it, sensible, created, ever in motion, coming to be in a certain place and again from thence perishing, apprehensible by opinion with sensation. And the third kind is space everlasting, admitting not destruction, but affording place for all things that come into being, itself apprehensible without sensation by a sort of bastard reasoning, hardly matter of belief. It is with this in view that dreaming we say that all that exists must be in some place and filling some space, and that what is neither on earth nor in heaven anywhere is nought.'[4]

To some extent there can be no question with regard to the interpretation of this. Space is to Plato 'the other,' what in the Platonic philosophy takes the place of the *prima materia* in the Aristotelian philosophy. This interpretation has been completely established by Zeller,[5] though the opposite view, which makes primordial matter different from space, was still maintained by Gomperz.[6] But here a subtle difference of interpretation arises, which has a close connexion with recent philosophy. We may adopt a subjective view with Ritter,[7] and hold that the relation subsisting between the ideal and the sensible is 'a mere relation to the sentient,' and still, as Zeller points out,[8] the resulting view of matter can be adopted, with slight modifications apart from that theory. The Platonic theory of matter is then, in effect, as Zeller says, identical with that of Leibniz. This is the interpretation of Plato adopted by Archer-Hind, according to whom space, though the substrate and recipient of the images of the ideas, is only 'the law of our finite nature which ordains that we shall perceive all objects as extended in space,' and depends on a subjective view of the Ideas, which, following Jackson, Archer-Hind

[1] *Early Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., London, 1914, p. 51.

[1] *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien*, bk. iv., Paris, 1858.
[2] Archer-Hind, *Timæus*, London, 1888, p. 171.
[3] *Ib.* p. 179. [4] *Ib.* p. 184 *f.*
[5] *Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, ch. vii.
[6] *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London, 1901–12, iii. 366.
[7] *Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*, Eng. tr., Oxford and London 1838–46, ii. 320.
[8] P. 311.

adopts. It is different, however, if an objective view of the nature of the Idea is taken, as was done by Maguire in his *Essay on the Platonic Idea*.[1] Maguire's theory is indeed classed by Zeller[2] along with Ritter's, and regarded as exposed to the same criticism. But, owing to the doctrine of the objectivity of the Idea, Maguire's view of the subjectivity of space approaches much more closely to the modern 'theory of objects' of Meinong and his school. Spatial *entia* are *entia rationis*, which may or may not coincide with phenomenal existence.

With regard to the remarkable phrase, 'apprehensible by a sort of bastard reasoning, hardly matter of belief,' its significance will appear hereafter. Here, however, we may say that it is closely related to Plato's conception of the world-soul. The latter is compounded of the ideal element and the element of multiplicity. It is antecedent to the world and yet in a way presupposes the element of plurality. Plato's theory of space presents in this way a close analogy to the Hegelian view, with a difference characteristic of the objectivity of ancient philosophy, as against the subjectivity of modern philosophy. In Hegel thought, by reason of the inner law of contradiction, which is its essence, expels from itself the phenomenal world, the out-of-itselfness of which is space. In Plato the 'otherness' which clings to the Idea is space. The contradiction which in Hegel is inherent in thought is in Plato adherent to the Idea. It is the infinite region of dissimilitude.

Between Plato and Aristotle there is often great similarity in statement; but the actual thought is altogether different. Space in Plato is matter, the only matter there is. Aristotle correctly represents his master here.[3] But Aristotle's doctrine is rather an identification of space with matter. It closely resembles the modern doctrine of relativity in its more moderate forms. Matter exists in space, but the space in which it exists is itself determined and produced by the matter existing in it. Space is no antecedent empty receptacle, into which the world and the things of the world are fitted. But neither is it 'soft'; it does not expand or contract any more than time. Space is 'the first unmoved limit of the containing body';[4] *i.e.*, matter exists, but exists with inherent spatial character. It is the boundary of the containing body, in its relation to the contained, that constitutes the spatial existence of the latter. When there is no containing body, space does not exist; therefore the universe is not in space. If there were no contained, there would be no boundary; therefore there must be a plenum. Aristotle's doctrine is made perfectly clear by his reply to Zeno's difficulty—that space, not being a substance, would have to be in something which is in space, and so on *ad infinitum*. To this Aristotle gives the reply that space may be in something else, as health in warm beings as a state, or warmth in body as an affection.[5]

It is in relation to the well-known paradoxes of Zeno that Aristotle's doctrine attains its full significance. These paradoxes are based on the contradictions which arise from assuming the actuality of the infinitely small. The Aristotelian doctrine implies that matter is the potentiality of space. Matter is the potentiality of actual existence. It is only through matter passing into actual existence that space exists as a reality. Matter, as infinitely great or infinitesimally small, is nothing actual. It is identical with pure potency. The infinitely little, the infinitely great, do not actually exist. This contradicts recent mathematical doctrines which treat the infinite as actual. The views of Cantor and his school have been subjected to criticism on this very point by Poincaré.[6] There is, however, an older line of argument which seems to be decisive in favour of the Aristotelian position. Actual is that which has one or other of two opposite determinations, not that which hovers in uncertainty between both. Consider the series of Grandi. If infinitely prolonged, such a series may be said to be equal to 0 *or* 1. But '*either* . . . *or*' cannot be actual. Actual is that which is determinate; which, in accordance with the law of Excluded Middle, possesses one or other of two conflicting characters; which is, therefore, something more than the potentiality of either. But this character cannot belong to a series which is incomplete, whose last member cannot be said to be odd or even, + or −, *i.e.* which has no last member. The same reasoning which applies to series applies also to space. As Cantor himself has pointed out, the actual infinite has been rejected not only by philosophers, but also by mathematicians, such as Gauss and Cauchy.[1] The strongest support for the actual infinite is derived from the use of convergent series in mathematics. But, if the opinion held by both Augustus de Morgan and William Rowan Hamilton be true—that the mathematical validity of the summation of such infinite series does not at all depend on convergence, as is commonly thought, but on this alternation—then it may, on the contrary, be held that the true mathematical conception is the potential infinite.[2]

We therefore see in Aristotle's views an advance on those of Plato. To Plato space is a sort of logical ejection from the Idea, possessed of no independent existence. In Aristotle it has such independent existence, which it receives from that which stands over against the Idea—the *materia prima*. It receives existential reality from the latter and ceases to be a mere dialectical relativity of the Idea. At the same time, Aristotle's doctrine, by making the reality of space thus dependent upon matter, anticipates the element of truth underlying the modern theory of relativity.

The doctrine of the Stoics[3] that beyond the world there exists an unlimited void, the distinction of the Epicureans between place (*τόπος*) and room (*χώρα*), and their doctrine of the intangible nature of empty space[4] are to be regarded as important not so much in themselves as marking the next great development in the conception of space, as having an entitative though not substantial existence distinct from matter. According to Plotinus, the magnitude of things does not pre-exist in first matter. First matter has not bulk, but the 'phantasm of bulk' as aptitude for it. First matter, by its very indefiniteness, stands in an indefinite relation to magnitude. It is separately neither great nor small, but both small and great. Space is posterior to matter and bodies; therefore bodies must first be material before they can be spatial.[5] In these chapters there is much that anticipates all future speculation on the subject of space. Plotinus advances beyond Plato and Aristotle; at the same time it is the logical outcome of Aristotle's doctrine. Aristotle had carefully distinguished space as something different from matter and form. Matter as pure potentiality is prior to its expression in spatial existence. This is logically involved in his doctrine that space is in bodies—not as contained in them, but as an affection. In Iamblichus the aptitude of Plotinus is explained by the efficacy of the primal one.[6] Proclus seems to combine this with the opposed view of Porphyry, and even regards space as a body.[7] The problem of philosophy is to explain how incorporeal form must necessitate extension and matter issue in space.

(*b*) *Middle Ages.*—The Alexandrian school did not attribute to space an existence independent of matter, outside the world. The same position was maintained by St. Augustine.[8] This remains the fundamental point of view of the Aristotelianism

[1] London, 1866.
[2] *Phys.* iv. 2 (209b).
[3] *Ib.* iv. 3 (210b 22).
[4] *Science et méthode*, Paris, 1908, Eng. tr., London, 1914.
[5] P. 308.
[6] *Ib.* iv. 2 (212a 20).

[1] Cantor, Letter to G. Eneström, 4th Nov. 1885.
[2] See R. P. Graves, *Life of Sir W. R. Hamilton*, Dublin, 1882–89, iii. 538–540, 551.
[3] Diog. Laert. vii. 140.
[4] *Ib.* x. 40.
[5] *Enneads*, II. iv. 11 f.
[6] Simplicius, *in Præd.* p. 34, ed. Basil, 1557, quoted by J. Harris, *Philosophical Arrangements*, London, 1775, p. 116; cf. E. Vacherot, *Hist. crit. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1846–51, ii. 61.
[7] *Scholia in Aristotel.*, coll. C. A. Brandis, vol. vi. of *Opera*, Berlin, 1831–70, p. 379.
[8] *De Civ. Dei*, xi. 5.

of the Middle Ages. De Wulf[1] attributes to Henry of Ghent belief in the possibility of the existence of vacuum, but only as a deduction from his theory of matter. But, within the general view of the dependence of space or extension on matter, what is most significant for the Scholastic theory of space is the controversy as to the principle of individuation. It is unnecessary here to enter into the numerous theories put forward on this subject in mediæval philosophy. It is sufficient to consider the theory of Aquinas, the different interpretations of it, and one or two of the theories opposed to it.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the principle of individuation is not matter in general, but *materia signata certis dimensionibus, i.e.* matter limited by dimensive quantity. There are, however, two interpretations of the phrase. According to Ægidio Colonna and others, it means matter quantitatively determined—not the mere potentiality or capacity, but the actual determination. According to Cardinal Cajetan, it means matter endowed with the proximate power of receiving such determinate quantity. The former interpretation is exposed to the objection, actually made by the realists, that such quantitative determination already implies the possession of form. The latter interpretation endows the *materia prima* with a determinate capacity or potentiality. Now the rival theory of Duns Scotus regards *hæcceitas* as the individualizing principle. This difficult conception has been explained by Rousselot[2] as a force or active type in matter. It is the reverse of St. Thomas's theory on the first interpretation; but it approximates to it on the second. To attribute to first matter a capacity or force prior to its union with form seems to require a degree of reality in matter apart from form. Notwithstanding this difficulty, Cajetan's interpretation of St. Thomas finds favour with Neo-Scholastics.[3]

The logical solution of these difficulties is to be found in the theory of aptitudinal extension put forward by Suarez,[4] that there is in first matter a natural tendency towards extension. But no more than any other Scholastic does he explain why it should be there. It does not escape the witty criticism of Geulincx on all these theories, that quantity is like the size used to stiffen the brims of hats, without which matter would become flaccid or collapse to a point.[5] Plotinus had already foreseen this criticism when he said that matter separately was 'both small and great.'

(*c*) *Cartesian and English philosophy.*—The speculations of the later Scholastics prepared the way for the doctrine of Descartes. Aquinas had held that *materia prima* was numerically one. Suarez[6] held that numerical distinction was not repugnant to it; moreover, he also admitted that the Scotist rejection of absolute accidents that are more than modal could not be philosophically disproved. Add to this that the conception of *materia prima*, except in so far as it is synonymous with the occupation of space, is negative,[7] and we are led to the doctrine of Descartes that 'extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance.'[1] It is not an identification of matter with space, but of space with matter. Extension is the sole attribute of corporeal substance; and yet it is distinguished from it, not by a real distinction, such as exists between substances, nor by a merely modal one, but by a 'distinction of reason.' This does not mean that extension is anything distinct from bodies.

'I do not suppose,' says Descartes, 'any real qualities in nature which may be added to the substance as little souls to their bodies, and which could be separated from it by Divine power.'[2]

It follows from this necessary inherence of extension in matter that the universe is infinite. 'It involves a contradiction that the world should be finite or bounded.'[3] The crux of the Cartesian philosophy is the synthesis of thought and extension. This may be attempted either from the side of thought or from that of extension. The first way is that of Malebranche; the second that of Spinoza. According to Malebranche, there exists in the Divine Intelligence 'intelligible extension'—the archetype of matter.

'God includes within himself an ideal or infinite intelligible extension. For God knows extension, inasmuch as he has made it, and he can know it only in himself. . . . Intelligible extension is immovable even intelligibly. . . . But only by it are we able to see or imagine actually bodies in movement.'[4]

The difficulty in this conception is thus put by Kuno Fischer:

'The intelligible extension can belong neither to extension, for it is intelligible, nor to thought, for it is extension.'[5]

To have escaped this contradiction Malebranche should have placed in the Divine Reason, not extension, but its intelligibility.

The relation of the attributes, thought and extension, in the philosophy of Spinoza has received at least four different interpretations.[6] The Hegelian interpretation regards the attributes as something read into the substance by our minds—a view also maintained by Schwegler and Erdmann.[7] Only two interpretations concern us here—the mathematical and the dynamical. The former[8] emphasizes the unity of the attributes, and consequently brings the substance within each attribute according to Spinoza's own definition: 'An attribute I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.' The latter, brilliantly advocated by Fischer, really separates the attributes. It places the substance outside them, as it were. They are forces proceeding from it. This agrees with Spinoza's definition of substance: 'I understand substance to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself.' The definitions are inconsistent. Both interpretations are correct, and are the consequences of the inevitable dialectic which underlies our conception of space.

According to Leibniz, space is 'an order of coexistences.' It is 'a relation, an order, not only between things existing, but between possible things as if they existed.'[9] According to Descartes, the sides of a hollow empty body would touch each other. Leibniz, on the other hand, says:

'I distinguish matter from extension, and I admit that, if there were a vacuum in a sphere, the opposite poles in the hollow space would not on that account touch. But I believe that this is a case which the divine perfection does not allow.'[9]

Space without body does not exist, and body has

[1] *Hist. of Mediæval Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1909, p. 365.
[2] *Études sur la philosophie dans le Moyen Age*, Paris, 1840–42, iii. 57.
[3] Cardinal Mercier, *Cours de philosophie*, Louvain, 1892–99, ii. *Métaphysique générale*, pp. 78, 80; De Wulf, *Scholasticism Old and New*, tr. P. Coffey, Dublin, 1907, p. 108. See also on the general question J. B. Hauréau, *De la philosophie scolastique*, Paris, 1850, ii. 130–136; A. Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Mayence, 1864–66, ii. § 130; Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1874–75, i. 445 f.
[4] *Metaphysicæ Disputationes*, disp. xl. sect. iv. 15 ff., ed. Paris, 1619, ii. 378.
[5] *Metaphysica vera et ad mentem peripateticam*, Amsterdam, 1691, pt. i. § 4; *Opera Philosophica*, ed. J. P. N. Laird, 1892, ii. 222.
[6] *Metaph. Disp.* disp. xiii. sect. xi. 10 (ed. 1619, i. 304).
[7] Cf. Mansel, *Metaphysics*[3], Edinburgh, 1875, p. 266.

[1] *Principia*, i. § 53.
[2] *Œuvres*, ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1824–26, ix. 104.
[3] *Ib.* x. 241.
[4] *De la recherche de la vérité*, Paris, 1674–75, 10me éclaircissement, obj. iii.; cf. his *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, i. iii.
[5] *Gesch. der neuern Philosophie*, Heidelberg, 1897–1901, ii. 71.
[6] Fischer, ii. 371–386, 560–562.
[7] *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1889–90, ii. 72, note.
[8] Most clearly put by J. H. Stirling in his tr. of Schwegler's *Handbook of the Hist. of Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1867.
[9] *Nouveaux Essais*, bk. ii. ch. 13.

extension and is in space by reason of its passive resistance or impenetrability.

'This primitive passive power or principle of resistance does not consist in extension but in an exigency of extension.'[1]

Leibniz in this language approaches very close to the aptitudinal extension of the Scholastics—an approach which becomes closer still in the *Systema Theologicum*.[2] Yet the difference is marked. To the Scholastic not the *materia prima*, but aptitudinal extension, is *extensionis exigentia*. To Leibniz the *materia prima* itself is this. The whole difference between Scholastic and modern philosophy lies in the change. The Leibnizian view is finally formulated by Wolf in the definition, 'Spatium est ordo simultaneorum, quatenus scilicet coexistunt.'[3]

A series of writers, mostly English, have put forward views affirming a direct relation between the Deity and space. Some, as Henry More,[4] have made it one of identity—a doctrine alluded to by Berkeley[5] and Leibniz[6] and also attributed to Jonathan Edwards. Newton[7] suggests that infinite space is the sensorium of the Deity. More definitely, in the general scholium at the end of the *Principia*, he says:

'The Deity is not eternity nor infinity, but He is eternal and infinite; He is not duration nor space, but He endures or is expanded. He endures always and is present everywhere; and by existing at all times and in all places, He makes duration and space, eternity and infinity to be.'

Clarke makes immensity, *i.e.* infinite space, 'a mode of an essence of substance incomprehensible to us.'[8] These speculations, if they mean anything, are important as asserting a direct relation between infinite intelligence and infinite space.

The main course of English philosophy is, however, concerned with the psychological question as to how we get our knowledge of space—a question still unsettled. To Hobbes space was the phantasm of an existing thing, as existing.[9] To Cudworth there is no actual infinity of space, only a potential infinity or indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude.[10] According to Locke, we get the idea of space through sight and touch. Pure space, which is capable neither of resistance nor of motion, he distinguishes from solidity.[11]

'The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves.'[12]

He distinguishes between the idea of the infinity of space and the idea of space infinite. The former is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind over what repeated ideas of space it pleases. The latter supposes the mind already passed over and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition can never totally present to it, and carries in it a plain contradiction.[13] According to Berkeley, 'the ideas of space, outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight.'[14]

'All place or extension exists only in the mind.'[15] 'Those qualities [extension and figure] are in the mind only as they are perceived by it;—that is not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of *idea*.'[1]

According to Hume, 'the idea of extension is but a copy' of the 'impressions of colour'd points, dispos'd in a certain manner.' When the colours change, 'finding a resemblance in the disposition of colour'd points, of which they are compos'd, we omit the peculiarities of colour, as far as possible, and found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points, or manner of appearance, in which they agree. Nay even when the resemblance is carry'd beyond the objects of one sense, and the impressions of ouch are found to be similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts; this does not hinder the abstract idea from representing both, upon account of their resemblance.'[2]

The remarkable point in this theory is that somehow out of mere qualitative differences of two senses, sight and touch, an idea of an order of disposition of points or, as Hume afterwards says, of co-existent parts is formed, which is the idea of extension or space.

The culmination of this whole subjective view of space is found in the theory of Brown, Bain, and J. S. Mill, by which, out of a series of muscular sensations, confessedly only occupying time, length of space, and with it longitudinal extension in every direction, is constructed, in such a way, however, that length in space is at bottom length in time. The difficulty in this theory has already been perceived by Hamilton.[3] It is briefly: How get length in space out of length in time? Mill in his reply very properly dwells on the fact that the notion of simultaneity must be supposed to have been already acquired; but his theory of the synthesis is not satisfactory.[4]

The chief contribution of Reid to the theory of our knowledge of space is his theory of natural signs, especially those of the third class.[5] This theory is highly suggestive, and resembles Lotze's theory of local signs, without the *petitio principii* involved in the very name of the latter. What is wanted is an analysis of these signs and an explanation of how it is that certain sensations of sight and touch should be able to act as such—what it is in them that constitutes the sign.

(*d*) *Kant.*—The most prominent theory of space in modern philosophy is that of Kant. According to Kant, space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. The reference outward of sensations and their representation as out of and near each other presuppose the representation of space: space is a necessary representation *a priori* lying at the basis of all external intuitions. It is not a discursive or general concept of the relations of things, but a pure intuition. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity; space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor themselves in their relation to one another, *i.e.* no determinations of objects in themselves. Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of external sense.[6] Space is empirically real with regard to all possible external experience. It is transcendentally ideal as regards things in themselves. By means of this theory Kant undertakes to explain the *a priori* synthetical principles of geometry, and it is this claim that is contested at the present day. In a paper in *Mind*,[7] entitled 'Going Back to Kant,' the present writer pointed out that the synthesis involved in *a priori* knowledge is not explained by Kant; it is only assumed as already existing in the mind. In this respect the recent reaction against Kant's doctrine is

[1] *Opera philosophica*, ed. J. E. Erdmann, 2 pts., Berlin, 1839–40, p. 436.
[2] Tr. C. W. Russell, London, 1850, pp. 114–116.
[3] *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1730–36, § 589.
[4] *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, London, 1671, ch. 6 ff.; cf. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, ed. J. Harrison, London, 1845, iii. 231.
[5] *Works*[2], ed. A. C. Fraser, London, 1901, i. 323, *Siris*, § 270.
[6] Third Paper to Samuel Clarke, in *A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke*, London, 1717, p. 57.
[7] *Optics*, London, 1706, p. 20.
[8] *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, London, 1705, p. 39.
[9] *De Corpore*, pt. ii. ch. vii. § 2.
[10] *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, ed. J. Harrison, London, 1845, ii. 528.
[11] *Essay*, bk. ii. ch. iv. [12] *Ib.* ch. viii. § 15.
[13] *Ib.* ch. xvii. § 7. [14] *New Theory of Vision*, § 46.
[15] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 67.

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 49.
[2] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. i. pt. ii. § iii.
[3] *The Works of Thomas Reid*[3], ed. W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 869.
[4] J. S. Mill, *An Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, London, 1865, ch. xiii.; Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*[3], do. 1868, p. 375.
[5] *Works of Reid*[2], p. 121 f.
[6] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pt. i. 'Transcendental Æsthetic, sect. i. 'Of Space,' §§ 2–4.
[7] ix. [1884] 274 ff.

relatively justified; though the attempt to reduce mathematics to analytical truths cannot succeed, this synthetic reference must itself be explained.

In England Kant's doctrine of space was maintained by Hamilton and Mansel; but Hamilton also asserted an *a posteriori* perception of extension as distinct from the *a priori* form space.[1] This is the perception of a great truth. But, to make it such, it must be shown how the texture of *a priori* thought is interwoven with spatial reality.

In a one-sided form something like this is to be found in the deductions of space in post-Kantian idealism. The most remarkable is that of Fichte.[2] He here expresses verbally the principle which we have had in view throughout this article: 'No space, without construction of it, notwithstanding, not space, but only its consciousness is thereby to be produced [ideal relation]; no construction without presupposing it [real relation].' Further on he says we should never get space out of us if we had it not in us.

To Schelling, too, space is nothing but 'an action of the intelligence.' 'We can define space as arrested time, time as flowing space.'[3]

Precisely the same determinations are found in Hegel: 'This immediate unity of space and time is already the ground, through which they are; for the negation of space is time.' 'The past and future of time, as *being* in nature, is space.'

In other words, space, if it is the abstract out-of-itselfness of nature, is in constant process, a sort of ideal movement, like a vector in quaternions; but this movement is time. Conversely, this movement constantly deposits itself, as it were, in space. For the rest, Hegel, like Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibniz, regards space as always filled; nor can a space be shown that is distinguished from its filling.[4]

2. Laws of thought and the concept of space.—We have now surveyed the views of the great thinkers. Herbart and Lotze, Schopenhauer and Hartmann, really only repeat or modify previous philosophical standpoints. It remains that we sum the results of this history. It is not any intelligible or subjective space that stands over against or generates objective space, but intelligence or thought itself acting according to its own laws. What are those laws? They may be described as the well-known laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. The elements in sensation out of which thought constructs space are its most abstract features—identity, difference, relation. But here a difficulty presents itself. Grassmann truly says:

'The concept of space can in no way be produced by thought, but always stands over against it as a given thing.' He adds: 'He who will maintain the opposite, must undertake the task of deducing the necessity of the three dimensions of space from the pure laws of thought—a task the solution of which presents itself as impossible.'[5]

We accept both these positions of Grassmann—that space must be given over against thought; that it cannot be got from the pure laws of thought alone. We go farther; we say that the pure laws of thought themselves cannot be got from thought alone; in other words, that the self-diremption of thought cannot take place apart from space and time. This means that abstract thought, space, and time are all correlative. This involves the apparent circle that, while space receives its determinate character from thought, the latter is again determined by the former. It has therefore to presuppose as prior to itself what itself has produced. But this is what this whole history has taught. This is Plato's 'bastard reasoning.' This is that aptitudinal extension which has to be presupposed as the basis of that actual extension which it is not, but which it produces. This is the source of that double interpretation, mathematical and dynamical, to which the attributes of Spinoza equally lend themselves. The psychological analysis of the English school—Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Brown, and Mill—acquires a new meaning when considered as the analysis not only of processes taking place in the individual mind, but also of universal relations of thought and being.

3. The three dimensions.—It remains to touch upon the problem of the three dimensions. Seeing that spaces of more than four dimensions, as well as non-Euclidean spaces generally, involve, as spaces, no internal contradictions—*i.e.*, the geometries based upon them are internally consistent—it is evident that we cannot derive the three dimensions from the mere principle of contradiction.

Leibniz[1] seeks to derive the three dimensions of space from the impossibility of more than three straight lines which cut in a point being perpendicular to each other. This has been objected to by Kant on the ground that it involves a circle. Kant himself conceived the possibility of two other proofs—one from the simplicity of the three first powers of numbers, which he rejects; another, and a highly interesting one, from the fact of substances in the existing world acting on each other in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance.[2] A proof with which he seems scarcely satisfied himself, and which seems at bottom not different from that of Leibniz, has been put forward by Lotze.[3] Hegel confines himself to saying that the necessity of three dimensions rests on the nature of the notion or concept.[4] Whewell[5] gives a proof from the fact that each portion of space has a boundary, and is extended both in the direction in which its boundary extends and also in a direction from its boundary. A derivation from the concept of motion similar to some of the foregoing has been put forward by Schmitz-Dumont.[6]

The fact that none of these attempts is satisfactory—all seem to involve *petitio principii*—should not preclude us from recognizing that they may be on the right track. The present writer believes that a proof may be derived from the imaginary symbol $\sqrt{-1}$ combined with the concept of order. A more satisfactory proof is the following. By far the most important and original contribution to our subject is the memoir by A. B. Kempe, 'On the Theory of Mathematical Form,' in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society, for 1886,[7] with supplementary paper, 'The Subject-Matter of Exact Thought,' in *Nature*, December 18th, 1890. In the art. 'The Theory of Mathematical Inference' in the *American Mathematical Monthly* for Jan. 1900 the present writer said:

'Mr. Kempe has shown that between the mathematical theory of points and the logical theory of statements, a striking correspondence exists. Between the laws defining the form of a system of points, and those defining the form of a system of statements, perfect sameness exists with one exception. The former is subject to a law to which the latter is not subject. It is sufficient here to say that it is the law "which expresses the fact that two straight lines can only cut once."

From these conclusions we may draw the converse inference that the laws which govern geometrical theory can be deduced from logical or purely analytical principles, taken in conjunction with that law in which the form of a system of points differs from the form of a system of statements. We have now to ask, Is there anything omitted from the form of a system of statements as contemplated by Mr. Kempe, or by the ordinary logic (and there is complete agreement between them), which would account for the absence of the particular law which distinguishes geometrical theory? I think there is. Mr. Kempe in order to effect his assimilation of the logical to the geometrical theory, and in particular in explaining the processes of immediate inference, has introduced two constants which play the same part in the logical theory that the "absolute" does in geometry. He entitles them "truism" and "falsism" respectively. It is by relation to these that such logical relations as contrariety, sub-contrariety, sub-alternation, analogous to the metrical relations of points in geometry, are determined. He considers

1 *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, Edinburgh, 1859–60, ii. 114.
2 *Werke*, Berlin, 1845–46, ii. 90–94.
3 *Werke*, Stuttgart, 1856–61, i. iii. 476.
4 *Werke*, Berlin, 1832–40, vii. i. 44, 47, 57, 61.
5 *Die Ausdehnungslehre v. 1844*[2], Leipzig, 1878, p. xxiii.

1 *Essais de théodicée*, Amsterdam, 1710, § 351; cf. § 196.
2 *Werke*, ed. K. Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert, Leipzig, 1838–42, v. 25, 27.
3 *Metaph.* bk. ii. ch. ii. § 135.
4 *Werke*, vii. 1, 48
5 *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*[3], London, 1858, i. 97.
6 *Zeit und Raum*, Leipzig, 1876.
7 Vol. clxxvii. p. 1.

"truisms" and "falsisms" as propositions or statements standing in the system of statements on the same footing with all other statements. In reality this is not so. The truism and falsism of Mr. Kempe are really the laws of Identity and Contradiction in disguise, and every synthetic statement or proposition expresses more than what these laws require. The principle that a real proposition refers to, or is a synthesis with, something more than itself, is as old as Aquinas, and is indeed the fundamental principle which makes our thinking dependent on experience. It is the non-recognition of this which prevents Mr. Kempe from evolving the relation of noncollinearity from the relation of a truism and falsism to each other, which ought to be capable of being done, if it were true that these propositions could rank *pari passu* with all other propositions. A truism is not as such a true proposition. Apart from the postulate of synthesis, no logical relation exists between the truism and falsism. Contradictories are in this case compatible, as Venn and Kant before him have pointed out.

If these views be true, I believe it ought to be possible to deduce the properties of Euclidean space, not from the analytical laws of thought, but from the pure postulate of synthesis, when subjected to conditions arising from these laws. The postulate can be shown to involve two things—(1) Infinity, (2) the necessary relation or connection of what Mr. Kempe styles truism and falsism equivalent to Boole's [1] $x(1-X)=0$.'

This pure postulate of synthesis is identical with that presupposition of the real existence of space which intelligence has to make as being prior to the very act by which it ideally determines space.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references quoted in the art. see: T. K. Abbott, *Sight and Touch*, London, 1864; W. H. S. Monck, *Space and Vision*, do. 1872; J. H. Stirling, *Sir William Hamilton*, do. 1865; W. Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*[4], Leipzig, 1893, ch. ii.; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1891, ch. xx.; G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*[3], do. 1913, bk. ii. pt. ii.; B. Erdmann, *Die Axiome der Geometrie*, Leipzig, 1877; L. Couturat, *Les Principes des mathématiques*, Paris, 1905, 'Appendice sur la philosophie des mathématiques de Kant'; A. N. Whitehead, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919.

GEORGE J. STOKES.

SPENCER, HERBERT.—The philosophy of Herbert Spencer is eminently characteristic of the Victorian era. It is dominated by two fundamental principles: (1) the doctrine of evolution, which was defended by Spencer several years before Darwin's researches were published; (2) his conception of political and social freedom, which was so powerful a factor in political thought during the middle of the 19th century. It so happened, therefore, that the predominant interests of his mind were just those which most markedly captured public attention during his life. His intense conviction and high intellectual qualities naturally brought him to the front as the leading exponent of the progressive ideas of his time; and the change which subsequently overtook those ideas similarly involved a great decline in his influence. The natural growth of Spencer's mind was in close harmony with the spirit of the times in which he flourished. His philosophic principles luxuriated in a congenial soil and atmosphere; they drew to themselves the whole of the intellectual and emotional vigour of his mind; at an early age he began to *live* in his ideas; philosophy more and more absorbed his life; and the external movements and incidents of his career are of little interest. The real life which he lived was the subjective life, which is best recorded by a description of his philosophy.

1. **Life.**—Spencer was born at Derby on 27th April 1820, son of a school teacher of strong radical views in politics and Quaker tendencies in religion. The father, like the son, was characterized by extreme independence of thought and action, and Spencer's education was of an unusual character. He was taught little of the ordinary subjects of a school curriculum; but his natural powers of thought and observation were developed by his father's method of directing him in the way of self-education and of learning to find for himself the answers to the questions and problems set him. Thus at the age of thirteen he had received no instruction in English history or biography, or in the English language, and next to nothing in Latin or Greek. He had, however, some acquaintance with the rudiments of physics and chemistry, in which his father was specially interested; he had picked up some natural history; he was backward for his age in most subjects, except perhaps geometry, on which his father placed much reliance as an educational discipline. In short, his education was largely neglected; but such as he received was carried out on principles which in recent times have come into favour among the leading authorities on education. For a year or two he was subjected to a somewhat more intensive training at the hands of his uncle, Rev. Thomas Spencer, a well-known social reformer and temperance agitator of the time. But when his official education was concluded at the age of seventeen, the only subject in which he had attained an average standard was mathematics.

Spencer began life as an assistant schoolmaster at Derby; but after three months an opening occurred on the London and Birmingham Railway, and he determined to enter upon the career of a civil engineer. For three or four years he was employed upon the railways which were then being rapidly constructed. He developed a strong interest in mechanics, and, when in 1841 his engineering work temporarily came to an end, he turned joyfully to the prospect of living by mechanical inventions. But these for the most part met with no commercial success, and after a while he determined to seek his fortune in literature. In 1842 he wrote a series of letters to an advanced dissenting organ called *The Nonconformist*, maintaining the view that police administration and the preservation of order were the sole duties of the State, to the exclusion even of preparedness for war, which he then regarded as wrong both for offensive and for defensive purposes. After several years spent in casual political writing and in engineering, Spencer at length in 1848 became sub-editor of *The Economist* at a salary of 100 guineas a year, with free bedroom and attendance at its offices in the Strand. He became friendly with John Chapman, the publisher, at whose *soirées* he met George Henry Lewes and many more of his later friends, including George Eliot, with whom he was soon on terms of intimacy. About this time he also made the acquaintance of Huxley and Tyndall.

In 1850 Spencer began to win a literary reputation by the publication of his first book, *Social Statics*, the main doctrine of which was the same as he consistently maintained throughout his life—the limitation of the functions of government to the bare minimum of maintaining order at home and resisting aggression from abroad. Thereafter he found admittance to many of the leading reviews; one of his most interesting articles, which appeared in the *Leader* of 20th March 1852, dealt with 'The Development Hypothesis,' in which he advocated a theory of evolution, seven years before the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. In 1853 Spencer resigned his position on *The Economist*, hoping to earn a sufficient livelihood through writing for reviews. In 1855 he published his first philosophical work, *The Principles of Psychology*, which was attacked in *The National Review* for its atheistic tendencies, but otherwise received little attention. During the writing of this work Spencer's health permanently broke down, and for the remainder of his life he was a victim of neurasthenia, which severely curtailed his hours of work; its chief symptom was an inveterate insomnia.

In 1858 Spencer drew up his scheme for 'A System of Philosophy'; and, to secure an income while writing it, he decided to issue it in quarterly instalments to subscribers at 2s. 6d. for each instalment of 80–96 pages. In England and America about 600 subscribers were obtained; but the work was carried on amid great financial difficulties, and was more than once threatened with stoppage. For many years Spencer's life is a mere record of ill-health, notwithstanding which volume after volume continued to appear. He lived mainly in boarding-houses in London till 1889, when he took a house with three maiden ladies in St. John's Wood. His most intimate friends were his fellow-members of the famous X Club, and he became a regular habitué of the Athenæum Club. The publication of the 'System of Philosophy' was concluded, after occupying 36 years, in 1896. Already for many years public recognition had been secured, and a chorus of public congratulation followed. In 1898 he removed to Brighton, where he died on 8th Dec. 1903. He was cremated at Golders Green without any religious ceremony, and his ashes were interred in Highgate Cemetery.

2. **Works.**—Spencer's writings as finally published are contained in 20 volumes, including the two volumes of *Autobiography*. In addition he published two small volumes of his father's—one a *System of Lucid Shorthand* (1893), the other an *Inventional Geometry* (1892) for the teaching of children. He published, moreover, during his lifetime eight folio volumes of *Descriptive Sociology* (1873–81), consisting of cuttings selected from numerous books of travel, describing the manners of primitive peoples. These served as a basis for the generalizations of his *Principles of Sociology*. Two further volumes have been published (1910) since his death, and also a posthumous pamphlet *Against the Metric System* (1904), an earlier edition of which he included in *Various Fragments* (1897, [2] 1900). Some unimportant writings of Spencer are included in the authorized *Life and Letters* by David Duncan. Of Spencer's twenty

[1] George Boole, *An Investigation of the Laws of Thought*, London, 1854, p. 49.

olumes ten are devoted to his 'System of Synthetic Philosophy.' They are as follows:

(1) *First Principles.*[1]—This, the opening volume of the philosophy, is divided into two parts, of which pt. i., 'The Unknowable,' sets forth Spencer's religious and metaphysical views. He attempts to establish a reconciliation between science and religion, by accepting as the fundamental truth that factor which they both possess in common, viz. the belief in the existence of some ultimate cause of phenomena — some profound mystery which lies at the back of the universe and 'from which all things proceed.' This ultimate mystery he terms 'the Unknowable,' and he separates himself from religion in denying to it any attributes of personality, or immortality, or any moral bearing. Since it is unknowable, these qualities, he says, cannot be predicated of it. And yet, with strange inconsistency, he goes on to affirm that it is infinite and absolute, omitting to explain how that which is absolute can be the cause of (thus entering into relation with) the phenomena of the knowable. However that may be, Spencer presents this 'Inscrutable Existence' as his substitute for religion. He himself regarded it with reverence, and considered that the religion of the future would take the form of a passive contemplation of 'the Unknowable.' Needless to say, this reconciliation between science and religion has been accepted by neither party. Science moves in the sphere of matter and energy, and has no interest in ultimate metaphysical existences. Religion does not accept a logical formula as a substitute for a God — a formula barren of emotional content and with no moral colouring.

The second part of *First Principles* deals with 'the Knowable.' Spencer takes the two physical laws, Indestructibility of Matter and Conservation of Energy, combines them into one under the title 'Persistence of Force,' and formulates it as the widest generalization of Philosophy, from which all the minor laws of science may theoretically be deduced. He then proceeds to his doctrine of evolution—not organic evolution only, but universal evolution. He observes that all matter and energy is in a permanent state of change or flux; and he sets forth the laws according to which this flux everywhere proceeds—in the development of nebulæ to solar systems, the formation of the earth and geologic change generally, the evolution of animals and plants, the mind of man, the development of nations or societies, and all social institutions. This all-embracing law of universal evolution is stated in the last edition of *First Principles* as follows:

'Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.'[2]

It is easy enough to perceive that such a formula does describe the main outlines of the course of change during the transformation of a nebula into a system of stars and planets; so also does it cover the naked-eye appearance of evolution from Amœba to man, and the development of the embryo in animals and plants. Even if, as Spencer endeavoured to prove, it is a correct statement of the course of all change in all spheres of human art and knowledge, the question still remains, How far is it significant? Has it the profound philosophical importance that he attributed to it? All that can be said at present is that, after more than half a century, it has proved to be heuristically barren. Spencer's case would perhaps have been stronger if he had left his formula as an inductive generalization. But, not content with this, he endeavoured to give it greater finality and deeper significance by deduction from the 'Persistence of Force.' In this attempt he certainly exceeded the range within which deduction is legitimate. The remaining sections of the philosophy are mainly and overtly the applications of the law of evolution to the various departments of human knowledge. He passed over astronomy and geology as being relatively simple, and proceeded at once to the organic realm.

(2) *The Principles of Biology.*[1]—The application of the law of evolution to living organisms brought Spencer into close connexion with the whole Darwinian movement. He was one of the very small minority who warmly believed in organic evolution and defended it in public, years before Darwin and Wallace announced their discovery of natural selection, to which Spencer in his *Principles of Biology* first gave the alternative name of 'survival of the fittest.' In the absence of this factor, Spencer imagined that inheritance of acquired characters was sufficient by itself to account for the whole phenomenon of organic evolution. He believed that the environment exerts direct and immediate action on individuals (which of course it does); he believed also that the use or disuse of its organs by any individual leads to the growth or reduction of those organs (which is equally undeniable); but he also held that these modifications of individual structure are passed on by heredity, and that their summation through many generations can thus account for the evolution of species. Of the latter doctrine there remains to the present day no evidence whatsoever. It must therefore be affirmed that Spencer, though right in his belief in organic evolution, was totally wrong in his conception of its method. On the discovery of natural selection, he immediately embraced the new theory, holding, however, that it was applicable chiefly to primitive forms of life. He consistently defended to the end of his life the doctrine that acquired characters are inherited, and that this is an adjuvant factor in evolution. In the nineties he carried on a long and vigorous controversy with Weismann on the subject.

Other features of *The Principles of Biology* were his definition of life as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations'; a theory of heredity as being due to 'constitutional units,' larger than molecules, but smaller than cells, which, like the molecules of a crystal, were possessed of a fixed 'polarity' and tended to fall into an arrangement characteristic of the structure of the species; finally, a doctrine of the antagonism between individuation and reproduction. These theories still possess considerable interest and value.

(3) *The Principles of Psychology.*[2] — This is perhaps the most original and important of the philosophic series. It introduced into psychology for the first time the idea of evolution, which runs through the whole work, although first published four years before the *Origin of Species*. But it suffers again from the emphasis laid on inheritance of acquired characters as the main factor of mental evolution. Thus one of the most important theories of the work is that in which Spencer by the aid of this factor endeavoured to establish a compromise between the empirical and the transcendental schools. Locke affirmed that all intelligence was the product of experience by the individual. Kant, on the other hand, insisted that intelligence was an innate endowment. Spencer put forward the attractive theory that

[1] London, 1862, [6]1900; popular ed., 2 vols., 1910.
[2] ii. 321 (pop. ed.).

[1] London, 2 vols., 1864–67, rev. ed., 1898–99.
[2] The 1st ed., London, 1855, was in 1 vol.; 2nd ed. in 2 vols., 1870–72; [4]1899.

intelligence is in all cases originally based on experience, but that the experience may be inherited, so that individuals are in fact born with innate powers of intelligence. In other words, intelligence is *a priori* for the individual, but *a posteriori* for the race. Plausible as this theory first appeared, it has not stood the test of later knowledge. The theory now most widely held is, not that intelligence gradually becomes instinctive and automatic in the course of generations, but that it is formed out of automatic, reflex, and instinctive actions by increasing composition and complexity.

Spencer analyzed mind into 'feelings' and 'relations between feelings.' The fundamental process of thought is the recognition of similarity or dissimilarity between two successive states of consciousness. In this doctrine he closely approached the associationist school.

Coming to the question of realism *versus* idealism, Spencer began by inquiring what is the test of truth. He concluded that the ultimate test of the truth of any proposition lies in our inability to conceive its negation. This test he called 'the universal postulate,' which is involved in every link of a chain of argument or reasoning. Now the theory of idealism, he says, is based upon a chain of reasoning with many links, and therefore as many applications of the universal postulate. The theory of realism, on the other hand, being a direct deliverance of consciousness, involves but one application of the universal postulate; and realism is by so much the more probable theory than idealism. Spencer thus confessed himself a realist, though with the proviso that the only fundamental reality is 'the Unknowable,' of which all phenomena are but manifestations. In this amended form he called his doctrine 'transfigured realism.' Few persons in these days would accept it, and a doubt must be expressed whether Spencer, intent as he was on his own line of thought, ever really appreciated the arguments of Berkeley and Hume.

(4) *The Principles of Sociology*.[1]—This is the longest single division of the philosophy, the multitudinous facts contained in it being drawn from the tables of the *Descriptive Sociology*. The chief conclusions reached are that societies fall into two main categories, the militant and the industrial, which are in strong contrast to one another. The former type is characterized by compulsory co-operation, the latter by voluntary co-operation. In the militant type of society government ramifies through every branch of a citizen's activities, individual liberty is narrowly restricted, the lives and actions of men are severely controlled by the State. In the industrial type of society, on the other hand, individual liberty is highly developed, the functions of the State are limited within narrow boundaries, the régime of contract has superseded the régime of status. The militant type is adapted for war, and is found where wars are frequent; the industrial type is a product of peace. With the militant type Spencer finds associated many of the personal vices of mankind, whereas the virtues are associated with the industrial type. He further subdivides the militant type into that which is purely military and that which is socialistic. The fundamental resemblance between these two arises from the wide extension of governmental organization in each, by contrast with the individual liberty of the industrial type. He holds that the difference of purpose for which that organization exists in the two cases cannot obscure their fundamental similarity.

Of the other doctrines of *The Principles of Sociology* the most important perhaps are those contained in the 'Data' and in the 'Inductions,' which form pts. i. and ii. respectively of the work. In the former the origin of all forms of religious worship is traced to ancestor-worship. In the latter an analogy is drawn in extreme detail between the individual organism and the social organism.

(5) *The Principles of Ethics*.[1]—This work was regarded by Spencer as the flower of his whole philosophy. His ethical principles are based both on evolution and on hedonism. Moral conduct, he says, is that which conduces to the maintenance of life, whether of the individual or of the species, or of social life. A system of morals should therefore be founded on a true doctrine of the evolution of life. But the ends of life are in general furthered by happiness. The pursuit of happiness, with certain notable exceptions, is advantageous to survival; had it been otherwise, the species would long ago have become extinct. Hence an ethics of evolution is also an ethics of hedonism. The happiness to which Spencer refers is of course mainly that derived from the higher, and not the lower, emotions.

In 'The Ethics of Individual Life,' dealt with in pt. iii., Spencer emphasizes man's duty to himself as distinct from his duty to his neighbours. He should take sufficient rest, and attend to his health and amusements; dereliction from these duties is a breach of moral principle. Spencer opposed a life of undue self-denial, arguing that wholesome forms of enjoyment are demanded by ethical principles.

The culminating portion of the work, however, is in pt. iv., entitled 'Justice,' in which Spencer defined the duties of the State with respect to its component individuals. He starts from the theory of the survival of the fittest. In every society the most vigorous and strongest members will, if unimpeded, achieve most success, and will thus multiply and hand on their qualities to future generations. The weaker strains will fail and gradually die out. Society will thus be gradually purged of its weaklings, and the race will be carried on by the most efficient. The maintenance of this law was regarded by Spencer as of cardinal importance to the welfare of the species. In order that its effects might be most fully realized, therefore, he urged that individuals must be as far as possible emancipated from all interference by the State. They must be left to reap the natural rewards of their modes of life. Clearly, however, the doctrine of liberty cannot be rendered absolute; for then crime would be unrestrained, and the highest success might be attained by a career of robbery and fraud. The freedom of the individual must, therefore, be limited by the State just in so far as is necessary (and no more) to preserve the like freedom for every other individual. Spencer's formula is:

'Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.'[2]

The practical results deduced by Spencer from this formula are that the proper functions of the State are limited to two things only: (1) prevention of foreign aggression, for which purpose an army and navy must be maintained, and (2) prevention of crime at home, *i.e.* prevention of aggression by individuals on one another. He interprets the phrase 'individual aggression' with considerable latitude; thus loud street noises are to be regarded as an aggression which should be suppressed; so also keeping a house in an insanitary condition, to the danger or annoyance of neighbours. But, outside his formula, all other under-

[1] Vol. i., London, 1876, [3]1885; vol. ii., 1882; vol. iii., 1896.

[1] Two vols., London, 1892–93. 'The Data of Ethics,' forming pt. i. of vol. i., was originally published separately in 1879.

[2] *Principles of Ethics*, ii. 46.

takings—such as education, the post office, road-making—are regarded as outside the province of government. Spencer urges that, if the State had never embarked on these activities, they would have been carried on by corporations of private individuals, and for the most part far more efficiently than they are at present. Leaving aside Spencer's formula of justice, and the corollaries which he drew from it, the essence of his ethics is that individual freedom should be brought to the highest point consistent with social order. He recognized that all these conclusions may be abrogated in time of war, and he was an inveterate hater of all war. He held that peace was an inviolable condition of social prosperity and progress; that war, other than defensive war, was the most abominable of all crimes.

While thus reducing the functions of government to those of merely maintaining a social condition in which natural selection could work unhampered, Spencer was far from asserting that the severity of the process should not be tempered by philanthropic sentiment. Accordingly he concludes his *Principles of Ethics* with two sections devoted to 'Negative Beneficence' and 'Positive Beneficence,' in which he describes the various ways in which the business and social relations of men should be redeemed from the hardships of a crude struggle for existence. Poor relief, *e.g.*, though no business of the State, should be undertaken by private persons. The relations of employer and employed should be governed not only by economic pressure, but also by a proper infusion of humane and philanthropic sentiment. This, however, Spencer considers outside the province of law; and the injunctions of 'beneficence' are to be enforced only by public opinion.

This is the end of the 'Synthetic Philosophy.' It is sufficiently obvious without further comment why Spencer has now passed so much out of fashion. In the sphere of politics the dominating note has now become equality rather than liberty. It is very possible that liberty may once again become a political ideal, but hardly in the form in which Spencer preached it. The great and luminous conceptions which lie at the back of his ethics were worked out by him into formulæ too narrow and precise to contain them. Moreover, not unnaturally, the work itself is apt to be judged by its practical conclusions; these being rejected, the fundamental conceptions tend likewise to be consigned to oblivion. It is unfortunate that Spencer's fine conception of human freedom should be condemned wholesale, merely because he too often applied it in a dogmatic and unsatisfactory manner.

Besides the ten volumes of philosophy, Spencer published ten other volumes. Three of these contain his *Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative* (1857–74). Many of them were written while he was a young man; and their subject-matter is for the most part embodied in a more systematic form in the 'Philosophy.' They are written in a more vivacious and attractive style than occurs in Spencer's more formal works. *Social Statics* has been already alluded to. *Various Fragments* (1897, ²1900) and *Facts and Comments* (1902) are two volumes of short essays on a great variety of subjects, written when Spencer was an old man. The *Autobiography* (1904) in two large volumes is the dullest of all Spencer's writings, and betrays the barrenness of his life, the current of which had been drawn away into his philosophical works. The two other volumes remaining to be mentioned achieved a far higher commercial success than any other of his publications. The *Study of Sociology* (1873) was written for the 'International Scientific Series' at the request of E. L. Youmans. It is concerned mainly with social science in general and the difficulties attending its study owing to the numerous different kinds of bias which intrude themselves at every point. Being comparatively short and intended for the popular market, it is the first book that should be read by a student of Spencer, and the only one of which perhaps it may be said that every well-read person ought to have read it. Finally, there is the *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (1861), which has had the most profound influence on all modern educational theories. It extols science as by far the most important ingredient in a good education. It strongly insists, moreover, on non-coercive methods; it is in this sphere that Spencer's sentiments of liberty have found the widest acceptance.

LITERATURE.—The two main authorities on Spencer's life are *An Autobiography*, 2 vols., London, 1904; and David Duncan, *The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, do. 1908. Apart from these, the only complete treatment of Spencer's life and works from the modern standpoint is the present writer's *Herbert Spencer*, in the series 'Makers of the Nineteenth Century,' London, 1917. In that volume will be found a complete bibliography, both of Spencer's own works and of the works by others who have dealt with him. HUGH ELLIOT.

SPERONISTÆ.—This is the name by which the Cathari (see art. ALBIGENSES) were known in Italy in the 13th cent., and they are thus designated in a law of the emperor Frederick II., A.D. 1224 (Mansi, *Concilia*, Venice, 1759–98, xxiii. 590). Charles Schmidt is of opinion that it is probably derived from Sperone, an Italian town in Piedmont, whose bishop, Robert of Sperone, along with his followers, had embraced the dualistic theory of the Manichæans (*Hist. et doctrine de la secte des Cathares ou Albigeois*, Paris, 1849, ii. 281–282; see also J. C. L. Gieseler, *A Compendium of Ecclesiastical History*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1853–65, iii. 446). J. BASS MULLINGER.

SPHINX.—In the well-known Greek myth the composite monster, with the head and bosom of a woman, the body of a dog or a lion, the tail of a serpent, the wings of a bird, the paws of a lion, and a human voice, who propounded enigmas, destroying those who failed to solve them, and who perished, self-destroyed, when her riddle was solved by Œdipus, bore the name of Sphinx ('Strangler'). Greek travellers, coming into the Nile Valley, found there also a composite monster, or many varieties of such a creature, who recalled to them their own native tradition, and upon these they bestowed the name of the creature of the Greek myth. Apart from the name, however, and a superficial similarity in the fact that the Greek monster and the Egyptian (in some cases) were both human-headed and brute-bodied, there was really nothing in common between the two types or the conceptions which they represent.

The original idea of the Egyptian sphinx was that of an imaginary quadruped, human-headed, living in the desert, and assumed by the sun-god Ra as his incarnation, for the purpose of protecting his friends. Out of this conception grew the idea of the sphinx as thē guardian of a temple, a deity, or a tomb; and Ra himself, the original guardian sphinx, is represented as being guarded by a sphinx in which is incarnate the god Aker, the watchman of the *duat*, 'under world,' and the special protector of Ra during the hours of darkness.

The former conception—that of Ra as guardian—is embodied in the greatest of all Egyptian sphinxes, that which crouches in front of the second pyramid at Gizeh. The date of this remarkable monument is uncertain. Its position in front of the Gizeh necropolis suggests that it was intended to guard the illustrious dead buried there against evil genii, and that, therefore, it may be roughly contemporary with the pyramids and tombs in its neighbourhood, *i.e.* of the period of the IVth dynasty. This date is so far countenanced by an inscription on the stele of Tahutmes IV., between the paws of the monster, which, though unfortunately mutilated at the point where its testimony would have been of most value, appears to mention Khafra, the builder of the second pyramid, as connected with the making of the statue of Tem-Heru-em-Khut, *i.e.* the sphinx. Maspero, however, prefers an even earlier date.

He regards this mention as 'the indication of an excavation of the Sphinx, executed under this prince [Khafra], conse-

quently the almost certain proof that the Sphinx was already enveloped in sand in the time of Khéops and his predecessors.'[1]

On the other hand, Petrie regards Tahutmes' mention of Khafra as entirely negligible.

'How much Tahutmes knew of Khafra, or cared to honour him, is shown by the material he selected for his tablet. It is carved on a grand door lintel of red granite, which almost certainly was robbed from the adjacent granite temple of Khafra.'[2]

Petrie suggests a date at all events later than the Old Kingdom, on the grounds that a tomb-shaft is found in the body of the image, that no tombs of earlier date than the IVth dynasty exist in this part of the necropolis, and that a tomb would hardly have been sunk in the rock of the statue after it had been carved to a divine form, and was generally venerated. The question of date, therefore, is in suspense.

The Great Sphinx is hewn out of the living rock, but has been patched and made up at various times with masonry. Human-headed and lion-bodied, it measures 150 ft. in length, and 70 in height, from the crown of the head to the base; the paws are 50 ft. long, the head is 30, and the face is 14 ft. wide. The Egyptian name for the Great Sphinx was Ḥu, and it represented Horus-on-the-Horizon, Heru-em-Khut, or Harmakhis. It is curious, if the early date for its existence be correct, that it is not mentioned in any early inscriptions, that no representations exist of so important a monument, and that no priests of the sphinx are recorded.

The stele of Tahutmes IV. already referred to was discovered by Caviglia in 1817. It stands between the outstretched paws of the figure, a granite tablet, 14 ft. in height. The inscription narrates how Tahutmes (1423–1414 B.C.), when hunting in the desert near Memphis, fell asleep under the shadow of the sphinx. Ra-Harmakhis appeared to him in a dream, and charged him to clear his image of the sand which had enveloped it on all sides, promising the king his favour if the task were executed. The inscription obviously fixes the lowest possible date for the existence of the sphinx, which must plainly have been of considerable antiquity in the time of Tahutmes IV.; beyond that it does not carry us with any certainty.

Apart from the Great Sphinx, there are few indications of the existence of sphinxes in the period of the Old Kingdom. It is only with the XIIth dynasty that the figure becomes popular, maintaining its popularity down to the time of the Ptolemys. The creature's function, as already indicated, is invariably to ward off evil genii from a tomb or a temple. Thus, in an inscription quoted by Bergmann,[3] we have the following:

'I protect the chapel of thy tomb. I guard thy sepulchral chamber. I ward off the intruding stranger. I cast down the foes to the ground, and their arms with them. I drive away the wicked one from the chapel of thy tomb. I destroy thine adversaries in their lurking place, blocking it that they come forth no more.'

To the period of the XIIth dynasty are now very generally assigned those sphinxes discovered at Tanis by Mariette in 1861, bearing heads of peculiar and strongly marked features, which were formerly held to be representations of a king of the usurping Hyksos dynasty. Golénischeff[4] has shown, by comparison of these with extant portraits of Amenemhat III. of the XIIth dynasty, that the Tanis sphinxes in all probability are portraits of that monarch.

The head of the sphinx, if human, was generally modelled on that of the Pharaoh in whose reign it was sculptured. It would therefore generally be the head of a king; but in the case of a temple founded by a queen the guardian sphinxes might be female, more particularly if they were also intended to represent a goddess. The sphinx, in fact, was not necessarily always a representation of an incarnation of Ra, but might represent other gods or goddesses. Thus Isis occasionally assumes the sphinx form, when she appears as the guardian of Osiris. From this fact arises the frequent representation of the sphinx with a head other than human. There are many instances of such images bearing the head of a jackal, a hawk, or, perhaps most common of all, a ram—the animal head being that of the particular god who was supposed to be incarnate in the sphinx in question.

From the time of the XVIIIth dynasty and onwards the sphinx becomes exceedingly popular—more, one may suspect, as a decorative adjunct to a temple than as bearing any special religious significance. Great numbers of these images are found in rows lining the approaches to the great temples—*e.g.*, the avenue of 122 sandstone sphinxes erected by Amenhotep III. before the temple of Khonsu, at Karnak, and similar avenues at Thebes. These were largely ram- and jackal-headed figures, often bearing between their fore-paws a small statue of the king who erected them. It may be questioned, however, whether these innumerable figures were actually meant to act as guardians of the temple or were not rather merely an architectural feature. Wiedemann's opinion is as follows:

'The stone rams, lions, etc., which we find as amulets, or which in many cases occupy the same position before Egyptian temples as the sphinxes, must by no means be confounded with the sphinxes; each was simply an image of the sacred animal of the god of the place, of the creature in which he took incarnate form, and each was therefore the equivalent of the statue of the god. There is no authority whatever for calling these objects by the name of sphinxes, and the mistaken nomenclature has arisen only from the fact that their office was the same, architecturally speaking.'[1]

The origin of the conception of the sphinx is obscure. Sayce is of opinion that it arose from a transference to Egypt of the Babylonian idea of guardian genii exemplified in the winged bulls and cherubim of Chaldæa.

'The curious similarity in the functions assigned to the images of composite animals both in Egypt and Babylonia raises the presumption that the composite forms themselves were ultimately derived from a Babylonian source. . . . It is only in Chaldæa that they find their explanation. . . . The sphinx of Giza still guards the desert of Giza because ages ago the flooding waves of the Persian Gulf made the Babylonians believe that the world had arisen out of a watery chaos peopled by unformed creatures of monstrous shape.'[2]

The inference, however, seems rather a wide one. The idea of the necessity of protecting the tomb against evil genii is of very early date in ancient Egypt, and is itself connected, in the Pyramid Texts, with the actual local flood—the inundation of the Nile; and it is difficult to see why it may not have arisen independently in Egypt under similar conditions to those which produced it in Babylonia. Moreover, the type of the sphinx which most closely resembles that of the Babylonian guardian genii, the winged type, is of later date than the normal Egyptian sphinx.

LITERATURE.—G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, Paris, 1895–99, vol. i., 'Les Origines, Egypte et Chaldée,' *Egyptian Archæology*[6], Eng. tr., London, 1902; E. A. Wallis Budge, *A Hist. of Egypt*, do. 1902, vols. ii.–iv.; W. M. F. Petrie, *A Hist. of Egypt*, do. 1903–05, vol. i.; A. H. Sayce, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*[2], Edinburgh, 1913; A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897; M. Brodrick and A. A. Morton, *A Concise Dictionary of Egyptian Archæology*, do. 1902.

JAMES BAIKIE.

SPINOZA.—I. *LIFE.*—Baruch de Spinoza was born at Amsterdam on 24th Nov. 1632. He came of a tribe of Spanish Jews, who had found in Portugal a precarious refuge from the attentions

[1] *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, i. 366, note 1.
[2] *Hist. of Egypt*, i. 52 f.
[3] *ZÄ* xviii. [1880] 50.
[4] *RTr* xv. [1893] 131 ff.

[1] *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., p. 199 f.
[2] *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, p. 119 f.

of the Inquisition. His father, Michael de Spinoza, hearing that a securer home was to be found in the United Provinces, removed thither. Already, in 1593, a company of 'Marranos' had been received in Amsterdam, and had in 1598 formed the first synagogue in that city. Michael was chosen to fill several offices of trust in the fraternity. He was thrice married: by his first wife he had a daughter Rebekah; by his second a son Baruch and a daughter Miriam.

Spinoza was instructed in all the puerile wisdom of the Synagogue. Of Isaac de Fonseca it is enough to say that he was afterwards a victim of the impostures of the sham Messiah, Shabbathai Sebi. Rabbi Saul Morteira, though kindly, was intellectually hardly superior to Fonseca. In Manasseh ben Israel Spinoza might have found a more sympathetic adviser; but during the years of gradual alienation Manasseh was absent on that mission to the Republican Government of England which led to the return of the Jews to our island. For very few of the standard authors did Spinoza indulge any feeling but profound contempt. 'I have read,' he says, 'some of the Kabbalistic triflers, at whose follies I was astonished beyond description.'[1]

The Synagogue, moreover, was compelled to maintain a rigorous orthodoxy. Such toleration as was allowed to the Jews was watched with jealous eyes. In 1617 the Remonstrants, fretted by the limitations that hedged in their own worship, complained of the freedom accorded to the Synagogue; and the complaint, though it did the petitioners no good, did the Jews some harm. In 1640 the vagaries of Uriel da Costa had created an uneasiness totally out of proportion to their intrinsic importance; and it is small wonder, then, that the authorities watched anxiously the growth of heresy in Spinoza's mind.

Discontented with the Ḳabbālā, the young man turned to secular studies. He felt above all the need of Latin, then the language indispensable alike in diplomacy and in science. Its elements he studied under a master conjectured by Meinsma[2] to have been a German named Felbinger. From Felbinger he perhaps learned a tinge of Socinianism. His next teacher was Francis Van den Ende, a physician and schoolmaster, who was suspected, not without reason, of imparting much more than Latin to his pupils. He made Spinoza not only a classical scholar, but a master of all the physics and physiology then known. It is probable that through Van den Ende Spinoza became acquainted with Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and possibly Giordano Bruno. The subsequent history of Van den Ende is well known. In 1674 he engaged in the stupid conspiracy of Rohan and the Marquise de Villiers against Louis XIV., and suffered death along with his principals.

There were others with whom about this time Spinoza came into contact. We are told by Colerus that he became intimate with 'some learn'd Mennonites.' One of the members of this sect, Jarrig Jellis, appears among his correspondents; another, John Bredenberg, was the author of a so-called answer to the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, which reveals more of the disciple than of the antagonist. Peter Serarius often visited Spinoza, and assisted him in his correspondence with Oldenburg. Peter Balling, Jan Rieuwertz, and others were also in his circle. The rumour indeed spread abroad that Spinoza was actually baptized.

All this could scarcely escape the eyes of Morteira and his colleagues. For some time they had been dissatisfied with the tone of their pupil; and matters came to a head when two of his companions stepped forward to accuse him of actual heresy. After a trial he was subjected to the 'lesser excommunication'; and Morteira is said to have made strong personal appeals to the young free-thinker. But all was in vain; and on 27th July 1656 the final sentence was pronounced. The text may be seen in Van Vloten or in Freudenthal;[1] it shows that the condemnation was less for speculative error than for some overt act. Much has been written in censure of the rabbis; their conduct will compare favourably with that of most other bodies on similar occasions. It is certain that Spinoza can have expected no milder treatment.

The heretic did not hear his sentence. Shortly before, according to a somewhat doubtful story, his life had been attempted by a fanatical Jew, and he removed to the house of a Remonstrant friend near Amsterdam. Thence he wrote his reply to the excommunication. This reply, which was in Spanish, is no longer extant; its substance is doubtless to be found in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Thenceforward he was lost to his old associations, and perhaps, as some think, marked the severance by substituting for his Jewish name Baruch its Latin equivalent Benedict.

Following the Jewish custom, he had most probably already learnt the art of lens-polishing—an art which the rapid advance of science was then rendering daily more important. Through this he earned a modest livelihood; and through this he became acquainted with Huygens and, later, with Leibniz. Friends, indeed, he never lacked. His fellow-students under Van den Ende and his Mennonite acquaintances held by him. When, in 1660, he removed to Rynsburg, near Leyden, it was probably to be near the Remonstrants, Rynsburg being then their headquarters. In April 1663[2] he again removed, to Voorburg, a suburb of the Hague, remaining there six years.

From 1656 to 1660, or perhaps still earlier, he completed his study of the Cartesian philosophy, and developed at least the outlines of his own. It was his duty to teach Cartesianism to a certain private pupil; but he early became dissatisfied with many of the principles which he had to teach. His objections he submitted to a coterie of students in Amsterdam. These enthusiasts speedily formed a kind of Spinozistic school, discussed his papers, and communicated their difficulties to him. 'Spinoza's gifts as a teacher,' says Lucas,[3] 'were such that he insensibly converted all men to his views.' His influence over his little school, at any rate, was immense. Among the number were Simon de Vries, a wealthy medical student, John Bresser, apparently an older man, and Lodewijk Meyer, who afterwards edited more than one of his master's works. Other acquaintances, more or less intimate, rapidly gathered round him. Pontiaan van Hattem became the founder of a curious Spinozistic church. Niels Stensen turned Roman Catholic, and engaged in controversy with his former friend. The Huguenot St. Glain translated the *Tractatus* into French. Tydeman, Spinoza's Voorburg landlord, was accused of being the creature of the 'atheist and mocker.' John Casearius, a name unearthed by Meinsma,[4] became a botanist of eminence. To John Bouwmeester, an Amsterdam physician, Spinoza wrote the affectionate *Epistle* 37. Towards Adrian and John Koerbagh he cherished equally friendly feelings. The former was a physician of some skill, and, if we may trust Meinsma's conjecture[5] that to him *Epistle* 28 was addressed, prescribed for his friend more than once. Both Adrian and John came under ecclesiastical censure, and died in prison. Henry Oldenburg of Bremen, the famous first secretary of the Royal Society, met Spinoza in 1661. He was a man of insatiable curiosity, but of no philosophical depth, and constitutionally timid. At first his letters urge Spinoza to publish his speculations: but after the appearance of the *Tractatus* he never ceases to ingeminate caution.

Spinoza's adherence to Descartes, if ever complete, was short-lived. True, in 1663 he threw into geometrical form, for the benefit of Casearius, the first two parts of the *Principia*; but his own appendix, *Cogitata Metaphysica*, contains clear evidence of independent thinking. Still earlier, if we may trust internal evidence, had been written a treatise which shows yet more unmistakably how widely Spinoza had already diverged from Descartes. Before 1661 he had completed the *Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, en deszelfs Welstand* ('Short Treatise on God, on Man, and his Well-being'), a work discovered only in 1852. Of this book two Dutch MSS exist. Both contain notes, some obviously written by disciples, a few perhaps by Spinoza himself. The original Latin has not been unearthed. Various strata of thought are to be detected in the work, from the early stage as represented in the curious dialogues to the mature appendix.

There is every reason also to believe that the *Ethics* was far advanced before Spinoza left Voorburg. We may fix its composition between 1661 and 1665, and the beginning of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* in the latter year. The date of the unfinished treatise *de Intellectus Emendatione* is uncertain; but critics are practically unanimous in placing it before that of the *Ethics*. In addition to all this his correspondence also must have been voluminous; for the large amount preserved includes only those letters which have a philosophical or scientific interest. The letters to Oldenburg are valuable as illustrating the indirect intercourse between Spinoza and Boyle. The correspondence with Huygens is polite, but not very illuminating. That with Simon de Vries, on the other hand, is of great importance. That with Blyenbergh, a burgess of Dort, is interesting as showing how Spinoza could deal with tedious pretenders to learning. To Peter Balling (probably the 'P. B.' who translated the *Principia* into Dutch) and to Hugo Boxel of Gor-

[1] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. ix., tr. R. H. M. Elwes London, 1883, i. 140.
[2] *Spinoza en zijn kring*, p. 196.

[1] *Lebensgeschichte*, p. 115.
[2] Freudenthal, *Spinoza*, i. 120.
[3] See Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, p. 22, also *Spinoza, sein Leben und Seine Lehre*, p. 87.
[4] P. 182. [5] P. 246.

cum Spinoza writes with great sympathy and even with occasional flashes of humour, on the subject of ghostly manifestations.

In 1671 (or, as Pollock thinks, 1673) he received an epistle[1] now ascribed to Jacob Ostens, a Rotterdam surgeon. Ostens enclosed a document from Lambert Velthuysen of Utrecht, which contained a violent attack on the 'atheistic' and 'immoral' principles of the *Tractatus*. Spinoza's reply shows that he was unconscious of any irreligious tendency in his work. It is written in an unusually passionate tone. Strangely enough, at a later time he became friendly with Velthuysen, and even[2] urged him to publish his strictures.

With Albert Burgh, a scion of a rich Amsterdam family, once his disciple (indeed he was supposed till Meinsma's time to be the 'fellow-lodger' now known to have been Casearius), Spinoza had an interesting correspondence. In 1675 Burgh entered the Roman Church, and wrote to his old master a curious letter advising him for his good. Spinoza's answer is the most contemptuous of all his writings. Burgh's one argument, indeed—the continuity of the Church—was not likely to have weight with one who could trace his spiritual ancestry to Abraham.

Meanwhile, Spinoza entertained hopes of support from the de Witts; and they in return appear to have claimed such assistance as he could give. At what time he received the small pension which John de Witt settled on him we do not know; but as early as 1663[3] he was planning the open publication of his works, with the countenance of 'some holding the highest places in the State.' The Grand Pensionary must have known him even in the Rynsburg days. With de Witt's supporter, John Hudde, burgomaster of Amsterdam, we know[4] Spinoza to have been intimate; and contemporary squibs speak of the *Tractatus* as 'written in collaboration with the devil and published with the connivance of de Witt.' Spinoza did what he could for the Pensionary; and his hopes were centred in the success of the anti-ecclesiastical policy of the great statesman. De Witt, however, could not favour open heresy; and the publication of the *Ethics* was accordingly postponed. Excited perhaps by the appearance of a Dutch version of the *Leviathan* in 1667, Spinoza turned to other studies, and in 1670 the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a work of epoch-making importance, was published anonymously. Spinoza suppressed a projected Dutch translation;[5] but precautions were vain. On the rise of William of Orange to power, orthodoxy resumed its sway; and in 1674 the work was formally prohibited. The Church of Rome soon followed suit; and the *Tractatus* shares with the *Leviathan* the honour of figuring on the Index.

In 1670 Spinoza removed to the Hague, lodging at first in the Veerkay with a widow named Van der Werve. Thirty years later the Lutheran minister Colerus occupied the same room, and was thus able to make those inquiries the results of which appear in his biography. But Spinoza's stay was short. Within a year he removed to the house of a painter named Van der Spijck, on the Paviljoensgracht; and here he remained till his death. He might, it is true, have easily improved his financial position. Simon de Vries in vain offered him a donation of 2000 florins; and, when the same devoted pupil, feeling the approach of death, endeavoured to make Spinoza his heir, he refused to accept more than 300 florins per annum. He had already yielded up to his relatives the whole of his patrimonial inheritance except a single bed. In 1673[6] he declined the offer of the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg made by the Elector Palatine Karl Ludwig.[7]

During his remaining years he lived a life of extraordinary seclusion, staying within doors often for days together. Two episodes alone broke the monotony. In 1672 de Witt was brutally murdered by the populace. Spinoza's philosophic calm was for once disturbed. He burst into a passion of weeping, and was with difficulty prevented from affixing a placard, with the words 'Ultimi barbarorum' upon it, to the walls of the prison where the deed was done. Shortly afterwards he incurred an even greater risk. Condé's winter quarters were at Utrecht, and Spinoza visited the French general under safe-conduct. He there received marks of favour, and the offer of a pension from Louis XIV. Refusing the pension, he returned to the Hague, where he found himself in great danger of being torn to pieces as a spy. Van der Spijck indeed expected the house to be stormed by the mob; but Spinoza reassured him, saying that many of the chief men in the city knew the nature of his errand; if the worst came to the worst, he would go out alone and meet the fate of de Witt. The purpose of this strange excursion remains a mystery; but it seems most likely that the authorities deliberately chose him, as a man of European reputation but no diplomatist, to open up with the French informal negotiations which it would be easy to disavow.

Meanwhile his reputation continued to grow, and the circle of his acquaintance to widen. Chief among his new friends was Leibniz (*q.v.*), whose indebtedness to Spinoza, minimized by himself, has recently been made clear.[8] In 1670, having already read the *Tractatus*, Leibniz began to correspond on the neutral subject of optics. Spinoza received his advances with caution, refusing to show him the *Ethics*. But in 1676 Leibniz's aversion yielded to an admiration of which afterwards he endeavoured to make light. The introduction was brought about by George Schuller. At first the younger man was quite fascinated by the older; but there was a want of intellectual sincerity in Leibniz which rendered permanent confidence impossible. To Schuller was also due the acquaintance between Spinoza and Tschirnhausen. Correspondence began in 1675. Tschirnhausen was one of the select few to whom the *Ethics* was entrusted; and his criticisms were among the keenest that the author ever had to meet. Soon afterwards we find him in London, where he removed a misunderstanding that had clouded the relations of Boyle and Oldenburg with their friend. In later years Tschirnhausen drew largely, without acknowledgment, on Spinoza's *de Intellectus Emendatione* for his *Medicina Mentis*.

Spinoza's mental activity during his later years, probably because of failing health, was slight in comparison with what it had been. It seems that he revised the *Ethics*, possibly adding the remarkable propositions that close the fifth part. In 1675 he endeavoured to publish the work; but the divines and the Cartesians again interfered.[1] Phthisis was congenital with Spinoza, and its advances were not retarded by the climate of the Hague. Early in Feb. 1677 Schuller wrote to Leibniz that the end was approaching. The *Tractatus Politicus* was laid aside for ever, and the design for a comprehensive scheme of natural philosophy was not even sketched out. Death came suddenly at the last, just in time, perhaps, to save him from the fate of Koerbagh. Feeling worse than usual, he had sent to Amsterdam for a medical friend, probably Schuller.[2] On Saturday, 20th Feb. 1677, he came downstairs and conversed with the Spijcks, smoked a pipe, and went early to bed. Next day he again came down. Schuller had now arrived, and ordered some broth, of which, on the return of the Spijcks from morning service, he partook quite heartily. There seemed no reason why they should not go to church again in the afternoon; but on their return they heard that Spinoza was dead. The physician returned at once to Amsterdam. Many apocryphal details have been added to this narrative by legend-mongers. There is no ground for the suspicion, entertained by Martineau among others,[3] that the physician and the philosopher had contrived a euthanasia—conduct condemned by Spinoza himself.[4] Spinoza's property fetched so little that his sister Rebekah did not claim the inheritance. The MSS of the *Opera Posthuma* were duly conveyed to Jan Rieuwertz. Meyer furnished the preface, and Schuller, as we now know, supervised the publication. In the next year the work was anathematized.

Spinoza was a man of middle height, with a distinctly Jewish countenance, the swarthy complexion of a Spaniard, and a forehead befitting a philosopher. He was abstemious almost to asceticism, rigidly careful to keep his expenditure within his means, but cheerful in his demeanour. He conversed on affable terms alike with the highest and the lowest. Such signs of impatience as we detect in his letters show merely that his serenity was not attained without an effort. A noble independence was perhaps the most marked feature in his character. His intellectual hardihood, almost unparalleled as it was, involved no intolerance of the views of others. Love of truth was his guiding principle. To children he showed himself tender, affectionate, and even playful. He is one of the very highest exponents of the philosophical and self-centred virtues; if we must find fault, it is to point out his lack of an active benevolence, of a passionate zeal like that of Paul for saving the world at large. He had not, in fact, a truly broad humanity. He has been charged with moral cowardice. It is asserted that there is a kind of *suppressio veri* in the *Tractatus*, and that theological terms are, in the *Ethics*, frequently used in a misleading sense. But this seems a harsh judgment. His learning has recently been shown to have been great.[5] The publication by Van Rovigens in 1889 of an inventory of his library proves the wide range of his acquirements. He was, unquestionably, weakest in the domain of the inductive sciences.

Of portraits of Spinoza the best is that at Wolfenbüttel, of which there is a copy at the Hague, and which is reproduced in Martineau. Some copies of the *Opera Posthuma* have a portrait, perhaps derived from the Wolfenbüttel painting. The miniature reproduced by Schaarschmidt[6] may be genuine. There is also a portrait in the German translation of Colerus.[7] Spinoza's drawing of himself as Masaniello was seen by Colerus, but has apparently perished.

The discovery of the *de Deo* in 1852, and the bicentury of his death in 1877, roused great interest. At the bicentenary Renan delivered his famous eulogium. In 1880 the bronze statue by Hexamer was unveiled at the Hague; while a tablet in the wall of the house that stands on the side of Spinoza's lodgings in the Paviljoensgracht marks the spot where he spent his last days.

II. *PHILOSOPHY.*—1. **Its aim.** — The speculations of Spinoza never forgot their practical end. It was his object to 'discover and attain something which would enable him to enjoy supreme, continuous, and permanent happiness.'[8] His philosophy aims at 'tranquillizing the mind of the individual, and elevating social life.'[9] But soon he discovered that well-being is not to be captured by a direct assault.[10] Hence Spinoza's doctrine is not primarily a metaphysic but an ethic; nay, more, it is not so much a philosophy as a religion.

[1] *Ep.* 42. [2] *Ep.* 69. [3] *Ep.* 13.
[4] *Epp.* 34–36. [5] *Ep.* 43. [6] *Epp.* 47, 48.
[7] See Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, p. 219.
[8] L. Stein, *Leibniz und Spinoza*, Berlin, 1890.

[1] *Ep.* 68. [2] Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, p. 296.
[3] *Study of Spinoza*[3], p. 102 f.
[4] *Eth.* iv. 18, schol.
[5] See Leopold, *ap.* Freudenthal, p. 213.
[6] *De Deo*, ed. C. Schaarschmidt, Amsterdam, 1869.
[7] Pollock, *Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy*[2], pref.
[8] *Int. Em.*, beginning. [9] *Eth.* ii. 49, cor. schol. *ad fin.*
[10] Cf. *Int. Em.* i., ii.

'There is,' he says,[1] 'for sciences but one purpose, to which they should all be directed, namely, supreme human perfection.' And this perfection can be reached. 'Those who deny that men can ever attain virtue or truth, by that very denial prevent themselves from attaining it.'[2] But this virtue can be reached only through intellectual certainty. We may perhaps hazard a guess as to the process by which he was led to his deductions. His spiritual ancestry was theological; hence his first independent thought moved on theological lines. His life, again, had led him to attach a supreme importance to 'fortitude.' But a mere unreasoned fortitude was worse than useless. Spinoza was the last man to court unnecessary pain. Resolved to live his own life, he desired to practise that *animositas* by which 'a man strives to preserve his own being in accordance with the dictates of reason.'[3] Resolved, on the other hand, to be of use to his fellows, he desired also to practise that *generositas* whereby, solely under the dictates of reason, a man seeks to unite other men in friendship to himself. Virtue of any kind appeared to him impossible without 'adequate knowledge.'[4] Hence the necessity of a method for discovering the true.

2. Logic and doctrine of method.—Truth is its own ultimate guarantee; 'it is not necessary to know that we know.'[5] But by truth is not meant the correspondence with any physical fact. An architect's idea of a building is 'true,' even if the building is never erected, provided that the idea conforms to the rules of architecture.[6] On the other hand, a reckless assertion is none the less false because it may turn out accidentally 'true.' It is as well, therefore, to note how the true differs from the false.

Knowledge is of many kinds. It may arise from hearsay; from mere experience ('ab experientia vaga'—a phrase borrowed from Bacon); from inference ('ubi essentia rei ex alia re concluditur'). All these are 'inadequate' kinds of knowledge. True perception arises only when the thing is perceived solely through its essence or by the knowledge of its 'proximate cause.' Nor, when we employ this method, do we need another method to test it. Otherwise there would be a constant regress to infinity—which is as absurd as to say that, because tools are needed to make tools, therefore no tools can ever be made.[7] Falsity consists in mistaking accidents for essence.[8] Simple ideas then are necessarily true; inadequate ideas arise from the careless juxtaposition of two or more simple ideas. To attain truth, we have only to split ideas into their simple components.[9]

To exclude confusion, the following rules must be observed: (1) the definition of a thing should comprehend the proximate cause; and (2) all the properties of the thing must be capable of being deduced from it. Thus only shall we secure the two essentials of adequate knowledge—clearness and distinctness in our ideas. Spinoza illustrates his meaning by asserting that the ordinary definition of a circle merely defines one of its properties. It should be defined as the figure described by a line whereof one end is fixed and the other free.[10] To this assertion certain acute objections were made by Tschirnhausen; and Spinoza found some difficulty in answering them.[11] A further objection is of importance, as it brings us to the very centre of the Spinozistic philosophy. This idea of definition involves a confusion between the 'formal' law of cause and effect and the 'objective' law of logical deduction. 'The relation,' says Spinoza,[1] 'between the abscissæ and the ordinates of a curve *results from* the nature of the curve precisely as the essences of created things result from the nature of God.' But really this relation does not *result* at all; it only emerges later *in our minds* because of their incapacity to grasp many ideas at once. Nevertheless it is necessary to notice this essential feature of Spinoza's theory. An effect neither follows nor precedes its cause; the distinction between the two is merely, to him, one of logical convenience.[2]

So far, then, of the definitions of created things. But what of uncreated, and of the ultimate idea of all, that of God? If definition is nothing but the 'objective' (*i.e.* nearly what we now call the 'subjective') aspect of cause, what then of God the First Cause? The rules for defining an uncreated thing[3] lay it down that all idea of cause must be excluded, while no abstraction is permissible. It would seem therefore hard to define God; and yet all knowledge is conditioned by the knowledge of Him. Everything is either *in se* or *in alio*; if it is *in alio*, it must, as we have seen, be defined by the *aliud*; if *in se*, where is the definition to begin? If God is defined by His attributes, they must be His causes, and therefore (logically) prior to Him. Spinoza meets the difficulty by using the vulgar phrase ('ut vulgo dicitur'),[4] *Causa sui*. From this definition Spinoza imagined it possible to deduce properties.[5] Among these properties he regards existence as one: 'When the definition of the [uncreated] thing has been given, there must be no room for doubt as to whether it exists or not.'[6] Conceive a Being the very essence of which is existence. We *can* conceive such a Being: therefore it exists. This startling proposition is an extension of the Cartesian 'Cogito ergo sum.' Upon the idea of this Being all knowledge is based. 'That method is the most perfect which exhibits the standard of the idea of the most perfect Being.'[7] 'As soon as possible, we must inquire whether there is such a Being, which is the cause of all things as its "objective" essence is the cause of all our ideas.'[8]

What Spinoza meant by his 'perfect Being' is doubtful. But it is at any rate certain that it is not an *abstract* deity—so much so that Spinoza forbids us to deduce abstract essences from the idea of God. Such generalizations, formed by abstracting from a *number* of individuals, are nothing but negations. All things follow from the divine nature; but these 'things' are 'individuals';[9] and hence 'we must admit into our definitions as few abstract nouns as possible.'[10] Yet the first deducibles from God are not individual things; they are *res fixæ*, *æternæ*, and yet *singulares*. What then are these? They are present everywhere, the *genera* of the definitions of individual things, and the *causæ proximæ* of all things; but their real nature is obscure.

3. The geometrical method of the Ethics.—At this point the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* ('Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding') breaks off; and we therefore turn to the *Ethics*. At the outset of this work we are struck by a change of method. The title-page speaks of 'Ethica *ordine geometrico* demonstrata.' Spinoza's motive for using axioms, postulates, and propositions is not quite clear. Causation being but logical deduction, he regarded things, which are implicit in the idea of God, as capable of being drawn out explicitly, precisely as from the definition of a circle its properties can be deduced. Con-

1 *Int. Em.* ii. note. 2 *De Deo*, ii. 8.
3 *Eth.* iii. 59, schol.
4 Cf. Camerer, *Die Lehre Spinoza's*, p. 254.
5 *Int. Em.* vi. 6 *Ib.* ix. 69. 7 *Ib.* vi.
8 *Ib.* ix. 72. 9 *Ib.* x. 10 *Ib.* xiii.
11 *Epp.* 82, 83.

1 *Cog. Met.* i. 2. 2 Cf. here, *Ep.* 60.
3 *Int. Em.* xiii. 97. 4 *Ib.* xii. 92.
5 *Eth.* i. 16, dem., and *Ep.* 60. 6 *Int. Em.* xiii. 97.
7 *Ib.* vii. 38. 8 *Ib.* xiv.
9 *Ep.* 75. 10 *Int. Em.* xiv. 99.

fusing logical necessity with dynamic efficiency, he states in one place that God is the *cause* of all things ;[1] in another, that God *is* all things. In i. 11 he tells us that everything must have a cause of its existence; but in the ordinary sense of the word 'cause' this is obviously false. What is necessary is a cause of its coming into existence. This confusion is the source of much difficulty in the interpretation of Spinoza. In any case the choice of the Euclidian method is the natural concomitant of this theory of causation. The example, it is true, had been set by Descartes; but Spinoza would have used it even if Descartes had not anticipated him. Not that he thought that the method excluded error. Already he had used it to exhibit the Cartesian system at a time when he did not believe in it. But he saw clearly that error is more easily brought to light by this means than by any other. Of course there are objections to its use. The cogency of Euclid is due to the fact that his primary assumptions are either self-evident or at least sufficiently near the truth for the purpose in hand; whereas it is precisely Spinoza's definitions and axioms that arouse controversy. Another objection was first brought forward by Tschirnhausen,[2] and has been developed by Joachim,[3] Busolt,[4] and others. From a geometrical definition we can deduce but one property. All others can be deduced only by bringing other definitions into relation with the first. Similarly, when Spinoza 'deduces' from the definition of God, he is really, though unconsciously, deducing from other definitions. His right to select one attribute as the defining property is the matter in dispute. And hence we are not surprised to find that he constantly, if tacitly, varies the definition. When 'Substance' fails him, he has recourse to 'Nature'; when 'Nature' gives way, he substitutes 'Reality'; when 'Reality' is not concrete enough, he falls back on 'God.' Thus Spinoza himself is often driven to drop the deductive method, and to allow himself the luxury of explanations, notes, and appendices. Occasionally he even calls in experience to confirm his theoretical propositions.

4. Metaphysical doctrine. — (*a*) *Substance.*— Spinoza's God is not the deity of any religious system. His conception may be expressed, provisionally at least, by the term 'Reality.' All things exist *in alio*. Retracing our course, we track the *aliud* to its conditioning somewhat; and finally we must arrive either at blank nonentity and scepticism or at certainty based on that ultimate Reality of which 'things' are expressions. The first alternative being impossible to Spinoza, he came to the second. He had already shown to his own satisfaction in the *de Deo* that God exists; and in the *Ethics*, though he gives certain formal definitions, he in fact takes Reality as a first postulate.

This Reality is not mere Being—not (to use Hegel's phrase) the night in which all cows are black. It is a concrete, pregnant, and living conception, positive in itself and capable of positive development. Spinoza makes desperate attempts to give it a higher position than that of the mere abstract home of attributes. The infinite is not less, but more, positive because it is indeterminate. Yet he cannot always rid himself of an abstract way of regarding Reality. As Caird well puts it,[5] the ultimate, with him, is reached not by reconciling opposing elements, but by abstracting from their difference. Still, Spinoza's intention was always to represent the real as concrete.

This idea appears under many different aspects. Tracing back the chain of causes, we reach at last the *Causa sui*. As cause, it is *Natura-naturans*, that which underlies phenomena. As caused, it is *Natura naturata*; *i.e.*, it is identical, in a sense, with the phenomenal world. From another point of view, Reality is Substance, that which is in itself and is conceived through itself—a restriction of the use of the word which Spinoza had not always made.[1] Yet another word is 'Nature,' which[2] is *unum æternum, per se infinitum*; but the word expresses Reality rather as the productive source of things than as their underlying principle. Hence it is less frequently employed in the *Ethics* than elsewhere. Lastly, by the term 'God' is meant a Being absolutely infinite, that is 'Substance consisting of infinite attributes, whereof each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.'[3] From this definition the idea of personality, often ascribed to God in the *de Deo* and in the *Cogitata Metaphysica*,[4] has been rigidly excluded. God is no longer good; He no longer has a will; He is 'perfect,' but not in the moral sense;[5] nor does He ever act for an end.

The first few propositions prove, or state, the identity of these various ideas. *Causa sui* must have necessary existence; hence it is Substance. Substance is necessarily infinite; therefore it is God. Thence we pass to the proof that there is but one Substance;[6] but, if God is infinite in infinite ways, this seems little more than a truism. Yet Spinoza was convinced[7] that he could deduce from his definitions less obvious conclusions than these. First, God is the most real (or perfect) entity. Secondly, He is one and whole. Thirdly, He is concrete, not abstract. He has infinite attributes, but not 'infinite' in a numerical sense; nor is He one in a numerical sense. He is in fact the unchanging Unity which underlies the fleeting manifestations of the many. Were there not this simplicity beneath the complexity of Nature, Nature could not possibly be conceived. Yet God is not the whole as including the parts;[8] for, if so, as parts, they would be independent of Him. To separate the whole into parts is to destroy it. By this we see that Spinoza means to assert that the Reality involves a reconciliation of all difference; but whether he is always consistent is another matter.

In what sense God is 'concrete' we have seen. He is 'infinite' not through negation, but because He admits of unlimited predicates being affirmed of Him. It is only the imperfection of language that compels us to use a negative term of a quality essentially positive.[9]

That God exists of necessity is shown both *a priori* and *a posteriori*;[10] but the real demonstration lies in the whole theory of which the proofs are a part, and this we may sum up as follows.

The notion of cause is reciprocal: everything that is involves God as its cause, just as much as God involves it. Now, things are perceived by us under the entangling notions of time, place, and the like. Such conceptions are mere phantoms. Nevertheless, the things are not altogether phantasmal; nay, they appear simply because they really are. 'Every idea of every existing thing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence.'[11] The tiniest entity implies infinitude. God, then, both is and is not identical with the many. He is identical with the many in so far as they are implicit in Him; He is different, inasmuch as He is not subject to the mutations of the many. He is not the sum of what appears; he is all that is. 'He is the immanent cause of all things, and not the transient.'[12] Spinoza will have no dualism. 'God *and* Nature'—the phrase of the earlier writings—gives place to 'God *or* Nature.' Nay, even space and thought must be united in one, which includes both. The idealists also allow but one; but that is done by subsuming space under thought. The materialists subsume thought under space. Spinoza's form of monism is peculiar to himself, and is exhibited in his remarkable doctrine of attributes.

(*b*) *Attributes.*—Substance can be, and is, known. 'I have,' says Spinoza, 'as clear an idea (if not as clear an *image*) of God as of a triangle.'[13] Experience shows that we can form two clear ideas of Substance—as extended and as thinking. Hence extension and thought are each co-extensive with Substance; nay, they are Substance, or, as Spinoza phrases it, they are attributes of Substance. 'It

[1] *Eth.* ii. 49, Cor. schol. [2] *Ep.* 82.
[3] *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 115–119.
[4] *Die Grundzüge der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik Spinoza's*, pp. 72–74.
[5] *Spinoza*, p. 146.

[1] See *Cog. Met.* ii. 12, where he speaks of 'created substances.' and *de Deo*, i. 2, where he calls extension a substance.
[2] *De Deo*, i. 2, dialogue, *ad init.*
[3] *Eth.* i. def. 6.
[4] See, however, the dialogue in *de Deo*, i. 2.
[5] Cf. *de Deo*, i. 2. [6] *Eth.* i. 14.
[7] *Ep.* 83, to Tschirnhausen. [8] *Eth.* i. 13.
[9] *Int. Em.* xi. 89. [10] *Eth.* i. 11, and schol.
[11] *Eth.* ii. 45. [12] *Ep.* 73.
[13] *Ib.* 56.

is essential to the nature of Substance that each of its attributes should be conceived *per se*. All the attributes have always been together in it, nor could one have been produced from another; but each expresses the reality of substance.'[1] Each of the two attributes that we know (and each of the others, did we know them) gives us a final account of ultimate Reality.

The two attributes were accepted from Descartes; but with startling differences. Descartes[2] denied that God is extended. Space is a creature of God, who gave it its 'primary' qualities of motion and rest, three dimensions, and the like. The 'secondary' qualities he regarded as not created by God, but due to the percipient mind. To Spinoza the whole idea of 'creation' is repugnant.

The attributes are independent of each other. Body cannot determine the mind to think, nor mind determine the body to move.[3] Ideas are due to God as *res cogitans* simply; motion and rest to Him as *res extensa* simply.[4] How, then, is the unity of God secured? There are infinite attributes, each pointing to an independent essence: how, then, is there but one Reality? Spinoza's proof[5] is curious. He says that, if twenty men exist, there must be a reason, over and above the cause of human existence in general, why *twenty* men should exist. But the definition of God, implying existence, yet contains no provision for several substances. Hence only one can exist. This ingenious argument occurs again; but it is hardly convincing. All that really is shown is that number is beside the question; and so Spinoza himself seems to recognize[6] when he says 'eum qui Deum unum vel unicum nuncupat, improperè de eo loqui.' God, then, is merely indivisible Reality. But, if there is no passage from extension to thought, how are we to account for the statement that extension and thought move in parallel lines—that for every affection of space there is a corresponding affection of mind?

The point is too abstruse to be discussed here in detail. Difficulties enough remain. If it is intelligence that perceives attribute, then thought, which is an attribute, seems made a judge of itself; indeed, as Tschirnhausen pointed out,[7] thought is conscious of extension also, and hence, in the forcible phrase of Martineau, elected as a consul, it soon poses as a dictator. In one of his most striking pages Pollock[8] asks what difference it would make if every attribute but thought were destroyed; and the answer is simply 'None.' Then why does Spinoza postulate other attributes? Above all, why demand an infinite number? We might ask other questions. Does thought correspond with *each* of them, so that we have a series of pairs of which thought is always one? Or is there another series of pairs, like extension and thought, but not the same, in each of which one, but not the other, can look over its neighbour's wall, and in which neither can see any farther? Spinoza[9] hints at answers to these questions, but gives no satisfactory solution.

Monism is neither good nor bad in itself. There is nothing, apart from good reasons, that makes monism better than dualism or than infinitism. What, then, is it beyond prejudice that compels us to posit any unifying principle of these infinite attributes, which are distinctly stated to have nothing in common? Spinoza's theory made him reduce the many to one. Experience showed him two. But you do not bridge the Channel by simply calling England a part of Europe.

As Martineau[10] has shown, there is an essential difference between extension and thought in their relations to their modes. Body is a limited fragment of extension; our minds are not limited fragments of the infinite mind-stuff. For, though all individual things are animate,[11] they do not think; they are only thought of. Nor does God Himself think; those who ascribe thought to Him are like those who should confuse the Dog-star with the animal that barks.[12] Intellect[13] belongs to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans*. Nay, to attribute thought to God would be to attribute to Him an imperfection.

There is difficulty enough, then, in the transition from substance to attribute. There is hardly less in that from attribute to mode.

1 *Eth.* i. 10, schol. 2 *Princ.* i. 23.
3 *Eth.* iii. 2. 4 *Ib.* ii. 5, 6.
5 *Ib.* i, 8, schol. 2, *Ep.* 34. 6 In *Ep.* 50.
7 *Ep.* 70. 8 *Spinoza*[2], p. 164.
9 *Ep.* 66.
10 *Study of Spinoza*[3], pp. 180–192, *Types of Eth. Theory*, i. 365.
11 *Eth.* ii. 13, schol. 12 *Ib.* i. 17, schol.
13 *Ep.* 9.

(*c*) *Modes, infinite.*—Mode is an affection of Substance, that which exists not *in se* but *in alio*.[1] It will thus partake of the twofold nature of Substance. As we have seen, 'things' are both extended and 'animata'; and modes are 'things' under the phenomenalizing influence of time. In coming under that influence they lose some of their reality. All things follow from the divine perfection, but all are not equally perfect—a doctrine of ethical import.[2] The First Cause alone is perfect; that which is directly produced by God is the nearest approach to perfection (it is 'infinite' in its own kind, and admits of the least negation). That which is produced mediately is imperfect in accordance with its degree of mediacy. Thus an infinite number of modes follows from God 'by the necessity of the divine nature.'[3] Mode, then, is a device for deducing the finite from the infinite. But the step is not made at once. We pass first to infinite modes. These are Substance in its totality considered as active. Extension is barren until touched to life by motion and rest; and these have an infinitely extended range. Similarly, Substance as thought, when its decks are cleared for action, appears as *intellectus absolute infinitus*. Yet both these, though infinite, are intelligible not *per se* but *per aliud*. They are therefore modes, not attributes—'sons of God' in the language of the *de Deo*.[4]

Each of these immediate infinite modes gives birth to 'mediate' infinite modes. Under motion and rest stands the *facies totius universi*,[5] which, though varying internally, is in total always the same. Spinoza's account is brief; but the doctrine seems to be derived from that of Descartes, that the quantity of motion in the universe is constant. By this Descartes meant momentum. Had Spinoza lived now, he would doubtless have expressed his 'mode' in terms of the Conservation of Energy. That there were other such 'mediate infinite modes' is likely enough; but conjecture may well be spared.

How intellect, which is a mode, can yet be absolutely infinite is hard to see. 'Our mind, so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, determined by another eternal mode, and this by another, and so on *in infinitum*; so that all together constitute God's eternal and infinite intellect.'[6] Thus 'God's intellect' is here used as equivalent to the sum-total of human intellects, including potential intellect as well as actual; and it deals not merely with extension, but with thought itself. Every thought is capable of being made the object of another thought, and so on *ad infinitum*. The absolutely infinite intellect is identical with the whole of these actual or potential series. Here for once Spinoza seems to use the term 'infinite' in the sense which he elsewhere rejects—that of indefinitely numerous.[7]

In the attribute of thought the mediate eternal mode, corresponding to the *facies* in extension, is not given by Spinoza. Did we know the other attributes, we should find each of them throwing off stems, first immediate and then mediate, in a series of similar pairs. But even so we have not bridged the chasm from the infinite to the finite. How is that to be done?

(*d*) *Modes, finite.*—Spinoza's answer is that finite things are themselves in a sense infinite. Their essences are eternal; their existence finite. In *Eth.* i. 17, schol., *e.g.*, we learn that a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence, for the latter is eternal.[8] Peopling the vast heaven of eternity are countless hosts of

1 *Eth.* i., def. 5. 2 *Ep.* 19. 3 *Eth.* i. 29.
4 i. 9. 5 *Ep.* 64. 6 *Eth.* v. 40, schol.
7 See Martineau, *Study of Spinoza*[3], pp. 198–200.
8 Cf. *Int. Em.* viii. 53.

eternal essences; they pass for a moment through the entangling atmosphere of existence, and flash into a transient light. Essence[1] is 'the manner in which created things are comprehended in God's attributes.' Hence the essences even of finite things are eternal. Thus the passage from the infinite to the essence of a finite thing is but a passage to the entirely finite. But whence comes the partial finitude?

Everything left to the play of its own essence would be eternal. Nothing can be destroyed,[2] except by a thing of the same kind, external to itself. The essence of a thing neither brings it into existence nor expels it thence. There cannot be a finite thing until there is another finite thing to determine it; and that other is itself determined by another finite thing; and so *ad infinitum*.[3] So also there is no particular thing than which there is not a more powerful one by which it may be destroyed.[4] But whence does the finite get its first impulse? This indefinite series is not true infinity.[5] Nay, finiteness, a mere negation, seems to have been unconsciously pressed into the domain of causality. As Martineau well puts it, finding the 'most capacious essences struck with sterility' in the domain of actual things, Spinoza invents a second kind of causality, the despised inductive.[6]

He has been defended on the ground that this second causality, being bound up with temporal existence, is a mere illusion. Spinoza's particular things, say some, have no real existence; and therefore the series of causes that leads to them, being illusory also, is of course irreconcilable with the eternal causality. Much in his language lends countenance to this theory. In *Ep.* 29, *e.g.*, he says that extended substance is not really divided, as we are so prone to divide it in imagination. Yet elsewhere he speaks of particular things as 'actually existing';[7] and this existence seems to have been objective (*formalis*). Else why does he tell us that the finite is only in part negative?[8] Admitting, then, to the full the illusoriness of the temporal existence of particular things, we are still unable to reconcile the two lines of causality into one. How they put on this illusory actuality is precisely the difficulty which Spinoza does not meet. He provides causes for the real and causes also for the phenomenal; but he says nothing as to how the real becomes phenomenal.

Assuming, however, this double causality, let us see how it works. The existence of each thing is a mediate infinite mode. If left to its essence, the thing would simply be. But it comes into a 'struggle for existence' with other essences.[9] Hence arise the ideas of contingency, possibility, and the like. If the circumstances of the temporal world forbid the appearance of the thing, we call its existence 'impossible'; should they not forbid it, we call it 'probable' or 'possible.' But in either case the contingency is merely a phrase for our ignorance.[10]

To sum up: a finite individual thing is a fusion of its eternal essence with the temporal chain of causality, which alone determines its duration. In both these senses the thing is called actual; but the actualities are of totally different kinds.[11] In the individuality of such a thing both attributes (and possibly even the infinite others also) must, in modal form, unite their forces. In a man, *e.g.*, must combine size, form, motion, etc., while external circumstances will, by their action upon him and upon themselves, decide the length of his terrestrial course. A man is a complex; and our knowledge both of his mind and of his body, as well as of his external conditions, must be fragmentary at best.[12]

(*e*) *Man as mode.*—Among all individuals man is highest. Not of course that he is the end of Nature, or that Nature in any sense aims at his welfare.[13] Nevertheless, as there are degrees of perfection, man, expressing the infinite both in mind and in body better than other finites, is the most perfect. Even in men there are degrees of perfection. The good man expresses God more fully than the knave.[1] Ideas differ from one another in containing more or less reality.[2] Hence, by the doctrine of parallelism, the human body also is superior to other finite bodies. Not, of course, that there is any causal connexion between body and mind. The body and the idea of body (*i.e.* the mind) are the same individual conceived under different attributes.[3] The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and nothing else.[4] True, Spinoza probably began by regarding the body as the prior;[5] but in the *Ethics* this has been dropped, and the highly artificial doctrine which, for want of a better term, we have called 'parallelism' has been substituted. This doctrine involves the rejection of all belief in a real self in man, as is clearly seen in the series of propositions[6] in which the subject is discussed. There is no *faculty* of desiring, loving, understanding. All these are fictions, or metaphysical universals. To call them 'mind' is like explaining a stone by talking of lapidity.[7] 'The mind is a definite mode of thought, and not the free cause of its actions.'[8] The perceptions of the mind vary with the sensations of the body.[9] The idea which constitutes the actual being of mind is not simple, but compound.[10] The succession of thoughts *is* the mind. The human mind does not know the body to exist save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected; and[11] the idea of the human mind is referred to God (*i.e.* exists in the ordered sequence of the world) precisely as the idea of the human body. But how can the mind, which is nothing but a series of thoughts, be conceived by one link in that series? Spinoza answers[12] by propounding the theory of the mind not only as the idea of the body, but as *idea ideæ*, *i.e.* as conscious of ideas. Precisely as it sums up the sensations into one whole which we call the body, so these various ideas are summed up into one generalization and contemplated as a whole.[13] But the difference is obvious. An idea of an idea is caused by that idea, whereas the body is absolutely dissociated from the mind.

The ambiguity in the word 'idea' must already have struck the reader. When Spinoza tells us that all things are animate, or that the object of the idea constituting the mind is the body and nothing else, he does not mean by 'idea' what we now denote by 'concept,' but merely the parallel in thought to the body in extension. Thus the *idea corporis* is one kind of idea; the *idea ideæ* is another.

We may well ask how, if the mind is but a succession of ideas, it can form judgments. The answer is[14] that the judgment is in the idea itself, and not in the mind regarded as having the idea. The truth of an idea is its own standard; the mind does not judge its truth, but the idea asserts its own truth. A false idea, similarly, is negative in itself.[15] There is, as we have seen, no faculty of judgment; and the possibility of judgments is not explained, but simply referred dogmatically to the ultimate Substance. We shall find later that will, which is to Spinoza a judgment, is equally reduced to a mere point in a long line of points reaching back to infinity.

The purpose of the theory of *idea ideæ* was to reinstate after a fashion the 'self' which had been destroyed by the rejection of 'faculties.' But the self, lodged at the end of an infinite series, recedes like a will-o'-the-wisp the more it is pursued; and a mind which receives ideas passively *ab extra* has no claim to the character of a real mode of thought. Regarding man as finite, in fact,

1 *Cog. Met.* I. 2.
2 *Eth.* iii. 4.
3 *Ib.* i. 28.
4 *Ib.* iv. ax.
5 *Ep.* 12, etc.
6 *Study of Spinoza*[3], p. 200, *Types of Eth. Theory*, I. 299.
7 *Eth.* ii. 11, 13, v. 29, schol., etc.
8 *Ib.* i. 8, schol.
9 *Ib.* iv. ax.
10 *Ib.* i. 33, schol. 1, iii. 4, 6, ii. 30, dem.
11 *Ib.* v. 29, schol.
12 *Ib.* ii. 16, 26 f., etc.
13 *De Deo*, ii. 24; *Tr. Pol.* ii. 8, and *passim*.

1 *Ep.* 23.
2 *Eth.* ii. 13, schol.
3 *Ib.* ii. 21, schol.
4 *Ib.* ii. 13.
5 *De Deo*, suppl. p. 243, pt. ii., 'de Mente Humana,' 2.
6 *Eth.* ii. 11 ff.
7 *Ib.* ii. 48, schol.
8 *Ib.* ii. 48, dem.
9 *Ib.* ii. 14.
10 *Ib.* ii. 15.
11 *Ib.* ii. 20.
12 *Ib.* ii. 21.
13 *Ib.* ii. 21, schol.
14 *Ib.* ii. 43, schol.
15 *Ib.* ii. 35.

Spinoza seems to have *ipso facto* banished the self; for the essence of self is independent reality. There is in the mind much that we do not know, which yet may be postulated from considering the body; and *vice versa*. Hence to know the one thoroughly we must discuss the other; and Spinoza[1] proceeds to give us a few propositions (or 'lemmas') on body generally, into which we cannot here enter. The probability is (though Joachim and others dispute it) that a full knowledge of man would reveal body, mind, and an infinite number of other modes in the other attributes. When Spinoza says[2] that 'of things as they are in themselves God is the cause so far as he consists of infinite attributes,' he must surely mean that every individual thing, man included, is a fusion of modes of all the attributes.

5. Theory of knowledge.—At this point Spinoza resumes the thread of psychological analysis that was broken off in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. The test of truth is in the idea itself; the mind does not, strictly, *judge* its ideas. Nevertheless we need some method of comparing these ideas—and most of all in a system which regards the ideas *as* the mind. Spinoza accordingly gives us a classification. We find three classes: (1) ideas of the imagination, (2) ideas of reasoning, (3) ideas of intuition. In earlier times Spinoza seems to have regarded ideas as passive,[3] but in the *Ethics* he speaks otherwise: 'I call an idea a conception rather than a perception, because the latter word seems to imply that the mind is passive with respect to the object.'[4] An adequate idea, then, is one in which the intrinsic (or subjective) marks of truth are present, namely, clearness and distinctness; and to attain certainty we need only reduce ideas to simplicity. This is done directly by intuition, and mediately by reasoning; hence the only source of error is imagination.

(*a*) *Ideas of imagination.*—The question of the relation between mind and body was differently solved by Spinoza at different times. In the appendix to *de Deo*[5] he says, 'mens a corpore originem ducat.' In *Int. Em.*[6] the possibility of ideas arising from fortuitous motions of the body is admitted. To account for this influence he adopted Descartes's fantastic doctrine of animal spirits. This theory he utterly rejects in the *Ethics*.[7] Nevertheless a few traces of it seem to remain in the language which he uses to explain imagination.

We only know our body phenomenally, 'by the ideas of the affections of the body.'[8] Hence our knowledge of it is very imperfect. We know it not in its cause, but through ideas of its successive states, and these ideas are confused with those of other bodies.[9] This ill-blent conception is imagination. If we are affected by an external body, we regard that body as present;[10] and we tend to regard even absent external bodies as present also. This is explained[11] by a curious physiological doctrine, which we need not here examine. Anyhow, when the external body is really there, we 'perceive' it—*i.e.*, the mind forms an idea which is parallel to the contiguous body. This Spinoza calls the idea of the body—another instance of the ambiguity of the term 'idea.' Like Sir William Hamilton, he identifies the cause of a sensation with the object of a perception. Still more clear is this when we look at his account of representation—*i.e.* of the formation of pictures of external things that are not there. The external bodies have left a 'footprint' on the brain. Whenever that footprint is reproduced by internal causes, we invent the external cause. Modern psychologists would unanimously assert that we do not (as a rule) think *of* these states of the brain. The thought arises *from* them, doubtless; but an idea caused by a thing is not a knowledge of it. In any case, a knowledge of the body thus attained is inadequate; and the mind's knowledge of itself, being attendant on the ideas of bodily affections,[1] is equally inadequate.[2] We can often correct one imagination by another;[3] but full correction can come only from reasoning or intuition.

Should ideas be frequently given together, an association tends to be created by which the appearance of one idea arouses the others. Thus[4] from the word 'apple' we proceed to form the image of the fruit. (Spinoza does not distinguish this association from memory.) Should a large number of these images recur, the mind, retaining the *ratio patientis*,[5] and acting as a mere 'spiritual automaton,' selects those ideas that are alike in certain respects from those that are alike in others, and forms blurred images. This is the origin of those worthless 'universals' which, as we saw above (§ 2), are mere negations. To the universal we give an equally worthless class-name, which means one thing to one man and another to another.[6] Still more blurred are those abstract images which are represented by 'transcendental' terms like 'thing,' 'being,' 'somewhat.'[7] Such a fiction, so persistent that it hampers even philosophers, is that of time, which is 'nihil praeter modum cogitandi.'[8] This doctrine must not be confused with the Kantian 'forms of thought.' With Kant 'time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation *of all our intuitions*.'[9] With Spinoza time is quite unessential to all rationally conceived ideas. So long as we confine ourselves to essences, we are in a region to which the notion of time is quite foreign. Time, in fact, is a form of contingency, which, as we saw above, is not in nature but in ourselves.

Equally illusory is the notion of freedom.[10] Not knowing the causes that impel us to action, we imagine ourselves free to do this or that. Even so a falling stone, if it could think, would fancy it fell of its own accord. Similar is that worst of all errors, the ascription to God of a purpose in His actions.[11] Intellect and will do not pertain to God; they are a mere *refugium ignorantiæ*.

(*b*) *Reasoning.*—If the imagination is prone to false generalizing, it does not follow that all generalizing is false. Without some form of generalization thought is impossible. In *Eth.* ii. 38 we learn what is the true form. 'Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.' Suppose our body to be acted on by an external thing. There must be something 'commune et proprium' to the two. Let the body be again acted on, this time by another external thing. There will again be something in common; and so on. The idea of this common element will be clear and distinct, *i.e.* adequate. Such a remaining common quality is weight. Our idea of weight, then, is adequate. Similarly with the yet wider idea of extension. Such *communes notiones*, unlike the false universals, are true; and the more the body has in

1 *Eth.* ii. 13. 2 *Ib.* ii. 7, schol.
3 *De Deo*, ii. 15: 'Tò intelligere puram esse passionem.'
4 ii. def. 3.
5 Pt. ii., 'de Mente Humana,' *ad init.*
6 xii. 91. 7 v. pref.
8 *Ib.* ii. 19. 9 *Ib.* ii. 16.
10 *Ib.* ii. 17. 11 *Ib.* ii. 17, schol.

1 *Eth.* ii. 23. 2 *Ib.* ii. 29.
3 *Ib.* ii. 17. 4 *Ib.* ii. 18, schol.
5 *Int. Em.* xi. 86. 6 *Eth.* ii. 40, schol. 1.
7 On these *entia ficta* see *Cog. Met.* i. 1, 6, etc.
8 *Cog. Met.* ii. 10, 5.
9 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, i. 2.
10 *Eth.* ii. 49. 11 *Ib.* i. appendix.

common with external bodies the more things can be adequately known.[1] These *communes notiones* may be made the basis of reasoning (*fundamenta rationis*), and will lead to other adequate ideas. Doubtless Spinoza had in his mind the fact that Euclid's axioms are called *communes notiones*; but he would have extended the phrase to include the fundamental ideas of physics, dynamics, and his own ethics. When once these foundations have been laid, accuracy in ratiocination will secure certainty.

Imagination regards things as contingent; reason regards them 'sub quadam aeternitatis specie.'[2] If a child sees Peter two or three times in the morning, he will associate the morning with Peter. If on occasion James should appear instead of Peter, the child's expectation will waver between the two. Reason, on the other hand, conceives things out of all relation to time. When considering a triangle, it does not consider whether the triangle is new, old, large, or small. Reason, in fact, views nature in an *ordo ad intellectum*.

But this phrase, 'sub specie aeternitatis,' is ultimately deposed in favour of another. To know the *communes notiones*, to know the 'essence' of an individual thing, to know a thing 'under the form of eternity,' are all reduced[3] to knowing a thing 'by reference to the eternal and infinite essence of God.' This is a sublime phrase, the full meaning of which will appear only as the whole philosophy is studied. At present a few words must suffice. All properties of matter are known with reference to extension. But extension is the infinite essence of God on one side. And therefore, as our knowledge of extension (the most ultimate of *communes notiones* in one attribute) is adequate, so our knowledge of any extended thing can be adequate only so far as it is referred to that ultimate attribute. Similarly with the other attribute of thought. Deductive reasoning is a safe way of attaining this adequacy—nay (apart from the obscure exception to which we now proceed), it is the only one.

(*c*) *Intuitive knowledge.*—Still higher than reason is *scientia intuitiva*, which is so darkly delineated that its features are only dimly discerned. We learn, however, the following points.

(*α*) It deals with the essences of singular things;[4] not, like *ratio*, with *communes notiones*. A word is here necessary on these essences. Spinoza is generally called a nominalist; and his rejection of 'universals' justifies us in so regarding him. But how, under a system of nominalism, essences can remain is a riddle. Retaining essences, we must mean by them the common properties of things; and so Spinoza does, when he calls the common properties of bodies the eternal essence of the human body—*i.e.* the essence of the human body is that which it shares with non-human bodies! But as a rule he speaks, as here, of the essences of individual things—a conception almost paradoxical. Yet some such conception seems necessary to explain that agreement between the idea and the *ideatum* which constitutes truth. In this agreement there is a kind of identity between the two, the 'formal' and the 'objective' being only aspects of the same thing; and that 'same thing' is the essence. This essence is not the product of the mind only—such a quasi-Berkeleian theory is utterly foreign to Spinoza; nor can it be in the body before the mind perceives it—else the body would be made prior to the mind. Such as it is, it is perceived by *scientia intuitiva*.

(*β*) It acts immediately and not deductively. The example given is as follows.[5]

Required a fourth proportional to three given numbers. Tradesmen arrive at the correct result either 'ab experientia vaga' or by remembering the rules of thumb learnt at school ('ex auditu'). The mathematician sees it 'sub specie aeternitatis,' having seen the laws of proportion and referred them to 'God'—*i.e.* to the controlling conceptions of space. But with very simple numbers there is no need of either process; in a single flash the correct answer is obtained; and this is intuition.[6]

Whether this intuition is due to long practice in *ratio*, or is a separate faculty, is not quite clear.[7] Spinoza confesses that the things he knows by this kind of knowledge are few;[8] but it is possible to attain it, for[1] 'we can form that kind of knowledge,' though we cannot form images of God as we do of bodies, and therefore fancy we have not as clear an idea of Him as of bodies.

(*γ*) A third hint as to the nature of intuition is given in *Eth.* v. 31. We there learn that it depends (1) on the mind, (2) on the mind as formal, (3) on the mind so far as the mind itself is eternal. On these enigmatical sentences much has been written. With hesitation we advance the following attempt at solution. 'The idea of every individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.'[2] If, *e.g.*, we wish to know any individual mode of extension, we must refer it to the attribute of extension in God. *Ratio* does in fact thus proceed. Beginning with space, it adds the differentiæ one by one, until it arrives at the definition required. This Spinoza would call 'acting as far as the mind is finite.' Intuition, on the other hand, beginning with the individual thing and acting by its 'eternal' powers, escapes all the intermediate stages, and grasps at once the relation of the thing to God. Seeing the unity of the individual thing as prior to its diversity, it proceeds at once to the unity of God whence that unity flows; whereas *ratio* sees the diversity first. Strictly, indeed, intuition does not *proceed* at all. Presented with a triangle, it would see at once what properties are general and what special, and would, by the eternity of the mind, refer the universal properties at once to the attribute of extension. Hence, as has often been pointed out, *scientia intuitiva* is really possible only for an infinite mind.

Scientia intuitiva ought, if it transcends reason, to carry us back to a principle that unifies alike the things among themselves and their differences from the perceiving mind. Spinoza has shut out this possibility by confining intuition to the perception of individual things. Nevertheless, he is not entirely unconscious of the obligation; for, when (as in *Eth.* v.) he speaks of the mind that has attained this knowledge, he is led on to speak of that mind as absorbed in the Reality which it grasps; as, in fact, one with God. 'To see God in all things, and all things in God'—Spinoza's ideal—is impossible save for God Himself; and even for Him impossible, since intellect does not belong to *Natura naturans*.

Ratio and intuition exhaust all possible instruments of knowledge. Intellect directed on either of these paths cannot err. To discern the true, all that is necessary is to resolve ideas into their simplest form. Nothing would induce Spinoza to give any other criterion of truth than truth itself; it is the rule both of itself and of the false.[3] When, in fact, we see the truth, we see it; and there is no more to be said.

6. **Doctrine of the emotions.**—*Scientia intuitiva* shows that, while all things depend on God, their individuality is not destroyed thereby. By a noble paradox it asserts that the aloneness of things is precisely the essence which they derive from God. From God they gain the power of existing (so to speak) apart from God. Once launched on the sea of life, they exert a power which is none the less their own that it is recognized to be God's. This doctrine Spinoza expresses in terms of the *conatus*; and it is here that we must seek the transition from knowing to doing, from metaphysic to ethic.

This theory is stated thus: 'Everything, as far as it *is* in itself, endeavours to continue in its being.'[4] That this 'endeavour' is a mere metaphor in many cases is at once seen. 'This *conatus* is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.' To some extent Spinoza had been anticipated by Descartes, who asserted the doctrine of *inertia*—*i.e.* that external causes alone can alter the state of a body. Other philosophers had already treated this *inertia* as a *vis*; and hence we are not surprised to find Spinoza speaking of this passive principle as a '*vis* qua res in existendo perseverat'; while in the *de Deo* it is called the *naturalis amor* of everything for the preservation of its body. In things generally the *conatus* is equivalent to their existence; in living things it is their life; but it belongs primarily to the mind-side of the thing,

1 *Eth.* ii. 39, cor.
2 *Ib.* ii. 44, cor. 2.
3 *Ib.* ii. 45.
4 *Ib.* v. 36, schol.
5 *Ib.* ii. 40, schol. 2.
6 See also *de Deo*, ii. 1.
7 See Busolt, p. 62.
8 *Int. Em.* iv. 22.

1 *Eth.* ii. 47, schol.
2 ii. 45.
3 ii. 43, schol.
4 *Ib.* iii. 6.

and in man[1] the mind is conscious of the *conatus*. The existence which we attempt to maintain is the temporal and phantasmal;[2] but the *conatus* follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature.[3] Referred solely to the mind, it is will; referred to body and mind in conjunction, it is appetite. Will, then, is simply 'appetite with consciousness thereof.'[4] This transformation of the mere essence of a man into the active principle of will is one of Spinoza's most astounding feats.

But observe that the will is, as we have seen, not 'free.'[5] God alone is free—and that in the sense that He works solely from the necessity of His own nature. Secondly, the will is not a faculty. *Voluntas* is only a general name for the sum of particular volitions, as the mind is the sum of particular ideas. Thirdly, *voluntas* is merely a judgment, not a desire. When I see a triangle and affirm that its angles are equal to two right angles, this affirmation is a *voluntas*. How far this identification, so strange to modern eyes, is absolute may be doubted. It has been well pointed out that the psychological classification of mind into will, feeling, and cognition was not known to Spinoza;[6] and possibly, as Pollock suggests,[7] Spinoza simply means to assert that the will is active as the understanding is active. In any case he excludes choice from will, and forbids us to pass what are ordinarily known as 'moral judgments' on any action whatever. Virtue thus reduces to an acquiescence in our fate. When we see that what happens both within us and without us is as 'necessary' as the properties of a triangle are necessary when once its essence is given, we shall endure our lot with even mind.[8]

Hence we do not desire a thing because it is good; we call it good because we desire it. Whatever satisfies the *conatus* in any degree is so far 'good'; whatever hinders it is so far 'bad.' The same series of deeds may be good or bad in different circumstances. Externally, the matricide of Orestes does not differ from that of Nero.[9]

Voluntas, or *appetitus*, being a judgment, may be either adequate or inadequate. From the former arise activities of the mind, from the latter passivities.[10] Whatever increases or diminishes the activity in the body, the 'idea' thereof increases or diminishes the power of thought in the mind.[11] Thus the mind can undergo change, and pass, like the body, to a greater or less 'perfection.' These states are called respectively pleasure (*lætitia*) and pain (*tristitia*). The first active exercise of the *conatus* appears when the pleasure or pain has given rise to desire (conscious appetite).[12] Desire is mild or intense according to the intensity of the pleasure or pain in which it originates, and has as many varieties as there are varieties of that pleasure or pain. It is in fact 'the being of a man himself, so far as we conceive it as determined to a particular action by any given affection of it.'[13] Pleasure has one advantage over pain in that it increases the vitality to which it owes its origin;[14] hence desire arising from pleasure is, *ceteris paribus*, greater than that arising from pain. Desire, pleasure, and pain are to Spinoza the only primary emotions.

To develop his theory of the emotions, Spinoza relies largely upon association of ideas, which had already been applied to the same end, but with far less skill, by Hobbes. The result is universally regarded as Spinoza's masterpiece. His very success, however, makes it unnecessary for us to follow him in detail. A slight reference will be sufficient. Feelings are twofold: if based on inadequate ideas, they are passive; if on adequate, active. Subjection to the former is human bondage; subjection to the latter is only another word for the highest freedom.

Since we naturally endeavour to preserve our existence, we naturally endeavour to banish those images that lower our vitality, and to maintain those that heighten it. Hence arise the passive emotions of love (or liking) and hate (or dislike). By the law of association we soon come to like or dislike things in themselves indifferent to us;[1] and anything may, accidentally, be the cause of such an emotion.[2] Thus we explain avarice, regret, jealousy, and rivalry.[3] These emotions often, as in avarice, attain a power totally out of proportion to the pleasure or pain from which they spring.

By the very fact that we conceive a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves subjected to a like emotion.[4] From this principle, applied in the fashion of Adam Smith, Spinoza works in order to trace many of our *affectus* to sympathy. It is this *imitatio affectuum* which, referred to pain, is called commiseration, and, referred to desire, is called emulation.[5] Thus we explain repentance, ambition, envy, or benevolence.

Contingency and freedom being illusions, we ought neither to regret our own (so-called) bad actions, nor to plume ourselves on our 'good' ones, nor to be angry with a man who injures us. 'Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner'; or, rather, to understand is to see that the very notions of approval and pardon are irrelevant. It is from such inadequate ideas that arise anger, remorse, self-approval, revenge.[6]

Such passive emotions, then, subjection to which is bondage, are defined generally as follows: 'Emotion which is called a passion of the soul is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less force of existence in its body or some part thereof than it had before, on the occurrence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing more than of another.'[7]

Such emotions of course differ in different men,[8] or even in the same man. Spinoza would probably have allowed that the quality of a pleasure is to be taken into account as well as its quantity.[9]

We pass on now to active emotions, arising from adequate ideas. Some of these spring from *ratio*, others from *scientia intuitiva*. Where the mind conceives itself as active, it feels pleasure; hence the mind feels pleasure when it forms adequate ideas.[10] Desire also may arise from such ideas; but pain, by the very nature of the case, is excluded.[11] Spinoza has thus arrived at last at that *virtus* of the mind, *fortitudo*, which, as we saw, was the practical end he set before himself at the very commencement of his philosophy. *Fortitudo*, or strength of character, is merely the essence of the mind in its self-sustaining endeavour. The utmost that Spinoza can promise (on the other hand, the utmost that is worth having) is knowledge—knowledge more perfect in proportion to the greatness of the object that it covers. Fortitude is the courage to know—to get clear of the passive emotions, and to act from the *conatus* alone. As centred in ourselves, it is *animositas*, or valour; as directed towards others, it is *generositas*, or nobility. By the former is meant the desire whereby we strive to preserve our being in accordance with the dictates of reason; by the latter

1 *Eth.* iii. 9.
2 *Ib.* iii. 8.
3 *Ib.* ii. 45, schol.
4 *Ib.* iii. 9, schol.
5 *Ib.* ii. 48.
6 Joachim, p. 186.
7 P. 206.
8 *Eth.* ii. 49, Cor. schol.
9 *Ep.* 23.
10 *Eth.* iii. 3.
11 *Ib.* iii. 11.
12 *Ib.* iii. 9.
13 *Ib.* iii. Aff. def. 1.
14 *Ib.* iv. 18.

1 *Eth.* iii. 14.
2 *Ib.* iii. 15.
3 *Ib.* iii. 35, 36, 56.
4 *Ib.* iii. 27.
5 *Ib.* iii. 27, schol. 1.
6 *Ib.* iii. 25, 40, 49, etc.
7 *Ib.* iii. Aff. def.
8 *Ib.* iii. 57.
9 See *ib.* iii. 57, schol.
10 *Ib.* iii. 58.
11 *Ib.* iii. 59.

the desire whereby we endeavour, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid others and be their friends. Temperance and presence of mind are varieties of the one; courtesy and mercy, of the other. A man of fortitude will never allow his desires to be excessive; he will not be disturbed even by the fear of death, for he will think of death less than of anything. All this is due to his possession of adequate knowledge.

Nor is even fortitude all that is possible to us. There are yet higher emotions, springing not from reason, but from intuition. These Spinoza does not yet consider, pausing to touch on our subjugation to the emotions.[1]

7. Human bondage, or the power of the emotions.—Though 'good' and 'bad' are relative terms, it is perhaps as well to retain them, provided we keep in mind the sense in which they are used, and Spinoza lays it down that he will use 'good' as the synonym of 'perfect.'[2] 'There is no individual thing in nature than which there is not a stronger thing that can destroy it.'[3] Hence the force whereby a man persists in existing is infinitely (*i.e.* indefinitely) surpassed by the power of external causes.[4] Passion, therefore, being due to these external causes, has enormous force, and can at times overcome all the rest of a man's activities.[5] A passion can be destroyed only by a contrary passion.[6] Reason may easily be overcome by emotion: knowledge can control the emotions only so far as it is itself one of them.[7] Desires may be controlled by other desires; and desire of future good is more easily controlled than desire of what is now agreeable.[8] Desire arising from pleasure we have seen to be stronger than that arising from pain.[9] Hence we might almost echo the despairing cry of the poet, 'Video meliora proboque: deteriora sequor'; but, says Spinoza, 'I have not written this to draw the conclusion that ignorance is better than knowledge, or that a wise man is no better than a fool. What reason *can* do in controlling the emotions I shall show later. At present I shall say that reason demands that every man should love himself, and should desire everything which really brings him to greater perfection.'[10]

Virtue is based on the self-maintaining impulse. Every man necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be 'good' or 'bad'—*i.e.* conducive to his self-conservation or the reverse. The more he endeavours to preserve his own being, the more virtuous he is; and only external causes can prevent his so endeavouring. No virtue can be conceived apart from the *conatus sese conservandi*. A man is not virtuous if he acts from inadequate ideas; for, 'acting' thus, he is really 'passive' and swayed by external causes. Virtue, then,[11] is intellect. In accordance with reason, we can endeavour nothing except to understand. Of these assertions, so Socratic in sound, it is certain that the proof would hardly have satisfied Socrates.

The following propositions (29–37) are even harder to follow. Nothing that has not something in common with our nature can do us good or harm (29)—an obvious truism. Yet we are told next (30) that a thing cannot be bad for us *through* that which it has in common with our nature. In so far as it is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good (31). The purpose of these three truisms is to lead up to positions of value in Spinoza's political system—viz. that men necessarily agree if they live in obedience to reason, and that apart from reason no truly social life is possible. A rational life is unfortunately rare; and yet, as Aristotle said, man cannot help being social. Duly to live the rational life, a complex organism is necessary. In Spinoza's Cartesian phraseology, 'Whatever disposes the human body so as to render it capable of being affected in a greater number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways, is useful to man,'[1] provided only this increased complexity is not purchased at the expense of stability of equilibrium. Such instability is always bad, even though it does not amount to what is usually called death.

To social life and a complex organism Spinoza proceeds to add[2] reasonable pleasure. Pleasure *per se* is good; pain *per se* is bad. Spinoza is no ascetic. Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good and an aid to perfection. It is the wise man's part to enjoy what comes in his way as much as possible—not, of course, to satiety, for that would not be enjoying it.

Hence we see what reason demands of man. He who lives by reason endeavours to render love for hatred, kindness for contempt.

'He who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure but through increase in their powers.' . . . 'He who rightly realizes that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt; nor will he bestow pity on anything. He who is easily touched with compassion often does something which he afterwards regrets.' Yet 'he who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion seems hardly a man at all.'[3]

Self-approval may arise from reason, and is indeed the highest object we can hope for. Humility, on the other hand, is no virtue, but a passion. Repentance, likewise, is no virtue; he who repents only makes himself miserable twice over—first by doing the bad action, and secondly by fretting about it. True, *as things are*, both humility and repentance do on the whole more good than harm; and, as 'sin' is inevitable, it is better to sin in the direction of repentance than in the opposite. It was natural, then, for the prophets, in an irrational age, to recommend so strenuously humility and repentance. Those who live under these emotions are not far from the kingdom of reason. But within that kingdom there is a better way.

Pride and dejection are both signs of weakness; but the latter, as a pain, is more easily cured. Dejection, says Spinoza very acutely, is indeed very near of kin to pride.

To all actions to which we are determined by emotion, we can be determined without emotion by reason.[4] Desire that springs from reason cannot be excessive; and the rational mind is affected equally whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present;[5] hence, if our ideas were only adequate, we should desire a future thing as keenly as though it were present. But, having no adequate knowledge, we are reduced to reliance on the imagination, which prefers present things to future. We are often led by fear, and do good to escape evil, which is contrary to reason, and the lowest of superstitions. Under a reasonable desire we seek good directly and only accidentally shun evil.

The knowledge of evil is inadequate.[6] Spinoza's proof of this statement has been much criticized, and seems indeed to rest on a confusion between knowledge of a negation and a negation of knowledge. He is more correct when[7] he asserts that, as good and evil are relative terms, so a knowledge of either is incomplete without a knowledge of the other. If we possessed adequate knowledge, we should know neither. Precisely similarly,[8] Spinoza gets rid of sin by treating it as a mere negation.

As usual, the practical is not forgotten. Under the guidance of reason we must pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils; and the greater good in the future rather than the lesser in the present.[9] A reasonable man, living among the ignorant, will avoid receiving favours from them—but only as far as he can. Only 'free' men, however, are really 'grateful' to one another.[10] But a man is more truly 'free' in a society than in solitude; hence the reasonable man does not seek the fictitious freedom of a hermitage. In fact, he will acquiesce in things as they are, for, 'As far as we are intelligent we cannot desire anything save what is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything save the true; hence the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.'[11]

8. Human freedom, or the power of the understanding.—We now reach the most attractive, but at the same time the most enigmatical, part of the *Ethics*. Leaving the indicative mood, Spinoza passes on to the imperative; and, as we shall see, he ventures on daring flights.

'I shall treat,' he says, 'of the power of reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of mental freedom or blessedness; we shall then be able to see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.'[12] He leaves to logic the discussion of the means of perfecting the mind, and to medicine that of the means of perfectly adapting the body to its functions. The power of the mind over the emotions is not direct; it is defined by the understanding

1 *Eth.* iv.
2 *Ib.* iv. pref.
3 *Ib.* iv. **ax.**
4 *Ib.* iv. 3.
5 *Ib.* iv. 6.
6 *Ib.* iv. 7.
7 *Ib.* iv. 14.
8 *Ib.* iv. 16.
9 *Ib.* iv. 18.
10 *Ib.* iv. 17, schol.
11 *Ib.* iv. 26–28.

1 *Eth.* iv. 39, dem.
2 *Ib.* iv. 41.
3 *Ib.* iv. 46, schol., 50, schol.
4 *Ib.* iv. 59.
5 *Ib.* iv. 62.
6 *Ib.* iv. 64.
7 *Ib.* iv. 68.
8 *Ep.* 19.
9 *Eth.* iv. 65 f.
10 *Ib.* iv. 71.
11 *Ib.* iv. appendix, § 32.
12 *Ib.* v. pref.

solely. In other words, the passions can be subdued only by knowing them.[1]

Then follows what has been called a 'great promise.' There is[2] no modification of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception—*i.e.* we can reduce it to its proper place in the order of nature, and see it in its relation to the God of whom it is part. We have long learnt, by painful experience, that no scientific discovery is absolutely true. But to Spinoza, as to Bacon, it may well have seemed that a few generalizations, and the collection of a great but limited number of facts, would lay open the map of a known universe. Yet even Spinoza is doubtful, for he adds a scholium to the effect that every one has the power of knowing his emotions, if not absolutely, at least in part. The practical deduction is that we should try to form this clear and distinct notion of our passions. Thus we shall know their causes, and see them as necessary. Forthwith the inadequate idea, which is the emotion, passes into adequacy; the emotion fades; and in proportion as we understand things as necessary, in that proportion has the mind power over the emotions. No one, *e.g.*, pities a baby because it cannot walk. But, if most people were born full grown, and only here or there did babies appear, every one would pity babies, because infancy would not seem to be a necessary state.[3]

The strength of an emotion is in proportion to the number of simultaneous causes by which it is aroused.[4] So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging modifications of our body according to the intellectual order;[5] and here, practical as usual, Spinoza adds some directions for conduct so obvious and simple that they have often been ridiculed as childish. It is only, however, to plunge us almost at once into one of his most enigmatical utterances. 'The mind can bring it about that all bodily images of things may be referred to the idea of God';[6] and this clear and distinct understanding (which to us seems far more unattainable than it did to Spinoza) is henceforth to be known as the 'love of God.'[7] Precisely as rationality suddenly appeared in the emotional garb of *fortitudo*, so, equally suddenly, intuitive knowledge has donned the aspect of love. Some would explain this metamorphosis as due to a desire to accommodate philosophy to theology. Others assume that Spinoza still retained a rag of Jewish mysticism; others again that, like other philosophers, he had an esoteric and an exoteric speech—the one for the initiated, the other for the profane. Whatever the explanation, it is such passages as these that have given Spinoza his hold on men like Coleridge and Schleiermacher, and extorted the cry of Novalis that here was a 'God-intoxicated man.' In reality this 'love' is less emotional than it looks, amounting at most to an *acquiescentia* in our lot. God is without passions, nor is He affected by pleasure or pain; 'he who loves God cannot desire that God should love him in return.'[8] No one can hate God—a clear proof that this 'love of God' is not the opposite of hate, but something of a different order altogether. This love is fostered 'in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be bound to God by the same bond of love.'[9] In plain prose, a knowledge of the laws of Nature leads us to a sober acceptance of what befalls us, and to a readiness to do without what we cannot attain; and the discoveries of others, as we assimilate them, aid in the same soothing process.

To sum up: the mind's power over its emotions consists (1) in its knowledge of them; (2) in separating them from the thought of an indistinctly apprehended external cause; (3) in the fact that, with respect to time, the emotions referred to things we distinctly understand surpass those referred to things we conceive confusedly; (4) in the number of the causes which foster the affections having regard to God or to the common properties of things; (5) in the ability of the mind to rearrange and associate its emotions one with another.

We have now reached the most tantalizing portion of Spinoza's work—a portion, indeed, which there is some reason to believe that he wished to mark off from the rest as not absolutely necessary to his theory, however fondly he might himself dwell upon it. At any rate, he says[1] that, even if the whole series of propositions through which we are now about to pass should be rejected, the virtue of *fortitudo* is none the less binding on us.[2]

So far there has been not the slightest trace of the meaning 'immortality' in Spinoza's use of the word 'eternal.' Eternal truth is simply necessary truth. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the word suddenly changes its meaning. When we read that something eternal remains of the mind after death,[3] there is nothing in the words to imply immortality. If, like Camerer, we hold such a view, we must defend it on other grounds. It is certain that Spinoza once maintained the actual immortality of the soul.[4] True, God, who made the soul, can destroy it; but it is tolerably sure that He never will. In the *de Deo* the position is more doubtful: some, with Sigwart, see in it still an assertion of immortality; to Martineau and others the opposite seems the case. 'If united with the body only, the soul must perish: if with something else that is unchangeable and abiding, then it cannot but be unchangeable and abiding also.'[5]

Adequate knowledge, then, is the only escape from death; even if it be a personal escape, it is open only to the philosopher. So far the *de Deo*; in the *Ethics* the word 'immortal' is dropped. But even from the *de Deo* we learn that (1) the presumed deathlessness of the soul must not interfere with the rigid parallelism of soul and body; (2) the deathlessness is a life to be enjoyed not hereafter, but here and now; (3) it is not open to all, but (in the strict sense) only to the possessor of adequate ideas; (4) the way to attain more of it is to increase our stock of such ideas.

Now the substitution of 'eternal' for 'immortal' would seem to imply the elimination of all idea of time from the conception of the mind.[6] But, while duration is no part of the definition of eternity, yet eternity must entail some kind of endless duration. Thus in *Eth.* v. 20, schol., the word 'duration' is applied to the mind's existence apart from the body. The arguments of Martineau and others against this are due to confounding duration with time (a confusion, indeed, from which Spinoza himself is not free).[7] While persistence is not necessity, that which does not persist cannot be necessary; and thus in *Ep.* 36 lack of duration is marked as an imperfection in extended things.

Again, nothing is eternal in its own right but God Himself. The essence of things is eternal, but not their existence.[8] The mind, then, as being produced by God, has no necessary existence; the existence of mind as such begins with that of the corresponding body.

[1] *Eth.* v. 1–3. [2] *Ib.* v. 4. [3] *Ib.* v. 6, schol.
[4] *Ib.* v. 8. [5] *Ib.* v. 10. [6] *Ib.* v. 14.
[7] *Ib.* v. 15 f. [8] *Ib.* v. 19. [9] *Ib.* v. 20.

[1] *Eth.* v. 41.
[2] See Pollock, p. 263; and Taylor, in *Mind*, new ser., v. [1896] 243 ff.
[3] *Eth.* v. 23. [4] *Cog. Met.* ii. 12.
[5] *De Deo*, ii. 23. [6] *Eth.* ii. 44, cor. 2.
[7] Joachim, p. 294. [8] *Eth.* i. 24.

We are now ready to deal with propositions 21 to 41 of pt. v. In spite of the arguments of Camerer,[1] conscious personal immortality is not implied in them; v. 21 shows that imagination and memory expire with the body; v. 34 that personal distinctions between man and man vanish at death; v. 22, an exceedingly obscure proposition, asserts that 'in God there is necessarily an idea, expressing under the category of eternity the essence of this or that human body'—*i.e.* that the human mind, considered as a necessary element in the thought-side of the universe, is so far eternal. But v. 23 adds more: it asserts duration, in some sense, of this eternal part of the mind. 'The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it *remains* that is eternal.' Yet even this is not enough; v. 22 applies to the body as much as to the mind. How then does the eternity of the latter surpass that of the former? What is this *aliquid æternum* that survives? To the first question v. 23, schol., seems to supply the answer, viz. that the mind alone can know and enjoy its own deathlessness. To the second question Spinoza gives no explicit reply; but we may perhaps deduce it; v. 24, 25 show that the *aliquid* consists in knowledge of the third kind; but v. 27, asserting that this knowledge leads to *acquiescentia*, manifests also the essentially emotional character of this remnant. It is in fact not only intellectual, but an *amor*. Yet in v. 29 we learn that it arises from contemplating the essence of the body under the form of eternity—*i.e.* from using our own body as the type of extension, and then passing to adequate knowledge, first of extension generally, and thence of the mind also. An adequate knowledge of the body gives us, ultimately, a knowledge of God.[2] And this knowledge of God leads not only to acquiescence, but to the love of God—a love eternal,[3] and totally different from all other passions; for these disappear when the body dies.[4]

Thus this intellectual love of God endures after the death of the body. But it is no personal survival; for personality, by which memory is implied, perishes with the body.[5] But in proportion as our body is capable of more activities, in that proportion is our mind eternal,[6] for our mind will have more means of attaining knowledge, and thus will have more chance of attaining to the intellectual love of God. It is only a natural extension of this to assert that God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love;[7] *i.e.* that the infinite Mind (made up into unity from all the finite minds) must have a complete knowledge of the universe in both its attributes, and must, with an infinite acquiescence, 'see that it is good.' This is not, as Martineau thinks, a mere tautology. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself;[8] but the completeness of knowledge is to be attained only by the union in one of the infinite number of souls that people the universe. It is not, of course, the *Natura naturans* that loves itself; but neither is it the individual mind simply; it is that mind absorbed into the unity of infinite minds. In other words, only the adequate formulation of truth, itself possible only to the united mind of man, can persist unchanged.

To sum up in the words of Taylor:

'Those personal memories and affections which derive all their piquancy and poignancy from the personal reference, perish for ever, as such, at death. They depend for their very existence on just those differences which make the existence of one man separate from that of another; and it is for Spinoza only so far as men are indistinguishably one that they are immortal.'[9]

[1] P. 122. [2] *Eth.* v. 30. [3] *Ib.* v. 33.
[4] *Ib.* v. 34. [5] *Ib.* v. 34. [6] *Ib.* v. 39.
[7] *Ib.* v. 35. [8] *Ib.* v. 36.
[9] *Mind*, new ser., v. 164.

Similarly with honest but defective scientific thought: the ideas of Ptolemy survive indeed, but metamorphosed beyond recognition. And all men are subject to this mortality; for[1] no man can make himself a mere home of adequate ideas. All men are subject to passion, and therefore mortal.[2] 'But an adequate idea, once thought, takes its place as a permanent addition to knowledge.'

To Spinoza, then, truth once discovered is absolute and lasting truth. 'Blessedness'—*i.e.* the intellectual acquiescence which springs from philosophic knowledge—is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. The pursuit of philosophy will, indeed, bring us nothing outside of itself; but it will bring us enough.

'The wise man is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, always possesses true acquiescence. If the way is hard, yet it may be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.'[3]

9. Attitude to religion and to theology.—Spinoza's enigmatical language has led to divergence of interpretation. He has been denounced as an atheist; on the other hand, he narrowly escaped being the eponymus of a Church. Pontiaan van Hattem, seizing upon some of his doctrines, and blending them with those of Christianity, produced a system which was in 1714 anathematized by the Dutch authorities. Another minister, Van Leeuhof, in a book called *Heaven and Earth*, endeavoured similarly to adapt Spinozism to orthodoxy. Herder, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Coleridge (the last by the most desperate methods of exegesis) also tried to enlist Spinoza on the side of ordinary theism. Even Goethe upheld this view against Jacobi: 'So möchte ich ihn Theissimum und Christianissimum nennen und preisen.'[4] Hegel, again, declared that he might rather be accused of acosmism than of atheism. By others he has been dubbed pantheist in all the meanings of that much-enduring word.

It is plain, then, that we must turn from the interpreters to Spinoza himself; and we believe that to those who do so, whatever the name they choose to describe him, the main lines of his thought will become clear.

God has neither intellect nor will.[5] God is 'free'—*i.e.*, He acts from the necessity of His own nature; but He has not the choice to make things other than they are. To deny this is really to deny God's omnipotence; it would imply that He can conceive things that He does not make. Things must have happened as they have happened;[6] to assert the contrary is to deny the perfection of God. Some would argue that there is no perfection or imperfection in things themselves, but that the perfection or imperfection is due to the will of God. But this would imply that God, who necessarily understands what He wills, could will that He should understand things otherwise than He does understand them.

God does not act to an end; nor is He a thinking thing in the sense of a self-conscious being. Intellect belongs only to *Natura naturata*; and even in *Natura naturata* the larger proportion of 'thinking things' do not really think. They are 'animate,' but not self-conscious. To Spinoza[7] thought was conceivable apart from ideas; hence, when he asserts[8] that there is in God an idea of His essence (a passage relied on by Busolt and others to prove the personality of God), we are not to assume more than we do when we assign an 'idea' to a stone. In *Eth.* ii. 11, cor., we are plainly told as much. 'When we say that God has an idea, not as merely constituting the human

[1] *Eth.* iv. 4. [2] *Ib.* v. 34. [3] *Ib.* v. 42, schol.
[4] Quoted by M. Grunwald, *Spinoza in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1897, vol. iii. p. 119, § 63.
[5] *Eth.* i. 17, schol. [6] *Ib.* i. 33. [7] *Ep.* ix.
[8] *Eth.* ii. 3.

mind, but as having along with the human mind also the idea of another thing, this is to say that the *human mind* perceives the thing inadequately.' Nothing is here referred to but *our* mind; and even when, as in v. 40, schol., we are told that finite thoughts together form the infinite intellect of God, it is in a sense we that supply the unifying principle.

All attempts, then, to save any remnant of personality to the Spinozian God are vain. There is no room even for such a 'teleology of the unconscious' as that afterwards developed by Schopenhauer (*q.v.*). Final causes are human figments.[1] Men persuade themselves that everything is created for their sake; they thus tend to consider what is useful to them as 'good,' what hinders them as 'bad.' Hence they are puzzled by seeing so many 'imperfections' in Nature, as if what does not suit them were imperfect. If we ask why God did not create all men so as to follow reason, Spinoza answers that the laws of His nature are so vast as to suffice for the production of every degree of perfection. This is not what even Goethe would call 'Christianissimum.'

Yet the whole argument of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* goes to show that, whatever may do for philosophers, ordinary men need a religion of some sort; and we shall see later that Spinoza thought it desirable that the State should fix the religion for its subjects. No man is the worse for holding a practical rule of life, or for connecting it with a dogmatic system which satisfies his own mind, provided he does not interfere with others. 'All men can obey; there are few that can acquire a virtuous disposition by the guidance of reason'; hence the simple following of the Scriptures is sufficient for the vast majority of mankind.[2] 'Faith does not demand that doctrines should be true so much as that they should be pious.' Thus between faith and philosophy there is no connexion: the one looks for truth, the other for obedience. Faith therefore allows the greatest latitude in philosophic speculation, while it condemns those who teach opinions tending to obstinacy, hatred, and anger. It is indeed astonishing how far Spinoza, in the *Tractatus*, often carries his accommodation of philosophy to religion. God, *e.g.*, is sovereignly just and merciful, the exemplar of the true life, our equitable Judge. He does not act under compulsion, but by His absolute fiat and grace. He forgives the sins of those who repent.[3] It is needless to point out that this is not the language that Spinoza uses to the initiated.

Nevertheless the converse process was necessary; and the religion of the time required to be, to some extent, re-stated in philosophic language. While Spinoza wished the ordinary man to tolerate the philosopher, he also wished so to read the beliefs of the ordinary man as to make them not repugnant to the sage. It is here that, in the opinion of many, his chief glory lies; but he has suffered the usual fate of the pioneer. His results have been made the ladder for subsequent climbers, and have been unceremoniously kicked down when used.

Even he had his predecessors; but his work in the domain of Biblical criticism was amazingly original. He saw that the Bible is not one book, but a literature, produced at widely different dates, by men of widely different characters, and under the influence of widely different degrees of inspiration. On the other hand, he saw many miracles narrated in the Scriptures which the very slightest skill in exegesis would reduce to natural events; for it was his principle—at least ostensibly—that the Scriptures can teach nothing repugnant to our understanding. 'Truth,' he says, 'cannot be at variance with truth, or Scripture teach nonsense. Were we really to find in it what contradicts natural light, we should reject it as freely as we do the Koran or the Talmud. But'—and here there is surely some irony—'far be it from us to imagine that in the sacred writings there can be found any thing repugnant to the light of nature!'[1]

From this principle flow two maxims. The Bible must agree with science. If they seem to disagree, either we must have interpreted the Bible wrongly or we must apply criticism to discover what the Bible really is — whether it claims inerrancy, whether particular passages are genuine, whether the author is confining himself to his proper sphere. Both these weapons Spinoza uses freely.

Thus prophecy[2] is an ordinary phenomenon. It is only the Jewish habit of omitting to take account of secondary causes that deludes us into imagining that the prophets derived their revelations directly from God. Those revelations were real when external to the mind of the prophet, imaginary when he was in a state likely to dispose him to fancy that he received them. The voice with which God revealed the law to Moses was real; that which called Samuel was imaginary. Similarly, the dreams in which God appeared to so many prophets seem to indicate imaginary colloquies. The prophets are fallible and self-contradictory.[3] The style of the prophecy varies with the prophet.[4] Ezekiel and Amos are less cultivated than Isaiah and Nahum. Even the visions vary in accordance with the character of the seer. Prophets are often ignorant: thus Joshua, or the man who wrote his history, fancied that the sun could stand still.

Similarly with other points. There is nothing special in the Jewish religion or history. The Hebrews had no monopoly in election, in prophecy, in oracles. Their long endurance as a nation is due largely to circumcision.

The masses are accustomed to call anything unusual a 'miracle,' imagining God to be generally asleep, and to wake in order to perform extraordinary deeds.[5] As a matter of fact Nature is immutable, and God's character is far better shown in ordinary events than in 'miracles.' By the 'will of God' Scripture means nothing but this immutable order; and many a so-called miracle is easily seen to be quite natural—*e.g.*, the call of Saul, the 'creation' of the rainbow, the raising of the Shunammite's son. Every event truly described in Scripture necessarily happened by immutable law. Many, however, are not related truly, but symbolically, fancifully, or in Oriental fashion. Such are the ascent of Elijah, the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, the cleaving of the rock in the desert. Scripture itself asserts unchanging law: 'Whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever.'[6] The Bible, it is true, being written in a dead language and in an Oriental style, is a specially difficult book; but it must nevertheless be interpreted by the same rules as apply to any other book.

Heresy being so dangerous, even Ben Ezra had been obliged to veil his meaning in a cloud of obscure phrases. Ben Ezra is the only predecessor to whom Spinoza acknowledges a debt; but he refers to Maimonides, and may have read the *Systema Theologicum* of La Peyrère (1655). Ben Ezra had already shown that Moses could not have written the Pentateuch; but Spinoza went farther, and pointed out that the book was based on earlier documents, and bears traces of an editorial hand. And that hand can be traced elsewhere, down even to 2 Kings. This compiler[7] may be presumed, in default of certain evidence, to have been Ezra. Whoever he was, some cause prevented him from giving his work complete consistency.

On the rest of the OT Spinoza is less full.[8] The books of Chronicles are of very late date, and of such low authority that we may well wonder how they got into a canon from which Wisdom was excluded. The Psalms and Proverbs were arranged about the time of the Second Temple. Jeremiah is a confused compilation, Ezekiel a fragment. It is remarkable that Spinoza does not seem to have detected the double authorship of Isaiah; but he saw much disorder in the prophecies as we have them. Job is possibly a translation from a Gentile poem; for 'the Satan' is not unlike the Greek Momus. Daniel is partly genuine, partly compiled from Chaldæan sources about the time of the Maccabees. Whoever the authors, there are many errors in the books. Those who try to reconcile contradictions are undertaking a futile task—'a pretty piety, forsooth, which accommodates the

1 *Eth.* i. appendix. 2 *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* xiv.
3 *Ib.* xiv.

1 *Cogitata Metaphysica*, viii. 5; see also *Ep.* 21.
2 *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* i.
3 Cf. 1 S 15[29] with 15[35] and Jer 18[10].
4 *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* ii. 5 *Ib.* vi.
6 Ec 3[14]. 7 *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* ix. 8 *Ib.* x.

clear passages to the obscure, the sound to the corrupt.' As to the authority of the canon of Scripture, what is it but that of the council of experts that made it? A fresh council might give a different decision.

Spinoza declines the task of applying criticism to the NT. He has not, he says—perhaps with a touch of irony—sufficient knowledge of Greek. He gives us, however,[1] some indications of his views. The apostles, like the prophets, told what they saw, and needed no supernatural gifts for what they did. Their epistles and sermons—those of Paul especially—reveal men of exceptional, but by no means miraculous, powers. Towards Christ the attitude of Spinoza is very remarkable.

'God can communicate immediately with man; still, a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural knowledge must possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow-men: nor do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ. To him the ordinances of God were revealed directly, without words or visions. The voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the voice of God; and it may be said that the wisdom of God took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that he is the way of salvation.'[2]

To Christ God 'gave revelations unaccommodated to Christ's opinions,'[3] so that Christ's knowledge was adequate, and comprehended only *notiones communes et veras*. Yet the orthodox ideas of Christ were to Spinoza not only false but unintelligible. 'The eternal wisdom of God is shown in all things, but chiefly in the mind of man, and most of all in Christ. . . . But as for the proposition enounced by some churches, that God took on him the nature of man, it seems to me as if one should tell me that a triangle had assumed the nature of a square.'[4]

On the resurrection of Christ Spinoza's views are similar to those of some modern thinkers. He takes the death and burial literally, but the resurrection allegorically. 'I admit that the Evangelists believed it literally; but they might well be in error without prejudice to the Gospel doctrine. Paul, to whom also Christ appeared later, asserts that he knows Christ not after the flesh but after the spirit.'[5]

If, then, Spinoza is to be claimed as 'Theissimum et Christianissimum,' it must be on other grounds than his theological and philosophical views as recorded by himself; and, while his life was such that Christians may well own him as a brother, his belief was outside the most comprehensive Christian symbol.

10. Political philosophy.—Though it is likely that to Spinoza political speculation was more congenial than metaphysical, we need not examine his political writings at any length. In the first place, they can be understood with tolerable ease by the ordinary reader; in the second, they have exerted nothing like the same influence as his other works—partly, perhaps, because they were left unfinished. A brief summary, however, is desirable.

As might be expected, he treats men as they are, and not as philosophers or preachers would like them to be. Such writers, he says, have given us satires rather than systems of ethics, and have never produced political theories useful out of Utopia. It has been left for statesmen, with all their faults, to write serviceably on politics. Men are subject to passions; they pity the ill-off and envy the well-off. Those who fancy that men as a whole will follow reason are dreamers. 'And so I have laboured not to lament, mock, or execrate human actions, but to understand them; and to look on passions not as vices of human nature, but as properties as native to it as heat and cold to the atmosphere.'[6]

[1] *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* xi. [2] *Ib.* i. [3] *Ib.* iv. [4] *Ep.* 73. [5] *Ib.* 76. [6] *Tract. Pol.* i. 4.

Looking at facts, then, we find all men living in some kind of social order. Men have already tried all possible societies; all that remains for philosophy is to decide on the best ways of improving known types.[1]

There is no such thing as *jus naturæ*. Right is only another word for power. Every man has as much natural right as Nature allows him power. Man does, and can do, nothing not in accordance with the laws of Nature. Even in 'breaking' them we necessarily obey them; and the reasonable man is no more acting according to right of Nature than the fool. But men soon find that a right which belongs to everybody defeats itself. Hence arise commonwealths. Two men, though each has yielded up some of his power to the other, have more power (*i.e.* 'right') than one. One man may secure the dependence of another either by persuading his mind or by coercing his body;[2] and the same may be done by a combination of men. In a combination the power is proportioned to numbers; and this right or power is called 'dominion.' It is dominion that determines right and wrong, justice and injustice; for in 'Nature' everything belongs to anybody who can get it.

Under any dominion the State is 'civil'; the body under dominion is a 'commonwealth,' and the general business is 'affairs of State.' Whether the supreme authority be a monarch, an aristocracy, or a democracy, it has simple natural right, limited by the power of the multitude considered as one. Obviously, therefore, each single citizen's 'right' is less in proportion as the commonwealth exceeds him in power. Whatever it decrees, he must do; for, even if he knows it to be evil, it is a lesser evil than resistance. But[3] plainly those things to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth. Nor are things within those rights which are abhorrent to the majority. Thus the external shows of religion are within, the inner emotions without, the purview of the State. One state is to another state as one man to another man; save only that a state can defend itself more easily than a man can defend himself. Two states are naturally enemies; and unfortunately one can make war, while it takes two to make peace. Two thus agreeing are called contracting powers; but contracts are binding only so long as the circumstances under which they were made remain unchanged. Every state can break its contract when its safety demands such action.[4] Spinoza sees the apparent immorality of this doctrine, and devotes a few lines to its defence.

The functions of the supreme authority[5] are to create 'rights' within the dominion, to make laws, to declare war and peace, to appoint executive officers, and the like. In so acting it may do foolishly, but it cannot (strictly) do 'wrong'; for it is itself the fountain of law. Civil jurisprudence depends on the mere will of the commonwealth, which is not bound to please any but itself.

Contracts by which the multitude transfers its right to one council or one man should without doubt be broken when general expediency demands. But to decide when it is thus expedient is within the right of him only who holds dominion. Nevertheless, if the breaking of them weakens the hold of the ruler upon the ruled, by that very fact the commonwealth is dissolved; civil law ceases, and war begins.[6] The sanction that constrains the ruler to keep the laws is simply this, that beyond a certain point he cannot go without destroying his position. All despotism is tempered by potential rebellion. It is futile to inveigh against the people for rebelling; people never rebel without a

[1] *Tract. Pol.* i. 3. [2] *Ib.* ii. 10. [3] *Ib.* iii. 8. [4] *Ib.* iii. 14. [5] *Ib.* iv. [6] *Ib.* iv. 6.

cause. The end of all government is security.[1] Seditions and contempt of law are due not so much to the wickedness of the subjects as to the bad state of the dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship; it is the business of the State to make them so. Men's passions are everywhere the same; if wickedness prevails more in one commonwealth than in another, it is because the one has not pursued the end of government so well as the other. Where licence is rare and virtue common, the rulers must receive the praise—as Hannibal is deservedly renowned because in his army there never arose a mutiny. Of course all this does not apply to a commonwealth that is held down by force or by the craft of a despot. Spinoza gives no counsel to such a despot; that has been done once for all by Machiavelli. Here Spinoza shows his acquaintance with the 'most ingenious' Florentine. 'If there is one writer,' says Duff, 'whom we may call Spinoza's master, it was Machiavelli';[2] and Goethe rightly declares that Spinozism is ultimately Machiavellism.

We next discuss in succession the three forms of government—monarchy,[3] aristocracy,[4] and democracy.

With a possible criticism of Hobbes, Spinoza asserts[5] that a really absolute monarchy cannot exist. The monarch has to seek coadjutors; and the 'monarchy' is thus really an aristocracy, but a concealed one, and thus the worst of aristocracies. Certain checks are therefore desirable. A parliament should be appointed by the king, and chosen from the various families in the State; it should advise the king, but the ultimate responsibility should be his. Smaller bodies should be chosen to form the executive and the council of judges; the latter should serve for only a year and vote by ballot. The army should be composed exclusively of citizens, and be paid only in time of war; the generals should be changed every year, and the officers receive no pay except plunder. By these means Spinoza hoped to prevent the usurpations of Cromwells and Sforzas. Certain laws are to be so firmly fixed that not even the king can abolish them—as Ulysses could not break the rule that he had laid down when about to pass the sirens. Under a monarchy no churches ought to be built at the public expense; nor ought laws to be made about opinions. Let such as are allowed the public exercise of their religion build a church at their own cost.

Under an aristocracy the factions in the governing body will be weaker the more there are to whom dominion is given. Hence that body should be large — a hundred good men at least; and, to ensure that number of good men, the total number ought to be at least five thousand. Thus we shall have enough men to provide ability, and too many to allow of the tyranny of a clique. To such a body absolute power may be trusted; for they could never be guided by one mind except for (at least apparently) honourable ends.[6] The polity most adapted to aristocracy is a confederation of cities,[7] but the seat of federal government should not be in one of the united cities. Under an aristocracy the governed are not citizens, but subjects; hence the army should be paid, and promotion should be possible, that *esprit de corps* may be secured. Aristocracies, indeed, by their very origin betray the fact that such *esprit de corps* is often wanting; for they have usually risen out of democracies.[8] Out of the council are selected syndics, men of some age, to watch and check the councillors. There shall also be chosen an executive senate, to inspect fortifications, pass laws, deal with other states, and so on. There should be an established religion, to which all patricians should conform, and State-provided churches. Freedom of worship is allowed, but only on condition that it 'goes softly.' Academies founded at the public expense are instituted to restrain men's natural abilities rather than to cultivate them. But in a free commonwealth arts and sciences will be best cultivated if every one that pleases is allowed to teach publicly, at his own risk.[1] The sanction of an aristocracy is the general perception that its destruction would be a great evil. Hence, if wise, it will take care to rule in accordance with the general desire, appealing to reason rather than to fear.

'A government which aims at nothing else than to guide men by fear will be rather free from defects than possessed of merit. Men are to be so guided that they may deem themselves not to be guided at all, but to live of their own free will.'[3]

Hence vexatious and trifling restrictions should be avoided; sumptuary laws should never be imposed;[3] and the common vices of peace are never to be forbidden directly, but by laying such foundations of dominion that the many may live—not wisely, for that is impossible, but under the guidance of passions useful to the commonwealth.[4] An aristocracy thus founded will be, internally, indestructible. Its fall, if fall there be, will come from without.[5]

Spinoza's definition of democracy deserves notice. In aristocracies citizenship is granted by the choice of the supreme council; in democracies it is allowed by law.[6] It might happen that the law gave this franchise to elder men only, or to first-born sons only, or to the wealthy only; it might be that the number of the enfranchised was far smaller in a democracy than in an aristocracy; but, as long as it is the law that fixes the franchise, a democracy it remains. It is obvious[7] that such a definition has a wide scope.[8] But Spinoza confines his attention to 'that in which all, without exception, who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only, and are independent and of respectable life, have the right of voting in the supreme council [he does not touch on representative government] and of filling the offices of the dominion.' He thus excludes aliens, slaves, and women. On the exclusion of women he has an interesting paragraph, with which the work breaks off unfinished.

'It may be asked whether women are under men's authority by nature or by convention. If we consult experience, we shall find the cause to be their weakness. There has never been a case of men and women reigning together; but, wherever men exist, men rule and women are ruled. If by nature women were equal to men, surely among nations so many and so different some would be found where both sexes rule alike, and others where men are ruled by women. And since this is not the case, one may assert that women have not by nature equal right with men.'

Elsewhere[9] Spinoza touches briefly on democracy, and seems to prefer it to other forms of government. But, under whatever form our lot is cast, our duty is to obey the commands of the dominion, and to recognize no right save that which it sanctions.

LITERATURE.—The literature connected with Spinoza is enormous, and only a small selection can be given here. For further details the reader is referred to Pollock's first ed., to A. Van der Linde's *Benedictus Spinoza: Bibliographie* (The Hague, 1871), and to the British Museum Catalogue.

i. *LIFE.*—J. Colerus, *Leven van Spinoza*, Amsterdam, 1705, Fr. tr. (inaccurate), The Hague, 1706 (in *Opera*, ed. H. E. G. Paulus, 2 vols., Jena, 1802–03, and elsewhere); the Eng. tr. of the Fr. (London, 1706) is given in Pollock; Lucas, *La Vie de Spinoza* before 1688, reprinted, Amsterdam, 1719 (till recently Lucas was unknown, and this work was attributed to St. Glain and others; it is now established that Lucas is no pseudonym, and the work, once discredited, is now rehabilitated [Meinsma;

1 *Tract. Pol.* v. 2.
2 *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, p. 10.
3 *Tract. Pol.* vi., vii.
4 *Ib.* viii., ix., x.
5 *Ib.* vi. 5.
6 *Ib.* viii. 6.
7 *Ib.* ix. 1.
8 *Ib.* viii. 12.

1 *Tract. Pol.* viii. 49.
2 *Ib.* x. 8.
3 *Ib.* x. 5.
4 *Ib.* x. 6.
5 *Ib.* x. 10.
6 *Ib.* xi. 1.
7 *Ib.* xi. 3.
8 Pollock, p. 313.
9 *Tract. Theol.-Pol.* xvi.

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E. E. KELLETT.

SPIRIT (Holy), SPIRIT OF GOD.—The terms 'Spirit of God' and 'Holy Spirit' are common to several great speculative and religious systems. Zoroastrianism (*q.v.*) speaks of a Spenta Mainyu ('Holy Spirit'), which is variously represented: as a personified emanation of the Godhead, as a created being probably above the rank of angels, and even as identical with the Supreme Creator, Ahura Mazda. He possesses creative powers, ethical qualities, and teaching offices which closely resemble the Christian view.[1] The later Stoics spoke of a *spiritus sacer*=God, the *anima mundi*, who was conceived as a materialistic fiery breath, the intelligent permeating containing principle of the cosmos, resident in man and observant of his good and evil deeds.[2] In Greek mystery-religions we meet with 'Holy Spirit' (τὸ πνεῦμα ἱερον, ἅγιον), which comes from God into the initiate at the mysteries.[3] The Hebrews appear to have first grasped the concept of the Spirit of God, which in the OT faintly, and in Talmudical literature more clearly, approaches hypostatization. In Muhammadanism the Holy Spirit, probably under Jewish influence, was identified with the angel Gabriel.[4] Christianity, starting with the monotheistic doctrine of Judaism, included within its doctrine of God an inseparable distinction of agents—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—each possessing properties and characteristics which resemble, while they transcend, what is termed 'personality' in human beings.

The object of this article is to trace, in outline, the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. By way of introduction we shall examine the Hebrew notions of 'spirit' amidst which the OT view of the Spirit of God (Jahweh) took its rise; then we shall mark the development of that conception in Biblical (OT canonical and extra-canonical) and subsequent rabbinical literature (Talmudic and post-Talmudic); and, finally, after examining the Biblical (NT) contributions, we shall trace the formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's person and work in the thought and life of the Christian Church.

I. *INTRODUCTION: HEBREW.*—Our limits, in this section, are the canonical books (OT), in which the characteristic Hebrew notions of spirit find expression. Towards the close of the canon, and in the apocryphal literature more notably, the term 'spirit' is extended, probably under Babylonian and Persian influences, to include angels and demons.[1] This extension we here lay aside. The term *rûaḥ* (רוּחַ), generally translated 'spirit' in English, comes from a Semitic root, *rûḥ*, which, in cognate languages, signifies 'to breathe,' 'to blow.' Kindred words in Heb. are *rêaḥ*, 'scent,' 'odour,' and the verb (only in Hiph.) *rûaḥ*, 'to smell,' 'to perceive odour.' With the verb the organs of breathing, the mouth and nostrils, are frequently mentioned. The primary signification of *rûaḥ* appears to be 'air in motion,' as wind or breath, and the general idea which is common to nearly all its usages is 'power in manifestation, or energy.' The various usages of *rûaḥ* (which occurs 378 times) may be roughly classified under four heads: (1) physically, (2) physiologically, (3) psychically, and (4) 'supernaturally.'

(1) *Physically* (131 times).—In this aspect *rûaḥ* is used of the air in motion, the wind in all its moods and phases, whether gentle or stormy, hot or cold. Then it serves to denote direction, the quarter from which the wind may blow (Gn 8^{1}, Ex 15^{10}, Gn 3^{8}, Jer 49^{36}). In later writings it acquires the figurative sense of 'vanity,' 'emptiness' (Is 41^{29}, Job 7^{7}, Ec 1^{14}).

(2) *Physiologically* (39 times).—This usage, which may be derived from the former by observation, denotes the breath in the bodies of men and animals. From the close connexion between the breath and the phenomena of life and energy, the *rûaḥ* came to be considered as the vehicle of life and even as the life itself. In sickness, exhaustion, or swoon the breath and corresponding vitality were reduced, and it was said that the *rûaḥ* had gone away; similarly, after food or under the stimulus of joy the *rûaḥ* returned and man revived (Gn 45^{27}, 1 S 30^{12}, Jg 15^{19}, 1 K 10^{5}). When the *rûaḥ* left the body entirely, death took place (Ps $104^{29f.}$). The further induction that the *rûaḥ* was the immaterial life principle does not seem to have been common before the Exile; in Ezk (cf. ch. 37) it becomes prominent, and thenceforth *rûaḥ* is used, along with *nᵉshāmāh* and *nephesh*, to denote the breath-soul in man. In the earlier literature *nᵉshāmāh* is the usual term (Gn 2^{7}) for the normal breathing, *rûaḥ* being reserved for the more violent breathing which marks exertion or emotional excitement. In the passage just referred to we have the first statement of the notion that man's breath-soul is derived immediately from God by spiration;[2] not until after the Exile does *rûaḥ* occur in that connexion (Is 42^{5}, Zec 12^{1}, Job 27^{3}, Ps 104^{30}), and then it is applied to animals as well (Gn 6^{17} 7^{15} [P]). Yet a distinction is drawn between man and other animate beings. Both are formed out of the dust of the ground, but he becomes a living being by the direct inbreathing of Elohim, and at death his *rûaḥ* returns to God (Gn $2^{7.\ 19}$, Ec 12^{7}, Ps 31^{5}). Because man's *rûaḥ* comes from God, it is the

1 Cf. *Yasna*, xxxi. 7, 9, 11, xxx. 3–5, xlv. 2, xxviii. 2, xlvii. 2, xxviii. 11, xliv. 7, and artt. AMESHA SPENTAS, DUALISM (Iranian).
2 Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 134; Stobæus, i. 322; Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 7; Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* xli.
3 Cf. R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 156 ff.
4 Cf. *Qur'ân*, ii. 81, 254; cf. *DI*, artt. 'Gabriel,' 'Holy Spirit.'

1 See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Hebrew), vol. iv. p. 596 f.
2 For Babylonian parallel cf. *KAT*[3], p. 526.

object of His regard; He protects it and continues it in being, and so can be called 'the God of the spirits of all flesh' (Job 10^{12} 12^{10}, Nu 16^{22}). The Hebrew genius was not speculative, and the derivation of man's spirit from God probably expressed the popular opinion of animism, the wonderful power inherent in *rûaḥ* indicating the presence of deity in man. But the ideas of divine immanence or of the divine breath physically extended into man, as Stoicism fancied, cannot be in the Hebrew thought; they belong to later philosophical speculation, the first traces of which become apparent only in the extra-canonical literature (*e.g.*, Wisdom and Philo). Man's divine origin, however, lifts the Hebrew view above the Greek: he is no mere product of nature,[1] the dualism of Greek thought about man is avoided, and through the original connexion of man's *rûaḥ* with God the way was left open for those approaches of God to man which are the glory of Hebrew religious experience.[2]

(3) *Psychically* (74 times).—As the breath is often the visible index of man's stronger emotions, the term *rûaḥ* readily served to express his inner life in its emotional and mental aspects, and was used in parallelism along with the terms *nephesh* and *lēbh*. Anger, grief, and zeal were often exhibited with dilated nostrils and laboured breathing; hence we find *rûaḥ* as well as nostril (*'aph*) used as a synonym for anger, in both God and man (Mic 2^{7} RVm 'impatient,' Jg 8^{3}, Job 4^{9}). In post-Exilic literature the term *rûaḥ* is extended to cover such emotions as sadness, trouble, bitterness, and longing, which are regarded as located 'in the *rûaḥ*' (1 K 21^{5}, Gn 41^{8} 26^{35} [P], Is 26^{9}, Job 7^{11}, 1 S 1^{15}). From Ezekiel's time onward the *rûaḥ* was regarded as the organ of knowledge (parallel to בִּין, *lēbh*, the usual term, Ezk 11^{5} 20^{32}, 1 Ch 28^{12}, Ps 77^{6}), and occasionally, though rarely, as the seat of volition (Ps $51^{12.\ 14}$ [Heb.], Ex 35^{21} [P] 'a willing spirit'), and, lastly, of it are predicated such ethical qualities as 'new,' 'guileless,' 'broken,' 'haughty,' etc. (Ezk 11^{19}, Ps 32^{2} 51^{17}, Is 57^{15}, Pr $16^{18ff.}$).

Rûaḥ and nephesh.—At this point a word on the relation of these terms may fitly come in. It has been held that they express distinct substances or elements in man, which, along with *bāsār* ('flesh'), make up a trichotomy in human nature.[3] A comparison of passages where the terms occur together does not sustain this view (cf. 1 S 1^{15}, Is 26^{9}, Job 3^{20} 7^{11}). Both express the invisible immaterial element in man as contrasted with the flesh. *Rûaḥ* and *nephesh* are related together as animating principle and animated result: the former denotes the vital energy, which lies more basally in human nature than *nephesh*. From the point of view of experience, *nephesh* is the subject, the ego, whilst *rûaḥ* is less immediately under self-control, and is more moved from without. Hence it is that aspect of human nature more immediately in touch with the Divine Spirit. But it should be remembered that Hebrew thought does not work scientifically as it describes mental phenomena; it moves instinctively and intuitively, and deals with things, not abstractions. And, because *rûaḥ* had a physical quality and connoted power and energy, it was used to denote the causative principle in all actions, whether bodily or mental.

The connotation of power with *rûaḥ* explains its usage to denote the energy of the personality in particular manifestations. Some of these may be more settled—what we call character or disposition; to these the ethical predicates are applied (see above); less permanent manifestations, as humours, moods, whims, are frequently described in such phrases as 'spirit of wisdom,' of grace, of whoredoms, of deep sleep, etc. In so far as they are manifested in the human spirit, they may be grouped under the heading psychical, but by reason of the unusual force which they display, and in accord with primitive views of personality as liable to invasion by spirits from without, they fall rather to be considered under the next section.

(4) '*Supernaturally*' (134 times).—A stricter definition would be 'extra-human,' since Hebrew thought made no distinction between natural and supernatural, God being regarded as the cause of all that happens, whether good or evil. But for convenience' sake, and because the action of the Spirit of God falls under this head (though its detailed consideration is deferred to II.), the term may be allowed to stand. Under the heading 'supernatural' *rûaḥ* are included agencies operating upon man—only rarely upon inanimate nature—whose source is outside or above him. In the literature, as we now have it, they are all under God's control, but the literary phraseology suggests that in the pre-literary period they were not so viewed. These agencies appear to be 'survivals from the animistic past of Israel,'[1] in which sickness, insanity, abnormal powers of body or of mind, were accounted for as due to a subject becoming possessed by an extraneous spirit. Such were the evil spirit which rushed upon Saul and terrified him (1 S 16^{16} 18^{10}), the ill-will caused by an 'evil spirit' (Jg 9^{23}), the spirit of jealousy between man and wife (Nu 5^{14}), and the spirit of whoredom which makes Israel err and wander into idolatry (Hos 4^{12} 5^{4}). The over-mastering might of such beings is expressed by the vigorous verbs which describe their action. They 'rush upon,' 'fall upon,' 'come upon,' 'pass over upon' men; the action of the Spirit of Jahweh upon Elijah suggests storm-demons (1 K 18^{12}, 2 K 2^{16}). In one case a 'lying spirit' is distinctly hypostatized; it stands, speaks, receives commands, and departs (1 K 22^{19-26}).[2] This language had a marked influence upon the descriptions of the activity of the Spirit of God in both OT and NT. That Spirit is said to clothe (Jg 6^{34}; cf. Lk 24^{49}), come mightily upon, fall upon (Ezk 11^{5}, Ac 11^{15}), carry away (1 K 18^{12}, Ac 8^{39}), push or move (Jg 13^{25}, Mk 1^{12}, ἐκβάλλει) men. Another group of phrases, which first appears in the time of Isaiah, ascribes to *rûaḥ* material properties, as a kind of fluid element. Thus a 'spirit of perverseness' is 'mingled' by Jahweh in the midst of Egypt (Is 19^{14}), a 'spirit of deep sleep' is 'poured out' like a stupefying drug, producing effects like drunkenness (Is 29^{10}; cf. Ac 2^{13}). Such language is repeatedly used of the Spirit of God in the writing prophets (Is 32^{15} 44^{3}, Jl $2^{28ff.}$, Ezk 39^{29}, Zec 12^{10}). It relates itself with the idea of 'anointing' (*q.v.*), whereby is imparted the divinity that 'doth hedge a king' or prophet (1 S 10^{1} 16^{14}, Is 61^{1}). *Rûaḥ* can be put into a person (Is 63^{11}, Ezk 37^{14}, 2 K 19^{7}), so that he is 'filled' with it (Ex 31^{3}, Lk 1^{41}); it can be taken away (Ps 51^{13} [Heb.]), and distributed upon others (Nu $11^{17.\ 25}$). It can be poured out with fertilizing effect upon inanimate nature as well as man (Is 32^{15} 44^{3}). As the 'demonic' *rûaḥ* suggested personal actions and so influenced NT terminology, so the fluid-like *rûaḥ* had a far-reaching influence, appearing in the NT conception of the Holy Spirit as a gift, and in the later theological speculations of the Greek Fathers as a kind of substance, which was imparted to believers in the sacraments. From this analysis it is clear that the term *rûaḥ* is a general one embracing, by syncretism, elements collected from various sources, and not derivable from one general principle. Herein lies the difficulty for the modern mind as it approaches the Hebrew idea of 'spirit.' For now spirit denotes, metaphysically, the immaterial as contrasted with the material; and the modern

[1] Cf. H. Siebeck, 'Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom Geist in der Wissenschaft des Altertums,' *Zeitschr. für Völkerpsych. und Sprachwissenschaft*, xii. [1880] 389 f.

[2] Cf. H. W. Robinson, *The Religious Ideas of the OT*, London, 1913, pp. 82, 110 f.

[3] Cf. F. Delitzsch, *A System of Biblical Psychology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1867, p. 113 ff.; R. H. Charles, *EBi*, col. 1342.

[1] Stade, *Biblische Theologie des alten Testaments*, Tübingen, 1905, p. 99.

[2] See *ERE* iv. 595a.

mind finds it difficult to understand the materialistic view of spirit as an ethereal fluid substance, except in poetic metaphor. Again, the philosophical use of the term to denote a self-conscious subject possessing 'perdurable individuality' has little in common with the animistic meaning of *rûaḥ*, or the primitive psychology of the Semitic mind, which could identify mind with physical organs or physical breath. And yet there was an unconscious logic at work when popular fancies grouped such disparate elements under the term *rûaḥ*. The wind of heaven in its mighty, mysterious, quasi-personal activity is very similar to the action of 'spirits,' and both suggest the miraculous, supersensible power which streams through nature and into human life with such startling effects. Thus, unconsciously, *rûaḥ* expressed the metaphysical notion of causality, the principle of movement, energy, and life in the universe. But, in accord with the Hebrew genius, this principle was expressed, not in abstract static terms as in Greek—the Hebrew language was little fitted for that—but concretely, dynamically, picturesquely, realistically. And so *rûaḥ* was taken into the service of religion as the term whereby could be expressed the nature of the wind, the life of beasts and men, the deepest impulses in the breasts of saints and sages, and the modes of the manifold activities of God Himself.

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II. *OLD TESTAMENT (CANONICAL AND EXTRA-CANONICAL).*—The sources readily fall into two main divisions, canonical and extra-canonical, each of which may be conveniently divided into two sections, viz. canonical: (1) pre-Exilic and (2) Exilic and post-Exilic; extra-canonical: (1) Palestinian and (2) Jewish-Alexandrian.

Our purpose is to trace historically the development of the conception of the Spirit of God, the various spheres of its working, and any hints of its hypostatization in this literature. Any development of the idea of God will be reflected in the doctrine of His Spirit.[1] The predominant designation in OT is 'the Spirit of JHWH,' less frequently 'Spirit of God' (רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים), sometimes with pronouns 'His,' 'thy,' 'my,' rarely absolutely as 'the Spirit,' and only thrice 'Holy Spirit,' and then with pronominal suffix, 'thy' or 'His' (Is $63^{10.\ 11}$, Ps 51^{11}). The distinction between Spirit of Jahweh and Spirit of Elohim will be noted as it emerges in the literature.

What was said of *rûaḥ* in the previous section, as applied to man, is applicable to its use in connexion with God. The wind, in early poetry, was regarded as His breath (Ex $15^{8.\ 10}$, Ps 18^{15}), and the storm, used frequently to describe theophanies, was the explosion of His wrath (Is 4^{7} $30^{27f.}$ 59^{19}, Job 4^{9}). In some cases there is ambiguity; *rûaḥ* may be viewed literally, as wind, or metaphorically (Ex 15^{10}, 1 K 18^{12}, Is 40^{7}, Hos 13^{15}). But, generally, it is used to denote the higher activities of the divine nature, which are, by anthropomorphism (*q.v.*), regarded as similar to the energies of thought and volition in man. Yet there is a striking difference. Only rarely (and that in late passages) is the spirit of man within his control as a subject (Ps 77^{6}, the earliest example); God's spirit, as befits perfect personality, is always at His command—not that it is thought of as another; the Spirit of God is God Himself. The nature of that Spirit is nowhere discussed; it is not presented metaphysically or statically: it is always an energy; the Spirit of God is God at work manifesting effective power. The various spheres of the Spirit's activity may be formulated as cosmical, intellectual, inspirational in the prophets and the Messiah, moral and religious in the 'pious'; but this belongs to dogmatics rather than to the scope of an Encyclopædia. The historical method here pursued, while surveying the entire field, has the added advantage of presenting the successive extensions of the Spirit's activity as they arose under a gradual revelation.[1]

1. **Canonical.** — i. PRE-EXILIC. — (*a*) *JE and kindred documents (9th–8th cent. B.C.).* — The earliest documents of the Pentateuch present the Spirit of Jahweh (or Elohim) in materialistic fashion. It is the divine essence which is common to Jahweh and the *bᵉnê-ʾelôhîm*, as contrasted with flesh, the element proper to human beings (Gn 6^{3} J; cf. Is 31^{3}). By means of the illicit intercourse of the *bᵉnê-ʾelôhîm* with the daughters of men, *rûaḥ* has passed into mankind, producing longevity, if not deathlessness, which Jahweh is resolved to abridge. The text is so confused that nothing can be deduced with certainty as to the action of *rûaḥ*.[2] Materially regarded is the spirit which is transferred from Moses to the seventy elders (Nu $11^{17.\ 25}$ JE; cf. 2 K 2^{9}), producing a dual effect, viz. an outbreak of ecstatic transitory prophecy (v.[25]) and the more abiding gift of rulership. The latter appears also in the case of Joseph (Gn 41^{38} E) and the early judges (Jg 3^{10} 11^{29}). What the outward phenomena of ecstatic prophecy are like is described more fully in the narratives about Balaam and in the earliest stories concerning Saul (Nu $24^{2ff.\ 15f.}$ JE; 1 S 10^{1-13} 11^{6}). In language reminiscent of 'demonism' the Spirit of Elohim is said to rush upon Saul, producing amentia and excited utterances like ravings (*nibbᵉ* in Hithp.), so that he becomes another man, breaking out in warlike fury (1 S 11^{6}); a later passage states that he lay naked, unconscious, a day and a night (1 S 19^{18-24}). In Balaam's case, he is thrown into a trance by the oncoming of the Spirit of Elohim, in which state he receives visions and messages. In such descriptions we have the onlooker's impressions: the unwonted abnormal excitation upon the person 'enthused' is ascribed to the 'spirit' which has taken possession of his faculties. The phenomena of prophet-bands in Saul's day, the use of music as a stimulus (cf. 2 K 3^{15}), and the passage of the 'spirit' by infection to others suggest that the earliest prophecy in Israel was akin to the mantic of heathendom (cf. 1 K 18^{29} of Baal-worship).[3] No messages are preserved (the Songs of Balaam are probably later); the deed alone interprets the Spirit's purpose, and so the patriotic fury of warriors, like Gideon and Saul, and the marvellous prowess of Samson are attributed to the Spirit, as in later days the phenomenal strength of Elijah was due to 'the hand of Jahweh' (1 K 18^{46}).

[1] For the idea of God and its development see art. GOD, vol. vi. p. 254.

[1] For classifications see H. B. Swete, in *HDB* ii. 402; A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the OT*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 120 ff.; more detailed in Irving F. Wood, *The Spirit of God in Biblical Literature*, London, 1904; E. W. Winstanley, *Spirit in the NT*, Cambridge, 1908, pp. 1–5.

[2] See Commentaries of Skinner, *ICC*, or Driver, *Westminster Comm.*, *ad loc.*

[3] See E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], Freiburg i. B., 1898, ii. 9.

At this point we may observe some distinction in the use of the divine names. 'Spirit of Elohim' appears to denote the marvellous, the divinely-imparted power, in general; 'Spirit of Jahweh' the working might of Jahweh as it served to deliver Israel, Jahweh's covenant-people, in particular. Spirit of Elohim calls attention to the supersensible cause; Spirit of Jahweh, to the soteriological purpose. But how little of ethical content is conveyed can be seen when the homicidal mania of Saul is ascribed to the Spirit of Elohim (1 S 18^{10}). Yet ethical discrimination begins to appear. The evil spirit which induces the king's insanity is not Spirit *of*, but *from* (*me'eth*, 1 S 16^{15}) Elohim; the good spirit is Spirit of Jahweh.[1] The evil spirit is not so immediately in connexion with Jahweh as the good spirit, though originating causally with Him. The development of that discrimination to a separate hypostatic 'lying' spirit, and thence to a Satan as personal principle of evil (1 K 22$^{21f.}$, Job 1^{6}, Zec 3^{1}), has a reflex action, beyond the OT limits, on the personality of the Holy Spirit.

(*b*) *Pre-Exilic writing prophets* (*8th cent. B.C.*).—The nature of 'spirit' is less physically viewed by proto-Isaiah; indeed, one passage is unique in presenting 'spirit' almost metaphysically, as the principle of the divine nature, dynamically viewed, and the equivalent of deity itself (Is 30^{1} 31^{3}). It is described as a 'subtle essence' poured forth from on high, and has a cosmical reference, in that it causes the amazing fertility of the land and ethical qualities in Israel, its people (32$^{15f.}$). But its special sphere is the national life, making Israel independent of foreign alliances, and invincible (31^{3}), but, if neglected, as it speaks through the prophet, the nation adds sin to sin (30^{1}). If this passage is a reference to the prophet's experience, it stands alone, and in the writing prophets such a reference is exceedingly rare. Hosea and Micah have but one such reference each (Hos 9^{7}, Mic 3^{8}, text suspect), while Jeremiah and the others, except Ezekiel, have none at all. This striking omission is probably due to the superior elevation of prophecy above the earlier ecstatic form, too closely associated with the term *rûah*. Prophecy is now a clear-minded ethical communion with Jahweh, whilst the symptoms of popular prophecy, resembling drunkenness, and the fact that it could be artificially induced, along with the emphasis on the ecstatic form and not the ethical contents, may account for the preference for the phrase 'hand of Jahweh' (Is 8^{11}, Jer 15^{17}) to denote the force of the constraining prophetic impulse. Even Hosea's reference (9^{7}, 'the man of the spirit') may be only the popular language, cited by the prophet. The purpose of the Spirit's working is more ethically grasped, Micah receiving it as an aid in proclaiming to the nation its sin.

ii. EXILIC AND POST-EXILIC.—(*a*) *From the Exile to the Temple-rebuilding* (*590–520 B.C.*).—The 6th cent. B.C. witnessed a universal impulse and advance to religion. Within this period two great religions, Confucianism and Buddhism, originated and spread; the genius of Greece blossomed in poetry, art, and philosophy, and prophecy reached its climax in Israel. The doctrine of the Spirit shared in this advance, as doubtless it prompted it. The Spirit of Jahweh is presented in manifold aspects as the principle of life and energy in God, the organ of His intelligence at work in creation, evolving order out of primeval chaos (Is 40^{13}, LXX *νοῦς*, Gn 1^{2}),[2] executing His purposes in history, even among the lower creatures (Is 34^{16}), the energizing cause of movement in the suprasensible sphere (Ezk 1$^{12.\ 20}$ 10^{17}), the principle of life which streams into a dead nation, revivifying it at Jahweh's bidding (Ezk 37$^{5-9}$; cf. Job 32^{4}), the immaterial principle and organ of mind in man (Ezk 20^{32}, Job 32^{8}), and the agent working ethical renewal within man (Ezk 11^{19} 18^{31} 36^{25}). Noteworthy is the fact that with the emergence of individualism in Ezekiel's teaching, and the recognition of spirit in man as an integral constituent of personality, the call is issued to man to co-operate with Jahweh in the making of a 'new spirit' into which Jahweh may pour His own (Ezk 18^{31}). And that new spirit is to be the possession not only of the prophet but also of the ideal Israel, as an 'abiding' endowment (Is 42^{1}), enabling it to carry religion (*mishpāt*) to other nations (cf. Is 44$^{3ff.}$), and issuing in a moral life of unbroken fellowship with Jahweh (Ezk 39^{29}). Ezekiel's 'vision of the dry bones' (cf. 37$^{1-14}$) is the classic passage in all literature for its graphic portrayal of the might of the Spirit in quickening and regenerating a morally dead people, and marks the highest point reached in the OT doctrine of the work of the Spirit, anticipating the description of the Spirit in the NT and the Creeds, as *τὸ ζωοποιοῦν* (1 Co 15^{45}).

Within this period we mark the first hints of a hypostatization of the Spirit. The apostrophe to the *rûah* in Ezekiel's vision is remarkable, indicating considerable independence (Ezk 37^{9}); still more so the passage in Deutero-Isaiah (48^{16}, but see Comm. on the text) where Jahweh's Spirit is sent as a working ally with the prophet. Similar traces meet us in the prophets of the Return. The Spirit is presented as 'standing in the midst' of the returned exiles, enabling them to complete the rebuilding of the Temple (Hag 2^{5} RVm, Zec 4^{6}) —a task beyond ordinary human might. But the growing tendency to regard Jahweh as transcendent (cf. Ezk 43^{6}, the interpreting angel, Zec 1$^{9.\ 19}$) may account for these prophets making no claim to the possession of the Spirit: it is regarded as a medium whereby Jahweh's words were given to prophets of other and earlier days (Zec 7^{12}). The ebb-tide of prophecy has now begun.

(*b*) *From the Return to the close of the canon* (*520–c.150 B.C.*).—In this period, when Israel had come under foreign dominion and legalism began to take the place of prophecy, references to the Spirit of God are confined, in the main, to the past history of Israel or its future glory under the Messiah. In these references the older terminology survives, like a literary tradition, but the 'demonic' might is associated with utterance, whether in song or in impassioned speech (1 Ch 12^{18}, 2 Ch 24^{20}), and the materialistic *rûah* accounts for the superior skill of the craftsmen engaged upon the Temple vestments and furniture, whose 'filling' issues in wisdom, understanding, and knowledge (Ex 28^{3} 31^{3} 35$^{30ff.}$ P). This materialistic notion of 'spirit' appears again in the 'anointing' (*q.v.*) of the priest, the king, the prophet, and the Messiah (Ex 29^{7} [Aaron], 1 S 10^{1} [Saul] 16^{12} [David], Is 61^{1} 11$^{2-4}$), as in the ordination of Joshua (Nu 27^{23}). By means of the Spirit thus conveyed such persons became sacrosanct, and the vehicles through whom Jahweh ruled His people. But the emphasis is laid upon the heightened consciousness, as in the case of the Messiah, who is thereby equipped for all His functions, judicial, executive, and religious (Is 11$^{2-4}$; for date as post-Exilic cf. G. B. Gray, *ICC*, *ad loc.*). The inspiration is dynamic, an intensifying of the faculties, though, in the swan-song of David, the very words are said to be the utterance of the Spirit (2 S 23^{2}). We mark an increase in the use of personification as applied to the Spirit. He 'speaks' in David, was the instructor and leader of Israel in bygone days, will 'rest' upon the Messianic King, and was 'resisted,' 'rebelled against' and even 'vexed' by the stubborn, sinful nation (2 S 23^{2}, Neh 9^{20}, Is 63^{14} 11^{3}, Ps 106^{33}, Is 63^{11}). The last term was much used by the 4th cent. Greek Fathers to prove the personality of the Spirit, but, in view of the passage, a woman 'grieved in spirit' (Is 54^{6}), and the personification of the 'Word' and

[1] On texts cf. S. R. Driver, *Notes on the Heb. Text of the Books of Samuel*[2], Oxford, 1913, *ad loc.*

[2] Cf. art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Hebrew), vol. iv. p. 154[b], n. 1.

'Wisdom' (Is 55^{11}, Pr 1^{23}, where Wisdom has a 'spirit'), such language should not be unduly pressed. Further, ethical attributes are assigned to the Spirit; it is called 'good' (Neh 9^{20}, Ps 143^{10} RVm) and thrice 'holy' (Is $63^{10.\ 11}$, Ps 51^{11}). 'Good,' however, may only indicate the results of its operation, and holy, in itself, does not necessarily carry an ethical connotation.[1] Etymologically the word probably means 'separation'; then it gathered about it the notions of the unapproachable—what, in comparative religions, is meant by the term 'tabu' (*q.v.*)—and acquired the signification of the divine as contrasted with the human, and is applied to things and places as belonging to God (cf. 'holy hill, arm,' etc.). Any ethical meaning that the term conveys depends upon how the Deity is conceived. From Proto-Isaiah onwards the prophets had conceived of God as ethical, and ethical requirements had been enjoined upon Israel, so that in fact, as well as in name, she should be God's 'holy people.' And it is precisely in connexion with Israel's refusal to accept the divine leading that the term is employed of the Spirit, and so the phrase 'His (thy) Holy Spirit' indicates 'a principle which is both pure and inviolable, which resents and draws back from the contact of human impurity and especially of wilful opposition.'[2] With this use of personal language we find an advance in the hypostatization of Jahweh's Holy Spirit when it is used in parallelism with the 'angel of the Presence,' as the medium of the divine guidance of Israel in the wilderness (Is $63^{9\text{-}11.\ 14}$; but cf. LXX). 'The angel of His Presence' (*mal'akh pānâv*) appears to be a combination of *theologoumena* (cf. Ex $23^{20.\ 23}$ *mal'akh*, 33^{14} *panâi*) which indicate how the transcendent Deity could yet temporarily descend to visibility, whilst 'Holy Spirit' presents His living energy at work in the people. This hypostatization, however, does not reach, though it prepares for, the doctrine of an inner distinction within the Godhead. In philosophical terms, the Spirit is the means whereby the Deity can be regarded as immanent and yet transcendent. Thus the term 'Spirit' could be used as synonymous with 'Divine Presence,' either as subjectively experienced by the penitent, whom it quickens with a poignant sense of sin (Ps 51^{11}), or, more objectively regarded, as omnipresent and omniscient (Ps 139^{7}). And so it was the bond uniting the worshipper with his God.

Such experiences in the OT were very rare, and eschatological hopes looked forward to the gift of the Spirit as a distinguishing feature of the day of the Lord, when it would be the perpetual possession of all Israel (Is 59^{21}), irrespective of sex or age (Jl $2^{28\text{-}30}$), and there would be fulfilled the great wish of Moses, 'Would God that all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put his spirit upon them!' (Nu 11^{29}).

2. Extra-canonical.—(*a*) *Palestinian.*—In this section, which extends to the end of the 2nd cent. A.D., the references to the Spirit of God are chiefly backward to canonical Scriptures or forward to Messianic hopes. The term 'Holy Spirit' is used more frequently, probably to indicate its ethical character and distinguish it from the crowd of spirits that fill the air, but it means little more than a pious disposition in individuals.[3] It is a *charisma*, giving skill in dream-interpretation, or pre-vision of the future, in the prophet or the blessings of the Patriarchs.[4] There is a marked emphasis on ethical qualities as the condition and result of its operation, and once it is said to be the creator of life, *i.e.* life after death.[1] Its vehicle in the future will be the Messiah, empowering Him for all various functions as ruler and judge by its abiding presence, and He in turn shall communicate it to men.[2] The hypostatization of the Spirit advances in this period to full personality. His mission at the creation is distinctly asserted,[3] He works independently of God,[4] and, in passages probably influenced by Christian ideas, the Spirit is the mother of Jesus,[5] a fellow-counsellor of Christ,[6] and stands in the place of God, as the object of worship,[7] though in angelic form.

(*b*) *Jewish-Alexandrian* (*Wisdom of Solomon, c. 150–50 B.C., Philo, 20 B.C.–A.D. 50*).—The outstanding feature in these authors is the attempt to combine Hebrew conceptions of spirit with those of Stoicism (*q.v.*). In Wisdom the term 'spirit' is bound up with wisdom, with which it is practically identified ($1^{5\text{-}7}$ 9^{17}), and in which it is inherent (7^{22}; but cf. LXX A). This Spirit, whether of Wisdom or of the Lord, is presented as a material ductile essence, permeating and pervading the universe, of which it is the cohesive bond ($7^{22\text{ff.}}$ 1^{7} 12^{1}). Streaming into man by the divine in-breathing, it constitutes him an active soul and originates his spiritual nature (15^{11}, πνεῦμα ζωτικόν), and, in accord with the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι of the Stoics, is the cause of his understanding of the phenomenal universe and the hidden counsel of God (7^{7} 9^{17} τὸ ἅγιόν σου πνεῦμα). It is an ethical principle, training men to virtue, fleeing from the wicked, and, since it is an extension of the divine Spirit into men, it is the medium whereby God is cognizant of their thoughts and deeds ($1^{5\text{-}9}$). The materialistic implications of 'spirit' check the tendency to hypostatize and personify it, and wisdom, which had been quasi-personalized in earlier literature (cf. Job 28, Pr $8^{22\text{-}31}$, Sir $24^{3\text{-}12}$), takes its place, and is more personally regarded, without, however, becoming fully a person or ceasing to be an attribute of God.[8]

In Philo both wisdom and Spirit are overshadowed by his doctrine of the Logos (*q.v.*). The Spirit of God (θεῖον πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα θεοῦ) is mentioned only (but cf. *de Migr. Abr.* ch. 7) when making citations from OT, and these are limited to man's creation and inspiration.

'The conception of πνεῦμα [in Philo] may be regarded as being closely analogous to the modern conception of "force," and especially to that form of the conception which makes no distinction of essence between "mind-force" and other kinds of force, such as light or electricity. It is analogous but not identical; for force is conceived to be immaterial, whereas πνεῦμα, however subtle, is still material.'[9]

The spirit which was imparted to man at his creation is the divine Spirit, which is 'a stamp and impress of the Divine power,'[10] a 'colony from that blessed nature,'[11] 'the image of the Divine and invisible,'[12] 'the basis (οὐσία) of our thinking reasonable nature.'[13] But it is not severed from its source, of which it is an extension, as a ray from the sun,[14] and this connexion explains how man is able to grasp God's thought,[15] for the πνεῦμα is 'the pure science of which every wise

[1] See art. HOLINESS.

[2] J. Skinner, *Isaiah*, Cambridge, 1896–98, ii. 201; see also Skinner, art. 'Holiness' in *HDB*, and A. B. Davidson, *Theology of the OT*, pp. 144 ff., 252 ff.

[3] Sus 45; Theod. Jub. i. 22 *f.* citing Ps 51^{11}.

[4] Dn 5^{12} 6^{4} LXX, $4^{5.\ 6}$ Theod.; Sir 48^{24}; *Test. Pat.* Lev. 2^{8}; Jub 25^{14} 31^{12}.

[1] *Apoc. Bar.* 23^{5}; cf. 4 Mac 7^{14}.

[2] *Ps.-Sol.* 17^{42} 18^{8}; En. 49^{3} 62^{2} 67^{10}; *Test. Pat.* Lev. 18^{6}, Judah 24^{2}.

[3] Judith 16^{14}.

[4] *Sibyll.* 3^{701}.

[5] Jerome, *Com. in Isaiam*, on Is 11^{2}, *Com. in Michæam*, on Mic 7^{6}, etc.

[6] *Acts Thom.* 39^{50}.

[7] *Ascension of Isaiah*, ed. R. H. Charles, London, 1900, p. 1, Introd.

[8] Wis 7^{26}; see, further, T. Rees, 'The Spirit of God as Wisdom,' in *Mansfield College Essays*, London, 1909, p. 289 ff.; *Apocrypha and Pseudepig. of OT*, Oxford, 1913, i. 528.

[9] E. Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, Oxford, 1889, p. 126.

[10] *Quod det. pot. insid.* 22.

[11] *De Mund. opific.* 46.

[12] *De Plant. Noe*, 5.

[13] *De Concup.* 10.

[14] *Quod det. pot. insid.* 24, *de Concup.* 11.

[15] *Leg. Alleg.* i. 13, *Vit. Mos.* iii. 36.

man is a partaker.'[1] All men have visitations of the divine Spirit, but in men of pleasure, owing to the flesh, it makes no lasting stay, whilst its continuance with the prophet and philosopher requires that their normal faculties lie in abeyance, and, in ecstasy, they are played upon by the Spirit as the harpist strikes his harp.[2] Personal language is used to describe the mode of approach and the operations of the Spirit. It 'seeks men,' 'guides their feet to truth,' 'strengthens all and conquers all that is beneath'; it has distinctive properties as 'invisible,' 'all-wise,' 'divine,' 'indivisible,' etc.,[3] but such language, in view of the entire system of Philonic thought, does not denote personality. Whatever personalization and hypostatization of divine qualities take place must be looked for in connexion with the Logos.

LITERATURE.—In addition to works cited, the following may be consulted: E. Kautzsch, art. 'Religion of Israel,' in *HDB* v. 612 ff.; E. Kŏnig, *Gesch. des AT Religion*, Gütersloh, 1912; H. W. Robinson, *The Religious Ideas of the OT*, London, 1913; H. B. Swete, art. 'Holy Spirit,' in *HDB* ii. 402–405.

III. *JEWISH (POST-BIBLICAL, TALMUDIC, AND POST-TALMUDIC).*—The Rabbinical teaching concerning the Spirit of God, or the Holy Spirit, belongs to the Haggādāh and shares the discursive, non-systematic character of that branch of instruction. The absence of doctrinal formularies from Talmudic Judaism[4] gave room for all shades of opinion, provided that they could in some way be connected with the letter of the OT Scriptures and did not contravene the doctrine of the *Shĕmā'* (Dt 6[4-6]). Hence no systematic or authoritative doctrine of the Holy Spirit can be deduced from the mass of traditions contained in the Gemara and the Midrashim, and the anonymous authorship of many sayings about the Holy Spirit makes the tracing of the historical development of doctrine well-nigh impossible. References to the Holy Spirit increase as we pass from the Mishnāh to the two Talmuds and the homilies in the Midrashim, but this increase is due mainly to the greater quantity of Haggādic materials contained in the latter sources. From the Targums, notwithstanding the fact that in their present form they are later than the Mishnāh (*c.* A.D. 200), we may roughly ascertain how the Holy Spirit was regarded in the early Synagogue. In the Talmuds we may see the opinions of the schools from the 2nd to the 6th cent. A.D., and the Midrashim, while containing early materials, bring us to the 11th cent. A.D.

The terms 'Spirit of God,' 'Spirit of Jahweh,' occur sparingly in Targums and Talmuds, owing to the desire to avoid the mention of the divine name, and the Holy Spirit (*rûaḥ haqqôdesh*, m., f. *qudshā'*) takes its place. The term 'holy' serves to denote that the Spirit belongs in some way to the sphere of the divine, and distinguishes it from the crowd of spirits which filled the air, according to Jewish belief. Sometimes the Targums translate 'Spirit of God,' 'Spirit of Jahweh,' by 'spirit of might' (*rûaḥ gᵉbûrāh*), to interpret the 'demonic' working of the Spirit upon the early heroes, judges, and kings (Jg 13[25] 14[6. 19] 15[14], 1 S 11[6] 16[14], 1 Ch 12[18]), but more frequently as 'spirit of prophecy' (*rûaḥ nebû'āh*), to denote inspiration in its varied forms. The Holy Spirit is identified with the spirit of prophecy,[5] and the phrase 'my Spirit' is expanded into 'my Holy Spirit,' when used of God.[6] Once it is beautifully rendered 'spirit of compassions.'[7] In Is 63[10f.] we find 'the words of His holy prophets' for 'His (' thy') Holy Spirit,' and this paraphrase may be due to the desire to avoid early Christian applications of that passage to prove the hypostatization of the Holy Spirit. The relationship of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* to God is expressed by the phrase *min qedhem*, lit. 'from before, or the presence of'—a phrase the significance of which is much disputed. According to modern Jewish writers, it is used merely to avoid anthropomorphic ideas concerning God, and the use of the divine name,[1] whereas others interpret it as distinctly hypostatizing the Holy Spirit, placing Him alongside of Meṭaṭron, Memra, and Shekinah, the beings who mediate the activities of God upon the world and mankind.[2] The controversy is part of the larger question whether the conception of God in rabbinic Judaism made Him so transcendent and absolute as to require these mediating agencies, and left no room for His immanence in the world and man. This view is valid if Judaism can be presented as a philosophical system, but it overlooks the testimony of religious experience, which felt, especially in prayer, that God was very near.[3] On the other hand, as W. O. E. Oesterley remarks,[4] 'it is significant how in modern handbooks on Judaism, this specifically Rabbinical doctrine of intermediate beings between God and man is passed over in silence.' The more recent attempt of Abelson[5] to extract a doctrine of divine immanence from Rabbinical literature is little else than a *tour de force*. Keeping strictly to the term *min qedhem*, it denotes, as applied to *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*, not so much 'the Spirit *of* God' as the 'Holy Spirit *near* God.'[6] As such there is hypostatization, but no clear emphasis upon 'personality.'

Along with Meṭaṭron and Shekinah, *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* occupies 'an intermediate position between personalities and abstract beings. While, on the one hand, they are represented as being so closely connected with God as to appear as parts of Him, or attributes, they are, on the other hand, so often spoken of as undertaking individual actions that they must be differentiated from God.'[7]

In the Talmud the Memra does not play the rôle which marks the Targums, possibly because it lay too near in thought to the Logos doctrine in early Christian discussions, and Shekinah is more frequently used than *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*. They appear to be used indiscriminately and interchangeably, and both are presented as the source of prophecy.[8] It is difficult to draw any distinction between the two terms, and yet in some passages some distinction seems intended.[9] Perhaps Shekinah mediates the presence of God more objectively in shining splendour, and *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* more subjectively to the human mind,[10] though *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* is regarded at times as manifest in forms of light and glory. There is a marked advance upon OT teaching in the use of language suggestive of hypostatization and personal activities in the Talmudic references to the Shekinah and *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*. In several passages *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* is clearly distinguished from God, as when He acts as mediator between Israel and God[11] and 'cries' to God.[12] Personal activities are described when He is said to speak, cry, rest upon, depart[13] from any one. He is said to weep,[14] to lead like a shepherd,[15] and even to love.[16] In this usage we find it used as a masc. substantive;[17] more usually, however, it denotes an impersonal power and is used as fem. substantive. A favourite term to describe its coming is *shārā'*, 'to settle upon,' whereby its action is presented as staccato and momentary, not as a permanent indwelling. It comes from heaven, or the Holy Place, but, in view of the rabbinical polemic against the presence of two powers in heaven,[18] we are not to think of any disjunction within the Godhead. As in OT, so in Talmudic teaching, the nature of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* is often put in materialistic and impersonal terms. It was one of the ten things created on the first day;[19] it can be drawn up, like water, from the wells of salvation;[20] it is likened to a weight which God measures out;[21] more frequently it is described as light and glory which glimmers and shines upon persons (cf. Pauline δόξα). It shone in the three court-houses of Shem, Samuel, and Solomon,[22] glimmered (נעוצה) upon Jacob, his sons, and Tamar;[23] when it shone upon Phinehas, his face glowed like a torch;[24] it shone on Moses, and passed from him to the seventy elders as a light from lamp to lamp.[25] In passages

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[1] *De Gig.* 5, on Bezalel, Ex. 31[3]; cf. E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon*, Paris, 1908, p. 134 ff.

[2] *De Gig.* 5, *Quis rer. divin. heres.* 53, *de Mono.* 1, *ad fin.*, *de Spec. Legg.* iv. § 8; cf. Plato, *Timœus*, 71 D.

[3] *Somn.* ii. 252, *Plant. Noe*, 24, *Vit. Mos.* ii. 265, in L. Cohn and P. Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera*, 8 vols., Berlin, 1896–99.

[4] See art. CREEDS (Jewish). [5] Targ. Jer. to Gn 41[38].

[6] Ps.-Jon. to Gn 6[3], Is 42[1] 44[3], Ps 143[10].

[7] Ps.-Jon. Gn 1[26].

[1] Cf. *JE* vi. 6; J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, London, 1912, pp. 13, 37, 197, etc.

[2] Cf. F. W. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2], Leipzig, 1897, § 40; P. Volz, *Der Geist Gottes*, Tübingen, 1910, p. 165.

[3] Cf. J. *Berāḥ.* 13*a*; *Debar. R.* 102*a*; and, in general, R. T. Herford, *Pharisaism: its Aim and Method*, London, 1912, pp. 259–262; C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism*, do. 1903, p. 55 f.

[4] *The Jewish Doct. of Mediation*, London, 1910, p. 197.

[5] *Op. cit.* [6] Volz, p. 165.

[7] Oesterley, p. 197; cf. W. Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judenthums*[2], Berlin, 1906, p. 394 ff.

[8] Cf. B. *Sôṭāh*, 9*b*; J. *Ab. Zar.* 42*c*; B. *Bĕrāk.* 31*b*; B. *Sanh.* 11*a*; B. *Bābhā Bathrā*, 134*a*, *b*; B. *Sôṭāh*, 13*a*; *Vajjik R.* 8[2]; *Mĕḥilta*, 44*a*, ed. M. Friedmann (Vienna, 1870), med. pag.; *Qoh. R.* 1[2]; *Yalk. Sim.* to Jon. 1; Rashi on B. *Ḥag.* 13*b*; cf. Abelson, App. 1.

[9] Cf. B. *Yômā*, 21*b*; B. *Sanh.* 11*a*; *Mĕḥilta* to Ex 14[12] (Friedmann, p. 28[b]), where Shekinah sends *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*.

[10] Weber, § 40. [11] *Vajj. R.* 6[1]; *Debar. R.* 3.

[12] *Cant. R.* 8[12]; *Esther R.* 10[4]; *Yalk. Sim.* to Est 5[2].

[13] *Gen. R.* 60[3] 65[4]; נמלה; נמחלקה

[14] *Ex. R.* 15[15]. [15] *Pirqê de R. Eliezer*, 39.

[16] *Yalk. Sim.* to Jer 1[5]. [17] *Qoh. R.* 7[29] (A.V. 28).

[18] Cf. B. *Ḥag.* 15*a*.

[19] B. *Ḥag.* 12*a*, *b*; cf. M. Friedländer's tr. of *Pirqê R. Eliezer*, ch. 3, pp. 12, 27.

[20] Is 12[3], J. *Sukk.* 55*a*; *Gen. R.* 70. 9; *Pesiqtā Rabbathi*, ed. Friedmann, 1[b]; *Ruth R.* 4[12]; cf. Jn 7[37-39].

[21] *Vajj. R.* 16[2] on Job 28[25].

[22] B. *Makk.* 23*b*, תוספתא; *Qoh. R.* 10[16]; *Gen. R.* 85[12].

[23] *Gen. R.* 74[19] 84[19] 91[7] 85[9]. [24] *Vajj. R.* 11.

[25] *Ib.* 32[4]; *Debar. R.* 13[20].

about Samson the Midrash compares it to sound.[1] Once it is compared to a dove, to determine the distance between the upper and the lower waters at the Creation.[2] The distinctive office of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* in Talmud and Midrashim, as in Targums, is to communicate the knowledge of the divine will to the men and women of the OT. The Tôrâh, according to the rabbis, contained in advance the future history of the world, and, on that principle, any passage that could be applied to the events of history was regarded as a prophecy uttered by men 'in the Holy Spirit' (*bərûaḥ haqqôdesh*; cf. NT, *ἐν πνεύματι*). Thus the naming of children, the Exile, the building and destruction of the Tabernacle, the partition of the Holy Land among the tribes, even the death of workmen engaged upon the Temple-building, were all foretold by *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*.[3] In marked contrast to the exclusion of women from religious orders in Christendom is the prominence assigned by the rabbis to women as subjects of inspiration. Tamar, Rebekah, Sarah, Miriam, Deborah, Hannah, Esther, Abigail, and even the harlot Rahab were all styled prophetesses,[4] and in one passage it is declared that 'the mothers of Israel were all prophetesses.'[5] All the prophets possessed the Holy Spirit,[6] as did all who crossed the Red Sea,[7] and even their sons of a later day.[8] But the prophet *par excellence* was Moses; of him it is said that 'he beheld in a polished mirror,' but 'the prophets in an unpolished one,'[9] and at his death the Holy Spirit attested his pre-eminence by citing Dt 34[10].[10] Even the non-Israelites prior to Balaam's time could have inspiration, but because of Balaam's attempt to destroy Israel it was taken from the Gentiles.[11] But R. Jose said that the heathen had *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* only by night, and so received only half a word of revelation.[12] All the canonical books of the OT were written 'in the Holy Ghost,' but there was much discussion as to whether some of the Hagiographa 'defiled the hands,' *i.e.* were canonical or not,[13] but after Jabne (Jamnia, *c.* A.D. 90) Proverbs, Canticles, and Qoheleth were accepted as written by Solomon 'in the Holy Spirit.'[14] Special verses of Scripture are said to have had unique inspiration, as when David uttered Ps 11[2], Solomon Pr 10[6], and Abigail 1 S 25[29].[15] The OT is especially the book of the Holy Spirit, through which He is ever speaking, the regular formula being '*rûaḥ haqqôdesh* saith, or crieth.'[16] In most of these cases *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* is a substitute for the divine name, though in others, when he addresses God, a distinction is observable. In many of these utterances of the Holy Spirit the connexion between Scripture citations is very slight; 'no freak of allegory, of word-play, of fantastic juggling with letters and syllables is without illustration.'[17] But frequently moral lessons of great beauty and lofty purity are found, the Holy Spirit dissuading from wine, loose speaking, wicked actions, and sin in general.[18] There are curious passages in which the Holy Spirit is presented as a mystical element (cf. NT, *ἐν πνεύματι*), immersed in which the soul sees 'into the life of things,' discerning the hidden thoughts of hearts, as when Rebekah divines Isaac's thought, Deborah knows the words of Sisera's mother, Hezekiah sees the character of his son, and the Israelites read Pharaoh's secret designs.[19] Such insight was superior to the faculty of dream-interpretation, heathen divination, and the seer's vision; through these stages Balaam passed 'to the Holy Spirit,' and to them he relapsed when it 'left him.'[20] At its supreme moment prophecy is 'the knowledge of God,' which is conveyed to the prophet when he is so nigh to God that 'space is not,' and the divine working lies open to his gaze.[21]

The prerequisite conditions for the illumination of the Spirit are dwelt upon by the rabbis. Sometimes they are physical, as when Jacob's grief for Joseph causes the Spirit's departure, as it returns to him when he hears that Joseph lives.[1] Wisdom, strength, and wealth are necessary if one is to have the Shekinah[2] —a passage so expounded by Moses Maimonides as to make the *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* depend upon man's work almost entirely.[3] More commonly the conditions are moral. 'To join oneself to uncleanness brings the spirit of uncleanness, but to join oneself to the Shekinah merits to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.'[4] The Holy Spirit left Phinehas and David because of their sin, and only after long repentance did it revisit David.[5] In the *scala perfectionis* of R. Phineas (2nd cent. A.D.) the attainment of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* is preceded by holiness and the fear of sin,[6] and moral renewal precedes the bestowal of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* in the coming age.[7] Faith as the condition of receiving the Holy Spirit in the NT is paralleled in the Midrash in a fine passage. So great was faith upon Israel at the Red Sea that they were all inspired and burst forth into song *bərûaḥ haqqôdesh*,[8] and R. Nehemiah (2nd cent. A.D.) adds that 'every one who takes upon him one precept in faith is worthy that *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* should rest upon him.' Such a reward is meet for those who suffer for Israel's sake.[9] Above all, preoccupation with the Tôrâh makes one worthy of this boon. Bezalel's 'filling' with the Spirit of God is explained as in the wisdom of Tôrâh, the understanding of Halâkhâh, and knowledge of the Talmud.[10] The scribes of old were overshadowed by *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*;[11] the teacher of Tôrâh in public merits to receive it, as also he who studies it with a view to practice.[12] The high-priest must speak by *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* and have the Shekinah abiding on him when consulting the Urim and Thummim,[13] from which later rabbis (*e.g.*, Maimonides, Beḥai, Naḥmanides) argue that it was inferior to prophecy but superior to Bath Qôl.[14] The acquisition of the Holy Spirit will lead to other blessings. The joy at the Exodus and at great festivals is due to it;[15] it inspired David to song;[16] like the *gratia præveniens* of mediæval Christian theology, it effectuated piety, for 'all that the righteous do they do in the Holy Spirit,'[17] and in the age to come it will lead to the resurrection from the dead.[18] Life will be its 'note' in that age, as wisdom is in this,[19] and, instead of a few chosen to be prophets, all Israel will prophesy[20]—a promise extended by Tanna debe Elijahu R. to the non-Jew, the woman, and the slave.[21] How far into Talmudic times the experience of the Holy Spirit was vouchsafed to men is a question raised by the repeated assertion of Abelson[22] that it was very frequent. On the one hand, it is stated that in the time of the second Temple there were no manifestations;[23] for *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* ceased at the death of the last prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi,[24] and went above to God.[25] On the other hand, a few rabbis of the first two centuries A.D. are said to have 'seen by the *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*.'[26] The contradiction may be resolved by taking the former passages to allude to *rûaḥ haqqôdesh* as creative of Scripture, and the latter to a lower form of inspiration.[27] Abelson's assertion rests upon too few examples, and strains the meaning of the word, 'to merit,' 'to be worthy' —surely a different thing from saying that men actually experienced it. In place of *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*, it is expressly stated, there came the Bath Qôl, which uttered short sentences to authenticate decisions of the rabbis. Once it announced that Hillel and Samuel the Lesser were worthy to receive *rûaḥ haqqôdesh*.[28] But that Bath Qôl had not the authority of the Holy Spirit is seen in R. Joshua's (A.D. 250) repudiation of its message.[29] It is of interest to note that in early Christian polemics there is explicit statement that the Holy Spirit had ceased in Judaism and passed over into the Christian Church.[30]

Summary.—The distinctive contribution of Israel to the doctrine of the Spirit of God upon the basis of OT revelation alone completes its term in the

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1 *Vajj. R.* 8[2]; cf. B. *Sôṭâh*, 9*b* and Ac 2[2].

2 B. *Ḥag.* 15*a*; for inapplicability to the dove at Christ's baptism cf. A. Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus*[4], London, 1887, i. 286 f.; cf. I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism*, do. 1916, p. 46 ff.

3 *Gen. R.* 37[7] 75[8] 82[10]; *Yalk. Sim.* on Ca 1[11]; *Tanḥ.* אמא, § 1; *Yalk. Sim.* on Jos 7; *Tanḥ.* חקת, § 6.

4 Cf., *e.g.*, B. *Meg̱ill.* 14*a*, *b*.

5 Rashi on Gn 27[42]; *Gen. R.* 72.

6 Targ. Jon. to Is 40[13]; *Sifrê Deut.* 170 to Dt 18[18]; *Vajj. R.* 15[2] at bottom.

7 *Meḥil.* to Ex 12[36]. 14[12. 31].

8 Tosef. to *Pesaḥ*, iv. 8; B. *Pes.* 66*b*; *Cant. R.* 2[3].

9 B. *Jeb.* 49*b*; *Tanḥ B.ᵉmidhbar*, § 12; cf. 2 Co 3[18].

10 *Debar. R.* 11[10].

11 *Tanḥ. Balak*, § 1; *Bemidbar R.* 20[1].

12 *Vajj. R.* 13[3].

13 *Mishnâh Yadaim*, iii. 5; B. *Meg̱ill.* 7*a*.

14 *Sed. Olam*; cf. 15 at end; *Tosef.* ed M. S. Zuckermandel, Pasewalk, 1877–80, p. 683; *Cant. R.* 1[6-9].

15 *Vajj. R.* 4[3]; *Gen. R.* 32[7]; *Qoh. R.* 3[21].

16 Cf., *e.g.*, J. *Sôṭâh*, 23*d*, 24*a*; B. *Pesâḥ*, 117*a*; *Sifrê Deut.* 355 (Friedmann, p. 148*a*) (6 times); *Vajj. R.* 4[1] (5 times); *Qoh. R.* 10[16] (3 times); in NT cf. Ac 1[16], He 3[7], etc.

17 Cf. *Yalk. Sim.* to 1 S 12[8].

18 *Tanḥ.* שמיני, § 5, citing Pr 23[29]; *ib.* תמורה, § 2 (ed. Buber, iii. 44), citing *Qoh.* 5[5]; *ib.* § 4, citing Pr 21[23] and *Yalk. Sim.* to Jer 1[5], on Hos 11[1], 'The Holy Spirit saith, "Do not I love a lad who has not yet tasted sin?"'

19 *Tanḥ. Tôl.ᵉdoth*, § 10; *ib.* ילך, § 4; B. *Ber.* 10*a*; *Sifrê Num.* 11[6]; *Meḥil.*, Friedmann, 40*b*, l. 10.

20 *Tanḥ. Num. Balak.* §§ 4, 5.

21 *Meḥil.*, Friedmann, p. 44*a*, med. pag.; cf. also p. 28*b*, l. 10; *Cant. R.* 1[9].

1 *Gen. R.* 91[6]; *Âbhôth de R. Nathan*, § 30, *ad fin.*

2 B. *Shabb.* 92*a*.

3 *Môreh Nebûchim*, bk. ii. ch. 32–37.

4 *Sifrê* to Dt 18[12] (Friedmann, p. 107*b*).

5 *Bemid. R.* 20[1]; *Gen. R.* 20[1] 60[3]; *Yalk. Sim.* to 2 S 22; *Midrash Tehillim* to Ps 118[23].

6 *Mishnâh Soṭ.* ix. 15; cf. J. *Sabb.* 3*c*; B. *'Abôdah Zârâh*, 20*b*.

7 *Tanḥ. Qiddûshîm*, § 15, on Ezek 36[26*f*.].

8 *Meḥil. Beshall.* ii. 6; Friedmann, p. 33*b*.

9 *Tanḥ.* בהעלותך, § 13; *ib.* בשלח, § 10; cf. 1 P 4[14].

10 *Tanḥ.* ויקל, § 5, on Ex 35[30].

11 *Ib.* § 8, on 1 Ch 26[5]. 12 *Cant. R.* 1[10]; *Vajj. R.* 35[7].

13 B. *Yômâ*, 73*b*.

14 Cf. Buxtorf, *Historia Urim et Tummim*, ed. Basel, 1659, p. 295; see ch. iv.

15 *Meḥil.* to Ex 14[31]; J. *Sukk.* 55[a].

16 *Yalk. Sim.* to Ps 24. 17 *Tanḥ. Vajeḥî*, § 14.

18 B. *'Abôdah Zârâh*, 20*b*.

19 *Ex. R.* to 35[30]; *Tanḥ. Vajeḥi*, § 3, on Ezek 37[14].

20 *Ib.* בהעלותך, § 16 *ad fin.* on Jl 3 (Heb.).

21 *Yalk. Sim.* on Jg 4[14]; cf. Ac 2.

22 Pp. 37, 205, 208, 260, 268, 271 f., 279.

23 B. *Yômâ*, 21*b*; *Bemid. R.* 15[10].

24 B. *Sanh.* 11*a*; B. *Sôṭâh*, 48*b*; *Cant. R.* 8[3]; cf. A. Marmorstein, *Midrash Haserot we-Yeserot*, London, 1917, p. 38, n. 158.

25 *Qoh. R.* 12[7].

26 Simeon b. Yoḥai, *J. Sheb.* 38*d*; Aqibâ, *Vajj. R.* 21[8]; Gamaliel II., *Vajj. R.* 37[3]; R. Meir, *ib.* 99.

27 Cf. K. Kohler, *Grundriss einer systemat. Theologie des Judenthums*, Berlin, 1910, p. 32.

28 *Tosef. Sôṭâh*, 13[2-4]; J. *Sôṭâh*, 23*d*; B. *Sanh.* 11*a*.

29 B. *Bâb. Meṣî'â*, 59*b*.

30 Cf. Just. Mart. *Dial. cum Tryph.* 52, at end, 82, at end; Origen, *c. Celsum*, vii. 8.

Midrashim. The earliest forms of the Spirit's working in the OT were expressed in terms tinged with animistic associations, and other kinds of spirits were subordinated to Jahweh. The Spirit of God meant God at work, and at first the emphasis fell upon the marvellous and abnormal in the physical and mental life of ecstatic prophecy. Later, when Jahweh had been conceived by the great prophets of the 8th–6th cent. B.C. as the sole ethical Lord of Israel and the world, His Spirit's operations were seen to have a cosmical reference, creating the world, the inner life of man, and especially the moral renewal of the individual and the nation. The later canonical literature, with its view of God as remote and transcendent, exhibited tendencies to regard His Holy Spirit as in some manner (never investigated) distinct from Him, as a localized presence within the Israel of the Exodus and the Return; but these tendencies, under Hellenistic influences, in *Wis. Sol.* and Philo, are transferred to His wisdom and the Logos. They re-appear, however, with greater strength in the Targums and Talmud, where, along with other quasi-personal agencies, the Memra, Metatron, and Shekinah, the Holy Spirit has His distinctive sphere, that of revelation, which is confined to the Tôrāh. As the revelation within the Tôrāh was, to the rabbis, final and complete as regards this world, any further manifestations of the Holy Spirit were reserved for the world to come, the Messianic age.

Mediæval and modern Judaism. — The first attempts to give a philosophical foundation for Jewish dogmas were influenced by the ideas of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, which came from Arabian philosophy. The result was that the Spirit of God was regarded as strictly a property or attribute of God, and not as an independent subsistence, and Saadya Fayyum (A.D. 892–934) explained the personal actions of the Spirit of God in the OT as merely picturesque language which corresponded with no reality of inner distinction in the Godhead. Division of properties was predicable only of bodies, and, since God was Spirit, inapplicable to Him, and the selection of the properties of life and wisdom by Christian mediæval theologians, who hypostatized them in their doctrine of the Trinity, Saadya regarded as arbitrary. Why not hypostatize omniscience and omnipotence? And, if there is manifoldness in the divine nature, why reduce it to a threefoldness only?[1] Maimonides (A.D. 1135–1204) reduced the term 'Spirit of God' to mean simply His intention or will.[2]

Muhammadanism also modified Jewish ideas of the Spirit of God. In the Qur'ān the Holy Spirit was ranked with angels among created beings, and identified with the angel Gabriel. He is the faithful Spirit who brought the Qur'ān from heaven to earth[3] and strengthened the faithful, among whom Jesus, the Messiah, is included.[4] Al-Farābī (A.D. 950) identified this 'faithful Spirit' with the 'active intellect' of Arabian philosophy,[5] and this conception was taken into Judaism by Abraham ibn David (A.D. 1160) to explain prophetic inspiration. He likewise identified the Holy Spirit with Gabriel.[6] This identification of prophecy with the 'active intellect' was, however, opposed by Judah Halevi (*q.v.*).[1] The latter preferred to use another expression for the Holy Spirit, 'the Divine Influence,' to which personal attributes are ascribed.[2] A further modification of the meaning of the Holy Spirit, whereby it generally signifies the inward state of the soul of man as he participates in a godly spiritual nature which is conveyed by emanation, is found in the mysticism of Ḳabbalism.[3]

There has been little discussion of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit *per se* by Judaism in the modern period. Of late the doctrine of divine immanence has been brought in to explain the doctrine of the Spirit of God.

'God not only pervades the entire world,' says N. S. Joseph, 'but is within us, and His Spirit helps and leads us towards goodness and truth.'[4] C. G. Montefiore tends to identify the Spirit of God with reason, which 'is the same divine element which produces, on the one hand, a learned man of science, and, on the other, an unlettered saint.' 'It is the Divine in man which makes him capable of goodness and capable of sin.'[5]

In such a view there is little in common with the OT view of the Spirit as revealer, and renewer of man's moral nature, tainted by sin, and speculative problems are raised by the doctrine of immanence which belong to the realm of philosophy rather than to the Jewish doctrine of the Holy Spirit.[6]

LITERATURE.—The following may be consulted: W. Bacher, *Die Agada der palästinischen Amoräer*, 3 vols., Strassburg, 1892–99, *Die älteste Terminologie der jüdischen Schriftauslegung*, Leipzig, 1899; M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, London, 1891; D. Neumark, *Gesch. der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1907; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], London, 1911; S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, do. 1909, *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser., do. 1896–1908; artt. 'Holy Spirit,' 'God,' in *JE*; 'Holy Spirit' in Hamburger. The ed. of *Tanḥuma* cited above is Warsaw, 1873.

IV. *NEW TESTAMENT.* — The NT is pre-eminently the book of the Holy Spirit. Every writing (except 2 and 3 Jn) refers to it; each Gospel opens with the promise of its effusion; the Acts is devoted to its operation in the creation, guidance, and expression of the Christian Church; whilst the Epistles constantly refer to its working in the individual and collective life of believers. It is variously spoken of as 'the Spirit,' 'Spirit' (220 times), 'the Holy Spirit,' 'Holy Spirit' (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα ἅγιον) (91 times), 'the Spirit of God, of the Lord, of God the Father, of the Father' (19 times), and as 'the Spirit of His Son, of Jesus, of Jesus Christ, of Christ' (5 times). Each of these phrases is full of significance. 'The Spirit,' *par excellence*, indicates how conspicuous is its place in Christian experience; 'the Holy Spirit' (3 times only in OT canon), whilst differentiating it from the host of spirits, often evil, with which popular fears and fancies, Jewish and Gentile, peopled the regions of air,[7] frequently expresses the ethical working of the Spirit upon Christians, as well as denoting, generally, the divine; and as 'the Spirit of Christ' there is set forth the cardinal feature of NT pneumatology, as compared with OT and Judaism, viz. that the 'Spirit of God, of the Father,' which Christians have received, has been procured for them by Jesus, in whom it dwelt when incarnate, from and through whom it comes, now that He is exalted.[8]

[1] *Emūnōth ve-de'ōth*, Germ. tr. J. Fürst, Leipzig, 1845, pt. ii. § 24, p. 152 ff.; for good summaries see M. Eisler, *Vorles. über die jüd. Philos. des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1870–83, pt. i. p. 16 f.; W. Bacher, *Die Bibelexegese der jüd. Religionsphilos. des Mittelalters vor Maimūni*, Strassburg, 1892, p. 42.

[2] *Môreh Nebûchîm*, pt. ii. ch. 40.

[3] xxvi. 193, xlii. 52, xvi. 2. [4] lviii. 23, ii. 81, 254.

[5] See artt. ACTIVITY, vol. i. p. 83 f.; AVICENNA, vol. ii. p. 275[a]; AVERROËS, vol. ii. p. 265[a]; *EBr*[9] iii. 154, 150.

[6] *Emūnāh Rāmāh*, 58–91 (ed. S. Weil, Frankfort, 1882, pp. 74–115); see D. Kaufmann, *Gesch. der Attributenlehre der jüd. Religionsphilos. des Mittelalters*, Gotha, 1877–78, p. 203, n. 181.

[1] Cf. *Kitāb al-Khazari*, i. 87, tr. H. Hirschfeld, London, 1905, p. 61.

[2] *Ib.* iii. 17, Eng. tr. p. 153; cf. Hirschfeld's Introd. p. 9.

[3] See art. KABBALA.

[4] *Religion, Natural and Revealed*, rev. ed., London, 1906, quoted by I. Abrahams, *Aspects of Judaism*, London, 1895, p. 27.

[5] *Liberal Judaism*, London, 1903, p. 29 ff.; cf. *Outlines of Liberal Judaism*, do. 1912, pp. 57 f., 173 f.

[6] See art. GOD (Biblical and Christian), vol. vi. p. 268.

[7] Cf. artt. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Christian), (Jewish); *DOG* i. 440 ff.; H. Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heil. Geistes*[3], Göttingen, 1909, pp. 34–42; H. Weinel, *Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister*, Freiburg i. B., 1899; M. Dibelius, *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus*, Göttingen, 1909; *RGG*, art. 'Geister, Engel, Dämonen im A.T., Judentum und N.T.' (Bertholet).

[8] Cf. R. C. Moberley, *Atonement and Personality*, London, 1901, p. 195 f.

The sources from which the doctrine of the nature and working of the Holy Spirit in the NT can be deduced may be grouped as follows: (1) Synoptic Gospels and Acts; (2) General Epp. (except 1 Jn), Hebrews, and Apoc. Jn; (3) Pauline literature; (4) Johannine literature.

1. **Synoptic Gospels and Acts.**—(*a*) *Synoptics.*—The common traditions in the Synoptics (=Q) present the Holy Spirit in the OT conceptions and refer mainly to the Messianic endowment of Jesus and His teaching concerning the reign of God. At the baptism of Jesus the Holy Spirit is manifest in bodily form as a dove (Mk 1^{10}=Mt 3^{16}=Lk 3^{22}), but what the dove symbolizes is not clear, since rabbinical, Syrian, and Philonian symbolism present no real analogy.[1] The anointing of the Holy Spirit is claimed by Jesus as indicating the nature of His mission (Lk $4^{18.\ 21}$=Is 61^{1}), and is ascribed to Him elsewhere (Mt 12^{18}=Is 42^{1}, Ac 10^{38}). It is regarded as the moving cause of the ecstatic impulse which drove Him to the Temptation (Mk 1^{12}=Mt 4^{1}=Lk 4^{1}) and the extraordinary energy, tension, enthusiasm, and exultation which marked His ministry (Lk 4^{14} 10^{21} RV, Mk $3^{21.\ 30}$). The manifestation of the Spirit's power in the expulsion of demons is the proof of the presence of the Kingdom (Mt 12^{28}, but Lk 11^{20}, *ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ*), all the goods of which are summed up in the Holy Spirit (Lk 11^{13}=Mt 7^{11}, *ἀγαθά*). It is promised as an aid to disciples when they shall be on trial before Jewish and Gentile tribunals—a passage anticipating the Paraclete's office in Jn (Mt 10^{20}=Lk 12^{12}, Mk 13^{11}=Lk 21^{15});[2] and 'the Holy Ghost speaking in them' clearly suggests personality. In the passages on the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Mk 3^{28-30}=Mt $12^{31f.}$=Lk 12^{10})[3] the Spirit is correlated with God, though not clearly hypostatized. The sign of the Spirit's presence is power, supernatural might, which is manifest intermittently, explosively, sometimes ecstatically.

This aspect is specially prominent in Lucan passages. In Luke's 'Vorgeschichte' a remarkable outburst of the Spirit of prophecy accompanied the infancies of John the Baptist and Jesus, inspiring John's parents and Simeon with utterances of lyric beauty (Lk $1^{41.\ 67}$ $2^{25ff.}$) and reproducing in the Baptist features of ecstatic prophecy as in the Nazirites and Elijah (Lk 1^{15-17}; cf. LXX, Nu 6^{3}, Jg $13^{4f.}$, Mal $3^{1.\ 23f.}$ [Heb.]). The operation of the Holy Spirit, superseding human paternity at the conception of Jesus, is absolutely unique (Lk 1^{26-38}, Mt 1^{18-21}). Although OT birth-stories, as of Isaac and Samuel, have coloured Luke's diction, there is strictly no parallel in Scripture, and supposed pagan illustrations can scarcely apply in view of the Jewish-Christian sources from which the narratives must come.[4] The Spirit is regarded not as personal, but as the 'power of the Highest' (Lk 1^{35}), but that power is humanly conditioned by moral qualities of faith and self-surrender in Mary, and works for a moral end. Undoubtedly Christological speculation has motived the narrative, but it is observable that the ideas are not shaped by Pauline speculations of the 'Second Adam' (B. Weiss), but reflect 'the beliefs of the Jewish-Christian circle in which they were handed down.'[5] The closing passage of Matthew's Gospel (28^{19}) suggests the divinity of the Holy Spirit and a distinction within the life of God, upon which later theology grounded its doctrine of the Trinity (*q.v.*). The words hardly come from our Lord, but their early adoption by the Church as the baptismal formula[1] indicates the Christian feeling that they accord with His thought, even as they furnish a succinct statement of the revelation of the Triune God, into living fellowship with whom, at baptism, believers were consciously brought.[2]

(*b*) *Acts.*—The Acts presents the historic fulfilment of the Baptist's prophecy and of the promises of Jesus to bestow the Spirit (Lk 3^{16}, Ac 1^{5} 11^{16}, Lk 12^{12} 21^{15}, Ac 4^{8} 6^{10}, Lk 24^{49}, Ac 2^{39}). There are several public manifestations of the Spirit (cf. 4^{31} 8^{17} 13^{2} 19^{1-6}), but two stand out conspicuously—the Pentecostal effusion and when Gentiles came within the Church (chs. 2, 10–11). At the former there are physical accompaniments of mighty wind and disparting tongues of flame suggestive of OT theophanies.[3] A feature common to both is glossolaly, which is represented at Pentecost as capacity to speak foreign tongues—perhaps in imitation of Jewish traditions of the Law-giving in seventy languages at Sinai,[4] but more probably it signifies ecstatic praise to God (2^{11} 10^{46}).[5] There was a wide-spread diffusion of the Spirit not only in Palestine, but farther afield in the Roman Empire, and it was manifested, abnormally and explosively, by extraordinary elevation of human faculties, so that miracles, prophecy, glossolaly, and visions were abundant; more normally in great enthusiasm, new courage, liberty of speech, skill in debate, keen insight into and wise use of Scripture, sound judgment of human character, business aptitude, and comfort in suffering. The Spirit is not presented as the principle of ethical life, as in Paul, yet ethical qualities of repentance, obedience, and faith are needed for its reception, and it belonged to every believer (2^{38} 10^{44} 11^{17} 13^{52}). In the communal life of the Ecclesia it inspired mutual service, generous self-sacrifice, joyous fellowship, thus transforming and socializing human nature (2^{42-47} 4^{32-37}). The Spirit supervised every stage of the Ecclesia's advance (cf. 1^{26} $8^{17.\ 29}$ $10^{39.\ 44}$ 11^{15} 13^{2-4} $15^{8.\ 28}$ 16^{6-10} 20^{22}), but neither conferred infallibility (cf. 20^{23} $21^{4.\ 11-14}$) nor superseded human judgment (cf. $16^{7f.}$ with ^{10} *συμβιβάζοντες*). It is described impersonally as a gift, which God gives or the Son outpours (11^{17} 15^{8} $2^{33.\ 38}$), more usually as power (1^{8}). Yet personal actions are attributed to the Spirit: it 'speaks,' 'bears witness,' 'separates' for service, 'approves' a conciliar decision, 'forbids,' 'appoints overseers,' and can be 'resisted,' 'tempted,' and 'lied against.' In these last cases the Spirit is co-ordinated with God ($5^{3.\ 4.\ 9}$), but there is no attempt to think out the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. Once, though perhaps the passage denotes merely a vision, it is called 'the Spirit of Jesus' (16^{7}). But, as regards men, the Spirit denotes the divine, the supernatural, for it comes from God, indicates Jesus' claim to be Messiah, authenticates His exaltation, fulfils OT prophecy, and is the medium whereby He is present and operative within His Church (cf. 2; Jl 3^{1-5} LXX).

2. **General Epistles (except 1 Jn), Hebrews, Apoc. Jn.**—The few references to the Holy Spirit within this group[6] are connected with Christian experience and prophecy. There is little mention of the explosive working of the Spirit, as in Acts, except in the Apoc., where it forms part of the

[1] Cf. S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser., p. 111 f.; H. B. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, London, 1909, App. A.
[2] Cf. J. Moffatt, *The Theol. of the Gospels*, London, 1912, p. 183 f.; A. Titius, *Die NT Lehre von der Seligkeit*, pt. i., Freiburg i. B., 1895, p. 161 f.
[3] For text see Driver, *HDB* iv. 583; *EBi*, cols. 4727–4733.
[4] Cf. H. J. Holtzmann, *NT Theologie*, Tübingen, 1896–97, i. 414.
[5] Swete, p. 28; for sources cf. Moffatt, *Introd. to the Lit. of the NT*, Edinburgh, 1911, pp. 211, 251 f., 259, 266 ff.; see also H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, London, 1912, pp. 515–534; *HDB* ii. 463.

[1] Cf. *Didache*, vii. 3; Just. Mart. *Apol.* i. 61 ff.
[2] See, further, art. BAPTISM, vol. ii. pp. 376ᵃ, 380 ff.
[3] Cf. Verg. *Æn.* ii. 603.
[4] Cf. Philo, *de Decal.* 11 Sept. 22; cf. *Tal. b. Sot.* 36*b*.
[5] Cf. 1 Co $14^{27f.}$ and art. CHARISMATA.
[6] For relationship to Pauline and Johannine literature cf. Moffatt, *Introd. to the Lit. of the NT*, *passim*.

apocalyptical terminology (*ἐγενόμην ἐν πνεύματι*, 1[10] 4[2] 17[3] 21[10]; cf. En. 71[5], Bel 36); its working is more permanent and more related to the ethical life. Thus it is the source of sanctification (1 P 1[2]), for which as an indwelling presence it jealously yearns (Ja 4[5]),[1] the atmosphere of prayer (Jude [20]), comfort in affliction, for its abiding is nothing less than the Shekinah manifestation of God to Christians as to the Messiah (1 P 4[14] = Is 11[2]); it testifies to the restful state of the blessed dead (Rev 14[13]) and pleads in unison with the Bride, the Church, for the Bridegroom's speedy return (22[12. 17. 20]). As a supernatural power the Spirit gave the impulse to evangelism, and its diversified effects certified the divine character of the salvation which the gospel brings (1 P 1[12], He 2[4], *Πνεύματος ἁγίου μερισμοῖς*). It is connected with baptism, wherein the 'illuminati' taste, here and now, of the joys and powers of the age to come (He 6[2-5]; cf. Ac 2[38] 19[1-6]).[2] The relation of the Spirit to Scripture and prophecy shows a notable advance. As in Talmudic teaching, the Holy Spirit speaks directly through Scripture (He 3[7] 9[8] 10[15]), and not, as hitherto in the NT, mediately through the OT writers (cf. Mt 22[43], Ac 1[16] 4[25] 28[25]). The Spirit which spake in and through OT prophets is described as the Spirit of Christ (1 P 1[11], *τὸ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*), *i.e.* either the Spirit of the pre-existent Messiah or, as Hort interprets, 'a spirit of anointing.'[3] Either way the revelation in both OT and NT by prophets or evangelists is regarded as continuous, the same Spirit operating in both,[4] and later 'the Spirit of prophecy' and the 'witness of (*i.e.* about) Jesus' are interchangeable terms (Rev 19[10]). The book of Revelation claims to be 'prophecy,' but its inspiration takes the general form of apocalyptical prophecies, the contents being conveyed when the recipient is in ecstasy, which, in the latest NT writing, is regarded as the normal mode (2 P 1[21], *φερόμενοι*). Personal actions are ascribed to the Spirit: it 'testifies,' 'signifies' (1 P 1[11], *ἐδήλου*), 'speaks' (Rev 2[7], etc., 14[13] 22[17]), 'longs for,' and 'indwells' (Ja 4[5], but perhaps human spirit is meant), and can be 'insulted' (He 10[29]). Its temporal mission is once mentioned (1 P 1[12], *ἀποσταλέντι*; cf. Rev 5[6]), and it is correlated with the Father and the Son (1 P 1[2], Jude [20f.]). It appears to be identified with the Son when He speaks to the Churches (Rev 2[7], etc.), and perhaps the position of the seven spirits between the names of God and Jesus Christ (1[4]), together with the assertion that they are the possession and eyes of the latter (3[1] 5[6]), indicates that the Divine Spirit is meant, in 'plenitude and perfection.'[5] But the seven spirits may be synonymous with the seven angels (8[2ff.] 15[1ff.]), as in apocryphal literature.[6] However that may be, they personify the divine activity and mediate the presence and rule of Christ upon earth.[7]

3. **Pauline literature.**—The main outlines of Pauline teaching concerning the Holy Spirit can be found in the four great controversial Epistles (Gal., 1 and 2 Cor., Rom.), and the teaching in the Captivity and Pastoral Epistles is congruous therewith (cf. Gal 5[5], 1 Co 6[11] with Tit 3[5]). To avoid repetition we shall not present the teaching in its historic sequence, and it would be precarious to affirm development of doctrine from letters written informally and occasionally in the midst of missionary activity. The place of the Holy Spirit in Paulinism is cardinal.

'It is the soul of the doctrine, the binding principle which makes all its parts coherent, . . . a specific category of thought fixing the point of view from which the apostle carries on all his meditations and reasonings, co-ordinates and logically develops his entire conception of Christianity.'[1]

Hence it follows that the full statement of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit would require a treatise upon Paulinism in its entirety. Our scope limits us to those salient points which mark advance upon earlier NT conceptions, and furnish materials for the later theological formulation of doctrine.

(1) The first point of Pauline teaching which marks advance is the idea of the Spirit as the principle of the Christian's ethical life. Hitherto that aspect had appeared in the OT (Ezk 11[19] 18[31] 36[26], Ps 51) and one Petrine passage but casually (1 P 1[2]); now it is predominant. The Spirit is the power of God which comes into human life, and, in alliance with the Christian's faith, delivers him from the thraldom of sin, death, and law into the blessedness of liberty (Gal 5[18], Ro 8[2], 2 Co 3[17]). The Spirit's working is grounded upon the redemption which Christ wrought for man by His death, and is the impartation of the positive blessings which mark henceforth the Christian life. Such blessings are justification (1 Co 6[11]), assurance of sonship to God, with its privilege of access to the Father (Gal 4[6], Ro 8[15f.], Eph 2[18]), and the Spirit works as a powerful ally in the believer's warfare against sin and Satan (Gal 5[16f.], Eph 6[17]), is an effective helper and co-operant pleader in his weaknesses and prayers (Ro 8[26f.]), is continually given by God to procure the progressive realization of a sanctification which covers his entire nature, body, soul, and spirit (1 Th 4[8], 2 Th 2[13], Ro 15[16], 1 Th 5[23]), and makes the body a shrine of God, wherein the Spirit permanently dwells (1 Co 6[19] 3[16]). The Spirit is the source of his new life and the element in which it thrives (Ro 8[2-6], 2 Co 3[6]), the standard by which he walks and advances (Gal 5[16. 25]), the efficient cause of the ninefold graces of the Christian character (5[22f.]), the renewer of the whole nature, especially of 'the spirit of the mind,' so that it is enabled to understand mysteries and receive revelations and a wisdom from God, compared with which all other knowledge is as folly (Tit 3[5], Eph 4[23] 1[17], 1 Co 2[10ff.]). So thoroughly does the Spirit penetrate and change a man that he becomes a being distinct from ordinary humanity, and can be described as 'spiritual' (*πνευματικός*), whilst they are 'carnal' or 'soulish' (*σάρκινος*, *ψυχικός*). The difference is seen not only in ethical conduct (Gal 5[19-23]), but in new knowledge. The 'spiritual' is initiated into the secrets of God's inmost thoughts, and beholds Christ invested with a new significance, and appropriates materials for thought and teaching beyond the grasp of the 'natural' man (1 Co 2[6-14]). His judgment acquires an absolute worth because it is informed by the Spirit of God. Indeed, so marked is the distinction that the non-Christian hardly possesses any human 'pneuma' at all, and, compared with his former condition, the Christian is a 'new creation.'[2]

(2) The second distinctive contribution to pneumatology is the Pauline valuation of 'charismata.' The explosive staccato manifestations of the Spirit in glossolaly and prophecy which are presented in Acts are supplemented and more fully described by Paul. The order in which they are grouped suggests a valuation from the more intellectual, as wisdom and knowledge, through the miraculous powers, to the gifts most useful in Church-worship, the last of which is glossolaly and its interpretation (1 Co 12[8-10]; cf. [29-30]). 'He proceeds from the

1 Cf. Hort, *ad loc.* 2 See artt. BAPTISM.
3 Cf. Hort, *The First Epistle of St. Peter, I. 1–II. 17*, London, 1898, *ad loc.*; G. B. Stevens, *Theol. of the NT*, Edinburgh, 1899, p. 298 ff.
4 Cf. Constant. Creed, *τὸ λαλῆσαν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις*.
5 Alford, *The Greek Testament*, new ed., Cambridge and London, 1881–84, iv. 549.
6 Cf. To 12[15], En 20[7] 90[21], and *HDB* iv. 254[a], 256[a].
7 Cf. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, p. 272 f.

1 A. Sabatier, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, p. 305 f.
2 On the question whether Paul's anthropology is dualistic and Hellenistic or mainly Hebrew cf. Holtzmann, *NT Theologie*[2], ii. 19 f. with H. W. Robinson, *Bib. Doct. of Man*, p. 110, and Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, App., note O, *ad fin.*

worthiest to the least worthy.'[1] The criteria of valuation are utility and the upbuilding of character (1 Co 12⁷, *πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον*, 14²⁶, *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*) in the Church (cf. 14⁵. ¹². ¹⁷). By these tests prophecy was superior to glossolaly, but transcending all 'charismata' is the grace of love (12³¹–14¹). Paul hints that they may pass away (13⁸), but faith, hope, and love ever abide. Thus the normal supersedes the abnormal, the inward ethical abiding work of the Spirit is of greater worth than the more striking, spasmodic, miraculous 'charismata.'[2] Not that Paul deprecated or desired the cessation of the latter; he boasts his surpassing excellency in them (14¹⁸), cites them as proofs of his apostleship (Ro 15¹⁸), and encourages their use in Corinth, provided they are practised with decency and order (1 Co 14⁴⁰). These two conceptions of the Spirit, as miraculous and as ethical principle, are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive;[3] they may be simultaneously present, even as electricity may be diffused in the atmosphere and concentrated in the lightning-flash. And the combination is not original to Paul; it is found in Ezekiel, and the idea of worth was finely expressed in the theophany to Elijah at Horeb, in the contrasted storm and the 'sound of a gentle stillness' (1 K 19¹¹ᶠ.). But Paul restored the ethical-religious Spirit from the background, where popular judgment and rabbinic emphasis on the Spirit as prophetic had placed it, and, although sub-apostolic writings scarcely appreciated it, it came once for all to the forefront in the doctrines of grace in Augustinianism and the Reformation.

(3) A third contribution is found in the mystical phrase 'in spirit,' 'in holy Spirit,' which parallels the ever-recurring 'in Christ Jesus,' 'in the Lord.' In some cases it is difficult to determine whether *ἐν πνεύματι* denotes the human spirit or the divine. Generally, however, the human spirit as energized and impregnated by the divine is meant. In this usage the Spirit is regarded as mediating the union of believers with Christ and with one another within the Church. The Spirit of Christ and of believers mutually interpenetrate, so that each is in the other, as air may surround and penetrate a man (cf. Ro 8⁹. ¹¹, 1 Co 3¹⁶ 6¹⁹, Gal 2²⁰). Their union is 'more real, more intimately nigh, Than e'en the closest earthly tie' of human marriage (1 Co 6¹⁶ᶠ.; cf. Eph 5²⁹⁻³²). To be 'in the Spirit' is to possess all the blessings of God's kingdom—faith, righteousness, joy, and peace; in that element conscience is quickened, love born, holiness attained, and immortality realized (1 Co 12³, Ro 14¹⁷ 9¹, Col 1⁸, Ro 15¹⁶ 8⁴). The Spirit is the mode whereby the transcendent, exalted Christ is immanent and dynamic within believing men, and in that close and fruitful fellowship space and time are surmounted, and believers whilst on earth are 'in the heavenlies,' 'hid with Christ in God' (Eph 1³ 2⁶, Col 3¹⁻³). Similarly the Spirit is the cohesive bond of Church-fellowship. At baptism believers were refreshed (*ἐποτίσθημεν*) and merged their several peculiarities, racial, social, sexual, into a higher unity, the 'one body,' in which the Spirit dwells, thereby making it a temple and dwelling-place of God (1 Co 12¹³, 2 Co 13¹⁴, Ph 2¹, Eph 4⁴ 2¹⁸. ²²).

Other valuable teachings can only be touched summarily. In polemics with Gentile and Jew the place of the Spirit is prominent. As regards the former, the Spirit gave a force to Paul's preaching which proved its divine origin, opened the eyes of the morally blind, freed receptive hearers from the bondage of demons, and their chief, 'the God of this world,' cleansed them from the impurities of the flesh and evil speech, and imparted a wisdom which gave a knowledge of God such as philosophy could never give (1 Th 1⁵ᶠ. 2¹³, 1 Co 2⁴ᶠ., Ro 8²⁹, Eph 2², 1 Co 6⁹ᶠ., Eph 4²²ᶠ. ²⁹ᶠ., 1 Co 1²¹. ³⁰ 2⁶. ¹⁰). As regards the Jew, the supply of the Spirit demonstrated the superiority of the gospel to the Law, fulfilling the promise to Abraham of world-wide blessing, by making believers free sons of God and heirs of the promises, whereas the Jew was a perpetual 'minor,' under bondage to the Law (Gal 3, 4, Ro 8). The Spirit was the life-giver, the Law destroyed; the one an enabling power for real service of God, the other powerless, a mere outward form (Gal 3²¹, 2 Co 3⁶, Ro 2²⁹, Ph 3³). The Spirit characterizes the New Covenant, which is as different from the Old as life from death. Moses, the unique prophet to Judaism, is surpassed by every believer, for his glory was waning, whilst theirs is ever waxing and transforming them by virtue of the Spirit of Christ ever being given to them (2 Co 3⁷⁻¹⁸). The Spirit's working fulfilled eschatological hopes; for the Kingdom of God was present where He worked; already the Christian possessed an instalment and parcel of the future inheritance (Ro 14¹⁷, 2 Co 1²²ᶠ., Eph 1¹³ᶠ. 4³⁰), and the life which survived bodily death, and was growing, through the Spirit's quickening power, the 'spiritual body' which should resemble the 'body of glory' of the Heavenly Christ (1 Co 15⁴⁴ᶠ. ⁵⁰, 2 Co 3¹⁸, Ph 3²¹). As 'firstfruits of the Spirit' the Christian was the prophecy of a redemption which should include the entire creation (Ro 8¹⁸⁻²³).

The nature of the Spirit Paul nowhere attempts to define: he is concerned with His presence and working, which is described in impersonal and personal terms. Impersonally, it is a power or gift, 'given,' 'supplied to,' 'poured out within' believers (1 Th 4⁸, Ro 5⁵, Ph 1¹⁹, Gal 3⁵); it is the unction that makes men anointed, the 'ink' of Christ's signature, the 'seal' attesting divine ownership, the 'firstfruits and first instalment' (*ἀρραβών*) of the heavenly inheritance (2 Co 1²¹ᶠ. 3³, Eph 1¹³ᶠ. 4³⁰, Ro 8²³, 2 Co 5⁵). Personal terms are more frequent than in earlier NT writings: the Spirit 'dwells' within, 'leads,' 'witnesses along with' the human spirit, intercedes for men (1 Co 3¹⁶, Ro 8⁹ᶠ. ¹⁴. ¹⁶. ²⁶ᶠ.). He 'searches' and 'knows' the divine mind, 'works,' 'distributes,' and 'wills,' and can 'be grieved' (1 Co 2¹⁰ᶠ. 12¹¹, Eph 4³⁰). Such attributes as thought, choice, selection, volition—indeed, in one place, identity of subject amid manifold operations (1 Co 12⁴⁻⁹, 'one and the same Spirit')—suggest a self-conscious agent, and so personal in the modern sense of the term. That this usage is more than poetic personification (B. Weiss, Beyschlag, Feine) is manifest from the frequent co-ordination of the Spirit with the Father and the Son (Ro 8⁹⁻¹¹, 1 Co 12⁴⁻¹¹, 2 Co 13¹⁴, Eph 2¹⁸ 4⁴⁻⁶), and the 'supernatural' quality of His working, as life-giving, renewing, sanctifying, indwelling, and equipping the Church. And, as the Spirit of the personal God, His operations are necessarily personal. But personal as Spirit, in distinction from God? There are hints of such, when He is described as the self-consciousness of God, which yet goes forth from Him (*τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*, 1 Co 2¹²) on a mission parallel to that of the Son, whose Spirit He also is (Gal 4⁶; cf. v.⁴, *ἐξαπέστειλεν*), and as interceding for saints over against God (Ro 8²⁷). But God is not the abstract Deity of theism; it is God as revealed in Christ.[1]

Of the relation of the Spirit to Christ Paul never speaks explicitly. The Spirit is not Christ's human spirit,[2] nor was Christ on earth the incarnate Spirit of God.[3] The Spirit is imparted as the Spirit of the Risen Christ, and their working is practically identical (Ro 8⁹, 2 Co 3¹⁷, Eph 3¹⁶ᶠ.), though some distinction is apparent (2 Co 3¹⁷ᶠ. 13¹⁴). But that distinction is never presented as an eternal immanent relation, nor does Paul throw any light upon the Christological question whether the Spirit is Christ's 'very own.' The practical religious purpose of his writings keeps such formal and metaphysical speculations in the background.

Into recent discussions as to the sources and the respective values of the varied elements blended together in Paul's concept of spirit we cannot

[1] T. C. Edwards, *A Commentary on the 1st Ep. to the Corinthians*², London, 1885, p. 314. For detailed discussion see art. CHARISMATA, and Schmiedel, *EBi*, cols. 4755–4776; *RGG* ii. 1203–1208 (Brückner).

[2] Cf. Gunkel, p. 82.

[3] Volz, *ad fin.*; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, i. 50, n. 1.

[1] Cf. Moberley, p. 194 f.

[2] Cf. Sanday-Headlam on Ro 14. [3] So *HBi*, col. 4754.

enter. Recent research into the mystery-religions[1] appears to indicate that, beyond a few phrases, Paul took little from that source;[2] and no more from Stoicism;[3] and that not in Greek dualism but in the OT the roots of his ideas lie, whilst, above all, in his experience at conversion and the subsequent manifestations of Christ in the Spirit within his breast he found the materials of his doctrine of the Spirit.[4]

LITERATURE.—The following may be consulted: J. Weiss, *Die Nachfolge Christi*, Göttingen, 1895; A. Titius, *Die NT Lehre von der Seligkeit*, ii. 'Der Paulinismus,' Tübingen, 1900; P. Kölbing, *Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus*, Göttingen, 1906; E. Sokolowski, *Die Begriffe von Geist und Leben bei Paulus*, do. 1903; J. Moffatt, *Paul and Paulinism*, London, 1910; A. E. Garvie, *Studies of Paul and his Gospel*, do. 1911, pp. 189 f., 262–265; A. Schweitzer, *Gesch. der paulin. Forschung*, Tübingen, 1911; Kirsopp Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911; C. Clemen, *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christenthum*, Giessen, 1913; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, London, 1912, pp. 56–60, 334 ff.; W. M. Ramsay, *The Teaching of Paul in Terms of the Present Day*, do. 1913.

4. **Johannine literature (Gospel of John, 1 Ep.).**—The teaching of the Fourth Gospel concerning the Spirit is based upon sayings of Jesus, but the form of its presentation is shaped by the writer's experience of the Spirit and his *milieu* towards the close of the 1st century. The critical questions as to the authenticity of these sayings are, in part, met by the writer's view of the Spirit as interpreting and supplementing the revelation of Jesus to meet new situations and ever-enlarging spiritual capacity ($14^{26f.}$ $16^{12ff.}$). The Synoptic teaching is presupposed and supplemented. The endowment of the Spirit at Jesus' baptism was abiding, complete, and imparted by Him to the disciples by insufflation after the Resurrection and Return to the Father ($1^{32f.}$ 3^{34} 20^{22} $7^{38f.}$ 16^{7}). Instead of being an occasional helper in times of trial, the Spirit is promised as an indwelling perpetual Paraclete (Mt 10^{20}; cf. Jn $14^{16f.}$); the meagre account of the promise of the effusion of the Spirit after His departure, in Luke (24^{49}), is expanded in the upper-room discourses (Jn 14–16), where the return of the Lord in the Spirit takes the place of, as it interprets, the eschatological discourses in the Synoptic Gospels. Pauline teaching is modified and developed. The explosive working of the Spirit has vanished, prophecy is only mentioned as unconscious in Caiaphas (11^{51}), or false in heretics (1 Jn 4^{1}), and 'spirits' are proved by a doctrinal test (1 Jn 4^{1-6}; cf. 1 Co 12^{3}), whilst the 'chrism' of the Spirit operates in the normal knowledge of every believer, thus dispensing with the need for discerners of spirits and 'inspired teachers' (1 Jn $2^{20.\ 27}$; cf. 1 Co $12^{3.\ 10.\ 29}$). The Pauline characteristic of the Spirit as power is dropped, as also that of the Spirit as source of ethical gifts like faith and peace, whilst the operation of the Spirit as life-giving is more emphasized (3^{5-8} 6^{63}). Eternal life as a present possession is more conspicuous, and the Spirit as 'earnest' is not mentioned. The glory of Christ is presented as His while on earth, and not as a quasi-physical radiance of the suprasensible world, closely associated with πνεῦμα as a light-substance, as in Pauline teaching, and thereby the material implications of Stoical conceptions are avoided. The Pauline view of the Spirit as imparting new knowledge (1 Co 2) is placed in the centre of the Johannine teaching.

The older Hebrew idea of πνεῦμα as wind and life-principle is kept (3^{5-8} 20^{22}), but life is viewed not physically but as a moral fellowship with God.

[1] See artt. MYSTERIES.
[2] Cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, London, 1913.
[3] Cf. A. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das NT*, Giessen, 1911, p. 178.
[4] Cf. P. Feine, *Theologie des NT*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 362, 501 f.; H. Weinel, *Bib. Theologie des NT*, Tübingen, 1911, p. 318.

Along with this appears the closest approach made in Scripture to a view of πνεῦμα as a metaphysical principle, closely akin to that in the mystery-religions, where 'spirit' is the divine essence communicated to men in ecstasy or the sacraments. Spirit is from the supernatural order, is mighty, mysterious, and free in its working; it comes from God to man, and imparts life and knowledge (3^{5-8} $6^{62f.}$). It is the essential quality of the divine nature, the life-giving element in the utterances of the divine Son (4^{24} 6^{63}), and imparts to the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist their efficacy, the one to initiate, the other to sustain, spiritual life. The language is very realistic, and almost suggests that πνεῦμα is a substance,[1] though its reception is ethically conditioned; faith is prerequisite, and repentance. Spirit operates not magically but morally in the enlightened consciousness of the believer.

There is a fresh proportion observable in the terminology of the Spirit (10 times). 'The Holy Spirit' as full title (τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον) occurs but once, 'Holy Spirit' (Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον) twice, and a personal designation, 'the Paraclete' (ὁ Παράκλητος, 4 times; of the Risen Lord, 1 Jn 2^{1}), meets us, which is particularized as 'the Spirit of Truth' (6 times). There is no exact equivalent in English for 'the Paraclete'; 'Comforter,' 'Helper' miss the legal nuance, whilst 'Advocate' does not cover the varied offices predicated in the Gospel, of which intercession forms no part.[2] The other designation, 'the Spirit of Truth,' must be explained by the Johannine usage of truth, as deepest reality, and no bare abstraction—the reality of the divine life and order which has been revealed concretely, historically, personally, in Jesus Christ, who is the Truth (14^{6}). Thus the Spirit of truth is His Spirit—in one passage the Spirit and truth are identified (1 Jn 5^{6})—and its working is confined to believers, as an immanent, permanent agent, invested with personal qualities.

Whether the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, is a person or not is much debated.

W. R. Inge goes too far when he says: 'It is quite useless to ask whether, for St. John, the Paraclete is a distinct hypostasis in the Godhead,' though his further remark is true, that 'the category of personality is quite foreign to the Evangelist, as to his whole school.'[3]

The personal activities predicated of the Paraclete, teaching, reminding, witnessing, convincing, leading, speaking, hearing, glorifying (14^{26} 15^{26} 16^{8-15}), the studied selection of masculine terms for the neuter substantive πνεῦμα (it is ὁ παράκλητος, not τὸ παράκλητον, and the personal pron. ἐκεῖνος is steadily used, 16^{13-15}), above all, the functions discharged, imply personality.

As Swete puts it, 'That He fulfils the whole of our Lord's personal functions towards the Church, that He belongs to the category of Paraclete—Teacher, Director, Protector, Counsellor—this invests Him with all the essential attributes of that which we understand by personality.'[4]

That the Paraclete is not identical with the spiritual presence of Christ in His Church (Tholuck, Reuss) is clear from the designation of Him as 'another Paraclete' (ἄλλον παράκλητον, 14^{16}) distinct from Christ, who sends Him, and to whom the Spirit bears witness, as He glorifies Him (15^{26} 16^{14}). And, if language means anything, when the Spirit is said to hear and receive the things that He announces, hypostatization is surely implied. And so 'we must think of the Spirit as an independent spiritual Centre, proceeding from both God and the Exalted Christ.'[5] In the conjoint 'sending' of the Spirit by the Father and the Son we have the basis of the later Western addition of the 'Filioque' clause to the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed, though His subordination to the Son is not necessarily implied when His office is related almost entirely to the interpretation and furtherance of the revelation of God made in and by the Son. But there is nothing said about an eternal procession in the word ἐκπορεύεται (15^{26}); the temporal mission is alone in view. The coming of the Spirit is conditioned by the departure and glorification of the Son (16^{7} 7^{39}), though whether the Spirit acquired thereby 'a possibility of His inter-

[1] Cf. E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 289 f.
[2] See art. ADVOCATE, vol. i. p. 139 f., and artt. 'Paraclete' in *HDB* iii. 665 ff., *EBi* iii. 3567 ff.
[3] *DCG* i. 891[a]; cf. J. Réville, *Le Quatrième Évangile*, Paris, 1901, p. 254.
[4] *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, p. 292; cf. G. B. Stevens, *The Johannine Theology*, London, 1894, ch. viii.
[5] Titius, *NT Lehre von der Seligkeit*, iii. 102.

penetrating human nature,'[1] or death was necessary to liberate Christ's spirit from bodily and spatial limitations (Holtzmann, Loisy), is not expressly stated. Rather, the Spirit is withheld until the revelation which it is His office to explain and enforce is completed. The Spirit's relation to the Son is analogous to that of the Son to the Father. He comes not in His own name, to speak self-originated messages, but to testify to and glorify the Son, even as the Son did the Father. Within the Church the Spirit is the mode whereby the Risen Lord is yet present, and, as the 'other Paraclete,' the Spirit is a perpetual immanent teacher and exegete, a colleague in the Church's witness for Christ, convincing and convicting the world of its unbelief, wrongness, peril, and guilt ($14^{16f.\ 26}$ 15^{26} 16^{8-11}). His activity is so real and effective within the Church that all previous workings of the Spirit are, in comparison, as nothing (7^{39}), and 'from the Spirit' the individual gains the assurance that he abides in God and God abides in him (1 Jn 3^{24} 4^{13}).

LITERATURE.—The following may also be consulted: on the term 'Paraclete' ('Advocate'): J. C. Hare, *The Mission of the Comforter*[3], ed. E. H. Plumptre, London, 1876, note K; E. Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, Oxford, 1889, p. 82 f.; F. Field, *Notes on Translation of NT* (Otium Norvic. iii.), Cambridge, 1899, p. 102 f.; E. A. Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*, London, 1905, 1720 k., *Paradosis*, do. 1904, 1413 a.; B. F. Westcott, *Speaker's Comm.*, ii. [do. 1880] 211 f., add. Note to Jn 14^{16}; T. Zahn, *Das Evang. des Johannes*[2], Leipzig, 1909, p. 554.

More generally: F. J. A. Hort, *The Way, The Truth, The Life*, Cambridge and London, 1894; M. Goguel, *La Notion johannique de l'esprit*, Paris, 1902; E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*[2], Edinburgh, 1909; B. W. Bacon, *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, London, 1910; J. Moffatt, *The Theology of the Gospels*, do. 1912, ch. v.; artt. in *DCG* (J. Denney, W. R. Inge) on 'Holy Spirit,' and 'John, Gospel of,' give good bibliographies.

V. *CHURCH HISTORY AND DOCTRINE.* — Each of the great periods of Church history — the Patristic, mediæval, and Reformation—has been occupied with some aspect of this complex theme. In the first period (1st to 6th cent.) the Fathers drew the main lines of doctrine concerning the personality, deity, and procession of the Holy Spirit. That doctrine of the procession was, during the mediæval period, one of the causes which, unhappily, still sunder the Eastern and Western Churches. At the Reformation and during the modern period interest centred chiefly in the work of the Holy Spirit in redemption and sanctification, and the constitution and organization of the Christian Church. Such results as have attended these discussions are formulated in creeds, symbols, and confessions. There is, however, a striking disproportion between the place of the Holy Spirit in the formularies of the Church and in its religious experience. For the latter we must have recourse to the liturgies and hymns used in worship, to movements (Montanism, Mysticism, Quakerism) which have often been frowned upon, if not repressed, by ecclesiasticism, and religious biographies; and outside the Church philosophical discussions have modified the concepts of spirit and personality, so that there is a wide-spread conviction in the present age that the Patristic formulation in the Creeds of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is inadequate and requires to be re-moulded and re-stated in terms of modern thought. These various aspects may be grouped thus, following, so far as possible, the chronological order: (1) to the formulation of the deity and personality of the Holy Spirit in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed (to A.D. 381–451); (2) the doctrine of the Procession to the Great Schism ('Filioque' controversy); (3) distinctive developments within Roman Catholicism (to Vatican Council, A.D. 1870); (4) Reformation and post-Reformation developments; (5) the Holy Spirit in liturgies and hymnology; (6) mysticism and the Holy Spirit; (7) modern philosophy and the Holy Spirit.

1. To the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed (Chalcedon, A.D. 451).—The doctrine of the person of the Holy Spirit is part of the general Christian doctrine of God,[2] and the relations of the Holy Spirit to the other Persons, and to the Son specifically, fall for fuller consideration under the art. TRINITY. The deliberate formulation of the doctrine does not begin until the middle of the 4th cent. and could not be attempted until the Church had settled the previous question as to the divinity of Christ. The result may be at once stated. The article in the Nicene Creed, καὶ (πιστεύομεν δὲ) εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, is expanded in the so-called Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed to καὶ (πιστεύομεν δὲ) εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συνπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.[1]

We may take these two Creeds as landmarks for the historical stages of the discussion: (*a*) to A.D. 325; (*b*) 325–381 (?)

(*a*) *To A.D. 325.*—The apostolic age bequeathed to its successors four views of the Holy Spirit: (1) as an attribute of God without hypostatization; (2) as an impersonal energy or operation; (3) as a gift, expressed in impersonal terms; (4) as a Person with distinct hypostatization. The last was kept prominent before the Church by the baptismal formula,[2] the constant association of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son as the object of faith and worship, and the expositions of the faith such as meet us in the various early forms of the so-called Apostles' Creed.[3] The 2nd cent. apologists, in their polemic with heathendom, fell back upon the better-known philosophical terms, the Logos and Wisdom (*qq.v.*), to explain the creative providential operations of God in the world, and the inspiration of Scripture (OT), and, like Philo before them, found it difficult to keep the concept of Spirit distinct from that of the Logos.[4] In the early crude Christological speculations the Spirit, viewed as a divine essence, was frequently identified with the Son.[5] Gradually, however, the distinction between the Son (=pre-existent Logos) and the Spirit becomes clearer, Justin placing the Spirit third in order[6] in the divine name, Theophilus introducing the term 'Trinity' (τριάς) in a passage where Wisdom (=Spirit) is differentiated from the Logos;[7] and Athenagoras appears to have grasped the idea of the Spirit as the unifying bond of the divine life, and marks the unity and distinction of these united beings.[8] Yet he withholds the predicate θεός from the Spirit, when it is given to the Father and the Son;[9] Justin appears to rank Him with angels as objects of worship,[10] and Tatian subordinates Him to the Son as His 'minister.'[11] The same position is found in the Gnosticism (*q.v.*) of Basilides,[12] and the necessity of refuting the many Gnostic systems, by reflex action, directed attention to the inner relations within the Deity, though the Son rather than the Spirit was the main theme of consideration. Summaries of the traditional teaching of the Church were drawn up as Rules of Faith, and made the norm by which heretical doctrines were tested.[13] Irenæus, as against the

[1] W. Milligan, *The Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of Our Lord*, London, 1891, pp. 209 ff., 213.

[2] See art. GOD, vol. vi. esp. pp. 259–263.

[1] H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum*[12], Freiburg i. B., 1913, pp. 30, 38.

[2] Mt 28^{19}; cf. *Did.* vii. 1, 3; Justin Mart. *Apol.* i. $61^{3.13}$.

[3] For Old Roman Symbol cf. art. CREEDS AND ARTICLES (Ecumenical), vol. iv. p. 237b.

[4] Just. Mart. *Apol.* ii. 10; Theophilus of Antioch, *ad Autol.* i. 7, ii. 10, 15, 18, 23; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 5; cf. T. Rees, *The Holy Spirit*, London, 1915, p. 114 ff.

[5] Just. Mart. *Apol.* i. 33; Hermas, *Sim.* v. 5. 2, 6. 5, ix. 1. 1; Pseud-Clem., *ad Cor.* 9^{5} 14^{3}; cf. Iren. *adv. Hær.* v. 1, 2; Tatian, *Or. ad Græc.* 7; Tertull. *Apol.* 21, *adv. Marc.* iii. 16, 6, *de Car. Chr.* 18; see Lightfoot, *ad* Clem. Rom. ix. 4, and art. ADOPTIANISM, vol. i. p. 103b.

[6] *Apol.* i. 13, τάξις. [7] *Ad Autol.* ii. 15.

[8] *Leg.* 10. 4, 12. 2, 24. [9] *Ib.* 10.

[10] *Apol.* i. 6. [11] *Or. adv. Græc.* 18.

[12] Cf. vol. ii. p. 429.

[13] Cf. Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 10. 1, iii. 3. 1, i. 9. 4; Tert. *de Præsc. Hær.* 13, *de Vel. Virg.* 1, *adv. Prax.* ii. 9 (ed. A. Souter, London, 1920), *adv. Marc.* i. 5, 21; Origen, *de Princ.*, præf.

emanation theory of Valentinus, who placed the Son and the Holy Spirit remotely and secondarily in a syzygy, unites them with God as 'His Hands' by which He created the world,[1] and Tertullian, unlike Irenæus, does not hesitate to borrow the Gnostic term προβολή (Lat. *emissio*) to describe the mode of issue of the Son and the Spirit from God, but he guards against the notion that it implies severance, and uses the illustrations of the root, the tree, and the fruit, the fountain, the river, and the stream, the sun, the ray, and the apex, to express the processions of the Son and the Spirit from, whilst yet continuing in union with, God.[2] Against the Monarchianism (*q.v.*) of Praxeas he asserted an economical Trinity, in which the Spirit had a hypostatic distinction, being third in order, 'the third name of divinity,' the 'vicar' of the Son, to whom He is subordinate, though He is divine, since He is 'of one substance' with the Father.[3] In Sabellianism (*q.v.*) the Holy Spirit receives more mention, but He and the Father and the Son are merely phases of the successive temporal manifestations of God, who is, in Stoic fashion, by a dialectic process, extended into a Trinity and contracts into a monad again, and thereby hypostatic distinction vanishes.[4] With Paul of Samosata (*c.* 269) the Logos and the Spirit are identical, and simply properties or attributes of God, and the Spirit wrought in Jesus as a mere power or influence, 'not essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) but as a quality' (ποιότητα). The two forms of Monarchianism, the modalistic and the dynamistic, found in Sabellius and Paul of Samosata their clearest utterance, and their standpoints also indicate the rival theories, representative of heathen pantheism and Jewish monotheism respectively, which confronted the Church. Origen (*c.* A.D. 185–254) rose above the materialistic Stoical view of Tertullian,[5] for to him the Holy Spirit was no mere influence, but 'an intellectual substance,' 'an energetic essence but not an energy,'[6] but in his freer speculations he regarded the Spirit, like Tertullian, as subordinate to the Son. Discussing the passage 'all things were made by Him' (*sc.* the Logos, Jn 1[3]), he throws out three possible views: (*a*) that the Spirit was made by the Logos; or (*b*) was 'ungenerate' (ἀγέννητον[7]), like the Father; or (*c*) has no proper essence (οὐσία) beyond the Father and the Son. He inclines to (*a*), allowing that the Spirit is in honour and rank above all other creatures, but younger than and inferior to the Son, whom He needs for both subsistence and attributes.[8] As Westcott observed, the temporal manifestation, and not the essential immanence, of the Trinity is in view.[9] Elsewhere Origen had pointed out that Scripture had nowhere clearly indicated whether the Spirit is to be regarded as born or (like the Father) 'ungenerate,' as also whether He was a Son or not.[10] But a different note is heard when he states that he found no passage in Scripture asserting that He is a creature, and that in the Rule of Faith the Spirit is associated with the Father and the Son in dignity and honour, and that there can be nothing greater or less within the Trinity.[11] Both these views came into collision in the next century, the subordinationism finding expression in Dionysius of Alexandria († A.D. 265) and Eusebius of Cæsarea (A.D. 264–340),[12] the other, based on Scripture and tradition, passing by way of Gregory of Neocæsarea († A.D. 270) —who spoke of the Spirit as 'having His subsistence from the Father'[13] and 'above creaturely state or servitude, co-eternal, equal in sovereignty, and ever with the Son'[14]—to Athanasius and thence to the great Cappadocians, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa. Yet Origen prepared the way for the ultimate solution by his doctrine of the generation of the Son as an eternal immanent relation within the Godhead, which explained the consubstantiality of the Son and the Father, and then, by inference, of the Spirit with both.

(*b*) *To A.D. 325–381.*—Before dealing with that solution, we must briefly outline the outward history within this period. Although Arius in his *Thalia* regarded the Trinity as composed of persons whose glories and essences differed infinitely,[15] another generation passed before the question concerning the Spirit's place in the Godhead was definitely considered. The various Arian and semi-Arian synods held between 340 and 360 mentioned the Spirit in their creeds, but confined their attention to His work in the main, admitted His personal existence, anathematized those who regarded Him as a part of God, or, in Sabellian fashion, confused Him with the Father and the Son,[16] but went no further than affirming a unity of agreement between the 'Persons' of the Trinity, and hesitated about assigning the predicate of deity to the Spirit.[17] But about A.D. 358 in Egypt, and a few years later in Asia Minor, under the influence of a deposed bishop of Constantinople, Macedonius, and his follower, Marathonius, the doctrine was widely disseminated, reaching the West in a short time, that the Spirit 'was simply a creature, a servant of the Son, one of the ministering spirits, differing only in degree from the angels.'[18] They were variously styled Macedonians, Marathonians, 'Pneumatomachoi,' and, by Athanasius, the 'Tropicoi,' because they interpreted Scripture passages as τροποί, 'metaphors.' At once this view was assailed by synods, orations, and the pen. At Alexandria, in 362 and 363, it was anathematized, and the deity, consubstantiality,[19] and the duty of glorifying the Spirit with the Father and Son were enjoined.[20] In the West a series of councils were held in Rome (A.D. 369–380),[21] adopting the same course, and a letter from Pope Damasus expressing Western opinion was endorsed by no fewer than 146 Eastern bishops at Antioch in A.D. 378. Finally in 381, at Constantinople, a council (later recognized as the 2nd ecumenical) was held, at which the Nicene Creed was confirmed, the Macedonians anathematized, the worship of the Spirit as co-equal with the Father and the Son enjoined by imperial decree (and rigorously enforced by a subscription test two years later).[22] The decisions, however, rested on weightier support than the imperial fiat. Athanasius (*q.v.*), the great Cappadocian triumvirate,[23] Didymus the Blind, and Epiphanius had written treatises or produced orations refuting the Mace-

[1] *Adv. Hær.* iv. præf. 4; cf. *ib.* 7. 4.
[2] *Adv. Prax.* 7, 8, 25.
[3] *Ib.* 9, 30, *de Præsc. Hær.* 13, *adv. Prax.* 2 (ed. A. Souter, London, 1920); cf. *ERE* vi. 261[a].
[4] Epiphanius, *Hær.* 62; Basil. *Epp.* 210. 5, 214. 5; Athanasius, *Or. c. Arian*, iv. 12, 25.
[5] Cf. Tert. *de Anima*, 5–9.
[6] *De Princ.* I. i. 3; frag. 37, ed. A. E. Brooke, *The Commentary of Origen on S. John's Gospel*, Cambridge, 1896, ii. 252.
[7] For this term cf. art. EUNOMIANISM, vol. v. p. 575[a]; Suicer, *Thes.*, Amsterdam, 1682, pp. 49–53.
[8] *In Joan.* ii. 10 [6]. [9] *DCB* iv. 136[b].
[10] *De Princ.*, præf. [11] *Ib.* I. iii. 7; præf., 4.
[12] *Expositio Fidei* (*PG* x. 985 f.).
[13] *Ib.*, *ad fin.* [14] Athan. *de Syn.* 15.
[15] Cf. Athan. *de Syn.* §§ 23–30; for creeds see Hahn-Harnack, *Bibliothek der Symbole*[3], Breslau, 1897, pp. 183–209.
[16] Cf. 2nd Conf. of Antioch, A.D. 341, and the 'Macrostich,' A.D. 345.
[17] Athan. *Ep. ad Serap.* i. 1; cf. art. MACEDONIANISM, vol. viii. p. 225.
[18] So Soc. *HE* iii. 7. [19] Athan. *ad Jovian.* 4.
[20] Cf. Hefele, *Conciliengesch.*[2], Freiburg i. B., 1873–90, i. 739–743.
[21] For the question as to the validity of the Council and whether the creed which bears its name actually emanated from it cf. artt. COUNCILS AND SYNODS, vol. iv. p. 190[b], CREEDS AND ARTICLES (Ecumenical), vol. iv. p. 239 f.
[22] See art. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY.

donians and Eunomianism (*q.v.*), and worked out a doctrine of the Trinity. We summarize their conclusions so far as they bear upon the deity and personality of the Holy Spirit. That the Spirit is a living being is assumed because scarcely questioned. Yet Gregory of Nazianzus discusses every possible view. The Spirit either is a self-subsisting substance, or subsists in another as an accident, or in God. If an accident, He would be an activity of God, actuated but not active, and ceasing to be when the activity ceased. If a substance (οὐσία), He is either a creature of God or God. But Scripture says that He is active, 'working,' 'speaking,' 'separating,' etc., so He is more than an energy, an accident of God; and, since also we believe in Him and are perfected in Him, He is no creature, but is included in the idea of God. Therefore in substance He must be God, otherwise a creature *essentially* different from the divine would be intruded within the Trinity, and the unity of the Trinity would be disrupted. And it were blasphemous to worship a creature.[1] Further, the predicates of eternity and omnipresence ascribed by Scripture (Ac 5^3, 1 Co $2^{10f.}$ 3^{16} 12^{14}, 2 Co 3^{14-18} 13^{14}, 1 Jn 4^{13}, Mt 28^{19}, Gn 1^2 most cited) to the Spirit, His glorious titles, His innate underived goodness and holiness, His operations in creation and redemption—*e.g.*, perfecting angels, quickening, liberating, sanctifying, 'deifying' men and uniting them to God—are properties and prerogatives of no creature but of God alone, and so the Spirit must be divine.[2] Again, since the working of the Spirit is similar to that of the Father and the Son, that similarity argues a community of essence.[3] Indeed the working of the Godhead is one, and, as the grace of the Father through the Son is completed in the Spirit, 'the Spirit is conjoined with and inseparable from the Father and Son in every operation.'[4] The Spirit is the perfecting cause in the united threefold divine working, and to reject the Spirit is to make faith in the Son impossible, to frustrate the blessings conveyed in baptism, to forfeit one's sonship.[5] That conjunction and co-operation imply coequality, and the numerical order of names in the baptismal formula implies connumeration, not subnumeration (*συναρίθμησις, ὑπαρίθμησις*) or subordination.[6] Further, since the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, 'His very own,' He stands related to the Son as the Son to the Father, *i.e.* consubstantially and inseparably, and is in God by virtue of being in the Son, who is also in God.[7] Therefore the Holy Spirit is rightly included in the Godhead, and to be worshipped and glorified with the Father and the Son as divine.[8]

It is not within our province to discuss the Scriptural exegesis which supplies the material, and the Neo-Platonic metaphysics which furnishes the formal, principles of this argumentation. But, before proceeding to the next section, it is imperative to keep in mind that the 'personality' predicated of the Holy Spirit, as of the others in the Trinity, is not the modern concept of a self-cönscious, self-determining ego. Rather, 'the three subjects ranked neither as separate persons, nor as attributes of the real divine being, but as three special bearers or independent *foci* of all attributes and activities of their common divinity, and also of a peculiar and characteristic property.'[9]

2. The doctrine of the Procession (Filioque controversy). — We divide this section, which covers a thousand years, into two parts: (*a*) the divergence between the Eastern and Western Churches in doctrine, and (*b*) its conciliar expression.

(*a*) The Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed, after asserting in Scriptural phrases the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, formulated, in the clause *τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον*, that wherein He is differentiated from them. As 'ungeneracy' (*ἀγεννησία*) denotes the special characteristic of the Father as having the divine essence within and from Himself, so 'generation' (*γέννησις*) and 'procession' (*ἔκπεμψις, ἐκπόρευσις*) denote the special characteristic of the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively, as they eternally derive their being from the one fount of deity.[1] As against the Macedonians 'procession' implies that the Spirit is not a creature, and also evades the Eunomian dilemma that He is either 'ungenerate' or 'generate,' whilst the combination of Scriptural passages (Jn 15^{26}, 1 Co 2^{12})[2] in the formula removed the ground for complaint often urged against the unscriptural Nicene term *ὁμοούσιος*. The relation of the Spirit to the Son is not dealt with in the original form of this Symbol. The Greek Fathers of this period at times touch the matter. They appear to shrink from using the term 'procession' of the Spirit's timeless relation to the Son, sometimes using Jn 16^{14}, 'receiving from the Son,' in that connexion (so Athanasius and Epiphanius), at other times drawing a distinction between the egress of the Son and Spirit, the former being immediately, the latter mediately through the Son, from the Father. This distinction, shaped by Gregory of Nyssa,[3] became the typical Eastern formula.[4] And yet, in other passages, the Son and the Father appear as conjoined in the origination of the Holy Spirit[5] —a view which is never directly opposed for four centuries, except by Theodore of Mopsuestia († 429) and Theodoret († 458).[6]

In the West another direction was taken. Hilary (*c.* 360) had asked, without answering, the question whether the Spirit's receiving from the Son differed in meaning from the Spirit's proceeding from the Father (Jn 16^{14} 15^{26}), and Ambrose († 397) regarded the terms as parallel, though he did not teach the doctrine of an eternal procession from the Son.[7] It was Augustine, Ambrose's pupil, who laid down the doctrine of the dual procession, *i.e.* that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, who together (and not, as in Greek theology, the Father solely) constitute the *principium* of the Spirit.

Not that they constitute two *principia*, as the Easterns later alleged, or that He proceeds from them as they are hypostatically distinct, but 'secundum hoc quod unum sunt . . . sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus et ad creaturam relative unus creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum sanctum unum principium.'[8]

He deduces the doctrine from Scripture, from the 'insufflation' in Jn 10^{22}.[9] Augustine had perceived that in the doctrine of the Trinity, as taught by the Greeks, subordination was not thoroughly excluded so long as the 'procession' of the Spirit was regarded as serial from the Father to and through the Son; so he reconstructed that

[1] *The Five Theological Orations*, ed. A. J. Mason, Cambridge, 1899, v. 6; Athan. *ad Serap.* i. 17, 20, iii. 6; Gregory Naz. § 10.
[2] Athan. *ad Serap.* i. 23 ff., iii. 3; Basil, *de Spir. Sanct.* chs. 9, 16, 19, 24; Gregory Naz. *Theol. Orat.* v. 14, 28, 33; Didymus, *de Trin.* ii.; cf. Nicetas of Remesiana (A. E. Burn, Cambridge, 1905), *de Sp. S.* v.[6c] xviii.
[3] Basil, *Ep.* 189.
[4] Athan. *ad Serap.* i. 14; Basil, *de Spir. Sanct.* 16 [38].
[5] Basil, *de Spir. Sanct.* 10–12, 15.
[6] *Ib.* 9, 18; cf. Greg. Naz. *Theol. Orat.* v. 19.
[7] Athan. *ad Serap.* i. 27 *f.*, 25 *ad fin.*, 27, iii. 5, iv. 3; Basil, *de Spir. Sanct.* 17 (43), 18 (45), *Ep.* 38[4].
[8] See, further, artt. ATHANASIUS, vol. ii. p. 172; CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, vol. iii. p. 212 *f.*; and TRINITY.
[9] F. Nitzsch, *Evang. Dogm.*, Freiburg i. B., 1889–92, ii. 415; quoted by W. P. Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*[2], London, 1912, p. 218, n. 2.

[1] Greg. Naz. *Or.* xxxix. 12, xxv., *Theol. Orat.* v. 8; Greg. Nys. *adv. Eun.* 1; cf., on the term, Suicer, p. 1068 *f.*
[2] See Hort, *Two Dissertations*, Cambridge, 1876, p. 86, n. 4.
[3] See vol. iii. p. 214[b].
[4] Cf. John Dam. *de Fide Orthod.* i. 12.
[5] Greg. Naz. *Or.* xxxvii., *τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνημμένον*; Did. Alex. *de Spir. Sanct.* §§ 31–37; Epiph. *Ancor.* ix. 69 *f.*, *παρ' ἀμφοτέρων, ib.* 73, *ἐκ, παρὰ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ*;
[6] See art. ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY, vol. i. p. 586.
[7] *De Spir. Sanct.* ii. 11.
[8] *De Trin.* v. 14.
[9] *Ib.* iv. 29 (*PL* xlii. 908); *Tract. in Joann.* xcix. 7 *ff.*

doctrine and conceived of the Trinity as an eternal reciprocity of relations.

'Semper atque inseparabiliter, . . . simul in invicem, neuter solus, . . . quia unum sunt relative.'[1]

In that eternal mutual relation the spirit is the mutual love of both the Father and the Son, the harmony of their unity and equality, their communion, essential holiness, very nature and substance.[2] This doctrine of the dual procession permeated the Western Church and eventually found expression in the inserted clause 'Filioque' in Latin translations of the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed.

(*b*) *'Filioque' Controversy* (*conciliar*).—This controversy strictly belongs to ecclesiastical history and not to the history of doctrine, but, for completeness, a brief outline is given. The first recorded mention of the insertion of the 'Filioque' clause appears in connexion with the Council at Toledo (A.D. 589) on the occasion of King Reccared's conversion from Arianism.[3] The interpolated creed was popular in Spain, France, and England, but not even Charlemagne could induce Leo III. to authorize its adoption in Rome (802). The innovation of this teaching was one of the counts of Photius's indictment against the Western Church in A.D. 866, which led to a rupture three years later. Not until A.D. 1017 did the interpolation receive official sanction at Rome, by Benedict VIII., and this was followed by the schism in 1054. At Bari, in 1099, Anselm of Canterbury produced his treatise on this theme; but not till the 2nd Council of Lyons (1274) did re-union appear practicable. An agreement was reached, explaining the dual procession as 'not from two *principia* but one *principium*, by one "spiration" and not two,' but attempts to enforce the agreement met with violent resistance in the Eastern Churches. Again at Ferrara-Florence, 1439,[4] a formula was reached in which the Greeks accepted *Filioque* as =*per Filium*. But synodal letters revoked the agreement in 1442 and 1453, and the following year the Eastern Church was under the rule of the Turk. At Bonn (1875) the Old Catholics attempted to heal the long-running sore, but the results reached lack official recognition.[5]

LITERATURE.—On the Patristic doctrine the best work in English is by H. B. Swete, art. 'Holy Ghost,' in *DCB* iii. 118 ff.; see also his *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, London, 1912. Good introductions and summaries may be found in A. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, iv. 108–137; G. Thomasius, *Dogmengesch.*, Erlangen, 1874, i. 236–262; see also F. J. A. Hort, *Two Dissertations*, Cambridge, 1876; H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], Cambridge, 1900; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Introd. to the Early Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, London, 1903, pp. 197–238.

On the history of the doctrine of the procession see the bibliography in *DCB* iii. 133. The standard works are: J. G. Walch, *Hist. Controversiæ Græcorum Latinorumque de Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Jena, 1751; H. B. Swete, *The Hist. of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, Cambridge, 1876.

3. **Later Roman Catholic developments.**—These developments, so far as they concern the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, bear upon His work in the inspiration of Scripture and tradition, and as guaranteeing the infallibility of the pope when pronouncing *ex cathedra* the doctrines implicit in the sources of revelation. The former was dealt with at the Tridentine Council (A.D. 1545–1563), the latter at the Vatican (A.D. 1870). Before narrating the developments, a brief résumé of the previous history of opinion may fitly be inserted here. The organ of the Holy Spirit's utterances was regarded by the sub-apostolic age as supremely the OT,[1] and until the disappearance of prophets towards the end of the 2nd cent. A.D. their presence within the Church visibly attested the Spirit's rule and guidance.[2] The excesses of ecstatic prophecy in Montanism (*q.v.*), and its protest against ecclesiastical laxity, provoked a reaction and strengthened episcopal organization, and henceforth the episcopacy was regarded as alone possessing a 'charism,' as the custodian of unwritten, apostolic tradition, and the bond of Church unity.[3] Against the heresies of the 2nd and 3rd centuries these traditions were used, along with and equal to NT Scriptures, as standards of doctrine; and the presence of bishops in general councils made possible the famous canon of tradition, as 'quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est.'[4] The general councils were held to be specially inspired by the Holy Spirit,[5] Gregory the Great († 604) even ranking the first four general councils as equal in authority to the four Gospels,[6] and with this the East was in accord.[7] One strong objection, indeed, of the Eastern Church to the interpolation of 'Filioque' was that it lacked ecumenical sanction. This is not the place to narrate the long struggles between East and West over papal supremacy, and between the Western Councils[8] and the popes as to the seat of authority. In sum, the papacy had become virtually an absolutism under the form of a constitutional monarchy, and the Reformers (see below) challenged the entire system. At Trent it was decreed that unwritten traditions were equal in authority with the written Scriptures, since they had come down in unbroken succession from the apostles, who had received them from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Holy Spirit's dictation; that the OT Apocrypha is canonical; that only the Holy Mother Church can authoritatively interpret and judge the true sense of Scripture, limited by the unanimous consent of the Fathers; that the Latin Vulgate is the authentic form of Scripture for preaching controversies, etc.[9] Although the Holy Spirit was supposed to preside at the sessions, only rarely is any decree made alluding to His prompting;[10] and the question whether the pope was the ultimate repository of tradition was adroitly evaded. Bellarmine, however († 1621), threw out the idea that the word of the Church, *i.e.* either of a Council or of the pope teaching *ex cathedra*, was no mere word of man, liable to error, but in some mode (*aliquo modo*) God's word, *i.e.* put forth by the assistance and governance of the Holy Spirit.[11] The papacy of Pius IX. (1846–78) marks the enactment of that view. His first encyclical (Nov. 1846) asserted infallibility, as also the declaration of the immaculate conception (1854);[12] he asserted that 'la tradizione sono io,' and the Vatican Council, while limiting the exposition of revelation or the deposit of faith so as not to declare new doctrines,[13] pronounced it as a 'divinely revealed dogma' that,

1 Cf. *Ep.* 238[12ff.] (*PL* xxxiii. 1043), *de Trin.* vi. 9 *fb.* (xlii. 929).

2 *De Trin.* v. 12 (*PL* xlii. 919), vi. 5 (*ib.* 927), xv. 27 (*ib.* 1080), *de Christ. Doct.* i. 5, *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 24; see, further, vol. vi. p. 262 f. and vol. iv. p. 240[b].

3 But cf. art. CREEDS AND ARTICLES (Ecumenical), vol. iv. p. 240[a], and A. E. Burn, 'Some Spanish MSS. of the Constantinopolitan Creed,' in *JThSt* ix. [1908] 301 ff.

4 Cf. vol. iv. p. 199.

5 See, further, art. GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH, vol. vi. pp. 426 f., 432 f.

1 Clem. Rom. *ad Cor.* 45; Barnabas, etc.

2 Cf. *Did.* xi.; Hermas, *Mand.* xi.; Barnabas, 16[9]; cf. Harnack, *TU* ii. 123 f.

3 Iren. *adv. Hær.* iii. 18, iv. 26. 2; Cyprian, *de Unit. Eccl.* ch. 4.

4 Vincent of Lerins (A.D. 434), *Common.* ch. 2.

5 Cf. artt. COUNCILS AND SYNODS, vol. iv. p. 190 f., BIBLE IN THE CHURCH, vol. ii. p. 590.

6 *Ep.* i. 24.

7 Cf. John Dam. *de Fid. Orth.* i. 1, iv. 16 f.

8 *E.g.*, of Constance, 1414–18; see artt. COUNCILS AND SYNODS, vol. iv. p. 198, GALLICANISM, vol. vi. p. 161[b].

9 Sess. iv. v.

10 Cf., *e.g.*, sess. vi. pref., xxi. 1.

11 *De Verb. Dei*, iii. 10.

12 Cf. Lord Acton, *The Hist. of Freedom and other Essays*, London, 1907, p. 499; W. Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, ii. 295 ff.

13 *De Eccl. Christi*, ch. iv.[3]

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'when the Roman pontiff speaks *ex cathedra* . . . by the Divine assistance promised to him in the blessed Peter (Lk 22^{32} is usually meant), he possesses that power of infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be furnished in defining doctrine on faith or morals. . . .'[1] Thereby 'the infallible authority of the Council infallibly created the infallible authority of the Pope, and by that Act died,'[2] and the teaching office of the Spirit was confined to the pope, and, through him, the Roman hierarchy.

LITERATURE.—See art. COUNCILS AND SYNODS, vol. iv. p. 203, and add H. E. Manning, *The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*[2], London, 1899; W. Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, 2 vols., do. 1912; G. P. Fisher, *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*[2], Edinburgh, 1897 (for good summary of Fessler's exposition of the dogma of infallibility); W. P. Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*[2], London, 1912, ch. i.

4. The Reformers and their successors.—With the Reformation the work of the Holy Spirit in the personal experience of believers was brought into the foreground. Both the formal and the material principles of the Reformation — the sufficiency of Scripture alone without the accretion of tradition, and justification by faith—were based upon the illuminating regenerating operations of the Spirit. Scripture had its authority, not from the Church, of which rather it was the norm and touchstone, but from the Holy Spirit, for, as Luther (1483–1546) said, it was 'the book, writing and word of the Holy Spirit,' and of that he was certain, because 'the Holy Ghost also writes it inwardly in the heart.'[3] Of that certainty,[4] both as to Scripture and as to the subjective assurance of election, Calvin (1509–64) was the chief exponent. It was a self-evident persuasion, wrought by the 'inward testimony of the Holy Spirit,' lifting the mind above doubts, hesitations, and scruples as to the truth of the Scripture; a persuasion superior to reason, needing no external arguments, for the Spirit that spoke in the prophets still speaks in the hearts of believers.[5] But against the Anabaptists (*q.v.*), who claimed the Spirit's inspiration for their visions, Calvin and the various confessions restricted the Spirit's operation to the Word of God, and thus prepared the way, in the absence of a reasoned theory of inspiration, for the later Protestant legalism,[6] which could assert that the consonants and vowel points of the Hebrew OT were inspired.[7] From this new Babylonian bondage to the letter deliverance came —to the heart, with the spread of Pietism (*q.v.*), under Spener († 1705) and Francke († 1727), who deeply influenced Moravianism, and thus the Evangelical Revival in England under Wesley, and to the mind, through the spread of Biblical criticism.[8] That the Quakers are in the line of the Reformers, notwithstanding the criticisms of John Owen and Richard Hooker, can be seen from George Fox's word in Lancaster court-house (1652):

'The Holy Scriptures were given forth by the Spirit of God, and all people must first come to the Spirit of God in themselves, by which they might know God and Christ, of whom the prophets and apostles learnt, and by the same Spirit know the Holy Scriptures; for as the Spirit of God was in them that gave forth the Scriptures, so the same Spirit of God must be in all them that come to understand the Scriptures.'[9]

All the various Protestant types agree as to the need for the Spirit's work in regeneration, but differ, owing to their anthropological views as to the extent of man's corruption, concerning the degree of this influence and the place of the human element in salvation. We cannot here go into the details distinguishing Lutherans, Calvinists, and Arminians.[1] Luther's beautiful language may be taken as typical:

'I believe that it is not of my own reason or by my own strength that I believe in Jesus Christ my Lord: it is the Holy Ghost that by the Gospel has called me, with His gifts has enlightened me, through genuine faith has sanctified and sustained me, just as He calls, gathers together, enlightens, sanctifies, and sustains by Jesus Christ, in true proper faith, all Christendom.'[2]

Both Luther and Calvin derive much from Augustine's doctrine of grace, for which Calvin preferred to use the term 'Spirit of God,' thus avoiding the nuance of quasi-physical-force which clings to Augustine's thought and the mediæval sacramental theory of grace. He more closely connected the Holy Spirit with Jesus Christ:

'The Holy Spirit is the bond by which Christ efficaciously binds us to Himself,' it is the efficient cause of salvation creating faith 'by which he (*sc.* the believer) receives Christ,' and 'where the Spirit illumines to faith Christ inserts us within His body and we become partakers of all goods.'[3]

The instruments used by the Spirit are the Word of God, read or preached, and the sacraments, which are regarded as 'visible words, pictures of the word, signifying what the word proclaims.'[4] The retention of infant-baptism, however, scarcely accords with the condition of Church fellowship, which is 'principaliter societas fidei et Spiritus sancti in cordibus,'[5] and it was left to Anabaptists and Quakers to protest against this inconsistency.[6] The effect of the Spirit's working is faith, defined by Calvin as 'a certain and steady knowledge of the Divine benevolence towards us, revealed to our minds and sealed to our hearts by the Holy Spirit.'[7] Personal assurance as a part of saving faith, emphasized by early Reformers,[8] was ultimately dropped by their successors, though revived by the early Methodists.[9] Human co-operation with the Spirit in conversion was practically denied by the deterministic thought of Luther[10] and Calvin. Melanchthon, however, asserted three conjoint causes — the Word, the Holy Spirit, and man's will (the latter weakened by the Fall), and initiated the controversy over Synergism (*q.v.*); but later the human factor had freer play with ethical gain in the doctrines of Arminianism and Amyraldism (*qq.v.*).

As regards the person of the Holy Spirit, the traditional views were accepted by the Reformers, with the exception of the Socinians, who revived Arianism (*q.v.*), taking the ascriptions of personal activities in the NT as figures of speech, and the Spirit of God as a property of God without hypostatization.[11] Although Socinianism called forth a copious literature in opposition, the arguments for the Spirit's personality marked no advance upon Patristic discussions.[12]

Leaving the historical confessional formulation of the Spirit's person and work, we now turn to the presentation of the Holy Spirit as an experi-

[1] Cf. T. Granderath, *Constitutiones Dogmaticæ Sacros. Œcum. Conc. Vat.*, Freiburg i. B., 1892, pars. 11, 'Const. de Eccl.' iv.[5]; the decree is given fully in vol. iv. p. 842[a].
[2] A. Sabatier, p. 6.
[3] J. Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.*[2], 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1901, ii. 7, Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1897, ii. 226–253; Luther, *Sämmtliche Werke*, Erlangen, 1826–57, xxiii. 250.
[4] See art. CERTAINTY (Religious), vol. iii. p. 825 f.
[5] *Inst.* bk. i. ch. vii. §§ 2–5.
[6] Cf. art BIBLIOLATRY, vol. ii. p. 616 (*f*).
[7] *Cons. Helvet.*, 1675, art 2.
[8] Cf. E. Reuss, *Hist. du canon des saints Ecritures*[2], Strassburg, 1864, chs. xvi.–xvii.; A. Sabatier, p. 204 f.
[9] *The Journal of George Fox*, London, 1901, i. 133; see also R. Barclay, *Apology for the True Christian Religion*, London, 1678, prop. iii.

[1] The various elements in their Confessions can be readily seen in J. G. B. Winer's *Doctrines and Confessions of Christendom*, ed. W. B. Pope, Edinburgh, 1873.
[2] *Cat. Min.*, art. iii.; see also R. Otto, *Die Anschauung von dem heil. Geiste bei Luther*, Göttingen, 1898.
[3] *Inst.* bk. III. ch. i. §§ 1, 4, ch. ii. § 35.
[4] *Apol. Conf. Aug.* art. vii. § 5; *Inst.* iv. xiv. 10, 17, xvii. 10.
[5] *Apol. Conf. Aug.* art. vi. § 5.
[6] See art. BAPTISM, vol. ii. pp. 400–405, for a fuller discussion.
[7] *Inst.* III. ii. 7. [8] Cf. Luther on Gal 2^{16}.
[9] Cf. W. Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1862, essay iii., and art. METHODISM.
[10] Cf. R. Seeberg, *Dogmengesch.*, Leipzig, 1895–98, ii. 227.
[11] F. Socinus, *Responsio ad libellum Jac. Wuieki*, cap. x.; *Cat. Racov.* cap. 6, qu. 12.
[12] Cf. Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed*, London, 1659, art. viii., and notes in vol. ii. pp. 259–262, ed. E. Burton, Oxford, [3]1847.

ence. The remaining sections will treat that experience, normally as exhibited in liturgies and hymnology, distinctively and peculiarly as manifested in mysticism, and critically in the light of modern philosophical discussions of the concept of personality.

5. The Holy Spirit in liturgies and hymnology.—In the cultus of the Christian Church the Holy Spirit has been from the first an object of worship, with His appropriate festival of Pentecost,[1] special seasons (as baptism, the eucharist, anointing, confirmation, ordination [*qq.v.*]), when His presence and operation were invoked, and distinctive organs through whom He was mediated to the Church. In the apostolic age the eucharist was followed by what was practically the celebration of His 'real presence' within the Church.[2] His operation was represented in diverse fashion: as a sanctifying influence operating as a physical force upon the waters of baptism, and expelling the dragon therefrom,[3] as a magic power passing through the oil of unction into the body and soul of the anointed, imparting divine life, removing the traces of sin, charming away invisible evil spirits, producing gladness and making men 'christs.'[4] Or He comes as light, and the baptized become 'illuminati' and 'see things beyond man's ordinary vision,'[5] as a 'seal,' stamping the divine image upon the soul, giving it a 'character,' later regarded as indelible,[6] which served as a mark of identification for aiding angels on earth and the last Judgment in heaven, and as a potent amulet against the devil.[7] At the 'epiclesis' in the eucharist (*q.v.*) His coming shows forth (ἀποφήνῃ), changes, and sanctifies the elements,[8] and the prevailing Greek view was that thereby the holy food became 'the medicine of immortality.'[9] At the laying on of hands in confirmation and the ordination of bishops, presbyters, etc., the Holy Spirit came to be thought of as conveyed by physical contact.[10] Yet with all this materialistic and magical terminology, borrowed from the OT and mystery-religions, the religious instinct prevented the more spiritual view of the Holy Spirit as working in the mind and conscience of men from fading altogether away, and there were never wanting voices to assert that the Spirit was not tied to the sacraments, that faith and penitence were indispensable for the acquisition of the Spirit, that the agencies who conferred Him were not fontal but only ministerial, and that He was no impersonal gift but a living being. To these things the hymns of the Church universal give ample witness. Passing by the early doxologies, we may note the beautiful expression of the Spirit's influence in the recently discovered *Odes and Psalms of Solomon*:[11] near as the wings of a dove to its brood (28^{12}), opening the soul as spring softens the hard clods (11), playing as a harpist upon the soul (6^{1-4}), prompting praise and teaching His ways (36^{1-4} $3^{11f.}$). Another Syrian singer, Ephraem of Edessa (*c.* 378), warns against too much scrutiny as to the Spirit's subsistence. 'Love the brooding of the Holy Spirit and approach not to pry into Him.'[1] The Latin hymn-writers, however, did not hesitate to set their doctrines to hymns, the dual procession, the Spirit as the bond of the Trinity, as the mutual love of the Godhead, finding frequent expression.[2] Impressive in its simple majesty is the solitary line of the *Te Deum*, 'Sanctum quoque Paraclitum Spiritum'; and, however the inclusion of the *Quicumque Vult* in the service-books of Western Churches, Roman Catholic and Protestant, is regarded, it at least kept in the foreground the personality and deity of the Spirit. Two noble hymns from the 9th and 11th centuries—the 'Veni Creator Spiritus' and 'Veni Sancte Spiritus'[3]—have served as models for most modern hymns dealing with the Spirit's work as experienced by devout believers. And, although Ritschl's criticism of Lutheran hymns for Pentecost, that little mention is made of the Spirit as the creator of a common consciousness and corporate fellowship within the Church[4] and 'a purely individual self-contemplation' is disproportionately emphasized, is applicable to most hymns, nevertheless the outburst of hymnody has created Churches, stimulated revivals, overflowed ecclesiastical boundaries, and, along with prayer, kept the Spirit's regenerating, renewing, consoling, teaching, guiding work before the Church, checked the crass materialism which ceremonialism undoubtedly fosters, as it has borne witness also that the Spirit ever indwells the Church.[5]

6. Mysticism and the Holy Spirit.—The mystics in their quest for an intense awareness of the Divine Presence meet with a response which they interpret as the direct action of the Spirit of God upon the human spirit. Various are the signs denoting the Spirit's activity—ecstasy,[6] glossolaly,[7] a fecundity of ideas which fall thick and fast as snowflakes on the mind,[8] emotional enthusiasm,[9] an inflow of divine love strengthening the will,[10] an accession of new vigour so that 'the operations of the soul entirely united to God, are all divine,'[11] and especially noble fortitude in martyrdom.[12] More generally the Spirit's coming is seen in the enhancement of the mental powers, purging 'the eye of the soul'[13] so that the hidden meaning of Scripture grows plain[14] and the mysteries of Christianity become clear. Thus Tertullian, the Montanist, claims that the Paraclete is the institutor of a new discipline, making the Catholic faith better known, clearing up obscurities and equivocations in Scripture, and reforming the intellect.[15] Origen

[1] See artt. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian), vol. v. p. 847, 'Pentecost' in *DCA*, p. 1618 f.

[2] Cf. L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship: its Origin and Evolution*[4], Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 43.

[3] Tertullian, *de Bapt.* v.; Cyril Jer. *Cat. Lect.* iii. 3.

[4] Cyr. Jer. xx. 3, xxi. 1 ff.; Methodius, *Con.* viii. 3.

[5] Justin Mart. *Apol.* i. 61; Cyr. Jer. xvi. 16.

[6] Augustine, *contra Ep. Parm.* ii. 13; Conc. Trid. sess. vii. 'de Sac. in genere,' can. ix.

[7] Cyr. Jer. xvii. 35, i. 2.

[8] *Apost. Const.* viii. 12, § 17; Cyr. Jer. xxiii. 7; *Liturg. Jacob.* xxxii.; *Liturg. Marc.* xvii.

[9] Ignatius, *Eph.* 20; Irenæus, iv. 33. 1; Greg. Nys. *Orat. Cat.* 37.

[10] Tertullian, *de Res. Carn.* 8; Cyprian, *Epp.* lxxiii. 7 f. (Oxford ed. lxxiv. 7 f.); pseudo-Cyprian, *de Aleat.* 3; Cyr. Jer. xvi. 26; *Apost. Const.* viii.; Augustine, *de Bapt. c. Donat.* iii. 16; *Catech. Rom.* pars. ii. ch. iii. qu. 24, ed. Florence, 1718; cf. Anglican Prayer Book at ordination of bishops.

[11] Ed. J. Rendel Harris[2], Cambridge, 1911.

[1] *Select Works*, tr. J. B. Morris, Oxford, 1847, p. 400 *f.*

[2] Cf. Paulinus of Nola, *Nat.* 9; Prudentius, *Cathem. Hy.* 5, v. 159; Adam of St. Victor, in H. A. Daniel, *Thesaurus Hymnologicus*, Leipzig, 1841–56, vol. ii. hy. 90[2].

[3] *Ap.* Daniel, i. 306, ii. 37.

[4] *Hist. of the Christian Doct. of Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1872, p. 328.

[5] For the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in liturgies cf. A. J. Maclean, *The Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, ch. vii.; Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 157 *f.*; for Anglican Prayer Book cf. art. 'Holy Spirit,' in *Prayer-Book Dictionary*, ed. G. Harford, etc., London, 1912; cf. art. 'Hymnody,' in *CE* vii. 596 *f.*, where further literature is cited.

[6] Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* iv. 22; cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* vi. ix. 8 ff.; Bernard, *de Consid.* v. 11.

[7] Ignatius, *Phil.* 7; cf. exx. in G. N. Bonwetsch, *Gesch. des Montanismus*, Erlangen, 1881, p. 197 ff. for Montanism; and artt. CAMISARDS, IRVING AND THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH

[8] Philo, *de Migr. Abr.* 7; Mme. Guyon, *Autobiography*, Eng. tr., Bristol, 1773, pt. ii. ch. 21.

[9] Cf. John of Ruysbroeck, *Vie et Gestes* (*Œuvres*, vol. i.), Paris, 1909, pp. 115, 119 ff., 123.

[10] Augustine, *de Spir. et Litt.* 49, on Ro 5^5; Richard of St. Victor, *de Contemp.* v. 5.

[11] John of the Cross, *Montée du Mt. Carmel*, French tr., Paris, 1866, iii. 1, Eng. tr., London, 1906, iii. 1, § 6.

[12] Cf. *Passio Perpetua et Felicitas*; Eusebius, *HE* v. 16 *f.*

[13] Cf. Clem. Alex. *Pæd.* i. 6. 28; Augustine, *Conf.* vii. 8, 10.

[14] Cf. art. ALLEGORY.

[15] *De Monog.* 2, *adv. Prax.* 2, *de Res. Carn.* 63, *de Vel. Virg.* 1.

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alleges that the Spirit enables men to acquire the gifts of learning, wisdom, and knowledge.[1] Cyril of Jerusalem points out that all intellectual beings, even the archangels, need the teaching and sanctifying influence of the Spirit,[2] and Gregory of Nazianzus claims that aid in the formulation of the doctrine of the Spirit.[3] Sometimes messages are received in the mystic state, by audition or vision, which are held to possess objective validity, and to continue, if not supersede, Scripture revelation. But a close scrutiny generally reveals that such messages have some basis in Scripture, or are the offspring of auto-suggestion, and the practical judgment of the Church has placed such communications or revelations in a place below canonical Scripture. A recurring feature is the view of the Spirit or Paraclete as marking the consummating age of revelation—the mature stage, the OT and NT being respectively the childhood and youth of religion. We meet it in Montanism as it protests against officialism within the Church;[4] in the Middle Ages in the protest against sacramentarianism of Amalric of Bena (*c.* 1204) and Joachim of Flore († 1202)—the latter the only prophet outside canonical Scripture mentioned by Dante[5]—who taught the supersession of the sacraments in the age of the Spirit; at the Reformation, when the thoroughgoing Reformers, the Anabaptists (*q.v.*), set the inward voice or word of the Spirit above the outward word of Scripture, and in Puritan England with the Quakers' protest against sacraments, orders clerical, and formal religion. Usually the mystic is found re-asserting some neglected or forgotten truth of religion or emphasizing a union with God so close as to verge on the absorption of the soul in God, as in pantheism (*q.v.*), and intensity of emotion is taken as the sign of the Spirit's presence. All movements of the soul are taken as the action of the Spirit, and consequently fanaticism and enthusiasm have been at a premium.[6] Yet, beyond question, springs of energy have been unsealed (cf. Catharine of Genoa, Mme. Guyon), an exhilaration of Spirit experienced, an inbreaking from the supersensible world apprehended and utilized, which have started revivals, lifted the Christian Church to higher levels of service and devotion, and prevented Christendom from accepting the world as a closed system into which new streams of blessing from God can find no entrance. The phenomena of revivals especially endorse the mystics' claims:

> 'The impulse of the Great Awakening (in America 18th cent.) was a theological conviction which took shape in (Jonathan) Edwards' [*q.v.*] mind, a belief in the immediate action of the Divine Spirit upon the human soul.'[7]

Of the Spirit's working the mystics have no doubt:

> 'Whoso hath felt the Spirit of the Highest
> Cannot confound nor doubt Him nor deny.'[8]

They are sure that they have reached the essence of essences, have touched the ultimate reality, God. But, when they are asked for further knowledge of the inner life of the Godhead, there is no fresh knowledge conveyed over and above the Christian revelation. The Trinity is still the dispensational Trinity, and, though Eckhart and John of Ruysbroeck may pass beyond that Trinity into the 'stillen Wüste' of Godhead, the secret of an immanent Trinity in the Godhead remains undisclosed. And orthodox mystics, as Sta. Teresa and St. John of the Cross,[1] fare no better. Behind all their musings we catch echoes of the Augustinian-Scholastic doctrine that the Son proceeds through the divine intellect and the Spirit through the divine will[2]—echoes which make clear that the human mind is not so bare and empty of earthly reasonings as was supposed. Still, the mystics of a speculative turn have served the race nobly by their scrutiny of the cognitive processes in mysticism. Eckhart's doctrine[3] of the *Fünkelein*—'the likest God within the soul,' 'the divine spark,' in which all other faculties of the soul meet—as the meeting-place of the temporal and eternal world, one with God in essence, is an advance on mediæval ideas of grace as a magical bestowal, lifts human nature above Augustinian doctrines of total depravity, prepares the way for the Quaker doctrine of the 'Inward Light,' for the modern view of divine immanence, and gives a ground for the working of God in other religions besides Christianity.[4] But the distinctive feature of Christian mysticism, as it bears on the Holy Spirit, is that the Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, the Eternal Son, who works within believers and brings them into the state of sonship to God, gives an assurance of salvation which no rationalism can shake, and to their 'wondering view reveals the secret love of God.'[5]

7. Modern philosophy and the Holy Spirit.—The Holy Spirit in the specific theological sense has been but little discussed in modern philosophy. Spinoza ([*q.v.*] 1632–77), it is true, examined the Biblical data in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*,[6] but scarcely passed beyond the mediæval Jewish view of the Holy Spirit as the spirit of prophecy, reduced it to designate the contents of revelation or simply the ethical effects which He produces in men, and regarded the inner witness of the Spirit as pure presumption, a product of prejudice and passion, reason being really the light of the Spirit.[7] Hegel (*q.v.*) used the term 'Holy Spirit' to denote the spirit of logic, but the resemblance to the Christian doctrine is merely nominal. The God of Hegelianism is scarcely personal,[8] and the rôle of the Spirit as the synthesis of a dialectic process would make it the sole and supreme reality in the Trinity, and the Father and the Son inferior to, and mere abstractions from, its reality.[9] The *Geistesleben* of Rudolf Eucken's philosophy labours under the difficulty, common to idealistic systems, of showing how its manifold activities are explicable without a personal substrate or subject, and how 'an abstraction' can be 'of itself the most fruitful of realities,'[10] and, though God, as in speculative theism, is regarded as 'spirit,' the

[1] *De Princ.* i. 1; cf. Basil, *de Spir. Sanct.* 9.
[2] *Cat. Lect.* xvi. 23.
[3] *Orat.* xli. 26; cf. John Smith, *Select Discourses*[3], London, 1821, pp. 3 ff., 24.
[4] Tertullian, *de Vel. Virg.* 1, *de Monog.* 14, *de Pudic.* 21; cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* xli. ch. 11.
[5] *Par.* xii. 139 ff.
[6] Cf. art. ENTHUSIASTS (Religious).
[7] A. V. G. Allen, *J. Edwards*, Boston, 1889; cf. J. Buchanan, *Office and Work of the Holy Spirit*[5], Edinburgh, 1844, p. 402 f.
[8] F. W. H. Myers, *Saint Paul*, London, 1867.

[1] Cf. *The Interior Castle*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, vii th Mansions, i. 9; *The Ascent of Mt. Carmel*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, bk. ii. ch. 29.
[2] Cf. Augustine, *de Trin.* xv. 27; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I. qu. xxvii.
[3] Cf. W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*[2] (*BL*), London, 1900, p. 157 f.; R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, do. 1909, p. 231.
[4] Cf. artt. INSPIRATION, POSSESSION.
[5] See, further, artt. MYSTICISM; John Owen, *Works*, ed. W. H. Goold, Edinburgh, 1850–55, iv. 4–226; W. P. Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*[2], ch. iii.; F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, 2 vols., London and New York, 1908; E. Herman, *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*[2], London, 1916; on Eckhart see F. Pfeiffer, *Deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrhunderts*, Stuttgart, 1845–57, ii. 66, l. 2, 110, l. 26, 55, l. 22 f. Akin to the experience of the mystics is that of great poets and artists; cf. Dante, *Par.* i. 13–33; Milton's Invocation, *Par. Lost*, i. 17–26; Browning's *Cristina*, iii–iv; for a useful discussion cf. *The Spirit*, London, 1919, Essay vi. 'The Psychology of Inspiration' (C. W. Emmet); W. Macneile Dixon, 'Inspiration,' in *HJ* xii. [1914] 509 ff. See artt. POSSESSION.
[6] Amsterdam, 1670.
[7] Chs. i., xi., xv.
[8] Cf. J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 160, 165, n. 1.
[9] J. M. E. MacTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge, 1901, § 213 ff.
[10] F. von Hügel, *HJ* x. [1912] 669.

Holy Spirit as an inner distinction within God is not discussed. The critical analysis of self-consciousness, which is distinctive of modern philosophy, has influenced the attitude of mind as it approaches this doctrine of the Spirit. The Kantian epistemology, with its limitation of the pure reason to the phenomenal, has restrained speculation on the transcendental factors experienced in religion, and fostered agnosticism in theology. This is apparent when Kant says, 'We can neither recognize a super-sensible object within our experience, nor exercise an influence upon it,' in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*,[1] in the Ritschlian theology with its exclusion of metaphysics from theology and the meagre attention given to the Holy Spirit's work, and in the 'religionsgeschichtliche' school (Gunkel, Weinel, Volz), who would evaluate the phenomena of the Spirit's working by parallelism with heathen views of demons, gods, and spirits.[2] The idealist reaction against Kant (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), by examining the Ego in cognition and volition, has elucidated somewhat the meaning of personality. As a result the traditional interpretation of the Church, whereby personality is construed in terms of substance and accident,[3] is felt to be inferior to that in terms of self-conscious spirit. But personality (*q.v.*) as yet has been only partially explored, and the application of one mystery to another can hardly bring much light to the mind.[4] When applied to the Trinity, speculation can help us to conceive the timeless relation of the Father and the Son as mutually subject and object, but furnishes little explanation why a third is necessary, and the Augustinian interpretation of the Spirit as the mutual bond between the Father and the Son merely gives a relation, and a relation is not necessarily a person.[5] Even the analysis of the religious consciousness affords little help, for to practical experience the indwelling of Christ and the incoming of the Spirit cannot be differentiated.[6] In view of these facts, not to mention the divided state of Christendom, the stagnancy of thought in the Eastern Church, and the standardization of Aquinas's theology by the Roman Church, the likelihood of any ecclesiastical reformulation of the doctrine is very remote. The tendency of modern philosophy to postulate the metaphysical reality of spirit has also influenced theological thought on the doctrine of the Spirit. In this view, spirit is 'a substantial, yet immaterial, entity,'[7] a synonym of mind as the substrate of consciousness, whether in the individual or in a society. This usage is akin to that of the Logos in Greek philosophy, and meets us in the *Zeitgeist* of modern speech. It is of value in so far as it supposes consciousness as a quality of spirit, and points the inadequacy of representing mental phenomena in terms of matter and force. But, when it is applied to the Holy Spirit as the collective spirit (*Gemeingeist*) which animates the collective life of believers,[8] it does less than justice to the personal activities ascribed by Scripture to the Holy Spirit and repeats the Sabellian heresy. The religious instinct can acquiesce in no impersonal principle or transitory modality, and any interpretation of the Spirit which falls short of ascribing personal consciousness to Him makes Him cease to be an object of adoration and worship.[1] From the criticism of self-consciousness and the narratives of mystical experiences certain conclusions may be drawn—as that the Spirit is known only in His working, and not in Himself; that it is difficult to represent His personality to the mind, since He is manifested in the gifts which He confers without the medium of a physical body; that His presence is apprehended in the light that He brings rather than in what He is; that what lends precision to the idea of the Spirit is to be sought in the character and life of Jesus, God's Son, whose Spirit He is; that His individuality is suppressed in His mission to glorify the Son (Jn 16^{14}); and that the organism He indwells, through which His operations are manifested, owing to the divided state of the Christian Church, is but dimly apprehended as the Body of Christ, 'the Temple, the Habitation of the Holy Ghost.'

On the whole question of the Spirit's personality and the difficulty of its expression we cannot better the language of Swete:

'The idea of the One Undivided Essence, subsisting eternally after a three-fold manner and in a three-fold relation, finds but very partial correspondencies in the nature of man or in any finite nature. When we try to express it in precise language, our terminology is necessarily at fault; the "hypostasis" of the philosophical East, the "persona" of the practical West, are alike inadequate; in the things of God we speak as children, and we shall continue to do so until "that which is perfect is come." Yet our imperfect terms represent eternal verities. The currency may be base, but it serves for the time to circulate amongst men the riches of God's revelation of Himself.'[2]

'Trasumanar significar *per verba* non si poria; però l' esemplo basti a cui esperienza grazia serba.'[3]

LITERATURE.—The following may be consulted: i. *GENERAL.*—Histories of Doctrine by G. P. Fisher[2], Edinburgh, 1897; K. R. Hagenbach, Eng. tr., do. 1880, i. 171–176, 365–371; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden*[4], Halle, 1906; R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch*[2], 2 vols., Leipzig, 1908; M. Kähler, *Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*[3], do. 1905; B. H. Streeter and others, *The Spirit*, London, 1919.

ii. *PARTICULAR.*—G. Smeaton, *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*, Edinburgh, 1882; K. F. Nösgen, *Der heilige Geist, sein Wesen und die Art seines Wirkens*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1905–07; W. L. Walker, *The Spirit and the Incarnation*[2], Edinburgh, 1901, and *The Holy Spirit*, London, 1907; A. C. Downer, *The Mission and Administration of the Holy Spirit*, Edinburgh, 1909; F. B. Denio, *The Supreme Leader*, Boston, 1900; W. T. Davison, *The Indwelling Spirit*, London, 1911 (contains select bibliography); A. L. Humphries, *The Holy Spirit in Faith and Experience*, do. 1911; W. H. G. Thomas, *The Holy Spirit of God*, do. 1913; C. L. Slattery, *The Light Within*, do. 1915.

iii. *PHILOSOPHICAL.*—C. F. D'Arcy, *Idealism and Theology*, London, 1899, and art. 'Trinity' in *DCG*; W. Adams Brown, *The Trinity and Modern Thought*, n.p., 1906; J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* (Gifford Lectures), 2 vols., Glasgow, 1899, lect. xix.; C. C. Everett, *Theism and the Christian Faith*, New York, 1909.

iv. *ON RITSCHLIANISM AND THE HOLY SPIRIT.*—A. E. Garvie, *Ritschlian Theology*[2], Edinburgh, 1902, ch. xi.; J. K. Mozley, *Ritschlianism*, London, 1909. See also artt. in *RGG*, *s.v.* 'Geist und Geistesgaben,' 'Trinität'; *CE* vii. 409 ff.; *DPhP*, *s.v.* 'Spirit (Spiritualism),' 'Pneuma.'

R. BIRCH HOYLE.

SPIRIT CHILDREN.—

Different views may be accepted as to the nature of primitive religion, magic, and their relations to each other; but there is no doubt that among the lower races the subject-matter of magico-religious practices and ideas is largely taken from fundamental organic functions and crises of life. Food, matters of sex, economic activities on the one hand, birth, puberty, marriage, death on the other, are all associated with ritual

1 Königsberg, 1793, tr. J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, 1838.

2 Cf. K. F. Nösgen, *Der heilige Geist*, i. 25, n. 50.

3 Cf. 'Athanasian' Creed; Basil, *Epp.* xxxvi. 6, xxxviii. 8; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, i. qu. xxix.

4 Cf. W. Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, Oxford, 1910, p. 156 *f.*, for the subliminal self as 'the sphere' where the Divine Spirit works; and cf. H. R. Mackintosh, in *ExpT* xxi. [1909–10] 553 ff. and art. CONSCIOUSNESS, vol. iv. p. 53 f.

5 Cf. D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*[7], Edinburgh, 1914, p. 210 f.

6 Cf. J. Denney, *The Christian Doct. of Reconciliation*, London, 1917, pp. 308–312.

7 J. Dewey, in *DPhP* ii. 308a.

8 Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*[4], Berlin, 1842, § 123; cf. Hegel, *Phil. of Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, ii. 334, iii. 28; Ritschl, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr, Edinburgh, 1900, 606 f.

1 Cf. Robert Hall's experience described in the memoir by Olinthus Gregory, prefixed to Hall's *Works*, London, 1846, i. 62

2 Church Congress, Exeter, London, and Derby, 1894, p. 694; see, further, art. PERSONALITY; A. E. Garvie, *The Christian Certainty and the Modern Perplexity*, London, 1910, ch. x.; W. P. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*[2], pp. 213–223; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, London, 1912, pp. 508–526; C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, do. 1911 p. 278 f.

3 Dante, *Par.* i. 70–72.

and belief in the majority of native communities. Death is perhaps the most important fact among those with which primitive ritual and belief are concerned. The opposite gate of life is, on the other hand, probably the least prominent. Though there is no native community which does not speculate about what happens to a man after his death, only very few seem to have any ideas as to when and how life comes into existence. There is, however, a type of belief which deals with this problem and attempts to define the nature and condition of a person before birth. Using a term introduced by Spencer and Gillen and adopted by Frazer, we can apply the name 'spirit children' to such unborn beings waiting to come into this world.

As far as is at present known, the ethnographical area of this type of belief is restricted to portions of Australia and Melanesia. The ideas of the Central and Northern Australian tribes about spirit children are most definite and detailed, and we possess an excellent account of them in the works of Spencer, and of Spencer and Gillen.

1. **Arunta.**—The Arunta, who inhabit the Alice Springs district of Central Australia, are the tribe among whom this type of belief was first discovered by Spencer and Gillen. Their ideas may be described somewhat in detail as a typical example. The Arunta believe that in remote times their tribal hunting-grounds were peopled by half-human, half-animal beings, whom they call *alcheringa* (*q.v.*), and from whom the members of the present tribe are descended. These mythical ancestors were endowed with powers not possessed by their descendants. They roamed about the country in companies, whose members belonged to the same totem, and performed various deeds, mainly magical ceremonies. As a rule, in association with every important ceremony, they left traces in the form of natural features, such as water-holes, rocks, grottos, or creeks. Many of the tribal traditions are concerned with the manner in which the *alcheringa* ancestors came to be associated with definite localities, scattered over the tribal territory and marked by some striking feature. At some such places the ancestors simply performed a ceremony, and afterwards continued their wanderings; at others they passed underground, leaving behind their bodies or part of their bodies, or else they went down into the earth, spirit and body together. But at every such spot they left behind a number of spirit children (*erathipa* or *ratapa*). These spirit children live in the totemic centre, awaiting reincarnation.

Naturally many details of these beliefs are hazy and indefinite, varying according to the section of the tribe, the tribal status and intelligence of the individual native, and many other circumstances. It must be borne in mind that in this matter, as in every native belief, only the broad outline of the idea is fixed and definite. Within this a certain latitude is left to the individual mind, for, although ritual, custom, and myth cause the main points and many details of unwritten native tradition to become uniform and rigid, concerning other details there may be several currents of tradition.

Thus the relation of the *alcheringa* ancestor to the spirit child (*erathipa*) is not very clear. It seems that in some cases the ancestor is imagined by the natives to have been transformed into the spirit child; in other cases the latter is conceived by them as emanating from the *alcheringa* ancestor. In some instances it seems that a number of spirit children are descended from one mythical individual. Yet the main idea remains stable through every variation in belief, that every spirit child is definitely related to one individual *alcheringa*, and that the man into whom this spirit child will develop will inherit his totemic character from the *alcheringa* ancestor and be associated with the latter's bull-roarer.

The nature of the spirit children seems to be a point on which the opinions of the natives vary. Most generally they are regarded as fully developed babies, male or female, endowed with life. They are invisible to ordinary men, but can be seen by certain magicians.

There are also several opinions on record as to the manner in which the spirit child enters the body of a woman, who can become pregnant only if she passes near the totemic centre, the place of the *erathipa*. An *erathipa* may enter her womb through her flank, or an *alcheringa* ancestor associated with the totemic centre may throw a diminutive bull-roarer at the woman, which enters her body and becomes a child. The spirit child is probably associated or identified, in the ideas of the natives, with the bull-roarer. Again, the natives will affirm that in some cases the *alcheringa* ancestor himself enters the body of a woman and becomes a child. These cases are, as the natives affirm, very rare, and they can easily be diagnosed, since children conceived in this manner have fair hair and blue eyes.

Another point in which the Arunta seem to have no very detailed and definite views is the reincarnation of human beings. After an *alcheringa* ancestor has produced an *erathipa* which enters a woman and becomes a living individual, the question arises, Whither does his spirit or life principle go after death? Is it destroyed, or is it again changed into an *erathipa*? There is a belief among the Arunta, recorded by the missionary C. Strehlow, according to which the spirits of the dead go to an island, where they live a kind of replica of their earthly life and then are finally destroyed and return to this world no more. According to this belief, an individual sooner or later ceases to exist, and there is no reincarnation. Spencer and Gillen make no explicit statement as to the existence among the Arunta of beliefs in the reincarnation of human beings. On the other hand, these two authors found definite views concerning reincarnation among the tribes living all around the Arunta, and it seems more than plausible to assume that the belief in reincarnation does exist among this tribe. Here again it must be emphasized that the existence of variations in belief, of contradictions, or even of two mutually exclusive beliefs in the same tribe, is by no means an exceptional occurrence.

2. **Other Australian tribes.**—Only a few words need be said about the other Australian tribes among whom similar beliefs have been found by Spencer and by Spencer and Gillen. Thus the tribes living to the south of the Arunta believe in the existence of spirit children, derived from mythical totemic ancestors. These spirit children enter into women and become human beings. Again, each human individual returns after death to the state of a spirit child and reincarnates as a new earthly life. At each reincarnation the sex of the individual changes.

Among the Warramunga, a tribe living to the north of the Arunta, all the spirit children emanate from one ancestor. Human beings again become spirit children after death and reincarnate. Among some other tribes of that region similar beliefs exist, with the exception that women are not supposed to reincarnate, *i.e.* a woman's spirit ceases to exist after her death.

Among the tribes of the Northern Territory, investigated by Spencer, the same type of belief has been found in a definite form. These natives also affirm that companies of mythical ancestors roamed about the country and that a number of spirit children emanated from them. These spirit children, associated with totemic centres, enter the bodies of women and become human beings. Dead men become spirit children and are born again, the sex of the individual alternating at each rebirth. Every individual in the tribe can be traced to a particular totemic ancestor, and each man bears a name that indicates this relationship. In one of these tribes, the Kakadu, there is an

interesting belief showing that the natives have the idea of a kind of spiritual continuity between the various reincarnations of the same individual ancestor.[1]

3. Melanesia.—The belief in spirit children, as known to exist in certain districts of Melanesia, is much less definite than among the Australian natives. W. H. R. Rivers has found among the natives of Banks Islands (Southern Melanesia) the belief that in some cases pregnancy is caused by an animal of supernatural character 'entering' the body of a woman. The natives consider this incarnation, not as a material, but as a spiritual act, and the 'supernatural animal' cannot be classed as a spirit child, unless we give this term a much broader meaning. Moreover, this form of conception is believed to take place only in exceptional cases, so that it cannot be considered a general theory of reproduction. It shows therefore very little resemblance to the Australian beliefs. The 'supernatural animal' stands in no relation to spirits of the dead, and consequently these natives cannot be said to believe in re-incarnation.

A general theory of birth showing a distinct affinity to the Australian beliefs has been found among the Melanesians who inhabit the Trobriand archipelago off the north-east coast of New Guinea. These natives, who, like the Australian aborigines, are ignorant of physiological paternity, believe that pregnancy is caused by a spirit, who inserts an embryonic baby (*waiawaia*) into the womb of a woman. Each *waiawaia* is moreover a metamorphosis of an individual spirit. Every human being goes after death to the island of the spirits, where he lives through another existence, very much like that which he lived in this world. After a time he undergoes, of his own free will, a transformation; he shrinks into a *waiawaia*, which the natives imagine to be just like an embryo. Then another spirit—as a rule a female one—takes the spirit child and carries it to the village, where she inserts it into the body of one of her near relatives. All these individuals—the spirit child, the ministering spirit, and the prospective mother—are invariably of the same totemic clan; in fact they are always near relatives in the cognate line. There are several variants of this belief: thus some natives affirm that the spirit child is not an embryo, but a diminutive, invisible being of nondescript character, and that it is not inserted into a woman by another spirit, but floats amidst the foam of the sea and enters the girls while they are bathing in salt water. Again, some natives deny reincarnation: each spirit, after a prolonged existence in the nether world, finally dies. According to this version, the spirit children spontaneously come into being somewhere on Tuma, the island of the dead.

4. Summary.—Summing up the above data, we may conclude that the following ideas are characteristic of the belief in spirit children: (1) the spirits, or vital principles, of men to be born exist in a definite state before entering life; (2) they pass into life by entering or being inserted into the womb of a woman; the only cause of pregnancy is the entry of a spirit child into a woman's body; (3) sexual intercourse stands in no causal relation to pregnancy; (4) spirit children are a transformation of previous human or mythical beings, who thus become reincarnated. The belief in spirit children involves the ideas of reincarnation or of the continuity of life.

The beliefs in question are closely connected with the problem of totemism (*q.v.*), and they play an important part in J. G. Frazer's attempt to solve this problem. On the other hand, they are closely associated with the ignorance of physical fatherhood, which has left a distinct imprint on the folklore of primitive and civilized races.

[1] Spencer, *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory*, pp. 270–274.

LITERATURE.—The standard works by W. B. Spencer, and by W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, are the most important sources for the Australian beliefs in question: Spencer-Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899, ch. iv. p. 112 ff., esp. 119–127, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, do. 1904, pp. 146–148, 156–158, 170; W. B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia*, do. 1914, index, *s.v.* 'Spirit children.' The work of C. Strehlow (*Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien*, so far pts. i.–iv., Frankfort, 1907–13) contains valuable additions in detail, but no new essential features. The claims of this author, who worked after Spencer and Gillen and had their achievements to guide him, to have corrected his predecessors' discoveries on certain vital points are evidently due to Strehlow's failure to grasp the intrinsic complexity of native beliefs.

The Melanesian sources are: W. H. R. Rivers, 'Totemism in Polynesia and Melanesia,' *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 156 ff.; B. Malinowski, 'Baloma; the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands,' *JRAI* xlvi. [1916] 353 ff.

J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols., London, 1910, and E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, 2 vols., do. 1909, deal theoretically with this problem.

B. MALINOWSKI.

SPIRITISM.—Spiritism (or spiritualism) may be defined as the belief that it is possible to communicate with the 'spirits' of the dead so as to receive from them intelligent messages and proofs of their identity and survival, and as the study and practice of so doing. Thus defined, spiritism is of immemorial antiquity and universal distribution; it has always exercised an important influence on religions and philosophies, and has affected conduct, though not, apparently, to the extent which its theoretic importance would seem to warrant. Spiritism naturally has a strong attraction for those who have suffered bereavement, while their sense of loss is poignant; but the spirit-world is also a source of repulsions and an object of dread, and as a rule this view of it prevails over its attraction. So the religions hedge it round with powerful tabus, and endeavour to monopolize and regulate spiritistic practices so as to render them harmless or nugatory; the philosophies also mostly labour to show that there can be no scientific knowledge of the spirit-world. This contention is more or less justified by the fact that spiritism is much older than science; it embodies a large number of primitive ideas and superstitions, and concerns itself with a mass of obscure and elusive phenomena which science has neglected or put aside, because they did not seem capable of complete scientific explanation. They impress the popular mind, however, and spiritism has contrived to combine them in a more or less coherent interpretation. This interpretation is essentially pre-scientific, but it has nevertheless shown considerable capacity to develop in accordance with the ideas of the time.

The natural starting-point for this development is the world-wide notion of 'spirit' or soul—the 'breath' which animates the body and is its principle of life. This notion is easily suggested, not only by the apparently supernormal experiences to be mentioned, but by the familiar habits of sleeping and dreaming. Accordingly the spirit is conceived as detachable from the body and capable of wandering about at large while its owner is asleep or entranced. It is not, however, necessarily regarded as the real man. In the Homeric eschatology, *e.g.*, the real man (*αὐτός*) is the body, and is devoured by birds and dogs,[1] while the souls which descend into Hades are devoid of intelligence, until they are enabled to materialize themselves again by drinking the blood of Odysseus's sacrifice.[2] Being thus already independent of the body during life, the spirit naturally survives at death and becomes a 'ghost,' all the more formidable for being endowed with undefined powers,

[1] *Il.* i. 3 f. [2] *Od.* xi. 153.

and with a tendency to linger among its familiar haunts, especially if it is not 'laid' by proper burial rites. Their hankering to return to bodily existence renders 'spirits' capable of obsessions, *i.e.* of occupying and using, temporarily or permanently, any bodies into which they can find admission. The owner of a body so receptive of spirit influence then becomes a natural intermediary between this life and spirit-life, a 'medicine-man' or priest; in modern spiritist phraseology he is technically called a 'medium.' Moreover, whereas a spirit was originally supposed to produce effects in virtue of its own powers, the tendency in modern spiritism is towards a subtler theory which regards the presence of a medium as always necessary, even where it is not recognized. The rarity of mediumship and lack of mediumistic quality can then be used to explain why so few 'see ghosts' and have abnormal experiences, and why phenomena attributable to 'spirits' are on the whole rare everywhere.

The theory of mediumship and the idea of using a code of signals for spelling out communications are the two chief developments which characterize what is called 'modern spiritualism.' This arose in 1848 at Hydesville, New York State, in the family of John D. Fox, out of mysterious knockings, which appeared to be intelligent. One of the daughters suggested a code, three raps for yes, one for no, two for doubtful; and communication was established with what claimed to be a 'spirit.' The three Fox sisters became the first 'mediums,' and the practice of sitting in 'circles' (holding *séances*) for the purpose of communicating with 'spirits,' who answered by raps, tilts of the table, or other signals, rapidly spread over the whole world.

As time went on, the 'phenomena' of spiritism became very various. They are usually classified as (*a*) psychical and (*b*) physical. (*a*) Under psychical phenomena may be enumerated the various forms of automatism, of speech, of writing, of vision (*e.g.*, crystal-gazing [*q.v.*]), obsessions, impersonations, trances, apparitions, hallucinations, clairvoyance, clairaudience, hyperæsthesia, prophecy, and the like. Any supernormal knowledge elicited by any method of communication or in any of these states, or in 'veridical' dreaming, especially when yielding evidence of 'spirit-identity,' may also be claimed in favour of the spiritist interpretation. (*b*) As physical phenomena there are said to occur in *séances* inexplicable movements of bodies ('telekinesis'), sounds, lights, 'direct' spirit writing, the passage of solids through solids, as in the untying of knots, the 'materializations' of human and other forms, the bringing in of objects from a distance ('apports'), levitations, spirit photographs, immunity from the effects of handling fire, etc. In many cases, however, the question whether a phenomenon reported —*e.g.*, a spirit-light or an apparition—is 'physical' or 'psychical' (*i.e.* hallucinatory) may be the very point to be decided, and, if the evidence pointing to the occurrence of *collective* hallucinations is admitted, the ordinary criteria of physical reality rather break down. It should be remembered also that the convenient distinction between the physical and the psychical may not ultimately apply and that it may be unwise to take it too absolutely.

The examination of these phenomena, and in general the investigation of the subject, are beset with extreme difficulty. Nearly all the facts are in dispute, nearly all are susceptible of alternative interpretations. Nearly all the theories are vague and too ill-defined to be tested experimentally. Indeed, there is so little control of the phenomena that crucial experiments cannot be made. Those who interest themselves in the subject are commonly animated by strong prejudices and the most virulent forms of bias. The subject itself is essentially a 'borderland,' and it is not the business of any established science to concern itself with its systematic and persistent exploration. But for these very reasons it provides excellent material for those who are desirous of studying the making of a science.

Of the current interpretations the simplest is undoubtedly that of (1) fraud. It is certainly capable of disposing of much of the evidence, and no investigator can afford to disregard it so long as frauds of all sorts are possible and easy, as they must be so long as the phenomena are allowed to occur in the dark or in insufficient light, with little or no control of crude observation by apparatus, with mediums who are paid by results and are dependent for their livelihood on their success, or who resent ordinary precautions as imputations on their honesty. Still there is nothing genuine on earth that cannot be simulated, and the possibility of fraud is not always a proof of it. And it is fairly clear that ordinary fraud is not an adequate explanation of everything that is reported. The sitters often deceive themselves, and, *e.g.*, regard as supernormally acquired information which they have themselves inadvertently given to the mediums. The mediums, again, may be self-deceived, for their mental constitution is frequently abnormal, and, especially in the case of psychical phenomena, they are often in conditions of 'trance,' etc., in which they act out dreams, suggestions, and hallucinations, and are hardly responsible for their actions. Moreover, it has been shown experimentally[1] that many of the successful frauds are due, not to the ordinary methods of conjuring-tricks, but to a special source of error, viz. the impossibility of continuous observation, lapses of attention of which the observer is not himself aware.

When fraud has been sufficiently discounted, there still remains a choice of non-spiritistic interpretations which may or may not admit that the phenomena are in part supernormal. (2) Many of the 'psychical' phenomena—*e.g.*, impersonations, obsessions, premonitions, automatic writing, exhibitions of supernormal knowledge, etc.—appear to be genuine products of the subliminal, subconscious memory, multiple personality, and other imperfectly understood processes of the human mind, which can simulate spirit-communications to a surprising extent. It should be noted also that the phenomena appear spontaneously to assume a spiritistic form and that the communications regularly claim to come from 'spirits.'

The weakness of this method of explanation is that no definite limits are set to it. If even the faintest, and normally imperceptible, stimulus may impress the sense-organs, and if there can be submerged records of everything that ever has been, or might have been, noted, the feats of hyperæsthesia or of 'memory' may border on the miraculous. Consequently this explanation easily shades off into (3) the telepathic, which frankly admits that the phenomena transcend the limits of recognized human faculty, but refuses to ascribe them on this account to the spirits of the dead. This interpretation, though not incompatible with spiritism—for, if there can be telepathy between living minds, why not between the living and the dead?—is detrimental to it, because it renders it impossible to regard even the best evidence for spiritism as conclusive. It seems sufficient to suppose that knowledge may percolate from one living mind to another, supernormally but subliminally and unconsciously; for, if the supernormal knowledge is to be verifiable, it must have passed through some human mind. The existence of telepathy (*q.v.*), however, rests on a somewhat narrow experimental basis, while the principle itself is too negative to be a good explanation, and there is no evidence for it in the extended form,

[1] Cf. R. Hodgson and S. J. Davey, 'The Possibilities of Mal-Observation and Lapse of Memory,' in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, pt. xi. [1887] p. 381.

which assumes that any knowledge possessed by any mind may be reproduced in any other. Still even the spiritists are beginning to reckon with the possibility of telepathic percolation of knowledge from the mind of the sitter to that of the medium, and also to admit that the communications received from 'spirits' do not come directly from the nominal communicator, but are affected considerably by the mind of the medium, conscious and 'subliminal,' and by the 'control' of the medium in the 'spirit'-world, who forms a sort of second mediator. Communication thus becomes a highly complex process, and errors may be ascribed to failures of transmission, either from the communicator to the controlling spirit, or from the latter to the subliminal, or from the subliminal to the trance-consciousness of the medium, or lastly to the abnormality and lack of power of the medium.

(4) In addition to telepathy, some philosophers (*e.g.*, William James and Maeterlinck) have suggested, as a possible source of the supernormal knowledge, a sort of cosmic reservoir of knowledge which the medium's mind subconsciously taps.

(5) Lastly, many theologians, especially Roman Catholic, with some philosophic support,[1] still ascribe all the phenomena of spiritism to 'devils,' simulating the spirits of the dead.

To meet these alternatives, the supporters of the spiritistic interpretation have endeavoured to strengthen the evidence of spirit-identity with a certain amount of success. Experiments with sealed test-letters deposited by the departed have indeed hitherto failed, almost completely. Attempts have also been made to get what can be recognized as the same intelligence to manifest through a number of independent mediums. The difficulty of excluding telepathy in such cases has led on to the theory of 'cross correspondences,' as developed in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* (from 1903), in which an often very complicated series of allusions is given, piecemeal, at different times, and through different automatists. Each allusion is unintelligible or nonsensical as it is given, but nevertheless, when the case is complete, they all dovetail together into a coherent and intelligible whole which is suggestive of the personality of a particular communicator. In this way it is claimed that the possibility of telepathy may be eliminated, since no living human mind knows the answer to the puzzle until it is given, and it is then also seen that an intelligence other than the medium's, and identical throughout, was at work all along, constructing the enigma. But of course chance coincidence can never quite be excluded, and the method of proof is too subtle to be popularly convincing. The chief exceptions taken to the character of the alleged spirit-communications have been ingeniously met: the triviality of the messages relied on to prove spirit-identity has been closely paralleled, in some experiments initiated by J. H. Hyslop, by the methods used among friends, (*a*) in determining the authorship of intentionally vague and general messages, and (*b*) in detecting impersonations. It was found that apparently quite inadequate clues were recognized as characteristic and led to correct identifications.[2] The objection that nothing of scientific novelty or value is ever imparted by spirits is met by pointing to the difficulty of verifying such information if it should be given; the frequent confusion and dreaminess of the messages is explained by the difficulties of communication 'with one asleep through one asleep.' To the objection that the 'spirits' do not behave in a dignified manner worthy of spiritual beings it is replied that there is no reason to think that the mere fact of death should entirely transform their character and outlook, and, besides, we know too little about their life to judge what behaviour would befit them. This reply has value if it acknowledges that at present the term 'spirit' is not much more than a name for our ignorance. Altogether, then, the evidence for the 'psychical' phenomena has to be left in a very ambiguous and unsatisfactory condition.

Nor is the situation any better as regards the 'physical' phenomena. They are of course far more improbable *per se* and very susceptible of explanation by fraud. Nevertheless, the evidence for their occurrence is quite copious, and by no means inferior in quality to that for the 'psychical' phenomena. Indeed, from first to last, from the mediumship of D. D. Home (1850) to that of Eusapia Paladino and Marthe Béraud (1914), some of the best and most elaborately recorded evidence has concerned 'physical' phenomena. Besides fraud and collective hallucination, the spiritist interpretation has here to reckon with the theory that the phenomena are due to some unknown force emanating from the medium, to which some of the observers have given the preference. In conclusion it may be said that, whatever view is taken of the phenomena as a whole, and even if they are destined to serve only to enlarge our conception of the possibility of fraud and self-deception, they are deserving of more, and more scientific, study than they have received.

[1] *E.g.*, F. H. Bradley, in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914, p. 440.

[2] Cf. *Pro. Soc. Psych. Res.*, pt. xli. [1901] p. 537 f.

LITERATURE.—The literature of the subject is immense, but much of it is of very little value. The year 1882 may be taken as the dividing point between the older and the later literature; for it is the date of the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research, by Henry Sidgwick, Edmund Gurney, Frederic Myers, W. F. Barrett, and others, with which may be said to have begun the continuous, systematic, and co-operative study of the phenomena alleged. The publications of this Society (*Proceedings* and *Journal*) are indispensable to the student, alike for their records and for their critical contents.

Among the works of the earlier period may be mentioned E. W. Capron, *Modern Spiritualism*, Boston, 1855; J. W. Edmonds and G. T. Dexter, *Spiritualism*, New York, 1853; R. Hare, *Experimental Investigations of the Spirit Manifestations*, do. 1856; A. de Gasparin, *Des Tables tournantes*, 2 vols., Paris, 1854; M. Thury, *Les Tables tournantes*, Geneva, 1855; A. De Morgan and Mrs. S. E. De Morgan, *From Matter to Spirit*, London, 1863; *Report of the Committee of the Dialectical Society*, do. 1871; William Crookes, *Researches in the Phenomena of Spiritualism*, do. 1874; Alfred Russel Wallace, *Miracles and Modern Spiritualism*, rev. ed. do. 1896; D. D. Home, *Lights and Shadows of Spiritualism*, do. 1877; W. Stainton Moses ('M.A.Oxon.'), *Spirit Identity*, do. 1879. Abroad Allan Kardec (M. H. D. L. Rivail), *Le Livre des esprits*, Paris, 1853, [3]1865, the chief of the reincarnationist spiritists, and the works (1852–67) of K. von Reichenbach, the discoverer of paraffin, on the (really subjective) manifestations of 'odic force' visible to his 'sensitives,' may be mentioned; also J. K. F. Zöllner, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1878–81, tr. C. C. Massey, *Transcendental Physics*[3], London, 1885, in which spirits operating in a fourth dimension of space were invoked to explain the untying of knots.

Since 1882 the work of the S.P.R. group and their allies deserves special attention. Of these E. Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and F. Podmore, *Phantasms of the Living*, 2 vols., London, 1886, was the first; F. W. H. Myers's *magnum opus*, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, 2 vols., do. 1903, appeared posthumously. F. Podmore's works, of a highly critical, not to say sceptical, character, include *Studies in Psychical Research*, do. 1897, *Modern Spiritualism*, 2 vols., do. 1902 (largely historical), and *The Newer Spiritualism*, do. 1910. The writings of Richard Hodgson, Mrs. E. M. Sidgwick, J. G. Piddington, W. W. Baggally, and Mrs. Verrall are confined to the publications of the S.P.R.; but those of Andrew Lang (*The Making of Religion*, London, 1898), William James (two brilliant essays in *The Will to Believe*, do. 1897, and *Memories and Studies*, do. 1911), J. H. Hyslop, Secretary of the American S.P.R. (*Psychical Research and Survival*, do. 1913), Oliver Lodge (*Raymond*, do. 1916), W. F. Barrett (*On the Threshold of the Unseen*, do. 1917), J. A. Hill (*Psychical Investigations*, do. 1917), Hereward Carrington (*The Physical Phenomena of Spiritualism*, Boston, 1907, *Eusapia Paladino and her Phenomena*, New York, 1909, *The Problems of Psychical Research*, London, 1914), and F. C. S. Schiller (two chapters in *Humanism*, do. 1903, on the psychological and philosophic aspects) are also available in book form.

In Switzerland T. Flournoy of Geneva maintains a scientific attitude very similar to that of the S.P.R.; his *Des Indes à la planète Mars*, Paris, 1900, with a supplement in *Archives de Psychologie de la Suisse romande*, no. 2 (1901), is a model study of an important case of somnambulic mediumship. Cf. also his *Esprits et médiums*, Paris, 1911. J. Maxwell, *Les Phénomènes psychiques*, do. 1903, Eng. tr. *Metaphysical Phenomena*, London, 1905; E. Morselli, *Psicologia e Spiritismo*, Turin, 1908; C. Lombroso, *After Death—What?*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; A. von Schrenck-Notzing, *Materialisations-Phänomene*, Munich, 1914; Mme. Alexandre Bisson, *Les Phénomènes dits de matérialisation*, Paris, 1914; and W. J. Crawford, *The Reality of Psychic Phenomena*, London, 1916, are mainly records of experiments. The *Report* (Philadelphia, 1887) of the Seybert Commission on spiritualism was negative, and enabled the testator's funds to be used to endow a chair of philosophy. Hostile criticism is also represented by A. Lehmann, *Aberglaube und Zauberei*, Stuttgart, 1898; A. E. Tanner, *Studies in Spiritism*, New York, 1910; and I. L. Tuckett, *The Evidence for the Supernatural*, London, 1911; and, as a specimen of dialectics, by F. H. Bradley's art. 'Evidences of Spiritualism,' in the *Fortnightly Rev.*, new ser., xxxviii. [1885] 811 ff.

Of periodicals there may be mentioned, in addition to the *Proceedings* and *Journals* (monthly) of the English and of the American S.P.R., *Light*, the official organ of English Spiritualism (weekly), *The Occult Review* (monthly), *Psychische Studien*, ed. A. Aksakow, and *Annales des sciences psychiques*.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

SPIRITUALISM.—1. Spiritualism is a popular term for what is more correctly called Spiritism (*q.v.*).

2. In philosophy spiritualism is the opposite of materialism (*q.v.*), *i.e.* the doctrine that reality is ultimately spiritual in its nature. Of this doctrine there may evidently be two varieties, according as this is asserted of all reality or only of some; in the latter case spiritualism is compatible with a dualism which admits the reality also of material substance, as in Cartesianism.[1] In the former sense it is not easy to distinguish spiritualism from idealism (*q.v.*) (in some of the many senses of that term), and indeed the two notions are often used interchangeably. It may be said, however, more strictly that, whereas idealism renders all reality relative to and dependent upon mind, spiritualism regards it as consisting of 'spirits,' which are not wholly or chiefly minds, and so does not make the cognitive process essential to reality. It will follow from this distinction that the same philosophy may be both spiritualistic and idealistic; Berkeley's doctrine, *e.g.*, is idealism in that it denies the reality of material substance and conceives physical reality as existing only for minds and having for its *esse percipi*; but it is spiritualism in that it composes ultimate reality of spirits, whose *esse* is *percipere*.[2]

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

SPIRITUALITY. — The term 'spirituality' has been used in a great variety of ways. The French have appropriated it as the name for the finer perceptions of life; by the American transcendentalists it is used as a special mark of superior intellects; it is often applied to those mediums through whom communications from departed spirits are said to reach common earth; Evangelical Christianity reserves the term to describe the warmer religious emotions; and it has its proper and peculiar application as the distinguishing quality of NT believers.

The substantive 'spirituality' does not occur in Scripture, but the adjective 'spiritual' (πνευματικός) is frequently employed to describe the character of the man who has entered the Kingdom of God. Such a man has the Holy Spirit as the vital, determining principle of his life. The NT usage does not permit us to apply the epithet to any one who has been moved in some vague way by holy impulses, for a definite and well-marked character is indicated by this description. Of spiritual persons Newman writes:

'He [the Holy Spirit] pervades us (if it may be so said) as light pervades a building, or as a sweet perfume the folds of some honourable robe; so that, in Scripture language, we are said to be in Him, and He in us.'[1]

Spirituality can best be understood by first considering the promises of Jesus and thereafter noting the experience of it in the early Church.

1. **Spirituality the promise of Jesus.** — The esoteric state called 'spirituality' is a legitimate outcome of the Christian life as it was conceived by its Founder. Our Lord went everywhere offering to men an effective holy life which would issue from union with Himself, but, as the days approached when He would be called upon to leave this earth, He began to promise another Presence, the Comforter, who would maintain this union. The life in Jesus would not dissipate itself as a tender memory on the rough sea of human history, but would communicate its virtues continuously to the faithful.

That spirituality was the chief feature of the life offered by Jesus is evident from His insistent demand, 'Ye must be born again' (Jn 3^7; cf. v.^{3}). Entrance into the Kingdom of God is possible only to that man who has undergone a distinct change in the character of his affections. The new birth[2] is further described as being 'born of water and of the Spirit' (Jn 3^5). After the manner of an inspiration, the heart is mysteriously moved towards the ideals of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the decisive moment in this change is an inward awakening to the presence, near a man, of a sphere of life infinitely more valuable, because more spiritual, than the natural life of mankind. In its mode of action the birth in the Spirit less resembles the heightening and deepening of moral instinct—common enough in human history—than the creation of a new kind of being. Mysterious in its origin, this new birth is not, however, dissociated from the ordinary workings of human faculty. It employs both the will and the heart; it works by convincing the one and softening the other.

The new life in the Kingdom was adequately described in the teaching and illustrated in the conduct of Jesus; and the promise of another Comforter was kept ever in strict agreement with that teaching and life.

The beneficial effects of the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit are three.

(1) When the Holy Spirit is come in His fullness, He will be present as an immediate and effective moral power in the heart: 'He . . . will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment' (Jn 16^8). 'The idea of "conviction" is complex. It involves the conceptions of authoritative examination, of unquestionable proof, of decisive judgement, of punitive power.'[3] The result of the Holy Spirit's work will be to put believers in possession of clear moral ideals, so that they must be seen and acknowledged as true. The real nature of sin, the necessity of righteousness, and the inevitability of judgment will be alike recognized. In other words, the first effect of the Spirit's illumination is a clear insight into the moral relation of human action to the universe as that was conceived by Jesus. The conscience is at once enhanced in value and becomes more authoritative by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

(2) The second effect of the Spirit's presence will be a new possession of truth: 'He shall guide you into all the truth' (Jn 16^{13}). Truth was to Jesus, as to His Jewish contemporaries, that practical wisdom by which conduct was guided. The modern conception of truth as 'that which satisfies the intellect' was not in His mind. By 'truth' our Lord means a knowledge of that which is necessary for life in harmony with God. To those disciples who would obey Him Jesus promised a knowledge of the truth, and 'the truth shall make you free' (Jn 8^{32}). This was evidently a promise of practical freedom—freedom for action as well as for thought. It would, however, be a mistake to confine this understanding to practical truth alone, for in the gradual approximation to a complete knowledge of conduct the intellectual qualities would be brightened and a new point of view acquired. The spiritual mind may not only feel more warmly moved by the knowledge of moral truth; it may also act with greater intellectual prescience.

(3) The Holy Spirit will glorify Jesus; *i.e.*, He will reveal to

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[1] See art. DESCARTES.

[2] See artt. BERKELEY, PERCEPTION.

[1] *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, new ed., London, 1868, ii. 222.

[2] See art. REGENERATION.

[3] B. F. Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John*, London, 1908, ii. 219.

the heart of man the majesty and unspeakable beauty of the character and work of Jesus. Like a treasure of inexhaustible wealth, the Spirit will find Jesus an object adequate for all His blessed operations in the human soul (Jn 15[26]). New aspects of the character, new satisfactions in the finished work, and new delights in the friendship of Jesus remain to be discovered to men by the Holy Ghost. In this, His most proper work, the Holy Spirit will be the witness of that divine love of which Jesus was the conspicuous agent.

In view of our Lord's promises, we may say that humanity and history, broadly conceived, will determine the limits of genuine spiritual experience; for, however mysterious in its origin, the new life in the Spirit identifies itself with the conscience and the heart of man; and the Spirit Himself lives more and more to exploit the perfect character of Jesus as that manifested itself in history. These two positions, clearly established in the Incarnation, must be the norm by which all spiritual pretensions are to be judged. Does any spiritual claim contradict an enlightened moral consciousness? Does it get ever quite out of touch with the historical Jesus? If so, it has thereby discredited itself in the Christian view of spirituality.

2. Spirituality the experience of the Church.—In striking agreement with the forecast of Jesus is the experience of the apostles, notably of St. Paul. For him the peculiar feature of the life in Christ is the presence of the living Saviour in the hearts of those who love Him. Love for God and man, efficient moral power, and the whole new life and hope of the gospel come from the indwelling Jesus, who more and more identifies Himself with the Christian—soul of his soul, heart of his heart, the life within his life. This blessed indwelling the apostle describes in other places as the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. For him, as for all the apostles, Pentecost was the birth-place of modern Christianity. What is noticeable in his Epistles is the growth of an experience which fully justifies the prophecies of Jesus about the Comforter.

The virtues foretold are precisely those which now appear in the experience of the Church.

(1) The presence of the Holy Spirit is a new principle of moral power. The Christian is free from the bondage of iniquity; the body is dead because of sin; and in the age-long struggle between the lower and the higher nature victory is now with the spirit (Ro 8, Gal 5). This domination of the Christian's conscience by the Holy Spirit extends to the farthest thought of the imagination which, with all other motions of the heart, is to be brought into subjection to Jesus (2 Co 10[5]). So powerful is this influence that the body itself, the seat of so many imperfections, shall one day be quickened by the Spirit into an immortal existence (Ro 8[11]). In one famous sentence St. Paul lets us understand his sense of the moral efficiency of the Holy Spirit in a Christian; 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty' (2 Co 3[17]). In this freedom, the summit of moral attainment, where the law becomes a habit of the soul, St. Paul recognizes the legitimate and inevitable effect of the indwelling of the all-powerful Holy Spirit.

(2) No less emphatically does the apostle describe the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit. The Christian is an enlightened person, whose inner principle of intelligence is the infallible light of the Spirit of God (1 Co 2[14-16]). With full knowledge of the seriousness of the claim that he is making, the apostle proceeds to declare that in the light of the Holy Spirit a humble Christian is better informed than the princes of wisdom or the teachers of the schools (vv.[10-13]). Here, as to his Lord, truth is for St. Paul practical wisdom—that which relates to conduct as it touches God and as it affects men. But St. Paul claims, without fear, for every spiritual man that he is so enlightened in those matters which most deeply influence human life that he may without presumption set himself up to judge all things (v.[15]). The criterion of all practical truth is its conformity to that inner enlightenment which a believer enjoys in the Holy Spirit. Thus early did the Church claim those virtues promised by Jesus.

(3) The promise that the Spirit should testify of Jesus becomes so certain a maxim that St. Paul scarcely feels himself called upon to justify it. Only once, and that in an argument about the moral blindness of the Jews, does he declare that the Lord, *i.e.* the Christ, is the Spirit (2 Co 3[17]). In all other places he allows himself to speak indifferently about the indwelling Christ and the indwelling Spirit. The total result of the Spirit's influence in the heart is that Christ is formed in us (Gal 4[19]).

In this vital spiritual union with Jesus the virtues of Jesus are reproduced. The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost (Ro 5[5]); towards God the Christian attitude is the affectionate trust of a child (8[15]); and in this loving experience joy rises to its crown, for therein Christians know themselves the children of God, assured of final salvation. In his relation to his neighbour the Christian is animated by the Spirit in tender affection. The apostle urges his converts not to grieve the Spirit by bitterness, wrath, and anger, but rather to please Him by being 'kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving each other' (Eph 4[30-32]). In the Epistle to the Galatians St. Paul consciously and definitely describes the conduct of the spiritual (*πνευματικοί*); they are to bear one another's burdens, to communicate their knowledge to the ignorant, and never to weary in well-doing (ch. 6). But it is in 1 Co 13 that the ardent apostle crowns love and sets it on the throne of Christian character. The conclusion of the whole matter is summed up in one sentence: the Spirit of God is a spirit of 'power and love and discipline' (2 Ti 1[7]).

3. False spirituality.—This enlightened, holy, and loving life, the possession of all believers, is the mark of a true Christian and constitutes 'the spiritual man.' Such a lofty life runs the risk of all high things—it may be misunderstood. It is misunderstood by the formalists of all ages, who insist upon religion confining itself within strict rules or laws. This temper is always with us, but it was bravely faced and triumphantly defeated by St. Paul in his encounter with the Judaizing teachers. In the Epistle to the Galatians the supremacy of the Spirit and its inherent freedom are courageously expounded.

On the other hand, the promised gifts of the Spirit have led many to make extraordinary claims of spiritual enlightenment and independence. Mysticism (*q.v.*), so closely akin to the temper of the Indian *yogi*, the Buddhist *dhyana*, and the Muhammadan *ṣūfi*, has appeared in the Church from time to time, believing itself to be the natural development of the teaching of St. Paul. Numerous and sometimes moving attempts have been made to justify the mystic claim of 'immersion in the infinite ocean of God,' but these can be successfully dealt with only as St. Paul handled them. He adopted instinctively the norm which lies latent in Christ's promises. All pretended insight on the part of so-called 'spiritual' persons must be judged by one criterion: Does it testify of Jesus? To the Gnostic claims which began to make themselves felt in the church at Colossæ St. Paul opposes the history of Jesus. Do the Colossians believe themselves to be possessed of a wisdom (*γνῶσις*) superior to that of ordinary Christians? St. Paul replies that there is no need of any wisdom or help which could not be found in Christ (Col 2[3, 10]). To the refined ideals of Gnosticism (*q.v.*), which shuddered at the thought of the contamination of the pure Deity in the creation of this material world, St. Paul simply cites Jesus, who so little considered matter evil that He was the medium of creation; and, so far from requiring some intermediate angelic agency, God had been pleased to make all fullness (*πλήρωμα*) dwell in Jesus (1[19] 2[9]). Spirituality is a character in closest touch at every moment with Jesus as He revealed Himself in history.

In the same way all practical results of spiritual possession must be tested by the moral standard of the gospel. Asceticism (*q.v.*), the cherished ideal of the Gnostics, is an error. 'Touch not, handle not' has a show of humility, but is not effective against the lusts of the flesh (Col 2[23]). The true deliverance is in union with Jesus through the Spirit, whereby our affections are lifted to higher things (3[5]). Even the earnest believer's desire for the supernatural gifts of the Spirit is

not to be encouraged. There were, indeed, gifts of tongues, of prophecy, of faith, and such like; and without doubt some heightening of the natural qualities of man does follow the presence of the Holy Spirit in the heart, and may be beneficial for the extension of Christ's Kingdom; but the essential and particular characteristics of the spiritual man are these three things, enlightenment, love, and power. 'If I have the gift of prophecy, and know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing' (1 Co 13[2]). The heightened powers of knowledge, of insight, and of superhuman gift are all, in the Holy Spirit, closely and intimately moral—after the morality of Jesus. From St. Paul's time to the present no better test has been found for the valuation of the spiritual phenomena of religion.

Spirituality is the essential temper of a Christian, and it consists in the possession of the individual by the Holy Spirit of Jesus, whose blessed presence is manifest in an increasing moral insight and conquest, a growing knowledge of the deep mysteries of God, and an ever more tender and sensitive love towards God and man; in a word, an ever closer approximation to the likeness of the Son of God as He lived among men. In the preservation and cultivation of this spiritual union the Christian finds the duty of his high calling. Kinship with Jesus through the Spirit has to be maintained by a life-long reaching unto consecration. In this task a ready and willing obedience is the surest means. Moral kinship grows with acts of morality, the kinship of loving hearts grows with acts of love, and the kinship of the Holy Spirit grows with acts of faith and spiritual conduct.

See also art. EXPERIENCE (Religious).

LITERATURE.—John Owen, *Πνευματολογία; or, A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit*, London, 1674; H. C. G. Moule, *Veni Creator*, do. 1890; Maurice Goguel, *La Notion johannique de l'esprit et ses antécédents historiques*, Paris, 1902; Auguste Sabatier, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, bk. iii., 'The Religion of the Spirit'; H. B. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, do. 1909; Rudolf Eucken, *The Problem of Human Life*, Eng. tr., do. 1910, pt. ii. 'Christianity'; George Steven, *The Psychology of the Christian Soul*, do. 1911; Henri Joly, *The Psychology of the Saints*, Eng. tr., do. 1898.

DAVID FYFFE.

SPITTING.—See SALIVA.

SPONSORS.—1. Origin and meaning.—The word 'sponsors' was and is still applied to those who undertake certain spiritual responsibilities for the baptized, in some cases for infants who are unconscious of the vows of renunciation, faith, and obedience required before baptism, and in others for those who by strange circumstances have been placed in the same condition. St. Cyril of Alexandria[1] tells us that, when men were seized with extremity of sickness and it was thought proper on that account to baptize them, there were some appointed to make both the renunciation and confession of the same. For this reason they were also called *susceptores*. Directly the Church admitted the necessity of infant baptism, something of the kind was obviously necessary. To baptize children without demanding of them some profession of faith and obedience would be to abandon one of the most important parts of the rite and to lead to the opinion that baptism availed for salvation independently of the co-operation of the will of the baptized. If we believe that by baptism we put on Christ, as the seed may be said to put on the earth into which it is placed, then, just as the seed requires the care of the gardener, so the soul of the infant requires the care of the sponsor till it shoots up and is able, with the friendly help of the Sun of Righteousness and the dew of God's Holy Spirit, to take care of itself. The Church naturally shrank from placing a seed into the garden of the Lord unless there were some who by raking and weeding would give it the opportunity it needed.

[1] *Comm. St. John*, xi. 26.

2. Who may be sponsors.—In the first days the sponsors were ordinarily the parents of the child; they would be best fitted and naturally the most desirous so to train the child that it might realize and fulfil the promises and vows made in its name. And yet even then the Church was anxious to emphasize the truth of the spiritual birth of the child by making as little of the natural tie as possible. The natural parents became spiritual parents, representing the Mother Church whose children the infants became by baptism. Of course in many cases, especially during the days of persecution, there were no parents to stand for the child, and the Church would then provide deacons, deaconesses, or virgins, who would act in her name and make the profession demanded. So too in the large number of adult baptisms it must have often happened, as it does in the mission field, that the parents were heathen or so ignorant as to be unable to be responsible for the spiritual education of the candidates. Hence it became more and more exceptional to find parent sponsors, until at last parents were forbidden to take on themselves the office. It was doubtless felt that the new tie of god-parent, as the sponsor was called, was never very seriously recognized by those to whom the old tie was everything, and that there was a distinct gain in obtaining those outside the family to whom the spiritual tie was all important.

3. Sponsorial responsibilities.—It has sometimes been said that the pledges which the god-parents are asked to make are profoundly unreal. How can any one make a promise for some one else of whose character he knows nothing? And yet it has its analogy. Estates are held by trustees in behalf of children on special conditions, such as that they profess the Protestant religion or become Roman Catholics. These trustees pledge the children so far and do their best by providing them with suitable teachers to see that they fulfil the promises made in their name. And, as the children grow up, they are told that the property will not be theirs unless they accept the responsibility long ago made for them. So too the god-parents ought to see that their god-children realize the splendid inheritance which is to be theirs and the conditions on which alone they can hope to win it.

4. Number of sponsors.—The English Book of Common Prayer orders that there be three god-parents, two of the same sex as the baptized; but the Roman Church, in this more strictly in accord with primitive usage, requires only one, or at the most two. Bingham is very emphatic here:

> 'We never read of more than one in all the accounts of the ancients, and one of the same sex for adult persons. . . . Some rules forbid more than one, either in baptism or confirmation.'[1]

The number demanded by the English Church may be due to early stormy days when it was felt necessary to throw about the child as strong a bulwark of Christian friends as possible. They were, as is seen by the 29th canon, obliged to be communicants, and therefore naturally expected to be keenly interested in the spiritual training of the child. It was their duty to see that their god-children were taught to know the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, to learn their Catechism, and to be brought to the bishop to be confirmed by him.

5. Present practice.—It is to be feared that great laxity in practice is now to be found, partly through unwillingness to interfere with the rights

[1] *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, bk. xi. ch. viii. § 11.

of the parents, partly through the choice that is so often made, not of those who will be of spiritual help, but of those to whom the offer of the responsibility seems to be a compliment. And it is largely owing to this want of care in seeing that the baptized are spiritually educated that we find thousands of the baptized so ignorant of the most elementary principles of Christianity, in this particular offering a sad contrast to the intelligence and knowledge of catechumens in the mission field.

LITERATURE.—J. Bingham, *The Antiquities of the Christian Church*, bk. xi. ch. viii., *Works*, new ed., Oxford, 1855, iv. 143 ff.; *DCA* ii. 1923–1925; *The Prayer Book Dictionary*, ed. G. Harford and M. Stevenson, London, 1912, p. 371; F. Procter and W. H. Frere, *A new Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer*, do. 1901, p. 575n.; Darwell Stone, *Holy Baptism*[3], do. 1901, p. 100 ff.

G. H. S. WALPOLE.

SPONTANEITY.—Spontaneity, in its most general meaning, denotes some form of internally initiated action. It is usually opposed to externally caused events, and probably arose in the defence of some sort of freedom as distinguished from determined or necessitated action. It is not exactly co-extensive with the idea of free action, as the latter implies reflexion and deliberation. Spontaneity seems to consist with unconscious action, though implying that it originates in the subject of it as distinguished from externally initiated actions.

In the physical world actions and motions connected with its natural order are supposed to be caused by some agency outside the subject in which the event takes place. Matter is supposed to be inert, which means that it will not change its present condition, whether of motion or of rest, without the interposition of external causes. Physical events do not take place of themselves—*i.e.*, they are not spontaneous. Hence we say that they are determined, and we mean by this that they are caused from without. But in living organisms we observe a type of actions that, whatever ultimate mechanical influences are supposed, seem to originate wholly within the subject of them. They apparently have no external causes. Consequently we have come to call them spontaneous. Plato called all such action 'self-motion.' This was his conception of free action. Later philosophic thought added self-consciousness and purposive mental states to the notion of freedom, and included spontaneity in it. This freedom implied the possibility of alternative choice as well as self-originative action, and the idea of spontaneity had either to be synonymous with this or to represent the unconscious but subjectively initiated actions of the lower organisms, which did not seem to be mechanically caused. It thus stood as a conception half-way between determined and free actions.

Thus spontaneity is a condition or element of freedom and responsibility, but does not constitute the whole of them. Responsibility implies conscious choice and the knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, as well as subjective causation. Freedom may not imply more than conscious choice and self-caused actions, and so is not coterminous with responsibility. But spontaneity denotes nothing more than subjective causality, and may occur without conscious choice or the distinction between right and wrong. It is therefore the initial stage of development, or the point of transition, between mechanical and consciously determined actions.

LITERATURE.—G. F. Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1896–97, ch. vi.; A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*[3], London and New York, 1880; J. H. Hyslop, *The Elements of Ethics*, New York, 1895, ch. iv.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

SPRINGS AND WELLS.—See WATER, WATER-GODS.

STAFF.—A staff or wand carried in the hand has been put to many and various uses by man in the development of culture. The most obvious use for such an instrument is defence or attack. A piece of wood from two to four inches long is the constant companion of women in Australia and elsewhere; by its aid yams, fish, game, honey, and so forth are procured. By people to whom writing is unknown notched sticks are employed as helps to memory and as a means of carrying messages from one tribe to another. In this article, however, we shall confine our attention to the use of staves as instruments of magic or divination and as ensigns of dignity and authority.

1. **The magico-religious use of staves.**—In most parts of the uncivilized world wands carried in the hand are used for magico-religious purposes. Staves form part of the equipment of the medicine-man almost everywhere. These wands are regarded as endowed with supernatural power in various ways; sometimes it depends on an incantation sung over the instrument, as in the case of the pointing stick, at other times the magical virtue is inherent in the material itself, as, *e.g.*, the twigs of hazel or the mistletoe bough. Again, a rod may be possessed of magical power only on certain occasions (Midsummer Night, St. John's Day, etc.) or at particular places (*e.g.*, a tree grown on a grave).

The conception of sacredness in primitive society is generally allied to that of authority. It is therefore not surprising that the staff of office is often at one and the same time part of the insignia of rank and a magical instrument. The horse-staves of the Buriats may be quoted as an example of this class of wand. It is only in higher culture that the sceptre proper is found, usually having evolved out of an implement originally intended for defensive purposes.

The classification of the so-called *bâtons de commandement* is by no means easy, as their function is not yet clear. It seems almost certain from their ornamentation that they were used for ritual purposes, though their name suggests that they were wands of office. For the sake of convenience we shall consider them under the heading 'wands of office' (below, 3), although they seem to be more closely related in function to the Australian *churinga*.

2. **Magic wands.**—(*a*) *The pointing stick.*—One of the commonest forms of magic is the 'pointing' of a stick or bone at some individual with the object of injuring him. Among the Arunta tribe of Central Australia these pointing sticks are known under various names, such as *injilla*, *irna*, *ullinka*, etc. These may be taken as typical examples of a class of magical instruments of world-wide distribution. The *injilla* and *irna* are small bones about six inches long, at one end of which is a small lump of resin, and round this a few strands of human hair are wound. When a man (sometimes called *kurdaitcha*) goes forth to avenge the death of one who is supposed to have fallen a victim of evil magic, he equips himself with this instrument, and, after charging it with magical properties by muttering over it an incantation such as 'May your heart be rent asunder!', he points it in the direction of the foe. In due course the victim invariably dies, unless the evil magic can be removed by a medicine-man.[1] In the Malay form of *tuju*, or pointing, the sorcerer points a magic dagger or other weapon, repeating a similar curse, towards an enemy, who forthwith sickens and dies.[2]

The *irna* differs from the *injilla* by being rather longer, tapering to a point at one end, and not having a hair string

[1] Spencer-Gillen[3], p. 534 f.
[2] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 199.

attached to it. The *ullinka* is a special form of *irna* with a hooked end instead of a lump of resin, and is supposed to be the charm used by the *iruntarinia*, or spirits, to annoy and often to kill men against whom they have some special grudge.[1]

Any stick, wand, or weapon which has been thus 'sung' is thought to be endowed with *mana* (*q.v.*) of a malignant nature — *arungquiltha*, as the Australian native would say. So strong is this belief that there are several cases on record of slight wounds from a charmed spear or boomerang proving fatal, by the power of suggestion.[2]

(*b*) *Churinga.*—When a man in Central Australia desires to use magic to help him to secure a wife from a distant group, he takes a small wooden *churinga* (sacred instrument of wood or stone), about six or eight inches long, called a *namatwinna*, and goes into the bush, accompanied by two or three friends. All night long the party keep up a low singing of songs and amorous phrases addressed to the woman. At daylight the man stands up and swings the *churinga*, causing it first to strike the ground as he whirls it round and round and makes it hum. The sound is supposed to reach the woman and stir up her affections towards the man.[3]

Special *churinga* may be used in various ways for particular magical purposes. Thus the *churinga unginia*, which has a lump of resin attached to one end and is painted with alternate stripes of red and black, is thought to promote the growth of the beard. Another is used to allay inflammatory affection of the eyes, consequent upon the bites of flies. Women, by procuring the spear-like seed of a long grass, and charming it by singing some magic chant over it, are able to injure a male enemy by pointing and throwing it towards him.[4]

(*c*) *Divining-rods.*—A tree that grows on a grave is regarded by the S. Slavonian peasant as sacred.

'Whoever breaks a twig from it hurts the soul of the dead, but gains thereby a magic wand, since the soul embodied in the twig will be at his service.'[5]

In Europe magical properties are attributed to certain flowers, seeds, and branches of trees gathered at midsummer.

Thus in Moravia, Mecklenburg, and apparently in England and Scotland, branches of hazel were cut down by night on Midsummer Eve, as mystic divining-rods, capable of revealing treasures buried in the ground, and also of detecting thieves and murderers. In the neighbourhood of Berlin it is said that 'every seventh year there grows a wonderful branch on a hazel bush, and that branch is the divining-rod.' This can be found only on the evening of St. John's Day, by 'an innocent child, born on a Sunday and nursed in the true faith.' If the rod is to discover gold, it is named Casper; if it is to reveal silver, it is called Balthasar; if it is to point out hidden springs of water, it is dubbed Melchior. In Sweden Midsummer Eve is also the usual time for procuring the divining-rod. Sometimes it is cut from a mistletoe bough, and sometimes from four different kinds of wood—mistletoe, mountain-ash, aspen, and another. When such a rod is laid on the ground directly over treasure, 'it will begin to hop about as if it were alive.'[6]

Plants like the mistletoe are frequently regarded as containing magical virtue—perhaps, as Frazer suggests, because they do not grow on the ground. Branches of these plants are often to be found attached to the ceiling of a house or over a stable door to prevent the ingress of witches. The famous golden bough that grew on a holm-oak in the Arician grove at Nemi is compared by Virgil to the mistletoe[7]—a view revived by Frazer in his immortal work which takes its title from the legend.[8] The mistletoe may well have been described as the 'golden bough' on account of the rich golden tinge which the plant assumes in withering. The yellow colour of the bough may have suggested its supposed property of discovering the spots where gold exists in the earth.[9]

Iron rods are used in rain-making among the Bari of Africa. One of these rods is provided with a hook, and another is a two-headed spear. With the hook the rain-maker hooks and attracts the rain-clouds; with the two-headed spear he attacks and drives them away. To make women fruitful, the rain-maker chief takes an iron rod with a hollow bulb at each end, in which are small stones. Grasping the rod by the middle, he shakes it over the would-be mother, rattling the stones and muttering an incantation.[1]

These are a few examples of sticks carried in the hand that are used as instruments of magic. Closely associated with the Australian *churinga* and pointing sticks are the various poles and posts erected in connexion with solemn magico-religious rites—*e.g.*, the *nurtunga*, the *kauaua*, the *ambil-yeri-kirra*, the *waninga*, the *arachitta* poles used by the natives in their initiation ceremonies.[2]

3. Wands of office.—(*a*) *Bâtons de commandement.*—Before considering examples of staves used as insignia of office, a word must be said regarding the somewhat mysterious *bâtons de commandement* found in palæolithic caves. In their simplest form they are rods of reindeer horn, having one or more holes bored through them. Sometimes they are carved into a simple symmetrical form without ornamentation; at other times they are elaborately decorated with engravings of animals, especially the horse. One of these implements found by Lartet and Christy at La Madeleine is engraved on both sides with figures of horses following one another, four on one side and three on the other. Another staff from the same shelter has engravings of two fishes and a horse. In several cases the end is fashioned to represent the head of an animal. On a baton found in the cavern Mége Teyjat (Dordogne) appear the head of a hind, serpents, swans, a finely-engraved horse at a trot, and three curious anthropomorphic figures.[3]

Among the carvings on bones collected by M. Piette there are several skinned animal-heads, which surely can be explained only in terms of magic, since, as Salomon Reinach has pointed out, it is unthinkable that the pre-historic designer worked from a skinless model to improve his art.[4] What, then, is the significance of these elaborately decorated objects? De Mortillet called them *bâtons de commandement* because he imagined that they were sceptres, similar in type and purpose to the ivory wands ceremonially carried before persons of importance among the Eskimos, and to the clubs used in like manner by certain chiefs in N. America. Others have identified them with hooks for fastening garments—a rude kind of fibula.[5] It is not easy to believe, however, that a piece of bone about 18 inches in length would have been employed for this purpose, since the Magdalenians were quite capable of making more convenient fasteners. Moreover, there is not the slightest trace of similar objects used in this way by the Eskimos. Boyd Dawkins's view that they were arrow-straighteners is more plausible, though by no means convincing.[6] Sollas favours this explanation owing to the remarkable resemblance between the Magdalenian staff and the Eskimo's arrow-straightener,[7] but it has yet to be proved that Magdalenian man was acquainted with the bow. By other authors the *bâtons* have been identified as parts of reindeer harness, hunting trophies, tent-pegs, drum-sticks, and magic wands. That they have some magico-religious significance seems to be apparent from the elaborate ornamentation and their similarity to staves used for ritual purposes among modern people in a primitive state of culture. Bernardin compared the genealogical staves of the Maoris with the *bâtons de commandement*, interpreting the notches with which they are often marked as indicative of the chief's genealogy, and the drawing of an animal on one side as a tribal badge.[8] If they are taken in conjunction with the smooth pebbles painted on one side with dots and bands in red and black ochre, found by Piette at Mas d'Azil, it seems more than probable that these so-called staves of office were used ritually in 'pre-historic sanctuaries' as *churinga* or magic wands. In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to affirm definitely that they were part of the ritual machinery of a palæolithic totemic cult, since the existence of the practice of totemism in this age is not con-

[1] Spencer-Gillen[s], p. 534f. [2] *Ib.* p. 537 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 541. [4] *Ib.* p. 545 ff.
[5] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 33.
[6] *Ib.* pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 67 ff.; cf. A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, do. 1884, p. 191 ff.
[7] *Æn.* vi. 205 ff.
[8] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 315 ff.
[9] *Ib.* n. 287.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 347.
[2] See art. POLES AND POSTS.
[3] *Rev. de l'Ecole d'Anthrop.* xix. [1909] 63.
[4] *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, Paris, 1905–12, iv. 36.
[5] *L'Anthropologie*, xii. [1901] 190.
[6] *Cave Hunting*, London, 1874, p. 355.
[7] *Ancient Hunters and their Modern Representatives*, London, 1915, p. 454.
[8] *Revue savoisienne*, Feb. 1876, p. 12; cf. *RA* ii. [1899] 478; *L'Anthrop.* xiv. [1903] 357.

clusively proved. It is not too much to say, however, that the gradually accumulating evidence is pointing to the latter conclusion.[1]

(*b*) *Horse-staves.*—Although we do not follow de Mortillet in his interpretation of the function of *bâtons de commandement*, yet there is abundant evidence that in all stages of culture a rod or staff has been regarded as a token of authority. The shamans among the Buriats of Baikal, in S. Siberia, are equipped with two horse-staves, made of wood or of iron, as part of the insignia of their office. When a novice is about to receive his first consecration, two planks are cut out of a birch-tree growing in the forest where the shamans are buried. This is done in such a manner that the tree does not die, as its death would be a bad omen for the shaman. From these planks the wooden horse-staves are made. The implement is 80 cm. long, having a horse's head carved at one end, and at the other the form of a hoof. Some distance from the lower end the knee-joints of the horse are cut out. Little bells, one of which is larger than the rest, are tied to the horse-staves, together with small conical weights of iron, blue, yellow, and red ribbons, and strips of ermine and squirrel fur. To add to the effect, miniature stirrups are also attached. The iron horse-staves, which the shaman does not receive till he is given the iron cap after the fifth ablution or consecration, resemble the wooden staves, and represent the horses on which he is supposed to ride to the upper and lower worlds.[2] The horse-staves, drums, and other ritual implements are kept in the *shiré*, a box 3½ ft. long and 1 ft. deep, standing on four legs. According to Klementz, the horse-staves take the place of the drum among the Buriats.[3]

(*c*) *Clubs and maces.*—The staves of office among people in higher states of culture have for the most part developed out of the wooden club, originally intended for defensive purposes. The simplest form of club is that made by cutting off the root ends of small trees to form a 'head,' the root-stumps making the weapon the more formidable and effective. The latter advantage has led to other clubs, not similarly provided with natural projections of this kind, being furnished with them artificially. In process of time these imitation root-stumps became conventionalized, especially when iron displaced wood in the manufacture of weapons.[4] An examination of mediæval maces and similar staves of office will reveal their lowly origin. In the ceremonial maces of the 17th cent. the clubbed end has become the handle, while the handle end has become the larger and more imposing by the addition of crowns and other ornamentation.

In America every tribe used clubs for defensive purposes, but after the adoption of more effectual weapons, as the bow and the lance, clubs in many cases were relegated to ceremonial functions. The chief man of the Mohave carried a potato-masher-shaped club in battle, similar to those found in the caves in S. Arizona. The Zuñi used in certain ceremonies huge batons made of agave flower-stalks, and in the new fire ceremonies of the Hopi a priest carries a club of the same material, shaped like a plumed serpent. Carved wooden batons were frequently carried by chiefs, shamans, and song-leaders on state occasions, as emblems of authority or rank, among the north-west tribes of America. In pre-historic times long stone knives, beautifully flaked, appear to have been frequently employed as ceremonial weapons, and their use still continues in parts of California. Among the Kwakiutl tribe club-shaped batons, carved to represent various animals, are used by the leaders in ceremonial dances.[1]

(*d*) *The scipio.*—In early classical times the sceptre was a long staff tipped with a metal ornament carried by persons in high official positions—kings, judges, consuls, priests, military leaders, etc. The sceptre of King Agamemnon was worshipped as a god at Chæronea; a man acted as priest of the sceptre for a year at a time, and sacrifices were offered to it daily.[2] Representations on the walls of the painted tombs of Etruria show that among the Etruscans sceptres of great magnificence were used by kings and priests. From these the Roman *scipio eburneus*, the ivory rod carried by the consul, was probably derived. On the medallions of the later Empire figures are represented holding rods tipped with an eagle (*sceptrum Augusti*).

(*e*) *The pastoral staff.*—With the advent of Christianity the *scipio* became an episcopal ornament.[3] Some writers regard the crozier as the survival of the *lituus*, or rod, used by the Roman augurs in their divinations, because this was curved at the top, recalling the shepherd's crook of the mediæval pastoral staff. But, since the crook did not appear till towards the end of the 9th cent., this suggestion seems to be highly improbable, if not altogether impossible. The only instance of a curve at the top of a pastoral staff before this time is in the sacramentary of Autun (*c.* 800),[4] but, as the date of the document is uncertain, the evidence is of little value. The early illustrations of croziers represent them as long rods held in the left hand and surmounted by a sphere.[5] This type persisted till the 10th century. The curve first appeared in the West as a right-angular band at the top of the staff resembling a modern walking-stick—*e.g.*, St. Fillan's staff at Edinburgh. This fact has led some to find the origin of the ornament in an ordinary walking-stick, but the more probable explanation seems to be that it was evolved out of the ancient staff of office carried by persons of rank as a symbol of jurisdiction. This view is supported by the fact that it has been customary from the Middle Ages for church officers to bear *ferules*, or wands, on certain occasions[6]—a custom that still survives in the wands carried in procession by churchwardens.

(*f*) *The beadle's staff.*—Just as the pastoral staff is the symbol of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the mace the outward sign of the corporation, so, as the movement towards local self-government developed, the authority exercised over the parish by the local officers was marked by the beadle's staff. Staves were borne by the parochial authorities from the time of Elizabeth and perhaps earlier. It was, however, after the Restoration that the beadle's staff came into general use. The creation of 50 new parishes in the City of London in Queen Anne's reign gave occasion for the making of a considerable number of staves, which accounts for the fact that very many in this district bear a date about that time. The numerous examples of staff-heads may be divided into: (1) plain pear-shaped knobs, (2) statuettes of saints and models of buildings such as Cripple Gate, the Tower of London,

[1] Cf. art. SACRIFICE (Introductory and Primitive).
[2] *JAI* xxiv. [1895] 86-90; cf. M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, Oxford, 1914, p. 224.
[3] Cf. art. BURIATS, vol. iii. p. 16.
[4] H. Balfour, *The Evolution of Decorative Art*, London, 1893, p. 93 ff.

[1] F. Boas, 'The Social Organisation and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians,' in *Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus. for 1895*, Washington, 1897, p. 311; A. P. Niblack, 'Coast Indians of S. Alaska and N. British Columbia,' *ib. for 1888*, do. 1890, p. 128.
[2] Paus. IX. xl. 6.
[3] *De eccles. Offic.* lib. ii. cap. v.
[4] Léopold Delisle, 'Le Sacramentaire d'Autun,' *Gaz. Archéol.* [1884], p. 13, pl. 22.
[5] O. M. Dalton, *Catalogue of Early Christian Antiquities in the British Museum*, London, 1901, p. 53; *The Benedictional of Archbishop Robert*, ed. H. A. Wilson, do. 1903, p. xi.
[6] *Voyages liturgiques de France*, Paris, 1718, p. 29; *Archæologia*, liii. [1890] 277 ff.

etc., (3) medallions, mitres, crowns, crosses, etc.[1] The beadle in his official robes, staff in hand, is still to be seen in a few churches conducting the preacher from the priest's stall to the pulpit. The devout, however, will hardly regret that the quaint emblem of civil authority has, in most cases, given place to the symbol of redemption surmounting a tall wand of wood and metal, borne at the head of processions.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes; cf. art. REGALIA. E. O. JAMES.

STARS.—See SUN, MOON, AND STARS.

STATE.—1. Evidence.—The nature of the state is to be discovered by the observation of about forty contemporary organizations; each must be analysed and its value estimated both from the point of view of those (citizens or subjects) who belong to it and from the point of view of those who are not its citizens or subjects. But, since all states are results of growth, they must be understood by reference to the past. The number of states in existence is always changing; their organization is often entirely transformed and the relations of one to the other vary infinitely. Again, since there are many other forms of social organization (churches, clubs, trade unions, capitalist companies, etc.), the state must be understood by comparison with these, both as to past history and as to present circumstances. But underlying all organizations are the passions and ideas of men and women. These are to be seen not only in the actual structure of the forty or more states now existing, but also in the tendencies of government and law; for these point to a future which is somewhat different from the present. And, since the actual tendencies do not always indicate the intentions or ideals of men, such ideals should influence our judgment of the state; for an effective ideal sometimes corrects a tendency and sometimes illuminates actions which appear to be irrational.

An analysis of state structure at present should be derived less from philosophical treatises than from official reports and the unofficial comments on administration; for the philosopher is often unable to believe his eyes, even when he determines to use them. But the agent of the state and the practical man, on the other hand, seldom understand what they are doing, as the oarsman seldom understands mechanics. We must therefore interpret; and for this purpose we refer to philosophic writers, allowing always for their tendency to emphasize the obsolete and discounting the national or provincial limitations of all 'classical' authors.

From such evidence, from about forty specimens in contact one with the other and each with many different social organizations, from tendencies, ideals, reports, comments on administration, and philosophical opinions, we must discover the nature of the state. Every state to which we refer is independent of others in its internal administration and equal, at least in theory, to all others in its external rights; therefore it is called sovereign. Other uses of the word 'state' (*e.g.*, United States) we neglect, and we omit the discussion of part-sovereignty (*e.g.*, Oman). But, even if we limit the name to sovereign states, it must be recognized to be a name for a changing object and only for what is common to many different specimens.

2. General idea.—The state is at present the supreme organization of political life, and political life is that part of social life which is concerned with setting in order the various interests of man.[2] The state is not, therefore, necessarily concerned with religion as the Church is, nor with trade as the company or the trade union is, nor with art as the academy is, although the state must take account and adjust the claims of all these. In that sense politics is architectonic; but the state is not for that reason superior, as the policeman is not superior to the artist. There are, however, certain issues in which the state must take precedence, not only in authority, but also in affection, as, *e.g.*, when order or liberty is threatened. The precedence due to the state in purely political issues and in certain crises does not imply worship, since the state is a means to full social life and individuality and in no sense an end in itself.

It is implied in this conception of the state that social life takes shape in different forms of 'community,' if we understand by that word any unit of social grouping the 'frontiers' of which are sufficiently definite to be felt as dividing those who belong to the group from those who do not. Some of these communities are more permanent than others; some imply a more conscious common purpose among the members. A village community is more permanent than a committee; the members of a scientific society are more conscious of a common purpose than the members of a church. And among all the forms of community there are now distinct and co-ordinate communities or social organizations representing purposes or tendencies of men which are not normally confused or subjected one to the other: these are states, churches, labour organizations, capitalist companies, etc. The present distinctions of social organization are the result of a long development; for in earlier times only one form of social organization fulfilled vaguely all the functions now fulfilled separately by very many different 'communities.' That earlier form is sometimes called a state; but we shall not include that meaning in our use of the term. At present there is a distinct form of social organization through which administration, law, police, 'defence,' and other distinct social functions are fulfilled, and this alone we call a state. It is co-ordinate with religious or trade organizations; but its relations with these are not yet clear, either in theory or in practice. All that is obvious is that a church or religious society is not a part or a dependency of the state; nor is the state inferior to any church. Associations of those who have a common economic purpose are, also, not necessarily parts or dependencies of the state; nor is the state an economic unit. The state, however, must not be identified with 'the government.' It is the whole group of those who have, consciously or unconsciously, a common political purpose. We may, therefore, speak in metaphor of the soul of the state, as men used to speak of the soul of the Church. The members of a state, whether divided or not in religion, trade interests, or intellectual pursuits, are bound together by a sentiment, which is the expression of a vague purpose. On the other hand, this soul of the state is nothing without administration, which is the invariable sign of political life. Thus obedience to law is ultimately dependent upon enthusiasm for or acquiescence in a particular form of state life; but few men are 'politicals' in their inmost thoughts or for most of their lives, and perhaps very few men find in a state and its activities the highest and most permanent object of their enthusiasm, although many can be easily persuaded that all they hold valuable would be destroyed if the form of state life to which they are accustomed happened to disappear. In subordination to the state are all other forms of organization of the same social 'order' (*i.e.* the

[1] M. and C. Thorpe, *London Church Staves*, London, 1895.
[2] See art. POLITICS.

political order)—*e.g.*, municipal or provincial councils, systems of education and sanitation. As the activities directly connected with political organization tend to increase, the differentiation of subordinate state functions proceeds farther; but there is no likelihood of trade or religion or science or art being entirely absorbed by the state, although some would aim at such an artificial simplification of social organization. The tangled luxuriance of modern society annoys many; it is an object of perception, without emotion, for our present purpose. The state is the result of a relation between individuals, but all individuals are grouped in various ways, and the state may therefore be also the result of a relation between their groupings; that is to say, the 'members' of a state are not only individuals but also groups of individuals of the political order.

3. Internal structure.—The development of social life through which the state has reached its present form and position is dealt with in the art. POLITICS. Here we must analyse the present situation in political life; and for this purpose it is necessary to distinguish the inner structure of the state from its external contacts, although we must admit that neither would be what it is but for the other. Internal discord promotes external wars, and wars assist domestic tyranny. The internal structure of states is more highly developed, it has been given more thought, than the external contacts; for frontiers were once the limits of interest for the majority of citizens, subjects, or rulers.

(*a*) *Administration.*—The most important feature of internal structure is administration. The so-called executive is, therefore, the most general phenomenon of state life; the members of the executive are theoretically agents of the state group, and their action is state action. There is indeed a pious belief of philosophers that they express the 'real will' of the members (citizens or subjects) of the state; but the words imply too conscious a political life. In fact in most states most inhabitants acquiesce in the acts of an executive. This is an inherited attitude; and the forms of executive or administrative action are also in great part inherited. There are emperors, kings, and also presidents, and, more powerful in normal life than these, permanent officials generally belonging to a close social caste, with others of subordinate castes under them—secretaries, burgomasters, prefects, town clerks, inspectors, and policemen. In the administrative acts of these the state used to appear as repressive (a hindrance of hindrances), and now begins to appear as directive.

Internal structure differs in homogeneous (national) states and heterogeneous (non-national or imperial) states; for in the latter selected members of one (predominant) race administer the affairs of districts inhabited by other races. The subject races are necessarily not citizens, since that word implies a right to assist in choosing the form of administration. The frontiers of states therefore do not always mark distinctions of nationality; but in most states the administration is marked by the characteristics of one nationality, and unity of administration tends to eliminate the antagonisms of race, unless one race is oppressive to the other.

Local government is roughly of two kinds—regional, as in Great Britain and the United States, or centralized, as in France and Germany. In the regional type of government the inhabitants of small districts choose their own administrators for local interests (sanitation, housing, roads, etc.); in the centralized systems prefects or burgomasters are appointed by the central government, and the inhabitants of the district are allowed only advisory functions. The two systems tend to assimilate through an inspectorate in the regional and local patriotism in the centralized state.

As regards larger units of population (above about 5,000,000) administration is either unitary or federal. In the former nearly all provincial affairs are dealt with at one centre; in the federal system large powers (in education, taxation, etc.) are given to provincial (sometimes called 'state') groups under the general control of a federal council and executive. The growth in the size of states has led to an increase of federal government, sometimes proceeding by the 'devolution' of powers from a central executive to provincial or district administrations, sometimes by the organizing of close political dependence upon a central authority of groups hitherto independent.

All these differences of internal structure within one common character of all states show the desire to make administration effective over large areas, while allowing for divergent interests of different localities, nationalities, or political capacities. There is no universal method of distinguishing interests peculiar to small groups from those common to many groups or indeed to the whole human race, and all good methods of administration allow for a continual change in such interests.

(*b*) *Legislation.*—Administration is, as it were, the action of the state, but legislation is its mind or will. A permanent instrument of continuous legislation is, however, a comparatively recent development in the life of states; and, although the executive has always depended upon the mind, will, or opinion of the state group, there was for long no voice for such will or opinion. Even now in many states (France, Italy, etc.), by a device known as 'administrative law,' the members of the executive are given a legal position which divides them from the ordinary citizen. The state, acting by its appointed agents, is given special privileges (courts, etc.) as against the ordinary citizen. This system, although it is a development of the old autocratic government, is not simply primitive, and it does not tend to disappear. It seems to be a distinct line of development, and is contrasted with the 'rule of law,' under which the agents of the state itself can be tried in the common courts. The latter system is peculiarly English; but it has no hold in countries in which the strength of state administration is believed to be of the first importance.

The vitality of the state is generally concentrated in a representative body, parliament, or chamber, in which new needs are met by new enactments. But some states have fixed or rigid constitutions, or bodies of law within which the powers of the representative chamber are confined, while other states depend upon an undefined tradition which may be indefinitely modified by the legislature. Between these two extreme types are the majority of state systems. Where the unity of the state is not 'natural,' or where the sense of that unity is not innate in the citizens, the fixed or rigid constitution is strongest; but, where there is a long tradition of unity, what seems to be the very essence of the state can be changed by the legislature of the day. The judicature is often said to be a third function within the state, but it is hardly on a level with the two others. In most states those who decide the meaning of law or apply it to cases are subordinated either to the legislature or to the executive. The judicial system is, however, an expression of the will or mind of the state, intermediate between the legislative and the executive.

(*c*) *Parties.*—The life of the state in the legis-

lature, and sometimes even in the executive, is shown in modern times by political parties, which with many variations in different lands seem in every state to conform roughly to two types—one devoted to the maintenance and development of established tradition, the other concerned with general principles of reform. Parties are also sometimes formed by social or economic classes for their own advantage; and sometimes the party is only the following of a strong person. It is usual to suppose that the parties in any state stand for differences which are subordinate to the common interest of all the citizens of that state; but this view is difficult to maintain in cases where the principles of the party refer to policy in general and not to specific local means to order and liberty. There is a tendency to underrate the value of parties in giving political consciousness, because of the abuses of party manipulation for trivial ends.

4. External contacts. — It is essential to the understanding of the state to note that every state is commonly regarded, by those who do not belong to it, as an armed band. The structure of every state and the attitude of its citizens are indeed greatly affected by the fact that every state is in contact with other states. The inherited contact may be described as suspicion tempered by diplomatic comity; but economic and cultural development has led to important beginnings of inter-state organization (the Universal Postal Union, etc.). There are administrative changes in the external structure of the state, and administration of this new kind tends to increase. It will undoubtedly change the common attitude towards 'other' states; and therefore it will affect the nature of the state. But the older non-administrative and quasi-legislative system of international law, together with its culminating expression in The Hague Conferences, has also considerably modified the nature of the state. Under such influences the state in its external contacts appears as one among many co-ordinate and equal political institutions; and state action, though not politically 'sanctioned,' is morally estimated by reference to a vague consensus of civilized opinion in all states. This section of state life is now developing rapidly, and therefore no conclusive or schematic view can be had of it.

In the external contacts of the state, where political organization has made no progress, crises occur which lead to a periodic atavism known as war. Preparations for this affect the structure and conduct of all states, and some states are so greatly affected that certain writers have thought war the highest function of state life. In war the external contacts of the belligerent states are reduced to force and fraud. There have been stages in state development when it seemed as if force and fraud would be delimited by distinguishing citizens from soldiers, neutrals from belligerents, and otherwise combining political and military conceptions; but it seems likely that such attempts will fail, because of the economic interdependence of groups and the more destructive mechanisms of modern times.

5. Tendencies.—The facts which we have so far analyzed are the result of about 2000 years of development, and the development has not ceased. In order to understand the state, therefore, we must look towards the future. The general tendencies are as follows.

(1) There has been an increase in the size (area and population), with a decrease in the number, of states. This decrease was most marked in the 19th cent. and has been due not only to conquest but also to political subordination following economic pressure. It is not clear whether, as some expect, the tendency will result in small states becoming mere satellites to empires; but already, in spite of the theory of international law, the 'Great Powers' arrange differences without consulting other states. The increase in the size of states involves that similar administration and similar laws are established among great numbers who inhabit vast spaces; and therefore the frontiers of political administration are fewer. If frontiers are regarded as sources of friction, the decrease in their number involves a decrease in the probabilities of war; and the greater size of states is, from this point of view, an advantage. But a larger state involves a greater number of officials and, what is more important, a greater separation between citizens and these officials, their agents. The result is that state action tends to become dehumanized, and no responsibility is felt by the general body of citizens for the acts done on their behalf. Thus the good effects of democratization are often counteracted by the evil effects of officialism. This obviously is not peculiar to political organization. The same causes have led to increase in the size and decrease in the numbers of businesses; and large financial companies tend to destroy the sense of moral responsibility among their members for the actions done in their interest.

(2) The second important tendency is the increasing frequency of contact between all states, even those far distant. Frontiers have become lines of contact as much as marks of division. Commercial treaties increase in number, and diplomacy is a continuous process, inter-relating all states. Here also the political world is like the economic; and, as in the economic sphere a world market is created by contact, so in the political sphere contact produces similarity of moral standards, of action, and even of administrative structure. If the trend of events in the 19th cent. continues, there will be much more common political ground for the whole human race, and this may possibly result in developing the League of Nations.

(3) On the other hand, there is a third tendency to variety of political structure. The monarchies of the 18th cent. were much more like one another than are the republics of the 20th. Political consciousness is more highly developed, and the result is a greater variety in the devices of administration; *e.g.*, new methods of local government are being tried in various states.

(4) Underlying the variety of structure there is a general tendency towards what may be called by the old name of democracy. The simple-minded faith of Rousseau, indeed, is not accepted without corrections; but there is undoubtedly an increasing control of government in most states by the ordinary citizen. This is no obstacle either in theory or in practice to the recognition of special ability. With this we may connect the increase of state action in favour of the greater number of the inhabitants of the territory of the state. The rights of the majority are being recognized even before their power is acquired. Wage-slavery, starvation, and premature death, now suffered by nine-tenths of the human race, may yet be regarded as of greater political importance than the 'rights of property' or the development of trade; but the nine-tenths of the race are politically powerless, and state-action—*e.g.*, to decrease infant mortality—will depend, not upon the number who have the vote, but upon the sense of responsibility among voters. In the new democracy the citizen thinks in new terms, not in the terms of family, trade, party, or frontier.

6. Interpretation. — Such tendencies as these indicate the ideals which fitfully illuminate politi-

cal change. The intention of all those who are conscious of state life appears to be the attainment and maintenance of order and liberty—as much order as will allow all members of the state to develop their powers and as much liberty as will permit security of tenure or certainty of expectation. The kind of life desired, however, varies so much in different localities that what satisfies one group seems to another to be tyranny or licence. We are driven therefore to a philosophic interpretation of those human passions and ideas which result in ever-changing political organizations. A great part of the traditional interpretation is obsolete, and the inherited language is somewhat misleading. The state is not to be confused with society, and we must not identify individuality with citizenship. The problem of the citizen and the state is only one phase of the general problem of the individual and society. The 'real will' of the philosophers' creed is to be found in various social forms, not all in a hierarchy, but some co-ordinate. Any one civilized man is normally a meeting-place, occasionally a point of conflict, between different social allegiances which arise out of his different interests or emotions. He has special relations to others in accordance with their common dwelling-place, or language, or religion, or trade, or culture; and the state is that group of men, women, and children so related as to accept or to maintain a special method of obtaining order and liberty. Men so related are different from what they would be if, by an impossible hypothesis, they can be supposed to be separate atoms. There is no atomic individual. But, on the other hand, the state is not a new mind or soul. It is a reality of the social order, and metaphors drawn from the individual are misleading. The unity and fullness of state life are, however, often greater than those of a church or a trade union.

We have pointed out the signs of state life in administration and policy; but the State of which men sing, for which men die, is not the officialism of Washington or Whitehall. It may in metaphor be called a spirit or a soul, and it is expressed in myth as Britannia, La France, or Deutschland, although confused in such myth with the spirit of a nation. A nation, as distinct from a state, is usually held to be a group of those who speak the same language, are physically related, and accept the same moral tradition; and, where the boundaries of a state administration do not coincide with national distinctions, there are conflicts of allegiance. Other social groupings, such as churches, trading companies, and trade unions, also cause conflicts with state loyalty. The limit of allegiance is to be found by reference to the purpose for which state administration exists. No man is bound to support the action of a state official or even of the whole body of citizens in the sphere of fine art, for the state is not an institution for the purposes of artistry, nor is it supreme over art institutions. The precise delimitation of state functions may be difficult, but a limit does exist. In normal life, however, the conflict of claims is infrequent, and few are driven to decide a conflict of allegiance. The majority act impulsively on no consistent principles. It is therefore almost useless to define what we mean by the word 'state,' as it would be useless, except for purely legal purposes, to define what we mean by 'man.' State administration must be believed, by those who benefit directly, to exist for securing order and developing freedom. But every one of the institutions now called states is performing other functions besides this; and some such states appear to non-citizens to be obstructing that for which the state should exist. Again, every state is changing its nature under our very eyes; and it seems probable that the political and social life of the next century will create clearer distinctions between the different forms of organization within society and a rapid development of state activities.

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C. DELISLE BURNS.

STATE OF THE DEAD.

Primitive and Savage (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 817.
American.—See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (American).
Babylonian (R. W. ROGERS), p. 828.
Buddhist (E. J. THOMAS), p. 829.
Celtic.—See CELTS, § xvi., BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic), DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Celtic).
Chinese.—See COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD (Chinese), iii. 728.
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Egyptian.—See CREED (Egyptian), iv. 243, ETHICS (Egyptian), v. 476 ff., BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic), ii. 706.
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Japanese.—See BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Japanese).
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STATE OF THE DEAD (Primitive and Savage).—**1. Introductory.**—No subject connected with his psychic life has so engrossed the mind of man as that of his condition after death. Savages in all regions of the world have generally very clear and vivid conceptions of the spirit-world—its life, its characteristics, its landscapes—and this suggests an intense preoccupation with the subject. The wide-spread fear of the dead points to a very primitive idea that their state was not one in which life had ended. Death had cut off energies; that was obvious enough; but were there not other energies at work, or were not those energies capable of manifestation in subtle, mysterious ways? Whether men at first believed in a spirit, soul, or ghost, separate from the body, or not, there seems every reason to believe that they regarded the dead as still carrying on some kind of existence, which rendered them objects of dread. Where burial was in use, perhaps the simplest idea was that the dead man lived on in the grave in bodily form. Such practices as binding the dead with cords, laying heavy stones or a mound of earth on the grave (doubtless to prevent their egress), or feeding the dead at the grave, or, again, the idea that the dead could come forth from the grave,

not merely as spirits, but in the body—the root of the vampire superstition—all point in this direction. It is even confirmed by the fact that, where a separable spiritual essence is believed in, the spirit or ghost is invariably associated for a longer or shorter time with the grave, lingering round it for some days. The grave is the dead man's house—an idea surviving in the Scandinavian belief that the barrow is the abiding-place of the dead in bodily form. The idea of a subterranean world of the dead was probably of early origin, many graves together merging into one wide region underground, the individual grave or tumulus affording entrance to or egress from it. In the belief of many tribes the subterranean region is in the west, towards the setting sun. As the sun dies each day and sinks in the west, often to shine in the place of the dead, so man also goes in that direction. This idea of a western region of the dead is still found where an island spirit-world is believed in, or even, as with many prairie tribes of N. America, a distant paradise on the plains into which the sun seems to sink. Often, too, the idea of a return to the place whence the ancestors of the tribe first came, whether that was underground or not, is entertained. Again, where the spirit-land is on the surface of the earth, it is situated in distant mountains or valleys. Probably the conception of a spirit-world in heaven, or on the heavenly bodies, was not of primitive origin. As some think, it may have been suggested by the custom of cremation: as the smoke of the pyre rose upwards, so also did the soul.

The clear view of the other world found in many savage beliefs shows that men had thought much about it. Their fundamental idea of it was necessarily its likeness to this world: imagination then made it all that man could wish for; it was better, pleasanter, happier than this world. On the other hand, it might not be so good, but such an other world was usually for unworthy persons, and here retributive ideas, though not always on strictly ethical grounds, begin to dawn. The thoughts of men affected their dreams or trance-states. They believed that they saw the other world or that their spirits had been transported there. Dreams, trances, swoons, affected by the belief, reacted upon it in turn and gave greater detail to it.

Savages often assert that their knowledge of the state of the dead is derived from dreams. The Andaman Islanders, who think that no mortal has ever gone to the other world, assert that a medicine-man once had a dream about it.[1] The New Caledonians derive their knowledge from convulsionaries who have visited the land of the dead in trances—*i.e.* from their vivid dream experiences.[2] The Sia also have gained acquaintance with it from men who died for a time (passed into a swoon) and looked into the spirit-region, though they, like many other tribes, say that much knowledge was gained from the dead, who once returned bodily to enjoy a feast.[3] Medicine-men, who are very commonly believed to project their spirits into the other world, are also propagators of knowledge regarding it.[4]

The long journey to the other world, the obstacles encountered, the ordeals to be undergone, the spirits or demons to be met with, are often the subject of elaborate mythical accounts, and due preparation is made for the journey and its trials by the burying of objects with the dead, by the possession of necessary tatu marks, mutilations, and the like, or by acquaintance with what is likely to befall one. Where the sea has to be crossed, the boat is generally more or less magical. Constantly, too, we meet with the idea of a bridge over a river, ravine, or gulf. To cross this narrow log, serpent, or knife-edge bridge is usually an ordeal.[1] The journey of souls to the other world is often the subject of detailed descriptive myths, affording knowledge to the soul of what it will encounter, just as in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* and the Orphic-Pythagorean tablets buried with the corpse. In Fiji it forms the subject of a long poem,[2] and elsewhere it is almost equally elaborate, or may even be roughly mapped out.[3] To aid the dead man on the way, to give him light or warmth, fires are very commonly lit on the grave, and in order to satisfy his hunger food-offerings are placed there, or regular feasts for the dead are made from time to time,[4] while moccasins or (at higher levels) shoes may be supplied to the corpse as protection against the rough journey.[5] Having once reached the other world, the spirit, according to well-nigh universal belief, can return to earth, mostly to its old haunts, often invisibly, but sometimes manifesting itself in various ways.

The beliefs of most savage peoples regarding the state of the dead are seldom of one exclusive pattern. There are instances of this, but often different views are held, even of a contradictory kind. Where no fixed dogmatic creed is taught and believed, traditional belief will vary, and different beliefs, perhaps evolved by one people or taken over from other tribes, will be found in different sections of a tribe. A savage may entertain alternative or even contradictory beliefs without feeling their incompatibility. Such beliefs, however, become more reconcilable when they concern the fate of the various souls with which a human body is often supposed to be animated.

How soon man began to believe in a state of the dead cannot now be discovered. But, while skeletons unearthed belonging to the earlier stages of the palæolithic culture have not apparently been those of corpses carefully buried, this need not preclude the supposition that burial-rites were in use then.[6] In late Acheulean times evidence of these begins to be found. Then and in the Mousterian period the dead were buried in or laid out on the floors of grottos and caverns. Some of the skeletons are in a crouching position, and stone tools or bones of animals, possibly remains of food-offerings, are found with them.[7] In the next, or Aurignacian, period the evidence of ceremonial burial and the existence of grave-goods continues. Some skeletons are embedded in a mass of small shells, or the head rests on a stone, or has a necklet and a crown of shells. Others lie in a bed of red earth. Implements are also found with the skeleton, as well as remains of food. In some cases a number of skeletons are carefully interred together.[8] The Magdalenian age burials (*e.g.*, at Laugerie Basse and Chancelade) and those of the Azilian-Tardenoisian horizon (as at Ofnet, Mas d'Azil, and Fère-en-Tardenois) show equally and even more elaborate traces of ceremonial burial.[9] In all these cases the frequent connexion of tomb and hearth, the carefully prepared attitude of the body, its interment in a special layer of foreign material, the custom of collective burial, and the presence of grave-goods and food-offerings point to reverence for the dead, to some religious concep-

[1] E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. [1883] 161.
[2] J. J. Atkinson, *FL* xiv. [1903] 257.
[3] *II RBEW* [1894], p. 143.
[4] See also art. Descent to Hades (Ethnic), § x.

[1] See art. Bridge, vol. ii. p. 852 f., and later sections of this article.
[2] Art. Fiji, § II. 4; B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 117 f.
[3] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 43.
[4] See art. Death and Disposal of the Dead (Introductory), §§ x., xv.
[5] See art. Shoes and Sandals.
[6] A. Keith, *The Antiquity of Man*[2], London, 1915, p. 185, finds evidence in the Galley Hill remains of burial in the Chellean period.
[7] H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*[2], London, 1916, pp. 24, 215 ff., 221; Keith, pp. 109, 116.
[8] R. Verneau, *Les Grottes de Grimaldi* (*Baoussé-Roussé*), tome ii. fasc. 1 ('Anthropologie'), Monaco, 1908, *passim*; Osborn, p. 302 ff.; Keith, p. 119.
[9] Osborn, pp. 376, 475 f.; R. R. Schmidt, *Die diluviale Vorzeit Deutschlands*, Stuttgart, 1912, i. 41; J. Dechelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique, celtique et gallo-romaine*, i. ('Archéologie préhist.'), Paris, 1908, pp. 314 ff., 505 f.

tions, and to some belief in survival after death.[1] In the neolithic age the ritual of burial and the graves and sepulchral monuments are still more elaborate, the rites including discarniture, painting and adorning the body or skeleton, very complete deposition of grave-goods, and occasionally secondary burial. So, too, in the bronze age similar respect for the dead is found. Such careful attention to them argues fixed religious beliefs and some clear conception of a future life, and this is confirmed by the existence of similar burial customs among savage tribes known to possess elaborate beliefs regarding the state of the dead.[2]

For a comparative view of the subject, the various beliefs of different peoples may be classified and each described under a different heading, but always with the condition, noted above, regarding variety of beliefs among the same people. Often, too, those beliefs merge into each other. In most cases savages limit their conception of the other world to their own people, not troubling themselves about the fate of other tribes, except in some instances regarding souls of enemies as their slaves or allotting to them an evil destiny. How far an unending immortality is consciously believed in is seldom quite clear. In some instances the soul dies a second or even a third death, and there is an end of it. Probably in most cases savages do not trouble much about the condition of long-dead ancestors, unless these are famous enough to have their memory preserved for generations. As little do they trouble themselves about the duration of the future life. Ghosts are feared as long as they exist or have power to revisit the earth. The fear is greatest for those most recently dead; more distant dead persons are forgotten by degrees, hence not feared, and their existence is not a matter of inquiry. Frequently, according to Hertz, the fear is greatest as long as the process of decomposition lasts, and until the secondary funeral rites are accomplished.[3]

See further art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 1.

2. Extinction after death.—There are very few savage peoples who believe in utter extinction, and, where the belief exists, it arises perhaps as much from lack of interest in other-world conditions—an unusual attitude with the savage—as from a sceptical outlook. On the other hand, it is not uncommon to find that extinction or some very undesirable fate is expected for the common herd or for certain persons obnoxious to society.

Some American Indian tribes, or individual members of tribes who believe in a future life, are said to entertain no such beliefs; and among the natives of Kiwai on the Fly River, British New Guinea, while there is a definite belief in a future life, some think that there may be no such state.[4] Hyades and Deniker report of the Fuegians that they have no belief in a future life, yet some of them believe that the *walapatu*, who make strange noises at night and try to enter the huts and eat them, are spirits of the dead. Others, however, regard them as men of a neighbouring tribe.[5] The Abipones, again, are said to be ignorant of what becomes of the soul after death and not to think of inquiring. Yet they believe that spirits of the dead become visible at the call of the necromancer, and that certain small ducks which fly by night are souls. There is also some belief that ancestral spirits are in the Pleiades.[1]

3. Vague ideas of a future state.—The case of the Abipones just mentioned illustrates what is not uncommon among some savages, viz. a vague conception of the future life, joined with the view that there is no special region of the dead. They remain about the homestead or in some neighbouring part of the country, or haunt the grave, or wander aimlessly around.

The Aetas, a Negrito people of the Philippine Islands, believe that the spirits of the dead are all around, or that they enter one spirit inhabiting a large boulder.[2] Some of the Dravidian tribes of India are equally vague in their belief. The Kotis worship a stone into which the spirit of the dead man is supposed to have entered on the eleventh day after cremation.[3] Among the Coorgs of Mysore large forests, untrodden by human foot, are set apart as abodes of deified ancestors.[4] On the fifth day after a death the Gonds recall the soul, and, catching a fish or an insect, bring it to the house and place it among the sainted dead of the family, believing that the spirit has thus been brought back to the house. Sometimes the animal is eaten in the belief that the spirit will be reborn as a child. Ancestors are represented by pebbles kept in the sacred part of the house. Good souls are easily appeased, but bad souls and spirits of those dying a violent or unnatural death are mischievous.[5] The Nāgas of E. Assam are doubtful whether the spirit remains in the corpse or at the grave or goes to a far country. Some think that it dwells on a high hill to the west, others that it remains in stone monuments near the village, and others that it goes to an underground paradise, like this world, where it dies a second time and goes to a lower state. Dying there once more, it returns to earth as a butterfly or small house-fly and then perishes for ever.[6] The Khonds bring back souls to the house through the medium of a cock or a spider, and feed them twice a year with rice, but they also believe that souls are reborn in children. Spirits of men killed by tigers are believed to guide tigers in search of fresh victims.[7] Among the Veddas of Ceylon the *nae yaku*, or recently dead, are believed to attend on Kande Yaka, though there is no idea as to his whereabouts. Spirits of the dead are vaguely supposed to be all around or in hills, caves, and rocks. Spirits of wives of headmen haunt slopes or tops of hills, where they are sometimes jealous of people gathering honey. Certain *yaku*, probably those of the forgotten dead, are regarded as attached to forest glades, large trees or rocks, and hill-tops. In the last case they tend to take the name of the hill. A regular cult is offered to all these spirits.[8]

In Africa many Bantu tribes appear to have little or no idea of a future place of souls.

Of the southern Bantu Macdonald says that the spirit-world is very hazy and uncertain to their minds.[9] Sometimes, as with the Thonga, several ideas seem to be current. Thus these people think that spirits go to a great village under the earth where everything is white, and where they till and reap, and possess cattle and everything else in abundance. The funeral rites, however, suggest that the grave is the house of the dead, while a third belief places ancestral spirits in sacred woods,

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1 Cf. Dechelette, i. 301 f.

2 Cf. Dechelette, i. 450 ff.; T. E. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy and Sicily*, Oxford, 1909, p. 113 ff., 169 ff., and *passim*; B. C. A. Windle, *Remains of the Prehistoric Age in England*, London, 1904, p. 128 ff.; art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Europe, pre-historic), vol. iv. p. 465b.

3 R. Hertz, *ASoc*, x. [1905–06] *passim*.

4 *11 RBEW*, p. 484; G. Landtman, 'Wanderings of the Dead in the Folk-Lore of the Kiwai-speaking Papuans,' in *Festskrift tillägnad Edvard Westermarck*, Helsingfors, 1912, p. 71.

5 *Mission scientifique du Cap Horn, 1882–83*, Paris, 1891, vii. 254 f., 257; J. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, London, 1900, p. 214 f.

1 M. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, tr. S. Coleridge, London, 1822, ii. 74 f., 270; T. Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, iii. 501; see also art. MASAI, vol. viii. p. 481b.

2 See *ERE* ix. 274a. 3 *IGI*, Oxford, 1907–09, xv. 389.

4 *Ib.* xi. 25. 5 *Ib.* xii. 325.

6 W. H. Furness, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 463.

7 *IGI* xv. 281 f.; *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xii., *Madras*, pt. i. p. 63.

8 C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 133, 140, 151.

9 J. Macdonald, *JAI* xx. [1891] 129.

intrusion on which is tabu, and where they live a family life under human form, but appear to the living as snakes.[1] The Bageshu think that spirits remain about the house, making their wants known through dreams.[2] The Awemba speak vaguely of their friends as becoming good spirits in the other world, but nothing is said of its whereabouts. Souls of chiefs haunt the thickets in which they are buried, and sometimes appear as pythons.[3] The Ba-Huana think that man possesses two souls: one, the *bun*, disappears at death, none knows where, except that the *bun* of a man with many fetishes may enter a large animal; the other soul, the *doshi*, lingers in the air, visits its friends, and haunts enemies.[4] The Baganda believe that spirits had to appear before the god of death, Walumbe, to give an account of their deeds and to pay their respects to him. They do not appear to have been rewarded or punished, and after this audience they returned to the places where their bodies lay. Ghosts dwelt among the living and played at noontide in the gardens, but they were also attached to their jawbones, and those of kings were kept in special temples.[5] Ghosts of common people among the Ba-hima wander round the kraals, after having visited a distant land. Kings are believed to become lions, princes and princesses serpents.[6] The Ba-Mbala think that the soul wanders about, and, if the grave is neglected, it disturbs or causes the death of its relatives. If it is satisfied, it takes the form of some animal, the kind and size of which depend upon the position held by the deceased in life.[7]

Among the Wagogo of E. Africa, though souls are worshipped, little is known as to a spirit-land, but there may exist some belief in transmigration.[8] The A-Kamba and other E. African tribes think the *aïmu*, or spirits of ancestors, of which every one has several in his body, sit at death in trees, good and bad apart. Miniature huts are built for them, and the woods cannot be trespassed on with impunity. These spirits are controlled by the impersonal deity Mulunga and speak through mediums. Each wife of a mortal man has also a spirit-husband, on whom largely depends her fruitfulness.[9] The A-kikúyu think that spirits wander about and haunt the huts, while some pass into animals. Others, again, go to Mi-i-ri-nuja Mi-kon-go-i, a residence of the dead of former generations. The whole belief regarding the dead is vague.[10] The tribes of E. Central Africa—Angoni, Manganya, etc.—believe that the dead live on in the old place and see all that goes on there, but sometimes they appear as animals in order to play pranks.[11]

The Hottentots abandoned the village at a death, lest the dead should return and torment them; medicine-men had the power to exorcize the ghosts, whose presence was indicated by rattling noises, while they beat the living almost to death. Prayer was made at the grave, however, and water was thrown on it soon after burial, 'to cool the soul.' Souls were said to go to God, but where precisely their locality was is uncertain, though the belief that stars were souls or eyes of the deceased may indicate that they were somewhere in the sky. Criminals and slaves killed by their masters were left to be devoured by beasts and so annihilated.[12]

Unlike some other African Pygmies, those of the Congo region are said to have little or no belief in a life after death, though some of the dead are vaguely thought to live on as snakes or red bush-pigs, whose strange bristles attract the attention of these people by their bright colour.[13]

Apart from such Bantu tribes as have been noted above, most African races—Negroes, etc.—have more definite beliefs regarding the dead, which, indeed, other Bantu groups are known to possess.

While with most of the Papuo-Melanesian tribes in New Guinea the belief in the other world is full and clear, with some of them it is not so.

The natives in the Cape King William district regard the spirits of the dead as playing by day in open meadows and hiding at night in the forest. There is also a belief in transmigration, while some think that spirits go eastwards to Bukaua on Huon Gulf to spend a shadowy existence there.[1] The Papuans of Wakatimi (Dutch New Guinea) regard *niniki* (ghosts) as 'things which you could not see but are here and there in the air about you,' and when asked where souls have gone point vaguely to the horizon, repeating the word 'far.'[2]

Other sporadic instances of vague beliefs are found in S. America, where certain tribes in Colombia think that the ghosts wander round their earthly dwellings after death, or, in the belief of the Orinoco tribes, round their graves.[3] The Lenguas of Paraguay have similar beliefs and think that the spirits can be seen at night. There is also a belief in a gloomy under world.[4]

The Mafulu, a Negrito people modified by Papuan influence, think that the ghost at death goes to the mountains, where it becomes, if under 45 years of age, the shimmering light on the ground where the sun penetrates the forest, or, if older, a fungus. What precise meaning is attached to 'become' was not ascertained. Ghosts come down from the mountains to get ghostly food, but whether as shimmering light and fungus is not clear. If a ghost is dissatisfied with his mountain abode, he may return to the village, not apparently as light or fungus, and there he does harm. Natives avoid this shimmering light and fungus when on the mountains.'[5]

4. **The state of the dead similar to earthly life.**—Such a similarity is definitely asserted in the beliefs of many widely scattered peoples; of others it may be deduced from the available data. But it should be observed that occasionally the conditions of life in the other world may be slightly better than those here, though not enough so to mark these instances as distinctively apart. Less often, too, the state of the dead may be regarded as not so good as that which they enjoyed on earth. We shall consider here some instances of such a future state in which it is more or less clearly expressed that it is open to every one.

Where a definite future life is believed in by the Bantu tribes of Africa, it is usually conceived as being on the whole similar to this life. The Basutos conceive it as underground—*mosima*, 'the abyss'—with green valleys and villages like those of earth, where man's feelings, ideas, and doings are much the same as here. Others think that the shades are calm and silent, without joy and without grief.[6] Where the Zulu belief is definite, it also refers to an under world which men have visited from this world, but combined with this is the common idea that the dead re-appear as snakes—a general Bantu belief.[7] The Bondei belief is that souls go into a mountain (Mlinga) by a brass door, but they can also wander about on earth and cause dreams.[8] Among the western Bantu, while the future life is vaguely conceived, it is still a shadowy replica of this life. The spirit-world is regarded as being all around men, good and bad living together in Njambi's town, much as they do here, but free from the limitations of this life. The great, good, and rich remain in the spirit-world and form a class of spirits called *awiri*, who may

1 H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, p. 350 f.
2 J. Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 188.
3 J. H. West Sheane, *JRAI* xxxvi. [1906] 152.
4 E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *ib.* p. 291.
5 J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, pp. 281 ff., 315.
6 Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 101 f.
7 Torday and Joyce, *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 417.
8 H. Cole, *JAI* xxxii. 328.
9 C. W. Hobley, *The Ethnology of A-Kamba and other E. African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 85 f.
10 W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People: the Akikúyu of British E. Africa*, London, 1910, p. 240.
11 Macdonald, *JAI* xxii. [1893] 114.
12 T. Hahn, *Tsuni-||Goam, the Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi*, London, 1881, pp. 85, 109, 112 f.; G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's*, Breslau, 1872, p. 338; A. Le Roy, *La Religion des primitifs*, Paris, 1911, p. 374.
13 H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 830, *George Grenfell and the Congo*, do. 1908, ii. 632.

1 R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, ii. 245. 259.
2 A. F. R. Wollaston, *Pygmies and Papuans*, London, 1912, p. 182 f.
3 T. Koch, *Intern. AE*, xiii., suppl. [1900] p. 118; J. Gumilla, *Hist. naturelle, civile, et géographique de l'Orénoque*, Paris, 1758, p. 351.
4 S. H. C. Hawtrey, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 288; see also art. PARAGUAY.
5 R. W. Williamson, *The Mafulu Mountain People of British New Guinea*, London, 1912, p. 266 f.
6 E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1860, p. 261; *ERE* ii. 855b.
7 See art. SERPENT-WORSHIP (Introductory and Primitive) § 2.
8 G. Dale, *JAI* xxv. [1896] 232.

wander as ghosts, or take some visible form, or be born as children or as animals.[1] The Yaos think that the *lisoka*, or soul, leaves its earthly abode never to return, and goes to Mulungu (God, or the spirit-world, or the aggregate of all spirits). The spirit is there endowed with such powers as it never had on earth and is worshipped in the ancestral cult which predominates among the people.[2]

Several Negro tribes believe in different non-material parts of man, the fate of which after death is of a varied kind.

Among the Tshi- and Ewe-speaking peoples there is a clear belief in two non-material parts: (1) the *kra* (Tshi), *luwo* (Ewe), a sort of guardian, indwelling spirit, which existed before a man's birth and has already served many men; its connexion with an individual terminates at death, when it becomes a *sisa* (Tshi) or *ñoli* (Ewe). The *sisa* may be reborn at once or may remain with the corpse as a *kra*, but then must eventually become a *sisa* and retire to the land of the *insisa*, across the river Volta, where the *insisa* live and build houses. Thence it may return and annoy the living if their *kra* is absent—*e.g.*, in sickness or dreams. The *ñoli* lingers by the grave for a time and then enters a newly-born child or an animal, becoming a *luwo* again. Failing this, it wanders about, doing good or ill according to its disposition. (2) The *srahman* (Tshi) or *edsieto* (Ewe) is a ghostly counterpart of the man. If he dies before his time—*e.g.*, in battle or by accident—it lingers round his dwelling before setting out for Srahmanadzi, the land of ghosts. Srahmanadzi is a shadowy counterpart of this world, where chiefs are chiefs and slaves are slaves, but it is gloomier than life here. Houses, forests, and rivers there are all ghosts of those once existing on earth. Every one retains the age at which he died, as well as any bodily imperfections possessed in life. Edsie is the Ewe counterpart of Srahmanadzi; by the eastern Ewe it is called Kutome. There is no belief in immortality among the Ewe: their Dead Land is inhabited only by ghosts of the recently dead, who are cognizant of what goes on here and sometimes cause sickness when they desire the services of their descendants.[3]

The Kagoro of the Niger believe that all men have shadows or souls with the voice and form of the body. The soul must cross the stream which separates this world from the next by a bridge, and, if its body is not really dead, it is sent back. Ghosts or souls (*mobwoi*) lead the lives of men, fighting, eating, drinking, but without houses. Ghosts are always hungry and thirsty, and punish their living relatives if their wants are not attended to. A ghost has also the power of transmigrating into the body of a descendant, after which it is reborn.[4]

The Nandi identify the shadow with the soul and hold that all souls, whether of the good or of the bad, go underground and live there. The poor are still poor; the rich are still rich. This region has hills, rivers, plantations, and a sea, just as on earth.[5]

Several American Indian tribes regard the state of the dead as differing but little from that of men here, but the more general belief is that it is better, or, again, that there is a division between souls on various grounds.[6] To the Kiowa the other world is a shadowy counterpart of this, but they have also a vague idea of transmigration, owls being supposed to be animated by the souls of the dead.[7] The Seri believe that the dead return to the primordial under world where all things originated, but they are apt to come by night and work mischief among the living.[8] The Tewa Indians think that in their under world the sun shines at night, but is as pale as the moon. The human race lived there until they forced their way up to earth. The sun passes through a lake and enters it, but it is gloomy and dank. In it is the happy hunting-ground of the spirits, *wajima*, described as a *kiva*-like place.[9] The Mandans have a similar myth about their earliest home underground. Souls go there again after death by means of an underground lake, which the sins of the wicked are said to prevent them from crossing, but this is probably a reflexion of Christian belief.[1] The Seminoles know little about Po-ya-fi-tsa, the place where spirits go, but they call the dead 'the people of Po-ya-fi-tsa.' At burial the feet are placed to the east, so that, when the dead man rises to go to the skies on the fourth day, he may reach the sky-path at the place of the sun's rising. Otherwise he may be lost. Burnt wood is placed in the hand of the dead to protect them from evil birds on the skyward journey.[2] Similar beliefs regarding the shadowy likeness of the other world to this are found among the Carrier Indians, Chinooks, Cherokees, Chibchas, Hurons, and Hopi, as is shown in the artt. on these tribes.

The beliefs of the Papuans and the Melanesians and of those tribes which show a mixture of both races are very circumstantial regarding the other world. Among the Papuans of Dutch New Guinea the Noofoor think that it is under the earth or beneath the sea, and that everything there is as on earth, save that vegetation is more luxuriant. Every one goes there, but the dead still help the living, who pray to them and often revisit the earth. Souls, however, are also described as remaining in the grave with the corpse or residing in images which are made for them.[3] In the islands to the west souls also reside in images or miniature houses, but the mountain tribes of these islands locate the spirits among branches of trees, where food is placed for them.[4] The people of Windessi allot two spirits to every one. There is an under world where the dead dwell in a large house, where the two spirits of a woman are incarnate in a body and live idly. One of the spirits of a man also departs thither; the other is re-incarnated as a man or sometimes as a woman, who now becomes a medicine-man. Images of the dead are in vogue here also, and spirits can do mischief through them.[5] To the west of British New Guinea the people of Kiwai on the Fly River think that the spirits live in the ground beside their bodies, but easily come up to this world. This region in the ground, Adiri, was at first a dismal place, but was made fertile by Sido, the hero who first went there, as all do now.[6] In the island of Paho the region of spirits lies in the west and is very like this world. The dead appear to men in dreams, and offerings and prayers are made to them by the living.[7]

The Temi, a Melanesian people in New Guinea, think that men have two souls; one, which is long, appears at the moment of death to relatives at a distance and then goes to a village on the northern coast; the other, the short soul, after remaining for a time with the body, goes to Lamboam, an underground region, where the offerings made to it cause it to be well received. At first it is cold, but the friendly ghosts who meet it heat stones, by which it is soon warmed. It sometimes returns to earth. Lamboam is said to be a better place than earth, but life there continues the life here, and ghosts even die, after which they become ants or worms or mischievous wood-spirits.[8] The tribes about Wedau and Wamira say that a spirit goes to a valley in the mountains approached through a hole in the ground. Many questions are asked of it by the other spirits, after which it is admitted and lives feasting, dancing, and fighting. Should it be killed, that is the end of it.[9]

Outside New Guinea the Melanesians of Murua (Woodlark Island) place the region of spirits on the island of Watum, where good and bad live together under the rule of Paidogo.[10]

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[1] R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, London, 1904, pp. 56, 77, 287.
[2] A. Hetherwick, *JAI* xxxii. 91 ff.; D. Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 66 f.
[3] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 149 f., *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, do. 1890, p. 102 ff.; *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903] 571.
[4] A. J. N. Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 153 f.
[5] A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1909, p. 41.
[6] See below, §§ 5, 6.
[7] *17 RBEW*, pt. i. [1898] p. 237.
[8] *Ib.* p. 292*. [9] *29 RBEW* [1916] p. 51.

[1] *11 RBEW*, p. 512. [2] *5 RBEW* [1887], p. 520.
[3] A. Goudswaard, *De Papoewa's van de Geelvinksbaai*, Schiedam, 1863, p. 77 f.; O. Finsch, *Neu-Guinea und seine Bewohner*, Bremen, 1865, p. 104 f.; M. Krieger, *Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, n.d. [1899], p. 400 f.
[4] F. S. A. de Clercq, *Tijdschrift van het koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*, 2nd ser., x. [1893] 198 f.
[5] J. L. D. van der Roest, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, xl. [1898] 164 f.
[6] Landtman, p. 59 f. [7] *Ib.* p. 68 f.
[8] R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 518.
[9] H. Newton, *In Far New Guinea*, London, 1914, p. 219.
[10] J. H. P. Murray, *Papua, or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, p. 129.

The general belief among the Melanesians is that a division is made between spirits, generally on ceremonial grounds.[1]

Among the Yakuts there is a belief that the region of the dead is beyond the eight grades of heaven to the west, where constant night reigns and winter prevails instead of summer, the sun there being turned upside down. Maidens never get husbands, and youths never get wives. Houses are of stone and iron, the top narrow, the bottom flattened out, and the centre bulging.[2]

Similar beliefs regarding one state for all, the conditions of which are similar to those of earth, are found among the Gilyaks, Lapps, Lithuanians, Ostyaks, to some extent in Indonesia, Indo-China, and among the Daphlās and Orāons in India.[3]

5. The state of the dead happier than earthly life.—In this section only such a state is described as is open to all, without any division being made between them.

Such a belief seems to have existed among the Tasmanians and among several Australian tribes, especially in the west and south and in New South Wales.[4]

Among the Melanesians the natives of the Hood Peninsula, New Guinea, think that the ghosts live in an underground region, which is better than this world, with good houses and gardens. Spirits have also access to the abodes of the living and harm those who displease them.[5] At Tube-tube the spirit-land is one of eternal youth, and all are changed into the prime of life. It is located on Bebweso, a wooded hill which the natives avoid. Death and sickness are unknown. Married people are reunited, and the unmarried marry; children are born; and the spirits of animals follow those of men thither. All things are plentiful; fighting and stealing are unknown.[6] Among the southern Massim of Bartle Bay the soul (*aru*) goes to Maraiya in the south-east, where the lord of the dead assigns it a place. After passing up the Uruam river to the mountains, it is met by waiting souls which have knowledge of its coming, and, after questioning it, lead it to its own friends, who take it to their village. The skin of the spirits is now white; there is plenty to eat, but no sickness or evil. Yet souls fight there, and, if one is killed, it dies for ever.[7]

The Monumbo in N.E. New Guinea believe that souls go to a region where there is no work or suffering, and where they engage in all the pleasant pursuits which they loved on earth. They can help or torment men and are seen flying through the air as shooting stars. When they grow old, they die and become plants or animals.[8] The Roro-speaking tribes distinguish between the shadow (*oriorema*) and the soul (*tsirama*). The latter haunts villages and sends bad luck if too many quarrels occur, or it steals away other souls. The abode of souls is Arizo in the bush, where a large garden is cultivated by them and all are happy. If a living man ventures there, he dies, and plants taken thence to mortal gardens are carried back or wither. A fiery spirit meets the soul and asks if its ears and nose are pierced, and by what death it died. According to the manner of death, the soul is sent by one of several roads all of which reach Arizo.[9]

The Papuan people of Rossel, south-east of Woodlark Island, believe that souls go to a mountain at the west of the island which, they say, is covered with beautiful gardens and houses, though to the eye there are only rocks and scrub.[10]

In New Caledonia the other world is under the mountain Mu and is like this world, but its fruits are finer and larger. Good men are welcomed, but quarrelsome and rancorous ghosts are beaten by dead chiefs, and ghostly monsters are said to devour souls. The dead also appear as lizards to the living. Lambert gives another account referring to the natives of the Belep group and the Isle of Pines. All souls go to a region under the sea, Tsiabiloum, where everything grows in profusion without cultivation. Souls are first caught in a net by a spirit called Kiemoua and beaten, after which they go to Tsiabiloum. Sickness, death, sorrow, sleep, and darkness are unknown there. In daytime on earth souls revisit their graves or the places where their souls are preserved, and where they receive worship.[11]

Melanesian beliefs are further considered in § 6.

Among the N. American Indians instances of a better state in the other world are found—*e.g.*, among some of the Pima, who think that souls go to the land of the dead in the east, where the sun rises, separated from the region of the living by 'earth crack,' a chasm. In this region there is rejoicing, gladness, feasting, and dancing. Others hold that souls live round their old places and play pranks on the living, causing sickness by showing themselves to these. Others, again, believe in transmigration into owls.[1] The Thompson River Indians think that the land of souls is underground, towards the sunset, reached by a long track, at the end of which is a great lodge with doors at its eastern and western sides and a double row of fires extending through its length. When the spirit reaches this, he hears his dead relatives, who have assembled there, laughing, talking, and singing. He is welcomed and, on entering, finds a beautiful region with plenty of grass, flowers, and fruit. Warmth, light, and a pleasant perfumed air characterize this country where the people are joyful and happy.[2] The future state, according to the adherents of the Sioux Ghost-dance religion, will be such that the whole Indian race, living and dead, will be reunited on a regenerated earth to live a life of unalloyed happiness, free from death, sickness, and misery. Each apostle of this religion has filled in the details according to his mental capacity and his ideas of happiness.[3] The Paiutes also believe that, when earth has grown old, it will be made new. All Indians will rise again or awake to immortality after a deep sleep.[4] The Porto Rico tribes believed that the dead go to a valley called Coaibai, where their ancestors lived, and where they will have many wives, and plenty to eat, as well as all kinds of pleasures.[5]

Other examples of such American Indian beliefs in a happy state for all are given in the artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 6, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (American), § 10, BEOTHUKS, § 5, CALIFORNIA, § 4, NATCHEZ, § 12, OJIBWA, § 4 (*c*).

The Indian tribes of the West India islands conceived the dwelling-place of the dead as situated within their own territory or, as some thought, among the valleys on the west side of Hayti. There in shady arbours they passed the time with beautiful women and in the enjoyment of delicious fruits.[6]

Similar beliefs exist among many S. American tribes. In Venezuela some of the tribes believe that the spirits go to certain lakes and are swallowed by great serpents, which carry them to paradise, where they enjoy a life of dancing and drinking.[7] The Boro, Witoto, and other tribes of the Issa-Japura district bury grave-goods with the dead and light fires upon the grave, round which (or in the house or the woods) the soul hovers for a time, and then departs to the happy hunting-grounds of the good spirit. There everything is on a pygmy scale, including the souls themselves. According to some tribes, this paradise is above the sky; in the opinion of others, it is in the far distance towards the setting sun. Evil things are excluded from it. Hunting is always successful, women are beautiful and obedient, and friends meet again. Souls are regarded as immortal, so long as they are remembered by the living or appear in dreams to them. This paradise is open to all tribesmen with whom the good spirit is not vexed, but enemies whose bodies have been mutilated or divorced from all their possessions wander in the forest or go down into holes in the earth. Medicine-men who have the power of assuming

1 See below, § 6.
2 W. G. Sumner, *JAI*, xxxi. 97 f.
3 *ERE* vi. 226[a], vii. 797 f., viii. 115[b], ix. 578, vii. 227 f., iv. 399[b], ix. 505.
4 See art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 2, for details.
5 R. E. Guise, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 216 f.
6 G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 443 f.
7 C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 657.
8 P. F. Vormann, *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 409 f.
9 Seligmann, p. 809. 10 Murray, p. 138.
11 J. J. Atkinson, *FL* xiv. 257 f.; Lambert, *Mœurs et superstitions des Néo-Calédoniens*, Nouméa, 1900, p. 13 f.; G. Turner, *Samoa, a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, p. 346, speaks of the spirits as departing to the forest.

1 H. B. Alexander, *North American Mythology* (=vol. x. of *The Mythology of All Races*), Boston, 1916, p. 147 f.
2 *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 252 f.
3 *14 RBEW*, pt. ii. [1896] p. 777.
4 *Ib.* p. 784 f.
5 *25 RBEW* [1907], p. 70.
6 Müller, p. 174.
7 W. E. Roth, *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 161.

tiger-shape in life may do so after death. The sun is said to be the abode of great priests, and stars are also thought to be souls of chiefs or great men.[1]

The Guarani revere Tamoi, who once dwelt among them, and, after having taught them agriculture, left them, promising to bring them at death to heaven, where they would have plenty of hunting and rejoin their friends and find their wives more youthful. When one of them dies, Tamoi raises him on a holy tree to heaven, and such a tree is always found near the dwellings as a perch for the departing souls.[2] The Tupinambas believe that all souls are immortal and dwell in beautiful regions watered by fine rivers and stored with many fruit-trees, where they pass their time in dancing.[3] The belief of the Warraus in rich hunting-grounds and luxuriant arable land in the other world is illustrated by a verse of the death-song: 'Bring him [the spirit of the dead man] to his friends whom thou hast robbed us of before, and may he find yams and cassava and hunt apes and ajuti.'[4] The Mokuschi think that they will dwell in another region of the earth, where their only occupation will be hunting, and hostile tribes will be their slaves.[5] The Chani Indians call the world of the dead Aguararenta, 'fox-village.' It is in the east, and there all the dead dwell, existing by day as foxes, rats, etc., but by night resuming human form and enjoying great drinking bouts. The dead sometimes appear to the living or take them on a visit to Aguararenta, and their death follows soon after.[6]

The anonymous 16th cent. author of *A Treatise of Brazil* speaks of the belief of the tribes (met with by him) in Elysian fields by the side of a fair river, with many fig-trees, where the spirits do nothing but dance.[7] This seems a wide-spread belief in S. America, as the instances cited have shown, together with those already referred to in art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 6, and in the artt. CHILE, § 9, PAMPEANS, § 3, and PATAGONIANS, § 4.

6. The state of the dead one of differing conditions upon various grounds.—While a division among the dead or a series of different fates based upon moral grounds is not uncommon even among savages, attention must be paid to what, in the savage moral code, constitutes good and bad, since 'goodness' may only mean bravery as opposed to cowardice, or the slaying and possibly the eating of many victims. No doubt bravery is a virtue, and sometimes the moral code goes beyond this. We have also to inquire whether Christian influences may not have been at work as regards savage retributive notions. But in other instances (and these by far the more numerous) the division may be based upon the nature of the death, the sort of burial, the character and amount of the funeral-offerings, the status of the deceased, or even upon his possession or non-possession of certain distinctive marks. Something approaching retribution may also be seen in the ordeals which the spirit has to undergo on his way to the other world, often at the hands of supernatural beings. These are to some extent judges of the dead, while sometimes ghosts themselves act as judges of a newcomer and decide whether he will be admitted to more blissful regions or not. Or again they may themselves punish an unworthy ghost. These ideas do not always occur with clear precision and often mingle with each other.

It is curious to observe that with many of the Pygmy (Negrillo and Negrito) races there is a certain idea of retribution, or of a division between good and bad, or of an ordeal to be undergone, the bad falling victims while undergoing this, but generally being released to the better world after a time. 'Good' and 'bad' must here be interpreted liberally, though by no means empty of moral content. We find this among the Andaman Islanders, and the Sakai, Semang, and Jakun of the Malay Peninsula.[1] The beliefs of the Pygmies of Central Africa have not yet been fully studied, but certain aspects of their beliefs regarding the dead are known. There is little or no cult of ghosts. The Ajongo tribe in the Gabun believe that the spirit or shade sinks into the ground, afterwards rising to the supreme god, who then rewards or punishes it. Punishment is meted out to such as have stolen the wives of others, to poisoners, and the like.[2] Judgment after death upon souls is ascribed to the supreme being Indagarra by the Wa-Twa of Urandi.[3]

Few Bantu tribes in Africa believe in a division between different classes or morally different persons in the other world, though, even where the state of the dead is vaguely conceived, some approach to this is found in the fact that translation into animal form is for chiefs only or is regulated according to the position of the spirit in this world. But the Bangala of the Upper Congo believe that a man who has been good according to the native code of morals remains in Longa, a subterranean region in which the conditions are the same as on earth. Men whose position in this world prevented their being punished for their crimes receive retribution in the other world, though by whom is not stated. Ghosts of the bad haunt the forest and river, where they do mischief to the living.[4] The Fan believe that the spirit dwells in a mysterious underground place, governed by a king who condemns to a second death those who conduct themselves badly there. They go to a terrible place, where they are unhappy and whence they never return. Men who were very bad in this life go there directly at death. This second death is the most terrible thing which can befall a man. Spirits of the dead have knowledge and power superior to the living. They regret their earthly life, however, and are hostile to those left behind. The spirit is also said to have the power of entering into any animal.[5]

With the Yoruba-speaking tribes of the Gold Coast, at the moment of death an invocation is said by the priest that the road may be open and good for the soul and that nothing evil may meet it. Similar invocations are said at the grave, where a goat is sacrificed and also a fowl, which is said to 'buy' or open a right of way for the ghost. The ghost goes to Ipo-oku, 'the land of the dead,' beneath the earth, but he does not reach it unless the prescribed ritual has been performed. If it is omitted, he wanders homeless or is cast by evil spirits into Orun-apadi, 'the unseen world of potsherds.'[6]

The retributive ideas of some Negro tribes have already been discussed, as well as their idea of goodness.[7] Some of the Dravidian tribes of India also make a division among the spirits of the dead. The Lushei Kuki clans think that the dead go to Mi-thi-kua, 'dead man's village,' beyond which is Pial-ral, an abode of bliss open only to those who have duly performed sacrificial rites, killed men and certain animals, and been successful in love affairs. Pupawla, the first man who died, shoots at all spirits except those of certain men whose prowess with women is specified. Those whom he hits cannot reach Pial-ral, but remain in Mi-thi-

[1] T. W. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, pp. 55, 226, 234, *FL* xxiv. [1913] 54 f.
[2] A. D. d'Orbigny, *Voyage dans l'Amérique méridionale*, Paris, 1834–47, iv. 109.
[3] I. L. Gottfriedt, *Neue Welt und amerikanische Historien*, Frankfort, 1655, p. 143.
[4] R. Schomburgk, *Reisen in Britisch-Guiana*, Leipzig, 1847–48, ii. 446; Roth, *30 RBEW*, p. 160.
[5] Koch, p. 126.
[6] E. Nordenskiöld, *Indianerleben*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 255 f.
[7] *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes*, Hakluyt Soc. Ex. Ser., Glasgow, 1905–07, xvi. 419.

[1] See art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 2.
[2] A. Le Roy, *Les Pygmées*, Tours, 1905, p. 179.
[3] W. Schmidt, *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, Stuttgart, 1910, p. 234.
[4] J. H. Weeks, *JRAI* xl. [1910] 370, *FL* xii. [1901] 134.
[5] E. Allégret, *RHR* l. [1904] 219; A. L. Bennett, *JAI* xxix [1899] 86.
[6] Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1894, pp. 127, 137.
[7] BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 5.

kua, where life is troublesome and difficult, and everything is worse than on earth. Those who reach Pial-ral are called *thangchhuah*, and they enjoy there food and drink without labour. Women can pass there only if taken by their husbands. The spirits are sometimes re-incarnated as hornets, or as dew which, if it falls on a man, is born as his child.[1]

The place of the dead among the Todas is known as Amnodr, and it lies to the west, but below the surface of the earth, where it is lit by the sun as it sinks in that direction. Amnodr is presided over by the god Ön. The dead are known as the *amatol*, and it is believed that at one time the living could pay them a visit, returning again to earth, but that this was stopped by Ön because of the behaviour of one man. Life in Amnodr is like life on earth. There are buffaloes and dairies, just as the living Todas have, but no pigs or rats are permitted there because they would spoil the country by rooting it up. There are definite routes for the spirits, and at one point they knock on a stone and lose all affection for this world. Another stone causes them to be sound and vigorous. A ravine is crossed by a thread; the bad fall from it into a river and are bitten by leeches; they are then helped out by people on the banks, and remain with them for a time proportionate to their badness. Others cross the bridge easily. Bad people include the selfish, jealous, grudging, and all offenders against the sacred dairy. The prospect of this punishment has little effect on conduct, while the inhabitants of certain districts can cross the bridge, however wicked they are. As spirits walk about Amnodr, their feet and legs wear down; and, when they are worn to the knees, Ön sends them to this world to be reborn.[2]

The Nāga tribes of Manipur have various beliefs. Thus the Tangkhuls hold that spirits force their way into heaven by means of the spirit of a buffalo. There the deity judges them, and spirits are divided into two classes according as they acquired animals by stealing or by honest hunting. Thieves have now to take a road where they meet with dreadful things, honest men follow a pleasant road, but both finally arrive on the banks of a river, whence they go to the house of the deceased in the upper world. In Mao spirits are thought to strive with a deity. If they wound him, all is well; if not, they are enslaved for ever. A deity called Kechira is also said to sort out the dead according to merit (success in love) or the manner of death. Those dying in battle go to one place; those who have their ears split to another; those dying in childbirth to a third. There is also a pleasant place within the earth where the dead are said to go. In other cases the good and bad are thought to be divided, but what these words signify is uncertain. Some of the tribes also hold various theories of rebirth.[3]

The ideas of retribution current among American Indian tribes are frequently moral, though often bravery or status determines the place of the dead. The moral retribution has been in some cases coloured, if not more, by knowledge of Christian beliefs. To the instances already cited[4] may be added others.

The Omaha put the sign of the tabu with the dead, for recognition by friends in the other world—*e.g.*, moccasins of the skin of the male elk on the feet of him to whom the animal had been tabu. The Milky Way is the path of the spirits. Life in the other world is like life here, but free from sickness and want, and on the whole happier. There are seven spirit-worlds, each higher than the preceding, and progress is effected by the soul dying to each in succession. On the Milky Way sits an old man directing spirits of the good and peaceable by a short route to the region of souls. The contumacious have to take a longer way and wander wearily to it. Another account tells of a log over a chasm, whence the bad fall off and are lost. Murderers are thought to wander always without rest. The dead still take an interest in the affairs of earth and can revisit it.[5] The Hidatsa believe that each man has four souls which join together after death and are restored to the mansions of the ancestors underground, where life goes on as it does here. Ghosts of suicides, however, have a separate place in the Ghost Village. The idea of a narrow bridge over a river also occurs: brave warriors and good hunters easily cross it, but the worthless slip off into the stream and to oblivion.[6] The Sia of the Pueblos locate the region of the dead to the north, underground, in the place first occupied by their ancestors. The road thither is crowded with spirits of unborn infants coming to earth and with the spirits of the dead. These never return to earth, though they once did so and informed the living of the state of the other world, its fields, high mountains, lakes, and rivers. The spirits sleep by day and work by night—*i.e.*, when the sun reaches their world. The Sia wish to die when the body ceases to develop, so that they may gradually return to the conditions of infancy. At such a period a man does not die, but sleeps to awake as an infant in the other world. The spirit goes there four days after death and meets two guards, who ask for his credentials. If he has not got his *hä'chamoni*, he must roam about somewhere in the north. Others are shown their relatives and bidden to join them and be happy. The wicked are in no case allowed to enter, but are placed in a great fire. If theurgists have performed their duties with an unwilling heart, they must live apart in the spirit-world, without nourishment, for a time varying according to the amount of the purification required.[1]

The Assiniboin believe that the dead go to a land in the south where game is abundant and the rivers are full of fish, and where the good and brave find many women and buffaloes. But there is a region of perpetual snow and ice, or an island, where the wicked and cowardly are confined, deprived of all the pleasures of life. Ghosts of the dead may be seen, but more often heard, by the living, or may even become materialized and marry and live as ordinary human beings. Some Indians of this tribe, however, believe that there is nothing beyond this life.[2] To the Dakotans there is ascribed a belief in four spirits—one which dies with the body, one which always remains near it, a third, which goes to the other world in the south, and a fourth, which lingers with the dead man's hair kept by the relatives. This is thrown into an enemy country, where it roves to and fro causing disease and death. A fifth spirit is sometimes supposed to be reborn in an animal or a child.[3] An old woman sits on the road to the 'Many Lodges' and examines the spirits for tatu marks. Such as do not possess these are pushed over a cloud and fall to this world as wandering ghosts. A report of the New England tribes, dating from the 17th cent., states that souls of the great and good dwell with the gods; the bad are not allowed to join them, but wander without rest or home.[4]

The Tlingit Indians distinguish between the shadow and the ghost or spirit. The 'Ghosts' Home' is above the plane of this world, and some go to the sun, moon, or stars. If a person was unhappy in this world, a dead relative would bid him come to the spirit-world, and his death followed. A house there is called 'Sleep-house,' where the ghosts rest. This name was also given to the next higher region, to which those dying by violence go. It is reached by a ladder, guarded by a being in human shape. If a man dies unavenged, he cannot mount the ladder, but drifts about on the wind. Below the earth is a third region, for the drowned. The bad are said to go to the 'Raven's Home.' In the other world the spirits share the offerings made them by the living. The way there is difficult, and spirits are attacked by wolves and bears.[5] Two lower worlds are assigned to the dead in the belief of the Bellacoola Indians; and from the upper of these souls may be reborn into this world. This subterranean ghost-world is described as stretching along the banks of a sandy river. The ghosts walk head downwards and speak in a different tongue from that of the world above, while the seasons there are the contrary of those on the earth.[6]

According to Zuñi belief, the ghost hovers round the village for four nights after death and then starts for Ko'thluwaläwa ('dance village'), the abiding-place of the council of the gods, situated in the depths of a lake and containing the great ceremonial house of the gods. Then it proceeds to the undermost world, whence the Zuñi came, and whence the dead supply the earth with water. But the ghosts often return to Ko'thluwaläwa to join in the sacred dances. Ghosts of members of the Bow priesthood, however, join the Kúpishtaya, mighty warriors who control the lightning, and become lightning-makers.[7]

The Eskimo of Bering Strait think that there may be three forms of the spiritual essence or soul—one destined for a future life, one which takes flight into the air at death, and a third, which remains with the body and possesses evil powers.

[1] J. Shakespear, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 62; *IGI* xvi. 219.
[2] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 397.
[3] T. C. Hodson, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 160 f., *JAI* xxxi. 307.
[4] BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 5.
[5] A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, *27 RBEW* [1911], p. 588 ff.
[6] *11 RBEW*, p. 517.
[1] *11 RBEW*, pp. 68, 143 ff. [2] *Ib.* p. 485.
[3] *Ib.* p. 434 ff. [4] *14 RBEW*, pt. ii. p. 982 f.
[5] *26 RBEW*, p. 460 f.
[6] Alexander, *N. American Mythology*, p. 263.
[7] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], pp. 20, 65, 32, 307. For other American Indian beliefs regarding a division in the state of the dead see artt. CHOCTAWS, § 4, DÉNÉS (vol. iv. p. 640a), HUPA, § 2, HAIDA, § 16, and BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 5.

After lingering for a time at the grave, the first of these departs to the other world. Spirits of shamans and of those who die by accident, violence, or starvation go to a land of plenty in the sky, where there are light, food, and water. Their state becomes still better by the offerings of food made by relatives at the feasts of the dead. Those dying from natural causes and also shades of animals go to the underground world of the dead, where each kind of animal lives in a village of its own. Here their state entirely depends upon the aforesaid offerings. Thieves from fellow-villagers, witches and sorcerers, bad shamans, and people who practised forbidden ceremonies are unconscious after death, though they may return to haunt the living.[1] On the Lower Yukon the distinctions after death seem to be based entirely upon the offerings made. The shade sees nothing until it is placed in the grave-box, when it perceives other shades, who show it the way to the other world. On the way it subsists on the food buried with it, and in the spirit region it lives an aimless existence, dependent upon the offerings at the feasts on earth to which it is invited. It there temporarily enters the person chosen as its namesake or the next child born. Having eaten, it is then dismissed. If a person dies without any one to make a feast for him, he is forgotten and lives just as the poor and friendless do on earth. There appears also to be some idea of retribution for social offenders.[2]

The beliefs of the Central Eskimo differ from these. Their supreme being, Anguta, has a daughter Sedna, who is mistress of the land of Adlivun under the earth, living in a large house with a dog at the threshold. The dead are taken by Anguta and carried there. The dog just allows them to pass, and they remain for a year, pinched by Anguta. Some of the tribes know of a still lower region, Adliparmiut—a dark place where snowstorms rage and trouble abounds, and whence there is no return, according to Hall. He also says that a happy region in heaven is called Qudlivun or Qudliparmiut, or these are happy and light regions one above the other. They abound with deer which are easily caught, and there is neither ice nor snow, trouble nor weariness, and spirits there sing and play without end. The good—those who have been kind to the poor and who were happy on earth, also suicides, those killed by accident, starvation, or murder, and women dying in childbed—go to Qudlivun. The bad—the unkind and unhappy, and all who have killed men in anger—go to Adliparmiut and remain there.[3] But, according to Boas, all dying of diseases or infringing Sedna's orders go to Adlivun and remain there a year. Murderers and offenders against human laws never leave it. Other souls are taken to Adliparmiut, where they live comparatively at ease, though not so blessed as the 'Qudliparmiut.' They hunt whale and walrus, and are always troubled by ice and snow. These accounts vary, but the belief of the tribes is undoubtedly that all dying through accident or violence and women dying in childbirth go to the upper world. The general belief seems to be in a series of abodes of ascending or descending value.[4] Lyon, an earlier traveller, cites heaven as a delightful place, while four lower worlds exist through which the dead pass, the lowest being the best.[5] While the Iglulirmiut think that the soul leaves the body immediately and goes to Adliparmiut, the tribes of Davis Strait believe that it lingers for three days with the body. While it is in Adlivun, it is regarded as a malevolent spirit and frequently roams round the villages. Its touch kills a man; the sight of it causes sickness and mischief. When a soul passes to Adliparmiut, it is at rest and ceases to be feared.[6] The older writers on Greenland give varying accounts of the state of the dead, and probably the native accounts varied from tribe to tribe.

The Hudson Bay Eskimo hold that the place of spirits depends on their condition on earth, and especially on the manner of their death. The violent, starved, and women dying in childbirth go to the sky, where they lack many luxuries. They are called *kelugmyut*, from *keluk* ('sky'), the name of this region. Others go down into the earth (*nuna*) and are called *nunamyut*. The two classes can communicate with each other. All desire to go below and enjoy the pleasure of communion with those on earth—a pleasure denied to those in the sky-world. But, if a person dies from natural causes, his spirit dwells on earth and after four years rests in the grave.[7] This belief is the reverse of that of the Central Eskimo, though it agrees with that given by Rink, Crantz, and Nansen.[1]

Among the S. American tribes some allot a better fate in a cheerful paradise to chiefs, heroes, and wizards, especially such as have killed and eaten many enemies. They dwell in pleasant gardens behind the mountains, with clear streams, rich fruit-trees, and abundance of game, fish, and honey, and there they amuse themselves with songs, dances, and laughter.[2] Where a distinction exists, it is generally one between the great and the common people or between brave warriors and cowards. This is even expressed by the Isannas and Zaparo in transmigration doctrine: souls of brave men become birds of beautiful plumage and enjoy pleasant fruits, whereas others become reptiles or evil spirits.[3]

The Araucanians held that souls were invisible but corporeal. A long journey had to be made to Galicman, the spirit-land, and the sea had to be crossed. The island of Mocha was the starting-place, and a narrow path was followed where an evil old woman met the souls and demanded tribute. If it was refused and if she overcame them, she poked out an eye. Another old woman in the form of a whale carried them over the sea, or they were carried in canoes, according to the belief of the inland tribes. Evil spirits could not enter paradise, where the same castes existed as on earth. There was abundant feasting, drinking, and dancing, and men were waited on by their wives. Poor people, those robbed of their possessions, and public women went to a cold region where food was plentiful but of poor quality. The dead could return to earth, and generally appeared transformed and visible to the *pillí*. Another account says that souls were divided according as they died by drowning, in the forest, or in their huts.[4] The heaven to which the Bakairi go was once nearer the earth or part of it, and was the place where the first ancestors lived, and there all exists as is related in the old traditions. Heaven is richly endowed with fish and game. Worthless and evilly-disposed men continue their character in another place as malevolent ghosts wandering round and spreading fear and terror.[5] The Uaupes believe that they go to Jurupari, their ancestor, but, if they did not honour him in life, the way is difficult and they lose themselves. Women come to a shed of which the owner is Bichiú, an infernal spirit. It is full of various objects. If the women have seen the dance-masks and dresses or Jurupari on earth, they remain in the shed, which forms a kind of hell. If not, they go to the heaven of Jurupari and spend their time with the men in merriment and drinking. There is also an evil place, the locality of which is uncertain, where evil men arrive after having lost themselves on the way. There they live as on earth, but endure unhappiness and suffering.[6] In the province of Cumana the dead are believed to pass to the cave of Guacharo in the mountains on their way to the other world. If they are good, they go on immediately; if not, they must remain there for a longer or shorter period. The cries of birds heard from the cave are their groans and lamentations.[7] Lery gives an account of the Tupinambas different from that cited above.[8] Souls which have been virtuous, *i.e.* avenged them of their enemies and eaten many, fly beyond the mountains to join their ancestors, where they lead a joyous life in pleasant gardens. Souls of cowards, who did not care to defend their land, are violently carried away by Aygnan and live in torment with him.[9] Another idea of division is seen in the belief of the Bororo, who think that the sun is made up of dead *barih* (medicine-men), who rise daily with red-hot irons before their faces, after prowling about the earth at night. In the sun dwells also the head of all the *barihs*, who is intermediate between men and spirits. Less important *barihs* dwell in the moon. Stars are Bororo boys, or houses of dead children. Ancestors also dwell in the rocks in the form of parrots. Deer, jaguar, and vultures also contain souls of ancestors. Souls of the dead (*aruë*) may appear in the world and be seen by relatives, but all become of one sex, female, at death.[10] Another method of distinction is found with the Otomacs, who think that souls go to the west and dwell there without trouble or toil. But on the way they are met by Tigtitig, a bird, which swallows all who are afraid to fight it.[11]

The belief in a species of fiery hell, entertained by some tribes, is probably of Christian origin, a

1 E. W. Nelson, *18 RBEW*, pt. i. [1899] p. 422.
2 *Ib.* pp. 424, 428.
3 C. F. Hall, *Life with the Esquimaux*, London, 1865, i. 524.
4 F. Boas, *6 RBEW* [1888], pp. 582 f., 590.
5 G. F. Lyon, *Private Journal*, London, 1824, p. 372.
6 Boas, p. 590.
7 L. M. Turner, *11 RBEW*, p. 192 f.

1 BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 2.
2 J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 288.
3 C. F. P. von Martius, *Beiträge zur Ethnographie und Sprachenkunde Amerika's zumal Brasiliens*, Leipzig, 1867, i. 602.
4 Müller, p. 287.
5 K. von den Steinen, *Unter der Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 349 f.
6 F. R. J. de Pons, *Travels in S. America, 1801–4*, Eng. tr., London, p. 129.
7 Roth, p. 161. 8 See above, § 5.
9 J. Lery, *Brasil*, in *Hakluytus Posthumus*, xvi. 550.
10 A. H. Savage Landor, *Across Unknown South America*, London, 1913, i. 242, 245, 256 f.
11 Roth, p. 161.

retributive doctrine tacked on to a simple belief in continuance of the soul in another region.

The Payaguas think that evil souls go to a place full of cauldrons and fire, but the good dwell under water-plants and are nourished on fish.[1] The Paressi believe that a fire which flickers up on the way to the other world destroys the wicked, but, should they survive it, a horrible monster tears out their eyes and kills them. Souls of the good dwell in heaven with ancestors as they did on earth and procreate many children.[2] The Maipures place the good in a pleasant region, but the evil go to a spring where a continual fire burns them.[3]

See also artt. BRAZIL, vol. ii. p. 863[a] (Arawaks), and BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 7.

Among the Massim of British New Guinea the abode of the dead with the tribes of Waga-Waga is a land called Hiyoyoa under the sea, where it is day when night comes on the earth. Tumudurere, a being who was never a man on earth, receives the ghosts and tells them where to make their gardens. But only those buried with their faces to the east are able to reach Hiyoyoa.[4]

In Tube-tube (Slade Island), S.E. New Guinea, the spirit rises from the grave the night after the burial, and a fire is therefore kindled to keep it warm on the journey to Bwebweso, which is a place of eternal youth. The spirits are in the prime of life, and there are no evil spirits, sickness, or death. There are reunions between husbands and wives, and the children born never grow older than maturity. Gardens yield plentifully, and spirits of useful animals abound. Fighting and stealing are unknown, and brotherhood prevails. The spirits, however, act as judges, and those who do not attain the right standard are kept in an outer circle whence Elysium is seen by them. The very wicked must wander up and down the earth for ever in great pain.[5]

The beliefs of the Eastern Melanesians from the Torres group to Fiji have already been considered,[6] but it is important to notice that ghosts are not eternal in the underground Panoi. They die a second death, or, as some believe, there are two regions called Panoi, one above the other, and, when ghosts die in the upper one, they live again as white ants' nests in the lower one.[7] The people of the Trobriand Islands think that at death the spirit splits up into two, or that there are two spirits—*kosi*, which remains near the village for a time playing tricks, and *baloma*, which goes to Tuma, an agreeable spirit-land on earth's surface, underground, or on an island. If to the last, it goes by a spirit-canoe. On the shore it bewails its fate along with spirits of kinsmen. At a well it washes its eyes and becomes invisible; then it knocks on two stones, and at the second knock all other *baloma* crowd round and welcome it. Now it meets Topileta, the headman of Tuma, who admits or rejects it according to the payment made of the *baloma* of things buried with it. According to the cause of death—by magic, by poison, or in war—the spirit traverses a different road to Tuma, that for spirits of men killed in war being the best, by poison not so good, and by magic the worst. Those unable to pay are banished to the sea and changed into mythical fish. Relatives now meet the *baloma*, and a house is built for it. It weeps much, but receives comfort, especially from female *baloma* with whom it forms connexion. After a time it dies, but is not annihilated. *Baloma* can revisit the earth from time to time, where they play tricks like the *kosi*. In Tuma they live the life of man, sleeping, eating, and love-making. According to one view, at the second death the spirit descends to a lower stage of Tuma, the underground view of its locality being the most general. *Baloma* may also be reborn on earth, according to a curious theory which connects all pregnancy with the act of a *baloma*.[8]

[1] F. Azara, *Reise nach Süd-Amerika*, Berlin, 1890, p. 267.
[2] Von den Steinen, p. 435. [3] Koch, p. 130.
[4] Seligmann, pp. 610, 655.
[5] J. T. Field, in G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians* p. 442 f.
[6] See art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 4.
[7] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 273 ff.
[8] B. Malinowski, *JRAI* xlvi. [1916] 354 ff.

At Maweo, in the New Hebrides, the ghost is thought to sit in trees mocking the relatives who are mourning over the dead body. It then departs to a ravine, over which it must leap, and, if it falls short, it returns to life again. Finally it reaches the shore, where the ghosts meet it. Those of men whom its owner has slain or killed by magic now avenge themselves on it. It is also thought that, if the ghost falls at a gully on the way to the other world, it is dashed to pieces. A fierce pig also meets ghosts and eats those who failed to plant pandanus trees on earth. In Panoi a ghost may not drink water if the ears were not pierced, or eat good food if he was not tatued.[1] In general over this area ghosts of men who possessed *mana* are worshipped, and they still work for the living. Ghosts are believed to be present and partake of the feasts, and are also associated with places or objects where their power is felt. Ghosts may also take up their abode in certain animals, which are accordingly held sacred. At Efate in the New Hebrides the soul passes through six stages of existence and finally is extinguished. The other world is in the west of Efate, and there the ghost meets Seritau, the cannibal executioner, and his assistants. If it cannot reply to his questions, it is handed to Maseasi, its tongue is cut out, its head split open, and then twisted round. But people of the Namtaku tribe and those with certain bodily markings pass those ordeals safely. In Malekula belief there are three stages of existence after death, the first 30 miles underground, and in these the soul becomes more and more ethereal and finally fades out. The ghosts rule the affairs of earth, and punish with death those on earth who transgress, especially in the matter of providing them with pigs.[2] In San Cristoval the soul may pass into an animal or be reborn as a child or exist as a ghost, going to Rotomana, the situation of which is variously described, but life there is like life here. A spirit at the entrance admits ghosts with ears and noses pierced and the proper marks under the right eye. Another belief is that of the continued life of the ghost in the village. Souls incarnated in animals still preserve human powers and may help the living.[3]

In north and east Melanesia the dead are believed to visit the earth from time to time, and they especially dwell about their skulls, which are duly preserved. There is a long journey to the other world, for which provision is made at the grave. Among the Sulka people who acted wrongly in life, or were murdered, or left few relatives, are not buried, and their ghosts perhaps do not enter the other world. Falling stars are ghosts descending to bathe in the sea, and the phosphorescence on the waves is caused by their movements there.[4] In New Britain the spirit-land, Matana nion, has no certain location, and it is said that, 'if our eyes were turned so that what is inside the head were now outside, we should see that Matana nion was very near to us.' Life there is like life in this world, but niggardly men are chastised, and breaches of custom—*e.g.*, theft—are also punished, after which the soul may enter an animal. There are also separate places for people who have died by sling or tomahawk and for those who have died of sickness or sorcery.[5] In the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain, the natives believe that the island paradise is guarded by a being who asks the ghosts their names, their residence, and the amount of shell-money which they left behind. Rich ghosts are allowed to enter and enjoy the pleasures of paradise. Others are debarred from it and become wandering spirits, who avenge their fate on the living. But, if some one makes a feast and distributes shell-money on behalf of such a ghost, he can then enter into bliss.[6] On the mainland of New Britain there is a separate region for poor people and for those at whose burial no shell-money was offered.[7]

The beliefs of the Polynesians are considered in art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 3; see also art. HAWAII, vol. vi. p. 530[b]. For the Dayaks see *ERE* ii. 683[a] and vii. 245[b].

7. Rebirth and transmigration.[8]—The state of the dead is sometimes one of rebirth in human form or of transmigration into animal form or a

[1] Codrington, p. 278 f.
[2] B. T. Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. [1894] 10.
[3] C. E. Fox and F. H. Drew, *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 161.
[4] P. Roscher, *AA* xxix. [1904] 214 f.
[5] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, p. 193 f.
[6] P. A. Kleintitschen, *Die Küstenbewohner der Gazellehalbinsel*, Hiltrup bei Münster, n.d., p. 225.
[7] Brown, p. 398.
[8] Cf. artt. TRANSMIGRATION.

series of these. This belief is, however, sometimes associated with belief in another world, because of the inconsistency of savage ideas, because different strata of belief originating in different sources may exist, or because one of the non-corporeal parts of a man transmigrates, while the other goes to the spirit-world. Or the ghost may return from the other world and assume a new bodily form temporarily or permanently. Again, transmigration may be the fate of the wicked or of common people, others going to paradise, or, again, it may be the lot of the good. Some examples of such beliefs have already been recorded, but a few other typical instances may here be mentioned.

(*a*) Sometimes there is no belief in another world, but merely in transmigration. We find this with the Suk, who think that the spirit passes into a snake at death. It may enter the huts; and, if so, the ghost is hungry, and milk, meat, and tobacco are placed for it.[1] So, too, the people of Khé, E. Africa, hold that souls of ancestors inhabit the bodies of the colobus monkey, and under no circumstances will they kill that animal or allow it to be killed.[2] The Yaguas of S. America believe that the soul first mounts to God in heaven and then recommences life on earth.[3]

(*b*) Sometimes, along with belief in another world, we find women flocking to the death-bed of a tribesman in the belief that his soul will pass into their bodies and be reborn as a child, as among the Algonquians.[4] Other American Indian tribes bury their children by the roadside that their souls may enter women passing by, or medicine-men effect the transfer of soul to a relative, whose next child is animated by it, as among the Tacullis.[5] Many of the mountain and desert tribes believe in re-incarnation, though some of them limit it to the souls of children.[6] There are similar beliefs and customs in W. Africa, as in the Oil Rivers district, where re-incarnation is believed to be the common lot of human souls.[7]

(*c*) Transmigration is held with other beliefs—*e.g.*, among Australian tribes, where the return of the soul in animal shape or its rebirth as a white man may be believed in along with definite ideas of the other world.[8] So in Guiana this belief in the return of a native as a white man co-exists in some tribes with a belief in the continued presence of the spirit near the place where it lived or in a paradise of souls.[9] In New Guinea the Papuans of Sialum and Kwamkwam have various beliefs—*e.g.*, in a shadowy life in another region, in spirits hovering near the village, and in transmigration into animals.[10] In Melanesia it is also thought that ghosts may take up their abode in animal forms, the animals when known being then regarded as sacred, although the belief in another world is clear and vivid.[11]

(*d*) Again, while the rich, chiefs, and the like go to a better world, common people roam the earth as animals, as the Ahts believe.[12] In the Himalaya region spirits haunting mountains are believed to be those of people who have not gone to heaven, and who assume animal forms temporarily and attack men.[1] Or, again, while the doctrine of transmigration is diffused among the American Indian tribes, it is sometimes regarded as the fate of the wicked, as among the Dogribs, who think that these become wolves.[2] This is also found among several S. American tribes.[3] Or it may take this form that, while nobles and warriors have pleasing animal forms after death, the common folk pass into unattractive or detested forms, as among the Tlascalans and also the Isannis of Brazil.[4] The idea of the Pankhas and Bunjogeos of India is, on the other hand, that, while all go to the hill whence men first emerged, none can return who led a bad life on earth, but Khozing, the patron god, sometimes sends back the good in a new body.[5]

(*e*) Re-incarnation may be merely a temporary matter for the spirits of the dead, as it was a privilege in ancient Egyptian belief. The general Bantu belief in souls as snakes and the like seems to be of this kind. The souls make themselves manifest to men in these animal forms, but pass a spirit life in another region, more or less vaguely conceived. In W. Africa belief in this occasional transmigration into an animal also occurs,[6] and we find it again among the Eskimo, with whom, *e.g.*, a woman would not eat walrus because her husband's soul had adopted it as a temporary habitation. The *angekok* announces to the woman the animal into which her husband's soul has entered.

(*f*) Among the Mohaves we find that the souls of the dead die a second death, now becoming owls. As owls they die a third time and become water-beetles, finally changing into air.[7] The Chiriguanos believe that souls go to Iguihoca, where they pass several years in enjoyment, and then become foxes or tigers.[8] On the other hand, the Bellacoola do not admit transmigration for souls which have died a second death and passed to the lowest under world.[9]

(*g*) The idea that stars are the souls of the dead is also met with, especially among S. American tribes. The Patagonians think that they are older members of the tribe, or that these hunt on the Milky Way, though the general belief is that souls return to the caverns where the gods live and where the Indians were created.[10] The Araucanians also think that their forefathers watch them from the sky as stars moving in the Milky Way,[11] and the Abipones place their ancestors in the Pleiades.

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3 F. de Castelnau, *Expédition dans les parties centrales de l'Amérique du Sud*, Paris, 1850–61, v. 25.
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J. A. MacCulloch.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).—The ideas of the Babylonians and Assyrians of the state of the dead must have varied greatly in different places and at different periods as religion developed, or at times suffered relapse, but our knowledge of the origin and composition of the religious or mythological literature is not sufficient to enable us to form any other picture of these eschatological beliefs than a general one, valid certainly at some one period, but of what origin and in what period we cannot say. Our knowledge in this case is therefore far below that attainable in the religion of Israel, since the application of criticism has permitted the approximate dating of the relevant parts of the religious literature. Yet that which is known is important in itself, for no picture of civilization in the great valley of the Tigris and Euphrates would be complete without the colour of religion, and in religious thought nothing touches man more intimately than his thought of the life after death. Besides this, the religious ideas of these peoples touched Israel so closely that, while light is reflected upon them from Palestine, there is also light from them upon the ideas of the Hebrews.

Our knowledge of Babylonian and Assyrian ideas concerning the state of the dead is primarily derived from three sources: (*a*) the epic of Gilgamesh, (*b*) the story of the Descent of Ishtar, and (*c*) the legend of Nergal and Ereshkigal. We do not know the date of the origin of any of the three, but the last-named has come to us in a form much earlier than the other two and may best be considered first.

Among the literary material in old Babylonian script found at Tell el-Amarna in Upper Egypt, in 1887, are two fragments of a legend concerning Nergal and Ereshkigal. They were deposited there during the reign of Amenophis IV. (Ikhnaton or Akh-n-Aten), king of Upper and Lower Egypt about 1360 B.C., and are therefore as old as or older than that time, but how much earlier the story was composed we do not know. So much literature is associated with the reign of Hammurapi, king of Babylon (2130–2087 B.C.), that there has grown up among Assyriologists a tendency to ascribe much else to that same period without positive evidence. This may be so old, but there is no proof of it, and to assign it to the period would be as uncritical as is the assigning to the Mosaic period of great pieces of Hebrew literature. Whatever its age or origin, it witnesses to a view of the world of the dead at about 1400 B.C., in Babylonia, and was considered of enough importance to have been carried into Egypt. This legend begins:

'When the gods prepared a feast
To their sister Ereshkigal
They sent a messenger:
Even if we should descend to thee,
Thou wouldst not come up to us,
Therefore send (hither) and take thy portion [lit. 'food'].'

Here then we have a goddess in the nether world, among the dead, summoned to participate in a feast held among the gods above. She is called Ereshkigal ('ruler of the great place'), and the story represents her as an angry being, full of grim menace, easily provoked, fit indeed as a warder of the dead who might try to escape from hands more lenient. She is not married, for the place of the dead is not fit for the propagating of human kind—that belongs to the genial earth above. She has, however, a minister named Namtar, whom she sends to the feast of the gods above.

As the story runs, when Namtar entered the assembly of the gods, all but one rose to receive him, honouring him as the representative of Ereshkigal; the god Nergal kept his seat. When this was reported to Ereshkigal, she was furious and sent Namtar back to bring Nergal before her, threatening to kill him. To answer this summons, Nergal had to pass through fourteen doors, at each of which he stationed a demon whom his father Ea had sent with him as a body-guard. When at last he had reached the abode of Ereshkigal,

'Within the house he seized Ereshkigal,
By the hair, bent her down from the throne
To the ground, to cut off her head.'

Overcome by the god, her brother, Ereshkigal offered marriage to him, was accepted, and installed as the sovereign of the region.

The story is instructive. The abode of the dead was a prison-house indeed with a warder so severe as Ereshkigal, and now with a new master in the god Nergal, who was so much more severe than she that he could beat her into submission. In a kingdom of the dead, barred within no fewer than fourteen gates, these two ruled over their prisoners, of whose state nothing specific is told us.

For a little light upon that we must now turn to the story of Ishtar's Descent to Hades, the text of which is found on three tablets from Kuyunjik which probably belonged to the library of Ashurbanipal about 650 B.C.[1] The story appears to be a nature-myth in origin, in which Tammuz represents the spring vegetation which is parched by the summer heat and vanishes from earth during winter to be restored again by the goddess of fertility in the spring season. The cult of Tammuz spread widely, and appeared in Palestine (Ezk 8[14]), and in Greece in the story of Adonis and Aphrodite. The Babylonian story represents the goddess Ishtar as seeking entrance to the abode of the dead to search for her husband Tammuz. It begins thus:

'To the land of No-return, the region [. . .],
Ishtar, the daughter of Sin, directed her thought,
The daughter of Sin directed her thought,
To the house of darkness, Irkalla's dwelling-place,
To the house from which he who enters never returns,
To the road whose path turns not back,
To the house where he who enters is deprived of light,
Where dust is their sustenance, their food clay,
Light they see not, in darkness do they sit.'

Here then we have a picture of the miserable gloom in which the dead live, or rather maintain an existence of unending wretchedness. In this, as in the former legend, Ereshkigal is their warder, and now her estate is guarded by seven doors, instead of by fourteen, though there is no comfort to be taken from that, for the seven are quite as effective in holding the dead inside. As Ishtar comes to each of these doors, she is successively stripped of her ornaments and clothing until she comes at last nude into the presence of Ereshkigal and her prisoners. Not a ray of hope is there anywhere in it, until the god Ea determines to arrange a release for Ishtar, who is passed successively through the doors by which she had entered, receiving again each article of apparel or adornment. If Ishtar, having once entered this realm of the dead, could be released from it, faith might have taken wings and invented a hope that the dead also might find release in some fashion. We must next see whether there is any light upon this question in Babylonian eschatology.

The third source of Babylonian ideas of the state of the dead is the Gilgamesh epic found upon a series of tablets belonging to the Nineveh collec-

[1] The text is best published in *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum*, xv. pls. 45–48; for tr. see Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels*, pp. 121–131.

tions buried in the mound of Kuyunjik.[1] The hero of this epic is Gilgamesh, and the stories are woven about a historic character once king in Uruk (Erech), and are made the medium for the expression of the views and speculations of Babylonian priests, theologians, and philosophers concerning the mysteries of the universe. The only parts of the epic important for the present purpose are those in which Gilgamesh is associated with his friend Engidu and with the hero of the deluge whose name is read Ut-napishtim. Engidu has perished through the machinations of Ishtar, and Gilgamesh has good reason to fear that death will claim him also. He wanders in search of immortal life and, coming at last to the maiden Sabitu at the seashore, asks of her this great boon. He hopes to learn the great secret if he can find a way to reach Ut-napishtim amid the dead. Coming after much effort into his presence, he is surprised by his appearance.

'I consider thee, O Ut-napishtim,
Thy appearance is not changed, thou art like me,
Thou art not different, even as I am, thou art.'

Here then is a man who once lived among men, who is not in such a sorry plight as those of whom we have heard in the other stories. He has been exalted, and Gilgamesh would know why or how. This question opens the way to the telling of the story of the deluge and the great deliverance from it. After the story has been told, a way is made for Gilgamesh to return from his fruitless journey, for he has learned nothing. It would seem, as we survey the story from this great distance, that the stage was set for a larger hope, but it did not appear. If Ut-napishtim had found a life and not a mere existence after death, might not faith rise to grasp the idea that perhaps to another this might also happen, and, if to another, perhaps to many more? But Babylonian thought was unequal to so great a leap into the darkness. The utmost attained seems to be a hint that he who died in battle or in war (if this be really the meaning of a very obscure line) has a happier issue in the life to come.

'He who dies the iron death (?), saw you such an one? I saw,
Upon a bed of ease he rests, clear water he drinks.
He who dies in battle, saw you such an one? I saw,
His father and mother hold his head, and his wife bends over (?) him.'[2]

This is something, however vague, which is better than the state of the dead portrayed in the Descent of Ishtar. But it does not carry far, nor did it become general so as to be represented elsewhere in any literature yet recovered. Instead of rising into this and thence onward into a more spiritual belief, progress was apparently ended, and despair of any better future state drove man back into taking gain of this life. So it happens that in another and unhappily fragmentary text[3] we have Gilgamesh (herein called Gish) confronted with despairing advice:

'Gish, whither goest thou?
The Life, that thou dost seek, thou shalt not find.
When the gods humanity did make,
For humanity did death determine,
But life held in their own hands.'

What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? It is to make use of this life and abandon the hopeless search for immortality.

'Thou, Gish,—let thy body be filled,
Day and night be fraught with pleasure (?),
Daily make a feast of joy,
Day and night dance (?) and joy (?),
Clean be thy dress,
Thy head be washen, in water bathed,
Look joyously at the child that holds thy hand,
Hold thy wife in pleasureful embrace.'

Here is the end of it all. The centuries of thought and aspiration have ended in finding the be-all and end-all of hope in this, and not in the next, life. A study of the Hebrew ideas will show how much surer was the advance among them of thought from ideas quite as sombre as those of their great neighbours into a faith on which Jesus might later build a great assurance.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *Texts and translations.*—Of the story of Nergal and Ereshkigal one piece is in the British Museum and is published by C. Bezold and E. A. W. Budge, *The Tell el-Amarna Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1892, no. 82; the other is in the Berlin Museum and is published by H. Winckler and L. Abel, *Der Thontafelfund von El-Amarna*, Berlin, 1889, no. 240. It has been often translated, most recently in R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, New York, 1912, pp. 131–135, with further bibliography. The Descent of Ishtar is published in the original text in H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. [²1891] 31, and better in *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum*, xv. [1901] pl. 45–48. It also has been frequently translated, last by Rogers, pp. 121–131, and by M. Jastrow, Jr., *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, Philadelphia and London, 1915, pp. 453–461, who also discusses its interpretation. The Gilgamesh epic is published in the original text by Paul Haupt, *Das babylonische Nimrod-Epos*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1884–91, with supplements by the same in *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, i. [1889] 49 ff., 97 ff. Parts of it have been much translated, especially the portion recounting the deluge. Certain portions are in Rogers, p. 80 ff., and in Jastrow, p. 443. But for a full treatment see A. Ungnad and H. Gressmann, *Das Gilgamesch-Epos*, Göttingen, 1911.

(*b*) *Discussions.*—A. S. Geden, *Studies in the Religions of the East*, London, 1913, p. 159 ff.; H. Schneider, *Kultur und Denken der Babylonier und Juden*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 152 ff.; M. Jastrow, Jr., *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York and London, 1911, p. 351 ff., *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions*, London, 1914, p. 196 ff.; P. S. P. Handcock, *Mesopotamian Archæology*, do. 1912, pp. 399–405; S. H. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, do. 1914.

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STATE OF THE DEAD (Buddhist).—Buddhism, like other religions, makes the distinction between the transitory world and the eternal, but except for the *arhat* death is merely the beginning of another life-course (*gati*) through this mutable universe. The individual may become an inhabitant of hell, an animal, a *preta*, a human being, or a god,[1] the three first being states of unhappiness (*apāya*). After *pretas* some schools place another unhappy state, that of *asura*, but the Hīnayāna refuses to recognize it as a separate *gati*.

1. Conditions of rebirth.—The kind of rebirth is determined by the individual's *karma* (*q.v.*). The view of R. C. Childers is often repeated, that at death the constituent elements (*khandhas*) of the individual perish, 'but by the force of his kamma a new set of khandhas instantly starts into existence, and a new being appears in another world.'[2] As pointed out in art. INCARNATION (Buddhist), the view that *karma* is the only link between two existences is unsupported by the texts. So also is the further inference that there is no real transmigration. There is of course no transmigration of an *ātman* in the sense of any permanent, stable, unchanging mind or consciousness. The link between two states of the individual, whether in one birth or in succeeding existences, is the causal relation between any one combination of elements forming the individual and the previous states. This combination is not a permanent *ātman*, nor is there any one element in it, such as consciousness, that forms a permanent basis.

The combination is '"a living continuous fluid complex," which does not remain quite the same for two consecutive moments, but which continues for an endless number of existences, bridging an endless number of births, without becoming completely different from itself.'[3]

[1] The tablets are in the British Museum and have been published in the original text by Paul Haupt, *Das babylonische Nimrod-Epos*. It has been often translated; see Literature below.

[2] *Gilgamesh Epic*, xii. 151–154.

[3] The Meissner Fragment; see B. Meissner, 'Ein altbab. Fragment des Gilgamesepos,' *MVG* vii. [1902] pt. i.

[1] *Majjhima*, i. 73.

[2] *Dict. of the Pāli Language*, London, 1875, *s.v.* 'Khandho.'

[3] L. de la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa* (*HL*), Cambridge, 1917, p. 35.

That the individual in this sense was previously a certain being, and that he may remember many previous existences, is not a mere accommodation to popular notions, but appears as a commonplace throughout the *Suttas*.

Rebirth in Kāmaloka, which includes the lower universe from the lowest hell up to and including the six sensual heavens, is in accordance with a man's moral or immoral acts. More than mere morality is required for rebirth in the higher realms. The four classes of the heavens of form, and the four stages of the formless world, correspond to the stages of trance, and are attained by the practice of the spiritual exercises.

2. The eight hot hells.—It is not clear that the Pāli Scriptures recognize one consistent system of hells (*niraya*, *naraka*). What is usually described as the Buddhist view is a system of eight hells. It is not found in the *Vinaya* or the *Suttas*, but occurs in the later books (*Jātaka* and *Abhidhamma*), and also forms the basis of the more developed Mahāyāna systems. Those hells are below the earth, and their description in the commentary on *Jātaka* 530 (v. 270) is as follows:

(1) *Sañjīva*.—Beings are here cut to pieces by the keepers of hell, and come repeatedly to life to suffer the same punishment. Hence the name, which means 'resuscitation.'

(2) *Kālasutta*.—Beings are struck down with blazing weapons, and, while lying on the ground, are cut into eight or sixteen pieces with an instrument called *kālasutta* (Skr. *kālasūtra*).

(3) *Saṃghāta*.—Beings on burning mountains are crushed like sesamum seeds or sugar-cane by 'smiting' (*saṃghāta*).

(4) and (5) *Roruva*.—There are two hells of this name, Jālaroruva, 'Roruva of flame,' and Dhūmaroruva, 'Roruva of smoke,' where beings are correspondingly tortured. In Sanskrit works the names are Raurava and Mahāraurava, interpreted to mean 'wailing' and 'great wailing.' The Pāli form appears to be a derivative of the proper name Ruru.

(6) *Tapana*.—'Heating,' where beings are fixed on spikes the height of a palm-tree and burnt.

(7) *Pratāpana*.—'Great heating,' where beings are cast down from a blazing iron mountain, below which blazing stakes are set up.

(8) *Avīchi*.—Flames arise from each of the four walls, and from the top and bottom, and strike the opposite sides. The name, if divided *a-vīchi*, means 'without a wave,' but the commentaries, probably to get an intelligible meaning, make it signify 'without rest or cessation.' 'Here there is no interval of cessation either of the flames or of the pain of the beings.'[1] Kern has pointed out that it is probably from *avāch*, *avāchī*, 'downwards,' formed on the analogy of *udach*, *udāchī*, 'higher,' and means 'lowest point.'[2] This view is strengthened by the fact that it is the lowest point of the universe, and that in the Yoga system Avīchi is not a hell, but the lowest part of the universe, over which are placed the six hells of this system.[3]

3. Minor hells.—Besides these hells there are, according to the commentator, sixteen minor hells (*ussada*, 'excrescence') attached to each great hell, making 128 or, in all, 136. This account agrees essentially with the *Mahāvastu*, i. 4ff. It is probably a systematizing of earlier and inconsistent accounts, as it contains details which do not harmonize, and of which the relation to the main features is not clear. The *Pañchagatidīpana*, a Pāli work known only from a Siamese source, gives four *ussadas* to each great hell: Mīlhakūpa, the hell of dung, where beings are pierced by worms; Kukkula, the hell of hot ashes; Asipattavana, the forest with leaves of swords; and Nadī (Vetaranī), the river of bitter water. The *Mahāvastu*, i. 7, has essentially the same, but Kuṇapa ('carrion') replaces Milhakūpa. It is usually taken for granted that these are the names of the four *ussadas* of each hell. This may be so, if we assume that the system is consistent, but, as will be seen, it is more probable that several systems are combined.

4. Earlier systems.—The *Suttas* know nothing of the eight hells, but have several passages in which hells are described. In *Aṅguttara*, i. 141, seven tortures are described.

> The king of hell, Yama, hands the culprit over to the keepers of hell, who torment their victim by thrusting an iron stake through each hand and foot, and breast (the 'five-fold bonds'); they chop him with axes; they set him upside down and chop him with adzes; they fix him to a chariot and move it backwards and forwards over the burning ground; they make him go up and down a mountain of burning coal; they put him head first into a blazing copper cauldron (*lohakumbhī*); they throw him into the great hell (Mahāniraya).

An evident modification of this occurs in the commentary on *Petavatthu*, iv. 1, 8, which speaks of the five-fold bonds, sprinkling with molten copper, ascending the mountain of coals, throwing into the copper cauldron, entering the forest with leaves of swords, crossing the Vetaranī, and throwing into the great hell. These are here called the seven *ussadas*, and, though the comment rests on a doubtful interpretation of *sattussada*, it illustrates the divergent conceptions and the attempt to harmonize them.

The above passage of the *Aṅguttara* recurs in the *Majjhima*, iii. 183, where it is followed by a description of the great hell (Mahāniraya), the great carrion hell (Gūtha), the great hot-ashes hell (Kukkula), the great silk-cotton tree forest (Simbalivana), the great sword-leaf forest (Asipattavana), and the great bitter-water river (Khārodaka). Here they are not *ussadas*, and there is no trace of the eight hells, but we find later the Mahāniraya (which is the proper name of a hell in the Hindu system) treated as the same as Avīchi, and the Gūtha and other hells termed *ussadas*.[1] With the absence of any mention of eight hells in the *Suttas*, and the existence of divergent descriptions, this probably implies the combination of two independent systems. The Mahāniraya is identified with Avīchi, and the Gūtha and other great hells are reduced to *ussadas* round the eight great hells. Both systems are no doubt in their main features pre-Buddhistic. Several of the names are identical with some in the system of the 21 Hindu hells[2] and the six of the Yoga system.[3]

There are still other unlocated hells, which appear to have developed out of the description of special kinds of tortures, Kākola, Khuradhāra, Sataporisa, Sattisūla, Sunakha.[4] In Sanskrit works we find as 'great hells' Śālmali (the Simbali forest of Pāli), Agnighaṭa, Andhakāla, Sitodaka (Śīt-?), Asichchheda, Śambara.[5]

In *Dīgha*, ii. 12, there is a reference to beings in the *Lokantarikā*, the space between every three adjacent universes, which is quite dark. It is described in the commentary[6] as a great hell, where sins of violence against relatives and virtuous ascetics are punished. In *Jātaka*, vi. 247, it is the penalty for heresy. The inhabitants have long nails, and like bats on trees they hang from the *chakkavāla* walls that encircle the world. Then, finding no food, they drop into the salt water below. They are classed as *pretas* in R. S. Hardy's Sinhalese sources,[7] but there is no indication of this in the Pāli.

A system which shows no relation to the eight hells is described in the *Suttanipāta*, iii. 10. Buddha is asked how long is the length of life in the Paduma hell. He answers that it is not easy to say how many years, but that it is possible to make a comparison. If a man were to take a single grain every century from a load of sesamum seed, the task would be finished in less time than the period of the Abbuda hell. Then follow nine other hells, the length of time in each of which is twenty times longer than the preceding: Nirabbuda, Ababa, Ahaha, Aṭaṭa, Kumuda, Sogandhika, Uppalaka, Puṇḍarika, Paduma. This makes the length of the Paduma hell 512,000,000 times that of the Abbuda.

There is nothing to show that these are not

1 *Jātaka*, v. 271.
2 *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme*, i. 298.
3 Vyāsa on *Yoga-sūtras*, iii. 25.

1 *Mahāvastu*, i. 6-8.
2 *Yājñavalkya*, iii. 222; *Manu*, iv. 88.
3 Vyāsa on *Yoga-sūtras*, iii. 25.
4 *Jātaka*, v. 143, 145, 247, 269, 274; cf. the tortures in *Suttanipāta*, 673-5.
5 *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, 18, 50.
6 *Dīgha Comm.*, Colombo, 1918, i. 289; cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899-1910, ii. 9.
7 *Manual of Buddhism*², pp. 48, 59.

distinct hells, as they are termed in the text. The commentator, however, says that they are not separate hells, but indicate the length of time in Avīchi. It is certain that the names do signify high numerals, but the identification with Avīchi is probably another case of harmonizing, as the punishments described in the verses following are not those of Avīchi. They are those of *Aṅguttara*, i. 141, and of what are called the 'seven *ussadas*' in the *Petavatthu* commentary. Although these verses may not be contemporary with the previous prose account of Abbuda, etc., there is nothing in either to suggest the system of eight hells. The commentator also shows that his view was not of unquestioned authority, as he states two other interpretations: (1) that the names Abbuda, etc., are due to the variety of pains and punishments in each, (2) that they are cold hells.

5. Cold hells.—It is as cold hells that eight of these ten hells appear in a modified form in Sanskrit works. The names in *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 122, are Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Aṭaṭa, Apapa, Hāhādhara, Utpala, Padma, Mahāpadma, the Pāli Kumuda, Sogandhika, and Puṇḍarīka being omitted, and Mahāpadma being added. The Pāli is more systematic, as the last five of this list are the names of the five kinds of lotuses. From the *Abhidharmakośa*[1] and Chinese sources we know that the names like Apapa and Aṭaṭa are interpreted as the sounds uttered by their inmates, and those named from the different kinds of lotuses (Utpala, Padma) are due to the frozen flesh of their victims exfoliating in the form of these flowers. There is no reason to think that this, any more than the whole system of cold hells, is anything but a development of scholastic exegesis, and the reduction to eight is probably due to a desire to make them conform with the hot hells.

6. Locality of hells.—The Scriptures imply that the hells are below the earth, apparently in descending order corresponding to the ascending heavens. Later writings give various inconsistent accounts, showing that they are merely the elaborations of commentators. Avīchi, according to *Abhidharmakośa*,[2] is 20,000 leagues (*yojanas*) below Jambūdvīpa. Other authorities put the hells 500 leagues down, and below the southern extremity of Jambūdvīpa. *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 123, makes Sañjīva and the other hells the lowest of the *pātālas*, or subterranean regions, with Avīchi consequently at the bottom of the universe. Accounts of the size are equally contradictory. The *Jātaka* commentator makes Avīchi 1800 leagues in diameter and 5400 in circumference, showing that he conceived it as circular.[3]

7. Crimes punished in each hell.—The criminals punished in the first hot hell are strikers, murderers, and those moved by covetousness and anger; in the second slanderers, liars, and those undutiful to father, mother, or friends; in the third those who kill rams, antelopes, and other living beings; in the fourth those who inflict torments on living beings; in the fifth those who destroy the property of the gods, of Brāhmans, of their *guru*, though charged to guard it; in the sixth those who burn forests and live animals; in the seventh the infidel (*natthika*) who reverses right and wrong; in the eighth those who kill disciples, father, mother, or *guru*. This is the arrangement of the *Pañchagatidīpana*, with which the *Mahāvastu* agrees in the main. It is naturally absent from the *Suttas*, which usually mention the traditional list of ten sins as leading to hell. The *Jātaka*, v. 267, puts parricides and slayers of ascetics in the first (Kālasutta), unrighteous kings in the sixth (Tapana).

The absence of certain notorious crimes is noticeable. These are punished in the minor hells—a fact which is not surprising, when we know that in the *Sutta* accounts they were not *ussadas*, but great hells. Violators of morality suffer in Milhakūpa; adulterers climb the thorny *simbali* trees; in the Asipattavana the destroyers of confidence are cut to pieces; robbers swallow hot balls of iron, and killers of fish are plunged into Vetaraṇī. In these *ussadas* the *Jātaka* also puts matricide, abortion, and adultery. The slaying of father or mother, slaying an *arhat*, shedding the blood of a Buddha, schism, and heresy are also said to be punished in Avīchi.[1]

8. Length of life in the hells.—There is no fixed duration of life for beings in states of punishment, according to *Abhidhammattha-saṃgaha*, v. 4. In *Itivuttaka*, 18, it is said that he who causes a schism suffers in hell for a *kappa*. Schism is punished in Avīchi according to later accounts, but there is no indication that the system of eight hells is recognized here. The passage became later a matter of controversy in different schools, especially as it was not agreed whether the *kappa* was a great æon, the period between two destructions of the universe, or a subdivision of this, an *antara-kappa*.[2] The account of the Paduma hell recognizes no definite period, since the unit of the ten periods is undetermined, and similarly in other parts of the *Suttas*, where the refrain occurs, 'and they die not until their evil karma is exhausted.'

An arrangement found in the *Abhidharmaśāstra* quoted by Feer makes the periods correspond to those of the heavens of Kāmaloka, *i.e.* in the Sañjīva hell 500 years, a day and night of which equal 50 human years. These periods are doubled for each succeeding hell, till we get for Avīchi 64,000 years, with a day and night of 6400 human years. The arrangement in Hardy's Sinhalese authorities[3] is apparently the same.

9. Animals.—Animals are classed as eaters of grass, of carrion, living in darkness (*i.e.* blind), in water, in filth. The foolish man, who formerly in this world has taken pleasure in these things and has done evil deeds, is born in one of these classes. As there is no morality and accumulation of merit in such existences, it is exceedingly difficult to escape from this state, and, if even after repeated animal births the individual reaches the state of man, he is born in a very low caste.[4] The *Pañchagatidīpana*, 45–50, makes animal birth correspond with the supposed characters of different kinds of animals. The licentious are born as geese and pigeons, the stupid as worms. Through anger they become serpents, and through pride and insolence asses and dogs. The envious and avaricious become monkeys, the meat-eaters tigers and other carnivorous animals.

In Mahāyāna the saving power of the *bodhisattvas* extends to all realms. Avalokiteśvara empties the hells and *preta*-world, he takes the form of a bee, and by humming his teaching to innumerable worms causes them to remember the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order, so that they are reborn as *bodhisattvas* in Sukhāvatī.[5]

10. Pretas.—A *preta* (Pāli *peta*) is properly one who has 'gone before,' a departed person. Hinduism developed a very characteristic form of worship of the dead.[6] Buddhism modified this by making *pretas* a special class, who have to expiate a certain kind of *karma* in the *preta*-realm (*petti-*

[1] L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Vasubandhu et Yaçomitra. Troisième chapitre de l'Abhidharmakoça*, London, 1914–18, p. 80 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 78.
[3] Cf. art. Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist); and A. Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes d'hist. et de littérature orientales*, Paris, 1843, p. 79.

[1] *Mahāvastu*, i. 26; other details are given in Feer (see Literature).
[2] *Kathāvatthu*, 476.
[3] *Manual of Budhism*[2], p. 28.
[4] *Majjhima*, iii. 167–169.
[5] *Karaṇḍavyūha*, p. 46.
[6] See art. Ancestor-worship and Cult of the Dead (Indian).

visaya). In the Buddhist view it is only the departed condemned to this realm that can benefit by offerings (*saddha, śrāddha*) made to them by their relatives and friends. In the other four courses the life of the departed person depends upon the means of support in the world to which he has gone.[1] The *Tirokuḍḍasutta*[2] describes the worship (*pūjā*) as consisting in actual offerings of food and drink set out for the departed.

'Those who are compassionate give to their relatives pure and excellent food and drink at the proper time, saying, "May this be for our relatives; may they be made happy." . . . The petas live on what is given from this world.'

The commentary explains that the offerings are made by giving alms to the Order, and the merit is assigned to the *pretas*, whereby they benefit. The monks performing the ceremony, in fact, take the place held in the Hindu rite by the Brāhman priests, who represent the deceased ancestors.[3]

11. Preta-realm.—The *pretas* are ghosts, which live at cross-roads and congregate outside the fences and at the doors of houses. They are described in the commentary as having long dishevelled hair and beard, lean, rough limbs, looking like burnt trees after a forest fire, some scorched with flames arising from their stomachs and issuing from their mouths through their burning hunger and thirst, some with bellies like mountains and their throats the size of a hole made by a needle. The effect of their *karma* is to make their relatives forget them, and then their only food is indescribable filth. Several kinds are mentioned: *kuppipāsika*, 'afflicted with hunger and thirst'; *vantāsa*, 'eating vomit'; *paradattūpajīvin*, 'living on what is given by others'; *nijjhāmataṇhika*, 'burning with thirst.'

12. Sins punished in the preta-realm. — The special sins leading to *preta* existence are niggardliness or refusing to give alms and envy of the blessings of others. Those who have dissuaded from giving become needle-mouthed, and those who, though intending to give, have afterwards regretted it become eaters of filth. This sin is put by *Saṃyutta*, i. 92, in the Mahāroruva hell. One who says unpleasant things in anger becomes a *preta* with fiery throat.[4]

In the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*[5] the city of *pretas* (*pretanagara*) is an abode adjoining Avīchi. It has door-keepers, and is mentioned in several passages along with various hells.

After *pretas* the *Pañchagatidīpana* groups several classes of superhuman beings, which, though strictly speaking divine, do not generally reside in heaven. They are chiefly beings whose *karma* is mixed: *kumbhaṇḍas*, demons attendant on Virūlhaka, one of the four great kings; *rākṣasas*, cannibal demons; *gandharvas*, divine musicians; *piśāchas, paṃsupiśāchas*, mud-demons; *yakṣas*, demons, especially those attendant on Vessavaṇa, one of the four great kings; and *asuras*, gods expelled from the heaven of the Thirty-three, and forming a separate *gati* in some schools.[6] *Nāgas* and *garuḍas*, whose natural forms are serpents and birds respectively, are classed with the animals.

13. Man.—Rebirth as a man, whether from a previous higher or from a lower existence, implies that the individual has some good *karma* to his credit. The punishment of hell is monitory and retributory, not a purification as in the Christian purgatory; but, although a being in a state of punishment cannot acquire merit, he may be reborn as a man or god owing to the ripening of *karma* from a still earlier existence. Such *karma* may result in an individual being reborn as a man, who has done deeds that otherwise would have led to heaven or hell. If he has formerly been a shedder of blood, he will be short-lived; if an injurer and striker of living beings, he will be diseased; if of an angry and despairing nature, ugly; if eager for gain and honour, weak; if he is not a giver, poor; if proud and insolent, of low caste; if not an inquirer as to what is good and worthy, stupid. And the practice of the opposite virtues leads to long life and the other corresponding blessings.[1]

14. Heavens. — The arrangement of heavens, though peculiarly Buddhist as a system, is based upon Hindu conceptions, and the names of the lower heavens are often similar to or identical with those of the Yoga philosophy. There is little doubt that they are pre-Buddhistic, and hence it is not surprising that the original meaning of several of the names of different gods and heavens was apparently unknown to the Buddhists, who interpreted them in more than one way. The series of heavens as given in *Majjhima*, i. 289, is as follows:

A. THE SIX HEAVENS OF SENSUAL ENJOYMENT (Kāmaloka).—(1) *Chātummahārājikā devas.*—This is the heaven of the four great kings, the gods of the four quarters, and protectors of each of the four continents. They are Dhataraṭṭha (Dhṛtarāṣtra), king of the east; Virūḷha (Virūḍhaka), of the south; Virūpakkha (Virūpākṣa), of the west; and Kuvera or Vessavaṇa (Vaiśravaṇa), of the north. Their attendants are respectively *gandharvas, kumbhaṇḍas, nāgas*, and *yakṣas*.[2] Their abode is half-way up Mount Meru, the centre of the world.

(2) *Tāvatiṃsa devas.*—The 33 gods, with Sakka at their head, dwell on the top of Mount Meru. The *asuras* are placed below or at the foot of Mount Meru, after being expelled from Tāvatiṃsa by Sakka. Other superhuman beings of general Hindu mythology (mentioned under *pretas*) properly belong to this region. Rebirth in the vegetable world is apparently absent from the Buddhist system, but trees and plants are really divine beings, *devatā*, and their life is that of the tree-spirit inhabiting them.

(3) *Yāma devas.*—This would naturally mean gods of the heaven of Yama, Yama being the Vedic king of the heaven of the fathers. In Buddhism, however, Yama has become king of hell and the *pretas*, and the commentaries interpret *yāma* in various ways—*e.g.*, 'the misery-freed gods'[3] or in the sense of a watch (period of three hours), as being the period by which these gods reckon time. Dhammapāla on *Therīgāthā*, 197, derives it from the root *yā*, in the sense of 'having attained divine pleasure.' Their king is Suyāma.

(4) *Tusita devas.*—These are the 'delighted or satisfied gods,' and their abode is the heaven from which the *bodhisattvas* descend to become Buddhas. The king is Santusita.

(5) *Nimmānarati devas.*—This means gods who delight in creation or transformation. The commentary on *Vimānavatthu*, 80, explains the name as those who take delight and sport by changing their forms at pleasure. *Dīgha*, iii. 218, interprets it as those who exercise their power over sensual desires created by themselves. Their king is Sunimmita.

(6) *Paranimmitavasavattī devas.* — According to *Dīgha*, iii. 218, these are gods who exercise their power over sensual pleasures created by others. Their king is Vasavatti, and as ruler of the highest of the Kāma heavens he is later identified with Māra.[4] As this and the previous heaven correspond to the Yoga Aparinirmitavaśavartin and Parinirmitavaśavartin, they are probably ancient terms, interpreted variously without reference to their original application. The Yoga terms show that *para-* may be a mistake for *pari-*, and the Buddhist interpretations consequently mere etymological illusions.

B. HEAVENS OF THE WORLD OF FORM (Rūpaloka).—The following list of 13 is that of *Majjhima*, i. 289. Other lists vary from 16 to 18, and have also minor differences in arrangement. The usual number of 16 is obtained by subdividing the first *dhyāna* into three, and adding the *asaññasattas* in the fourth *dhyāna*. The principle of division in all the lists is the classification of the heavens above Kāmaloka into eight planes, according to the four *dhyānas*, and the four higher 'attainments.'

(1) *First dhyāna.—Brahmakāyika devas*, gods of the troop of Brahmā, subdivided in *Vibhaṅga*, 424, into (*a*) *Brahmapārisajja devas*, gods of Brahmā's retinue, (*b*) *Brahmapurohita devas*, family priests of Brahmā, (*c*) *mahābrahmas*, great Brahmās. In the *Suttas* only one great Brahmā is at any given time supreme.

(2) *Second dhyāna.—Abha devas*, gods of brilliance, including (*a*) *parittābha devas*, gods of limited brilliance, (*b*) *appamāṇābha devas*, gods of unlimited brilliance, (*c*) *ābhassara devas*, radiant gods.

[1] *Aṅguttara*, v. 269–271. [2] *Khuddakapāṭha*, vii.
[3] W. Caland, *Altindischer Ahnencult*, Leyden, 1893, p. 154.
[4] *Pañchagatidīpana*, 52–59. [5] Pp. 12, 35, 66.
[6] Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, viii. 1.

[1] *Majjhima*, iii. 202–206; *Pañchagatidīpana*, 70–162.
[2] *Dīgha*, ii. 257.
[3] S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Compendium of Philosophy*, London, 1910 (tr. of *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*), p. 138, n. 2.
[4] *Jātaka*, i. 63.

(3) *Third dhyāna.*—*Subha devas*, gods of beauty or lustre, including (*a*) *parittasubha devas*, gods of limited lustre, (*b*) *appamāṇasubha devas*, gods of unlimited lustre, (*c*) *subhakiṇha devas*, gods of complete lustre.

(4) *Fourth dhyāna.*—(*a*) *Vehapphala devas*, gods of great fruit, (*b*) *aviha devas*, gods of non-increase (?), (*c*) *atappa devas*, gods of coolness, (*d*) *sudassa devas*, gods fair to see, (*e*) *sudassī devas*, well-seeing gods, (*f*) *akaniṭṭha devas*, gods among whom none is the youngest—a Vedic epithet of the *maruts*, but with no discernible reference to those gods.

In *Dīgha*, ii. 50, 52, the last five of this *dhyāna* are called the *suddhāvāsas*, 'gods of pure abode.' Another class of this *dhyāna* is that of the *asaññasattas* or *asaṃjñisattvas*, beings of unconsciousness.[1] *Vibhaṅga*, 425, puts them first in this class. In Sanskrit lists are further found the *anabhrakas*, 'cloudless' gods, and the *puṇyaprasavas*, 'merit-producing' gods.

C. Heavens of the formless world (Arūpaloka).—The four divisions of this world correspond to the four attainments (*samāpattis*).

(1) *Ākāsānañcāyatanūpaga devas*, gods who have reached the stage in which the object of thought is space realized as infinite.

(2) *Viññāṇañcāyatanūpaga devas*, gods of the stage in which the object is cognition realized as infinite.

(3) *Akiñcaññāyatanūpaga devas*, gods of the stage in which the object is nothingness.

(4) *Nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatanūpaga devas*, gods of the stage in which the object is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness.

15. Life of the gods.—The *Vimānavatthu* commentary describes life in Kāmaloka as consisting of sensual pleasures like those on earth, but on a grander scale. The gods have each a palace of gold, ruby, etc., and retinues of nymphs. They move through space on flying couches, and sport in the Nandana grove, or in boats on the great lakes. The sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies are among the vehicles of such gods. Sakka has female attendants skilful in dancing and singing. They marry and intermarry with the gods of the four great kings and the *asuras*.

In Rūpaloka there is no sensual desire—*i.e.*, according to *Abhidhammattha-saṃgaha*, vi. 12, those groups of material qualities constituting smell, taste, body, sex, and those produced by food, are absent; and among the unconscious beings also the groups of seeing, hearing, mind, and voice. In Arūpaloka all the groups of material qualities are absent.

Birth in Rūpaloka and Arūpaloka is attained by the practice of the corresponding *dhyāna*, and birth in one of the three divisions of each of the first three *dhyānas* is in accordance with the limited, medium, and eminent exercise of each. *Vibhaṅga*, 425, includes in the fourth *dhyāna* also the four stages of Arūpaloka, and makes birth in the seven divisions from *asaññasattas* to *akaniṭṭhas* correspond to seven ways of practising this *dhyāna*. Birth in Arūpaloka is in accordance with the object of thought of each division. A somewhat different arrangement occurs in *Abhidhammattha-saṃgaha*, vi. 10.

16. Length of life in the heavens.—In the heaven of the four great kings a day and night equals 50 human years, and the length of life is 500 divine years—*i.e.* 9,000,000 human years. These figures are doubled for each of the following Kāma heavens, giving for the *paranimmitavasavattīs* a day and night equal to 1600 human years, and a life of 16,000 divine years.

The three divisions of the *brahmakāyikas* have a life of one-third, one-half, and a whole *kappa*; of the *parittābhas* it is two *kappas*, and, by successive doubling for each of the following, 64 *kappas* for the *subhakiṇhas*. *Asaññasattas* and *vehapphalas* both have 500 *kappas*, and the following to *akaniṭṭhas* successively double. In Arūpaloka the ages are 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, and 84,000 *kappas*.[2]

Further cosmological details will be found in art. Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist), and an account of the paradises of Mahāyāna in art. Blest, Abode of the (Buddhist).

Literature.—L. Feer, 'L'Enfer indien,' *JA*, 8th ser., xx [1892] 185 ff., 'Comment on devient preta,' *ib.* 8th ser., iii. [1884] 109 ff., 'Comment on devient deva,' *ib.* 8th ser., iii. 1 ff., 'Comment on devient arhati,' *ib.* 8th ser., i. [1883] 407 ff.; *Fragments extraits du Kandjour* (*AMG* v. [1883], containing translations of *Pañchagatidīpana*, and the Chinese *Lou-tao-tsi*, § 1, *Tien tao* ['Way to Heaven']); H. Kern, *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië*, Haarlem, 1882, i. 287–299; R. S. Hardy, *A Manual of Budhism*[2], London, 1880.

Edward J. Thomas.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Christian).—**1. General character of the Christian view.**—The distinctive feature of the Christian doctrine of immortality, as distinguished from that of Greek philosophy, is its insistence upon the survival, not of a part only, but of the totality of human personality. The Greek view is sometimes spoken of as the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, but it is only of part of the soul that persistence is affirmed. If Plato at times, in accordance with popular ideas, speaks of friendship with the great and good as among the pleasures of the next world, thus implying the permanence of man's emotional and affective nature, his more usual view is cold and intellectual. In theoretic Platonism what survives is little more than the power of abstract thought, and eternal bliss consists mainly in the calm and unemotional contemplation of the eternal, unchanging 'Ideas.' In Aristotle this intellectualist tendency is still more pronounced. What survives at death is simply the divine principle of pure intelligence (*νοῦς*), which apparently is absorbed into the Divine Mind, so that it becomes a serious question, in spite of such passages as *Nic. Eth.* i. 11, whether Aristotle can rightly be regarded as a believer in individual immortality.

To the Jew the life of the affections, of the emotions, of the senses, and of active volition, seemed of more worth than the life of abstract thought. As soon as ever he conceived a blessed life beyond the grave as possible at all, he demanded that it should have all (and more than all) the warmth, the fullness, and the vivacity of earthly life. Eternal life, in his view, meant the enhancement and enrichment of life, not its impoverishment, and impoverished it would surely be, in his opinion, if it lost one single element which in the earthly life possesses artistic, moral, or emotional value. The Jew, then, stood for the survival of human personality in its entirety.

But this position, when logically thought out, seems to imply a life lived in a material environment, and even the survival (in some sense) of the human body. Sensation, *e.g.*, seems to require organs of sensation, emotion some sort of bodily organization, the recognition of friends some kind of visible form by which to distinguish them; furthermore, it seems impossible to understand how the artistic faculties can be exercised except upon sensible objects possessed of æsthetic charm. If, therefore, eternal life implies, as to a Jew it does, the most perfect and satisfying life imaginable, it must imply a life lived *in the body*, and *in a material universe*, both of which, however transfigured and glorified, must still be thought of under the category of matter.

This point of view, characteristic of the main stream of Jewish thought, as distinguished from the speculations of the Platonizing school of Philo, was that which commended itself to Christ and the first Christians. Hence their descriptions of the life to come are pictorial, vivid, almost sensuous, employing largely the current apocalyptic imagery. Such descriptions are undoubtedly symbolical, but they do not symbolize a purely spiritual existence. When we read of harpers with their harps, of the new song of the redeemed, of

[1] *Dīgha*, iii. 263; *Kathāvatthu*, 260; *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 123.

[2] *Aṅguttara*, i. 213, 267; *Vibhaṅga*, 424–426. In *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 142, the meaning of *kappa* in this connexion is discussed.

the new heavens and the new earth, of the new Jerusalem paved with gold, of its joyous inhabitants clothed in white and carrying palms, we are not meant to think of disembodied spirits existing *in vacuo*, but of visible human bodies gloriously arrayed, and of real sensible things corresponding in the heavenly sphere to what we should here call beautiful music, beautiful literature and poetry, beautiful architecture, and beautiful scenery.

But the Christian view of heaven, though containing an element which (in a good sense) may be called 'sensuous,' is not sensual. Christ was careful to guard from the first against those gross and carnal conceptions of future bliss which among His contemporaries tended to attach themselves to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. According to His teaching, in the world to come man will have outgrown his lower animal propensities, such as the appetite of sex (Mt 22^{30}, Mk 12^{25}, Lk 20^{35}) and the desire of eating and drinking (Ro 14^{17}). Allusions to feasting in the next world are certainly to be understood symbolically, as is especially evident from Mt 26^{29}.

Occasionally, but very rarely, the same spiritual view of the resurrection life appears in rabbinical writings:

'In the world to come,' said Rabbi Rab, 'there is neither eating, nor drinking, nor sexual pleasure, nor strife, but the righteous with their crowns sit around the table of God, feeding on the splendour of His Majesty.'[1]

The risen Lord's eating with the disciples during the great 40 days is not inconsistent with this view. He ate, not as needing food, but in order to afford a convincing proof of His bodily resurrection (Lk $24^{36ff.}$, Ac 1^4 RVm, 10^{41}).

The resurrection bodies of the saints were conceived of not as natural, but as glorious and spiritual (Mt 22^{30}, 1 Co $15^{35ff.}$), like the bodies of the angels, whom the ancient Jews and the early Church (at least to the close of the 4th cent.) regarded not as strictly incorporeal, but as invested with spiritual bodies, it being the privilege of God alone to be purely incorporeal.[2] Although the identity of the resurrection body with the earthly body is often suggested, or even insisted on in the NT (see Mt $5^{29.\ 30}$ 10^{28}, Ro $8^{11.\ 23}$, 1 Co 15^{53}; cf. also Mt 27^{52}), the identity thought of was probably one of continuity, rather than of identical materials. The doctrine of the full material identity of the earthly with the resurrection body seems not to be part of the original tradition, and is probably inconsistent with the Pauline doctrine (see especially 1 Co 15). It cannot be proved by the analogy of the resurrection of Jesus Himself. That resurrection was indeed a type and figure of the resurrection of the saints, but it was also a convincing sign of the Lord's victory over death, and of the triumph of spirit over matter. Accordingly, for apologetic reasons the actual buried body rose, leaving the tomb empty, but at the moment of resurrection it was transformed into a glorious and spiritual body, belonging henceforth to the heavenly sphere, and perceptible to mortal senses only by virtue of a voluntary and temporary accommodation to earthly conditions. Such at least seems to have been the view of the first disciples, and it is still the belief of the majority of Christians.

2. The locality of heaven.—Undoubtedly heaven is a state rather than a place, but a religion which, like Christianity, teaches the resurrection of the body and the glorification not merely of the spiritual, but even of the material universe, cannot dispense altogether with the idea of locality in connexion with heaven. What appears to be the teaching of the NT is this. At present, owing to the imperfection of the universe, God's glory and majesty cannot be fully manifested in it. The boundaries of heaven (*i.e.* of the sphere in which the divine glory is fully manifested) are consequently restricted. But in the consummation and regeneration of the universe (παλιγγενεσία, Mt 19^{28}; ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, Ac 3^{21}), which will accompany the resurrection, when the whole creation, which, being enslaved in the bondage of corruption, groaneth and travaileth in pain together (*or* together with man) until now, shall be delivered into the liberty of the glory of the children of God (Ro 8^{21}), then the glory of God, at present manifested within a limited heaven, will be manifested throughout the entire universe, and the boundaries of heaven and of creation will be conterminous (2 P $3^{10.\ 13}$, Rev 21^1; cf. Is 65^{17} 66^{22}, Rev 11^{15}, etc.). The distinction between heaven and earth will then have no meaning. Wherever God's servants may be, on whatever employment, God will be with them, and they will see His face—in other words, they will be in heaven, just as at present the holy guardian angels, while performing their ministry on earth, never really leave heaven, because they always see God's face (Mt 18^{10}).

3. The essential bliss of heaven.—Since God is the object of a Christian's supreme love, to see Him face to face must be a Christian's supreme bliss. This unveiled vision of God, which is the unending joy of the angels (Mt 18^{10}), will also be the final reward of the pure in heart (Mt 5^8). Both St. John and St. Paul agree in this doctrine, but it is the author of the Apocalypse who works it out into the fullest detail.

'Beloved,' says St. John, 'now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; *for we shall see him even as he is*. And every one that hath this hope set on him purifieth himself, even as he is pure' (1 Jn $3^{2.\ 3}$). 'For now,' says St. Paul, 'we see in a mirror, darkly [lit. 'in a riddle']; but then *face to face*: now I know in part; but then shall I know (ἐπιγνώσομαι) even as also I have been known' (1 Co 13^{12}).

This immediate contemplation of the Infinite Essence of God, which, as conferring the highest conceivable degree of bliss, is generally spoken of as the Beatific Vision, must be regarded as a strictly supernatural endowment of grace, not analogous to any faculty at present possessed by man. Here on earth even our own personality, in its full depth and reality, is mysteriously veiled from us. What the thinker is in distinction from his thought, what the self-identical soul is, as distinguished from its changing states, we have not the least idea. The more we try to fix our gaze inward upon our true selves, the more confused our vision becomes, and we have to abandon the task as hopeless. If, then, we cannot by nature know our own selves, how much less can we know the Absolute Spirit! Hence Christian thought has always recognized that in order to attain to the immediate vision of the Divine Essence, the human soul must be lifted above the natural order altogether, made to partake of the Divine Nature (2 P 1^4), and, so far as this is possible without complete absorption into the Godhead, even 'deified,' as the Greek Fathers did not hesitate to express it.

The richness, magnificence, fertility, and comprehensiveness of this doctrine must be admitted even by those who cannot share it. It sums up and includes all lesser ideals by transcending them. It satisfies the Platonic ideal, because God is Himself the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, and, in contemplating Him, the soul contemplates the Absolute Good. It satisfies also the Aristotelian ideal of perfect intellectual knowledge, because in God the soul sees the universe no longer in scattered fragments, but as a single whole, from which standpoint the cosmos appears to be what it really is, viz. an orderly rational system.

The need of satisfying the intellectual faculties

[1] *Ber.* 17*a*.

[2] See, for a full presentation of the evidence, 'Angélologie d'après les Pères,' in Vacant, *Dict. de Théol. cath.*

of man is not ignored by Christianity. It emphasizes the essential rationality and intelligibility of the universe by regarding creation as the work of the Logos, or Reason of God, which, having from the beginning been immanent in the world, was finally manifested in the person of Jesus Christ, and is the object of Christian worship. A religion which pays the homage of adoration to Reason cannot fairly be accused of neglecting the claims of intellect. Intellectual knowledge has always been one constituent in the Christian ideal of human blessedness. St. Paul longs for *ἐπίγνωσις*, which certainly includes intellectual knowledge; and Origen considers that the satisfaction of the thirst for knowledge, which God has implanted in the soul, will be among the greatest of the joys of heaven. According to him, the cultivation of philosophy, and even of natural science, will be among the principal occupations of the glorified saints of God.[1]

But Christianity does not fall into the mistake of ranking intellect above moral goodness. It is not mainly as the Supreme Reason, but as the All-Holy, that God is adored by angels and men (Is 6^3, Rev 4^8). Religion has always recognized that the true being of God is best expressed in terms of moral personality. Thus the ancient Jews regarded Him mainly as Monarch and Judge. Christianity, without rejecting these ideas, transfigured them by conceiving of God as Unbounded Love (Jn 3^{16}). God, then, for Christians, is primarily 'Our Father which art in heaven,' and from this point of view heaven is regarded in Scripture as *the home*, where God gathers His children round Him in the loving intercourse of family life. 'In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you; for I go to prepare a place for you' (Jn 14^2).

The most wonderful representation of God in this aspect is the parable of the Prodigal Son. Here the Infinite Creator appears as running (*δραμών*) to meet the repentant prodigal, falling on his neck and kissing him fondly (*κατεφίλησε*), bringing forth the best robe, putting a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet, and killing the fatted calf and making merry (Lk $15^{20ff.}$). In the same spirit, the author of the Apocalypse exhausts the resources of language and imagery in trying to describe God's tender and familiar intercourse with the saints in heaven (Rev 21^3).

As in the love of God Christianity finds the supreme satisfaction of the human affections, so in the worship of God it finds the chief satisfaction of human emotion. Of all the emotional states experienced on earth the profoundest and the most uplifting is the sense of boundless adoration, joined with abject self-abasement, which thrills through the devout soul as it contemplates the infinite perfections of God. In heaven this rapture of adoration will never cease. 'They have no rest day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God, the Almighty, which was and which is and which is to come' (Rev 4^8).

Worship is the emotional expression of man's consciousness of God's absolute transcendence, and of the infinite gulf which separates even the most exalted creature from the Infinite Creator. The Christian cannot feel towards His God like the pantheist, who knows no God higher than the universe of which he himself forms a part. The Christian's God is absolute, self-existing, self-sufficing, not dependent upon the universe in any way for His perfection and blessedness, but transcending it to an infinite extent, and therefore claiming a homage that is absolutely unbounded. The Incarnation, though it bridges the abyss, does not destroy it. Even as incarnate, immanent, and holding familiar intercourse with His creatures, the Creator still maintains His awe-inspiring and ineffable transcendence. Indeed, it is just this ever-present consciousness of His immeasurable elevation above all created being that lends to the idea of the incarnation of God its profound emotional value. Even before God incarnate the heavenly host falls down in boundless adoration (Ph 2^{10}).

Heaven, therefore, both in the OT and still more in the NT, is represented as a glorious sanctuary in which God's servants worship Him unceasingly with inward purity of heart, and with the outward expression of a magnificent ritual. There will be no temple (*i.e.* no special temple) there (Rev 21^{22}), because the whole universe will become one vast temple of God; and the worship will be ceaseless, because every activity of whatever sort, having as its end the glory of God, will be an act of worship.

Chs. 4 and 5 of the Apocalypse give an ideal picture of the perfect worship of heaven. It is a worship in which all creation (nature as well as man) harmoniously joins. How precisely the writer thinks of nature is not quite clear. It is possible that he regards nature as offering its worship vicariously, through its king and high-priest, man. More probably, like most ancient thinkers and like St. Paul (Ro 8^{22}), he regards nature as animated, and thinks of a vast graduated hierarchy of nature-spirits, culminating in the soul of the physical universe regarded as created, joining with angels and men in the anthem of praise. The worship is paid not only to God, but also to God incarnate, 'the Lamb as it had been slain' (Rev $5^{6.\ 12}$, etc.; Ph 2^{10}, etc.).

4. Heaven as a perfect society.—Trinitarianism regards God not as a monad, but as a perfect society, and finds in the nature of the Godhead itself the heavenly archetype of the family and of the state. The idea of the Church and of the communion of saints is therefore of the essence of Christianity. Religion, from the Christian standpoint, is man's approach to God as a member of a brotherhood, a family of God, a holy Church, in whose fellowship his spiritual life is nourished and perfected. Christianity makes men members one of another, puts in their mouths a social prayer ('Our Father,' not 'My Father'), helps them on their way by social worship and social sacraments, and teaches them to regard the service of man as one with the service of God (see especially 1 Jn 3^{13-18} $4^{20.\ 21}$). Heaven, therefore, as realizing the social ideal, is continually represented in the NT as a perfect society, city, or state (He $12^{22ff.}$).

All war, violence, and danger from enemies external and internal will have ceased, and therefore the gates of the city 'shall in no wise be shut by day' (*i.e.* not shut at all), 'for there shall be no night there' (Rev 21^{25}). Heaven will be a sinless society, for 'there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean, or he that maketh an abomination and a lie: but only they which are written in the Lamb's book of life' (21^{27}).

5. The activities of the heavenly citizens.—The unceasing worship of heaven is not to be taken as implying that there will be no other activity than worship there, but rather that all occupations of every sort, being undertaken for the glory of God and in His service, will partake of the nature of worship. Many NT passages imply that all worthy faculties of individuals and races will find due employment in heaven (Rev $21^{24.\ 26}$).

Thus, since heaven is a state or city, there will be a scope for faculties of government and administration there (cf. Lk 19^{17}, 'Have thou authority over ten cities'). Our Lord teaches both in the parable of the Talents (Mt $25^{14ff.}$) and in the parable of the Pounds (Lk $19^{12ff.}$) that all faculties worthily employed in this world will receive additional scope in the world to come. If the indications in the Apocalypse are to be trusted, there will be great scope for the artistic faculties. In heaven there will be beautiful architecture and craftsmanship (Rev 21^{12}), beautiful poetry (5^9 14^3

[1] *De Principiis*, ii. 11, etc.

15[3]), and beautiful music, both vocal and instrumental (14[2] 18[22]), or at least some higher reality corresponding to these. Of the cultivation of philosophy and science in heaven we have already spoken.

6. Relation to time.—Christianity took over from Greek philosophy, and to some extent developed independently, the profound and fruitful idea of the distinction between time and eternity, and between becoming and being. First clearly stated by Parmenides, *c.* 500 B.C. ('True Being never was and it never will be, since it is present all of it together, only in *the now*, one and indivisible'), it is worked out in considerable detail by Plato, *c.* 390 B.C., especially in his *Phædrus* and *Symposium*. Plato regards time, which is divisible into successive moments of which only one is actual at a time, as a half-unreal shadow of eternity, which latter cannot be divided into parts, is present whole and indivisible in the changeless now, and is the only true duration. Similarly he regards becoming (*γένεσις*), *i.e.* evolution or change, which takes place in time, as an imperfect shadow of true being (*οὐσία*), which is changeless and self-consistent, and exists only in eternity. This view is also found in the NT.[1]

The doctrine of eternity has an important practical bearing upon our conception of man's future beatitude. One of the greatest imperfections of our present thinking is its piecemeal character. Geometry, *e.g.*, must be painfully and imperfectly acquired as a series of successive propositions, each of which requires a separate demonstration. A perfect intelligence would grasp in one mental act all the possible spatial relations of bodies. For such an intelligence there would be no 'proofs,' for all geometrical truths in all their relations would be grasped in a single intuition. In this world all our thinking is of the same disjointed and unsatisfactory character. We think of God in church, but forget Him as soon as we leave, because we have other things to think about. When talking to one friend, we forget for the time all our others. We cannot think of history as a whole, but only of a succession of incidents, of which only one can be clearly grasped at a time. In all our attempts to take comprehensive views details drop out of sight; hence our best generalizations are unsubstantial and unsatisfying. Neither of God, nor of nature, nor of ourselves, nor of our neighbours, nor of our future destiny, can we form anything but fragmentary and inadequate views.

Christian theology teaches that one of the chief results of the Beatific Vision will be that the soul, seeing all things in God, will see them, as God sees them, 'sub specie aeternitatis,' *i.e.* entire and complete, in all their mutual relations, in one undivided and indivisible mental act. Partial knowledge will be replaced, not indeed by omniscience, but by complete and adequate knowledge of all things, at any rate, which come within the intellectual capacity of creatures. There will be a similar unification of the emotional and affective life, so that all the affections and emotions will be felt *at once*. This inner unification of our mental life, by virtue of which our total knowledge of ourselves, of God, of our friends, and of the universe, together with the whole of the affections, emotions, and volitions, which our relations to these will evoke, will be simultaneously present to the mind in one majestic harmony, will give to life lived in eternity a richness and a vivacity of which a life lived amid the distractions of time and change can give no conception whatever. It is this inner unification of life, and not its mere endlessness, that is signified when the life of heaven is spoken of as 'eternal' (*αἰώνιος*).

It does not, however, follow from what has been said that time will have no sort of existence in the world to come. It may be that the lower creation will still be subject to time and to some degree of change. But, for the redeemed (at any rate in the higher aspects of their life) time and all essential change will have ceased to be.

7. Heaven regarded as a state of progress.—Of late years the traditional view of heaven as a timeless and changeless state of perfection has been sharply challenged both from the standpoint of the evolution theory and from that of the philosophy of Bergson. Both these systems postulate unending change, and Bergsonism regards change, and its accompaniment time, as ultimate realities belonging to the very essence of true life. There is a certain tendency, therefore, among modern theologians to regard heaven not as a state of perfection, but as one of continuous progress towards perfection. Westcott[1] even claims NT support for this view, and interprets the heavenly *μοναί* of Jn 14[2], not as dwelling-places, but as temporary halting-places for the soul in its never-ending journey towards perfection.

To the present writer this view seems a serious impoverishment of the Christian ideal. If we admit that the essential life of God is eternal and not temporal, and that the Christian hope is to share it, then it seems natural to suppose that Christians will share in the eternity of that life. If they do not, the expression 'eternal life' is denuded of a large part of its meaning. Moreover, the modern theory seems to err by interpreting the higher in terms of the lower. If heaven is a state of the highest conceivable good, then it seems quite illegitimate to describe it in terms of analogies taken from the imperfect conditions of this fleeting world. Evolution and change are not good in themselves; on the contrary, they are signs of imperfection. They mark a struggle towards a goal, and, when the goal is attained, no place remains for them. Heaven, according to traditional ideas, means the attainment of the goal, the actual and abiding possession of the highest possible good that a creature can attain. That is surely a far more satisfying conception than unending progress towards a goal that is never reached.

8. The state of the lost.—The final condition of the lost is a problem of secondary importance. The possibility of final impenitence, and therefore of final perdition, seems necessarily involved in the accepted doctrines of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul; and Christ frequently warned His hearers against the danger of incurring final reprobation (Mt 25[41-46] 5[22. 29] 8[12] 10[15] 11[22] 12[32]; cf. Mk 3[29], Mt 13[42. 50] 18[8] 22[13] 23[15. 33] 24[51] 25[30], etc.). But it does not seem to follow from the possibility of this doom that any will actually incur it. It may be that the providence of God will find means to avert it, and that the solemn warnings of Christ are among these means. Even if we grant, as the general tenor of the NT seems to suggest, that some will remain hardened and impenitent to the end, yet assuredly these will be rare and exceptional cases. NT teaching, taken as a whole, suggests, not indeed universalism, but

[1] See particularly Jn 8[58], 'Before Abraham was, I am,' where the *γενέσθαι* of Abraham is contrasted with the *εἶναι* of Jesus; Rev 10[6], *χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται*, where the RV, following all ancient authorities, correctly translates, 'there shall be time no longer'; 1[4], *ἀπὸ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος*, where the absence of inflection shows that immutable duration, *i.e.* eternity, is meant; also *αἰώνιος* in such phrases as *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, both in St. John's Gospel and in the Synoptics, means 'eternal' very much in the Platonic sense.

[1] On Jn 14[2].

certainly the salvation of the great bulk of mankind.

God 'willeth that all men (*πάντας ἀνθρώπους*) should be saved, and come to the knowledge (*ἐπίγνωσιν*) of the truth' (1 Ti 2⁴). He 'is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe' (1 Ti 4¹⁰). The Son of God came to seek and to save that which was lost (Mt 18¹¹), and to be the Saviour of the world (Jn 4⁴², 1 Jn 4¹⁴). 'God sent not the Son into the world to judge [condemn] the world; but that the world should be saved through him' (Jn 3¹⁷).

Salvation, then, will be the rule, reprobation the rare exception. The process of reclamation may in some cases be difficult, the expiatory and cleansing discipline may be severe and prolonged, but in the end, after whatever perils and sufferings, the great majority of God's children will stand before Him, pardoned and sinless.[1]

With regard to the finally impenitent, our task here is not to investigate their probable fate as a question of pure philosophy, but to ascertain, as nearly as we can from the documents, what the original Christian view was. And, in the opinion of the present writer, an impartial criticism will in the end be driven to admit that Christ believed and taught that their doom will be eternal (Mt 25⁴¹· ⁴⁶ 18⁸, Mk 3²⁹ 9⁴³⁻⁴⁸, 2 Th 1⁹, Jude⁷). Of the various expedients devised by modern criticism to avoid this conclusion the best is certainly that which interprets eternal death as annihilation (*q.v.*). Annihilation was an idea not altogether unfamiliar to our Lord's contemporaries. Not to mention apocalyptic writings,[2] Rabbi Hillel taught that, whereas hardened sinners will 'go down to Gehenna and be punished there for ages of ages,' sinners of lesser delinquency will be annihilated and cease altogether to exist at the judgment. According to Edersheim, annihilationism even became the favourite rabbinical doctrine in the 2nd century.[3]

Annihilationism has the indubitable advantages (1) of being possible historically; (2) of giving an adequate meaning to *αἰώνιος* (the wicked are destroyed for ever); (3) of providing for the final extinction of all evil, moral and physical; and (4) of thus establishing the absolute and unchallenged supremacy of good.[4] But, attractive as it is, it cannot be reconciled with the NT evidence taken as a whole. It may satisfy *ὄλεθρος αἰώνιος*, but not *κόλασις αἰώνιος*. Still less can it explain or satisfy such passages as Mk 9⁴⁶, 'Gehenna, where their worm dieth not'; and Mt 13⁴²· ⁵⁰, 'the furnace of fire: there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth' (cf. 8¹² 22¹³ 24⁵¹ 25³⁰, Lk 13²⁸, etc.). The conscious existence of the lost is expressed or implied in so many NT passages that only a drastic and quite uncritical purging of the text can get rid of it.

The final question now arises: Is it possible to reconcile eternal punishment with the Divine benevolence and with the ultimate victory of good over evil? Probably it is. The general principle of the judgment will be the loss of faculties which have been abused (Mt 25²⁸, Lk 19²⁴). Now, the faculty which, in the case of the finally impenitent, has been wholly and irremediably abused is that of free will, and, therefore, whatever else eternal loss may involve, it must involve the loss of this. But with the loss of free will disappears also the power of sinning, and of resisting God's will, and, therefore, at the judgment, moral evil will disappear, and the holy will of God will be supreme. The lost, deprived of all power of volition and choice, will sink to the rank of necessary agents, and will do the will of God, like the lower creation, by necessity. Thus all creation will be subject to its Creator, and God will be all in all (1 Co 15²⁸).

[1] See below, § 9. [2] See art. ESCHATOLOGY.

[3] *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*⁴, London, 1889, ii. 791 ff.

[4] See art. CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY.

It is not necessary to regard the condition of the lost as absolutely intolerable, though, in contrast with the bliss of the redeemed, it will appear most sad. Its sadness will consist mainly in regret for the loss of the Beatific Vision, and remorse for the criminal folly which has led to their degradation from the rank of responsible beings. On the other hand, their condition may admit of important alleviations. Thus they can sin no more, and will perform the will of God unerringly, which will surely be for their good. Moreover, their enjoyment of natural goods, though impaired, will not be destroyed. In fact it even seems possible to regard their condition as one of relative happiness of a purely natural kind. At any rate, we may be sure that their condition will be better than absolute non-existence, for we cannot imagine an omniscient and all-merciful God calling into being creatures whose final state will be worse than non-existence. The purely proverbial expression made use of, Mt 26²⁴, is not sufficient evidence to the contrary.

9. **The intermediate state and purgatory.**—The expectation that the final judgment would come within their own generation caused the doctrine of the intermediate state to appear relatively unimportant to the first Christians, and, as some think, even to Christ Himself. The references to it in the NT are accordingly not very numerous, and, were there a sufficient motive to do so, might possibly be explained away by the use of a little critical ingenuity. This has, in fact, been attempted even in so recent and judicial a work as Salmond's *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*[4]. But, inasmuch as the doctrine in question (in the most usual form of which the intermediate state was divided into two main compartments—a state of blissful expectancy in which the righteous awaited their reward, and a state of painful confinement in which the unrighteous expiated their crimes, and were in some cases cleansed from sin) had already attained considerable development before the Christian era, and is found in full possession of the field immediately after the apostolic age, there is nothing to prevent, but everything to suggest, our taking the relevant NT passages at their full face value.

The *locus classicus* is the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Lk 16¹⁹ff.), which embodies the Jewish conception entire, with only this difference, that the righteous are separated from the unrighteous by a great gulf, instead of by 'a hand's breadth' (the rabbinical view). Lazarus rests in Abraham's bosom—a common rabbinical designation of the intermediate abode of bliss—while Dives is in torments. That the torments of Dives are to be regarded as temporary is probably indicated by the use of *ᾅδης* instead of *γέεννα*, and by the softening of his hard and selfish nature indicated in v.²⁷ff.

The purgatorial aspect of the punishments in Hades is still more clearly indicated in Mt 12³², which seems to suggest that all sins, except one, may, under certain circumstances, find pardon in the world to come (a common Jewish expression for beyond the grave); also in Mt 5²⁶, which appears to imply that even grievous sinners may be released from their torments after adequately expiating their crimes. The possibility of the pardon of sin after death is also presupposed by 1 Peter (probably the work of the apostle himself), which represents Christ as preaching in Hades, not only to the righteous, but even to those sinners who rejected the preaching of Noah, and who, according to popular belief, were hopelessly lost (1 P 3¹⁹ 4⁶). This, the natural and obvious sense of the passage, and that in which it was almost universally understood in ancient times, is now very generally recognized as the only tenable one.

The fact is that purgatorial ideas were well established in Judaism long before Christ, and that Christianity simply adopted them. Judas Maccabæus is represented as offering prayers and sacrifices for the sins of his soldiers fallen in battle, and thus making 'a reconciliation for the dead, that they might be delivered from sin' (2 Mac 12³⁹ff.). Shammai taught that, whereas the sins of desperate sinners are punished for ever, others 'go down to Gehenna, and moan, and come up

again.'[1] The early Church, while taking a very gloomy view of hell, took, on the whole, a hopeful view of Hades. Hades was regarded as a great mission-field for the evangelization of the heathen and of imperfect believers. As the Lord Himself had preached the gospel there, so, after their deaths, had the apostles. According to Hermas, they had even baptized there, thus rendering unnecessary the practice of vicarious baptism for the dead to which St. Paul alludes.[2] Clement of Alexandria says expressly that 'God's punishments in Hades are saving and disciplinary, leading to conversion, and choosing rather the repentance than the death of a sinner.'[3]

Along with the Jewish doctrine of Hades, Christianity took over the closely connected Jewish practice of offering prayers and oblations for the dead. This must have happened early in the apostolic age, since at a later period the mutual hostility of the Church and the Synagogue would have prevented it. It is true that the NT evidence is not demonstrative (though, if we accept the now widely prevalent view that the Kingdom of God preached by Christ is eschatological, it is difficult to exclude the dead from the petition, 'Thy kingdom come' in the Lord's Prayer; and the prayer for Onesiphorus, 1 Ti 1[18], is now almost universally regarded as a prayer for the dead;[4] cf. also 1 Co 15[29]); but, at any rate, the practice was well established in the 2nd century. In the East there is the inscription on the tomb of Abercius (*c.* A.D. 175), inviting the Christian passer-by to pray for his soul, while in the West the incidental allusions of Tertullian (*c.* A.D. 200) point to an organized and long-established custom.

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See also Literature of art. ESCHATOLOGY.

C. HARRIS.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Greek and Roman).—**I. Greek.**—The spirits of the dead were regarded by the Greeks, all through their history, as still retaining a material vesture, but extremely attenuated. Their appearance to mortal eyes was shadowy and dreamlike. Homer[1] described them as *ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα*, figures without vital strength (*μένος*), and especially bloodless. As is shown by the *Νέκυια*,[2] they are capable of feeding on the blood of sacrifice, which gives them temporary vitality; but without this reinforcement they seem to have neither speech nor memory. Ghosts were very commonly supposed by the Greeks to hover about the spot where their material remains were interred. Yet the conflicting idea that there is a common abode, vaguely named as 'the unseen' (*Ἀΐδης*), in which all spirits normally dwell, became current in the earliest times. In the Homeric poems a few souls, by special favour of the gods, awarded apparently with no regard to moral merit, reach the home of bliss in the Elysian fields, and become in a sense divine. Such are Teiresias, Menelaus, Rhadamanthus, and Achilles. Homer presents also, very dimly, a picture of a region of woe beyond the grave to which are consigned a few abnormal sinners, such as Tityus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus; also the men who have taken an oath and forsworn themselves. From the earliest times the fate of the perjurer was conceived by the Greeks as especially dark. Later feeling about the dead was largely influenced by the mysteries and by philosophy. There floated about a conception that the origin of the soul was really divine, and that its imprisonment in earthly barriers was a punishment; that the body was in reality a tomb (*σῶμα σῆμα*). These ideas were largely spread by the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods, in whose rituals was expressed the longing of the soul on earth to find its way back, after death, to the home of its origin. Empedocles described the soul in its earthly sojourn as 'an exile from the gods, and a wanderer' (*φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλητής*). He held the doctrine of successive periods of existence, in which the soul is invested with different material forms, its fate in each period being determined by its conduct in previous stages. The best conditions are reserved for the ethically best, who become seers, poets, physicians, and princes. Sin-laden souls have to pass into the lower forms of life, and occupy the bodies of animals and even of plants. The persistently better spirits make their way back to the regions of the divine. These doctrines embody elements drawn from the East. They were accepted by Plato and elaborated by him with much mystic and poetic embroidery. In his writings the vision of life after death became vivid and pictorial. The teaching of transmigration (*q.v.*) was of course bound up with the idea of a judgment of souls after death. The judgment is conspicuous already in Pindar, but some of the details which were

[1] *Rôsh Hashshānāh*, 16*b*.
[2] See 1 Co 15[29]; Hermas, *Sim.* ix. 16; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi. 6.
[3] *Loc. cit.*
[4] Cf. art. PRAYER FOR THE DEPARTED (Christian).

[1] *Od.* x. 521, 536, xi. 29. [2] *Od.* xi.

popularly accepted in later times — *e.g.*, the functions of the three judges, Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus—appear first in Plato. In the *Gorgias* and *Phædo* the incurable souls enter on an eternity of misery. In Plato the references to pre-existence (*q.v.*) become explicit and detailed, and the process of recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) becomes very prominent. By it the mind can recover memories of its primal happy state in possession of heavenly knowledge, which was obscured by its descent to earth. The means to this consummation was philosophic exercise. Later belief about the dead was influenced to a considerable extent by Stoicism. The Stoics believed in a periodic destruction and reconstruction of all created forms; therefore the departed spirit maintains its individuality only until the cataclysm that follows next after its death on earth. In later times a whole series of divinities came to be connected with the judgment and the governance of the dead, and notions of Elysium and Hades became more distinct. Hades was now conceived as a god and 'a discipliner of mortals' (*εὔθυνος βροτῶν*). Among the many gods to whom functions connected with the dead were assigned Hermes took a special place. He was the conductor of the spirits from earth to their place of abode in the other world, and obtained the title of 'conductor of souls' (*ψυχόπομπος*). In the great mysteries celebrated at Eleusis Demeter and her daughter Persephone were the grand figures, and it is well known that due participation in their ritual was deemed to ensure the happiness of the soul after death. Other mysteries served the same end, and pictured the journey of the soul from earth to the other world. Only in comparatively later times did Pluto (*Πλούτων*) come to occupy the infernal throne (first in the Attic poets of the 5th cent. B.C.). His name (connected with *πλοῦτος*, 'wealth') appears to be one of the numerous euphemistic titles bestowed on the powers of darkness. As in the case of the fairies among modern peoples, it was thought dangerous to assign to supernatural beings titles which implied evil, however truthfully. There were many spots in the Greek world at which there were popularly supposed to be gateways of the infernal abode, as at Cape Tænarus in Laconia. The same idea connected with Lake Avernus in Italy is doubtless of Greek origin.

In the late Greek age writers like Plutarch present a strange mixture of notions concerning the condition of the dead, and their abodes, and their migrations from form to form—a compound of popular Greek superstitions with elements drawn from mysteries and philosophy (especially Platonic and Stoič), and also from Oriental religions. The lore by which spirits might be invoked and compelled to disclose the future was greatly elaborated, and necromancy was one of its chief forms. It may be remarked that the Greek ghost did not often appear to mortals gratuitously—that is to say, without the compulsion which the sorcerer was able to lay upon him. The Homeric ghost is usually, like the Homeric god, seen by mortals in dreams; and in the whole age of Greek civilization the connexion of ghosts with dreams was very close. The modern 'ghost-story' has remarkably few counterparts in ancient literature, either Greek or Roman, although tales of haunted houses were not unknown, and such tales were made the theme of several Greek comedies, of which the authors are known, and doubtless of others of which there is no record. The Greek original of the *Mostellaria* of Plautus cannot be traced.

The belief in the dependence of the dead upon the offerings of the living for their comfort and consideration in the other world was universal in Greece, and was treated as rational by Aristotle; so was the belief that the dead spirits can powerfully affect the living, more for evil than for good. Among the Greeks the cult of ancestors did not occupy so prominent a place as it held among the Romans, who believed that the family had for its chief object the maintenance of this cult. The family *sacra* did not in Greece make nearly so deep an impression on religion and law and social usage as was the case among the Romans. And public ritual for the appeasement of the dead was not nearly so conspicuous in the area of Greek civilization as it was in the Roman area. In Athens and in a number of Ionic communities there was a ceremony called Anthesteria, celebrated in spring (February), when all life revives and the life of ghosts is unusually active, so that they come in numbers about the homes of the living. It was vitally necessary to protect the community against them. During the time of the ceremony many public and private activities were suspended. On the conclusion of the ritual the spirits were warned away by a cry which one of the ancient grammarians has preserved: *θύραζε κῆρες, οὐκετ' ἀνθεστήρια* ('Out, ye ghosts, the Anthesteria is over'). The word *κήρ*, which is here used of the ordinary ghosts, came to mean an avenging spirit, like the name Eumenides. There can have been originally no sharp dividing line between the non-human and the human avenging spirit. At the time of the Anthesteria the doors of houses were smeared with pitch, to keep the spectres aloof; this wears the appearance of a homœopathic remedy. Sulphur was also a prophylactic. The ceremony of Anthesteria probably derived its name from its occurrence in the season of spring flowers. Flowers were not conspicuous among offerings pleasing to the dead in the Greek ritual. They were far more prominent in later Roman civilization, when days were appropriated to the service of the spirits which bore the name of *dies rosæ* and *dies violæ*.

2. Roman.—It is clear that the Romans, from the remotest times, regarded the spirits of the dead as in some sense divine. All through their history the tomb was regarded as an altar, and it is often so described in inscriptions. Varro and other ancient scholars set forth the evidence relating to this matter. Servius, commenting on the expression *divi parentes*, put by Virgil into the mouth of Æneas[1] when he had accomplished the funeral ritual in honour of Anchises, quoted the expression *dei parentes* as commonly applied to deceased ancestors. But the word *divi* (properly used of deified mortals) better expresses the feeling of the classical age. In his ideal code of law in his *de Legibus* Cicero has: 'Leto datos divos habento.'[2] Certainly all through their history the Romans believed not merely that the living could influence the condition of the dead by assigning to them or withholding from them due honour and offerings, but also that the dead had great power to affect the fortunes of the living. Primarily, the duty of assuring to the dead their rights rested upon their living descendants. The Roman conception of the family regarded it as a perpetual corporation which included both the dead and the living. This sense of the perpetual unity and unbroken continuity of the family found expression in all the observances paid to the departed, beginning with the funeral procession, in which men walked, invested with the ancestral *imagines*, personating the dead to whom these belonged. 'Peace with the dead'[3] was important, not only to the separate families, but to the whole body of citizens collectively; it was hardly less

[1] *Æneid*, v. 47. [2] ii. 23.
[3] 'Pax mihi cum mortuis' in Plautus, *Mostellaria*, ii. 2, 89.

so, indeed, than the *pax deorum*. Therefore we find that, on the days in the calendar on which occurred ceremonies expressing the private reverence for the world of spirits, there were also celebrations ordained by the State and conducted by public religious and secular authorities.

The original Roman idea about the abode of the departed was that the soul of every deceased man whose funeral rites had been duly performed by the living dwelt in the tomb in which his body or his ashes had been deposited. Some ancient Roman scholars and many modern scholars have believed that in primitive times the bodies of the dead were actually buried within the family dwelling. But in the most distant pre-historic time to which research in Italy has enabled us to penetrate there were great cemeteries outside the bounds of the town-settlements. And in historic times burial within city limits was very unusual, except at the Greek city of Tarentum, where the intramural cemetery figures conspicuously in the stories of sieges and captures of the place. The life of the departed soul was envisaged as a continuance of his life before death. He has a 'house,' for *domus* is a common designation of the tomb.[1] Pre-historic funeral urns found in Latium are actually shaped like the huts in which the people lived at the time. In later Roman times phrases like *domus æterna* were quite common in inscriptions on tombs. The emperor Julian[2] speaks of *sepulcrum* as 'domus defunctorum.' The deceased was supposed to need in the other world everything that he required while on earth. Hence the multiplicity of articles which were buried with him (or burned with him, for material things seem to have been thought to have a ghostly survival) and the periodical offerings to him of food and drink—simple things in the earliest time, such as milk, honey, eggs and beans, and flowers to grace his repasts; later on wine occupied an important place. The ghost was thought of as a sort of 'breath' (*anima* or *spiritus*) and as bloodless. Hence his desire for blood to revive his strength. This was afforded by sacrifices at the tomb, the victims chosen being especially those of dark colour. The desire of the dead for blood is depicted in *Odyssey*, xi., where Odysseus lures the heroes slain at Troy to the upper world by the blood poured into a trench. The desire for blood is also attested by the history of the gladiatorial games, which, for some centuries after they were introduced from Etruria, were always ostensibly performed in honour of some particular deceased person. The chief form taken by the veneration of the dead was that of a meal celebrated at stated times at the tomb by the members of the family. Doubtless the deceased ancestors were imagined as present. The chief occasions were the anniversaries of the birth and death of the departed. Very often there were round about the tomb appurtenances for the convenience of these recurring observances—an assembly room (*schola*), a dining-room (*cenaculum*), a kitchen (*culina*), a garden. Many references to all these appear in inscriptions. Gifts to the dead man were *inferiæ* (a name obviously connected with *inferi*), whether given at regular times or irregularly.

In order that the deceased man might have rest in his tomb, it was necessary that the due ritual should have been gone through by the living (the *iusta*). Otherwise he had an evil influence on the survivors, and would hover about and torment them. It was the duty of every man who came across a corpse to throw earth upon it, in order that the spirit might have rest. Drowned men's souls flitted about above the water.[1] Even a priest, who was ordinarily deemed to be defiled by the presence of a corpse, was strictly held to the duty of appeasing the spirit by attending to the funeral rite. The only persons who had no claim to funeral honours were executed criminals, suicides, and men struck dead by lightning—a sign of divine wrath.

Departed spirits were most generally spoken of as *manes*, literally 'the good people.'[3] As some spirits were hostile to the living and others benevolent, the application of *manes* to all must be euphemistic, just as the phrase 'good people' is applied in Ireland to all the fairies, though not all are beneficent. The title *dis manibus* (often indicated by *D.M.* or *D.M.S.* [*dis manibus sacrum*]), which appears at the head of innumerable Roman tomb inscriptions, calls for some comment. This kind of titulature did not come into general use till the early imperial period. When the words are written in full, we find *diis* or *dis*, hardly ever *divis*.[2] In general, it is clear that the *di manes* are the family ancestors who are in amity with the living, and have been to some degree elevated to a superhuman level. The epithet *inferi* is often attached to them, as by Tacitus, *Annals*, xiii. 14: 'inferos Silanorum manes.' Passages such as that just quoted throw doubt on the idea which is often accepted, that, when *dis manibus* or *D.M.* is followed by the name, in the genitive, of the person to whom the tomb is dedicated, then the words indicate the spirit of that individual person.[4]

The conception of a general dwelling-place of departed spirits is much later than that of the tomb as the abode of the deceased members of the family, and may very possibly be not indigenous in Italy, but borrowed in very early times from the Greeks. In the prologue to the *Casina* of Plautus it is called *communis locus*, and quite early in Roman literature *plures* is a euphemistic phrase for the dead collectively, borrowed of course from the Greek πλείονες. But the mass of the people never abandoned the older idea, and the two views continued to exist side by side. There is no proper Latin name for this abode; it is generally designated by Greek names, such as Acheron. Some particular spots in Italy, especially Lake Avernus, came to be regarded as affording communication with the infernal world. There is practically no indigenous Italic mythology connected with this world; all the tales concerning it are borrowed from Greece. When, in his first book, Lucretius declaims against *superstitio*, his illustrative tales are those of Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the like. All definite Italian beliefs about judgments after death and rewards and punishments in the world beyond the grave seem to have been derived originally from the Greeks. Yet the notion of a general receptacle for departed souls, if not absolutely primitive among Romans, is involved in some practices which, as we shall see presently, are relatively early.

The ghosts were conceived as consisting of highly attenuated matter, and were generally denoted by the words *anima* and *spiritus*, both of which meant, originally, air or breath.[5] Their appearance was ugly; hence the epithet *deformes* was often applied. Sometimes the skeleton was supposed to be visible. Ghostly visions rarely appeared to waking men; the ghost is usually an accompani-

[1] So *casula* in H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinæ selectæ*, Berlin, 1892–1906, no. 7519, and the curious phrase *domus Romula*, 'the grave of a Roman,' in inscriptions from Mauretania.

[2] *Cod. Just.* ix. 19. 4.

[1] Horace, *Odes*, i. 28.

[2] Cf. the opposite, *im-manis*.

[3] But cf. *divi parentum* in an ancient formula quoted by Festus, p. 230.

[4] Phrases like *patriis deis* (*CIL* iii. 3688) and *manes paterni* (Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 443) point in the same direction; rather the company of the family spirits is indicated.

[5] Virgil, *Æn.* v. 740, compares them to smoke.

ment of dreams. It will be remembered how important are these dream-visions in the explanation which Lucretius gives of the origin of the belief in immortality.[1]

The principal ceremonies for the appeasement of the dead took place on nine days in February (13th-21st); on the latter day the great State ceremony of the *Feralia* was performed. The other days were *dies parentales* as being sacred to the *di parentum*, the ancestors of the various families, and were days for private celebrations.[2] The day after the *Feralia* was called *Caristia* or *cara cognatio*, on which a kind of family reunion was held, embracing both the living members and the reconciled dead. The preceding ceremonies were supposed to have ensured perfect harmony between the upper and the nether worlds.[3]

The *lares* of the home were especially connected with this last celebration, and their relation to the *manes* is to be considered. Although the existing evidence shows the *lares* to have been pre-eminently protecting divinities of localities rather than of persons, they were so closely connected with the home that they presented themselves to the imagination of the living as the spirits of departed ancestors. While *manes* is a plural without any corresponding singular, the *lar familiaris* was the mythical ancestor who founded the family. He appears as a character in the *Trinummus* of Plautus. Another word applied to ghosts is *larvæ*. Those who bear the name are the unreconciled spirits who are malignant in their feeling towards the living. A madman was often called *larvatus*, *i.e.* one plagued by the *larvæ*, just as in Greece the madman was supposed to be harassed by the Furies. The word *furiæ* is indeed in Latin literature often used of the malignant ghost, as, *e.g.*, of the ghost of Clodius, who desired vengeance on Milo.[4] Another word applied to malevolent spirits is *lemures*. A very ancient ceremonial of reconciliation called Lemuria, originally public, but in a later time left in private hands, was performed on three days in February. In ancient literature *lemures* and *larvæ* are often synonymous terms. The object of this celebration was to expel the dark spirits from the house.[5] Black beans, thrown by the *paterfamilias* behind him, over his shoulder, were prominent in the ritual.

One other ceremony must be mentioned. There was a pit called *mundus*, which was the central spot in the old supposed Palatine 'city of Romulus.' This was closed by a great stone, called *lapis manalis*. On three days in the year this stone was lifted and a ritual was gone through which certainly had for its object the propitiation of the dead. It seems therefore that, whatever purpose this *mundus* primitively served (some scholars suppose that it originally contained reserve stores of provisions for the primitive community), it was assuredly regarded later as one of the openings to the infernal regions.

If the dead dwell together, it is natural to imagine them as having an ordered polity, governed by divinities, as in the upper world. To those of the lower regions the general term *di inferi* was applied, as opposed to *di superi*; but the circle of the *di inferi* is not easy to depict. The contrast between the two divine circles was very marked.[6] On days devoted to the veneration of the infernal powers the temples of the *di superi* were closed. In the classical age the supernal gods were figures borrowed from Greece; the Roman antiquarians, however, preserve the names of primitive Italic divine figures such as Mania, Dea Muta or Tacita, Furina, Laverna.

When Greek philosophy gained influence over the education of the Romans of the upper classes, many conceptions of the condition of departed souls were borrowed, especially from Plato and the Academies and Stoics, who sometimes regarded souls as fragments of the divine element in the universe. Souls were deemed to have an affinity with fire, and after death good souls, which had not lost affinity with what is divine, were supposed to flee to the abode of fire in the upper circles of the sky, where they were in touch with the gods. This idea is often represented in the works of Cicero.[1] Traces of it are to be found in very early Latin literature, in the writings of Ennius and others. Some even went the length of supposing that the souls became stars.[2] The bad or common souls defiled by sin were still relegated to Tartarus. Sometimes the soul was identified with the man's *genius*, which was sent out from Juppiter at birth and returned to him at death.[3]

The monumental inscriptions of the imperial age oftenest represent death as eternal sleep, but many times it is intimated that this perfect rest is a boon dependent on a good life.

LITERATURE.—Information on this subject may be found in works on Greek and Roman religion, particularly in O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, 2 vols., Munich, 1897-1906; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, do. 1902, [2]1912; W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899; also many artt. in Roscher, especially those by H. Steuding on 'Manes' and 'Inferi'; others in Daremberg-Saglio, especially that by J. A. Hild on 'Manes.' Greek and Roman ideas of the state of the dead are treated and compared with the ideas of other peoples in *GB*[3].

J. S. REID.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Hebrew).—The early Hebrew ideas of the state of the dead are those common to all primitive peoples. Existence continues after death, but in a shadowy, dreamlike state which does not deserve the name of life. Most of these early ideas are illustrated in the story of the calling of Samuel by the witch of Endor (1 S 28). The dead are the replica of their living selves: Samuel appears as an old man covered with a cloak, but recognizable by Saul. They keep their personal characteristics: Samuel berates Saul as in life. They are divine beings (*elōhîm*) and foreknow the future, but are subject to the call of human spells. They are 'disquieted' by being brought back to earth, but are obliged to obey the summons of the necromancer.

The qualities of this existence were, so far as revealed by the literature, conceived mostly in a negative way. No one looked forward with pleasure to the life after death. A man to whom life has brought suffering may be pictured as longing for the refuge of death, but it is only as a place of rest from the unbearable tortures of life (Job $3^{3ff.\ 13f.\ 21f.}$, Ps $49^{11.\ 15}$). The term 'life' is not used of their existence. The dead are not living, for the spirit (*rūaḥ*), which is the principle of life given by God, has been taken from them and returned to God (Ps $104^{29f.}$, Job $34^{14f.}$, Ec 12^{7}). They are not, then, souls, persons (*nephesh*) in any true sense. In the late codes H and P (Lv 19^{28} $21^{1.\ 11}$ 22^{4}, Nu 5^{2} 6^{11} $9^{6.\ 7.\ 10}$) and in Hag 2^{13} *nephesh* is used of the dead, but in most of the passages the reference is to the dead body which defiles the living person, not to the dead as existing in another realm. The early literature has no special name for the dead, but the Wisdom literature and other late passages use *reph'āîm* (Job 26^{5}, Is 14^{9} 26^{19}, Ps 88^{11}, Pr 2^{18} 9^{18} 21^{16}). The word is from a root meaning 'sunken,' 'flaccid,' 'powerless.' How early this name was used we cannot

1 *De Rer. Nat.* iv.
2 W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 307 ff.
3 Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 621 ff. 4 Cicero, *pro Milone*, 91.
5 Nonius, p. 185, from Varro.
6 Cf. Virg. *Æn.* viii. 245: 'regna pallida dis invisa.'

1 As in *Somnium Scipionis*, 8, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 76.
2 Ovid, *Metam.* xv. 840 ff.
3 Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 10, 15.

say, but the idea which it connotes belongs to primitive thought and continued as long as the realm of the dead was a factor in Hebrew thought. The dead are weak, even kings having lost their power (Is 14^{9-17}). They are nowhere represented as able to bring harm to the living, though they may give useful information and presumably aid.

The early Hebrew writings give no detailed picture of the state after death to correspond with the pictures of Muhammadanism, Zoroastrianism, the religion of Egypt, or mediæval Christianity. The conceptions of Greece and Rome, which remained to the end remarkably primitive, are more vivid and pictorial than the Hebrew. The reason for this barrenness is not lack of imagination—there is no reason to suppose such lack of imagination—but rather the fact that the prophetic influence was against any emphasis on the life after death. Possibly, had the prophetic writers felt free to record all phases of the popular belief, the meagre outline of the picture might have been somewhat filled in. It is probable that the popular imagination was less barren than the literature would lead us to think. The place of the abode of the dead was called Sheol. The origin of the word is uncertain; it possibly means 'the hollow place,' 'the pit,' possibly 'the place of inquiry,' with reference to necromancy.[1] It is beneath the earth (Gn 37^{35}, Pr 15^{24}, Job 11^{8}, Is 14^{9}), and is called the pit (Is 14^{15}). Like most primitive races, the Hebrews attempted no sharp distinction between the realm of the dead and the grave. They brought to the grave offerings for the dead, whether for worship or for sustenance.[2] The dead dwell in the grave, but also in Sheol (Ezk $37^{12f.}$, Gn 37^{35}), while sometimes terms are used which imply that Sheol is the grave (Is 14^{11}). R. H. Charles holds that Sheol signifies 'all the graves of the tribe or nation . . . united in one.'[3] The meaning then expands to embrace the departed of all nations, and so Sheol comes to be the common home of the dead of all nations (Ezk $32^{21.\ 27}$ 31^{15-17}). L. B. Paton[4] holds that the early idea of the dead was connected only with the tomb, and that Sheol was a Sumerian conception borrowed by the Canaanites, and from them by the Hebrews. However that may be, it is very common to find, in all early thought, the grave and the realm of the dead confused. Soon the grave loses its local and literal connotation, and is almost a synonym for the land of the dead. Even so, in Hebrew thought, to die is to be gathered to the fathers, even where, as in the case of Abraham, one is buried far from the ancestral tombs (Gn 25^{8}). When David says of his son, 'I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me,' he does not have the grave in mind (2 S 12^{23}).

The religious aspect of the state after death was determined by a singular belief: Jahweh had nothing to do with the dead. In Sheol no one praises Jahweh (Is 38^{18}). Jahweh is the God of the living, not of the dead. A psalmist reasons with Jahweh, 'Why will you kill me? If you do, I cannot praise you, and you will lose a worshipper' (Ps 6^{5}). It was one of the terrors of death to the devout worshipper of Jahweh that he would be deprived of the presence of God. In a late Psalm the writer feels so confident of the care of Jahweh that he says, 'If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, thou art there' (Ps 139^{8}); but this only expresses an extreme faith in the power of God and is a poetic rather than a creedal statement. Jahweh's blessing was concerned with this life. If He 'delivers from Sheol,' it is in the sense of keeping His people from death (Ps 30^{3} 49^{15} 86^{13}, Pr 23^{14}, Jon 2^{2}, Hos 13^{14}). With the growing conception of the power of Jahweh in the universe, it became more difficult to think of even Sheol as outside His vision and authority. Jahweh controlled all the world, and nothing lay beyond His ken. In the post-Exilic writing it became possible to say, without, however, carrying the statement to a logical conclusion, that Sheol lay open before Jahweh (Job 26^{6}, Pr 15^{11}). Even the early prophets had used such figures (Am 9^{2}). It is possible that in some of the passages the writer was using more than a figure, that his sense of the permanent relation of God to man pierced the veil of death with a venture of faith. It could not be that God would let go His hold for good or ill on the person of man. Some have seen this hope in Ps $16^{10f.}$ 17^{15}, but these passages are of doubtful import. It is more likely in Ps 49^{15}. Many suppose Job 19^{25-27} to represent such a mood of faith, but it may show only the confidence of a final vindication on earth. All these passages point the way to a religionizing of the ancient idea of Sheol. If the dead could be conceived as still standing in the presence of God, not cut off from Him, then this shadowy existence would be filled with life, and the dead might become living souls, whose destiny of happiness or unhappiness would be the result of good or evil in their life on earth. The growing emphasis on the universal power of God pointed the way to this result, but it never was attained. The deliberate suppression by the prophetic religion of attention to the state after death worked strongly in the opposite direction. Existence in Sheol became less and less real. The writer of Ecclesiastes leaves the impression that Sheol had come to be so negative that it was practically non-existent, and that death was thought to end all. Who can tell if man has a different future from the beasts (3^{21})? The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit, the principle of life, returns to God who gave it (12^{7}). In Hebrew thought the primitive conception of a shadowy existence after death was slowly lost, pinched out by the richer, fuller value of a religion which had to do with life, not death.

Another primitive quality of Sheol was its non-moral character. It was not a place of punishment or reward. There were no compartments for good and bad, nor could the unsatisfying character of the existence after death be alleviated by any act of righteousness while alive. If Jahweh had no relation with Sheol, He would of course neither punish nor reward its inhabitants. His favour was shown by keeping the righteous from it, while allowing the wicked to be swept into it by death (Ps $49^{14f.}$). Rewards and punishments belong to this life. But what of those who do not receive their due rewards and punishments? It was this ethical problem that caused a new conception of the state after death to arise.

The tragedy of the problem of suffering in the book of Job lay in the belief that there was no life after death where God could do justice to the innocent sufferer. As Hebrew history went on, those faithful to Jahweh suffered and sometimes died for the preservation of the national faith. Would God give them no recompense? Would the triumphant wicked die in prosperity and God bring upon them no punishment? These ethical problems cried to heaven for solution, if the Hebrews were to keep faith in the justice of their God. Under this pressure a new factor, the resurrection, was added to the picture of the state after death. Two influences contributed to the rise of the belief in the resurrection. One was the hope of the renewed nation. The theory of the resurrection furnished the promise that the Jews who had laboured for their nation would be brought back to share in

[1] See art. 'Sheol,' in *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the OT*, ed. F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, Oxford, 1906.
[2] See art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Hebrew).
[3] *A Critical Hist. of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, London, 1899, p. 33.
[4] 'The Hebrew Idea of the Future Life,' in *BW* XXIV.

its future glory. The other was the Hebrew psychology. The Greeks thought of the soul as naturally immortal. This idea was borrowed by the Alexandrian-Jewish writers. It appears in Philo, in the Wisdom of Solomon (3[1-9]), and also in Josephus: 'Souls have an immortal vigour in them.'[1] But most Jewish thought held consistently to the old Hebrew psychology. Man was a divinely given soul in a living body. Body and soul were both necessary to constitute life. Jewish thought had not yet arrived at Paul's subtlety of a spiritual body (1 Co 15[35-49]). If God was to give life to men, He must restore them to earthly bodies. The earliest passage reflecting the thought of the resurrection belongs perhaps to the 4th cent. B.C.: 'Thy dead shall live; my dead bodies shall arise' (Is 26[19]). So far as this passage shows, the thought of the resurrection was then limited to righteous Israelites, who will rise in Palestine and share in the glories of the renewed nation. The only other OT passage which offers a hope of resurrection is Dn 12[2], 'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.' Since the time of the former passage the idea had grown. It had come to include the wicked as well as the righteous; but it was not yet universal. Those who had received due rewards and punishments in this life were not to be brought back from Sheol. The resurrection was a theory for satisfying the demand for justice. But the belief in resurrection did not grow up without protest. The writer of Ecclesiastes spoke for the conservative element which regarded this new speculation as an unproved hypothesis that might easily displace the sane balance of life. He insisted that no one could be sure of any reward after death. Existence after death was to him entirely negative (3[19-22] 9[5-6] 12[7]). The Sadducees continued the conservative tradition, but all the other schools of Jewish thought accepted the new theory of the resurrection. In forming a picture of the state after death, there was some attempt to combine the new theory with the old belief in Sheol. In *Enoch*, 1–36, Sheol was said to contain four divisions: for the wicked who have received due punishment in this life and will not be raised; for the wicked who will be raised for punishment in the day of judgment; for the moderately righteous, who will be raised for their reward; and for the heroes of faith, who are waiting resurrection in a paradise of bliss. Gradually, however, the belief in resurrection became enlarged to include all the dead. Sheol in the old sense tended to disappear, and the state of the dead tended to become happiness for the righteous and misery for the wicked, while waiting for the resurrection.[2]

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned under art. ESCHATOLOGY, see C. F. Burney, *Israel's Hope of Immortality*, London, 1909; A. Lods, *La Croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiquité israélite*, Paris, 1906; L. B. Paton, 'The Hebrew Idea of the Future Life,' in *BW* xxxv. [1910] 8–20, 80–92, 159–171; H. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Eng. tr.[2], Edinburgh, 1893, ii. 320–332; A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament*, do. 1904, pp. 402–532; H. W. Robinson, *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, London and New York, 1913, pp. 91–101; H. P. Smith, *The Religion of Israel*, New York and Edinburgh, 1914, pp. 25–33, 289, 326–328; J. P. Peters, *The Religion of the Hebrews*, New York, 1914, pp. 446–463.

IRVING F. WOOD.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Hindu).—1. Vedic.

—The chief source of our knowledge of the eschatology of the *Rigveda* is a short collection of funeral hymns in the late tenth book (xiv.–xviii.), composed to accompany the rite of burying or cremating the body of the dead. The latter rite was clearly becoming the normal form of disposal, but the fate of the soul had come to be regarded as independent of the mode of treatment of the body: those burned by fire and those not so burned are alike deemed to find their way to a heaven in the sky presided over by Yama, the first of mortals to die, and by the god Varuṇa. In this new abode the dead man retains his full personal identity; his spirit is united with a body, a sublimated form of his earthly frame; and the future life is a glorified edition of the life on earth. Yama, with the gods and the fathers, sits under a tree rich in foliage, while the flute sounds and songs are sung.[1] Soma places the worshipper in the heaven where there is light everlasting, where all desires are fulfilled, and every kind of pleasure abounds.[2] The spirits abiding in heaven are distinct from, but in the closest unity with, the gods; they come in thousands on Indra's car to share the offerings of men;[3] some drink the *soma*, others honey or melted butter.[4] But in addition to offerings the dead profit by their sacrifices and their gifts to the priests (*iṣṭāpūrta*) while on earth, for in some manner they are united with them in the new life.[5] Their descendants implore their favour, deprecate their anger for any sin committed against them, and entreat them to bestow boons, especially that of offspring—which may be a faint trace of a belief, long anterior to the doctrine of transmigration, that the ancestor is in some sense reborn in the infant which he is asked to bestow. As there are families in earth, so in the sky there are families—the Aṅgirases, the Vasiṣṭhas, Bhṛgus, Atharvans, Navagvas, Vairūpas, etc.

Those who attain to the heaven are specified in a late hymn;[6] they comprise the warriors who lose their life in battle, the bestowers of a thousandfold largesse to the priests, the sages of a thousand songs and performers of penance—in other words, the warriors, the rich men of the clan, and the priests themselves, who naturally enough have depicted a heaven which is more in keeping with their vocations than with those of warriors. But there is no indication in the *Saṃhitā* of the mode in which the boon of heaven is allotted by the gods who are implored to accord it. Yama is not a judge of men's deeds; and, though he has two fierce dogs, with four eyes and wide nostrils, past whom the dead man has to go on his way to Yama's abode, their function seems to be that of messengers who bear to mortals the summons of death rather than of powers which discriminate the good and the evil. The grant of heaven must therefore be deemed an act of free grace bestowed by the gods on their worshippers rather than a reward adjudicated by a judge of souls. The fate of those who failed to achieve such a boon may then have been, as R. Roth[7] held, mere annihilation, with which would accord the stress laid by the *Rigveda* on length of life as the great aim of man. But we hear also[8] of a deep abyss made for those who are false, like women who are unfaithful to their husbands; a hymn[9] against demons consigns to an abode under the three earths the one who plots against the singer, and there are references to the wicked being consigned either to a pit (*karta*)[10] or to the lowest darkness,[11] which may be interpreted as allusions to a place of punishment.

Of other fates of the dead there is no direct proof in the *Rigveda*. It is a plausible conjecture that in the seers who guard the sun[12] we are to

[1] *Ant.* XVIII. i. 3.

[2] For the resurrection and the Messianic time see artt. ESCHATOLOGY, § 10, BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic).

[1] x. cxxxv. 1, 7.
[2] ix. cxiii. 7 ff.
[3] x. xv. 10.
[4] x. cliv. 1.
[5] x. xiv. 8. This is not to be interpreted in any mystic fashion; as the dead man is united with a body, so he needs the victims he sacrificed and the cows he bestowed on the priests in his life in the world to come.
[6] x. cliv.
[7] *JAOS* iii. [1853] 345.
[8] iv. v. 5.
[9] vi. civ.
[10] ix. lxxiii. 8.
[11] x. cliii. 4.
[12] x. cvii. 7, cliv. 5.

recognize an allusion to the idea that the stars are the souls of the holy dead—a conception natural enough when the sun, himself a god, is conceived as the home of the fathers. Of greater interest are those allusions which connect the dead more closely with the earth. We hear of the fathers as divided into the uppermost (those of the sky), the midmost (those of the air), and those who are among the abodes of men.[1] The distinction between the way of the fathers and that of the gods[2] may reflect a contrast between the fathers' abode on earth and that of the gods in the sky. The eye of the dead man is bidden to go to the sun and his breath to the wind, and he is invited to go to the sky, the earth, or the waters, and to enter into the plants with all his members.[3] In the ritual of burial the earth is conceived as according the dead a resting-place.[4] Yama, first of men to die, is described as proceeding along the mighty *pravatah*[5] — a term which suggests a journey to the limits of earth rather than an ascent to the sky. In these passages we may doubtless see relics of the older belief which tied the spirit closely to its former abode on earth, but the *Rigveda* throws no light on the ideals which promoted the setting in the sky of the abode of the dead. If it was an outcome of the practice of cremation, the connexion between the two ideas had disappeared in the Rigvedic period, which sets the dead in the heaven, whether cremated or not; and it is not impossible that the fathers were gradually elevated to the sky because of their assimilation with the gods in power and attributes, and that cremation was adopted after the belief in the heavenly abode of the soul had come into being as harmonizing well with that conception.

The later *Saṃhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* render more definite the description of heaven and hell. The *Atharvaveda* lays stress on the reunion of the dead with his wife and children,[6] and promises him abundance of sexual enjoyment,[7] as well as freedom from the exactions of temporal superiors.[8] The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* explains that, in accordance with the nature of the sacrifices which a man offers on earth, in heaven he is freed from the necessity of eating: the mere offerer of the *agnihotra* must eat night and morning, but the piler of the fire-altar can exist for a hundred years of unalloyed bliss without nutriment.[9] The delights of heaven are a thousand times those of the happiest of mortal men.[10] Great stress is laid on rebirth in the next world with perfect members (*sarvatanūḥ sāṅgaḥ*), and for this the most careful collection of the bones of the dead man is necessary on earth, so that the theft of the bones is a most severe punishment.[11] Between men and the gods there is established the essential distinction that the former must lay aside their earthly bodies to attain immortality.[12] Immortality is essentially a second birth,[13] and its character is determined by man's deeds on earth,[14] and diverse ways of sifting the good and bad are laid down: after death the man must pass between two fires which consume the evil and permit the good to pass on, or he is weighed in a balance — perhaps a conception borrowed from the balance ordeal of ordinary life.[15] But the heaven which is attained is no longer necessarily the abode of Yama. A contrast is drawn between the world of heaven and that of the fathers, the entrance to the former being in the north-east, while that to the latter is in the south-east.[1] The due performance of rites leads to the performer attaining union and identity of world with the god in question, Agni, Āditya, Varuṇa, Indra, or Brahmā;[2] and in unequivocal terms the souls of the dead are declared to be stars.[3]

Hell now attains definite form: the oppressor of the Brāhman sits amid streams of blood chewing hair,[4] and the world of hell (*nārakaloka*) is definitely promised to the miscreant who refuses to give a priest the cow for which he asks.[5] The vision of Bhṛgu recorded in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[6] preserves in a priestly form[7] a conception of hell as a place of retribution in which men are repaid by their victims the same tortures as they inflicted on them in life, and the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* reinforces the same view.[8] But comparatively little prominence is given to hell in the *Brāhmaṇas*; there appears a more serious conception, that of repeated death in the next world, an idea of peculiar horror to the Vedic Indian, whose chief prayer was for length of days in this world and freedom from death (*amṛta*) in the world to come. But this conception, that of *punarmṛtyu*, appears only in the latest of the great *Brāhmaṇas*, the last book of the *Aitareya*, the *Śatapatha* and the *Kauṣītaki*, and it is not without importance that these are also the works which present hell as a place of retribution, rebirth and hell alike appearing as the penalty for ignorance of ritual, not as punishment for moral wrongdoing.

In the *Upaniṣads*, though not in the earliest portions of them, the decisive step is taken of transferring the rebirth to earth, which is foreshadowed in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, and of making the fate of man depend on his metaphysical knowledge and his conduct. The new ideas necessitated a substantial revision of the old eschatology: the distinction between the way of the fathers and that of the gods was adopted, and the oldest text which adopts the full doctrine of transmigration, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[9] distinguishes between the man who attains through true knowledge the way of the gods, to be merged ultimately in *Brahman*, the man whose good works entitle him to proceed on the way of the fathers to the moon, there to enjoy recompense for his works, and then to return to earth in a human form, and the wicked for whom the third place is reserved and who are fated to be reborn as inferior animals. An important change is made in the scheme by the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,[10] which distinguishes between two classes of those who go to the moon—those of good conduct who are reborn as men, and those of abominable conduct who are reborn as dogs, pigs, or out-castes—but which illogically retains the third place, though the distinction between the two sets of those who go to the moon has robbed that category of its validity. The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, apparently in an effort at greater system, sends even those with the saving knowledge to the moon, whence they proceed after examination as to their knowledge to Brahmā, while the others return from the moon for rebirth according to their merits. The prominence of the moon in these views is remarkable, and is brought into combination with the clearly popular idea that the waxing and

1 x. xv. 1 f. 2 x. xviii. 1.
3 x. xvi. 3. 4 x. xviii. 10 ff.
5 x. xiv. 1. 6 xii. iii. 17.
7 iv. xxiv. 2. 8 iii. xxix. 3.
9 x. v. 1, 4. 10 xiv. vii. 1, 32.
11 xi. vi. 3, 11, xiv. vi. 9, 28. 12 x. iv. 3, 9.
13 xi. ii. 1, 1. 14 vi. ii. 2, 27.
15 xi. ii. 7, 33; cf. art. Ordeal (Hindu), vol. ix. p. 523 f.

1 vi. vi. 2. 4, xiii. viii. 1. 5.
2 ii. vi. 4. 8, xi. iv. 4. 2, v. 6, vi. 2. 2; *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, iii. 44; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, iii. x. 9, 11, 11. 6.
3 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vi. v. 4. 8; *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, v. iv. 1. 3.
4 *Atharvaveda*, v. xix.
5 *Ib.* xii. iv. 36. *Nāraka* occurs also in *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, i. 325, where three heavens and three hells are alluded to.
6 xi. vi. 1 ff.
7 Cf. A. Weber, *ZDMG* ix. (1855) 237 ff.
8 xi. 8. 9 vi. 2. 10 v. 10.

waning of the moon is connected with the movements of the souls, as they ascend to it or descend from it. But beside this complicated system, which endeavours to unite the popular belief in heaven and hell with the new faith of transmigration, there remains the simpler view that rebirth on earth is the fate of the soul, and occasionally there is enunciated the doctrine that for the possessor of true knowledge there is no rebirth, no reward in heaven or punishment in hell to face, but that by reason of this knowledge he is merged after death in the absolute spirit.

In the *Gṛhya-* and the *Dharma-Sūtras*, which deal with the domestic and legal rules prevailing at the end of the Vedic period, the new doctrine of transmigration appears side by side with, and united with, the simpler view of heaven and hell, while a new element appears in the conception that all creation, including heaven, is periodically destroyed.[1] Thus Āpastamba[1] holds that the fathers exist in heaven until the end of a world-order, that after this destruction they exist again there as the cause of seed, that immortality consists in rebirth in the person of one's son, and that the wicked are extinguished. More important than these expressions of opinion as to the fate of the dead, which vary from *Sūtra* to *Sūtra*, are the ritual prescriptions for the tendance and worship of the dead, which in substance are doubtless older than the more elaborate ritual of the *Rigveda*. The dead are the recipients of many offerings, especially each month at the new moon, and these offerings are deposited in shallow pits, to which they are deemed to come in order to extract the heat from the food offered to them. After they have eaten, they are bidden to depart, and to return in a month's time bearing with them offspring.[2] But a clear distinction is made between the newly dead and those who have died before. The great-grandfather, grandfather, and father are normally alone invoked by name, but, for a period usually fixed at a year after death, a special offering is made to the dead man, and he is not included with his ancestors; at the end of this offering his spirit is not dismissed, but merely bidden to be at peace[3]—a clear indication that for this period the spirit was supposed to dwell in the neighbourhood of its former abode. Originally perhaps this belief may have stood in relation with the practice of a provisional followed by a final interment of the bones, but the connexion is not recognized by any Vedic text. To this view may be referred the allusion in the *Rigveda* to the fathers who are on earth: the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*[4] threatens him who wounds a Brāhman with exclusion from the world of the fathers for as many years as the Brāhman's blood wets grains of sand; and, in contrast to the prevailing view of the fathers as dwelling in light, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[5] and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*[6] see in the world of the fathers an abode of dreams. The same *Brāhmaṇa*[7] speaks of the fathers as creeping about the roots of the trees—apparently a relic of the belief that the soul of the dead clung to the tree under which its bones were buried or which served to supply its coffin.[8] Two *Sūtra* passages may be adduced for the view that the dead might pass into an animal form, apart from transmigration proper. When the bones were collected for final interment, if they could not be found, a garment might be spread out, and the dead invoked; if any animal then alighted on the garment, it was deemed to represent the dead;[1] and Baudhāyana[2] declares that the fathers go about in the semblance of birds.

1 II. ix. 23 f.
2 *Hiraṇyakeśi Gṛhya-Sūtra*, II. xiii. 2.
3 *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhya-Sūtra*, IV. ii. 6.
4 II. vi. 10. 2. 5 XII. ix. 2. 2. 6 VI. 5.
7 XIII. viii. 1. 20.
8 The practice in the marriage ritual by which stepping on the threshold is avoided may be due to the belief that the spirits of the dead, once buried under the threshold, have their abode there (cf. M. Winternitz, *Das altindische Hochzeitsrituell*, Vienna, 1892, p. 72).

2. Post-Vedic.—In the post-Vedic literature, whether Brāhmanical, Buddhist, or Jain, none of which can in its present form be dated with any certainty or probability earlier than 200 B.C., the ideas regarding the state of the dead which are developed in the Vedic period are further elaborated, but without the addition of any conception of importance, and without any greater success in the effort to combine the older beliefs with the doctrine of transmigration. Nothing shows more convincingly the persistence of the popular belief in heaven than the dominant influence which it exercised on philosophical belief. The *Upaniṣads* tend on the whole to teach the doctrine of annihilation of personality for the possessor of true knowledge, but the *Vedānta-Sūtra*[3] clearly rejects this view in favour of the doctrine that the sage attains a future of unlimited power and bliss, inferior to the Lord only in not having the capacity of creating and maintaining the world, and this view, though rejected by Śaṅkara in his esoteric doctrine, is accepted as valid by Rāmānuja and by the sects of Vaiṣṇavas who follow the main lines of his philosophy; a similar view is held also by the Śaivas. Buddhism, which equally in its logical theory regards annihilation as the reward of enlightenment, admits for ordinary purposes the existence of heaven, and the Mahāyāna school exalts the attainment of heaven to the highest hope of man, depicting its joys in such works as the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* in the most exaggerated terms. Jainism similarly imagines in elaborate detail a complicated system of heavens for beings of diverse merits. The same tendency is seen in the epic: a scale of heavens is gradually evolved; the heaven of Brahmā is placed above the lower heavens, but even it is not a final abiding-place, and the heaven of Viṣṇu is superimposed upon it as the place where there is no change, and where the sage is exempt from the departure from the lower heavens entailed by the periodical destruction of existence.[4] The number of heavens is now unlimited, for each deity has his special world; many of them are described in the *Svargakhaṇḍa* of the *Padma Purāṇa*, and most *Purāṇas* contain some mention of them.

Parallel with the multiplication of heavens is the multiplication of hells. The *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* enumerates seven, and the Jains have also a list of that sacred Indian number. Multiples of seven are also known, 21 (which is given by Manu) being a special favourite, while there is preference with the Buddhists for eight and its multiples in reckoning hells, the number of which later is increased indefinitely. In the description of their horrors fancy runs riot, as in the long enumeration in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*,[5] and in the later art it is plain that the Indian conceptions were influenced by Christian legend and art. It is possible that an early example of such influence[6] is to be seen in the legend of the visit of King Vipaścit to hell, which he refuses to leave until the pains of the inmates are removed, as recounted in that *Purāṇa*.[7] A somewhat similar tale is recounted also in the *Padma Purāṇa* of King Janaka and in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* of Avalokiteśvara, and there is much earlier evidence of the existence of the legend of the visit of Christ to hell. With the development of the hell as a place of punishment, the necessity of providing some means of allocating

1 *Kauśika-Sūtra*, lxxxiii. 22 f.
2 *Dharma-Sūtra*, II. xiv. 9. 16.
3 *Mahābhārata*, III. cclxi. 4 IV. iv.
5 X. ii.
6 See F. B. Cowell, *JPh* vi. [1876] 222 ff. 7 XV.

heaven or hell to the soul is felt, and in the *Purāṇas* Chitragupta appears as the recorder of the deeds of men and Yama as a judge who sends them to heaven or hell according to their deserts.[1] But Yama tends to sink from his rank, and to become merely the lord of one of the hells, and the prevailing view is that heaven is essentially the result of divine grace, whether or not evoked by effort on the part of the recipient of the boon. Similarly, while the fate of the dead in theory depends on their own deeds, in practice it is regarded as dependent also on the actions of their descendants. An epic legend tells how Agastya saw his ancestors hanging head downwards in a hole called hell, because of his failure to beget sons, and the utmost stress is laid throughout the literature on the necessity of the due performance of the funeral rites, and of the offerings, generically entitled *śrāddhas*, requisite to secure the welfare of the departed soul. These offerings not only serve to provide the spirit, disembodied in the process of creation, with a celestial body, but also avail to raise him from one stage of existence to another; the *nārāyaṇabali* is especially commended in many texts as a means of securing the advancement of the dead to the Vaikuṇṭha heaven. The closeness of the dead to the living is seen in the daily offerings of food which are made to them; they are also fed specially at every occasion of family rejoicing, and with special solemnity before a marriage—a clear trace of their abiding concern with the continuance of the race.

Practically new in the literature of this period is the recognition of the spirit of the dead as a ghost appearing on earth in close contact with man. The absence of such accounts in the earlier texts may reasonably be ascribed to the character of the Vedic literature, for the distinction between the recently dead and the ancient fathers in the *Sūtras*, and the whole nature of the ritual, suggest clearly that there was nothing strange in the idea of the presence of the dead in the vicinity of human dwellings. The regularity of such presence is emphasized in the Buddhist *Peta-vatthu*, which reveals ghosts entering into conversation with men, lurking about houses and at cross-roads (a favourite place of burial and the resort of spirits), as wandering about unhappy, clothed only in their own hair, tormented by heat which neither wind, water, nor shadow can alleviate, unable to find anything to drink even in the midst of the Ganges, which turns to blood as they seek to swallow its water. The influence of the doctrine of transmigration is, however, obvious, as the dead often declare that they are fated to die again in a brief period and then to go to one hell or other. This belief in ghosts is universal in the later literature: the *Divyāvadāna*[2] tells of a ghost city, the *Jātaka*[3] of an island inhabited by female ghosts; and a famous scene in the *Mālatīmādhava* of Bhavabhūti describes a common theme, the presence of countless ghosts at the place of the burning of the dead. A more poetic use of the same idea is seen in the *putradarśana* scene in the *Mahābhārata*,[4] where Vyāsa by his magic power summons up before the eyes of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Gāndhārī the spirits of those who fought in the great battle. In modern tales stress is laid on untimely and violent death as a frequent source of the wandering of the restless spirit. Thus a legend in the late *Garuḍa Purāṇa* tells of a robber whom a tiger killed and who in consequence wandered about as a ghost until a crow dropped his bones in the Ganges, when the sanctifying power of its waters transferred his soul to heaven. The idea is doubtless primitive, though not expressly recorded in the earlier texts, save in so far as it may be inferred from the notice in Baudhāyana[1] that the spirit of an embryo becomes a blood-sucker, and from the bitterness against the slayer of embryos which is recorded as early as the *Saṃhitās* of the *Yajurveda* and may be ascribed to the resentment felt against a person who lets loose on the world so uneasy a spirit.

In the Vedic period very little stress is laid on the dangerous side of the dead. The *Rigveda* indeed deprecates the anger of the ancestors for sin committed against them;[2] the fathers are entreated to defeat the enemy of their descendants; and reference is made in the *Atharvaveda*[3] to fiends who creep in among the fathers, assuming the likeness of kinsmen, which may point to the spirits of the unfriendly dead. But, even if, as is possible, in the *rakṣasas* and *piśāchas* of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the later *Saṃhitās* we may see spirits of the hostile dead converted into demons, it is at least plain that the consciousness of such an origin was not normally present in the Vedic period. The later literature freely recognizes friendly spirits of the dead, which give good advice to men, and regards the ancestors as able and willing to aid, but it also lays stress on the malevolent tendencies of hostile spirits, and is especially prone to attribute to their agency the workings of disease, which, by perhaps an earlier stage of thought, are directly made personal powers in the *Atharvaveda*.

In this prominence of the idea of the hostility of the dead it is possible to see the result of the gradual Hinduization of the Indo-Aryan religion. The belief in the sending of diseases by spirits of the dead is widely present among aboriginal tribes,[4] but in itself it is too easily explainable as a natural development to be available as a proof of borrowing. Among the primitive tribes, apparently without Hindu influence, systems of belief as to the state of the dead have developed themselves which have often a somewhat striking similarity to those produced by Hinduism. The Khands have a god of judgment who dwells on a high rock surrounded by a black river, and the souls of the dead climb up the rock with much effort to await his decision. The good are accorded life in the sun, or are reborn in the tribe, the priests having the power to reveal in each case who is reincarnated in the newborn child, and the wicked are reborn as diseased and endure misfortune, or, if very wicked, suffer annihilation. The Oraons are less advanced, for they do not accept the belief in a life in heaven; unfortunate people survive death as unhappy ghosts; a man eaten by a tiger comes again to life as a tiger, but the ordinary man suffers annihilation. There are also traces of the belief that the spirit of the dead can pass directly into an animal—a belief which may have had a share in the development of the doctrine of transmigration.

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[1] H. H. Wilson, *The Vishnu Purâna*, ed. F. Hall, London, 1864–1877, ii. 216.
[2] P. 7. [3] iv. 2. [4] xv. xxix.–xxxvi.

[1] See A. Ludwig, *Der Rigveda*, Prague, 1876–88, v. 421.
[2] x. xv. 6. [3] xviii. ii. 28.
[4] See J. M. Campbell, *IA* xxiii. [1894] 377 *f.*, and art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Introductory and Primitive).

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A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Iranian).—The Mazdean doctrine of the state of men's souls after death is exceedingly simple and remarkably consistent through the whole range of literature from the *Gāthas* to the most recent Pahlavi treatises. It is summed up in the belief in a heaven and a hell for the virtuous man and the sinner respectively, each (at least in the *Gāthas*) apparently eternal in duration.

1. Heaven.—The celestial abode is designated in the *Gāthas* by the beautiful and poetical name of Garō-demāna, 'house of song'[1] (*i.e.* of hymns of praise), the dwelling-place of Ahura Mazda and his holy ones. It is also designated as the 'house or kingdom of Vohu Manah, the kingdom of blessing.' In the Later Avesta it assumes the form Garōnmāna, but also is styled Vahištā Anhuš, literally 'the best existence,' which has remained the ordinary term in subsequent epochs, down to the Modern Persian Bihišt. In Pahlavi literature it takes the form Garōtmān. Another term which seems to indicate the heavenly abode is Anagra Raochā, 'the everlasting lights.' Bartholomae, however, surmises that of all these terms Garōdemāna, in its various forms, may signify a kind of inner heaven, a 'holy of holies,' in paradise itself.[2] Dhalla writes:

'In contrast to the single heaven referred to in the Gathas, we meet with a fourfold division of heaven in the Avestan period. Garonmana, or the Abode of Praise, remains the highest heaven, the realm of bliss that is reached by traversing the three lower heavens, called Humata, or Good Thought, Hukhta, or Good Words, and Hvarshta, or Good Deeds, as beatific abodes for the soul.'[3]

The same writer also considers that, whilst Anagra Raochā in the Later Avesta designates Garōnmāna, the expression Vahištō Anhuš is a generic name for all four heavens. Söderblom, on the other hand, takes Vahišt as signifying the three inferior heavens, as opposed to the supreme Garōtmān, 'la félicité suprême auprès de Dieu,'[4] which seems less likely. The fourfold conception of heaven persists unchanged through the Pahlavi and subsequent periods. So does the presentment of heaven as a place of ineffable bliss, in company with Ahura and his celestial court, and of brilliant, dazzling light.

2. Hell.—In accordance with the Iranian love of symmetry, the place of the wicked after death is in all details the exact opposite of the heavenly abode. The Gāthic name of the Inferno is Drūjōdemāna, 'house of the *druj* (or of the lie)'—the later Pahlavi Drūzōtmān, or again Drūjī gereda, 'pit of the *druj*' (*i.e.* Angra Mainyuš). Similarly it is Achištā Anhuš, 'the worst existence'—in the Later Avesta *duz-ahū*. Dhalla also holds that there are in the Later Avesta, by contrast to the one hell of the *Gāthas*, four abodes of the damned—Dushmata ('evil thought'), Dushukhta ('evil word'), Dushvarshta ('evil deed'), and lastly the fourth or lowest hell, which has no specific name or its own in the Avesta, but is known as *anaghra temaḥ* ('endless darkness').[1]

The miseries and tortures of the souls in hell are terrible indeed. Moulton sums them up in a striking passage.

'Hell is full of darkness, sad voices, stench, foul food, and cold. It would seem that the conception of it sprang from the privations of winter on the steppes during the migration southward, when the preciousness of the house-fire made Atar the very symbol of all that was best for man.[2] For the Iranian, hell and the demons were always in the north. The idea of darkness is the distinguishing feature of the House of the Lie. It is worked out in the later fancy which conceives the damned so close together that they seemed an indistinguishable mass; yet in the darkness each ever wails, "I am alone!" The symbolism of Fire was kept out of this eschatology for obvious reasons.'[3]

3. Purgatory.—Thus Mazdeism had its Paradiso and Inferno; had it also a Purgatorio? Several scholars hold that such a state is indicated in *Yasna* xxxiii. 1, by the verb now read by Bartholomae[4] as *hememyāsaitē*, the whole sentence then reading:

'The Judge shall act most justly towards the wicked, the just, and him in whom the false and the right are commingled': ('bei dem sich [zu gleichen Teilen] mischen was falsch und was bei ihm recht ist').

Moulton[5] seems to consider that this 'discovery' of Bartholomae is in some sort of opposition to the view on the Pahlavi *hamīstakān*[6] expounded by E. W. West, C. de Harlez, and other writers. The difference, however, is one of etymology merely. If the above view of *Ys.* xxxiii. 1 is right, then we shall have the 'middle state' recognized in the Avesta itself: if not, it must be looked upon as a later Pahlavi development. But in either case there does not seem to be the idea of a place of *purgation* for souls after death.

4. Vision of Artā-i Vīrāf.—As mediæval Christianity had its Dante who embodied the doctrine of the world beyond the grave in his immortal vision, so Sasanian Mazdeism had its famous prose legend of the somewhat similar vision, by an unknown writer, of the saintly Vīrāf, which very probably was based on much more ancient traditional material.

This short Pahlavi religious tractate known as the *Artā-i Vīrāf Nāmak*, 'Book of Artā-i Vīrāf,'[7] has for centuries been a favourite work with all classes of the Parsi community. It was sometimes read before large assemblies, with the effect thus described by its learned editor, Dastur Hoshangji:

'It speaks volumes both for the effective style of the Artâ Vîrâf Nâmak and for the implicit faith which the Parsis placed in what was written therein, that a few years ago, when the book used to be read before them, overpowered by consciousness of guilt, the punishment for which was so terrifically described, they, but especially the gentler sex, used to weep. It was a most affecting spectacle to witness the awakening conscience exhibiting itself in trickling tears.'

This popularity of the *Vision* is shown by the fact that, besides the original Pahlavi text, which exists in two or three considerably divergent recensions, translations into both Sanskrit and Gujarāti exist, besides several Persian versions, both in prose and in poetry. These poetical versions are quite modern and were composed respectively in A.D. 1530–31, 1532–33, and 1679.

In the very careful introductory essay prefixed to his edition, Haug comes to the conclusion that the author, whoever he may have been, must have

[1] Cf. Welsh, *Bód alaw*, 'abode of music,' though of course not with the same signification.
[2] *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1904, *s.v.*
[3] *Zoroastrian Theology*, p. 178.
[4] *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, p. 100.

[1] P. 179.
[2] Similarly it is recorded that the early Christian missionaries in the Scandinavian countries represented to their converts hell as a place of intense cold; the idea of fire would have suggested comfort rather than suffering.
[3] *Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 172 f.
[4] *S.v.* '*Myas.*' [5] P. 175. [6] See below, p. 848 f.
[7] As we might say, 'Saint Vîrâf.'

lived after the time of the celebrated Zoroastrian theologian, Ādarbād Māhraspand, the minister of Shāpūr II. (A.D. 309-379), but before the downfall of the Sāsanian dynasty in the 7th cent., for the book undoubtedly belongs to Sasanian times, perhaps the 5th or 6th cent. A.D.

The general course of the *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak*—the trance and vision of the Zoroastrian seer and his visit under the guidance of the spirits Srōsh and Ātaro, over the Chinvat Bridge, to the world beyond the tomb, first to the four heavens, thence by command of Aūharmazd through the horrors of the Inferno, finally back to the divine throne in Garōtmān—is too well known to need recapitulation here. It is, however, of interest to note that, whilst Dante is supposed to visit the world of spirits in his actual living body, so that it is noted by the spirits as a marvel that his body casts a shadow, Artā-ī Vīrāf's soul leaves his body whilst in the trance induced by *mang*, and thus disembodied makes the journey through heaven and hell. Here we have a striking analogy with the legend of Er, the son of Armenius, the Pamphylian, in Plato's *Republic*,[1] whose soul similarly leaves his body on the funeral-pyre and goes forth to view the spirit-world, but eventually (like that of Artā-ī Vīrāf) returns to his body still lying on the pyre.[2]

Both Artā-ī Vīrāf and Dante have the guidance of two celestial beings in their wonderful journeys. In the case of Dante the poet Vergil, and afterwards Beatrice, accompany and direct him through the spirit-world. With Artā-ī Vīrāf it is the archangel Srōsh (the Avestic Sraosha, the spirit of obedience, *i.e.* to the divine law) and the genius of fire, Ātaro, who together act as guides through the realms of heaven and hell. As they enter hell, Artā-ī Vīrāf remarks:

'Srōsh the Pious and Ātaro the angel took hold of my hand and I went thence onwards unhurt. In that manner I beheld cold and heat, drought and stench, to such a degree as I never saw nor heard of in the world. And when I went further, I also saw the greedy jaws of Hell, like the most frightful pit, descending in a very narrow and fearful place; in darkness so gloomy that it is necessary to hold by the hand; and in such stench that every one into whose nostrils that air ascends, will struggle and stagger and fall; and on account of such close confinement no man's existence is endurable.'[3]

The narrative continues:

'I came to a place and I saw a great river which was gloomy as dreadful Hell; on which river were many souls and fravashis; and some of them were not able to cross, and some crossed only with great difficulty, and some crossed easily, and I asked thus, "What river is this? and who are these people who stand so distressed?" Srōsh the Pious and Ātaro the angel said: "This river is the many tears which men shed from the eyes, for the departed. They shed those tears unlawfully, and they swell this river. Those who are not able to cross over are those for whom, after their departure, much lamentation and weeping were made; and those (who cross) more easily, are those for whom less was made. Speak forth to the world thus: 'When ye are in the world make no lamentation and weeping unlawfully, for so much harm and difficulty may come to the souls of your departed.'"'[4]

The crossing of a river as the means of entrance into the spirit-world is, of course, a commonplace of literature. We find it in Homer and Vergil, from whom Dante has borrowed his four infernal rivers, Acheron, Styx, Phlegethon, and Cocytus. It is also a commonplace of Iranian eschatology, as in the Avestic description of the adventures of the soul after death, which have been borrowed wholesale in the *Qur'ān*.

It may be observed how very large a proportion of Artā-ī Vīrāf's vision (no fewer than 83 out of the total 101 chapters) is devoted to the description of hell, whilst the description of heaven occupies only nine chapters. On the other hand, in the vision of heaven, as compared with that of hell, there is a certain orderly arrangement observable, whilst an entire want of order prevails in the long rôle of the various crimes and their punishments in the infernal regions — literally, 'Ubi nullus ordo sed sempiternus horror inhabitat.'

It is a curious fact that all the sufferers in Artā-ī Vīrāf's hell are anonymous, with the single exception of the lazy man, whose name seems to have been Davānos, and who is punished like Dives, the rich man in the gospel, solely because of his laziness, since, when 'he was in the world, he never did any good work.' Yet, whilst his whole body was being gnawed by *khrafstras*, his right foot alone was untouched, 'for that he once with this right foot cast a bunch of grass before a ploughing ox,' so that his solitary good deed went not unrewarded.

Of the many and very miscellaneous kinds of sin and of their terrible and often grotesque chastisements enough has been said in the art. SIN (Iranian). But these punishments of the wicked in the *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak* appear in no particular order, and, at least as regards hell, 'there is nowhere any system or plan perceptible.'[1]

Perhaps the most striking feature in the Inferno of both Vīrāf and Dante is the position assigned to the evil spirit, the arch-enemy of God and the dominant ruler of hell. The climax of Dante's Inferno is the vast figure of Lucifer frozen in the lowest depths of nether hell at the apex of the inverted cone in which it is formed. In the *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak* Ahriman (Angra Mainyuš or Ganrāk Mīnōi) is similarly found in the darkest hell, which apparently is fixed in the very centre of the earth. Here the evil spirit ridicules and mocks the unfortunate sinners. And, just as, after beholding the horrors of Lucifer, Vergil leads Dante at once out to the southern hemisphere and the serener atmosphere of Purgatory, so Srōsh and Ātaro take hold of Artā-ī Vīrāf's hand at the same juncture and lead him forth 'from that dark, terrible, fearful place,' back to the eternal light of the presence of Aūharmazd—for it is a peculiarity of this *Vision* that it begins with the brief visit to the celestial court before the soul of the seer is led to the infernal regions.

The account of heaven is comparatively brief. Artā-ī Vīrāf's three first heavens are those of the stars, the moon, and the sun, whilst the fourth and last is the all-glorious Garōtmān, wherein is the throne of Aūharmazd. Brilliant light and glory are the characteristics of the heavens of both the Persian and the Italian seers, and adorn the blessed souls who inhabit them. Both Dante and Artā-ī Vīrāf behold in their respective paradises the soul of the first progenitor of the human race—Adam in the case of Dante, Gayōmard in the case of Artā-ī Vīrāf.

But what about the question of a purgatory? Certainly, immediately after the passage of the great river described above, Vīrāf says:

'I came to a place and saw the souls of several people who remained in the same position. And I asked the victorious Srōsh the Pious and Ātaro the angel: "Who are they? and why remain they here?" Srōsh the Pious and Ātaro the angel said: "They call this place Hamīstagān, and these souls remain in this place till the Resurrection; and they are the souls of those men whose good works and sins are equal, . . . for every one whose good works are three scruples more than his sins, goes to Heaven; they whose sin is in excess go to Hell; they in whom both are equal remain among these Hamīstagān till the Resurrection. Their punishment is cold or heat from the revolution of the atmosphere, and they have no other adversity!'[2]

This doctrine of the Hamīstagān is curiously like the Irish conception of Limbo in the 'Vision of Adamnan' (*Fis Adamnain*) as the place 'at the hither side of the lightless land for those whose good and evil have been equal.' Many writers, including J. J. Modi, see in the Hamīstagān the analogue of the Christian Purgatory. This is, however, scarcely tenable. It is true that, as in

[1] x. 13. [2] x. 16. [3] xviii. 1-9. [4] xvi. 2-12.

[1] Haug, *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak*, Introductory Essays, p. lxix.
[2] vi.

the Christian Purgatory, the sufferings of these souls will eventually come to an end, but there is no idea of purgation by suffering, as in Dante's Purgatorio. The Pahlavi name is a plural of the adjective *hamīstak*, meaning 'in equilibrium, or stationary,' and is no doubt derived from the idea of a balance in which the two scales are exactly balanced, and so stationary. These spirits, therefore, in the Iranian, the Irish, and the Italian visions, would seem more akin to those neutrals of whom Dante writes:

'Che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.'[1]

Even if we accept Bartholomae's reading and translation of the Avestan term in *Ys.* xxxiii. 1, already referred to, the etymology of *hamīstakān* (or *hamēstagān*, as sometimes written) remains obvious and certain.

We need not here enter into the question[2] as to the indebtedness of the Artā-ī Vīrāf legend to older Hebrew Vision literature of the same kind. That the central idea of describing the secrets of the other world under the allegorical form of a journey undertaken by a living man, guided by supernatural beings through the realms beyond the tomb, and even no inconsiderable part of the details of the description, may have been borrowed by a Persian writer from some Jewish original is by no means unlikely, especially when we remember that most characteristic tendency of the Iranian mind towards the adaptation and assimilation of outside theories and ideas which has been so marked through the whole course of its history. Nevertheless W. Bousset writes:

'Es scheint mir der Beweis erbracht, dass wir in der eranischen Religion die Heimat jener bunten Phantasien und jener ekstatischen Mystik zu suchen haben.'[3]

5. Duration. — For the *Gāthas* there is little doubt that the duration of both heaven and hell was conceived as eternal, as shown by the phrases *yavoi vispāi*, 'in omne saeculum,' *ameretāitī*, 'eternity,' *utayūtā*, 'perpetuity,' applied to both the blessed and the damned. Later theology, however, seems to have modified this teaching, at least as regards the infernal regions. As has been remarked in art. SALVATION (Iranian), the great flood of molten metal at the end of time and the final resurrection and regeneration (*tanū-i pasīn*) is, according to some of the Pahlavi writers, to purify even hell and the wicked therein:

'Praise to Him, the merciful Lord, who . . . at the end shall deliver even the wicked from Hell and restore the whole Creation in purity.'[4]

LITERATURE.—J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (*HL*), London, 1913, esp. lect. v.; 'The Last Things'; M. N. Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, New York, 1914, esp. chs. vii., viii., xix., xx., xxxi., xxxii.; N. Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, tr. from Swedish by J. de Coussanges, Paris, 1901, esp. chs. i. § 1, ii. § 1; L. C. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884, ch. vii., Eng. tr. by Firoz Jamaspji Dastur, *The Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids*, Bombay, 1889. For the *Artā-ī Vīrāf Nāmak*, see the ed. of Hoshangji Jamaspji Asa, M. Haug, and E. W. West, *The Book of Ardā Vīrāf*, Bombay and London, 1872; Glossary and Index to same by West and Haug, Bombay, 1874; a French translation by A. Barthélemy, *Ardā Vīrāf-Namak, ou Livre d'Ardā Vīrāf*, Paris, 1887; a new ed. of the Pahlavi text, with Persian and Gujarāti trr. by Dastur Kaikhosru Jamaspji, Bombay, 1902; L. C. Casartelli, 'The Persian Dante,' in *The Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, do. 1918.]

L. C. CASARTELLI.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Muhammadan).—The *Qur'ān* abounds in pictures of the life after death. There is, however, a certain monotony in them, for they mostly present the same ideas, frequently repeated. They consist of three factors—(1) resurrection, (2) judgment, (3) heaven and hell—with occasional references to the state between death and the resurrection. Some of the passages reflect ideas which must have been current at the time:

'How will it be when the angels take their souls, smiting their faces and their backs?'[1].

This implies a contemporary belief in the angels who visit man in the grave and beat the wicked.[2] Abundant descriptions of heaven and hell are found, used for warning to disbelievers and encouragement to believers. As in Christian eschatology, the condition of souls in the intermediate state between death and the resurrection was not made clear in the early writings. Later speculation busied itself with the problem. Some held that the spirits of the faithful were taken up through the seven heavens into the presence of God, and then returned to the grave for the examination by the two angels, Munkir and Nakir. Martyrs were regarded, not as remaining in the graves, but as living in the presence of God, where 'there is no fear for them, and they shall not be grieved.'[3] The spirits of common believers stay near the graves, or, some hold, are in the lowest heaven with Adam. Infidels are beaten before and behind by the two examining angels, then crushed down into the earth and left to be bitten by great serpents. Their cries of pain may be heard by all, except men and *jinns*.

Once the camel of Muhammad shied in passing a graveyard, and Muhammad said, 'Surely the infidels are punished in their graves, and, if I were not afraid you would leave off burying, verily I would call on God to let you hear what I now hear.'[4]

The infidel's own foul actions come to him as a devil with a hideous face, and taunt him,[5] as his evil deeds pursue and taunt the sinner in Zoroastrian eschatology. On the basis of *Qur'ān*, lxxxiii. 7–10, some say that the soul of the sinner awaits judgment in a pit in hell.

The general ideas of the resurrection are borrowed from Judaism and Christianity, with the addition of some details from Zoroastrianism. The resurrection will come at a time when evil is triumphant on the earth.

God will say to the angels, 'Bring out those that shall be sent to hell.' They will say, 'How many are they?', and God will say, 'Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand.'[6]

The body of the resurrection will be a body of flesh, regenerated from the *os sacrum*, from which man was created.[7] The body will be created naked and uncircumcised, 'as at the first creation.' When Muhammad's wife, 'Ā'isha, objected that it was indecent, he replied, 'The business of the day will be too momentous to permit people looking at one another.'[8] God will judge from great books each as long as one can see. But a bit of paper with the Muslim confession on it will outweigh all the evil deeds of a man's life.[9] Muslims will ask Adam to intercede for them at the judgment, but he cannot, for he has sinned. Nor can Noah, Abraham, Moses, or Jesus, but Muhammad will do it. After the judgment men will pass over the bridge al-Aarāf. Muslims will go swiftly and easily, some in the twinkling of an eye, some like lightning, some like wind, some like birds, some like swift horses, some like camels. Of those who fall off, God will allow Muhammad to bring back all in whose heart there is any good. God will even bring into paradise a handful of men who have never done any good, and will purify them till they are pure as pearls.

Descriptions of the state of the good and of the evil in paradise and hell are almost entirely in

1 *Inferno*, iii. 36.
2 Ably discussed by M. Gaster in *JRAS*, 1893.
3 *AKW* iv. [1901] 169.
4 *Dinkart*, ed. P. B. Peshotan, Bombay, 1874–1917, vol. ii. ch. 81 § 6.

1 xlvii. 29. 2 See art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 9.
3 *Qur'ān*, iii. 164. 4 *Mishkat al-Masabih*, i. 39.
5 *Ib.* i. 40.
6 *Ib.* xxiii. 8; in ch. 10 Adam asks the same question and receives the same answer.
7 *Ib.* xxiii. 9. 8 *Ib.* xxiii. 10.
9 *Ib.* xxiii. 11.

terms of the senses. The life in paradise is described in terms of luxury, pleasure, and rest—which would naturally appeal to the Arab of the desert.

Paradise is better than anything in the world. It is a garden in which are rivers of water, flowing springs, branching trees with all kinds of fruit. There shall the saints recline on couches, on green cushions, and on beautiful carpets, bedecked with bracelets of gold and with pearls, wearing green robes of silk and brocade. Fruits shall be within reach, and whatever they call for shall be served them. Around them shall go eternal youths, with goblets, ewers, and a cup of flowing wine. No headache shall they feel therefrom, nor shall their wits be dimmed. They shall be served by large-eyed damsels of modest glance. They shall see the angels reclining about the throne, praising their Lord.[1]

In the traditions the same description is carried on. *Mishkat al-Masabih*, xxiii. 13, is devoted to a description of paradise.

It is made of gold and silver bricks, with musk for mortar; its gravel is pearls and rubies; its earth saffron. If a man from paradise were to appear and show the rings on his wrists, the splendour of them would hide the splendour of the sun. Everything is there which the senses can desire or which will delight the eye. A tree grows there under which one might ride for a year and come to no end. Every person will be pleased with his own place and not envy another. If a man wish to cultivate land, he may, and fruit will ripen and grow in a moment. No one will sleep there, for sleep is death's brother. All men and women are beautiful. The youth of men is renewed, and they enter paradise as beardless youths. In other places they are said to be in the prime of life at the age of thirty.

The *ḥūris*, the female companions of faithful men in paradise, are described in the *Qur'ān* as maidens, modest and beautiful, of equal age.[2]

Remembering the golden streets and gates of pearl in the book of Revelation, Christians have often asked if the sensuous descriptions of paradise in the *Qur'ān*, and still more in the traditions, were not to be understood as figurative expressions of spiritual ideas. Here and there a sect of Islām has so interpreted them. Mirza Ghulām Ahmād of Qadian, the leader of a sect of Indian Muslims, known as the Ahmadiyyah, argues[3] against the material interpretation of heaven. There are, he says, no cows and bees in heaven to make milk and honey. The goods of heaven are secrets from the earth,[4] so they cannot be material things. *Qur'ān*, ii. 23, 'they are provided with fruit,' has been misinterpreted. It means that they shall eat not fruits like those of the earth, but spiritual fruits.

'Heaven and hell, according to the Holy Quran, are images and representations of a man's own spiritual life in this world. They are not new material worlds which come from the outside. It is true that they shall be visible and palpable, call them material if you please, but they are only embodiments of the spiritual facts of this world. . . . Heaven and hell, according to Moslem belief, are the images of the actions which we perform here below.'[5]

This, however, has not been the general orthodox position of Islām. The literalness of interpretation in tradition is forcibly illustrated in *Mishkat al-Masabih*, xxiii. 13:

'Musselmen will be given strength and vigour in paradise to have connection with many women. It was said, "O messenger of God, will a man be able to connect himself with many women?" His Majesty said, "The powers of one hundred men will be given to one man."'

There are, however, elements of spiritual appreciation, both in the *Qur'ān* and in the traditions. *Qur'ān*, xlvii. 16 f., *e.g.*, couples among the goods of paradise all kinds of fruit and the forgiveness of the Lord. *Mishkat al-Masabih*, xxiii. 14, is headed 'On Seeing God.'

Muhammad said, 'Men shall see God as one sees this moon.' 'They will see God in paradise, and will love the sight of Him better than anything else.' Then he repeated *Qur'ān*, x. 27: 'To those who do what is good, goodness and increase! nor shall blackness or abasement cover their faces! these are the fellows of Paradise, they shall dwell therein for aye.'

Al-Ghazālī said:

'Nothing of the delights of paradise can be compared to the delight of meeting God; for the other bodily enjoyments of paradise dumb animals share with the believer, but this is reserved for him alone.'[1]

The suffering of the unbeliever, like the reward of the faithful, was conceived in material terms. The *Qur'ān* is rich in passages threatening tortures to the damned—'the companions of the fire,' as they are most often called.

They will live 'in hot blasts and boiling water and a shade of pitchy smoke.' They 'shall broil upon a burning fire, shall be given to drink from a boiling spring! no food shall they have save from the foul thorn, which shall not fatten nor avail against hunger.' They shall abide therein for ages. No cool thing shall they taste or drink. Nineteen angels are set over hell as its guardians. 'Whenever a troop of them [who disbelieve in their Lord] is thrown in, the keepers shall ask them, "Did not a warner come to you?" They shall say, "Yea, a warner came to us, and we called him a liar, and said, 'God has not sent down aught; ye are but in great error.'" And they shall say, "Had we but listened or had sense, we had not been amongst the fellows of the blaze!"' They will broil in the fire, and, 'whenever their skins are well done,' then other skins will be given them, 'that they may taste the torment.' Here in the hell of fire they will dwell for ever and ever.[2]

The traditions amplify, sometimes to grotesqueness, the physical tortures of disbelievers. *Mishkat al-Masabih*, xx. 15, is devoted to descriptions of 'The Fire and its People.'

The fire of hell shall be seventy times as hot as the fire of the world. God will make the bodies of the infidels large, so that they may suffer more. They will be given food infinitely loathsome, of which they will eat and still be hungry. They will be bitten by serpents as large as two hundred camels, and by scorpions as large as mules, and the bites shall give pain for forty years.

That the pains of hell are eternal is a tenet of Islām. When it is said that, since all things fleshy are temporal, the bodies of the unfaithful must at last be destroyed, answer is made that God is all-powerful and can do what He will, or that they will be re-created, after they have been burned, that their tortures may proceed.

The ultimate assignment to paradise or hell is on the basis of belief or disbelief in Muhammad's mission. In general, ethical considerations are not regarded in the assignment of a man's destiny. One passage in the *Qur'ān* has been made the basis for the theory of a Muslim purgatory:

'There is not one of you that will not go down to it,—that is settled and decided by the Lord.'[3]

Some hold that this refers only to the passage of all souls over the bridge al-Aarāf; some that all must pass through hell, but that to believers it will be cool and pleasant; and some that this text warrants the belief in a purgatory for such Muslims as need to be purified from sin, unless they have died in battle.

Muslim theology has divided both heaven and hell into regions. The *Qur'ān*, like the Jewish traditions, speaks of seven heavens,[4] but the abodes of the blest are reckoned as eight: Dāru'l-Qarār, 'the abode of rest,'[5] Dāru's-Salām, 'the abode of peace,'[6] Jannatu'l-Ḫuld, 'the garden of eternity,'[7] 'Illiyūn, 'the garden of the Most High,'[8] Jannatu'l-Firdāus, 'the garden of Paradise,'[9] Jannatu'l-Mā'wā, 'the garden of refuge,'[10] Jannatu'n-Na'īm, 'the garden of pleasure,'[11] Jannati 'Adin, 'the garden of Eden.'[12] These are doubtless synonymous terms in the *Qur'ān*, but tradition made them the names of different realms of bliss.

Likewise the different words used for hell have been taken to signify seven different realms of torture, as distributed among the adherents of the various religions, on the authority of a passage in the *Qur'ān*:[13]

'It has seven doors; at every door is there a separate party of them.'

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[1] See *Qur.* lv. 46 ff., lvi. 1–39, xlvii. 16 ff., xviii. 30 ff., xxxvii. 39 ff., xxii. 23 ff., x. 9, xxxviii. 50 ff., lxxvi. 12 ff., *et al.*
[2] xxxviii. 52, lv. 56, *et al.*
[3] In his *Teachings of Islam*, Eng. tr., London, 1910.
[4] *Qur.* xxxii. 17. [5] P. 144 f.

[1] Quoted in Klein, *Religion of Islām*, p. 96.
[2] See *Qur.* lvi. 40 f., lxxxviii. 1–7, lxxviii. 21–30, lxvii. 6–12, lv. 58 f., lxx., lxxii. 24, lxxiv. 25–32, ci., *et al.*
[3] xix. 72. [4] xxiii. 17. [5] xl. 42.
[6] vi. 127. [7] xxv. 16. [8] lxxxiii. 18.
[9] xviii. 107. [10] xxxii. 19. [11] v. 70.
[12] ix. 73. [13] xv. 44.

Jahannam (Gehenna), the purgatorial fire, is for Muslims;[1] Laẓai, the flaming fire, for Christians;[2] al-Ḥuṭamah, the raging fire, for Jews;[3] Sa'ïr, the blazing fire, for Sabæans;[4] Saqar, the scorching fire, for the Magi;[5] Al-Jahïm, the fierce fire, for idolaters;[6] Hāmiyeh, the abyss, for hypocrites.[7] There is no evidence that such classification of either the regions of reward or those of punishment was in Muhammad's thought.

If the paradise of Islām is almost lacking in spiritual satisfaction, its hell is entirely without spiritual torment. The torture of an accusing conscience, the absence from the vision of God, the sting of remorse, are nowhere expressed. Physical torture is magnified and multiplied, but no word is uttered of that greater suffering which the sensitive soul may endure through its own self-condemnation.

See also art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 9.

LITERATURE.—In addition to that mentioned under ESCHATOLOGY, the great collection of traditions in *Mishkat al-Maṣábïh* deals with this subject in bk. xxiii. (Eng. tr. by A. N. Matthews, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1809–10); Al-Ghazālī's tractate on eschatology, *Ad-Dourra al-Fākhira*, tr. L. Gautier, *La Perle précieuse*, Geneva, 1878; M. Wolff, *Muhammedanische Eschatologie*, Leipzig, 1872, is a translation of a writing of recent date, author unknown; R. Leszynsky, *Mohammedanische Traditionen über das jüngste Gericht*, Berlin, 1909; E. Sell, *The Faith of Islâm*[2], London, 1896; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Studies in a Mosque*[2], do. 1893; F. A. Klein, *Religion of Islâm*, do. 1906.

IRVING F. WOOD.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).—Our knowledge of early Teutonic ideas as to the state of the dead is entirely a matter of inference, as there are no extant sources from which direct information relating to that period can be obtained. For later times, coinciding in date with the introduction and establishment of Christianity in N. Europe, there is a considerable body of evidence, but mainly from one source—the early literature of Iceland. As this is not free from Christian and even classical influence, some care must be exercised in accepting the statements found there and in drawing conclusions from them; but there can be no doubt that with due precautions the evidence from this source is of the greatest value and that in the main it is of a very reliable character.

For the long pre-historic period which lies beyond these written records the only evidence of any kind is that furnished by the science of archæology. The great advances which this has made in recent times have established one fact which is of much significance as an indication of early Teutonic beliefs regarding the dead. From the earliest stone age down to the later iron age there can be traced the practice of depositing with the dead of either sex, whether simply buried or previously burned, not only articles of clothing and personal adornment, but weapons, utensils and implements of various kinds, and even articles of food and drink. While to a certain extent this might be accidental or at least not significant, all analogy and probability point to the conclusion that the practice was usually deliberate and full of meaning, and was based on the view that the deceased person still had some interest in, or some use for, such articles as accompanied his or her body in its final resting-place. Whatever the exact circumstances of the life after death might be, its requirements were obviously supposed to have some analogy with those of the living person and to require similar provision to be made for them. It is possible that this view may have undergone considerable modification in later times, and that latterly the depositing of such articles in the grave was rather a lingering convention than the result of a real belief in their necessity or usefulness: conventional survivals of the practice are in fact still widely existent in Teutonic as well as in other countries. From the Icelandic evidence, however, it appears most probable that on the whole the original belief which formed the basis of the custom remained in full vigour so long as the old religion survived. For those who held this belief the dead not only retained their personality, but had a definite abode in the grave in which they had been placed; in later times it is especially the grave-mound that figures as the actual home of the deceased, who is regarded as normally occupying it even at a time long after that in which he lived. As the dead had thus a fixed abode, it was natural that the surviving kinsfolk should regard it with respect, even for several generations, and that a certain cult of the dead should arise, which in special cases might develop into partial or complete worship. It is in this connexion that evidence on the subject first makes its appearance in written sources. Ecclesiastical regulations framed in Germany in the 8th and 9th centuries make reference to 'sacrificia mortuorum' (A.D. 742); 'sacrilegium ad sepulchra mortuorum,' and 'sacrilegium super defunctos, id est dadsisas' (*c.* 825), the meaning of the Old Saxon word *dadsisas* being doubtful. The prominence of the grave-mound as the place of burial is also shown by the enactment that the bodies of Christian Saxons are to be taken to the churchyard for interment, 'et non ad tumulos paganorum.' The same association of the mound with heathenism appears in phrases which survive quite late in Scandinavian documents (sometimes in forms which have become almost unintelligible, such as *frá heiðnum haugi*, 'from heathen mound,' as an expression for 'from ancient times.'

The bare suggestions conveyed by these brief phrases are quite in accordance with the details which can be gathered from the old Icelandic poems and sagas, in many of which there occur passages bearing directly upon the theme. In these records the grave-mound is as normally the abode of the stirring and conscious dead as the ordinary house is of the living person. There is practically no change except that the dweller in the mound (the *haugbúi*) no longer has his place among the living. Sometimes the mound is ancient and its occupant belongs to remote times—so remote that even his name has been forgotten—but he is still able to appear to the living and even to answer their inquiries as to his own identity.

So it was with King Ögvald of Rogaland in Norway, who gave answer as to the time at which he lived to one who was just setting out to settle in Iceland.[1] Another early king, Vatnar, appeared to a merchant who had told his story, while his ship lay beside the grave-mound, and rewarded him by instructions how to find treasure in the mound.[2]

In other tales the persons and incidents are still more legendary or unreal, as in those of Helgi and Sigrún, or of Hervör and Angantýr, in which the imagination of the poet has invested the belief with marvellous touches of pathos and terror. Such instances might have little value in themselves as evidence for any actual belief, but the practice of mound-burial remained in vogue so late in Iceland that various tales of the dead inhabitants have all the freshness of reality about them.

Thus *Landnámabók* tells of a certain Ásmund, one of the early settlers, who was laid in a ship with a thrall beside him. A woman who was passing the mound heard him recite a verse, in which he expressed his dislike at being burdened with such a companion; the mound was therefore opened and the thrall removed.[3]

The famous Gunnar of Hlíðarendi (killed in 990) was seen by moonlight in his open mound, in which four lights were also burning; he wore a joyous look and recited a verse about

[1] xix. 69, *et al.* [2] lxx. 15. [3] civ. 4.
[4] iv. 11. [5] liv. 43. [6] ii. 113.
[7] ci. 8.

[1] *Hálfs Saga*, 2.
[2] *Landnámabók*, Reykjavík, 1891, p. 231.
[3] *Landnámabók*, bk. ii. ch. 6.

himself in a voice which was audible at some distance off.[1] The poet Thorleif, who died about the same time, at a later date came out of his mound and helped a shepherd-lad to complete a verse in praise of himself; as the lad woke up from his vision, he saw the poet's back as he disappeared into the mound again.[2] Even a Christian like the colonist Ásólf, who died early in the 10th cent., was still interested in the state of his grave and the resting-place of his bones a full century later.[3]

So active were some of the dead, and so effective in the doing of harm to the living, that strong measures had to be taken to reduce them to a quieter state. Others, again, were formidable only when an attempt was made to enter the mound and rob them of their treasures. Tales of the performance of this perilous task are sometimes told of historical personages, but are more characteristic of the fictitious type of saga, in which the *haugbúi* becomes a stock character and is the subject of some grim narratives. Of those who leave the quiet of the mound in order to trouble the living there are some notable instances even in the more historical sagas, and many examples from the traditional lore of later times. The extensive ghost-literature of Iceland, indeed, both ancient and modern, affords one of the strongest proofs of the persistence of this belief in the individual survival of the dead among their old surroundings. Nor was their range confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the burial-place; they were, especially in the night or twilight, but exceptionally even in broad daylight, able to revisit the homestead and enter the houses, from which they sometimes even drove away the living occupants. The supreme example of this is the story of the hauntings at Fróðá on Snæfellsness in the year 1001, where the aggressive dead had finally to be expelled by a regular process of legal ejectment.[4]

When other means failed, the approved remedy was to open the mound and remove the body to some more distant place and, in the last resort, to burn it. It is thus clear that in the later days of the old religion the burning of the body was destructive of the real personality of the dead; whether this was so in earlier times when cremation was usual is a question which cannot be answered.

The attachment of the dead to the old home is also shown by certain instances in which the living person gives instructions as to his own burial.

Hrapp in Laxárdal (dying about 940) gave orders that he was to be buried in a standing posture under the doorway of his hall, so that he might continue to keep a watchful eye upon his household and homestead. His manner of doing so was so little appreciated that in the end his body was removed and subsequently burned, the ashes being disposed of at sea.[5] In a neighbouring district, at a slightly later date (988), Tungu-Odd requested his friends to take him up to Skáneyjarfell and bury him there, so that he might be able to look over all the neighbourhood; and his request was carried out.[6]

In place of the artificial grave-mound a natural hill or hillock was sometimes regarded as the abode to which members of a particular family retired on their departure from this life.

Thus the heathen kinsmen of an early Christian woman-settler in Iceland, Auðr or Uðr, had a religious respect for the hillocks on which she had raised crosses and performed her devotions; 'they believed that they died into the hillocks, and Thórð Gellir was led into them before he assumed the position of a chief.'[7] Another early settler, Thórólf, 'had so much reverence for the hill that stood on the ness, which he called Helgafell,' that he made it a place of sanctuary, 'and it was the belief of Thórólf and his kinsfolk that they all died into the hill.'[8] On the evening before Thórólf's son Thorstein was drowned his shepherd saw the hill opened up towards the north; within it large fires were burning, there was sound of revelry and drinking, and he could hear that greetings were given to Thorstein and his companions, and that to the former was assigned the seat of honour over against his father.[9]

Other instances of the same belief are found in Selthórir and his kinsmen, who died into Thórisberg, and Kráku-Hreiðar, who 'chose to die into Mælifell.'[1] The casual manner in which these are mentioned in the sources indicates that the idea was a familiar one which required no explanation or comment.

That the mound and its occupant were held in respect by the surviving relatives was natural and usual, and traces of this have survived to the present day in the Scandinavian countries. That such respect might also assume the character of actual worship of the dead is clearly indicated by the ecclesiastical prohibitions quoted above, though positive evidence for the practice is not common. Some of the early Swedish kings are recorded to have been honoured in this way. Grím Kamban, the first settler in the Færöes, 'was worshipped when dead on account of his popularity.'[2]

The scarcity of such instances may indicate that the practice was falling into disuse in the later centuries of heathenism, though it certainly survived in Germany at the close of the 10th cent. to such an extent that it was necessary for the Church to denounce the 'oblationes, quae in quibusdam locis ad sepulchra mortuorum fiunt.'[3] There are even apparent survivals of sacrifice to the dead in almost modern times, but it is doubtful how far these are of real importance as evidence for any continuation of the old belief. In the older Scandinavian period there is reason for believing that the name of 'elf' (*álf*) was one of the designations of the dead, and it is a natural inference from this that the ceremony known as *álfablót* was primarily intended either to honour or to propitiate the spirits of the departed. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the usual funeral feast had any such character, although the dead themselves might occasionally be present at it.

This is related to have happened among the other strange events at Fróðá, when the drowned Thórodd and his companions came into the hall in the evening in their wet clothes. The company were pleased at their appearance, 'for it was regarded as a truth that drowned men had a good reception from the goddess Rán, if they came to their own funeral feast.'[4]

Sometimes the appearance of the dead in company with each other was a token of coming death for others.

When Bárð in Eyjafirth (about 980) was leaving the house of his sister-in-law, his wife turned round to look after him and fell down in a faint. 'I saw dead men,' she explained, 'coming to meet Bárð, and he must be fey; we shall not meet again.'[5] The death of the foster-brothers of Ólafsdal by each other's hand (about 1025) was preceded by the appearance, close to the farm of Garpsdal, of Thorgeir Hávarsson and nine other men who had fallen along with him. They were all blood-stained, and they walked past the farm until they came to a stream near it, where they disappeared.[6]

The fore-warnings thus given by the voluntary appearance of the dead might also be attained by a deliberate process of interrogating them; but for this end it was necessary to 'wake up' the sleeping inmate of the grave, who might naturally be loath to be disturbed. Specific instances of this practice, however, belong rather to the realm of legend, as when Odin wakes up the sibyl to tell him the fate of Balder. The waking-up might also be performed for other reasons, as when Svipdag seeks the aid of his mother Gróa or when Hervör goes to demand the sword Tyrfing from her father Angantýr. In the story of Heðinn and Högni the dead men who have fallen in the battle are waked up again by Hild each night to resume the conflict; this nightly strife continued for nearly a century and a half before it was ended by a follower of Ólaf Tryggvason in the closing years of the 10th century.[7]

1 *Njáls Saga*, 78.
2 *Flateyjarbók*, i. 214.
3 *Landnámabók*, ii. 16.
4 *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 51–55.
5 *Laxdœla Saga*, 17, 24.
6 *Hœnsa-póris Saga*, 20.
7 *Landnámabók*, ii. 16.
8 *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4.
9 *Ib.* 11.

1 *Landnámabók*, ii. 6, iii. 7.
2 *Ib.* i. 6.
3 Burchard von Worms, 'Decreta,' in J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], Berlin, 1875 78, iii. 407.
4 *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 54.
5 *Víga-Glúms Saga*, 19.
6 *Fóstbrœðra Saga*, 19.
7 *Flateyjarbók*, i. 281–289

From this shadowy and imperfect, though real and individual, existence there was one way by which the dead might escape—that of being born again. That the doctrine of rebirth was prevalent in older times is expressly stated by the unknown collector of the Edda poems.

'It was a belief in old times that persons were born again, but that is now called an old wife's delusion. Helgi and Sigrún are said to have been born again; he was then called Helgi, prince of the Haddings, and she Kára, daughter of Hálfdan.'[1]

In the mythical *Gautreks-saga* the berserks who wish to annoy Starkað call him 'a 'reborn giant.' In the historical period it was commonly believed that King Ólaf the Saint was a reincarnation of a remote ancestor, Ólaf of Geirstaðir, known as Geirstaðaálf.

Once, as the king rode past the grave-mound of this Ólaf, one of his followers ventured to say to him: 'Tell me, my lord, if you were buried here?' The king replied: 'My spirit never had two bodies, and has not now, nor will it have at the resurrection.' The retainer persisted: 'It has been said that when you came to this place before, you spoke thus: Here we were and here we walked.' The king flatly denied the assertion and rode away as quickly as possible.[2]

Even as late as the middle of the 13th cent. the belief in rebirth appears to have survived in Iceland.

A certain Thorgils, who at that time rose to distinction, was a source of great joy to the men of his district: 'It seemed to them that Kolbeinn was born again and come back to them, whom they had always longed for.'[3]

So long as the dead were regarded as intimately connected with the burial-place and the old homestead, it is obvious that any theory of a special place for the spirits of the departed was not urgently required. Such an idea, however, may actually have arisen at a very early period, and it is unnecessary to suppose that the two views would be felt to be mutually exclusive. At all periods when burning was the ordinary method of disposing of the dead, the idea must have been natural that body and spirit were separable, and that with the destruction of the body the spirit was free to go elsewhere. Even when simple burial was practised, such a separation was not unthinkable; the spirit might well have its usual abode apart from the body, though capable of returning to it at will.

In one of the Edda poems already cited[4] Helgi is buried in a mound, but departs to Valhall. One evening Sigrún's attendant sees him ride up to the mound 'with many men'; he says that leave to return has been granted to him. Sigrún then enters the opened mound, and there is talk of intense pathos between them; but towards morning Helgi has to depart again, so as to be back at Valhall before cockcrow. (Variations of the idea form the theme of many ghost-tales in different lands.)

Departure to another world after being consumed on the funeral pile comes out clearly in the story of Balder, whose horse was burned along with him, and who then rode off to the domain of the goddess Hel, and in that of Brynhild, who is represented as driving to the same place in the chariot in which she was laid and consumed. According to Snorri, the institution of burning was ascribed to Odin himself:

'He said that each man would come to Valhall with such treasures as he had on the funeral-pile.'[5] (A further point of the belief was that 'the higher the smoke rose into the air, the more exalted the person burned would be in heaven.')[6]

The departure to another world, however, might equally well take place when the body was left unburned.

King Harald Hilditönn, who was laid in a mound along with valuable rings and weapons, was provided with both a car and a horse, so that he might either drive or ride to Valhall.[7]

That these legendary instances have some foundation in actual custom is shown by the passage in *Gísla Saga* relating to events about 965.

In this, at the burial of Véstein, Thorgrím is made to say: 'It is the custom to bind hell-shoes on men, with which they shall go to Valhall, and I will do it for Véstein.' When he had done so, he said: 'I cannot bind hell-shoes, if these come loose.'[1]

Such accounts, however, belong to the Viking age, for which there is clear evidence of a developed theory of another life, with assignment of definite places for different classes of men. The earliest of these abodes of the dead was no doubt the realm of the goddess Hel, a world of shades similar to the Hades of the Greeks, in which the departed spirits appear to have had only a negative kind of existence, devoid of any occupation or interest.[2] At a later period, however, those who found their way to this region were only those who died of sickness or old age. Those who were drowned belonged to the goddess Rán, and those who fell in battle were divided between Odin and Freyja. There are also indications that some were supposed to fall to the lot of Thor, and that Freyja was the receiver of all women. Of the various conceptions arising from these views that which received most elaboration, if the extant evidence is to be relied on, was the life of the warriors who had gone to Odin in Valhall, of which a full account is given by Snorri in the first part of the Edda.[3] Whether any of the dead were supposed to remain loosely attached to earth itself, without having a definite place assigned to them, does not appear. There is no evidence that the ideas of the 'wild hunt' and similar companies of departed spirits, so prevalent in later tradition, go back to the early Teutonic period or reproduce any conceptions from that time.

It is only in Snorri's Edda (written about 1220), and in a few lines of the older poetry on which this is based, that any ethical idea appears in the allocation of the different abodes.

The highest god, All-father, 'created man and gave him a soul which shall live and never perish, even if the body decay to dust or be burned to ashes; and all men whose ways are right shall live and be with himself in the place called Gimlé; but wicked men go to Hel and thence into Niflhel, which is down in the ninth world.'[4]

When the world itself has been consumed by fire, the spirits of men will still subsist and have various abodes, many of them good and many bad. 'Then it will be best to be in Gimlé in heaven, where there will be abundance of good drink for those who enjoy that in the hall called Brimir. . . . That is also a good hall which stands on Niðafells, made of red gold; its name is Sindri. In these halls shall good and righteous men live.'[5]

On the other hand, all murderers and perjurers find a place of torment in a great hall on 'Corpse-strand,' the doors of which face northwards. The walls of this are wattled with snakes, whose heads are turned inwards; these spout out venom which flows through the hall in streams, and in these streams the wicked are doomed to wade.[6]

It is doubtful how much of this is genuine and how much is due to ordinary mediæval conceptions of heaven and hell. In any case the ideas are far removed from the more primitive beliefs which were still current in Snorri's time, and which, however much they may have been elaborated by the story-teller and the poet, clearly have their roots in the old Teutonic times of which no record has been preserved.

LITERATURE.—E. Mogk, *Mythologie*, in H. Paul, *Grundriss der german. Philologie*, Strassburg, 1891–93, iii. 249–266; E. Wadstein, *Kleinere altsächsische Sprachdenkmäler*, Norden, 1899, pp. 66, 142–144; H. Hildebrand, *Folkens Tro om sina Döda*, Stockholm, 1874; G. Storm, 'Vore Forfædres Tro paa Sjælevam-dring,' in *Arkiv för nordisk Filologi*, ix. [1893] 199–222; H. Schetelig, 'Folketro om Gravhauger,' in *Maal og Minne*, Christiania, 1911, pp. 206–212; H. Rosén, *Om dödsrike och dödsbruk i fornnordisk religion*, Lund, 1918.

W. A. CRAIGIE.

STATE OF THE DEAD (Tibetan). — The immediate ceremonies performed by Tibetans on a death, and their object, have already been de-

1 *Völsunga-kviða en forna, ad fin.*
2 *Flateyjarbók*, ii. 135.
3 *Sturlunga Saga*, ed. G. Vigfusson, Oxford, 1878, ii. 234.
4 *Völsunga-kviða en forna.*
5 *Ynglinga Saga*, 8. 6 *Ib.* 10.
7 *Sögubrot af Fornkonungum*, 9.

1 *Gísla Saga*, 14. 2 See *ERE* ii. 707 ff.
3 *Ib.* p. 707 f. 4 *Snorra Edda, Gylfaginning*, 8.
5 *Ib.* 52. 6 *Ib.*

scribed.[1] The Tibetan notions on the state into which the spirit or soul of a deceased person is supposed to pass after death are mainly of an animistic character, and derived from the aboriginal shamanist Bon cult (see art. TIBET), though veneered over more or less with the ritual of Indian Buddhism and 'celestial' Chinese cosmogony. The laity and most of the Lāmas believe that, at first at any rate, the spirits of all the dead tend to become malignant ghosts, which require propitiation by the surviving relatives, except in the case of a few great saints, like the Grand Lāmas, whose spirits are supposed to re-incarnate almost immediately. But, in the background, most Tibetans cherish the hope of attaining the western paradise of the blest, the everlasting solar paradise of 'the Buddha of Boundless Light' (Hod-dpag-med or Amitābha), the popular goal of Northern Buddhists generally, just as in Southern Buddhism, in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon, the popular goal is not a *nirvāṇa* of extinction, but Indra's paradise in the sky, whence, they are taught, Buddha Gautama descended to this world and which he frequently revisited. It is mainly with the object of gaining merit sufficient to reach this paradise that the Tibetans so assiduously tell their beads, mutter so incessantly the mystic *Om maṇi* formula, and ply their prayer-wheels, revolving the same printed sentence, which is believed to close the door of hell and be the passport to heaven. The idea of rebirth in human or other form is not a popular one; nearly all concentrate their hopes on reaching paradise. Even *nirvāṇa* is considered by most Lāmas to be not any extinction of existence, but a dreamy existence in a personal paradise outside the circle of rebirths and so infinitely remote that it is unknowable.

The prevalent belief that the spirit of the dead person becomes a malignant ghost at first is in practice generally assimilated to the Buddhist theory of hell, as a temporary purgatory of expiation for sin. The spirit is admonished by the priests, as soon after death as possible, to take the road pointed out to it leading to the tribunal of the Judge of the Dead, but it requires the assistance of the priests by masses at every stage throughout that journey to pilot it along. At the outset it is free for one or two weeks to wander about, and this is the period when it is likely to exercise a malignant influence on the survivors. The regions through which the soul is piloted by the priests are of the nature of outer hells beset by demons lying in wait for straying souls, and generally resemble those analogous regions through which the spirits of the deceased were supposed to pass as categorically described in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* and reflected in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*. The masses prescribed by the priests of all sects of Lāmas for the protection of the soul of the deceased in this long journey are very elaborate, prolonged, and costly, and usually run the relatives into debt. The present writer has been told by Tibetan servants on more than one occasion that the priests had informed them that the masses already said and paid for had only helped the soul past such-and-such demons and regions, that it was now in such-and-such a distressful spot, and had such-and-such danger zones still to pass before reaching the judgment-seat, when the supreme effort of the priests would be necessary to procure 'rebirth' in paradise.

The hells offer the chief terror to the Tibetans, whom the priests have made familiar with the hideous tortures to be expected there by the harrowing scenes which they have painted in graphic gruesome detail on the walls of every temple, whilst the ubiquitous Wheel of Life fresco, which also depicts the hells and other spheres of orthodox Buddhist rebirth, displays in its upper compartment, in alluring contrast, the bliss and joys of paradise. A peculiarity of the Tibetan hells is the addition of a series of cold hells to the orthodox hells of the Buddhists.[1] It is easy to see how the idea of cold hells arose, on the extension of Buddhism from subtropical India to such totally different physical and ethnic conditions as exist in icy Tibet; the natives of the palæarctic region of Central Asia were accustomed to feel the bitter pain and misery of the arctic cold and to regard heat rather as a comfort and blessing. These cold hells are placed on the edge of the Buddhist universe in a subterranean region of darkness below its encircling wall (Chakravala). They are encircled by icy glacier mountains and have demon attendants of appalling aspect, as in the hot hells. They are eight in number, like the orthodox hot hells, and are thus described:

(1) *Ch'u-bur che'n-po* (Skr. Arbuda)='blistered or chapped.' The torture here is constant immersion of the naked body in icy glacier water, under which it becomes covered with chilblains (a torture which may be compared with the curse invented by a scribe in the reign of Athelstan for any one who should break the terms of his charters: 'May he be tortured by the bitter blasts of glaciers and the Pennine army of evil spirits').[2]

(2) *Ch'u-bur brol-wa* (Skr. Nirarbuda). The chilblains are rudely scarified by knives, producing open raw sores.

(3) *A-ch'u* (Skr. Aṭaṭa). 'Ach'u' and 'A-ṭa-ṭa' are explained as the exclamations of anguish beyond articulate expression, which resound through this hell.

(4) *Kyi-'ud* (Skr. Hahava). A worse degree of cold in which the tongue is paralyzed, and the exclamation of 'Kyi-u' or 'Ha-ha' is alone possible.

(5) *So-t'am-pa* (Skr. Ahaha). Here both jaws and teeth are spasmodically clenched through cold.

(6) *Ut-pal-ltar gas-pa* (Skr. Utpala). Livid sores develop which become everted like the petals of the blue Utpal lotus-flowers.

(7) *Padma-ltar gas-pa* (Skr. Padma). The sores become like the red lotus Padma flowers.

(8) *Padma-ch'en-po-ltar gas-pa* (Skr. Puṇḍarika). Raw sores where the flesh falls away from the bones like the recurring petals of the great lotus, and which are continually pecked and gnawed by birds with iron beaks, as in Æschylus's Greek legend of *Prometheus Bound*.

The agonizing torments of these hells, so vividly pictured and described by the priests, no doubt act as a deterrent to evil-doers and have thus a certain ethical value, though this is largely discounted by the fear and loss of peace of mind inflicted on the surviving relatives by the harrowing stories of intermediate tortures requiring masses, invented by the self-interested rapacious priests.

The paradise of the blest, when once eventually reached, is considered to be everlasting, and thus is unlike Indra's heaven, the popular goal of Hindus and the Southern Buddhists, which, although more permanent than the earth, is finite, and its occupants subject inevitably to re-enter the cycle of ceaseless rebirths in a higher, but most often a lower, sphere of life, with, according to Buddhist teaching, its inveterate misery. The Tibetans thus look forward to a happier existence in the world beyond death than do the Hindus and Southern Buddhists.

LITERATURE.—E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, London, 1863, pp. 92 f., 134 f.; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895, pp. 76 ff., 127 f., *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, do. 1905, pp. 86 f., 222 f.

L. A. WADDELL.

STATIONS.—This word was used in Christian antiquity in more than one technical sense. We

[1] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Tibetan).

[1] See artt. STATE OF THE DEAD (Buddhist), COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

[2] Cited by D. W. Freshfield, in *Geog. Journal* [1894]. The cold hells figure in the N. European mythology as evidenced by this reference to them in the 10th cent. Anglo-Saxon tale 'Salomon and Saturn.' On the defeat of the rebel angels it said that 'for them, he [God] made Hell, a dwelling deadly cold, with Winter covered: Water he sent in and snake-dwellings, many a foul beast with horns of iron, bloody eagles and pale adders; thirst and hunger and fierce conflict, mighty terror, joylessness' (tr. J. M. Kemble, *Salomon and Saturn*, p. 173).

may first consider the word as used in the West in early times, the Latin *statio* being in question; and then 'stations of penitents,' and finally 'stations of the cross' will be dealt with.

1. Stations as fasts.—The first instance of this is in Hermas (early or middle 2nd cent. ?), who, writing at Rome in Greek, transliterates *statio* into *στατίων*. He says to the Shepherd, 'I am keeping a station' (*στατίωνα ἔχω*). The Shepherd asks, 'What is a station?' Hermas replies that it is a fast, and that he is fasting according to his custom.[1] From the language used we may gather that 'station' was not a universally known name; and that it is not used in Hermas for a fast on any fixed day. Later, at the end of the 2nd cent. and early in the 3rd, Tertullian gives the name 'stations' to the half-fasts (*semijejunia*) of Wednesdays and Fridays,[2] which ordinarily ended at 3 p.m., but which the Montanists prolonged till the evening.[3] The 'Psychics' (Catholics) sometimes continued 'the station even over the sabbath (Saturday), a day never to be kept as a fast except at Pascha.'[4] In these half-fasts the 'Psychics' sometimes lived on bread and water, and they treated them as of voluntary observance rather than as matters of injunction, as the Montanists did.[5] The *de Jejuniis* was written after Tertullian became a Montanist. In another late work[6] he uses the word *statio* more generally, of Daniel's fast (Dn $10^{2f.}$): 'in a station of three weeks aruit victu,' *i.e.* he practised xerophagy, a much restricted diet. In *de Jejun.* 13 Tertullian calls fasts held before the meetings of councils 'stations.' In an earlier work, written before he became a Montanist,[7] he speaks of the eucharist being celebrated on 'station days,' and of the scruples of some at communicating then, lest they should break their fast. He suggests (for the scrupulous) private reservation of the sacrament until the 'station' is over, but deprecates their absenting themselves from the eucharistic service: 'Will not thy station be more solemn if thou hast also stood (*steteris*) at the altar of God?' He goes on to explain that the word 'station' is derived from a military metaphor, 'for also we are God's soldiers' (*militia*; cf. 2 Co 10^{4}, 1 Ti 1^{18}, 2 Ti 4^{7}). And this is doubtless the true origin of the name. In classical Latin *statio* is a military guard, and *stationarius* is a soldier on guard. Tertullian uses *stationes facere* ('to keep watch') both literally and figuratively of Christians on guard.[8] In the 4th cent. Augustine uses *stationarius* figuratively,[9] and Ambrose says that stations are encampments protecting us from the assaults of the devil; 'standing' in them, we repel the enemy.[10]

Tertullian uses *statio* also in other senses: as 'the resting place in believing' (*statio credendi*), a metaphor from a camp;[11] as a 'stage' of life (marriage as opposed to virginity);[12] and in a physiological sense, as the membrane round the heart (*statio sensuum* = *περικάρδιον*).[13]

It will be noticed that all the writers mentioned above were Westerns. Easterns, like the author of the *Didache*[14] and Clement of Alexandria,[15] speak of the Wednesday and Friday fasts, but do not use the word *statio*. An Eastern instance, however, of *statio* transliterated is the East Syrian (Nestorian) *istatyūnā*, used in the service-books for 'a doctrinal hymn.'[16]

[1] *Pastor, Sim.* v. 1.
[2] *De Jejun.* 2, 13 f.
[3] *Ib.* 1, 10.
[4] *Ib.* 14.
[5] *Ib.* 10, 13; in § 10 the *indignas*, 'unworthy,' of the MSS should probably be emended to *indictas*, 'enjoined.'
[6] *De Anima*, 48.
[7] *De Orat.* 19.
[8] *De Cor. Mil.* 11.
[9] *Enarr. in Ps.* xciii. Vulg. [xcv.], § 9.
[10] *Serm.* 25; ed. Paris, 1549, col. 716.
[11] *De Præscr.* 10.
[12] *De Exhort. Cast.* 9.
[13] *De Anima*, 43.
[14] § 8 (*c.* A.D. 180 ?).
[15] *Strom.* vii. 12 (*c.* A.D. 200).
[16] A. J. Maclean, *East Syrian Daily Offices*, London, 1894, p. 294.

2. Stations in churches and sacred places.—The name *statio* is also used for a public service (usually at Rome the eucharist), held in a previously arranged church or sacred place for the whole community; frequently there was a procession to the place, and the station may have been so called because the procession stopped there, though it has also been held that the name came from these public services being held on 'stated' days, or (originally) on 'station days,' Wednesday and Friday.[1] The name was also given to the church or place where the service was held, or to the processions themselves.[2] This use of the word is later than that described in the preceding section. But Cyprian in the 3rd cent. describes how the messengers of Novatus burst in 'in statione,' demanding that their accusations should be publicly investigated by Cyprian and the people; and 'in statione' can hardly mean here 'on a station day,' but must signify 'in a public assembly.'[3] Gregory of Nazianzus in the 4th cent. uses the cognate *στάσις* of an assembly in church.[4]

In the interesting *Pilgrimage of 'Etheria'* (*'Silvia'*), probably of the end of the 4th cent., stations at the holy places in and near Jerusalem are described in some detail, but they have no technical designation. The thing, but not the name, is there. We may gather that the Western (Spanish ?) authoress did not know the name, or she could hardly have avoided using it. The place and time of the next station are publicly given out by the archdeacon just as in the *Ordines Romani* (below).[5]

At Rome we find both the name and the thing. Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590–604) is said[6] to have regulated the stations and to have fixed the churches in Rome where they should be held. The whole of the local Church took part in them, and hence in the *Ordo Romanus* of St. Amand, found in a 9th cent. MS, we read of a *statio catholica*.[7] Stations are frequently mentioned in the *Ordo Romanus Primus* (*c.* A.D. 770; founded on a similar document of the 6th cent.) and in the succeeding *Ordines*.[8] The eucharist was celebrated at the stational church with much solemnity by the pope. If a diocesan bishop said a stational mass in the absence of the pope, he did all as the pope would do; but, if a presbyter did so, then the 'Gloria in excelsis' was omitted, because it was said by a presbyter only 'in Pascha,' *i.e.* in Eastertide.[9] The archdeacon in the *Ord. Rom. Prim.* announces the next station,[10] but in *St. Amand* the deacon.[11] We read of a 'stational chalice,'[12] apparently a large one, and 'stational crosses,'[13] and a 'stational acolyte' (*unus ex acolythis stationarius*, or simply *stationarius*),[14] who goes before the pope on foot in the procession, with the chrism, a napkin (*mappula*) being wrapped round the *ampulla*, or vessel holding the chrism. It was at such solemn stations that ordinations were held in Rome, on the Saturday of Ember weeks.[15]

The *Gregorian Sacramentary*[16] gives masses for all the stations at the various churches in Rome.

3. Stations of penitents.—In the 4th cent., or possibly earlier, the penitential system was developed both in the East and in the West, but

[1] See above, § 1.
[2] Ducange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Statio,' § 1.
[3] *Ep.* xliv. [xl.], 'ad Cornelium.'
[4] *Orat. in Conc. Constant.*, near the end: *στάσεις πάννυχοι*.
[5] For the *Pilgrimage* see Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[4], Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 490 ff.; esp. cf. p. 516.
[6] In his *Life* by John the Deacon, ii. 18.
[7] Duchesne, p. 473.
[8] E. G. C. F. Atchley, *Ord. Rom. Prim.*, London, 1905, p. 82, etc.; for the date see p. 7.
[9] *Ib.* p. 148.
[10] *Ib.* p. 142.
[11] Duchesne, p. 473.
[12] Atchley, p. 156.
[13] Duchesne, p. 474.
[14] Atchley, p. 118.
[15] *Ib.* p. 37; Duchesne, p. 353.
[16] Ed. H. A. Wilson, London, 1915 (Henry Bradshaw Society).

it is only in the East that the organized 'stations of penitents' are found, and even there not universally. There are differing grades of penitents, called *βαθμοί* or *βαθμοὶ ὡρισμένοι*, at the Council of Ancyra in N. Galatia (A.D. 314).[1] They were four in number: (*a*) 'mourners' (*flentes*, *προσκλαίοντες*), who might not enter the church (hence *πρόσκλαυσις* for the name of the station); perhaps also called at Ancyra[2] 'storm-driven' (*χειμαζόμενοι*), which usually means 'demoniacs,' as in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, viii. 12, 35, 38; (*b*) 'hearers' (*audientes*, *ἀκροώμενοι* [see below]), who stood within the church door or in the porch (hence *ἀκρόασις*, *ἀκροᾶσθαι*); (*c*) 'kneelers' (*substrati*, *ὑποπίπτοντες*), who might enter the church, but not pass the ambo (hence *ὑπόπτωσις*, *ὑποπεσεῖν*); (*d*) 'bystanders' (*consistentes*, *συνιστάμενοι* or *συνεστῶτες*), who might be present at the eucharist, but might not communicate or make an offering (hence *σύστασις*). The first three grades were dismissed before the *missa fidelium* began. In the second and third canonical epistles of Basil, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia,[3] we find all four grades; thus a person in his first year would be 'expelled from prayer' and would 'weep at the church door' (=*a*), in his second he would be 'received to the sermon' (=*b*), in his third he would be 'admitted to penance' (=*c*; see below), in his fourth he would be allowed to 'stand with the people, while withheld from the oblation' (=*d*). In some cases[4] a station might be omitted, the penitent going straight from the first to the third station; in can. 81 of Basil, as in can. 7 of Ancyra, the last station is apparently omitted. This fourth station is also called 'joining only in prayer' or 'being without offering,' as at Ancyra[5] and Nicæa.[6] The third station seems to have been the most important, and Basil[7] calls it by the general name of 'penitence' (*μετάνοια*). The first mention of these four stations has been thought to occur in a passage of Gregory Thaumaturgus, bishop of Neocæsarea,[8] where all four are named; but this is probably an addition by a later writer,[9] and we cannot be certain of the existence of the four stations much before the 4th century. But they, or most of them, are mentioned at Ancyra,[10] at Nicæa,[11] at Neocæsarea in Pontus (A.D. 314 or later).[12] At the last a 'kneeler' is called *γόνυ κλίνων*.[13]

On the other hand, we do not find these grades of penitents in the Church Orders of the 4th (or 5th) cent.; thus in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (*c.* A.D. 375) the penitents are mentioned as being dismissed at the eucharist after the catechumens, but they are all called 'hearers,'[14] or, generally, 'those in penitence.'[15] In this work, then, we have no trace of stations of penitents, though *σύστασις* is several times used in it in other senses. And the same thing is true of the other Church Orders. It is equally true of Western and 'African' councils, such as those of Elvira in Spain (*c.* A.D. 305), Arles in Gaul (A.D. 314), Carthage II. (A.D. 387 or 390), Hippo in Africa (A.D. 393), Toledo in Spain (A.D. 400), Orange in Gaul (A.D. 441), Arles II. (A.D. 443 or 452), and others; these mention penitents, but have no stations. This is the case also with the Gallican *Statuta ecclesiæ antiqua* ('Gallican Statutes'; *c.* A.D. 500). In Tertullian the catechumens are the 'hearers' (*audientes* or *auditores*).[16]

[1] Can. 20 f., 23 f.
[2] Can. 17.
[3] *Epp.* cxcix., ccxvii., cans. 22, 56–83 (A.D. 375).
[4] As in can. 80.
[5] Cans. 4–6.
[6] Can. 13 (A.D. 325).
[7] Can. 22.
[8] *Ep. can.* 11 (*c.* A.D. 258).
[9] See *DCB* ii. 736b.
[10] Cans. 4–9, 16, 20–25, hearers, kneelers, bystanders.
[11] Cans. 11–14, the same.
[12] Can. 5, hearers, kneelers.
[13] For these stations see also J. M. Neale, *A Hist. of the Holy Eastern Church*, pt. i., *General Introduction*, London, 1850, i. 208 ff.
[14] viii. 6, 12.
[15] viii. 9.
[16] *De Pœn.* 6, where the meaning 'penitents' has been proposed, but is not really possible.

The name 'hearers,' whether used of penitents or of catechumens, comes from the fact that these classes heard the liturgical lessons (in some cases not the Gospel), though they were not allowed to be present at the more solemn part of the eucharist.

Even in the East the stations of penitents seem not to have been at all regularly organized. They are not mentioned in the *Apostolic Canons* (in their present form probably dating from *c.* A.D. 400), nor in the canons of Gangra in Paphlagonia (4th cent., date uncertain), or of Sardica, the modern Sofia in Bulgaria (A.D. 347; the genuineness of these canons is disputed), or of Antioch *in encæniis* (A.D. 341). These canons mention penitence, but not the grades or stations. At Laodicea in Phrygia (*c.* A.D. 386) 'hearers' may mean all penitents;[1] no other station is mentioned. The canons of the ecumenical councils of Constantinople (A.D. 381), Ephesus (A.D. 431), and Chalcedon (A.D. 451) do not deal with penitence. In Chrysostom's Constantinople writings there is no mention of the dismissal of the stations of penitents,[2] possibly because the office of penitentiary presbyter in that city had lately been abolished (*i.e.* A.D. 391).[3]

In the Churches of the farther East the stations of penitents, if they existed, apparently soon died out.[4] Jacob of Edessa, in his *Letter to Thomas the Presbyter*,[5] describing the liturgy as known to him (he died A.D. 708), speaks of the catechumens as 'hearers' and describes their expulsion in the liturgy before that of the 'energumens' and the 'penitents,' but says that it was in fact quite obsolete in his day. In the canons (8th or 9th cent.) of uncertain origin, perhaps Syrian Jacobite, given by H. Denzinger,[6] and in the Jacobite canons also given by him,[7] of a later date, there is just a trace of 'mourners' in the fact that some penitents are not allowed to enter the church, but are ordered to remain outside 'weeping for their sins,' usually for a year, but in some cases for a much longer period; after that they are allowed to enter the church, but are restrained from communion for a longer or shorter period; the penalty ordinarily provided is fasting, on a restricted diet, but in one case[8] a flogging, and in the latest set of canons a stated number of genuflexions and recitations of anthems (*sedré*). In the Nestorian *Sunhadhus* (Book of Canon Law) there are no stations of penitents.

We must therefore conclude that stations of penitents were an Eastern, not a Western, organization, and that even in the East they were only partially recognized, and that but for a time. We find them, however, in the 'Trullan' (Constantinople) Council of A.D. 691 or 692.[9] This is a quotation from Basil, and speaks of all four stations of penitents, but does not name them.

4. 'Stations of the cross.'—This is a name given in post-Reformation days to a series of sculptures or pictures set up in many churches in the West, showing various events in the Passion of our Lord, for the devotion of worshippers who cannot go to the sacred places of the Holy Land, and who go round these stations, praying at each. The stations are fourteen in number, and do not all represent events explicitly mentioned in the Gospels. The name is apparently derived from the idea of a station described above in § 2.

[1] Can. 5; ordinations were not to take place in their presence.
[2] J. H. Srawley, *The Early Hist. of the Liturgy*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 122.
[3] Socrates, *HE* v. 19; Sozomen, *HE* vii. 16.
[4] For a trace of them see Srawley, p. 123, n. 1.
[5] Eng. tr. in F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford, 1896, i. 490.
[6] *Ritus Orientalium*, Würzburg, 1863–64, i. 474.
[7] i. 482–500
[8] i. 484; can. 88.
[9] Can. 87

LITERATURE.—This has been mentioned in the course of the article. Other meanings of *statio* and its derivatives may be seen *s.v.* in C. du F. Ducange, *Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, Paris, 1840–50; new ed., Niort, 1883–87.

A. J. MACLEAN.

STEALING.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

STEDINGERS.—The crusade against the Stedingers was of the mixed political-religious type characteristic of all the later crusades. The Stedingers were a mixed race of herdsmen and fishermen who had colonized the lower Weser and the country north of Bremen. Disputes with the counts of Oldenburg from about 1187 were soon mixed up with questions of tithes. Some monks who urged the duty of payment were murdered, and a priest who had tricked a woman, by placing in her mouth a coin instead of the wafer, was slain by her husband. This led in 1206–07 to the attempt of Hartwig II., archbishop of Bremen († 3rd Nov. 1207), to reduce the Stedingers by force, but the first effort had little success. In 1229 a further attempt by Gerhard II. of Lippe, archbishop of Bremen, led on Christmas Day to the complete repulse of the crusades. Unfortunately the Stedingers, to celebrate their triumph, appointed mock popes, archbishops, and bishops, and this enabled the authorities to represent them as spiritual rebels. In 1230 the Stedingers were accordingly put under the ban at a synod in Bremen as the vilest of heretics, and on 3rd Feb. 1232 Gregory IX. ordered a crusade to be preached against them. They were described in the bull as heretics who worshipped demons, indulged in magic, and sometimes crucified priests. On 19th Jan. 1233 Gregory once more repeated his exhortations to the crusade in letters to the bishops of Westphalia.[1] An army was collected, but nothing was accomplished. As the crusaders melted away, Gregory, on 17th June 1233, ordered a new crusade.[2] He attributed past lack of success to the belief that the crusaders were not getting the same indulgences as those granted for the Holy Land. The bishops were ordered to make it clear that the indulgences were the same. The new crusade devastated the country; all the men captured were burned; but it was finally defeated, and its leader, Count Burchard of Oldenburg, was slain.

In 1234 a third crusade was preached by the Dominicans in Holland, Flanders, Westphalia, and the Rhinelands. On 27th May at Altenesch the Stedingers were broken up, chiefly by the force of Thierry, count of Cleves. To the memory of the 6000 Stedingers then slain a monument was dedicated on the field of battle on 27th May 1834. After the devastation of their land Gregory announced in Aug. 1236 that the rebellion was at an end, and that the survivors were to be reconciled to the Church.

LITERATURE.—The main authority is H. A. Schumacher, *Die Stedinger*, Bremen, 1865. There is a short abstract of this in H. C. Lea, *A Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., New York, 1887, iii. ch. iv. The primary sources will be found in the contemporary chronicles, especially Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis Ecclesiæ Pontificum*, ch. 203, Albert of Stade, *Chronicon* and *Chron. Erfordiens.*, all in Pertz, *MGH*; see also O. Raynaldus, *Annal. Eccles.*, ed. J. D. Mansi, Lucca, 1747–56, *sub ann.* But the primary sources are very confused in their accounts.

H. B. WORKMAN.

STIGMATA.—Stigmata is the name specially applied to marks on the body which have a religious reference. Herodotus[3] relates, regarding a temple of Hercules in Egypt, that runaway slaves who took refuge in it were not liable to be re-captured if they had received on their bodies stigmata which signified their devotion to him. Such marks are alluded to by St. Paul in Gal 6[17], where he speaks of himself as bearing in his body 'the stigmata of the Lord Jesus'; and Pontius (3rd cent.) refers to Christian 'confessors whose foreheads were sealed with a (sacred) inscription.'[1]

1. From the 13th cent. (and perhaps earlier, although unrecorded) the word has been applied particularly to wounds resembling those of the crucified Jesus, and found on the person of a devout believer, especially after intent contemplation of our Lord's Passion. In over 100 cases one or more of the stigmata of the Cross—the wound on His forehead due to the crown of thorns, those on His hands and feet caused by the nails, and the wound in His side inflicted by the soldier's spear—are stated to have been reproduced in the persons of fervent Christians.[2] The earliest recorded and historically the most notable instance is that of St. Francis of Assisi, two years before his death; and in connexion with this reported stigmatization, chiefly, the question has been debated whether the alleged reproductions of Christ's stigmata really existed, and, if so, whether they were miraculously imparted, self-inflicted, or spontaneously formed as the outcome of abnormal yet not supernatural influence of soul over body.

2. The earliest detailed account of the stigmata of St. Francis is furnished by Thomas de Celano, whose first biography of the saint was composed, by order of Pope Gregory IX., at some date between 16th July 1228, when Francis was canonized (within two years after his death), and 25th Feb. 1229, when the biography received papal approval.[3] Celano relates how, in the autumn of 1224, the saint retired, along with a few companions,[4] for meditation and devotion to Mt. Verna, an isolated peak of the Apennines, over 4000 ft. in height. During their sojourn there the soul of Francis was filled with thoughts of our Lord's Passion. On one occasion, at the date of the Festival of the Elevation of the Holy Cross, 14th Sept.,[5] he saw in a vision a Man of God like a seraph, with six wings, standing above him, and nailed to a cross, with hands extended and feet joined together. Two wings were raised above the head; two were outstretched for flying; two covered his body. After Francis had experienced a brief rapture, the vision vanished; but its significance was soon revealed.

'In his own hands and feet there began to appear marks of the nails, just as, shortly before, he had seen those on the Holy Man crucified. His hands and feet appeared transfixed in the middle with nails; the heads of the nails appearing on the inner side of the hands, and on the upper side of the feet, while the points (*acumina*) of the nails were on the other side. Those marks were round on the inside of the hands, but oblong on the outside; and a fleshy excrescence (*caruncula*) appeared, projecting from the rest of the flesh, as if the tops of the nails were bent back and pierced through. The right side was as if transfixed by a spear, a scar being formed over the wound. This right side often emitted blood; so that his tunic and under-garments were frequently besprinkled. Ah! how few, while the crucified servant of the Lord was alive, had the privilege of beholding the sacred wound of the side! But Elias[6] was so fortunate as to be one who, while the saint lived, had the privilege of seeing both [blood and wound]. Happier still was Rufino who touched the precious wound. . . . For he [the saint] most anxiously concealed it from strangers; he concealed it most carefully even from his intimate friends; so that both the brethren who were moderately acquainted with him and also his most devoted followers were for long ignorant thereof. . . . It was his custom to reveal the precious secret to few or none (*raro aut nulli*). . . . After his death there remained on

[1] A. Potthast, *Reg. Pont. Rom.*, Berlin, 1874–75, i. 778.
[2] *Ib.* i. 790. [3] ii. 113.

[1] *Vita et passio S. Cæcilii Cypriani*, ch. vii.
[2] See Imbert-Gourbeyre, *Les Stigmatisées*, 1873. He enumerates 125 cases of women and 20 of men who were alleged to have stigmata—80 of them prior to A.D. 1700. A few may be deducted as barely relevant.
[3] Celano, *Vita prima*, proleg. and note in the Paris MS.
[4] *Vita prima*; *AS*, Oct. ii. 708 f. According to the *Fioretti* (14th cent., but believed to embody contemporary testimony), three of these were Leo, Masseo, and Angelo.
[5] So the *Fioretti*; Celano does not indicate the exact date.
[6] Vicar-general of the order, and successor of St. Francis. He was not in sympathy, however, with Francis' rule of absolute poverty, and was eventually superseded and disgraced.

him the appearance of the Passion; while he seemed as if he had been recently taken down from the Cross; having his hands and feet transfixed with nails, and his right side as if pierced with a spear. They beheld his flesh, which formerly had been dark, shining with exceeding brightness; they saw his face as it had been the face of an angel. . . . It was wonderful to see, in the middle of his hands and feet, not indeed the punctures of nails, but the nails themselves set in them with the black colour of fresh iron, and the right side reddened with blood. Brethren and sons ran to behold; weeping together they kissed the pious father's hands and feet, and also his right side.'

3. Several notable variations from this narrative are found in somewhat later records. (1) The writing attributed to 'Three Companions,' Leo, Angelo, and Rufino (in a part of it, however, which Sabatier[1] holds to be not of their authorship, yet very ancient) and also the biography of the saint composed by Bonaventura in 1260, represent as crucified not the seraph himself but a man borne by the seraph on his wings. (2) This narrative ascribed to the 'Three Companions' indicates that Francis could not prevent the stigmata from being manifest to his intimate friends;[2] and Bonaventura more emphatically declares that very many (*plurimi*) brethren saw the stigmata during the saint's life, including 'some cardinals owing to their intimacy with the holy man.'[3] (3) Matthew Paris, writing some time before 1259, ignores any appearance of stigmata until fifteen days before Francis' death, represents blood as 'continually flowing' from hands and feet, and refers to the wound in the side being 'open wide.'[4]

4. Celano does not profess to have beheld the stigmata; and, as already stated, he expressly names only two persons who had seen any of them. The narrative attributed to the 'Three Companions' is still less definite as to witnesses. From other sources, however, we have strong confirmation of the main testimony that, at some time or other, stigmata were seen on the person of St. Francis.

(1) Leo, one of his companions on the Verna, after authenticating the saint's autograph benediction (preserved at Assisi), adds the words which may still be read at the foot of the little document:

'The blessed Francis, two years before his death, kept Lent on the Verna, from the Festival of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin to the Festival of St. Michael in September; and the hand of God was laid upon him *per visionem et allocutionem seraphym et impressionem stigmatum Christi in corpore suo*.'[5]

(2) In the *Speculum Perfectionis*, substantially composed before 1247 by Leo, assisted by other 'companions,' there is a brief but distinct reference to the stigmata.

'In sacro monte Alvernae tempore quo recepit stigmata Domini in corpore.'[6]

(3) On the day of Francis' death his vicar-general Elias announced the fact of the stigmata to members of the order in France as follows:

'Not long (*non diu*) before his death our brother and father appeared crucified, bearing in his body five wounds which are truly stigmata of Christ: for his hands and feet bore as if marks (*puncturas*) of nails forming scars, and showing the blackness of nails; while his side appeared pierced with a spear and often exuded blood.'[7]

(4) Salimbeni, in his *Chronica* (1282–87), testifies that Leo, who was present when the corpse of Francis was washed, told him that the saint looked precisely like a crucified man taken down from the Cross.[1]

(5) In 1247, at an assembly of Franciscans in Genoa, Bonifacius, a member of the order, publicly and solemnly declared, in response to a question by John of Parma, general of the order:

'These sinful eyes beheld them [the stigmata]; these sinful hands touched them.'[2]

(6) In a bull of date 1237 Pope Gregory IX. (formerly Cardinal Ugolini), a personal friend of St. Francis, bears official testimony to the reality of the stigmata in hands, feet, and side, both during life and after death ('specie stigmatum divinitus extitit insignitus').[3]

(7) Bonaventura, in his *Legenda S. Francisci* (A.D. 1260), repeats substantially, although, as we have seen, with some variations, Celano's record on the authority of personal friends of the saint.

5. Notwithstanding these testimonies, the unreality of the stigmata (unless fraudulently inflicted by Elias on the night of Francis' death) has been maintained in modern times by Hase,[4] Renan, and others. This disbelief rests (1) on the alleged absence of direct testimony by any actual witness with the doubtful exception of Elias; but the statement of Leo in his *authentication* and the attested declaration of Bonifacius amount practically to such direct testimony; (2) on discrepancies as to details in the various primitive records—discrepancies, however, which do not affect the main points of the testimony; (3) on the admitted doubt or disbelief of the bishop of Olmütz and some other contemporaries, including certain Dominicans and secular clergy,[5] but these had not all the evidence before them, and they were affected by *a priori* considerations, such as the impropriety of representing any one except Christ as possessing the stigmata of the Holy Passion; (4) on suspicions connected with the obsequies of the saint, whose body was hastily coffined and entombed in the morning after the night of his death, while, on the occasion of its translation, the exact place of sepulture was concealed; but the hurried funeral (apart from the frequency of hasty burial in hot climates) was probably due to fear of relic-hunters tearing the body in pieces; and the subsequent concealment may have arisen from suspicion of the Perugians, who were believed to be anxious to possess the body; (5) on the absence of any reference to the stigmata in Gregory IX.'s bull of canonization. Gregory, however, as we have seen, testifies elsewhere to their reality.[6]

6. The testimonies adduced appear to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that phenomena resembling the stigmata of Christ's Passion appeared in the person of St. Francis on Mt. Verna, and were also seen by numerous witnesses after his death. On the other hand, evidence that the stigmata were continuously on the saint's body during the two years between the Verna vision and his decease is inadequate and burdened with difficulty, while

[1] *Life of St. Francis*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, pp. 375–378. The original record was completed in 1246; but the existing document bears evidence (Sabatier maintains) of mutilation, and the latter part is apparently a summary by a different writer of the later portion of Francis' life.

[2] *AS*, Oct. ii. 741.

[3] *AS*, Oct. ii. 778. He specifies Pope Alexander IV. as having stated in his (Bonaventura's) hearing that he had seen the stigmata; but this pope in his bull *Benigna operatio* (A.D. 1255), while threatening with St. Peter's anger doubters of the miracle, rests his plea for the reality of the stigmata not on his own witness of them, but on the authority of his predecessor, Gregory IX. Bonaventura may have misunderstood Alexander.

[4] *Historia Major*, pp. 339–342.

[5] *Speculum Perfectionis*, ed. Sabatier, preface, p. lxviii.

[6] *Ib.* p. 194; Knox Little, in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xvii.

[7] *AS*, Oct. ii. 669. Wadding, in his *Annales Minorum* (17th cent.), declares this letter to be a copy of an autograph preserved in a Belgian monastery (*AS*, Oct. ii. 648).

[1] Quoted by Sabatier, *Life of St. Francis*, Eng. tr., p. 438.

[2] Eccleston, *De adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam*, Coll. xii. in J. S. Brewer's *Monumenta Franciscana*, Rolls ser., IV. i. p. 51. Eccleston composed this work between 1250 and 1272. Bonifacius probably refers to what he saw and did after St. Francis' death; for during the saint's life he would not have been allowed to touch the wound in the side.

[3] *AS*, Oct. ii. 654. Bonaventura, indeed, in the preface to his Life of St. Francis (*Legenda Major*), states that at first Gregory doubted the reality of the stigmata; but the above testimony indicates that his doubts were dispelled after due investigation.

[4] *Franz von Assisi*, pp. 142–202 (1856 ed.). Hase, however, eventually adopted another view (see below).

[5] *AS*, Oct. ii. 654–658.

[6] See Sabatier, *Life of St. Francis*, Eng. tr., p. 438; and Knox Little, *Life of St. Francis*, pp. 315–317; both writers reply in detail to Hase's arguments.

the minute details given by Celano and others on reported testimony receive scant corroboration from eye-witnesses. For (1) no one actually declares that he had seen the stigmata during that interval; (2) only two persons, Elias and Rufino, are expressly stated to have seen or touched any of the wounds during Francis' life; (3) Elias testifies only to the appearance (or re-appearance) of the stigmata 'not long' before the saint's death, without either asserting or denying earlier stigmatization;[1] (4) Celano, indeed, as we have seen, states that Francis revealed the secret of the stigmata to few or none ('raro aut nulli'); yet, even supposing, as Bonaventura declares, that Francis, after the Verna vision, wore sandals and gloves for concealment, the wounds in his hands, if they continued to exist, could not have escaped fairly frequent observation. Accordingly, Bonaventura, perceiving doubtless this impossibility, yet believing in the continued existence of the stigmata, contradicts Celano and writes that *plurimi* saw them. (5) But, if very many saw them, how account for wide-spread early doubts arising after the saint's death as to the reality of the wounds, before adequate testimony to their existence was furnished[2]—doubts which were regarded as of sufficient importance to occasion two papal bulls denouncing doubters in 1237? (6) Elias, with every motive to magnify the miracle, writes, not, like Celano, of 'excrescences of flesh' and of 'heads and points of nails,' but simply of hands and feet having '*as if* the marks of nails' and 'shewing the blackness of nails.'

How much of the earliest records can we safely regard as true? We may accept (1) the main point of the narratives of Celano and others as to the saint's vision of a crucified seraph or man, in so far as that record is confirmed by Leo (who was with him) in his authentication of Francis' benediction; (2) the statement, also confirmed by Leo in that authentication, as well as by the *Speculum*, that on this occasion certain stigmata of the Passion appeared on the saint's person; (3) the testimony of Elias, of Pope Gregory IX., and probably of Bonifacius, that at the saint's death, and therefore presumably 'not long' before it, the stigmata were also visible. On the other hand, the continuance of the stigmata over two years, and several details in the narratives of Celano and Bonaventura, must be set aside as legendary accretions, occasionally inconsistent with each other, and the outcome of mere reported testimony in which fancy is mingled with fact.

7. Of the facts thus accepted three explanations have been offered.

(1) The stigmata were 'divine manifestations'—'in the true sense of the word miraculous'—given by God to St. Francis, in order to 'bear witness to his special sanctity' and spiritual likeness to Christ, as well as to vindicate the truth of his teaching. This was the view of his personal followers and of the great majority of his contemporaries; it is still upheld by most Roman Catholics and by some representatives of Reformed Churches.[3] This explanation harmonizes with the mediæval religious viewpoint and received general acceptance in mediæval Christendom. Yet the doubts of the contemporary bishop of Olmütz and others, grounded chiefly on dogmatic reasons, show that even in that age, and even when allowance is made for the prejudice and jealousy of secular clergy and rival orders, there were some to whom the alleged imprinting of stigmata by divine action appeared unbecoming. Most modern Protestants and probably many devout Roman Catholics realize as almost grotesque an alleged attestation of special holiness through infliction of bodily wounds.

(2) Another explanation is that Francis, during his vision on Verna, while in a state of ecstasy, and without distinct consciousness, inflicted on himself the stigmata, being moved thereto by an ecstatic desire to be 'crucified with Christ' and to become 'conformable unto His death.' This explanation is rendered tenable by the rejection of the details about 'fleshy excrescences' and about heads and points of nails under the flesh, as being inadequately attested, and by the limitation of the stigmata to what Elias calls '*as if* marks of nails' and 'scars in hands and feet,' along with 'a side which *appeared* as if pierced with a spear.'[1] One difficulty of accepting this view rests on the renewal of the stigmatization not long before Francis' death, when he may well have had a repetition of the vision, but when he may be assumed to have been too feeble for any considerable self-wounding such as would lead to a recognition of the stigmata of the Cross by his followers; and, even if we admit that enfeebled persons sometimes exert for a few moments in delirium præter-normal strength, could self-stigmatization, in such circumstances, have been effected by the saint without observation by others? The difficulty, however, of accounting, on this theory, for the later stigmata 'not long' before death would be removed, if we supposed (what Elias's real character, afterwards disclosed, renders conceivable) that Elias himself re-inflicted on the saint's corpse wound-marks which then no longer existed, but which Elias believed to have formerly existed in the living body for some time after the Verna vision. Francis died in the evening; Elias, as vicar-general, would be guardian of the body over night; and what is known of his ambition, worldliness, and intrigues, which eventually issued in his deposition, renders it not incredible that, for the great glory of the order, he should have conceived and carried out a scheme to relieve the former real stigmatization from such doubt as Francis' own habitual reticence had engendered.

(3) It is not necessary, however, to assume miraculous divine intervention, ecstatic self-infliction by the saint himself, or fraudulent production by another. The mutual influence of soul and body is a subject as yet only partially investigated. 'We have caught,' as Sabatier writes, 'but fleeting glimpses into the domain of mental pathology.'[2] The extraordinary is not to be identified with the miraculous; and we know enough not to be over-sceptical of the power of man's higher nature to impress itself, in certain cases, on the lower, and to cause the reproduction so far in the body of what is generated in the soul. The influence, *e.g.*, of a mother's thoughts on the person of her unborn child is widely accepted; the wonders of hypnotism and mesmerism are well known; and in numerous instances a man's character is observed gradually to mould his face. Granted, moreover, that in the great majority of alleged cases of stigmatism there is either some ground for suspecting imposture or at least the lack of adequate evidence of reality,

[1] Sabatier, indeed, inclines (Eng. tr., p. 436) to accept the reading *nam diu* for *non diu*; but there is no ancient authority for what is apparently a conjectural emendation grounded on what it was thought that Elias *ought* to have written.

[2] 'Multi de his (stigmatibus) per orbem dubitabant' (Eccleston, *loc. cit.*).

[3] Jörgensen, *Den hellige Frans af Assisi*, French tr., pp. 434–448, Eng. tr., p. 291 ff.; Cuthbert, *Life of St. Francis*, p. 337; Knox Little (Anglican), *St. Francis of Assisi*, p. 319.

[1] Hausrath, *Die Arnoldisten*, p. 224; Bournet, *S. François d'Assise*; Hase, *Handbuch der prot. Polemik*, Leipzig, 1862 p. 492.

[2] Eng. tr., p. 434.

there remain some well-attested instances in which the sentiments of a soul, filled with thoughts of Christ's Passion, have been reproduced in bodily manifestations analogous to those recorded in the case of St. Francis.

8. We must leave out of consideration the celebrated case of St. Catherine of Siena, who testified before notable witnesses that after Holy Communion she felt in her body the stigmata of the Crucifixion, including those of nails in the middle of her hands; for the reality of such bodily stigmata is manifestly disputable without impugning Catherine's sincerity. But the following authenticated stigmatizations, recorded in modern times, render credible other instances less adequately attested.

(1) The case of Maria von Moerl of the Tyrol, in whose hands, feet, and side stigmata began to appear in 1834, after Holy Communion or meditation on the Passion; she survived until 1868. J. J. von Görres, who relates her experience, states that stigmata on her person were seen by thousands of observers. He himself saw her repeatedly in her ordinary condition as well as in her ecstasies, and clearly discerned the stigmata. He testifies also that there was in her case 'no previous learning of a part; the whole proceeds naturally from her inward self; nothing forced or exaggerated can be observed in the representation.'[1]

(2) Maria Dominica Lazzari of Capriana, about whom Dr. Leonard del Cloche, director of the Civil and Military Hospital at Trent, testifies that he saw her repeatedly in a state of ecstasy in 1833–34. 'On the outside of her hands,' he declares, 'about the middle, rose a black spot, like the head of a thick nail, perfectly round. At the top of the right foot, about the centre, was a mark like those of the hands. Her mind appeared calm: her body was in a tremble. A wound in her side has been seen, only by stealth, by her mother and sisters. "I feel frightful pains," she said, "in every part of my body."'[2]

(3) Louise Lateau, of Bois d'Haine in Belgium, who bore an excellent character, was neither specially emotional nor exceptionally imaginative, was accustomed to hard work, and was one of the most helpful young women in her village. In 1868 she began to notice blood coming from her hands, feet, and side on Fridays after meditation on Christ's Passion. Dr. Ferdinand Lefebvre, Professor of Pathology in Louvain, devoted much attention to her case for six weeks, and took about 100 medical friends to examine the phenomena. She was put to various tests, to ascertain if the wounds were due to artificial causes. Thus Lefebvre called on a day when he had told her he would *not* come, and found her in an ecstasy, with blood newly exuded from her forehead and right hand. On another occasion, in the presence of two eminent physicians, he caused an artificial blister to be raised, similar to one which had appeared (so she declared) without her intervention. During her ecstasy the natural blister emitted blood, but the artificial one yielded none. The glove test was also applied. A leather glove, put on one hand, was tied and sealed at the wrist; when it was removed, on Good Friday, the blood flowed as before. It has been suggested that perforation with a needle may have taken place; but the hæmorrhage was preceded by the formation of a vesicle which became distended with serum, and spontaneously burst, after which blood flowed for several hours.[3]

Such cases appear to prove that stigmatization may result from extraordinary yet not supernatural intensification of that natural influence of soul over body which to some extent exists in all persons but is particularly potent in the case of intensely religious natures at times of special spiritual impression and ecstatic exaltation. This is substantially the view regarding the stigmata of St. Francis taken by Trench,[4] Sabatier,[5] and Doreau.[6]

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H. COWAN.

STOICS.—The Stoics were the members of a philosophical school founded in Athens about 300 B.C., which in its developments became characteristic of the whole Hellenistic area and age. Rooted in the strong moral instincts of the Semites, it grew to embrace the scientific knowledge of the Greeks, and branched out in the logical and practical methods of Roman law and education. Its range in time extends over the three centuries before the Christian era and the first three centuries of that era; that is, it synchronizes with the history of the Roman Empire. Since that time its forces have been absorbed in the development of Christianity.

1. **Origin and history.**—The system was founded by **Zeno**, born at Citium in Cyprus in 336 B.C. His father was a merchant of purple, and as such a great traveller; the 'Socratic books' which he brought home from Athens were eagerly read by the young Zeno, and drew him to visit the Greek city. Whether Zeno himself was of Phoenician or of Greek descent concerns us little; that at Athens he was nicknamed 'the Phoenician' indicates that he brought with him to that city an atmosphere of Phoenician sentiment and morality. At Athens he attached himself to Crates of Thebes, then the representative of the Cynic school.[1] In Crates Zeno found the moral enthusiasm which seeks the good at however high a price, and which welcomes want and suffering as the discipline of individual character; but he also found a revolt against scientific knowledge and the ordered decencies of life from which he was soon eager to dissociate himself. He therefore became in turn a disciple of Stilpo the Megarian and Polemo the Academic. All these schools belonged to the Socratic succession; but, when Zeno turned his attention to the writings of Heraclitus (*q.v.*), he forged a link also with the Ionic philosophers.[2] About the year 300 B.C. he founded a school of his own, which (broadly considered) was based on the concretion of all these schools of thought, and the dogma of complete harmony (*ὁμολογία, convenientia*) in God, the universe, and man. Conversely, those of his followers in any period who failed to grasp his teaching in all its width are seen to fall back upon the more partial teaching of the constituent philosophies. The followers of Zeno were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards, from the 'picture porch' (*στοὰ ποικίλη*) where he delivered his lectures, Stoics. The first published work of Zeno was his Πολιτεία, or *Commonwealth*, written while he was still a member of the Cynic school. His picture of

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[1] See his *Stigmata*, pp. 171–197, being a translation of part of his *Die christliche Mystik*, 4 vols., Regensburg, 1836–42.

[2] Von Görres (pp. 197–211), who quotes from a medical journal of Milan, embodying the description; L. Boré, *Les Stigmatisées du Tyrol*, Paris, 1847.

[3] Lefebvre, *Louise Lateau: sa vie, ses extases, ses stigmates: Étude médicale*, Louvain, 1870; G. E. Day, art. 'Louise Lateau,' in *Macmillan's Mag.*, xxiii. [1871] 488 ff.; *Brit. Med. Journal*, 6th and 20th May 1871.

[4] *Med. Ch. Hist.* p. 235. [5] Eng. tr., pp. 433–443.

[6] *Saint François*, pp. 63–66.

[1] See art. CYNICS. [2] See art. IONIC PHILOSOPHY.

a perfect state embraces the whole world, so that a man says, not 'I am a citizen of Athens,' but 'I am a citizen of the world.' The laws of this state must be prescribed by nature, not by convention. There must be no images or temples there, for these are unworthy of the deity; no sacrifices, because he is not to be appeased by gifts; no law-courts, for the citizens must not dispute; no statues, for the true adornment of a city is the virtue of its inhabitants; no gymnasia, for the youth must study virtue and not idle exercises. There must be no distinction of classes, for all must be wise men; no distinctive dress for the sexes, for their virtues and duties are the same; no delicate scruples as to the burning or burying of the dead, for souls, not bodies, are of importance. And in this state love must be master. Although the *Commonwealth* is, strictly speaking, a Cynic rather than a Stoic production, it represents the fundamental aims of the Stoic philosophy.

All the main doctrines of Stoicism are attributed to Zeno, but before describing these it may be well to give a short history of the chief teachers of the school, so that both deviations from Zeno's teaching and enrichments of it may be described under their proper headings.

Of the 'companions of Zeno' Persaeus of Citium pursued a political career, taking service with Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia. Aratus of Soli was welcomed at the same court, and is known by his *Phaenomena*, an astronomical treatise translated by Cicero, largely used by Virgil in his *Georgics*, and containing the phrase 'for we are all his family' (*τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν*) quoted by St. Paul.[1] Sphaerus introduced the new philosophy at Alexandria. Aristo of Chios fell back on Cynic views; and Dionysius of Heraclea 'deserted' to Cyrenaicism. Zeno's successor was Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 B.C.), whose *Hymn to Zeus* is not only the prototype of Hellenistic hymnology, but also a fairly complete summary of Stoic theory as applied to religious worship. Cleanthes (*q.v.*) is the theologian of the Stoic school, and gives a special emphasis to that part of its doctrine which is derived from Heraclitus, including the theories of the 'universal fire,' of the Logos (*λόγος*), and of tone (*τόνος, intentio*). His hold upon the public seems to have been small, and it was reserved for his successor, Chrysippus (*q.v.*) of Soli (280–206 B.C.), to popularize the school and so become its second founder. His methods were illustration (for which the whole Greek poetry and especially the writings of Euripides were ransacked) and argument on the lines of the syllogism. His bias was towards the Academic element in Stoicism, and there is some weakening with regard to its first principles not only in his writings, but also in those of his successors, such as Boethus of Sidon, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Seleucia (238–150 B.C.), and Antipater of Tarsus (200–129 B.C.). In the 2nd cent. B.C. the Stoic teachers began definitely to measure their principles by comparison and conflict with the rival schools of the Academy, now flourishing under the guidance of Carneades and of Epicurus.[2]

At the end of that century we find Stoicism translated into the environment of the Roman nobility by Panaetius (189–109 B.C.), Posidonius (135–51 B.C.), and Hecato, all men of position and literary attainment in the island of Rhodes. None of these are philosophical teachers in the strictest sense; they were to a large extent men of letters and science owning a partial allegiance to a particular school of thought (*secta*). In particular, their respect for the writings of Plato led them to accept various doctrines which in fact harmonized better with the teaching of the Academic school. To the resultant teaching the name of the 'middle Stoa' has since been given. This name represents not a distinct philosophical system, but a partial failure to grasp the fundamentals of the system, which paved the way to the 'eclecticism' dominant at Rome in the time of Cicero, in which incongruous elements taken from all the philosophies were combined in ever-varying dishes to meet the ephemeral tastes of the debating-room and the dining-hall.

The more systematic teaching of Stoicism revived in the 1st cent. of the empire at Rome under a series of popular teachers, such as Attalus, L. Annaeus Cornutus, Seneca, C. Musonius Rufus, Euphrates of Tyre, and Epictetus (*q.v.*). Drawn from all nationalities and from every class, these teachers have it in common that they use such forms as the lecture, the poem, and the epistle, in which the fundamental doctrines of the system are assumed, but not taught. This method postulates a previous training in principles, though in practice such training must often have been as defective as the theological knowledge of the average listener to a modern sermon. All these teachers, as well as Marcus Aurelius (*q.v.*) the emperor, whose writings are addressed to himself, afford valuable illustrations of Stoic doctrine without giving us much help as to its real essence. Their teaching is usually orthodox, and therefore free from the vagaries of the 'middle Stoa'; but the more difficult theories tend to disappear, whilst the application to practice becomes all-important.

[1] Ac 17[28].

[2] See artt. ACADEMY, ACADEMICS, EPICUREANS.

2. Teaching. — Reverting to the teaching of Zeno, we find that he took over the division of philosophy, generally accepted in his time, into the three sections of logic, physics, and ethics; but he held that these three were inseparable, since no one of them could be understood apart from the two others.

(*a*) *Logic.*—In logic Stoicism asserts the certainty of knowledge, as against the Academics, who deny this; and this assertion implies the existence of a 'criterion' (*κριτήριον*) by which the true can be distinguished from the false. Since a final and absolute criterion of truth is undiscoverable, we shall not expect to find that Zeno discovered it; such a criterion is necessarily an ideal towards which only an approximation can be made. Zeno and his successors were catholic in their investigations into the theory of knowledge, and, though we find a general sketch of their doctrine given in Cicero's *Academica*, we can hardly present it as a consistent system. Knowledge is attained by reason; but, since reason may fall, the aim is to keep reason upright. Men disagree; some therefore assert what is true, others what only seems to be true. Taking the knowledge that comes through the senses as the simplest type, we distinguish first the 'sensation,' which may be described as a pulsation which passes from an 'object' through the sense-organ to the mind, or *vice versa*; as a result there is impressed upon the soul an 'imprint' (*φαντασία, visum*). This imprint necessarily corresponds to the object if the intellect and the sense-organ are both healthy, the object really there, and the place and manner in accord; if these conditions are not fulfilled, the imprint corresponds to an imagined object only, *i.e.* to a 'phantasm.' The true imprint or mind-picture is distinguished from the false by its greater clearness (*ἐνάργεια, perspicuitas*). To determine whether the requisite clearness exists is the function of the will, which gives or refuses its assent (*συγκατάθεσις*). If this assent is given weakly or hastily, we attain 'opinion,' and not 'truth.' If it is rightly given, the truth so ascertained should be fixed in the mind by a firm grasp (*κατάληψις, comprehensio*), and retained there by memory.

Single truths when remembered can be compared, contrasted, and so forth, and thus the objects which they represent are subjected to 'reason's work of comparison' (*collatio rationis*). From comparison the reason develops general notions, which therefore have no real existence in themselves, but only a sort of existence in our minds. Yet these general notions could not be so developed unless they already existed in the mind, at any rate in a potential form. The doctrine of the *tabula rasa* is often attributed to the Stoics, but appears rather to be opposed to their system. It is true that we may trace the growth of ideas from the outside to the soul, but equally we are entitled to regard the soul as possessing all the ideas first in a rudimentary shape; they are stimulated and clarified, but not created, by contact with experience. The rudimentary or 'inborn' ideas are part of the soul's inheritance from that universal reason of which the soul is a fragment. The reconciliation and development of this theory is a most difficult matter, and so it was found by students of Stoicism, and increasingly in the intellectual decadence of the early Christian centuries. The question 'What is the Stoic criterion?' was probably a standing puzzle, which might be answered by the terms 'reason,' 'will,' 'clearness,' 'sensation,' and so forth, according to the bias of the individual. The practical application

of the Stoic logic is easier to define. Believing truth to be attainable, the Stoic was in principle dogmatic; finding error to be common, he was no less critical. Careful observation, deliberation, memory, and other agencies must all be trained so as to reduce error; and the final issue gives assurance only if it records an agreement between individual observations and general theories, and between individual judgment and the 'common sense' or universal judgment of the race.

The study of definitions, syllogisms, paradoxes, and the like was all included in the Stoic logic, which also embraced the whole field of etymology, grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric.

(*b*) *Physics.*—Under the heading of physics are included all the problems of metaphysics, physics in the modern sense, astronomy, religion, anthropology, and psychology; in fact, we might briefly say that physics includes all subjects except logic and ethics. More definitely, physics is the study (1) of the universe, (2) of man. As regards the universe, the Stoics start from the 'four elements' of earth, air, fire, and water, which have remained over in common thought as a debris from the Ionic philosophies. These four elements are re-grouped in two classes as 'mind' and 'matter,' 'active' and 'passive,' 'soul' and 'body,' the first constituent of each of these pairs being more or less closely associated with 'fire,' and a distinction being made between the elemental or 'creative' fire and the destructive fire of the domestic hearth. But, although these various dualisms have a place in the Stoic system, they are all subject to a higher monism, that of the one elemental stuff or 'body' referred to in the paradox 'Soul is body.'

The history of the universe starts with the elemental or all-pervasive fire, which is also the Deity and the 'First Cause.' This fire is in turn pervaded by the Logos, or ordering force, which from one point of view is single and divine, and from another is made up of countless 'seed-powers' (*σπερματικοὶ λόγοι*) which are the germs of future individual existences. The primal fire, by processes of successive thickening and corresponding dilution of strain (*τόνος*), converts itself into the four elements, and these in turn into the various orders of living things. Of these gods and men constitute the highest class, dominated by the reasoning soul (*νοῦς*), which has its home in the ruling part (*ἡγεμονικόν*). Among gods are counted the sun and heavenly bodies, which are beings possessed of will and motion from within. Below the reasoning class come animals, which possess soul (*ψυχή*), but not reason; they also possess something corresponding to the reasoning powers, emotions, and inclinations of reasoning beings. Plants possess growth-power (*φύσις*), which is in turn a kind of soul; and even inanimate objects have cohesion (*ἕξις*), though without growth. Since all these powers are fragments of divine force, we may speak of 'God in the stone.' Thus the whole universe is pervaded by deity in a graded scale; and God is related to the universe as soul to body. It is, however, a paradox to say that 'God is the universe,' and the Stoic creed corresponds very imperfectly to modern pantheism.[1]

Body is combined with soul in its varying grades by the principle of pervasive mixture (*κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*). Nowhere is there an absolute line of demarcation, and, as all beings have proceeded from God, so they will all be absorbed in deity at the general conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*) with which the history of the universe ends. Then God becomes 'all in all,' and from Him commences a new era of development.

During each stage the universe is controlled by the divine principle of order, which we may call the Divine Law or Destiny, but for which the most appropriate name is Providence. Providence is by its nature beneficent, chiefly in relation to reasoning beings; in this sense we may say that the whole universe is made for the good of man. The wickedness, suffering, and destruction everywhere seen in the world appear to contradict the belief in Providence, and the favourite subject of the Stoic sermon or essay is the surmounting of this contradiction.

Religion is the recognition by man of his relation to deity, and its essential features are not ceremony or sacrifice, but prayer, self-examination, and praise. Hence the early Stoics found themselves in conflict with conventional religion; later, and especially in Roman life, the Stoics reconciled themselves with it by the principles of interpretation and conformity. The work of Cornutus on the gods shows us this system in full play. Here the old gods of the Graeco-Roman mythology are interpreted as natural powers, and the legends concerning them are converted into parables conveying scientific truths. This method greatly aided the extension of Stoicism by making it a support of traditional customs and beliefs; at the same time its intensive power was weakened by the habit of compromise. In particular, the Stoics learnt to associate themselves with the practice of animal sacrifices just at the time when the general conscience was revolting against it as meaningless and cruel.

The most important chapter in the Stoic physics deals with the nature of man, who is the universe on a small scale, or a 'microcosm.' Each human soul is a fragment of the universal divine force, yet not completely sundered from its parent-stock. Thus, in the words of Aratus, 'we are all his family.' The soul is the ruling part (*ἡγεμονικόν*) of the man, and is possessed of reason; yet in its various parts or faculties it is spread throughout the whole man, and is found in all grades, even the lowest. Thus the 'five senses,' sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, are all functions of the soul, each working through its appropriate sense-organ, the eye, ear, nose, palate, and skin. These associate man with the outer world by way of knowledge; others, such as speech, motion (breathing, digestion), and procreation, by way of action. Thus human nature consists broadly in knowledge and action, and is guided by reason and will. The highest philosophy is to recognize that reason and will are ultimately one. Both are subject to disturbance, owing to the relaxation of the divine strain, or 'tone,' which gives men individuality and at the same time wilfulness or sin. The disturbances of the soul are diseased states (*πάθη*) or tempests (*emotiones*), but the discussion of them falls within the department of ethics.

The doctrine of the life of the soul after the death of the body was accepted in a general way, but without emphasis, by the Stoics; but in truth the Stoic system does not admit the existence of the body at all; for even the lowest parts of the body, the hair and the nails, possess *φύσις*, or vegetable growth. The embryo, according to the Stoics, is a vegetable; and apparently the Stoics vaguely conceived that at death the man was parted in two, the higher developments of soul finding their way to an ultimate reunion with the Deity, the lower sinking to vegetable and inorganic life and ultimately disappearing in the four elements ('earth to earth, ashes to ashes'). From either point of view the individuality is ultimately lost; and, as in the Roman period the hope of a future life was a passionate clinging to personality, the Stoic teachers meet this hope with an increasingly firm negation. In the earlier

[1] See art. PANTHEISM (Greek and Roman).

periods the whole question is left in the region of myth and fancy, most characteristically represented by Virgil's pictures of purgatory and Elysium.

(c) *Ethics.*—Ethics is built upon physics: what man ought is derived from what man is. This transition includes a logical contradiction which is unsurmountable. In physics the whole universe appears as 'good'; yet this 'good' is without colour, for it is contrasted with no evil. On the other hand, in ethics men are sharply divided into the 'good' and the 'bad.' The Cynics avoided this contradiction by ignoring physics and declaring the ethical standard to be self-illuminating or 'intuitive'; but to such a solution the Stoics were determinedly opposed. The starting-point of their own theory is to be found in the gradations of soul, by which a hierarchy of rank is established among living beings. Virtue for man is to maintain his rank as son and equal of God; vice is to fall to the level of the animals or the plants.

That 'virtue is the supreme good,' and the 'wise man' alone happy; that external circumstances, such as health, wealth, and good name, do not (as the Academics say) contribute to happiness even one atom; that a short and a long life may equally be complete—these and the like are paradoxes which Stoicism draws from its Cynic root. Its special contribution to philosophy is the elaborate analysis by which virtue is given a definite meaning, which in turn can be applied to all circumstances in life so as to guide and support the individual in his choice. This rule of life was at first summed up in the phrase 'to live consistently,' later 'to live consistently with nature.' With each successive teacher the formula was developed, the principle being best maintained by the phrase of Chrysippus, 'to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this world.' On the other hand, the practical applications follow more quickly from the phrase of Diogenes of Babylon, 'to take a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with nature.' Nearly all modern writers on Stoicism assert, with Zeller, that the Stoics deliberately softened their original teaching so as to accommodate it to the practical needs of their hearers. This is a misapprehension: the Stoics from the first were occupied in interpreting their rule in a practical sense, and such deviations as occur are due to the influence (largely unconscious) of Academic teaching on Chrysippus and his successors of the 'middle Stoa.' That hearers also unconsciously influence their teachers is true of all schools of thought.

The general ethical teaching of the Stoics is made most clear to us in Cicero's *de Finibus*. All animals, we learn, as soon as they are born, seek to maintain their life and their bodily wholeness; thus self-preservation is the first law of nature. Later they seek to propagate their race, and at the same time feel an affection for their offspring; this is the second law. Man, however, is from the first a social animal, and is possessed of a love of knowledge; hence social and intellectual ends are specially characteristic of the human race; such is the third law. From such a group of natural laws we select certain objects, such as health, well-being, long life, which are set before us as aims to be attained, whereas their opposites are to be avoided. These are the *προηγμένα* and *ἀποπροηγμένα* of the Stoic system, and its critics are never weary of ridiculing these un-Greek terms borrowed from the hierarchies of Eastern courts. In our words, these ends are respectively 'desirable' and 'undesirable'; but none of them is 'good' or 'evil,' nor can we reach good by adding together any number of things desirable ('Bonum non fit accessione'). How, then, do we know the good? When a man has practised the attainment of the desirable, when he has learnt to prefer the higher to the lower amongst these, when he has disciplined his members and attuned his thoughts until without hesitation or slip he always attains the best in the individual case—when (*i.e.*) by training and self-discipline he has become possessed of true wisdom—then there will flash before his eyes at some one moment the 'vision of the good,' never afterwards to be lost to his view This is the moment of 'conversion.' In modern terms we might perhaps say that 'virtue is defined by the intuition of the moral expert, or man of good life.' Logically this definition may leave much to be desired; its practical and educational value is attested by experience.

All virtue is one, yet it has many forms, such as the four virtues of popular philosophy—courage, wisdom, justice, and temperance. The practical workings of these are expounded in Cicero's *de Officiis*, in accordance with the teachings of Panaetius and Hecato; and, as we might expect, this ever-popular treatise is very largely Academic in its details. Opposed to the virtues are the four vices—fear, discontent, greed, and elation. These follow from weakness or ignorance; fear, *e.g.*, is derived from the error of seeing evils in the future when in truth only things undesirable are threatening. The later Stoics chiefly denounce anger as a vice. All the virtues and the vices are exhibited in social action, and the Stoic is before all things a man who lives in society, marries, and participates in the politics of his city: cloistered virtue ('vivere in umbra') is a form of cowardice.

The unbending gravity of the Stoic sage readily recommended itself as an ideal to the Roman nobility; but the later Stoics recognized the objection that the complete absence of the softer feelings implied an unattractive, if not repellent, character. Still rejecting all stormy states of the soul, they admitted that its surface should be like that of a sunny sea, not that of an ice-bound lake. Thus they came to find room for the 'good emotions,' now commonly called the 'affections.' These are identical in classification with the vices, but their play does not exceed the bounds of reason: 'caution' stops short of fear, and 'joy' of elation. Almost we admit that 'desipere in loco' may be virtuous.

The Stoic system of ethics thus developed was admirably suited for education, and is in fact the basis of all the traditional maxims which are to-day imparted to the young. Never does the Stoic teacher speak with a harsh voice, as his critics suggest, not knowing that rigid general principles must always be tempered in their practical application by consideration for person and place. If the soul of the 'wise man' is always tense, yet none knows better than the Stoic that 'relaxation' is needed by the young; if perfect action implies perfect knowledge, nevertheless it is quite practical to 'learn by doing.' Thus the youngest child may begin to 'get on,' *i.e.* to become a 'proficient,' and his well-wishers will not hurry him unduly to the stage of conversion. This practical application of Stoicism became, through Quintilian, the foundation of the modern theory of education.

3. **Practical influence.**—No system of philosophy, at any rate in the Western world, has borne fruit in practice to an extent comparable with that of Stoicism. Like all other great reforms, it was first ridiculed, then hated, and finally adopted. Ridicule of Stoicism is found in Cicero's speeches and in Horace, and through them is familiar to the modern literary world. Hatred of the system is most conspicuous in Lucretius.[1] Of its adoption Rhodes is the most typical example in the Greek-speaking world; but similar movements took place in all the great cities of Asia Minor and Egypt, and notably in Tarsus. In the West, Stoic principles are taken for granted in all Roman literature from the beginning of the Christian era. Of the greatest interest is perhaps the use of Stoicism by kings and governors. Among the successors to Alexander's empire many of the most eminent associated themselves with Stoic ministers. The Roman nobility adopted the system from Panaetius; the legislation of the Gracchi, the pure administration of men like Mucius Scaevola the *pontifex* and Rutilius Rufus, and the new spirit of Roman law embodied in the theories of the *ius gentium* and the *ius naturae* are all due to its influence. Under the early empire all good administrators were men imbued with Stoic principles; and it is not too

[1] See art. LUCRETIUS, §§ 8 and 9.

much to say that through Stoicism the Roman world-empire found itself a soul. The 'Stoic opposition' under Nero and his successors has become famous through the pages of Tacitus; but the passive resistance of such men as Thrasea has falsely suggested that Stoicism is in its essence individualistic and ethical. The examples of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius on the other side show its fuller development in social and political life.

4. Stoicism and Christianity.—Stoicism came early into contact with Christianity through the apostle Paul. The similarity in tone and content between parts of the Pauline epistles, the writings of Seneca, and the records of the teaching of Epictetus has long been familiar to students of Christian theology; the simple explanation is that Paul was brought up in Tarsus in a society permeated by Stoic thought.[1] Quite appropriately, he first appears in Christian history through his 'conversion,' in which he parted alike from Hebraism and from Stoicism. He realized that ethics can never be rooted in science, or the ideal in matter-of-fact; he therefore refused to give his allegiance to science or his admiration to the cosmos, and found himself in a higher region of 'spirit' in which 'faith' is the path-finder. The 'wise man' whom the Stoics could never find among their neighbours he recognized without hesitation in the Christ. But in the new religious belief the old foundations of the philosophy survive. Paul's use of the term 'body' is purely Stoic, and so are his whole analysis of 'bodies,' earthly, animal, celestial, and so forth, his analysis of human nature, and his conception of the functions of religion. His views of the divine birth of Jesus, and of His resurrection as the type of that of the Christian believer, are unintelligible except in terms of Stoicism.

Much controversy has arisen as to the origin of the terms 'the Word'[2] and 'the Holy Spirit' in Christian theology, and here we can only note that both terms were in familiar use in the Stoic school at the same epoch. They cannot, however, be claimed as distinctively Stoic. But the way of thinking according to which God is at the same time one and many belongs to the very core of Stoicism. Therefore, whilst the doctrine of the Trinity is somewhat dimly adumbrated by St. Paul, it has long ago been noted that its principle finds full expression in the earlier writings of Seneca: 'To whatever country we are banished, two things go with us, our part in the starry heavens above and the world around, our sole right in the moral instincts of our own hearts. Such is the gift to us of the supreme Power which shaped the Universe. That Power we sometimes call the "all-ruling God," sometimes the "incorporeal Wisdom" which is the creator of mighty works, sometimes the "divine Spirit" which spreads through things great and small with duly strung tone . . .'[1] The quotation is not complete, nor is it suggested that Seneca's theology would have satisfied an inquisitor. But, on the other hand, it may be fearlessly maintained that the Christian cult of 'the Holy Spirit' and the ecclesiastical dogma of the Trinity grew great in a soil enriched by Stoic speculation and experience.

From the 3rd cent. onwards Stoicism was rapidly absorbed in Christianity. A youth nurtured in Stoic principles rebelled against the continuance of animal sacrifices, and submitted gladly to the authority of a 'wise man' visible in the flesh. But the Stoic converts brought with them their scientific methods and even their school text-books; the *de Officiis* and the *Discourses of Epictetus* became for all practical purposes Christian manuals. It is greatly to be desired that modern theologians should be equipped with a better knowledge of the philosophy which more than any other was a nursing-mother to the Church.

LITERATURE.—The literature of Stoicism is voluminous and superficial. The early Christian writers were suspicious of a system which still maintained some independent vigour, and was associated in their minds with conformity to pagan cults. In and since the Middle Ages the respect paid to Plato and Aristotle has hindered the due recognition of the Hellenistic philosophies. Thus editions of the works of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius have appeared in rapid succession from the hands of editors, translators, and commentators who do not even claim to have studied the philosophy which these writers expound. Only in the last half-century has a real appreciation of the subject established itself.

The standard authority is E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, new ed., tr. O. J. Reichel, London, 1892. A shorter but sounder treatment is found in a study on 'Stoicism and the Last of the Stoics' by G. H. Rendall, prefixed to his tr. of *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself* (London, 1898). W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, Edinburgh, 1907, and R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, London, 1910, give good general sketches. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, London, 1911, is fuller in detail than other English books, and contains a bibliography of works ancient and modern on the subject. Of the original sources the ed. of *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* by A. C. Pearson (London, 1891) and H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1903–05, in addition to the classical authors already referred to and the *Anthologium* of J. Stobaeus (C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, 5 vols., Berlin, 1884–1912), are the first necessaries for the student's equipment. Two treatises by A. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, Stuttgart, 1890, and *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet*, do. 1894, give an admirable exposition of Stoicism in the form of a commentary on Epictetus, who would have been greatly pleased to learn that he knew his subject so well as this genial German writer suggests.

E. V. ARNOLD.

STONES.

Introductory and Primitive (E. SIDNEY HARTLAND), p. 864.
Greek and Roman (P. GARDNER), p. 869[b].
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 871[a].
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 876[a].

STONES (Introductory and Primitive).—**1. Veneration of boulders and standing stones.**—As noted in art. STONE MONUMENTS, many of the menhirs in Europe and Asia Minor have probably been actually figures of deities. Rocks, boulders, and standing stones have been worshipped as gods or as inhabited by gods all over the world. Wherever men have been struck by the appearance or position of a rock or stone, they have regarded it with awe as uncanny, and in innumerable cases they have ultimately erected it into a divinity, brought offerings, and put up prayers before it. Instances need not be cited; they are found in every quarter of the globe. Among the natives of India the divinity frequently consists of, or is represented by, a group of comparatively small stones, which are usually painted red. Elsewhere, as among the Negroes of W. Africa, and occasionally in Europe by the pre-historic inhabitants, they have been roughly carved into a faint resemblance to human shape.[3] Many such stones are of great size; but others are quite small, and then, like the Indian *śālagrāmas*, almost indistinguishable from amulets. A *śālagrāma* is a water-worn concretion containing ammonites and other fossil shells, found in Nepāl, in the upper course of the river Gaṇḍakī, a northern tributary of the Ganges. It is looked upon as sacred, and is usually identified with the god Viṣṇu. As such it is the object of a cult by its possessor. Probably its veneration antedates the Aryan occupation, and it has been adroitly adapted to the Hindu religion in a manner not unknown in other aggressive religions.[3] Sometimes a tribe or clan claims to have issued from a rock: the Arab clan of Beni Saher ('sons of the rock') are said to have issued from a rock, still shown, in the land of

[1] See art. PAUL, § a
[2] See art. LOGOS, § 2.
[1] Seneca, *Dial.* xii. 8. 3.
[2] C. Partridge, *Cross River Natives*, London, 1905, pp. 269, 271; *L'Anthropologie*, v. [1894] 22, 27 ff.
[3] *RHR* xliii. [1901] 325; A. M. T. Jackson, *Folk Lore Notes*, Bombay [1915], ii. 80.

Moab.[1] Tales of petrifaction of men and animals, of supernatural beings or monsters, or even other objects, are everywhere current accounting for rocks and great stones of suggestive shape, appearance, or position. Such a rock on the side of Mount Sipylos, in Lydia, doubtless gave rise to the ancient legend of Niobe. The transformation is said to be caused by offences of various kinds against the higher powers, by curses, by the infringement of a tabu, by mere caprice on the part of some divine being, or even to be without any assignable cause.[2] In many cases probably the boulder was the object of worship which has been forgotten, and the tale is the method of accounting for the awe and fear in which it has been held. Many stones to which worship has been accorded are, there can be little doubt, aerolites.[3] Such, *e.g.*, is the famous Ka'bah at Mecca. Among the Romans the Hermæ—stones carved with the head and trunk of human form, and representing the god Mercury—were boundary stones. Originally they were rough, unshapen stones. Such stones are still the object of veneration in Annam.[4] Their inviolability as boundary stones would naturally lead to more extended regard.

Another cause of reverence for rocks and stones has been a natural depression which has been interpreted as a footprint, or the impression of the hand, head, or knee of some supernatural personage—a god, saint, devil, or hero of old—or the hoof-prints of his horse. Such a mark is looked upon with awe, and, if attributed to a sacred person, usually becomes the object of devout observance, if not of an actual cult. Thus through the length and breadth of Europe the impress of the foot or of some other part of the body of the Virgin Mary or a saint is venerated, and various legends are told to account for it. So in India footprints of Visnu and, where Buddhism reigns, footprints of Buddha are shown, many of which have been manipulated by art.[5] Both in Europe and in the East there are numerous depressions in rock attributed to mythical personages who have probably been displaced by the existing religion from the sacred position which they held, while the depressions now credited to the personages of the existing religion are generally taken over from a religion that has passed away. These are well known and need not be referred to in detail. Elsewhere, however, such impressions have excited the imagination and religious fervour.

'On the hills near Kachindamoto, on the south-west arm of Lake Nyasa, there is said to be a big flat stone on which are the footprints of man and all the animals, which emerged from a hole in the stone.'[6] On Vancouver Island the Kwakiutl show the footmarks of an ancient hero of their traditions.[7] According to the Lillooet, one of the ancient 'Transformers' stamped on a rock near a lake called Tsekalenal, and left the impress as a tribal boundary.[8] Similar marks on the Argentine shore of the Alta Paraná have been exploited by the Jesuit missionaries as the marks of the hands and feet of St. Thomas, the apostle of the Indies.[9] As in other parts of the world, impressions are identified by native tradition in America as those of different members of heroes or their mythical foes; and in some cases the colouring of strata of the rocks is thus accounted for.[10]

Stones pierced by a hole are frequently sacred. Persons desirous of being rid of sins or sickness creep, or are passed, through them for that purpose: the Mên-an-Tol near Penzance is a well-known example. Stones with smaller holes are utilized, by passing the hands through, to take an oath or enter into a solemn engagement.

'The Plichtin' Stane o' Lairg,' in Sutherlandshire, was built into a wall connected with the old parish church. It was famous as a medium for the making of bargains and the pledging of faith on all sorts of occasions, including the plighting of troth between young men and maidens. But some years ago the old church was pulled down to make way for improvements, and the stone passed into private hands. It was ultimately given by the then owner to the Archæological Museum at Toronto, where it is now exhibited.[1]

To many boulders and artificially-placed stones the belief attaches that they move at certain times. It is a jocular remark at Llandrindod that a certain stone goes to the brook to drink every time it hears the cock crow. Similarly, it is said of the Long-stone on Minchinhampton Common, Gloucestershire, that it runs round the field when it hears the clock strike twelve.[2] But such a saying is merely a serious belief in decay. A large stone called 'the De'il's Cradle,' in Clackmannanshire, is believed 'by the superstitious in the vicinity' to be raised from its place every Hallowe'en to serve as a swing for the potentate whose name it bears.[3] In the Commune de Gardes in Charente, France, there is a block called 'the Mushroom,' which turns on Sunday at noon; the people of the neighbourhood have a certain veneration for it, and the old women are careful to protect themselves with the sign of the cross as they go by.[4]

Outside Europe there are similar beliefs. The 'moving stone,' which is believed by the natives of Borneo to be the waist-cloth of a hero called Simpurai, was hallowed by a ceremonial feast, as described by Bishop Chambers.[5] The Bribri Indians of Costa Rica say of certain stones on the mountain of Nemoie shaped like jaguars that they become alive and true jaguars when they are approached. They are the subject of a tradition relating to the ancient history of the people.[6] There is a boulder of reddish sandstone on the side of a steep hill on the north bank of the Marias river, in Montana, round which the soil is constantly worn away by wind and rain, and which consequently is moving slowly down the hill. The Blackfoot Indians believe it to be alive and make offerings to it.[7]

Rocking stones—boulders resting now only on a point of rock as a result of the disintegration of their supports—are capable of being moved. They are found in various places, the most famous being the Cornish Logan Stone. A legend frequently attaches to them; and sometimes, as at Vertolaye, in Auvergne, mothers take their children to the stone, that they may grow up healthy. At Pontivy such a stone is used by suspicious husbands for divination as to the virtue of their wives.[8]

A large number of erratic boulders and other single stones (sometimes heaps of stones) are attributed to supernatural beings who have thrown them in a contest, dropped them as they were being carried, generally with evil design, or emptied them from their shoes. In this way, too, rocks have been pierced or split, leaving a gaping chasm. These monuments of more than mortal power are not confined to the British Islands or even to Europe. They are found from the New Hebrides to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. And

1 A. Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris, 1908, p. 107.

2 E. S. Hartland, *LP* iii. 120. The stories are innumerable and a commonplace of tradition.

3 W. Crooke, *FL* xi. [1900] 34.

4 *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 522, 1156.

5 W. Crooke, *PR* ii. 199, with plate.

6 *JRAI* xl. [1910] 301.

7 G. M. Dawson, *Proc. and Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada*, v. [1887] p. 20 (of offprint).

8 *JAFL* xxv. [1912] 296.

9 *Ib.* xvi. [1903] 58.

10 *19 RBEW* [1900] pt. i. p. 480; J. Teit, *Traditions of the Thompson River Indians*, Boston, 1898, pp. 45, 96; F. Boas, *Indianische Sagen von der nord-pacifischen Küste Amerikas*, Berlin, 1895, pp. 202, 234; *Univ. California Pub.* x. [1914] 279; Dawson, *Proc. and Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada*, ix. [1891] p. 32 (of offprint); *RTP* xii. [1897] 357.

1 *Ontario Archæological Rep.*, 1896–97, p. 64.

2 *Archæologia Cambrensis*, 6th ser., xvii. [1917] 400; *FL* xxiii. [1912] 340.

3 *County FL* vii. [1914] 309, quoting *The Scottish Journal of Topography*, etc., 1848.

4 *L'Anthropologie*, x. [1899] 290.

5 H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British N. Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 353.

6 *JAFL* xvi. 4.

7 G. B. Grinnell, *Blackfoot Lodge Tales*, London, 1893, p. 262.

8 L. J. B. Bérenger-Feraud, *Superstitions et survivances*, Paris, 1896, ii. 383.

they are of a sufficiently commonplace type to need no specification.

Sometimes stones are believed to grow out of the earth like a plant, as in Annam,[1] or to bring forth other stones, as in Mid-Celebes.[2] Even where they are not believed themselves to grow, they are frequently held to have power to cause organic life to increase.

On Mota, one of the Banks' Islands, a large stone with a number of small ones lying beneath it, like a litter of pigs, was held capable of bringing pigs to any one who offered money upon it;[3] in the Banks' Islands, indeed, no garden was planted without stones being buried in the ground to ensure a crop, and one shaped, as pieces of coral often are, like bread-fruit was of special virtue for ensuring a crop of bread-fruit.[4]

Finally, many of these rocks and stones are the objects, or at least the scenes, of magical or religious rites. Phallic rites at megalithic monuments have already been mentioned.[5] These are not the only rites performed at sacred rocks and stones. The mere sacredness renders them tabu, so that, as Sébillot notes in France, many peasants even at the present day are unwilling to pass them alone after nightfall or even in full daylight, their gestures showing the respect and hereditary fear which they inspire.[6] What is true of the French peasant is true of the folk everywhere, in Christian and pagan countries alike. Offerings of various kinds are made at such rocks and stones. The Mandans used to propitiate their oracular stone with knives, pipes, and cloth.[7] The Rāja of Dumrāon, who is the head of a sept of Panwārs, on succession, places upon a certain large stone for which they have a great reverence an offering of flowers, sweetmeats, and a few rupees.[8] Among the Chams of Annam any one finding a block of stone near his residence, among other rites, washes it, puts a cup of alcohol upon it, and calls upon the spirits to drink and to eat betel. To possess such a stone is to be well and to increase the number of one's children.[9] Near a certain Mordvin village lies an enormous stone, so sacred that at ordinary times no one dare approach it; but yearly, at a festival now identified with the Christian Trinity-day, a gathering is held there, a goose is sacrificed, and its head laid down beside the stone.[10] In Madagascar stones thought to be inhabited by spirits or possessed of power are smeared with grease, and sacrifices of domestic fowls are offered to them; the blood and feathers and the feet and head of the victim are smeared on, and placed about, them.[11] A very common rite in the offering of sacrifice to any object of worship is to sprinkle or smear the blood upon it. In India and adjacent countries (even as far away as the New Hebrides) blood is imitated with red powder or other colouring matter, and the mere rubbing of a stone with red constitutes it a sacred idol.[12] Among the A-Kamba of E. Africa there is a sacred rock called Kabubooni, where people go regularly to pray to the ancestral spirits for increase of worldly goods. A libation of mead is poured at the foot of the rock; a goat is killed, and its blood is allowed to run into the ground and mix with the mead.[1] The aborigines of the Canary Islands went in procession to certain sacred rocks in time of trouble, carrying libations of milk and butter; they danced round them, and from one of them warriors, it is said, threw themselves as expiatory sacrifices.[2]

Stones are set up, and ceremonies performed at both sacred rocks and stones, for various purposes. A very common object is to bring rain. The people of Hierro, in the Canary Islands, set free a pig at the rock with this object.[3] The A-Kamba, in the ceremony just cited, prayed for rain, that being necessary for the prosperity of their flocks and herds, their chief wealth. In Sumatra the Menangkabau of the Padang highlands have a stone at Kota Gadang in the form of a cat reputed to give rain, to which intent it is smeared with the blood of a chicken, and rubbed and incensed to the accompaniment of a magical formula.[4] To strike a stone much venerated by the Similkameen of British Columbia is sufficient to bring rain. About thirty years ago a Christian native made a bet with a heathen on the subject and struck the stone. The sky was then cloudless; but rain is said to to have speedily gathered and poured down steadily for a week.[5]

In India a red painted stone is often set up to guard the fields.[6] In Annam a great unhewn or roughly-hewn stone is erected at the entrance of a village to arrest malign influences and evil spirits which might come that way to injure the inhabitants.[7] By every village on the island of Nias, at least on the east coast, a stone was erected, in order, it is said, that all the villagers should be of one mind. An offering was made at the erection of the stone, the stone was twisted round a little, and the priest addressed the people, warning them that, if any one would not follow the accepted customs, his neck should in like manner be twisted. Sacrifices were offered at the stone in case of adultery or theft. It was believed that to step over the stone was to lose the power of the limbs.[8]

The use of holed stones for the pledging of faith has already been mentioned. Such use is not confined to holed stones.

The stone at Shechem set up by Joshua as a witness to the Israelites' covenant is an example.[9] One of several sacred stones at Ambohimanga, the former capital of Imerina, Madagascar, was called 'the stone of oaths.' People were wont to resort to it for the taking of solemn oaths.[10] There is another stone at Ambohimanga, and a similar stone at Antananarivo, on which the monarch was required to stand at his installation, and where probably the oath of allegiance was taken.[11] The use of a special stone for this purpose is not unknown elsewhere: British readers will be reminded of the Coronation Stone in Westminster Abbey, previously at Scone and there used for the inauguration of the Scottish kings. The stone in such cases is probably sacred, and a portion of its sanctity is transmitted to the king thus ceremonially mounted upon it. The *Lia Fáil*, or 'stone of destiny,' at Tara, with which the Coronation Stone is claimed to be identical, was credited with divining power. 'It used,' we are told, 'to roar under the person who had the best right to obtain the sovereignty of Ireland at the time of the men of Ireland being in assembly at Tara to choose a king over them.'[12]

As might be anticipated, divination is often drawn from sacred rocks and stones. The rock already mentioned as venerated by the Mandans

[1] *Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 959.
[2] A. C. Kruijt, *Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel*, The Hague, 1906, p. 210.
[3] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 181.
[4] *Ib.* p. 183. For a similar custom in New Caledonia see *L'Anthropologie*, viii. [1897]; *FL* xiv. [1903] 256.
[5] See art. PHALLISM, vol. ix. p. 825.
[6] P. Sébillot, *Le Paganisme contemporain chez les peuples celto-latins*, Paris, 1908, p. 309.
[7] *Papers of the Peabody Museum*, iii. [1906] 138.
[8] W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 123.
[9] A. Cabaton, *Nouvelles Recherches sur les Chams*, Paris, 1901, p. 158.
[10] J. N. Smirnov, *Les Populations finnoises des bassins de la Volga et de la Kama* (French tr. by P. Boyer), Paris, 1898, i. 486.
[11] *Antananarivo Annual*, 1892, p. 493; J. Sibree, *The Great African Island*, London, 1880, p. 305; G. Mondain, *Des Idées religieuses des Hovas*, Paris, 1904, pp. 12, 23.
[12] L. K. Anantha Krishna, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, Madras, 1909–12, i. 12; *Census of India, 1911*, vol. vii., *Bombay*, pt. i. p. 67, do. vol. xvi., *Baroda*, pt. i. p. 68; Jackson, *FL Notes*, ii. 87; *Anthropos*, ii. 959; Codrington, p. 183.

[1] C. W. Hobley, *The Ethnology of A-Kamba*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 167.
[2] *American Anthropologist*, new ser., ii. [1900] 492.
[3] *Ib.* p. 493. [4] Kruijt, p. 209.
[5] *JAI* xxi. [1892] 314.
[6] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. vii., *Bombay*, pt. i. p. 67; Jackson, *loc. cit.*
[7] *Anthropos*, ii. 959. [8] Kruijt, *loc. cit.*
[9] Jos 24[26].
[10] *Antananarivo Annual*, *loc. cit.*
[11] *Ib.* pp. 485, 492; A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, p. 82.
[12] G. Keating, *The History of Ireland*, tr. D. Comyn, London, 1902–08, i. 101; see E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, do. 1914, p. 290 ff.

was consulted on going to war. Those who consulted it approached it weeping and groaning. After smoking they retired to a distance for the night. 'The next day they take down on parchment what the stone shows. The painted parchment is carried to the village, where the old men interpret it.' It is said that new figures are seen on the stone from time to time. The Minnetarees also had a stone which was consulted in 'practically the same way.'[1] In Borneo, 'in an interior Lundu house,' were the sacred objects of the tribe. Among these were several stones which 'turn black if the tribe is to be beaten in war, and red if to be victorious: any one touching them would be sure to die; if lost, the tribe would be ruined.'[2]

Rocks and stones are held valid for other purposes. Sunshine is believed to be produced in Melanesia by smearing a standing stone with red earth or winding a round stone, called a sun-stone, with red braid and sticking it with owl's feathers to represent rays, muttering a spell the while and hanging it on a tree.[3] Bontoc Igorot hunters hold a 'fire-feast for wild carabaos' at a certain rock, held to be a transformed spirit, with an incantation to the animals.[4] Below Paimut, on the Yukon, is a large block of stone, said to have been dropped there by the Raven Father after making the earth. He left instructions to the people, whenever fish became scarce, to tie an inflated bladder to the stone and fling both into the river. The story goes that the instructions were obeyed once, with the most satisfactory results.[5] In France standing stones and rocks are largely resorted to not only for phallic ceremonies, but also for the cure of various infantile and other disorders.[6] It is only necessary to refer to the numerous and complicated ceremonies performed at and with stones and rocks in the course of the *intichiuma* rites of the Central Australian aborigines, the object of which was the multiplication of the totem.[7] Simply to throw a stone on the top of a standing stone or rock, as on a rock in the Lutkoh River in the N.W. Frontier Province of India, is deemed auspicious;[8] and no passer-by omits to add to a heap of stones, whatever may be the original significance of the pile. These customs are universal.

2. Stones as amulets.—Stones as amulets have been already incidentally treated in artt. CHARMS AND AMULETS. But there are certain uses of such stones which may be here illustrated. In Scotland it was a common belief that distempers in cattle were to be cured by giving the ailing animals to drink water in which *lengan* (stones used for divination) had been dipped. The most celebrated of these stones is the Lee Penny, which gave the hint to Sir Walter Scott for the plot of *The Talisman*. It is an heirloom in the family of the Laird of Lee, whose ancestor, Sir Simon Lockhart, it is said, brought it back from Palestine, where he obtained it as part of the ransom of a Saracen chief. It is a triangular stone of a dark red colour set in a silver coin, which has been pronounced to be a groat of Edward IV. In addition to its virtue in curing cattle, it was believed to be powerful against hydrophobia, as was claimed to have been proved upon Lady Baird of Sauchtonhall near Edinburgh about 1707. It has often been described and its cures narrated. It has been more than once the subject of complaint to the presbytery, and it has been exhibited to the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland.[1] Stones called curing-stones, used in a similar way, are known also in Ireland. To many of them a traditional history attaches, connecting them with the supernatural.[2] Other curing-stones are also found, the most noted of which are those of St. Fillan, pieces of quartzite preserved in a niche in the wall of the mill of Killin, Perthshire. These are said to be 'socket-stones in which the spindle of the upper millstone used to work before the introduction of the improved machinery.' M. Martin, in the *Description of the Western Islands of Scotland* (London, 1673), mentions a globe of stone of the size of a goose's egg, on the island of Arran, used to remove stitches from the sides of sick patients. The natives also swore decisive oaths upon it; and it was believed that, if it was cast in front of an enemy, he would lose courage and run away.[3] Curing-stones are known in many parts of the world. Many of them are pre-historic arrow-heads, called 'thunderbolts.' To this kind of stone must also be reckoned concretions like the bezoar-stone, ultimately of animal origin. They are used not only like the Lee Penny, but in various other ways.[4] In France and Belgium statues of saints, or stones looked upon as such, are rubbed with the body, or scraped and the resulting powder swallowed in water, for diseases, and especially by women for the cure of barrenness.[5] In the Fiji islands, where leprosy is not uncommon, there are stones, regarded with much awe as the shrines of ancestral spirits, which inflict the disease, and others which cause abdominal tumours and abdominal dropsy, but none, it seems, which are the means of healing.[6]

A curious use of what may perhaps be regarded as a kind of amulet is found in Ireland. Cup-markings in boulders and in rude stone monuments are well known and are by no means confined to these islands or to Europe. In Ireland such hollows in a stone or rock are called *bullans*—a term also applied to the stone or rock itself. Their origin and purpose are to-day as much as ever the subject of puzzle and controversy. Many Irish examples have a small stone deposited in the basin. Such stones and similar ones lying on old altars of ruined churches, or on stones held to be altars, are regarded as endowed with extraordinary power. From their use they are often termed 'cursing-stones.' On the shore of Upper Lough Macnean, near the ancient ruined parish church of Killinagh, stands a *bullàn* stone containing ten cavities, each of them filled with a stone of suitable size. The *bullàn* is called St. Brigid's stone or altar. When any of the neighbours has a grudge against another and wishes him harm, he goes to the altar and there curses him, at the same time turning the stones deposited in the cavities.[7] So, among other places, at Croagh-Patrick, a mountain

1 *Papers Peabody Museum, loc. cit.*
2 Ling Roth, i. 232, quoting H. Keppel.
3 Codrington, p. 184; cf. *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 226.
4 A. E. Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot*, Manila, 1905, p. 82.
5 *18 RBEW* [1899] pt. i. p. 426.
6 P. Sébillot, *Amer. Anthr.*, new ser., iv. [1902] 78 ff.; see also the same writer's *Le Folk-lore de France*, 4 vols., Paris, 1904–07, *passim*.
7 *Report on the Work of the Horn Expedition to Central Australia*, London and Melbourne, 1896, iv. 67; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 167 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 283 ff.
8 *Census of India, 1911*, xiii., *N.W Frontier Province*, p. 91.

1 *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland*, xxvii. [1893] 494; C. Rogers, *Scotland, Social and Domestic*, London, 1869, p. 211; J. G. Dalyell, *The Darker Superstitions of Scotland*, Glasgow, 1835, pp. 157, 680; W. Henderson, *Notes on the Folk-lore of the Northern Counties of England*, London, 1879, p. 163.
2 *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland*, xxvii. 444 n., 500; W. Gregor, *Notes on the Folk-lore of the North-East of Scotland*, London, 1881, p. 39; *Caledonian Medical Journal*, new ser., ii. [1896] 268.
3 *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland*, xxvii. 447, 510, xlvi. [1912] 278.
4 Authorities are numerous. Reference may be made to *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland*, xxvii. 503 ff.; Henderson, p. 165; *Journ. Roy. Soc. Ant. Ireland*, xliii. [1913] 267, *FL* ix. [1898] 86, xii. [1901] 272, xvi. [1905] 335; *Am Urquell*, vi. [1896] 161; G. Pitre, *Biblioteca delle Tradizioni Popolari Siciliane*, xix. [Palermo and Turin, 1896] 294; *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 266.
5 E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909, i. 63 f.; *RTP* xiii. [1898] 266.
6 *FL* vii. [1896] 5.
7 W. F. Wakeman, *Proc. Royal Irish Academy*, 3rd ser., i. 262.

in County Mayo and a place of pilgrimage, it is a custom that any of the pilgrims who have a quarrel with their neighbours will take up a certain flag from the sacred well on the mountain and turn it upside down in the name of St. Columkill, after which they return home and fast for fifteen days, taking nothing but bread and water once in twenty-four hours. The object of this is to honour the saint and induce him to put to death the person or persons against whom they have a grudge. If unsuccessful, they return to the well, there perform a 'station' backwards, and turn the flag upside down again.

'If stormy weather happen, either in spring or harvest, the whole country will say that it was because Columkill's stone was turned, and they will even watch in harvest to prevent the people from turning it.'

Pebbles are also carried home from another 'station' called 'Patrick's bed,' to prevent barrenness and to banish rats and mice.[1] On Caher Island, off the coast of Connaught, is a small church on the altar of which lies a stone called Leac na naomh ('flag of the saints'). It is said to be used to 'elicit the truth.' Any one on the west coast of the mainland or on the islands who is wronged, after praying and fasting at home, sails over to the Caher and turns the Leac. The weather then immediately becomes unfavourable, storms occur, and boats are often sunk, until the person who has turned the stone is vindicated.[2]

In Scotland, on the island of Fladda in Argyllshire, is a church dedicated to St. Columba. It has an altar at the west end, and on it a round blue stone which is always moist. Fishermen detained on the island by contrary winds used to wash this stone with water in the hope of procuring a favourable breeze.[3] On the island of Tiree in the Inner Hebrides is a stone almost buried in the ground. It is called Clach na stoirm ('the storm stone'). If taken out of the earth, cleaned, and set upright, it will cause a storm to arise.[4] The Roman geographer Mela tells of a stone or rock at the oracle of Ammon, in Cyrenaica, having similar powers. It was sacred to the south wind, and, whenever it was touched by the hand of man, a raging wind arose and drove the sands along like the waves of the sea.[5] In the Fiji islands there are stones which, if touched, cause a strong wind and a rising of the sea, more or less violent according to the force used against the stone.[6]

3. Crystals.—Among stones, crystals, commonly of quartz but also of other minerals, have everywhere attracted the attention of mankind. The use of crystals in what is known as scrying or crystal-gazing has been dealt with in art. CRYSTAL-GAZING. Scrying has been generally practised by both savages and people of the higher civilization[7] for the purposes of divination. But this is probably a special application of minerals already sacred, arising from their shape, lustre, refractions of light, transparency, and other striking properties, which have first caused them to be appropriated as amulets or reverenced. From pre-historic times in Europe they have been valued. In Anglo-Saxon graves in England balls and other pieces of rock-crystal, and in Frankish graves in Germany pieces of rock-crystal and milk-quartz, have been found. Balls of crystal have also been discovered in early graves in France, in Germany at Alzay, near Mainz, in Denmark near Aarslev in Fyen (the two last in women's graves), in a sepulchre at Mycenæ in Greece, and also at Rome. They were probably amulets, and certainly highly prized.[1] And the folk-tales of glass-mountains seem to be a distant echo of the uncanny properties attributed to crystals. Balls of rock-crystal mounted in silver are said to be not uncommon in Japan; but we have no information as to their use. Pieces of rock-crystal brought from a distant part of the island have been found in a pre-historic kitchen-midden in the south-west of the island of Trinidad.[2] There is scarcely a village in Yucatan without a quartz-crystal or other translucent stone called a *zaztun*, which is used for scrying by a diviner. It is first sanctified by burning before it gum-copal as an incense and by reciting certain magical formulas in an archaic dialect.[3] Numerous quartz-crystals have been found in the ruins at Casa Grande and elsewhere in Arizona, and in fetish-bags buried with the dead in various parts of the Pueblo country. The legends of the Pima and Pueblo traditions show that these crystals were employed in medical practice. The still living tribes of Arizona, particularly the Hopi, make use in their rites of a variety of stones, among which are 'rock-crystals, botryoidal stones employed in treating disease or by sun priests in rain ceremonies.'[4] The use of quartz-crystals in the Tusayan rites has been described by J. W. Fewkes,[5] and that of 'a crystal supposed to have been brought from the undermost world,' in the Zuñi rites, by Mrs. M. C. Stevenson.[6] A piece of rock-crystal was among the sacred objects seen by Charlevoix in a mausoleum of the chiefs of the now extinct Natchez of Louisiana.[7] Enormous crystals, sacred stones, endowed with power to kill or to protect, are mentioned in the traditions of the Luiseños of S. California; and rock-crystals are called 'the raven's arrows' and are regarded with superstitious fear, as is natural when they are connected with a bird so much feared.[8] Among the tribes of the North-West candidates for initiation into certain secret societies of the Nootka and of the Kwakiutl are supposed to be initiated by having a magical piece of quartz inserted into their bodies by supernatural beings, which has the effect of killing them. To restore the candidate to life the stone must be removed by shamans.[9] A piece of rock-crystal is mentioned in the legends of the Kwakiutl as given to or thrown at the hero by a supernatural being, and as conferring the power of flying.[10] And the neighbouring Catloltq tell of a double-headed snake that struck a hunter with a spear so that he fell as dead, afterwards giving him a transparent stone and leading his soul through all lands while his body lay where it fell until the soul returned.[11] So in S. America, among the Kobeua on the borders of Colombia and Brazil, in order to initiate a novice as a medicine-man, or *piaye*, an older *piaye* is said to fetch from a lofty mountain certain *dupa*, or magical white stones, which are voided by the great vulture. These stones he enchants 'through the novice's nose into his head; and there they eat up the whole brain and the eyes. Brain and eyes become and remain

1 P. D. Hardy, *Holy Wells of Ireland*, Dublin, 1836, pp. 30, 33.
2 C. R. Browne, *Proc. Royal Irish Academy*, 3rd ser., v. [1898] 69.
3 *FLJ* vii. [1889] 45.
4 J. G. Campbell, *Witchcraft and Second Sight in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland*, Glasgow, 1902, p. 93.
5 *De Situ Orbis*, i. 8. 6 *Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 724.
7 Cf. J. Wierus, *De Præstigiis Dæmonum*, Basel, 1577, bk. ii. ch. 4; J. Aubrey, *Miscellanies*[4], London, 1857, p. 154; Reginald Scot, *Discoverie of Witchcraft* (reprint of 1st ed., 1584), ed. B. Nicolson, do. 1886, pp. 335, 344, 354 360, 483.

1 *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland*, xxvii. 522; *Anthropos*, viii. [1913] 864.
2 *Amer. Anthr.*, new ser., xix. [1917] 477.
3 *FLJ* i. [1883] 245. 4 *28 RBEW* [1912] p. 130.
5 *Journ. Amer. Ethnol. and Archæol.* ii. [1892] 76, 123, 124.
6 *30 RBEW* [1915] 92.
7 *Bull. BE* xliii. [1911] 158, quoting P. F. X. de Charlevoix's *Journal of a Voyage to N. America.*
8 *Univ. California Pub. in Amer. Archæol. and Ethnol.* viii. [1908] 136, 147, 219.
9 F. Boas, *Rep. of 60th Meeting of Brit. Assoc.* [1890] p. 600. *Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.*, 1897, p. 633.
10 Boas, *Indianische Sagen*, pp. 162, 165.
11 *Ib.* p. 82.

dupa.'[1] It is not expressly said that these stones are crystals. It is certain, however, that crystals play a large part in the magical practice of the tribes of the northern part of S. America. They are part of the stock-in-trade of the *piaye*; they are inserted in the calabash which forms his rattle; they are employed for charming, bewitching, or cursing others. Macusis and Wapisianas are described by R. Schomburgk as 'cutting each other's legs as a remedy for over-fatigue,' with a piece of rock-crystal, an instrument to which they ascribed particular virtue.[2] A more recent traveller describes the Andoke (also on the borders of Colombia and Brazil) as placing great faith in magical stones. When treating a patient, they lay stones on him.

'The medicine-man gazes on them abstractedly till a degree of self-induced trance is established. He will then break out into a frenzy, stamp, shout and brandish his rattle.' They 'are also used for magical rubbing.' The only ones which the traveller succeeded in seeing 'are of quartz, somewhat roughly made flat discs, worn smooth by continual use.'[3]

The Carib medicine-man is believed to send them into the body of any one whom he desires to render sick, and, if called on for aid, to eject them afterwards.[4]

In all parts of Australia the same virtues are ascribed to quartz-crystals and other shining stones. In New South Wales none of the medicine-man's possessions is more reverenced than quartz-crystals; they are held to possess marvellous powers.[5] They are sucked from the bodies of the sick, presumably first sent there by magical power.[6] They are used for rain-making.[7] In Queensland they are believed to be falling stars and are treasured by the natives with mysterious secrecy and used for incantation.[8] North and south, east and west, in the Australian continent quartz and rock-crystals are used for magical purposes; they are an essential part of the medicine-man's outfit, and they are buried with him.[9] They are made use of in the puberty ceremonies.[10] In Central Australia, and probably elsewhere, it is believed that at the initiation of a medicine-man the spirits implant in the body of the candidate a supply of these stones, upon which he is subsequently able to draw for the purposes of his craft.[11] Finally, in New South Wales, among the tribes of which the nearest approach to a belief in a divinity is found, these crystals are distinctly connected with Daramulun, Baiame, or whatever the chief personage of their mythology may be called. He it is who gives the crystals; and his own body in his camp on a high mountain or in the heavens, where he now presides, is itself partly a great crystal.[12]

Among the Melanesians of New Guinea pieces of quartz, both crystalline and vein-quartz, are used in sorcery for the purpose especially of causing death to an enemy; and they are part of a sorcerer's outfit. Quartz pebbles are considered of deadly potency.[1] A tale reported from a Fijian source relates the gift by a supernatural being of a crystal which showed anything he wished to one who looked into it. The person to whom it had been given learned remedies for disease in this way and practised them with success; but he was eventually imprisoned when the Government heard of it.[2] The Dusuns of British N. Borneo carry quartz-crystals as amulets.[3] Among the Sea Dayaks of Sarawak every medicine-man possesses a piece of quartz-crystal, which, when called in to attend a sick man, he consults to ascertain where the escaped soul of the patient has hidden (scrying), so that he may fetch it back. But he does not appear to make any further use of it in his ceremonies.[4] Some at least of the S. African Bantu value a piece of crystallized feldspar and wear it round the neck as an amulet. They believe it to be brought down in the lightning and to be found when a flash strikes the earth.[5] A celebrated rain-doctor in Mashonaland owed his power to a small white stone, probably a piece of feldspar or quartz.[6] In Portuguese E. Africa the medicine-man uses hot pieces of quartz-crystal to heat the drink in the poison ordeal, doubtless because of their supposed magical effect.[7]

4. Stone money.—One of the most curious applications of stone is the use of large solid disks, or wheels of it, as money, or a medium of exchange, on the island of Yap, or Uap, a westerly outlier of the Caroline group in Micronesia.

These wheels consist of limestone or arragonite quarried and shaped in Babelthuap, one of the Pelew Islands, 400 miles to the southward. They vary in diameter from one foot to twelve feet, and each of them has in the centre a hole for the insertion of a pole sufficiently large and strong to bear the weight and facilitate transportation. They are known as *fei*. The limestone of which they are composed, to be of the highest value, must be fine, white, and of close grain. It is described as 'somewhat like quartz, but not so translucent, nor of so fine a grain.' They are cut as nearly circular as primitive resources permit. The hole in the centre is roughly about one-sixth of the total diameter. From their size and weight they are frequently not capable of being stored in the native houses; and, since they are not easily stolen, they are (perhaps more often than not) kept outside. Thus, as one traveller says, 'they are more for show and ornament than for use.' The houses of the richer men, and the *failu*, or *pabai*, the men's house where the men live and hold their councils and assemblies, in every village have their fronts adorned with *fei* that testify to the wealth of the inmates. The value depends not only on the size, but also on the quality of the material.

It need not be said that the islanders have also other currency, of smaller value but more portable, consisting of pearl-shells and sacred mats (called *umbul*) of banana fibre.[8]

LITERATURE.—This is mostly found in ethnographical works, as indicated in the foregoing pages. It may, however, be useful to refer to the classified list of rude stone monuments, in S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, Paris, 1905–12, iii. 364. Lord Avebury, *Origin of Civilization*[6], London, 1889, pp. 307–316, gives a general account of stone-worship. A useful general account of the monuments themselves by J. W. Fewkes is given in *Great Stone Monuments in History and Geography* ('Smithsonian Misc. Collections,' vol. lxi. no. 6), Washington, 1913; a similar account of the rude stone monuments of India by W. Crooke, in *Proc. Cotteswold Field Club*, xv. [1905] 117 ff. See also, for those in the Nilgiri Hills, W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 438 ff. An account of stone cults in the Græco-Turkish area is given by F. W. Hasluck in *BSA* xxi. [1914–15].

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

STONES (Greek and Roman).—

The veneration of stones is one of the earliest forms taken by

[1] T. Koch-Grünberg, *Zwei Jahre unter den Indianern*, Berlin, 1910, ii. 155.
[2] *30 RBEW*, pp. 329 f., 352.
[3] T. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, p. 184.
[4] *Ib.* p. 379.
[5] *Anthropos*, vi. 889; L. E. Threlkeld, *An Australian Language*, Sydney, 1892, p. 48, app. pp. 85, 93, 102.
[6] *JAI* xvi. [1887] 57.
[7] K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, pp. 26, 35, 48, 74, 75, 80, 137.
[8] W. E. Roth, *N. Queensland Ethnog. Bull.* v. [1903] 8; E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1886–87, iii. 29.
[9] *JAI* vii. [1878] 248, 289, xiii. [1884] 130, 190, 194, 296, 299, 445, xvi. 26, 43, 48, xxviii. [1899] 20; R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, Melbourne, 1878, i. 336, 464, 473; T. Worsnop, *The Prehistoric Arts etc. of the Aborigines of Australia*, Adelaide, 1897, p. 171; Howitt, pp. 357 f., 365, 400.
[10] Brough Smyth, ii. 272; *JAI* ii. [1873] 281, xiii. 296, 445, note 1.
[11] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 525; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 480; *JAI* vii. 289, xvi. 50.
[12] *JAI* xiii. 445 n., xvi. 51 f.; K. Langloh Parker, *More Australian Legendary Tales*, London, 1898, p. 80, *Euahlayi Tribe*, pp. 7, 76; R. H. Mathews, *Ethnol. Notes on the Aborig. Tribes of New South Wales and Victoria*, Sydney, 1905, p. 142.

[1] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 284, 287, 290.
[2] *FL* xxiv. [1913] 233.
[3] *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 393.
[4] E. H. Gomes, *Seventeen Years among the Sea Dyaks of Borneo*, London, 1911, p. 165.
[5] J. Chapman, *Travels in the Interior of S. Africa*, London, 1868, i. 262.
[6] *Journ. of the African Soc.* iv. [1905] 319.
[7] J. G. Frazer, *Folklore in the Old Testament*, London, 1918, iii. 376.
[8] W. H. Furness, *The Island of Stone Money*, Philadelphia and London, 1910, p. 93; F. W. Christian, *The Caroline Islands*, London, 1899, pp. 236, 256, 291.

magic and religion in all countries, and it is one of the most persistent. In the case of meteoric stones, which fall from the sky, veneration may well seem natural; but it is not confined to such. Stones of unusual colour or shape have frequently attracted veneration; and this has even been extended in modern Greece and Asia Minor to wrought stones from temples, or even marbles bearing inscriptions.

We may trace three stages in stone-worship in Greece. In the first the stone, in virtue of something strange about it—its colour, its shape, or some curious fact in regard to its appearance or history—is worshipped as a fetish. In the second it is regarded as the chosen seat of some divine power, some god or hero. In the third it is venerated in connexion with some interesting event in mythic history.

(1) In the pre-historic age of Greece stone pillars seem to have been objects of veneration. Several were discovered by Arthur Evans in the great pre-historic palace at Cnossus in Crete. They were usually dedicated, so to speak, by cutting on them the sacred sign of the double-axe, the symbol of the Cretan deity afterwards called Zeus. To this age must also belong, in the main, what we have called the first stage in the worship of stones, whether natural or rudely cut into conical shape. Such fetishism no doubt survived into the classical period on many sites, though, as is natural, the historians and poets of Greece make little mention of it; and later writers, such as Pausanias and Plutarch, are apt to interpret it through the medium of myth. Theophrastus, however, in the 4th cent. B.C., gives us, as a mark of the superstitious man (*δεισιδαίμων*), that he will pour oil on the already oily stones which stand at the cross-ways, and not pass on until he has prostrated himself and worshipped.[1] This rubbing or anointing with oil or with fat seems to have been the chief element of the ritual in regard to sacred stones.

Somewhat more elaborate was the cultus of a stone among the Ænianes of Thessaly. They made sacrifices to it, and placed on it the fat of the victims.[2] This is an extreme case; and the people told a mythical story to account for the custom.

Greek necklaces are extant in which wrought flints or small meteoric stones are enclosed in gold-work; and it has been supposed, with great probability, that they were regarded as bringing luck. We may perhaps have here the origin of the use of precious stones in jewellery.

(2) The second stage, in which a stone is regarded as the chosen seat and representative of a deity, was exemplified in many places in Asia Minor and Greece. One of the most noted of these primitive symbols occurs on the coins of Paphos in Cyprus. The place of honour in the temple of Aphrodite in that city was held by a conical stone, which stood for an image of the goddess. Similar conical stones may be found on the coins of Apollonia in Illyria and many other places. When Pausanias visited Greece, he found in many places, in the open air, stones which were called by the names of the deities.

> At Pharæ in Achaia, he writes, 'in the market-place there stand about thirty squared stones: these the people of Pharæ revere, giving to each stone the name of a god.' 'In the olden time,' he adds, 'all the Greeks worshipped unwrought stones instead of images.'[3]

Many such stones, unwrought or rudely shaped, held their place in sacred shrines at a later time. In the old gymnasium at Megara[4] was a stone in the form of a small pyramid, which was called Apollo Carinus. A mere stone stood for Herakles at Hyettus; and in some of the most important temples of Greece stones retained their place of honour. Eros at Thespiæ was represented by an unwrought stone,[1] and the Graces at Orchomenus by stones which fell from the sky. In later Greece we have relics of the worship of the deities in such primitive forms in the representation of Apollo in the streets by mere columns and the frequent placing of the heads of Hermes and Dionysus on square pillars called 'Herms.'

> Coins of the Roman age enable us to trace step by step the process by which these sacred stones were gradually transformed into the human image.[2] At Emesa in Syria the temple image was a mere conical stone, like the omphalos preserved at Delphi; at Perga in Pamphylia the head of a deity emerges from the top of a pyramidal stone; at Ephesus the figure of the goddess Artemis, 'the image which fell from heaven,' has articulate head and feet; but the body is not much more than a cone. At Samos, Aphrodisias, and Euromus we find on the coins primitive figures, articulate above, but ending below in a mere shapeless trunk. And, though such images, in the 5th and 4th centuries, were often removed to make way for the noble productions of the Greek chisel, they often returned to their place of honour some time before the Christian era.

(3) The third stage was reached when stones were no longer regarded as the dwelling-places of deities, but were held sacred in virtue of some mythological story connected with them; *e.g.*, a stone at Troezen, in Argolis, was said to have been the scene of the purification of Orestes after the murder of his mother. Another at Gytheium was the seat, sitting on which he had recovered from his madness.[3] Curiously, this stone was locally called Zeus Cappotas, or 'the Reliever,' whence it is clear that the story about Orestes is a later and rationalizing tale. Close to the altar of Apollo at Thebes was a stone, called 'the Chastener' (*σωφρονιστήρ*), which Athene had hurled at Herakles when he was mad, and attempting to slay his father Amphitryon.[4] Probably in all these cases the stone had been held sacred from early times, and the story was an invention of a later age.

The most noted sacred stone in Greece was the conical stone at Delphi, often figured on coins and vases as covered with woollen fillets. No doubt in early times it was held in honour as intrinsically sacred. But in later times the story told in regard to it was that it was the stone which Cronus had been induced to swallow in the place of the infant Zeus, whom his father wanted to make away with. This barbarous story was softened or superseded by the poets. Pindar attributes the sanctity of the stone to the belief that it was the exact centre of the earth, the *γῆς ὀμφαλός*.[5] Zeus, it was said, had let fly two eagles from the two ends of the earth, and they had met at Delphi. This statement, of course, from the scientific point of view has no basis. But the whole process of thought in regard to the stone, first magical, then mythological, and then pseudo-scientific, is very interesting and instructive. It is curious that close connexion between a stone and an oracle is found elsewhere. The chief oracle of the Mandan Indians of America was situated at a great stone, whither deputations resorted to seek divine guidance.[6]

Though the evidence is scanty, we cannot doubt that in Italy a similar range of ideas prevailed. Lucian[7] mentions a Roman, named Rutilianus, who furnishes a parallel to the superstitious man of Theophrastus. He was a gentleman and an official; but, whenever he saw a sacred stone anointed with oil or adorned with garlands, he would straightway fall on his knees, or, standing by it, utter prayers for various boons.

Two stones which were probably originally

1 *Characters*, ch. xvi.
2 Plutarch, *Quæst. Græc.* 13.
3 VII. xxii. 3.
4 Paus. I. xliv. 3.

1 Paus. IX. xxvii. 1.
2 P. Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, Cambridge, 1883, pl. xv.
3 Paus. II. xxxi. 4, III. xxii. 1.
4 *Ib.* IX. xi. 1.
5 *Pyth.* iv. 131; Strabo, ix. p. 419; cf. art. OMPHALOS.
6 J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, London, 1898, iv. 155.
7 *Alexander*, 30.

fetishes play an important part in Roman history. In 204 B.C., during the war with Hannibal, the Romans, on the advice of the Sibylline books, imported from Pessinus in Asia Minor the stone which was there regarded as the dwelling-place of the mother-goddess Cybele. And Cybele brought with her to Rome an Oriental cultus and a train of priests. Again, in the 3rd cent. A.D., the emperor Elagabalus introduced at Rome the veneration of the sacred stone at Emesa which was regarded as the seat of the Oriental sun-god, and which appears in a chariot on the coins of the emperor.

Until the end of paganism there was in places apart from stir and progress a cult of stones. Arnobius, *e.g.*, who wrote in Africa about A.D. 300, says,[1] in regard to his pagan life, that, when he saw a sacred stone, he adored it, as if some virtue dwelt in it. And in fact such superstitions have not yet disappeared. In the *Annual of the British School at Athens* for 1914–16 F. W. Hasluck gives an account of the stones still held sacred in Greece and Turkey. Some of these may have kept their place from remote antiquity; but in some cases they are architectural fragments, or even marbles bearing inscriptions, which must have come to honour in comparatively recent times. The veneration of stones, in modern as in ancient times, is a matter not so much of date as of seclusion from the paths of education and progress. In Turkey, at the present day, the people often break up inscribed marbles in the hope of finding gold inside them; and, as this hope can scarcely be based on experience, it may well be a relic of the early veneration of stones.

LITERATURE.—F. Lenormant, art. 'Bætylia,' in Daremberg-Saglio; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, 6 vols., London, 1898, Index, *s.v.* 'Stone.'

P. GARDNER.

STONES (Indian).—**1. Stages in stone-worship.**—The worship of stones is widely spread throughout India, and assumes numerous and varied forms. In the first place, a distinction must be drawn between the pre-animistic and the animistic conception of sanctity in the stone. In the former the stone is regarded as sacred or tabu because it is vaguely conceived to possess some innate power which causes fear or reverence; in the latter the stone is believed to be the abode of some spirit. But in many cases it is not easy to separate these two forms of sanctity with any approach to precision.

'All the various functions of these stones, prophetic, kathartic, prophylactic, etc., are only various manifestations of its [the aerolitic stone's] supernatural power. In primitive days a sacred stone is a god of all work.'[2]

(*a*) *The pre-animistic stage.*—Here the stone is feared or reverenced mainly because its appearance is queer or uncanny, or because the circumstances of its discovery or erection suggest some tragical occurrence which continues to invest the place with a sense of awe or terror.

Thus, throughout India, we find 'the worship of a stone oddly shaped, of a jutting piece of rock, a huge boulder lying alone in the plain, a circle of stones, a peculiar mark on the hill-side or a hummock atop, an ancient carved pillar, a milestone unexpectedly set up where none was before, with strange hieroglyphics, a telegraph post, fossils with their shell marks; in fact, any object of the kind that catches attention as being out of the common way.'[3]

As instances of this class of belief, some curious fossils found near a Muhammadan shrine at Girar in the Wārdha district are supposed to be stock-in-trade of two Banjāra traders who mocked the saint, and their wares were turned into stone.[4] Some stones may be simply commemorative or used for some magical purpose.

Among the Bhīls, after a birth, the mother smears a spot outside her hut with cowdung marked with lines of turmeric. In the midst of the figure thus made she places five stones, corresponding to the number of days which have elapsed since the birth, and, laying round them pieces of coco-kernel, she sprinkles them with turmeric, millet, red powder, and spirits—possibly a magical charm to bring good luck on the child.[1] The Kurumbas, a forest tribe of S. India, place an ordinary stone in a cave; it is not a *liṅga*, and they call it Hiriadeva, 'great god.'[2]

Or, again, the appearance or position of a stone suggests a tragedy.

Such is the *baghaut*, or 'tiger cairn,' a pile of stones erected on the spot where a man has been killed by a tiger, to which every passer-by adds a stone.[3] Another case is that of Dāntan Deo, 'the deity with the teeth,' embodied in a projecting rock, which bears a rude resemblance to a hideous grinning skull, with enormous teeth.[4] In many instances curiously formed natural monoliths are supposed to represent a bride and bride-groom with their escort, as in the case of Dūlhā Deo.[5] In Bombay curiously cleft rocks or crags at Matherān and in the Poona district commemorate a similar tragedy, caused by the opening of the hill-side which engulfed the party.[6] In the Vizagapatam district some stones near a river pool represent a Banjārā (*q.v.*) and his pack bullock, turned into stone by the curse of the king of the fishes for killing and eating one of the sacred fish.[7] In the Himālaya a holy *fagir* came to a mountain to worship and accomplished his pilgrimage. But he incurred the displeasure of the god by returning to ask some favour, and was turned into a rock, which now appears white at sunrise, red at midday, and green at sunset.[8]

Aerolites or meteoric stones, often found in India,[9] fall into the same class, it being 'probably easier, even for the naïve imagination of early men, to conceive of a stiff log-like idol descending thence than of a seated divinity shot from the sky, throne and all.'[10] In India some of these stones are worshipped as *liṅgas*; one in Bengal is called Adbhūtnātha, 'the miraculous god.'[11]

A famous stone, hung from an iron chain in the tomb of Maḥmūd at Bijāpur, was said to be a meteorite brought from Arabia, and was believed to protect the building from lightning; it has now been proved to be a piece of nephrite or jade.[12]

(*b*) *The animistic stage.*—In some of the instances already given we approach the animistic stage, where the stone is conceived to be the abode of a spirit. In the instances which follow this belief is clear.

In Burma some septs of the Karen tribe keep in their houses stones to which they make offerings of blood; as a member of the tribe explained, 'If they do not give it blood to eat, it will eat them.'

Some of these stones are supposed to give good crops of rice, others to be the embodiment of benevolent spirits, which, however, sometimes turn out to be malevolent; others are supposed to kill persons whom their owners dislike.[13] At a later stage these vague spirits become identified with special gods and receive definite names.

In the Deccan, at the full moon of Sept.–Oct., each Kunbi collects in his field six stones which he assumes to represent the five Pāṇḍava heroes of the *Mahābhārata* and their mother Kuntī; he smears them with lime and spots of red paint, breaks a coconut before them, and offers food.[14] The Shānārs, palm-tree tappers of Mysore, worship a male and a female deity, which, on holy days, are represented by two rude stones, taken up for the occasion; during the rite they are placed in a shed, but afterwards they are thrown away and neglected.[15]

1 *Adv. Gentes*, i. 39.
2 J. E. Harrison, *JHS* xix. [1899] 237.
3 A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*[2], London, 1897, i. 11 *f.*; cf. E. Westermarck, *MI*, London, 1906–08, ii. 592 f.
4 R. V. Russell, *Wardha Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1906, i. 27 f.

1 *BG* xii. [1880] 87.
2 G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa*, London, 1893, p. 235.
3 *PR*[2] i. 267 *f.* This mode of averting evil has been discussed by J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 15 ff., who explains it as a means of purification, the evil being thought to be embodied in the missile which is thrown away (*ib.* p. 23 f.).
4 *PR*[2] i. 119. 5 *Ib.* i. 119 *f.*
6 *BG* xiv. [1882] 235, xviii. iii. [1885] 141; for similar legends in Europe see J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1880–88, iv. 1446 f.
7 E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, i. 129.
8 *Census of India, 1901*, xvii., *Punjab*, pt. i. p. 127.
9 E. Balfour, *Cyclopædia of India*, London, 1885, i. 276, ii. 935.
10 *CGS* i. 335; cf. *JHS* xix. 236 f., xxi. [1901] 118 f.
11 *PR*[2] i. 82. 12 *BG* xxiii. [1884] 606.
13 *British Burma Gazetteer*, Rangoon, 1880, ii. 241.
14 *BG* xxi. [1884] 117.
15 F. Buchanan, *A Journey from Madras through . . . Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, London, 1807, ii. 385, 415.

In a temple of Durgā at Manipur a rough black stone, apparently quite unworked, represents the goddess.[1] In Bengal, at the close of the festival which commemorates the end of the menstrual period of Mother Earth, a stone representing the goddess is placed erect on the ground; the top is painted with vermilion; it is purified by bathing, and decked with flowers, and offerings of milk and fruits are made to it.[2] The image of Asāpūrṇā Mātā, 'she who fulfils desires,' at Madh in Cutch, is a red-painted rock, about 6 ft. high and 6 ft. broad at the base, narrowing to a point at the top, with some vague resemblance to the human form. People walk round it, and the chief annually sacrifices seven male buffaloes before it.[3] In Gujarāt many of the gods of the forest tribes are represented by stones. Vaitāl Dev, a hill-god, is a stone about 4 ft. high; Simādiā Dev, a red-coloured stone under a sacred tree, is worshipped at marriages.[4] In the Central Provinces, Bhaiṅsāsur, the buffalo-god, is a stone placed in every field, sometimes one or two for the whole village. It is worshipped when a cow runs dry or the milk goes bad. Muṭhiyā Deo, the divine watchman, is a stone smeared with vermilion at the meeting of the village cross-roads.[5] Ghaṭoiyā, 'lord of the crossing' (*ghāṭ*), is a round stone placed on a platform near fords, and Kheḍapati or Khermātā, 'deity of the village site-mound' (*kherā*), is a stone worshipped at sowing-time and harvest.[6] In Kolhapur the local god, Jotibā, and his consort, Yamāī, dwell in rough stones.[7] All over N. India the collective gods of the hamlet are represented by a pile of stones of the most heterogeneous kind—water-worn pebbles, flint hammers, fragments of carved stone from ancient buildings, and the like—all arranged under the sacred tree of the hamlet.[8]

2. Stones used in orthodox Hindu worship.—Many stones are used in worship by Brāhmans and other high castes. Among the Hindus generally particular respect is paid to stones which appear spontaneously and bear no marks of human work. They are known as *svayambhu*, 'self-existent,' chiselling being regarded as disturbing and offensive to the indwelling spirit. Many of the most famous *liṅgas* and other holy stones are of this kind.[9]

The *śālagrāma*, a black ammonite, found in the Nepāl river Gaṇḍakī, from its curious interstices and other markings, is regarded as the abode of Viṣṇu.[10] Bairāgīs (*q.v.*) are specially careful about the *śālagrāma*; they will not eat without worshipping it, and, when so doing, they cover their heads with a piece of cloth upon which the name of Rāma is inscribed.[11] Smārta Brāhmans in S. India use five stones in their domestic worship—the *śāḷagrāma*, representing Viṣṇu; the *vāṇa-liṅga*, a white stone, Śiva; a piece of red jasper, Gaṇeśa; a bit of metallic ore, Pārvatī, or a *liṅga-yoni*, Śiva-Pārvatī; a piece of pebble or crystal, the sun.[12]

3. Worship of special stones.—Worship of certain stones is specially important: the boundary-stone, the 'navel-' or village-stone, the death- and memorial-stone, the bride-stone, and the grindstone.

(*a*) *The boundary-stone.*—The best examples of this come from S. India. H. Whitehead[13] connects this cult with the totem sacrifice, the totem animal being slain that its blood may be shed and may thus secure the presence of the totem deity at a particular spot, which then becomes tabu. To prevent violation, the place is marked by a simple heap of stones, or by an upright stone-pillar, which would perhaps be sprinkled with the blood.

The boundary-stone, in India and elsewhere, marks the division between the cultivated area and the waste, a margin of separation between the sacred and the profane, within which the sacred processes of domestic life and husbandry might go on, undisturbed by dangers—human, spiritual, or what not—coming from the profane world beyond.[1] Throughout India the boundary-stone and its cults ensure the protection of the hamlet from foreign (and therefore hostile) spirits. Some tribes worship a god of boundaries, like Sundi Pennu of the Kandhs; others practise propitiation of foreign spirits at the boundary (*sīmānta pūjana*), when the party of the bridegroom arrives to fetch the bride.[2] In the Central Provinces there is a tree or stone worshipped as Miṛoī Deo, god of boundaries, to whom, in times of sickness, worship is done by hanging small flags on his shrine and by offering goats; in the Betul district, at the Dasahrā festival, the *bhūmkā*, or medicine-man, installs Dongar Deo, god of hills, on the boundary; he is believed to avert calamities for the coming year.[3] In Trichinopoly, at the propitiation of the boundary-goddess, the priest carries a pot full of boiled rice and the blood of a sacrificed lamb to the boundary-stone, walks round the stone three times, and at the third circuit smashes the pot on a second smaller stone at the foot of the boundary-stone.[4] In Mysore these stones are often adopted into the cults of the higher gods, by carving on them Śaiva or Vaiṣṇava symbols.[5] In Gujarāt Khetrpāl, 'tract-guardian,' the boundary-god, is represented by a stone on which is carved the figure of a horse.[6] In S. India such stones are held in great respect, are worshipped at the festivals of the village-goddesses, and may be known by their shortness and the oily incrustation caused by constant anointing; in Vizagapatam, when cholera appears, sacrifice is made at the stone, and crows' or peacocks' feathers are hung across the paths, or a broom is suspended to brush away all evil influences.[7]

(*b*) *Village-stones.*—In S. India such stones are known as 'navel'-stones. With these we may compare the omphalos (*q.v.*), or 'navel,' at Delphi, for which there are numerous parallels in many parts of the world.[8]

In the middle of the threshold of nearly all the gateways of ruined forts in the Bellary district there is a roughly cylindrical or conical stone, known as the 'navel' or 'middle' stone (*hoddu-rāyi*), planted there when the fort was built, and marking its limits. Before sowing, the village oxen are worshipped and driven past the stone to the sound of music; a mock combat follows between the owners of the cattle, each trying to drive his beast first through the gateway, and omens are taken from the colours of the animals: if a white ox wins, white crops, like cotton or white millet, will prosper in the coming year; if red, those with red grains, like red millet, will thrive.[9] In Mysore this cattle-stone is a rough slab, about 4 ft. high and 3 ft. broad, set upon a stone platform about 1½ ft. broad. When cattle suffer from sore feet, the owner pours curds over the stone for their recovery; charms against the evil eye and other dangers are engraved on stones, called 'amulet-stones' (*yantra-kallu*), which are often erected at the entrances of villages.[10]

[1] T. C. Hodson, *The Meitheis*, London, 1908, p. 102.
[2] *Census of India, 1901*, vi., *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 189.
[3] *BG* v. [1880] 233 f. [4] *Ib.* ix. i. [1901] 292.
[5] R. V. Russell, *Betul Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1907, i. 54; *Chhindwara Gazetteer*, 1907, i. 446 f.
[6] Russell, *Damoh Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1906, i. 36.
[7] *BG* xxiv. [1886] 300. [8] *PR*[2] i. 97.
[9] M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 69; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895, p. 328.
[10] W. Ward, *View of the Hist., Lit., and Relig. of the Hindoos*[2], Serampore, 1815, ii. 221 ff.; V. Nagam Aiya, *Manual of Travancore*, Trivandrum, 1906, ii. 55 n.; M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, v. 78, n. 2.
[11] Thurston, i. 132. [12] *Ib.* i. 315.
[13] 'The Village Deities of India,' *Bull. Madras Museum*, v. [1907] 181 ff., *The Village Gods of S. India*, Oxford, 1916, p. 146 ff.

[1] W. W. Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, p. 212, referring to Van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, ch. ii.; cf. Westermarck, *MI* ii. 67 ff., who regards the stone as an embodied curse.
[2] S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, London, 1865, p. 366; J. M. Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, pp. 159, 217 f., 317.
[3] R. V. Russell, *Damoh Gazetteer*, i. 36, *Betul Gazetteer*, i. 56.
[4] Whitehead, *The Village Gods of S. India*, p. 104.
[5] B. L. Rice, *Mysore*[2], London, 1897, i. 508.
[6] *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 292.
[7] F. R. Hemingway, *Trichinopoly Gazetteer*, Madras, 1907, i. 81; W. Francis, *Vizagapatam Gazetteer*, do. 1907, i. 68.
[8] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, London, 1898, v. 314 ff.; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 557 ff.
[9] W. Francis, *Bellary Gazetteer*, Madras, 1904, i. 61; Thurston, i. 172 f.
[10] Whitehead, *Bull. Madras Museum*, v. [1907] 125; Rice, *Mysore*[2], i. 456 f.

In other parts of the country village-stones, embodying the luck of the community, are erected. The Garos erect sacrificial stones at the entrance of any large village. They are rough, unhewn stones, set up in the ground without any attempt at regularity, and seldom more than 3 ft. high. They are regarded with much reverence, and may never be removed. When a village site is changed, the stone remains, and the villagers return to the old stone for the annual ceremony. When the time of sacrifice arrives, the stones are decked with crowns made of bamboos, and sacrificial emblems are placed near them. Swords are brought out and planted, point upwards, in the hollow ends of a row of short bamboos. The priest slays the victim, and smears its blood on the stones. In some cases each stone appears to represent a particular guardian-spirit, and is given a name accordingly.[1] Among the Lushais, when the season for the jungle clearance (*jhūm*) begins, the Chiru clan kill a dog at a stone placed east of the village; as soon as it grows dark, men and women drink and dance round the stone.[2] The Pahāriyās of Chotā Nagpur sacrifice to their guardian stones and anoint them with red lead and oil.[3]

The worship of such stones is closely associated with the cult of sacred trees. The Skr. word *chaitya* (*q.v.*) means 'a funeral pile or grave, a monument or tombstone,' and also 'a sacred tree,' like the fig, 'growing in or near a village and held in veneration by the villagers, a place of sacrifice or religious worship, an altar.'[4] In some villages in S. India 'the deity is represented simply by a stone pillar standing in a field, or on a stone platform under a tree, or in a small enclosure surrounded by a stone wall.'[5] The Kurumbas worship a block of stone under a tree, by the name Gurunātha, 'lord teacher.'[6] In Mysore serpent-stones are set up on a platform facing the rising sun, under trees, one of which is invariably a sacred fig, which represents a female, and the other a margosa, a male.[7] Among the Garos near the stones erected by the tribe to commemorate a tragic death either a *mandal*-tree (*Erythrina suberosa*) or an Euphorbia cactus is planted.[8] The shrine of the village-deities in N. India always consists of a pile of stones collected under a sacred tree, usually a species of fig.

(*c*) *Death- and memorial-stones.*—In many cases the stone is designed to form a home for the spirits of the dead or to serve as a memorial of them.

In W. India the 'life-stone' (*jīv-khāḍā*) is used in the funeral rites. The Bhoīs of Bombay keep the stone with which, at the cremation, the water-jar is broken by the chief mourner in the house for the ten days of mourning. On the tenth day the chief mourner goes to the river with the 'life-stone,' offers grain and a copper coin to it or to the spirit immanent in it, and bathes it thrice. Then the Brāhman priest, muttering spells and prayers, flings the stone into the water, thus finally disposing of the spirit.[9] Among the Chodhrās, on the fourth day after a death, a spirit medium, accompanied by the friends of the dead man, sits in the *devāsthān*, a plot of ground set apart near each village for the spirits of their forefathers, in order that they may not wander through want of shelter and company. He kills a fowl, letting some of the blood fall upon the 'life-stone.' Then he offers grain and butter, paints the stone red, consecrates it to the spirit of the dead man, and in some cases covers it with a quaintly ornamented dome of clay. Near the stone the friends set a small clay cow or she-buffalo for a woman, and a horse for a man.[10]

[1] A. Playfair, *The Garos*, London, 1909, p. 96 f.
[2] J. Shakespear, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 168.
[3] F. B. Bradley-Birt, *Story of an Indian Upland*, London, 1905, p. 295; cf. the custom of pouring blood on stones representing the great god, Marang Buru (*ib.* p. 258, with a photograph, p. 261).
[4] M. Monier-Williams, *Skr.-Eng. Dictionary*, *s.v.*; cf. A. J. Evans, *JHS* xxi. 105 f., 126 ff.
[5] Whitehead, p. 122. [6] Oppert, p. 235.
[7] Rice, *Mysore*[2], i. 455; C. F. Oldham, *The Sun and the Serpent*, London, 1905, p. 152 f.
[8] Playfair, p. 97.
[9] *Eth. Surv. Bombay*, no. 115 [1908], p. 6.
[10] *Ib.* no. 80 [1907], p. 3 f.

By an extension of the belief that the spirit immediately after death takes refuge for a time in the 'death-stone,' and may be disposed of if the survivors fling it into water, it is believed that the spirit may be embodied in a memorial-stone, raised on or near the grave, before which offerings are placed to propitiate the ghost.

The most typical case of such memorial-stones is found among the Khāsis.[1] The same custom prevails among other tribes on the frontier of Assam. Among the Lushais a big upright stone is erected in the centre of the memorial-platform, and on it 'various figures are roughly outlined, representing the deceased and sometimes his wives and children, and the various animals that he has killed.'[2] Among the Old Kukis the stone is erected in anticipation of death or at the funeral, and the corpse of a village officer is carried, from left to right, round his memorial-stone.[3] Among the Nāgas the custom of erecting such stones is closely connected with ancestor-worship. A man will erect a stone in the name of his father, from whom he believes he will receive help, should need arise. Hence the preservation of the stone is associated with the luck of the family, and a man erects a stone if he desires to found a family.[4] The Mikirs erect on the grave of a great man a tall upright stone, with a broad stone supported on short uprights; on the latter offerings for the spirit are placed.[5]

Among the Mūṇḍās of Bengal, at the death of a leading man, a great stone is dragged by several men to the burial-ground. Some wealthy men prepare the stone in anticipation of death. Near the stone a deep hole is dug for the reception of the cinerary urn. These massive gravestones mark all ancient villages.[6]

In W. India similar stones are erected by the forest tribes. The Nāiks of Gujarāt, a year after a death, with the help of a holy man (*bhagat*), bring a stone from a river-bed and set it up as a memorial. The *bhagat* or a member of the family smears the stone with red lead, kills a hen, and sprinkles its blood on the stone. The Mātā, the Mother-goddess, possesses the *bhagat*, who trembles all over, and says to the spirit of the dead man: 'See that you do not disturb this family!' After the rite the hen is roasted and eaten by the family. A similar offering is made annually at the Holī, or spring fire-festival.[7] The Bhīls, after a death, employ a mason to carve on a stone a figure of the deceased on horseback. The stone is washed, daubed with red powder, and taken to the village *devāsthān*, where a goat is killed, its blood sprinkled on the stone, and the flesh cooked and eaten with as much spirits as the party can afford to buy.[8] In almost every part of Kāṭhiāwār, near the entry to villages, are stones like tombstones, known as *pāliyā*, or 'guardians,' erected in memory of Chārans (*q.v.*), men and women who killed themselves to prevent the capture of the village cattle or to recover them from the predatory Kāṭhīs. The name of the Chāran, the date, and the object of the memorial are inscribed on the stone, while a rude sculpture shows the men on horseback killing themselves with sword or spear, and the women pressing daggers into their throats.[9]

In other parts of Bombay 'battle-stones' are found, carved on the top with a funeral urn, and an attendant on each side holding a fly-whisk. Below are panels representing battle-scenes and worship of the *liṅga*. These stones are known as the 'seven heroes,' and are much dreaded because their spirits are believed to scour the country at night.[10] Similar memorials of old border fighting are found in Rājputānā, and they easily develop into the ornamental *chhatrī*, or cenotaph, which is erected to the memory of distinguished men.[11] In the same class are the *satī* shrines, memorials of faithful wives who died with their lords.[12] In S. India these are known as *māstikal* (*mahā-satī-kal*, 'holy woman's stone'); they generally bear carvings of a pointed pillar or post, from which projects a woman's bent arm, holding a lime-fruit, which the *satī* always carried when going to her death.[13]

(*d*) *The bride-stone.*—During the marriage ceremony the bride is made to stand on a stone, which is in some places held sacred. According to the Vedic ritual, 'the rice, which had been put into a basket, is then taken up, and the stone is placed before the bride, who treads upon it with the point

[1] See art. KHĀSIS; P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, p. 144 ff.; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 55 f.
[2] Shakespear, p. 85, with photographs of such stones, pp. 140, 147.
[3] *Ib.* p. 165.
[4] T. C. Hodson, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 138; Dalton, p. 43.
[5] E. Stack, *The Mikirs*, London, 1908, p. 42.
[6] Dalton, p. 202 f., with an illustration; Bradley-Birt, pp. 60 f., 101, with an illustration.
[7] *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 325. [8] *Ib.* iii. [1879] 221.
[9] *Ib.* viii. [1884] 136 f. n.
[10] *Ib.* xi. [1883] 307 f., xiv. [1882] 57 f., 309 f., xxii. [1884] 716 f.
[11] A. Adams, *Western Rajputana States*, London, 1900, p. 442, with photograph; F. S. Growse, *Mathura*[3], do. 1883, pp. 150, 306; Oldham, p. 102.
[12] *BG* ix. i. [1901] 358 ff.; *PR*[2] i. 185 ff.
[13] B. L. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, London, 1909, p. 185.

of her right foot, while the groom recites the prayer: "Ascend this stone; be firm like this stone; distress my foes, and be not subservient to my enemies."'[1]

On the same principle, at initiation, a Brāhman boy is made to stand with his right foot on a stone, while the words are repeated: 'Tread on this stone; like a stone be firm.'[2] In the modern practice, at a Brāhman wedding, a stone (*aśman*) is kept near the marriage fire, and, at each turn, as the bride followed by the groom draws near the stone, she stops and stands on it until the priest finishes reciting a hymn.[3] The same custom is found among the forest tribes. At a Muāsī wedding seven little heaps of rice and turmeric are arranged on a curry-stone. At each turn, as the pair go round, the groom causes the bride to kick away one of the heaps, thus dispersing ill-luck; among the Mūndās the bride stands on a curry-stone placed on a plough-shaft, supported on sheaves of grass and corn, emblems of fertility; among the Orāons the bridegroom stands on a curry-stone behind the bride and with his toes treads on her heels.[4]

(*e*) *The grindstone.*—This is used in birth and marriage rites as a symbol of fertility.

Among the Kunbīs of Kolābā, when a child is born, the grandmother or some elderly woman of the house places a grindstone in the lying-in room, and on it sets a small image of the tribal goddess made of rice-flour. She sprinkles red powder on the image, burns frankincense before it, offers fruit and flowers, and, wrapping the child in a cloth, presents it before the goddess, praying that she will accept the offerings, and be kind to the child.[5] The Rāmoshīs (*q.v.*) of Poona worship a grindstone on the fifth day after a birth.[6] The Govardhan Brāhmans, on the fifth day after a birth, place four stalks of millet on a grindstone, and keep a lamp burning all night to scare evil spirits.[7] At a Kunbī wedding a piece of cloth is steeped in turmeric, which scares evil spirits, and a root of tamarind, a holy tree, is placed on the cloth tied to the neck of the grindstone.[8]

4. Stones possessing magical powers.—Magical powers are attributed to many kinds of stones.

(*a*) *Holed stones.*—In many Indian dolmens there is a hole in the front slab. Many theories have been advanced—that it allows exit for the spirit of the dead man; that it permits offerings being passed into the inner chamber; that it allows an arm or other injured limb to be passed within the chamber, which possesses curative powers.[9] All holed stones possess magical powers, possibly because they afford entrance to a spirit which thus occupies the stone.[10] In the same class are the cup- and ring-markings found on many stones in India and elsewhere.[11] The meaning of these markings is obscure. In India a resemblance has been traced between them and the hemispherical depressions on village platforms, into which milk and Ganges water are poured to propitiate the malevolent dead.[12]

(*b*) *Creeping through or under sacred stones.*—The custom of creeping through the orifice of, or under, a sacred stone, as a mode of purification or as a test of purity, is common in India. At Dabhoī in Baroda, near a Musalmān tomb of some celebrity, there is an upright slab with a circular orifice, which discriminates between thieves and honest men. The stoutest man, unjustly charged with theft, can creep through it with ease, while the thinnest culprit will stick.[1] A stone with similar magical qualities is found at Bhaunagar, and is known as the 'window of Truth and Falsehood.'[2] At Śatrunjaya there is a holed stone, the hole being called Muktdwārā, 'door of bliss,' through which any one who can creep is sure of beatitude.[3] People creep through the hole in the Śrigundī stone at Malabar Point, in order to get rid of the ghost of men murdered by them. Śivajī performed this rite, probably to get rid of the clinging ghost of Afzul Khān, and Raghunāthrāo Peshwa to escape that of his murdered nephew, Nārāyanrāo.[4]

(*c*) *Swearing on sacred stones.*—The common custom of swearing upon a sacred stone may be partly based on the belief that the strength and stability of the stone lend confirmation to the oath.[5]

The Tangkhul Nāgas of Manipur have in their village heaps of peculiarly-shaped stones on which they take oaths.[6] The Garos swear on a meteorite,[7] the oath sworn being: 'May Gōéra (the god of lightning) kill me with one of these if I have told a lie!'; they also swear by the *śālagrāma* ammonite.[8] At Tirumala, in the N. Arcot district, the keys of the temple jewel-chest used to be placed on a stone, which was believed to guard the temple by moving round it at night; one night it killed a man who was accidentally locked in; people now take oaths before it, the witness, after bathing, moving round the stone in his wet clothing, touching the stone, and swearing.[9] At the shrine of a saint in Champāran, Bengal, there was once an inscribed stone by means of which thieves could be detected and stolen property recovered; Mahārājā Jang Bahādur is said to have carried it off to Nepāl.[10]

(*d*) *Stones which give strength and cure diseases.*—Some stones are believed to possess magical powers of giving strength and of curing disease.

In Manipur there is a 'war-stone,' which gives strength to warriors; heads taken in a raid were shown to it; no woman may look on the stone lest she destroy its powers.[11] In some of their hamlets the Kotas set up curiously carved stones believed to possess healing powers, if the member affected be rubbed against them.[12] In Bengal, during a cholera epidemic, a woman found a white, glittering stone in a tank. She took it home, and that night an old woman appeared to her in a dream and taught her how to expel the disease by worshipping the stone. She carried out the instructions, and the stone is now worshipped under the name of Dīdī Ṭhakrūn.[13] In Central India stones known as Motī Mātā, 'pearl mother,' and Lālbāī Phūlbāī, 'dear flower lady,' are worshipped during epidemics of cholera. The *barwā*, or village medicine-man,

[1] H. T. Colebrooke, *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus*[2], London, 1858, p. 135.
[2] H. Oldenberg, *The Gṛihya Sūtras*, pt. ii., *SBE* xxx. [1892] 146.
[3] *BG* xxii. [1884] 81.
[4] Dalton, pp. 194, 234, 252.
[5] *BG* xi. [1883] 56.
[6] *Ib.* xviii. i. [1885] 415.
[7] *Ib.* p. 161.
[8] *Ib.* p. 303.
[9] For illustrations see J. Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments*, pp. 468, 469, 473; for similar holed dolmens in Europe and India, W. C. Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, ii. 627 f., 708, iii. 723, 753, 758.
[10] Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, p. 164 f.; *PR*[2] ii. 64 f.; *Man*, iii. [1903] no. 8, p. 17 ff.; on promises made at holed stones, Scott, *The Pirate*, note BB.
[11] J. H. Rivett-Carnac, *Arch. Notes on Ancient Sculpturings on Rocks in Kumaun, India*, Calcutta, 1883.
[12] D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 116.

[1] *BG* vii. [1883] 548.
[2] A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, London, 1878, p. 574 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 576.
[4] *BG* xxvi. iii. [1894] 607 *f.*; *Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island*, Bombay, 1909–10, ii. 360. Compare the creeping through the passage known as St. Wilfred's Needle at Ripon Cathedral (*NQ*, 8th ser., ii. [1892] 313, 398).
[5] J. G. Frazer, *Lectures on the Early Hist. of the Kingship*, London, 1905, p. 73, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, ii. 364.
[6] Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, p. 110.
[7] See § 1 (*a*).
[8] Playfair, p. 75.
[9] A. F. Cox and H. A. Stuart, *Manual of N. Arcot*, Madras, 1895, i. 329.
[10] *Census of India, 1901*, vi., *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 178.
[11] T. C. Hodson, *The Meitheis*, p. 102, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, p. 175; on similar tabus of menstruous women and of immorality see J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 145 ff.; Westermarck, *MI* ii. 417 ff.
[12] Thurston, iv. 14.
[13] *Census of India, 1901*, vi., *Bengal*, pt. [illegible] p. 194.

slays a goat, the head of which, with lemons, copper coins, eggs, flowers, etc., is placed in a potsherd and offered to the stone; a small toy cart is placed near the stone, in which it is believed that the dreaded spirit may be induced to leave the place and take the disease with her.[1] The Burmese believe that a cabalistic figure engraved on a stone will make it float, and such a stone, if buried in a man's flesh, saves him from drowning. Certain stones, said to be found in the heads of birds, in trees, and in animals, are prized as amulets. They keep off sword-thrusts and evil spirits. When placed on a child's face or put into any one's blood, they introduce a spirit; the person so possessed falls into a trance, and may be questioned as to the doings of other evil spirits in the neighbourhood.[2] With such curative and magical stones may be compared the snake-stone and the jewel said to be found in the head of a snake.[3]

5. **Pre-historic stones.**—The pre-historic stone monuments of India include megalithic graves, known as dolmens and cistvaens, cairns, and standing monoliths.

An attempt has been made by G. Elliot Smith to assign the impulse for the erection of these monuments in Europe, Asia, and Africa to a single race starting from Egypt.[4] This view, as far as Europe is concerned, has not met with general acceptance.[5] In the case of India, it is difficult to attribute these monuments to a single race entering by the land route, because such monuments are rarely found in the Panjāb or along the routes which the so-called Aryans and other invaders from Central Asia followed. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the dolmen has for its antetype the hut, of which models, to provide for the repose of the spirit and for the supply of its food, were and are often erected.[6] If such monuments in certain areas assume the megalithic form, it is because stones suitable for the purpose are procurable there. So far as our present knowledge extends, the dolmens and other megalithic monuments of the Deccan and S. India appear to belong to the early Iron Age. Some of the three-sided open dolmens may have been used as ossuaries, like those of the Khāsis (*q.v.*). One difficulty in assigning a date to these erections is that they continue to be set up by some of the present tribes. Thus the Todas erect funeral-stones, at which buffaloes are slain at funerals; others mark the spot where the corpse is laid, or a mound is raised for the same purpose. But at present no sanctity is attributed to them, and there are no definite signs of veneration or worship.[7]

Among the Wās of Upper Burma are seen collections of boulders with pointed stones in the centre. In one village there is a large flat stone propped up on several others in dolmen fashion. These may have been graves, but they are now said to be the abode of the house-spirit—one belief not necessarily excluding the other.[8] The cairn is usually surrounded by a circle of monoliths, like the Vetālā circles in the Deccan. Here the circle encloses a stone, the god's house, the stones in the circle being called his watchmen. It has usually been assumed that such central stones or tumuli, surrounded by a circle of monoliths, passed into Buddhism in the form of the *stūpa* (*q.v.*), with its elaborately carved railing; but V. A. Smith derives the domical *stūpa*, not from a tumulus, but from the curved roof of bamboos built over a primitive circular hut-shrine constructed of perishable materials.[1]

Cairns of mockery.—A curious variety of cairn in Bālūchistān is that known as the cairn of mockery or reproach.

'The stones of reproach in the Bugtī country . . . tell of some tribesman's black deed, incest may be, or flight from the field, or foul murder. Of these cairns there is no mistaking the meaning, for they are generally topped by a stone as black as the deed itself. And their size alone is enough to suggest that the larger cairns dotted about Baluchistan are memorials of some famous battle-field. In the Brāhūī country, . . . if a man is a miser, his neighbours vent their spleen by piling up a cairn against him; if a man flees from battle, a cairn will commemorate his cowardice; if a man brings down a fine head, there will be a cairn where he stood and another where the beast fell; if a man dies heirless, a cairn will be raised to his pitiful memory. Every little thing seems to prompt the Brāhūī to pile one stone upon another. . . . If dry cairns lie on the beaten track, they grow in height week by week; each passer-by will add his stone to the pile.'[2]

6. **Flint implements.**—Flint implements or celts, of both the Palæolithic and Neolithic types, are found in abundance in many parts of India.

Some hesitation has been expressed in accepting the fact that quartzite implements from the Indian laterite beds belong to the Palæolithic age; but it is now established that not only do the river-drift implements of W. Europe and those from the Indian laterite display the same general technique, but, what is of more importance, they evidently belong to the same geological horizon in both countries.[3]

According to Bruce Foote, 'the geological evidence afforded by the formations in which the chipped stone implements of Palæolithic type are found indicates—especially in the sections in Western India—that a great gap, historically speaking, exists between the date of deposition of such formations and of the beds in which, or on which, the earliest traces of neolithic man are met with. The geological evidence in Southern India, though less strikingly clear, points in the same direction.'[4]

No such break occurs between the Neolithic and the Iron Age. In fact, even at the present day, some tribes use implements made of stone. The Andamanese never made celts, but they use a quartz flake chipped off, never worked, for shaving and tatuing; these are now often replaced by flakes of glass obtained from the European settlements, and they still employ various stones for sundry domestic purposes.[5] Many of the jungle tribes still use, or have only recently abandoned, stone implements. The Keriyās of Chotā Nāgpur, up to the advent of the Hindus, from whom they obtained iron, used axes and grubbers of stone.[6] The Kādu of Mysore use bits of broken glass for razors.[7] In Bengal the umbilical cord is severed with a sharp-edged piece of bamboo or an oyster shell—an interesting survival of the time when metals were unknown.[8] Strabo[9] states that the Ichthiophagi of Bālūchistān possessed no iron.[10]

At the present day it is generally believed that celts are thunderbolts (κεραύνια).[11] Some Madras tribes believe them to be the thunderbolts of Viṣṇu.[12] The Khyens of Assam, when a tree is

1 *Census of India, 1901*, xiii., *Central Provinces*, pt. i. p. 78.
2 Shway Yoe [J. G. Scott], *The Burman*, London, 1882, ii. 128, i. 55.
3 H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], London, 1903, p. 847 ff.; *PR*[2] ii. 141 f., 143 f.
4 *The Ancient Egyptians and their Influence upon the Civilisation of Europe*, London, 1911, p. 176; *Man*, xiii. no. 105, p. 193 ff.
5 *ERE* iv. 468; J. W. Fewkes, *Great Stone Monuments in History and Geography* ('Smithsonian Misc. Coll.,' vol. lxi. no. 6), Washington, 1913.
6 See art. FOOD FOR THE DEAD, vol. vi. p. 66[b].
7 W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 438 ff.
8 *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, Rangoon, 1900, i. i. 514, ii. 82.
1 *Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 17.
2 *Census of India, 1911*, iv., *Baluchistan*, p. 64; cf. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vi. *The Scapegoat*, p. 14.
3 A. C. Logan, *Old Chipped Stones of India*, Calcutta and London, 1906; *Man*, vii. [1907] no. 63, p. 110 f.
4 *Catalogue of the Prehistoric Antiquities in the Government Museum*, Madras, 1901, Introd. p. iv.
5 *Census of India, 1901*, vol. iii. p. 66; *JAI* vii. [1878] 446, xii. [1883] 379 f.
6 V. Ball, *Jungle Life in India*, London, 1880, p. 91.
7 Rice, *Mysore*[2], i. 213.
8 *Census of India, 1901*, vi., *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 480.
9 xv. ii. 2.
10 J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, London, 1901, p. 82.
11 Cf. *Man*, iii. [1903] no. 102, p. 182 f., viii. [1908] no. 54, p. 104 f.
12 Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 178.

struck by lightning, search for the thunderbolt, and any likely stone is accepted as such, made over to the priest, held sacred, and sacrifice is made before it as to something sent from heaven.[1] V. Ball tells of a man finding a stone in a part of his field which had been struck by lightning during the preceding night.[2] The Malāyālis of S. India place in their shrines celts and other stone implements; they do not understand what they are and reverence them accordingly; outside one of their villages was found a small stone shrine, capped with a stone slab, whereon were stacked several Neolithic celts, supposed to be thunderbolts sent from heaven.[3] Similar implements are often found at shrines in N. India.[4] The Nāgas believe that Neolithic celts found in their country fell from heaven, and the Shāns of Burma say that such stones fall in their country and are of three kinds —one like brass found only by lucky people, others which are living, and some which are dead and have lost their virtues.[5] Some of the wild tribes of Burma take oaths by drinking water in which a stone hatchet or celt (which they believe to be a thunderbolt) has been immersed, calling on the spirit immanent in the weapon to punish the man who commits perjury.[6] In Sikkim great faith is placed in the magical power of celts, or 'thunder-stones,' as they are called. The stone is washed with soap in a little warm water, and women are made to drink the water in order to ease the pains of delivery.[7]

LITERATURE.—There appears to be no comprehensive monograph on the sacred stones of India. References to some of the scattered literature are given in the article. For the Indian pre-historic stone monuments see W. C. Borlase, *The Dolmens of Ireland*, London, 1897, iii. 750 ff.; Meadows Taylor, 'Descriptions of the Cairns, Cromlechs, Kistvaens and other Celtic, Druidical or Scythian Monuments in the Dekhan,' *Trans. Royal Irish Academy*, xxiv. [1865] 329 ff.; J. W. Breeks, *An Account of the Primitive Tribes and Monuments of the Nilagiris*, London, 1873; W. Francis, *Gazetteer of the Nilgiris*, Madras, 1908, i. 94 ff.; J. Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments in all Countries, their Age and Uses*, London, 1872, p. 452 ff. Numerous papers on the subject will be found in *JAI*, vols. ii., vi., xiii., xvi. For the Khāsi monuments see P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, London, 1907, p. 144 ff.

W. CROOKE.

STONES (Semitic).—**1. Ritual use of stone implements and stones.**—During the Stone Age religion developed among all the peoples of the world. In attempting to establish and perpetuate friendly relations with the gods and spirits, definite rituals were evolved, and the instruments employed in these rituals were naturally made of stone. Such is the conservatism of religious practice and of practices bordering on the religious, such as initiations, that stone implements and stones were used in these ceremonies long after the tools employed in everyday life were made of metal. Circumcision among the Semites began far back in the Stone Age, but as late as the Exodus from Egypt and the conquest of Palestine —a time on the borderland of the Iron Age—flint knives were still used in circumcision.

Zipporah is said to have circumcised the son of Moses with a flint (Ex 4^{25}), and Joshua is said to have made flint knives on purpose to circumcise the Hebrews just before he undertook the conquest of Western Palestine (Jos $5^{2ff.}$). Similarly, in an Egyptian tomb of the time of Teti,[8] the founder of the VIth dynasty about 2575 B.C., where we see the operation of circumcision being performed on two young men, the knife in the hand of the left-hand operator is clearly a flint; it is cone-shaped, with a sharp edge. The right-hand operator holds a square knife, which, so far as the form is concerned, might be of metal, but which Müller[9] thinks is a flint that has been shaped, and this is altogether probable.

Closely connected with the ceremonial use of stones is their magical use.

In certain ancient Babylonian incantations a clay image of a witch was made, in the midst of which a stone from the mountain was put;[1] in another a stone was bound on to the son of a man.[2] In a fragmentary tablet which contains part of a ritual of a soothsayer directions are given for stringing a variety of precious stones, among which was lapis-lazuli, and hanging them on the neck.[3]

2. Sacred stones.—The ritual use of stones is connected with the fact that in many parts of the world certain stones have been considered sacred. The tradition that celts are 'thunder stones,' or stones that have fallen from heaven, probably arose from the fact that aerolites are found all over the world and, as stones that have fallen from heaven, are considered sacred.

Such a stone existed at ancient Ephesus, and is mentioned in Ac 19^{35}. It is probable that the 'black stone' in the Ka'bah at Mecca is of this nature, and it has been conjectured that the Ark of Jahweh, carried from place to place by the Israelites in the wilderness, originally contained such a stone.[4]

Large stones and rocks, whether crags or boulders, have been considered sacred by the Semites.

Gideon offered food to an angel upon a rock, and the rock served as an altar (Jg 6^{20}). Manoah did the same thing at Zorah, and the rock is definitely called an altar ($13^{19f.}$).

Such sacred rocks, regarded as holy and serving as altars, have been found in various parts of Palestine. They are often over sacred caves.

One was discovered by Schumacher at Tell-el-Mutesellim,[5] another by Macalister at Gezer,[6] while under the dome of the Mosque of 'Umar in Jerusalem such a rock is still guarded as sacred by Muhammadans.[7] Those at Mutesellim and Gezer bore cup-marks, and all three show channels leading to openings through which sacrificial blood could flow to the sacred cave beneath. That at Gezer probably was over the sanctuary of the cave-dwelling people. On the rock at Jerusalem the Hebrews offered their sacrifices down to the destruction of the Temple by Titus.

In imitation of these natural rocks, or because of their influence, altars, and in one instance an entire high place, were hewn out of the solid rock. This was the case at Petra,[8] where the high place was of Nabatæan origin and probably does not greatly antedate the Christian era.

In Arabia a sacred rock became a god. The god al-Fals was a red projection of a somewhat human shape in the midst of the mountain Aga.[9] Indeed it is not too much to say that all over Palestine and Arabia sacred stones were abundant. In the Hauran saints are still believed to bless certain stones so that they have the power of healing. Vows are made, not to the stones, but to the saints.[10]

3. Heaps of stones.—In the trans-Jordanic part of Palestine heaps of stones, or cairns, were old in OT times. They were probably constructed by Neolithic men, and Hebrew tradition accounted for them as best it could.

Such a heap mentioned in Gn $31^{48ff.}$ was believed to have been erected in patriarchal times as a witness of the agreement between Laban and Jacob. There is another such heap halfway up Mount Nebo, and another on its summit, where tradition has it that Moses died.[11]

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1 Dalton, p. 115. 2 P. 473.
3 Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iv. 412, 421.
4 *PR*[2] i. 97. 5 *JAI* i. [1872], app. p. lxii.
6 C. J. F. Smith Forbes, *British Burma and its People*, London, 1878, p. 282.
7 *Census of India, 1901*, vi., *Bengal*, pt. i. p. 479.
8 See W. Max Müller, *Egyptological Researches*, i., Washington, 1906, pl. 106.
9 *Ib.* p. 61

1 K. L. Tallqvist, *Die assyrische Beschwörungsserie Maqlû*, Helsingfors, 1894, no. viii. 82.
2 *Ib.* no. vi. 48.
3 H. Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschwörer, und Sänger,' no. 74, in *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1901.
4 Cf. G. A. Barton, *The Religion of Israel*, New York, 1918, p. 69.
5 G. Schumacher and C. Steuernagel, *Tell-el-Mutesellim*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 156 ff.; G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, p. 168.
6 Cf. R. A. S. Macalister, *The Excavation of Gezer*, i. 102 ff., ii. 378 ff.; Barton, *Archæology*, p. 167.
7 Barton, *Archæology*, pp. 168 ff., 208.
8 Cf. R. E. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Provincia Arabia*, i. 239–245; G. Dalman, *Petra*, pp. 56–58; Barton, *Archæology*, p. 174 f.
9 J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], p. 51 ff.
10 S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, p. 84 f.
11 For a picture of the last-mentioned see G. A. Barton, *A Year's Wandering in Bible Lands*, Philadelphia, 1904, opposite p. 143.

In Palestine and Arabia the *fellahin* accumulate heaps of stones at the point on a road where one first catches sight of a holy place or an important town. Each traveller casts his stone on one of the heaps, and the action is considered meritorious.

4. Monoliths.—The Semitic monoliths, or *maṣṣēbhāh*, are treated in a separate art. MAṢṢĒBHĀH, and those at the high places of Petra, Gezer, Taanach, Tell es-Safi, etc., are described in the art. HIGH PLACE. Such monoliths survive in places east of the Jordan and retain their sacred character in the estimation of the modern peasant.

At Ezra in the Hauran there are two pillars which, it is said, a bastard cannot pass.[1] At a village in the Druse mountains there are upright stones between which bridal couples must walk.[2] At Karyaten, the last outpost on the way to Palmyra, there is a prostrate pillar that is regarded as sacred to a certain saint. Near it is a mud hut about the size of a bee-hive, in which vessels containing oil to be burned are placed by those who pay vows to the saint.[3]

Sometimes stones are worshipped which have acquired sanctity during the historical period.

Thus near El-Merkez, in the Hauran, in front of a Muslim place of prayer is a rock 7 ft. high and about 4 ft. wide, called the Rock of Job. It is regarded as the dwelling-place of a *wali*. It is part of a monument of Ramses II. and bears a representation of his head and an inscription in hieroglyphs.[4]

According to Tacitus, one of those pillars stood in the temple of Astarte at Paphos in Cyprus. It was regarded as the statue of the goddess.[5] Similar pillars were employed as religious symbols in ancient Arabia, where they were called *anṣab* (sing. *noṣb*).[6] At Yeha and Aksum in Abyssinia monoliths of this character were connected with the ancient Semitic cult.[7] They were taller than the average of those found in Palestine, and had fire-hearths, or altar-hearths, at their bases. Perhaps it was such a pillar that Mesha, king of Moab in the 9th cent. B.C., calls an *ariel*, or fire-hearth.[8]

Pillars of this character stood before every Phœnician and Punic shrine. They are frequently pictured on the votive offerings which have been recovered in considerable numbers from those countries.[9] The tops of them are often carved into a pyramidal shape, suggesting the top of a phallus.

Egyptian obelisks were developed from such pillars. In tombs of the IVth dynasty obelisks 3 ft. in height have been found. That found in a Vth dynasty temple was about the height of some of those monoliths. It differed from them only in having its sides cut down to a square and the top shaped into the form of a pyramid.[10] In the time of the XIIth dynasty the main shaft was greatly elongated, thus making the obelisk with which travellers are familiar.[11]

LITERATURE.—C. R. Conder, *Survey of Eastern Palestine*, i., London, 1889; R. A. S. Macalister, *The Excavation of Gezer*, 3 vols., do. 1912; R. E. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Die Provincia Arabia*, 3 vols., Strassburg, 1904–09 (see index); G. Dalman, *Petra und seine Felsheiligtümer*, Leipzig, 1908 (see index); G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1917, pt. i. ch. xi.; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, pp. 51–53, 118; W. R. Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894 (see index); S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, New York and London, 1902, pp. 84–88.

G. A. BARTON.

STONE MONUMENTS (Rude).—1. Nomenclature and classification. — When monuments made of large undressed stone blocks first attracted the attention of the learned, in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was assumed that they were of 'Celtic,' or 'Druidic,' origin—an assumption which still remains enshrined in current terminology. Even in scientific writings several types are denoted by names derived from Celtic languages. This Celtic attribution is, however, certainly erroneous; such monuments are found in parts of the world where no Celts ever existed; and even in the Celtic regions of Europe they are to be attributed to races who preceded the Celts. The term 'megalithic,' to denote these structures, was formally adopted at the meeting of the Congress of Anthropology and Prehistoric Archæology in 1867. The monuments may be classified into two main divisions, which may be called non-constructional and constructional respectively. The first of these contains stones set on end, singly or in groups, not showing any greater architectural skill than is needed to erect a heavy monolith. The second contains all monuments in which heavy stones are built one over the other: these often indicate the possession of no small ingenuity on the part of the builders. In each of these divisions may be grouped three classes of monument: the non-constructional are *meini hirion*, or standing stones, alignments, and circles; the constructional are trilithons, dolmens, and cistvaens. There are several subordinate types in each class, some of which are noticed below.

2. General description of the different kinds of monuments. — (*a*) *Standing stones* (Welsh and Breton *maen hir*, *méan hir* [Anglicized 'menhir'], 'long stone,' plur. *meini hirion*; Irish *gallán*; sometimes, but now comparatively rarely, called by the Breton name *peûlvan* [*peûl-van*, 'stone figure']).—A standing stone is an undressed block of stone set up on end—the simplest form of stone monument. The height ranges from 2 or 3 ft. up to nearly 70, the height of an enormous menhir at Locmariaquer, Brittany (now fallen). The shape also is very various, some being quite irregular blocks, some being needles, with round, square, rectangular, or trapezoidal transverse section, others being flat slabs on edge, occasionally with the breadth nearly as great as the height. To some extent this depends on the nature of the stone available in the neighbourhood; but it is not the least remarkable fact about rude stone monuments that the builders often went far afield for the stones which they used, so that the monument belongs to a different formation from the country around it.

This is the case with the Locmariaquer menhir, which, though it weighs nearly 350 tons, must have been dragged a considerable distance before being set up. The blue stones at Stonehenge are likewise foreign to the district.[1] While in the prehistoric period of which we are speaking a menhir is essentially a rude undressed pillar, the tradition persists in the shapely form of Egyptian obelisks, or the column-like Pompey's Pillar; or else in masonry imitations of monolithic pillars like Trajan's Column at Rome or the Nelson Memorial in Trafalgar Square.

(*b*) *Alignments.*—These consist of standing stones arranged in straight lines. They may be of any number, from a single line of two stones up to the magnitude of the extraordinary monument at Carnac, Brittany. Here there are three groups of alignments, respectively 11, 10, and 13 in number, and containing when complete 1120 stones.

(*c*) *Circles.*—These consist of standing stones arranged in one or more rings, circular or oval. Single rings are by far the commonest, though double rings, more or less concentric, are also found, as at Avebury in Wiltshire. There is almost invariably an additional stone, either inside or (far more commonly) outside the circumference of the circle.

[1] In such cases it is sometimes *possible* that the stones were ice-borne erratics, and actually found on the site.

[1] Curtiss, p. 84.
[2] *Ib.* p. 84.
[3] *Ib.* p. 85.
[4] *Ib.* p. 86.
[5] Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 3.
[6] Wellhausen[2], p. 118; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 201.
[7] J. T. Bent, *The Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, London, 1892, pp. 180–185; J. Faïtlovitch, *Quer durch Abessinien*, Berlin, 1910, p. 35 f.
[8] Barton, *Archæology*, p. 364.
[9] Cf. *CIS*, *Tabulæ*, *passim*.
[10] Cf. L. Borchardt, *Das Grabdenkmal des Königs Ne-User-Re'*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 184 and pl. 20; G. Maspero, *Art in Egypt*, Eng. tr., New York and London, 1912, p. 50.
[11] Maspero, *Manual of Egyptian Archæology*[5], Eng. tr., London, 1902, p. 105 f.

The 'Friar's Heel' at Stonehenge, and 'Long Meg' in the group known as 'Long Meg and her Daughters' near Penrith, are good examples. Ship-shaped enclosures (*skeppssättningar*) are found in Scandinavia; the remarkable Deerpark monument in Co. Sligo, Ireland, may also be developed from the plan of a ship.

(*d*) *Trilithons.*—In these monuments two stones on end support a third, laid horizontally across their tops, after the fashion of the jambs and lintel of a doorway. Trilithons are rare as independent monuments; more frequently they enter into the composition of elaborate monuments, as at Stonehenge, and at the Deerpark in Co. Sligo. It is worth passing notice that the famous trilithons (so-called) of Tripoli are merely oil-presses of Roman date.

(*e*) *Dolmens.*—In a dolmen three or more stones on end support one or more large slabs (called the 'cap-stones') lying horizontally upon their tops, after the manner of a table. From this analogy the monument derives its name (Breton *taol-méan*, 'stone table').[1] The name *cromlech* (Breton *kroum-lec'h*, 'stone curve') is to be avoided, because it is not accurately descriptive, and, moreover, the word is more correctly used in French works to denote a quite different class of monuments, namely stone circles. This word is said to appear first in literature, in the Welsh Bible of Bishop Morgan (1588) at Is 2[21], to translate 'caverns.'

There are two principal varieties of dolmens: (1) dolmens proper, and (2) *allées couvertes*. In the dolmen proper the supporting stones are arranged more or less in a square, broad-oval, or circle, the two axes being approximately of the same length. In the *allée couverte* the supporting stones stand in two rows, parallel or slightly inclined to one another, and the enclosed space is roofed with a succession of slabs laid across them. The length of this class of monument is, therefore, much greater than the breadth. The rows are usually parallel, but Ireland has a number of examples of wedge-shaped *allées couvertes* in which the two lines expand from one end. In many cases, especially in dolmens with very heavy cap-stones, the supporting stones are absent from one side, so that the cap-stone rests partly upon the ground. A dolmen so constructed is sometimes called a *demi-dolmen*. A composite form is sometimes seen in which the cap-stone is partly supported, not on the ground but on a subordinate cap-stone. A good example of this not very common type exists at Trefignaeth near Holyhead, N. Wales.

(*f*) *Cistvaens* (Welsh *cist-faen*, 'stone coffer') are practically dolmens built of roughly squared slabs rather than of blocks of stone, fitting more closely together, so that the chamber within is much less open than in the ordinary dolmen. They are of a smaller size than the average dolmen.

A word may here be said of 'rocking stones,' which held a prominent place in the speculations of the pioneer archæologists. These are boulders so poised on a narrow part of their surface that a light pressure—even a child's hand—can make them oscillate, though a great force would be needed to dislodge them. In the early days of pre-historic research these were supposed to be 'Druidic oracles.' But it is now recognized that rocking stones are the accidental results of geological processes—ice transportation, denudation, and the like—and are of no archæological significance. It is by no means wildly improbable that stones so strangely balanced may have been used for the purpose suggested, but it is quite undemonstrable.

Many monuments combine the characteristics of several types.

Thus, to mention but a very few familiar examples, (i.) the great circle at Callernish, in the island of Lewis, has a large menhir at the centre, and is crossed by a single alignment running east and west, and by a double alignment running north and south. (ii.) Near Ronachan, Cantire, is an alignment of three stones ending in a dolmen. (iii.) Stonehenge, when complete, seems to have consisted of (1) an earthen mound enclosing an area about 300 ft. in diameter; (2) a circle of about 30 standing stones with a lintel across each pair, forming a continuous architrave, about 100 ft. in diameter; (3) the outer circle of 'blue stones' about 6 ft. high; (4) a series of five trilithons ranging in height from 16 to 21 ft., arranged in a horseshoe; (5) the inner circle of 'blue stones'; (6) the so-called 'altar-stone,' a recumbent block in the middle, about 16 ft. long; (7) an avenue running from the earthen ring to the north-east, with (8) the 'Friar's Heel,' a single stone standing at the end. The beautiful photographs of Stonehenge taken from a balloon[1] give an admirable idea of its plan and present appearance. (iv.) On the Meayll Hill, Isle of Man, is a circle of cists.

3. **Method of erection.**—The enormous weight of some of the stones used in these structures is one of the most surprising facts about them.

At Mount Browne near Carlow is a dolmen with a cap-stone weighing about 100 tons. This is exceptional—it is indeed the heaviest stone in a dolmen in Europe. But cap-stones of 40–70 tons are not uncommon; and to erect many of the single standing stones must have been a most formidable task. The stones were probably transported on rollers from their original sites, by the united labour of many men with or without the help of animals (cf. the Egyptian representations of the transportation of colossi). The standing stones, as well as the supporting stones of dolmens, were, most likely, erected by being run up sloping earth banks and tilted over the edge into the sockets prepared for them. In some excavations made at Furness, near Naas, Co. Kildare, a layer of made earth was found, overlying the natural soil,[2] round the foot of a great standing stone. This has been explained as the spread-out material of the inclined plane up which the stone had been rolled, to drop it into position. The same method was probably employed, when the upright stones of dolmens had been fixed in position, to raise the cap-stone to its place.[3]

However the difficulties of construction may have been overcome, the existence of these enormous monuments implies a considerable degree of social organization on the part of their builders. The co-operation of great numbers of men was necessary to transport and to deal with the blocks, and some compelling power must have existed to secure such co-operation—whether the external pressure of a despotic chief or medicine-man, or the more subtle influence of loyalty to common tribal interests. And in many cases there must have been the controlling power of a single mind superintending the work—an architect, with skill to assure himself that the supporting stones were properly spaced, and sufficiently firm to bear the weight of the cap-stone.

4. **Purpose.**—Rude stone monuments are either memorial or religious in their purpose; but these two explanations are supplementary, not mutually exclusive. For a memorial of a deceased chieftain is a shrine in honour of his ghost, and thus *ipso facto* acquires a religious significance.

The fact that interments have frequently been found at the foot of standing stones (as was the case at Furness, mentioned above) shows that such are often gravestones. Even down to the comparatively late date when writing was used by the Celtic-speaking inhabitants of Gaul, Britain, and Ireland this form of memorial was used; for undressed pillar-stones exist bearing inscriptions in Roman or Ogham letters, but otherwise not differing from the rude monuments of the pre-Celtic peoples. How far the chieftain's life was supposed to pass into the standing stone erected above his grave we cannot say. Such a transference of soul was certainly regarded as taking place in the case of a tree planted on the grave; and there is a curious idea still current among the Irish peasantry that stones, like trees, are capable of growth.[4] Thus it is by no means impossible that the connexion between the stone and the spirit of the buried chieftain was much closer than a mere relation of corpse and memorial, and that the stone was really a tangible recipient of honours offered to the departed.

But it is more than likely that many of the menhirs were actually figures of deities. Cæsar describes the Gauls as worshipping 'Mercury,' of whom they had many *simulacra*.[5] There are,

[1] In strict grammar the form with initial *d* should not be used except after the Breton definite article. *Taol* (also spelt *tôl*) is not a native Celtic word, but a loan-word from Latin *tabula*.

[1] *Archæologia*, vol. lx. pt. ii. [1907], plates 69, 70.

[2] *Proceedings Royal Irish Academy*, vol. xxx. sect. C [1912–13] p. 351 ff.

[3] See King Frederic VII.'s paper, 'Sur la Construction des salles dites des Géants,' in *Mémoires de la soc. royale des Antiquaires du Nord*, Copenhagen, 1850–60, p. 1.

[4] The present writer has been shown, by a not unintelligent farmer, a peculiar mark in the side of a pillar-stone which was explained as being due to the pressure of another stone while the first block was growing.

[5] *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 17.

actually, no images of gods in Gaul dating before the Roman period, if we except a few very rude representations of a female divinity.[1] The probability is that Cæsar was the spectator of rites round a menhir, which he took for a phallus, and, with the phallic associations of the Hermes figures in his mind, concluded that he was the spectator of a worship of Mercury. This probability is increased by an important passage in the 7th cent. life of St. Samson, bishop of Dol. Samson was a missionary from Britain, and, coming to Dol, was witness of a 'bacchic' adoration of a 'simulacrum abominabile,' which he proceeded to consecrate by cutting upon it the sign of the cross.[2] St. Patrick found at Magh Slecht, probably somewhere on the borders of counties Cavan and Leitrim in Ireland, the 'king-idol of Ireland,' whose name is variously given as Cromm Cruaich or Cenn Cruaich, with twelve attendant gods surrounding it; evidently a stone circle, with the additional stone above described, is intended. The saint destroyed it. The accounts of this monument and the adoration paid to it are obscure, thanks to the drastic editing that the surviving fragments of Irish literature have undergone at the hands of the monastic scribes to whom we owe their preservation; but it is not difficult to see evidence of human sacrifices and ceremonial mutilations in the expressions used.[3] Another idol of stone, called Cermand Cestach, is referred to in a gloss in the *Martyrology of Oengus*.[4] This stood close by the Cathedral of Clogher, Co. Tyrone, and was in some way consulted as an oracle. A stone alleged to be the idol in question stands on the place indicated, but its identity with the ancient stone is doubtful. A passage in one of the 'Brehon Law Tracts'[5] referring to the boundaries between adjacent properties enumerates among other forms of landmark 'a stone of adoration.' This indicates another use for rude stone monuments; but landmarks have at all times been under the protection of tutelary deities, so even here we cannot get away from a fundamental religious association in the monument. Slight traces of the conception of rude stone monuments as being, virtually, statues or embodiments of supernatural beings (gods or ghosts), survive in modern tradition—as in the name *fear breagach*, 'false man,' sometimes given to them, both in Ireland and in the Scottish Highlands; in alleged resemblances to human figures, which the local people sometimes point out, but which it requires the eye of faith on the part of a stranger to perceive; and in the crosses often cut or erected upon them, both in Ireland and in France, as though to drive the paganism out of them. On the other hand, the menhir of Kernuz, Finisterre, has had a figure of Mercury and some other figures sculptured upon it in Roman times.[6] In the neighbourhood of Confolens the dolmen of Saint-Germain-sur-Vienne has been turned into a chapel, by substituting moulded Gothic pillars for the supporting stones; and at Arrichinaga in Spain there is an example of a dolmen being turned into a baldacchino over the altar of a church. These remarkable cases of the Christianization of rude stone monuments will be found illustrated in Fergusson's work.[7]

The figure of Cromm Cruaich is said to have been of gold, or ornamented with gold. No standing stones bearing such ornaments are known—which is not to be wondered at. But a number are in existence which are ornamented with cups, spirals, or concentric circles; and generally it is a prominent stone of a group that is so decorated. 'Long Meg,' in the Penrith group, is a good example.[1]

A fine series of standing stones near Kilmartin, Argyllshire, shows a suggestive grouping: a tall slab ornamented with cups and rings on its western face, with a small enclosure immediately in front of it that has all the appearance of a sacrificial hearth, while two stones side by side some distance to the east, and a similar pair some distance to the west, appear to be the terminal gateways of an avenue (possibly once marked out with palisades) having the ornamented stone in the middle. The cups and rings are most probably religious (solar?) emblems.[2] A very similar group near Dingle, Co. Kerry, is known locally by the suggestive name 'the Gates of Glory.'[3]

Alignments are very probably avenues for ceremonial processions, but these are perhaps the most difficult of all rude stone monuments to explain. An alignment of two stones generally marks the head and foot of a grave. Circles likewise probably represent some form of procession or dance: the circle of sub-gods, exercising their evolutions around or in front of the chief god, may well be represented by these monuments. Traditional practices, such as the paying of 'rounds,' appear to indicate that some kind of circling procession was an important part of ancient ritual; such half-humorous survivals as the convention of passing wine sun-wise are reminiscences of the same order of observances. The tradition often preserved that stone circles are petrified men, who were turned into stone as a punishment for dancing improperly, or on the Sabbath, no doubt echoes dimly the original intention of the builders.

At Hollywood, Co. Wicklow, is a fine circle on a field known by the suggestive name of Aughgraney (*achadh gréine*, 'the field of the sun'); the circle is explained as the profane dancers, the outside stone as the piper. So in France stone circles are popularly called *les danses, la ronde des fées, le bal des dames*; in Germany *Steintanz*; and Geoffrey of Monmouth speaks of Stonehenge as *Chorea Gigantum*.

A circular enclosure is frequently marked out around a dolmen or a barrow by means of blocks of stone or stone pillars. Good examples are to be seen in Ireland at the *Leac na bhfian* (now called the 'kissing stone') at Carrowmore in Co. Sligo,[4] and at New Grange. In Denmark enclosures of this kind sometimes are square or rectangular. In such cases the circle is meant primarily to mark the enclosure sacred to the dead, either to protect it from trespass or to prevent the ghost from wandering at large among the living. Sometimes a stone circle has been found embedded in a tumulus, perhaps because the earth mound was raised higher than had been the original intention of the builders. Earthen mounds, however, often take the place of the stone ring in such cases.

The Semites were among the most assiduous raisers of 'pillars' in the ancient world, and perhaps it is among them that the subject can be most fully and instructively studied.[5] The erection of large stones as memorials is frequently referred to in the OT—more frequently as memorials of events than of individuals. But in many such cases the explanation is clearly traditional, associated with megalithic monuments of which the true origin had been forgotten.

Such was the stone circle which gave its name to Gilgal by the Jordan, explained as a memorial of the crossing of the Israelites (Jos 4^{5}) and obscurely referred to in Jg 3^{19} ('the graven images' in RVm). The 'pillar' over Rachel's grave was explained as a memorial of the dead (Gn 35^{20}); such seem

[1] Illustrations in *L'Anthropologie*, v. [1894] 147 ff.
[2] *AS* (*Bolland.*), July, vol. vi. p. 584 D.
[3] See *The Tripartite Life of St. Patrick*, Rolls ser., LXXXIX. i., ii., ed. Whitley Stokes, London, 1887, i. 90–93; *RCel* xvi. [1895] 35, 168.
[4] Ed. Stokes, Henry Bradshaw Society, xxix., London, 1905, pp. 186, 187.
[5] *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1865–1901, iv. 142, 143.
[6] See *RA*, ser. II. vol. xxxvii. [1879] plates 3–5; *Illustrated Archæologist*, ii. [1894] 16 ff.
[7] *Rude Stone Monuments*, pp. 337, 388.

[1] See J. Y. Simpson, *Archaic Sculpturings of Cups, Circles*, etc., Edinburgh, 1867, plate vii.
[2] See *Proc. of Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, xvi. [1881–82] 111.
[3] *Journal Royal Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 5th ser., viii. [1898] 161.
[4] W. C. Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, i. 147.
[5] See artt. POLES AND POSTS, MAṢṢĒBHĀH, STONES (Semitic).

even to have been erected during the lifetime of the owner, as in the case of Absalom (2 S 18[18]), and a Phœnician inscription of one Abd-Asar in Cyprus, who says יאנאת לכבת מצבת, 'I erected a *maṣṣēbhāh* [over my grave] in my lifetime.'[1] The 'stone of Bohan' (Jos 15[6]) seems to be some kind of landmark.

But it is as sacred stones—signs, representations, or habitations of deity—that pillars are of the most conspicuous importance among the Semites. A pillar, מצבת, of stone (or several pillars) was an essential part of a Canaanite high place (*q.v.*), and in the pre-Deuteronomic system an essential instrument of the Jahweh-worship of the Hebrews.

Jacob erected a pillar at Beth-el (Gn 28[18]); and, even so late as Isaiah, in an ideal picture of the extension of the cult of Jahweh over foreign countries, we read of an altar 'with a pillar at the border thereof' (19[19]). On the other hand, Hosea (10[1f.]) disapproves of the pillar-cultus, doubtless on account of the abuses that were inseparable from it, though it is straining the sense of 3[4] to consider that he regards pillars as prohibited. At last in the Deuteronomic legislation (Dt 16[22]) the erection of a pillar, as a thing hateful to Jahweh, is forbidden. A pillar was erected by Ahab in Samaria (2 K 3[2]) to the Tyrian Baal.

The alignment discovered at Gezer has enabled us to form a concrete picture of these groups of sacred stones.

Dolmens and the other constructional monuments are more specifically connected with burial than with religion, though no doubt these also were centres of funeral rites; and the emblems sometimes carved upon them (especially in Brittany and in Scandinavia) indicate at least a secondary religious purpose attaching to them.

Some dolmens were covered by earth, and thus became chambered tumuli, with or without an *allée couverte* leading to the central chamber. But it may be taken as certain that many of the dolmens that now stand free of earth were always intended to be so. An earth mound resists natural destructive causes to a surprising degree, and a human destroyer would not be likely to spare the stone structure at the centre if for any reason he took the trouble of disposing of the earth. It is impossible to explain what has happened to the earth if we are to suppose that dolmens were always covered in. Moreover, in many cases (as in the fine dolmen at Legananny,[2] Co. Down) the supporting stones are so far apart that they would not hold back the earth from running in under the cap-stone and filling the chamber which the stones were presumably intended to make. In several cases the dolmen is erected on the summit of a tumulus; here it must be considered as a mark or monument erected over the grave underneath. This must also be true of the numerous large dolmens, in which the chamber is too open to conceal a funeral deposit. Not improbably many dolmens are cenotaphs, erected to commemorate a warrior whose body could not be found, and whose ghost accordingly it was specially important to propitiate. Both in Bavaria and in Ireland excavation has shown that some of the most carefully built tumuli are cenotaphs.

Another use for standing stones is in ratifying contracts. The 'holed' stones—standing stones with a perforation through them—must have been especially used for this purpose, if we may trust the evidence of traditional customs existing till quite recently. At Stennis, *e.g.*, the most binding contract was that between two persons who clasped hands through a hole in one of the stones.

Herodotus tells us that 'the Arabians observe pledges as religiously as any people: and they make them as follows. When any wish to plight their faith, a third person standing between them makes a cut with a sharp stone in the palm of the hand, near the longest fingers, of the two contracting parties and then taking from the cloak of each a wool-flock, he smears seven stones lying between them with the blood, and doing so he calls upon Dionysus and Urania.'[3]

Holes are found in the stones of some dolmens, especially in India, but they are not uncommon nearer home, as in Cornwall, Brittany, etc. Probably the holes in dolmens are intended to allow egress to the ghost, or else for the deposit of offerings at the tomb.

Salomon Reinach, in an interesting article entitled 'Les Monuments de pierre brute dans le langage et les croyances populaires,'[1] has collected a number of names applied to stone monuments, which appear to enshrine vague recollections of their former purpose. Such names as *pierres du soleil, Sonnensteine*, suggest sun-worship; *pierre du serment, du feu, de la valse*, refer to oath-taking, fire ceremonials, or religious dances. *Pierres du sabbat* speaks of the Christianization of a district, after which the pagan monument would seem to the converts a resort of demons. Of a different order are names like 'Long Meg and her Daughters,' 'the Maidens of Lanyon,' *pierre de la justice*, which refer to family or assembly groups. Other names refer to ancient gods or fabulous beings, like 'Wayland Smith's cave' in Berkshire, or the numerous French structures called after the giant Gargantua. Others are called after dwarfs, sorcerers, mothers (=the groups of Gaulish and Germanic deities called *matres*), the devil; such heroes as King Arthur in England and Diarmait (with his lover Gráinne) in Ireland; the Druids; and historical persons like Cæsar, or certain saints. Other names such as 'Druids' altars,' and the like, are local attempts made to explain them. In many cases rude stone monuments are the subject of superstitious practices which have evidently a long ancestry behind them, designed to secure offspring, to cure diseases, to bring down curses on an enemy, to ratify contracts, etc. To others manifestations of life, talking, bowing at the Angelus, returning to their place if removed, etc., are ascribed. These will all be found analyzed in Reinach's paper. The conclusion at which he arrives is that the folk-lore of rude stone monuments is entirely pagan, and that, even when the Virgin, saints, the devil, and other conceptions due to Christian teaching are associated with them, these are merely secondary and have been substituted for beings of the earlier faiths.

5. **Geographical distribution.**—The geographical distribution of rude stone monuments extends, in the continental mass of the Old World, from the extreme west of Europe to the extreme east of Asia, and from Scandinavia to Central Africa; but the area over which they are found is not continuous. In spite of centuries of destruction, rude stone monuments of every type abound in the British and Irish Islands, and some of the most remarkable structures in Europe are found there.

In Ireland nearly 1000 dolmens have been recorded. In France they are also common—some 4000 dolmens are recorded as existing there. The peninsula of Brittany is especially rich in rude stone monuments of all kinds. The peninsula of Spain and Portugal contains some magnificent examples of dolmens, but circles seem to be less common there than in the other countries named above. In contrast to this comparative wealth in Spain rude stone structures are practically unknown in Italy (except at Otranto, in the 'heel' of the peninsula) and in Greece (except in one example in the north-east of the Morea). In Northern and Central Europe they occur in Belgium, Holland (in the province of Drenthe), and in Oldenburg, Brunswick, Mecklenburg—*i.e.* in the northern plain of Germany. They are common in Denmark and the Danish Islands, and also in S. Sweden. In Central Europe they are rare: a dolmen is reported at Chamblandes, Canton de Vaud.[2] The islands of the Mediterranean—the Balearic Islands, Corsica, Sardinia, Malta, and Gozo—possess many structures of this kind, in remarkable contrast to the barrenness of the adjacent mainland. They are found in S. Russia, in the Caucasus, and also in Bulgaria. Crossing to Africa, we find dolmens and circles abundant in the countries north of the Sahara, bordering on the Mediterranean. South of the Sahara no dolmens exist, but circles have been found in Gambia, and groups of standing stones in Nigeria and the Sudan. In Asia Palgrave describes a circle which he has seen in Arabia, and Doughty describes an alignment of stones; Western Palestine has yielded a few dolmens, but Eastern Palestine has large numbers. There is then a gap till we come to India, parts of which (especially the west coast) abound with dolmens and circles. In China they appear to be absent; but dolmens are frequent in Korea and Japan.[3]

This wide area, and the many gaps which it presents, make it impossible to accept the view that the rude stone monuments, wherever found, are to be assigned to a single race of dolmen-builders, and are to be taken as monuments of their wanderings. Given the large deposit of time on which we can draw, the theory that the trade and intercourse of the Stone and early Bronze Ages carried the knowledge of new religions and new arts from one people to another makes much less demand on our powers of credulity than that of one all-

[1] *CIS*, 46.
[2] Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, i. 282. [3] iii. 8.

[1] *RA* III. xxx. [1893] 195.
[2] *L'Anthropologie*, xii. [1901] 276.
[3] For references see the Literature.

pervading race, which manipulated and worshipped large blocks of stone, permeating the local races native to the different countries where these monuments are found, and existing side by side with them. Indeed, the theory of independent origin among different people and in different places is not more incredible. The present author is bound to admit, in spite of the many writings sustaining a contrary thesis, that he can see no difficulty in supposing that the spirals decorating a Maori chieftain's face and the spirals in the chamber at New Grange have had ancestries totally independent of each other, both being directly derived from natural forms (vine-tendrils or the like) observed independently in the geographical areas to which they severally belong. Nor can he see any difficulty in supposing that people in Peshawar and people in Spain should have hit independently on the same solution of the problem of how to bury their dead out of their sight, and how to commemorate and honour them.

6. Chronology.—The dolmens of Japan have to be treated separately in considering the chronology of rude stone monuments. These are comparatively late, being in many cases recognized as the tombs of emperors of known date. Gowland, the leading authority on the subject, dates the Japanese dolmens from 200 B.C. to A.D. 500 or 600. Certain Russian monuments built of large stones, being furnished with grave-goods of the late Bronze or early Iron Ages, are also comparatively recent. Apart from these groups, however, the origin of these monuments must be put back to a period of very considerable antiquity.

The date of such monuments as these can be determined (*a*) from objects to which a date can be assigned found in association with them, and (*b*) from ornamentation sculptured upon them. Much time and ingenuity has been wasted in endeavouring to solve the chronological problems by astronomical calculation, but too many arbitrary assumptions have to be made, and the results obtained carry no conviction.

Speaking generally, we may say (i.) that a single standing stone may belong to any age, from the Stone Age to the period of early Christianity, and that, unless datable objects be found in close connexion with any individual example, or unless it bears some datable inscription or ornament, it is impossible to say when it was erected; (ii.) that dolmens, on the whole, belong to the period of transition from the Stone to the Bronze Age; (iii.) that, to judge from the ornament sculptured on some examples, stone circles belong, on the whole, to the beginning of the Bronze Age, though some may belong to the end of the Stone Age. That stone implements were exclusively found in the excavation of Stonehenge does not vitiate this result; for stone implements would naturally be used instead of the comparatively soft and valuable bronze for such rough and coarse work as the quarrying and trimming of blocks of stone.

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STONING.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jewish), ADULTERY (Jewish), (Muslim).

STORM, STORM-GODS.—1. Introduction.—The gods of cataclysms naturally held the first rank in the 'magic-religions' of the earliest types of human society. Some of them gradually became connected with the gods of abysses and especially with those of the earth and its depths. Others went to swell the army of the demons of darkness and of evil. The gods of hurricanes and tempests followed the same process, though more slowly.

They are the manifest product of naturism and personification; speculations on the composition and structure of the sky[1] deny them any rôle in the upper world; it is only by accident that they are sometimes connected with the activity, but not the personality, of the sky-god. By the same reasoning primitive man (or at any rate present-day uncivilized man) did not place the storm-gods on the physical plane inhabited by the gods of the air,[2] although sometimes, as the result of time and the confusion of myths, the maleficent storm-gods seem to become intermingled with the hierarchies of the air-gods. The general principle is that the storm-gods are personalities essentially distinct from the air-gods and having no logical connexion with them.

One of the clearest results of this is the frequent opposition between the air-gods, regarded as the regular and, on the whole, beneficent rulers of such-and-such a quarter of the atmosphere, and the storm-gods, naturally assimilated to maleficent principles. Another feature that separates the storm-gods from the air-gods is still more remarkable. As is shown in art. AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR, the air-gods usually dwell in the aerial regions. The search for the principle of causality, the observation of the relation of cause and effect, and, lastly, animism have on the contrary almost everywhere connected the storm-gods with the terrestrial plane, solid or liquid. Sometimes they are localized, and have as their habitat the summit or the peak of some high mountain, from which they are supposed to dart forth to cause their ravages; sometimes they are imagined as hidden in a grotto or cavern, or as wandering through the labyrinths of valleys and ravines, or ready to leap from the neck of a mountain or a pass or to spring from a precipice; or, again, they are the formidable gods of the desert who hide in great whirlwinds of sand, advancing in columns. Among peoples inhabiting the shores of large lakes or inland seas or the sea-coast the storm-gods seldom dwell at the bottom of those deep waters; they practically always leap from a cape, a point, or an isolated rock, to accomplish their work of destruction. At other times they come from a mysterious island, an islet remarkable for its strange shape, or a sea-grotto feared by fishermen; sometimes (more rarely) they are known to have their palace at the bottom of one of those gulfs, bays, or lagoons that are subject to sudden crashes of tempest. Their attack, both by sea and by land, is swift and unexpected; the poetry of Chaldæo-Assyrian cosmogony describing their tumultuous outbursts calls them 'wild horses born in the mountain.'

2. Diffusion.—In what regions do we find those gods? From the naturist point of view this question becomes theoretically a question of meteorological geography and practically a question of making an abstract of the evidence of ethnological geography. In Asia we find storm-gods in the labyrinths of passes of the Tibetan group, the formidable solitudes of the high summits of the Himálayas, the frozen tracks of the desert of Gobi; in Africa, in the mountainous group of the Cameroons, those of Ruwenzori and Kilima-njaro, the headlands of Lake Victoria-Nyanza and Lake Tanganyika, and the desert wastes of the Kalahari; in America, in the great passes and summits of the Andes, the islands of Lake Titicaca, and the volcanic peaks or the sierras of Mexico. Maritime regions also have their series of storm-gods: in the first rank naturally come the desolate countries of polar tempests, the ice-peaks of the 'gods of terror' in Greenland, those of the Eskimo regions, the frozen Arctic Ocean and Lapland with their 'tempest spirits,' and the Atlantic coast of Europe; in Africa it is mainly the more exposed west coasts; in the vast expanses of the Pacific two favourite regions are prominent at the two extremities: in the north between Japan and the Siberian coast, and particularly at the southern extremity of America towards Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego, and the Magellan Strait; in the Indian Ocean, and wherever typhoon holds sway, we find islands, gulfs, and rocks marking the sites of the kingdoms of the storm-gods; lastly, in the southern seas (Polynesia and Micronesia) cosmogonic mythology confirms the presumptions of geography by describing the eternal struggle of the gods of order, the allies of man, with the turbulent and destructive storm-gods.

Of course the parallelism between geography and mythology is not constant nowadays. Civilization first of all consigned a large number of the early storm-gods to the realm of allegory or dissolved them in syncretism. Then they passed away along with the oldest established polytheism, with which the advance of human speculation had connected them. Such was the case with the Chaldæan storm-god, the Egyptian Set, the sons of the Mediterranean Æolus, and the pre-historic storm-god who to the first sailors of our races personified the north wind (Boreas), the tramontane wind, and the tempest wind of the west Brittany coast. Traces of them recur in stories and throughout the deformations of classical folklore and mythology, and clearly enough to prove the correctness of the theoretically presupposed connexion between physical geography and religion; clearly enough too to show the connexion between their scattered traits and those of the storm-gods of the savage races of the present day, and to convince us that the work, characteristics, nature, and rôle of the storm-gods were uniformly identical in the first ages of all the religious groups.

The result is that the area of the diffusion of the storm-gods is entirely different from that of the air-gods. Not only is there nothing resembling the universality of the presence of the sky-god, but there are even complete religious zones from which the storm-god is absent.

3. Rôle.—The material characteristics and effects of the storm had the logical consequence of forcing the storm-gods into the army of evil, wherever men had arrived at the stage of disengaging the rudiments of dualistic classification from the apparently chaotic collision of the forces and beings of nature. Myth afterwards attempted to vindicate this classification. And, since by reason of their accidental character the harmful activities of the storm-gods fitted them only for a subordinate rôle in the great struggle, some of the myths aimed at explaining the times and circumstances of their appearances; and thus we see them figuring in the cosmogonic cycle. Since cosmogony is the putting in order and the 'stabilization' of the evil or incoherent energies of chaos, the rôle of the storm-gods, who are always the agents of confusion and destruction, necessarily places them among the conquered powers (*e.g.*, in Chaldæa). It is true that the dualistic struggle

[1] See art. SKY, SKY-GODS.
[2] See art. AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR.

persists in the majority of dualisms in order to explain the constant reappearance of evil, but in these also the storm-gods are always conquered in the end. They often call to their aid legions of malevolent phantoms and evil spirits who wander by night on the surface of the earth (*e.g.*, China, Korea). But this very alliance results in their gradually losing their personality and becoming merged in the huge army of secondary spirits in the service of the great maleficent deities.

Such were in primitive times the seven sons of Bel, the Chaldæan chiefs of the Annunaki, or Annunas, of the earth (here again we see the storm-gods connected with the terrestrial plane). They had 'grown up in the depth of the abyss'; they were 'the squall of wind which runs swiftly,' and the seventh one of them was 'the frightful whirlwind which smashes everything.'

Thus their human cult is very much reduced: they have neither sanctuaries nor priests; but here and there they have persons affiliated with them who control them by magical power and who can make them come and let loose their evil forces (*e.g.*, in Polynesia).

4. Cult.—The nearest approach to a cult of the storm-gods is among certain fishing peoples (in the Pacific—*e.g.*, Saghalien Island, etc.), who use propitiatory means to conciliate them when setting out on an expedition. But, though the Ainus may invoke or flatter Shi-Asha by offerings, the opposite process, viz. protection by the aid of a more powerful good spirit, seems to be the more frequent proceeding. The ancient Chaldæan poems say of them: 'they listen neither to prayer nor to supplication.'

In exceptional cases the storm-deity may not have a uniformly wicked character. Besides the very dangerous spirits of the icebergs and the scourges which they let loose by hurricanes, the Eskimos attribute to Arnaknagsak (or Sedna), mother of the tempests, an old woman who lives at the bottom of the sea, the power of procuring food for them. Cases of this kind (of which there are about half-a-score well authenticated) proceed as a rule from local observation of the consequences of a great storm, which are sometimes helpful to man. The Bretons of Ile de Sein attributed a beneficent character to the tempests of the south-west, because they brought shipwrecks to the coast.

In exceptional cases also the storm-god seems to be connected with the army of the sky-god. Thus among the Andamans the tempest is the result of the will of the famous Puluga. Such a fact tends to imply the evil character of the sky-god, and consequently is of great theoretical importance. On examination it appears that the confusion is caused by the presence in the tempests of those regions of a great number of meteorological phenomena, such as lightning, thunder, etc., whose management belongs by definition to the supreme god or the sky-god. In such cases the storm loses its personality; it becomes a manifestation of the sky-god and is interpreted as a punishment or revenge of the offended sky-god.

The same kind of mixture by confusion of myths or linking of exterior characteristics explains why certain peoples, such as those of Guiana or of Brazil (*e.g.*, the Botocudos) connect the storm-gods with the stellar deities or with the moon.

5. Representations.—The fetishistic representations of the storm-gods have so far received little study. Nevertheless they exist in large numbers in all the religious groups that have storm-gods and mainly in the groups in which fishing is the chief means of subsistence. These fetishes are inspired by the usual principles—supposed affinities, allusions to mythical episodes, attraction or repulsion (the same reasoning as for fetishes of diseases), amalgams of magical substances, etc. Some good specimens may be mentioned among the Ainus, and among the races of Polynesia, Micronesia, New Guinea (*e.g.*, in the Gazelle Peninsula), Vuatam Island, etc. Representations of an idolatrous but aniconic type have been studied still less. As is the rule in naturism, they are inspired at the outset either by the external appearance of the covering of the storm-god or by the usual principles of symbolico-magic (effect for cause, part for whole, etc.). The appearance of a tornado, of a water-spout, of the storm-clouds, of a whirlpool, of lightning, of typhoons, and the kinds of death and destruction caused by the storm-gods, have suggested a large number of abridged and distorted forms and secret magical forms. Nevertheless our ignorance of their real meanings and the reticence of the uncivilized render ethnological inquiry on this point very difficult.

When we pass to iconic reproductions, we find here also that the maleficent and dangerous character served as starting-point. The plastic expression by man of their material physiognomy offers at once a very great variety of material representation and extreme monotony of theoretical conception: fantastic ugliness (as terrifying as possible) has everywhere been used to express their wickedness, their fury, and the fear which they inspire. Naturally each local art borrowed from its special demonography and from local material elements its ugliest and most bizarre traits. Ethnographic collections show types borrowed from Polynesian religions, from the coast of W. Africa, and from pre-Columban America (the last especially in drawn and painted forms). The classical East has left us the distorted images of the south-west wind. Two details are common to all: (1) the use of composite traits, like the figures of nightmares—hideous mixtures of heads, members, and different parts of the body of the most repugnant and terrible animals; and (2) the almost complete absence of symbolic allusion to a mythical episode or a cosmogonic rôle of first rank. The Annunaki, sons of Bel, might have composite bodies of lions, serpents, or hideous animals, half-reptiles, and half-birds; but they were never anything but subordinates. It is purely literary licence when the poet calls them 'destroyers of the sky.'

6. Conclusion.—The evolution towards dualism has given only imperfect results. Nowhere has the storm-god succeeded in taking first rank in the army of evil, and the reason seems to be that such a place presupposes a continuous activity and a constant presence. The chthonian gods and the gods of darkness have made various storm-gods their subordinates, but not their equals. Where there has been organization of the original naturistic dualism, they have fallen to the rank of simple evil spirits or inferior demons. Among peoples who have attained to the redaction of stories of a properly mythological kind they are based on a number of episodes of a rather subordinate character — of which the religions of classical India and of Greece give us some satisfactory examples (cf. above). The purely allegorical and poetical myth marks the last visible shadow of their gradually disappearing traits.

LITERATURE.—There seems to be no monograph on the subject. Some of the classical literature will be found in the art. AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR. For literature on primitive races see artt. on the various peoples and their religions.

GEORGE FOUCART.

STRANGERS.—I. *PRIMITIVE USAGE IN REGARD TO THE FOREIGNER OR STRANGER.*—**1. A** survey of the evidence shows us that, among the peoples which occupy the lowest place in the scale of culture, the population lives scattered in small groups of the nature of families.[1] Among the Negritos of the Philippines the family group consists of from 30 to 40 persons,[2] in the case of the Yahgan of Cape Horn from two to five families are found in a single wigwam,[3] while, among the Central Australian tribes, members of the local group wander in small parties of one or two families over the land which they own.[4] These

[1] See W J McGee, 'The Siouan Indians,' in *15 RBEW* [1897], p. 200; and the instances in P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, *The Silent Trade: a Contribution to the Early Hist. of Human Intercourse*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 6 and note 8.

[2] A. Schadenberg, 'Ueber die Negrittos der Philippinen,' *ZE* xii. [1880] 137.

[3] T. Bridges, *ap.* E. Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*[2], London, 1894, p. 44.

[4] Spencer-Gillen[2], p. 16.

family groups are, in general, subdivisions of a larger unity. Thus the Negritos recognize the subsistence of social ties between a few families;[1] the Yahgan recognize clans which comprise many smaller divisions;[2] and the tribe of Central Australia is 'an entity . . . divided into a number of lesser groups. . . . These again are divided and subdivided until we reach the smallest group consisting of a few families or even only a single family.'[3] Further, as E. M. Curr[4] observes, every tribe has constant, and for the most part friendly, relations with other tribes.

At times these family groups join forces for the purposes of war or the chase; and at times they exchange visits, and, in some cases at all events, meet for the performance of ceremonies. As a general rule, however, such gatherings are occasional only and of short duration. They break up as soon as the purpose which brought them together is served; and of course they cannot outlast the food supply of the place at which they meet.

While, then, it is plain that the social feelings of the savage reach beyond the family groups to which he belongs, it is difficult or, rather, impossible to make a general statement as to the extent of their range. Bishop Stirling[5] says of the Yahgan that, beyond the family circle, the relation of man to man is doubtful, if not hostile. On the other hand, Spencer and Gillen[6] declare that permanent enmity between any two of the tribes with whom they are acquainted is a thing unknown. In short, the range of the social feelings is widely different in different cases. In some they reach beyond the clan or even the tribe; in others they hardly cross the limits of the family group. The statement of Spencer and Gillen as to the relations of the associated tribes of Central Australia suggests that these tribes have advanced no little way from the simplest stages of social life,[7] and that the Yahgan conception of the world beyond the family group (or little aggregate of family groups) as a hostile world may be taken as representing the 'primitive' conception.

In many instances this conception is held most strongly by that portion of a community which has no personal knowledge of the strangers whom it hates and fears.

Thus the Californian tribes which live at a distance from one another are in perpetual enmity;[8] and the Seri of Sonora, who never see their neighbours except on the frontier or in foray, kill them as a tribal duty, whenever opportunity offers.[9] Before the British settlement of the Andamans there existed extreme jealousy and distrust between adjacent tribes, and even between scattered communities of the same tribe; and it was often the case that tribes fifteen or twenty miles apart had no knowledge of one another.[10] So, too, those of the Yahgan who have never met with the Ona hate and fear them, while those who are their neighbours intermarry with them, with the result that both Yahgan and Ona learn one another's language and are, to some extent at all events, influenced by one another's manners and modes of life. In the same way the Yahgan dread the Alacaluf, believing them to be possessed of supernatural powers, until they have actually seen them, and have become familiar with their appearance.[11]

2. Whatever may be the proximate causes, whatever may be the precise degree of his fear and hatred, the fact remains that as a general rule the savage fears and hates the stranger, and looks upon him, certainly as an enemy, and, it may be, as a being brutish, monstrous, or devilish.

The Orang-Ot of Borneo, when they meet with strangers, turn their backs on them and squat on the ground, hiding their faces; and they explain this behaviour by saying that the sight of strangers makes them dizzy and affects their eyes like the sunlight.[1]

There are many instances of a people calling itself by a name which signifies nothing more than 'the men,' and thus distinguishing itself from the rest of mankind, whom it regards as belonging to a lower order of being. The designation 'Hos'—a branch of the Kols—means 'men' as contrasted with brutes;[2] and the Narrinyeri take great pride in their name, which means 'belonging to men.' 'We are men,' they say, while they call other natives 'wild black fellows.'[3]

Examples of like import are supplied by the Chingpaw, known as Kakhyen by the Burmese, the Tepecanos of Mexico, the Kurnai, the Wiimbaio, the Bakoba, the Yahgan, and the Arawaks and Caribs of Guiana, the Chiriguans, the Chippewas, the Wintūn, and other Californian tribes.[4]

3. The Tupi of Brazil call all men not of their race or speech 'Tapuya,' 'strangers' or 'enemies'[5]—a practice which Burton compares with the case of the 'Hebrew Goyi (Gentile), the Hindu Mlechchha (mixed or impure breed), the Greek *βάρβαρος*, the Latin Barbarus, and the Chinese Fan Kwei (foreign devil).'[6] Several of the Californian tribes are called 'Yuki.' The word in the Wintūn language means 'stranger,' and secondarily 'bad Indian,' 'thief,' and is applied in the same way as the Greek *βάρβαρος*.[7] In the language of the Pomo 'Chumaia' means 'stranger,' 'enemy,' and is used by them in speaking of their neighbours who are really Yuki.[8] The Chippewas, too, employ the word signifying 'stranger' in the sense of 'enemy';[9] and it may be noted, as showing the position which the stranger and the outcast occupied in early times, that a series of words which meant originally 'stranger,' 'outcast,' 'alien,' have come to mean 'miserable' or 'unfortunate.'[10]

4. In the Western Islands of Torres Straits it was regarded as meritorious to kill foreigners either in fair fight or by treachery, and honour and glory were attached to the bringing home of the skulls of the natives of other islands, slain in battle.[11]

J. J. Atkinson tells us that he had three servants, natives of New Caledonia, who had been with him for five years. Two of them belonged to one tribe, and the third, a boy, belonged to another. These tribes were neighbours. Atkinson gave the three a holiday, and landed them at the village of the two natives, with the result that the boy was killed and eaten by them the same night.[12]

[1] A. B. Meyer, 'Die Negrittos der Philippinen,' *Petermann's Mitth.* xx. [1874] 21.
[2] Bridges, *ap.* Westermarck, p. 44.
[3] A. W. Howitt, 'The Dieri and other Kindred Tribes of Central Australia,' *JAI* xx. [1891] 35.
[4] *The Australian Race*, Melbourne and London, 1886–87, i. 63.
[5] 'Residence in Fuegia,' in *S. American Missionary Magazine*, iv. [1870] 11.
[6] a p. 32, b p. 31.
[7] Cf. A. Lang, *Social Origins*, London, 1903, p. 69.
[8] J. Baegert, 'An Account of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Californian Peninsula,' tr. C. Rau, in *Annual Report of . . . the Smithson. Inst. . . . for the Year 1863*, Washington, 1864, p. 359.
[9] W J McGee, 'The Seri Indians,' in *17 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. pp. 130, 132.
[10] E. H. Man, *On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, p. xvii.
[11] P. Hyades and J. Deniker, *Mission scientifique du Cap Horn*, Paris, 1885–91, vii. 15; see also the observations of Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 31, regarding the prevalence of similar conceptions among some of the Australian tribes.

[1] C. A. L. M. Schwaner, *Borneo, Beschrijving van het Stroomgebied van den Barito*, Amsterdam, 1853, i. 229; P. J. Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, Zalt-Bommel, 1854–56, ii. 392, gives the same account of the Poenans; and see also G. F. Lyon, *A Narr. of Travels in N. Africa*, London, 1821, p. 149; *Pilgrimage of Fa Hian*, from the French ed. of the *Foe Koue Ki* of Rémusat, Klaproth, and Landresse, Calcutta, 1848, p. 232.
[2] E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 178; cf. p. 35 as to the Dophlās.
[3] G. Taplin, *op.* J. D. Woods, *The Native Tribes of S. Australia*, Adelaide, 1879, p. 1.
[4] Other instances will be found in A. H. Keane, *Man Past and Present*[2], Cambridge, 1899, 1920, *Ethnology*, do 1896; and in Hamilton-Grierson, p. 30, note 2.
[5] *The Captivity of Hans Stade of Hesse in A.D. 1547–1555 among the wild Tribes of E. Brazil*, ed. R. F. Burton, London, 1874 (Hakluyt Society), p. lxx.
[6] *Ib.*
[7] S. Powers, 'Tribes of California,' in *Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 125 f.
[8] *Ib.* p. 136.
[9] W. H. Keating, *Narr. of an Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River*, London, 1825, i. 336.
[10] O. Schrader, *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, Jena, 1886, p. 7; cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, p. 396 ff.
[11] *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–12, v. 277 ff.
[12] 'The Natives of New Caledonia,' *FL* xiv. [1903] 250; cf

The stranger in the Nissan Islands is regarded as an enemy, and is, if possible, killed and eaten.[1] We have a like account of the inhabitants of Mabuiag,[2] of the Massim of New Guinea,[3] and of the Battas. In the last case the inhabitants of the villages, which are cut off from one another by high grass and primeval forest, practise a system of mutual exclusion. To be a stranger is to be an enemy; and a native who enters the district of his neighbours runs the chance of being eaten.[4] So, too, Strabo[5] says of the Scythians on the Euxine that they sacrificed strangers, devoured their flesh, and used their skulls as drinking-cups. Among the Nāgas every tribe, almost every village, is at war with its neighbours; and he who leaves the territory of his tribe does so at the peril of his life.[6] The Wazaramo do not allow strangers to camp within their villages; and among the Wanyamwezi it is impossible for single individuals to move from one district to another. They are sure to be plundered, if not murdered.[7] The Bakete and Bakuba refuse all friendly advances by peoples in their vicinity, and the stranger who enters their territory is treated as an enemy.[8] The Akka look upon strangers as fair prey;[9] the Kabyles regard all who live beyond their frontiers as enemies;[10] and the Bakwiri villages are fences for protection, as they are continually at enmity with one another.[11] Schweinfurth[12] makes the general observation that in Africa there is an utter want of wholesome intercourse between race and race. For any member of a tribe which speaks one dialect to cross the border of a tribe which speaks another is to court destruction; and the effect of difference of language in intensifying the mutual discords between petty tribes has been remarked by A. von Humboldt[13] in the case of the American tribes between the equator and the eighth degree of north latitude. The Arab who meets an unknown wanderer in the desert acts in accordance with the saying, 'The stranger is for the wolf';[14] and it is a consequence of this desert law, which identifies the stranger with the enemy, that the *jinn* are regarded as hostile, as gods without worshippers, dwelling in haunts and not in sanctuaries.[15]

A stranger may not approach a Khond village,[16] unless invited; and, in speaking of Angamiland, G. Watt[17] says that it is no unusual state of affairs to find *khel* A of one village at war with *khel* B of another, while not at war with *khel* B of its own village. The *khels* are often completely separated by great walls, the people on either side living within a few yards of each other, yet having no dealings whatever.[18] Lyon tells us of two towns separated only by a wall. The inhabitants of the one town are at constant war with those of the other. They seldom see and are perfect strangers to one another.[1]

It is to be observed that in some countries the stranger, if he be of high repute for sanctity, may run the danger of being slain so that the blessing of his perpetual presence may rest on the land. Thus the Afghan Hazarehs kill and bury in their own country any foreigner who performs a miracle or shows any sign of divine favour;[2] and similar statements are made regarding the Wa[3] and the inhabitants of Yunnan.[4]

5. Among the Kabyles the foreigner is prohibited from performing any act which assures to him property or influence.[5] The Mairs will not tolerate the residence of any stranger among them;[6] and a similar policy was pursued by the tribes of which P. von Martius[7] speaks, and, at one time, by the Masai.[8] So too in Dahomey an alien may not establish himself in the country without the king's permission;[9] and J. H. van Linschoten[10] states that a similar regulation prevailed in China.[11] In the height of their prestige the Masai punished with death by beating any one of their people who returned after having gone to live with foreigners;[12] and the Wachaga formerly inflicted the death penalty on any woman of the tribe who married a stranger.[13] Among the Khonds marriage with a stranger adopted into the tribe is forbidden;[14] and, according to Ibn Batuta,[15] the women of Zebid will marry the stranger, but will not quit their country. Even in the burial of the dead the same conception prevailed. Thus the Choctaws thought it irreligious to bury their kinsman alongside of a stranger, much more to inter him in the tomb of an enemy.[16]

6. The stranger is regarded as a being without rights; for he is outside of the sphere within which alone they are recognized and enforced. This view prevails among many peoples.[17]

It is held, *e.g.*, by the Wakapomo,[18] the Wanyamwezi,[19] the Barea and Kunáma,[20] the Bogos,[21] the Pelew Islanders,[22] and certain Papuan tribes—the Yabim on the north coast of New Guinea, and the Tami Islanders.[23]

Except in so far as modified by treaty, by special protection, or by the institution of hospitality, the same conception ruled among the nations of classical antiquity.

'Cum alienigenis, cum barbaris, aeternum omnibus Graecis

V. de Rochas, *La Nouvelle-Calédonie*, Paris, 1862, p. 250; A. Bernard, *L'Archipel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*, do. 1894, p. 292.

[1] F. Sorge, 'Nissan-Inseln im Bismarck-Archipel,' *ap.* S. R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Africa und Oceanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 414.

[2] *Reports of the Cambridge Anthrop. Expedition*, v. 278.

[3] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 569.

[4] F. Junghuhn, *Die Battaländer auf Sumatra*, Berlin, 1847, p. 109 f.

[5] VII. iii. 6 f.

[6] W. Crooke, *Natives of Northern India*, London, 1907, p. 43.

[7] J. A. Grant, *A Walk across Africa*, Edinburgh, 1864, pp. 38, 102.

[8] H. von Wissmann, L. Wolf, C. de François, and H. Mueller, *Im Innern Afrikas*, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 208, 227.

[9] G. Burrows, *The Land of the Pigmies*, London, 1898, p. 195 f.

[10] A. Hanoteau and A. Letourneux, *La Kabylie et les coutumes kabyles*, Paris, 1872–73, ii. 141.

[11] Leuschner, *Die Bakwiri*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 21.

[12] *The Heart of Africa*, tr. E. E. Frewer, London, 1873, i. 200.

[13] *Personal Narr. of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent*, tr. H. M. Williams, London, 1814–29, v. 270.

[14] C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, Cambridge, 1888, i. 276; cf. p. 580.

[15] W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 119 ff.

[16] H. B. Rowney, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, p. 101.

[17] 'The Aboriginal Tribes of Manipur,' *JAI* xvi. [1887] 362.

[18] See Keane, *Man Past and Present*, p. 189, as to the *khel*.

[1] P. 162; for other instances see Hamilton-Grierson, p. 31.

[2] R. F. Burton, *Sindh, and the Races which inhabit the Valley of the Indus*, London, 1851, p. 388; see also p. 86.

[3] *Census of India, 1901*, i. Ethnographic Appendices, Calcutta, 1903, p. 217.

[4] *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, tr. H. Yule[3], revised H. Cordier, London, 1903, ii. 79; W. Gill, *The River of Golden Sand*, do. 1880, i. 323.

[5] Hanoteau-Letourneux, ii. 140.

[6] Rowney, p. 54.

[7] *Von dem Rechtszustande unter den Ureinwohnern Brasiliens*, Munich, 1832, p. 34.

[8] S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, pp. 4, 105.

[9] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1890, p. 227.

[10] *Voyage to the East Indies*, London, 1885 (Hakluyt Society), i. 135.

[11] See T. R. Jernigan, *China in Law and Commerce*, New York and London, 1905, p. 241.

[12] Hinde, pp. 4, 76.

[13] J. Kohler, 'Das Banturecht in Ostafrika,' *ZVRW* xv. [1902] 61.

[14] S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, ed. W. Macpherson, London, 1865, p. 69.

[15] *Voyages d'Ibn-Batoutah*, tr. C. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti, Paris, 1853–59, ii. 169.

[16] J. Adair, *The Hist. of the American Indians*, London, 1775, p. 184.

[17] See Hamilton-Grierson, p. 33.

[18] A. Kraft, *Die Wakapomo*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 292.

[19] Kohler, *ZVRW* xv. 46.

[20] W. Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 477.

[21] Munzinger, *Sitten und Recht der Bogos*, Winterthur, 1859, pp. 28, 48.

[22] J. Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der Südsee,' *Journ. des Museum Godeffroy*, i. [Hamburg, 1874–75] 220, 238.

[23] Kohler, 'Recht der Papuas,' *ZVRW* xiv. [1900] 388 f.

bellum est.'[1] 'No Greek,' says Cunningham, 'was ever at home in another Greek city than his own; he was liable to be sold in a city in which he had no rights and no status.'[2] In early Rome the citizen was regarded as the sole possessor of rights, the privileges conferred in later times on the *peregrinus* by the *jus gentium* being, in the main, a result of peaceful intercourse between the republic and the nations, introduced by an advancing commerce. Under the later emperors the merchant belonging to an independent country was subjected to numerous disabilities; and, on the breaking up of the empire, the old conception of the stranger's position immediately revived.[3] In the Middle Ages the foreigner was regarded as incapable of holding land; he was subjected to many disadvantages in matters of law and legal procedure; he was not permitted, or was permitted only upon making a payment (*gabella emigrationis*), to leave the country with the wealth which he had accumulated; on his death his property fell in whole or in part to the supreme authority; and it was confiscated on his banishment.[4] 'Peregrinum qui patronum non habebat vendebant Saxones.'[5]

It is worthy of remark by way of contrast that, in Babylonia, resident aliens became citizens and were under no disabilities.[6]

Again, the position of the alien was injuriously affected by the view, very generally held, that the family, the group, the community, or the district to which a criminal or a debtor belonged—his fellow-countryman or his fellow-townsman — was liable in the penalty which he had incurred or the obligation by which he was bound.[7] There are even cases in which a stranger is treated as bound to pay for what another stranger, with whom he is wholly unconnected, has taken without payment;[8] and in one case (Kunáma) the host whose guest is slain may slay the slayer's guest.[9]

7. The view that the stranger has no rights finds, among the Yabim, its most forcible expression in its application to shipwrecked persons.[10]

According to Herodotus,[11] the Tauri sacrificed all such unfortunates to the Virgin. They were plundered in New Zealand;[12] and, in Borneo, both wrecks and their crews belong to the district where the disaster occurs.[13] It was the custom at Malabar that everything obtained from a wreck fell to the fisc. Calicut formed the sole exception to this rule, which seems to have prevailed on all the Indian coasts.[14] The Fijians used to kill and eat even those of their own race who were cast ashore;[15] and, according to Wilkes,[16] they were accounted as an offering to the gods and sacrificed. Another authority, however, states that they were spared, because the gods would be angry if the gift which they had sent was rejected.[17] The Yahgan kill castaways;[18] and du Cange sums up the practice of the Middle Ages thus: 'Neque dumtaxat naves ipsae fractae et naufragium passae, resque in iis contentae dominorum erant: sed et homines ipsi, qui in iis vehebantur: adeo ut et per vim caperentur, et persoluto pretio a captivitate liberari cogerentur.'[19]

D'Arvieux[1] gives a similar account of the Arabs. A very different mode of treatment is found among the western islanders of Torres Straits, who adopt the stranger as a brother and give him a garden.[2]

The distinction between the position of a stranger and that of a fellow-tribesman is illustrated by the fact that among many peoples the thief is regarded as an offender only when he steals from a compatriot or fellow-tribesman or villager;[3] and that the goods of a foreign merchant become on his death the property of the king of the country in which he has died.[4] It was the custom, however, in India as well as in the Sudan not to interfere with the property of deceased strangers, but to hand it over to the persons entitled to it;[5] and, according to Tavernier,[6] a similar practice prevailed in Persia.

8. The position of the outlaw throws light upon that of the stranger.[7]

9. Another indication of the primitive view is to be found in the symbolic acts which are the necessary preliminaries to the stranger's reception —acts by which he makes clear that his intentions are friendly, or from which he ascertains that those whom he is approaching are well-disposed towards him.

Thus it is a common sign of friendliness to advance displaying green boughs,[8] or holding out grass, as among the Masai,[9] or waving white cloth.[10] Near Cape Hinchingbroke some of the natives stood up with their arms stretched out like a cross,[11] or held up a stick with the large feathers or wing of a bird tied to it,[12] or a leathern frock on the end of a pole,[13] or offered a white cock.[14] Among the Shoshones the stranger paints the women's cheeks with vermilion in token of peace;[15] and the red shield hoisted on the mast of a ship, or hung over the walls of a town, or swung over his head by a herald, was a sign of peace among the Scandinavians.[16] In New Guinea and the adjacent islands the natives broke their spears on their own heads to show their pacific intentions,[17] or dipped their hands in water and sprinkled it over their heads.[18] The last-mentioned practice

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[1] Livy, xxxi. 29; cf. G. Grote, *A Hist. of Greece*[4], London, 1872, ii. 162.

[2] *An Essay on Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects (Ancient Times)*, Cambridge, 1898, p. 75.

[3] R. von Ihering, *Geist des römischen Rechts*[4], Leipzig, 1878, i. 231 f.; W. Pappafava, *Über die bürgerliche Rechtsstellung der Fremden*, tr. from Italian to Germ. by M. Leesberg, Pola, 1884, p. 4 ff.

[4] L. Goldschmidt, *Handbuch des Handelsrechts*[3], Stuttgart, 1891, p. 120 ff.; see also W. J. Ashley, *An Introd. to English Economic History and Theory*, London, 1888–93, pt. ii. 'End of the Middle Ages,' p. 13 ff.; and below, § 7.

[5] Maginardus, *Transl. S. Vitti*, ch. 13.

[6] C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 118.

[7] See Hamilton-Grierson, p. 16, note 2; G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1894, p. 92; G. Grey, *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in N.W. and W. Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 239; J. Matthews, *A Voyage to the River Sierra-Leone*, do. 1791, p. 82; and cf. the curious customs noted at Hawaii by E. Dieffenbach, *Travels in New Zealand*, do. 1843, i. 199, and among the Abors by Dalton, p. 24; see also Jernigan, p. 74 f.

[8] H. Capello and R. Ivens, *From Benguela to the Territory of Yacca*, tr. A. Elwes, London, 1882, ii. 242.

[9] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, p. 477.

[10] Kohler, *ZVRW* xiv. 388 f. [11] iv. 103.

[12] J. S. Polack, *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, London, 1840, ii. 68.

[13] S. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, London, 1862, ii. 292.

[14] Ibn Batuta, iv. 97 f.; *Book of Ser Marco Polo*, ii. 386.

[15] T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*[2], ed. G. S. Rowe, London, 1860, i. 210.

[16] *Narr. of U.S. Exploring Expedition*, iii. 244, note.

[17] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 147.

[18] T. Bridges, *Mœurs et Coutumes des Fuégiens*, tr. P. Hyades, *Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris*, ser. iii. vol. vii. [1884] p. 180.

[19] *Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, ed. L. Favre, Niort, 1883–87, *s.v.* 'Lagan.'

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[1] *Travels in Arabia, the Desart*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1723, p. 191 ff.; cf. p. 68 ff.

[2] *Reports of Cambridge Anthrop. Expedition*, v. 278.

[3] M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, new ed., London, 1839, i. 297 (Afghans); see authorities in Hamilton Grierson, p. 34.

[4] Hamilton-Grierson, p. 35, note 4; and see A. L. von Schlözer, *Russische Annalen in ihrer slavonischen Grundsprache*, Göttingen, 1805, iii. 332; du Cange, *s.vv.* 'Albanagium,' 'Albani'; Goldschmidt, p. 121; and above, § 6.

[5] Ibn Batuta, iv. 83, 42.

[6] *The Six Voyages of J. B. Tavernier through Turkey into Persia and the East Indies*, made English by J. P., London, 1678, p. 103.

[7] See art. OUTLAW.

[8] Hamilton-Grierson, p. 70 and note 1; J. Cook, *A Voyage towards the South Pole and round the World, 1772–75*, London, 1777, i. 221 (Otaheite), ii. 35 (Mallicollo); K. Lehmann, 'Kauffriede und Friedensschild,' in *Germanistische Abhandlungen zum LXX. Geburtstag K. v. Maurer's*, Göttingen, 1893, p. 54 f. (Scandinavia); R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, London, 1855, p. 175 (New Zealand); J. Macgillivray, *Narr. of the Voyage of H.M.S. 'Rattlesnake,'* do. 1852, ii. 41 (islands of Torres Straits); 'Navigation Australe faite par J. Le Maire et W. C. Schouten . . . 1615–17,' *Recueil des Voyages . . . de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, Rouen, 1725, viii. 174 (New Guinea); O. Finsch, *Samoafahrten; Reisen in Kaiser Wilhelms-Land und Englisch-Neu-Guinea*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 295 (Kaiser Wilhelm's Land); B. Hall, *Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea and the Great Loo-Choo Island*, London, 1818, p. 145 (Loo-Choo Island); H. von Wissmann, *My Second Journey through Equatorial Africa*, Eng. tr., do. 1891, p. 143 (Baqua-Sekelai); C. A. Vincendon-Dumoulin and C. Desgraz, *Iles Marquises ou Nukahiva*, Paris, 1843, p. 13 (Marquesas).

[9] C. H. Stigand, *To Abyssinia, through an Unknown Land*, London, 1910, p. 211 f.

[10] Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 13; U. Lisiansky, *A Voyage round the World, 1803–06*, London, 1814, p. 64 f. (Marquesas); 'Navigation Australe,' p. 174 (New Guinea); J. Cook, i. 83, 220 (New Zealand, Otaheite); J. Cook and J. King, *A Voyage of Discovery to the Pacific Ocean . . . 1777–80*, London, 1784, ii. 355 (near Cape Hinchingbroke); Lehmann, p. 54 f. (Scandinavia).

[11] Cook-King, ii. 355; cf. p. 397. [12] *Ib.* p. 357.

[13] *Ib.* p. 391. [14] Wilkes, iii. 279 (Fiji).

[15] M. Lewis and W. Clark, *Travels to the Source of the Missouri River, 1804–1806*, new ed., London, 1815, ii. 86; cf. McGee, *17 RBEW*, pt. i. p. 168.

[16] Lehmann, pp. 55–60.

[17] 'Navigation Australe,' p. 199.

[18] *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Gazette*, ed. J. R. Logan, iv. [Singapore, 1850] 8.

seems to be general among the Papuans.[1] It is found in Ceram[2] and at Ternate;[3] and a somewhat similar usage among the Wakikuju has been described by von Höhnel.[4] The Bushmen, to show their friendliness, lay down their arms and sandals while still at a distance,[5] or wave a jackal's tail attached to the end of a stick,[6] while the inhabitants of the island called 'Gente Hermosa' hold resinous sticks burning like torches for the same purpose, perhaps with the view of disenchanting the strangers, rather than with that of showing their friendliness.[7] An old Eskimo of the Isle of St. Lawrence held up a variety of articles, and then, extending his arms, rubbed and patted his breast—the usual Eskimo indication of friendship.[8] Thus savages, by displaying goods which they are ready to barter, show that they have come to trade;[9] and Livingstone says: 'The usual way of approaching an unknown people is to call out in a cheerful tone "Malonda," "Things for sale, or do you want to sell anything?"'[10]

In many places the rule is established that an approaching stranger must in some way give notice of his presence—*e.g.*, by sounding a trumpet,[11] by shouting or blowing a horn,[12] by coughing twice,[13] by uttering the cry peculiar to his tribe,[14] or by making a series of smokes.[15]

'If,' says an ancient law of the Javanese, 'any person enter a village at an improper hour, and is twice challenged without making any reply, he shall be considered a thief. A person skulking behind a door or fence, and refusing to answer, shall also be considered as a thief.'[16]

Sometimes an attempt is made to ascertain the real mind of the stranger by means of divination. Among the A-nyanja medicine is given to a goat or fowl for this purpose, and its death is regarded as of evil omen.[17] Dalton[18] speaks of a similar practice as existing among the Pádam.

10. The Ashango host smears himself with red as a mark of friendliness, and it is a favourable sign if he asks the stranger to do likewise.[19] The Ovambo welcome him by smearing his face and breast with butter,[20] while in New Guinea it is of good omen if the host presents betel-nut to the new-comer with the thick end towards him.[21] It is not improbable that the elaborate forms of salutation in use among many peoples[22] served originally to declare the intention of persons meeting for the first time.[1]

'The Tibu,' *e.g.*, 'is always distrustful; hence meeting a fellow-countryman in the desert, he is careful not to draw near without due precaution. At sight of each other both generally stop suddenly; then crouching and drawing the litham over the lower part of the face in Tuareg fashion, they grasp the inseparable spear in their right and . . . bill-hook in their left. After these preliminaries they begin to exchange compliments, inquiring after each other's health and family connection, receiving every answer with thanksgiving to Allah. These formalities usually last some minutes.'[2]

Doughty[3] tells us of the Arabs that, when a stranger enters the tent, his hosts 'observe an honourable silence, asking no untimely questions, (such is school and nurture of the desert) until he have eaten and drunken somewhat at the least, and by "the bread and salt" there is peace established between them, for a time.'[4] There are traces of a similar etiquette in the Homeric poems;[5] and it is found among the Omahas[6] and some of the Athapascan tribes of Alaska.[7]

With this form of politeness we may compare the solemn silence with which the Tupi[8] and the Caribs[9] receive the stranger on his first arrival. This abstention from speech with him may, it is thought, originate in their fear of him as not, it may be, inherently tabu, but as belonging to strange gods, as bringing with him strange supernatural influences.[10] Besides, it may be that the stranger is not a human being, but a spirit. Hence one must make some sound each time one draws in one's breath or be smitten with dumbness.[11] Among the N. American Indians it is a common notion that 'strangers, particularly white strangers, are oft-times accompanied by evil spirits. Of these they have great dread as creating and delighting in mischief.'[12] The Nāga, when entering or leaving a strange village, and especially when leaving after having enjoyed its hospitality, strikes his ears, forehead, and stomach with a sprig of wild indigo, which he then places in his kilt, in order to avert any evil consequences of his temerity;[13] and for the same reason the giver of hospitality is exposed to danger.[14] The Bakaïri believe that evil, sickness, and death come from the sorceries of strangers beyond their borders;[15] and similar views prevail among the Melangkaps of Borneo[16] and some of the Australian aborigines.[17] In mid-Borneo the stranger's presence at religious rites is feared, and is regarded as dangerous to

1 *Journ. of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Gazette*, iv. 8.
2 S. Müller, *Reizen en Onderzoekeningen in den indischen Archipel*, Amsterdam, 1857, i. 55.
3 *Terra Australis Cognita, or Voyages to the S. Hemisphere, 16th–18th Centuries*, ed. J. Callander, Edinburgh, 1766–68, i. 260.
4 *Zum Rudolph-See und Stephanie-See*, Vienna, 1892, p. 315 f.; see also G. Forster, *A Voyage round the World in H.B.M. Sloop Resolution*, London, 1777, ii. 186, 235 (New Guinea, Mallicollo).
5 G. W. Stow, *The Native Races of S. Africa*, London, 1905, pp. 49, 142.
6 *Ib.* p. 49.
7 *The Voyages of P. Fernandes de Queiros, 1595–1606*, tr. and ed. Clements Markham, London, 1904 (Hakluyt Society), i. 427; see § 11 below.
8 F. W. Beechey, *Narr. of a Voyage to the Pacific and Beering's Strait*, London, 1831, i. 331.
9 O. von Kotzebue, *A Voyage of Discovery into the South Sea and Behring's Straits*, Eng. tr., London, 1821, i. 189.
10 D. and C. Livingstone, *Narr. of an Expedition to the Zambesi*, London, 1865, p. 434.
11 A. d'Orbigny, *Voyage dans l'Amérique méridionale*, Paris, 1839–44, iv. 164 (Yuracarès).
12 Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], p. 400; but see W. E. Wilda, *Das Strafrecht der Germanen*, Halle, 1842, p. 673, note 3 (old Germany).
13 P. Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas*; *die materielle Cultur der Danâkil, Galla, und Somâl*, Berlin, 1893, p. 249 (Kafa); Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, i. 258 f. (Tarahumares).
14 E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 321.
15 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 569 (Australia).
16 J. Crawfurd, *Hist. of the Indian Archipelago*, Edinburgh, 1820, iii. 115.
17 H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, London, 1897, p. 450; see D. and C. Livingstone, p. 109.
18 P. 25.
19 P. B. du Chaillu, *A Journey to Ashango-land*, London, 1867, p. 341.
20 C. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*; *or, Explorations and Discoveries, during Four Years' Wanderings in the Wilds of S.-W. Africa*, London, 1856, p. 184; cf. J. L. Burckhardt's account (*Notes on the Bedouins and Wahâbys*, London, 1830, p. 102) of the Arabs of a tribe in Nejd.
21 J. Chalmers, *Pioneering in New Guinea*, London, 1887, p. 180.
22 See art. SALUTATIONS; R. Schomburgk, *Reisen in Britisch-Guiana*, Leipzig, 1847–48, i. 205, 361 f.; d'Orbigny, iv. 164 (Akawais, Arawaks, and Macusis); Duff Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 35 (Yaos); J. Lery, *Hist. Navigationis in Bresiliam*, chs. 17, 19, in T. de Bry, *Hist. Americæ*, pt. iii., Frankfort, 1590–1602 (natives of Brazil); H. Ling Roth, 'On Salutations,' *JAI* xix. [1890] 164 ff.

1 Hamilton-Grierson, p. 72.
2 E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants*, Eng. tr., London [1878–94], xi. 430.
3 i. 228.
4 See below, § 18, and cf. H. C. Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, New York and Edinburgh, 1896, p. 9.
5 E.g., *Od.* i. 120 ff., iv. 60 ff.
6 Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains . . . compiled from the notes of Major S. H. Long*, London, 1823, ii. 44.
7 Ivan Petroff. 'Report on the Population, Industries, and Resources of Alaska,' in *Compilation of Narratives of Explorations in Alaska*, Washington, 1900, p. 262.
8 Villegagnon's 'Voyage,' in *Terra Australis Cognita*, p. 269 f.
9 J. Gumilla, *Hist. naturelle, civile, et géographique de l'Orénoque*, French tr., Avignon, 1758, ii. 80–84; L. de Poincy and C. de Rochefort, *Hist. naturelle et morale des îles Antilles de l'Amérique*, Rotterdam, 1681, p. 514.
10 See F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 71; R. R. Marett, 'Is Taboo a negative Magic?', in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 233. Marett adopts the view that the stranger is inherently tabu (*The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914, p. 96).
11 V. Stefánsson, *My Life with the Eskimo*, London, 1913, p. 171.
12 R. I. Dodge, *Our Wild Indians*, Hertford, Conn., 1886, p. 119.
13 T. C. Hodson, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 135.
14 See art. GIFTS (Primitive and Savage), § 4 (1)
15 K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 232 f.
16 J. Whitehead, *Exploration of Mount Kina Balu, North Borneo*, London, 1893, p. 198.
17 Curr, i. 50; cf. L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 259

young children.[1] In the eyes of the natives of India he is specially dangerous in relation to food;[2] and among some of the jungle tribes charmed circles are drawn to keep off 'spirits belonging to another settlement, which, being strangers, are presumably hostile.'[3]

If the stranger be thus possessed, he must be disenchanted.[4]

Among the Thonga tribes he must submit to a purifying ceremony;[5] and in Benin he was compelled to wash his feet before entering the country.[6] 'One of the duties of the medicine chief is to exorcise these spirits,'[7] and, when ambassadors visit the Tatars, 'they and their gifts must pass between two fires to be purified, lest peradventure they have practised some witchcraft, or have brought some poyson or other mischiefe with them.'[8]

It seems not unlikely that to present the stranger with a lighted cigar,[9] or with a bowl of liquor,[10] or with betel-nut,[11] or to offer him the firstfruits of the soil, and, on his accepting them, to entertain him with feast, dance, and song,[12] or to receive him with a sacrifice,[13] is to perform a symbolic act of which, in some cases at least, the original significance has been forgotten—to remove the tabu from him and admit him for a time within the circle of the group.[14]

In this practice is, we believe, to be found the explanation of two very curious modes of reception. When a stranger visits a Tupi camp, he goes to the hut of his chosen host and sits down without speaking. By and by the women come to him and weep over him, and commend him, and he, too, must weep. In the end the master of the hut addresses him, provides him with food, and slings a hammock for him; and he distributes small presents.[15] This weeping welcome has been observed in New Zealand,[16] Queensland,[17] Tahiti,[18] Ulietea,[19] in the Penrhyn Islands,[20] New Caledonia,[21] the Andaman Islands,[22] and among the Ainu of Yezo.[23] In the last three cases it appears that it is indulged in only at meetings of relatives, and to such the explanation offered by E. B. Tylor[24] (that it signifies grief for those who have died in the interval of separation) or that of H. Ling Roth[25] (that it is 'joy weeping') may apply. But neither explanation meets the case where the unknown stranger is wept over on his arrival.[26] In speaking of the natives of the island of Macassar, J. G. F. Riedel[27] says that men and women weep immediately on meeting.[28]

Another curious form is found among the Central Eskimo. The stranger is welcomed with a feast; and, as he slowly approaches, one of his hosts gives him a severe blow and awaits a blow in return, and an exchange of blows continues until one of the combatants yields.[1] At one time a similar custom prevailed in Greenland.[2] The explanation of this practice is apparently to be found in the account by Hall[3] of a similar ceremony in use among the Eskimo of Cumberland Inlet. There the combat is between the stranger and the sorcerer. After having exchanged blows, they kiss one another, and the stranger is hospitably received by all. The practice, in short, is a rite of aggregation.[4] Mariner[5] informs us that at Tonga visitors or persons who have been long absent may be challenged 'by any one, or every one of the island, so that in the end they are pretty certain of getting a thorough beating'; and we may note in this connexion the statement of St. John,[6] that the Koreans 'have no salutation except buffeting each other.'

In some cases the savage offers his blood to his own gods in order to gain their protection—a proceeding which has not infrequently been mistaken for a token of friendship;[7] or he takes the stranger to a temple and prays that any evil which the latter may have brought with him may be averted;[8] or, as among some of the nomadic Arabs of Morocco, he presents the stranger with drink, which, should the latter misbehave himself, 'would cause his knees to swell so that he could not escape. In other words, he has drunk a conditional curse.'[9]

11. Further, it is plain that the supernatural influences which accompany the stranger will be especially potent in his own country.

In some parts of Australia natives, in approaching a strange encampment, 'carry lighted bark or burning sticks in their hands, for the purpose, they say, of cleansing and purifying the air';[10] and Frazer[11] suggests that the fire borne at the head of the army in ancient Greece and among the Ovambo of S.W. Africa 'may have been intended to dissipate the evil influences, whether magical or spiritual, with which the air of the enemy's country might be conceived to teem.' In the country of the Brataua Lohan had his home; and they 'believed that he watched over them, and that he caused their country to be deadly to strangers. It was therefore to him that they attributed the taboo which protected them against the visits of other tribes.'[12]

The danger of trespassing upon tabued ground was, accordingly, very serious; and the dread of incurring it was formerly so powerful among the New Zealanders that, on going to a strange land, they performed certain ceremonies 'to make it *noa*, lest, perchance, it might have been previously *tapu*.'[13] In some cases the stranger seeks to render himself acceptable to the divine guardians of the place through which he must pass by throwing down on a heap a stone, a rag, a stick, or some grass;[14] and in this connexion we may mention the belief, current among the Bechuanas, that a stranger can ensure a friendly reception by spitting on a stone and adding it to a heap on the road.[15]

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1 A. W. Nieuwenhuis, *Quer durch Borneo*, Leyden, 1904–07, i. 74, 163.

2 Crooke, *Natives of N. India*, p. 195.

3 *Ib.* p. 259.

4 See *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 102 ff.

5 H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, London, 1912–13, i. 153, 284.

6 H. Ling Roth, *Great Benin*, Halifax, England, 1903, p. 123.

7 Dodge, *loc. cit.*

8 *The Texts and Versions of John Pian de Carpine and William de Rubruquis*, ed. C. R. Beazley (Hakluyt Society), London, 1903, p. 113; cf. p. 131. See § 11, below.

9 Von Martius, p. 56 (natives of Brazil).

10 Schomburgk, i. 197 (Indians of British Guiana); K. Weinhold, *Altnordisches Leben*, Berlin, 1856, p. 445 (old Scandinavia); cf. H. C. Trumbull, *Studies in Oriental Social Life*, London, 1895, p. 112 f.; and see C. H. Stigand, *To Abyssinia through an Unknown Land*, London, 1910, p. 211.

11 Kohler, *ZVRW* xiv. 389; cf. Chalmers, p. 130 (Papuans).

12 See A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, pp. 44–46.

13 Trumbull, *Threshold Covenant*, pp. 1–10, 58 f.

14 See the mode of welcome at the island of Gente Hermosa (§ 9, above) and the practice of carrying fire noted in § 11, below.

15 Villegagnon, p. 269 f.

16 Taylor, p. 175; G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, ii. 107.

17 C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, London, 1889, p. 224.

18 W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1831–36, ii. 337.

19 J. Cook, i. 365.

20 C. E. Meinicke, *Die Inseln des stillen Oceans*, Leipzig, 1875–76, ii. 264.

21 C. Lambert, 'Mœurs et superstitions de la tribu Bélep (Nouvelle Calédonie),' in *Les Missions Catholiques*, xii. [Paris, 1880] 69.

22 Man, pp. 73, 173.

23 H. C. St. John, *Notes and Sketches from the Wild Coasts of Nippon*, Edinburgh, 1880, p. 245.

24 *EBr*[9], *s.v.* 'Salutations.' 25 *JAI* xix. 178 *f.*

26 As to some of the Queensland tribes see Lumholtz, p. 224 f.

27 *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 405.

28 See also N. del Techo, 'The Hist. of the Provinces of Paraguay, Tucuman, Rio de Plata,' *ap.* A. Churchill, *Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1704, iv. 718; A. F. R. Wollaston, *Pygmies and Papuans*, do. 1912, pp. 41, 56; *JRGS* xxxviii. [1911] 211.

1 F. Boas, 'The Central Eskimo,' *6 RBEW* [1888], p. 609; cf. H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh and London, 1875, pp. 211, 240, 286.

2 F. Boas, *loc. cit.*

3 *Narr. of the Second Arctic Expedition*, ed. J. E. Nourse, Washington, 1879, cited in *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 108.

4 See A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, pp. 55, 183, 236, 249.

5 *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*[2], Edinburgh, 1827, i. 277.

6 P. 245. 7 Jevons[2], p. 71.

8 G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, p. 291.

9 E. Westermarck, *MI* i. 590.

10 R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, Melbourne and London, 1878, i. 134.

11 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings*, London, 1911, ii. 264, pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 111; see *The Voyages of P. Fernandes de Queiros*, tr. C. Markham (Hakluyt Soc. II. xiv. and xv.), London, 1904, i. 427; and *The Texts and Versions of John Pian de Carpine and William de Rubruquis* (Hakluyt Soc. Ex. Ser.), London, 1903, p. 113; cf. p. 131.

12 Howitt, p. 485.

13 E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, London, 1854, p. 83.

14 J. Thomson, *To the Central African Lakes and Back*, London, 1881, i. 228; see E. S. Hartland, *LP*, do. 1894–95, ii. 214 f.; and F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 267 ff.

15 G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrika's*, Breslau, 1872, p. 200.

It is 'at the boundary of two districts, or where some dangerous tract of country commences,'[1] that the savage is most likely to regard any natural object which is strange or unusual as connected in some way with mysterious influences fraught with peril to himself. Nor is the reason far to seek; for the borderland is from its very nature the home of the mysterious and awe-inspiring. The line of division is marked sometimes by natural objects and sometimes artificially. These natural objects, such as mountains, rivers, forests, or jungles, are associated by the savage with demons or spirits or powers stronger than man and potent to work him good or evil;[2] and he regards with similar feelings the great tracts of waste lands which in many instances serve as boundary.

The Mangwangwana kings, *e.g.*, deliberately surrounded their country 'with an enormous starvation area, by ruthlessly destroying villages and whole races around them. The foodless belt was a greater protection to them than the great wall of China to the Chinese Emperors.'[3] J. B. Tavernier[4] attributes a similar policy to one of the Persian kings; and Cæsar says of the German tribes: 'Civitatibus maxima laus est, quam latissimas circum se vastatis finibus solicitudines habere.'[5] The Romans sometimes adopted this method of protection, and in Karolingian times the Spanish border was similarly secured.[6]

In other cases the boundary was marked by upright stones,[7] which, in Old Germany, *e.g.*, were not infrequently the gravestones of heroes.[8] In some parts of ancient Ireland pillar-stones were worshipped; and 'a stone of worship' is said by the Brehon laws to be one of the objects used for marking the limits of lands.[9] Hommel[10] observes that, 'in South Arabic inscriptions, *wathan* signifies "boundary pillar," and at the same time "statue of god," "idol."'[11] Grimm tells us that ordeals, especially ordeals by battle, generally took place in the border-land which lay between two districts. This spot—often a meadow or an island—was chosen because it was a holy place, sacred to powers whose presence ensured fair play to both combatants.[12] Sometimes the boundary is formally placed under the protection of the supernatural. P. B. du Chaillu gives an instructive account of the means taken to secure the Otando country against a plague of smallpox:

'To protect the village from the wizards who might enter it from the neighbouring villages . . . the doctor, accompanied by the whole of the people, went to the paths leading to Máyolo from other villages and planted sticks at intervals across them, connecting the sticks by strong woody creepers and hanging on the ropes leaves from the core of the crown of palm trees. It is recognized law among these people that no stranger can come within these lines.'[13]

So too Ellis[14] tells us that it was thought impossible for a hostile force to make its way into Elmina if the body of a human victim who had been sacrificed were cut up and distributed round the outskirts of the town so as to enclose it.[15] Among the aborigines of E. Brazil the *pajés* assist in laying down the tribal boundaries, by celebrating magical rites, and in some cases by hanging 'pieces of medicine' to the objects which mark the dividing-line.[16]

II. *EXCEPTIONS TO, AND MODIFICATIONS OF, PRIMITIVE USAGE.*—12. The evidence which we have adduced makes it sufficiently clear that the limits of the primitive group constitute for its members the limits not only of their rights and duties, but also of the only life possible for them. Beyond those limits lies an unknown world peopled by hostile beings and pervaded by malevolent influences, and, therefore, of deadly danger to the stranger who crosses its boundary. Thus the phrase 'homo homini lupus' is apt to express the relation which normally subsists between group and alien group. Still, it is, as we shall see, susceptible of modifications in more ways than one. The stranger may be admitted to the membership of the group—*e.g.*, by adoption—or he may be so connected with it by marriage, friendship, or some such tie that he may, in virtue of that connexion, be permitted to share, to some extent at all events, in the rights of its members. Or he may remain outside of the group unconnected with it by any such tie, and yet be treated, in certain circumstances and subject to certain limitations, as a friend or, it may be, as a neutral.

A. Where the stranger is admitted to the membership of the group or is so connected with it by marriage, etc., that he is permitted to share in the rights of its members.—(*a*) *Persons who have 'made brothers.'*—See art. BROTHERHOOD (Artificial).

(*b*) *Captive and other persons adopted into the group.*—13. We find in the treatment of prisoners of war an example of the gradual mitigation of the rigour of primitive usage. In the earliest times the victor slaughtered not only the adult males, but the women and children of the vanquished. In some instances the slaughter of prisoners is due to the belief that, as worshippers of vanquished gods, they are an especially acceptable sacrifice to the gods of the victors.[1] A step in advance is taken when the victor, having grasped the fact that a living slave is worth more than a dead enemy, spares the conquered warrior.[2] When the Namaquas discovered that Damara prisoners made useful drudges, they ceased to kill them.[3] In New Zealand captives and their children were enslaved; and remnants of scattered tribes submitted to servitude in order to secure protection.[4] Among the tribes of Sierra Leone prisoners taken before the rice-crop were spared to cultivate the ground, while those taken afterwards were generally killed.[5] In the Marquesas prisoners are not always killed; they are sometimes adopted by chiefs and become members of the tribes or families which receive them. So close is this connexion that instances are cited in which an adopted captive has followed the chief who adopted him in a hostile expedition against the tribe of his birth.[6] A somewhat similar account is given by Rochas[7] of the natives of New Caledonia; and among the N. American Indians the custom of adopting prisoners of war to fill the places of dead persons is extensively practised. The adopted person becomes brother or sister, son or daughter, according to the position which the deceased occupied;[8] and, if he be assumed into the place of the head of the family, he exercises in regard to the dead man's wife and children the rights of husband and father.[9]

1 Thomson, *To the Central African Lakes*, i. 228.
2 Cf. Dalton, p. 38; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], pp. 114, 120.
3 W. J. Ansorge, *Under the African Sun*, London, 1899, p. 42.
4 P. 9. 5 *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 23; cf. iv. 3.
6 H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1887–90, i. 115, note 3.
7 Hamilton-Grierson, p. 29.
8 J. Grimm, *Deutsche Grenzalterthümer* (*Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1864–90), ii. 73.
9 P. W. Joyce, *A Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 277; cf. ii. 266 ff.
10 Quoted by Trumbull, *Threshold Covenant*, p. 334.
11 Cf. *ib.* pp. 166 ff., 177 ff.
12 *Deutsche Grenzalterthümer*, p. 58 f. 13 P. 177.
14 *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1887, p. 53.
15 Cf. Sall. *de Bell. Jugurth.* 78, where the story of the Philæni is told; see also Grimm, *Deutsche Grenzalterthümer*, ii. 73; R. M. Luther, *ap.* H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, London, 1887, p. 315; Hamilton-Grierson, p. 12 f. and note 4.
16 Von Martius, p. 34 f.; see Hamilton-Grierson, 'The Boundary Stone and the Market Cross,' *Scottish Historical Review*, xii. [1914] 24 ff.; and art. LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES.

1 Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 170.
2 See R. von Ihering, *Der Zweck im Recht*[3], Leipzig, 1893, i. 242.
3 Andersson, p. 288; see also the instances given by A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894–95, i. 357.
4 Polack, ii. 52. 5 Matthews, p. 147.
6 Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 258.
7 P. 252.
8 L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London, 1877, p. 341 f. He observes that adoption and torture were the alternative chances of the captive.
9 C. Colden, *The Hist. of the Five Indian Nations of Canada*[3], London, 1755, i. 9 f.

It has been observed that, 'if prisoners thus admitted into families behave well, they have everything they want. But if they run away and are taken, their lives are in danger. . . . Even the nations to whom the runaways belong will not receive them, but treat them as ungrateful beings; they therefore turn out vagrants and infest the woods.'[1] Edwin James[2] adds that such persons become so identified with their adoptive nation that they regard the application to themselves of their name of origin as an insult.

(*c*) *Persons marrying into the group.*—14. In many cases a tribe ceases to regard or treat a stranger as an enemy if he has married into it. In Kreis Kita and among the Wachambala a stranger can enter into a family by marriage; and the practice has been observed among the Xarayes.[3] But intermarriage does not always produce peace,[4] for, in some instances, intertribal fights continue, and after the battle the women of the combatants visit each other and condole on the loss of their common relatives.[5] In the Marquesas a man who has married a woman of a neighbouring tribe may pass to and fro between it and his own tribe in time of war without fear of molestation.[6] In the Washington Islands men and women of different tribes betrothed on the conclusion of a peace are spared in time of war;[7] and among the tribes of the Nāga hills a native who has married a girl of another village and resides with her there is regarded as a neutral, and may safely go from her village to his own even during hostilities.[8] A similar account is given of the Asaba people of the Niger.[9] In Somaliland *abbans* are selected from men whose daughters are married to members of the tribe to be visited;[10] and within the borders of Sintang only those foreigners may exercise the calling of merchants who are married to women of the country.[11]

(*d*) *Persons introduced by a member of the group, mutual friend, etc.*—15. In many instances a friendly reception may be procured by means of an introduction. Among the Andaman Islanders a stranger may not enter a district without express permission, unless accompanied by a native of it. If he visit a camp for the first time, he will be welcomed if introduced by a mutual friend.[12] So, too, the Kurnai did not molest the Brajerak families which came into their country, because they regarded as brothers the Brabolung who had brought them in.[13] Again, Kolben[14] tells us that a traveller's best course among the Hottentots was to take a native with him. Then he was safe and was hospitably entertained. The same is true of the Western Eskimo;[15] Leo Africanus[16] says that in some parts of Morocco the stranger must have the escort of some saint or woman of the country; and among the Indians of the Goajira Peninsula women are so much respected that a stranger protected by them may travel in perfect security.[1] The women of Konoma were occasionally hired as escort;[2] and the women of the Bhils protect the stranger against the cruelty or licence of the men.[3] Herman Melville[4] states that, although the hostilities between the tribes preclude any intercourse, yet a man who has formed a friendship with a member of a hostile tribe may, subject to certain restrictions, venture with impunity into its territory. 'The individual so protected is said to be "taboo," and his person, to a certain extent, is held as sacred.' In Fiji the stranger must be accompanied by a recognized herald or by a man specially appointed by a chief who is on friendly terms with the tribe to be visited;[5] and in the principalities of Ghazi-Kumuk and Kaidek he will be seized and sold unless he has a native with him or letters of recommendation to a prince, or knows or can name the prefect of the mosque whither he is bound.[6] In some cases the traveller depends on his engaging servants who assume the office of protectors;[7] and sometimes the host gives his staff[8] or his spear[9] to his guest as a passport, or makes certain marks upon him with white chalk, which serve the same purpose.[10] The gifts exchanged by kings and princes were used as tokens accrediting the persons who possessed them.[11] The σύμβολον of the Greeks, the *tessera hospitalis* of the Romans, and the *chirs aëlychoth* of the Carthaginians were similarly employed;[12] and we may perhaps compare with these practices that of the heathen Northmen, who frequently marked themselves with the cross in order more easily to enter into business relations with Christians.[13] Robertson Smith[14] mentions the case of an Arab patron, who stamped his client with his camel-brand; and the Narrinyeri *kalduke*[15] may be referred to in this connexion.

(*e*) *Persons connected by class and totem.*—16. The totem bond was very strong in some tribes.

Fison and Howitt say of tribes bound together by the great class divisions of Eaglehawk and Crow: 'It mattered not from how distant localities two men might be, their speech might be unintelligible to each other, their status of family and their customs might have marked variance, yet the common bond of class and "totem" was a brotherhood which they would not fail to acknowledge.'[16] In parts of New Guinea and in the western islands of Torres Straits 'a stranger from hostile tribes can visit in safety villages where the clan of his *nurumara* is strong, and visitors from other tribes are fed and lodged by the members of the *nurumara* to which they severally belong.'[17]

[1] G. H. Loskiel, *Hist. of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Indians in N. America*, tr. C. I. La Trobe, London, 1794, pt. i. p. 151; J. Carver, *Travels through the Interior Parts of N. America*, do. 1778, i. 346.
[2] ii. 20.
[3] J. Tellier, *Kreis Kita, Französischer Sudan*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 143; F. H. Lang, *Die Waschambala*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 221; L. L. Dominguez, *The Conquest of the River Plate* (Hakluyt Society, lxxxi.), London, 1891, p. 209 f.
[4] See H. B. Guppy, *The Solomon Islands and their Natives*, London, 1887, p. 18.
[5] Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, p. 70.
[6] Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 258.
[7] C. S. Stewart, *A Visit to the South Seas*, London, 1832, p. 200.
[8] R. G. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called Naga Hills,' *JAI* xi. [1882] 67.
[9] J. Parkinson, 'Note on the Asaba People (Ibos) of the Niger,' *JAI* xxvi. [1906] 316.
[10] F. L. James, *The Unknown Horn of Africa*[2], London, 1890, pp. 89–92.
[11] Schwaner, ii. 197. [12] Man, pp. 26, 46, 80.
[13] Fison-Howitt, p. 222; cf. Brough Smyth, i. 134.
[14] *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope*, tr. G. Medley, London, 1731, p. 266.
[15] J. Simpson, 'Observations on the Western Eskimo,' in *Further Papers relating to the recent Arctic Expeditions, presented to both Houses of Parliament*, London, 1855, p. 926.
[16] *Hist. and Description of Africa*, tr. J. Pory, London, 1896 (Hakluyt Society), ii. 229, 326.

[1] F. A. A. Simons, 'An Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula, U.S. of Colombia,' *Proc. RGS*, new ser., vii. [1885] 792.
[2] Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, p. 115.
[3] Crooke, *Natives of N. India*, p. 43.
[4] *A Narr. of a Four Months' Residence among the Natives of a Valley of the Marquesas Islands*, London, 1846, p. 155.
[5] Fison-Howitt, pp. 192 f., 223, note.
[6] J. Reineggs and M. Bieberstein, *A General Hist. and Topographical Description of Mount Caucasus*, tr. C. Wilkinson, London, 1807, i. 95.
[7] L. Magyar, *Reisen in Süd-Afrika, 1849–57*, tr. J. Hunfalvy, Buda-Pest and Leipzig, 1859, i. 31 f.
[8] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, p. 384.
[9] Leo Africanus, ii. 327. [10] Magyar, i. 133.
[11] S. Laing and R. B. Anderson, *The Heimskringla or the Sagas of the Norse Kings*[2], from the Icelandic of Snorri Sturlason, London, 1889, i. 68; see also *The Story of Gisli the Outlaw*, from the Icelandic by G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1896, p. 28; for the signet rings used as passes in Old Russia see von Schlözer, *Russische Annalen*, iv. 59; J. P. G. Ewers, *Das älteste Recht der Russen*, Dorpat and Hamburg, 1826, pp. 182–185, 193, note 43; for the 'scontrino' see K. von Scherzer, *Narr. of the Circumnavigation of the Globe by the Austrian Frigate 'Novara,'* Eng. tr., London, 1861–63, ii. 8, note.
[12] R. von Ihering, 'Die Gastfreundschaft im Alterthum,' in *Deutsche Rundschau*, li. [1887] 387 ff.; O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Alterthumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 273.
[13] *The Story of Gisli*, p. 18 and note; G. Vigfusson and F. York Powell, *Origines Islandicæ*, Oxford, 1905, i. 329.
[14] *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 148, note 2 (*ad fin.*).
[15] See art. Brotherhood (Artificial), § 23.
[16] P. 223; cf. Howitt, *JAI* xx. 42; cf. pp. 74 (and note), 78.
[17] A. C. Haddon, *Head-Hunters, Black, White, and Brown*, London, 1901, pp. 103, 135; *Reports of Cambridge Anthrop. Exped.* v. 161.

And it was a fixed rule in battle that no man should attack or slay another bearing the same totemic crest as himself.[1] Seligmann observes,[2] however, that among some tribes totemism exerted no influence in the battle-field.[3] This branch of the subject receives elaborate treatment in Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy*.

B. Where the stranger is not admitted to the membership of the group, and is not connected with it by marriage, etc., and yet is treated, in certain circumstances and subject to certain limitations, as a friend or neutral.—(*a*) *The trader.*—See artt. GIFTS (Primitive and Savage), MARKET, §§ 3, 8.

(*b*) *The guest protégé.*—**17.** Even the rudest savages are accustomed to pay visits to and receive them from their friends; and these visits are made the occasion of sports, dances, carousals, and distributions of gifts. The visitors are not merely entertained; they are secured, for the time being, against robbery and violence. And, when the need of holding intercourse of some sort with strangers arises, the hospitality exercised within the group supplies the form of the new relation, much as the earliest modes of trading with strangers seem to have been adaptations of the exchange of gifts in use among friends.[4] That the good treatment of the stranger was an innovation on the previous practice is shown by the fact that one word is in several languages used to express the conception of 'enemy' and that of 'guest.'[5]

18. It need hardly be said that the measure of the hospitality accorded differs widely among different peoples.[6]

19. Among many peoples the stranger is admitted during his stay to the marital privileges of his host, while in some cases the host's daughter, sister, or servant is offered.[7] To the desire to induce the stranger to bring his wares to market Heeren[8] ascribes certain Lydian and Babylonian regulations regarding the relations of foreigners with the women of the country; and we may assign to a like origin such customs as the temporary marriages of Central Asia and similar usages there and elsewhere.[9]

20. Buildings for the accommodation of wayfarers were provided by the nations of northern and classical antiquity;[10] and numerous instances of a like care are found among savage and barbarous peoples in cases where the burden of hospitality falls upon the king or the community.[11]

In ancient Ireland guest-houses or hospices were attached to the religious houses, and there were public hostels throughout the country, which disappeared, however, after the Anglo-Norman invasion.[12] The Incas built houses for travellers along the royal roads. But it is to be noted that the only travellers were those who bore the commands of the king or his officials.[1]

21. Frequently a parting gift to the guest[2]—it may be in the form of food for his journey[3]—or by the guest,[4] or an exchange of gifts,[5] accompanies or completes the exercise of hospitality.[6]

Among the Southern Slavs the guest is, in some districts, escorted to the limits of his host's possessions.[7] The practice is found in many other parts of the world—*e.g.*, in Circassia,[8] among the Moors,[9] in Egypt,[10] in Fiji,[11] and in the old North.[12]

22. In many instances the hospitable reception of the stranger is subject to certain restrictions—a fact which shows that, at all events in the early forms of the institution, the guest becomes a friend, and ceases to be an enemy, only for a limited time. Among the Arabs the peace established between the stranger and his hosts lasts for 'two nights and the day in the midst, whilst their food is in him';[13] and a similar period was the term of the guest's stay in old Germany[14] and among the Moors of Brakna on the Senegal.[15] In ancient Ireland the term was three days and three nights.[16] The Southern Slavs declare that 'a guest and a fish smell on the third day'; and the Anglo-Saxon saying ran, 'Two nights a guest, the third night one of the household,' *i.e.* a slave.[17] In New Zealand well-disposed strangers are hospitably treated during their stay, which, however, is not to be prolonged beyond the time required for the dispatch of their business.[18] In the Marquesas visitors who attend the festivals of hostile tribes leave on the evening of the third day, which seems to mark the limit of the security granted to them;[19] among the Wachambala the stranger receives food for a day, and, if he stays longer, must purchase his supplies, unless he has a protector.[20] In many cases hospitality and protection last only so long as the stranger resides with his host.

Thus, it is said of the Arab that 'he robs his enemies, his friends, and his neighbours, provided that they are not actually in his own tent, where their property is sacred.'[21] A similar account is given of the Fiji Islanders,[22] the Namaquas,[23] the Khonds[24] and Afghans,[25] the Kurds,[26] and the inhabitants of Ghazi-Kumuk and Kaidek.[27] If an enemy enters an Osage camp, and asks for protection, he is safe after he has eaten with his hosts, until he returns to his own home, when the privilege expires.[28] Among the Eskimo of Greenland the enemy was sheltered;[29] and in the old North not even the murderer of a

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[1] *Reports of Cambridge Anthrop. Exped.* v. 189; J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, ii. 37; see Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 451.

[2] P. 683 ff.

[3] Cf. J. H. P. Murray, *Papua, or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, p. 122.

[4] Hamilton-Grierson, pp. 16 *f.*, 69; see art. GIFTS (Primitive and Savage), § 6.

[5] See Hamilton-Grierson, p. 69, note 2.

[6] See series of artt. HOSPITALITY.

[7] Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*[3], pp. 73–75; *Book of Ser Marco Polo*, i. 210, 212, ii. 54, 56 *f.*; Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, i. 23; P. Wilutzky, *Vorgesch. des Rechts*, Breslau, 1903, i. 45 ff.; see also Weinhold, p. 447.

[8] *Historical Researches into the Politics, Intercourse, and Trade of the Principal Nations of Antiquity*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1833, i. 105 *f.*, ii. 199.

[9] See *Book of Ser Marco Polo*, i. 193, 210, 212, ii. 44, 48, 54, 56 *f.*; M. A. Potter, *Sohrab and Rustem*, London, 1902, p. 145 ff.

[10] Schrader, *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, pp. 28–31.

[11] T. Bowrey, *A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669–79*, London, 1905 (Hakluyt Society), p. 117, note 2 (Golconda); Wilkes, ii. 149 (Samoa); Weinhold, p. 369 ff. (old North); H. O. Forbes, *A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago*, London, 1885, p. 140 f. (Sumatra); Ibn Batuta, i. 238 (Damascus); Hamilton-Grierson, p. 82, note 1.

[12] Joyce, i. 330–338, ii. 171.

[1] Garcilasso de la Vega, *First Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, Eng. tr., London, 1869–71 (Hakluyt Society), ii. 29.

[2] Steinmetz, p. 45 (Banaka and Bapuku); Hamilton-Grierson, p. 75, note 1 (Andaman Islands, Polynesia, Norse kingdoms).

[3] C. Hager, *Kaiser Wilhelms-land und der Bismarck-Archipel*, Leipzig, n.d., p. 70 (natives of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land); W. N. Dall, *Alaska and its Resources*, Boston, 1870, p. 397 (Aleuts).

[4] Nicole, *Die Diakité Sarrakolesen*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 123.

[5] Hyades-Deniker, p. 373 (Yahgans); Man, pp. 26, 80, 172 (Andaman Islanders); J. Kohler, 'Das Recht der Marschall-Insulaner,' *ZVRW* xiv. 440 (Marshall Islanders); Tac. *Germ.* 21; Weinhold, p. 448 (old Germany); *Od.* xxiv. 272 ff. (Homeric world).

[6] See Van Gennep, *Rites de passage*, p. 50 *f.*

[7] F. S. Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1885, pp. 646–650.

[8] J. von Klaproth, *Travels in the Caucasus and Georgia in 1807–8*, tr. F. Shoberl, London, 1814, p. 336.

[9] B. Meakin, *The Moors*, London, 1902, p. 294.

[10] J. Petherick, *Egypt, the Soudan, and Central Africa*, London, 1861, p. 237.

[11] Williams-Calvert, i. 155. [12] Weinhold, p. 447.

[13] Doughty, i. 228; cf. ii. 94.

[14] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], p. 400; Weinhold, p. 447.

[15] R. Caillié, *Travels through Central Africa to Timbuctoo*, Eng. tr., London, 1830, i. 75.

[16] Joyce, i. 331 *f.* [17] Westermarck, *MI* i. 595.

[18] Cook-King, i. 139.

[19] Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 265.

[20] F. H. Lang, *Die Waschambala*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 246.

[21] Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahdbys*, i. 158; Doughty, i. 30, 276, 377; W. J. Harding King, *A Search for the Masked Tawareks*, London, 1903, p. 61.

[22] Wilkes, iii. 77. [23] Fritsch, p. 362.

[24] Rowney, p. 101. [25] Elphinstone, i. 296 *f.*

[26] C. von Hahn, 'Neues über die Kurden,' *Globus*, lxxxvi. [1904] 31.

[27] Reineggs-Bieberstein, i. 96.

[28] McGee, *15 RBEW*, p. 237.

[29] F. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, tr. W. Archer, London, 1893, p. 116.

brother could be turned away.[1] In Selangor a guest must stay three nights in the house, his departure on the first or second night being called 'insulting the night.' To avert the evil consequence of such an act, fumigation is resorted to.[2]

23. Among the tribes near Port Moresby the stranger stays with his specially good friend (*vasila*), no matter what his own group of descent may be;[3] the Kabyle stranger goes to a friend, or, if he has none in the village, to the *amin*, who provides for him according to his quality;[4] and, among the Wachambala, there is in every village an official who sees that a stranger receives food and lodging.[5] A like arrangement is found among the Ghiljies[6] and some of the Thonga tribes;[7] and in ancient Ireland a public hospitaller attended to the wants of the stranger.[8]

24. Among many peoples the stranger consults his safety best by choosing a protector. Among the Barea and Kunáma he must select a host, and, in the case of the latter people, if he leaves his host's house, he must be accompanied by a native.[9] The foreign settler in the country of the Bogos must take a protector from the Schmagilli, a class of nobles or, rather, freemen; and he and his descendants continue to be the dependents of the person chosen. The foreign merchant may, however, change his patron.[10] Among the Beni-Amer he must take a temporary guardian.[11]

Burton tells us that 'the Abban or protector of the Somali country is the Mogasa of the Gallas, the Akh of El Hejaz, the Ghafir of the Sinaitic Peninsula, and the Rabia of Eastern Arabia. . . . The Abban acts at once as broker, escort, agent, and interpreter, and the institution may be considered the earliest form of transit dues. In all cases he receives a certain percentage, his food and lodging are provided at the expense of his employer, and he not infrequently exacts small presents for his kindred. In return he is bound to arrange all differences, and even to fight the battle of his client against his fellow-countrymen. Should the Abban be slain his tribe is bound to take up the cause and to make good the losses of their protégé. . . . According to the laws of the country, the Abban is the master of the life and property of his client.'[12]

25. Ibn Batuta[13] informs us that at Magadoxo, when a vessel arrived, some of the young people of the place went on board, each bearing a covered dish containing food. This one of them presented to a merchant of the ship, crying, 'This is my guest'; and all the others acted in the same manner. The merchant left the vessel only to go to his host's house, unless he had visited the city often before, in which case he went where he pleased. The host sold for the merchant what he had brought with him, and made his bargains for him. A similar custom prevailed in the Maldives,[14] at Mindanao,[15] at Raiatea,[16] and at Rurutu;[17] and the Bachapin *maat* of the Klaarwater Hottentot not only supplies him with food and lodging, but assists him in making his purchases, and even collects articles to be ready for him on his next visit. When, on the other hand, the Bachapin visits his Hottentot *maat's* village, he lives there at free quarters.[1] In the time of Ibn Batuta[2] there existed among the Turkomans associations of bachelors, who made it their business to entertain strangers, whether merchants or merely travellers; and among the Eskimo of the Mackenzie river the stranger, by choosing a native as a protector, established with him a sort of relationship and a community of rights and duties.[3] According to Seligmann,[4] when a ship's crew arrives at the Papuan Gulf, each man chooses a friend; and the friends decorate each other with the personal ornaments which they have brought to barter.[5]

26. In Circassia there are fraternities the members of which are bound to defend and assist one another; and the stranger who has a member for his *konak*, or host, has a claim for protection and hospitality not upon him only, but upon all the members of his fraternity.[6] A similar account is given of the Turkomans,[7] while among the Ossetes the host is responsible for his guest's safety, even though he be an enemy.[8] Among the Pottawatomie, however, the laws of hospitality do not shield the enemy;[9] and among the Akikuyu they protect neither host nor guest.[10]

Every Kabyle village is a little isolated world. Were it not for the *anaya*, each would be at constant warfare with its neighbours. This institution secures a protection which is personal to the protégé, and the efficacy of which is measured by the influence and power of the protector.[11] The *anaya* may be accorded by an individual, a *sof*, a village, or a tribe. Breach of it is punished with death and confiscation;[12] and a Kabyle cannot refuse to grant it, even to a stranger, if he be in immediate danger.[13]

27. In many cases the most efficacious protection is that of the king of the country or chief of the village visited. Among the Battas the fugitive who trusts himself voluntarily to a petty rajah is absolutely safe.[14] In the country of the Kimbunda the king is the exclusive protector of strangers; and, while an injury to a guest is thought to draw down the wrath of the gods, his good treatment is due to the fact that the monarch, by using him well, is really serving his own interests.[15] It has been remarked that 'a chief is rather envied his good fortune in first securing foreigners in his town.'[16] In New Zealand a foreigner (*pakeha*) might obtain a chief's protection on the understanding that he gave him large presents for small, bought from him at the highest price, and kept him in tobacco.[17] Sometimes this protection was conferred in the form of a tabu.[18] When the stranger becomes the protégé of a ruler whose power is absolute, he may not as a general rule leave the country without the royal permission, or engage in trade with subject persons without the royal knowledge and approval. The king, in short, monopolizes commerce.[19] The blackmail which is

[1] Weinhold, *Altnordisches Leben*, p. 442.
[2] W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 351.
[3] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 68.
[4] Hanoteau-Letourneux, ii. 45.
[5] F. H. Lang, *Dis Waschambala*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 248.
[6] Elphinstone, ii. 155. [7] Junod, i. 323.
[8] Joyce, ii. 168 ff.
[9] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, p. 477.
[10] Munzinger, *Sitten und Recht der Bogos*, pp. 43–46.
[11] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, p. 314.
[12] *First Footsteps in E. Africa*, London, 1856, p. 89; cf. Duff Macdonald, i. 117; and see J. Bruce, *Travels to discover the Source of the Nile*, Edinburgh, 1804, ii. 145 f. (*ghafir*); Doughty, i. 235, 360 (*rafik*); L. W. C. van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout et les colonies arabes dans l'archipel indien*, Batavia and The Hague, 1887, p. 75 f. (*sayyir*); C. W. Isenberg and J. L. Krapf, *Journals detailing their Proceedings in the Kingdom of Shoa*, London, 1843, p. 256 (*mogasa*); and R. F. Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, do. 1860, i. 253 (*balderabba* of the Abyssinians).
[13] ii. 181 f. [14] *Ib.* iv. 119 f.
[15] W. Dampier, *Voyage round the World, and other Voyages and Descriptions*, London, 1703, i. 328.
[16] F. D. Bennett, *Narr. of a Whaling Voyage round the Globe*, London, 1840, i. 186 f.
[17] Ellis, iii. 104 f.

[1] W. J. Burchell, *Travels in the Interior of S. Africa*, London, 1822–24, ii. 555; Burton, *Lake Regions*, ii. 54.
[2] ii. 261.
[3] E. Petitot, *Les Grands Esquimaux*, Paris, 1887, pp. 188, 239.
[4] *Melanesians*, p. 108.
[5] See also B. Hagen, *Unter den Papua's*, Wiesbaden, 1899, p. 219; J. Pfeil, *Studien und Beobachtungen aus dem Südsee*, Brunswick, 1899, p. 124 f.
[6] J. S. Bell, i. 84, 204; Klaproth, pp. 318, 336.
[7] A. Vambéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, London, 1864, p. 49 f.
[8] A. von Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia*, Eng. tr., London, 1854, p. 412.
[9] Keating, *Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River*, i. 98.
[10] W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People: the Akikuyu of British West Africa*, London, 1910, p. 247.
[11] Hanoteau-Letourneux, iii. 70 ff.
[12] *Ib.* iii. 61–63. [13] *Ib.* iii. 80.
[14] Junghuhn, ii. 238.
[15] Magyar, i. 224, 257, notes 11, 14.
[16] D. and C. Livingstone, p. 224.
[17] *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori (F. E. Maning), London, 1863, pp. 165–168; cf. Polack, i. 44 f.
[18] Angas, ii. 115; Cook-King, iii. 10, 163; Lisiansky, p. 104.
[19] See A. G. Laing, *Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko, and Soolima Countries in W. Africa*, London, 1825, p. 356 f.; C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan*, do. 1882, i. 209, ii. 17, 26; J. H. Speke, *Journal of the*

the price of the protection of many African potentates is not, in the opinion of Burton,[1] unjust. It forms the custom-dues of the government, and takes the place of the fees expected by the *abban*.[2] Until it is paid, the road is shut.[3] On payment of a similar impost the Tuareg nobles protect those who pass through their territories.[4]

The προξενία of the Greeks and the consulship of the Middle Ages supplied the stranger's need of a protector,[5] and were indeed offshoots of the institution of hospitality.[6]

28. The ἀνὴρ ξεινοδόκος commanded the respect and approval of the Homeric world;[7] and he is regarded with those feelings by many savage and barbarous peoples. 'Among the Arabs there is no better report of a man's life than to be called in his country *karîm*, a liberal soul; so nothing more hateful than the lean niggard's name, *bakhîl*.'[8] Among the Ahts,[9] the tribes south of the Yukon river,[10] and the Western Eskimo[11] reputation and rank are acquired by the exercise of liberality.[12] Among the Kukis a curious incentive to hospitality and bravery is found. 'All the enemies' that the tribesman 'has killed will be in attendance on him as slaves' in the next world, 'and the animals of all kinds he has eaten with his friends will live again as his farm-stock.'[13]

29. Some peoples treat the refusal of hospitality as a punishable offence.[14] Grimm[15] quotes a provision of the *Lex Burgundia* to the effect that 'quicumque hospiti venienti tectum aut focum negaverit, trium solidorum inlatione mulctetur'; and Bastian[16] tells us that, if a Slav refuses to receive a stranger, he is deprived of his property and his house is burnt down. Francis Fleming[17] observes that, if a Kafir rejects a request for hospitality, the headman of his kraal is fined in cattle, a portion of the fine being made over to the person aggrieved.

30. In the country of the Kimbunda an injury to a guest is thought to draw down the wrath of the gods;[18] and a similar view was held by the old Germans. They regarded it as a duty incumbent upon all to treat his person as sacred, and to lodge and maintain him.[19] In modern Arabia a protected stranger is called a *dakhîl*; in old Arabia he was called a *jâr*. The relation was sometimes temporary, sometimes permanent, sometimes hereditary. The protection might be against a particular enemy, or against enemies in general. In some cases it was constituted by a solemn engagement at a sanctuary, and held good until renounced at the same place. Thus the god himself became the protector of the stranger's cause.[1]

According to the Hebrew lawgivers, the stranger had a sacred right to protection. He was regarded as poor and helpless, and was classed with the widow and the orphan as one not to be oppressed or afflicted; and, in this connexion, the law made no difference between native and foreigner.[2] In the world of the Homeric poems the normal relation of state to state was one of war. The stranger had no rights; and yet the degree of civilization to which a people had attained was estimated largely on a consideration of its attitude towards him. He was, as were the beggar and the suppliant, regarded as holy, and he enjoyed the special protection of Ζεὺς ξένιος. Moreover, the king must guard his guest against those of his subjects who would attack him, and must permit him to depart without let or hindrance. In some cases the relation between host and guest was hereditary.[3] The position of the stranger upon Italian soil seems to have been very similar. To slay the guest was to offend the gods of hospitality.[4] Mommsen[5] lays special emphasis on the legal nature of the compact of friendship. It rested, just as other consensual contracts rested, on the declared will of the parties, and it was recorded in duplicate on tablets—*tesseræ hospitales*.[6] Where it was entered into by private persons, the guest had a claim for maintenance and protection only on his host. It could be formed only between different communities or between members of different communities—a characteristic which also marked the relation of patron and client.

According to the Talmud and the Qur'ân, the exercise of hospitality is a religious duty;[7] and a similar view seems to have prevailed in ancient Egypt.[8] Among the Damaras a withering curse falls upon those who refuse to share their food with the stranger;[9] and a somewhat similar conception was held by the Masai.[10] But, according to Merker,[11] Masai hospitality was limited to Masai.

(*c*) *The fugitive and the suppliant.*—**31.** The practice of hospitality creates and fosters a disposition to be hospitable; and the protection enjoyed by the fugitive and the suppliant seems to be a natural extension of that accorded to the trader. In many instances where individual districts are united by no common bond the fugitive from one village flees to another, where he is maintained and protected;[12] and in some cases the privilege is granted by a chief from selfish motives—*e.g.*, to increase his following.[13] The security afforded may be limited to a fixed period. See art. ASYLUM.

(*d*) *The envoy.*—**32.** The duties of an envoy can frequently be performed only in a border-land; and in such cases the sanctity of his privilege is, in part at least, to be attributed to the sacred characteristics of the spot.[14] But the office and the privilege attached to it originate in the elementary needs of savage societies; and here, as in so many other instances, religion invests with its form and supports with its sanctions the institution which those needs have created. The envoy is regarded as inviolable in the Marquesas[15] and

Discovery of the Source of the Nile, Edinburgh, 1863, pp. 268, 304, 345, 373, 376; H. Low, *Sarawak*, London, 1848, p. 336; see also § 6 above.

[1] *Lake Regions*, i. 253. [2] See above, § 24.

[3] Speke, pp. 126, 131, 171; J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, London, 1885, p. 271.

[4] Harding King, p. 263.

[5] See P. Monceaux, *Les Proxénies grecques*, Paris, 1885, pp. 106–125; A. Schaube, 'Le Proxénie au moyen âge,' *Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée*, xxviii. [1896] 525 ff.

[6] See Schrader, *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, p. 12.

[7] B. W. Leist, *Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte*, Jena, 1884, p. 213, referring to *Od.* iv. 33, viii. 545, xv. 54, xxiv. 272, *Il.* iii. 207, xviii. 387, 408.

[8] Doughty, i. 430; cf. Burckhardt, i. 72.

[9] G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868, p. 112 f.

[10] Dall, p. 151.

[11] H. Rink, *Eskimo Tribes*, London and Copenhagen, 1887, p. 28 f.

[12] See also F. Boas, 'Second General Report on the Indians of British Columbia,' and H. Hale's 'Introduction,' in the *Report of the 60th Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, London, 1891, pp. 557 ff., 588 ff., where the gift-festival ('potlatch') is described.

[13] Dalton, p. 46.

[14] G. Timkowski, *Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China*, London, 1827, ii. 345 (Mongols); Hanoteau-Letourneux, ii. 117 (Kabyles).

[15] *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[2], p. 899.

[16] *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1860, iii. 231.

[17] *Southern Africa*, London, 1856, p. 244.

[18] Magyar, i. 224, 257, notes 11, 14.

[19] Cæs. *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 23; Tac. *Germ.* 21.

[1] Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*[2], p. 48 ff., *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 75 f.

[2] Ex 22[21f.], Lv 19[33], Dt 10[19].

[3] See L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, ii. 276–286, 324 ff.; Leist, p. 213 ff.; A. G. Keller, *Homeric Society*, London, 1902, p. 299 ff., where the references to Homer are collected. See also Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 269 ff., and *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, p. 7 ff.

[4] Livy, xxxix. 51; cf. i. 45.

[5] *Römische Forschungen*[2], Berlin, 1864, i. 332 ff.

[6] See above, § 15.

[7] See Westermarck, *MI* i. 580.

[8] E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, London, 1901, ii. 372.

[9] Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, p. 147.

[10] Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 415.

[11] *Die Masai*, p. 117.

[12] A. Hellwig, *Das Asylrecht der Naturvölker*, Berlin, 1903, p. 15, citing *Das Ausland*, xxxviii. [1865] 731 (Samoa); see also Kubary, p. 218 (Pelew Islanders); A. H. Post, *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1887, i. 190; Pauli, in *Peterm. Mitth.* xxxi. [1885] 21 (Bakwiri); M. Rautenen, *Die Ondonga*, *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 337 (Ondonga); Junghuhn, ii. 238 (Battas); see Macpherson, p. 66 (Khonds).

[13] Fritsch, p. 93 (Amaxosa); T. Nauhaus, 'Regierungsform und Gerichtsbarkeit der Kaffern,' *ZE* xiii. [1881] 348.

[14] See above, § 11; and cf. H. S. Maine, *Village Communities in the East and West*[6], London, 1890, p. 193; Lord Avebury, *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man*[5], do. 1902, p. 318 ff.

[15] Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 256.

among the Basutos;[1] and with all the Ewe-speaking tribes it is an unheard-of crime to molest an ambassador bearing the stick of office.[2] A like account is given of the ancient Irish,[3] of the Bushmen,[4] and of tribes in Guinea,[5] in Central Australia,[6] in New South Wales,[7] in Polynesia,[8] and in New Zealand; but, in the last instance, only if the envoy be related to the tribe to which he is sent.[9] Among the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon the life of the war messenger is secure, a near relative of the people challenged being, if possible, selected for the office.[10] Among the Brazilian aborigines foreign messengers are sometimes subjected to ill-treatment;[11] and authorities differ as to the practice of the N. American Indians in former times.[12] In New Caledonia a chief who wishes to sue for peace sends a woman with a man who has friends in the enemy's tribe to carry his proposals. They are safe, while other persons would be killed and eaten.[13] The Dieri send women as ambassadors or messengers.[14]

Among the Baris 'women are allowed to visit their relations in distant villages, and it is a recognised rule . . . that they should never be molested in any way. Thus, they are often able to act as ambassadors and peace-makers between contending tribes.'[15] The envoy was regarded as inviolable in Mexico and at Tezcuco;[16] and it is said of Muhammad that he spared the lives of certain persons on the ground that they were ambassadors and therefore privileged.[17] The messenger was sometimes accredited by a gift.[18]

(*e*) *Women, holy men, and other privileged persons.* — 33. We have seen that in many instances women act as envoys to hostile tribes[19] without fear of molestation. It is not always easy to say whether they enjoy this privilege in virtue of the office with which they are entrusted, of the occupation in which they are employed, or of the sex to which they belong. Female captives are spared in many cases in which all the male captives are put to death;[20] and in some countries a traveller escorted by a woman[21] and an outcast who takes refuge with a woman[22] are treated as inviolable. In the last two cases, at all events, it seems as if it were the mysterious sanctity attributed universally by uncultured man to womankind that operates as a protective agency.[23]

In New Zealand women were permitted to go from camp to camp during war;[24] and the same is told of the Baris by Mounteney-Jephson,[25] of the natives of Engano by Bastian,[26] of the Nāga tribes of Manipur,[27] and of the Angemi and Kachu Nāgas by Dalton.[28] In the last case the statement holds true only of the tribe's intestine wars. When these same tribesmen are fighting with alien tribes, they spare neither age nor sex.

Among the Mandingoes there are four trades or professions, which rank in the following order: orators, minstrels, shoemakers, and blacksmiths. Their members can travel through the country unmolested, even in time of war; and strangers of African blood are safe under their protection.[1] A like inviolability and protective power are possessed by the Purrah men of the Timanee country,[2] and were possessed, according to Herodotus,[3] by the Argippæans; and certain tribesmen in Rājputana and Gujarāt, who are bards by profession, serve as the guardians of travellers in a country infested with robbers.[4] In the western islands of Torres Straits there were persons, to whom the name *paudagarka*, 'man of peace,' was applied, who were exempt from war and its consequences.[5] Among the Brazilian aborigines the property of the *pajés* is spared in time of war;[6] and, according to Bastian,[7] the hereditary priest of Christian Swanetia enjoys a like privilege. In Oromó wars merchants and priests are not molested;[8] and in Java the Badui are regarded as a sacred race, whose villages none may enter.[9] In some parts of Australia small parties of natives whose object is to procure red earth for colouring purposes are permitted to pass unharmed by the tribes through whose country their way lies.[10]

(*f*) *Frequenters of festivals and holy places.*— 34. We have referred to the security enjoyed by the stranger during the celebration of festivals.[11] In the Marquesas, during certain festivities, of which the occasion is unexplained, hostile tribes come to share the pleasures of those with whom they fought yesterday and may fight to-morrow, and they are protected by a tabu, which, it seems, expires on the evening of the third day.[12] During the *nanga* rites at Viti Levu initiates belonging to hostile tribes may attend them in safety, provided that they reach the *nanga* unobserved.[13] In Australia hostile tribes meet in peace during the performance of certain initiation ceremonies;[14] and it is said of the Kisti and Ingush, once Christians, now Muslims, that they observe a feast at Easter at which the bitterest enemies refrain from violence.[15] During the fishing festival on the Barwan river the tribes occupy a common camping-ground, the neutrality of which is strictly preserved;[16] and Bastian[17] tells us that the temple of Cozumel in Yucatan was visited yearly by pilgrims, who passed thither through hostile territories without fear of molestation.

Among the Tuaregs[18] and in various parts of India[19] travellers encamping near such holy places as the shrines of saints are safe from spoliation.

W. R. Smith[20] observes that, in certain tracts of sacred land in upland Arabia, hostile tribes meet and drive their flocks together in peace, whereas on any other ground they would fly at one another's throats; and Catlin[21] says of Red Pipe Stone

1 E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, Eng. tr., London, 1861, p. 224.
2 Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 178.
3 Joyce, i. 135. 4 Stow, p. 221.
5 Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, ii. 164; see also Matthews, p. 77.
6 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 332, note 2; cf. p. 551.
7 Fison-Howitt, p. 283 f.; K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, p. 63.
8 Cook-King, ii. 64, 66, 69. 9 Polack, ii. 20.
10 A. E. Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot*, Manila, 1905, p. 177.
11 Von Martius, p. 47. 12 See Waitz-Gerland, iii. 154.
13 Lambert, in *Missions Catholiques*, xii. 176.
14 Howitt, *JAI* xx. 59 f., 72 f., *Native Tribes*, p. 682.
15 A. J. Mounteney-Jephson, *Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator*, London, 1890, p. 140.
16 A. de Herrera, *The General Hist. of . . . America*, tr. J. Stevens, London, 1725–26, ii. 248, iii. 317.
17 W. Muir, *The Life of Mahomet*, London, 1858–61, iv. 247.
18 Weinhold, p. 448; see above, § 15.
19 See above, §§ 14, 32.
20 G. Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, London, 1861, p. 301 (Samoa); Paulitschke, p. 256 (Oromó); D. and C. Livingstone, p. 385 (Zulu); Junghuhn, ii. 158 (Batta); Crooke, p. 143 (Mirzapur).
21 See above, § 15.
22 Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 892; L. Fuld, 'Das Asylrecht im Alterthum und Mittelalter,' *ZVRW* vii. [1887] 150.
23 Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 640.
24 Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, p. 334.
25 P. 140.
26 *Indonesien oder die Inseln des malayischen Archipel*, Berlin, 1884–94, Lief. iii. 51.
27 Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, p. 114.
28 P. 44.

1 A. G. Laing, p. 132.
2 *Ib.* p. 96. 3 iv. 23.
4 A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, new ed., London, 1878, p. 558, and H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, new ed., London, 1903, *s.v.* 'Bhāts'; Crooke, *Natives of N. India*, p. 108.
5 *Reports of Cambridge Anthrop. Exped.* v. 302.
6 Von Martius, p. 30.
7 *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, iii. 369.
8 Paulitschke, p. 256. 9 H. O. Forbes, p. 102.
10 W. E. H. Jessop, *Flinderland and Sturtland*, London, 1862, ii. 211.
11 See above, § 22 f.
12 Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, p. 265; G. H. von Langsdorff, *Voyages and Travels in various Parts of the World, 1803–07*, London, 1813–14, i. 159 f.
13 B. C. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 147.
14 Angas, ii. 221.
15 Reinegga-Bieberstein, i. 51 f.
16 K. L. Parker, p. 8.
17 *Die Völker des östlichen Asien*, Leipzig and Jena, 1866–71, vi. 363 note, 364 note.
18 Harding King, p. 277. 19 Rowney, p. 126.
20 *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 145.
21 *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions of the N. American Indians*[3], London, 1842, ii. 167.

Quarry, whither the tribes resorted to procure the red stone for the manufacture of their pipes, that it was a neutral ground 'to which the Indians came unarmed under the fear of the vengeance of the Great Spirit.'

III. *GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.*—35. We have seen that, to the savage, the world which lies beyond the community to which he belongs—*i.e.* beyond his group and the groups associated with it on terms which are friendly rather than hostile—is a world strange and mysterious, peopled by beings whom he hates and fears as his deadly foes. He thinks of them as belonging to an order other than his own, as less or, it may be, as more than human; and he looks upon them as absolutely rightless; for the sphere of rights is conterminous with the sphere within which he himself lives. As regards himself, life is possible for him only within the little circle of his community; with it he and his fellows must stand or fall; and, accordingly, its preservation is of vital importance to him and them. It would seem, then, that to secure the common safety must be the aim of each and all. And yet it is not to be supposed that the individual member has that aim consciously in view as the principle of his action. What he has in view is his own interest—in this case his own safety. But that can be secured only if the community be safe; and, accordingly, in seeking to serve his own interest, he contributes, although unconsciously, to the realization of the common aim. Custom makes obligatory the teachings of the group's experience. It compels performance of those actions which have been found to serve it, and abstention from those which have been found to disserve it. Custom, be it observed, not merely imposes a rule upon the individual from without, but provides an inward principle, which he accepts without reflexion, and upon which he acts as matter of course. It points out the way which all must take; and those to whom it speaks take that way, without question, as the only way possible. Thus custom is at once legal and moral; and it is also religious in the sense that any breach of it, whatever the specific character of that breach may be, will be punished with evils such as are associated with the mysterious and supernatural — disease, disaster, and death. Law, morality, and religion have not as yet secured separate domains. They co-exist undifferentiated as elements of custom, which forms, indeed, rather the atmosphere than the rule of life.[1]

36. Now, the safety of the community is menaced by the very existence of the stranger; and accordingly it is a duty imposed by custom on each of its members to hunt him down and put him to death, whenever opportunity offers. Still, many instances are to be found, even among the rudest peoples, in which the rigour of the early rule has been relaxed. The victors, *e.g.*, do not always seek to exterminate their opponents. Sometimes they marry the women, and sometimes they adopt the children, and even spare the adult males whom they have captured to serve as slaves, or, it may be, to be admitted to a full share in the rights and privileges which they themselves enjoy. Nor are the benefits of adoption confined to the captive. They are, in many cases, extended to the suppliant, the fugitive, and the stranger. Further, the group not infrequently admits to its membership the man who marries into it and the man who 'makes brothers' with some one of its members. In all these cases the stranger, by being incorporated into the group, acquires, to some extent at all events, the rights of a member. Again, there are instances in which the man who marries a woman of an alien group may pass to and fro between it and his own group, even in time of war, without fear of molestation. Here the privilege exists by reason not of incorporation, but of a personal bond. Sometimes the brotherhood which springs from community of class and totem asserts itself in the case of men whose groups are in open hostility. Here the member of a group is member of a larger unity to which his enemy also belongs. There is still another class of cases in which the stranger remains outside of the group, and yet is treated by its members as a being possessed of rights. The envoy, *e.g.*, is in general regarded as inviolable, even when he is a stranger to those to whom he bears his message. In some countries the women of groups engaged in war with one another may pass in safety from group to group; and priests, wizards, doctors, holy men, the members of certain classes and societies, persons engaged in certain religious and social observances, traders, and guests are treated as entitled to a like privilege. This privilege is not always strictly personal; sometimes, as in the case of *asyla* and places devoted to trade, it is attached to a certain spot, and sometimes it is effective only at a certain time, such as a market-day or day of festival.

37. To what cause, then, are we to attribute these modifications of the early rule—the rule that the stranger must die in the interests of the community? The answer seems to be plain. The rule is modified because experience has taught the community that its interests are better served by sparing and protecting than by killing him. The captive is allowed to live as soon as the captor discovers that a living slave is more useful than a dead enemy. The trader is maintained and protected as soon as those who wish to deal with him find that, in order to secure his presence, they must provide for the safety of his property and person.

It is, of course, an individual who initiates the change. Some one has an interest to serve, and, in order to serve it, he makes an experiment. If it turns out successful, it will be imitated by all who think that a like result would be beneficial to themselves. And, if experience shows that the practice thus formed is generally advantageous to the members of the community, it will gradually be adopted as a general practice, which, approved by public opinion, will, in its turn, become obligatory upon all, as part and parcel of the common custom.

38. In the early days of the change the old custom remains unaltered and unimpaired, except in so far as its operation is suspended in the common interest. In other words, the stranger is still regarded and treated as an enemy, except in a limited class of cases in which, in order to serve that interest, he is protected. The members of the community are, so far as it proscribes him, prohibited from extending to him their sympathy and generosity. It may be that some of them entertain such feelings towards him; but they may not act upon them, and they accept that prohibition as the rule of their conduct—a rule which, as befits a rule of custom, is at once legal, moral, and religious. In so far, however, as he is protected by the community, its members serve it best who give practical expression to such feelings in their dealings with him. And here again religion, law, and morality work, as it were, into one another's hands; for the command that the stranger shall be well treated is addressed to those who are disposed to treat him well. At the same time, it is to be observed that custom emphasizes now the religious, now the legal, now the moral, obligation which it imposes on its subjects, and thus initiates a process which results in the substitution of rules of law, morality, and religion for its own single rule.

[1] Hamilton-Grierson, pp. 38 f., 94.

39. Further, when custom gives free rein to kindly feeling, that kindliness reaches not only the stranger who is, in some sense or to some effect, useful to the community, but also the useless stranger—the beggar, the weakling, and the wanderer. Here morality takes possession of a field in the occupation of which law may or may not come to share. And, even if law be absent, morality may find itself supported by religion; for often the gods, who are the guardians of custom, take into their keeping those who have no claim to legal protection. As the stranger's position improves, his face becomes more familiar, his presence more welcome; and the better he is known and understood, the stronger grows the conviction that the restrictions, local, temporal, and personal, which hamper intercourse with him must be removed. Gradually the old order yields to the new, the duration of the movement and the character of its result being more or less determined by the disposition and circumstances of those who take part in it; and the stranger is at length secured, not by way of special privilege, nor by means of special institution, but by the public recognition that he is in himself the subject of rights.[1]

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the footnotes.

P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

STRIKES.—A strike is a sudden and collective act of a body of workmen who decide to cease work on account of a dispute with their employers respecting wages or some matter affecting their employment. The men—to use their own expression—'down tools' and refrain from work until the cause of their complaint is adjusted. The act is one of social or economic warfare. A strike is a conflict between capital and labour, joint agents in the production of wealth. A lock-out is a corresponding act on the part of the employer, who refuses on the ground of some dispute to allow his employees to continue work. Strikes are much the more frequent; they generally involve a large number of workmen and may reduce an industry to stagnation for a considerable period, thereby causing both inconvenience and loss to the public.

A strike may be local, *i.e.* limited to one mine, mill, or district; or it may extend over a considerable area and affect the convenience and well-being of a large community, as in the case of a railway strike. Trade unions (*q.v.*), the organizations of men in the same industry, are frequent promoters or agencies of strikes.

This interruption of modern industry is one outcome of the large system of production which has grown up during the last century as a result of mechanical invention and the application of the forces of nature (steam power, electricity, etc.) on an enormous scale, the consequence being a vast aggregation of capital and labour in individual industries. These two agents in the production of wealth have thus been brought into very intimate and dependent relation, and have become joint sharers in the result of their co-partnership under the heads of wages and profits. This sharing of the joint earnings in the product gives rise to disputes, as do also the conditions under which the industries are carried on. These conflicts often precipitate strikes, causing the sudden suspension of industry.

Trade unions, the recognized organizations of workmen, perform various functions: they act as benefit societies for mutual help as well as combinations for collective bargaining as to rates of pay, hours of labour, and regulations touching the industry and its relations to other industries. The employees claim a right to a voice in the detailed methods of the industry to which they devote their lives and skill, corresponding to the rights of the owners, who have contributed their capital, business direction, and knowledge. Large production with its manifold benefits is thus made dependent upon the two factors—capital supplied by one group of agents and labour contributed by another. These factors in turn are dependent for their reward upon the product or service which they render to society; and they are in a certain degree opposed to one another in the division of the economic results of their combined action. The latter fact is the chief source of the conflicts which so often culminate in strikes. Strikes are not necessarily either immoral or illegal: they are ultimate appeals to force for a decision in cases of conflict where milder methods have failed; their ethical character depends upon the justice of the claims advanced and the manner in which the struggle is carried on.

In the early days of machine industry and large production, and before the economic relations of labour and capital on a large scale were understood, these disputes were often violent and accompanied by injurious acts. Strikes were then regarded as illegal and criminal, and were repressed by Conspiracy Laws and Acts for the protection of property. Since 1875 trade unions have been accepted as lawful institutions, and a large amount of legislation has been enacted concerning the relations of capital and labour—*e.g.*, the fixing of minimum wages in trades, the hours of labour, conditions affecting the safety and health of workmen, etc. With the vast growth of industry and the extension of the franchise trade unions have become powerful and have enlarged their field of action. They often exercise a kind of monopoly to prevent non-unionists from being employed in the same mine or factory; and they impose regulations on piece work, and create fine lines of demarcation between different classes of work, as, *e.g.*, between carpenters and joiners, bricklayers and masons. These rules tend to multiply the number of separate trades, and it is doubtful whether these refined subdivisions and classifications of labour are a benefit to society, whilst they have often led to disputes ending in strikes.

The effects of strikes upon the community are wholly injurious: they check supplies, raise prices, create inconvenience, and impede other dependent industries. Negotiation is the rational method for adjustment of differences, as it is generally practised in business affairs which involve competition; but strong feeling, ignorance, and the intervention of agitators all militate against negotiation. Both employers and employed need to realize that they are equally partners in production and mutually dependent. Since the product or service rendered must reward both classes, wisdom would dictate that their joint enterprise would succeed best when friction is reduced to a minimum. To this end economic knowledge of the principles of production and distribution is very necessary, while mutual confidence is also a desideratum. Opposed to these are the forces of ignorance, distrust, and selfishness, that lead to conflicts wasteful and destructive, which are an injury to both parties, while they also impose loss and inconvenience upon the community at large. Mutual confidence and a desire for equitable distribution is the object to be secured, and without conflict, *i.e.* by means of fair bargaining. In some trades standing committees of representatives of labour and capital have been established which meet at regular intervals to discuss difficulties; this method has been found very successful in avoiding friction and arriving at a common understanding.

In the early period of capitalistic production

[1] See Hamilton-Grierson, §§ 25, 52, 56-61.

strikes were very frequent owing to the ignorance and mutual distrust of employers and men. On the one side dictatorial methods, on the other measures for limiting production, hindrances to the use of machinery, and obstruction to improvements led to frequent suspensions of industry. Most of the large industries have at some period suffered from these modes of social warfare; the mining industries, the great railways, the building and textile trades, engineering, shipping, and even agriculture in which the organization of labour would seem almost impossible, have all suffered from strikes. In some cases the trade of the locality has been ruined; in all it has incurred waste, and great loss has fallen upon consumers through consequent scarcity and high prices.

Education, and more especially moral and economic instruction, is the most effective remedy for improving the relations between capital and labour, by teaching their mutual dependence and the importance of their joint efficiency. In recent years many trade union leaders have proved themselves wise administrators and have displayed much ability in the conduct of their unions; many have been elected to parliament, and some have filled high office, where they have demonstrated their capacity for legislation and have rendered valuable service as officials and even ministers. The position and public influence thus attained by these men effectually dispose of the charge of prejudice against labour, and prove that the interests of labour will be adequately secured as far as legislation can effect that object.

Many schemes for cementing the interests and activities of employers and employed have been devised with the object of avoiding the miseries of strikes. All such measures recognize and rest upon the principle of co-partnership between capital and labour and their joint interest in the productiveness of their industry.

Arbitration was an early method devised to terminate quarrels already begun, by calling in a competent judge or expert who should decide, after evidence and investigation, upon the merits of the case. This method succeeded in some instances where the arbitrators were men of large experience, sound judgment, and a reputation for sympathy with labour. In many cases, however, their decision was rejected when it was found to be unfavourable to the men. The utility of this method led in 1896 to the appointment of a Public Arbitrator, whose function was to investigate and offer mediation in cases where his intervention was accepted. Special qualities, however, are necessary for such a post, and the method cannot be regarded as a universal remedy. It suffers from the fact that it is applied only as an antidote, after the rupture has taken place and bitter feelings have been evoked. What is required is a means of prevention rather than a remedy.

Boards of Conciliation have also been devised with the object of avoiding strikes by smoothing over differences and removing causes of complaint. Representatives of employers and workmen meeting at regular intervals may constitute a Board of Conciliation and succeed in preventing conflict. Such methods conduce to mutual understanding and harmony; they lead to concessions and tend to consideration by making each side acquainted with the other's difficulties. Sometimes a sliding scale of wages has been adopted, but occasionally the union has rejected the scale when it has led to a fall in wages. That conciliation, however, cannot be a universal remedy is proved by the number and magnitude of strikes since first the system was adopted.

Profit-sharing and *co-partnership* are other schemes for securing the joint interest and friendly co-operation of capital and labour. They give a definite interest to the worker in the result of the enterprise; in effect he becomes a shareholder and a participator in the annual profit. This method has succeeded in special cases in maintaining good relations, but its scope and application are limited, and it is apt to fail in a year of no profits. Trade unions do not regard the system with favour, nor are employers generally willing to adopt it.

The South Metropolitan Gas Company is a well-known and remarkable instance of the success of this method. During many years its annual statement has shown a good division of profits, and it has maintained good relations between the company and the employees. This result was due mainly to the wise and sympathetic guidance of the manager, Sir George Livesey. About 120 such undertakings are reported as existing in the United Kingdom; these are due in a large degree to the sympathetic influence of individuals.

Defects in human nature—distrust, self-love, greed, idleness, and ignorance—are all antagonistic to economic peace and concord. But, if a whole nation can be captured by the passion of greed and lust for power to dominate the world, can we expect that groups of men engaged in industry will cease to succumb to motives of selfishness? When a higher morality has brought mankind to a nobler plane of justice and sympathy, universal peace may not be unattainable, and strikes, like other modes of warfare, may then disappear.

During the last two years the problem has been materially affected by the action of the Unions of the Coal Miners and the Railway-men, which have been captured by socialistic leaders and have adopted the projects of Nationalizing the Mines and the Railways in the interests of the 'workers.' So far the attempt has failed to do more than materially raise wages, and increase the cost of coal and railway traffic. Socialism and Syndicalism cannot be discussed under the title of this article. One can only point out that success would mean plundering the shareholders and consumers, and would threaten ruin to industry and the country.

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G. ARMITAGE-SMITH.

STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE.—This is a technical phrase used by Darwin to describe what occurs in Nature when living creatures respond by novel or intensified endeavours and reactions to the pressure of environing difficulties and limitations. The concept is wider and subtler than is suggested by the words taken literally.

'I should premise,' said Darwin, 'that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny.'[1]

The struggle for existence is a fundamental idea in biology, but it is not so easily grasped as is usually supposed.

'Nothing is easier,' Darwin said, 'than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult—at least I have found it so—than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood.'[2]

The central idea is that of a clash between the endeavours of living creatures on the one hand and environmental difficulties on the other.

1. **Reasons for the struggle for existence.**—The three chief difficulties that beset organisms are those involved in the tendency to over-population, in the nutritive dependence of one creature upon another, and in the changefulness—especially the

[1] *Origin of Species*[6], p. 50. [2] *Ib.* p. 49.

irregular changefulness—of the environment. To these must be added the fact that it is in the very nature of organisms—of the typical majority, if not of all—to be aggressive or insurgent, ever seeking fuller self-expression and further mastery of their surroundings. This leads to 'struggle' in the widest sense.

2. Modes of the struggle for existence.—The struggle for existence is often spoken of as if it were confined to intraspecific competition.

Thus Weismann writes: 'The "struggle for existence," which Darwin regarded as taking the place of the human breeder in free nature, is not a direct struggle between carnivores and their prey, but is the assumed competition for survival between individuals of the same species, of which, on an average, only those survive to reproduce which have the greatest power of resistance, whilst the others, less favourably constituted, perish early.'[1]

But this restricted view is not Darwin's. 'Two canine animals, in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds, of which only one on an average comes to maturity, may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground.'[2]

Similarly, he goes on to say that several seedling mistletoes may struggle with each other on the branch, while the mistletoe in its relation to birds may be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants. 'In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience' sake the general term of Struggle for Existence.'[3]

The fact is that the struggle takes place (*a*) between fellow-organisms of the same kith and kin, but (*b*) also between foes of entirely different natures, and (*c*) between living creatures and their inanimate surroundings. Furthermore, it may be for food, for foothold, for luxuries, for mates, and for the sake of the young. The essential idea is 'answering back' to environing limitations and difficulties; and in an outlook on animate Nature it is of real importance to be clear that the struggle for existence need not be directly competitive, need not be sanguinary, need not lead to elimination there and then, and that it may often be accurately described as an endeavour after well-being. It is very inaccurate to picture animate Nature as, in Huxley's phrase, 'a dismal cockpit.'

3. The breadth of the concept.—In face of difficulties and limitations one kind of organism may intensify competition, another may exhibit an elaboration of parental care, another may experiment in mutual aid, another may take to some form of parasitism, and another may change its habitat. These are some of the many 'answers back' which living creatures make to environing difficulties and limitations, and all are to be included in the concept of the struggle for existence. Instead of making an opposition between 'struggle for self' and 'struggle for others,' or between 'mutual struggle' and 'mutual aid,' it is scientifically clearer to recognize that the concept of struggle, as Darwin used it, includes all the fresh reactions and responses which individual organisms make in face of difficulties. As Spencer, Kessler, Geddes, Drummond, Kropotkin, Cresson, and others have shown, survival is often the reward of those organisms that give the best send-off to their offspring, or that vary most in the direction of self-subordination, or that experiment most successfully in sociality. But the important point is to get away from the nightmare idea that the struggle for existence is necessarily an internecine competition between kin at the margin of subsistence. Of this mode of the struggle there are not on record more than a few good illustrations; in any case, as Darwin emphasized, it is far from being the only mode.

As a technical term, 'the struggle for existence' is not applicable when organisms faced by difficulties and limitations do not 'answer back' to these. Thus it is not obviously applicable to such a case as that of the myriads of open-sea animals engulfed in the baleen whale's huge mouth; it is not obviously applicable to such a case as that of the grass on which the cattle browse. It is essential to the concept that there be an individual 'answer back.' Similarly, it may be argued that, when an adaptive response comes to be part of the constitution of a species, when all the members of a species are so hereditarily endowed that they meet a familiar difficulty with effectiveness, and with equal effectiveness, then the swirl of the struggle for existence has passed from that particular point to some other. These capacities of effective response have been wrought out in the course of ages of struggle; they are now engrained in the constitution of the species; they have, so to speak, passed beyond the scope of struggle, except in so far as their continued exercise is necessary for their continued efficiency. But it is very interesting to consider these securely established ways, for thus we realize how large a proportion of the energy and time at the disposal of living creatures is spent in activities which make not for self-increase, self-stability, or self-preservation, but for the welfare of the family, the kin, and the species. Survival has doubtless been in many cases the reward of the individualistic competitor—a fox, let us say—but not less frequently of those with a capacity for self-forgetfulness and other-regarding activities. An otter is a solitary predatory carnivore, but the preoccupation of the mother with the nurture and education of the cubs is surely a very important factor in the survival of the species. It may be said that neither naturalists nor philosophers have as yet adequately realized the extent to which there is throughout animate Nature a subordination of the individual to the species.[1]

4. Results of the struggle for existence.—The outcome of the struggle for existence varies with its conditions.

(*a*) When the 'answer back' which organisms give is uniformly ineffective, the result will be an indiscriminate reduction of numbers. This will doubtless relieve the pressure of population, but it will not directly make for progress. A diagrammatic illustration may be seen when great crowds of lemmings, whose numbers have outrun the means of subsistence, obey the instinct to pass on, and swim out to sea, where they are drowned.

(*b*) The 'answer back' which organisms give may be uniformly effective, as when large numbers succeed in finding a new habitat or in discovering a new mode of life. For animals, as for man, the exploration of new territory has been a frequently recurrent result of the struggle for existence, and one of the most important. It is very instructive also to notice how species nearly related keep out of one another's way by exploiting slightly different levels of the same crowded area. This is vividly illustrated on the seashore. This kind of outcome will not have any direct effect on the constitution of the race, but it may possibly be important in stimulating germinal and habitable variability. It should be noted that, when organisms survive difficulties in a struggle in virtue of individually acquired and non-heritable somatic modifications, or in virtue of individual and non-heritable plasticity of endeavour, there will not be any direct constitutional effect on the race.

(*c*) The result which has most evolutionary interest is discriminate elimination, where the sifting depends on the possession or non-possession of certain heritable variations. When different

[1] *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. A. C. Seward, Cambridge, 1909, p. 20.

[2] *Origin of Species*[6], p. 50. [3] *Ib.*

[1] See Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*; and Cresson, *L'Espèce et son serviteur*.

members of the species 'answer back' in virtue of hereditary endowment with varied degrees of effectiveness, the struggle for existence will tend to bring about the elimination of the relatively less fit, and a variety may actually supplant the parent species. This does not necessarily mean internecine competition between the members of the species, for, when a microbe, *e.g.*, attacks a family, the resistive capacity of the survivors is not gained at the expense of the other members, nor does it hasten their elimination.[1]

It is often said that what the discriminative modes of struggle actually effect is elimination, rather than selection. This is true, but too much must not be made of it. What actually happens in natural selection is a change in the centre of gravity of variation by the removal or handicapping of the less adaptive variants, but the elimination of X is correlated with the survival of Y. Darwin showed his wonted shrewdness in giving to *The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection* the alternative title *The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. The important point is to realize that the struggle for existence may result in a process of natural selection without there being any rapid killing off of the less fit. If the relatively less fit have a more difficult life and do not live so long as the relatively more fit, if they have smaller and less vigorous families, if the parents are harassed so that they cannot give their offspring the best available nurture, and so on, the process will, in the long run, work out to the same result as if the less fit had come to a rapid violent end. Another consideration, of great importance but rarely appreciated, is that the struggle for existence seems to the expert naturalist to operate in reference to an intricate web of life, or system of inter-relations, which has been gradually wrought out in increasing complexity. Steps of organismal progress become in some measure embodied in extra-organismal linkages, in a *systema Naturæ* which has been increasingly elaborated through the ages; and this is part of the explanation of the progressiveness of evolution. There has been an evolution of the environment—of the struggle, of the selection—as well as of the organisms. The sieve evolves as well as the material sifted.

5. **General.**—(*a*) It is a basal fact in the scheme of organic evolution that one type of organism depends on another for sustenance. On the whole, the lower feed the higher, though the tables are sometimes turned. The living material passes from one incarnation to another; and, while we may not be scientifically warranted in saying that the myriads of prolific crustaceans in the sea are there in order that fishes may be fed, the fact is that the existence and persistence of the teeming multitudes of small fry has made the great race of fishes possible. And the great multitude of fishes has made the livelihood of much higher organisms, such as ospreys, possible. This nutritive dependence of organism upon organism is one of the factors necessitating a struggle for existence; and there seems no good reason why in its general aspects it should grate on æsthetic or ethical susceptibilities. The tendency which many not very highly individuated organisms have to prolific multiplication sometimes leads to grim results, as when a sow has more offspring than she can feed, or when a marsupial mother has more offspring than her pouch has teats for, or when, as in the egg-capsules of some whelks, there is necessitated cannibalism in the cradle; but, in general, there is nothing incongruent with the rationality of animate Nature in the fact that, with heavy odds against life, there should be provision for a safe margin. It is very instructive to notice how reproductivity is economized, along many different lines, in proportion to the advance in instinctive or intelligent control of circumstances, or in effectiveness of parental care and nurture. It is true that the callous changefulness of the physical environment causes much misery among living creatures, but a much larger fact is the remarkable fitness of our earth to be a home of life.[1] Moreover, while the physical environment is often tyrannous in its changefulness, its importance as a stimulus to effort and possibly to variation must be borne in mind. Furthermore, against the callousness of the physical environment must be set the plasticity with which the animate environment adjusts itself in linkages or inter-relations to register, or organize, or systematize organismal advances in evolution. This is one of the largest facts of natural history, and must form part of the perspective of our picture of the struggle for existence.

(*b*) The currency of half-understood biological ideas has often proved mischievous. Thus a vindication of internecine competition and of warfare among men is sometimes sought in an appeal to the fact that there is universal struggle for existence in animate Nature. Can we improve upon Nature's régime?, it is asked—as if man had not been doing this (with clouded success, it may be admitted) since civilization began. In repelling this sophism, the following points may be noted. (1) The struggle for existence, as Darwin insisted, includes much more than internecine competition among nearly related kin. It includes many non-competitive forms of an endeavour after well-being. (2) Some non-competitive modes of struggle—*e.g.*, elaborations of mutual aid and improvements in co-operation—seem to have been factors in great steps of progress in Nature, and well deserve man's imitation, which indeed, consciously or unconsciously, they have always had. (3) The sifting that goes on in the struggle for existence does not in itself make for more than the survival of those relatively fittest to given conditions. This can be no criterion of human conduct, unless the given conditions include the highest values. To take a particular case, there is not in biological analogy any warrant for supposing that the result of war must needs be a survival of the fittest in any desirable sense. (4) There are many interesting analogies between animal and human societies, but the differences are greater than the resemblances, and there is apt to be fallacy in arguing from the former to the latter. This is made particularly clear in Chalmers Mitchell's *Evolution and the War*. (5) If, as the facts suggest, there has been in the realm of organisms an evolution not only of organisms but of modes of selection, this will hold *a fortiori* for mankind, where the gradual displacement of natural selection by rational and social selection, though fraught with great dangers, opens up great possibilities of amelioration. (6) Finally, it must be borne in mind that in mankind it is not enough to refer to biological criteria, for, while these are fundamental, social criteria are supreme. Thus, to look at the question of war from another point of view, a war which is, biologically regarded, a reversion to the crudest mode of the struggle for existence may be, socially regarded, an expression and discipline of many and high virtues in combatants and non-combatants alike.

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[1] For a critical discussion of the alleged keenness of competition among members of the same or nearly related species see P. Chalmers Mitchell, *Evolution and the War*.

[1] See L. J. Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, London, 1913.

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STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT.—

1. Origin, aim, and extent.—The Student Christian Movement is world-wide in scope and carries on work in some 2500 universities and colleges in forty lands. In 1920 the World's Student Christian Federation celebrated its 25th birthday. It federates national movements in the United States of America, Canada, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Russia, Scandinavia, S. Africa, China, India, Japan, and Australasia. Pioneer work, which will issue in further national movements, is in progress in S. America, Austria, Hungary, and the Balkans. Its membership, somewhat reduced by the war, is 176,000 students.

The Movement came into being as the result of several converging streams of influence. The beginnings in Great Britain may be traced to the evangelical revival of the middle of last century. Meetings held in Cambridge at the time of the Mission of Moody and Sankey in 1873, though not conducted by them, gave an impetus to already existing work there, and led to the formation of Christian Unions in Cambridge and Oxford. In 1877 an annual conference was instituted, attended by delegates from these two universities and from Edinburgh, Glasgow, Durham, and Dublin. The volunteering of the 'Cambridge Seven' for missionary work in China, followed by the visits to various colleges and universities of Stanley Smith and C. T. Studd in 1884 resulted among other things in the remarkable work carried on for ten years in Edinburgh under the leadership of Henry Drummond. To his influence, and to that of the student deputations from Edinburgh which visited other colleges, the Student Christian Movement both in America and in Great Britain is largely indebted. Meantime a similar movement was making progress in America, which took shape in 1886 in the Student Volunteer Missionary Union. Visits paid to this country by J. N. Forman and R. P. Wilder, two of the founders of that Union, led to the inauguration at a conference in Edinburgh in April 1892 of a similar Union for Great Britain. It is at this date that the Movement in an organized form may be said to begin.

These Unions were composed of men who had formed the purpose of becoming foreign missionaries, and the first aim of the founders was to appeal to the universities for volunteers for the mission field. Planted at first as a mustard-seed in some American Colleges, the Student Volunteer Missionary Union has grown to marvellous dimensions, and up to the year 1919 there were 9000 missionaries in the field whose names had been enrolled as Student Volunteers. The movement, therefore, from its origin has had as its horizon nothing less than the whole world.

It is impossible in a short article to trace the course of the Movement's growth throughout the world. The character and development of the national movements naturally vary in accordance with the differences characteristic of, say, America and Europe, East and West, Roman Catholic and Reformed countries. But there is enough in common to justify the taking of one national movement as illustrative of the rest. This article is therefore based on the writers' knowledge of the British Student Movement.

2. Development and methods.—The pioneers of the movement in 1892 were concerned to win men and women in the British colleges for service abroad. This simple beginning has led to a complex development. The search for volunteer missionaries revealed the religious needs of both men and women students in every kind of college. In the older universities Christianity was found to be institutionally represented. But even there, and still more in the newer universities, in national training colleges, in technical, medical, and other schools, great numbers of students were found to lie outside the embrace of organized Christianity. There are no 'enchantments of the Middle Ages' in the great majority of modern British colleges. They represent a growth of education which has been independent of the Churches. It fell therefore to the pioneers of the movement not only to appeal for 'student volunteers' from the colleges, but to cultivate in the colleges some oases of Christian life and conviction in their religious deserts. The S.V.M.U. thus gave rise to the General College Department, which is a federation of local Student Christian Unions. In 1892 only 20 colleges had religious organizations. In 1919 there were 126 Christian Unions in British colleges, with a total membership of about 6000 students. The missionary aim of the S.V.M.U. led not only to the formation of Christian Unions in secular colleges, but also to the creation of a Theological College Department, in which are associated 63 theological colleges, representative of all the Christian bodies other than Roman Catholic. This extension represented the desire to bring home to men preparing for the ministry both the missionary call of the hour and the religious needs and aspirations of their contemporaries about to enter other professions.

The College Christian Unions are self-governing. They are grouped in six intercollegiate Unions in Wales, Ireland, Scotland, North and South of England, and London, each with a representative Council. In Ireland, Scotland, and Wales especially the work has developed along characteristically national lines. The affairs of the Student Christian Movement as a whole are controlled by a General Committee elected annually and composed almost entirely of students still in college. This Committee employs, in 1920, thirty college men and women as Secretaries, most of them recent graduates, who act as links between the colleges, and help to bring to bear upon local problems the experience of the whole Movement. Methods of work vary with the college, but in nearly all there are lectures on the Bible, various aspects of Christian belief, the missionary enterprise and social questions, small groups of eight or a dozen meeting weekly for discussion of books published by the Movement for the purpose, prayer meetings and series of addresses designed to present the appeal of Christ to the entire body of students. These methods are supplemented by small Conferences in various parts of the college field for the more thorough study of the Bible, or missions or social problems under the guidance of experts. The Summer Conferences (held latterly at Swanwick, Derbyshire) are attended by students from all parts of the country. One of the most important departments of the Movement's work in recent years has been due to the presence in the colleges of increasing numbers (over 2000 in 1920) of students from other countries. It seeks to do all in its power to secure a friendly welcome for these men and women, whose presence provides a unique opportunity for the promotion of mutual understanding and international goodwill. Special secretaries have been set apart for this purpose. Several of these groups of foreign students have formed Christian Unions of their own. The Student Movement House in London provides premises for a Club which includes among its thousand members students of thirty-three nationalities.

The growth of the movement has therefore been in extension. It cuts a section through the length

and breadth of the British adult education. It has also been in intension. The pursuit of the original and relatively simple missionary aim has laid bare a complexity of religious need and opportunity. The movement began with a certain evangelical *naïveté*. It was based on 'Bible Christian' assumptions and was not at first sensitive to the intellectual difficulties of students or to the relationship between foreign missionary enterprise and the reproach of the gospel constituted by social conditions at home. But with very great rapidity the movement was led to face the facts. It has set itself sympathetically to foster the quest of the younger generation after a fresh understanding of the gospel. It has boldly spread among students the positive and constructive results of Biblical study. At the same time it has recognized fully that the gospel has not only to be carried to the heathen but also to be applied to the Christianization of society everywhere. It has been foremost in the consciousness that the focus of Christianity according to the mind of the Master is something more than individual salvation. In other words, it has embraced the gospel of the Kingdom of God. This is of especial significance when the comprehensive character of the student field is taken into account. Every profession has its postulants in the colleges. The movement therefore has been stimulated to think out how Christianity applies to the life and work of men and women in every kind of secular profession. This complex development of the movement's activities is represented in the growth and character of its literature. Beginning with comparatively simple missionary and Biblical propaganda, it has expanded into something fairly representative of the relationship of Christ to the thought and life of the times.

At the same time the central and single loyalty of the founders of the movement has been continued: it is loyalty to Jesus Christ. Students have grown undoubtedly in an unwillingness merely to accept traditional beliefs about Him. The movement is now less possessed than formerly of a fixed and agreed message about Him. It is more of a quest after 'the truth as it is in Jesus.' But it has advanced in the conviction that the master-key to all the interwoven problems of the world lies with Him. It has therefore grown in a deepened and intensified loyalty to Him.

3. Doctrinal position and relation to the Churches.—For its faith and doctrinal position the movement has come to depend (in a way which what has been said will render intelligible) less upon any independent formulation of its own than upon the faith of the adult Churches. The movement after all is not a Church; it is the adolescent department of the Churches; it is the means of collecting and formulating to the elder Christian world the hopes, needs, and difficulties of the coming generation. It is also the channel through which the forces of the Christian Church may reach the student class, otherwise largely inaccessible. For teachers, writers, speakers, secretaries, it draws freely upon the ranks of organized Christianity. It has held consistently to the task of reinforcing the adult Church with the vigorous faith and service of the student whom it has helped to belief in Christ and to devotion to His cause.

Thus related to the Churches, the movement has been brought face to face with the problem of Christian unity. Yet its interest in the problem is not direct; it is incidental to the main work of winning students for Christ and His service. None the less the movement is doing formative work for the cause of Christian unity. It is not content with negations, but seeks to make to converge on the needs of students all the resources of the divided Body of Christ. The movement (and notably its conferences) is the meeting-place, under conditions of mutual need and adolescent candour, of men and women representative of the full width of Christian division. No one is asked to leave behind his denominational loyalty, but all bring it with them and make it their contribution to the common stock. Thus the movement, and notably its Theological College Department, has become the means of exchange of view and mutual understanding between representatives of Christian traditions as widely separated as the Friends on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other.

Such in outline is the British Student Christian Movement. Its significant features, missionary, social, intellectual, and ecclesiastical, deserve illustration and amplification from movements in other countries. There is no doubt, *e.g.*, that on the continent of Europe there is a far greater degree of alienation of the student class from organized Christianity than in Great Britain. Movements of intellectual and moral revolt have gone deeper. In fact, the World's Student Christian Federation by its touch with students is concerned with a whole world of deep spiritual, moral, and political unrest. Again, the movement in other lands has come to be quite clearly of opinion that, wherever liaison and co-operation with Catholic Christianity is feasible, it is the right policy, so that the streams of new life may be helped to flow down and purify the old channels. There are many Orthodox, Copt, Gregorian, and some Roman Catholic, students within the Federation. Everywhere the movement asks of students but two questions: whether they see in Jesus Christ the hope of the world; whether they will join with others in making Him King in their hearts and over the whole of life. To that common task it invites all to bring the treasures of their ecclesiastical inheritances wherewith to enrich the Student Christian fellowship.

It remains to add that the war but heightened the value and potentiality of the movement in all lands. The Student Federation held together despite all the ruptures of war, and on a general view has not lost ground despite all the losses of the war. In many parts of Europe, notably in the Balkans, Austria, Hungary, and Poland, movements of emancipation consequent on the war expose a deep need and opportunity for Student Movement enterprise. In some countries no doubt the movement is small and struggling, and faced by desperate difficulties. But everywhere, nevertheless, the true light already shineth. It is the light of Christ, in whom this movement trusts. He has greatly blessed it. The future, therefore, is bright with the hope of His using it afresh in His purposes of healing and reconciliation for the world.

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STUNDISM.—See SECTS (Russian).

STŪPA.—*Stūpa* (Sanskrit), a Buddhist monument or mausoleum, generally called 'tope' (from Pāli *thūpa*) in India and adjacent countries, means 'mound' or 'tumulus,' and the term *chaitya* (*q.v.*) had originally the same meaning, though it afterwards came to denote any memorial or sacred spot or sanctuary of any shape, whereas *stūpas* were always built in the shape of towers, surmounted by a cupola and one or more *chattra* ('parasols'). King Aśoka, the Buddhistic Constantine (3rd cent. B.C.), is said to have erected, within the space of three years, 84,000 *stūpas* in different parts of India, to preserve the remains of Buddha.[1]

[1] There must have been *stūpas* long before the time of Aśoka, since he declared, in an inscription discovered by Führer in the Tarai, near the Nepālese village of Nigliva, that he increased or enlarged for the second time the *stūpa* of the Buddha Kŏnākamana, a mythical predecessor of the historical Buddha, and since the ruined Piprāwā *stūpa* contains an inscription which is decidedly prior to the period of Aśoka.

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Funeral tumuli are spread over the whole continent of Asia and Europe, and it may be taken for granted that the worship of *stūpas*, or mausoleums of distinguished personages, was handed down to the adherents of Buddha from a remote period. Thus the excavation, in 1905, of the curious earthen mounds north of the village of Lauriya, in the Bettiah subdivision, has revealed the interesting fact that these ancient conical structures contain deposits of bones as well as gold leaves and other ornaments. Aśoka erected one of his pillars near these old monuments, which had probably formed an object of worship long before his epoch, and may have contained the remains of royal persons. When dying, Buddha is said to have declared that, besides himself and his disciples, a monarch and a *pratyekabuddha* (*q.v.*) were worthy to be dignified with the erection of a *stūpa*. Nor were *stūpas* entirely confined to Buddhists in the historical period of India. There is a story of the Buddhist king Kaniṣka having by mistake paid homage to a heretical *stūpa*. *Stūpas* are mentioned in the sacred writings of the Jain sect, and an ancient Jain inscription discovered at Mathurā records the consecration of one or two statues at a certain ancient *stūpa*. A Brāhmanical hermitage, represented on the sculptures of Sānchī and Amarāvatī, shows the figure of a *stūpa*. All the *stūpas* actually discovered, however, seem to be of Buddhist origin, and we know for certain that it was an established usage of the Buddhist Church to raise memorials called *stūpas* on the ashes or relics of its teachers, and in those places which were hallowed by some remarkable event in the history of Buddha or of his followers. This accounts for the fact that *stūpas* are found not only in India itself, but also in all other countries where Buddhism is or has been in the ascendant.

1. **Stūpas discovered outside of India.**—Of these the ruins of a *stūpa* at Anurādhāpura (Ceylon), supposed to date from 161 B.C. to A.D. 137 or earlier, are perhaps the most ancient. The celebrated Javanese monument of Boro-Budur, in the central part of Java, which belongs to the 7th–9th cent. A.D., consists of eight terraces and contains no fewer than 73 *stūpas*, with sitting statues of Buddha. The temples of Ayuthia, the ruined ancient capital of Siam, exhibit a curious mixture of the *stūpa* style with other Indian elements. Other independent varieties of the *stūpa* have been developed in Burma, Nepāl, and Tibet. The Chinese *stūpas*, built since the 1st cent. A.D., have no cupola, but from seven to thirteen *chattras*. The dowager empress Hon of China is said to have built a *stūpa* of nine storeys, 900 ft. high, crowned by a mast of 100 ft. carrying 50 golden disks. In Ladakh Simpson discovered the reproduction of a *stūpa* with thirteen *chattras*. In Afghanistān some 60 *stūpas* were examined by Masson. They are remarkable for the fragments of one or two bones, evidently relics, which they generally contain in a small apartment in their centre, and to protect which they appear to have been erected. A certain *stūpa* near Kuchar in E. Turkestan was opened in 1889 by some natives of the place looking for treasure. What they actually found was not treasure, but a heap of very ancient Sanskrit MSS, which were afterwards deciphered by R. Hoernle in *The Bower Manuscript* (Calcutta, 1893 ff.). In the same country Stein discovered, in 1900, an enormous *stūpa*, situated in a rectangular courtyard, the walls of which were decorated with rilievos of the 4th century A.D.

2. **Indian stūpas.**—The rise and development of *stūpa* architecture may, however, best be studied in India, where it originated, especially in the ancient sculptural and pictorial representations of *stūpas*. A very ancient type of *stūpa*, which consists of a simple round tumulus surrounded by a balustrade, has been preserved in an old Sānchī sculpture. According to Rhys Davids, the first step in the development of the original cairn or mound into a *stūpa* consisted in building it more carefully than usual, with stones and in covering the outside with fine *chunam* plaster to give a marble-like surface. The next step was to build the cairn of concentric layers of the huge bricks in use at the time and to surround the whole with a wooden railing. There can be no doubt that the railings and *toraṇas* (gates) were originally made of wood, like the wooden gates so common in the court-yards of Chinese and Japanese temples, which seem to have been derived from the Indian *toraṇas*, though the only preserved specimens of the latter—*e.g.*, the beautifully ornamented gate of the Sānchī tope—are made of stone. The *stūpa* itself was early placed on a circular terrace or plinth. A parasol (*chattra*) was added on the top, the sign of high station in the East. Between it and the cupola there was a quadrangular structure, fitly called the neck (*gala*) of the *stūpa*. Many *stūpas* contained quite a series of parasols, diminishing in diameter as they approached the top of the building. The height of the parasols was at least one-third of the whole height of the edifice (said to have been 632 ft. in the case of the famous sanctuary of Peshawār, as seen by a Chinese traveller). The miniature *stūpas*, which were used as objects of worship, containing small fragments of sacred texts, called *dharma-śarīra*, or religious relics, are only a few centimetres in height.

A Buddhist Sanskrit work, the *Divyāvadāna*, contains a description of the mode in which an elaborate *stūpa* was gradually erected by a rich Indian merchant. He began by having four staircases built on the four sides of the future *stūpa*. Then he built successively the three terraces or plinths which were to be reached from the staircases. They were surmounted by the dome or cupola, called 'egg' (*aṇḍa*), in which there was a hole for the pillar or flagstaff carrying the whole series of parasols (*chattrāvalī*). The cupola was crowned by a pavilion, or kiosk (*harmikā*), serving as a base for the pillar, which, rising from the dome, passed through the pavilion. A rain-water pot (*varṣa-sthāla*) is also mentioned, in which precious stones were deposited.

The *stūpas* of India may be conveniently divided into two classes, according as they were built as *dāgabas* (from Skr. *dhātugarbha*, 'receptacle for relics'), for the purpose of enshrining some sacred relic, or as memorials of some remarkable event in the life of a Buddha or other saint. A specimen of the latter kind is the famous *stūpa* of Sārnāth (*q.v.*), near Benares, situated in the Deer Park (*mṛgavana*), where Buddha took up his residence, with his five disciples, when commencing his mission as a teacher. The building now consists of a stone base 93 ft. in diameter, surmounted by a tower in brick-work, rising to a height of 110 ft. above the surrounding ruins, and 128 ft. above the plain. In his excavations Cunningham found, at the depth of 10½ft. from the summit, a large stone inscribed with the Buddhist creed, but no relic.

Near Nagarahāra, in the Kabul valley, there were two *stūpas* intended to perpetuate the memory of the celebrated meeting of the future Buddha with his mythical predecessor, Dīpaṅkara. Many other such memorial *stūpas*, which have now disappeared, were seen and described by the devout Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited India between A.D. 400 and 800.

The *stūpas* of Bhīlsa (*q.v.*), in Central India, the most extensive group of topes in India, include the great memorial tope at Sānchī, supposed to have been built or commenced by King Aśoka (3rd cent. B.C.), a massive structure of brick and stones, 42 ft. high, rising on a stone plinth and surrounded by a stone railing containing four beautifully

ornamented gates. *Stūpa* II. of Sānchī, on the other hand, is a relic shrine containing the remains of two contemporaries of King Aśoka, and *stūpa* III. has supplied two relic caskets bearing the names of two distinguished pupils of Buddha.

The great tope of Mānikyāla in the Panjāb, in its lowest deposit, which was discovered just below the centre, contains a brass cylindrical casket, with an old inscription and several coins of very ancient date. This tope is a hemisphere 127 ft. in diameter, the total height of the dome, as it now stands, being 92 feet. Four broad flights of steps facing the cardinal points lead to the top of the terrace for the use of pilgrims. In the Sonāla tope, near Mānikyāla, Cunningham discovered a crystal box containing the relic, which was a very small piece of bone wrapped in gold-leaf, along with a small silver coin, a copper ring, 24 small beads of pearl, turquoise, garnet, and quartz. These, with the gold-leaf wrappers, make up the seven *ratnas*, or jewels, which usually accompanied the relic deposits of the old Buddhists, and which are still placed in the *chortens* (*q.v.*) of the Buddhists of Tibet.

Near the ancient town of Sopārā, in the Thāna District of the Bombay Presidency, Indraji in 1881 opened a large dome-topped mound, the ruins of a brick Buddhist *stūpa*. In the centre of the dome, a little below the level of its base, he found a large circular stone coffer in which stood an egg-shaped copper casket surrounded by a circle of eight small seated copper images of Buddha, well-proportioned and gracefully formed. In the copper casket were enclosed, one within the other, four caskets, of silver, of stone, of crystal, and of gold. Between the silver casket and the copper casket were gold flowers of seven varieties, and a small image of Buddha, sitting cross-legged on a lotus, also 13 precious stones of seven kinds, apparently taking the place of the seven jewels, and 31 other drilled stones of various shapes, intended apparently as a necklace presented to the relics. Among the stones was a well-preserved unworn silver coin, with a legend referring to King Yajna Sātakarni (2nd cent. A.D. ?). The gold cup was found to contain 13 tiny pieces of earthenware; they were probably believed to be fragments of Buddha's begging bowl, which was held in great reverence by Buddhists. The idea of the builders of the *stūpa* seems to have been to enclose the relics in seven envelopes, each more valuable than the one below, the clay and brick of the mound being reckoned as the least valuable of all.

In the *stūpa* of Bhaṭṭiprolu in the Kistna District, Madras Presidency, several relic caskets were found by Rea in 1891, with interesting inscriptions, in ancient characters (of the 3rd cent. B.C. or so), declaring two of the caskets to be intended for relics of Buddha.

In the extreme north of India, near the Nepālese frontier, in the neighbourhood of the site of Kapilavastu (*q.v.*), Buddha's birthplace, W. C. Peppé, a landholder, excavated in Jan. 1898 the brick *stūpa* of Piprāwā. In its interior chamber he found a stone coffer containing several other vessels in which were preserved pieces of bone, quite recognizable as such. Round the rim of the lid of one steatite vase runs an inscription in ancient characters of the Maurya type, but without long vowels. This is the oldest inscription hitherto discovered in India, since it must belong to the 4th, or perhaps the 5th, century B.C. According to the interpretation given by Fleet, the record declares that 'this is a deposit of relics of the brethren of Buddha, together with their little sisters and with their children and wives,' and it commemorates the enshrining of relics of Buddha's kinsmen and of their families, probably after they had been massacred by the king of Kosala, as the Buddhist tradition has it. The vessels were found to contain, besides the bones, a vast number of various small ornaments and objects of art—*e.g.*, two small human figures in gold-leaf, jewels and articles made from them, coral and crystal beads, a coil of fine silver wire, a lion stamped on gold-leaf, an elephant, two birds of cornelian and metal, gold- and silver-leaf stars, etc. These were, according to Fleet's plausible conjecture, apparently the trinkets and household treasures of the women and the playthings of the children, entombed together with their bones by some unknown pious friend of the slaughtered people.[1]

3. Artistic value.—From an artistic point of view, the sculptures contained in the stone railings and huge gates of some *stūpas* are particularly interesting and important. Thus the sculptures of the eastern gate of the great Sānchī *stūpa* abound in life-like representations of the principal scenes of the romantic history of Buddha, of *stūpas* and their worshippers, of sacred trees and lotus-flowers, of elephants, camels, lions, and peacocks, of deities, kings, female dancers, etc. The style of these sculptures exhibits a strong Persian influence, notably in the bell-shaped capitals of pillars. The same style is visible in the splendid railings of Bhārhut (*q.v.*), the only remains of the great Bhārhut *stūpa*, which was situated about midway between Sānchī and Bodh Gayā, the place of Buddha's enlightenment, which is likewise marked by the remains of some interesting railings dating from the Aśoka period. The Bhārhut sculptures, now mostly in the Calcutta Indian Museum, belong to the same period as the Sānchī sculptures (*c.* 200 B.C.), and are particularly valuable for the old inscriptions explaining their meaning. The highly finished rilievos of the Amarāvati (*q.v.*) *stūpa*, on the other hand, which are now to be seen in London, are to some extent an offshoot of Gandhāra art, the Greek or Græco-Buddhist art of N.W. India having extended its influence as far southward as the course of the Kistna. The railings of Amarāvati, judging from the inscriptions, seem to belong to the end of the 2nd century B.C. The best preserved *stūpas* are those which form the innermost part of numerous cave temples in W. India. There is an open space round them for circumambulation, but there is nothing remarkable about them from an artistic point of view.

4. Worship of stūpas.—*Stūpas* were worshipped, not only by circumambulating them, with the right side turned towards the *stūpa*, but also by placing on them flowers, incense, cloth, parasols, flags, great banners, and ornaments, by offering them coins, by washing them with milk, etc. This worship has survived to the present day in Buddhist countries—*e.g.*, in Burma, where on festival occasions a thousand candles are burnt day after day before the great *stūpa* of Shwe-Dagon at Rangoon, which is devoutly believed to contain eight hairs of Buddha. The miniature *stūpas* of the Buddhists were manufactured in great numbers for devotional purposes and worshipped in the houses of the laymen. Buddhist monks used to make them with their own hands. Large *stūpas* were found in every Buddhist convent, and the sanctity attributed to them appears from the reply said to have been given by the then Buddhist community to King Puṣyamitra, the persecutor of Buddhism, when he asked which of their sanctuaries they would rather have destroyed, the *stūpas* or the monasteries, and they answered: 'The monasteries.' The relics recently dug out from some of the Indian *stūpas* have become an object of veneration to the Buddhists of other countries. When the splinters of Buddha's bowl

[1] See, however, art. KAPILAVASTU, vol. vii. p. 661b

had been excavated from the Sopārā *stūpa*, the Buddhist high-priest of Ceylon petitioned Government that a small portion of the bowl of the world-honoured Gautama might be given to him to deposit in the monastery of Adam's Peak—a petition which, we need hardly say, was readily granted. The relics contained in the Piprāwā *stūpa* were offered by the Indian Government to the king of Siam, who sent an envoy to India to receive the relics, and agreed to distribute portions of them among the Buddhists of Burma and Ceylon.

5. Who built the stūpas?—It may be confidently asserted that kings and princes were not the only builders of *stūpas*. The renowned King Harṣa (7th cent. A.D.) is reported to have erected several thousand *stūpas*, each about 100 ft. high, along the banks of the sacred Ganges. Merchants and traders, on the other hand, prevail among the donors referred to in the Sānchī and other inscriptions, and it seems that this class was the chief stronghold of Buddhism.

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STYX.—The name clearly signifies, in respect of its derivation, the 'horror' or 'abomination.'[1] Homer describes the Thessalian Titaresius,[2] which flows into the Peneus but does not mix with it, as an effluent of the Styx, to which it owes its magical properties; for Styx is the most potent sanction of an oath, seeing that it was by the inviolable waters of the Styx that the immortals themselves swore.[3] The circumstances and consequences of the oath are detailed by Hesiod.[4] Zeus dispatches Iris to convey the magic water in a golden pitcher, and the defaulter is excluded from the Olympian community, and remains in a breathless trance for a period of nine years until the great cycle is complete. It may be said that the gods swear by Styx so as to invoke death, and that they issue a challenge involving the loss of their divinity in case of failure to fulfil the oath. But it was natural to ascribe to the gods a sanction which men themselves regarded as supremely holy. Thus even in the absence of direct evidence we should be ready to infer that the practice of swearing by Styx was current upon earth as well as in heaven. However, the fact is proved by the testimony of history. When Cleomenes in exile from Sparta tried to persuade the Arcadians to join him and march against his countrymen, he was eager to induce the chieftains to go with him to Nonacris and swear by the waters of the Styx that they would follow wherever he might lead.[5] The custom is explained by the belief in the deadly nature of the Arcadian spring, a draught of which was supposed to be instantly fatal.[6] Thus to invoke the waters of the magic stream, believing that they would kill the man who forswore himself, constituted an ordeal[1] like the drinking of bull's blood or the lifting of red-hot bars; and Styx is accordingly described as she who guards the right.[2] Generally, Stygian waters have a magic power either for harm or for weal. The Telchines sprinkled the fields of the island of Rhodes with Stygian water in order to make them unfruitful.[3] On the other hand, the vulnerability of Achilles' heel was said to be due to the fact that Thetis held him by the heel when she bathed him in the waters of the Styx to confer immortality upon him.[4] T. Bergk[5] quotes an Arcadian legend that whosoever drank of the waters of the Styx on a particular day of the year secured thereby immortality.

The name seems to have been appropriated generically to rivers which by the weirdness of their surroundings or the character of their waters were believed to possess a magic virtue. Besides the places already named, we read of a Styx in Egypt, in Arabia, in Ephesus, in Eubœa, and elsewhere. Hence it is not surprising that poetic imagination should have conceived of Styx as the chief river of the under world[6] and the source of Cocytus.[7] But the development of the idea that the Styx was a barrier shutting off the infernal regions which it encircled in a ninefold sinuosity,[8] and the fable of Charon in whose boat every shade must cross the river, are known to us from post-Homeric sources. The mythological connexions of Styx, as described in the *Theogony*, are of minor interest. She appears as daughter of Oceanus, spouse of Pallas, and mother of Zelos, Nike, Kratos, and Bia,[9] with whose support she assisted Zeus in his war with the Titans.[10]

A. C. PEARSON.

SUBCONSCIOUSNESS.—The question of the nature and existence of subconsciousness may be said to have begun with Leibniz, although it was much later before the term itself came into use. Locke, in attacking the Cartesian view that the mind thinks always, or is always conscious, had said that, since thinking is an operation, like motion in bodies, it must be intermittent; further, that we cannot think without being sensible of it, any more than we can be happy or miserable without being aware of it; and to say that we may be conscious at the moment of thinking, but forget it immediately, is to make a pure assumption; such fleeting impressions, 'characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces,' would be of no value to the soul if they existed.[11] Leibniz's reply was that, as visible bodies and movements really depend on, and are made possible by, invisible or imperceptible bodies and movements, so there are numberless minute perceptions, not sufficiently distinct to be noticed or remembered, which yet can be inferred from their effects. Not only is there at any moment a multitude of impressions being made on the senses, only a very few of which can capture our attention, but also there is something remaining in the mind from every one of our past thoughts, none of which can ever be wholly effaced. In deep sleep, in a faint, perhaps even in death, when the unity of consciousness is broken, the mind splits up into an infinite number of minute confused sensations; perhaps this is also the natural condition of the waking mind of animals. Many of our actions, however impulsive and unmotived in appearance—habits, customs, passions—are determined by the pressure of these minute unobserved sensations. It is in-

[1] See art. ORDEAL (Greek).
[2] Bacchyl. x. 9.
[3] Nonnus, xiv. 46 ff.
[4] Stat. *Achill.* i. 269.
[5] *Kleine philolog. Schriften*, Halle, 1886, ii. 701.
[6] Hom. *Il.* viii. 369.
[7] *Od.* x. 514.
[8] Verg. *Georg.* iv. 480.
[9] Hes. *Theog.* 363 f.
[10] *Ib.* 397.
[11] Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1690, bk. ii. ch. i. § 15 (*Works*, ed. Bohn, do. 1876–77, i. 217).

[1] See J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 73.
[2] *Il.* ii. 755.
[3] Hom. *Il.* xiv. 271, *Od.* v. 185; Verg. *Æn.* vi. 324.
[4] *Theog.* 784–805.
[5] Herod. vi. 74.
[6] Paus. VIII. xviii. 4, with Frazer's notes.

teresting that the three features introduced by Leibniz—the unnoticed impressions of the moment, the traces representing past thoughts, the continuity and unity of the mind—have remained throughout the main elements in the problem of subconsciousness. It was on these 'petites perceptions' that Leibniz based his doctrine of the 'pre-established harmony' between soul and body, his law of continuity, his identity of indiscernibles;[1] his theory also of the summation of stimuli, the continued activity of the soul through the deepest sleep, the theory that sensations and perceptions are really sums of an infinite number of minute or infinitesimal sensations, etc. Kant followed Leibniz, connecting the idea of subconsciousness (1) with the differences of degree in the clearness and distinctness of ideas; (2) with the notion of a chart or field of consciousness, some parts of which are brightly, but much the greater part dimly, illumined; (3) with forgetfulness or dissociation, as in his argument that there can be no sleep without dreams, that those who suppose there is have only forgotten their dreams.[2]

In the discussion between Sir William Hamilton, W. B. Carpenter, and J. S. Mill, etc., as to the existence of *unconscious* mental modifications the question turned mainly upon what are now called *subconscious* ideas. Hamilton pointed out that Locke's assumption that consciousness and the recollection of consciousness are convertible is disproved by somnambulism and by many dreams, which can only be inferred, from actions carried out, to have taken place.[3] We are never suddenly awakened from a deep sleep without finding ourselves in the middle of a dream; the probability therefore is that we are always dreaming, or being conscious, in sleep, and that we forget these dreams because of the contrast and confusion between the two worlds of sleep and waking. It is as if the brightness of the real and sensory world dimmed the colours of the imaginary world. He accepts the conclusions of T. S. Jouffroy[4] that it is the body only that sleeps, the mind being constantly awake; that during sleep, while the senses, being bodily organs, are torpid on the whole, one or more of them may continue to send imperfect impressions through to the mind; that the mind, being awake, estimates the importance of these, and may, if it so decides, wake the body; a slight movement of the patient may wake the sick-nurse when the much greater sound of a passing wagon fails to do so; many persons can awake at a fixed hour, etc. Similar activities of the mind and similar modifications exist in waking life alongside of the fully conscious ideas. Hamilton details three degrees of these: (1) Our acquired habits of mind, the language or languages, the sciences we may have learned, and the like; they must have *some* sort of existence in the mind when they are not being actually put into operation. (2) There are systems and habits of which the mind is unconscious in its ordinary state, but which are revealed 'in certain extraordinary exaltations of the powers,'[5] such as madness, fever, etc. 'The evidence on this point shows that the mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge, which, though in our normal state they have faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, etc., flash out into luminous consciousness, and even throw into the shade of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had, for a long period, been eclipsed and even extinguished.'[6] (3) The third group is those 'mental activities and passivities, of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious'[7] —the unconscious, or subconscious, as it would now be called, out of which the conscious is built up.

Hamilton's examples are partly those of Leibniz —perception through the senses, as the green of a distant forest is made up of the green of the separate trees and even leaves, which are not separately visible;[8] partly new instances, as the mediate association of ideas, where one idea suggests another through some hidden link, which may only afterwards and by special effort, if at all, be brought to full consciousness;[9] again, our acquired dexterities and habits, where, according to Hamilton, the mind exercises volition and so far a control over the whole series of acts (in speaking or writing, *e.g.*), but has no consciousness or deliberate volition in regard to each separate movement in the series. Yet the detailed movements must be somehow in the mind, before they are carried into execution. He proposes therefore to regard all such phenomena as implying 'latent modifications,' 'unconscious activities' of the mind.[1] J. S. Mill, in his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*,[2] discusses the 'unconscious mental modifications' and points out that the acquired knowledge and skill, when not in use, are simply *capabilities*, not actions or passions at all, whether 'latent' or other:

'I have the power to walk across the room, though I am sitting on my chair; but we should hardly call this power a latent act of walking.'[3]

The second class of cases referred to by Hamilton, unconscious powers revealing themselves in abnormal circumstances, are not latent states of mind, but latent memory—'capabilities of being affected, not actual affections.' The really test case is therefore the third—present and actual mental modifications of which we are unaware—the elements of perception, etc. It is a pure assumption that, when an object is perceived, and therefore affects the mind, its parts as parts must also affect the mind:

'It is a supposition consistent with what we know of nature, that a certain *quantity* of a cause may be a necessary condition to the production of *any* of the effect.'[4]

With regard to the mediate associations and acts of dexterity, Mill rejects Hamilton's test of memory—that what we do not remember cannot have been in our consciousness at all; an evanescent consciousness may be followed by an evanescent memory; if the consciousness is too fleeting to fix the attention, *a fortiori* the remembrance of it must be so also.[5] In turning over the pages of a book which we are rapidly reading, we must form a conscious purpose to turn each page, but, 'the purpose having been instantly fulfilled, the attention was arrested in the process for too short a time to leave a more than momentary remembrance of it.'[6] The interest of the sensations or ideas is momentary; there is nothing to associate any one of them particularly with our permanent interests, and so they lapse immediately from the mind. On the other hand, Mill agrees with Hamilton that there *are* unconscious modifications, but they are of the *nerves*, not of the mind.

A wound is unnoticed in the heat of battle: 'The supposition which seems most probable is, that the nerves of the particular part were affected as they would have been by the same cause in any other circumstances, but that, the nervous centres being intensely occupied with other impressions, the affection of the local nerves did not reach them, and no sensation was excited.'[7]

So with mediate association: 'The chain of causation being continued only physically, by one organic state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly that the state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not produced.'[8] So in perception generally, and in feelings or emotions, where we appear to have a complex resultant of a multitude of simple impressions and feelings:

'The elementary feelings may then be said to be latently present, or to be present but not in consciousness. The truth, however, is that the feelings themselves are not present, consciously or latently, but that the nervous modifications which are their usual antecedents have been present, while the consequents have been frustrated, and another consequent has been produced instead.'[9]

This is W. B. Carpenter's well-known principle of 'unconscious cerebration'[10]—mental changes, of the results of which we subsequently become conscious, going on 'below the plane' of consciousness,

[1] See C. I. Gerhardt's Introd. in Leibniz, *New Essays concerning Human Understanding* (first published in his *Œuvres philosophiques*, Amsterdam and Leipzig, 1765), tr. A. G. Langley, London and New York, 1896, p. 11.

[2] Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Königsberg, 1798, ed. J. H. von Kirchmann, Leipzig, [3]1880, §§ 5, 35.

[3] *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Edinburgh, 1859, i. 319.

[4] *Mélanges philosophiques*, Paris, 1833, p. 318; [4]1866.

[5] P. 340. [6] *Ib.* [7] P. 347.

[8] P. 350. [9] P. 351.

[1] P. 361. [2] London, [3]1867, ch. xv.

[3] P. 329. [4] P. 332. [5] P. 337.

[6] *Ib.* [7] P. 341. [8] P. 341 *f.*

[9] P. 343.

[10] *Principles of Mental Physiology*, London, 1874, ch. xiii.

during deep sleep, or when the attention is wholly absorbed by other trains of thought; *e.g.*, we are trying to recollect something, a name or the like, and fail; later, when we are doing something quite different, the name may come suddenly into our mind, in O. W. Holmes's picturesque phrase, 'delivered like a prepaid parcel, laid at the door of consciousness like a foundling in a basket.'[1] The suggestion is that we voluntarily, or at least through our conscious efforts, set going certain processes in the brain, which continue while our consciousness is otherwise occupied, work out the result by themselves, and send it up into consciousness. Carpenter gives numerous instances of how the automatic motor apparatus, in speaking, writing, drawing, and many other forms, reveals thoughts, memories, new ideas, which are so strange to the individual that he cannot accept them as his own; in particular, many of the phenomena of spiritualism may be so explained—table-turning, planchette-writing, and other means of tapping the buried experiences and imaginings of the self. Mediate association he also explains by the 'doctrine of resultants,' and our complex perceptions in the same way as Mill. In rapid reading, calculating, etc., the individual letters or numbers are not separately noted, although in learning to read and to calculate it must have been so.

'An impression made by it [the individual number] upon the cerebrum, which does not produce any *conscious* recognition of its numerical value, comes to be adequate for the evolution of the result.'[2]

The development of thoughts, plans, inventions, compositions, in the mind of genius, and in ordinary mortals, both normally and also in abnormal, excited, absorbed states; the influence of moral character upon action, of intellectual character and experience upon decisions; the influence of prejudice, past experiences and associations, forgotten so far as the individual sources are concerned—all these are instances of the unconscious or rather the subconscious in mind, which Carpenter interprets in this physiological way. Practically the same explanation is adopted by G. H. Lewes in *Problems of Life and Mind*.[3] Meantime G. T. Fechner's *Elemente der Psychophysik*[4] brought about a return to Leibniz's views upon the nature of consciousness; consciousness in its kind and degree depends upon the 'psychophysical activity.'

'Essentially it is just the same principle that man's psychophysical activity must exceed a certain intensity, in order that *any* consciousness or waking shall take place, and that during waking life every special determination of this activity, whether excited by a stimulus or arising spontaneously, and which is capable of giving a special determination of consciousness, must exceed a certain intensity, in order really to be conscious.'[5]

He introduced the analogy of a wave, or curve, its height at any point indicating the intensity or other quantitative value of the impression represented at the corresponding point on the base. The height of the wave as a whole must somewhere exceed a given limit, in order that there shall be any consciousness; this is the main threshold, corresponding to the main or total wave. This wave in its turn is the resultant of an 'under wave,' and of a number of 'over waves,' each of which again has its threshold. Even those ideas of which the wave-crests are 'under-threshold' or 'subliminal' may contribute to the raising of the total wave over the threshold.

Thus 'every perception of things that we know vividly, a house, a person, draws through association a mass of other ideas with it, which remain in the unconscious, and yet, unconscious as they are, constitute for us the *meaning* of the house, of the person, which otherwise would count merely as a spot of colour for the eye.'[1]

All the systems and ideas in the mind of the individual are connected, or continuous, subliminally, while above the threshold they may be discrete, separate, whether simultaneously or successively; in the same way there is continuity between the minds of all living organisms, although the consciousness of one may normally have no touch with that of another. Different psychophysical conditions may raise or lower the general threshold, in the one case breaking up the continuous into discrete life (as in the splitting of personality), in the other case combining discrete individuals into a higher unity (as perhaps in the tribal consciousness or again in the unity of consciousness from the right and left halves of the human brain, or from the segments of radiate animals, etc.). It is also an important part of Fechner's theory that the intensity of consciousness varies with the amount of continuity or discontinuity; when the soul is split into two or more, the intensity of the consciousness in each is proportionately reduced.[2] In the case of the smaller or over-waves the same principle holds; they correspond to the variations of attention and discrimination in the individual's consciousness. The more widely the attention is spread or diffused, the less the intensity of each idea; the more concentrated or limited, the higher the intensity of the thoughts that are its object.[3] It is really the dissociation that explains the low intensity of subconscious states—not *vice versa*. Harald Höffding pointed out that in many of the instances given by Carpenter and others 'not conscious' means 'not self-conscious.'[4] We do not reflect upon such ideas sufficiently for their relation to the self or Ego to be brought out. On the other hand, it is impossible not to accept the law of continuity for the psychical as in the physical world, or to regard even the unconscious in mind as simply a lower degree, a 'continuation backwards of the series of degrees of consciousness.'[5]

William James[6] ridicules the notion of unconscious mental states as a 'sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies.' In his detailed analysis and criticism of the supposed proofs he rests partly (1) on rapid and therefore easily forgotten consciousness, partly (2) on split-off consciousness, (3) on brain-tract stimulation without consciousness.

'There are all kinds of short-cuts in the brain; and processes not aroused strongly enough to give any "idea" distinct enough to be a premise may, nevertheless, help to determine just that resultant process of whose psychic accompaniment the said idea *would* be a premise, if the idea existed at all.'[7]

This would account for the supposed unconscious inferences in perception—*e.g.*, recognizing persons by their voices, where the determining fact may be the quality of the overtones in the voice, of which the percipient has no conscious knowledge. Learning and skill James regards as predispositions—not ideas, but particular collocations of molecules in certain tracts of the brain.[8] So instincts are mechanical actions of the nervous system; our rapid judgments of size, distance, etc., are simply cerebral associations, mechanisms either inborn or acquired by habit.[9] But the main criticism is (4) that the theory springs from a confusion between having an idea at a given moment and knowing about the idea afterwards—between a state of

[1] Quoted in Carpenter, p. 520, from *Mechanism in Thought and Morals*, Boston, 1871, p. 41.
[2] P. 530.
[3] 2nd ser., London, 1877, prob. iii., 'Animal Automatism,' ch. iv., 'Consciousness and Unconsciousness.'
[4] Leipzig, 1859, [2]1889. [5] [2]ii. 454.
[1] P. 461. [2] P. 537. [3] P. 541.
[4] *Outlines of Psychology*, tr. Mary E. Lowndes, London, 1893, p. 72.
[5] P. 82.
[6] *The Principles of Psychology*, London, 1891, i. 162 f.
[7] P. 167. [8] P. 168. [9] P. 169.

mind as a subjective fact and the objective thing it knows.[1] A given idea must be fully conscious, or it does not exist at all; something else is there which may be a substitute for the given idea, may take its place, but is not it. This may be a brain-process, or it may be another idea. The same idea is not sometimes less, sometimes more, clear and distinct; even obscure feelings *are* exactly as they are felt to be; attention or introspection does not alter elements that are already present; it may cause them to be replaced by others. The difference is that some ideas cognize the same object more fully, completely, adequately, than other ideas which refer to the same objects; but the latter are not in themselves vague or indistinct ideas. These are purely relative notions, relative to the way in which ideas represent objects. In the chapter on 'The Stream of Thought,' however, James seems to adopt the theory of the sub-conscious in a thorough-going form.[2]

The stream of thought is in very large degree constituted by feelings of tendency, the 'free water of consciousness,' in which 'every definite image is steeped and dyed.' With each such image there 'goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image, is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that is fused into one with it.'[3]

Differences in the shade of meaning with which the same common word may be used, lapses of speech or writing, etc., illustrate the existence of the 'psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe.'[4] The fringe is caused by the stirring of faint brain processes, or rather it represents their influence upon our minds; but, as James protests,[5] this does not mean that the fringe is a kind of psychic material by which sensations are made to cohere; it is simply 'part of the object cognized,—substantive *qualities* and *things* appearing to the mind in a *fringe of relations*.' It is especially in reference to meanings that he makes use of this conception; as on p. 281, or again on p. 472:

'*The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought.* It is one of those evanescent and "transitive" facts of mind which introspection cannot turn round upon, and isolate and hold up for examination. . . . In the (somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it pertains to the "fringe" of the subjective state, and is a "feeling of tendency," whose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of dawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced.'

Thus 'subconsciousness,' like 'unconsciousness,' has come to mean a variety of different things to different psychologists; the simplest standpoint is that of Sully or Ward, that there are degrees in consciousness, and that the subconscious represents the lower degrees, short of unconsciousness.

'There are degrees of consciousness. In addition to the region of our distinct consciousness, there is a vast region of the subconscious or faintly conscious. This domain consists of all those psychical elements, which enter into and colour the conscious state of the time, but which are not discriminated or distinguished. . . . With this wide obscure region of the sub-conscious, there stands contrasted the narrow luminous region of the clearly conscious.'[6] In the theory of attention, Sully adds, we are confronted with the fact '*that psychical phenomena present themselves in unequal degrees of definiteness or distinctness*, or, to express the fact otherwise, that they may be more or less prominently present in consciousness, or may take up more or less of the conscious attitude. . . . At any moment we may become aware of the presence of such vague elements as bodily sensations, half-developed recollections, obscure and indefinable feelings. This dim twilight region may be marked off as that of the sub-conscious.'[7]

Two assumptions are made in these statements, which may be questioned: (1) that there are degrees of consciousness, and (2) that what we are conscious of is psychical—sensations, recollections, feelings. The existence of degrees of consciousness is also pressed in his most recent work by James Ward.[8]

[1] P. 172. [2] P. 224 ff. [3] P. 255.
[4] P. 253. [5] *Ib.* note 2.
[6] J. Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*[2], London, 1885, p. 74.
[7] *Ib.* revised ed., London, 1895, p. 78.
[8] *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge, 1918, p. 90 ff.

Since there is, above the threshold of consciousness, a gradual rise in the intensity of impressions, as attention is directed to them, we can hardly suppose that before this point 'their intensity changed instantly from zero to a finite quantity.' Rather 'there was an ultra-liminal or sub-liminal phase where too it only changed continuously. The latter alternative constitutes the hypothesis of subconsciousness.'[1] He adds that the hypothesis of subconsciousness is in the main nothing but 'the application to the facts of presentation of the law of continuity. Its introduction into psychology was in fact due to Leibniz, who first formulated that law.'[2]

But ideas as well as impressions rise and fall in consciousness; those ideas which are not for the moment in the mind, or not fully presented, cannot be said to be wholly outside of the mind, or non-existent; they are not mere possibilities; there is always a tendency towards their realization—*i.e.* a psychical disposition, which other dispositions, or actualities of thought, may hinder or may assist. To the range of this second form of sub-consciousness, that of mental dispositions or tendencies, there are no assignable limits.[3]

A third meaning of subconsciousness is the split-off consciousness, which may be illustrated by H. Bergson. Conscious states, as he has pointed out, have two quite distinct aspects, and much of the difficulty of such questions as that of subconsciousness arises from the confusion between them.

'Our perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur under two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible.'[4] 'Sensations . . . seem to me to be *objects* as soon as I isolate and name them, and in the human soul there are only *processes*.'[5] 'States of consciousness [*i.e.* processes], even when successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be reflected.'[6] 'It is only an inaccurate psychology, misled by language, which will show us the soul determined by sympathy, aversion, or hate as though by so many forces pressing upon it. These feelings, provided they go deep enough, each make up the whole soul, since the whole content of the soul is reflected in each of them.'[7]

But not every impression is incorporated into this mass of conscious states; the suggestions of hypnotism, the impulses of hereditary vice, the unfinished notions of a false education, tend to form secondary, parasitic selves, which continually encroach upon the main self, and restrict its freedom.[8] This is a different interpretation of subconsciousness; the secondary selves are sub-conscious to the main self, which may, however, at any time assert its strength.

'At the very minute when the act [suggested by the parasitic self] is going to be performed, *something* may revolt against it. It is the deep-seated self rushing to the surface. It is the outer crust bursting, suddenly giving way to an irresistible thrust.'[9]

So for Bergson the continuity of the past is guaranteed for the present self. Subconsciousness may refer either to the healthy and normal way in which the essential and valuable is picked out from the wealth of possible impressions and ideas which constitute the self; or again it may refer to the abnormal and unhealthy functioning, against the self, or at least independently of the self, on the part of groups and masses of the ideas of the past; or finally it may refer to the supernormal way in which thoughts, inspirations of genius, moral ideals, are elaborated in the subconscious workshop, throwing up into consciousness only their finished products. It is in the last two senses that the word is most frequently used in modern pathology and occultism. See art. UNCONSCIOUSNESS.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned in the footnotes, see Alois Höfler, *Psychologie*, Vienna, 1897, p. 270 ff.; J.

[1] P. 91. [2] P. 98. [3] P. 98.
[4] *Time and Free Will*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 129.
[5] P. 131. [6] P. 98. [7] P. 165.
[8] P. 168.
[9] P. 169; so in *Matter and Memory*, tr. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, London, 1911, p. 188, he describes our character as 'the actual synthesis of all our past states'; we use the whole of our lived experience; true we possess only a summary or digest of it, but at any moment it is the useful which consciousness picks out, rejecting the superfluous in this great mass of material which is potentially open to it.

Jastrow, *The Subconscious*, London, 1906; C. G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, tr. Beatrice M. Hinkle, do. 1917, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*[2], ed. Constance E. Long, do. 1917, esp. chs. xiv. and xv.; C. Lloyd Morgan, *An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, do. 1894, chs. i. and ii.; F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, 2 vols., do. 1903; E. B. Titchener, *Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, New York, 1908; A. M. Bodkin, 'The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process,' *Mind*, new ser., xvi. [1907]; 'Symposium on the Subconscious,' ed. Morton Prince, *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, ii., New York, 1907; Guido Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, tr. H. Manacorda, London, 1903, ch. vii., 'Consciousness.'

J. Lewis McIntyre.

SUBJECTIVISM and SUBJECTIVITY.—These are terms generally used to denote that type of philosophical and theological thought which makes the thinking and feeling subject the chief factor in experience. Though the terms are often regarded as interchangeable, they should be, and generally are, distinguished, subjectivism being confined to the various forms of philosophical theory, and subjectivity to the theological. For our present purpose it will be convenient to maintain this distinction.

Subjectivism may therefore be further defined as (1) that form of pure subjective idealism which would limit the mind to the consciousness of its own states and deny the possibility of objective knowledge of things in themselves; (2) that philosophical theory which lays chief stress on the function of the subjective factor in constituting experience, and asserts the subjective origin of forms of perception; (3) that type of ethical theory which finds in feeling, and especially in the feeling of happiness, the chief aim of morality.

1. Philosophical.—On the philosophical side subjectivism, or mentalism, as it is called by some modern writers, has a long and interesting history. It has been a powerful factor in every form of idealism. Idealistic systems indeed may be said to have varied mainly in the extent to which they have allowed prominence to the subjective element in knowledge. In modern philosophy Descartes's 'Cogito ergo sum' is the starting-point, but it is not until Berkeley that we find subjectivism carried to its logical conclusion. His position is that all knowledge is relative to the subject or perceiving mind, and therefore that the world of objects is no more than an inference from those subjective experiences which are the only immediate sources of knowledge. Though Berkeley's theory is crudely stated and one-sided, it marked a real advance in speculation and made the old forms of dogmatic dualism impossible. Its author was certainly not consistent, and, when he found that his formula '*esse=percipi*' did not cover the facts, he assumed the existence of a divine mind, or a number of minds like our own, to be the vehicles of ideas. Another type of subjective idealism is found in J. G. Fichte, whose epistemological point of departure is described as an absolute Ego—not to be identified with any individual subject—which sets up a non-Ego over against it. This so-called solipsism (*q.v.*), however, Fichte does not logically carry through, for he is compelled to find certain realities in the world of the non-Ego in order to give to the moral will some reasonable end or aim. A further development of subjectivism is seen in Leibniz's doctrine of self-determining monads, by which he sought to combat the prevalent materialism which would make thoughts the objects of sense-experience. Leibniz asserted the priority of spirit and maintained the rights of the thinking subject as over against the substance of Spinoza or the atoms of the empiricists. At the same time he admitted the necessity to thought of certain sense-given material. It was left to Kant to find a way out of these paradoxes and contradictions by a more searching critical process. He laid the foundation of all future idealism by carrying out a 'Copernican revolution' in the relations between mind and the universe, or subject and object.

'Suppose we try now,' he says, 'whether better success may not attend us in the problems of metaphysics if we assume objects to be under a necessity of adapting themselves to the nature of our cognition.'[1]

On this basis Kant proceeds to establish the place of the mind and its synthetic activity in the forming of experience, with a success which is now universally acknowledged. He argued that 'perception without conception is blind, conception without perception is empty.' At the same time he vindicated the place of the object in such a way as to show that the categories of the understanding are not valid for objects apart from experience. While it is true that 'understanding makes nature,' it makes it out of given material, viz. the phenomena or data of sensibility. His vindication of the subjective factor in knowledge underlies all the various forms of modern idealism, though they differ widely in the importance which they assign to it. While the priority of mind in the epistemological process is now generally conceded, the balance between subjective and objective must be maintained. It is recognized that they go together and that they represent an antithesis which is of quite gradual growth. Psychology points to a close parallelism in the origin and growth of the consciousness of the internal and external worlds, of the Ego and the non-Ego. Neither can exist without the other, and to exalt the one over the other is to give a one-sided presentation of the facts.

2. Ethical.—In ethics subjectivism is that form of moral philosophy which finds the end of moral action in a subjective state or feeling. This feeling is generally described as one of happiness, and conduct which tends to arouse and foster it is regarded as good, while conduct which defeats it or produces the opposite—pain—is bad. In the history of ethics subjectivism appears either as hedonism or as eudæmonism (*qq.v.*). As the former it lays chief stress on feelings of sensual gratification as the end to be sought, while the latter interprets feeling in the more intellectual, or even spiritual, sense as contentment or happiness resulting in well-being. In the former, too, the happiness of the individual is the chief end in view, but in eudæmonism it is generally the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is sought. Pure hedonism is practically confined to the Cyrenaics of the ancient world. They argued that the good of man consists in the sentient pleasure of the moment, and therefore to seek as much enjoyment as possible is the best and wisest course. Aristippus, *e.g.*, held the extreme subjectivist position that we know nothing of things save the impression they make on our senses. From this it was an easy inference that pleasure, or the 'smooth motion' of sense, is the only cognizable good, and that the part of wisdom is calmly and resolutely to pursue it.

Epicurus accepts this position in so far as he recognizes that pleasure is the chief good of man and pain the chief evil, but he is very far from confining pleasure to the gratification of the bodily senses. He regards the pleasures of the mind as more important, and more worth striving after, than those of the body, as they involve memory and anticipation as well as immediate enjoyment. The happiness at which he aims is thus a finer and more lasting thing than mere vulgar sensualism, though it is still dependent on sensation. It is this wider interpretation of happiness that underlies all the later forms of eudæmonistic ethics. Shaftesbury, *e.g.*, regards inner satisfaction as the end of morals; Lotze

[1] Preface to *Critique of Pure Reason*[2].

claims feeling as the only real and final standard of value; while the utilitarians find the goal of all moral action in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There is no question that happiness, especially in the wider and deeper sense now generally given to it, is a legitimate end of human action. But, when it is claimed that it is the only end, the claim must be resisted. There are many ends which are entirely legitimate objects of pursuit, altogether independently of the feelings which they may excite. No system of ethics will satisfy which fails to take these into account.

3. Theological.—On the theological side of our inquiry subjectivity may be defined as that theory which finds the organ and criterion of religious truth in the intimations of the religious consciousness rather than in history or revelation. All mystical theology, *e.g.*, tends to exaggerate the subjective element, in so far as it rests on a direct, secret, and incommunicable knowledge of God, as opposed to that which is mediated through creatures or through revelation. Mystical experience, however, has this peculiarity, viz. that it implies a type of consciousness the end of which is to fuse subject and object into an undifferentiated one, or to absorb the individual in the whole. It involves union of the soul with God, though God is known only in and to the religious consciousness. It was Schleiermacher among theologians who first formulated this principle and so emphasized the function of the religious consciousness as to vindicate the independent reality of religion apart from knowledge and morality. He did so by insisting that religion belongs, not to the region of reason, conscience, or will, but to that of feeling—the feeling of absolute dependence. It is through this feeling, or consciousness, that God makes Himself known to man. The appeal, therefore, in the first instance, is not to history or Scripture, but to Christian experience. 'True religion is sense (*Sinn*) and taste for the Infinite.' Schleiermacher was by no means consistent in his subjective interpretation of religion, for he always regarded it as a historical phenomenon and held that it could not be rightly understood apart from history. He laid special stress on the importance of the historical person of Jesus Christ for Christianity and finds in the redemption wrought by Him the essence of His religion.

At the same time, as Höffding says, 'He never abandoned the conviction that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this, and this alone, can bring men into immediate relation to the Highest.'[1]

Schleiermacher's doctrine has had immense influence on all subsequent theology, especially in the importance that it assigned to religious experience. Ritschl is at one with him on this point, and finds the materials for Christian theology in the consciousness of redemption, though with him it is the consciousness of the community rather than of the individual that is concerned. But he differs from Schleiermacher in arguing that the whole basis of the Christian system is the definite historical revelation in the Person of Jesus Christ. At the same time he still further emphasizes the subjective element in theology in contending that religious beliefs are invariably judgments of value. By this he means that they are to be estimated by their worth or value for the percipient self, according to the pleasure or pain which they arouse. He says:

'Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed to him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end.'[2]

[1] Quoted in W. B. Selbie, *Schleiermacher: a Critical and Historical Study*, London, 1913, p. 136.
[2] *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1900, p. 205.

Largely under the influence of Ritschl and his followers there has arisen a marked tendency in modern theology to lay stress on the experimental process. To some extent this has been a reaction against the excessive objectivism of the older orthodoxy, which interpreted Christianity purely in terms of a supernatural revelation. Human nature was regarded as essentially alien to the divine, and needing some powerful influence or impression from without in order to arouse its latent spiritual capacities. In contrast to this, emphasis is now laid rather on the fact that religion is natural to man and is to be found in the development of his religious consciousness. Great importance is therefore attached to the study of this development both in the individual and in the race. This has given quite a new place to the psychology of religion, particularly in the adolescent stages of human development. There is no doubt as to the weight to be assigned to this subjective process, but the reaction in its favour goes too far when it is suggested that we can find here a complete explanation of religious phenomena. Experience can be truly gauged only when it is possible to give an answer to the question, Experience of what, or of whom? 'The immediate deliverances of the Christian consciousness' are really meaningless apart from the historic facts on which they rest and which have called them forth. Nor is man's proved capacity for religion a sufficient basis on which to build, apart from the action of objective forces without, which serve to elicit it and regulate the course of its action. In other words, God must be taken into account and something like revelation allowed for before the full story can be told. It is no doubt a great gain to have escaped from the old rigid supernaturalism, which seemed to impose religion on man as something from without, and essentially alien to his being; but it is an equally false view of the situation to regard religion as a mere emanation of man's consciousness without any objective reality to which it can correspond. The right solution of the problem is to be found in giving the proper emphasis to both the subjective and the objective elements, and not enhancing the one at the expense of the other.

LITERATURE.—i. *PHILOSOPHICAL.*—Histories of Philosophy, such as J. E. Erdmann, 2 vols., Berlin, [4]1895–96, Eng. tr., 3 vols., London and New York, 1890; W. Windelband, Freiburg, 1890–92, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1893; Berkeley, *Works*[2], ed. A. Campbell Fraser, 4 vols., Oxford, 1901; John Watson, *Kant and his English Critics*, Glasgow, 1881; W. Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Logic*[2], Oxford, 1894.

ii. *ETHICAL.*—E. Pfleiderer, *Eudämonismus und Egoismus*, Leipzig, 1880; J. Watson, *Hedonistic Theories, from Aristippus to Spencer*, Glasgow, 1895; H. Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics*[3], London, 1892.

iii. *THEOLOGICAL.*—E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion* (Gifford Lectures), 2 vols., London, 1894; L. F. Stearns, *The Evidence of Christian Experience*, New York and London, 1890; D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*[3], Edinburgh, 1901; J. W. Oman, *Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion*, London, 1893.

W. B. SELBIE.

SUBLAPSARIANISM.—Sublapsarianism is the name given to that milder form of Calvinistic predestinarian doctrine (called also infralapsarianism) in which the act of God, in decreeing to save some (election) and pass by others, is presumed to have in view mankind as already fallen, and sunk in corruption, in contrast with the supralapsarian form of the same doctrine, in which mankind are supposed to be regarded simply as creatures, not having done either good or evil. The distinction is not made by Calvin, but appears in the theologians who immediately succeeded him. By help of it the grace of God is thought to be enhanced to those that are saved, and His justice vindicated in the passing over of others, since, the whole race being already a *massa*

damnata, not any have a claim on His mercy. It is the sublapsarian view that has commonly commended itself to Calvinists, and appears in their symbols. The canons of the Synod of Dort, *e.g.*, are sublapsarian.

See, more fully, artt. CALVINISM, SUPRALAPSARIANISM, where also consult literature.

JAMES ORR.

SUBORDINATION. — Subordination (*subordinatio*, ὑποταγὴ τάξεως) is a technical term used in Christian theology to describe a relationship existing between the Son and the Father, and more rarely a relationship of the Spirit to the Father and the Son.

The doctrine of subordination was, as Dorner affirms, 'an auxiliary doctrine,'[1] and assumed various forms before a satisfactory theological formulation of it was achieved by the Nicene theologians. The Nicene doctrine is thus defined by R. L. Ottley:

'The Father (ὁ θεός, αὐτόθεος) is the fountain-head or root of Deity (πηγή or ῥίζα τῆς θεότητος). The Son and the Spirit, though co-eternal and co-equal, are subordinate in rank, because the Divine essence in them is derived from the Father. So in the language of Nicene theologians, the Father alone is ἀγέννητος, the Son is γεννητός: the Father αἴτιος, the Son αἰτιατός; the Father is ὁ θεός: the Son is of Divine essence (θεός). . . . As the original source of the Son's Deity, the Father may be termed "greater" than the Son. . . . The subordination is a τάξις not of time, but involved in the relationship of cause and effect. Such subordination is entirely compatible with equality of essence and majesty. So far the Nicene theology recognises the subordinationist views which had prevailed and had been carried to excess in third century writers.'[2]

Episcopius (the 17th cent. Arminian theologian) has briefly summarized it thus:

'Generatio divina est fundamentum subordinationis inter P. et F. Plus est esse a nullo quam esse ab alio, generare quam generari.'[3]

Although the dogmatic theologians have been inclined to base their doctrine on metaphysical grounds and to find it in the notion of generation or derivation, its basis is primarily Scriptural. Apart from the numerous passages in the Synoptic Gospels which set forth the Son as obedient to the Father in His incarnate life and as living on earth only to accomplish His Father's will, there are many other passages which set forth this filial subordination as being a feature of the eternal (not merely of the temporal and mundane) relations of the Son to the Father. NT writers who are in no sense Adoptianist,[4] but hold the Logos Christology and believe in an eternal and pre-existent Christ, are explicit teachers of this subordination. Thus the author of the Fourth Gospel cites Jesus as saying, 'I and the Father are one' (10^{30}; cf. 1^{1} 17^{5}) and also 'The Father is greater than I' (14^{28}). St. Paul, although in Ph 2^{6} he writes of the Son that He was originally 'in the form of God'[5] and is 'before all things' (Col 1^{17}), yet affirms that at the conclusion of His redemptive mission 'shall the Son also himself be subjected unto him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all' (1 Co 15^{28}). The writer of the Hebrews, while affirming, on the one hand, that the Son is the effulgence (ἀπαύγασμα) of His Father's glory and the very image of His substance (χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως) (1^{3}), yet asserts, on the other hand, that he, 'though he was a Son, yet learned obedience by the things which he suffered' (5^{8}; cf. $2^{10ff.}$). Thus, although the text of Scripture plainly taught the subordination, subjection, or obedience of the Son to the Father, yet it was a belief never held strongly without some danger to Christian orthodoxy, as is evident from a study of the Fathers of the 2nd and 3rd centuries. This was due to the tendency to interpret the obedience of the Son as denoting some inferiority in the divine nature of the Son. This was a note of Arian teaching, and it was able to claim not a few of the orthodox writers of the 3rd cent. as giving some support to its contention—*e.g.*, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen. This Arian emphasis on subordination produced a natural reaction in orthodox circles, especially in the West, the Western orthodox tendency being to interpret the Son's subordination as having reference only to His manhood. Hence the *Quicunque Vult* affirms that the Son is 'equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, but inferior to the Father as touching His manhood,'[1] and that 'in this Trinity there is nothing before or after, nothing greater or less, but the whole three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal.'[2] Herein it goes farther than the great Nicene theologians of the East would have ventured to go, and is perilously near eliminating the Nicene doctrine of subordination altogether. That this is not a misinterpretation of the Western orthodox tendency as exhibited in the *Quicunque* is proved by the rise of the doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit a little later in the same theological circles.

The history of the doctrine indicates that there is danger in regarding subordination as possessing a metaphysical significance. The metaphysical inferiority of the Son may not properly be deduced from it. Orthodoxy affirms that the substance, essence, and nature of Father and Son are identical (ὁμοούσιος). The subordination of the Son ought not to be regarded metaphysically. It is entirely moral. Although identical in substance and equal in nature, the will of the Son is subject to the will of the Father, and this subjection is a voluntary subjection.

In the world of mundane standards obedience and subordination may seem to denote inferiority; in the realm of divine ideas there is no necessary connexion between the two. The Son is obedient to the Father for no such metaphysical reason as that the Father is the πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, or *fons et principium divinitatis*, and generates the Son eternally (*i.e.* above and outside time). The Son is obedient because of the moral perfection of the Father. The will of the Father is that which the Son, with every moral and rational being, is morally bound to obey, not because the Father is ingenerate, but because His will is supremely good. Subordination in the form of voluntary and rational obedience, so far from being a mark of inferiority of nature, is the mark of identity with the divine nature. Christ exhibited this identity by the perfection of His obedience. In the case of men who are potentially sons of God, subordination becomes increasingly the dominant note of their nature as they grow into the divine likeness. The notion that subordination denotes inferiority of nature is essentially unchristian and subversive of the whole ideal of Christian ethics. 'He that is greatest among you let him be your servant.' On the other hand, the denial of subordination can be maintained only in the face of all the significant NT utterances on this point, and such denial tends to break up the μοναρχία by making it merely a metaphysical and not a moral unity.

The μοναρχία (or unity of the divine nature in the three Persons of the Trinity) is preserved on its metaphysical side by the doctrine of the identity of substance (ὁμοούσιος) of the three divine Persons, but on its moral side it is preserved by the doctrine of the subordination of the will of the Son to the

[1] *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, div. I., vol. ii., p. 110.
[2] *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*[2], London, 1902, p. 579 f.
[3] Cited by Dorner, div. ii., vol. iii., p. 349, n. 3.
[4] See art. ADOPTIANISM.
[5] See Lightfoot, *ad loc.*

[1] 'Aequalis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patri secundum humanitatem'; cf. the Orleans, Stavelot, Troyes, and Fortunatus commentaries in A. E. Burn, *The Athanasian Creed and its Early Commentaries* (*TS* iv. 1), Cambridge, 1896, pp. 7–40
[2] 'Nihil prius aut posterius, nihil maius aut minus.'

will of the Father, and the will of the Spirit to that of the Father and the Son.

Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, when combined with the doctrine of the Son's moral subordination to the Father, seems to provide that way of regarding the hypostasis of the Son and His relation to the Father which satisfies both the Christian intellect and the Christian conscience.

It would save confusion if the term 'subordination' were always limited in Christian dogmatics to the Nicene doctrine, and 'subordinationism' used of its heretical travesty or exaggeration.

LITERATURE.—K. R. Hagenbach, *A Hist. of Christian Doctrines*[3], Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880–81, i. 178–183, gives a number of pertinent Patristic quotations and also references to modern theologians. For further references see A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*[3], Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, iii. 134 f., iv. 21, 23, 65 f., 72, 75, 87, 124, 129; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Introd. to the Early Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, do. 1903, pp. 148 f., 151, 161, 163, 177, 180; I. A. Dorner, *Hist. of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, A. i. 274, ii. 17 ff., 77 ff., 80, 87, 117, 144, 175 f., 194, 228, B. ii. 160 ff., 349 f., 357, iii. 21. H. D. A. MAJOR.

SUBSTANCE.—There have been many attempts in modern philosophy to interpret experience intelligibly without the aid of the category of substance, but, even when it has been denied in words, it has not been possible to deny it in thought. Those who rid themselves of it in particular forms or meanings to which exception could be taken are mistaken in supposing that they have thereby got away from the category itself. For the notion of substance as 'a sort of Kantian *Ding-an-sich*' is one from which we simply cannot get away. It will suffice at present to recall the position of Leibniz, that a correct view of substance is the key to philosophy, and the view of Kant that substance is the supreme and first principle of nature, which alone secures unity of experience.

1. **Definition and rise.**—The presupposition of the real is being. The principle of being gives rise to the distinction of substance and attribute. The attribute exists only in and through the substance in which it inheres. The notion of substance arises in experience as that of something which has being, or exists in itself (*οὐσία, ens in se subsistens*). It is viewed as distinct from phenomenon. But there is the further notion of substance as a support or subject (*ὑποκείμενον, substantia*) of accidents, as the old logicians called them. Ontologically, the former is clearly that which has the greater fundamental importance. Existing in itself is an absolute perfection of substance; supporting accidents or temporary modes is but a relative perfection.

Greek philosophy 'is dominated from beginning to end by the problem of reality (*τὸ ὄν*).'[1] True reality or being is accordingly our theme, as the notion of such substance has been developed from Aristotle onwards. An ever-identical substance, immutable and homogeneous throughout, was sought, no doubt, by the Eleatics, but such an inactive, changeless substance, though supposed to be psychically animated, could not give an absolute substance. For its general ground of pure being was such as to negate the very essentials of substance, which must be a unitary substrate of manifold modes or accidents. What the view, therefore, gained in logical consistency it lacked in philosophical value, and the Eleatics were driven to the denial of the phenomenal world.

The interest largely centres in the discussions of the Scholastic philosophers, and these were based on Aristotle. We have seen that substance is *per se*, accident is *in altero*. The relation of the accidents proved very troublesome to the Scholastics. Of these we shall now mention only two, in addition to Aquinas: Gilbert de la Porrée and Albertus Magnus. The position of Aquinas (*q.v.*) amounted to this, that a substance is a thing whose nature is not to exist in another, while an accident is a thing whose nature is to exist in another. But the notion of substance, taken as inclusive of existing in itself and also of supporting accidents, is very abstract and generic in character, and must not be simply transferred or applied to the real order of things. Indeed, the being denoted by substance is essential, and not merely existential, being. For all that, it was in respect of finite or created being that the substance category was applied by the Scholastic philosophers. Substance, or being, may be thought of as a regulative notion in the mind, whose content, as objectively affirmed, is determined only in the course of speculation. This is not to say that the corporeal world, and our experience of it, have not to do with the way in which we gain our hold on the concept of substance; nor is it to suggest in any way that substance is not a category of the real. The world of positive phenomena is the foundation of the world of metaphysics, but the force postulated by metaphysics is not to be identified, for all that, with physical forces. Metaphysics deals with being in itself—not in its empirical suchness. It is only in and through form that substance is intelligible; and form disappears with substance. Substance is, in fact, the persistent value which we find subsisting throughout all the transformations of phenomena, and it is often regarded as the most important of the categories. But where, or how, is this substance to be found? A substantial entity which shall meet the case is what philosophy has sought from its earliest beginnings up to the present—in vain. No existent has been found in nature, or within the whole range of human knowledge, that could really remain identical with itself while undergoing changes and transformations. It thus becomes evident how the substance concept took its rise. It was abstracted from cause, was in origin psychological, and is in character anthropomorphic. The law of causality could not suffice; some basis in eternal fact still remained necessary; but no act of perception could give such necessary or eternal fact as was required. It could only be embodied in some entity that deserved to be called a substance; it could only be witnessed to by reason itself. Philosophers who believed in a single substance called it God; those who preferred a plurality of substances still made God the supreme substance, and treated other existences as substantial only in a secondary or derivative sense. Thus it was that the doctrine of substance came to be the keystone of Continental rationalism, and we shall presently glance at the way in which the doctrine worked.

Thought was further driven to find the source of the substance concept at last in the notion of the self-identical Ego or subject, whose varying states are but attributes of this self-identical Ego. In the unity of this self or subject, amid its changing states, has been found the substance so long sought for by philosophy, unique and incomparable as it is among the substances of the world. Aristotle had already placed the primal ground in pure self-activity, *actus purus*, although this in itself could be no final resting-place for thought. His doctrine of substance as a self-active principle is fundamental in our cognitive experience. It is an intellectual intuition. It springs up in experience every time my self-activity is inhibited by anything whatsoever. It is but the inevitable making real of that which I must so interpret in terms of my real self. Substance is thus an ultimate in experience, beyond or behind which we cannot go.

Descartes viewed substance as existing *per se*, but his inveterate dualism led to two disparate

[1] J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., London, 1914, p. 11.

hypothetical substances, each of which he wrongly conceived as essentially inert. His 'thinking substance' (*res cogitans*) was being whose essence is thought; in thinking, the spirit passively received ideas; its manifestations were accidents of a non-extended substance, which was the matrix of intensive or psychical modes. Then his 'extended substance' (*res extensa*) was matter extended in three dimensions and conceived as inert; it was the substratum of physical modes; and its manifestations were accidents of an unconscious space-filling substance. It was evidently hopeless for Descartes and his followers rationally to account for the connexion or intercommunication that appeared to subsist between those two disparate substances. They overlooked that such material extension, and the modes of motion found therein, are, in our actual awareness, psychical manifestations—part of conscious content, as Berkeley was not slow to perceive. Berkeley himself, however, gave no satisfactory account—no self-consistent one—of his two substances, the finite and the infinite Spirit. The other substance of Descartes, the psychical form, was attacked by Hume, who argued that our conscious awareness is only of psychical states or particulars, and these of purely experiential origin; from all which it is clear that we cannot conclude to a permanent psychical or thinking substance. But Hume's view overlooked that our conscious states are transient, and lacking in power, agency, and enduring consistency. Such a thoroughgoing phenomenalism as that of Hume is really out of the question, and would render an intelligible theory of things impossible. The fact is that, whatever he may have done with the notion of an unknowable substratum—and substance in this sense he roundly denied—Hume did not do away with substance in the sense of something which exists in itself. He says:

'We may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but 'tis vain to ask, *Whether there be body or not?* That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.'[1]

Not only so, but he goes on in the same work to assume the extraordinary position of substantializing the accidents.

As for Locke, he no more denied substances than did Descartes, but he held that all our ideas of substances come short of exact correspondence to their objects. Substance meant for him only a supposed, but unknown, support for accidents, for a proper definition of substance he never reached. Substances were for him supposed to carry with them the supposition of some real being, and substances and modes alike were constructs (see below).

At this point some notice must be taken of Spinoza's position. Spinoza tried to prove that the two substances of Descartes, the thinking and the extended, were but attributes of one and the same substance—a substantial One-and-All.

All things and individuals he merged in this universal substance. Descartes had defined substance in an ambiguous manner, though he doubtless meant it in the Scholastic sense of that which exists *of* itself. His definition is: 'By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.'[2] This meant necessary being, or what the Scholastics called *ens a se*. To him God alone was substance, all was in God, and moved by Him. In Spinoza attributes are those necessary attributes which express essence. Of course the Spinozan transition from the two passive and opposed substances of Descartes to one absolute, timeless, ever-identical substance was intelligible enough. But his consistency was doubtful enough when he postulated for it a power of self-determination whereby it became (logically or not) differentiated into attributes and modes, with whatever result to its ever-identical perfection. Says Spinoza, in a formula of not very explicable character, after all the discussion expended upon it: 'By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.'[3]

[1] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, London, 1739, bk. i. pt. iv. sect. ii.
[2] *Ethics*, bk. i. def. iii. [3] *Ib.* bk. i. def. iv.

Spinoza might, no doubt, get substance, as one and indivisible and containing an endless multiplicity, in this way, but there was a great deal to be said against his turning the term 'substance' aside from the meaning that it had borne. Spinoza also misused the category of causation, wherein cause is an essentially relative and temporal term, to style his absolute substance 'self-caused' (*causa sui*). In this way is set up his absolute substance or God-Nature (*Deus sive Natura*), but in a manner obviously open to criticism. Then, having so gained his absolute substance, he treats it, in his artificial system, as the *ratio* or logical ground of all reality.

Leibniz made substance not one, but many. He took self-acting force or power to be substance, made substance indestructible and immaterial, and broke up the one thinking substance into a multiplicity of individuated thinking atoms. These simple and unextended substances were his windowless monads, impenetrable and indestructible. They constituted essentially active entities. Activity was his basal note. But he left his self-acting force unexplained; and his monads, with no real interaction between them, were not satisfactorily accounted for either. Logical contradiction there may not be, but his supposed harmony without real interaction breaks down in the actual universe. From Leibniz, however, the individualistic character of substance—its essential character, in the concrete sense, as individuality—may be said really to date. Of course, Aristotle had regarded as the pure form not substance, applied to actual things, but individual substance—the concrete individual. But Leibniz took the conception away from its Cartesian domination by the idea of space. To him each monad is a microcosm—a mirror of the universe. Rational monads are, in the hierarchy of substances, God's agents, while sub-rational monads are His instruments. Activity, as an ideal-spiritual function, was, for him, of the essence of substantial being. But there are inherent difficulties in his theory of the relation of individual substances to the Supreme Monad, which he has left unresolved. By his dynamical conceptions, however, he had prepared the way for Kant.

2. Kantian and post-Kantian developments.—The substance notion began in Kant to shape itself in the form of a subject-activity; that is to say, imperfectly or unconsciously the substance notion was passing away from the idea of mere dead substrate into the conception of a living subject. Substance was, for Kant, that which may be conceived as subject, without itself being predicate of anything else. He had got so far beyond the substance concept as to make it a category. Kant laid an epistemological basis for the substance doctrine, which cannot be discussed here; he showed how metaphysically unfruitful was the tendency to treat thing and property in independence; he tried—and it was a new thing—to make substance one of the constitutive elements of experience. Even if he carried his work only half through, he merits gratitude for doing as much for experience as he did.

In opposing Berkeley's identification of being and the perceptions of being, Kant treated substance as merely the permanence (*Beharrlichkeit*) of the thing in the form of time. The protensive character of substance was thus emphasized. Kant viewed this persistent or permanent background as a necessary demand of thought, whereby change or alteration could be understood. Upon this permanent the notion of change rests, and the paradoxical position of Kant accordingly was that only the permanent is subject to change. But it is doubtful whether our conception of substance and quality is so much a matter of pure thought as Kant supposed, for substance is objectively real in all being as perceived and known by reason. The element of permanence, however important for philosophy, must not be regarded, in the case of specific substances, as being so much of the essence of substance as it has been by Kant, Green, and others. Substance as subject, and sub-

stance as the permanent—Kant but ill connects these two. The primary and essential idea or notion of substance is that of subsistence—that which has a proper being of its own. It was essentially by the help of the substance category that Kant thought his thing-in-itself. It is not in accord with Kant's teaching that a recent philosopher[1] has treated substance and the unconditioned as identical, in Spinozan style. Kant held that substance belongs to the category of relation, although it has been ably argued that he ought to have held more firmly to pure substance (not being put together out of parts) as pure intuition (*Anschauung*, not *Begriff*), and ought not to have made it belong to his doctrine of the categories. The substance conception, it is urged, first makes experience possible, and cannot be got from experience, which at most yields its *Vorstellung*. Against these positions it may be remarked that substance is being, and that a *Begriff* of substance is therefore possible, even if we call it an abstraction, and challenge its place in the Kantian categories.

Hegel held substance to be the absolute form-category. Metaphysics had, for him, no higher category than that of actuality: the actual is the system of phenomena; this actual is a concrete universal; it is a self-subsistent unity, like the substance of rationalistic philosophers. But the march of Hegel's thought is from substance to subject, a thought-unity which breaks itself up into its own particulars. Thought, his self-actualizing universal, became constituted through its own immanent dialectic, but with a one-sided neglect of *Erfahrung*. When it came to the absolute spirit, however, Hegel had the merit to make it a person (*einer*), not a substance (*eines*). In the infinite positiveness of the substantial this living substance, which is the eternal, is immanent and present, in his view, within the appearances of the temporal and transitory.

Schopenhauer rested the fact of change upon substance as its unchangeable substratum. To him the law of causality held only for phenomena, not for substances themselves. The world is my presentation, he says, and the ground or reason is Will. Universal, all-pervading Will is the true ground or reason of all phenomena; this, as blind and unconscious, is obviously not without affinities to the one universal substance of Spinoza.

Lotze makes substance matter of experience, and emphasizes the aspect of the self as subject in our knowledge of substance—a term which is rather ill-defined in his treatment. He has a good deal to say of an infinite substance, which encloses all things, and in which every event has its ground. His monism is resolute, but not thought out to the end. His infinite substance is conceived as in constant change: he conceives it as world-idea or animating soul of world-culture. His attempt to set out the spirituality of the infinite substance left it in too indeterminate a form. His basal insistence, however, was that the world is a unity, with one soul Being conditioning and enclosing all other being. His conception is too abstract, the inner essence of the unity not being defined. It does not seem that those who have ascribed a substantialized concept of the soul to Lotze are really right, for the substance was to him a *Schein*, and the soul was no thing.

Hartmann took substance, in the metaphysical sphere, to be pure subject of activity, and the metaphysical subject of such activity was to him, before all things, a substantial unity. The necessity for a permanent, unchangeable, non-spatial, supra-temporal substance Hartmann founds upon the fact of change. Substance for him subsists in itself and for itself, and is therefore of itself and through itself. It seems, indeed, on his full account, to be the last miracle of all. A concrete, substantial monism is what he postulates, and the modes are the changing accidents of the one concrete substance. His stress on the dynamic theory of matter led him to emphasize intensity instead of extension, as Spinoza had done. But it was on very inadequate grounds that he sought to raise the Unconscious to the position of the Absolute, or a thoroughgoing world principle. Renouvier, in the final phase of his thought, used the term 'substance' for the monad. But this spiritual substance is for him only a sign or symbol to mark the co-ordination of phenomena co-existent and successive—the continuity of memory and revolvings in time having their place. There is obviously nothing of the old term 'substance' here except the name; no absolute unity excluding every multiplicity of distinct facts, nothing but just the soul as the theory of actuality thinks of it. To the critical realism of Wundt substance is the concept which springs from the attribute of permanence. The underlying substratum of things is being, unchanging and absolute. But the concept has no great metaphysical justice from Wundt; he does not allow it to be an original concept, but takes it as ground of experience, and of purely logical import. He fails to do justice to the part played by the activity of the object, and he objects to the substance concept being applied to inner experience. Wundt and Paulsen apply it only to the corporeal world, where the atoms are the absolutely permanent substratum of all corporeal reality.

3. Conclusion.—In our discussion it has been shown that extension and motion are, in our actual awareness, of purely psychical significance. This is an important result for substance, from the metaphysical point of view. Of course, the permanence of substance amid all changes is, nevertheless, taken by science as a postulate, for it is an axiom with which the scientific mind cannot dispense. Hence Haeckel finds the last unity in substance, but his substance is too much a play of pluralistic-mechanistic elements to be a real monism. The law of substance is for him, however, fundamental, and in the idea of substance he finds matter and energy inseparably bound together. But he unsatisfactorily confounds matter and energy with matter and spirit or mind. It is, however, clear that the notion of an ultimate material substance is as completely discarded by modern science as Berkeley could have wished. In metaphysics the substance category has survived every metaphysical attack in a way which proves the term to meet something ineradicably planted in our cognitive being or experience. The fact is here, so to speak, its own ground: mere 'groundedness' is absent; the character of *essentiality* makes the concept of substance. Substance, in its most generic concept, is to be taken as real, although substance has always, in metaphysics, been non-perceptible. We can, by metaphysical abstraction, reach a notion of substance that appears, in a sense, accordant with that which is fundamentally present in modern physics, as reducible to persistent forms of energy. But Ostwald substantializes energy, holds it for substance because existing in space and time, and claims his logically over-weighted energy concept to be the most universal in science. Hartmann allows energy to be a real, objective appearance, as much as matter. But Riehl urges against Ostwald that energy is an abstraction, and that the forms of energy are concrete, so far as known to sense, and bound to spatial things. He objects to energy as a single magnitude, because every form of energy is, in his view, a product of two magnitudes, both of them real—a factor of capacity and a factor of intensity. The metaphysical implications of his energy concept have not been worked out by Ostwald in any satisfactory way.[1] It must suffice to say that experi-

[1] A. Spir, *Denken und Wirklichkeit*[4] (=*Gesammelte Werke*, I.), Leipzig, 1908–09.

[1] See J. Lindsay, *Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics*, p. 24 f., and *A Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism*, pp 280–282, 341 f.

ence shows that, in analyzing any empirical substance, we are dealing with something that occurs in our consciousness, and has its factors there, so that our view of the world is modified by this metaphysical reflexion. One notion of substance is that it is due to the activity of an object given us in sense-perception—an activity independent and causal in its working. This self-asserting individuality of substance has been emphasized by realistic philosophers.

From the standpoint of the realist, 'the relation of mind and object is comparable to that between table and floor, and the cognitive relation—if you abstract, as you may, from the distinctive character of the mental term—is merely the simplest and most universal relation between finite things in the universe.' 'Hence such errors as that we impute substance or causality to things on the analogy of mind, instead of actually finding them there.'[1]

Substantiality is then an objective implication of our experience—in this connexion, our object-subject experience. Hence the claim of science to have established an objective synthesis of cosmical relations, whose existence does not depend simply on human perception. Nevertheless, substance must be sought, not only in the changing *continuum* of sense, but also in the self, which attests itself as substantial being behind all its activities. The transcendent substance which we seek must be found in the subject, whose consciousness of the object is so exhausted in knowledge of the object itself as not to know that it knows its object. But this knowing subject, this highest unity of transcendental apperception, is itself substance, and the support of all being, as we know it. In other words, what we are yields the fullest consciousness of substance that we have, in virtue of its self-identical Ego amid changing states or manifestations. That Ego or consciousness already carries within itself, in virtue of its own rational intuition, the whole idea of being, apprehended as substance and quality. Even Locke did not fail to incorporate the idea of the self in his views on substance, albeit in a scattered and unsystematic fashion, which deprived his philosophy of the full unity which it might have possessed.

Of course, the whole system of objects, whether persons or things, must be related substantially, or grounded in real being. Such is the basis of knowledge—the basis of science and philosophy, which are thereby made possible to us. This objectivism has need to be kept in view from the metaphysical side itself, with its deep demand for a problematic substance. For insistence is sometimes made on the permanence, singularity, and activity of substance, as attributes of substance due simply to man's projection of his own perduring, unified, and active self. In other words, the substance concept is accused of being really anthropomorphic. But an unconditioned knowledge is certainly impossible, and the world known by us may still be an honest world. Our knowledge is of the objective—the real; and knowledge is always of that which transcends what is given in mere sense-perception.[2] Knowledge of the objectively real can never be satisfactory so long as it is regarded merely as a multiplicity of parts, without being taken up into the unity of the subject. Knowledge of substance we have seen to be through its attributes or predicable qualities: there is for us no knowing substance without knowing quality; the substance so known is that which underlies or binds substance and attributes together. Our knowledge of substance is thus not of substance *per se*, as contrasted with its attributes. But, if we make substance merely a unity of the qualities, we get only a bare abstract unity, which cannot help us in any concrete fashion. Hence the real must be held, as Hegel insisted, to be the individual—the self-fulfilling subject in the manner already shown. It is scarcely necessary to refer to the peculiar use of the substance category by J. E. McTaggart, who makes minds or spirits find their metaphysical satisfaction in substance, not in self-consciousness. To him the self is substance existing in its own right, and spirits have their self-identity in their substance and its persistence. The theory is not one that is likely to appeal to many minds.

In view of all that has been advanced, the concept of substance is here taken to be that of an absolute form-concept—the absolute self-determining activity, in fact, and foundational in importance for metaphysics. We cannot get along metaphysically without this concept of substance, in some form or other, be it as matter, or energy, or soul. The substance category has yielded to that of spirit; the substance conception has been replaced by that of subject, for the substance concept has been shown to be no adequate or exhaustive one for our ultimate consciousness of what we are; and there is opened up the discovery of a real Absolute, whom, as externalized, we know as existential counterpart of the unity of experience. The way to a spiritualistic monism is thus reached, on which no more need now be said.

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ŚŪDRA.—Śūdras are the fourth, or servile, class in ancient Hindu society, as contrasted with Brāhmans, or priests, Kṣatriyas, or warriors, and Vaiśyas, the common folk.

1. Name.—The derivation of the term is uncertain. Native writers derive it from Skr. *cuch*, 'to be afflicted.' It has been supposed that it was originally the name of a tribe living near the Indus, and it has been compared with that of the town Σύδρος on the lower Indus and of the Σύδροι tribe in N.

[1] S. Alexander, *The Basis of Realism*, London, 1914, pp. 10, 29.

[2] See art. EPISTEMOLOGY.

Arakhosia.[1] They have also been identified with the Abhīras and Nishādhas, a black, long-haired race of aborigines, not originally a component part of the Aryan race, but brought under its influence by conquest; and it has been supposed that, the Śūdras being thus the first tribe reduced to servitude by the Aryans, on the further occupation of India by the Aryans the name was extended to all the servile classes. The name Dasyu or Mlechchha was then applied to the unsubdued foreign tribes, who did not speak Sanskrit and had not been influenced by Aryan culture.[2] Zimmer identifies them with the Brāhūī of Baluchistān. The latest view is that the term was probably applied by the Vedic Indians to the nations opposing them who ranked as slaves, and also to various classes of humble position who supplied the needs of the village communities, and it included Aryans who, on account of some offence against tribal discipline or for other reasons, were excluded from the Aryan community.[3] Fustel de Coulanges[4] compares the position of the Roman plebeians with that of the Śūdras, as the former had no *sacra* or ancestors, and did not belong to a family or gens.

2. Legendary accounts.—The uncertainty felt regarding the meaning of the name is reflected in the contradictory legends accounting for their origin.

In the hymn known as the *Puruṣa Sūktā*,[5] when the primal male, Puruṣa, was cut into pieces, 'the Brāhman was his mouth; the Rājanya was made his arms; that which was the Vaiśya was his thighs; the Śūdra sprang from his feet.' The same story is told in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, ii. 5. 37. The *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* states that Brahmā created the caste of the Śūdras 'as the nourisher. The earth is the nourisher.'[6] The *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* says: 'The Brāhman is a caste derived from the gods; the Śūdra is one derived from the Asuras,' or demons.[7] According to Manu, 'for the sake of the prosperity of the worlds, he [the Creator] caused the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra to proceed from his mouth, his arms, his thighs, and his feet.'[8] In a later passage, however, he says that 'elephants, horses, Śūdras, and despicable barbarians, lions, tigers and boars are the middling states, caused by the quality of darkness (*tāmasi*).'[9] Again, in the *Vāyu Purāṇa* we are told that 'those who were cleansers (?), and ran about on service, and had little vigour or strength, he [Brahmā] called Śūdras . . . . he assigned the practice of the mechanical arts and service to the Śūdras.'[10] According to the *Harivaṃśa*, the Śūdras were formed 'from a modification of smoke . . . the Śūdras spread over the earth are unserviceable owing to their birth with all its circumstances, to their want of initiatory rites, and the ceremonies ordained by the Vedas.'[11] Finally, in the *Mahābhārata*[12] another theory is suggested: 'Those red-limbed Brāhmans [twice-born] who were fond of sensual pleasure, fiery, irascible, prone to daring, and who had forsaken their duties, fell into the condition of Kṣatriyas. The yellow Brāhmans [twice-born] who derived their livelihood from cows and agriculture, and did not practise their duties, fell into the state of Vaiśyas. The Brāhmans [twice-born] who were addicted to violence and lying, who were covetous, and subsisted by all kinds of work, fell into the position of Śūdras. . . . He who is unclean, is addicted constantly to all kinds of food, performs all kinds of work, has abandoned the Veda, and is destitute of pure observance, is called a Śūdra.'[13]

One point seems to be clear from this medley of priestly legend—that the Śūdras, from the fact of their creation, though it was from the feet of Brahmā, and in spite of the contempt with which they were regarded, were acknowledged to be members of the Hindu polity, in contrast to the outer non-Aryan barbarians, the Dasyus or Mlechchhas.[14]

3. Position of Śūdras in the law literature.—While theoretically the Śūdras were included in the Aryan society, it became the leading principle of their overlords to reduce them to a condition of degraded servitude. This was probably due to two leading motives: (1) the desire to preserve the purity of the dominant whiter race, and thus prevent as far as possible *connubium* between the two peoples, by inflicting degrading punishments for violation of the laws of marriage, and by reducing the offspring of such unions to a condition of humiliation; (2) as in the case of the Helots of Sparta, the desire to guard the ruling race from the danger of insurrection on the part of their slaves, who were numerically superior to their rulers, and thus constituted a perpetual source of danger. The position of the Śūdras under Brāhman legislators is clearly stated in the law-books—the *Laws of Manu*,[1] and the *Sacred Laws of the Āryas* as taught in the schools of Āpastamba, Gautama, Vāsiṣṭha, and Baudhāyana.[2]

'A Śūdra, whether bought or unbought, a Brāhmaṇa may compel to do servile work; for he was created by the Self-existent (Svayambhū) to be the slave of a Brāhmaṇa. A Śūdra, though emancipated by his master, is not released from servitude; since that is innate in him, who can set him free from it?'[3] 'A low-caste man who tries to place himself on the same seat with a man of high caste, shall be branded on his hip and be banished, or the king shall cause his buttock to be gashed.'[4] If a Śūdra has intercourse with a woman of the twice-born class, if she was unguarded, he shall be mutilated; if she was guarded, he shall lose his life.[5] If a Śūdra intentionally listens to a recitation of the Veda, his ears shall be filled with molten tin or lac; if he recites Vedic texts, his tongue shall be cut out; if he remembers them, his body shall be split in twain.[6] The slaying of a Śūdra by a Brāhman is a minor offence, causing loss of caste (*upapātaka*).[7] The penalty for killing a Śūdra is the same as that for killing a flamingo, a crow, an owl, a musk-rat, or a dog.[8] Another text fixes the penalty for slaying a Vaiśya at one hundred, and a Śūdra at ten cows.[9] Eating with a Śūdra is strictly forbidden; if a Brāhman dies with the food of a Śūdra in his stomach, he will become a village pig in his next birth, or be born in the family of that Śūdra.[10] Food which has been brought by an impure Śūdra, whether he has or has not touched it, must not be eaten.[11] If a Śūdra touches a Brāhman, the latter shall cease eating.[12]

Among other disabilities of the Śūdra the following may be mentioned.

He cannot be initiated,[13] be a judge,[14] receive leavings at the mind-rite for the dead (*śrāddha*),[15] receive spiritual advice from a Brāhman,[16] sacrifice,[17] or travel with a *snātaka* (a Brāhman who has completed his studentship).[18] According to the same authority, his duties are to serve meekly the other three castes,[19] but he may not carry out a dead Brāhman, if men of the same caste are at hand, for the burnt-offering which is defiled by a Śūdra's touch hinders the passage of the deceased to heaven.[20] A Brāhman who gains his subsistence from Śūdras ranks with a breeder of dogs, a falconer, one who defiles maidens, and him who delights in injuring living creatures.[21] But, with his habitual inconsistency, the lawgiver rules that, among Śūdras, a Brāhman may eat the food of his friend, cow-herd, farm-labourer, slave, or barber.[22] A Brāhman may confidently seize the goods of his Śūdra slave, for that slave can possess no property.[23] While intercourse of a Śūdra with a Brāhman woman is sternly forbidden, a Brāhman may have a Śūdra wife, and her son receives a share of the inheritance.[24]

4. The Śūdra in modern times.—The position of the Śūdra in N. India differs from that in the South.

In Bengal a distinction is drawn between what are known as 'clean' and 'unclean' Śūdras. This is explained by Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya thus:

'To form an idea of the exact status of these [the artisan castes] and other clean Śudras, the reader should bear in mind the following rules of the Hindu caste system:—1. A man of any of the superior castes may drink such water as is fetched or touched by a clean Sudra, whether the water be of the river

1 Ptolemy, vi. 20.
2 R. Caldwell, *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or S. Indian Family of Languages*[2], London, 1875, p. 112; J. Wilson, *Indian Caste*, Bombay, 1877, i. 111 ff.
3 A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, ii. 265, 388, 391 f.
4 *La Cité antique*[3], Paris, 1870, p. 279 ff.
5 *Rigveda*, x. xc. 12.
6 J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, i. [1858] 13.
7 *Ib.* i. 14.
8 *Laws*, i. 31.
9 *Ib.* xii. 43.
10 Muir, i. 31.
11 *Ib.* i. 35.
12 *Śānti Parva*, 188 f.
13 Muir, i. 88 f.
14 See art. CASTE.

1 *SBE* xxv. [1886].
2 *Ib.* ii. [²1897], xiv. [1882].
3 Manu, viii. 413 f.
4 *Ib.* viii. 281; Gautama, xii. 7; Āpastamba, II. xxvii. 15.
5 Manu, viii. 374; Āpastamba, II. xxvi. 20, xxvii. 9.
6 Gautama, xii. 4–6.
7 Manu, xi. 67.
8 Baudhāyana, I. x. 19. 6.
9 *Ib.* I. x. 19. 2.
10 Vasiṣṭha, vi. 27.
11 Āpastamba, I. v. 16. 22.
12 *Ib.* I. v. 17. 1.
13 Manu, x. 4.
14 *Ib.* viii. 20 f.
15 *Ib.* iii. 249.
16 *Ib.* iv. 80 f.
17 *Ib.* iii. 178.
18 *Ib.* iv. 140.
19 *Ib.* i. 91.
20 *Ib.* v. 104.
21 *Ib.* iii. 164.
22 *Ib.* iv. 253.
23 *Ib.* viii. 417, xi. 13.
24 *Ib.* ix. 154; for further details of the legal position of the Śūdra see J. Wilson, *Indian Caste*, i. 46 f.

Ganges, or from any other source. 2. The water of the river Ganges, though fetched by an unclean Sudra, is not thereby rendered unfit for the high caste Hindu's drinking purposes. But every other kind of water is polluted by the touch of an unclean Sudra. 3. Even the water of the sacred Ganges is rendered useless to a Hindu by the touch of a non-Hindu. 4. The touch of non-Hindus and unclean Sudras being contaminating, it is only the clean Sudras that can render the necessary personal service to the high caste Hindus like the Brahmans, Rajputs, Vaidyas, and Kayasthas. 5. The twice-born castes cannot, without rendering themselves liable to expiation, eat any cooked food touched by a Sudra. The result of this rule is that a Sudra menial, whether clean or unclean, can be of no use to a high caste Hindu for the actual cooking of his food, or the serving of it. In fact, in the absence of his Brahman cook, the high caste Hindu has himself to cook the food of his servant. For the actual cuisine work, the clean and the unclean Sudra stand on the same footing. But while the clean Sudra can assist in the process in various ways, the unclean Sudra is not allowed even to enter the cook-room. It is for this reason that the clean Sudras alone are usually appointed menials in Hindu households. Another important difference between the clean and the unclean Sudras lies in the fact, that while a Brahman can minister to the former without losing his Brahmanism, he cannot show such honour to the latter without being degraded for ever. Further, though the Shastras forbid the acceptance of the Sudra's gifts without any reference to his status, yet in practice the best Brahmans do not hesitate to accept the bounty of the Nava Sayakas [or clean Sudras], when the amount offered is a large one.'[1]

The author seems to be unconscious of the strange picture which he draws of the caste system in Bengal at the present day. It attempts to adhere to the primitive four-group system of Vedic times; but this has become gradually broken down when certain of the so-called menial groups secure a position of wealth and authority. They retain the name of Śūdra, but they become 'clean,' as contrasted with their humbler brethren who accept a position of servitude. As he points out, the greed of the Brāhman priests is tending, by the acceptance of gifts from classes which they hold to be impure, to render the archaic system, under modern conditions, unworkable.

In S. India, on the other hand, especially by Brāhmans and by those Europeans who take their caste nomenclature from Brāhmans, the term Śūdra is applied to the mass of the Dravidian population, including many castes which claim a high social position and enforce rigid precautions to secure personal purity, such as an exaggerated fear of pollution not merely by the touch but even from the immediate neighbourhood of out-castes.[1]

'Whilst it is evident that the entire mass of the Dravidians were regarded by Manu and the authors of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas as Kshatriyas by birth, it is remarkable that the Brāhmans who settled among the Dravidians and formed them into castes, in imitation of the castes of the North, seem never at any time to have given the Dravidians—with the exception perhaps of the royal houses—a higher title than that of Śūdra. They might have styled the agricultural classes Vaiśyas, and reserved the name of Śūdra for the village servants and the unenslaved low castes; but acting apparently on the principle that none ought to be called either Kshatriyas or Vaiśyas but Aryans, and that the Dravidians were not Aryans, they seem always to have called them Śūdras, however respectable their position. In consequence of this the title Śūdra conveys a higher meaning in Southern than in Northern India. . . . In Southern India it was upon the middle and higher classes of the Dravidians that the title Śūdra was conferred. . . . The Brāhmans, "who came in peaceably and obtained the kingdom by flatteries," may probably have persuaded the Dravidians that in calling them Śūdra they were conferring upon them a title of honour. If so, this policy was perfectly successful; for the title of Śūdra has never been resisted by the Dravidian castes; and hence while in Northern India the Śūdra is supposed to be a low-caste man, in Southern India he generally ranks next to the Brāhman. The term Śūdra, however, is really as inappropriate to any class of Dravidians as the term Kshatriya or Vaiśya. It is better to designate each Dravidian caste simply by its own name.'[2]

In deference, however, to popular sentiment, at the Madras census of 1901 the use of the term 'Śūdra' by enumerators was forbidden. The difficulty arising from the use of the term is shown by the necessity of dividing the ill-organized Nāyar group into high, intermediate, and low-caste Śūdras.[3]

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities have been quoted in the course of the article. For the Bengal Śūdras see H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1891; and for S. India E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, 7 vols., Madras, 1909; G. Oppert, *On the Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa or India*, Westminster and Leipzig, 1893.

W. CROOKE.

[1] *Hindu Castes and Sects*, Calcutta, 1896, p. 225.

[1] See art. OUT-CASTES.

[2] Caldwell, p. 116 f.; cf. V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1904, pp. 113, 116.

[3] L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *Cochin Tribes and Castes*, Madras, 1909, i. 18.

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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SUFFERING.—I. *INTRODUCTION: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEM.*—Suffering, as a feature of life in this earth, is too obvious and too familiar to need description. Sentimentality and denunciation are alike superfluous. Suffering is all but universal. From the point where, in the evolutionary process, a brain is developed, upward through all ranks of being, suffering is an unvarying element in experience. It appears in endless variety. Some of it belongs to animals in their natural conditions as an accompaniment of their life-story or as a consequence of their predaceous habits. It is, however, in human life that suffering most abounds. A great deal of human suffering is what we term roughly 'physical pain,' though, in point of fact, the suffering of a self-conscious being must be radically distinct from that of a living creature in whose sentient life the thought of personality has not yet dawned. Physical pain is found in many degrees of intensity, from that which is easily bearable, at least by persons in normal health, to that which is appalling to look upon, and must constitute an unimaginable anguish. If we pass from physical suffering to that which is mental and moral, we are overwhelmed by the mass and the magnitude of the agonies that are the lot of mankind. From the sorrows of childhood, deeper than the observer can calculate, to the stony griefs of age, untold and ungauged, there is a range of suffering beyond all enumeration and conception, baffling the imagination, affronting the intelligence.

The worst feature of human suffering is the chaotic nature of its distribution. If strong men alone were sufferers, we would comfort ourselves by noting the gladness of little children; but children suffer, often with an intensity which seems too awful for the tender frame to endure and yet survive. If the guilty alone suffered, we might have some kind of theodicy to fit the facts; but the innocent suffer; they are the greatest sufferers. If we had to consider only our own pains, we might find a reason for them, or at least we could retreat to the fastness of our unconquerable soul. When, however, it is the pain of others that confronts us, we feel that our explanations are an impertinence. The clue to their sufferings is not to be found in any supposed rationale of our own.

The deepest element in the problem of pain is that so much suffering is meaningless, as far as our most careful thought can discern. After we have noted causes the removal of which would certainly reduce the quantity of pain in the world, after we have seen the ends which it may be supposed to serve, there remains a surplusage of pain unaccounted for by our largest theory. It is this surplusage that forms the heart of the mystery of suffering. If there is any meaningless pain in the world, it cannot, surely, be the best of all possible worlds. How can a world crossed by such a bar sinister be the expression of wisdom, power, or goodness?

'The dilemma of Epicurus is still with us: if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then he is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if he has both the power and the will, whence then is evil?'[1]

The challenge to theism is direct. There is probably little theoretic atheism among ordinary men and women. But it is certain that in multitudes of cases faith has suffered shipwreck on the rock of meaningless pain. To this form of unbelief women are peculiarly prone. Suffering appeals to their sympathy. Their acquaintance with it is wide and intimate. They feel, more deeply than men, the waste and cruelty of it; and they are accordingly brought to doubt the existence of a God who is at once almighty and all-merciful. In their case, too, scepticism means more than it does to the majority of men. It is not merely the abandonment of a theory. It is the ruin of a life, through the loss of the hope which alone makes life endurable. In all ages the pressure of this problem of pain has been felt. It may even be said to be the driving force in all philosophy and in every great religion.

How shall man be reconciled to life? What view of the world must be taken if man is to live worthily in it? What estimate of life must be held if it is to be at least endurable? How are the facts of suffering to be adjusted to the sense of value and the inspiration of hope, which are the mainsprings of fruitful labour?

II. *THE LEADING ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTION.*—1. Pessimism.—Frankly and definitely, suffering is so wide-spread and so intense that the verdict

[1] W. R. Sorley and others, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life*, p. 48.

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of open-eyed and unprejudiced observers must be that the world is an intolerable place to live in, and that life is an unendurable burden.

The classical example of this solution of the problem of pain is the doctrine of Buddha, which, in the heart of the 19th cent., was reproduced by Schopenhauer. Pessimism must always be substantially the same. It is interesting for its verdict, not for its discussions. Buddha's 'Four Noble Truths'—pain, the origin of pain, the destruction of pain, and the eightfold holy way—are the conclusion of the whole matter. The first contains the result of direct observation. Suffering prevails. Life is worthless and miserable. The second traces this universal wretchedness to its source in 'thirst,' the desire which attaches the soul to worldly objects and leads to 'becoming'—an infinite series of new existences, with a monotonous repetition of birth, pain, and despair. The third points out the means of deliverance from life and from suffering, viz. cessation of desire. Let desire cease; then the thread of life will be snapped; then the fountain of suffering will cease to flow. The fourth is Buddha's plan of salvation, containing a careful account of the steps by which the extinction of desire is to be accomplished. Among these morality has its place; and Buddhist ethic has a mild lustre of its own. The crown of the procedure, however, is contemplation. Schopenhauer's 'path' includes art, but otherwise is scarcely an improvement upon Buddha's. The issue for both is the same—the cessation of desire, the abandonment of the will to live.

To discuss the philosophy of pessimism (*q.v.*) would be wasted labour. The Buddhist psychology, with its rigidly atomistic sensationalism, has gone to the scrap-heap. Schopenhauer's dependence on Kant does not give his system commanding authority. The real strength of pessimism, or the final demonstration of its weakness, must be sought elsewhere. Pessimism pursues the empirical method. The first question to be asked is as to the validity of this method and as to the certainty of the first 'Noble Truth' reached by means of it. Can the worthlessness of life be established by any enumeration of details? The question is not as to the possibility of balancing the pessimist's instances by others of a more cheering nature. Optimism cannot be established by such means. The real question is as to the method itself. The pessimist inference from the facts of pain is not really drawn by mere generalization. It rests on a preconceived theory of values, by which all the facts of life are tested. Pessimism is simply disappointed hedonism. If the highest good is pleasure, life is certainly not worth living, for pleasure in any guise is not to be had, on any terms whatever, in human experience, to such a degree as to counterbalance the damning facts of pain. If the Creator was bound to secure for His creatures a surplusage of pleasure, He certainly has failed to do so. His power has not been equal to His good intentions. If He exists, we must conceive of Him as shorn of His omnipotence, or even 'gone mad.' Hedonism, however, is of all ethical theories the most precarious. If appeal be made to experts in living, the answer will be returned that happiness is not the chief good for man and cannot be conceived as the chief end of creation. That place of eminence belongs to moral goodness.

Our question as to the world, accordingly, must be: Is it so framed and ordered that moral goodness is being wrought out therein, not merely in spite of, but actually by means of, the suffering that is to be found in all human life? It is to be observed, however, that the answer might be enough to refute pessimism, and yet leave a crux for theism. We might be quite convinced that virtue is the highest good for man, and we might vindicate the position that virtue grows to its maturity through the discipline of pain; still, if there remains a margin of suffering that bears no relation at all to character and cannot be related to the chief end of creation, the theistic conclusion remains open to doubt. It may even become necessary to maintain that optimism cannot be established by argument at all, and that theism is warranted by some other process than that of logical demonstration. In that case the challenge of suffering may be met; but not otherwise. After we have refuted a theoretic pessimism, we have to recognize the fact of pain. Before one irrelevant pang our best theorizings sink abashed. We have nothing to say. Our speech would be a worse irrelevance.

2. Stoicism.—Another answer to the challenge of suffering is to the effect that, while pain is real and may be very acute, it is one of those indifferent things which a wise and strong man may neglect, not allowing it to disturb him in any way. The Stoic philosophy is the elaboration of this answer, by means of a full apparatus of metaphysic, psychology, and ethic. Stoicism, however, is more than a philosophical theory. It is an attitude to life. It reappears in noted personalities, when the insistent evils and disorders of the world drive men to the inner region of their own souls, to find there a refuge nowhere else discoverable. The circumstances under which classical Stoicism arose are familiar. It was an age of individualism. No relief or satisfaction could be found in any form of life open to man in the world of that day. Men could not go into the world and find the counterpart of their own moral nature. They could not lose themselves in the activities of city or nation and in the very process of such devotion achieve their own highest welfare. And this for two reasons: no city or nation was left standing in its independence; and the soul of man had grown so great in its needs and capacities that it could no longer be satisfied within the limits of civic or national activities, however intense and vivid these might be. Man had discovered himself. He knew now that nothing less than the universe would meet his need and afford a satisfying life. Here, then, is the Stoic gospel, which is at once a philosophy and a message of salvation. The ultimate reality is reason. We may speak of Nature or of God. In any case there is one principle at work in the world and in man. Stoicism is, in this aspect, optimism. It believes in a principle which underlies all phenomena and is moving through all events to complete victory. This principle is the life of all that is, both within man and beyond him. It is a principle of reason and of harmony. It is inherently good; and its supremacy is the highest welfare of the world and of man. The ethical ideal for man, accordingly, is consistency with nature or with reason; or, speaking religiously, it is harmony with the will of God. The ancient Stoic doctrine of providence has the fervour of intense religious conviction. It is strange at first sight that such a glowing optimism should have any room for a theoretic acknowledgment of the facts of pain and evil. It is to be noted, however, that the ultimate reason has been reached in Stoicism too easily. It is, after all, a negation of the vast and confusing facts of a miserable and perplexing experience. It is the bare affirmation of an abstract principle which ought to be the truth of all things and, in point of fact, is reproduced in scarcely any of them. Reason is everything; and yet reason is nowhere. Stoic optimism is a faith; but the Stoic estimate of facts is dark and pessimistic. What, then, is man to do, poised as he is between reason, which is his true nature, and a world in which man and things are so irrational? What attitude is he to take towards such brute facts as hunger and cold, oppression and cruelty, bereavement and grief? The Stoic answer is serene and hard. The wise man will choose reason. He will be absolutely sure that this choice brings him a good of which no power in man or in things can rob him. He is in indefeasible possession of the absolute best. His harmony with reason sets him in a charmed circle, into

which nothing irrational and evil can ever enter. Pain racks his body; but his body is not his reason. Death robs him of wife or child; but they are not himself. Evil afflicts his friends; but that cannot invade the citadel of his own peace. We read the aphorisms and counsels of an Epictetus with a shudder. So calm, so logical, so inhuman! It ought to be noted, however, that this attitude of complete detachment towards pain and evil is an advance upon a view such as that of Aristotle, which regards them as obstacles in the way of a perfect life. To the Stoic they are not obstacles. The perfect life has simply nothing to do with them. The wise man will not court them; but he will not allow them to disturb his serenity. He will make their occurrence in his experience the occasion of manifesting his consistency with reason. He will even benefit by their presence, inasmuch as his conquest of them will invigorate his strength and enable him to gain a yet greater superiority over them. But, in themselves, they have no relation to his inner life, which is complete without them and does nothing to them. At this point our admiration for the Stoic attitude reaches its highest.

Here also our criticism begins. The reason, which is the Stoic's God, and highest good, is not positively related to the manifold experiences of life. It is not in and through them that reason is revealed in its own inner wealth, and that man attains the fullness of his being. Very specially, pain and evil serve no end of reason, and the supreme principle of the universe has no relation to them. Man, in union with that principle, has no duty with regard to them, save to repel them and to refuse to them the tribute of an emotion. It is not on these lines that the worth of life can be vindicated or an idealist construction of the universe be established. The Stoic conclusion is mere negation, abstraction, and emptiness. It is good only for defiance; but defiance is not victory over pain; and far less is it transmutation of evil into the means of a greater good.

Yet is it good, even for defiance? Stoicism has too easily assumed that man can choose the reason of the universe and identify himself with it. A painful doubt develops. What if a man's self be the main obstacle to his being identified with God? In abandoning all things finite and particular, will he not need also to surrender himself? Thus the axe is laid to the root of Stoic pride; and the Stoic gospel turns out to be a counsel of despair. In the might of my self I am to defy the world. But who am I? The very essence of finitude, the very acme of contrast with the reason which is the harmony of the universe. My utmost willing, then, is weakness. Upon my resistance falls the doom of ineptitude and impotence. Victory is turned to defeat. Self-confidence is no longer possible; for self is the secret of failure. When Stoicism has reached this point, it is ready for a philosophy, or a religion, which shall start where it ended and make the condition of man's achievement of the highest good, not his self-assertion, but his self-surrender. The challenge of suffering might now be met in a different way—not by resistance, but by acceptance. Pain might become, not an obstacle in the path of the perfect life, not even a thing indifferent to man's inner good, but the opportunity and the instrument of his death to self, and therefore, also, of his complete self-realization. Stoicism began with optimism and ended in pessimism. It might be possible to reverse the process and to lean our optimism upon a deeper view of evil than an empirical pessimism had ever reached. Such a stage beyond Stoicism is found in one direction in Neo-Platonism, and by another path in Christianity.

3. Meliorism.—A nobler answer to the challenge of suffering than that offered by Stoicism was very prevalent during the recent war. The world, it is admitted, is full of virulent evils and untold sufferings. These things are not to be explained. They are to be fought. They are not to be accepted as an irresistible fate or as the appointment of an almighty and sovereign Disposer of events. They are evil, and only evil, continually. Judged by the human conscience, they exist only to be resisted, defeated, banished from the experience of the race. They are a challenge to love, sympathy, honour, to be met by sacrifice, by service, and above all by unending war. All intelligences are summoned to take part in this war for peace, this struggle for the abolition of suffering. Among the hosts engaged in this life-and-death conflict some individuals, both human and superhuman, occupy the position of leadership, as well in strategy as in the actual fighting. Commander-in-chief of this army is God. He is not what absolutism, or orthodox theism, has conceived Him to be. He is not the inscrutable ground of all being, the omnipotent will, the omniscient mind by whose unalterable decree all things in creation are predetermined. He is a finite being, though of course His resources both in wisdom and in power are far more than human. He is in this fight, which is no shadowy and spectral combat, but is for Him as for man tragically real, a genuine life or death struggle. We can indeed scarcely imagine His being defeated ultimately; but He has not won yet. Nay, He cannot win unless He secure the co-operation of man. In this tremendous conflict human beings cannot be neutral. If they are not for Him, they are against Him, slackers, traitors, or open enemies. He sends out a great call for volunteers; and all who have a spark of generosity or heroism will rally to His side. They will fight with the splendid courage which comes from sympathy with the oppressed and tortured everywhere, and with the desperate energy of those who see the issue plainly. They are fighting for their all, for the very life of humanity, and humanity's radiant and high-souled Leader. Every rookery pulled down, every disease routed, every social wrong redressed, is a battle won in the long campaign, a stage to the final, all-comprehensive victory. Suffering is being eliminated. Progress is being made. The end, if not in sight, is reasonably secure.

But the practical value of meliorism must rest ultimately on the validity of its presuppositions. If these are invalid, their results cannot be permanent. Now the presuppositions of meliorism are mainly three: (1) the universe is conceived as growing in time, its future, strictly speaking, unpredictable; (2) God Himself is avowedly a finite being, in time, sometimes described even as 'young,' with a future before Him in which He has still to make good; (3) the issue of the conflict is, in the nature of the case, uncertain, though every successive victory and the inexhaustible resources of intelligences, human and superhuman, give ground for hope. It is not too much to say that each one of these presuppositions is disputable. Not one of them has won universal consent. Together they constitute a huge hypothesis. If regarded as more than this, they become sheer dogmatism; and dogmas are but 'iron rations' at best, and are soon exhausted.

The error both of Stoicism and of meliorism lies in trying to turn what is partial into an absolute. Because a man is summoned to oppose the evil that is in the world with all his might, it is supposed that he can 'carry on' till the victory is his. Suppose, however, that this rough dualism between the good man and the wicked world does not represent the real situation. Suppose that the real source of evil is not without, but within, and that

the conflict that is being waged in the world is the image and the outcome of a more devouring strife that rages in man's own soul. Then the result will be, as happened in the history of Stoicism, that self must give up its self-sufficiency and must seek the true and the good, not by self-assertion, but by self-surrender, and see in its attainment of virtue and knowledge the disclosure and the communication of One who includes the universe in His consciousness and His control. Then the fighter may 'carry on' without anxiety and without self-confidence, because the victory has been won already, not by himself, but by the Power which is working in him, whose servant and vehicle he is. The end of such a war is not uncertain, though it can be reached only through a sacrificial ministry.

It ought to be added that meliorism makes no pretension of having solved the problem of pain. It knows no more than any other theory why pain should ever be; and it cannot be blamed for refusing to face the question. A graver defect, however, is its inability to provide hope or comfort for those sufferers who are not taking part in the successive victories, or are not directly benefited by them In this war, as in all wars, it is the non-combatants who suffer most. But really the metaphor breaks down altogether. Where time is the whole of reality, there can be no 'repatriation' of those who have been overwhelmed by the powers of evil. Some meliorists believe in immortality. But their faith is not a certain conclusion from their presuppositions; nor does meliorism require such a faith for its completeness. It is concerned only with the progress of humanity. Its soldiers get their fill of fighting, and this is all the pay they ask for. Those who have never had a chance to fight, who have been crushed by forces too great for them, have no compensatory advantages offered them. At this point meliorism lapses below Stoicism. It has no resource against pessimism. A world with such hopeless, meaningless pain in it had better never have been. The meliorist 'God' escapes the condemnation and contempt even of the most ordinary intelligence, only because, to do him justice, he is not creator of the world, and is not responsible for its blemishes. We stand, as does 'God' also, in the midst of a circumambient fate, unintelligible, inaccessible, whose blind decree can be neither modified nor served, which is liable at any moment to intervene disastrously in our affairs and turn our most brilliant victory into mockery and despair.

4. Optimism.—The most perfect optimism would be a thoroughgoing pantheism. If finitude is really an illusion which disappears from the point of view of the Absolute, evil cannot be held to exist. Ascend to the point of view of the Absolute, and forthwith evil is seen to be mere seeming. The idea that it exists is the mistake of those who attribute to things finite a reality which does not belong to them.

This sounds convincing. But two remarks immediately occur. (1) Who shall ascend to the height of the Absolute? How shall the finite leap to the Infinite? Practically, pantheism has nothing to say to the sufferer. His pain is utterly irremediable. Pain necessarily belongs to the finite. He is bound to the finite. As long as he exists he must suffer. When suffering ceases, he will have ceased to be. Pantheistic optimism is thus pessimistic in its estimate of life. (2) If evil is an illusion, because it is finite, so must good be also, for it too is finite. Good and evil are, in fact, meaningless. For the Absolute they do not exist. Optimism and pessimism, accordingly, are philosophies of the unreal, and are in the strictest sense alike nonsense. Of course this treatment of the problem of pain is due to the error which turns the unity of thought against the manifold of experience and regards the universal as the only real, while the particular is condemned as the illusory.

The philosophy of Leibniz has been dealt with in this *Encyclopædia*[1] and needs no further exposition here. Leibniz stands at the opposite pole from pantheism; yet it is pantheism to which his own ruling principle of thought constantly leads him. The principle of sufficient reason, as he interprets it, is the same as that of identity and contradiction. A complete analysis would be a perfect explanation. The principle of identity is the highest principle of truth. All appearance of difference is mere illusion, due to the disability of a finite consciousness. From this point of view the problem of evil may be solved; but the solution is really pantheistic.

[1] See artt. LEIBNIZ and PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.

The criticism of Hume, and the yet more destructive work of Kant, have made the dominance of an abstract Absolute impossible for modern thought. The finite has come to its rights. The principle of freedom is too strongly entrenched in the convictions of men ever to be relegated to the sphere of the negative and the illusory. This means that modern optimism can no longer take the position of pantheism, and so affirm the sole reality of good as to destroy the possibility of evil. Its proof must now consist in arguing that evil is inseparable from the highest good in this sense, that the highest good is attainable only through the conquest of evil. This argument consists fundamentally in a special reading of the facts of human life. It may be presented as a deduction from an idealist philosophy, or it may appear as an induction from data empirically reached. Fundamentally it is a judgment of value, as intuition of the significance of life, and is not reached by either the *a priori* or the *a posteriori* method.

'There is no evil except for a rational being, who is capable of willing a good which he identifies with the absolute good, but which is in reality in antagonism to it. But, inasmuch as the possibility of willing this lower good is inseparable from the existence of free subjects, who only come to the clear consciousness of the higher through experience of the lower, it is just the high destiny of man and the infinite perfection of God which make it inconceivable how there should be a universe, containing beings who realize what is the meaning of their own life and of the whole, unless those beings pass through the long and painful process by which the absolutely good is revealed as that which can overcome the deepest depths of evil.'[1]

Watson, from whom these words are quoted, develops them into a view of human life and history which shows that, the higher the conception of the good, the deeper will be the insight into evil. The man who knows himself a sinner knows that no sin is alien to him. He is the supreme sinner of the universe, the chief of sinners; and in the act in which he confesses and dies to his sin the violated order is rectified; and the guilt which he so profoundly acknowledges is lifted to the shoulders of Another, and he is free for ever. Watson does not in this passage explicitly apply this profound conception of an optimism, vindicated through a deeper pessimism than Buddha or Schopenhauer ever knew, to the pangs of nature and the physical woes of men. Plainly, however, the one problem lies within the other. The deepest evil man can suffer is the division within his own spirit. Let his breach with the Absolute be healed, and his breach with nature cannot fail to be healed likewise. The truth of nature is spirit. If the unity of spirit rise triumphant above the dualism that a false assertion of freedom has wrought, there can be left nowhere in the universe any element of difference, and therefore of evil, which is not in process of being transcended in the realization of the ultimate good.

Many writers who do not adhere to Watson's type of idealism base their ethical view of the universe on the facts which he emphasizes. The world was certainly not framed to produce the pleasure of all sentient creatures or the happiness of human beings. The highest good is moral good, and moral good can be attained by man only through a process of discipline. A world which made goodness easy would make true goodness impossible. By work, by suffering, and by temptation, human character is perfected. The theistic and optimistic inference is more securely drawn from a world with imperfections, in conflict with which character is ripened, than it would be from one in which neither physical nor moral evil was present. It is possible to believe that the Creator of such a

[1] John Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 459.

world is good and wise and almighty, whereas such a faith would be valueless if the world were a machine for turning out mechanical perfection. This does not mean, of course, that for every pain we suffer we can allege a moral purpose. Physical suffering comes to us through our place in a cosmic order whose laws operate with absolute impartiality.

Would we prefer that it were otherwise? Yet in such a world, and in such a world alone, can the highest good be realized. As matter of observed fact, the good is making progress towards a victory, which may be delayed, but which stands in no reasonable doubt. One difficulty lies in the path of such modest optimism, viz. the fate of the individual. Most upholders of this view take refuge in the idea of personal immortality. It is granted that the general optimistic estimate requires that there shall be a balance of good for the individual as well as for the race, seeing that the individual is an end in himself, and not a mere link in a chain. But in the vast majority of individuals this balance is not struck within time and space. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate another life, in which the wrongs and sufferings of this world shall be rectified and their memory lost in the realization of perfect good.

An argument such as this, which turns upon the supremacy of moral worth, and the function of pain in realizing it in the history of individuals and of the race, is intellectually unanswerable. The conclusion of the whole matter is:

'God's in His heaven—
All's right with the world!'

It is to be noted, however, that, when we have solved the problem of pain from the point of view of the spectator, suffering still remains a mystery for the sufferers. No amount of argument can meet their need. What they require is an experience. Their pain cannot be transmuted into joy by telling them that, in the final result, there will be for them a preponderance of good. They will continue to suffer, and before their anguish argument sinks back ashamed. They need to be introduced to the experience of a suffering within which theirs is comprehended and of a good through which theirs is guaranteed.

Optimism must submit to the test of fact. The fact in this case is pain; and pain is insoluble by a process of reasoning. Over against every phase of the argument stands the intractable pain, or, rather, there stands the piteous army of the sufferers. Optimism appears satisfactory only when we stand back from the facts. Stand in the midst of them, and our philosophy is smitten into silence. A world, with pain in it—and such pain!—cannot be the best of all possible worlds.

Of course, Omar Khayyam's aspiration is ridiculous. We cannot 'grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,' cannot 'shatter it to bits' and 'remould it nearer to the heart's desire.' None the less, we turn from the best that the optimist can say to the contemplation of a universe which contains such 'things' in it and are conscious of a lamentable gap. The key does not fit the lock. Suffering remains a mystery and a challenge to theism.

5. **The Christian doctrine of providence.**—It cannot be doubted that Jesus had the whole fact of pain present to His mind. He lived in the midst of suffering. Yet it did not present itself to Him as a problem. Certainly He made no explicit reference to the questions with which Job wrestled. His compassions flowed forth unhindered by any theory of the causes of pain. He never viewed suffering as other than a great evil. He devoted a large part of His ministry to its alleviation. But He never stood before it confounded or paralyzed. If He was conscious of its challenge to theism, He never replied by argument. He lived in unbroken communion with God, and faced all the problems of life from that position of perfect acquaintance. He knew God. He knew that God's love gathers into its compass all the suffering of man and of the whole sentient creation. The good will of a God whom He knew as the Father cannot be impugned. The victory of His love cannot be doubted. In this faith Jesus lived and died. He revealed to men its divine object, and gave theism the verification of experience. Christianity is the reproduction of this proof. It is a life 'hid with Christ in God.' Its secret is an experience. This experience is not a mystic rapture, to be attained in rare moments by those who have leisure to cultivate the conditions leading to such remote and perilous heights. It may be reached by children. It can be reached only by those who consent to become as little children. It is peculiarly accessible to sufferers. It is reached in the act by which man surrenders his separateness of will and commits himself trustfully to the divine love as it meets him in the chiefest of all sufferers. Such an experience cannot be translated directly into a theory of pain. It contains more than any theory can express. All noble idealism seeks to interpret its fullness; and, apart from it, no philosophical solution can be more than an attractive speculation.

The Christian doctrine of providence (*q.v.*) articulates the leading ideas which are implicit in this experience, and by means of them seeks to exhibit the relation of God to the history of the world. It does so, however, under the distinct understanding that the experience of communion with God, while it is central and all-comprehensive, cannot be drawn upon to provide ready-made answers to the questions which intellect may raise regarding the course of nature and of human life. The divine love is the highest reason. The Logos is love incarnate in the life of the Son of God. But this does not mean that a book could be written, solving, on the whole and in every detail, the mystery of pain. No reasoning process can reach the sanctuary where God at once comforts and remakes the soul that pain has shattered. The Christian is an optimist, but not a theorist. He knows God. He has seen Him in Christ. God is love. That is the secret. There is no truth outside of love, no power that can withstand love. It dominates the universe. It is almighty. When it is reproduced in man, it is the greatest thing in the world. The doctrine of providence simply says, in different connexions, that the divine love is sure of itself, knows its own design, is baffled by no obstacles, overcomes all enemies, is moving to an end, guaranteed in Christ, which is none other than God's perfect communication of Himself in and to a universe which responds with the 'Amen' of absolute faith and unhindered devotion. Christian optimism blends the confident assertion of love's supremacy with an unashamed agnosticism. Its key unlocks the mystery of suffering. Yet the Christian does not employ this key to meet the question of why and wherefore, either as to the presence of pain in the world at large or as to any individual affliction. He bears witness to the fact of love. The acceptance of that fact introduces the sufferer to an experience in which all questionings are transcended in a great possession. Christianity accordingly stands apart from theoretic optimism. It does not, of course, impugn the function of pain, by which philosophers and poets have sought to establish their hopeful conclusions. It can use such instances of beneficial pain as illustrations of its own central truth. It doubts, however, their adequacy to establish, by intellectual demonstration, results so magnificent. It is in full sympathy with their spirit. But it rests its optimism on a different basis; and it presents its results not so much to those who contemplate suffering from without, in order to satisfy their questions, as to those who know it from within, that they may know it better and enter through it into fellowship with God.

(*a*) *The ground of Christian optimism.* — The Christian doctrine of providence stands at one point in profound and significant agreement with such an idealism as is presented in the writings of Caird and Watson. It believes that the problem of pain is part of the wider and deeper problem of moral evil. It does not stay to discuss the fact of

physical evil before it has dealt with the graver problem of sin. It presses on to the tremendous fact of breach with God, confident that, if that has been met and healed, no other discord can remain finally unresolved. Nature finds its truth in man. Physical suffering has its analogue in the division which exists between the human soul and God. Reconciliation with God will be the final solution of a mystery of pain which reverberates throughout the universe. In spite of this parallelism, however, Christianity and idealism stand apart. Christianity is an idealism, no doubt. But idealism is not Christianity. The vital question for both is the reconciliation of man and God. How is it achieved? Idealism answers, In an idea. Christianity ventures its all on an historic fact. Idealism pursues the soul to its deepest consciousness of guilt and declares that there already is the reconciliation. The consciousness of guilt is possible only to a soul fundamentally at one with God. In awaking to a sense of his guilt, man knows himself reconciled at once to God and the universe. The spiritual unity is gained; the unification of all experience is thereby guaranteed. Christianity deepens the diagnosis and exhibits a different remedy. In sin man has the universe against him. It reacts to his sin in perpetual judgment, registering in his character and his career, in loss and defeat and pain, the condemnation which man's attack upon the universal order has brought upon him. This automatic reaction does not stand apart from the will of God. It reflects one aspect of the divine mind regarding sin and carries out one part of the divine dealing with it. But sin is not the ultimate reality of the moral world; and judgment is not the whole mind and will of God. The ultimate in God and in the universe is love. The reconciliation is accomplished not in an idea, but in the action of God. The love of God goes into action coincidently with the sin of man. It is true that God's experience of time must differ from ours in a manner necessarily inconceivable by us; so that it is not improper to speak of an eternal act of love and an eternal atonement. But the standpoint of Christianity is definitely historical. Sin is in time. Sin-bearing is in time also. Love can reconcile the world to God only if it pass to the world's side and in the world realize experimentally the whole meaning of sin. It must enter into the tragedy of human life in an experience more tragic than any penitent sinner ever passed through. 'Christ died for our sins' (1 Co 15^{3}). It is the first, the only, Christian gospel. In the action and passion of a life crowned by the Cross Christ is not another than God. He is God, in a temporal experience, manifesting an eternal fact. Love has gone to the utmost limit of sin and suffering and has returned bearing the fruits of that unimaginable agony in a world reconciled, mankind redeemed, sin and evil judged, exposed, broken. The fact of sin—that is pessimism. The fact of Christ—that is optimism. Christianity confronts the world of sin and suffering with the deeper suffering of divine sin-bearing love. All else that it has to say is an inference from that basal fact. Its doctrine of providence consists in developing the significance of that fact for the varied discipline of life.

'The Christian faith in providence is an immediate inference from the Christian experience of redemption, and it is an inference as vast and unqualified as the redeeming love on which it rests.'[1]

To be reconciled to God is to be reconciled to life. To be at one with God is to be at home in the universe. The reactions of the order with which we now live in harmony set like a tide towards our perfecting. 'All things work together for good to them that love God.' Love has taken the place of fate. Possessing it and being possessed by it, we possess all things. We cross every chasm, even the ultimate gulf of death, and find ourselves still in a region where love is king.

[1] J. Denney, *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 330*f.*; see also pp. 1, 3, 177–179.

The NT is a lyric; but it is not a freak of poetic fancy. It is the song of a victory won, the record of an experience, not the less reliable that it is amazing, an inference which is strictly logical, from the greater to the less, though it surpass all calculation. 'He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?' (Ro 8^{32}).

(*b*) *The Christian attitude towards suffering.*—(1) Pain means obstruction of life. It is essentially evil. It is not the intention of God that any of His sentient creatures should suffer. It is not possible to say to every sufferer, 'God sent you this; He has laid this affliction upon you.' This judgment upon suffering as evil will be assailed from many points of view, scientific, ethical, and religious. Suffering, it will be said, is inevitable, as an element in the evolution of the world. It was experienced by innumerable sentient creatures millenniums before man appeared on the earth, before the first sin was committed. Suffering, it will be urged, is a splendid moral discipline. It is, therefore, a good, of which no man can complain that he has had too much. It is sufficient to reply that the Author and Object of Christian faith, the Revealer and the Organ of the infinite love, did not think so. He steadfastly set Himself to reduce the sum of pain. So far as we know, He never met a case of pain which He did not relieve, if the conditions were present for His doing so. In such action He Himself suffered exceedingly. He made no moan. He recognized such suffering to be necessary to the fulfilment of His redeeming vocation (Mt 8^{17}). But His doing so cannot be construed as an approval of pain. Rather was it a judgment upon pain as an evil to be removed at any cost of pain. This judgment, moreover, was not an implicit hedonism. It would be ridiculous to make such a suggestion regarding the teaching of Jesus. He never taught that it was a primary concern of God's love to keep His creatures immune from suffering. He absolutely denied that the crown of life was pleasure. But this cannot be construed to mean that He regarded suffering as a good, or asceticism as the ideal of life, or sorrow as the soul of religion. It does imply, however, that He regarded the condition of the world as abnormal. He occupies the point of view of the religious mind of Israel in looking upon the world as standing in intimate and vital relation with human life. There is a strict relevance between these two. If there be evil in man, there will be pain in nature. Nature stands so near to spirit that it thrills responsive to the breach that sin has wrought between the human spirit and the divine. Paul is enlarging the same idea inherited from the OT, and reinterpreted through the death and resurrection of the Redeemer, when He speaks of the 'sighing of creation,' of its subjection to *ματαιότης* and its share in the hope of redemption (Ro $8^{18\text{-}22}$). There is suffering in nature; and there is suffering in man as part of nature. And all suffering, in nature or in little children, is the exposition and illustration of that which, in self-conscious and self-determining man, is sin. Dogmatism regarding the origin of sin and suffering is forbidden. To appeal to predestination for a theory is to bring the Eternal within the limits of time. We have nothing to do with origins. We have to do only with meanings and values. And this is the meaning which Christianity puts on pain. It means intensely; and it means evil. The first thing to be done with it is

not to discuss it or apologize for it, but to relieve it, if possible, and at least administer the healing of sympathy. This, then, is the first position of Christianity with respect to pain: it is not God's will for His creatures that they should suffer; it is His will that pain shall be abolished from His universe for evermore.

(2) Pain is not an unanswerable challenge to theism. It is not inconsistent with the supremacy of love. Love has won an eternal victory in an event which occurred in time. Love has snatched victory from defeat. It has transmuted the foulest crime of man into the instrument of the divine redemption. It has done this greatest thing. How shall it not accomplish all lesser things in the same order? He who redeems from sin will not be baffled by suffering. It is to be noted carefully that Christian thought, in claiming that God is not hindered by the obstacle of pain, is not passing from ethical to non-ethical considerations, giving up love to take up power. What Christian experience finds in the Cross of Christ is not an incident, an act over and done with, like the punishment of a criminal. It is the historic revelation of that which is in essence timeless, and endures through all time, and triumphs in all history, viz. the atoning love of God. The Cross is the supreme revelation of the divine immanence. God is present in all pain. He suffers in all suffering. He is the chief sufferer in the world.

Theology has never done justice to the surest affirmation of faith: 'In all their affliction he was afflicted.' The incarnation of God in Christ is the deepest truth of the divine relation to the world. Nicene orthodoxy is not orthodox enough. Misled by the Greek conception of the Absolute, it ascribes divinity to One who, nevertheless, has an experience of which God is incapable. But the God whom faith finds in Christ is the only God there is. He suffers in all that sin has wrought, and His suffering is the redemption of the world. Christianity meets the challenge of pain, not by anxious computations of the amount of good which may be extracted from the agonies that fill the records of time, but by the unveiling of the suffering of God. The Cross is the only Christian apologetic. Only through the suffering of God is it tolerable to suppose that a world with pain in it is His world, reconciled to Him, and carrying within its tragic history the energy of omnipotent redeeming love. We time-determined consciousnesses cannot pretend to understand God; but we know Him with an estimate that is sure and pierces the inevitable mists of time. God is love. This we know. For the rest we can afford to wait.

(3) Christianity sets out in the name and by the power of a victory already won, on its age-long vocation—the conquest of sin and suffering. To accept at God's hands the deliverance He has wrought by pain is to be committed to a perpetual war with pain. The campaign is world-wide. The battles are innumerable. The fundamental strategy is to utilize for every instance of pain the energy of love, which is the very nature of God and is available and adequate for the redemption of man. In this matter it may be that Church theology and Church policy have lagged behind the actual experience of Christians and have failed to push home the victory.

Three lines of action are prescribed by the consciousness of redemption. (i.) The employment of pain. It is here that optimism is most at home. Browning has rung out the answering challenge to pain. It is absolutely true that in a sinful world the perfecting of souls is won through suffering. We are to react on the pains we endure, and so make them subservient to the development of moral stature. We are bound to be swift and earnest in this subjection of pain to our uses; for the opportunity of so employing it passes with the passing moment. We are to lay to heart the thought which finds eloquent expression in Ugo Bassi's 'Sermon in the Hospital':

> 'While we suffer, let us set our souls
> To suffer perfectly: since this alone,
> The suffering, which is this world's special grace,
> May here be perfected and left behind.'[1]

All this is to be accepted, rejoiced in, and practised. The only reservation to be made is that such considerations do not establish optimism as a theory. The data are not broad enough. The victory over pain must first be won before specific sufferings can be attacked in detail and made to yield booty to the conqueror. This is the paradox of the higher life of man. Apart from this sure base in triumphant love, the flood of irrelevant pain in nature and history would rout the most confident optimism.

(ii.) The mastery of conditions. This is the sphere of organized ministry. All such service, whether operated by idealists or materialists, Christians or non-Christians, proceeds on the supposition that the conditions of human life are abnormal, and that, before full vigorous life can be enjoyed, these conditions must be improved. Another presupposition, however, has to be made if such ministerial aid to sufferers is to be completely successful, and is to be rendered, not merely with skill and fidelity, but with the energy of perfect confidence. We must be certified that in rendering such help we have the universe on our side, that resident within it are forces capable of carrying sentient creatures to such complete and harmonious exercise of function as shall be a perfect victory over pain. No alteration of conditions will be of any avail in social service or in medical work, unless there be this fountain of energy, discharging itself for ever through these channels. Apart from this, we shall not escape the verdict of pessimism on our most abundant efforts. Many will appeal to 'Nature'; but Christianity knows nothing of personified abstractions. It goes deep into experience, and finds the living God, triumphant over pain, and pouring the energy of His Spirit through channels of human ministry. Such an experience of God binds upon those who share it an inescapable obligation of combating pain of every kind, wheresoever it shows its desolating presence. They are the fellow-workers, without question or criticism, of all of any creed, or none, who will do this work and become conscious or unconscious instruments of love, suffering and victorious.

(iii.) The direct exhibition of the ultimate cure of pain, viz. the love of God in Christ. This is not an extravagance of unreasoning emotionalism. It is sober fact, verified in innumerable instances; God's love does heal pain. If the love of God were regnant in all human life, how much of the world's pain would remain? This is not an abstract speculation; it is a question whose answer cannot be arithmetically complete, and yet is absolutely sure, and admits of boundless practical application. We must make thorough work of the category of solidarity. Soul and body, man and man, race and race, humanity and nature: the universe is organic to the core. It lives from the centre. By the lines of solidarity pain has penetrated to the last filament of the vast web of life. By the same lines of solidarity the healing of pain will go spreading through the entire creation which now waits with eager longing for the revelation of the sons of God. Man's part in this comprehensive conquest of pain corresponds to his place and function in the world. In him the meaning and value of the world are consciously apprehended and uttered. By him too they have been grievously mistaken, and the forces which should have filled the world with the peace and joy of functions normally operating and perfectly fulfilled have been hindered, and the world of man and nature has been put to illimitable torture. It is not morbid when a man sees in the pain of innocent children, of wronged womanhood, and even of the creatures beneath our rank, the sign and seal of his own sin, the issues of a mighty evil in which he is confederate. It is the simple truth.

Therefore man has special work to do in the healing of pain. He has to receive the healing which love can bestow in his own experience, allowing it unhindered exercise as he is reconciled to God and to life. He has to become the conscious organ of that healing to all who suffer. He is never to inflict pain except in so far as pain, in the conditions under which we live (themselves abnormal), is the instrument of moral or physical benefit. He is to be ceaselessly the channel of the love of God to man. Simply by being in the communion of God, one living in the divine love becomes source and centre of healing to the souls and bodies of all around. The evidence is matter of daily experience. Yet the power of healing is not a bare physical force. It requires conscious appropriation and direction. Love that heals is not magic. It is effective as a vocation, accepted and fulfilled. The specific task of love belongs to the manifold opportunities of life, and these are innumerable. They include all ministries of help. In particular, two great obligations rest on all in whom love is doing its reconciling and healing work. One is witness, the other is prayer. The Church, called into being by love's deed, has been

[1] H. E. Hamilton King, *The Disciples*, London, 1887, p. 191.

slow in its recognition of these evident duties—slower, and less confident, in respect of the second than of the first. Yet it is in prayer that the function and high privilege of humanity do chiefly consist. By prayer man enters the sanctuary of the divine immanence. In prayer the indwelling love finds another home and citadel, a new centre from which to work. Prayer is the liberation of the spiritual energies that are saving the world. Prayer provides God with the conditions without which an Omnipotence that is moral, and not physical, dare not and cannot work. The question will be asked, Does this mean that any given pain can be relieved by prayer? The answer must be that dogmatism and prediction are forbidden by the organic structure of the universe. No man sins by himself or suffers by himself, and no man is redeemed for himself alone. It is impossible to cut a man out of the texture of his existence and operate on him as though he were an unrelated atom moving in empty space. We have no calculus by which to work out the measurements of the individual's sin and sufferings or to forecast the immediacy and completeness of his deliverance. At the same time, our answer must not 'limit God.' He certainly does not fling about His powers, healing at haphazard. But with equal confidence we may affirm that His healing power is available beyond any measure in which men have permitted it to operate. The *ordo salutis* here is fixed and cannot be altered: first the reconciliation, then the healing; first the faith that commits itself absolutely to God in Christ, then the faith that refuses no gift of God.

The experience recorded in the NT is normative. First, believers owned Jesus Lord, then they received the Spirit. The love to which they committed themselves lived on in them, and wrought mightily. No complete catalogue of such operations could be given. But among the lists that are given we read of healings (1 Co $12^{9.\ 28}$). The gifts of the Spirit are not magical, and there is nothing stereotyped in the activities produced by them. It would be ridiculous to infer from the presence of a certain gift in the NT communities that it must be perpetual in the Church of all ages. The gifts were created for use. If the use ceased, the gift was withdrawn. But is it fair to regard healing as a sporadic and passing manifestation of the Spirit's presence? Healing of the world's pain is certainly part of the world's redemption. Is it proper to make a distinction here and say that we will believe in the forgiveness of sins, but draw the line at the relief of pain? It may be that sects which we justly condemn for their absurd metaphysic and their ridiculous jargon, and for faults graver still, have such influence as belongs to them because they have been bold enough to rely on a healing power which belongs to the love that was, in Christ, the reconciliation of the world. It may be that the Church has to learn in this matter from those whom, quite justifiably, it has excluded from its fellowship. In any case, the conquest of pain is the work of omnipotent atoning love; and in prayer man co-operates with God in healing the hurt of humanity and of the world.

(4) Christian faith is more than conqueror of pain and can do much more for the sufferer than relieve him of his distress. Christianity teaches the transmutation of pain. Those who love God find that all things, pain included, work together for their good. As they go deeper into the experience of suffering, they make a still more wonderful discovery. In their pain they are not alone. They meet in that sequestered place Another, and He too is a sufferer. These two pains, theirs and His, draw together into the unity of one experience—He in them, and they in Him; their pain His, His pain theirs. This is not to escape from pain. It is to take out of pain the element which makes it an evil. When the self is surrendered to the love of God in Christ, the sting of pain, which is sin, is taken out of it. It becomes straightway part of a life-fellowship with redeeming love. It undergoes a complete transmutation. It has been taken up into the pain that is the price of the world's redemption. There is no question of diminishing the value of love's redeeming deed on the Cross of Christ. But the method of triumphant love remains. The ages reproduce the method of Calvary. The sufferings of Christ rise like a tide in the souls of His people (Ph 3^{10}, Col 1^{24}). Their sufferings take on the quality of His. They are ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial. They are not on that account less hard to bear. Were shame and spitting, thorns and nails, less painful because Jesus bore them as part of His obedience? Suffering borne with Him is suffering still. It is, however, bearable, and far more than bearable. It is utterly changed. It is not a fate, but a vocation, the highest service that a soul can render to God or man. Its evil is blotted out. It is a moment in the being of the highest good. This does not mean that in every suffering a believing man will be conscious that it is good. The pain may inhibit the sense of joy, even as it did with Jesus on the Cross. But none the less is it received and retained by the servant of God as the crown of his ministry, even as Jesus refused to come down from His Cross.

Perhaps James Hinton overstrains the thought when he suggests that our feeling of pain in sacrifice is due to the lack of a perfect love in us. Sacrifice is pain; but in deepest anguish we know it preferable to the best that the world can give.

'Remembering these things . . . what should we consider the presence of pain in the world to mean? . . . Does it not mean that a world in which so much of pain is present, is adapted—was altogether made—to be the scene of an overpowering, an absorbing love? . . . The reason we are made, or seem as if we were made for pain, is that we are made for love. . . .

What is the happiness God has meant us for, the happiness to which human nature is fitted, to which it should aspire? Should it be that from which the painful is banished, or that in which pain is latent? Should pain be merely absent, or swallowed up in love and turned to joy? . . .

The pain that is latent in man's bliss is latent, too, in God's; in His most as He is highest: and that great life and death to which the eyes of men are ever turned, or wandering ever are recalled, reveals it to us. . . .

All pains may be summed up in sacrifice; and sacrifice is—of course it is—the instrument of joy.'[1]

This is a nobler optimism than that which rests its case on the fruitage of benefit out of pain. Browning, who is the poet of the one, has not missed the other:

'I think this is the authentic sign and seal
Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad,
And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts
Into a rage to suffer for mankind,
And recommence at sorrow: drops like seed
After the blossom, ultimate of all.'[2]

The mystery of pain, then, is hid with Christ in God and becomes the open secret of the universe. All pain is a symbol of the suffering of God, and fulfils the function of sacrifice. These innumerable untold and incalculable pains of nature and of humanity are drawn into the compass of the atoning suffering of God. The sign of the Cross is upon a world of sin. The ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial quality of suffering begins very early in the history of the world. Its presence is ever more closely marked as the scale of being rises. It can be traced in each stage of the 'ascent of man.' It can be followed along the whole course of that river of blood and tears which flows through human history. It is useless to make computations, and ask, Was even redemption worth such a price? It would

[1] *The Mystery of Pain*[2], pp. 37, 38, 39, 40, 52.
[2] *Balaustion's Adventure.*

not be, if the price paid were merely human pain. But within the human pain is hid the anguish of crucified love. It is part of 'the reproach of Christ.' Because the infinite love shares this pain, it is transmuted. It becomes part of the price which God pays. Nothing could apologize for God, not any benefit wrung from tortured bodies and slaughtered souls, if He merely looked on from a throne of omnipotence. But a God who suffers is immune from our criticism and does not need our defence. The suffering of love has redeemed the world and has not lost its redeeming power.

Confessedly, this is a faith, not a theory. It is not the less, but the more, sure on that account. It is not a precarious inference from insecure premisses. Its premisses are the love and suffering of God, revealed in the ministry and the Cross of Christ, and apprehended in the act which commits the soul to their redeeming power. Faith is not an act finished in a spasm of emotion. It is the assumption of an attitude towards God and towards life, warranted and established by God's redeeming action.

Faith, says a great Christian teacher, 'is the whole being and attitude of the soul as determined by the sin-bearing love of God in Christ. That love, and that love alone, evokes it, and on that love and that alone, it rests.'[1]

Therefore, Christian optimism is not a document which can be signed, sealed, and delivered to a suffering world to solve the whole problem of suffering. It is the outcome of an experience. Experience cannot be finished, gathered up, and put aside. It lives and grows from a centre. Those who will know the force of its demonstration must occupy the central standpoint. As that is reached in the act of self-commitment to the appeal of divine suffering love, it can be retained only in the continued action of communion with God. Faith in divine providence is not easy. Did any serious thinker ever imagine a state of mind in which faith would rest on an argument? Faith is a post held in the midst of a furious attack which never ceases. It can be held only in prayer. Prayer is at once communion and co-operation with God. In both aspects it carries with it confirmation of faith. Without it faith withers and dies. As we live by receiving the divine love and by acting in the power of it, even to the last limit of devotion, the world where men suffer reveals itself as still within the compass of a sovereign purpose which through pain is passing to its victory. And prayer is the concentrated power of that life, the life of receiving and of giving. Prayer, therefore, conveys the final proof of divine providence. In prayer the darkness of suffering comes into the light of divine victorious love.

(5) Lastly, the Christian view of pain is available for comfort. Comfort for such suffering as the world is full of cannot consist in words.

'The philosopher's generalisations falter, and only the professional pietist, babbling about all being for the best, keeps on talking. His observations are highly admirable. But even faith is almost ashamed of them. It is better to say nothing. There is simply nothing to be said.'[2]

The only offer of comfort that will not insult the sufferer comes from the love of a God who can and does suffer. This is the knowledge we have of Him. Where suffering is He is, in the fullness of a power won by His own pain. Outside of Him there is no comfort. A world without suffering love at the heart of it would be an atheistic world. The last word regarding it would be unrelieved pessimism.

Comfort is the work of God within the soul. It is direct, immediate, as the divine Spirit enfolds the human in the unity of a mutual indwelling. Its action is beneath the eye of the observer; and it fulfils its mission when there is no eye to see, no heart to pity. It is the privilege of creatures whose consciousness is other than human. It upholds those who are not conscious of its operations. Beneath their pain there is a divine experience of which theirs is part. Christianity is withheld from pessimism, only because it holds thus profoundly the truth of the divine immanence. Only so is it withheld from blasphemy, as it beholds the agonies of the world. Even so, it is dumb with amazement. All the more earnestly does it lay upon those who have received the Divine consolations the duty of ministering to those who suffer. Their fulfilment of this duty consists in making themselves the vehicles of redeeming love. They have nothing of their own to give. The comfort they can give is simply the comfort they have received, and that is the love of God. Whatever they say and do will be effective as it bears witness to, and is the medium of, this—the only medicine for human hurt. In many cases silence will be the most perfect human vehicle of the divine comfort.

The Christian view of pain does not warrant the conclusion that in the case of the individual all suffering will cease. The organism is disordered, and the elimination of pain cannot take place at haphazard. The doctrine of divine providence, however, rests on the eternal victory of love, of which the time-development of the world contains the progressive achievement. It, therefore, becomes a prediction of that which will emerge out of time—the complete reconciliation of the world.

Without this, comfort in suffering would be incomplete. God has no comfort to give if He is uncertain of victory. Love is triumphant over sin and suffering; therefore both sin and suffering will cease to be. The final message of Christianity to a suffering world is one of an immortal hope: 'There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away.'

LITERATURE.—See references in artt. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM and GOOD AND EVIL; and art. 'Pessimism' in *EBr*[11]. Almost all volumes dealing with the philosophy of religion, or with Christian apologetic or dogmatic, have discussions of the topic. A selection of English works is here appended. J. Sully, *Pessimism, a History and a Criticism*[2], London, 1892; John Tulloch, *Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion*, Edinburgh, 1884; Robert Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*[5], do. 1894; W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, do. 1907; E. Naville, *Le Problème du mal*, Lausanne, 1868, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871; A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, London, 1902; J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Oxford, 1917; John Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, Glasgow, 1907, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, 2 vols., do. 1912; E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1893, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 2 vols., do. 1904; A. C. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*[2], Edinburgh, 1899; J. Oswald Dykes, *The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence*, do. 1909; Horace Bushnell, *The Moral Uses of Dark Things*, New York, 1868; Henry Jones, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, London, 1891; J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, Edinburgh, 1912; P. Carnegie Simpson, *The Facts of Life*, London, 1913; C. F. D'Arcy, *God and Freedom in Human Experience*, do. 1915; R. L. Ottley, *Christian Ideas and Ideals*, do. 1909; B. H. Streeter and others, *Concerning Prayer*, do. 1916; F. J. Foakes-Jackson and others, *The Faith and the War*, do. 1915; [L. Dougall], *The Christian Doctrine of Health*, do. 1916; W. R. Sorley and others, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life*, Cambridge, 1916; J. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*[3], Edinburgh, 1897; A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World*, New York and London, 1907; G. J. Blewett, *The Christian View of the World*, New Haven, U.S.A., and London, 1912; William James, *Pragmatism*, London, 1907; A. B. Bruce, *The Moral Order of the World*, do. 1899, *The Providential Order of the World*, do. 1897; C. C. Everett, *Theism and the Christian Faith*, New York and London, 1909; W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, Edinburgh, 1906; G. C. Workman, *At Onement*, London, 1911; Henry Drummond, *The Ascent of Man*, do. 1894; W. S. Palmer, *Providence and Faith*, do. 1917; Douglas White, *Forgiveness and Suffering*, Cambridge, 1913; W. F. Cobb, *Spiritual Healing*, London, 1914; Frank Ballard, *Why does not God intervene?*, do. 1912; James Hinton, *The Mystery of Pain*[2], do. 1907; J. H. Brookes, *The Mystery of Suffering*, New York, 1903; P.

[1] Denney, *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 295.
[2] Carnegie Simpson, *Facts of Life*, p. 72.

Laurent, *The Mission of Pain*, Eng. tr., London, 1910; V. C. Harrington, *Problem of Human Suffering*, New York, 1899; J. Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, London, 1917; J. E. McFadyen, *Jesus and Life*, do. 1917; G. Steven, *The Warp and the Woof*, do. 1917; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1918.

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SUFFERING MESSIAH. — See JESUS CHRIST, vii. 514, MESSIAH, viii. 574[a].

ṢŪFĪS. — **1. Derivation and meaning.** — The derivation of the name 'Ṣūfīs' (Muḥammadan mystics) was long a subject of dispute. Most Ṣūfīs favour the theory that it is derived from *ṣafā* ('purity') and that the Ṣūfī is one of the elect who have become purified from all worldly defilements. Others would connect it with *ṣaff* ('rank'), as though the Ṣūfī were spiritually in the first rank in virtue of his communion with God; or with *ṣuffa* ('bench'), referring the origin of Ṣūfism[1] to the Ahl al-ṣuffa ('people of the bench'), a title given to certain poor Muslims in the early days of Islām who had no house or lodging and therefore used to take shelter on the covered bench outside the mosque built by the Prophet at Medīna. As Qushairī and other Ṣūfīs admit, none of these explanations is etymologically defensible. There is, however, among the derivations proposed by the Ṣūfīs themselves one which does not violate the principles of etymology. The author of the oldest extant Arabic treatise on Ṣūfism, Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, declares that in his opinion (which, naturally, is not based on philological grounds) the word 'Ṣūfī' is derived from *ṣūf* ('wool'), 'for the woollen raiment is the habit of the prophets and the badge of the saints and elect, as appears in many traditions and narratives.'[2] Notwithstanding the facetious remark of Scaliger, 'quod quidam Sofi a flocco lanae dictum uolunt, hoc leuius est ipso flocco lanae,' it was perceived by some European Orientalists in the 18th cent. that this derivation was what Reiske pronounced it to be—'sola uera et grammaticae ipsique rei congrua.' Meanwhile its claims to acceptance were challenged by Joseph von Hammer, who in his *Gesch. der schönen Redekünste Persiens*,[3] asserted that the Ṣūfīs are related to the ancient gymnosophists of India and that 'the Arabic words Ṣūfī (mystic) and *ṣāfī* (pure) belong to the same root, like the Greek *σοφός* and *σαφής*.' This unlucky sentence might cast doubt on von Hammer's competence as a philologist, but his suggested equation of 'Ṣūfī' with *σοφός* was, at first sight, plausible enough. Although rejected by Tholuck,[4] it has been championed in comparatively recent times by Adalbert Merx.[5] In 1894 the question was finally settled by Th. Nöldeke, at that time Professor of Arabic in the University of Strassburg. He pointed out[6] that the word *σοφός* is unknown in Aramaic and therefore could scarcely be expected to occur in Arabic. On the other hand, both Aramaic and Arabic have the words *σοφιστής* and *φιλόσοφος*, and in the latter language the *σ* is represented by *sīn* (س), as is almost invariably the case in Greek words which have been Arabicized, not by *ṣād* (ص). If 'Ṣūfī' were of Greek extraction, its initial *ṣād* would be at least abnormal. Further, we have no positive ground for regarding the derivation from *σοφός* as probable in itself, whereas the derivation from *ṣūf* is confirmed by the authority of Oriental tradition. Nöldeke then cites a number of passages showing that, in the first two centuries of Islām, garments of coarse wool were worn by the common people and especially by those who followed an ascetic way of life. The words *labisa 'l-ṣūf*, 'he clad himself in wool,' occur frequently in the early literature and signify that the person to whom they are applied has renounced the world and become an ascetic; at a later period, when asceticism passed into mysticism, *labisa 'l-ṣūf* generally means 'he became a Ṣūfī.' In Persian too the ascetic is often called *pashmīna-pūsh*, *i.e.* 'wearing a woollen garment.' The old Muslim ascetics who clothed themselves in wool borrowed this practice from Christian hermits or monks. When Ḥammād b. Salama († A.D. 784) came to Baṣra, he said to Farqad al-Sanjī, who appeared before him in a woollen garment, 'Put off this (emblem of) Christianity.'[1] Such garments are described as *ziyy al-ruhbān*, 'the dress of the Christian ascetics.'[2] A *ḥadīth* put in the mouth of the Prophet states that Jesus Himself used to wear them.

We are told by Jāmī[3] that the name 'Ṣūfī' was first borne by Abū Hāshim of Kūfa, a contemporary of Sufyān al-Thaurī († A.D. 778). According to Qushairī,[4] it came into vogue before A.H. 200 (=A.D. 815). Al-Sarrāj mentions the view that it was invented by the people of Baghdād.[5] Although the circumstances of its origin are obscure, it seems to have gained currency during the period of transition from asceticism to mysticism, about the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijrah, and may possibly mark some stage in that process. No weight can be attached to the apocryphal traditions which seek to prove that the appellation existed in the Prophet's time or even throw it back into the pre-Islāmic age. The Ṣūfīs of the 3rd and 4th centuries, who claimed to be the true spiritual descendants of Muḥammad, considered themselves fully justified in fabricating evidence in support of their assertion. So far as the present writer is aware, the first Arabic writer to use the word 'Ṣūfī' is Jāḥiẓ of Baṣra († A.D. 869), who refers to 'the Ṣūfīs amongst the pietists' (*al-Ṣūfīya mina 'l-nussāk*) and enumerates the names of several who were famous for their eloquence.[6]

In the present article the terms 'Ṣūfī' and 'Ṣūfism' are to be understood in their ordinary sense, viz. as equivalent to 'Muḥammadan mystic' and 'Muḥammadan mysticism.' Ancient Ṣūfism, however, had strong ascetic tendencies, while the mystical element might be insignificant; and there have always been Ṣūfīs of an ascetic and devotional type whom we should hesitate to describe as mystics in the proper meaning of the word. In Persian and Turkish poetry 'Ṣūfī' sometimes bears the sense of 'hypocritical pietist' or 'dissolute free-thinker' and may be used as a term of reproach by poets who are themselves Ṣūfīs of a different sort.[7]

2. Origin and early development.—The beginnings of mysticism in Islām take us back to the great ascetic movement which arose, largely under Christian influence, during the 7th cent. A.D.[8] This is reflected in the biographical works containing notices of eminent Ṣūfīs, which include the names of many of those early ascetics. The movement, though extreme in certain directions, was mainly orthodox. It is characterized by

[1] 'Ṣūfism' is the more correct form. 'Ṣūfiism' implies derivation from 'Ṣūfi,' whereas the corresponding Arabic words *taṣawwuf* and *ṣūfī* are collateral formations from *ṣūf*, which is the common root of both.

[2] *Kitāb al-Luma'*, ed. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1916, p. 20 f.

[3] Vienna, 1818, p. 346, note 1.

[4] *Ssufismus*, p. 30 f.

[5] *Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, p. 37 f.

[6] *ZDMG* xlviii. [1891] 45 f.

[1] *Iqd*, Cairo, A.H. 1293, iii. 348.

[2] Sha'rānī, *Lawāqiḥ*, i. 45.

[3] *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, ed. W. N. Lees, Calcutta, 1859, p. 34.

[4] *Risāla*, Cairo, A.H. 1318, p. 9.

[5] *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 22.

[6] *Kitāb al-bayān*, Cairo, A.H. 1313, i. 138.

[7] Cf. E. J. W. Gibb, *Hist. of Ottoman Poetry*, London, 1900–09, i. 25 f.

[8] See art. ASCETICISM (Muslim).

intense religious exaltation, an overwhelming consciousness of human frailty, boundless fear of God, and utter submission to His will. There was no organized monastic life, though some ascetics wandered to and fro accompanied by a few friends or held prayer-meetings in which they studied the Qur'ān and discussed their spiritual experiences. Baṣra seems to have been the centre of an anti-ritualistic party who laid stress on the higher aspects of asceticism, regarding it as essentially an inward feeling, whereas the Syrians were more concerned with its external forms;[1] Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (*q.v.*) said that it consisted in humility and was not a matter of dress and food. Examination of what is involved in the first article of the Muslim creed—the command to associate nothing with Allāh—gradually led to the view that true asceticism is incompatible with any selfish desire, even with the desire to undergo the utmost privations and austerities for the sake of winning paradise, and that it must culminate in disinterested love of God.[2] Thus the old asceticism, rooted in fanatical exaggeration of religious observances, gave way to a doctrine which in the end threatened to make all observances unnecessary. But this consequence did not show itself immediately. The Ṣūfīs of the 2nd cent. were usually orthodox and law-abiding. They cultivated poverty, self-abasement, resignation. If they loved God, they feared Him more, and on the whole their mysticism lacked positive qualities as well as distinctive theories. They stand midway between asceticism (*zuhd*) and theosophy, or gnosis (*ma'rifat*). The word that best describes their attitude is 'quietism' (*riḍā*).

Special mention may be made of Ibrāhīm b. Adham, a prince of Balkh, whose legend is modelled on the story of Buddha;[3] Shaqīq, also of Balkh, who developed the doctrine of 'trust in God' (*tawakkul*);[4] Rābi'a al-'Adawiya, a saintly woman who was born at Baṣra and died at Jerusalem;[5] and Ma'rūf al-Karkhī, a native of Baghdād.[6] The two last-named foreshadow the ecstatic and enthusiastic mysticism which is characteristic of the succeeding age, although it may be doubted whether all the sayings and verses attributed to Rābi'a on the subject of divine love are genuine. Ma'rūf is the author of the first recorded definition of Ṣūfism, 'to grasp the verities and to renounce that which is in the hands of God's creatures.'[7]

During the 3rd cent. Ṣūfism enters decisively on a new course. The ascetic and quietistic spirit, though still strong, is overpowered by speculative and pantheistic tendencies which had hitherto remained in the background but now assert themselves with increasing boldness. Notwithstanding the dominant and vital part which these tendencies play in the future development of Ṣūfism, it is a mistake to identify their triumph with the origin of Ṣūfism. Nor is it less a mistake to describe them as an entirely foreign element which flowed into Ṣūfism from outside and rapidly transformed it, so that all at once it became different in kind. The germs of Ṣūfī pantheism are to be found in the Qur'ān:

E.g., xxviii. 88: 'Every thing is perishing (*hālik*) except the face (reality) of Allah'; lv. 26 f.: 'Every one on the earth is passing away (*fānī*), but the glorious and honoured face of thy Lord abideth for ever'; and ii. 109: 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah.'

Certainly the Muslim mystics might have arrived independently at the conclusion that Allāh is the only real being.

'It is conceivable that this notion may have come into Islam from outside; on the other hand, speculation on the doctrine of the divine unity appears sufficient to account for its development and indeed for its origin. Had there been more gods than one, says the Koran, the heavens and the earth must have come to grief; but if any attempt be made to define the word "god" metaphysically, speculation quickly leads to something like the truly existing or the necessarily existing; even with Homer the difference between God and man is that the former is eternal, the latter transient. The relation between God and matter immediately suggests questions: is matter independent of God, or not? The former supposition leads to polytheism, the latter only is consistent with real monotheism. If, then, God is not outside matter, He must in a way be identical with matter; and the most thoughtful of the Ṣūfīs, accepting this conclusion, based on it a series of inferences as unlike the original doctrines of Islam as any that could have been evolved.'[1]

Theoretically, there is no reason why the Ṣūfīs should not have reached their pantheistic goal in some such fashion as this, and probably they often did, although in most cases it was a truth grasped intuitively from mystical experience rather than the result of philosophical reflexion. But, in seeking to explain how they advanced from quietism to pantheism, we cannot proceed on the assumption that they were wholly impervious to non-Islāmic ideas. The influence of Christianity, Neo-Platonism, and Buddhism is an undeniable fact. It was in the air and inevitably made itself felt. Of its extent and importance we have ample evidence, although the materials at our disposal seldom enable us to trace it out in detail. In short the new Ṣūfism of the 3rd cent., like Ṣūfism in every period of its history, is the product of diverse forces working together — speculative developments of the Muḥammadan monotheistic idea, Christian asceticism and mysticism, Gnosticism, Greek and Indian philosophies. Until recently the problem has been attacked on the wrong lines. Many former investigators held the view that this great movement, which drew its life and strength from all classes and races in the Muslim empire, could be adequately explained by pointing to one definite source (*e.g.*, the Vedānta or Neo-Platonism) or by formulating theories which are at best half-truths (*e.g.*, that Ṣūfism was a reaction of the Aryan mind against a Semitic religion forcibly imposed on it). It is now, the present writer thinks, recognized that, instead of searching in vain after a single cause, we should endeavour to study the various influences by which the Ṣūfī doctrine was moulded, to place them in due order and connexion, and to distinguish as far as possible what was contributed by each. These influences constitute the environment in which the doctrine developed, and among them are to be reckoned all political, social, and intellectual conditions which favoured the growth of mysticism, such as the devastating civil wars of the Umayyad period, the sceptical and rationalistic currents that ran strongly in the early 'Abbāsid age, and particularly the bitter sectarianism and barren dogmatism of the *'ulamā*.

The main features in the evolution of Ṣūfism in the 3rd cent. may be set forth as follows.

The older Ṣūfīs had sought to bring every word, act, and thought of their lives into harmony with the divine will—an ideal which expressed their conception of Allāh as a transcendent personality, 'the Lord of created beings,' and which they attained by means of asceticism. This theory and practice naturally produced (1) the doctrine of divine love, which is the highest positive form of quietism, and (2) ecstasy, which is frequently a result, either involuntary or intentional, of ascetic exercises. Although the early Ṣūfīs were more or less orthodox, their relation to Islām being not unlike that of the mediæval Spanish mystics to the Roman Catholic Church, a religion of love and ecstasy was bound to come into conflict with Islām sooner or later. Rābi'a declared that she had no

[1] *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo, A.H. 1310, i. 129.
[2] Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*, p. 167 f.
[3] See art. 'Ibrāhīm b. Adham' in *EI*; Goldziher, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 132 f.; Nicholson, in *ZA* xxvi. [1911] 215 f.
[4] See art. Asceticism (Muslim).
[5] See von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, p. 64 f.; R. Dozy, *Essai sur l'hist. de l'islamisme*, tr V. Chauvin, Leyden, 1879, p. 318 f.; Nicholson, *A Literary Hist. of the Arabs*, London, 1907, p. 233 f.
[6] See *JRAS*, 1906, p. 306 f.
[7] *Ib.* p. 331.

[1] Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*, p. 180 f.

fear of hell or hope of paradise, and that she could not love the Prophet because her love of God absorbed her so entirely that neither love nor hate of any other thing remained in her heart. The barrier between Allāh and His creatures was gradually broken down. The definition of divine unity (*tauḥīd*) became pantheistic; the unique personality of Allāh, far above and beyond human reach, was transformed into the one real Being (*al-Ḥaqq*) revealed in all created things, the mystic's true self, which he finds by losing his individual consciousness in ecstatic self-abandonment. This doctrine, however it may be disguised, is the essence of Ṣūfism, and the historical circumstances of its origin justify the statement that it was at least partially derived from sources outside of Islām. Merx, indeed, seems to go too far when he calls it 'Greek' and connects it specifically with the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite,[1] though it may well have been influenced both by them and by the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a Neo-Platonic treatise of which an Arabic version appeared before the end of the 3rd century. But at this epoch little can have been borrowed directly from books. What makes the influence of Hellenism certain is the fact that in Western Asia and Egypt the Ṣūfī theosophy arose on a soil long saturated with Hellenistic culture, while some of its leading exponents were non-Arab Muslims belonging to the subject nationalities.[2]

One example will suffice. The mystical knowledge of God peculiar to the Ṣūfīs is denoted by the term *ma'rifat* = γνῶσις, *i.e.* immediate knowledge resulting from apocalyptic vision. It is defined in this sense by several Ṣūfīs of the 3rd cent., but we owe the first important speculations on its nature to Dhu 'l-Nūn of Egypt († A.D. 859), of whom his Persian biographer says: 'He is the head of this sect [the Ṣūfīs]: they all descend from and are related to him.'[3] That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; yet it shows the significance of the man. Now, Dhu 'l-Nūn was a Copt or Nubian by race; he is described as a philosopher and alchemist—*i.e.* a student of Greek wisdom; during his life he was regarded by many as a *zindīq* (free-thinker). Here we have plain indications that, as soon as Islāmic mysticism began to develop, it drew inspiration from the doctrine concerning 'a gnosis or higher knowledge which can be taught with safety'—as Dhu 'l-Nūn also says—'only to the "perfect" or "fully initiated."'[4] While Dhu 'l-Nūn conceived the Ṣūfī's supreme experience as a super-intellectual God-given knowledge, peculiar to those who 'see God with their hearts' and ultimately involving complete unconsciousness ('the more a man knows God, the more is he lost in Him'), he never makes use of the term *fanā*, which is associated with the name of his contemporary, Abū Yazīd, or Bāyazīd, of Bisṭām. *Fanā* is best rendered by 'passing-away'; it may be applied to the disappearance of evil qualities or, in its pantheistic sense, to the passing-away of the whole individual self in union with God. Possibly the term was derived by Muslim mystics from a verse in the Qur'ān[5] quoted above, but in Eastern Persia, where it first came into prominence, it must have been deeply coloured by Perso-Indian ideas.[6] The definition of *fanā* as a moral state, and of the means by which the extinction of all passions and desires is brought about, agrees so exactly with the definition of *nirvāṇa* that Buddhistic influence cannot be denied. As regards the pantheistic aspect of *fanā*, the Vedānta and similar forms of Indian thought readily suggest themselves. Here again the lives and sayings of representative Ṣūfīs, in conjunction with other historical evidence, provide the only trustworthy clue. Bāyazīd was a native of Khurāsān. His grandfather was a Zoroastrian and his master in Ṣūfism a Kurd. He learned the mystical doctrine of passing-away (*fanā*) in the divine unity from Abū 'Alī of Sind. He knew the Indian practice of 'watching the breaths' (*pās-i anfās*) and described it as the gnostic's worship of God.[7] The character of his pantheism is probably reflected in the utterances which his legend records, even if their authenticity may be questioned—for example,

'I went from God to God, until they cried from me in me, "O Thou I!"'

'Verily, I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me. Glory to me! How great is my majesty!'

'Nothing is better for man than to be without aught, having no asceticism, no theory, no practice. When he is without all, he is with all.'

'Creatures are subject to states, but the gnostic has no state, because his vestiges are obliterated and his individuality (*huwiyat*) passes away in the individuality of Another and his traces are effaced by Another's traces.'

At this time earnest Ṣūfīs did not habitually and openly indulge in the language of 'deification.' The doctrine underlying it was esoteric, reserved for adepts in theosophy, who usually were more discreet than Bāyazīd and Ḥallāj. They saw the necessity of keeping their mystical theories in close touch with the religion which they professed. Consequently the Qur'ān and the Sunna were proclaimed to be the standard to which not only speculation but also spiritual feelings and states must conform.

Let us now consider the methods whereby a reconciliation was effected and take a general survey of the relations existing between Ṣūfism and Islām.

3. The Law, the Path, and the Truth.—The Qur'ān contains a few passages from which it can fairly be argued that Muḥammad had in him something of the mystic, but that book as a whole is no better fitted than the Pentateuch to form the basis of a system of mysticism. Nevertheless, the Ṣūfīs, adopting the Shī'ite principle of allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*), were able to prove to their own satisfaction that every verse and word of the sacred text hides treasures of meaning which God reveals to the elect[1]—meanings which flash upon the inward eye in moments of rapt meditation. So much being granted, one can imagine that it was easy to show Qur'ānic authority for any mystical doctrine whatsoever and to maintain that Ṣūfism was really the esoteric teaching of the Prophet communicated by him to his son-in-law, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. From the same principle it follows that the Ṣūfī interpretation of Islām admits an endless variety of divergent and even contradictory beliefs and practices, all of which *ex hypothesi* are equally valid in kind, though not in degree, since the meanings of the Qur'ān are infinite and reveal themselves to each mystic in proportion to the spiritual capacity with which he is endowed. Hence the Ṣūfīs are not a sect, and there is no uniform body of doctrine constituting what is called 'Ṣūfism.' The many-sidedness of the term is exemplified by the innumerable attempts made to define it.[2] Similarly, the attitude of the Ṣūfīs towards Muḥammadan religious law depends on a subjective criterion. Some punctiliously fulfilled their ritual obligations, while at the same time they recognized that forms of worship have only a relative value in comparison with 'the works of the heart,' or are altogether worthless except as symbols of spiritual realities. To make the pilgrimage, *e.g.*, is to journey away from sin; to put on the pilgrim's garb (*iḥrām*) is to cast off with one's every-day clothes all sensual thoughts and feelings. This is a well-known doctrine of the Ismā'īlīs, from whom the Ṣūfīs seem to have borrowed it.[3] Others are antinomian, whether they be free-thinking and free-living dervishes, genuine mystics like the Malāmatīs described by Hujwīrī,[4] whose fear of men's praise caused them deliberately to act in such a way as to incur reprobation, or gnostics supremely indifferent to the shadow-shows of religion and

[1] *Idee und Grundlinien*, p. 18 f.

[2] Many illustrations of the close parallelism existing between the leading ideas of Hellenistic religious philosophy and those of early Ṣūfism will be found in the introduction to *Bar Hebræus's Book of the Dove*, tr. A. J. Wensinck, Leyden, 1919, p. xxxix f.

[3] Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, p. 36.

[4] W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (*BL*), London, 1899, p. 81.

[5] lv. 26.

[6] See Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, p. 163; Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 16 ff.

[7] *Tadhkirat al-auliyā*, i. 162, 10; cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *The Yogāvacara's Manual* (*PTS*), London, 1896, p. x.

[1] Cf. *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 72 f.

[2] See *JRAS*, 1906, p. 330 ff.; Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, p. 166.

[3] Cf. *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 172 f. (Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 91 f.) with Browne's *Literary Hist. of Persia*, ii. 241 f.

[4] *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. Nicholson, p. 66; cf. M. Hartmann, *Der islamische orient. Berichte und Forschungen*, Berlin, 1899-1910, i. 156 f.

morality in a phantom world. Many Ṣūfīs, however, insist that, normally at any rate, perfect realization of the Truth (*ḥaqīqat*)—*i.e.* the consummation of the mystical life—is not only compatible with observance of the Law (*sharī'at*) but includes it as a facet or aspect of the whole. This view will be better explained if we give a brief account of its ethical and psychological basis.

The Ṣūfīs regarded themselves as a peculiarly favoured class, possessing an esoteric knowledge of the Qur'ān and the apostolic traditions, and using technical expressions which no ordinary Muslim could understand. This fostered a feeling of brotherhood, and it was not long before traces of organization began to appear. Eminent mystics gathered round them groups of disciples (small at first) for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Ṣūfīs were trained. It was generally held that for those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director (*shaikh*, *pīr*, *murshid*), was looked upon with suspicion. The authority of the *shaikhs* was absolute. It lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Hujwīrī mentions a three years' probation.

'The first year is devoted to service of the people [*i.e.* the Ṣūfīs], the second year to service of God, and the third year to watching over his own heart. He can serve the people, only when he places himself in the rank of servants and all others in the rank of masters, *i.e.*, he must regard all, without exception, as being better than himself and must deem it his duty to serve all alike. And he can serve God, only when he cuts off all his selfish interests relating either to the present or to the future life, and worships God for God's sake alone. . . . And he can watch over his heart, only when his thoughts are collected and every care is dismissed, so that in communion with God he guards his heart from the assaults of heedlessness.'[1]

On taking the vow of initiation, the novice was invested by his *shaikh* with the *khirqa* or *muraqqa'a*, a garment made of pieces of cloth stitched together, which in later times superseded the woollen dress worn by the original Ṣūfīs. This ceremony marked his admission to the Ṣūfī brotherhood. Occasionally a Ṣūfī might be invested with two *khirqas* by different *shaikhs*, as happened to Abū Sa'īd ibn Abi 'l-Khair. The veneration which the *shaikhs* inspired in their disciples is well known. Dhu 'l-Nūn went so far as to say that the true disciple should be more obedient to his master than to God Himself.[2] The rule, method, and religious practice inculcated by the *shaikh* and followed by the disciple constitute the Path (*ṭarīqa*). Accordingly, the Path has no fixed and uniform character; its details are determined by the individuality of the teacher. The *ṭarīqas* of the dervish orders exemplify this divergence. Broadly speaking, the Path corresponds to the *via purgativa* of mediæval Christian mysticism. Hunger, solitude, and silence are the chief weapons employed in the war against 'the flesh' (*nafs*). The ascetic and ethical discipline is divided into a progressive series of 'stations' (*maqāmāt*), which the learner must traverse, making himself perfect in every one of them before advancing to the next. They vary in number and order, but the first place is usually occupied by 'repentance' or 'conversion' (*ṭauba*), *i.e.* turning away from sin towards God. The moral ideal of the Ṣūfīs is unselfishness, whether it take the form of renouncing worldly possessions and desires, sincerity in word and deed without regard for the good opinions of others, patience, humility, charity, or trust in God and single-hearted devotion to His will.[1] These are the fruits of the Path, but its true end is attained by means of exercises in spiritual meditation and recollection which predispose and prepare the disciple for ecstatic experiences. It may be that he will never reach that end; ecstasy is an incalculable gift of divine grace and cannot be extorted. But the Ṣūfīs had a method of their own for producing the state of mind in which 'revelation' of the unseen was most likely to occur. They called it *dhikr* ('recollection'), set the highest value upon it, and deemed it the corner-stone of practical religion.[2] The simplest form of *dhikr* is the continual repetition of the name Allāh or of some short litany, accompanied with intense concentration on the thought of God.[3] Concentration might be assisted by other means, such as flagellation and holding the breath, until the sense of personality gradually disappeared in a state of trance.

'The first stage of *dhikr* is to forget self, and the last stage is the effacement of the thinker in the act of thought, without consciousness of thought, and such absorption in the object of thought as precludes return to the subject thereof.'[4] Concerted performances of *dhikr*, with music and dancing, were introduced at an early date, and their demoralizing effect on neophytes is noted by Hujwīrī.[5] Such prayer-services, as is well known, play an important part in the ritual of the dervish orders.[6]

A general view of Ṣūfī psychology, so far as it bears on the ecstatic life, may be obtained from Qushairī[7] or from the more systematic treatment of the subject by Ghazālī in the second half of his *Iḥyā*.[8]

There are four terms which, taken together, comprise the sensual, spiritual, and intellectual nature of man: (1) *nafs*, the appetitive soul; (2) *rūḥ*, the spirit; (3) *qalb*, the heart; (4) *'aql*, the intelligence. The *nafs*, being the seat of the passions, is wholly evil; its mortification by means of asceticism is the Ṣūfī's holy war (*jihād*). The *qalb* and the *rūḥ* (to which Qushairī adds the *sirr*, the inmost ground of the *qalb*) are the proper organs of the mystical life and are not clearly distinguished from one another. *Qalb*, as used by Ṣūfīs, does not signify the heart of flesh, but 'a transcendental subtlety' or non-material essence whereby the realities of all things are perceived and reflected as in a mirror. Hence the phrase *oculus cordis* has equivalents in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. But the power of the heart to perceive and reflect spiritual realities depends on its purity. It is veiled in greater or less degree by sensuous impressions—sin, egoism, book-learning, traditional faith, etc.; and, in proportion as these veils are removed, its vision of reality becomes more perfect. God alone can purify it, but the need for co-operation with the act of divine grace is asserted by those Ṣūfīs who follow the Path and attach particular importance to the methods of recollection (*dhikr*) and meditation (*murāqabat*), by which the heart is purged of everything except the thought of God. The 'stations' (*maqāmāt*) of the Path, which belong to the mystic's practical religion, are subordinate to the 'states' (*aḥwāl*), which belong to his inner life. The term 'state' (*ḥāl*) denotes a mood of feeling, a spiritual disposition or experience, which God causes to pass over the heart; it is not subject to human control, but comes and goes as God wills; usually it is transient, but it may abide permanently. The classification of *aḥwāl* in pairs of opposites—*e.g.*, hope and fear, expansion and contraction, presence and absence—answers to psychological facts familiar to students of mysticism. Passively yielding to the divine influences which swing him to and fro in an ascending scale, the Ṣūfī is 'the son of his time,' dominated by the 'state' in which he finds himself at the moment, oblivious of the past and without thought of the future. The highest 'states' are ecstatic, and the term *ḥāl* is often synonymous with ecstasy, though it had not this special sense originally.

Here we come back to the point at issue between Ṣūfism and Islām. Through ecstasy the Ṣūfī reaches the plane of the Truth (*ḥaqīqat*), where he is one with God. The person thus enraptured

[1] *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. Nicholson, p. 54.
[2] *Tadhkirat al-auliyā*, i. 131, 7.

[1] See R. Hartmann, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Ḳuschairī*, p. 44 ff.
[2] See art. ASCETICISM (Muslim).
[3] Cf. D. B. Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 255 *f.*
[4] *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, 161, 18. [5] *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, 420.
[6] Cf. E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[5], London, 1871, i. 309; Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, New York, 1911, p. 160 ff.; J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes, or Oriental Spiritualism*, London, 1868
[7] R. Hartmann, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Ḳuschairī*, p. 69 *f.*
[8] Summarized in Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 220 ff.

(*majdhūb*) is a saint (*walī*); no further testimony is required, since the doctrine that a saint who violates the Law is thereby shown to be an impostor applies only when the ecstatic fit has subsided. And in any case, it was argued, a divinely inspired man must not be judged by appearances; his knowledge of unseen things may justify him in doing what religion and morality condemn: the story of Moses and Khaḍir[1] illustrates this. Ecstasy not being confined to one sex, the Ṣūfī legend includes a long roll of women, to whom a separate section is sometimes allotted in standard hagiographical works. In accordance with the theopathetic character of Muslim saints, their miracles (*karāmāt* = χαρίσματα) are described, not as wrought by them, but as granted or manifested to them; and, while the higher Ṣūfism declares that 'reliance on miracles hinders the elect from penetrating to the inmost shrine of the Truth,' and that 'the greatest miracle is the substitution of a good quality for a bad one,' the popular *walī* cannot, even if he wishes, avoid the reputation of being gifted with powers which Muslims call 'extraordinary' and Europeans 'supernatural.' The saints form an invisible hierarchy by which the order of the world is maintained. At their head stands the *quṭb* ('axis'), under him inferior grades of sanctity—*nuqabā*, *autād*, *abrār*, *abdāl* or *budalā*, etc.—the numbers of each class increasing in proportion to its distance from the *quṭb*.[2] Probably this idea was taken over by the Ṣūfīs from the Shī'ites and Ismā'īlīs.[3]

The Ṣūfī theory of ecstasy recognizes two aspects of the experience of oneness with God. These aspects are symbolized by such negative terms as *fanā* ('passing-away' from individuality), *faqd* ('self-loss'), *sukr* ('intoxication'), with their positive counterparts *baqā* ('abiding in God'), *wajd* ('finding God'), and *ṣaḥw* ('sobriety'). In the controversy which arose as to the relative values of the ecstatic state and the subsequent return to consciousness[4] it is easy to discern the same motives as ranged Ṣūfīs on opposite sides in regard to the question, Were they antinomian or not? From the standpoint of pure Ṣūfism there is nothing beyond the supreme negation of self, when 'the mortal disappears' and religion no longer exists; but logic compels those Ṣūfīs who are more than nominal Muslims to set the life in God against and above the death to self, and to find the highest mystical experience in the state of conscious clairvoyance which succeeds the moment of ecstasy.

'The full circle of deification must comprehend both the inward and outward aspects of Deity—the One and the Many, the Truth and the Law. It is not enough to escape from all that is creaturely without entering into the eternal life of God the Creator as manifested in His works. To abide in God (*baqā*), after having passed away from selfhood (*fanā*), is the mark of the Perfect Man, who not only journeys *to* God, *i.e.* passes from plurality to unity, but *in* and *with* God, *i.e.* continuing in the unitive state, he returns with God to the phenomenal world from which he set out, and manifests unity in plurality. In this descent . . . he brings down and displays the Truth to mankind while fulfilling the duties of the religious law.'[5]

Such a compromise could not restore the balance effectually. The Ṣūfīs might do homage to the Law, but they ranked it below the Truth and even below the Path. And, if the Truth is above the Law, yet not in contradiction with it, the view was plausible that, when a man has attained to the Truth, all his acts and words are holy and in harmony with the spirit of the Law, however they may seem to clash with its letter. Still, a *via media* had to be secured, even at the price of illogical concessions on both sides.

A Persian Ṣūfī, writing in the 5th cent., laments that his contemporaries 'give the name of "law" to their lusts, call their own senseless fancies "divine knowledge," the motions of the heart and affections of the animal soul "divine love," heresy "poverty," scepticism "purity," disbelief in positive religion "a passing away from self," neglect of the Law of the Prophet "the mystic path."'[1]

In A.D. 1045 Qushairī published his famous 'Epistle on Ṣūfism' (*Risāla fī 'ilm al-taṣawwuf*), recalling to his fellow-mystics how in past times great Ṣūfīs spoke and behaved as good Muslims and set an example of piety which their unworthy successors had almost forgotten. That these protests were not made in vain was due above all to Ghazālī.[2] He fused the traditional and mystical elements into one mass. His work was lasting because it took shape not so much from the force of his mind as under the pressure of a searching spiritual experience: he had worked out and solved the problem in himself before he gave the result in his books. Fifty years after the appearance of Qushairī's *Risāla* Ghazālī resigned the professorship of theology and canon law which he held in the Niẓāmīya college at Baghdād and went into retirement as a Ṣūfī. He has told us in pages as fascinating as Newman's *Apologia* how his studies and meditations at last made his conversion inevitable, through what struggles he shed off philosophy, scholasticism, and legalism, and gained the certainty that the central truth of religion lies in the inner life of the soul.[3] By frankly accepting the main Ṣūfī position Ghazālī gave a new meaning to Islām and an assured place within its fold to many earnestly religious men and women whom the formalists would have driven out if they could. Henceforth Islām is in large measure a mystical faith. But Ghazālī always remained a Muslim in two essential points: (1) his reverence for the religious law, (2) his view of the nature of God. He shut the door against pantheism by insisting on the dogma that the Divine Being is personal, unique, distinct from all other beings. In so far as the human soul has these attributes, it is capable of knowing God; but it can never be identified with God. Our knowledge of God depends on His will to make Himself known through revelation to prophets and saints whom He created. This left Allāh spiritualized and brought near to men's hearts, but still Allāh, not the All in One. It may be said that Ghazālī belongs to Islām rather than to Islāmic mysticism, and that, inasmuch as he is not a pantheist, he is not a typical Ṣūfī. This seems true. On the other hand, while Ṣūfīs who are pantheists often use language implying belief in a personal God, such belief is by no means inconsistent with the full theory of *fanā*, or at least may be sincerely combined with it.

4. God, man, and the universe.—Upon the foundation of experimental mysticism the Ṣūfīs built a theology and a philosophy of which the forms are as various in content and expression as the materials are diverse in origin. It is a notable fact that the oldest scheme of this kind—which has recently been made accessible through the publication of the *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn* of Ḥallāj[4]—was derived from the Christian doctrine of two natures in God.

According to Ḥallāj (*q.v.*), the essence of God's essence is love. Before the creation God loved Himself in absolute unity and through love revealed Himself to Himself alone. Then, desiring to behold that love-in-aloneness, that love without otherness

[1] *Qur'ān*, xviii. 64–80.
[2] Cf. E. Blochet, 'Etudes sur l'ésoterisme musulman,' *JA*, 9th ser., xx. (1902) 49 ff.; Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 214.
[3] Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolegomena*, tr. M. de Slane, Paris, 1862–68, iii. 104 ff.; cf. H. S. Nyberg, *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-'Arabī*, Leyden, 1919, introd., p. 113.
[4] Cf. Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 184 f.
[5] Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 163.

[1] Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 8.
[2] See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Muslim).
[3] See *al-Munqidh min aḍ-Ḍalāl*, tr. Barbier de Meynard, *JA* VII. ix. 5 ff.; D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903, p. 215 f.
[4] See Literature.

and duality, as an external object, He brought forth from non-existence an image of Himself, endowed with all His attributes and names. This divine image is Adam, in and by whom God is made manifest. Ḥallāj, however, maintains a certain distinction between the divine and human natures. Even in their mystical union some personality survives: divinity (*lāhūt*) is infused in—not confused with—humanity (*nāsūt*), as wine in water; hence the 'deified' man cries, '*Ana 'l-Ḥaqq*,' '*I* am God.'[1] The markedly Christian flavour of the Ḥallājian doctrine, together with its author's use of the heretical term *ḥulūl* ('infusion' or 'incarnation'), condemned it in Muslim eyes, and later Ṣūfīs take care to give it a monistic interpretation; Ibn al-'Arabī, *e.g.*, reduces the *lāhūt* and *nāsūt* to correlative and interchangeable aspects of the one reality. Yet the magnitude of the debt which Ṣūfism owes to Ḥallāj can hardly be overestimated. His doctrine, though formally rejected, introduced and established in Islām the revolutionary idea that there is a principle of difference in the Absolute itself.

An important school of Ṣūfīs, whose watchword is 'the unity of being' (*waḥdat al-wujūd* or *ittiḥād*), hold that reality is one, that all apparent multiplicity is a mode of unity, and that the phenomenal is the outward manifestation of the real. Their views may be illustrated by giving some account of a work entitled *The Man perfect in Knowledge of the Last and First Things* by 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, a mystic of the 15th century A.D.[2]

The essence of God is unknowable *per se*; we must seek knowledge of it through its names and attributes. It is a substance with two accidents, eternity and everlastingness; with two qualities, creativeness and creatureliness; with two descriptions, uncreatedness and origination in time; with two names, Lord and slave (*i.e.* God and man); with two aspects, the outward or visible, which is the present world, and the inward or invisible, which is the world to come. Pure being, as such, has neither name nor attribute; only when it gradually descends from its absoluteness and enters the realm of manifestation do names and attributes appear imprinted on it. The sum of these attributes is the phenomenal universe, which is phenomenal in the sense that it shows reality under the form of externality. Although the distinction of essence and attribute must be admitted if we are to think of the universe at all, the two are ultimately one, like water and ice. The so-called phenomenal world—the world of attributes—is no illusion; it really exists as the self-revelation or other self of the Absolute. It expresses God's idea of Himself; for, as Ibn al-'Arabī says,

> 'We ourselves are the attributes by which we describe God: our existence is merely an objectification of His existence. God is necessary to us in order that we may exist, while we are necessary to Him, in order that He may be manifested to Himself.'

The simple essence, apart from all qualities and relations, Jīlī calls 'the darkness' (*al-'amā*). It develops consciousness by passing through three stages which modify its purity and simplicity. The first stage is oneness (*aḥadīyat*), the second is 'He-ness' (*huwīyat*), the third is 'I-ness' (*anīyat*). By this process of descent absolute being becomes the subject and object of all thought and reveals itself as divinity with distinctive attributes embracing the whole series of existence. While every appearance displays some attribute of reality, man is the microcosm in which all these attributes are united, and in him alone does the Absolute become conscious of itself in all its diverse aspects. This can only mean that the Absolute, having completely realized itself in human nature, returns into itself through the medium of human nature, or, in mystical language, that God and man become one in the perfect man—the divinely rapt prophet or saint—whose religious function as a mediator between man and God corresponds with his metaphysical function as the unifying principle by which the opposed terms of reality and appearance are harmonized. Therefore the upward movement of the Absolute, from the sphere of manifestation back to the unmanifested essence, takes place in and through the unitive experience of the soul; and so we have exchanged metaphysics for mysticism. Jīlī recognizes three phases of this experience running parallel, as it were, to the three stages—oneness, He-ness, and I-ness—traversed by the Absolute in its descent to consciousness, viz. the illumination of the names, the illumination of the attributes, and the illumination of the essence. The perfect man is the final cause of creation, the preserver of the universe, the *quṭb* ('axis') on which all the spheres of existence revolve. He is a copy made in the image of God—a type of the essence with its two correlated attributes, divinity and humanity. Hence his real nature is threefold, as Jīlī expressly declares in the following verses:

> 'If you say that it (the essence) is One, you are right; or if you say that it is Two, it is in fact Two;
> Or if you say, "No, it is Three," you are right, for that is the real nature of man.'[1]

Coming from a Muslim, who identifies the absolutely perfect man with the prophet Muḥammad, this Trinitarian doctrine is very remarkable; but we must remember that the Ṣūfīs generally regard Muḥammad as the Logos, the Light of God which existed before the creation of the world, and for the sake of which all things were made.[2] The Logos is manifested in every age by the prophets and saints, who alone are actually perfect, though all men are potentially so.

Other Ṣūfīs enumerate 'five different planes of existence (*ḥaẓarāt-i khamsa*), which loses in true Being as it descends,'[3] and many adopt the Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation.[4]

The theory that all existence, thought, and action are really divine leads to consequences from which the Ṣūfīs do not shrink. In the first place, the universe must be essentially good. Even infidelity and sin are effects of the divine activity and belong to the divine perfection. Satan himself glorifies God, inasmuch as his disobedience is subordinate to the eternal will. Yet some attributes, *i.e.* some aspects in which God shows Himself, such as majesty and wrath, are relatively less perfect than others, such as beauty and mercy. What men call evil is privation, not-being. In relation to the One, who has no opposite, it is nothing; it appears only in the phenomenal world, where things are manifested *per contraria*. Similarly, all religious beliefs must be essentially true. God, as Ibn al-'Arabī says, is not limited by any one creed.

To summarize Jīlī once more: the different forms of worship result from the variety of names and attributes by which God reveals Himself in creation. Every name and attribute produces its own characteristic effect; *e.g.*, God is the true Guide (*al-Hādī*); but He is also the Misleader (*al-Muḍill*), for the Qur'ān says: 'Allāh shall lead the wicked into error.' If any one of His names had remained ineffectual and unrealized, His self-manifestation would not have been complete. Therefore He sent His prophets, in order that those who followed them might worship Him as the One who guides mankind to salvation, and that those who disobeyed them might worship Him as the One who leads mankind to perdition. He is the truth or essence of every belief. Idolaters worship the being who permeates each atom of the material world; dualists adore the Creator and creature in one; magians (fire-worshippers) the unity in which all names and attributes pass away, just as fire destroys all natural properties and transmutes them to its own nature; those who deny the existence of a Creator really worship Him in respect of His He-ness, in which He is potentially but not actually creative. It follows that all men are saved at the last. But Jīlī, as a Muslim, is obliged to make distinctions.

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[1] *Kitāb al-Tawāsīn*, ed. Massignon, p. 129 f.

[2] See Shaikh Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. 150 ff.; Nicholson, 'The Ṣūfī Doctrine of the Perfect Man,' in *The Quest*, viii. [1917] 545 ff. A more adequate account of Jīlī's work will be found in the present writer's *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (in the press).

[1] *Al-insān al-kāmil*, Cairo, A.H. 1300, p. 10, l. 21 f.

[2] Tor Andrae, *Die person Muhammads*, Stockholm, 1918, p. 333 ff.

[3] See E. J. W. Gibb, *Hist. of Ottoman Poetry*, i. 54 f.

[4] Cf. Nicholson, *Selected Poems from the Dīvāni Shamsi Tabrīz*, Cambridge, 1898, p. xxxii f.

The more completely and universally the idea of God is presented in any form of worship, the more perfect that form must be. Religions revealed through a prophet contain the fullest measure of truth, and among these the most excellent is Islām. Non-Muslims, although their felicity is ultimately assured, suffer retribution: in the case of those who acknowledge no prophet, because they invented forms of worship for themselves; and, in the case of Jews and Christians, because they altered the one revelation brought by all the prophets from Adam to Muḥammad. Jīlī finds in Christianity the nearest approach to his own monistic interpretation of Islām. Christians (he says) recognize the two complementary sides of true belief concerning God, viz. that from one point of view He is above all likeness, while from the other point of view He reveals Himself in the forms of His creatures. Their mistake lies in the limitation to which they have subjected the principle that God becomes manifest in this way. God said in the Qur'ān, 'I breathed my spirit into Adam'; and here the name Adam signifies every human individual. The worship of those who behold God in man is the highest of all. Something of this vision Christians possess, and their doctrine about Jesus is a bridge that will lead them at last to the knowledge that mankind are like mirrors set face to face, each of which contains what is in all; and so they will behold God in themselves and declare Him to be absolutely One.

5. Sūfī poetry.—Among the practices devised by the Sūfīs for the purpose of stimulating religious emotion there is none more potent than that which they name 'audition' (*samā'*), *i.e.* listening to music and song.[1] Countless stories are told of Sūfīs who were thrown into ecstasy on hearing a few lines of verse chanted inadvertently by a singing-girl or with intention by one of themselves. Such verses were usually erotic, but not mystical; the allegorical sense was not given by the poet but was supplied by the hearer. In Sūfī poetry, of course, it is otherwise; here the poet's meaning is mystical, however sensuous may be the form in which it lurks. And often the two kinds are so like each other superficially that, unless we have some clue to the intention of the writer, we cannot easily decide whether we are reading an ode of human love or a hymn addressed to the Deity.[2] If it be asked why the Sūfīs make such large use of erotic and bacchanalian symbolism, the answer is that they could find no analogy more suggestive and better adapted to shadow forth the states of enthusiasm and ecstasy which their poets describe.

'Wine, torch, and beauty are epiphanies of Verity,
For it is that which is revealed under all forms soever.
Wine and torch are the transport and light of the knower;
Behold The Beauty, for it is hidden from none.
. . . . . .
Wine, torch, and beauty, all are present;
Neglect not to embrace that Beauty.
Quaff the wine of dying to self, and for a season
Peradventure you will be freed from the dominion of self.
Drink wine, for its cup is the face of the Friend;
The flagon is His eye drunken and flown with wine.'[3]

This poetry is the chief glory of Persian literature. It may be studied in the quatrains attributed to Abū Sa'īd b. Abi'l-Khair,[4] in the poems of Farīdu'ddīn 'Aṭṭār,[5] Jalāl al-dīn Rūmī (*q.v.*), and Jāmī,[6] or in the *Gulshani Rāz* of Maḥmūd Shabistarī. Whinfield's edition of the last-named work[7] is provided with explanatory notes and may be recommended as the best introduction to the subject. In Arabic this *genre* of poetry takes a more conventional form, which is not so attractive to Western readers, but the odes of Ibn al-Fāriḍ[8] are exceedingly fine, while those of Ibn al-'Arabī,[1] in spite of their recondite style, contain some passages of great beauty. Of the Turkish Ṣūfī poets the most interesting is Nesīmī,[2] a fervent admirer of Ḥallāj and a member of the sect known as Ḥurūfīs, who derive their title from the mystic significations which they attach to the letters of the alphabet and to combinations of these.[3]

The Ṣūfī poet is not directly concerned with metaphysics.

He 'lets his heart be wholly filled by the sublime conceptions of all-embracing Unity and all-conquering Love which form the real basis whereon all the rest is built. . . . He sees how the Truth is the one source of all existence, diffused throughout the universe through emanation after emanation; how the Primal Intelligence, itself rayed out from the One, rays out in turn the Primal Soul; how the Divine Names cast their light upon the darkness of not-being, each atom of which mirror-like reflects one. He sees how the Awful Attributes of the Truth are reflected in the existence of hell and the devils, and how the Beautiful Attributes are reflected in that of Paradise and the angels. He further sees how Man reflects all the Attributes, Awful and Beautiful alike, and is thus the Microcosm, summing up the universe in himself. He thus sees how it is the Truth alone that is acting through all things, and moreover how this action is a never-ceasing, never-pausing process, every existent atom being each instant clothed with a fresh phenomenal efflux radiated from the Source of Existence, and being again stripped of it, so that the whole contingent universe is momentarily being annihilated and re-created, though the successive acts of destruction and renewal follow one another in such swift succession that they are wholly imperceptible, and all appears as one uninterrupted line, even as an unbroken circle of fire is seen if a single spark shall be whirled quickly round. But the poet may not rest content with the mere perception of these high mysteries; indeed that very Love which has revealed them to him impels him to seek reunion with the Truth.'[4]

God, as the poets conceive Him, is the eternal Beauty which by the necessity of its nature desires to be loved, manifests itself for the sake of love, and is the real object of all love. Even earthly love is a type of spiritual, a bridge leading to reality.[5] The soul, being divine in its essence, longs for union with that from which it is separated by the illusion of individuality, and this longing aspiration, which urges it to pass away from self-hood and to rise on the wings of ecstasy, is the only means whereby it can return to its original home. Love transmutes into pure gold the base phenomenal alloy of which every creature partakes. While reason is dualistic, love unifies by transcending thought.

'He comes, a moon whose like the sky ne'er saw, awake or dreaming,
Crowned with eternal flame no flood can lay.
Lo, from the flagon of thy love, O Lord, my soul is swimming,
And ruined all my body's house of clay!

When first the Giver of the grape my lonely heart befriended,
Wine fired my bosom and my veins filled up,
But when his image all mine eye possessed, a voice descended:
"Well done, O sovereign Wine and peerless Cup!"

Love's mighty arm from roof to base each dark abode is hewing
Where chinks reluctant catch a golden ray.
My heart, when Love's sea of a sudden burst into its viewing,
Leaped headlong in, with "Find me now who may!"'[6]

The following passages further illustrate the manner in which this principle is applied by Ṣūfī poets.

Love is the final cause of creation:

'In solitude, where Being signless dwelt,
And all the universe still dormant lay
Concealed in selflessness, One Being was,
Exempt from "I"- or "Thou"-ness, and apart
From all duality; Beauty Supreme,
Unmanifest except unto Itself
By Its own light, yet fraught with power to charm
The souls of all . . .
But Beauty cannot brook
Concealment and the veil, nor patient rest
Unseen and unadmired: 'twill burst all bonds
And from its prison-casement to the world
Reveal Itself . . .

1 Cf. D. B. Macdonald, 'Emotional Religion in Islam as affected by Music and Singing,' *JRAS*, 1901, pp. 195 ff., 705 ff.; Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 393 ff.
2 See Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 102 ff.
3 *Gulshani Rāz*, ed. and tr. E. H. Whinfield, London, 1880, p. 78 f.
4 Text and Germ. tr. by H. Ethé in *Sitzungsberichte der k. bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, Philos.-philol. Classe, lxxix. pt. 2 [1875] p. 145 f., lxxxix. pt. i. [1878] p. 38 f.; cf. E. G. Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, ii. 261 ff.
5 *La Poésie philosophique et religieuse chez les Persans, d'après le Mantic uttair, ou le Langage des oiseaux*, ed. and tr. Garcin de Tassy, Paris, 1864.
6 *Yūsuf und Zulaikha*, tr. R. T. H. Griffith, London, 1882.
7 London, 1880.
8 Cf. Grangeret de Lagrange, *Anthologie arabe*, Paris, 1828, p. 25 ff.; Nicholson, *Lit. Hist. of the Arabs*, p. 393 ff.

1 *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*, ed. and tr. Nicholson, London, 1911.
2 Gibb, i. 336 ff.
3 See E. G. Browne, in *JRAS*, 1898, p. 61 ff.; C. Huart and Feylesouf Rizā, *Textes persans relatifs à la secte des Hourouſis*, London, 1909.
4 Gibb, i. 65 f. 5 See Gibb, i. 20 f., 63 f.
6 *Dīvāni Shamsi Tabrīz*, p. 342.

Wherever Beauty dwells,
Such is its nature and its heritage
From Everlasting Beauty, which emerged
From realms of purity to shine upon
The worlds, and all the souls which dwell therein.
. . . . . .
Each speck of matter did He constitute
A mirror, causing each one to reflect
The beauty of His visage. From the rose
Flashed forth His beauty, and the nightingale,
Beholding it, loved madly. From that fire
The candle drew the lustre which beguiles
The moth to immolation . . .
Beware! say not, "He is All-Beautiful,
And we His lovers." Thou art but the glass,
And He the face confronting it, which casts
Its image on the mirror. He alone
Is manifest, and Thou in truth art hid.
Pure love, like beauty, coming but from Him
Reveals itself in thee. If steadfastly
Thou canst regard, thou wilt at length perceive
He is the mirror also; He alike
The Treasure and the Casket. "I" and "Thou"
Have here no place, and are but phantasies
Vain and unreal.'[1]

Love is the essence of all religions:

'Soul of mine, thou dawning Light: be not far, O be not far!
Love of mine, thou Vision bright: be not far, O be not far!
. . . . . .
See how well my Turban fitteth, yet the Parsee Girdle binds me;
Cord and Wallet I bear light: be not far, O be not far!
True Parsee and true Brahman, a Christian, yet a Mussulman,
Thee I trust supreme by Right: be not far, O be not far!
In all Mosques, Pagodas, Churches, I do find one Shrine alone;
Thy Face is there my sole delight: be not far, O be not far!'[2]

The same principle enables the Ṣūfī poet to solve the problems of evil and predestination.

'The more a man loves, the deeper he penetrates the divine purposes. Love is "the astrolabe of heavenly mysteries," the eye-salve which clears the spiritual eye and makes it clairvoyant.'[3]

Through love we can discern that evil, so far as it has any real existence—and in relation to God it has none—is a good in disguise or, at the worst, a necessary condition for the manifestation of good.[4] As regards predestination, perfect love implies identity of will and thus abolishes the conflict between freedom and necessity.

'The word "compulsion" makes me impatient for love's sake;
'Tis he who loves not that is fettered by compulsion.
This is close communion with God, not compulsion,
The shining of the sun, and not a dark cloud.'[5]

The lyric poetry of Ṣūfism reaches its highest mark in pantheistic hymns describing the states of *fanā* (negation of individuality) and *baqā* (affirmation of universal consciousness).

'Lo, for I to myself am unknown, now in God's name what must I do?
I adore not the Cross nor the Crescent, I am not a Giaour nor a Jew.
East nor West, land nor sea is my home, I have kin nor with angel nor gnome,
I am wrought not of fire nor of foam, I am shaped not of dust nor of dew.
I was born not in China afar, not in Saqsīn and not in Bulghār;
Not in India, where five rivers are, nor 'Irāq nor Khorāsān I grew.
Not in this world nor that world I dwell, not in Paradise, neither in Hell;
Not from Eden and Rizwān I fell, not from Adam my lineage I drew.
In a place beyond uttermost Place, in a tract without shadow of trace,
Soul and body transcending I live in the soul of my Loved One anew!'[6]

Though many of these poems are exquisite in form and elaborate in style, it is difficult to regard them as products of conscious literary art, and the present writer is inclined to accept the statement that the odes of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Ibn al-Fārid, Ibn al-'Arabī, and other Ṣūfī poets were often composed under the influence of ecstasy and are in fact analogous to what is known as 'automatic writing.'[1] Their rhythm and melody, combined with the symbolic form in which they are clothed, give them a strange power of communicating to the reader the same feeling of rapture by which their composer was inspired; and the effect is greatly enhanced when they are chanted with an accompaniment of music, as is customary among Ṣūfīs engaged in *dhikr*. While students of this poetry cannot ignore the conventional rules of interpretation which assign a fixed allegorical meaning to a large number of words that are commonly used in a different sense, such a method may easily be pushed too far. Ibn al-'Arabī's commentary on the *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq* shows that even the author of a mystical ode is sometimes unable to explain its meaning. The ecstatic element appears only at intervals and seldom with its first intensity in narrative romances, which depict the soul's love of God and its ultimate union with Him as the story of two human lovers—*e.g.*, Yūsuf and Zulaikhā, Laila and Majnūn, Salāmān and Absāl—and didactic poems, of which the *Masnavī* is the most celebrated.

LITERATURE.—This art. is supplementary to, and should be read in connexion with, the art. ASCETICISM (Muslim). In the present writer's opinion, it would be premature to aim at giving a historical conspectus of the subject, since adequate materials are not yet available. Further information concerning the doctrines of individual Ṣūfīs will be found in the artt. 'ABD AL-QĀDIR AL-JĪLĀNĪ, 'ABD AR-RAZZĀQ, ḤALLĀJ, IBN ṬUFAIL, JALĀL AL-DĪN RŪMĪ, MUḤYĪ AL-DĪN IBN AL-'ARABĪ, ASH-SHA'RĀNĪ, and SUHRAWARDĪ. See also artt. BLESSEDNESS (Muhammadan), COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Muslim), DERVISH, and LOVE (Muhammadan).

(1) *General.*—**F. A. G. Tholuck**, *Ssufismus sive Theosophia Persarum pantheistica*, Berlin, 1821; **E. H. Palmer**, *Oriental Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1867; **E. G. Browne**, art. 'Ṣūfiism,' in *Religious Systems of the World*, London, 1892, p. 314 ff.; **I. Goldziher**, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 139–200; **D. B. Macdonald**, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, Chicago, 1909; **R. A. Nicholson**, *The Mystics of Islam*, London, 1914; **Hujwīrī**, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. R. A. Nicholson, do. 1911.

(2) *Origin and early development.*—**A. von Kremer**, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 52 ff.; **E. G. Browne**, *Literary Hist. of Persia*, London, 1902–06, i. 296 ff., 416 ff.; **A. Merx**, *Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, Heidelberg, 1893, p. 25 ff.; **I. Goldziher**, 'Materialien zur Entwickelungsgesch. des Ṣūfismus,' *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vol. xiii. [1899] no. 1, p. 35 ff.; **R. A. Nicholson**, 'An Historical Enquiry concerning the Origin and Development of Ṣūfiism,' *JRAS*, 1906, p. 303 ff.; **D. S. Margoliouth**, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism (HL)*, London, 1913, p. 167 ff.; **Shaikh Muhammad Iqbāl**, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, do. 1908, p. 96 ff.; **H. Frank**, *Beitrag zur Erkenntniss des Sufismus nach Ibn Khaldūn*, Leipzig, 1884; **L. Massignon**, *Kitāb al-Tawāsīn*, Paris, 1913; **D. S. Margoliouth**, 'Notice of the Writings of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, the first Ṣūfī Author,' in *Trans. of the Third Internat. Congress for the Hist. of Religions*, Oxford 1908, i. 292 ff.; **R. Hartmann**, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Kuschairi*, Hamburg, 1914; *Al-Kuschairi's Darstellung des Ṣūfitums*. Berlin, 1914; **I. Goldziher**, 'Neuplatonische und gnostische Elemente im Ḥadīth,' *ZA* xxii. [1908] 317 ff., *A Buddhismus hatdsa az Iszlamra*, Budapest, 1903, tr. T. Duka, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 125 ff.; **E. H. Whinfield**, 'Hellenism and Muhammadanism,' *JRAS*, 1905, p. 527 ff.; **R. A. Nicholson**, 'The Goal of Muhammadan Mysticism,' *JRAS*, 1913, p. 55 ff.

(3) *Doctrine.*—Most of the important European books and papers on Ṣūfism have already been mentioned in the present art. or in the various artt. enumerated above. These titles are not repeated in the list which follows. **M. Schreiner**, 'Beiträge zur Gesch. der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam,' *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 513 ff.; **E. Blochet**, 'Etudes sur l'ésoterisme musulman,' *JA*, 9th ser., xix. [1902] 489 ff. and xx. [1902] 49 ff. (concerning the different grades of Ṣūfīs, the *quṭb*, and the inferior saints); **I. Goldziher**, *Muhammedanische Studien*, Halle, 1888-90, pt. ii. pp. 277–378 (worship of Muslim saints); **H. Ethé**, 'Der Ṣūfismus und seine drei Hauptvertreter,' in *Morgenländische Studien*, Leipzig, 1870, p. 95 ff.; **W. H. T. Gairdner**, 'Al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-Anwār and the Ghazālī-Problem,' in *Der Islam*, v. [1914] 121 ff., "*The Way*" *of a Mohammedan Mystic*, Leipzig, 1912; **E. H. Whinfield**, *Lawā'iḥ* of Jāmī, Persian text with Eng. tr., London, 1906; **F. A. G. Tholuck**, *Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*, Berlin, 1825.

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[1] Jāmī, *Yūsuf ū Zulaikhā*, tr. E. G. Browne, in art. 'Ṣūfiism' in *Religious Systems of the World*, p. 328 f.

[2] Tr. after Rückert by W. Hastie in *The Festival of Spring, from the Dīvan of Jelāleddīn*, Glasgow, 1903, p. 3.

[3] Whinfield, *Masnavi-i Ma'navi: the Spiritual Couplets of Maulana Jalālu-'d-dīn Muhammad-i Rūmī*, London, 1898, Introd. p. 28.

[4] Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 96 f.

[5] Whinfield, *Masnavi-i Ma'navi*, p. 26.

[6] *Dīvāni Shamsi Tabriz*, p. 344.

[1] Cf. the testimony of Madame Guyon and Blake, cited in **E. Underhill**, *Mysticism*[4], London, 1912, p. 78 ff.

SUGGESTION.—Suggestion is the production of a reaction by an ideational process, but without deliberation on the part of the subject thereof. The term applies also to any attempt by the subject or by another person to produce such a reaction. 'A' suggestion is any idea that determines, or is used for the purpose of determining, the outcome of such a non-deliberative process.

The qualification 'by an ideational process' is intended to differentiate suggestion from primary instinct-acts. Such acts, though they may be secondarily initiated by an idea or mental image (as when a letter makes me angry with the writer of it), require as their primary stimulus nothing but an appropriate sense-presentation. Suggestion, on the other hand, is primarily ideational. The most typical suggestions are those that are conveyed by language. Gesture, in the broad sense of significant bodily motions, postures, and inarticulate vocalization, comes next. Natural phenomena act suggestively only when they have antecedently acquired a meaning, as when one avoids poison ivy, or quickens one's pace upon hearing distant thunder.

The term 'reaction,' as here used, refers to both psychical and bodily responses. It includes beliefs, hallucinatory perceptions, attitudes (with their affective and emotional aspects), stimulation of involuntary muscles and of certain glands, particular contractions of voluntary muscles and muscle-systems, even extended chains of such contractions, and finally, in all these fields, inhibitions and functional paralyses as well as stimulations.

A reaction is 'deliberate' when it is made after attention has been given to alternatives, and with the alternatives in view. Associated with the idea that defines any alternative is a tendency towards something beyond itself as merely this idea now present. Because of these associated tendencies ideas may be said to compete with one another and therefore to involve inhibitions as well as positive stimulations. In deliberation there is mutual inhibition of two or more competing ideas, wherefore popular thought correctly conceives that pause or postponement is a mark of deliberate conduct and of deliberate believing. Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence, or relative lack, of such competition, inhibition, and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the ideas appropriate to the given situation, and focused or 'narrowed down' to some one idea or coherent chain of ideas. Thereupon the associated tendency that has just been referred to is automatically instated.

How such associated tendencies should be conceived has been a matter of debate. W. McDougall, emphasizing the subconscious character of the connexions here involved, and also the close relation of suggestion in general to 'psychic phenomena,' is of the opinion that any adequate analysis of suggestion must rest at last upon a theory of the subconscious.[1] William James used the phrase 'ideo-motor action' to designate what he regarded as a mental law, namely:

'Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind.'[2]

On the other hand, E. L. Thorndike opposes to the 'ideo-motor' theory, and by implication to McDougall also, the following far simpler theory: an idea may produce a movement in either of two ways—by imaging an object that awakens an instinctive response, or, under the ordinary law of habit, by reinstating something that has previously been associated in the subject's experience with the suggestive idea. The reason why the idea of bending my first finger produces actual bending, according to Thorndike, is that the two—the idea of the bending and the actual bending—have been experienced together heretofore. The very first flexions of the finger, it may be added, occurred reflexly, without any antecedent idea thereof. Just so, if the sight of a glass of water upon my dinner-table induces me to drink water that I do not want, habit is clearly the explanation.[1]

This theory enables us to bring all the psychical and physical manifestations of suggestion under the same two heads, habit and instinct.

Both are found in Antony's handling of the Roman rabble. The opinion of the artisans concerning Cæsar's death was quickly reversed, not by the weighing of pros and cons, but by bringing attention back again and again to essentially the same point, i.e. by narrowing attention so that the old attitude of admiration for Cæsar the conqueror was reinstated. In addition, Antony arouses various instincts, as when he works upon curiosity until the crowd demands to hear the will that he pretends to withhold.

It is evident that suggestion is not an exceptional, rare, or abnormal phenomenon, but an omnipresent fact of all mind whenever its reactions are upon the ideational level. In hypnosis competing ideas may be inhibited to an extraordinary degree, but there is no fixed line of division between the incipient stages of hypnosis gradually brought on and fully normal mental action. Similarly the ordinary effects of cheerful or of gloomy expectation are merely heightened in the extreme and truly remarkable facts of suggestive therapeutics.[2]

The process of suggestion has, as such, no particular relation to the truth or the falsity of what is suggested. One may arrive by suggestion at true beliefs or false, and at ethically correct or incorrect attitudes and conduct. Suggestion is an ordinary device of oratory and of preaching, as it is also of advertising and of salesmanship. Recent works on 'business psychology' present what may fairly be called a technic that is parallel to that of physicians who employ psycho-therapy. Thus far the ethical aspects of influencing buyers by suggestion have not been examined as carefully as the technic.

If any one should doubt whether the deliberate influencing of men to act without deliberation is ever justifiable, the following three considerations would have a bearing. (1) There are numerous cases in which the ends of deliberation are defeated by the process of deliberation itself, as when too meticulous weighing of possible consequences or an overwrought insistence upon complete certainty prevents the action that a situation calls for. One way to get such a person over his 'dead centre' is precisely to narrow his attention to one of the alternatives until action ensues. (2) When an instinctive capacity for noble emotions and attitudes has become dull from disuse, one simply lacks considerations that are needed for deliberation. A psychological pre-condition of all deliberation is appreciation of the pertinent alternatives. What is to be done for a man, then, whose habits preclude any feeling of the force of a pertinent alternative? The obviously rational procedure is by processes of suggestion to narrow his attention upon some object that may awaken an instinctive response of the desirable sort, and then to lead him to include this fresh experience among the data of his deliberate thinking. (3) Whether we will or not, a large factor in education, particularly in the development of standards and ideals in the young, is suggestion emanating from adults, especi-

[1] See art. HYPNOTISM.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 526.

[1] See Thorndike, 'Ideo-Motor Action,' *Psych. Rev.* xx. [1913] 91–106.
[2] See artt. DISEASE AND MEDICINE, HYPNOTISM, PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS.

ally parents and teachers. A purely rationalistic education is a psychological impossibility. Hence it is a custom of educators to take at least some measures for determining the sorts of suggestion to which pupils shall be exposed. M. W. Keatinge argues for careful, deliberate planning of this part of teaching.[1]

On the other hand, suggestion is, on the whole, a process of repetition or of maintaining some *status quo ante* rather than a process of criticism and revision. Under the influence of suggestion alone one merely drifts with social currents, or follows a leader, or imitates one's own past, or at best applies a recognized standard or sets free a disused instinctive capacity. To judge a standard, on the other hand, one must attend to alternatives. It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to suppose that truly ethical action requires nothing but deliberation. Ethical situations are made real to us, especially situations that call for reform, by some kindling of elemental processes that include strong satisfactions or their opposites. Thus it comes to pass that great sermons commonly interweave strong suggestions with analysis and even argument.

To exhibit the whole significance of suggestion in religion would require an historical catalogue of practically all forms of deeply felt experience. Primitive fears connected with tabu and with spiritism were propagated from individual to individual and from generation to generation by suggestion. The same is true of the rejoicing that accompanied some of the ceremonies. Priesthoods acquired and retained their power by narrowing the attention of worshippers by means of sense stimuli of various sorts focused upon some point that required no deliberation. The mystics of all ages have practised auto-suggestion under the name of contemplation or interior prayer. Modern revivals have produced a sense of sin, conversion (reversal of attitudes and of likes and dislikes), and 'assurance' or the 'witness of the Spirit' chiefly by suggestion. Indeed, managers of revival campaigns at the present day are accustomed to organize preaching, singing, personal work, and advertising of various kinds upon a strictly suggestive basis. Not the least item is the careful preparation of the public mind, sometimes for weeks in advance of the first public meeting. Finally, such experiences as 'the jerks,' 'the power,' 'speaking in tongues,' and 'interpretation of tongues' present as a whole cases of suggestion. They are usually initiated by a spontaneous automatism which is then imitated (by oneself and by others) without deliberation, but often with support from passages of Scripture. The idea of a baptism 'with fire' has similarly fulfilled itself here and there.[2]

The phenomena of suggestion reach their climax in human masses, whether crowds (which involve spatial propinquity) or a public whose opinions and attitudes are formed by common reading matter or even by statements passing from mouth to mouth. It is a fact of common observation that in a crowd one may act 'like a different person,' accepting as truth what one could not ordinarily believe, and conducting oneself contrary to one's ordinary standards. The mechanism whereby crowd suggestion acquires this remarkable power is as follows. (1) Certain instinctive capacities are strongly stirred by the massing of appropriate stimuli. Man has a gregarious instinct, is peculiarly interested in the movements of his fellows, and is sensitive to their approvals and disapprovals. Here is the basis for a quickening or excitement of the mind through the mere presence of others, as also for watching and following others, and for subordinating, even forgetting, one's own ideas in the presence of a sentiment generally held by the mass. (2) A crowd usually assembles under the influence of some common thought. Even when this is not the case, conversation tends to produce a common thought. Moreover, under the stimulus of the excitement already referred to, some individual—either one with relatively few inhibitions or one with strong convictions, or even a designing demagogue—is likely to speak aloud. This often precipitates the thinking of the entire mass. It is now as if each one were suggesting to every other one the idea that has come to expression. Thus sentiment rolls up like a snowball. (3) This narrowing of attention, as already indicated, involves an equally strong inhibition upon ideas that would ordinarily appear as competitors. Therefore strong, impulsive action occurs spontaneously and appears to the subject to be natural and justifiable. A crowd is incapable of fine discriminations and of skill; its acts tend towards the simplicity and crudity of instinct; and therefore, in this case, a human association easily acts less socially (as far as ends and consequences are concerned) than its members would do if they faced the same moral issue severally.

All that has just been said applies also to masses that are unified by means of the public press. Our present means of communication are so swift and so all-pervasive that men feel the presence of one another almost the world over at almost the same instant. Communities that are a thousand miles apart get the same news, often word for word, at about the same hour; the effect of the news in one community now becomes an item of news in the other; action as well as idea thus spreads. This is the process whereby a whole nation rises to succour sufferers from earthquake or from fire, or to repel an invader. Thus, too, political opinions as well as fashions of dress and of speech spread with great rapidity.

A study of suggestion as a means of governing men in the State as well as in the Church will show that one of the basal differences between types of organization lies in the degree to which suggestion, as compared with deliberation, is officially used. At the tribal level of organization common action is secured to a great extent by suggestion of the crowd type, as in dances and other ceremonies, and in the personal leadership of the chief. In the monarchical State, as in sacerdotal religion, men are ruled partly by direct command (which is, under some conditions, a potent mode of suggestion), and partly by pageantry and other sensuous or sentimental appeal that ever reawakens a traditional attitude of loyalty. The underlying psychical principle of democracy, on the other hand, is deliberate group action. A deliberative group is one in which unity is sought, not by withdrawing attention from alternatives, but by mutual incitement to pause and weigh alternatives before acting. This type is most fully developed in bodies that have formal rules of order. Here, as a preliminary to each common act, the entire group pauses, the chairman saying, 'Are there any remarks?' Then, as if challenging each individual to full, deliberate self-expression, he asks, 'Are you ready for the question?' This procedure has been devised so as to prevent action under suggestion. Whereas the crowd becomes a unit by the suppression of individual inhibitions, the deliberative group achieves its unity precisely by inviting the expression of competing ideas, and by spreading them out for inspection and unforced selection. The ballot, in popular government, is an organ for essentially

[1] *Suggestion in Education*[2].

[2] See H. S. Dyer, *Revival in India*, London, 1907, ch. iv. and p. 76.

the same type of deliberation on the scale of the local community or of the nation.[1]

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GEORGE A. COE.

SUHRAWARDÎ.—Suhraward, a small town in the Jibāl province of Persia, has given its name to two celebrated mystics whose lives, characters, and opinions present a remarkable contrast, though both were born in the same decade. Of Shihāb al-dīn 'Umar b. 'Abdallah al-Suhrawardī (A.D. 1144–1234) it is enough to say that he was a Ṣūfī of the conventional type, that he lectured and preached in Baghdād under court patronage, and that his writings include a well-known treatise on Ṣūfism—the *'Awārif al-ma'ārif*—and a polemical work directed against the study of Greek philosophy, which he dedicated to the khalīfah al-Nāṣir.[2] His contemporary, Shihāb al-dīn Yaḥyā b. Amīrak al-Suhrawardī (A.D. 1153–91), after studying jurisprudence and theology at Marāgha, devoted himself to mystical philosophy, led the wandering life of a dervish, and finally settled in Aleppo. While some of his earlier books were written under the influence of Aristotle, he was at heart a Platonist, as is shown by the title and contents of his chief work, the *Ḥikmatu 'l-ishrāq* ('Philosophy of Illumination')—whence the school of mystics who follow him are called Ishrāqīs (*al-ishrāqīyūn*). Being an enthusiast as well as a bold and original thinker, he made no attempt to disguise the anti-Islāmic tendency of his doctrines. It cannot be denied that from the orthodox standpoint they were detestable; and, though at first he found an admirer in al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, the son of Saladin, he was condemned and executed by order of that prince in 1191. The name of 'martyr' (*shahīd*) was refused to him; he is generally known as Suhrawardī al-maqtūl ('Suhrawardī the slain') or al-Shaikh al-maqtūl.

In his theory of illumination he combines Neo-Platonic and Persian ideas. The source of all things is the Absolute Light (*al-nūr al-qāhir*). That which is visible requires no definition, and nothing is more visible than light, whose very nature consists in manifestation.

'The Primal Light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities created by two distinct creative agencies. . . . The relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own negation—Darkness, which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not change of place; it is due to the *love* of illumination which constitutes its very essence. . . . The number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations of intenser brightness become in their turn the sources of other illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these illuminations are mediums, or in the language of theology angels through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance from the Primal Light.'[1]

We may distinguish two illuminations, *i.e.* modes of being, of the Primal Light: (1) pure, abstract, formless; (2) accidental, derivative, possessing form. The pure light is self-conscious substance (spirit and soul), knowing itself through itself, for 'whatever knows itself must be pure light.' The accidental light is related to the pure light as effect to cause and only exists as an attribute in association with the illuminated object (body), which is not matter in Aristotle's use of the term, but merely the negation necessarily implied in the nature of light.

'The experimental fact of the transformation of the primary elements[2] into one another points to this fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being.'[3]

It is of two kinds: (*a*) dark substance, (*b*) dark forms, *i.e.* qualities; and the combination of these two makes up a material body. Since darkness is nothing but the absence of light, and light is identical with reality, the substance and forms of the universe consist of illuminations diffused from the Primal Light in infinite gradations of intensity. It follows that everything partakes of reality in proportion to the radiance which it receives and towards which it ever moves 'with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more of the original fountain of Light.' This perpetual flow and ebb of desire produces the revolutions of the heavenly spheres, the processes of nature, and all human activities. The abstract light (First Intelligence) is less perfect than the Primal Light (God), in contemplating which it becomes conscious of its imperfection, whence there arises in it a darkness that is the ground of plurality in the sensible world. While the entire universe is eternal as emanating from the eternal Light, but contingent if regarded as the object of irradiation, some illuminations are simple, others compound and therefore inferior. The intelligences, the celestial spheres, the souls of the heavens, time, motion, and the archetypes of the elements belong to a higher world, which may be called eternal in contrast with all below it, though in the relation existing between them not posteriority but parallelism is implied. Suhrawardī, like Plato, conceives a world of Ideas—he declares that it was revealed to him mystically—in which every kind of sublunary thing exists as a substance in itself.[4] The wise men of Persia (Zoroastrians), he says, gave names to many of these pure lights (Ideas); *e.g.*, they named the Idea of water Khurdād (May), that of trees Murdād (July), and that of fire Ardībihisht (April).

As each species is endowed with its distinctive qualities and preserved by its guardian Idea—'the lord of the species' (*rabbu 'l-nau'*)—so the Idea of the human body is 'the holy spirit' or universal Reason, while bodies individually are types of rational souls. The soul does not exist before the body. Being pure light, it imparts illumination to the body through the medium of the animal soul. It operates with the five external and the five internal senses, which correspond to powers residing in the ideal archetype. Thus vision, knowledge, memory, imagination, etc., are essentially not passive functions but illuminative acts of the soul. Obeying the principle that what is lower in the scale of being loves what is higher, the soul longs to be united with the formless

[1] Cf. G. A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, ch. viii.
[2] Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, i. 440; von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, p. 99.

[1] Shaikh Muhammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908, p. 127 f.
[2] Suhrawardī recognizes only three elements, fire being regarded as hot air.
[3] Iqbāl, p. 133.
[4] Carra de Vaux, 'La Philosophie illuminative d'après Suhrawerdī Meqtoul,' *JA*, 9th ser., vol. xix. [1902] p. 72.

world of light, and it advances towards this end according as it seeks to become perfect in philosophy and the practice of virtue. By so doing it develops a mystical perception (*dhauq*) which clears all doubts away. *Dhauq*, as Suhrawardī tells us, forms the basis of the speculations set forth in the *Ḥikmatu 'l-ishrāq*. In one passage he seems to hint that he himself is the *qutb*, the mysterious head of the Ṣūfī hierarchy,[1] for he asserts that the philosophy of illumination was taught by Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Zoroastrian sages, and that the world is never without some one who possesses the doctrine and can expound it with authority; that person, he adds, is God's vicegerent (*khalīfat Allāh*) on the earth.[2] Attainment of *fanā*[3] unites the soul with God, but does not mean that one substance is absorbed in another. No two souls can be completely alike.

'The individual souls, after death, are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship with physical organisms. . . . Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make up their deficiencies. The doctrine of transmigration cannot be proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint, though it is a probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which calls back the whole universe when this journey is over, and starts another cycle of being to reproduce in almost all respects the history of the preceding cycles.'[1]

Suhrawardī agrees with Ghazālī in holding that the world could not be better than it is. Evil is a negation depending on the motion and darkness which, as we have seen, are involved in the nature of light; it is associated with the effects and does not proceed *per se* from the First Cause; if it existed *per se*, it would not be evil. In his clear and sympathetic exposition of the Ishrāqī philosophy Shaikh Muḥammad Iqbāl calls attention to Suhrawardī's intellectual independence and to the skill with which he moulded his Neo-Platonic materials into a thoroughly Persian system of thought, uniting speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. Mystic and (in a sense) pantheist as he was, he regards the external world as real and never loses touch with it.

'No Persian thinker is more alive to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in reference to his fundamental principles.'[2]

LITERATURE.—Besides the references given in the art., M. Horten, *Die Philosophie der Erleuchtung nach Suhrawardī* (*Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, xxxviii.), Halle, 1912; A. von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 89 ff.; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, Berlin, 1898–1902, i. 437.

REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

SUICIDE.

Introductory (H. J. ROSE), p. 21.
Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 24.
Chinese (P. J. MACLAGAN), p. 26.
Greek and Roman (A. W. MAIR), p. 26.
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Muhammadan (W. M. PATTON), p. 38.
Semitic and Egyptian (G. A. BARTON), p. 38.

SUICIDE (Introductory).—Before attempting any discussion of suicide from the standpoint of ethics or religion, we should note that in many cases — probably the majority, among civilized peoples—either no moral judgment can be passed upon the act or at least great allowance must be made for the mental condition of the agent. Lunacy not infrequently involves such complete loss of the instinct of self-preservation that the patient, even where analgesia is not present, will mutilate or kill himself, apparently without any idea of what he is doing. So in *dementia præcox* 'self-respect, modesty and the instinct of self-preservation are quite absent'; and the result is various absurd, criminal, or indecent acts, including suicide for a trivial reason or none at all.[4] Again, *dementia paralytica*, or chronic periencephalitis, although like many forms of mental diseases it generally produces intense and unreasoning attachment to life,[5] often involves accesses of wild, self-directed fury, such as that in which Guy de Maupassant tried to kill himself.[6] But the most typical examples are those of melancholia. We quote part of Tanzi's admirably lucid account:

'In some cases of melancholia scenes of the most horrible and sanguinary nature, which are represented to the patient's mind as simple possibilities, and repeated as favourite images on account of their hideousness, become transformed into a *motor obsession*. The obsession, meeting with but slight resistance in an exhausted and abulic brain (*i.e.* one almost if not quite deprived of will-power), becomes so imperative as to drive the patient inexorably to the commission of acts corresponding to it, such as . . . suicide in its most horrible forms.'[7]

The state in which these acts occur—the *raptus melancholicus*—is quasi-unconscious. But suicide often takes place in less advanced cases than this, when the patient is not wholly irresponsible, but is actuated by motives the importance of which his disease greatly exaggerates. A preliminary symptom of the *raptus* is precordial anxiety—a sort of horrible intensification of that uneasy 'sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach' which often attacks a healthy man when frightened or anxious.[8] Now, as a normal subject may be tempted, by the depression arising out of a real misfortune, to take his own life, so a melancholiac suffering from this intense and abnormal feeling of anxious misery is not infrequently driven in a quasi-normal way to commit suicide. Objectively he has no sufficient motive, but subjectively his hopeless depression, the morbid nature of which he is unable to realize, presents itself as a good reason for wishing to be dead and fulfilling his wish.[4] Still more typical are those suicides of melancholiacs which are inspired by altruistic motives, the patient believing that his death will in some way greatly benefit his friends—*e.g.*, that he is miserably poor and must relieve his family of the burden of supporting him,[5] or that his life is demanded in expiation of a fancied crime, or the like. Such unfortunates are well aware of what they are doing; their delusion consists simply in believing that they have an adequate motive. Often their action has a kind of perverted nobility, arising from a devotion to an ideal which in itself is lofty enough, although the ideal is imaginary and the form which the devotion takes morbid. It has been suggested that in these cases the disease has exaggerated and distorted the instinct of self-sacrifice,[6] which is a normal constituent of the

[1] See art. ṢŪFIS. [2] Carra de Vaux, p. 68 f.
[3] See art. ṢŪFIS.
[4] Tanzi (*A Text-book of Mental Diseases*, p. 640) gives a case (p. 641) of a patient who believed that he was invulnerable and killed himself in trying to prove it. An apparently unmotived suicide is described on p. 662.
[5] Tanzi, p. 231. [6] *Ib.* p. 519. [7] *Ib.* p. 513.
[1] Iqbāl, p. 147 f. [2] *Ib.* p. 149.
[3] This is merely a rough description of the nature of the two sensations. Physiologically they are quite distinct, one being precordial, the other epigastric.
[4] Tanzi, p. 514; Mercier, *Sanity and Insanity*[2], p. 350.
[5] Mercier, p. 351; this suicide was in reality very well off.
[6] It might also be described as a distortion of the social sense, or herd-instinct, which some would regard as primary (like self-preservation, etc.). See W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*[2], London, 1919, especially p. 18 ff.

sexual emotions, especially in women. Hence such suicides are particularly common among adolescents. As there is admittedly a close connexion between sexual and religious emotions, especially in their more exaggerated and morbid forms, we may put some at least of the religious suicides (see below) in this category.[1]

In most cases of this kind the patient's insanity is easily recognizable; and even in those instances where a melancholiac supposed to be cured relapses and ends his life in a suicidal fit—or possibly feigns recovery in order to carry out, when left unguarded, his purpose of self-destruction—we need have no hesitation in pronouncing him at least partly irresponsible.[2] It is less easy to pass judgment on the numerous class of neurasthenics. A characteristic feature of the mental state of these sufferers is that impulses, often of the most absurd or criminal nature, haunt and obsess the imagination; and, while the patient knows perfectly well that these impulses are not rational—thus differing from the melancholiac—he is not always strong-minded enough to control them.

The most vivid description known to us of this condition occurs, not in a technical work at all, but in two of the stories of one who seems himself to have been a neurasthenic and clearly regarded such impulses as part of the normal human mentality—Edgar Allan Poe.[3] This author represents two men, one as betraying a fatal secret, the other as killing a pet animal, for no other reason than that the acts are insanely devoid of motive; and the writings of alienists[4] give many actual cases of the same kind. Clearly, then, when a neurasthenic's obsession is suicidal, if he yields to it, he cannot either be regarded as an ordinary lunatic who does not know what he is doing or imagines that he has good reasons for his act, or be judged like a normal man who decides, on more or less rational grounds, that he wishes to end his life.

It is still harder to pass satisfactory moral judgments on the rather numerous persons, apparently sane but perhaps really neurasthenic, whose suicides have a motive, but an inadequate one—a small injury, real or supposed, to honour, or even so trivial a cause as a wager.

Suicides of this kind sometimes amount to a sort of epidemic. When one member of a family has ended his life, the recurrence of the anniversary of his death, the sight of the weapon that he used, or some such casual association has been known to drive a relative to follow his example, until as many as seven of one household have died by their own hands.[5] Larger epidemics, extending through an entire city, or even wider,[6] have not been unknown in ancient or modern times, and are frequently associated with religious mania. These are probably hysterical, as hysteria is easily communicated and often produces, especially among women, 'theatrical attempts at suicide.'[7]

To all these classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances of persons who are sane for the greater part of their lives, but, as a result of violent nervous shock, disease, grief, excesses of one sort or another, etc., become temporarily unbalanced to a slight degree. These causes are so many that it is questionable whether any one whose life is of normal length is absolutely sane during every waking moment of it.[8] We need not doubt that the charitable verdict of the average coroner's jury, 'suicide while of unsound mind,' is in a large percentage of cases quite in accordance with medical facts.

But our primary interest is in the act of one who, being perfectly sane, takes his own life. The question whether such a deed is justifiable, and, if so, when and under what circumstances, has been answered in the most various ways by peoples of different degrees of culture, from the lowest savages to members of the highest civilizations, ancient and modern. Some account of these answers has been given elsewhere.[1] We propose now to consider the attitude taken by religions, savage and civilized, and by the leading schools of moral philosophy.

1. **Religion.**—Various faiths have taken every conceivable view of suicide, from recommending it to resolutely and uncompromisingly opposing it. As the grounds for the former view are less obvious to us, it is well to begin by briefly discussing them. First in the list stand those fanatic beliefs, including degraded forms of Christianity, whose votaries have been impelled to kill themselves, often in most painful ways, to attain a blissful immortality or to avoid something which they regarded as polluting.

Russia furnishes us with some remarkable examples. Thus at Tiraspol, in 1897, twenty-eight persons buried themselves alive to escape the census, which apparently they regarded as sinful. But a more wide-spread epidemic occurred in 1666, in which year many Russian zealots looked for the appearance of Antichrist. To escape him and enter heaven, suicide was strongly urged by certain wrong-headed and often wholly criminal persons, clerical and lay. 'Whole communities hailed with enthusiasm the gospel of death, and hastened to put its precepts into practice. . . . At first the favourite mode of death was by starvation. . . . (But) death by famine was attended by some obvious disadvantages. It was slow: it opened the door to repentance: it occasionally admitted of rescue. Accordingly death by fire was preferred as surer and more expeditious. . . . The mania in its most extreme form died away towards the end of the seventeenth century, but during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cases of collective suicide from religious motives occurred from time to time.'[2]

Many of these people, and other such religious suicides, were undoubtedly in a condition of hysteria, if not actual paranoia. We have a parallel to such self-destruction in the most horrible of the rites of Kybele—that which took place on the *dies sanguinis*, at least in its earlier form.[3] On this occasion the devotees of the goddess, wrought up to a pitch of frenzy by an exciting and elaborate ritual, not only wounded themselves, but performed the act of self-emasculation, thereafter joining the ranks of the *Galli*. Turning now to medical evidence, we find[4] such mutilation named along with suicide and manslaughter as typical of some forms of lunacy. We have thus two closely related acts, both involving loss of the instinct of self-preservation, arising, not from ordinary mania, but from a temporary insanity artificially produced and due to a perverted or degraded religious instinct.

But religious suicides are not always maniacs. We need only allude in passing to the innumerable cases, familiar from Frazer, of divine kings and other incarnate deities who kill themselves or are killed, either after a fixed period has elapsed or when their bodily vigour begins to fail. Indeed, these can hardly be called suicides in the strict sense, since the killing is, in intent, merely the first act of a process of reincarnation. That the god should be destroyed is never thought of; it is simply desired to provide him with a new and more desirable fleshly covering. Nor can one justly class as maniacs those persons who hold that by killing themselves they can attain future happiness—an idea not uncommon in some forms of Buddhism—or will return to life in this world stronger or wiser than before.[5] However erroneous their belief may be from the point of view of any sound theological or metaphysical system, it is not a delusion in the medical sense, but often the perfectly logical result of their tenets. In the

[1] See Mercier, pp. 354–357.

[2] For other forms of mental disease resulting in suicide during more or less complete irresponsibility see Tanzi, pp. 321 (alcoholism), 603 f. (epilepsy).

[3] See 'The Imp of the Perverse' and 'The Black Cat' in *Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque*, especially the opening paragraphs of the former.

[4] Several examples in Tanzi, p. 540 f.

[5] Tanzi, p. 231.

[6] *E.g.*, at Miletos; see Plutarch, *de Mulierum Virtutibus*, p. 249 *b*, *c* (wholesale suicide by hanging of the young women 'from some obscure cause'); *cf.* Aulus Gellius, xv. x. 1 f.

[7] Tanzi, p. 585. [8] Mercier, p. 131.

[1] See art. EUTHANASIA.

[2] Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 44 f., quoting I. Stchoukine, *Le Suicide collectif dans le Raskol russe*, Paris, 1903; cf. Tanzi, p. 731 f.

[3] Vividly described by Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 223 ff.; cf. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912, p. 321 ff.

[4] Tanzi, p. 513.

[5] Examples of both in *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 42 ff.

lower strata of human history we have numerous examples of savages who regard suicide as perfectly justifiable (*a*) because the deceased will in the next world have a body in the same state as his present one.[1] This naturally leads to the conclusion that voluntary death is much preferable to mutilation or long and wasting illness, since it will avoid a maimed or helpless life after death. Such suicides are practically examples of euthanasia (*q.v.*). Or (*b*) suicide may, at least in some cases, be reputed as honourable and therefore as procuring a more than usually pleasant lot in the next world, not merely avoiding an unpleasant one. Obviously such ideas are not wide-spread or unqualified, or they would result in the extinction of the peoples holding them. They mostly take this form: a dependent — wife, vassal, or slave—is so closely bound to his or her superior that death cannot sever the tie; therefore, just as in any earthly journey the vassal will faithfully attend his lord, so, when his lord dies, the most honourable course is to follow and continue to serve him. Such fidelity will, it may be expected, result in due honour among the dead.

So at the death of a king of Benin 'his favourites and servants used to compete with each other for the privilege of being buried alive with his body in order that they might attend and minister to him in the other world,' and 'the first to die was deemed the happiest,'[2] no doubt as being the most prompt and willing. Similarly among the early Germans 'infame in omnem uitam ac probrosum superstitem principi suo ex acie recessisse';[3] and in a higher civilization Persian nobles were capable of similar devotion to their king.[4]

But this is hardly a religious idea; more definitely connected with religious belief is the Hindu *satī* (*q.v.*).

Religious opposition to suicide is to be found in all, or nearly all, strata of civilization. Probably the chief, if not the only, reason for this among primitive races is simply the dread of the ghost. The self-destroyer must have been greatly wronged or troubled in some way, or he would not have acted as he did; therefore his ghost will be an unusually troublesome and revengeful spirit, like that of all *βιαιοθάνατοι*—to borrow the convenient Greek term. Hence, either he must be appeased by the death of his enemy, if known, or by offerings of some kind, or else he must be rendered harmless.

A natural way to accomplish this is to mutilate or destroy the corpse—in fact, to treat it much as mediæval Europe did a supposed vampire. Well-known survivals of this are the Athenian practice of severing its right hand,[5] and the custom, not long discontinued in England, of driving a stake through the body. Such treatment, originally a mere precautionary measure, would easily enough generate the belief that the act of the deceased was something extraordinarily wicked, *i.e.* strongly displeasing to whatever deity the community worshipped. It should be noted, however, that among some peoples in a not very advanced stage of culture suicide is objected to on religious grounds, but no such drastic methods of treating the corpse are in vogue. The Kayans of North Borneo hold that those who die by their own hands live miserably in the next world; but the bodies are not burned or mutilated, nor is any fear of them shown,[6] unless their unceremonious burial on the spot where they are found may be taken to be a precautionary measure indicating fear.[7]

This vague idea of suicide as a crime has been taken over by several higher religions and explained by them in the light of their ethical and eschatological beliefs. Thus for any uncorrupted and logical form of Buddhism it is clearly forbidden, since it violates the first of the five fundamental precepts, 'Kill not any living thing.'[1] A religion—it can scarcely be called a philosophy—which presents certain striking parallels to that of Gautama gave an elaborate justification of its prohibition of suicide. To the Orphic-Pythagorean the present life was a penance which took the form of imprisonment; therefore to kill one's self was to attempt, quite vainly, to shirk a deserved penalty.[2] This view, with various modifications, was taken up by Plato, and reappears in the theological teachings of later philosophy.[3]

The native Roman religion perhaps condemned suicide originally and in theory at least. Servius[4] tells us that the *libri pontificales* bade the body of one who had hanged himself to be cast forth unburied; and the later *Seruius Danielis* adds on the authority of Cassius Hemina that the idea of the disgracefulness of suicide dates from the time of Tarquinius Superbus. More noteworthy is a quotation from Varro,[5] confirming the statement that *suspendiosi* were denied the regular funeral rites. We have no hint, however, that the various suicides of legend and history were otherwise than honourably treated. Possibly the objection was not to suicide in general, but to hanging, regarded as *informis*. At any rate, the rhetorical discussions of the subject[6] quote no native religious scruple.

The opposition of Christianity has from an early date been of the most determined kind. It is true that nothing in the NT directly justifies such an attitude, but certain Patristic writings make it obvious that by their time the discussion had taken the form of an inquiry whether self-destruction was ever allowable. Thus St. Augustine[7] deliberates at considerable length whether such a crime (*scelus*), as he repeatedly calls it, may be condoned in the case of a woman whose honour is in danger, or in any case; and he arrives at a negative conclusion. His reasons are chiefly: (*a*) that suicide is an act which precludes the possibility of repentance,[8] and (*b*) that it is a form of homicide, and therefore a violation of the sixth commandment,[9] not justified by any of the exceptions, general or special to that commandment, which have been divinely established,[10] and aggravated by the fact that the person thus killed has done nothing worthy of death.[11] Hence suicide to avoid violation is at best the commission of a greater sin to escape a lesser.[12] But even St. Augustine himself was obliged to admit the possibility of exceptions, since in his day several persons who had taken their own lives were recognized officially as martyrs—an indication, even if other proofs were lacking, that the opposition to suicide was of gradual growth. He suggests[13] that in such cases as in that of Samson a special divine ordinance superseded the general law, which nevertheless remains in full force for all ordinary persons. This remains in substance the position of orthodox Catholicism. It is not insignificant that in the most splendid of all mediæval works on eschatological subjects, although the possibility of repentance at the very moment of a violent death is admitted, the examples are chosen from persons killed in battle or by assassins.[14] Nor has orthodox Protestantism been any less emphatic; indeed, its rejection of the doctrine of purgatory makes it still more uncompromising in condemnation of suicide and less hope-

[1] See, *e.g.*, T. C. Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 159; W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, do. 1911, p. 120; for these and other examples cf. *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 10 ff.; and for classical survivals of this belief see Verg. *Æn.* vi. 427, 446 ff., 494 ff.; Lucian, *Menippus*, 470, 472, and elsewhere.

[2] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 139 f.

[3] Tacitus, *Germ.* 14.

[4] Xen. *Anab.* I. viii. 29; Herod. viii. 118.

[5] Æschines, *in Ctes.* 244.

[6] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 40, 201.

[7] Cf. the reluctance to have anything to do with the dangerous corpse of a woman dying in child-birth (*ib.* p. 155).

[1] See Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, London, 1889, p. 126.

[2] See Plato, *Phædo*, 62 B; cf. Philolaos, *ap.* Clem. Strom. iii. 433 (fr. 23 Mullach), and artt. PYTHAGORAS, THRACE.

[3] Plato, *Phædo*, *loc. cit.*; cf. Cicero, *de Senect.* xx. 73, *pro Scauro*, iii. 4.

[4] On Verg. *Æn.* xii. 603. [5] *Ib.*

[6] *E.g.*, Cic. *pro Scauro*, iii. 2 ff., *Tusc. Disp.* I. xxxiv. 83 f., etc.

[7] *De Civ. Dei*, I. xvii. ff.

[8] Ch. xvii. 'Quoniam (Iudas) Dei misericordiam desperando exitiabiliter paenitens, nullum sibi salubris paenitentiae locum reliquit: quanto magis a sua nece se abstinere debet qui tali supplicio quod in se puniat non habet.'

[9] Ch. xx. [10] Ch. xxi. [11] Ch. xvii.

[12] Ch. xxv. 'Quis ita desipiat ut dicat: "Iam nunc peccemus, ne postea forte peccemus"? . . . Nonne satius est flagitium committere quod paenitendo sanetur, quam tale facinus ubi locus salubris paenitentiae non relinquitur?'

[13] Ch. xxvi.

[14] Dante, *Purgatorio*, v. 52 ff.

ful with regard to the future destiny of suicides. Judaism in its later forms strongly denounces self-destruction,[1] but the OT says nothing which could reasonably be held to justify this, unless we adopt the Augustinian view of the meaning of the sixth commandment. Probably the Hebrews, until late post-Exilic times, must be counted among those races to whom suicide is simply one of the various possible forms of death and calls for no special comment.[2]

2. **Ethics.**—All the different views of suicide taught by various religions re-appear, with additions and re-statements, in various ethical systems. The religious side of Plato's views has already been mentioned. Both he and Aristotle[3] objected to self-destruction as cowardly and an offence against the State, which thus loses a citizen. Plato also declares it unnatural, since a man is his own closest friend. But both are willing to allow it in some cases—incurable pain, or disgrace so great as to make life no longer worth living. The flood of individualism which resulted from the overthrow of the old political life by the Macedonian conquest swept away the second of the above arguments; and consequently we find much discussion of suicide in the later schools, notably Stoicism, and a decided tendency to condone or even commend it. Its most whole-hearted upholders are those who deny immortality, or at least personal immortality; for they readily embrace the idea—as old as Homer and frequently appearing in poetry—that death is the cure for all ills.[4] A thoroughgoing exponent of this view and insister upon the miseries of life was Hegesias the Cyrenaic, who, according to Cicero, was 'forbidden by King Ptolemy to lecture on that topic, owing to the number of suicides which took place among his hearers.'[5] Less extreme doctrines were prevalent among the Stoics, who before the time of Posidonios generally denied personal immortality and without exception refused to admit that death was an evil or life a good. Both being 'indifferent,' since neither is a virtue or a vice, it follows that sometimes one and sometimes the other is 'preferable' (*προηγμένον*); hence it is 'reasonable' for even the perfectly wise man to kill himself if it will benefit his friends or his country, or will free him from great pain or incurable disease.[6] Suicide for trifling reasons, however, was condemned.

Epiktetos, perhaps the most lovable member of this school, puts the matter thus in an imaginary dialogue with his pupils: 'Epiktetos, we can no longer endure to be bound to this wretched body! . . . Let us go whence we came; let us at length get free of these chains that weight us down.' . . .

'Wait for God, sirs; when He gives the signal and sets you free from this your service, you shall depart to Him; for the present, endure to live in the place where He has stationed you. . . . Wait, do not depart unreasonably.'[7]

Another passage indicates what he means by a 'reasonable' departure:[8] 'The room is smoky. If only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke, I will go. Remember this, keep fast hold on it—the door is open. . . . "You must live in Gyara."'[9] Very well. But Gyara seems to me a very smoky room. So I will depart to a habitation in which no one can prevent me dwelling; a habitation which is open to everyone.'

The Epicureans did not indeed recommend suicide in general; but that death, although an evil, is not one which can touch or harm us is one of their fundamental principles. 'When we are, death is not present; when death is present, then we are not,' says the founder of the sect.[10]

[1] Josephus, *BJ* III. viii. 5. This view probably had great influence on early Christianity.

[2] See art. EUTHANASIA.

[3] Plato, *Laws*, 873 C, D; Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* v. 1138a7, with J. Burnet's note.

[4] Homer, *Il.* v. 61 ff.; Soph. *Philoct.* 797; cf. *Oed. Col.* 1225 ff.; Eur. *Heracl.* 595 f.

[5] *Tusc. Disp.* I. xxxiv. 83. Hegesias's teachings won him the surname of *πεισιθάνατος*.

[6] Diog. Laert. vii. 130. [7] *Dissert.* I. ix. 16.

[8] *Ib.* I. xxv. 18.

[9] A rocky islet in the Ægean—the Roman Siberia.

[10] Diog. Laert. x. 125; cf. Lucr. iii. 830 ff.

The suicide of the ordinary unphilosophical man, Lucretius stigmatizes as self-contradictory, since it is caused by fear of the very death which it courts.[1] The Cynics professed to be absolutely indifferent to life and death as to everything else and are accused of killing themselves by extraordinary methods for little or no reason,[2] while some Skeptics were equally insensible.[3] In Rome, where originally suicide appears to have been rare,[4] the famous deaths of Cato, Thrasea, and others were for the most part inspired by Greek teaching, generally Stoic. Mediæval ethics added nothing new.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of modern times to the rational treatment of the matter is the consideration noticed in the opening paragraphs of this article, that many suicides are non-moral and entirely the affair of the specialist in mental diseases. Apart from this, and considering only cases where the agent is fully rational, the characteristic feature of the ethical discussions of the subject is their elimination of the theological elements in the arguments, Hume's famous essay 'Of Suicide'[5] being the last important work to pay them much attention. Perhaps the school most nearly favourable to suicide is Utilitarianism; for, starting from its definition of a good act as one which increases the sum total of human happiness (identified with pleasure),[6] one can easily imagine cases where the death of a man by his own hand would cause little or no pain to any one and would be more or less completely a source of pleasure to many. The more metaphysical schools discountenance it, either as an insult to humanity in general as embodied and exemplified in oneself (Kant) or as a final assertion of the will to live (Schopenhauer). There is also a tendency, arising from a contemplation of such medical facts as those already mentioned, to remove it altogether from the field of ethics—a view which we believe to be an exaggeration of a truth. The general trend of non-theological thought on the part of the ordinary educated man is towards a compromise between the extreme laxitude towards suicide represented by Stoicism and the extreme rigidity of the Kantians. That self-destruction is now and then justified by circumstances is admitted by most; and it is quite as widely admitted that those circumstances must be of an extreme and unusual kind to make the act anything else than cowardly and otherwise immoral.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works given under EUTHANASIA, the following may be cited: E. Tanzi, *A Text-book of Mental Diseases*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; C. Mercier, *Sanity and Insanity*[2], do. 1905 (short popular account); J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], do. 1911–14; J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, do. 1863 (many subsequent edd.).

H. J. ROSE.

SUICIDE (Buddhist).—1. Introduction.—We are concerned only with 'religious suicide' and the Buddhist views thereon, not with the various kinds of suicide mentioned in Buddhist literature, interesting as they may be.[7] The position of the old Indian ascetics in regard to suicide may be summarized as follows. While the majority of sects were addicted to rapid methods of suicide—throwing oneself down from a mountain, etc.—the Jains (and probably also the disciples of Gosāla) considered those methods vulgar and evil.[8] Men

[1] *De Rer. Nat.* iii. 79 ff.

[2] Luc. *Vit. Auct.* 10 [p. 550], *καὶ τέλος, ἢν σοι δοκῇ, πολύποδα ὠμὸν ἢ σηπίαν φαγὼν ἀπόθανε.*

[3] Pyrrhon, *ap.* Stob. *Flor.* cxxi. 28.

[4] See art. SUICIDE (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.

[5] First published in his *Essays and Treatises*, London, 1777.

[6] 'Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure' is the famous dictum of J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

[7] See, *e.g.*, *Majjhima*, ii. 109; a husband, threatened with separation from his wife, kills her and commits suicide, in order that they may be husband and wife in their next birth.

[8] See *Kathākośa*, tr. C. H. Tawney, London, 1895, p. 8.

who thus kill themselves are reborn as demons.[1] While practising starvation, the Jain must avoid any desire for death (*maraṇāśaṃsā*):[2] 'Renouncing all food and drink, I patiently wait for my end.'

2. Buddhism condemns asceticism.—Any austerity which is likely to weaken body or mind is forbidden. The Jains and many others saw in asceticism and physical pain (*duḥkha*, *tapas*) a force that makes for purification from sin; suicide by starvation is the ascetic act *par excellence*.[3] While vocal sins are destroyed through silence (*mauna*) and mental sins through 'respiratory-restraint,' bodily sins are destroyed through starvation (*abhojana*)[4] and lust is crushed through mortification. Buddhism had better methods of crushing lust and destroying sin—the realization of the impermanence of pleasure and of the non-substantiality of the Ego, the experience in trance (*dhyāna*) of a happiness which has nothing to do with pleasure and destroys in a man any infatuation for pleasure. It was thus enabled to disqualify ascetic methods.

3. Buddhism condemns suicide.—There is a celebrated text:

'A monk who preaches suicide, who tells man: "Do away with this wretched life, full of suffering and sin; death is better," in fact preaches murder, is a murderer, is no longer a monk.'[5]

A man must live his allotted span of life. He cannot avoid, by suicide, the sufferings which are the result of his former evil deeds; nor can he win sooner, by a voluntary death, the reward of his good deeds. Everything comes to him who waits. To that effect Buddha employs to Pāyāsi the simile of the woman who cuts open her body in order to see whether her child is a boy or a girl.[6]

It seems also that suicide from religious motives is not effective. Buddhists object to 'thirst for non-existence' (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*), as they object to 'thirst for existence' (*bhavatṛṣṇā*). A saint must abide in indifference, without caring for life, without caring for death. He will not commit suicide in order to reach *nirvāṇa* sooner. Is not suicide a desperate act of disgust and desire, disgust of existence, desire of rest?

4. Buddhism admits suicide.—We have therefore good reason to believe (1) that suicide is not an ascetic act leading to spiritual progress and to *nirvāṇa*, and (2) that no saint or *arhat*—a spiritually perfect being—will kill himself. But we are confronted with a number of stories which prove beyond dispute that we are mistaken in these two important conclusions. On the one hand, suicide may be in certain cases the actual cause or the occasion of the attainment of *arhat*ship, although in other cases it may be premature and sinful. On the other hand, *arhats* commit suicide.

In illustration of the first point, we may quote the stories of the attempted suicide of (1) Sīhā, (2) Sappadāsa, and (3) Vakkali; for the second the suicide of (4) Vakkali and (5) Godhika.

(1) Sīhā was distressed at not obtaining spiritual progress after seven years of endeavour. She said: 'What have I to do with this wretched life (*pāpajīvita*)? I will die through hanging.' But, just as the rope was tied round her neck, she was turning her thought towards enlightenment (*vipassanā*), as was her former habit. She attained *arhat*ship, and at this very moment the rope loosened from her throat and fell.[1]

(2) The story of Sappadāsa is to the same effect. This monk was overpowered by passion (*kilesa*) and never obtained concentration. This distressed him so much that he was about to commit suicide with a razor or a sword, when he suddenly realized the inward vision.[2]

(3) Vakkali was fond of looking at the Buddha, and the excessive importance which he attached to the physical body—a putrid body (*pūtikāya*)—of the Master was an obstacle to his spiritual advance. In order to create in him a 'holy fear' (*saṃvega*), the Buddha commanded him to go. Desperate at being no longer able to see the Master, Vakkali decided to commit suicide by throwing himself down from a mountain, saying: 'What have I to do with this life, if I can no longer see Him?' At this moment the Master appeared and prevented him from thus 'destroying the conditions of his reaching the Path (*maggaphala*).'[3]

(4) Vakkali was suffering from a painful illness. Bhagavat came to comfort him and said: 'Your death will be a holy one, an auspicious one (*apāpika*).' When the Master had gone, Vakkali uttered for the last time the Buddhist profession of faith (universal transitoriness) and took the sword.[4]

(5) Godhika was unable because of disease to remain in a certain state of meditation. He thought: 'If I were to take a sword.' Māra approached the Buddha and told him: 'Your disciple wants to die; he has resolved to die. Prevent him. How could one of your disciples die while he is not yet an *arhat*?' But, as it is explained in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Godhika reached *arhat*ship just after he had begun cutting his throat.[5] It is said: 'Those who take the sword are without regard for life; they achieve insight (*vipassanā*) and reach *nirvāṇa*.' 'Thus act the strong ones (*dhīra*); they desire not life; having removed thirst and the root of thirst (that is, ignorance), Godhika is at rest.'[6]

5. The nirvāṇa of the great saints.—Vakkali was an *arhat*, but, as he did not possess the power of 'loosening the *saṃskāras* of life,' he had, in order to die, to take the sword. On the other hand, Śākyamuni and, in later sources, a number of saints—*e.g.*, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī in the *Apadāna*—possess such a power. The Sanskrit *Abhidharma*[7] teaches that it belongs to the saints who have reached the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* ('*nirvāṇa* without rests').

In the case of Śākyamuni we have to deal with a voluntary death; in the case of Mahāpajāpatī, who has to obtain permission of Śākyamuni before she resolves to die, we have to deal with a voluntary death of a slightly different character. The Pratyekabuddhas, like Śākyamuni, decide for themselves when the 'time' has arrived; their method is to rise a few cubits above the ground and burn themselves.

We can easily understand that a Buddha, when he has set in motion the wheel, when he has elected two chief disciples—briefly, 'when he has done what he had to do'—is duly authorized to enter into the final rest. The case of an *arhat* is not different; the *arhat* also has achieved what he had to achieve—*i.e.* he has removed the slightest kind of desire. If he is not, like a Buddha, capable of abandoning life in a quiet way, there is no reason why he should not have recourse to more drastic methods.

6. Mahāyāna praises and deprecates suicide as self-surrender and worship.—The saint of the new Buddhism must, before reaching *nirvāṇa*, spend millions of lives in charity, worship, and meditation. 'Abandoning one's existence' (*ātmanas tyāgaḥ, ātmabhāvatyāga*) is to be looked upon as the best self-sacrifice, for to give one's body is better than to give alms; and also as the best

[1] The *giripadana* or *bhṛgupāta* is *pāgayajanacetṭhiya* (H. Jacobi, *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mahārāṣṭrī*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 2; A. Weber, *Fragment der Bhagavati*, Berlin, 1865–66, p. 206).

[2] On Jain suicide see J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; Uvāsagadasāo, ed. and tr. A. F. R. Hoernle, Calcutta, 1888–90, §§ 57, 89; *Ācārāngasūtra*, i. 7. 5–8, tr. H. Jacobi, *SBE* xxii. [1884] 74–78; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 291; G. Bühler, *Ueber die indische Sekte der Jaina*, Vienna, 1887, p. 12. As concerns Gosāla, see Uvāsagadasāo, app. ii. p. 23 (suicide is permitted to ascetics who have reached the highest degree of perfection).

[3] Violent death, voluntary or not, destroys sin (see J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*).

[4] See, *e.g.*, *Majjhima*, i. 93; *SBE* 1. [1910], *s.v.* 'Suicide,' the references to vols. xxii. and xlv.

[5] *Pārājika*, iii.; see *SBE* xiii. [1881] 4.

[6] *Digha-Nikāya*, ii. 331; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 350 (*SBB* iii. [London, 1910]).

[1] *Therīgāthā*, 77. [2] *Theragāthā*, 408.

[3] *Ib.* 350; Dhammapada's Commentary, 381; also Aṅguttara's Commentary.

[4] *Saṃyutta*, iii. 123. [5] Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, i. 2.

[6] The *Milindapañha* deals with suicide (see *SBE* xxxv. [1890] 273 ff.), but does not mention Godhika and Vakkali. See J. P. Minayeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, tr. R. H. Assier de Pompignan, Paris, 1894, p. 223; *Saṃyutta*, i. 120, iii. 123; Dhammapada's Commentary, v. 57 (i. 431); Kathāvatthu's Commentary, *ad* i. 2.

[7] *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. vi.

worship, for to burn one's body as an offering is certainly more meritorious than to kindle lamps at a shrine. We may refer (1) to the story of the future Śākyamuni giving his body to feed a starving tigress,[1] and (2) to the legend of Bhaiṣajyarāja, who, dissatisfied with his previous worship although painful and extravagant, filled his body with all sorts of oil and set it on fire.[2]

The *bodhisattvas* of the past have practised in that way many heroic deeds (*duḥkara*), some of which are told in the canon of ancient Buddhism (*Chariyapiṭaka, Jātaka*); the new scriptures are inexhaustible on this topic.

In accordance with the principles of the new Buddhism and the *Légende dorée* of the eternal Buddhism, self-surrender culminating in voluntary death has been held in honour in various Buddhist countries. It happens (or it used to happen) that Chinese monks beg for fuel, build a funeral pyre, sit cross-legged on it, cover their head with linen soaked in oil, and set themselves on fire. With some branches of the Chinese Mahāyāna, the 'burning of the skull' is an essential part of ordination as a 'future Buddha'—a symbol of the holocaust for which human courage is nowadays inadequate.[3]

The pilgrim I-tsing says that Indian Buddhists abstain from suicide and, in general, from self-torture.[4] Whether this statement be accurate or not—A. Barth did not believe it to be quite accurate—the theologians of the Great Vehicle strongly deprecate such practices. One of the chief aims of Śāntideva in his *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*,[5] 'A Compendium of the Rules of the Disciple of the Great Vehicle,' is to elucidate this point: In what measure is a disciple—a beginner—to imitate the heroic deeds of the *bodhisattvas* of old? The disciple is ready, willing, and resolved even to commit sin and to burn in hell for the sake of another, not to mention sacrificing his limbs and body; but he must avoid any mistake in the realization of his resolve. The question is whether in such and such a case sacrifice or self-denial is really useful to our fellow-creatures; whether there is not some other means of procuring universal welfare. To sum up, the sacrifice of one's body is not in accordance with a wise estimate of the spiritual needs of a beginner.

LITERATURE.—See, in addition to the sources cited in the footnotes, L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Quelques Observations sur le suicide dans le Bouddhisme ancien,' *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres de l'Académie de Belgique*, 1919, pp. 685–693; A. Rémusat, *Foé Koué Ki*, Paris, 1836, p. 272; J. Legge, *Fâ-hien's Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, Oxford, 1886, p. 86; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886, p. 39; E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues, extraits du Tripiṭaka chinois et traduits en français*, Paris, 1910, i. 207, 265, *passim*; E. Huber, *Le Sutralamkara de Açvaghoṣa*, French tr., Paris, 1908, pp. 126, 440; *Abhidharmakośa*, ii. 10, v. 7.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

SUICIDE (Chinese).—Suicide is at least not uncommon in China. Literature and history supply illustrations. In a Chinese novelette the heroine commits suicide on the grave of her betrothed lover to avoid the marriage arranged for her with his rival, and that rival thereupon takes his own life in order to pursue in the other world at once his quest for his bride and vengeance on her lover. Among some eight hundred biographical notices in W. F. Mayers's *Chinese Readers' Manual*,[1] 27 instances of suicide are recorded—generals after defeat, a tyrant to escape his impending doom, a dethroned ruler, statesmen whose advice, like Ahithophel's, has been rejected, or who desired to enforce their counsel by this last proof of their earnestness, a captive to avoid exile, hopeless prisoners, ministers who, having incurred imperial displeasure, were allowed to die thus rather than by the hands of the executioner, a rebel whose plot was discovered, women to avoid a marriage deemed by them to be shameful, an upright servant rather than commit a murder enjoined on him, a minister of justice under whose subordinates capital punishment was unduly frequent, those moved by loyalty to a deceased master, by grief for the death of father or son, or by shame for a son's treachery.

In addition to suicides on such occasions as these, some of which will be noted as peculiarly Chinese, cases also occur in which misery (*e.g.*, hopeless leprosy) drives to suicide. More frequent are cases in which suicide is committed in an access of passion, sometimes with the view of involving one's adversary in legal proceedings in this world, or less frequently with the hope of harassing him by visitations of the vengeful ghost.

Hanging, leaping down a well, and opium poisoning have been perhaps the most common methods of suicide; the last may diminish in frequency under the present opium restrictions.

In the absence of accurate statistics it is impossible to estimate the ratio of deaths by suicide to the total population. The general impression, probably well founded, is that suicide is much more frequent than in Great Britain. This greater frequency, if it is assumed as fact, may be accounted for by the low value put on individual life, a tendency to ungovernable rage, and the fact that social and religious feelings do not rigorously inhibit suicide, but rather in certain circumstances (*e.g.*, where marriage is being urged on a widow or a bride whose betrothed bridegroom has died) approve it.

LITERATURE.—*The Encyclopædia Sinica*, Shanghai, 1917, London, 1918; J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, New York, 1865, London, 1866; A. H. Smith, *Village Life in China*, Edinburgh, 1900; *Records of the General Conference of Protestant Missionaries*, Shanghai, 1890, pp. 329–333.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

SUICIDE (Greek and Roman).—I. *GREEK.*—Under the name 'suicide' we here include all forms in which the individual kills himself intentionally, whether he acts of his own free will or under compulsion, and whether the end of his action be selfish or altruistic.

1. **Legendary suicides.**—The earliest definite mention of suicide in Greek literature is the case of Epikaste (Iokaste), the mother of Oidipus of Thebes, in the *Nekyia*.[2]

Odysseus tells how in Hades 'I saw the mother of Oidipodes, fair Epikaste, who wrought an awful deed in ignorance of mind, marrying her own son. And he had slain his father and he married her. And presently the gods made it known to men. Then he in lovely Thebe endured sorrow and ruled over the Kadmeans by the grievous counsels of the gods. But she went to the house of Hades, fastening a high noose from the lofty hall, holden by her woe. And to him she left sorrows in the aftertime full many, even all that the Erinyes of a mother bring to pass.'

The precise motive for suicide is not very clearly indicated here, or rather Homer does not distinguish clearly between the horror of Epikaste at the revolting nature of the situation in which she unwittingly finds herself and her shame in the face of her deed becoming known. But the essential points are that (1) suicide presents itself to Homer as the natural and fitting act when life has lost all that makes life worth living, and (2) no blame attaches to suicide in itself.

[1] *Jātakamālā*, i., tr. J. S. Speyer, *SBB* i. [1895].
[2] *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, xxii., tr. H. Kern, *SBE* xxi. [1884].
[3] See J. J. M. de Groot, *Le Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, Amsterdam, 1893, pp. 50, 217, 227. It is recorded that in the Japanese sect of Sukhāvatī religious suicide was not unknown. In 1422 a large company of persons, after hearing a stirring sermon by a zealot to the effect that paradise may be gained solely by calling on the name of Amitābha, committed suicide by walking into the sea while repeating the 'Namu Amida Butsu.'
[4] *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 197 f. (ch. xxxviii. f.); A. Barth, *Journ. des Savants*, 1898, p. 541.
[5] *Bibl. Buddhica*, i. [Petrograd, 1902].

[1] New ed., London, 1910. [2] Hom. *Od.* xi. 271 ff.

But the most famous and indeed the typical heroic suicide is that of Aias. Homer does not mention his suicide explicitly, but it is clearly alluded to in *Od.* xi. 548 ff., where Odysseus expresses his regret at having obtained the arms of Achilles:

ὡς δὴ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τοιῷδε ἐπ' ἀέθλῳ·
τοίην γὰρ κεφαλὴν ἔνεκ' αὐτῶν (the arms of Achilles) γαῖα κατέσχεν,
Αἴανθ', ὃς κτλ.

His suicide was recounted in the *Aithiopis* of Arktinos in connexion with the award of the arms of Achilles to Odysseus.[1] It is to be noted that so far there is no mention of madness or of an attack by Aias upon the herds. These incidents were, however, recounted in the *Little Iliad* of Lesches.[2] Also, whereas in *Od.* xi. 555 it is emphasized that the death of Aias was mourned by the Greeks equally with that of Achilles, the *Little Iliad*[3] told of the withholding of burial honours. But even so there is nothing to indicate that the suicide in itself was considered blameworthy. It is an act quite in accordance with the haughtiness and self-sufficiency which characterize Aias in Homer, and of which the famous 'silence of Aias' in *Od.* xi. 553 ff., so admired by the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*,[4] is a fitting expression. The suicide of Aias is the typical act of a great soul which cannot brook dishonour.

A motive of a less heroic kind which prompts to suicide is excess of sorrow for the dead. The feeling is one familiar to Homer. 'If I lose thee, it were better for me to go beneath the earth,' says Andromache to Hektor,[5] in the same spirit in which David cries, 'Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!'[6] There is not in Homer any express mention of suicide for this reason, but Antikleia is referred to in terms which are hardly consonant with any other explanation than that she died by her own hand.

Eumaios says to the disguised Odysseus: 'Laertes still lives, but evermore he prays to Zeus that life may perish from his limbs within his halls; for he mourns exceedingly for his son that is gone and for his wedded wife, whose death beyond all else hath grieved him and brought him to untimely age. She in grief for her glorious son perished by a miserable death (λευγαλέῳ θανάτῳ): so may none perish who dwells here friendly to me and doing friendly deeds.'[7]

The natural inference from these words is strongly confirmed by the reference to her in *Od.* xi. 84 ff. and 197 ff. The later story said frankly that she hanged herself.[8]

The list of such suicides is a long one.

Aigeus, father of Theseus, had arranged with his son when he left for Crete, carrying the annual tribute of the Athenians to the Minotaur, that, if Theseus were successful in slaying the monster, a white sail should be hoisted upon the returning vessel. Theseus forgot to take down the black sail which the ship was flying, and Aigeus, thinking that his son had perished, threw himself from the rock on which he was keeping watch into the sea (Ægean) which thenceforth bore his name.[9] Erigone, daughter of Ikarios, hanged herself when she found the dead body of her father.[10] Skedasos committed suicide when his daughters had hanged themselves.[11] When Evadne throws herself on the funeral pyre of her husband, her father Iphis threatens to commit suicide by starvation.[12]

A special case of suicide to avoid shame is that to escape sexual dishonour.

Legend told how the Leukadian rock received its name from Leukatas, who, to escape the unwelcome attentions of Apollo, plunged into the sea off the island of Leukas.[13] Pausanias tells us[14] how the daughters of Skedasos of Leuktra hanged themselves to escape the violence offered them by certain Lacedæmonians.

Suicide, in the sense of self-devotion for one's country, has always occupied a prominent place in patriotic saga. Kodros, the last king of Athens, is a famous example.

The Lacedæmonians, under pressure of famine, resolved to invade Attica. But first they consulted the Delphic oracle as to their prospects of taking Athens and, receiving an answer that they would be successful if they did not kill the Athenian king, marched on the city. Cleomantis, a Delphian, secretly communicated to the Athenians the purport of the oracle. Kodros thereupon dressed himself as a beggar and stole out of the besieged city and proceeded to gather firewood. When two enemy scouts approached him, he slew one of them with his hatchet, whereupon the other, taking him for a beggar, drew his sword and slew him, thus rendering the capture of Athens impossible.[1]

There is the similar story of Makaria, daughter of Herakles and Deianeira.[2] That such a death was deemed a glorious one is sufficiently attested.[3]

2. Heroic suicide.—The motives which in the Homeric poems seem mainly to be regarded as prompting to suicide are of a heroic nature—the sense of dishonour suffered or impending, the devotion of a high purpose, or the intolerable sorrow of a personal bereavement. The sense of the common ills of humanity is by no means ignored—πλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν.[4] But there is no pessimism. Whatever the evils that darken human life, at least it is a good thing to enjoy the sun, and the darkest shadow that falls athwart Homeric life is the sense not of its burden but of its brevity. Life at any level is to be preferred to the sunless realms of Hades.[5]

But with the rise of reflexion, as witnessed in the poetry of the age succeeding the Homeric, we have a view of life which is frankly pessimistic. Hesiod conceives the present to be an age of iron, thrown into darker relief by the picture of a happier golden age gone by.[6]

That life is an evil has become a commonplace. πάντων μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον[7] is a doctrine which becomes a hackneyed phrase of later poetry—τὸ μὲν δὴ πανταχοῦ θρυλούμενον, κράτιστον εἶναι φημὶ μὴ φῦναι βροτῷ.[8] The logical consequence of this view of life is that man is justified in ending what he cannot mend. Whether, in fact, this pessimistic view of life actually induced an increased practice of suicide is more difficult to establish. But in any case motives of a less heroic kind seem now to be recognized as worthy causes of suicide. Thus poverty is expressly recognized by Theognis[9] as a sufficient cause.

3. The historians.—In the historians of the 5th cent. suicide is not a particularly prominent feature, and belongs in general to one or other of the types already noticed.

Herodotus relates the legend of Nitokris, who, in order to escape punishment for her misdeeds, committed suicide by leaping into a room full of ashes.[10] Arion is compelled by the ferrymen either to commit suicide, with the prospect of being buried ashore, or to jump into the sea.[11] The daughter of Mykerinos, being violated by her father, hanged herself from grief.[12] Shame was the motive for the suicide of Spargapises, leader of the Massagetai, who in a state of intoxication were surprised and killed or captured by the Persians.[13] And we have the parallel stories of Othryades, who, ashamed to return to Sparta when his company was killed, slew himself at Thyreai,[14] and of Pantites, who, having survived the disaster at Thermopylai, 'on his return to Sparta, being held in dishonour, hanged himself.'[15]

1 Cf. Proclus in *Epicorum Græc. Fragmenta*, ed. G. Kinkel, Leipzig, 1877, p. 34, 8 ff.
2 Cf. Proclus, *Ep. Gr. Fr.* p. 36.
3 *Ep. Gr. Fr.* p. 40; Eustath. *Il.* p. 285, 34.
4 [Longinus] ix. 2: ἡ τοῦ Αἴαντος ἐν Νεκυίᾳ σιωπὴ μέγα καὶ παντὸς ὑψηλότερον λόγου.
5 *Il.* vi. 410. 6 2 8 1833.
7 *Od.* xv. 353 ff. 8 Hygin. *Fab.* 243.
9 Plut. *Thes.* 22; Diod. iv. 60 *f.*; Hygin. *Fab.* 242; Suidas, *s.v.* Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος; Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 74.
10 Apollod. iii. 14, etc. 11 Paus. ix. xiii. 3.
12 Eurip. *Suppl.* 1105 *f.*
13 Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 279. 14 ix. xiii. 3.

1 Lycurg. *c. Leokrat.* 84 ff.
2 Paus. i. xxxii.; Eurip. *Heraklëidai.*
3 Paus. ix. xvii. 1. 4 *Il.* xxiv. 49.
5 *Od.* xi. 488 ff. 6 *Works*, 174 ff.
7 Theognis, 425 ff.
8 Eurip. *Bellerophon*, frag. 287. 1 f. (A. Nauck); cf. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1227 *f.*
9 173 ff. 10 ii. 100. 11 *Ib.* i. 24. 12 *Ib.* ii. 131.
13 *Ib.* i. 213. 14 *Ib.* i. 82. 15 *Ib.* vii. 232.

In Thucydides we read how in 427 B.C. the Corcyrean democrats 'went to the temple of Hera and, persuading some fifty of the suppliants (belonging to the oligarchic party) to stand their trial, condemned them all to death. The majority refused to come out, and, when they saw what was going on, destroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple where they were, except a few who hanged themselves on trees or put an end to their lives in any other way they could.'[1] Again in 425 B.C. the oligarchs of Corcyra were entrapped into a large building from which they were led forth in groups of twenty for execution. When those in the building got to know what was happening, they refused to come out. Then the Corcyrean populace broke a hole in the roof through which they showered tiles and arrows at those within. 'The prisoners tried to shelter themselves as best they could. Most of them put an end to their own lives. Some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them; others strangled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips torn from their own clothes. This went on during the greater part of the night, until in one way or another, by their own hands or by missiles from the roof, they all perished.'[2] Thucydides knows, too, the story that Themistokles poisoned himself: *λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν*.[3]

In Xenophon, *Hell.* VI. ii. 36, we have the familiar motive of shame. Krinippos, when the Syracusan fleet under his command was captured by Iphikrates (373 B.C.), *ὑπὸ λύπης θανάτῳ αὐθαιρέτῳ ἀποθνήσκει*. So *Hell.* VII. iv. 9, when the invading Arkadians were attacked in camp by the Eleans, whom they defeated, the Elean hipparch, who was held responsible for the attack, committed suicide (364 B.C.).

But the suicide which is more prominent in Xenophon is of the romantic type, described as *ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἐπισφάξαι ἑαυτόν*, where love faithful unto death refuses to be comforted otherwise than by sharing the fate of the beloved. 'Cyrus himself died, and eight of his best followers fell over him (*ἔκειντο ἐπ' αὐτῷ*). And Artapates, the most faithful of his staff, when he saw that Cyrus had fallen, is said to have leapt from his horse and thrown himself upon him. And some say that the king ordered him to be slain over Cyrus (*ἐπισφάξαι αὐτὸν Κύρῳ*); but others say that he drew his sword and killed himself over him (*ἑαυτὸν ἐπισφάξασθαι*).'[4] We have the same motive in the story of Pantheia, so beautifully told by Xenophon.[5]

The emotional value of this motive has made it very prominent in literature, as, indeed, it has everywhere and at all times been actually a very common cause of suicide.

It is familiar to the OT.[6] Already in Homer Antilochos holds the hands of Achilles, lest in his grief for Patroklos he should cut his throat;[7] and, even if suicide is not meant, Andromache's anguish for Hektor almost makes her die.[8] Most familiar perhaps of all is the case of Laodamia, the wife of Protesilaos, to whom she had been married just before his departure for Troy. There Protesilaos was the first to leap ashore and, after slaying many Trojans, was killed by Hektor. After his death his wife grieved for him so much that Hermes for pity brought back Protesilaos from the dead. At first Laodamia, thinking he had actually returned from Troy, rejoiced, but when he returned to Hades *ἑαυτὴν ἐφόνευσεν*.[9] As this legend is enshrined for us in the verses of Wordsworth, so Tennyson has told the story of another who was faithful unto death: Oinone, the beloved of Paris, whose story is unknown to the epic cycle and to the tragedians. When Paris died, she either hanged herself[10] or threw herself into his funeral pyre.[11]

Another late legend is that of Hero and Leander, the subject of the poem by Musaios entitled *τὰ καθ' Ἡρὼ καὶ Λέανδρον*. Leander of Abydos swam the Hellespont nightly to visit his beloved Hero, the priestess of Aphrodite at Sestos across the straits, being lighted by a lamp which Hero set upon her tower by the seashore. He attempted the passage one stormy night, when the lamp was extinguished by the storm. Next morning his dead body was washed ashore, and Hero threw herself from her tower to join him in death.[1] Pausanias[2] remarks of three heroines, Marpessa, Kleopatra, and Polydora, that they all committed suicide in this way: *προαποθανοῦσι πᾶσαι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑαυτὰς ἐπικατέσφαξαν*.

The motives of such suicides are not always identical and no doubt were sometimes complex. Sometimes it was the last sacrifice of devotion, a tradition become a religion, like the Indian *satī* or our own proud tradition that the captain goes down with his ship.

Xenophon tells how in 388 B.C. Anaxibios the Spartan, falling into an ambush, said to those by him: '"Gentlemen, my duty is to die here. As for you, seek safety before we engage the enemy." Then he took his shield from his armour bearer and fell fighting at his post. But his favourites (*τὰ παιδικά*) abode with him, and twelve of the Lacedæmonian harmosts who had come from the cities died with him fighting.'[3] Haimon in the *Antigone* of Sophocles had all along determined to die with Antigone,[4] but the actual suicide is complicated by his futile attempt to slay his father and becomes outwardly an act of disappointed rage.[5]

Where the suicide considers himself responsible for another's death, his own death may appear to be due as an act of atonement.

Thus Kallirrhoe, having by her unkindness brought about the suicide of her lover Koresos, repented and out of pity for him and shame for her conduct killed herself,[6] precisely as Adrastos, when he accidentally killed the son of Crœsus, 'stood before the dead and submitted himself to Crœsus, holding out his hands and entreating him to slay him over the dead (*ἐπικατασφάξαι τῷ νεκρῷ*) since for him life was no longer tolerable (*οὐδὲ οἱ εἶναι βιώσιμον*).'[7]

But, without any such complications, we have the devotion of those who, lovely and pleasant in their lives, in death would not be divided. When Kastor is slain by Idas, his brother Polydeukes cries: 'Our Father, Son of Kronos, what release shall there be from sorrow? Give me also to die with him, O Lord. Honour is departed for him who is bereft of friends.'[8] And the more one knows of the religious thought of the Greeks, the less is one inclined to disparage the influence of the motive to which Plato alludes—the hope of a blessed reunion hereafter: 'Ere now for human love, for dead wife, for dead son many a man has gone willingly to the house of Hades, drawn by the hope that in the world beyond they might see and be with those they loved.'[9]

4. Compulsory suicide.—A special interest attaches to Xenophon, *Hell.* II. iii. 56. In describing the execution by compulsory suicide of Theramenes in 403 B.C., he says: 'When, being compelled to die, he drank the hemlock (*τὸ κώνειον ἔπιε*), it was said that he threw what was left of it as in the game of *cottabos*, crying, "This for the fair Kritias!"' This is the first occurrence of the word *κώνειον* in the historians and the only one in Xenophon. When the practice of execution by compulsory poisoning was introduced in Athens we do not know, nor when hemlock first became the recognized medium. The use of hemlock for this purpose, we may with probability suppose, first became regular in the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C. Even in the orators, however, references to it are surprisingly rare. It is not mentioned in Antiphon. Andocides mentions it only once.[10] Lysias refers to it twice.[11] It is not found in Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Dinarchus. The advantages of hemlock-drinking over other more

[1] iii. 81. [2] iv. 48. [3] i. 138.
[4] *Anab.* i. 8. [5] *Cyrop.* vii. 3.
[6] 1 S 31[4f.]; see art. SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian).
[7] *Il.* xviii. 33 f. [8] *Ib.* xxii. 473 f.
[9] Apollod. *Epit.* iii. 30: *ξίφει διεχρήσατο ἑαυτήν*; Eustath. on *Il.* ii. 700; cf. Ovid, *ex Ponto*, iii. i. 109 f.
[10] Apollod. iii. xii. 5. 4, vi. 1–3; Lycophron, 57 ff.; Konon, 23; Parthen. *Erot.* 4.
[11] Q. Smyrn. x. 262, 484; Ovid, *Her.* 5.

[1] Musaios, *op. cit.*; Stat. *Theb.* vi. 542; Verg. *Georg.* iii. 258; Ovid, *Her.* 17, 18.
[2] iv. ii. 5; cf. the case of Skedasos (ix. xiii. 3).
[3] *Hell.* iv. viii. 38 f. [4] 751.
[5] 1234 f. [6] Paus. vii. xxi.
[7] Herod. i. 45. [8] Pind. *Nem.* x. 76 ff.
[9] *Phædo*, 68 A. [10] *De Pace*, 10.
[11] *C. Erastosthenem*, 17, and *Περὶ δημ. τ. τ. Νικίου ἀδελφ.* (*Or.* 18) 24.

cumbrous methods of suicide are referred to in the *Frogs*[1] of Aristophanes (405 B.C.).

It was by drinking hemlock that Socrates died in 399 B.C.[2] It was the method used by the Athenian women whom the shameful conduct of the characters of Euripides drove to suicide, according to Aristophanes.[3] It is difficult to resist the conclusion that in the stress and excitement and anxiety of the closing years of the Peloponnesian war suicide had assumed a prominence hitherto unknown, and it would appear that this phenomenon was not unconnected with the interest in the preparation of speedy and painless modes of putting an end to life. Incidentally it may be noted that Attic hemlock was reputed to be specially effective.[4] Theophrastus tells us of the discovery by Thrasyas of Mantineia of a *ῥᾳδία καὶ ἄπονος ἀπόλυσις* in which the juices of hemlock (*κώνειον*) and poppy (*μήκων*) and other such herbs were made up in a dose of small bulk, weighing about a drachma, the effects of which were incurable and which, moreover, would keep and retain its potency for an indefinite period.[5] No doubt, also, the fact of having at their disposal a convenient and not too painful means of terminating life induced, as in our own time, many rash persons to attempt their lives. It is interesting to note that Menander wrote a play with the title *Κωνειαζόμεναι*. Hence there was developed the interest in antidotes of which we have evidence.[6] Theophrastus has much to say of antidotes.[7] In particular it is interesting, in view of the attitude of the people of Ceos to suicide, to notice that to them is attributed an improved method of preparing hemlock.[8]

The story of the death of Theramenes points in the same direction. When in our own country death by the axe of the headsman was a common fate, it became a point of honour with his victims that they should take leave of life like gentlemen. Montrose, we are told, went to the scaffold clad in rich attire 'more becoming a bridegroom than a criminal going to the gallows.' Such conduct is the true analogue to the dying libation of Theramenes. Socrates had the same idea:

'What about making a libation with this cup?', he says to the jailer, 'May I or not?', and, that not being feasible, he yet drank the cup of death 'easily and cheerfully' as one who toasts a friend.[9]

And, as meaner victims of the axe imitated the conduct of Montrose and others, and the grand manner degenerated into the bravado of the desperate and callous, so we have a degenerate echo of the heroic in the story told by Ælian and Athenæus of the devotees of debauchery who, having drained the cup of pleasure to the lees, ended by throwing away the cup, and concluded life's banquet with a toast.[10]

5. Legal aspect.—So long as suicide does not become so frequent as to threaten seriously the well-being of the community, the State has no motive to intervene by legislation against it. At no time does Athenian law define suicide as a penal offence. The only outbreak of which we hear in Attica suggesting an epidemic of suicide is that which legend connected with the origin of the Aiora, or swing-festival.

Legend told how, when Dionysos first came to Attica with the new gift of wine, he was hospitably entertained by Ikarios, to whom he revealed his intoxicating boon. Ikarios gave of the wine to some shepherds, who in their vinous frenzy killed their would-be benefactor. His daughter, Erigone, guided to the spot by his faithful dog Maira, hanged herself on a tree. Then there broke out among the Athenian women an epidemic of hanging, which abated only when the Athenians discovered the cause and instituted the Aiora festival in honour of Erigone.[1]

Plutarch tells of a similar outbreak at Miletos which, obscure in origin, was generally attributed to atmospheric conditions:

'A strange and terrible affliction once came upon the maidens of Miletos, from some obscure cause—mostly it was conjectured that some poisonous and ecstatic temperament of the atmosphere produced in them a mental upset and frenzy. For there fell suddenly upon all of them a desire of death and a mad impulse towards hanging. Many hanged themselves before they could be prevented. The words and the tears of their parents, the persuasions of their friends, had no effect. In spite of all the ingenuity and cleverness of those who watched them, they succeeded in making away with themselves. The plague seemed to be of an unearthly character and beyond human remedy, until on the motion of a wise man a resolution was proposed that women who hanged themselves should be carried out to burial through the market-place. The ratification of this resolution not only checked the evil but altogether put an end to the passion for death. A great evidence of the high character and virtue of the women was this shrinking from dishonour and the fact that they who were fearless in face of the two most awful things in the world—death and pain—could not support the appearance of disgrace nor bear the thought of shame after death.'[2]

Theramenes, in whose time hemlock as a means of suicide appears to have come into vogue, was a native of Ceos, and we have seen above that Theophrastus[3] ascribes to the Ceans certain improvements in the method of preparing that poison. There is evidence that at some period suicide by drinking hemlock was a recognized practice—if not a legal regulation—in Ceos for persons who had passed the age of 60. Strabo[4] (63 B.C.–A.D. 23), speaking of Iulis, the chief town in Ceos, birthplace of Simonides and his nephew Bacchylides, says:

παρὰ τούτοις δὲ δοκεῖ τεθῆναί ποτε νόμος, οὗ μέμνηται καὶ Μένανδρος [342–291 B.C.] *"καλὸν τὸ Κείων νόμιμόν ἐστι, Φανία· ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ζῆν καλῶς, οὐ ζῇ κακῶς." Προσέταττε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νόμος τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας κωνειάζεσθαι, τοῦ διαρκεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν τροφήν· καὶ πολιορκουμένους δέ ποτε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, ψηφίσασθαι φασι τοὺς πρεσβύτας τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποθανεῖν, ὁρισθέντος πλήθους ἐτῶν· τοὺς δὲ παύσασθαι πολιορκοῦντας.*

Stephanus of Byzantium[5] writes to the same effect.[6] So too Ælian.[7] Valerius Maximus, who wrote under Tiberius, attests a similar practice for Massilia and tells of the Cean practice as he had actually witnessed it.[8]

In Thebes, too, the treatment of suicides attracted some remark.[9] In Athens such differential treatment as we hear of is of a religious rather than of a legal nature. The suicide as a victim of violence belongs to the class of those whose spirits 'walk.'[10] According to a statement in Suidas,[11] suicides and other victims of violent and untimely death were buried in a special place. We find a similar ordinance given by Plato.[12] To the same order of ideas belongs the Athenian custom of burying the hand which wrought the

1 116 ff.

2 Plato, *Phædo*, 57 A; *τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν*; cf. 57 B, 116 D, 117 A. Though Plato does not name the poison, it is clear from the symptoms described that it was hemlock. Ælian, *Var. Hist.* i. 16, calls it merely *τὸ φάρμακον*; Diodor. xiv. 37: *πιὼν κώνειον ἐτελεύτησεν*; Diog. Laert. ii. 42.

3 *Frogs*, 1050 f. 4 Plutarch, *Dio*, 58.

5 Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* ix. xvi. 8.

6 Plato, *Lysis*, 219 E: 'I mean, for example, if a father knew that his son had drunk hemlock and thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine.' Cf. Nicander, *Alexipharmaca*, 186.

7 ix. xvi. 6. 8 *Ib.* 9. 9 Plato, *Phædo*, 117.

10 Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 23; Athen. xii. 537 C.

1 Servius and Probus on Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 389; Hygin. *Fab.* 130, *Astron.* ii. 4; Pollux, iv. 55; Hesych. *s.vv.* Αἰώρα and Ἀλῆτις; *Etymologicon Magnum*, ed. F. Sylburg, Leipzig, 1816, *s.v.* Αἰώρα; schol. Hom. *Il.* xxii. 29; Athen. xiv. 618 E, F. For this and other swinging rites cf. *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, Note B, p. 277 ff.

2 Plut. *Mulierum Virtutes*, 249 B–D.

3 *Hist. Plant.* ix. xvi. 4 x. 486.

5 *De Urbibus*, *s.v.* Ἰουλίς.

6 Cf. Heracleid. *Polit.* 9, and the epigram of Meleager, *Anthologia Palatina*, vii. 470, where the deceased is made to say that at an advanced age (*κάρτα πρέσβυς*) ἦλυθον Αἴδαν αὐτοθελεί, Κείων γευσάμενος κυλίκων.

7 *Var. Hist.* iii. 37. 8 Val. Max. ii. 6.

9 Zenob. *Prov.* vi. 17; Phot. *Lex.* s. *Τί οὐκ ἀπήγξω ἵνα Θήβησιν ἥρως γένῃ*;

10 See Plato, *Laws*, 865.

11 *S.v.* Κυνήγιον: *ὅτι ἐν τῷ Κυνηγίῳ καλουμένῳ ἐρριπτοῦντο οἱ βιαιοθάνατοι.*

12 *Laws*, 873 C.

deed apart from the suicide's body.[1] Josephus, in mentioning the custom, adds the unsatisfactory reason that the hand was regarded as alien to the body.[2] It is more natural to connect the practice with the idea of the soul of the suicide 'walking'—'perhaps to prevent his ghost from attacking the living.'[3]

6. Philosophy.—As regards the attitude of the philosophic schools, the teaching of the Pythagoreans condemned suicide. According to Orphic or Pythagorean doctrine, the soul is undergoing in the body a penitential discipline for ante-natal sin.[4] Hence suicide is an unwarranted rebellion against the will of God on the part of the individual, whom it behoves to wait until it please God to set him free.

Plato, if we may infer his position from the *Phædo* and the *Laws*, condemns suicide on grounds which we would characterize as religious. Religious, too, are the grounds on which Aristotle appears to regard suicide as reprehensible.[5] Aristotle treats suicide as an offence not against the individual, but against the State, and that of a religious kind, as involving the city in pollution and requiring therefore penalties of a religious nature. No doubt Aristotle had in view such ceremonial observances as the severance of the right hand and the like, to which we have referred above.

Stoic teaching was decidedly favourable to suicide. Life and death being for the wise man indifferent (ἀδιάφορα), morally neither good nor evil, the question of suicide resolves itself for him into a decision whether life or death is in a given case preferable. Life in accordance with nature being the Stoic ideal,[6] when the conditions essential to that ideal are no longer fulfilled, suicide becomes a reasonable deliverance (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή).

Thus suicide may be demanded by a man's duty to his country or his friends or by a condition of severe pain or of physical disablement or incurable disease.[7] The paradox of the Stoic position is that the question of 'to be or not to be' is decided not with regard to virtue or vice, but with regard to the ἀδιάφορα, the 'indifferent' things. It is a question of τὰ καθήκοντα and τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.[8] Hence it may be proper (καθῆκον) for the happy to commit suicide, for the unhappy to remain in life.[9] Goodness or badness *per se* has no bearing on the question.[10] There is, indeed, little that differs from the Platonic position in the statement of their doctrine in Diogenes Laertius.[11] But the danger of the Stoic doctrine lay in the facility with which comparatively trivial discomforts might be held to justify suicide.

Zeno (*c.* 300 B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school, is said, according to one account, to have taken his own life because he had stumbled and wrenched his finger.[12] Cleanthes, his successor, having developed a gum-boil, refrained from food by the advice of his doctors for two days. The treatment was successful, and the doctors relaxed the regime and allowed him πάντα τὰ συνήθη, all the usual foods. But Cleanthes, having gone so far in the path of death, persisted to the end.[13]

For the Stoic the length or brevity of life was a matter of indifference.[14]

The Cynics, too, favoured suicide. Antisthenes seems to have used the term, afterwards so familiar in the Stoics, ἐξαγωγή, to denote suicide.[1] Diogenes is said to have recommended suicide to Antisthenes.

According to Diog. Laert. vi. 18, when Antisthenes was lying upon his deathbed, Diogenes visited him, carrying a dagger; and, when Antisthenes said, 'Who will deliver me from this trouble?', Diogenes, showing him the dagger, said, 'This.' There is a similar story in Diog. Laert. iv. 3, that on one occasion Speusippos, driving in his carriage to the Academy, met Diogenes and wished him good-day (χαῖρε εἰπεῖν), to which he replied that he would not wish him the same ὅστις ὑπομένεις ζῆν τοιοῦτος ὤν.

On the other hand, the Academic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean schools were all opposed to suicide, at any rate in theory.

With regard to the Academics it may suffice to quote the story of Carneades, who, when he heard that the Stoic Antipater had committed suicide by drinking poison, exclaimed, 'Then give me too to drink!' And, when his friends said, 'What?' 'Athol brose' (οἰνόμελι), he said.[2]

The Peripatetics hold that the excellences of the soul are superior to the excellences of the body and other external excellences, yet they aim at the other excellences, first, as desirable for their own sakes, and, next, as being useful πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν κοινωνικὸν βίον καὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεωρητικόν. παραμετρεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς.[3] Their attitude to suicide is thus in sharp contrast to that of the Stoics.

As regards the Epicureans, believing as they did in the extinction of the soul at dissolution, it might well seem that life at any level was at least worth something, and it were folly to cast that away for the nothingness of the grave. It would seem that they occupied themselves particularly in pointing out the folly of committing suicide through fear of the terrors of death.

'Death, that most dreaded of ills, is nothing to us. For while we are, death is not; and when death has come, we are not. Death, then, is nothing to the living nor yet to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter no longer exist. The crowd, to be sure, at one time shrink from death as the worst of evils, at another choose it as a refuge from the miseries of life. But the wise man neither declines life nor shrinks from death, since life is not distasteful to him, nor does he think it an evil not to live.'[4]

The Cyrenaics seem in general to have been opposed to suicide. Theodoros, counting the world his country and disbelieving in friendship, held that even self-sacrifice for one's country was unjustifiable.[5] Hegesias, on the other hand, preached suicide so frankly as to earn the title of ὁ Πεισιθάνατος,[6] and with such success as to provoke the interference of Ptolemy.[7]

7. Religion.—From the religious point of view suicide was regarded always as a crime, a violation of the social order. We have seen that Orphic teaching condemned suicide. But it is impossible to regard this condemnation as limited to so confined a circle. The more one reflects on the evidence, the more one is forced to the conclusion that much which we ascribe to the Orphics is really part of the general tradition—part of the popular belief. The sort of doctrine which Plato ascribes at one moment to the mystics he at another ascribes to popular belief. In any case the belief in immortality is described in the *Apology* as among τὰ λεγόμενα, among the popular beliefs. And popular belief certainly differentiated between the fortune after death of the suicide and of those who died a natural death (θανάτῳ εἱμαρμένῳ, *morte sua*). Already in Homer it is difficult to account for the position of Antikleia, the mother of Odysseus, on any other supposition than that

[1] Aischin. *c. Ktes.* 244: ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν.
[2] *BJ* III. viii. 5.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 220 n.
[4] Philolaos, *ap.* Clem. *Strom.* iii. 3, p. 186. Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 493 A, *Cratyl.* 400 C.
[5] *Eth. Nic.* v. 11 (1138[a]).
[6] τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (Cleanthes, *ap.* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 132).
[7] Diog. Laert. vii. 130.
[8] Stob. ii. 226; Plut. *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1042 D.
[9] Plut. *loc. cit.*
[10] Plut. *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1039 E, *de Comm. Not.* 1163 C–D; Cicero, *de Fin.* iii. 18.
[11] vii. 130. [12] *Ib.* vii. 28 ff. [13] *Ib.* vii. 176.
[14] Cic. *de Fin.* iii. 14.

[1] Cf. Athen. iv. 157 B; Plutarch, *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1039 E, 1040 A, and *de Comm. Not.* 1063 C, D; Diog. Laert. vi. 24.
[2] Diog. Laert. iv. 64 f.; Stob. *Flor.* cxix. 19.
[3] See Stobæus, ii. 264–266.
[4] H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Berlin, 1887–1903, iii. 60, tr. A. E. Taylor; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* xxiv. 22, lxx. 8; and the eloquent protest of Lucretius, iii. 79 ff.
[5] Diog. Laert. ii. 98. [6] *Ib.* 86.
[7] Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 34; cf. Plutarch, *de Amore Prolis*, 497 D.

she is a suicide and thus not admitted immediately to the realm of Hades.[1] We have seen above that, according to one tradition, the dead Aias was deprived of certain rites of burial. The same feeling is at the bottom of the practice of severing the right hand of the suicide and burying it apart from the rest of the body. So in our own country suicides used to be buried at the marches in a no man's land: or, if in the churchyard, the body must be passed over the wall and not enter by the gate.

As popular religion regarded with horror all shedding of blood, all interference with the natural bounds of life, so it regarded with a peculiar horror the shedding of kindred blood (*αἷμ' ἐμφύλιον*). Ixion, who first introduced this crime—*ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρώτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμιξε θνατοῖς*—won for himself a choice woe.[2] The supreme case of 'kindred blood'—which is the term used by Sophocles to denote the patricide of Oidipus[3]—is suicide. The Greek language hardly distinguishes between self-murder and murder of kin. The suicide belongs to the class of the victims of violent and untimely death—*ἄωροι βιαιοθάνατοι* (or, in late usage, *βιοθάνατοι*)—the murdered, the dead on birth or in nonage,[4] the unborn victim of abortion,[5] regarding the fate of whom the popular mind was peculiarly sensitive. It seems probable that these religious grounds, and not any speculative theories, were the really active motives at all periods of ancient Greece in condemning the practice of suicide.

II. *ROMAN.*—1. **Heroic suicide.**—What we may call the heroic type of suicide—committed either to escape intolerable shame or for great causes which seem to demand the sacrifice of the individual life—was thoroughly consonant with the character of Republican Rome. Such suicides were a prominent feature in the early history of Rome, and the tradition of them undoubtedly exercised a powerful influence upon later conduct.[6]

The typical example of self-sacrifice for the fatherland is that of the Decii. According to modern authorities, the story is true only of the younger Decius. But, in any case, both are enshrined in Livy's matchless prose. The elder, P. Decius Mus, devoted himself in 337 B.C. in a battle with the Latins near Mount Vesuvius, when he was in command of the left wing. A precisely similar story is told of the younger Decius, who at the battle of Sentinum in 295 B.C. devoted himself to death, charging into the densest ranks of the Gauls, where he fell.[7]

Suicide to escape intolerable dishonour is illustrated by the story of Lucretia, the victim of the *mala libido*[8] of Sextus Tarquinius. Her story is too familiar to be told here.[9]

2. **Penalties of suicide.**—We have seen that suicide by hanging was regarded by the Greeks as a shameful type of death. When Oidipus discovers the nature of his sin, he can find no stronger words to describe his deeds than to say that they are *κρεῖσσον' ἀγχόνης*, *i.e.* such as even suicide by hanging could not expiate. The Roman feeling seems to have been precisely similar. If we quote the case of Amata, wife of King Latinus, it is mainly on account of the interesting matter preserved by Servius in his commentary on the passage. Vergil tells us that

> 'Regina ut tectis venientem prospicit hostem,
> Incessi muros, ignes ad tecta volare:
> Nusquam acies contra Rutulas, nulla agmina Turni:
> Infelix pugnae juvenem in certamine credit
> Exstinctum; et, subito mentem turbata dolore,
> Se causam clamat, crimenque, caputque malorum:
> Multaque per moestum demens effata furorem,
> Purpureos moritura manu discindit amictus,
> Et nodum informis leti trabe nectit ab alta.'[1]

Servius on this passage tells us that certain posthumous penalties attached to this form of suicide:

> 'Sane sciendum quia cautum fuerat in pontificalibus libris ut qui laqueo vitam finisset, insepultus abiceretur. . . . Cassius autem Hemina [the oldest Roman annalist] ait: "Tarquinium Superbum cum cloacas populum facere coegisset et ob hanc iniuriam multi se suspendio necarent, iussisse corpora eorum cruci affigi: tunc primum turpe habitum est mortem sibi consciscere." Et Varro ait: "Suspendiosis quibus iusta fieri ius non sit, suspensis oscillis[2] veluti per imitationem mortis parentari."'

It is clear in any case that the grounds on which this particular kind of suicide was condemned were religious or mystical rather than ethical.

3. **Suicide under the Empire.**—That suicide was extremely prevalent under the Empire, at any rate among the higher ranks of society, cannot be doubted. Nor are the causes which contributed to this state of affairs difficult to conjecture. The most important were probably chiefly two: on the one hand the decay of religious belief and on the other hand the great popularity of a school of philosophy which was favourable to suicide. With regard to the first, however, it is to be remarked that it does not appear that even in Republican times suicide, for sufficient cause, was considered to be inconsistent with piety. The Stoic teaching suited in general the typical Roman character, and, in particular, the Stoic teaching in regard to suicide found ready acceptance among the educated classes under the Empire. In this matter the Stoic position appealed even to men who in other respects were at variance with the Stoics. In one sense the Stoic doctrine was merely a logical development from the position taken up by Plato. Even Plato had admitted suicide when some compelling *ἀνάγκη*—some ineluctable constraint of circumstances—forced a man to end what he could not mend. The nature of this *ἀνάγκη*, or, as the Romans called it, *necessitas*[3] or *necessitudo*, was so indefinite as to be capable of a very various interpretation. It only remained for later Stoics like Panaitios (*c.* 140 B.C.) and Posidonios (*c.* 130–46 B.C.) to interpret it in the sense not of an external compulsion, but of an inner overmastering impulse. By this interpretation the whole philosophic anti-suicide position was undermined. It was no longer felt to be a disgraceful thing to commit suicide: the only thing worth considering was how to commit suicide with such bravery or bravado, such fortitude or such parade of fortitude, as would most appeal to the imagination. The morality of suicide was no longer in dispute: given such a situation as either from the individual point of view or from the point of view of his relation to the State appeared intolerable, then suicide was the obvious and expected course of action.

The pages of the writers of the Empire teem with suicides, and a glance at some of these will help to illustrate what was the current view of voluntary death.

Pliny the younger,[4] writing of Titus Aristo, an eminent lawyer whom he describes as inferior to none of the philosophers 'castitate, pietate, iustitia, fortitudine,' tells how, being afflicted by 'longa et pertinax valetudo,' he contemplated taking his own life: 'You would be surprised, were you present, at the patience with which he bears this illness, holding out against pain, resisting the temptation to quench his thirst, enduring the unbelievable heat of fever while motionless and warmly covered. He lately summoned me and a few other special

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1 *Od.* xi. 85 f. 2 Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 30 ff.
3 *Oed. Tyr.* 1406.
4 Plato, *Rep.* 615 C: *τῶν δὲ αὐθὶς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων.*
5 See S. Reinach, 'Ἄωροι βιαιοθάνατοι, in *ARW* ix. [1906] 312–322, and S. Wide, in *ARW* xii. [1909].
6 See Cic. *Pro Sestio*, 48, *pro Scauro*, iii. 1 ff.
7 Livy, viii. 9 f., x. 28. 8 *Ib.* i. 57.
9 *Ib.* 57 f.: Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 741 ff.

1 *Æn.* xii. 595 ff.
2 The meaning of these *oscilla* we have seen above in connexion with the Athenian festival of the Aiora; cf. Verg. *Georg.* ii. 387 ff.
3 Tac. *Ann.* vi. 28. 4 *Ep.* i. 22.

friends and requested us to consult his physicians about the issue of his illness, with the intention of voluntarily departing from life, if his illness were incurable, while on the other hand, if it were merely to be difficult and tedious, he would bear up and bide his time; for so much, he thought, was due to the entreaties of his wife, the tears of his daughter, even to us his friends, that he should not by voluntary death abandon our hopes, if only they were not vain. Such conduct I consider eminently high and praiseworthy. For to rush to death under the influence of an impulse and an instinctive feeling is no more than what many have done: but deliberately to weigh the motives for and against and then, as reason advises, to accept or reject the policy of life or death, that is the conduct of a great soul.'

In A.D. 101 the poet Silius Italicus committed suicide by abstention from food. Pliny says: 'It has just been announced that Silius Italicus has ended his life by starvation (*inedia*) in his Neapolitan villa. Bad health was the cause. He had developed an incurable tumour and, weary of it, he betook himself to death with irrevocable firmness. Up to his last day he had been happy and fortunate, with the exception of the death of the younger of his two children.'[1]

In *Ep.* iii. 16 Pliny celebrates the heroic conduct of Arria, who, when her husband Cæcina Pætus was condemned for his share in the conspiracy of Scribonianus against Claudius in A.D. 42, encourages her husband to commit suicide, first stabbing herself and then handing the dagger to her husband with the words 'Paete, non dolet.' This famous suicide is the subject of an epigram of Martial.[2]

A somewhat similar story is told in Pliny.[3]

A special interest attaches to the type of suicide mentioned by Pliny in *Ep.* iii. 9.

Cæcilius Classicus, proconsul of Bætica A.D. 98–99, was accused of extortion and anticipated judgment by death—presumably suicide: 'Ille accusationem vel fortuita vel voluntaria morte praevertit; nam fuit mors eius infamis, ambigua tamen: ut enim credibile videbatur, voluisse exire de vita, cum defendi non posset; ita mirum pudorem damnationis morte fugisse, quem non puduisset damnanda committere.'

References are frequent under the Empire to the forestalling of judgment by suicide. In a well-known passage[4] Tacitus explains the motives, referring to the year A.D. 34, as being dread of the executioner and the desire to secure certain posthumous advantages which the suicide had over the condemned in respect of the disposal of his person and his property. Normally, it appears, the goods of a condemned person were confiscated, and he forfeited the rites of burial. The suicide, on the other hand, did not forfeit the rites of burial, and his testamentary dispositions remained valid. These advantages constitute what Tacitus calls the 'pretium festinandi.'[5] In practice, however, there seems to have been considerable variation in the treatment of the goods of such a suicide. In the time of the Republic apparently his goods were confiscated as a matter of course.[6] It is clear from the evidence of Tacitus himself that even under the Empire suicide before sentence did not always save the suicide's goods from confiscation.[7]

The perplexities of the question and the various distinctions made may be seen in Justinian, *Dig.* xlviii. 21: 'DE BONIS EORUM QUI ANTE SENTENTIAM VEL MORTEM SIBI CONSCIVERUNT VEL ACCUSATOREM CORRUPERUNT,' where § 3 forms an important document with regard to suicide:

'Persons accused of or caught in crime who, through fear of the charge hanging over them commit suicide, have no heirs. Papinianus,[8] however, writes that, when guilty persons who have not been accused commit suicide, their goods are not forfeited to the *fiscus*. For it is not the fact of guilt that is liable, but the fear of the guilty conscience is held in the case of an accused person as tantamount to a confession of guilt. Therefore, for the confiscation of the goods of suicides, it is required that they must either have been accused or caught in the criminal act. According, however, to the rescript of the emperor Pius, the goods of a person who, lying under an accusation, commits suicide are confiscated only if the crime of which he was accused was such that, if condemned, he would have suffered either death or deportation. He likewise held that a person who was accused of a petty theft, even if he committed suicide by hanging, was not in such case that his goods should be taken away from his heirs, any more than they would have been taken from himself, had he been convicted of theft. Therefore the goods of a suicide are to be forfeited only if the charge in which he was implicated were of such a nature that conviction would have entailed the loss of his property. If, on the other hand, a person committed suicide from weariness of life or impatience of pain or the like, he was entitled, according to Antoninus, to have a successor. According to a rescript of the emperor Hadrian, if a father, accused of killing his son, committed suicide, it must be held that his suicide was due rather to grief for the loss of his son, and therefore his goods were not to be confiscated. This distinction is on the same level as the inquiry whether a person who commits suicide without being guilty is liable to any penalty on the ground that he has passed sentence on himself. For in any case suicide is punishable save when it is due to weariness of life or intolerance of some grief. And rightly so: for, if a man did not spare himself, much less will he spare another. It is forbidden by imperial mandates to confiscate the goods of persons who have died in prison or on bail, while the issue of their case is still uncertain. We have to consider, in the case of a person who has died by his own hand without reasonable cause while under accusation, whether, if his heirs are prepared to take up his case and maintain the innocence of the deceased, they are to be heard and his goods not to be confiscated until the charge is proved; or whether in any case they are to be confiscated. But a rescript of the emperor Pius to Modestus Taurinus laid down that, if the heirs are prepared to undertake the defence, the goods are not to be confiscated, until the charge is proved.'

Other examples of this type of suicide in Tacitus are P. Vitellius,[1] M. Æmilius Scaurus,[2] Plancina.[3] L. Piso died before his trial by a *mors opportuna* which was probably suicide.[4]

A notable feature of the Empire is the use of compulsory suicide as a means of execution. Intimation is conveyed, more or less explicitly, to the party concerned that his death is desired. The advantages of this form of compulsory death over actual execution were apparently partly æsthetic, but probably the main advantage was that it seemed to make the guilty person his own judge and executioner and thus relieved the emperor of the *invidia* which necessarily attached to an actual execution. This method left to a man his 'choice of death'—what was known as 'liberum mortis arbitrium,'[5] or merely 'mortis arbitrium.'[6]

Other examples of compulsory suicide recorded in the *Annals* of Tacitus are Silanus,[7] Poppæa Sabina,[8] Silvanus,[9] Narcissus,[10] Iulius Montanus,[11] Thrasea Pætus, Soranus Barea and his daughter,[12] Valerius Asiaticus,[13] Arruntius,[14] Anteius.[15]

Three examples may be selected as being the suicides of notable men with regard to whose last moments we possess detailed records—the poet Lucan, the emperor Nero, and Seneca.

The suicide of Lucan in A.D. 65 is thus described by Tacitus:[16]

'Exim M. Annaei Lucani caedem imperat [sc. Nero]. Is, profluente sanguine, ubi frigescere pedes manusque, et paulatim ab extremis cedere spiritum, fervido adhuc et compote mentis pectore, intellegit; recordatus carmen a se compositum, quo vulneratum militem, per eiusmodi mortis imaginem obisse tradiderat, versus ipsos rettulit [*Pharsal.* iii. 635–646?], eaque illi suprema vox fuit.'[17]

The suicide of Nero has often been described. The account given by Suetonius[18] is too long to quote. The story of Seneca's death is told in Tacitus, *Ann.* xv. 60–63.

It appears that in those times every suicide was more or less a *poseur*, who was expected to make his suicide remarkable by some notable word or act. Hence Tacitus remarks: 'Senecio . . . et

1 *Ep.* iii. 7. 2 i. 14. 3 *Ep.* vi. 24.
4 *Ann.* vi. 29. 5 *Ib.* 6 Cf. Livy, iii. 58.
7 Tac. *Ann.* iv. 19 *f.*, ii. 31 *f.*, iii. 16, 17.
8 *Digesta Responsa*, bk. xvi.

1 *Ann.* v. 8. 2 *Ib.* vi. 29. 3 *Ib.* 26.
4 *Ib.* iv. 21; cf. Livy, vi. 1: 'iudicio eum mors adeo opportuna, ut voluntariam magna pars crederet, subtraxit.'
5 Suet. *Domit.* 8. 6 Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 33.
7 *Ib.* xv. 32. 8 *Ib.* xi. 2. 9 *Ib.* xv. 71.
10 *Ib.* xiii. 1. 11 *Ib.* xiii. 25. 12 *Ib.* xvi. 33.
13 *Ib.* xi. 3. 14 *Ib.* vi. 48. 15 *Ib.* xvi. 14.
16 *Ib.* xv. 70.
17 Cf. Sueton. *Vit. Luc.*: 'Impetrato autem mortis libero arbitrio, codicillos ad patrem de corrigendis quibusdam versibus suis exaravit: epulatusque largiter, brachia ad secandas venas medico praebuit.'
18 *Nero*, 49.

Quinctianus et Scaevinus . . . mox reliqui coniuratorum periere, nullo facto dictove memorando.'[1]

A notable feature of those suicides is the frequency with which the wife shares the suicide of the husband or even by example prompts him to death—*e.g.*, Sextia,[2] Pompilia,[3] Seneca's wife, as just mentioned, and Arria, wife of Pætus.

Suetonius, as the historian of the emperors, naturally has numerous suicides, some of which present interesting features.

In his life of Augustus[4] we have a curious case (in 42 B.C.):

'patrem et filium pro vita rogantes sortiri vel dimicare [i. 9, trial by combat] iussisse [sc. Augustus] ut alterutri concederetur; ac spectasse utrumque morientem, cum patre, qui se obtulerat occiso, filius quoque voluntaria occubuisset nece.'

'Quin et Artabani, Parthorum regis, laceratus est literis, parricidia et caedes et ignaviam et luxuriam obicientis, monentisque, ut voluntaria morte maximo iustissimoque civium odio quam primum satisfaceret.'[5]

'Alios [other senators], cum clam interemisset, citare nihilo minus ut vivos perseveravit, paucos post dies voluntaria morte periisse mentitus.'[6]

The attitude of at least the educated world of the time may be described as an advanced Stoicism, and the permissibility of suicide under certain circumstances was accepted at Rome not merely by professed Stoics but also by adherents of other philosophical schools. We cannot do more here than summarize and illustrate the chief aspects of the question of suicide as it presented itself to the chief exponents of later Stoicism.

In the first place, whereas to Plato suicide had seemed to be permissible only, if at all, under compulsion (ἀνάγκη) of an external nature, this compulsion is now so interpreted that suicide becomes in fact not so much the involuntary act of the unwilling victim of circumstances as the voluntary assertion by the individual of his freedom. The liberty of the 'wise' man consists precisely in this that he is entitled to 'withdraw himself' (ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν) when he finds his liberty hampered by his environment. Already Cicero had interpreted for the Romans this phase of later Stoicism:

'Et constat Stoicos, praesertim inter Romanos, in eo quod vitae se subducere liceat morte voluntaria (ἐξαγωγήν dicere solebant) vel libertatem sapientis cerni putasse.'[7]

This is the prevalent doctrine under the Empire.[8]

Hence the man who finds it no longer possible to obey God, or, in other words, to live as his nature requires, is to perceive precisely in this fact an intimation from God that it is time to depart from life.[9]

Again, Plato had felt the difficulty that, while on the one hand it was better for man to depart and be with God, it was yet held to be unlawful to hasten that departure by one's own voluntary act. Now the conviction of the nothingness of this present life as compared with the after life for which it is a preparation has become an additional motive for suicide, no longer hampered by any other restraint than that the individual must convince himself that God gives the signal for him to depart.[10]

In the end, then, to be or not to be becomes purely a question for the individual. Suicide is not to be the rash act of a momentary impulse, a temporary confusion of values. It is to be determined upon or rejected after due deliberation. Nothing indeed is more striking in the accounts of suicides under the Empire than precisely this formal weighing of the considerations for and against.

[1] *Ann.* xv. 70. [2] *Ib.* vi. 29. [3] *Ib.* xv. 63.
[4] Ch. 13. [5] *Tiberius*, 66.
[6] *Caligula*, 26. For other cases of suicide cf. *Galba*, 3, *Jul. Cæs.* 36, *Claud.* 31.
[7] *De Fin.* iii. 60.
[8] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* xii. 10; Epictetus, *Dissert.* i. 24: τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον· μέμνησο ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται.
[9] Cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* iii. 24. 101.
[10] Cf. *Ib.* i. 9. 16; Seneca, *Ep.* cii. 23.

The individual point of view was much insisted upon in the later Stoicism. The same set of circumstances might in a given case demand suicide, in another not. A situation of intolerable shame, for instance, might be for an ordinary man a sufficient ground for suicide. Yet it might be the duty of another man, whose life was essential to the State, to reject the temptation. A man's death must be in consonance with his life.

Peregrinus, according to Lucian, ἔδη βούλεσθαι χρυσῷ βίῳ χρυσῆν κορώνην ἐπιθεῖναι· χρῆναι γὰρ τὸν Ἡρακλείως βεβιωκότα, Ἡρακλείως ἀποθανεῖν.[1]

This doctrine of 'propriety' is expounded in a well-known passage of Cicero's *de Officiis*, which is of course based upon Panætius.[2]

III. *Conclusion.*—Our review, then, of the history of suicide among Greeks and Romans shows that at all times the only valid motives against the practice of suicide have been, in the main, not ethical but religious. And consequently the penalties attached to suicide are not so much civil as religious. They affect a man's condition not here but in the hereafter. The withholding of the rites of burial, the severance of the right hand, and so forth, all belong to the religious circle of ideas. When religious values ceased to have any meaning and were not replaced by other values, then, as in the case of the Cynics, there was no antagonism to suicide. When, on the other hand, the life hereafter was so emphasized that in comparison with that after life the life here seemed of little account, there was an obvious impulse to suicide. But that impulse was resisted and decried—by Plato on the ground of a higher law, a great mystery which demands that we remain in our prison-house till God shall please to set us free; by the Neo-Platonists because suicide is *ipso facto* detrimental to the soul. The whole question is admirably put in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* i. 13:

'Haec Platonicae sectae semina altius Plotinus exsequitur. Oportet, inquit, animam post hominem liberam corporeis passionibus inveniri. Quam qui de corpore violenter extrudit, liberam esse non patitur. Qui enim sibi sua sponte necem comparat, aut pertaesus necessitatis aut metu cuiusquam ad hoc descendit aut odio; quae omnia inter passiones habentur; ergo etsi ante fuit his sordibus pura, hoc ipso tamen, quod exit extorta, sordescit. Deinde mortem debere ait animae a corpore solutionem esse, non vinculum, exitu autem coacto animam circa corpus magis magisque vinciri. Et revera ideo sic extortae animae diu circa corpus eiusve sepulturam vel locum, in quo iniecta manus est, pervagantur: cum contra illae animae, quae se in hac vita a vinculis corporia philosophiae morte dissolvunt, adhunc extante corpore caelo et sideribus inserantur.'

Literature.—K. A. Geiger, *Der Selbstmord im klassischen Altertum*, Augsburg, 1888; E. Durkheim, *Le Suicide*, Paris, 1897; R. Hirzel, 'Der Selbstmord,' in *ARW* xi. [1908]; A. Buonafede, *Histoire critique et philosophique de suicide*, Paris, 1762.

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SUICIDE (Hindu).—1. Vedic.—In view of the devotion to life and its pleasures which marks the *Rigveda*, and which is reflected in the disapproval therein implied of the practice of *satī*, it is not surprising that no trace of the custom of religious suicide can be found in that text. Nor in the later *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* is there any clear recognition of such a usage, unless we accept the suggestion of Hillebrandt[3] that the consecration ceremony (*dīkṣā*),[4] which is an essential preliminary to the most important rites, is in reality a faded form of the older practice of suicide by fire. While it is true that the generation of heat in the man who undergoes the rite is an important feature of it, the purpose of this practice, as of the fasting which constitutes even a more essential

[1] Lucian, *Peregrin.* 33.
[2] Cicero, *de Officiis*, i. 111 ff., tr. G. B. Gardiner, London, 1899.
[3] *Rituallitteratur* (= *GIAP* iii. 2), Strassburg, 1897, p. 125.
[4] See B. Lindner, *Die Dikṣā oder Weihe für das Somaopfer*, Leipzig, 1878.

element of the ceremony, may much more naturally be deemed to be to produce the psychological condition best suited for the performance of the sacrifice. There are, however, in the *Brāhmaṇas* two doctrines which undoubtedly pave the way for the approval of suicide from religious motives. In the first place, there is developed the conception that the proper sacrifice is that of a man's self, and that other forms of offering are substitutes;[1] in the second place, in the latest of the great *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Śatapatha*,[2] the closing act of both the *puruṣamedha* and the *sarvamedha*, the human and the universal sacrifices, is the giving away by the performer of the whole of his possessions, including in the latter case even the land, and his wandering into the forest, doubtless as a preliminary to an early death. The teaching of the *Upaniṣads*, which emptied empirical life of all true reality, held out union with the infinite as the result of knowledge, and glorified the cessation of existence, must have tended to the same result, but the logical conclusion of their thought is not expressed in any of the older *Upaniṣads*, and it is only in such late works as the *Jābāla*[3] and *Kaṇṭhaśruti*[4] *Upaniṣads* that it is expressly laid down that the *sannyāsin*, who has acquired full insight, may enter upon the great journey, or choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning, by fire, or by a hero's fate. Earlier evidence (and better proof of usage) is afforded by notices in the *Dharmasūtras*: in Vasiṣṭha[5] it is expressly stated that the world of *Brahman* is obtained by entering the fire; and in Āpastamba,[6] in an interesting discussion which ends with a defence of secular life and aims, it is admitted that in one view the ideal was for an ascetic first to live on fruits, roots, grass, and leaves only, then on those things alone which become spontaneously detached, then on water, then on air, and finally on ether alone. With the testimony of Vasiṣṭha accords the record of the death on a pyre erected by his own wish of Kalanos, an Indian follower and friend of Alexander, who fell ill at Pasargadæ and decided on death, despite the opposition of the king, rather than alter his mode of life.[7]

2. Buddhism and Jainism.—It is characteristic of the general sanity of Buddhism in its earliest form that the Buddha appears to have disapproved of suicide, as he disapproved of all excesses of ascetic fervour. But it would be surprising if the influence both of Brāhmanism and of Jainism had not had its effect in making suicide reputable in certain communities. Not only is the duty of self-sacrifice deemed to excuse the action of the *bodhisattva* in committing suicide with the definite aim of being reborn as the fish whose flesh alone can save the people from disease, but self-destruction appears to be approved if undertaken with the desire of securing rebirth in such a condition as will permit entry into the Buddhist order.[8]

While this attitude is exceptional in Buddhism, Jainism frankly recognizes and commends religious suicide. It is dealt with at length in the *Āyāra*,[9] the first *Aṅga*, and its preliminaries are described in detail in the *Aurapachchakkhāṇa* and the *Saṁthāra*, the second and fourth of the *Painnas* in one reckoning. But suicide is not permitted promiscuously; it is allowed to those ascetics who have acquired the highest degree of perfection, and it in essence consists of giving up begging, and lying down in a duly chosen place to await death by hunger and thirst. Frequent mention is made of death being thus brought about by a month's abstinence (*kālamāse*); this fate is recorded of the Tīrthakaras Pārśva and Ariṣṭanemi,[1] of the monk Khandaga,[2] of the layman Ambada,[3] and of all those celebrated in the *Uvāsagadasāo*. At this supreme moment of his career the ascetic must not long after rebirth in this world or as a god; he must not wish to live on or desire sensual pleasures, but equally he must not seek for death to come more swiftly. The final condition thus reached by the sage (*samāhipatte*) is one of complete mental and physical collapse. Practically identical with it appears to be the *pannabhūmi*, the last of the eight stages of man's existence as taught by Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta.[4] The popularity of the practice is attested throughout the whole history of Jainism: in 1172 thus died the great scholar and statesman Hemachandra, followed in a short time by his patron Kumārapāla;[5] in 1912 a monk at Aḥmadābād, though in perfect health, starved himself to death by a fast of 41 days; and in the following year a nun at Rājkot, having previously weakened herself by austerities, died after two or three days' fast. Suicide, however, is still not permitted to others than ascetics, and non-religious suicide is regarded with especial horror by the Jains, as they disapprove of all taking of life. The problem of reconciling these two views is solved as little by the Jains as by the Brāhmanical schools.

3. Hinduism, mediæval and modern.—Hinduism stands firmly on the position reached in the *Dharmasūtras*, which permits religious suicide, while censuring ordinary forms of self-murder. Manu[6] expressly permits a Brāhman, in circumstances explained (doubtless correctly) by his commentators as disease or great misfortunes, to walk straight on in a north-easterly direction subsisting on water and air until his body sinks to rest, and declares that a Brāhman who has got rid of his body by any of the means practised by ancient sages obtains the world of *Brahman*; and Medhātithi interprets the methods in question as drowning oneself in a river, leaping from a height, burning, or starvation. The *Mahābhārata*[7] fully recognizes the wickedness of suicide; nevertheless the prince Duryodhana himself resolves to die by starvation, and for this purpose, as the ceremony is a religious rite, dons old garments and holy grass, drinks water, and applies his mind to devotion, though his purpose is eventually defeated.[8] An interesting tale,[9] which appears also in the *Pañchatantra*,[10] is that of the hunter for whom a pigeon roasts itself as a guest-offering; the wife of the bird declines to survive her husband, and the hunter, saddened by their sacrifice, repents and himself ends his life by fire. A new aspect of suicide appears in connexion with the development of the devotion paid to the sectarian deities which is characteristic of Hinduism, for suicide now means not so much absorption in an impersonal absolute as union with a very personal deity. The idea is reflected in the mythical account of the history of Mīrā Bāī, the

[1] A. B. Keith, tr. of *Taittiriya Saṁhitā*, pt. i. p. ovi ff.
[2] XIII. vi. 1 ff.
[3] 5; cf. P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906, p. 382.
[4] See F. O. Schrader, *The Minor Upaniṣads*, Madras, 1912, i. 39, 390 f. The great journey is probably wandering on without food until death takes place.
[5] xxix. 4. [6] II. ix. 23. 2.
[7] Arrian, *Anab.* vii. 3. A similar deed is recorded of an Indian sage who formed part of an embassy to Augustus in 20 B.C., and accompanied his court to Athens; but he had not the excuse of disease (Dio, liv. 9; Strabo, xv. i. p. 720).
[8] J. S. Speyer, *Die indische Theosophie*, p. 276 f. Cf. art. SUICIDE (Buddhist).
[9] I. vii. 6 ff.

[1] *Kappa Sutta*, 168, 182.
[2] *Bhagavatī*, ed. A. Weber, Berlin, 1866, p. 300.
[3] *Ovavāiya Sutta*, 100.
[4] Buddhaghoṣa's comm. on *Dīgha Nikāya*, ii. 20.
[5] G. Bühler, *Über das Leben des Jaina Mönches Hemachandra*, Vienna, 1889, p. 50 f.
[6] vi. 31 f. [7] XII. ccxcvii. 31 f.
[8] III. ccli. 20 ff.
[9] *Mahābhārata*, XII. cxliii. 10 ff.
[10] T. Benfey's tr., Leipzig, 1859, ii. 247 ff.

devotee of Kṛṣṇa in the time of Akbar, who is recorded to have disappeared into a fissure which showed itself for a moment in the image of her chosen divinity when she was paying homage to him at Dvārakā. Similar considerations doubtless prompted some of the comparatively rare suicides which took place during the *yātrās* of Viṣṇu as Jagannātha at Purī. Neither Chaitanya, to whose teaching the fame of the shrine was largely due, nor any of his followers appears to have encouraged or approved this form of worship; no allusion is made to it in the elaborate account of the car-procession by Kṛṣṇadāsa or by Abu-l Faẓl. It is not impossible that the conception may have been borrowed from a Śaiva sect, some fusion of the two cults having taken place at Purī, but Chaitanya's own end was mysterious, and in his lifetime he had sought mystic union with the god in ecstatic trance, so that the occasional suicides of ardent devotees beneath the wheels of the car of Jagannātha can hardly be deemed unnatural or surprising.[1]

The wide-spread nature of the custom, and its prevalence both with and without Brāhmanical sanction, are attested by H. T. Colebrooke from personal observation just at the opening of the 19th century. In 1802 the legislature intervened to prevent the practice of suicide on the island of Sāgar, at the mouth of the Ganges, where, in pursuance of vows, not only were children cast into the sea to be devoured by sharks but grown-up persons voluntarily underwent the same fate. This practice was confined to the lower castes, as was also the custom by which men used annually to hurl themselves from a precipice in the mountains south of the Narmadā, sacred to Kālbhairo, in fulfilment of vows undertaken at an earlier period. This rite was carried out by mountaineers; great concourses gathered at the place on the new moon of Phālguna, the day appointed for the ceremony, and it is significant of the passion for public recognition as part of the motive of such suicides that the man meditating this fate was wont to proclaim his intention publicly and, attended by a band of musicians, to promenade in the neighbouring towns collecting alms. On the other hand, not only did the practice of *satī* (*q.v.*) flourish under Brāhmanical auspices, but the custom of suicide by drowning at the specially holy spot of the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges was approved, while the practice of lepers consenting to burial alive was promoted by the grant of obsequies which were otherwise denied. The Śaivas also allowed suicide by cutting the throat before the image of Bhavānī in the temple of Vindhyāvāsinī, near Mirzapur. Interference with these rites was gradual, but the final adoption of the principle of treating as a criminal offence participation in a ritual suicide has deprived the act of much of its religious character, though it is of course impossible to prevent suicide on the part of those who regard such a fate as a logical outcome of the religious convictions which they hold.

So far as religious suicide has been approved in India, it is significant that it has been in cases of men who have lived a full life and acquired a high measure of ascetic power, and that suicide in other cases has never been authorized and has instead been strongly condemned. There is obviously comparatively little essential distinction between the practice of austerities to a pitch which deprives the ascetic of all mental and physical activity, and the actual termination of life; an intermediate stage is furnished by the cataleptic condition which the Yogi seeks to induce, and of which the most famous case is that of Haridās, who even survived burial for considerable periods.[1] But in its essence the practice can hardly be traced to any origin other than the effort to supply a rationale for the old and inhuman usage by which the aged head of a family might be cast out to die, when he became too old to rule or be of service to his kindred—a usage for which there is clear evidence in the *Rigveda*.[2] In place of the violent removal of the elders there was substituted the doctrine that in old age it was the duty and privilege of a man to adopt a hermit's life, unless he preferred to terminate of his own will an existence which had become burdensome. The essentially popular character of the practice is proved conclusively by the pertinacity with which the Jains have maintained it from the earliest period, though the doctrine of the sanctity of life as adopted by them would otherwise have forbidden approval of the custom.

[1] See art. JAGANNATH.

LITERATURE.—For the question of the *dīkṣā* see A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Breslau, 1891–1902, i. 482 ff., *Deutsche Litteraturzeitung*, xvi. [1895] 74; H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 398 ff., *ZDMG* xlix. [1895] 176; A. B. Keith, tr. of *Taittirīya Saṅhitā*, Cambridge, Mass., 1914, p. cxiv f. For Buddhism see L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, p. 325 ff. The Jain views are given and explained by H. Jacobi, *Gaina Sutras*, pt. i. [*SBE* xxii.], Oxford, 1884, p. 68 ff., pt. ii. [*SBE* xlv.], do. 1895, p. 24; A. F. R. Hoernle, in his ed. of the *Uvāsagadasāo*, Calcutta, 1890; Lewis Rice, *Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgoḷa*, Bangalore, 1889, p. 15 ff.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, London, 1856, ii. 331 ff.; Margaret Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915. For Hinduism generally see A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882; H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, do. 1862, vol. i.; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, do. 1896, *Epic Mythology* (=*GIAP* iii. 1b), Strassburg, 1915; J. S. Speyer, *Die indische Theosophie*, Leipzig, 1914. The facts as to the *yātrā* of Jagannātha are examined in detail by W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 132 ff., 306 ff., *The Indian Empire*[3], do. [1893], p. 276 ff. The observations of H. T. Colebrooke are given in a paper quoted by T. E. Colebrooke, *The Life of H. T. Colebrooke*, London, 1873, p. 178 ff.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

SUICIDE (Japanese).—Japan is known as a country in which an unusually large number of people commit suicide. According to the latest statistics, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics of the Japanese Government, the number of deaths by suicide in the ten years preceding 1915 was as follows:

Year.	Population.[3]	Number of Deaths.	Deaths by Suicide.	Number of Suicides per One Million Inhabitants.
1905	47,678,396	1,004,661	9,413	197
1906	48,164,761	955,256	8,906	184
1907	48,819,630	1,016,798	9,180	188
1908	49,588,804	1,029,447	9,595	193
1909	50,254,471	1,091,264	10,553	210
1910	50,984,844	1,064,234	10,773	213
1911	51,753,934	1,043,906	10,753	207
1912	52,522,753	1,037,016	11,128	212
1913	53,362,862	1,027,257	11,942	223
1914	54,142,441	1,101,815	12,705	234

The same returns give the number of deaths by suicide according to sex and age, as shown on Table 1.

According to the methods employed, the number of deaths is as shown on Table 2.

Some of the principal causes of suicide are shown on Table 3.

Among the methods of suicide used by Japanese the following three are unique and worthy of description:

(1) *Harakiri* ('belly-cutting'), more commonly

[1] R. Garbe, *Sāṁkhya und Yoga* (=*GIAP* iii. 4), Strassburg, 1896, p. 47.

[2] VIII. li. 2; H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 328; cf. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, i. 395.

[3] Populations in Korea, Formosa, and Saghalien are not included.

TABLE 1.

Age.	Sex.	Year.									
		1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
1–16	Male	82	84	83	79	135	131	135	108	122	141
	Female	108	64	90	80	103	115	116	91	111	100
16–20	Male	201	244	258	309	299	316	345	379	344	388
	Female	383	381	373	440	409	405	399	356	449	413
20–30	Male	1105	1277	1318	1494	1568	1527	1597	1633	1767	1855
	Female	929	971	1019	1015	1069	1021	1058	1102	1213	1231
30–40	Male	825	785	909	894	965	1019	1022	1015	1131	1214
	Female	480	461	515	504	573	543	587	560	580	641
40–50	Male	903	774	773	821	918	881	834	861	998	1049
	Female	402	365	406	398	388	418	408	485	479	479
Over 50	Male	2607	2252	2122	2296	2608	2756	2569	2657	2913	3210
	Female	1379	1241	1308	1261	1383	1428	1421	1452	1592	1724
Unknown	Male	9	6	5	4	94	171	209	212	206	221
	Female	—	1	1	—	41	42	58	67	87	89

TABLE 2.

Method.	Sex.	Year.									
		1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
Hanging	Male	3593	3337	3296	3427	3861	3909	3666	3769	4123	4376
	Female	1591	1516	1573	1617	1637	1616	1578	1621	1791	1814
Drowning	Male	1148	984	921	1087	1183	1247	1222	1245	1318	1516
	Female	1685	1510	1536	1574	1698	1693	1746	1770	1810	1927
Stab-cut	Male	186	193	201	239	265	243	269	276	325	343
	Female	95	87	112	108	117	118	86	103	127	126
Fire-arms	Male	117	127	121	143	150	158	132	136	149	144
	Female	8	13	9	12	16	12	8	9	13	10
Poison	Male	124	137	170	171	223	260	349	346	347	375
	Female	58	68	103	112	107	137	186	206	190	226
Railway	Male	—	—	—	—	698	804	821	930	1017	1105
	Female	—	—	—	—	294	307	343	403	465	436
Otherwise	Male	564	644	759	830	207	190	252	213	202	219
	Female	244	290	379	380	98	89	95	101	65	88
Total	Male	5732	5422	5468	5897	6587	6811	6711	6915	7481	8078
	Female	3681	3484	3712	3703	3967	3972	4042	4213	4461	4627

TABLE 3.

Cause.	Year.									
	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
Mental disease	4563	4312	4298	4174	3784	3622	3421	3358	3276	3453
Physical pain	1676	1514	1640	1835	2109	2155	2146	2224	2460	2669
Poverty	1192	984	1005	1017	891	824	771	837	897	875
Jealousy	340	373	428	485	327	257	264	234	232	235
Remorse	274	271	226	232	230	165	156	173	157	193
Family trouble	248	278	334	330	227	251	248	268	321	332
Fear of punishment	86	64	102	91	167	185	195	213	219	214
Anxiety	42	65	68	55	163	229	238	219	232	199
Business failure	162	116	128	136	177	187	184	189	252	304
Dissipation	51	81	86	95	203	147	184	215	185	197

called *seppuku*, was, until the promulgation of the new criminal code in 1873, a method of punishment frequently required of offenders from the nobility and the military class. The laws of the Tang period in China, which for several hundred years had been the model of the Japanese legal system, recognized three forms of capital punishment: beheading, strangulation, and self-execution. The last was allowed to offenders of rank, that they might escape the shame of public death at the hands of others. The criminal laws of Japan allowed self-execution to members of the royal family and to others above the fifth court-rank, except in case of high treason. *Harakiri* dates from the Taira and Minamoto period in the 12th cent. and was widely practised during the Sengoku period of internal strife. During the Tokugawa period the practice developed into a complicated system with much etiquette and formality.

'It was not mere suicide. It was an institution, legal and ceremonial, invented in the middle ages, by which warriors could expiate their crimes, apologize for error, escape from disgrace, redeem their friends or prove their sincerity.'[1]

The most notable historical case of *harakiri* is that of the 47 Ronin, in 1703. The *daimyo* Asano had been obliged to commit *harakiri* to atone for an unjustifiable attack upon Kira, a nobleman in the Shogun's palace. A band of devoted followers, after long effort, avenged their master by assassinating Kira. They gave themselves up to justice and, under sentence, committed *harakiri* at the

[1] T. Harada, *Faith of Japan*, New York, 1914, p. 129.

homes of the *daimyos* to whom, in groups, they had been entrusted. Their bodies were buried with respect at a Buddhist temple in Tokyo; and to this day many admirers of their chivalrous loyalty pay homage at their tomb.

For the purpose of *harakiri* a site was usually selected in some garden facing a residence, sheltered at the back and sides by curtains of white cotton. Within the curtained enclosure were placed two mats covered with a mattress of light blue. The condemned seated himself upon the mattress in the presence of superintending witnesses, with a kinsman or special friend to act as an assistant. He was clothed in special garments, and, after certain formal ceremonies, was handed a short sword with which to make the horizontal cut through the abdomen. The cut having been made, it was the duty of the assistant to behead the sufferer, that the agony of death might be short.

Though *harakiri* is no longer recognized as a form of public execution, the method is still not uncommon among those who seek to avoid the humiliation of public condemnation and punishment or the supposed disgrace of capture by the forces of an enemy in battle.

(2) *Shinju* or *aitaishi* ('dying between two parties') is the death together of unhappy lovers who seek escape from the difficulties of their earthly lot and entrance upon a happier life in the next world. For the accomplishment of *shinju* drowning has been the most frequent method, the lovers often tying themselves together with a strong rope. So common was this form of suicide among the lower classes during the Tokugawa period that in 1723 the Shogunate issued special regulations forbidding it, refusing formal burial to the bodies, and condemning to shame or exile any one who might survive the attempt. At present *shinju* is of frequent occurrence; and in recent years other forms of death, such as poison or mutilation beneath trains, have been employed.

(3) *Junshi* is suicide upon the death of one's lord or master with the idea of following him into the next world. In ancient times this was an act of loyalty required by custom, until the emperor Suinin (29 B.C.–A.D. 70) ordered the substitution of clay images for the bodies of attendants and favourite animals. *Junshi* was revived during the feudal period, not as a requirement, but as a voluntary custom whereby loyal followers, through *harakiri*, expressed their devotion to their masters. The drowning of almost the entire Taira clan in the western sea at the downfall of that clan and the *junshi* of hundreds of the family of Hojo Takatoki at the end of his career are among the most striking manifestations of this *junshi* spirit. The custom was forbidden by the Shogunate in 1744, and, before the opening of the Meiji era, had become uncommon; but solitary cases have occurred from time to time. Of these the most startling in recent times was the death by *harakiri* of General Nogi and his wife, at the time of the funeral of the emperor Meiji, in Sept. 1912.

LITERATURE.—*Encyclopædia Japonica*, vol. vi., *s.v.* 'Seppuku (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1914; B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], London, 1902; *Annual Report of Statistics of the Japanese Imperial Government* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1917.

TASUKU HARADA.

SUICIDE (Jewish).—Only a very few cases of suicide are recorded in the OT. The ancient Hebrews were, on the whole, a naive people, joyously fond of life, and not given to tampering with the natural instinct of self-preservation. Nor are all of the few instances recorded on the ordinary level of suicidal occurrences. The case of Ahithophel (2 S 17[23]) is the only one which, in the modern mind at any rate, excites loathing and reprobation. The suicide of Zimri (1 K 16[18]) and of Abimelech (killed at his own request by his armour-bearer [Jg 9[54]]) only leaves us cold; whilst, on the other hand, the death of Samson (Jg 16[26ff.]) and of Saul and his armour-bearer (1 S 31[4f.]) inspire us with a sense of awe and a certain kind of admiration rather than any other feeling.

But, when later the people of the Dispersion became more and more affected by some of the evil influences around them, and the difficulties and perplexities of existence kept on increasing, a much less wholesome attitude towards life made itself perceptible. And, as cases of suicide became more frequent, it was at last found necessary to give a name to the evil. A suicide was thus, in exact legal terminology, described as 'one who purposely destroys himself.'[1] In accordance with a general Rabbinic principle of legislation, an effort was, moreover, made to find support in the Scriptures for the new ideas and enactments which the practice of suicide brought in its train. In *Midrash Rabbāh*, 34, the prohibition of suicide is thus derived from the wording of Gn 9[5], the little word את in ואך את דמכם ('and surely your blood') being taken to include self-destruction. Dt 4[9] ('Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently') has been considered capable of a similar interpretation, and some[2] would even include suicide in 'Thou shalt not kill,' contained in the Ten Commandments. An indignantly rejected suggestion to commit suicide rather than suffer is also by some discovered in Job 2[9-10] (cf. 7[15]).

Considering some confusion of ideas which the elaborate treatment of the subject by J. Hamburger[3] may produce in the reader's mind, it seems necessary to state that the Rabbinic, like the Christian and general, conception of the act entirely excludes submission to a death of martyrdom from even the category of condoned or permissible suicide, so long as the victims do not, under the stress of fear or suffering, lay violent hands on themselves (or, by mutual consent, on one another).

The difference between an act of self-destruction during martyrdom and martyrdom pure and simple is illustrated by the striking case of Ḥananiah b. Tĕradyon, who, whilst suffering the pangs of death by fire during the Hadrianic persecutions, is reported to have replied to his disciples' suggestion that he should open his mouth, so that the fire should enter it and consume him more quickly, in these words: 'It is right that he who has given life should take it away, but let not a man destroy himself' (though, on the other hand, he allowed the executioner to heap up the flames and otherwise hasten his end).[4]

We must, therefore, limit ourselves to cases in which the act of death is, in the literal sense of the term, self-inflicted, though a division into different categories is at the same time necessary. Concerning suicide induced by the martyr spirit of patriotism we find instructive information in Josephus, where both sides of the argument are forcibly stated from the points of view of warriors, philosophers, and men of the world.

In the speeches addressed to the Jewish garrison of Masada[5] their commandant Eleazar lays special stress on their resolve, made long ago, 'never to be servants to the Romans, nor to any other than God himself,' and then exhorts them to receive their punishment for their past sins from none other than the Deity, 'as executed by our own hands'; and, on finding that his words had not yet produced the desired effect, he adds, among other things, the further argument that death 'affords our souls their liberty, and sends them by a removal into their own place of purity, where they are to be insensible to all sorts of misery,'

[1] המאבד עצמו לרעת (*e.g.*, at the beginning of *Sĕmāḥoth*, ii.). The terms החונק את עצמו ('one who strangles himself') and ההורג את עצמו ('one who kills himself') are also used. The act of suicide is represented by איבד עצמו לרעת.

[2] See J. L. Saalschütz, *Das mosaische Recht*, Berlin, 1846–48, p. 550.

[3] Art. 'Selbstmord,' in *Realencyclopädie*, Talmudic part.

[4] T.B. '*Abōdāh Zārāh*, 18*a*.

[5] *BJ* VII. viii. 6 *f.*

the final result being that 960 persons (*i.e.* the whole garrison, including women and children, with the exception of two women and five children) consented to die rather than yield themselves up to the Romans. (The spirit of the act is, of course, the same as caused the self-destruction of Razis, as related in 2 Mac 14[37-46]; and with the occurrence at Masada may be fitly compared the typical mediæval instance of the death of a large number of Jews in York in the year 1190.)

Josephus's own attitude towards suicide, under similar conditions, is revealed in *BJ* III. viii.

In the speech which, after the fall of Jotapata, he addressed to the men who had taken refuge with him in a cave, he compares a suicide to a pilot 'who, out of fear of a storm, should sink his ship of his own accord,' reminds them that it is a wicked and perfidious act to cast out of one's body the soul which God had committed to it, and exhorts them not to endeavour, by an act of self-destruction, 'to run away from God, who is the best of all masters.'[1]

A somewhat analogous, though much more pitiable, class is well represented by the case[2] of 400 captive boys and girls who, when they understood that they were being carried off for a life of shame, determined to end their lives by drowning. To quite another category belong a certain number of persons who are reported to have committed suicide under the stress of acute remorse for certain acts of theirs.[3] A different case, again, is that of the executioner of Ḥananiah b. Tĕradyon, already referred to, who, on receiving from the dying martyr the promise of future bliss, is said to have destroyed himself in the flames in which the saint had died, in order to enter at once on his inheritance. Rabbinic leniency by way of accepting excuses for young suicides is shown in the cases of certain children who had destroyed themselves because they lay under a threat of punishment from their respective fathers.[4]

The judgment of a person who, in our own legal phraseology, has been proved a *felo de se* is, in the main, left to God (לשמים),[5] though a person who recklessly endangers his life is subject to judicial chastisement (מנת מרדות).[6] With regard to the treatment of the body of a suicide, there is a mention in the speech of Josephus referred to of the custom which demanded that the remains should lie exposed till sunset. In *Sĕmāḥoth*, ii. 1,[7] it is enacted that one should neither rend one's garments for a suicide nor bare the shoulder or engage in any other formal mode of mourning. Care is taken, however, not to offend the feelings of the relatives of the dead. Those present at the funeral, therefore, form themselves in a row and recite the necessary order of service. The general rule, indeed, is that one does everything required by respect for the living, but omits all the rest. There has also been a rule of burying a suicide away from the regular line of graves, but this is not always observed.[8]

It should be mentioned in conclusion that statistics comparing the prevalence of cases of suicide among modern Jews with those of other races and denominations are given in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

LITERATURE.—The literature has been indicated in the article.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

SUICIDE (Muhammadan).—There is no specific text of the Qur'ān which forbids suicide, though it would seem that the texts which bear upon the taking of human life in general are sufficiently clear as to their purpose to include any kind of wilful killing in private life. The following verses will indicate the bearing of the Qur'ān upon the subject:[1]

'It is not for any soul to die, save by God's permission written down for an appointed time' (iii. 139; the reference is to him who 'dies or is killed'). 'It is not for a believer to kill a believer save by mistake' (iv. 93). 'And whoso kills a believer purposely, his reward is hell, to dwell therein for aye; and God will be wroth with him, and curse him, and prepare for him a mighty woe' (iv. 95). 'He respites them until a stated time; and when their time comes they cannot put it off an hour, nor can they bring it on' (xvi. 63).

The attitude of Muhammad has no doubt been correctly interpreted by *ḥadīths* which Bukhārī accepts as genuine:

'Whosoever shall kill himself shall suffer in the fire of hell,' and 'shall be excluded from heaven for ever.'[2]

At the present time, and for many centuries past, there has been unanimity of opinion throughout Islām that suicide is a violation of a divine command contained in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet. A tradition relates that Muhammad refused to bury a suicide, and his example has established a law to that effect in Islām. In spite of the law, however, it is customary to accord the funeral rites in such cases.

It is difficult to obtain statistics covering suicide in Muhammadan countries, but all authorities who treat of suicide in an exhaustive way agree that in those countries the practice is almost unknown. It is clear from the statistics presented in scientific works on suicide that the physical environment of different peoples offers no adequate explanation of the varying ratio of suicides among them, while difference of religious belief as between groups always results in a varying proportion of suicides. The regions of Islām show few suicides precisely because of the nature of the Muslim's belief in God and the future life. The right attitude for the Muslim is *islām*, an acceptance of life's events as settled by divine appointment, of death as fixed as to both time and manner, and of the hereafter as a pre-arranged order of retributive rewards and penalties distributed according to the individual's attitude of acquiescence in the arrangement of life and destiny or of revolt against it. Suicide is an act of revolt against God, and the perpetrator of the act risks the wrath of God and the indescribable penalties of the Fire. Whatever else Islām may lack in the way of ethical influence, its sense of obligation to make acceptance of Providence the cardinal factor in obedience to God has been an effective determinant of conduct, and its doctrine of future retribution has been efficacious in strengthening this virtue of active resignation to the will of God.

LITERATURE.—Most of the leading treatises on suicide contain a brief reference to the Muslim attitude on the subject. In none of these works is there any attempt really to cope with the question, the available materials not permitting any well-founded conclusions as to the extent and causes of the phenomenon. The most useful general discussion is found in *RGG* v., *s.v.* 'Selbstmord.' See also *DI*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

WALTER M. PATTON.

SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian).—Among the ancient Hamito-Semitic peoples the love of life was strong. They were (with the possible exception of the Egyptians) still in the earlier and less reflective stages of civilization, and consequently showed little of that melancholy which leads to frequent suicide.

1. **Semitic.**—Among the Semites not only was the love of life strong, but their primitive religion was a worship of the goddess of life. Most of their deities of later time were gods that were in some form closely associated with the idea that life was divine. Their general attitude towards life was one of joyous interest in objective things. Their philosophical and reflective powers never attained any great degree of vigour. There are, accordingly, no cases of suicide on record except where

[1] The manner in which Josephus finally escaped death, whilst all his companions save one lay slain around him, will be found described in *BJ* III. viii. 7.

[2] Recorded in T.B. *Giṭṭin*, 57*b*.

[3] See, *e.g.*, *Genesis Rabbāh*, ch. 40; T.B. *Qiddushin*, 81*b*; Rashi in the mention of Beruriah (a doubtful case, however) in T.B. *'Ābōdāh Zārāh*, 18*b*.

[4] *Sĕmaḥoth*, ii. 4 *f.*

[5] Maimonides, *Mishneh Tōrah*, *Hilkhōth Rōṣēaḥ*, ch. ii.

[6] *Ib.* ch. xi.

[7] Also embodied in, *e.g.*, *Yōrēh Dē'ah*, § 345.

[8] See Hamburger, end of art. 'Selbstmord,' where references relating to this point are given.

[1] The translation is E. H. Palmer's, *SBE* vi. [1900].

[2] See *DI*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

the deed was committed in order to avoid a form of death that was considered particularly disgraceful.

An early and classical example of this is the suicide of King Saul of Israel (1 S 31[4]). Israel's armies had been defeated by the Philistines. Saul said to his armour-bearer: 'Draw thy sword, and thrust me through therewith; lest these uncircumcised come and thrust me through, and abuse me.' Naturally the armour-bearer was afraid to do this, so Saul fell upon his own sword and ended his life. Clearly the deed would not have been committed but for the desperate straits in which the king found himself. To him, as to many in all parts of the world, the foreigner was unclean. Philistine foreigners did not bear the sacred mark of circumcision; they were doubly unclean. He took his own life in order to avoid dying by such unholy hands after having been tortured by them.

A second case is that of Saul's armour-bearer. When he saw that his king had committed suicide, he followed the example of his master. His motive may have been in part the same as Saul's; it may have been in part despair at the death of his chief. At all events the armour-bearer, like Saul, took his own life only when a death which he regarded as disgraceful was inevitable.

Closely analogous to the suicide of Saul was the death of Abimelech, the son of Gideon (Jg 9[54]). Abimelech had made himself king of Shechem and a small territory about it; he sought to enlarge his dominion by the conquest of Thebez, a city some miles to the north-east of Shechem. In attacking the city he drew near to the wall, whence a woman threw a millstone on his head and broke his skull. He thereupon commanded his armour-bearer to thrust him through, lest it should be said of him that a woman slew him, and the armour-bearer obeyed. Abimelech did not actually die by his own hand, but, since the death-wound was inflicted by his own command, it was practically suicide.

A similar case in the Maccabæan period is reported in 2 Mac 14[37-46]. A certain Razis, imprisoned in a tower in Jerusalem, which Nicanor was besieging, when he saw that resistance was useless, fell upon his sword. As the wound thus inflicted was not fatal, he threw himself from the tower. When that did not kill him, he disembowelled himself.

At least two instances are recorded among the Hebrews in which traitors committed suicide.

Ahithophel, one of David's trusted advisers, betrayed his master and conspired with Absalom. When he saw that David had eluded the traitors and that civil war would follow, he hanged himself (2 S 17[23]). Similarly Judas Iscariot, the betrayer of Jesus Christ, when he saw that, as a consequence of his deed, Jesus was arrested and condemned, went and hanged himself (Mt 27[5]). Possibly his effort to end his life in this manner failed, for another account (Ac 1[18]) implies that he, like Razis, died from being disembowelled.

Conscience, then as now, sometimes drove traitors to end their own lives. Both the reasons for suicide which can be traced in ancient Israel operated in the case of Shamash-shum-ukin, king of Babylon, 668–648 B.C.

He headed an extensive conspiracy against his brother and suzerain, Ashur-bani-pal, king of Assyria. When Ashur-bani-pal, having defeated Shamash-shum-ukin's army and the forces of his allies, besieged him, Shamash-shum-ukin, reduced to extremity, threw himself into a burning pit rather than fall into the hands of his brother.[1] His rebellion had exposed him, in case of capture, to the kind of barbarous torture inflicted by the Assyrians on rebels—a prospect that might well drive a man to the less painful death of a burning pit. Shamash-shum-ukin might, however, have faced this, as many another had done, had it not been for an accusing conscience.

The cases cited sufficiently reveal the ancient Semitic attitude towards suicide. It was resorted to only in extreme cases.

2. Egyptian. — The attitude of the ancient Egyptians towards suicide was in general like that of the Semites. The love of life was strong in them, and their conception of the life beyond such that it presented to them deterrents of various kinds. The inscriptions present us with two sources of information on the subject, one practical, the other theoretical.

In the reign of Ramses III. (1198–1167 B.C.) a conspiracy against the life of the king was formed in the *harīm*, in which a number of high officials were implicated. The king appointed a commission to investigate the matter and to try the criminals. From the records of this commission we learn that at least seventeen persons, who were found guilty, were left to themselves and permitted to take their own lives.[2] It was in a way compulsory suicide. Death by their own hands was, however, apparently regarded as less humiliating than death at the hands of an executioner. An eighteenth person, when found guilty, committed suicide, apparently to the regret of the commission.[1] It appears from this record that the punishment of high and formerly trusted officials was probably accomplished by the ancient Egyptian government in this way.

An interesting document written during the Middle Kingdom (2100–1800 B.C.), which has been entitled by Erman and Breasted 'The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Own Soul,'[2] indicates that, in the *mêlée* of Egyptian feudal development, as the failure of old religious forms to satisfy increased and a sense of the injustices of life attained power, suicide was contemplated by some as an escape from life's ills.

The beginning of the papyrus is lost, but from what remains it is clear that a certain man of gentle spirit (his name is lost) fell sick. He was forsaken by his friends; even his brothers left him uncared for. Deserted by all, he was robbed by his neighbours. His former good deeds were forgotten. Although a wise man, when he would plead his own cause, he was thrust aside. His name, which should have been revered, was defamed. He then determined to take his own life, but, as he stood on the brink of the grave, his soul shrank back in horror and refused to accompany him. The dialogue then began. The soul's first reason for not going with him was the fear that there would be no tomb to dwell in after death. This afforded the misanthrope an opportunity to expose to his soul the utter futility of all such preparations. The soul had counselled death by burning, but had then shrunk from that, as there would be no surviving friend to stand by the bier and make the mortuary offerings. He urged his soul to undertake these duties itself, but then the soul refused death in any form, declaring that, even when the great built pyramids and endowed mortuary services, their tombs were in time neglected and permitted to fall into ruins, so that they were in no better case than the poor. His soul urged that it was good for men to 'follow the glad day and forget care.' The misanthrope then proceeds to demonstrate that life, instead of being an opportunity for pleasure, is far more intolerable than death. The demonstration is embodied in four poems addressed to his soul. The first of these pictures the unjust abhorrence in which the speaker's name was held by the world. The second sets forth the corruption of society. The third, which speaks of death as a glad release, justifies suicide. It runs as follows:[3]

'Death is before me to-day
[Like] the recovery of a sick man,
Like going forth into a garden after sickness.

Death is before me to-day
Like the odour of myrrh,
Like sitting under a sail on a windy day.

Death is before me to-day
Like the odour of lotus flowers,
Like sitting on the shore of drunkenness.

Death is before me to-day
Like the course of a freshet,
Like the return of a man from the war-galley to his house.

Death is before me to-day
Like the clearing of the sky,
Like a man 'fowling therein toward' that which he knew not.

Death is before me to-day
As a man longs to see his house
When he has spent years in captivity.'

The fourth poem contributes to the argument in favour of suicide by expressing the conviction that in the 'beyond' that justice which is unattainable in this world will be experienced.

'He who is yonder
Shall seize (the culprit) as a living god,
Inflicting punishment of wickedness on the doer of it.

He who is yonder
Shall stand in the celestial barque,
Causing that the choicest of the offerings there be given to the temples.

He who is yonder
Shall be a wise man who has not been repelled,
Praying to Re when he speaks.'[4]

This document shows how world-weary Egyptians looked at suicide 4000 years ago. An interesting feature of the point of view is that it betrays no

[1] Cf. *KB* ii. 191.
[2] See J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. §§ 444–454.
[1] *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. § 456.
[2] For a more complete account of it see J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp 188–198.
[3] As translated by Breasted, p. 195.
[4] *Ib.* p. 197.

consciousness that self-destruction is wrong. In this respect it is in striking contrast to the Talmud. Rabbi Eleazar says that Gn 9[5] means that 'I [God] will require your own blood from you'[1]—a clear recognition of the sinfulness of suicide. The Egyptian misanthrope, so far from betraying any such consciousness, seems to hold that the fact that in the world beyond he can not only attain the justice that is denied him here, but also assist in the establishment of justice, is a reason for hastening by his own hand his release from life's intolerable conditions.

LITERATURE.—K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, New York, 1918, p. 484; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, iv. 217–221; A. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, in *ABAW*, Berlin, 1896; J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912. GEORGE A. BARTON.

SUKHARS.—See RUKHARS.

SUMATRA.—See JAVA, BALI, AND SUMATRA.

SUMERO-AKKADIANS.—1. The term.—The ethnic expression 'Sumero-Akkadian' does not occur in the inscriptions, but, as the compound *Kengi-Ura*, translated by the Semitic *Šumer u Akkad*, 'Šumer and Akkad,' is found, it is a perfectly legitimate name for the mixed population which of old occupied the alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates, where they flowed into the Persian Gulf.

2. Probable derivation of the names.—Many suggestions have been made as to the origin and meaning of *Kengi* (or *Kingi*)-*Ura* and *Šumer u Akkad*, but it must be admitted that both these points are doubtful even now.

J. D. Prince[2] suggests that it may be a combination of *kēn* (long form of *ki*), 'land,' and *gi*, 'reed,' 'land of reeds' being 'an appropriate designation of Babylonia.' In the lists, however, *Kengi* or *Kingi* is rendered simply by *mātu*, 'country,' and here stands for 'the country' in the sense of 'our native land.'[3] This being the case, it is probable that the above forms are nasalized from *kigu*, the name of the first character, suggesting that *kiki* may have been the unweakened form. As *bur* to *Ura*, that is the pronunciation given to the characters *bur*, superimposed, when they are used for *Akkad*. This group also stands for the highlands of Armenia and of Palestine, and therefore indicated a mountainous region.[4] That the Akkadian Semites (not, as formerly supposed, the Sumerians) came from some highland district is quite possible, and that may be the meaning of *Ura*. *Akkad*, however, is probably shortened from *Agadé*, one of the names of the old capital of the northern district of Babylonia. In Gn 10[10] *Accad* is named as one of the cities of Nimrod's kingdom, after Babel (Babylon), but *Agadé* seems to have come into prominence before the great capital city. In addition to *Kingi*, Šumer is also expressed by the characters *Eme-ku*[ki], which have, perhaps, to be pronounced *Eme-laḫ*, '(the land of) the holy tongue (or language),' meaning the idiom used in the religious services of the Babylonian temples, and esteemed as sacred from pre-historic times. The connexion of Šumer with the OT Shinar (*Shin'ar*) is still uncertain. Suggestions will be found in *HDB* iv. 503 f., that which makes it a changed form of *Shingi-Ura*, for *Kingi-Ura*, being the best.

3. The earthly paradise.—The tract wherein lay Êridu, 'the good city,' and the land of Tilmun,[5] which traditionally enjoyed, in the beginning, the happiness and the innocence of the golden age, seemingly always appealed to the imagination of the Babylonians as being at that time the most desirable abode on earth. It was this, apparently, which led to the designation of Adam's first dwelling-place as 'a garden eastward, in Eden' (Gn 2[8])—*i.e.* in the *êdinnu* (Sumerian *edina*)—which, however, seems not to occur as a place-name except in the compound Sippar-edina ('Sippar of the *eden*') and in the river-name *id edina*, 'the river of Eden (or of the plain).' Nevertheless, the idea always existed, and probably increased among the Babylonians, that their land was the site of the paradise of old time. This theory, moreover, is in a measure supported by the fact that Ê, which often stands for Babylon or Babylonia, may be an abbreviation of *Êridu*, and *Tin-dir*, 'the abode' or 'the grove of life,' probably refers to the wonderful vine therein. Many things, in fact, support the theory advocated by Friedrich Delitzsch,[1] and treated of by scholars and theologians before and since.[2]

4. Ethnic position.—As remarked above, it is probable that the Akkadians (the Semitic section of the inhabitants) came from some mountainous district, and it may have been originally an early stream from the west (the Amorite or Palestinian highlands) which preceded that of Ḫammurabi, who, having installed himself at Babylon, made that city the capital of the land. But both races were apparently, in their origin, mountaineers, as is suggested by the fact that the Sumerian word *kura* is the common word for both 'mountain' and 'country.' If de Lacouperie's contention[3] (afterwards followed up by C. J. Ball[4]) is correct, that Sumerian, both tongue and writing, is an early form of Chinese, then their Mongolian origin would seem to be proved. The likeness of certain Sumerian words to Turkish suggests that they may have been a pre-historic race from the Far East, of Turko-Mongolian origin. Traces of oblique eyes are to be found in the small head from Tel-loh (Lagaš in S. Babylonia), given in de Sarzec;[5] and another example is the bearded male head in relief.[6] Good grounds for the theory exist.

5. Evidence of the Syllabary as to the probable original home of the Sumerians.—It was long ago noted that the absence of a special ideograph for 'river' implies that such a thing, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, did not exist in the country of their origin. This, in fact, seems to be true, as the compound ideographic group for 'river' shows the sign for 'water' (*a*) followed by a square representing a lake or reservoir with the character for 'to run,' 'to flow,' within. The Sumerians may, therefore, have come from a mountainous region where lakes and ponds were common, and rivers were mountain-streams or torrents. The word *kur*, which stands for both 'country' and 'mountain,' and seems to be a picture of three mountains, supports this. On the other hand, the existence of a character for 'date-palm,' *gišim-mar*, 'the fruit-tree' in a special sense, somewhat negatives this evidence.

In the list of characters known as 'Syllabary *b*' we gather from the first entry that the Sumerians thought of the heavens (*ana*) as the abode of the deity (*dingir*). They believed also in spirits (*gidim*, *utuk*, etc.), and made offerings (*sigisse*) to the gods. To all appearance they lived in houses (*é*), not tents, and those houses had doors (*giš-gal*) furnished with bolts and bars. The houses were situated in streets (*sila*), which formed cities (*uru*, dialectic *eri*). Their fields were more or less rectangular, and were protected, at least in Babylonia, by boundary-stones. It was apparently not until they had settled in their new home that their fields were called 'water-centres' (*a-šag*). They had dogs, and the dogs were faithful but quarrelsome. They also possessed goats, sheep, oxen, and swine. They did not at first know the horse, the ass (*anšu*) being the common beast of burden. Naturally they knew of wool (*sig*), and it would seem

1 *Baba Qamma*, 91*b*.

2 *Materials for a Sumerian Lexicon*, Leipzig, 1905–08, pt. ii. p. 206.

3 There is apparently another (variant) form for *Kingi*, viz. *Kibēgi*, but this may be due to a pun (see *PSBA* xxxv. [1913] 155).

4 If, however, *Bur* stands for a reservoir or waterway, *bur* would indicate the watershed of the Tigris and the Euphrates—see § 6 (*b*).

5 See below, § 6 (*c*).

1 *Wo lag das Paradies?*, Leipzig, 1881.

2 See also *PSBA* xxxiii. [1911] 161, xxxv. [1913] 154 f.; *ExpT* xxix. [1918] 181 ff., 288; and cf. art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic), vol. ii. p. 704*b*.

3 See 'Babylonia and China,' in *Babylonian and Oriental Record*, i. [1886–87] 113, 'The Old Babylonian Characters and their Chinese Derivates,' *ib.* ii. [1887–88] 73; *cf.* also pp. 149 ff., 184 ff., 221 ff., 251 ff.

4 See 'The New Accadian,' in *PSBA* xii. [1890] five papers, 'Ideograms common to Accadian and Chinese,' *ib.* xiii. [1891] three papers.

5 *Découvertes en Chaldée*, Paris, 1884–1912, pl. 25, no. 1.

6 *Ib.* pl. 21, no. 6.

that linen (*kat*, Semiticized as *kitû*) was one of the fabrics which they produced. They had pots (*duk*, *lut*) and dishes (*bankur*), and used ovens (*udun*). Apparently the only simple ideograph for a metal was *urudu*, 'copper,' silver and gold being described as the 'day-bright' and the 'reed-bright' metals respectively. It is supposed that the only iron at first known—*an-bar*, 'the heaven-metal'—was meteoric. Tin was called *nigga* or *nagga*, and was probably originally pronounced *anagga* (Semiticized as *anaku*). They knew of fire, and used braziers, and a modification of the character for 'fire,' expressing the word 'new' (*ge*), suggests the purification of the metals and the completion of pottery and the like by its means.

6. Languages and literature.—(*a*) There has been much difference of opinion as to the existence of the non-Semitic Sumerian language as distinguished from the Semitic Akkadian. Halévy and his followers have even contended that it was merely an 'allography'—an invention of the Semites for expressing their own language in another way. Such an expression as 'to pour out speech' (*gu-de*), however, for 'to call,' 'announce,' is probably too foreign to the Semitic mind to admit of such an idiom replacing the common Semitic *nabû*—so, also, 'to set the breast' (*gab-ri*) for 'to resist.' Sumerian, moreover, has an involved and more widely-differing grammatical construction. The complicated system of verbal incorporations, the absence of case-endings, the use of 'postpositions' instead of prepositions, and other peculiarities, stamp Sumerian as being a language which Semites would be most unlikely to invent. Concerning its connexion with old Chinese,[1] there seem to be many analogies with regard to both characters and words, but the theory has not been very generally accepted. Many admit, on the other hand, that Turkish contains a certain number of similar roots, such as *mal* (*wal*) and *ol* in *olmak*, 'to be'; *ara* and *yuru* in *yurumek*, 'to go'; *du* and *de* in *demek*, 'to speak,' etc. Turkish, however, with its longer history, has naturally developed many new forms, and the numerals differ, but perhaps it is recognizable as a very late relative of Sumerian in its pronouns.

(*b*) Akkadian is now accepted as the correct designation of the speech of the Semites of Babylonia, derived from what was apparently the most ancient Semitic settlement in the tract, viz. the kingdom of Agadé. Akkad, as already remarked, was called by the Sumerians *Ura*,[2] and the ideograph *bur*, by which it is expressed, is suggested by J. D. Prince[3] as referring to the two rivers which were regarded as 'the life of the land,' viz. the Tigris and the Euphrates. There is some uncertainty as to the division in which the Akkado-Assyrian language should be placed, but it may, perhaps, be regarded as the bridge connecting the Aramaic and the Canaanitish forms of Semitic speech. Its verbal conjugations belong to the former, whilst the consonantal system of its roots resembles that of the Semitic languages to which Hebrew belongs. In the use of the words, however, Akkado-Assyrian struck out a line of its own.

Thus 'hand' is not *idu* (Heb., Arab., etc. *yad*), but *qâtu*; 'man' is not *iah*, as in Hebrew, but *awêlu*; 'servant' is not *'ebed* or *'abd*, but *wardu*, the comparatively rare *abdu* having been borrowed at an early date from W. Semitic speech. On the other hand, the roots of the words for 'God' (*ilu*) and 'lord' (*bêlu*) are the same as in the other Semitic tongues. The Heb. *melek*, 'king,' and *sar*, 'prince,' are represented in Semitic-Akkadian by *šarru*, 'king,' and *malku*, 'petty king' respectively. 'House' (*bîtu*) and 'street' (*sûqu*) are from the same roots as in the other Semitic languages, but in Akkadian a temple was simply a 'house' (*bîtu*), whilst the other Semitic languages used the word *hêkal*, from Sum.-Akk. (*h*)*ékallu*, 'palace'—(*h*)*egala*, 'great house,' in Sumerian. Similarly the Sumero-Akkadian word for 'city' was *âlu*, but the Hebrews used the Sumerian dialectic *'ir*, which appears as *yeru* (for *êru* or *âru*) in the name of Jerusalem.

(*c*) Most of the Sumero-Akkadian legends and mythical stories have been dealt with in the artt. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS and HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Babylonian). It is naturally difficult to distinguish the nationality of each legend, but most or all of them have a more or less Sumerian foundation. Among the distinctively Sumerian legends of Babylonia may be classed that of Alorus and his five successors, as well as those of Alaparus or Adapa, Tammuz, and Euedoreschus.[1] From their names it seems that the ancestors of the hero of the Flood were Sumerian, and the origin of the legend of the Flood itself is now proved to be so, notwithstanding that his names, Atra-ḫasis and Ut-napištim, are Semitic. This is shown by the very noteworthy earlier version in the Pennsylvania University Museum,[2] which is written in the Sumerian language, without any Akkadian rendering.

In this text the mother-goddess (Nin-tu, Aruru, and Zêr-panitum are some of her names) speaks of certain people whom she had created. At that time—long, probably, before the Flood—five great cities existed, viz. Êridu, the paradise-city, protected by the god Êa; Dûr-Kiš, 'the fortress of Kiš,' which preceded Babylon as foremost city of the land; Larancha, allotted to the god Papil-ḫursag, who apparently became its patron; Zimbir (Sippar), which was given to the sun-god, and became the great centre of his worship; and Šuruppak, now Farâ, the Babylonian Noah's birthplace, allotted to the god Šuruppak or Šukurru. It will be noted that in this list of primitive Babylonian (Sumero-Akkadian) cities there is no mention of 'Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh' (Gn 10^{10}). As in the case of the bilingual Creation-story,[3] in which Merodach and Aruru not only create, but also construct the cities wherein men are to dwell, it may be supposed that these deities were not only the guardians, but also the builders of the foundations of which they were now appointed patrons. A fracture of the tablet here makes an unfortunate gap, and, when the inscription is again readable, we have, instead of the Creation, an old version of the Flood-story. The mother-goddess, here called Nin-tu ('lady of reproduction'), like Maḫ in the 11th tablet of the Gilgameš-legend,[4] bewails the destruction of the people whom she had created, and the gods invoke the compound deity Ana-Enlila ('heaven and welkin') possibly to prevent the Flood from taking place. At this point Zi-û-suddu ('the being [or soul] of remote days'),[5] an anointing-priest of the god Êa, went through certain rites and ceremonies, apparently with the object of saving mankind from the threatened destruction, but without effect.

'All the powerful wind-storms as one rushed forth—a water-flood raged over the [hostile]. After the water-flood had raged over the land for seven days and seven nights—after the mighty boat had been carried away by wind-storms over the swollen waters, Utu [the sun-god] came forth again, on heaven and earth shedding day. Zi-û-suddu opened a window of the mighty boat—the hero Utu maketh his light to shine within the mighty boat. Zi-û-suddu, the king, prostrateth himself in the presence of Utu—the king sacrificeth an ox, slaughtereth a sheep.'[6]

In the final column Zi-û-suddu and his companions conjure Ana-Enlila, 'by the soul of heaven and the soul of earth,' to be well disposed towards them. This favour was duly accorded, and the twofold divinity, as in the Gilgameš Flood-story, conferred immortality upon him. Afterwards, to make good the ravages of the tempest, which had slain so many of the human race, 'the seed of mankind' was taken up, and made to live again in the land of Tilmun,[7] the district at the head of the Persian Gulf, which at that time extended much farther inland than now.

An analogous legend is that of Uttu (?)—probably one of the strangest records of the Creation and the Flood in existence. It was found at Nippur (Niffer) and was first translated by Stephen Langdon.[8]

[1] See above, § 4.
[2] See above, § 2.
[3] Pt. iii. p. 352.

[1] *ERE* vi. 642 *f.*
[2] See Arno Poebel's *Historical and Grammatical Texts* in *Publications of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum*, vol. iv. no. 1 (Philadelphia, 1914), p. 7 ff.; T. G. Pinches, in the *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, London, 1915, pp. 307–312.
[3] *ERE* ii. 314[a].
[4] *Ib.* iv. 551[a], var. for line 10: '(The goddess) Maḫ called out, making her voice resound.'
[5] The Sisythes (for Sisydes) of Lucian's *de Dea Syria*, 12 (see J. Garstang, *The Syrian Goddess*, London, 1913, p. 50).
[6] The sacrifice seems to take place whilst the patriarch was still in the ark, and not after its inmates had come forth. But perhaps two acts of sacrifice were recorded.
[7] See *ExpT* xxix. [1918] 181.
[8] *The Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood, and the Fall of Man*, Philadelphia [1915]; see notice by A. H. Sayce, *ExpT* xxvii. [1916] 88 ff.; also S. Langdon, *ib.* p. 165 ff., and Pinches in the *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*,

It begins with a description of Tilmun, the glorious and pure (or holy). There Enki (Êa) and his spouse (Damkina) had their home, and on that account the original condition of Tilmun was that of the world during the traditional golden age of the Greeks. The people who lived in this happy land were not afflicted by sickness and old age, nor, apparently, did crime exist. This happy state of things, however, was seemingly not to last, for Enki, the water-god, announced his intention to destroy the field (probably meaning the whole district) by means of a flood. This was to last for nine periods of a month each, during which mankind would disappear like butter when it melts. There was one man, however, who was faithful to the deity, and for him, according to Langdon's translation, 'Enki the king' waited on a boat. The context seems to show that the great and pious personage whom the god thus favoured was Uttu, saved by the deity owing to his faithfulness. After the gap which occurs here Uttu seems to be engaged in gardening-work, he having become, like Noah, an agriculturist.

After another gap certain plants, possibly cultivated by Uttu, are spoken of, and it is stated which of them he (probably Uttu) might or might not eat. One of the forbidden plants Langdon regards as the cassia, but this is doubtful. The parallel between this story and the Creation-story in Genesis, where Adam is forbidden to eat of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, is noteworthy, though what is attributed to the first man in the one is attributed to a prototype of Noah in the other. But Uttu's plants were not trees, and they apparently did not confer either life or wisdom.

Among other Sumerian legends may be noted the story of Enlil and Ninlil, the older Bel and Beltis,[1] the legends of Merodach,[2] the legend of Tammuz, and probably that of Ištar's descent into Hades to seek him.[3] The myth of Ura or Nergal, the god of plague and death, Nergal and Ereš-ki-gal,[4] Enlil, Tišpak, and the Labbu-serpent,[5] together with others[6] of which the names only are known, may be added.

But besides the legends there are many historical documents, of which the most noteworthy are the inscriptions of Ê-anna-tum (*Stèle des Vautours*), En-anna-tum II. (cone), Uru-ka-gina (cones), Gudea (statues and cylinders), with numerous others.[7] As the dynasty of Ur seems to have been Sumerian, it is probable that detailed histories of the kings existed, and a fragment of one dealing with Sur-Engur and his son Dungi is known. This is the period (2300 B.C.) when the transformation of the Sumerian states into a Sumero-Akkadian collection of nations may be said to have taken place.

There are also numerous temple-records and accounts, inventories, lists, a few letters and contracts, and chronological lists and mathematical tablets. The Sumerian lists of words are unaccompanied by Semitic-Akkadian renderings. These, as well as the lists of names (places and men), are generally classified.

(*d*) From a religious point of view, the Akkadian legends are most valuable and interesting. It seems not improbable that the accounts of the Creation and the Flood first published by George Smith were Semitic compositions, though based upon Sumerian originals. This is implied by the fact that most of the names, especially those of deities (Anu, the heaven-god, Enlil, the older Bêl, Êa and Damkina, the god and goddess of the waters, Merodach, the king of the gods, Anšar and Kišar, the host of heaven and the host of earth, etc.),[8] are Sumerian, though Tiamat (Tiawath), the dragon of chaos, Kingu, her spouse, and Mummu, their son, seem to be Semitic-Akkadian. How Sumerian dominated in the religion of the Sumero-Akkadians may be realized when it is remembered that Sumerian names in their pantheon exceeded enormously those of Semitic origin—Šamaš, the sun, Bêl and Bêltu (Beltis), which generally stand for Merodach and his spouse, Nabû, the teacher, and his spouse, Tašmêtu^{m}, 'she who hears,' Addu (Assyr. Adad) or Rammânu (Hadad or Rimmon), and certain other descriptive divine names which possibly came into existence only after the Sumerian cult had conquered. Everything tends to show that the Sumerian element of the population preponderated in religious matters, as in the literature and the art of the Sumero-Akkadians.

1915, p. 312 f. Instead of Uttu (?), the name was at first read as Tagtug (?), which is a transcription of the two characters by which it is expressed.

[1] *ERE* vi. 644b; also *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 185 ff., 575 ff. (numerous additions by Langdon).

[2] *Ib.* p. 644 f. [3] *Ib.* p. 645a.

[4] *Ib.* [5] *Ib.* p. 645b. [6] *Ib.* p. 644b.

[7] See F. Thureau-Dangin, *Inscriptions de Sumer et d'Akkad*, Paris, 1905.

[8] See art. SABAOTH.

7. Social life.—Sumerian influence in the land of the Sumero-Akkadians was, in fact, evident in every phase of their life.

The system of government was by a 'great man' (*lugal*) or 'king' (Sem. *šarru*), who had under him various officers, and was represented in the more important civic centres by a 'head-man' (*ig-sag*, Sem. *iššaku*, 'he who is head')—viceroy or mayor. To lighten the work of the supreme ruler, the tablets indicate that he had numerous 'servants,' or royal or vice-regal secretaries, whose cylinder-seals appear (generally beautifully-engraved specimens of intaglio art) on the documents written or drawn up on the king's or the *iššaku's* behalf. During the time of the dynasty of Babylon the *iššaku* had sunk to the position of administrative officer—probably something like a mayor.

Other officials were the superintendent (*nubanda*), often, apparently, the king's treasurer and palace-steward, and the business-agent (*damgar*), who acted sometimes as superintendent of the women's house or harim. Naturally, there were business-agents of various kinds, and belonging to the same class were apparently the messengers and ministers, political and other. These two classes of officials had to do with the transport of 'drink, food, and oil,' and apparently acted as political ministers. The number of documents referring to the transmission of goods, etc., suggests the existence of something analogous to posts as early as 2300 years B.C. Passing over the *nimgir*, 'director' or 'governor,' of whom there were several grades, and the *ga-ku-du*, 'grain-measurer' (Lau) or 'cup-bearer' (Zimmern), we have the *sag-nanga*, 'district-chief,' the *nimgir-abzu*, director of reservoirs, springs, or watercourses, the *muwe*, distributers of rations, etc. Among the humbler civil servants were the carriers, labourers, gardeners, scribes, barbers—tonsure-cutters of the religious orders and apparently also hair-dressers (Sum. *šui*, Akkadian *gallubu*)—a few of them being women. Connected with the royal and temple domains were also smiths, shoemakers, carpenters, tailors or cloth-workers, goat-herdsmen, shepherds, ass-herdsmen, boatmen, gate-keepers, and various others.

Though it may be held that these details are of but little importance, they all tend to show how highly organized were the Sumero-Akkadians at an exceedingly early date, and the social and industrial system which they had initiated naturally formed the foundation of those of the Babylonians and the Assyrians later on. One list of late date (perhaps a copy of an earlier one) from Nineveh contained, when complete, about 190 official titles or designations, some of them ethnic, like 'the Itu'ite,' 'the Assyrian secretary,' 'the Aramæan secretary,' etc. Priests and temple officials, judges and law-court officers, were also to be found with the Sumero-Akkadians, as with the Babylonians and Assyrians at all times.

8. Ethical character.—The numerous names of men compounded with those of deities show, independently of the temple worship and ceremonies, how religious the Sumero-Akkadians were. Each city had its favourite deity, and every man worshipped the form or aspect, shown by the appellation chosen, of the deity whom he regarded as his or his family's special protector. In addition to their religious tendencies, however, they were exceedingly superstitious, and fond of incantations and charms, of the efficacy of which they were never in doubt.[1] Every disease or sickness was capable of being cured by these means, and in all probability other advantages which men are accustomed to seek could be attained by the same means. Among these may be classed the destruction of one's enemy by melting away his waxen effigy, the cutting off of his life by the cutting of a string or thread symbolizing it, and the like. When seeking a sign, they generally appealed to the deities Šamaš and Hadad, whose rays and wind, penetrating everywhere, revealed to them

[1] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Assyro-Babylonian).

everything that passed on the earth. They were therefore the gods of judgment and justice, and appeal was made to them that the sign or pronouncement asked for might be true.

In the matter of morals the Sumero-Akkadians were probably not better than their neighbours, but there is one point which is worthy of note, viz. that in their literature, so far as we are acquainted with it (with the exception of the legend of Gilgameš and one or two others), immoral or obscene passages are exceedingly rare. Moreover, it is in the same legend of Gilgameš that the greatest hostility to the goddess Ištar or Venus is shown—hostility which brought upon that hero all the misfortunes which afterwards befell him. Slavery seems to have been in full force among the Sumero-Akkadians, but there is no proof that slaves were ever ill-treated. Ruthlessness in war was also not one of their failings, as far as their records are preserved, and they were probably the superiors of the Assyrians at all times in that respect. As a nation, whether the states be taken individually or as a whole, there is no doubt that they had a high opinion of learning and the advantages to be gained therefrom. To all appearance it was a meritorious thing to know the mythology which, to them, occupied the place of Holy Scriptures, and to be acquainted with the history of their land, which enabled them to judge of the dealings of their gods with their rulers during their long existence as a nation. In like manner, a knowledge of the methods of legal procedure enabled their scribes to employ themselves usefully by drawing up contracts; and those who made a specialty of such things could read the signs in the heavens and make known all kinds of omens, thus earning the gratitude of their fellow-citizens and their own living by the fees of those whom they served. Whatever their defects, their records exhibit them as worthy people, equal in social progress to all their contemporaries at the early age at which they flourished.

9. Early Sumerian dominion.—Whether the Sumerians or the Akkadians entered Babylonia first is another uncertain point, but it is to be noted that the earliest documents are in the Sumerian language, and the earliest records refer to Sumerian kings. Legends, ritual-texts, hymns, contracts, etc., and word-lists are all Sumerian at the earlier periods, and, when these documents came to be translated, the Sumerian text always preceded the Akkadian or Semitic. Their entry into the country must have taken place about 5000 B.C. or earlier, but the Semitic-Akkadians probably became prominent only about 2500 B.C. The Semites, however, were certainly numerous in the country at an earlier date, and were steadily growing in power. Sargon of Agadé or Akkad seems to have reigned about 2800 B.C. (Nabonidus's date for this ruler is equivalent to 3800 B.C.), and he was certainly not the first ruler of Semitic race. The presence of such Semitic-looking names as Qalumum and Zuqakip, 'the scorpion,' who reigned before the mythical Etanna,[1] notwithstanding that we have to make allowance for the inordinate lengths of their reigns, probably takes back Semitic (Akkadian) dominion in Babylonia to a date which can hardly be later than 4000 B.C. In that case we may carry back Sumerian dominion to 4500 or 5000 B.C., and even 8000 B.C. has been spoken of.

10. Babylonia under Sumero-Akkadian rule.—(*a*) *The large states.*—The number of states into which Babylonia was divided until the time of Hammurabi's dynasty (*c.* 2000 B.C.) is uncertain, but it can hardly have been less than 40 or 50. This, naturally, only shows that each state had its own ruler, and claimed independence from all its neighbours. As may be imagined, the total of these states varied at different times, owing to conquest of the strong by the weak and to the gradual absorption of their smaller neighbours by the larger or more predominant centres of civilization. The name of each little state was generally that of its capital, and it is thus that we have the kingdoms of Agadé or Akkad, Kiš, Unug or Erech, Uriwa or Ur, Isin, Muru, Larsa, Lagaš, Ka-dingira or Babylon, Nipri or Nippur, and many others. Apparently after the Kassite conquest of about 1700 B.C. Babylonia was called Kar-Duniaš, 'the district of the lord of the world,' but the older name of Akkad, derived from the state of which Sargon the Babylonian was the ruler about 2800 B.C., clung to it even in the time of Aššur-bani-âpli, 'the great and noble Asnappar,' about 650 B.C. The name of Chaldæa seems to have been applied to it, and that by non-Babylonians, only after the time of the Chaldæan dynasty to which Merodach-baladan belonged. As has been remarked above (§ 4), the usual word for 'country' was *kur*, but another largely used is worthy of notice, viz. *kalama*, written with the character *un*, which generally stands for 'people.' This identification of the land with its people implies a strong sense of nationality in the minds of the non-Semitic Sumerians, but was less pronounced in the minds of the Semitic-Babylonians after the time of Nebuchadrezzar.

(*b*) *The smaller foundations.* — Though the capitals and larger cities (as understood in those days) were numerous, there were many smaller centres and settlements, sometimes founded by prominent agriculturists or traders, but in many cases they were religious foundations. Among the former may be mentioned the city of Idi-Uraš (*âl Idi-^{d} Uraš*) and the 'upper city of Elnanu' (*âl Elnana êlû*) of tablet 23 of the Relph collection,[1] where also we find Larsa and Pulukku (*Larsa^{ki}, Dûr âl Pulukku^{ki}*, 'the fortification of the city Pulukku') mentioned. No. 26 of the same collection refers to the cities of men named Amat-îli, Sin-nûr-mâti^{m}, etc., the 'Taribu^{m}-district' (*kar taribu^{m}*), the '(god) Enki-district' (*kar ^{d} Enki*), the 'new Broad-street district' (*kar sila dagala-ge*), etc. These 'districts' were apparently instituted for the reception of the temple revenues, paid in kind.

11. The Sumero-Akkadians' view regarding their native land.—The idea gained by the study of the inscriptions is that the people of Babylonia (and probably of Assyria also) looked upon their dwelling-place as a holy land. Every state, every foundation, had its deity, and visits to the holy places were meritorious acts.[2] First and foremost, apparently, we have the paradise-city Êridu, the abode of the god Êa—the city whose ideograph was sometimes used, in later times, to express the land of Babylonia in general.[3] Next came the great capital, Bâb-îli (Sum. *Ka-dingira*), 'the gate of God'—probably a folk-etymology brought about by the name *Babila^{m}*, which was possibly (with *Babala^{m}*) the true form. Near Babylon was Gudua (Cutha), the city of the god Nergal, and Dailem, the ancient Delmu, where Uraš (one of the names of En-urta) had his seat. Other foundations were Muru, where the god Muru (Hadad or Rimmon) was worshipped, Qatan, the seat of the god Qatnu, and Lasima, that of the god Lasimu, the swift runner. These similar names of the cities and their patron-gods remind us of Aššur, the old capital of Assyria, the centre of the worship of the national god Asshur, and Nineveh,

[1] See *ExpT* xxvii. 518^{a}. For the legend of Etana see *ERE*, vol. ii. p. 315^{a}, vol. vi. p. 644^{a}.

[1] *PSBA* xxix. [1917] 90 f.
[2] See *ERE*, vol. x. p. 12.
[3] See § 3.

imitated from the Babylonian Nina, the former the city of the goddess Ištar as the goddess of war, and the latter that of Nina, her Babylonian prototype. Greatly favouring the gods, Babylonia was held to be greatly favoured by them—hence, perhaps, the reputation of the land as the district of the whilom Paradise (see § 3).

LITERATURE.—L. W. King, *A Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, and the works mentioned at the end of the art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS. See also artt. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Assyro-Babylonian), FAMILY (Assyro-Babylonian), CONSCIENCE (Babylonian), DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).

T. G. PINCHES.

SUMMUM BONUM.—Modern ethical philosophy has at various times sought its constitutive principle in the will of God, the law of duty, the problem of the origin of the moral sense, the ideas or ideals of perfection, personality, progress, and evolution. For ancient ethics the ultimate reference was to the idea of good.

1. Definitions and early ideas of the good.—In its broadest acceptation 'good' is simply the term of general approval which no developed language lacks. Etymology cannot help us to a closer definition, for the etymology of *ἀγαθός* is not known and cannot be identical with that of *bonus* or of 'good.' The conjectural psychology of primitive man is of no avail, for it is uncertain, and in any case Homer was already far beyond that stage. It is obvious that primitive man did not draw our sharp distinction between moral good and other good or desirable things. There is abundant evidence in and out of Greek literature for the unmoral specification of good to courage in war, high birth, wealth, and other objects of approval or desire.[1] A unifying definition of good will always remain either a more or less plausible generalization from extant literature or an arbitrary deduction from metaphysical first principles. The Platonic *Euthyphro* and *Lysis* may serve as anticipatory illustrations of all such attempts, though the one nominally discusses holiness and the other the primal object of love or friendship (the *φίλον*). The *Euthyphro* leads to the *impasse* of the problem debated by scholasticism: Does God love holiness (or the good) because it is holy, or is it holy because God loves it?[2] The *Lysis* refers all particular loves to the primary love or end which seems to be the good.[3] But what intelligible motive is there for loving the good save as a remedy against evil?[4] Near the end of the dialogue the difficulty is evaded by renaming the good, in anticipation of Stoic terminology, the *οἰκεῖον*, the 'own,' the 'proper' (or, as Emerson sometimes renders it, the 'friendly'), and by calling evil the 'alien.'[5] The association in the *Lysis* of the good with the end or purpose dominates all later discussions and is the basis of most modern definitions from Schopenhauer to Herbert Spencer and William James. It is of course not explicit in pre-philosophic literature.

2. Homer.—In Homer we find the ethical meaning of good already existing side by side with its unmoral or half-moral use in the sense of brave or well-born. This has been and will be denied. But it is the only reasonable interpretation of such passages as Achilles' saying: 'Every good and sensible man loves and cherishes his own bride.'[6] The fact that Homer also speaks of a good meal, and of the menial services which the worse sort render to the good,[1] need not signify more than does our own language about a good dinner or the best citizens. The abstract use of the neuter *ἀγαθόν*, 'a good thing,' is also found in Homer and in Hesiod's *Theogony*.[2]

3. The pre-Socratics.—The philosophic discussion of the good begins with Socrates. But a few passages of the pre-Socratics might be regarded as anticipations. Several fragments of Heraclitus suggest the idea of the relativity of the good eloquently developed by the Platonic *Protagoras*.[3] And Aristotle says that Empedocles' use of the opposites love and hate is equivalent to the doctrine that good and evil are the causes of things.[4] Later philosophy found the beginnings of a classification or scale of goods in the famous scolium:

> 'Health is the best when all is done,
> The gift of beauty is next in worth,
> The third is riches fairly won,
> To be young with comrades is the fourth.'

It is with latent reference to that that Plato affirms with emphasis that not even health takes precedence of the virtue or good of the soul.[5] It may be the highest of popular or so-called goods. It is not the good.

4. Socrates and Xenophon.—The Xenophontic Socrates identifies the good with the useful: 'If you ask me for a good that is good for nothing, I do not know it, nor have I any use for it.'[6] There is no proof that this is a genuine report of distinctive Socratic teaching and no presumption that Xenophon had any ideas on the subject which he did not pick up from Plato.

5. Plato.—Plato's doctrine of the good has been obscured by the unnecessary mystery that has been made of its allegorical elaboration in the imagery of the sun, the divided line, and the cave in the *Republic*.[7] The essential meaning of this allegory is demonstrably quite simple. It is merely the postulate that ethical, political, or social science presupposes the conscious apprehension of some co-ordinating purpose and final test of all endeavour.[8] In the lack of such a vision of the idea of good, the so-called statesman is only an empiric and a rhetorician. The statesmen of Plato's reformed republic must possess this vision and this insight.[9] They can attain it only through the scientific and philosophic education which he prescribes[10] and the practical experience of affairs with which it must be supplemented.[11] Further than this Plato does not wish to define the idea of good[12] except through the implications of the entire moral and social ideal embodied in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.[13]

Plato's is the earliest and most effective presentation of these ideas. But so obvious a thought has of course occurred to many other moralists. Locke[14] uses it to prove that moral rules are not innate or self-evident, since their 'truth . . . plainly depends upon some other antecedent . . . from which they must be deduced.' Höffding[15] expresses it thus: 'Every ethical reasoning has validity only so far as the disputants recognize a definite primordial value which determines all more

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[1] See art. THEOGNIS.
[2] 10 A. [3] 220 B.
[4] *Lysis*, 220 E ff.; cf. T. Gomperz's observation (*Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1901–12, ii. 149) that 'in nearly all philosophies of any vogue the technical terms denoting "the supreme good" were words of negative import.'
[5] 221 E; cf. also *Symp.* 205 E.
[6] *Il.* ix. 341; cf. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, i. 289.

[1] *Od.* xv. 324.
[2] For the further pre-philosophic history of the word and its synonyms see Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, i. 290 ff., and art. THEOGNIS. In this matter, as in all study of Greek philosophy, entire precision is attainable only by thinking in the Greek terms, if need be, transliterated.
[3] *Protag.* 334 A; cf. Heraclitus, frag. 52, 57, 61, in *Heraclitii reliquiæ*, ed. Ingram Bywater, Oxford, 1877.
[4] *Met.* 985 a 8.
[5] *Rep.* 591 C, *Laws*, 661 B, 728 D.
[6] *Mem.* III. viii. 3. [7] 508 A ff., 509 D ff., 514 ff.
[8] See *Rep.* 519 C; and P. Shorey, in *Classical Philology*, Oct. 1914, pp. 351, 366; *Meno*, 91 A, *Euthydem.* 291 B, 291 D E, *Protag.* 318 E with *Rep.* 428 B, *Protag.* 329 D ff., *Gorg.* 455 B with 504 D, 507 D, 503 D E with *Laws*, 635 E.
[9] *Rep.* 504 C, 534 D. [10] *Ib.* 533 A.
[11] *Ib.* 519 B C, 539 E. [12] *Ib.* 506 D E.
[13] *E.g.*, the sketch, or *ὑπογραφή*, of *Rep.* 504 D is the system of the definition of the virtues given in bk. iv.
[14] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. i. ch. iii. § 4.
[15] *Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., New York, 1905, p. 165.

special goods.' In the words of G. Lowes Dickinson:[1] 'For we must live or die; and if we are to choose to do either, we must do so by virtue of some assumption about the Good.' Whether by accident or design, a witty page of G. K. Chesterton's *Heretics*[2] is an admirable statement of Plato's postulate that we must know the good before we can rightly know or do anything else. The conception pervades all Ruskin's preaching.[3]

If these and countless other modern writers still find occasion to dwell upon this elementary truth, there is no presumption that it is too simple to constitute the underlying significance of Plato's allegory. The difficulty is in the prevailing quest for subtler or more mystical interpretations to obtain a hearing for the demonstration that this in fact was Plato's essential meaning. It is then, as we shall see later, mere misapprehension when modern scholars identify the idea of good with God, confuse its plain ethical and political interpretation by the introduction of the metaphysical problems common to all Platonic ideas, or read into its ethical application in the *Republic* all the teleological developments of the *Timæus*.

Apart from this misapprehension, Plato's doctrine of the good is his entire ethical and social philosophy as collected from the minor dialogues, from the discussion of utilitarian hedonism in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Laws*, and from the closer psychological analysis of the same problem in the *Philebus* and the 9th book of the *Republic*, 583 B ff. Throughout the minor dialogues the undefinable good is the test that all tentative definitions of the virtues or exaggerated claims of the sophists fail to pass. The phrasing of *Republic*, 505 B f., is equivalent to a reference to these discussions. The virtue which we are trying to define, the ability of which you boast, must be a good, Socrates urges, and the interlocutor is unable to show that it is always and unconditionally good. The consistency and symmetry of this method point directly to the idea of good in the *Republic* as the symbol of such an absolute good, and to the Platonic guardians' knowledge of it as distinguishing them from the politicians, the sophists, and their pert disciples whom Socrates puts to confusion.

The other approach to the problem of the good is through the hedonistic utilitarian controversy. Is the good pleasure or is it something higher—virtue, knowledge, or communion with God?[4] The Socrates of the *Protagoras* formulates the obvious hedonistic utilitarian argument in a way that leaves nothing for Epicurus and very little for Bentham and Mill to add. The eloquent rejection of this point of view in the *Gorgias* and *Phædo* is an inconsistency only for critics who fail to observe by what nice distinctions Plato's affirmations are guarded or who refuse to interpret the apparent antinomy by the psychology of the *Philebus* and the conclusion of the whole matter in the *Laws*.[5] The measured preponderance of pleasure might arguably be the good if pleasure were really measurable and rightly measured[6] or if what the multitude call pleasures were really pleasant.[7] Plato's final feeling is aptly expressed in the words of Matthew Arnold:

'That joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life inevitably moves, let not the reader . . . confuse his mind by doubting. The real objection is to low and false views of what constitutes happiness. *Pleasure* and *utility* are bad words to employ because they have been so used as to suggest such views.'[8]

Plato did not object to the Greek equivalent of utility, but he did to *ἡδονή*, as Cicero did to *ἡδονή*, *voluptas*. In *Laws*, 733 A, Plato substitutes *χαίρειν*, but to make his meaning clear he, in a sentence which Epicurus might have written,[1] allows *ἡδίων*.[2]

To return to the idea of good, the Socratic censure of Anaxagoras in *Phædo*, 98, is sometimes misunderstood. What Plato plainly says is that a teleological explanation of the universe in terms of the good[3] would most completely satisfy his feeling. He is unable to find or to construct such an explanation[4] and so falls back upon a different thing, the safe and second best method of the ideas—a kind of working logic which renounces both the speculative physical hypotheses of the pre-Socratics[5] and the hope of a teleological interpretation.[6] In spite of this, interpreters persistently identify the doctrine of ideas with the method of teleological deduction from the good. The *Timæus* does attempt such a deduction, but avowedly in the form of poetry and as a probable tale. There is nothing to justify the transference of this line of thought to the idea of good in the *Republic*. Amid the 'demonic hyperboles' of the *Republic* passage, 509 C, there may be phrases that suggest the dependence of the physical universe on the idea of good and the subordination of all other ideas to this *summum genus*.[7] But the main emphasis and purpose of the passage is to stress the ethical and political significance of the idea of good as we have already met it in the minor dialogues. Plato does not say that all other ideas are included in the good as a logical *summum genus*, nor does he say that mathematics and the sciences are to be deduced from the idea of good. He says that, rightly studied, these disciplines will quicken the mind's eye for the apprehension of all abstract truth and so ultimately for that of the idea of good.[8] In other words, the sociologist and the statesman must be prepared for their tasks by the severest scientific and philosophical education which the age affords.

Space fails to show how every significant part of the allegory confirms our simple and rational interpretation.[9] The idea of good is the cause of both existence and knowledge because all human institutions originate in the founder's purpose or idea of good and are, as Coleridge often said, best understood in the light of their purpose—the good they were intended to accomplish. This could be extended to the physical universe by the teleology of the *Timæus* and the *Phædo*.[10] God's idea of good in the *Timæus* is the cause of the world, so far as necessity permitted; and we understand the world best when we apprehend His designs. But the *Republic* is not directly concerned with these applications, and we distort Plato's meanings when we force them into the systematic metaphysical construction from which he abstained.

The comparison of the idea of the good with the sun is of great interest for the study of the history of religion, but need not detain us here.[11] Nor can we delay for the enormous influence of this passage in the history of Neo-Platonism,

1 *The Meaning of Good*, Glasgow, 1901, New York, 1907, p. 189.
2 London, 1905, p. 83.
3 See in particular the preface to *The Crown of Wild Olive*, and in *The Two Paths* the passage beginning: 'If you will tell me what you ultimately intend Bradford to be, perhaps I can tell you what Bradford can ultimately produce' (lect. iii. § 87).
4 *Rep.* 505 B, *Phileb. passim*, *Theæt.* 176.
5 733 *t.*; cf. *Classical Philology*, Oct. 1914, p. 364.
6 *Laws*, 733, 734 A B.
7 Cf. *ἀγενατος* in *Rep.* 576 A, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 b 19; *Rep.* 586 A ff., 583 B.
8 *God and the Bible*, popular ed., New York, 1883, p. 141.

1 734 A; cf. H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 64, 72; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, London and New York, 1910, p. 172.
2 Cf. Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 22, *Class. Phil.* x. 335; Jowett, introd. to his tr. of the *Philebus*; Seneca, *Epist.* lxvii. 15: 'Ego tam honestae rei ac severae numquam molle nomen imponam.'
3 98 B. 4 99 C. 5 96 A B.
6 100 C. 7 509 B, 517 B, 532 A.
8 511 C, 534 C, 520 C, 521 D, 525 C, 527 A, 529 B.
9 Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 225 ff.
10 97 D E; cf. also the Platonizing passage in Aristotle, *de Cœlo*, 288 a, 1–10.
11 Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 223 *f.*; A. C. Pearson on Soph. frag. 752.

mysticism, and superstition. In Apuleius 'Platonis τὸ ἀγαθόν' actually occurs in a context which might cause it to be mistaken for one of a list of demons.[1]

6. The idea of good and God.—The identification of the idea of the good with God could do no harm if taken merely as religious poetry. The goodness of God is His chief attribute both as a negative criterion in the theological canons of the *Republic*[2]—so the Stoics held that God was the cause of good only, never of evil—and positively in the teleology of the *Timæus*. Plato is perhaps not unwilling to hint at the identification in such passages as *Rep.* 508 C and 517 B. God and the idea of good are both expressions of the highest ethical ideal, and the language which Plato used of both is, as Emerson and Arnold would put it, an ejaculation 'thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.'[3] As Epictetus says,

'God is beneficent, but the good also is beneficent. It is natural therefore that the true nature of the good should be in the same region as the true nature of God.'[4]

But in fact the two terms and the two ideas came to Plato in different trains of thought and as symbols of distinct traditions, and they cannot be identified without wresting the Platonic texts from the plain purport of their contexts and attributing to him a system of metaphysics which he did not care to construct.[5] By the same methods of interpretation one could identify God and the idea of good in the philosophy of Jesus with the aid of Mt 19[17], Mk 10[18], Lk 18[19].

7. The minor Socratics.—We shall make only brief reference to the so-called minor Socratics. The fundamental theory of the Cyrenaic hedonism differed little from that of Epicurus and of the Socrates of the Platonic *Protagoras*, though special points of distinction were laboured in the schools.[6] The alleged doctrine of Aristippus, that only the pleasure of the present moment counts, perhaps because 'the next may never come,' is a temperamental attitude rather than a philosophy. This attitude was illustrated by many anecdotes, and strongly appealed to Horace.[7] Walter Pater's *Renaissance* and the chapter on the 'New Cyrenaicism' in *Marius the Epicurean* commend the Cyrenaic *summum bonum* to an æsthetic generation in the form: 'Be perfect in regard to what is here and now.' 'Burn always with this hard, gem-like flame.'

Cynicism is only a cruder, harsher anticipatory form of Stoicism. Antisthenes is said to have affirmed toil and hardship (*πόνος*) to be the good and to have prayed, 'Let me be mad rather than feel pleasure.'[8]

We do not know enough about the 'Megarians' to interpret Euclides' pronouncement that the one is good,[9] though Gomperz[10] undertakes to interpret it.

8. Aristotle.—The first sentence of Aristotle's *Ethics* and the first sentence of the *Politics* repeat as a truism the main thought that emerges from the Platonic quest for the good. Aristotle recognizes that the problem of ethical theory is to ascertain and define the nature of this good that all action and choice presuppose. As he proceeds, Aristotle seems to repudiate the debt to his teacher, to which every page of the *Ethics* testifies, by his insistence on metaphysical objections to the theory of ideas in general and so to the idea of good in particular.[11] The polemic has of course no relevance to the ethical problem. And, when Aristotle contemptuously asks,[1] 'How would a weaver or a carpenter be profited by knowing the absolute idea of good?', he forgets that he himself has just borrowed the Platonic imagery of the unifying *σκοπός*, or aim, to prove that a generalized conception of the good will be practically helpful.[2] As Sir Thomas Browne aptly puts it,

'Aristotle, whilst he labours to refute the ideas of Plato, falls upon one himself: for his *summum bonum* is a chimæra, and there is no such thing as his felicity.'[3]

Aristotle himself admits that the synonym happiness, *εὐδαιμονία*, which he substitutes for the good, is only a blank cheque.[4] Happiness is of course, as Plato said before him and Pope after, 'our being's end and aim.'[5] Cicero, while repudiating pleasure, assumed happiness to be the end as a matter of course,[6] and Leslie Stephen says:

'Good means everything which favors happiness . . . nor can any other intelligible meaning be assigned to the words.'[7]

It depends upon your conception of happiness or your definition of pleasure whether, with Epicurus, Bentham, and Herbert Spencer, you add pleasure as a third synonym or with Plato, Cicero, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Macaulay, Arnold, and Jowett, protest that to do so is either to confuse the right use of language or to suggest a false ideal of happiness. The definition of happiness with which Aristotle fills out the blank cheque is a somewhat lame and impotent conclusion of so elaborate a discussion. What hinders us, he asks, from pronouncing happy the man who energizes in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not through any chance time, but for a complete life?[8] Later philosophers interpreted the Aristotelian definition of happiness as a trimming compromise between Epicurean hedonism and the severe idealism of Plato's *Gorgias* and the Stoics. Cicero sometimes argues that in theory there can be no adequate sanction for virtue except on the Stoic principle that nothing else is a good.[9] Sometimes he affirms that in practice the Peripatetics, who recognize external goods, give no larger place to them in their own lives than do the Stoics, who evade this concession by a change of terminology and denominate what the rest of mankind call goods not goods, but 'preferred.'[10] Otherwise Aristotle's contribution to our topic is slight. He is not deeply interested in the fundamental problem.[11] He reviews the hedonistic controversy, in substance concurring with Plato, but unable to refrain from a tone of condescending superiority to Plato's pursuit of edification.[12] The poetical allegory of the idea of the good in the *Republic* would of course be unsympathetic if not incomprehensible to him. But the statement of an eminent scholar, that he never alludes to it, overlooks the fact that Plato's distinction there between the method of pure dialectic and that of the sciences[13] is one of Aristotle's fundamental ideas recurring throughout his writings.

In the end Aristotelianism, in this matter as in others, comes back to an extreme form of the Platonism which it begins by repudiating. In Neo-Platonic interpretation and in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the desire by which the Aristotelian first mover moves the heavens is the yearning of all creation towards him as the supreme good. This interpretation, supported by one metaphor and two or three ambigu-

1 *Apol.* xxvii. 2 379 C.
3 *God and the Bible*, p. 22; cf. *Rep.* 505 E: *ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι.*
4 *Discourses*, 281.
5 Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 188 f., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17.
6 Diog. Laert. ii. 88 f.; Cic. *de Fin.* i. 11; Gomperz, ii. 215.
7 *Sat.* II. iii. 100 ff., *Ep.* I. i. 18, xvii. 14, 23.
8 Diog. Laert. vi. 104. 9 *Ib.* ii. 106; Cic. *Acad.* i. 42.
10 ii. 173–175. 11 *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 11 ff.

1 *Eth. Nic.* 1097 a 8.
2 *Ib.* 1094 a 24; cf. Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 102.
3 *Religio Medici*, pt. ii. § 15.
4 *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 22. 5 Cf. *Sym.* 205 A.
6 *De Fin.* ii. 27.
7 *The Science of Ethics*, London, 1882, p. 42.
8 *Eth. Nic.* 1101 a 14.
9 *De Fin.* ii. 18 f., iii. 11, v. 26–28, *Tusc.* v. 8, 15.
10 *De Fin.* iv. 26.
11 See art. PHILOSOPHY (Greek).
12 *Eth. Nic.* 1172 a 30–35. 13 *Rep.* 510.

ous verbs in the Aristotelian text, was blended with the poetical doctrine of Platonic love as the aspiration for ultimate beauty[1] identical with ultimate good. But this theme would demand a volume.

9. The post-Aristotelian schools.—The *summum bonum* was one of the two or three chief topics of debate in the post-Aristotelian schools.[2] Cicero tells an amusing story of a Roman pro-consul who proposed to convene a world's congress of philosophers and settle the question once for all.[3]

Locke[4] argues from the diversity of human tastes that 'the philosophers of old did in vain inquire whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation.' Locke's argument has been used against the utilitarian reference of all things to 'happiness' or pleasure by Coleridge, Hazlitt, Macaulay, and many others. But, as Mill[5] says, the question concerning the summum bonum is the same thing as that concerning the foundation of morality. And it is idle to expect men to cease discussing that. Horace, *e.g.*, was no metaphysician. He is interested only in

'quod magis ad nos
pertinet, et nescire malum est,'[6]

and he sums up this necessary knowledge in the three problems: (1) 'Divitiis homines, an sint virtute beati,' which was the ordinary man's conception of the difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic good; (2) 'Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos,' the compatibility of disinterested friendship with Epicurean principles — a question much debated between the Epicureans and their opponents;[7] (3) 'Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid ejus.'

Locke's impatience of the problem is perhaps a survival of Renaissance distaste for the scholasticism of the mediæval literature *de bonitate pura* as seen in Albert's report of the treatise of al-Farabi.

The title of Cicero's *de Finibus* exhibits the continued association of the 'good' with the 'end,'[8] and Cicero resumes for all practical purposes the net outcome and the influence on modern literature of the post-Aristotelian discussion of the *summum bonum*.[9]

10. The Epicureans.—The Epicureans revived the thesis of Plato's *Protagoras* and insisted that pleasure 'rightly understood' is the only conceivable end for a sentient creature.[10] They then, like modern utilitarians, devoted themselves to the revaluation or the restatement in their terminology of all ethical values—what the Epicurean in Cicero[11] styles 'ad eam accommodare Torquatos nostros,' 'fit our examples of Roman virtue into the theory.' They also, like their modern analogues, complained bitterly of the critics who had misunderstood their meaning.[12] These tactics irritate Cicero, who thinks that he knows the meaning of the Greek ἡδονή, a perfect synonym of the Latin *voluptas*.[13] The Epicurean *summum bonum* may be discussed in a corner. No one would dare proclaim it to a large audience.[14] And the heroic deeds of Greek and still more of Roman worthies who gave their lives for their country[15] are sufficient proof that 'the quadruped opinion will not prevail.'[16]

11. The Stoics. — The Stoic doctrine is more sympathetic to the moralist and the orator and has the further interest of a strictly deduced and ingeniously elaborated scientific system.[17] In essence it is the old paradox of the Socrates of the *Gorgias*, that nothing is really good except the good moral will. All other so-called values are either non-existent or insignificant when weighed against this. 'Sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,' says Cicero in *Lucullus*, 44, and in the *Tusculans*, v. 12, he takes for the text of the entire doctrine a single sentence of Plato's *Menexenus*.[1]

In the refutation of Epicurean hedonism and the working out of the system the supreme end was variously defined and deduced, and the schools and sects of philosophy were minutely classified by the various 'ends' or principles of the supreme good which they adopted.[2] The demonstration that pleasure is not the end and the detailed deduction of Stoic ethical principles could take their start from the idea of nature and the life accordant with nature[3] or from the abbreviated formula, the consistent life.[4] The argument from nature, as set forth in Cicero,[5] presents startling analogies both with the 17th and 18th cent. philosophy of 'self-love' and with the modern logic of evolution. Pleasure is not the end, because it is not in fact the beginning, of animal or human activity.[6] The earliest and fundamental *conatus* of all sentient life is not towards pleasure as such, but towards self-preservation.[7] The pleasure is, so to speak, a by-product.[8] Upon this supervenes in the rational animal man the recognition that the true self, the higher self, is the spiritual and moral self. The conservation of this self then becomes the end. And it matters little in practice whether all other ends are annihilated or merely dwindle to insignificance in comparison with this.[9] Thus Cicero sometimes treats the entire suppression of the animal or lower self as a fallacy of Stoic paradox[10] and sometimes as a rebuke of Peripatetic compromise and as an indispensable condition of absolute and disinterested virtue.

12. The sceptics.—The various schools of sceptics impartially assailed all dogmatic systems. But they did not for that reason admit that they lacked a moral ideal or the conception of the supreme practical end. Their scepticism was a means to the end of tranquillity or imperturbability of soul and the guidance of life by reasonable probability.

13. Developments of Platonism: the ascetic ideal.—In the Græco-Roman empire the eclectic literature of moral and religious edification reproduces all these points of view and ideas, but retains little interest in the dialectic of the schools and the philosophic theory of ethics. The cumulative influence of Platonism reveals itself not only in the softening and refinement of Stoic technicality and paradox, but also in the increasing prominence of another ideal, if not idea, of good—the ideal of detachment from the world and the flesh and approximation to God through the lonely purity of a spiritual and contemplative life. Plato's *Phædo* and the eloquent digression of the *Theætetus* are the earliest explicit Greek expression of this ideal. It is a human mood or temperament of renunciation and reaction. The opposition of the theoretic and the practical life was debated in the *Antiope* of Euripides.[11] And recent conjecture attributes to Pythagoras the three types of life associated with the tripartite psychology of Plato's *Republic* and employed as an ethical commonplace in the beginning of Aristotle's *Ethics*.[12] Thenceforth philosophy was the way of life, and the *summum bonum* was the happiness embodied in or to be attained by the wise man.[13] The latent and still unresolved contradiction between the social conception of virtue and this personal ideal of salvation and happiness is apparent already in Plato and Aristotle. The artist Plato paints the two companion pictures of the Socrates of the

1 Cf. Emerson, *Nature*, ch. ii.: 'God is the all-fair.'
2 Cic. *Lucullus*, 9, 42 f. 3 *De Leg.* i. 20.
4 *Human Understanding*, bk. ii. ch. xxi. § 55.
5 *Dissertations and Discussions*, New York, 1882, iii. 300.
6 *Sat.* II. vi. 71 ff.
7 Cic. *de Fin.* i. 20, ii. 26. 8 *Ib.* i. 4, 9.
9 The fragmentary Greek texts are most conveniently consulted in Usener's *Epicurea*, and von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1903–05. The more significant of these texts are correctly translated in R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*.
10 Epicurus in Hicks, p. 171. 11 *De Fin.* i. 10.
12 See, *e.g.*, Epicurus in Hicks, p. 172; Usener, pp. 64, 88; Cicero, *de Fin.* i. 11, ii. 7.
13 *De Fin.* ii. 4, 33; cf. i. 5.
14 *Ib.* ii. 22–24, iv. 9, v. 22. 15 *Ib.* i. 7, ii. 19, 35.
16 Emerson, 'Montaigne, or The Skeptic,' in *Representative Men*. Emerson, like Cicero, is thinking of the close of the *Philebus* or of *Republic*, 586 A; cf. *Acad.* i. 2; *de Fin.* i. 21, ii. 33: 'bestiis . . quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis.'
17 *De Fin* iii. 8, 22, v. 28.

1 239 E.
2 Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 11; cf. *Lucullus*, 42, *de Fin.* v. 7, *Tusc.* v. 30.
3 *De Fin.* iii. 9, iv. 11.
4 Von Arnim, i. 45; Diog. Laert. vii. 89.
5 *De Fin.* v. 11, 13. 6 *Ib.* i. 16, ii. 11, iii. 5.
7 *Ib.* iii. 5, iv. 7, v. 9.
8 Diog. Laert. vii. 94: ἐπιγεννήματα; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1174 b 32: ὡς ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος.
9 *De Fin.* iv. 12, v. 24, 30, *Tusc.* v. 17.
10 *De Fin.* iv. 11, 14 f.
11 Reconstructed from the quotations in Plato's *Gorgias*, 485 E ff.
12 1095 B 15.
13 Cf. in von Arnim, iii. 146–71, the collections 'de sapiente et insipiente.'

Symposium and the Socrates of the *Phædo* and leaves their reconciliation to the ingenuity of modern interpretation. Will the sage take part in politics? To this question of the later schools the idealist Plato answers: 'Only in the politics of his own city, the city of God.'[1] But Plato's practical decision appears in the prescription of the *Republic* that the philosopher must descend into the cave to help his fellowman,[2] in his journeys to the court of Syracuse, and in his devotion of the last years of his life to the laborious composition of the *Laws*.

In Aristotle the contradiction is disguised, but pervades the entire *Ethics*. Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue,[3] but it finally appears that there are intellectual as well as moral virtues,[4] and the highest activity is the pure contemplation of thought which the student may enjoy interruptedly and God eternally.[5] The life in accordance with ethical virtue is secondary.[6] The Stoic sage is distinguished from the Cyrenaic and Epicurean in Horace[7] by his immersion in political activities.

Chrysippus said that Aristotle's theoretic life was only a form of hedonism.[8] The literature of Stoicism harps on the word *κοινωνικός*, as the literature of to-day on the words 'social' and 'socialized.' And many modern critics have taken the Stoics at their own estimate and praised Stoicism on this score as against Platonism. But Cicero points out that in fact the Academy and the Lyceum were the chief schools of oratory and political science. And Seneca says epigrammatically:

'Quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, at nemo non misit.'[9]

14. **Neo-Platonism.**—The divorce between culture and life in the declining period of the Græco-Roman empire confirmed these tendencies, and Neo-Platonism, the predominant philosophy of the last three centuries, constructed its system and its ideal out of the eloquent passages of the *Phædo*, the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Theætetus* that preach purification from sin or sensualism, flight from the world, concentration of the mind upon itself, and assimilation of the human to the divine as the way of salvation and of good.[1] These conceptions were blended with the doctrine, derived from the Platonic *Symposium* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, of the upward striving and aspiration of all creatures towards the primal source of the good and the beautiful, God.

It is not a practicable final philosophy of the supreme human good for any race of men in whom the will to live persists. It is only the beautiful legacy which the dying philosophy of Greece bequeathed to the idealism and the religious poetry of the world:

> 'If, in the silent mind of One all-pure,
> At first imagined lay
> The sacred world;
> . . . . . .
> O waking on a world which thus-wise springs!
> . . . O waking on life's stream!
> By lonely pureness to the all-pure fount
> (Only by this thou canst) the colour'd dream
> Of life remount!'[2]

With this poetic interpretation of Matthew Arnold we may compare the last words of Plotinus' *Enneades*, *φυγή*, with Plato, *Theæt.* 176 B, *φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*, and with the closing words of Emerson's last essay, 'Illusions,' in his *Conduct of Life*: 'They alone with him alone.' But the final good of Plato and of Greece in her prime is rather that of Tennyson's *Ancient Sage*:

> 'Let be thy wail
> And help thy fellow men.'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

PAUL SHOREY

SUN, MOON, AND STARS.

Introductory (F. VON OEFELE), p. 48.
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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introduction).—In every quarter of the globe the star-studded heavens have attracted the attention and challenged the scrutiny of mankind. Very especially was this the case in the low-lying plain of Babylonia, with its pellucid atmosphere, and hence the study of astrology and astronomy, while practically universal, reached a remarkably high stage of development in that region. On the one hand, the fixed stars, of various degrees of brilliance, are ranged immovably in groups that stamp themselves upon the visual organs; while, on the other, the moon, the sun, and the five visible planets seem to be constantly changing their respective positions. Such phenomena were interpreted by primitive man in a subjective and anthropomorphic fashion, and his notions regarding them were still in vogue when genuine scientific inquiry entered the field, so that until about 1500 A.D. astrology and astronomy remained an inextricable mass of confusion.

1. **The seven planets.**—In the northern regions of the Old World every object was regarded by the primitive mind not merely as personal, but also as sexual. In the north-east the twin concepts of *Yang* and *Yin* long survived amongst the Chinese as a philosophical formula, classifying all existing things as male (= good) or female (= evil). Persian dualism retains the twofold principle in its most incisive form. In the Middle Ages, Christian ideas were for a time excessively influenced by the antithesis of God and Satan, though here the sexual dichotomy characteristic of the primitive mind has disappeared.

Now this tendency of the aboriginal mind towards sexual personification left some of its earliest deposits upon the observation and study of the stars. Even the simplest observations of the planetary movements brought to light the striking fact that

[1] *Rep.* 592 A B.
[2] *Ib.* 529 E, 519 B. The ingenious suggestion that this is the Orphic *κατάβασις* exemplifies again the danger of over-stressing Plato's imagery as against his meanings.
[3] 1102 a 5 ff.
[4] 1103 a 5, *Ethics*, bk. vi.; Plato, *Rep.* 518 D E.
[5] 1177 a 12, 1178 b, *de Cœlo*, 292 a 22.
[6] 1178 a 9.
[7] *Ep.* i. 1. 16 *f.* [8] Hicks, p. 54.
[9] *De Tranquillitate Animi*, i. 7.

[1] On this aspect of Plato's own philosophy cf. E. Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, p. 440 ff., and O. Apelt, *Platonische Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 147 ff., 'Der Wert des Lebens.'
[2] Matthew Arnold, 'In Utrumque Paratus' (*Poems*, ed. London, 1881, i. 70).

the elongations of the two inferior planets, Mercury and Venus, never reached beyond a certain limit, and that these bodies traversed the zodiac as if held within the magic circle of the sun. The moon and the three superior planets were less restricted in their motions. It was therefore quite in keeping with the imaginative and symbolizing proclivity of the primitive intellect to represent the Sun, Mercury, and Venus as a family, travelling, in relatively close company, like nomads in the ecliptic. Of this family the Sun came to be regarded as the father, Venus as the mother, and Mercury as their son. The other planets were looked upon as mere vagrant males, who on occasion, however, might act as a disturbing influence in the union of the Sun and Venus.

In speculations of a still earlier period it was the sun and moon alone that formed the marriage relationship, the sun being usually the husband and the moon the wife; only in exceptional cases were the positions reversed. Occasionally, too, the relations between sun and moon were represented as homosexual and pederastic. But in the ancient Orient and in Egypt the septet of planets had already attained to such prominence in comparison with the two greater luminaries that the idea of a marriage between sun and moon hardly left a trace behind.

Even in the most remote ages the periods of revolution peculiar to the several planets had been studied, with results which led to their being arranged in the following sequence (with the earth, of course, at the centre of the universe)—Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. The sun's superiority in size was enough of itself to give him the median position. The planets named before the sun alternated as morning and evening stars, or in other ways; and of the twofold characteristic thus exhibited one aspect might be regarded as good and the other as evil. The three last-named, or exterior, planets formed a triad by themselves, and they appeared to the observer as less under the control of the sun than his own family or the moon. The middle place amongst them was occupied by Jupiter, who might thus be deemed their king; and the king as such, according to Oriental ideas, was good. But as the sun, the giver of life and light, was likewise good, it followed that Mars and Saturn must be evil—by the principle of alternation, namely, which is even yet resorted to, as, *e.g.*, in the counting of one's coat-buttons, in ideas about even and odd, and in other primitive superstitions. Mars with his relatively short period of revolution became the youthful turbulent demon, while the slowly-revolving Saturn was figured as the hoary-headed begetter of evil.

Not only, however, do men look upwards towards the planets, but the planets themselves look downwards upon men and events on the earth. They were even supposed to impress their own characters upon earthly affairs, intervening therein as their nature prompted. In the case of the sun and the moon such action was obvious to all, and by analogy it was attributed to the other five planets as well. These ideas were so simple and natural that, at the time when, in the oldest civilized lands, such as Babylonia and Egypt, the earliest scientific observations and records of the planetary motions were collected, they had permeated all study of the subject. The consequence was that these naive ideas continued to mingle with the subsequent results of genuine astronomical inquiry.

Aboriginal man came upon a fresh vein of ideas when he divined a mutual connexion between the lustre of the stars and that of the metals. The metals with which he was acquainted being precisely seven in number, it was natural to associate with them, not the fixed stars, but the seven planets. The parallels were as follows: the Sun with gold, the Moon with silver, Mars with iron, Mercury with quicksilver, Jupiter with tin, Venus with copper, and Saturn with lead. Hence in mediæval, and even until modern, times, the metals were indicated by the planetary symbols. Then alchemy attached special symbols to other substances; and as alchemy and astrology were intimately connected with each other throughout their entire course, it may be well to give a list of the symbols used by alchemists in the Middle Ages:—

☉ gold, ☾ silver, ♂ iron, ☿ quicksilver, ♃ tin, ♀ copper, ♄ lead, ♁ antimony, ♆ lime, ♎ sulphur, ♇ tartar, ⊖ salt, ⊕ saltpetre, ⊕ sulphuric acid, ✻ ammonia, ⌢ distillate and sublimate, ⌣ precipitate. As will be shown in dealing with the horoscope, the symbols of the four traditional elements were derived from the two 'houses' known as *ὑπόγειον* and *μεσουράνημα* respectively.

We have thus sketched the main lines of thought by which the planets came to have their particular significance in astrological speculation. More remote considerations must here be left aside. Suffice it to say that, in the final scheme of astrology, Mercury became the lord of wisdom, cunning, artifice, and craft, and was likewise bi-sexual; Venus became the lady of love; Mars, the lord of war and violence generally; Jupiter, the ruler of gods and men; Saturn, the lord of cruelty and truculence. The Sun, Jupiter, and Saturn were propitious by day, and the Moon, Mars, and Venus by night. The planets infected with their own qualities such as were born under their influence, but in certain situations their normal action might be completely reversed.

2. The ecliptic and the zodiac.—Civilized man is still affected by the variation of times and seasons, and in a yet higher degree this was the case with primitive man. The latter could hardly remain inattentive to changes of temperature and weather in their connexion with day and night, or with summer and winter, or, again, with the varying position of the sun in the sky. In his ingathering of marine products for daily food and his cruising expeditions off the coast he became aware of the connexion between the ebb and flow of the sea and the course of the moon. His interest in the chase and his sexual relations obliged him to take notice of the fluctuating brightness of the moon by night. He noted that the period of menstruation coincided with that of a lunar revolution. In the life of primitive man, accordingly, there was no concern of importance but was somehow related to the movements of the sun or the moon. As soon, however, as the planets came to be regarded as endowed with personality, the interventions of sun and moon in human affairs began to be thought of as the conscious and voluntary actions of higher beings, whose purpose it was to bring the fortunes of nations, monarchs, and individual human beings into continuous correlation with their own particular activities in the higher sphere.

The planets Venus and Mercury, being represented as respectively the wife and the son of the sun, must inevitably, according to human notions, exert an influence upon the actions of the being personified as husband and father. But, this being so, it was impossible to leave Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn out of account. Now these five smaller planets, equally with the larger two, confined their movements to a certain narrow belt of the firmament. The only difference between the circular paths of the sun and the moon and the

paths of the smaller planets is that the latter exhibit certain peculiar convolutions, which were called epicycles, and may be illustrated by a curved line as follows: . The orbits of the sun and the moon, no doubt, also showed many deviations from the path of simple revolution about the observer's own point of view. But the only change which a dweller upon the earth could discern in the smaller planets was the shifting of their several positions among the fixed stars, and their concomitant variations in apparent magnitude. Investigation of these planets, therefore, did not reach beyond investigation of their paths in the firmament.

After sunset about one-half of all the stars are visible. The great mass of these lie in the broad equatorial girdle of the heavens between the sun and a point 180° E. of the sun. The lines bounding the stars of the circumpolar vault and those of the southern hemisphere are not constant, but fluctuate inversely. The stars, however, that come into consideration in regard to the planetary orbits travel from east to west, passing below the horizon one after another, so that just before sunrise the other half of the stars, *i.e.* those lying between the sun and 180° W., are within the field of view. Thus, an examination of the sky made twice in one night, viz. shortly after sunset and shortly before sunrise, will embrace practically every important phenomenon in the starry heavens. These accordingly were the two times of astronomical observation to which prime importance was ascribed throughout antiquity, and into relation with which all observations were brought.

In the course of one night, then, primitive man could see almost all the stars visible in our latitude. One of the few exceptions was formed by the stars which happened to be situated in the sun's meridian for the time being. Their light was lost in the sun's beams, and they were meanwhile invisible. After sunset and before sunrise, moreover, there was a short period of twilight, causing a degree of obscuration such that brighter stars remained visible only when they were over 12°, and fainter stars only when over 15°, E. or W. of the sun. In virtue of the sun's movement in the zodiac, the observer of the morning and the evening sky might witness the following phenomenon. On a particular evening of the year a star, especially one situated in the zodiacal belt, would be visible for a few minutes after sunset, and on the following evening be seen no more. Now, such a star remained invisible for a certain time every year, and the astrologer spoke of it as being 'combust,' *i.e.* dissolved in the overpowering beams of the sun. Then, after a period of 24 to 30 days, according to its brilliance, the same star reappeared shortly before sunrise. The star's disappearance from the evening sky in the west was termed its heliacal setting, and its reappearance in the morning sky to the east its heliacal rising.

In the astrology and astronomy of both East and West throughout the entire ancient era the heliacal rising of various groups of stars was carefully noted, and employed in registering the date of events. So far, the earliest known instance of this, found more than once in historical records, is the heliacal rising of Sirius, the of the Egyptians, which was pronounced Σῶθις, and translated τὸ ἄστρον τὸ τῆς Ἴσιος, by the Greeks. By this means, long before the building of the pyramids, was indicated the beginning of the sidereal year, as well as a particular era of about 1500 years, at the end of which the first day of the sidereal year coincided with that of the tropical year. Half-way through the period of invisibility the star and the sun lie in the same meridian. The corresponding proximity of a star to any of the planets but the sun is called a conjunction, and every conjunction was astrologically of great importance. But when the sun is one of the coincident pair, the occurrence is known as the cosmical rising of the star in question. It is to this cosmical rising, not as in ancient times to the heliacal rising, that special prominence is attached by modern scientific astronomy.

The Egyptian sacred year was subsequently adopted by the Romans as the Julian year, with the intercalation of a day in every fourth year. This computation allowed for the fact that the sun seems to move forward some $\frac{1}{1461}$ of his orbit every day. This might have suggested a division of the ecliptic into 365 parts, only a trifling error being thus involved. What was actually done, however, was to divide the great circle into 360 parts, involving a still larger error of adjustment. The calculation of the yearly period and its division into twelve months—of which we shall treat more fully below—together with many other things, were thereby greatly simplified. But the sun's orbit of 360 degrees, with a day for each degree, left some 5¼ days of every year out of account. Now we still speak of a summer solstice and a winter solstice, meaning thereby the two points at which the sun reaches his greatest declination north and south respectively. Originally, however, the residual 5¼ days were divided between the two solstices, the sun being actually represented as pausing in his declination, so that he could still traverse the 360 degrees of the ecliptic in 360 days. In the ancient Egyptian calendar this whole redundant period was transferred to the time just anterior to the heliacal rising of Sirius, five days being inserted in ordinary, and six in leap (or temple) years. In the early Roman calendar the intercalation was made at the winter solstice. To the Babylonian calendar, which, with a displacement of the year's beginning, is still in use as the Jewish calendar, we must return when we deal with lunar computations. Be it noted here, however, that for astrological and astronomical purposes the Babylonians placed the compensatory interval for the most part at the beginning of spring, but sometimes at the beginning of autumn.

The time at which this yearly intercalation was made was dependent in the main upon the fixing of the zero meridian in the movable vault of heaven. The points through which this zero line might be conveniently drawn were, of course, many. Once it was fixed, astronomy and calendar were brought into harmony, and a definite instant established for commencing the day. The Babylonians began the day with sunrise, and the year with the spring equinox, thus placing the zero of the ecliptic upon the first point of Aries. Among the Jews the day began with sunset, and the civil year with the autumn equinox; and, had the Jews studied astronomy independently, they would have drawn the zero of the ecliptic through Libra. In the early Roman, as in our modern, calendar the day is reckoned from midnight, and the year from the winter solstice; here, therefore, the zero would lie in the first point of Capricornus. The Romans, however, as classical writers inform us, borrowed their astronomy and astrology from Babylonia, and accordingly it is the Babylonian zero point that is found among the Romans, as also in later developments, and even in the astronomy of the present day. The Egyptians dated their year from the rise of the Nile on the 19th of July, and the corresponding zero meridian passed through Sirius. With this, however, the beginning of the day did not harmonize, for, according to notices found in the Mantelpaviane and other hieroglyphic texts,

the Egyptian day was reckoned from sunrise. This dislocation likewise is probably due to Babylonian influence of a very remote date.

We have seen that the ecliptic, and indeed the circle generally, was divided into 360 degrees, to correspond approximately with the sun's daily change of position among the stars throughout one year. These divisions, however, were found inconveniently small, and the ecliptic was then portioned out into constellations, each having an arc of 30 degrees, and three subdivisions of 10 degrees, or decanates. This division came about in two ways. In the first place, at any given time something like one-twelfth of the ecliptic was 'combust'; and, secondly, each of these twelfths was traversed by the sun in about the same time as the moon required for one complete revolution. In this way the annual course of the sun was furnished with the 12 zodiacal signs of the ecliptic. Moreover, in the earliest times the synodical period of the moon was divided into three, viz. waxing, dominant, and waning moon, and this division was adhered to by later astrology. Now to each of these synodical thirds of the moon's course corresponded a movement of the sun extending to some 10 degrees, and thus in time arose the division of the ecliptic into 36 decanates.

The trisection of the moon's period just noted probably led in very remote times to the institution of weeks of ten and five days. It does not appear, however, from what we have so far learned of ancient Eastern history, that these measurements had any practical significance. It was only in astrology and astro-mythology, with its historical legends, that the 36 decanates (or the 72 semi-decanates) were actually made use of. This chronometry, no less than that explained above, was in vogue throughout Babylonia and Egypt, if not elsewhere. A final vestige thereof was the Egyptian practice of assigning 401 *ushabti* for the dead—365 for the days of the year and 36 as guardians for the ten-day weeks. In astrology of the higher type, to the time of Kepler, calculations were made by means of the degree and, above all, of the decanate; and the moon from her tenth to her twentieth day was always spoken of as being in her domain. In general, however, the method of reckoning which superseded all others, for both astronomical observation and astrological interpretation, was that of the well-known 12 zodiacal signs, although these were variously designated in the several civilized lands of antiquity. It likewise forms the foundation of the Babylonian scheme of months, as appears from the following parallelism: Libra, *tašritu* (Bab.), Tishri (Heb.), followed by Scorpio, *araḫ-samna* (Bab.), Marcheshvan (Heb.); then Sagittarius, *kislimu* (Bab.), Kislev (Heb.), etc. The names of the months were also indicative of their meteorological conditions; thus, *e.g.*, the winter rainy season was symbolized by Capricornus (originally the marine animal *Hippocampus guttulatus*), Aquarius, and Pisces, all in some way connected with water.

Here, moreover, we again meet with the practice of portioning out good and evil, or rather male and female, alternately. Astrologically the zero point of this distribution lay between Cancer and Leo, approximating, therefore, to that of the Egyptian Sirius-year. Leo, Libra, and Sagittarius came to be regarded as male; Virgo, Scorpio, and Capricornus as female. It is worthy of remark that as a result of this law of alternation the astrologer was actually forced for thousands of years to speak of Taurus as feminine. Then the constellations of the zodiac were also allotted severally to the planets; thus Cancer was assigned to the moon, Leo to the sun, Gemini and Virgo to Mercury, Taurus and Libra to Venus, Aries and Scorpio to Mars, Sagittarius and Pisces to Jupiter, and Capricornus and Aquarius to Saturn. The particular planet was called the 'lord of the mansion' belonging to its respective sign or signs. Tradition tells us, however, that there were other 'gods (or lords) of the mansion.' Those of the Egyptians have been transmitted to us not only by the reports of Marcus Manilius, but also by an almanac notice found in the Ebers Papyrus; some of their names likewise survive in the Coptic designations of the months. A comparison of the various lists shows us that in the course of thousands of years the tradition remained unaltered, though in that of Manilius there is a dislocation to the extent of one zodiacal sign.

The ecliptic of the sun is traversed approximately also by the moon, and in relation to the latter it was measured by a unit of the sun's course, viz. the arc described by the moon in one day. In order to correspond, therefore, with the moon's period of 28 days, the ecliptic was divided afresh into 28 lunar stations. But as the sun, during the moon's sidereal period, has moved onward by about two lunar stations, astrological calculation assumed a period of about 30 lunar stations, *i.e.* the time between one new moon and another, as the measure of a month. In order to delimit these stations, however, the astrologer did not portion out the ecliptic in a fresh series of constellations, but distinguished each of the 28 by a dominant star in the ecliptic. In contradistinction to the older method of dividing the 30 days of the moon's synodical period in three, there arose subsequently the plan of dividing its sidereal period in four. Once in each of these quarters each of the seven planets was recognized as the lord of a lunar station, the order of sequence being the same as that in which, in the horoscope of the hours, the planets became lords of the ascendant at sunrise.[1] Thus came about the division of the sidereal month of 28 days into four weeks of 7 days, with Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn as successive lords of the lunar stations in each week. This astrological scheme of naming the days of the week after the rulers of the lunar stations still survives throughout Christendom, while, on the other hand, the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments entirely avoid the use of such designations, distinguishing the days of the week by ordinal numbers alone.

The various locations of the five smaller planets were usually designated by the 12 zodiacal signs into which the sun's path is divided, as is specially shown in regard to Egypt by the Berlin Demotic Papyrus, p. 8279.

3. Spherical astronomy and the astrological houses. — Observations of the astral motions within the scope of natural vision are designated spherical, and when these have been duly adjusted they are, by way of contrast, called cosmical, while the actual occurrences themselves are spoken of as sidereal. Modern scientific astronomy likewise must always take the direct spherical observations as its starting-point, only then proceeding to elaborate its way towards the higher levels of knowledge. The astrology and astronomy of the ancient world never got beyond the spherical stage. Hence it was necessary from the outset to lay down fixed bearings for observational purposes, such as would be furnished by two lines, one run-

[1] If we take the planets, therefore, in the reverse order of their propinquity to the earth, viz. Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon, and suppose that each planet in turn presides over an hour of the day, then, if, *e.g.*, Saturn presides over the first hour of a particular day, he will also preside over the 8th, 15th, and 22nd hours; the 23rd hour accordingly will fall to Jupiter, the 24th to Mars, and the 1st hour of the new day to the Sun: hence Saturday is followed by Sunday, and so on.

ning east and west, the other north and south, through the observer's own position.

In connexion with nearly all ancient systems of religion are found sacred edifices of great age whose longitudinal axes lie exactly east and west. The determination of this east and west line, *i.e.* the parallel of latitude, was thus one of the early triumphs of the human mind. The oldest known instrument employed for the purpose was the stile, which afterwards developed into the gnomon of the sun-dial, and, indeed, the sun-dial itself. The stile was a vertical shaft fixed in the centre of a circle. In the morning, and again in the evening, the shadow of the pillar extended a considerable distance beyond the circle, while for an hour or two before, as also for an hour or two after, midday the extremity of the shadow lay within the circle. It was necessary, therefore, to mark the two points at which the shadow, forenoon and afternoon, terminated precisely upon the circle. The straight line joining these two points supplied an accurate east and west alignment, which could thus be secured on any sunny day at any season of the year. The use of the gnomon, in some form or another, seems to be common to primitive and the older civilized peoples.

Simple trial and observation showed that a stationary point was to be found in the north pole of the firmament and the star lying nearest to it. The direction of the meridian line through any given point of observation could then be ascertained by the following expedient. Two horoscopers stood face to face upon a line lying roughly north and south. The observer on the south, holding up before him the split rib of a palm leaf, moved it into such a position as enabled him through the fissure to see the pole star directly above the crown of his companion's head. Then the observer on the north, looking through the slit, saw all the then culminating stars from the southern point of the horizon upwards, and in this way projected his meridian upon the celestial vault.

The east and west points of the horizon, and the meridian of the observer, having been ascertained, the earliest facts of observation regarding the paths of the planets could be brought into relation therewith. The fixed stars, indeed, never varying in their positions relative to one another, also rose and set at constant distances from the east and west points respectively. On the other hand, the sun, the moon, and the five smaller planets rose and set at points never twice the same successively, and sometimes north, sometimes south, of due east and west. As regards the sun, the most northerly point of his rising and setting was reached as he entered Cancer, and the most southerly as he entered Capricorn, while his rising and setting were due east and due west respectively twice a year, viz. as he entered Aries and Libra. The extreme limits of his northward and southward movements in the ecliptic were called the tropical points, and the two constellations concerned came to be known in astrology and astronomy as the tropical constellations of the zodiac. Corresponding results were established with reference to the other planets.

But there is likewise an apparent daily revolution of fixed stars and planets alike around the position of the observer, each of them crossing his meridian once in every 24 hours; while if they lie in the equatorial circle the intersection takes place exactly 6 hours after they rise in the east, and 6 hours before they set in the west. Hence the observer's celestial equator, too, is always laid out in 12 segments corresponding to the 12 constellations of the zodiac; and if we disregard the sun's daily eastward movement of one degree, we find that every two hours the zodiac changes its position relatively to the equator by one whole zodiacal sign of 30 degrees. Now the intermediate positions of the signs during these two hours being left out of account, the observer's celestial equator was once for all divided into 12 apparently stationary parts, each of these having its own meridian. The illustration below shows an equatorial section traversing the horizon and the celestial sphere. These parts were called 'houses,' and all the conditions found within them were treated as if stationed in their respective middle lines. Now, as the enumeration of the houses began in the east, and then proceeded downwards under the eastern horizon, *i.e.* according to the order in which the phenomena of each successive house would appear above that horizon, the due east point fell exactly in the middle of the first house, the due west point in that of the seventh, the meridian in that of the



tenth, and the opposite meridian in that of the fourth. All primitive astronomical and astrological study of the sky was occupied, and indeed necessarily occupied, with the rising, culmination and setting of the heavenly bodies, with the passage of planets, normal stars, and constellations from one house to another, and with the mutual positions of the planets as measured by the houses they happened to occupy at any given time.

It would appear that these houses were sometimes divided in two, as, *e.g.*, in Egypt in the time of King Seti; and this led quite naturally to the division of the day into 24 hours, and eventually to the arrangement of the dial-plate of our clocks. For more exact observations, however, each house was subdivided into three decanates, and each decanate into ten degrees, the advantage of this being that the sphere of the observer had the same number of parts as the ecliptic, while the boundary lines defining the parts of each coincided every four minutes.

This method of parcelling out the sun's apparent daily course must have been instituted at a very remote period, in an age indeed when the astronomer had not yet grasped the idea of a circular orbit, but still thought of the solar path as a square. In



the figure representing the horoscope this quadrate form was retained, and it has remained in use till modern times, and, in fact, till the present day. To this method of delineating the stellar paths in

the horoscope by means of the square we shall frequently have occasion to return, as a considerable number of symbols relating to God and the world were evolved therefrom. In interpreting the horoscope the various positions were so far as possible brought into relation with the first house, and with the latter as starting-point the astrologer, applying the principle of even and odd as in the case of the exterior planets, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, alternately assigned to the other houses an essential character of benefit or bane. Thus the twelfth house was unfavourable, the eleventh favourable, the tenth—apart from its special position—unfavourable, the ninth favourable, the eighth supremely unfavourable, and so with the rest. This mode of interpretation was also arrived at along another line of thought, and, being thus supported by two ostensible proofs, it was believed to be established beyond dispute. The second proof in question was that supplied by the 'aspects,' of which we shall treat presently.

The plan of indicating position by means of zodiacal signs and houses could at best give approximate results. For the sake of simplicity it was assumed that the boundary lines of the several signs always coincided with those of the several houses, and that accordingly at the end of a Babylonian double-hour each sign moved instantaneously into another house, whose number was one less than that of the house which it had vacated. For all further deductions within the limits of plane geometry, the entire contents of any particular zodiacal sign were regarded as concentrated in the middle point of the sign and the house then congruent therewith.

The enumeration of the astrological houses from the east downwards towards the west, then eastwards again above the horizon, so that account is first of all taken of the invisible regions of the stellar heavens, had its origin in the fact that the attention of the astrologer was primarily directed towards the rising of the stars, and accordingly the houses were numbered in the order in which the stars contained in them at any given time would reach the eastern horizon and become visible.

4. **Aspects.**—The term 'aspects' was used in astrology to denote the relative positions of the houses and zodiacal signs, or of the stars situated in the houses at any given time. Planets in the same sign and the same house were said to be in conjunction; planets in opposite signs and houses, in opposition. The other possible relations amongst the celestial phenomena were defined with reference to regular inscribed polygons. Thus, if a planet were situated in the twelfth or the second house, then the line joining the middle point of either of these houses and that of the first house would form one side of a regular inscribed dodecagon; in

which case the planet in question was said to be in dodecagonal aspect to the east point, or 'horoscope' in the original sense. As in the same way planets in the eleventh and third houses furnished the side of a regular hexagon, their aspect towards the east or the horoscope was spoken of as sextile. Similarly planets in the tenth and fourth houses were in quartile or square, and those in the ninth and fifth were in trine. The line joining the middle point of the eighth or the sixth house with the east point was not a constituent part of any regular figure within the circle, and suggested at best a cross dodecagon, formed thus, which was regarded as the violation of all order. But as conjunction and opposition were reckoned amongst the regular aspects, the eighth was the only visible house having no aspect towards the horoscope. The principle of alternate numeration likewise pronounced this house unfavourable. In the astrological application of spherical astronomy it therefore signified the house of death.

Prior to the stage now reached, the exclusive concern of the astronomer had been to map out the heavens with such precision as would enable him to fix his observations by means of a verbal record. His conception of aspects, however, *i.e.* of the relations of the stellar positions to the horoscope, led him to assign values to the stellar positions themselves, and as soon as these came to be represented as anthropocentric or concentric, the initiative was given to the science of Judicial Astrology. Nevertheless we must emphasize the fact that the original scheme of the horoscope was depicted as a square, and that, before it became possible for astrology to speak of regular polygons, the conception of the sun's apparent diurnal motion as a circle must have come to the front. Thus the very language of astrology shows it to have been a kind of excrescence, not inherently connected with astronomy at all. Even in the Middle Ages a distinction was still maintained between Natural Astrology and Positive Astrology. The former dealt with the actual, and especially the baneful, influence of the planets upon meteorological changes—wind, storm, hurricane, thunder, flood, and earthquake. It was accordingly bound up with the naive and fantastic weather-lore of primitive man, and is to some extent still in evidence in scientific meteorology. In regard to the latter it is even yet frequently true that *sub iudice lis est.*

Positive or Judicial Astrology, on the other hand, was concerned from the earliest times with the supposed influences of the planets upon the fortunes of men and nations. It is now regarded by all sober minds as an extravagance of the human intellect, as something that the race has finally left behind. In Judicial Astrology it was no longer merely the aspect of a star to the horoscope, *i.e.* the east point, that was specified and appraised, but also the aspect of two planets with respect to each other. If one planet, for example, was situated in the eleventh house and another in the eighth, the two were said to be mutually in quartile. Here again, moreover, we find the alternate distribution of good and evil: conjunction was good; adjacent aspect or aspect in dodecagon was evil; sextile was good; quartile relatively evil; trine specially good; absence of regular aspect was specially evil, and opposition relatively good.

Since the line between the eighth or the sixth house and the east point did not form the side of a regular inscribed polygon, these two houses were deemed of inferior value. For the anthropocentric mind of the astrologer it was therefore a short step to regard them as houses of misfortune. The eighth house thus became the house of death, and the sixth the house of pains. We shall see later that in the reciprocal relations between the macrocosm and the microcosm the left arm became a synonym for the house of death and the left leg for the house of pains, and that in consequence these bodily parts themselves came to be regarded as of evil omen.

As emphasis was laid likewise upon the mutual correspondence of east and west—an idea that was corroborated by the principle of alternate numbering—the twelfth and second houses were counted

unfavourable. In primitive plane geometry the inscribed triangle and hexagon were deemed pre-eminently regular figures, and once more the alternate enumeration gave the same result. Consequently the eleventh, ninth, fifth, and third houses were reckoned favourable; while the tenth and fourth, again, were relatively evil. These symbolical interpretations, however, were sometimes set aside, sometimes even reversed, especially those connected with the invisible half of the sky.

The tenth house, as that in which the stars culminated, was supposed, by a very natural symbolism, to preside over dignities and offices, while the fourth house, lying directly beneath us, came in similar fashion to be associated with parents and ancestors, as those who had passed into the under world, and inferentially with all the other ties of kinship. On the ground of a certain analogy with the eighth house, *i.e.* that of death, the twelfth became the house of enmity (*κακοδαίμων*), and, by a further analogy, the second became the house of poverty. As the second house, however, was situated in the sky belonging to the under world and therefore opposite to ours, it became the house of fortune and riches, and for the same reason the sixth house, that of pains (or, according to another interpretation, that of service), became the house of health. Next to the house of death came the ninth as the house of the tutelary deity, while the eleventh, adjacent to the house of enmity, became that of friendship (*ἀγαθοδαίμων*). On the ground of similar considerations the third became the house of brothers, and the fifth the house of children. Finally, as the first house was specially associated with the querent of the astrological oracle, the seventh belonged to the querent's counterpart, *i.e.* in the ordinary course of things, wife or husband.

The designations of the various houses were therefore as follows: (1) life, (2) riches, (3) brothers, (4) parents, (5) children, (6) health, (7) marriage, (8) death, (9) religion, (10) dignities, (11) friendship, and (12) enmity. But this arrangement gave only the general scheme of astrological prognostication, and in the course of thousands of years various changes were introduced. Our information regarding any particular era of astrological speculation is defective, and we speak only in a general sense when we assert that from first to last the system detailed above remained essentially unchanged. It was all along recognized, moreover, that the scheme must be specially adjusted to special circumstances. Thus in the case of sickness the real querent was the invalid himself, and it was about him, therefore, that the first house supplied information. The counterpart was meanwhile not the wife, but the disease itself, upon which accordingly light was cast by the seventh house. The tenth house, in which the stars culminated over the patient, symbolized the physician, while the fourth, lying directly beneath in the under world, signified medicine. Account was also taken, of course, of the eighth house as the house of death, and of the sixth as the house of health. The houses of friendship, enmity, riches, brothers, and children were not supposed to wield any influence upon the course of the disease. Nor was much importance attached, in such cases, to the symbolism of the sun's planetary family; and, in fact, according to Greek accounts of Egyptian astrology, neither Venus nor Mercury was taken into consideration at all.

5. The astrological conception of the world.—The enormous advances that have been made within modern times in the study and practical application of the natural sciences, as well as the great contrast that obtains between the ancient and the modern scientific point of view, are matters of common knowledge. It is impossible to understand the theories of nature held by the ancients without a clear conception of the difference between their fundamental standpoint and our own. According to the older view of the world, which can be traced backwards for 5000 years before Christ, and which still held unquestioned sway for 1000 years after Christ, all natural objects issued in parallel lines from certain primary causes of universal operation. Modern science, on the other hand, assumes that the various groups of physical phenomena proceed by differentiation from certain primordial forms. While the ancients, therefore, looked upon the diversity of things as original, and their common elements as due to external influences, the moderns assume that the properties which objects have in common are inherited from a single primary form, and that their differences have been produced by external conditions, such as, *e.g.*, the struggle for existence.

The two conceptions, however, are not held stringently apart, nor does history show a rigid line of demarcation between the later and the earlier. Even in Genesis (10^{1a}), for instance, we have a table of nations which stands in complete agreement with the modern point of view, more particularly in the circumstance that it traces back the ancestry of all mankind in a series of converging lines. Much more in accordance with the ancient conception, on the other hand, is the Greek Deluge-story of Deucalion, according to which human beings were generated spontaneously from stones acted upon by the formative powers present in the air.

The theory of parallel processes may be called the 'ancient astrological,' or, again, the 'Oriental astrological' view of the universe. It had its birth amongst the early civilizations of the East, and its leading science was astrology; nor is it yet a spent force among certain Asiatic peoples of to-day. Now even our modern science, with its discovery of steam-power and its remarkable utilization of electricity, does not enter so profoundly into contemporary experience as did the ancient astrological conception into the life, thought, and feeling of the distant past.

Perhaps the most effective resistance to the more harmful issues of the astrological theory of the universe was made by the peoples living around the Mediterranean. But the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are likewise free from the evil outgrowths of that view. Nevertheless, we must remember that even the Biblical writers were children of their time, and could therefore hardly avoid expressing their thoughts in terms of the recognized philosophy of their age. Hence, just as we have come to recognize that the thorough-going study of Biblical Hebrew cannot dispense with the philological investigation of Arabic, Ethiopic, Babylonian, Syriac, etc., so we are now beginning to realize the impossibility of understanding the tenor of Biblical modes of expression apart from a knowledge of the astrological conception of the world common to the Babylonian, the Egyptian, and other ancient civilizations.

We must again refer to the square form of the horoscope, as furnishing the ground-plan of this theory of the world. The figure shows us the link which the theory had with astrology, and also with other two occult sciences, viz. Alchemy and the Kabbala.

It is of interest to note that the symbols used in astrology for the four cardinal points were simply the triangles corresponding to the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth houses respectively. But while, according to the expedient already noticed (p. 52[a]), the positions of the stars in the ecliptic were determined by the observer on the north, the fixing of the cardinal points was effected by his fellow on the south. The horoscope was therefore seen by the latter from the opposite point of view, and the

four houses in question took a reverse form, so that △ came to mean north, ▽ south, ▷ east, and ◁ west. With this exception, however, all further inferences were drawn from the proper form of the horoscope, *i.e.* from the figure it presented to the observer on the north.



The tenth house, as the *summum cælum*, and the fourth, as the *imum cælum*, embraced everything in the world above and the world below respectively. The upper world as a whole, however, consists of the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth houses. In the hieroglyphic script of Egypt, accordingly, heaven is represented by the exterior boundary of these five houses, thus: , which, of course, according to the Egyptian practice in such matters, is only a contour, and really stands for . The same proportions and angles are likewise retained in the Egyptian representation of the goddess of heaven, who broods over the earth-god—a phenomenon which will meet us again when we treat of Egypt. The under world was represented, of course, by the same figure inverted. Now we find two different ideas attaching to each of the houses numbered ten and four. According to one conception the *summum cælum* contains the heavenly upper ocean, from which rain falls (אֲרֻבֹּת הַשָּׁמַיִם in the Biblical narrative of the Deluge), while the *imum cælum* embraces both the ocean of the under world and the subterranean water from which the fountains of the deep are fed (מַעְיְנוֹת תְּהוֹם; also the sources of the Nile in Herodotus). According to the other conception there lies above us first of all air, then fire; and beneath us, first earth, then water.

Now the latter theory furnished also the alche-



mistic symbols of the elements—symbols which are still written by doctors in old-fashioned mysterious receipts, and were in common use among physicians and apothecaries a hundred years ago. Thus, for example, ▽*sigill.* signified *terra sigillata*; *lumbric.* ▽*restr.* = *lumbrici terrestres*; ▽*flor.* ⊙*rant.* = *aqua florum aurantiorum*; or something was to be boiled *leni* △, *i.e.* *leni calore*. Distilled alcoholic liquors were known as 'burnt water,' and were denoted by a combination of the symbols for water and fire, thus . To this day the device  displayed upon rustic inns indicates the licence to sell brandy.

This combined symbol was used not only in alchemy but also in the Kabbala, where it represented the Star of David. It became, in fact, a symbol for God (just as the fire-eye, *i.e.* , was employed in Christian symbolism to signify the Holy Spirit); for, by the rules of the Kabbala, the combination of the principal consonants of אֵשׁ ('fire') and מַיִם ('water') yielded the word שָׁמַיִם ('heaven'), which in its turn was the cabalistic equivalent of אֱלֹהִים ('God'). Thus the term God could be expressed by the secret sign as the synthesis of fire and water. In the synagogue all pictorial representation of God was forbidden, nor was it allowable to give utterance to the tetragram יהוה unless absolutely necessary. In the same way, therefore, as the word אדוני had to be resorted to as the oral designation of God, the symbol came to be used in the architecture of the synagogue as His graphic designation. This figure, moreover, not only contains within itself the symbols of the four elements, interlaced with one another, but, besides the upper and lower triangles signifying fire and water respectively, it also shows four extra-mundane triangles, which could thus be regarded on cabalistic principles as metaphysically symbolizing the four consonants of the tetragram. Hence, even in passages of ancient Christian works where we might expect some such phrase as 'with God,' we actually find the cabalistic device

signifying יהוה.

According to the astrological theory of the world, however, not only the perpendicular section through the universe, but the surface of the earth itself, was thought of as quadrate, since the cube, as the ideal geometrical figure, was the accepted symbol of the world as a whole. This idea finds



frequent expression even in later cabalistic writings treating of the origin of salt, which, of course, also crystallizes in cubes. The scheme of the horoscope, accordingly, became a comprehensive map of the world as well. As previously explained in

connexion with the points of the compass, the horoscope was in this case constructed, as it were, from the opposite point of view. In the centre was the navel of the world, which every nation sought to claim for its own territory, and as the site of the national sanctuary. The figure also supplied the four pillars, viz. N.E., N.W., S.E., and S.W., upon which the heavens are supported. Of these the best known was the S.W. pillar, as it was there that Atlas had been relieved by Hercules.

6. Anthropomorphic nomenclature of the sphere.—The square horoscope was not the only expedient resorted to in setting forth the relations of the stars, as another method was also in use among the Egyptians. From a time anterior to Menes until the final period, the high priest of Heliopolis was known as , *i.e.* 'chief astrologer.' We may note in passing that this office was held by Poti-phera (of which name the literal Greek translation was Heliodoros), the father-in-law of Joseph (Gn 41[45]). Tables of observations made in Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty are still extant, and in these are recorded the times at which the fixed stars cross the middle lines of the houses, *i.e.* the beginnings of the double-hours. The astrologer on the north found the meridian of the place of observation by looking through the slit of the palm-leaf rib above the bald crown of his companion. The middle meridians of the first and seventh houses were given by the horizontal line, while the observer found those of the eleventh and ninth houses by lines projected over his companion's right and left eyes respectively, and in similar fashion those of the twelfth and eighth houses by lines above the right and left elbows. It is probable that the sixth house was in like manner associated with the left knee, and the second house with the right.

From this point of view the left arm corresponded with the house of death and the left leg with the house of sorrows, and on this account there eventually arose a superstitious aversion to using the word 'left' at all. In particular, all actions performed by the left hand came to be regarded as unlucky. It may well be the case that mankind was right-handed rather than left-handed before astrology asserted its sway, but the ban thus laid upon the left extremities of the body undoubtedly supplied a further reason for excluding the left side and especially the left hand from all actions of great and critical moment.

7. Applied astronomy and astrology.—Alike in the greatest and in the smallest affairs of life uncivilized man is affected by the changes incident to the day and the season, by the phases of the moon by night, and by the ebb and flow of the tides. Hence the observation of sun and moon with a view to a standard measurement of time, or, in other words, to the construction of a calendar, was a vital condition of all progress in civilization. But, as the periods of the earth's rotation about its axis (*i.e.* the apparent diurnal movement of the sun), of the moon's revolution, and of the sun's apparent annual revolution, are incommensurable with regard to each other, the early attempts to frame a serviceable calendar were attended with no small difficulty. As the lunar month made more impression upon the primitive mind than the actual solar year, endeavours were made in the earliest calendars to base the latter upon an integral number of the former, and all sorts of expedients were tried in order to harmonize the two periods. At a further stage in the growth of civilization the determination of the true solar year became the subject of inquiry, the length of the true lunar month being then left out of consideration. Here again, however, the residual fraction of days provided difficulties, and the difference between the calendars of Western Europe and Eastern Europe (Russia) shows that these difficulties have not yet been overcome. In the pre-Christian era there was a disparity between Babylon, with its cyclically adjusted lunar year, and Egypt, with its solar year, or, rather, its two unequal solar years. Other civilizations employed other types of calendar. A purely lunar calendar is still in use among Muhammadans.

The outstanding periodic phenomena of the apparent courses of sun and moon were registered in these calendars, and were celebrated as occasions of joy or sorrow according to their influence upon human life. In such feasts and fasts the moon and the sun were, first of all, personified, and they still continued to be revered as divine or heroic beings even after the particular days connected with their movements by astrology and astronomy had been duly set down in the artificially corrected and adjusted calendars of ancient and modern civilized peoples.

8. Lunar, solar, and planetary deities.—The ascertainment of such varying influences of the moon and the sun as could be registered in the calendar was undoubtedly a forward step in the mental development of primitive man. But the notion that the movements of moon, sun, and planets were effected by powerful and conscious beings, more or less endowed with free will, was an open door to all illusion. The religion and mythology of the lowest races are permeated with this idea. Amongst more highly civilized peoples, again, we find a stock of myths of like purport, which, partly indigenous and partly exotic, forms a kind of illicit religion or superstition, and which shows many points of contrast with the teachings of the recognized national cult. In periods distinguished by a high state of civilization this supplementary religion finds acceptance only amongst the lowest and least enlightened ranks of the people, while at times, when culture is at a low ebb, it extends its sway over the leading classes as well.

In cases, however, where a relatively advanced and purified form of religion found its way into a region already civilized, the old representations of moon and sun as personal beings, as also the narratives that had grafted themselves upon their festivals, degenerated into mere legends. As illustrations of the process we may name the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid in the Roman religion, the stories of the Thousand and One Nights in Islām, and Grimm's domestic and popular tales in Christianized Germany.

But it was also possible that a fusion might take place between the older and the newer narratives. Thus, apart from the sphere of religious history as such, there are many mediæval kings and heroes whose actual experiences, on the one hand, stand forth in the clear light of history, but whose legendary adventures, on the other, show unmistakable deposits from the personifying narratives about the moon and the sun. The same process has been at work practically everywhere; we trace it not only in the *Nibelungenlied* and the *Iliad*, but also in connexion with all the great figures who as gods or prophets occupy the supreme place in the various systems of religion. Popular imagination, in fact, clinging as it does to the ancient legends, is quite indifferent as to the figure around which it throws them; it may fix upon Confucius, Buddha, Zarathushtra, Jesus, or Muhammad. Even the older religions, with deities unmistakably of planetary origin—the Babylonian

Shamash, the Egyptian Rê, the Greek Apollo—show such secondary deposits from various astro-mythological sources.

The disengagement of this secondary astro-mythological element from the Christian system of thought has now become one of the prime tasks of theological criticism. It is no longer possible for any earnest scholar to reject the fundamental idea of such analysis, and the extent to which the work of elimination shall be pursued depends entirely upon whether the individual theologian leans towards the more orthodox or the more liberal side. In regard to Confucius, Buddha, Zarathushtra, and Muhammad, as also in regard to the Alexander romances, the Christian theologian concedes the rights of the method without hesitation. Further, the OT and the Life of Jesus have from ancient times been the nuclei of a mass of legendary stories (the Talmud, etc.; Gospels of the Infancy, etc.), which all theologians have for centuries regarded as apocryphal; and it cannot be disputed that the study of astro-mythology has rendered valuable service in throwing light upon the origin of these spurious additions to the lives of the leading personalities of our religion. Once more, there is a group of writings which, though reckoned apocryphal by evangelical Churches, are still included in the Roman Catholic canon; and, as might be expected, the bearing of the astro-mythological theory upon these writings is estimated by the two great parties within Christianity in precisely opposite ways. And when at length the theory is applied to certain constitutive elements in the OT, and to the life of Jesus as given in the evangelical records, the theologians who concede its rights in these domains are fewer still in number. The explanation of this, of course, is that such criticism seems to undermine the historicity of the Biblical narratives, and to leave nothing but a mass of mythical stories about the planets, which have crystallized around certain more or less unreal figures in the history of Israel. The logical result of the process appears to be the subversion of every constituent of Christianity save its ethics.

Taken in this sense, the comparative study of astrology and astro-mythology rests upon an impregnable foundation. The implications of its results, as was said above, may quite well be brought into harmony alike with the most rigid orthodoxy and the broadest liberalism. Hence it cannot be non-suited by either of the warring schools; it is reconcilable even with the aims of its critics. Just as comparative philology is an ideal and impartial science, so must the comparative study of myths assume a like impartiality; and the indispensable framework of this study is formed by the planetary deities of astrology.

9. Prophetic astrology.—From the theological point of view, prophetic astrology must be regarded as a by-way towards superstition, and, indeed, as one of the main sources of superstition. It was evolved by gentle gradations from what we may call 'calendar astronomy.' Primitive man discerned parallelism not only in the processes of nature, but also in the State and in human life; nay, even in the forms and organs of animals he read analogies and homologies, and many other fields of observation presented similar correspondences. But by far the most obvious and unmistakable cases of parallelism were those which subsisted between the motions of the sun and the moon, on the one hand, and the periodic variation of the tides, of light and heat during the day, and of the seasons, on the other. Hence arose the notion of planetary deities or angels—beings who acted according to highly complicated laws, ordained either by themselves or by a superior power, and who sought to bring all events, great and small alike, within the range of parallel uniformities. Where the trend of thought was polytheistic, the planets were regarded as gods; where it lay towards monotheism, they were but the messengers of a Divine will beyond them; or, as the case might be, an inevitable fate was supposed to hang over the gods themselves.

From the standpoint of the ancient astrologer, the supreme function of all learning was the observation of certain simple phenomena and the drawing of inferences bearing upon a parallel series of facts otherwise veiled. The primary task of astrology was to ascertain the positions of the planets in relation to one another, to the zodiacal signs, and to the observer himself, and then to make deductions therefrom. This was astrology properly so called, and it required for every particular case a direct reading of the sky. A cloudy night, however, rendered such direct readings impossible. Now, the Kouyunjik inscriptions, dating from the time of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal, yield evidences for a continuous series of actual observations. From these we learn that, notwithstanding the complexity of the planetary movements, the periodic repetition of essential phenomena had been calculated for each particular planet. Thus the astrologer could fall back upon tabulated records covering every particular sequence of planetary movement, and could substitute these for direct observation. It is true that, owing to trifling inaccuracies in the data thus supplied, this course was avoided for thousands of years; but at length the momentous step was taken. No doubt, it still remained necessary to bring certain recorded positions to the test of actual observation; but, with these exceptions, the researches of the practical astrologer were thenceforth pursued in the study. Our earliest evidences for this procedure date from the period of the Persian monarchy.

So far as astronomy itself is concerned, this was a progressive movement; but, from the standpoint of observational science, it was a backward step. It issued finally in the determination and mathematical calculation of the planetary orbits by Kepler. But, in our estimate of Kepler's discoveries, we must always bear in mind that he was still under the spell of the astrological conception of the universe. It was his firm belief that his discoveries supplied the key to all events of history, and had exalted astrology to the level of a perfect and independent science of simple calculation, while in reality he had given the death-blow to its pretensions.

From the time of the earliest attempts to draw up a calendar—through the period of the Sumerians and Akkadians—to the days of Kepler astrology underwent no essential change, save that it gradually abandoned the method of direct observation of the heavens in favour of, first, a partial use of tables containing earlier observations, and, finally, a purely arithmetical determination of the positions occupied by the planets at any given time. Astrology, be it remembered, was a study of international importance. Wherever, therefore, in the history of any civilized country we can trace some slight advance in astronomical science, we find corresponding records, practically contemporaneous, in all the civilized countries of that epoch. Additions to men's knowledge of the stars were valued only as ancillary to the determination of the planetary positions. As all the available evidence goes to show, however, astrology, throughout its entire career, had but one method of adapting this knowledge to oracular ends—the method, namely, of symbolical interpretation, with a more or less clearly realized principle of alternation. In the main, the positions of the planets were made

the basis of prognostications of the unborn future, but they were also used as a means of filling up *lacunæ* in the knowledge of the past and the present.

10. Astrology and medicine.—In the ancient Oriental view of the world, astrology, religion, and therapeutics went hand in hand. In the conviction that all things in the universe proceeded in parallel lines, men spoke of a macrocosm (primarily the stellar world as the province of Deity) and a microcosm (primarily the human body), and sought for far-reaching analogies between them. Thus—to take one of many examples found in Sanskrit literature—the Vedas and their allied texts exhibit attempts to establish an exact equivalence between the number of the bones in the human body and that of the days in a year. Simple as would have been the task of enumerating the bones accurately, they were purposely numbered wrongly, so that the desired numerical relations might be educed; the lower jaw, for instance, was said to be composed of eighteen single pieces, not including the teeth, just because this number, while purely factitious, could, as the twentieth part of 360, be used for purposes of speculation. The method was applied in every field, and things which did not harmonize in fact were arbitrarily made to do so.

In the ancient East the therapeutic art was based upon the two fundamental postulates of air in motion and liquid in motion, and it was supposed that in the human body the air passed along the arteries, while the liquid traversed the veins. The solid substance of the body (its earthy constituents) and its native heat (its igneous constituents) were regarded as forming a fixed and constant mass: earth and fire, in fact, were probably never considered in their physiological aspects until the Hellenistic period. The astrological references hitherto discovered in Babylonian and Egyptian texts show that air and liquid alone were taken into account. In the further development of these notions, special prominence was given to the air by the pneumatists, and to the blood (*i.e.* liquid, and a mixture of the four principal humours, viz. water, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) by the hæmatists. We cannot enter here into the particulars of the antagonism maintained between the two schools for several thousand years, an antagonism which we can trace in the period when the Pyramids were built, and which, again, moved the hæmatist Aristophanes to the mortal hatred wherewith in the *Clouds* he arraigned the pneumatism of Socrates before the Athenian populace. Suffice it to say that, in all references to the facts of nature found in the Pentateuch, the Jahwistic sections (of Genesis in particular) represent the pneumatic, and the Elohistic portions the hæmatic, point of view, whereas the Priestly Code exhibits no scientific tendency at all. The pneumatists regarded the nose as the most important organ of the body. We may recall the numerous phrases formed with אַף in the OT, and the large noses of the singers in the chorus of the *Clouds*. Even amongst the inscriptions from Nineveh, which must, on the whole, be reckoned to the hæmatic school, the present writer has found no fewer than fourteen different texts referring to divination by the nose.

According to the hæmatist, life was concentrated in the liver, the כָּבֵד, or heavy organ, which, accordingly, together with the blood, plays a prominent part in the OT and the Talmud. Among the Babylonians and Etruscans, again, as also among the various peoples influenced by them, haruspicy took the special form of divination by inspection of the liver. The cuneiform texts which treat of this hepatoscopy are without number, and have been read and translated mainly by Jastrow. In the ancient East, and even in Greece, the hæmatists were for the most part firm believers in astrology, omens, and all that we now brand with the name of superstition. To dreams, above all, they attached great importance, while the pneumatists, on the other hand, as is shown by the writings of Hippocrates, declared dreams to be unworthy of consideration. The pneumatists seem to have borne the reputation of being enlightened persons, or sometimes even atheists, as was the case with the pneumatist Socrates as delineated by Aristophanes. From certain fragmentary indications we may perhaps gather that in the main the Christians of the early centuries were pneumatists in their knowledge of nature.

From the mental standpoint of the hæmatic astrologer every actual group of relations amongst the planets mirrored itself in all synchronistic events and conditions, and thus the entire horoscope would be reproduced in the variations and peculiarities found in the liver—the central organ—of the newly-born sacrificial animal. An expert examination of the liver could therefore quite well take the place of a direct observation of the sky. The practice of hepatoscopy was extensively diffused, and diagrams illustrative of the art are still extant. The method adopted by the Babylonians was to portion out the liver in what may be called oracular squares by means of a right-angled system of ordinates, a device reminding us of the square sections shown by the extant Egyptian projection of the heavens made in the time of King Seti, and likewise of the square figure used as the ground-plan of the normal horoscope. Among the Etruscans, however, hepatoscopy employed a polar projection in its construction of oracular fields, and to this arrangement corresponds the system of regular polygons designed to represent the relative positions of the planets in the circular horoscope.

Another way of dispensing with direct observation of the heavens was to watch the forms assumed by certain substances when suddenly placed under new conditions, as it was supposed that the forms thus produced were determined by the configuration of the planets at the time. Oil or melted tallow was dropped into water, or water into oil, and the diviner took note of the resultant forms. We possess two comprehensive lists drawn up in the reign of King Ḫammurabi of Babylon for the express purpose of interpreting these formations. This mode of divination still survives in the superstitious practice of dropping molten lead upon a cold surface.

A further variety of oracle was found in dreams, to which reference has already been made. Dreams also were believed to run parallel to the facts of astrology, and might, therefore, be substituted for the latter. But, as dreams were held to have their origin in the blood, their significance was conceded by the hæmatists only.

Finally, every unaccountable phenomenon of nature—from the movement of an animal to a monstrous birth—everything, in short, that touched human life at any point, came to be associated with planetary influence, and might become the basis of divination. The library of Sardanapalus contains thousands of tablets in which such superstitious ideas and practices are expounded with the most precise casuistry. They seem to have been regarded as the supreme and final expression of wisdom, and might relate to matters a thousand years old. But these fallacious issues of man's search for knowledge, involving such a prodigal expenditure of energy in collecting data, find their ultimate explanation in the fundamental misconception of astrology, viz. that the incidents of life, being dependent upon the contemporaneous con-

figuration of the planets, must exhibit a parallel order in their occurrence, and that accordingly valid inferences regarding either of the parallel series may be drawn from the other. The underlying conception of the whole procedure, however, was that of the astrologer, and hence we find that in the system of divination by bowls which was practised in the time of Ḫammurabi, the instantaneous formations of dropped grease were regarded as yielding actual knowledge of the planetary deities.

11. Subsidiary tables.—The various substitutes for astrological diagnosis might become, and, indeed, necessarily became, very important, as it was often difficult to determine the requisite facts concerning the planets. We must remember that the problem usually set before the astrologer was to draw the horoscope of the birth or conception of an individual at a time when years had elapsed since these events, and by this means to forecast the future. His task was, in short, to re-construct the astrological conditions of a past event, and he had in consequence to refer to tables or lists of earlier astronomical observations. As regards the sun and the moon, the information he required was furnished by the calendar, but special lists were necessary for the five smaller planets. An extensive table of this kind, written in the Demotic character of Egyptian, and dating from the reign of Augustus, has been preserved. The Julian emperors, let us remember, used to settle their retired soldiers in Egypt. Colonies of veterans thus established in the Fayum would be largely drawn from those who had been born in the reign of Augustus. It was therefore necessary that the astrologer who practised his art in this province should possess lists of the successive positions of the planets during that reign. The example before us is but the transcript of a transcript: whole lines are wanting, and figures have been misread. We may thus infer that such lists were produced in great profusion to meet the needs of astrologers in the various districts and villages. In order to make the proper entries in the horoscope required, the astrologer needed simply to know the zodiacal signs in which the several planets were situated at the time, and accordingly the information supplied by the astrological lists regarding any particular planet was confined to the day of the month on which it entered a new sign. The ancient lists of ephemerides were thus neither more nor less than astrological tables.

For predictions of a general kind the astrologer constructed 'nativities,' while for cases of sickness he drew horoscopes of the *κατάκλισις*, *i.e.* the inception of the disease, and otherwise adapted his art to special circumstances. He had to be informed of the day, month, and year of the critical event. The signs occupied by the smaller planets at the given date were then noted down from lists like that of the Berlin Papyrus 8279; the moon, together with the day indicating its age, was inserted in the proper sign according to the calendar of the lunar cycle, its lunar station being also fixed by established rules; the sun was placed according to the date. The next step was to arrange these particulars systematically in the twelve houses, the exact hour of the event, or, failing that, the time of sunrise, being used as the determining point. From this, again, the positions of the planets relative to one another, to the eastern point, and to the different zodiacal signs, were deduced and interpreted.

12. The horoscope of Jesus Christ.—As an illustration we shall take the horoscope of the conception of Jesus, according to the form in which we are able to re-construct it from the Demotic table of the planets in the Berlin P. 8279. The dates given are themselves products of astrological speculation, and cannot be regarded as historically established, but they are nevertheless worthy of notice. On the 24th of June, B.C. 7 (or previously), took place the conception or birth of John the Baptist. On the 15th of April, B.C. 6, 5 a.m., the annunciation to Mary (instead of the conception of Jesus), and, at the same time, the observation of this 'nativity' by the Magi. Between the 24th of June, B.C. 6, and the 25th of November, B.C. 6, occurs the visit of the Magi to King Herod. After the 25th of November, B.C. 6, the Magi notice the re-appearance of the stellar configuration at the annunciation. On the 27th of December, B.C. 6, the stellar configuration becomes stationary (*ἀστὴρ ἔστη*), and the Magi worship the infant at Bethlehem.

Now the horoscope of the 15th of April, B.C. 6, can be re-constructed thus:



and supplies the following apotelesmata capable of interpretation:

(1) The horoscope of the day appears (with sunrise). (2) Aries is in the ascendant. (3) Mars, as lord of the house of Aries, presides over the birth. (4) The sun is in the ascendant. (5) Saturn in the ascendant. (6) Jupiter in the ascendant. (7) Mercury in the ascendant. (8) Saturn in the ascendant, and above the horizon. (9) Saturn is intercepted between the favourable planets Venus and Jupiter. (10) Mars in the second house. (11) The moon enters the eighth house. (12) Venus is in the twelfth house. (13) Mercury in the house of Mars, and likewise in immediate proximity to Mars. (14) Saturn is in his *ταπείνωμα*, or 'detriment.' (15) The sun in his *ὕψωμα*, or 'exaltation.' (16) The moon in her *ταπείνωμα*. (17) Venus in her *ὕψωμα*. (18) Venus is *matutina* (morning star). (19) Jupiter is in proximity to his house Pisces. (20) Jupiter in trine (*adspectus trigonalis*) with his house Sagittarius. (21) The sun in trine with his house Leo. (22) Saturn's motion is direct. (23) Jupiter is direct. (24) Mars is direct. (25) Venus is retrograde. (26) Mercury is direct. (27) Mercury is combust. (28) Mercury in immediate proximity to the sun. (29) Mercury is invisible. (30) Mars is not combust. (31) Mars is nevertheless invisible, and is, in fact, entering upon its invisible period of three months. (32) Mars is separated from the sun by Mercury. (33) Saturn is separated from the sun by Jupiter, though the latter is combust. (34) Jupiter is combust. (35) Jupiter is separated from the sun by small planets. (36) All the morning stars are visible. (37) All the evening stars are invisible. (38) Mars is situated in his nocturnal triangle. (39) The terrestrial triangle contains Mars only, its nocturnal lord, situated in Taurus. (40) Mars is in opposition to his house Scorpio. (41) The moon in trine with her house Cancer. (42) The moon is in her domain. (43) The trigonum of fire contains its lords conjoined in Aries. (44) The trigonum of water contains its diurnal lady Venus. (45) The trigonum of water contains its nocturnal ruler, the moon. (46) The moon and Venus are in trine. (47) The trigonum of air is empty. (48) Saturn and Jupiter are in conjunction. (49) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus *conjunctio maxima*, and dominates the entire horoscope. (50) This *conjunctio maxima* was preceded by a *conjunctio magna*, occurring in Pisces (indicating the astrological necessity for the forerunner, John the Baptist). (51) Saturn is in conjunction with the sun (but cf. 33). (52) Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury. (53) Mars and Mercury are in different houses, but close together. (54) Saturn and Venus are in the same relation. (55) Jupiter is in conjunction with Mercury. (56) Venus is visible. (57) Saturn is visible. (58) Jupiter is visible. (59) Saturn has no aspect with the moon. (60) Saturn is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus. (61) Saturn is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but triply intercepted.

(62) Jupiter has no aspect with the moon. (63) Jupiter is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but intercepted by Saturn. (64) Jupiter is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but doubly intercepted. (65) The sun has no aspect with the moon. (66) The sun is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but doubly intercepted. (67) The sun is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but intercepted once. (68) Mercury has no aspect with the moon. (69) Mercury is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but triply intercepted. (70) Mercury is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars. (71) Mars is in opposition to the moon. (72) Mars is in trine aspect with Venus. (73) Full moon is just past. (74) No planets are in quartile with each other. (75) Of the tropical signs only Aries is occupied, but it contains four planets. (76) All the planets except the moon are clustered near the sun. (77) All the planets except the moon and Venus are under the influence of the sun (Mars as lord of the sun's house). (78) Jupiter emerges from the sun's beams. (79) Hence the *conjunctio maxima* also emerges. (80) All the visible planets and the moon are situated in the diurnal sky. (81) All invisible planets are in the nocturnal sky. (82) The lord of Saturn's house is Mars. (83) The lord of Jupiter's house is Mars. (84) The lord of the sun's house is Mars. (85) The lord of Mercury's house is Mars. (86) The lord of Venus's house is Jupiter. (87) The lord of the moon's house is Mars. (88) The lord of the house of Mars is Venus. (89) The horoscope, *i.e.* Aries, is masculine. (90) The other occupied houses are feminine.

Several points of detail may be left out of account. By making the horoscope more precise, and dividing it into decanates and degrees, we might multiply indefinitely the ninety particulars given above. These data of the positions occupied by the planets were known as *apotelesmata*. The ninety *apotelesmata* enumerated here can be interpreted only in part at the present day, as our information regarding ancient modes of astrological interpretation is at best fragmentary. According to rules still extant, interpolations and adjustments, no doubt, have also been made in certain particulars. So far, however, as we can test the interpretations of this horoscope, it corresponds with the evangelical narratives of the life of Jesus even in its smallest details.

13. The development of astronomy and astrology among the various peoples.—The foregoing sketch makes it evident that primitive peoples constructed their calendars by direct observation of the heavens. Similarly, it is amongst these primitive peoples, as indeed we might expect, that we find the first steps of the transition from astronomy to astrology. Thus, in the interior of some of the larger South Sea Islands, as, *e.g.*, Borneo, a primitive astronomy and astrology are found amongst the aborigines, while the inhabitants of the sea board, as also of the smaller islands, exhibit a higher development in the science of the stars, partly because their nautical interests demanded a more thoroughgoing observation of the heavenly bodies, and partly because they were influenced by the higher standard of culture attained by the Asiatic races, as is shown, for example, by the fact that the Malay language contains words borrowed from Chinese, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. Of the pictorial writing of ancient Mexico, part of the calendar is all that has hitherto been deciphered; but even this suffices to show striking correspondences between the civilizations of America anterior to its discovery by Columbus and those of the ancient Asiatic races, and not least in astronomy and astrology. The development of these sciences already attained in the Babylonian period or later in the time of Alexander the Great is practically the same as now prevails throughout China, in part of Japan, and, above all, in India.

In the West, likewise, the results of astronomical inquiry were still encumbered with the old superstitious conceptions. The earliest successful attempts to eliminate these conceptions and their effects from astronomy were made about A.D. 1500. It is true that at the zenith of Roman civilization the educated classes tried to throw the lumber of astrology overboard. Certain of the Church Fathers wrought strenuously to oust it from its place. But, on the one hand, the vexed question regarding the date of Easter, which was simply a consequence of combining the lunar calendar of Babylon with the solar calendar of Egypt, and, on the other, the attempt to fix a year for the birth of Christ, gave astrology once more a certain adventitious prestige in Christian life and theology. Fresh vantage ground was also won for it in the secular learning of the Middle Ages by the Western drift of Islām and the Jewish Kabbala. As a matter of fact, the astronomy of the West, and, in particular, the coalescence of astronomy and astrology in the later culture of Western lands, is a development or an importation from the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East.

Until the time of Kepler, astronomy was always bound up with astrology, and its progress was for the most part of a meagre kind. This may seem incredible so long as we confine our investigation to a short period abounding in records, but it is always unsafe to argue from the silence of the earlier records that the apparently fresh facts set forth in the later constitute an actual advance. No candid observer in the field of astrology could fail to notice that, while this or that forecast might happen to be correct, yet in many cases the configuration of the planets, however skilfully interpreted, could not be reconciled with the facts of experience. Certain details of astrological procedure were, therefore, constantly being left behind, as in an ever-seething witches' caldron; and, on the other hand, long disused methods were once more resorted to. This was especially the case when, in periods of unrest, races and civilizations were shaken and mingled together. Detailed research in a narrowly circumscribed period may thus produce the illusion of rapid development in a science which, in its leading features, really remained unchanged from age to age.

The fundamental tenets promulgated by astrology as inviolably true were manifold. From the fourth house, as it seemed, welled up the subsoil water and the springs which fed the rivers, while from the tenth house came the rain. Now when primitive man found the moon in either of those houses he anticipated a flood. But the moon was evidently connected also with the occurrence of menstruation, which was regarded as a periodic overflow of blood. The astrological explanations of these phenomena tended to corroborate one another so fully that the sovereignty of the moon over the liquid element was deemed indisputable. An example of a different kind is furnished by the horoscope of disease, or rather of the *κατάκλισις*. Here the invalid was the querent, and his malady the quesited, and information regarding them was supplied by the first and seventh houses respectively. Now, in the regular horoscope the sixth house was significant of pain and the eighth of death, and thus the entire western section of the sky from 45° above the horizon to 45° below it was the region of disease. In this expanse, however, the sun, distinguished among the planets as the source of heat, is situated between three and nine o'clock p.m., and this again is the time when the invalid shows symptoms of fever. An easy explanation was thus provided for the increase of febrile temperature, while on the other hand the validity of the science was demonstrated once more. Astrology simply abounded in spurious proofs of this type.

Thus the leading principles and ideas of astrology were looked upon for centuries as incontrovertible. Its failures were attributed to points of secondary moment, save in cases where it seemed more convenient to change the time premised by a whole double-hour, and so to shift the entire horoscope by one house—an artifice

which would in general quite invert the first interpretation. Corrections and alterations were thus made in matters of detail, while among the more progressive peoples the general tendency was towards over-refinement in interpretation and an ever-expanding casuistry.

Accordingly there was no real development in the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East within historic times. The extant evidences of the inscriptions go as far back as the period of Šargâni-šar-ali and Narâm-Sin. From the reign of the former eight short texts are all that have as yet been brought to light, and from that of the latter sixteen only, all of the same date. It is not to be expected, therefore, that we shall trace all the details of later astrology in such meagre records. It is surely sufficient for our purpose that the later period, the archives of which may quite well extend backwards to the monarchs just named, yields a mass of evidence to show that astronomy and astrology had by this time reached the status of a closed and rounded system. Inscriptions from the age of Hammurabi make it clear that full instructions had already been drawn up for the practice of divination by cups in connexion with planetary configurations. From a period about a thousand years before Christ come the inscribed boundary-stones, the dates of which are indicated by their arrangement of the planetary symbols. Thereafter the richest vein of astrological records is found in the library of Sardanapalus. We learn from these that there was a system of observatories covering the whole kingdom, that there was an established scheme of relays for the professional astrologers and of serial reports regarding their work, and that a State library had been established for the purpose of supplying all needed information in astrology and the auxiliary arts of divination. It is to be regretted that as yet only the *Reports* of the astrologers and the instructions regarding hepatoscopy have been properly edited. The cuneiform texts of the period between Sardanapalus and the beginning of the Christian era are not so rich in relevant information. The astronomical texts of this epoch, however, have found a thoroughly capable editor in Kugler, whose labours were based on the preparatory studies of Strassmaier and Epping, but who, unfortunately, engaged as he was with the productions of a relatively short period, has failed to grasp the subject in its entirety. A final residuum of Babylonian astrology was the perfunctory knowledge of 'the science of the Chaldæans' current in the days of the Roman Empire. From the beginning of our era astrology and astronomy languished on in the various Asiatic countries, but they were borne westwards by the Arabs. Mesopotamia always remained more or less of a *terra incognita* for countries influenced by Græco-Roman civilization.

On the other hand, Egypt became permanently merged in the Roman Empire, and, at a later period, in the Byzantine Empire. It was Egypt, therefore, that brought Babylonian astronomy and astrology into real contact with the West. Even in the most remote times, in a period, it may be, anterior to the First Dynasty, astrology, religion, and medicine were combined as one science at Heliopolis. The high priest of Heliopolis, officially invested with the star-spotted panther's skin, was all along the supreme State astrologer until the imperial age of Rome, and he bore the title of 'great in vision' already alluded to. A hierarch of this order is named in the Bible (Gn 41^{45}) as the father-in-law of Joseph—of that Joseph who was himself an interpreter of dreams ($40^{5ff.}$ etc.), and practised the art of divination by bowls ($44^{5.\ 15}$), referred to in connexion with Hammurabi. On the wall of a tomb dating from the reign of Seti I. we find lists of stars, times of culmination, etc. Extensive tables of ephemerides and a fragment of planetary divination according to the different houses, together with corresponding dream-tables, have survived from the age of Augustus. We possess even horoscope-texts drawn up in the Imperial period. Our minor records of later Egyptian astrology are thus fairly numerous.

Græco-Roman civilization throughout its entire geographical and historical range, until the establishment of the world-empire and its swift decline, never produced such monuments as we find in the great empires of the East. Observatories of colossal proportions, attached to primeval temples containing archives by which the positions of the planets might be traced and tested for centuries and millenniums, were never the work of Greece and Rome. Among the Etruscans, therefore, and subsequently among the Romans, it was the surrogates of astrology that occupied the central place. Apuleius explicitly asserts that the Chaldæans were the founders of astronomy and astrology. But, so far as the Romans concerned themselves with the study, they appealed to the works of an assumed Egyptian king called Nachepso and his astrologer Petosiris of Sais. At a later period Claudius Ptolemæus (A.D. 100–178) was regarded as the final authority in our twin sciences, and beside him we catch a glimpse of the somewhat legendary Hermes Trismegistos. But, as has been already indicated, the claims of astrology were not left unchallenged in this period. About the year A.D. 200 the famous physician Sextus Empiricus wrote a work in six books *πρὸς μαθηματικούς*, of which the fifth was directed *πρὸς ἀστρολόγους*. He prefaces his confutation by a sketch of the entire system of knowledge possessed by the Χαλδαῖοι, and in this he provides valuable materials for a thoroughgoing digest of the astrological texts in the library of Sardanapalus.

In this later period, however, astrology has maintained some degree of progress in the Far East. Among the Chinese and Japanese, occult art, in the modern 'fengshui,' seems rather to have taken the form of geomancy. Just as in the Near East astrology gave birth to hepatoscopy, so in China and Japan the interpretation of the planets in the celestial vault has been transformed into divination by the carapace of the tortoise. Similarly the Gypsies have developed a system of fortune-telling from the open hand; and the designation of the convexities of the palm as 'mounts' of the various planets shows us that this practice also is a surrogate of astrology.

LITERATURE.—The significance of astronomy and astrology for the interpretation of the religious conceptions of the ancient East, as also for the exegesis of the Bible, has only recently been recognized. There is as yet no comprehensive work dealing with the subject. Contributions to the study have come mainly from the hand of H. Winckler (especially in *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*, Leipzig, 1907), of whom A. Jeremias (*Die Panbabylonisten, der alte Orient und die aegyptische Religion*, Leipzig, 1907) has proved an able ally. Fugitive essays have appeared in considerable numbers, principally in publications of the *Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft* and the *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*; Hinrichs (Leipzig) has also issued a number. At first the new exegetical theory encountered very strong opposition, but afterwards seemed to have won a general assent; more recently, however, the work of Kugler, already referred to and appraised, has given it a partial reverse. K. Sudhoff (*Iatromathematiker, vornemlich im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Breslau, 1902) and the present writer, starting from the history of medicine, have studied the ancient astronomy and astrology, and have arrived at the same results as Winckler, though by a very different path. The present writer has also written numerous essays on the subject, and these have appeared in various periodicals, medical, philological, and theological, esp. *Die Angaben der Berliner Planetentafel*, p. 8279, Berlin, 1903, *Das Horoscop der Empfängnis Christi*, do. 1903. These publications are based upon cuneiform and hieroglyphic (or demotic) texts which have only recently become accessible.

The leading work for the discovery of the relevant cuneiform texts is C. Bezold, *Catalogue of the Cuneiform Tablets in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum*, 5 vols. The shorter texts are to some extent accessible in Thompson, *Reports of the Magicians and Astronomers of Nineveh and Babylon* (1900). Outgrowths of Oriental astronomy and astrology are found in the writings of Claudius Ptolemæus, Claudius Valens, Paulus Alexandrinus, Julius Firmicus Maternus, and Marcus Manilius, and also in the works of opponents, such as Sextus Empiricus, Cicero (*de Divinatione*), Horace, Juvenal, Pliny, and, in the 15th and 16th cents., Hieronymus Cardamus and Pico de Mirandola. Boll, *Sphæra*, is a modern comprehensive work dealing with classical astrology and astronomy, but the author had not the requisite data for a corresponding treatment of the ancient East. The latest cuneiform texts from the period of the Persian kings and the Seljüks have been utilized by Kugler in vol. i. of a work to be completed in 5 vols. E. Stucken, *Astralmythen* (Leipzig, 1907), admirably depicts the process by which the myths and legends of the various races of mankind grow out of the same original astrological conceptions, and arranges the stupendous mass of materials according to their affinities with the Biblical narratives regarding Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Esau, and Moses. A short manual of astrology by Ernst Mayer, entitled *Kurzes Handbuch der Astrologie*, and giving technical information about the placing of the horoscope, was published by Dekker (Berlin, 1891). A vast aggregation of data relating to the vestiges of astrology in Asia and the South Seas may be gleaned from the *Mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, in *Der Janus* (*Archiv für Gesch. der Medicin*), and in the publications of Sanskrit scholars. The attempt to furnish a more detailed bibliography than the present is always confronted with the difficulty of knowing which of the manifold ramifications of our subject the reader is interested in. In one or other of the leading works here cited, however, the student will find a more complete list of works relating to the particular field of inquiry with which he is concerned.

F. VON OEFELE.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Primitive).—Knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies is possessed in varying degrees by most primitive peoples. In the earlier stages of civilization that continued observation which is necessary to arrive at a reasoned explanation, which is the foundation of astronomical science, is not possible through lack of proper means of recording its results, nor is it called for by the practical requirements of a population which lives chiefly by hunting. For an agricultural people, however, foreknowledge of the recurring seasons becomes essential, and it is necessary that some means should be found to mark the proper seasons for performing the operations to ensure the food supply. In the stars, with their regular motions of rising and setting, primitive man has found the earliest and most convenient calendar. In default of a theory based upon a series of observations, the supposed movement of the sun round the earth, the phases of the moon and the motion of the stars, the shape and character of the sky, have been explained by formulæ composed of material drawn from the texture of man's religious beliefs. The celestial bodies, equally with his fellows and material surroundings, he considers to be animated with a personality like his own, though more powerful. Starting from this fundamental assumption, primitive man has fashioned for himself, in his legends, a fairly complete explanation of the celestial phenomena which come under his observation.

1. **Sun and moon.**—It is almost universal among primitive races that both sun and moon should be regarded as alive and quasi-human in nature. Their sex differs among different races, but the moon is more commonly male and the sun female. Relation between them, varying in character, is also recognized. Among the Dieri of Australia the sun is the daughter of a Dieri woman, who after her birth sank into the earth in shame. The natives of Encounter Bay say that the sun is a woman who has a lover among the dead. Each night she descends among the dead. At her rising she appears in a red kangaroo skin, given her by her lover. A Wotjobaluk legend relates that the sun is a woman who was digging yams and reached the West; after wandering round the earth she came back to the other side, and has done the same ever since. The Wurunjerri say that the sun is the sister of every one. This may be compared with the story of the origin of the sun told by the Arunta. At Alice Springs there is a tradition that in the Alcheringa the sun came out of the earth at a spot now marked by a stone in the country of the Bandicoot people, in the form of a spirit woman, accompanied by two other Panunga women, who were sisters, the elder of whom carried a child. The spirit woman went up into the sky, and she does this every day, visiting the old spot at night and rising in the morning. A medicine-man could see her in the hole, but not a person with ordinary vision. The two women settled among the Bandicoot people, and originated a local sun totem. This totem may be compared with the sun totem of the Incas. The sun has a definite relation to each individual member of the various divisions, belonging itself to the Panunga division, as did the two women. Among these people a ceremony connected with the woman and the child is performed, in which symbols of the sun are worn.

The Masai say that the sun married the moon, and they had a fight. Each damaged the other. The sun was so ashamed that he became bright, in order that people might not be able to look at him. The moon was not ashamed, and it is possible to see that her mouth is damaged and that one eye is missing.

It is interesting to note that, while the sun is a man and the moon a woman, the Masai word for sun, *eng-oloñg*, is feminine, and *ol-apa*, 'the moon,' is masculine. The Bushman story goes that the sun was an old man, from whose armpit light radiated; some children threw him up in the sky, where he stuck.

Occasionally both sun and moon are feminine. Among the Mantras the sun is a woman, who is continually being pulled by a string held by her lord. The moon is a woman, the wife of Moyang Bertang, who sits in the moon making nooses for men.

(*a*) *Origin and movements of the sun.*—The origin of the sun, as related in the Tembeh legend of Sam-mor and his battle with Naing, has advanced beyond the anthropomorphic stage. When Sammor had imprisoned Naing, he rolled the fire with which he had fought into a ball, and this, as the sun, still revolves round the mountain to watch Naing. This conception of the sun as inanimate is probably due to external influence, but it has a parallel among the Gallinomeros of Central California, where the hawk and the coyote, after jostling one another painfully in the darkness which then prevailed, collected two masses of inflammable substance; the hawk then flew up into the sky with them, and lighted them with flint. They give light as the sun and the moon. The Wurunjerri believe that the sun was made by Puppu-imbul, one of the race inhabiting the earth while everything was dark. This personage, it is hardly necessary to point out, belongs to the race of demiurges of which Prometheus is the type.

The sun did not always cross the sky in the same leisurely manner as at present. The great feat of Maui, the Maori hero, was that he tamed the sun. According to one version, he beat him so unmercifully that he lamed him, and he has walked slowly ever since. In Samoa the sun had a child by a Samoan woman, who trapped the sun by a rope made of vine. Another Samoan lassoed the sun, and made him promise to go slowly. The same or an analogous explanation is found in Aztec folk-lore and in North America. On the other hand, in Australia and in Melanesia the sun did not set. In the myth of the aborigines of Victoria, Norralie decided that the sun should disappear at intervals, and addressed it in an incantation, 'Sun,

sun, burn your wood, burn your internal substance, and go down.' The sun now burns his fuel in a day, and goes below for fresh firewood (R. Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria*, iv. 430). In Melanesia Qat (the Melanesian hero) went to Qong ('night') and begged assistance. The latter put him to sleep, and, in twelve hours or so, crept up from the horizon and sent the sun crawling to the West (Codrington, *JAI*, Feb. 1881). In a Brazilian myth, a man ('the great serpent') who owned night sent it in a gourd to his daughter on her marriage; the messengers opened the gourd and let it out.

Various explanations are given of the sunset. The simplest is that the sun sinks into a hole, occasionally the hole from which he arose. The Dieri say it sinks into a hole near Lake Eyre, and in the night travels underground to the East, in the same manner as it was believed to do in ancient Egyptian belief. Not infrequently the sunset myth takes the form of a legend of a personal hero plunging into the body of a personal night. Maui was caught in the mouth of Hine-nui-te-po, 'Great Daughter of Night,' and thus brought darkness and death into the world. Since then the sun descends into the under world, and repeats the battle with Hine-nui-te-po every night. An explanation of sunset is that Maui took fire, and when it burnt him he plunged into the sea. Among the Basutos, all men but Litaolane were devoured by a monster. He also was swallowed, but cut his way out. The Zulu story of the rescue of Princess Utombende is of a similar character.

(*b*) *Origin and movements of the moon.*—The moon occupies a prominent place in primitive folk-lore for which her periodical growth, diminution, and disappearance, phases more marked than those of the sun, may not unreasonably be held to be responsible. Like the sun, the moon is regarded as a living person. Allusion has already been made to the variation in the attribution of sex to the moon among different peoples. One or two further instances which illustrate other points of lunar mythology may be added. Among the Aruntas the moon is a big man (*etwa oknurcha*). They say that, when there was no moon in the sky, a man died and rose again as a boy. The people ran away. He said, 'Do not run away or you will die. I shall die, but will rise again in the sky.' He grew up and died, reappearing as the moon. Since then he dies periodically. When he is not visible, he goes away to his two wives who live in the west. A second legend of the origin of the moon, which is found among the same tribes, relates that the moon was carried by a blackfellow in the hollow of his shield, who hid it in a cleft of the rocks during the day. Once it was stolen from his shield while lying on the ground. He pursued the robber but could not catch him, so he shouted that the moon should go up into the sky and give light to the people during the night. In South-East Victoria in one myth the moon is an old man who climbed a tree to pick grubs. His sons made the tree grow to the sky, where he became the moon. The Dieri say that there was once no moon; the old men held a council, and a *mura-mura* gave them a moon in order that they might know when to hold their ceremonies. The same reason for the moon's existence is given among the Todas.

The marks on the face of the moon are explained in various ways. The Eskimos say that these marks are the ashes which were smeared on his face by his sister the sun, when he tried to embrace her. Among the Besisi it is said that their chief ancestor Gaffer Engkoh once fell to earth and climbed back to the moon by means of a festoon which he plaited. His comrade Porang Aliyan ascended with Engkoh, but the latter slipped back quickly, taking his rope with him. Porang now dwells in the moon, protecting the souls of the dead who visit the moon from wild beasts. The Mantras believe the dark spots on the moon to be a tree. The Malays see in the moon a banyan tree, under which sits a hunchback plaiting a fishing line. When the line is finished, he will fish up everything on earth, but a rat always gnaws away the line. This belief also occurs in Sumatra. The Malays also say 'the moon is great with a mouse deer,' a belief possibly derived from the Sanskrit idea of the hare which was taken up into the moon for protection. In Mexico it was said that a god smote the moon in the face with a rabbit (Sahagun, viii. 2); in Zululand and Tibet a hare was translated to the moon. The connexion between the hare and the moon is also found among the Namaquas of South Africa. The hare was sent to men to confer upon them a return to life after death, but by a mistake in the message made them mortal. In Fiji the same point of human mortality was argued between the moon and the rat. The latter prevailed.

The Wotjobaluk also connect the moon with a resurrection after death. When all animals were men and women, the moon used to say, 'You up again,' and the dead came to life. An old man said, 'Let them remain dead'; none then came to life except the moon. The connexion is obviously suggested by the necessity for finding an explanation of the phases of the moon. Various explanations are current. The Masai say that the sun carries the moon in his arms when she is tired. After carrying her for two days, he leaves her in his setting-place. On the fourth day she is visible to donkeys. On the fifth day men and cattle see her again. The Wiimbaio say that the moon did not die periodically until so ordered by Nurelli. The natives of Encounter Bay held that the moon was a dissipated woman who spent her time among the men, but when she wasted away they drove her out. While she is in seclusion she feeds upon nourishing roots and becomes plump again (Brough Smyth, *op. cit.* i. 432).

(*c*) *Eclipses.*—An eclipse, whether of the sun or of the moon, is at all times regarded with dread; it is almost universally believed, at the early stages at least, to be caused by a monster who devours, or attempts to devour, the luminary. See art. PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, vol. x. p. 368 f.

2. Stars.—The belief that the stars are great men and divinities translated to the heavens occurs among nearly every people in the world. Stars are grouped together in constellations which represent persons, many of them large, sometimes including one or more of the constellations of our astronomy. The inhabitants of Torres Straits include in their constellation Tagai—a hero who stands at the head of a canoe holding a spear and a bunch of fruit—the Southern Cross, Scorpio, Sagittarius, Corvus, and stars of Lupus and Centaurus. The 'Shark' includes the Great Bear and Arcturus and Gemma. In New Zealand Orion's Belt is Maui's Elbow, while the Southern Cross is identified with the stern of the canoe of Tamarete. Among the Wurunjerri of Australia α and β Crucis and α and β Centauri and other stars are the sons of Bunjil, the latter himself being Altair. Two stars on either side of him are his wives, who belong to the black swan totem, while his brother Nurong and his wives are Antares and adjacent stars. Bunjil and his sons were translated to the sky in a whirlwind. The whole group is intimately connected with the totemic system, Bunjil or Pund-jel being an Australian demiurge. At Alice Springs in Australia the Aruntas say the Evening Star is a woman who went into the earth at a spot marked by a white stone at Temple Bar in the Macdonnell Range, leaving her *churinga* behind. Every child

conceived at this stone belongs to the Evening Star totem, although it is in the lizard totem country, and any child conceived *near* the stone is a lizard. Orion's Belt is said to be a group of young men dancing corroboree. Jupiter, the 'foot of day' (Ginabong-Bearp), was a chief among the old spirits, a race translated before the appearance of man. Among the Eskimos of Greenland, Orion's Belt is 'the Lost Ones,' a number of seal hunters who lost their way home. The Pleiades, an extremely important group of stars for primitive peoples, were known to the Indians of North America as 'the Dancers,' to the Lapps as a company of virgins, and to the Australians as a group of girls playing corroboree. The Aruntas believed them to be women who went up into the sky and have remained there ever since. A legend of the Wurunjerri runs that, when some young women were digging yams, the crow stole their yam sticks. They were swept into the air, when Bellin-Bellin let the whirlwind out of the bag, and the stars are the fire on the end of their yam sticks. Another version says that the group is Bunjil's daughter and two men who were turned into women by Bunjil's son, each receiving yam sticks from Bunjil's daughter. The almost unvarying association of the Pleiades with women among different races is remarkable. It thus appears that the legends which attribute an heroic and human origin to the stars and constellations contain the germs of conceptions which have been utilized by modern astronomy in mapping out the heavens.

Stars, however, are not always translated human, divine, and 'semi'-divine beings. Allusion has already been made to the Malay and Sakai belief that stars are clefts in a superincumbent rock. Take-mahuta, in the Polynesian story, after separating his father and his mother, stuck stars all over his father's body. Maui, after slaying his sons, placed an eye of each in the heaven as the morning and evening star respectively—a story which represents a transition stage between the two groups of animate and inanimate origin.

It is not surprising to find the stars regarded as the moon's children. The Mantras say that once the sun and moon, who were both women, had many children, the stars. They agreed to devour them. While the sun did as agreed, the moon hid her children, producing them afterwards. The sun, being very angry, now pursues the moon but cannot catch her, though sometimes she succeeds in biting her, causing an eclipse. The same story is told by the Hos of Chota Nāgpur. In this story, however, the sun threw a hatchet at the moon and cut her in two.

For practical purposes among most primitive peoples the stars perform a more important function than the sun. By their rising and setting the times of the feasts and ceremonies are determined, and among agricultural peoples their movements serve as a calendar by which the various operations in cultivating the soil are regulated. In the Torres Straits, Tagai marks the time for new yams and the migrations of turtle; Seg, the time for another kind of yam. The Murray Islanders also use Tagai as a mark in navigation. The rising of the constellation Dorgai, which coincides with the North-West Monsoon, is the time to 'make dance.' The natives of Borneo, especially the Dayaks, watch for the Pleiades to determine when to prepare their ground for planting. When it is estimated that the wet season is approaching, men are sent to the forest to watch for the rising of the Pleiades. The Kenyahs and Kayans of Borneo measure the length of the sun's shadow by means of a marked stick with the same object (C. Hose, *JRAS*, Straits Branch, Jan. 1905). The importance of such observation of sidereal phenomena is evident when it is remembered that in tropical regions the seasons bring little or no sign of change to serve as the farmer's calendar. The Masai recognize that the rainy season is approaching when they see the Pleiades, while in the Society Islands the year is divided into two halves, *Matari-i-inia* and *Matari-i-raro* according as this constellation is visible above the horizon after sunset or not. In fact, over nearly the whole world the rising of the Pleiades is the beginning of the year or a cycle, marks the time for feasts, and is an occasion of ceremonial observance. It may be recalled in passing that Penrose found that the Hecatompedon and the old Erechtheum had been ascribed to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May day; and in Britain, it is suggested, while Stonehenge appears to have been built in relation to the rising of the sun at the summer solstice, the 'Hurlers' in Cornwall on *prima facie* evidence seem to have been built in relation to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May morning B.C. 1600 approximately.

In some cases the use of the stars as a calendar is not immediately obvious, but is a matter of interpretation. In Australia, Yuree and Wanjel (Castor and Pollux) pursue the Kangaroo (Capella) and kill him at the beginning of the great heat, and the mirage is the smoke of the fire they roast him by. Marpean-Kurrk and Neilloan (Arcturus and Lyra) discovered the ant-pupa and the eggs of the loan bird and taught the aborigines to use them for food. As Tylor points out, these legends and their analogues may fairly be interpreted as indicating the seasons when the pupa and eggs may be found, the great heat expected, and so forth.

3. Signs and omens. — The train of thought underlying primitive astronomical theory would seem peculiarly adapted to foster the magical conceptions and analogies upon which astrological reasoning is based. Omens and signs, favourable and unfavourable, are and have always been the object of constant observation in the past of savage and semi-civilized people. It is, therefore, not surprising that peculiar powers in controlling human events should be attributed to those heavenly bodies which are regarded as endowed with powers similar to but greater than those possessed by human beings. Even when a stage has been reached at which the magic powers of the witch no longer gain credence, belief in the power of the moon or the first star of the evening to grant a wish remains as evidence of a time when the favour of the heavenly bodies was essential to success. Lacking the knowledge necessary for the pseudo-scientific cartography of astrology, primitive races never attained the heights of judicial astrology. Yet the belief that, for instance, a child born under Leo would possess qualities usually associated with a lion is one with which a savage would find himself in full sympathy. The Malays possess an elaborate system by which the year is mapped out into lucky and unlucky periods depending upon a rotation of days, each associated with deities, planets, and lucky and unlucky colours, and are acquainted with the use of the magic squares. But their astrological science has been borrowed from the Hindus and Arabs. In the case of races which may truly be described as primitive, the germ of the science rather than the science itself is found, while vestigial traces of these primitive beliefs linger in the popular folk-lore of civilized countries. The belief that the weather changes with the phases of the moon is found among the Ewe peoples of West Africa, where a certain number of days' rain is said to accompany each of the four changes of the moon. At these times they are forbidden to take purgatives, and children and cattle are born. At the rising of Ezā (Orion) rain

falls for seven days in accordance with the number of stars in the group; three days' rain follows the rising of the group Atielo, while the star Toro is peculiarly favourable to huntsmen, who call this time *Ladorgbe*, 'animal chop grass' (P. Fr. Müller, 'Folkloristische Ewhetexte' (Gē-Dialekt), *Globus*, lxxix. Jan. 17, 1901). These beliefs, however, may be regarded as generalizations from imperfect data assisted by magic, rather than as originating in a magical connexion. A less doubtful case of intimate relation between celestial and terrestrial phenomena occurs in the widely distributed belief, still common in European folk-lore, that fertility of crops and success in an enterprise depend on an action undertaken under a waning moon. The Lithuanians wean boys on a waxing, and girls on a waning moon, believing that in the one case it provides strength, in the other, slenderness and grace.

An instance of a belief which most nearly approaches judicial astrology is quoted by Tylor (*Prim. Cult.*[4] i. 129) from Shortland. The Maoris when besieging a 'pa' believed that the result could be foretold by the relative position of Venus and the moon; if the planet were above the moon, the foe would conquer; if below, the home force would be victorious.

LITERATURE.—No comprehensive study of *primitive* astronomy on scientific lines has been made; reference to astronomical legends and a few identifications of stars known to the natives will be found scattered in works dealing with individual races. General principles of study will be found in E. B. Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[4] 2 vols., 1904, and A. Lang, *Myth, Rit. and Relig.* 1899. See also Sir N. Lockyer, *Dawn of Astronomy*, 1894. For ceremonies connected with the Pleiades see R. Andree in *Globus*, lxiv. no. 22. Instances here quoted are taken chiefly from W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900; Skeat-Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906; A. W. Howitt, *Nat. Tr. of S.E. Aust.*, 1906; Spencer-Gillen, *Nat. Tr. of Cent. Aust.*, 1898; A. C. Haddon, *Head Hunters*, 1901; A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, 1905; Sir G. Grey, *Polynesian Mythology*, 1855.

E. N. FALLAIZE.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (American).—

1. Sources.—A large part of our knowledge of the astrology and astronomy of the American Indians is derived from their traditions as reported by early European and American missionaries and travellers. These writers had the advantage of contact with the various tribes before European influence had extensively modified their modes of thought, but they paid little attention to astronomical traditions. The few constellations mentioned by them are seldom identified, and the identifications are frequently indefinite or incorrect. A number of works by native authors give tribal tradition in authentic form, but little astronomy.

In Mexico and Yucatan a few codices, which escaped destruction at the hands of the Spanish priests, contain many complex astronomical symbols of which little is definitely known as yet, but from which, undoubtedly, much will eventually be learned. They are supplemented by hieroglyphs on structures and monuments. In Guatemala there is the *Popol Vuh*, or 'Book of the People' (ed. and tr. Brasseur de Bourbourg, Paris, 1861), and in Peru Salcamayhua's Spanish account of Aymara Quichua antiquities (tr. Markham, Hakluyt Society, 1873). These manuscripts either are of pre-Columbian origin or present pre-Columbian material with slight European modifications. They include some myths and legends having an astronomical basis (cf. also Brinton, *Annals of the Cakchiquels*, Philadelphia, 1885; and *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, ed. Ximenez de la Espada, Madrid, 1879). Until recently even scientific travellers have often shown indifference towards astronomical traditions, but ethnologists now recognize the importance of this subject and are collecting material which, in spite of the long contact between Indians and Europeans, affords sufficient evidence of native origin.

In North America these traditions are supplemented by a few valuable star charts. Three have recently been collected amongst the Osages, Pawnees, and Huichols (Dorsey, in *9 RBEW*, p. 378; *Field Columbian Museum Report*, xi. pl. 72; Lumholtz, in *Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History*, iii. 57 ff.). The two first are intimately associated with the ritual of the tribal secret societies. The Osage chart represents the Hyades, Pleiades, morning and evening stars, sun and moon, and probably the Milky Way and part of Scorpio. The Pawnee chart shows the Pole Star, Great and Little Bear, Northern Crown, Orion, Hyades, Pleiades, Milky Way, and probably Capella; that of the Huichols depicts as stars or constellations the Scorpion (Scorpio) and its Heart (Antares), the Deer (Taurus?), which is pursued by the Dog, a Woman bearing a child, the Crab, Beehive, Humming Bird, and other objects. The winter counts of the Western tribes represented each year by some important event, which is pictured upon a buffalo hide. Naturally they include astronomical figures. That of Lone Dog, for example, presents the meteoric shower of 1833, a comet, and a solar eclipse. The altars of Pueblo secret societies furnish numerous stellar symbols, as is shown by the researches of Cushing and Fewkes in *RBEW*, *JAFL*, and *Amer. Anthropologist*. Tablets inscribed with astronomical characters have been found at Rockford, Illinois, Mitchell Co., North Carolina, and in Missouri. Excepting the rayed solar face, crescent moon, and morning and evening stars, the characters upon these tablets have not been satisfactorily deciphered.[1]

The Mexican calendar stones present another and an elaborate source of astronomical symbolism, to which considerable study has been directed (see CALENDAR [Mexican]). Inscribed stones of astronomical significance have also been found in the Chibcha region of Colombia. The symbols seem to correspond with those ascribed to the Chibcha calendar and constellations by Duquesne (cf. Bollaert, *Antiquarian Researches*, London, 1860; also Humboldt, *Researches*, and Lemly, in *Century Mag.*, 1891, p. 885). A circular gold 'zodiac' from Cuzco presents a solar rayed face surrounded by twelve unknown symbols (Bollaert, *op. cit.* p. 146; Markham, *Cuzco and Lima*, London, 1856, pp. 107–108; Winsor, *Critical and Narrative History of America*, Boston, 1884–1889, i. 235). A wooden box from the west coast of South America figured by Kingsborough (*Mexican Antiquities*, London, 1831, iv.) presents Peruvian symbols of the sun and moon, Orion, Taurus, the Pleiades, and other constellations, but they are associated with symbols of European origin.

A most valuable source of astronomical knowledge is the Peruvian star chart of Salcamayhua, a pure-blooded Aymara of the ruling class, who wrote during the first quarter of the 17th century. With the exception of a prudential reference to the symbol of the Southern Cross, this chart presents only native concepts. It gives symbols of the sun and moon, morning and evening stars, southern pole, Coal Sack, Milky Way, and all the zodiacal asterisms (cf. Hagar, in *Compte Rendu du Congrès international des Américanistes*, Paris, 1900, p. 271 ff.).

2. Scientific knowledge.—The use of gnomons, natural and artificial, was wide-spread in America. Amongst many of the tribes there are still old men who delight in determining the seasons and the time of day by the position and direction of the solar shadows. The Pueblos have measured and named the sunrise points on the eastern horizon so as to divide the year into two periods of six months, and the time of the equinox is determined with great care. The Zuñis used as a gnomon an erect sandstone slab adorned with a solar effigy (Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday*, New York, 1901, pp. 305–306; Fewkes, *Annual Ceremonies at Walpi*, Leyden, 1895).

At Chapultepec, in 1775, a stone was found under which three crossed arrows pointed accurately to the equinoctial and solstitial sunrise points (Bollaert, in *Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London*, i. 210 ff.). The main doorway of the chief temple of Cuzco fronted the north-east, so that at the June solstice the rays of the rising sun would penetrate into the temple and illumine the solar plate at the opposite end, thus recalling the temples of Egypt and Greece; and the early Christian cathedrals oriented to the sunrise point on the day of the saint to whom they were dedicated. It is not unlikely that the orientation of Mexican and Peruvian structures will enable future investigators to determine the dates of their construction by means of the method so brilliantly pursued by Lockyer in Egypt and Penrose in Greece (Lockyer, *Dawn of Astronomy*, London, 1894). Beebe has shown that the monolithic gateway and a large stone platform at Tiahuanaco probably served as a solar dial. The

[1] See *Proceedings of Davenport Acad. of Sciences*; J. P. McLean, *The Mound Builders*, Cincinnati, 1879, p. 118; Short, *North Americans of Antiquity*, New York, 1880, p. 38. W. S. Beebe, who made a special study of the Davenport and Piqua tablets, attempted a full explanation of both. He makes the former wholly and the latter partly astronomical, but his interpretation of the latter stands little chance of acceptance in the present stage of our knowledge. A copy of his privately printed notes is deposited in the Davenport Academy, Davenport, Iowa. One is in the author's possession.

sides of the pyramids of Mexico and Central America are often aligned to the cardinal points. In Mexico, Nobel describes a perpendicular shaft in the pyramid of Xochicalco which permitted the rays of the zenith sun to fall upon an altar in an interior chamber. The shadows cast by the steps of the pyramid of Papantla were observed for calendar purposes (Humboldt, *Researches*, ii. 87), and tradition indicates a similar use of the steps and platforms at Cuzco known as the 'Monkeys' Dance.' Mrs. Zelia Nuttall, moreover (*Boas Anniversary Volume*, New York, 1906, pp. 290–299), points out various pictographs in the Mexican codices which represent priests observing the stars to determine the time. The different divisions of time were marked by the sounding of drums or trumpets in the temples. The priests used various methods to fix the position of the asterisms. They observed them through the doorway of the temple, which was elevated above the surrounding country, sometimes placing forked or bifurcated sticks within the doorway to define the position more exactly, and sometimes using a peculiar figure representing the drawn-up limbs of a seated man for the same purpose. A possible use of rows of upright sticks is also indicated.

The Peruvians are also said to have noted the solstices and equinoxes by means of the shadows cast by certain columns. Those on the equator were held most sacred, because at the equinox they cast no shadow (Garcilasso de la Vega, *Commentarios reales de los Incas*, vi. 22). These columns have never been found, but circular stone sun-dials, called *intihuatana*, 'the sun tied up,' exist on the Carmenca hill at Cuzco, where the 'columns' are said to have stood, and elsewhere. A shadow is cast thereon by a small erect stone, which, Squier suggests, may rightly have been known as the *inti rucana*, or 'sun-finger.'

Alleged telescopic tubes have been found in the mounds of the United States and in Peru (Bollaert, *op. cit.* pp. 213, 276; du Gourcq, in *Popular Science Monthly*, xlv. 832), but were probably used by the physicians, who in the latter country were expert in sucking poison from wounds and diseased tissues. The Mexican astronomers, however, seem to have employed obsidian mirrors in their observations (Nuttall, 'Fundamental Principles of New and Old World Civilization,' in *Peabody Museum Publications*, ii., Cambridge, Mass., 1901).

The more advanced American nations, such as the Mayas and Aztecs of Mexico, and the Aymaras and Quichuas of Peru, seem to have attained an astronomical knowledge nearly, if not fully, equal to that of any people prior to the invention of telescopes; they had learnt all that could be learnt by the unaided eye. Their principal practical incentive to stellar observation was the accurate determination of seed-time and harvest, this being elaborated into a calendar. They do not seem to have attained to the heliocentric system, but they knew the cause of the lunar phases, and distinguished the five brighter planets. The Mexicans estimated their synodic periods accurately, and the Peruvians observed the sun-spots (Humboldt, *Vues des Cordillères*, ii. 302, *Researches*, ii. 173; Salcamayhua, *op. cit.* p. 131; du Gourcq, *op. cit.* p. 825), large spots being sometimes visible to the naked eye through the mist or light cloud (*qarua*) which is of common occurrence in Peru. In some myths the sun and other celestial bodies, and even the earth, are represented as balls or globes. This does not necessarily imply either European influence or exact knowledge. It may be an analogy derived from the supposed hollow ball of the sky.

3. Astrology.—A system of astrology was undoubtedly in vogue in America. The *Tonalamatl*, or book of lucky and unlucky days, included in the Mexican codices, indicates the propitious and unpropitious times for performing certain actions. In the Codex Vaticanus a human figure appears surrounded by the day signs, which have also zodiacal associations. The commentator says that the influence of month signs upon the moment of birth was an established belief.

'The Mexicans,' says Sahagun (*Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*, iv. Introd.), 'take much care to know the day and hour of birth of each person in order to conjecture his destiny, life, and death, but they do not base their prognostications upon the positions of the stars.' Nevertheless, the stars warn a god that he must go away in five years (H. Phillips, jun., in *Proc. of American Philosophical Soc.* xxi. 617 f. [Philadelphia]). In Guatemala diviners were called upon to determine the propitious date for each monthly festival. As soon as a child was born, it was brought before the diviner, who, observing the day of birth, told what the child would be and what disposition it would show. He announced these things after consulting a book which contained the month and day signs (Ximenez, *Las Historias del origen de los Indios de Guatemala*, Vienna, 1857, pp. 158–160). In Peru one class of priests devoted themselves to divination by observation of the stars, and the chief priest dwelt away from the Inca capital that he might observe them and meditate more freely upon them. In the solitude of the mountain deserts lived priests who contemplated and adored the stars 'almost without ceasing.' People visited them to learn about lost articles, absent friends, and future events. Even the wild tribes of Eastern Peru regard some constellations as propitious to man, others as hostile (Lorente, *Hist. del Peru*, Lima, 1860, p. 229; Markham, *Cuzco and Lima*; von Tschudi, *Travels in Peru*, New York, 1854, p. 288; 'Relacion anonima,' in *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, pp. 157, 164, 178).

It is said that the coming of the Spaniards had been predicted many times by these observations. Atahualpa's general is quoted as saying to his ruler just before the arrival of the Spaniards became known: 'My lord, I watched the stars last night, and saw in them the presage of a great calamity.' Later, Atahualpa himself declared that the appearance of a comet in the Sword of Perseus presaged the death of a man of high rank, and that a similar sign had been seen in the skies a short time before the death of his father, Huayna Ccapac. He was murdered soon after. A diviner, by observing the appearance of the moon, is said to have foretold to Huayna Ccapac the civil war between his sons and the destruction of the Inca rule. Comets and a thunderbolt which fell upon that Inca's Cuzco palace occasioned analogous predictions. Similar prophecies in Mexico were not so clearly attributed to the stars (Garcilasso, *Commentarios reales*, tr. Markham, Hakluyt Society, v. 28, ix. 14; Humboldt, *Views of Nature*, London, 1856, p. 429; Prescott, *Conquest of Peru*, bk. ii. ch. 6).

4. Ritual.—The ceremonials of the various tribes also include astronomical features; in fact many of their elements seem to have originated in the wish to imitate on earth the aspects and movements of the celestial world. The imitations of animals in the dances of the primitive tribes arise among those more advanced to elaborate figures, dances, and processions reflecting the orderly movement of the sun and stars across the sky and the progress of time and of the seasons. The American Indians as a whole are a thoughtful and religious race, much given to ceremonials. Even their games and sports, even their ordinary details of domestic life, are made part of the religious ritual to be ceremonially performed, and from the grandest to the most insignificant details of their ritual much is based upon astronomical symbolism.

In the various ball games found from one end of the continent to the other, the movement of the ball originally represented that of the sun (Brinton,

Myths of the New World, New York, 1868, *American Hero Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 119). Among the Cherokees, prior to the contest, the opposing teams were carefully instructed in the use of magic formulæ, and the issue was supposed to depend upon the amount of magic power thereby developed (Mooney, in 7 *RBEW*, p. 301 ff.). In Yucatan and Central America the ball court itself represented the celestial field. The game was won by the player who drove the ball through a stone ring upon which two interlaced serpents, symbols of the eternal years, were sculptured. The *Popol Vuh* describes contests at this game, the result of which determined the control of *Xibalba*, or Shadow Land; and Mrs. Nuttall asserts that the ball courts were also used as astronomical observatories. The Araucanians saw the divine will in the result of the game, and used it to decide the fate of those accused of crime.

It is probable that the annual ceremonial hunts, once common in the South-western United States, formed a terrestrial imitation of the celestial Hunter, as in Peru, and foot-races also symbolized the solar journey. In the Mexican game of 'those who fly' the celestial revolution was symbolized by four men masked as eagles who circled about a pole at the end of four cords wound round it (Clavigero, *Historia*, ed. Mora, Mexico, 1844; Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 24 f.). Dice games, common in North America, reflect the celestial imagery on both dice and board. The Mexican game of Patolli uses a cruciform board representing the four celestial regions, through the divisions of which a stone marker progresses like one of the celestial bodies (Sahagun, *op. cit.* vi. 8; Culin, 'American Indian Games' in 24 *RBEW*; Nuttall, *op. cit.* pp. 82, 87). A serpent-dance in which the dancers imitated the motion of the serpent existed until recently among the Micmacs and other Northern tribes, and in Peru. In the North the dance symbolized the movement of the Pleiades across the sky (Hagar, in *Congrès international des Américanistes*, New York, 1902, and *JAFL* xiii. 92 ff.). The famous serpent-dance of the Hopis, figured on Mexican and Central American monuments, was a rain-making ceremonial performed in August under the sign of the Tiger Sun (Leo). The well-known mural paintings in the Temple of the Tigers at Chichen Itza represent a similar ceremony also dedicated to the Tiger Sun. In the Mandan buffalo-dance, twelve dancers divided into groups of four represented the cardinal points, and doubtless also the twelve regions and the months. Two of the middle four were painted black and dotted white to represent the night sky and the stars. The other two, painted red, personated the day (Catlin, in *Smithsonian Report*, 1885, p. 359), and the movement represented alternating day and night. The Natchez ceremonially gathered to watch the rising and setting solstitial sun through the doorway of their temple. The sun-dances of various tribes dramatize the progress of time and the seasons. The nocturnal Iroquois feast of the dead seems to have celebrated the return of the spirits to earth over the Milky Way in spring and fall.

At the end of each fifty-two years' period the Mexicans expected that the midnight culmination of the Pleiades would mark the end of the cosmos, or its renewal for a like period. All fires were extinguished, and the advance of the Pleiades towards the critical point was observed from the summit of the mountain called 'Hill of the Star.' The stars having passed the meridian, a fire was kindled upon the summit, from which fires were re-lighted elsewhere, and the people gave themselves over to rejoicing (Sahagun, *op. cit.* tom. i. lib. 4, tom. ii. lib. 7; Torquemada, *Monarquia Indiana*, tom. ii. 292–295; Boturini, *Idea*, pp. 18–21; Clavigero, *Storia antica del Messico*, tom. ii. pp. 62, 84, 85; Mendieta, *HE*, p. 101; Acosta, *Hist. de las Yndias*, pp. 398–399). In Peru as in Mexico this date marked the entrance of the sun into the sign of the dead, symbolizing death, destruction, and renewal.

The rising of the morning star, the Pleiades, and Gemini was hailed with songs and dances by many tribes. In Mexico there was an annual sacrifice of a human being, who enacted the yearly course of the sun. He ceremonially ascended the steps of the *teocalli*, or god-house, to represent the sun climbing from the south to the northern solstice. At the moment when the sun reached the meridian he was slain, and his body was hurled down the steps to represent the declining course of the sun after the northern solstice (Hagar, *Peruvian Astronomy*). Similarly, among the Chibchas a human victim fastened on a pole was annually slain by the arrows discharged by a ceremonial procession of people masked and costumed to represent the various zodiacal asterisms (Duquesne, in Bollaert, *Antiquarian Researches*, p. 47).

About the time of the December solstice, though in recent times not every year, the Skidi Pawnees sacrificed a maiden to the morning star. There is no reason to doubt the indigenous origin of this very remarkable and suggestive ritual, which is described in art. PAWNEE, vol. ix. p. 699[a].

In similar obstacle legends among the more advanced tribal families of the American Indians there are indications that the astronomical symbolism was itself used to typify as the ultimate meaning the progress of the human soul (cf. Dorsey, in *Congrès international des Américanistes, XVe session*, Quebec, 1907, ii. 66–70, and Natalie Curtis, *The Indians' Book*, New York, 1907, pp. 102, 103; the deductions are the writer's, and will be found further developed in his *Peruvian Astronomy*).

A monthly ritual is known to have existed among the Pueblos, Mexicans, Mayas, Central American tribes, Peruvians, and probably the Chibchas. Among all of them the features of these festivals referred to some attribute of the zodiacal asterism through which the sun was supposed to be passing at the time.

The plan of the Peruvian temple of Cacha, or 'the messenger,' as well as the remarkable legend connected with it, points to a ceremonial procession enacting the yearly course of the sun within the building. The importance of the stellar cult in Peru is indicated by the fact that the Peruvians made images of all their constellations.

5. Mythology and star-lore.—The arch of the sky was generally regarded as a kind of transparent roof, over which the heavenly bodies walk. The Chinooks on the north-west coast and the Peruvians represented it by two oblique lines meeting in an acute angle. Possibly the 'Maya arch' possessed a similar symbolism.[1] On the Peruvian box the sky is seen as a woman's breast. It forms the clothing of the Huichol eagle-goddess and of the wife of the Pawnee Spirit of Life, and is symbolized by the concave interior curve of some Central American and Pueblo vases (Dorsey, *op. cit.* p. xviii; Stevenson, *op. cit.* p. 24). Above the sky dwells the Sun Father, with his wife the Moon Mother (who is sometimes also his sister), attended by the divine pair of the morning and evening stars, and surrounded by their stellar children.

The sun and moon were regarded as the progenitors of the stars and of mankind, but seldom or never as the supreme celestial powers. They

[1] Collection of A. F. Chamberlain; Hagar, *Peruvian Astronomy*, Salcamayhua Chart.

were the objects of a celestial cult existing practically everywhere in America, in which, at different times and places, sun, moon, and various constellations seem to have assumed predominance without occasioning more than a relative change of influence. Nor is there much evidence of conflict between the votaries of the various aspects of the astronomical cults. Sectarianism was almost unknown in the natural religions of America; such tortures and persecutions as existed in Mexico, for example, had little or no connexion with religious or theological differences. In Mexican tradition two men, one of them leprous, threw themselves into a fire and came out respectively the sun and the moon.

The gender of the sun and moon is sometimes reversed. A legend found in almost identical form among the Eskimos, the Cherokees, and the Amazon tribes personifies the moon as a man who secretly visited his sister at night. She, desiring to identify her unknown visitor, rubbed upon his face some black substance, which produced the lunar spots. A similar legend occurs among the Caddos (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, Washington, 1905, pp. 11–12). The Iroquois saw in these spots an old woman who each month stirs a bowl of hominy with her cat (dog?) seated beside her. The Peruvians interpreted them as resulting from the embraces of a fox enamoured of her beauty; the Mexicans as a form of a rabbit, with which the gods struck the face of the moon, wishing to lessen its light, which formerly was as great as that of the sun. According to the Mexicans, the moon is always running after the sun, but never overtakes him. The divine being Quetzalcoatl made his son the sun, the god of water made his the moon (Phillips, *op. cit.*). The Onas of Patagonia make the sun pursue the moon (his wife) because she overheard some of the secrets of the male secret society. In terror she sprang off a cliff, the sun followed, and both jumped into the sky, where the pursuit continues (Barclay, in *Geographical Journal*, xxii. 62). In Corvichan tradition the sun, moon, and stars were shut up in three boxes, which were opened by the hero Yehl, whereupon they escaped to the sky (Deans, in *AAOJ* x. 111).

In higher Peruvian symbolism, the sun was tied by an invisible cord to the invisible pole of the sky, and was driven round it like a llama by the power of the Universal Spirit, although generally, after passing over the sky, he was thought to enter a cave in the west and to proceed by a subterranean passage to emerge next morning in the east. An equally interesting explanation of the origin of night and day is found in the Wichita legend (echoed by the Caddo) of the three deer, who are three stars, pursued by a fourth, which is a hunter who will overtake them at the end of the world. One deer is white, representing day, one black, representing night, one half black and half white, representing alternate day and night. The last was wounded, whence we have day and night (Dorsey, *Myth. of the Wichita*, Washington, 1904, pp. 21, 25–26, *Traditions of the Caddo*, pp. 13–14).

Among the Peruvian coast tribes, according to Garcilasso, the sun plunged into the western ocean and dried up the waters with his heat both where he entered and where he emerged—whence, apparently, the tides. In numerous North American legends he is visited by terrestrial travellers, whom he receives kindly, and to whom he sometimes imparts supernatural powers. The Mexicans described how he was once caught in a snare which a hero had contrived for him. This legend, which is also Polynesian, probably refers to the solstices, when the Indians generally thought of him as seated or resting, since they observed that for several days at these seasons he moved neither north nor south at his rising, but appeared at the same point on the horizon. The Mayas accordingly called these days 'the bed of the sun'; and at this time the Mexicans, Mayas, and Peruvians refrained from labour in imitation of the solar repose. The Mayas symbolized the June solstice by a tortoise, that of December by a snail, because of the slow motion of these animals (Forstemann, 'Commentary on Maya MSS' in *Peabody Museum Papers*, vol. iv. no. 1, p. 45, Cambridge, 1904; Schellhas, 'Representation of Deities of the Maya Manuscripts,' *ib.* no. 2, p. 115, Cambridge, 1906).

The Peruvians represented the sun as a bearded man in the prime of life, who impressed his footprint on a rock to mark the height of his power. This affords an explanation of a world-wide type of solar legends. Throughout America the solar rays were symbolized by hair. In Peruvian art the sun becomes the conventionalized face of a man upon which appear marks called tears by some, but perhaps having a pathological meaning. The Mexican hero Citli shoots three arrows at the sun and succeeds in wounding him. The enraged sun returns one arrow, which pierces Citli's forehead (Mendieta, *op. cit.* p. 77). The sun is the Spider Woman of some western tribes, the Ojibwa Wigwam of the Great Spirit, and the Zuñi shield of burning crystal which he carries, while the Kutenai Coyote manufactures the sun out of grease made into a ball (Chamberlain, in *AAOJ* xvii. 69). In Peru an oval plate, the symbol of the All-pervading Spirit, ultimately manifested in fire, earth, air, and water, was called the image of the true sun, of which the solar orb was only the reflexion. The sun, says the Quichua, Blas Valera, was the child of the Creator, and his light was that part of his divinity which the Creator had imparted to him. It was considered sacrilegious to look at his face; but early writers give several accounts of Inca rulers (particularly Huayna Ccapac) who did so, and who declared their scepticism of the supremacy of an object which never rested, but eternally moved upon its track like a driven animal, whose face the clouds obscured. From the nature of their light, gold was sacred to the sun and silver to the moon.

Eclipses were regarded as attacks made by some insect or animal upon the object enshadowed. In accordance with a world-wide custom, a terrific noise was made to frighten away the attacking monster, although the Tlascalans believed that the sun and moon were fighting. To induce them to cease, red-skinned people were sacrificed to the sun and albinos to the moon. The Peruvians thought the sun was angry when his face became obscured, while under like conditions the moon was believed to be ill. If her light disappeared altogether, she was dead and would fall from the sky upon earth, killing every one upon it. Dogs were beaten, as the moon was thought to be fond of them because they had rendered her a certain service, and it was hoped that their cries would induce her to uncover her face. A similar custom existed in Mexico (Ixtlilxochitl, *Hist. des Chichimèques*, Paris, 1840, cap. 6; Oviedo, *Hist. gen. y nat. de las Indias*, Madrid, 1851, xxix. 5; Piedrahita, *Hist. del Nuevo Reyno de Granada*, Antwerp, 1688, v. 1, vii. 6; Garcilasso, *op. cit.* xi. 1).

The altruistic spirit of the Pueblo community may be seen in the legend that the moon was once as bright as the sun, but gave up part of her light that people might sleep at night. According to the Sioux, the diminishing of the moon is caused by the nibbling of field mice, who thus prevent it from growing too large and injuring the earth (*Red Man*, xvi. no. 45). The profile face of the woman in the moon is figured on the Salcamayhua

chart. The Osages and the Mexicans seem also to have observed her. As the sun, being a male, watches over the fortunes of men, so the female moon is the guardian of women, to whom appeals for help were addressed in childbirth.

According to the Micmacs and Ojibwas, the stars are the lights of camp-fires before the wigwams of the dwellers in the land of the sky. Here and there we see them grouped in villages, and the brightest represent the largest fires before the dwellings of the chiefs. By other North American tribes they are described as birds that fly to the sky at night, by the Mexicans as eyes. Some Brazilian tribes regard them as rifts in the canopy of the eternally glowing sky-land (Seler, *Codex Vaticanus*, London, 1902, p. 44; Hagar, 'Micmac Star Lore,' MSS; Nery, *Land of the Amazons*, London and N.Y., 1901, p. 47). These simple and primitive notions existed coincidently with the division of the sky into constellations bearing the names of animals, plants, and frequently of inanimate objects.

Among the American tribes we find single stars named after individual objects, and groups forming true constellations; but probably nowhere in America is a constellation recognized which has become conventionalized like our own to such a degree that the derivation of the name is not really apparent from the alignment or other features. The morning and evening stars were naturally the most important of the stellar host. In the legends of the Cherokees, Peruvians, and others, the morning star appears before the first rising of the sun. It is the great star, the warrior, or messenger who goes in advance to announce the coming of his solar master. Its advent was hailed with incense and dances. It was widely symbolized by an equal-armed red cross. An Ojibwa legend makes it an older sister, who at her own desire was borne by the winds into the eastern sky, whilst her brother ran up a high mountain to hunt. So, according to Diodorus Siculus, the divine youth Hesperus went to the summit of a mountain at night to study the stars and a great wind carried him into the sky, where he became the evening star (Schoolcraft, *Hiawatha Legends*, Philadelphia and London, 1856, p. 90 ff.).

Among the Caddos the morning star was the errand man selected by the moon to be his assistant chief and to call the people together. He used to get up early during war expeditions, long before dawn, to go round the camps and wake the people so that the enemy would not find them. That is the reason why he gets up so early now. Morning Star has three brothers, Evening Star, North (Pole) Star, and South Star. Their father's name was Great Star, and he was the chief of the people (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, pp. 7–8, 15).

In America the evening star was usually regarded as a woman, because it governed the time of family re-union at home, though among the Zuñis it is the twin brother of the morning star. In Mexico it is the Lord who comes with his torch to light the dwellings on high, in Peru the female maize-grinder, the torch in the west, while among the Micmacs it is leader of the stellar tribe. Its symbol is frequently a white cross. It is the mother of all things to the Skidi Pawnee, who keeps a garden in the west in which the sun rests at night, where the corn is always ripening and much buffalo meat is stored (Schoolcraft, *op. cit.* p. 90 ff.; Cushing, *Zuñi Folk Tales*, New York, 1901, p. 378; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, pp. xv, 5; Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on 'Cult and Symbol,' pp. xv, 3). As the converse of the morning star, the Caddos believe that the evening star would go back a long distance upon the trail and warn his people if the enemy approached (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 15).

The identity of the planets, whether the morning or the evening star, was recognized in Peru, Mexico, California, and parts of South America. The Peruvians made Mercury the ruler of merchants, travellers, and messengers. The Amazon tribes call it 'Deprived of Fish,' since it is believed to cause a scarcity of food fishes. Venus, in Peru, governed the daughters of the rulers, and women generally, dawn, rains, and flowers; Mars, war and soldiers; Jupiter, public matters and food supplies, and to him they offered firstfruits. The Peruvians placed Venus alone of all the stars in the dominion of the sun, evidently because it alone is sometimes visible in the full solar light. Because of its brilliant rays they called it Chasca, 'Curling Hair.' Because of its beauty they said that the sun never permitted it to wander far from his presence—a poetical interpretation of the fact that Venus never departs as far from the sun as the major planets. They also called this planet Chasqui, 'the Messenger,' because its swift passage from star to star suggested the swift running messenger upon the highways (Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on 'Cult and Symbol'). In the codices it is represented by numerous symbols, in the temple of Mexico by a high column, and in the myths it is identified with Quetzalcoatl. The Californian Indians say that the sun has two daughters, Mercury and Venus. Twenty men kill them, and after fifty days they return to life (Mendieta, *op. cit.* pp. 82, 83; Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 53; Emerson, *Indian Myths, Legends, and Traditions*, Boston, 1885, p. 481; Nery, *op. cit.* p. 251; *Explication Codex Telleriano-Ramensis* in Kingsborough, *Mexican Antiquities*, 191).

The Milky Way in North America generally, and among the Guaranis of Paraguay, was the path of spirits, over which the souls of the dead pass between this world and the sky-land of the hereafter. Those of the good follow the broader and easier arm, those of the evil-doers the narrow and difficult arm. It is the Cherokee and Pueblo 'Way of Meal,' the Micmac 'Ancient Trail' and 'Way of Reeds,' the Californian 'Backbone of the Sky,' the Pawnee 'Dust raised by Buffalo Racing.' A Zuñi legend calls it the 'Great Snow Drift of the Skies' (Stevenson, *op. cit.* p. 25; Cushing, *op. cit.* p. 581; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, p. 57; Hagar, *Cherokee Star Lore* [in *Boas Anniversary Volume*, p. 354 ff.]). In Peru and at Zuñi, as among the ancient Sumerians, it is associated with a gigantic celestial serpent. On the Osage star chart it is figured as a river, and it appears as a celestial stream in the mythology of the Peruvian and Amazon Indians. In Peru, as in the legends of the Ojibwas and Cherokees, and as in the Euphratean region, China, and Japan, this river is associated with the passage of souls. The Cherokees and the Kutenai also call the Galaxy 'the Way of the Dog,' the tribes of Guiana 'the Way of the Tapir' and the 'Path of the Bearers of Whitish Clay' (Brett, *Indian Tribes of British Guiana*, New York, 1852, p. 107; Chamberlain, in *AAOJ* xvi. 69).

In the sand paintings of the Mission Indians of California the outer circle is called 'Our Spirit,' a name of the Milky Way. The whole represents the world resting on the Milky Way. A gate or door to the north permits the escape of the soul at death.

The Cherokees recognize two dog stars, Sirius and Antares. In spite of the identical name of the former in our tradition, this is probably a native name, for it is explained by a Cherokee legend which bears no resemblance to its Oriental analogue. In it the two dogs act as guardians of

'the Way of Souls,' at the extremities of which they are stationed, and they must be propitiated with food before they will permit the souls to pass. The Winnebagoes, Ojibwas, and Huichols also recognize a dog star, and the Hindus and Zoroastrians likewise place two dogs upon the way of souls. The Caddos say that a dog gifted with prophetic powers talked with its master, the pair becoming two bright stars in the south (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 25).

The Pleiades are the most conspicuous constellation in the star-lore and ritual of the American Indians, though in North America they share the leadership with Ursa Major. Throughout America they are known as the stars of harvest and of the propitious rains. Their Peruvian name 'Granary' is echoed by the Eskimo 'Sharing-out of Food.' In allusion to their alignment they were generally known as a group of various objects: in Peru 'the Doves,' in Guatemala 'the 400 Young Men,' and in Mexico 'the 400 Rabbits,' patrons of feasting and of intoxication. They are also the Algonquian 'Sweating-Stones,' referring to the seven stones with which the sacred bath of the medicine-man was heated. Their Maya name and Micmac symbol, the rattle of the rattlesnake, suggest an association with the group of small mounds on 'the Way of the Dead' at Teotihuacan, for these mounds are traditionally dedicated to the stars, and from some of them have been exhumed large and erect rattle figures, which were evidently used as altars.

Another important aspect of the group is that of 'the Dancers,' suggested by the twinkling of the closely grouped stars. The whole stellar world follows the group, as they perform their cosmic dance across the sky; and so on earth their rising was hailed by Brazilians, Cherokees, Micmacs, and probably many other tribes, with an imitative song and dance referring more or less directly to the eternal procession of the heavens. The Iroquois, Housatunnuks, and Cherokees have, or had, an explanatory legend which describes how a group of boys, while dancing, ascended to the sky and became the Pleiades. Among the Caddos there are seven brothers who played all day long. Being scolded by their mother and refused food, they danced round the house, gradually rising from the ground until they reached the sky. As they disliked work, they disappeared in spring, when work time begins (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 64). The Blackfeet believe that they ascended because their fathers gave to their sisters, instead of to them, the yellow skins of the buffalo calves they had slain. In revenge they determined to go away each year when the buffalo calf skins became yellow. This occurs in May, when the Pleiades are hidden in the sunlight. The Kiowas call the Pleiades 'the Star Girls,' and they are probably represented by the dancing stellar maidens who descend to earth in the poetic legend of Algon. The seventh Pleiad appears in the Cherokee and Iroquois legends, in the former as a boy who is knocked down with a pole before reaching the sky, in the latter as a star whose light is dimmed because of his desire to return to earth (James Mooney, letter to author; R. W. Wilson, *AAOJ* xv. 149; Emerson, *op. cit.* p. 72; Sergeant, *Housatunnuk Indians*, Boston, 1753; Domenech, *Deserts of North America*, London, 1860; Schoolcraft, *Hiawatha Legends*, p. 116 ff.; Mrs. Erminie Smith, in *2 RBEW*, p. 80).

Almost invariably seven stars are attributed to the group, thus including one star which, though of the sixth magnitude while its companions are of the third and fourth, may be seen by one with strong sight or in a clear atmosphere. The Cherokees also relate that the seventh Pleiad fell to earth, leaving a fiery trail. He became a bearded man, who warned them of the coming flood. So in Peru the approach of the Pleiades to the meridian enabled the llamas of Ancasmarca to warn their shepherd of the coming of the annual deluge or rainy season in November. In Mexico the six *tzontemocque*, or stars which fall at the deluge, seem to have been Taurid meteors (Mooney, in *17 RBEW*, p. 621; *Explication Codex Telleriano-Ramensis*). 'If people will look at these stars (the Pleiades),' runs the Pawnee song, 'they will be guided aright.' Many tribes actually did use them as a guide by night (Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, Rochester, N.Y., 1857, ii. 106). Everywhere the Pleiades are a peaceful, beneficent, and friendly constellation; and there are some indications in Peru and elsewhere that they were once regarded as being (or having special influence over) the home of souls.

The pole star of the Northern hemisphere seems to have been observed by all, or nearly all, the northern tribes. It is the Ojibwa 'Man who walks behind the Loon,' a disappointed lover, who, metamorphosed into a firefly, flew to the sky; in another version a hunter of bears. The Kutenai call it a female grizzly bear; but this apparently refers also to a constellation which includes Ursa Minor and Ursa Major. The Sioux declare that 'all stars walk around the pole star, which is the star that does not walk.' The Micmacs describe it as a bear hidden in a den, about which a group of hunters (Ursa Minor) eternally circle in a vain attempt to discover it. The Pawnees call it 'the star that does not move,' and regard it as the chief of the stars. In the Southern hemisphere the pole is indicated on the Salcamayhua chart as the apex of two slanting lines, which form the sky roof of the world. To it point three stars of the Southern Cross, called the male group, and having phallic attributes. The Maya name of Vega is 'Scrotum Star,' but this star ceased to mark the north pole several thousand years ago. The Peruvians used the Southern Cross to indicate the divisions of the night, the Mayas to indicate the seasons (Emerson, *op. cit.* p. 58; La Flèche in *AAOJ* vii. 106; Chamberlain, *ib.* 1770; Copway, *Traditional History of the Ojibway Nation*, London, 1850, p. 113 ff.; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, pp. 3–4).

The stars of Ursa Major seem to have been called 'the Bear' by the Indians of practically the whole of British America and the United States. An accompanying legend is found in almost identical form among the various Algonquian tribes, the Housatunnuks, Iroquois, and the Cherokees, but is given most fully by the Micmacs. The four stars of the body of Charles's Wain, or the Dipper, as Americans call it, form the body of the bear. The three following stars, ϵ, ζ, η, with four trailing behind them in the form of a bow (γ, ϵ, η Bootis, and Arcturus), are seven hunters, who are pursuing the animal. The little star, Alcor, close to the second hunter, is the pot in which they intend to cook her meat. Corona Borealis and μ, δ Bootis form the den from which she climbs down in the spring. In the summer she runs across the sky with the hunters in full pursuit; in the fall she is overtaken and shot, and begins to fall over on her back. The blood from her wound causes an eternal stain upon the breast of the foremost hunter, the robin, and, dripping upon the trees of earth, it gives to the foliage its blood-red autumn hues. But the bear eternally returns to life. Through the winter she lives in her den invisible (below the horizon), to issue forth again in spring, and thus eternally to renew the celestial drama. The seasonal features of the

legend correspond accurately with the actual positions of the stars in the early evening. There is good reason to believe that this is a native legend, or at least one of pre-Columbian origin, though the earliest reference to it seems to be by Le Clerq in 1691 (Hagar, in *JAFL* xiii. 92 ff.). In connexion with the hunting concept, it is noteworthy that the Wichitas regard the Great Bear as the patron of those about to engage in war expeditions (Dorsey, *Myth. of the Wichita*, p. 18).

The Blackfeet know the principal stars of Ursa Major as seven boys, all save the youngest of whom (Dubhæ) had been killed by their sister. The Sioux call the four body stars the coffin. It is borne by four men who are followed by mourners. Mizar and Alcor are called 'She who Comes with her Young One Weeping.' The Ojibwas also called these stars 'the Fisher,' and the Zuñis represented them by seven white pebbles in the rites of the 'Priesthood of the Bow.' The Pawnees described Corona Borealis as a circle of chiefs, in whose honour was founded the society of 'Chief Dancers.'

The Belt of Orion among the Point Barrow Eskimos becomes three men who were buried in the snow, the Micmac 'Three Fishermen,' the Zuñi 'Hanging Lines,' and the Patagonian 'Three Bolas,' or round stones with which animals are slain by hunters. The Peruvians, like the Basques and the people of Deccan, call it 'the Steps.' The whole constellation is the Zuñi 'Celestial Hunter' pertaining to the sun. In Peru it is symbolized by crossed arrows, and relates to hunters and hunting. A myth makes it the Promethean figure of a criminal raised aloft for punishment by two condors. It may be connected with the Mexican Citli, 'the Bowman.' The names of a few other constellations and single stars have reached us, but present no features of special interest.

In view of the similar and wide-spread symbolism associated with some constellations in America, a more or less uniform system of celestial symbolism may have existed through a large part of the continent, similar to the primitive symbolism of the eastern continent in some elements, yet unique in others.

Unquestionably many of the symbolical concepts have been transmitted from tribe to tribe for long distances. Many of them are of pre-European, or at least of pre-Columbian, origin, and the analogies which they present with Oriental symbolism must be explained either as like effects of like independent causes or by pre-Columbian intercommunication between the continents. The weakness of the former explanation lies in the complexity and conventionality of the concepts, and in the difficulty of tracing the symbolism to any natural basis. The American zodiacs, for example, reveal analogies with the ancient Oriental zodiacs in every sign, yet in few if any instances, either in the Orient or in the Occident, are we able to explain why these signs were so named or why their symbolical attributes are what they are. The zodiac is older than its seasonal associations; its origin remains unknown, yet we find it in similar form in America and in the Orient. The same argument applies, although perhaps less forcibly, to a large part of the astronomical symbolism of America.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article.

STANSBURY HAGAR.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Buddhist).

The astronomical ideas found in Buddhism do not form an independent system, but have developed in close relation with Hindu theories. The problem is rather to determine what stages of development are to be found in the canonical and later books. Thibaut[1] divides Indian astronomy into three periods: (1) that of the Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas*, (2) the middle period with a fully developed native Indian system, (3) the third period, showing Greek influence. The Buddhist scriptures cover a long time, some of the later containing references to the Greeks, but it is to the middle period, and rather to the early stages of this, that the astronomical notions of these works belong. They are in the main the same as those that we find in the *Purāṇas*. The Hindus had two important uses for astronomy: the sacrifices and astrology, neither of which was countenanced by the Buddhists. The latter had no special motive for paying close attention to astronomical theory beyond that required for determining the periods of the lunar month with its fast-days, the period of Retreat in the rainy season, and the divisions of the day. According to *Vinaya*, ii. 217, a monk who lives in the forest is to learn 'the positions of the lunar signs (*nakṣatras*), either the whole or one section, and is to know the cardinal points.'[2] At the end of the ordination service the process of 'measuring the shadow,' *i.e.* calculating the time of day, is performed in order to determine the seniority of the monk, and he is instructed in the length of the seasons and division of the day.[3]

1. Position of sun and moon.—The heavenly bodies that we see are the vehicles of gods, who have been thus reborn through their merit, and who are associated with the thirty-three gods, but below them in rank.[4] The moon, the sun, and the constellations come as gods in the retinue of Sakka to visit Buddha,[5] and in *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 10, the moon, sun, earth, and the *asura* Rāhu occur along with the guardians of the ten quarters as world-protectors. When sun and moon occur together, the moon is always mentioned first.

In the scriptures there is no systematic description of the heavenly bodies, but the account given in the *Sārasaṃgraha*[6] corresponds to scattered notices in earlier works and probably underlies them. The earth, a flat disk, is 1,203,450 leagues (*yojanas*) in diameter and 3,610,350 in circumference. In the centre is Mt. Meru, rising 84,000 leagues above the surface of the earth, and round it circle the sun, moon, and stars, shining in turn on the four continents round Mt. Meru.[7] Night is caused by the sun passing to the other side of Mt. Meru. The diameter of the moon is 49 leagues and the circumference 147; of the sun 50 and 150 respectively.[8] The sun as the vehicle (*vimāna*) of the god is one league higher in position than the moon. It is of crystal outside, gold within,[9] and hot within and without. The moon is of silver outside, of jewel within, and cool within and without. The sun has three paths—*ajavīthi*, *nāgavīthi*, and *govīthi*—according to its apparent course in the ecliptic during the seasons along the equator, and above or below.[10] This fact appears to be referred to in the *Sīlāni*,[11] where the sun and moon are spoken of as going along their paths or out of their paths. Whether there was any early theory

[1] *Astronomie, Astrologie, und Mathematik*, Strassburg, 1899, p. 4.
[2] *Vinaya Texts*, pt. iii. (*SBE* xx. [1885]) p. 294.
[3] *Upasampadā-kammavācā*, tr. J. F. Dickson, Venice, 1875 p. 13; I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 100.
[4] *Jātaka*, no. 450. [5] *Dīgha*, ii. 259.
[6] Cosmological passages are quoted in R. S. Hardy, *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, London, 1866, appendix.
[7] *Aṅguttara*, i. 227.
[8] The ratio of the diameter and circumference of a circle is thus 1 : 3, as in *Jātaka*, v. 271. This illustrates the rudimentary character of Buddhist astronomy.
[9] We should expect gold outside, but such is the text.
[10] So, but more elaborately, in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, bk. ii. ch. 5.
[11] *Dīgha*, i. 10; cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, London, 1899, i. 20.

of the cause of revolution, apart from the choice of the god of the luminary, is not clear. The Chinese sources of A. Rémusat state that five vortices of wind support and move the vehicle of the sun in the required directions, and five other vortices similarly move the moon.[1]

2. Eclipses.—Eclipses are due to the *asura* Rāhu, who is stationed at the moon's nodes, and periodically swallows the sun and the moon. The legend that Rāhu is the monster's head, severed when he was drinking the ambrosia produced at the churning of the ocean, appears not to be early Buddhist, nor even ancient Hindu. It is absent from the account of the churning in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.[2] Buddhaghoṣa describes Rāhu not as a head, but as having a complete body, of which he gives the dimensions.[3] The Puranic notion of Ketu as the severed body of Rāhu at the descending node, although mentioned in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 164, and implied in *Abhidhānappadīpikā*,[4] 61, among the 'nine planets,' is a late borrowing from Hinduism. Two ancient *suttas* describe the moon and sun as being afflicted by Rāhu and appealing to Buddha, who commands Rāhu to let them go.[5]

3. Planets.—The stars also are said to move along and out of their paths.[6] The term here used for star is *nakkhatta* (Skr. *nakṣatra*), and probably refers to the planets, as Buddhaghoṣa understands it in this context.

The only planet distinctly mentioned in the *Suttas* is Osadhitārakā. That this is Venus may be inferred from its being described as the brightest of the luminaries next to the moon and as appearing in the morning.[7] The Sanskrit recension of the *Dīgha* passage in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 71, definitely identifies it with Venus by substituting Uśanas, one of the Sanskrit names of this planet, for Osadhi. The name Osadhitārakā is unexplained. The phrase *Osadhī viya tārakā*, 'like the star Osadhi,'[8] shows that it does not mean 'star of plants' (as in *oṣadhīpati*, 'lord of plants [or of the *soma*-plant],' a title of the moon). The possibility that *osadhī* is a corruption of *auṣaśī*, 'star of dawn,' is attractive, but there is nothing in texts or commentaries to support it. The same is the case with the view of Kern that it is a corruption of *osanī*=Skr. *auśanī*, a derivative of *uśanas*.[9]

4. The lunar zodiac.—The term *nakṣatra* has been from late Vedic times applied especially to 27 or 28 constellations lying roughly along the ecliptic and forming a lunar zodiac; and from the Buddhistic use of many of them as proper names it may be inferred that they were known to the earliest Buddhists. They are as follows:

(1) Assayuja (β, γ Arietis), (2) Bharaṇī (35, 39, 41 Arietis), (3) Kattikā (Pleiades), (4) Rohiṇi (Hyades), (5) Magasira (λ, φ Orionis), (6) Addā (α Orionis), (7) Punabbasu (Gemini), (8) Phussa or Tissa (θ, δ, γ Cancri), (9) Asilesā (ε, δ, σ, η, ρ Hydræ), (10) Maghā (Regulus), (11) and (12) Pubba- and Uttara-phagguni (δ, θ, β, 93 Leonis), (13) Hattha (δ, γ, ε, α, β Corvi), (14) Chittā (Spica), (15) Sāti (Arcturus), (16) Visākhā (Libra), (17) Anurādhā (δ, β, π Scorpionis), (18) Jeṭṭhā (Antares), (19) Mūlā (λ Scorpionis, etc.), (20) and (21) Pubba- and Uttara-asāḷha (δ, ε, σ, ζ Sagittarii), [(22) Abhiji (Vega)], (23) Savaṇa (Aquilæ), (24) Dhaniṭṭhā or Saviṭṭhā (Delphin), (25) Satabhisaja (λ Aquarii, etc.), (26) and (27) Pubba- and Uttara-bhaddapadā or -poṭṭhapadā (the square of Pegasus), (28) Revatī (ζ Piscium, etc.).[10]

No. 22 in this list is not in the *Abhidhānappadīpikā*. It was early omitted in Hindu astronomy, but the existence of Abhiji (Skr. Abhijit) in the Buddhist system may be inferred from the statement that the number of *nakṣatras* is 28[11] and from the existence of Abhijika as a proper name.[1] It also occurs in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 165, and in the list of Rémusat.[2]

References to other fixed stars than *nakṣatras* are rare in all Indian literature. The descent of the Heavenly Ganges, a myth relating to the Milky Way, is referred to in the canon, but never in any astronomical connexion. In *Jātaka*, vi. 97, seven sages are mentioned, but their names are not those which Hindu mythology gives to the seven *ṛṣis*, after whom the seven stars of Ursa Major are named. The name Sakaṭa, 'the cart,' in *Dīgha*, ii. 234, is probably a name of Rohiṇī, as suggested by S. Konow.[3] It is so named by several Hindu astronomers.[4]

5. Months.—The moon in the course of a year may be full in any of the *nakṣatras*, and we find such expressions as *Visākhapuṇṇamā*, 'full-moon when the moon is in Visākhā'; but there had been established earlier than Buddhism a system of twelve lunar months, with names derived from certain of the *nakṣatras*. These are:

(1) Chitta (Mar.–Ap.), (2) Visākhā (Ap.–May), (3) Jeṭṭha (May–June), (4) Āsāḷha (June–July), (5) Sāvaṇa (July–Aug.), (6) Poṭṭhapāda (Aug.–Sept.), (7) Assayuja (Sept.–Oct.), (8) Kattika (Oct.–Nov.), (9) Māgasira (Nov.–Dec.), (10) Phussa (Dec.–Jan.), (11) Māgha (Jan.–Feb.), (12) Phagguna (Feb.–Mar.).

These names were later applied in Hindu systems also to the twelve solar months, but in the canon the reckoning appears to be always lunar, as well as in the Ceylon chronicles.

The month is divided into two parts (*pakkha*), the dark (*kāḷa*) from full to new moon, and the light (*sukka, juṇha*) from new moon to full. Whether the month ended with full or new moon is not clear, but the fact that the dark half is mentioned first and that the months of Retreat began the day after a full-moon day and ended on a full-moon day, suggests that the full-moon day was the end. Both methods were in use by the Hindus in Vedic times, as they are at the present day.[5]

6. The week.—The division of the half month at the eighth and fourteenth or fifteenth day easily led to the reckoning of seven days as a usual period (*sattāha*), but there is no trace in the Pāli writings of the system (no doubt non-Indian in origin) of naming the week-days from the names of the sun, moon, and planets. These names occur in the order of the days of the week as the first seven of the nine planets in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 164.

7. The year.—In *Aṅguttara*, i. 213, where the length of a year of the gods is given, it is said to be a year of twelve months, the month being made up of 30 nights (and days). This gives a year of 360 days, and is the exact number in use in the Vedic period.[6] The number 30 is probably obtained by adding together the 15 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would be sometimes 29 and sometimes 30, as the synodic lunar month is rather over 29½ days. There must have been a mode of intercalating months to bring the lunar months and solar year into harmony from time to time, as in the case of the Hindu systems, but the process is unknown. The modern Siamese have a year of 354 days, the months being alternately of 29 and 30 days. In every third or second year (seven times in 19 years) the eighth month is reckoned twice, and in every fifth or sixth year one day is added to the seventh month, bringing the lunar year into harmony with the solar year.[7]

The Hindu systems have two modes of beginning

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[1] *Mélanges posthumes d'hist. et de litt. orientales*, Paris, 1843, p. 83.

[2] Bk. i. ch. 9.

[3] Comm. on *Dīgha*, no. iv. § 6.

[4] This work (of the 12th cent.) was the chief source of the astronomical items in R. C. Childers, *Dictionary of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, but it is based largely on Hindu sources, and forms no independent evidence for Buddhist astronomy. The nine planets are the moon, sun, five greater planets, Rāhu, and Ketu (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 164).

[5] *Saṃyutta*, i. 50 f., tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in *Kindred Sayings*, London, 1918, i. 71.

[6] *Dīgha*, i. 10.

[7] *Majjhima*, ii. 34.

[8] *Vimānavatthu*, I. ix. 1.

[9] *Verspreide Geschriften*, The Hague, 1913, ii. 250.

[10] From *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, 58–60. Exact identifications of them are given by W. D. Whitney in *Sūryasiddhānta*, tr. E. Burgess, New Haven, 1860, p. 324; cf. *Nakṣatra* in A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912.

[11] *Mahāniddesa*, 382; *Jātaka*, Com. vi. 476.

[1] *Saṃyutta*, ii. 204.

[2] P. 85.

[3] *JPTS*, 1909, p. 13.

[4] H. Kern, note on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, ix. 25, tr. in *Verspreide Geschriften*, i. 217.

[5] Thibaut, p. 12; R. Sewell and S. B. Dikshit, *The Indian Calendar*, London, 1896, § 13; see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Buddhist).

[6] Thibaut, p. 7.

[7] F. J. Wershoven, *Lehr- und Lesebuch der siamees. Sprache und deutsch-siames. Wörterbuch*, Vienna, 1892.

the year: (1) with the full moon of Kattika, (2) with the month Chitta.[1] The former is implied in the usual Buddhist reckoning of the three seasons, in which the cold season is always mentioned first.[2] This period was also the end of the Retreat, in which the annual redistribution of robes took place. The second mode of beginning the year is implied in the *Dīpavaṃsa* and in the list of lunar months in the *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, which begins with Chitta.[3]

8. Seasons.—The ancient Hindu seasons are three: *hemanta*, the cold season from Māgasira to Phagguna; *gimha*, the hot season from Chitta to Āsalha; and *vassa*, the rainy season from Sāvaṇa to Kattika. These dates, however, would vary from year to year through the irregularity caused by the lunar months and occasional intercalation.[4]

Dīpavaṃsa, xii. 44, calls Jeṭṭha the last of the hot months. *Vassa* in the sense of Retreat does not correspond with the rainy season, but extends over three months of that period. The Hindu subdivisions of the three seasons into five or six[5] are not found in Pāli works, but there are occasional references to autumn (*sarada*) as the early part of *hemanta* and to spring (*vasanta*) as the early part of the hot season.[6] *Mahāvyutpatti*, 253, gives the list of six, and I-tsing[7] also describes other systems of division used in various localities.[8]

9. Astrology.—Indian astrology, as the science of omens drawn from celestial phenomena, is a branch of divination. It is stigmatized in *Dīgha*, i. 10, as a base science and false means of livelihood. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, 927, the monk is forbidden to devote himself to magic (*āthabbana*), to (the interpretation of) the dream, the sign, and the *nakṣatra*. That such a science is possible is generally taken for granted, but in the *Jātaka* there is a tendency to ridicule the belief in lucky *nakṣatras*,[9] omens,[10] names,[11] and sneezing. There is no reason to think that this sceptical attitude is primitive; it is rather the rationalizing of a single individual or of a school. The survival of the belief within orthodox Buddhism is shown in the collection of *suttas* drawn from the canonical books called the *Paritta*, which, among other formulas intended to ward off hostile powers or to win their favour, contains the two *suttas* on the eclipse of the moon and of the sun.[12]

A fragment of a MS of an astrological work in corrupt Sanskrit has recently been discovered in East Turkestan at Khotan.[13] It is shown to be Buddhist by the phraseology, as well as by the reference to the *ṛṣi* Kharuṣṭa, who makes known to the congregation the knowledge of 'nights, days, moments, planets, half-months and months.'[14] The matter is similar to that in Hindu astrological works, such as: what *nakṣatras* are effective for conception, which are causers of misfortune or success in certain undertakings. There can be little doubt that it is borrowed from some Hindu work, and, like later works of this kind, it shows the influence of Greek astronomy in the use of such terms as *hora*, and the names of the 12 signs of the zodiac (Pisces, Scorpio, etc.) along with those of the *nakṣatras*.

LITERATURE.—The sources and authorities are given throughout the article. EDWARD J. THOMAS.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Celtic).—1. Very little is known about the astrology and astronomy of the Celts. The Druids, as we learn from Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14), discussed and transmitted to their disciples many questions regarding the stars and their motion. They had observed the course of the moon, and by it they regulated their calendar. Their months and years began with the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250); they counted by nights (Cæsar, vi. 18. 2); and their cycle was one of thirty years (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250).

The discovery of the calendar of Coligny has made it possible to determine these general ideas for the Gallo-Roman period. This calendar gives a year of 354 days, divided into twelve months of twenty-nine and thirty days alternately. To establish agreement between the lunar and the solar year a month of thirty days was intercalated every two and a half years. At the beginning of every fifth year there was complete agreement between the two methods of calculation; and probably this was the occasion, as Jullian remarks, on which were offered the quinquennial sacrifices of which Diodorus speaks (v. 32. 6).

Astrology, properly so called, does not seem to have been practised by the pagan Irish. But in the 'Lives of Saints' there are to be found some superstitious practices derived from the observation of the stars. The foster-father of Columcille goes to ask a prophet when he should begin to teach the child to read. The prophet after having examined the heavens replies that he must begin immediately (*Lives of Saints from the Book of Lismore*, l. 812). Manannan mac Lir used to know by studying the sky when there would be fine weather and when bad (*Cormac's Glossary*, p. 114).

The scientific observation of stars was also in use among the ancient Irish. Loeg observes the stars to ascertain when midnight comes (*Mesca Ulad*, 13). Some treatises on Irish astronomy dating from the early Middle Ages have been preserved. They are founded on the system of Ptolemy, and seem to be translations of foreign works. The words used to denote the sun-dial are borrowed from the Latin. Yet the Irish were particularly clever at calculating dates, and in the *Saltair na Rann* it is told that every intelligent person should know the day of the solar month, the age of the moon, the flow of the tide, the day of the week, and the chief saints' festival days. Perhaps in the ancient Irish and Welsh texts there are traces to be found of the primitive Celtic calendar. The year was divided into two halves or into four periods of three months, the month being divided into two parts. The periods of time most in use were those of three nights and three days, or nine nights and nine days, while the most common cycles were those of three years and of seven years. In Armorican Brittany and in Wales the names of the complementary days which served to convert the lunar year into a solar year (Brit. *gourdeziou*, Welsh *dyddiau dyddon*) have been preserved. Several popular superstitions are attached to them. Thus a medical manuscript mentioned by O'Curry contains a list of unlucky days, and in Irish literature there are numerous examples of births delayed in order that they may take place on a lucky day, and of disasters which might have been prevented if an undertaking had not been engaged in on an unlucky day.

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[1] Whitney, p. 270.
[2] *Vinaya*, i. 137.
[3] There is no reason for thinking that the year ever began with Sāvaṇa. The recurring phrase *Komudī chātumāsinī* does not mean the full moon of Kattika 'in the fourth month,' but 'at the Chāturmāsya festival.' See T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, in *Vinaya Texts*, pt. i. (*SBE* xiii. [1881]) p. 324, n. 2; *Jātaka*, vi. 221; *Dīpavaṃsa*, xv. 1. On the Chāturmāsya, or 'Four month' celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hindu).
[4] See the Commentaries on *Sutta Nipāta*, 233, p. 192, and *Vimāna Vatthu*, vii. 5, 6.
[5] Thibaut, p. 11.
[6] *Majjhima*, i. 115; *Jātaka*, i. 86; Com. on *Sutta Nipāta*, 233.
[7] Pp. 101, 219.
[8] See also art. CALENDAR (Buddhist).
[9] 49. [10] 126, 155. [11] 97.
[12] See artt. MAGIC (Buddhist) and DIVINATION (Buddhist), where the later developments of Buddhist astrology are given. See also, for modern Sinhalese Buddhism, E. Upham, *The History and Doctrine of Budhism popularly illustrated; with Notices of the Kappooism, or Demon Worship, and of the Bali, or Planetary Incantations of Ceylon*, London, 1829; for Tibetan, E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, Leipzig and London, 1863; for Chinese, Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 84 ff.
[13] *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan*, ed. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle and others, Oxford, 1916, i. 121.
[14] Cf. *Dīgha*, iii. 85.

2. The Gallic god Belenos had been assimilated to Apollo as a healer rather than as a sun-god. We have no evidence of worship of the stars among the Gauls except a few dedications to the sun and the moon in Gallo-Roman inscriptions (A. Holder, *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896–1913), and the mention of the worship of an image of the sun (*AS*, 4 Sept. ii. 197 C). No conclusion can be drawn from the representation of stars on the shields of the Orange-arch, from the *rouelles* dug out in so great a number, or from the wheel that is an attribute of a Gallo-Roman god assimilated to Jupiter; for the stars may be ornaments or armorial bearings, and the wheel may be a divination-wheel or a symbol of the thunder as well as a symbol of the sun. Some customs of the ancients may be connected with the beliefs relating to the stars—*e.g.* the gathering of the mistletoe and the beginning of the years and months on the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 250), the dread of the Asiatic Galatians during an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. v. 78).

The evidences of the worship of the sun and the moon in ancient Ireland are not numerous. The most explicit text is in the *Confessio* (§ 60) of St. Patrick, in which he alludes to worshippers of the sun. G. Keating (*History of Ireland*, ed. D. Comyn and P. Dinneen, 1902–1908, bk. i. § 12) says that one of the Dê Danann was named Mac Gréine, 'Son of the Sun,' because his god was the sun. A passage of *Cormac's Glossary* (p. 54) tells us that Irish pagans used to carve some pictures—*e.g.* that of the sun—on the altars of their idols, and Keating (ii. 11) relates that in Columcille's time a priest of Tirconnel who had set up images of the sun and the moon in the church was carried off by a devil. The king of Ulster, Loegaire, swore by the name of the elements—the earth, the sun, and the wind (W. St. Boroma, *RCel* xiii. [1892] 52 f.).

LITERATURE.—J. Loth, 'L'Année Celtique' in *Revue Celtique*, xxv. (1904) 113–142; P. W. Joyce, *A Social History of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 464–471; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1907, i. 393, ii. 124, 141. G. DOTTIN.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Chinese).—I. *INTRODUCTION.*

—The Chinese view of the sun, moon, and stars taken as a whole may be likened to a web woven of three different threads: the thread of astronomy, the thread of religion, and the thread of astrology. Astronomy means here the observation of the heavenly bodies and the truths deduced therefrom, chiefly for practical purposes. It may therefore be called 'observational' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'physical' or 'descriptive' astronomy, founded by Galileo after his invention of the telescope, and it may also be called 'practical' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'theoretical' astronomy, founded by Newton on the hypothesis of the law of gravitation. The religious view of the Chinese concerning the heavenly bodies may be called astrological, and their astrological view may be called religious in the comprehensive sense of the term. But a clear line of distinction can be drawn between them. The idea of deity or God is always present and predominant in the religious view, whereas it may be vague and even absent in the astrological view. The latter is concerned chiefly with the influences of the heavenly bodies upon men, while the former is concerned chiefly with the relation of God to men as revealed in the heavenly bodies—*i.e.* God's messages and warnings derived by means of the observation of the heavenly bodies.

The Chinese term for the study of the heavens is *tien wen*, literally 'the system (or order) of heaven.' The term is not limited to purely astronomical knowledge, but has been applied equally to astrological and religious beliefs or views concerning the heavens.

Chinese astronomy has been of much interest to many European scholars, its great antiquity being widely admitted.

'The progress of Astronomy among the Chinese,' says John Williams, 'is a subject of highest interest whether it be considered as recording observations of the heavenly bodies made by one of the most ancient and primitive races of mankind, which appears in extremely remote time to have advanced to a high degree of civilisation; peculiar, however, to itself; and which has preserved the manners and customs established by its early rulers more than two thousand years before the Christian era, in a great measure unaltered to the present day. Or whether the fact that at a period long anterior to the commencement of civilisation among the Western nations, and when almost universal barbarism prevailed among them, astronomy had been carried to a great degree of perfection by the Chinese, as manifested by their still existing records, whose authenticity is not only strongly asserted by that people, but is acknowledged by some of the most eminent European scholars of the present day.'[1]

It has been said by some of the authorities of our own century that the antiquity of Chinese astronomy is 'greater even than that of almost any other nation.'[2] But the study of the heavens in China is not pursuit of knowledge, or astronomical knowledge, for its own sake. Being a highly practical nation, the Chinese, when they seek to know anything, generally have some end or ideal in view to the attainment of which knowledge is merely a means. The present case is not an exception. Having to arrange all their religious ceremonies, social and governmental affairs, and, most important of all, their agricultural work according to the seasons, the Chinese, even at the earliest period of their history, felt the great need of a proper calendar, the formation of which required astronomical knowledge. Apart from this, there were other motives—the religious and the astrological. The latter explains itself, and the former has a double purpose. On the one hand, the Chinese sought to know the laws of the heavens, which were for them, in some sense, divine, in order to apply them to their own conduct, social as well as individual. The doctrine of the imitation of, or the conformation of men's conduct with, the laws of the heavens has been much held by Confucianists, and especially by Taoists, and can be found in most of the Chinese classics. On the other hand, as they believed the celestial phenomena to be God's revelations or warnings to men, they wanted to know them in order to re-adjust their conduct.

Both the astronomical and the religious views of the Chinese concerning the heavens are as old as their history, and it is difficult to tell which is earlier; their astrology is a later development. The Chinese term for 'astrologer' is *êrh tse* or *sing tse*, which may be translated 'the man of sun' or 'the man of stars.' According to the Chinese records, the former term did not occur until the 5th cent. B.C., and the latter is of still later date. Kepler says that astronomy is the wise mother and astrology the foolish daughter. If we may adopt this saying with a little modification, we can regard the astrology of the Chinese as the daughter of their astronomy and religion. These three different views have for thousands of years influenced the Chinese mind, and the astrological view, though the latest, has almost since its birth been the most powerful. Even at the present day among many of the Chinese astronomy has not divorced itself from religion, nor has it disowned or rid itself of astrology, as Western astronomy has since the 16th century.

II. *THE ASTRONOMICAL ASPECTS.* — The

[1] *Observations of Comets*, London, 1871, p. vii.

[2] E. B. Knobel, 'Abstract of a Lecture on Chinese Astronomy,' in *Journal of the British Astronomical Association*, xix. [1908-09] 338.

Chinese are great believers in their ancient classics, so that to deal with their ancient views and beliefs is to a great extent to deal with their modern ones as well. The great antiquity of Chinese astronomy has been admitted by many of the best European scholars of both the last and the present century. According to tradition, a sort of calendar was invented by Fu Hsi (3328 B.C.) as a result of observations of the phenomena of the heavens. The reformation of the calendar and the rectification of intercalation are attributed to Hwang Ti, or the Yellow Emperor (2698 B.C.). In the record called *Ssŭ Ki* of Ssŭ Ma Chien, China's most famous historian (2nd and 1st centuries B.C.), it is recorded:

'Hwang Ti commanded Hi Ho to take charge of the observation of the sun, Yih Chang the observation of the moon, and Yu Chu the observation of the stars.'

He is also said to have brought into use the lunar cycle of nineteen years, by which the conjunctions and oppositions of the sun and moon can be calculated, and the intercalary months regulated. This was more than 2000 years before the introduction of the same system among the Greeks by the astronomer Meton.[1] *The Annals of the Bamboo Books*[2] record that at the time of the reign of Tsuan Hsu (beginning 2513 B.C.) a conjunction of the five planets was observed by the Chinese in the constellation called Yin Shih or Shih.[3] It has been carefully calculated and asserted by the French astronomer, Jean S. Bailly, that such a conjunction did take place on 29th Feb. 2449 B.C., which would be the 65th year of Tsuan Hsu's reign. In the time of the emperor Yaou (2356 B.C.) the Chinese already knew the exact, or almost exact, number of days in a year, had a way of determining solstices and equinoxes, and had in use an intercalary system and some instruments for the survey of the heavens, and the knowledge of the five planets and of the twelve zodiacal signs, and most probably of the 28 stellar divisions.

In the 'Canon of Yaou,'[4] the first book of the *Shu King* ('The Canon of History'), we read:

'Thereupon Yaou commanded He and Ho[5] to have reverence to the great heavens, and to calculate and delineate the movements and appearances of the sun, the moon, the stars, and the zodiacal spaces; and so to deliver respectfully the seasons to the people.

He separately commanded the second brother He to reside at Ye-e, in what was called the Bright Valley, and there respectfully to receive as a guest the Rising Sun, and to adjust and arrange the labours of the Spring. "The day," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is in Neaou;[6] you may thus exactly determine mid-spring. The people begin to disperse; and the birds and beasts breed and copulate."

He further commanded the third brother He to reside at Nankeaou, and arrange the transformations of the summer, and respectfully to observe the extreme limit of the shadow. "The day," said he, "is at its longest, and the star is Ho;[7] you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people are more dispersed; and the birds and beasts have their feathers and hair thin, and change their coats."

He separately commanded the second brother Ho to reside in the west, in what was called the Dark Valley, and there respectfully to convoy the setting sun, and to adjust and arrange the completing labours of the autumn. "The night," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is Hiü;[1] you may thus exactly determine mid-autumn. The people begin to feel at ease; and birds and beasts have their coats in good condition."

He further commanded the third brother Ho to reside in the northern region, in what was called the Sombre Capital, and there to adjust and examine the changes of the winter. "The day," said he, "is at its shortest, and the star is Maou;[2] thus you may exactly determine mid-winter. The people keep their cosy corners; and the coats of birds and beasts are downy and thick."

The emperor said, "Ah! you, He and Ho, a round year consists of three hundred, sixty, and six days.[3] By means of an intercalary month do you fix the four seasons, and complete the determination of the year. Thereafter, in exact accordance with this, regulating the various officers, all the works of the year will be fully performed."'

In the 'Canon of Hsun,' the second book of the *Shu King*, it is recorded that, having accepted the throne which had been often offered to him by the emperor Yaou, the emperor Hsun examined the gem-adorned sphere and the gem transverse tube in order to regulate the seven directors or planets.

Both the commandment of Yaou and the examination of Hsun are supposed to have taken place at the beginning of their reigns. The observation of the heavens then must have been of great importance. According to another book of the *Shu King*, called 'The Punitive Expedition of the Prince Yin,' in the reign of King Tsung Kang (2159–2146 B.C.) there were astronomers who failed to foretell an eclipse of the year 2158 B.C. (?), and it was considered such a great crime that the prince of Tin, who was then commander-in-chief of the imperial armies, received orders from the king to punish them with the imperial forces.

The Chinese then commenced their observation of eclipses from a time not later than the 22nd cent. B.C., though some European scholars regard the eclipse of the sun on 29th Aug. 775 B.C., recorded in the *Shi King* ('Book of Odes'),[4] as the earliest recorded eclipse in all history. In Ma Twan Lin's *Encyclopædia* more than 600 eclipses of the sun are recorded from 2168 B.C. to A.D. 1223. There are many other kinds of heavenly phenomena which have been keenly observed by the Chinese from a very early period as well. From 611 B.C. to A.D. 21 alone comets are recorded 372 times, as shown in Williams' *Observations of Comets*. The spots of the sun were observed and recorded by the Chinese not later than A.D. 301, *i.e.* 1308 years before the assumed first discovery of solar spots by Galileo in A.D. 1610 and 1300 years before the invention of the telescope. 48 observations of solar spots, from A.D. 301 to 1205, are recorded in Ma Twan Lin's *Encyclopædia*, which was published in A.D. 1323, *i.e.* 288 years before Galileo's observation. In the same *Encyclopædia* a great number of instances of the observation of moving or shooting stars are recorded from 1122 B.C. to A.D. 1230. Meteors have been observed, and recorded by the Chinese since, as early as 1578 B.C. The *Bamboo Books* record: 'In the tenth year [of the emperor Kwei of the Hia dynasty, *i.e.* 1579 B.C.] the five planets went out of their courses. In the night stars fell like rain.' Comparing it with the year A.D. 1866, remarks E. B. Knobel, when they had the great display of meteors, the interval gave 104 periods of 33·11 years. Now Leverrier's period for the November meteor is 33·25. Thus it is hardly possible to doubt that

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[1] See Williams, *Observations of Comets*, Introduction.

[2] A large collection of ancient documents, discovered A.D. 279; see James Legge's tr. in *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, vol. iii. pt. i.

[3] One of the 28 stellar divisions determined by α, β, and other stars in Pegasus, extending north and south from Cygnus and Piscis Australis and east and west 17° and comprising part of Capricornus and Aquarius.

[4] Legge, *Chinese Classics*, vol. iii. pt. i. [1865] pp. 15–27.

[5] Names of two families which had been hereditary officers of the Board of Astronomy since the time of Hwang Ti.

[6] Neaou is a space of heavens extending over 112° and embracing the seven constellations of the southern quarter. The star in Neaou is, according to the view held by Chinese scholars and adopted by many Western scholars, such as James Legge, John Williams, etc., the star Tsun Hwuo, corresponding to Cor Hydra. After an elaborate calculation Williams says (p. xi) that that star should culminate at sunset on the day mentioned in the *Shu King*. He then says: 'Thus a strong presumptive proof is again afforded of the veracity of the Chinese history as recorded in the *Shu King*.'

[7] The central star of the seven constellations of the eastern quarter, corresponding to the heart of Scorpio.

[1] The central star of the seven constellations of the northern quarter, corresponding to β Aquarii.

[2] The culminating star of the seven constellations of the western quarter, corresponding to the Pleiades.

[3] 'When it it said,' says the editor of Yung Ching's *Shu King* (James Legge's tr.), 'that the year consists of 366 days, we are to understand that Yaou was speaking in round numbers. The period in question is now called the value of the years. It has been differently estimated by the astronomers of successive dynasties.'

[4] II. iv. 9; Legge's tr., London, 1876, p. 229 f.

we have here the earliest record of a shower of those meteors.[1]

III. *DIVISION OF THE STARS.*—1. **The 28 siüs or shĕs.**—In common with the Hindus, Arabs, Babylonians, Persians, and Copts, the Chinese have the division of the ecliptic into 28 mansions, which are called *siüs* or *shĕs*. According to the interpretation of Ssu Ma Kuang, a great scholar of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1279), *shĕ* has the meaning 'to reside (or to stop) somewhere' and *siü* means 'an abode,' and both words express the idea of the sun, the moon, and the five planets in their revolution residing in turn in the divisions of the sphere indicated as the 28 abodes. This meaning is very similar to that of the Hindu *nakṣatras* ('stars' or 'asterisms') and the Arabian *manāzil al-kamar* ('lunar mansions'). There is, according to Knobel's calculation, a concordance of the determinants of the *siüs*, the *nakṣatras*, and the *manāzils* in fifteen divisions, of the *siüs* and the *nakṣatras* in four divisions, of the *siüs* and the *manāzils* in five divisions, and of the *nakṣatras* and the *manāzils* in four divisions. This remarkable resemblance attracted the attention of many Western scholars and seemed to them a sufficient reason for presuming that all three systems sprang from a single source. The conclusions arrived at are different. Some hold that the system originated in India and the Chinese borrowed it from there; others are of opinion that the Chinese borrowed from the Arabs; another opinion is that the Babylonians were the originators; while still others say that the origin is to be found in Central Asia or some part of Persia. Unfortunately none of these conclusions is supported by satisfactory evidence.

But there are differences as well as resemblances between these three systems, and the Chinese division has its own peculiarity. The Chinese divisions are very unequal in the angular intervals and therefore cannot present the daily stations of the moon, as the Hindu divisions do. They are measured on the equator rather than on the ecliptic. According to G. Schlegel,[2] there is no connexion at all between the Chinese asterisms and the lunar zodiac. Some of the names of the 28 *siüs* were known to the Chinese as early as the time of the emperor Yaou (2356 B.C.), while the earliest Babylonian record concerning the lunar mansions and the earliest Hindu record of the *nakṣatras* named after the Vedic deities are much later than that.[3]

The *nakṣatras*, in their recent forms at least, are apparently assimilated to the Chinese *siüs*, and the whole system of junction stars is undoubtedly an imitation of them.[4]

J. B. Biot and his son were the first to demonstrate the identity of the Chinese *siüs* and the 28 lunar mansions of the Hindus and Arabs. They concluded that this arrangement of celestial divisions was invented by the Chinese and borrowed from them by the Hindus and Arabs for purely astrological purposes.

'To this day,' says J. J. M. de Groot, 'no considerations of importance have cancelled these views [of Biot], and though they have been rigorously combated by Weber, Max Müller, and other authorities of renown, yet it seems that most investigations of oriental astronomy silently subscribe to them.'[5]

[1] *Journ. of the British Astronomical Association*, xix. 337–345.
[2] *Uranographie chinoise*, The Hague, 1875.
[3] *Observatory*, xxxii. [1909] 187.
[4] According to Agnes M. Clerke's art. 'Zodiac' in *EBr*[11], the *siüs* were of Chinese invention and the *manāzils* were of Indian derivation. The *nakṣatras* in their recent organization were, as far as possible, assimilated to the Chinese *siüs*. 'The whole system of junction stars,' she says, 'was doubtless an imitation of the *sieu*; the choice of them by the Hindu astronomers of the 6th century A.D. was plainly instigated by a consideration of the Chinese, compiled with a widely different intent.'
[5] *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, bk. i. vol. iii. p. 974, footnote.

2. The twelve kungs.—Besides the division of the lunar cycle into 28 unequal mansions, the Chinese, in common with the Hindus and Western nations, divide the zodiac into twelve equal parts as follows:

(1) Ta Liang, Aries–Taurus; (2) Hsi Chen, Taurus–Gemini; (3) Tsun Hseo, Gemini–Cancer; (4) Tsun Go, Cancer–Leo; (5) Tsun Vi, Leo–Virgo; (6) Hseo Sing, Virgo–Libra; (7) Ta Ho, Libra–Scorpio; (8) Ssi Mu, Scorpio–Sagittarius; (9) Sing Ki, Sagittarius–Capricorn; (10) Huan Hio, Capricorn–Aquarius; (11) Tsu Tsu, Aquarius–Pisces; (12) Hiang Lo, Pisces–Aries.

These names are found in Chinese books written several centuries B.C.—*e.g.*, *Tso Tsuan*, *Ĕrh Ya*, etc. The Hindu zodiac signs, which are probably of Greek origin, entered China at a much later date.

3. The four quarters and the five kungs.—The Chinese divide the heavens into four quarters. The eastern quarter is called Tsang Lung ('the Blue Dragon') and is associated for astrological purposes with the season of spring, the planet Jupiter, the element wood, the colour blue, the taste sour, and the virtue of benevolence. The southern quarter is called Chü Niaou ('the Red Bird') and is associated with the season of summer, the planet Mars, the element fire, the colour red, the taste bitter, and the virtue of propriety. The western quarter is called Pe Hwu ('the White Tiger') and is associated with the season of autumn, the planet Venus, the element metal, the colour white, the taste hot, and the virtue of righteousness. The northern quarter is called Hsüan Wu ('the Black Warrior,' or 'the Black Tortoise,' as it has also been interpreted) and is associated with the season of winter, the planet Mercury, the element water, the colour black, the taste salt, and the virtue of wisdom.

In Ssŭ Ma Chien's *Ssŭ Ki* the stars are divided into five *kungs*, or palaces—middle palace, eastern palace, southern palace, western palace, and northern palace. The middle palace consists of the northern circumpolar stars, and the other four are like the four quarters stated above. This system of division is followed by Pan Ku in his *History of the Later Han Dynasty*.

4. The three yuans and the two kuans.—The three *yuans* (palaces or stellar spaces) are (1) Tsu Vi Yuan (the Middle Palace), consisting of the northern circumpolar stars, (2) Tai Vi Yuan (the Upper Palace), consisting of stars in Leo, Virgo, Corvus, etc., and (3) Tien Ssu Yuan (the Lower Palace), bounded by two chains comprising Hercules, the upper part of Ophiuchus, etc.

The two *kuans*, or kinds of officers, are (1) *tsung kuan*, the internal officers, consisting of groups of stars inside the equator, and (2) *wusi kuan*, the external officers, consisting of groups of stars outside the equator.

This system of the division of the heavens is peculiarly Chinese and is very ancient. In the *Tien Wun*, consisting of eight chapters, written by Wu Hian, an astronomer of the Yin (or Shang) dynasty (1766–1122 B.C.), the astronomer assigned to the Middle Palace four seats or officers, consisting of eight stars, to the Upper Palace one seat, consisting of one star, to the Lower Palace four seats, consisting of eight stars, to the internal officers five seats, consisting of 24 stars, and to the external officers nineteen seats, consisting of 93 stars. In the *Tien Wen Sing Chan*, written by Kan Te, an astronomer of the state of Tsi, and the *Tien Wen*, written by Hsi Hsen, an astronomer of the state of Wui (both astronomers lived about the 4th cent. B.C.), the method of division is identical with that of Wu Hian, but the numbers of officers and stars are greatly increased. Adding these estimates together, we get 283 officers, consisting of 1464 stars.

5. The three yuans and the 28 siüs.—There is a

popular book consisting of 31 songs by Tan Yuan Tsu of the Sui dynasty (589–617), called *Pu Tuen Ko*. It divides the stars into three *yuans* and 28 *siüs*. There are in all 193 *kuans*, or officers, consisting of 1457 stars. The stars which have been named by the Chinese are not many more than this, except in the book of Chang Heng, which gave 320 *kuans*, consisting of 2500 stars, and, besides these, 11,520 stars. This system of division is followed by Ma Twan Lin and others.

IV. *THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS.*—**1. Animistic view.**—The animistic view which the Chinese took of many things in nature is seen in their attitude to the sun, moon, and stars. Many of them regard the heavenly bodies not as merely inanimate bodies, but as dwelling-places of spiritual beings or as spiritual beings themselves; *e.g.*, there is, it is said, a cock in the sun and a hare in the moon, the palace of angels; the hare is said to be sitting under a tree pounding medicine in a mortar. Those spiritual beings have superhuman powers, though the supreme power is not attributed to any of them, but to *Tien*, *Shang-ti*, or God alone. Hence the movements and appearances of the heavenly bodies are not regarded as mechanical, lifeless, or inevitable, for within or behind them there is a will which causes them. This will may be the will of the heavenly bodies, of the spiritual beings who dwell in them, or of God, the Supreme Ruler.

2. Comparison of the heavens with the earth.—In the heavens there are the sun and the moon; correspondingly on the earth there are the *yang* and the *yin*, the two contrary conceptions applied to phenomena mental and moral as well as physical. *Yang* is the male principle, associated with heat, day, etc., and *yin* is the female principle, associated with cold, night, etc. Hence the sun is called 'the great *yang*,' and the moon 'the great *yin*.' It is also said that the sun is 'the crystallization of the *yang*' and the moon 'the crystallization of the *yin*.' The five planets are said to correspond to the five elements of the earth, and therefore Mars is called 'the planet of fire,' Mercury 'the planet of water,' Venus 'the planet of metal,' Jupiter 'the planet of wood,' and Saturn 'the planet of earth.' Similarly, the different stars and constellations are believed to correspond to the various portions of the surface of the earth. In the chapter called *Tien Kwan* ('The Heavenly Officers') in Ssŭ Ma Chien's *Ssŭ-Ki*, in which all the beliefs mentioned above may be found, we read: 'The twenty-eight *siü* or constellations correspond to the twelve *chows*, or provinces. . . . The source of this (saying or belief) is of remote antiquity indeed.'

It is a popular saying in China that 'the stars of the heavens above and the configurations of the earth beneath correspond with each other.' A great number of stars—*e.g.*, the twenty stars constituting the two chains of the Tien Ssu Yuan, or the Lower Palace—are believed to correspond to certain countries in China and are given the names of those countries.

In some of the ancient books the heavens are said to be spherical and the earth square, the heavens dynamic and the earth static. There are also ancient stories or mythologies which represent the heavens as having a hollow place in the north-west round which all the stars revolve, and the earth as having a hollow place in the south-east towards which all the waters run.

3. Comparison of the heavenly bodies with men.—Heaven, earth, and men are believed to be the three great powers or genii in the universe. The heavenly bodies are regarded not merely as separate individuals, but as having a society like that of men. As the Chinese state was an empire, so the heavenly society was believed to be an empire. This can be observed in the names of the stars. The coining of significant poetical or mythological names for the heavenly bodies was probably to render easier the task of discriminating and remembering them. Many stories grew round those names, which are regarded by some as fables and by others as true. According to the names of the stars in the Tai Vi Yuan, the Upper Palace, the northern polar star (Polaris) is where the emperor is. The reason is quite plain, as Confucius said: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue is like the northern polar star, which keeps its place, and all the other stars turn towards it.'[1] The Great Bear, or the Spoon, as it is called in China, is said to be the imperial chariot, and its motion round the northern polar star is said to be the emperor viewing his empire in all directions. Names of some of the other stars are: the Empress's Palace, Crown Prince, Prince, Princess, Guards, Civil and Military Officers, Law-Court, Prison, Armoury, Storehouse, Kitchen, Bed, Canopy, etc.

4. Relation between the heavenly and the earthly empires.—These two empires are not separated from one another without inter-communication. *Tien*, or *Shang-ti*, the Supreme Ruler, governs both, but the heavenly one more directly. The ruler of the earthly empire used to be called Tien-tsu, 'the son of Tien (or God).' Enthronement used to be regarded as the appointment of God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. Therefore, when the Son of Heaven was good and his empire well governed, auspicious phenomena used to appear from God in the heavens, and, when he was bad and his empire in disorder, threats used to appear. There are many heavenly phenomena which are regarded as God's threats—notably eclipses. The *Canon of Odes* refers to an eclipse of the sun of the date 29th Aug. 775 B.C., which was carefully verified by John Chalmers.

> 'The sun was eclipsed—
> A thing of very evil omen,
> First the moon looked small,
> And then the sun looked small,
> Henceforth the people
> Will be pitiable indeed.
> The sun and moon presage evil
> By not keeping to their proper paths;
> All through the kingdom there is no [good] government,
> Because good men are not employed.
> For the moon to be eclipsed
> Is a small matter,
> But now the sun is eclipsed,
> How dreadful is that!'

In the Confucian classic called *Tsun Tsiu* ('Springs and Autumns') the eclipse of the sun which took place on 20th April 610 B.C. is recorded. The writer says:

> 'On the occasion of an eclipse of the sun, the Son of Heaven should not have his table spread so lavishly as usual, and should have drums beaten at the altar to the spirits of the land, while the feudal princes should present offerings of silk to the spirits of the land and have drums beaten at their courts, thus manifesting their own service of the spirits and so teaching the people to serve their rulers, according to the respective rights of each, as was customary in ancient days.'

The word 'eclipse' used here is the same as the word 'eat.' The eclipse of the sun or the moon is described, in some of the Chinese stories, as the sun or moon being eaten by a certain animal, and the beating of drums is said to frighten the animal away.

The sun in the heavens is also said to correspond to the ruler on the earth; *e.g.*, when the people wished the death of Kie, the tyrant (reigned 1818–1753 B.C.), they said: 'O sun, why expirest thou not? Let us die together with thee.' Therefore the eclipse of the sun is generally regarded as a threat from God to the emperor. There are

[1] *Analects*, bk. ii. ch. 1.

numerous examples, and the edict of the emperor Ming Ti (A.D. 227–239) after the eclipse of the sun in 233 is most illuminating:

'We have heard,' says the emperor, 'that if a sovereign is remiss in government, God terrifies him by calamities and portents. These are divine reprimands sent to recall him to a sense of duty. Thus, eclipses of the sun and moon are manifest warnings that the rod of empire is not wielded aright. Ever since We ascended the throne, Our inability to continue the glorious traditions of Our departed ancestors and carry on the great work of civilization has now culminated in a warning message from on high. It therefore behoves Us to issue commands for personal reformation, in order to avert impending calamity. The relationship, however, between God and man is that of father and son; and a Father, about to chastise his son, would not be deterred were the latter to present him with a dish of meat. We do not therefore consider it a part of Our duty to act in accordance with certain memorials advising that the Grand Astrologer be instructed to offer up sacrifices on this occasion. Do ye governors of districts, and other high officers of State, seek rather to rectify your own hearts; and if anyone can devise means to make up for Our shortcomings, let him submit his proposals to the throne.'[1]

Comets, even more than eclipses, are regarded as God's threats. When the comets appeared in 524 B.C., travelling eastward towards the Milky Way, an officer said: 'This is a broom to sweep away the old, and give us new. God often makes us such signs. The feudal princes will suffer from calamities by fire.'[2] The stars or the spiritual beings who dwell in them sometimes descend from the heavens, either by themselves or by the will of God, are born on earth, and go back to their positions in heaven after their earthly life.

In *The Annals of the Bamboo Books* there are the following legends:

'He's mother (the mother of Hwang Ti, 2968 B.C.) was called Tu Paon. She witnessed a great flash of lightning, which surrounded the star Chu (or Dubhe) of the Great Bear with a brightness that lighted all the country about her, and thereupon became pregnant.'

'His mother was called Niu Tsie. She witnessed a star like a rainbow come floating down the stream to the islet of Hwa. Thereafter she dreamed and received it, and was moved in her mind, and bore *Shaon-Haon* [the emperor Che, 2597 B.C.].'

'His mother was called Niu Chu. She witnessed the *Yaou Kwang* star (or Bemtuash) go through the moon like a rainbow, when it moved herself in the palace of Yio-Fang, after which she brought forth *Tsun Hu* [the emperor, 2513 B.C.].'

'His mother was called *Sie-Ki*. She saw a falling star which went through the constellation Maou, and in her dream her thoughts were moved till she became pregnant, after which she swallowed a spirit's pearl, . . . and gave birth to *Yu* (king 2205 B.C.) in Shih Nio.'

There are 28 heroes in Chinese history who were believed to be the 28 *siüs*, or constellations, descended. A great man on earth may become after death a spiritual being in heaven and dwell in one of the stars. Some stars are named after historical heroes. There are a great many stories, love stories, and mythologies based upon beliefs of this kind.

5. Sacrifices.—We read in the 22nd book called *Ki Tung* ('The Foundation of Sacrifices') of the *Li Ki* ('The Book of Rites'), a collection of treatises on the rules of propriety or ceremonial usages, one of the five Confucian books or canons:

'Of all the methods for the good ordering of men, there is none more urgent than the use of ceremonies. Ceremonies are of five kinds, and there is none of them more important than sacrifices.'[3]

Among various sacrifices there are sacrifices to the sun, moon, and stars. We do not know when these rites began, but they have been performed under each dynasty from the 23rd cent. B.C. down to the time of the present Republic of China. In the 20th book of *Li Ki*, called *Ki Fâ* ('The Laws of Sacrifices'), it is said:

'With a blazing pile of wood on the Grand altar they [the Emperors, from Emperor Shun 2255 B.C. to King Wu 1122 B.C.] sacrificed to Heaven;[4] by burying (the victim) in the Grand mound, they sacrificed to the Earth. (In both cases) they used a red victim.[1]

By burying a sheep and a pig at the (altar of) Great brightness, they sacrificed to the seasons. (With similar) victims they sacrificed to (the spirits of) cold and heat, at the pit and the altar, using prayers of deprecation and petition; to the sun, at the (altar called the) royal palace; to the moon, at the (pit called the) light of night; to the stars at the honoured place of gloom; to (the spirits of) flood and drought at the honoured altar of rain; to the (spirits of the) four quarters at the place of the four pits and altars; mountains, forests, streams, valleys, hills, and mounds, which are able to produce clouds, and occasion winds and rain, were all regarded as (dominated by) spirits.'[2]

In the 21st book of *Li Ki*, called *Ki Î* ('The Meaning of Sacrifices'), it says:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated. The sovereigns of Hsiâ [dynasty, 2205–1766 B.C.] presented it in the dark. Under the Yin dynasty [1766–1122 B.C.] they did so at noon. Under the Kau [dynasty, 1122–255 B.C.] they sacrificed all the day, especially at daybreak, and towards evening.

They sacrificed to the sun on the altar, and to the moon in the hollow;—to mark the distinction between (the) gloom (of the one) and (the) brightness (of the other), and to show the difference between the high and the low. They sacrificed to the sun in the east, and to the moon in the west;—to mark the distinction between (the) forthcoming (of the former) and (the) withdrawing (of the latter), and to show the correctness of their (relative) position. The sun comes forth from the east, and the moon appears in the west; the darkness and the light are now long, now short; when the one ends, the other begins, in regular succession:—thus producing the harmony of all under the sky.'[3]

These are the sacrifices at the equinoxes; that to the sun at the vernal equinox in the eastern suburb, and that to the moon at the autumnal equinox in the western suburb. These had been performed under each dynasty, and can also be found in *Ta Tsing Tung Li* ('The Ritual of the Manchu Dynasty'). The former is called *Chow Zi*, 'The Morning Sun,' and the latter *Si Yüe*, 'The Evening Moon.'

In the dynasty of Chin (255–206 B.C.) they sacrificed to what they called the eight gods, *i.e.* the god of the heavens, the god of the earth, the god of war, the god of the *yin*, the god of the *yang*, the god of the sun, the god of the moon, and the god of the four seasons. In *Han Shu* ('the Book [or History] of the early Han Dynasty') [206 B.C.–A.D. 25] it is said: 'There were such eight gods in the ancient times, but their origin is unknown.'

In the dynasties after the China dynasty different temples were built for their sacrifices. Even at the present day temples connected with the sun, moon, and stars can be found in different places. In Peking there is the world-famous Tien Tan ('Temple of Heaven'), and in it there are altars of the sun, of the moon, of the 28 constellations, and of some other stars and groups of stars. In the Manchu dynasty (1644–1911) sacrifices were offered in the Temple of Heaven once every spring and once every autumn. Even since the establishment of the Republic of China (1911), a grand sacrifice was offered in the Temple of Heaven by Yuan Shi Kai, the first Chinese President.

The 15th of the eighth lunar month is a Chinese holiday called *Tsung Tsiu Tse* ('the mid-autumn holiday'). The moon is said to be always at its fullest and brightest on this evening if it is visible, whereas this need not be so on the same date of other lunar months. A family festival used to be, and in some places still is, held in Chinese houses on that evening. The offerings to the moon consist chiefly of fruits, and the ceremony is similar to that of Chinese ancestor-worship. On this holiday schools, shops, etc., are closed, and farmers cease work for a few days. Relatives and friends exchange presents, chiefly

[1] H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals*, London, 1915, p. 180.
[2] *Ib.* p. 58.
[3] Tr. J. Legge in *The Sacred Books of China*, pt. iv. (*SBE* xxviii. [1885] 236).
[4] On the blazing pile were placed the victim and pieces of jade; in the square mound were buried the victim and pieces of silk.

[1] Red was the special colour of victims under the Chow dynasty.
[2] *SBE* xxviii. 202 f. [3] *Ib.* p. 218 f.

eatables, and invite each other to dinner on one or more of the days following the mid-autumn holiday.

With regard to the sacrifices to the stars we read in *Urh Ya*, an ancient dictionary, one of the Thirteen Confucian Classics: 'The sacrifice to the stars is called Pu.' Even in our day tablets of stars can be found in public temples and private houses in different provinces.

6. Significance or purpose of sacrifices.—The significance of these sacrifices is not merely religious, nor is their religious significance always the most prominent. Sometimes these rites were used for political purposes by the rulers. This is the case not only in ancient times; there was a time in our present century when *Shinkio Riyo Mondai* ('The Problem of the Utilization of Religions') was of great interest to statesmen and politicians in Japan, and the political significance of the sacrifices at the Temple of Heaven performed by Yuan Shi Kai was sufficiently obvious. When the sacrifices are performed by the people, their purpose is sometimes social as well as religious. In any case the idea of keeping up the custom seems to play a great part. Western scholars are apt to take these sacrifices purely as the expression of religious faith and devotion. The following passages in *Lî Kî* may show that they are not always so.

As sacrifices are the most important of ceremonies or rites, let us first indicate the purposes for which they are offered.

'The rites to be observed by all under heaven were intended to promote the return (of the mind) to the beginning (= Creator of all); to promote (the honouring of) spiritual Beings; to promote the harmonious use (of all resources and appliances) of government; to promote righteousness; and to promote humility. They promote the return to the beginning, securing the due consideration of their originator. They promote (the honouring) of spiritual Beings, securing the giving honour to superiors. They promote the (proper) use of all resources, thereby establishing the regulations (for the well-being of) the people. They promote righteousness, and thus there are no oppositions and conflictings between high and low. They promote humility, in order to prevent occasions of strife. Let these five things be united through the rites for the regulation of all under heaven, and though there may be some extravagant and perverse who are not kept in order, they will be few.'[1]

There are two other passages, one of which indicates the objects to whom sacrifices should be offered and the other the purposes of the sacrifices.

'According to the institutes of the sage kings about sacrifices, sacrifice should be offered to him who had given (good) laws to the people; to him who had laboured to the death in the discharge of his duties; to him who had strengthened the state by his laborious toil; to him who had boldly and successfully met great calamities; and to him who had warded off great evils.'[2]

'Sacrifices were for the purposes of prayer, or of thanksgiving, or of deprecation.'[3]

The sun, moon, and stars fall under none of the above five classes except that in later dynasties some stars were sacrificed to for the power of warding off evils. With regard to the three purposes that of thanksgiving seems to be the sole motive for which the Chinese sacrificed to the sun, moon, and stars.

The Chinese were grateful to the sun, moon, and stars, and expressed their gratitude by means of sacrifices, because, says a passage: 'As to the sun and moon, the stars and constellations, the people look up to them.'[4] The phrase 'look up to' (*jan yang*) in this case has an ethical meaning, as when we speak of looking up to a great man with a view to modelling our behaviour on his. The Chinese believed that they could adjust their conduct by observing the appearances and movements of the heavenly bodies, which were regarded as God's revelation.

[1] *Lî Kî*, xxi. i. 20 (*SBE* xxviii. 219 f.).
[2] *Ib.* xx. 9 (*SBE* xxviii. 207 f.).
[3] *Lî Kî*, ix. iii. 28, in *Sacred Books of China*, pt. iii. (*SBE* xxvii. [1885] 448.
[4] *Lî Kî*, xx. 9 (*SBE* xxviii. 209).

There seem to be other reasons why the Chinese should be grateful to the sun, moon, and stars—especially to the sun for its great and various benefits—but the fact is that they attribute these benefits to *Tien*, God, rather than to the heavenly bodies themselves. Indeed their sacrifices to these bodies are sometimes an indirect way of expressing their gratitude to God.

7. Sun-worship, moon-worship, and star-worship.—Is there, or has there been, sun-worship, moon-worship or star-worship in China? The answer to this question depends upon what we mean by the term 'worship.' If by worship we mean the 'adoration, sacrifice, praise, prayer, thanksgiving, or other devotional acts performed in honour of the Supreme Being or God,'[1] it is certain that there is no such worship in China, and perhaps also that such worship has never existed there. None of the heavenly bodies is conceived by the Chinese as the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is, for them, *Tien*, God, and God only. Nor can we find such worship in China if we take the term 'worship' to mean (1) the 'prostration which arises in presence of a superior being on whom we are absolutely dependent and whom we fear or reverence,' or (2) 'the feeling and act of worship' which 'involves primarily submission and fealty,' and 'is the attitude of the weak to the strong on whom they are absolutely dependent.'[2] The Chinese do not regard themselves as absolutely dependent on any of the heavenly bodies or on the spirits dwelling in them, but they regard the heavenly bodies or their indwelling spirits as dependent on *Tien*, 'God,' as they themselves are. It is true that they believe these heavenly bodies to possess powers which do not belong to men, but they also believe that men have powers which these bodies do not possess. What is more, some of them believe that certain men have the power of subjugating the spirits of the heavenly bodies, as magicians have the power of controlling spirits.

There are certain passages which have been regarded as evidence of sun-worship in China. In the 9th book of *Lî Kî*, called *Kiâo Teh Sĕng* ('The Single Victim at the Border Sacrifices'), a passage says:

'At the (Great) border sacrifice he [the Son of Heaven] welcomed the arrival of the longest day. It was a great act of thanksgiving to Heaven, and the sun was the chief object considered in it.'

Legge, commenting on this, says:

'The sun became for the time the "spirit-tablet" of Heaven. Fang Küeh says: "(The Son of Heaven) was welcoming the arrival of the longest day, and therefore he regarded the sun as the residence (for the time) of the spirit of Heaven. That spirit could not be seen; what could be looked up to and beheld were only the sun, moon, and stars."'[3]

The present writer need not give his own translation here, but he must point out that the idea that the sun was regarded as the residence of the spirit of Heaven is not implied either in Fang Küeh's commentary or in the text.

With reference to the passage in the book[4] on the meaning of sacrifices, namely:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of the gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated,'

Khân Hâo, a Chinese commentator, says, according to Legge:

'Heaven is the great source of tâo (the course of nature and duty), and of all the visible bodies which it hangs out, there are none greater than the sun and moon. Therefore, while the object of the suburban sacrifice was a grateful acknowledgment of Heaven, the sun was chosen as the resting-place for its spirit (or spirits). The idea in the institution of the rite was deep and far-reaching.'[5]

[1] *The Century Dictionary of the English Language*, London, 1889, *s.v.* 'Worship.'
[2] *DPhP* ii. 822.
[3] *SBE* xxvii. 427, n. 1.
[4] *Lî Kî*, xxi. i. 18.
[5] *SBE* xxviii. 218, n. 2.

The same remark may be made on the translation of this passage, viz. that there is neither in the text nor in the commentary the idea that the sun was chosen as the resting-place of the spirit (or spirits). The ultimate purpose in both these cases was to express gratitude by means of sacrifices to Heaven, but not to the sun or the spirit of the sun. Heaven is invisible, and they thought that for the object of sacrifice something visible was required. Therefore the sun was chosen as a symbol. Neither of these two cases therefore can be regarded as an example of sun-worship. There does not seem to be any other case. Legge says concerning the last example :

'It must be borne in mind that the rites described in the text are those of former dynasties, especially of that of Kâu. I cannot bring to mind any passages in which there is mention made of any sacrifice to the sun or sun-spirit in connexion with the great sacrifice to Heaven, or Shang Ti, at the service on the day of the winter solstice in the southern suburb.'[1]

Hence it is only by taking the term 'worship' in a very comprehensive sense, and by ignoring the purpose of the sacrifices, that we may say that the fact that the Chinese sacrificed to the sun implies that they worshipped it. It is the same with regard to their worship of the moon and the stars. In whatever sense we may be justified in saying that some of the Chinese worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, such worship occupies a very insignificant position in China compared with the worship of other natural phenomena or the spirits of them. If by sun-worshipper, moon-worshipper, etc., we mean one who regards the sun or the moon as the only or the supreme object of worship, we may say with conviction that the Chinese are not, as they have never been, sun-worshippers, moon-worshippers, or star-worshippers.

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

T. Fu.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew).—

The Hebrew conception of the universe, as we find it in the OT, is not scientific in the modern sense of the term. The cosmology of the Hebrews (see art. COSMOLOGY [Hebrew]) is characterized by the simplicity and *naïveté* of primitive folk. The attitude of mind is one of awe and wonder, not of critical inquiry; and to pry closely into the secrets of the divine government is felt to indicate a want of reverence, and even to be dangerous. Moreover, it would be natural to a people which seems to have had an innate genius for religion to think, even after it had progressed beyond the stage of quite primitive ideas of the universe, that religion itself constituted the whole of true science or knowledge.[2] We need not expect, therefore, to find in the OT any inkling of the modern science of astronomy. The Hebrew shepherds without doubt, like the Phœnician mariners (cf. Pliny, *HN* vii. 57), closely observed the sky, and learned from the scrutiny many lessons of practical value for their every-day life. It is equally likely that at an early date the Hebrews were wont to worship the stars and planets. There are later traces of this worship in the OT (cf. 2 K 17[16]).[3] And, besides this, the figures suggested by various constellations no doubt gave rise to a number of curious fables and fancies. On the other hand, the OT, as we have it, a collection of much-edited writings, preserves few traces of the astronomical and astrological lore of the Hebrews themselves. Since in the course of their national development the study of the stars and planets became more and more associated with the idolatrous practices of surrounding nations, later editors would be anxious to avoid, or even to remove, references to astronomy and astrology (cf. Dt 18[10]). This would account for the fact that most of the references preserved in the OT are of a very general nature.

The chief planets are, of course, alluded to frequently. The sun (*shemesh*) is spoken of as ruling by day (Ps 136[8]), and is often referred to as coming forth (from one chamber) in the morning and going in (-to another chamber) in the evening. Its magnificence (Jg 5[31]) and its wonderful power for good (Dt 33[14]) or for evil (2 K 4[18f.]; cf. Ps 121[6]) impressed the Hebrews, as they have impressed all peoples. Jahweh Elohim Himself might be compared to a sun (Ps 84[11]).[1] There are four words for 'moon' in the OT. *Yārēaḥ* is used especially in poetry (Gn 37[9], Jos 10[12] etc.). To this word is closely related one of the words for 'month,' *yéraḥ*, a word which is common to all the Semitic languages, though not in frequent use in the OT. Another word, *lebhānāh*, which occurs only three times (Ca 6[10], Is 24[23] 30[26]), designates the moon as the 'white one' or the 'pale one.' Rarer still is a word *kese'* (perhaps connected with the Assyr. *kusê'u*, 'headdress' or 'cap'), which denotes the full moon (perhaps the moon-god clothed in the splendour of his tiara).[2] The most common word is *ḥōdesh*, which means 'new moon,' and also 'month.' Thus the new moon was regarded as marking a new period or month, and the use of *yārēaḥ*, *yeraḥ*, and *ḥōdesh* for both moon and month shows that among the Hebrews the month and year were lunar. The moon rules the night (Ps 136[9]), and, like the sun, is a power for good (Dt 33[14]) or for evil (Ps 121[6]). Its pale brilliance made it the emblem of beauty (Ca 6[10]). In a few passages reference seems to be made to eclipses (Am 8[9], Is 38[8], Job 9[7] etc.). And we are once told that 'the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the nation had avenged itself on its enemies' (Jos 10[12f.]). In late writings there are several allusions to the worship of the sun (Ezk 8[16f.], Job 31[26f.]; cf. 2 K 23[5]) and moon (Dt 4[19]).

Other planets are mentioned more incidentally. Thus, in all probability, Venus[4] as the Morning Star is referred to in Is 14[12] under the name הֵילֵל, *hêlēl*, or הֵילָל, *hêlāl* (lit. 'the glittering one'), though it should be mentioned that some expositors have seen in the term an Arabic name for the moon (هِلَال, *hilâl*). W. Lotz (*PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Sterne') indeed argues that the Arabic word means 'new moon,' which would be unsuitable; as we find among the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians. But the present writer has pointed out (*Journal of the Manch. Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1917, pp. 67–70) that the word usually translated 'wings' will bear another meaning. The meaning may be 'skirts' rather than 'wings,' and the figure that of the glorious robe that flows from the sun.

[1] *SBE* xxviii. 218, n. 2.

[2] On this point Laurie Magnus's '*Religio Laici*' *Judaica* (1907) will be found suggestive. It has been argued elsewhere (W. Jay Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*[10], 1907) that ignorance of, or indifference to, what we term science might co-exist with a perfect knowledge of the laws of the moral and spiritual life.

[3] It is quite unnecessary to suppose that the idea of worshipping the stars and planets was borrowed, though, of course, the Hebrews came more and more into contact with people who were addicted to this worship. Whether and to what extent they came under direct Babylonian and Egyptian influence is a disputed matter (see K. Marti, *Religion of the OT*, p. 36 ff.). Cf. the proper names שִׁמְשַׁי (Jg 13[24]) and שִׁמְשַׁי (Ezr 4[8]), derived from שֶׁמֶשׁ, 'sun'; the Palmyrene ירחי, and the Biblical יְרֵחוֹ, Jericho, derived from יֶרַח, 'moon.' Cf. also Beth-shemesh, a place sacred to the sun-god. Commentators have seen in Mal 3[20] (4[2]) the conception of a winged solar disk such

[1] In Jg 14[18], Job 9[7] the word translated 'sun' is not *shemesh*, but *heres* (cf. Is 19[18], and the place-names in Jg 1[35] 8[13]). It is probable that in Jg 14[18] the text is corrupt.

[2] The name Sinai is probably derived from Sin, the name of the moon-god in Babylonian. In Ex 3[1] Sinai is described as 'the mountain of Elohim,' *i.e.* the sacred mountain. This suggests that it had long been sacred.

[3] The writer clearly intends a miracle to be understood (so C. Steuernagel in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, 1899). Other expositors (*e.g.* W. H. Bennett in 'Joshua,' *SBOT*, 1899) regard the passage as poetic and figurative (cf. Jg 5[20]).

[4] Another designation of Venus is *meleketh ha-shāmayim* מֶלֶכֶת הַשָּׁמַיִם, 'the queen of heaven,' mention being made of cakes which were baked for her (Jer 7[18] 44[17. 25]).

but, according to Zimmern and Buhl's edition of Gesenius's *Lexicon* (*Handwörterbuch*[14], 1905) it can denote the old moon as crescent.[1] Further, in Am 5[26] we probably have an allusion to Saturn (סִכּוּת, *sikkuth* = סַכּוּת, *sakkuth* = Assyr. *sakkut*; and כִּיּוּן, *kiyyun* = כַּיָּן, *kêvān* = Assyr. *kaivânu*).

The stars, again, are alluded to frequently in a general way; but there are a few references to particular stars or constellations, and these require special attention. The earliest of them is found in Am 5[8]. Since, however, the same terms occur, with others, in passages in the late book of Job which contain more precise references to astronomy, it is best to consider the Job passages first.

In Job 9[9], in a description of God's almighty power as manifested in the marvels of the material world, Job is represented as pointing to God as one

'Who shaketh the earth out of her place,
and the pillars thereof tremble.
Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not;
and sealeth up the stars.
Who alone spreadeth out the heavens,
and treadeth upon the waves of the sea.
Who maketh *'āsh*, *kĕsīl*,
and *kīmāh* and the chambers of the south.'

The context indicates that the terms in the last two lines (עָשׁ, *'āsh*; כְּסִיל, *kĕsīl*; כִּימָה, *kīmāh*; חַדְרֵי תֵימָן, *ḥadrê têmān*) designate particular stars or constellations. We are helped, too, by the fact that three of them occur again (*kīmāh* in Am 5[8], Job 38[31]; *kĕsīl* in Am 5[8], Is 13[10], Job 38[31]; *'ayish* = *āsh* in Job 38[32]); but there is considerable uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of some at least of the terms.

1. עָשׁ, *'āsh*, or better עָיִשׁ, *'ayish*, as in Job 38[32], and better still עָיִשׁ, *'ăyush*, as suggested by the Syriac (Pesh. עיושא). In Job 9[9] LXX has Ἕσπερος, Vulg. 'Hyades'; in Job 38[32] LXX Ἕσπερος, Vulg. 'Vesper.' Modern expositors have found in the word either the Great Bear, the Pleiades, Hyades, or the Northern and Southern Crown. *'Āsh* in Job 9[9] has to be taken in connexion with the other passage, 38[32], in which, according to the Massoretic text, it is said: 'or dost thou guide *'ayish* with her young?' (ועיש על-בניה תנחם).[2] It is noteworthy, too, that what in Arabic corresponds to the Great Bear is called *na'sh*, 'the bier,' and that the three tail stars of Ursa Major are called *banāt na'sh*, 'children of the bier' (*i.e.*, in this case, 'mourners'). It is true that no philological connexion can be established between the two words, but the Arabic phrase 'children (or daughters) of the bier' is suggestive as regards *'ayish* and her children. It might seem natural to expect to find a striking constellation like the Great Bear mentioned in Job 9, and it would be fitting that it should be assigned the first place, though it may be mentioned in passing that possibly the Hebrews thought of this constellation not as a Great Bear, but as a lioness with her young (cf. with Ewald, Arabic *'ayuth*, and see A. Dillmann's Commentary). But there is some force in the argument that *ayish* can hardly be Ursa Major, because the constellations in Job 38[31f.] are referred to on account of their meteorological importance. Some expositors, therefore (*e.g.*, M. A. Stern, Nöldeke, Schrader), have thought that *'ayish* represents the Pleiades. The great objection to this is that there is very good reason to think another Hebrew term (see below) designates that constellation. The 'children' of *'ayish* would certainly suit the Pleiades, which are sometimes represented as a hen with its chickens. But, on the other hand, the smaller stars surrounding or adjoining a star of the first magnitude might in several cases be described as its children. The Pleiades not being probable, some scholars agree with the Vulgate of Job 9[9] in thinking that *'ayish* represents the Hyades (so, *e.g.*, Hoffmann, Schiaparelli); and this view has the support of the Syriac (Pesh. עיושא).[1] Moreover, the constellation is suitable as being one of great meteorological importance. Elsewhere in Hebrew *'āsh* means 'moth.' Friedrich Delitzsch has suggested that it may have the same meaning here, since the name 'moth' (*sâsu*) seems to have been given to a star by the Assyro-Babylonians (see T. G. Pinches, in Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy'). Now, the Hyades, a great red star of the first magnitude (Aldebaran) and five stars of the fourth magnitude, resemble our letter V or the Greek Δ. And Schiaparelli points out (p. 58) that in the butterfly stage, when the moth is at rest, 'its wings are not held detached from the body, as happens with most other butterflies, but spread themselves over it in such a way as to form a cloak, more or less similar (according to the several species into which the animal can be divided) to an isosceles triangle.' The suggestion is that to the author of the passages in Job *'āsh* meant 'moth,' which was a name for the Hyades. In that case, assuming the identity of *'āsh* and *'ayish*, the 'children' of *'ayish* would be the minor Hyades which surround Aldebaran. Against this it might be urged that it is easier to explain *'āsh* as short for *'ayish* than to account for *'āsh* as the original form, and that 'moth' does not seem a likely name for a constellation (especially the Hyades, apart from its form). The question of identification cannot be decided definitely. But, as the Pleiades has to be excluded (see below), there are reasons for thinking that either the Great Bear or the Hyades is intended. The Great Bear was no doubt as well known to the Hebrews as to other ancient peoples; but it would not be in the least surprising to find no mention of it in the OT, the references to astronomy being so few.

2. כְּסִיל, *kĕsīl*, usually translated 'fool.' In Job 9[9] LXX has Ἀρκτοῦρος, Vulg. 'Orion'; in 38[31] LXX Ὡρίων, Vulg. 'Arcturus'; in Am 5[8] LXX omits, Vulg. 'Orion'; in Is 13[10] (כְּסִילֵיהֶם, their '*kĕsīlīm*') LXX Ὡρίων, Vulg. 'splendor earum.' Some of the Rabbis of the Middle Ages (Saadya, Abulwalid, and others) identified the word with the Arabic *Suhail* and interpreted it in its later sense, Canopus. The preponderating view of the versions is in favour of Orion, a constellation which was popularly thought of as a giant who was bound in chains to the sky. *Kĕsīl* occurs elsewhere in Hebrew with the meaning 'dullard' or 'fool,' and modern expositors commonly think of the giant (Orion) as a fool in the sense of an impious person who had rebelled against God. But the Arabic equivalent of the root (كسل, *kasala*) means 'to be thick, plump,' which suggests that *kĕsīl* itself need not mean anything more than giant (the big, burly one); and, as Cheyne says (art. 'Orion' in *EBi*), *kĕsīl* ought not to be confounded with *nābāl* ('fool' in the sense of impious person). In Job 38[31] there seems to be a reference to some myth current among the Hebrews, the giant being spoken of as bound with cords; but what exactly the myth was is quite uncertain. In Am 5[8] *kīmāh* (see below) and *kĕsīl* are again mentioned together ('seek him that maketh *kīmāh* and *kĕsīl*, and turneth black darkness into morning,' etc.) as well as in Job 38[31] ('Dost thou bind the bands of *kīmāh*, or loose the cords of *kĕsīl*?'). Further, in Is 13[10] we find the curious expression 'their *kĕsīlīm*' (often translated 'the stars of

[1] P. Jensen, however, thinks (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy') that there is little ground for supposing that any star or planet is referred to; the reference in Isaiah is too vague.

[2] For תְּנַחֵם, however, it is better to read תְּנַחֶם ('and dost thou console *'ayish* for her children?'). See, further, below.

[1] It seems certain that the Syriac word does denote the Hyades or the chief star of the group (cf. Barhebræus).

heaven and the Orions thereof').[1] This seems to indicate that primarily *kĕsīlīm* was used to denote stars of the first magnitude, in distinction from lesser stars (*kōkābīm*). In any case it is pretty generally agreed that *kĕsīl* represents Orion. It is one of the most brilliant constellations, and did not fail to arrest the attention of the ancients.

3. כִּימָה, *kīmāh*, literally 'a group, cluster,' cognate with Arabic *kâma* (كَامَ), 'to heap up.' In Job 9[9] LXX has Πλειάς, Vulg. 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. כִּימָא; in 38[31] the renderings of the Versions differ only to the extent that the Vulg. has 'Pleiades'; in Am 5[8] LXX omits, Vulg. has 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. כִּימָא. Most of the ancient authorities, in fact, understand the Pleiades by *kīmāh*. Several modern expositors, however, prefer to think of Sirius (*e.g.*, G. Hoffmann). But the word itself suggests that we are to look for a compact cluster of stars, and, of course, we must seek for one that early attracted attention. The Pleiades, as Schiaparelli says, is the best known of such clusters, 'and also the only one which has in consequence of its conspicuous light awakened universal attention at every time and among all peoples' (p. 62).[2] The expression 'the bands of *kīmāh*' in Job 38[32] is no doubt to be understood metaphorically.[3] The Arabic name for the Pleiades, *thurayya*, also means 'cluster,' and Bar Ali mentions it as an explanation of *kīmāh*. The word *kīmāh* itself has also been connected with the Arab. *kūmat*[un], 'house,' and the Assyr. *kimtu*, 'family.' In either case the name would suit the Pleiades.

It should be noted, further, that, according to some ideas found in the Talmud (*B*rakhōth*, 58*b*; *Rosh ha-shanah*, 11*b*), God brought the flood by causing *kīmāh* to set instead of rise in the morning, and by removing two stars from it. This is given as the explanation of Rabbi Joshua. According to R. Eliezer, the changes took place at a season when *kīmāh* is wont to set in the morning, and what God did was to make *kīmāh* rise in the morning on the day in question and lose two stars. This caused the flood. According to Stern, the dates mentioned suit exactly the morning rising and setting of the Pleiades, and seem to prove that in the time of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer (beginning of 2nd cent. A.D.) the Jews identified the Pleiades with *kīmāh*. It is further represented in the Talmud (*ib.*) that God afterwards set things right by taking away two stars from '*ayish* to diminish its rain-producing force.[4]

4. חַדְרֵי תֵמָן, *ḥadrê tēmān*, lit. 'chambers of the south.' The LXX renders ταμεῖα Νότου, Vulg. 'interiora Austri.' We seem to require mention of another definite constellation. This has given rise to the suggestion that the phrase designates the bright star Canopus or the constellation to which it belongs (so Stern). Other expositors regard the text as corrupt, and, emending חדר וְתֵמָן, see in the first word some uncertain constellation, and in the second (תאמן=תמן) Gemini, 'the Twins.' But we are not obliged to find in *ḥadrê tēmān* a special constellation. 'Chambers (or store-houses) of the South' might, as K. Budde says ('Hiob,' in W. Nowack's *Handkomm. zum AT*, 1896), denote a whole group of constellations in the southern sky. Dillmann (*loc. cit.*) thinks that the author of Job cannot have known anything of the stars of the southern hemisphere, but that it was known to him, as one who had travelled, that the farther one goes south the more stars and constellations become visible. To those who dwelt in the north these were, so to say, enclosed in the inmost chambers of the vault of heaven, and were therefore invisible. This would explain the expression 'treasure-houses of the South' (cf. Pr 24[4]; Job 37[9]). The word *ḥeder*, coming from a root meaning literally 'to conceal,' in the plural would bear the meaning 'penetralia.'[1] Schiaparelli gives reasons for thinking that the reference is to the imposing constellation found on the charts of to-day 'distributed between Argo, the Southern Cross, and the Centaur'; but whether this was visible to the author of Job depends upon the date of the book, which is uncertain.

In Job 38[31f.] we find another difficult astronomical term. The passage is as follows:

'Dost thou bind the bands of *kīmāh*,
or loose the cords of *kĕsīl*?
Dost thou bring out *mazzārōth* in his season,
or dost thou lead out '*ayish* with her young?'

We have already dealt with three of the terms which occur here. We have now to consider—

5. מַזָּרוֹת, *mazzārōth*. The Vulg. has 'Lucifer'; Targ. שמרי מוליא. The word may come from זָרָה, *zārāh*, which means literally 'to scatter,' but can be applied to powder (Ex 32[20]), hair (Ezk 5[2], Is 30[20]), etc. *Mazzārōth* would then mean 'scatterers' or 'sprinklers,' the reference being to rain. On this supposition, Stern and Hoffmann understand the Hyades to be meant, since the heliacal rising of their chief star, Aldebaran, announces the season of rain.[2] Gesenius derived the word from נזר, *nāzar* (Arab. نَذَرَ), and explained it as 'astra præmonentia.' Another suggestion is that it is derived from זהר, *zāhar*, *mazzārōth* being for *mazhārōth*, and meaning the 'brilliant' stars which shine with a special lustre, the planets, either all of them or the brightest and most striking. But the word is more commonly regarded as identical with *mazzālōth* (מזלות) in 2 K 23[5], the interchange of *l* and *r* presenting little difficulty. The LXX has μαζουρώθ in both cases. In 2 K *mazzālōth* has been supposed by some expositors to mean 'the signs of the zodiac,' being apparently a loan-word from Assyr. *manzaltu* or *mazaltu*, 'station, abode (of gods),' which, again, is from *nazâzu*, 'to stand.' But in the passage in question it would be more natural to find mention of the planets, and some expositors so interpret *mazzālōth* (in Rabbinic *mazzālōth* means 'planets' as well as 'signs of the zodiac'). *Mazzālōth* would be the stars and planets regarded as 'mansions' (Assyr.) of the great gods (see *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Mazzaloth').[3]

[1] Kittel would read בּוֹכְבֵיהֶם, 'their stars.' But this is not necessary. Nor is it necessary to follow Cheyne in emending the whole of the beginning of the verse thus: עָשׁ וְכִימָה וּכְסִיל, 'the Great Bear, the Pleiades (?), and Orion.'

[2] An old English name for them is 'the seven stars' (AV in Am 5[8]).

[3] The Hebrew has מַעֲדַנּוֹת כִּימָה, *ma'dannōth kīmāh*, which AV translates 'sweet influences,' some such idea being suggested by the root as found elsewhere. It is better, however, to follow many modern expositors, and regard *ma'dannōth* as equivalent to *ma'naddōth*, 'bands' or 'fetters,' from *'ānad*, 'to bind' (so Ewald, Dillmann, Duhm, and others). It we translate 'bands,' we may think of the Oriental poets' habit of comparing the Pleiades with an ornament (Ideler, *Sternnamen*, p. 147).

[4] According to Stern, the Talmudists undoubtedly understood the Hyades by '*ayish*. May there not be references to an earlier form of this kind of legend in Job 38[31f.]? The passage might be translated thus (interchanging תקשר and תפתח in ver. 31):

Dost thou loosen the bands of the Pleiades (*kīmāh*)
or bind fast the cords of a giant (-star, *kĕsīl*)?
Dost thou lead forth the rainers (*mazzārōth*) in due season
and comfort the Hyades for its children?

The 'rainers' (from זָרָה, lit. 'to scatter') would be the stars taken from the Hyades, and are referred to in the next clause as 'its children.'

[1] Cf. A. B. Davidson, 'Job' in *Cambr. Bible*, 1893: 'probably the great spaces and deep recesses of the southern hemisphere of the heavens, with the constellations which they contain.'

[2] Stern identifies *mazzārōth* with *mazzālōth*, and would derive the latter from חָיַל, *ḥizzil*, 'to cause to flow.' This, again, would give some meaning equivalent to 'rain-producers.'

[3] P. Jensen (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy') says that *mazzālōth* may mean either 'planets,' 'signs of the zodiac,' or 'stations of the moon.'

It is not necessary, however, to regard *mazzārōth* and *mazzālōth* as identical. We have found reason to think that another word denotes the Hyades as a constellation. That does not prevent us from supposing that *mazzārōth* may be a further description of some of the stars in this group.[1] The word *mazzārōth* has also been identified with the Great Dog, whose chief star is Sirius. This, as the brightest of the fixed stars, and for meteorological reasons as well, everywhere attracted the notice of the ancients.

6. It should be noted further that in Job 37[9] another word occurs (מְזָרִים, *mĕzārīm*) which bears some resemblance to *mazzārōth*. The passage runs: 'Out of its chamber cometh the whirlwind, and cold out of *mezārīm*.' This word might also come from *zārāh*, 'to scatter.' On that assumption, it has been supposed to mean 'scattering' or north winds. Another suggestion, however, is that it is a corruption of the Babylonian *mišri*, 'the northern (star)' (so *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Mazzaroth'). A more recent conjecture is that of Schiaparelli (p. 69 ff.). He suggests that the correct punctuation of מוּרִים is *mizrīm* or *mizrayim*, *i.e.* the plural or dual of a word מִזְרֶה, *mizreh*, which is referred to in Is 30[24] and Jer 15[7] as an instrument for winnowing. Schiaparelli points out that the arrangement of the stars of the Great Bear is such that they might be thought to resemble a winnowing fan. To the ancient Chinese these stars actually suggested a ladle, which, with its cavity and handle, is very like a winnowing fan. The plural *mizrīm* would indicate more than one instrument. Schiaparelli therefore thinks that the word might designate the Great Bear and the Lesser Bear; and in that case, of course, the dual *mizrayim* would be a still more suitable description. The fact that the Phœnicians used the Lesser Bear when at sea to find the direction of the north is noteworthy in this connexion. The suggestion is very ingenious. But unfortunately *mizreh* is not the term which denotes a winnowing instrument of the shape required. The word for that is *raḥath* (the other term mentioned in Is 30[24]). *Mizreh* is apparently the *midhrā* of modern Syria, a pitch-fork with six prongs, and the Great Bear can hardly be said to resemble that.

7. Some expositors have found yet another reference to astronomy in the בָּרִחַ נָחָשׁ, *nāḥāsh bārīaḥ*, of Job 26[13]. Meaning literally 'the fleeing serpent,' the words have been supposed to refer to the Dragon between the Great and the Little Bear. There is nothing in the context, however, to indicate that the author had any star or constellation in mind.

The OT contains very few definite references to astrology, though the prohibition in Dt 18[10] shows that it was practised. We can hardly say that there was no astrology amongst the ancient Hebrews, in spite of the fact that the present allusions are late and due to Assyro-Babylonian influence. In Is 47[13] (post-Exilic) we read: 'Yea let them deliver thee, the dividers(?) of heaven (הֹבְרֵי שָׁמַיִם), the gazers on stars (חֹזִים בַּכּוֹכָבִים), those who make known each new moon (מוֹדִעִים לֶחֳדָשִׁים), from the things that are coming upon thee.' The word translated 'dividers' occurs here only, and LXX has for the whole phrase *οἱ ἀστρολόγοι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*. It has been connected with an Arabic word 'to divide' (*ḥabara*, lit. 'to cut into large pieces'), a meaning which suits very well, since the Babylonians divided the sky for astrological purpose into signs of the zodiac. 'Those who make known each new moon' (or the 'monthly prognosticators') would be persons, like the Assyrian and Babylonian astrologers, who noted lucky and unlucky days, preparing monthly almanacs or calendars based on astrological calculations (see Cheyne, 'Isaiah,' *PB*, 1898). In Dn 5[11], according to AV, Daniel became chief of the 'astrologers' (אַשָּׁפִין) in Babylon; but the correct translation of the word is 'conjurers' or 'enchanters.'

[1] See the conjecture made above on p. 82[a], note 4.

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MAURICE A. CANNEY.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hindu).—1. The sun.

—Solar worship has been described as the real religion of India. Nor is it difficult to understand how in a land flooded with sunshine, where every phase and function of life is dependent upon the kindly warmth of the sun and his destructive energy and power are felt in the uttermost extremes of heat, it should have been man's primary business to win his favour and placate his wrath. In the ancient verse of the *Gāyatrī* every Hindu begins his day with prayer and ascription of praise to the sun, the giver of light, heat, and fertility. In his mid-day devotion also he remembers and renders homage to the same deity. It is apparently true that at no period in India was the worship of the sun to any great extent exclusive. There are no distinct sects at the present time who reverence the sun alone and bear his name. The essentials of his worship, however, are present everywhere and in all the sects, more or less avowedly, or in disguise, and combined with other cults; and his practical and decisive influence on daily life is universally recognized.

In the *Ṛigveda* Sūrya, or the sun, is worshipped under many names and forms. The three chief aspects under which he presents himself to his worshipper are the rising, culminating, and setting sun. These are not separated or distinguished as three deities, but are varying forms of one and the same god, in each of which he displays himself with different attributes and as exercising different powers. Especially is he reverenced as Savitṛ, the giver and sustainer of life, who each morning wakes the universe and men from sleep. One of his most ancient cults, perhaps the most ancient of all, is under the name Mitra, the Persian Mithras; whence some have conjectured that India derived her solar religion from the West. If borrowing took place on either side, it is probable that in those early days the indebtedness was Persian. As Mitra, the sun was associated as a member with an early triad, symbolized by the sacred syllable *Om*, Agni or fire, Vāyu the wind, and Mitra. This triune aspect also was manifested in the sun as the heavenly fire, and he bore corresponding epithets or titles, as *tripād*, 'three-footed,' *trivikrama*, 'three-stepping,' and others. The last name was appropriated more particularly to Viṣṇu, the sun as the all-pervader, who in three strides traverses the three worlds, earth, heaven, and hell. He is invoked also as Pūṣan, the guardian and preserver of the cattle, the companion of travellers, and guide of the soul on its perilous way to the lower world.

In the mythology Sūrya is the son of Dyaus, the wide-spreading sky, and is described as 'all-creating' and 'all-seeing.' In this aspect his most ancient and significant name is Prajāpati, the 'lord of creation.' He traverses the heavens in his golden car, drawn by seven steeds, of which Uṣas, or the Dawn, is the charioteer; and the Aśvins, twin gods of the morning, are his children. By his power he drives away the demons of sickness,

and expels diseases and all the subtle and dreaded influences of darkness. The beneficent offices of physician and healer of bodily ills, which later are ascribed to the Aśvins, are in the first instance those of Sūrya himself.

There seems no reason to reject or doubt the statement of Śaṅkara in the 10th cent. that in his time there existed distinct sects of sun-worshippers, Sauryas, of one at least of which the members were accustomed to carry branded on their forehead and breast the symbol of their deity. They have, however, all died out and been forgotten.[1]

Not many temples dedicated to the worship of the sun have survived, nor is it probable that at any period in Indian history they existed in any considerable number. That at Konārak in Orissa is the best known, and architecturally of the most interest. It is, however, neglected and ruinous, and attracts no worshippers. There is another at Gayā, and a small but much-frequented shrine at Benares, where the fire-sacrifice is offered in honour of the sun.

Among the non-Aryan peoples of India and the sub-tribes, who may be described as on the borders of Hinduism, sun-worship is much more open and confessed. By the Dravidians and Kolarians the sun is widely invoked as Parameśvar, the creator and preserver, and is worshipped with prayer and sacrifice. The most popular form of offering is a white cock, whose head is struck off at the village shrine. He is Sūrāj Nārāyan (Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa), and the traders in the bazaars draw images or symbols of the sun at the entrance to their booths for good luck.[2] Similar representations or figures may be often seen on pillars. The *nīm*-tree is especially sacred to the sun, and there exists a popular legend or story which records its association with his cult. By many the *Holī* festival in the south of India is believed to have been instituted originally in order to propitiate the sun-god. He is invoked also to avert or to heal disease, and on the occasion of an eclipse the tom-toms are beaten and other ceremonies observed to rescue the deity from the powers of evil. The same conception, that worship and sacrifice are efficacious to avert disaster from the object of worship, may perhaps be recognized in the especial frequency of sun-ritual and adoration in the winter season among some northern tribes, at a time when the divinity may be supposed to be weak. A sacred meal is partaken of in his honour, and this must be eaten without salt. A similar ritual is observed when the sun enters a new sign of the zodiac. There are races and peoples in India at the present time who believe themselves to be descended from the sun.

2. The moon.—From the earliest times in India it would appear that the moon has been a popular subject of traditional story and mythology, but, so far as is known, there never existed any formal moon-cult or sectarian worship. A late work of the 17th cent. mentions 'moon-worshippers' and 'star-worshippers.' It is improbable, however, that any special sect was in the writer's mind. Worship of the moon in one or other of her aspects, either alone or in conjunction with other rites, is common in India at the present day, and such worship has in all probability never been intermitted. There are, however, no exclusive votaries or sects who make the moon their chief deity. In this respect, therefore, the popular worship of India is in contrast with the established cults of ancient Babylonia and other countries.

In the *Rigveda* and the early literature Soma (*q.v.*) is identified with the moon, and in one passage at least the waning of the moon is caused by the gods drinking up the nectar (*amṛta*).[3] The great deities Indra and Agni are identified with its phases, representing the new and full moon respectively; so also Varuṇa and Mitra are deities of the waxing and waning moon.[1] As usual among primitive peoples, the moon is a male divinity. A title of Śiva is *chandra-śekhara*, 'he whose crest is the moon,' *i.e.* the moon-bearer, and in this sense he is contrasted with Viṣṇu, who represents the sun. The ancient lunar dynasty of India (*chandravaṁśa*), whose capital was at Hastināpura, or Delhi, about 50 miles north-east of the modern city, claimed descent from the moon.

The moon also (Soma) was one of the treasures recovered at the churning of the ocean, together with the *amṛta* (nectar). Elsewhere he is enumerated among the eight *lokapālas*, or guardians of the universe. He is lord of the planets and of plants, of offerings and of penances.[2] More often he is regarded as one of the nine planets and is associated with them in worship, but especially with the sun. The departed go to the moon, and there is the abode of the *pitṛs*, 'fathers,' whither they are borne on the smoke of the funeral pyre. A more popular title or a more popular ritual for him is as Oṣadhipati, or Oṣadhīśa, 'lord of plants.' Agriculture in general is under his protection and is subject to his influence.

The phases of the moon are often decisive for the work of the fields; and the economy of the household, with its various anniversaries and important events, is similarly determined by the moon's position and aspects. The title 'lord of plants' is probably derived from the practice, common also in other countries, of collecting medicinal herbs, etc., by the light of the moon. In this character he is a god of healing, and for certain diseases—*e.g.*, leprosy—to gaze at the reflexion of the moon in *ghī* or oil is an important and efficacious remedy. The periods of new and full moon are especially dangerous owing to the increased activity of the spirits at these times. In some parts of the country the conch-shell is a symbol of the deity of the moon. Among some of the primitive Kolarian tribes, instead of being regarded as a male divinity, the moon is mythologically the wife of the sun, and the stars are their children.

3. The stars.—The principal stars and constellations are known to the Hindus by name, and are recognized as beneficent or the reverse, especially in their relation to family and individual happiness or misfortune.

Thus the Pole-star is *dhruva*, 'fixed' or 'stationary,' although the same title is given to some of the *nakṣatras* (see below). The seven stars of the Great Bear are seven *ṛṣis*, translated to the heavens. Canopus also is a *ṛṣi*, Agastya, the sage and reputed evangelist of S. India. The Pleiades are the six *kṛttikās*, 'nymphs,' the nurses of Skanda, the god of war, who bore from them the title of Kārttikeya. Orion represents the head of Brahmā in the form of an antelope's or stag's head (*mṛgaśiras*), struck off by Śiva, etc. Great regard is paid especially to the planets and the constellations or groupings of stars known as *nakṣatras*; and the star, planet, or constellation under which a man is born gives infallible indication of his future lot. In parts of N. India the stars generally are the cattle that the moon tends in the character of shepherd.

The full number of the planets is nine, but sometimes only seven or five are enumerated. There is a temple at Benares dedicated to the nine planets, where flowers and other offerings are presented. The complete number includes the sun and moon, and the others in order are Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, with Rāhu and Ketu. The two last represent the ascending and descending nodes of the moon's orbit.

Rāhu is the cause of eclipses, when he swallows the sun or moon, and this he is said to do in revenge for the loss of his head, which was cut off by Viṣṇu as a punishment for his having stolen and drunk part of the nectar churned from the ocean. By drinking the *amṛta* he became immortal, and his wrath is perpetually exhibited in the eclipses, when the village folk seek to propitiate him with various rites. Rāhu is therefore known as the bodiless, and there exists at Benares a shrine dedicated to him under this form. Ketu is the progenitor of the numerous tribe of meteors and comets. In the *Purāṇas* they are all described as deities, each with his own car, that of Mars being golden with eight red horses. The days of the week also are named from them.

Some of the planets are favourable and some malevolent; but all need to be propitiated and their favour if possible secured before a marriage or other important event in the household. The omission of the *śānti* or *śānti-karman*, the 'propitiation ceremony, would most certainly result in harm and disaster.

[1] See art. SAURAPĀTAS, SAURAS, or SAURYAS.
[2] See art. SYMBOLISM (Hindu).
[3] *Ṛigveda*, x. lxxxv. 5.

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II. iv. 4. 17 f.
[2] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. 22.

Rāhu and Ketu, with Saturn, are deities of ill omen who presage sickness and all kinds of trouble, and to be born when one of these is in the ascendant is a grave misfortune. The remaining planets are propitious, especially Mercury, Venus, and Jupiter, in whose hands are the gifts of wisdom and all knowledge and skill.

In the *Rigveda* *nakṣatra* is the name for a constellation in general. Universally, however, in later times and technically the *nakṣatras* are the lunar mansions, or stations, through which the moon passes, as the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac. Originally these seem to have been 27 in number, but in the later literature and in astrological calculations more usually 28. Mythologically they are the wives of the moon and daughters of Dakśa, one of the Ādityas. Like the planets, the *nakṣatras* are important and influential deities, whose countenance is sought before undertaking a journey or making arrangements for marriage or other domestic rites. Every Hindu boy's horoscope contains a reference to the *nakṣatra* under which he is born, and he bears a secret name other than that which is given him at the special name-giving ceremony (*nāmadheya*), which is written in the horoscope and is stated to contain always one letter at least from the name of the *nakṣatra* through which the moon was passing at the hour of his birth.

LITERATURE. — M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, pp. 341–346; W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, 2 vols., do. 1896, *passim*; A. S. Geden, *Studies in the Religions of the East*, do. 1913, pp. 212 ff., 221 ff.; S. Reinach, *Cults, Myths, and Religions*, tr. E. Frost, do. 1912; H. Whitehead, *The Village Gods of South India*, Oxford, 1916; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*, London, 1887, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic*, Calcutta, 1882.

A. S. GEDEN.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Iranian).—Astronomy received much attention in ancient Persia, as is obviously implied by the current tradition that the Magi, the sacerdotal class of the Medes and Persians, were highly skilled in divination, an art which depended largely upon a knowledge of the heavenly bodies, astrology and astronomy being sister sciences in antiquity. The part which the veneration of the sun, moon, and stars played in the national religion of early Iran is well known (see art. ZOROASTRIANISM), and some of the Greeks regarded Zoroaster as much in the light of a professed astrologer and star-worshipper as in that of a wise man and prophet (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Proœm.* i. 6, ἀστροθύτην; Scholiast on the Platonic *Alcibiades*, i. 122; *Clementine Homilies*, ix. 3–6, *Recognitiones*, iv. 27–29; Suidas, *Lexicon*, *s.v.* ἀστρονομία, Ζωροάστρης—all collected in Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, New York, 1899, pp. 226–273). The Avesta and the Pahlavi books, especially the *Bundahišn* and *Dīnā-i Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, contain frequent allusions of an astronomical nature; and Persian literature, after the Muhammadan conquest of Iran in the 7th cent., contains similar references. These three sets of sources furnish our chief supply of information, supplemented by comparisons drawn from Babylonia and Assyria, as well as by other material.

1. **Conception of the universe.**—The ancient Iranians naturally based their astronomical system upon a geocentric conception of the universe. It is probable that in the earliest times the shape of the earth was regarded as round and flat, although it is not altogether clear whether the Avestan word *skarəna*, 'round' (cognate with the Greek σφαῖρα), signified merely circular, or whether it actually meant spherical (*Yašt*, v. 38, x. 95, xvii. 19). It is almost certain, however, that in later times the globular form of the earth was recognized by the Persian astronomers, possibly influenced by Ptolemy, who was a great authority among the Arab-Persian scientists. The spherical shape may be inferred from two Pahlavi passages which apparently contain the idea of the cosmic egg—a wide-spread notion in antiquity. The first of these passages occurs in the *Dīnā-i Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, xliv. 1–11 (tr. West in *SBE* xxiv. 85): 'The sky is arranged above the earth, like an egg, by the handiwork of the creator Aūharmazd; and the semblance of the earth, in the midst of the sky, is just like as it were the yolk amid the egg.' The second Pahlavi passage is found in the *Dīnkarṭ*, ii. 74. 2 (ed. Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1876, ii. 72): 'The world and the other creatures are placed together in the midst of the sky, like the bird in the midst of the egg; the sky surrounds all, as the egg does the bird' (tr. Casartelli, *Mazdayasnian Philosophy*, Bombay, 1889, p. 107). In the arrangement of the universe the earth was regarded as encompassed by the atmosphere (Av. *vayu*, Phl. *vāi*; or Av. *θwāša*, Phl. *spihr*), above which was the sky or firmament (Av. O.P. *asman*, Phl. *Asmān*, lit. 'stone'), beyond which again rose the empyrean realm (Av. *anaγra raočā*, lit. 'endless lights'), the abode of Ormazd and his angels. Through a misapprehension of the true facts, moreover, the sun and moon were located beyond the sphere of the stars (cf. Phl. *Arṭā-Vīrāf*, vii. 1–x. 13; *Bundahišn*, iv. 4; *Zāṭ-Sparam*, vii. 6; *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xii. 5; *Gr. Iran. Bund.*, tr. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 310; *Dāṭistān*, ii. 1, xxxiv. 2; Av. *Vendidād*, vii. 52; and consult Jackson, 'Die iranische Religion,' § 66, in Geiger and Kuhn, *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, ii. 671–672).

2. **Sun and moon.**—In the Zoroastrian ritual, as preserved in the Avesta, both the sun (*hvar*) and the moon (*māh*) receive high veneration individually, and each has a special hymn of praise devoted to its glorification (*Yašt*, vi. and vii.); besides, minor litanies and prayers are consecrated to their particular service (*Sīrōzah*, i. 11, ii. 11; *Yašt*, vi. 1–7, vii. 1–7; *Nyāiš*, i. 1–10, iii. 1–11). A similar degree of reverence was accorded them during Parthian and Sasanian times, as is shown by the Pahlavi texts themselves and by allusions in the Greek and Latin classics (*e.g.*, Phl. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, vii. 1–3; *Dīnkarṭ*, i. 51. 6, the former translated by West in *SBE* v. 297–298, and the latter by Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1875, i. 47, and tr. p. 48: cf. also such classical writers as Strabo, xv. 3. 13, p. 732; Ammianus Marcellinus, *Hist.* xxiii. 6, xvii. 5; Dio Chrysostomus, *Orat. Borysthenitica*, xxxvi.; and Nicolaus Damascenus, frag. 66, p. 401, ed. Müller). The supremacy of the sun among the heavenly bodies is naturally emphasized in the Avesta (*e.g.*, *Yašt*, vi.), and its various positions in the heavens are described in *Bundahišn*, v. 1–7, and *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xxi. 1–7. In the latter passage there are to be found special observations of the midday and afternoon shadows with respect to the sun's altitude in the various zodiacal constellations. Solar observations were important in determining the various times of day for performing the sacrifice.

The moon, like the sun, is invoked because of its beneficent influence (*Yašt*, vii. 1–7), and there are several specific allusions to its periodic phases (*e.g.*, *Yasna*, xliv. 3; *Yašt*, vii. 2–4; *Fragment*, viii. 1; *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, lxviii. 1–6, lxxi. 2, tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 210–211, 215). The connexion between the moon and the tides was fully recognized in Sasanian times, and a crude attempt was made to explain it (see *Bundahišn*, xiii. 13–14; *Zāṭ-Sparam*, vi. 14–17). Eclipses, both of the sun and of the moon, were regularly taken into account 'in the calculations of the astronomers,' at least under the Sasanians, as is shown by *Dāṭistān-i*

Dīnīk, lxix. 1–7, and the cause of these obscurations was thought to be the intervention of two bodies that revolve below the two greater lights (*Dāṭ.* lxix. 1–7; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 46, tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 212–213, xxiv. 132).

3. Stars.—There is an abundance of star-lore throughout the entire literature, and particular stars, or groups of stars, are alluded to as guarding the quarters of the heavens into which the Zoroastrians divided the firmament. The chief star in the Avesta, as elsewhere, is called Tishtrya (Av. *tištrya*, Phl. *tištr*), and it is usually identified with Sirius. Tishtrya is regent of the eastern division of the sky, an opponent of the meteors, and the bringer of rain by overcoming Apaosha, the demon of drought (*Yašt*, viii. 1 ff.; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, vii. 1, ix. 2). The fixed star Satavaēsa (Av. *satavaēsa*, Phl. *sat-vēs*, 'having a hundred servitors'), which is possibly to be identified with Fomalhaut, is an ally of Tishtrya, and lord of the southern heavens (*Yašt*, viii. 9, 32, 43, 44; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xiv. 5, vi. 16). The guardianship of the west is entrusted to Vanant (Av. *vanant*, Phl. *vanand*, 'victorious'; cf. *Yašt*, xxi. 1, viii. 12, xii. 16; *Nyāiš*, i. 8; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1; *Mainōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 12; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28–38), while the keeping of the north is consigned to the constellation of Ursa Major, called Haptō-iringa (Av. *haptō-iringa*, Phl. *haptō-iring*, 'with seven signs'; cf. *Yašt*, viii. 12, xii. 28, xiii. 60; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 12; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28–38). The Pleiades (Av. *paoiryaēinī*) are mentioned in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 12), and there are certain other allusions that may contain the names of special stars, though their interpretation is open to question (see Kuka, 'Stars mentioned in the Avesta' in *Zartoshti*, ii. 7–22, Bombay, 1904). In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundahišn* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 6,480,000, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings,' in the *Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume*, Bombay, 1914, pp. 116–158; see also Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, pp. 23–27, 210–213, 279–281.

4. Planets, meteors, and comets.—In contrast to the fixed stars and regular constellations, the planets, meteors, and comets were held by Zoroastrians to be disturbers of the established order of the universe, and consequently to be of Ahrimanian origin and evil nature—a point of view directly opposed to that of Babylonia, where the planets were looked upon as distinctly beneficent in character (cf. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 373). To the planets Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn (the only five then known, but making seven with the sun and the moon, by the side of which they were usually mentioned) there were given, respectively, in Pahlavi the euphemistic names *Tīr*, *Vahrām*, *Aūharmazd*, *Anāhid*, and *Kēvān*, derived from divine names, including the name of the god Ahura Mazda himself, because these beneficent powers curb and restrain the maleficent influence exercised by the planets (*Bundahišn*, v. 1–2; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 1–5; *Zāṭ-Sparam*, ii. 10, iv. 7–10, vi. 1–2; and consult the list in al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 172). The Persian treatise *Ulamā-i Islām* (tr. Vullers, *Fragmente über die Religion des Zoroaster*, Bonn, 1831, p. 52) states that they originally bore the names of demons, but were afterwards given designations of good omen. At the same time it is not impossible that we have in their nomenclature a translation of the Babylonian names of the planets, *Nabu*, *Nergal*, *Marduk*, *Ištar*, *Ninib*, as may be surmised from the equations, Marduk (lord of the gods) = Aūharmazd = Jupiter; Nergal (god of war) = Vahrām = Mars; and Ištar = Anāhid = Venus; on the confusion between Tishtrya ('Sirius') and Tīr ('Mercury') compare the note by Gray, *ERE* i. 798[b]; and, for the Babylonian names of the planets, consult Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 134–139; Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 370, 454–466. This parallel, in any case, is of interest because the Sanskrit names given by the Hindus to the planets show no likeness to the Babylonian (cf. Weber, *Vorlesungen über indische Literaturgeschichte*[2], Berlin, 1876, p. 267 f.). Shooting stars are alluded to in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 8) under the name of *kərəmā stārō*, a designation meaning, perhaps, 'worm stars'; and there are several passages, in both Avesta and Pahlavi literature, which allude presumably to comets (*Yasna*, xvi. 8; *Bundahišn*, v. 2, xxviii. 44, xxx. 17; *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, xxxvii. 55, lxix. 2).[1]

5. Signs of the zodiac.—The names of the twelve signs of the zodiac, at least in Sasanian times, correspond in concept with those familiar to us through the Greek and Latin designations, and are parallel likewise with the Babylonian, from which, like the Indo-Germanic zodiac in general, they are believed to be derived, and of which their names are translations—a phenomenon precisely paralleled in India and in other Asiatic countries (see Ginzel, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, i., Leipzig, 1906, pp. 78–88). Thus in Pahlavi we find *Varak* ('Ram,' Aries), *Tōrā* ('Bull,' Taurus), *Dō-patkar* ('Two-figures,' Gemini), *Kalakang* ('Crab,' Cancer), *Sēr* ('Lion,' Leo), *Khušak* ('Maiden,' Virgo), *Tarāzuk* ('Balance,' Libra), *Gazdūm* ('Scorpion,' Scorpio), *Nēmasp* ('Half horse,' Centaur or Sagittarius), *Vahīk* ('Goat,' Capricorn), *Dūl* ('Waterpot,' Aquarius), *Mahīk* ('Fish,' Pisces). The names of the twenty-eight lunar mansions, as recognized in 'the subdivisions of the astronomers' (Phl. *xūrṭak-i hāmārikān*), are given in the *Bundahišn* (ii. 3); but the reading of the various designations is by no means sure, and the individual identification of the names remains, therefore, uncertain, even when compared with those in the Soghdian and Khorasmian list, given about A.D. 1000 by al-Bīrūnī (*Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 227 f.).[2] Possibly some further light may be gained from a study of the terminology used for these asterisms by the Hindus, Chinese, and Arabs, if not by the Babylonians (see Ginzel, *op. cit.* pp. 70–76). Such an attempt has already been made from the Sanskrit side, in comparison with Avestan and Pahlavi, by a Parsi scholar named Anklesaria, in an article entitled 'Asterisms in Iranian Literature' in *Cama Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, pp. 216–227.

6. Prediction of events.—Like the reference in the preceding paragraph to the minute subdivisions used by the astronomers (*Bund.* ii. 3), there are kindred allusions in Sasanian literature to 'the calculations of the astronomers' or to 'the com-

[1] The Soghdian names of the planets given by Manichæan fragments discovered at Turfan, in Chinese Turkestan, correspond in general to the forms given above (see F. W. K. Müller, 'Die "persischen" Kalendarausdrücke in chinesischen Tripiṭaka,' *SBAW*, 1907, pp. 458–465).

[2] The zodiacal names given by the Turfan fragments (Müller, *loc. cit.*) are identical with those of Eastern Asia, as found in China, Siam, and Cambodia, as well as in Tibet and in Old Turkish inscriptions (Ginzel, pp. 85–87, 404, 411, 452, 501), thus differing entirely from the Babylonian nomenclature.

putations made by astrologers' with regard to observing favourable or unfavourable conjunctions of the stars (*e.g.*, *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, lxix. 3; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28; *Epistles of Mānuščihar*, II. ii. 9–11; see West, *SBE* v. 11, xxiv. 130, xviii. 212, 333–335, xxxvii. p. xlvii). Ardavān, the last of the Parthians and predecessor of Ardashīr Pāpakān, who founded the Sasanian dynasty in the 3rd cent. A.D., is represented as consulting on grave matters with his 'wise men and constellation-knowers' (*dānakān va axtar-mārān*, in the Pahlavi text *Kārnāmē-i Artakhshīr-i Pāpakān*, ii. 4–5, iii. 5–6, ed. Darab Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1896, pp. 10–11, 15–16), and their knowledge of the position of the stars at the moment enabled them to predict to him future events. In a Pahlavi work dated A.D. 881 and entitled *Epistles of Mānūščihar*, II. ii. 9–11 (re-translated by West, *SBE* xxxvii., Introd. p. xlvii), there is a specific allusion to a set of astronomical 'tables' (Phl. *zīk*, cf. Arab. *zīj*, and the Byzantine Gr. ζῆζι of Theodorus Meliteniotes, ed. Usener, *Ad historiam Astronomiæ Symbola*, Bonn, 1876, p. 14), which were constructed by 'the great Shatro-ayār.' See, more fully, art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan), p. 95[b] below. The passage cited mentions the tables alongside of those of Ptolemy and of the Hindus.

7. Astronomical works.—Some of the works from which citations have been drawn above, like the one last quoted, actually belong to the early Muhammadan period of Persia, even though written in Pahlavi. Astronomy, influenced by Arab science, continued to flourish in Iran under Muslim rule. The notable scientific achievements of the great savant and chronologist, al-Bīrūnī of Khiva (973–1048), are sufficient to prove that fact, and it is certain that computations of the positions of the heavenly bodies must have played an important part in the reform of the calendar and establishment of the new Jalalian era, in 1079, by the Seljūk sultan, Jalāl-al-dīn Malikshāh, under the direction of a commission of scholars headed by the well-known astronomer poet, Omar Khayyam. Omar, in fact, had been summoned to Merv by the sultan, four years previously, to make observations in the royal observatory, and there he constructed the *Zīj-i Malikšāhī*, 'Astronomical Tables of Malikshāh,' which were employed in the calendar reform. The names of two of his colleagues engaged upon the reform were Abu'l Muẓaffar al-Iṣfizārī and Maimūn ibn Najīb al-Wāsiṭī (see Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, London, 1906, ii. 181, n. 2). A section of a large work composed in 1082–1083 by Kai-Kā'ūs and entitled *Qābūs-Nāmah* (ch. 34) was devoted to 'astrology and mathematics' (ed. Teheran, 1285 A.H.; tr. A. Querry, Paris, 1887; cf. Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 277). The Persian poet Anvarī, of the 12th cent., was a great astrologer, and a conjunction of the planets in the sign of Libra, calculated to take place on September 16, 1186 (or in October of the preceding year, according to other accounts), led him to predict dire calamities for that day; but happily they did not occur (see Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 368; Horn in *GIrP* ii. 262–263). In the 13th cent. the Mongol ruler Hulāgū Khān, grandson of Chingīz Khān, established a celebrated observatory at Marāghah, in Azarbaijan, Western Persia, the building of which was begun in 1259, and traces of its ruins are still to be seen (cf. Wilson, *Persian Life and Customs*, New York, 1895, p. 77). Hulāgū's astronomer-royal was the learned Naṣīr-al-Dīn of Ṭūs (1201–1274), whose *Zīj-i Ilkhānī*, or almanac and astronomical tables, was a notable contribution to science (see Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 484–486). The names of several other mediæval Persian astronomers, with a mention of their tables, are found in the Byzantine treatise of Theodorus Meliteniotes, referred to above (ed. Usener, pp. 13–14). Best known among the astronomical tables, however, are those of Ulugh Begh, grandson of Timur and founder of the observatory at Samarkand, in which city he died in 1449. These tables, written in Arabic, were translated into Persian and were made accessible in Europe through a Latin version by Greaves (Gravius, London, 1652), and again by Hyde in Persian and Latin (Oxford, 1665), and more recently by Baily (London, 1843) in *Memoirs of the Royal Astronomical Society*, xiii. 79–125. With reference to the present status of astronomical studies in Persia itself, one of the largest meteorites in the world is preserved as a curiosity in the Shah's palace at Teheran to-day; but there is no astronomer-royal to know its true value, and Persia must still wait a renaissance before independent work in studying the heavens is done by those of native birth.

8. Influence of the heavenly bodies.—The astrological aspects of Persia's early studies of star-lore have already been indicated above. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that 'judicial astrology,' or the attempt to determine scientifically the presumed influence of the heavenly bodies upon the destiny of human events, was often regarded more highly than natural astrology, or astronomy in our sense, which confines its investigations to determining the motions and positions of the stars, sun, and moon, in order to gain more strictly scientific results, as we regard them.

In some of the paragraphs given above there have been allusions to the beneficent part played by the sun and the moon in the development of the world and in advancing the welfare of mankind (*e.g.*, *Yašt*, vi. 1–5, vi. 5; *Bundahišn*, vii. 2–4, and elsewhere), while the stars also entered into the sphere of human activity by exercising a kindly sway over the earth. Thus the great rain star Tishtrya, aided by Satavaēsa in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 1–62; *Sīrōzah*, i. 13, ii. 13), combats the demon of drought, when invoked by men, and confers blessings upon his faithful worshippers. The victorious star Vanant (*Yašt*, xx. 1) repulses the influence of evil; and Haptō-iringa (Ursa Major) is effective even in tempering the torment of the souls in hell, a region located in the North (*Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 15–21; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 31–33). The three fixed stars or constellations just named are regarded in the Pahlavi book *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* (xiv. 5–6), which was written about the 7th cent., but contains older material, as exercising an influence upon the efficiency of the sacrifice during the time of their ascendancy. In another chapter of the same work (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xxi. 1–7) a specifically fortunate character is ascribed to the shadow of the noonday and afternoon sun when occupying certain positions in the zodiacal signs; and in *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, vi. 9, the stars are synonymous with destiny. The malign influence ascribed to the planets has been sufficiently indicated above, and need not be referred to again in this section.

Sufficient reference has likewise been made to the part played by astrology, astrologers, and horoscopes both in Sasanian and in Muhammadan-Persian times. We need only recall the allusion to the last of the Parthian kings, Ardavān, and his astrologers (*Kārnāmē*, ii. 4–5, iii. 5–6), and we have the authority of the great Khorasmian scientist al-Bīrūnī for the fact that the Persian astrologers, like others, held that the zodiacal sign of Cancer was 'the horoscope of the world' (al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 55). A good illustration, in the 17th cent., of ephemerid tables that were used also for horoscopic purposes may be found in a work translated from the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with a Latin commentary,

by Beck, in his *Ephemerides Persarum per totum annum*, Augsburg, 1696 (especially chs. iii.–iv., vi.). Even to-day the astrologer's art in casting a horoscope holds an important place in the life of the ignorant and superstitious folk of Persia, and it still survives, though it is gradually disappearing, among the Zoroastrian Parsis of India (cf. Karaka, *History of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 160–162).

LITERATURE.—For a translation of the Avesta and the Pahlavi books consult the versions by Darmesteter and West in *SBE*, vols. iv., xxiii. ; and v., xviii., xxiv., xxxvii., and by Mills, *ib.* xxxi. ; likewise the French translation by Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892–1893. The more important single works on the subject have been given in the course of the article.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Japanese).—In the ancient mythology of Japan the sun-goddess plays the most important rôle, while the moon-god, her brother, occupies an insignificant place, and almost nothing is told about stars. The commonly accepted story is that the sun-goddess (Amaterasu, 'the heaven-shining deity') and the moon-god (Tsuki-yomi, 'the ruler of the moonlight night') were born, together with the storm-god (Susa-no-wo, 'the swift-impetuous'), of the couple who were the progenitors of the Japanese archipelago.[1] In this story the creation of these deities is conceived evidently as a generative act, whereas another version makes the emergence of the two deities from the 'white copper' mirrors the work of the male progenitor alone. Perhaps a more interesting version of the story is that the sun and the moon were produced out of the eyes of the progenitor, when he was washing in order to purify himself from the stains with which he had been contaminated on his visit to the infernal world after the death of his consort.[2] Though there are these different versions, the common trait and predominant factor in the story is that the sun-goddess is considered to be the supreme ruler of heaven and earth, and also the progenitrix of the ruling family, who claim to have handed down from the goddess herself the three insignia of the throne (see below). Now the relation between the sun-goddess and the moon-god is based on the natural phenomenon that the two are visible alternately by day and by night. The story is as follows :

> The sun-goddess once commissioned her brother, the moon, to go down from their heavenly abode to earth to see Ukemochi, the female genius of food. When the latter entertained the moon with the food-stuffs taken out of her body, the moon became flushed with anger and slew the goddess of food. The sun-goddess was so displeased with her brother's wantonness that she said to him : 'Thou art a wicked deity. I must not see thee face to face.' Hence the sister and brother appear alternately in heaven.[3]

The intention of the story is evident, but at the same time it shows a characteristic of the sun-goddess as the matron of agriculture, which played a great part in the myths and worship of the goddess.[4] Thus, in contrast to the prominent rôle played by the sun-goddess, the moon plays a very inferior part, and a much smaller part is played by the stars. A star-god is mentioned in the ancient myth, but his rôle is quite ambiguous, while a festival in honour of certain stars (the stellar constellations called the Herdsman and the Weave-maid) was derived from China. All other stories and worship of stars are much later and were introduced chiefly through Buddhist agency, though some of them may have been derived from other sources—Hindu, Persian, or Chinese. The most prominent star-worship is that of the Pole star, together with Ursus Major. These stars, conceived as one deity, are worshipped by the Buddhists as the protector of the country as well as of individual fortune, while the Shintōists identify them with the Taoist 'palace of iridescent subtlety' (Shi-bi-kyū in Sino-Japanese), where the highest deity of Shintō, the 'eternal-ruling' (Minaka-nushi), is believed to reside. But this Shintō worship is of late origin ; it was specially emphasized by a Shintō theorizer in the early part of the 19th century.

When Buddhism was introduced into Japan (6th cent.) and questions came up as to the relationship between the indigenous deities and the Buddhist pantheon, the Buddhist teachers tried to discover analogies between them and to explain that the Buddhist deities were the original noumena and the native ones their lateral manifestations. The most striking analogy was found between the sun-goddess and the aspect of Buddha's personality conceived in the sun-myth. The difference in gender concerned the syncretist but little, partly because the Japanese language had no genders and partly because the noumenon and the manifestation may take any sex. The result was an identification of the Japanese sun-goddess with Buddha Vairochana ('the illuminator'), and this conception exercised a wide influence on doctrine and worship during the sway of the syncretic Shintō from the 8th cent. down to the middle of the 19th, when the combination was dissolved by force. Among the theorizers of the syncretism we may cite one, Kanera (1402–81), who explained sun, moon, and stars as corresponding to the three insignia of the throne, *i.e.* the sun to the mirror, the moon to the jewel, and the stars to the sword.[1] This eclectic theory was backed by the popular conception of the 'three illuminating bodies' (*San-kō*) and their worship. People even nowadays regard a simultaneous appearance of the three as an auspicious occasion for worship and as a sign of special blessing to the country—*e.g.*, when on an autumn day the clear sky and the comparatively weak light of the sun cause the new moon and a certain star (Venus) to be visible to the eyes. Naturally, various configurations of the celestial bodies were used for methods of divination and predictions. In these methods Hindu, Persian, and Chinese elements may be detected, and their influence is still a living force among the mass of the people.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the footnotes, see M. Anesaki, *Japanese Mythology* (=vol. viii. of *The Mythology of All Races*), Boston, 1920.

M. ANESAKI.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan).—I. *ASTROLOGY.*—1. Name.—Among the Muslims the technical name of astrology is *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *aḥkām an-nujūm*,[2] 'science (or art) of the decrees of the stars,' *'ilm al-aḥkām*, 'science of the decrees.' Sometimes, though rarely, in place of *aḥkām* its synonym *qaḍāyā* is found. Another name is *an-najāmah* (*nijāmah*) or *'ilm an-najāmah*. On the other hand, the names *'ilm* (*ṣinā'at*) *an-nujūm*, 'science (or art) of the stars,' *'ilm at-tanjīm*, mean astronomy as well as astrology, and they also mean both of these sciences taken together. The word *aḥkām* also signifies 'judgments,' 'judicial decisions' ; accordingly the first of the denominations given above was in the Middle Ages translated in the Latin versions of Arabic works by *scientia judiciorum stell-*

[1] See *Nihongi : Chronicles of Japan*, tr. W. G. Aston (*Proc. Japan Soc. of London*, Suppl. to vol. i. [1896]), p. 18 *f.* ; and, for the following stories, pp. 20, 32, etc.

[2] See *Koji-ki, or Records of Ancient Japan*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain (*TASJ*, Suppl. to vol. x. [1883]), pp. 42–44. This version is preserved also in *Nihongi*, p. 32, and, for its connexion with the conception of life and death, see art. LIFE AND DEATH (Japanese).

[3] *Nihongi*, p. 32.

[4] Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 282 *f.*, where the ritual to the goddess for harvest is cited.

[1] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Japanese), vol. ix. p. 870.

[2] As in the case of the other branches of scientific literature, so for astrology the Muslim peoples made use of the Arabic language.

arum, and thence came the name of *astrologia judiciaria* or *astronomia judiciorum*, astrology, as opposed to *astrologia* (*astronomia*) *quadrivialis* (or *doctrinalis*), which is astronomy. Thus in the denomination of astrology among the Musalmāns there is a concept somewhat different from that contained in the Greek term [τέχνη] ἀποτελεσματική, 'science of the fulfilment [of astrological prognostications].' The astrologer is usually called by the same name as the astronomer, viz. *munajjim* (much more rarely *najjām*); sometimes, however, he is called by the special word *aḥkāmī* (plur. *aḥkāmiyyūn*, *aṣḥāb ṣinā'at al-aḥkām*). It was only in the 19th cent. that the distinction between *munajjim*, 'astrologer,' and *falaki*, 'astronomer,' was introduced into Arabic (at least in Egypt and in Syria).

2. Divisions.—The Muhammadans usually arrange the science of astrology under five principal heads:

(*a*) The fundamental principles of astrology, viz. the different divisions of the ecliptic, the properties of the various celestial places and of individual planets, the methods of determining the ascendant and the 12 celestial houses (*buyūt*, 'domus'), the planetary conjunctions, etc.

(*b*) Prognostics of a universal character (*al-aḥkām 'alā umūr al-'ālam*), viz. those which refer to the vicissitudes of kingdoms, dynasties, religions, and cities, to wars, epidemics, famines, winds, rains, the prices of goods, etc. This part of astrology, which Ptolemy calls ἀποτελεσματικὴ καθολική, 'universal apotelesmatics,' is usually called by the Arabs *taḥāwīl sinī al-'ālam*, 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' since a great part of these prognostics is deduced from the planet which has the dignity of 'significator' (ἀφέτης, *dalīl*, *hayláj*) at the moment when the sun enters Aries, *i.e.* at the beginning of each tropic year. This universal part of astrology is subdivided into three sections: (i.) predictions drawn from the various kinds of planetary conjunctions (*qirānāt*, *iqtirānāt*), (ii.) predictions based on the 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' (iii.) predictions relating to the 'mutationes aëris' (*taghayyur al-hawā'*), *i.e.* to meteorological phenomena, and which are deduced from the lunar stations, or from the heliacal rising of Sirius, etc.

(*c*) Individual prognostications relating to the vicissitudes of individuals, derived from the planet or other celestial place which may happen to be the 'significator' at the moment of birth, and then from the 'significator' at each revolution of successive tropic years. This part of astrology Ptolemy calls γενεθλιαλογική, and the Arabs *al-mawālīd*, 'nativitates.'

(*d*) *Masā'il*, 'interrogationes' (ἐρωτήσεις), or that part of astrology which is concerned with replies to questions, *e.g.*, the circumstances of a distant relative, the author of a theft, the hiding-place of a runaway slave, etc. The 'interrogationes' are always connected by the Muhammadan astrologers with the division of the heavens into 12 'domus.' The astrologers who follow the pure tradition of Ptolemy do not admit the 'interrogationes.'

(*e*) *Iḫtiyārāt*, 'electiones,' *i.e.* the choice of the propitious moment for doing any particular thing. The most common method is that of determining such a moment by seeking in which of the 12 celestial 'domus' the moon is found at that particular moment. This was also very probably the method employed by the Greeks; but along with this some Muhammadan astrologers use another method, of Indian origin (but also attributed to Dorotheus), which consists in deducing the fitting moment for action from the place which the moon then occupies in one of the 28 lunar stations or mansions (*manāzil*). The 'electiones' also are not admitted by the astrologers who follow Ptolemy's teaching.

3. Place among the sciences.—The science of the stars, says Ptolemy at the beginning of his *Tetrabiblos*, or *Quadripartitum*, consists of two parts: the first studies the appearances of the motions of the heavenly bodies either with respect to each other or with respect to the earth; the second seeks to deduce, from the physical qualities of those appearances, the changes which take place in the sublunar world. The first part is a science which stands by itself, and can be studied independently of the second; this, on the contrary, cannot do without the first. This conception that astrology is but the sister of astronomy, a branch, that is to say, of the 'science of the stars,' which in its turn is a part of 'mathematics' (*'ulūm riyāḍiyyah*, *'ulūm ta'līmiyyah*, *ta'ālīm*), is common to all the Musalmān astrologers and astronomers, and is accepted also by some philosophers (al-Fārābī in his *de Scientiis*, and the Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafā', or 'sincere companions' of the 10th cent. in their *Epistles*), by the author of the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, or 'Encyclopædia of the Sciences' (10th cent.), and by the great historian philosopher Ibn Ḫaldūn (*Proleg.* lib. vi. cap. 13; M. G. de Slane's Fr. tr., Paris, 1862–68, iii. 122 f.).

Astrology, however, is classified in a different way by the majority of the philosophers. Musalmān writers commonly divide all science into two great categories: (*a*) sciences which relate to religious law (*'ulūm shar'iyyah*), that is to say, in addition to theology and canon law, the learning which serves as an introduction to them, namely, grammar, lexicography, rhetoric, poetry, history, etc.; (*b*) intellectual or philosophic sciences (*'ulūm 'aqliyyah* or *ḥikmiyyah*), which the author of the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, thinking of their origin, calls *'ulūm al-'ajam*, 'foreign sciences.'[1] The intellectual or philosophical sciences in their turn are for the most part divided into the three sections[2] already fixed by the later Greek peripatetics and by the Neo-Platonic expounders of Aristotle (*e.g.*, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Johannes Philoponus), namely: (*a*) metaphysic (*al-ḥikmah al-ilāhiyyah*, θεολογία, *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*); (*b*) natural sciences (*al-ḥikmah aṭ-ṭabī'iyyah*, 'natural philosophy,' φυσική); (*c*) mathematical sciences (*al-ḥikmah ar-riyāḍiyyah*, μαθηματική). These last correspond to the *Quadrivium* of Boethius, namely, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; on the other hand, the natural sciences are subdivided into eight fundamental parts, named for the most part after the titles of the corresponding Aristotelian works, namely: *Auscultatio physica*, *Generatio et corruptio*, *Cœlum et mundum*, *Meteoræ*, *Mineralia*, *Vegetalia*, *Animalia*, *de Anima*. Avicenna (*Fī aqsām al-'ulūm al-'aqliyyah*, in *Tis'rasā'il*, Constantinople, 1298 A.H. [=A.D. 1881], p. 71 ff.), Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Saḫāwī (*Irshād al-qāṣid*, ed. A. Sprenger, Calcutta, 1849; the author died in 749 A.H. [=A.D. 1348]), Ḥājjī Ḫalīfah (in the introduction to his *Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopædicum*),[3] and others consider astrology as one of the 7 (or 9) *furū'*, 'secondary branches' of the natural sciences, placing it, that is to say, beside medicine, physiognomy, interpretation of dreams, alchemy, the science of talismans, etc. This same classification of the natural sciences is found in al-Ghazālī († 505 A.H. [=A.D. 1111]), who, in his *Taháfut al-*

[1] Each of these two great categories afterwards gives place to the distinction between theoretical (*naẓariyyah*) and practical (*'amaliyyah*) science—a distinction which has its origin in Aristotle (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*[3], Tübingen. 1875–81, II. ii. 177).

[2] Other divisions, indicated in the writings of the Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafā', in the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, etc., are useless for our present purpose.

[3] Ed. G. Flügel, 8 vols., London, 1835–58.

falāsifah, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 63 f., refers to it as common amongst the Musalmān peripatetics, and approves of it.

Averroës, in the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 121, admits, as corresponding to Aristotelian teaching, the eight fundamental parts of the natural sciences; but he denies that the so-called derived branches are sciences. Medicine, he says, is an art (*ṣinā'ah*) and not a science; it has a practical and not a theoretical character; accordingly astrology is included in the same category with divination from the flight of birds and from the movement of quadrupeds (*zajar*), with divination in the form of vaticinations (*kahānah*), with physiognomy and with the interpretation of dreams, all being arts which have as their aim the prediction of the future, but which 'are not sciences either theoretically or practically, however it may be supposed that one may sometimes derive some practical advantage from them.'

A curious classification is found at the beginning of the unedited book *de Interrogationibus* (*Fī'l-masā'il*) of the astrologer Ya'qūb al-Qaṣrānī, who lived in the 3rd cent. A.H. (9th A.D.). According to the catalogue of the Arabic MSS of Berlin (W. Ahlwardt, *Verzeichniss der arab. Handschriften*, Berlin, 1887–99, v. 275, no. 5877), he maintains three degrees (*marātib*) of science: theology, medicine, science of the stars; the last, being based not on observation, but on deduction from analogy, occupies a place between the other two.

4. Sources.[1]—(*a*) *Greek.*—These are represented by the classic (if we may call it so) astrology of the *Tetrabiblos* or *Quadripartitum* of Ptolemy; by the writings of Dorotheus Sidonius (1st cent. A.D.), which go back to the Græco-Egyptian tradition; by the great eclectic compilation of Vettius Valens (2nd cent. A.D.);[2] by the book on the 'decani,' the 'interrogationes,' and the nativities of Antiochus of Athens (2nd or 3rd cent. A.D.), which appears especially to follow the Babylonian tradition; by the Καρπός, or *Centiloquium*,[3] falsely attributed to Ptolemy; by some works ascribed to the mythical Hermes;[4] and by an author whose name (Rīmos?, Zīmos?) is cited by Arabic writers in a form so corrupt as to be unrecognizable. Of another Greek writer, Teucer or Teucrus of Babylon, the Arabs had knowledge through Iranian sources.

(*b*) *Indian.*—The Musalmān writers mention seven or eight Indian astrologers, whose names, however, it has not as yet been possible to identify with the corresponding Sanskrit. The most important is K.n.k.h or K.t.k.h, who, according to some Arabic writers, appears to have come to Baghdād to the court of the khalīf al-Manṣūr, bringing thither astronomical books of India, and, according to others, making known Indian arithmetic. The Arabs attribute to him writings on the *numūdār* (that is, on the method of ascertaining a factitious ascendant of the nativity), on the nativities, and on the conjunctions of the planets; it is therefore plain that he had also treated of the part of Indian astrology called in Sanskrit *horā* or *jātaka*, which arose through Greek influence. This confirms a conjecture of F. Boll (*Sphaera*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 414 f.), who, from the citations contained in the *Introductorium* of Abū Ma'shar (or Albumasar), infers that K.n.k.h had before him materials of distant Greek origin for his representation of the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani.' But in general, Musulmān astrologers cite simply 'the Indians' (*al-Hind*), without particular names of authors. We must further add that the influence of Indian astrology made itself felt sometimes through Iranian writings and oral teaching, as is apparent from some Indian words which have passed into Arabic terminology in an Iranian form—*e.g.*, *darījān* (Ind. *drekkāna*).

(*c*) *Iranian.*—These are in the Pahlavī language or Middle Age Persian. The writings of Teucrus of Babylon (second half of the 1st cent. A.D.) on the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani' reached the Arabs through a Persian version, where the name of the author, on account of the ambiguity of the Pahlavī writing, was afterwards spelt by the Persians and Arabs Tīnkalūs (also Tankalūsh or Tankalūshā); so that in the *Introductorium* of Abū Ma'shar his teachings were given as 'teachings of the Persians' (*madhhab al-Furs*) and contain also some Persian names of constellations (cf. Boll, p. 415 f.). Another source was Buzurjmihr's commentary on the astrological Ἀνθολογίαι of Vettius Valens; the Pahlavī translation of the Greek title was *vizīdhak*, 'selected,' which became in Arabic *al-bizīdhaj* and was afterwards variously and strangely corrupted by Arabic writers.[1] The Musalmāns also cited as a source of astrological teachings the mythical Zoroaster (Zarādusht in Arabic writings, Zardusht in modern Persian writings), whose name indeed was already frequently found in Greek astrology of the 4th and following centuries. A fourth source is the book on 'nativities' of [al-]Andarzghar, son of Zādānfarrūḫ; but we lack information about this personage, whose name is corrupted into Alendezgod in the Latin version of Alcabitius (al-Qabīṣī), and into Andruçagar in the Latin version of the book of the Jew Ibn 'Ezrā on nativities (which always draws on Arabic sources). Those astrological writings which are ascribed by the Arabs to Jāmāsp the Wise (the trusted counsellor of the mythic king Gushtāsp) seem to be late Muhammadan falsifications.

We do not know exactly when all these works hitherto mentioned were first translated into Arabic, but it is certain that the great majority of them were known in the second half of the 8th cent. A.D., that is, when Musalmān culture began. If the indication placed at the end of the unedited *'Arḍ miftāḥ an-nujūm* of Hermes (MS in Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan) is true, this book would seem to have been translated in the month Dhū 'l-qa'dah, 125 A.H., namely, in September 743 A.D., while the Umayyad khalīfs were still reigning. The first version of the *Tetrabiblos* is due to Abū Yaḥyā al-Baṭrīq, a translator of the time of al-Manṣūr, the second 'Abbāsid khalīf (136–158 A.H. [A.D. 754–775]); Dorotheus and Antiochus are already mentioned in the writings of Mā shā' Allāh (Messahala) in the second half of the 8th cent.; all the other Greek authors mentioned above are amply cited by the astrologers of the 9th century. As has already been said, the writings of the Indian K.n.k.h seem to have been known at Baghdād in the time of the khalīf al-Manṣūr; and about the middle of the 9th cent. we have already several small astrological works of al-Kindī (Alchindus) formed expressly on Indian models. It is almost certain that the Persian books were translated by members of the family

[1] For details see the present writer's Arabic lessons on the origins of astronomy among the Arabs (*'Ilm al-falak, ta'rīḫuhu fī 'l-qurūn al-wusṭā*, Rome, 1911–12), pp. 189–215 (Iranian sources), 216–220 (Greek sources), etc.

[2] Muhammadan astrologers were also acquainted with the *Anthologiæ* of Vettius Valens through an Arabic translation of a Pahlavī version; cf. below, under (*c*).

[3] The Arabic tr. is rather a paraphrase, which attempts to interpret the theories obscurely indicated in the Greek text.

[4] Some of the works attributed to Hermes seem to be Musalmān falsifications—*e.g.*, the book *de Revolutionibus nativitatum*, which has reached us in a Latin translation.

[1] In the Latin version of Albohazen Haly filii Abenragel, *De iudiciis astrorum*, Basel, 1571, the name of the book is *Yndidech* (p. 149, col. b), *Enzirech* (p. 176, col. a), *Endenadeyg Persarum* (p. 347b), *Endemadeyg Persarum* (348b), *Andilarehprosu* (404b).

Nawbaḥt, known by their translations from Pahlavī into Arabic (cf. *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, pp. 244, 274), whose head was astrologer at the court of al-Manṣūr; and in any case the antiquity of Iranian influence in astrology is attested by the fact that in the works of Mā shā' Allāh, according to the Latin translation of John of Seville, technical terms of Iranian origin are freely used: *e.g.*, *alhyleg* (*alhaylāj*), *alcochoden* (*al-kadḫudāh*), *alimbutar* (*al-jānbaḫtān*).

Side by side with the written sources there was, without doubt, the oral tradition of the peoples converted to Islām.[1] Among the Syrians Christianity had almost suffocated astrology, although Bardesanes (154–222) had reconciled Christian dogma with an attenuated form of predestination by means of the stars; all the same we know that at Ḥarrān, the ancient Carrhæ, special astrological traditions flourished along with other pagan sciences. It is further probable that Theophilus, son of Thomas, a Christian of Edessa who was astrologer of the khalīf al-Mahdī (A.D. 775–785), and who has been cited by several Musalmān astrologers as an authority on the subject of 'electiones,' again took up with Syrian oral tradition. In the same manner it is natural that there were absorbed into Musalmān culture the astrological beliefs and practices of the Aramaic centres (tending to paganism) of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, of the Egyptians, etc. Finally, we must not forget the Judaic element which had a notable part in the first ages of Musalmān astrology; in fact, among the principal writers on astrological matters in Arabic in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Hijra are the Jews Mā shā' Allāh, Sahl ibn Bishr, Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī, and Sanad ibn 'Alī.

5. Special character.—The civilized peoples over whom the Arabic domination of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries extended, viz. Greeks, Copts, Syrians, Persians, and Indians, had already imagined all the possible fundamental combinations concerning the influence of the stars over mundane events; consequently it was impossible for the Musalmān astrologer to find out anything substantially new. On the other hand, the principal justification of astrology consisted precisely in presenting itself as the jealous preserver of that which an age-long experience had taught the wise of preceding generations. The office of the Musalmān astrologers consequently was reduced to a choosing of what seemed suitable among the many principles and methods of their predecessors, and at times to a harmonizing of elements of very diverse origin, amplifying and completing particular points on which it was easy to give free rein to fancy. All this, as we have said, was done with the widest eclecticism. But, though nothing really original is met with in the field of apotelesmatics properly so called, there is, all the same, a point on which Arabo-Musalmān astrology is far superior to other astrologies, including the Greek, and represents a real progress. This consists of a wide and continued application of spherical astronomy and of exact mathematical processes to the methods of astrological research. Among the Greek astrologers the calculations are very rough; arcs of the ecliptic are substituted for arcs of the equator, right ascensions for oblique ascensions; rough tables, useful for a determined terrestrial latitude, are also employed for different latitudes; the latitudes of the planets are neglected in the calculation of the radiations ('projectiones radiorum,' *maṭāriḥ ash-shu'ā'*). Among the Greeks we seek in vain for a clear exposition of the method of determining mathematically the 12 heavenly 'domus,' which, however, form one of the hinges of the astrological system. Ptolemy himself, teaching minutely in the *Tetrabiblos* how the 'directio' (ἀφέσεις) is calculated, completely neglects the latitude of the planets. Characteristic is the fact that Ptolemy, in the *Almagest*, occupies himself with three problems useful only to astrologers (inclination of the shadow of the eclipses with respect to the ecliptic and to the horizon, position of the stars with respect to the sun in consequence of the daily motion of the sphere, appearances and occultations of the planets with respect to the solar rays), and which even in astrology are of very small importance; and, on the other hand, he does not make the slightest allusion to other problems of spherical astronomy which would be of capital importance for apotelesmatics. Musalmān astronomers, on the contrary, teach exact calculations, and often even prepare tables for all the mathematical problems required by astrology: determination of the 12 celestial houses, 'directio,' 'revolutiones annorum,' 'profectio,' 'projectio radiorum.' Thus astrology, among the Musalmāns, becomes an art which demands a solid scientific preparation, and which tends to give an ever greater mathematical complication and exactness to its methods of research among celestial phenomena. *E.g.*, the *mamarr* ('passage [of one planet over another],' *almanar*, or 'supereminentia,' of our astrologers) corresponds exactly from an apotelesmatic point of view to the καθυπερτέρησις of the Greeks; but whilst for the Greeks this takes place when a planet is situated to the west of another, viz. has a lesser longitude, for the Arabs the *mamarr* takes place when a planet in its own epicycle is distant from the apogee of the epicycle less than another planet is distant from the apogee of its own epicycle. Consequently, its calculation in Musalmān astrology is not a light matter, and requires the employment of complete planetary tables. We can understand, therefore, why the theory of the *mamarr* of the planets is not only expounded in several treatises of spherical astronomy, but has also given rise to special monographs. The importance of all this is plain: in the Hellenistic world astrology flourishes while astronomy decays; in the Musalmān world of the Middle Ages astrology becomes a potent ally of mathematical and observational astronomy.

6. Polemic concerning astrology.—From Islām astrology at first had a much less unfavourable reception than from Christianity. The latter had to combat in the teachings of astrology an entire world of pagan ideas and cults; it had to contend against the concept of necessity, which excluded Christian free will. In the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., however, the pagan elements of astrology were completely modified; they were so entirely hidden under a verbal formalism as to be no longer recognizable; and, on the other hand, orthodox Islām, with its doctrine of predestination, which excluded the freedom of human actions, was, at bottom, not very far removed from the εἱμαρμένη of the Stoics and of many astrologers of antiquity. When we consider that the first Musalmān theologians took no heed whatever of the sciences which did not appear to have any relation to the religious content of Islām, we easily understand how astrology had been able to advance unimpeded through its first stages almost up to the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra. It is not, therefore, astonishing that Abū Ma'shar, writing his *Introductorium* in 848 A.D., among the ten categories of persons hostile to astrological teaching, makes no mention whatever of opponents influenced by strictly religious reasons,[1] and he makes his defence of astrology to consist (*Introd.* I. 5, fol. b 2 v.–b 3 v.) only in an amplification of the arguments with which Ptolemy (*Tetrab.* I. 3)

[1] Cf. Nallino, *'Ilm al-falak*, pp. 326–332.

[1] *Introductorium*, I. 4 (Augsburg, 1489, fol. a 7 v.–b 2 v.).

had already maintained the material and moral advantages of foreseeing the future, even if this should appear to be adverse to us. The 'philosopher of the Arabs,' al-Kindī, who died a little after 870 A.D., regards astrology as an integral part of philosophy (*ḥikmah, falsafah*); he seeks its basis not only in the four mathematical, but also in the physical and metaphysical doctrines;[1] and he opposes it to many popular prejudices. Al-Kindī was perhaps the only one who endeavoured to reduce to a completely rational and systematic form the principles and the methods of astrology.

But matters soon underwent a change. Towards the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra the knowledge of Aristotle's teaching grew more definite and profound, and in this there was no place for astrology; hence the philosophers commenced to make war against it. On the other hand, the theologians were not slow to see in the influence attributed to the stars over human actions a menace to the severely monotheistic conception of Islām, more especially when later on there filtered into Muslmān theology an opposition to the idea of necessary causality, and the atomistic doctrine of continued creative acts became more prevalent. Moreover, the daring predictions concerning the duration of Islām[2] became an evident danger to dogma. Thus the polemic against astrology became very acute.[3]

The most ancient confutation which we possess is that of **Abū 'l-Qāsim 'Īsā ibn 'Alī**,[4] drawn up in the first half of the 10th cent.,[5] and preserved in a work of the Ḥanbalite theologian, Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, *Miftāḥ dār as-sa'ādah*.[6]

After an exordium in which he admits that the stars may have some influence on such natural phenomena as climate and temperament, but denounces the practice of foretelling the future by their means, he divides his dissertation into three distinct parts. The first has reference to the discordance among astrologers as to their fundamental principles concerning the nature of the influence of the stars, and an exposition follows of several fundamental principles for astrological calculations on which the various writers disagree—*e.g.*, the method of determining the planetary 'termini,' the 'significator' (*dalīl*, ἀφέτης), the 'pars fortunæ,' the male and female zodiacal signs. The second part consists of the examination of many principles which are affirmed by the astrologers, but which are repugnant to good sense (*mustabsha'*). In the third part 'Īsā ibn 'Alī cites some of the arguments adopted by the astrologers in favour of their science, and refutes them.

Contemporary with 'Īsā ibn Alī is the famous philosopher **al-Fārābī** (*q.v.*; † A.D. 950), who, as a profound student of Aristotle, could not but be opposed to astrology. We have a work of his against astrology,[7] which, however, is not so vigorous a confutation as we should have expected from such a philosopher and contains some childish reasonings. This is explained by the fact that the work is merely a series of notes, published by a disciple just as he found them.

The philosophers contemporary with al-Fārābī did not all share his hostility to astrology; in fact the schools which had been less subject to Aristotelian influence favoured it, as was already the case with al-Kindī.

With reference to this a special place is held by the **Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā'**, 'Sincere Companions,' who flourished in al-Baṣrah towards A.D. 950–960, and whose writings set forth the philosophic doctrines of the heretical Bāṭinites, a branch of whom were the Carmaṭians (al-Qarāmiṭah), who towards the end of the 3rd cent. A.H. (9th cent. A.D.) caused political disorders in the 'Irāq, and who founded an independent kingdom in N.E. Arabia which lasted until after A.H. 474 (A.D. 1081–82). The Carmaṭians had reaped great advantage from astrological predictions based on the theory of the great planetary conjunctions.[1] One can therefore understand that the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā' not only admitted, with Aristotle and other Arabic philosophers, that the changes (generation and corruption) of the sublunar world were consequent upon celestial movements, but also that the planets foretell the future and have a direct influence upon the will and the moral character. The great encyclopædic work of the Iḫwān is imbued with those astrological ideas, among which the theory of planetary conjunctions occupies the principal place.

Favourable to astrology also are those other philosophers who lead up to **Abū Sulaimān Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn Bahrām as-Sijistānī al-Manṭiqī**, who, in the second half of the 10th cent., gathered about him at Baghdād a number of learned men for the purpose of discussing various subjects. Notes and summaries of many of these discussions were collected in the *Kitāb al-muqābasāt* of Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, a philosopher, mystic, and jurist († after 400 A.H. [A.D. 1009–1010]), about whose orthodoxy there is some suspicion. A record of a meeting in reference to astrology is preserved almost entire in the work already cited of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah.[2] Some of those present had attacked astrology, declaring it to be useless, since, after so much study and effort on the part of its supporters, it does not succeed in modifying those events which overwhelm both the wise astrologer and the ignorant man. There then rose up several questioners to refute these accusations, and they set themselves specially to explain how predictions can fail in spite of the truth of astrology, and that, in any case, the efforts of astrologers to discover the truth are always noble. Their defence of practical astrology is somewhat weak, and is probably the last that has been made in the field of philosophy.

Avicenna (*q.v.*; † 428 A.H. [A.D. 1037]) contends against astrology, not only in his great encyclopædia, *ash-Shifā'*, 'The Recovery of the Health [of the Soul],' and in the *an-Najāh*, but also in a special work of which a full résumé was made by Mehren.[3] He demonstrates that astrology has no foundation, and proceeds to show that, even admitting its theoretical truth, it would be impossible for men to acquire a knowledge of it.

Averroës (*q.v.*), or Ibn Rushd († 595 A.H. [A.D. 1198]), is also a decided adversary of astrology, as appears from the severe judgment referred to above (§ 3) and from some passages of his comments on Aristotle. But it would be useless to continue the review of the philosophers, who after the 10th cent. A.D. are all in agreement on this question. It is more interesting to consider the position taken up by the theologians, who—from the motives indicated at the beginning of this section—engaged, towards the end of the 9th cent. A.D., in a relentless war against astrological theories.[4]

We have already seen the attitude of al-Jubbā'ī. We may add here that **Ibn Ḥazm** († 456 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), who fiercely opposed the scholastic or speculative theology of al-Ash'arī in Spain, gives his ideas on astrology in *Al-Fiṣal fī 'l-milal wa 'l-ahwā' wa 'n-niḥal*.[5] He divides those who believe that the future can be foretold by means of the stars into two classes: (1) misbelievers and polytheists, and (2) persons who are in error. The first are those who maintain that the stars and the

[1] Cf. the quotations in M. Steinschneider, *ZDMG* xviii. [1864] 134; and chs. x. and xi. of the anonymous Latin pamphlet *De erroribus philosophorum* (written in the second half of the 13th cent.), ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*[2], Louvain, 1908–11, pt. ii. pp. 18–21.

[2] *E.g.*, Theophilus, son of Thomas, the astrologer of the third 'Abbāsid khalīf (see above, § 4), maintained that the reign of Islām would last only 960 years (Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Proleg.*, lib. iii. ch. liv., tr. de Slane, ii. 222 f.). The philosopher al-Kindī calculated that the duration of the kingdom of the Arabs would be 693 years (see O. Loth, 'Al-Kindī als Astrolog,' in *Morgenländische Forschungen, Festschrift an H. L. Fleischer*, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 263–309).

[3] Men like al-Jāḥiẓ († 255 A.H., 869 A.D.) and the famous theologians al-Jubbā'ī († 303 A.H., 915–916 A.D.) and al-Ash'arī († 324 A.H., 936 A.D.) were declared enemies of astrology.

[4] According to Ibn al-Qifṭī, ed. Lippert, p. 244 f., he died on Friday, 28 Rabī' ii., 395 A.H., *i.e.* 28th March, 1001 A.D.; cf. also *Fihrist*, p. 129.

[5] It is, in fact, cited in the preface of the *Libellus isagogicus ad magisterium judiciorum astrorum*, which al-Qabīṣī had written for Saif ad-daulah, prince of Aleppo, who reigned from 333 to 356 A.H. [A.D. 944–967].

[6] Cairo, 1323–25 A.H. [A.D. 1905–07], ii. 156–196.

[7] Al-Fārābī, *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, tr. F. Dieterici, Leyden, 1892, pp. 170–186 (pp. 104–114 of the text published in 1890). Dieterici at some points has not understood the meaning of some technical terms of astrology, so that his version is not always perfect.

[1] Cf. M. J. de Goeje, *Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahraïn et les Fatimides*[2], Leyden, 1886, pp. 115–129.

[2] ii. 185–193.

[3] A. F. Mehren, 'Vues d'Avicenne sur l'astrologie,' *Muséon*, iii. [Louvain, 1884] 383–403, reprinted in 'Homenaje á D. Francisco Codera,' *Estudios de erudición oriental*, Saragossa, 1904, pp. 235–250.

[4] See also a brief account by I. Goldziher, 'Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften' (*ABAW*, 1915), pp. 20–25.

[5] Cairo, 1317–21 A.H. (A.D. 1899–1903), v. 37–40.

heavenly spheres are intelligent beings, agents, of eternal duration, and disposing of earthly things either with or without God. The second are those who hold that the stars and the celestial spheres, whilst without intelligence, have been created and established by God as indicators of things which are to take place.

The preserver of Ash'arite dogmatic theology, **al-Ghazālī** († 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]), opposes astrology in his *Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn*, 'The Revival of Religious Sciences.'[1] And the same attitude we find in the books of the famous Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taimiyyah († 728 A.H. [A.D. 1328]).[2]

But the most vigorous and complete confutation of astrology is contained in the *Miftāḥ dār as-sa'ādah* of **Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah** († 751 A.H. [A.D. 1350]),[3] one of the most noted theologians of the Ḥanbalite school. Only the famous work of Pico della Mirandola, *Adversus astrologiam*, can be compared to the 110 closely printed quarto pages of the confutation written by this Muhammadan theologian, whose impassioned polemics press upon the adversary with an infinity of subtle distinctions which prove the force of his dialectic.

In the theological world perhaps the sole defender of astrology is **Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī** († 606 A.H. [A.D. 1210]), cited above. Famous especially for his great commentary on the Qur'ān, he composed also many theological, philosophical, and astrological works, and studied medicine and mathematics. Without doubt his confidence in astrology is due to his cultivation of the sciences, and this confidence already appears in his commentary on the Qur'ān.

No theologian seems to have followed Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī in his bold interpretations of Qur'ānic passages and of religious traditions. Besides, after the writings of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah and his predecessors, polemics about astrology could no longer reckon on any novelty of argument. The considerations developed by the great philosopher of history, **Ibn Ḫaldūn** († 808 A.H. [A.D. 1406]), in his historical *Prolegomena*,[4] are alone deserving of notice.

7. Astrology in common life.—The four orthodox schools of jurisprudence and the Shī'ite school were already in existence when the war of the philosophers and theologians against astrology became fierce; accordingly, the anathema launched against it in the name of religion did not occupy much space in Muhammadan law, notwithstanding the fact that this had its chief foundation in religious doctrine. Among some jurists of a rather later age, however, we meet with open hostility to astrology. In Muhammadan law the buying and selling of useless things is forbidden; therefore some jurists[5] teach that one may not sell or buy books of astrology. Another legal prescript does not admit the testimony of misbelievers; therefore some jurists, regarding the astrologer as a misbeliever, deny him the right of acting as a witness.[6] But, before theological anathema smote it, astrology was deeply rooted among all lay classes of society. The courts of the 'Abbāsid khalīfs at Baghdād and of the numerous small dynasties which arose in the Muhammadan world after the 3rd cent. of the Hijra received astrologers with great favour and consulted them on affairs of State as well as on trifling matters of daily life. At the foundation of Baghdād in A.D. 762, and at that of al-Mahdiyyah (in Tunis) in 916, the astrologers, summoned for the purpose, indicate the propitious moment for beginning the work. Many writings on apotelesmatics are dedicated to khalīfs, sultans, and princes. In Turkey, even at the beginning of the 19th cent., one of the chief posts at court was that of *munajjim-bāshī*, or chief astrologer; and the case was similar in Persia, in India, and in Muhammadan central Asia.[1] In the *Thousand and One Nights* not only is the astrologer with his astrolabe mentioned several times (*e.g.*, Nights 28 and 50 of the Egyptian edd.), but there is also a complete dissertation on the elements of astrology (Nights 254–257, in the story of the slave girl Tawaddud). Further, the considerable number of old Arabic astrolabes still existing in the East and in South Europe would alone suffice to prove the great diffusion of astrology throughout the Muhammadan world; and it found strong support among the students of astronomy. Cases of persecution of astrologers by the State are extremely rare. Al-Ḥākim, Fāṭimid khalīf of Egypt, who in 404 A.H. (A.D. 1013–1014) prohibited the study of astrology and banished from Cairo those who cultivated it, was an astrologer himself, and that decree of his is one of many acts of madness committed in the last years of his life.

In the Muhammadan countries into which European civilization has penetrated (which with the Copernican system has destroyed the bases of apotelesmatics) astrology has lost its importance and remains the monopoly of the popular classes, among whom it has degenerated into a form of prediction without any serious mathematical and astronomical basis. On the other hand, in countries where there is little or no European influence (*e.g.*, in many parts of Morocco) apotelesmatics still flourish, but accompanied by only rudimentary astronomical knowledge. To-day in S. Arabia the function of the astrologer is exercised especially by the *qāḍī*,[2] *i.e.* by those whose duty it is to see that canon law is observed!

8. Influence on European astrology.—The astrology of the Latin Middle Ages from the beginning of the 12th to the end of the 15th cent. is really Arabic astrology. Its sole sources are Arabic (Albohali, Albohazen, Albumasar, Alcabitius, Alchindus, Almansor, Alphadol, Aomar, Gergis, Hali, Haly Heben Rodan, Messahala, Zahel, and some pseudepigraphical works), or at least translations from Arabic (*e.g.*, the *Tetrabiblos* or *Quadripartitum* of Ptolemy, and the Καρπός or *Centiloquium*); the technical terminology is literal translation or mere corruption of Arabic words. In the 16th cent. the humanists rescued from oblivion the poem of Manilius and the crude compilation of Firmicus Maternus; but this was a mere literary exercise of no importance for the astrology of the 17th century.

In the Byzantine world also Muhammadan astrology leaves deep traces in many versions from the Arabic and from the Persian;[3] so that side by side with the works derived from the classic Greek authors appear those of 'Αμμάσαρ (Abū Ma'shar), 'Αχμέτ (Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf ibn ad-Dāyah), Μεσσάλα (Mā shā' Allāh), Σάχλ (Sahl ibn Bishr), and other Arabic writers. Thus there frequently occur in Byzantine astrological writings Arabic and Persian names of planets or technical terms which no longer correspond to those of classical Greek.

[1] Cairo, 1302–03 A.H. (A.D. 1885–86), i. 27 f. All this passage is copied without indication of its source in ad-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān*, Cairo, 1311 A.H. (A.D. 1893), i. 12 f., *s.v.* 'Asad.'

[2] *Majmū'at al-fatāwā*, Cairo, 1326–29 A.H. (A.D. 1908–11), i. 323–336.

[3] Ed. Cairo, 1323–25 A.H. (A.D. 1905–07), ii. 132–240.

[4] Bk. vi. ch. 26 (tr. M. G. de Slane, iii. 240–249).

[5] *E.g.*, al-Bājūrī, *Ḥāshiyah 'alā Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī*, Būlāq, 1292 A.H., i. 445.

[6] Cf. the quotations in Saḥnūn ibn 'Uthmān al-Wānsharīsī, *Mufīd al-muḥtāj fī sharḥ as-sirāj*, Cairo, 1314 A.H., p. 5.

[1] Cf. *e.g.*, F. Bernier, *Evénements particuliers des états du Mogol*, Paris, 1671, p. 96. See also J. T. Reinaud, *Monumens arabes, persans, et turcs*, Paris, 1828, ii. 367 f. For Persia see *Voyages du chevalier Chardin en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient*, new ed., Amsterdam, 1735, i. 242, iii. 163–165, 174–183.

[2] R. Manzoni, *El Yèmen*, Rome, 1884, p. 209; H. von Maltzan, *Reise nach Südarabien*, Brunswick, 1873, p. 164.

[3] The Arabs and the Persians are called indifferently Πέρσαι.

Finally, the Jewish astrological literature of Europe, in which a conspicuous place is occupied by the works of Abrāhām ibn 'Ezrā († 1167), is based exclusively on Arabic sources.

LITERATURE.—There is no work setting forth the content and history of Muhammadan astrology. For biographical and bibliographical notices of individual astrologers reference may be made to H. Suter, *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1900 (completed in 'Nachträge und Berichtigungen zu "Die Math. und Astron.,"' in *Abhandlungen zur Gesch. der mathematischen Wissenschaften*, xiv. [1902] 157–185). The mathematical side of Muhammadan astrology and the explanation of several technical terms are set forth in the present writer's annotations on al-Battānī, *Opus astronomicum*, 3 vols., Milan, 1899–1907. Beyond two or three small pseudepigraphical writings of no importance, printed or lithographed in Cairo, and the dissertation of al-Kindī published by O. Loth (see above, p. 92[a], n. 2), there are no edd. of complete astrological works in the original text; there are, on the other hand, edd. of Middle Age Latin versions (15th–16th cent.), several of which have been cited in the course of the article.

II. *ASTRONOMY.*—1. Name.—The names *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *an-nujūm*, 'science (or art) of the stars,' *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *at-tanjīm* denote both astronomy and astrology. For the former science Averroës[1] adopts the expression *ṣinā'at an-nujūm at-ta'ālīmiyyah*, 'mathematical art of the stars,' which is found also in the original Arabic of the *de Scientiis* of al-Fārābī, where Gerard of Cremona translated it by 'astronomia doctrinalis,' misled by the double signification of the adjective *ta'ālīmī*. The astronomy of observation is designated by Averroës[2] *ṣinā'at an-nujūm at-tajrībiyyah*, 'experimental art of the stars.' Special names of astronomy are *'ilm al-haī'ah*, 'science of the form [of the universe],' and *'ilm al-aflāk*, 'science of the celestial spheres.'[3] The branch of astronomy which deals with the construction and use of instruments for determining the time, especially for the purpose of regulating the times of the religious services in the mosques, is named *'ilm al-mīqāt*, 'the science of the time appointed [for the canon prayers],' and he who cultivates it is called *muwaqqit*.

2. Scope.—The Greek and Muhammadan conception of astronomy does not exactly correspond to the modern conception.

Al-Fārābī says in his treatise *de Scientiis*[4] that astronomy has for its object the study of the celestial bodies and of the earth from these three points of view: (*a*) number, figure, order, and respective position of the spheres and of the celestial bodies; their magnitudes and distances from the earth; immobility of the earth; (*b*) celestial motions and their consequences with regard to the stars themselves (conjunctions and oppositions, eclipses, etc.); (*c*) magnitude of the inhabited part of the earth and its division into zones or climates; determination of geographical co-ordinates; effects of the rotation of the celestial sphere in regard to parts having different latitudes (varying length of the day, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.). This scheme of the content of astronomy is found also in later writers,[5] with the sole difference that the study of the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies and spheres comes to be considered under a category (*d*) separate from (*a*).

According to Avicenna, the astronomer studies 'the parts of the universe as far as regards their figure, their respective positions, their magnitudes, and their distances from each other; he further studies the motions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies, the estimate (*taqdīr*) of the globes, of the axes (*l. quṭūb*) and of the circles [ideal] on which those motions take place. All this is contained in the *Almagest*.'[6]

The limits of astronomy are well defined by Ibn Ḫaldūn († A.D. 1406):

Astronomy consists of the study of the celestial bodies and motions as they appear to us; 'it is a most noble science, but it does not give, as is often supposed, the form of the heavens and the disposition of the spheres and of the stars as they are in reality. It only indicates that from those motions there result for the spheres these forms and these dispositions. Now, as is known, it is not strange that from one and the same thing there should result necessarily two different things; therefore, when we say that those motions give as a result [those celestial configurations], we seek to argue the mode of existence of the result by means of the necessary cause; a proceeding which does not at all guarantee the truth. Nevertheless, astronomy is an important science, indeed one of the fundamental parts of the mathematical sciences.'[1]

The diversity of criteria and of purposes by and for which the physicist ('naturalis') studies celestial phenomena, in contrast to the astronomer ('astrologus'), is shown also in a passage of Averroës.[2] This conception of the philosophers is shared by the Muhammadan astronomers, for whom astronomy embraces spherical astronomy (with the theory of instruments), mathematical chronology, spherical trigonometry, and geography as based on mathematics (like that of Ptolemy); and it excludes all that for us would enter into the field of stellar physics and celestial mechanics. This is evident from the summary[3] of the best systematic treatise on Muhammadan astronomy, viz. the unedited *al-Qānūn al-mas'ūdī*, composed in Arabic by al-Bīrūnī († A.D. 1048):

(*a*) General notions and fundamental hypotheses for the geometrical representation of celestial phenomena; (*b*) mathematical chronology, conversion of one era into another, festivals of various peoples; (*c*) spherical trigonometry; (*d*) circles of the celestial sphere and systems of co-ordinates; phenomena of the diurnal motion of the sphere with reference to the earth (amplitudes, solar altitudes, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.); (*e*) form, dimensions, etc., of the earth; problems relating to terrestrial longitudes and latitudes; the direction of Mecca with regard to other places on the earth; geography on a mathematical-astronomical basis; (*f*) theory of the sun; (*g*) theory of the moon; solar and lunar parallaxes; (*h*) syzygies, eclipses, appearance of the new moon; (*i*) fixed stars and lunar stations; (*j*) theories of the five planets; geocentric distances and magnitudes of the celestial bodies and spheres; (*k*) problems of spherical astronomy as subserving astrology (calculation of the twelve celestial 'domus,' of the 'applicationes,' of the 'projectiones radiorum,' of the 'directiones' and 'profectiones,' of the 'revolutiones annorum,' of the *mamarr*, of the planetary conjunctions, of the millenary periods).

Muhammadan astronomical writings, almost always in Arabic, can be classified under four groups:

(*a*) General elementary introductions which represent a perfected form of what the *Isagoge* of Geminus and the *Hypotheses* of Ptolemy were for the Greeks; belonging to this category—to cite only writings translated into European languages and edited—are: the *de Imaginatione Sphæræ* of Thebit (or Thābit) ibn Qurrah († A.D. 901), the compendium of Alfraganus or al-Farghānī († after 861), and the compendium of al-Jaghminī († 1344–45);[4] (*b*) systematic treatises corresponding in type to the *Almagest*, but more perfect—*e.g.*, the unedited work of al-Bīrūnī cited above; the Latin translation of the *Almagest* of Geber (or Jābir) ibn Aflaḥ, printed at Nürnberg, 1534, would belong to this category if it had not omitted all the mathematical and astronomical tables; (*c*) treatises of spherical astronomy for the use of calculators and observers; these are called *zīj* (plur. *zījāt*, *azyāj*, *ziyajah*); they presuppose a knowledge of the general principles of cosmography and consist essentially of tables for calculation, illustrations of the use of the tables, and indications as to the manner of solving problems of spherical astronomy (for the most part without demonstration); the only treatise of this kind published and translated is that of al-Battānī;[5] of the Persian treatise of Ulūgh Beg only the prolegomena (explaining the use of the tables) and the stellar catalogue have been edited and translated; (*d*) writings on special subjects — *e.g.*, stellar catalogues, treatises on instruments, etc.

[1] Ibn Rushd, *Metaphysic*, Cairo, n.d. [1902], p. 65, l. 3 from end (ed. and tr. by C. Quirós Rodríguez, Madrid, 1919, bk. iv. § 13).

[2] P. 83 (Quirós, bk. iv. § 77).

[3] See also above, I. 1.

[4] This has reached us only in the Latin version of Gerard of Cremona († 1187), Paris, 1588. The part relating to the mathematical sciences has been translated into German by E. Wiedemann, 'Beitr. zur Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften,' xi. (*Sitzungsberichte der physik.-medizin. Sozietät in Erlangen*, xxxix. [1907] 74–101.

[5] *E.g.*, Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Saḫāwī, *Irshād al-qāṣid*, Calcutta, 1849, p. 84 f.

[6] *Risālah fi-aqsām al-'ulūm al-'aqliyyah*, in the *Tis' rasā'il*, Constantinople, 1298 A.H. (1881). The same definition is found in the *Chahār Maqālah*, written in Persian about 1160 by Niẓāmī-i-'Arūḍī-i-Samarqandī (tr. E. G. Browne, Hertford, 1899 [extract from *JRAS*], p. 89).

[1] *Prolegomena*, bk. vi. ch. xvi. (tr. de Slane, iii. 145 f.).

[2] *Comm. de Cœlo*, bk. ii. ch. 57 (*Aristotelis Opera omnia cum Averrois Cordubensis commentariis*, Venice, 1562, vol. v. fol. 136r.–v.).

[3] According to the indexes of the chapters given in the catalogues of the Arabic MSS in Oxford and Berlin.

[4] *Sullāḳā Haunānāyā*, the course of astronomy of Barhebræus, ed. and tr. F. Nau (*Le Livre de l'ascension de l'esprit sur la forme du ciel et de la terre*, 2 pts., Paris, 1899–1900), although written (in 1279) in Syriac by a Christian bishop, belongs to this category.

[5] To which is to be added the Latin translation, made in the 12th cent. by Athelhard of Bath, of Maslamah al-Majrīṭī's recension of the tables of al-Ḫuwārizmī, ed. with an excellent German commentary by H. Suter, 1914.

3. Relation to Islām.—Muhammadan religious ritual bases some of its prescriptions on elements of an astronomical character. The hours within which each of the five daily ritual prayers is valid depend on the latitude of the place and on the epoch of the solar year; further, the legal time for the night prayer is between the end of the evening and the beginning of the morning twilight. The ritual prayer is not valid unless the face is turned in the direction of Mecca; hence the necessity of solving the astronomical-geographical problem of the azimuth of Mecca. The beginning and the end of the month assigned to the fast are determined not by the civil calendar, but by the actual appearance of the new moon; and the beginning of the daily fast is given by the morning twilight. Finally, special ritual prayers are prescribed at eclipses of the sun and moon, for which it is well to be prepared in time. All this presupposes a certain degree of astronomical knowledge; and, although the majority of theologians and jurists are not content with pure calculation for the appearance of the new moon, but require the actual sight of the phenomenon, it is evident that the religious precept must be a real stimulus to scientific study. This explains also why the Muhammadans have undertaken so much research into the complex phenomena of the twilight and of the conditions of visibility of the new moon—phenomena which were almost entirely neglected by the Greek astronomers. On the other hand, many passages of the Qur'ān set forth the benefits which God has vouchsafed to men by means of celestial bodies and motions; at least they invite reflexion on the goodness and providence of God. Astronomy thus becomes an ally of religion.

4. Sources.[1]—(*a*) *Arabian.*—A first element of an exclusively practical character is due to the Arabs before Islām. Like all other peoples who dwell in hot countries and are compelled to prefer night to day for travelling, the Bedawin made use of the stars for guiding their wanderings and for calculating (approximately) the hours of the night; they were thus familiar with the principal appearances of Venus and of Mercury, the places of the rising and setting of the more brilliant stars, and above all the annual course of the moon determined by noting its position in relation to 28 successive groups of stars called for this reason *manāzil al-qamar*, 'lunar stations.' Further, among the sedentary agricultural tribes, the seasons and many meteorological provisions (especially those for rain) were strictly connected with the annual rising of certain fixed stars[2] or else with the cosmic setting of the lunar stations. Hence, even in the 16th and 17th centuries, Arabic writers on astronomy still occupied themselves with the lunar mansions[3] and their *anwā'*, or cosmic settings.

(*b*) *Indian.*—The Muhammadans owe the first scientific elements of astronomy to India. In 154 A.H. (A.D. 771),[4] there came to Baghdād an Indian embassy one learned member of which introduced to the Arabs the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta*, composed in Sanskrit in A.D. 628 by Brahmagupta. From this work (which the Arabs called *as-Sind-hind*) Ibrāhim ibn Ḥabīb al-Fazārī drew the elements and the methods of calculation for his astronomical tables (*zīj*) adapted to the Muhammadan lunar year. Almost contemporaneously Ya'qūb ibn Ṭāriq composed his *Tarkīb al-aflāk*, 'The Composition of the Celestial Spheres,' which was based on the elements and methods of the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* and on other data furnished by another Indian scientist (K.n.k.h), who came to Baghdād with a second embassy in 161 A.H. (A.D. 777–778). It seems that almost at the same time there was translated into Arabic under the name *al-Arkand* the *Khaṇḍakhādyaka*, written about A.D. 665 by the same Brahmagupta, but containing elements different from those of his other work. Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Ahwāzī, a contemporary of al-Fazārī and of Ya'qūb ibn Ṭāriq, probably drawing on oral teachings of learned Indians, introduced to the Arabs the planetary motions according to al-Arjabhad (a corruption of Āryabhaṭa, the name of an Indian astronomer who wrote in A.D. 500). These Indian works had many imitators in the Muhammadan world up to the end of the first half of the 5th cent. of the Hijra (11th cent. A.D.); some astronomers (*e.g.*, Ḥabash, an-Nairizī, Ibn as-Samḥ) wrote contemporaneously books based on Indian methods and elements and books with Græco-Arabic elements; others (*e.g.*, Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq as-Sarakhsī, Abū 'l-Wafā', al-Bīrūnī, al-Ḥāzinī) adapted elements calculated by the Muhammadan astronomers to great artificial cycles of years constructed in imitation of those of the Indians. For one of the characteristics of the astronomical books of India is their representation of the mean motions of sun, moon, and planets by the number of their revolutions in cycles of millions of years, starting from the supposition that at the beginning of creation sun, moon, and planets were all in conjunction in a given degree of longitude (*e.g.*, at the first point of Aries), taken as the initial point of the celestial sphere, and that at intervals of millions of years they will all be in conjunction again at the same point.[1] Further, many treatises composed by the Arabs gave the roots of the mean motions for the meridian of Uzain (corrupted later into Azīn and Arīn, the Sanskrit Ujjayinī), supposed to be the central meridian of the inhabited earth (90° E. of the first Ptolemaic meridian). From those Indian books the Arabs also derived their first knowledge of trigonometrical sines, of course in the form employed in India, *i.e.* for arcs of 3° 45′ and for the radius of 3438′.

(*c*) *Iranian.*—A few years after the introduction of Indian astronomy, and before the end of the 8th cent. A.D., there was translated into Arabic the Pahlavī work entitled *Zīk i Shatroayār*, 'Astronomical Tables of the King,' a name which became in the Arabic version *Zīj ash-Shāh* or *Zīj ash-Shahriyār*. The original was certainly composed in the last years of the kingdom of the Sāsānids, since the tables were based on the epoch of Yazdagird III. (16th June, A.D. 632); its elements were derived, not from Persian observations, but from Indian books. It appears also that the roots of the mean motions were referred to the meridian of the mythical castle Kangdizh, which Persian epic legend placed in the Far East. The Arabic version met with great favour among the Muhammadans. We know that the astronomer and astrologer Mā Shā' Allāh († at the beginning of the 9th cent. A.D.) made use of it for his calculations, that in the first half of the 9th cent. Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khuwārizmī had deduced from it the equations of the planetary motions, whilst he had drawn the mean motions from the *as-Sind-hind* and other elements from Ptolemy, and that Abū Ma'shar († A.D. 886) used it for his astronomical tables. After the 9th cent. A.D. the *Zīj ash-Shāh* rapidly fell into disuse; but a passage of az-Zarqālī (Arzachel) shows that towards the middle of the 11th cent. some astrologers in Spain still calculated the longitude of the fixed stars according to the tables of the Persians.

(*d*) *Greek.*—Last in chronological order is the influence of Greek astronomy. At the end of the 8th cent. or at the beginning of the 9th A.D. a rich patron, of the family of the Barmecids, Yaḥyā ibn Khālid († 191 A.H. [A.D. 807]), caused the *Almagest* to be translated for the first time into Arabic. But this book, full of difficulties and obscurities, could not, at first, compete with easier and more practical works of Indian and Persian origin. It acquired influence later, when the mathematical preparation of the Muhammadans was more advanced, and when better translations appeared. In the first half of the 9th cent. also Arabic translations were made of the *Geographia*, the *Tabulæ Manuales*, the *Hypotheses Planetarum*, the *Apparitiones* (φάσεις) *Stellarum fixarum*, and the *Planisphærium* of Ptolemy; the *Tabulæ Manuales* of Theon of Alexandria; the book of Aristarchus on the magnitudes and distances of the sun and moon; the *Isagoge* of Geminus; two tractates of Autolycus; three of Theodosius; and the little work of Hypsicles on the ascensions. To the 9th cent. also probably belongs the Arabic translation of the astronomical tables of Ammonius, of which we still find traces in the 11th cent., when they were remodelled by az-Zarqālī, to pass afterwards into mediæval Latin literature under the names of Humenus, Armanus, etc. Finally, there appear to have been translated in the same century the book of the constellations of Aratus and a book on the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies, which, falsely attributed to Ptolemy, is known by the Arabs under the name of *Kitāb al-manshūrāt*.

5. Some astronomical teachings.—We may here refer to some special points, which have an importance for the history of the general ideas of celestial phenomena. The only system received by the Muhammadan peoples was the geocentric. Aristotelian philosophy, the authority of Ptolemy, and the requirements of astrology were insurmountable obstacles to the conception of a heliocentric system, which, in any case, could not have been demonstrated by irrefutable reasons or, in the absence of telescopes, have procured any real advantage to practical astronomy. The lack of telescopes kept Muhammadan astronomers from becoming acquainted with other planets than those already known to the Greeks. The mode, too, of representing their motions is always that of the Greeks, viz. by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; nor

[1] For details see Nallino, *'Ilm al-falak*, pp. 104–140, 313–323 (for Arabic sources), 149–180 (Indian), 180–188 (Persian), and 216–229 (Greek).

[2] Alois Musil and Antonin Jaussen have found this usage still in vogue among the Bedawīn of Moab. Eduard Glaser indicates it for the Yemen.

[3] These correspond only approximately to the *nakṣatras* of the Indians.

[4] So al-Bīrūnī. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qifṭī (a source of less authority) has 156=773.

[1] This Indian idea occurs also in some Arabic works which are not astronomical—*e.g.*, Ibn Qutaiba, *Liber poëtis et poëtarum*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1904, p. 503 f.

do the modifications of certain parts of the planetary theories of Ptolemy introduced by some (*e.g.*, Naṣīr ad-dīn and Quṭb ad-dīn ash-Shīrāzī) depart much from this principle. Only among writers who are philosophers rather than astronomers do we meet with theories that supersede those of eccentrics and epicycles.[1] In any case, among them all, the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic doctrine of the circular form of celestial motions reigns supreme, for the elliptic orbit indicated by az Zarqālī for Mercury[2] is merely a graphical construction on the lamina of the astrolabe, and not a theoretical representation.

(*a*) *Number of the spheres.*—The number of the spheres, *i.e.* of what in the Middle Ages in Europe were called 'heavens,' is eight in Aristotle and Ptolemy, viz. seven for the planets (including the sun and the moon) and one for the fixed stars. This number of eight is preserved by the first Arabic astronomers—*e.g.*, al-Farghānī and al-Battānī, for whom, however, these ideal spheres, created to satisfy the requirements of physics and not those of astronomy properly so called, had no practical importance. Still the number of eight, combined with the Aristotelian theory of solid spheres in which the heavenly bodies are infixed without being able to move themselves, did not easily agree with the other teachings of the Ptolemaic system. Aristotle, who was ignorant of the motion of the precession of the equinoxes, and who consequently held that the fixed stars are really immovable, assigned to the eighth sphere the apparent diurnal motion of the celestial vault from east to west, a motion which the eighth sphere impressed also on all the others. But Ptolemy, accepting from Hipparchus the precession of the equinoxes on account of which the fixed stars have a slow and continued increase of longitude, came implicitly to attribute to the sphere of the fixed stars two motions in opposite directions—one (diurnal) from east to west, and the other from west to east. Ptolemy had no occasion to notice and correct this contradiction, which was soon perceived by the Arabic writers. The contradiction would have been easily eliminated by supposing that the fixed stars moved by the precessional motion within their own sphere, supposed accordingly to be fluid and not solid; and perhaps al-Battānī had in mind the possibility of this hypothesis when he entitled ch. li. of his book[3] thus: 'Of the motion of the fixed stars, whether they move in their sphere, or whether the sphere moves with them.' Another solution of the difficulty would have been to suppose the fixed stars to be infixed in the convexity of the sphere of Saturn, itself naturally subjected, like all the planetary apogees, to the motion of the precession; then the eighth sphere, no longer containing the stars, would only have had the office of impressing the diurnal motion on the spheres below. This solution was actually given by Muhammadan writers, some of whom indeed took advantage of it for reducing the number of the spheres to seven, to conform with the seven heavens of the Qur'ān; but this was never accepted by the astronomers.[4] Therefore, when Ibn al-Haitham († 1039) introduced into pure astronomical teaching the doctrine of the solid spheres of Aristotle, it was necessary for the physical reasons set forth above to add a ninth sphere without stars, impressing on the other spheres diurnal motion. This ninth sphere, accepted by all the later astronomers, was called 'the universal sphere,' 'the greatest sphere,' 'the sphere of the spheres,' 'the smooth sphere' (*al-falak al-aṭlas*), 'the sphere of the zodiac,' 'the supreme sphere.' In general also the philosophers—*e.g.*, Avicenna and Ibn Ṭufail—accept these nine spheres; Averroës,[1] however, under the influence of Aristotle, cannot bring himself to exceed the number of eight. In the theological camp the nine spheres did not find many opponents, in spite of 'the seven heavens' mentioned in *Qur.* ii. 27; it was held that the specification of the number seven did not imply the negation of a superior number.[2] In fact, several theologians saw in the eighth and ninth spheres respectively the 'seat' (*kursī*) and the 'throne' (*'arsh*) of God mentioned in the Qur'ān.[3]

Doubts were not wanting, however, concerning the unity of the sphere of the fixed stars. Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[4] informs us that Avicenna, in his book *ash-Shifā'*, declared: 'Up till now it has not been clear to me whether the sphere of the fixed stars be a single sphere or be several spheres, placed one above the other.' And Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[5] adds that the hypothesis of the single sphere for all the fixed stars rests only on the assumption of the equality of their motions, but that this equality is not at all certain. He further says that, even if the equality of the motions were a certainty, he would not deduce from it the necessity of a single sphere bearing all the stars infixed in it. In face of these criticisms, one comprehends the scepticism of Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī: 'In conclusion, to none of the ancients or of the moderns is the number of the heavens quite certain, either by the force of reasoning or by the way of tradition.'[6]

(*b*) *Order of the planets.*—The order of the planets followed by almost all the Muhammadan astronomers is identical with that of Ptolemy, although they recognize, together with the Greek astronomers, the lack of absolute proofs in the case of the two inferior planets and the sun. Without telescopes they could not see the transits of Venus and Mercury across the sun or determine the parallaxes of the planets situated above the moon. Some Arabic authors believed that they had perceived transits of Venus or of Mercury across the sun; but what they really saw was solar spots.[7] On the other hand, the postulates of astrology continued in the Muhammadan age to guarantee, from lack of scientific reasons to the contrary, the Ptolemaic series: moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. Spain alone had astronomers who departed from this order. Jābir ibn Aflaḥ (*c.* 1140) held it more probable that Mercury and Venus were above the sun on account of their analogy to the superior planets in having epicycles and eccentrics, stations and retrogradations. Al-Biṭrūjī (*c.* 1200), moved by physical reasons connected with his special system of planetary notions, placed the sun between Mercury and Venus.

(*c*) *Obliquity of the ecliptic.*—The obliquity of the ecliptic with regard to the celestial equator is one of the fundamental elements of astronomical calculation. The Greeks, from Eratosthenes (230 B.C.), had assigned to it the constant value of 23° 51′ 20″; *i.e.*, they held it to be invariable. The astonishment of the Arabic astronomers must have been great when they found by their observations an obliquity sensibly less; at first they could not decide whether the discrepancy was due to a real diminution of the obliquity or to a defect in the ancient observations. Al-Battānī leaves the ques-

1 Cf. below, § 6.

2 In the *Libros del saber de astronomía*, iii. 280. In any case, the earth there occupies the centre of the ellipse and not one of the foci.

3 Ed. Nallino, i. 124.

4 Cf. Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī, *Tafsīr* (in marg. to the *Tafsīr* of aṭ-Ṭabarī), 1st ed., i. 205 (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 27); Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, Cairo, 1308–10 A.H., ii. 90 (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 159).

1 *Metaphys.*, Cairo, n.d. [1902], p. 66 (ed. and tr. Quirós, bk. iv. § 16).

2 Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī, *loc. cit.*; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, i. 260.

3 See al-Qazwīnī, *Cosmography*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1848, i. 54; the glosses on *Mawāqif* of 'Aḍud ad-dīn al-Īji; E. W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 8 vols., London, 1863–93, *s.v.* ''Arsh,' etc.

4 ii. 59; cf. Avicenna, *Ash-Shifā'*, Teherān, 1303–05 A.H., i. 175 (in the 6th ch. of the 2nd *fann* of the *Ṭabī'iyyāt*).

5 ii. 59 and i. 259 f. 6 *Loc. cit.* 7 See § 7 below.

tion undecided and declares that he chooses the excellent value found by himself (23° 35′), 'since this was observed by us with our own eyes; the other, on the contrary, was received through the information of others.'[1] Some, less prudent, deduced the theory of libration[2] from the discrepancies as to the obliquity of the ecliptic combined with those relative to the precession of the equinoxes. But the continued series of observations left no doubt by the 13th cent. that the obliquity of the ecliptic was subject to a very slow regular diminution,[3] which therefore came to be admitted by all the astronomers; in Europe, on the other hand, we must come down to Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) to see it affirmed in the midst of opposition which lasted through the greater part of the 17th century. The Muhammadan astronomers had no means of determining whether this diminution was continuous or periodical and within what limits it was contained.[4] Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (*c.* 1260), who had accepted the hypothesis of az-Zarqālī as to libration, believed that the obliquity oscillated between a maximum of 23° 53′ and a minimum of 23° 33′; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[5] admitted a continuous diminution on account of which the ecliptic will coincide one day with the equator and then will depart from it again, so that the Tropic of Cancer will pass to the south and that of Capricorn to the north. Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī († 1274 A.D.) confined himself to setting forth the eight possible hypotheses as to the continuity or the periodicity of the diminution, without giving preference to any.

(*d*) *Precession of the equinoxes.*—The precession of the equinoxes, on account of which the equinoctial points retreat from east to west along the equator and cause a continuous increase in the longitude of the fixed stars (calculated precisely from the point of the vernal equinox or the first point of Aries), is one of the greatest discoveries of Hipparchus, accepted by Ptolemy. It was accepted by all the Muhammadan astronomers, who, from the first half of the 9th cent., assigned it a value much more exact than that of Ptolemy (36″ yearly), viz. 54″ 33‴; later, a continued series of observations indicated other values still more approximate to the true one. There remained a question which celestial mechanics alone has been able to solve with certainty: Is the precession to be regarded as continuous, so that in many thousands of years the retreating equinoctial points will accomplish the entire circuit of the ecliptic, or is it confined within limits so as to be reduced to one oscillation, more or less great, of the equinoctial points? The first hypothesis, which is the true one, is accepted by Ptolemy; the second was followed by some Greek astrologers after the Christian era, who held that the equinoctial points, after having advanced 8° in 640 years, retreated 8° in a similar lapse of time, returning thus to the primitive point. According to them, the precession was 45″ a year. Finally, it is necessary to note that, while some Indian writers are quite ignorant of the precession, others admit it in an oscillatory form with arcs of 54° or 48° (namely, 27° or 24° from the one part and from the other of ♓ Piscium), which they imagined by gross mistakes and not for scientific reasons.

(*e*) *Hypothesis of libration or trepidation.*—The great majority of Muhammadan astronomers held that there was a continuous precession, rightly attributing the discrepancies concerning its value to the imperfection of the observations of the Greeks. We know only three writers of the second half of the 9th cent. who, through Indian influence, accepted the idea of the oscillatory precession in the empirical form of the Greek astrologers mentioned above and of the Indians. On the other hand, Thābit ibn Qurrah († 901) suggested that the discrepancies in the estimate of the annual precession were due in reality to an apparent irregularity of that motion, and that they were connected with the discrepancies relative to the obliquity of the ecliptic. In an epistle which is preserved by Ibn Yūnus he says that he had up till then kept his own calculations private, because he regarded them as uncertain and only provisional. It seems that these secret papers formed the tractate which has come down to us only in two unedited Latin translations under the title *De motu octavæ sphæræ* or *De motu accessus et recessus.*[1] In this tractate Thābit notes that, if all the known observations were exact, there would be a slackening and an acceleration in the motion of precession and in the increase and diminution of the obliquity of the ecliptic. In order to explain these apparently irregular variations, he proposes the following hypothesis:

> The eighth sphere, viz. that which contains the fixed stars, has a movable ecliptic, the extremities of whose axis rotate about the equinoctial points of an ideally fixed ecliptic inclined 23° 33′ in respect of the equator; the complete rotation on those two small circles, having 4° 18′ 43″ of radius, is accomplished in 4171½ lunar years. In this period the equinoctial points would seem to accomplish, with a motion not uniform, an oscillation of 21° 30′ (10° 45′ forwards and the same backwards); in a similar time there will take place an unequal variation of the obliquity.

The hypothesis of Thābit was received in its entirety in Europe by Purbachius (1423–62) and by his commentators Reinhold and Nonius. The oscillation of the equinoctial points is called by the Arabs *ḥarakat al-iqbāl wa 'l-idbār*, 'motion of advance and of retreat,' whence the Latin name *motus accessus et recessus*; this was also called in Europe *motus octavæ sphæræ*, in contradistinction to the motion of the ninth sphere, to which was attributed the motion of the continuous precession; finally, since the longitude of the fixed stars underwent the same oscillations of the equinoctial points, it was often called in Europe *trepidatio fixarum*. This does not seem to have had supporters among the Muhammadans of the East after the 11th century. It had greater fortune among the Muhammadans of the extreme West (Spain and Morocco). Towards 1060–70, at Toledo, az-Zarqālī, in order to make his observations agree with those of his predecessors, suggested that the poles of the ecliptic circulated about the equatorial poles, so that the equinoxes advanced by one unequal motion towards the east about 10° and then retreated irregularly by 20°, accomplishing, *i.e.*, an oscillation of 10° forwards and 10° backwards with reference to an equinoctial point ideally fixed. Every arc of 10° would have been passed over in 750 years, so that the complete cycle of the libration would be accomplished in 3000 years. The hypothesis of az-Zarqālī, explicitly denied by Averroës,[2] was accepted by al-Biṭrūjī (*c.* 1200) in Spain and by Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (*c.* 1260) in Morocco; it also found great favour among the Jews and Spanish Christians and had an influence on the Hebrews, who, on a basis of Arabic sources, compiled about 1270 the *Tabulæ Alphonsinæ*.[3]

(*f*) *Motion of the solar apogee.* — Ptolemy (followed by all the later Greeks) says that he found the longitude of the solar apogee to be equal to that observed by Hipparchus, and consequently believes that it is immovable at 65° 30′, while the apogees of the five planets move with the motion of the precession. It is a merit of the Arab astronomers of the khalīf al-Ma'mūn (813–833) that they recognized that the solar apogee is subject to the

[1] Ed. Nallino, i. 12.
[2] See below, § (*e*).
[3] This was already the opinion of Ḥāmid al-Ḥujandī, about A.D. 1000.
[4] Only in the second half of the 18th cent. has celestial mechanics been able to establish the fact that it is a question of a very slow oscillation contained within limits of less than 2½°.
[5] *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, i. 260, ii. 59 f.

[1] A suspicion arises, however, that this tractate may rather be by a grandson of Thābit, viz. Ibrāhīm ibn Sinān ibn Thābit, who wrote concerning libration (as al-Bīrūnī and Qāḍizādeh attest).
[2] *Metaphys.* p. 66 (Quirós, bk. iv, § 15).
[3] It must be noticed that these Hebrews combined the hypothesis of Az-Zarqālī with fantastic elements; viz. they admitted a continuous precession accomplishing the circuit of 360° in 49,000 years (*i.e.* just about 26″ 27‴ a year), which precession was to be always corrected on the basis of an inequality accomplishing its own period in 7000 years. They evidently wished to introduce into the hypothesis of trepidation Judaic elements —a thousand jubilary periods of 49 years and a thousand sabbatical periods of 7 years!

motion of the fixed stars and of the planetary apogees, *i.e.* to the displacement of longitude due to the precession of the equinoxes. But the solar apogee has also another very small proper motion in longitude which, according to Leverrier, is only 11·464″ yearly. This motion must have escaped the Muhammadan astronomers. The determination of the longitude of the apogee is not easy and, in times when telescopes and pendulum-clocks were lacking, could not be effected with absolute certainty in the minutes of arc; on the other hand, there was no term of comparison with ancient observations. One understands, therefore, why the majority of Muhammadan astronomers did not give to the solar apogee any other motion than that of the precession, attributing the small discrepancies to the imperfection of instruments and observations. It seems that Thābit ibn Qurrah, however, had dared to affirm the existence of a *proper* motion. Al-Bīrūnī[1] informs us that Thābit, author of a tractate on the inequality of the solar year, had determined 365 days, 6 hours, 12 minutes, 9 seconds, as being the length of the year which we call anomalistic, *i.e.* the time which the sun takes to return to its own apogee. If, then, the same Thābit (if we may rely upon a piece of information which Regiomontanus and Copernicus seem to have derived from the *De motu octavæ sphæræ* cited above) determined the length of the sidereal year as 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 12 s., it is plain that he must have attributed to the solar apogee a small proper motion added to that of the precession.[2] Certainly the values found by Thābit are excellent, since, according to the moderns, the anomalistic solar year is 365 d., 6 h., 13 m., 54·9 s., and the sidereal year 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 10·7 s. It is beyond doubt that az-Zarqālī determined with great exactness ($12\frac{1}{3}\frac{1}{6}\frac{2}{0}''$ every Julian year) the proper motion of the apogee, as distinguished from that due to the precession; and he therefore supposed that the centre of the eccentric of the sun moved over a very small circle, and by this was also settled the variation of the eccentricity of the solar orbit. Among us the proper motion of the apogee was discovered only in the 16th cent. by Kepler and Longomontanus.

(*g*) *Third lunar inequality.*—We need not notice other modifications of special points of Ptolemaic doctrines. It will be enough now to make a reference to a controversy carried on from 1836 to 1871 in the Academy of Sciences of Paris without any definite conclusion being arrived at, viz.: Is the discovery of the variation or third lunar inequality to be ascribed to Abū 'l-Wafā' († 998), as L. A. Sédillot maintained, rather than to Tycho Brahe? There would have been no reason for this dispute if that part of the *Almagest* relative to the movements of the moon had been better studied, and if the analogous discussions in the works of other Arabic astronomers had been examined with care. Carra de Vaux[3] has demonstrated that the hypothetical theory of the variation was nothing else than the προσνευσις of Ptolemy, *i.e.* the difference between the true and the mean apogee of the epicycle by which difference the mean anomaly is corrected so as then to calculate the simple equation of the moon. Al-Battānī opportunely calls it 'equation of the anomaly.' It is curious to note that no one has observed that already in 1645 Bullialdus (I. Boulliau) had recognized that the προσνευσις corresponded to about half of the 'variation' of Tycho Brahe, and that consequently the tables of Ptolemy for the moon were sufficiently near to the truth.

6. Opposition to Ptolemy.—The many modifications of the doctrines of the *Almagest* never abandon the geometrical foundation followed by Ptolemy for the representation of the motions of the sun and planets, viz. a combination of eccentric circles and epicycles. This permitted the representation of celestial motions with all the exactness of which astronomical instruments were capable before the discovery of pendulum-clocks and telescopes; it was further obedient to the Aristotelian principle that celestial motions are circular only. Practical astronomy therefore did not feel the need of theories based on different geometrical principles. The difficulty arose only from a physical point of view, since the idea of numerous circular motions round an imaginary point was repugnant to the principles of Aristotelian physics. It was precisely in the name of Aristotelian natural laws that the battle began among the Arabs of Spain in the 12th cent. against the eccentrics and epicycles of Ptolemy; but their opponents were philosophers.[1]

The first of these was Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn aṣ-Ṣā'igh, known by the name of Ibn Bājah or Avempace († 1139), who is said to have explained the celestial motions by means of eccentrics only, rejecting the epicycles as repugnant to the physics of Aristotle; but we have no particular account of his system.[2] After him we find Abū Bakr ibn Ṭufail (*q.v.*; † 1185–86), famous in Europe for his *Philosophus autodidactus*, who said to al-Biṭrūjī that he had found a theory of those motions quite different from that of Ptolemy rejecting both eccentrics and epicycles, and that he had promised to put it in writing. But it seems that the promise was not fulfilled. The ideas of Ibn Ṭufail probably influenced his friend Averroës (*q.v.*; † 1198), who affirms[3] the physical impossibility of the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy. The astronomers, he continues, assign an eccentric to the moon because, since she is eclipsed now more and now less in one and the same point of the zodiac, they suppose that she traverses the cone of shade at different distances with regard to the earth. 'But this may happen also on account of the diversity of her position, if we imagine that the poles of the lunar sphere move around the poles of another sphere If God shall prolong our life, we will investigate the astronomy of the time of Aristotle, since this seems not to contradict physics; it consists of motions which Aristotle calls *laulab* [*i.e.* spirals]. I believe that this motion consists in this, that the poles of one sphere move about the poles of another; since then the motion [resulting] is according to a line *leulebia* [*i.e.* spiral], just so is the motion of the sun [combined] with the diurnal motion [of the celestial sphere]. Perchance it is possible by means of such a motion to represent the inequalities which take place in the planetary motions.'

In his commentary on the *Metaphysic*, xii. 47,[4] Averroës does not succeed in forming a clear idea of the system of Eudoxus from the scanty allusions of Aristotle and from the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which is very defective in this part, it not being clear in what manner the 'motus gyrativi'[5] arise from two contrary motions, unless two different poles be supposed.[6] He observes that by this hypothesis one could explain all the appearances of the planets: 'et iste motus, ut mathematici Hispaniæ dicunt, existit in orbe stellato, et vocant ipsum motum processus et reversionis.'[7]

Although Averroës did not complete his exposition,[8] he had guessed a notable part of the hypothesis of Eudoxus (*c.* 409–356 B.C.), which was for the first time reconstructed by G. Schiaparelli in 1875. Averroës, like Eudoxus, allows only spheres concentric with the earth; he admits that the line *laulabī* may be the apparent result of two contrary circular motions—one of the sphere of the planets, and the other, in an opposite direction, of another sphere whose axis is inclined in respect of the axis of the first sphere; finally, the line *laulabī* corresponds to the ἱπποπέδη of Eudoxus, in the form of ∞, which, according to the Greek geometricians, belongs to the category of spiral lines (σπείραι), and, according to modern geometricians, would

[1] *Chronology of the Ancient Nations*, Eng. tr., London, 1879, p. 61 f.

[2] The fact that Thābit wrote a tractate to maintain that the solar apogee does move is of no importance, since it is probably merely a confutation of the Ptolemaic immobility.

[3] 'L'Almageste d'Abû 'l-Wéfa al-Bûzdjâni,' in *JA* VIII. xix. [1892] 440–471.

[1] Cf. L. Gauthier, 'Une Réforme du système astronomique de Ptolémée tentée par les philosophes arabes du XII^e siècle,' in *JA* X. xiv. [1909] 483–510; but this article is insufficient from a mathematical-astronomic point of view.

[2] See Maimonides, *Le Guide des égarés*, ed. and tr. S. Munk, Paris, 1856–66, ii. 185 f.

[3] *Comm. de Cœlo*, ii. 35 (*Aristotelis Opera omnia cum Averrois Cordubensis commentariis*, Venice, 1562, v. fol. 118v.–119r.).

[4] Ed. cit. viii. fol. 331v.–332r.

[5] Thus the Latin translator in the commentary on the *Metaphysic* renders the Arabic adjective *laulabī* 'spiral, in the form of a spiral or of a screw.'

[6] And, in fact, this was the hypothesis of Eudoxus.

[7] *I.e.* the motion of the libration of the fixed stars in the hypothesis of the Spaniard az-Zarqālī (see above, § 5, (*e*)).

[8] Cf. also ed. cit. viii. fol. 329v. (on *Metaphys.* xii. 45).

be a lemniscate described on a spherical superficies instead of on a plane. There naturally occur in the hypothesis of Eudoxus some special conditions, of which Averroës does not seem to have thought; one does not understand, then, how the Arabian philosopher thought to save himself from the greatest objection which could be made to the system of concentric spheres, viz. that by making the distance of the celestial bodies from the earth always equal it did not permit of an explanation of the variation of the diameters of the sun and moon.

Another friend and disciple of Ibn Ṭufail, al-Biṭrūjī (a native of Pedroche to the north of Cordova),[1] attempted a complete system as a substitute for the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy,[2] by placing the data of observation of the *Almagest* in agreement with the peripatetic philosophy. He says that, moved by discourses of Ibn Ṭufail to meditate on this question, he had arrived at new theories by a kind of divine revelation. He admits with Ptolemy the nine spheres concentric with the earth; on the other hand, he denies the eccentrics and the epicycles. He finds it to be contrary to natural order that, while the ninth sphere impresses on all the others the diurnal motion of rotation from east to west, the spheres below the ninth should have besides a motion of their own in an opposite direction. In order to remove this contradiction, he conceives a whimsical theory which betrays the inexperience of the author in the field of practical astronomy.

According to him, the movements of the planets and of the fixed stars in longitude take place in reality from east to west, like the diurnal motion of the rotation of the heavens; those movements which astronomers have judged to be from west to east are simply illusory appearances due to the progressive diminution of the angular velocity of the spheres, according as a gradual approach is made from the ninth sphere to the earth.[3] The ninth sphere accomplishes the 360° of circumference in 24 hours and communicates this motion to the spheres below; but the impulse grows weaker from sphere to sphere. That of the fixed stars, which is immediately under the ninth, accomplishes in 24 hours something less than 360°; and this little retardation brings it about that after 36,000 years[4] it has accomplished a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere and appears to be moving very slowly in a direction contrary to it. Under the sphere of the fixed stars comes that of Saturn, considerably slower; it accomplishes in the space of about 30 years[5] a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere. Thus Jupiter loses a whole circuit in 12 years; Mars in two; Venus, the sun, and Mercury in one; and the moon in a little more than 27 days. This, then, is the reason why all the spheres under the ninth appear to move in a direction contrary to it.

For physical reasons, therefore, al-Biṭrūjī believes that the sphere of Venus is to be placed above the sun and that of Mercury below it. There remain to be explained the inequalities of the motions of the sun, moon, and planets. He says that he drew inspiration for this from constructions analogous to that by which az-Zarqālī had imagined the motion of the libration of the fixed stars. While az-Zarqālī made the poles of the ecliptic rotate parallel with the plane of the equator, al-Biṭrūjī, in the case of the planets, made the poles of the planetary spheres move on inclined planes round the poles of the equator or of the ecliptic; from this it results that the planets describe lines *laulabinæ*, *i.e.* spiral, on a spherical superficies. Thus are also explained the stations and retrogradations of the planets. For this part, therefore, we have the partial resuscitation of the hypothesis of Eudoxus. The ideas of al-Biṭrūjī were accepted by a fair number of Christians and Jews in Spain and Provence; and they had also an echo in Italy in the 16th century.

7. Celestial physics.—As is said above,[6] celestial physics, according to Muhammadan and Greek writers, lies outside the field of astronomy; its problems are discussed in books of metaphysics, of physics in an Aristotelian sense, and of theology, or at least in special works, of which the greater part are now either lost or unedited.

Like Ptolemy, the most ancient Arabic astronomers neglect to define the idea of the celestial spheres and limit themselves to considering them in the mathematical aspect of ideal circles representing the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The Aristotelian conception of solid spheres was introduced for the first time[1] into a purely astronomical treatise by Ibn al-Haitham; and he, in his unedited compendium of astronomy, gives the definition which was accepted afterwards by all the other writers of elementary treatises: 'A celestial sphere (*falak*, plur. *aflāk*) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superficies having the same centre.'[2] In this, as he himself says, he drew his inspiration from the *Hypotheses Planetarum* of Ptolemy; in fact, as we see from a passage of Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, he followed the *Hypotheses* also in expounding how the celestial motions can be represented, and also by supposing simple equatorial zones of those complete spheres, so that the spheres of the epicycles become, as it were, tambourines (*duff*) rotating on their own axes, and the other spheres like armils.[3] This second form of representation was soon abandoned, as contrary to the principles of natural philosophy.

Muhammadan writers agree with Aristotle in holding that the spheres and the celestial bodies are a simple unique substance, different from the four elements of the sublunar world, and forming a fifth element. The solidity also of the spheres, by reason of which the stars remain infixed within them, and by which the stars are carried round, is accepted by almost all,[4] except a few theologians who, to support a strictly literal meaning of a passage of the Qur'ān,[5] maintain that the stars move within the spheres like fish swimming in water. The ideas of the majority of writers after the 4th cent. of the Hijra are those set forth in the dogmatic theology of al-Baiḍāwī († 1286) as follows:

'The spheres are transparent; since if they were coloured, our eyes could not possibly see that which is within them. They are neither hot nor cold; since otherwise the heat and cold would dominate in the elements of the sublunar world on account of their contiguity to it. They are neither light nor heavy; since otherwise in their nature there would be a tendency to rectilinear motion.[6] They are neither moist nor dry; otherwise the facility or difficulty of taking certain forms or of attaching themselves would be manifested in rectilinear motion. They are not capable of quantitative motion; since, if the convexity of the external superficies were to increase, it would be necessary that there should be a void above it, which is absurd; and the same is to be said regarding concavity since if this were to increase it would be necessary that one sphere should enter into another or that between the two there should be a void.'[7]

So also it is proved by Aristotelian reasonings that the motion of the spheres must be circular.

The greater number of Muhammadan philosophers accept the peripatetic doctrine that the spheres and the stars are living beings, rational, operating by their own will; that the spheres have souls which exist in their bodies as our souls in our bodies; and that, as our bodies move under the impulse of our souls towards the ends we have in view, so also do the spheres, which have as their end the serving of God. This doctrine is for the most part repudiated by the theologians: al-Ghazālī († 1111) does not deny the possibility of it, but he affirms that we are incapable of knowing it; on the other hand, Ibn Ḥazm († 1064), Ibn Qayyim

[1] Alpetragius of our mediæval writers.

[2] Of the book of al-Biṭrūjī there has been published only an obscure Latin tr. (Venice, 1531) made from a Hebrew version. The Latin tr. made in 1217 at Toledo by Michael Scotus is unedited, as is also the Arabic text.

[3] This idea was already maintained by the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā' about the middle of the 10th cent. (see their *Rasā'il*, Bombay, 1305–06 A.H., ii. 22–26) and by Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, Cairo, 1308 A.H., ii. 60 f. (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 159) and vi. 117 f. (on *Qur.* xxi. 34). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentrics and epicycles.

[4] This is the period of time in which, according to Ptolemy, the fixed stars accomplish the circumference, proceeding towards the east.

[5] The duration of the heliocentric sidereal revolution of Saturn is a little less than 29½ years; it is, in the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the revolution of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the zodiac.

[6] See § 1.

[1] This follows from the preface itself of Ibn al-Haitham and from the attestation of Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Saḫāwī, *Irshād al-qāṣid*, p. 85.

[2] Only the spheres of the epicycles are full, *i.e.* are true globes.

[3] These two forms of hypothesis are always found side by side for every planet, in bk. ii. of the *Hypotheses*, published for the first time (1907) in German according to the Arabic version which takes the place of the lost Greek text (in Ptolemy, *Opera astronomica minora*, ed. Heiberg, p. 113 ff.).

[4] The ancient Arab astronomers—*e.g.*, al-Battānī (i. 124)—leave the question uncertain.

[5] xxi. 34.

[6] According to the Aristotelian theory (*de Cœlo*, i. 8 f.), heavy bodies tend in a straight line towards the centre of the world, light bodies tend to withdraw in a straight line from the centre.

[7] *Maṭāliʿ al-anwār*, Constantinople, 1305 A.H., p. 262.

al-Jauziyyah († 1350), and many others absolutely deny life and intelligence to the heavenly bodies. The philosophers of the peripatetic school and several theologians (*e.g.*, al-Baiḍāwī) hold that the movers of the celestial souls and consequently of the spheres are pure intelligences. Concerning their origin al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and their followers maintain a Neo-Platonic emanatory theory: from the first principle emanates the first intelligence, and from this are derived all the nine spheres by means of successive triads always composed of intelligence, soul, and body, until one arrives at the final or active intelligence from which is derived all the material of the sublunar world. This theory is vigorously opposed by al-Ghazālī and the other theologians.

The question of the marks on the moon is either neglected or only hinted at in the works hitherto published. The idea that the moon had valleys and mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and so could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers.

Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, however, explicitly affirms: 'There are those who believe that there exist on the surface of the sun spots, in the same manner as there are marks on the surface of the moon.'[1] These spots were actually seen on some occasions, but were erroneously believed to be transits of Mercury and Venus across the sun.

The comets and the other meteors (in an Aristotelian sense) were the subjects of observations and of numerous monographs. But, judging from the little that we know about them, Muhammadan writers followed in this matter the theories set forth by Aristotle in his books on meteorology.[2]

8. Conclusion.—The importance of Muhammadan astronomy in the history of science has been variously judged; sometimes Muhammadan astronomers have received excessive praise, sometimes unjust criticism, as if they had done nothing but preserve and transmit to Europe Greek science, improving it only in minor details. This harsh verdict is due not only to very imperfect knowledge of the Arabic writings on astronomy (of which the greater part is still unedited), but also to the fact that no account has been taken of the special conditions of astronomy in the glorious period of Muhammadan culture. The system invented by the Greek geometricians, and completed by Ptolemy, for representing all the celestial motions had mathematically all the precision that could be desired or attained by the use of the best instruments; it produced no sensible discrepancy between theory and the result of observation. The elliptic orbits of Kepler would not have given the theory greater perfection than it received from the complicated system of eccentrics and epicycles; the latter indeed had the advantage of preserving the Pythagorean and Aristotelian principle, which denied any but circular movement in the heavens. One must not forget that even in the heliocentric system of Copernicus the motions of the planets were still explained by means of combinations of epicycles — combinations which were in several cases less perfect than those employed by the Ptolemaic astronomy. To change the method of geometrical representation would therefore have been whimsical—a mathematical trick, which no datum of observation would have justified; and, in fact, those Arabs who wished to eliminate the eccentrics and the epicycles[1] were philosophers rather than astronomers, and they propounded their hypotheses from data based only on Aristotelian physics.

It is thus easy to understand how it was that, *e.g.*, the astronomers of the khalif al-Ma'mūn and their successors saw no necessity for drawing from their observations of the movement of Venus[2] the final conclusion that Venus revolved round the sun. From the point of view of such phenomena as could be observed without telescopes, this second hypothesis had no higher value than that which made Venus revolve round the earth. In a word, celestial appearances gave no cause to shake the foundations of the geocentric system, which agreed very well with every religious notion, and which was supported by the authority of both Aristotle and Ptolemy, reinforced by a very potent element in Hellenistic and mediæval culture, viz. astrology. Giovanni Schiaparelli, in one of his monographs on Greek astronomy,[3] has set forth clearly the decisive influence which astrology, brought into Greece by the Chaldæan Berosus (3rd cent. B.C.) and consequently received with great favour by the Stoics and Neo-Pythagoreans, had in the abandonment of the heliocentric system of Aristarchus. Astrological doctrine, based on the immobility of the earth in the centre of the world, was irreconcilable with any system which made the earth revolve round the sun or round any other body; astrology was thus a very powerful additional obstacle to the abandonment of the geocentric idea. Further, we must not forget that it was only in the 17th cent. that European physics reached clear proofs of the diurnal rotation of the earth and justified elliptic orbits and the heliocentric system, and that the really irrefutable argument for the revolution of the earth round the sun was furnished only in 1728 by the discovery of the aberration of the fixed stars.

An essential condition of all astronomical progress is to have at disposal a long series of methodical observations; and in this matter Muhammadan astronomers were obliged to begin, so to say, from the foundation. Ptolemy was the last Greek observer; but not even all the observations which he says he made are true. In several cases of capital importance—*e.g.*, regarding the obliquity of the ecliptic and the longitude of the solar apogee —he gave as agreeing with his own observations data found about 270 years before his time by Hipparchus, thus causing certain elements to be believed constant which are really variable. In other cases—*e.g.*, regarding the precession of the equinoxes — his observations are very rough. Theon of Alexandria (4th cent. A.D.) and Proclus (5th cent.) do no more than accept Ptolemy's elements, in some ways aggravating his errors; accordingly, during the seven centuries from Ptolemy to the first flourishing of Arabo-Muhammadan astronomy, we have not even one observation which is of use to the science. The first task, therefore, of the Arabic astronomers was to revise all the Ptolemaic elements of the celestial motions; it was a time not to form new theories but to collect the indispensable elements of fact by means of continuous observations more accurate than those of the Greeks. This task was accomplished by the Muhammadan astronomers in a marvellous manner;

[1] *Mafātiḥ al-ghaib*, i. 259, on *Qur.* ii. 27.

[2] On falling stars see present writer's art. in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, viii. [1920] 375–388.

[1] See above, § 6.

[2] They found (contrary to Ptolemy) that Venus has the same longitude of apogee, the same eccentricity, and the same equation of centre as the sun; and so the true longitude of the centre of the epicycle of Venus is always equal to the true longitude of the sun. This was the same as to suppose that the orbit of Venus is an epicycle whose centre is always the true place of the sun and runs over the solar orbit; in other words, it was equivalent to making Venus a satellite of the sun.

[3] *Origine del sistema planetario eliocentrico presso i Greci*, Milan, 1898, § 55.

indeed, we must come down to the time of Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) to find observers and observations comparable to those of the Muhammadan Middle Ages. Further, by founding trigonometry in a modern sense and developing it to a high degree they furnished astronomical science with an excellent instrument for its work.

The influence of Muhammadan astronomy in Europe is so far-reaching that to treat of it at length would be to give the history of some centuries of European astronomy. From the 12th cent. to the end of the 15th the compendiums used in the schools were translated from Arabic or were based on Arabic writings; the astronomical tables and the processes of calculation were derived from Arabic works, among which must be classed (from the point of view not of their language but of their contents) the celebrated tables of Alfonso which were still used by many in the 16th century. Spherical trigonometry in Europe started from Arabic treatises; the famous Regiomontanus himself (1436–76) borrows more than appears on the surface from al-Battānī. Through the influence of these Arabic sources the ancient Latin technical terminology was greatly modified, and not only do Arabic astronomical terms enter into European languages, but Latin words acquire new significations by imitation of corresponding Arabic words. The words 'degree,' 'minute,' 'equation' (in its astronomical sense), 'equation of the centre,' 'argument' (of a table), and some others, owe their technical signification to ridiculously literal translations of Arabic writings. We cannot enumerate all that European astronomy owes to Muhammadan observers; it will be enough to recall that they rendered inestimable services even to writers of the 17th cent.—*e.g.*, Halley—precisely because they offered the only certain means of checking elements determinable only by a comparison with observations separated by long intervals of time. The books of Regiomontanus, Purbachius, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Riccioli, etc., cite the observations which were known to them of their Oriental predecessors. The theory and practice of instruments in Europe has also Arabic sources. Finally, we must not forget the influence exercised by the Arabs in the way of example. They infused into the Christians and Jews of Spain a passion for continued observations and an idea of the perfectibility of astronomical science; from Spain this passion and idea spread through the rest of Europe, preparing the way for modern astronomy.

The conditions of the Byzantine mediæval world were not favourable to the development of the sciences. Nevertheless, Muhammadan culture, which left many traces in Byzantine astrology, had also its part in astronomical studies. In 1323 an anonymous Greek introduced the Persian astronomical tables of Shams ad-dīn al-Buḫārī (Σὰμψ Μπουχαρής), which were at once widely used; in 1346 George Chrysococces made a new redaction of them, preserving at the same time many Arabic-Persian technical terms; and finally, about 1361, Theodore Meliteniotes reproduced these methods and these Persian tables in the third and last book of his *Ἀστρονομικὴ Τρίβιβλος*, after having set forth in the first and second books the methods and the tables according to Ptolemy and Theon of Alexandria. Thus there was created at Byzantium also a new astronomical terminology different from that of the classic Greek; and sometimes even Greek proper names appeared transformed by their passage through Arabic-Persian sources, as *Θαούνης* in place of *Θέων*.

LITERATURE.—There is no satisfactory exposition of the astronomy of the Muhammadan peoples in the Middle Ages; the general histories of astronomy—*e.g.*, those of F. Hoefer, J. H. von Mädler, R. Wolf (the best of all), and Arthur Berry—are inadequate, antiquated, and often erroneous. J. B. J. Delambre, *Hist. de l'astronomie du moyen âge*, Paris, 1819, pp. 1–211, and 513–539, is not a history but an analysis (of very unequal value) of various works of Muhammadan authors; the part devoted to the unedited book of Ibn Yūnus (pp. 76–156) is especially noteworthy, but it has the usual defect of Delambre—instead of the analyzed processes of the author, it substitutes a series of formulæ found by Delambre himself. Useful, but to be used with great caution, is L. A. Sédillot, *Matériaux pour servir à l'hist. comparée des sciences mathématiques chez les Grecs et les Orientaux*, 2 vols., Paris, 1845–49; see also his *Mémoire sur les instruments astronomiques des Arabes*, do. 1841 (*MAIBL, Savants étrangers*, i.). The present writer's Arabic book quoted above, p. 90[3], n. 1, concerns only the earliest period (summary of H. Suter, in *Bibliotheca Mathematica*, III. xii. [1912] 277–282). Many historical notices concerning the development of astronomical theories are to be found in the present writer's commentary on al-Battānī, *Opus astronomicum*, 3 vols., Milan, 1899–1907; short notices are to be found here and there in E. Wiedemann, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften,' nos. iii.–xxxviii. (in the *Sitzungsberichte der physikal.-medizinischen Sozietät in Erlangen*, 1904–1914) and in other small pamphlets by the same author. For biographical and bibliographical notices concerning individual writers see the excellent book of H. Suter, *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1900, and 'Nachträge und Berichtigungen zu Die Math. und Astron.,' in *Abhandl. zur Gesch. der mathemat. Wissenschaften*, xiv. [1902] 157–185. For edd. and tr. of original texts see above, II. 2.

CARLO ALFONSO NALLINO.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic). — I. *TEUTONIC.*—**1. Archæological evidence.**—The world-wide symbol of the sun-wheel occurs in the earliest Scandinavian rock-markings. Rude representations of horses and ships, which may have solar significance, are also found. In 1902 a curious object, apparently connected with the sun-cult, was discovered near Trundholm in Sweden. It is a representation of a disk, having gilding on one side and spiral ornamentation on the other, with a horse in front of it, both horse and disk being drawn on a waggon.

2. Solar myths.—Sun and moon, day and night, summer and winter, are personified in the poems of the older Edda. The Valkyrie Sigrdrifa invokes Day and the sons of Day, Night and her kinswoman.[1] Various passages from *Grimnismál*, *Vafþrúðnismál*, and *Völuspá* are summarized by Snorri:[2]

'Night, who was of Jotun race, married Delling, who was of Aesir race, and their son was named Day.' 'Then Allfather took Night and her son Day and set them up in heaven and gave them two steeds and two chariots and they were to drive round the earth every twenty-four hours.' The earth is bedewed by the foam which falls each morning from the bit of Hrimfaxi, the horse of Night. Day's steed is called Skinfaxi and he lights up the whole world with his mane. 'Then said Gangleri: "Who steers the course of the sun and of the moon?"' Mundilföri had a son Mani and a daughter Sol, whom the gods set up in heaven. 'They let Sol drive the steeds which drew the chariot of that sun which the gods made to light the world, from the sparks which flew out of Muspellheim [*i.e.* the world of fire and heat]. . . . These steeds are called All-Swift and Early-Awake, but under the withers of the horses, the gods set two wind-bellows to cool them, but in some old records that is called "isarnkol" [*i.e.* iron-coolness]. Mani steers the course of the Moon and rules over waxing and waning.'

The belief in the chariot and horses of the sun is very wide-spread; in Scandinavia, judging by the archæological evidence, it must have existed in very early times. We may have a reference to the same idea in Tacitus:

'Beyond the Suiones is another sea, sluggish and almost stagnant, by which the whole globe is imagined to be girt about and enclosed, from this circumstance that the last light of the setting sun continues so vivid till its rising as to obscure the stars. Popular belief adds, that the sound of his emerging from the ocean is also heard, and the forms of horses and the rays streaming from his head are beheld.'[3]

Like most other primitive people, the Scandinavians were struck by the phenomena of the eclipses, which they thought were caused by wolves.

'He who pursues her [*i.e.* the sun] is called Skoll; he frightens her and he will catch her; but he who is called Hati

[1] *Sigrdrifumál*, 2. [2] *Gylfaginning*, x.–xii.
[3] *Germ.* 45. Unfortunately the text is uncertain; some editors read *deorum* for *equorum* in the last sentence.

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Hroðvitnison leaps in front of her, and he will catch the moon, and so it must be.'[1] 'Skoll is the name of the wolf, who pursues the gleaming goddess to Ironwood. Another called Hati, son of Hroðvitni, goes before the fair bride of heaven.'[2]

Sun and moon will be involved in the final world-catastrophe.

'Then said Gangleri: "Of what race are these wolves [*i.e.* Skoll and Hati]?" Hár said: . . . "The old giantess rears the sons of many Jotuns and all in the form of wolves, and it is said that of the race of these wolves, there shall come one mightier than all, called Moon-Swallower and he . . . in demon's form shall seize the moon. . . . He shall fill himself with the bodies of doomed men, he shall stain the god's abode with red blood; the sunshine shall be black, and all the weather treacherous during the following summer."'[2]

'Whence comes a sun, in the smooth sky,
When Fenrir [*i.e.* a monstrous wolf] has overtaken this one,
One daughter alone, shall the Elf-beam [*i.e.* the sun] bear,
Before Fenrir overtakes her.
The maiden shall ride on the mother's paths
After the Powers have perished.'[3]

3. Sun-worship.—Our knowledge of the religious practices of the Teutons is very meagre, and it is difficult to say how far the stories told in the two Eddas formed part of a living religion, even among the Scandinavians. We have, however, various references to the sun-cult from other sources. Procopius[4] describes how in the island of Thule [*i.e.* Scandinavia] the sun does not appear for 40 days at the winter solstice. At the end of this period messengers are sent up into the mountains to watch for the rising sun. They send word to the people below that the sun will shine upon them in five days: thereupon begins 'the greatest feast of the inhabitants of Thule.'

The positive side of Cæsar's well-known description of Teutonic religion[5] is probably true. The Teutons may well have acknowledged as gods such things as are 'objects of sight and by whose power they are apparently benefited, the sun, moon, fire,' although these were not their only deities. Observances in connexion with the sun and moon are forbidden in Christian sermons and penitentiaries. St. Eligius (588–659) tells his hearers that no Christian person 'calls sun or moon lords.' In the 11th cent. the *Decrees* of Burchard of Worms mention pagan traditions:

'Id est ut elementa coleres, id est lunam aut solem, aut stellarum cursum, novam lunam, aut defectum lunae, ut tuis clamoribus aut auxilio splendorem ejus restaurere valeres.'[6]

From Canute's Anglo-Saxon Laws[7] we learn that 'heathenship is to honour heathen gods, and sun or moon, . . . etc.' We have perhaps a trace of sun-worship in *Landnámabók*:

'Thorkell Moon, the law speaker, was of the best conversation of any heathen man in Iceland. . . . He had himself carried out into the rays of the sun in his death-sickness and commended himself to that god which had made the sun.'[8]

We know little of Anglo-Saxon paganism. Bede, however, mentions a goddess Eostur, in whose honour April was called 'Eosturmonath.'[9] The word 'Eostur' is identical with the Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, and Lithuanian names for the goddess of the dawn, or *Morgenröthe*, probably the same being who is referred to in the Lithuanian and Lettish folk-songs as the daughter of the sun.

Throughout Teutonic territory the first and second days of the week are named after the sun and moon. Sunna is mentioned with Wodan and Frûa in the Merseberg charm. Sol is counted as one of the *asynjur*.[10]

It is noteworthy that Snorri (see above) distinguishes between the physical sun and moon and the beings who rule over them and guide their movements. This distinction has been partly preserved in the Old Norse language, where the word *tungl* (A.S. *tungol*, Goth. *tuggls*, 'a star')

[1] *Gylf.* xii. 15. [2] *Grimn.* xxxix. 38.
[3] *Vafþrúðnismál*, 46 f. [4] *De Bell. Goth.* ii. 15.
[5] *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 21. [6] *PL* cxl. 960.
[7] *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, ed. B. Thorpe, London, 1840, p. 162.
[8] i. 9. [9] *De Temp. Ratione*, 15.
[10] *Gylf.* xxxv. 45.

denotes the actual moon, and Máni the supernatural being who directs his course. The same idea seems to underlie many of the Lithuanian and Lettish folk-songs.

II. *Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian.*—**1. Mythology.**—Our chief knowledge of the solar mythology of the Baltic peoples is derived from Lettish and Lithuanian folk-songs, the most significant of which have been translated and analyzed by W. Mannhardt.[1] In these poems the changes which pass over the face of the sky, especially at dawn and sunset, are viewed as a drama, the chief actors being sun, moon, the daughter of the sun, the sons of God, Perkun, the thunder deity, 'God' and 'dear Maria'—the last two being as frankly pagan as the rest. Often, of course, the poems are confused and inconsistent, and it must be remembered that the terms 'sun,' 'moon,' etc., sometimes stand for the presiding deity, sometimes for the actual sun, etc., personified:

'The Sun, in the apple garden,
Weeps bitterly.
The *golden apple* hath fallen
From the apple tree.'[2]

(Here there is a clear distinction between the deity and the physical sun.)

'The Sun dances over the silver mountain,
Silver shoes she hath on her feet.'[3]

(In this case sun and sun-goddess appear to be one and the same.)

'God,' who was at war with the sun for three nights and three days, is evidently a sky-deity. The sky itself is described as a 'great water' or a mountain:

'The Sun with two gold horses
Rides up the rocky mountain,
Never heated, never weary,
Never resting on the way.'

(In this and in other songs we get the wide-spread myth of the horses of the sun.)

2. The sun.—The sun is called in many of the songs 'daughter of God,' in Lettish sources *saulesmaat*, 'mother of the sun.' She is married to the moon, who is, however, an unfaithful husband.

'It happened in the spring-time
That sun and moon did wed,
But the sun rose up early
And from her the moon fled.
The morning star was loved then
By the lone wandering moon,
Who with a sword was smitten
In deep wrath by Perkun.'[4]

The children of the sun and moon are the stars, who are called orphans, because they appear only at night after their mother, the sun, has abandoned them.

3. The sons of God.—The morning and the evening stars play an important part in the folk-songs, sometimes as a single being, sometimes in dual form. In Lithuanian sources they are called Auszrine and Wakarine[5] and are described as the handmaids of the sun.

'"Dear sun, daughter of God,
Who kindles your fire in the morning?
Who spreads your bed in the evening?" . . .
"Auszrine kindles the fire.
Wakarine spreads the bed."'[6]

In Lettish songs the morning and the evening stars are called the 'sons of God'—an epithet exactly equivalent to the Greek Dioskouroi. Like the Dioskouroi and the Aśvins of Indian mythology, the Lettish sons of God are connected with horses:

'Hither rode the dear sons of God
With steeds dripping with sweat.'[7]
'Folks say the moon has no steeds of his own.
The morning star and the evening star
They are the steeds of the moon.'[8]

[1] 'Die lett. Sonnenmythen,' *ZE* vii. 73–104, 209–244, 280–330.
[2] *Ib.* p. 91 ff. [3] *Ib.* [4] *Ib.*
[5] Nom. fem. of adjective derived from Lith. *auszra*, 'dawn,' *vakaras*, 'evening.'
[6] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.* [7] *Ib.* [8] *Ib.*

4. The daughter of the sun.—A favourite theme of the Lettish folk-songs is the wooing of the daughter of the sun by the son of God, the sun providing the dowry, often most unwillingly.

'Why are grey steeds standing
By the house-door of the sun?
They are the grey steeds of the son of God
Who woos the daughter of the sun.
The son of God stretches out his hand
Over the great water
To the daughter of the sun.
The sun cries bitterly
Standing on the mountain.
Why should she not weep?
She sorrows for the little maiden,
She sorrows for the dowry,
For the chest which is laden
With gold and silver gifts.'[1]

This is a good example of a sunrise or sunset myth. The daughter of the sun is the red glow which is in the sky when the planet Venus appears, but soon afterwards melts into darkness or the full light of day. The 'dowry' seems to be the rays of the sun which light up the edges of the clouds and the tops of trees and mountains.

'The sun prepareth the dowry herself, gilding the edge of the forest of pines.'[2]

The daughter of the sun is almost certainly identical with the goddess mentioned by Lasicius.[3] 'Ausca dea est radiorum solis, vel occumbentis vel supra horizontem ascendentis.'[4]

5. Dear Maria.—Mannhardt considers that the name Maria has been substituted for that of various pagan deities, but it is also possible that she stands for a particular goddess, perhaps the Perkuna tete (*i.e.* the aunt of Perkun) mentioned by Lasicius: 'Perkuna tete is the mother of thunder and lightning; who receives into a bath the weary and dusty sun, and sends her out again next day washed and shining.'[5] Maria also presides over a bath-chamber:

'Behind the mountains smoke is rising.
Who is it hath kindled fire?
Dear Maria heats the bathroom
Where bathe little orphan maidens [*i.e.* stars].'[6]
I ran down into the valley, into the bath-chamber of dear Maria.'[7]

According to Prætorius,[8] the Nadravians worshipped a star-god Szweigsdukks, who is evidently the Suaixtix worshipped by the Sudavians in Samland and equated with Sol in the *Constit. Synod. Evangel.* of 1530. Lucas David[9] calls Suaixtix the god of light and mentions him as one of the four deities who were invoked at agricultural festivals.[10] This deity seems to have been worshipped in both male and female form: 'They more commonly called this godhead Sweigsdunka, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided.'[11] Is this perhaps 'the maiden who weaves star-coverings,' mentioned in one of the folk-songs, and also the goddess whose place has been taken by dear Maria, and who was also known as the aunt of the thunder-god? The underlying idea may be that she is a goddess of fire, light, and heat.[12]

6. Cult.—We know little of the sun-cult of the Baltic peoples, although we know from Peter von Dusburg[13] and Erasmus Stella[14] that sun, moon, and stars were worshipped as important deities.

[1] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.* [2] *Ib.*
[3] *De Diis Samagitarum*, in *Respublica sive Status regni Poloniæ, Lituaniæ, Prussiæ, Livoniæ, etc.*, Leyden, 1627, ch. viii.
[4] Ausca, in Lith. Auszra, a word which is connected with Skr. *usas*, Gr. 'Ηώς, Lat. *Aurora*, O.E. *Eostur*, all of which (with the possible exception of Eostur) denote goddesses of the dawn.
[5] P. 300. [6] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.* [7] *Ib.*
[8] *Deliciæ Prussicæ*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871, p. 26.
[9] *Preussische Chronik*, ed. E. Hennig, Königsberg, 1812, i. 86.
[10] *Ib.* p. 91. [11] Prætorius, p. 26.
[12] See art. NATURE (Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian).
[13] *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, Leipzig, 1861–74, i. 53.
[14] *Ib.* iv. 294.

Prætorius[1] tells us that Bretkius (a historian of the 16th cent.) had observed that the Nadravians did honour to their gods by worshipping the different phases of the moon at various stages of their agricultural work.

In the course of his missionary journeys among the Lithuanians Jerome of Prague met with a people who worshipped the sun and who had a strange cult of a huge iron hammer. The priests justified this cult by telling Jerome that formerly the sun had been invisible for many months because a king had imprisoned it in a tower. 'The signs of the zodiac brought help to the sun, and broke the tower with the huge hammer, and restored the liberated sun to men, and therefore that which had been the instrument by which mortals had received light was worthy of veneration.'[2] According to Rendel Harris, the signs of the zodiac here stand for the Heavenly Twins or 'Sons of God': 'These and similar cases all arise out of the same theme, that the Sun (or the daughter of the Sun) has been carried off, or swallowed or imprisoned, and must be recovered.'[3] They use the hammer, the weapon of the thunder-god, because sacred twins are universally considered as children of the sky or thunder-god. In one of the Lettish songs they are described as 'workmen of Perkun.'

LITERATURE.—(I.) See works cited in art. NATURE (Teutonic). (II.) W. Mannhardt, 'Die lettischen Sonnenmythen,' *ZE* vii. [1875] 73–104, 209–244, 280–330; J. Rendel Harris, *The Cult of the Heavenly Twins*, Cambridge, 1906, *Boanerges*, do. 1913; see also art. OLD PRUSSIANS for further literature.

ENID WELSFORD.

SUN-DANCE.—See PHALLISM, ix. 823.

SUNDAY.—1. History of Sunday before the Christian era.—Only three times in the NT is there any reference to a religious observance of Sunday. St. Paul urged his converts at Corinth to put aside money for charity every Sunday (1 Co 16^2). Shortly after writing this he preached at a service held at Troas, which is mentioned as if it were a regular institution (Ac 20^7). Thirty years later, perhaps, the author of the Apocalypse wrote: 'I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day' (Rev 1^{10}). Though not quite conclusive, the evidence makes it probable that the observance of Sunday began among St. Paul's churches, which were predominantly Gentile. Now we cannot suppose that Gentile Christians, who were taught by St. Paul to protest against having the Sabbath imposed upon them, would yet accept from the Jews a whole system of reckoning time by weeks. It is important, therefore, to inquire how far the week was recognized in the Græco-Roman world independently of the Jews.

The week originated in Babylon, where it was invented for astrological reasons, but came to be used as a civil division of time. At first each month began with a fresh week, so that there were two or three odd days at the end. This was too inconvenient to last; and the weeks, emancipated from the month, ran on in an unbroken series. The gradual diffusion of Babylonian astrology carried a knowledge of the week into W. Asia, then into Egypt, and later still into E. Europe. The Israelites, when they invaded Canaan, found it established there and adopted it, as they did many other elements of Amorite culture; but the emphasis laid upon the Sabbath was their own.

In considering the recognition of the week in Europe it will be convenient to trace the evidence backwards. We may begin with Dio Cassius. Writing soon after A.D. 230, he says:

'The dedication of the days to the seven planets originated in Egypt, but has spread over all the world in comparatively

[1] *Deliciæ Prussicæ*, p. 18. [2] Æneas Sylvius in *ib.* iv. 239.
[3] *Boanerges*, p. 334.

recent times. The ancient Greeks, at any rate, knew nothing of it: but now it is established not only among all other peoples but even among the Romans, who already regard it as more or less a national tradition.'[1]

In the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr, writing for heathen readers, speaks of Saturday and Sunday (*τὴν Κρονικήν, τὴν Ἡλίου ἡμέραν*) as if they were familiar names to all.[2] Near the end of the 1st cent. Josephus boasts:

'Nor is there any city of the Greeks, nor any barbarian city, nor any nation, where our custom of resting on the seventh day has not reached.'[3]

That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; but it would have been meaningless unless division of time into weeks had been so familiar that any one might know which day was a Saturday. The belief that such was the case in the 1st cent. is supported by a picture which was found at Herculaneum, and therefore painted before A.D. 79. It contains the heads of the seven planetary deities in the order of their days—Saturn, Apollo, Diana, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus. Numerous references in Latin literature assure us that the Jewish Sabbath was well known as early as the Christian era. But only those are to our purpose which imply familiarity with the week. Such are the passages in Tibullus,[4] Ovid,[5] and Martial,[6] which mention the observance of Sabbaths by Romans. But more remarkable is the fact that Horace,[7] writing about 35 B.C., could represent an ordinary superstitious mother as making a vow for next Thursday (*Jovis dies*) and could describe how he himself attempted to escape from a bore by pleading that it was a special Saturday.[8] Neither the vow nor the plea would be intelligible without the week as a familiar background.

2. Sunday in the primitive Church.—It was therefore not only the Jewish proselytes among St. Paul's converts, but all his Greek and Roman disciples, who reckoned their time by weeks and therefore found a weekly day of worship natural. To such, again, as were Jews by race it seemed actually part of the order of nature. That is why, we may well suppose, St. Paul's protests against the observance of the Sabbath or of any fixed days[9] were but partially successful. The Sabbath, indeed, was given up by the churches which he founded. But, as a concession to his converts' habit of mind, another day of the week was chosen for worship. There could be no question what the choice should be, for the Lord's resurrection had given the first day of the week an unquestionable pre-eminence.

The name of this day which was current in the Roman Empire was 'the day of the sun' (*ἡ Ἡλίου ἡμέρα, dies solis*). The Jews, who avoided all use of heathen terms for either days or months, called it the first day of the week (*μία Σαββάτων*), and the earliest Christians followed their example. But a mere number was felt to lack distinction, and very soon an appropriate name was found, which contrasted alike with Sabbath and Sunday. The first day of the month, at least in Asia Minor, was usually called the 'Emperor's Day' (*Σεβαστή*).[10] Now the early Christians, partly by way of challenge, applied to their Lord many of the official terms which were consecrated to the emperor, the lord of the earth. So it was probably not without reference to the term *Σεβαστή* that they entitled the first day of the week *Κυριακή*, 'the Lord's Day.' So apt a name was rapidly established. The author of the Apocalypse, writing about A.D. 90, uses it without explanation. To Ignatius[11] (*c.* A.D. 110) it was a matter of course and a basis for argument. When the empire became Christian, the name entirely displaced 'the day of the sun' for all who spoke Greek or Latin. *Κυριακή* remains to this day in Greek; and in the Romance languages we find derivatives of *dies Dominica* — Dimanche, Domenica, and so on. But the Northern peoples, who in accepting the week from the heathen Romans had named the days after the corresponding Northern divinities, were more conservative. In England Sunday (A.S. *Sunnan Daeg*), in Germany *Sonntag*, in Sweden *Söndag*, have resisted all attempts to substitute either Lord's Day or Sabbath.

3. Observance in the Church before A.D. 321.—The records tell us very little about the manner in which Sunday was observed during the first three centuries, except that it was the day on which Christians assembled for worship. After St. Paul, who is quoted above, our first witness is the younger Pliny. His famous letter, written to the emperor Trajan in A.D. 104, tells how the Christians in his province of Bithynia held a service early in the morning 'on a fixed day' (*stato die*) and a common meal late in the evening.[1] Ignatius (A.D. 110) insists upon the contrast between the Lord's Day and the Sabbath.[2] A little later the *Teaching of the Apostles* ordains:

Κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ Κυρίου συναχθέντες κλάσατε ἄρτον καὶ εὐχαριστήσατε προεξομολογησάμενοι τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν, ὅπως καθαρὰ ἡ θυσία ὑμῶν ᾖ.[3]

A simple service, before or after the day's work, was the only observance possible for a community most of whose members occupied very humble stations, while many were slaves. As the Christians advanced in numbers and in social position, they were able to command the time for a long service. Justin Martyr, writing about A.D. 170, describes one which must have occupied at least two hours; for it includes readings from the Bible, sermon, prayers, and Eucharist.[4] And, since Melito, bishop of Sardis, just about the same time published a treatise *On the Lord's Day*, we may conclude that the services were being systematized.[5] How important they were considered is partly shown by Tertullian's attack upon cowardly bishops, who excused themselves for fleeing from persecution on the ground that in such times they could not assemble a congregation or celebrate the Sunday rites: 'Sed quomodo colligemus, inquis, quomodo Dominica sollemnia celebrabimus?'[6] From that time onward the position of Sunday as a holy day was unquestioned; and we need trace its history no further.

Just at that point we find the first suggestion of a Sunday holiday. Two sentences of Tertullian are worth quoting, both written while he was still a Catholic. In Sunday worship, he says, Christians avoid every trace of gloom, and even put aside business which might interfere with prayer ('differentes etiam negotia, ne quem diabolo locum demus').[7] And, when he tells the Christians that they have more festivals in the year than the heathen, he implies that Sunday, like a Roman festival, is more or less a holiday: 'Si quid et *carni indulgendum* est, habes, non dicam tuos dies tantum, sed et plures. Nam ethnicis semel annuus dies quisque *festus est, tibi octavus quisque dies*.'[8]

It is to be observed that he compares Sunday with heathen festivals rather than with the Sabbath. So long as Jewish Christianity remained a power, or the hostility of Jews a thing to be feared, Gentile Christians were anxious to repudiate any connexion between the Sabbath and Sunday. The feeling was obviously strong when Ignatius wrote *μηκέτι σαββατίζοντες ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζῶντες*,[9] and when the author of the *Epistle of Barnabas* described Sunday as *ἄλλου κόσμου ἀρχήν*.[10] Justin Martyr shows its influence when he derives the sanctity of Sunday from the creation and the Resurrection. Although Jewish Christianity disappeared from the West before the end of the 2nd cent., there is plenty of evidence that some of its traditions persisted in the Eastern Church for two hundred

1 *Hist. Rom.* xxxvii. 18.
2 *C. Apion.* ii. 40.
3 *Ars Amat.* i. 415.
4 *Sat.* II. iii. 290.
5 *Ib.* I. ix. 69.
6 IV. iv. 7.
7 Ro 14^5, Gal 4^{10}, Col 2^{16}.
8 *Apol.* i. 67.
9 I. iii. 18.
10 A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., London, 1910, pp. 361–366.
11 *Ad Magn.* 9.

1 *Epp. ad Traj.* 96.
2 *Ad Magn.* 9.
3 *Didache*, xiv.
4 *Apol.* i. 67.
5 Eusebius, *HE* iv. 26.
6 Tert. *de Fuga in Persecutione*, 14.
7 *De Orat.* 18(23).
8 *De Idol.* 14.
9 *Ad Magn.* 9.
10 *Ep. Barn.* 15.

years more. The *Apostolic Constitutions*,[1] *e.g.*, recognized a parallel observance of the Sabbath and Sunday. And the Council of Laodicea (363), while condemning a Judaizing observance of the Sabbath, marked it as a festival and a day of worship. Different as was the East from the West, they were in constant communication; and the maintenance of the Sabbath in the East was a reason for keeping Sunday clear of Sabbatarianism in the West. Egypt, intermediate between East and West, was Western in its observance of Sunday. Accordingly Clement of Alexandria (*c.* 200) says that the Lord's Day is celebrated by putting away evil thoughts and acquiring true knowledge;[2] and Origen (*c.* 240) apologizes for the common observance of Sunday as a concession to the feelings of the weaker brethren. They, 'being either unable or unwilling to keep every day in this manner, require some sensible memorials to prevent spiritual things from passing altogether away from their minds.'[3]

A hundred years later Athanasius wrote to much the same effect: 'We keep no Sabbath day (but) we keep the Lord's Day as a memorial of the beginning of the second new creation.'[4]

St. Jerome follows in the same line. He tells how his party of recluses at Bethlehem attended Church services on Sunday, but otherwise pursued their usual occupations.[5] St. Augustine, while insisting upon the festal character of Sunday—'Dies tamen Dominicus non Judaeis sed Christianis resurrectione Domini declaratus est, et ex illo habere coepit festivitatem suam'[6]—pronounces that the Fourth Commandment is in no literal sense binding upon Christians. His words seem framed to exclude the idea of any transference of obligation from the Sabbath to Sunday.

4. Movement in favour of a day of rest.—While the leaders of the Church gave no sanction to the idea that Sunday was the heir of the Sabbath, that idea was all the time gaining power among the mass of the Christian people in the West. Several causes combined to favour its growth. As the passage quoted above from Tertullian indicates, the numerous heathen festivals constantly suggested that a holy day should be a day of rest. Familiarity with the OT, whose authority was unchallenged, insensibly turned men's thoughts in the direction of Sabbatarianism. Increasing leisure and power enabled many Christians to command a day of rest. Greater stress was laid, as time went on, upon the duty of attendance at the Church services, which in many cases involved the abandonment of regular work. How steadily popular opinion was moving in the direction of a Sunday holiday may be inferred from a resolution passed in 305 by the Council of Illiberis in Spain, making the observance of the Lord's Day compulsory and ordaining that failure to attend the services shall be punished with excommunication. The Sabbatarian movement, therefore, like that for the worship of the saints, came from below. Theologians long resisted it, but at last yielded, and sought for reasons to justify a practice which the people had adopted. Among these we do not usually find either the duty of observing the Fourth Commandment in the spirit or the social need (recognized in Deuteronomy) of a day for rest and recreation. The reasons alleged are of a mystical and symbolical character, such as would naturally suggest themselves to theologians in difficulties. And yet the very contrasts which they draw between the Sabbath and the Lord's Day show the influence of the popular pressure, and prepare the way for the identification of the two which was to come in the 9th century.

St. Ambrose, *e.g.*, describes how the first day has succeeded to the dignity which formerly belonged to the seventh: 'Ubi enim Dominica dies coepit praecellere, qua Dominus resurrexit; Sabbatum, quod primum erat, secundum haberi coepit a primo. *Prima enim requies* cessavit, *secunda* successit.'[7] St. Chrysostom (*c.* 390) goes further. Commenting on 1 Co 16[1], he says that the first day of the week was well chosen for acts of charity, ὅτι καὶ ἀνεσιν ἔχει καὶ πόνων ἀτέλειαν. He thus actually carries back the Sunday rest into the year 57. And, when he writes about Ro 14[5], he asserts that 'esteemeth every day alike' has reference only to fasting. The reason of so strange a misconception is doubtless that he regards the observance of Sunday as a matter of course. Although, therefore, he generally contrasts Sunday and Sabbath in the manner of his time, it is not surprising to find him once coming very near to the later Sabbatarian view. In the 10th *Homily* on Gn 1 he writes: 'God from the first teaches us symbolically to set apart one whole day in the week and devote it to spiritual activities.'

Examples might be given from other writers. But these are enough to indicate the double process which was going on. While the official position of the Church was hostile to Sabbatarianism, the writers could not altogether resist the influence of popular opinion which was steadily moving towards it.

5. Constantine's decree of A.D. 321.—Parallel to the Christian movement in favour of a Sunday rest there seems to have been another, which was quite independent. The matter is obscure, and we must rely in part upon conjecture. As the social and industrial organization of the empire advanced under the Pax Romana, the sporadic festivals of the ancient calendar became more and more inconvenient. The efficiency of labour depends largely upon recreation; but holidays at irregular intervals are not effectual for recreation, and interfere sadly with organization. We can imagine that the heathen often reflected upon the contrast, to which Tertullian points, between the regular weekly festival of the Christians and their own uncertain celebrations; and that they wished that they could exchange their inconvenient holidays for a regular rest on 'the day of the sun.' Some such process of thought in the popular mind is required to explain the readiness with which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree. Though he was doubtless influenced mainly by the wishes of his Christian supporters, it was not as 'the Lord's Day' but as 'the venerable day of the sun' that he described the new public holiday:

'Omnes judices urbanaeque plebes et cunctarum artium officia venerabili die Solis quiescant. Ruri tamen positi agrorum culturae libere licenterque inserviant, quoniam frequenter evenit ut non aptius alio die frumenta sulcis aut vineae scrobibus mandentur, ne occasione momenti pereat commoditas coelesti provisione concessa.'[1]

There has been much speculation about Constantine's motives. Eusebius would persuade us that they were wholly religious,[2] others that social and political considerations determined his action; but we have not sufficient evidence to decide the question. One thing is certain. The edict of A.D. 321 marks an epoch in the history of Sunday. It was the parent of a double series of legal enactments and conciliar decrees which exercised a great influence—both for good and for evil—upon the life of all Europe during many centuries.

6. Later imperial decrees.—With regard to the imperial decrees, it is important to remember that they affected an ever-decreasing area. The laws of Theodosius the Great, which forbade all litigation and the spectacles of the theatre and the circus on the 'dies Solis quem Dominicum rite dixere majores' (386), affected mankind from Spain to Mesopotamia. But its reiteration by Leo and Anthemius (469) was addressed only to Turkey, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. The chief importance of those later decrees is that, enshrined in Justinian's Code, they set up a standard for the new nations which gradually rose out of the flood of barbarian invasion.

7. Decrees of Church Councils (300–600).—On the other hand, the decrees of Church Councils had an immediate influence not only in the areas which they represented but also to some extent throughout the former Roman Empire, for the Church maintained a large degree of unity. It is therefore worth while to record not only how the Council of Laodicea (363), ordering men to work on the Sabbath, bade them τὴν Κυριακὴν προτιμῶντες, εἴ γε δύναιντο, σχολάζειν ὡς χριστιανοί, but also how the Council of Orleans (538), while protesting

[1] vii. 23, 36.
[2] *Strom.* vii. 12.
[3] *C. Celsum*, viii. 22 f.
[4] *De Sabbat. et Circumcis.* 4.
[5] *Ep.* cviii. 20.
[6] *Ep. ad Jan.* 22 f.
[7] *In Ps.* 47.

[1] *Cod. Just.* bk. iii. tit. xii. 3.
[2] *Vita Const.* iv. 18–21.

against an excessive Sabbatarianism, forbade all field work under pain of censure; and the Council of Macon (585) laid down that the Lord's Day 'is the day of perpetual rest, which is suggested to us by the type of the seventh day in the law and the prophets,' and ordered a complete cessation of all kinds of business. How far the movement had gone by the end of the 6th cent. is shown by a letter of Gregory the Great[1] (pope 590–604) protesting against the prohibition of baths on Sunday.

8. Sabbatarian movement (600–800).—It was a right instinct which led the people to demand, and emperors and councils to grant, that Sunday should be a day of rest as well as of worship. Up to the end of the 6th cent. the resultant changes in law and custom, in spite of some extravagances, were on the whole beneficial. But in the darkness of the next two centuries other influences came into play. The ceaseless wars and disorders which lowered the standard of civilization both in the Eastern Empire and in Western Europe threw all initiative into the hands of military or ecclesiastical rulers. Changes were no longer made in response to the people's demand, but were imposed upon them by rulers who were guided not by a sense of practical need but by monkish theory. Thus an edict[2] of Clotaire III. (*c.* 660) forbids servile labour on Sunday.

'Quia hoc lex prohibet et sacra scriptura in omnibus contradicit.'

Among the laws of Ine, king of Wessex (*c.* 690), we find the following:

'If a "theowman" work on Sunday by his lord's command, let him be free; and let the lord pay xxx shillings as "wite." But if the "theow" work without his knowledge, let him suffer in his hide, or in "hide-gild." But if a freeman work on that day without his lord's command, let him forfeit his freedom, or sixty shillings: and be a priest doubly liable.'[3]

9. The Christian Sabbath from 800 to 1500.—(*a*) *Decrees of rulers and councils.*—Though the decrees of the 7th and 8th centuries were obviously part of a Sabbatarian movement, the term 'Sabbath' was not applied to Sunday until Alcuin had written:

'Cujus observationem mos Christianus ad diem dominicum competentius transtulit.'[4]

Under his inspiration the new feeling, long fluid in society, was crystallized in Charlemagne's decree of A.D. 789, which forbade all ordinary labour on Sunday as a breach of the Fourth Commandment. In particular it forbade agricultural labour, which Constantine had expressly permitted, and the holding of markets, which Constantine had appointed in order to encourage country people to attend the church services: 'Provisione pietatis suae nundinas die solis perpeti anno constituit.'[5] From that time onward the identification of Sunday with the Sabbath was taken for granted, and from that principle deductions of increasing severity were drawn by princes and ecclesiastics.

Among the decrees which were issued by princes for their own dominions we may mention that of the emperor Leo (*c.* 900) which forbade agricultural work in the Eastern Empire, and that of Edgar the Peaceable (A.D. 958) which extended the Lord's Day from 3 p.m. on Saturday to Monday's dawn. More interesting, because of wider influence, are the pronouncements of leading churchmen. In the 12th cent., *e.g.*, Bernard of Clairvaux maintained that the Fourth Commandment required the Sabbatical observance not only of Sundays but also of holy days. In the 13th cent. Thomas Aquinas lent his immense authority to the same principle: 'Sabbatum . . . mutatur in diem dominicam . . . Similiter aliis solennitatibus veteris legis novae solennitates succedunt.'[6] In the 15th cent. Tostatus, bishop of Avila, a learned canonist, laid down the law of the Christian Sabbath with a fullness of detail which rivals that of the Pharisees. And the precepts of the learned were enforced and illustrated for the multitude by stories of miraculous judgments—ranging from toothache to sudden death—which had fallen upon those who profaned Sunday or Saint's Day by labour.[1]

For five hundred years after Charlemagne Church Councils were much occupied with questions of Sunday observance. The following examples may perhaps be sufficient for the purpose of illustration:

A.D. 829—The Council of Paris re-enacts the prohibition of ploughing, marketing, and law business on Sunday.[2]

853—A Synod at Rome forbids markets and field labour.[3]

1009—A Council at Hexham (? Eingthamense) forbids markets, fairs, hunting, and ordinary labour.[4]

1031—The Council of Bourges forbids travelling, except in cases of necessity or charity.[4]

1050—The Council of Coyac (in Spain) forbids all 'servile work' and all travelling.[4]

1212—The Council of Pamiers commands all parishioners to hear *the whole* of the mass and preaching.[4]

1244—The Synod of Lyons found it necessary to limit the number of holy days, whose increase was causing various abuses.[5]

1322—The Synod of Valladolid ordained 'quod nullus in diebus Dominicis et Festivis agros colere audeat, aut manualia artificia exercere praesumat, nisi urgente necessitate, vel evidentis pietatis causa.'[4]

(*b*) *How Sunday was observed.*—What was the effect of all these exhortations? The constant reiteration of the same orders is general evidence that they had not been obeyed. But particular evidence is not lacking. In 1226, *e.g.*, the prior of Walsingham, who held a market on Saturday and Sunday, granted half the profits to Sir William de Clare in exchange for other rights.[6] And the records tell not only of journeys which emperors and kings made on Sunday, but also of three emperors who were crowned in St. Peter's at Rome on that day, causing thereby an immense amount of labour.[7] Sunday, therefore, was not generally observed with anything like the strictness which Church authorities enjoined. Yet it was to a large extent observed as a holiday and a day of worship. How were the hours of leisure spent? In all the decrees of Councils and pronouncements of individuals, down to the 15th cent., there is no prohibition of any recreation except dancing, the singing of ribald songs, theatrical performances, and races in the circus.[8] The last two prohibitions of the emperor Leo soon became needless, for theatre and circus ceased to exist. So from 900 till the Reformation there was practically no limit set to the amusements of the people on Sunday. What use was made of that liberty we may infer partly from the decrees of Councils in the 16th cent. and partly from the Puritan reaction which soon began in Protestant countries.

10. The Roman Catholic Sunday in the 16th century.—The Council of Cologne[9] (1536) decrees:

'Cupimus his diebus prohiberi nundinas, claudi cauponas, vitari comissationes, ebrietates, sumptus, lites, lusus improbos, choreas plenas insaniis, colloquia prava, cantilenas turpes, breviter omnem luxum.'

The Council of Milan (1573) complains that Sunday is commonly profaned by markets, open shops, hawking, dicing, sports, conjuring, and theatrical performances. The Council of Rheims (1583) decrees:

'Nemo lusibus et choreis det operam. Venditiones quarumcunque rerum, his exceptis quae ad divinum cultum et victum necessarium pertinent, nundinae publicae, mercatus et auctiones, ne fiant diebus festis. Ludos etiam theatrales, etiam praetextu consuetudinis, prohibemus.'

The Council of Narbonne (1609) protests against the profanation of Sunday by dancing, singing,

1 *Ep.* xiii. 1.
2 Heylin, *Hist. of the Sabbath*, ii. 137.
3 A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, Oxford, 1869–78, iii. 215. The resolution of the Council of Cloveshoo (747), which is sometimes quoted, applies only to monasteries.
4 *Hom.* 18, *post Pentec.*
5 J. Gruter, *Inscriptiones antiquae*, Amsterdam, 1707, clxiv. 2.
6 *Summa*, II. i. qu. ciii. art. 3.

1 Concil. Parisiense, *a.* 50; H. Spelman, *Concilia*, London, 1739–64; i. 128; *Miracles de St. Benoit*, vi. 10, viii. 32.
2 Heylin, ii. 5, § 7.
3 *Ib.* ii. 5, § 7.
4 Spelman, *op. cit.*
5 *De Consecratione distinct.* iii. cap. 1.
6 F. Blomefield, *Topographical Hist. of Norfolk*, London, 1805–10, ix. 276.
7 Heylin, ii. 5, § 9.
8 *Ib.* ii. 5, § 10.
9 See P. Labbe and G. Cossartius, *Sacrosancta Concilia*, Paris, 1670–72.

hunting, hawking, markets, public feasts, and revelling, and allows none but travellers to be served in the inns.

These quotations prove that the Counter-Reformation led the authorities of the countries which remained Roman Catholic to recognize a duty with regard not only to Sunday labour but also to Sunday recreations. They seriously endeavoured to check the licence which had been allowed for many ages and had doubtless increased with the advance of material prosperity in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is difficult to estimate how far they succeeded in reforming the manners of the people. Peter Heylin, sub-dean of Westminster, whose *History of the Sabbath* is the most valuable book on the subject, is an important witness, for he travelled on the Continent very soon after the close of the 16th century. He sums up his impressions in these words:

'Nor is their discipline so severe as their Canons neither. So that the Lord's Day there, for ought I could observe, when I was amongst them, is solemnised after the same manner as with us in England: repairing to the Church, both at Masse and Vespers, riding abroad or walking forth to take the ayre, or otherwise to refresh themselves, and following their honest pleasures, at such leisure times as are not destinate to the publick meetings: the people not being barred from travelling about their lawful business, as occasion is, so they reserve sometime for their devotions in the publike.'[1]

But Heylin, as an advocate, looks only on the fair side; and undoubtedly (as the decrees of the Councils imply) there were many regions in which Sunday was spoiled both by needless labours and by the coarsest amusements.

11. The Protestant Sunday in the 16th century.—The Reformers of the 16th cent. were in a difficult position, for, although they regarded both Gn 2 and Ex 20 as historical, they could not rest the institution of Sunday on either of the traditional grounds. They could not identify it with the Jewish Sabbath; nor could they admit that an ecclesiastical rule of observance, however venerable, was of unchangeable validity. Yet both feeling and reason urged them to maintain its obligation. Luther, Calvin, and the various catechisms and confessions put forward much the same view—to this effect:

The Fourth Commandment was abrogated by the New Testament: and ideally there should be no distinction between days. But human nature requires a day of rest from labour: the soul demands leisure for joint worship: therefore a day must be fixed for all. We cannot do better than follow the tradition which sets apart the first day of the week.[2]

Sound as that argument was, it had an unfortunate effect upon the minds of a generation who had been trained to rest upon absolute law and were not ready to accept reason in its place. To a vast number of Protestants Sunday appeared to have lost its authority; and there was a decided slackening of its observance. Heylin thus describes the state of things in the latter part of the century:

'There was no restraint on Sundays in the afternoone, from any kind of servile work, or dayly labours; but that men might and did apply themselves to their severall businesses, as on other days. As for the greater townes, there is scarce any of them, wherein there are not Faires and Markets (Kirk Masses, as they used to call them) upon the Sunday: and those as much frequented in the afternoone as were the Churches in the forenoone. . . . So that in generall the Lord's day is no otherwise observed with them . . . than an half holiday is with us. . . . For recreations, last of all, there is no question to be made, but that where working is permitted, and most kinde of businesse, a man may lawfully enjoy himselfe and his honest pleasures; and without danger of offence pursue those pastimes by which the mind may be refreshed and the spirits quickened.'[3]

This is true, he says, of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and part of Poland.

In England, where religious changes were far less violent, the observance of Sunday in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth was considerably stricter.

Both *The Institution of a Christian Man* (1537) and the queen's *Injunctions* (1558) lay down excellent principles. And yet one of the *Homilies*, published in 1563, sorrowfully confesses: 'The Lord was more dishonoured and the Devill better served on Sunday than upon all the dayes in the weeke besides.' King James's proclamation of 7th May 1603 is a significant confirmation of this complaint: Having been informed 'that there had been in former times a great neglect in keeping the Sabbath day,' he ordains 'that no Bearebaiting, Bull-baiting, Enterludes, common Playes, or other like disordered or unlawful Exercises or Pastimes be frequented, kept, or used at any time hereafter upon any Sabbath day.' And this was not because James was accustomed to great strictness in Scotland, where up to 1600 observance was on the whole less precise than in England. The early Calvinists were not Sabbatarians, and John Knox himself played bowls on Sunday.

12. The 17th and 18th centuries.—(*a*) *England.*—Till the reign of James I., as we have seen, England and Scotland kept pace with the movements on the Continent. But throughout the 17th cent. our island was the scene of a dramatic struggle which had no parallel elsewhere. The extreme Protestant type of mind has a natural affinity to the OT, and the Calvinists and other Puritan sects early felt the attraction. By a process somewhat like that which took place in the 5th and 6th centuries, they turned towards the Jewish Sabbath, and their steps were hastened by repulsion from the scandals of the 16th cent. Sunday. The movement, of which the early stages are obscure, came to a head in the publication of a remarkable book.

Nicholas Bownd, a Suffolk clergyman, in his *Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, or the *True Doctrine of the Sabbath* (1595), boldly and crudely claimed for Sunday the authority and the observances of the Jewish Sabbath and maintained that they should be enforced by the State. The book had an immense vogue. It was translated and circulated on the Continent, where it exercised much influence. In England, accepted as an inspiration by some and as a challenge by others, it gave rise to a literary controversy which lasted for a hundred years. The first reply to it was James I.'s *Book of Sports*[1] (1618), which proclaimed liberty for the people to enjoy their traditional pastimes on Sunday except bull- and bear-baiting. This was followed by the Sunday Observance Act (1625), which forbade men to go outside their own parishes in search of amusement on Sunday. The *Book of Sports* was republished by Charles I. in 1633, with a special admonition to justices of the peace: 'Look to it, both that all disorders there may be prevented and punished, and that all neighbourhood and freedom, with manlike and lawful exercises, be used.'

In 1635 Francis White, bishop of Ely, published an official defence of this view; and in 1638 Heylin supported it with *The History of the Sabbath*, a book which shows much ability and learning. The controversy was continued, and 120 books on the subject were published in the next hundred years. Other weapons were used besides the pen. In 1643 Parliament ordered the *Book of Sports* to be burned by the hangman and imposed the Puritan Sabbath upon the ever-increasing area which their troops commanded. In 1648 they formally adopted the *Westminster Confession* and the *Longer* and the *Shorter Catechisms*. One quotation from the last-named must suffice.

'Q. 60. How is the Sabbath to be sanctified?—A. The Sabbath is to be sanctified by a holy resting all that day, even from such worldly employments and recreations as are lawful on other days; and spending the whole time in the public and private exercises of God's worship, except so much as is to be taken up in the works of necessity and mercy.'

By successive enactments (1644, 1650, 1656) the same Parliament proscribed every kind of Sunday recreation, even 'vainly and profanely' walking for pleasure. At the Restoration the pendulum swung the other way. The court, the cavaliers, and the High Church clergy led the way in a violent reaction; and the return of the Prayer-book service on Sunday morning was accompanied by trading, open theatres, and ostentatious frivolity

[1] Vol. ii. p. 191.

[2] See Luther's *Larger Catechism*, the *Augsburg Confession*, the (Calvinist) *Heidelberg Catechism*, the *Helvetic Confession*, Calvin's *Institutes*.

[3] ii. 6, § 9.

[1] The full title of this work is *The Kings Majesties Declaration to his Subjects concerning Lawfull Sports to be Used*, London, 1618.

in the afternoon and evening. To what lengths the court went may be learned from Macaulay's description of Charles II.'s last Sunday night. There were many protests; and the battle of the books continued, Bishop Pearson, John Owen, and Richard Baxter being among the combatants. In 1677 a compromise was effected. The Sunday Observance Act regulated trade, labour, and travelling in a reasonable way, making ample allowance for 'works of necessity.' At the same time the Sunday Observance Act of 1625 was revived and came to be recognized as the standard by which amusements were to be regulated. Both acts were observed with varying degrees of strictness at different times and in different places. But it is no little tribute to their reasonableness that both remained in force until the year 1871, though they were modified in some details; *e.g.*, in 1699 forty watermen were allowed to ply on the Thames, in 1710 coaches and chairs received permission to stand for hire, and in 1794 bakers to sell bread at certain hours. From the Revolution to the death of Queen Anne a higher standard prevailed, both of attendance at church and of obedience to the law. Under the Georges, though no change was made in the law, and though the same literary controversy continued, there was a steady decline in both respects. About 1780 the Evangelical Revival, following the movement led by the Wesleys, produced a considerable change in opinion and observance. How much need there was for improvement may be inferred from three actions of Bishop Porteous, who was a leader of the new school. He supported the institution of Sunday Schools, which began in 1780 and soon spread over the country. He persuaded the Prince of Wales to transfer the meetings of his rowdy 'Sunday Club' to a week day. And he drew up the Sunday Observance Act of 1781, which enacts that any place of public entertainment or debate where a charge is made for admission may be deemed a disorderly house. Passed in order to check bear-baiting and infidel propaganda, this act has been used of late to impede Sunday concerts and lectures to working-men.[1] For many years it was undoubtedly of great value, helping to restore the credit of Sunday in the public eye. But, when the rapid growth of large towns, due to the industrial revolution, presented new problems, this law combined with the restrictions of travelling to cause mischief. The mass of the industrial population, cooped up in towns which were almost destitute of churches, had no meeting-place but the street or the public-house. This evil became serious in the latter part of the 18th cent., but its full development was not seen till the 19th.

(*b*) *Scotland.*—Scotland very early in the 17th cent. adopted the theory of the 'Christian Sabbath' and applied it to social life with the ruthless logic which is characteristic of Calvinism. The *Westminster Confession* was adopted by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1647, before Parliament had passed it; and it has remained the formal standard of faith to the present day. So long as it was enforced by public opinion—*i.e.* till about 1870—the Scottish Sunday was observed with amazing rigour. Not only were ordinary recreations disallowed; a ban was put even upon books and music, except such as were recognized as religious in the narrow sense. No recreation remained but whisky-drinking, and a great part of the drunkenness which is still common in Scotland may be traced to an unwise Sabbatarianism. In parts of the Highlands and the Islands the old rigour remains; but in the greater part of the country, as will be explained below, the last fifty years have witnessed a great change.

(*c*) *America.*—The American colonies differed in their practice. The more southerly States, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, were inclined to English views of Sunday. The New England States, founded by Puritans, kept very close to the Scottish standard; but their coast towns were influenced by English practice, and their Western border by the practical necessities imposed by danger from their Indian neighbours.

(*d*) *Protestant Europe.*—Nicholas Bownd's book was translated into several Continental languages and exercised a considerable influence. In Holland and Switzerland a strong Sabbatarian party grew up; and in Protestant Germany his doctrine found rigorous advocates. But on the whole the Sabbatarians failed; and the observance of Sunday, especially in Germany, fell much below the standard in England. Sunday labour was very common, and Sunday amusements were very coarse.

(*e*) *Roman Catholic Europe.*—In Roman Catholic countries, during the same centuries, Sunday was so much eclipsed by the Saints' Days that it ceased to be observed with any kind of strictness. While the Saints' Days were real holidays, labour on Sunday was the rule rather than the exception. Till near the end of the 18th cent. the priesthood were powerful enough to secure a general attendance at mass; but the rest of the day was usually given to ordinary occupations. If in Spain Sunday was more a day of rest than in France or Italy, this was because it was the day set apart for bull-fights.

13. From the French Revolution to 1848.—The French Revolution marks an epoch in the history of Sunday observance. Its new calendar, with a week of ten days, though ephemeral and rather absurd, was a practical challenge to tradition, whose effects were permanent. The questions which it raised frightened some men into reaction, but excited others to free speculation. And it gave prominence to one fact, which no Government could afford to ignore for long. In every country there was an increasing number of citizens who did not acknowledge the Christian sanctions for Sunday, for whom, therefore, any rules for Sunday observance must rest on social rather than religious grounds. The recognition of this fact gradually affected the administration of the existing laws; and perhaps it may account for the complete absence of legislation between 1780 and 1850. In England the repulsion caused by the Revolution combined with the Evangelical Revival to render Sunday observance much stricter. The laws of 1677 and 1781 were rather rigidly enforced, and public opinion (among the minority who had votes for Parliament) was on the whole Sabbatarian. For the middle class and for all the people in country districts the movement was largely beneficial. The churches were filled; the sense of duty was strengthened; and habits of reflexion were induced. On the other hand, for the growing multitudes in the great towns the restrictions imposed by law became ever more cruel. Neglected by the Church, they had few places of worship and little will to enter them. They wanted means of getting into the country and opportunities of reasonable recreation in the town; but these were denied them, and nothing was left but the public-house. It was not till about 1850 that their needs were recognized. The active controversy which was carried on about Sunday concerned only the reasons for observing it. Several distinguished writers took part in the discussion, but they did little more than reproduce the well-worn arguments of the 17th cent. on either side.

[1] The present writer was threatened with prosecution in 1897 for lecturing to a Sunday Society in Bristol.

In France, though Napoleon re-established the Church, the hold of Sunday upon the public mind could not be restored. It remained to a large extent a day of trade and of labour, as well as of social amusement. In Spain and Italy there was no striking change. In Germany, which had been penetrated with French ideas, there was a marked decline. If we may judge by the books which were published there between 1780 and 1848, public opinion was averse to strictness based on religious grounds and not yet alive to the social reasons in favour of a day of rest. Sunday observance therefore, resting mainly upon tradition, naturally failed to maintain its hold.

The United States continued the division of opinion which had existed among the colonies of N. America. New England and the Western States, which were gradually peopled by emigrants from New England, remained Sabbatarian, while the Southern States, led by the Quakers of Pennsylvania, generally adopted the more liberal view. Between 1820 and 1850 many books were published on both sides, but no legislation resulted.

14. From 1848 to 1914.—From 1848, the 'year of revolution,' we may date a new phase of the Sunday controversy. Suddenly the masses of the people, especially in manufacturing towns, acquired a new consciousness and began to be regarded with a new interest. The consequences were not long in making themselves felt. Hitherto it may be said that the churches and the legislatures had, on the whole, worked in harmony. Since 1848 there has been a gradual divergence. For, while the churches were slow to admit the possibility of change, the legislatures, more and more influenced by popular opinion, tended to favour relaxations which were supposed to be required by new social conditions. At the same time an agitation began in some countries in favour of limiting the Sunday labour which vast numbers felt to be oppressive. These two elements were mixed in very different proportions in different countries.

(*a*) *England.*—In England, where Sunday labour was already severely limited, the main question was that of relaxation. In 1851 a lively controversy arose about two points. Should railway travelling be allowed on Sunday? And should the new Crystal Palace be open to the public on Sunday afternoon? The instances could not have been better chosen, for their discussion involved all the main principles which were at stake. Twenty years passed before any legislative result came of the debate. In 1871 an Act was passed requiring the consent in writing of the chief officer of a police district, or of two magistrates, before a prosecution for Sunday trading could be instituted under the Act of 1677. Since then the Sunday Observance Act has been a dead letter. And an Act of 1875 has very much limited the application of the Act of 1781. That did not end the debate. In 1875 the Sunday League was formed to advocate the opening of museums and picture galleries and other means of rational recreation on Sundays. In spite of several societies started in opposition, the Sunday League has gradually effected a great and beneficial change.

But the real crux of the situation is connected with travelling. Nothing has done so much to alter the habits of the people as the rapid increase in means of communication. The railway, the steamer, the tramcar, and the motor-car have successively helped to empty the towns on Sunday. They have answered a real need; for the strain of modern life has created a new craving for fresh air and change of scene, which finds satisfaction in the week-end habit of the richer folk and in the excursion train for the poorer. The desire for such recreation is natural and wholesome. At the same time it is responsible for two serious evils. (1) Those who spend Sunday away from home rarely devote any part of it to worship, and those who remain at home feel themselves thereby excused from attendance at church. Consequently the number of those who enter any place of worship on Sunday forms an increasingly small percentage of the population. (2) Every added facility for travel on Sunday involves additional labour on the part of a large class of workers. The railways, the tramways, the restaurants, the bands, and the news agencies are so heavily tasked on Sunday that few of their employees enjoy anything like a day of rest.

Intent upon claiming what they considered their right to recreation and convenience, the mass of the people did not see what was involved in its satisfaction. Shops were increasingly opened, trains ran in ever-increasing numbers, and a large number of subsidiary industries were obliged to join the movement. Then contractors who were in a hurry took to Sunday work; and there was a real danger that the industrial population might lose their day of rest. About the beginning of the 20th cent. the trade unions and other bodies began to realize the danger; shop-assistants began to protest; and so a check was imposed upon the movement. In the first year (1914–15) of the Great War it seemed as if the national necessity might obliterate Sunday rest. Munition factories and many others were opened on Sunday, and double pay was offered for work on that day. But the result was uniformly a diminished output. Many of those who worked on Sunday for double pay spent the extra money in drink on Monday and Tuesday; and such as conscientiously toiled all seven days did so with rapidly failing energy. After two years Sunday work was generally abandoned; and it may be hoped that the nation has taken the lesson to heart.

(*b*) *The Continent.*—On the Continent during the latter half of the 19th cent. the same causes produced even more marked effects. In the eighties and nineties a stranger could hardly tell from the aspect of the towns whether the day was Sunday or not. But at last even the 'anti-clerical' Governments, which had looked on complacently at a change which diminished religious observance, became aware that it was causing immense social mischief; while on behalf of the overstrained workers urgent claims were made for a legal day of rest. Between the years 1895 and 1910 laws were passed, in almost every country of Europe, which were intended to secure a weekly holiday for every working-man.[1] Even in France, where the secularist influences were strongest, it was judged necessary to insist upon Sunday as the normal day of rest, all substitutes in special cases being regarded as exceptional. The general effect of this movement was a marked change in the aspect of the towns. In the year 1913 no factories were working on Sundays, and few shops were opened. Thus in a large measure Sunday observance has been restored, but with a difference. It is now popularly regarded, not primarily as a response to the religious need of worship, still less as obedience to a divine command, but as the condition of wholesome life for the labouring man.

15. The present state of the question.—The foregoing narrative should help us to discern the principles upon which Sunday observance ought to be based, and perhaps to determine the proper mode of observance, and the means by which it may rightly be enforced or encouraged.

Why is Sunday to be observed? It is easier for us to answer this question than it was for the theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, and that for two reasons. Recent investigations into early Church history, of which the results are summarized above, have removed some prejudices which hampered our ancestors. We now know how gradually the observance of Sunday developed and how late was the theory which connected it with the Sabbath. And the modern study of the

[1] See the return made to the House of Lords on the subject in 1911.

OT has removed a difficulty which they could never fully meet. So long as the story of the creation in Gn 1 and 2 and the account of the giving of the Law on Mt. Sinai were regarded as historical, the question had to be faced: How can a divine command, directly given to men, be abrogated? The answer for us is plain: No such commands were ever given, and the stories which record them are legends. The Sabbath was made for man; and, under the guidance of Providence, it was made by man. Sunday, in its turn, was made by man and for man. Man, therefore, is lord both of the Sabbath and of Sunday. It is from the experience of men, both as individuals and in societies, that the reasons must be drawn which determine the manner in which Sunday is to be observed.

(*a*) *The new reasons for observing Sunday.*—These reasons are evidently of two kinds, answering to the conditions required for bodily vigour and spiritual health. While the former may be regarded as especially the concern of the State and the latter of the Church, the mutual influences of body and mind are so considerable and so intricate that in practice it is hard to draw a line between the sphere of politics and that of religion. It is all the harder because to ancient thought the distinction was unknown, and even in modern times is largely artificial. For the Church cannot ignore the body, nor can the State disregard the interests of the spirit. But happily no sharp division is necessary. The reasons given by the Reformers[1] are of general application and may satisfy both the Churchman and the statesman. Since three hundred years of controversy have added nothing substantial to them, we may be content with restating them in a more detailed form.

The need of bodily rest at short intervals is a fact of human nature which all civilized nations have recognized by instituting public holidays. The more complex the social and industrial organization, the more important it becomes that such holidays should recur at regular intervals. The sporadic festivals of the ancient Roman calendar and the Saints' Day system of modern Italy could not be tolerated in an industrial country; for production depends upon regularity of labour and the efficiency of labour upon regularity of recreation. Constantine's decree of A.D. 321, therefore, not only conferred a benefit upon the individual and satisfied a requirement of the Church, but also solved economic and social problems which were growing very difficult. Its wisdom is proved by the fact that, in spite of occasional protests and experiments, the Sunday holiday has remained the rule of civilized countries ever since.

The well-being of the people, which is the proper object of government, demands more than mere cessation of work at sufficient intervals. The life of the citizen is incomplete, and his value to the State is small, unless he cultivates his mind, develops family affection, and enjoys social intercourse. All these functions require leisure—not merely the tired hours after a day's work, but whole days when the time can be disposed of at will. It is in days of leisure, also, that personality has the best chance of development. The State, therefore, has a responsibility, not only for appointing holidays, but also for preventing such misuse of them as may diminish their value to the citizen and to the community. On the other hand, experience proves such responsibility to be of a negative rather than a positive character. The State can remove obstacles to a right course of action, but cannot compel the individual to walk therein. If any positive commands are laid down for the weekly holiday, they must issue from a religious authority, which appeals only to spiritual sanctions, and affects only those who acknowledge its right. The Christian Church is such an authority, and has strong reasons, besides those just mentioned, for requiring its members to observe Sunday. Putting aside the mistaken claims for Sunday, which originated in the dark ages and were so hotly urged in the 17th cent., there remain some which are undeniable. The spiritual life of the individual requires a recurrent leisure time, in which he may read or meditate, may do acts of charity, and commune with his friends, with nature, or art. It requires, also, regular opportunities of joining in common worship, without which his membership of a Church becomes unreal. The former demand might be satisfied by times of leisure peculiar to himself. But the latter involves regular holidays which are common to all. Nor can it be a matter of indifference whether these holidays fall on Sundays. The power of association and tradition is enormous: no man can escape from it, and no Church can ignore it. To substitute another day would be to waste the accumulated associations and traditions of nearly 2000 years which are concentrated on Sunday. For on the Lord's Day Jesus rose from the dead; on that day, ever since, His disciples have met for worship and mutual comfort; on that day they have joined in the feast of His love. Luther did not state the whole case when he wrote: 'Because Sunday has been appointed from the earliest times, we ought to keep to this arrangement, that all things may be done in harmony and order, and no confusion be caused by unnecessary novelties';[1] for he ignored one of the strongest impulses in human nature.

(*b*) *The mode of observance.* — Assuming the above reasons for the observance of Sunday, we have to consider, from the point of view of Church and State, what ought to be the manner of its observance. The action of the State in such matters, as we have indicated already, is mainly negative. It has to protect the worker against the oppression of unbroken labour, to secure for him a regular period of recreation, and to prevent other persons from interfering, whether by force or by bribery, with his reasonable use of his leisure time. That task is not so simple as might appear. Every right, when exercised, imposes a duty upon some one else. The right to food involves the Sunday labour of the milkman; the right of the public to enjoy works of art encroaches upon the leisure of the custodians; the right to fresh air and green fields compels the toil of the railwayman. These classes also have their rights, which must somehow be safeguarded. To adjust conflicting claims in the interest of the people as a whole is a work of much insight and patience; nor can it be accomplished once for all, since every enlargement in the tastes and interests of the many involves a fresh tax upon the ministrations of a few. In Britain, happily, men seem to be approaching a general agreement about the main principles of such accommodations. No man should be required or encouraged to work on Sunday except for the benefit of a large number. The railwayman, the custodian of a picture gallery, or the musician who plays in a band, is engaged in a work of charity, if he is not adding a seventh working day to his week for the sake of profit. No such plea can be made on behalf of a manager who makes profit by the performances of others, or of a tradesman who opens his shops on Sunday. A partial exception is rightly made in the case of those who supply the public with needed refreshments. But even that requires careful watching;

[1] See above, § 11.

[1] *Larger Catechism.*

and the Government has long recognized the duty of limiting the sale of intoxicants to certain hours of the day.

The action of the Church, on the other hand, is positive. It aspires to guide men in their use of the leisure which is secured to them by the State. The primary duty which it inculcates upon all is that of attendance at public worship, for which the Sunday rest was originally instituted. But it also indicates proper uses for the hours which are not spent in such attendance. In the past such guidance took the form mainly of prohibitions. We have seen that, when the prohibitions were few, the result was licence; and, when they were multiplied, Sunday became a day of gloom and boredom. Not to speak of the Scottish 'Sabbath,' which has become proverbial, the restraints were mischievous enough in England till past the middle of the 19th century. The children of pious parents might not play on Sunday except with a Noah's ark. Boys and girls might not take exercise, but sat wearily still. Their elders, limited to 'religious' books or 'sacred' music, took refuge in sleep. Much harm was done to the cause of religion by such observances, and still more by the opposition which Churchmen raised in Parliament to every proposal for allowing rational entertainments for the artisans of the great towns.

A better spirit now prevails. But, while there is little of coercion by Church authority, there is very little of positive suggestion. The time has come when the Christian Church as a whole must formulate something like a programme, instead of leaving Sunday progress to individual experiment. Some such statement of principles as the following, if issued by authority, would relieve many troubled consciences and prevent much revolt.

(1) Sunday is the day for Christians to join in worship. No man spends it well who does not habitually unite with his neighbours in praise and prayer.

(2) Sunday is a day of recreation. Recreation means different things for different people, since an essential feature of it is change. The manual labourer will rest his body; the brain worker will seek exercise; both alike will be the better for a visit to a picture-gallery, or a concert, or a talk with friends.

(3) Sunday is the festival of family life. It is the only day on which most fathers can see much of their children. Unless some hours of the day are employed in cultivating family affection, its ties will be dangerously relaxed.

(4) Sunday is the day for meditation. The average man, if he does not devote some part of Sunday to reading or thought about matters outside his daily occupations, becomes a slave to routine and no longer possesses his own soul.

(*c*) *How far observance can be enforced.*—By what means can the due observance of Sunday be promoted? The primitive Church punished some offenders with excommunication; the mediæval Church employed the method of penance on a large scale. Both these weapons are now out of date; and they were never of much use for promoting what is best. In proportion as her rules advance from 'thou shalt not' to 'thou shalt,' the Church is less and less able to use any kind of compulsion. She cannot, in fact, compel her members to-day; she can only persuade them through the teaching of ministers and the opinion of neighbours.

The State, on the other hand, just because its commands are nearly all prohibitions, whose object is to protect the rights and interests of the community, can and must use compulsion. Every breach of positive law can be measured and punished by fine or imprisonment. Yet the main influence is really that of public opinion; for the magistrates and police, who administer the law, will always be strict or lax according to the general feeling of the society in which they live. The best means therefore of securing a proper observance of Sunday is to educate public opinion.

LITERATURE.—Many hundreds of volumes have been written on this subject. A very good account of some 800 will be found in Robert Cox, *The Literature of the Sabbath Question*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1865. A few of them are historical, but the mass are arguments for and against the obligation of the Sabbath, in which the same ideas (very few) recur over and over again. The following short list gives specimens of the writings of different countries and denominations. The English predominate, for England has produced far more books than all the other countries put together.

(i.) *13th century* —**Thomas Aquinas**, *Exposition of the Commandments.*

(ii.) *16th century.*—**Martin Luther**, *Larger Catechism* and other books; **John Calvin**, *Institutes*, bk. ii. ch. viii.; **Philip Melanchthon**, *The Augsburg Confession*; **Thomas Cranmer**, *A Confutation of Unwritten Verities*; **Richard Hooker**, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, v. 69–71.

(iii.) *17th century.*—**Nicholas Bownde**, *Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti* or *The True Doctrine of the Sabbath*, London, 1595, [4]1606; **King James I.**, *The Book of Sports*, do. 1618; **Francis White**, *A Treatise of the Sabbath Day*, do. 1635; **Peter Heylin**, *The Hist. of the Sabbath*, do. 1636; **Hugo Grotius**, *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ*, Amsterdam, 1627, reprint, Glasgow, 1745, bk. v.; *The Westminster Confession of Faith* and *Catechisms*, London, 1647, 1648; **John Cocceius**, *Indagatio Naturæ Sabbati*, Leyden, 1658; **Edward Stillingfleet**, *Irenicum*, London, 1659; **Richard Baxter**, *The Divine Appointment of the Lord's Day proved*, do. 1671.

(iv.) *18th century.* — **Thomas Morer**, Κυριακὴ Ἡμέρα, London, 1701; **Jonathan Edwards**, 'On the Perpetuity and Change of the Sabbath,' Sermons xiii., xiv., xv., in *Twenty Sermons on Various Subjects*, Edinburgh, 1804; **Isaac Watts**, *The Holiness of Times, Places and People*, London, 1733, Discourse i., 'On the Perpetuity of a Sabbath'; *An Act for preventing certain Abuses and Profanations on the Lord's Day*, 1781; *Decree of the National Convention of France appointing a new Calendar*, 1793; **Beilby Porteous**, *A Letter to the Clergy of the Diocese of London*, London, 1789.

(v.) *19th century.* — *Report of the Lord's Day Observance Society*, 1832; 'Edinensis,' *Sunday Railway Travelling*, Edinburgh, 1847; **J. A. Hessey**, *Sunday: its Origin, Hist. and present Obligations* (*BL*), London, 1860, [5]1889; *Report of a Committee of Congress* (U.S.A. 1833); *Report of the Committee of the Legislature of New York, on the Judiciary*, 1838; **E. W. Hengstenberg**, *Über den Tag des Herrn*, Berlin, 1852, Eng. tr. London, 1853; **François Perennès**, *De l'Institution du dimanche*, Paris, 1844; **P. J. Proudhon**, *De la Célébration du dimanche*, do. 1848; **W. F. Crafts**, *The Sabbath for Man*, New York, 1885; **J. Lefort**, *Du Repos hebdomadaire*, etc., Paris, 1873; **C. Büttner**, *Die Sonntagsruhe im Gewerbebetrieb und im Handelsgewerbe*, Leipzig, 1895.

Heylin and Hessey treat the question historically and with much ability. Parts of the history are well treated in articles and special chapters: Smith's *DCA*, *s.v.* 'Lord's Day'; *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Sunday' (deals chiefly with legislation); *PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Sonntagsfeier'; *HDB*, *s.vv.* 'Lord's Day' and 'Sabbath' There is also a good chapter (ch. vii.) in **W. E. H. Lecky**, *Democracy and Liberty*, 2 vols., London, 1896.

M. G. GLAZEBROOK.

SUNDAY SCHOOLS.—1. Origin.—The history of the Sunday school is not the history of religious education. The latter has always existed; the former is a modern institution. The Sunday school is a voluntary lay organization conducting religious instruction in classes on Sunday, generally but not always in church buildings, generally but not always as part of a church organization. The informal instruction that was probably given by teachers in the early Christian communities was somewhat akin to the activity of the Sunday school teacher. But the catechetical schools[1] which flourished in the post-apostolic Church were entirely different. Moreover, the regular catechizing of children, which was always the duty of the minister, albeit a duty very much neglected for many centuries, was not a precursor of the Sunday school. Indeed, if it had been thoroughly effective and well developed, there might never have been a Sunday school. The failure of the clergy thoroughly to systematize and to develop the religious education of the children made the Sunday school necessary. Thus the Scottish clergy, who were more successful in the training of children, regarded the new institution at first as altogether superfluous. The origin of the Sunday school is to be sought in the sporadic efforts of earnest men and women to supply some elementary instruction to children who were neglected by the Church. The most notable instance of such effort was that of Robert Raikes at Gloucester; the name 'Sunday school' seems first to have been attached to his

[1] See art. CATECHUMEN, CATECHUMENATE.

institution; and there was genetic connexion between Raikes's enterprise and the whole Sunday school movement that succeeded.

2. The period of beginnings.—(*a*) *Robert Raikes and the first Sunday schools.*—The national duty of universal education was not fully recognized in England until fifty years ago. In the 18th cent. education was the privilege of the well-to-do. Even the many benefactions which had been provided from time to time for the education of the poor had become almost universally devoted to the children of the middle classes. Moreover, with the development of the factory system, the children had been forced into labour at a very early age, with the result that they grew up in hopeless illiteracy. Among a number of efforts to remedy this intolerable condition the most significant was that of Robert Raikes, editor of the *Gloucester Journal*. He was a man of generous sympathies, interested in various efforts to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate. His attention was attracted to the vicious conduct of the 'young pagans' who were employed in the factories during the week, but who were at large on Sunday, and who naturally employed their single holiday in the only rough recreation which they understood. Believing that their ignorance was responsible for their depravity, he gathered a number of them into a school and secured four women at one shilling per day to instruct them 'in reading and the Church Catechism.' The date of this simple enterprise, which was soon copied in numerous towns, is usually set at 1780. Sunday schools became so popular that attention was given to them in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and the various letters in that once influential periodical still remain our most important source of information regarding the beginning of the movement. Wesley, in his itineracy, soon came upon Sunday schools in various places, and with fine insight immediately saw their possibilities.

(*b*) *The Sunday school in America.*—The American churches were accustomed to hold services in the morning and afternoon. There was an 'intermission' of an hour or more, during which a simple lunch was eaten. Naturally this period was often used for the catechetical instruction of the children, for whom the somewhat solemn services provided little that was appropriate. There is no evidence that any such practice was at all common previous to the Revolution. The catechizing of children took place in the schools, in the family, and in connexion with the pastoral visits of the minister. A large proportion of the children were of course altogether neglected. The period of the Revolutionary War was not favourable to religious education, and the strong influence of France tended decidedly away from religion. In the general desire of the churches to meet this condition, they turned with interest to the new institution of the Sunday school, which had been introduced into the United States from England. It was not in America primarily (though it was to some extent) a school held on Sunday for illiterate children who could not be instructed on weekdays, but rather a school conducted by the Church for religious instruction on the day set apart for that purpose. Thus from the beginning the Sunday school in America was more closely related to the Church than it was for a long time in England. This is not to say that there was not considerable opposition in the one country as in the other from clergymen who felt the danger of the intrusion of inexpert laymen.

(*c*) *Sunday school organizations.*—Within a few years of the establishment of the Raikes schools organizations for propagating the institution came into existence.

William Fox, a London merchant, had had in contemplation a large plan for the gratuitous instruction of the poor. When he learned of the Raikes scheme, it seemed to him more practical than his own more ambitious project; and he took the lead in forming, in 1785, the Society for the Establishment and Support of Sunday Schools. In 1796 was organized the Edinburgh Gratis Sabbath School Society. Others were formed in other Scottish cities. In 1810 the Hibernian Sunday School Society was organized in Dublin. These societies collected funds for the establishment of new schools, for the payment of teachers, for the purchase of Bibles, spelling-books, etc. The practice of paying teachers, although continued in a few places for many years, very soon gave way to the volunteer system, with the spread of the new institution. A number of young men who were giving their services in the Sunday schools of London felt the necessity of mutual help and conference, and organized in 1803 the Sunday School Society for this purpose. This organization became the most significant means of developing the Sunday school in Great Britain.

Organization began in America with the First-Day or Sunday School Society at Philadelphia, in 1791. It was undenominational in character and philanthropic in purpose. The visit of Albert May of London in 1811 greatly stimulated interest in Sunday school organizations. Many of them were formed in American cities. After a number of federations of these had been made, the desire for a national undenominational union resulted in the organization in 1824 of the American Sunday School Union, which has continued to do effective work to the present time.

(*d*) *Lessons and methods of teaching.*—The earliest Sunday school teaching was of the most primitive sort. Many schools on both sides of the Atlantic were obliged to give much of their time to the simplest lessons in reading and spelling. Religious instruction consisted of the memorizing of Scripture, hymns, and catechism, the teacher simply listening to the recitation. Soon some simple plans of lessons were prepared, with some practical appreciation of child religion. Helps to the teacher were the *Sunday School Repository, or Teachers' Magazine*, which began in London in 1813, and the *American Sunday School Magazine*, started in 1824.

3. Development of the Sunday school in America. — (*a*) *Denominational organizations.*—The definite adoption of the Sunday school by the Church in America is seen in the steps taken by almost all the denominations subsequent to the organization of the American Sunday School Union to supervise and extend the work within their own churches. For example, in 1827 the Sunday School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized in New York City; Baptist and Congregational organizations starting in 1825 developed into the American Baptist Publication Society in 1840, and into the Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society in 1868. The superior church bodies of other denominations undertook similar responsibilities.

(*b*) *The Sunday School as a pioneer religious agency.*—It is easy in the light of our modern educational science to criticize the poor endeavours of early religious education, but no history of the wonderful development of the Mississippi valley would be adequate which failed to recognize the social significance of the little Sunday schools that went far ahead of the organized Church into the pioneer communities.

In 1829 the American Sunday School Union established its first western headquarters at Cincinnati, and in the following year resolved at its annual convention to undertake the organization of a Sunday school in every destitute place in the Mississippi valley. Funds were raised, lay and clerical missionaries were appointed, and a notable advance was made. A single missionary in the course of a life of arduous journeying organized over 1300 new schools. As it was said of old that where ten Hebrews lived there should be a synagogue, so it came to be the expectation in America that, wherever three or four Christian families were neighbours, a Sunday school should be started, at first in the farm-house, later in the school-house or in the court-house. Very many churches of the West had their origin in the activities of a few of the laity who had begun religious work by the organization of a little Sunday school.

(*c*) *The International Sunday School Association.*—The convention system has been characteristic of the American movement. Neighbourhood conventions were held before 1820. Springing from the annual meeting of the American

Sunday School Union, a national convention of Sunday school workers was called in 1832. After a very successful session this body adjourned to meet the following year. Numerous state and county conventions met in the succeeding years, until in 1859 a third annual convention was called. The fourth did not meet until after the Civil War, in 1869, and by that time the noted Illinois leaders, B. F. Jacobs, Edward Eggleston, J. H. Vincent, and D. L. Moody were prominent. While this convention was not called international, there were delegates from Canada and from the British Isles. The same was true of the fifth convention of 1872, at which the uniform lessons were adopted. The movement then became definitely organized as international, with delegates from all the states and provinces of North America. An official body was gradually developed, which supervised the extension of the system to state, county, and township conventions, meeting annually and leading up to the great triennial gathering. At the eleventh convention in 1905 it was resolved to incorporate under the name 'International Sunday School Association.' This was done in 1907, headquarters being established at Chicago. A completely articulated organization exists under an executive committee, with a general secretary and a corps of superintendents over the various divisions and departments.

(*d*) *The development of the lesson system.*—As an improvement on mere memorizing, the 'limited lesson' system came into vogue about 1825. Two years later Albert Judson published a question-book, which supplied some notes and explanations of the selected lessons. In the same year the American Sunday School Union issued the *Union Question-Book*, which was followed annually by others covering a considerable portion of the Bible. Various schemes followed, the result partly of private enterprise, partly of denominational zeal. There was no adequate direction, and Sunday school leaders felt the need of some unity of effort. After much discussion the convention of 1872 voted to issue a uniform system of lessons for all Sunday school pupils. A lesson committee was appointed, and great enthusiasm was developed in the scheme. The co-operation of the British Sunday School Union was secured, and the lessons became practically universal. Noted writers prepared lesson-helps and commentaries; great teachers' meetings were held for the exposition of the lesson of the forthcoming Sunday, and the public press frequently devoted a column on Saturday to this purpose.

After twenty years of great external success the educational value of the uniform lesson was seriously called in question. The subject was warmly debated in conventions. At last, in 1908, the convention decided, while continuing the uniform lesson, to authorize its lesson committee to prepare a thoroughly graded course, to be used by such schools as desired it. This has since been done, and a series of text-books has been prepared by the various denominations upon the lessons thus outlined.

(*e*) *Teacher training.*—It has been recognized that most Sunday school teaching has been very unsatisfactory. Efforts have been made almost from the beginning to effect improvement. The institutes held since 1837 for public school teachers were a challenge to the Sunday school, which was answered by the development of conferences and institutes. The normal class of J. H. Vincent in Illinois in 1857 was a model which many followed. Courses for normal training of increasing scope have been issued, until to-day those published by the various denominational societies and prepared by educational experts are of very high grade. A summer school has been established at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, where instruction for professional and lay workers is carried on during the vacation season.

(*f*) *The Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations.* — The activity of the various denominations in Sunday school work has very markedly developed during the last thirty years, until there has grown up a professional body of editors and secretaries representing the more definitely Church point of view. These leaders, feeling the need of a common expression of the denominational responsibility for religious education, organized in 1910 the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations. Annual meetings are held, at which important problems of educational policy and administration are discussed. The existence of such a representative body naturally raised the question of future responsibility for the making of the lessons for the Sunday school world. The lesson committee has therefore been reconstituted, and now consists of eight members selected from the international association, eight members selected by the council, and one member selected by each denomination having a lesson committee.

(*g*) *The emphasis on religious education.*—The last quarter of a century has been marked by a growing emphasis upon the more serious educational responsibility of the Church. This was seen in the demand for the graded curriculum. In addition to the international lessons, several very significant courses of study have been produced, notably the *Constructive Studies* of the University of Chicago Press, the *Completely Graded Series* of Scribner, and several series of various denominations. In 1903 was organized the Religious Education Association to promote the educational ideal in religion and the religious ideal in education. The Association holds annual conventions or conferences, conducts studies and surveys, publishes a magazine, gathers in its offices in Chicago all significant material on religious education, and conducts an extensive correspondence of advice and stimulus on problems in this field. Several denominations have established Boards of Religious Education, which are undertaking the supervision of the entire educational work of the Church. Leaders of great ability are being selected as secretaries. In some cases these boards are preparing new and specially graded curricula.

The numerous agencies of religious education are being co-ordinated in the more progressive churches under a professional director of religious education. He is becoming the educational minister of the Church. Some colleges and universities and most theological seminaries have established chairs of religious education, by means of which a trained professional force is being developed and scientific work in religious education is being undertaken. An extensive literature has already been produced, both technical and popular.

4. **British developments.**—(*a*) *The Sunday School Union.*—The parent society in London developed into a nation-wide enterprise. In 1821 there were four metropolitan auxiliaries and sixty provincial unions, besides the Sunday School Society of Ireland and the Sabbath School Union of Scotland. The reports of that year show 4000 schools with 36,000 teachers, and 500,000 scholars. In 1823 infant schools were added for children below the ordinary Sunday school age, as in 1811 Thomas Charles of Bala, the Welsh Methodist leader, had already established adult schools. The latter subsequently became known as senior classes, and in time both infant and senior branches became part of a completely organized school. The Union celebrated its jubilee in 1853 by inaugurating a fund for the erection of

a permanent building. In 1862, at the time of the International Exhibition in London, a general Sunday school convention was held, attended by delegates from all over the British Isles, as well as from the Continent, the United States, and the Colonies. British Sunday schools were accustomed to meet in the morning and in the afternoon, and the Union had prepared annually a double series of lessons. Beginning with 1874, the British Lessons Committee co-operated with the American Committee in the production of the international series of lessons.

In 1880 was celebrated the centenary of Sunday schools throughout the United Kingdom, and a great convention was held in London to which delegates came from all over the world. As a result of this enlarged interest, the Union modified its constitution so as to become thoroughly national in character, representation to the counties being extended in 1890.

During the last thirty years the Union has developed a very significant philanthropic work, including country homes for poor scholars, a home of rest for lady teachers, a children's convalescent home, etc.

(*b*) *Educational progress.*—In the second quarter of the 19th cent. a forward movement in the science and art of pedagogy began in Scotland. David Stow organized the Glasgow Normal School for the training of teachers. Believing that the same principles could be applied to religious education, he published in 1826 a training system. The Union published in 1837 *Popular Education, or a Normal School Manual.* In 1856 a training class was organized at Pimlico. An attempt was made in 1861 to establish a college for Sunday school teachers, but it was found more feasible to develop a system of standardizing examinations. The college was finally established in 1899, and the examination system adapted to this organization. In addition to the publication of lessons and the encouragement of teacher training, the Union has developed a considerable literature for teachers and scholars, a separate building being required for this phase of its work.

5. World Sunday school work.—The Sunday school spread naturally through the English-speaking world. Various efforts were made, beginning as early as 1815, to establish it on the Continent, but with slight success. The convention in London in 1862, at the earnest solicitation of Albert Woodruff, undertook a continental propaganda. Sunday schools were established in all European countries. This movement was promoted by the world's conventions which met in London in 1889, in St. Louis in 1893, in London in 1898, in Jerusalem in 1904, in Rome in 1907, in Washington in 1910, in Zürich in 1913. At Rome the World Sunday School Association was organized, with American and British sections. Missionary work in China, India, S. Africa, and Europe was assigned to the British section; in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, S. America, and in the Muslim fields to the American section. The Association reported at Zürich the world Sunday school membership as 30,015,037, with 310,057 schools, and 2,669,630 officers and teachers.

6. Non-Protestant Sunday schools.—The Roman Catholic Church has adapted the Sunday school to its system, though without relinquishing the control to lay leadership. In the Hebrew Reformed Synagogue the Sunday school, generally under paid teachers, has become very effective. Among the Latter-Day Saints an excellent system of religious education has been developed, including the Sunday school. The Christian Science churches have established Sunday schools especially for children.

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THEODORE GERALD SOARES.

SUNNITES.—1. Distribution. — Islām is at present divided into two great unevenly divided sections. The Shī'ahs (*q.v.*) are found in Persia and among the masses in India; the Sunnites in the Turkish empire as it was prior to the Great War, in N. Africa, Egypt, other parts of Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China, and the East Indies. In India the ruling class is of Sunnite faith; in the Turkish empire there are numbers of Shī'ahs of the better class who make a point of concealing their religious convictions. The Muhammadan population of the world is estimated to be about 221,000,000, and of this total it is reckoned that about 15,000,000 are Shī'ahs; the rest are Sunnīs. The Ibādīs (*q.v.*) of E. Arabia and N. and E. Africa are not relatively numerous and are neither Shī'ah nor Sunnite inasmuch as they claim descent from the Khārijite[1] schism of the early Umayyad period. The Zaidites (*q.v.*) of Yemen, though of Shī'ah origin, are on terms of fellowship with the Sunnites of Arabia.

2. The term 'Sunnite' and the early attitude towards the sunnah.—The Sunnite is the follower of the *sunnah* ('form,' 'outline,' 'mode,' 'usage'), or the view and usage of the Prophet. The issue implied in the use of the term is as to how new demands of thought are to be satisfied and new situations are to be met. The party of the *sunnah* contended that, where the Qur'ān did not fully and clearly provide direction, the inquirer should seek trustworthy information as to what Muhammad had said on the subject, what his action had been with relation to it, or what he had approved in others. The *sunnah* of the Prophet would be found embodied in a tradition (*ḥadīth*), and it was of the highest importance that the trustworthiness of traditions should be certified. They were tested, not by their intrinsic probability or by their consistency with other reports, but solely by the reputed reliability of the succession of persons through whom they had been handed down. If the *'isnād*, or chain of guarantors, had no unreliable members, the contents of a tradition were considered to furnish unimpeachable support for the opinion or course of action on behalf of which they had been cited. This mode of arriving at the *sunnah* of the Prophet opened the way to the wholesale fabrication and perversion of traditions to suit the needs of persons hard pressed for arguments on behalf of causes honest or dishonest. Abū Ḥanīfah († 150 A.H.) seems to have felt that tradition as a basis of support was not sufficient. Possibly, as a Persian he lacked the Arab's respect for this mode of proof and sought a more rational method, but what determined his attitude to an

[1] See art. KHAWĀRIJ.

even greater degree was probably the notoriously untrustworthy manner in which traditions were produced. He preferred to resort directly to the Qur'ān and, where it was not explicit, to decide according to his own view of what might fairly be inferred from its teaching as bearing on the question in hand. This method of obtaining direction involved two principles which the party of the *sunnah* for a long time viewed with distrust, viz. *ra'y*, or independent personal judgment, and *qiyās*, argument from the analogy of known cases to secure direction for new cases. Both of these were thought to imply disrespect towards inspired authority. Abū Ḥanīfah went farther than this in the readiness which he showed to depart from the written authority of the Qur'ān and the direction given by the *sunnah*. Even when these gave a clear decision, or where the principle of *qiyās* gave a definite instruction, the situation might suggest a better view or a wiser course of action. To follow such a suggestion was a duty. The principle here implied is termed *istiḥsān*, preference, or asking for the better thing. It involves personal independent judgment (*ra'y*) to a greater degree than the employment of *qiyās* does and is still more inconsistent with the early view of the party of the *sunnah* ('Ahlu-'s-Sunnah). Mālik ibn 'Anas († 179 A.H.) lived in the atmosphere of tradition at Medīna, and tradition had more weight with him than with Abū Ḥanīfah. Still, where traditions were being forged at the rate he knew and for the purposes of which he was aware, there was room for a principle of decision in legal and doctrinal questions which would protect Islām against injury through capricious or irrational judgments. Mālik, therefore, admitted the rule of *istiṣlāḥ*, the seeking of the public welfare, which might override the dictation of the Sacred Book and the *sunnah*. The strict party of the *sunnah* opposed this rule, as it had the liberal practice of Abū Ḥanīfah; both allowed too much room to *ra'y*. To men accustomed to earlier conditions, when the absence of a *sunnah* which might cover all cases left room for decision on other grounds, the mere multiplying of traditions did not afford a sufficient reason for surrendering methods of obtaining guidance which had been followed when traditions were not available. Meanwhile the uninformed masses of Islām were strongly inclined to the simpler method of appeal to external authority. *Qiyās*, *istiḥsān*, *istiṣlāḥ*, and *ra'y* were too human, and hence too feeble and erring. The future of Islām largely depended on whether free scholarship (*ra'y*) or authority (*sunnah*) became the ruling factor in the community, whether the need of the Muslims was to be conceived according to the view of intelligent leaders or to that of the great body of the people with its clinging to old-established ways.

3. The Mu'tazilite reaction.—The traditional and rationalistic tendencies both went on developing, and the mutual antagonism between them was intensified. The rationalistic party became recognized as a party which favoured *ra'y*, lent its approval to Greek philosophy and Christian culture, and regularly employed the Aristotelian method of arriving at truth. The earlier *khalīfahs* of the Abbāsid dynasty had been interested in these things, but they became established and officially approved under the *khalīfah* al-Ma'mūn († 218 A.H.). In the last year of his reign he instituted an inquisition against the traditionalists. This inquisition (*al-Miḥna*) went on for sixteen years (218–234 A.H.), and, while it lasted, the orthodox suffered severely and their leaders were often under peril of death. This period of persecution, with the strenuous controversies which it witnessed, settled the characteristic marks of the later Sunnī belief and also brought out and sharpened the weapons by which rationalism sought to destroy the positions of the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah. The latter applied to their opponents the name Mu'tazilah, 'dissenters' or 'seceders.' It was a name which had been used in a favourable sense of pious ascetics or hermits, but in the late 2nd cent. A.H. it was given an unfavourable significance and came to mean heretics. On the one side were the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah, and opposed to them were the 'Ahlu-'r-Ra'y, the Mu'tazilah. The fundamental question for both parties was the true conception of God. Was the view held by the one party or the other a view which did justice to the unity of the Supreme Being? Was it one which adequately set forth and protected His character as a perfect Being? The Mu'tazilah, as their orthodox antagonists called them, were proud to describe themselves as the 'party of the (divine) unity and justice' ('Ahlu-'t-Tawhīd wa'l-'adl). They charged the party of the *sunnah* with a contradiction of both these divine virtues.

Connected with these fundamental issues were others of sufficiently vital importance but subordinate to them. The question as to the source of authority for belief and conduct required to be solved. The party of the Qur'ān and *sunnah* insisted upon a literal conformity to these two sources, while the Mu'tazilah demanded that belief and conduct should be consistent with reason, and the method by which the rational view was to be tested was that of the Aristotelian logic. This science was known by the term *kalām* (*q.v.*), and those who relied upon it were designated Mutakallimūn — descriptions without intrinsic stigma, but acquiring in the hands of the orthodox Sunnites the unpleasant implication of heresy and heretics respectively. The Mu'tazilah nevertheless were proud to call themselves 'Ahlu-'l-'Aql, 'the party of reason,' and felt that only by reason could one reach a worthy view of God and of man's duty to Him. The Qur'ān was saved from absurd interpretations and became a real guide for reasonable beings only as it was subjected to a rational process of study. Literal acceptance of the text had led the orthodox to proclaim the dogma of the uncreated and eternal nature of the Qur'ān, and as a party in this early time they applied the dogma even to the letters and words of the book as written and to the sounds of the uttered recitation or reading. It was in the controversy regarding the uncreated nature of the Qur'ān that Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (*q.v.*) appeared as the outstanding champion of the traditional view. When pressed by the Mu'tazilite argument to the effect that the human media and the inanimate records were obviously not unlimited in either nature or duration, his answer was that the book declared itself to be (or, rather, God in the book declared it to be) *kalām Allāh*, *i.e.* the word or speech of God, which was inseparably and uninterruptedly an attribute (*ṣifa*) of God. It could not be dissociated from the thought of God and the divine reason and was therefore eternal. This polemic instantly raised the question of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*). Was the *kalām Allāh* to be conceived as an entity independent as to essence from the being or essence of God? Were all the attributes entities in this sense? On the basis of the statements of the Qur'ān the party of the *sunnah* persistently argued for the affirmative. The Mu'tazilah charged them with giving God a partner (*shirk*). It was polytheism to assert that there were other eternal entities beside God. The Qur'ān text should not be interpreted in such a sense as to violate the unity of God and 'associate' other beings with Him. It should be explained in an allegorical sense (*ta'wīl*) where the literal sense would involve irreverence or what was irrational. The orthodox rejoinder relentlessly attacked the presumptuous setting up of *ra'y* over the *kalām Allāh*. It surely was the greater sin that the creature should venture to set aside the plain words which God had spoken because to him they seemed absurd. The ambiguity of the terms used in the controversy made agreement between the two parties impossible. 'Word of God' meant one thing for Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and a very different thing for his persecuting inquisitors. For him to claim that his Qur'ān was uncreated, and for them to reply that their Qur'ān was created, must necessarily have left each where he was before the argument. The *sunnah* party suffered much ridicule at the hands of their opponents because of their readiness to accept all the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'ān as precise descriptions of fact. They boldly taught that God sat on a throne, possessed sight, smell, hearing, etc., though they grew more cautious as the controversy wore on and pressed for verbal acceptance of the Qur'ān teachings, with a consent to leave questions as to how such things could be with God Himself to make plain later or not to make plain as He chose. It was to be an acceptance 'without seeing how' (*bilā kaifa*, or, contracted, *balkaifa*). Connected with this subject of the anthropomorphic attributes and acts of God in the Qur'ān is that of the possibility of actually seeing God, as the Qur'ān declares. If the saints see God, it is implied that the anthropomorphic view is literally true; if it is not true, they do not see Him.

One more element in the Mu'tazilite controversy

remains to be noticed. The party of the *sunnah* held the characteristic Arab view that the will of Allāh was the all-determining source of change and activity in the world. The 'party of *'aql'* allowed to man the capacity to initiate action and placed upon him the responsibility for his choice. Because of their attitude on this special point, the Mu'tazilah are classed as Qadarites (believers in free will). Their argument attacked the orthodox, particularly on the ground that they held man responsible for his acts and nevertheless denied that he was free. Freedom he might seem to have, but it was only illusory; in reality his acts were created by God, without whom nothing happened. This orthodox contention the Mu'tazilah repudiated as involving injustice to man and also as implying an insulting impeachment of God's justice.

4. Re-establishment of orthodoxy.—The Mu'tazilite controversy was summarily terminated by the *khalīfah* al-Mutawakkil in 234 A.H. He reversed the liberal policy of his predecessors, declared the doctrines that they had championed to be offences against the State, and proclaimed the orthodox views to represent the official opinions which alone would be tolerated in Islām. This official endorsement of the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah has been maintained in Islām down to the present. The dogmatic beliefs of the persecuted orthodox are held by both Sunnites and Shī'ahs, and the Sunnī khalīfate has regularly stood sponsor for them. There is no doubt that the Mu'tazilite *khalīfahs* of the Miḥna period represented a relatively small minority in the Muslim world of their time and that al-Mutawakkil was wise not to continue his support of their views in the face of an adverse popular sentiment. Tradition and Qur'ān retained their hold upon the masses, to whom their directness and their clear mandatory accent appealed as mere reflective opinion could hardly hope to do. The great body of Islām ranged itself behind the orthodox *khalīfahs*, and the Mu'tazilah tend to disappear little by little. The free-thinking teachers notwithstanding give the traditional theologians a great deal of trouble, in spite of the smallness of their numbers. It was easy to make a system based on literal interpretations appear ridiculous when attacked by means of keen dialectic, and the orthodox tenacity and insistence did not prevent their partisans from feeling an awkward discomfort when they were forced to evade rather than answer the attacks made upon them. It will be readily understood that the man who enabled them to inflict genuine defeat upon their opponents, Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (*q.v.*), would seem to the orthodox to be almost a prophet when he arrived.

5. Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī.—Al-Ash'arī had been long trained in the views and arguments of the Mutakallims, and there is some plausibility in the legend which represents him as using their method against his own teacher al-Jubbā'ī to the discomfiture of the latter. He had apparently come to see that the Aristotelian logic was valuable, not for the discovery of truth, but for making explicit the significance of propositions which were taken for granted and for the confutation of false arguments. It became clear to him that religion could not be built securely upon *kalām*, a formal science. The foundation must be in revelation through inspired men and media, through prophets and sacred writings. Feeling that, in spite of their poor logic, the party of the *sunnah* had founded Islām upon the true basis, that tradition was a genuinely trustworthy means of communicating revealed guidance from age to age, and that the consensus of the Muslim community (*ijmā'*) expressed through its leaders was more reliable than the judgment of the individual Mutakallim, al-Ash'arī returned to the orthodox faith which he seems to have inherited from his forbears in the first instance. He came back converted through his own employment of *kalām* against itself, and naturally he made use of the weapon from that time (300 A.H.) forward to disprove the views of the Mu'tazilah and to develop into a system the orthodox doctrine.

6. The principle of consensus.—The principle of consensus operated more largely from the days of al-Ash'arī onward. It was Ash-Shafi'ī († 204 A.H.) who first made extensive use of it in his teaching and was prepared to accept it as a guide where the Qur'ān and *sunnah* failed to afford direction. His preference for *ijmā'* was approved only with reserve by the rigid Ḥanbalite orthodoxy of the 3rd century. Al-Bukhārī's strictness in the criticism of *ḥadīths* and his refusal to give an opinion on the human utterance of the Qur'ān are possibly alike based upon an employment of the *ijmā'*. The principle has a bearing upon the division of Islām into Sunnites and Shī'ahs. In the days of the early Ash'arite school this division, which is based, not upon dogmatic differences of a genuine religious character, but upon a divergent view of the khalīfate, had not yet taken place, and the *ijmā'* embraced the whole Muslim community. When the division came, it was recognized that the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah lay beyond the boundaries of the Persian empire as organized under the Ṣafawids (A.D. 1502), and that *ijmā'* had a sense and a binding force in Sunnite Islām which it did not have in Persia. The Persian Muslims readily accord the name Sunnīs to their rivals and accept Shī'ah as a proper term by which to describe themselves. *Ijmā'* is especially a Sunnite principle and has guided the leading movements and changes of Sunnite Islām during many centuries. There is no need of its use among the Shī'ahs, where appeal is made to the inspired authority of the *imāms* as it is voiced through their *mujtahids*.

In spite of the fact that the Ḥanbalite school, so powerful in the 3rd cent. of Islām, is now almost a negligible quantity, al-Ash'arī, the founder of the Sunnite theological system, was an ardent Ḥanbalite after his conversion and died in that faith (320 A.H.). It is necessary to say, however, that the views which are now held by all the Sunnite schools are the founder's views as somewhat liberalized by the Ash'arite school after his death. There is evidence to show that the cast-iron system into which the great teacher came back at the time of his conversion from Mu'tazilism was modified through the very *kalām* influence which he brought with him. It was probably al-Ash'arī's thought to employ *kalām* for purely apologetic purposes, but his followers gave much more scope to the principle of the censensus than he seems to have thought of. The 'Six Correct Books' of traditions (*Kitābu Sittah*), of which the two great *Saḥīḥs* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim are the most essential authorities, contain the only generally accepted evidence as to the *sunnah*, but in the application of the *sunnah* the principle of the *ijmā'*, used in accordance with the scholastic method introduced by al-Ash'arī, has made it possible to leave far behind the strict views of law held by the triumphant Ḥanbalite school of the 3rd Muslim century. That kind of unchanging orthodoxy would not have preserved the unity of Islām as it has been preserved among the Sunnites. Modern Ḥanbalites are the consistent successors of the early Ḥanbalite school before al-Ash'arī, but they exert little influence. Sunnite Islām is an Islām to which the liberal views of the Ḥanifites and the moderate views of the Mālikites and Shāfi'ites have had less and less difficulty in adjusting themselves as time has passed, so that in opinion and practice unity and even a large measure of uniformity have come to prevail. The Ḥanbalite domination of the Sunnī sect became at once impossible with the admission of the *kalām* method and the broader understanding of the *ijmā'*. The schools differ, as they have always differed, in the extent to which they recognize certain liberal principles and attitudes of mind. Analogy (*qiyās*) and judgment according to personal opinion (*ra'y*, and, in special relations, *istiḥsān*, or preference for a better view) play a large part in the administration of Ḥanifite law, a less important part among the N. African Mālikites, and a small part in the Shāfi'ite communities of Islām. But the difference is within the region of *fiqh* and not within that of dogmatic opinion.

7. Triumph of Ash'arite theology.—The process of liberalizing the orthodox system of al-Ash'arī must have been somewhat rapid in the century

following his death. Towards the end of the 4th cent. A.H. there seems to have been a disposition to allow *kalām* to run riot in Baghdād, where we read of theologians who were willing to argue questions without reference to the traditional authorities of Islām. Even in the West the great thinkers, excluding Ibn Ḥazm (*q.v.*) as almost a sole exception, gave themselves more and more to a philosophical account of religion and at the same time realized painfully that they had parted company with accepted orthodox views. Men like Ibn Ṭufail and Averroës (*qq.v.*) in the late 6th cent. A.H. have one system for the masses and another teaching for the instructed few. Nevertheless one may say that, in spite of excesses, the Ash'arite school had definitely imposed its views and method upon the Muslim world before the end of the 11th cent. of our Christian era. The liberty of thought which al-Ash'arī had secured for Islām had developed by that time a controversial intellectualism which left no place for intuition or mysticism in religion, and orthodoxy was in serious danger of losing the sympathy of the masses. A new emphasis was called for in order to supply a corrective to the general rationalism which prevailed.

8. Al-Ghazālī.[1]—Al-Ghazālī († 505 A.H.) was by nature an intensely religious man to whom the truth was the greatest of all possessions. It was for him life's supreme concern to solve the problem of Ultimate Reality in such a way as to be satisfied that he enjoyed contact, response, and fellowship with it. He was convinced that what he sought could not be given by an acceptance of truth on mere external authority, a point to which, in spite of his dependence upon *kalām*, al-Ash'arī still held. He saw that the Mutakallims could proceed to their conclusions only as they took for granted certain propositions which they did not prove, and that, when they had said all, the seeker had in possession only a system of logical inferences and not at all an experience of the ultimately real. Not because it was a last resort or because he was in despair of finding anything better, al-Ghazālī turned to Ṣūfism. He made a full and sympathetic trial of the Ṣūfī discipline, after having tried other ways, and was convinced that the Ṣūfīs (*q.v.*) had solved the problem of the soul's quest. Man craved a satisfying revelation and a satisfying communion with God; he received both through faithful conformity to the Ṣūfī ideal and persistent openness to receive higher communications. Al-Ghazālī was a moderate Ṣūfī who was ready to give due weight to reason within its own limits, and who recognized the ethical and religious duties of the common life. His pre-eminent gifts and virtues—for he was one of the finest characters as well as one of the greatest minds which Islām has produced—have made his solution of the religious problem exceedingly influential down to our own day. Ṣūfism became a power far beyond the borders of the dervish organizations; the extreme dependence upon rationalism was checked; the emotional factors in human nature were provided for with due regard to ethical and religious conduct. Probably no teacher since the days of the Prophet has afforded to Muslims a better illustration of the possibilities of their own faith. Sunnites generally admit a great indebtedness to him, and his works are standard texts in the training of orthodox theologians (*'ulamā*).

9. Sunnites and Shī'ahs.—The distinction between Shī'ahs and Sunnīs has its roots in the dispute between the 'Alids and Umayyads in the years which followed the *khalīfah* 'Uthmān's assassination (35 A.H.). In its origin it has nothing to do with the religion founded by Muhammad, but rather is occupied with the political question of the succession to the leadership of the Muslim community. At first the 'Alids on their side claimed that they were the legitimate *khalīfahs* because they were descended from the Prophet's daughter Fāṭimah and his cousin and intimate companion, 'Alī. The Umayyads on their part claimed a nomination by the choice of the Muslims themselves and as a further title claimed kinship with the Prophet as being of the Hāshimite family. Later the 'Alids stood for the claims of descent against all claims of right to office because of the popular choice. This difference still marks off the Shī'ah political theory from that held among the Sunnites.

(*a*) *Theory of the khalīfate.*—There is, moreover, an old standing difference between the Sunnites and Shī'ahs as to the functions of the *khalīfah*. Among the Sunnites the *khalīfah* is a political ruler essentially, while from the first the 'Alid party regarded the Prophet's successor as a religious guide and therefore preferred to designate him as the *imām* of the Muslim community. It was assumed that his physical descent from the Prophet secured to him not merely divine rights, but also a divine endowment of grace and wisdom. No such assumption was held by the Sunnites with relation to their *khalīfahs*. They were chosen from among the believers and could claim no supernatural qualifications. Their authority was conferred by the Muslim community and carried with it no implication of pre-eminent saintliness or infallibility. The Sunnite attitude towards the *khalīfahs* differs greatly from that of the Shī'ahs towards the *imāms*. The personal qualities and public influence of the *khalīfahs* have been largely determinative of the respect shown to them. Among the Shī'ahs the office hallows the occupant, and the *imāms* are regarded with the deepest religious veneration. The Sunnite *khalīfahs* by law are required to be of the Prophet's tribe, the Quraish; the *imāms* were chosen from the still more narrow circle of the Prophet's immediate family.

Since the twelfth *imām*, Muhammad ibn al-Ḥasan, disappeared in the middle of the 3rd cent. A.H., the line of visible *imāms* has been suspended, but there has never been a legal reason why the Sunnī khalīfate should be interrupted, as it has always been possible for the Muslim community to find an eligible candidate and to nominate him, provided circumstances did not interpose a physical hindrance. The *sulṭāns* of Turkey have assumed to be the *khalīfahs* of the Prophet and have taken to themselves the exclusive title pertaining to that office, Emīr al-Mu'minīna, 'Commander of the Faithful,' since the time of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1512. As they are not of Arab race, let alone of Quraishite lineage, there is no basis in law for the Ottoman claim. The first *sulṭān* (Selīm I.) to assume the title justified his act on the ground of a surrender of his rights on the part of the last 'Abbāsid *khalīfah*, al-Mutawakkil II., who at the time of the conquest of Egypt was attached to the court of the Mamluk *sulṭāns* and was recognized by them as the spiritual head of Islām. The Ottoman *sulṭāns* have retained in their own persons the dual authority temporal and spiritual which the Mamluks had divided, and the principle of the consensus seems to have permitted the *'ulamā* to legalize the departure from the law of the khalīfate as settled by the *sunnah*. They have accepted the transfer of the 'Abbāsid rights to Sulṭān Selīm as giving a title, and have regarded it as fortified by other considerations, viz. the Ottoman conquest of Muslim domain, the control of the sacred cities, and the possession of relics of the Prophet. The *sulṭān* has made a concession to traditional sentiment in constituting the chief *mufti* in Constantinople as *shaikh ul-Islām*, or highest spiritual authority over all believers. This functionary, nevertheless, derives his power from the *sulṭān* who appoints him, though it is to be admitted that the choice of the *'ulamā* practically settles the appointment. All questions affecting Islām are considered by the *shaikh ul-Islām*, and are subject to his decision as promulgated by a *fatwā* issuing from him. The other conditions recognized by Sunnite authorities as binding in the election of a *khalīfah* are that he shall be of adult years, of sane mind, of free condition, a man versed in the learning of Islām, and a capable administrator who will rule justly. In contrast to the Shī'ahs, the Sunnī doctors have always recognized Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān, the first successors of the Prophet, as genuine *khalīfahs* (*al-Khulafā ar-rāshidūn*) together with the fourth *khalīfah* 'Alī, who of course is allowed to be a legiti-

[1] Cf art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Muslim), § 7.

mate successor by the Shī'ah sect also. For 'Alī and his successors in the imāmate the Sunnīs have much respect on account of their reputation for either piety or learning, though they do not admit the Shī'ah claim of supernatural gifts or divine rights as belonging to them.

(*b*) *Enmity between Sunnites and Shī'ahs.*—The intense hatred between Sunnīs and Shī'ahs as distinct sects dates from the time when the Shī'ahs were constituted a separate political organization by the foundation of the Ṣafawid empire of Persia in A.D. 1502. The fault in this mutual bitter feeling is greater on the Shī'ah side than on that of the Sunnites, but the treatment of Persian pilgrims to Mecca has been an enduring irritation, and in earlier times the military aggression of the Turkish *sulṭāns* gave occasion for resentment in Persia. As has been pointed out above, there are many individual Muslims of Shī'ah connexion in the Turkish empire, and, either because of an acquired indifference or oftener because of their practice of *taqīyah* (concealment of faith), they suffer no personal inconvenience at the hands of their Sunnite neighbours. The proposal of Nādir Shah in the 18th cent., that a reunion of Islām be brought about by admitting the Shī'ahs to fellowship with the Sunnīs as a fifth orthodox school, was prompted by the world-ambition of that ruler and was met by vigorous and successful opposition on the part of the Persian *mujtahids* and *mullahs*.

(*c*) *Position as to the sunnah.*—The difference between the Sunnites and the Shī'ahs does not consist in the acknowledgment of the *sunnah* of the Prophet by the former and its denial by the latter. The title of the Sunnīs to have the oldest and the most thoroughly tested body of traditions is not questioned, but the Shī'ahs also have their *sunnah*, whose authorities are the acknowledged *ḥadīth* collections of the sect. Resting upon these recognized standards, the Shī'ah teachers claim that they alone have the genuine *sunnah*, while the Sunnite version, they allege, has been perverted so as to furnish arguments against the claims of 'Alī and his sons to the succession of the Prophet. The corruption of the *sunnah* for any such purpose by the Sunnites is exceedingly unlikely, while the evidence of the manipulation of traditions by the Shī'ahs to support their own side is considered to be fairly clear. In the interpretation and adaptation of the *sunnah* to new relations the Sunnites are guided by the consensus (*ijmā'*) and analogy (*qiyās*), while the Shī'ahs claim to be alone rightly guided in their following of the *sunnah*, inasmuch as they have enjoyed the infallible instruction of the *imāms* either in person or since the line has been suspended by the inerrant communication of their word and will through the *mujtahids*. According to the *sunnah* view, there can be no *mujtahids* in Islām since the death of the last great orthodox founder in the 3rd cent. A.H. The term as employed in Sunnī circles is limited to the great *imāms* of the earlier centuries who founded the four orthodox schools and laid on indisputable foundations the theology and law of Islām. Since their day no teacher's opinions have justified themselves as a permanent basis for faith and life.

10. Changes in Sunnite Islām. — In theory Sunnite Islām is tied up to the Ash'arite system, and because of that it is thought to be fated to intellectual stagnation. The facts show that from the time of al-Ash'arī himself there was some modification of the founder's positions, and with the contribution made by al-Ghazālī one may say that the modification amounts to a materially altered view-point and the introduction of a new and revolutionary emphasis which laid stress upon intuitive and emotional factors in religious experience. The necessities of the historical situation have repeatedly rendered nugatory the theoretical requirements of Sunnite orthodoxy. Where Muslims live under Christian governments, as in India, the law of the khalifate has to yield place to the obligations of political loyalty, the duty imposed by the *jihād* is in most cases unfulfilled, and the *zakāt* must be modified, especially as to the authority to whom it is to be turned over and the mode and purpose of its distribution. With the universal recognition of saint-worship and the cult of relics, the dogma of the unity of God and the law against idolatry (*shirk*) are violated, and the sufficiency of the canonical authorities, the Qur'ān and *sunnah*, is called in question. It may be recalled that one fruit of the modern liberal movement in India is the rise of the Aḥmadīyah sect, whose founder, Mirza Ghulam Aḥmad († 1908), recognized the logic of facts in the position of the Indian Muslims and declared that the duty of the *jihād* was not binding any longer. The practical effect of the Ṣūfī teaching when fully developed is a pantheism which is in contradiction with the hard, clear-cut monotheism of the Ash'arite theology. It is a pantheism leading to a loosening of the positive bonds of conduct which the orthodox teaching imposes. The righteousness of the Ṣūfī may become extravagantly mechanical and violently anti-social, so much so that public regulation may be called for, as is the case in Egypt. Enough has been said to show that Sunnite Islām, however immobile it may be in theory, has admitted into its system under the compulsion of facts vastly important modifications, some of which have seemed to contain unrevealed potentialities of disintegration.

11. Detailed differences between Sunnites and Shī'ahs.—A few points in which Sunnites and Shī'ahs differ require to be mentioned.

(*a*) The Sunnites do not accord to 'Alī and his sons the degree of veneration which the feast of Muḥarram implies. This holds true even if the Sunnite Muslims of India do not scruple to participate in the ceremonies of the feast along with their Shī'ah neighbours. (*b*) There is some confusion of the orthodox feast of the 'Ashūra, which falls on the tenth day of Muḥarram, with the Shī'ah feast, which extends from the first to the tenth day of that month. The motive of the respective feasts is, however, entirely different. The 'Ashūra commemorates the completion of creation by the creating of Adam and Eve on the tenth day of Muḥarram, while the tenth day of the Shī'ah ceremonies is simply the crowning day of the whole Muharram feast, pointing in particular to the Kerbelā massacre which is supposed to have taken place on that day. (*c*) Generally speaking, the ritual of ordinary worship differs only in the non-essential points. The mode of purification before the *ṣalāt* with the Sunnites includes the washing of the arm upwards to the elbow, while with the Shī'ahs the process is reversed. In the washing of the feet the Sunnite ritual literally washes; the Shī'ah merely rubs or wipes the feet. (*d*) To perform the *ḥājj* by proxy is not permitted by the Sunnīs, while it is not uncommon among their rivals. This permission, if granted, would violate the cardinal Sunnī requirement that a Muslim must perform the *ḥājj* at least once during his lifetime. (*e*) More far-reaching in its social effects is the permission given by the Shī'ah law to contract *mu'ta* marriages. These temporary unions, for a price agreed upon and under conditions of legal contract, are forbidden by the Sunnite codes. (*f*) The Sunnite recognition of the principle of *taqīyah* is limited to cases of extreme personal danger when it is at most permitted to dissemble one's religious convictions in order to preserve one's life. The Shī'ahs do not view *taqīyah* as limited to situations of personal risk, and, where it applies, they do not merely permit a resort to *taqīyah*, but strongly recommend the employment of it. Especially where the interests of religion may be supposed to be in jeopardy, the Muslim of Shī'ah faith will feel the use of *taqīyah* to be a moral obligation.

In all that has been said in the foregoing description of the Sunnite position and practice regard has been had to only those matters which fall within the canon law (*sharī'ah*). It must be kept in mind that in all Muslim countries, whether Sunnite or Shī'ite, there is another authority which has its constituted rights and its organized administration, viz. the customary law (*'urf* or *'adah*). This differs according to the established conventions of different places. It is not a distinctive feature of the Sunnites and need not be more fully treated in this article.

The power of the *'ulamā* among the Sunnīs is

very great, though as a class they are not viewed with the superstitious veneration or even fear which the Persian Shī'ah shows to many of the *mullahs*, to all the *mujtahids*, and to the large class of *sayyids* who are to be found in Shī'ite regions. The influence of the *'ulamā* has been conserved by their learning, which, though narrowly restricted to Muslim theology and law, is often comprehensive within those limits. This learning is constantly on call in the service of the Muslim community. Their influence, moreover, has been much greater than it might have been owing to a certain measure of accommodation which has made large room for such a phenomenon as the Ṣūfī movement—a movement whose elements of wonder and emotionalism have proved to the satisfaction of the masses that Islām was still a medium of supernatural power and divine life. Along with this they have admitted to the curriculum of theological studies in all the leading schools the works of the great mystics, particularly those of the master, al-Ghazālī. The tacit or explicit approval of the cult of saints, endowed as it is by public funds, may be an anomaly, but for the orthodox leaders it also is an instrument of power. More potent than any other factor is the fact that the consensus (*ijmā'*) is realized only through the *'ulamā* and that no cause has been so effective in bringing about change of policy and the initiation of new lines of action as the voice of the *'ulamā* declaring the mind of the universal Muslim community. The *ijmā'* is being prepared by the training which the candidates for the learned calling receive, whether it be in the Azhar University at Cairo, in the schools of Constantinople and India, or in the ancient seats of learning like Bokhāra. It is a long mechanical process aiming at fixing rigidly the positions of traditional orthodoxy in the thoughts and sympathies of the student and cultivating in him a fanatical devotion to the authority of the past, especially of the primitive age of the faith. It is natural that, when his opportunity to lead comes, he should adjust himself as an obedient part of the whole traditional system.

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SUPERNATURALISM.—Supernaturalism is the mental attitude that has the supernatural for its object. The term is used by anthropologists[1] to express the fact that primitive magic and primitive religion alike rest on a belief in supernatural powers. In such a context it is convenient to have a word such as 'supernatural' that may be equated now with 'magical' and now with 'divine.'[2] For the savage respects the human magician 'on account of his continual intercourse with the supernatural world,'[3] and, on the other hand, must be allowed 'to possess a rudimentary notion of certain supernatural beings who may be fittingly called gods, though not in the full sense in which we use the word.'[1] Frazer, indeed, assumes a general tendency among savages to claim 'powers which we should now call supernatural,'[2] on the ground that 'a savage hardly conceives the distinction commonly drawn by more advanced peoples between the natural and the supernatural.'[3] F. B. Jevons, on the other hand, warns us against 'the error of imagining that there was a time when man did not distinguish between the natural and the supernatural. This error may take the form of saying either that to primitive man nothing was supernatural or that everything was supernatural.' He goes on to say:

'Primitive man took to himself the credit of his successful attempts to work the mechanism of nature for his own advantage, but when the machinery did not work he ascribed the fault to some overruling *super*natural power.'[4]

The objection of E. Durkheim, that to recognize breaches in a habitual order does not amount to the recognition of breaches in an order conceived as necessary after the manner of modern science,[5] is surely somewhat hypercritical in such a context. An objection of another kind, since it does not dispute the facts, but merely regards convenience of terminology, is that of J. H. Leuba,[6] who in naming the belief in supernatural power would call attention to the power rather than to the supernatural quality attaching to it, and hence would substitute for 'supernaturalism' the term 'dynamism,' originally used by A. van Gennep[7] to describe the 'impersonalist' theory of *mana* as contrasted with the 'personalist' theory of animism. Now there is much to be said for the view that the positive content of supernaturalism receives its fullest conceptual expression in terms of the *mana* type.[8] But the mental attitude in question has its negative side as well as the positive side connoted by *mana*, since it is called forth by the frustration of reasonable expectation; so that, as Jevons says, 'where the natural ended, the supernatural began.'[9] Again, this mental attitude is not so predominantly intellectual that it can be suitably designated by means of any mere concept that it generates. For the rest, anthropological terminology is, happily, in a somewhat fluid condition, and may be varied without impropriety in response to the needs of different theoretical purposes. It will suffice here to give a brief account of the chief aspects of the mental attitude under consideration.

1. **Emotional aspect.**—The emotional constituents of the magico-religious sentiment have been subjected to psychological analysis with results that show it to be, even in its simplest forms, exceedingly complex. 'Awe' is perhaps the word in our language that expresses its many-sided nature most fully, and awe is defined by W. McDougall as 'a tertiary compound of fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling.'[10] Round the object provided by the supernatural, fear, admiration, and submissiveness in varying degrees are organized into a mood, whether, in addition, that object be on the whole hated or loved, and consequently take rank as a manifestation of evil or of good supernatural power. Thus the sentiment is excited equally by magic and religion, the sorcerer, like the god, being 'surrounded by a halo of mystery and an atmosphere of awe.'[11] To appreciate the

[1] *E.g.*, J. G. Frazer, *GB*, London, 1890, i. 37, [2]1900, i. 137, [3]1911, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 386; R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, do. 1909, p. 11.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 366; cf. p. 374.
[3] *Ib.* p. 357.
[4] *Ib.* p. 386. [5] *Ib.* p. 51.
[4] *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 18 f.
[5] *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, p. 36.
[6] *A Psychological Study of Religion*, New York, 1912 p. 84.
[7] *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 17.
[8] See art. MANA.
[9] *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.*, p. 19.
[10] *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913, p. 305; cf. p. 131.
[11] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 356.

emotional attitude of primitive man towards a universe which, beyond the narrow circle of the daily routine, is almost wholly unknown, yet felt to be pregnant with immeasurable possibilities of weal or woe, one should take stock one by one of the more baffling and startling elements in his experience, as is done, *e.g.*, by W. D. Wallis in his paper 'The Element of Fear [better 'Awe'] in Religion.'[1] Confined by his ignorance to the immediate here and now, the savage attributes mystic powers alike to the stranger at a distance and to those of his own race that are dead and gone. Nor does the familiar present remain unvisited by portents. The sky above him is disturbed by thunderstorm, eclipse, shooting stars, the aurora; earth and sea about him have their haunted pools, their fantastic rocks. Then living nature teems with wonders—trees and herbs, reptiles and fishes, birds and quadrupeds, that look strange or behave unaccountably. Moreover, man is mysterious to himself, with his visions, his seizures, the power of his eye and gesture, his sheer impressiveness, ranging from the majesty of kings to the gruesomeness of witches. For the rest, life is full of accidents and coincidences. Altogether, the savage world provides plenty of scope for that interplay of primary emotions of which awe is the outcome. Be it noted, however, that the essence of supernaturalism does not consist in bare feeling, but attains to expression through every aspect of the mental life at once.[2]

2. Intellectual aspect.—Since supernaturalism has a negative as well as a positive side, embodying a cautious doubt of the unknown combined with an effort to read a meaning into it, primitive thought needs a twofold set of concepts. Negatively the supernatural is *tabu*, positively it is *mana*.[3] Among savages, of course, such notions have not been built up into any systematic theory; nor is it possible to say at what stage of mental evolution they first came into use, though perhaps it would be hard to point to any primitive people that lacks them entirely. Moreover, since the supernatural implies evil power as well as good, ministering to the purposes of the sorcerer no less than to those of the priest, it is to be expected that *mana* will sometimes split up into two notions that stand antithetically for the good and bad kinds of supernatural power.[4] Finally, it cannot be said that rudimentary thought is altogether without an idea corresponding to that of the natural or normal. It seems highly doubtful whether we can credit the savage with a belief in what we call the uniformity of nature, as some have sought to do;[5] indeed, historically, the modern concept of 'nature' would seem to have descended from *mana*, its wonder-working quality having been shed by the way.[6] But in the Polynesian *noa*, the non-sacred, common, or permitted,[7] we have the counterpart, as in the Latin *profanus*, of 'nature' so far as it stands not for mechanism but for routine. We must not, however, look for definiteness in primitive categories, since they are never subjected abstractly and as ideas to reflective examination, but merely embody such more or less arbitrary associations as custom suggests and sanctions.

3. Practical aspect.—Seeing, then, that the savage may be said to live out his ideas rather than to think them out, it is in the sphere of his actual practice as regulated by social use and wont that we are likely to meet with the clearest indications of his mental tendencies. Primitive supernaturalism will declare itself primarily in a group of traditional activities through which the appropriate feelings and thoughts find their satisfaction. The question, then, is how far there is a distinctive province of behaviour corresponding to the interest in the supernatural. Now, there can be no doubt that among some peoples of low culture the cleavage between the secular and the magico-religious sides of the social life is made 'as with a hatchet.' Thus we are told of the Central Australian:

> 'From the moment of his initiation . . . his life is sharply marked out into two parts. He has first of all what we may speak of as the ordinary life, common to all the men and women, and associated with the procuring of food and the performance of corrobborees, the peaceful monotony of this part of his life being broken every now and again by the excitement of a fight. On the other hand, he has what gradually becomes of greater and greater importance to him, and that is the portion of his life devoted to matters of a sacred or secret nature. As he grows older he takes an increasing share in these, until finally this side of his life occupies by far the greater part of his thoughts.'[1]

B. Malinowski, however, referring to this passage, raises a doubt whether such a bipartition of activities is a universal feature of primitive society. He instances Veddas and Melanesians, among whom religious and secular interests and pursuits seem to shade into each other without perceptible break.[2] But, when Durkheim states[3] that 'the division of things into sacred and profane lies at the base of all religious organization,' he can hardly be intending to affirm that a religious organization worthy of the name is to be found among all mankind. It is surely enough if the generalization hold good in the typical case. Moreover, this theory of the 'two worlds' of the sacred and the profane, though convenient in certain contexts—as, *e.g.*, to explain those 'rites of passage' whereby a man during initiation, or a woman at child-birth, enters a condition of *tabu* and passes out again into ordinary life[4]—need not be pressed too hard, seeing that sacredness is to some extent relative, so that, *e.g.*, a man may be *tabu* to strangers without being so to his friends.[5] All that need be assumed here is that certain activities tend to be organized about the interest in the supernatural as embodied in a specific tissue of feelings and beliefs. The magico-religious life is unlimited in its claim on human endeavour, and in its ulterior effects on human welfare may be well-nigh all-pervasive. But the mental attitude that it demands cannot be continuously maintained. Whenever the tension is relaxed, 'nature,' in the shape of the effortless rule of habit, is busy making good the strain.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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SUPERSTITION.—1. Signification and use of the term.—The word 'superstition' is used both in a concrete and in an abstract sense. We group together as superstitions a number of beliefs, habits, and fancies, tribal and individual, which we regard as not being founded on reasonable conceptions of the world and of human life, necessities, and obligations. The general or abstract term 'superstition' signifies the disposition to attribute occurrences to præternatural or occult influences, and to direct conduct with a view to avoiding mischief or obtaining advantages which such influences are supposed to produce. The precise connexion between the etymology of the word and its ordinary signification is not easy to trace. The prefix *super* seems to imply some excess, and this excess may generally be conceived as an exaggeration of a reasonable belief in some supernatural agents or agencies, with a readiness

[1] *Journ. Rel. Psychol.*, July, 1912, pp. 257–304.
[2] Cf. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1893, p. 453.
[3] Cf. R. R. Marett, 'The *tabu-mana* Formula as a Minimum Definition of Religion,' in *ARW* xii. [1909] 186–194.
[4] For examples see Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], p. 85 f.
[5] Cf. *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 51, 112, 220; A. O. Lovejoy, *Monist*, xvi. [1906] 381.
[6] Cf. H. Hubert and M. Mauss, in *ASoc* vii. [1904] 72; Durkheim, p. 35.
[7] See E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, Wellington, N.Z., 1891, *s.v.*

[1] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 33.
[2] *Rep. Brit. Assoc.* 1914, p. 534.
[3] *ASoc* ii. [1899] 19.
[4] Cf. A. van Gennep, *op. cit.*
[5] *Ib.* p. 16.

to accept unverified statements as to spiritual or magical interference in the material world. The origin of the most potent and widely spread superstitions has already been discussed under various headings.[1] It seems therefore more suitable here to consider superstition as an abstract quality, and to regard it in its psychological and historical aspects.

Two points may be noted for the purpose of clearing the ground: (1) the intensely subjective way in which the word is commonly used. No man is ready to acknowledge himself as superstitious, but almost every one is ready to recognize superstition in another. We find that men of a particular race, culture, and tone of mind brand as superstitious the religious or ceremonial observances of an alien people, while charging such people with incredulity if they are unready to receive new doctrines equally superstitious from their own standpoint. 'What is religion to you is superstition to me,' and *vice versa*, is a tacit assumption against which we must be on our guard. (2) Superstition need not be in any way connected with mysticism (*q.v.*). True, the mystic who regards all things and persons as owing what reality they have to a divine and supernatural life or element is likely to have a strong desire to find traces of the spiritual and eternal manifested in or through the form of the material and temporal. But the reasonable mystic, by very reason of his belief in the spiritual nature of ultimate reality, is the less liable to give credence to fanciful and grotesque intimations from a spirit world. Plato, the greatest of mystics, was eminently sane and reasonable. If the same cannot be said of all the Neo-Platonists, the reason must be that some of them were less mystical because more material than he.[2] Some confusion, however, may arise from the circumstance that many minds (especially of a saintly or of a poetic order) attach a symbolic meaning to certain material phenomena or ceremonial acts without any excessive regard for their intrinsic value. Hence we have the interesting fact that, in the higher religions of an advanced race, we may have what seems to be identity in attachment to doctrine and ritual with far-reaching differences in fundamental religious conceptions. Hence the warnings of religious teachers, on the one hand against the sudden demolition of 'superstitions' which have, for the uneducated, been valuable from their association with religious thought and feeling, and on the other against the confusion of symbol and reality, which tends to materialize and crystallize popular religion.

The superstitious mind, then, is one that is not educated to discern the character of evidence, or that has not patience to suspend judgment in the presence of unfamiliar phenomena. If it is objected that some very powerful and (in some directions) well trained intellects have coincided with a superstitious bias, these exceptions would seem due to a want of mental balance.

2. Historical aspects.—Turning from the individual to society and to historical progress, we may say that, roughly speaking, superstition declines as the view of the universe becomes more scientific. True, the birth of many—perhaps of all—sciences is attended by crude hypotheses which lend themselves to strange vagaries of thought. This is specially evident in the pseudo-science of alchemy, whence emerged the science of chemistry.[3] Even the earliest efforts of Ionic thought were not without such vagaries, yet the Greek philosophers had in them the root of the matter—a whole-hearted desire after truth. Therefore they progressed, and their progress belonged to the Western world.

When, in May, 585 B.C., in the midst of a battle between Lydians and Medes, there occurred 'the first eclipse of which European science foretold when it should betide,' the date was to have 'a deeper interest for Europe than the warfare. . . . Thales of Miletus, the father of Greek, and thereby of European, philosophy and science, had studied astronomy in Egypt; and he was able to warn the Ionians that before such a year had passed—his lore could not tell the day or the hour—the sun would be darkened.'[4]

This does not, of course, imply that the Greeks had already become, or were ever to become, what we should call a scientific people. But to bring so uncanny an occurrence as a darkening of the sun within the range of calculable events was to cut the ground beneath many superstitions. Yet Greek religion and Greek life abounded with superstitions. The religion of the Olympians was bound up with beliefs about the gods which Plato would have excluded from his ideal city, and the old-world ritual which survived in popular ceremonies was yet more favourable to unreasonable fancies and actions. The Athenians were doubtless the most intellectual of the Greeks, yet their prosecutions for impiety show both a low standard of religious liberty and a high standard (if the expression may be used) of respect for ancestral religion. Anaxagoras, Pericles, Euripides, above all Socrates, suffered at the hands of their countrymen. True, their cause prevailed in so far that in the next century speculation was more free and scepticism had scope; and, after all, the moderation centred in the maxim *μηδὲν ἄγαν* seems to have checked any tendency to persecution like that of the Middle Ages and later. Nicias was, in spite of his popularity, blamed by posterity for delaying the retreat of the Athenians before Syracuse on account of an eclipse of the moon. But the point against him, most probably, was not that he was too ill-educated to know the cause of lunar eclipses (since most Athenians would then have been in his company), but that he preferred the almost certain event of annihilation for his army to the exceedingly doubtful risk of supernatural punishment if he neglected the state of the heavens.

Yet, by a kind of paradox, scepticism seems to have overshot the mark, and, by denying the possibility of all certainty, to have opened the way, for people who *must* believe something, to all manner of superstitious habits and practices.[1] The interchange of religious ideas, the foundation and migration of religious societies, and the general disintegration which followed the conquests of Alexander and the advance of Rome meant, to many individuals in many places, a remarkable development and enlightenment of the religious consciousness; but it also meant a recrudescence of Oriental and barbarous superstition. This is found even among the late philosophical sects, notably the Neo-Pythagorean.[2]

As might naturally be expected, in societies comprising men of culture considerably above the rank and file of their contemporaries, we have, from the ancient pagan world, emphatic protests against the mischief wrought by superstition. Chief among these is the great poem of Lucretius (*q.v.*), who sees in superstition, or in popular religion, the most potent source of human ill. The same missionary spirit pervades the treatise of Plutarch *περὶ Δεισιδαιμονίας*, in which he holds up to contempt the figure of the man who lives in perpetual fear of having, by some trivial action, offended supernatural powers. There is, however, this great difference between the two: that, whereas Lucretius would dispense with the gods altogether, Plutarch (*q.v.*) holds to a faith in the divine beneficence and to the propriety of observing ancestral rites. The most eloquent part of his essay is that in which he shows the absurdity of stigmatizing as blasphemous those who deny the existence of the gods, while tolerating those who spread evil notions as to their malignity and vindictiveness. The same contrast may be noticed in assailants of superstition at various periods: the uncompromising enthusiast would sweep away all religious beliefs and institutions, though he may, like Lucretius, entertain conceptions of the universe which may fairly be regarded as religious. The conservative reformer, however anxious to remove causes of distress and aberration due to mistaken theology, may cling to old habits of piety, and reinterpret ancient traditions in accordance with liberty of thought.

3. Superstition and Aberglaube.—It may be noted that the kinds of superstition opposed by moral reformers are generally those which arise from baseless terrors. There are, of course, other manifestations of the superstitious spirit of a comparatively innocuous kind, such as belief in fairies, superstitions concerning the weather, lucky and unlucky days, and the like. And there is a mass of what may be regarded as superstition about the accretions to almost every system of positive religion, which on the one hand changes it very

[1] See esp. artt. MAGIC, CHARMS AND AMULETS, DREAMS AND SLEEP, EVIL EYE, MYTHOLOGY, PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

[2] See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

[3] See M. M. Pattison Muir, *The Story of Alchemy and the Beginnings of Chemistry*, London, 1902, also artt. ALCHEMY.

[4] J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of Greece*, London, 1900, ch. vi., sect. 1.

[1] This 'overshooting of the mark' by the sceptics is suggested by E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, London, 1913.

[2] See art. NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM.

conspicuously from its original form, and on the other hand may bring it within the reach of minds unaccustomed to deal with abstract ideas. These accretions are sometimes, in order to avoid the unpleasant connotation of 'superstition,' called by the German name of *Aberglaube*. They consist both of ritual and of dogma, and are hardly ever entirely to be distinguished from the necessary appurtenances of the religion with which they are associated.

The Middle Ages are generally regarded as pre-eminently a time of superstition. The judgment is probably justifiable, though there were as many hard-headed and constructive thinkers at most epochs of the Middle Ages as there have been earlier or later. But apart from the mixture of races and consequent multiplication of superstitions in the declining Empire, with the deficiency of mental culture in the leaders of the barbarian races, there was a great force arising to control speculation — that of ecclesiastical authority. This, however, must be considered on two sides. The worst kinds of superstitions, or at least the most conspicuous kinds, especially in Eastern Europe, were distinctly discouraged by the Church — soothsaying, necromancy, charms, and the like. And there can be little doubt that many of the heresies crushed out by the mediæval Church were accompanied by superstitious vagaries. Still, the fact is patent that the suppression of free thought, especially as directed to Church doctrine and ritual, must have tended to the growth of *δεισιδαιμονία* in Plutarch's sense. Of course, when we speak of the suppression of free thought, we do not necessarily mean that a very large number of persons suffered from not being allowed to think freely. Probably the number who thus suffered was comparatively very small. But many more must have lived in perpetual fear of the unseen. The terrors of the Judgment Day and of the world to come are very familiar objects of mediæval art, and it is difficult for us to see how far they were practically mitigated by the harmonious setting forth of the more comforting and spiritual elements in Christianity, with which they were, perhaps not quite consistently, associated.

The Renaissance and the Reformation are commonly regarded as having given the death-blow to superstition—so far, at least, as their influence extended. It is certain, however, that the indiscriminate cult of antiquity, which in some sections of society accompanied the Renaissance, contained or encouraged superstitious fancies and observances of a novel kind. And as to the Reformation even in Protestant countries, practically a good deal of *Aberglaube* formed part of the newly established doctrines and usages, and the sway of spiritual authority was by no means removed. The great movement towards mental and spiritual emancipation is generally taken as beginning in the 18th century.[1] It is to be noted that the battle waged on behalf of human reason was not confined to the world of thought and opinion. Political institutions, social divisions, industrial methods, and moral conventions were to be submitted to the test of right reason, and, if they failed, to be extirpated forthwith. The bitterness with which the contest was carried on, and which reached its culminating point in the excesses of the French Revolution, was partly due to the belief that superstitious practices had been maintained chiefly by those who profited by them—from the medicine-men of a savage tribe to the officers of an established church or a hereditary monarchy. Although there is, of course, some ground for such a supposition, as a partial explanation of the evil in question, its wholesale acceptance shows a very deficient comprehension of human nature. Without intelligible reasons, man is always desirous of knowing more than he can know about the spiritual world, and he will more readily submit to authority which has a traditional, if not actually a divine, sanction. And the exact nature of the government and institutions which right reason would commend has, of course, been very differently conceived by socialists or revolutionists of various types. Still, the general recognition that all beliefs and practices ought to have some rational justification was a great point gradually gained. It does not, of course, imply that nothing should be believed without strict logical proof, or that no institution should be maintained that does not evidently serve some useful object. But it does embody the Stoic principle that life should be according to nature and according to reason, and thus it tends to eliminate most of what is injurious either in superstitions with regard to religion or in tame acquiescence in existing governments.[1]

4. Influence of education.—The great agency making for the reduction of superstition during this century and the last is popular education. True, our elementary education can hardly as yet be called scientific, and what passes for scientific education may, after all, be superficial and narrow. But all sound teaching, at the present day, may be said to produce something like a scientific view of man and his environment—a view perfectly compatible with belief in the spiritual significance of life and even in a possible communion with non-material beings, but inconsistent with fanciful and trivial interpretations of natural phenomena as determined by præternatural agency.

If there should ever be a recrudescence of superstition in this generation or the next, it would probably be due, not to a defect in the scientific faculty, but to the expectations lately raised within the bounds of scientific investigation. Experts in psychology, especially those who have devoted themselves to what is technically called psychical research (*q.v.*), have, to many sane and scientific minds, proved the possibility of telepathy, thought-transference, and other processes which, fifty years ago, would certainly have been set down as superstitious. More than this, some persons of scientific mind and education believe that they have actually established and conducted a means of communication between living and dead.[2] When the persons engaged in these investigations are careful and scientific, we are inclined to accept their evidence, as we should on any other point of expert investigation. But in this field the 'media' used are of such uncertain character, the conditions and possibilities of communication so deeply veiled in obscurity, the desire to attain to fellowship with the departed so intense, that it is as well to approach all such problems with the most suspicious caution. There may be, as has often been said, a 'superstitious fear of superstition.' But, while suspending judgment on the result of the inquiries of experts, the non-expert may be in danger of falling into a superstitious habit of mind such as tends to upset entirely the mental balance.

LITERATURE.—For primitive superstitions see the works mentioned in the artt. here cited, esp. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], London, 12 vols., 1911–15; E. B. Tylor, *PC*[4], 2 vols., do. 1903. For the philosophy and history of the question see the various histories of philosophy and W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1887; A. W. Benn, *Hist. of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols., do. 1906; J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, do. 1907; Plutarch, *Moralia*, including *de Superstitione*, tr. into very vigorous English by Philemon Holland, do. 1603; Matthew Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, do. 1873, chs. on '*Aberglaube* invading' and '*Aberglaube* re-invading.'

ALICE GARDNER.

[1] See artt. ENLIGHTENMENT, ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.

[1] See art. RATIONALISM. [2] See art. SPIRITISM.

SUPRALAPSARIANISM.—The term supralapsarianism is used in Calvinistic theology, in contrast with sub- or infra-lapsarianism, to denote a view of the divine decrees in which, for the manifestation of His glory, God is held to destine a certain portion of mankind to eternal life, and another portion to destruction, regarding both simply as creatures, and antecedently to any consideration of the Fall and sin. It is not meant that this purpose is actually carried out without regard to character or condition; but, in the order of decrees, it is first determined who are to be embraced in the one class, and who in the other; then the means are appointed—including creation, the Fall, sin, redemption—by which the end in each case is to be attained. So harsh a view of the divine procedure has always been in the highest degree repellent to Christian minds; accordingly, the great majority of Calvinists have shrunk from it, and contented themselves with the milder sublapsarian view, which affirms an election of God from the mass of mankind, regarded as already fallen.

On its historical side, the question is raised whether Calvin himself is to be classed as a supralapsarian or a sublapsarian. Some incline to the former view, but the truth seems to be that, when Calvin wrote, the question had not distinctly emerged, and the emphasis which he continually lays on election as a choice of some from a sinful mass, and on reprobation as grounded on the sinner's own evil, fairly warrants the more usual opinion that his doctrine inclined more to sublapsarianism.[1] On the other hand, Beza, Calvin's successor, Gomar, the colleague and opponent of Arminius in Holland, Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, and a few others,[2] were conspicuous for their advocacy of supralapsarianism; and the Remonstrants, in the Arminian controversy, naturally sought to fasten this view on all Calvinists. It is really, however, an extreme opinion, and the bulk of Calvinists, as already said, have wisely kept themselves aloof from it. Turretin, *e.g.*, ably states and defends the sublapsarian position in his *Institutio*.[3] The Synod of Dort, in its decision, framed its canons on sublapsarian lines.[4] The *Westminster Confession* leans, in certain of its clauses, to the stronger view of Archbishop Ussher (author of the Irish Articles), and of a few members of the Assembly, but the tone of the debates in that body sufficiently shows that the prevailing opinion was sublapsarian, and the Confessional statement, taken as a whole, is of this character. The stronger view has, indeed, no symbolical sanction.

Cunningham, in his discussion of the subject,[5] claims that the controversy is one 'of no great intrinsic importance,' but this can hardly be allowed.

'A doctrine of this kind, which bids us think of beings not yet conceived of as even created (therefore only as *possibles*)—not to say as sinful—set apart for eternal blessedness or misery, and of the fall and redemption as simply means for effecting that purpose, is one which no plea of logical consistency will ever get the human mind to accept, and which is bound to provoke revolt against the whole system with which it is associated.'[6]

It cannot even be conceded, though it has often been contended, that this *is* the most logical form of the predestinarian doctrine. The end, it is argued, comes necessarily first in order of thought; then the means are devised which are to accomplish it. In the case of moral destiny, we are disposed to say, this is the precise inversion of the fact. There can be no legitimate consigning of a moral being to wrath, save as he is in some way viewed as deserving of that wrath; even in order of thought, therefore, the consideration of moral state must precede the sentence of rejection. If the reply is made that the sin itself is viewed in Calvinism as foreordained, this is doubtless true, but only in the sense in which every event in life is foreordained, viz. by God's decreeing to admit it into His providential plan and to overrule it for the ends of His wisdom. It is a totally different thing to affirm that sin is ordained as a means to the destruction of a being already foreordained to wrath prior to consideration of his sin.

It need only be added that the whole subject assumes a different aspect when fuller justice is done to the Scriptural idea of election as aiming, not at exclusion, but at subsequent wider inclusion.[1]

LITERATURE.—P. Schaff, *A Hist. of the Creeds of Christendom*, London, 1877, pp. 453–455; W. Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1862; C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, London and Edinburgh, 1872–73, ii. 316–320.

JAMES ORR.

SURINAM.—See GUIANA.

SURVIVALS.—See RELIGION, vol. x. p. 664, § 4.

ŚVETĀMBARAS.—**1. Origin and history.**—'We,' said a Śvetāmbara once to the present writer, 'are the Catholics amongst the Jains; the Digambaras represent the Puritans'; and that does roughly sum up the difference between the two great sects of the Jains.[2]

Even during the lifetime of Mahāvīra[3] two parties probably existed, for the great Jain hero seems to have formed his community by uniting two different orders of mendicants, the Sthavira kalpa and the Jina kalpa. The Sthavira kalpa wore clothes, but one section of the Jina kalpa did not, going about like Mahāvīra himself, clad only in the four quarters of the sky. This outward and visible difference was symbolic of the differing types of men in the community, and only a strong statesman could have held the two parties together; under any great strain the cleavage was bound to become permanent.

According to the Sthānakavāsī Śvetāmbara tradition, the first crisis arose through a great famine that occurred in the reign of Chandragupta (? 310 B.C.), when 12,000 Jain monks went to S. India under Bhadrabāhu in search of food. These, being the young and vigorous members of the order, were able to carry out their rule in its entirety and so went unclad, whilst the other members of the community, who remained at home under Sthūlabhadra, amounting also, the legend says, to 12,000, were allowed (owing perhaps to age and infirmity) to wear clothes, no matter to which of the two parties they had originally belonged. When Bhadrabāhu returned home after the famine, although he became once more head of an undivided community, he was never able to insist on nakedness as a rule of even a section of the community. The second cause of schism also arose during this famine—at least according to the Sthānakavāsī Śvetāmbara tradition; for it was then, during his leader Bhadrabāhu's absence, that the second in command, Sthūlabhadra, called a council at Pāṭaliputra to collect the sacred books. The council were able to produce only eleven *Aṅga*, but Sthūlabhadra himself supplied the missing twelfth *Aṅga*. Bhadrabāhu on his return was annoyed to find that this council had been held in his absence, and not unnaturally, though irritably, declared that the twelfth *Aṅga* was hopelessly lost. It only remained now for a leader to be found for the malcontents to hive off, and (if the legend be true) irritability had much to do with that leader's decisive action. About forty years after the great famine (according to Tapāgachchha Śvetāmbara tradition, about A.D. 142; according to Sthānakavāsī, A.D. 83; and according to Hoernle, A.D. 79 or 80) the reins of government fell into the weaker hands of a man called Vajrasena, and the community finally divided. The Śvetāmbara quote

1 See art. CALVINISM.
2 See Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, p. 366 f.
3 Loc. iv. qu. ix.
4 Cf. Schaff, *Hist. of the Creeds*, i. 455.
5 *Hist. Theology*, Edinburgh, 1862, ii. 435, *Reformers and Theol. of Reformation*, p. 358.
6 Orr, *The Progress of Dogma*, London, 1901, p. 296.

1 See artt. CALVINISM, ELECTION, PREDESTINATION.
2 See artt. DIGAMBARAS, JAINISM.
3 See art. AJĪVIKAS, § 2 f.

the following legend to account for the actual cleavage:

A monk named Śivabhūti had been given a most beautiful blanket by the king in whose service he had been at the time of his initiation. His spiritual preceptor warned him that it was becoming a snare to him and advised him to give it away; this he refused to do, so his preceptor took the extreme step of tearing up the blanket in its owner's absence. Śivabhūti, when he discovered what had happened, was so angry that he declared that, if he could not have the one possession which he valued, he would keep nothing at all, but would wander in entire nakedness like the Lord Mahāvīra himself; and he then and there started a new sect, that of the naked Digambara.

This very human legend which the Śvetāmbara (the 'White-clothed') tell of their unclothed rivals not only accounts for their nakedness, but also goes on to explain another difference between the two sects; for, when Śivabhūti's sister wanted to join his order, seeing that it was impracticable for a woman to go about nude, he roundly told her that it was impossible for a woman to become a nun, or to obtain *mokṣa* (*q.v.*) without rebirth as a man, and thus laid down for all time a distinctive tenet of the Digambara. Important as these legends are, it must be remembered that they are quoted only as illustrative of the Jain point of view, for their confirmation is sadly to seek, and the legends connecting Chandragupta with the faith are essentially open to suspicion.

2. Distinctive tenets and practices.—We are on firmer ground when we notice the main differences between the two sects at the present day. We are already prepared for the fact that the Śvetāmbara list of sacred books is not accepted by the Digambara, and that, since they hold that no woman can attain *mokṣa*, the Digambara will not admit the Śvetāmbara tradition that Mallināṭha (the nineteenth *tīrthaṅkara*) was a woman. But the two sects differ very considerably about the life-story of Mahāvīra.

The Śvetāmbara say that their great saint married and enjoyed life to the full before entering an order, and that, even when he at last decided to do so, he waited till his parents' death, and until he had gained his brother's consent, lest he should grieve any one before receiving initiation, which he obtained in his thirtieth year. The more austere Digambara tradition, however, is that their founder never married; and, having no hesitation about hurting any one's feelings, renounced the world at the mature age of eight. Even the prenatal stories differ, for the Śvetāmbara believe that Mahāvīra's mother had fourteen wonderful dreams; the Digambara say that she had sixteen; while the legend of the removal of the embryo of Mahāvīra from Devānandā to Triśalā is a Śvetāmbara one.

The lists of the heads of the community since Śivabhūti of course differ also. The Śvetāmbara generally arrange their philosophy in nine categories; the Digambara arrange very much the same philosophy under seven heads. One point of divergence on which they lay great stress is that, according to the Śvetāmbara, a *tīrthaṅkara* needs food to support him until he dies; while the Digambara believe that, once a *tīrthaṅkara* has attained omniscience, he has no further need of meals.

There are also differences in actual practice. A Śvetāmbara ascetic may keep a loin-cloth, a shoulder-cloth, and a blanket to wear. Indeed, including these and his brush, mouth-cloth, and wooden vessels, he is allowed to retain fourteen possessions in this world, whereas a Digambara is absolutely nude and, though provided with a brush and peacock's feathers, has to live entirely in the jungle. The Śvetāmbara laymen complain that their ascetics interfere too much in their conferences; this complaint is, of course, never brought against a Digambara ascetic, whose lack of clothing interns him for life in the wilderness.

There are also different rules about begging for the ascetics of the two orders, and the Digambara ascetics have no *upāsarā*. Again, the Śvetāmbara idols have glass eyes inserted in the marble, wear a loin-cloth, and are bedecked with jewels, whereas the austere Digambara idols are nude and are represented as being dead to the world, with eyes cast down. There is naturally therefore a difference in the installation ceremonies of their idols. The ordinary worship differs also. The Śvetāmbara, when performing the eightfold worship, offer flowers and fresh fruit to their idols, and so on great festivals do the Visapanthī Digambara; but the Terāpanthī Digambara never offer flowers or fresh fruit; in their stead they use cloves, dry coco-nut, sugar, and rice.[1]

There is another very interesting difference. A Digambara Jain has no private idol in his own house, but, if a Śvetāmbara is a wealthy man and lives far from a temple, he may have his own private chapel. This chapel is separate from the house and can be entered only by persons in a state of ceremonial purity. In the chapel, if he can afford it, he may have a *pratīmā* (an image of any one of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkara* that an astrologer selects for him), or he may have a *siddha chakra* (a tray on which are depicted the leading points of the Jain faith).[1] The householder offers the eightfold worship to the *pratīmā*, but only washes and wipes the *siddha chakra* and marks it with sandalwood paste. An instructed Śvetāmbara would never ask a boon even of the idol in his own house: he would only stir himself up to future efforts by meditating on it. But if, as often happens, an uninstructed Śvetāmbara does ask a gift, his prayer would be answered not by the *tīrthaṅkara* (who as a matter of fact does not even hear it) but by the *yakṣa* in attendance on the *tīrthaṅkara*.

3. Śvetāmbara sects.—The main division of Śvetāmbara Jains is into Sthānakavāsī and Derāvāsī. The Sthānakavāsī are a non-idol-worshipping sect, which arose about A.D. 1474.[2] Excepting on the crucial point of idol-worship, they do not differ much from other Śvetāmbara Jains.

At the present time the chief sects among idol-worshipping (Derāvāsī) Śvetāmbara are the Tapāgachchha (whose ascetics use red alms-bowls, and whose laymen in their devotions first confess their sins of walking and later their sins of trading), the Kharataragachchha (whose ascetics use black alms-bowls, and whose laity first confess their sins of trading and later their sins of walking), and the Añchalagachchha and the Pāyachandagachchha, whose divergences are very slight.

It must be remembered that these are only spiritual distinctions and do not interfere with the freedom of marriage between different sects. The chief castes among the Jains are Osavāla, Poravāḍa, Śrīmālī and Śrī Śrīmāla, which are each divided into two sections, Dasā and Vīsā. It is impossible for members of these different castes to intermarry: thus an Osavāla Kharatara could marry an Osavāla Sthānakavāsī, for, though the sect differs, the caste is the same, but a Dasā Osavāla could never marry a Vīsā Osavala, and still less could any Poravāḍa marry any Osavāla. It is interesting to notice, however, that any Jain could dine with any other Jain, Śvetāmbara or Digambara, whether Osavāla or Śrīmālī; but they would not interdine with any Brāhman convert to Jainism.

LITERATURE.—Through the kindness of Jain friends the writer was given an opportunity of translating this art. to the leading Tapāgachchha Śvetāmbara Sādhu in Rājkot in his *apāsaro*, when the principal Sthānakavāsī Jain *paṇḍits* were also present; the art. has thus had the advantage of criticisms and suggestions from both parties at first hand. See also A. F. R. Hoernle, *Annual Address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, in *JASB*, Calcutta, 1898; Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910, and *The Heart of Jainism*, do. 1915.

MARGARET STEVENSON.

[1] Cf. art. WORSHIP (Jain).
[2] Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 87.

SWAHILIS.—See ZANZIBAR.

SWAN-MAIDENS.—The beautiful and poetic myth of swan-maidens is of early origin and, in varying forms, of very wide diffusion. The central idea of the myth is that certain beings, half-mortal, half-supernatural, have the power of metamorphosis into bird-form; connected with this are two secondary ideas: (1) that this power is dependent on the possession of a magic attribute, which was generally a bodily covering, such as a feather coat, robe, or veil, but sometimes merely a ring or chain; (2) that either this being, when in human form, or her captor is subject to a tabu of some kind. There are so many variations on these themes that it is impossible to do more than refer briefly to some of the most significant versions.

1. In Oriental folk-lore. — Oriental folk-lore furnishes many instances of bird-maiden stories. In Indian tradition we find the very early myth of Urvaśī embedded like a jewel in the dull ritual of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*.

The *apsara*, or nymph, Urvaśī loves one of the lunar race of kings, Purūravas; in wedding him she stipulates that she must never look upon him naked. By a trick played by the *gandharvas*, supernatural beings who desire the return of their former playmate, the promise is broken, and Urvaśī vanishes. Purūravas, seeking her, finds her and her companions swimming on a lotus-lake in the shape of water-birds. They 'appear to him,' *i.e.* assume human form, but in response to his pleading Urvaśī replies: 'I have passed away like the first of dawns. . . . I am like the wind, difficult to catch.'[1] Finally, however, she relents, and the couple are re-united.

In the *Vikramurvaśī* of the poet Kālidāsa, a drama based upon this story, the bird-myth has almost disappeared, except for Urvaśī's power of flying and for the constant references to swans throughout act iv. Her change into human form depends merely upon the laying aside of a veil, in itself probably a stage convention for invisibility; the marital tabu, which Lang[2] characterizes as a relic of 'a traditional Aryan law of nuptial etiquette,' assumes a quite different form.[3]

The myth re-appears in one of the finest tales of the *Thousand and One Nights*, that of Hasan of Bassorah.

Hasan is enjoying the hospitality of a family of princesses; when obliged to leave him, they enjoin him not to open a certain door. He disobeys, and finds a fair pavilion and a bathing-pool, to which come flying from the desert ten birds, one among which was pre-eminent for beauty. Each bird, as it alighted, 'rent open its neck-skin with its claws, and issued out of it, and lo, it was but a garment of feathers.' After their departure Hasan, who has become deeply enamoured of the fairest bird-maiden, confesses his disobedience to his hostess, and is told that this damsel is 'the daughter of the sovran of the Jans. He hath an army of women, smiters with swords, and lungers with lances, . . . and the plumed skins wherewith they fly are the handiwork of enchanters.' Hasan is advised to steal the feather dress and never again to let it come into the owner's hands; he does so, but after three years the wife by a ruse secures the dress, buttons it on, and flies away. Hasan tracks his wife to the islands of Wāk-Wāk, inhabited by the warrior women, and recovers her.[4]

The story of Janshāh[5] is a slighter tale that begins similarly; but the bird-maidens are only three in number, and are 'as doves, eagle-sized.' The husband's device to secure the feather coat is to place it in a chest, leaden-bound, which is built into the foundations of the palace; but in vain, for the lady traces it by scent and digs it out.[6]

The Wāk-Wāk islands of the former tale have been identified with various Melanesian islands;[7] it is not surprising, therefore, to find the tale of Hasan re-appearing in the Celebes in a modern form, which Tylor quotes in connexion with the heaven-plant myth.[1] Tatar versions of the myth are signalized as being the only ones to represent the bird-maiden as a malignant being, half-vampire, half-fury;[2] in the Tatar poem quoted by J. G. Frazer[3] to illustrate the external soul belief, the hero wrestles with the evil swan-woman for 'moons and years.'

2. In classical tradition. — Classical tradition does not seem to have preserved any swan-maiden tale in a complete form, but that the main idea was a familiar one is evident from the Cycnus myths, the bird-transformation of the comrades of Diomedes, the story of Leda, and the symbolic connexion of swans with Apollo, with the Muses, and with Aphrodite.[4] Modern Greek folk-lore represents the Nereids as flying maidens, similar in many points to swan-maidens.[5]

3. Slavic.—Slavic folk-lore bears frequent testimony to the myth. The South Slavs were naturally more influenced by late Greek and by Oriental tradition, and the Bulgarian *samodivas*, and the Serbian *vilas*, like the Greek Nereids, resemble the swan-maidens; *e.g.*, the *vilas* are associated with water and have the power of flying.[6]

The Polish fairy-tale of the prince and the twelve geese-princesses shows that the myth in its simplest form was known to the Western Slavs.[7] The most important Russian example is the tale of 'Sweet Mikāilo Ivānovitch the Rover' and Mārya the white swan; this begins in fairly conventional style, although without the feather dress, but later it diverges considerably, for Mārya dies, is magically revived, and finally forsakes her husband for another love.[8]

4. Celtic.—Old Celtic tradition has two beautiful and elaborate swan-maiden tales, as well as an episode in the story of Etain, wife of Eochaid, who is carried off by the hero-god Mider in the form of a swan.[9]

The story of the 'Children of Lêr,' one of 'the three most sorrowful tales of Erinn,' is an example, with Christian 'overlay,' of that variant of the myth in which the swan shape is enforced by malignant magic. The four royal children, metamorphosed for 900 years, retain their powers of human reasoning and speech, and have the gift of singing 'plaintive music at which the men of the world would sleep, and there shall be no music of the world its equal.'[10]

This power of song is turned to account in the Christian episode which concludes the tale.[11] 'The Dream of Oengus' conforms more closely to the regular swan-maiden type, so much so that J. A. MacCulloch[12] dismisses it as of no mythological or religious value; its artistic value, however, is very great.

The god Oengus is smitten with love for a dream-maiden, the original of whom proves to be Caer, a princess who spends every alternate year in the form of a swan. Oengus, having once seen her in mortal form, succeeds in discerning her in swan-guise from among her 150 companions 'with their silvery chains and golden caps around their heads.' He woos and wins her, and flies off with her, himself also metamorphosed, and their singing is of such beauty as to lull to sleep all its hearers for three days and three nights.[13]

5. Teutonic.—The Teutonic races bear the distinction of having developed the swan-maiden myth most elaborately, and of having enriched it by connecting it with other supernatural ideas. Traces of the symbolic importance of swans are found in the primitive myths of the life and death

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[1] This formula, 'difficult to catch,' recurs in the Welsh tale of the Van Pool, quoted by Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, p. 275 ff.

[2] *Custom and Myth*, p. 76.

[3] Cf. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, xi. v. 1, tr. J. Eggeling, *SBE* xliv. [1900] 68–74; *Vikramurvaśī*, tr. E. B. Cowell, Hertford, 1851.

[4] R. F. Burton, *A Plain and Literal Translation of the Arabian Nights*, Benares, 1885, viii. 7–143.

[5] *Ib.* v. 329–381.

[6] Contrast with this Hartland's idea (p. 308) that the swan-maiden must always employ an intermediary to obtain her robe.

[7] E. W. Lane, *The Thousand and One Nights*, London, 1838–41, iii. 523, note 32.

[1] *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*[2], London, 1878, p. 355 f.

[2] A. Schiefner, *Heldensagen der minussinischen Tataren*, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 201.

[3] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 144.

[4] W. Smith, *Classical Dictionary*, *s.vv.* 'Cycnus,' 'Diomedes'; Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*[2], pp. 569–572.

[5] B. Schmidt, *Griechische Märchen*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 133.

[6] F. S. Krauss, *Tausend Sagen und Märchen der Südslaven*, i., Leipzig, 1914, *passim*.

[7] A. H. Wratislaw, *Sixty Folk-tales from exclusively Slavonic Sources*, London, 1889, p. 111 f.

[8] Isabel F. Hapgood, *The Epic Songs of Russia*, New York and London, 1886, pp. 214–231.

[9] H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Irish Mythological Cycle*, Dublin, 1903, p. 182.

[10] With this sleep-bringing power may be compared the trolls' swans that sing the enchanted prince asleep in the Icelandic fairy tale (J. C. Poestion, *Isländische Märchen*, Vienna, 1884, no. vii. pp. 49–54).

[11] *Atlantis*, iv. [1863] 113 ff., tr. E. O'Curry.

[12] *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 82

[13] *RCel* iii. [1876–78] 347 ff., tr. Edward Müller.

both of the world and of individuals; thus the two swans, the progenitors of all the swan-kind, that float on the Urtharbrunnr of the old Norse cosmogony,[1] may be contrasted with the swan that lived, according to Finnish myth, on the river of Tuoni or Death.[2] In later folk-tale we find a swan living on a hidden lake, which maintains the world in equipoise by carrying a ring in its beak; when it drops it, the end of the world will come.[3] Popular saying still remembers the bird as one of omen and augury;[4] in Rügen, swans, not storks, are the bringers of new-born children,[5] while, on the other hand, the sight of a swan in flight may betoken death,[6] and swans are often leaders of the spirit-host.[7] The ideas of animal shape-changing and of the external soul favoured the development of the swan-maiden myth in folk-lore. The Scandinavian North, as one of the chief haunts in Europe of the wild swan, showed itself especially alive to the beauty and significance inherent in the myth; Grimm,[8] influenced perhaps by the legends of the 'goose-footed woman,' 'la reine pédauque,' and 'Berthe aux grands pieds,' thinks that the goose supplanted the swan in legend, but this seems hardly proved. The power of flying and the possession of a feather coat were attributes of many gods in the Norse pantheon. The swan-maiden of the Scandinavians appears to have been merged into the Norns on the one hand and the Valkyries on the other, who themselves often have traits in common. The connexion of swans with augury and with the Urtharbrunnr, the home of the Norns, prepares us for the former aspect; the power of 'riding through the air' possessed by the Valkyries prepares us for the latter; and we have already seen the bird-maidens as warrior-maidens in the story of Hasan of Bassorah.

The swan-maidens of the *Nibelungenlied* are Norns also; as swan-maidens they appear to Hagene 'like birds,' and they fall into his power when he takes their garments, but they are also 'wise women,' and one gives him prophetic warning.[9] The maidens of the *Völundarkvitha*[10] are conventional swan-maidens with their 'swan-coats,' but they are also Valkyries, for they appear helmeted. Again, the hero Helgi is helped in battle by Kāra, a rebirth of the Valkyrie Svava, who hovers singing above him.[11] Fridlevus II., king of Denmark, is given helpful warning before a battle by the song of three swans.[12] After this it is not surprising to find also traces of a connexion between swan-maidens and the *fylgja*, or female guardian-spirit; thus the *fylgja* of a beautiful woman appears as a swan.[13]

6. The swan-knight.—The swan-knight seems to have been monopolized and localized by Teutonic mythology, although there are traces of the idea in classical legend, as in the Cycnus myth already mentioned,[14] and although the Teutonic myth appears to have fused with Celtic Arthurian legend. The popularity of the charming tale of Helyas, knight of the swan, and supposed ancestor of Godfrey of Bouillon, is attested by the numerous versions of it in various languages.

In the popular German fairy-tale the enchanted brothers owe their restoration to human form, not to the prowess of their brother, as in Helyas, but to the devotion of a sister. Of the other swan-knights of Brabant, the link with the Graal legends has brought Lohengrin, son of Parsival, most into prominence and popularity. The fact that the swan-hero arrives from an unknown land in a skiff, and departs in the same way, has led Grimm[1] to trace the beginning of the Teutonic swan-knight myth to Scyld and Scēaf, semi-divine founders of the Danish race, of whom a similar tale is told, although the connexion with the bird-myth is very obscure.

7. Interpretations.—The interpretations of the swan-myths have been various; the earlier school of mythologists saw in them nature-myths, the swan-maiden being the white cloud, her captor the storm-spirit.[2] Others have explained the swan-maiden, who is subject to mysterious prohibitions and who in the end is almost always lost to her captor, and the swan-knight, who must not reveal his name or place of origin, as denizens of the world of the dead or of the islands of the blessed.[3] A more prosaic view takes into account merely the totemistic aspect which the myth shows in common with all animal shape-changing tales, points to the swan-maidens and swan-knights as founders of clans, and compares them with such figures as Mélusine of Lusignan.[4] The most modern theory brings the tabu into prominence, to the overshadowing of other aspects, and adduces the wide evidence now forthcoming of marital tabus among primitive peoples;[5] thus a curious piece of corroborative evidence on the symbolic connexion between swans and women has been found in the rites enforced on secluded girls among American Indian tribes.[6] Fortunately for the appeal of the myth, none of these theories has power to detract from, but all serve only to enhance, its elusive and poetic beauty.

LITERATURE.—J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, i. 426–430; W. Mannhardt, *Germanische Mythen*, Berlin, 1858, p. 340 ff.; E. H. Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, do. 1891, chs. vi. and vii.; J. Fiske, art. in *Atlantic Monthly*, xxviii. [1871] 129–144; S. Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*[2], London, 1869, chs. xxi. and xxii.; F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, pp. 54–65, 239–250; A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, ch. iv.; E. S. Hartland, *The Science of Fairy Tales*, do. 1891, chs. x.–xii.; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, tr. B. J. Vos, Boston, U.S.A., 1902, ch. xv.; W. Müller, 'Die Sage vom Schwanritter,' in *Germania*, ed. F. Pfeiffer, i. [1856] 418–440.

M. E. SEATON.

SWĀT or UDYĀNA.—This is a famous principality in Independent Eastern Afghanistan, between the latter country and Kashmīr, to the south of Chitral and the Pamirs. It receives the name of Swāt from the river of that name (the Svastu, in Sanskrit), which joins the Kabul branch of the Indus above Peshāwar. Its literary name of Udyāna (in Prakrit, Ujjāna) is ascribed to its 'garden or park-like' appearance; for it is an exceptionally richly cultivated and well-watered beautiful Alpine valley. Through this Indo-Scythian country Alexander descended for his invasion of India, crossing, it is generally supposed, the Malakand Pass, which is on the main route to the Indian plains; but Swāt is best known for its fame as an ancient centre of Buddhism. It is still thickly covered with the ruins of Buddhist monuments and temples, richly decorated with some of the finest sculptures of the Græco-Buddhist or so-called Gandhāra (*q.v.*) type of art. These sculptured friezes and terra-cottas date chiefly between the 2nd and 5th centuries A.D.; and a collection of several hundreds was made by the present writer during the Chitral expedition of 1895 and is now preserved in the Calcutta and Peshāwar museums.[7] The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hian, who visited the country *c.* A.D.

[1] Snorri, *Edda*, ed. E. Wilken, Paderborn, 1877, p. 24.
[2] *Kalevala*, rune 14.
[3] F. Gottschalck, *Sagen und Volksmärchen der Deutschen*, Halle, 1814, p. 227.
[4] Cf. Grimm, i. 437, note 1.
[5] E. M. Arndt, *Schriften für und an seine lieben Deutschen*, Leipzig, 1845, iii. 547; cf. in Chinese legend the fostering of the hero Hou Chi by a wild swan (C. F. R. Allen, *The Book of Chinese Ballads*, London, 1891, p. 385 f.).
[6] F. A. Kuhn, *Märkische Sagen und Märchen*, Berlin, 1843, no. 68.
[7] W. Müller, 'Die Sage vom Schwanritter,' in *Germania*, ed. F. Pfeiffer, i. 421.
[8] P. 1098.
[9] *Nibelungenlied*, Aventiure xxv.
[10] Stanzas 1–3.
[11] *Fornaldar Sögur*, ii. 375 f.
[12] Saxo Grammaticus, *Hist. Danica*, vi. 178.
[13] M. Bartels, 'Isländischer Brauch und Volksglaube in Bezug auf die Nachkommenschaft,' *ZE* xxxii. [1900] 70.
[14] Cf. *Æneid*, x. 185–197.

[1] 368–370.
[2] E. H. Meyer, *Germ. Mythologie*, pp. 90, 125.
[3] W. Müller, *op. cit.*; Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, pp. 54–65.
[4] Cf. art. ANIMALS, § 26.
[5] Hartland, pp. 304–322.
[6] *GB*[2], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 47–50, 90–92.
[7] L. A. Waddell, *Report on Archæological Tour in Swat*, Calcutta, 1895, reprint in *Asiat. Quarterly Rev.*, Oct. 1895, and 'Newly Excavated Greco-Buddhist Sculptures from Swāt Valley,' *Trans. of the Oriental Congress*, 1897, sect. i. 245–247.

400, says: 'The religion of Buddha is very flourishing . . . in all there are 500 monasteries, they belong to the Little Vehicle (*Hīna-yāna*) without exception.'[1] But, when Hiuen Tsiang visited the land *c.* A.D. 630, he found that nearly all the convents, some 1400 in number with formerly 18,000 priests, were 'waste and desolate.'[2] It is a striking commentary on Fa Hian's reference to the exclusive prevalence of the 'Little Vehicle' form of Buddhism that as a fact all the sculptural remains are of the 'Great Vehicle' (*Mahā-yāna*).

It was regarded by Fa Hian as the most northerly province of India, and the food and clothing of the people were the same as in India, and this is still the case—the people dress in white. The dimensions of the Swāt country, as described by Hiuen Tsiang at 5000 *li* (about 833 miles) in circuit, show that it in those days evidently included, in addition to the valley of Swāt, also the Chitral and Dard adjoining countries and the mountains on the right bank of the Indus, even beyond the great bend of the river to the south.

It was the native country of Padma-saṁbhava (*q.v.*), the founder of Lāmaism in Tibet; and the notorious prevalence of Śaivite magical rites in the manuals ascribed to that saint in the Tibetan is somewhat in keeping with the old reputation of this country for sorcery. Hiuen Tsiang, in his visit to this land about a century before Padma-saṁbhava's period, writes: 'The science of magical formulas is become a regular professional business with them (the men of Swāt or Udyāna).'[3]

The belief in serpent-dragons of rivers and springs was especially prevalent here. It was at the source of the Swāt river that was located the legendary water-dragon or serpent Apalāla, whose conversion by Buddha is a favourite motive in Buddhist art, both north and south. Hiuen Tsiang refers especially to the 'white water' issuing from this spring, as also does al-Bīrunī about the 11th cent. A.D.,[4] which would doubtless be snow-water rather than glacial, yet it suggests that the river-name Svastu may have originally been derived from *sveta*, or *sweta*, 'white,' which approximates the modern name of that river, 'Swāt.' Confirmation of this ancient water-serpent worship was found by the present writer in a Kharoṣṭhī inscription upon a great boulder at a spring of which the record reads from a rubbing taken by the present writer: 'By the son of Dati, the Thera (Buddhist monk) Nora, a tank was caused to be made for the worship of All Serpents (in) the year 113.'[5] This date, from the palæographic details, is placed about 65 B.C.

LITERATURE.—References are cited in the article.

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SWAZIS.—See BANTU AND S. AFRICA.

SWEARING.—See OATH, PROFANITY.

SWEAT, SWEAT-HOUSE.—Sweat, a colourless fluid containing about 2 per cent of solid matter, is a secretion of the sebaceous glands. Its chief function is to regulate the heat discharge of the human body. It is connected with some curious and interesting religious and magical customs in various parts of the world.

1. Sweat in magic. — Primitive man regards sweat, like blood, saliva, hair, and nail-parings, as a medium both for setting sorcery in motion against an enemy and for working the more harmless forms of magic. Codrington says that among the Melanesians the belief prevails that a leaf with which a man has wiped the perspiration from his face may be employed to work mischief against him.[1] A like belief is found among the Negroes of N. America.[2] Some of the natives of N.E. New Guinea take elaborate precautions to prevent a drop of their sweat from being made use of by a sorcerer; on leaving a camping-place, they stab the ground all over with their spears.[3] Some of the most curious uses to which this exudation of the human body has been put are illustrated by a group of customs connected with love magic.

'A cake, an apple, or a sweetmeat impregnated with the sweat of the giver is a powerful philtre throughout the greater part of northern and central Europe, from Cairn Gorm to the Carpathians.'[4] A Hungarian girl steals meal and honey at Christmas-time, bakes a cake, takes it to bed with her for one night, and then bestows it on a youth whom she wishes to fall in love with her.[5] W. R. Paton says that in three Νομοκάνονες (confessors' manuals) of the Orthodox Church, which are, he believes, less than three centuries old, 'women are accused of rubbing dough on their bodies, and giving it to eat to men in whom they wish to arouse satanic love.'[6]

The victim of such love magic can, however, have recourse to a counter-charm of the same character. 'It was narrated that if a man who, under the influence of a philtre, was forced to love against his will, would put on a new pair of shoes, and wear them out by walking in them, and then drink wine out of the right shoe, where it could mingle with the perspiration already there, he would promptly be cured of his love, and hate take its place.'[7]

A similar idea underlies the superstition prevalent among the Negroes and Indians of N. America, and also in Belgium, that, if the owner of a dog wishes to make the animal faithful to him, he should give it some bread which has been soaked in his sweat.[8] In the island of Tutu, in the Torres Straits, men drink the sweat of renowned warriors to acquire courage.[9]

The mythology of ancient Egypt seems to have ascribed a sacramental virtue to the sweat of Osiris. In the pyramid libation-formulæ the libations appear to be his sweat; and in the ritual of Amon the incense appears to be crystallized drops of it.[10] A song quoted by A. Erman speaks of the Nile as the sweat of Osiris' hands.[11] The Negroes of Jamaica identified a man's luck with the perspiration of his hands, and believed that, if the latter were wiped away, the former would disappear.[12]

2. The sweat-house. — The ceremonial use of vapour baths is a custom of great antiquity and wide geographical distribution, being found both in N. America and in N. Europe. In the former continent it was probably known to every tribe north of Mexico, though along the north-west coast it has been superseded by sea-bathing.

'The type of the ordinary sweat-house seems to have been everywhere the same. Willow rods or other plant stems were stuck into the ground and bent or fastened with withes into a hemispherical or oblong frame-work, which generally was large enough to accommodate several persons. A hole was dug conveniently near the door into which stones, usually heated outside, were dropped by means of forked sticks. These were sprinkled with water to generate steam. A temporary cover of blankets or skins made the enclosure tight.'[13]

In each tribe there were certain prescribed rules for the construction of the sweat-house. In some cases, however, the communal ceremonial chamber was used for this purpose. Sometimes it was used as a kind of men's club like the Pueblo *kiva*,

1 Ch. viii.
2 *Si-yu-ki*, tr. S. Beal, London, 1884, i. 120.
3 S. Julien's tr. of *Hiouen Thsang*, Paris, 1853, confirmed by T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1904–05, i. 226.
4 *Alberuni's India*, ed. E. C. Sachau, London, 1910, ii. 182.
5 Cf. J. G. Bühler, *Vienna Oriental Journ.* x. [1896] 55 f.

1 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 203.
2 E. S. Hartland, *LP* ii. 74.
3 J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 213.
4 *LP* ii. 123. 5 *Ib.* 6 *FL* v. [1894] 277.
7 J. G. Bourke, *Scatalogic Rites of all Nations*, Washington, 1891, p. 349, quoting S. A. Flemming, *De Remediis*, p. 19.
8 *LP* ii. 124.
9 A. C. Haddon, in *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–12, v. 301.
10 A. M. Blackman, *ZÄ* l. [1912] 69 ff.
11 *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 81.
12 *FL* xv. [1904] 209.
13 *Bull. 30 BE* [1910], pt. 2, p. 660.

women being permitted to enter it for certain ceremonial purposes, but not for sweating. Among certain tribes on the Pacific coast women were not even permitted to gather wood for the holy fire to be kindled in the sweat-house. In California, where sweating always had a religious significance, some of the tribes used the sweat-house as a sleeping-place for adult males. Half-an-hour was usually spent in the sweat-house, and then the bather plunged into a stream, if there was one at hand.

'Among the Eskimo, hot air was used in place of steam and in Zuñi, and probably in the Pueblos generally, hot stones near the body furnished the heat.'[1]

Some tribes lit the fire in the sweat-house in autumn and kept it alive till spring. Bancroft says of the Northern Californians:

'A fire is built in the centre [of the sweat-house] in early fall and kept alive till the following spring, as much attention being given to it as ever was paid to the sacred fires of Hestia.'[2]

Sweating in N. America was practised for three purposes: (1) *religious*—such as purification and the propitiation of spirits, preparation for war, and on arrival at puberty, when it was usually attended by scarification and mutilation; (2) *therapeutic*—prescribed by a shaman, who stood outside and invoked the spirits believed to cause the disease (among the Plains Indians shamans who officiated at these ceremonies had usually to pass through the sweat-house themselves for purposes of purification); (3) *social and hygienic*—a number of persons would enter a sweat-house for the purpose of enjoying the luxury of a bath (among certain tribes this became an almost daily practice, and was perhaps a degeneration).

The sweat-bath is also used by the Eskimos of Bering Strait, among whom the men and boys indulge in it about once a week, or once in every ten days during winter, but with this people it does not appear to possess a religious significance.[3]

Among many tribes the sweat-house had its own guardian spirit or *manitu* (*q.v.*).

Among the Lillooets of British Columbia 'men who had the spirit of the sweat-house for their guardian spirit made a sweat-house of elk-skin supported on wands, and inside it they placed four large stones, which were heated to make the steam for the bath.'[4]

It was believed among the Algonquins that a man when in the sweat-house might acquire *manitu*. A Fox Indian, relating his experiences during a sweat-bath, once said:

'Often one will cut one's self only through the skin. It is done to open up many passages for the manitou to pass into the body. The manitou comes from the place of its abode in the stone. It comes roused by the heat of the fire, and proceeds out of the stone when the water is sprinkled on it. It comes out in the steam, and in the steam it enters the body wherever it finds entrance. It moves up and down, and all over and inside the body, driving out everything that inflicts pain. Before the manitou returns to the stone, it imparts some of its nature to the body. That is why one feels so well after having been in the sweat-lodge.'[5]

Among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia, when a boy reached the age of puberty, he went through certain ceremonies to obtain a guardian spirit.

In the sweat-bath 'he prayed to the spirit of sweat-bathing under the title of "Sweat-bathing Grandfather Chief," begging that he might be strong, brave and agile, lucky, rich, a good hunter, a skilful fisherman, and so forth.'[6]

The Ojibwa (*q.v.*), an Algonquin tribe, had a secret society called the 'Midē'wiwin,' or society of the shamans. For four days before initiation into it a candidate would purify himself in the sweat-bath.

'In all ceremonies, prophetical or medico-magical, great reliance is placed on the vapor-bath. . . . It is entered with sacred feelings, and is deemed a great means of purification. Secret arts are here often disclosed between *Medais* [shamans] of high power, which could not be imparted in other places, or positions, believed to be less subject to the influence of sanctifying power.'[1]

When we turn to the Old World, we find a striking resemblance to the American customs in Herodotus's description[2] of the use of the sweat-bath among the Scythians as a means of purification, after mourning. The construction of the sweat-house was, however, simpler than in America. Three sticks were stuck in the ground, leaning towards each other, and around them pieces of felt were tightly stretched. A dish containing red-hot stones was placed inside. Hemp seed was then thrown on to the stones. A close parallel to this custom was found among the Delaware Indians, and is described by Tylor:

'At their festival in honour of the Fire-god with his twelve attendant manitus, inside of the house a small oven-hut was set up, consisting of twelve poles tied together at the top and covered with blankets, high enough for a man to stand nearly upright within it. After the feast this oven was heated with twelve red-hot stones, and twelve men crept inside. An old man threw twelve pipefuls of tobacco on these stones, and when the patients had borne to the utmost the heat and suffocating smoke, they were taken out, generally falling in a swoon.'[3]

The sweat-bath, as used among the peasantry of Great Russia, possesses the nature of a ceremonial purification even at the present day. It is taken weekly on Saturday afternoons, and all kinds of pollution must be avoided till after the service on Sunday morning.[4] Among the northern Finns, for the *savna*, or sweat-bath, a log-hut is used. The bath is frequently taken *en famille*.[5] With this people, however, and also with the Lapps, who make use of the sweat-bath on Saturdays before putting on their clean clothes, it appears to be an entirely secular institution.[6] Vapour baths were in use among the Celtic tribes, and the sweat-house was in general use in Ireland down to the 18th,[7] and even survived into the 19th century. It was of beehive shape and was covered with clay. It was especially resorted to as a cure for rheumatism.[8]

Vapour baths were used by the Greeks and Romans; details for their construction are given by Vitruvius.[9] The sweat-bath, which in England has been miscalled the 'Turkish bath,' being in reality of Russian origin, was introduced into this country by David Urquhart, M.P. (1805–77).

3. Origin and distribution.—The presence of the sweat-bath both in N. Europe and in N. America at once raises the question whether it has originated independently in each of these continents, or whether it has reached them from a common centre of distribution. It is essentially a northern institution, and one belonging to the Mongoloid branch of the human family. M. A. Czaplicka suggests that the Slavs of Great Russia probably borrowed it from the Finns of the Middle Volga. There are many unsolved problems connected with the ethnology of the Scythians, but there appears to have existed among them a Finno-Ugrian element from which most likely the sweat-hut was derived. We should naturally expect to find the sweat-hut in N. Asia, whose inhabitants form an ethnological bridge uniting the Mongoloid peoples of Europe and N. America. We are,

[1] *Bull. 30 BE* [1910], pt. 2, p. 661. [2] *NR* i. 356.
[3] E. W. Nelson, in *18 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. p. 287.
[4] J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 420; cf. p. 414.
[5] W. Jones, 'The Algonquin *Manitou*,' in *JAFL* xviii. [1905] 184.
Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 414.

[1] H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1853–56, v. 423 f., quoted by Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 486.
[2] iv. 73–75. [3] *PC*[3] ii. 417 f.
[4] D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, rev. ed., London, 1905, i. 41.
[5] S. Tromholt, *Under the Rays of the Aurora Borealis*, ed. C. Siewers, London, 1885, ii. 102.
[6] P. B. du Chaillu, *Land of the Midnight Sun*, London, 1881, ii. 206.
[7] David Urquhart, *Manual of the Turkish Bath*, London, 1865, p. 62.
[8] See art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Celtic), vol. iv. p. 749[a].
[9] *De Architectura*, v. 10, 11.

however, disappointed in this expectation, since among the aborigines of N. Siberia it is not indigenous, but is in use only among those tribes which, like the Yakuts, have derived many elements in their culture from the Russians. We seem, then, to be led to the conclusion that the sweat-bath originated independently in both Europe and America, or else that it originated in a more southerly latitude than N. Siberia. The vapour-bath appears to be one of those institutions which were originally indulged in for hygienic purposes, but afterwards, owing to their beneficial results, came to be connected in the mind of primitive man with mysterious unseen powers, and hence were used in connexion with religious rites. Now, however, the sweat-bath seems to be regaining its former secular character.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

H. J. T. JOHNSON.

SWEATING.—See ECONOMICS.

SWEDENBORG. — 1. Life and works. — Emanuel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm on 29th Jan. 1688. He was the second son of Jesper Swedberg, bishop of Skara and previously professor in the University of Upsala. The family was ennobled by Queen Ulrica Eleonora in 1719, when the patronymic of Swedberg was changed into the name of Swedenborg.

Little is known of Swedenborg's childhood. After completing his studies at Upsala in 1709, he started on an extended foreign tour, and he was in England in 1711, 'studying Newton daily and very anxious to see and hear him.'[1] We gather from one of his letters to his brother-in-law, Dr. Ericus Benzelius, that mathematics and astronomy absorbed at that time most of his interest. He wrote of his conversations with Flamsteed, Halley, and other well-known men of science, but his copious references to the works of Dryden, Spenser, Milton, Shakespeare, and others show that his scientific studies did not prevent him from becoming acquainted with the best English literature. Swedenborg spent nearly two years in London and Oxford. He afterwards visited Holland, France, and Germany, working all the time at a number of inventions. One of them was 'the plan of a certain ship which with its men was to go under the surface of the sea and do great damage to the fleet of the enemy.'[2] Another of his inventions was a magazine air-gun to discharge 60 or 70 shots in succession without reloading. He also devised a flying machine, but the great Swedish engineer, Christopher Polhem, expressed the opinion that, with respect to flying by artificial means, it was about the same thing as trying to make a *perpetuum mobile* or to make gold!

In 1716 Swedenborg was appointed by King Charles XII. extraordinary assessor at the Royal Board of Mines, an appointment which caused him to decline the offer of a professorship of astronomy in the University of Upsala. As the eldest son of his family, Swedenborg had a seat in the House of Nobles of the Swedish Parliament, but his interest in science, always greater than in politics, led him in 1721 to go abroad to study the mines and manufactures of other lands. It was during this journey that he published a treatise on physics and chemistry, at Amsterdam, a second edition of his *New Method of finding the Longitude*, at Leipzig, and *Miscellaneous Observations on Geology and Mineralogy*. But the work which won for Swedenborg a European reputation was his *Opera Philosophica et Mineralia* in 3 vols., with numerous copperplates, published at Dresden and Leipzig in 1734 at the expense of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick. In the first volume of that work, the *Principia*, Swedenborg gives an elaborate theory of the origin of the visible universe and propounds his nebular hypothesis. This theory has been often attributed to Kant and Laplace as the original authors, but Swedenborg's theory appeared in the *Principia* in 1734, while Kant's *Natural History of the Heavens* was published in 1755, and Laplace's *Système du Monde* in 1796, as has been shown by Arrhenius in his introduction to the Latin reprint of Swedenborg's *Cosmologia*. Soon after appeared the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (1740–41) and *The Animal Kingdom* (1744–45), in which are given the results of Swedenborg's extensive labours in anatomy and physiology. In 1745 his *Worship and Love of God* was published. This work marks the surprising transition of its author's mind from plain scientific and philosophical reasoning to what is generally considered a form of religious mysticism, but what the author himself would have described as spiritual perception. A great change had come over him. His mind, as he himself says, had been opened to enable him to hear and see things of the other life.

Swedenborg gives the year 1743 as the date of the opening of his spiritual sight, but it was in April 1745, according to his own statement, that he was fully admitted to intercourse with angels and spirits, not by any process analogous to what is usually termed spiritism (*q.v.*), but by speaking with them directly, while remaining normally conscious of everything about him on earth. He was quite aware of the scepticism with which such a mental state would be received, when made known to the world, and he anticipated it in his first theological work in these words: 'I am well aware that many persons will insist that it is impossible for any one to converse with spirits and angels during his life-time in the body; many will say that such intercourse must be mere fancy; some, that I have invented such relations in order to gain credit; whilst others will make other objections. For all these, however, I care not, since I have seen, heard and felt.'[1]

In 1747 Swedenborg resigned his position on the Royal Board of Mines and devoted himself to the new work to which he believed himself to have been divinely called. His vast work, the *Arcana Cœlestia*, was completed in 8 vols. in 1756. Then followed, among others, *The Earths in the Universe* (1758), *The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrine* (1758), *Heaven and Hell* (1758), perhaps the best known of all his books, *On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body* (1769), *Divine Love and Wisdom* (1763), *Divine Providence* (1764), *The Apocalypse Revealed* (1766), *Conjugal Love* (1768), the first theological work to which Swedenborg's name is attached, and lastly *The True Christian Religion* (1771).

It is interesting, and in a sense very significant, to find that, while Swedenborg was fully occupied with the publication of so many theological works, he yet found time and freedom of mind to attend to mundane affairs. In 1763 he wrote several papers on scientific subjects in the *Transactions of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Stockholm*, and in 1766 he republished at Amsterdam his *New Method of finding the Longitude of Places on Land and Sea*. Count Höpken has stated that 'the most solid and best written memoirs at the Diet of 1761 on matters of finance were presented by Swedenborg.'[2]

The last political document bearing his signature is an address to the Diet entitled 'Frank Views concerning the Maintenance of the Country and the Preservation of its Freedom,' in which he utters a warning against the revival of an absolute monarchy.

On Christmas Eve, 1771, while in London, he had a stroke of apoplexy and was visited by the minister of the Swedish Church, E. Ferelius. He never completely recovered, and he died on 29th March 1772 in the eighty-fifth year of his age at his residence in Great Bath Street, Coldbath Fields, London. He was buried in the Swedish Church. In 1908 the Swedish Government, having made arrangements for the transfer of Swedenborg's remains to his native country, sent the frigate *Fulgia* to England to bring them home, and in due time they were deposited in the Cathedral of Upsala, close to the resting-place of Linnæus.

2. Doctrines.—The philosophical and theological doctrines professed by Swedenborg may be conveniently considered under three heads—God, the world, and man.

(*a*) *God.*—He has nowhere given any formal arguments to prove the existence of God. He starts at once from the conviction that 'all the principles of human reason unite and, as it were, concentre in this, that there is one God, the Creator of the Universe.' Two principles constitute the essence of God—love and wisdom. His infinity comprehends both immensity and eternity, His immensity having relation to space and His eternity to time. But God with respect to the created world is 'in space without space, and in time without time.' God is life, and all life is from Him. Life itself is uncreatable, but it can be communicated, lent, as it were, to finite beings. God is one absolutely in essence and in person. The Lord Jesus Christ is God, indeed, but He is not another divine person. He is Jahweh manifested in the finite garment of humanity. Yet in Him is a divine Trinity of love, wisdom, and power —the three essentials of His divine nature. Thus the Lord alone ought to be loved supremely and worshipped as our Heavenly Father. To see Him is to see the Father (Jn 12^{45} 14^{9}).

In a sense Swedenborg admits that God, in His essence, is unknowable, but he believes that there is a form of anthropomorphism which is not only permissible in speaking of God, but necessary, because it conveys a profound truth about Him. He asserts that our thinking in human symbols would be baseless and misleading if God Himself were not divinely human. Hence his startling postulate, 'God is a man.' Of course, he does not

[1] R. L. Tafel, *Documents concerning the Life and Character of Swedenborg*, 3 vols., London, 1875–77, i. 200–344 (Swedenborg's first letter from England to Benzelius, Oct. 1710).

[2] *Ib.* i. (Correspondence with Benzelius).

[1] *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 68.

[2] Tafel, ii. 408.

mean that God is a man in a physical sense. His real meaning is simply that, if we think at all about God, we must do so by means of symbols derived from our highest human experience. But, if these symbols do not correspond, in an infinite Reality, to what they represent, as finite symbols, to us, then all these conceptions are not merely imperfect and inadequate, but actually false. We are then obliged to conclude that there is a fundamental antinomy in the constitution of the human mind, so that the Power from whom it proceeds has so constructed it that it must think about that Power, and think about it falsely. Surely, Swedenborg considers, what the human mind *must* think should be, at least, an approximate symbol or representation of a fact. If we doubt this, the grounds upon which we believe any philosophical, ethical, or spiritual truth are undermined.

Thus, to think of God as a divine man would simply mean, for Swedenborg, to think of Him as being infinite love and wisdom, as He is apprehended by us by means of symbols derived from the highest of human faculties, the intellect and the will—those faculties by which we are made 'in the image of God.' But Swedenborg seems also to have discerned some profound connexion between this conception of God as a divine man in His essential nature and the rational interpretation of a possible incarnation in time. In reading Swedenborg it must always be remembered that there is an idealism, quite his own, at the basis of his philosophical views and consequently of his theology. This enables one to understand much that lies hidden behind his realistic language when he deals with spiritual matters for which our human vocabularies have only weak and inadequate expressions.

(*b*) *The world.*—This should be particularly remembered in his treatment of the creation of the world. Swedenborg has attempted to correlate two apparently irreconcilable ideas—the idea of a personal God distinct from the universe, and the idea of an immanent Creator. He has done it by means of his doctrine of 'discrete degrees.' He holds that there are substances of many orders composing the universe. The primary, self-existent substance is the infinite God from whom all finite substances originate. But those substances are related to each other in an order constituted by degrees named 'discrete degrees' in distinction from 'continuous degrees,' because they are plans of existence entirely separate from each other and incapable of being resolved one into another. A continuous degree is merely a variation of being or quality on its own plane, as from heavier to lighter, or from denser to rarer. It is only a question of more or less. Discrete degrees, on the other hand, are never of the same forms or qualities of being, and, moreover, they involve the relation of cause and effect. Hence Swedenborg says: 'Nothing, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been known of discrete degrees but only of continuous degrees; yet without a knowledge of both kinds of degrees nothing of cause can be truly known,' for 'seeing from effects alone is seeing from fallacies.'[1] He means that fallacies arise, not from a failure to distinguish between cause and effect, as, *e.g.*, between matter and spirit, but from the fact of regarding them as differing by continuous degrees only and not by discrete degrees. For thus cause is never lifted above the plane of effect, nor spirit above the plane of matter.

It is maintained therefore that in everything of which anything can be predicated there are what are called end, cause, and effect, and these three are to each other according to discrete degrees. In creation the natural or material world is the effect, of which the spiritual world is the cause, and God is the end. The first act of creation, not in time but in order, is the putting forth by the Divine of a finite emanation of love and wisdom from Himself. This is conceived as a spiritual sun of incomparable splendour, a manifestation so intense that the finite mind could not bear its ardour, were it not tempered by intermediate stages. Thus, successive discrete degrees, separated not in space but in the quality of their spiritual constitution, produce the higher and the lower heavens; other discrete degrees subsist in the angelic forms according to their receptibility of love and wisdom.

Similarly, the affections and thoughts which constitute the life of men are not, as it seems to us, self-generated, but pass into their minds out of the spiritual world, in a clearer or more obscure manner, always according to discrete degrees and in the order of cause and effect. In the world of matter a different law operates. Matter is derived not directly from spirit, but from the natural sun, which, according to Swedenborg, is not only the centre and support of our solar system, but also the proximate cause of its existence. From the activity of this primal sun are ultimately produced, by discrete degrees, the atmospheres and matter itself out of which the physical world is formed. The material substances, conceived as inert in themselves, are nevertheless capable of being acted upon by spiritual forces. But there is nothing of God in them as the ultimate of creation, since their life has ended in no-life, and love and wisdom have ended in forms of motion. Of course, this does not mean that God is not present in this ultimate of creation.

This doctrine is intended to exclude the incomprehensible idea of a creation *ex nihilo*, whilst it is meant also to provide against a pantheistic interpretation of the universe. It inevitably presents the difficulties which are inseparable from any theory of emanation.

(*c*) *Man.* — The theology of Swedenborg, as it deals with man, his nature, and his destiny, cannot be understood apart from his view (or, as he would insist, apart from the doctrine that he was divinely commissioned to make known to the modern world) of the real meaning of God's Word as we have it in the letter of Holy Scripture. More than 150 years ago Swedenborg had foreseen the difficulties and objections which criticism might bring forward as an argument against a belief in a divine revelation. 'It is in the mouth of all,' he says, 'that the Word is from God, is divinely inspired and therefore holy. But yet it has been unknown hitherto where within it its Divinity resides. The man who worships Nature instead of God may easily fall into error concerning the Word, and say within himself when he is reading it: "What is this? Is this divine? Can God who has infinite wisdom speak thus?"'[1] Yet Swedenborg never lost his faith in a divine revelation, and one of the principal objects of his theology is to show that the difficulties which create so serious a stumbling-block in many minds are due to the fact that they are looking in the Bible for what its letter does not and cannot explicitly manifest. He affirms that the Word contains throughout a spiritual meaning which alone gives the true and full sense of God's revelation to man.

Philo, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others have attempted to discover a spiritual sense in the Bible, but Swedenborg's conception proceeds on entirely different lines. For him the Word is the divine truth itself as it exists in God. It is the very form of God, and the medium of communication and conjunction with Him for the

[1] *Divine Love and Wisdom*, no. 187 *f.*

[1] *True Christian Religion*, no. 189.

angels in the heavens and for men upon earth. But truth in this divine form is utterly incomprehensible to any finite mind. To render it at least partly intelligible, it must descend through the discrete degrees already described, and assume successively lower and lower forms of expression adapted to the comprehension of the various grades of finite intelligence. On earth it presents itself to us as the letter of our Bible, or rather as the original texts from which that letter has come to us.

How then are those texts written? They are written in pure 'correspondences,' *i.e.* in symbols derived from nature. Every natural object is conceived to be the effect, and therefore the expression, of spiritual causes. Those effects 'correspond' to those causes; hence their capacity, when properly understood, to reveal the spiritual meaning contained in them.

The first result of this principle is that man is thus enabled to know the true canon of the sacred Scriptures. Those books which are so written as to present a correspondential spiritual meaning are really 'the Word.' The other books possess devotional and even doctrinal value, but they are not 'the Word.' Guided by this fact, Swedenborg declares that the only books of the Word in the Bible are, in the OT, the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings, the Psalms, and the Prophets from Isaiah to Malachi; in the NT, the four Gospels and Revelation. The Epistles form therefore no part of what Swedenborg strictly calls 'the Word.' But he valued them highly, and he frequently quotes them.

In the letter, as we have it, Swedenborg recognizes a human element manifested in the language and feelings of the writers of the various books of the Bible; it is only the spiritual sense that is entirely and solely divine. Hence many of the difficulties raised by the higher criticism would be no difficulties for him; *e.g.*, instead of a creation in six days in the book of Genesis, he reads there the earliest condition of man and the gradual development of his psychological constitution; his growth in a knowledge of good and truth, of love and faith, and of divine things; and finally his introduction to a celestial perception of divine truth itself. It is a conception of the regeneration of man, called to reach his spiritual destiny through knowledge, trial, faith, and love, and Swedenborg sees that such a conception has a sublime meaning for us which it could not have had for the men who lived when the letter was written. It would have been an unintelligible revelation for most of them. Therefore the full meaning of the letter as contained in the spiritual sense was not given to them. There is, according to Swedenborg, a grave spiritual danger in the premature disclosure to any mind of divine Truth.[1]

But what is man? He is, says Swedenborg, made to be at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. He is not life, but a recipient of life from God. And God grants man a sense that the life which he feels within himself is his own, in order that he may live as of himself. In every man's soul there is an inmost or supreme degree into which the divine of the Lord proximately flows; hence it is that man can receive intelligence and wisdom and speak from reason, and from this also comes the fact that his soul is endowed with immortality.

The will rather than the understanding constitutes the man. Swedenborg rejects the idea of angels having been created as such to people the heavens. All spirits, he believes, whether in heaven or in hell, are from the human race. He also holds that there is no personal Devil or Satan, but that that name signifies the whole society of evil spirits.

The life of man cannot be changed after death, for the spirit of man is such as his love is, and infernal love cannot be changed into heavenly love, 'because they are opposite.'

The problem of evil, as presented by Swedenborg, is explained by the freedom with which God has endowed man, and it is because God 'who changeth not' will not withdraw that gift that man's love remains what it was even after death. If he has deliberately made evil his good and good his evil, then he is his own hell, and does not desire heaven. He could find no ease there, and would long for his congenial surroundings and associates. He is not sent to hell; he goes there of himself, and would be happy there, if an evil soul could find permanent happiness anywhere. But he inevitably meets with sufferings and punishments, inflicted not by God or His agents, but chiefly by the evil spirits his associates. What happens under our eyes here upon earth continues in hell. For evil breeds evil always and everywhere. This conception is sad, but certainly drawn from life.

Are then those sufferings eternal? It is difficult to interpret definitely the teaching of Swedenborg on that point. How far 'those sufferings may be mitigated,' says Howard Spalding, 'we are not told, but a careful study of all that Swedenborg has said on the subject suggests that they may be so greatly modified as to cease to be acutely felt.'[1] It is remarkable that, according to Swedenborg, there is no absolute destruction of evil even in heaven, for nothing which has formed part of the spiritual nature of man can ever be annihilated. Spirits therefore—yea, angelic spirits—carry with them into heaven the perverted organic forms in which their evils resided. They are even permitted to experience from time to time a sense of their evils, but not uselessly, for by those alternations of state spirits are kept in continual spiritual progress. Thus the regeneration of man, begun on earth, continues to eternity.

Of heaven we are told that God Himself is heaven, and that His presence to each human spirit brings heaven into him, but always in a degree which depends on a certain faculty of reception acquired on earth by man's conscientious endeavour to make what he truly believes the rule of his life.[2]

There has been a tendency, more or less defined, to class Swedenborg among the mystics, but this seems to be due to an imperfect understanding of his system. His conception of life in heaven should suffice to show how little he has in common with mysticism past or present.

The fulfilment of God's purpose in creating the world is a fundamental doctrine in Swedenborg's theology. That purpose, we are told, was, by making man in His own image and endowing him with the faculties of freedom and rationality, to prepare him for that conjunction with God which constitutes the angelic heaven. In this sense, the creation means infinite love seeking by love to cause love to arise freely between the Creator and His rational creature. But the misuse of rationality and freedom has led to evil being chosen and loved instead of good; hence sin, whose effect is the weakening of true freedom, and the obscuring of that interior light within us which is rationality. Then it is that the love which had created man has also come to save him. By His incarnation the Lord did not come to reconcile His Father

[1] See *Arc. Cœlest.* no. 3398.

[1] *The Kingdom of Heaven as seen by Swedenborg*, p. 4 f.

[2] For full details see especially Swedenborg's *Heaven and Hell*.

to man, for God in Christ, as Swedenborg says, is the one only God who is love itself and does not need to be reconciled to His creature. It is man who needs to be reconciled to God. The Lord came and, as to His human nature, was born, lived, suffered, and died 'for us,' not 'instead of us.' He came to enable man to do that which, through sin, he had almost lost all power of doing, namely, to shun evil and to do the Lord's will in a life of righteousness and true holiness. Moreover, God 'became flesh,' not only to effect this work of redemption, but also that He might visibly manifest His infinite love for man, and thereby give to him for ever a definite object of intelligent faith, worship, and love. Man is said to be saved by the blood of Christ, in this sense, that His blood is the symbol of divine truth, and the shedding of His blood is the symbol of the imparting of His spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. The Atonement, for Swedenborg, is thus really an at-one-ment, the reconciliation of man to God by the love and power of God. It was accomplished by the Lord taking upon Himself man's nature, enslaved by sin, from the Blessed Virgin Mary, sustaining in His own person the assaults and temptations of the powers of darkness, and gradually subduing them. For this work the Lord laid down His life, *i.e.* the life in Him of all that was not in perfect agreement with the infinite perfections of His indwelling divinity. When this was done, 'consummated,' the Lord Jesus Christ was no longer, even as to His human nature, the Son of Mary. He was the 'only begotten Son of God,' the perfect manifestation of the infinite, invisible Father. This process, called glorification, was completed after His resurrection, when the Lord 'put off' from the infirm human nature all its hereditary tendencies to evil and sin, and 'put on' from the Father the divine humanity subsisting in the essential divinity within Him. This is the supreme type of man's own regeneration by which, having put off hereditary tendencies to evil and his actual sins, he puts on from the Lord, in the degree that he has thus put off evil, a new regenerated and spiritual humanity, a spiritual mind. No real regeneration can be attained except in accordance with the principle that a 'saving faith' is 'a faith which worketh by love.' Salvation by 'faith alone' is rejected and condemned by Swedenborg in innumerable passages in his works.

It is important in connexion with this subject to understand his idea of 'the Church.' The essential Church for him is constituted by a genuine love of goodness and truth and by the spiritual relation established with the Lord in the minds of men. The true Church is therefore invisible, but, so far as it is a true Church, it can never pass away. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the disclosure by the Lord of further truths called for by new conditions in the world of human thought and experience, and needed to establish a higher level of spiritual life. Nor does it exclude the possibility of the loss or the corruption of truths previously held, rendering necessary the institution of a specific 'New Church' in order to restore what has been lost, and to incorporate new truths which the Church in the past was not ready to receive. The assertion, therefore, made by the disciples of Swedenborg that a 'New Church' has been instituted, involves, as they would insist, no disparagement of the former Christian Church 'so far as it is really the Lord's.' The members of the 'New Church' at the present time consider it an entire misconception to imagine that Swedenborg is the founder of a 'New Church.' He himself always repudiated any such pretension. He considered himself a mere instrument through whom new truths needed in the Church were communicated to the world. His chief point always is, however, that 'the Church is one thing and religion is another.' The Church is called a Church from doctrine; religion is called religion from a life according to doctrine. Hence his well-known saying: 'All religion is related to life, and the life of religion is to do Good.'

LITERATURE.—Benjamin Worcester, *The Life and Mission of Emanuel Swedenborg*[6], Boston, 1907; George Trobridge, *A Life of Emanuel Swedenborg: with a popular Exposition of his Philosophical and Theological Teachings*, London, 1912; John Howard Spalding, *The Kingdom of Heaven as seen by Swedenborg*, do. 1916; Samuel M. Warren, *A Compendium of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg*, do. 1896 (very useful to obtain a first general idea of Swedenborg's voluminous works); *A Dictionary of Correspondences, etc., extracted from the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg*, Boston, 1910; Frank Sewall, *The New Metaphysics*, London, 1888, *Swedenborg and Modern Idealism: a Retrospect of Philosophy from Kant to the Present Time*, do. 1902; Theophilus Parsons, *Deus-Homo*, do. 1871; Edward Madeley, *The Science of Correspondences elucidated*, new and enlarged ed., do. 1902; *Transactions of the International Swedenborg Congress*, do. 1910.

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SWINE.—The swine plays a prominent part in many ancient and modern religions. The word 'pig' is unlucky to the Scottish fisherman, and on hearing it he will feel for the nails in his boots and mutter 'Cauld iron.'[1] The inhabitants of certain villages on the north-east coast of Scotland consider the words 'sow,' 'pig,' and 'swine' very unlucky; should any one be so unwise as to utter these words while the line is being baited, the line will surely be lost. The Galelareese, having noticed that, whilst men suffer from itch, caused by treading on the fallen fruit of the *aren* palm-tree, the wild boar, which is fond of the fruit and runs freely among it, is not liable to such a disease, argue that the fruit treats the pig as a real friend, and, if one by grunting can impress the fruit that he is a pig, it will treat him in the same way.[2] The pig was offered by the Romans and Greeks as an expiatory sacrifice. Cato advises that, before thinning a grove, the Roman farmer should offer a pig to the god or goddess of the place.[3] The grain distributed as prizes in the Eleusinian games in Greece was grown on the Rarian plain near Eleusis; this plain was so sacred that no dead body was allowed to touch it, and, whenever a defilement occurred, a pig was offered as a sacrifice. The Caribs abstained from pig's flesh because, like most primitive races, they believed that the physical and mental qualities of the human being depend largely upon the food which he eats; therefore, if they were to eat the flesh of pigs, they would have small eyes like those of a pig. Similarly Zulu girls abstain from eating pig's flesh because they fear that by eating it they might gradually come to resemble the ugly pig in appearance. But there are other reasons why primitive man abstained from pork. The Kai of N.E. New Guinea find that pigs are the worst enemies of the crops; therefore, if a field-labourer were to eat pork, the dead pig in his stomach would attract the living pig into the field.[4] Swine's flesh was forbidden to all the Semites except the Babylonians, but it is an open question whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean.[5] As early as the time of Hammurabi pork was a highly valued food among the Babylonians and frequently formed part of the temple offering. By

[1] J. Macdonald, *Religion and Myth*, London, 1893, p. 91.

[2] M. J. van Baarda, 'Fabelan, Verhalan, en Overleveringen der Galelareezen,' *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, xlv. [1895] 511.

[3] H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinæ Selectæ*, Berlin, 1892–1914, no. 4911.

[4] C. Keysser, 'Aus dem Leben der Kaileute,' in R. Neuhaus, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 125.

[5] Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 54; cf. Antiphanes, *ap.* Athenæus, iii. 95 (A. Meineke, *Fragmenta Comicorum Græcorum*, Berlin, 1839–57, iii. 68).

the inspection of pigs various omens were derived, and in the official lists special provision is even made for the temple pigs. The heathen Harranians sacrificed swine's flesh once a year and ate the flesh.[1] By the Syrians the swine was regarded as sacrosanct, and it was specially sacred to Aphrodite.[2] To the Greeks the attitude of the Jews towards swine was difficult to understand.[3] In Is 65[4] 66[3. 17] we are told that some of the Jews used to meet secretly to eat swine's flesh; it has been suggested therefore that 'the swine was revered rather than abhorred by the Israelites,'[4] and that it was not eaten because it was divine. To the Egyptians the pig was very loathsome.[5] Swineherds were forbidden to enter a temple and even had to marry among themselves. If a man even touched a pig, he immediately stepped into a river to wash off the taint. Pig's milk caused leprosy. These prohibitions prove that the Egyptians originally regarded the pig as sacred, for the belief that the eating of a sacred animal produces leprosy and that the effect caused by touching a sacred object is removed by washing was current among many ancient tribes and religions.[6] Later, however, the pig began to be looked upon with horror and was regarded as the Egyptian devil and the embodiment of Set or Typhon and enemy of Osiris. Typhon, in the form of a pig, injured the eye of Horus, who burned him and ordained that a pig was to be sacrificed, seeing that Ra, the sun-god, had declared the pig to be an abominable beast. We find in various religions that the animal sacrificed to a god because he is the god's enemy was originally the god himself. Now, we read that Typhon was hunting a boar when he discovered and mangled the body of Osiris, and that for this reason pigs were sacrificed once a year. It has therefore been suggested that originally the pig was a god, and that he was no other than Osiris.[7] We have already seen that the Kai of New Guinea abstain from pork because they regard the pig as the enemy of the crops, so that we can understand why the Egyptians should have identified their corn-god Osiris or his enemy Typhon with a wild boar. It might also be noted that pigs were sacrificed to Osiris on the very day on which he is recorded by tradition to have been killed. Further, the pig was sacred to the corn-goddess Demeter and was often associated with her. In art she is represented as accompanied by a pig.[8] At the Thesmophoria it was customary to throw pigs into some sacred vaults, which are described as the 'caves of Demeter and Persephone.'[9] It seems that the pigs were intended to represent Persephone and her descent into the lower world. An ancient legend tells that, when Pluto carried off Persephone, Eubuleus, a swineherd, was herding his swine near the spot, and his herd were engulfed in the cave into which Pluto and Persephone had vanished. The Thesmophoria has analogies in the folk-customs of N. Europe. In certain districts of Courland the pig is the corn-spirit, whose power of fertility lies in his tail; therefore, when barley is sown for the first time in the year, the sower sticks a pig's tail into the field, believing that the ears of corn will grow as long as the tail.[1] The idea that the pig is an embodiment of the corn-spirit can further be seen from the Scandinavian custom of 'Yule boar.' This is a loaf prepared from the last sheaf in the form of a pig. It is usually prepared at Christmas and kept till sowing-time, when it is given to the plough-horses in the hope that it will be the means of securing a good harvest.[2] In this connexion it is of interest to note that Ball finds a philological connexion between Tammuz, the Assyrian god of the under world and of vegetation, and the Chinese and Turkish words for pig. He also cites the evidence of classical writers[3] that 'the Jews did not use swine's flesh because it was sacred inasmuch as by turning up the earth with its snout it taught men the art of ploughing.'[4] In some parts of White Russia it is believed that the bones of a pig preserve the corn from hail, whilst in other places the ribs are thrown into the seed-bag among the flax-seed because they cause the flax to grow well and tall. The Alfoors of Minahassa in N. Celebes believe that a pig's blood causes inspiration, and at one of their festivals the priest drinks a pig's blood and thereupon is able to prophesy as to how the rice-crop will turn out.[5] The inhabitants of Car Nicobar rub themselves over with pig's blood in order to cleanse themselves of any devils of which they may be possessed.[6] In the same way the Greeks cleansed a homicide by sprinkling him with pig's blood and beating him with a laurel bough. The Karens of Burma believe that a bad harvest is caused by adultery, and, in order to atone for this, those detected in adultery must buy a pig, scrape out furrows in the ground with each foot, and then fill them with the pig's blood.[7] Some Yabim believe that after death their souls will be turned into swine, and they therefore abstain from swine-flesh lest they should thus be eating the souls of their relatives. The people of Tamara (off the coast of New Guinea) also abstain from pork because the souls of the dead transmigrate into the bodies of pigs. The worshippers of Adonis did not eat pork because their god had been killed by a boar. It has been suggested that the cry '*Hyes Attis!*', raised by the worshippers of Attis, meant 'Pig Attis!'[8] In Fiji a huge pig is presented to those who are initiated into manhood. At Maewo, in Aurora, one of the New Hebrides, fifty days after the death of a wealthy man pigs are killed, and the point of the liver of each pig is cut off. The brother of the deceased goes to the forest and calls out the dead man's name, saying 'This is for thee to eat,' the idea being that, if pigs are not killed for the benefit of the dead man, his ghost has not proper existence.[9] It should be noted also that the pig is very often represented by a cowry-shell. Malinowski, in an

[1] En-Nedim in D. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 42.

[2] Swine were also sacrificed to Aphrodite at Argos (Athen. iii. 49) and in Pamphylia (Strabo, ix. 5. 17).

[3] Plutarch, *Symposiacon*, iv. 5.

[4] But see R. H. Kennett, *The Composition of the Book of Isaiah in the Light of History and Archæology*, London, 1910, p. 61.

[5] Plut. *de Is. et Osir.*, 8; Herodotus, ii. 47, etc.

[6] Cf. the practice of the Jews of washing their hands after reading the Scriptures, also Lv 16[23f.]; *Central Provinces Ethnographic Survey*, Allahabad, 1907–11, ii., 'Draft Articles on Uriya Castes,' p. 16.

[7] E. Lefébure, *Le Mythe osirien*, Paris, 1874–75, pt. i., 'Les Yeux d'Horus,' p. 44; E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 496 f., also *Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection*, London and New York, 1911.

[8] J. Overbeck, *Griechische Kunstmythologie*, Leipzig, 1873–78, pt. ii.

[9] F. C. Movers, *Die Phönizier*, Berlin, 1841–56, i. 220.

[1] W. Mannhardt, *Mythologische Forschungen*, Strassburg, 1874, p. 186 f.; also A. Witzschel, *Sagen, Sitten, und Gebräuche aus Thüringen*, Vienna, 1878, pp. 189, 218.

[2] For further details concerning this and similar customs throughout various parts of Europe see F. Panzer, *Beitrag zur deutschen Mythologie*, Munich, 1848–55, ii. 491; J. Jamieson, *Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language*, new ed., Paisley, 1879–82, iii. 206 f.; Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1877, p. 197 f.

[3] Callistratus, *ap.* Plut. *Symp.* iv. 5.

[4] C. J. Ball, 'Tammuz, the Swine God,' *PSBA* xvi. [1894] 195 ff.

[5] J. G. F. Riedel, 'De Minahasa in 1825,' *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, xviii. [1872] 517 f.

[6] V. Solomon, 'Extracts from Diaries kept in Car Nicobar,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 227.

[7] F. Mason, 'On Dwellings, Works of Art, Laws, etc., of the Karins,' *JASBe* xxxvii. [1868] pt. ii. p. 147 f.

[8] J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 22.

[9] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 282.

account of the natives of Malu Island, off the coast of New Guinea,[1] says that at one of their feasts the natives erect a gallows and ornament it with a white shell called *moto* (the so-called white cowry, *Ovulum ovum*). This shows that they are about to offer pigs for sacrifice, and the number of pigs to be sacrificed is always the same as the number of shells. The association of this shell with pigs is important when it is remembered that cowries are widely known as pig-shells. This fact, and also the passionate tendencies of swine, would be the most plausible explanation of the abhorrence with which they have always been, and still are, regarded in the East.

LITERATURE.—The literature is contained in the article.

MAURICE H. FARBRIDGE.

SYMBOLISM.

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SYMBOLISM (Christian).—It is proposed in this article to indicate the more important of the emblems and personifications in which Christian belief has found spontaneous expression. The literary images which deserve to be called symbolical, but which have not embodied themselves in pictorial or material shapes, are excluded from view. An attempt will be made, however, to connect the emblems which call for notice with the language of the New Testament.

When the subject is thus defined, the field to be surveyed is at once seen to admit of a clear division. The first four or five Christian centuries separate themselves for our purpose markedly from the centuries which follow. For the symbolism of the earlier period we have the definite and varied testimony offered by the sepulchral paintings and inscriptions of the Roman catacombs. With the light thus obtainable we are able to see the hopes with which the Christians of Rome during this formative period followed their dead into the unseen world and connected the life that now is with that to which they believed it to be the portal.

Burial in the catacombs and the symbolism to which it gave rise practically ceased before the middle of the 5th century. From that time onwards new images and ideas crowd in upon us, created by the popular imagination in response to the Church's teaching and worship, to legends of the saints, animal fables, and spiritual plays and moralities. Many of these images do not succeed in finding an emblematic expression, but those which do create a symbolism far exceeding that of the previous period in amplitude. We shall give our chief attention to the earlier period, and briefly indicate the later emblems which, either from their permanence or from their inherent significance, seem especially to claim notice.

A review of the entire field brings one decisive feature of the symbolism into prominence. The emblems will all be found to point onwards to a life beyond the tomb. The symbolism is created by a hope or, it may be, a fear whose fulfilment is not expected within the limits of our present existence. The justification of this 'other-worldliness' may readily be found in our records of the life of Christ. His ministry began with the announcement, 'The kingdom of God is at hand,' and was throughout a prophecy of good things to come (Mk 1^{15}). Some of His disciples may at first have believed that they would see these good things before they 'tasted' death (9^{1}). The mere lapse of time was enough to stamp such expectation with the mark of illusion. Every year it became more clear that the realization of the promised kingdom must needs be a slow and gradual process. In another respect also the desired consummation underwent a change. The earth ceased to be regarded, as perhaps it had at first been, as the scene of fruition. The liveliest hope cannot resist the accumulating contradictions of continuous experience. Year by year it became less likely that the kingdom could ever be localized or assume any material shape. The Crucifixion and its sequel had lifted the thoughts of the disciples from the earth and carried them into that heaven which had now become the Master's home. To this heaven they transferred their 'treasure' (Mt 6^{19}), less perhaps from deliberate apostasy than from the reluctant acceptance of undeniable experience, and to it their hearts ascended. Death thus reassumed its normal character, and what lay beyond it became an object of anxious thought or fervent longing. These thoughts and longings form the central motives of Christian symbolism. The blessedness hoped for after death, the means by which it may be reached, and the character of Him who procured and guarantees it—these will be found to be the subjects round which the Christian emblems of all periods gather. From the beginning hope has been the dominant Christian characteristic. The scene of fulfilment and the mode of realization may have shifted. Hope itself has remained.

The symbolism of the catacombs embodies the hopes of future blessedness entertained by those who used these burying-places up to the time when such subterranean burial ceased. Thus the roses, or flowery meadows and shrubs, which appear on so many tombs represent paradise. Its entrance is sometimes indicated by a curtain which is in process of being drawn aside. The Good Shepherd who appears on tomb after tomb may with greatest probability be here regarded as the Lord and Protector of the dead. It is they whom He gathers round Him in the heavenly fields. One of their number is the sheep He carries on His shoulders. The fish, one of the two articles of food with which the thousands were fed (Jn 6^{1-14}), represents the mystical union with Christ, and its fruit incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία). The vine points to the heavenly feast, or to its earthly pledge—the Eucharist. The dove, sipping water from the basin or jar, is the soul refreshing itself from the water of life (Rev 22^{1}). The palms symbolize either the palms borne by the blessed (7^{9}) or the wreaths or crowns of those who have been victorious in the race of life (1 Co 9^{25}, 2 Ti 4^{8}). The anchor indicates the hope of He 6^{19} which enters in 'within the veil.' The ship and lighthouse typify the dangerous voyage across the ocean of life to the haven of safety. The stag is that of Ps 42^{1}, and represents the soul's thirst for God.

The paintings of the catacombs have been fully described by two recent writers. Wilpert, in his *Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, has classified the paintings, reproducing all that are important and giving his interpretations of their symbolism. Von Sybel, in his *Christliche Antike*, has reviewed the subject on the ground provided by his predecessor's labours. He also reproduces many of the paintings and states his own conclusions in a lucid style and with much wealth of learning.

The symbolism of the later centuries has the

[1] *Trans. and Proc. Royal Soc. S. Australia*, xxxix. [1915] 494 f.

same general character. As sin and misery increase on the earth, fear plays a larger part in the Church's symbolism. The torments of the lost become more conspicuous than the joys of the blessed. A final judgment of all mankind displaces the earlier individual judgment and assumes truly terrifying aspects. The figure of Christ becomes more stern and awful, and, as it does so, the person of the Virgin Mother takes His place as Protector and Advocate.[1] She is invested with steadily-growing dignity and is separated more and more from human infirmity. The Church becomes a figure of regal authority. In what has been said [2] to be 'perhaps the finest mediæval personification' —the sculpture on Strassburg Cathedral — she appears as a royal lady, with the crown upon her head and the banner of victory and the chalice in her hand. Elsewhere Christ is seen crowning her from the Cross, or she receives His blood in her chalice. Thus, whether in earlier or in later art, the symbolism alike points beyond the tomb.

We may now proceed to deal in greater detail with the separate symbols. They will be found to gather, for the most part, round two central subjects: (1) Christ, regarded as the author of eternal life, and (2) the heavenly state.

1. The author of eternal life.—Christ is represented in all our Gospels as the giver of eternal life to those who accept and follow Him. The synoptists amply confirm His declaration in the Fourth Gospel: 'He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement, but hath passed out of death into life' (Jn 5^{24}; cf. Mt $10^{32f.\ 39}$ 19^{29}, Lk $9^{24.\ 56}$, etc.). There can be no doubt that, whatever the Kingdom of God may have meant to the first Jewish disciples, it represented an inseparable association with Christ, here and hereafter, as Master and Saviour. To the Gentile world Christ, we may safely say, appeared as, above all else, a deliverer from the power of death. He had taken flesh that 'through death he might . . . deliver all them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage' (He 2^{14}). He had 'abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel' (2 Ti 1^{10}). These and similar passages were probably understood by the earliest believers much as they are by ordinary Christians to-day. They were taken to mean that the faithful disciple would find Christ waiting for him, when death was past, and that Christ would then lead him into a better and happier existence than he had hitherto known, better and happier because it was nearer to God. Christians generally would not perplex themselves then, any more than they do now, with questions regarding the precise nature or locality of this future existence. The 'eternal life' which in the Fourth Gospel is the equivalent of Messianic blessedness was probably understood by the great majority of readers as a life in which the disciple would 'see' God, and which would not come to an end as earthly life does. Far as this is from exhausting the meaning of the word 'eternal,' it is difficult to suppose that the word can ever have conveyed, or does even now convey, to the ordinary Christian more than this simple interpretation. Of this better life, to be known hereafter, Christ had given a foretaste or prophecy during His earthly ministry. The blind then received their sight, the lame walked, the lepers were cleansed, the deaf heard, the dead were raised, and the poor had good tidings preached to them (Mt 11^{5}). It is this power of God to save from death and harm that finds expression in the paintings of the catacombs. Christ appears as the son of God foretold by prophetic voices. His ministry has been heralded by many previous displays of God's saving power. He has actually shown Himself to be the raiser of the dead, the restorer of the blind, and the healer of the sick. He waits for His disciples beyond death to lead them into the heavenly pastures. Such are the subjects and implications of the symbolism.

(*a*) *OT types.*—Scenes from the OT which were especially held to typify this deliverance recur with great frequency on the tombs. These are the salvation of Isaac, when he was about to be slain in sacrifice by Abraham, the salvation of Noah in the Ark, the restoration of Job to his former prosperity (Job $42^{10.\ 12}$), the rescue of Jonah from the jaws of the sea-monster, and the preservation of the three Hebrew youths in the flaming furnace. Some features in the symbolism of these paintings deserve particularly to be noted. In the representations of Abraham's contemplated sacrifice it is the rescue of Isaac from death that the painter desires to symbolize. This is plain from the attitude in which Isaac is represented when the design of the picture permits. He appears with extended arms—a posture of prayer or adoration of which more is said below. This is also the attitude of Noah as he stands in the Ark, and of the three children in the furnace. There is no suggestion in the paintings of the theological meanings afterwards found in Abraham's projected sacrifice. It may also be observed that the Deity is represented here, as generally or often in the earliest Christian art, by an outstretched hand. No attempt is made to delineate His features. There are no representations of the Trinity such as we find afterwards. Of all Biblical types Jonah has been the most frequently chosen by these painters. He forms the subject of 129 separate pictures which have come to light. It is to be observed that he does not here appear as a type of the resurrection of Christ, as he does in Mt 12^{40}. Nor is it the repentance of the Ninevites at his preaching (Mt 12^{41}) that the painters wish to symbolize. He is represented as an example of God's saving power. Sometimes he forms the subject of three or four connected pictures. We first see him standing on the deck of the vessel and about to be cast into the sea. We then see the monster vomiting him out towards the land. He next appears resting under the gourd, which takes the form of an arbour like those in paradise. There may be a fourth picture where he reclines in an attitude of dejection, his head resting on his hand.[1]

(*b*) *The sacred infancy.*—The divine childhood is depicted on a number of tombs. One of the most beautiful paintings in the catacombs [2] is the picture in the Priscilla cemetery of the Christ-child on His mother's breast. The mother bends slightly forward as if to suckle the child. The child's hand is spread out over the mother's breast, but the face, with wonderful eyes, is half turned towards the spectator. Above the heads of mother and child two stars are indicated in an oblique direction. To the left stands a man in mantle and sandals who has in his left hand a written roll and with his right points to the star above. This figure probably represents, not Joseph (who, as far as is known, does not appear in early Christian art), but a prophet, either Isaiah, who pointed to the light of the Messianic age (60^{1-6}), or Balaam (Nu 24^{17}, Rev 22^{16}), who told of the star to arise out of Jacob. If this identification be correct, it is, as von Sybel says,[3] 'one more evidence that at least the earlier Catacomb painting was in no sense historical, but entirely symbolical art.' The picture belongs to the beginning of the 2nd century.

Another incident of the sacred infancy frequently

[1] See art. 'Mary,' in *HDB*.
Schulze art. 'Sinnbilder,' in *PRE*[3] xviii. 392.

[1] Von Sybel, p. 216 ff. [2] *Ib.* p. 247.
[3] *Ib.* p. 249.

depicted is the visit of the Magi. They are generally represented as three in number, although the painter may be led by the exigencies of space to increase them to four or reduce them to two.

'The definite determination of their number as three, their designation as kings, the ascription to them of proper names (Kaspar, Melchior, Balthasar), the differentiation of their ages —to this legendary web antiquity only contributed the first threads. Its elaboration was the work of the Middle Ages.'[1]

The Annunciation (Lk $1^{26ff.}$) forms the subject of two paintings, one belonging to the end of the 2nd and the other to the 3rd century.[2] Mary is seated. The angel, in the form of a man, makes the announcement standing, as a visitor who has just entered the house. The relative postures of the two figures can be explained without the supposition of an intention to claim for Mary a higher dignity than for the angel. The two paintings may presuppose, but cannot be held to go beyond, the Gospel narratives.

On the other hand, Mary's perpetual virginity finds constant expression in mediæval art. The OT provides many images of inviolability which are applied to Mary. She is the 'fons signatus,' the 'hortus conclusus,' and the 'turris' of the Song of Solomon (4^{15} 4^{12} 4^{4}). The christianized *Physiologus*—a mediæval bestiary or book of animals, real and fabulous, with allegorical explanations[3]—supplied the legend of the unicorn, a fabulous animal which could be tamed only by being caught in the lap of a pure virgin. Ezk 44^{2} provided the symbol of the barred door, Jg 6^{37} that of Gideon's fleece watered by the dew from heaven. The number and variety of these symbols show the value assigned to the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity by the mediæval Church.[4]

(*c*) *The Divine Healer.*—The Gospel miracles, of which there are numerous representations in the catacombs, are evidences of God's desire to release humanity from its plagues. In the heavenly city of the Apocalypse there was to be neither sorrow nor death (Rev 21^{4}). To this divine purpose the healings of Christ bore emphatic witness. His ministry was a short-lived anticipation of the Messianic Age (Mt $11^{4ff.}$). The beneficent power, then displayed in a few instances, would hereafter be seen in the fullness of its strength. It is an evidence of the authority rapidly acquired by the Fourth Gospel that the miracle most frequently represented in the catacombs is the raising of Lazarus (50 examples have been discovered). We remember how both the sisters greet the Saviour with the words, 'If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died' (Jn $11^{21.\ 32}$). We are intended to regard the presence of Christ as incompatible with death, or at least with its bereaving power. Other healings which may with certainty be identified are that of the paralytic (Mk $2^{1ff.}$ and ||), where the man appears walking with his bed on his shoulder, and that of the blind man, where we see Christ touching with His finger the man's closed eyes. Another unmistakable scene is the cure of the issue of blood (Mk 5^{25} and ||). The woman comes behind the Saviour as He walks with two disciples, and kneels that she may touch the hem of His robe. Other paintings have no distinctive features which would justify certain identification.

(*d*) *The Cross.*—The absence from the earlier catacombs of what has now become the distinctive Christian emblem is full of significance. The use of the cross as a separate symbol appears to date from the campaign of Constantine against Maxentius (A.D. 312), when Constantine put the cross upon the shields of his soldiers. Previous to this date we find the cross mentioned in one inscription in the catacombs, and appearing doubtfully in two ceiling-paintings. Both inscription and paintings belong to the 2nd century. The monogram of Christ (*e.g.*, ,) appears in inscriptions of which some may possibly be anterior to Constantine, but its general use dates from the reign of this emperor. It has accordingly become customary to regard both the cross and the monogram as indicating a date not earlier than the 4th century. It should also be observed that the only known reference to the Passion in the catacombs previous to the 4th cent. is what is believed to be a representation of the crowning with thorns in the Pretextatus cemetery.[1] The absence of any symbol of the Passion from the earlier tombs may readily be accounted for by the fact that their paintings were intended to display, not death, but the victory over death. Even when the cross does begin to appear, it seems to be introduced, not for its own sake, but as a support for the rose-leaves which gather round it. It thus becomes a beautified or transfigured cross. We are reminded of the symbolism of the Passion-narrative in the Fourth Gospel, where we see Christ reigning with sovereign authority from the Cross, and the majesty of the Divine Sufferer shining through the indignities which strive in vain to obscure it. The foliage-crosses of the catacombs—concealed or 'dissimulated' crosses—have indeed been traced to the supposed desire of the Christians to avoid observation. Apart, however, from the fact that such crosses do not begin to appear until the 4th cent., it is difficult to believe that the other emblems which do appear would not have clearly indicated these vaults as Christian burying-places. It seems more natural to suppose that the transfiguration of the Cross effected by St. Paul's theology required much reflexion before it could find emblematic expression. The Cross was at first a stumbling-block (Gal 5^{11}) and only slowly became a symbol of glory (6^{14}).[2]

It will thus have been observed that the earliest representations of the Passion were avowed symbols, suggesting, but not depicting, the sacrifice of the God-man. Realism becomes more pronounced as we travel down the centuries. The crucifix—an inevitable development of the cross—does not appear in churches till after the 7th century.[3] The implements of the Passion (hammer, claws, etc.) become independent emblems towards the end of the Middle Ages, when indulgences began to be attached to their veneration. The lamb with blood streaming from its breast, and carrying the cross or a banner upon which the cross was depicted, became a favourite symbol on the portals of Latin churches. The pelican (taken from the *Physiologus*), who tears open its breast to feed its young, was used to represent the sacrificial death of Christ.[4]

(*e*) *The Good Shepherd.*—The favourite symbol of Christ among those who constructed and used the catacombs was that of the Good Shepherd. This image takes here the place of the crucifix in later art. It appears in two different forms in the Gospels. In Lk 15^{3-7} the shepherd is seen bringing home on his shoulders, 'rejoicing,' a sheep that has been lost. In Jn 10^{1-17} the shepherd leads his sheep to and from the pastures and protects them

[1] Von Sybel, p. 250.
[2] Wilpert, p. 202; von Sybel, p. 252.
[3] See Cahier and Martin, *Mélanges d'archéologie*, Paris, 1847–56, 'Curiosités mystérieuses,' ch. vii. pp. 107–117.
[4] Schulze. *PRE*[3] xviii. 392.

[1] Wilpert, p. 226; von Sybel, p. 292.
[2] For the three forms of the cross in later symbolism—*decussata*, or St. Andrew's cross, ; *commissa*, Tau or Egyptian cross, ; and *immissa*, —see art. Cross.
[3] See *DCA. s.v.* 'Crucifix.'
[4] Schulze. *PRE*[3] xviii. 392.

from the wolf, even at the price of his own life. It is added by Christ in a subsequent verse (v.[27f.]): 'My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.' Both representations are of frequent occurrence on the tombs. We see the shepherd pasturing his flock, and carrying upon his shoulders a sheep, whose legs he clasps sometimes with one and sometimes with both hands. There seems to be little doubt that this favourite symbol, like the others in the catacombs, is intended to transport the mind beyond death. The painters wished to indicate the power of Christ over death. Those who died, no less than those who lived, were under His protection, 'the sheep of his pasture.' Thus, where a landscape is indicated in the paintings it is invariably that of the garden or park which typifies paradise. The image, so understood, would appear to have passed into the early burial prayers of both the Greek and the Latin liturgies.[1] Thus, when A. P. Stanley[2] points to the frequent image of the Good Shepherd as an evidence of the joyousness of early Christian feeling, we must remember that the sheep in these pictures are in all probability those who have passed from the vicissitudes of the world into the safe haven of eternal rest.

A brief reference may here be made to the emblems which early Christian art adopted from Greek and Roman mythology. We cannot measure the precise significance which these emblems possessed for the Christians who used or looked at them. They may have been little more than the current decorations of the period; or they may have had a distinct didactic purpose, and been intended to suggest that Christ was the reality to which the heathen mythology pointed in unconscious and hesitating prophecy. So Eros and Psyche appear in many of the catacomb paintings, and in five different pictures where we should have expected the Good Shepherd we find Orpheus with his lyre.

(*f*) *The Judge of the dead.*—In some paintings Christ is seen seated upon a raised platform, plainly in the character of Judge. In one of these[3] we see a male figure in the posture of an *orans* between two taller forms, who point to him as if they were his introducers or sponsors. In the background upon a raised pedestal is Christ, who stretches His open right hand over the head of the middle figure, while in His left He holds a roll. In Wilpert's opinion, the middle figure represents one of the dead who has already stood before the judgment-seat of Christ, while the two other figures represent his advocates.

These representations of judgment convey some important suggestions. The face of Christ in the picture described above is grave without being stern. It must be remembered that no authentic likeness of Christ appears to have been preserved by His disciples. The varieties given to His face and figure from the earliest times put this beyond reasonable doubt. Irenæus[4] shows that no trustworthy portrait existed in his day. To the same effect are the words of Augustine.[5] The disciples were thus left to their own insight and skill to depict His likeness. The painters of the catacombs seem to have given Him the typical male head of their time. This type was during the first two centuries a beardless face with the hair closely cut. It was followed in the 3rd cent. by a face, still beardless, but surrounded by long hair falling upon the forehead and down the back. A still later type was a bearded face framed in flowing or curling locks. If the painters were guided by the prevalent fashions of wearing the hair and beard, it is obvious that we cannot infer much from the apparently increasing seriousness of the countenance.[1] The growth of asceticism in subsequent ages had a marked influence. The early effort after beauty was abandoned. Manly beauty was associated in the mind of the monastic Church only with barbarian soldiers. The words of Is 53[2], 'There is no beauty that we should desire him,' shaped the artist's conceptions. The figure of Christ in the Church of Galla Placidia in Ravenna (*c.* A.D. 450), when compared with the portrait to be seen in the Church of Apollinaris in the same city, painted about a century later, shows the transition from the earlier ideal, shaped by the love of beauty, to the ascetic or melancholy conceptions of later art.[2]

These representations seem also to make it plain that the judgment symbolized was individual and thought of as taking place immediately after death. The departed appears at once before the judgment-seat of Christ (2 Co 5[10]). The approving sentence of the Judge is the signal for his immediate entrance into paradise. Thus in one painting[3] we see two figures, one on either side, drawing back a curtain to admit into paradise one of the departed, who stands in the centre in the posture of an *orans*. In another painting two of the blessed move eagerly forward to welcome a new arrival, who advances in the same attitude of devotion. We find no representation in the catacombs of a general judgment of mankind. Nor do the paintings, as archæologists of all schools agree, give any indication of belief in an 'intermediate state' or a period between death and judgment. All those who die in Christ are conceived as passing at once from their death-beds into heaven.[4]

When we pass into the subsequent centuries, death and judgment assume terrifying shapes. The destructive power of death is symbolized by a man who weeds the garden of life or fells its trees, or (after Rev 6[8]) as a rider with drawn bow, above all as an emaciated old man who finally reaches the form of a skeleton with scythe and hour-glass. 'The dance of death' appears to have originated in the plague known as 'the Black Death.' It quickly gained a wide popularity, which it retained far beyond the Middle Ages. The soul, leaving the body, was regularly represented as a little human figure, naked and sexless, emerging from the mouth. In pictures of the Last Judgment popular imaginations of hell took the place of the earlier representations of paradise. Hell was symbolized by the open throat of a monster (after the leviathan of Job 41), into which men and women, masters and servants, priests and people, were thrust. Devils in every shape did their work of derision and torture under the supervision of the prince of hell. To him the popular imagination transferred everything it knew of monsters, and thus there arose the being of many shapes and names with goat's horns, cloven hoof, bat's wings, and a tail. He even took the form of a blackbird, and, as such, flew into the mouth of Judas at the Last Supper, and whispered into the ear of Pilate as he sat in judgment. Popular humour may well have had its share in shaping these fancies.[5]

2. The heavenly state. — St. Paul represents Christ as the second Adam, who undid the consequences of the first Adam's transgression (Ro 5). By the early Christians heaven was pictured as a restored Eden. The word 'paradise' appears to

1 Von Sybel, p. 242; *ap.* Muratori, *Liturgia Romana Vetus*, Naples, 1760, i. 751: 'We pray God faithfully that He may grant [to the departed] that, redeemed from death, released from his sins, reconciled to the Father, brought home on the shoulders of the good Shepherd, he may enjoy the society of the blessed.'

2 *Christian Institutions*, London, 1881, ch. xiii., 'The Roman Catacombs.'

3 Wilpert, p. 394; von Sybel, p. 271.

4 *Contra Hær.* i. 25. 6. 5 *De Trin.* vii. 4 f.

1 Von Sybel, p. 281; Wilpert, p. 106; E. von Dobschütz, 'Christusbilder,' in *TU*, new ser., iii. [1899].

2 See art. 'Jesus Christ, Representations of,' in *DCA*.

3 Wilpert, p. 467; von Sybel, p. 267.

4 Wilpert, p. 430; von Sybel, p. 273.

5 Schulze, *PRE*[3] xviii. 393.

have been originally Persian and to have been introduced into Greek literature by Xenophon.[1] The Greeks seem to have passed it on to the Hebrews. It appears in the OT only in writings subsequent to the Greek period (Ec 2^5, Ca 4^{13}, Neh 2^8), and bore the meaning of a park with trees, shrubs, and grass, and tenanted by wild animals, such as surrounded the residences of eastern potentates. Such parks were commonly enclosed by a wall or trellis-shaped fence. Trees, shrubs, flowers, and the trellised fencing in the catacomb paintings are invariably symbols of paradise.[2]

On the threshold we meet with the figures known as *orantes*. These are forms, male or female—the latter are much more numerous than the former—standing with arms either fully extended or bent at the elbows, and with opened hands. The *orantes* give rise to questions which are still in debate. Whom, in the first place, are these figures intended to represent? Against the supposition that they are either likenesses of the departed or intended to represent their souls[3] we have to place the fact that a female *orans* often appears painted on the tomb of a man, and also to remember that the paintings appear to have been sometimes executed before the tombs were filled. It seems therefore most natural to regard the *orantes* as ideal figures, poetic representations of the blessed dead. Again, what is the meaning of the outstretched arms and open hands? Are we to understand the attitude as one of prayer or one of adoration? And, if it be prayer that is symbolized, for what do the suppliants pray? The answers to these questions are not unaffected by dogmatic interests. According to the opinion of Wilpert, the *orantes* are praying for the salvation of their friends who still remain upon the earth. In some of the inscriptions we find the survivors asking for the prayers of the departed.[4] On the other hand, we meet with the attitude in some cases where it unquestionably symbolizes adoration, or at least the prayer in which entreaty loses itself in submission. Thus in the OT scenes of deliverance from death the rescued appear often in the attitude of *orantes*. So Noah stands in the Ark, and Daniel among the lions, and so the three children appear in the furnace. Yet in each of these cases the deliverance has already been granted. If anything is asked for, it can only be the continuance of something begun. So the new inmates of paradise seem to stand in an attitude of wondering recognition. In the highest Christian prayer entreaty ceases because the human will is one with the divine. The lifting up of the hands was a Jewish as well as a Christian practice (Is 1^{15}, 1 Ti 2^8).

3. The heavenly feast. — The Christians who buried their dead in the catacombs had two sacraments, both of which are frequently symbolized in the paintings. In baptism the believer was admitted among the number of the elect. He became a 'saint' in the original sense of that word. On the tombs we find representations both of the baptism of Christ by His forerunner and of the Church's baptism. There are also three pictures of a fisherman, seated on the bank and drawing a fish out of the water with his hook. The figure may point to baptism and to the words of Jesus addressed to the disciples: 'Come ye after me, and I will make you fishers of men' (Mt 4^{19} and ||). If this be so, it would supply an additional reason for the adoption of the fish as a Christian symbol.

In the Eucharist the believer partook of the bread which came down from heaven, and of which he who ate would not die (Jn 6^{50}). In it he had the prophecy of the heavenly feast. When Jesus took leave of His disciples, He told them of the new wine which He would drink with them in the Kingdom of God (Lk 22^{18}). The Crucifixion shattered for a brief interval the hope raised by the prophetic words. Despondency gave way to renewed confidence when it became clear that God had not 'allowed His Holy One to see corruption.' So 'day by day, continuing stedfastly with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread at home, they [the disciples] did take their food with gladness and singleness of heart' (Ac 2^{46}). It is no longer possible to mark the steps by which this early 'breaking of bread' passed into the Church's Eucharist. It is enough to recognize that what afterwards became the ecclesiastical rite originally formed part of the corporate feast of the Christian society. If the presence of the heavenly Christ was, as we can well believe, more vividly realized during these feasts than at any other time, the disciples would naturally associate them with the peace or joy which awaited them hereafter. The fellowship of the earthly feast would provide the mould for their anticipations of future happiness. They might recall the Biblical assurances: 'Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God' (Lk 14^{15}), 'Blessed are they which are bidden to the marriage supper of the Lamb' (Rev 19^9), 'To him that overcometh, to him will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of God' (2^7). It is profitless to dwell upon the inconsistency of picturing spiritual happiness by an image which appeals only to man's bodily appetites. For in the 'new world' which, whether it be peopled by corporeal or incorporeal beings, is in any case to be the scene of fruition every earthly image, the most attenuated equally with the most material, becomes obsolete. An instrument intended for a region surrounded by an atmosphere is useless when the atmosphere is transcended. Thus the most spiritually-minded Christians, restricted by limitations from which they cannot escape, may well continue, as they do, to associate heaven with the 'shout of them that triumph, the song of them that feast.' In the catacomb paintings heavenly happiness is frequently represented by the image of festal joy. The scene of the feast is marked, by the customary indications, as paradise. The guests are to be seen, generally if not always, behind the roll which is the recognized symbol for the cushions used at feasts. Often attendants appear carrying a dish or holding a flagon or wine-cup. In one series of four pictures these attendants take the form of two female figures who are designated by inscriptions as 'Irene' and 'Agape.' They are appealed to by the guests to supply warm water or to mix the wine ('Irene, da calda'; 'Agape, misce nobis'). One of the figures seems thus to symbolize the peace of heaven, and the other the love from which the Christian love-feast derived its name, and which was one of St. Paul's three abiding things.[1] The food indicated in these pictures consists invariably of bread and fish. Sometimes a number of baskets, filled with small round loaves, appear either in front of the cushion-roll or on either side of it. The miraculous feeding of the thousands was plainly the model in the painter's mind. This miracle, connected by St. John (6^{35}) with the 'bread of life,' was an anticipation of the heavenly feast. Similarly prophetic was the Church's Eucharist, which in some of the paintings seems to be expressly depicted and made a symbol of its heavenly antitype. It need only be added that the fish, from its presence in the miracle, as well perhaps as for the reason given above, appears to have established itself as a symbol for a Christian disciple, long before the acrostic was discovered: ἰχθύς = Ἰησοῦς χριστὸς θεοῦ υἱος σωτήρ.

It will appear from the foregoing summary that, while Christian symbolism points persistently onwards towards an ideal world, conceived as lying beyond death, the hope thus expressed is sustained by experiences which are prized for their own sake, and also as earnests of things yet to come. Eternal life, the ultimate blessing of the Fourth Gospel, is there represented as both present and future. So the Messianic kingdom of the earlier evangelists was yet to come, while it was also 'within' or 'among' the disciples who walked with Jesus and saw God in Him. The Church which continued His ministry in the ages that followed was likewise a prophet of what was yet to be, and also a teacher of men amidst the dangers and obligations of actual life. Thus in the Middle Ages, while the three theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) appear repeatedly on church porches, pulpits, and monuments, the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) also assume their symbolic shapes. The Church is a teacher of common-place morality, while at the same time she must bear witness to truths whose validity cannot be demonstrated by everyday experience. The Christians who built the catacombs tell us in many inscriptions of the central hope with which they consigned their dead to the tomb. Their desire was that the departed might 'see God' ('Vivat in Deo,' 'Vives in æternum,' 'Deum videre cupiens vidit'). Such is the hope, vague and yet real, changing but steadfast, which has created the Christian symbols of the past, and may be trusted to fashion new ones as the human heart becomes more proficient in the interpretation of its own language.

LITERATURE.—J. Wilpert, *Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, 2 vols., Freiburg i. Br., 1903; L. von Sybel, *Christliche Antike*, Marburg, 1906–09, i.; G. B. de Rossi, *La Roma sotterranea cristiana*, 3 vols., Rome, 1864–77; V. Schulze, *Archäolog. Studien über altchristliche Monumente*, Vienna, 1880, art. 'Sinnbilder,' in *PRE*[3]; C. Cahier and A. Martin [Jesuit Fathers], *Mélanges d'archéologie, d'histoire et de littérature . . . du moyen âge*, 4 vols., Paris, 1848–56, *Nouveaux mélanges d'archéologie, d'hist. et de litt. sur le moyen âge*, do. 1873–75; F. Cabrol, *DACL*, *s.v.*; R. St. J. Tyrwhitt, *DCA*, *s.v.*

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[1] See a learned note in von Sybel, p. 161.
[2] Von Sybel, p. 167.
[3] De Rossi, *Roma sotterranea cristiana*, ii. 324, *Bull. Christ.*, 1867, 1885, quoted by von Sybel.
[4] 'In orationibus tuis roges pro nobis quia scimus te in Christo' (Wilpert, p. 211; von Sybel, p. 264).

[1] Wilpert, p. 470; von Sybel, p. 207; de Rossi, *Bull. Christ.*, 1882.

SYMBOLISM (Greek and Roman).—A symbol is a visible or audible sign or emblem of some thought, emotion, or experience, interpreting what can be really grasped only by the mind and imagination by something which enters into the field of observation.

So far as Greek and Roman religion are concerned, we need speak only of two kinds of symbols—symbolic representation by means of actions or words and symbolic representation in art.

Religion, taking its rise in experience and belief, tends, as it becomes less literal and less insistent, to give rise to symbolism; and this is true also of that lower kind of religion which is called magic. When primitive men thought that by certain actions and words they could compel spiritual powers to do their bidding, or when they thought that the painting of animal forms on the walls of their caves gave them power over the animals depicted, they had not yet reached the stage of symbolism, but had taken the first steps towards it; when they poured water on the ground to produce rain, they thought that there was an actual causal connexion between the ritual act and the fall of rain. But just as, when religious belief decays, the feelings which gave rise to it often find scope in the field of poetry, so, when actual belief in the power of sympathetic magic grows less, the actions and ceremonies to which it led are often continued in symbolism.

I. *GREEK.*—**1. In local cults.**—The local cults of Greece, which went on at a lower level, and in a more conservative key, than the religion of poetry and of philosophy, preserved a great deal of symbolism. Even in Athens the great festivals embodied such traces of primitive religion. At the Brauronian festival young girls, impersonating bears, danced a bear-dance in honour of Artemis. At the Diasia the priest who struck down the sacrificial ox was accused of murder and in turn accused his instrument, the axe, which was condemned and solemnly cast into the sea. In the worship of the dead flowers and fruits gradually took the place of the more serious offerings of an earlier time. With the dead were buried, not, as in primitive times, real armour and ornaments, but only symbolical offerings, money of gold-leaf, animals of terra-cotta, and the like. Sometimes these objects were only depicted in relief on the tombstone. The terrible human sacrifices once brought to the sterner deities were commuted into sacrifices of animals, sometimes clad in human fashion, or mere images of human beings. Naturally it was in the mysteries, where the survivals of primitive religion were most rife, that symbolism was most prominent. Mere ceremonial ablutions took the place of actual immersions as a ceremony of purification. The sacred meal which the deity shared with his votaries became a mere ceremonial tasting of some special food. At Eleusis, in the great mysteries, the votaries emptied two vessels filled with water, turning to east and west and repeating the sacred formula ὗε, κύε ('Sky pour rain; earth bear grain'), which was directed to earth and sky, and was evidently a survival of an ancient magical formula for the production of rain.

The suppliant who visited the cave and oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia, before he went into the presence of the hero, drank from two springs, that of oblivion and that of memory, to signify that he was to forget the past and to remember the revelation which was to come to him. Originally, in all probability, the water of these springs was supposed to have some actual effect on the votary, as had the spring in the cave of the Clarian Apollo at Colophon on the priest who drank of it before soothsaying. But in the time of Pausanias[1] the action had become merely ritual and symbolical.

The sacred marriage was common to several cults in Greece. When the notion of the deity was somewhat crude, women were shut into the temple, to stand in the same sexual relation to him in which, according to tradition, Cassandra stood to Apollo. But, as time went on, such dedication became only symbolical, the place of the victim being sometimes taken by the wife of the priest.

As the mystery religions spread and their outlines hardened, a new element came in, which was destined to take further development in Christianity—the element of authority. Symbolic rites were practised, not on the ground of mere tradition, but by ordination of the recognized hierophants of each cultus, who claimed a divine communication. This element, however, scarcely belonged to the earlier religious view of either Greeks or Romans, among whom authority in religion was scarcely recognized apart from tradition. Cults had an open field and freely competed one with another, except those with which the safety of the State was supposed to be connected.

It seems that almost all ritual which does not appeal to the intelligence is in character symbolic. And the notable feature in symbolic ritual is that, since it appeals mainly to the emotions, it may be interpreted or understood in a great variety of ways. At the mysteries of Eleusis, *e.g.*, some of the votaries might regard the whole proceedings as a sort of spell to cause fertility; some might be genuine worshippers of the great goddesses Demeter and Persephone; some might, like Cicero, find in the ritual a promise and pledge of a life beyond the grave. Everything depended on the religious outlook, the exalted or materialist beliefs of the votary himself.

> 'Aristotle,' says Synesius,[2] is of opinion 'that the initiated learned nothing precisely; but that they received impressions, were put into a suitable frame of mind.'

Thus symbolic ritual has a great attraction for persons of emotional temperament, while it is distasteful to those of strongly developed intelligence, who like definite views. Compared with clear doctrine, it is like music compared with painting. It was by no means well suited to the minds of the more cultivated Greeks.

2. In art.—In early Greek art symbolism appears in two forms: in representing by some simple figure an idea such as a quality or attribute of one of the deities and in representing the whole of anything by depicting some characteristic part of it.

A few symbols of the deities seem to have been taken over by the Greeks from the pre-historic peoples whom they displaced in Crete and Hellas. Such is the double-edged axe, which is found in the palace of Cnossus in Crete in the third millennium B.C. in scenes of cultus, and which belongs to a male or female deity of the people. This axe became among the Greeks a symbol of Dionysus. The snake also appears as an attribute of a goddess of Crete frequently represented, and later was inherited by the Greek Erinyes. But most of the symbols of the gods of the Greek pantheon seem to be more immediately derived from the art of the nations of Syria and Mesopotamia. Most of these symbols were displaced by growing anthropomorphism. This statement requires some explanation. On early bronzes and terra-cottas found on Greek sites, dating from the 7th or 6th cent., the goddess Artemis is figured as winged and holding in her two hands lions, panthers, or swans. On the chest of Cypselus, a

[1] IX. xxxix.
[2] Aristotle, *Frag.*, ed. E. Heitz, Leipzig, 1869, p. 40.

7th cent. work preserved at Olympia, Pausanias[1] saw such a figure, which surprised him by its strangeness. It was strictly symbolical; the wings were not for flight, but only to typify swiftness, the lions were added to show the power of the goddess over animals, whose mistress (πότνια) she was. We can trace this representation step by step through Greek art and see how in maturer times the swiftness of the deity was indicated by her stature and slimness of build, her power over animals by the stag or dog who accompanied her. A similar transformation takes place in the case of Zeus. On early coins of Elis an eagle appears as a substitute for the god; later he bears the eagle in his hand. Later still, as in the great statue of Pheidias, a golden eagle was an adornment of the sceptre of Zeus. Thus, as time went on, merely outward symbols tended to disappear or at all events to become unimportant; and the meaning which they had conveyed was expressed in the type of the deity. Certain symbols, however, held their ground. The thunderbolt of Zeus, indicating him as the lord of storms (Ζεὺς ὑέτιος), is usual in the 5th century. To express this feature in the type of the deity would not be easy. The bow, as symbol of the rays of the sun-god,[2] is usual in the hand of Apollo in archaic representations; later the lyre is far more usual. Even wings do not altogether disappear, but they mostly lose their merely symbolic character and are used for flight, as in the case of Victory and Eros, an innovation ascribed to the sculptor Archermus of Chios (*c.* 570 B.C.). The god Hermes, even in late art, carries wings on his cap or his heels—a survival of archaic symbolism.

Coins furnish us with many examples of symbols belonging to the deities. In the 7th and 6th centuries the obverse of electrum and silver coins usually presents some very simple symbolical device—a griffin at Teos and Abdera, a thunderbolt at Olympia, a wolf at Argos, an owl at Athens; and then, after the archaic period, this type is usually banished to the reverse of the coin, and in its place we have the head of the deity to whom the type belongs. It must, however, be observed that, when numismatists speak of a symbol on a coin, they use the word in a technical sense, to indicate not a symbolical type, but one of those small and subsidiary devices often placed in the field of a coin by magistrates who were responsible for its issue—a device probably often taken from the private signet of such magistrates.

Another phase of symbolism is found when in artistic representation a part is taken to stand for the whole. This often appears on Greek vases and reliefs. Pausanias[3] observes that, in the painting representing Hades by Polygnotus at Delphi, the grove of Persephone is represented by one tree. So on vases a temple or a house is often represented by a single column, a river by a swimming fish, a sea-shore by a shell, and so forth. It is probable that this was how the scenes in tragedies were represented on the background of the stage. It is really a sort of shorthand, and altogether parallel to the process by which in Egypt and elsewhere picture-writing came into being.

Symbolical or allegorical impersonations are to be found in Greek art at all periods, though more often in archaic art and that of Hellenistic times than in the greatest period. On the chest of Cypselus, in the 7th cent., we are told by Pausanias[4] that Night was figured, carrying two boys, one white and one black, who represented Sleep and Death respectively. Justice as a beautiful figure scourged Injustice, who had the form of an ugly woman. Fate, with teeth and claws like a wild beast, claimed Polynices as a victim. Even in the great age we have such figures as Virtue, Nemesis, Opportunity (Καιρός). But it is in the Hellenistic age, in the great cities of the East, that symbolic personalities most abound. In the celebrated procession of Ptolemy II. of Egypt[1] we have figures of the Year and the Seasons; in that of Antiochus IV. of Syria[2] we find statues of Night, Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning, and Noon. On the coins of Alexandria under the Romans we find a remarkable set of fanciful figures—Euthenia (Prosperity), Kratesis (Dominion), and the like.

The great Ionian cities of Asia Minor appear on monuments of the Roman age in the persons of the legendary Amazons whom they claimed as their foundresses.[3] Smyrna on coins carries a double-axe and has a prow of a ship at her feet; Cyme holds a dolphin and a trident; Teos, a city renowned for vines, carries the thyrsus of Dionysus; Ephesus carries poppies and ears of corn, and so forth. In each case the attributes embody the situation or the produce of the city. In a noted Pompeian painting[4] we have well-characterized impersonations of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The list might be almost indefinitely lengthened.

Symbolism in Greece, in the great period, often takes fine poetic forms, as when the sun-god in his chariot on the pediment of the Parthenon represents the East in the morning, or boys plunging into the sea represent the setting stars on a fine vase in the British Museum.[5] In the same age rivers are represented by man-headed bulls, as on the coins of Gela and Catana in Sicily; nymphs have cows' horns; Alexander the Great appears on the money of his general Lysimachus with the ram's horn of Ammon.

But, in spite of such examples as these, there is a broad line of distinction between the use of symbolism in Oriental art—the art of Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, and India—and the use in Greek art. Oriental art is content with adding symbols to the human forms of deities, without caring for their beauty or appropriateness. In Egypt and Babylon we find human bodies joined to the heads of all kinds of animals—lion, bull, jackal, hawk, and so on. And Indian figures of deities represent them with several heads, many arms (each holding some attribute), necklaces of skulls, and the like. Oriental art tries to represent in this way qualities and attributes which sculpture or painting could not otherwise portray—elements of mysticism, mythological tales, or sometimes the ideas of pantheistic religion. Greek art avoids monstrous forms as a rule, though it inherits a few specially suitable for artistic development, such as the Centaur. And it does not attempt to portray, in sculpture or in painting, anything which lies outside the scope of those arts. Exquisite in form and clear in meaning, its creations do not carry us beyond sense and intellect, do not appeal to the mystical tendencies of men. Thus Greek symbolism has no wide limits.

II. *ROMAN.*—**1. In cult and law.**—In Roman religious ceremonies the symbol held a large place. This was natural, as in quite the early times of the republic there was an invasion of Greek religion and Greek deities, which caused the old rustic religion of the Roman people to survive only in the form of ritual, the meaning of which was in a great degree obscured. Hence the State cultus of Rome was divorced alike from belief and from morality, and, so long as the magistrates performed

[1] v. xix. 9.
[2] Homer, *Il.* i. 45.
[3] x. xxx. 6.
[4] v. xviii.

[1] Athenæus, v. 196.
[2] *Ib.* p. 194.
[3] *JHS* ix. [1888] 56.
[4] W. Helbig, *Wandgemälde Campaniens*, Leipzig, 1868, no. 1113.
[5] *Catalogue*, E 466.

exactly the ceremonies handed down by their ancestors, it mattered little what meaning they attached to those ceremonies or what beliefs they held in religion. The emperor, whether he were a Trajan or a Nero, was always *pontifex maximus* and represented to the gods the State in its religious capacity. Hence the Romans were extremely careful as to the way in which they wore the toga or the cap called *apex*, as to their exact position in relation to the points of the compass, and as to the attitude in which they stood when they were sacrificing. All these details had no doubt some meaning in their origin; but not only are we unable usually to discover what it was, but even the Romans did not know: they blindly followed the tradition, with an uneasy feeling that, unless they did so, some great calamity would overtake the State. Most of these ritual customs were probably derived from the Etruscans, a people at a low level of culture, but exact in all matters of a religion which seems scarcely to have risen above the level of magic.

When an official conducted a sacrifice, he sprinkled the victim with wine and threw over it salt meal; then he made a ritual motion symbolical of slaying it, but the actual butchering was done by attendants.[1] Like the Greeks, the Romans contrived to put in the place of human sacrifices the mere offering of substitutes and symbols.[2]

When the Greek deities migrated to Rome, they took with them their recognized symbols; and the native gods, who were largely identified with the immigrants, also adopted these outward signs of inward powers. Thus in art Greek customs went on, as in fact the artists were usually Greek. So we have on Roman monuments the symbolism of Ephesus and Alexandria. Allegorical and symbolical figures, such as Pudicitia, Ubertas, Annona, appear abundantly on the Roman coins; but they can have had but little serious worship. In short, while symbolism is of importance in relation to Roman cultus, it is unimportant in earlier Roman art, requiring a concrete poetical imagination of which the Romans were destitute.

There was a good deal of symbolism or symbolic ritual in the customs of Roman law; *e.g.*, if a man purchased a slave, he laid hands on him (*mancipatio*) in the presence of witnesses and weighed out at the same time to the seller a piece of money which was accepted as a symbol of the price, *quasi pretii loco*, as Gaius says.[3] We need not be surprised that much symbolism made its way into Christianity in Rome, since it had become a recognized part of the routine of daily life.

2. In art.—In the time of the Roman dominion, as the religion of Mithras and other mystery cults spread from east to west through Europe, the range and power of symbolism increased. We may especially trace on tombstones of the period of the empire, alike in Italy, Gaul, and other regions, a growth of religious symbols mainly having reference to the life beyond the tomb, which was taking an ever larger place in men's thoughts and hopes. Some of the mythological scenes which the Greeks had depicted on tombs, from mere artistic and decorative motives, seem to have been re-interpreted in a more mystic fashion. Such were the rapes of women and the combats of men; and more especially scenes from the lives of Heracles and Orpheus and other heroic persons who had won immortality by great deeds, or had descended into Hades and returned. Some ordinary figures of earlier art—the griffin, the lion, the bull, the cock—became connected with the hope of immortality. The Mithraic shrines of northern Europe contain reliefs in which symbolism seems to run wild, though we know so little about Mithraism that our interpretation of such reliefs is usually conjectural. On this subject the works of Franz Cumont are authoritative. It is impossible here to discuss the question of the symbolism on later pagan tombs. A good account of it will be found in Mrs. Arthur Strong's *Apotheosis and After Life* (1915). This writer, however, goes too far in interpreting almost all the scenes and figures on such tombs in reference to the future life. It is obvious that, unless we keep in restraint the tendency to read mystic meanings into painted and sculptured scenes, we may drift back into the fancy world of Creuzer, who traced the influence of the mysteries everywhere on Greek vases and Roman reliefs. We are on safer ground in speaking of contemporary Christian art, because here we have a literature for comparison.

In the early Christian art[1] of the catacombs and of sarcophagi there is even an increase of symbolism, as compared with contemporary pagan works. This is natural, because the Christians commonly adopted pagan types, only giving them a fresh meaning; *e.g.*, the peacock, which in Greek art belonged to Hera, became to Christians a symbol of the resurrection, probably because the flesh of the peacock was supposed not to decay. Orpheus became an emblem or symbol of Christ. The fish, the sheep, the vine, all acquired a new Christian signification. Probably in many cases the meaning would not be realized by the pagan artist who was called in; and it was safer that the knowledge should be confined to the society. This symbolism is apt to degenerate into something like shorthand: a man carrying a couch refers to the miracle of the healing of the paralytic man; a cock beside Peter to his denial of his Master, and so forth.

The use of symbols in the later Neo-Platonic philosophy is so closely connected with their use in Christianity that it need not be here treated. See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

LITERATURE.—There is no recent work which deals methodically with Greek symbolism. Roman symbolism is treated in Mrs. Arthur Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life*, London, 1915.

P. GARDNER.

SYMBOLISM (Hindu).—Of all religions of the East, the home of type and imagery, Hinduism makes the most use of symbols. It has formally declared the ultimate truth to be unknowable and indefinable. In all its scheme of practice and teaching it seeks to make definite approach to the reality by suggestive type or symbol—an approach that can never find its goal, but can only draw nearer and nearer, as it points successively, like the ancient Greek philosophers, to the symbol or likeness which most fully and faithfully reflects the true, and embodies the largest part of a reality which in its entirety is inconceivable by the human mind and inexpressible in the language of men. The symbol is the necessary and helpful intermediary between the inadequate capacity of the mind of the would-be worshipper and the incommunicable nature and fullness of the Unknown whom he adores. A complete and adequate description therefore of the Hindu use of type and symbol would require an almost complete exposition of Hindu belief in its many varieties and ramifications. Whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of this the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine are sufficient illustration. All, however, that is practicable within the limits of an article is to indicate the motive or motives that more or less consciously and avowedly have prompted the use of the symbol, to set forth in the briefest possible

[1] G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 352.
[2] *Ib.* p. 355. [3] i. 119.

[1] Cf. art. SYMBOLISM (Christian).

manner its historical relations in the religious scheme and cult, to define its necessary limits, and to select for illustration and comment a few of the more important types which have occupied a considerable place in the belief and profession of the adherents of the faith. A mere enumeration of the symbols employed would be a large and probably impossible task.

1. **Use and purpose of symbols.**—The use and purpose of the symbol is twofold: (1) to set forth in visible or audible likeness what cannot be really or fully expressed to the physical eye or ear, or even clearly conceived by the limited faculties of the human mind. All language is in the last resort symbolic, and religious language in an especial degree, for it endeavours to present a mystery, a reality too deep for words. The Hindu faith had at its service a language of the utmost delicacy and flexibility, with a vigorous and fertile growth and an almost unlimited vocabulary, and found itself in a world of tropical luxuriance, with a tropical wealth of beauty and suggestiveness. It was not to be wondered at that it became profuse in type and symbol and laid under contribution all the facts and phenomena of nature to serve its religious and priestly ends. All the great gods had their resemblances, animal or material forms, in which they presented themselves embodied to human sight, which served to recall to the worshipper the deity, whose mind and character they more or less inadequately reflected. Other more rare and refined symbols were presentative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblem of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. The wise man does not worship the symbol, the shape in clay or wood or stone, but is thereby reminded of the invisible substance or reality which they each represent.

(2) The image or symbol serves the purpose also of providing in material and suitable form a convenient object of reverence, to meet the religious need of those whose minds, through darkness and ignorance, are unable to grasp the conception of an unseen formless deity. Such men, if left without a visible object to which their reverence and fear may attach themselves, will wander in a maze of doubt, disquiet, and unbelief. It is better that they should worship erroneously, worship a thing, than that they should not worship at all. There is much that might be urged in favour of the Hindu view that regards the worship of the external symbol as a stepping-stone to higher, clearer forms of belief; it is a view unacknowledged perhaps but not unknown to other faiths. And in Hinduism, whatever may be said of or claimed by the wise and instructed thinker, the *pūjā* of the multitude to the image of the god is reverent and sincere. In some respects also and within definite limits the Indian contention has justified itself that the symbol has proved a signpost and a guide to better, higher thoughts and to a truer worship of Him whom no form can express or language describe.

2. **The most important types.**—(*a*) The most important symbols are those of the *Brahman*, the undefinable and unknowable origin and source of all. Of the *Brahman* only signs and types can be employed, for the primeval source and sustainer of the universe is beyond and above thought or word. His names or titles are symbolic: *hiraṇyagarbha*, the golden germ, that was in the beginning; *svayambhū*, the self-existent one; *viśvakarman*, the artificer of all things; and many others. The authors of the *Upaniṣads* especially attempt to set forth in symbolic terms the being and nature of that which in the last resort they are obliged to confess is beyond knowledge. *Prāṇa*, the breath, or *vāyu*, the wind, is a frequently recurring type; and it seems to have been felt that by its mysterious and elusive character the *prāṇa* was peculiarly fitted to represent that which in its essence eludes comprehension. The breath, *prāṇa*, is *Brahman*.[1] A similar type is the *ākāśa*, the all-pervading and all-surrounding ether, 'omnipresent and unchanging in the heart.'[2] *Manas* also, the mind or will, is with the *ākāśa* a symbolic form or type under which the *Brahman* is to be meditated on or worshipped.[3] The mystical syllable *Om*, the most widely venerated syllable in the world, is the highest *Brahman*, and its utterance with understanding of its significance secures the accomplishment of every wish.[4] *Om* is also a symbol of the Hindu triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and each of the three sounds of which the word is composed represents one of these deities. To the Buddhists also the word is a symbol of much significance, forming part of the sacred six-syllabled formula which every Buddhist cherishes in his memory and makes a constant part of his invocation and prayer.

A more comprehensive and suggestive symbol of the *Brahman* is given in the compound *sachchidānanda*, a kind of triple representation in three several modes or aspects, as *sat*, 'being,' *chit*, 'thought,' and *ānanda*, 'bliss.'[5] This more refined and abstract symbolizing represents a later phase of speculative thought and marks a forward step in the progress of philosophic insight. As a type or symbol it is less inadequate than the sun in the heavens (*āditya*),[6] the material *ākāśa*, the golden *puruṣa* in the eye,[7] or even than *manas*, or the significant name *ātman* itself. In its further course, moreover, speculative thought denied that even in *sachchidānanda* any positive implication concerning the *Brahman* did or could reside. The *Brahman* transcended all symbols and assertions, comprehended both being and not-being (*sat*, *asat*), thought and not-thought (*chit*, *achit*), bliss and its contrary (*ānanda*, *anānanda*), or rather he was above and beyond all, the unsearchable and unknown.

(*b*) Each of the great gods has an animal or material form or object which represents him to the eyes of men, by which he is symbolically known. The more popular gods have many symbols. The 'vehicles' of the gods are practically symbols of their presence and power—the goose of Brahmā; Garuḍa, the monstrous eagle of Viṣṇu; the bull (Nandi) of Śiva; the fabulous sea-monster (*makara*) of Varuṇa, who is then depicted as a white man and is described as *makarāśva*, 'he whose steed is the *makara*,' riding, with the head and fore-legs of an antelope and the body and tail of a fish; the peacock of Kārttikeya, the god of war; the monkey of Hanumān; the deer of Vāyu; the elephant Airavata of Indra, produced with other sacred and marvellous objects at the churning of the ocean; the buffalo and dogs of Yama; and many others. Of the well-known Hindu triad Brahmā hardly possesses any emblem or type except his sacred goose—an indication of how little the first member of the triad attracted to himself the thought and worship of the Hindu. Of the popular Viṣṇu there were many symbols, some of which are always represented on the images or pictures of the god. The most frequent and characteristic is perhaps the *chakra*, or discus;

[1] *Kauś.* ii. 1 f.
[2] *Chhānd.* iii. xii. 7–9 (*SBE* i. 46); *Bṛhad.* iii. vii. 12, 16. iv. 1. 3.
[3] *Chhānd.* iii. xviii. 1 (*SBE* i. 53); *Bṛhad.* iv. i. 6.
[4] *Bṛhad.* v. i. 1; *Kaṭha*, i. ii. 16; cf. Manu, ii. 83.
[5] *Chhānd.* vi. ii. 1, viii. xii. 4; *Taitt.* ii. 1, iii. 4–6; *Bṛhad.* ii. i. 20, iii. 6. The formula itself as a whole is found only in late Upaniṣads; cf. Deussen, *Up.* p. 126 ff.
[6] *Chhānd.* iii. xix. 1 (*SBE* i. 54).
[7] *Taitt.* ii. viii. 5; *Chhānd.* i. vi. 8.

the club and conch-shell also which he carries are indicative of his authority and power. The auspicious mark (*śrīvatsa*) usually represented on the breast of the god, in form like a curl of hair, and the three-pronged or trident-like mark made with white or coloured earths on the foreheads of his worshippers are symbolic, the latter of devotion to the service of the deity. The sacred *tulasī* plant in the courtyard of the dwelling is the mark of the deity's presence and protection, and in it centres the worship especially of the women of the household. The *śālagrāma* also, the sacred ammonite-stone, is another mystical and well-known symbol.

The symbolic types or presentations of the rival deity, Śiva, who in almost equal degree with Viṣṇu holds the affection and regard of the Indian peoples, were equally numerous. The most important are the bull Nandi, on which he rides, and the *liṅga*, or phallus. Every Śaivite temple has its sacred bull, who roams the courtyards and streets unmolested and receives practically divine honours. The *liṅga* is the commonest emblem of the god, and the stones, great or small, which represent him have this form or are roughly shaped to it. Two of these stones are said to bear a pre-eminently holy character: that at Benares, where Śiva is worshipped as Viśveśvara, *παντοκράτωρ*, the lord of all; and the idol in the temple at Somnath, destroyed by Mahmud of Ghazni in his iconoclastic raid into India. The trident also is borne by Śiva, a type of government and authority; and the crescent moon depicted on his forehead has a special significance, recalling the sovereignty which was assigned to him when the moon was recovered from the depths of the ocean.

Similarly the wives of the great gods have each their symbols—the trident and skull of Kālī, the lotus of Sarasvatī, wife of Brahmā, and also of Lakṣmī, wife of Viṣṇu.

In a late writing the Gāyatrī is said to represent the triad of gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and also the three Vedas.

(*c*) Under sacred trees in the vicinity of Indian villages will often be found the images or symbols of the *grāmadevatā*, the village divinities who watch over its interests and care for the inhabitants; and in the village fields the clay or pottery steeds of Aiyanar (*q.v.*), the tutelary deity of the fields, on which he rides by night to pursue and rout the demoniac powers.

(*d*) There are symbols also of a more general import, which are not always easy to classify. The *piṇḍa*, or ball of cooked rice, used at the commemorative services for deceased relatives and offered to the *pitṛs*, represents symbolically the share which the departed still have in the family life. The most important and widely recognized symbol of this character is probably the sacred footprint, which typifies both the presence and the authority of the god. In the courtyard or vicinity of many, perhaps most, Hindu temples there is the print of a foot on the ground, often of large size, with sacred symbols engraved on the sole, which differ according to the deity commemorated. To these there is sometimes a legend attached, which gives its supposed history and describes the occasion on which it was impressed. The well-known footprint on Adam's Peak in Ceylon is believed by Śaivites to be that of Śiva. By Buddhists also the numerous footprints of the Buddha are regarded with reverence.

(*e*) In many parts of India the symbols of the sun and moon and the planets may be seen. The two first are represented by a disk or crescent respectively, made of metal. The signs of the planets in their order are as follows: of Budha, or Mercury, a bow; of Śukra, or Venus, a square; of Maṅgala, or Mars, a triangle; of Vṛhaspati, or Jupiter, a lotus; of Śani, or Saturn, an iron scimitar or sword; of Rāhu, a *makara*; and of Ketu, a snake. The last two symbols are usually of iron; the square of Śukra is silver or silvered, and the bow of Budha is gilt.

(*f*) Hindu coins and seals also bore symbols, which were very numerous and diversified. Besides figures of gods and goddesses, the commonest emblems were the trident, denoting empire; the elephant or bull, power; the umbrella, royal dignity and right; the crescent, a lunar dynasty; a thunderbolt, spear, or other weapon, armed might. Others also with these were indicative of the authority or claims of the sovereign by whom they were designed.

LITERATURE.—W. J. Wilkins, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic*[2], Calcutta and London, 1900; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891; W. Crooke, *PR*, 2 vols., do. 1896; V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, ch. x., 'Symbols on Coins and Seals, etc.'; E. J. Rapson, 'Indian Coins,' in *GIAP* ii. 3B, Strassburg, 1898; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, Eng. tr.[3], Oxford, 1906.

A. S. GEDEN.

SYMBOLISM (Jewish).—Symbolic actions as well as symbolic ideas occur in the Hebrew Bible frequently. The prophets often made use of symbolic ideas—*e.g.*, the basket of fruit in Am 8^{1}, the vineyard in Is 5^{1-7}, the almond-trees in Jer 1^{11}, the dry bones in Ezk 37^{1-14}, and the various figures in Zechariah. Equally frequent are symbolic actions—*e.g.*, the rending of mantles (1 S 15^{27}, 1 K 11^{30}), the discharge of arrows from a bow (2 K 13^{15-19}), the casting of shoes (Ps 60^{8}, Jos 5^{15}, Ru 4^{7}). The former type easily merges into the parable, the latter into charms; possibly we should say that they emerge from these literary and magical arts. Symbols, in any case, have frequent historical connexion with primitive culture, though they tend to transcend their origin under the transforming influence of higher conceptions. Most important, therefore, for the present article is the association of symbolic ideas with religious ceremonial. Prominently the Sabbath is described as a symbol, *ôth*;[1] similarly with the rite of circumcision (Gn 17^{11}), the phylacteries (Dt 6^{8}), the Passover (Ex 13^{9}), natural phenomena such as the rainbow (Gn 9^{12}; cf. Gn 1^{14} in the Rabbinical commentaries).

It was accordingly easy for later Judaism to apply symbolic meanings to many of the Biblical institutions. Philo, throughout his works, elaborates such interpretations, but the method is much older. Thus in the *Letter of Aristeas* (which can scarcely be later than the 2nd cent. B.C. and may well belong to a century earlier) the enactments as to the animals lawful for food are explained symbolically.[2] But by Philo's age symbolical interpretation had so fully developed that the Alexandrian allegorist felt impelled to rebuke those of his brethren who neglected the ceremonial acts because they regarded them merely as symbols of ideal things.[3] Though this is a real danger to a ceremonial religion, on the other side it can gain appreciably by idealizing institutions the original significance of which is outworn or unknown. Ancient rites may have been derived from primitive tabus, and yet they have retained permanent acceptance by the process of symbolization. In a remarkable letter Maimonides (*q.v.*) dealt with certain acts of worship, such as prostration (as practised by Muhammadans in the 12th century). Probably such acts were derived from olden customs of exposing parts of the body, but, contends Maimonides,[4] they no longer mean anything

[1] See art. SABBATH (Jewish). [2] §§ 139–166.
[3] *De Migr. Abrahami*, 16 (*Opera*, ed. T. Mangey, London, 1742, i. 450).
[4] *Teshûbôth She'elôth we-Iggarôth* ('Letters'), Constantinople, 1520, fol. 5*b*.

of the kind and have become symbols of humility. Present values do not entirely depend on past origins. A similar principle might undoubtedly be very widely applied to the history of religious ceremonial, which often becomes ennobled by the newer ideas read into it by progressive ages. And, conversely, when an institution is lost (as with the Biblical sacrifices), the whole system may be retrospectively idealized by symbolical adaptation. When, after the destruction of the Temple, prayer and charity and fasting perforce displaced sacrifice, the latter shared in the moralizing process. But the relation went deeper. Fasting *was* sacrifice: the loss of bodily tissue corresponded (in the Rabbinic conception) to the offering of a sacrificial animal on the altar.[1] The table at which the ordinary meals were eaten became a veritable altar,[2] and the partaking of food was in the Jewish home associated with a variety of customs, derived in large part from the same range of symbolism. It has often been claimed, moreover, that the dietary laws, besides being included in the law of holiness, or rather because of that inclusion, were a training in control of the appetites and restraint of desires.[3] Maimonides also offers a utilitarian view, that the forbidden food was unwholesome;[4] thus showing that, though the utilitarian and the symbolical interpretations are in a sense rival theories, they may be syncretized by a skilful moralist.[5]

Another aspect of the same phenomenon is presented by symbolic survivals. Acts which were once literal are retained as rites. Many current Jewish marriage customs are of this nature. The bridal canopy, so picturesque a feature of a Jewish wedding, was originally the marriage chamber. Then the Scriptural application of the marital state to the relation of God to Israel led to symbolic results, among them the appointment of a bridegroom of the Law on the feast of Rejoicing at the end of Tabernacles.[6] It is not quite clear why a glass is broken at Jewish weddings; it is probably a *memento mori*.[7] Funeral customs are also marked by symbolic survivals. Some of these are Kabbalistic in origin, and it is not always easy to discriminate the symbolical from the superstitious.[8] So, too, with such ceremonies as *tashlîkh*.[9] Many symbolical customs arose in memory of the destruction of the Temple. Historical associations are also responsible for many a symbolic rite. Draping the synagogues in black on the fast of the 9th of Ab is an instance in point. The *shofar*, or ram's horn, was thus connected with events and anticipations, with Sinai in the past and the Messianic age in the future. According to Se'adiah, the *shofar* symbolized ten ideas: (1) creation, (2) repentance, (3) revelation, (4) prophecy, (5) destruction of the Temple, (6) the binding of Isaac, (7) imminence of danger, (8) day of judgment, (9) restoration of Israel, and (10) resurrection. In this manner many rites were saved from becoming obsolete. The phylacteries worn on the head typify service of the mind; on the hand, service of the body. The former represents the recognition of the Godhead, the latter restraint of lust.[1]

Jewish symbolism is also illustrated in ecclesiastical art, and in colours. Thus the blue thread on the fringes (Nu 15^{38}) is the colour of the sea, the sky, the divine throne of glory.[2] The symbolism of art was more thoroughgoing. The Crown of the Law is a frequent ornament on mantles of the scrolls, and so is the Shield of David.[3] On ancient Jewish coins, too, symbols were employed; so also with tombs.

The prevalent custom now is to avoid sepulchral emblems. This accords with the oldest rule, for the *ṣiyyun* of the Talmud was only a mark warning wayfarers against incurring ritual impurity by contact with the tomb. Yet the action of Simon, who carved panoplies and (possibly) ships on the pyramidal tombs at Modin (1 Mac 13^{29}), can scarcely have been isolated. Outside Palestine the Jews of the first centuries of the Christian era certainly adopted the Greek habit of inscriptions and introduced symbols, such as an oil vessel, the seven-branched candlestick (symbolical of the soul [Pr 20^{27}]), the ram's horn (Messianic), and an ear of corn (type of the resurrection). These emblems are parallel to those on the Maccabæan coins and to those favoured by Jews in the late mediæval period. At that late date symbols appear descriptive of the dead, as out-stretched palms as in act of benediction (for priest), ewer as in act of bathing (Levite), a harp for a musician, a crown for a goldsmith, and so forth. In the 18th cent. Jews, like their Christian neighbours, used symbolical signs for houses and businesses. Thus the Rothschild family still exemplifies the custom in its name ('Red Shield'). Ornamental coats-of-arms are found on tombs in the oldest Jewish burial-ground of the Sephardic Jews in London. Such customs are no longer in vogue. There has been a growth, however, of symbolism in synagogue decoration in the form of glass windows mostly without human or animal figures.

In the Talmud a good deal of legal symbolism was taken over from ancient Biblical as well as from Roman law.[4] Some of this is still retained.

Returning to the more religious aspect of the subject, we may say in general that in the Midrash symbolism is the soul of Jewish ceremonial. Many particulars of the sacrificial system, the ritual of the Temple, synagogue, and home, are treated in this manner. Take, *e.g.*, the rites of Tabernacles—the bearing of palm-branch, citron, myrtle, and willows of the brook (Lv 23^{40}). The palm is the spine, the citron the heart, the myrtle the eye, the willow the mouth, so that, in the synagogue liturgy, the citron atones for heart sins, the palm for stiff-necked pride, the willow for foul speech, the myrtle for lusts of the eye. In another version the old homilists[5] explain the 'four kinds' as symbolizing four types of character. The citron has both scent and taste, so there are men who study and perform; the palm-date has taste but no scent, so there are men who study but do not perform; the myrtle has scent but no taste, so there are men who perform but not on the basis of study; the willow has neither scent nor taste, so there are men who neither study the law nor perform good deeds. The Holy One did not destroy these, but bade all be united into one bundle, the better elements atoning for the less

[1] *Num. Rabbâh*, 18. [2] T.B. *Ber.* 55*a*.
[3] Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, tr. M. Friedländer, London, 1885, iii. 25.
[4] *Ib.* iii. 48.
[5] Cf. on this point M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, p. 456; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, p. 194. In modern times there has been a strong tendency (often unhistorical) to explain symbols on utilitarian grounds.
[6] On greeting the Sabbath bride see *Annotated Ed. of Auth. Daily Prayer Book*, pp. cxxiv, 111 (this work may be consulted throughout for liturgical symbolism).
[7] Cf. I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, ch. x.
[8] The best collection of the customs connected with illness and death may be found in Aaron b. Moses, *Ma'abar Yabbok*, Mantua, 1626 (often reprinted).
[9] *JE*, *s.v.*

[1] Cf. *Shûlḥân 'Arûkh*, i. ch. 25.
[2] Cf. *Sifrê* on the text.
[3] On this see *JE* viii. 251 f. and *Jewish Opinion*, London, Jan. 1919. The Tree of Life (on the basis of Pr 3^{18}) was also a symbol of the life-giving power of the Law, and the Tree accordingly appears in synagogue decorations.
[4] Cf. S. Krauss, *Talmud. Archäologie*, Leipzig, 1910–12, iii. 3. On the symbolism of the shoe see *JQR*, new ser., vi. [1915–16] 1–22.
[5] *Pesiqtâ R.*, 28, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1880, p. 178.

good. In this manner symbolism is turned to the cause of humanism.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are cited in the course of the article. See particularly M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, London, 1891, pp. 328 f., 335, 344, 356, 437; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, do. 1903, Introd., ch. i. (end) and *passim*; *JE*, *s.v.* 'Symbol'; *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, ed. I. Abrahams, London, 1914.

I. ABRAHAMS.

SYMBOLISM (Muslim). — The Islāmic languages appear to have no exact equivalent for 'symbol.' When it signifies a badge indicative of office, party, or community, the nearest would be *shi'ār*, or in certain cases *ghiyār*; where what is meant by it is a veiled expression for an idea, the Arabic rendering would be *kināyah*.

Islām as a religious system has nothing corresponding to the Christian cross. Muhammad seems to have adopted the Roman eagle as the standard for his armies,[1] but the flag of the later ('Abbasid) khalīfahs was 'like any other, only black in colour with the legend in white, "Muhammad is the Apostle of God."'[2] Those borne by various factions and regiments differed in colour and at times in the wording of the legend; thus the Abbasid colour was black, the 'Alawid green, the Umayyad white; the flag of the Zanji pretender of the year 255 A.H. was a strip of silk with a Qur'ānic legend in red and green;[3] in the processions of the sultans of Tunis white, red, yellow, and green flags were carried; those of the different tribes differed in legend;[4] the flags of the different divisions of the Ottoman army were red, yellow, green, white, red and white, green and white.[5] The Muhammadan colour in India is green,[6] which by an ordinance of the Mamluk Sultan Sha'ban of 773 A.H. on the turban indicates descent from the Prophet.[7]

There is no more common error than the supposition that the crescent (or rather crescent and star) is an Islāmic symbol, and even approved writers on Oriental subjects are apt to fall into it.[8] It was certainly in pre-Turkish times sometimes used as an ornament on the minarets of mosques;[9] and on flags—*e.g.*, that of the Fāṭimids of Egypt, accompanied by a lion of red and yellow satin,[10] and that of the Almohads (A.D. 1159)[11]—and on the sedan-chair of a Zanjid princess.[12] As such the crescent had been employed on the Roman senatorial shoe—a practice for which Plutarch[13] offers a variety of reasons. The current view of its adoption by the Turks is well presented by F. T. Elworthy:

'Hera, under her old moon-name, Iō, had a celebrated temple on the site of Byzantium, said to have been founded by her daughter Keroëssa, "the horned." The crescent, which was in all antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages the symbol of Byzantium, and which is now the symbol of the Turkish Empire, is a direct inheritance from Byzantium's mythical foundress Keroëssa, the daughter of the moon goddess Iō Hera.'[1]

Keroëssa, supposed to have been not the foundress, but the mother of the founder, of Byzantium, seems to have been an inference from the Golden Horn and so to have no place in this inquiry. Further, it seems correct to say that the crescent and star figure, though rarely, on coins of Byzantium, but as one of numerous ornaments,[2] and that no ancient author mentions any connexion between this emblem and the city. The *signa Constantinopoleos*, according to A. Geofræus,[3] who asserts that the Turks 'neque insigniis utuntur neque coronis,' were quite different. The earliest mention of it in English literature is said to be in the *Arte of English Poesie* by G. Puttenham (1589),[4] who ascribes its introduction to the sultan Selim I. (1512–20), with the notion of increase and brightness, though it has been observed[5] that the crescent is not that of the new but that of the waning moon, while rising in its wake is the morning star of hope; from Puttenham's time the antithesis between it and the cross has been common in English and French literature. F. Sansovino,[6] however, supposes it to have been the ancient emblem of Bosnia, adopted by Muhammad II. when that country was conquered in 1463. This is declared to be an error by Zinkeisen,[7] who speaks of a golden crescent inherited from the Seljuks, and displayed on all the flags and standards of viziers, beglerbegs, etc., appearing on the earliest flags of the Janissaries. With von Hammer Purgstall[8] it is a silver crescent which, with the two-pointed sword of 'Umar, gleamed on the blood-red flag of the earliest Janissaries; in the authority to which he refers[9] the Janissaries' flag displays the sword without the crescent; what appears on the flag of the cavalry is evidently a horseshoe rather than a crescent, with no star. It is worth noticing that the Seljuk chronicler Ibn Bibi[10] compares the shoe of the sultan 'Ala-addin's horse to a crescent and its nails to stars; whence the symbol may originally belong to cavalry regiments. Its occurrence, however, on certain Byzantine coins is remarkable, and seems to have some connexion with its later employment by the Turks, who have not often introduced it on coins.

The symbols of royalty in use at the Islāmic courts were similar to those found elsewhere. In Umayyad times the khalīfah on accession received a rod, a signet, and a scroll.[11] The rod was doubtless the Prophet's; in 'Abbasid times a new khalīfah received not only the Prophet's signet, which was a silver ring with a bezel of Chinese iron with the legend 'Muhammad is the Prophet of God,' but that of his predecessor, with a ruby inscribed with the khalīfah's name.[12] The 'Abbasid khalīfah also wore a crown,[13] against Arab usage;[14] and indeed the etiquette of their court was closely modelled on that of the Sasanians, as appears from the recently published handbook of it by Jāhiẓ of Basrah.[15] A crown was worn by the Fāṭimids of

1 A. von Kremer, *Culturgesch. des Orients*, Vienna, 1875–77, i. 81.
2 Miskawaihi, tr. D. S. Margoliouth, i. 198.
3 Ṭabarī, *Chronicle*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1879–1901, iii. 1748.
4 Qalqashandī, *Subḥ al-A'sha*, Cairo, 1915, v. 143.
5 J. W. Zinkeisen, *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, Gotha, 1840–63, iii. 271.
6 J. W. Kaye and G. B. Malleson, *Hist. of the Mutiny*, London, 1888–89, v. 82.
7 Ibn Iyās, *History of Egypt*, Cairo, 1311, i. 227.
8 Kaye and Malleson, iii. 96: 'From the time when Mahmud of Ghazni had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindus.' Al-Biruni, *Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 293, compares with the Christian symbolism of the cross the comparison of the name Muḥammad with the human figure.
9 See a case about A.D. 1270 in the mosque of San'a in Yemen (Khazrajī, *The Pearl-Strings*, tr. J. W. Redhouse, Leyden, 1906–08, i. 189).
10 Qalqashandī, iii. 474.
11 É. Mercier, *Hist. de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berbérie)*, Paris, 1888–90, ii. 100.
12 Ibn Jubair, *Viaggio*, tr. C. Schiaparelli, Rome, 1906, p. 226.
13 *Quæst. Rom.* p. 281.
14 *Diwan* of Buḥturī, Constantinople, 1300, i. 70, ii. 153, etc.
15 *Livre de la Couronne*, ed. Ahmed Zeki, Cairo, 1914.

1 *The Evil Eye*, London, 1895, p. 133.
2 Provisionally collected by J. H. von Eckhel, *Doctrina Nummorum Veterum*, Vienna, 1792–98, ii. 28.
3 *Aulæ Turcicæ Descriptio*, Basel, 1577, p. 3.
4 In *English Reprints*, ed. E. Arber, London, 1868, p. 117.
5 By G. H. Lancaster, *Prophecy, the War, and the Near East* London, 1916, p. 151.
6 *Hist. universale dei Turchi*, Venice, 1568, *f.* 67.
7 iii. 273.
8 *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, Pest, 1827–35, i. 93.
9 Plate XVII. in Comte de Marsigli's *État militaire de l'empire ottoman*, The Hague, 1732, ii. 53.
10 Ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leyden, 1902, p. 204.
11 *Aghani*, Cairo, 1323, vi. 106.
12 Miskawaihi, i. 329. He also inherited the Prophet's cloak (*burdah*), turban, and throne or pulpit.
13 *Diwan* of Buḥturī, Constantinople, 1300, i. 70, ii. 153, etc.
14 *Mutanabbii Carmina cum Comm. Wāhidii*, ed. F. Dieterici, Berlin, 1861, p. 380.
15 *Livre de la Couronne*, ed. Ahmed Zeki, Cairo, 1914.

Egypt also.[1] In their processions there were borne a rod, a special sword (said to have been made of meteorite), an inkpot, a lance, a target (said to have belonged to the Prophet's uncle Ḥamzah), a horse-shoe-shaped ruby,[2] and a canopy or umbrella. The last of these was a common emblem of royalty, and figures, *e.g.*, at Indian courts,[3] where the sovereign in the 16th cent. was attired 'in a white *qaba*, made like a shirt tied with strings on the one side, and a little cloth on his head coloured oftentimes with red or yellow.'[4] The *qaba* appears in the attire of the Buwaihid Mu'izz al-Daulah (10th cent.),[5] and, with a black robe, a belt, and a sword, it formed the distinguishing dress of a vizier.[6] Apparently the belt symbolized some sort of subordination, as an Indian prince to whom Yamin al-Daulah gave a robe of honour had to be compelled to put on this portion of it.[7]

Homage to a newly-appointed sovereign was (at any rate in early times) indicated by a shake of the hand, the meaning of which is shown by the term employed to be agreement over a bargain. In later times homage was indicated by kissing the ground before the ruler; this practice, originally alien to Islāmic ideas, had become familiar before the end of the 4th Islāmic century.[8] To a newly-appointed vizier (or emir) food was sent in the 4th cent. from the khalīfah's table,[9] probably signifying that he had become a member of the royal household. The practice of offering such a person fragrant herbs[10] is said to have been a purely Persian or Dailemite rite, the sense of which is not clear.

Owing to Islāmic objection to the limner's art, symbolism is very scanty in its architecture, and where found appears to be borrowed. The great mosque of Cordova exhibited in the carvings of its lattices the peculiar form of the Indian cross, the meaning of which is unknown, whereas 'the cresting of the walls, originally painted scarlet, is typical of flame, and, brought from Persia, symbolized the faith of the Ghebers, worshippers of fire.'[11] Probably in such cases the Muslim worshippers and spectators were quite ignorant of the signification. The same is likely to be true of the ornaments to be found on other works of art, such as pottery and textiles. Certain creatures are indeed habitually associated with particular ideas, chiefly on etymological grounds—*e.g.*, the raven with parting—but there is little scope for their employment in art. The symbolism of magical or quasi-magical rites in use in some communities (*e.g.*, the figures representing either a double hand or the spathe of the male palm, indicative of fertility, painted in Tunis on the walls of the house where there is to be a wedding)[12] is probably not Islāmic.

The practices of Islāmic ritual are tralatitious, though taken from many different communities; their symbolic interpretation is therefore conjectural, and is the subject of considerable speculation. Several pages are devoted by the mystic Ibn 'Arabī to the meaning of the postures of prayer (*ṣalāt*):

'The raising of the hands implies that whatever was therein has fallen away; it is as though the Almighty, when He commanded this, said, "When thou standest before Me, stand as a poor mendicant, who owns nothing; fling away everything that thou possessest, and stand empty-handed, setting it behind thee; for I am in front of thee." Moreover since the hands are the seat of power, by raising his hands he confesses that the power is God's, not his own; he who raises them to the chest is thinking that God is in front of him; he who raises them to his ears is thinking that God is above him. Sitting in prayer is the attitude of the slave before his master, an attitude which he may not adopt without the master's leave,' etc.[1]

Similar speculations on the meaning of the ceremonies of the pilgrimage are to be found in the work of Ghazālī;[2] the special garments worn by the pilgrim, *e.g.*, are to remind him of the grave-clothes wherein he will meet his Maker.

Besides explaining much of the Qur'ān as elaborate symbolism the Ṣūfīs (*q.v.*) developed a system of their own, or rather a number of systems; and there are numerous collections of odes in Arabic and Persian which, ostensibly dealing with love and wine, are traditionally interpreted as dealing with the doctrines of pantheism. Illustrations of the style will be found in the commentary of H. Wilberforce Clarke on his translation of the *Divān* of Hāfiz,[3] where we are told that 'breeze' signifies the means whereby union with the Desired One is attained, 'bell' signifies the angel of death, 'dark night' the world, 'wave' the excess of divine knowledge, etc., whereas in some cases the same term is variously explained; thus 'narcissus' may signify the growth of the world, the pure existence of God, the vision of God, or inward results of joy in respect of deeds. These interpretations are not always very convincing; but in some works of the kind the symbolism is either interpreted by the author himself or is sufficiently clear or conventional to leave no doubt of the meaning; an example is to be found in the *Masnavi* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.[4]

The employment of symbolic acts, either to emphasize language or in lieu of it, is common with Oriental peoples, but not specially Islāmic. The same parable has a tendency to do duty through many centuries. Ibn al-Athīr records (A.H. 442) how, when an Arab tribe proposed to take Kairawan, they selected as their commander a man who offered to pursue the following plan: taking a carpet, he unfolded it, and then said to the others, 'Which of you can get to the middle of this carpet without treading upon it?' They declared it to be impossible. He showed them that the carpet had to be rolled up from the edge, meaning that the country had gradually to be conquered and secured. According to W. G. Palgrave, Ibrahim Pasha obtained the command of an expedition against Nejd eight centuries after by solving the problem of the carpet.[5]

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

SYMBOLISM (Semitic).—The extent to which symbolism exists in OT literature is very doubtful. In the case of the Babylonians and Assyrians, however, our knowledge is much more definite and is obtained chiefly from a study of cylinder-seals, the Babylonian boundary-stones, and the monoliths of Assyrian kings. On the Babylonian *kudurrus*, or boundary-stones, the emblems of the gods are grouped together, and in one case the name of the god with whom the emblem is associated is inscribed by the side, thus giving us definite data on which to base our investigations.

The Hebrew word for symbol, *ôth*, is most probably connected with the root *âwâ*, 'to describe with a mark,' and with Assyr. *ittu*. Some scholars have suggested a connexion between Assyr. *ittu* and Heb. תְּיָרָה.[6]

1 Qalqashandī, iii. 472.
2 Rubies of this shape adorned the case of the supposed Qur'ān of 'Uthmān, carried before the Almohad Yūsuf (S. P. Scott, *Hist. of the Moorish Empire in Europe*, Philadelphia, 1904, ii. 304).
3 V. A. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Mogul*, Oxford, 1917, p. 87.
4 Description by Ralph Fitch, 1585, *ib.* p. 108.
5 Miskawaihi, ii. 165. 6 *Ib.* i. 166, etc.
7 Ibn al-Athīr, *Chronicle*, A.H. 396.
8 See Hilal, ed. H. F. Amedroz, Beyrut, 1904, p. 456, etc. Earlier examples are *Aghānī*, vi. 20 (time of Amīn); Ṭabarī, iii. 1825 (time of Muhtadi).
9 Miskawaihi, i. 186, 223, 351, ii. 15, 82.
10 *Ib.* ii. 82. 11 Scott, i. 656.
12 A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London, 1914, p. 114.

1 *Futūḥāt Makkiyyah*, Cairo, 1293, i. 551 f.
2 *Iḥyā 'Ulum al-Dīn*, Cairo, 1306, i. 208 f.
3 Calcutta, 1891, i. 2 f.
4 See the tr. by E. H. Whinfield, London, 1898.
5 *Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, London, 1865, ii. 48.
6 *BOR* i. [1900] 130.

1. The symbolism of religious life.—The Temple as the centre of the religious life of ancient Israel should be treated first. Solomon's temple was specifically built in order that it might contain the ark, the symbol of the presence of the deity. In the second Temple, the adytum being empty, the presence of the deity was symbolized by the continuance of the altar service, the Day of Atonement ritual, and the shewbread. Among the Semites the god was symbolically represented as a nobleman dwelling in his palace, and W. M. Flinders Petrie[1] has shown that the features and routine of Egyptian temples were similar to those of large households. First came the small chamber symbolizing the mysterious dwelling of the deity himself. The larger hall in front of this could be compared to the audience-chamber where human kings receive their subjects, whilst the larger space in front of the building was primarily a meeting-place for the people. The division of the Temple into a Holy Place and Holy of Holies was also symbolical and corresponded to the heavens and the highest heaven (שְׁמֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם and שָׁמַיִם [1 K 8[27]]), whilst the entrance may have symbolized the earth, Jahweh's footstool (Is 66[1]). Why was the Temple built on a mountain? This really brings us to another question. Was there any connexion between the idea which represented Jahweh's home on a mountain and the 'high places' referred to in the OT? From the standpoint of the Deuteronomic historian, the high places were legitimate places of worship until the building of the Temple at Jerusalem. It is to be noted also that the high places are said to have been built on hills, and it has therefore been suggested[2] that they were artificial mounds taking the place of natural high places such as the summits of hills and mountains. The explanation of this symbolism can be learned from Babylonia. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Babylonian temples was their enormous size. In Gn 11[3f.] we read that the people meet together in the land of Shinar and decide to build a city and a tower that shall reach up to heaven. To the Babylonians a temple was above all a 'high place,' and there is a symbolic reason to account for this conception. Jensen[3] has shown that the Babylonians regarded the earth as a huge mountain. In fact the earth was actually called E-Kur, 'mountain house.' Later they began to identify one particular part of the earth—a mountain peak preferably—as the dwelling of the god, so that the temples which were built later were known as 'mountain houses.' The height of the temple thus symbolized the mountain which had formed the original home of the deity.[4] The same idea can be seen by sketching the history of Mt. Zion. The sanctuary on the mountain existed before the settlement of the Hebrews. Just as His people dispossess the early settlers of Canaan, so Jahweh dispossesses the god of Zion. Mt. Zion is now regarded as His home and He therefore reveals Himself to His people from the mountain (Ex 19[11]). We can thus see the symbolic idea which suggested the *ziqqurats* in Babylonia, the high places in Canaan, and the sacred temple mount in Israel.

The very names 'ark of Jahweh,' 'ark of God,' suggest that the ark contained an object which in some manner symbolized the God of Israel. In the Assyrian temples a statue of the god took the place of the ark in the Holy of Holies, and it has therefore been suggested that the ark with the cherubim over it was a symbol of Jahweh. The custom of carrying about an ark as a symbol of the deity has its parallel in other Semitic religions. In Babylonia the gods were carried about in ships in solemn procession, and in Egypt the arks with their images were placed in boats. Renan[1] actually derives the Hebrew ark from the Egyptian ark-boat, but there is not sufficient evidence to warrant such a suggestion.

Cheyne[2] thinks that the symbolic meaning of the brazen serpent can be learned from Babylonia. He thinks that the brazen oxen in 1 K 7[25] were copies of the oxen which stood in Babylonian temples as symbols of Marduk. I. Benzinger[3] has suggested that there was a serpent-clan among the Israelite tribes and that *Nehushtan* may have been its sacred symbol (Gn 49[17]). The two pillars Jachin and Boaz which stood in front of the porch of the Temple were probably symbolical. The temple of Melkarth at Tyre and also the temple at Hierapolis had two similar pillars in front of them, and, as these were symbols of the deity and Solomon's temple was constructed on the same principle, it has been suggested that Jachin and Boaz were symbols of Jahweh. It is possible that the brazen lavers and the sea of the Temple symbolized the clouds. As to the sea and oxen, W. H. Kosters[4] finds here a symbolic trace of the Babylonian myth of the struggle of Marduk and Tiamat—the sea representing Tiamat and the oxen Marduk. Seeing that the Babylonian creation-myth determined the form of the Israelitish cosmogony, this view has received general support, although there is no direct reference to it in the OT. H. P. Smith[5] suggests that the twelve oxen were symbols of the twelve constellations and that the sea was a symbol of the great celestial reservoir from which the earth is watered. The ornamental figures on the smaller lavers he also regards as symbolical. The bull was sacred to Jahweh, the lion was sacred to Astarte, whilst the palm-tree is represented with a symbolic meaning in Phœnician art. The ornamentation therefore suggested a syncretistic purpose in building the Temple.

Although there is not the slightest reference in the OT to any symbolic meaning of the tabernacle, scholars, both ancient and modern, have suggested that both in its structure and in its appurtenances it symbolized various religious truths. The Heb. מִשְׁכָּן, 'dwelling,' expressed the idea that God dwelt among His people; אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד, 'tent of meeting,' represented the idea that God met His people there; whilst the name אֹהֶל עֵדוּת, 'tent of the testimony,' constantly called to mind that the decalogue inscribed on the tables of the ark bore witness to the covenant between Jahweh and His people. But there are other ideas symbolized by the tabernacle. The innermost chamber, the Holy of Holies, was the dwelling-place of the deity Himself. This could be entered by the high-priest alone, and only once a year—on the Day of Atonement. In this chamber everything was made of gold and decorated with beautifully-made fabrics, whilst the vestments of the high-priest were conspicuous by their gorgeous finery. This gave expression to the thought that God's most holy minister and His chief abode should be adorned with becoming dignity and splendour. On the other hand, in the Holy Place, which could be entered by the priesthood only, the furniture was of gold, whilst the outer pillars, which were taken, no doubt, as belonging to the court, were made of brass. The court, which was for the people, had

[1] Presidential address before the Egyptian Section of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (*Transactions*, Oxford, 1908, i. 186 f.).
[2] W. Gesenius, preface to C. P. W. Gramberg, *Religionsideen des AT*, Berlin, 1829, i. xix–xxi.
[3] *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, pp. 185–195.
[4] Cf. the minarets attached to the Muhammadan mosques, and see K. Herzfeld's monograph, *Samarra*, Berlin, 1907.

[1] *Hist. of the People of Israel*, Eng. ed., London, 1888, i. 123.
[2] *EBi*, col. 3388.
[3] *Hebräische Archäologie*, Tübingen, 1907, p. 392.
[4] *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, ii. [1879] 455 ff.
[5] *OT Hist.*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 166.

only brass. The covering for the Holy of Holies was made of costly materials with figured cherubim; the curtain at the door of the Holy Place was without cherubim, and that at the court was simply made of white linen. We can thus see how the costliness of the adornments of the different apartments symbolized their sacredness; the more sacred a chamber was, the more sumptuously was it adorned.

'Together the curtains are designed to form the earthly, and, with the aid of the attendant cherubim to symbolize the heavenly, dwelling-place of the God of Israel.'[1]

The sacrificial system of the Hebrews symbolized self-surrender and devotion to the will of God, the need of forgiveness, and the blessing of divine fellowship. The peace-offering with its communion-feast showed the idea of fellowship between God and man; the *tamid*, or continual offering, symbolized Israel's pledge of unbroken service to Jahweh; whilst the sin-offering with its sprinkling of blood showed that one of the conditions of cleansing oneself from sin was to place oneself submissively before God. The care taken in the preparation of the aromatic compounds of the incense suggests a symbolic meaning. From Ps 141[2] it appears that incense was regarded as a spiritual symbol of prayer. Bähr regards the shewbread as a symbol of the fact that Jahweh was ever present with His people and was the giver of their daily bread. Circumcision was a tribal badge and showed that the patient had been admitted a member of the tribe, whilst the Sabbath symbolized the completion of the work of creation. In Ex 31[13] it is actually described as an everlasting symbol (אוֹת) between Jahweh and Israel. The long hair worn by the Nazirite symbolized his consecration for some special service. In ancient religions the offering of one's hair, like the offering of one's blood, symbolized the making of a covenant between the worshipper and his god. The frontlets, or *ṭōṭāphōth* (Ex 13[16]), were badges worn upon the forehead and arm to show that the worshipper belonged to a certain religious community, and as a worshipper of the national deity was subject to His help and protection.[2] Fire occurs as a symbol of the divine presence (Ex 20[18] 3[2] etc.). It was also regarded as a purifying agent (Is 48[10]), and to pass through fire was therefore a symbol of purification. Would not this explain why sacrifices were burned before they could be accepted by God? Water was another source of symbolical purification. Ablutions were so common among the Hebrews that it is difficult to distinguish washings performed for the sake of the body and those with a symbolical significance. Anointing[3] denoted the consecration of a person or even of an inanimate object (such as the tabernacle and its appurtenances or the stone at Bethel). In Ps 92[10] it is referred to as a symbol of prosperity and joy, and the cessation of the practice was therefore a symbol of mourning (2 S 12[20]). The word *ashērāh*, which appears very often as a name for Astarte (1 K 18[19], 2 K 21[7] etc.), came to be used as a name for the symbol of the goddess[4] (Dt 7[5], Ex 34[13] etc.). The *ḥammanîm* were most probably symbols of the sun-god, who is called in Phœnician inscriptions בעל חמן,[5] whilst the *maṣṣēbhôth* were symbols expressing gratitude for a divine revelation (Gn 28[22] 31[13] etc.). As to bull symbolism, it most probably originated among the Hebrews themselves (and was not borrowed from the Egyptians, as hitherto supposed). The Hebrews being an agricultural race, it was natural that they should look upon the bull as a symbol of strength and power. The bulls on the lavers of Solomon's temple may have been due to the influence of Phœnician workmen, for among the Phœnicians Baal was represented as a bull. The horns of the altar are regarded by some scholars as symbols of ancient bull-worship. The *ziqqurats*, or temple towers, of Babylonia consisted usually of three, four, or seven stones, no doubt on account of the symbolic sacredness attached to these numbers. The quadrilateral shape of the *ziqqurats*, with the four corners towards the four cardinal points, symbolized the four quarters over which the Babylonian kings held dominion. The lions (symbols of Nergal) and the bulls (symbols of En-lil) which stood at the entrances of Assyrian temples probably symbolized the means which the gods had at their disposal for punishing man. The names of the temples symbolized the character of the gods to whom they were dedicated. Nabu's temple was known as E-pad-kalama-suma, 'the house of him who gives the sceptre of the world'—no doubt suggested by the staff which formed the symbol of Nabu. Sin's temple at Harran was called 'the house of joy,' and that of Shamash was known as 'the house of the universal judge.' The basin of the temple known as *apsu* represented the domain of Ea, the water-god. The *ziqqurats* and the basin thus became 'living symbols of current cosmological conceptions.'[1]

We may now turn to the symbols of the gods themselves.[2] The symbol of Ramman, the storm- and thunder-god, was a lightning fork, whilst an axe represented the destruction which storm and thunder bring in their wake. His nature as a solar deity was also symbolized by a bull. Sin had a crescent, either by itself or with a disk. Since the moon at certain phases suggested the appearance of a horn, he was represented as an old man with a flowing beard, and wearing a cap on which were the horns of the moon. The horn was thus regarded as his crown and came to symbolize his power. This explains why the Assyrian kings adorned themselves with a horned crown as a symbol of divinity.[3] Anu symbolized 'the abstract principle of which heaven and earth are emanations.'[4] Such expressions as 'light of heaven and earth,' by which Ninib was known, symbolized his beneficent character as a solar deity. But the fiery rays of the sun might also be destructive, and he was therefore represented also under the form of a lion. Ea's symbol consisted of a ram's head which projected from a frame. This symbol occurs on the Bavian relief and the Esarhaddon stele. But on boundary-stones his symbol is usually an animal with the head of an antelope and the lower part of a fish. As the water-god of Babylonia, fountains were sacred to him, and he was regarded as the giver of fertility. He was the Oannes of Berossus—half man, half fish—who came out of the water to instruct the people. The symbol of a fish was therefore suggested either by the idea of fertility or by the fact that he was god of the water. Nabu, as scribe of the gods, was symbolically represented as carrying the tablets of fate and recording the decision of the gods upon them.

[1] A. R. S. Kennedy, art. 'Tabernacle,' in *SDB*, p. 885.

[2] Cf. the custom among later Jews of fastening to the doorpost a small box containing certain texts from OT, and the Babylonian custom of hanging up images of some protecting deity at the entrance to houses (L. W. King, in *ZA* xi. [1896] 50–62).

[3] For the origin and significance of the rite see A. H. H. Kamphausen, art. 'Salbe,' in Riehm, *Handwörterbuch des bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–94.

[4] G. A. Barton, 'The Semitic Ištar Cult,' *Hebraica*, ix. [1893] 131–165, xi. [1895] 73.

[5] A Bloch, *Phön. Glossar*, Berlin, 1890, p. 22.

[1] M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 653.

[2] These symbols can be studied most conveniently from the *Mémoires de la délégation en Perse*.

[3] In OT the horn was a symbol of power and its exaltation signified victory (1 K 22[11], Jer 48[25] etc.).

[4] Jensen, p. 274.

The staff by which he is represented symbolizes either the stylus of a writer or a ruler's sceptre. The solar god Marduk symbolized the sun of spring which brings about the growth of vegetation and the revival of nature. As a warrior-god his symbol is a spear, and as a storm-god he is represented by a horned dragon. Sometimes he is represented by the symbol of a dog, and in a lexicographical tablet[1] there is a reference to four dogs of Marduk. As the goddess of love and the symbol of creation Ishtar was represented by a female figure with her breasts exposed and a child on her left arm sucking her breast. She symbolized every feminine phenomenon of the Babylonian pantheon. She was the mother of the gods and the mother-goddess, and was therefore prayed to in hymns as 'helper and heavenly midwife.' As goddess of the passions she was represented on seal-cylinders as nude, with the distinctively feminine parts particularly emphasized. In the astrological system she was identified with Venus and regarded as a symbol of light. Sometimes her symbol is a star[2] of various shapes.

Nergal, who symbolized the hot sun of midsummer, was represented by a lion; Nusku, the fire-god, by a lamp; and Nirgusu by an eagle. Hommel[3] connects the name Bau with *bohu* of Gn 1, and suggests that the goddess was a symbol of the watery depths of the universe. On one of the inscriptions of Nabu-pal-iddin Shamash is represented as seated in his shrine; before him is a table resting on a wheel, and attached to the wheel are cords held by two male figures which direct its course. These figures represent the messengers of Shamash, Malik and Bunene, who occupy the position of chariot-drivers. The sun's movement across the heavens, which is here symbolized by the wheel, was thought of as a drive[4] (cf. Ps 19[6]). On seal-cylinders his beneficent character is symbolized by the manner in which he pours forth streams of water from jars placed on his shoulders. But the most common symbol of Shamash is a sun-disk.

The chief symbol of Ashur was a standard which consisted of a pole surrounded by a disk enclosed within two wings. Above the disk was the figure of a warrior shooting an arrow. The terra-cotta images of Bel found at Nippur[5] represent him as an old man with a flowing beard, a real 'father' of the gods. He personified the various forces of nature whose seat and sphere of action is the inhabited world. Together with Anu and Ea, therefore, he symbolized the eternal laws of the universe.

2. The symbolism of common life.—A Hebrew slave who refused to take advantage of the liberty open to him after seven years' service had one of his ears bored with an awl and pinned to the door to show that he was in future to be devoted to the service of that house[6] (Ex 21[6]). Elevation to a position of superiority was symbolized by placing a crown on the head (2 S 1[10], 2 K 11[12] etc.). The worshipper spread out his hands in prayer to show that he desired to obtain divine mercy and help (Ex 9[29. 33], 1 K 8[22] etc.). Washing of the hands was a symbol of innocence. In Dt 21[6] the heifer's neck was broken to show that the murderer deserved the punishment, whilst the elders of the city by washing their hands showed that they were free from the guilt. Hostility towards a person is shown by gaping with the mouth (Ps 35[21], Job 16[10] etc.); ill-feeling by clapping the hands (Ezk 6[11] 21[17] 22[13]), or by spitting in the face (Nu 12[14], Dt 25[9]); and anger by gnashing the teeth (Ps 35[16], Job 16[9], La 2[16] etc.). The key of the door was probably looked upon as a symbol of authority, and to place it upon a man's shoulder showed that he was appointed steward (Is 22[22]). Covering a woman with one's mantle signified the intention of acting as her protector (Ezk 16[8]). The father of a new-born child acknowledged it as his offspring by placing it upon his knees (Job 3[12]). In a Babylonian poem describing the wickedness wrought by the evil spirits they are said to snatch the child from the knees of a man. The use of salt as a condiment and the piquancy which it gives to insipid articles of diet caused it to be regarded as a symbol of life. An abundance of salt has the effect of preventing the growth of vegetation, and therefore the ploughing of a city with salt denoted that it was condemned to eternal destruction (Jg 9[45]). It was a mark of reverence to cast off the shoes on approaching a sacred person or place (Ex 3[5], Jos 5[15]). To appear barefoot was a sign of great emotion or of mourning (2 S 15[30], Is 20[2] etc.), and to draw off the shoes meant to give up a legal right (Ru 4[7]). The taking of an oath was symbolized by placing the hand under the thigh of the adjurer (Gn 24[2] 47[29]), or by lifting up the hand towards heaven[1] (Gn 14[22]). As kissing was a means by which parts of the body of different persons came into contact, it was naturally a symbol of affection and reverence (Gn 27[26], Ex 18[7], Ru 1[9] etc.). Various symbolisms were used in mourning.[2] Sackcloth was worn to show that the mourner's grief for the departed was so great that he was ready to give up all the pleasures and conveniences of life (Gn 37[34], 2 S 3[31]). The tearing of one's garment denoted that the mourner's dearest friend had been torn from him (Gn 37[29] 44[13] etc.). The mourner went about barefoot and bareheaded (2 S 15[30], Ezk 24[17]), sat in ashes and sprinkled ashes upon his head (Jer 6[26], La 3[16] etc.), and practised various mutilations of the body (Jer 16[6] etc.). Shaving the head (as among the Arabs at the present time) was also a sign of mourning. The making of a covenant was symbolized by the person who gave the pledge passing between the parts of an animal cut into pieces, and thus showing that he was ready to be similarly treated if he failed to keep his promise (Gn 15[9ff.] etc.).

Light represented to the Orientals the highest human good. The most joyful emotions and pleasing sensations are described under imagery derived from light (1 K 11[36], Ps 97[11] etc.). It was only natural that there should follow a transition from corporeal to spiritual things, so that light came to typify true religion and the happiness which it brings. Sin, wickedness, chaos, were represented by darkness. The lion was a symbol of strength (Jl 1[6]). Kneeling was a mark of homage to a superior, and is therefore referred to as an attitude of worship (2 Ch 6[13], 1 K 8[54]).

In Babylonia it was customary for the suitor to present gifts to the girl's parents. According to some scholars, this symbolized the purchase of the bride—a practice which existed in earlier times. Various symbolisms were connected with the marriage ceremony, but their meaning is obscure. The officiating ministers bound sandals on the feet of the newly-wedded pair,[3] gave them a leather

[1] H. C. Rawlinson, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, London, 1861–84, ii. 56, col. iii. 22–25.

[2] On a Phœnician gem the gazelle is figured along with the star and dove as a symbol of Astarte (W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*[2], London 1903, p. 227 f.).

[3] *Die semit. Völker und Sprachen*, Leipzig, 1881–83.

[4] See A. Jeremias, *The OT in the Light of the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, i. 116.

[5] H. V. Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century*, Edinburgh, 1903.

[6] Nowack, *Lehrbuch der heb. Arch.*, Freiburg i. B., 1894, i. 177.

[1] Cf. the Babylonian expression *nish kate*.

[2] M. Jastrow, 'Dust, Earth, and Ashes as Symbols of Mourning among the Ancient Hebrews,' *JAOS* xx. [1899] 133–150.

[3] T. G. Pinches, *Notes on some Recent Discoveries in the Realm of Assyriology*, London, 1892–93.

girdle, and fastened it to a pouch of silver and gold. The first of these ceremonies may have symbolized the marriage-contract between them. We are told in the Code that, if a maid behaves insolently towards her mistress, the latter may put an *abuttu* on her and reduce her to slavery. The adoptive parent may do the same with a disobedient son. What the *abuttu* was is unknown. Jensen has suggested that it was some kind of incised mark which acted as a symbol of the person's position (cf. the mark on Cain's forehead [Gn 4^{15}]). The repayment of a debt or the dissolution of a partnership was symbolized by the breaking of a tablet. Mutilation is often referred to as a punishment for crime, and the form of mutilation was symbolical of the offence itself. For striking a father the hand was cut off; for ingratitude evidenced by speech the tongue was cut out; as a punishment for unlawful curiosity the eye was torn out; and as a mark of disobedience the ear was often cut off. The cutting short of the hair was a mark of degradation. The city walls were regarded as a symbol of shelter.[1] Swearing by the gods and the king was a means of sanctioning an agreement. When a contract was made, both parties and witnesses added their names to it. And this was authenticated by impressing their seals or making a nail-mark. The Code states explicitly that a woman was not a wife without 'bonds.' This was a marriage-contract which symbolized an official acknowledgment of the union. An artisan symbolized his adoption of a child by teaching him a trade. The penalty of breaking a contract was the payment of two or more white horses to the god. The exact meaning of this symbolism is unknown, but white no doubt suggested purification and innocence. In Babylonian magic there was a symbolical tying and loosening of knots according as the sorcerer wished to strangle his victim or to release him from any demon by which he had been captured. If a magician wished to rid himself of an object, he would burn or torture an image of it, believing that the victim would meet with the same fate as his image. By 'seizing the hands of Bel,' the Assyrian kings legitimized their claim to the Babylonian throne.

3. The symbolism of numbers and colours.—It is doubtful whether the Hebrews used numerical symbols in OT times. On the Moabite Stone and the Siloam inscription the numbers given are invariably in words. But this does not exclude the possibility that numerical symbols, which were employed by the Babylonians and Egyptians, were also used by the Israelites. In S. Arabian and Phœnician inscriptions also the numbers are partly written and partly indicated by figures. The numbers most commonly used with a symbolical meaning are three, four, and seven.[2]

White symbolized purity and innocence. It represented light, which impressed the Hebrew mind not only by its brilliance and beauty, but by its divine symbolism and profound moral connotation (Lv $16^{4.\ 32}$, Dn 7^{9}, Ps 104^{2}). As black absorbs all colours and thus buries the light, it symbolized death, humiliation, mourning (Mal 3^{14}, La 4^{8} etc.). Blue, representing the colour of an unclouded sky, symbolized revelation (Ex 24^{10}). It was the first of the colours used for the curtains of the sanctuary, and the Israelites were commanded to have a ribbon of blue fringe on the edge of their garments in order to remind them of Jahweh (Nu $15^{38f.}$). Red, as the colour of blood, represented bloodshed, war, guilt (Zec 6^{2}). Purple was the distinguishing mark of royalty, representing dignity and honour (Est 8^{15}, Jg 8^{26}), whilst green, as the colour of plants—growths to which people look forward in winter—symbolized hope and resurrection.[1] It was also the symbolic colour of the moon.[2]

4. Special symbolisms in OT.—Ahijah tore his garments into twelve pieces in order to show that the kingdom of Israel would be similarly divided (1 K 11^{30-32}). One of the sons of the prophets asked his comrade to smite him, and by his wound thus showed the punishment that Ahab had deserved (20^{35}). Zedekiah, a false prophet, put on horns in order to show that Ahab would push the Syrians as with horns of iron (22^{11}).

In considering the special symbolical actions of the prophetic books, we are confronted with very great difficulty. For scholars are divided in their views as to whether these actions were actually performed in their literal sense or were merely conceived as symbolic visions in the minds of the prophets. It seems almost certain that there are a number of such actions which could not have been performed literally. It is impossible, however, for the present writer to discuss in this brief article the category to which each of these many prophetic symbolisms belongs. But a brief discussion of some of these from the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel may give some indication as to the difficulties in arriving at a definite decision. In Jer 13^{1-11} Jahweh tells the prophet to go to the Euphrates and hide his linen girdle in a rock. After a while he is told to remove the girdle, and he then finds it to be marred. The lesson is that, just as a girdle from its nature clings to a person, so Israel is closely united to Jahweh.

Now, on the one hand, it may seem unlikely that Jeremiah should have undertaken a journey from Jerusalem to Babylon—a distance of about 200 miles—in order to bring out this point to the people. But it is possible that the journey *was* actually performed. (1) We know that the prophet was absent from Jerusalem during part of Jehoiakim's reign, and, as we have no account of his whereabouts during this period, it is possible that he made the journey to Babylon then. (2) In Jer $39^{11f.}$ we are told that Nebuchadrezzar behaved in a most friendly way towards him on the capture of Jerusalem. This can be explained by the suggestion that king and prophet had met previously, and that it was on the occasion of the prophet's visit to Babylon. In Ezk 4^{5} we are told that the prophet lay upon his side for 390 days. How can this be taken literally? Did any person actually count the number of days? In 4^{12} we are told that Ezekiel used human excrement for fuel in baking some barley cakes. Surely it cannot reasonably be suggested that the prophet would have inconvenienced himself by going to such extremes merely in order to bring home to the people some divine message which he could very well have preached in a much more suitable manner. There are some scholars, chief of whom is A. Klostermann, who argue that these symbolical actions *were* performed. The dumbness of Ezekiel (3^{24-27}), they suggest, was due to a temporary loss of speech, and they explain similar performances by somewhat similar suggestions. Against this it may be argued that the prophet here refers to his keeping silent from delivering any prophetic message rather than actual speechlessness. Again, the fact that the prophet had to remain at home, in order to carry out the divine command, suggests

[1] The Code says that, if a father repudiates his son, 'he shall leave house and yard.' 'Yard' simply means 'enclosure' and may refer to the city walls, as a symbol of shelter (C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. and Assyr. Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 42).

[2] Cf. art. NUMBERS (Semitic).

[1] Hammurabi says that he 'bedecked the grave of Malkat with green,' the colour of resurrection (introduction to h's Code of Laws).

[2] Jeremias, i. 110.

that it was not loss of speech but an injunction to refrain from reproving his co-religionists any more. The present writer is therefore inclined to agree with R. Smend, A. Kuenen, and E. Hühn in regarding many of the symbolisms of Ezekiel as being merely symbolical visions in the mind of the prophet and as not having been performed externally.

LITERATURE.—Very little indeed has been written by modern scholars on OT symbolism. Among the older works the most important is C. Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen Cultus*, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1837–39. For discussion of prophetic symbolism by modern scholars see F. Giesebrecht, *Die Berufsbegabung der alttest. Propheten*, Göttingen, 1897; F. E. König, 'Zur Deutung der symbolischen Handlungen des Propheten Hesekiel,' in *NKZ* iii. [1892]; E. Hühn, *Die Messianischen Weissagungen*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1899; W. Nowack, *Die kleinen Propheten*, Göttingen, 1897, p. 29; F. Delitzsch, *Iris: Studies in Colour and Talks about Flowers*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1889.

For a study of Babylonian symbolism see W. J. Hinke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur*, Philadelphia, 1907; W. H. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910; P. Jensen, *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890; K. Frank, *Bilder und Symbole der babylonisch-assyrischen Götter*, Leipzig, 1906; J. de Morgan, *Mémoires de la délégation en Perse*, Paris, 1900–05, vii. 137–153; F. Hommel, 'Ursprung des Tierkreises,' in *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, Munich, 1900, ii. 236–268.

MAURICE H. FARBRIDGE.

SYMBOLO-FIDEISM.—Symbolo-fideism[1] is the name given to the theology taught in the second half of the 19th cent. at the Protestant Faculty of Paris by Professors Auguste Sabatier and Eugène Ménégoz, and disseminated since by a large number of their pupils and disciples. It has also been called the theology of the Paris school.

As its name indicates, this theology has two aspects: (*a*) symbolism, which deals with religion more particularly from the point of view of its form, and (*b*) fideism, which deals with it from the point of view of its content. Sabatier devoted himself specially to the former and Ménégoz to the latter aspect. But the two conceptions are inseparable and interdependent. Together they form a theology with a distinct character of its own.

The basis of symbolism is the psychological observation that the essence of things escapes us, and that we know only their manifestations in the form of images, figures, and symbols. We cannot, *e.g.*, know what God is in Himself. We know Him only by the more or less anthropomorphic representation which we form of Him in our thought. This we express by the terms 'Father,' 'Lord,' 'Master,' 'Captain,' 'Sovereign,' 'King,' or by emblems bringing out one or other of His attributes—*e.g.*, Lion, Rock, Banner, Fire. These symbols are without doubt the expression of a living reality, but the conformation of our brain is such that it cannot grasp that reality naked; our mind can apprehend it only when it presents itself in the garment of a more or less sensuous representation. This observation holds good in regard to all religious data, and is borne out in the most subtle dogmatic systems. The task of the theologian is to lay bare the eternal truth from under its contingent manifestations and its historical formulæ; moreover, these formulæ are subject to the laws of historical evolution.

As regards the Deity, it is the name 'Father,' habitually used by Jesus Christ, that best suits the religious man's conception of the Supreme Being—perfect, just, merciful, eternal, all-embracing; a Spirit both transcendent and immanent, on whom man feels himself absolutely dependent, while at the same time conscious of liberty and responsibility before Him. On the ideas of liberty and responsibility depend those of sin and penalty, which in turn suggest those of pardon and salvation. A lively conviction that we are created for life and not for death, for happiness and not for suffering, rouses us to aspirations after salvation. We desire life, happy life, eternal life. The whole idea of salvation is summed up in these words.

How are we to attain this life, this salvation? Conscience replies: By the pardon of our sins. But how is pardon to be obtained? It is with this vital question that fideism is concerned. The term 'fideism' (Lat. *fides*, 'faith') was employed in the religious sense for the first time by Ménégoz in his *Réflexions sur l'Évangile du salut*.[1] Its meaning is most concisely indicated in the phrase: 'We are saved by faith, independently of beliefs.'

The distinction between faith and beliefs is one of the fundamental premisses of fideism. By faith is meant the movement of the self towards God—a movement which implies forsaking sin, repentance. The man who repents and gives his heart to God is saved, whatever his beliefs may be. This statement is opposed to the old orthodoxy, which made adherence to certain official dogmas a condition of salvation. Fideism declares that a man is saved by faith alone ('*sola fide*'). At the same time, it recognizes the value of doctrines. Doctrines are dynamic ideas which make for good when true, and for evil when false. Fideists regard them therefore as pedagogic instruments of the first order. It is for this reason that they attach so much importance to the pursuit of truth and oppose so resolutely doctrines which they consider erroneous. It is only through a great and regrettable misunderstanding that their opponents reproach them with indifference to doctrine; and it is also false to assert, as has been done, that fideists fail to appreciate the intellectual factor in religious faith. Faith, according to their teaching, is an activity of the self in its unity, and therefore must comprise all the elements of the soul's faculties—thought, feeling, and will. But the essential factor in salvation is the inward movement towards God, not intellectual adherence to some doctrinal tenet. Fideists reject the doctrine of salvation by beliefs without thereby denying the spiritual influence of beliefs, as the Reformers rejected the doctrine of salvation by works, while maintaining that good works are obligatory on Christians.

In a general way, and as a result of historical, critical, exegetical, and philosophical studies, fideists have departed from orthodox theology and returned to the simple doctrine of salvation as taught by Jesus Christ, according to their interpretation, to the multitudes in His preaching of the gospel; hence their emphasis on repentance and on consecration of the soul to God as conditions of salvation.

As regards the idea of salvation, they find it in the symbolic interpretation of the primitive Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. This idea has for them two aspects: (1) the entrance of believers at death into celestial happiness, and (2) the gradual establishment of the Kingdom of Justice and Peace on the earth. These two ideas combined constitute in their eyes the Kingdom of Heaven.

The name 'Symbolo-fideism,' which expresses the union of symbolism and fideism, gained currency from two articles by Eugène Ménégoz, signed T. P. ('Théologien protestant') in the *Eglise Libre* (1894, nos. 31 and 33). Auguste Sabatier accepted this title (*Esquisse*, p. 456). It passed into Holland with the thesis by J. Riemens entitled *Het Symbolo-fideisme: Beschrijving en kritische Beschouwing* (Rotterdam, 1900), and into Germany with Gustav Lasch's *Die Theologie der Pariser Schule: Charakteristik und Kritik des Symbolo-Fideismus* (Berlin, 1901).

Symbolo-fideism has given rise to numerous controversies, an echo of which is found in current

[1] In recent years the word 'fideism' has frequently been used alone.

[1] Paris, 1879, § 44.

religious journals and theological reviews. Its adversaries have also published a number of polemical pamphlets. These are referred to in the writings mentioned below.

LITERATURE.—The two principal works of Auguste Sabatier on the subject are the *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, Paris, 1897 (several times reedited), Eng. tr., London, 1897, and *Les Religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit*, Paris, 1904 (published from MS, after the death of the author), Eng. tr., London, 1904. The writings of E. Ménégoz are collected in *Publications diverses sur le fidéisme et son application à l'enseignement chrétien traditionnel*, 5 vols., Paris, 1900–20. The reader will find in these works references to other works of the same authors. See also Hector Haldimann, *Le Fidéisme; Etude critique de la doctrine du 'Salut par la foi, indépendamment des croyances,'* Paris, 1907; E. Ménégoz, *Religion and Theology*, London, 1908; *Le Salut par la foi, indépendamment des croyances: Anthologie du fidéisme*, by the Comité des publications religieuses libérales de Genève, Geneva and Paris, 1913; A. Delcourt, *Le Fidéisme: La notion intégrale du salut et l'essence de l'Evangile*, Paris, 1914. A. Thiébaut has given an objective and critical exposition of fideism in the *Journal religieux des Eglises indépendantes de la Suisse romande*, 1917, nos. 23–26.

EUGÈNE MÉNÉGOZ.

SYMPATHY.—Sympathy, as the etymology denotes, is 'feeling with' others. Two persons feeling alike do not, however, make a true sympathetic couple unless the feeling of one has partly caused or is reinforcing the feeling of the other. The perfection of mutual sympathy is reached when similar feelings originate spontaneously in the two and reinforce each other. Any relation, however, in which there is a mutual reinforcement of feeling, however originated, is one of mutual sympathy.

1. Emotional contagion.—The primary fact in sympathy is that the feeling of one person can, on occasion, cause similar feeling in another. In its primitive manifestations this occurs without reflective consciousness of the feeling, and certainly without distinction of persons in respect of its origin. This is shown in the contagion of popular excitement—*e.g.*, panic, war-frenzy, the intensified enthusiasm of public meetings, the wild joy, the furious hatred, the boundless affection, that mark the excited crowd. The emotion, or its manifestation in some, excites similar emotions latent in the others, and forthwith by sympathetic reinforcement the emotional disturbance in each is abnormally increased. Probably it is only those who, from the beginning, have some set against the prevalent emotion that maintain a normal level throughout. Such sympathetic outbursts must be themselves short-lived, and, as the cause of excitement is withdrawn, the persons affected by contagious feeling return to their ordinary emotional level. This may even be one of indifference to the popular frenzy in which they took part. It may, indeed, be one of revulsion if they have been drawn, as sometimes happens, into a condition of which in their normal moods they disapprove. Such revulsion would happen, *e.g.*, if an advocate of peace found that he had been drawn by fellow-feeling into a demonstration of war enthusiasm. The hot fit is followed by a cold fit. Hence the instability of popular acclamation, the apparent superficiality of feeling which appears when people liable to sympathy of this primitive unreflective kind are massed together. The most suitable material for the typical 'fickle mob' is a town population sympathetically sensitive and intellectually immature.

The short-lived character of the feeling thus contagiously aroused follows in the nature of the case, because there is no settled identification of self-conscious personality with it. I feel in a sense, but do not feel myself as feeling: I do not take the feeling into myself as mine. It is *on* me and moves me, but it does not enter into any relation to that total of ideas, impulses, feelings, and desires which is *me*. It may be a mere motive excitement, moving me blindly to action, or it may take possession of me completely with fixed idea and over-mastering mood, acting instead of me and overpowering me. In either case I come out of it, and in the latter case as one recovered from a madness. Something like this, no doubt, befell Parisians in the brief violence of the Terror.

2. Self-conscious sympathy.—When self is identified with the feeling which nevertheless is ascribed to another person as origin, we have sympathy proper. The development of self-consciousness goes hand in hand indeed with the exercise of sympathy. We learn to know ourselves, and to become all that we are capable of becoming as self-conscious persons, by our dealings with our fellows, and *pari passu* with our consciousness of them as other selves. In so far, however, as we are clearly conscious of self, we are prepared to set bounds to the operation of primitive sympathy. A new condition of feeling, discontinuous with my previous state so as to preclude its origination in me, is roused in me by sympathetic contagion. It is to the self an invasion from without. As a feeling, moving me but not mine, it must be referred to a neighbouring conscious self, who is manifesting it independently. Our first concern, however, is its treatment by the self which is invaded. Feelings that harmonize with the total state of this self enter into it as elements in its development: the sympathy of children with parents and other elders plays a large part in the building up of their personality. Confidence in the elders who give the lead to sympathy predisposes to acceptance of their guidance. The emotional being of the child is educated in this way. If of average docility, it takes the form suggested to it by its society. On the other hand, the suggested feeling may be out of harmony with the character as already formed: thus the brave man may feel the horror communicated to him by the panic-stricken multitude, but he overcomes it as no possible part of himself. When the feeling thus communicated to us takes strong hold, the repulse by a strong character is correspondingly emphatic. In sensitive natures this gives rise to a peculiar sense of revulsion, as towards something put into us against our will; and the transference of this revulsion to the source of contagion is probably the chief cause of violent personal antipathy. Between this attitude of abhorrence towards the induced emotion and willing receptiveness of it, as extremes, lie all degrees of being moved by a feeling from which, as outside the disposition of our own personality, we nevertheless withhold ourselves. Whether we admit the feeling to influence over us, or harden our will against it in a sort of self-defence, it appears to us essentially, and throughout its action, as the feeling of another person with which in a measure we feel. This definite ascription of the feeling to another is the second characteristic feature in sympathy, and gains prominence with the developing consciousness of self and of other selves.

3. Control of sympathy.—In passing it may be noted how large a part in life is played by the partial hardening of the heart against the contagion of social feeling. This control of sympathetic distraction in general belongs to the preservation of self as maintenance of character. It is not only that undesirable emotions—*e.g.*, of hatred, fear, envy—should be suppressed, as they are by the self-possessed though sensitive members of the excited crowd.[1] Experience soon reveals that the preservation of self, even in the ordinary physical

[1] Common self-possession, as in the man who is not liable to the contagion of feeling, must be distinguished from the subtle excellence of sympathy under control. Probably this is one of the qualities of the born leader.

sense, requires much systematic control of emotion, whether initiated sympathetically or otherwise. An emotional nature loosely controlled is morally unstable and makes for a nervous break-down in course of time. This is the hysteric type, so far as it depends on moral character. It is a main principle of moral health that the emotional life as it increases should be kept more and more strictly in subordination to the ends which it subserves. The precise definition of those ends belongs to the subject of ethics: the average man conceives them simply as the happiness of personal health for himself and his associates, together with some service in furtherance of the common weal. It may be that the rank and file of modern humanity suffer from lack of vitality and variety in the emotional life, but for the moment we are not concerned with them. Persons of the sympathetic cast are—under modern conditions more especially—liable to so much emotional invasion as must result in nervous exhaustion if not systematically kept in check. It is interesting to note how the habit of control over sympathy develops with experience from youth to maturity: the first great sympathetic grief overwhelms us as if it were our own; later we have learnt to throw ourselves outside the emotion into the actions required to assuage the sufferings of our friend; later still, to those who are overtried, callousness may come, with the exhaustion of either physique or morale.

Most of these observations apply to all feeling, however initiated. Sympathetic feeling differs from other feeling as being specially liable to increase of control by development of the element of otherness in it. This is of a piece with another useful psychological truth, namely that the tension of any violent feeling may be relieved by treating it as an object of imagination or thought. Tennyson's lines bear on this point:

> 'Likewise the imaginative woe,
> That loved to handle spiritual strife,
> Diffused the shock thro' all my life,
> But in the present broke the blow.'[1]

In constructing a story, an essay, or a poem which depicts the emotion as affecting imaginary persons, the sense of its personal attachment is obscured: it is projected more or less, *i.e.* thrown out of self-consciousness into the non-ego. Similarly, but as of course and instinctively, we project our sympathetic feelings back into the other self and, although still feeling them, are as a rule much relieved. This relief is no doubt chiefly due to the stop that is placed on the disturbance of the emotional personality in general by the sharp dissociation of the new feeling from those immediately pertaining to the self: it is the other person's feeling, and, though it disturbs me, I limit that disturbance by *knowing* it as something which has not its origin, and is therefore not necessarily permanent, in me. This control of the sympathetic disturbance furthers and is furthered by practical activity in relief of the other's distress.

4. Identification with the 'other.'—The exceptions indeed in this case explain the rule. When the sympathetic feeling is ascribed to a person much beloved, it may affect us more than if it were of our own origination. This, no doubt, is what is meant when it is said that another person is dearer to us than ourselves. The consciousness of the beloved person's consciousness is in this case so established as part of our own that the projection of the feeling into it does not in the least dissociate the self from the feeling. So far as we know what the beloved person feels, we go on feeling it and being further disturbed by it all the time. Indeed there appear to be, in cases of intense affection when the self identifies itself passionately with the other, two ways in which the sympathetic feeling may become more disturbing than the equivalent primary feeling would be. (1) In projecting it on the beloved other, imagination, moved by the habit of affectionate concern, may greatly exaggerate its force and significance: the finger-prick which, in spite of instinctive tears, is a trifle to the baby may bulk large in the distressed imagination of the anxious mother; and the same kind of thing happens in a thousand hidden ways when love prevails, and it happens for pleasure as well as for pain. (2) Each person has an intimate sense of the powers and resources within himself by means of which he bears his troubles and controls his emotional being generally. About the beloved other, however intimately known, he is never quite so sure, and thus, no matter how equal things may otherwise be, the sense of mystery breeds, as it were, a germ of fear that heightens pain and, by release from it, also heightens joy. This goes, moreover, with the essential fact that love at its strongest exceeds self-love in desiring the welfare of its object. The heightening in this way of feeling sympathetically experienced may perhaps be discriminated introspectively as an additional element of anxious concern about subjective consequences. Such concern is given to their own emotions by none but morbid people. And indeed even in the lover-like relation to which this tender anxiety naturally belongs it may be so exaggerated as to be morbid concern of self for the other. For this reason it is often well that persons who get too much on one another's mind—as we say—should be sometimes separated.

The absence of this intimate affection in the case of ordinary associates makes it possible to limit the sympathetic disturbance by instinctively projecting it back into the other mind, consciousness of which is only now and then associated with the consciousness of self. There are, of course, all degrees of dependence on one another in this respect. A man may go through life without one associate in whose welfare he has any genuine lasting interest, capable of sympathy but never in danger of being shaken by it. Most persons, however, have friends sympathy with whom does penetrate into them, as well as move them out of themselves. Some men are, in the absence of contrary cause, friendly to all their associates: these are universally sympathetic also, in proportion to their primary sympathetic sensitiveness. Friendliness, however, as the disposition to identify oneself with another, must be carefully distinguished from the primary capacity to feel as others feel.[1] When they are combined, we have the sympathetic nature as popularly understood. But an unfriendly man may be sensitive to another's feelings, in which case he not only projects them on the other but sharply dissociates himself from all interest in him. It is as if he said, 'I know what you feel; I feel you feeling it; but it is nothing to me.'

5. Insight and sensitiveness.—Apart from unfriendliness, however, this cool dissociation of self from interest in the other, combined with sympathetic sensitiveness, explains the gift of neutral or cold insight which plays so large a part in the intuitive knowledge of men. Intellectual constructiveness, which bodies forth an idea of the man's character as shown by his actions, is the ordinary substitute for intuition; and in some ways it is a safer guide. The intuitionist, *e.g.*, may mistake his man by overestimating the significance of a transitory mental attitude. He is also likely to eke out his intuitions by specula-

[1] *In Memoriam*, lxxxv.

[1] Friendship is in its degree the affectionate interest in another's consciousness of which the extreme has been described, and friendliness is the disposition to be so interested.

tions and imaginings into which all sorts of error may creep. If he abounds in self-confidence, he is a dangerous guide: but, if he treats his gift humbly as a useful auxiliary, it will serve him in good stead and improve with such exercise.

A person of sympathetic bent may have experiences of cool insight, but with this difference that, since in such case he does not identify himself with the other, he is moved to change the state of the other into identification with him. Thus the orator feels that his audience is puzzled or hostile: they do not convert him, but he is not indifferent, so he puts out his strength to express himself and make them feel his feeling. The mere lecturer, on the other hand, only tries to show and make them see his meaning. The orator is the speaker whom the Americans call 'magnetic': he makes his hearers feel as he does, at least for the time. But the beginning which he makes is at the other end of the coil, by insight into the feeling which is theirs but not his. This is the getting into sympathetic touch. By showing this sympathy on neutral ground or even in respectful dissent, he fixes the attention of his hearers. His interest in them interests them in him: then the position is reversed, the mind of the speaker shown, and the original attitude of the audience merged in the new state by which they are identified with him. This kind of thing happens every day on a small scale in the experience of sympathetic people. To understand, to be interested though in disagreement, to persuade—these are the means, and in this order, by which one person transforms the mental attitude of another. The more instinctive the process is, the better, sympathy operating in the pair by its natural impulse to mutual identification of mental content.

6. Affinity of character.—In so far as the sympathetic bent in the full sense turns upon friendliness of disposition, persons may be characterized as sympathetic generally, *i.e.* in relation to all sorts of other persons. In so far, however, as it depends on primary contagiousness of feeling, affinities of character must profoundly affect the relation between any pair. Racial type, *e.g.*, is a basis of such affinity, and the mutual intelligibility of two compatriots, while partly arising from like habits of expression and community of associations, turns also on functional capacity to feel alike. In whatever way we explain the prime fact of emotional contagion, it is evident that no one can communicate to another a feeling of which the latter is constitutionally incapable. The fearless man cannot feel like the coward, nor the liberal man like the mean. Each can only see that the other acts in a manner directly opposite to himself and recognize the corresponding state of mind as a mystery. To sympathize with another, we must be *able* to feel like him. Some would say, further, that we must have felt on our own origination as he now feels; but that is not so certain, though perhaps it generally happens so. Our capacity to sympathize, therefore, is at least limited by the possibilities of our character. How far these are limited, or how far they may be extended beyond our present experience of them, we never know. Certain it is that in human society we run up now and then against mysteries, persons with whom after much acquaintance we never get in touch, who always seem to us as if they were feeling their way through life at the other side of a high wall over which we cannot see, through which we cannot hear, them. At the same time, we meet others with whom, in trifling things and large alike, we find ourselves in tune, so much in tune that diversities of aim and opinion, though standing out the more clearly, do not mar the general harmony. But mental conditions are so complex that likeness of condition between two minds must generally be of a very partial kind.

7. Similarity and association.—Another influence to the same effect which enters into these cases is natural similarity in habit of expression. This is best seen in racial affinity: the stock of native gesture due to heredity, including facial expression, intonations of voice, and a multitude of tiny movements, felt rather than seen—all are available for that involuntary play of subtle signs which is the veiled language of sympathy. Whether contagion of feeling originates with instinctive imitation of feeling-signs or not, its development in relation to the complex psychoses of the adult is dependent on the swift interpretation of their secret signs. Human beings are indeed so profoundly interesting to each other when they really show themselves that an easy mutual intelligibility is often almost equivalent to friendship at first sight.

Intelligibility follows also on intimate association, and this is favourable to the sympathetic relation. A common stock of experiences, habits, and even feelings is formed by association in life, and the result is similar to that of congenital affinity, though lacking the charm of its ever-recurring unexpectedness. Congenital affinity, it should be noted, is not limited to cases of similar racial type. It is a happy accident of human development which may be encountered at any turn.

8. Sympathy in education. — The value of sympathy as an element in the development of moral life is too large a subject to be treated here. A few words, however, may be devoted to (1) the teacher's use of sympathy in education, and (2) the training of sympathy in the child.

(1) The teacher's use of sympathy, like that of the orator described above, begins in his own sympathy with the learner's state of mind and ends in the achievement of the learner's sympathy with his. The teacher's sympathy requires as a starting-point, therefore, some demonstration on the child's part, and to evoke this in as good a form as possible for his purpose—but in any form rather than none—must be his first care. By entering into the child's mind thus shown to him he establishes the contact of sympathy, and by maintaining this contact he leads where he will, provided he keeps to the possible levels of the child throughout. It is not so much in regard to the method of individual lessons as in respect of his general procedure and influence that the teacher's tact is shown. A mistake of intellectual method is a small matter compared with an error in the procedure of moral discipline. It is quite possible to keep in touch with the child's sympathies, even when punishment seems to estrange him for a time.

(2) In the training of sympathy the first requisite is to encourage its manifestations when they occur spontaneously, and to suggest conduct which is the natural expression of interest in others. The tendency to sympathize with joy as well as with sorrow—*Mitfreud* as well as *Mitleid*—should be called out. All this belongs to the development of the sympathetic nature, which, however, also stands in need of disciplinary training. This, for the most part, life supplies, and the educator should be wary lest he interfere unwisely and too much. The delicate process of control and moderation by which each self sets limits to its sympathies had better be left to itself; and, as a rule, it is dangerous to train the young to repress, otherwise than by more fully expressing, their nature. Wise discipline trains to the control of one function for the sake of fulfilling another more perfectly. Thus, emotion is in general controlled by using it to subserve the voluntary and intellectual life.

Thought and conduct are the antidotes to hysteria and emotional riot. As regards sympathy in particular, we should be chiefly concerned to develop first its voluntary and, second to that, its intellectual side. The barren sympathy with suffering, *e.g.*, which does not go on to some comforting act is morbid because it ends in useless emotional disturbance. Doing in accordance with the occasion is the habit to which sympathy should be most carefully trained. Its other requisite is that it should be intelligent, and this is often a much-needed lesson. A useful sympathy with others requires imagination and reflexion sufficient to construct a true ideal of what they want. This intelligent apprehension of another's case is of inestimable value in making the fellow-feeling, as well as the friendly action, fit.

Persons who are 'too sympathetic to be of any use in trouble' are persons who, by neglecting to help their fellows as need arose, have let themselves get into a habit of being overwhelmed by painful fellow-feeling. The remedy is to do something for the prime sufferer. This is the natural course in the case of an unspoiled will.

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S. BRYANT.

SYNAGOGUE.—See WORSHIP (Hebrew) and (Jewish).

SYNAGOGUE, THE GREAT.—See JUDAISM, vii. 593 f.

SYNCRETISM.—1. Untechnical use of term.—The term 'syncretism' has a very curious record. It is as old as Plutarch, who seems to have coined it, or at any rate to have made it current. In his essay on brotherly love[1] he observes that even brothers and friends who have quarrelled prefer to associate with one another, in face of a common danger, rather than to fraternize with the foe; which is a Cretan precedent and principle,

'for, although the Cretans were frequently at faction and feud with one another, they became reconciled and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them. This they called "syncretism" (*συγκρητισμός*).'

By 'syncretism,' in this political sense, therefore, we are to understand the instinct of self-defence which sinks private differences before a threatening peril on the outside. The 'syncretists' close their ranks; they like quarrelling among themselves, but they would rather exist than indulge in fatal internecine strife at home.

After Plutarch the term became submerged. Fourteen centuries later it re-appears in the pages of Erasmus, who was in his own way, especially when the way ran through the *Adagia*, a 'syncretist' of the reconciling order, averse to feuds. Erasmus sets down the reference to Plutarch, and he also employs the term in his correspondence.

Thus we find him writing from Louvain (22nd April 1519) to Melanchthon, hoping that scholars of all parties will close their ranks against the barbarians: 'Vides quantis odiis conspirent quidam adversus bonas literas. Aequum est nos quoque *συγκρητίζειν*. Ingens praesidium est concordia.'[2]

During the next century and a half the term is tossed about Europe by members of the Reformed and of the Roman Church, sometimes as an appeal, more often as a taunt; theologians who endeavoured to reconcile extremists were dubbed 'syncretists,' and 'syncretism' was indifferently and acrimoniously applied to all irenical proposals, whether these were the product of a Laodicean indifference or of a genuine love for moderation. In passing from the humanists to the theologians, the term upon the whole acquired disparaging associations, which continued to cling to it. 'Syncretist' became almost a synonym for 'hybrid.' It was derived from *συγκεράννυμι*, and the supposed etymology corroborated the connexion of the term with all that was heterogeneous.

This is the predominant meaning of the term in ordinary French. In untechnical English it also denotes 'fusion' of a more or less illegitimate or artificial kind. Thus Hallam[1] says of Giordano Bruno: 'What seems most his own . . . is the syncretism of the tenet of a pervading spirit, an Anima Mundi, which in itself is an imperfect theism, with the more pernicious hypothesis of an universal Monad.'

2. Philosophical and ecclesiastical applications.—In the history of philosophy 'syncretistic' has been applied to the harmonizing efforts of those who, like Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th cent., refused to allow their love of Plato to be identified with any depreciation of Aristotle. The controversy between the Aristotelians and the Platonists had been sharpened by the impetus given to Platonic studies after the fall of Constantinople. Partisanship ran strong, and the more moderate men failed to draw the rival schools together.

'Throughout all the tangles of this complicated controversy, a thread of gold is interwoven by the serene and imperturbable temper of Bessarion.'[2]

What happened in 15th cent. philosophy was repeated on a larger scale in the theology of the 17th century. The 'syncretistic controversy' of that age rose out of the efforts made by G. Calixtus (1586–1656), a distinguished scholar at Helmstädt, to draw the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches together. 'A plague o' both your houses,' he cried, like Mercutio. But it was Mercutio's dying cry of indignant protest. Calixtus lived and worked to check the plague. He was acutely sensible of the harm and danger to Christianity which the sharp internal divisions within the Church produced. But his broad, catholic temper met with little response among his contemporaries. The controversy lasted even after his death, assuming political as well as theological forms. The 'syncretistic' party in the Church failed, however, to carry its principles into effect. Even well-meaning and wise attempts to emphasize the fundamental Christian principles held by various Reformed Churches, or by all the Reformed Churches in common with the Roman Church, were suspect in that age of hardening division and widening cleavage. Men were told that in view of the Roman peril they would be well advised to subordinate their private idiosyncrasies in the Reformed Church; or Christians in both Churches were reminded that the menace of outside heathenism should make them close their ranks. But 'syncretism' of this kind was generally branded as a betrayal of principles or as an attempt to secure unity at the expense of truth. The 'syncretistic controversy' was a quarrel over peace, and such quarrels are not the least bitter upon earth. What the 'syncretists,' in Plutarch's sense of the term, called a harmony, their opponents called a 'hybrid.'

The Roman Church had a 'syncretistic' controversy of its own, an eddy in the turbulent dispute over the relations between grace and free will, which poured from the last quarter of the 16th century.[3] 'Syncretic' is the term applied to the system of belief which endeavours to harmonize the conflicting views of the Thomist and the Molinist parties by assuming two sorts of efficacious grace, which are held together by prayer.

3. In comparative religion.—'Syncretism,' as men like Calixtus and Zwingli used it, still retained something of the practical sense which

[1] *De Fraterno amore*, 19.
[2] *Opus Epistolarum*, ed. P. S. Allen, Oxford, 1906–13, iii. 539.

[1] *Introd. to the Literature of Europe*, 4 vols., London, 1837–39, pt. ii. ch. iii.
[2] J. E. Sandys, *Hist. of Classical Scholarship*, Cambridge, 1903–08, ii. 75.
[3] Cf. *CE* iv. 238 f., vi. 713 f.

Plutarch had originally attached to the expression. But this is lost in the technical, modern application of the term to a phenomenon in the history of religion, *i.e.* to the fusion of various religions in doctrine or in cult. Here 'syncretism' denotes generally an unconscious, wide-spread tendency, due to or fostered by some re-adjustment of political relationships or by some clash of civilizations. There is a blending of religious ideas and practices, by means of which either one set adopts more or less thoroughly the principles of another or both are amalgamated in a more cosmopolitan and less polytheistic shape. Such movements in the religious world are often preceded and accelerated by a new philosophical synthesis as well as by a political re-arrangement, but the outcome invariably is a unification of deities, which, as J. Toutain has pointed out,[1] proceeds on one or other of two lines: either two deities of different religions are assimilated by comparison or several deities are grouped together in a fresh synthesis. The motives for this re-statement are drawn from the dawning consciousness that any particular form of religion is no longer adequate by itself, that others possess like features, possibly of superior efficacy and appeal, and that such features can be incorporated without detriment to the essential principles of the particular religion in question. The study of comparative religion exhibits this phenomenon in a variety of shapes and stages, but it is specially prominent during the first four centuries of the Christian era.[2]

The tendency to this syncretism or amalgamation of deities and cults had been in operation long before the rise of Christianity. When one tribe conquered another, or when two tribes or nations formed a political alliance, there was a strong movement towards fusing their gods. The foreign power, especially if it were dominant, fascinated many of its subject or weaker neighbours. An exchange of deities might be made, out of courtesy. Similarities in ritual were developed, and stress was laid on what was common to the two religions. Now and then the gods were identified, and this was specially easy in the primitive days when certain gods were still nameless powers;[3] men were invited to recognize their own gods under the names of foreign deities or to welcome the latter as allies. The connexion between Israel and Canaan is an illustration in point,[4] and an equally familiar one is the influence of Assyrian rites upon the religion of Israel under kings like Manasseh and Amon,[5] when syncretistic influences were specially powerful in consequence of the political situation. The phenomenon is by no means confined to the history of Israel's religion in the ancient world. For different reasons syncretism, or, as some prefer to term it, 'theocrasy' (*θεοκρασία*),[6] was rife at one period in Greek religion owing to Oriental influences,[7] and as late as the 8th cent. of our era a similar blending took place in Japan.[1] But it is in the history of Judaism, particularly during the two centuries preceding the Christian era, that the elements and issues of syncretism are most clearly marked.[2]

The main impetus to this rise of syncretism came from the political re-adjustment after Alexander the Great. The Seleucid period witnessed a contact between the East and the West, round the Mediterranean basin, which led not only to a fusion of Babylonian with Greek and Roman deities[3] and to a ferment of Oriental religious feeling throughout the Græco-Roman world, but also to movements which, in spite of the vigorous reaction led by the Maccabees[4] and their supporters, affected some circles in Judaism itself. The Hellenizing tendency was fostered by Jewish writers like Eupolemus and Artapanus. It went hand in hand with the allegorizing of Homer and of the OT and with the Stoic philosophy of the Logos. As the tendency to syncretism was innate in Egyptian religion[5]—the spread of the Serapis-cult is only one later instance of it—and as Alexandria formed the centre of activity not only for the amalgamation of Egyptian and Greek or Syrian cults but also for speculative Judaism under the spell of the new ideas of cosmopolitanism, it is not surprising that a step was there taken in the direction of a syncretistic Judaism, which should assimilate and employ current Greek ideas of a cosmopolitan, cosmic character. The exponent of this syncretism is Philo.

'Un syncrétisme dans lequel sont admis tous les éléments, en particulier péripaticiens et platoniciens, qui s' accordent avec l'idée stoïcienne fondamentale de la sympathie des parties du monde, telle serait la définition la plus exacte des vues cosmologiques de Philon.'[6]

Philo's aim was not to blend Judaism with Hellenism. He adhered to his religious inheritance. But he endeavoured to enrich and safeguard it by re-stating it in terms of the current religious philosophies of his day.

As Judaism on the whole resisted this Philonic speculative tendency,[7] so did Christianity in the main resist the later Gnostic movement with its syncretistic impulse during the 2nd and 3rd centuries.[8] Syncretism was partly an evidence of strength and partly an indication of weakness at that period. So far as it meant a readiness to set the new faith in a positive relation to the elements of truth in contemporary cults and mysteries, so far as it breathed a spirit strong enough to assimilate vital data from its new soil and yet preserve its distinctive characteristics, it was healthy. In this respect it carried on the work of the best apologists, linking the Christian tradition to the new situation and proving that the faith was too vital to remain a Semitic cult. But there was another side to syncretism, and to this the Church was keenly, if not always wisely, alert. The fascination of the movement lay in its cosmopolitan appeal—an appeal which was the more seductive that already, within paganism itself, the movement had made headway, as we see from the tone of men like Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Numenius,[9] and from a specific phenomenon like the transformation which had come over a deity such as Isis[10] in the popular pieties of the age. The

[1] *Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris, 1908–11, ii. 227 f. See J. H. Moulton, *The Christian Religion in the Study and the Street*, London, 1919, pp. 253–268 ('Syncretism in Religion').

[2] Cf. *ERE* vi. 232 *f.*; A. Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1908, i. 33 ff., 312 ff.; J. Reville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, Paris, 1886, ch. iv.; J. Huby, in *Christus: manuel d'hist. des religions*, do. 1912, p. 340 f.; S. J. Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, Chicago, 1914, pp. 71 ff., 191 f.; S. Angus, *The Environment of Early Christianity*, London, 1914, p. 23 ff.; W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, do. 1918, i. 46 f.

[3] Cf. F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, pp. 235 f., 255 f., 390 f.

[4] Cf. *ERE* vii. 441 f., 582.

[5] Cf. B. Stade, *Biblische Theologie des AT*, Tübingen, 1905–11, i. 235 f.

[6] *E.g.*, recently F. Legge, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, Cambridge, 1915, ii. 32 ('the *theocrasia* which was welding all the gods of the mysteries into one great God of nature').

[7] Cf. *HDB* v. 150 f., and *ERE* vi. 421 f.

[1] *ERE* vii. 483; J. Dahlmann, in *Christus*, p. 122 *f.*

[2] Cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, London, 1913, p. 57 ff.

[3] *ERE* vii. 434[a].

[4] Cf. W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Books of the Apocrypha*, London, 1914, p. 22 ff.

[5] Cf. A. Menzies, *Hist. of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 145.

[6] E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1908, p. 161.

[7] Elsewhere combinations of Judaism and paganism are to be detected, however—*e.g.*, in Asia Minor, in the worship of *θεὸς ὕψιστος*.

[8] Cf. *ERE* vi. 232 *f.*

[9] *Ib.* vi. 282[b], ix. 308[b].

[10] Cf. *ib.* vi. 378 *f.*, vii. 434 ff.

passion of the time was for a vague monotheism, which should reflect and answer the unity of the empire. A cosmopolitan syncretism, in the 3rd cent.,[1] began to overlay the earlier national religions and to embrace the Syro-Hellenic and the Western cults in a synthesis which regarded all deities as so many varied expressions of the One, and all rites as more or less acceptable forms of approach to this central, all-pervasive Deity.[2] The individual features of the separate gods and goddesses became less and less distinct. Idiosyncrasies were obliterated, and stress was laid, from the religious as well as from the philosophical and the political points of view, upon the all-embracing unity—generally conceived as a solar pantheism. A man like Macrobius voices this in the 4th century. It underlay the pagan reaction of Julian, which was its last serious challenge to a recalcitrant Christianity. For, although the Church admitted elements which were of semi-polytheistic character, in the worship of the saints, the exploiting of miracles, and even the adoration of the emperor, nevertheless formally the sense of Christianity decided against syncretism of the Gnostic and later of the Neo-Platonic shape.[3] This is the paradox of the situation. Christianity proved by its exclusiveness that it was not, and was not to be, a merely 'syncretistic' faith, in the sense of being eclectic or derivative. At the same time, it not only assimilated bravely and wisely many elements organic to its growth, but also admitted, as we see, *e.g.*, in its later Egyptian popular developments,[4] semi-pagan features which were a handicap ultimately to its successful advance.[5] The syncretistic situation was at once an opportunity and a risk for Christianity. The opportunity was often seized, and the risk was sometimes too much for the faith. Still, the environment did not mould Christianity as it moulded movements like Mithraism and Neo-Platonism. The catholicism of that age suffered from the desire to conciliate the natural man, but it had more in it than an indiscriminate selection or an anxious imitation, such as syncretism usually exhibited.

The tendency of syncretism, when broadly viewed, was to henotheism or pantheism rather than to monotheism. It is true that syncretistic movements meant a break away from polytheism.

> 'The first corollary of a truly pantheistic religion is not so much toleration of all forms of worship, as a tendency to embrace them all in a single syncretistic system. The one God is the same for all. What, then, does the name they give him matter?'[6]

Such is the theme of a book like the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius, and it is the principle of the religious synthesis underlying Plutarch's philosophy of things. But, as the arguments of a Neo-Platonist like Iamblichus show, this serene indifference was not incompatible with ideas which were henotheistic rather than monotheistic, and the popular cravings proved too much for even a monotheistic principle in Christianity. Pope's opening lines in 'The Universal Prayer'—

> 'Father of All! in ev'ry Age,
> In ev'ry Clime ador'd,
> By Saint, by Savage, and by Sage,
> Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!'—

echo the syncretistic aspiration in its exalted and abstract form. But syncretism, like Catholicism, appealed to lower as well as higher cravings. The adoration of a Deity like this left the heavens strangely bare for those who had been accustomed to a richer variety of worship, and thus the syncretistic tendency was welcomed as it allowed these heavens to be repeopled by a host of spirits and saints. Syncretism, in practice, almost invariably fostered mythology. Sages and saints, no less than savages, yielded to its spell in this direction. It was found quite compatible, in pagan syncretism, to unite a reverence for the One with some special adoration of one or more favourite, traditional deities.[1] And it is a question how far even the Christian Church of the 4th cent., *e.g.*, which had rejected in earlier days the hospitable syncretism of a monarch like Alexander Severus, tolerated, for the sake of their associations and popular appeal, forms of adoration which were, strictly speaking, out of line with essential monotheism.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been noted during the course of the article; the 'syncretistic controversy' of the 17th cent. is discussed by I. A. Dorner, *Hist. of Protestant Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871, ii. 177 f.; K. Löffler, *CE* xiv. 383 f.; P. Tschackert, *PRE*[3] xix. 243 ff., and in J. H. Blunt, *Dict. of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought*, London, 1874, p. 585 ff.

JAMES MOFFATT.

SYNDERESIS.—The word *συντήρησις*, which has no classical authority, should mean 'preservation.' In scholastic and mystical theology it appears, often in the corrupt forms *synderesis* or *sinderesis*, in a sense which is hardly justified by the etymology of the word. Τήρησις is used in later Greek in the sense of 'observation,' and *συντήρησις* may have been coined on the analogy of *συνείδησις*. The first example is in Jerome:

> 'Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant *συντήρησιν*, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, . . . non extinguitur, et qua . . . nos peccare sentimus.'[2]

Bonaventura[3] couples *synteresis* with *intelligentia*, as *intellectus* with *ratio*. Elsewhere he connects *synteresis* with *conscientia*.

> 'Benignissimus Deus quadruplex contulit ei adiutorium, scilicet duplex naturae et duplex gratiae. Duplicem enim indidit rectitudinem ipsi naturae, videlicet unam ad recte iudicandum, et haec est rectitudo conscientiae, aliam ad recte volendum, et haec est synteresis, cuius est remurmurare contra malum et stimulare ad bonum.'[4]

In the *Itinerarium* he defines *synteresis* as 'apex mentis seu scintilla.' Hermann of Fritzlar speaks of it as a power or faculty in the soul, wherein God works immediately, without means and without intermission. Ruysbroeck defines it as the natural will towards good implanted in us all, though weakened by sin. Giseler uses similar language, saying that the spark (so Eckhart speaks of a *Funkelein* in the soul which cannot be extinguished) was created with the soul in all men, and is a clear light in them, striving in every way against sin and impelling steadily to virtue, and pressing back towards the source from which it came. In Thomas Aquinas *synteresis* is the highest activity of the moral sense. Gerson says that the cognitive power in man has three faculties—the simple intelligence or natural light, which comes from God Himself; the understanding, which is the frontier between the two worlds; and the sense-consciousness. *Synteresis* is the effective

1 'The expansion of the imperial organisation, the mixture of nationalities in the capital, and the flooding of them by Oriental elements, the heightened intercourse, the prolonged residence of the legions in the provinces and their permeation by foreigners, finally, since the 3rd century, the advent of emperors who were foreigners and unfamiliar with the national spirit of Rome—all these produced the syncretism of religions' (P. Wendland, *Die hellen.-röm. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*[2], Tübingen, 1912, p. 152).

2 See G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 80 f. 'The reconciled East and West met in Rome to exchange compliments and gods' (J. Martineau, *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, London, 1890–91, ii. 315).

3 *ERE* ix. 320.

4 Cf. P. D. Scott-Moncrieff, *Paganism and Christianity in Egypt*, Cambridge, 1913, pp. 126 f., 129 f., 150 f.

5 Cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, ii. 124 f.

6 G. d'Alviella, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God* (*HL*), London, 1892, p. 232.

1 W. Pater notes this in Marcus Aurelius: 'To his pious recognition of that one orderly spirit, which, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, diffuses itself throughout the world . . . he had added a warm personal devotion towards the whole multitude of the old national gods, and a great many new foreign ones' (*Marius the Epicurean*[3], London, 1892, i. 198).

2 *In Ezech.* i. 1. 3 *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, i.

4 *Breviloquium*, ii. 11.

faculty answering to the first of these, and contemplation is its corresponding activity. The word also occurs in Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales. Eckhart sometimes seems to identify *synteresis* with the *Fünkelein* or *Ganster*, and with the *intellectus agens* or *die oberste Vernunft*; but the tendency of his philosophy is to make the 'spark' supra-rational and uncreated; he even says: 'Diess Fünkelein, dass ist Gott.' In the earlier writers *synteresis* is usually thought of as a remnant of the sinless state of man before the fall, while in the bolder thought of the school of Eckhart it becomes the seat or organ of divine immanence and of the highest personal inspiration. The notion of an impeccable 'soul-centre' may be traced back to the Neo-Platonists.

LITERATURE.—W. Preger, *Gesch. der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1874–81; A. Lasson, *Meister Eckhart der Mystiker*, Berlin, 1868; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, London, 1899.

W. R. INGE.

SYNDICALISM.—See SOCIALISM.

SYNERGISM.—1. General meaning of the term and its Scriptural support. — The term 'synergism' (*συνεργεῖν*, *συνεργός*, 'to co-operate,' 'fellow-worker') became definitely fixed as a *terminus technicus* in theology in the 16th century. It was applied to the later views of Philip Melanchthon and his followers on the question as to the relation between the Holy Spirit (or God's grace) and man's will in regeneration. This view, broadly stated, is that the human will can and does co-operate with the grace of God as a *vera causa regenerationis*. It opposes the position expressed in the sentence 'Homo convertitur nolens.' The human will was, it is true, not regarded as the primary cause (hence synergism differs from Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism); that was unreservedly assigned to God's Spirit and to the preaching of the Word, but the energy of the human will was given a place, and its assent an essential place, in the act of regeneration. The enunciation of this view caused unusual heat among theologians, because its truth or falsehood affected the whole realm of theological truth—the effects of the fall on human nature, the nature and working of God's decrees, the responsibility of the sinner, in fact all Christian anthropology and soteriology.

The term 'synergism' owes its origin to Scripture, but the Scriptural usage of the word operates in a different universe of discourse from the theological. In the NT *συνεργεῖν* (*συνεργός*) is never applied to the psychological relation, whatever that may be, whether creative or co-operative, between God's Spirit and man's will in regeneration or conversion. Its general usage is to describe the objective co-operation of Christian brethren in the furtherance of God's kingdom on earth.

In 1 Co 3[9] (*θεοῦ γάρ ἐσμεν συνεργοί*) the co-operation referred to is that between men in their outward labours for God, not a co-operation between them individually or unitedly with God, however true that may be in itself; and at any rate it refers to post-conversion experience, not to pre- or simul-conversion relationships. In Ph 2[13] the reference is to men already regenerated, and the same is true of Ro 8[28], if *ὁ θεὸς* is the true text—God works in all things for good with those who love God. It does not directly refer to what takes place in conversion, nor does it state the active elements involved therein and their relationships. Again, in Mk 16[20] the co-operation of the ascended Lord with the heralds of the gospel is spoken of in regard to miracles. But the word in Scripture is never used of man's natural faculties or capacities (before conversion) working together with the Spirit of God to effect regeneration, which is the specific and proper theological application of the term. If thus synergism is to be rejected or to be defended from Scripture, it must be by reference to the truth of Scripture, and not to its letter.

2. The origin and development of synergism in Melanchthon's doctrine.—The earlier writings of Melanchthon betray no synergistic tendencies. On the contrary, they are in some respects more rigidly deterministic than even Luther's. The religious man is profoundly conscious of his dependence on God's grace. He does not dream of co-ordinating or equating his own freedom with the grace of God as causal in his salvation. This is true even of those who are legitimately called synergists. 'Arminians usually pray like Calvinists,' said Charles Hodge, adding, what is equally true, that 'Calvinists frequently preach like Arminians';[1] *i.e.*, they appeal to men as responsible voluntary agents. The difficulty arises when one or other of these aspects of experience is made the determining factor in the elaboration of a theological system. Truth is largely a matter of proportion and balance. To begin with, Melanchthon, whose mind was eminently of a systematic cast, worked out his system under the dominating influence of the experience of divine dependence. The Holy Spirit teaches us, he says, that all things happen necessarily by predestination, and therefore there is no such thing as freedom of our will. To maintain free will was to dethrone the grace of God from its unique supremacy. This was his position in the first edition of his *Loci Communes Rerum Theologicarum*,[2] and it was even more rigidly expressed in his Commentary on Romans and Corinthians.[3] Free will he regarded as a scholastic figment emanating from carnal wisdom and obscuring the blessings brought to us by Christ. It made men arbiters of their own salvation and consequently undermined the immediacy of Christian assurance and froze the stream of personal devotion to the Redeemer. Melanchthon resolutely applied this conception of predestination to all events, physical and moral, outward and inward:

'Si ad praedestinationem referas humanam voluntatem nec in externis, nec in internis operibus ulla est libertas.' Since man is born a child of wrath, it follows that he is born without the Spirit of God, and therefore 'nihil nisi carnalia sapit, amat, et quaerit.'[4]

Man has no power over his inward affections, and, though Melanchthon admits that in outward things he has some freedom, even here the power of will seems to vanish. Thus Melanchthon, applying a transcendental conception, predestination, to the facts of human life, as he read them or understood them from Scripture, came to assert that no real causality existed anywhere but in God's will, and so the betrayal of Judas is as truly and as immediately an act of God as the calling of Paul. The reprobation of the damned is as properly and in the same sense the effect of God's will as the salvation of the elect. We are not to think of certain events as determined while others are allowed. All things immediately flow out of God's will necessarily. All questions as to the rightness of God's procedure he silences by regarding these questionings as issuing from man's carnal inquisitiveness.

It follows from this position that man could contribute nothing to his own conversion. He could not repent of himself, and so-called morality (pre-conversion) has no spiritual value.

'Homo per vires naturales nihil [potest] nisi peccare. Carnale est quidquid per naturae vires fit, Socratis constantia, Zenonis moderatio, nihil nisi carnales affectus sunt.'[5]

At this stage we see Melanchthon planted firmly on the experience of God's free grace which gave its strength to the new outlook of the Reformation, combating strongly the popular Roman Catholic view according to which man's free will aided by certain ecclesiastical rites contributed

[1] C. A. Salmond, *Princetoniana*, Edinburgh, 1888, p. 177.
[2] Originally published at Wittenberg and Basel in 1521, and ed. T. Kolde, Leipzig, 1900.
[3] Nüremberg, 1522.
[4] *Loci*, 1521, p. 97.
[5] *Ib.* pp. 97–115.

something to man's salvation—a view which cut the vital nerve of personal trust in Christ as the alone Redeemer and opened a door by which the whole mechanism of merits and of an external ecclesiastical authority as ultimate source of redemptive assurance could be reinstated. Melanchthon, however, was extravagant in his elaboration and his application of the truth of man's dependence on God for salvation. He confused in the interests of a theory natural and moral causality, and left no moral bridge between nature and grace. He raised a spiritual feeling—of supreme importance, no doubt—to a position of absolute sovereignty over man and nature and over God Himself. It was impossible that this could be the final resting-place of one like Melanchthon to whom the ethical interest was so important and who was of a mediating spirit.

'Ego mihi conscius sum, non ullam ob causam unquam τε θεολογηκέναι, nisi ut mores meos emendarem.'[1]

Accordingly he was soon convinced, both by the development of his own experience and by the movement of events, of the necessity of defending his position from misconceptions—not now so much from the side of Rome as from pretended followers of free grace itself—and this led him to modify his earlier views. He now came to see that there were many positions previously held by him which he would have to alter. His study of the Greek fathers, whose views on free will were determined by their hostility to Eastern fatalism, and who were very conscious of the moral continuity between nature and grace (often the two were not clearly distinguished by them), influenced his thought, and we find him frequently quoting from Chrysostom: ἕλκει μὲν ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενον δὲ ἕλκει, or from Basil: μόνον θέλησον καὶ θεὸς προαπαντᾷ.[2]

The contentions of Erasmus as against Luther undoubtedly influenced Melanchthon also, and the result was emphasis on the will's own activity in conversion.

His increasing familiarity with the classical moralists and the Stoics, but above all his earnest ethical nature, stimulated into protest by the fanaticism of enthusiasts who regarded regeneration as an immediate unmediated *opus operatum*, led him to alter his views or, as he thought himself, to replace the emphasis. Pre-conversion morality was now given a moral valuation. Men were saying that they could do nothing, and so they defended everything that they did or felt inclined to do, however wicked or outrageous. Roman Catholics were thus given an occasion to equate Lutheranism with immoralism in personal life and anarchy in society, and the doctrines of grace had therefore to be set on an ethical basis for the benefit alike of opponents and of adherents. The result was the advocacy by Melanchthon of what became known in the Lutheran Church as synergistic views. It was in his eyes not a capitulation or a palinode, but an ethical rehabilitation of the doctrine of free grace, although it was viewed by genuine Lutherans as a reversion to Pelagianism.

'One egg is not liker another than his synergy is to the Pelagian,' said Matthias Flacius[3] the Illyrian, a champion of Lutheranism, concerning the views of Melanchthon's follower Victorine Strigel. 'Man, they say, can by the natural powers of his free will equip and prepare himself for the reception of God's grace—exactly the teaching of the godless sophists, Thomas of Aquino, Scotus, and their disciples,' said Nicholas Amsdorf of Johann Pfeffinger and Melanchthon.[4]

[1] From a letter to Joachim Camerarius, in *Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. C. G. Bretschneider and H. E. Bindseil, Halle and Brunswick, 1834–60, i. 722.

[2] *Loci*, 1535, p. 376, and elsewhere.

[3] Weimar Disputation, 9th session (cf. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen*, p. 226).

[4] *Öffentliche Bekenntnis der reinen Lehre, des Evangelii*, etc., Jena, 1558.

Synergism, however, is to be understood not from the extreme censures of its opponents, not even from the extreme statements of its advocates, but rather when we look on it as an ethical protest against positions that threatened to submerge the conscience and heart and to disarm the Church in her fight against licence and anarchy. It is therefore necessary to state Melanchthon's position more fully.

3. Melanchthon's synergism and its effect on his theological outlook.—Melanchthon's interest, we have said, was mainly practical, not theoretic. Accordingly his interest latterly in predestination was that of the custodian of morals. He desired to safeguard God's moral purity from any shadow that might be cast upon it by this dogma and at the same time to free man's moral nature from the paralysing effect of a monergistic determinism. His early statements were extravagant. Now he emphatically declared that God could in no sense be regarded as the author of sin. Evil was permitted by Him, but it was abhorrent to His nature. He therefore felt obliged to give up the dogma of an eternal decree of reprobation. The cause of man's sin was in man himself, and the hardening of his heart was due to wilful disobedience and perversity. Man's own responsibility for his spiritual state was emphasized. The offer of God's grace was universal. Original sin was a fact, yet man's will, though it could not initiate a gracious state, could yet adopt an attitude of welcome or of repugnance to God's grace offered in His Word. Accordingly we find Melanchthon editing the original *Augsburg Confession* in this interest.

Art. 18, which originally read, '*Justitia spiritualis* is effected by the Holy Spirit which is received into the heart through the Word,' he altered to read, '*Justitia spiritualis* is effected in us when we are helped (*adjuvamur*) by the Holy Spirit.' The same alteration, *adjuvari*, is made in art. 20. He prepared the *Leipzig Interim* in the same spirit: 'Although God does not justify men through their merits, nevertheless the merciful God does not act on man as on a block but draws him so that his will co-operates, provided he has come to years of discretion.'

Melanchthon's position is clearly stated in the revised edition of his *Loci* (published in 1533) in a sentence that became famous and stereotyped in after controversy:

'In hoc exemplo videmus conjungi has causas, verbum, Spiritum sanctum et voluntatem non sane otiosam, sed repugnantem infirmitate suae'; or, as he expressed it in later editions: 'hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei. Posset enim excutere ut excutit Saul sua sponte, sed cum mens audiens, ac se sustenans non repugnat, non indulget diffidentiae, sed adjuvante etiam Spiritu sancto conatur assentiri in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa.'[1]

There is little doubt that Melanchthon applies this to the act of conversion, and his view was that the positive assent of the will was essential, although, as Herrlinger[2] points out, he maintained at times that the help of the Holy Spirit was necessary to enable the will to accept the gospel.[3] While he does not make it at all times quite clear whether this assent was itself the result of the working of God's Spirit or due to the natural energy of the will, yet he seems certainly to maintain that something must be granted to the will itself, and here is the point on which the synergistic controversy hinges. This dubiety is noticeable also in some of his followers. One of them, Pezelius, interprets his master as teaching that the will was a *causa subordinata*, after the Holy Spirit in the Word had roused up the soul.[4]

Latterly he defined the will after Erasmus as *facultas applicandi ad se gratiam*, and therefore the difference between the saved and the lost is

[1] *Corp. Reform.* xxi. 658.

[2] *Die Theologie Melanchthons*, Gotha, 1879.

[3] See I. A. Dorner, *A System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 171.

[4] See Luthardt, p. 189.

ultimately due not to election—for even God foresaw something in the elect which conditioned His election—nor to reprobation, but to man himself. The difficulty which confronted Melanchthon was just to determine what constitutes responsibility, and, even if his solution is defective and open to verbal criticism, as it certainly is, it is a merit that he recognized the problem in its seriousness and that he tried to solve it on moral grounds.

Melanchthon's synergism also affected his practical outlook. To those who defended civil and social outrage because they were sinners, and would remain sinners unless changed by a divine act which they could do nothing to initiate, he sternly said that man in spite of original sin had liberty in outward actions, the reason could control the will, and the will the bodily movements. No man could say, like the servant of Zeno, that he was compelled to sin by fate. It is clear that his soul loathed this Manichæism, as he called it, and his safeguarding of predestination from those who so understood it was clamantly demanded by the circumstances of the age and of many ages since. It is surely as immediate a datum of Christian experience that the sinner is responsible for his sin as that he ascribes his salvation to God's grace.

Melanchthon did not take a prominent part in the Majoristic controversy, which arose over George Major's statement that 'good works are necessary for holiness,' but by various utterances he indicated that, whilst maintaining the Lutheran position that justification is of grace alone, he was anxious to show that a holy life was the inevitable consequence and the test of the reality of a justified life. Amsdorf's statement that 'good works are harmful to holiness' he characterized as a 'lewd saying' (*unflätige Rede*).[1]

4. The synergistic controversy.—Melanchthon's statements concerning free will were ambiguous and so hesitating that men, accustomed to the breezy statements of Luther on the same subject, felt as if he attributed to the will more than he actually expressed, and his acceptance of Erasmus's formula gave this feeling a colour of truth. Luther on this point was definite:

'In geistlichen und göttlichen Sachen was der Seelen Heil betrifft da ist der Mensch wie die Salzsäule, wie Loth's Weib, ja wie ein Klotz und Stein, wie ein todt Bild, das weder Augen noch Mund weder Sinn noch Herz brauchet.'[2]

What Luther advocated with zeal Melanchthon admitted with reserve. Controversy was therefore inevitable, and it broke out violently, occasioned by two disputations of Pfeffinger,[3] a Leipzig professor and disciple of Melanchthon.

He tried to answer the question why one man under the preaching of the Word became converted and another did not, and the decisive factor, he maintained, was that one willingly assented and the other did not. The difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the activity of the divine will: therefore the difference lies in man himself. We must therefore attribute a certain synergy to our will. Man even now in his fallen state is not as a statue or a stone, nor is he purely passive, for, if that were the case, there would be no difference between the pious and the impious, the elect and the damned, Saul and David. God would become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the impious and the damned. On the other hand, the human will has not the power to effect spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit moving through the Word of God, and the mind thinking, and the will not resisting but complying under the Spirit's influence—these are the causes which concurrently produce conversion.

Pfeffinger's defence and explanation of Melanchthon's views called forth violent opposition especially from Amsdorf and Flacius. The former (see above) said that, according to Pfeffinger, man could prepare and equip himself for conversion by the natural powers of his free will without the aid of the Holy Spirit. Verbally this was very unjust, but essentially it had an element of truth in it. Flacius appealed to Luther's words and declared that man was worse than a stock or stone because he offered resistance to God's Spirit. The will therefore does not co-operate; it opposes and resists. Every one knows that this criticism, though infelicitously expressed, is in touch with reality and spoken out of personal experience. As regards regeneration, man is absolutely passive—he is spiritually dead; the image of God is not only wholly obliterated, but is transformed into the image of Satan. Man thus contributes nothing positive to his own conversion; any contribution of his is negative and resisting.

Pfeffinger replied to Amsdorf and incidentally mentioned Flacius. He declared himself more explicitly as holding that the unconverted will had the power of either obeying or resisting God's offer in His Word. Thus the controversy raged, the new university of Jena contending for the old position of Luther and violently opposing the synergistic movement, which was stoutly advocated by the faculties of Leipzig and Wittenberg. At last, at the instigation of Flacius, an attempt was made to silence opposition by authority. John Frederick II., Elector of Saxony, was appealed to, and by his command a *Book of Confutation and Condemnation* of all prevalent heresies was published at Jena in 1559. Of its nine divisions the sixth was devoted to the refutation of synergism. Those who taught that man had power in his will to co-operate with the grace of God in conversion were stigmatized as overthrowers of the grace of God. It was false to maintain that man can do anything by his free will in accepting or rejecting grace. Human nature is wholly adverse from God and hostile to God and is subjected to the tyranny of sin and Satan.

In a similar strain the orthodox Lutherans—Amsdorf, Wigand, Tilman Hesshusen, etc.—spoke and wrote against synergism and deduced this anthropology from their predestinarian views, the last-named saying that, in one respect,

'God did not wish that all men should be saved, for He did not elect all. God's will acts in one uniform way on men just as on stocks and stones.'[1]

Melanchthon raised his voice against this deterministic delirium and declared that it is absurd to talk of conversion until the will consents, that to reject God's grace is an act of will and not an act of God, and that human nature had at least power in outward actions. An attempt was made to make the book binding on teachers and preachers, but without success. Even in Jena, the citadel of orthodoxy, Pastor Hugel refused to read the document from the pulpit, and Strigel raised his voice on the synergistic side. Both Strigel and Hugel were imprisoned, and it looked as if synergism were doomed in Jena, for the university was strengthened in the orthodox interest by the appointments of Wigand and Judex to professorial chairs and by the recall of Musæus, all of whom were strong champions of orthodoxy. However, the prisoners were set free after an imprisonment of less than six months, and a further attempt was made to settle the dispute by public discussion. This disputation lasted from 2nd until 8th Aug. 1560, and occupied thirteen sittings. The interest for us centres in the positions defended and refuted regarding free will and God's grace.

To begin with, Strigel maintained that the substance and qualities of human nature were not obliterated by the fall nor altered, but only hindered in their activity. His position he made clear by a curious physical illustration.

A magnet, he said, cannot attract iron when smeared with onion-juice, yet it retains its magnetic properties, and it can attract though smeared with goat's blood. It is the same magnet in both cases, but its activity is hindered in the one

[1] *Corp. Reform.* ix. 407.
[2] *Enarr. in Ps. xc.*
[3] *Propositiones de libero arbitrio* and *Quæstiones quinque de libertate voluntatis humanæ*, Leipzig, 1555.

[1] See Luthardt, p. 241.

case and not in the other. So by the fall man's nature is not destroyed, but only weakened. He is like him who fell among thieves between Jerusalem and Jericho, half-dead, or like one weakened by disease but not dead like a corpse.

Strigel is here aiming at a distinction which satisfies many theologians—that between formal freedom and material freedom or that between natural ability and moral ability, a distinction largely used by Jonathan Edwards but in currency before his day.[1] According to this distinction, man does what he pleases and wills what he pleases. That is the very meaning of will—it is not compelled from without; but, though man has this natural ability, as a matter of fact he does not will the good spiritually simply because he does not want to—he lacks moral ability.

Seeberg contends that Strigel was groping after this distinction, but did not adequately express it.[2] That is certainly true of him at this Weimar disputation. He did not make his meaning clear, but afterwards he distinguished very clearly between *efficacia* (δύναμις) or *facultas*, on the one hand, and *capacitas* or *aptitudo*, on the other. Man has lost the first through the fall, and the Holy Spirit restores to the will the δύναμις or efficacy or faculty of believing, which was lost by the fall. At this disputation, however, Strigel did not go so far as that. When asked by Flacius if the human will co-operated with the Holy Spirit before conversion or only after, he hesitated and said that to him conversion was not a point but a line, not the beginning of the Christian life but the whole of it.

It is evident from reading the disputation that Strigel really wished to attribute power to the will, but at the same time to ascribe the chief place to the Holy Spirit—so that synergism is an unfortunate term to use of factors that cannot be equated. He repeated the Melanchthonian formula: 'Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis quae voci divinae assentitur,' a sentence which is ambiguous; and on this point no decision could be reached. On the other hand, Flacius went so far as to say that the very substance of the soul was altered by the fall and by sin, and that therefore man was purely passive, or active only in hostility to God. Peace could not be restored by public controversy. In a few months the party of the Illyrian was driven from the country, and Flacius, a man of undoubted erudition, died in his fifty-fifth year at Frankfort-on-Main. Strigel also left and died in Heidelberg at the early age of forty-five.

5. The Formula of Concord.—After various unsuccessful attempts at a solution of this and other disputes the *Formula of Concord*[3] appeared, and, as it became an authoritative standard of the Lutheran Church, its position on this topic must be stated here.

The problem is dealt with in artt. 1 and 2 of the *Formula*, and, while no personal names are mentioned, the views of contending parties are very clearly kept in mind. In the 1st art., dealing with original sin, a clear distinction is drawn between actual transgressions (*actualia delicta*) and the hereditary sickness of the soul. Man's nature is in all its parts poisoned by inherited sin, and for this condition man is guilty and condemned by God's law, so that by nature men are the children of wrath, and from this state they can be saved only by the benefits of Christ's merit. How this corruption is transmitted is described. God creates every soul afresh, but because of physical generation from corrupted seed the hereditary disease of sin is propagated. Yet God is not the author of sin in either its origin or its development, nor is man's substance converted into sin. Original sin is not to be identified with the essence of man. A clear distinction must be made between our nature (which was created, and which is daily preserved, by God), in which original sin dwells, and that original sin itself which dwells in our nature. To teach otherwise is Manichæism, not Christianity. This is further corroborated by the fact that the Son of God, according to His human nature, is consubstantial with us, His brethren. He took our nature, but it was sinless in Him. Further, God in sanctifying men purifies them from sin, accepting them for Christ's sake. He gives them grace, but He has eternal hostility towards sin itself. Moreover, if original sin were the substance of the soul, the doctrine of the resurrection of believers would be null and void. Thus the *Formula* disposes of the Flacian error. Yet, while all this is so, man before God in his actual fallen state is truly and spiritually dead in all his faculties, as far as spiritual good is concerned. Strigel's illustration of the magnet will not do. Man is not simply surrounded by outward hindrances; he cannot do anything, however small, in his natural state in regard to spiritual things. He has not the capacity 'in rebus spiritualibus aliquid inchoandi, operandi aut cooperandi.'

In the 2nd art., in which we have an attempt at an analytical solution, the relation of man's powers to the Holy Spirit is set forth. In fallen man before conversion there does not remain the smallest spark ('ne scintillula quidem') of spiritual power by which he can prepare himself for apprehending God's grace, or for applying or accommodating it to himself. Rather he resists it. Man is capable certainly of being converted. He is still a reasonable creature, but as regards any real initiative 'hac in parte deterior est trunco, quia voluntati divinae rebellis est et inimicus.' He has a capacity for conversion, but a passive one, and his conversion is purely a work of the Holy Spirit. At the same time it is stated that man by natural reason and will has somehow power to live a decent outward life. Thus the *Formula of Concord*, while strongly opposing the strange view of Flacius as regards the substance of the soul of fallen man, at the same time as strongly opposes the view which would give any power to the will in initiating conversion. Of Melanchthon's three causes it makes the Holy Spirit alone the efficient cause, the will and nature of man being only a subject to be converted, while the Word of God preached or read is the means through which the Spirit works. Great stress is laid on the Word of God as the means of the Spirit's working. Thus God softens men's hearts, draws them, and reveals to them their sin; and, realizing His anger, they feel in their heart contrition which makes them attend to the promises of the gospel, and so faith ('scintillula fidei') is quickened in their soul and 'hoc modo Spiritus Sanctus qui haec omnia operatur in cor mittitur.'

Thus the *Formula of Concord* unhesitatingly rejects synergism. In conversion the real agent is the Holy Ghost, the assent of the will is not a cause, but is itself an effect of the Spirit's working through the Word. Co-operation may be spoken of after conversion, but even then we must not think of God's Spirit and man's will as if they were like horses drawing a load and working side by side. God's Spirit in the converted man works on and through the will.

6. The Reformed position as regards synergism.—The problem of the relation of man's nature to the grace of God was agitated in the Lutheran Church after the *Formula of Concord* and has been a subject of dispute down to the present day.

[1] It is used by Twisse, Howe, and very clearly by Isaac Watts, the famous hymn-writer.
[2] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*, Leipzig, 1895–98, ii. 356.
[3] See *ERE* iii. 849.

In the Reformed Church the same problem arose, though it was approached somewhat differently. The distinctive feature of the Calvinistic system is its logical consistency; every doctrine is discussed not only by itself but in the light of the whole. The supreme regulative principle in Calvinism is the sovereignty of God; and, when man's regeneration was viewed in the light of this principle, it was recognized that God's grace acted differently on men who are regenerated and on those who are not. That is obvious, but whence the difference? It was due to the determination of God. God, who had elected some, did so not as a bare matter of decree or quiescent foreknowledge or fortuitously waiting on their faith, but energetically through a series of efficient means—the redemptive mission of His Son, the preaching of the Word, the irresistible working of the Holy Spirit; and these were effective all along the line in the case of the elect, leading them from spiritual death to grace and glory. Now, in the case of the unregenerated it was a sufficient proof that this divine redemptive causality had no place, that it failed in this link of regeneration. It was nonexistent here; therefore it was wholly nonexistent. God did not elect them; the redemption of His Son was not purposively undertaken or efficaciously operative in their case. Thus the question of the will is so embedded in the logical coherence of the system that to moot it is to raise the question of the validity of the system as a whole, and that is what happened in the case of Arminius, and especially—for Arminius himself did not attribute regenerating power to the will—in the case of his followers Simon Bischop (Episcopius), Philippus van Limborch, and others. The objections to Calvinism, as far as the subject of this article is concerned, were directed mainly against what was called irresistible grace and the extent of the Atonement.

The Arminians—for we may leave the Socinians out of account; W. Robertson Smith has aptly described them as 'Pelagians of the intellect'—held that grace worked similarly on all, the difference from which conversion arose being due not to God's grace but to man's own will. To them irresistible grace (or, more properly, efficacious grace) meant necessity, and so the responsibility for the final damnation of the lost fell on God. Again, they maintained that by the Atonement the possibility of salvation was opened to all, and they vehemently rejected the doctrine of the eternal reprobation of some, as Wesley so strenuously did afterwards. The Synod of Dort attempted to settle the problem, but in the Reformed Church as in the Lutheran it keeps constantly emerging. Here even more than in the Lutheran Church, which diffidently refrained from applying predestination theories to its anthropological and eschatological views,[1] the problem is an acute one, for the question of God's moral character is raised, and it is from this quarter, rather than from the sphere of religious psychology, that the opposition emerges, and here its strength lies. Hence we find that Calvinistic apologetic has largely been a defence against what is regarded as misunderstandings, perversions, and unwarrantable inferences.

In regard to efficacious grace the Calvinist did not mean that God's grace did violence to the human will by outward or inward compulsion, or that it altered the nature of the will as such, which always has worked and does work voluntarily, but that grace affected the disposition of man in such a way that the resistance of the will was changed into obedience. It was not the obedience of the will that made grace efficacious, but much more the efficacy of grace that made the will not only in act but in disposition obedient.

Some Calvinists, notably the school of Samur, agreed with the Arminians that the Atonement was intended for all mankind; but the Arminians contended further that it is left to the free will of man either to concur with or to reject this intention. The Calvinists felt that, while this opened a possibility of salvation to all, it made salvation certain for none; the Atonement thus became itself a contingency rather than a reality, and they could not understand a purpose of God which could thus be frustrated. To leave the future of mankind hanging on the slender thread of the free will—even if that thread was not itself an illusion—seemed too precarious to be consistent with a purposive God, and rendered the salvation of the regenerate itself problematic, a denial of the perseverance of the saints. Hence the position that the Atonement was meant for those that are saved or to be saved, and that grace is efficacious in the case of the elect; and so the empirical fact that some are not saved is itself a proof that in God's secret purpose the Atonement was not meant for them.

Here also, as in the Lutheran Church, and as in the internal disputes on this question between the Jesuits and the Jansenists in the Church of Rome, as well as in the disputes between Rome and Reformers on this point, we see the question at issue in spite of many cross currents in the discussion itself. The Calvinistic and Arminian problem is even more illuminating than the Lutheran because it is more conscious of the pervasive nature of the issue. It is a matter not of anthropology simply, but of theology in all its bearings. A survey of the discussion, in spite of the changed outlook of our own day, reveals the palpable dangers on either side and at least teaches us where we are not to search for an adequate solution.

The problem is not an accident of history, but a fundamental problem of thought, perhaps the problem which goes deepest of all—the relation between God and man. It goes deeper and higher than the question of man's place in nature or man's place in history; it is the question of man's place in relation to God.

7. Conclusion.—What, then, is the significance of the synergistic controversy for modern Christianity? It is evident that many of the preconceptions accepted by both parties alike, whether we look at the discussion as handled by Augustine and Pelagius, by Flacius and Melanchthon, by Calvin and Arminius, or by Jansenist and Jesuit, are antiquated. The march of natural science has raised afresh the whole question of the nature of man, and the problem is now whether man's nature can be explained from below as a development of life in general. Alongside of the activity of science has gone a prodigious wealth of philosophical speculation dealing with the nature of man, his place in the universe, and the value of his experience and his ideals. The profound changes also in the structure of society, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the consequent application of new categories in the explanation of the significance of human life have changed the outlook considerably. The more direct activities of Christianity itself, its vast missionary ideals and efforts, the investigations into the psychology of the Christian life, the insight into what is permanent in Christian experience as distinct from what is accidental or subsidiary—in short, the main currents of modern thought and life—have poured through Christian theology till the old landmarks are submerged, and history and reflexion alone make us certain that the unity of experience is a reality and that the problems of the spirit change not.

[1] Cf. also the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church.

however much the outlook may change. It is on this changed background and in the light of these tendencies that the problem of synergism can alone be approached.

(*a*) Modern Christianity in all its schools has had to fight against a naturalistic conception of man. From this point of view we can appreciate the emphasis laid by the early Greek theologians on man's freedom. Whatever may be thought of their view of freedom, the important point is that as against fatalism Christianity asserts that freedom has a real meaning as applied to man. So all Christian schools to-day, whether they be historically affiliated with Augustine or Pelagius, emphasize freedom as against physical necessity or direct determinism. Freedom has a meaning in regard to man that it has not in regard to matter. It is necessary to be clear on this point because naturalistic necessitarians too often claim the Augustinian and the Calvinist as on their side, whereas they are working on a different level of experience altogether. This is brought out clearly by the following considerations.

(1) According to Calvinism and Arminianism alike, man was originally created in the image of God, and his final end is 'to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever.' This is deeper than any change brought about by sin and subsists as an inalienable characteristic of human nature.

'A lady once said to me, "The more I see of myself, I see nothing so properly mine as my sin." I said to her, "Well, you do not see deep enough. There is something far more properly yours than your sin; and your sin is improperly yours. It is a blot in your being, which, if you do not get quit of it, will never cease to be *unnatural* to you. No; the image of God is more properly yours, though you had no share in the production of it."'[1]

(2) It has always been held that man is responsible for his sin. He has formal freedom, nor can he ever become a non-moral being in the sense that he can become non-voluntary in his actions or place himself beyond the claims of the moral law on his character. Whatever his actual condition due to sin, these things hold true. His reason, conscience, and will always act rationally, morally, and volitionally. Again, the question here is not whether we agree with the content of this nature as explained by different schools of Christian thought. We may consider that the Arminian view gives too much, and the Calvinistic view too little, real freedom; but the important point is that from the general Christian standpoint man is not explicable in terms of mechanism, however subtle or refined in form. The synergistic controversy has no meaning either for opponent or for defender if the naturalistic view of man is true. The theory of T. H. Green[2] as to the relation of the character to volitions is simply Calvinistic psychology in a philosophical dress, but its whole motive is to overthrow the naturalistic conception of man.

(*b*) Synergism becomes a real problem when man's freedom is viewed in the light of God's activity. We are so accustomed to defending liberty against material necessity in our age that we are apt to forget that the real problem of freedom emerges on the religious plane. What meaning and content are we to give to man's freedom, not now as against nature, but as against God Himself? Two main streams of thought emerge in history on this question.

(1) The Pelagian, looking almost exclusively at man's free power of initiative, became jealous even of God's interference. Man on this view is a bare individual and largely, if not wholly, his own creator. His sin is a bare act of will, undetermined by what went before and unaffected by what comes after. His will is his unconditionally, for the character is the result of acts of will; but an act of will can alter it easily. His merit is his own, and his salvation is his own. God never gets inside the adytum of man's free spirit, and free will is primarily the power of choosing between alternatives.

(2) To the Augustinian the problem was far more complicated. He recognized that man was organically related to the past. The influences of the past affect his will and disposition and character. He does not begin as a moral neutral or moral unit. Sin is more than a bare act of will. When a man becomes self-conscious, it is there not simply as the result of a wrong choice, but as the fruit of a vitiated disposition and itself a source of vitiation. The characteristic of moral awakening is the discovery of our bondage. We become conscious of our need of freedom more than of the fact that we are free. The interposition of God is not regarded as a violation of freedom, but welcomed as the restorer and succourer of true freedom itself, which to the Augustinian meant acting in accordance with the highest. This deeper view of man led Augustine to the certainty of pre-individual iniquity—racial evil—as it led Kant to posit a supra-temporal fall. Objections may be raised to phrases like original sin, the guilt of Adam's transgression, the fall of Adam, supra-temporal fall, and it is right to aim at verbal accuracy if possible, but it is essential that the repudiation of inadequate phraseology should not be accompanied by the rejection of the realities bodied forth by inaccurate phrases.

We have the same tendencies in philosophy in our day represented by pluralism in its many forms and by absolute idealism. The former is so alive to the importance of the individual that in its extreme and logical forms it makes the individual eternal *a parte ante*, and, if God is recognized, it is as a *primus inter pares*; the latter is so conscious of the claims of God that it tends to annihilate the personal life of the individual *a parte post*. The problem as to how a man can act against God's will is insoluble intellectually, and the Calvinist has great difficulty, in spite of his insistence on man's accountability and God's holiness, in saving himself from the pitfall of pantheism where sin is factorized into something different from what it is to the conscience. Yet, however sinful man's state may be, however the sinner may be alive to the deep-seated nature and wide extent of this disease, he accepts responsibility for it as his. He cannot devolve the responsibility on Adam or on circumstances. That is the moral attitude. The intellect may attempt to explain sin either scientifically as a residuum from our animal origin or philosophically as due to finitude or as a necessary stage in our development; but every explanation that explains away the moral attitude is itself unsatisfactory. Pantheism, material, philosophical, or theological, suffers shipwreck on the conscience. But, on the other hand, though we are compelled to recognize centres of activity acting contrary to God's will, it is impossible to give them the self-subsistence that we give to God. Even in sinning they depend on Him and are within the scope of His control. The Christian doctrine of creation—creation in time, for creation has no other meaning in regard to dependent beings — saves from pantheism and pluralism alike. While all subsist in God, personalities have a limited power of self-antagonism to God, but they do not compel God to disown His character as Source and responsible sustainer of all. He creates personalities with the capacity to create themselves. Their endowments and faculties, which vary so much as regards both individuals

[1] John Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*[3], Edinburgh, 1871, p. 124.

[2] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883.

and races, which are also so clearly dependent on their historical setting, are of God. It is this inalienable immanence of God that accounts for the presence of high ideals among men however sinful, for the unrest and lack of harmony in the life of man of which Pascal speaks so eloquently, and it is this that makes salvation possible and essential. The Augustinian tended to view man's original constitutive nature as made in God's image as an affix of an ideal human ancestor, and to leave man as he now is nothing but his sinful organic relations. A logical distinction was made an absolute distinction *in rerum natura*. The divine image in man was practically regarded as a *fulgor* appearing once in Adam for a brief space, but now no more; but sin has meaning only when the inalienable immanence of God in man is fully recognized. The Church has never agreed to the Flacian view of human nature as itself sin; but its language has often been perilously near it, and, when it has, protests have been raised, as in New England, where the amiable qualities of man have been emphasized until the need of salvation has been minimized or evaporated. On the ground, then, of man's original creation, we understand that man has freedom which, alas, has been exercised against God Himself, though given by God and intended by Him to coincide joyfully with His own.

How to reconcile God's holy omnipotence and foreknowledge with this human fact seems an insoluble problem. We must give content to God's predestinating activity; it is not enough to posit a quiescent, non-interfering divine knowledge; otherwise there is no guarantee of the ultimate success of God's purposes. But, on the other hand, we must not look on God's absolute decrees as the moral cause of sin or as acting mechanically in man, and certainly not as an insurmountable barrier to the recovery of his true freedom, and that in a moral way.

The synergist fought against a view of God which made Him in the case of some men the obstacle to salvation, withholding His grace from some, and making remedial provision only for some; and in this the synergist was right. Here again the Christian doctrine of the new creation is the safeguard. God is not only inalienably immanent in man by virtue of the first creation; He is also redemptively active in man through Christ. The Calvinist is mainly right in his psychology of conversion.

God's grace is efficiently active, and the consent of the will is the result of that activity; yet He is active in harmony with man's true being, and man's consent is voluntary. Man does not simply accept the offer of grace by the power of his unaided will and so convey it into the soul. His will is never unaided; grace comes into the soul as a power of God moulding the will itself. The acceptance itself is not the cause of its presence. The supremacy of grace and its efficiency is maintained by the religious consciousness on self-examination, but the acceptance itself is an act of will.

The miracle here also is not that a man's will should be effectually motived to harmonize with God's redemptive activity; the miracle is that some men should resist even this. It is not to be thought that their resistance is due to the fact that God withholds or withdraws His gracious activity or that He uses it only gingerly. The gospel offer is to all, even the Calvinist says, and it is a *bona fide* offer; it is more, for the cost to God—what we mean by the Atonement—is so real and so great that the activity of God is an energy penetrating into man. God does not deal with the sinner simply in the way of punishing him; He deals with him in a redemptive way. How can this fact of man's resistance, again, be reconciled with God's omnipotence in grace? Many, like Schleiermacher, find refuge in final universal salvation, in a probation extending beyond this life. But God's omnipotence is a reality which recognizes now man's power of resistance because it values man's freedom. This resistance does not annihilate the divine omnipotence, nor does it rob God of His character as Creator and Redeemer, were the resistance to be eternal.

The value of synergism is in its denials. It is wrong to regard God's activity as doing violence to this initiative of man. The weakness of synergism is that it tends to regard this activity of man as separate from God to begin with and as only co-operating with God. The relation between them is more intimate. God Himself is present from the outset in this freedom; and when, as in Christian experience, the soul awakens to the presence of God, then it is felt that God has done so much in Christ, and is doing so much, that it is joyfully acknowledged that the will's power is His, and the renewal of it is His work. Salvation is not an acquisition of the will so much as the welcome deliverance and liberation of the whole personality. Religion in its strength emphasizes God, and in so doing frees man into the liberty of joyful service.

LITERATURE.—The lives of the reformers, and the general treatises on the history of the Reformation, all deal with the synergistic controversy. J. W. Richard, *Philipp Melancthon: The Protestant Preceptor of Germany, 1497–1560*, New York, 1898, gives a good account of Melanchthon in English; cf. Karl Schmidt, *Philipp Melancthon*, Elberfeld, 1861.

C. E. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen*, Leipzig, 1863, gives a detailed history of the controversy in its origin and development; also *Die Arbeiten Melancthons im Gebiete der Moral*, Leipzig, 1884; Flotow, *De synergismo Melancthonis*, Vratislaw, 1867, is a special handling of the subject referred to by G. Kawerau, who has written much on the various antagonists in the synergistic controversy; see Schaff-Herzog, xi. 223 ff., also *PRE*[3] xix. 229 ff.; E. F. Fischer has a treatise on Melanchthon's teaching on conversion (*Melanchthons Lehre von der Bekehrung*), Tübingen, 1905; and Paul Tschackert, *Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre*, Göttingen, 1910, pp. 520–531, is an excellent summary.

The literature on the *Formula of Concord* is relevant to the discussion; cf. F. H. R. Frank, *Theologie der Konkordienformel*, vol. i., Erlangen, 1858; R. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Heidelberg, 1870, p. 171 ff.; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*[4], Halle, 1906. R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Leipzig, 1895–98, as well as other treatises on dogmatics, give relevant sections. See also H. Heppe, *Gesch. des deutschen Protestantismus*, 4 vols., Marburg, 1853–56; I. A. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880–82, iv. 164 ff. For Reformed doctrine see literature under art. CALVINISM, and for the modern problem H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*[2], Edinburgh, 1913. See also artt. CONVERSION, FREE WILL, GRACE.

D. MACKENZIE.

SYNODS.—See COUNCILS AND SYNODS.

SYRIANS (or **Aramæans**).—**1. General introduction.**—The Hebrew 'Aram' is rendered in the LXX by Συρία, 'Syria.' We may therefore take it for granted that originally the words 'Aramæans' and 'Syrians' were synonymous. At a later time 'Syrian' and 'Assyrian' were used indiscriminately: Ἀσσύριος = Σύριος = Σύρος.[1] According to Gn 10[22], Aram was one of the five sons of Shem, and, according to Gn 10[23], Aram was the father of Uz, Hul, Gether, and Mash. The Aramæans, or Syrians, are therefore Semites.

A complete study of the Aramæans would include that of all the races whose languages, manners, and religions come within the Syrian scope. But our purpose here is to consider only the pagan Aramæans. We shall not touch upon Western (*i.e.* Biblical) Aramæan, represented by several quotations preserved in the OT and the NT, nor the Egyptian papyri and ostraka, particularly those of Elephantine, nor the Jewish dialects

[1] Cf. T. Nöldeke, in *Hermes*, v. [1870] 443 ff.

represented by the Targums, the Megilloths, and the Jerusalem Talmud, nor Samaritan, nor the fragments of Christo-Palestinian literature. All those are of the greatest importance from the general Aramæan point of view, religious as well as philological, but are outside the scope of this article. The same remark applies to the different branches of Eastern Aramæan, which includes the Babylonian Talmud, the literature, language, and religion of the Manichæans, Mandæans, and Harranians (*qq.v.*). We shall also leave untouched the study of Syriac (language and literature) and the chief Neo-Aramæan (Christian) dialects.

The best known of the pagan Aramæans are the Palmyrenes (*q.v.*), the Nabatæans (*q.v.*), and the Syrians of Damascus and of the region north of Syria. We get our information on these races from the OT, ancient inscriptions, and Latin and Greek coins and documents.[1]

The ethnic *aramî*, אֲרַמִּי, 'Aramæan,' is found in 2 K 5^{20}, Gn 25^{20}, Dt 26^{5}. Its fem. is *aramîa*, אֲרַמִּיָּה in 1 Ch 7^{14}. The plur. is *aramîm*, אֲרַמִּים in 2 K $8^{28c.}$ 9^{15}. The corresponding Greek of the LXX is respectively *βαθουὴλ τοῦ Σύρου ἐκ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας, ἀδελφὸν Λαβὰν τοῦ Σύρου* (Gn 25^{20}), etc.; *ἡ Σύρα* (1 Ch 7^{14}); *οἱ Σύροι* (2 K 8^{28}).

The adverb אֲרָמִית, *aramî*, 'in Aramæan,' is translated by the LXX *Συριστί* in Is 36^{11}, 2 K 18^{26}, Dn 2^{4}, 2 Es 47.

The OT gives the following information on the pagan Aramæans.

Aram Ṣoba (*Zobah*), אֲרָם צוֹבָה (LXX *τὴν Συρίαν Σουβά*), in 1 S 14^{47}, 2 S 8^{3} etc., $10^{6.8}$, 1 K 11^{23} etc. This expression means an Aramæan state in the north of Canaan or its capital. The town of Zobah was situated in Lebanon, according to 1 Ch 18^{3}.

Aram Ma'aka (*Maachah*), אֲרָם מַעֲכָה (LXX *ἐκ Συρίας Μααχά*), in 1 Ch 19^{6}, means a territory at the foot of Mount Hermon (Jos 13^{13}). The name of the people is Ma'akati (Maachathites), מַעֲכָתִי; according to Dt 3^{14}, the Ma'akati dwelt beyond the kingdom of Og; they were not included in the conquest of the descendants of Manasseh (cf. Jos 12^{5} 13^{11}, 2 S 23^{34}).

Aram beth Reḥob (*Beth Rehob*), אֲרָם בֵּית רְחוֹב (LXX *Ῥοώβ*), in 2 S 10^{6-8}, was a small Aramæan or Syrian kingdom which supplied mercenaries to the sons of Ammon when fighting against Joab, King David's general. They took to flight before Joab, who re-entered Jerusalem in triumph. Rehob is said to be in the north of Palestine, in the region of Laish, or Dan (Jg 18^{28}).[2]

Aram Naharaim (*Nahor*), אֲרָם נַהֲרַיִם (LXX *εἰς τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν*), is identified by the LXX with Mesopotamia (Gn 24^{10}, Dt 23^{5}, Jg 3^{8}, 1 Ch 19^{6}), 'Syria of the two rivers.' This is a mistake. Naharaim means 'country of the river,' and corresponds to the Nârima of the Tel el-Amarna letters and to Nahrina in the Egyptian inscriptions; it extended along the two banks of the middle Euphrates.[3] At the time of the Khati the name Naharanna was given to the country lying between the Balikh and the Orontes.[4]

Paddan Aram (*Padan-aram*), פַּדַּן אֲרָם (LXX *ἐκ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας Συρίας*), in Gn 25^{20} $28^{2.5-7}$ 31^{18} 33^{18} 35^{9} etc. This term, 'field of Aram (?),' perhaps refers to northern Mesopotamia.[5]

2. Damascus.—*Aram Dameśeḳ*, אֲרָם דַּמֶּשֶׂק (LXX *Συρία Δαμασκοῦ*), in 2 S $8^{5f.}$, 1 Ch $18^{5f.}$, is Syria of Damascus, which came to the help of Hadadezer, king of Zobah; David slew 22,000 Syrians and put garrisons in Syria of Damascus (Syria-Damascus).

In the course of time Syria (Aram) comprised numerous divisions, the chief of which, besides those mentioned above from the Bible, were: Batania, or country of Bashan, Commagene with its capital Samosata, Cyrrhestice with Cyrrhus as capital, Chalybonitis with its capital Chalybon (Halep = Alep), Coele-Syria with Heliopolis (Baalbek) as capital, Seleucide, or Tetrapolis, with Seleucia, Antioch, Laodicea, and Apamea as principal towns, Chalcidice with its capital Chalcis (Kinnesrin), etc. In many cases we have not enough information about these divisions to treat them separately. The best plan will be to give a résumé of the details supplied by history, inscriptions, and other documents, grouping them round Damascus and the Damascene.

The god who received most worship was Hadad, whose consort was 'the Syrian goddess,' or Atargatis. This god was also called Ramân or Rammân. These two names appear as early as 3000 B.C. in the cuneiforms. This deity does not appear in Phœnician texts. Hadad is represented in the same way in Syria and Mesopotamia. He is the god of lightning and thunder; he shakes the mountains; he is beneficent when he sends the rain which fructifies the earth; he is the destroyer when he sends floods and inundations. According to the inscriptions of Senjirli, Hadad was the first of the gods of northern Syria in the 8th cent. B.C. His chief sanctuary was at Hierapolis (Mabbog, Manbij), near the Euphrates. He was specially worshipped by the agricultural populations of Syria as the protector-god of the harvests. In time his cult became confused with that of the sun; his head was then ornamented with rays; this identification is particularly noticeable in Heliopolis (Baalbek), where the cult of Hadad and that of the sun are one and the same. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Optimus Maximus; he received various local denominations (Dolichenus, Hadaranes, Heliopolitanus), but he can always be recognized by the fact that he is represented with the bull or that he is mentioned along with his consort, the Syrian goddess Atargatis. A third personage is usually connected with these great gods, regarded as their son or their daughter. These three together form the triad known as the *dii syri*. They have sanctuaries in a great many Syrian towns—Rhosus, Raphaneæ on the Lebanon (in Græco-Roman times). But the principal sanctuary of the Syrian gods, after Hierapolis, was Damascus, and the Bible mentions kings of Syria in the 9th cent. B.C. with theophorous names, such as Ben-Hadad, Tabrimmôn. It is even possible that this cult of Hadad exercised a certain influence on some Israelite centres, which would explain the representation of Jahweh by a young bull. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Damascenus. In all probability Jupiter Heliopolitanus, the god of Heliopolis (Baalbek), should be identified with Hadad.

The consort of Hadad is Atargatis, the great Syrian goddess—also under the names Allât and Venus—who must not be confused with Astarte, the Phœnician goddess. Coins of Hierapolis call her 'Ate or 'Atar'ate. She was represented with her head surrounded with rays. The symbol of Atargatis was composed of the crescent moon in conjunction with the solar disk.

Besides the divine couple, Hadad and Atargatis, the Syrian pantheon included other deities, of secondary rank, several of whom had a purely local character.

Reshef, or Rashuf, was the incarnation of thunder and lightning. He was often represented as a soldier armed with spear, mace, bow, and shield; he carried on his helmet a gazelle's head surmounted by two sharp horns. Reshef is also met with in Phœnicia and in Cyprus. He was in later times identified with Apollo. Some scholars regard him as a Phœnician rather than a Syrian deity.

The inscriptions also mention Rekub-El, 'the charioteer of El,' who is probably an importation into Syria of the charioteer of the sun-god of the Assyrians. El was an important deity, but did not occupy the first rank in the Syrian pantheon.

Bel was worshipped in Syria, as in Assyria and among the other Semitic races.

Alongside of sun-worship the Syrians devoted a very special cult to the moon-god. Of two

[1] Cf. Nöldeke, 'Die Namen der aram. Nation und Sprache,' in *ZDMG* xxv. [1871] 113 ff.

[2] Cf. F. de Saulcy, *Dict. topog. abrégé de la Terre Sainte*, Paris, 1877, p. 260.

[3] Cf. *La Bible du centenaire*, Paris, 1916, p. 28.

[4] Cf. G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, ii.

[5] Cf. *La Bible du centenaire*, p. 32

Neirāb inscriptions (6th cent. B.C.) one mentions Sahar, Shamash, Nikkal, and Nusk, the other omits Shamash, 'the sun,' and mentions only Sahar, Nikkal, and Nusk. Sahar, the moon-god, was the chief deity of Harrān. His wife, Nikkal, corresponds to Nin-gal, 'the great lady,' wife of Sin, the Assyrian moon-god. Their son, Nusk (Nusku in Assyrian), represents fire, according to some scholars, and, according to others, he personifies the crescent moon.[1]

The stele of Teima (an oasis in the north of Arabia) names three Aramæan deities: 'Ṣalm, Singalla, and Ashira, gods of Teima.' Lagrange[2] proposes to identify Ṣalm with Salmu, the 'dark,' the dark planet, *i.e.* Saturn. According to other writers, the word *ṣalm*, 'image,' 'statue,' means the idol of the local god (*ba'al*) of Teima; Singalla is of Assyrian importation and denotes the great Sin; Ashira corresponds to the Asherah of the Canaanites.

An inscription recently discovered by Pognon in the region of Aleppo, but probably the oldest Syrian inscription, mentions not only Zakir, king of Hamath, and La'ash, but also a new deity, the god Alur (800 B.C.). He is probably a local god, the *genius loci* of Hazrak, for in the continuation of the text the important part is ascribed not to Alur but to Ba'al Shamain.

Of the three Senjirli inscriptions that of Hadad, the oldest, mentions the gods Hadad, El, Reshef, Rekub-El, Shamash, who accorded to Panammu what he asked of them. Lagrange[3] calls attention to the fact that no goddess figures in this list. The second inscription, called that of Panammu, dates from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III. (754–727 B.C.) and mentions the gods Hadad, El, Rekub-El, Shamash, and all the gods of Jadi. The third one, called that of Barrekub, dates from the same period, but does not mention any deity, except that Barrekub declares that, on account of his loyalty, his lord Rekub-El and his lord Tiglath-Pileser have placed him on his father's throne.

When Zenobia was taken captive to Rome, the cult of the Syrian gods penetrated to the great city with her (or before her). This fact is now duly established by the discovery of a sanctuary to Janicula in the gardens of the Sciarra villa. There we read inscriptions dedicated to the Syrian god Adad (Hadad) of Lebanon on a small white marble altar. There is also an inscription dedicated 'diis syris' at Spalato.[4]

Literature.—Lucian, *de Dea syria*; C. Clermont-Ganneau, *Études d'archéologie orientale*, vol. i. in 2 pts., Paris, 1880–95, *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, do. i. [1888], v. [1902] (the remainder in course of publication); G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, do. 1895–99, ii.; W. M. Ramsay, art. 'Hierapolis,' in *HDB* ii. 379 f.; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905, *passim*, and pp. 491–510 for the inscriptions in Aramæan dialects; F. Cumont, *Les Cultes d'Asie Mineure dans le paganisme romain*, do. 1906, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, do. 1906; R. Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., do. 1903–05, and artt. 'Hadad' and 'Heliopolitanus,' in Pauly-Wissowa; P. Gauckler, 'Le Bois sacré de la nymphe Furrina et le sanctuaire des dieux syriens, au Janicule, à Rome,' in *CAIBL*, Mar. 1907, pp. 135–159; H. Pognon, *Inscriptions sémitiques de la Syrie, de la Mésopotamie, et de la région de Mossoul*, Paris, 1908; R. Dussaud, 'Le Royaume de Hamat et de Lou' ouch au viii^e siècle avant J.-C.,' in *RA* i. [1908] 222–235; R. Savignac, review of Pognon's work in *RB*, 1908, pp. 596–600; A. Legendre, art. 'Syrie,' in *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, ed. F. Vigouroux, Paris, 1891–1912, v. 1930–48; H. A. Strong and J. Garstang, *The Syrian Goddess*, London, 1913 (cf. R. Dussaud, in *RHR* i. [1913] 387 f.).

3. The Nabatæans.—According to some scholars, the Nabatæans were Arabs who used Aramæan as their literary language; according to others, on the contrary, they were pure Aramæans who in the course of their migrations mingled on the one side with the southern populations of Arabia, while to the north they became masters of Trans-Jordan as far as Damascus. The oldest Nabatæan inscriptions (1st cent. B.C.) contain no Arabisms; afterwards, at the beginning of the 1st cent. of our era, Arab influence makes itself clearly felt, especially in the regions of Ḥegrā and Medain Sāleh.

The Nabatæan sources now in our possession are inscriptions, which are published in the second part of *CIS*, and coins, which have been studied most recently by R. Dussaud and have revealed an almost unbroken succession of kings, from Obedas I. (90 B.C.) to Malichus III. (A.D. 106). But before these dates a Nabatæan race was known which in 312 B.C. was powerful enough to gain the victory against Antigonus. After this victory the Nabatæans, an essentially trading people, occupied the north of Arabia, the country of Edom, and the Damascene. F. H. Vincent has gathered together all that is known about the pantheon of the Nabatæans; they honoured the sun, to whom they built an altar on their houses, and to whom they offered libations and burned incense. The following are the principal deities. Dūshara (Dusarēs) seemed to occupy the first rank and to be the god of the king. Then came Allāt (fem. of Allah) and Manūthu or Manavat. The god Hobal belonged originally to Syria. Mutaba and Harisa are almost unknown. Qaysa was perhaps the ancient national god of the Edomites. The names of the goddesses Vagrah and Tada are from a doubtful reading as well as those of Nashbu and Elgē. The Syrian god Ba'al Shamin was also adopted by the Nabatæans. The Nabatæans erected temples to their gods. The temple comprised a small building to contain the statue of the god, a sacred enclosure (*ḥaram*), votive stelæ, and niches for the icons.

Whether the Nabatæans were strongly Aramaized Arabs or real Aramæans, they gave a very large place in their pantheon to the deities and cult-objects of Aramæan or Syrian origin. See, further, art. NABATÆANS.

Literature.—M. de Vogüé, *Inscriptions sémitiques publiées*, Paris, 1869–77, 'Textes nabatéens,' pp. 100–124; C. Clermont-Ganneau, 'Les Noms royaux nabatéens employés comme noms divins,' in *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, i. [1888] 39, 'Le Cippe nabatéen de D'meir et l'introduction en Syrie du calendrier romain combiné avec l'ère des Séleucides,' *ib.* 48, 'La Statue du dieu Obodas roi de Nabatène,' *ib.* ii. [1898] 366, 'Les nouvelles Inscriptions nabatéennes de Pétra,' *ib.* 370, 'Manboug-Hierapolis dans les inscriptions nabatéennes,' *ib.* iv. [1900] 99, 'Le Dieu nabatéen Chaï 'al-Qaum,' *ib.* 382; F. H. Vincent, 'Les Nabatéens' in *RB*, 1898, pp. 567–588; R. Dussaud and F. Macler, *Voyage archéologique au Safā et dans le Djebel ed-Drūz*, Paris, 1901; R. Dussaud (in collaboration with F. Macler), *Mission dans les régions désertiques de la Syrie moyenne*, Paris, 1903 (=extract from vol. x. of *Nouvelles Archives des missions scientifiques*); E. Littmann, *Semitic Inscriptions* (*Publications of an American Archæological Expedition to Syria in 1899–1900*, iv.), New York, 1904; R. Dussaud, 'Numismatique des rois de Nabatène,' in *JA* i. [1904] 189, *Monnaies nabatéennes* (=extract from *RN*, 1905, p. 170); M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905; G. Dalman, *Petra und seine Felsheiligtümer*, Leipzig, 1908, *Neue Petra Forschungen und der heilige Felsen von Jerusalem*, do. 1912; J. B. Chabot, *Les Langues et les littératures araméennes*, Paris, 1910, pp. 21–23; A. J. Jaussen and R. Savignac, *Mission archéologique en Arabie* (*mars–mai 1907*), i., 'De Jérusalem au Hedjaz Medain-Saleh' (*Publications de la Société des fouilles archéologiques*, ii.), Paris, 1909 (see review by R. Dussaud in *Journal des Savants*, Oct. 1910, pp. 460–474, entitled 'Les Ruines de Hégra'); R. Dussaud, art. 'Pétra' in *La grande Encyclopédie*, Paris, n.d., p. 531 f. ('son importance [de Pétra] nous est surtout connue à l'époque gréco-romaine. Elle est alors la capitale des Nabatéens. . . . Les Nabatéens sont des Arabes. La langue de leurs inscriptions est araméenne, ce qui prouve simplement la diffusion de l'araméen à l'époque gréco-romaine. L'ancien idiome arabe s'est conservé dans les noms propres'); *CIS*, pt. ii. (vol. i. 1 [1893], 2 [1902], 'Inscriptiones nabateæ,' no. 157–489, vol. ii. 1 [1907], no. 1472 f.).

4. The Palmyrenes.—See art. PALMYRENES.

Literature.—In addition to the Literature appended to art. PALMYRENES, see L. Double, *Les Césars de Palmyre*, Paris, 1877; L. G. Deville, *Palmyre: souvenirs de voyage et d'histoire*, do. 1894; R. Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., do. 1903–05; J. B. Chabot, *Les Langues et les littératures araméennes*, do. 1910, pp. 19–21; *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique* (published by the commission of the *CIS*), do. 1900 ff.

[1] Clermont-Ganneau, *Études d'archéologie orientale*, ii. 182 f.; Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*, pp. 499–501.
[2] Pp. 501–504. [3] P. 494. [4] *CIL* iii. 1961.

5. Syrian cult.—In their pantheon, as in their religious practices, the Aramæans had naturally very close relations with the Assyro-Babylonian cults on the one hand and with those of Phœnicia and Canaan on the other. They practised the local agrarian cults, in conjunction with the worship of sun, moon, and stars, preferably on high mountains or sharp mountain-peaks, regarded as the abode of the gods. They worshipped sacred trees (the tree of life) and plants. They also rendered worship to sacred springs, and Palmyra possessed a specially consecrated river, whose Tyche was venerated. Certain sacred rivers had miraculous powers: if the offering sank to the bottom of the water, it was approved by the deity; if it floated, it was not approved.

As among the rest of the Semites, sacred enclosures have been found among the Aramæans, known as *ḥaram*, and much used among the Arabs. The boundaries of the *ḥaram* were fixed by stelæ, several of which have been recovered during the course of excavation.

We have little information concerning the after life among the Semites in general, and the Aramæans in particular. Like the ancient Hebrews, they probably had Sheol, the kingdom of the dead. From the Senjirli and Neirāb inscriptions, which are very important funerary texts, we learn that the Aramæans believed that a part of the dead person survived, called *nephesh*, 'soul.' It was a material principle, to which they had to offer food and drink.

Among the most venerated objects of worship we must mention the sacred stones, or bætyls, which assumed various aspects. The presence of the god was materialized by a stone placed in the sacred enclosure. The inscription of Hadad shows that the Aramæans worshipped the *neṣib*, a hewn stone or statue. A Palmyrenian inscription shows among the Aramæans the use of the *maṣṣēbāh* (*q.v.*), in the sense of 'stele.' And they distinguished between the funerary stele, *nafsha*, 'soul,' of pyramidal form, and the votive stele, or *mesjida* (whence our word 'mosque,' through Arabic), which meant the place in which the deity was worshipped.

As regards the personnel of the cult, we hear of the priest, *komer*, attached to the service of such-and-such a god. It was he who offered the holocaust. Barbers played an important part, both in performing the ritual incisions and in shaving the heads of those who dedicated their hair to the deity in consequence of a vow. There were also scribes, charged more especially with keeping the accounts of the temple. Sacred prostitutes were not lacking in the Aramæan cults; and lastly we must mention the familiars of the temple, who rendered services to the faithful who came to worship or make vows, and who lived in the surroundings of the temple, finding their food in the remains of the meals offered to the gods.

6. Calendar.—The Aramæan calendar is fairly well known; the Nabatæans and Palmyrenians employed the Seleucid era, and for a very long time the Syrians made their year begin in autumn. The names of the months of the Palmyrenians are all known: Tishri, Kanun, Kslul, Ṭbṭ, Shbṭ, Adar, Nisan, Ir, Sion, Qinian Ab, Elul. Those of the Nabatæans are the same, except the second and tenth, which are not known. This information refers to the Aramæans in Roman times. The ancient names of the months have not yet been brought to light by the oldest inscriptions (Senjirli and Neirāb).

LITERATURE.—**Ph. Berger**, *Les Inscriptions sémitiques et l'histoire* (a lecture delivered at the Sorbonne), Paris, 1883, (=extract from *Bulletin de l'Association scientifique*, 155); *CIS* I. i. [1889], ii. [1893], iii. [1902], II. i. [1907]; **Ph. Berger**, *La Bible et les inscriptions*, Paris, 1890; **R. Duval**, *Les Littératures araméennes*, do. 1895; **G. Maspero**, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, do. 1895-99, ii.; **A. H. Sayce**, arts. 'Aram, Aramæans,' in *HDB* i. 133 f.; **T. Nöldeke**, artt. 'Aram' and 'Aramaic Language,' in *EBi* i. 276-288; *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique*, ed. by the commission of *CIS* i. (Paris, 1900-05), ii. pt. i. [1907], pt. ii. [1908], pt. iii. [1912], *s.v.* 'Araméen,' 'Nabatéen,' 'Palmyrénien'; **R. Dussaud**, 'Les premiers Renseignements historiques sur la Syrie' (=extract from the *Revue de l'École d'anthropologie de Paris*, July, 1902, pp. 252-264), *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., Paris, 1903-05; **M. J. Lagrange**, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], do. 1905; **A. Lods**, *La Croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiquité israélite*, 2 vols., do. 1906; **R. Dussaud**, 'Un Monument du culte syrien et d'épo que perse,' in *RHR* ii. [1913] 62-68, art. 'Syrie,' in *La grande Encyclopédie*, do. n.d., xxx. 798 f.

FRÉDÉRIC MACLER.

SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.—1. Scope of this article.

—Much confusion has arisen from the fact that several different bodies of Christians—Jacobite, Maronite, Nestorian, Malabarese, and others—habitually call themselves 'Syrians,' as well as from the fact that the word 'Syria' itself has meant different things at different times. It will therefore be well at the outset to define the scope of this article.

The East Syrians or Nestorians call themselves 'Sūrāyé,' said to be a corrupt form of 'Sūryāyé.'[1] The Syrian Jacobites are in the Syriac vernacular commonly called 'Siryāné,' by way of distinction (or better 'Sūryāné' or 'Seweryāné').[2]

The name 'Syria' (Syr. Sūriyā, Gr. Συρία or Σούρ, 'e locis Palestinæ maritimis')[3] has been derived from 'Tyre' (Syr. Ṣūr), though it is spelt with a different *ṣ*. It varied in meaning from time to time. In Roman days, at the beginning of our era, it denoted the country west of the Euphrates and north of the Arabian desert, including Palestine and Palmyra, and extending north to the Taurus; though the Roman procurators or the Herods ruled all or part of Palestine, being more or less independent of the governors of the Roman province of Syria. At a later date 'Inner Syria' meant Palestine (and the coast lands to the north thereof), and 'Outer Syria' meant Mesopotamia.[4] The modern Turkish *vilayet* of Syria is only a fraction of the old Roman province, and lies east of the Lebanon, extending from Hama on the Orontes in the north to the Hedjaz in the south, Damascus being the capital, while the *vilayet* of Beirut is west of the Lebanon, and the old Judæa in an independent *sanjak* under a *muteserif*.[5] Thus the term 'Syrian Christians' has little relation to the term 'inhabitants of Syria.' The most comprehensive definition of the former is 'those Christians who use or have used the Syriac language in their liturgical services or as a vernacular.' It thus includes the Jacobites of Mesopotamia, the Nestorians, the Maronites of the Lebanon, the Syrian and Chaldæan Uniats, and the Christians of St. Thomas in Malabar.

The history of many of these Christians has usually been considered in Europe only as far as it affects their relations with certain heresies, *i.e.* only from one episode (however important) of their annals. These doctrinal questions have already been dealt with in artt. MONOTHELETISM, MONOPHYSITISM, and NESTORIANISM, and will therefore not be referred to in this article except incidentally, and when they are necessary to explain the history or customs of the Syrian Christians.

2. Syriac-speaking Christians.—Syriac is a branch of the Aramaic family of languages. The written or classical Syriac—the Syriac of the liturgies and patristic literature—was the language spoken at Edessa, and was not very distant (though differing somewhat in grammar and vocabulary) from the Aramaic of Palmyra and that of Palestine (the Biblical Aramaic of the OT, or 'Chaldee,' as it used to be called), perhaps not more distant

[1] R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, ii. 2585.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 2586. [3] *Ib.* ii. 2585. [4] *Ib.*
[5] *The Geographical Journal*, l. [1917] 13.

than some dialects of 'English' now current in the British Isles are from one another. The Edessa Syriac was the medium of commerce in the valley of the Euphrates, and was used far and wide for literary purposes. But, though this was, and is, the written language, other dialects of Syriac were spoken vernacularly throughout a very wide district, from the Mediterranean to the eastern limits of Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Adiabene (east of the Tigris), and southwards to the borders of Egypt and Arabia.[1] There were many Syriac-speaking monks in Egypt in the 4th cent. and later.[2] Even the Armenian Christians used Syriac till the 4th century.[3] Thus there were many Syriac dialects. They were not the lineal descendants of classical Syriac, but were rather in the position of sisters or nieces of that language.[4]

Syriac gradually gave way, vernacularly and to some extent liturgically, to Arabic after the Muhammadan conquest, though it has had locally a considerable influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of the Arabic which supplanted it.[5] The only Christians who now speak it habitually are the East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldæan), among whom it is practically the only language used (though many of the Moṣul Uniats also speak Arabic), the Jacobites of Jebel Tūr, and the people of Ma'lūlā near Damascus. The other Jacobites and the Maronites now ordinarily use Arabic for their vernacular. The Malabarese have probably never used Syriac vernacularly—unless the immigrants from Persia used it for a while (see below, § 9)—but have always spoken an Indian dialect. It may be noted that many Jews in E. Turkey and Persia have a vernacular closely akin to the spoken Syriac of the Nestorians; and the language of the Mandæans (*q.v.*), or so-called 'Christians of St. John,' if they still exist, is another branch of Aramaic. In the early ages of Christianity the literary language of Syria proper was Greek (see below, § 3), but Syriac was the popular language there till after A.D. 500. It should be remembered that Antioch itself was a Greek, not a Syriac, centre. The city was predominantly Greek, though Syriac was the language of numerous monks in it and its neighbourhood, and of the country people.[6]

All the above-mentioned Christians use classical Syriac as their liturgical language; and many of them use it still as their literary language, as all did till the Middle Ages. It will thus be seen that the prayers in the Church services are only imperfectly, if at all, understood by the majority of the worshippers. In Syria proper, however, many of the prayers are said in an Arabic translation, so as to be intelligible to the people; they are then written in Syriac characters, and this combination of Syriac and Arabic is called Carshuni (Syr. *garshūnī*).[7] But those services which are the bishop's own—*e.g.*, ordination—are in Syriac only, as are all the prayers which are said inaudibly by the priest.

The vernaculars differ from classical Syriac in different degrees. The East Syrian vernacular dialects, which vary a good deal among themselves, differ from it perhaps as much as Italian from Latin, while the Ma'lula dialect has retained more of the older grammar and is less analytically developed.[8] This last vernacular is particularly noticeable as being preserved by those who are so far isolated from other Syriac-speaking Christians. Ma'lula (called Seleucia by the Turks) is a village of some 1000 inhabitants, situated on a high plateau about 5000 ft. above sea-level, north-east of Damascus; while two neighbouring villages, though most of their inhabitants have become Musalmāns within the last 250 years, also speak Syriac vernacularly. Ma'lula consists ecclesiastically of two divisions; half are of the Uniat Melkite rite (see below, § 6), half of the Greek Orthodox rite. Each division has an ancient monastery.[1] The local tradition is that the inhabitants are immigrants from the east, from the district of Singar or Sinjar (west of Moṣul), which is now largely inhabited by Yezīdīs, or so-called 'devil-worshippers'; but this tradition is of very doubtful value.[2]

Of all the Syrian Christians, whether they have lost their own vernacular or have retained it, it may be noted that their clergy are supposed all to be able to read and write and understand classical Syriac; and most of them can do so, and can even, with some difficulty, speak it. But this is now only as a foreign language.

There are some differences of pronunciation. The East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldæan) say *ā* when the West Syrians (Jacobite) and the Maronites say *ō* (*e.g.*, *malkā*, *malkō*, 'a king'), the former being the older sound, preserved to us in transliterations like Talitha (Syr. *ṭlithā*), Maranatha (Syr. Māran ethā or possibly Mārānā thā). The East Syrians hardly ever aspirate *p* (except when it is used to form a diphthong), and many of them never aspirate *t* or *d*; almost all of them pronounce the vowels Rbhāṣā (Rwāṣā) and Rwāḥā alike as *ū*, the *ō* sound being produced only by a combination of the vowel Zqāpā (Zqapha) with *w* or aspirated *b* or *p*. One point with regard to transliteration of Syriac words into Roman characters must be mentioned. European Orientalists usually write twice a medial consonant in certain verbal formations and in words derived from them, because it is said to be 'virtually doubled' (*e.g.*, 'Addai' for 'Adai'). The Syrians themselves, however, dislike doubled letters, and in their vernacular admit them only in a few (chiefly foreign) words, and in that case they pronounce each letter distinctly, like the *d*'s in 'mid-day.' On the other hand, they sometimes compensate for not doubling a medial consonant by converting a preceding short *a* into a long one. Most of them pronounce aspirated Kaph (*kh*) and Ḥeith (*ḥ*) alike.

3. Syrian Christianity in early times.—In considering the spread of Christianity in these regions before the theological controversies of the 5th cent. caused the divisions which exist to this day, we are faced with the difficulty that legends are the traditional groundwork of the religious history. It is not easy to estimate the amount of truth or falsehood that underlies the legends; but there is no doubt that all these regions were largely Christianized at an early period.

(*a*) *The Roman province of Syria.*—Here we are not troubled with legend. In the 1st cent. of our era the province extended to the Euphrates, and was conjoined with Cilicia.[3] Antioch was the civil metropolis, and was likewise the headquarters of Syrian Christianity; there the disciples were first called 'Christians' (Ac 11[26]). Greeks and Syrians were both represented at Antioch (see above, § 2). There is no evidence as to the extent to which the Church services were conducted in the Aramaic vernacular rather than in Greek; but probably, at a time when the worship was in the main extemporaneous, both languages were used. Though most of the people, perhaps, understood Greek, even if it was not their mother tongue, yet experience shows that the last sphere in which a vernacular gives way to the language of commerce and public life is that of religion. It is therefore probable that Syrian Christians in the Roman province to a large extent worshipped in their vernacular from apostolic times onwards. But Greek was the literary language. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch at the beginning of the 2nd cent., wrote in Greek (he calls himself 'bishop of Syria');[4] Lucian and Dorotheus, Diodorus, bishop of Tarsus, and Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia (both these of Antioch), Chrysostom, Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus—all of the 4th and 5th centuries—did

[1] M. Parisot, in *JA* xi. [1898] 240.
[2] J. B. Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, pt ii., *Ignatius and Polycarp*[2], London, 1889, i. 327.
[3] F. C. Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 19.
[4] T. Nöldeke, *Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache*, p. xxxv.
[5] Parisot, pp. 240, 246.
[6] Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 45.
[7] Payne Smith, i. 790.
[8] See Parisot's sketch of this dialect.

[1] Parisot, pp. 255-261. [2] *Ib.* p. 270.
[3] W. M. Ramsay, *A Historical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, London, 1899, p. 277; cf. Gal 1[21].
[4] τὸν ἐπίσκοπον Συρίας (*Rom.* 2; cf. 9, where he speaks of the 'church in Syria,' and God as its shepherd in his stead).

the same. The Antiochene school of theology was clearly a Greek school.[1] A trace of the mixture of the Greek and Syriac elements may be seen in the *Pilgrimage of 'Silvia'* (*'Etheria'*), a work probably of the end of the 4th cent., which describes the bishop of Jerusalem as knowing Syriac (*'siriste'*), but as always speaking Greek and having his sermons and the lections interpreted into Syriac by a presbyter who stood by.[2]

In the 4th cent., when the provincial organization of the Church was promoted, Antioch was one of the great centres, and its bishop was called a 'metropolitan'; the corresponding verb is found in canon 19 of the Council of Antioch *in encæniis* (A.D. 341), and the name itself in can. 6 of Nicæa (A.D. 325), which says that the rights formerly possessed by Antioch must be preserved to it. Thus Antioch had long exercised some sort of jurisdiction over neighbouring sees. Yet the *Apostolic Constitutions*, a Greek work written in Syria *c.* A.D. 375, does not mention metropolitans, any more than the other 'Church Orders' do.[3] This is important in connexion with the supposed dependence of Seleucia-Ctesiphon on Antioch, for which see below (*c*).

(*b*) *Edessa.*—This famous city of Mesopotamia, called in Syriac Ur-hai (now Urfa), was the capital of the kingdom of Osrhoëne (a Greek name derived from 'Ur-hai'). 'Edessa' was the Greek name for the city. The kingdom was independent till A.D. 216, when it was incorporated in the Roman empire. According to the well-known legend of Abgar and Addai, Edessa was Christianized in the middle of the 1st cent.; the legend is given in full in the *Doctrine of Addai* (see below, § 4), and in a shorter, and perhaps more original, form by Eusebius,[4] who says that his account was translated from the Syriac. Edessa is represented as a heathen city, which worshipped (the *Doctrine* tells us) Bel and Nebo,[5] though Burkitt suggests that these names come from a perusal of the OT and not from any real historical reminiscence.[6] Abgar,[7] the heathen king or toparch of Edessa, sends messengers to our Lord, and a correspondence ensues; after the Ascension the apostle 'Judas Thomas' sends Addai (called by Eusebius Thaddæus, and said to be one of the Seventy) to Abgar to teach him the faith.[8] Addai does many mighty deeds; one of his converts was Aggai, who 'made the silks and headbands of the king,' and he was made bishop[9] by Addai as his successor. Addai died a natural death at Edessa, but Aggai was afterwards martyred by the son of Abgar; and, as he could not consecrate his successor Palūṭ by reason of his sudden death, the latter was sent to Antioch and was ordained by Serapion the bishop. Narsai, king of Assyria, sent messengers to King Abgar to learn about all these matters. Such is the legend. As we have it, it is of the 4th cent., though clearly based on one that is a good deal older; R. A. Lipsius[10] concludes that the extant correspondence between our Lord and Abgar was manufactured *c.* A.D. 200. What is the substratum of truth in all this it is not easy to say. The mention of Serapion (bishop of Antioch, A.D. 190–210) gives us a date for Palūṭ, and Lipsius[11] regards the latter as the first historical bishop of Edessa. But there is no need to dismiss Addai entirely to the realms of myth. If the Edessenes were casting about for an early founder of their Church, they would be much more likely to fix on the great apostle 'Judas Thomas,' whose tomb was claimed for Edessa in the middle of the 3rd cent. (see below, § 9), than on the unknown Addai. It seems to be likely, therefore, that Addai (probably a Palestinian Jew) was the first preacher of the gospel at Edessa, perhaps early in, or about the middle of, the 2nd century. The real Abgar who favoured Christianity may have been Abgar IX., the last independent king of Edessa. Burkitt[1] suggests that the consecration of Palūṭ by Serapion of Antioch represents a movement for closer union with 'Western' (Greek) Christianity, and perhaps means a break in the episcopal succession.

In the 2nd cent. **Bardaiṣān** (Bardesanes) was born at Edessa (A.D. 155–223?);[2] he is reckoned as a Syrian Gnostic (though this is doubtful), and was a most learned man, a great hymn-writer,[3] and author of a polemic against Marcion. All his works have perished except the extant Syriac treatise *de Fato*, which is usually thought to be his; Eusebius[4] tells us that he wrote a book with that title. Burkitt[5] assigns the *de Fato* (which is called in the MS the *Book of the Laws of Countries*) to Bardaiṣān's disciple, Philip, on the strength of the work itself; but many think that the insertion of 'Philip' (a very unusual Syriac name) is only a literary device, and that Bardaiṣān himself is the real author. He certainly is the chief speaker in the dialogue, which is between a Christian and a heathen, and turns largely on the question why God allowed man to sin. Eusebius[6] and Epiphanius[7] say that Bardaiṣān was originally a follower of Valentinus, and Epiphanius makes him always a Valentinian. The fullest biography of this erratic writer is by Michael the Syrian, Jacobite patriarch of Antioch (1166–99), but his details cannot be entirely trusted. The school of Bardaiṣān survived his death, and remained in opposition to the orthodox party; Rabbula is said to have converted the remnants of it.[8]

One of the most famous of the Edessenes was **Ephraim** (Ephrem) **the Syrian** (born *c.* 308, †373). He came from Nisibis[9] to Edessa and founded or reorganized a seminary there, which became the great university of the East, though for a while after his death it fell under Arian influences. He was a deacon only, said to have been ordained by Basil of the Cappadocian Cæsarea, and to have declined advancement;[10] his own statement, that he had 'the talent of the priesthood,'[11] does not contradict this, for in Syriac 'priesthood' (*kāhnūthā*) includes all orders of the ministry. He was a most diffuse writer, and achieved a great fame in posterity.[12]

In the 5th cent. the most famous Edessenes were two of the bishops of Edessa. **Rabbūlā** (bishop from 411 to 435) was the son of a heathen priest and of a Christian mother. He was converted

1 See art. ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY, vol. i. p. 584 ff.
2 vii. 5.
3 A. J. Maclean, *The Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 72 *f.*
4 *HE* i. 13.
5 So also the *Acts of Sharbil*, for which see below, § 4.
6 *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 17; cf. Is 46[1].
7 Most of the independent kings of Edessa were called either Abgar or Ma'nu.
8 In the Ethiopic *Preaching of Judas Thaddæus in Syria* Thaddæus is associated with St. Peter, not with St. Thomas (E. A. W. Budge, *The Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1899–1901, text and Eng. tr., ii. 357).
9 'Guide and ruler'; so also the *Edessene Canons* (see below, § 4) call the bishop, can. 17 and (?) 24.
10 *DCB* iv. 881. 11 *Ib.* iv. 876.

1 *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 28 ff.
2 See F. J. A. Hort, in *DCB* i. 250 ff., for the date.
3 See art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian).
4 *HE* iv. 30.
5 *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 14.
6 *Loc. cit.* 7 *Hær.* lvi.
8 Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 189.
9 As appears both from the Syriac (Nṣibhin, pron. Nṣiwin) and from the Greek, the middle ṣ is long, contrary to the ordinary pronunciation. The word forms the end of a Greek hexameter in the epitaph of Abercius; see the restoration in Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*[2], i. 496. Burkitt has pointed out to the present writer that the pronunciation with short ṣ perhaps comes from the Armenian form of the name, 'Mtsbin.'
10 Sozomen, *HE* iii. 16. 11 *DCB* ii. 138 n.
12 For Ephraim see also Theodoret, *HE* iv. 26, and Jerome, *de Vir. illustr.* 115; for a very unfavourable view of his intellectual powers see Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 95 ff.

after he attained to manhood; and he became a great ascetic, and the friend of Cyril of Alexandria. At the end of his life he strenuously opposed Nestorius.[1] The other famous bishop was his successor, **Ibas** (bishop from 435 to 457), who was inclined to favour Nestorius (see below, § 8).

During all this period the Church seems to have made rapid progress. Eusebius[2] says that bishops from 'the whole of Syria and Mesopotamia' attended the dedication of Constantine's great church at Jerusalem in 335.

(*c*) *The Persian empire.*—A great deal of light has been thrown on early Syrian Christianity in Persia by the recent publication of the works of Nestorian writers. Formerly we had to rely mainly on the accounts of Jacobite authors like Bar Hebræus. The two sets of accounts correct one another and disprove more than one myth; and Neale's narrative in his *History of the Holy Eastern Church*[3] needs much correction in this respect.

One legend is a continuation of that of Abgar and Addai already mentioned. Mari, disciple of Addai, travelled from Edessa and evangelized 'Persia' (*i.e.* what became later the eastern part of Asiatic Turkey, as well as the modern Persia), penetrating as far as the province of Fars. Mari is not mentioned in the *Doctrine of Addai*, which, however, has a hint that Christianity extended from Edessa into Persia. Nor is Mari mentioned in the lately published and very valuable *History* of Mshîḥâ Zkhâ (lit. 'Christ has conquered'), of the 6th cent., which states that Addai was the apostle of Adiabene and Assyria (this apparently contradicts the *Doctrine*, which makes Addai live and die at Edessa), and that he ordained Pqîdhâ as first bishop there. The Nestorian *Sûnhâdhûs*, or Book of Canon Law,[4] names as the 'converters' of that region Thomas 'of the Indians and Chinese' (*Sînâyê*), 'Bartholomew, that is Nathanael, of the Aramæans, Addai of the Seventy, the teacher of Aggai, and Mari of Mesopotamia and of all Persia.'[5] This is all clearly mythical, but is there any truth underlying the legend? Some consider that there was no Christianity, or at least no organization of Christianity, east of the Tigris before the Sasanid empire was established by a revolution, A.D. 225. This is perhaps going rather too far. If there was nothing before the third decade of the 3rd cent. to build upon, it is unlikely that so early a writer as Mshîḥa Zkha could have given us such details; he could not have invented Pqîdhâ out of nothing. It is quite probable that there were Christians in Assyria in the 2nd cent., for Tatian,[6] the disciple of Justin Martyr, tells us that he was born 'in the land of the Assyrians.' This must be discounted by the fact that he probably wrote only in Greek, though many think that his *Diatessaron* (for which see below, § 4) was written in Syriac;[7] and that he may therefore have been of Greek parentage, and have been converted to Christianity when in the West. We learn from Epiphanius that he laboured in Syria and Mesopotamia.[8] In any case there was no bishop at Seleucia-Ctesiphon, the twin-capital of the Persian empire, situated on the Tigris below Baghdâd, till the end of the 3rd century. Papa is the first known bishop of that city; he was consecrated *c.* 280.

Another legend is much later, and professes to account for the existence of a patriarch at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. It is given by Bar Hebræus and other writers, and in the *Sûnhâdhûs*,[9] and is to the effect that two men went from Persia to Antioch to receive the episcopate in 190. According to the first writer, one of them was crucified as a Persian spy, as was Ṣlîbha (pron. Ṣlîwâ, lit. 'cross,' still a common name), the bishop of Antioch, while the other escaped to Jerusalem and was consecrated there, returning with a letter conferring the patriarchate on the Church in Persia. The *Sûnhâdhûs* does not name Ṣlîbha, but says that two patriarchs, 'one of the East and one of the West,'[10] were crucified on the doors of the church of Antioch, and it gives the pretended letter of the 'Western patriarchs' to the 'Easterns,' bestowing on the latter a patriarchate, and absolving them from the duty of sending their patriarchs to Antioch to be consecrated. The first patriarch, it says, was either Papa or Shaḥlûpâ—it does not profess to be certain.[11] This Shaḥlûpâ was probably the bishop of Adiabene, east of the Tigris and between the two Zabs, who was a contemporary of Papa. The letter of the 'Westerns' is a late forgery. The earlier writers, like Mshîḥa Zkha, know nothing of the story, despite the fact that that historian wrote the life of Aḥâ d'abhûh, the bishop who is said to have escaped. The whole is doubtless a fiction, and it is improbable that the Persian Christians ever depended for their bishops on Antioch, though they doubtless received their Christianity from Edessa, and Edessa possibly received it from Antioch. The idea of patriarchates, it need hardly be said, belongs to a much later time than these pretended events. The East Syrian ('Persian') metropolitanates were organized *c.* A.D. 410. There is no early evidence of Antioch exercising jurisdiction over the Church in Persia. When Papa was condemned by his brother bishops, he appealed, successfully, to Edessa, and perhaps to Nisibis.[1]

An important event for the Church occurred in A.D. 297, when five Persian provinces were ceded to the Roman emperor.[2] This strengthened the ecclesiastical ties between East and 'West.' The cession made Nisibis a Roman city. Its most famous bishop at that time was **James of Nisibis**, who was born there towards the end of the 3rd century. Ephraim was his disciple, and was baptized by him. James himself was a great author of Syriac works.[3]

It is remarkable that, though James was present at Nicæa in A.D. 325, the East Syrians knew nothing officially of that council till the Synod of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in A.D. 410, when they freely accepted the Nicene decrees and creed. To this day they use a rather peculiar version of the longer form, the so-called 'Constantinople' creed, which came into general use (see below, § 9). The Arian controversy did not touch them; and an illustration of this may be seen in the fact that Aphraates, whose Homilies (see below, § 4) are a continuous exposition of the Christian faith, does not mention Arianism at all, though he lived at a time when that heresy was prevalent in the 'West.'

The principal East Syrian bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon after Papa and before the Nestorian period were **Simeon Bar Sabâ'é** (martyred under Sapor II.), **Yahbh-alaha** I. (pron. Yâw-alâhâ), and **Dâdhîshû**. Of other bishops may be specially mentioned **Aphraates** (Aphrâhât), in the 4th cent., whose see was perhaps Mar Mattai, near Moṣul (see below, § 5), and **Mârûthâ** (early 5th cent.), bishop of Maipharqat or Martyropolis, north of Nisibis, author of the *Book of Martyrs* (see below, § 4). Mârûthâ often acted as adviser to the Persian king and as ambassador to the Roman emperor. The *Sûnhâdhûs*[4] mentions an earlier Mârûthâ, who was (it says) present at Nicæa, but it is probable that he did not exist, and that the statement is due to a confusion.

The period was marked by many personal quarrels,[5] a feature of later history also, and by the great persecution under King Sapor II. (†A.D. 379), which lasted some 40 years and resulted in many martyrdoms.[6] The Persian kings at one time favoured the Church and at another persecuted it. It is important to notice that even in the early days the political conditions tended, quite apart from theological considerations, to separate the East Syrians from the rest of Christendom. It was the policy of the Persian authorities when they tolerated Christianity to separate it as much as possible from that in the rival Roman empire. Another persecution, at the instigation of the Magians, whose religion was that of the State, broke out under King Bahram (Vararanes) V., *c.* A.D. 420. Theodoret[7] makes it arise under his predecessor Yazdegerd, though continued under Bahram, but Socrates[8] says more accurately that it arose after Yazdegerd's death.

The title of the bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, *c.* A.D. 400, was 'the Catholicos of the East,' and this is still preserved by their successors. The title 'Patriarch' was added a little later, at the Council of Dadhishu, held A.D. 424 at 'Markabta of the

1 For his Biblical work see below, § 4.
2 *Vit. Const.* iv. 43.
3 *Gen. Introd.* i. 139 ff.
4 This is here quoted in the MS form used by the Nestorians themselves. It is also incorporated in a larger collection given by Chabot (*Synodicon Orientale*).
5 ix. 1.
6 *To the Greeks*, 42.
7 E. Nestle, in *HDB* iv. 646.
8 *Hær.* xlvi. 1.
9 ix. 1, 5.
10 The 'West' means what we should call the 'Near East.'
11 For Papa see above.

1 W. A. Wigram, *Introd. to the Hist. of the Assyrian Church*, p. 53 f.
2 The provinces reverted to Persia in 352.
3 For notices of him see Theodoret, *HE* ii. 26, and Gennadius, *de Script. Eccles.* § 1 (continuation of Jerome's *de Vir. illustr.*).
4 i. 3, 5.
5 Wigram, ch. iii.
6 Sozomen, *HE* ii. 10 ff.
7 *HE* v. 38.
8 *HE* vii. 18.

Arabs.' This council firmly established the independence of the 'Eastern' patriarchate.

4. The Syriac Bible and early Syriac literature.—Before the doctrinal divisions of the 5th cent. there was a considerable activity in Syriac literature, all written in what we call 'classical Syriac' (see above, § 2). The Gospels were current in Syriac in five forms. (*a*) The four 'Gospels separate' (Syr. *Ewangeliyōn da-Mpharrshé*), now generally called the 'Old Syriac,' are known to us by two MSS: the Curetonian, discovered in Egypt in 1842, and ed. by Cureton in 1858; and the Sinaitic Syriac, a palimpsest discovered by Mrs. Gibson in the monastery of Mount Sinai in 1893. Both of these have the above Syriac title, which distinguishes them from the *Diatessaron* (see below). Both are perhaps of the 4th century. The Curetonian has the same type of text as the Sinaitic, but differs from it in many details.[1]

(*b*) The *Diatessaron* of Tatian (2nd cent.), sometimes called by the Syrians 'the Mixed [Gospels],'[2] is a harmony of the four Gospels, and is known to us through a commentary on it by Ephraim handed down in an Armenian translation, by quotations in Aphraates, and by an Arabic translation of the Harmony itself made in the 11th cent. by the Nestorian monk Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib.[3] The *Diatessaron* is mentioned in the *Doctrine of Addai*.

(*c*) The Pshīṭtā,[4] or 'simple' version, so called to distinguish it from the complicated recension of Thomas of Ḥarqel (see below), is the version still used by Syrian Christians. The name is first found in the 8th or 9th century. This version, which is now often called 'the Syriac Vulgate,' contains the whole Bible, OT and NT (including the OT Apocrypha), less 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and Revelation. Because of its universal acceptance, it may safely be assigned to a date before the divisions of the 5th century. The Gospels in this version have been critically edited by G. H. Gwilliam.[5] It appears that Tatian's Harmony was at one time in popular use among the Syrian Christians, but early in the 5th cent. Rabbūlā, bishop of Edessa (see above, § 3), and Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, were instrumental in its being abolished and destroyed in favour of the 'separate Gospels.' Burkitt's theory has been very generally accepted, viz. that the Pshīṭtā Gospels are a revision of the 'separate Gospels' made early in the 5th cent. under the direction of Rabbūlā; that the *Diatessaron* was written in Greek (but see above, § 3), probably at Rome, by Tatian, and translated into Syriac in his lifetime, *c.* A.D. 170; and that the 'separate Gospels' date from *c.* A.D. 200, the translator being familiar with the *Diatessaron*.[6] These views are combated by Gwilliam, who is inclined to assign a much earlier date to the Pshīṭtā Gospels;[7] he objects that Burkitt's theory is not adequately attested, does not explain the disappearance of the 'Old Syriac,' and does not account for the acceptance of the Pshīṭtā in the 5th cent. by Nestorians and Jacobites alike.[8] The fact that the East Syrians were not definitely Nestorian in Rabbūlā's time, or indeed for a long time after him (see below, § 8), appears to the present writer adequately to account for their being ready enough to accept such a version of the Gospels in place of the *Diatessaron*.

[1] For these two MSS see F. C. Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, Cambridge, 1904. For the date see Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 54, and *Evang.* ii. 13, 28.

[2] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 115. [3] *Ib.* ii. 4.

[4] Usually written in English Peshitta, Peshitto, or Peshito, but all these forms give the ordinary reader an erroneous idea of the pronunciation of the first syllable. Also the first *t* is pronounced quite differently from the second.

[5] *Tetraeuangelium Sanctum*, Oxford, 1901.

[6] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 5.

[7] *Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica*, v. [Oxford, 1903] 189 ff.

[8] On this last point see Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 162, and *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 59 ff.

(*d*) Recensions of the Pshīṭtā were made by **Philoxenus**, bishop of Mabug (Hierapolis, near the Euphrates), A.D. 508 (not now extant), and by **Thomas of Ḥarqel** ('Harklean' version), A.D. 616. Both of these writers were Monophysites, and it appears that the only dissatisfaction with the Pshīṭtā that made itself felt was among the Jacobites, and not among the Nestorians. But even among the Jacobites that version remained supreme.

Some characteristics of the Pshīṭtā may here be mentioned. Its MSS, unlike those of the Greek Bible in the 5th cent., all show practically the same text. Some of them are as old as the 5th cent., the oldest *c.* A.D. 450. One rather noticeable difference between the 'Old Syriac' and the Pshīṭtā Gospels occurs in the Lord's Prayer, where the former has 'our continual bread,' the latter 'the bread of our need.' Another difference is in the gender of 'Holy Spirit.' The noun 'spirit' being feminine in Syriac, the older writers make 'Holy Spirit' feminine also, and Aphraates speaks of the Holy Ghost as 'our mother,' just as the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* speaks of Him as our Lord's mother. But from the time of the Pshīṭtā onwards 'Holy Spirit' is made masculine by a grammatical revolution, though in Lk 4[1] and Jn 7[39] Psh there is a survival of the older usage, the feminine being retained.

Hitherto we have considered only the Gospels. There is no extant text of Acts or the Epistles older than the Pshīṭtā, but quotations in Aphraates and in Ephraim's *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, now extant only in an Armenian translation, are of some slight help.[1] In Aphraates and in the genuine works of Ephraim there is no clear reference to any of the Catholic Epistles. The *Doctrine of Addai* expressly confines the Scriptural canon to the Law and the Prophets, the Gospel, St. Paul's Epistles, and Acts. Thus the Pshīṭtā, admitting as it does the principal Catholic Epistles, shows an advance on the way to a fuller canon.[2] The Pshīṭtā OT was not revised by Rabbūlā, and is undoubtedly much older than his time, perhaps dating from the end of the 2nd century.[3] The translator had a good knowledge of Hebrew, though he was somewhat influenced by the Septuagint. Burkitt thinks that he must have been a Jew, and that he made his translation for the Jews, who had probably settled at Edessa before it became a Christian centre. The OT quotations of the *Acts of Judas Thomas*, the *Doctrine of Addai*, the *Edessene Canons*, Aphraates, Cyrillona, and the genuine works of Ephraim (for all these see below) agree largely with the Pshīṭtā, but their Gospel quotations do not do so, rather resembling the 'Old Syriac' and the *Diatessaron*. After Rabbūlā all the quotations but two agree with the Pshīṭtā, the 'Old Syriac' having thus almost entirely disappeared.[4] The 'Old Syriac' Gospels appear to be later than the Pshīṭtā OT, as the translator of the former, translating direct from the Greek, uses Hebrew proper names correctly transliterated from the Hebrew, as does the Pshīṭtā translator of the OT. The Old Syriac Gospel translator could hardly do this unless he had the correct forms of the proper names before him already in use.[5]

Of other early Syriac works, in addition to liturgies, some of which seem in their main features to have been written before the middle of the 5th cent., and in addition also to early Syriac translations of Greek books, the following may be mentioned. (1) *The Disputation with Manes*, by **Archelaus**, bishop of Kashkar in Mesopotamia (3rd cent.?), is now extant only in Greek fragments and in a Latin translation, but was originally written in Syriac. (2) The *Doctrine of Addai*,[6] already mentioned, is a work of the latter part, or, according to R. A. Lipsius,[7] of the beginning, of the 4th cent., giving the legend of Abgar (see above, § 3). (3) The voluminous works of **Ephraim** consist of commentaries, homilies, letters, and hymns.[8] At least one of his works, *On the Holy Spirit*, was translated into Greek before Jerome's time.[9] (4) **Aphraates**, the Persian martyr and sage, wrote his *Homilies* A.D. 337–345. Their theological attitude calls for some remark in view of their aloofness from Hellenistic influence. There is no special difference between him and 'Western' writers in the presentment of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and in Aphraates, as elsewhere, baptism is 'in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy

[1] Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 48.

[2] *Ib.* p. 59. [3] *Ib.* p. 70.

[4] *Ib.* pp. 54–56. [5] *Ib.* p. 73.

[6] Ed. G. Phillips, London, 1876. [7] *DCB* i. 31.

[8] For a list of the works attributed to him of which we have pre-Muhammadan MSS, see Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 118; but some works in later MSS may also be genuine.

[9] *de Vir. illustr.* § 115.

Ghost.' Man is a temple for God to dwell in.[1] But the doctrine of the sacraments must be noticed. The teaching about the eucharist, indeed, is more or less that of the Greek-speaking Christians. The body and blood of our Lord are received by the faithful. Fasting communion is enjoined, but special stress is laid on fasting from sin. Yet this seems to be only the complement and groundwork of the literal fasting. One passage,[2] however, is thought by Burkitt[3] to show that Aphraates considered baptism, and the sacramental system generally, to be only for ascetics, and not for the married laity. This conclusion has been much disputed. At least it is certain that Aphraates favoured the postponing of baptism till after marriage, just as Constantine postponed it till the end of his life. The same tinge of ultra-asceticism is seen here that appears in the *Acts of Judas Thomas* (see below and § 9). But there is no evidence that this was more than the private opinion of individuals, or that the original East Syrian Church as a whole considered full membership to be incompatible with anything but the ascetic life. (5) The Syriac *Doctrina Apostolorum* (or *Edessene Canons*) was written *c.* A.D. 350 and is a kind of 'Church Order.' As is the case with many books of that class, it puts injunctions into the mouth of the apostles, and it is of great interest as telling us of the customs of the Edessene Church in the 4th century. It makes Addai the apostle of Edessa, and Aggai, 'a maker of silks,' the apostle of Persia, Assyria, Armenia, Media, the countries round Babylon, the 'Huzites and the Gelae, as far as the borders of the Indians and as far as the land of Gog and Magog.' This shows that the East Syrians at a very early date were a missionary body. (6) The *Syriac Martyrology* may be dated *c.* A.D. 350. It is found in the MS (dated 411) mentioned below. It mentions Ḥabbīb the deacon, as well as Shamuna and Guria (on whom a metrical homily is extant), but not Aggai, Sharbil, or Barsamya (see below). (7) **Abba** (Abha, pron. Awā), the disciple of Ephraim, wrote a commentary on the Gospels, of which only a few fragments remain. (8) **Cyrillona** wrote his poems *c.* A.D. 396.[4] (9) The *Martyrdoms of Barsamya and of Ḥabbīb*, and (10) the *Acts* or *Hypomnemata of Sharbil*, are accounts of the deaths of three Edessene heroes.[5] (11) The *de Fato* of Bardaiṣān (?) has already been mentioned (§ 3). (12) **Mārūthā** (§ 3) wrote his *Book of Martyrs* early in the 5th cent. to commemorate those who suffered in Persia in the great persecution of Sapor II. (13) The *Life of Rabbūlā* (see above) was written shortly after his death, A.D. 435. (14) The *Acts of Judas Thomas* (the apostle) is a highly interesting religious novel, written by one who was of doubtful orthodoxy, but was perhaps a pioneer missionary in E. Mesopotamia in the 3rd cent., or possibly Bardaiṣan himself, or at any rate one of his school. The Syriac origin of this work is maintained by T. Nöldeke and F. C. Burkitt[6] and others.[7] The *Acts* contain the well-known *Hymn of the Soul*, for an English translation of which see Burkitt's *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 218 ff.; but the hymn is really an independent Syriac composition added to the *Acts*. These *Acts*, while unorthodox, are probably not Gnostic, being very different from the Greek *Acts of John*, which are thoroughly Gnostic. In the Syriac *Acts* there is no inner circle to whom alone the whole truth is taught.[1] (15) Syriac may be the original language of the Clementine story which has been reproduced in the *Clementine Homilies and Recognitions*. An earlier form of the story,[2] perhaps of the 3rd cent., has lately been discovered in Syriac.[3]

There are also several translations of Greek works into Syriac which were made before the great separation of Syrian Christians. Thus the works of Eusebius were so translated very shortly after his death; a MS of a Syriac version of the *Martyrs of Palestine* and the *Theophania* is extant, dated A.D. 411, and this is not the original autograph,[4] and another of the *Ecclesiastical History* is extant dated A.D. 462.[5] Pamphilus the martyr, Eusebius's teacher, had a society, *c.* A.D. 300, which translated Greek works into Syriac.[6] The Ignatian Epistles were translated into Syriac (the 'Curetonian Syriac Letters') at least in the 5th cent., and, if the six additional letters are not an integral part of this version, probably earlier.[7] It is noteworthy that Syrian Christians, by means of classical Syriac, made many Greek works, philosophical, scientific, and religious, known to the East. Some Greek works are known to us only in their Syriac dress; and even some works in Armenian come to us from the Greek through the Syriac. The principal era of Armenian translations from the Syriac was the 5th century.[8]

5. West Syrians or Jacobites.—We now proceed to consider the divisions of Syrian Christianity which resulted from the Christological controversies of the 5th century. It is not necessary here to repeat the accounts of those controversies which have already been given in this *Encyclopædia*; but we may discuss the general history and the customs of the different Syrian bodies which separated from one another and from the 'Western' Church of Constantinople and Rome.

The Syrian Monophysites may be considered first.[9] In Syria proper there was a constant contention between them and the Orthodox for more than a hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), and the patriarchs of Antioch were sometimes Orthodox and sometimes Monophysite. The most famous of the latter was **Severus**, who maintained possession of Antioch itself from A.D. 513 to 518; he was an author, and wrote in Greek. He was a great admirer and quoter of Ignatius's Epistles.[10] He was the leader of his party till his death *c.* A.D. 540, after which a double succession to the patriarchate was continuous; and it has been preserved to the present day. The final breach between Orthodox and Monophysites may be said to have occurred in the reign of Justin II., the successor of Justinian. He persecuted the Monophysites, and an account of these troubles may be read in the third book (the only part extant) of **John of Ephesus**, a contemporary. John was Monophysite bishop of Ephesus in the 6th cent., but he wrote in Syriac, and was the first Syriac historian. He was a native of Amida (Diarbekr). For **James of Sarug** († A.D. 521 or 522), who has been thought to have been a Monophysite (but this is very doubtful), and for other early Syrian poets, see art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian), § 1.

The Syrian Monophysites are called **Jacobites** from **Jacob Baradai** (Baradæus), or **Zanzalus**, a monk of a monastery near Edessa, who came to Constantinople *c.* A.D. 540 to plead the cause of Monophysitism. After remaining there fifteen

[1] *Hom.* xvii. [2] *Ib.* vii. 20.
[3] *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 51 f., and so the later *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 125 ff.
[4] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 150; Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*[2], i. 168.
[5] For a summary of these histories of Barsamya and Sharbil see Lightfoot *op. cit.* i. 66 f. Lightfoot remarks that they must not be taken as genuine history.
[6] *JThSt* i. [1899–1900] 280 ff., ii. [1900–01] 429, iii. [1901–02] 94, and *Evang.* ii. 101.
[7] For these *Acts* see further below, § 9.

[1] Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, pp. 76–79.
[2] Edited with translation by A. Mingana, *Some Early Judæo-Christian Documents*, Manchester, 1917.
[3] For most of the above works see W. Wright's *Short Hist. of Syriac Literature*; many of them appear in English in the 'Ante-Nicene Christian Library,' xx. [Edinburgh, 1871], though they cannot all claim to be ante-Nicene.
[4] *DCB* ii. 320. [5] *Ib.* p. 326.
[6] Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*[2], i. 327.
[7] *Ib.* p. 326. [8] *Ib.* p. 86 f.
[9] For the struggle between Monophysitism and orthodoxy after the Council of Chalcedon, and for the alternately favourable and unfavourable attitude of the Byzantine Court towards the latter, see art. MONOPHYSITISM. With the opponents of Chalcedon in Egypt and in Armenia we are not here concerned.
[10] Lightfoot, i. 178.

years, he was consecrated bishop by the imprisoned Monophysite bishops in the capital, and sent to Syria to organize his sect. He consecrated **Sergius** to succeed Severus at Antioch, and appointed **Paul the Black** to succeed Sergius. He is said to have ordained two patriarchs, 89 bishops, and an enormous number of clergy. He is often called bishop of Edessa, but Bar Hebræus[1] says that he was a bishop with no fixed see. John of Ephesus was his panegyrist. He died in 578, and after his death the Monophysites were driven from Antioch. The term 'Jacobites' was a nickname, given by the Orthodox; but the Jacobites themselves readily accepted it, tracing it, however erroneously, to the apostle James, to whom also they ascribe their principal liturgy. Their controversy with the Greeks, like the controversy of the East Syrians with the Greeks, was not only theological; it was largely tinged with national differences. Indeed both were to a considerable extent contests between Syriac thought and Hellenistic culture.

In the 7th cent. the Muhammadans conquered Palestine, Syria, and the East; and at first the new rulers favoured the Jacobites as the rivals of the Greeks. The principal writer of this period was **James** (Jacob) **of Edessa** (†708), who was a poet, commentator, and letter-writer, and a voluminous translator of Greek works into Syriac. To him, *e.g.*, we owe the knowledge of the 'Church Order' called the *Testament of our Lord*, a Greek work of c. A.D. 350, now extant only in Syriac.

The Jacobite patriarchs have continued to this day (at any rate from the 13th cent., or, according to Neale,[2] from the end of the 16th cent.) to style themselves 'of Antioch,' though they transferred their residence to various places—to Malatia on the Euphrates, to Amida, and finally (in the 12th cent.) to the monastery of Deir-el-Za'afaran (the 'saffron monastery') near Mardin, where they have been ever since.

Perhaps the most eminent Jacobite of all history was **Gregory Bar Hebræus, or Abulfaraj** (†1286), a man of Jewish parentage, who became a convert to Christianity and afterwards *maphrian* or metropolitan of Mosul, having formerly held other sees.[3] He wrote many works, and his *Chronicle* (which may be read in Assemani) is a valuable history. He seems to have been greatly esteemed even by his Nestorian opponents, who attended his funeral in large numbers; he died at Maragha (south of Tabriz), but was buried in the monastery of Mar Mattai on Jebel Maqlub (Syr. Elpeph), a day's ride north-east of Mosul, and his grave is still shown there. His *Chronicle* is, for his age, fairly trustworthy, but when he deals with Nestorian matters it should be compared with the writings of that body.

A less known Jacobite writer was **Dionysius Bar-ṣalibi** (Syr. ṣlibhi, pron. ṣliwi), also called James, metropolitan of Amida, a theologian and commentator, probably of the 11th century.[4]

We know less of Jacobite organization and customs, ecclesiastical and liturgical, than we do of those of the Nestorians, of which we have been fully informed in the last quarter of a century. For the modern Jacobites the best short account is to be found in O. H. Parry's *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, which has been largely drawn upon in the description which follows. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of the patriarch; the maphrian, who since the 12th cent. has had his see at Mar Mattai (see above) or in Mosul itself; and bishops of Jerusalem, Damascus or Homs (Emessa), Edessa, Amida, Mardin, Nisibis, Maipharqat (now Farqin; see above, § 3) and Ma'dan, Aleppo, Jezireh (on the Tigris), and Ṭur 'Abhdin (Jebel Ṭur). There are also some bishops without sees, as at Mar Mattai, where, when the present writer visited the monastery in 1887, the establishment consisted of one bishop and one monk. The patriarch is elected by the people, and the election is confirmed by the bishops resident near Mardin; it is common for the maphrian to be promoted to the chief position. The patriarch, or more rarely the maphrian, consecrates all the bishops, who must be either monks or widowed priests; those chosen from the monks are called *maṭrān*, or 'metropolitan,' while those chosen from the widowed priests are called *asqof* (ἐπίσκοπος), and are of slightly lower rank, not being eligible for the patriarchate or maphrianate. Each bishop has the prefix 'Mār' ('my lord') before his name.[1] The patriarch and the other bishops are recognized by the State as judges for their own people, especially in minor matters, and in questions of marriage and divorce. The canonical age for the ordination of bishops is 35, of deacons 20; but this has never been kept as a fixed rule. Bar Hebræus was ordained bishop at 20; deacons are often ordained as little boys, but they must be able to read the Psalms in classical Syriac. The parish priests, who are elected by the parish councils of deacons and laymen, must be married men; if their wives die, they enter a monastery or else become *asqofs*. A second marriage is not allowed to them. The priests must let their beards grow, but they shave their heads completely. The leading priest in a large town is often made a chorepiscopus, but he is not a bishop, and cannot ordain. There are many deacons in each village—they are engaged in secular work during the week—as they are indispensable for the celebration of the eucharist. Minor orders are practically obsolete.

Several ground-plans of churches may be seen in Parry.[2] The altar, at least in most cases, stands in an apse, not (as among the Nestorians) attached to the east wall, and there are seats for bishops and clergy behind. This is also the usual Greek custom. The whole sanctuary in Syrian churches, Eastern and Western, is called 'the altar' (Syr. *madhb'ḥā*), though this name is sometimes also given to the holy table itself. The latter is usually of stone, though in some of the Jacobite churches it is of wood.[3] There are side chapels with 'altars,' north and south of the sanctuary—the churches face east—and in some cases, as at Mar Mattai, there is another chapel at the north side for the burial of bishops, called *beith qaddīshē* ('house of the saints'). Between sanctuary and nave there is a stone wall or screen, sometimes with folding doors, and always with a veil. The nave has no furniture except one or two lecterns. The altar is usually placed under a baldacchino. The Jacobites, like the Nestorians, do not allow images in their churches, but have a great veneration for the cross.

Monasteries are common; the monks are often laymen, though they are sometimes in holy orders. The monasteries are under the rule of the diocesan bishop except where they contain the tomb of a patriarch or a maphrian; in that case they are directly under the patriarch. Nunneries seem to be obsolete. The technical Syriac term for the monastic life, among both the Jacobites and the Nestorians, is 'sadness,' 'mourning.'[4]

The eucharistic liturgy ordinarily used is that of 'St. James,' a translation of which, in the Jacobite form, is given in Brightman's *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. 69 ff. The Syrian Jacobites, Maronites, Uniat Syrians, and Malabar Jacobites all use the same liturgy with some variations.[5] Leavened bread is used, and must be baked for each occasion. The leaven is handed down from remote ages, as among the Nestorians. The eucharist is reserved for the sick, but only for communion on the same day. Little children (who are confirmed immediately after baptism) are communicated.

[1] For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 12.

[1] Assemani, *Bibl. Or.* ii. 327.
[2] Assemani, ii. 244 ff.
[2] *Gen. Introd.* i. 152.
[3] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 181.
[4] Renaudot, *Lit. Or.* ii. 453.
[4] Syr. *abhīūthā* (see the Nestorian *Sūnhādhūs*, vii. 2, can. 7, etc.).
[5] For a list of other Jacobite liturgies see Brightman, i p. lviii ff.

The antidoron or eucharistic bread not consecrated (Syr. *būrkthā* = *εὐλογία*) is distributed after the service. The celebrant wears albe, amice, undivided stole, yellow shoes, a maniple over each arm, and a chasuble split down the front and buckled with silver at the neck. The vesting takes place in the side chapel, where also the elements are prepared. There are in some churches daily eucharists. There are no special vestments (except girdles, and often, for the deacons, stoles) at the daily offices. These last have not been published, and exist in manuscript only. One of the great features of Jacobite worship is the peculiar addition of "who wast crucified for us" to the Trisagion ('Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us'), which is used at many of the services. The addition was first made by Peter the Fuller († A.D. 477), and was eagerly adopted and retained as a test of Monophysitism.[1] Baptism is not allowed to be administered in private houses. The child at baptism is signed with *moron*, or unguent (which is consecrated once a year by the patriarch), anointed all over the body with oil (which has been hallowed by the *moron*), immersed in water thrice up to the neck, clothed, and confirmed.[2] Confession before communion is recommended by the canons, but is now almost obsolete. Some of the canons[3] are more strict, and insist on confession before communion on Maundy Thursday, Christmas, and Pentecost.[4] The fasts are somewhat severe. Besides Lent and Advent, both of which are strict fasts, there are (*a*) the Fast of the Ninevites, three days in spring, said to have been instituted owing to a plague in the 6th cent.,[5] and strenuously maintained also by the East Syrians; (*b*) the Fast of the Apostles, after Pentecost; and (*c*) the Fast of Mary, August 1–15. Wednesday and Friday are fasts in each week, from sunset to sunset.

The Jacobites are to be found chiefly in Mesopotamia and northwards to Ḫarput and Diarbekr, but there are also a good many of them near Damascus and a certain number around Mosul. The largest numbers are perhaps to be found in the hilly region of Jebel Ṭur (Arab. also Ṭūr 'Abdīn; Syr. Ṭūr 'Abhdīn), N. of the line Mardin—Nisibis—Jezireh. In this district Syriac is still spoken vernacularly. Here some of their oldest and most interesting churches are situated.[6] It is always difficult to reckon numbers in Turkey; but Gibbon's estimate[7] of from fifty to eighty thousand is certainly too low. We may perhaps put the total in Turkey at rather less than 200,000.[8]

Certain communities of Jacobites have become Uniat (see below, § 6). Jesuit missionaries first came to Mesopotamia in 1540. In 1646 the Uniat patriarchate was fixed at Aleppo, and the patriarch took his title from that place. The Syrian Christians in that neighbourhood mostly belong to that jurisdiction.

6. Melkites and Uniats.—The former name, which is derived from Syr. *malkā* ('king'), a word used also, like *βασιλεύς*, for an emperor, was invented in the 10th cent. by the Jacobites for those Christians who adhered to the Council of Chalcedon. It was a nickname, meaning 'royalists,' and implying that they could stand only by the support of the Roman emperor. It may be compared with the nickname 'Erastians' used in this country at the present day; both have a somewhat similar shade of meaning. But the name 'Melkites' was quite readily accepted by those to whom it had been given in derision,[1] and was applied to all those who were in communion with Constantinople, whether Syrian, Egyptian, or Greek. In comparatively recent times the name has been given, and given exclusively, to the Christians of Syria and Egypt who have been drawn from the Orthodox Eastern Church and have been united to Rome. Such, *e.g.*, are the 'Syrian Melkites,' whose liturgical language is, or was, Syriac.

The name 'Uniat' is applied to those Eastern Christians who have been united to Rome, but are allowed to keep their own liturgies, liturgical language, and ecclesiastical customs, especially as to the marriage of their clergy—though in all these respects modifications, sometimes very considerable, have been introduced. The earliest of these 'Uniats' are the Maronites (see below, § 7); but there are also four Uniat Churches of the Græco-Slavonic rite—the Bulgarian, Greek Melkite (formed of Arabic-speaking Orthodox after the Synod of Bethlehem, in 1672), Rumaic or Roumanian, and Ruthenian; there are also the Armenian Uniats; the Syrian Uniats, drawn from the Jacobites in 1646 (see above, § 5); the Chaldæan Uniats, drawn from the Nestorians (see below, § 8); and the Malabar Uniats (see below, § 9). The Uniats have nine Eastern patriarchs. Those of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch live in Rome. In addition there are Uniat patriarchs of Jerusalem (Greek), Antioch (Maronite), Antioch (Greek), Antioch (Syrian), Cilicia (Armenian), Babylon (Chaldæan).[2] European readers are often confused by the fact that there are no fewer than six patriarchs who take their title from Antioch—one Greek Orthodox, four Uniats, and one Jacobite.

The Syrian Uniats use the liturgy of 'St. James'; the rubrics are often in Carshuni (Arabic in Syriac characters), the audible prayers both in Syriac and in Carshuni, the inaudible in Syriac only.[3] The Chaldæan Uniats use the liturgy of 'Addai and Mari' with some amendments; their daily services are considerably abbreviated compared with those of the Nestorians, and in the case of the long festal Night Service about six-sevenths are omitted.[4]

7. Maronites.—These Syrian Christians of the Lebanon derive their name from their teacher John Maro, or Maron, a learned monk, who was named patriarch of Antioch, perhaps early in the 8th century. He has often been confused with an earlier Maron, called by Gibbon[5] 'a saint or savage of the fifth century,' whose relics were greatly venerated. In the time of John Maron the Monothelete controversy was still going on, and these Lebanon Christians espoused that cause.[6] They were thus in opposition to their Christian neighbours, and later, as Christians, to the Muhammadan authorities; and they received the nickname 'Mardaites' or 'Rebels' (Syr. *marīdhē*).

In 1182 they renounced Monotheletism under the influence of their patriarch Aimeric, and were united with Rome, then numbering about 40,000 souls.[7] At that time the connexion with the West

[1] But the ancient and authoritative Jacobite statement of faith (the 'Creed of our Sainted Fathers'), published by the Syrian Patriarchate Education Committee in English (*The Ancient Syrian Church in Mesopotamia*, London, 1908), emphatically states that the Trisagion with this addition is addressed to 'the Only-begotten Son,' and not to 'the Three blessed Persons' (p. 10). This 'Statement of faith' is quite free from Monophysitism. It denies that the divine nature of our Lord was commingled with the human nature, or that the two natures became commixed and changed so as to give rise to a third nature, and asserts that the two natures became united in indissoluble union without confusion, mixture, or transmutation, and that they remained two natures in an unalterable unity.

[2] For early Syrian baptisms see below, § 8.

[3] Several collections of these may be read in H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, i. 475 ff.

[4] *Ib.* p. 487.

[5] Wigram, p. 214.

[6] Parry, p. 169 ff.

[7] vi. 55.

[8] For the Jacobites in India see below, § 9.

[1] Gibbon, vi. 44, note 109.

[2] A. Riley, 'Synopsis of Oriental Christianity,' *The Guardian*, xliii. 947 (27th June, 1888), since reprinted.

[3] Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lvi.

[4] Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 298.

[5] vi. 55.

[6] See art. MONOTHELETISM.

[7] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 154.

was through the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. After the destruction of that kingdom in the 14th cent. relations with Rome were at times broken off, but they were resumed, and still continue. In the year 1584 Pope Gregory XIII. founded a college in Rome for training their clergy, and this institution has the honour of having in the 18th cent. educated the learned brothers J. S. and J. A. Assemani, to whose literary labours scholars are so much indebted for their knowledge of Syriac Christianity. The Maronites subscribed the decrees of the Council of Trent in 1736.

They are allowed to retain their own liturgical customs, and use the Syriac 'St. James' and other anaphoras.[1] The rubrics in the printed books are in Carshuni; some of the formulæ are in Carshuni and Syriac.[2]

The Maronite clergy may marry. They also elect their own patriarch, who still takes his title from Antioch. He lives at the monastery of Qānōbīn (*κοινόβιον*), in the Lebanon, and has under his jurisdiction bishops at Aleppo, Tripoli (in Syria), Byblus and Botra, Baalbek or Heliopolis, Damascus, Berytus, Tyre and Sidon, and in Cyprus.[3] Their numbers are difficult to estimate. Gibbon[4] gives 150 priests and 100,000 souls, but they probably number about a quarter of a million.

They have suffered much from their feuds with their neighbours, the Druses, and in the year 1860, after great massacres of the Maronites, the British and French governments intervened for their protection.

8. East Syrians, or Nestorians.—We may now take up the history of the Church in the Persian empire from the middle of the 5th century.[5] The first great event for the East Syrians after the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431, was their final expulsion by the emperor Zeno from the school of Edessa and the consequent founding of the school of Nisibis, A.D. 489. **Ibas** (Syr. Ihibha, pron. īhīwā, lit. 'given'), bishop of Edessa, who was strongly Dyophysite, had been condemned by the Latrocinium, or 'Robber Synod,' of Ephesus in 449, but was acquitted and restored to his see by the Council of Chalcedon two years later, after having anathematized both Nestorius and Eutyches. During his lifetime the Monophysites made no way at Edessa, but after his death in 457 they became predominant there, and after a long struggle expelled their opponents. This was a decisive event in the Persian Church. Although up to that time it had had no direct dealings with Nestorianism, its tendency was mainly Dyophysite, and the influx of Nestorians from the Roman empire greatly strengthened that tendency. Nevertheless it is a mistake to suppose that the Persian Church at some definite date in the 5th cent. espoused Nestorianism and was therefore cut off from the Catholic Church. The process was a gradual one. The principal influence in the latter half of the 5th cent. was that of **Bar Sōmā** (Barsumas, lit. 'son of the fast'), bishop of Nisibis, who had taught at Edessa, and now, in the vacancy of the catholicate, organized the East Syrian Church in a Nestorian sense; he must not be confused with his namesake of the Latrocinium, who was a Monophysite. There was some opposition to 'Nestorian' doctrine, especially from the monks of Mar Mattai (see above, § 5), who to this day are Jacobites. The catholicos **Acacius** (Syr. Aqaq), who was bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon from 485 to 496, went to Constantinople on a mission from the Persian king, and there declared that his Church knew nothing of Nestorius; he was admitted to communion by the Orthodox, having anathematized Bar Ṣōmā.[1] We may perhaps discount his statement as an Oriental exaggeration; but the incident shows that the separation was not yet complete. Still later, good relations with Constantinople took place in the time of **Mar Abha** (pron. Awā) **the Great**, a contemporary of Jacob Baradai (see above, § 5). This prelate, a convert from Magianism, was catholicos from 540 to 552, having been a teacher at Nisibis, and having visited Jerusalem, Egypt, Greece, and Constantinople in the time of Justinian. In his Catholicate, as it would seem, the Council of Chalcedon was accepted by the East Syrian Church.[2] The *Sūnhādhūs*[3] quotes with approval one of its canons, and dates the council as '25th October, 763 of Alexander,' *i.e.* A.D. 452 (*sic*); the session of that day was particularly solemn, and was attended by the emperor and empress: it ended the principal work of the council.[4]

One of the first matters discussed in this period was the marriage of bishops and clergy. A council was held in 484 at Beith Laphaṭ (also called Gondisapor, perhaps the modern Shiraz); it allowed them to marry, and even permitted a second marriage to clerical widowers. This was confirmed in a council held by Acacius in the following year. Several patriarchs were married: Babhai (pron. Bā-wai), catholicos from 496 to 505, his successor Silas, Elisha, Paul, and Ezekiel, all of the 6th century.[5] But Mar Abha set his face against episcopal marriage, himself declining to marry; and after his time it became rare. The present rule is that a bishop must be a *rabban* ('monk,' but see below), and may not marry or have married, and must never have eaten flesh-meat; nor must his mother have eaten meat during her pregnancy.[6] There is evidence that the rule against eating meat did not hold in the 7th century.[7] It is noteworthy that Ebedjesus (see below) in his *Sūnhādhūs* passes over the question of episcopal marriage in silence, and does not refer to the decrees which permitted it.[8]

The definite official adoption of Nestorianism, or of what was taken for such, must be dated at the beginning of the 7th cent., when the East Syrians formally repudiated the term 'Theotokos' and adopted the phrase 'two *qnomē*, one *parṣopa* (*πρόσωπον*), two natures' with reference to our Lord.[9] The opposition to the 'Nestorians' of the Monophysite minority in Persia was greatly strengthened by the influx of a large number of captives of the latter persuasion from Syria, in 540 and 573, under Chosroes I.; the influence of Shīrīn, the Christian queen of Chosroes II. (590–628), was latterly in their favour.[10]

Monasticism was at one time a most flourishing institution among the East Syrians. Thomas of Marga (see below) gives us a graphic description of his own monastery, and we have other sources of information in Sozomen,[11] in P. Bedjan's *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum*, and elsewhere.[12] It seems to have been introduced into the East from Egypt by **Mar Awgin** (pron. Ōgīn; = 'Eugenius,' + 363 ?), who founded the famous monasteries of Mount Izla (near Nisibis) and Deir-el-Za'afaran (near Mardin; see above, § 5). He is said to have been the teacher of James of Nisibis. His *Life* is included in

[1] For a list of these see Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lviii.
[2] *Ib.* p. lvii.
[3] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 154. For their forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 14.
[4] vi. 57.
[5] For the doctrinal controversy which occupied the Council of Ephesus see art. NESTORIANISM.

[1] Wigram, p. 170. [2] *Ib.* p. 188. [3] v. 21.
[4] Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils of the Church*, Eng. tr., iii. 353 ff.
[5] Wigram, pp. 175, 178, 212; Budge, *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxxxii f.
[6] Cf. Jg 13[4f.].
[7] Wigram, p. 249. Eusebius (*HE* ii. 23) says that James the Just 'was holy from his mother's womb . . . he did not eat flesh (*ἔμψυχον*)'; *i.e.* he was a Nazirite, though abstinence from flesh was not part of a Nazirite's vow.
[8] The *Sūnhādhūs* (vii. preface) says that bishops were *usually* chosen from among the monks.
[9] Wigram, p. 258. But the latest investigations show that *qnoma* (= hypostasis) is used in the earlier sense of 'substance,' not of 'person.' This makes the phrase, if redundant, at least quite orthodox.
[10] *Ib.* pp. 242, 247. [11] *HE* vi. 34, very short.
[12] For an account of the institution see Budge, *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxvii ff.

Bedjan's work, but it is remarkable that Thomas of Marga does not mention him. The great organizer of monasticism among the East Syrians was a later monk, Abraham of Kashkar, a town between the lower Euphrates and the Tigris. Abraham refounded Mount Izla in the 6th cent., and his canons, which are still extant,[1] are included in the Nestorian *Sūnhādhūs*.[2] His successor as abbot, **Dadhishu**, made canons accepting the doctrines of Diodorus, Theodore, and Nestorius.[3] The rules as to jurisdiction of monasteries were the same as among the Jacobites (see above, § 5); in the 'patriarchal' monasteries the diocesan bishop might not officiate nor be mentioned in the litany.[4] One of the most famous of the monasteries was that of Beith 'Abhé (pron. 'Awé), probably founded by **Jacob of Lāshūm**, a monk of Mount Izla, in the 6th cent.; its situation is uncertain, but probably it was near the Great Zab.[5] This monastery produced from the 7th to the 9th centuries many patriarchs, as well as its famous historian, Thomas of Marga. The monastery of Rabban Hormuzd, about 30 miles north of Moṣul, is close to the village of Alqosh (Elkosh), where the tomb of the prophet Nahum, in a Jewish synagogue, is still shown. The monastery was founded by **Hormuzd of Beith Laphaṭ**, *c.* 600. He spent the last 22 years of his life there and was buried within it, as were several patriarchs.[6] The number of monks had dwindled from fifty in 1820 to about ten in 1890,[7] a new monastery having been built at the foot of the hills, not far away. When the present writer visited the two monasteries in 1887, there was in the new one a large number of monks, busily engaged. Both the monasteries now belong to the Uniat Chaldæans (see above, § 6). There were also many other monasteries elsewhere.[8]

Monasteries are now quite obsolete among the Nestorians, though a few *rabbans* (monks) live in the world under a private rule, neither marrying nor eating meat, such as the late well-known Rabban Yonan (Jonah) of Qūchānīs.[9]

Among a large number of Nestorian writers the following may be mentioned. Narsai († *c.* 502), a poet and homilist, called 'the Harp of the Spirit,' went to Nisibis from Edessa on the expulsion of the Nestorians. Ebedjesus says that he wrote 360 homilies; of these 47 have been published in Syriac by A. Mingana, and those on the eucharist and baptism, translated into English by R. H. Connolly, are of the greatest importance for the history of the early East Syrian rite. **Mshiha Zkha** was the writer of a most valuable history in the 6th century (see above, § 3). **Ishu'yahbh III.** (pron. Ishūyāw), who was catholicos for ten years from 650, was the reputed author or reviser of the ordination and baptismal services, and also of the Hudhra (see below).[10] In the earlier Syrian rite of baptism, as evidenced by Narsai, the *Syriac Didascalia*, and some other Syriac descriptions, the anointing seems to have been only before baptism; the post-baptismal anointing was added among the Jacobites in the 5th cent., probably by Severus (see § 5), and among the Nestorians by Ishu'yahbh.[11] **Thomas of Marga**, bishop in the 9th cent. of that city (on the Zab) and metropolitan of Beith Garmai (east of the Tigris), was a monk of Beith 'Abhé (see above); his *Book of Governors*, a monastic history, is most valuable as filling a gap of 300 years in the history, otherwise hardly known. **George of Arbela**, metropolitan of Moṣul and Arbela (south-east of Moṣul) in the 10th cent., wrote a commentary on the services of the Church, which is valuable for the history of the Nestorian liturgies.[12] **Mari Ibn Suleiman** ('son of Solomon') was a chronicler of the 12th century. **Ebedjesus** (E. Syr. 'Abhdishu, pron. 'Ōdishū, lit. 'servant of Jesus'), metropolitan of Ṣubha (pron. Ṣūwā), by some identified with Nisibis,[13] in the 13th cent. compiled the *Sūnhādhūs*, or 'Book of Canon Law,' now in constant use by the Nestorians, though many of its provisions have become obsolete.[1]

The missions of the East Syrians have been far extended. Their work in India is attested in the 6th cent. by Cosmas Indicopleustes (see below, § 9). Gibbon remarks[2] that 'the barbaric churches, from the Gulf of Persia to the Caspian Sea, were almost infinite.' The missionaries extended their labours to Socotra, Ceylon, Turkestan, and even to China, where the Nestorian monument of Si-ngan-fu, dated A.D. 781 ('1092 of the Greeks'), attests their activity, which also gave rise to the legend of Prester John (*q.v.*), a supposed priest-king in Tartary. Wherever they carried their teaching, they used Syriac as their liturgical language, even though it was not that of the people.[3] Thus the Malabarese have always used Syriac liturgies. This great activity swelled the numbers of Syrian Christians exceedingly, and the Nestorians and Jacobites together are said to have been more numerous than the Greeks and Latins together.[4]

Under Muhammadan rule East Syrian Christianity was alternately favoured and persecuted. Under Tamerlane ('Timur the Lame') in the 14th cent. it was almost annihilated. But a remnant survived and is still to be found in the mountains of Kurdistan in E. Turkey, in the upland plains of Azarbaijan in the north-west of the present Persian kingdom, especially in that of Urmi or Urumi (often called in Europe Urmia), and in the low-lying plain of Moṣul (Nineveh). The patriarch, who after the foundation of Baghdād (A.D. 762) had left Seleucia-Ctesiphon for that city, later removed to the north. But disputes as to the succession divided the patriarchate. The Nestorians themselves are now under the rule of Mār Shimūn (these two words are pronounced as one and are accented on the first and last syllables), who lives at Qūchānīs in the almost inaccessible mountains which surround the Great Zab, a beautiful retreat near the small town of Julamerk. Each successive catholicos takes the name 'Shimūn' (Simon), whatever his baptismal name. The East Syrians of the Moṣul plain, now called Chaldæans, have been united with Rome since 1680, when they were received by Pope Innocent XI. Their head ('patriarch of Babylon') bears the name Mār Eliyā (Elijah). He has several bishops, each styled metropolitan, under him. He retains the title ('of Babylon') which the Nestorian patriarchs often used when they lived at Seleucia-Ctesiphon; it is also found in the *Sūnhādhūs*.[5] There were at one time patriarchs at Amida (Diarbekr), who also were united with Rome; these bore the name Mar Joseph.

All the East Syrians speak Syriac vernacularly, though many of those in the Moṣul plain speak Arabic also. It is common to hear the sailors on the Tigris steamers talking vernacular Syriac, these being Chaldæan Uniats. The total number of Nestorians and Uniats combined is, or was till lately, perhaps about 300,000.

A detailed account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Nestorians is given in Maclean-Browne, *The Catholicos of the East*, ch. ix. The patriarch, or catholicos, has under him a *maṭrān*, or metropolitan, who bears the dynastic name of Mār Ḥnān-ishū ('mercy of Jesus'), and several bishops, the number varying considerably from time to time. The present method of filling bishoprics (including the patriarchate) is for each bishop to bring up one or two boys or young men, his nephews or near relatives, as potential successors. Such a one is called in the vernacular *nāṭar kūrsē* ('keeper of the seat'), and is not allowed to eat meat or marry; the bishop ordinarily nominates the one

[1] *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxxxiv. [2] vii. 3.
[3] *Ib.* vii. 4. [4] *Ib.* vii. 6. [5] Budge, i. p. xli ff.
[6] *Ib.* p. clvii ff. [7] *Ib.* p. clxix.
[8] For the Jacobite monastery of Mar Mattai near Moṣul see § 5.
[9] Maclean-Browne, *Catholicos of the East*, p. 19. The *Sūnhādhūs* forbids monks to marry 'like the rest of the clerks and laymen' or to eat meat in their monasteries (vii. 2, can. 5).
[10] Cf. Budge, i. p. lvi.
[11] T. Thompson, *The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, Cambridge, 1914, p. 31. See also art. CONFIRMATION, §§ 6, 7.
[12] For an account of this book see Connolly, *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, p. 75 ff.
[13] But see R. Payne Smith, *Thes. Syr.* ii. 3373.

[1] For a list of the works of Ebedjesus see Assemani, *Bibl. Or.* i. 3 ff., 380 ff. G. P. Badger (*Nestorians and their Rituals*, ii 380 ff.) gives an English translation of his best known work, the *Margānithā* ('Pearl'), and (ii. 361 f.) of his catalogue of authors and their works, chiefly East Syrian. For East Syrian hymn-writers see art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian).
[2] vi. 49. [3] Renaudot, *Lit. Or.* ii. 563.
[4] Gibbon, vi. 50.
[5] ix. 1. The above remarks and much of what follows apply to the time before the Great War.

whom he wishes to succeed, but in theory the people elect from among the 'keepers of the seat.' In the 15th cent. the catholicos made a law restricting the catholicate to members of his own family. This was an innovation, though perhaps not a very recent one. The catholicos consecrates the bishops; but the metropolitan consecrates the catholicos.[1]

In most villages there is at least one priest, in some several; and deacons are very numerous, as the eucharist cannot be celebrated without the assistance of a deacon or of a priest acting as deacon. Occasionally a priest is made an archdeacon (*arkān*), but this is now only an honour, not involving special duties. Formerly there were chorepiscopi and periodeutæ ('visitors'); these were presbyters, not bishops. The office of periodeuta is at least as old in Syrian Christianity as Rabbūlā (6th cent.), as he mentions it in his canons.[2] The East Syrian *Book of Heavenly Intelligences*[3] enumerates nine orders in three divisions; (1) the episcopate: patriarch (or catholicos), metropolitan, bishop; (2) the presbyterate: chorepiscopus, periodeuta (or archdeacon), presbyter; (3) the diaconate: deacon, subdeacon, reader. These are said to correspond to the angelic hierarchy (as given by pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and others) of (1) cherubim, seraphim, thrones; (2) dominions, virtues, powers; (3) principalities, archangels, angels. Minor orders are now obsolete. There are no longer any deaconesses.

Many of the ecclesiastical customs of the Nestorians are those also of the Jacobites (see above, § 5). But there are some differences. The Nestorian priests and deacons may marry, and if their wives die they may marry again; but the parish priests are not obliged to be married, though as a matter of fact they are hardly ever single men. The churches, which (especially in the mountains of Kurdistan) have exceedingly narrow and low doors, sometimes only accessible by a ladder, and which are often built for security in a cleft of a rock or in some almost inaccessible place, are nearly all of the same pattern. Outwardly they show no sign of Christianity save a small cross beside the church door. They have no towers or spires, such as the Armenian churches have. Internally they have a stone wall reaching to the roof and dividing the nave from the sanctuary; a doorway in this wall is covered with a veil which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. On the nave-side of this wall is a raised pace called *bema* (a name which in other Eastern communions means the sanctuary), and this again is bounded by a dwarf wall with apertures in the middle and at the side, where the clergy stand to communicate the people. This raised pace somewhat corresponds to the Greek *σωλέας*.[4] Against the dwarf wall, towards the nave, are projections (said to contain relics) for the cross and for books. The altar is attached to the east wall, and is usually built into a recess therein. It is oblong, not square as among the Greeks. The people stand in the nave to worship, the men in front, and the women behind; there are no seats, and if there is any occasion for sitting, such as a sermon, the people sit on the matted floor. Two other features of the churches may be noticed: a baptistery (also used as a vestry, and usually for baking the eucharistic bread), at the south-east corner of the church next the sanctuary; and a court (often open to the air) on the south side of the nave, where the daily prayers are said in summer. This is the usual arrangement, and is that of the church of Mart Mariam (St. Mary) at Urmi in Persia, which claims to be the oldest church in the world, and to contain the tomb of one of the Wise Men of Bethlehem, built (as the most ancient tombs are) into the wall of this church—in this case at the south-east corner of the nave.[5] The people are called to worship by a wooden board (Syr. *nāqūshā*) hit by a mallet; this is the Greek *σήμαντρον*.[6] Bells are seldom used to summon to prayer, though there are often strings of small bells hung inside the church.

[1] For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 13.

[2] Given in Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 144.

[3] Maclean-Browne, p. 184. [4] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 201.

[5] For a ground plan see Maclean-Browne, p. 301; for plans of two other famous churches see pp. 291, 296.

[6] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 217.

The vestments worn at the eucharist differ somewhat from those of the Jacobites. For a chasuble the Nestorians wear a kind of cope (*ma'ăprā*), which has no fastening at the neck, and is very difficult to keep in position. The priests' stoles, like those of the West, do not differ in shape from those of the deacons; maniples and amices are not worn. Private confession, though often referred to in the service-books, is now obsolete. The fasts are the same as those of the Jacobites, but the fasts of the Apostles and of Mary are almost if not quite obsolete, as are some others mentioned in the East Syrian books. The Wednesday and Friday fasts do not in practice begin on (what we call) the evening before, but they end at sunset; all Eastern Christians reckon the day as beginning and ending at sunset, and our 'Sunday evening' is their 'Monday evening.'

The chief liturgy used by the Nestorians is that of 'the apostles Addai and Mari.' This liturgy has many early features, especially a form of eucharistic invocation of the Holy Spirit which is not as fully developed as that in most of the Great Liturgies. It prays that the Holy Ghost may come and rest on the oblation, and bless and sanctify it, that it may become (or be) for us for the remission of sins, etc.; and it does not explicitly mention the change in the elements. But the most curious feature is the absence of the words of our Lord spoken at the Last Supper, when after 'blessing' or 'giving thanks' He gave the sacrament to the disciples ('This is my body,' etc.). Neale[1] argues on *a priori* grounds that 'Addai and Mari' must have originally had these words. But this is a precarious statement; there are other instances of at least the partial omission of the words.[2] This liturgy in no way refers to the Nestorian controversy. On certain days of the year the anaphora of 'Addai and Mari' is not used, but that of 'Theodore the Interpreter' (of Mopsuestia) or that of 'Nestorius' is substituted, the first part of the liturgy, and the ending, being common to all three. All these anaphoras date, in some form, from very early times; the first probably, in its earliest shape, was compiled before A.D. 431; the other two are certainly not the work of the bishops after whom they are named, but are the work of East Syrian authors. The author of 'Nestorius' must have had a Byzantine liturgy before him, as many traces of that rite are found in it. But all three anaphoras are quite distinctly of the East Syrian, not of the Byzantine, family of liturgies. All three seem to have been composed before Narsai (end of 5th cent.), though doubtless many more modern additions have been made to them.

Eucharists do not occur very often among the Nestorians—some five or six times a year as a rule, though in a few churches weekly eucharists are the custom. The people communicate, as they pray, standing, the mothers holding up the very little children in their arms to receive. All receive in both kinds separately (the species of bread in their hands), except the very little ones, for whom the celebrant dips a small portion of the consecrated bread in the chalice and then puts it in their mouth. Reservation for the sick is not allowed. The eucharistic bread is leavened.[3] All services, without exception, are sung; but no instrumental music is allowed.

The baptismal customs do not differ greatly from those of the Jacobites.[4] The service is closely modelled on the eucharistic liturgies, than which

[1] *Gen. Introd.* i. 486.

[2] A. J. Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, pp. 40, 45, *Early Christian Worship*[2], London, 1915, pp. viii, 25.

[3] For a curious tradition as to the handing down of the leaven see Maclean-Browne, p. 247.

[4] For a description see Maclean-Browne, p. 267 ff.

it is certainly later. There is, however, no kiss of peace. The triple immersion is absolutely total. As with all Easterns, the presbyter confirms, and lays his right hand on or over the neophytes; the use of the consecrated oil at this point is not explicitly mentioned in the service-book, but it is customary for the priest, when signing the neophytes with the sign of the cross, to do so with his thumb which he has dipped in the oil. There are now no interrogations or renunciations,[1] though they are alluded to in the 5th cent. by Narsai, where the renunciations have special reference to heresy.[2] Private baptism is not, in practice, allowed; if a village has no church, a child must be carried to another village which has one. Thus some children die unbaptized, though it is not likely that a person would grow up without baptism. Sponsors are considered as being akin to their godchildren, and the relationship is a bar to marriage.

The non-liturgical services are of great interest, and are extremely long, at least in theory. They consist mainly of hymns and anthems.[3] The great number of martyrs in the East Syrian Church is reflected in the frequent mention of them by name in these anthems. The calendar is remarkable, and in some respects unique. Most of the saints' days fall on a Friday, and suit very well with the arrangement of the ecclesiastical year, which is divided into periods of about seven weeks each, more or less—Advent, Epiphany, Lent, Easter, 'The Apostles' (after Pentecost), 'Summer,' 'Elijah,' 'Moses,' and the 'Hallowing of the Church.' A few of the holy days, however, fall on fixed days of the month, as Christmas (Dec. 25), Epiphany (Jan. 6), St. George (April 24, etc.), St. Cyriac and St. Julitta (July 15 and Dec. 22), St. Peter and St. Paul (July 29), St. Mary (Aug. 15), Holy Cross Day (Sept. 13, not 14 as elsewhere). The twelve apostles are commemorated together on a Friday before Lent, the four evangelists on another, the 'Greek doctors' (Diodorus, Theodore, Nestorius) on a third, the 'Syrian doctors' (especially Ephraim, Narsai, Abraham [of Kashkar?, see above]) on a fourth. On other Fridays are commemorated St. James the Lord's brother, St. Mary, St. John Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul (a second commemoration), Mar Abha or else the patron saint of the church, St. Stephen, the forty martyrs of Sebaste, all the departed, the Seventy, and some others.

The choirs are divided into two parts, and according as the first or the second choir begins the anthems the week is called 'Before' or 'After,' 'Before and After' (Syr. *Qdhām ū-Wāthar*) being thus taken for the name of the ordinary book of daily services. The *propria* for Sundays, fasts, and festivals are of very great length, and are contained in the books called *Ḥūdhrā* ('cycle') and *Gazzā* ('treasure'), two enormous MS volumes, and some others. These two are not published; but the complete East Syrian service for the Epiphany is given in English in Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 288 ff. (from a MS in the Library of the Propaganda Fide in Rome), with the cues all filled in, and a part of these two books is published in Syriac in the *Breviarium Chaldaicum*. The Psalms are said (at least in theory) all through twice a week, and the whole Psalter is recited on festivals of our Lord. In the litanies, which are numerous, and one at least of which is said at almost every service, the ruling patriarch, metropolitan, and bishop of the diocese are commemorated by name. The marriage-service and the burial-service for laymen (*'anīdhā*) have been published in Syriac.[1] The burial-service for the clergy (*kūrastā*) is much longer and more elaborate than that for laymen. These burial-services are most dramatic, and consist partly of dialogues between the departed and the mourners, or between the departed and those already in Sheol. After the funeral the kiss of peace is given, at least in the case of priests and bishops. All pass in line and kiss the hand of the departed, or a cross laid on his breast, and so take leave of him.[2] Badger gives an English translation of the baptismal-, marriage-, and ordination-services, and of the burial-service for priests.[3]

9. Christians of Malabar, or of St. Thomas.—Ancient tradition, in which, however, we can have little confidence, makes St. Thomas the apostle the first teacher of Christianity in India. The legend is told in the Syriac *Acts of Judas Thomas* (see above, § 4), which, curiously enough, makes Thomas (lit. 'twin') the twin-brother of our Lord. J. R. Harris sees here traces of the influence of the Heavenly Twins on Christian legend.[4] The Ethiopic legend of St. Thomas[5] is still fuller. Our Lord divides the world into twelve portions, and Thomas's lot is to go to India. Very unwillingly, but encouraged by our Lord, he goes, guided by Peter and accompanied by Matthias. Jesus appears in the form of a rich man, who sells Thomas as a slave, the price to be given to the poor and needy. Peter and Matthias return. Thomas is set to work as a stonemason, carpenter, and physician; but he afterwards explains that the buildings which he undertook to build were the souls which he won to Christ. He appoints a bishop, priests, and deacons, and departs in a cloud, having been miraculously clothed again in the skin which had been flayed off him. According to another account,[6] he was pierced by soldiers' spears and died. The opposition is said to have been largely due to his preaching encratism,[7] and persuading wives to forsake their husbands. The *Acts of Judas Thomas* says that the relics of the apostle were transferred to Edessa (A.D. 232?). It has been suggested by some that the name 'Christians of St. Thomas' comes from another Thomas than the apostle. This later namesake, **Thomas Cannaneo**, is variously assigned to the 4th or the 9th century.[8] Another legend connects Pantænus of Alexandria (*c.* A.D. 200) with India, where, it says, the apostle Bartholomew had already preached.[9] Pantænus is said by these writers to have found there a copy, in the Hebrew language, of St. Matthew's Gospel, and to have left it behind him.

The first certain historical testimony to the existence of Christians in India is that of the Alexandrian merchant who afterwards became a monk, and whom we know from his Indian travels as **Cosmas Indicopleustes**. He travelled far, and his *Christian Topography of the Whole World* in twelve books, still extant, is a valuable historical piece of evidence, though it is marred by the erroneous geographical conceptions of the day. The first six books may be dated *c.* A.D. 547, the rest *c.* 560. Cosmas's other works are not now extant. He travelled in India and Ceylon, and describes 'Mali' (identified with Malabar) on the Indian coast, the centre of the pepper trade. He

[1] See under Literature at end of this article.
[2] Maclean-Browne, p. 287.
[3] *Nestorians and their Rituals*, ii. 195 ff.
[4] *The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends*, London, 1903, p. 20 ff.
[5] E. A. W. Budge, *Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1901, Eng. tr., ii. 319 ff., Ethiopic text in vol. i.
[6] *Ib.* ii. 353. [7] See art. ENCRATITES.
[8] Howard, *The Christians of St. Thomas and their Liturgies*, p. 15 f.
[9] Eusebius, *HE* v. 10; Jerome, *de Vir. illustr.* 36.

[1] See art. ABRENUNTIO.
[2] Connolly, *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, p. 37.
[3] See art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian), § 4.

testifies to a large number of Christian churches on the coast of India and in Ceylon and Socotra, whose clergy, he says, were ordained by the Persian archbishop of Seleucia, and were subject to his jurisdiction; the Church there had had many martyrs and a large number of monks. Thus we may gather that the 'Christians of St. Thomas' are the fruits of the missionary activities of the Church of the Persian empire (see above, § 8), and that their Christianity had begun long before Cosmas's time, probably in the 4th century.

The subsequent history is somewhat obscure. Immigrations of Christians to Malabar from Baghdād and elsewhere occurred twice in the 8th and 9th centuries, and the immigrants intermarried with the native Christians. The later of these movements was under two Nestorian priests (bishops?), **Mar Sapor** and **Mar Peruz**. The fame of the Malabar Christianity spread to the West, and King Alfred of England sent ambassadors to that country.[1] The converts were protected by the king of Cochin. They had their bishop at Angamala, and he was styled 'Metropolitan of India,' having in his jurisdiction 1400 churches and 200,000 souls in the whole district.[2]

A theory has lately been put forward by P. T. Geevergese, a native Malabar Syrian, in a tract entitled *Were the Syrian Christians Nestorians?*, to the effect that the Malabarese were Jacobites till the 15th cent., when they became Nestorians for a hundred years. It is agreed that their Church was originally founded from Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and that they were under the Catholicos of the East in the pre-Nestorian period; but this writer maintains that thereafter they depended on the Jacobites, not on the Nestorians. The only argument of any importance adduced in favour of this theory is the existence of two inscriptions at Kottayam, a town of Travancore, in Pahlavi, the official language of the Persian empire during the Sasanian dynasty; they are said to be of the 7th or 8th century. One of the inscriptions has a line also in Syriac, in Estrangéla characters, perhaps of the 10th century. The two run thus: (*a*) 'In punishment by the cross (was) the suffering of this One, He who is the true Christ, and God above, and Guide ever pure'; (*b*) ['Let me not glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ] who is the true Messiah and God above and Holy Ghost.' The words in square brackets are in Syriac. Geevergese amends 'Holy Ghost' to 'Guide ever pure' as in the former inscription. These are said to be anti-Nestorian. But is this the case? The 'Nestorians' of the Persian empire never failed to assert that He who died upon the cross was God. The existence in Malabar of an old Jacobite Bible of the 12th cent. or earlier proves nothing in the absence of evidence as to when it was brought there. The suggestion that the Portuguese inquisitors found some liturgical practices existing which showed traces of Jacobite rather than Nestorian influence, though *ex hypothesi* the latter had been predominant for over a hundred years, will hardly bear examination. Thus the inquisitors mention a liturgy 'of Diodorus' as being in use. There is no such known Nestorian liturgy. Therefore, it is maintained, the liturgy in use was non-Nestorian, *i.e.* Jacobite. It would indeed have been remarkable if the Jacobites had named one of their liturgies after the real father of Nestorianism. Renaudot[3] supposes that 'Diodorus' is here a mistake for 'Theodorus,' but, as the Synod of Diamper mentions both Diodore and Theodore, this is very unlikely.[4] Geevergese agrees that the Nestorians of the Tigris valley at the end of the 15th cent. and the beginning of the 16th sent bishops to Malabar, on the request of deputies who had come thence, and he maintains that these converted Malabar from Jacobitism to Nestorianism. It does not appear to the present writer that Geevergese has proved his theory; but there is possibly this amount of truth in it, that certain of the Malabarese Christians, who have unfortunately always been conspicuous for quarrelsomeness (like their spiritual ancestors), may have had dealings with the dissentient Jacobites of the Tigris valley, or with the Western Jacobites, before the 15th century. Thus a deputation is said to have gone to the Monophysites of Alexandria to ask for a bishop for 'India' (Malabar?), A.D. 695.[5]

An ecclesiastical revolution was effected by the Portuguese in the 16th century. They established the Inquisition at Goa in 1560. The Synod of Diamper, in the south of Cochin, held in 1599 under **Alexius de Menezes**, archbishop of Goa, united the Malabarese, then estimated at about 200,000 souls,[6] to Rome, and rooted out all traces of Nestorianism. Celibacy of the clergy was enforced, and made retrospective. All old books and liturgies were destroyed, or radically altered, so that probably there does not now exist a single complete copy of the liturgies as used before the synod. Renaudot remarks[1] that the Portuguese censors incautiously condemned things which had nothing to do with Nestorianism. The liturgy which they found to be principally used was closely related to, or practically the same as, the Nestorian 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8). An English translation of this[2] is published by J. M. Neale,[3] who says[4] that it is given as revised by Menezes and the Synod of Diamper. Yet this cannot be altogether the case, as it contains the names of Nestorius, Diodore, and Theodore, as well as of Ephraim, Abraham, and Narsai (see above, § 8), and the phrase 'Mother of Christ' for 'Mother of God' (see below). Neale gives some of the prayers in what was probably the original order, but indicates by numbers the order in the form approved at Diamper.

The change from ancient customs was effected only after great opposition on the part of the Malabarese themselves, who rallied under their bishop, **Mar Abraham** († 1597). It was his death that made the Synod of Diamper and the real union with Rome possible.[5]

It is interesting to notice the changes of custom and of liturgy effected at Diamper. Up to this time the Malabar Christians had had but a single bishop at a time; hence, perhaps, arose the custom for the chrism at confirmation to be consecrated by a priest (*catanar*) rather than, as elsewhere in the East, by a bishop; indeed, the Malabarese were accused of not having had confirmation at all,[6] though this is clearly a mistake. The chief changes in the eucharistic liturgy made at Diamper were the following. The pope's name was substituted for that of the patriarch of Babylon. For the names of Nestorius, Diodore, Theodore, and other 'Nestorian' fathers, those of Cyril (of Alexandria) and others were substituted. The phrase 'Mother of God' replaced 'Mother of Christ.' Where, before the consecration, the words 'the body,' 'the blood,' occurred (as often in Eastern liturgies by anticipation), the words 'bread,' 'wine,' were substituted. In the 'Nicene' creed the phrases 'God of God, Light of light, very God of very God,' which were said to have been wanting in the Malabar form, were inserted; probably what is meant is that the first two of these phrases were wanting in Malabar, as they do not occur in the Nestorian creed (see above, § 3). The phrase 'consubstantial with the Father' was substituted for 'Son of the essence of the Father,' the usual equivalent in Syriac (Neale unfortunately does not give the text of the creed in his Malabar liturgy). The host was ordered to be elevated at the consecration. But the chief change was a reversal of prevalent Oriental conceptions of liturgy. The epiclesis, or invocation of the Holy Ghost, was moved from its place after the narrative of the Last Supper and placed before it,[7] the wording being altered so as to make the epiclesis refer only to a good reception of the sacrament. For these changes see Howard, p. 40; but two of his statements appear to be doubtful. The Portuguese censors probably found no narrative of our Lord's words at all, as they were working on 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8); they probably therefore inserted them from one of the other anaphoras, though not in the place where

[1] Howard, p. 21. [2] Gibbon, vi. 51. [3] ii. 569.
[4] Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lxxx.
[5] Neale, *Patriarchate of Alexandria*, ii. 88.
[6] Howard, p. 23.

[1] ii. 565.
[2] From the Latin of J. F. Raulin's *Hist. eccl. Malabaricæ*.
[3] *Liturgies of St. Mark . . . and the Church of Malabar*, p. 128 ff.
[4] *Ib.* p. xvi. [5] Howard, p. 26. [6] *Ib.* p. 38.
[7] For a double invocation in the Egyptian rite, one before and one after the narrative of the Last Supper, see art. INVOCATION (Liturgical), § 6.

they are found in those anaphoras, but in the place which they thought most suitable. The other statement, that the Portuguese altered the wording of the epiclesis, is also doubtful, for, as Neale gives it,[1] it agrees exactly with the epiclesis of 'Addai and Mari,' which, as we have seen, is of a somewhat early type, throwing most of the emphasis on the effects and purpose of the consecration, for the benefit of the communicants, rather than on the change effected in the bread and wine. The history of the changes at Diamper fully justifies Renaudot's dictum quoted above, and shows that the Portuguese censors were quite ignorant of liturgical science.

The Portuguese changed the episcopal see from Angamala to Cranganor on the coast, so that it might be more accessible to them, and that they might have a greater hold on the native Church. But during the whole time of their rule in India they aroused constant opposition from the Malabarese, whom the terrors of the Inquisition were never able entirely to subdue.

In 1663, after more than 60 years of Portuguese rule, the Malabarese were enabled by the Dutch conquests in India once more to assert their independence, induced thereto by the murder of Theodore, a bishop sent from 'Babylon.' The Dutch expelled the Jesuits from Malabar soon after 1663. But the Malabarese were not united among themselves, and about half remained in obedience to the Roman see, while the rest became independent of it. These last gladly accepted Gregorius, Monophysite bishop of Jerusalem, who came from the Jacobite patriarch at Mardin in 1665. Gregorius consecrated Thomas as metropolitan, and since then the Malabarese have been in the main Jacobite. This change of front appears remarkable at first sight. Yet we must remember that in their origin neither the Malabar Church nor her mother, the East Syrian Church, was Nestorian, for they both existed before Nestorianism was propounded. And, though many East Syrians were genuinely Nestorian, it is very doubtful if their Church was consistently and officially so; still less certain is it that the Malabarese were strongly imbued with that doctrine. Hence we can understand why they grasped at the first hand that was stretched out to help them in getting rid of the Western authority which was imposed on them, but under which they had never rested content.

In the year 1700 and afterwards Nestorian bishops were sent, but they only secured the allegiance of a minority. In the 19th cent. the history is one of constant litigation between rival parties. The Nestorians of Malabar, after many lawsuits, won recognition in the courts and part of the endowments. In the year 1850 they obtained a bishop from Mar Shimun, the Nestorian catholicos (see above, § 8). Later, another was sent, but he was murdered by robbers on the journey. In 1907 Mar Shimun consecrated Mar Timotheus (Abimelech), who now holds office.[2]

There are now perhaps 300,000 Syrian Christians, all told, in India; the majority are Jacobites, and have since the 17th cent. adopted the Jacobite liturgies and customs.[3] The metropolitan usually consecrates his own successor, from the family in which the archidiaconate has been hereditary. The archdeacon is called *ramban*. The eucharist is only rarely celebrated; the laity must communicate at least three times in the year,[4] but there are often eucharists without lay communicants. The churches are plain, consisting of nave and chancel without transepts.[1] There is one altar, the so-called 'side altars' being used only, as in the Nestorian churches, for holding a cross, or books, or the like. The altar itself is 4 ft. high by 6 ft. long and 3½ (or 4) ft. wide, sometimes of stone and sometimes of wood. It stands out from the east wall, as in the Jacobite churches of Mesopotamia, in contrast to the Nestorian altars. At the eucharist the altar is covered with a white cloth, and has a frontal. On it are placed a wooden cross (often with the figure of our Lord painted on the wood), two candlesticks, a book-stand, a slab of wood or marble for the chalice and paten to rest upon, a 'sponge' of silk for wiping the priest's fingers and for cleansing the chalice after the service, and three veils for the chalice and paten. The bread is leavened, and must be prepared on the day when it is used; each bread is round, and stamped with a cross. It is called variously *Qōrbānā* ('Oblation'), 'first-begotten,' 'the Seal,' 'the Body,' 'the Coal' (Is 6[6]). These are common Syriac names elsewhere for the eucharistic bread. The naves of the churches have earthen floors; they have no furniture except two bells inside the church; a gallery is often placed at the west side of the nave. On the nave-side of the chancel arch there is a space railed off, not unlike the Nestorian *bema* (see above, § 8), but some 12 ft. wide as compared with a 3 ft. width of the *bema*. The churches sometimes have pictures;[2] this is probably a relic of Portuguese influence. There is always a veil at the chancel arch, which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. Externally the churches have little adornment; the west front has three storeys, and is whitewashed. The roof is high-pitched, that of the chancel being always higher than that of the nave. The vestments worn seem to be much the same as those of the Jacobites of Mesopotamia (see § 5), and are more elaborate than those of the Nestorians. At the eucharist the celebrant wears special shoes, whereas the Nestorians take their shoes off; also a black serge or coarse cotton robe (perhaps a sort of cassock), a white linen albe, a stole in one piece with an opening for the head, girdle, maniples, chasuble (or cope) of silk damask, and cap.[3] At ordination the clergy receive the tonsure,[4] as do the Nestorians, the latter, however, only cutting off some of the ordinand's hair in the form of a cross. As in the worship of all Syrian Christians, much incense is used at the eucharist and other services.

In some externals, especially in the matter of vestments, the Nestorian Malabarese seem to have assimilated their customs to those of their Jacobite neighbours.

10. Modern missions. — Besides the Jesuit, Dominican, and Lazarist missions to the Uniat bodies mentioned in § 6, there have been during the last 80 years various missions to the Jacobites and Nestorians. The American Presbyterian and Congregational Boards of Missions have long had missionaries among them; the Archbishop of Canterbury's educational 'Assyrian Mission' has worked among the East Syrians since 1886; and later the Russian Church sent a mission to them. Similarly missionaries from the West have laboured among the Malabarese in India. To all these missions we are largely indebted for a knowledge of the people, and for the publication of the Bible in classical and vernacular Syriac, of patristic texts, and of other liturgical and educational works.

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[1] *Liturgies*, p. 149 f.
[2] Heazell-Margoliouth, *Kurds and Christians*, p. 196.
[3] An account of these may be seen in Howard, p. 55 ff.
[4] Howard, p. 147.

[1] Howard, p. 123 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 153.
[3] *Ib.* p. 132.
[4] *Ib.* p. 160.

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viii. For *SYRIAC TEXTS* of early works by Syrian Christians see W. Wright, *Short Hist. of Syriac Literature*, London, 1894.

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TABERNACLES.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

TABU.—The word 'tabu' is properly an adjective and appears to mean literally 'marked off' (perhaps from Polynesian *ta*, 'mark,' *pu*, 'exceedingly'). Applying equally to persons and things, it signifies that casual contact with them is forbidden as being fraught with mystic danger. Custom enjoins a negative or precautionary attitude towards them because of the supernatural influence with which they are temporarily or permanently charged. In short, they are 'not to be lightly approached,' and that always for some magico-religious reason. The term is native to the Pacific region, but has been adopted, with some modification of meaning, to designate a fundamental category of comparative religion. Thus, as in regard to the cognate term *mana* (*q.v.*), it is advisable to distinguish the local from the generalized sense.

1. Local meaning of tabu.—(*a*) *Cook's discovery of tabu.*—'Taboo,' used indifferently as adjective, noun, or verb, was introduced into English by Captain Cook. He first met with the word, in 1777, at Tonga.[1] Hence, by the way, the popularization of the Tongan form *tabu*, *tapu* being usual elsewhere in Polynesia, with *kapu* in the Hawaiian group; though in Melanesia *tabu* again occurs, as also *tambu*. When Cook later on discovered the Sandwich Islands, he found the institution of tabu prevailing there with even more rigour than at Tonga, whereas it seemed to him to have been less strictly observed in the Society Islands, except as regards the tabu resulting from contact with the dead.[1] He gives a clear and consistent account of the notion involved, stating that tabu 'has a very comprehensive meaning, but in general signifies that a thing is forbidden,' being 'applied to all cases where things are not to be touched.' He also emphasizes its 'mysterious significance' and duly notes the 'mixture of religion' in a certain ceremony concerning which 'we seldom got any other answer to our inquiries but *taboo*.'[2] Moreover, he makes it clear that religion herein made common cause with law and government. In reference to the same ceremony, he says: 'When we returned to the king, he desired me to order the boat's crew not to stir from the boat; for, as every thing would, very soon, be *taboo*, if any of our people, or if their own, should be

[1] See J. Cook and J. King, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776–80*, London, 1784, i. 286, and *passim*.

[1] *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776–80*, ii. 249.

[2] *Ib.* i. 286, 350, ii. 40.

found walking about, they would be knocked down with clubs, nay, *mateed*, that is, killed.'[1]

Indeed, Captain King (who carries on the story after Cook's death) is perplexed to decide how far the 'implicit and scrupulous obedience' of the natives in regard to the prohibitions laid upon them—as when Karakakooa Bay was tabued, at the request of the navigators, while the remains of Captain Cook were being committed to the deep—was due to some 'religious principle' and how far to 'the civil authority of their chiefs.'[2] The whole account, however, makes it clear that king, chiefs, priests, and the gods themselves, formed one undivided theocracy, whereof tabu constituted the chief instrument, at once spiritual and temporal in its nature and effects. More especially, it ensured a complete control of the economic situation. Thus at Tonga the special officer who 'presided over the *taboo*' was a veritable food-controller:

'He and his deputies inspected all the produce of the island; taking care that every man should cultivate and plant his quota; and ordering what should be eat, and what not. By this wise regulation, they effectually guard against a famine; a sufficient quantity of ground is employed in raising provisions; and every article, thus raised, is secured from unnecessary waste.'[3]

For the rest, tabu was the corner-stone of the class-system, ensuring the subjection of women to men, of the lower orders to the chiefs, and of all to the king, whose very name was tabu on penalty of death.[4]

(*b*) *Primary connexion of Oceanic tabu with a theocratic system.*—Here, then, in this alliance of the religious with the civil forms of authority, we have the distinctive mark of tabu as understood in its local sense. R. Taylor's definition of it, as 'a religious observance established for political purposes,'[5] hits off what is at any rate its leading aspect in Oceania. In the Polynesian islands a class of chiefs with a social influence proportionate to their *mana*, or supernatural power, was everywhere recognized; and in the Eastern groups at any rate there were supreme potentates who might fairly be termed kings, though sometimes, as at Tonga in Mariner's day, the religious head of the community might be said to reign while the war-chief, his inferior in the hierarchy, actually governed.[6] On the other hand, no chieftainship proper is to be found in Melanesia. Here, however, the secret societies exercise a tumultuous, but none the less forcible, control over affairs by means of tabu; while, conversely, 'in cases where the English word taboo can be employed there is always in Melanesia human sanction and prohibition.'[7] Thus there is every reason to suppose that throughout the Pacific we have to do with customs belonging to a single type. This view is supported by the remarkable fact that, despite the diversity of tongues obtaining in this wide area, the word tabu in one of its dialectical forms, as well as the complementary term *mana*, is in general use. But, if the nature and name of the institution are uniform, so presumably will be its origin. On the strength of this argument, W. H. R. Rivers has recently tried to show that tabu in its Oceanic distribution stands everywhere alike for the prestige acquired and the authority exercised by an immigrant folk—his so-called '*kava* people'—in its dealings with an indigenous population of markedly inferior culture.[8] It is interesting to speculate how a system of tabus may have developed on the spot under stress of such culture-contact—how, for instance, barbarians, already worshipping gods and respecting private property, might come to impose their will on magic-haunted communistic savages, for whom threats rather than reasons must be provided as the grounds of obedience. On the other hand, if the immigrants came from Indonesia, as the theory assumes, it is also possible that they brought some form of the custom with them ready-made, since the Indonesian *pomali* is 'exactly equivalent to the "taboo" of the Pacific islanders.'

Thus in Timor 'the custom of "tabu" called here "pomáli," is very general, fruit trees, houses, crops, and property of all kinds being protected from depredation by this ceremony, the reverence for which is very great. A palm branch stuck across an open door, showing that the house is tabooed, is a more effectual guard against robbery than any amount of locks and bars.'[1]

This mode of indicating a tabu is similar to the Oceanic. Thus, when Cook wished to set up his observatory in the Sandwich Islands, the priests tabued the place for him by setting up wands;[2] and the *soloi*, or tabu-marks, of the Banks group in Melanesia usually consist of the leaves of some plant.[3] It may well be, then, that the property-mark, with its implication of a transferable curse, came into Oceania along with the notion of private ownership. It certainly was most effective in protecting property—far more so than the guns which the early mariners discharged at the thievish islanders with a like object in view.

(*c*) *Secondary developments of tabu in Oceania.*—It remains to note that, whereas the essence of tabu in its local signification consists, as has been shown, in a theocratic form of government, which in its turn may have developed by way of an apotheosis of landlordism, the ramifications of the notion are endless and cover the whole religion of Oceania, at any rate so far as it is taken in its negative aspect, namely as a system of scruples. The theocracy could consecrate a site, or devote a victim, or appropriate a house or canoe, or betroth a woman, or proclaim a rest-day for men or a close-time for game, all these being cases of the communication of tabu by a ritual act of imposition, such as could at will be neutralized by a ceremonial removal.[4] On the other hand, many tabus were inherent rather than acquired, such as those associated permanently with women, strangers, the sick, and the dead, or for the time being with the woman in child-birth or the warrior on a campaign. The world-wide distribution of similar beliefs concerning an infectious impurity makes it extremely improbable that they can be referred in the mass to an immigrant culture or treated as mere reasons of state, the by-products of the administrative scheme. At most we may say that, in so far as the direction of affairs was centralized and deliberate, they were incorporated in the political machine and to a like extent became subject to manipulation. Thus, at Hawaii in 1819, King Rihoriho at one stroke abrogated the laws of the tabu; though only, let us note, to make way for *la tabu*, the British Sunday.[5] So much, then, for the local or Oceanic sense of tabu with its special connotation of a theocratic system of controls, a more or less consciously organized body of sanctions backed by the joint authority of Church and State.

2. Scientific meaning of tabu.—(*a*) *Tabu as an aspect of rudimentary religion.*—For the purposes of the science of comparative religion it is convenient to drop the implication of a human sanction and to insist solely on the supernatural

[1] *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776–80*, i. 338.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 163. [3] *Ib.* i. 411. [4] *Ib.* ii. 170.
[5] *Te Ika a Maui*, London, 1855, p. 55.
[6] Cf. W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ed. J. Martin, London, 1817, ii. 87.
[7] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 215.
[8] Cf. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 239, 252, 384, 409, 485.

[1] A. R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*[2], London, 1869, i. 196, ii. 450.
[2] Cook-King, iii. 10, 36. [3] Rivers, i. 92.
[4] Cf. Taylor, pp. 78, 91.
[5] W. Ellis, *Narrative of a Tour through Hawaii*, London, 1826, pp. 15, 52, 95.

or mystic aspect of the penalties in store for the tabu-breaker. In this way it is possible to bring together under one head a large variety of avoidances characteristic of the less advanced peoples, of whom it may broadly be said that they have no king but custom. Just as their response to traditional rules is largely automatic, so, correspondingly, the rule itself has imputed to it a no less automatic power of self-maintenance and self-vindication. Indeed, so necessary is it for general purposes to lay stress on the immanence of the sanction normally attributed to a tabu that it is safer to deny the name altogether to prohibitions deriving their force mediately from a god or his earthly representative and to distinguish these as religious interdicts or bans. Tabu, in short, is to be understood as meaning 'unlucky to meddle with' rather than forbidden by edict human or divine. It belongs to what may be termed the perceptual (Lévy-Bruhl would say 'prelogical') stage of religion, when values are massively apprehended without analysis of their grounds. At this stage emotion of the collective or mobbish order is paramount as regards both the excitatory and the inhibitive processes that govern the social life. Now of all the emotions fear is inhibitor-in-chief, having in virtue of its haunting quality a special power of sustained control. A primary source of fear is the unfamiliar or strange as such; and this kind of fear in varying degree is always present as an element in that complex emotion of awe or reverence which is the root of religion. Tabu, then, stands for the whole mass of such fear-inspired inhibitions in so far as they proceed directly from the religious emotion, as it regulates the social tradition in the relative abeyance of reasoned direction. Here we have at any rate the psychological clue to a vast variety of customary abstinences—'negative rites,' as they may be called—of which the particular conditions are a matter for historical treatment in detail.

(*b*) *Tabu and the notion of contagion.*—It may next be noted that emotions are infectious. It is, indeed, the leading principle of mob-psychology that emotions are propagated more readily than ideas, their external manifestations lending themselves to unintelligent imitation. Moreover, fear is, perhaps, the most infectious of all. Hence the fear-inhibition embodied in tabu always implies an infectious unluckiness—a transferable curse on meddlers. As A. van Gennep in his analysis of the *fady* (=*tabu*) of Madagascar shows, the institution rests on two notions, one being that of *tohina*, 'contagion.'[1] 'Everything,' says Jevons, 'which comes in contact with a tabooed person or thing becomes itself as dangerous as the original object, becomes a fresh centre of infection, a fresh source of danger to the community.'[2]

Jevons goes on to discriminate between 'things taboo,' the primary sources of such contagion, and 'things tabooed,' in which the tabu-infection is not inherent but derivative.[3] 'A single thing taboo might infect the whole universe,' as he says with pardonable exaggeration;[4] but in practice the transmissible fear is strictly limited in its possible effects, being confined to certain channels prescribed by convention. Meanwhile it is not always easy to draw the line between the two classes. The clearest cases of 'things tabooed' are those in which, as in Oceania, a divine chief tabus something hitherto common, or *noa*—say, a hunting-ground—and then after a time restores it to ordinary use. But, when Jevons accepts at its face-value the Polynesian explanation that the tabu on the sick is due to the fact that they are possessed by an *atua*, or spirit, and therefore pronounces them 'tabooed but . . . not taboo,'[1] it is at least arguable that a 'pre-animistic' basis must be sought for the belief; for what more perceptibly contagious than certain (and those precisely the stranger and more alarming) forms of disease? It is surely no mere superstition to suppose that sickness—nay, as it were, death itself—is 'catching.' On the other hand, it is hardly profitable, in deference to the theory that the emotions of man afford the best criterion of his instincts, to regard 'things taboo' as so many danger-signals to which mankind has an innate predisposition to attend. Tabus need rather to be studied in relation to their proximate conditions, which are not biological but historical. In other words, tabus are primarily matters of custom, forming part of the social inheritance, not of the individual heredity.

(*c*) *Tabu and the notion of supernatural power.*—The other notion on which the tabu of Madagascar rests, according to van Gennep,[2] is that of *hasina* =*mana*, or supernatural power. The person or thing is not to be trifled with, because liable to react with a force of unknown range and degree. There is a spiritual electricity that must be insulated lest it blast the unwary. Now, if religion were all fear, such *mana* would rank as wholly bad, since fear is a shrinking from evil. But other primary constituents of the religious mood make rather for interest, receptivity, approach, communion. For reckless self-assurance, indeed—for what the Greeks knew as ὕβρις—there is always 'the devil to pay.' But fear tempered with wonder and submissiveness, and thus transmuted into reverence, is the forerunner of love. So *mana* has its good side as well, though from the standpoint of tabu this helpfulness remains, so to say, in reserve, being a consummation that lies beyond the purview of the fear-inhibition as such. Meanwhile to an advanced theology that has clarified its concepts by the method of antithesis the savage apprehension of *mana* by way of tabu seems blurred and equivocal, an experience of something monstrous, half-devil and half-god. And that there is some such ambiguity in the value perceived cannot be denied. The sacred and the abominable, the pure and the obscene, the hallowed and the accursed pivot within the same perturbed awareness of the object. Nevertheless, rudimentary religion has gone a long way towards defining in practice, if not in theory, the good and the bad manifestations of the hidden power. Thus the novice at initiation or the warrior on a campaign is tabu that he may seek and find grace in the self-concentration that ensues after spiritual crisis overcome. On the other hand, the criminal is tabu because his very soul is attainted; wherefore, as the words of his doom, 'Sacer esto,' imply, he cannot touch water and fire lest he sully their purity with his foulness.

(*d*) *Tabu as a source of personal religion.*—At this point it may be observed that the institution of tabu is not only the main organ of social discipline at the lower levels of culture, but likewise the seed-bed of personal religion. The latter function hinges on the fact that to be tabu with respect to society is at the same time to be tabu in relation to oneself. The external signs of this self-regarding attitude of precaution are often ludicrous enough, as when a man cannot feed himself, or must scratch his head with a stick, or needs to snuff up the holiness that exudes from his fingers. But an inward-seeking view reveals a profit even in such practices. The *mana* to be conserved is just that part of a man that he feels to be most

[1] *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, p. 17.
[2] F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 61 f.; see the whole of ch. vi. for examples.
[3] *Ib.* p. 69 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 69.

[1] *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, p. 70.
[2] *Loc. cit.*

worth the saving—the will for power. Such power may be coveted for temporal ends. Savage shepherds of the people are not more disinterested than the rest of their kind. But at least it is proximately envisaged as a spiritual power. At least it is the sort of power that comes with and after self-abnegation and the exercise of humility. There is good evidence, too, that a sense of unworthiness consequent on the violation of his self-regarding tabus—as one might say, his 'vows'—is enough to cause voluntary resignation of office on the part of the primitive wonder-worker. There can be no doubt, then, that the experience both of the access of inspiration and of its withdrawal is often perfectly genuine; and, again, that the due safeguarding of such a gift is a lesson first acquired in the school of tabu. Further, not to lay exclusive stress on the ecstatic experience peculiar to the religious genius, the whole development of personality, so far as this comes about by way of reverie and reflexion, arises largely out of the tabu condition. No other such opportunity is afforded in the gregarious life of the savage tribesman for that self-communing whereby man eventually becomes master instead of slave of the sense-world. Self-respect, again, is nourished on privacy; the king or priest must keep his distance from the *profanum vulgus*, lest he make himself cheap not only in their eyes but also in his own.[1] For the rest, tabu stands for the etiquette of savage life, and by encouraging mutual consideration enables manners to ripen into morals, the end of which is freedom.

(*e*) *Danger of the over-development of tabu.*—Hitherto the fruitfulness, the educative value, of tabu as a factor in religion of the perceptual or rudimentary type has been chiefly signalized. After all, the inhibition of impulse affords the measure of human advance. But such inhibition may be overdone, with paralysis of the will to live as a consequence. Tabu as such represents negation, and a religion made up mostly of negations is necessarily sterile. Denial, even self-denial, cannot but be soul-destroying, if taken as an end in itself. Hence a meticulous scrupulosity is a mark of degraded religion. Nothing, *e.g.*, is so characteristic of the dairy-cult of the Todas as the web of tabus in which every action of the priest-dairyman is emmeshed, and Rivers not without good reason comments: 'The Todas seem to show us how the over-development of the ritual aspect of religion may lead to atrophy of the ideas and beliefs through which the religion has been built up.'[2]

Even a positive rite such as prayer may degenerate into formalism. Much more is this likely to happen with the negative rite or tabu, wherein the nature of the spiritual activity subserved is less immediately manifest. In the last stage of such decay—and in this also the case of the Todas is instructive[3]—the scrupulosity itself tends to become a sham, an organized hypocrisy of evasions. The function of ritual in religion is to relieve attention in regard to things indifferent, and of negative ritual to do so in regard to things actually disturbing—all this in order to set attention free for active converse with the divine. It is true that there is in many forms of religious experience—and they are perhaps especially to the fore in rudimentary religion—a characteristic prelude of apparent inaction, a spell of listening, as it were; and, so far as the tabu condition corresponds to this halt on the threshold, it is apt to seem barren of results when it is not. To judge fairly in each case, we must watch the ritual drama as a whole to see whether the passivity induced is of the pregnant order. As an incident in a 'rite of passage' to a higher plane of experience, the chrysalis stage of the soul is symptomatic of development. If, on the other hand, the will to win through be somehow asphyxiated on the way, negation has triumphed; too much safeguarding has destroyed; the husk has stifled the germinal process.

(*f*) *Methods of studying tabus in detail.*—This cursory sketch of tabu aims at no more than a generalized version of the institution as it bears on the earlier growth of the spirit of religion. A fuller treatment might be based on the study of the particular systems of tabu native to the various ethnic areas—as has here been attempted only in regard to the Pacific region—when many differences of detail and shades of local colour would doubtless come to light. In defence of the present method, however, it can be urged that to deal with tabus on the ethnological principle would well-nigh involve a survey of religions on the same distributive plan, since every savage people has a religion and every savage religion has its tabus. Nay more, savage religion tends to be co-extensive with the social life itself; so that a regular panorama of cultures may seem to be the logical outcome of such a method. Another way of dividing up the subject (but one again that must inevitably lead too far afield) would be that of distinguishing certain main departments of activity typical of primitive society as a whole and showing how each is conditioned by its own set of special tabus. The food-interest, *e.g.*, is engirdled by one vast network of ritual controls, the sex-interest by another. Indeed, the critical stages of every vital process are hung about with such customary danger-signals. Sometimes these traditional fears can be shown to correspond to facts; more often they appear arbitrary, sheer aberrations of fancy, due to false analogy or what not, that have been incorporated in the tribal lore by a historical chance. Thus, however detailed our study of tabus, we are not likely to arrive at the explanation of minor features. For these reasons it has seemed preferable here simply to enlarge on the general principle that, at the primitive level, the object of religious belief or worship is always tabu, just as it is always *mana* as well; and that, moreover, tabu forms the hither aspect of the religious experience, inasmuch as fruition is reached through fear.

(*g*) *Tabu from the standpoint of civilization.*—Tabu being properly an institution of savagery, it would hardly be in point to consider at length its ulterior consequences for civilization—as apart from its survivals in folk-lore, which indeed are numerous. But a word about such after-effects may be added by way of conclusion. We must not look for them solely within the sphere of religion as it is now. With the gradual substitution of a rational for an emotional system of controls, there has come about a decentralization of authority whereby disciplines once merged in an all-pervasive religious sanction have been invested with quasi-independent functions. Politics to-day deals with the divine right of kings, law with the sacredness of property, morals with the virtues of temperance and chastity, and so forth. In all such cases the tendency is to refuse any validity to the old-world sentiment of tabu. Reason prefers to rest its case on grounds of so-called common sense. At most the immediacy and seeming unconditionality of the tabu-feeling might enlist the sympathies of certain schools of ethical thought. As for modern religion, while it hesitates to adopt a rationalist outlook, it is naturally anxious to purge its traditional rites of the mildew of ancient superstition. On all sides, however, so far as the influence of a philosophy of man makes

[1] Cf. *kapukapu*, 'to put on airs of distance or separation from others,' with *manana*, 'to respect oneself,' in E. Tregear, *The Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, Wellington, N.Z., 1891, pp. 203, 473.

[2] *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 455. [3] *Ib.*

itself felt, there is of late manifested a deeper interest in the emotional life, more especially as it relates to conduct. Alike in social psychology with its study of the crowd and in individual psychology with its doctrine of the subconscious the conviction is growing that society and mind alike are controlled from below, as it were, as well as from above—that reason is at best a constitutional ruler whose authority rests not on force but on consent. It may be, then, that, examined from this point of view, the primitive institution of tabu will be found to embody elemental principles of order that to-day are as active as ever beneath the surface of a changed custom. Experience, which is experiment, has doubtless taught us to reject many a freakish usage dear to the old order; but this experience, which in its most critical form is science, bids us seek beneath the accidents of history for those essential laws whereby our racial sense of direction is continuously maintained.

LITERATURE.—(i.) For tabu in Oceania see the works cited above, early authorities such as Cook and Mariner being especially enlightening, since the original social system has long been gone, at any rate in Polynesia; compare also Th. Waitz and G. Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, vi.; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, iv.; G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, do. 1884; *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori, do. 1884; since the same cultural influences presumably extend to Indonesia and the Malay region (including Madagascar), see also W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, do. 1900. A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, brings the local into relation with a general interpretation.

(ii.) For a world-wide review of the facts about tabu see J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[3], 12 vols., London, 1911–15, esp. vol. iii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, and for his general theory vol. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 111 ff., also *Psyche's Task*[2], do. 1913. The subject being germane to any systematic account of primitive religion, it is hard to draw up a short list of authorities, but the following, in addition to those already quoted in the text, will be found useful: W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894; E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, do. 1902; E. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, esp. p. 427 f.; and, on special aspects of tabu, Crawley, *FL* vi. [1895] 130 ff.; E. Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, London, 1914; H. Webster, *Rest Days: a Study in Early Law and Morality*, New York, 1916. For a psychological study of tabu see R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914; E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, do. 1910.

R. R. MARETT.

TAHITIANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TALISMAN.—See CHARMS AND AMULETS.

TALMUD.—Two great works are known under the title 'Talmud'—a word (תַּלְמוּד) which denotes primarily 'teaching' and secondarily 'learning.' The two works are the Palestinian and Babylonian recensions, both of which are, in form, commentaries on the text of the Mishnāh (מִשְׁנָה). The Mishnāh ('repetition,' hence oral teaching by repeated recitation) was completed about A.D. 200. The Talmud consists of the Mishnāh with the Gemara (גְּמָרָא). It represents the scholastic activities of the Jewish Rabbis from the beginning of the 3rd to the close of the 5th century A.D.

The history of the compilation of the Talmud has been dealt with in many treatises and essays.[1] It is not the design of the present article to add to these or to reconsider the critical literary problems involved. Two practical questions will occupy us: (1) the attitude of the outside world to the Talmud,[2] and (2) the causes and nature of the permanent value of the Talmud within Judaism.

1. The Talmud in history.—The century which saw the completion of the Talmud also witnessed the beginning of interference with the normal circulation of the Rabbinical literature. In the year 553 the Emperor Justinian was called upon to arbitrate on a difference which arose between two sections of Jewry in the Byzantine realm. Whereas some were desirous of publicly reading the Scriptures both in Greek and in Hebrew, others wished to use the Hebrew only. Justinian[1] ordered the præfect Areobindus to promulgate the imperial decision in favour of the use of Greek (the Synagogue might use Aquila if it preferred it to the Septuagint), or of other vernacular tongues such as Latin in the Italian provinces. The emperor, moreover, forbade any attempt on the part of the heads of the schools or elders to prevent the use of the vernacular by devices or excommunication. Most significant of all was Justinian's interdiction of the practice of giving the Haggādic exposition (*δευτέρωσις*) after the reading of the Scripture. The opening words of the rescript explain Justinian's intention. The Jews, he suggested, should read their Scriptures with an eye to the hidden meaning and see in them a prophetic announcement of Christianity. Hence the emperor would naturally desire to curb the popularity of the Rabbinic exegesis, which of course would confirm the Jews in their refusal to admit Christological interpretations. Thus Justinian, who introduced drastic legislative enactments against the Jews, was also among the first to attempt interference with the free use and spread of their literature.[2]

We must here confine our attention to that phase of interference which concerns the Talmud. It was not till the 13th cent. that the attack assumed practical shape. Paris, in the year 1244, was the scene of the first public burning of copies of the Talmud. Before that date the Rabbinic doctrines had been assailed in the *de Insolentia Judæorum* of Agobard; but from the Paris incident onwards these assaults became far more frequent and dangerous. Nicholas Donin of La Rochelle had, while a Jew, been excommunicated by the Rabbi Yeḥiel of Paris because of his denial of the validity of the Rabbinic tradition. This occurred in 1225; he subsequently joined the Franciscans, and in 1239 he formally laid an accusation against the Talmud before Pope Gregory IX., who addressed bulls to many lands (including England) ordering the seizure of copies of the Talmud pending a public inquiry. In France the matter was seriously taken up. Charges of blasphemy, immorality, particularism, and absurdity were formulated; a public dispute between Donin and four Rabbis was ordered. The humours and futilities of such debates have been satirized in Heine's poem 'Disputation.' But the consequences were deplorable. The Talmud was condemned; many copies of it were burnt; and popular outbreaks against the Jews resulted.

Within a few years similar scenes were enacted in Barcelona. Here again the attack originated with a Jewish convert to Christianity, Pablo Christiani. He instigated a public debate between himself and Naḥmanides in 1263, as to the attributes and coming of the Messiah, and the Rabbi was sentenced to exile because his defence of Judaism was pronounced blasphemous. In 1264 Christiani induced Pope Clement IV. to appoint a Commission of censors, who expunged all those passages which appeared derogatory to Christianity. In particular, as time went on, Talmudic references to ancient paganism were misinterpreted as being attacks on the Church. This charge was brought forward by yet another erstwhile Jew, Geronimo de Sante Fé, who engineered a public dispute in Tortosa in 1410, and, like Christiani, submitted to the verdict of the crowd the most intricate problems of Biblical exegesis in relation to Messianic belief. The practical outcome again

[1] See 'Literature' below.

[2] *Cf.* art. ANTI-SEMITISM.

[1] *Novellæ Constitutiones*, 146.

[2] The view of Justinian's rescript given in the text is the one usually adopted. It is by no means the only possible explanation, for it is possible that what Justinian prohibited was the use of the traditional Aramaic translation (see art. TARGUMS).

was not a settlement as to the significance of Is 53, but the confiscation of copies of the Talmud.

Of much greater interest was the controversy which waged round the Talmud at the beginning of the 16th century. Owing to the part taken by Reuchlin (*q.v.*) in this incident, the Talmud became the battle-ground between the old and the new, between the obscurantists and the humanists. Again the protagonist in the attack on the Talmud was one who had left the Synagogue for the Church. It must not, however, be thought that the proverbial zeal of converts has invariably assumed this guise. In the recent assaults made on the Talmud by representatives of modern anti-Semitism (*q.v.*), powerful among the defenders of the fair fame of the Rabbinic system were such famous Judæo-Christian scholars as Daniel Chwolsohn and Paulus Cassel. The opponent of Reuchlin was of a different type. We know very little as to the antecedents of Johann Pfefferkorn, of whom Erasmus said that from a bad Jew he became an execrable Christian ('ex scelerato Judæo sceleratissimus Christianus'), for no reliance can be placed on the insinuations made by satirists that in his earlier days Pfefferkorn had added to the respectable calling of a butcher the disreputable career of a burglar. All that we know is that Pfefferkorn was animated by a strong animosity towards his former co-religionists, that his fanaticism far exceeded his learning, and that he found support for his campaign among the Dominicans of Cologne. Though the Jews had been excluded from that city in 1426 and only regained rights of free domicile there with the coming of the French in 1798, Cologne remained during the 15th and 16th centuries the headquarters of the campaign against Jewish books.

It would be unprofitable to repeat the details of the oft-told tale of Pfefferkorn's pamphlets and Reuchlin's rejoinders; of the seizure of Hebrew books in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1509, their restoration, and the long-drawn-out struggle that ensued in Rome. Nor is it of any importance to us now whether or not Pfefferkorn wrote the works that bear his name. The whole incident would have been forgotten but for certain facts. In the first place, this battle of the books gave rise to a famous satire, the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*, the first part of which appeared at Tübingen towards the end of 1514. The effect of this rather savage satire was instantaneous and permanent. As an exposure of obscurantism it remains one of the most masterly efforts ever put forward on behalf of humanism. The struggle between Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn became, in short, elevated to a higher plane. Reuchlin, once for all, struck the true note when he protested against the destruction of a literature because elements of it were distasteful to certain of its critics. 'If the Talmud contains errors,' he said, 'let us render them innocuous by studying to sift the chaff from the grain. Do not burn the Talmud, but read it.' It is to Reuchlin that we owe the foundation of Hebrew chairs in the universities; the first Hebrew text printed in Germany was the edition of seven Psalms used by Reuchlin in 1512. The study of Hebrew in Christian Europe commenced with him, was taken up by his immediate successors, and has never since been relinquished.[1] Reuchlin's devotion to Rabbinism began with his interest in the Ḳabbālā. But Hebrew was the passion of his life. And there is no doubt that to him we owe that interest in the Talmud which soon led to the publication of a complete printed edition of all its tomes. There were, as we shall see, printed editions of parts of the Talmud available in 1510, when he wrote that 'he would like to pay the price for a copy of the Talmud twice over but he had not yet been able to obtain one.'[1] He was referring to MS copies. Within about a decade of the year in which Reuchlin wrote this lament it was easy to procure the Bomberg edition printed in Venice. It was fortunate for scholarship that Daniel Bomberg began to print the Talmud in 1520, before the censorship intruded its hand. Yet the censorship has this value. In 1550 the Talmud was placed on the Index. But the Tridentine Synod in 1564 provided that the Talmud might be circulated, if the passages obnoxious to Christianity were deleted. This was done, and between 1579 and 1581 there was completed the censored Basel edition which formed the model for many subsequent editions. In this form, claims the Basel editor, the Talmud may be read by Christians not only without reproach but even with profit ('etiam cum fructu a nostris legi potest'). The Inquisitor Marco Marino went through the Venice edition of 1546–50, censored it, and affixed his name to the expurgated version page by page. The expurgated passages have often been edited and commented on separately. Attacks on the Talmud, nevertheless, continued. As late as 1757 copies of the Talmud were publicly burned in Poland as a result of the Kamenetz-Podolsk disputation. Literary onslaughts have naturally continued, and modern anti-Semitism has displayed much energy in seeking in the pages of the Talmud grounds for attacks on the Jews. Those pages contain enough and to spare of superstition, narrowness, folly, and intolerance. But the faults are superficial, the merits fundamental; and it is because of the latter that the Talmud retains its permanent worth.

2. Permanent value.—In the first instance the Talmud represents more fully than any other Jewish work the lineal development of the religion of the OT. In several important particulars, the Talmud, indeed, represents an advance on the OT. The view (adopted by the school of R. H. Charles) is untenable that Rabbinism was a degeneration, while Apocalypse was an advance. On the contrary, all the nobler elements of the OT teaching were absorbed into and developed by Rabbinism, which was essentially a prophetic system. The moral life was at once the basis of religion and its ultimate outcome. The Talmud concerned itself with life. It therefore drew little or no distinction between the secular and the religious. This is not the place to discuss the Pharisaism which is assailed in the Gospels. For, however we explain the discrepancy, the Pharisaism of the Gospels is not identical with the Pharisaism of the Talmud.

Hence, though the Talmud, because it combines secular and religious into one whole, is often inclined to attach undue importance to ritual or customary trivialities, it cannot be said that it does so at the expense of the great principles. And, when all has been said, the fact remains that, difficult though it be to harmonize the daily round with the higher calls of spiritual moments, the Talmud did effect this harmonization with a considerable measure of success. The Talmud is interpenetrated with the presence of God in human life, and worship was not merely confined to the hours spent in congregational prayers. The home was sanctified as well as the synagogue. This fact constituted and constitutes the worth of the Talmud to the Judaism of all ages. The liberals who have rejected the authority of the Talmud have not rejected its spirit and its outlook.[2] They, like the conservatives, feel that the hallowing of life is the purpose of life. And, among the many attempts to effect this hallowing of life—in relation primarily to God, but also in intercourse

[1] S. R. Hirsch, *A Book of Essays*, London, 1905, p. 14.

[1] *A Book of Essays*, p. 141. [2] Cf. art. Liberal Judaism.

with man—the Talmud must be conceded a high place.

In the main, then, the Talmud retains its worth because it has so thoroughly absorbed the prophetic conception of the close interconnexion of religion and life. But life is not altogether expressible in terms of conduct. There is the intellectual side. Now, for long intervals, the Talmud was the main means by which the Jew cultivated his mind. Some of the greatest Talmudists of the Middle Ages were indeed also devoted to science and philosophy, in the technical sense of those terms. But there were masses of Jews who knew no other intellectual interest than the Talmud and the allied literature. The nature of the Talmud saved them from stagnation. For the Talmud is a work of most manifold interest. It concerns itself with every phase of human activity. To read it intelligently—and it was assuredly so read—was a liberal education in the arts and sciences and philosophies. So wide is its range that a student of the Talmud is perforce acquainted with very many subjects which nowadays are regarded as distinct disciplines. The mind of the student was kept alert; his attitude never became scholastic; at every point he was in contact with actualities. It was an essential function of the Talmud to maintain this alertness, so that to con over its pages was not identical with losing oneself in an obsolete past. The Talmud breathes with vital freshness.

This enables us to understand why the Talmud has never been superseded by the codes founded upon it even by authorities so competent and able as Moses Maimonides and Joseph Qaro. The codes omit the very element which makes the Talmud so important, so unique. The codes reduce ritual and religious conduct to rule; the decisions are stated in precise paragraphs; they are anonymous. But the Talmud presents processes as well as results; there is little of rule in it, less of precision; and the dicta are largely associated with the names of their authors. We see the religious evolution in action. And, just as it is in action in the older book, it remained in action in the modern life. The claim often put forward by recent Talmudists that their beloved tomes represent a progressive Judaism is well founded. Codes have an air of finality, while the key-note of the Talmud is continuity.

For the Talmud, after all, comes into line with the newer theory of the evolution of religion. The effect of the Talmud, it has been said, was to obscure the difference between Scripture and Tradition. This may be true, but modern criticism tends (on quite other grounds) to obliterate the distinction. The Scripture is itself a traditional evolution—so the newer theories hold. The Talmud in essence anticipated this theory, not in the direction of belittling the divine character of the written text, but in the direction of magnifying the human part in the authorization of the message. Man has his part to play in bringing the Law into operation—in interpreting it, which is often another term for expanding it.

We can here merely mention the beauties of the Talmud, its felicities of thought, its flights of fancy, its parables, its poetry. The Jew did not merely feed his mind on the wit of the Talmud or his spirit on its idealism. His heart and imagination found their nourishment there also. From its pages the liturgy derived some of its choicest prayers. In germ, the Talmud already contains the mysticism which in later ages grew up so luxuriantly in Judaism. That this mysticism rarely became antinomian was due almost entirely to the Talmud, which more than permitted—for it encouraged—individualism as well as communism in the religious life. Our present point, however, is that volumes could be compiled (volumes have been compiled) out of the fine gems presented in a literary form which is unlike that of any other work—unlike in grotesqueness as well as in efficiency.

In the presence of these merits the attacks on the Talmud failed. Partly they were theological, partly moral, partly social. Ridicule was cast on its trivialities; fault was found with its religious conceptions; objection was taken to its attitude to Gentiles. These unfavourable criticisms were not all unfounded, for the Talmud contains much of inferior value, and bears the marks of the different ages and strata of thought in which it grew up. Nevertheless, some of the attacks on the Talmud were absolutely false; in others the assailants confused the attitude towards the Rome which destroyed the Temple with the attitude to the Rome which became the seat of the papacy. Often, too, overmuch importance was attached to the *obiter dicta* of isolated Rabbis. When, however, it was protested by Donin in 1239, and by Romano in 1553, that it was the Talmud that confirmed the Jews in their obstinate fidelity to the Synagogue, the charge was largely just. But that must be assigned to the Talmud as a merit, not as a fault. At all events it explains, perhaps in the most effective manner, how it came about that a work, so curiously alien from the modern canons of excellence in literature, has maintained its position not only with those Jews who more or less order their lives in accordance with it, but also with those who, rebels against its authority, retain an affectionate regard for its spirit. Written in style far removed from modernity, the Talmud is one of the most modern of books.

LITERATURE.—S. Schechter, in *HDB* v. 57–66, with full bibliography; W. Bacher, in *JE* xii. 1–27 (also with bibliography); H. Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, ii. chs. xiii.–end, and elsewhere in passages indicated in detail in the Index volume (1898) to the American ed. of the translation, p. 589 ff. The well-known unfavourable view of Schürer is contained in his section on 'Life under the Law,' in his *History*, Eng. tr., II. ii. § 28. An account of the Talmud is given in I. Abrahams, *Short History of Jewish Literature*, London, 1906, ch. iii. Special attention may be drawn to the brilliant essays of E. Deutsch (*Literary Remains*, London, 1874) and J. Darmesteter (*Reliques scientifiques*, Paris, 1890).

I. ABRAHAMS.

TAMIL-SPEAKING PEOPLES.—See DRAVIDIANS.

TAMMUZ.—

Tammuz was the West Semitic form of the name of the great Asiatic nature-god, typifying the changing seasons in their relation to man's needs, desires, and passions, though the last-named were far from being so pronounced in connexion therewith as the other two aspects. For its meaning, and also other names of Tammuz, see §§ 7, 10, below.

1. The old view of the legend of Tammuz.—Prior to the successful reading of the Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions the legend of Tammuz was regarded as being exclusively West Semitic, owing, apparently, to the scene of the god's activities being located, in the then extant records, in Syria. There was considerable difficulty, however, in finding an acceptable root by which the name of the god might be explained.

2. Its most familiar versions.—According to the classic legend of Tammuz, his mother had unnatural intercourse with her own father, urged thereto by Aphrodite, whom she had offended. Pursued by her father, who sought to kill her for this crime, she prayed to the gods, who changed her into a tree, from whose trunk Adonis (the Græco-Syriac name of Tammuz) was in due time born. So charmed was Aphrodite with the beauty of the infant that, placing him in a chest, she

handed him to Persephone to take care of. The goddess of the under world, however, when she found what a treasure she had in her keeping, refused to part with him again. Zeus was therefore appealed to, and he decided that for four months in the year Adonis should be left to himself, four should be spent with Aphrodite, and the remaining four with Persephone. A variant account, however, agrees with the Babylonian legend in making him pass six months with Êreš-ki-gal (Persephone) and six with Ištar, or Aphrodite. The classic versions represent Adonis, or Tammuz, as being passionately fond of hunting, and undeterred therefrom by the fiercest quarry. His end was tragic, as he was slain through the tusk of a wild boar piercing his groin (see § 14).

3. The Syrian versions.—The centre of the Syrian worship of Tammuz was probably Gebal; in any case, Balthi ('the [divine] Lady,' as Aphrodite seems to have been called in the extreme west of Asia) was believed to have migrated thither from her realm of Cyprus for love of Tammuzo (Tammuz). But before Tammuzo she had loved Ares (Mars)[1] and thereby aroused the jealousy of her husband Hephæstus. In this version Tammuz is described as the son of Cuthar, king of the Phœnicians, to whom, when she fled from Cyprus, Balthi made all the villages around subject. It was not the irresponsible act of a wild boar, however, that caused the death of Tammuz, but the jealousy of either Aphrodite's husband Hephæstus or her lover Ares, who came and slew Tammuz on Lebanon whilst he was hunting wild boars.

The Syrian lexicographer Bar Bahlul also gives the legend as he had heard it: 'Tomuzo was, as they say, a hunter shepherd and chaser of wild beasts; who when Balathi loved him took her away from her husband. And when her husband went forth to seek her Tomuzo slew him,' but was himself slain later on by a wild boar which he encountered in the wilderness, and his father made a great weeping for him in the month named after him.

The Rabbinical references to Tammuz are more curious than instructive with regard to the history and development of the myths concerning him.

One (that of Rabbi Solomon Isaaki, or Rashi), commenting on Ezk 8^{14}, in order to connect the root of the name Tammuz with the Chaldæan *aza*, 'to make hot,' describes it as 'an image which the women made hot in the inside, and its eyes were of lead, and they melted by reason of the heat of the burning, and it seemed as if it wept; and they (the women) said, "He asketh for offerings."'

This and other varying traditions concerning Tammuz, however, seem to belong to the Christian era.

4. The worship of Tammuz in Syria.—In all probability the mourning for Hadadrimmon mentioned by Zechariah (12^{11}) is a reflexion of the lamentations for Tammuz, with whom this deity is said to have become identified; and in a passage in Amos (8^{10}) the Israelites lament as for 'an only son.' The most noteworthy Biblical passage, however, is seemingly that in Jeremiah (22^{18}), where it is said that they shall not lament for Jehoiakim, saying, 'Ah my brother! or, Ah sister! Ah lord! or, Ah his glory!' and where the word 'sister' suggests the sympathy of the mourners for his bereaved spouse or lover. When Belili, his sister, in the Babylonian legend, says, 'My brother, only (one), do not cause me pain'[2] (by leaving the world again to go to the regions below), we have perhaps a better parallel. Byblos, the Biblical Gebal, was the centre of the worship of Tammuz in Syria, where, in the month of June, the funeral-festival of the smitten sun-god was held, and lasted for seven days. 'Gardens of Adonis'—flower-vases planted with seeds which sprang up quickly, and as quickly, owing to lack of moisture, faded away—were prepared by the mourning women as emblems of the early death of the youthful Adonis. Throngs of wailing women filled the streets and the gates of the temple, tearing their hair, disfiguring their faces, and gashing their breasts. The Galli—emasculated priests of Ashtoreth, the spouse of Tammuz—took part in the mourning for 'the bridegroom of her youth.' These days of mourning were followed by days of rejoicing for his resurrection, during which a papyrus-head came over the waters of the Mediterranean from Alexandria—an emblem of the severed limbs of Osiris, which, gathered up by Isis, his inconsolable spouse, after he had been dismembered by Typhon, had of old arrived at Gebal. Thus did the legend of Tammuz assimilate itself with the Egyptian myth of the sun-god Osiris.

5. Tammuz in Babylonia, his birth-place.—So far Babylonian sources have furnished but few of the details of the Syrian and the Greek versions of the myth of Tammuz. To all appearance the legend had not been carried from Syria to Babylonia, as might be expected, but the reverse. In its original form it must have been of considerable antiquity. According to the archaic list of royal names[1] discovered at Nippur (*Niffer*), and now preserved in the museum of the University of Pennsylvania, Dumu-zi, as the Babylonians called Tammuz, was a king of Erech and ruled for 100 years. His predecessor was the god Lugal-banda, who reigned for no less than 1200 years, whilst his successor was the half-divine and only half-historical king of Erech Supuri, Gilgameš, who ruled for 160 or possibly 180 years. According to this record, Tammuz was a fisherman (Sumerian *šu-ḫa*) of the city Ḫa-a, a site as yet unidentified, but which one would expect to find somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. Though king of Erech, Tammuz was more especially associated with Êri-du, the divine city of Êa, the god of the waters, at the head of the same waterway, and it was only natural that a maritime people, such as the southern Babylonians were, should make Tammuz a fisherman. In that part of the land he was evidently the god of the fruitfulness of the teeming waters, just as, inland, he was god of the fruitfulness of the fertile Babylonian plain.

6. Ištar's search for Tammuz in Hades.—Outlines of this legend are given in the articles BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS[2] and HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Babylonian).[3] From this text we see that Tammuz was, at the time of Ištar's descent, in the under world with Êreš-ki-gal (Persephone), whither he had descended in accordance with the decision of the king of the gods (Bel-Merodach = Zeus). This legend likewise shows that Tammuz had become the lover of Ištar, or, as the record puts it, 'the husband of her youth.' The sacrifices which she was willing to make on his account are noteworthy, for at each of the seven gateways of 'the land of No-Return' she parted—under protest—with an article of apparel or adornment, until she appeared in the presence of the queen of the region perfectly naked. As things went wrong on earth owing to the absence of the goddess of love, Šamaš, Sin, and Êa bestirred themselves and secured her release. Here the subject suddenly changes, and the name of Tammuz appears in the text for the first time:

'If she [Êreš-ki-gal] hath not given thee her dismissal, return to her.
Upon Tammuz, the husband of [her] you[th],
Pour out pure water, [sprinkle] sweet oil.

[1] Mars is probably to be identified with the Bab.-Nergal rather than with En-urta (Ninip). The former was the spouse of Êreš-ki-gal (Persephone). (See § 10 below.)
[2] See § 6 below.

[1] See *ExpT* xxvii. [1915–16] 519a.
[2] *ERE* ii. 315b. [3] *Ib.* vi. 645a.

Clothe him with a festive garment, let him strike up with the flute of lapis-stone—
Let the joy-maidens dance, [let] the honoured one . . .
[Then] Belili set [down] her instrument,
[And] "eye-stones" filled [her] la[p ?]—[1]
[When] she heard her brother's voice, Belili smote her instrument . . .
Her "eye-stones"[2] filled [her] thoughts (?).
"My brother, only (one), do not cause [me] pain (?)."
On the day Tammuz plays on the lapis-flute, they will play along with him the tambour of chalcedony (?).
The men-mourners and the women-mourners will play along with him.
May the dead (?) arise and smell the incense.'

Belili, mentioned here as the sister of Tammuz, appears also in the great list of gods[3] in connexion with Alala, as forms of the deities of the heavens, Anu^{m} and Anatu^{m}. The flute of Tammuz, like the divine vine at Êridu, was of lapis-stone, emblematic of the blue sky, and it is not unlikely that the other objects mentioned—Belili's 'eye-stones' and the 'tambour'—were of precious and similarly symbolical materials.

7. Other Babylonian references to Tammuz.—The first place ought probably to be assigned to the lists of gods, which furnish us with some of his names, and the deities with whom he was identified. The transcription of the group standing, in Sumerian, for Tammuz is 'Dumu-zi,' though a longer form, 'Dumu-zida,' is often found. The commonly accepted rendering of this group into Semitic Babylonian is *mâru kênu*, 'the true (or faithful) son.' Of the lists in which the name is found the most important is probably the trilingual text (two dialects of Sumerian and Semitic Babylonian equivalents) published in *WAI* ii. pl. 59. In that inscription his character as a sun-god is indicated by the fact that his name comes towards the end of the section referring to the sun-god Šamaš, after Kêttu and Mêšaru, that deity's two attendants.[4] After this comes Ṭu-zi-zi (? from Tumu-zi), in standard Sumerian [Dumu]-zi, rendered by *šu-ma—i.e.* transferring Dumu-zi into the Semitic Babylonian column—and from the next line we see that he bore in Sumerian also the name of U-libir-si (dialectic) or Enligir-si, probably meaning 'the lord of the righteous covenant,' or the like. The next line, which begins a new section, has the name of Sir-du, dialectic Ṣir-ṭumu, the mother of Tammuz. Other deities in this section are 'the lady of the plain,' Ištar, and 'the lady of the gods.' A section giving further names of these goddesses follows, and then comes the final section of the tablet, beginning with Êreš-kigal and explaining her as Allatu^{m}, the Babylonian Persephone. Important as showing the feminine aspect of Tammuz, which is also visible in the Syro-Greek view of the deity, is the list[5] in which he is called Ama-ušumgal-ana, 'the peerless mother of heaven,' which may be one of the aspects of the planet Venus, described[6] as 'male at sunrise.' Another name, En-mersi, dialectic for Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagaš, identifies Tammuz with that deity and stamps him specifically as the great god of agriculture.[7]

8. The abodes of Tammuz in Babylonia.—The chronological list preserved at Philadelphia, U.S.A.,[8] makes Tammuz a king of Erech and seems to indicate that his native place was a city expressed by the characters Ḫa-a. In the incantation published in *WAI* iv. pl. 15, however, Êridu seems to have been his chief city, of which, therefore, Ḫa-a may have been a suburb or even another name:

'In Êridu a black vine grew—in a sacred spot it was made.
Its substance was white-flaked lapis-stone, planted in the Deep.
Êa's path in Êridu is filled with fruitfulness—
His seat is the [central] place of the earth.
His abode is the bed of Engur [the Abyss].
In his holy house, which is like a forest, [his] shelter is set—no man can enter therein.
In the midst of it is Šamaš [and] Tammuz [Dumu-zi],
Between the mouths of the rivers [or canals] on both sides.'

Here follow the names of the waterways in question: Ka-ḫengala, Igi-ḫengala, and Ka-na-ab-ul, though the true total seems to have been four.[1]

Instead of 'the god Šamaš (and) Tammuz' we might read 'the sun-god Tammuz,' which would correctly describe his position in the Babylonian pantheon. The Sumerian original has expressed the name of Tammuz by the feminine Ama-ušumgal-ana.[2] The connexion of Tammuz with the vine of Êridu, the Paradise-city, stamps him here likewise as one of the gods of fertility, and it is owing to this that he is so closely connected with the god Êa, to whose nourishing streams the great fruitfulness of the land was due. It is noteworthy that Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagaš, who was identified with him, bore also the name of Uru, 'the husbandman.'[3]

9. Tammuz as the herdsman.—It has already been noted that Dumu-zi, or Tammuz, was called the fisherman (*šu-ḫa = bayaru*), but later he appeared as 'the herdsman.' This view of the deity is referred to in another incantation:

'The milk of a yellow goat which has been brought forth in the holy fold of Tammuz [Dumu-zida]—
The milk of a goat of the flock—may he give thee with his holy hand.
Pour it then into the skin of an undefiled she-goat.
Azag-suga, the uz-maḫ-Enlila ['glorious goat of the god Enlila'], has caused [it] to be eaten with his sacred hand.
Merodach, son of Êridu, has given the incantation—
May Nin-aḫa-kuddu, the lady of the limpid fountain, make him [the sick man] holy, make him pure.'

'The incantation of the milk of the yellow goat, and the flour of the undefiled she-goat's skin.'

The antiquity of the association of Tammuz with the flocks in Babylonia is shown by the noteworthy text in *The Amherst Tablets*, i. (London, 1908) no. 119, where 'fleece' is expressed by the phrase 'sheep of the sky.' This indicates that the flocks of Tammuz, the sun-god of spring, were the clouds illuminated by the setting sun, and comparable with the flocks of Helios in Greek mythology. In the same publication, nos. 110, 112, and 114 refer to the 'grain of the priest of Tammuz,' and no. 118 mentions his temple at Lagaš. The date of these inscriptions is about 2300 B.C.

10. The Babylonian hymns to Tammuz.—At least two series of these existed, and they may have formed the originals of some of those chanted by the Hebrew women[4] as well as by the Phœnicians and the other nationalities who accepted or adopted the cult. The following will show their nature:

'The ewe and her lamb he taketh;
The goat and her kid he taketh.
The ewe and her lamb he smiteth down;
The goat and her kid he smiteth down.

Arise then, go, hero, the road of "No-return."
Alas, hero! warrior, Un-azu;
Alas, hero! hero, my god Damu;
Alas, hero! son—my faithful lord;
Alas, hero! Gu-silim the bright-eyed;
Alas, hero! god Nagara, lord of the net;
Alas, hero! overseer, lord of prayer;
Alas, hero! thou who [art] my heavenly light;

[1] Probably poetically put for some such idea as 'Crystal tears filled her body'; see below.
[2] Probably 'crystal tears'—evidences of the grief she had felt when Tammuz descended into the under world.
[3] *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum*, London, 1908, pt. xxiv. pl. 1.
[4] See the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Babylonian), §§ 1 and 4.
[5] *WAI* ii. 54, 349.
[6] *Ib.* iii. pl. 53, l. 31; see *ExpT* xxx. [1918–19] 167^{a}.
[7] *WAI* ii. 54, ll. 34 and 36. For references to his temple at Lagaš see § 9 below.
[8] See § 5 above.

[1] See *ExpT* xxix. [1917–18] 182 *f.*, 288.
[2] See § 7 above.
[3] Tammuz visited not only the under world, but also 'the heaven of Anu'; see *ERE* vi. 644^{a}.
[4] Cf. Ezk 8^{14}.

Alas, hero! Ama-ušumgal-ana;
Alas, hero! brother, mother, heavenly vine.
He goeth, he goeth, to the bosom of the earth—
He will cause abundance for the land of the dead.[1]
For his lamentation, for the day of his fall,[2]
In an unpropitious month of his year.[3]
To the road of man's last end,
At the call of the lord,
[Go], hero, to the distant land which is not seen.'

Or, according to the Sumerian original of the last four lines:

'In an unpropitious month of thy year,
To the road of the people's end [or rest],
At the call of the lord,
The worthy one, in his distant land, is not seen.'

'The unpropitious month' is probably Du'uzu, or Tammuz; 'the road of man's last end' is that leading to the under world; 'the lord,' who calls him, is possibly Merodach, but may be Nergal, king of that region, the Babylonian Mars.[4]

After a division-line the text continues:

'Alas, my abundance which has been withheld! Alas, my produce which has been detained!
My heart is oppressed, shepherd, dwelling in exile—
Where is his city? My heart is oppressed!
From the house of gloom he shall be brought forth—
Thou who art worthy, from the house of gloom thou shalt be brought forth!
Alas, hero! warrior, Un-azu,' etc., etc., as above.

Though these lamentations may have been recited by the women and others who joined in the ceremonies, it is probable that they were originally placed in the mouth of Ištar. The abundance and plenty referred to is probably the fruit of the earth; the oppression of heart was due to the lack of these things, and also to the god's exile in the regions below.

The bearing of these hymns upon the legend is clear. We learn that (1) some accident had happened to Tammuz, by which his sojourn in the under world was brought about; (2) this accident was that in some way he 'fell'—either through an attack by a wild animal (boar) or, like Eshmun, the Phœnician deity, by his own hand; (3) the result was that he passed part of his life in the under world, whereby the earth suffered and the under world profited; (4) the under world, to which Tammuz went, was man's last abode and the place of the people's rest. Notwithstanding that he was fulfilling his mission, the exile of Tammuz was still an unpropitious event for him, the realm of Ereš-ki-gal not being, even for the earth-dweller, that place of delight which the man looking forward to life with his god in the realms of bliss would like it to be. It may be supposed, however, that the worshipper of Tammuz, when he departed this life to dwell with his god, hoped to enjoy companionship with him not only in Hades, but also on earth when his time came to return thither.

11. The transfer of the legend to Syria.—As has already been stated,[5] the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia was of considerable antiquity—as early, in fact, as 4000 B.C. or even earlier, and it had had, therefore, ample time not only in which to spread abroad, but also to assume new forms and receive additions. Besides Byblos, the Babylonian Gublu (Gebal), Tammuz was also venerated in many intermediate states and cities — Cilicia, Cappadocia, Lycia, Lydia, Ephesus, and Pterium. Everywhere the cult was most enthusiastically adopted, falling in, as it did, so exactly with the Semitic view of the nature of things. Apart from the theories which were held as to the creation of the universe, the legendary teaching connected with Tammuz dealt only with the continuance of what had been brought into existence by the Creator. Regarded as a sun-legend, it was recognized that 'the kindly fruits of the earth' were due to his rays, and to the fact that, when these and their accompanying warmth were withdrawn or reduced, the growth of vegetation ceased.

12. The reflex-influence of the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia and Assyria.—That this enthusiastic worship of the Babylonian Dumuzida, under the name of Tammuz, had influence in Babylonia and Assyria, sympathetically related as they were with the Western Semites, is but natural; and its greater importance in the countries of its adoption than in the land of its origin is also easily comprehensible. This was due to the fact that the Babylonians had, from the date of the rise of Babylon, accepted Merodach, who was also a sun-god, as their supreme deity. Tammuz therefore continued to represent simply one of his forms, and thus remained ineligible as chief of their pantheon, whose construction, as a philosophical system, his position of supremacy would have destroyed.

13. The development of the legend farther west.—In all probability more than one version of the legend anciently existed in Babylonia and migrated, with the worship, westwards. Representing the summer sun, with all its warmth and its vivifying and productive power, Tammuz was regarded as the god who passed the six months between the beginning of autumn and the end of winter in the under world. As the planet Venus seems to follow the course of the sun, her disappearance with him was interpreted as due to her desire to rescue him from that prison-house, but, as her movements do not coincide with the seasons, she generally had to come forth without him. When the time for his release came, therefore, he had to return to earth unaccompanied by his spouse.

In the West the legend was modified, and Tammuz-Adonis there appears as the son of the Cypriote king Kinyras and as beloved of the goddess Aphrodite. He died, it was said, in the forest of Lebanon, killed by the wild boar typifying winter; and since the time of that catastrophe the river Adonis, now the Nahr Ibrahim, 'Abraham's stream,' flows yearly, when in flood, reddened by his blood. The name Adonis is the Greek form of the Phœnician Adōn, 'lord,' which this deity, in common with many others, bore. In the Sumerian hymns (mostly in the dialect) he is constantly called the 'lord,' *un* or *uwun*, and it is probably owing to this, at least in part, that Adōn (Adonis) became one of his names.

14. Tammuz in Cyprus.—According to Ovid,[1] the scene passes, in part, from Assyria (Syria) to Cyprus. Kinyras, king of that island, had, by an incestuous relation with his daughter[2] Myrrha, a beautiful son named Adonis. The child was brought up by the nymphs and had hardly reached manhood when he became the lover of Aphrodite. One day, notwithstanding the goddess's supplications, he went hunting in the forest of Lebanon and was wounded by a boar sent by Ares (Mars), who was jealous of the divine youth. Aphrodite, hearing of this tragedy, filled the forest with her lamentations and tried to revive him, but without success. From the blood of the dying Adonis the anemone had its birth, and the river Adonis was thenceforth reddened yearly by his blood.

15. The legend of Tammuz in Greece.—According to Panyasis (5th cent.), Adonis was the son of a princess of Assyria (Syria), Myrrha or Smyrna,

[1] Variant rendering: 'Šamaš will make him great in the land of the dead,' but that given above seems preferable.
[2] The full rendering in Semitic is 'Filled with lamentation on the day that he fell and (was) in distress,' but the Sumerian is insufficient for all this.
[3] In the calendar of lucky and unlucky days (*WAI* v. 48) the entries for the month Tammuz (col. iv.) include 'weeping' on the 2nd day, and 'lamentation' on the 10th, but it is doubtful whether these really refer to the legend.
[4] See § 3 above, and § 14 below.
[5] § 6 above.

[1] *Metam.* x. [2] See §§ 2, 15.

whom Aphrodite had inflamed with a violent love for her father Theias. Myrrha profited by her father's drunkenness and the darkness, but, when afterwards Theias found out what had taken place, so violent was his anger that he attacked his daughter, sword in hand. Myrrha fled, praying the gods for protection, and the divinities who had been the cause of her ruin, recognizing that she was not really to blame, changed her into the tree which, since that time, has borne her name. Nine months later the tree opened and gave birth to the beautiful Adonis. Aphrodite took charge of him and, placing him in a casket, handed him to Persephone to take care of.

Other variants of the legend of Tammuz are recorded, but, as they are apparently later developments and seem not to bear upon the origin of the myth, it is needless to speak of them here. How far the above or any other variants may be founded upon further details from Babylonia is uncertain and will not be known until the Babylonian legend of Dumu-zida comes to light.

16. **Why did the legend vary?**—Not only was Tammuz faithful in fulfilling his fate and passing a part of his existence in the under world, but he was also faithful in bringing, as the god of agriculture, the fruits of the earth to perfection in their season. The climates of Babylonia and of Syria are so different that any legend common to both was bound, in its province, to differ; hence the variations in that of Tammuz noted here. According to G. Rawlinson,[1] increasingly heavy showers fall in Babylonia, in November and December, raising the river-levels. As spring advances, the showers become lighter and fewer until about May, when summer-weather arrives. From May to November rain is very rare indeed, and the sun's rays are only tempered at morning and evening by the grey mist. For five months, therefore, Babylonia is a land of drought. With this description the month-list of Lagaš, whose principal deity was Nin-Girsu — identified with Tammuz—seems to agree,[2] but it is the common calendar of later days[3] that is the most instructive. In this it would seem that it was the fourth month, Šu-(n)umuna, 'perfection of seed,' or the like (June–July), that ended the time of productiveness, and that this month was called Du'uzu, the West Semitic Tammuz, as the month of the god's greatest fruitfulness. The month next following, Bibi-gar, apparently means 'making heat' (=Heb. Ab), whilst the 6th month, August–September, is Kin-Innanna, 'the errand of Ištar,' generally regarded as that in which Ištar descended to Hades in search of her lover. Its Heb. name Elul (in Babylonian, Ululu) probably means 'grief' and seems to express the common Semitic sound of mourning and distress. In Marcheswan, the 8th month, the opening of the water-channels took place and was succeeded by the rain-clouds of November–December (the Heb. Chisley). The 11th month, January–February, was 'the month of seed' and probably marks the time when sowing became general. Finally came the 1st and 2nd Adars (Feb.–March), in Sumerian Še-gur-kud and Dir še-gur-kud, the two grain-plant cutting months, when the seedlings were cropped to encourage the increase of sprouts.

Roughly, the 12 months of the year fall into three groups of four each, Nisan to Tammuz marking the growth and perfection of the grain, Ab to Marcheswan practically barren owing to the great heat, and Chislev to Adar the season of irrigation by the rivers and the sprouting of the crops. It is probably to this that the three periods of the year of Tammuz—with Ištar, with Ereš-ki-gal or Persephone, and at his own disposal—are due, the division of his year into two periods of six months each being apparently Western.

17. **Tammuz in the late Assyrian inscriptions.**—In these documents there are certain names which testify to the popularity of the god—not, however, under the name of Dumu-zi or Tammuz, but under that of Adōn. The Assyrian form appears as Adunu, and the names containing it may be divided into the specifically Syrian and the Assyrian—the latter apparently imitations, or translations from Syrian into Assyrian. Among these are Adunu-apla-iddina, 'Adōn has given a son'; Adunu-nadin-apli, 'Adōn, giver of a son'; and Adunu-mâta-uṣur, 'Adōn, protect the land.' The purely Syrian names seem to be Adunaiz(i) or Aduna-iz(i), perhaps 'my lord hath sprinkled'; Aduni-ṭu and Aduni-ṭuri, 'my lord is my rock' (Heb. *ṣûr*); Aduni-iḫa, 'my lord liveth (?).' Aduni-ba'ali, 'Adōn is my lord,' is West Semitic and belongs to about 850 B.C. (he was king of Sianu), but all the rest fall between 680 and 660 B.C.

Whether, with Vellay, the gods of the countries into which the worship penetrated may be regarded as having become identified with Tammuz or not is doubtful. If correct, it was due to the fact that Tammuz, under the name of Adōn, 'lord,' was designated by a word which could be applied as a title to any god, whether the Merodach of the Babylonians, the Moloch of the Syrians, or the Hadad of the Amorites. It is this, in all probability, that caused Tammuz to become, in a measure, identified with the Adonai of the Hebrews—that more general divine name which, with them, replaced the all too sacred Jahweh (Jehovah) of their own monotheistic creed.

18. **The Tammuz-cult and its contemporary creeds.**—Naturally, the idea of a kind of martyr-god, dying, it may be, for the good of mankind, notwithstanding the difficulty of bringing Tammuz into this category, has to be taken into consideration. The most striking parallel, perhaps, is the Osiris of the Egyptians; and the Babylonian Merodach, who died in order that mankind might be produced from his divine blood, is equally noteworthy. As Merodach, the 'steer of day,' was a sun-god, it is not unlikely that he was regarded as dying daily and as being reborn that men might live. The sun as Tammuz, however, died yearly, not so much that men might live, but because he fell under the evil influences of the spouse of Nergal, the god of battle, disease, and untimely death. Vellay contends also that Jesus Christ, like Tammuz, was a sun-god and, also like him, descended into Hades; but there are so many fundamental differences in the career of the mythical sun-god of 4000 or 5000 years B.C. and the Christ of history that comparisons may well be set aside. The half-mythical Babylonian ruler, with his 100-year reign, comparing so unfavourably with his predecessor's 1200, may easily have had a misadventure in the hunting-field which gave birth to the nature-myth which the Babylonians, Syrians, and Greeks have handed down to us.

LITERATURE.—Charles Vellay, *Le Culte et les fêtes d'Adônis-Thammouz* (*AMG*, 'Bibliothèque d'Études,' xii.), Paris, 1904; M. Jastrow, Jr., *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 2 vols., 1905–12 (details rather meagre); T. G. Pinches, *Hymns to Tammuz in the Manchester Museum, Owens College*, Manchester, 1904 (vol. xlviii. pt. iii. of the *Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Lit. and Philosophical Society*, session 1903–04), *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* London, 1906, pp. 48, 69 ff.; *PSBA* xxxi. [1909] 63 (prayer to Tammuz); W. Aldis Wright, in Smith's *DB* iii. [London, 1893]; A. H. Sayce, in *HDB* iv.; T. K. Cheyne, in *EBi* iv.

T. G. PINCHES.

[1] *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, London, 1862–67, i. 38.

[2] See *PSBA* xxxv. [1913] 20 ff., 123 ff.

[3] T. G. Pinches, *An Outline of Assyrian Grammar*, London, 1910, p. 60.

TANJORE.—1. **History.**—Tanjore (Tamil Tanjāvūr, 'city of refuge') is the capital of the District of the same name in the eastern portion of the Madras Presidency; it is situated in 10° 47′ N. lat., 79° 8′ E. long.; in 1911 the population was 60,341. The District formed part of the ancient Chola country, and the kingdom reached the zenith of its power under Rājārājā I. (A.D. 985–1011). During the 13th cent. it passed under the rule of the Hoysala Ballālas of Dorasamudra and the Pāṇḍyas of Madura. An independent Nāyak dynasty was established in the 16th cent., which was displaced by a Marāṭhā kingdom about 1674. It was occupied by the British in 1773 and finally ceded to them in 1799; the royal family, who were pensioned, became extinct in 1885.

2. **The temple.**—Tanjore owes much of its importance to the great temple built by King Rājārājā I., who was a devoted Śaiva, but tolerant of other religions. It is known as Brihadīśwara, Brihatīśwara, said to mean 'temple of the great god,' or Rājārājīśwara, after its founder. Fergusson writes:

'In nine cases out of ten, Dravidian temples are a fortuitous aggregation of parts, arranged without plan, as accident dictated at the time of their erection. . . . The one great exception to this rule is to be found at Tanjore. The Great Pagoda there was commenced on a well-defined and stately plan, which was persevered in till its completion.'[1]

Entered by a fine gateway (*gopuram*), which is supposed to cast no shadow on the ground, the outer court, used as an arsenal by the French in 1772, is 500 ft. long and 250 broad, and is surrounded on all sides by a cloister. The main shrine stands to the west, and above it rises to a height of about 200 ft. a magnificent tower, decorated with pillars and statues. The summit is crowned by a single block of granite, weighing 80 tons, said to have been raised to its present position up an inclined plane commencing at a village four miles distant. An interesting feature of the tower is that the carvings are generally of a Vaiṣṇava type, while the ornamentation of other parts is Śaiva. Another curious fact is that one of the figures on the north side of the tower represents a European; the popular belief is that it is the figure of a Dane who assisted in the building or that it was erected to foretell the British occupation. It is probable that both the European figure and the Vaiṣṇava ornamentation were erected by one of the Nāyak princes, and that he was helped by some Danes who acquired Tranquebar in 1620. The base of the great temple and many of the other buildings are covered with inscriptions which have been translated;[2] nearly all of them belong to Rājārājā and his successors.

Another noteworthy building is the temple of Subrahmaṇya, god of war, younger son of Śiva,[3] with a colossal figure of Nandi, the bull of Śiva, 'a perfect gem of carved stone-work, the tooling of the stone in the most exquisitely delicate and elaborate patterns is as clear and sharp as the day it left the sculptor's hands.'[4]

'The temple, though beautiful, is not considered particularly sacred. The legendary cause of this is that the Śaivite saint Appar was refused admission to it, and that therefore it was not celebrated in his hymns or those of the other three Śaivite poet-saints. A peculiarity about it is that Śūdras are admitted to the apartment next the shrine, from which in most temples in this District they are excluded, and that Valaiyans [a hunting, fishing, iron-making, and cultivating caste],[5] who are usually not admitted at all, here come as far as the great bull.'[1]

3. **Tiruvādi.**—Tiruvādi (Tiruvaiyāru, 'the five holy rivers'), six miles N.W. of Tanjore, is a place of great sanctity, said to be holier than Benares by one-sixteenth, where pious Hindus desire to die and where their bones are cast into the river. It has a fine temple, called Pañchanadīśwara, 'Lord of the five rivers,' which contains inscriptions of Rājārājā and his successors.[2]

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been quoted in the article. For the early Tamil history see V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1904; G. Oppert, *The Original Inhabitants of Bhāratavarṣa or India*, London, 1893.

W. CROOKE.

TANNAIM.—See JUDAISM.

TANTRAS.—In the series of sacred books of the Hindus the *Tantras* occupy the fifth or sixth place. According to their character and contents they are fourth in the order of inspiration and authority, the degrees being *śruti*, *smṛti*, *Purānik*, and *Tāntrik*. They are also known as a fifth or the fifth Veda by those who regard them as authoritative and observe the ritual which they enjoin. In neither case is the series entirely chronological or consecutive. The *Tantras*, which succeed and are in part dependent on the *Purāṇas*, are also in parts unrelated to the latter and of greater antiquity. Their date, however, it is impossible to determine with any precision. The existing treatises are probably for the most part at least reproductions with additions and variations of older works which are no longer extant. In their present form they are usually ascribed to the 6th or 7th cent. of our era, but they may be considerably later. Tāntrik usages and popular formulas were current and practised in a much earlier age; they belong to a type of thought that is primitive and among primitive peoples varies little in the course of the centuries. Until recent years little was known of these works outside of India. A few have now been made accessible in translations, but the greater number are as yet unexplored.

The name *tantra* signifies a 'web' or 'warp,' then a continuous or uninterrupted series, and in religious usage an orderly rule or ritual. The word was then further applied to the doctrinal theory or system itself, and finally to the literary work or treatise in which it was set forth. In the last sense the word is not found in the *Amarakośa*, the great Sanskrit dictionary,[3] nor is it used by the Chinese pilgrims. The *Mahābhārata* also contains no reference to the *Tantras* or to any religious system founded upon them. All these facts are confirmatory of the comparatively late origin of the existing books. Śaṅkara enumerates the titles of 64 *Tantras*, comparatively few of which can be identified at the present day. The best-known of these treatises and the most worthy of study are perhaps the *Tantrakaumudī*, *Śaktisaṅgama*, *Rudrayāmala*, *Kālikā*, *Kulārṇava*, *Tantratattva*, and *Mahānirvāṇa*. Translations of the two last have been published by Arthur Avalon. Parts of the *Hitopadeśa* also are known as '*tantras*.'[4]

Traditionally the authorship of these works is attributed to Dattātreya, who was an incarnation of the Hindu trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva.

[1] *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1899, p. 342 f.
[2] E. Hultzsch, *South Indian Inscriptions*, Madras, 1890 ff., esp. vol. ii.
[3] B. Ziegenbalg, *Genealogy of the South-Indian Gods*, Madras, 1869, p. 63 ff.
[4] F. R. Hemingway, *Tanjore Gazetteer*, Madras, 1906, i. 271.
[5] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, vii. 272 ff.

[1] Hemingway, i. 271. For an account of the temple with illustrations see Fergusson, p. 342 ff.; *EBr*[11] xiv. 430; V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 36 f.
[2] Hemingway, i. 276 ff.; Fergusson, p. 346 f.; *EBr*[11] xiv. 431.
[3] Dated by Macdonell, but with much uncertainty, *c.* A.D. 500; see *Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1905, p. 433; cf. also T. Zachariæ, *Die indischen Wörterbücher*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 18 ff.
[4] For further titles see Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit Dict.*, *s.v.*, and *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 207.

They are therefore to be regarded as equally the revelation of the three supreme divinities. In form, however, they are dependent on Śiva alone, who in dialogue with his wife Durgā, or Kālī, reveals the mystical doctrines and observances which are to be received and practised by his worshippers. This authoritative or 'higher tradition' is further said to have been delivered from his central or fifth mouth. As such it is pre-eminently sacred and secret and may not be revealed to the uninitiated. 'The Vedas, the Śāstras, and the Purāṇas are like a common woman, but this mystical Śaiva science is like a high-born woman,'[1] and its communication is forbidden. The real authors of the several treatises are unknown. They bear the name also of *Āgamas*, and as such are sometimes distinguished from *Nigama*, the text of the *Vedas*, *Dharmaśāstras*, and other sacred books. The Indian commentator, Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, asserts that revelation (*śruti*) is two-fold, Vaidik and Tāntrik.[2] In the popular knowledge and belief they have practically superseded the *Vedas* over a large part of India, where religious practice and ritual are guided by the teaching of the *Dharmaśāstras*, *Purāṇas*, and *Tantras*. A native writer and exponent of these works in Bengal asserts that 'two-thirds of our religious rites are Tāntrik, and almost half our medicine.' They are the *Śāstras*, the scriptural authority and rule for the present age, the *kaliyuga*, and it is therefore incumbent on all orthodox Hindus to follow their directions.

In particular the *Tantras* are the religious textbooks of the Śāktas and of their various sects. There are different Tāntrik schools, with variant traditions, the distinctions between which are little understood outside of their immediate circle of adherents. The ritual of the *Tantras* of the Dakṣināchārins, however, is said to be pure and in harmony with the *Vedas*, while that of the Vāmachārins is intended only for Śūdras. Their influence unquestionably extends far beyond those who profess to accept their authority. Wilson quotes a passage from one of these treatises which claims that 'many a man who calls himself a Śaiva or a Vaishnava is secretly a Śākta, and a brother of the left-hand.'[3] Even the Jains of N. India are said to have adopted formulæ and ritual from the *Tantras*, and the Lāmaism or corrupt Buddhism of Nepāl and Tibet owes much to the same source.

The teaching of the *Tantras*, as of the *Purāṇas*, is essentially based on the *bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*), which is regarded as superior to the *karma-mārga* and *jñāna-mārga* of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*. Adoration of a personal deity is inculcated, especially of the wife of Śiva, who is worshipped as the source of all regenerative power. In all these writings the female principle is personified and made prominent, to the almost total exclusion of the male. Ultimately their doctrine is derived from the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, with its theory of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, with especial emphasis on the mystical side of Yoga teaching and practice. Like the *Purāṇas* also every *Tantra* should theoretically discuss in order five subjects—the creation and destruction of the universe, the worship of the gods, the attainment of supernatural power, and union with the Supreme Being. In reality their contents are almost entirely magical and mystical, but they range over a wide variety of subjects, scientific, religious, medical, speculative, etc.; and are interested in all that concerns human need and destiny. One at least of the more important *Tantras* expounds in metaphysical terms the nature of the Supreme Brahman, who is *nishkala* and *sakala*, *i.e.* with or without *prakṛti*, *nirguna*, and *saguna*; in the beginning only the *nishkala* Brahman existed, etc. Great use is made of mystical syllables, *oṃ*, *ām*, *um*, *ūm*, etc., with which sometimes whole pages of writing are filled. By the repetition of these, magical and supernatural abilities may be gained. The use of *mantras* also is enjoined, and numerous examples are given; their essence consists in certain mystical and secret letters or syllables which they contain (*bīja*). The significance of the letters of the alphabet is taught, the employment of mystic diagrams (*yantra*), sacred circles (*śrīchakra*), spells, charms, and amulets (*kavacha*), symbolical movements and crossing of the fingers (*mudrā*), etc.

Together with all this, which appears to us so meaningless and puerile, there is undoubtedly much that is of historical interest in the *Tantras*, and that is of value for the interpretation and interrelation of Hindu doctrine. They are generous and broad in their sympathies, recognize no distinction of caste or sex, 'for men and women equally compose humankind,' and they forbid the practice of *satī*. According to the orthodox view, the rites and doctrine which they inculcate are to prevail until the close of the *kaliyuga*.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Works*, i., ii., *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1862, esp. i. 248–251, iii., *Essays on Subjects connected with Sanskrit Literature*, do. 1864, p. 95 ff.; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], do. 1891, *Indian Wisdom*[2], do. 1875, p. 501 ff.; M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der indischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1908, i. 162 f., 229 n. 3, 481 f.; N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*[2], London, 1900; Arthur Avalon, *Principles of Tantra* (*Tantratattva*), 2 parts, do. 1914 and 1916, *Tantra of the Great Liberation* (*Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*), do. 1913; Arthur and Ellen Avalon, *Hymns to the Goddess*, do. 1913; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*[3], Eng. tr., do. 1891; R. W. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*, do. 1915. A. S. GEDEN.

TĀNTRISM (Buddhist). — A complete study of Buddhist Tāntrism would include the description and the history of its rites, its deities, and its doctrines, practically the *exposé* of the many problems which confront the historian of mediæval India. Buddhist tāntrism is practically Buddhist Hinduism, Hinduism or Śaivism in Buddhist garb. The present writer intends only to provide the reader with a definition of the chief topics.

Buddhists were not quite clear as to the specific meaning of the word *tantra*, 'book.' The Tibetan canon distinguishes the *Sūtra* (*Mdo*) and the *Tantra* (*Rgyud*), but a number of texts are classified in both sections: the limits between *Sūtra* (i.e. *Mahāyānasūtra*) and *Tantra* are not fixed. On the one hand, topics which are essentially Mahāyānist—*e.g.*, hymns to *bodhisāttvas* (*stotra*), resolutions to become Buddha (*praṇidhāna*)—are met with in *Tantra*; on the other hand, *Mahāyanasūtras* include a number of fragments and often whole chapters which would constitute by themselves so many Tāntrik texts.

A good example is found in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, 'Lotus of the true Law,' which contains a whole chapter[1] of *dhāraṇīs*, on talismanic words, invocations in litany form to a female deity or to a female power; 'giantesses' are mentioned as protectors of the *Sūtra* and of its readers. There are good reasons for believing that this chapter is a late addition: such an addition testifies that the spirit of Mahāyāna had become largely tinted with the spirit of Tantrism, or rather that the Tāntrik syncretism made little distinction between Mahāyānism and Tantrism properly so called.

Tāntrik books, by assuming the title of *Sūtra*, secured authority. The *Kāraṇḍavyūha* is styled *Mahāyānasūtraratnarāja*, 'the very best of the Sūtras.' As a matter of fact, the introductory section is written according to the pattern of a *Mahāyānasūtra*; it does not pretend to relate, as

[1] Quoted from Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], p. 191.

[2] *Śrutiśca dvividhā vaidihā tāntrikīca*, note on Manu, ii. 1; H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures*, i. 248.

[3] H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1862.

[1] Ch. xxi.

Tantras do, the dialogue of a god with a goddess; it preserves the old phrase, 'Thus have I heard,' followed by the mention of the place, Śrāvasti, Jetavana, and the description of an audience of *bodhisattvas*. But, when we consider the chief topic of the book, viz. the glorification of Avalokiteśvara as the owner of the 'science in six syllables,' we cannot say that the author has written what we should like to style a *Sūtra*. In many cases the Tibetan scholars were not deceived by mere titles; *e.g.*, although the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*[1] is styled *Sūtra*, it is not in the *Mdo*, but in the *Rgyud*, that the Sanskrit and the Chinese recensions of this celebrated book are to be found. But the fact remains that *Mdo* and *Rgyud* overlap in a great number of cases.[2]

These confusions or 'overlappings' are accounted for by the fact that a number of speculations, beliefs, and practices which reach their full development in the Tāntrik or last period of Buddhism were not unknown during the former period —*e.g.*, the use of talismanic spells. Again, the Westerns establish a close connexion between the word 'Tantrism' and the worse forms of Hindu (or Buddhist) paganism—magic, theurgy, left-hand worship—and so far they are right, for the magical or left-hand practices are properly Tāntrik, and not to be found in Buddhism outside *Rgyud*; but these practices are not the whole of Tantrism. *Tantra*, with the Hindus as with the Buddhists, covers a large field. We find in the *Rgyud* the texts which are concerned with worship, whether it is 'Tāntrik' worship or Mahāyānist worship, including the building of domestic *stūpas*, the erection and the consecration of idols, the *stotras* or hymns, the daily offering. Worship, with the whole of the religious practices, is a Tāntrik topic. The *Bhadracharīpraṇidhāna*, 'Resolution of Pious Conduct,' is reckoned a *Tantra*, because the recitation of this *praṇidhāna* is one of the daily duties of a Buddhist devotee of the Great Vehicle: from the point of view of the Western definition of 'Tantra,' this text is absolutely non-Tāntrik: it is free from any tinge of idolatry, it breathes the most lofty spirit of the Great Vehicle.[3] Litanies, lists of 100 names, whether of Prajñāpāramitā, Avalokiteśvara, or Mañjuśrī, are also *Tantras*. Litanies may be used for Tāntrik or non-Tāntrik worship. We know that the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*, 'Collection of the Names of Mañjuśrī,' is susceptible of a twofold interpretation: the first is a gnostic or purely philosophical one, the second sees its way to give to the most decent phrases the worst Tāntrik meaning.[4]

Therefore, in order to draw a general outline of the history of Tāntrik ideas in Buddhist literature and life, we must disregard the traditional divisions as embodied in the Tibetan catalogues or the Western theories on the subject, and build a classification of our own.

I. *EARLY BUDDHISM.*—The Old Buddhism, as preserved in the Pāli canon and in the Sanskrit Hīnayāna literature, has a number of features which are not specifically Buddhist, which are alien to the noble eightfold path, which, to put it otherwise, are more or less Tāntrik or open the way to Tantrism properly so called. Let us mention a few topics. (1) There is a general belief in the mystic power of the 'statements of truth';[1] Śākyamuni praises the use of half-magical 'formulas of protection' which have a large place in the more recent Sinhalese Buddhism (*paritrā, paritta, pirit*).[2] (2) In the earliest documents respect is paid to a number of deities or non-human beings who are both powerful and unfriendly; there is an 'orthodox' way of dealing with them, but 'unorthodox' worship is the natural result of fear. Vajrapāṇi is regarded as the 'guardian angel' of Śākyamuni, as the protector of the *avoué* of the Church. He is the pattern of the 'Dharmapālas' of a later age. (3) The worship of relics, the building of *stūpas*, pilgrimages, and idolatry are old features of Buddhism. (4) Last, not least, the earliest machinery of meditation or trance is akin to the more intricate machinery which constitutes the basis of the *Yogatantras*. Buddhist 'meditation' is simply Hindu *yoga* more or less transformed. The 'insight into the truth' (*satyadarśana*), which is the only and the sufficient means to *nirvāṇa*, practically implies (*a*) the meditation on loathsomeness (*aśubhabhāvanā*), when the ascetic, often 'a dweller in the cemeteries,' 'purifies his bones' —*i.e.* fancies that his flesh is rotten and falls, and sees only the bones behind, until the whole world appears to him as full of skeletons—and thus succeeds in crushing desire; (*b*) the restraint of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), counting the expirations and inspirations, in order to render thought more tractable and to direct it towards the Buddhist truths; (*c*) the *vimokṣas, abhibhvāyatanas*, and *kasinas*, prolonged contemplation of disks of earth, etc., by which (*d*) a number of supernormal states are induced, the so-called *dhyānas* (*jhāna*), or 'trances' and *samāpattis*, or 'ecstasies.' According to the Pāli and Sanskrit theologians it is only when absorbed in those supernormal states that a man is susceptible of rightly understanding the four Buddhist Truths (*satyābhisamaya*) and thus progressing towards *nirvāṇa*. Now it is quite safe to state that meditations on corpses, restraint of breath, the diverse methods of inducing trance, and the trances themselves have been borrowed by Buddhism from Hindu *yoga*. Buddhism established, more or less artificially, a strong connexion between those archaic devices of *yoga* and its own spiritual aim, *nirvāṇa*. But Buddhists did not ignore, and their books do not conceal, the fact that the discipline of *yoya*, while it may be made 'supramundane' (*lokottara*), *i.e.* utilized for the conquest of *nirvāṇa*, also provides a man with many 'mundane' (*laukika*) advantages: he who lives in cemeteries acquires power over the *bhūtas* and the manifold spirits who haunt these places; he who 'restrains the breath' masters thought and the body; he who practises trance becomes the possessor of magical powers and secures rebirth amongst gods. In short, a man who practises *yoga* becomes a *yogin*, or a *siddha*, an owner of 'perfections' or 'powers' (*siddhi*). It is clear that the position of Buddhism is not a safe one. Let us state it in plain words. A monk must perform in a Buddhist spirit, *i.e.* for the sake of *nirvāṇa*, a number of rites and meditations which confer the most precious 'mundane' advantages; he must disregard these advantages—which, in India, are the surest mark of holiness—while he perfectly knows that he can enjoy them when he likes. We may be sure—even if there were no documents to this effect—that many of the monks of early

[1] Fully analyzed by E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, p. 528.

[2] See M. C. Ridding and L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan MSS of the Stein Collection in the India Office* (Manuscript).

[3] *Kanjur, Rgyud* (Beckh), xxiv. 331; also in *Vinaya* (Dulva); B. Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1142, ed. and tr. by Kaikioku Watanabe, *Die Bhadracari: Eine Probe Buddhistisch-religiöser Lyrik*, Leipzig, 1912.

[4] *The* [*Mañjuśrī*]*nāmasaṃgīti* has been published by I. P. Minayeff together with the *Mahāvyutpatti* in *Buddhism, Researches and Materials*, Petrograd, 1887, i. sect. 2 (in Russian); we refer to the commentary called *Amṛtakaṇikā*.

[1] *Satyavachana*; see E. W. Burlingame, in *JRAS*, 1917, p. 429.

[2] See, *e.g.*, R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1860, pp. 26, 30, 240; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, pp. 302, 321. A large portion of the *Rgyud* is *paritrā*.

Christianity were not strong enough to resist so powerful a temptation; *e.g.*, they performed miracles for 'vain glory.' In such cases they acted as 'mundane' *yogis*; technically they followed the rules that later constitute the *Yogatantra*.

II. *MAHĀYĀNA.* — In Mahāyāna *bhakti*, or devotion, and *pūjā*, or worship in the Hindu guise, increase.

Mahāyāna is, like Hīnayāna, a thoroughly Buddhist discipline, viz. a way to *nirvāṇa*; the disciple of Mahāyāna is a candidate for Buddhahood (*bodhisattva*, future Buddha), because Buddhas alone reach *nirvāṇa*; he will become a Buddha by acquiring the wisdom and accumulating the merit of a Buddha. But an essential feature of the doctrine is that the candidate for Buddhahood cannot succeed without the help of the Buddhas and of the future Buddhas nearing Buddhahood; this help is secured through *bhakti*. The early Buddhist paid worship to Śākyamuni, to the relics, to the holy places, but there was little or no *bhakti* in his respectful behaviour. Now the objects of worship are so many living gods, so many *bhagavats*, quite different from Śākyamuni, very much like the Hindu *bhagavat*, and they are entitled to the *bhakti* of the faithful. As has been pointed out several times,[1] *bhakti* is seldom free from elements which easily take a Tāntrik shade. To mention only one point: a man will be saved by remembering at death the name of Avalokita or of Kṛṣṇa. The names of the Buddhas or the *bodhisattvas*, the mystic formulas in which they have themselves placed a wonderful force, acquire a rôle in the sanctification of the devotee. *Bhakti* has exalted the god to such a degree that *bhakti* is no longer necessary. Śāntideva, an orthodox divine of the Mahāyānist school, praises without reservation the use of *dharaṇīs* for the pardon of sins.[2] The schools of the Mahāyāna known as the Sukhāvatī sects place the highest spiritual advantages at the command of the man who knows how to worship Amitābha.[3]

Every form of *pūjā*, including the circumambulation of a *stūpa*,[4] offering flowers to a *stūpa*, giving food to the monks, etc., was considered very useful from the beginning. A treatise like the *Ādikarmapradīpa*[5] shows us that Mahāyāna has added much to the primitive liturgy; it gives a description of the many acts of worship which a Mahāyānist devotee, a 'beginner' (*ādikārmika*), was expected to perform — recitations of formulas, symbolic offerings, wonderful advantages to be obtained by acts which easily assume a mechanical character, so many features which give to Tantrism its specific aspects. A daily observance was the eightfold high *pūjā* (*aṣṭavidhā anuttarā pūjā*), a sort of worship 'in spirit and truth': confession of sins to the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*—to the Buddhas who have a special claim to the title of 'Buddha of confession'[6]—resolve to become a Buddha, 'application of merit' (*pariṇāmanā*), etc. That this eightfold *pūjā* often becomes a mere ritualistic performance—a special kind of *dhāraṇī* —is proved by the fact that it is a part of the *śādhanas* (see below). It is well known that Mahāyāna is prompt to admit any sort of spells that provide 'mundane' advantages[1] —of course it objects to 'black magic.' From our point of view, it is more important to observe that Mahāyāna worships a number of beings which are no longer Buddhist in character.[2] The demoniac origins of Vajrapāṇi are not forgotten; he nevertheless obtains a high rank in the pantheon; as he is the 'destroyer of the enemies of the Law,' he is probably one of the first gods who have been worshipped under a 'choleric' aspect.[3] Female figures —*e.g.*, the Tārās—are associated with the Buddhas, but there is not in this association any tinge of 'properly so called Tantrism.' The same can be said of Hārītī, the former goddess of smallpox, the account of whose avatars is one of the most curious and the best known pages in the religious and iconographic history of Buddhism. Her worship, both in the monastic and in the popular *milieux*, gives a correct idea of the Mahāyānist and of the half-Tāntrik methods of worship.[4]

III. *TANTRISM PROPER.*—Tantrism, properly so called, bears a twofold character; on the one hand, it is a systematization of the vulgar magical rites and it has existed under this form for many centuries in India and in Buddhism itself, together with its formulas and its pantheon; on the other hand, it is a 'theurgy,' a highly developed mysticism styled Vajrayāna; under this form Tantrism is an innovation in Buddhism.

Tantrism has its professionals, the sorcerers (*yogin*, *siddha*), and its laymen, the *clientèle* of the sorcerers, also all the Hindus who worship deities or idols of the Tāntrik type. The sorcerers, who are at the same time 'mystics' or adepts of the Vajrayāna, constitute a number of schools; there are many rival secret traditions characterized by different sets of formulas, of deities, and of theories.

We shall deal with only two points which deserve special notice: (1) the methods of *sādhana*, (2) the *vajrayoga*. To be complete, it would be necessary to study a number of *vidhis*, or rites, many of which are part of the Tāntrik daily cult and have been adopted by Mahāyānist Buddhism.[5]

1. **Sādhana.**—In order to perform a *sādhana*, *i.e.* the evocation of a god, the ascetic must be duly instructed by a *guru* and duly consecrated. The ascetics who have established the manifold secret sects of Tantrism had to propitiate the gods by long austerities and meditations before being favoured with the manifestation of the god; they at last received from him the secrets they are now able to teach to their pupils. The *guru* therefore assumes great importance: he is the paramount god of his pupil and the incarnation of the Buddha himself. When he has been taught all the details of the rites, the Tāntrika must undertake the *sādhana*, by which he renders visible any god he wishes and obtains control over him. The most important items in these magical performances are the knowledge of the *bīja*, the mystic syllable which is the 'germ' or the 'seed' of the god, and the knowledge of the *vidyā* or *mantra*, which gives to its owner control over him.

On a chosen day the ascetic, after performing the regular ablutions, wearing a neat dress or a new dress, goes to a solitary place, either auspicious—a wood or the bank of a river

[1] *E.g.*, by A. Barth, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1914, i. 190.

[2] *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, i.), ed. C. Bendall, Petrograd, 1897, p. 140.

[3] See *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, series III. (Aryan), pt. 2, Oxford, 1883, and *SBE* xlix. [1894].

[4] See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 297; I-Tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, ch. xxx., 'On Turning to the Right in Worship': 'What is walking towards the right or towards the left, however, would seem a little difficult to determine' (p. 141). I-Tsing has many details on worship as practised in Mahāyānist convents.

[5] Ed. and tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme : Etudes et matériaux*, London, 1898, pp. 162–282.

[6] See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 289.

[1] See, *e.g.*, *Ṭīkāstvustik* (*Bibl. Buddh.* xii.), ed. W. Radloff and A. von Staël-Holstein, Petrograd, 1910.

[2] We say 'in character,' for it is difficult to say whether Amitābha, *e.g.*, is not originally a sun-god; but Amitābha is 'Buddhistic'; he is the *sambhogakāya*, a modern name for the quasi-eternal Buddha of the Docetic school.

[3] The latest authority on the subject is A. Foucher, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhâra*, Paris, 1905–18, ii. 48–64.

[4] A. Foucher, *The Beginnings of Buddhist Art and other Essays*, tr. L. A. and F. W. Thomas, Paris, 1917; Noël Peri, 'Hārītī, la Mère-de-démons,' in *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême Orient*, xvii., fasc. 3 [1917]; cf. *JRAS*, 1895, p. 149.

[5] A glance at the catalogue of the *Rgyud* will show the variety of the *vidhis*.

—or loathsome—a cemetery—according to the purpose. He sits there at ease in a purified spot and fulfils in order the different acts of a Mahāyānist *pūjā*, offering of flowers and perfumes, either mental or real, to the host of Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, confession of sins, etc.[1] He continues in the same style by practising the virtues of friendship, pity, joy, indifference, by dwelling on the essential voidness of all things. Thus he is supposed to have acquired both merit (*punya*) and wisdom (*jñāna*): all this is only a preparation to the rite itself. The rite begins with the meditation on the *bīja* of the god who has been chosen for some technical reason (every god has his own department in mundane and supramundane affairs). If the god is Yamāntaka or Yamāri (the enemy or the destroyer of Yama, god of death), the syllable is *hūm*; it is to be written on the disk which in the magic circle (*maṇḍala*) is the symbol of the sun. The ascetic causes to arise from *hūm* the wrathful Yamāntaka, hair bristling, blue, with six faces, with six arms, with six feet, riding a bull, standing in the *ālīdha* pose, adorned with a garland of skulls, exceedingly frightful. When the god has been summoned in that way, the ascetic undertakes the second part of the rite: he fancies that he is the god; the identity of the ascetic and the god is a metaphysical truism; the ascetic does not identify himself with the god, he only realizes the identity. As soon as the ascetic knows that he is the god, he possesses all the powers that belong to the god: any wish he utters in the proper form—for his voice must be the voice of the god—will surely be accomplished.[2]

As A. Foucher, from whom this definition of *sādhana* is borrowed, rightly observes, the description of the gods as given in Tāntrik treatises must be accurate: any mistake in the mental representation of those frightful persons would be fateful. The *Sādhana* treatises have been the pattern according to which Hindu and Tibetan artists worked, and they furnish the best means to the identification of the icons or idols.

Sādhanas serve all sorts of purposes—worship, white and black magic. In many cases they are complete with their first part, the summoning of the deity, to whom worship and prayers are respectfully offered. More often, when the deities are the 'girls' or 'princesses' (*kumārī*, which is not 'virgin'), or the 'ascetic goddesses' (*yoginī*), we have to deal with the worst features of paganism.[3]

2. Vajrayāna.—But Tantrism is much more than a pagan system of rites of worship and sorcery. It is a vehicle (*yāna, naya*), a way to final liberation or to the *summum bonum*. Tantrism is the Tantrayāna, or the Mantrayāna (=*naya*), 'Vehicle of the Magic Formulas,' more often and more technically, the Vajrayāna. *Vajra*, 'lightning,' is originally and remains the weapon of Indra, of Vajrapāṇi, of the ascetics or *yogins*, against human or demoniac enemies. But *vajra* has assumed new meanings: (1) it designates the mystic or divine energy which is identified with 'intelligence' (*vijñāna*): there are *vajrabodhisattvas*, '*bodhisattvas* of *vajra*,' *vajrayoginīs*, 'divine female sorcerers,' *vajravarāhī*, 'the divine sow'; all divine beings are so many *vajrasattvas*, 'beings of *vajra*'; the supreme being, the Ādibuddha,[4] is the *vajrasattva par excellence*. (2) On the other hand, *vajra* (with the variant *maṇi*) is a decent or mystic phrase for *liṅga*, the male organ, just as *padma*, lotus, is the literary rendering of *bhaga* or *yoni*.[5]

To this twofold meaning of *vajra* correspond two Tāntrik schools, right-hand and left-hand. Both owe much to the Mahāyānist doctrines, to Madhyamaka, and to Vijñānavāda;[6] they cling to the theory of universal voidness (*śūnyatā*), but they develop the concepts of *tathatā*, *tathāgatagarbha*, etc., and result in an undisguised monism. While Mahāyāna states that all beings are 'future Buddhas,' that all beings are 'embryos of *tathāgatas*,' the two Tāntrik schools maintain that all beings are *vajrasattvas*, are the unique Vajrasattva; they also maintain that the nature of *vajra* is immanent in all beings and can be actualized by appropriate meditations and rites.

Now the left-hand school conceives the nature of *vajra* according to the Śaivite pattern; the right-hand school is nearer the Vedāntist or Yoga tradition: on the one hand the traditions of the *Mahākālatantra*, etc., on the other hand the Church of the *Mahāvairochanābhisambodhi*, the Vajraśekhara, etc.—the modern Japanese sect of Shin-gon-shū.

In the Tantras of the Śaivite type we have to deal with a Buddhist adaptation of Śaivism and Śāktism. The three traditional bodies of a Buddha are preserved, but the true nature of *vajrasattva* is his fourth body, 'the body of bliss' (*ānanda, sukhamaya, mahāsukhakāya*), the body of *vajra*; it is with that body that the eternal *tathāgata* or *bhagavat* eternally embraces his *śakti*, Tārā or Bhagavatī. From this erotic conception of the nature of being or the divine being it follows that, in order to actualize his real divine nature, the ascetic must perform the rites of union with a woman (*yoginī, mudrā*) who is the personification of the *bhagavati*,[1] who is Bhagavatī herself; as it is said, *buddhatvam yoṣidyonisamāśritam*, 'Buddhahood abides in the female organ.'[2] This truth was discovered by Śākyamuni, who, according to the *Chaṇḍamahāroṣaṇa*, conquered Buddhahood by practising the Tāntrik rites in the *harīm*. The most conspicuous topic of this literature is what is called the *strīpūjā*, worship of women:[3] disgusting practices, both obscene and criminal, including incest, are a part of this *pūjā*, which is looked upon as the true 'heroic behaviour' (*duḥkaracharyā*) of a *bodhisattva*, as the fulfilment of the perfect virtues. Buddhist mythology and mysticism are freely mixed with *śāktas*: the semen is the five Buddhas, etc. The leading idea that 'everything is pure to a pure man,' *omnia sancta sanctis*, is often expressed. 'Lust is to be crushed by lust. . . . Do strenuously that which is condemned by fools, united with your chosen deity, intent upon the purification of thought. Women stirred with the poisonous fire of love provide their lovers, ascetics of pure mind, with all the fruit of love. . . . Enjoy all the pleasures of love without fear. Do not fear; you do not sin.'[4]

We may add two remarks. (1) Some 'moral' rules are to be observed even in the ceremonies (*chakra*) which are provided for the thorough enjoyment of the *ma* (*māṃsa*, 'meat,' *madya*, 'alcohol,' *maithuna*, 'sexual union'). A modern Śaivite work, the *Mahānirvāṇatantra*,[5] explains that 'the ascetics should drink so long as their eyes do not roll and mind is not agitated. Beyond it, drinking is like that of a beast.' The rite of *pūrṇābhiṣeka* or *tattvachakra* must not be practised with any woman, but with one's own wife; so far, good, but there are two sorts of marriages, one for life, the other contracted for the purpose of the rite and lasting only till the completion of the rite. (2) Secret rites are the business of a few 'devotees.'

[1] See art. BODHISATTVA, vol. ii. p. 749b.

[2] Freely translated from A. Foucher, *Étude sur l'iconographie bouddhique de l'Inde d'après des textes inédits*, Paris, 1899–1905, pt. ii. p. 8f. See F. W. Thomas, 'Deux Collections sanscrites et tibétaines de *Sādhanas*,' *Muséon*, new ser., iv. [1903] 1.

[3] On the Tāntrik pantheon see A. Grünwedel, *Mythologie du Bouddhisme au Tibet et en Mongolie*, tr. J. Goldschmidt, Leipzig, 1900. The description of the local deities of Nepāl in S. Levi, *Le Népal*, Paris, 1905, i. 316–392, practically applies to all parts of Buddhist India.

[4] See *ERE* i. 93.

[5] On the spell *oṃ maṇi padme hūm* see *JRAS*, 1915, p. 397, and L. A. Waddell, art. JEWEL, vol. vii. p. 555. The old translation, 'Jewel in the lotus,' may be right after all.

[6] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist).

[1] We meet the formula, *Bhagavān bhagavatībhageṣu vijahāra*.

[2] On the *maithuna* rites see C. Bendall, 'Sabhāsitasaṃgraha,' *Muséon*, new ser., iv.–v. [1903–04]; L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Une Pratique des Tantras,' *ICO*, Paris, 1899, i. 241, 'Note sur le Pañcakrama,' *ICO*, Geneva, 1895, i. 137.

[3] On *strīpūjā* in Hindu Tāntrism see H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Calcutta, 1846, p. 160 f. (*Select Works*, London, 1861–77, i. 256 ff.). Little has been added by modern scholars; see R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 146.

[4] H. P. Shastri, 'Discovery of a Work by Āryadeva,' *JASB*, vol. lxvii. pt. i. no. 2 [Calcutta, 1898], p. 175.

[5] Tr. Manmatha Nath Dutt, *Wealth of India*, Calcutta, 1899–1900, vii.–viii.

On the whole and for the largest number of its adherents, Tantrism is simply paganism.

According to the left-hand Tantrism which we have described, the rites of union (*maithuna*) are not efficacious by themselves: before practising them the candidate for *vajrasattva*-hood must be 'purified' in a threefold respect; he must possess the body, the voice, and the thought of a *tathāgata*. This threefold purification constitutes the Tantrism of the right hand.

These are 'aspersions' or 'consecrations' (*abhiṣeka*),[1] 'marking' (*nyāsa*) which consecrates the different limbs of the body, 'prayers' (*japa*) which purify the voice. The most intricate part of this discipline concerns thought. No Western scholar has yet endeavoured to understand the three mysteries of the body, the voice, and thought, the *vajradhātu* and the *garbhadhātu*, the five *tathāgatas* (the so-called *dhyānibuddhas*[2]) who are associated with five wisdoms, with the five *dhātus* (earth, etc.), etc.; the Buddha, Vajra, and Padma class of formulas, etc. We depend on the descriptions of the Shin-gon-shū sect, which are too meagre and obscure to be thoroughly intelligible.[3] The opinion of the present writer is that a number of schools are to be distinguished: there are branches which are connected with *rājayoga* (meditation and knowledge are the only means to the actualization of the nature of a *tathāgata*); some other branches praise ritualistic performances, especially 'intertwinings of the fingers' (*mudrā*);[4] some will admit the rite of union, but with a female described as a *jñāna-mudrā*, a mental female.[5]

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ii. *Sanskrit sources.*—C. Bendall, *Catalogue of Buddhist Sanskrit MSS in the University Library*, Cambridge, 1883; R. Mitra, *The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal*, Calcutta, 1882; H. P. Śāstri, *A Catalogue of Palm Leaf and Selected Paper MSS*, do. 1905.

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v. *On the authors of the Tāntras.*—L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'hist. de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, pp. 355, 384.

vi. *On the subdivision of the Tāntras*, with the data of L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 152 and H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan-Eng. Dict.*, do. 1881, p. 112, cf. the *Padmatāntra*, *Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office*, pt. iv., *Sanskrit Literature*, by E. Windisch and J. Eggeling, London, 1894, p. 847; Sarat Chandra Das, *Tibet.-Eng. Dict.*, Calcutta, 1902, pp. 342, 396, 586, 697. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

TAOISM.—Taoism is one of the three 'Teachings' (*Sam Chiao*) of China, the others being Confucianism and Buddhism. Like Confucianism, and unlike Buddhism, it claims to be a native growth.

1. Lao-tse.—The primary source for our knowledge of Taoism is the *Tao-Teh King*. This small book of about 5000 characters, usually divided into two parts, 'Concerning Tao' and 'Concerning Teh,' comprising 81 chapters, is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), an older contemporary of Confucius. Lao-tse, surname Li, name Erh (= 'ear'), also known as Tan, a character which implies some aural peculiarity, is said to have been an official at the court of Chow and to have been visited on one occasion by Confucius, who after the interview compared him in his lofty incomprehensibility to a soaring dragon. Despairing of the world, Lao-tse retired from office and disappeared through the Western passes, the guardian of which induced him before leaving to compose the *Tao-Teh King* as a record of his teaching. This account of him was in later times supplemented by many marvels—*e.g.*, his prolonged gestation, which entitled him to be called 'old boy,' as his name Lao-tse might also be translated. Si-ma Ch'ien († 85 B.C.), who gives the more sober account of Lao-tse, gives also the names of his son and grandson and of the great-great-grandson of this grandson. He tells us further that about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. a book of Lao's was a favourite with the widowed empress of the second Han emperor. The emperor King (156–143 B.C.) is said to have made it a 'classic.' Still further back than Si-ma Ch'ien we have in Hwainan († 122 B.C.), Han Fei († 230 B.C.), and Chwang-tse (4th cent. B.C.) many quotations from Lao-tse (or Lao Tan) which are to be found in the *Tao-Teh King*. According to Legge, the first two of these authors quote the whole or parts of 71 out of the 81 chapters of that book. On a review of the evidence thus summarized, Legge concludes that he does not know of any other book of so ancient a date of which the authenticity of the origin and genuineness of the text are so well substantiated.

Criticism, however, has been busy both with Lao-tse and with his book. Founding upon the name Lao-tse, which may mean equally well 'old philosopher' or 'old philosophers,' an extreme criticism has resolved him into a number of ancient thinkers, some of whose sayings are preserved for us in the *Tao-Teh King*. For this view there is no ground except the ambiguity of the name. A less drastic criticism, of which H. A. Giles is representative, allows that at a remote period Lao-tse lived and thought and taught, and that some fragments of his teaching are preserved in the *Tao-Teh King*, in which we have those fragments pieced together by a not too skilful forger of the 2nd cent. B.C. with padding of his own. This conclusion is said to be practically certain. The criticism, however, by which it is attempted to establish this conclusion is somewhat crude. The external evidence summarized above at least does not support it; nor is it warranted by the occurrence in early Taoist writers of sayings ascribed to Lao-tse which do not appear in the *Tao-Teh King* and of sayings ascribed to Hwang-ti which do appear there, or by the evidence adduced from the *Tao-Teh King* itself (repetitions, quotations, late characters, rhyme), while the discrimination of what is admitted as genuinely from Lao-tse from what is rejected as compiler's padding is too subjective to be convincing. In favour of the earlier date of the *Tao-Teh King* it may be noted that, in its general type of teaching and in the avoidance of technical terms current in later Taoist authors it leaves on the reader the impression that it belongs to a less developed stage of Taoist thought than is found in them. The *Tao-Teh King*, however, still awaits a thorough application of sound critical principles. Indian influence on both the matter and the form of the *Tao-Teh King* has been asserted by some. The truth of this assertion cannot be considered apart from the general archæological question of the intercourse between India and China. There is a certain congruence between the mood of the *Tao-Teh King* and Buddhism, but not such as requires the dependence of one on the other as its explanation, and the present state of our knowledge hardly warrants the assumption of contact with Indian thought early enough to influence the *Tao-Teh King*, unless that book is dated later than all the other evidence seems to demand. According to D. T. Suzuki, the so-called Indian influence on the early Taoists is not probable. It is curious that in *Tao-Teh King*, ch. 39, § 3, there is an illustration taken from a chariot and its parts to which T. W. Rhys Davids[1] quotes a close parallel as having been used by Nāgasena, the founder of the Madhyamika school of Northern Buddhism, who taught about the beginning of our era. It is to be noted, however, that the same argument, only with a horse instead of a chariot as illustration, is found in Chwang-tse, bk. 25, p. 126.

It is not difficult to cull from the *Tao-Teh King* admirable ethical maxims.

[1] See INITIATION (Buddhist), vol. vii. p. 321, under 4 and 5.
[2] This phrase has never been met in any Sanskrit book.
[3] R. Fujishima, *Le Bouddhisme japonais*, Paris, 1889, pp. 81–99.
[4] See Si-do-in-dzou, 'Gestes de l'Officiant,' *AMG*, *Bibl. d'Études*, t. viii., Paris, 1899.
[5] *Mudrā* has a twofold meaning.

[1] *Buddhism*, London, 1878, p. 97.

'The highest goodness is like water. Water is good for advantaging all things and does not strive. It takes the place that all men hate' (ch. 8). 'He who raises himself on tip-toe cannot stand: he who straddles cannot walk' (14). 'He who overcomes men has force; he who overcomes himself is strong. He who knows he has enough is rich' (33). 'I have three precious things which I count and hold precious. The first is gentleness. The second is moderation. The third is not daring to take the first place under heaven' (67). To these might be added, but for the considerations mentioned below, the famous 'Recompense injury with kindness' (63).

The virtues commended lie in the line of self-suppression. For the inward state of which they are modifications the characteristic word is *hsü*, 'emptiness,' *i.e.* freedom from desires. Corresponding to this inner freedom from desires is the outward life of non-action (*wei wu wei*), *i.e.* absence of self-determined action for particular ends. Hence the world is an ethical danger (12), for it is by the world that we are drawn out into desire and action away from the stillness of our inner being, which it should be our object to keep (5), though this true type of life is unattractive except to the sage (35). He attains this life by a process of abscission of motives, by which he arrives at a childlike state of spontaneity and tenderness, in which there is also exemplified the paradoxical possession of security and strength (10, 20, 28, 55). This ethical ideal is supported by various arguments. Thus in ch. 13 the argument seems to be that to be in a position to enjoy what the world regards as honour is to be exposed to what the world regards as calamity. That which makes me a possible subject of either is just that I am an object to myself. The sage therefore treats his person as if it were alien from him. He never identifies his happiness with this or that, so never loses his happiness. Having no private ends, his private ends are realized (7). Again, it seems to be argued that as ideas suggest their contraries—*e.g.*, to know beauty is also to know ugliness—so the sage, seeing that everything is dogged by its opposite as by its shadow, refrains from all positive action (2). From the external world Lao-tse gathers illustrations, both negative and positive, of his teaching. The short-lived storm of wind and rain suggests the futility of violent action. Water in its fluidity and taking the lowest place exemplifies absence of self-determination and humility, while, as it also benefits all things and wears away that which is hard, it illustrates the paradoxical issue of *wu wei* ('Do nothing') in *wu pu wei* ('There is nothing that is not accomplished'). Specially is illustration to be found in vegetable life, which in obedience to an inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth, culminating and again subsiding (16). The Taoistic life is therefore a life of equable indifference, outwardly of non-action, devoid, *i.e.*, of action for chosen ends; moved in obedience to an inward spontaneity rather than motived by outward inducement; a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-determined. Hence the sage is 'simple' (19) with the simplicity of unwrought wood as contrasted with the definiteness of a carved beam; *i.e.*, he is free from self-determinateness. Again, he grasps 'the one' (22), withdrawing himself from the manifoldness of self-determination along particular lines and holding to 'the one,' *i.e.* the principle which Lao-tse knows as *Tao*.

The metaphysics of the *Tao-Teh King* centre in this conception of *Tao*. In many passages *Tao* has its common meaning of 'a way,' either the ethical way that men should follow or the method of action followed by Heaven (cf. 'course of Providence') or prescribed by Heaven for man's following. But elsewhere it is a metaphysical principle (chs. 1, 4, 14, 21, 25, 34, 37, 40, 42, 51, 62). The gist of what is stated in these chapters is as follows: The origin of heaven and earth is nameless (1), is indeed non-existence (40), something quite indefinite, which, when we attempt to define it, becomes nothing (14, 25); if we must make a name for it, we may call it *Tao*: it may seem to be prior to God (4); it becomes nameable in relation to the universe that springs from it (1), in an order which may be partly known (42); not only is it the origin of the universe as a whole, but it presides over all beginnings (21), reaching everywhere (25, § 3) and doing everything, while it seems to do nothing (37).

Summing up what we have here, we may say: (1) as transcendent existence *Tao* is something quite indefinite, which Lao-tse struggles to express by negatives; (2) from this indefinite ground the universe of things issues by a process which is emanation from *Tao* as mother and not creation by *Tao* as agent; (3) *Tao* is immanent in the world, working in an unobtrusive way, producing and bringing to perfection individual existences. On the whole, we perhaps come nearest to the meaning of *Tao* when we say that it is pure being (most abstract of categories) endowed with spontaneity, the ultimate essence and impulse of all definite things. Obviously this conception of *Tao* excludes all idea of its equation with God. In ch. 4 Lao-tse says of *Tao*, 'I do not know whose son it is: it appears to be before God (*Ti*).' There can be no doubt that with Lao-tse *Tao* is the ultimate ground of all definite existences, *Ti* among them, while, by saying that he did not know whose son *Tao* was, he lets us see that, having arrived at his conception of *Tao*, beyond which he could not go, for in the line of logical abstraction there is no going further than 'being' which is nothing, he yet dimly felt that it did not explain itself.

The only other term in the *Tao-Teh King* capable of a theistic interpretation is *T'ien*, Heaven. In some instances of its use a near approach is made to what we mean by Heaven when we use it as equivalent to Providence. In this, its highest, use it is not merely the physical sky, but a power supreme in the world of visible things obscurely connected with the sky, which is the supreme exemplar of *Tao*, but, even so, posterior and subordinate to it. *Tao* is to Lao-tse the ultimate and determining fact.

His metaphysic, as thus explained, explains his ethic. The ground of existence being a perfectly indefinite spontaneity, a dark abysmal one from which, for no reason assigned, the multiplicity of the world emanates, by the immanence of which the world is and is moved—all this agrees with the ethical doctrine of abstention from self-determination and of sinking back on the inner ground of our being that we may be as this spontaneity in us causes us to become. Here is the justification for regarding Lao-tse's doctrine as simply a variant of 'Follow nature'; only we must remember that *Tao* is both the substantial essence and the dynamic spontaneity of all things. This, of course, brings up the difficulty of accounting for the existence in *natura naturata*, the world of concrete things, of any contrariety to *natura naturans*, *Tao*, and raises the question, neither asked nor answered by Lao-tse, why a short-lived storm is not as much an expression of *Tao* as the enduring stillness of Heaven.

Before turning again to the practical side of Lao-tse's teaching, we may refer to what may, by courtesy, be called his theory of knowledge. It is by freedom from desire that we can attain to a knowledge of the mysteries of *Tao* (1). Inasmuch as *Tao* is the principle of all existence, knowing it, we are at the heart of all knowledge. There is no need for the sage to expatiate over the world. Without moving out of doors he already knows (47). Knowing one case, he knows all, for *Tao* is the one universal principle (44).

We can best return to Lao-tse's practical teaching by the word *Teh*, which next to *Tao* is his key-word. Like *Tao*, it received from Lao-tse a

new meaning, since it is the outcome of *Tao* (51). There is indeed a *Teh* which begins where *Tao* ends (38). This is the *Teh* which is the result of effort, self-conscious *teh*. *Teh* in the Taoist sense is usually distinguished by some epithet—'mysterious,' 'large,' 'lasting,' etc. As the outcome of *Tao*, it is activity devoid of self-determination, the expression of the spontaneity of the immanent *Tao*. The various virtues commended by Lao-tse are aspects of, or approximations to, this *teh*. It is in this Taoistic sense that we must take the famous maxim 'Recompense injury with *teh*,' where it is a mistake to translate *teh* by 'kindness.' The maxim is no more than a precept of indifferent self-possession: 'Be a Taoist, even though provoked' (cf. 5).

Lao-tse's practical teaching is completed by his speculations on physiology and politics. As to the former, it is asserted that the Taoist adept attains to 'lastingness' (7, 16, 44, 59). There is no place of death in him, and so he passes through dangers unscathed (50). Hints are also given of a death which is not destruction, implying a persistence in spite of death which is true long life (33). This thought, however, is not developed. With the other form of longevity appears to be associated a certain management of the breath (10, 52), and through this vein of thought there is a connexion with later Taoist developments.

In Lao-tse's politics, as in his ethics, there are attractive thoughts—*e.g.*, the protest against luxury in the court alongside misery among the people (53) and the detestation of war (31). The Taoist method of government is *laissez-faire*. The sagely king does nothing, and everything comes right of itself (32, 37, 57). Logically Lao-tse's thought implies that any sage would be the centre of a universal sway (49, 57, 77), but it is hinted that the influence of a sage becomes effective only when he has the advantage of high place (56). Here Lao-tse is in line with Confucius, who asserted that his principles would transform the world if only he could find a ruler wise enough to give him office. In describing the society which would come to being under Taoist influence, Lao-tse pictures small stay-at-home communities devoid of letters and of luxury, content with what is theirs and utterly incurious of what is not. As men within a Taoist society so societies in their relation to one another are to act Taoistically. The right way is one for men and for States (61).

There are unexplained remainders in the *Tao-Teh King*, but Lao-tse does give us a reasoned view of things. As we think back and back, we come to something which we cannot see or hear or touch, an obscure something from which all things come. It is in all things, which could not be apart from it. Yet it never parades itself. It simply is, a mysterious, ever-during, all-working existence. Let us conform ourselves to this: let us become one with it. For it is in us as in all else—our essence which would realize itself if it were not hindered by our self-will and self-seeking. If we put away these, then we know it and are and become what it tends to be. It is *Tao*, unqualified being, origin of things, and in them as essence and spontaneity.

2. Taoism before Lao-tse.—The question has been raised whether Taoism existed prior to Lao-tse. That there was such an early Taoism is argued on the grounds of quotations in the *Tao-Teh King* from earlier Taoists, the persistent reference of Taoism not only to Lao-tse but also to the at least semi-mythical Yellow Emperor (Hwang-ti, 2697 B.C.), so that 'the words of Hwang and Lao' came to be a term for Taoist teaching, and the allusions in the *Tao-Teh King* and other Taoist writings to an age when the world moved on Taoist principles. It has also been argued that, while the *I-King* is dualistic, it also contains allusions to a monistic and idealistic strain in pre-Confucian speculation, and that a doctrine of that from which the dual principles derived (*Tao*) was in various forms well known. Hence, it is claimed, the *I-King*, the doctrine of *Tao*, and some strongly held ethical principles intuitively known were the materials on which Confucius and Lao worked, Lao appropriating the monistic sayings of the *I-King* but placing his chief reliance on the doctrine of *Tao* as handed down from the Yellow Emperor.[1] In the same line E. H. Parker[2] says that there is little doubt that Lao-tse simply gave a name (*Tao*) to a floating group of ethical principles already for many centuries spread far and wide over China and already well known as the maxims of Hwang-ti, and that every single thought in the *Tao-Teh King* had been foreshadowed, usually word for word, in the *Book of History*, *Book of Rites*, *Record of Rites*, *Book of Changes*, *Book of Odes*, or other very ancient work. Among these other ancient works Parker puts the volume attributed to Kwan-tse, which he dates from the 7th cent. B.C. In spite of all that is here said, it may still be reasonably maintained that there is no conclusive evidence of an explicit Taoism previous to Lao-tse. Even Parker does not deny a certain originality to Lao-tse in developing a new quietistic conception of how human affairs once presumably were, and ideally should be, regulated. There may have been a floating group of ethical principles which Lao-tse took over, but it is the reasoned quietism of the *Tao-Teh King* based on *Tao* as metaphysical principle that alone has the right to be called Taoism, and of the earlier existence of this proof is yet lacking. In the *Tao-Teh King* itself there is no mention of Hwang-ti, and the allusions to the simpler social conditions of earlier times do not prove the existence then of a reasoned Taoism. Certainly this would be proved if we found Lao quoting 'from some sage anterior to himself who had already formulated the doctrine of inaction in the very terms we are accustomed to associate with the name and fame of Lao-tse himself.'[3] The reference is to *Tao-Teh*, ch. 57. But the introductory phrase may be translated 'Therefore the sage says,' meaning that such language is characteristic of the sage, whether actually or hypothetically existing, just as the next chapter contains a similar gnomic reference to the sage's action. Five other quotations (22, 41, 50, 69, 78) may be admitted, but they are not of a kind to prove the existence of Taoism anterior to Lao. Only if numerous other phrases introduced by the formula '*ku yüeh*' are treated as quotations, can justification be found for speaking as Legge does of 'the sentence-makers often drawn on by Lao-tsze'[4] or for saying that Lao-tse 'abounds in sentences out of some ancient lore of which we have no knowledge but for him.'[5] But these phrases may not be quotations so much as aphoristic expressions of Taoistic teaching, perhaps already current with Lao and his school. Parker's wide reference to ancient literature must be heavily discounted. It is difficult to justify his appeal to books so innocent of Taoism as the *Book of History* and *Book of Odes*. Moreover, it is one thing to find in ancient literature expressions congruent with Taoism and quite another thing to find expressions essentially Taoistic. It is true that *Tao-Teh* is a conjunction of characters

[1] *Encyclopædia Sinica*, p. 433.
[2] *Studies in Chinese Religion*, p. 53.
[3] Giles, *China Review*, xiv. 270.
[4] *The Texts of Taoism*, pt. i. [*SBE* xxxix.] p. 2.
[5] S. Johnson, *Oriental Religions: China*, Boston, U.S.A., 1877, p. 81.

long consecrated by use in the *Book of Changes* and the *Book of Rites*.[1] In the *Book of History* or elsewhere we may meet with phrases such as 'The Son of Heaven acts as the people's Father and Mother, and as such is the King of the world,' or 'That the Prince of a State should hold dirt in his mouth is the Providence (*Tao*) of Heaven.' But such things do not prove the existence of Taoism as a scheme of thought prior to Lao-tse. Nor, when we read in the *Tao-Teh King*, 'Thus we cannot say that the ancients meant nothing by the expression "Bend and survive,"' is it quite legitimate to annotate, 'Note Lao's allusion to more ancient philosophy.' There is no evidence that the ancients grounded this maxim on a metaphysical *Tao*. The *I-King* does in parts[2] contain indications of what may be called Taoist philosophy; but this very fact leads Legge to put the origin of these parts posterior to Lao-tse in the 5th or 4th cent. B.C. Kwan-tse may be dated in the 7th cent. B.C., but the work ascribed to him is suspected of being a forgery of a later date. In the present state of our knowledge it is probably right to say that the existence of a Taoist philosophy prior to Lao-tse is not proven. The *Tao-Teh King* may still be taken as the earliest example of Taoist thought.

3. **Taoism after Lao-tse.**—The history of Taoism immediately subsequent to Lao-tse is obscure. Somewhat later its development can be traced in a succession of authors.

(*a*) *Lieh-tse.*—The earliest of these may be Lieh-tse (=Licius, 5th cent. B.C.), but the authenticity of the work ascribed to him is doubtful. According to him, the whole of things is in perpetual transformation. The ultimate basis of all is a vague something which differentiates itself into *ch'i*, *hsing*, and *chih*. The second and third terms may be translated 'form' and 'matter' respectively, though we must beware of assuming an exact equivalence to these terms as used elsewhere (*e.g.*, in Greek philosophy). *Ch'i* is more difficult to translate. Giles[3] gives as its meanings 'the vivifying principle or aura of Chinese cosmogony: breath, vital fluid: force: influence.' The state of things when these three were in an undifferentiated and therefore imperceptible condition is called 'chaos,' whether this is or is not to be identified with the ultimate origin and basis of things. Progress is made from chaos by an evolution vaguely indicated, in the final stages of which the pure and light portions form 'heaven,' the heavy and gross form 'earth,' and 'man' appears as the vehicle of their harmonious *ch'i*. The general ethical temper is quietist, based now on ignorance, now on fatalism. Another root for it is found in the subjectivity of knowledge, and the absence of any criterion of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, though this is hinted at rather than developed. Along with this may be noted a disclaiming of any discrimination in worth between waking and dreaming experiences. Views of death are given which are perhaps not quite consistent. On the one hand is put the question, which might suggest Buddhist influence, 'When the spiritual enters its gate and the material returns to its root, where do "I" survive?' On the other hand, it is asked whether death may not be another birth. Lieh-tse makes much use of anecdotes, a good many of which seem to have been treated by Taoist writers as the stock property of their school. The magical side of Taoism shows in Lieh-tse considerable development as compared with the *Tao-Teh King*. The secret of it is such a selfless identification with the life of nature as brings the Taoist into harmony with all its forces, animate and inanimate. The alleged immunity of a drunken man from injury by accident is used to illustrate the still higher immunity which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the 'heavenly' (*i.e.* 'natural' as opposed to 'self-determined') element of his constitution.

(*b*) *Chwang-tse.*—The most brilliant of the Taoist writers is Chwang-tse (*c.* 330 B.C.). In him as little as in the *Tao-Teh King* is there any systematic exposition of Taoism. In the development of his views he uses various literary devices—anecdote, allegory, and imaginary conversation. In some places he handles somewhat freely not only Confucius, but even more ancient worthies, such as Yao and Shun. How little historical accuracy or consistency is regarded is shown by the fact that Confucius is also introduced speaking in quite a Taoist vein. It is not easy to see the drift and relevance of all Chwang-tse's chapters, but the reader cannot fail to find a characteristic attitude towards reality. As in the *Tao-Teh King*, the metaphysical basis of everything is *Tao*, which as the explanation of all things is not itself a thing. It is more abstract even than non-existence, which is made definite by its opposition to existence, and so it may be called non-existing non-existence. To call it *Tao* is only a metaphor. From this absolute indifference all existences, including spirits and God, have come. No explanation is given of this coming into existence of definite things, though, to be consistent with the general scheme, the evolution must be unmotived and spontaneous. The process from unconscious indifference to the world of consciousness and of differentiated things is described in the allegory of 'Heedless' and 'Hasty' pitying insensible Chaos, and digging in him orifices of perception with the result that he died (bk. 7). *Tao* is in things, their reality and the regulator of their processes. In accordance with this view *Tao* and things are the hints of the illusory nature of all knowledge coming through the senses. The truth of things is perceived by the spirit, and Taoist adepts, when most in touch with reality, are in a trance, their bodies like rotten tree-stumps and their minds like slaked lime. One may notice also the incipient scepticism based on the relativity of knowledge and the phenomenon of dreaming. A paragraph more quoted perhaps than any other from Chwang-tse, though by no means the most central to his position, is that in which he hesitates to decide whether he is Chwang-tse dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is Chwang-tse. Since *Tao* alone really is, the truth of life is to be found in the above-mentioned trance when self-consciousness and self-determination are completely lost. But, as in the *Tao-Teh King*, so here, things are taken for granted, with *Tao* as their spontaneously operating essence; and in accordance with this assumption the ethical ideal is with Chwang as with Lao a life of spontaneity. There is inculcated an abscission of all definite volition and an indifferent yielding of oneself to the course of nature. Hence follows a characteristic attitude towards death, which is regarded as natural and therefore as little to be feared as birth. The Taoist is independent of all accidents, which are of no importance in comparison with the independent worth of self as an expression of *Tao*. It is only false opinion which differentiates between this and that outward state. If all self-determined effort is a departure from the truth of life, it follows that the devotee of virtue and the worker of iniquity fall under the same condemnation. Hence results a paradoxical levelling down of moral distinction. A similar strain of thought appears in Yang-tse, the heresiarch whom

[1] Parker, p. 70. [2] *E.g.*, Appendix, iii.
[3] *A Chinese-English Dict.*², London, 1912, *s.v.*

Mencius criticized, and is there regarded as congruent with the teaching of Lao Tan.[1]

(*c*) *Han Fei-tse and Hwainan-tse.*—Other writers reckoned as belonging to the Taoist school are Han Fei-tse († 230 B.C.) and Hwainan-tse († 122 B.C.). The writings of the former are preserved in 55 chapters, two of which (21 and 22) are entitled 'Explanations of Lao' and 'Illustrations of Lao.' Apparent quotations from the *Tao-Teh King* occur elsewhere in his writings. Han Fei-tse hardly discusses the metaphysical side of Taoism. His book is ethico-political, and is marked by shrewdness rather than by loftiness of tone. One sympathizes with the Chinese student who protests against his being classed as a Taoist and explains what he regards as the degenerate nature of his teaching as due to a perversion to a scheming selfishness of such sayings of Lao-tse as 'When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a previous expiration' (36) and 'The sage wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them' (66). Hwainan-tse is a more genuine Taoist than Han Fei, but his writings in their fanciful analogies and extravagant statements give evidence of a progressive deterioration of Taoism. Ethically he is superior to Han Fei. In at least one statement of his fundamental ethical position he shows a close verbal approximation to orthodox Confucianism: action in accordance with the nature (*hsing*) is called *Tao*, and this nature is to be distinguished from the passions (*yü*).

4. Later Taoist literature.—Later Taoist literature is voluminous and reflects that medley of subjects which make up Taoism, such as the search for immortality (which Chu Hi singles out as its main object), the conquest of the passions, alchemy, amulets, the observance of fasts and sacrifices, ritual and charms, and the multiplied objects of worship. Much of present-day popular hortatory literature may be reckoned as Taoist. Probably the most popular of all Taoist writings is *The Tractate of Actions and their Retributions*, which dates from the Sung dynasty. According to the original text, retribution takes effect in this world. The practiser of virtue indeed not only may receive earthly happiness but also may hope as the culmination of his reward to become immaterial and immortal, *hsien-jen* (=*ṛṣi* of Buddhism). As for the transgressor, he suffers in his person and fortune, and, if at his death guilt still remains unequated by punishment, judgment extends to his posterity. Of this retribution Heaven and spiritual beings are recognized as the agents. In the illustrative anecdotes added in many editions to the original text the stage of retribution includes the other world and successive rebirths in this world. The inculcated morality has many excellent details, but extends also to tabus—*e.g.*, striding over a well or leaping over food.

5. Present-day Taoism.—Chang Tao-ling (A.D. 34) has been regarded as the founder of present-day popular Taoism, which is not unfairly described as a mass of superstitious magic. The earlier literature, however, makes it evident that before his time Taoism had yielded to the love of the marvellous. Chang Tao-ling is said to have received from Lao-tse himself, who appeared to him from the realm of spirits, a sword and other apparatus in virtue of which he was able to exercise control over the spirit world. Descendants of Tao-ling, in each of whom it is said the soul of their ancestor is successively incarnate, and whose residence is at Lung-hu Shan in Kwangsi, have inherited his powers, and since A.D. 748 hold by imperial decree the hereditary dignity of 'Master of Heaven.' They are often spoken of in works on China as Taoist popes. After the introduction of Buddhism into China Taoism shows very evident traces of Buddhist influence, which was particularly potent in the 3rd and 6th centuries A.D. In its religious literature and practices it follows Buddhist models and borrows Buddhist phraseology. It has its temples, priesthood, and monasteries. Giles' statement, that the celibacy of Taoist priests has been strictly enforced since the 10th cent.,[1] is subject to qualification. Eitel says that Taoist monks or priests do not take the vow of celibacy. They may keep their families outside the cloister walls and spend the whole time between meals at home.[2] Doolittle distinguishes two classes of Taoist priests.[3] A Christian influence in the names and titles of objects of Taoist worship has also been traced by some (*e.g.*, Wieger). Many of the best known objects of popular worship are members of the Taoist pantheon; *e.g.*, Yü Hwang Shang-ti, who is the Supreme Taoist god, is also he to whom the great name Shang-ti 'sans phrase' would be most readily referred by the ordinary Chinese. Lao-tse is himself worshipped as one of the 'Three Pure Ones' whose images are prominent in every Taoist temple, the two others being Yü Hwang and Pan Ku. Taoism has produced a plentiful crop of legends and fairy-tales, the influence of which is seen in Chinese art.

The gulf between the Taoism of the *Tao-Teh King* and present-day Taoism is a wide one. It has to be remembered, however, that even in the *Tao-Teh King* there are passages which suggest a marvellous mastery of nature by the Taoist adept and provide a starting-point for that search after immortality which, according to Suzuki, first opened the door for the inrush of superstition. The suggestion has also been made that, as the opposition sharpened between Confucianism and other strains of thought, all of popular religion and superstition that found no encouragement in Confucianism took refuge in Taoism. Over and above any such accretions and any particular phrases in the *Tao-Teh King* which might provide a germ of magical developments, the general position of Taoism from the beginning exposed it to such deterioration. Starting from the assumption that man and nature are fundamentally one, its quietism obliterated the line between moral and physical, and promised its adept such a harmony with Nature as laid open to him her secrets and made him merely the vehicle of her great powers. The distinctness of the moral person was lost in the all-embracing sweep of *Tao*. Confucianism also speculated on the relation between man and nature, and thought of the sage as exercising a cosmic influence. But this influence is the issue of moral development, and the Confucian emphasis on self-determined morality prevented any sinking of man into nature.

The nobler elements of Taoism are, however, not extinct. The Taoist pope is not recognized as head by all the Taoist priesthood. There are celibate Taoists among whom the nobler Taoist strain is cherished, who disclaim any connexion with him. In some of the secret societies also elements of the higher Taoism survive. Even in Confucian circles classical Taoism has influence. The writer recalls one scholar who would not have described himself as other than Confucianist, who was well acquainted with the *Tao-Teh King*, and who used to repeat with genuine appreciation, 'The highest goodness is like water.'

6. State relations.—During its long history Taoism has experienced a considerable vicissitude of political favour and disfavour. In the pre-Ch'in

[1] J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, London, 1861, vol. ii. *Mencius* (Prolegomena, ch. iii.).

[1] *Confucianism and its Rivals*, p. 176.
[2] *Notes and Queries of China and Japan*, Oct. 1868.
[3] *Social Life of the Chinese*, 2 vols., London, 1866, ch. ix.

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times the various schools of Chinese thought seem to have been allowed free play. With the Ch'in dynasty, the first emperor of which tried to suppress Confucianism, Taoism was in favour, and it continued to enjoy imperial patronage under the early Han dynasty. Thereafter its political relations were chequered; *e.g.*, in the 6th cent. it was suppressed in favour of Buddhism, while in the 8th cent. it was honoured by the emperor Hsüan Tsung. After other such vicissitudes it was by the late Manchu dynasty reckoned along with Buddhism and Christianity as a heterodox teaching in contrast to the sacred teaching of Confucius.[1] See also art. MYSTICISM (Chinese).

LITERATURE.—J. Legge, *The Texts of Tâoism*, pts. i. and ii. [*SBE* xxxix. and xl.], Oxford, 1891, *China Review*, Jan.–Feb. 1888; F. H. Balfour, *Taoist Texts*, London [1884], *The Divine Classic of Nan-hua*, Shanghai, 1881; S. Julien, *Le Livre de la voie et de la vertu . . . par le philosophe Lao-Tseu*, Paris, 1842; H. A. Giles, *Chuang-Tzŭ*, London, 1889, *China Review*, March–April, 1886, *Confucianism and its Rivals* (*HL*), London, 1914; E. H. Parker, *Dublin Review*, Oct. 1903, Jan. 1904, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, London, 1910; R. Dvořák, *Chinas Religionen*, Münster, 1895–1903, ii., 'Lao-tsï und seine Lehre'; R. K. Douglas, *Confucianism and Taoism*, London, 1906.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

TAPAS.—See ASCETICISM (Hindu).

TARGUMS.—Though the term 'Targum' was used by Jewish authorities to designate the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into any language, it was specifically restricted to the Aramaic renderings (cf. Ezr 4). Aramaic versions were used liturgically; the Hebrew text was read from a scroll, and this was followed by the Aramaic, recited without book by the official called *meturgeman*. This custom continued to the 10th cent., and was in parts maintained beyond that date. It is possible that the famous rescript of Justinian[2] was directed against the liturgical use of the Targum.

The most widely read of the Targums was that ascribed to Onqelos (*i.e.* Aquila), who lived in the 2nd century A.D. Aquila really rendered the Scriptures into Greek, but his name became associated also with the Aramaic version. Onqelos is a translation of the Pentateuch only, and it is known as the 'Babylonian Targum,' not so much because of its language, as because of its official adoption in the Babylonian Jewish academies. Thus, though edited in Babylonia, Onqelos is dialectically Palestinian. Onqelos probably includes elements of considerable antiquity, which were derived from oral tradition; some of it, on the other hand, is obviously of literary origin. Onqelos went through various re-editings, so that the extant text is not usually referred to an earlier period than the 4th or 5th century. The 'Palestinian Targum' (known also as the 'Targum of Jonathan'), though later than the earliest recension of Onqelos, contains elements older than the latter. The most remarkable theological characteristic of the Targums is the avoidance of anthropomorphisms. They are thus paraphrases rather than translations, though in very large part Onqelos is literal enough.

Similarly there were two Targums to the Prophets: the 'Babylonian' (ascribed to Jonathan, son of Uzziel), which originated (despite its Babylonian use) in Palestine; and the 'Palestinian,' which is fuller of homiletic elements. As selections were read from the Prophets (*haftârôth*) in the synagogues, these Targums also partook of an official character.

On the other hand, there were no such official Targums to those parts of the Bible from which no *haftârôth* were derived. Hence these Targumim to the Hagiographa form independent groups. On the whole they are freer, and in some cases (as in the Second Targum to Esther) are of greater interest for folk-lore than for exegesis. The Targum to the Song of Songs is throughout allegorical.

LITERATURE.—See full list of authorities in *HDB* iv. 683. Add W. Bacher, *Die älteste Terminologie der jüdischen Schrift-auslegung*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 204 ff., and his art. in *JE*.

I. ABRAHAMS.

TARTARS.—See TURKO-TATARS.

TASMANIANS.—See AUSTRALASIA, POLYNESIA.

TATHĀGATA.—Whatever it may have meant originally, or from whatever source it may have been derived, Tathāgata is an epithet of Buddha used to express his very personality. It is, first of all, an appellation to specify his dignity as an enlightened being and a teacher of men and gods. He is the one who has realized the four truths according to reality (*yathābhūtam*) and, consequently, mastered the way to the realization of the truths. Sensation, perception, and thoughts are all under his own control. He is free from the bondage of the six senses and attachment to their objects, because they are not his masters, as they are with the common people, but he is master over them.[1] Thus he is beyond all the commotions and disturbances arising from contact with the objects of sense and thought. He was born a man, but has become a superhuman being in respect of and by virtue of these highest moral and intellectual attainments.[2] In order to express these superhuman excellences of Buddha's personality, the Buddhists from the earliest time used to call their master the Tathāgata with a special reverence. In this use, therefore, the appellation signifies nearly the same thing as Sugata ('the one who has gone blessed'). Here Tathāgata means the one who has gone (*gata*) from the realm of attachment to the other beyond according to reality (*tathā*, which means the same as *yathābhūtam*).

But the virtue of a Buddha does not consist in attaining this position for himself alone. He teaches the people the Way to the same attainment and guides them in its realization. He is the Master who, having himself reached the castle of fearlessness, invites and leads them to the same. The Tathāgata is not only sure that he is the perfectly enlightened one and has thoroughly overcome the miseries of existence, but also equally sure that he is the master of the Truth and the Law. With this confidence he turns the supreme wheel of the Law and roars a lion's roar in the assemblies of beings.[3] Thus the Tathāgata is the enlightened one who knows the Way and reveals that Way by treading which he himself has become the 'thus-gone.'[4] He practises as he preaches (*yathā-vādī tathā-kārī*) and *vice versa*.[5] Though this explanation of the term is, as etymology, certainly far-fetched, it is quite natural that the Buddhists saw in their Master a being without any falsehood and self-deceit. The association of the appellation with the very personality of an unerring Master of the way to final emancipation is undeniable. A stanza which is said to have been uttered by the disciples at the death of the Master is another testimony to this association. It reads:

[1] See *Majjhima*, nos. 102 and 123 (tr. K. E. Neumann, ii[2] 83, 261 f.), and *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 94, xxxv. 136 (*PTS* ed. iii. 139 f., iv. 127).

[2] See *Saṃyutta*, xxxv. 90, xliv. 2 (*PTS* ed. iv. 64, 380).

[3] See *Saṃyutta*, xii. 21 (*PTS* ed. ii. 27), and *Aṅguttara*, iv. 9 (*PTS* ed. ii. 9).

[4] See *Saṃyutta*, viii. 7 (*PTS* ed. i. 191), xxii. 58 (*PTS* ed. iii. 65); cf. *Aṅguttara*, vi. 64 (*PTS* ed. iii. 417); *Majjhima*, no. 35 (*PTS* ed. i. 372); *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (*SBE* xxi. [1884] 120 f.).

[5] See *Itivuttaka*, 112 (*PTS* ed. p. 122); *Aṅguttara*, iv. 23 (*PTS* ed. ii. 23 f.). Cf. below, *Lotus*, ch. ii.; and *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, Paris, 1890, ii. 260, 266, 362, etc.).

[1] *Sacred Edict Maxim*, 7. [2] See art. TALMUD.

'The Master, such a Master as he is (*yathā etādiso*), without any parallel in the world, the *Tathāgata* . . . is gone.'[1]

'Thus-gone' is the Master who has seen the way and revealed it to us, according to reality.

To the Buddhists their Master was the 'thus-gone' or 'thus-destined' (translation of Edmunds) to final emancipation, the 'perfected' (*der Vollendete*, Neumann) in wisdom and its realization, in short, the 'truth-winner' (Rhys Davids). The appellation was certainly a self-designation of Buddha, but it was more used by his disciples to express their confidence in the Master.

So far the empirical aspect of the concept. We must now take up the metaphysical side of the idea conveyed by or attached to the term. The Buddhists were, probably in Buddha's lifetime, nearly realizing for themselves the truth that the revealer of the Way must be at home in it, and that therefore he is the Way itself. They said:

'The laws (*dhammā*) are real and not otherwise as they are, and these are perfectly known by the Tathāgata.'[2] Here 'the laws' mean not only Buddha's teaching, but the things taught in his teaching and their essence. Hence the saying: 'He, the Blessed One, knows having known (the laws), sees having seen, born of Light, born of Wisdom, born of Truth (*dhamma-bhūto*), and born of Brhmā; He is the one who reveals and tells, the One who gives immortality, the Lord of Truth, the Tathāgata.'[3] Here we have translated the *dhamma* by 'truth,' *i.e.* the truth expressed in Buddha's laws.

The ideas here formulated cannot be called metaphysical speculations; still they show a tendency to base the faith in the Master on the transcendental entity of the Truth, not only revealed to us by him, but also represented personally by him. The foundation and elaboration of these ideas must proceed to a further development of Buddhological (so to speak, in analogy with 'Christological') speculations. The fact of the faith has been laid down by the personal influence of the Master; thought and clear conception must follow it. And it is quite natural that the Buddhological ideas were always closely associated with the appellation Tathāgata. These thoughts may be studied from three aspects or phases of their development. They are: (1) the relation of the Tathāgata to the Truth (*dhamma*) which he revealed, (2) the communion of the Tathāgata with the many other Tathāgatas, and (3) the eternity of the personality of the Tathāgata.

(1) The term *dhamma* (in both singular and plural) is a very flexible one. But the various aspects of the concept have a necessary connexion, when viewed as centring in the person of the Master. The *dhammā* (plural) are qualities of things, both physical and mental, which are transient, but subject to the laws. These laws make up existence,[4] and our attachment to and thirst for them are the causes of the miseries of life. Misery, its genesis, its extinction, and the way of release from it—these truths have been revealed by the Tathāgata according to reality (*yathābhūtam*). Thus our emancipation from the miseries is possible only by realizing to ourselves the laws according to reality. These are the laws or teachings (*dhammā*) of the Tathāgata. Therefore the laws have their root, light, and basis in the Blessed One.[5] Buddha is the king of the laws. On the other hand, however, Buddhahood is attainable only by the comprehension of the laws. Hence it is true also that Buddha is the protector of the laws, who, leaning upon the laws, reveres, honours, and adores them.[6] The Law and its revealer are mutual in their relations. He who sees the Law sees the Master, and *vice versa*.[1] The *dhamma* is not merely a phenomenon or an instruction; it is in reality the Truth, according to and by virtue of which the Master and his followers, and consequently the Buddhas of the past and future, have attained or shall attain Buddhahood.

(2) According to a commentator, as given by Burnouf, Tathāgata (*tathā-āgata*, 'thus-come') means the one who has come thus, in the same manner as his predecessors, the Buddhas of the past; it is, on the other side, *tathā* and *gata*, 'thus-gone,' and means the one who has proceeded or departed as they.[2] The oneness of enlightenment and Law among the Buddhas of the past and of the present is an idea as old as the history of Buddhism, and the development of its philosophy has always had a close relation with the idea. 'The Tathāgatā (plur.) lead men by the right law (*saddhamma*)'[3]—these are the words believed to have been spoken by Buddha himself to his temptresses. This and similar passages, speaking of the Tathāgatas and the Law, indicate the communion of the Tathāgatas, or the unity of Buddhahood in the same truth. Not only has the Law been proclaimed by the Law-born Buddhas,[4] but they all have one and the same road to tread. This one road (*ekayāna*)[5] consists in nothing but reverence towards and realization of the Law. Herein lies the very essence of the teaching of all the Tathāgatas, or, speaking metaphysically, their entity—*dhammatā*[6] or *dhammassa sudhammatā*.[7] In this concept of the essence of Buddha's teaching or Law, and consequently of his personality as the Law-born, the Buddhist philosophers have found a metaphysical basis for their faith in Buddha as the *dhamma*-born. They were to find, by the help of this idea, a metaphysical unity in the communion of all the Tathāgatas. It is quite natural that Nāgārjuna,[8] the Mahāyānist philosopher of the 2nd cent. A.D., founded his theory of Buddha's *dharmakāya*, or *dharma-ātmā*, upon this concept of *dhammatā* and the authority of the verses speaking of the *ekayāna*, above referred to.

(3) This point gives us a key to the consideration of Buddhological speculation on the eternity of the Tathāgata's life. Whether the Tathāgata exists after his bodily death or not is a question that had been asked from very early times in Buddhist history. Buddha is said to have neither affirmed nor denied it.[9] It is remarkable that every time this question is asked Buddha is named by the epithet Tathāgata. Whatever this connexion may have implied, we see that the question is affirmed on a metaphysical basis in the Mahāyāna texts, and that here again the appellation Tathāgata comes most conspicuously to the front. We have two most important texts, which devote each a whole chapter to the question of the duration of the Tathāgata's life (*Tathāgata-āyuṣpramāṇā*)—the *Lotus of the Law*[10] and the *Golden Light*.[11]

[1] *The Book of the Great Decease*, vi. 15 (*SBE* xi. [1900] 116 f., and ed. R. C. Childers, London, 1878, p. 62).

[2] *Digha*, no. 34; cf. below, ch. ii. of the *Lotus*.

[3] See *Majjhima*, no. 18 (*PTS* ed. i. 182); *Saṃyutta*, xxxv. 116 (*PTS* ed. iv. 94 f.); cf. below, ch. v. of the *Lotus*.

[4] See *Aṅguttara*, v. 57 (*PTS* ed. ii. 75), and *passim*.

[5] See *Saṃyutta*, xxiv. (*PTS* ed. iii. 202–217), etc.

[6] See *Aṅguttara*, iii. 14 (*PTS* ed. i. 109), v. 133 (*PTS* ed. iii. 150), etc.

[1] *Itivuttaka*, 92 (*PTS* ed. p. 91); *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 87 (*PTS* ed. iii. 120).

[2] *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1845, p. 76; cf. *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, ii. 266).

[3] *Saṃyutta*, iv. 3, 5 (*PTS* ed. i. 127).

[4] *Theragāthā*, verse 491 (*PTS* ed. p. 51); tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, London, 1913, p. 237.

[5] See *Saṃyutta*, xlvii. 18, 43 (*PTS* ed. v. 168, 186), etc.; *Aṅguttara*, vi. 26 (*PTS* ed. iii. 314); cf. the *Lotus*, esp. ch. ii. (*SBE* xxi. 49, 54, etc.).

[6] See *Saṃyutta*, vi. i. 2, lvi. 24 (*PTS* ed. i. 140, v. 434); *Aṅguttara*, iv. 21 (*PTS* ed. ii. 21); cf. *Prajñā-pāramitā* in 8000 verses (ed. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888, p. 396).

[7] *Digha*, no. 19.

[8] In his *Prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* (B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of Chinese Buddhist Literature*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1169).

[9] A whole chapter called the *Avyākata*, 'Undefined,' *Saṃyutta*, xliv., is devoted to the question; cf. *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 85 f., xxiv. 15–18, xxiii. 1–10; *Majjhima*, nos. 63, 72, etc.

[10] *Saddharma-puṇḍarika*, *SBE* xxi. ch. xvi.

[11] *Suvarṇa-prabhā* (ed. Chandra Das, Calcutta, 1898), pp. 8–9

The first of these texts expounds at length the transcendental side of the Buddhological speculation, and the chapter above referred to may be taken as the conclusion of the exposition. Though the whole text seems to be a composite one, made up of heterogeneous elements, a definite line of argument may be found from its opening up to ch. xv. Ch. ii., entitled 'Tactfulness,' gives a view of the Buddha's personality as a skilful and tactful teacher of the Law, who, being versed himself in the deepest truth, knows how to guide men to enlightenment and how to carry out the one vehicle.[1]

The Tathāgata is a perfect being who knows all and is perfected in all virtues.[2] 'The Tathāgata only can proclaim the Tathāgata's Law, those laws which the Tathāgata knows. And the Tathāgata knows all laws, *i.e.* what are (*ye te*) the laws,[3] how (*yādṛśās*) they are, of what characteristics (*yallakṣaṇās*) they are, of what essence (*yat-svabhāvās*) they are. In these laws (*i.e.* truths) the Tathāgata is versed face to face. . . . Believe me, I speak what is real, I speak what is truthful, I speak what is not otherwise (*bhūtavādī, tathāvādī, ananyathāvādī*). . . . Having seized the one vehicle (*ekayāna*) I proclaim to beings the Law, the Buddha-vehicle; there is no second vehicle, nor a third. This is the nature of the Law (*dharmatā*) universally in the worlds in ten directions. All the Tathāgatas of the past, of the future, as well as of the present, proclaim the same one vehicle.'

After elucidating this mastership of the one vehicle by two parables, the text proceeds, in ch. v., entitled 'On Plants,' to reveal the entity of the Tathāgata's personality and his omnipotent powers. The Tathāgata who knows all *dharmas* is identified here with the *dharmas* themselves, or rather all the *dharmas* are concentrated in, and derived from, the personality of the Tathāgata. He is the king of the Law, as is stated in the *Nikāya* texts. But the king is not a mere legislator: he is the very entity of the laws.

'Whatever law for any case is laid down by the Tathāgata it becomes really so. The Tathāgata aptly ordains and lays down all laws. By the Tathāgata-wisdom he lays down the laws in such a manner that they enter into the position of omniscience.'

The Tathāgata is such a being because his omniscience, the *Tathāgata-jñāna*, is the very essence of all the laws, the real metaphysical foundation of all their manifestations. The saying that one who sees the Tathāgata sees the Law finds here a metaphysical interpretation, illustrated by a parable of rain which nourishes all plants, each according to its capacity and nature.

The discourses and dialogues following this chapter try to disclose the mysteries of Buddhahood. It is explained as of remote origin and in communion with all the enlightened of the past and future. The person of the Buddha, who was born among the Śākyas, and who has attained Buddhahood at Gayā, is nothing but a personal revelation of the eternal *dharmatā*,[4] *i.e.* the Tathāgata.[5] This faith is illustrated and supported figuratively by the issuing of innumerable saints out of the earth. The idea is that these saints cannot be the Tathāgata's disciples, unless he is Buddha from an infinite past. The argument reaches its climax in ch. xv., entitled 'The Duration of the Tathāgata's Life,' which brings to light the true measure of the Tathāgata's life. A corporal manifestation of the Tathāgata is for the benefit of those who need to be educated in that way. In reality he was perfectly enlightened long ago (*chirābhisambuddha*), and he is everlasting (*sadā sthita*). Therefore the Tathāgata declares, at the close of the chapter, that he knows eternity. Then he proclaims to all beings: 'I am the Tathāgata' (*lect. var.* 'I am thus and thus,' *tathā tathā 'ham*).

In the *Golden Light* it is first asked why the life of Śākyamuni lasted only eighty years. Buddha answers by affirming the immeasurableness of his life. All the saints and celestial beings utter verses praising and adoring the Buddha of an immeasurable life. Here we shall give an abstract of the verses, which are indeed the statement of a metaphysics of the Tathāgata. They say:

Hearken, unimaginable is the entity of the Lord of the world, the Tathāgata, who proceeds according to reality (*yathā-ākrama*). All the Buddhas are equal in their virtue, having the same *dharmatā*. The Tathāgata is unoriginated, and our Master is not a conditioned being. The Perfectly Enlightened has the Law as his body (*dharma-kāya*),[6] the Tathāgata has the Law as his realm (*dharma-dhātu*). Neither does the Buddha vanish nor does the Law perish, yet he shows extinction, in order to bring the beings to perfection. Unimaginable is Buddha, the Blessed One; the body of the Tathāgata is eternal; for the sake of compassion towards all beings he manifests himself in various appearances.

Here, as in the *Lotus*, remains a problem to be elaborated—the question of the relations between the unchangeable entity of the Tathāgata and his manifestation. A Chinese version[7] of the text, produced by I-tsing, adds a chapter after these verses, and it treats of the three bodies (or personalities) of the Tathāgata. This may be the work of a commentator, but it indicates how the Buddhological speculations have been closely connected with the appellation Tathāgata.

In summing up these ideas we may see that with the Buddhists the Tathāgata has meant the personal aspect of the *dharma*. To found metaphysical ideas upon faith in the person of the Tathāgata has always been the task of Buddhist orthodoxy, even in its phases of development in the East. But, in addition to this, we should consider two currents of thought which flowed beside the central one. (*a*) One of them is the theory that denies personality in the Tathāgata or anything else. It may be designated the theory of 'no-sign' (*alakṣaṇa*) and is represented by *The Diamond-cutter*[1] and other texts of the so-called Prajñā class. There the person of Buddha remains as the preacher of the sermons, and the epithet Tathāgata remains also; but nothing is allowed to be defined, any definition or qualification being thought to be a limitation, which means the same thing as illusion. Thus the texts which assert the omniscience of the Tathāgata deny to him any ascribable quality (*lakṣaṇa*). 'Tathāgata means one who does not go to anywhere, and does not come from anywhere.'[2] Here we see that the very idea of Tathāgata is put away. Nevertheless, in the midst of thorough negations, the identity of the Tathāgata and the Law is asserted.[3] This is indeed a testimony to the tenacity of the idea.

(*b*) Another current, opposite to the above, may be called the theory of 'signs' (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*). In its theoretical aspect this doctrine cannot be distinguished from orthodoxy, being founded upon the idea that all the *dharmas* are realities, which are realized in the person of the Tathāgata. But in practical aspects it looks to a Tathāgata beside the historical Buddha. Amitābha, the lord of the Sukhāvatī, or Vaiśā-jya-guru, the lord of the Eastern paradise, or Maitreya, the future Buddha in the Tusitā heaven, is the object of their adoration and their hope of salvation. The cult of the Tathāgatas in various heavens is found also in the *Lotus*,[4] and it has proved to be useful for propagandism. Buddhism of this kind, whichever may be its Tathāgata and ideal heaven, is founded upon the belief that any Buddha or saint is the manifestation of the one Tathāgata. This philosophy of the *dharma-lakṣaṇa* is a natural outcome of the early Buddhist concept of *dhamma* and is in conformity with the faith that every *dharma* is the manifestation of Buddha's wisdom (providence, so to speak). Moreover, the religion of adoring this or that Buddha as the being of compassion or as our saviour is not only in accordance with the philosophy, but also has a very sympathetic aspect of faith and piety. But the defect of this system lies in its losing concentration of faith in the historical Tathāgata and therefore in its running sometimes to an extreme pantheism.

To sum up the results: Buddhist philosophy started with the ideal of release from the miseries of life in conformity with the real nature of things (*dhammā*). As the reality, so the existence (*yathā dhammā tathā sattā*). This *yathā tathā* has been revealed by the Tathāgata, whose personality consisted in *yathā-vādī tathākārī*. This Buddha's personality is inseparable from the metaphysical entity of *dhamma*, and *vice versa*. The idea of the Tathāgata has, in this way, become the pivot around which both philosophical speculations and religious faith have moved and developed.

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M. ANESAKI.

[1] *SBE* xxi. 30-59.
[2] Cf. *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, ii. 362).
[3] Here and in the following passage *dhammā* means the things, together with their qualities and laws.
[4] Cf. *tathatvam* (*Lotus*, v. 20), and *dharma-tathatā* (*Lalita-vistara*, ed. S. Lefmann, Halle, 1902, p. 351, l. 8).
[5] Cf. *Lalita-vistara*, ch. v. (Lefmann, p. 351).
[6] Cf. *Lalita-vistara*, ed. Lefmann, p. 436 f.; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886, p. 396 f.
[7] Nanjio, no. 126.

[1] *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. [1894] pp. xii–xix, 110–144.
[2] *Ib.* xlix. pt. ii. p. 142; cf. art. DOCETISM (Buddhist).
[3] *Sarva-dharmā Buddha-dharmā* (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii. p. 134).
[4] Ch. xx.

TATI BUSHMEN.—1. Race and distribution.—The Tati Bushmen, called by the Bechuana Masarwa, and by the Matebele Amasile, are a branch of the Bush people of S. Africa, with whom they have many characteristics, both morphological and linguistic, in common.

The Bushmen in general were formerly spread over a much larger area of the continent of Africa than they occupy at present. Traces of their occupation, such as paintings, weapons, and implements, have been found far beyond their present limits. Indeed there is good reason for believing that at one time they occupied practically the whole continent and were driven by other peoples into their present territory. They are considered therefore by most anthropologists to be the true aborigines of S. Africa. In their legends they speak of a time when they were the only inhabitants of S. Africa. Paintings in the W. Sudan, in the caves of Algeria, and in Central France are strangely reminiscent of the Bushman paintings of Rhodesia or Cape Colony. The Grimaldi race, who inhabited some of the European caves in Aurignacian times, may have been either the ancestors of the Bushmen or a portion of the people who crossed over into Europe probably as slaves of the Cro-Magnon race. The Bush people are now confined to the country west of the Drakensberg Mountains and south of the Zambesi River to the Atlantic Ocean, but are principally found in the northern parts of Cape Colony, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, S.W. Protectorate, and S. Rhodesia. There are few, if any, Bushmen between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean, and not many in the Transvaal. So far as is known, there are none north of the Zambesi. From the Bantu traditions they must be recently extinct in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The Bushmen are divided into many different tribes and clans, speaking languages differing widely from one another, but all of the same general type. According to Meinhof,[1] the Bushman tongues are purely isolating and have their closest relations among the isolating languages of the W. Sudan. While this is true to a certain degree so far as the language of the Tati Bushmen is concerned, it is too sweeping a generalization in the present state of our knowledge. The Tati Bushmen inhabit the country between the Zambesi and the Crocodile Rivers, from the Transvaal and S. Rhodesia on the east to Lake Ngami on the west. They are fairly tall, 5 ft. 3 in. being the average stature of the men, while they are much darker in colour as a whole than the southern Bushmen. The Cape Bushmen seldom exceed 5 ft. in height, the average stature being 4 ft. 9 in., and are dirty yellow in colour. Among the Tati Bushmen some individuals attain a height of 6 ft., but they are rare. The face of the typical Bushman is triangular in outline, flat in appearance, with weak chin, depressed nose, and prominent cheek-bones. The ears usually have no lobes, the hair is thinly scattered over the skull in small tufts, there is little or no beard, and the whole appearance of the face is wild and foxy. Most of these characteristics are shared by the Tati Bushmen. Their bodies are small but tightly built, and they are seldom fat. Steatopygy is common among them, as among the southern Bushmen. The whole Bush population of S. Africa probably does not exceed 10,000, of which the Tati people may number 1000. They are a fast vanishing race.

2. Culture and organization.—The Bushmen, as their name (originally given to them by the early Dutch settlers) implies, are a people of the open country, a race of hunting savages living largely in the Stone Age. Their love of freedom amounts to a passion, and they are passionate, irresponsible, courageous, and cruel. Consequently they have practically no tribal organization, and very little clan system, except in the sense that a particular portion of country was the possession of a certain clan, the families of which, under the leadership of a man of known prowess, would combine to defend it against intruders. But usually all that obtained was that the various families combined in the face of danger, under the strongest and most capable leader, and, once that passed, the combination came to an end. They do not cultivate the soil and have no domesticated animals except dogs. They therefore depend entirely upon the chase. Their dwellings are caves or holes in rocks, or shelters made of a few branches stuck in the ground, with skins or mats thrown over them, which they carry away with them when they migrate from the district. Their material civilization is thus very meagre, being restricted to what is absolutely necessary for the capture and cooking of game. A little coarse pottery is or was made, while ostrich egg shells are used to hold water. Beads of dried wild berries and necklaces made from disks cut from ostrich egg shells are worn by both men and women. Ear-rings made from pieces of bone or wood, or—since the white man came to the country—of metal, usually brass, are common. Leather arm- and leg-rings, together with fillets of skin round the head, into which are stuck ostrich and other feathers, are also worn. Clothing is scanty and generally consists of the skin of an animal thrown over the shoulders in cold weather. The women wear a small piece of skin with fringes in front, while the men are content with a narrow piece of skin passed between the legs and tied round the waist with sinew or cord. Children of both sexes go naked. In warm weather to prevent the sun from blistering the skin, and in winter to keep out the cold, they smear the body with fat, often rancid, so that they smell very offensively. Weapons of war and the chase are spears, bows and arrows, and throwing-sticks. The tips of the arrows are smeared with poison made from the Bushman's poison bush (*Acocanthera venenata*) and the two-rowed Amaryllis (*Amaryllis distichia*), mixed with snake poison, and in some cases with poisonous ants. The food of both sexes consists of the flesh of animals, locusts, larvæ of ants, called 'Bushman rice,' gum, and various tubers and seeds. For the collection of tubers an implement called the */kibi* or */kwe* is employed. It is a stout stick about 3 ft. long, upon which a round flat stone with a hole in the centre is fastened about 9 ins. from the end. This is the well-known digging stick, which is also used to excavate graves.

3. Mentality; artistic and moral life.—The Bush people as a whole are low in the scale of mental acquirements. They have an extensive knowledge of the outdoor world, especially of the habits of wild animals. They are wonderful as trackers and have a remarkable sense of direction. Their reflective faculties are not highly developed, although some of their paintings, and more especially their folk-tales and songs, are not wanting in this respect. The most interesting thing about the Bushmen is their artistic ability. They have left paintings upon the walls of caves and rocks and incised figures upon boulders all over the country. Most of these paintings or chippings indicate objects of the chase, the habits of animals,

[1] C. Meinhof, 'The Language of the Hottentots,' *Addresses and Papers read at the Joint Meeting of the British and South African Associations for the Advancement of Science*, South Africa, 1905, iii. 193.

or more rarely scenes of war and domestic life. The drawings of the wild animals are in many cases really well executed, though one can trace in places the gradual evolution of the art of painting. A fresco recently discovered in the Matopo Hills near Bulawayo is remarkable for its artistic merit. There is not much perspective in most of the paintings, while the execution as a whole reminds one of the paintings of the Old Stone Age. Certain paintings of figures are supposed to have a mythological signification, as they cannot be connected with animals or circumstances of the present day. Some caves were called after particular paintings—*e.g.*, the Cave of the Great Serpent, the Cave of the Lion—and hence were held in a certain degree of reverence by the people. To such caves they would periodically return as to a rallying-point to talk over their wild adventures. It has been suggested that the art of the Bushman is due to sympathetic magic, that this was the idea underlying it—in other words, that the Bushman painted the animals on the walls of his cave-dwelling to give him power over them in the field. While this is possible, and may be probable in some cases, there is not any good evidence of it. It has been maintained that paintings usually depict animals desirable for food, and that noxious animals are conspicuous by their absence. So far as Bushman paintings are concerned, this is not true. If animals such as lions, leopards, snakes, and rhinoceroses are to be considered noxious animals, they occur often enough on the paintings. But such animals are not undesirable as food to the Bushmen, as they eat practically everything, and certainly would not refuse to eat the flesh of a lion, unless it happened to be the totem of the hunter. On the whole the paintings reflect no more than the ordinary life of the people *plus* the caprice of the particular artist. At intervals of leisure—and the Bushmen, when food was plenty, had much of that—the scenes of the past would rise up in their minds, and they would attempt to visualize them by painting them on the rock, and by constant practice the faculty of drawing improved. The colours employed were yellow, brown, red, and sometimes white, and blue. Some of these paintings are ancient, and some are quite modern, as certain of the artists are or were recently alive. The faculty of drawing and painting was said to be hereditary in certain families. The theory has been advanced that the painters and sculptors belonged to different tribes, but there is no good reason for accepting this.

The Bushmen are passionately fond of dancing, more especially at full moon and at certain seasons of the year. Fires are lit outside their caves, and dancing is kept up all night, or until the performers are exhausted. Some of these dances, in which the performers paint their faces and bodies, are of a religious nature. Some of them are more or less coarse. Songs are sung by the leaders, and the other performers join in the chorus. The motions are not at all graceful. Some dances are called after animals—*e.g.*, the eland bull dance, the baboon dance, the bee dance, and the frog dance—and each has its own peculiar tune. The dancers give very good imitations of the animal in its different attitudes. The instruments used to accompany these dances are stringed instruments similar to an ordinary bow, with a tortoise-shell as a sound-box variously called *!kopo*, *!kangen*, and *‖gora*, 'reed,' 'flutes,' and 'drums.' The dancers have rattles round their ankles, made of the skin of the inside of the springbok's ear, with small pebbles inside to make as much sound as possible. Circumcision dances are performed after the boys have undergone the ceremony. These are of a distinctly religious character. Bushman music is, as might be expected, of a very primitive character—the melancholy and monotonous repetition of a few notes. It does not usually consist of more than six tones (which do not belong to our scale), but the strangeness and wildness of the melody give it a peculiar charm. There are other tunes which show some advance, especially one by the Natal Bushmen. Harmony does not exist.

The Bushmen have an extensive range of terms for family relationships, both male and female. Some of these are connected with tabus; *e.g.*, a mother-in-law must not see her son-in-law or mention his name; he, on his part, must not mention hers. The same rule applies to some other relations also. A woman must avoid mentioning the name of her husband or any of his near relatives. There are different terms for these relationships, but the system among the Bushmen is not nearly so perfect as that among the Australians.

Marriage is usually a very simple matter among the Bushmen, some of whom are monogamists and some polygamists, according to their individual worldly position. Two young people very often simply go off and live together, but usually the young man has to prove his prowess by going into the veld and slaying some wild animal—the strongest and fiercest he can find—and presenting the whole or a selected portion to the girl's father. Among some tribes this is considered indispensable before asking the hand of a girl in marriage. If the present is accepted, the marriage is complete. Sexual intercourse before marriage, while looked upon as a crime, is very often practised. Divorce too is simple. A man or woman leaves his or her partner and goes off with some one else. The custody of the children does not cause much trouble, as the young people are accustomed to fend for themselves at an early age. Parental control is thus exceedingly weak. Marriage usually takes place within the clan, but a man cannot marry a woman of the same family as his own—*i.e.* bearing his own surname. So far as we know, a man cannot take his own sister to wife, because of his totem, but he may take his sister-in-law. Although there is much freedom in the intercourse of the sexes, incest and adultery are regarded as crimes and are punished by death, usually by retaliation on the part of the injured person. Murder, theft, abduction, and especially witchcraft, are crimes against the Bushman moral code and are punished by fines, expulsion from the tribe, or even death in the case of persistent offenders. The old people, when too infirm to follow the family in its wanderings or unable to procure food for themselves, are left to die.

4. Totemism and religion.—As has been remarked, totemism exists among the Bushmen, especially among those tribes that have had long contact with the Bantu peoples, but they are too much the children of the wild to have developed it to any extent. Some call themselves the Zebra clan, or the Eland clan, or the Duiker clan, and, while they avoid killing and eating these animals or certain portions of them, they are not at all strict about the matter when pressed by hunger. In the case of the Duiker clan, the members may eat all of the animal except the heart. Those clans whose totem was the buffalo did not scruple to eat every portion of a domestic ox, although they might not eat every portion of a wild buffalo, even though they looked upon oxen as tame buffaloes.

They believe in a spirit which the northern tribes call Thora, and the southern !Kang or ‖Kaggen.

W. H. I. Bleek,[1] J. M. Orpen,[2] and others think that !Kang is simply the mantis insect, for which they have a great reverence, but there does not seem to be great force in this contention. While it may be true of the Bushmen of Cape Colony, it is certainly not true of the Tati Bushmen. These tribes say that Thora is a spirit, that he sends the rain, the lightning (of which they are very much afraid), good weather, bad luck, and plenty. They are not very clear as to whether he is a person or not, but he is usually spoken of with dread, as a malevolent spirit, with whom it is advisable to keep on good terms. They also say that he made the animals, but they are not sure if he made the first men. The Tati Bushmen reverence the mantis to a certain extent, and do not like killing it if they can help it. All Bushmen have a great dread of death, and in common with many peoples believe that it is due to bewitchment by an enemy. Arbousset,[3] speaking of the Bushmen of Basutoland of his day, says that they looked upon death as a sleep. It is difficult to ascertain what they do really think on the subject, as they are so unwilling to speak of it at all. They also believe in some form of future life, but do not know what it is really like. They imagine that it does not differ much from the present life. This is shown by the burial customs of some tribes. They used to drag their dead into the surrounding bush to be devoured by wild animals, but generally they bury the bodies in a hole or cleft in a rock, which they carefully wall up, or they excavate a round hole about 3 or 4 ft. deep and place the dead man at the bottom in a sitting or lying position, with the legs doubled up to the chin, and in each case place beside him some food and his weapons of war. They generally indulge in a funeral feast afterwards, desert the locality, and never mention the dead man's name. Why they keep silence regarding the departed they cannot explain. Some tribes place the dead with his face to the rising sun; others observe no such custom.

The Tati Bushmen have no regular priests, but they have certain individuals, whom they call doctors, who possess a considerable knowledge of the properties and uses of wild plants, and thus exercise great influence over the people. This knowledge is sometimes confined to certain families, who jealously guard it. They have a considerable knowledge of vegetable poisons and have antidotes for them. Malicious poisoning does not often occur among them. Bushman doctors profess to cure malaria, typhoid, blackwater fever, dysentery, and other diseases, and, according to reliable information, are often successful. Most of the plants which they use are employed in religious ceremonies or in ordeals and trials for witchcraft. In fact, much, if not all, of the Bushman practice of medicine has a religious signification.

The Tati Bushmen, in common with most other Bushmen, practise circumcision. At present they perform the rite according to the Bechuana custom. Boys are operated upon at about the age of twelve years, development being rapid with them. A stone knife was formerly employed and still is by most tribes—a matter of necessity at first, but now a matter of custom, or of hygiene, as the knife is thrown away and a new one made for each ceremony. A number of boys of approximately the same age are operated upon at once. The method is as follows. The foreskin is pulled forward over the glans as far as it will stretch and then cut off with one slash of the knife. It quickly retracts and so prevents excessive bleeding, and usually heals rapidly. It is not known for certain whether the girls underwent the rite or not. The southern Bushmen cut off the last joint of the little finger of the right hand in the case of boys, and of the left hand in the case of girls. This was also a religious ceremony, but whether it took the place of circumcision or was additional thereto is still uncertain. Cutting off the joints of one or more fingers was also practised as a sign of mourning. The Tati Bushmen, whatever they may have done in the past, do not now practise finger-cutting.

5. **Omens.**—The great factor in the life of the Bushmen is their divining bones, commonly but erroneously called dice. The Bushmen would undertake no expedition without consulting them. They are four and sometimes five in number, and designated male and female. The female bone is usually longer than the male. They are made from the hoofs of animals, bone, horn, wood, or even the stones of wild fruits. Sometimes they are ornamented with designs on back or front. To consult them a man would clear a small space of ground, rub the bones with various kinds of medicine, blow upon them, and then cast them upon the ground. From their positions and conjunctions he divines what he wants to know, according to certain laws. If the result is unfavourable, it is useless for him to persevere in his object. Divination is also practised by means of the shoulder-blade of a springbok, and by certain other animals, such as the mantis, lion, jackal, and snake.

6. **Spirits.**—The Bushmen personify some animals and look upon them as men in another state of existence. They also believe that men, especially witch-doctors, can assume animal shapes at will and compel other people to do the same. This, they say, is to 'have power' over such victims. It has been held to indicate a belief in the transmigration of souls, but the point is very doubtful. They certainly believe in transformations of animals. The Tati Bushmen thoroughly believe in the existence of spirits, usually of a malevolent character, and, when closely questioned, admit that they can change their shapes at will, but they do not seem to believe that these spirits can be born again into other animal shapes. Lightning, wind, eddies of dust, storms, and other natural phenomena are looked upon as spirits. This is probably a relic of primitive man's belief that the animals and things about him were not different from himself—certainly to some extent the Bushman view. There are spirits of rivers, fountains, and thermal springs known to the Bushmen and much reverenced by them.

7. **Mythology of the heavenly bodies.**—The Bushmen have no regular system of mythology in the sense that the ancient Greeks or the modern Hindus have, but they have the elements of such. They are said to have worshipped the heavenly bodies and are therefore to be included among those people who attained to sidereal worship. Among the Tati Bushmen no special ceremonies are connected with these bodies, although it is evident from numerous tales in which the sun and moon appear that a considerable degree of reverence is paid to them. The new moon figures in many of their tales.

The moon is the shoe of the mantis. Her waxing and waning is explained as her dying and coming to life again. The Tati Bushmen have some of these tales in a more or less modified form; *e.g.*, one speaks of the moon coming down to wash her face in a pool of water. The Bushmen do not know why the sun is hot, and why there is no heat in the moon. Among the southern Bushmen the sun is spoken of as a little boy by the wayside; sometimes he is said to have been thrown into the sky by some children while he was sleeping. Again, the moon is spoken of as being cut by the sun and after death

[1] *A Brief Account of Bushman Folk Lore*, p. 6 ff.

[2] 'A Glimpse into the Mythology of the Malute Bushmen,' *Cape Monthly Magazine*, July, 1874, pp. 1–13.

[3] T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Relation d'un voyage d'exploration au nord-est de la Colonie du Cap de Bonne-Espérance*, p. 504.

carries away the people who are dead. Some of the Tati Bushmen say that the stars were once human beings and animals, and the Cape Bushmen speak of girls as having been turned into stars and flowers by the rain. Certain prominent stars have particular names among the Bushmen; *e.g.*, Jupiter is the Dawn's Heart; the Magellanic Clouds the Male and Female Steinbok, the Southern Cross the Giraffe Star (Tati Bushmen), Aldebaran the Male Hartebeest, Procyon the Male Eland, Orion's Belt the Female Tortoises. The origin of the stars is explained in the following manner. A girl of the early race, being angry with her mother because the latter asked her for a certain kind of food which she had put to roast in the fire, threw it together with the wood ashes that were upon it into the air. The food was changed into stars, and the ashes became the Milky Way. The rising of particular stars at certain seasons of the year was noted, as they were connected with the return of the seasons. Shooting stars were considered unlucky by the Tati Bushmen, and, if they appeared in great numbers, inspired terror.

8. Folk literature.—The Bushmen have a great body of folklore, mostly relating to animals and natural objects, customs, and so on, but next to none of a historical character, certainly none that throws much light on their origin and migrations. Not a tithe of those folk-tales have been garnered, and, as the race is a fast vanishing one, they will soon be completely lost. Bleek collected a large number of tales, and a selection from his great mass of materials was published in 1911 by his niece, Miss Lloyd. Smaller collections by Schultze, Theal, and Dornan have been issued. A study of these tales throws much light on the mental and moral outlook of the Bushmen.

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S. S. DORNAN.

TATUING.—The word 'tatu' or 'tattoo,' meaning to mark or puncture the skin, is derived from the Tahitian word *tatau*, a reduplicated form of the root *ta*, 'to strike.' It was used by Captain Cook in the account of his visit to Tahiti:

> 'Both sexes paint their Bodys, *Tattow* as it is called in their Language. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins in such a manner as to be indelible.'[1]

Cook was thus the first to introduce the word to the civilized world of his day. Many writers since his time have included in the general term 'tatu' the practice of marking the skin with cicatrices; the two processes are, however, very different. Tatu proper is the insertion of pigment under the skin, whereby a practically permanent stain is produced, while cicatrization is the marking of the body, either by cutting or burning the skin in such a way as to cause scars forming small depressions or by cutting into the skin and keeping the wounds open, so that keloids, or raised scars, are formed, which stand out prominently from the surrounding tissue.

[1] *Journal during his First Voyage, 1768–71*, ed. W. J. Wharton, London, 1893, p. 93.

1. Antiquity and distribution.—Both these modes of personal decoration are of considerable antiquity and of wide distribution; they have been found among people of greatly varying culture, from the aborigines of Australia, who adorn their bodies with cicatrices, to the Polynesians and Japanese, who have developed tatu proper into a fine art. At a very early stage man no doubt felt a desire for personal decoration and learnt to use pigment for this purpose; and it is possible that tatu was resorted to as a means of giving a permanent character to the designs thus made to beautify the body at a stage prior to the use of clothes. Archæological evidence can, unfortunately, give us no direct proof of the existence of such a custom as tatu in pre-historic times, but it is well known that Aurignacian man was skilful in the use of colour. Déchelette suggests that the finely pointed implements found in Magdalenian deposits may have been used for tatuing. Referring to the practice among primitive peoples of cicatrization and tatu, he says:

> 'Les premiers habitants de l'Europe préhistorique s'ornaient le corps à l'aide des mêmes procédés, mais en général il nous est impossible de distinguer nettement pour cette période entre la teinture corporelle simple et le tatouage. C'est là un fait établi par des preuves indirectes mais décisives pour la fin des temps quaternaires, pour l'époque néolithique et le commencement tout au moins de l'âge du bronze.'[1]

In the pre-dynastic tombs of the old Egyptians excavated by Flinders Petrie, de Morgan, Amélineau, and others, some rude human figures have been found bearing marks that suggest the use of tatu—*e.g.*, the female figure discovered at Tukh.[2] In the second Theban empire the Egyptians tatued themselves on the breast or arms with the names or symbols of deities, but decorative tatu marks are rare on Egyptian remains of the classical period.[3] The prohibition in Lv 19[28], 'Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you,' indicates that the Jews had seen these practices carried on by the heathen nations among whom their lot was cast, and perhaps had themselves adopted them.

There are many classical allusions to tatu in Europe. Herodotus writes of the Thracian women being tatued as a sign of nobility.[4] Pliny[5] says that the men of the Dacians and Sarmatians marked their bodies ('corpora sua inscribunt'). That tatu was known to the Pictones and other tribes of Gaul is shown by the evidence from coins.[6] Chinese tradition says that the great Chinese hero Tschaipe found tatu among the Ainus of Japan, who indeed practise it to this day. In China it ceased at a very early time to be a desirable mode of decoration and survives only as a method of imposing a distinctive mark. A. T. Sinclair says that 'among the ancient natives in the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, tattooing was general if not almost universal.'[7] It was also practised by the early inhabitants of S. America, as notably among the coastal tribes of Ecuador and ancient Peru.[8] G. Elliot Smith finds it along the coast-lines of a great part of the world and includes it in the culture-complex of the 'heliolithic' track.[9] Darwin, in drawing attention to the universality of the custom among primitive peoples, said: 'Not one great country can be named, from the Polar regions in the north to New Zealand in the south, in which the aborigines do

[1] *Manuel d'Archéologie*, Paris, 1908–13, i. 203.
[2] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Nagada*, London, 1896, pl. 59. 6.
[3] J. Capart, *Les Débuts de l'art en Egypte*, Brussels, 1904, p. 32 f.
[4] v. 6. [5] *HN* xxii. 1.
[6] T. Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Cæsar*, Oxford, 1907, p. 418 ff.
[7] 'Tattooing of the American Indians,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xi. [1909] 399.
[8] T. A. Joyce, *S. American Archæology*, London, 1912, p. 61 f.
[9] *The Migrations of Early Culture*, London, 1915, p. 7.

not tattoo themselves.'[1] W. Joest goes so far as to say that no race or people exists that has not had the custom of either painting or tatuing the body.[2] On the other hand, some investigators have failed to find traces of cicatrization or tatu among certain primitive tribes, such as the Vedda of Ceylon,[3] the Mafulu of British New Guinea,[4] the Tati Bushmen,[5] and others; but this negative evidence does not rule out the possibility that such practices were once known to these people and have become lost arts. Cicatrization is mainly confined to dark-skinned races, while tatu proper prevails with those of lighter colour. Thus we find cicatrization in Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, Fiji, and other parts of Melanesia, in Torres Straits islands, among the Papuans of New Guinea, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakai), the Andaman Islands, and in negro Africa. It has been superseded in S. America by tatu proper, but has been observed among the Caribs of Guiana and in Brazil. The light-coloured races who have practised tatu proper include the Maoris of New Zealand and the inhabitants of the other islands of Polynesia. It is also found in Melanesia, Micronesia, the Malay Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, India, among the Tibeto-Burman peoples in general (but rare in Tibet), and in Japan. In Africa it is found in Algeria, in Egypt, among the For, the Tushilang, the Namaqua Hottentots, and other tribes, but it is by no means so widely distributed in this continent as cicatrization. On the other hand, tatu proper was very prevalent in the New World, especially among the Indian tribes of N. America, such as the Iroquois, the Pricked Pawnees, the Delawares, and others. It is used extensively at the present day by the Haida Indians of the N.W. American coast, and also by the Eskimo, and in S. America, notably among the Mundrucu and Guaycura tribes.

Tatuing is said to be one of the chief occupations of the Oriental gypsies. Sinclair found that most of the tatuing among the lower orders in Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and some parts of Persia was done by them. They also tatu themselves, and in this they differ from European gypsies, for these do not wear tatu marks. 'Hence their tattooing is an easy mode of identifying Oriental gipsies, who are often seen in all parts of Europe and America.'[6] At the present day tatuing persists in Europe among the lower classes. Lombroso made a comparative study of tatu among soldiers and criminals, and concluded that it was especially prevalent among the latter. He noted that the designs in criminal tatu are often extremely complex and of a cynical and obscene character.[7] There was a considerable revival of tatu among the soldiers and sailors serving with the British forces in the recent war. A revival, too, has been evident in Japan since 1881, when tatu ceased to be a penal offence and came once more into vogue, with the result that it is now an elaborate art.[8] Apart from these and similar isolated revivals, tatu is, on the whole, rapidly declining, especially in Polynesia, once the centre of a highly developed system of tatu. This change is due, no doubt, in a great measure to the action of the missionaries, who have discouraged the practice, because of the orgies that often accompanied the tatuing operations.

2. Methods and implements.—The methods and implements used to produce these marks on the body vary considerably in different parts of the world and often reflect the cultural conditions of the people among whom they have been found. It is impossible here to do more than indicate briefly some of the more striking variations of the processes which have been recorded and add a few examples by way of illustration.

(*a*) *Cicatrization.*—In Central Africa prominent keloids are formed by detaching a piece of skin, which is raised and held by a pellet of tow till the wound is healed. A. L. Cureau alludes to 'dandies of the Upper Ubangi and Equatorial Congo' who undergo this operation as a means of obtaining 'the prominent crest which gives them a fierce expression.'[1] Irritant substances are sometimes rubbed into the incisions to prevent the wounds from healing too rapidly. Among the Bageshu, a Bantu people on the south and south-east slopes of Mt. Elgon, the girls use a crescent-shaped flesh hook sharpened to a needle point at one end. Scars are formed on the forehead and stomach by pinching up the flesh between the thumb and finger and running the hook through it; fine dust from a wood fire is then rubbed into the wounds.[2] Natives from the interior of Mozambique wear marked *rugæ* on the forehead.

These are formed 'by making vertical incisions in the skin, rubbing in a medicine, and then binding tightly with a cloth, so that wrinkles are formed in the line of the incision.'[3]

Cicatrization begins with the Andamanese at the age of eight and continues at intervals until the sixteenth or eighteenth year is reached. It is usually done by women, who use a flake of quartz or glass held between the forefinger and thumb. The arms and back are marked first, while fasting, and afterwards the chest, abdomen, and legs, but never the face; the special tribal marks are, in some tribes, made by men with a pig arrow. Pork is not eaten while the wounds are healing; and the northern tribes have certain ceremonies connected with the operation.[4] The aborigines of Central Australia cut the skin with flakes of flint or glass and rub in ashes or the down of the eagle-hawk.[5] At Port Essington (N. Territory of Australia) scars are formed by burning the flesh with a red-hot stick.[6] In N.W. Queensland they are made by lighting charcoal on the flesh and allowing it to burn there. The implements used in Melanesia differ in different islands; *e.g.*, in the Solomons the circular or chevron-shaped cicatrices worn by both sexes on the face are made with the claw of the flying fox,[7] while in Florida Island the pattern is 'marked out in circles with a bamboo, and the skin is cut with the bone of a bat's wing.'[8] The keloids and scars called *kotto*, which are customary in New Britain, are made with obsidian flakes.[9]

(*b*) *Tatu proper.*—A method which seems to suggest a combination of cicatrization and tatu proper is that of cutting the flesh and rubbing pigment into the wounds. Livingstone says of the Makoa (Makua) of Central Africa, who have double lines of keloids on the face: 'After the incisions are made, charcoal is rubbed in and the flesh pressed out, so that all the cuts are raised above the level of the surface.'[10] The charcoal gives a bluish tinge to the skin, 'and the ornament shows brightly in persons of light complexion, who by the by are common.'[11] The Ainu women of Yezo (Japan) cut gashes on the face with a sharp knife and rub in soot from burnt birch-bark, which

[1] *Descent of Man*, London, 1871, ii. 339.
[2] *Tätowiren, Narbenzeichnen, und Körperbemalen*, Berlin, 1887, p. 45.
[3] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 207.
[4] R. W. Williamson, *The Mafulu Mountain People of British New Guinea*, London, 1912, p. 36.
[5] S. S. Dornan, 'The Tati Bushmen,' *JRAI* xlvii. [1917] 44.
[6] *Amer. Anth.*, new ser., x. [1908] 361.
[7] C. Lombroso, 'Criminal Anthropology,' in *20th Century Practice of Medicine*, London, 1897, xii. 382 ff.
[8] B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[2], London, 1891, p. 399 ff.

[1] *Savage Man in Central Africa*, tr. E. Andrews, London, 1915, p. 169.
[2] J. Roscoe, 'Notes on the Bageshu,' *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 186.
[3] G. A. Turner, 'Tribal Marks of S. African Natives,' *Transvaal Medical Journal*, Feb. 1911, p. 13.
[4] E. H. Man, *Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, p. 112.
[5] Spencer-Gillen[2], p. 41 f.
[6] B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the N. Territory of Australia*, London, 1914, p. 9.
[7] C. M. Woodford, *A Naturalist among the Head-Hunters*, London, 1890, p. 31.
[8] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 237.
[9] R. Parkinson, *Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee*, Stuttgart, 1907, p. 145.
[10] D. Livingstone, *Last Journals in Central Africa*, London, 1874, i. 33.
[11] *Ib.* i. 49 f.

produces a bluish-black effect.[1] This method has also been observed in some of the islands of Micronesia.

The implements used for pricking the skin range in complexity from such simple natural objects as thorns, fish spines, cactus spikes, shells, and bones, to the elaborate metal appliance of the Burmese and the steel and electric needles of Japan and Europe in use at the present day. The Roro-speaking tribes of British New Guinea obtain the desired effect by very simple means. The operator, who is generally an old woman, applies colouring matter—soot mixed with water—with a fragment of wood frayed out at one end to form a coarse brush. The colour is pricked in by means of a pricker having one or more thorns set at right angles to its long axis; these thorns are driven into the skin by tapping the pricker gently with a small wooden mallet. The women of these tribes are tatued from head to foot, but the operation takes place at intervals, and there is a regular order in which the different parts of the body must be tatued; thus the hands and arms are done in childhood, and later the tatu is gradually increased until at marriageable age it is applied to the buttocks, legs, and last of all to the face.[2] The Polynesian method of tatuing is generally to trace the design on the skin first with charcoal and then to follow the pattern with a small adze-shaped implement furnished with a serrated bone edge. The skin is perforated by hammering or tapping this implement with another made of wood and shaped like a paddle. But the ways and means employed vary a good deal in the South Sea Islands, and the operation is often accompanied by much ceremonial and feasting, and the keeping of certain tabus; *e.g.*, brides in the Fiji, while being tatued, are *tabu siga*, and are kept in seclusion, for they must not see the sun.[3] In New Zealand a very strict tabu has to be observed by the person undergoing the ordeal; he may not communicate with any one not in the same condition, nor may he touch his food. The Maori chief had to be fed through a special funnel during the process, which entailed a good deal of ceremonial of a somewhat religious character. The Maori tatu, or *moko*, was of two kinds, of which the older method was a cutting into the skin with a small chisel-like tool made of sea-bird's wing-bones, shark's teeth, stones, or hard wood, and of different sizes and shapes. The edge of the chisel was applied to the skin and tapped by a small mallet, which sometimes had a broad flattened surface at one end used to wipe away the blood. This chiselling process was superseded by prick tatu, which was done with small-toothed or serrated implements dipped in colouring matter obtained either from charcoal mixed with oil or dog's fat or burnt and powdered resin.[4] In Borneo the design is pressed on to the skin with a tatu block dipped in pigment made from a mixture of soot and sugar-cane juice. The needle points of the pricker, which are also charged with pigment, are then driven into the skin by taps from a striker. Among the Kayans the men carve the designs on the blocks, but the tatu is done by women. The artists are under the protection of a tutelary spirit to whom sacrifices must be made, and the operator has to avoid certain foods. The women are tatued in a hut built for the purpose; their male relatives are dressed in bark-cloth and must remain indoors until the operation is completed; in fact it cannot be commenced unless their men-folk are at home. It is prohibited to tatu women at seed-time, or if a dead body lies unburied in the house, and bad dreams, such as 'a dream of floods, foretelling much blood-letting, will also interrupt the work.'[1] In Burma the outline of the desired pattern is roughly sketched on the skin with a camel's hair brush and is then pricked in by a series of punctures close together, which merge into a rough line. The pricker is of an unusual kind, being two feet long and weighted at the top with a brass or lead figure; the pigment is contained in a style four inches long, which fits into a hollow pipe and is thus joined to the weighted end.[2] In Japan steel needles of four different sizes are used; the effect of shading is procured by tying rows of needles together. Sepia, vermilion, and Prussian blue are used in the designs, which are very ornate.[3] In some parts of N. America the pigmented effect is obtained by running a needle-like implement through the skin threaded with some material coated in pigment.

This method was followed by the Salish tribes, who used a 'needle of fish-bone or a cactus spike, which passed a fine thread coated with charcoal under the skin,' or sometimes the charcoal was carried on an unthreaded needle, 'which was thrust under the skin in a horizontal direction.'[4]

The Eskimo use a needle and thread smeared with soot or gun-powder. Thus, speaking of the personal appearance of the Greenlanders, D. Crantz says:

'No one . . . is a finished beauty till the skin of her cheeks, chin, hands and feet, has been threaded by a string smeared with soot, which when drawn out leaves a black mark. The mother performs this painful operation on her daughter in childhood, fearful that she will else attract no husband. This custom obtains among the Indians of North America, and various Tartar tribes, where both sexes practise it; the one to heighten their charms, the other to inspire terror.'[5]

3. **Patterns.**—A detailed study of the patterns would doubtless yield results of considerable ethnological interest as pointing to the migrations and culture-contact of peoples. Flinders Petrie[6] has drawn attention to the resemblance between the Algerian patterns described by Lucien Jacquot[7] and those on the female figure found at Tukh and on the Libyans in the tomb of Seti I. (XIXth dynasty, 1300 B.C.). The dominating designs in Algeria are a cross and a figure resembling a fly, which are thought to be degenerate forms of the swastika—a device widely distributed in Africa and elsewhere, and of great antiquity, as is shown by its appearance on a leaden figure[8] in the second city of Troy (about 2500–2000 B.C.) and by its prevalence in ancient Crete. The designs in favour among the Haida tribes on the north-west coast of America are similar to those on their boats, house-fronts, pillars, and monuments, and include family crests and totemic symbols such as the thunder-bird, wolf, bear, codfish, and so on. There is a great variation in the patterns of the Polynesian tatu, for almost every island has some distinctive characteristic of its own. The Marquesans, *e.g.*, tatu in broad straight lines. Many of their signs suggest a hieroglyphic system which can be interpreted only by their priests; in Anaa, however, sea-urchins and quaint zoophytes are well represented on the leg and thigh. The Marquesan women have a design somewhat resembling a gridiron tatued on their lips.[9] In Tahiti the patterns are simpler, but of greater taste and elegance than those of the Marquesas Islands.

[1] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 24.
[2] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 265.
[3] T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*[3], London, 1870, p. 146.
[4] Major-Gen. Robley, *Moko: Maori Tattooing*, London, 1896, pp. 47, 62.

[1] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, i. 245–277.
[2] Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*[2], London, 1896, pp. 39, 41.
[3] Chamberlain[2], p. 401.
[4] C. Hill-Tout, *British N. America*, i., 'The Far West,' London, 1907, p. 74.
[5] *Hist. of Greenland*, Eng. tr., London, 1820, i. 129.
[6] *L'Anthropologie*, xi. [1900] 485.
[7] 'Les Tatouages des indigènes de l'Algérie,' *L'Anthropologie*, x. [1899] 434.
[8] H. Schliemann, *Ilios*, London, 1880, p. 337 f.
[9] F. W. Christian, *E. Pacific Lands*, London, 1910, pp. 197, 199.

The coco-nut tree is a favourite object, and figures of men, animals, and flowers also occur, as well as stars, circles, and lozenges.[1] The Maori tatu stands out in striking contrast to that of the rest of Polynesia, its chief feature being the blending of spirals and sweeping curves, which follow the conformation of the human form, the face being generally completely covered. This prevalence of curved lines suggests Melanesian influence; for Polynesian tatu is generally rectilinear in character. Melanesian tatu is often asymmetrical, perhaps because it is done at different times and by different artists. Here again the patterns are very diverse and suggest, as regards some islands, Polynesian influence. Each of the three principal centres of tatu proper in New Guinea has peculiarities of design and execution; thus, curved lines prevail in Humboldt Bay instead of the broader stripes of the south coast, and in the central district the designs used in tatu resemble those on the pipes and gourds, which show a preponderance of straight lines over curves and an absence of human or animal forms. The Motu (Port Moresby) and kindred tribes are said to have a geometrical art, and their tatu is angular in character, but there seems to be good evidence that many of their designs were naturalistic in origin and became conventionalized later.[2] In the Admiralty Islands the men wear cicatrices on chest and shoulders in the form of circular spots of the size of half-a-crown. Tatu proper is mainly confined to the women, who have rings round the eyes and all over the face, and diagonal lines on the upper part of the front of the body crossing one another so as to form lozenge-shaped spaces.[3]

Complicated serial designs are worn by the women in Borneo. The fingers and feet are done at the age of ten, the forearm at eleven, the thighs partly at twelve, being finished at puberty; it is thought immodest to be tatued after motherhood. The men have isolated designs, such as the dog design, in elongated or rosette form—a device prominent in Kayan art and one that can be traced in the shoulder tatu of many of the tribes including the Barawans (Sarawak). The most primitive tatu in Borneo is that of the Uma Long women of Batang Kayan; it is stippled in—on the forearm only—in irregular dots. Indigenous patterns are done by freehand, no blocks being used for them. The thigh tatu in Borneo produces the effect of tight-fitting breeches, and resembles that found among the Burmese and some of the Naga tribes. The latter have an elaborate face tatu called *ak*, formed of continuous lines across the forehead, round and underneath the eyes, over the cheeks, to the corners of the mouth and the chin. 'Rows of spots follow the outside lines, and two fine lines mark out the nose in a large diamond space.' With the Nagas both sexes tatu, but some tribes do not mark the face, and have the tatu placed on the breast, shoulders, back, wrists, and thighs.[4] The Burmese tatu generally from the waist to the knees, but among the Shans it extends from the neck to the feet. The designs include mystic squares, triangles, and a great variety of animals. The old or jungle style was to cover the skin with tracery producing an indefinite effect; the new style is distinct in outline.[5] Perhaps the most highly developed tatu is that of the Japanese, who cover the body with fantastic figures of dragons, birds, flowers, and landscapes, in a manner that recalls the patterns on their silks.

1 W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1831, i. 265 f.
2 Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 38.
3 H. N. Moseley, 'On the Inhabitants of the Admiralty Islands,' *JAI* vi. [1876] 401.
4 R. G. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called Naga Hills,' *JAI* xi. [1881] 208.
5 Shway Yoe[2], p. 41 f.

4. **Use and significance.**—(*a*) *Magico-religious.*—The use and significance of these marks were manifold, and they have played an important part in the life of primitive man, since they had a magico-religious as well as a social aspect. Their widespread use, even at the present day, as a magical protection against sickness and other misfortunes shows a very general belief in their supernatural efficacy. The Yuin tribe of S.E. Australia wear vertical cicatrizations round the upper arm to make boomerangs glance off.[1] In Timorlaut scars are made with red-hot stones on the arms and shoulders in imitation of smallpox marks to ward off that disease.[2] The Andamanese believe that cicatrization is good for rheumatism, toothache, headache, paralysis, epilepsy, and phthisis; it is resorted to for these and other ailments when all else fails. The Todas use it to cure the pains caused by milking buffaloes. Tatu proper is a remedy for rheumatism much in favour with the men of the Halba caste, who work on the lands in the south of the Raipur District and the Kānker and Bastar States in India; its action is probably that of a counter-irritant.[3] The Gonds and Baigas have a number of designs for the protection of different parts of the body, including a figure of the monkey-god Hanuman to give strength, of Bhimsen's club to assist digestion, of the foot-god to cure pain, and so on.[4] The Burman has similar safeguards worn on all parts of the body; they are a protection against wounds and secure freedom from pain, and are sufficiently potent to procure even the favour of princes. The only tatu worn by the Burmese women is a love-charm in the form of a triangle between the eyes or on the lips or tongue; it is done with the 'drug of tenderness'—a mixture of vermilion with herbs and other ingredients such as the skin of trout-spotted lizards.[5] The Shans tatu boys as a test of courage, but special designs are added to prevent injuries or other mishaps. In Borneo the Kayan men wear a special tatu on the wrist called *lukut*, which keeps away illness. The *lukut* is a much-valued bead, which was formerly fastened on the wrist of the sick man to 'tie in' the soul; but, as the bead was liable to be lost, a tatued representation of it came to be worn instead. The Ainu women are tatued on the lips and arms to keep away the demons of disease, who are thus led to believe they are the wives of the gods, since these are all tatued in this manner. If an epidemic occurs in a village, the women must tatu each other; they also use tatuing as a remedy for failing eyesight.[6]

Many races believe that the efficacy of tatu marks extends beyond the present life to that of the next world, where they serve as marks of identification—*e.g.*, Nāgas of Manipur, Kayans of Borneo, N. American Indians, and many others—or as a guide, or as currency enabling the traveller to accomplish his journey.

The Dhanwār, who inhabit the wild hilly country adjoining Chotā Nāgpur, say that tatu marks 'remain on the soul after death, and that she shows them to God, probably for purposes of identification.'[7]

Women of the Brāhman caste believe that after death they will be able to sell the ornaments tatued on their bodies and to subsist on the proceeds. In Africa a similar belief is found among the Ekoi women, who think that in the next world they can exchange their scars for food, and that the ghost is able to remove them one by one for this

1 Howitt, p. 746.
2 H. O. Forbes, 'On the Ethnology of Timor-laut,' *JAI* xiii. [1883] 10.
3 R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iii. 200.
4 *Ib.* iii. 124–127.
5 Shway Yoe[2], p. 45.
6 Batchelor, p. 23 f.
7 Russell, iii. 386.

purpose.[1] The Eskimo and the Fijians believe in Elysium only for the tatued; the Fijian women who have not these marks are said to be served up as food for the gods. Some investigators have insisted upon a considerable religious element in tatu, since the operation is often accompanied by sacrifice, prayer, and other religious ceremonies, and the designs frequently represent sacred animals, or other objects that may be regarded as symbols of gods. These serve to express a close union between the god and his disciple; hence the need for certain tabus to avoid the dread consequences of contact with persons in this dangerous state. The priest of the Ewe-speaking people of W. Africa has special tatu marks indicating the deity whom he serves and the rank that he holds in the priestly order; the shoulder marks in this case are so sacred that they must not be touched by the laity.[2] In San Domingo the priests did not wear a distinctive dress, but had a figure of a *zemi* (idol) tatued or painted on their bodies.[3] Tatuing was regarded by many people as a sacred profession, and the artists were under the special protection of deities of the craft. In Tahiti these were the children of Taaroa, the principal deity; their images were kept in the temples of those who practised the art professionally, prayers being addressed to them by the operator before he began his work. The Tahitians say that tatuing originated among the gods, and there are legends in Samoa and elsewhere telling of its sacred origin.

(*b*) *Informatory.*—To people who do not possess a system of writing the wearing of permanent and distinctive body-marks is not merely an æsthetic advantage, but in many cases a real necessity. Used extensively by uncultured peoples, these marks became a convenient means of conveying to their fellow-men all kinds of information concerning their activities and environment. They serve as a record of achievement and a means of identifying a man's tribe, clan, totem, social status, age-grade, and so on; and they have been regarded by some authors as a primitive form of writing.[4] Thus, in Africa cicatrization is a common form of tribal mark, the scars being worn on the face or on other parts of the body and arranged in a certain pattern. The Shilluk, Dinka, Dahoman, Mxosa, Mtyopi, and Hausa tribes are among those who follow this practice. Scars are used for the same purpose in the Andaman Islands, and in Melville and Bathurst Islands of N. Australia. Ellis, writing of the Maoris of New Zealand, says that their faces were much tatued:

'Each chief had thus imprinted on his face the marks and involutions peculiar to his family or tribe; while the figures tatued on the faces of the dependants or retainers, though fewer in number, were the same in form as those by which the chief was distinguished.'[5]

Even individual Maoris could be identified by special marks which were tatued on the face—usually near the ear—in addition to the general pattern. These came to be used as the signature of the wearer and have been accepted as such on documents relating to transactions carried on between the Maoris and white men.

The Salish and Déné tribes of N. America have markings—generally on the breast—symbolic of the totem or *manitu* of the individual wearing them. The Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands have their family totems or crests tatued on their bodies with great skill. The designs are often very elaborate and resemble those on the totem-posts that stand outside their houses. A. C. Haddon records an instance of the use of cicatrization to represent the totemic device in the Torres Straits, where he saw some women wearing it cut into their backs. He was told that the men wore it cut into the shoulder or calf of the leg.[1]

The Kavuya Indians of California formerly used the tatu designs worn by a landowner as a property mark by cutting or painting them upon trees and posts selected to indicate the boundaries. It was customary for the Maidu women to have a red spot tatued on the forehead by which, if taken prisoners in war, they could be identified by friends and so ransomed.[2]

A curious use of tatu occurs in the well-known story in Herodotus of the slave who was sent from Susa to Aristagoras of Miletus by Histiæus with instructions that he was to be shaved, and that Aristagoras should look at his head; this being done, it was found that a message had been tatued on the man's head, urging Aristagoras to revolt against the Persians.[3]

Cicatrization and tatu proper are included in the puberty rites and initiation ceremonies of many primitive peoples. In an account of one of these ceremonies in Australia Spencer and Gillen report:

'The final ceremony of initiation to manhood in the Urabunna tribe is called Wilyaru, and the same name is given to men who have passed through it. The most important part of the ceremony consists in making cuts on the back, one in the middle line of the neck and four or six others down each side of the backbone.'[4]

In the Marquesas Islands tatu proper was the principal initiatory rite.

In Samoa 'until a young man was tattooed, he was considered in his minority. He could not think of marriage, and he was constantly exposed to taunts and ridicule, as being poor and of low birth, and having no right to speak in the society of men. But as soon as he was tattooed he passed into his majority and considered himself entitled to the respect and privileges of mature years.'[5]

It sometimes marked the admission to secret societies, as in the Banks Islands (Melanesia), where at the performance of the *kole-kole* ceremonies the head of the *tamate* design adopted by members of the society is tatued on the wrist, a part of the body highly valued.[6] Mary H. Kingsley says of the initiation of boys in Africa:

'The boy, if he belongs to a tribe that goes in for tattooing, is tattooed, and handed over to instructors in the societies' secrets and formulæ.'[7]

In New Zealand tatuing began with both sexes at puberty, the women being tatued chiefly on the lips and chin.[8] Chin tatu on women signifies marriage, not only in New Zealand, but also among the Eskimo, the Chukchi, the Indians of the Pacific Coast, and in Syria, Egypt, and Tunis. Women are usually tatued at puberty. This is not, however, always the case, for in some of the islands of Fiji and among the Todas of the Nilghiris it is deferred until they have borne children, while with some races it is begun in infancy and completed at marriage. Only women are tatued among the Chukchi, most Californian tribes, the Ainus of Japan, and in many parts of India. In the Omaha tribe of N. America tatu marks on women signified great honour and a rank equal to that of a chief. Bachofen saw in the limitation of tatu to women among the Thracians an expression of their distinction and good social position.[9] This is contrary to the view taken by Plutarch, who said that the Thracians tatued their wives as a punishment to avenge the murder of Orpheus. In

[1] P. Amaury Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, London, 1912, p. 203.
[2] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, p. 146.
[3] T. A. Joyce, *Central American and West Indian Archæology*, London, 1916, p. 195.
[4] H. Wuttke, *Gesch. der Schrift und des Schrifttums*, i., 'Die Entstehung der Schrift,' Leipzig, 1872, p. 101.
[5] *Polynesian Researches*[2], iii. 354.
[1] *Evolution in Art*, London, 1895, p. 252.
[2] W. J. Hoffman, *The Beginnings of Writing*, London, 1895, pp. 37, 39.
[3] v. 35.
[4] *Across Australia*, London, 1912, i. 24.
[5] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 88.
[6] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 134.
[7] *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, p. 530.
[8] Robley, p. 33.
[9] *Das Mutterrecht*, Stuttgart, 1861, p. 336.

Melanesia, where tatu is mainly confined to women, their social position is very inferior, whereas in Polynesia it is comparatively good, and they are seldom tatued. But it is questionable whether there is any necessary correlation between the tatuing of women and their position in the social scale. The limitation of tatu to one sex or the other may be due to other causes; *e.g.*, it is possible that in the South Seas it may be connected with the migrations of different peoples.[1]

The social rank and profession of men are often indicated by their tatu marks, as in the case of the Maori chief who wore a complicated face tatu, and the Creek Town king who was marked in blue with figures of the sun, moon, and stars, animals, landscapes, and even battle-scenes. It has already been noted that priests sometimes had distinctive tatu marks. In some parts of India they serve as an indication of caste. All Gowari men—a herdsman caste of the Marātha country—are tatued with a vertical line on the forehead, the possession of this mark securing admission to the caste feasts.

Among some Indians of Brazil the executioner, or *matador*, was scarified above the elbows by the chief of the clan 'so as to leave a permanent mark there; and this was the star and garter of their ambition, . . . the highest badge of honour. There were some who cut gashes in their breast, arms and thighs, on these occasions, and rubbed a black powder in, which left an indelible stain.'[2]

The wearing of tatu marks proved a convenient method of recording, among other things, great achievements demanding personal valour and skill. The Koita tribes of British New Guinea have a special tatu for homicides.[3] Those of the Baronga (Bantu) who have slain an enemy used to be decorated with special marks from one eyebrow to the other:

'Dreadful medicines were inoculated in the incisions and there remained pimples "which gave them the appearance of a buffalo when it frowns."'[4]

On the Mendalam river in Borneo, the Kayans reserve thigh tatu for head-taking braves. With the Western Eskimo the men are tatued as a sign of distinction. Those who have captured whales have marks to show this, so that their tatu becomes a kind of whale tally.[5]

In many countries it is not only a record of great events, but also a memorial of the dead. In the Saibai and Dauan Islands (Torres Straits) the women wear a shoulder scar for a brother's death; it represents his nose, and the longer the nose, the longer the scar.[6]

In New Zealand 'the women were the chief mourners at funerals. . . . The custom was, in days gone by, that they should gash their faces, neck, arms, and bodies with sharp shells until they streamed with blood; the *narahu* or moko-dye was sometimes applied to the wounds, and the stains commemorated the scenes at which the women assisted.'[7]

In Polynesia the tongue was tatued as a sign of mourning. Ellis saw this operation performed in a house where a number of chiefs had assembled for the purpose, and has described the tatuing of Queen Rihoriho's tongue after the death of her mother-in-law.

(*c*) *Decorative.*—Perhaps the most general use to which tatu has been put is that of personal adornment. Ellis, after noting that tatu was used in Polynesia as a badge of mourning and a kind of historical record, adds: 'But it was adopted by the greater number of people merely as a personal ornament; and tradition informs us that to this it owes its existence.'[8] Among the Kayans of Borneo, who have a very artistic style of tatu, the men affect it chiefly for ornament: so do the women in Greenland, New Zealand, and elsewhere. In fact both sexes in many parts of the world attach to it considerable æsthetic value. In regard to cicatrization among the Andamanese, Man says that it is primarily for ornament and secondarily to prove courage in enduring pain. It seems evident that in the Torres Straits islands it was adopted as a means of acquiring a certain accepted standard of beauty, for Haddon says that the women had a Λ-shaped scar to prevent the breasts from becoming too pendulous.[1] This fashion is also found on the neighbouring coasts of New Guinea and was observed by Seligman among the Otati, an Australian tribe on the east coast of Cape York.

In contrast with the opinions expressed in the writings of Waitz-Gerland[2] and others in reference to the religious significance of tatu, Joest and Westermarck see in it only an expression of man's vanity and love of adornment: 'At present tattooing is everywhere regarded exclusively, or almost exclusively, as a means of decoration, and Cook states expressly that, in the South Sea Islands, at the time of their discovery, it was in no way connected with religion.'[3] Westermarck admits, however, that it has been made to subserve many purposes, but adds: 'Nevertheless, it seems to be beyond doubt that men and women began to ornament, mutilate, paint, and tattoo themselves chiefly in order to make themselves attractive to the opposite sex,—that they might court successfully, or be courted.'[4] Wundt suggests that the marks at first gave magical protection against evil powers, but gradually became merely decorative, and were used to make the personality of the wearer more striking, as in the case of warriors, who wore them to increase their terrifying aspect.[5] On the other hand, E. Grosse thinks the priority should be given to the taste for embellishment, and that the marks only later came to have a tribal or social significance: 'Summarizing the results of our investigations of the significance of primitive scarification and tattooing, we find that the marks serve partly as tribal tokens and have perhaps as such sometimes a religious meaning, although this cannot be proved for a single instance. But in other and the largest number of cases the scars and tattoo marks are for ornament.'[6]

5. Origin and development.—Many theories have been put forward to account for the origin and development of the practice of thus marking the human body: as regards the origin, however, they must remain, for lack of evidence, little more than mere speculations. Instances have been known of involuntary tatu occurring among mechanics and other workmen, who have accidentally grazed or cut themselves while handling charcoal or other colouring matter. Primitive man may have arrived at the notion of tatu by accident, such as the pricking of a finger by a half-burnt splinter or thorn while kindling a fire. The unusual mark thus made might well excite his interest and so lead to an attempt at imitation and to elaboration and invention. Herbert Spencer thought that the practice arose from the custom of making blood-offerings to departed spirits, and that the marks thus made expressed subordination to or close union with them, and became in many instances tribal marks, 'as they would of course become if they were originally made when men bound themselves by blood to the dead founder of the tribe.'[7] In this connexion F. B. Jevons writes:

'The marks or scars left on legs or arms from which blood had been drawn were probably the origin of tattooing, as has occurred to various anthropologists. Like most other ideas, we may add, that of tattooing must have been forced on man; it was not his own invention, and, being a decorative idea, it must have followed the laws which regulate the development of all decorative art. . . . So the scars from ceremonial blood-letting may have suggested a figure; the resemblance was deliberately completed; and next time the scars were from the beginning designedly arranged to form a pattern.'[8]

1 Rivers, ii. 436–438.
2 R. Southey, *The Hist. of Brazil*[2], London, 1822, i. 232.
3 Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 130.
4 H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912–13, i. 464.
5 J. Murdoch, *9 RBEW* [1887–88], p. 139.
6 *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–12, iv. 26.
7 Robley, p. 45.
8 *Polynesian Researches*[2], i. 262.

1 *Rep. Camb. Anthrop. Exped. to Torres Straits*, iv. 16 f.
2 *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, iv. 33–38.
3 E. Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*, London, 1894, p. 171 f.
4 *Ib.* p. 172.
5 *Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1900–09, v. 174.
6 *Beginnings of Art*, Eng. tr., New York, 1897, p. 80.
7 *The Principles of Sociology*, London, 1893–96, ii.[3] 71 f.
8 *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 172.

M. Neuberger regards tatu as one of the popular customs that have sprung from primitive therapeutics: 'Smearing the skin with earth led to painting the body, and scarification of wounds and rubbing in the earth or rust (according to whether the pain was to be lessened or increased) developed into tattooing.'[1] Wundt, Joest, and others see a possible causal connexion between body-painting and tatuing and suggest that the latter was a crude attempt to fix the designs once painted on the body. Wundt regards both these practices as specific stages in primitive art; and in tatu he recognizes two types, the one being a crude system of simple marks often intensifying the natural lines of the body, and the other a stage in which the skin is treated as a material to work on—just as sand or rock is used for drawing upon—when the simpler marks are replaced by fantastic symbols. Capart points out the practical importance of replacing temporary marks by permanent ones, if they have a special meaning attached to them: 'Les dessins que le primitif se peint sur la peau n'ont aucun caractère de persistence et l'on peut à volonté les faire disparaître et les remplacer par d'autres. Il peut y avoir parfois intérêt à les rendre indélébiles, lorsqu'ils sont, par exemple, des marques de tribus ou des marques religieuses. De là naît la coutume de tatouage.'[2]

Concerning the origin of *moko*, or Maori tatu, native tradition says that the first settlers marked their faces for battle with charcoal, and later these warlike decorations were made permanent to save trouble. 'Hence arose the practice of carving the face and the body with dyed incisions.'[3]

How difficult and well-nigh impossible it is to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the early history of such a custom may be gathered from the admission of W. Ellis, who, after many years of personal contact with, and careful observation of, the natives of the Polynesian islands, said in reference to their tatu: 'Although practised by all classes I have not been able to trace its origin.'[4]

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the footnotes. In addition to the works there mentioned the following may be consulted: C. Hose and R. Shelford, 'Materials for a Study of Tatu in Borneo,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 60 ff.; A. W. Buckland, 'On Tattooing,' *ib.* xvii. [1887] 318 ff.; A. Lacassagne, *Les Tatouages*, Paris, 1882; C. Marquardt, *Die Tätowierung beider Geschlechter in Samoa*, Berlin, 1899; Otto Finsch, 'Ueber Bekleidung, Schmuck und Tätowirung der Papuas der Süd-Ost Küste von Neu-Guinea,' *Mittheilungen der Anthrop. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xv. 12 [1885]; M. Haberlandt, 'Ueber die Verbreitung und den Sinn der Tätowirung,' *ib.* xv. [1885] 53; G. von Düben, *Om Tatuering*, Ymer, 1886; A. Krämer, 'Die Ornamentik der Kleidmatten und der Tatauierung auf den Marshallinseln,' *AA*, new ser., ii. 1 [1904]. Valuable information has also been obtained from an unpublished essay by W. O. Hambly on 'Tatooing as a Means of Emotional Expression.'

CONSTANCE JENKINSON.

TAUROBOLIUM.—The *taurobolium*, a sacrifice performed in connexion with the cult of the Great Mother of the Gods, but not limited to it, was one of the most peculiar and most celebrated rites of the last two centuries of paganism. A striking description of it is put by the Christian poet Prudentius, of the 4th cent., into the mouth of one of his characters, Romanus the Martyr (*Peristephanon*, x. 1006 ff.). The high priest of the Great Mother, a golden crown on his head, his temples richly bound with fillets, his toga worn *cinctu Gabino*, descends into a deep foss which is completely covered by a platform of planks pierced by a great number of fine holes. On to this platform is led a huge bull, bedecked with garlands of flowers, his front gleaming with gold. His breast is pierced by the consecrated spear, and the torrent of hot, steaming blood floods the covering of the trench, and rains through the thousand chinks and perforations on the expectant priest below, who throws back his head the better to present cheeks, ears, lips, nostrils, and even tongue and palate, to the purifying baptism. When life has fled and left cold the body of the slain bullock, and the flamens have removed it, the priest emerges and, with hair, beard, and vestments dripping with blood, presents himself to the expectant throng of worshippers, who salute and do obeisance to him as to one who has been purified.

There were two principal motives which prompted the ceremony of the *taurobolium*. In the earlier period, the 2nd and 3rd cent. A.D., it was usually a sacrifice whose object was the welfare of the Empire, Emperor, or community. An entire college, community, or even province could give it, and a frequent date for it was March 24, the *Dies Sanguinis* of the annual festival of the Mother and Attis. The more frequent motive of the rite in the late 3rd and 4th cent. was the purification and regeneration of an individual. Its efficacy lasted for twenty years, or was even eternal, the baptized person being spoken of as 'renatus in æternum' (*CIL* vi. 510, 512). It was performed by laymen as well as priests, and by persons of all ranks and both sexes. A special altar was erected for the occasion, the time occupied by the ceremony varied from one to five days, and the expense was borne by the individual or association that inaugurated it. Besides the personal and the patriotic motive, it was performed as a fulfilment of vows, or at the command of the Mother herself. In Rome it usually took place near a shrine which existed where the present church of St. Peter stands. The *criobolium*—the sacrifice of a ram—was instituted later in honour of Attis on the analogy of the *taurobolium*, in order to give him due prominence in the rites of the cult. See art. CRIOBOLIUM.

As the *taurobolium* was celebrated in honour of both the Great Mother and Attis, it probably possessed a significance regarding that part of the legend which concerned them both (see MOTHER OF THE GODS). The priest descends into the dark pit and leaves the light of day; Attis dies; the vegetation of the earth withers; the priest is bathed in blood, and rises from the pit purified; Attis is restored; the vegetation returns.

The similarity between Christian doctrine and the phrase *renatus in æternum* ('born again for eternity') is startling, and has suggested belief in some connexion between the two religions in the way of borrowing, especially as paganism vied with Christianity in later days in promising such benefits as the latter conferred. The *taurobolium*, however, is better explained as the survival of a primitive Oriental practice based upon the belief, not uncommon among rude peoples, that the strength of brute creation can be acquired by consumption of its actual substance or by contact with its blood. The spiritual meaning of the practice first came with the advance of culture and the discarding of the primitive, literal belief (see Cumont, *op. cit.* below).

Though the *taurobolium* might with reason be supposed to have come, with the cult of the Great Mother, from Asia Minor, there is no positive evidence that it was originally connected with it either in the East or in Italy. Cumont thinks that it was a rite in honour of the eastern Artemis Tauropolos, deriving from her its name *tauropolion*, which was corrupted to *taurobolium*; and that the rite, having become wide-spread in Cappadocia and the neighbouring provinces in connexion with the worship of Artemis Tauropolos and other deities closely allied or identified with her—principally Anaïtis and Bellona—naturally found its way with them into Italy early in the 2nd cent. A.D., after the annexation of that part of Asia to the Roman Empire, and was soon afterwards adopted and popularized by the priesthood of the Great Mother. Its first known celebration took place at Pozzuoli in A.D. 134, in honour of Venus Cælestis, who, Cumont thinks, was Anaïtis under a Roman name. His conclusion that it was celebrated in connexion with the worship of Bellona rests on slender evidence. Others believe it to have been a part of the Great Mother's worship in Asia Minor (Hepding, *op. cit.* below). Whatever its origin, its popularity was attained through the cult of the Great Mother.

[1] *Hist. of Medicine*, tr. E. Playfair, London, 1910, i. 2.
[2] Capart, p. 30.
[3] Robley, p. 2.
[4] *Polynesian Researches*[2], i. 262.

It spread throughout the Empire, and maintained its importance up to the fall of paganism, the last celebration known occurring at Rome in 394.

LITERATURE.—E. Esperandieu, *Inscriptions de Lectoure*, 1892, p. 94 ff.; Zippel, *Festschrift zum Doctorjubiläum Ludw. Friedländer*, 1895, p. 489 f.; G. Showerman, 'The Great Mother of the Gods' in *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin*, no. xliii., Madison, 1901; F. Cumont, 'Le Taurobole et le Culte de Bellone,' in *RHLR*, vi. no. 2, 1901; H. Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, 1903, pp. 168 ff., 201.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

TEETH.—1. Ornament and trophy.—Among both pre-historic and savage races teeth of animals and human beings are used as an ornament, usually strung together as a necklace, headband, or girdle. Such ornaments are already found among burial remains of Solutrean, Magdalenian, and Azilian horizons, the corpses having been buried wearing them. In a ceremonial burial of thirty-three skulls in the grotto at Ofnet, on the upper Danube, the skulls were ornamented with stag's teeth and shells.[1] Among savages the custom of wearing teeth is well-nigh universal,[2] and, while it may simply serve an ornamental purpose, the intention often goes farther. The teeth are worn as a trophy. Thus, among the tribes of the N.W. Amazon, necklaces are made of the teeth of the tiger and other animals, bored and threaded, or of human teeth bound into a necklace with fibre string. These denote the skill of the wearer as a hunter, or his bravery in war, and the human teeth, which are those of an enemy, are 'a visible and abiding token of completed revenge,' and are buried with the owner. Sometimes the larger animal teeth are ornamented with lines or carved.[3] Analogous to the practice of wearing teeth as a trophy is the curse used by savages, 'Let their teeth be broken,' and the Psalmist's words, 'Break their teeth' (58[6]), 'Thou hast broken the teeth of the ungodly' (3[7]). The suggestion is that of enemies as ferocious beasts deprived of their power to tear and rend.[4] Men doubtless used their teeth in early times as a weapon, as savage men and maniacs still do. Divine images are known to have actual teeth set in their mouths, possibly as a trophy or offering.[5]

Possibly teeth worn by men also served the purpose of an amulet, as having a connexion with the qualities of the animal or person from whom they were taken,[6] or as protecting the wearer from similar animals in time to come.[7] On the other hand, a person's own tooth might serve as an amulet. Pliny says that the first tooth shed by a child was so used and protected him from pain.[8] Where teeth are knocked out at initiation, they are sometimes carefully preserved, or regarded as sacred, or used for magical purposes.[9]

Teeth taken from a corpse were used to cure toothache or for magic, and those of an old woman were used as a fertility charm in the yam garden by the New Caledonians.[10]

2. Mutilation of the teeth.—Filing the teeth to a point either singly or in pairs, and knocking out certain teeth as a ceremonial act, usually at initiation, and the purposes which these practices serve, have been already discussed.[1]

Staining the teeth is practised by several lower tribes—*e.g.* in S. America and Indonesia—as well as at higher levels—*e.g.* in China (applying lac to the teeth).[2]

3. Teeth as relics.—Teeth of Christian saints have often formed relics, and in early Buddhism the four canine teeth of Gautama were among his 'seven great relics.' One of these has been famous in Ceylonese Buddhism as the *Dalada*. Its miraculous preservation from every means taken to destroy it by a hostile Indian king, and its ultimate arrival in Ceylon in A.D. 312, are the subjects of a long narrative, and the Chinese traveller Fa-hian describes the procession of the relic as he saw it in 405. At a later time the Portuguese are believed to have destroyed it, though the Ceylonese allege that they only destroyed a counterfeit and that the real tooth is the one still preserved at Kandy in a shrine. It is probably not genuine.[3]

4. Teeth in myth and legend.—Greek myth told how Kadmos, having slain the dragon guardian of the spring Areia, at the suggestion of Athene scattered its teeth on the earth like grain. From the teeth sprang armed men called Spartoi ('scattered') from the manner of their birth. A similar myth was told of Jason.[4]

In the 16th cent. a report that a child had been born with a golden tooth in Silesia caused much anxiety in Germany, being regarded as a portent. The physician Horst in 1595 published the result of his astrological researches on the subject, and declared that the tooth symbolized a golden age, preceded by the expulsion of the Turks from Christendom.[5]

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the notes.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

TEETOTALISM.—See ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.

TEINDS.—See TITHES.

TELEOLOGY.—I. *INTRODUCTORY*.—1. The term.—The word 'teleology' (Mod. Lat. *teleologia*, Germ. *Teleologie*, Fr. *téléologie*) appears to have been devised by Christian Wolff in 1728. He felt the need of a term to designate the branch of natural philosophy which had to do with ends (Aristotle's *τέλος* or *οὗ ἕνεκα*) or final causes (the *causa finalis* of the schoolmen) as distinguished from efficient causes (*ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται*, *causa efficiens*). For Wolff, accordingly, teleology signified the study of ends or final causes in nature, and more precisely the explanation or interpretation of natural phenomena in the light of the concept of end or final cause. In popularizing Leibniz's philosophy, he set explanation based on final cause side by side with explanation by efficient cause. Presumably Wolff derived teleology directly from *τέλος*, 'an end,' but, as J. Burnet has remarked,[6] the word is properly derived in the first instance from *τέλειον*, 'complete.' Thus, etymologically regarded, it does not bear the implication, which it has historically, of an external end; and the

[1] H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*[2], London, 1916, pp. 327, 378, 472, 477.

[2] O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 264 ff.; E. Grosse, *Les Débuts de l'art*, tr. E. Dirr, Paris, 1902, p. 67 ff.

[3] T. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, pp. 80, 82, 124.

[4] Cf. Pr 30[14], Job 4[10] 29[17], Jl 1[6].

[5] Stoll, p. 265.

[6] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Introductory and Primitive), vol. iii. p. 396[b].

[7] M. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, tr. S. Coleridge, London, 1822, i. 258.

[8] Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 7.

[9] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 593 f.; A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, pp. 542, 562 ff.

[10] Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 11; Stoll, p. 263; G. Turner, *Samoa, a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, p. 342.

[1] See art. AUSTERITIES, vol. ii. p. 233 f.

[2] Whiffen, p. 88; Stoll, p. 366; J. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, London, 1900, p. 174.

[3] J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, London, 1868, pp. 82, 158 f.

[4] For a connexion of these myths with the preservation of the teeth knocked out at initiation rites as a possible vehicle of reincarnation, being practically imperishable, and also because they look like 'seed-corn,' see Jane E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 272, 435.

[5] H. T. Buckle, *Hist. of Civilization in England*[4], London, 1864, i. 304; K. Sprengel, *Hist. de la médecine*, tr. A. J. L. Jourdain, Paris, 1815–20, iii. 247 f.

[6] *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., *Thales to Plato*, London, 1914, p. 346, note 1.

prevalent 'organic' use of it in modern thought is justified.

2. The concept.—As already indicated, the concept is much older than the term. It attaches itself primarily to that organic view of nature which was developed in the ancient Greek philosophy as against the mechanical view. According to the mechanical view, the whole is the product of the parts by their mutual interaction. According to the organic doctrine, the whole is ideally prior to the parts and constitutes the explanation of their mechanical actions and reactions. This last was a doctrine influential not only in the sphere of natural philosophy but in the spheres of political and social philosophy as well, and it led to the teleological interpretation of nature as a realm of ends or final causes. As the whole was an unchangeable form, it gave to all movement a purpose and goal; and in the light of its purpose and goal the movement itself was most deeply interpreted. This ancient opposition between the mechanical and teleological standpoints, as represented by Democritus and Aristotle respectively, set a problem which runs through the whole history of philosophy. The fundamental question at issue is, Are natural processes subordinate to conscious rational purpose, or is the world to be explained and interpreted by mechanical principles alone? That is the deeper philosophical issue in its most clear-cut form. There is a narrower issue which has assumed increasing definiteness in modern times. The fundamental question here belongs to scientific method rather than to metaphysics, and is most prominent at the present time in the dispute between mechanism and teleology in biological theory. Are the characteristic problems of biology (*q.v.*) capable of solution by means of mechanistic categories, or must teleological factors also be postulated?

II. *HISTORICAL.* — A. ANCIENT PERIOD. — **1. Anaxagoras** (*c.* 500–428 B.C.) has been hailed as the father of teleology, but he is so only in a qualified sense.[1] His explanation of nature—to judge from the fragments of his Περὶ φύσεως preserved by Simplicius and from the references in Plato and Aristotle—appears to have been virtually a mechanical explanation on the basis of a qualitative atomism, nor is it even certain that his First Cause of motion was an immaterial or incorporeal essence. The movement and order of the universe he ascribes analogically to Νοῦς (mind, intelligence, reason), which by an initial impulse imparted a rotatory motion to the pre-existent chaos in which 'all things were together.' But, once the rotatory motion was set up, Νοῦς apparently had little else to do. It may be that a thoroughgoing teleological view of nature is logically involved in the Anaxagorean doctrine of Νοῦς, whether Νοῦς (which is represented as omniscient and omnipotent) be regarded as a spiritual or a corporeal essence, as mind or mind-stuff. On the other hand, it is altogether probable that Anaxagoras did not carry out the full implications of his doctrine. Socrates in the *Phædo*[2] complains that in actual explanations he called in only mechanical causes—'airs, æthers, waters, and such like absurdities'; and Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*[3] (in a passage reminiscent, as Burnet[4] allows, of the passage from the *Phædo*) charges him with making use of Νοῦς merely as a *deus ex machina*, to account for the formation of the cosmos or for phenomena that he could not explain on mechanical grounds. Similar objections, as J. Adam[5] reminds us, were afterwards urged against Descartes and Newton. But, however we may interpret the Anaxagorean concept, we cannot but recognize its significance in the history of thought.[1]

2. Diogenes of Apollonia.—The teaching of Anaxagoras was apparently influential upon his contemporary Diogenes, who attributes Νοῦς to his primary substance, air, inasmuch as all things are 'disposed in the best possible manner'—a phrase which sends one's mind on to Leibniz and his theological optimism. It is, however, impossible to say whether Diogenes followed up his affirmation of purpose or design in nature any farther than Anaxagoras appears to have done; and this difference between them remains, that, whereas with Anaxagoras the teleological inference is in the direction of theism, with Diogenes it is definitely pantheistic.[2]

3. Socrates.—The teleology of Socrates (*q.v.*) is to be found in the *Phædo* and the *Memorabilia*. (*a*) The Socrates of the *Phædo* expresses himself as mightily pleased with the book of Anaxagoras in which Νοῦς is affirmed to be the cause of all things, but as disappointed with the failure of Anaxagoras to transcend the mechanical view. He is dissatisfied with a philosophy that cannot show how everything finds itself as it is because it is best for it so to be. He has grasped the distinction between mechanical and final causes in nature, and discovers only in the latter a true ground of explanation. To rely upon mechanical causes alone would be as absurd as to say that the real reason or final cause of his sitting in prison was certain bodily dispositions, and not his mental resolve to abide by his sentence, as the best thing to do. Had this not seemed the best, then 'by the dog these muscles and bones would have been off to Megara or the Bœotian frontier long ago.'[3] (*b*) Consistently with this representation in the *Phædo* the Socrates of the *Memorabilia*[4] is found affirming an immanent Reason in the world, and consistently too with the general doctrine of the Platonic Socrates concerning the individual and the State (which Adam would sum up as 'noocracy,' or the supremacy of Νοῦς or Reason).[5] At the same time the Anaxagorean concept receives in the *Memorabilia* a development so one-sided that it becomes difficult, if on no other ground than this, to believe in the representations of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon respectively as both even essentially historical. W. Windelband[6] suspects the influence of Cynicism and Stoicism upon the representation in Xenophon. In any case it is an exclusively anthropocentric teleology that is here formulated. The whole world of nature is said to yield traces of design, as appears in particular from the wonderful adaptations of means to end in the structure of the human body, in man's psychical constitution, and in the phenomena of external nature; and, furthermore, all is designed towards the one end of the advantage and well-being of men. (*c*) The Socrates of the *Memorabilia* gave perhaps the first formal exposition of the 'argument from design.' Formally, and often naively, he argues from the evidences of design in nature to the existence of an intelligent and beneficent Deity (σοφοῦ τινὸς δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου).[7] This anthropocentric teleology, with the theistic inference associated with it, impressed itself strongly upon subsequent religious thought.

4. Plato.—(*a*) The teleology of Plato (*q.v.*) is so far indicated in what has been said regarding the Socrates of the *Phædo*, but it has a deeper philosophical setting than can actually be found in

[1] See art. ANAXAGORAS and also art. PHILOSOPHY (Greek), vol. ix. p. 860b.
[2] 97 B, 8. [3] i. 4 (985*a* 18 ff.).
[4] *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], London, 1908, p. 310.
[5] *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, p. 263.

[1] See art. ANAXAGORAS, vol. i. p. 424.
[2] See art. PANTHEISM (Greek and Roman), vol. ix. p. 614a.
[3] *Phædo*, 99 A. [4] i. iv., iv. iii.
[5] *Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 342.
[6] *Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1900, p. 124
[7] *Mem.* i. iv.

Socrates. In keeping with his ethical and social philosophy, Plato seeks in his metaphysics to interpret the real in terms of the end or ideal of the Good. Ethics is for him the foundation of metaphysics, as it came to be for Lotze, and reality yields up its secrets according as its ethical meaning is apprehended. His conception, already adumbrated in the *Phædo*, of a 'Jacob's ladder of science' (as E. Caird calls it[1]), beginning with the lower principles of explanation and reaching to the highest principle of unity or the idea of the Good, by which all the others are explained, is developed more fully in the *Republic*.[2] The Good or Universal Reason (Νοῦς) is the final cause of every event and change, and to the idea of the Good all the other ideas are teleologically subordinate. The Good, as we may learn from a famous passage of the *Laws*,[3] is the perfection of the whole; and in the preservation and perfection of the whole every creature has its own proper end to fulfil. Thus it was that Plato sought by means of his theory of ideas to interpret the rational principle of Anaxagoras more adequately. He looks upon the world, says J. Hutchison Stirling, as 'a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart.'[4]

(*b*) In applying his metaphysical principles to the interpretation of nature, Plato is hardly liable like the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* to the charges of externality and anthropocentrism. For the *Timæus*, in which such a teleology may be found, is, in its details at least, 'mythical.' In consistency with his theory of ideas, Plato could not have claimed more for his accounts of the phenomenal world than that they were 'likely tales' (εἰκότες λόγοι). In any case he does not, even in the *Timæus*, lay much stress upon particular instances of adaptation in nature, nor does he encourage the notion of adaptations as designed exclusively for human needs. (*c*) In the *Timæus*, as indeed in the *Philebus* in non-mythical form, a theological interpretation is offered of the teleological constitution of the world. In offering it, Plato would apparently overcome the dualism between the ideal and the phenomenal which is inherent in his theory of knowledge and reality. God, the Demiurge, is represented as bringing order and harmony out of the moving chaos of not-being (μὴ ὄν), in accordance with the pattern of the Good, and in so far as natural necessity (ἡ ἀνάγκη) allows. Thus natural necessity comes in when divine activity according to ends fails as a principle of explanation, and something is yielded to Democritus. But, while the teleological explanation involves a recognition of divine activity, and is so far on the lines of the theistic argument, the Demiurge of the *Timæus*—the self-moved mover who fashions the world—is not identified with the Good, nor is he to be equated with the God of modern theism.

5. **Aristotle.**—(*a*) While it may be allowed to Plato that no ultimate explanation of anything is possible apart from the discovery of its final cause, we have to turn to Aristotle (*q.v.*) for a more adequate recognition of mechanical causes as principles of explanation, and this although Aristotle is the protagonist of the organic and teleological view of the universe. In the endeavour to overcome the Platonic dualism of ideas and things, Aristotle gives an even more thoroughgoing interpretation of the Anaxagorean Νοῦς than is to be found in Plato. With Plato he believes in the real existence of the form or idea, but he cannot think of it as separate from the world. It exists in the world and in things. Reality is a process of development, in which the change from more imperfect to less imperfect being is to be interpreted in the light of the τέλος, which in things that are not eternal is the moving form or final state of actuality (ἐνεργεία). The moved matter, which is the primal state of potentiality (δύναμις), exists for the sake of the form.[5] The individual is both form and matter, being form in relation to what is lower in the scale of things, and matter in relation to what is higher. The marble is form in relation to the materials composing its substance, and matter in relation to the statue which is made from it. The tree is form in relation to the elements of the soil that enter into the process of its growth, and matter in relation to the house built of it. The Good is the highest form of all, being pure form without matter, and is the ultimate end or final cause of all existence and all movement. It is not actually generated in the world-process, but is eternally implied in it, as the goal of the creation.

(*b*) With this peculiar speculative idea of development which fills the central place in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle opposes Democritus (*q.v.*) and the atomists, who appeared to him as mere 'drunken stutterers' in comparison with Anaxagoras. Even in inorganic nature he finds purpose or final cause operative. Just as an army moving on the field, or a ship cleaving the sea under full sail, offers an instance of effort directed towards an end, so, wherever we observe in natural processes the regular achievement of results, we may similarly discern the presence of purpose. But it is principally the realm of organic nature that is viewed thus teleologically. How absurd, he urges, to ascribe the forms and activities of living beings to the operation merely of accident (τὸ αὐτόματον) or chance (ἡ τύχη)! Empedocles (*q.v.*) was emphatically wrong in his theory of the origin of species, in which he avers that nature produces in her prodigality every possible type of animal form, and that only those forms survive which are coherently and consistently constructed. If, as Empedocles believed, nature once produced 'man-faced cattle' (βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα), presumably she also produced at one time or other 'olive-faced grapes'! Nature is a cause which acts purposively, and if her end is sometimes unattained, it is due to the mechanical necessity to which matter (ὕλη)—Plato's 'not-being'—is subject.

(*c*) Much more clearly than in Plato we find in Aristotle, especially in the *de Partibus Animalium* and other biological works, the recognition of the double play of mechanism and teleology in nature, especially in organic nature, which does not operate with the refractory medium of matter. As a naturalist he is content to lay stress upon only two forms of causation—material or mechanical (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and formal or final (οὗ ἕνεκα), and the formal or final cause comes first, being the reason which determines the whole process. The mechanical causes are the servants and instruments of the final causes. Thus in Aristotle both mechanism and teleology are accepted as factors in the explanation of nature, though the Platonic principle preponderates. It is not quite true, however, to say that Aristotle has succeeded in reconciling Plato and Democritus, that by his cosmo-teleology he mediates between the onto-teleology of the theory of ideas and the mechanism associated with the atomistic hypothesis. Owing to his scientific limitations, notably in connexion with the mechanics of the heavens, Aristotle pushed explanation by final causes farther than his general principles warranted. Frequently resting upon final causes alone, he at once hindered the progress of his own scientific thought and lent his authority to the narrow and one-sided finalism of the scholastic interpretation.

(*d*) Aristotle's organic or teleological doctrine, based on the metaphysical concepts of matter and form, strikingly anticipates certain modern positions in biological and psychological science. Applied, *e.g.*, to the conception of the organism, it offers, as L. J. Henderson assures us,[1] a complete formulation of the biological principle of organization. Aristotle conceives of the living thing as an autonomous unit, having the teleological principle within, and with every part functionally related to every other and existing as the servant of the whole. That is the implication, we are told, of his comparison of the organism to a well-governed commonwealth, in which, once order is established, the individuals duly play their parts and a separate monarch is no more needed.

6. **The Stoics.**—(*a*) Among the so-called sects that came after Plato and Aristotle the Sceptics (*q.v.*) had no contribution to make in teleology. If causality was suspect with them, as with Hume in a later age, so also was finality. The contribution of the Epicureans (*q.v.*) was distinctly negative. Epicurus is to be classed with Leucippus and Democritus, of whom Aristotle said that they 'rejected design and referred all to necessity.'[2] But the Stoics (*q.v.*) recognize the principle of teleology. There was one philosopher indeed, an Aristotelian, who came near to Stoicism in his opposition to the mechanical explanations of the atomists; but, on the other hand, as Windelband puts it,[3] he 'threw away the keystone of the Aristotelian teleology.' This was Strato of Lampsacus, who denied the existence of pure form as of

[1] *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (*Gifford Lectures*), Glasgow, 1904, i. 129.
[2] Bk. vi. [3] x. 903.
[4] *Philosophy and Theology* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1890, p. 113.
[5] Cf. also R. Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 155.

[1] *The Order of Nature*, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1917, p. 21.
[2] *De Generatione Animalium*, v. 18.
[3] *Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 301.

pure matter, declaring form to be always immanent in matter, and so converting the Aristotelian system into a consistent naturalism. Stoicism may also be described as naturalism, but it was at the same time a pantheistic system. The old dualism of form and matter which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Anaxagoras, and had failed to throw off, gave place to an eclectic and somewhat facile monism, in which one eternal substance manifested itself as spirit (λόγος σπερματικός) and matter (πνεῦμα διάπυρον). It was essentially a teleological explanation of the world that was given by Stoicism, because, although every particular phenomenon was said to be determined by natural necessity, as Democritus had maintained, natural necessity was not based, as with the atomists, on quantitative differences and initial movements, but depended on the vital activity of the whole.

(*b*) In carrying out its teleology, Stoicism made much of the beauty, order, and harmony of the world and the adaptations of means to end, especially in organic nature, as manifestations of the rational unity and ideal meaning of things. The evils of the world, which offered even more difficulty on the monistic hypothesis than in the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, were optimistically explained as instruments or concomitants of the great cosmic movement, and it was said that they would be recognized as such, if the individual could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation often descended to externality and anthropocentrism, as in the teaching attributed to Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. Thus it was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the ass to carry man's burdens. Yet an immanent or intrinsic teleology such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruous with Stoic principles.

(*c*) If the *Memorabilia* is possibly influenced by Stoicism, Cicero's *de Natura Deorum* indubitably is. There the inference to God from the order and beauty of the universe is eloquently set forth in a well-known passage[1]—reminiscent perhaps of Plato's story of the Cave—attributed to Aristotle, where is depicted the impression that would be made on men whose dwellings had been underground, on their first beholding the glorious spectacle of earth and sea and sky. It has been suggested[2] that in the argument for the being of God contained in the *de Natura Deorum* it is Aristotle we have chiefly before us; *e.g.*, the comparison, in several passages, of the world to a furnished or inhabited house or an adorned and decorated temple of the gods (a comparison which is to be found also in writers like Philo the Jew and Minucius Felix the Christian apologist) is said to have come from Aristotle. This suggestion is odious to philosophers who are jealous for the purity of the Aristotelian doctrine of the end, especially as Cicero in the *de Natura Deorum* furnishes the prototype, in the ancient world, of Paley's *Natural Theology* and the Bridgewater Treatises.

7. Teleology of history.—While in the ancient Greek philosophy a teleology of nature was expounded, in the religious period of the ancient world and within the early Christian Church the idea of a teleology of history gained ground. The opposition in the Gnostic view of history to the OT religion as the revelation of an inferior Deity led to the view of history which has established itself as the truly Christian. It fastened upon the Pauline doctrine of the pædagogic function of the Law, which gave to the Law a distinctive place in a teleological series of divine processes; and the whole course of the ages was interpreted in the light of the great divine plan of redemption culminating in Jesus Christ. With Irenæus the teleology of nature is ancillary to the teleology of history as thus expounded from the Christian standpoint. At the hands of Augustine the whole conception receives an impressive treatment, and the human race is regarded as a teleological unity, as being destined to receive entrance into the catholic or universal Church (*civitas Dei*). This anthropocentric view of the world as the scene of the divine redemption in Jesus Christ still prevails in Christian theology, in which the teleological principle of history is sometimes described as Christological or Christocentric.

B. MEDIÆVAL PERIOD.—**Thomas Aquinas.**—All through the Middle Ages, in Christian and Muhammadan countries alike, the Aristotelian teleology dominated philosophical and scientific thought. Unfortunately it was the Aristotelian teleology in its defective form of explanation by final causes alone (*i.e.* apart from mechanical causes), and it laid an arrest upon the movement of natural philosophy. Yet Archimedes and others who came after Aristotle had shown that mechanics at any rate could altogether dispense with the hypothesis of final cause. Aquinas (*q.v.*) makes use of the so-called teleological proof, which was the favourite proof in the patristic and scholastic ages, and he quotes as exponents of it John of Damascus and Averroës on Aristotle's *Physics*. There is an intelligent 'somewhat,' says Aquinas, by which all natural objects are ordered in relation to an end, and this 'somewhat' we call God—which, indeed, is the gist of the teleological argument, whether in its popular or in its more philosophical form. Aquinas also catches up the patristic idea of the teleological unity of nature and history, and through his doctrine of the State gives it a more systematic expression. The State was not with him, as with Augustine, the devil's province (*civitas huius sæculi*), but was based on natural law or right (*lex naturalis*), which has its source in God; and the life of virtue, which Aristotle said was to be realized in the political society, was the preparation for the higher life of grace in the society or community of the Church. 'Gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit.'

C. MODERN PERIOD.—**1. Bruno.**—The transition from ancient and mediæval to modern thought is well illustrated, in this matter of teleology, as in others, in the views of Giordano Bruno (*q.v.*). His whole philosophy represents an attempt to combine in a unitary system the Platonic and Aristotelian idealism and the modern mechanical view of nature, of which Democritus was the precursor. Like the atomists, he affirmed that only, as it were, after repeated experiments on nature's part did combinations of elements arise which, as being adapted to ends, conserved their stability. At the same time he affirmed—and here the idealistic strain appears—that there is a world-soul, or inner principle of motion in nature, which is purposive in its working, and so orders all things as to secure the world's progress. Thus the mechanical and teleological views are united in this thinker.

2. Bacon.—Though Francis Bacon (*q.v.*) may also be said to belong to the age of transition, he was more definitely on the side of the modern scientific movement. It would appear that he looked upon the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as 'planks of lighter and less solid wood' than the physical philosophies of ancient Greece lost in the wreckage of the Roman Empire. For him philosophy was restricted to the investigation of nature, and there were certain 'idols of the tribe,' or common prejudices, to be dismissed from the mind if nature was to be explained aright. Among these was interpretation by final causes. Under the illusion that man is the measure of things (which Protagorean utterance, curiously enough, is actually become the watchword of a recent philosophical movement) we interpret things in reference to ourselves (*ex analogia hominis*) instead of universally (*ex analogia universi*). Yet Bacon does not reject the reality of final causes.

'For the cause rendered, that the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture.' Final causes in physics are, however, sterile like Vestal virgins, and, worse than that, they are 'impertinent,' being indeed 'but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing.' But final causes have their place in metaphysic and religion. The divine wisdom even appears more admirable when nature 'intendeth' one thing and providence 'draweth forth' another.[1]

[1] Bk. ii.

[2] See Hutchison Stirling, *Philosophy and Theology*, p. 170 ff.

[1] *De Augmentis*, iii. 5.

Thus Bacon throws off the two thousand years' yoke and touches hands with Democritus and Leucippus across the centuries. But, while vindicating physical causation as the one form of causation of which physical science need take cognizance, he conserves the metaphysical and religious interests which were bound up with the Platonic and Aristotelian teleology. It were incredible to him that this 'universal frame' should be 'without a Mind.'[1] He failed, however, to appreciate the scientific importance of the Aristotelian concept of organization in biology, as also—but this was the legacy of the schools—the philosophical depth of the essential Aristotelian doctrine of the end.

3. Hobbes and Descartes.—(*a*) Hobbes (*q.v.*), following Bacon and Galileo, tried to liberate philosophy from the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas and forms and to substantiate the mechanical view not only in the realm of nature but in the realms also of mind and society. He reduced all cause to motion, and philosophy to a doctrine of motion.

(*b*) Though Descartes (*q.v.*) also dispensed with final causes in nature, he did not fall like Hobbes into materialism. He explained natural phenomena by the mechanical principles of matter and motion, so founding the now orthodox systematic view of mechanics, but he dissociated himself from the ultimate positions of the ancient atomistic philosophy. Mechanical explanation was not ultimate explanation. But his rejection of final causes in nature was on theological rather than epistemological grounds. We may legitimately enough, he thought, attribute ends or purposes to God, but we cannot hope to discover these, as they are hidden 'in the inscrutable abyss of His wisdom.' Here, as in Bacon, there is a clear distinction between the scientific and the metaphysical and religious interest in final causes—a distinction which became clear only in the modern period of thought.

(*c*) For the issue between mechanism and teleology in scientific explanation Descartes possesses considerable significance, not merely because of his peculiar vitalistic theory that the *vis viva* might alter the direction of motion if unable according to the law of conservation to change its quantity, but chiefly because of his law of conservation itself. In the effort to reach the true principle of mechanical causation, he arrived at the belief that God conserved in things as a whole all the movement which He introduced into them at the creation; so that in virtue of this initial disposition the necessary world-process was at every stage teleological. His vitalism was a short-lived theory, but his principle of conservation marks a notable advance in the teleology of nature.

4. Spinoza.—(*a*) The most vigorous, as it was the most uncompromising, attack upon final causes in nature came from Spinoza (*q.v.*). In explaining a particular phenomenon we cannot, he said, go beyond the particular attribute of the one divine substance, be it the attribute of thought or of extension, under which the phenomenon appears to us. For, while the attributes are parallel to each other, there is no interaction between them. Thus material phenomena, including the movements of the human body, are only explainable in physical terms. Matter cannot be grounded in mind. There can be no ends or purposes in nature.

(*b*) Apart from the incompatibility of the doctrine with his fundamental philosophy, two main objections are urged by Spinoza against final causes. The first is Bacon's objection—that acceptance of final causes hinders the investigation of nature: recourse to the will of God in the explanation of natural phenomena, and in particular of untoward phenomena like tempests, earthquakes, and diseases, is a refuge of ignorance (*asylum ignorantiæ*). The secrets of nature are with those who abandon final causes and place their trust in mathematics, which, as dealing with the essences and properties of things, leads to rational knowledge. The other objection is that the method of explanation by final causes encourages false anthropomorphic conceptions of God. A God who works purposively, or towards ends, is subject to fate or necessity and lacks perfection of being. It implies defect in God that He should be in need of anything. Nor have we any right to infer distinctions in the divine nature analogous to the elements of the human mind. The intellect and will we may ascribe to God are no more analogous to our intellects and wills than the constellation of the Dog to the animal that barks.

(*c*) Undoubtedly Spinoza did good service in exposing the weakness and superficiality of the traditional teleology, but it should be observed that, while the denial of teleology is already involved in the doctrines of substance and parallelism with which he sets out, at the close of his thought a certain light breaks in upon his system. The *amor intellectualis Dei* with which he concludes is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself, and we may learn from it that with His universe God is well pleased. The ideas of satisfaction and value which are essential to a teleological interpretation of the universe appear to be here conserved.[1]

5. Leibniz.—(*a*) Despite the able efforts of the Cambridge Platonists (*q.v.*), such as Cudworth and More, to vindicate for final causes a place in physics, the mechanical view found increasing support, being applied also as against Platonists and vitalists to the phenomena of life, and it was left to Leibniz (*q.v.*) to attempt a reconciliation of the opposing principles. Leibniz's essential position still meets with great acceptance among scientists, philosophers, and theologians. In the phenomena of nature, he says, everything happens mechanically and at the same time metaphysically, and the source of the mechanical is the metaphysical. This position finds clear expression in two sayings that may be placed side by side—one from a recently discovered fragment, and the other quite familiar: 'Omnia in tota natura demonstrari possunt tum per causas finales, tum per causas efficientes.' 'Causae efficientes pendent a finalibus.'

(*b*) While Leibniz was as 'corpuscular' as Descartes or Spinoza in the explanation of particular phenomena, he could not, for two reasons, rest in the mechanical explanation. One reason appears in his metaphysical construction of the concept of substance. Rejecting the Cartesian and Spinozan opposition of extension and thought, and affirming substance to be force (*un être capable d'action*) and force substance, he passed from an abstract to a more concrete monism. Matter was no longer to be defined as extension but as a form of force, more specifically as power of resistance; and mind was no longer to be restricted to the sphere of consciousness, and was represented as comprising subconscious states (*petites perceptions*). With this view of substance, and with the aid of the Aristotelian principle of continuity and development, Leibniz at length reached the speculative position that the real world consists of an infinite host of independent monads or individuals, at countless different stages of development, whose activity is fundamentally spiritual or perceptual. Now it is the very nature of the monad to strive after the realization of all its latent possibilities. It has to rid itself of confused perceptions and attain true ideas, and so to enter into the mind of God the Supreme Monad—an end which may only be achieved on the plane of self-consciousness and spiritual freedom. So it is, according to Leibniz, that the forces active in mechanism may be interpreted from the standpoint of teleology. Everywhere in nature purposive activity may be discerned. Take but the inward view, or, rather, take but the universal view, and the world of physical causes and effects becomes a world of means and ends.

(*c*) The second reason that led Leibniz to uphold the teleological interpretation of the world starts from his postulate of 'pre-established harmony,' which is intimately connected with his monadology. Though independent or 'windowless,' each monad 'mirrors' the rest of the universe. Though subject to its own laws, each monad is in harmony with the universal development. Geulincx and Spinoza had already applied the principle of harmony or correspondence to the two Cartesian attributes, but Leibniz applies it to the totality of substance. He compares the correspondence which he has in view to different bands of musicians who may keep perfectly together without seeing or even hearing one another. He compares it also, using a frequent analogy of the time (and with the relation of body and mind chiefly in view), to two clocks so skilfully made as never to get out of time. The pre-established harmony is not imposed upon the world from without, but belongs to the inner life of the monads; none the less it needs to be explained. The only possible explanation is to be found in the will and purpose of God. It is God alone who brings to pass the union or interconnexion of substances whereby the world is orderly and rational. Thus the order of the world, interpreted as a pre-established harmony, necessitates the teleological inference to God.

(*d*) The principle involved in the teleological inference is named by Leibniz the principle of determinant or sufficient reason, viz. that nothing can exist or be true without a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise. Without such a

[1] *Essays*, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'

[1] A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (*Gifford Lectures*), Oxford, 1917, p. 333; cf. also below, § III. C, 7 (*b*), 8.

principle, implying the complete rationality of existence, philosophy would for Leibniz have ceased to be, as indeed for Descartes or Spinoza. But Leibniz gave the principle a characteristic application. He regarded it as the foundation of the contingent truths of natural science, just as the principle of identity and contradiction was the foundation of the necessary truths of mathematics and logic. So that the conservation of force or energy and the equivalence of cause and effect in the world must be teleologically explained as dependent upon the divine wisdom and order.

(*c*) In biology, as in physics, Leibniz advanced the teleological problem. He is said to have established the truth that biological organization is compatible with the mechanistic theory, but in comparing the organism to a kind of 'divine machine' or 'natural automaton' he still comes short of the Aristotelian teleology.

6. Rationalistic theism.—(*a*) In the 18th cent. Leibniz's theology was more influential than his monadology. There appears to be a certain looseness of connexion between the two, and it was accentuated by Wolff's effort to systematize and popularize the master's doctrines. In Wolff the harmony of the world is no longer an immanent order, but an order externally imposed by God; and the world's chief end is utility and advantage for man and beast—especially utility for man. This externalism impressed itself upon the 'popular philosophy' that arose in Germany about the middle of the 18th cent., and it promoted a remarkable and many-sided growth of natural theology or teleological physics and organics, the aim of which was to multiply the evidences of design in nature in the interests of the teleological inference to creative wisdom and benevolence. There were astro-theologies, litho-theologies, phyto-theologies, insecto-theologies, ichthyo-theologies, and numerous others. As among the Stoics, the ideas of advantage and utility were often beaten out into petty trivialities (*Nützlichkeitskrämerei*).

(*b*) In France Fénelon had already written eloquently on natural theology on similar lines, although later the materialism of d'Holbach and the scepticism of Bayle were to cut at the root of the popular teleology, and Voltaire was to pour contempt upon its anthropocentrism and shallow optimism.

(*c*) In England, too, natural theology was early developed on the lines of a superficial utilitarianism, beginning in the 17th cent. with the works of the naturalist Ray (on whom Milton drew in *Paradise Lost*), and of Boyle, Barrow, and Parker, continuing with Derham and many others through the 18th cent., and receiving classical exposition in Paley's *Natural Theology*.[1] So exhaustively had the teleology of nature been discussed that the Scottish divine Thomas Chalmers, in the first Bridgewater Treatise,[2] turned to mental as distinguished from physical teleology, discoursing on the adaptation of nature to mind and on adaptations within the mind; while McCosh[3] laid the emphasis upon moral teleology, inferring from the moral order a moral Governor.

(*d*) Notice should here be taken of a universal view of teleology held by the English deist Shaftesbury,[4] who rose above the particular views that so largely prevailed in the deistic as in the orthodox circles of his time. His was an æsthetic teleology, and in the beauty and perfection of the world he found a proof of the existence of God. Not only does the unity of the world point to a universal Spirit; but beauty lies not in matter but in form or formative power, which must work with design.

7. Hume.—(*a*) The speculative sincerity of David Hume (*q.v.*) was probably not so great as his speculative genius. In the *Treatise of Human Nature*[1] he reduced the world to a mere complex of sensations—not an ordered complex, which could be ascribed to a divine Author; and yet in his theological writings, notably in the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*,[2] we find him apparently assuming order and purposiveness in the universe. If the tendency of recent interpretations of the *Dialogues* is to be trusted, we may even regard Hume as sincerely adhering to what is there called a 'genuine theism,' and as accepting the essential core of the argument from design as its rational basis. We may hear Hume himself speaking through Cleanthes, the rationalistic theist, when it is maintained that at every turn we are obliged to have recourse to the hypothesis of design in the universe; or through Philo, who is sceptical and naturalistic in tendency, when he admits that all objections to the hypothesis of design appear mere 'cavils and sophisms' to those who realize the beauty and fitness of final causes.

(*b*) None the less the criticisms of the teleological inference which are put in the mouth of Philo are of great historical interest and importance. Cleanthes, who states the theistic argument from design (round which the discussion of natural religion mainly turns), compares the world of order to a great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which, even in their most minute parts, are all adjusted to each other with marvellous accuracy. This universal adaptation of means to ends so resembles the products of human contrivance that we are led by all the rules of analogy to infer that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties. Philo replies, in Hume's own sceptical vein, that the principle of analogy is not a sure basis of argument, especially as we depart the more from the similarity of the cases. Can we really speak, *e.g.*, of analogy between the fabric of a house and the generation of the universe? And why should thought, design, intelligence, be made the model of the whole? If it is valid to say that, because the world resembles a machine, it arose from design, is it not at least equally valid to say that, because the world resembles an animal, it arose from generation? And why go beyond nature in search of a transcendent cause? To take one step beyond the mundane system is to be forced to go on in an infinite progression. For the ideal world, into which the material world is traced, is itself to be traced into another ideal world, and so on. May it not be that there are forces in nature by means of which, even after a botching and bungling of many worlds throughout an eternity, this orderly and harmonious system was struck out? At most the argument from design can only prove the existence of a being in time and space, fashioning a given material, and all pretension to ascribe infinity to the Deity or even perfection in His finite capacity must be renounced. Can we even pretend to decide from the phenomena of nature as to whether the Deity is one or many? (A similar reference to the limitations of the argument is found in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*,[3] in which the criticism is in the form adopted and made famous by Kant.)

(*c*) By the objections thus urged by Philo a strong impression is made upon Cleanthes, who is also led to admit, in view of the problem of evil, that the Deity might be described in the terms of 'benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity'—an old position of the Greek theology with which we have been familiarized in recent thought. The carefully formulated conclusion of the *Dialogues*, that (as Philo says) 'the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence,' may not have represented in Hume's mind the whole of 'genuine theism,' but it dealt a destructive blow to the rationalistic theology of his time, with its deistic implications, its petty teleology, and its hedonistic view of life.

(*d*) On the scientific or philosophical side, however, Hume made a positive contribution to the problem of natural teleology. The idea goes back as far as Empedocles, and is expounded in Lucretius, that in nature the principle holds of the survival of the fit. In the *Dialogues*, as we have seen, Hume gives expression to this principle, and he does so in respect of both inorganic and organic nature. Described as the tendency towards equilibrium or equilibration, it is recognized in modern physics and biology as teleological in character; but, when Hume speaks of it further as perhaps originally contained in matter, he at least suggests the idea that there is a deeper and

1 London, 1802.
2 *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the adaptation of external Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man*, 2 vols., London, 1833.
3 *The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral*, Edinburgh, 1850.
4 See art. DEISM, § 3.

1 3 vols., London, 1739–40. 2 London, 1779.
3 London, 1748.

more original teleology in nature than ordinary mechanistic theory suspects. So that with Hume the teleological appearance of nature is perhaps more than a postulate of the reflective or subjective judgment, as it is with Kant.

8. **Kant.**—(*a*) In his early work on *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*[1] Kant acknowledged the great value of the arguments drawn from the beauties, harmonies, and perfections of the universe, and more particularly of the starry heavens, to establish the existence of a supremely wise and powerful Creator. At the same time he rises above the popular teleology. In a later pre-critical work on *The Only Possible Proof of the Being of God*[2] he declares himself impressed with the physico-theological argument, but, like Hume's Philo, he doubts the validity of the inference to a Creator who is perfectly wise and good. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*[3] a similar criticism appears, with a famous tribute to the physico-theological argument as 'the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.'[4] The argument at the best, however, cannot take us beyond the great power and wisdom of the Author of the universe; and it can prove, not a Creator, but no more than an Architect, who is necessarily limited by the character of His material. Contingency belongs not to the matter but to the form of the world. The attempt to show that matter is contingent and dependent upon a principle of intelligence is to fall back upon the cosmological proof, which in its turn rests upon the ontological, with the consequence that the claim of the physico-theological to be a pure induction from experience is invalidated. This argument in fact originates in the propensity of the human mind to view the order and purposiveness of nature as though they were the products of intelligence and design—a propensity for which on the principles of the critical philosophy there can be no real basis.

(*b*) We need not dwell on Kant's views in his pre-critical writings of the teleological principle. It is sufficient to note that they were on the lines afterwards developed in the *Critiques*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he justifies, as against Hume's scepticism, the mechanical or scientific view of nature as subject to causal determination. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*[5] he vindicates the teleological view of the spiritual life as a realm of moral freedom and independence. From the critical standpoint therefore the doctrine of nature and the doctrine of morality may each be true in its own sphere, and mechanism and teleology be so far reconciled. In the *Critique of Judgment*[6] he seeks to overcome the dualism—in his own phrase, to bridge the gulf—between nature and the moral order, which he had regarded to begin with as closed systems, independent and separate. He realized that the sensible world of things and persons is but one aspect of reality, and the supersensible world of moral values but another, and that the two must be interrelated. Accordingly he draws attention to certain things belonging to the sensible world of nature which we cannot describe adequately without that notion of purpose or end which has its proper sphere in the supersensible world of spirit. One of these is the phenomenon of beauty, the other that of organic being.

(*c*) The first section of the *Critique* treats of the æsthetic judgment. In the æsthetic experience the beauty of nature, as of art, is felt to be purposive, in the sense that, while it arises out of the sensible, it is in harmony with our 'undefined idea' of the supersensible. The second section has to do with the teleological judgment, in which nature is regarded as purposive in itself, and not merely, as in the æsthetic judgment, in relation to the subject of experience.

(*d*) The purposive character of living beings raises for Kant anew the whole problem of the world as a teleological or organic system, and he now gives the notion of judgment a wider meaning than before. In its use of the principles of the understanding for the subsumption of the particular under the general (in which the faculty of judgment consists) judgment had been shown in the first *Critique* to be determinant or, as we might say, mechanical; i.e., its function is to determine or specify the phenomenal world of experience as a mechanical system under inviolable principles. But judgment is also of another kind, viz. reflective. In subsuming the particular under the universal, reflective judgment makes use of the idea of subordination to purpose or end as the guide to its operations. The determinant judgment is analytical, and simply brings particular facts under the universal principles of the understanding. The reflective judgment is synthetical, and, operating with the idea of nature as a teleological or organic unity, discovers its specific laws. As Windelband[1] remarks, in this application of the category of the practical reason to the object of the theoretical, we have evidently the highest synthesis of the critical philosophy.

(*e*) But still there is no real transcendence of the dualism between the realms of nature and ends, between the factual world of experience and the ideal world of purpose and meaning. For the principle on which reflective judgment proceeds—that the form of nature implies purpose, that the specific laws of nature are to be regarded as though determined by purposive intelligence—is not constitutive of objects. Transcendental though it be, as involving an *a priori* synthetic judgment, it remains a subjective or regulative principle, serving as a rule or guide for the organization of experience and the further extension of knowledge. Yet without the conception of end or a purpose of reason, as realized in the form of organized beings, we could not make such beings intelligible to ourselves. Even a simple blade of grass is inexplicable unless we look upon it as purposive.

(*f*) The conception of the organism as purposive leads, moreover, to the view of collective nature as an organic whole or teleological unity. But it should be reiterated that we cannot affirm the principle of end or final cause as belonging to the essential constitution of nature. Could we penetrate to the hidden ground of nature, we should possibly discover that the principles of mechanical and teleological causation are assimilated in one single principle. The very limitation of our knowledge suggests to us the idea of a higher intelligence, possessed of knowledge which is direct and not mediated by a subjective principle. For such an intuitive or perceptive understanding there would be no such separation as our discursive understanding makes between means and end. As it is, the mechanical and teleological principles are at once complementary and heterogeneous, though the teleological is the final or inclusive principle.[2]

9. **Hegel.**—(*a*) In the course of his examination of the critical philosophy Hegel (*q.v.*) dealt with Kant's view of the physico-theological proof. He agrees with Kant as to its inadequacy as a rational or logical argument. The conception of design, like that of cause in the cosmological proof, cannot express the true nature of the relation of the world to God. At the same time the argument represents a further stage, the first stage being represented by the cosmological argument, in the process whereby in the hidden or implicit logic of religion thought reaches the full apprehension of God as spirit or self-conscious intelligence. Kant might have allowed this, but for the rigidity of the distinction he drew between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, which made it impossible for thought to pass from the one to the other. But the distinction is only relative, and from the ultimate standpoint the two worlds are one. (*b*) As for the critique of the teleological judgment, here again Kant's doctrine is vitiated by the view of the phenomenal and the noumenal as abstract opposites. Yet Kant indicates, if indirectly, the right principle of cosmic interpretation. For it is impossible to distinguish the categories of mechanical and teleological causation as being constitutive and regulative, objective and subjective respectively. With his true apprehension of the idea of purpose as internal and immanent, Kant, but for his rationalistic prejudices, might have advanced to the recognition of the constitutive character of the organic or teleological principle. Internal

[1] Königsberg, 1755. [2] Königsberg, 1762. [3] Riga, 1781.
[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, 1860, p. 383.
[5] Riga, 1788. [6] Berlin and Libau, 1790.

[1] *A Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., New York and London 1893, p. 561.
[2] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 330.

adaptation or design is no less constitutive than the principle of mechanical causation. To overcome, says Hegel, the opposition of phenomena and noumena, we must follow the development of the world from the realm of nature to the realm of mind and thence to the unity of nature and mind in the idea of God, in whom the world is seen to be a rational system.

10. **Schelling: the philosophy of nature.**—(*a*) If Kant promoted the movement of German idealism, he also promoted—perhaps indirectly rather than directly—the new German humanism. We shall take occasion later to speak of the teleological or organic view of history associated with the names of Schelling and Hegel, who carried forward the work of Bossuet and Montesquieu, of Herder (*q.v.*) and Lessing (*q.v.*). Meantime we refer to another aspect of the humanistic movement, viz. the teleological or organic view of nature which was upheld under the leadership of Schelling by the so-called philosophers of nature. For Schelling, as for Plato and others among the ancients, there was a world-soul which as an inner principle of life united all differences in nature in a single organic system. It was felt by the new humanists, as J. T. Merz[1] puts it, that in the Kantian and more particularly the Fichtean philosophy the details of the scenery of nature were forgotten in the interest of studying the attitude and the emotions of the beholder. (*b*) Under the shelter of the humanistic movement, it should be noticed, there was a recrudescence of vitalistic theories in biology (which term was first used in this period by Treviranus to cover the whole of the science of life). Though the biological implications of the *Critique of Judgment* are difficult to grasp, vitalism could readily appeal to Kant's philosophical authority against the mechanical theory of life. For, while Kant handed over the inorganic realm to the mechanical theory (in this only sanctioning a *fait accompli*), he had maintained along with the teleological unity of nature as a whole the Aristotelian concept of biological organization. So at least it was generally thought, despite the metaphysical distinction he drew between the determinant and the reflective or teleological judgment as constitutive and regulative respectively. It is a distinction indeed which science cannot but ignore. When science employs teleological concepts such as function or adaptation, it gives them the same validity as the concept of mechanical causation.[2]

11. **Lotze.**—(*a*) The humanistic movement soon lost its force. The vitalistic theories which had received their impulse from it, and which culminated in Johannes Müller, fell into comparative neglect, and the mechanical view of life was once more dominant. The most solid, according to H. Driesch,[3] of all the attacks upon the older vitalism was made by Lotze (*q.v.*), whom he describes as a static teleologist in physiology in that he believed in the irreducibility of the category of the organism, but a dynamic teleologist or vitalist in psychology in that he believed the soul to be productive of absolutely new mechanical movement. (*b*) But the significance of Lotze for teleology lies not so much in his work in the domain of biology as in his philosophical system. In him science and philosophy, which since Leibniz and Kant had been going separate ways, meet once more. For he combines the mechanical view of nature with a teleological metaphysics (which he holds Schelling also did). It is his aim to show, as he says in the Introduction to the *Microcosmus*, 'how absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.'[1] In his scientific materialism he was at one with the great body of the scientific thinkers of his age. In his speculative teleology he had affinities with Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Herbart. Following Leibniz, he was led to conceive of the world as a plurality of real spiritual elements, but in mutual interaction according to the principle of immanent as distinguished from transeunt causality. In his endeavour to account for the causal relation and the reciprocal interaction of the elements, he was led, by a similar process of thought to that which Spinoza went through, to the idea of a universal all-embracing principle, which for religion has the value of God. Under the influence of Herbart and the Kantian criticism, he utilizes the principle of human analogy in interpreting the inner reality of nature, which he regards as the instrument of a purpose, viz. the purpose of supreme good, though it is by a practical conviction rather than a logical or rational process that we pass from the world of things and forms to the world of values. So it is that Lotze reaches his teleological interpretation of nature.

12. **Darwin.**—(*a*) At first sight it would appear that the theory of biological evolution associated with the name of Charles Darwin so strikingly vindicates the mechanical view of nature as to banish the idea of teleology altogether, not only from scientific explanation but also from philosophical interpretation. Certainly, as Darwin himself realized, the doctrine of descent by natural selection gave a fatal blow to the old argument from design as expounded by Paley.

'We can no longer argue,' he says, 'that the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man.'[2]

Paley had not appreciated the metaphysical difficulties involved in the notions of an external designer or contriver and of special external adaptations, and he laboured under the further limitation that he believed with the orthodox science of his time in the fixity or immutability of species. If species were not fixed and permanent forms but the results of long evolutionary processes determined by necessity or chance, then Paley's argument was still further discredited. There appeared to be no more design in the principle of natural selection than 'in the course which the wind blows.'[3]

(*b*) But, while the Darwinian theory was subversive of the teleological argument in its popular form, which was deistic or rationalistically theistic, it was not really anti-teleological in the Aristotelian and post-Kantian sense. No doubt the principle of natural selection is in itself fortuitous or non-teleological, and that despite the teleological flavour of the terms 'selection,' 'fitness,' by which it is expressed; so that J. Ward, borrowing a 'plain' term from Herbert Spencer, would describe the principle in mechanistic language as one of 'equilibration.'[4] Moreover, in the hands of ultra-Darwinians natural selection of random variations has been employed as an exclusive explanation of the modification and transformation of species, and, so employed, may be properly described as anti-teleological. But Darwin himself did not urge natural selection as an exclusive principle. He recognized in evolution other factors besides, both non-teleological and teleological; *e.g.*, in the last edition of the *Origin of Species* he makes a

[1] *Hist. of European Thought in the 19th Century*, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1896–1914, iii. 352.
[2] Henderson, *The Order of Nature*, p. 67.
[3] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, London, 1914, pp. 127–132.

[1] *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr.[4], Edinburgh, 1894, vol. i. p. xvi.
[2] *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*[2], 3 vols., London, 1887, i. 309.
[3] *Ib.* i. 309.
[4] *The Realm of Ends* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1911, p. 101.

point of saying that natural selection is 'aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts.'[1] Ward contends that this, the Lamarckian factor, like the factors of sexual and human selection, is strictly teleological in the sense that it presupposes psychical activity, conscious or at least sentient, directed to the end of the satisfaction of needs or desires. Whether the Lamarckian is a real or supposititious factor in evolution is a point with which we are not here concerned. It might be added, however, that the anti-Darwinian theories of evolution are more favourable to the teleological idea than the Darwinian and ultra-Darwinian theories; also that Darwin's general theory of organic evolution, like the general cosmogonic theory of Kant and Laplace, is being increasingly recognized as not inconsistent with an ultimate teleology, profounder, subtler, and less rationalistic than Paley's.

'Unless the cosmos itself,' says Ward, 'is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indwelling, informing Life and Mind.'[2]

13. Lachelier. — In Merz's opinion Lachelier's short tract, *Du Fondement de l'induction*,[3] is 'a corner-stone in the edifice of modern thought.'[4] Lachelier faces the problem of the contingent (or the collocation of things in space) which, along with that of the discontinuous, is involved in the Lotzean formula, that 'the things which surround us are the material in which, the laws of nature the forms *through* which, the world of values, or the Ideals, are, or have to be, realized.'[5] Following Cournot, he took up into his philosophy the old distinction between nature passively conceived and nature hypostatized or taken actively (*natura naturata, natura naturans*). The possibility of inductive reasoning rests, he says, on the recognition of both these aspects of nature, which are complementary. From the one standpoint nature is a mechanical or serial unity in which the antecedent determines the consequent; from the other it is a teleological, systematic, or harmonious unity in which the whole determines the existence of the parts. Efficient causes and final causes are both needed in the inductive process. Nature is at once a science, for ever producing effects from causes, and an art, for ever setting about new inventions. As there is a principle of regularity in nature, so there is a principle also of harmony or order. The contrast of mechanism with teleology, as Bosanquet has put it, 'is rooted in the very nature of totality.'[6] We shall see that this philosophical position of Lachelier has been fruitful in the scientific investigation of the problem of universal teleology.

III. *Systematic.* — A. Teleology in empirical description.—**1. Description, explanation, interpretation.**—(*a*) In proceeding from the historical to the systematic discussion, it will make for convenience of treatment to distinguish three aspects of teleology. Historically they have been closely associated, and it is impossible to separate them in any rigid fashion. They may be named, however, the descriptive, the explanatory, and the interpretative. If one hesitates to set up the distinctions here implied, one hesitates more as to the terms by which to designate them. For description, explanation, and interpretation are ill-defined terms in current usage, although—perhaps because—they circulate so freely in discussions of the world and its meaning. By descriptive teleology we mean the teleology which answers at once to the definition of the concept of end or purpose and is immediately recognizable. It might be otherwise named as formal, empirical, or *de facto* teleology. By explanatory teleology we mean the teleology which is postulated in scientific theory in explanation of things, processes, and events. It might be otherwise named as methodical or logical teleology. By interpretative teleology we mean the teleology which offers in philosophy and religion a spiritual interpretation of the world as a whole. It might be otherwise named as speculative, ideal, or spiritual teleology.

(*b*) It might be objected in particular to this scheme that modern physical science leaves explanation to metaphysical philosophy and claims for its formulas no more than descriptive validity. It concerns itself only with the question, 'What is it?', and hands over to metaphysics and religious philosophy the questions, 'How came it to be?', and 'Why came it to be?' But it appears to us that physical science has been suffering in the last generation from an excess of reactionary modesty. Behind its so-called descriptive formulations, which are broad generalizations, lie worlds of patient observation and experiment and a host of flashing inspirations; and, if it does not tell us all about the 'How,' it tells us a great deal about it, and is richly entitled to the larger claim involved in the term 'explanation.'

'It is an interesting point,' remarks J. Arthur Thomson, 'that just about the time when physics began to proclaim emphatically that its office was to describe and not to explain, natural history in Darwin's hands passed emphatically from description to historical explanation.'[1]

For the rest, there is in any case august and already classical authority for a certain individualism in matters of terminology.[2]

2. Descriptive teleology.—(*a*) Teleology, in the sense of purposiveness or activity directed towards an end, is immediately recognizable in the ordinary work-a-day world. Conscious striving after ends, with adaptation of means to ends, is characteristic of human life. The concept of end or purpose is itself derived from observation of the human mind, and conative activity involving ends is central in human experience. But the idea of teleology is readily extended beyond the reference to consciousness. There is a teleology below consciousness, just as there is a teleology above consciousness.

'Neither Christianity nor the coral reef,' says Bosanquet, 'were ever any design of the men or the insects who constructed them; they lay altogether deeper in the roots of things.'[3]

(*b*) As in human history teleology or purposiveness appears to be present in the process, though the individual goes forth, like Abraham, not knowing whither he goes, so it is also in the spheres of subconscious and unconscious life. Many biological processes show the appearance at least of purposiveness, and Kant was right in saying that we could not attain to the knowledge of living things except under the form of the teleological judgment. The structure of the organism, the reciprocal relation of its parts as both means and ends for each other, and its growth, in which it is at once continually self-produced and self-producing, all appeared to him to demand a teleological explanation. It may be that, as Kant's critical philosophy forced him to admit, the teleological principle is subjective and only regulative of knowledge. All we have to say here is that the phenomena of organismal life have been explained both mechanistically and teleologically, but *prima facie* they are susceptible to description in teleological terms.

[1] P. 421, quoted by J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[3] (*Gifford Lectures*), 2 vols., London, 1906, i. 280.
[2] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 302.
[3] Paris, 1871.
[4] *Hist. of European Thought*, iii. 620.
[5] *Ib.* iii. 616.
[6] *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1912, p. 155.

[1] *The System of Animate Nature* (*Gifford Lectures*), 2 vols., London, 1920, i. 13.
[2] Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, Oxford, 1915, p. 6.
[3] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 155.

(*c*) When we pass from organic to inorganic nature, we meet no longer with the appearance of purposiveness, because in inorganic nature there are, to the eyes of sight at least, no individual beings. Yet, if we were to indulge the 'pathetic fallacy,' we should look even upon inorganic nature, the air, the sea, a rock, as responsive to our varying moods and thus as so far teleologically constituted.

(*d*) But, if purposiveness may not be discerned in the inorganic world, it is recognizable in products of art and man's device that are composed of inorganic elements. To our fancy a piece of machinery is often informed with life and purpose, like the machines in Samuel Butler's satire of *Erewhon*, but the purposiveness resides not in the parts but in the processes they subserve. A machine, as Driesch[1] says, is distinguished from other human 'artefacts' as being made for processes. It is, as it were, the depository of a purpose. That is why the comparison of the world to a machine in the old natural theology, as by Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues*, is apt enough, especially when the Deity is deistically conceived as purely transcendent. On the other hand, it is also the reason why the comparison is inept from the standpoint of materialism or naturalism, and why from such a standpoint mechanism as applied to the world is not a particularly happy term.

(*e*) Nor should it be forgotten that under descriptive teleology may be included the recognition of order, beauty, and adaptations in nature as a whole. These things are upon that empirical level of reality which has been attained by the unreflective processes of common sense, and are consequently appreciated by all; and they form the sufficient basis of the traditional argument from design. For order, beauty, adaptation, all speak the language of teleology.

3. The argument from design.—The argument classically expounded in the ancient world by the Stoic Lucilius Balbus in Cicero's *de Natura Deorum*, and in the modern world by Paley in his *Natural Theology*, is doubtless made more impressive, but is not essentially strengthened, by the multiplication of curious instances of extrinsic and intrinsic adaptation derived from the scientific order of nature. It is sufficiently based, as already said, on the fact of the empirical order. As an integral part, nay the very marrow and substance, of the old natural theology of Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, the argument is liable to criticism for its deistic flavour, its hedonism, its antiquated pre-evolutionary science, its old-fashioned teleology; and apart from its limiting historical associations it is liable, as Hume and Kant made it abundantly clear, to the charge of being essentially fallacious. In inferring divine purposeful agency from the teleological appearance of nature, it is guilty, as the logicians would say, of the fallacy of transcendent inference. Obviously it must be restated in a profounder way, if it is to retain validity. The essence of the argument, says R. Flint,[2] is that order implies intelligence. It is an argument not *from* but *to* design, and it is only to be regarded as part of a great cumulative argument. G. T. Ladd[3] admits that the argument is properly an argument from universal order, and he is careful to say that it implies the validity of the ontological argument. From the 'orderly totality' of the universe he would postulate a world-ground conceived of as absolute will and intelligence. But the 'plain man,' with his eye only upon the empirical order, uses the argument without hesitation or logical scruple. When his mind beholds the chain of causes 'confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.'[1] Nor need the man of science, with his deeper appreciation of nature's order, be hesitant to follow the 'plain man.'

'The Logos,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'is at the core of our system, implicit in the nebula, as now in the dewdrop. It slept for the most part through the evolution of plants and coral-like animals, whose dream-smiles are a joy for ever. It slept as the child sleeps before birth. It became more and more awake among higher animals,—feeling and knowing and willing. It became articulate in self-conscious Man,—and not least in his science.'[2]

'There is . . . something,' says D'Arcy W. Thompson, 'that is the order of the cosmos and the beauty of the world, that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man. . . . You may call it Entelechy, you may call it the Harmony of the World; you may call it the *Élan vital*, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or you may call it, as it is called in the Story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men—you may call it the Spirit of God.'[3]

B. TELEOLOGY IN SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION.—**1. Cosmology.**—(1) *Mechanical explanation.*—The teleological appearance of nature and the forms of life, considered above, has set a problem which science no more than philosophy can afford to ignore. In cosmology, however, narrowly interpreted as the science of inorganic nature, teleology is not required as a principle of explanation, whether the cosmos be considered in the spatial or in the temporal reference, *i.e.* from the standpoint of cosmography or from that of cosmogony. The inorganic world is not teleological, for physical science at least, in the sense of exhibiting immanent purposiveness. In its formulations of the things and processes of the inorganic world science employs only the mechanistic terms of kinematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry; and it has amply vindicated its right to employ mechanistic terms exclusively in this sphere. Whether it may also do so in the spheres of biology, psychology, and sociology is another question. But in cosmology it has no use for the category of end or purpose, or for that matter for the categories of cause and substance, but assumes the working only of the non-spontaneous, the automatic, the mechanistic. It may possibly be that such real categories as substance and cause (whether efficient or final) are, in Mach's phrase, tinctured with 'fetishism,' but the exact sciences as such are by no means committed to a materialistic or naturalistic standpoint. Materialism and naturalism are ultimate positions, and scientific explanation is not necessarily that ultimate explanation which we would include under the term 'interpretation.' In point of fact, exact science increasingly recognizes the abstract and artificial quality of its explanations, as it realizes increasingly the distinction between conceptual formulation and perceptual reality. Its formulas have been variously characterized as symbols or counterfoils of reality, as a kind of conceptual shorthand, as economics of thought, as convenient hypothetical summations, or, in J. Royce's favourite metaphor, as the ledger entries and balances of a particular method of book-keeping. It is open to science, as he truly remarks, to enter its accounts by other methods of book-keeping.[4] Gravitation, *e.g.*, may yet be explained as a mere appearance of some more genuine process of nature.

(2) *Collocations.*—In view of the foregoing, we may allow that mechanical explanation, if abstract and hypothetical, reigns supreme and alone in the physical domain. While therefore Chalmers strengthened the case for physico-theology by reviving the Cartesian distinction between the

[1] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, p. 4.
[2] *Theism*[2], p. 181 ff.; cf. also *Agnosticism* (*Croall Lecture*), Edinburgh, 1903, pp. 182–184.
[3] *The Philosophy of Religion*, 2 vols., London, 1906, ii. 59 ff.

[1] Bacon, *Essays*, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'
[2] *The System of Animate Nature*, ii. 637.
[3] *Life and Finite Individuality* (two symposia of the Aristotelian Society), London, 1918, p. 54.
[4] *The World and the Individual* (*Gifford Lectures*), 2nd ser., New York, 1901, p. 216.

laws and the dispositions or collocations of matter, he placed his argument in jeopardy when he said that 'the main evidence for a Divinity lies, not in the laws of matter, but in the collocations.'[1] 'But what would become of this main evidence for a Divinity,' remarks J. Ward,[2] 'if the laws of matter themselves explained its collocations?' Yet, although science has been gathering the collocations within the mechanism of nature, the problem of order still remains. As in the biological sphere, so in the cosmological there is an ultimate collocation or configuration to be acknowledged which natural laws cannot explain. Says L. J. Henderson:

'The forms and states and quantities of matter and energy in the nebula determine the resulting solar system.'[3]

So that we may affirm that the universe possesses an original teleological character.

(3) *Fitness of the environment.*—(*a*) But is it possible to discover an explanation of the order of nature beyond the laws of nature's uniformity? Henderson thinks positive thought has found a clue. He points out that, if the scientific or mechanistic origin of the natural order is to be explained, it must be through principles that account not merely for the general character of orderliness in the phenomena of nature and the products of evolution, but also for that radical or fundamental diversity which Herbert Spencer declared necessary to the evolutionary process. Such principles, clearly, are to be sought not so much in the laws of nature as in the properties of matter. Accordingly Henderson has investigated the properties of the elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and of their compounds water and carbon dioxide, which have been the chief factors in both geological and organic evolution. These properties are found to constitute a unique group of singular physical and chemical characteristics, so that they are *maxima* or the fittest possible for organic life; *e.g.*—to take the compounds, which are the primary constituents of the environment—the solvent action of water is greater than the solvent action of any other liquid, and the solubility of carbon dioxide in water is such that it must always be evenly distributed between the atmosphere and aqueous liquids. Or—to take the elements themselves—hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen possess the greatest number of compounds and enter into the greatest number of reactions, involving the greatest transformations of energy known to the chemist. Further (and here a teleological consideration appears), the aforesaid unique ensemble of properties is uniquely favourable to the existence of systems—of which the world of physics and chemistry consists—of numerous, diverse, stable systems. In fitness for systems no other elements and compounds even approach hydrogen, carbon and oxygen, water and carbon dioxide. In short, the arrangement of the properties of matter among the elements makes the diversity of the evolutionary process possible.

(*b*) It is Henderson's opinion, following up these results of physico-chemical research, that, as according to the law of probabilities the connexion between the properties and the process cannot be due to mere contingency, the properties can only be regarded as a preparation for the process, or, in other words, as resembling adaptation. There must be a functional relationship between them—something like that known to physiology—which must be described as teleological. How otherwise can we express the fact that the collocation of properties unaccountably precedes that to which they are unquestionably related? Just as biological organization is teleological and non-mechanical, so with the connexion between the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen and the process of evolution. This is the positive contribution Henderson has to offer towards the vast problem of the contingent set for natural science by Lotze and Lachelier, and it goes to strengthen the philosophical position that mechanism and teleology are both at the foundation of the natural order.[4]

2. Biology.—(1) *Evolution.*—(*a*) The term 'evolution' (*q.v.*) is itself teleological in its primary meaning, and denotes more than mechanistic process; but it is possible that the mechanistic (*i.e.* physico-chemical) explanation of biological descent may be found sufficient in natural science. Possibly the evolutionary process is mechanistically determined through and through by natural selection interpreted as non-teleological (whether working upon so-called fortuitous variations or upon variations themselves subject to the law of probability), or by natural selection supplemented by other non-teleological factors, perhaps by some non-teleological factor yet to be discovered. On the other hand, we have seen that Darwin did not regard natural selection as exclusive of teleological factors, and it may well be that the psychical principles of self-conservation and subjective selection, on which J. Ward would lay stress, are required to give natural selection a *point d'appui*.[1]

(*b*) It is a searching test of the sufficiency of mechanistic explanation that H. Bergson in the rôle of biologist proposes. If it could be proved, he says, that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution, then pure mechanism would be refutable and finality in a certain sense so far demonstrable. Accordingly he examines the evolutionary hypothesis in the two forms of it that have emerged from the welter of biological controversy since Darwin's time. He puts it to neo-Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism alike, What is the explanation of the structural analogy between the eye of a vertebrate and that of a mollusc like the common pecten?[2] It appears impossible on neo-Darwinian principles, which enter readily into a mechanistic philosophy of life, to account for the production of the same effect by two different accumulations of an enormous number of small causes, whether the possibility be urged, as by the stricter Darwinists, on the theory of insensible accidental variations or, as by de Vries, on the theory of sudden and simultaneous variations or, as by Eimer, on the theory that assigns a direct rather than an indirect influence to the environment, explaining the evolution of the various organs by a kind of mechanical composition of the external with the internal forces. To account for the convergence of effects we must appeal, continues Bergson, to some inner directing principle. Here Bergson's sympathy with the neo-vitalism of Driesch and Reinke appears, though he is more interested in their critical work than in their constructions. Turning to neo-Lamarckism, which explains variations not as accidental or determined but as springing from the effort of the living being to adapt itself to the environment, he declares it to be the only form of the later evolutionism capable of admitting, as it actually does with Cope, 'an internal and psychological principle of development.'[3] Weismann has shown, however, that the Lamarckian hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics is at most the exception and not the rule. How then may an organ such as the eye be developed? Is not the organic effort a deeper and more psychological thing than any neo-Lamarckian supposes? So Bergson returns to his speculative theory of life. He finds the fundamental cause of variations that accumulate and create new species, in the transmission of the *élan vital* from one generation of germs to the next through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, which is the false anthropomorphic view both of mechanism and of finalism. Life proceeds by dissociation and division. It starts with a direction or tendency no doubt, and is in this sense finalistic, but we cannot foretell how and where it will end.

(2) *Mechanism and vitalism.*—(*a*) Leaving genetic considerations, we find ourselves still pursued by the mechanistic hypothesis, which affirms 'living matter' to be completely describable as a physico-chemical system, and organization and regulation—those distinguishing marks of living bodies—to be conceivable in physico-chemical terms. But it is also maintained as against this that the way of physico-chemical analysis and synthesis yields but an abstract product falling short of what answers to that *vue d'ensemble* which Comte advocated in the study of the living.

(*b*) Mechanistic theory in biology may be said to follow two main types, so far as regards the relation to teleology. Sometimes it has no traffic with teleology at all, and is still afflicted with what von Baer called 'teleophobia,' in its jealousy for the mechanical explanation. Sometimes again—and this represents the predominant tendency—it finds room for the teleological view, re-affirming in fact the Aristotelian doctrine of the internal teleology of the living thing, which is its self-regulation.

(*c*) But, with the more synthetic method involved in this type of mechanistic theory, vitalism has appeared once again in the history of biological theory, if in subtler and more elusive forms. The difference between the prevalent mechanistic theory and the vitalistic hypothesis may be expressed in the distinction due to Driesch between statical

[1] *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God*, i. 20, note.
[2] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 47.
[3] *Fitness of the Environment*, p. 301.
[4] Cf. *Fitness of the Environment, Order of Nature, Philosophical Review*, vol. xxv. no. 3 [1916], *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. xiii. no. 12 [1916].

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 290.
[2] *L'Evolution créatrice*, Paris, 1907, Eng. tr., London, 1911, p. 66 ff.
[3] *Ib.* p. 81.

and dynamical teleology.[1] Whereas in statical teleology the processes of life are judged to be purposive in virtue of a given machine-like order or form underlying them, in dynamical teleology it is in virtue of their possession of a peculiar autonomy; and dynamical teleology leads, as Driesch thinks, to some form of vitalism. We suppose L. J. Henderson, who is a mechanist, might then be also named a statical teleologist; for, while on the whole persuaded that organization (the central issue between the mechanism and vitalism of to-day) is capable of explanation—though not as yet explained—in physico-chemical terms, he is also persuaded that the teleological concept of organization, if to be found also in sociology and in the meteorological cycle, is a necessary biological category, and that a mechanistic physiology is at fault in not recognizing this.[2] But, though he thus believes with Driesch in teleology as an 'irreducible peculiarity' of vital phenomena, he is not a dynamical teleologist in the neo-vitalist sense. He might allow that organisms, like machines, are inert embodiments of purposiveness; he would not allow that they are actuated by purposiveness.

(*d*) The anti-mechanists also fall into two main groups. In the first are the neo-vitalists, of whom Driesch is the most prominent representative. They contend that biological processes are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of the organism, but that some non-physical principle (like Driesch's entelechy or unifying causality) impresses itself upon those processes, to suspend, regulate, or control the physical and chemical reactions. With such a principle at work, the outcome of events, experimentally considered at least, is no longer determinate and unequivocal. Bergson's *élan vital* is such another non-perceptual determiner. Now, as Bergson realizes,[3] the contention of neo-vitalism is relevant and weighty on the critical side, but on its positive side is beset with difficulties. Even granted the existence of the mysterious non-mechanical semi-psychical entity postulated in the theory, it is impossible to say where and how it works in the biological processes. In recent constructions, no doubt, there is none of the crudity ridiculed by Molière in the older vitalism when he declared the cause of sleep to be the 'dormitive virtue' (which reminds one of the Johnsonian legend that the noise of wheels was once attributed by the learned doctor to the strepituosity of circumrotatory motion). All the same the conception of neo-vitalism remains mystical in quality, and biological science is reluctant to entertain it. An entity such as Driesch formulates, which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent *sui generis*, non-spatial, albeit acting into space, non-material, but logically belonging to nature, may have a strange fascination for the metaphysician, but will hardly retain a place for itself in the world of scientific explanation. We are assured, moreover, that the second law of thermo-dynamics, which entelechy is said to be capable of suspending, will hold even in the obscure cases in morphology on which Driesch founds his theory.[4] We are also assured that the non-physical something which is supposed to intervene in physical and chemical processes is invariably dependent upon the existence of physical and chemical conditions, yet it is not explained what part these conditions play in bringing about the actual results.[1] Vitalism sets itself a hard task indeed in seeking to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the mechanical and metaphysical explanations.[2]

(3) *Biologism.*—(*a*) Even as a scientific hypothesis neo-vitalism appears already on the way to occupy an intermediate position. The issue now seems to lie between some kind of mechanism and a form of teleological theory even more anti-mechanistic than neo-vitalism. For want of a better name, the theory may be called 'biologism.' It is the biological as distinguished from the mechanical theory of life. It is vitalistic in a sense, for it regards it as impossible to conceive distinctively biological phenomena in physical and chemical terms. For it the autonomy of life is more than a statical conception involving a teleological and non-mechanical relationship between mechanical things and processes. The autonomy of life is a dynamical conception, involving a dynamical teleology. But it is the living organism itself, and not some directive force within it, as in properly vitalistic theory, that is dominant in organic activity. The organism exists as such, and its structure and activities are the expression of its existence.

(*b*) Here, as is claimed by J. S. Haldane,[3] a protagonist of the biological theory of life, we have a good working hypothesis, necessary to biologists, and capable of overcoming the failures of the physico-chemical conception. Biology, he urges, is something very different from physico-chemistry applied to life. Its phenomena differ, not merely in complexity but also in kind, from physico-chemical phenomena. Although physico-chemistry has much to teach us concerning the origin and destiny of the material and energy in the body, it fails to throw light upon the apparently teleological ordering of that material and energy. The inadequacy of the physico-chemical explanation appears when we enter into the deeper problems of the organism's activity, not to say fundamental problems, such as reproduction and heredity. Animal heat, respiration, circulation—to take these examples from physiology—all contain teleological (*i.e.* physiological) elements that do not yield to physico-chemical analysis. Life is a unity of structure, environment, and activity, and is not resolvable into mechanism. Separate a living part from its environment, or suspend its activity, and you alter it completely. What therefore matter and energy are to physics, or the atom to chemistry, the living organism is to biology.

(*c*) Haldane is further of opinion that, inconsistent with each other as are the biological and ordinary physico-chemical theories of life (so that personally he would as soon go back to the mythology of his Saxon forefathers as to the mechanistic physiology), a common meeting-ground between biology and physico-chemistry will yet be discovered. That will mean, however, not a reduction of the organic to the inorganic, but the inclusion of the inorganic within the domain of biology.[4] In such an opinion the contrast between the principles of mechanism and biologism is sharply revealed, but with it we seem to be carried beyond the universe of discourse of natural science.

(*d*) It appears to us that in their bearing upon scientific explanation the differences between the mechanist or statical teleologist and the biologist or dynamical teleologist (if we may wrest Driesch's terms to our own use) is not so very radical after all. It is significant that Henderson accepts the mechanistic hypothesis as *upon the whole* most consistent with the evidence,[5] and that Haldane advocates the biological hypothesis on account of the unsatisfactoriness of the *ordinary* mechanistic (*i.e.* physico-chemical) explanation.[6] They both accept the principle of organic autonomy, and are good Aristotelians (as indeed Driesch is also), and possibly they would unite upon the formula: 'Not mechanism *or* vitalism, but mechanism *and* teleology.' This is a thesis admirably supported

[1] *The History and Theory of Vitalism*, p. 5; cf. also *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, ii. 135 *f.*

[2] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6 [1918], p. 575 *f.*

[3] *Creative Evolution*, p. 44, note.

[4] L. J. Henderson, in *Philosophical Review*, xxvii. no. 6, p. 574.

[1] J. S. Haldane, *The New Physiology*, London, 1919, p. 137.

[2] Cf. R. Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 181.

[3] *The New Physiology*, p. 48; cf. also *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, London, 1913, *Organism and Environment*, New Haven, London and Oxford, 1917, *Life and Finite Individuality* (Two Symposia), London, 1918.

[4] *The New Physiology*, p. 19; *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 100.

[5] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 576.

[6] *The New Physiology*, p. 49.

by R. F. Alfred Hoernlé,[1] who would make the particular point that in biology teleology not only is compatible with mechanism but is 'logically dominant' over it. Teleological terms are required, he says, not as substitutes for physico-chemical terms but to express the dominancy of the structures and processes of life, which—as he goes on to say—cannot be reduced to exclusively physico-chemical terms without disregard of the difference, on which Bergson insists so strikingly, between the living and the dead.

(*c*) In an intimate and eloquent discussion of mechanism and vitalism J. Arthur Thomson[2] makes it abundantly clear that biologism is at present no more than a descriptive or methodological theory. It distinguishes itself from mechanism in demanding ultra-mechanical categories, but what these categories should be is not as yet determinate. He himself describes the organism in Bergsonian language as 'a historic being which has traded with time, and has enregistered within itself past experiences and experiments, and which has ever its conative bow bent towards the future.'[3] Hesitating to interpolate with Driesch and the positive vitalists a new agency or directive activity, he is content to say that the organism reveals new aspects of reality, transcending theoretically mechanical formulation.

3. Psychology.—(1) *Body and mind.*—(*a*) If the teleological standpoint is required in the scientific explanation of the world of organic nature, it is also required in respect of the world of mind or consciousness. The world of mind is the native sphere of purposive activity, and only a very abstract view of it can dispense with teleological categories. According to W. R. Sorley's[4] analysis, the contrast between a purely mechanical and a purposive system lies in this, that, although purpose is consistent with the law of causation and the principle of the conservation of energy, yet as the result of a purpose or mental idea there is a liberation of energy passing from the potential to the kinetic form, and the same purpose may also control, non-mechanically, the direction of the movement. Therefore it is not to account completely for the activity of a purposive system to describe it in merely mechanistic terms. When this position is challenged (as it is in psychology as well as in biology), as not fitting into the mechanistic hypothesis, the discussion passes inevitably into the speculative sphere.

(*b*) In psychology the mechanistic position founds upon the Cartesian law of psycho-physical parallelism, which represents the relation between brain-processes and psychical changes as one not of interaction but of concomitance, and it usually takes the form of the parallelistic hypothesis known as conscious automatism or psychical epiphenomenalism (*Begleiterscheinung*), in which inner or conscious states are accounted for as collateral products of the physical phenomena. On such principles as are embodied in this form of psycho-physical parallelism, the appearance of purpose or ideal direction is an illusion, and the consciousness of purpose either belongs to a different order or level of reality or is simply a result or effect, however vague, shadowy, impalpable, of the neural organization. On the first alternative, every neurosis has its psychosis, but they cannot affect each other. On the second alternative, every neurosis has its psychosis, but the neurosis cannot react even a very little upon the psychosis. Either, then, the mechanical theory does not apply to consciousness or the principle of the conservation of energy breaks down. The mechanist must either give up his case or overthrow the foundations of his faith. If this line of argument laid down by J. Ward[5] be valid, then we are free to turn from the mechanistic hypothesis to one that allows full value to the teleological appearance of conscious life, say, the animistic theory which has so long persisted in human thought and for which W. McDougall[6] has made out so strong a case in recent times, or the double-aspect theory with which the name of C. Lloyd Morgan[7] may be associated, and which J. Arthur Thomson favours as in line with his biological contention, largely based on a study of behaviour, that the organism is a psycho-physical unity.[8]

(2) *Psychologism.*—(*a*) But the working scientist need not commit himself to any speculative position on the problem of the relation between what we call body and what we call mind. If he is of opinion that psychology is more than physiology, as biology is more than physico-chemistry, he can at least affirm a descriptive or methodological 'psychologism,' transcending merely biological concepts and claiming teleological categories of its own, exclusive and irreducible. A merely physiological psychology, avers J. S. Haldane, is as inadequate as a mechanical physiology. A conscious organism, which reacts not only in space but also in time, and in its temporal reactions joins itself at once to the actual past and the potential future, shows itself to be more than a mere organism, such as we commonly regard a plant as being. The relation to its environment, which is established through perception and volition, is no mere external relation, as in the case of a mere organism. There is a real connexion between the external world and the internal organic world. The environment is 'teleologically determined' by our organic needs, and but for this 'teleological determinism' the world of our conscious experience would lack unity and coherence. To disregard therefore the psychological aspect of living things, especially human beings, and to describe their behaviour in other than psychological terms is to deal unduly in abstractions.[1]

(*b*) If we may extend a remark of J. Arthur Thomson,[2] in which this idea of the autonomy both of biology and of psychology is summed up, there is not one science of nature but several. There is the physical order of nature—the inorganic world—where mechanism is dominant (always on the assumption, as W. R. Sorley[3] reminds us, that qualitative differences are really reducible to quantitative differences of molecular and infra-molecular structure). There is the vital order of nature—the world of organisms—where mechanism is in logical subordination to teleology; and there is the psychical order of nature—the world of mind—where purpose is dominant. In biology the primacy of the biological standpoint, and in psychology the primacy of the psychological standpoint, is to be maintained.

(3) *Discontinuity.*—It may be thought that discontinuity of the categories makes against a unified theory of nature, such as mechanism offers. But a unified theory of nature does not require, says Hoernlé, 'the reduction of all universals to one kind, or the restriction of all variables to one type of values,' but may be achieved by 'the correlation of different types or groups or levels of phenomena.'[4] It is such a correlation, or cumulative integration, that is here supported. Nor need exception to it be taken in the name of ultimate or metaphysical unity. The categories of mechanism, life, and mind, which are fundamental hypotheses of natural science, are, in the wider view of philosophy, only provisional. It is possible, as J. S. Haldane has hinted, that the principle of continuity may yet be amply vindicated even in the scientific order of nature, and that without surrender to the mechanistic hypothesis. From his own standpoint of philosophical idealism he can say that the categories are the forms which the riches of the spiritual world assume in their progress towards the truly real.[5]

4. Sociology.—(1) *Two functions of psychology.*—A. E. Taylor[6] speaks of two functions of psychology. The first, which is not its proper function but which it exercises 'pending the majority of cerebral physiology,' is to set forth mental processes as mechanical uniformities of sequence. The other function is to treat of purposive activities and adjustments, and thereby to afford a suitable terminology for the sociological sciences, and in particular ethics and history. Apart from

1 *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 629 ff.
2 *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. i. lect. v.
3 *Ib.* i. 160.
4 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911–12, p. 216 ff.
5 *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. pt. iii.
6 *Body and Mind*, London, 1911.
7 *Scientia*, xviii. [1915] 1–15.
8 *The System of Animate Nature*, lect. vii., esp. p. 247 ff.

1 *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 111 ff.
2 *Introd. to Science*, London, 1911, p. 163; cf. also *HJ* ix. [1911], x. [1912].
3 *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*) Cambridge, 1918, p. 407.
4 *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 641.
5 *The New Physiology*, p. 156.
6 *Elements of Metaphysics*, London, 1903, p. 306.

the teleological symbols supplied by psychology, ethical appreciation and historical interpretation would be impossible. With this remark let us pass to the consideration of the teleological method in ethics and history.

(2) *Ethics.*—The teleological standpoint has its place in ethical theory, just as teleological symbolism necessarily enters into the appreciation of conduct. Among the possible divisions of ethical theories a fundamental one is into the teleological and the formal or jural. In the first case the moral standard is represented by the idea of good or value, in the second by that of duty or right. The teleological theory, which is found in Greek philosophy, takes the form either of hedonism or, as F. Paulsen,[1] borrowing an Aristotelian term, phrases it, of 'energism.' With Aristotle as with Plato the ethical end or ideal was the good personally realized in social relations as the actualization or full fruition of human powers and capacities. In modern ethical theory both the hedonistic and energistic forms of the teleological method have been revived. The formal or jural method is older than the other, as attaching itself to the legalistic stage of religion. Through Judaism it entered into theological ethics, and it received classical exposition at the hands of Kant, the fundamental idea of whose ethics is the original mental principle of the good will. As against a Kantian formalism and in favour of the teleological standpoint in ethical theory, it has often been urged that norms and motives of action are not abstract and transcendental principles but, as psychology and history teach us, generalized rules of the will which grow out of individual and social experience, and their value consists not in defining but in their power of promoting the ethical end.[2]

(3) *History.*—(*a*) The teleological principle has also been applied to the interpretation of the process of history. As we have already noticed, a teleological view of history took shape under the influence of Christianity, receiving various expression in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. But it was not until Lessing and Herder, or rather not until Hegel, that history was reflectively and intimately treated in the light of the Aristotelian principles of continuity and development.

(*b*) We may distinguish in this connexion three types of historical theory. J. S. Mill recognized the principle of continuity, but in his 'inverse deductive' method he applied to historical development the atomizing, mechanizing principles of Democritus and Descartes, treating history as a kind of social dynamics, human motives and actions as causes and effects, and the course of events as a rigorously determined sequence. Against this view it may be maintained that the hypothesis of mechanical causation is irrelevant in the sphere of history and of sociology in general, as in the sphere of psychology in its most characteristic aspect. Psychical events are not duly appreciated by means of subpersonal categories. A similar criticism is applicable to Herbert Spencer's theory of history. Although Spencer, here following Comte, applies the idea of organic or super-organic evolution to the interpretation of the historical process, he never really breaks with the conviction—'fixed probably in his mind,' says J. T. Merz, 'through his engineering education'[3]—that change and progress in society, as in nature and mind, are explicable on mechanical principles.

(*c*) The second type of historical theory is represented by Hegel himself, for whom the course of events is a continuity, not of mechanical causation but of evolutionary development. It is still a rigidly determined movement, but it is teleologically conceived, the end dominating the process. 'As the germ carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flavour and the form of the fruits, so the first vestiges of mind virtually contain the whole history.'[4] The history of society is for Hegel the necessary evolution of the immanent Idea, and the process is fixed in all its stages. Through human interests and actions the final purpose of history is carried out, but the purpose itself—such is the absolute cunning of reason—is beyond and external to human interests and actions.[5]

(*d*) It may be objected to this organic view that, in so generalizing the conception of historical development, it does not bring out its true nature as a process of interaction between conscious and self-conscious minds. Nor does it appear to offer a true rationale of human progress. A better explanation of the historical process, in our judgment, is implied in the words of G. Galloway, who, following Siebeck, says: 'Progress is the spiritual vocation of humanity: it is a task which it sets to itself, not an inherent necessity of its constitution. The ideal is freely pursued, and what ought to be is never that which perforce must be.'[1] In other words, the organic view is to be replaced by the historical or spiritual view, in which the freedom of human personality is more clearly acknowledged.[2]

(*e*) The fuller justification of such a position must lie in the metaphysical sphere. It may be here observed that the third type of historical theory might be distinguished from the others as teleological indeterminism. In it development is acknowledged to be epigenetic or, in Wundt's phrase, creatively synthetic, whereas in the teleological and mechanical determinisms above named development is the necessary effect, as it were, of an attraction from before or an impulsion from behind, of a *vis a fronte* or a *vis a tergo*.

(*f*) It may be also observed that teleological indeterminism in the theory of historical science naturally leads in metaphysics to a form of spiritual pluralism (*q.v.*), that teleological determinism makes a ready alliance with pantheism, and that mechanical determinism is at home in a naturalistic or positivistic setting. Yet it is not without significance that in J. S. Mill a survival of the deistic tendency of thought is to be found. For it may be not unjustly said that deism, as a dogmatic or theological position, with its shallow rationalizing of religion and its mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world, largely promoted what J. Royce calls the 'mechanistic dogma' of our time. An 'absentee God' may be done without, so long as the mechanism of the universe keeps going. At any rate naturalism, deism, pantheism, and pluralism will meet us as we pass from the world of scientific explanation into that of philosophical and religious interpretation.

C. TELEOLOGY IN SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION.—1. **Universal teleology.**—As we view the world in its totality and seek to discover its meaning, we pass from empirical description and scientific or logical explanation to spiritual, *i.e.* philosophical and religious, interpretation. Here we are face to face with the metaphysical aspect of teleology, which is the aspect it has chiefly presented in history. The need of a philosophical interpretation of the world has always been more or less consciously realized, and in recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the deeper problems of nature, mind, and spirit. Philosophy and religion alike welcome the tendency among natural scientists to make incursions into what science has for long regarded as the 'foreign field' of metaphysics—a tendency begotten of the increasing recognition that no more than materialism does naturalism speak the last word on the perennial metaphysical problems. This has been largely due to 'the liberating influence of biology,'[3] and is marked among biologists. We have already noticed the idealistic position of J. S. Haldane, and Driesch has advanced beyond a conceptual phenomenalism, having even formulated a critical metaphysic which leans to theism.[4] The new and wider scientific outlook is well reflected in the significant postscript to T. C. Chamberlin's discussion of the geogonic, geological, and biological processes in his remarkable book, *The Origin of the Earth*:[5]

'It is our personal view that what we conveniently regard as merely material is at the same time spiritual, that what we try to reduce to the mechanistic is at the same time volitional; but whether this be so or not, the emergence of what we call the living from the inorganic and the emergence of what we call the psychic from the physiologic, were at once the transcendent and the transcendental features of the earth's evolution.'

[1] *Introd. to Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, p. 421.
[2] Cf. G. Galloway, *The Principles of Religious Development*, London, 1909, p. 235 ff.
[3] *Hist. of European Thought*, iv. 519, note.
[4] *Philosophie der Geschichte*, ed. 1848, p. 21, quoted by Galloway, p. 5.
[5] Cf. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 149.

[1] *Realm of Ends*, p. 43.
[2] Cf. W. James, *The Will to Believe*, New York and London, 1897, p. 245.
[3] Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 66.
[4] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, pt. ii., esp. p. 232 ff.
[5] Chicago and London, 1916.

2. Teleology and naturalism.—(*a*) It is the essence of naturalism to construe the phenomena of life, mind, and society in terms of the mechanical and non-teleological conceptions which serve in physical science. But we are persuaded that thus to reduce the world to a mechanism is to fail to account for large tracts of experience. Mechanism is an undeniably excellent methodical principle, but is inadequate as an ontological dogma. Moreover, with the mechanistic dogma teleology cannot live, *i.e.* teleology as philosophical interpretation. It has ever been the contention of teleologists from Aristotle onwards that meaning and purpose underlie all material and mechanical processes, that mind or spirit is ideally prior to matter and more fundamental to reality. Naturalism, it may be said, ignores the distinction implied in Lotze's remark that 'the machinery which produces the image of a phenomenon is not identical with the meaning of this image.'[1]

(*b*) The counter-contention of spiritual philosophy is to be justified on epistemological grounds, as by J. Ward in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Ward insists boldly with Kant that the intellect makes or fashions, though it does not create, nature. He shows that the fundamental principles of knowledge, unity, causality, and regularity have entered anthropomorphically into our conception of nature, and that nature itself as one and uniform is teleological, being found conformable to human intelligence and amenable to human ends. The result is that unity of nature and man in one rational and coherent scheme of things, that confronting of human reason by universal reason, in which idealism or spiritualism has always consisted. It is the fault of naturalism, as Pringle-Pattison expresses it, that it prematurely closes the record, that it substantiates the antecedents in abstraction from their consequents.

'There is no system,' as he says, 'no whole of being, no real fact at all, till the external gathers itself up, as it were, into internality, and existence sums itself up in the conscious soul.'[2]

3. The essence of teleological interpretation.—Teleological interpretation is then confessedly anthropomorphic, or, as F. C. S. Schiller would say, humanistic. It rests upon the general epistemological principle of analogy, and is itself a particular instance of it. According to the teleologist, the worlds of nature and history are to be interpreted after the analogy of the purposeful life of which man is conscious in himself. Since Hume and Kant, at any rate, the analogical character of the teleological principle has been widely recognized. We saw it in Lotze, who believed none the less that the category of end or purpose afforded a definite clue to the nature of ultimate reality. We may see it in Bergson, who, however, regards the category of end or purpose as applicable only to the lower scientific order of reality. Yet, as H. Höffding[3] points out, Bergson himself actually employs the principle of analogy along with that of intuition. With him intuition is only the first step towards the interpretation of reality. As mechanism proceeds by analogy in taking the organism to be a machine, and finalism in making it respond to a preconceived plan, so is it not to go by analogy to understand life as an *élan*, a thrust, an effort? But in this instance, it must be allowed, the analogy is drawn not as in finalism from the intelligent self-conscious life, but from the spontaneous and semi-conscious psychical life. While there is force in this criticism of Bergson's position, it does not follow that Bergson's philosophy of life is thereby discredited. All metaphysic, as Leibniz said, is founded on analogy. Apart from the analogy of human experience, no kind of knowledge would be possible, and it is entirely reasonable to proceed by way of that analogy to the consideration of the truly and ultimately real. But it may be urged, as against Bergson, that the analogy of purposeful self-conscious activity—so central a feature in human experience—offers a better clue to the nature of the absolute experience than does any analogy based on experience which is subpersonal. In any case what is claimed here is that teleology is a valid principle of interpretation, and that divine purpose may be recognized as a true cosmic principle. We shall see that, if divine purpose is actually so recognized, the *analogia hominis* must not be pressed in detail. The category of purpose or end, viewed from the side of the Absolute, requires to be delicately handled.

4. Pragmatic teleology.— Pragmatism (*q.v.*) claims to be different from other philosophies in respect of the clearness of its consciousness that teleology is no more than a methodological postulate. It is astounded at the misunderstanding revealed in the recent criticism[1] that it assumes a teleological constitution of the universe guaranteeing in mediæval fashion satisfaction to human desires and needs—an assumption out of keeping, the critic adds, with the spiritual pluralism or radical empiricism which pragmatism generally professes. In reply F. C. S. Schiller[2] insists that, while the pragmatist makes use of the teleological principle, it is not for him an *a priori* truth that the universe is going to prove good and to be found favourable to his desires. His is a heuristic teleology. He assumes commensurability between the supreme reality and human faculty, and then acts upon the assumption in hope. In contrast to this methodological optimism, one recalls the attitude of Bertrand Russell,[3] who repudiates the 'will to believe' as an argument and can only face the universe with 'unyielding despair.' For, according to his naturalistic view, the universe is blind to good and evil and indifferent to human interests. Perhaps, as C. A. Richardson[4] suggests, it is the preoccupation of logical pluralism with the objective side of experience that leads it to look upon the notion of teleology with doubt and suspicion. But more likely the attitude arises out of a personal conviction or resolution of character.

5. Teleology in personal idealism.—(*a*) Where personal idealism means spiritual pluralism of a theistic type, the concept of purpose applied to the interpretation of the universe yields a conclusion that satisfies. Consider first how thoroughgoing an application of this concept is embodied in personal idealism. It conceives reality, as in the monadisms of Leibniz and Lotze, as consisting of a plurality of experiencing subjects or spiritual centres of experience. In this it builds upon the analogy in respect of purposiveness between human persons and the lower forms of organic life, and upon the conjecture that even inorganic matter is composed of purposive individuals. Like organic species arrested in their evolution, or apparently so, these exhibit the minimum of spontaneity and the maximum of habit, according to the idea expressed by J. Ward, 'Routine presupposes antecedent living purpose.'[5] The essential nature of the monads or spiritual individuals is affirmed to be their self-activity, involving self-determination (conscious, subconscious, or unconscious) in

1 *Kleine Schriften*, iii. 229, quoted by Merz, iii. 549.
2 *The Idea of God*, p. 215; cf. also p. 332.
3 *Modern Philosophers*, Eng. tr., London, 1915, p. 290 ff. (see esp. at p. 292 to *Den menneskelige Tanke*, French ed., pp. 318–327).

1 J. M. Warbeke, in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, xvi. [1919] 207, 'A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism.'
2 *Ib.* xvi. 548, 'Methodological Teleology.'
3 *Philosophical Essays*, London, 1910, p. 60 ff.
4 *Spiritual Pluralism*, Cambridge, 1919, p. 17.
5 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911–12, p. 260; cf. also C. A. Richardson, *Spiritual Pluralism*, p. 53.

reference to ends. Thus spirit and spontaneity, which naturalism banishes from the world, are restored on this panpsychist hypothesis throughout the whole vast range of experience. But that coherent experience may be made possible, a sympathetic *rapport* or responsive sympathy is, as with Lotze, postulated among the monads.

(*b*) With this the theory of personal idealism advances from its pluralistic base to its final theistic position, in which the world-ground is also teleologically conceived. Sympathetic *rapport* implies unity in the plurality, and unity implies a unifying principle, and the unifying principle is best stated not in the abstract terms characteristic of absolutist systems but in terms of that conative unity, that striving after the realization of ends, which is given at once in the most simple and the most complex individual experience; and in terms, moreover, of conscious and self-conscious activity, according to the teleological principle of the interpretation of the lower by the higher. Further, if we describe the world-ground as an ultimate self-conscious will, we are not to think of it, as in absolute idealism, as a purely immanent principle. Though God gives unity or system to the plurality of monads, He is not Himself the unity in which they subsist. There is a principle of distinction in a self-conscious mind, in virtue of which it belongs to itself and does not merely enter into other selves. So it is that G. Galloway,[1] *e.g.*, presses to a theistic conclusion.

(*c*) The map of reality consists, according to this theistic argument, of simple monads interacting within a common medium or environment, which is grounded in a transcendent self-conscious will. It is claimed that the theory offers a better key to the understanding of unity and individuality than absolute idealism or natural realism can supply. It is a brave attempt at any rate (and this is our particular point) to justify the teleological view of the universe on metaphysical grounds. Whether it yields too much to the voluntaristic psychology we do not pretend to judge; but we appreciate its consistency with the theism of the moral and religious consciousness, in which the teleological character of the world is felt.

'At the heart of religion and morality,' says Siebeck, 'is the feeling that the existence and development of the world is not an indifferent matter, but is designed to realise a highest Good.'[2]

When therefore ethical theism, with its religious conception of God as the absolutely good, is set beside the metaphysical theism of the pluralistic approach to reality, it seems possible to state a conclusion in terms such as these. (1) In the language of philosophy: though individual existences and personal spirits have a being for themselves and are variously endowed with spontaneity, the development of experience remains in the control of the world-ground. (2) In the language of theology: though the actions of the creature are not absolutely foreordained or predestinated but manifest spontaneity and freedom in various degrees, they fall within the providential government of God. (3) In the language both of philosophy and of theology, and in Galloway's concluding words, if the world have its ground in a self-conscious and ethical will, which comprehends and sustains all the individual centres of experience, faith in a providential order of things is sufficiently justified.[3]

6. Teleology of deism.—(*a*) While it may be said from the humanist side that the development of the universe is towards the goal of spiritual personality, it is difficult to conceive of the world-process *sub specie æternitatis*. The deistic conception of it, however, is an easy target for criticism. Its view of the world has been described as 'neterotelic.' The world is regarded as a sphere of divine purpose, but divine purpose is as it were imposed upon it from without. There is an inherent dualism in this, as J. S. Mill realized.

(*b*) In the traditional form of the 'argument from design,' where the setting is deistic, the divine Artificer fashioned the world to its present form out of an already given matter; or else, as in the ecclesiastical doctrine, the matter was first created out of nothing by divine power, then shaped by divine wisdom and beneficence. But this initial dissociation of matter and form is inconceivable, and has been 'as much a bugbear as a chimæra.'[1] The idea of external adaptation should be replaced by that of internal or immanent purpose. God is not beyond or even alongside His world, says a truer theism; He is within it as immanent life, will, intelligence.

(*c*) In the sphere of history, as in the sphere of nature, the deistic teleology is also superficial and inadequate. Its language, if not inappropriate in the world of concrete relationships in which religion lives and moves, can hardly be literally applied in philosophy. It looks upon God as a moral governor who imposes His laws upon man after the fashion of an earthly potentate. But, says a truer theism again, the divine laws are not externally imposed, but are immanent in man's heart and conscience; and the divine providence is not exercised *ab extra*, but is an immanent righteousness working in and through free human agency.

(*d*) May we not say that the end or purpose of God in nature and history is His self-manifestation or self-communication to personal self-conscious individuals capable of a spiritual response to Him whereby His own life receives enrichment? But, even in so saying, we speak in the manner of men in terms of time rather than eternity.

7. The purgation of purpose.—(*a*) With the deepening of its philosophical interpretation, the teleology of theism loses undoubtedly much of its traditional and popular meaning, but a substantial meaning may remain. The finite element of contrivance, with external adaptation of means to end, may rightly fall away from the idea of purpose as applied to the nature of the infinite experience. No part of the world is then in danger of being handed over, as virtually in deistic theology, to mechanical necessity; and the inorganic becomes essentially related or adapted to the organic, and both inorganic and organic to the whole cosmic process. It is the strength of idealistic interpretation that it can thus dispense in the cosmic reference with the 'theistic Demiurge'[2] and associate itself with what has been called an 'autotelic' view of the world-process. When purpose is no longer thought of as superinduced in creation and providence upon particular events of the world, but is intimately applied to the world in its totality, we learn to appreciate Kant's ideal of nature as a complete teleological system, in which for the intuitive or perceptive understanding the distinction of means and end is transcended, and the whole appears as the unity of its members and the members as the differentiation of the whole.[3]

(*b*) If the notions of contrivance and external adaptation are to be dismissed as unduly anthropomorphic, is the notion of a preconceived plan to be retained, or is the so-called plan but the nature or process of the whole? It would be easier for the personal idealist or theistic pluralist to retain the notion than for the absolutist. It was the

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914, pp. 402–456.
[2] *Ueber Freiheit, Entwicklung, und Vorsehung*, 1911, p. 45 (quoted by Galloway, p. 439).
[3] Galloway, pp. 447–449.

[1] Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 70.
[2] Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 133.
[3] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 328.

conviction that God cannot be regarded, except by the logical imagination, as devising schemes and selecting methods that led Spinoza, from his standpoint of abstract monism or singularism, to repudiate the principle of human analogy altogether and to deny of God the faculties of intellect and will. These, as being exercised in the outcarrying of finite plans and purposes, could not be predicated of the eternal Being. There is danger as well as truth in such a position, but what we are here concerned to say is that Spinoza's views are not incompatible with the essential idea of teleology. He denounces externalism and anthropocentrism, but none the less he looks upon the world as a significant whole, necessitated indeed, but necessitated by the divine nature itself, which is the nature of the whole.

'It is the idea,' says Pringle-Pattison, 'of the divine necessity as a self-affirmed life, and not as a blind force acting within the universe like a fate which it undergoes, that constitutes the differentia between a theistic and a non-theistic doctrine.'[1]

(*c*) In support of Spinoza's objection to the notion of a pre-existent cosmic plan, it is pointed out that the conception of purpose therein involved is even inapplicable to human action of the highest kind, such as moral conduct or artistic production. We may therefore grant it to A. D. Lindsay,[2] a sympathetic interpreter of Bergson, that, if the world is a purposive system, it possesses a unity or individuality in time as well as in space. Apparently such a consideration lies behind Bergson's rejection of radical finalism—such as Leibniz's—as being only an inverted mechanism, as implying that things and beings realize a programme previously arranged ('*Tout est donné*'). To postulate the totality of the real as thus complete in the beginning is to make time (*q.v.*) of no account. If time *does* nothing, it *is* nothing. Yet, according to Bergson, time—not abstract spatialized time but concrete time or real duration (*la durée*)—is the very substance of our world, and there is no stuff more substantial or more resistant.

(*d*) The force of what Bergson here essentially contends for is acknowledged by idealistic thinkers. If the course of the world is preformed and predetermined—'the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago'[3]—there is indeed not much to choose between naturalism and idealism. In this connexion it is significant that naturalism and idealism, like fatalism and predestinarianism, often meet and, like righteousness and peace, kiss each other. It is also significant that the crusade of spiritual pluralism, in its various forms, against the absolutist systems is for the redemption of the spiritual values sold by them—'treacherously sold,' says F. C. S. Schiller[4]—into the bondage of naturalism. If then we abandon radical finalism with its illusion of preformation and predeterminism, shall we say that 'the history of the universe is the history of a great adventure'? So C. F. D'Arcy[5] puts it, in sympathy with the Bergsonian view.

(*e*) Where idealism differs from Bergsonism, if not from Bergson himself, is in holding that the adventure is not in the experience of the absolute but in the experience or from the standpoint of the finite subject. Moreover, for a theistic idealism there are bounds to the scope of the adventure. The theistic universe is fundamentally ethical. It is the very heart and core of theistic faith that an eternal purpose of good is working itself out in the world. In terms of modern Christian theology, the world is the scene of the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

(*f*) It is but to state the complementary side of this faith to affirm that the world must possess value and real existence for the divine experience, and that into the divine experience the time-process must enter somehow. The purpose which God possesses in Himself is independent of time, which is not as in Bergsonism an ultimate reality, yet it is somehow connected with the time-process in which it is being realized. How time is retained and yet transcended in God we do not know, nor can we. Yet we are not without a clue. In mystical contemplation and in artistic enjoyment the sense of time, as we are told, may almost vanish from the consciousness; and it is claimed that the life of the philosopher or artist bears in this respect some kind of analogy to the divine life. It is at least suggestive of the idea for which Pringle-Pattison contends, that purposive activity is the concrete reality and time only the abstract form.[1] If this be so, then Bosanquet's criticism of teleology, in the sense of 'aiming at the unfulfilled,' is so far met. Such a teleology, he says, gives undue importance to time and to the last term of a time-sequence.[2] But, says Pringle-Pattison:

'The last term is only important because in it is most fully revealed the nature of the principle which is present throughout. It is precisely this linkage of the first term with the last and, to that extent, the transcendence of the mere time-sequence in the conception of an eternal reality, that seems to me to be expressed by the profound Aristotelian idea of τέλος or End.'[3]

(*g*) The question may be raised here whether the purpose that may be attributed to the infinite ground of the universe is to be regarded as conscious or unconscious. On this question Bergson would appear to range himself in the succession of Schopenhauer (*q.v.*) and von Hartmann,[4] with this difference that for them the gates of the future are closed. Undoubtedly the *via media* of unconscious purpose avoids the difficulty of explaining how one self-consciousness may exist within another, the finite within the infinite, but it possesses inherent difficulties of its own. It has to account for inorganic arrangement and process, and for the transition from the unconscious to the conscious and self-conscious, nor can it explain the reason why the vital impetus should tend in one direction rather than another.

'If,' as W. R. Sorley says, summing up an illuminating discussion, 'purpose be admitted as necessary for the interpretation of organisms, and if organisms are held to have arisen out of inorganic material, then there is good reason to postulate that the process which led to organic and purposive life was itself animated by purpose,' not individual nor merely racial purpose, but universal purpose acting, moreover, not 'after the fashion of impulse' but 'in the manner of mind or consciousness.'[5]

This theistic postulate of universal conscious purpose is to be justified in face of the facts of dysteleology,[6] yet it appears a more reasonable postulate than that of unconscious purpose, and more hospitable too of human experience in the realms of fact and value.

8. Teleology and value.—The category of end or purpose, when purged of its finite incidents of preconceived plan and external adaptation of means to end, tends to pass into the category of worth or value (*q.v.*). In the teleological view of the universe the end, which is the nature of the whole, is an ethical end worthy of being purposed, *i.e.* worthy, so to speak, of enlisting the desire

1 *Idea of God*, p. 340.
2 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911–12, p. 241.
3 W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1890, i. 453, quoted by Pringle-Pattison, p. 367.
4 *Humanism*[2], London, 1912, p. xxv.
5 *God and Freedom in Human Experience* (*Donnellan Lectures*), London, 1915, p. 217.

1 Pringle-Pattison, p. 358.
2 *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 135 ff.
3 P. 332.
4 See art. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.
5 *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 426 f.
6 Cf. Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*[5], 2 vols., Eng. tr. London, 1905, i. 86–88.

and effort of the Absolute. And may we not attribute desire and effort—conative activity—to God? May we not say that in the Infinite Experience conation and its correlative satisfaction are to be found, that, as Bosanquet[1] strikingly puts it, 'the contradiction of a conation co-existing with fruition must somehow be realized'? It seems to us that we must say this if the world is to be regarded as truly a 'vale of soul-making,' in which Providence rules and not fate, the concurrence of the living God and not the eternal decree, and in which spiritual values are created and realized. It is our belief that God is thus present and active in the process of the world, and that the true image of Him is not the pre-existent Creator of the deistic theology, nor the static timeless Absolute of acosmic pantheism, but the eternal Redeemer of the religious consciousness.

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WILLIAM FULTON.

TELEPATHY.—Telepathy, 'feeling from afar,' is a term coined by F. W. H. Myers, on the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, to express the apparently supernormal transmission of information from mind to mind in 'thought-transference' experiments and the like, just as 'telæsthesia' was suggested to cover the alleged facts of clairvoyance and clairaudience. It was defined as 'communication between one mind and another otherwise than through the known channels of the senses.' As thus defined, the notion was in the first place not free from vagueness. For, as a certain amount of hyperæsthesia of the known senses was admitted to occur under exceptional conditions, and this could be so extended as to amount to miracle, while it yet in a way explained away miracle, it was not clear how hyperæsthesia was related to 'telepathy.' Secondly, the definition was essentially negative, a declaration of ignorance, which suggested no agency or adequate cause for the phenomena it described. Now this was neither satisfactory nor a very strong or stable position logically. Even if the difficulty about the limits of hyperæsthesia is not raised, and if it is admitted that the possibilities of communication through the senses may be taken as fairly completely explored, we are impelled to develop such a definition in one of two directions. We may imagine some unknown sort of vibration, radiation, or 'brain-wave,' as a physical explanation of the phenomena alleged, undeterred by the facts that no positive support has yet been found for any such agency, and that, unlike physical forces, it would appear to be indifferent to distance; or else we may conceive telepathy as essentially psychic in its nature, and shall then tend to exalt it into a fundamental 'law' of spiritual being, as Myers himself subsequently inclined to do. But, so conceived, it is manifestly a challenge to further exploration of the spiritual world of which it claims to be a law; and yet it proves rather a double-edged weapon for believers in a spiritual world. It enables them indeed to hold that every mind, incarnate or discarnate, may in principle communicate directly with any other by telepathy; but it seems to formulate this possibility so broadly as to render it almost impossible for a discarnate mind to authenticate itself by communicating information. For any verifiable information must normally be, or have been, known to incarnate minds; and, if any living mind can 'tap' any other, and if knowledge can 'leak' subconsciously from any mind to any other, and still more if we entertain the somewhat fanciful but not unsupported hypothesis that all knowledge may be pooled in a vast 'cosmic reservoir' before it bubbles up in individual minds, the telepathic hypothesis can evidently be used to discredit nearly all the *prima facie* evidence in favour of 'spirit-communication.' Accordingly the opponents of this belief have made great play with it, even while holding also that the evidence for telepathy is itself insufficient to establish it as a *vera causa*.[1] This objection the believers endeavour to meet in various ways. They point out rightly that, if telepathy is a fundamental psychic law, it cannot be restricted in its operations to living minds. They argue, however, that unrestricted telepathy between incarnate minds, and such alone, is antecedently improbable, and quite unsubstantiated. Lastly, they try to develop methods of experimentation which avoid this objection, because the information communicated, though verifiable *ex post facto*, can be shown never to have been, as a whole, in the possession of any living mind. Hence the importance of 'cross-correspondences' between the information received through several channels and dovetailing into a coherent message; by this method some striking successes have been recorded, though different minds will long continue to vary widely in the estimation of their weight. Again, certain sorts of prediction may baffle explanation by telepathy. At present, however, no agreement, either about the nature of telepathy or about the degree to which it may be taken as a fact in nature, can be said to exist. More evidence is still required, and, until it is obtained, opinions will be determined not so much by the evidence itself as by the bias with which it is regarded.

The existing evidence is usually classified under the heads (*a*) *experimental* and (*b*) *spontaneous*. The former includes the evidence of hypnotization at a distance, recorded especially by Gibert and

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911–12, p. 251.

[1] Cf. art. PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

Pierre Janet, and experiments at close quarters, though without contact between the 'percipient' and the 'agent,' in guessing such things as cards and numbers, in reproducing diagrams and figures, etc. The transition to the 'spontaneous' evidence is mediated by a few rare cases in which the experimental projection of a phantasm is attested, on the strength of which it becomes possible to conceive the ordinary 'ghost' as an apparition telepathically projected by the dying or the dead. In all these cases the transfer of information has an emotional interest which is generally lacking in experiments of the first class, and this may conceivably account for their apparent capacity to override the obstacle of distance, which conspicuously differentiates them from the former. Still it should be remembered that to ascribe these phenomena to telepathy is a hypothesis which is possible only if telepathy is established independently by experimental evidence. Accordingly it is on this that the real stress falls. Now, as regards this evidence, it may be said in general that its character is very similar to that for other supernormal phenomena. Much of it is bad, some respectable, none beyond cavil. Its quality is not better than that of the best evidence for some of the most extreme phenomena, such as 'materializations.' It is liable, moreover, to the same or similar sources of error, fraud (in the shape of codes, collusion, and mendacity), mal-observation, lapses of attention, errors of memory, coincidence. The ultimate reason for these defects is that there plainly does not exist as yet any real experimental control of the phenomena and their conditions, so that the evidence cannot be accumulated at will, crucial experiments cannot be made, and the pragmatic test cannot be used to *apply* the doctrine of the direct intercommunication of minds and to distinguish the real from the alleged phenomena. As, however, this sort of situation occurs commonly enough in the beginnings of a science and sometimes lasts for centuries, it is no disproof of the reality of what is now provisionally called 'telepathy'; it may well be dispersed by pertinacious and concerted investigation, and in any case the matter should not be left in its present ambiguity.

LITERATURE.—This is largely the same as given in artt. PSYCHICAL RESEARCH and SPIRITISM. There may be mentioned in addition E. Boirac, *La Psychologie inconnue*[2], Paris, 1912, and *L'Avenir des sciences psychiques*, do. 1917, Eng. tr., *Our Hidden Forces* and *The Psychology of the Future*, New York and London, 1918; the art. by F. C. Hansen and A. Lehmann in *Philosophische Studien*, xi. [1895] pt. 4, 'Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern'; E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, London and New York, 1897; J. E. Coover, *Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior University*, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A., 1917; L. T. Troland, *A Technique for the Experimental Study of Telepathy and other Alleged Clairvoyant Processes*, 1917. All but the first of these attack the historical evidence, with some success, while the last two confess also (almost) complete failure in repeating the card- and number-guessing experiments of the Society for Psychical Research.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

TELUGU-SPEAKING PEOPLES.—See DRAVIDIANS.

TEMPERAMENT. — The doctrine of the temperaments is at once one of the earliest and one of the most persistent and popular efforts to classify the diversities of mental character in relation to bodily characteristics. It has always been recognized that there are broad differences of type in mind, and that some of these differences are inborn, and, practically at least, unmodified throughout life. It was natural that these should be looked for mainly in the feelings and emotions, which appear both more dependent upon the bodily constitution and less under individual control than either cognition or will. The temperament is accordingly a permanent disposition to certain forms or degrees of feeling, so far as such disposition is dependent on the inherited organic constitution. The number of temperaments has been variously given as two, three, four, six, eight, and even much larger numbers, but on the whole the classic 'four' has held the field down to our own day, as if it corresponded in some mysterious way to some ultimate differences in mind or body, or both.

This number was derived originally from the four elements of Empedocles, fire, earth, water, and air, and the four qualities, warm and cold, dry and moist; on these in turn was formed Hippocrates' theory of the four cardinal humours of the body—blood, corresponding to air, warm and moist; phlegm to water, cold and moist; yellow bile to fire, warm and dry; and black bile to earth, cold and dry. From these came through Galen the names of the main temperaments, *sanguine*, *phlegmatic*, *choleric*, and *melancholic*. Occasionally physiologists have suggested other terms for the phlegmatic and the melancholic, as 'lymphatic' and 'nervous,' lymph and nerve being at least known constituents of the body;[1] but the names as well as the number of the old four have kept their ground. For the Greeks the temperament meant a mixture or union of the four elements, qualities, or humours; where this contained a certain ideal proportion of each, there was bodily and mental health; where an excessive degree of one or more, or an excessive defect, there was distemper or disease. There should therefore have been only one ideal temperament, and a large variety of *in*temperaments,[2] but actually the four temperaments were regarded as falling within the limits of health and as implying only a slight predominance of one or other of the four qualities. With the progress of physiology, the physical basis of the temperaments underwent a series of changes in the conception of the theorists; first the mixture was sought in the blood itself, as conveying nutriment to all the tissues of the body—*e.g.*, the proportion of fibrin to fluid in the blood, the width of the vessels, the porousness of their walls and of those of the tissues; then stress was laid on the tissues of the body themselves, and especially the nervous tissue, its strength and its excitability (Haller); and finally on the more delicate qualities of the nerves as shown in intensity, and in rate, persistence, etc., of impression and of reaction. Here we are probably nearest to the truth, since it is with the nervous system that mental qualities and degrees are most directly correlated, but it must be admitted that we have no really scientific knowledge as yet of the precise relation of one to the other.

The problem may be approached from another side by considering the actual characterization or description of the four temperaments, the psychical qualities which each reveals; these are inferred of course from the behaviour, more especially the emotional expressions and the reactions of the will upon impressions; and here also there has been a constant tendency to simplify by seeking the main features of the temperaments in two pairs of mutually opposed characters, such as receptivity and spontaneity; change and persistence; feeling and action; pleasure and pain, etc. The most satisfactory of these psychological accounts is that of Wundt, based on the strength or weakness, and on the quick or slow rate of change in feeling and in mental life generally.[3] Strong and quick is the choleric temperament; strong and slow, the melancholic; weak and quick, the sanguine; weak and slow, the phlegmatic.

[1] Henle, *Anthropolog. Vorträge*, i. 108.
[2] Volkmann, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*[4], i. 207 f.
[3] Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*[5], iii 637.

As E. B. Titchener has put it, 'the man who thinks quickly and feels strongly, is choleric, the man who thinks quickly and feels weakly, sanguine. The phlegmatic thinks slowly and feels weakly, the melancholic thinks slowly and feels deeply.'[1]

The classification does not adequately explain, however, the fact that the feelings of the sanguine are predominantly cheerful or pleasant, those of the melancholic predominantly painful or gloomy; and Höffding has suggested another pair of temperaments, or another division—'the bright and the dark temperament'—in order to explain 'the tendency to one or other of the two great opposites of the life of feeling, which gives colour and direction to the whole disposition.'

'This opposition is more fundamental than that upon which the other four temperaments are based, for it has its root in the fundamental conditions for the preservation of the individual organism.'[2]

More recently an interesting attempt to analyse the dominant characteristics by experimental methods has been given by Narziss Ach;[3] he finds that it is mainly on the strength or weakness of the 'determination,' along with the persistence or rapid falling away of the determining force, that the feelings, the associations, and generally the whole mental life depend; accordingly he makes these characters the basis of his five temperaments—for he adds a fifth, the *reflective* (*besonnene*) temperament.

Whatever the ultimate characters may be, mental or physical, they must be such as exercise a decisive influence on the whole life, inner and outer, of the individual. The facts that the pure temperament is rare; that it makes, as Volkmann says, 'an almost uncanny impression,' when it does appear; that most of us are of 'mixed' temperament (however illogical such mixture may be); that the old terms have lost all meaning, and that the scientific analysis is still to seek—these facts, which have led many psychologists to drop the doctrine of the temperaments altogether, do not dispose of the existence of broad and deep differences of mental type, mainly in the spheres of feeling and action, for which *some* names, and a scientific analysis, must be found.

The organism, through the afferent nerves, sends from its every part a stream of influence to the brain; to the functions of every tissue there correspond impressions and feelings which may or may not reach or effect separate consciousness, but which produce a mass-effect in the cœnæsthesia, or organic sensibility, and in the general feeling-tone which corresponds to it. This is the basis of the self-feeling: it is the inner or subjective aspect of the temperament. There is, as Henle says, a *tonus*, or degree of tension, in every nerve, even when the muscles which it contracts or the sense-organs from which it is impressed are 'at rest'; it differs in degree in different individuals; for each individual it varies from time to time, under varying conditions of health, fatigue, etc., but there is a relatively constant value for each below which it does not fall, so long as the nerves have life. Where the tension is high, response of feeling and action will be energetic and rapid; where it is weak, or low, response will be feeble and slow. The *tonus* is the physiological fact corresponding to the mass-feeling—vague and indefinite as it necessarily is—out of which the different moods of the individual, and his emotions, his passions, down to the simplest feelings of sensory pleasure and 'unpleasure,' emerge like waves on the sea. Like all feelings, the temperamental feeling is both an index of bodily condition and a cause of bodily expression and action; like all feelings, it influences alike the intensity, the quality, and the course of thought. Hence the detailed descriptions of character which we find in the older and even in some of the later writers on temperament are not without interest.

Johannes Müller,[1] who regards the *phlegmatic* as the highest type—the ideal temperament—finds that in such a man, with a well-developed intelligence, his phlegm enables him to accomplish results impossible to others, even with their livelier feelings and desires; easily retaining control of himself, he cannot be induced to acts 'of which he would repent on the morrow'; he can calculate in all security the chances of the success of what he undertakes; in danger, at the decisive moment, he is master of himself, wherever it is not a question of sudden decision and energy; 'he feels his ills little, and bears them patiently, nor is he much moved by those of others'; speed and quickness of choice often give others an advantage over him; but, 'when he has time before him, he arrives quietly at the goal, while others, heaping mistakes upon mistakes, are lost in endless side-issues.' On the other hand, Müller finds that the species of phlegm characterized by laziness, apathy, insensibility, irresolution, ennui, slowness of intellect, and the like, is not the true type, but a pathological form. The *choleric* has a remarkable power of action, both in energy and in persistence, under the influence of passion; his passions inflame at the least obstacle; his pride, his jealousy, his desire of vengeance, his thirst for domination, know no bounds, as long as his passion moves him. He reflects little, acts without hesitation, on the spur of the moment, because he is convinced that he is right, and above all because such is his will. He rarely turns aside from error, but follows the course of his passion to his own ruin and that of others. With the *sanguine*, pleasure is the dominant tendency, along with great excitability, and a short duration of any mood. Sympathetic and friendly to others, but without persistence or constancy; quick to anger, but equally quick to regret; prodigal of promises, but equally ready to forget them; credulous and confident, he loves to make plans, which he soon lays aside; indulgent to the faults of others, he claims the same indulgence for his own; easy to appease, frank, open, amiable, sociable, incapable of interested calculation. With the *melancholic*, sadness is the prevailing tendency; his excitability is equal to that of the sanguine, but disagreeable sensations are both more frequent and more durable than those of pleasure. The sufferings of others call out his sympathy to a high degree; for himself he is fearful, undecided, distrustful; a trifle wounds and offends him; the slightest obstacle discourages him, and renders him incapable of reasoning to overcome it; his thoughts are full of melancholy, and his sufferings appear to him beyond all consolation.

In their *Psychology in the Schoolroom*[2] T. F. G. Dexter and A. H. Garlick venture to describe, on behalf of teachers—for whom it is necessary to know their pupils' temperaments—not only the mental but also the external physical appearance of the types. The *sanguine*, lively, excitable, quickly but not deeply roused, with feeling generally uppermost in his character, has the circulatory and respiratory systems well developed, has red hair, blue eyes, skin fair, and face animated. The *choleric*, self-reliant and confident, with will uppermost, has the muscular system well developed, hair and eyes dark, complexion sometimes sallow, face impassive. The *phlegmatic* or lymphatic, mind heavy and torpid, sometimes nearly stupid, patient, self-reliant, and slow, has the abdomen large, face round and expressionless, lips thick, body generally disinclined to exertion. Finally the sentimental (i.e. *melancholic*), with great love of poetry, music, and nature, and marked indifference to the practical affairs of life, has the head large, eyes bright and expressive, figure slender and delicate, movements quick.

It may be doubted whether teachers would be well advised to guide their treatment by such physical characters as these, when noted in their pupils. Nor has the attempt been very successful to look in the different temperaments for predisposition to certain diseases of the body. It is, however, antecedently probable, and appears to be confirmed by experience, that different temperaments are liable to different forms of insanity; at least it is true that in insanity the differences of temperament are as clearly marked as in health.

As in drunkenness one man is 'talkative and boastful,' another 'maudlin,' another 'tetchy and violent,' another 'melancholy and silent'; so 'the lunatic of sanguine temperament . . . is puffed up and vain, his dreams are of marble halls and flattering voices; the choleric patient suspects everywhere the plots of his enemies, and hears voices insulting him or urging him to deeds of violence; and whilst his hallucinations are more often auditory than visual, the contrary is the case with the

[1] *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 233.
[2] *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., p. 350.
[3] *Ueber den Willensakt und das Temperament*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 312 ff.

[1] *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, French tr.[3], ii. 557.
[2] London, 1905, p. 343.

melancholic, and especially, as the name implies, with religious "visionaries."'[1]

It is especially in the melancholic, nervous, or, as it is called in extreme cases, the 'neurotic' temperament that the tendency to insanity is marked. T. S. Clouston gives a striking description of the modern phase of this temperament.

'The man of this temperament is in body small, shapely, tending towards a dark complexion, thin skin, with delicate features, a well-shaped head, a quick, bright, restless eye; in figure small and wiry, nervous, highly strung and sensitive, feeling pain keenly and tolerating it badly, subject to dyspepsia and insomnia. His muscles are incessantly active. He is quick in mind and body, imaginative, keen, sensitive, ever alert, fine in the grain, subtle, fond of intellectual work, not always resolute in decision because he sees there are two sides to every question, often artistic in feeling, ambitious, and with an ill-concealed contempt for fools. When run down, this man is "ill to do with." When he grows old he gets thin, dyspeptic, irritable, and often neuralgic. The diseases he is specially subject to are nervous and mental.'[2]

In religious psychology also the temperaments are of considerable importance, owing to the great suggestibility of some (the sanguine and melancholic) as compared with others, the greater excitability of the sanguine and choleric, the brooding tendency of the melancholic or nervous, the insusceptibility of the phlegmatic, and the excessive self-centring of the sanguine and choleric.[3]

The relative permanence of the temperament in the individual is not inconsistent with some gradual change over long periods of time, although there is no doubt that the temperament is that part of our mental and physical endowment which requires greatest effort or most violent and prolonged change of circumstances to modify. It has been thought that broadly the different stages of individual development and of racial evolution are marked by differences of temperament. Childhood is sanguine, youth sentimental or nervous, mature age choleric, and old age phlegmatic. The temperaments of primitive races are less obvious, but they seem to move from the phlegmatic and choleric (Negroes, Malayans) to the melancholic and sanguine (Mongolian, Caucasian); in Europe we have the sanguine Frenchman, the choleric Spaniard or Italian, the phlegmatic Teuton, and the nervous Briton. Women on the whole are sanguine or nervous, men choleric or phlegmatic.[4] These are of course mere rough general impressions. It has also been remarked that there has been a change of fashion in temperaments, or in what has been regarded as the ideal temperament: at one time the sanguine, it became the dark and melancholic (in the days of Byron), later the phlegmatic or indifferent, to-day perhaps the choleric—the man of energy.[5] Character in the highest sense of the word is something very different from temperament; the latter has to do with the form and manner, the quantity and degree of mental life, character with its quality, the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic values which that life recognizes and pursues; temperament gives the foundation on which character must build—it sets the problems which the training and the making of character have to solve; whatever we may think therefore of the popular classification of the four temperaments, the individual differences themselves on which it is based—differences of sensitiveness to impressions and to feelings, of strength and quickness of reaction, of energy and endurance—are of the utmost importance. It is to such differences and their measurement that the modern individual psychology is directing its attention; and from it we may hope in time to obtain a scientific account of temperament.

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J. LEWIS MCINTYRE.

TEMPERANCE.—There is much difference of opinion among writers on moral theology as to the true relationship between the three virtues of sobriety, moderation, and temperance. Each has had its claims to be the archetypal virtue, which includes the others, advocated by representative writers; but there seem to be very strong reasons why temperance should be regarded as the inclusive virtue, the chief being that it has held a place from early times among the 'cardinal' or principal virtues. From the first, Plato seems to accept this grouping of virtues as based upon a current classification, and it passes through Aristotle and Stoics into Christian thought. The definition of temperance given by Cicero may be accepted as typical:

'Temperantia est rationis in libidinem, atque in alios non rectos impetus animi, firma et moderata dominatio. Ejus partes sunt, continentia, clementia, modestia.'[1]

Plato shows a tendency to identify 'temperance' with 'continence'; in *Rep.* iv. 430 E he defines *σωφροσύνη* as follows:

κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια.

Aristotle, however, defines the word as *μεσότης περὶ ἡδόνας* and distinguishes it from *ἐγκράτεια*. The temperate man (*σώφρων*), he says, does not feel the pressure of inordinate desires; the continent (*ἐγκρατής*) feels it, but holds desire in restraint.[2] So Cicero: 'Continentia est, per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur.'[3] In the NT the word *σωφροσύνη* occurs only in 1 Ti 2^{15} (*σώφρων* in 1 Ti 3^{2}, Tit 1^{8} $2^{2.5}$). *ἐγκράτεια* occurs in Ac 24^{25}, Gal 5^{23}, 2 P 1^{6}; *ἐγκρατεύομαι* in 1 Co 7^{9} 9^{25}; *ἐγκρατής* in Tit 1^{8}.

The general idea of temperance or moderation as an element in all virtue is peculiarly Greek, and it re-appears in Christianity.

'Temperance,' says Aquinas, 'is a cardinal virtue because that *moderation* which is common to all the virtues is peculiarly praiseworthy in the case of temperance.'[4]

This has been pointed out elsewhere.[5] It is perhaps most in accordance with modern ways of thinking to take as a basis the fact of personality and to consider the Christian as standing in a threefold relationship—to God, to his neighbour, and to himself. According to Augustine, there is a virtue corresponding to each of these relationships, as is implied in Tit 2^{12}, *ἵνα . . . σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν*.[6] Temperance is the form which

[1] E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, London, 1897, p. 188, quoting Paul Radestock, *Schlaf und Traum*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 209.

[2] *The Hygiene of Mind*, London, 1906, p. 66 f.

[3] See G. A. Coe, *The Spiritual Life: Studies in the Science of Religion*, New York, 1903; and E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*[2], London, 1901.

[4] See L. George, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, p. 136 ff., and Dexter and Garlick, *op. cit.*

[5] Volkmann[4], i. 211.

[1] *De Invent.* ii. 53. 164. [2] *Eth. Nic.* vii. 2. [3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli. art. 7, concl.; cf. Aug. *de Beata Vita*, 32: 'Modestia utique dicta est a modo, et a temperie temperantia. Ubi autem modus est atque temperies, nec plus est quidquam nec minus.'

[5] See art. MODERATION.

[6] Bern. *Serm.* 2 *in temp. Res.* 11, alludes to this passage: 'Haec enim tria sunt conversationis nostrae maxime necessaria: quoniam primum debemus nobis, secundum proximo, tertium Deo.'

true self-love, duty to self, necessarily takes. It is the spirit of discipline, or rather the spirit of love consecrating itself—body, soul, and spirit—to God.

The function of temperance 'consists in restraining and moderating the desires wherewith we yearn for those things which are apt to turn us away from God's laws.'[1]

Hence the virtue of temperance consists in the moderate and regulated use of those pleasures of sense, especially of touch and taste, which are most apt to draw the soul away from God, and to overthrow the supremacy of the rational faculty in man.[2] Temperance implies the control of appetite at those points where its demand is most importunate and difficult to resist. While 'moderation' (*modestia*) means self-control in matters of less difficulty, 'temperance' is concerned with the instincts and passions which in average human nature are the strongest and the least easy to restrain.

The following points seem to be worthy of special note.

1. The aim of the 'temperate' man is *positive*, not negative. He aims not merely at the subjugation of his lower nature, but at the cultivation of moral and spiritual power. Temperance is the virtue of the man of high ideals who strives to win a 'sovereign self-mastery.' It implies 'no monotonous restraint, but an ordered use of every gift.'[3] The temperate man faces life and uses its gifts and blessings in the temper of an athlete training for a contest (1 Co $9^{25f.}$) or of a soldier engaged in a campaign (2 Ti $2^{3ff.}$). He exercises self-control 'not only in cutting off superfluities but in allowing himself necessaries'[4]—watchful against any form of self-indulgence that may bring him under the power of the world or of his lower nature (1 Co 6^{12}). He is not hindered or overpowered by circumstances, but controls them; he makes them subservient to his spiritual progress; he passes through them upwards and onwards to God.

So Augustine describes temperance as 'that action whereby the soul with the aid of God extricates itself from the love of lower (created) beauty, and wings its way to true stability and firm security in God.'[5]

2. Temperance holds a very prominent place in the earliest Christian teaching (cf. Ac 24^{25}). In the *Acts of Thecla* the substance of St. Paul's teaching is described as λόγος θεοῦ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀναστάσεως. In the early Christian usage of the word ἐγκράτεια was probably identified with sexual purity, and was gradually extended to include any form of world-renunciation and mortification of the body.[6] The words ἐγκράτεια, ἐγκρατεύεσθαι occur frequently in Hermas, but already the tendency is to connote by them the temper of self-control or temperance in general.[7] It includes control of appetite in the sphere of sex, food, and drink; but also the temper of moderation in expenditure, of sobriety in judgment and self-esteem, of self-restraint in matters of speech, etc. There follows a list of virtues in respect of which δεῖ μὴ ἐγκρατεύεσθαι. According to Hermas, ἐγκράτεια is in fact an archetypal and inclusive virtue. It is coupled with ἀπλότης in *Vis.* ii. 3.[8] It has a saving virtue. The 'first commandment' is ἵνα φυλάξῃς τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὸν φόβον καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν.[9] Self-restraint is a fundamental duty because it is directly involved in that conflict between flesh and spirit which is the condition of our mortality and the occasion of moral victory or defeat. So Augustine asks:

'Cui peccato cohibendo non habemus necessariam continentiam, ne committatur? . . . Universaliter ergo continentia nobis opus est ut declinemus a malo.'[1]

3. Temperance or self-control forms part of 'the fruit of the Spirit' (Gal 5^{22}). 'Walk in the spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh.' As a gift or endowment of the Spirit it was supremely manifested in our Lord.

'Where,' asks Bernard, 'is temperance to be found if not in the life of Christ? Those alone are temperate who strive to imitate *His* life, . . . whose life is the mirror of temperance.'[2]

It is of self-control that Augustine is speaking when he exclaims, 'Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.'[3] The presence of the Spirit in man gives him liberty—the true freedom which consists not in following the impulses of the lower nature, but in fulfilling the will of God. Accordingly in Eph 5^{18} St. Paul seems to imply that the one infallible safeguard of temperance is the realization of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the soul.

4. The sin of intemperance is wrongly limited to one particular form of excess.[4] It may include want of restraint in work, in recreation, in intellectual speculation, in the pursuit of wealth or power, in the use of the faculty of speech. On this last point much stress is laid by some Christian moralists.[5] The fact is that the habit of loose, unrestrained speech paves the way for grave lapses from truth, purity, or good faith. It 'defiles the man' (Mt 15^{11}). It hinders or weakens that power of controlling 'the whole body' (Ja 3^2) which is essential to Christian perfection. St. James implies that the 'sovereign sway of the Christian conscience' must be exercised even in what seems a small sphere, and thence gradually extended to the whole field of human nature till man becomes 'Deo solo dominante liberrimus.'[6]

LITERATURE.—Augustine, *de Mor. Eccl.*, *de Continentia*, etc.; Ambrose, *de Off. Min.* i. 43; Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli.–cxliv.; J. Taylor, *Holy Living and Holy Dying*, London, 1847, ch. 2, § 2, *Sermons*, do. 1848, no. xvi. ('The House of Feasting,' pt. 2); B. F. Westcott, *Lessons from Work*, do. 1901, p. 289 ff.; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, bk. i. ch. vii. § 4; Stopford Brooke, *The Kingship of Love*, London, 1903, serm. x.

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TEMPLES.—A temple, in the original sense of the Latin word *templum*, meant a rectangular place marked out by the augur for the purpose of his observations, which were taken within a rectangular tent. An extended sense gave it the meaning of a consecrated place or building, of rectangular shape, 'inaugurated' by an augur. In this sense it was applied to the house of a god, though, strictly speaking, this meaning belonged to the *ædes*. In its primitive sense *templum* corresponds to the Gr. τέμενος, a place marked off as sacred to a god, in which a ναός, or house of the god, might be erected. As we shall see, an enclosed consecrated space often precedes an actual temple in our sense of the word, viz. the house of a god, a structure containing his image, and sometimes an altar, though not infrequently the altar stands outside the god's house (as in Greece) but within the sacred place, in the open air, as it did before any house for the god was erected. As images became more decorative and costly, it was natural to provide a house for them, though this might be done for a quite primitive image or even a fetish.[7] Less often, however, the chamber or house of the god contained no image; it was merely a place where he might invisibly dwell or which he might visit

1 Aug. *de Mor. Eccl.* 35.
2 Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli. art. 2.
3 Westcott, *Lessons from Work*, p. 271.
4 Bern. *de Consid.* i. 8.
5 *De Mus.* vi. 15. 50.
6 Cf. A. Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, i. 111.
7 See, *e.g.*, the list of things ἀφ' ὧν δεῖ τὸν δοῦλον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγκρατεύεσθαι in *Mand.* viii.
8 Cf. iii. 8, 'From faith is produced self-control; from self-control simplicity,' etc.
9 *Mand.* vi. 1.

1 *De Contin.* i. 17.
2 *In Cant.* 22. 11.
3 *Conf.* x. 29.
4 For temperance in drinking see artt. ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.
5 See, *e.g.*, Aug. *de Contin.* ii. 3; Ambrose, *de Off.* i. 2 and 3; Butler, *Serm.* 4.
6 Aug. *de Mor. Eccl.* xxi.
7 Cf. the African fetish-hut.

from time to time.[1] Where a god has his image in such a place, those of other divinities may also stand there or in subsidiary chambers connected with it. In the popular sense of the word, 'temple,' while it is connected with worship, is not usually a place within which the people worship. The priests alone enter it; the laity may worship only within the precincts, if even there. Temples vary from the simplest and smallest buildings, as they mostly were at first, to the most elaborate and vast structures.

In studying the origin of temples, no single source for all can be found, as this differs in different regions. Nomads could have no temples, though they might have tribal sacred places, or sacred tents carried in their wanderings. With the advent of a more fixed mode of life and permanent dwellings, a similar dwelling for the deity became necessary, as is seen in 2 S 7[2]. A variety of primitive temples is known, and it could have been only in the course of a long period of time that the more elaborate buildings came into existence, while, generally speaking, the intermediate stages are not always discoverable.

1. Origin of temples.—(*a*) *Sacred places.*—Among savages, and probably also among most groups of primitive men,[2] most of the rites of worship are carried on in the open air, sometimes because no images of divinities exist, or, where they do, they are not always enclosed within walls, and sometimes because spirits are regarded as connected with natural objects. Sacrifices are simply laid on sacred stones, or cast into the waters, or into the fire, or hung upon trees.[3] Worship takes place in the open air among many of the lowest tribes (Veddas, Australians, Mūndās and other Dravidian tribes, Melanesians, Sakai, and Jakun), as well as among tribes at a higher level (some American Indians, Lapps, Buriats, etc.). This is often the result of a nomadic life, yet even nomads carry sacred images with them[4] or have a tent for these or for other sacred things.[5] Such open places for worship tend to become sacred and to be preserved inviolate for cult purposes, and there images are set up.

Examples of this are found among the Sakai, Jakun, Mūndas, Fjort, and Indians of California.[6]

This is obviously necessary where a sacred tree or stone stands in such a place. Sometimes sacred places are associated with the traditional appearances of spirits, gods, or ancestors, and must therefore be holy for all time. The mere fact that a religious gathering takes place in a certain spot once is enough to give it sanctity, and the gathering becomes recurrent there. Such sacred places will usually be marked by images or symbols, or by boundary-stones forming an enclosure.[7] Single graves, often with a structure over them, and places of sepulture also become recognized places of cult.

The same preference for open-air worship in a recognized sacred place is found among the Chinese—*e.g.*, in the cult of the Altar of Heaven, which dates back to early times when the *genius loci* was worshipped at an altar under a tree.[8] The practice is also found in the primitive cult of the Indo-European races, as a result of their conceptions of deity, not dissimilar from those of savages. The sacred stone, the sacred tree or grove, the sacred spring, were places of cult and usually possessed an altar. The limits of the *τέμενος* were marked by boundary-stones, and within these stood an altar and a stone or post in which the deity resided. In early Indian worship there were no temples nor indeed permanent sacred places for cult—probably a result of earlier nomadic conditions prevailing after the people had become settled—and to some extent this is the case even now when temples have existed for centuries. So in early Rome there were holy places but no temples; and in ancient Persian religion there were neither images nor temples.[1] The custom and method of building temples were borrowed by the Romans first from the Etruscans and then from the Greeks. Teutons and Celts also worshipped first in the open air, and in their case the earlier cult is especially associated with the sacred tree or grove, though a spirit or god might be worshipped also on a mountain top, in a cave, or at a spring.[2] For the Gauls the evidence of Lucan is interesting in the passage where he describes a sacred grove near Massilia. The grove was tabu to the people; even the priest feared to walk there at midday or midnight, lest he should meet its sacred guardian. The trees were stained with sacrificial blood, but there were also altars, and the images of the gods were misshapen trunks of trees. The marvels of the grove are of a mythical kind.[3]

While sacred groves were general over the Celtic area, temples had begun to be built in both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul. The Boii had a temple in which were stored the spoils of war, and the Isubri (Isombri) had a similar temple.[4] Plutarch speaks of the temple where the Arverni hung Cæsar's sword, and Diodorus of 'temples and sacred places.'[5] The temple of the Samnite (Samnite) women, unroofed and re-roofed in a day, must have been a simple building.[6] In Gallo-Roman times elaborate temples were built after Roman models, as well as smaller shrines at sacred springs.[7]

Similar sacred groves existed among the Teutons, as many passages of Tacitus show.[8] 'What we figure to ourselves as a built and walled house, resolves itself, the farther back we go, into a holy place untouched by human hand, embowered and shut in by self-grown trees.'[9]

The use of the sacred grove continued during many centuries. But in these groves simple temples also stood, and are referred to by Tacitus, while sagas and later ecclesiastical writings speak of them, and the latter show that, when they were destroyed, a Christian church was often built on the site.[10]

The Latin names used for these are *fanum*, *casula*, and *templum*. The first was probably a mere hut in which stood the sacred image; the others were more elaborate buildings, whether of wood or of stone.[11]

The grove is thus a primitive holy place, which may have as an accessary a small structure for the image which later becomes a more elaborate temple. This worship in groves, which might become the seat of a temple, is also found among lower races.

The village shrine among the Dravidian tribes of India is an example. Under a sacred tree or grove stands a heap of stones or a mound; this may be replaced by a mud platform or a mud hut with a thatched roof, or by a small building of masonry with a domed roof and platform. These form an abode for the deity and are thus a primitive kind of temple.[12]

The early Semitic sanctuary was a sacred place associated with a theophany or with the continued presence of a spirit or divinity. This might be at a tree, a stone, on a hill, or in a cave.

These holy places were sacred territory enclosed by boundary stones or walls, with altar and *ashērāh*, or sacred pole. The 'high place,' or *bāmāh*, as its name denotes, was on a height, and in the enclosed space or court there were the altar, the *ashērāh*, and the *maṣṣēbhāh* (*q.v.*) the abode of the divinity), while connected with these were 'houses,' probably of the priests, which sometimes contained images (2 K 17[29]), though these were also enclosed in tents (2 K 23, Ezk 16[16]).[13] These houses or tents represent a primitive temple within the *bāmāh*, and, though no clear traces of actual temples have been met with in excavations, these may have been the origin of actual Canaanite temples such as those at El Berith and Gaza (Jg 9[46f.]

[1] Cf. the shrine or chapel of the god on the summit of the Babylonian *ziqqurat*, and the Jewish Temple.
[2] But see § 1 (*c*) below.
[3] For American Indian instances see J. R. Swanton, in *HAI* ii. 405.
[4] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 186.
[5] See § 1 (*c*) below, and cf. the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.'
[6] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 197; *ERE* iii. 144[a], viii. 362[b], ix. 2[a], 281[b].
[7] Hose-McDougall, ii. 7, 15; artt. LAPPS, § 7, LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES, § 3 (*a*), (*d*).
[8] See art. ALTAR (Chinese).

[1] Herod. i. 131; J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (*HL*), London, 1913, pp. 53, 225, 391.
[2] Cf. J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, iv. 1309.
[3] Lucan, *Pharsalia*, iii. 399 f.
[4] Livy, xxiii. 24; Polybius, ii. 32.
[5] Plut. *Cæsar*, 26; Diod. Sic. v. 27.
[6] Strabo, IV. iv. 6. [7] See art. CELTS, § XIV. 1.
[8] *Germ.* 9, 39 f., *Ann.* ii. 12, iv. 73.
[9] Grimm, i. 69; cf. art. OLD PRUSSIANS, § 4 (*c*).
[10] Tac. *Ann.* i. 51, *Germ.* 40; Grimm, i. 80 ff.; B. Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, London, 1851–52, i. 260; G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 403.
[11] Thorpe, i. 212; Grimm, i. 292.
[12] W. Crooke, *The N.W. Provinces of India*, London, 1897, pp. 236, 244 f., 249, *Natives of N. India*, do. 1907, p. 236; artt. DRAVIDIANS (N. India), § 27, BENGAL, § 9, ORAONS, § 7; cf. E. B. Tylor, ii. 223 f.
[13] A tent was used as a sanctuary in the temple of Beltis at Harran, and elsewhere (D. A. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 33), and by the Carthaginians as a portable shrine (Diod. Sic. XX. 65).

16[29]), probably consisting of an outer hall and an inner sanctuary for the image. The tents referred to resemble that provided for the Ark by David (2 S 6[17]), though it had previously been kept in some kind of building (1 S 3[3-15]; cf. 2 S 7[6f.]), just as there were family or tribal houses of a god (Jg 17[5] 18[18. 30f.]). Remains of simple Phœnician temples suggest Egyptian influence; they are little more than a *cella*, rectangular, but open in front.[1]

Examples of 'high places' among other races are found among the Aleuts and Bhils,[2] while they existed also in primitive Greek religion, and indeed wherever a cult was carried on on hilltops.

(*b*) *Shrines at graves.*—The grave as a sacred place may be another point of departure for the temple, when it is associated with a structure—though it be no more than an enclosing wooden fence with shrubs, as among the Tami of New Guinea[3]—where a cult is carried on. Sometimes an altar is placed over a grave, as with the Mayans and possibly the Nicaraguans,[4] and by the Chinese for the half-yearly sacrifice to the spirits of the dead.[5] Sometimes a series of memorial stones is erected, not always, however, over a grave, like the menhirs and dolmen-like structures of the Khāsis,[6] the stone circles with a rectangular niche in their circumference found in Algeria, the rectangular, elliptical, or circular groups of stones in Syria,[7] and the stone circles in Britain, varying in size and elaboration up to that at Stonehenge.[8]

These circles, long regarded without evidence as 'Druidical temples,' were probably connected with a cult of the dead in pre-Celtic times, and so were a kind of temple, like the Fijian *nanga* presently to be referred to. Some have regarded such a circle as that of Stonehenge as a temple dedicated to the sun or other heavenly bodies.[9]

Akin to these are the sacred stone enclosures, or *nanga*, of the Fiji islanders, now existing only as ruins.

These formerly presented the form of a rough parallelogram enclosed by flat upright stones, divided into three compartments by cross walls called respectively the little, great, and sacred *nanga*, the last enclosing the sacred *kava* bowl. Trees stood round the enclosure, and outside, beyond the sacred *nanga*, was the *vale tambu* ('sacred house'), a bell-roofed hut. Here the foreskins of youths circumcised on behalf of a sick parent were offered to ancestral gods with prayers for the patient's recovery. In the *nanga* 'the ancestral spirits are to be found by their worshippers, and thither offerings are taken on all occasions when their aid is to be invoked,' and here firstfruits are presented to them. They were also used in the elaborate initiation ceremonies, the object of which was the introduction of the candidates to the ancestral spirits.[10]

Where large chambered tombs exist, as they do in many parts of the world, they have been used for worship of the dead, either at the time of the burial or at stated intervals thereafter. To this extent, therefore, they form temples, and sometimes they contain a conventional image of the dead like the human figures roughly sculptured on the walls of rock-hewn tombs in France.[11] The structures built over graves may be no more than large huts, of logs and thatch, like those built over the graves of kings and chiefs among the Banyoro and Baganda, but these are regarded as temples, with priests and attendants, where the spirits of the dead are consulted.[12]

In Fiji certain temples of a primitive kind are associated with graves and with the cult of the *kalouyalo*, or ancestor-gods.[13] Not unlike these are the huts of reed and grass built over the graves of chiefs in pre-historic Egypt, where offerings were made. They gave place to mud houses, and these again to structures of stone. Of the latter the *maṣṭaba* had a chamber for the statue of the deceased and a tablet for offerings. Funerary chapels were part of the tomb-structure, but, where pyramids were built, this chapel or temple was erected outside the pyramid, and in it gifts and offerings were made. Sometimes they developed into large temples, which, like the smaller funerary chapels, had lands attached to them for their maintenance.[1]

(*c*) *Caves and temples.*—Caves occasionally served as scenes of a cult, and by their shape and enclosed space may have suggested the structural temple. The caverns of mid-Magdalenian times, which contained elaborate paintings of animals or even of human figures, have been regarded as the scene of religious or magical rites, but of this there is no direct evidence.[2] Where cave-dwellers used part of the cave as a shrine for an image or fetish, it might easily through conservatism still be regarded as the dwelling of a god, when men no longer used it for a dwelling. It might become a temple or be associated with a temple built above it. Caves used for burial purposes would doubtless also acquire a sacred character and be used for commemorative rites.

Thus some of the Canaanite 'high places' are associated with caves, which may have been abodes of the living or burial-places, and which, it has been conjectured, were used for oracular purposes or regarded as sanctuaries of a god.[3] Natural or artificial grottoes also constituted the earliest Phœnician temples.[4] An example of gods incarnate in animal shape inhabiting a cavern which served as a temple occurs in Fiji in the case of the gods Ndengei and Ratu-Mai-Mbulu, to whom prayers and offerings were made there.[5] Names of divinities worshipped in caves among the ancient Berbers are known, as well as the caves themselves with inscriptions to them. Sacrifices were probably offered in front of the entrance; within the cave niches contained sacred objects.[6] Rock temples are known in early Egypt and in N. Arabia, but they are most elaborate in India and Ceylon, where they are both hewn out of solid rock and sculptured in caverns. Some originated in Buddhist times, and many still exist as examples of striking architectural skill—*e.g.*, at Elephanta and Ellora.[7] Their prototypes are caves used as shrines and for the cult of Hindu gods in N. India.[8] Among the Caribs two caves were the places where sun and moon emerged and fertilized the earth. They were places of pilgrimage, were adorned with paintings, and contained images. Spirits were supposed to guard them.[9]

Another reason for caves becoming associated with worship is the belief that men first came out of them from their subterranean home. Examples of this are found in ancient Peru and other parts of America.[10]

Caves may also be the depositories of sacred or cult objects or of images of gods, and thus serve a purpose to which temples are also put.

The Arunta *ertnatulunga* is a rock crevice and sacred store-house containing *churinga* and their indwelling spirits. They are visited ceremonially and are highly sacred.[11] The Veddas keep their sacred arrows in caves to prevent them from being contaminated, especially by women.[12] The Hopi use clefts in the rock in which to place the *bahos*, or prayer-sticks, in honour of their deities, and the Coras and Huichols deposit ceremonial arrows and images in sacred caves.[13] The Ostyaks keep their images or stones representing the gods in sanctuaries in the hills guarded by a shaman.[14]

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[1] For the more elaborate Canaanite temples see art. ARCHITECTURE (Phœnician); and Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31.

[2] See artt. ALEUTS, § 5, BHILS, § 3.

[3] G. Bamler, in R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 518.

[4] *NR* ii. 799, iv. 61 f. [5] *ERE* i. 338[a].

[6] P. R. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, London, 1907, p. 144 f.; cf. art. MUNDAS, § 4.

[7] T. E. Peet, *Rough Stone Monuments and their Builders*, London, 1912, pp. 94, 116.

[8] *ERE* iii. 301[b], iv. 408. [9] Cf. artt. STONES.

[10] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 147 ff.; L. Fison, *JAI* xiv. [1885] 14 ff.

[11] E. A. Parkyn, *An Introd. to the Study of Prehistoric Art*, London, 1915, p. 158 f.

[12] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 109 f.; *ERE* ii. 357[b].

[13] *ERE* vi. 15[b].

[1] *A Guide to the Egyptian Collections in the British Museum*, London, 1909, p. 165 f.; *ERE* iv. 463.

[2] S. Reinach, 'L'Art et la magie,' *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903] 257; H. F. Osborne, *The Men of the Old Stone Age*[3], London, 1916, p. 423.

[3] See the reff. in *ERE* iii. 178, vi. 681[b].

[4] W. R. Smith, p. 180.

[5] B. Thomson, p. 114; T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, London, 1858, i. 217 f.; cf. *ERE* vi. 14[b], 15[b].

[6] *ERE* ii. 507[b].

[7] J. Fergusson, *The Rock-cut Temples of India*, London, 1864; see also artt. AJANTA, CAVES, ELEPHANTA.

[8] *ERE* v. 10[a].

[9] J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 220.

[10] *Ib.* p. 312.

[11] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 133, Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 267.

[12] C. G. Seligmann, 'The Vedda Cult of the Dead,' *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religion*, Oxford, 1908, i. 66.

[13] *ERE* vi. 786[b], 829[a]; C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, ii. 27, 160.

[14] J. Abercromby, *The Pre- and Proto-Historic Finns*, London, 1898, i. 162; *ERE* ix. 577[a].

(*d*) *The village-house, men's house, etc., as temple.*—In many regions where separate temples are unknown, the men's house, council-house, village-house, or the *kiva*, to some extent serves the purpose of a temple among its many other uses, and corresponds to the *prytaneum* of the Greeks and the *curia* of the Romans.

Religious dances or sacred dramatic plays are held in the 'village-house' among the Aleuts or in the 'assembly-house' of the Californian tribes, which may consist of a circular dome-shaped structure or a mere brushwood enclosure.[1] To the latter corresponds the bough *wurley* used in the fire-ceremony of the Warramunga tribe, in which certain men maintain for hours a continuous singing to the accompaniment of beating boomerangs.[2] Among many American Indian tribes, especially in the south-west, religious rites are associated with a 'sacred house,' as with the Hupa, which does not differ in construction from other houses in the village. Here sacred dances take place, and traditions are connected with it.[3] With the Pueblo tribes the *kiva* serves at once as sacred council-house, medicine-lodge, and temple of the members of a mystery society. In some districts *kivas* of ancient date are circular; more generally they are square and often below the surface of the ground. The pre-historic *kivas* of Colorado and Utah are of similar type. Women might not enter the *kiva* except to give food to husband or sons. *Kivas* are often very large, but the well openings are small, and entrance is gained by a ladder up to the roof, whence by another ladder descent is made to the interior from a hole in the roof. The walls are often decorated with symbolic paintings and are surrounded by a bench. At one end is an altar on which the symbolic objects of the society are placed, and before it is a dry sand 'painting,' representing gods and forces of nature.[4] Corresponding to these are the sacred lodges and club-houses of Melanesia and Papua, which are generally the nearest approach to temples in those regions. Examples are found in the 'sacred houses' of the Solomon Islands;[5] in the *toreu* of New Britain, etc.—a sacred enclosure with a large room where the dresses and masks were prepared and members of the society met, whence the spirit-personators of the ceremonies emerged, and which no woman or uninitiated male might approach;[6] in the *marawot* of the Bismarck Archipelago, a similar construction to the *toreu*, but with a special part containing images and visited by the *tena*, or magician, alone;[7] and in the house used in the *asa*-cult at Astrolabe Bay, where an ancestor-cult is practised.[8] The structure consisted mainly of wood and thatch. The 'men's house' in the same regions has often a sacred significance, and contains skulls and heads, effigies of the dead, and symbols associated with ancestor-worship, and sometimes masks, drums, and flutes connected with the mysteries and concealed from the uninitiated. These houses are often used for the worship of ancestors.[9]

(*e*) *The house-shrine as temple.*—Still another aspect of the primitive temple, sometimes suggesting a point of departure for more exclusive temple structures, is the hut or house a corner of which is set apart as a place or shrine for an image or sacred objects. This custom is well-nigh universal, and only a few examples need be noted.

Among the Banyankole in each hut is a special place for fetishes, consisting of a mound of earth a foot high, beaten hard, with grass laid upon it.[10] With Gold Coast tribes the *suhman* containing a spirit has an honoured place in a corner of the hut, where offerings are made to it, or, as with the Yoruba, the house-god Olarosa, represented in human form, is set up at the door, and huts have a recess in the wall for the fetish.[11] Here and there in Melanesia and Papua images of ancestors are kept in houses, or, as in certain islands off the western end of New Guinea, in a separate room of the house in which miniature wooden houses are placed for the souls to reside in. Offerings are made to them. In the chief's house are shrines for the souls of all who have died in the community. 'Such a house might almost be described as a temple of the dead.'[12] Among the Klemantans images are kept in the huts, or, as also with the Kayans, stand before them.[1] The Votiaks set their *vorsud*, or clan-god, on a shelf in the out-house.[2] In higher religions the household shrine is well known. Most Buddhist houses have their shelf with an image of Gautama. Shintōists treasure objects of private cult on a house-altar. In ancient Egypt each house had its domestic shrine, usually a recess or a cupboard with the figure of a household god.

In certain regions the temple seems to have arisen out of the private sanctuary of the king. In Mycenæ houses, especially the king's palace, had chapels as part of the structure, and the palace later became the temple. With the Phœnicians the temple was at first an annexe of the palace, like Solomon's temple at Jerusalem. Where a cult of the hearth-divinities, with libations thrown into the fire, existed—*e.g.*, in Roman houses—the house itself was a temple with the hearth as altar.

2. Actual temples in the lower culture.—We have seen that, while in many savage religions actual temples are unknown, many approaches to temples exist. Yet even savages are not devoid of temples of a primitive kind, for it was natural to suppose that, as the worshipper had a house, the god or spirit also should have one, either as the permanent shelter of his image or as the place whither he might resort and be approached by men in worship.

(*a*) The most primitive temples are probably those found in Africa, both Negro and Bantu. While frequently the 'place of praying' is a mere clearing under the tree in the village courtyard,[3] thus conforming to what was found in early Indo-European worship, sometimes an actual hut is provided for a god, not differing much from the ordinary hut.

On the Lower Niger the temples contain images standing on mud platforms, and the *ju-ju* house in the bush is secret to all but the priests, and contains images, while the walls are decorated with plates.[4] Similar temples exist among the Ewe, and that of the rain-god is painted with the colours of the rainbow.[5] The celebrated serpent-temple at Whydah was merely a circular hut, thatched with grass—a privilege allowed only to shrines and temples—standing in an oblong enclosure. In it the sacred snakes were kept.[6] In Dahomey temples are circular huts, so low that a man must bend double to enter one. Images stand in them on a platform of clay, before which are earthen pots and vessels smeared with blood, eggs, and oil. Some temples are elaborately decorated, and they as well as sacred groves are distinguished by calico streamers fluttering from poles or trees.[7] Among the Yoruba—*e.g.*, at Benin—the *ju-ju* temple consisted of a space of ground 150 yards by 60, surrounded by a high wall, and covered with short grass. At one end a long shed extended across the breadth, and under it stood the altar, made of three steps the whole length of the shed. This was slightly raised in the centre, and on it stood ivory tusks on bronze heads. In the centre of the enclosure were a kind of candelabra with hooks, and a well for the reception of the bodies of victims.[8] Among the Baganda temples resembled the king's house. They were conical structures with an elaborate reed thatch coming nearly to the ground, and supported on posts, with hide curtains for the doorway. They had also a sort of pinnacle composed of layers of reeds bound together and fastened to the top of the roof. The floor was strewn with a carpet of scented grass, dried, and cut to uniform length. These temples took some time to build, and their structure was frequently renewed. Some had also a court surrounding them, and in the case of the more important gods only the priests and mediums could enter it. In others the temple attendants had their huts in the court. Temples without courtyards could be approached and even entered by the people. The temple of the god of war was surrounded on three sides by a thick forest sacred to him. Each temple had its priests and mediums who lived in huts near by, where their vestments, worn on entering the temple, were kept. Young girls tended the sacred fire always burning in the temples, save in those which might not be entered by a woman. The larger temples had estates attached to them for their upkeep. Temples of gods had no images, for images were unknown, but they had a dais on which the invisible deity was supposed to sit, or on which his relics were kept. Sacred drums were stored in certain temples. Fetishes had also temples with priests and mediums, and there were special temples for the king's jaw-bone and umbilical cord,

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1 *ERE* i. 305a, iii. 143b, 144b.
2 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 332 f. 3 *ERE* vi. 880b.
4 F. S. Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday*, New York and London, 1901, p. 283 f.; F. W. Hodge, in *HAI* i. 710; cf. *ERE* i. 386a, 822a.
5 F. Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, tr. A. J. Butler, London, 1896-98, i. 325.
6 G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 60 f.
7 *Ib.* p. 72 ff. 8 *ERE* ix. 348 f.
9 R. Parkinson, *Inter. AE* xiii. [1900] 35, 42 f.; M. J. Erdweg, *Mittheilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxii. [1902] 292 f.; H. Zahn, in Neuhauss, iii. 291, 308; cf. *ERE* ix. 341, 349, 351, 354.
10 J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 133.
11 H. Ling Roth, *Great Benin*, Halifax, 1903, pp. 166, 171; cf. *ERE* ix. 278b, 280a.
12 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, pp. 139, 173 ff.; J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, i. 315 f.

1 Hose-McDougall, ii. 7, 19. 2 Abercromby, i. 164.
3 C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of the A-Kamba and other East African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 86; cf. *ERE* ii. 358a.
4 A. G. Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, London, 1906, p. 465.
5 A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1890, p. 49.
6 *Ib.* p. 57. 7 *Ib.* p. 80.
8 Ling Roth, p. 150.

and others for his ghost.[1] Similar temples for divinities and for the royal jaw-bone existed among the Busoga, Banyoro, etc., but with these and the Baganda the creator-god had no temple.[2]

(*b*) In Melanesia temples are not common, but in the Admiralty Islands wooden, thatched huts of a beehive shape, with carved door-posts representing male and female figures, serve as temples. The doorway is closed by a hurdle. Skulls of pigs and turtles are attached to the rafters, as well as balls of human hair. A mystery was always made about the principal temple, which contained images, and was sometimes open, sometimes closed.[3] In Fiji each village had one or more temples (*bure*), built on a mound faced with stone rubble-work. The roof was high-pitched, with a projecting ridge-pole, and the height of the structure was twice its breadth. Each *bure* had two doors and a fire-place, and contained images, jars, boxes, mats, etc. From the roof hung a long piece of bark cloth reaching to the floor at one of the corner-posts, and marking the holy place which none but the priest approached to be inspired by the god, who descended by this cloth. The dead were sometimes buried in the *bure*, but the building was only used for worship on special occasions and often became ruinous in the interval. It served also as a council-house and chiefs' club-house. *Bures* were also erected in memory of the dead, and had an altar for offerings.[4] In the district of Tumleo, New Guinea, *paraks*, or temples, built of wood and standing on piles, are found. They consist of two storeys and have high gables, and are approached by ladders with hand-rails carved in the form of crocodiles and ape-like figures. Nothing but drums and flutes is found in the *paraks*, and these, played by men, signify the presence of the spirits, for whose worship the temples exist. A certain degree of mystery attaches to the *paraks*; no woman or child may enter them or loiter in their vicinity.[5]

(*c*) In certain parts of Polynesia—Society and Sandwich Islands—the temples, or *marœ*, were enclosures open to the sky and they were of three classes: national, local, and domestic.

The national temples, called *tabu-tabu-a-tea*, perhaps because of their wide-spread sacredness, were depositories of the chief images and the places where great festivals were held. Each of them was composed of several *marœ*, some with inner courts for the images, altars, and sacred dormitories for the chief divinities, all enclosed by stone walls on two sides. In front was a fence, and at the back a pyramidal structure often of large size, with images and altars before it. At Atchura this structure was 270 ft. long, 94 broad, and 70 high. Steps led to the top, which had a surface area of 180 by 6 ft. Within the enclosure were the priests' houses, and trees grew both within and around it, forming a dark grove. Offerings were placed in the *marœ*. Men alone usually took part in the festivals, but on the completion of the year women and children also attended, but were not allowed to enter the sacred enclosure. Local *marœ* were those belonging to the different districts; the domestic *marœ* were for the family gods. In both of these, as well as in the royal *marœ*, the dead were deposited, and were there under the guardianship of the gods.[6] In other districts —*e.g.*, Samoa—temples resembled the beehive thatched huts, or, again, the village house where the chiefs met served as a temple. In some cases groves as well as temples were used as places of sacrifice.[7]

(*d*) Among the coast Veddas temple structures exist. One is 12 ft. by 10, roofed, and facing eastwards, with the roof carried forward beyond the front wall and door. Outside this structure are a long pole, a well, and a tree with a platform, and just outside the door stands an altar. The interior is decorated with cloths and branches on the occasion of a ceremonial dance, and ceremonial garments are kept within it. Some of the village Veddas have temples of bark or of mud resembling their own huts. In these the shaman dances, and symbols of the spirits are kept.[1]

(*e*) With the Todas, worshippers of the sacred buffalo, the dairy forms the temple or sacred place, with its ceremonial vessels and other things, which are preserved there; and precautions are taken to prevent their contamination by the touch or look of unauthorized persons. Relics of heroes are also stored in them. These temple-dairies have usually two rooms, and are of the same form as the native huts.[2]

(*f*) As an example of various stages in the evolution of temples from simple to highly elaborate, over a large area, we may cite those known in N. and S. America. Most of the lower tribes, and some of the more advanced (Hurons, Iroquois[3]), had no temples. But usually there were sacred spots or shrines where ceremonies were performed, sacrifices offered, and images set up.[4]

Among the Hopi such places were called *pahoki*, 'prayer-house,' and often had nothing to mark them but prayer-sticks —sticks with feathers attached. Others were denoted by circles of stones—*e.g.*, the sun shrine with an opening to the direction of sunrise at the summer solstice—by a single stone, or by some natural mark on a rock.[5] To these correspond the sites on which are erected bowers or lodges for the public performances of mystery societies in other tribes, often containing an altar with sacred objects.[6] More elaborate shrines also exist among the Hopis and will be described later. In S. America corresponding to such shrines is the secret spot where the *botuto*, or sacred trumpet, of the Orinoco tribes is kept, so that women and children may not see it. With other tribes the insiguia of a *piai* are tabu and are kept in a special shed or hut, which is also used as a place where he may be consulted. It is called a 'spirit-house' and is tabu.[7] Here also may be mentioned the special 'medicine-lodge' of many tribes, erected for the performances of the shaman, corresponding to that found among the Ural-Altaic tribes of N. Asia.[8]

With other tribes—*e.g.*, the Omaha—the sacred structure consisted of three sacred tents, or *tipis*, which were carried from place to place, like the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.' They consisted of poles tied together at the top, arranged in a circle, and covered with bison skins. They sheltered the three sacred objects—the sacred pole, the sacred buffalo-cow skin, and the sacred bag.[9] The household tent as a shrine containing an altar is also sporadically found—*e.g.*, among the Siksika, with whom each tent has an altar, a mere hole in the ground, in which sweet gum is burned.[10]

With the Apaches, Sioux, and others, sacred caves took the place of temples, where religious rites (tabu to women) were performed, or which were used as resorts for prayer.[11] In Florida the Apallachians had a cave-temple on the sun-mountain, Olaimi, 200 ft. long, and containing an altar and images. Images also stood at the entrance, which faced eastwards, so that the earliest beams of the sun fell upon it.[12] More elaborate still was a cave-temple of the Wiyataos, which had been used to celebrate rites by the followers of a culture-hero Wixipecocha, but was later turned into a structure with galleries, halls, and apartments. Into it the priests descended to perform sacrifices and ceremonies hid from the vulgar eye.[13]

Among the Chibchas the temples, each of which was dedicated to a god, were mere huts with clay walls, containing small stools on which idols were set. The floor was covered with grass, and mats hung on the walls. Those of greater importance had the distinction of having their chief posts set on the body of a sacrificed slave. Small shrines also existed

[1] Roscoe, *The Baganda*, pp. 271 ff., 292 ff., 303, 308. Cf. artt. HEAD, § 5 (*f*), MOUTH, § 1.
[2] Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, pp. 90, 131, 227, 246.
[3] *JAI* vi. [1877] 414.
[4] C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during 1838–42*, London, 1852, ii. 53 f.; Williams, pp. 191, 223; B. Seeman, *Viti: an Account of a Government Mission to the Vitian or Fijian Islands*, Cambridge, 1862, p. 391.
[5] R. Parkinson, p. 33 f.; Erdweg, pp. 295 f., 377.
[6] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 339 ff., 405; cf. Ratzel, i. 325.
[7] G. Turner, *Samoa, a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, pp. 19, 152, 289.

[1] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 168, 235.
[2] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 56 ff., 422, 428.
[3] See *ERE* i. 335[b]. [4] See § 1 above.
[5] J. W. Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 558[b].
[6] G. A. Dorsey, in *HAI* i. 227 f.
[7] *30 RBEW* [1915], p. 137; T. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons: Notes of some Months spent among Cannibal Tribes*, London, 1915, p. 212.
[8] See, *e.g.*, artt. NAVAHO, OJIBWA, SHAMANISM.
[9] Dellenbaugh, pp. 204, 208; J. O. Dorsey, *13 RBEW* [1896], p. 274.
[10] W. Hough, in *HAI* i. 46.
[11] J. G. Bourke, *FL* ii. [1891] 426; Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 559; Müller, p. 69; *ERE* vi. 829[a].
[12] Müller, p. 69.
[13] *NR* ii. 211; for other cave-temples see Müller, p. 184.

throughout this region, on hills or by lakes.[1] Among some Californian tribes structural temples, or *vanquechs*, in honour of the god Chinigchinich, consisted of an oval enclosure, four or five yards in circumference, with interior divisions formed by branches, stakes of wood, and mats, and containing a hurdle supporting an image.[2] The temples of the Natchez, one in each village, which stood on mounds, were huts about 30 ft. square and of a somewhat elaborate structure. They contained the sacred fire as well as a division in which sacred objects were kept. On a platform rested the remains of the 'sun-chiefs,' with sacred images, and in an innermost sanctuary was the holy image of the sun-god or hero. This temple was the object of great reverence.[3] Such sun-temples existed over a wide region in Florida, Arkansas, and Virginia, and were no more than large wigwams with thick mud walls and a dome-shaped roof with figures of eagles. Images stood in them, and women were excluded from them.[4] No more elaborate were the temples described by travellers among Virginian tribes, in the Mississippi region, among the Fox Indians, or in S. America with the Tupinambas.[5] Among the Huichols are temples (*tokpia*), 'god-houses,' and sacred caves, though the difference between the first two is not clear. The temples are larger than but otherwise resemble the houses, which are circular, stone-built, and roofed with thatch, and which possess a low entrance to the east. The roof is supported by upright beams. In the centre is a fireplace—a circular basin of clay. Niches in the interior walls contain ceremonial objects, and each of them is devoted to a god, and in charge of an officer of the temple. Flowers are offered with prayer in these niches. In front of the temple is a square open space for the 'god-houses,' in which the officers live who watch the temple. They are rectangular, of stone and mud, with a thatched gable-roof. The interior contains symbolic objects to please the gods. The people meet in the temples for shamanistic ceremonies. Chairs are placed for the deities invisibly present. Images are kept in sacred caves in the mountains, sometimes set in miniature temples there.[6] In the Pueblo region the more elaborate shrines were of the nature of temples. They consisted of sealed stone enclosures, sometimes with symbols painted on them, and they contained images and symbolic representations of supernatural beings. Among the Hopi the shrine of the earth-goddess is a sealed chamber in which is her image, seated. Every November at the 'new fire' ceremony a slab is removed, and offerings are placed in the shrine, while every four years the image is carried in procession. In all Pueblo shrines are placed permanent objects (images, stones, carved slabs, etc.) and temporary objects (prayer-meal, pollen, sticks, bowls of water, clay images).[7]

The council-house, men's house, the *kiva*, etc., as serving *inter alia* all the purposes of a temple, have been already referred to.[8] In the case of a *kiva*, or lodge of a mystery society, this is particularly marked. None but priests or the initiated may enter the sacred place; in it are made the sacred objects used in the ritual; and here prayers are said, smoke offerings presented, and other ceremonies—*e.g.*, purificatory rites—are carried on.

The rude stone structures just described form a primitive aspect of the more elaborate stone temples of barbaric peoples in N. and S. America. It was also natural that, where wooden temples existed, they should be replaced by temples of stone, as soon as more elaborate architectural methods were attained. Intermediate stages between these simple structures and the massive and elaborate temples—the ruins of which still command respect—are seldom met with, but Peter Martyr describes one in Hayti, and Schoolcraft another at Cayambe—a circle of sunburnt bricks 48 ft. in diameter and 13½ ft. high, with a small door, open to the sky.[9] Probably many of the Peruvian temples were of such a simple character, and even the great temple of the sun at Cuzco, comprising many buildings and apartments, though it was richly adorned with gold plates, cornices, and studs, and was provided with gardens and fields, had no great architectural character—mere squares and parallelograms of one storey, roofless or thatched.[10] Previous to the Inca rule, the temple was strictly a lofty altar with a chapel for the image. Under the Incas the chapel increased in size, encircling the altar, and was made elaborate by the addition of other buildings.[1] Certain remains of temples in Peru, however, show a greater architectural complexity than those described by early Spanish travellers.

The Mexican temples, *teocalli*, 'abode of the gods,' may be described as gigantic altars on which stood chapels for the images. There were many temples in each city, varying much in dignity.

The larger *teocalli* had a great outer court capable of holding a crowd of people. Within this space stood priests' houses, oratories, and chapels for lesser gods. There arose from it a pyramidal structure of earth faced with brick or stone, rising in stages, three to nine in number, each with a platform, to a height of 80 to 100 feet. Stairways, differently arranged, rose from the base to each platform, and thence to the top. Sometimes the stairway rose directly from base to summit up one of the faces of the pyramid; or it ascended at one of the angles to the first platform, at another angle to the second, and so to the top, in order that a religious procession in ascending might make a circuit of the structure. The platforms had palisades on which were stuck the heads of human victims. On the summit stood a tower or chapel, or sometimes two, containing the image of the god or gods to whom the temple was dedicated. In front of them stood the great stone of sacrifice and altars on which perpetual fire burned. The great procession of priests at the numerous religious services was visible to all who directed their eyes to the *teocalli*, as it made the ascent.[2]

The practice of placing temples on pyramidal structures is also found among the Mayans and throughout the whole area of Central America, but here the buildings were of a more ambitious kind, with elaborate architecture and sculpture.[3]

The mounds of the Mississippi region were thought to be of Mexican or Mayan origin, but it is now accepted that they were the work of Indian tribes—Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, Choctaws. Nor is it proved that every mound was crowned by a temple or altar. 'Whether these were sacred enclosures, sacrificial and temple mounds, are questions to be settled, if possible, by investigation and legitimate deductions.' Houses were built on some of the mounds, but occasionally travellers speak of a temple on a mound. In such a case the mound was of no great height, and the temple was a simple structure like that of the Natchez.[4]

3. Miniature temples.—Among many African tribes there is a custom of making a small hut for the spirits, about 2 ft. high. This stands in the village or outside, and offerings are made at it. It is supposed to contain 'an uncanny something,' and is a kind of temple of the dead, whose spirits are supposed to visit it.

In Uganda the hut is a veritable sanctuary, with a sort of altar for offerings.[5] In New Guinea some of the tribes set up little houses in the forest for the use of ancestral spirits, or place these within inner rooms of their own dwellings; others place the skull of the dead man in such a hut in the forest.[6] Similar miniature structures for ancestral ghosts are found in Indo-China and among the Gilyaks.[7]

4. Temples in the higher culture.—In higher civilizations the temple usually has a prominent place in religious life, and is architecturally of great importance. But here also it was evolved from simple structures, though these as well as the intermediate stages cannot always be traced in archæological sequence or from historical evidence. The series of articles on ARCHITECTURE deal with the structure of such temples in the greater religions, and it is unnecessary here to do more than offer a few general remarks.

(*a*) The great temples of ancient Egypt were preceded in pre-historic times by a simple structure of dried mud or a hut of wicker-work, not differing much from human dwellings and probably

[1] T. A. Joyce, *South American Archæology*, London, 1912, pp. 33, 37.
[2] *NR* i. 405.
[3] Dellenbaugh, p. 207; *ERE* ix. 190b.
[4] Ratzel, ii. 154.
[5] Müller, pp. 69, 280; John Smith, *Virginia*, in *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes* (Hakluyt Soc. Ex. Ser.), Glasgow, 1905–07, xviii. 450 *f.*
[6] Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, ii. 27 ff., 148 f., 160 ff.
[7] J. W. Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 559.
[8] § 1 (*d*) above.
[9] Müller, p. 184; H. R. Schoolcraft, *Information respecting the History, Condition, etc., of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1853–57, v. 94.
[10] Garcilasso de la Vega, in Purchas, xvii. 340 f.; Schoolcraft, v. 89.

[1] A. Réville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru* (*HL*), London, 1884, p. 215.
[2] Joseph Acosta, in Purchas, xv. 319 ff.; Réville, p. 47; *NR* ii. 577, iii. 430; see art. ALTAR (American), § 2.
[3] See art. ARCHITECTURE (American), § 5; *NR* iv. *passim*.
[4] *12 RBEW* (1894), pp. 171, 604, 609, 652, 660, 671.
[5] Hobley, *Ethnology of the A-Kamba*, p. 85; A. Le Roy, *La Religion des primitifs*, Paris, 1909, p. 288; A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906, p. 47; artt. NYANJAS, § 2 (*c*), BANTU AND S. AFRICA, vol. ii. pp. 357a, 359a.
[6] Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, i. 315 f.; *ERE* ix. 350a.
[7] *ERE* vii. 231b, vi. 226a.

resembling African native temples. The hut was sometimes square, sometimes domed, and stood on a platform of earth to save it from inundation. Within it was the image of the god, and the only opening for light was the doorway or portico, with a mast at each side. In front was a court fenced with a palisade.

The hut gave place to a stone building, but, when additional rooms were built round the central 'house of the god,' and when the whole structure of the temple, with its spacious sphinx-guarded approach, pylons, courts for the worshippers, pillared halls for processions of priests, etc., was elaborated, the dark central chamber of the god, accessible to the higher priesthood only, remained as a constant factor, and contained the divine image or the sacred animal. The door was solemnly sealed with papyrus and clay at night, and as solemnly opened in the morning, before the day's ceremonial began. Thus what had once been the temple itself was now the inner sanctuary of a wide-spread temple, with all its multifarious buildings and chambers for purposes connected with the cult. The height of the Egyptian temple diminished from front to back.[1]

(*b*) The great temples of Babylon had probably originated in a structure of simple kind, oblong in shape, with a recess for an image. Excavations show that the great temples stood in a court with a vestibule, flanked by chambers.

The temple building consisted of a long outer hall, opening into a smaller one with the holy place, or *parakhu*, where stood the image of the divinity and an altar. The holy place was open to the priests alone, or to a worshipper accompanied by a priest for special religious purposes. An altar stood in the court and perhaps in the outer hall also. The names of temples are many, and some of them show their great sanctity, others are suggestive of height—'the house of the shining mountain,' 'the lofty house.' This points to the high tower-like structure, the *ziqqurat*, which stood beyond the important temples, or towered within the sacred enclosure where stood many temples dedicated to various gods, as well as the houses of priests—a grouping of religious buildings found in the larger cities. The *ziqqurat* was a storeyed tower or pyramid, consisting of a series of diminishing and superimposed cubes. These varied in number, and symbolized the mythical mountain of the world. Where it consisted of seven storeys, these represented the planetary zones, or the seven zones of the earth. Each storey was approached by an inclined pathway or a flight of steps, either directly up the face or diagonally across it, until the top, which formed a broad platform, was reached. On the platform stood a chamber for the god, containing a couch and throne, and perhaps an image. As with the Mexican *teocalli*, processions winding up the tower could be plainly seen below, and, while the Egyptian temple in its grandest development was spread over a large area, the Babylonian, as far as the *ziqqurat* was concerned, aimed at reaching a lofty elevation, and represented in miniature the structure of the universe. It seems to have been regarded also as the grave of the god to whom it was dedicated, and persons of importance were sometimes buried round it.[2]

Both Egyptian and Babylonian temples were endowed with lands which yielded large revenues. Hence, outside their religious purpose, they had great influence on the economic life of the nation. In the Babylonian temple area also, as the priests were administrators of the law, there were courts of justice, chambers where national archives were stored, and even banks.

(*c*) The Greek temple was preceded by the τέμενος, the open sacred place with its ἄγαλμα of the deity, altar, and other *sacra*. In the Ægean religion the sacred cave served as a temple where the Mother-goddess was worshipped, as in the double cave (upper and lower) of Dicte in Crete, where a rich store of cult objects has been found in recent years.[3] Palaces had their domestic chapel or shrine, plain and of small size, with a ledge at one end for images and sacred objects. The ruler was a priest-king, and in one instance, that of the palace of Knossos, 'the Place of the Double Axe' (λάβρυς), the whole building has the character of a temple.[4] Free-standing shrines or temples also existed, like that discovered at Gournia, a small enclosure 12 ft. square, in the heart of the town, in which were found many images and cult objects.[1] With the perfecting of the divine image, a house to shelter it became necessary, and the earliest type was no more than a rectangular oblong *cella*, or σηκός. To this was soon added an additional chamber, with open front and a couple of columns supporting an architrave, the corners of which rested on flattened columns attached to the ends of the side walls. These columns were at first of wood; the earliest stone columns date from the 6th cent. B.C. Throughout the whole period of Greek religion the rectangular *cella* remained as the central part of all Greek temples, though it was sometimes prolonged back and front with additional chambers, or surrounded by single or double rows of columns, while these were sometimes also introduced within the *cella*. Vitruvius, indeed, classifies temples according to the arrangement of the columns in relation to the *cella*.[2] The temples of the gods faced eastwards, and opposite the entrance stood the image of the god. The *cella* also contained an altar or altars, votive offerings, and treasure, the last being also stored in the chamber behind the *cella*. The temples were never large; they were merely houses for the image, and hence were often kept closed. They were decorated with sculpture and painting both within and without. The temple stood within a τέμενος, where the great altar was placed, and where the worship was carried on.[3]

(*d*) The Roman *templum*, as already shown, was originally a rectangular space of ground marked off by the augur, in which a tent was pitched for augural purposes, like the 'medicine-hut' of the shaman. Strictly speaking, the house of a god was the *ædes*, but the word *templum* was now applied to such a structure, inaugurated by the augurs, and usually of larger and more complicated structure than the *ædes*. In the earliest times divine dwellings were unknown. The grove, the cave, the hearth, were the earlier sacred places, or the *sacellum*, a small place consecrated to a god, enclosed by a fence or wall, but roofless, with an altar and possibly an image. The Romans, in erecting houses for the gods, were influenced by the Etruscans and the Greeks. The Etruscan temples were of wood, oblong, with one or more chambers and an open portico. The Roman temple had also a central *cella*, but of much greater breadth than the Greek, this feature being probably a result of Etruscan influence. The structure of temples, whether simple or elaborate, was generally determined by Greek architecture, though there were differences in detail—*e.g.*, the absence of columns at the back. Circular temples were also built; these had become common in Greece from the 4th cent. B.C., though it is not impossible that the form may be copied from the early Italian house.

Before building a temple, a space of ground was *liberatus et effatus* by the augurs, and consecrated by the *pontifex*. When the building was erected, it was dedicated to a god. In some instances, however, a building might be consecrated to religious use without the preliminary augural ceremony. Such buildings were *sacra*, or *ædes sacra*, like the temple of Vesta.[4] Outside the temple stood the altar, and within burned the sacred fire. In the temples were stored votive offerings, gifts, treasure of all lands, as well as the images of the gods.

(*e*) During the Vedic period in India, as has been seen, there were no temples. No trace of temples in the pre-Buddhist period is known, but, if any existed, they must have been of wood, as they still are in Burma, the use of stone in

[1] G. Maspero, *L'Archéologie égyptienne*, Paris, 1887, pp. 65 f., 106 f., *The Dawn of Civilization*, tr. M. L. McClure, London, 1894, p. 119; W. Max Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*The Mythology of All Races*, xii.), Boston, U.S.A., 1918, p. 187 f.

[2] Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, p. 427; Herod. i. 181 f.; M. Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York and London, 1911, lect. v

[3] C. H. and H. B. Hawes, *Crete the Forerunner of Greece*, London and New York, 1909, p. 112.

[4] *ERE* i. 146

[1] Hawes, p. 101.

[2] Vitruvius, *de Architectura*, iii. 2.

[3] For plans and details, architectural and structural, see art. ARCHITECTURE (Greek), and cf. art. ALTAR (Greek).

[4] For architectural details see art. ARCHITECTURE (Roman), and cf. art. ROMAN RELIGION, § IV.

architecture not having been introduced until Aśoka's reign, as a result of contact with the West. Religious edifices are certainly known for the first time in Buddhism. The primitive sacred object in Buddhism was not an image, but a relic. This at first was not set in a temple, but enclosed in a *stūpa*, or *tope* (Sinhalese *dāgaba*) —an elongated hemispherical structure standing on a base, the exterior often richly carved or ornamented, and crowned with a square capital and the *chhattra*, or umbrella. Many *stūpas* contained no relic, but were erected as commemorative objects. A path fenced by a railing surrounded the *stūpa*, for circumambulation. The *stūpa* was decorated with flags, streamers, and flowers; and it was the chief religious edifice of early Buddhism.[1] Another religious edifice was the *chaitya*, a name applied to any religious monument—*e.g.*, a *stūpa* with relics—but also restricted to a building corresponding to a temple or church, the '*chaitya* hall,' with pillared aisles and an apse containing a *stūpa* and an altar.

The earliest known structural building of this type—*e.g.*, at Ter, Haidarābād—consists of an apsidal chamber with high barrel-vaulted roof. In front is a square hall, or *mandapa*—perhaps a later addition, lower in height, with a flat roof supported by pillars. The façade above the roof of the hall has a niche containing now a Hindu image, which was probably at one time a window. Within the apse stood a *dāgaba*, now replaced by a Vaiṣṇava image. *Chaitya*s of this type must have been common in India. Buddhism made use of rock excavations at an early time for *chaitya* halls, which sometimes had aisles.[2]

A third structure was the *vihāra*—a hall where the monks assembled, with cells at the sides for sleeping. The *vihāras* were later used as temples and became the centre of monastic buildings grouped around them. They usually stood beside *chaitya*s, though they came to be furnished with chapels in which religious services could be performed as well as in the *chaitya*.

During ten centuries from Aśoka's time onwards cave *chaitya* halls and *vihāras* were excavated all over India.

In early examples at Bihār the *chaitya* halls are merely oblong chambers, sometimes with a cell or apse at the farther end for the *dāgaba* with its relic. Others are more elaborate. The façade of the cave represents the exterior of a wooden *chaitya* in all its details. The interior is apsidal. Pillars are cut in the sides, and in the apse is the *dāgaba*, which now has the image of Buddha in front of it. Some of these caves are highly elaborate in their carving both within and without, and are also pillared structures with aisles. The cave *vihāras* have a central pillared hall with cells at the sides for monks. Beyond the hall are one or more inner sanctuaries for images of Buddha. These are later additions. Here again the architecture and adornment varies from simple to highly elaborate. The earliest free-standing *vihāras* were probably simple halls with cells attached, and were sometimes of a storeyed pyramidal form, each successive storey decreasing in size, and giving a series of pillared halls one above the other, with cells for the monks on the terraces. This architectural structure supplied a form for all the later temples of southern Hinduism.[3] Attached to great monasteries, as at Peshawār, was a court, or *vihāra*, with cells for images, and beyond that, opening from it, a circular or square court surrounded by similar cells, and with a *stūpa* in the centre. These belong to the period of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

One of the earliest known temples, or *chaitya*s, is at Bodh Gayā, in front of the Bo-tree of Buddha's enlightenment. Frequently restored, it was probably erected in the 6th cent., and is 160 ft. high by 60 ft. wide. It is rectangular with an elongated pyramidal form of nine storeys, each with exterior niches for images, and the interior *cella* contained originally an image of Buddha. Such a nine-storeyed tower-temple is unique in India, but is found frequently north of the Himālaya.[4]

Hindu temples doubtless owe much in their inception to Buddhism, and are of great variety in structure, size, and ornamentation. But there are two principal groups, one in Southern India of the so-called Dravidian style, and one in Northern India, each of which shows great uniformity in general plan. In S. India the structure consists of the temple proper, or *vīmana*, 'the vehicle of the gods'—a square building with a pyramidal roof which may have one or several storeys, like the storeyed *vihāra* of Buddhism. In this is the square cell containing the chief image of the god, and lit only from the doorway. Between the wall of the inner cell and the outer wall is the procession path, or *pradakṣina*. Pillared porches or halls called *mantapams* (Skr. *mandapa*) precede the entrance, and are usually larger than the *vīmana*. *Vīmana* and *mantapam* stand in a walled enclosure with gate-pyramids, or *gopurams*, corresponding to the Egyptian pylons and often very imposing. Within the enclosure stand a pillared hall, priests' dwellings, tanks, and other structures. These temples are devoted to the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva cults, and are not otherwise distinguishable apart from the sculptures and images. The earliest examples of the *vīmana* show its derivation from the Buddhist apsidal *chaitya* hall. The apse for the relic-shrine has become a cell for an image and is entered by a door. In another early example the circular apse has given place to a cell with altar and image, surmounted by a tower, and the hall in front, distinct from the cell, is pillared. Cell and pillared nave or *mantapam* are reproduced in all Jain and Hindu temples of later date, together with the storeyed tower. The enormous size and elaborate architectural and sculptural design of these buildings make them still marvellous rivals of the cathedrals of Europe. Some, besides the original enclosure with its gate-pyramids, have a second or even third exterior enclosure, with *gopurams*, shrines, porches, cells, etc. The *vīmana* in itself corresponds to the ordinary Hindu village temple, and in some examples has either been such a temple or is little more imposing than one of these. Sometimes two *vīmanas* dedicated to different divinities stand within the central enclosure. In S. India the largest group or congeries of temple buildings is at Śrīraṅgam. There are seven enclosures, leading gradually to the central shrine, and the three surrounding the central enclosure are crowded with temples, porches, halls, etc., while in each wall there are two or three *gopurams* of great height. 'The idea is that each investing square of walls . . . shall conduct the worshipper by regular gradations to a central holy of holies.'[1] While the temples of this kind are of comparatively late date, others of earlier date, but presenting the same general features, have been carved out of the solid rock and excavated internally, so that they are monolithic temples. The chief examples are the raths (*ratha*=*vīmana*) at Mamallapuram and the beautiful *kailāsa* at Ellora.[2]

The Northern temples (Fergusson's 'Indo-Aryan style')—*e.g.*, in Orissa—are characterized by a pyramidal curvilinear tower on a polygonal base in which is the central shrine, often quite small. The interior plan is square, and in the Orissan examples there are no pillars, or these are found only in modern additions. In front is a square porch with pyramidal roof, and sometimes in front of this again additional porches. The enclosing wall is always insignificant, if it is present at all, and has no *gopurams*. Other shrines are always subordinate to the towering temple proper with its porch. Even the more elaborate temples preserve these essential features—*e.g.*, the Kandarya Mahadeva, or temple of Śiva, at Khajurāho.

In all Hindu temples the inner cell or shrine with its image is the central feature round which all the other parts are grouped, and to which, however elaborate, they are all subordinate. The cell is cubical, of small dimensions, unornamented,

[1] See art. STŪPA. [2] See art. CHAITYA.
[3] J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, i. 171.
[4] *Ib.* i. 77 f.

[1] M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 448; Fergusson, i. 368.
[2] See art. ELLORA, vol. v. p. 270[a].

and unlit save by the doorway, and is too sacred to be entered by any but the priests. The exterior building surrounding the cell is of the most elaborate workmanship, often of a kind which offers little clue to the method of producing it. In some districts enormous numbers of temples exist, ancient and modern, and at Benares, the sacred city, there are 1500, though none are older than the 18th century.

(*f*) In Nepāl the *stūpas* do not contain relics. Some are of flattened hemispherical shape with a square capital, 'umbrella,' and lofty finial or spire, like those in Tibet and China, and stand on a plinth on which are built shrines of the five Dhyanibuddhas. Others are lower and flatter; and others again stand on a structure with successive roofs. Buddhism in Nepāl is mingled with Saivism, and the characteristic temple is a square structure of several decreasing storeys divided by sloping roofs. Some are mounted on a pyramidal-stepped platform. These buildings are of wood and stone.[1]

(*g*) In Burma the *stūpa* (*tsedi*) is bell-shaped and stands on a series of platforms, and is crowned with a conical finial. The temples are of square form with projecting porches. In the thickness of the walls are narrow corridors with niches in which are images. A series of storeys arranged pyramidally and crowned with a slender steeple forms the roof. Ancient Buddhist temples in Siam have a rectangular outer enclosing wall, within which is the *bot*, also rectangular, with a porch. The interior is divided by pillars into a nave and single or double side aisles. Within are the high altar and image of Buddha. Behind the *bot* stands a *stūpa*, or *phra*. *Vihāras*, or *vihāns*, and *kamburiens* are buildings similar to the *bot*, but smaller, where the laity come to pray or hear sermons. The *bot* is accessible only to the priests. The *mondob* is a rectangular building enclosing a huge image of Buddha. One enclosure sometimes contains several of these structures, erected from time to time by devout Buddhists.[2]

(*h*) The earliest Chinese religion had no temples, and apparently the general use of these is due to Buddhism. With few exceptions the temples of the three religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, are mainly of one type, though they differ in size. The religion to which each is dedicated can be discovered only from their interior decorations and the images which they enshrine.

Buddhist temples are enclosed by a wall with an ornamental gateway. The temple has a series of porches or halls, opening from each other. Two of these form antechapels to the main structure with its altar and images of the three Buddhas, facing the entrance, and stalls for the monks. Before the images stands the table for offerings, with lamps and flower-vases. Beyond this another hall contains a *dāgaba*, and a final one enshrines the image of Kwan-yin. Within the enclosure are the various buildings for monks, pagodas, drum-tower, bell-tower, and other structures. The roof has the characteristic form of all Chinese buildings, concave, with projecting eaves, but more elaborately decorated than in secular buildings. Confucian temples are of the same general plan, the central 'Hall of Great Perfection' containing the tablets of Confucius, his disciples, and the twelve sages. Tables for offerings stand before these. Taoist temples contain the images of the Three Precious Ones, in imitation of the three images of Buddhist temples.

(*i*) In Japan, as in China, the earlier worship was in a consecrated enclosure open to the sky. Tradition assigns the first temples to a period near the beginning of the Christian era. Shintō temples are not large and conform in structure to the architecture of an age when tools were few and primitive. The quality of the wood used in the structure is of more importance than ornamentation and carving, whereas the carvings on Buddhist temples are highly elaborate, and have much gilding, lacquer-work, and painting. The oldest Shintō temples and many of the smaller ones are thatched. The type is similar to that of China, showing that Chinese influences prevailed.

The temple area, at least in the case of the greater temples, has several enclosures, with fences and gateways preceded by flights of steps. The grouping of the various structures differs according to the nature of the ground, usually on a slope, giving the chief eminence to the main shrine. Shintō temples, but rarely Buddhist, are preceded by the characteristic *torii*, of two wooden uprights with cross-bars, the upper one projecting and curving upwards at the ends; they correspond to the gateways of *stūpas* and temples in India, like that of the *tope* at Sanchi, and to similar structures in religious architecture elsewhere.[1] The temple consists of two or three halls, one an oratory or prayer-hall for worshippers, an intervening hall, and the sanctuary open only to the priests. Shintō temples have no images, a mirror usually constituting the symbol of deity. Some temples are dedicated to more than one divinity. An altar stands in the shrine. The lay-worshipper, entering the prayer-hall, pulls a rope attached to a gong and so announces his presence to the deity before beginning his devotions. Within the temple enclosure, as in China, the grounds often being laid out artistically, stand a pagoda, drum-tower, belfry, stage for religious dances, library, votive-offering hall, store-houses, kitchen, priests' rooms, etc. This general description applies to both Shintō and Buddhist temples, though the latter are generally more gorgeous and imposing, and contain images, lights, votive offerings, lotus-flowers of silver-gilt, while the priestly ritual is elaborate. They are usually built of wood, with gilding and porcelain casing, and metal work; the roofs are of tiles.

(*j*) In Tibet the Buddhist monasteries are the chief architectural structures, occupying large areas and containing a square for assemblies, in which stands the temple.

This is a stone rectangular building, on the top of which is a pavilion with a roof of Chinese type. The interior is divided into a nave and side aisles by pillars, which are painted in yellow and red. The three great Buddhist images with their altar stand at one end. Other images stand along the side walls. There are no windows, and the interior, which is richly coloured or decorated with frescoes and hung with banners, is lit by lamps. Seats for the various officials and Lāmaist congregation are arranged according to a definite order. The temple is approached by a flight of steps and a gateway guarded by demoniac figures. In the vestibule are images of the kings of the four quarters, and also prayer-wheels. These, in larger temples, are placed in detached chapels, in which are images of lower divinities. Occasionally, as at Gyan-tse, a temple is built in stepped terraces, like a *vimana*, crowned by a drum-like structure, on which are a square and a *chhattra* canopy. Shrines to the different Buddhas occupy the various storeys.[2] The great 'cathedral' at Lhasa faces eastward, and is three-storeyed, the roof being of gold. The approach is through a pillared hall, adorned with pictures. Beyond this is an antecourt, leading to a pillared hall, shaped like a basilica and divided into aisles by a series of colonnades. It is lit from above, as there are no side windows. On the side walls are chapels. Lattice-work separates the cross aisles from the longer aisles, and on the west the sacred place is approached by a staircase. This is in form of a square, with six side chapels, three on each side. An altar stands in the centre, and on the west is a recess with an image of Buddha. Here too are the seats of the Dalai and Tashi Lāmas, and of abbots and lesser officials, as well as images, relics, prayer-wheels, etc.[3]

(*k*) The Hebrews had different kinds of sanctuaries before the Temple was built at Jerusalem. The 'tent of meeting' referred to in E was pitched outside the camp in the wilderness. There Moses communed with God, who appeared in a pillar of cloud (Ex $33^{7f.}$, Nu $11^{24f.}$ 12^{5} 14^{10}). It is not described, and was obviously of a simple character. Its one guardian was Joshua, who 'departed not out of the tent' (Ex 33^{11}). The tent may have contained the sacred Ark, a kind of abode of deity, as Nu 7^{89} shows (cf. 2 S 15^{35}), though tent and Ark are never mentioned together. Such portable sanctuaries were used by the Semites, either in nomadic or in more settled times, in the latter case certainly in connexion with war, when the images were carried with the army. The Hebrew 'tent' was used for sacred divination like the Semitic portable sanctuary, and it may be compared with the sacred tents of the Omaha.[4] The Tabernacle, elaborately

[1] Fergusson, i. 277 f.; H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, 2 vols., London, 1880.

[2] L. Fournereau, *Le Siam ancien, archéologie, épigraphie, géographie* (*AMG* xvii., xxxi.), Paris, 1896–1908; Spiers, in Fergusson, ii. 404 ff.

[1] See art. Door, § 2, vol. iv. p. 849[a].

[2] L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 287 ff.; Fergusson, i. 290 f.

[3] Waddell, p. 300; see also his *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, London, 1905, p. 361 ff.

[4] See § 2 (*f*) above.

described by P, and containing the Ark, was probably never more than an ideal priestly construction projected upon the past. The Ark was later kept in a 'house' or temple at Shiloh (1 S 1^9 $3^{3.15}$), which may have been destroyed by the Philistines, who carried off the Ark. On its recovery, it was kept from time to time in private houses, and possibly in a tent (2 S 7^6), as it was so kept later by David at Jerusalem (2 S 6^{17}; cf. 11^{11}). Tents were also used after the settlement in Canaan on the 'high places' (2 K 23^7, Ezk 16^{16}, 'sewn high places').

What the 'house' at Shiloh was like we have no means of knowing, but probably it was not elaborate. Micah's image and other religious objects were kept in an apartment of his house (Jg 17^5 18^{18}). When captured by the Danites, these were placed in a sanctuary at Laish. At Nob there was a sanctuary with its priesthood, containing an ephod and a table of holy bread (1 S 21).

Tent and high place were succeeded by the Temple built by Solomon. It stood within a great court as one of a series of buildings, including the palace, and was thus dominated by the latter, to some extent, though it was itself the chief building. It had its own 'court of the temple,' surrounded by a wall of stone and cedar.

The Temple was an oblong structure of stone, faced by a porch, in front of which stood two bronze pillars called Jachin and Boaz, like those in front of other Semitic temples. The structure, exclusive of the porch, which was of equal breadth with the Temple, was 60 cubits long, 20 broad, and 30 high. It was divided by a partition with doors into a Holy Place (*hēkāl*) and an Oracle, or Most Holy Place (*debîr*)—a square dark chamber 20 cubits in each direction, leaving a space of 10 cubits above it. The interior walls were lined with cedar, carved, and ornamented with gold, and the floor was of cypress. Between the walls of the structure and an outer wall, running round the sides and back to the height of 20 cubits, were three storeys of rooms for treasure and Temple ornaments. In the Temple wall, above these, there were latticed windows. The Oracle, or Most Holy Place, the *adytum*, was the dwelling of Jahweh, and contained the Ark with the cherubim. In the Holy Place stood the altar of shewbread, the altar of incense,[1] and ten candlesticks, five on each side. Outside the porch, which faced east, was the altar of burnt-offering, and near it a brazen sea supported by metal oxen, as well as ten smaller lavers on wheels. The people gathered for worship in the court, though it is called 'the priests' court.' The Holy Place was for the priests alone—a suggestive difference, appearing now for the first time.[2]

Thus the main features of the Temple were common with those of Syrian and Phœnician temples of the period—porch, outer chamber, and *adytum*—though some have suggested Egyptian influences in its construction.[3]

Ezekiel's ideal Temple has the same division of inner and outer sanctuaries and porch, but there are two courts, an inner one for the priests, an outer for the laity; and the sacred building was to be entirely dissociated from all secular buildings, and was also to be shut out from Jerusalem by the lands of the Zadokites.[4]

Zerubbabel's Temple of the restoration period had an outer court with walls and gates, and an inner court in which stood the altar of unhewn stones, and perhaps a laver. Into the inner court the laity appear to have had access for a time at least. The Temple itself had a Holy of Holies, but was unique among temples in possessing no representation or symbol of deity, the Ark having been lost. The presence of deity, however, was marked by the ritual of the Day of Atonement. The Holy of Holies was separated from the Holy Place by a curtain, and this chamber contained the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and the seven-branched candlestick. The Holy Place was entered by a curtain.

Herod's Temple, built about 20 B.C., was on a larger scale than any of its predecessors, but the general plan was the same.

A large outer court—'the court of the Gentiles'—was surrounded by porticoes or cloisters with marble pillars, built against the enclosing battlemented wall. Within the area, on a raised platform, was a second court surrounded by a terrace and an enclosing wall with nine gates, and with chambers and porticoes on its inner side. Within this none but Jews might enter. A wall across the breadth of this inner court divided it into two parts, the smaller of which was 'the court of the women.' The other part was open to male worshippers, and within its area stood the temple building, surrounded by a breastwork of stone enclosing the court of the priests. Within this court priests only could enter, except when a layman offered a sacrifice which required his presence. The Temple within this inner area was preceded by a lofty porch and gateway. This gave access to the *hēkāl*, or Holy Place, across the great door of which hung a curtain, and this again to the *debîr*, the Holy of Holies, across the entrance to which hung two curtains. Above these was an upper storey, and a side building of three storeys surrounded the Temple on three sides. In the *hēkāl*, which was open only to the priests, stood the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and seven-branched candlestick. The *debîr* was empty and quite dark, and was entered by the high-priest alone on the Day of Atonement. In front of the porch outside stood the altar of burnt-offering and the laver. The building was of white marble, and the eastern front and part of the walls were covered with gold.[1] The *debîr* was 20 cubits square; the *hēkāl* 40 cubits long, 20 broad, and 40 high. The porch was 100 cubits high, 100 broad, and 20 in depth, and extended on both sides beyond the Temple, with its side buildings, by some 15 cubits. Herod had raised many pagan temples throughout his dominions, and he erected this for the Jews in his capital partly as a matter of policy.

5. **Conclusion.**—A general survey of temples shows that the essential part is the *cella*, or chamber, for the image of the god, and that, whatever additions are made by way of increasing the splendour of the temple or as adjuncts to it, this remains constant, and is indeed its most important feature. It is the holy place, and is seldom if ever entered save by the priests. The temple at Eleusis forms an exception, for apparently there all was open to the worshippers. But generally worship takes place in the temple area or within the hall preceding the *cella*, which is very often dark and unlit by windows. The Jewish synagogue, the Muhammadan mosque, and the Christian church are not strictly temples, for they are not houses enclosing a divine image, but places of public prayer. Yet even in the mosque the recess, or *mihrāb*, indicating the direction of the *ka'bah*, towards which the worshipper prays, has a certain parallel to the *cella* with its image which the worshipper also faces. The great mosque at Mecca also contains the *ka'bah* with the sacred black stone, and the *ka'bah* is an old but reconstructed sanctuary within the mosque. In the Christian church the chancel and the sanctuary with the altar are not ordinarily open to the laity assembled in the nave, but yet they approach the altar at the Holy Communion.

Certain temples are national holy places, like the Pantheon at Rome, the *ka'bah* at Mecca, and similar great temples in important centres. Pilgrimages are often made to temples, and temples form asylums whither criminals flee for safety. Frequently there is much symbolism connected with the temple, and attention is paid to the direction in which it faces, most temples facing the east or the place of the rising sun. Very often in connexion with one great temple there will be a series of lesser shrines for other divinities, all forming a group of sacred buildings within the area. The area is usually enclosed by a wall with gates, which are often most elaborate, and avenues, while pillars and poles stand about it, and it is often decorated with flags and streamers. It is interesting also to notice how frequently with the change of a religion the old sacred places are retained, and successive buildings occupy the old site, or the same temple serves for new deities.

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[1] 1 K 7^{48}, perhaps a later addition to the text.
[2] 1 K 6 f., 2 Ch 3 f.
[3] Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31, describes the temple at Hierapolis, with its court, altar, pillars, *pronaos*, and *cellæ*. It faced eastwards.
[4] Ezk $48^{8ff.}$.

[1] Jos. *BJ* v. v., *Ant.* xv. xi.; Mishnāh, tr. *Middoth*.

R. P. Spiers, 2 vols., do. 1910, *The Temples and other Buildings in the Haram Area at Jerusalem*, do. 1878; G. R. M. Maindron, *L'Art indien*, Paris, 1898; Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Tempel'; G. Perrot and C. Chipiez, *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, 9 vols., Paris, 1882–1911; O. Schrader, *Reallexicon der indogerman. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, *s.v.* 'Tempel.'

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TEN ARTICLES.—See CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 851.

TEN COMMANDMENTS.—See DECALOGUE.

TENDAI.—See PHILOSOPHY (Japanese).

TERAPHIM.—See IMAGES AND IDOLS (Hebrew).

TEUTONIC RELIGION.—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—**1. Position of the Teutonic peoples.**—We have no detailed information (and indeed little historic evidence of any kind) relating to the Teutonic peoples before the time of Julius Cæsar (58 B.C.). For the first one and a half centuries A.D., however, a comparatively large amount of evidence is obtainable. During this time the area occupied extended from the Rhine to the basin of the Vistula. From the Roman empire it was separated by the rivers Rhine and Danube and by a fortified line connecting these two rivers. On the east and south-east the boundaries of the Teutonic area cannot be determined with any precision—the plain of Hungary was occupied largely by Sarmatian peoples, but it seems probable that the Teutonic peoples extended into the basin of the river Dneister. In the north they undoubtedly occupied the kingdom of Denmark and considerable portions of the Scandinavian peninsula.

From the 3rd to the 6th cent. the Teutonic peoples extended their dominions considerably to the south-east, south, and west. The Goths conquered a large portion of S. Russia, and from about 260 to 270 the Romans had to give up to them their territory of Dacia (north of the Lower Danube); moreover, about the same time the Alamanni occupied the Black Forest region. During the 4th cent. bands of warriors, in ever-increasing numbers, began to enter the Roman service, and towards the close of the century a large section of the Goths was admitted *en bloc* within the Roman territories in the Balkan Peninsula. Between 406 and 486 all the western territories of the empire were conquered by the Teutonic peoples, of which the most important were: (1) Visigoths, who occupied S. France and Spain after 412; (2) Ostrogoths, who occupied Italy, 489–553; (3) Vandals, who crossed the Rhine in 406, and in 429 passed over into Africa, which they held for over 100 years; (4) Burgundians, who crossed the Rhine shortly after the Vandals and in 443 occupied S.E. France; (5) Alamanni, who went into Alsace and Switzerland about the same time; (6) Bavarians, who occupied the Alpine regions farther east probably about the same date; (7) Franks, who conquered and occupied successively one part after another of Gaul from 428 onwards, becoming supreme by their victory over the Visigoths in 507; (8) Langobardi, who, after occupying for some time the province of Austria and the Alpine regions to the south, passed into Italy about 568 and brought the greater part of the peninsula under their dominion; (9) English, who conquered and occupied most of the southern half of Britain from about the middle of the 5th cent. onwards.

Before the end of the 8th cent. a new series of movements began among the Northern peoples, an activity almost entirely maritime and lasting throughout the 9th and 10th centuries; this period was commonly known as the Viking Age. While it lasted, large numbers of piratical adventurers settled on the coasts of the Scottish islands, of Ireland, of the Netherlands, and of N. France. The last named, occupied by the vikings under the leadership of Hrólfr, son of Rögnvald, officer of Harold the Fair-haired, king of Norway, became after 911 the earldom of Normandy. From 866 onwards a large part of England too came under Scandinavian rule, though this domination was only temporary. In 870, however, those Norwegian chieftains who were unwilling to accept the sovereignty of Harold the Fair-haired began permanently to settle in Iceland, and more than 100 years later, in 985, Greenland was colonized from Iceland. Contemporaneous with these events were similar movements across the Baltic, which probably emanated mainly from Sweden. The establishment of the Russian kingdom (traditional date 859) was due to such bands of adventurers. In the East we hear of raids by parties of Scandinavians as far as the Caspian.

2. The conversion of the Teutonic peoples.—As conversion was in general due to direct contact with the Romans, we find those Teutonic peoples first converted who were settled within the territories of the empire. Before the middle of the 4th cent. the conversion of the Goths by Wulfilas to the Arian form of the Christian religion had begun and was practically complete within a generation. From them this religion must have spread very rapidly to the Gepidæ in E. Hungary and to other neighbouring peoples, since the Vandals appear to have been converted before the great movement to the West began. The Rugii in the province of Austria, the Langobardi, and some of the Burgundians also adopted the Arian form of Christianity, while the Franks before the close of the 5th cent. and the English in the 7th were converted to Catholicism. It was due largely to the efforts of Irish and English missionaries that between the 6th and 8th centuries the remaining peoples on the Continent (except the Danes), viz. Alamanni, Bavarians, Old Saxons, and Frisians, were converted. In the 8th cent. after great difficulty Charlemagne enforced the adoption of Christianity throughout the territory of the Old Saxons who had been conquered by him. Among the Danes and the Swedes missionary enterprises met with some temporary success, especially in the 9th cent. during the time of the missionary bishop Ansgar (826 to his death in 865). But Christianity was not permanently established in Denmark till after the defeat of Harold Gormsson by Otto II. in 973. In Norway Hákon I. (934–960) and his successors Harald II. and his brothers (960–975) were Christians, but the country was very little affected till the time of Olaf Tryggvason (995–1000), to whom conversion was really due. Many of the Scandinavians settled in the British Isles were converted before the close of the 9th cent., and these countries had become entirely Christian in the course of the 10th century. Some of the early settlers of Iceland had been converted to Christianity in the British Isles, but it was abandoned by their descendants and not established in the island till 1000. The traditional date of the establishment of Christianity in Sweden was 1008, but it was only towards the close of the 11th cent. that the heathen religion was entirely abolished. The adoption of Christianity by the Russians dates from 988.

3. Authorities.—(1) The little information which we possess relating to the religion of the Teutonic peoples during the period before their invasion of Roman territories in the 5th cent. is derived from the writings of Cæsar, Strabo, and Tacitus—especially from Tacitus' *Germania*, written in the 1st century. Some little evidence is also furnished by Roman inscriptions. Still less information is to be obtained from the period during which the Teutonic peoples living on the Continent were converted, though a few scattered notices are preserved in the writings of Ammianus Marcellinus (late 4th cent.), of Jordanes (*c.* 550), and especially of Procopius (about the same

date). In the 8th and 9th centuries a little evidence is to be derived from laws and capitularies in which heathen practices are prohibited, and survivals of heathen practices are occasionally noticed in writings of a much later date. The authorities until the 6th cent. are entirely Greek and Latin, in the 7th Latin alone, and with the exception of Jordanes, a monk of Gothic family, we have no records of Teutonic nationality.

As to actual beliefs we learn very little. The only myth which has come down to us is of Langobardic origin and connected obviously with an attempt to explain the name of that people. It occurs for the first time in the *Origo gentis Langobardarum*, an anonymous work dating probably from the 7th century. There are also two German metrical charms from Merseburg which deal with mythological subjects (10th cent. MSS). Beyond this we have scarcely more than a few names, particularly those of the days of the week, which are translations from Latin and date probably from the 4th century.

(2) *English.*—In England most of the evidence available, which is but little, is contained in the writings of Bede († 735), who in the *Chronicle* attached to the *de Ratione Temporum* has left an account of the calendar used by the English in heathen times. A few references to their religion before conversion are preserved also in the *Ecclesiastical History*. No Anglo-Saxon poems have come down to us in a purely heathen form, but a certain amount of information relating to heathen practices and beliefs may be obtained from *Beowulf* and also from certain shorter poems, especially from charms. We may also learn something of the mythological conceptions of the English from glossaries, letters, and other writings.

(3) *Danes and Swedes.*—Certain foreign Latin works throw light on the religion of the Danes and Swedes. Particular mention may be made (for the Swedes) of the *Life of St. Ansgar* written by his disciple Rimbertus, and of the work of Adam of Bremen, who in the 4th book of his *History of the Church of Hamburg* gives an important description of the sanctuary at Upsala. Later Danish historians add considerably to our knowledge both of religion and of mythology for Danes and Swedes. In particular we have the *Danish History* of Saxo Grammaticus (*c.* 1200), much of the information in which is obtained from Icelandic sources. He himself acknowledges this in his reference to the men of Thule:

'Their stores, which are stocked with attestations of historical events, I have examined somewhat closely, and have woven together no small portion of the present work by following their narrative.'[1]

Some important evidence from earlier times is also to be obtained from inscriptions and sculptured monuments of the heathen period.

(4) *Norway and Iceland.*—(*a*) For the religion of Norway and Iceland far more abundant information is available from the Icelandic sagas, the evidence of which varies greatly in value. First in importance are the *Íslendinga Sögur* ('Stories of the People of Iceland'), anonymous works written chiefly in the 13th cent., though a few may be slightly older. These are based on oral sagas—stories preserved by oral tradition in a more or less fixed form of words—from the latter part of the 10th and early 11th centuries. Among these special mention may be made of *Eyrbyggja Saga*, which in its early chapters gives an account of the religious practices of a certain Thórólfr of Mostr, who emigrated to Iceland *c.* 884 to escape from Harold the Fair-haired. Much information relating to religion is also given in *Egils Saga*, *Njáls Saga*, *Viga-Glúms Saga*. These sagas tell us not only of the religion of Iceland itself, but also of the homeland Norway both before and after the settlement. For throughout the period covered by the *Íslendinga Sögur* (till *c.* 1030) it was customary for Icelanders to visit the home country, and consequently the scene of the sagas is often laid in Norway.

Next in order to these come the *Stories of the Kings of Norway*, contained in the important collection known as the *Heimskringla* by Snorri Sturlason († 1241). As an authority for the period of Harold the Fair-haired, he is not inferior to the writers of the *Íslendinga Sögur*, but his account of earlier periods, contained in the first saga, *Ynglinga Saga*, is legendary. The longer sagas of *Ólaf Tryggvason* and of *St. Ólaf*, in the *Flateyjarbók* and in the *Fornmanna Sögur*, offer a large amount of additional information, which in general is of a more legendary character than Snorri's sagas of the same kings, but all these sagas deal primarily with Norway. Much information too about religious practices and beliefs is contained in various stories of ancient time—the *Fornaldar Sögur*—which, like the *Íslendinga Sögur*, are for the most part anonymous, but of which the authority is much inferior to that of the latter. In part they are derived from earlier poems, some of which are inserted in the text. But there is no doubt that much fiction is embodied in these stories. The most important are *Hervarar Saga ok Heidhreks Konungs* and *Gautreks Saga*.

(*b*) For Norse mythology the chief sources of information are the poems commonly known as the Older Edda, the MSS of which date only from the 13th century. The poems themselves, on the other hand, are for the most part considerably older, most of those on mythological subjects dating probably from the 10th cent. and even in some cases from the 9th, and belonging consequently to the heathen period. The poems which give us most information are *Völuspá*, *Vafthrúthnismál*, and *Grimnismál*. The first deals with the cosmogony and fate of the gods. The second is in the form of a dialogue on mythological lore between Othin and the giant Vafthrúthnir. The third is a monologue by the disguised Othin, who gradually reveals himself by his mythological knowledge. Next in order of importance are *Lokasenna*, another dialogue poem in which Loki attacks various gods and goddesses with scandalous charges; *Skirnismál*, which tells of the wooing of Gerthr for the god Freyr; *Hymiskvitha* and *Thrymskvitha*, descriptions of the adventures of the god Thor; *Vegtanskvitha* ('Balder's Dreams'), a dialogue between Thor and a ferryman supposed to be Othin; *Alvíssmál*, a dialogue between Thor and a dwarf; *Hyndluljóth*, a dialogue between the goddess Freyja and a giantess Hyndla. Much mythology is also contained in the philosophical poem *Hávamál*, and incidentally in some of the heroic poems in the same collection.

In addition to the Edda poems there have been preserved the so-called 'skaldic' poems dating from the 9th and 10th centuries by known authors. The earliest of these (early 9th cent.) are fragments of poetry by Bragi Boddason, some of which are preserved, and which we know come from *Ragnarsdrápa*. To the late 9th cent. belong the *Ynglingatál* and *Haustlöng* by Thjóthólfr of Hvin, a genealogical poem describing the ancestors of the Norwegian royal family. To the same century belongs the poet, Thórbjörn Hornklofi. The *Eiríksmál*, an incomplete poem whose authorship is unknown, describes the death of Eric Blood-axe shortly after 954.

There are also extant two poems by Eyvindr Skaldaspillir, the *Hákonarmál* recounting the death of Hákon I. in 960, a copy of the *Eiríksmál*, and the *Hálleygjatál*, a genealogical poem dealing with the ancestors of the earls of Lathir, and modelled on *Ynglingatál*. References to mythology are also contained in many other poems.

It is to be noted that our knowledge of mythology comes almost entirely from Icelandic sources, for even the Norwegian poems—including the poems of the Edda, many of which were doubtless composed in Norway—are preserved only in Icelandic MSS. The chief reason for this phenomenon is doubtless to be found in the peculiar faculty for oral tradition developed in Iceland during the 11th cent. or slightly earlier, for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in Europe, except in Ireland. The unusual conditions under which Iceland was converted afford another reason, for there Christianity was not forced from above, as in countries with monarchical government. Indeed in Iceland there existed no strong central power which could effectively stamp out the observances and eradicate the remembrance of the old faith. The traditions of the heathen age survived the hostility of the Church in the 11th cent. and formed evidently a leading source of literary and antiquarian interest to subsequent generations.

A systematic account of Norse mythology is given in Snorri's Edda (commonly called the Prose Edda), the first part of which, *Gylfaginning* ('the Befooling of Gylfi'), is entirely devoted to the subject. Much mythology too is also introduced incidentally into the second part, *Skáldskaparmál* ('the Language of Poetry'). The chief authorities used by Snorri here are the poems of the Edda (*Völuspá*, *Vafthrúthnismál*, and *Grimnismál*). He makes use also of some lost poems and also no doubt of oral tradition.

Another account, which, however, has very little in common with the Edda, is given by the same author in the opening chapters of *Ynglinga Saga*. In it the gods are represented as having lived on earth as the rulers of the Swedes in ancient times—an account in which the euhemeristic element is prominent. A certain amount of mythological information also is afforded by the *Fornaldar Sögur*.

(*c*) The chief authority for the ethics of heathen times is the Edda poem called *Hávamál*, which, properly speaking, appears to be a composite work, made up of five different poems. In substance it may be compared with Hesiod's *Works and Days* or with the early Egyptian *Wisdom of Ptah-hetep*.[1] Such maxims occur in several other Edda poems, particularly in *Fáfnismál* and *Sigrdrífumál*. They are also common in the earliest Anglo-Saxon poems, though these do not often contain distinctively heathen precepts. The ethical standards of heathen times are no doubt faithfully portrayed in early Norse poetry and in sagas relating to the same period. With certain reservations the same may be said of *Beowulf* and other Anglo-Saxon poems.

4. Difficulties.—One of the greatest difficulties which the student of Teutonic mythology has to face is the question of how far the mythology and religious practices found in Iceland alone or in Iceland and Norway were shared also by the Danes and Swedes or by the Teutonic peoples in general. Indeed so little evidence is available, except for Iceland and Norway, that neither positive nor negative conclusions can be drawn with any confidence. Thus we have no information except from Norwegian-Icelandic sources of some of the more important deities, such as Freyja and Heimdallr; yet are we justified in assuming that these deities were unknown except in Norway and Iceland? One is forced to hesitate; for occasionally evidence is forthcoming for characters or conceptions which one might justifiably have assumed to be the creation of Norse literature. Othin's horse, Sleipnir—to quote one instance—is

[1] Tr. O. Elton, p. 5.

[1] Tr. by E. A. W. Budge ('Egyptian Library').

represented as having eight legs in Norse mythology, and we find a clear representation of such a horse on an engraved monument at Tjängvide, Götland.[1] The riding *valkyrjur* too (one of the most picturesque conceptions of Norse mythology) might well have been regarded as the creation of Norwegian poetry, had we not met with the same conception on a Swedish inscription at Rök; indeed with great probability it may be traced also in an Anglo-Saxon charm.

Another difficulty which confronts the student is that at first sight there appears to be an irreconcilable discrepancy between the account of Norse mythology given by Snorri and the references to religious beliefs and observances recorded in the *Íslendinga Sögur*. The former represents Othin as the chief and most important god of the Norse pantheon; and the early poems of the Edda and of the skalds agree with this representation. The *Íslendinga Sögur*, on the other hand, scarcely records a single instance of worship of Othin. In them Thor is by far the most prominent deity, and after him Freyr. It is only in the *Fornaldar Sögur* and in the other sagas relating to the legendary period[2] that we find Othin prominent. The explanation of this fact is probably that the worship of Othin and that of Thor belong to different classes of the population; the former was the god of the royal families and of their military followers, while the latter was the god of the free population in general. Kingship never existed in Iceland, and very few settlers appear to have been of royal blood, and consequently the god of this class of society, though still celebrated in poetry, does not seem to have received any actual worship.

Lastly, one characteristic of Norse mythology may doubtless be accounted for by the fact that so much of our information is drawn from Iceland. In peculiar contrast to the mythologies of other peoples, the Norse deities are not associated with particular localities, and herein no student can fail to contrast Norse and Greek mythologies. Freyr indeed is traditionally associated with Upsala, and there are indications which connect Gifjón with Sjaelland; but these instances are rare. The homes of the gods mentioned in the Edda poems—Breithablik, the home of Balder, Himinbjörg, the home of Heimdallr, etc.—seem to be purely mythical. Some evidence is to be found in place-names, however, that various deities were connected with localities in Norway, Sweden, and Iceland as well as with districts in other Teutonic lands. The reason for this comparative absence of local association is obviously to be found in the fact that by their emigration the colonists were cut off from the ancient sanctuaries of their race.

II. *GODS, SPIRITS, AND MYTHICAL BEINGS.*—Since Norse literature offers an abundance of material for the study of its mythology and religion, it seems almost necessary to make it the basis of any description of Teutonic mythology and religion. In the following account under each heading an attempt will be made to show also how far the testimony available for the mythology of the other Teutonic peoples is corroborative or discordant. In the first place, it is convenient to distinguish between (1) beings essentially mythical and (2) beings or phenomena in themselves natural but treated mythologically.

1. BEINGS ESSENTIALLY MYTHICAL.—This class consists of the following: (1) *æsir* (sing. *áss*) and *vanir*, (2) *jötnar* (sing. *jötunn*), (3) *dvergar* (sing. *dvergr*), (4) *álfar* (sing. *álfr*), (5) *nornir* (sing. *norn*), (6) *valkyrjur* (sing. *valkyrja*), (7) *fylgjur* (sing. *fylgja*), (8) *landvættir*, (9) such impersonal conceptions as Yggdrasil's ash.

[1] Cf. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age*, i. 58.
[2] Cf. *Ynglinga Saga*.

1. **Æsir and vanir.**—(*a*) *Norse.*—It is a peculiar characteristic of Norse mythology that it possesses two classes of gods. To the *æsir* belong Othin, his sons Thor, Balder, Vali, Vithar,[1] his brothers Vili and Ve,[2] and others. To the *vanir* belong Njörthr and his children Freyr and Freyja. Possibly also to the same class belongs Heimdallr, for, though this is not altogether proved by *Thrymskvitha*, 14, yet the fact that he is often associated with Freyja, apparently as her guardian, points in this direction.[3]

The story of the relationship of the two sets of gods is told most fully in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4. There had been a war between them, which was eventually settled by an exchange of hostages. Njörthr and his children were given as hostages to the *æsir*, and Hœnir accompanied by Mimir was sent as a pledge to the *vanir*. This story, in part at least, is known to early poetry. In *Völuspá*, 24, it is suggested that the *vanir* were successful, while in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 39, we are told that Njörthr had been given as a hostage to the *æsir*, and that he would return home to the *vanir* at the '*Ragnar Rök*.'

Apart from the *vanir* the divine mythology is confined to the *æsir*, in which term all the gods collectively are included. With them there are goddesses, known comprehensively as *ásynjur*, the chief of whom is Frigg, wife of Othin. Often Freyja of the *vanir* is included with this group.[4]

Besides the *æsir* and the *vanir*, we find two deities who belong to neither class and who indeed are never brought into connexion with the Norse pantheon, viz. Thorgerthr Hölgabruthr and her sister Irpa. Their worship was very prominent in Norway during the last years of the heathen age, especially under Earl Hákon of Lathir, who ruled Norway from 975 to 995 and who was specially devoted to their cult. Of myths connected with them we have no mention in Norse literature except what is apparently a confused reminiscence in *Skáldskaparmál*, 45. Their story is told only by Saxo,[5] who says that Thora (Thorgerthr) is the daughter of Cuse (*i.e.* Gusi), king of the Lapps, and wife of Helgi, the eponymous hero of Halogaland. It is generally believed that these deities hail from the north of Norway, and their character is Finnish (Lappish) rather than Norse.

Under the lordship of Othin the gods form an organized community, which is evidently modelled after the fashion of the ancient Scandinavian community. They have a council of twelve, whose duty it is to keep up the sacrifices, to deliberate on the government of the country, and to judge between man and man.[6] Councils of this type are found in many early Scandinavian countries, and there can be little doubt that in heathen times they had religious as well as judicial functions. In *Grímnismál* the gods are said to meet daily at Yggdrasil's ash. From the same poem we learn that each of the gods had a home of his own, the names of which are apparently mythical and generally adapted to the character of the god, Breithablik for Balder, Alfheimr granted as a tooth gift (*at tannfé*) to Freyr, etc. The most frequently mentioned is Othin's home of Valhöll ('the hall of the slain'), where he, together with the valkyries, entertains hosts of slain warriors, who pass their days in combat and their nights in feasting. In *Gylfaginning*, 23, some verses are quoted indicating that Njörthr loves living by the sea-shore, while his wife Skathi, daughter of Thjazi, a *jötunn*, prefers to dwell in her father's home, the mountains. Wherefore a compact is made by which they divide their time between the two places—Njörthr's home is called here

[1] Cf. *Gylfaginning*, 30, 51; *Grímnismál*, 17.
[2] Cf. *Gylfaginning*, 6.
[3] Heimdallr's father is not mentioned, but he is said to be the son of nine mothers, whose names are enumerated in the closing stanzas of *Hyndluljóth*.
[4] See art. God (Teutonic)
[5] Tr. O. Elton, p. 87 ff. [6] Cf. *Gylf.* 20

Nóatún. The association of Freyr with Upsala does not belong to this category.

Besides their individual homes, the gods collectively are said to inhabit Asgarthr. Their meeting-place is called Ytha-völlr.[1] In *Gautreks Saga*, 7, the hero Starkathr is represented as attending a conference of them held in a forest clearing. The significance of this (together with Yggdrasil's ash and the fact that *völlr* originally meant 'wood') is seen below, § IV.

A totally different account of the gods is given by Snorri, curiously enough, in the early chapters of *Ynglinga Saga*. Here they are represented as men who had once lived on the earth and come to Sweden from S.E. Europe. Othin is represented as dying and being succeeded in the leadership of the gods by Njörthr, whose reign was marked by prosperity and peace. The latter on his death was succeeded by his son Freyr, whose reign was of the same character. Freyr was succeeded by his sister Freyja, and she in turn by Freyr's sons, grandsons, etc., who are no longer represented as gods.[2] This story is no doubt of euhemeristic origin, but the association of Freyr with Upsala is ancient and traditional. In Saxo he is represented as instituting the Upsala sacrifices and is said to be the ancestor of certain Swedish warriors. *Ynglinga Saga* itself is largely based on an early poem *Ynglingatál*, which traces the ancestry of the ancient Norwegian royal family through the Swedes to Freyr, who is no doubt to be identified with Fricco of Adam of Bremen's account.[3]

There are many stories relating the appearances of the gods to men. These occur most frequently in the *Fornaldar Sögur*, and the deity most mentioned is Othin.[4]

(*b*) *Danish and Swedish.*—On examining non-Norse sources, we find a number of the Norse gods mentioned by Saxo, including Woden (Othin), Thor, Freyr, Frigg, and Oller (Ullr), as well as Balder and Hoder (Höthr), who, however, are by him represented as demi-god and human being respectively. It is not always clear how far Saxo draws from Icelandic sources, but there can be little doubt that these deities were known to him from Danish tradition. Freyr is constantly associated with Upsala and Sweden, and Saxo is also the only authority who gives the story of Oller (Ullr).[5] With Saxo the home of the gods is sometimes called Byzantium, which apparently is used to translate Asgarthr.

With regard to Swedish beliefs, we have important earlier evidence in Adam of Bremen's description of the sanctuary at Upsala. This contained the images of three gods, Thor, Woden (*i.e.* Othin), and a deity Fricco, who is in all probability to be identified with Freyr. No stories of the gods are, however, recorded from Sweden. In much earlier times we have a short account of the religion of the people of Thule (*i.e.* Scandinavia) written by Procopius.[6] The only deity specially mentioned by him is Ares, and it is not clear whether by this name we are to understand Othin or Tyr. An early trace of worship of Freyr may be preserved in the name Prove(n)—the god among the Wagri of N.E. Holstein.[7]

(*c*) *English.*—For the mythology of the heathen English we have little or no information except that to be obtained from names. The A.S. word *ós*, corresponding to the O.N. *áss*, occurs as the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet (though here apparently its meaning is forgotten).[8] It also is to be found very frequently in personal names, as in Oswald, and the plural form occurs only in the genitive *esa* in an A.S. charm.[9] The form *van-* does not occur, except rarely in personal names—*e.g.*, Wanræd—unless this is possibly the origin of the prefix *wan-* in *wanseoc* ('epileptic'), in which case we might compare *elf-adl* in Saxon *Leechdoms*,[1] ii. 344. 20.

Othin's name also is preserved—A. S. Woden—as the ancestor of all the royal families except that of Essex, which traced its genealogy to a certain Seaxneat. His name is also preserved in 'Wednesday' (as a translation of 'Mercurius'). Thunor (O.N. Thorr) is known only from 'Thursday' (where his name is used to translate 'Juppiter') and from certain place-names, *e.g.*, Thunresleah and Thunresfeld.[2]

The name of Fri (*i.e.* Frigg) is preserved only in 'Friday' (as translation of 'Venus'), and Ti (Tiig) (O.N. Tyr) occurs in glossaries as translation of 'Mars,' and, like *os*, is the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet. His name is preserved also in 'Tuesday.' In Bede's account of the heathen English calendar two months (corresponding to March and April) are said to derive their names from goddesses called Rheda (Href?) and Eostre (Eastre). The existence of these deities has been doubted by some modern writers. We also find a reference, in a charm which appears to be a mixture of Christian and heathen beliefs, to Erce ('Mother of Earth'), with which we may compare Semnes Mate (Lettish).

Lastly, mention may be made of Ing, the name of one of the letters in the Runic alphabet. In the verses dealing with Ing he is said to have been seen first among the East Danes, but afterwards he went east over the sea, his car speeding after him.

(*d*) *German.*—With regard to German mythology, a fragment relating to gods is preserved in one of the Merseburg charms, in which we are told that Wodan and 'Phol' were riding to the forest when the pastern joint of the latter's horse was dislocated. Various deities tried by their incantations to put it right. The names mentioned are Frija and her sister Volla,[3] and Sinthgund and her sister Sunna. The only other myth recorded occurs in certain Langobardic writings and is rather striking.

'The two tribes of Vandals and Langobardi (then called Winniles) appealed to the gods for victory in their war with each other. The Vandals approached Woden, who replied: "Whatsoever I shall first look upon when the sun rises, to them will I give victory." The Winniles appealed to Frija, wife of Woden, who gave counsel that at sunrise the women of the Winniles should come with their husbands and let down their hair about their faces, like beards. And when Woden saw the Winniles women, he said: "Who are these Longbeards?" And Frija replied: "As thou hast given them a name give them also victory." And he gave them victory.'[4]

Apart from these references, the gods are known from the names of the week: Donar (O.N. Thorr; A.S. Thunor) throughout the German area; Fria (Frigg, Fri) at least in the greater part of German area; Wodan (Othin, Woden) only in the north-west and in Holland; Tiu (Ti, Tir) only in the south-west. Occasional references to the gods are also found in lives of missionary saints. Thus the worship of Wodan among the Alamanni is mentioned in Jona's *Life of Columbanus*, while in other cases German deities are no doubt intended by old names such as Juppiter. In a formula used after baptism and commonly supposed to have come from the region of the Old Saxons (though the language is rather peculiar) the convert is required to abjure Wodan and Thunor and Saxnot together with other monsters (*Unholden*) associated with them. This Saxnot is doubtless to be identified with the name that stands at the head of the genealogy of Essex. Lastly, in Alcuin's *Life of St. Willibrord* we hear of a god called Fosite. He was worshipped on a certain island, called after him and identified

1 *Gylf.* 24.
2 Cf. Saxo, tr. O. Elton, p. 228, 'sons of Frey.
3 Cf. *Hist. of the Church of Hamburg*, iv. 26.
4 *Völsunga Saga*, ch. 11; *ib.* ch. 17; *Víga-Glúms Saga*, 26; cf. *Fornmanna Sögur*, xi. 134.
5 See art. GOD (Teutonic). 6 *Gothic War*, ii. 15.
7 Cf. Helmoldus, *Chron. Slavorum*, 153. 70. 84.
8 Cf. *Runenlied*, str. 10, C. W. M. Grein, *Bibliothek der angelsächs. Poesie*, ed. R. P. Wülcher, Leipzig, 1881–98, i.
9 *Ib.* p. 318.

1 Ed. T. O. Cockayne, *Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Starcraft of Early England*, 3 vols., London, 1864–66.
2 Cf. Thundersleigh in Essex and Thundersfield in Surrey.
3 Cf. 'Fulla' of Norse mythology.
4 *Origo gentis Langobardarum.*

by Adam of Bremen with Halogaland.[1] Grimm and others have identified this deity with Forsete, the son of Balder,[2] but discrepancies in the spelling of the two names offer difficulty.

In Gothic no names of deities have been preserved, unless we place in this category the name of the Runic letter Enguz (A.S. Ing). The word *ansis*, however (O.N. *æsir*), is mentioned by Jordanes in a curiously interesting connexion. He states that the Goths called their chiefs to whose good fortune they thought they owed their victory, 'non puros homines sed semideos id est anses.'[3] In earlier times Tacitus,[4] though unfortunately he seldom mentions Teutonic gods by their native names, twice mentions Mars and Mercurius among the deities of the Germans, and in the *Germania* specially mentions Mercurius as the deity most worshipped by them. There can be no doubt that the deities meant are the later Ziu and Wodan (N. Tir and Othin). In ch. 9 too he mentions Hercules and in *Annals*, ii. 12, a grove sacred to him. It is not so easy to ascertain the identity of this deity. Some modern writers believe Donar (O.N. Thorr; A.S. Thunor) to be intended; others think the reference is to a tribal deity.[5] In the same chapter Tacitus states that some of the Suevi worship with the symbol of a ship. Here again we are left in doubt as to the identity of the deity. Perhaps we may include the 'templum Tamfanæ' mentioned in *Annals*, i. 51, and 'lucum quem Baduhennae vocant' in iv. 73, if these be the names of deities. In *Germ.* 43 he speaks of a grove in which Castor and Pollux are worshipped under the name of deities. The fullest account, however, of a Teutonic deity is that of Nerthus,[6] who was worshipped by certain maritime peoples including the English, and whose sanctuary was situated on an island, the position of which is not clearly stated by Tacitus but is probably to be placed in the S.W. Baltic. It is to be observed that the name Nerthus is identical with the O.N. Njörthr, and, in spite of the difference in sex, we need scarcely doubt their original identity. Rites similar to those which Tacitus describes in connexion with Nerthus are associated with Freyr, son of Njörthr.

Apart from Tacitus, practically the only references to Teutonic deities occur in inscriptions upon altars raised by soldiers in the Roman service. Besides Mars, these inscriptions sometimes record a deity Nehalennia with the prow of a ship, and this may point to the identification with the Isis of Tacitus. In the introduction to *Germ.* 2 Tacitus states that in their ancient poems the Germans trace the origin of their race to a god called Tuisto ('son of earth'). His son was Mannus (? 'man'), and he again had three sons from whom three groups of peoples were named and descended—the Ingaevones (or Inguaeones), Ermi[n]ones, Istaevones. These group-names are mentioned also by Pliny the Elder, and a genealogy of the kind classifying Teutonic and other peoples is found in Merovingian times. We have no trace elsewhere of any god or hero called Istio, but there is some slight evidence for an Irmen. The name Ingaevones (or Inguaeones) is undoubtedly to be connected with A.S. Ing, who is associated in tradition with the Danes and with the titles Inguina Eodor and Frea Inguina, used in *Beowulf* of the king of the Danes. It is further to be noticed that in Norse the god Freyr and his descendants sometimes bear the title Yngvi, the full title of the god being Yngvi-Freyr or Ingunar-Freyr. His descendants—the ancient kings of Sweden—are known collectively as Ynglingar. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy between Norse and English tradition, the former connecting the name with Sweden, the latter with Denmark. Whatever may be the explanation of this, the association of the word with Freyr, the son of Njörthr, seems to point to some connexion with the worship of Nerthus—a conclusion which is confirmed by the fact that Tacitus, with whom Pliny is substantially in agreement, describes the Ingaevones as 'proximi oceano.'

2. Jötnar.—(*a*) *Norse.*—Giants or monsters play an important part in the stories of Norse mythology. When viewed collectively, they are called *jötnar* or *thursar*. Sometimes also we hear of the *hrímthursar* ('frost-giants') and *bergrisar* ('cliff-giants'). Most often, however, they appear singly, and the corresponding feminine form of the word *jötunn* is *gygr*. Unlike the *æsir*, they do not appear to form an organized community as a whole, though sometimes individual *jötnar* (like Thrymr, 'Lord of the Thursar') seem to have communities under their dominion. The home of the giants is known as Jötunheimar, lying, according to early story, far to the north-east, remote from Asgarthr, the home of the *æsir*. The general characteristics of the giants were huge form and superhuman strength.

The story of Skrymnir[1] tells dramatically how huge and strong a giant was conceived to be in Norse literature. For the god Thor took refuge one night in the thumb of one of his gloves, and, when he attempted to kill the giant with a blow of his hammer, Skrymnir only asked whether a leaf had fluttered down into his face.

Although the giants may have had monster shapes, it seems clear that sometimes the giantesses were deemed very beautiful, as in the case of Gerthr, to whose radiant beauty Freyr lost his heart.

It is necessary to distinguish between anthropomorphic and theriomorphic giants, though it is difficult to draw a definite line between them; *e.g.*, Loki has theriomorphic children. Many of the former class are mentioned in myth, the best known being Thrymr, Hymir, Hrungnir, Geirröthr, and Thjazi, all of whom fight with Thor, and are slain by him.

Sometimes the *jötnar* are on friendly terms with the *æsir*. Hyrrokin, a giantess, attended Balder's funeral, and it was through an appeal to her strength that the funeral ship was able to be launched. Further, we find a number of marriages between gods and giants; Njörthr married Skathi, the daughter of Thjazi.[2] Freyr married Gerthr, daughter of Gymir; and even Thor, despite his general hostility, had a son Magni by a giantess Jarn-Saxa. This giantess, with others, including the daughter of Geirröthr, appears as the mother of Heimdallr in *Hyndluljóth*, but this part of the poem (the short *Völuspá*) is commonly believed to be a late composition. The giants too are often represented as wanting to marry *ásynjur*; Thjazi carries off Ithunn, and Freyja was sued for by Thrymr. It may here be mentioned that anthropomorphic giants often had the power to assume the form of animals. In the incident referred to above Thjazi assumes the form of an eagle, and in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 37, the wind-demon Hraesvelgr is described as a *jötunn* in the shape of an eagle.

Although the giants are presumably gifted with tremendous physical strength, they are not always lacking in intelligence, for we have the incident of Othin's visit to the giant Vafthrúthnir in order to learn of his store of wisdom.

The chief theriomorphic *jötnar* are the Mithgarthsormr, or Jörmundgandr, and the Fenrisulfr, both of whom together with Hel are said to be the offspring of Loki and the giantess Angrbotha ('she who bodes distress'). Mithgarthsormr is represented in *Gylfaginning*, 34, as a kind of vast sea-serpent stretching round the earth. In *Hymiskvitha*, 23, Thor goes fishing and catches it on his hook. Fenrisulfr is a wolf which the gods succeed after great difficulty in fettering, though not until he has bitten off Tyr's hand, which has been placed in his mouth as a pledge of the good faith of the gods.[3] At the end of the world he will burst his bonds and attack the gods in conjunction with Mithgarthsormr, Loki, Surtr (a fire-demon), and other monsters. Although usually found in the company of the *æsir*, it would seem that Loki belonged to the *jötnar*. Here also we should perhaps mention Ægir, also called Hlér, a sea being, who is on friendly terms with the gods and visits them.[4] From *Fornaldar Sögur*, ii. 17, it seems clear that he was the son of Fornjotr, and in *Hymiskvitha*, 1, 2, he is described as a *berg-búi* ('cliff-dweller'), an epithet which is elsewhere synonymous with *jötunn*. His wife is called Ran,

[1] Cf. Adam of Bremen, *De Situ Daniae*.
[2] Cf. *Gylf.* 32. [3] Ch. 13.
[4] *Ann.* xiii. 57; *Germ.* 9.
[5] For Irmen cf. below, IV. (*f*) (ii.).
[6] *Germ.* 40.

[1] Cf. *Gylf.* 45.
[2] According to *Háleygjatal*, she was later also the wife of Othin.
[3] Cf. *Gylf.* 34.
[4] Cf. *Lokasenna* (prose introduction); *Bragaroethur*, 55.

and is said to have a net in which she catches all who perish in the sea. There is a suggestion too from the story in *Frithjófs Saga*, 6, that a man fearing death by drowning would do well to carry gold on his person in order to be received well in the halls of Ran.[1]

Apart from mythological works monsters are not infrequently mentioned both in the *Íslendinga Sögur* and in sagas of the kings, as well as in the *Fornaldar Sögur*, though they are more usually called *tröll* than *jötnar*.

As examples we may refer to the two demons (male and female) at Sand Haugar in the north of Iceland encountered by Grettir;[2] the female demon who ate eleven merchants in a rest house in the Norwegian mountains;[3] and the monster Brusi and his mother in the form of a black cat encountered by Ormr Stórolfsson in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*.

In those *Fornaldar Sögur* which deal with the north of Norway, viz. *Ketil Saga Haengs* and *Grims Saga Lothinkinna*, monsters are frequently mentioned. It may be noticed that Thorgerthr Hölgabrúthr once appears among them,[4] and Saxo's *Danish History* abounds with such stories. Tales like these recall Procopius's remark: 'The rest of the inhabitants of Thule . . . worship many gods and demons in heaven and in air and in sea and certain other daemonias which are said to be in the waters of springs and rivers.'

A spring was the home of Mímir. His story is given in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4, where the *æsir* send him with Hoenir as pledges to the *vanir*, who cut off his head and return it to the *æsir*. Othin then smears the head with worts to preserve it and keeps it for divining purposes. In *Völuspá*, 45, Othin is said to converse with Mímir's head. We are told further[5] that under one of the roots of Yggdrasil's ash is Mímisbrunnr ('Mímir's spring'), in which are hidden cunning and wisdom. Othin came to the brook asking a drink and was refused until he left his eye as a pledge. This he granted, and in *Völuspá*, 28, the sybil says: 'Mímir drinks mead every morning from the pledge of Othin.'

A reference to a Miming is made by Saxo[6] in his story of Balder and Höthr. Here Miming is called the 'silvarum satyrus,' and is said to have in his possession a sword and magic bracelets, the former of which alone of all swords will prevail against the charmed life of Balder. At the beginning of *Thithreks Saga* too Mímir is the name of the smith, teacher of both Sigfrit and Velint. It is to be noted also that Miming was the name of Weland's famous sword in the poem of *Waldhere*.

Perhaps originally Mímir was famed for his wisdom, but later tradition laid stress on his skill in smith's work. His name is preserved in modern Swedish folk-lore—Mímis-sjö and Mímis-ä ('sea of Mímir' and 'river of Mímir'), both of which preserve his connexion with water. His name is also mentioned in the mediæval German poem *Biterölf* as 'Mîme the old.'

(*b*) *Anglo-Saxon.*—The A.S. forms corresponding to the Norse *jötunn* and *thurs* are *eoten* and *thyrs*, and both terms are applied in *Beowulf* to the monster Grendel, who with his mother dwells under a pool in the fens and makes attacks on the hall of the Danish king whose knights he devours. As far as we can gather, these beings are anthropomorphic. The story of Beowulf's encounters is clearly to be connected with those of Grettir and of Ormr Stórolfsson and presumably has its origin in a folk-tale. In A.S. literature ancient weapons are sometimes described as being made by the giants.[7] In the *Gnomic Verses*, which form the introduction to the Abingdon text of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, the *thyrs* is said to have his home in the fens.

[1] For Ymir, the primeval giant out of whose flesh the world was made, see art. Cosmogony and Cosmology (Teutonic).
[2] *Grettis Saga*, ch. 65.
[3] *Saga of Olaf the Holy* (*Heimskringla*), 151.
[4] *Ketil Saga Haengs*, 5.
[5] *Gylf.* 15 (drawn from *Völuspá*, 29). [6] P. 85.
[7] '*Eald sweord eotenisc*' (*Beowulf*, l. 1558). The same expression is used for buildings of the past: 'Visible from afar are the (cities) skilfully built by the giants.'

(*c*) *German.*—There is no doubt that these monsters were known also in Germany, where we find for them the words *duris* (i.e. *thurs*) and *risi*. No stories dating from very early times happen to have been preserved, but mediæval German poetry and legend abound with references to such beings.[1]

3. Dvergar.—(*a*) *Norse.*—*Dvergar* is the name given collectively to the dwarfs in Old Norse literature, and to many of them are assigned individual names in *Völuspá*, 15 ff., where also their creation is mentioned. In *Gylfaginning*, 14, Snorri tells us that they first received life as maggots in the flesh of Ymir, but were endowed with intelligence by the gods, and given human shape. The *dvergar* were said to live either down in the earth or more frequently in stones (rocks), in front of which they were sometimes seen in the evening.

Svegdir one evening at sunset saw a dwarf sitting under a stone, and, when the dwarf called him to go into the stone, he assented, whereupon it shut behind him and naught has been heard of him since.[2]

It is perhaps to their connexion with rocks that the word for echo—*dvergmál* ('dwarf-speech')—owes its origin. In Norse literature they were renowned particularly for their skill in metal-work, and many were the wonderful things fashioned by their hands—so much so that a compound word has been formed to denote great skill, viz. *dverg-hagr*.[3]

On most occasions the dwarfs appear in human form, though small, but in *Reginsmál* Andvari lives in a water-fall in the shape of a pike and is caught in that form by Loki, who borrows Ran's net for the purpose. It is from him that Loki gets the gold required to ransom himself and his companions, Othin and Hoenir, from Hraethmarr, and this incident afterwards plays an important part in the *Völsunga Saga*. After this episode Andvari withdraws into the stone and curses all who shall possess the gold.

Possibly, too, 'Mimingus, sylvarum satyrus' mentioned by Saxo is associated with dwarfs, and possibly this Miming is identical with Völundr or Weland, the most famous of all smiths.

(*b*) The word corresponding to O.N. *dvergr* is to be found in all languages of the Teutonic peoples extant—O.H.G. *twerg*, A.S. *dweorh*. In A.S. literature we find a charm against a dwarf. Dwarfs also figure in German folk-lore. Thus in the *Seyfriedslied* the treasure which the hero won again after killing the dragon belonged in reality to some dwarfs, sons of Nybling.

4. Alfar.—For these see art. Demons and Spirits (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 633.

5. Nornir.—For these see art. Doom, Doom Myths (Teutonic).

6. Valkyrjur.—(*a*) *Norse.*—Valkyries, or 'choosers of the slain,' were supernatural maidens sent by Othin to determine the course of battles and to choose warriors for Valhöll. They are also known as *valmeyjar*, *skjoldmeyjar*, and *óskmeyjar*, and in *Völuspá*, 31—if the phrase is not an interpolation—they are called *nönnur herjans*. By the Edda poems, *Grímnismál*, 36, and *Völuspá*, 31, we are given certain information about them, and of the former poem Snorri has made use in *Gylf.* 36. In *Grímnismál* our attention is drawn mainly to one aspect of the valkyries—their duties in Valhöll; for Othin is represented in the poem as crying to his maidens to bear him the ale as they do to the *einherjar*, when they are feasting in the evening in the hall. Here we have the names of thirteen valkyries given.

Snorri inserts this stanza from *Grímnismál* in his elaborate account of Valhöll in *Gylf.* 38, expanding it in prose and adding that Othin sends these maidens to battle. He specially mentions

[1] Cf. art. Demons and Spirits (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 634.
[2] *Ynglinga Saga*, 15; also *Hervarar Saga*, 2.
[3] See art. Demons and Spirits (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 638[b].

Guthr, Rosta, and Skuld, the youngest norn, as undertaking this work. It is this function of the valkyries that the poet of *Vǫluspá* deals with in str. 31 of the poem. He gives us a picture of a band of valkyries, six in number and named, equipped and ready to ride into battle. From other references in Norse literature we learn that they were seen riding through the air and over the sea (*'lopt ok lǫg'*), white and shining with their helmets, shields, and spears—a splendid company of maiden warriors.[1]

With the valkyries may perhaps be compared the Slavic conception of the *vila*, who was thought to ride a seven-year-old stag and bridle him with snakes. The characteristic, attributed to her by the Slavs, of discharging fatal darts at men while in the air is especially interesting when compared with a similar reference in an A.S. charm.[2]

Other valkyries, who became the wives and lovers of heroes, and are represented as human in origin, although included by Othin among his battle-maidens, are mentioned below.[3] From a story in Saxo[4] we hear of maidens called 'nymphæ sylvestres,' who seem to be valkyries.

Hotherus (O.N. Hǫthr), the enemy of Balder, was hunting in a wood when he came to a lodge where he was greeted by certain wood-maidens. They told him that it was their lot to determine the fortunes of war and that often they secretly assisted their friends in battle, and gained for them the victory.

Since the valkyries were so closely bound up with the fate of warriors and the issue of battles, it is clear that they cannot be entirely dissociated from the norns. The close relationship between the two conceptions is clearly seen in the poem given in *Njáls Saga*, 156.

There in the accompanying prose account a certain Darruthr saw women riding twelve together to a bower, and, looking within, he saw that they had set up a loom of which 'men's heads served for weights, men's entrails for the weft and warp, a sword for the *skeith*, and an arrow for the *hrselt*.' They sang at their work and in their song seemed to describe themselves as valkyries, and finally they rode away, six to the south and six to the north.

Moreover, in *Gylf.* 36 Skuld, the 'youngest norn,' is included among the valkyries. In contrast with the norns, however, the valkyries are in Norse mythology associated chiefly with Othin, whose messengers they are, though in one passage quoted from Saxo they seem to assist Hother, who is an enemy of the gods.

(*b*) *Anglo-Saxon.*—In A.S. literature we find on several occasions the word *waelcyrge* (O.N. *valkyrjur*). In glossaries[5] it is glossed 'Erinys,' 'Bellona,' 'Tisiphone.' In Wulfstan's *Sermo ad Anglos* the *waelcyrge* are classed together with other undesirable people, and in a charm mention is made of certain women who ride over the land and array their forces. They hurl darts at human beings, who are thereupon seized with sudden pain. The word *waelcyrge* is not mentioned in the latter example, but there can be little doubt that the lines refer to them.

(*c*) *German.*—In German the word does not occur, though the idea does in the Merseburg charm, where they are called *idisi*. They are represented as fastening bonds, holding back the host, and tugging at the fetters.

7. Fylgjur.—For these see art. SOUL (Teutonic).

8. Landvaettir.—Just as the *fylgja* presided over the individual, so the *landvaettir* presided over the country as its tutelary spirits. A certain number of references are to be found to them in Norse literature, not the least interesting being the heathen law mentioned in the *Landnámabók*, iv. 7, which ordered that figure-heads of ships were to be removed on approaching the island, lest they should frighten the *landvaettir* with their 'yawning heads and gaping snouts.' In *Egils Saga*, 57, Egill turns a curse against the *landvaettir* of Norway in order to force them to drive away King Eric and Queen Gunnhildr, from whom he was fleeing. Sometimes *landvaettir* seemed to favour certain individuals, as was the case with Björn, the he-goat whom they accompanied to the assembly, while his brothers were accompanied by them when hunting and fishing.[1]

The *landvaettir* seem not always to be very clearly distinguished from the *fylgjur* of individuals; *e.g.*, in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Heimskringla*), 36, it seems to be suggested that the *landvaettir* of Iceland seen by the wizard are connected in some way with the great chiefs of the land. The word *vaettr* (pl. *vaettir*) is identical with A.S. *wiht*, 'creature,' etc., although the latter has not the specialized meaning of Old Norse. For the idea itself we may refer to the *genius loci* of the Romans.

9. Yggdrasil's ash. — Our information for Yggdrasil's ash is mainly derived from *Vǫluspá*, 19, 20, 27, and *Grímnismál*, 29–35. References also occur in *Fjölsvinnsmál*, 13–18. From *Vǫluspá* we learn that the ash Yggdrasil stands ever green over the well of Urthr ('Fate'), and from it falls dew into the vales beneath. Under this tree dwell the three norns. In *Grímnismál* not only do we learn that the *æsir* go daily to the judgment-seat under the ash, but we are given many details about its appearance.

It has three roots stretching in three directions. Hel dwells under one, the frost-giants under a second, and under the third the children of men. Its branches are the home of an eagle, a hawk, and a squirrel Ratatoskr, who bears messages to Nithhöggr dwelling below. Four harts gnaw the topmost branches, and many are the serpents which lie under its boughs.

In *Gylf.* 15f. Snorri adds that in the spring of Fate dwell two swans, from whom are sprung all birds of that race, and also from the branches of the ash drops dew called 'honey-dew,' on which bees feed. The ash is sometimes called Yggdrasil, Askr Yggdrasils. Lærárthr, Mjotvithr, and Mímameithr seem to be names for the same tree. In both *Grímnismál* and *Fjölsvinnsmál* we have indications that the ash is being gradually destroyed; a hart bites it from above, it rots in its side, and Nithhöggr gnaws it from beneath. And, according to *Vǫluspá*, 47 f., when the last days come, it will shiver and groan. The golden foliaged Glasir which stands by 'Sigtyr's halls'[2] is perhaps to be identified with it. One other striking passage must be mentioned—*Hávamál*, 138, in which Othin is described as hanging on that tree of which no one knows from whose roots it proceeds.

A similar conception to that of a world-tree is certainly to be found among other Teutonic peoples—*e.g.*, among the Old Saxons, who worshipped the Irmensul. Several features in Adam of Bremen's description of the tree beside the temple of Upsala also recall Yggdrasil's ash.[3]

ii. NATURAL THINGS VIEWED MYTHOLOGICALLY.—**1. Day and night.**—From references in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 13, 25, Night, the daughter of Nörr, is depicted as driving across the sky her chariot and horse Hrímfaxi, from whose bit falls the spume which makes the dew in the valleys. Of Day we are only told that he is born of Dellingr. In *Gylf.* 10 Snorri gives further genealogical details.[4] In *Alvíssmál*, 30, is given a list of names by which Night is known among the *jǫtnar*, elves, and gods. In the document *Hversu Noregr Bygthist* we find a genealogy traced back to Swan the Red, son of Dagr, son of Dellingr, and of Sól, daughter of Mundilfari. For the personification of Night and Day, we may compare

[1] *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, 28, and *Hákonarmál*, *pass.*; cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 633[a].

[2] Cf. below, § II. i. 6 (*b*).

[3] Cf. below, § II. ii. 9. For the valkyries as swan-maidens see art. SWAN-MAIDENS.

[4] P. 84. [5] Cotton MS, Vitellius A 15.

[1] Cf. *Landnámabók*, iv. 12. [2] Cf. *Skáldskaparmál*, 36.

[3] Cf. schol. 134 to Adam of Bremen.

[4] See art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

Greek mythology, especially the allusions to the chariots of the Sun and the Moon.[1]

2. Sun and moon.—For these see art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

3. Rainbow.—To the old Norse people the rainbow was the bridge built by the gods to span the space between earth and heaven. Bifröst or Ásbru was its name, and it was triple-hued. Though it is made with cunning and of great strength, Snorri tells[2] that the day will come when it shall be broken. This bridge is referred to as Bifröst in the Older Edda, though it is not explicitly identified with the rainbow. In *Gylf.* 27 Heimdallr is named as guarding it against the frost and cliff giants.[3]

4. Winds and seasons.—In *Vafthrúthnismál*, 27, 37, references are made to the winds and seasons. The winds, according to the poet, arise from beneath the wings of the giant Hraesvelgr, who sits at the end of heaven in the likeness of an eagle. In *Vafth.* 27 Vindsvalr is said to be the father of Winter and Svasudhr of Summer. In *Gylf.* 18 f. Snorri gives further details, explaining that the difference between Summer and Winter is to be accounted for by the difference of parentage, for each has inherited the disposition of his father.

5. Thor.—In the preceding paragraphs we have been dealing with mythological conceptions which are scarcely distinguished from the natural bodies or phenomena which have given rise to them. There can be no doubt, however, that other mythological conceptions originated from similar phenomena in early times, though their identity with these was subsequently forgotten. Thus the name of the god Thor is identical with the word for 'thunder' preserved in English and German. The identity was practically forgotten in Norse owing largely to the fact that the word had gone out of use, but it is clearly preserved in Adam of Bremen's account of the Upsala sanctuary, where he speaks of Thor, 'qui tonitrus et fulmina . . . gubernat.'[4] We may refer also to the 'malleos joviales' which were carried off by the Danish prince Magnus on one of his raids among the Swedish islands, and which, according to Saxo,[5] had been venerated as symbols of thunder.

In English and German the name of the god is not distinguished, and consequently with the small evidence at our disposal it is not always clear which of the two was meant. The thunder-god (especially personifications of thunder) is of course wide-spread among the people of Europe. It is sufficient here to refer to the Taranis of the Celts (whose name appears to be identical with that of the Scandinavian Thorr), Juppiter Tonans of the Romans, Zeus Keraunios of the Greeks.

6. Othin.—Many writers hold that Othin originated in a personification of the wind. This view is largely bound up with the association of the god with the raging host, the antiquity of which is not very clear. The name Woden itself, which seems originally to have meant 'inspired or frenzied,' hardly furnishes a parallel to the case of Thor.

7. Jötnar.—It has been supposed by many writers that not only gods but also *jötnar* largely owe their origin to personification of natural phenomena. The *hrímthursar* ('frost-giants') indeed, of whom we often hear collectively, can hardly be of other origin. The friendly *jötunn* Aegir is very closely associated with the sea, for which his name is often used in poetry. There is some reason also for suspecting that Thrymr, the *jötunn* who steals Thor's hammer, may originally have been a counterpart of Thor, a rival thunder-god. It has been proposed by some that the *eoten* Grendel in *Beowulf* arose from a personification of storm-floods, but this explanation is open to the objection that the story is clearly based on an early folk-tale, the original locality of which has not yet been determined. If the *jötnar* in general had been derived from the personification of natural phenomena, one would expect to find an obvious meaning for their names, as in the case of Thor and perhaps of Thrymr, but as a matter of fact the etymology of the majority of their names is quite obscure.

According to another view, which has obtained more currency in recent times, the *jötnar* largely represent the communities of a more primitive race or civilization. This view also can be justified in some cases by the records. The giant Hrungnir fights against Thor with a hone, which may perhaps represent a stone hammer, and the word *berg-búi* ('cliff-dweller') points in the same direction. In some stories, as in the case of Grendel, the *jötnar* have cannibal propensities, and for this practice there is thought to be evidence in the way human bones are found mixed with those of animals in some caves. We may note also that the name Heithr is sometimes applied to witches of 'Finnish' (Lappish) origin, while in *Hyndluljóth* Heithr is said to be the daughter of the *jötunn* Hrungnir.

Occasionally also the word *jötunn* is applied in some MSS to persons also described as *Finnar*, as in the case of Swasi, father-in-law of Harold the Fair-haired. In the genealogies given in a document *Hversu Noregr Bygthist* some connexion is hinted at between *Finn* and *jötunn*. With the evidence at our disposal we are not yet in a position to determine their origin. It has been suggested also that the *dvergar* may be derived from communities of more primitive inhabitants.

8. Nornir.—The *nornir* bear so close a resemblance to the *völur*[1] ('wise women'), not infrequently mentioned in the sagas, that there can be little doubt that they are at least partly derived from them. Sometimes indeed the words *norn* and *völva* are used interchangeably.

9. Valkyrjur.—It is not unlikely that the *valkyrjur* have a similar origin. Sometimes the name is applied to human beings endowed with supernatural powers, as, *e.g.*, to Svava, the heroine of *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, and to Sigrun in *Helgakvitha Hunding-bana II.*, and to Sigrdrifa, a valkyrie who was punished by Othin for not carrying out his commands. And, as most authorities identify her with Brynhildr, the term is applied to the latter also. This conception of human valkyries is not confined to the North. For, in Wulfstan's *Sermo ad Anglos, waelcyrgean* are mentioned beside *wiccean*, among a list of bad characters, from which the country is said to be suffering.[2] It is more difficult, however, to explain how the conception arose. We hear of fighting women more than once in Saxo, and the human *skjáldmeyjar* in the *Atlakvitha* point perhaps in the same direction.

10. Kings.—Among other human beings we may notice especially kings who were credited with supernatural powers both during their lives and after death. Two of the legendary kings of Sweden, Dómaldi and Olaf Trételgja, are said to have been put to death owing to bad harvests for which they were held responsible.[3] This belief lasted down to late times, since Gustavus Vasa is

[1] *E.g.*, Homeric *Hymns*, xxxi. 15 f., xxxii. 9 f., and, in particular, *Od.* xxiii. 244 ff. Cf. also 2 K 23[11].
[2] *Gylf.* 13.
[3] For reference to the rainbow in other mythologies we may compare *PC*[3] i. 298.
[4] iv. 26.
[5] *Gesta Danorum*, ed. A. Holder, Strassburg, 1886, p. 421.

[1] See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 632[a].
[2] Cf. II. i. 6 (*b*).
[3] *Ynglinga Saga*, 18.

said to have complained that the Swedes blamed him for bad weather. Nor was it peculiar to the North. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, xxviii. 5, 14, it was customary among the Burgundians to depose their kings in time of famine as well as after military disaster.

11. The dead.—Norse literature shows by constant reference that to the dead were attributed supernatural powers. Among those most commonly referred to is that of bringing prosperity and abundant harvest.

In *Ynglinga Saga*, 12, the god Freyr is said to die, but his death is not announced to his subjects the Swedes. His dead body was preserved that prosperity might abound in the land. A similar story is told about Halfdan the Black, for his body after death was cut in four pieces, which were buried in different parts of the kingdom, so that all sections of the land might have plenteous years.[1] A similar belief underlies the story of Olaf Geirstatha-alf,[2] and that of Guthmundr,[3] who after death was thought by his people to be a god, and was therefore worshipped. Yet another example is to be found in *Landnámabók*, i. 14, where Thórólfr Smjörr is mentioned as being worshipped after death. A curious instance of worship of the dead occurs in *Kristni Saga*, 2, where the missionary Thorvaldr is taken by a heathen Kodran to see a stone in which the ancestor (*dr-madhr* or *spá-madhr*) of the latter is said to have dwelt for a long time. Kodran averred that, when the missionary had sprinkled the stone with holy water, his ancestor had come out and complained that the water had scalded his little children.

12. Yggdrasil's ash.—This is a very complex conception, as may be seen from the variety of phenomena attached to it.[4] The descriptions indeed are hard to visualize and are apparently inconsistent. Sometimes the ash seems to spread out over the whole world; sometimes again it is represented as a definite locality to which the gods ride or walk to hold their court. If the tree called Laéráthr in *Grímnismál*, 25 f., is to be identified with the ash, as seems probable, it must be regarded as standing very near to Othin's hall. Now it was, and indeed still is, the custom for country houses in the North, especially in Sweden, to have standing by them a tree known as *vårdträd* ('protecting tree'), on which the welfare of the house is supposed to depend. Such trees were doubtless regarded as especially sacred in heathen times, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the original conception of Yggdrasil's ash may have been that of a *vårdträd* of the divine community. In *Völuspá* the reference to the ash seems to point to a tree on which the destiny of the gods depends rather than to an all-comprehending world-tree. That its origin is to be found in actual trees is rendered probable by the Irmensul, which likewise was all-comprehending ('universalis columna . . . quasi sustinens omnia'),[5] for this was a real tree, or rather a tree-trunk, in spite of the property assigned to it. Further, the adjuncts mentioned in *Grímnismál* and *Gylfaginning*—the harts, snakes, etc.—link it with grove sanctuaries. We may refer particularly to those of the Lithuanians and Prussians, especially to the sacred one at Romove. It was forbidden to injure any birds or animals in such groves. The description indeed of the sacred oak at Romove furnishes an interesting parallel to Yggdrasil's ash from real life. In the North itself we can find parallels for all the features involved; *e.g.*, snakes seem to have disappeared from the Northern sanctuaries before the date of our records, yet a very interesting analogy in some respects is furnished by the description of the sacred tree at Upsala in scholium 134 to Adam of Bremen's *History*.

iii. COSMOLOGY.—See art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Teutonic).

iv. ESCHATOLOGY.—See art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).

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[1] *Ynglinga Saga*, 9. [2] *Flateyjarbók*, ii. ch. vi.
[3] Cf. the mythical *Hervarar Saga*, 1.
[4] Cf. accounts in *Grímnismál* and the Prose Edda.
[5] Rudolph of Fulda, *MGH Inscript.* ii. 676.

III. *WORSHIP.*—The Teutonic festivals are treated separately under the heading FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Teutonic). There are also separate articles on SACRIFICE (Teutonic) and HUMAN SACRIFICE (Teutonic). The various superstitions are covered under the headings DIVINATION (Teutonic), MAGIC (Teutonic), and ORDEAL (Teutonic). It remains in this section to speak of prophecy and the priesthood.

1. Prophecy.—According to Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 61, numbers of women among the Germani were considered to possess the gift of prophecy 'in consequence of which many were revered as goddesses,' though he denies elsewhere[1] that the veneration paid to them was so great as this. One of the chief of these prophetic women was known as Veleda, a prophetess of the Bructueri, who ruled over considerable territory. To increase the honour in which she was held, she lived at the top of a high tower, and questions and oracular responses were conveyed between her and the public by a near relative 'like a messenger who had converse with the gods.'[2] The name Veleda, strictly speaking, does not appear to be a proper name but a Gaulish word for 'prophetess.'[3] We may here mention the story of the older Drusus, who in his last campaign was met on the banks of the Elbe by a woman taller than human who prophesied to him the manner of his death even as it afterwards came about.[4] According to Strabo,[5] the Cymbri had prophetesses who practised divination with slaughtered prisoners.[6]

2. Priesthood.—(*a*) *Priest.*—(i.) In Norway, and especially in Iceland, the duties of the priest were performed by the political leader of the people. During the colonization of Iceland the more important of the chiefs who went out from Norway built their own temples, not infrequently of the wood of which their temples had been made in Norway.

Thus we read in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4, that Thórólfr of Mostr built a temple to Thor of such wood. To this temple all the men in his own district had to pay a tax called 'temple-toll'; but the chief himself paid for the upkeep of the building and performed all the necessary duties in connexion with the temple and the temple services, while at the same time exercising judicial authority over the people of the neighbourhood. Again in *Hrafnkel's Saga Freysgótha*, 2, we are told that Hrafnkel raised a great temple in Athalból, where he 'made offerings to Freyr of the half of all the best things that he had.' Hrafnkel settled the whole of the valley and gave land to people on condition that he should be regarded as their chief and exercise the authority of priest over them.[7]

The priest was called *góthi*, and his office *gothorth*. In each *gothorth* was a consecrated place set apart for the *thing* (gathering of the people). Small settlers who were not of sufficient substance and authority to build temples of their own joined one or other of the *gothorth* so as to have the benefit of the temple services and the temporal protection of the *góthi*. So inseparable was the political function from that of the priest in Iceland that the *gothorth* formed the starting-point for the foundation of the constitution of Iceland. The title of *góthi* continued in existence after the adoption of Christianity, although now it had lost all religious significance and meant no more than magistrate (*lögsögumathr*). It is interesting to observe that the *gothorth* was a hereditary office and could even be bought and sold like any other property.[8]

This combination of priestly with secular authority existed also no doubt in Norway, whence the original priests of Iceland came, though—and here is a difference from Iceland—the power of the

[1] *Germ.* 9. [2] *Hist.* iv. 65.
[3] Cf. Gael. *fàile*. [4] Suetonius, *Claud.* 1.
[5] VII. iv. 3.
[6] See art. DIVINATION (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 827.
[7] Cf. also *Egils Saga*, 86, 89; *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 15.
[8] Cf. *Vatnsdæla Saga*, 41 f.; *Bandamanna Saga*, 8

local chiefs in Norway was subordinate to that of kings. The word *góthi* is occasionally applied to local chiefs—*e.g.*, to Thorhaddr the Old, who was *hof-góthi* at Maeren in Trondhjem[1]—and on several occasions we hear of priests in Iceland who had formerly possessed temples in Norway. The *Saga of Hákon the Good* (*Heimskringla*), 16, gives an account of a great sacrificial feast at Hlathir of which Earl Sigurthr sustained the whole cost himself; and from the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Heimskringla*), 75, we learn that it had been the custom of Olaf's predecessors to offer sacrifice in Trondhjem. In poetry we sometimes meet with such expressions as *vörthr véstalls* ('guardian of the altar') applied to kings of the past. In all cases, here as in Iceland, it is clear that no exclusively priestly class existed, and that priestly duties were in all cases combined with temporal power.

For Denmark very little evidence is available. On three Runic inscriptions found in Fyn, and dating approximately from the 9th cent., the word *kuthi* (i.e. *góthi*) is found in combination with some proper name to form a compound word. Hróulfr and Ali are said to have been *nuRakuthi* (*Nora-góthi*) and *sauluakutha* (*Sölva-góthi*) respectively. It has been suggested that Nori and Sölvi are the names of men; but it seems at least equally probable that they are place-names.[2] If this is so, Hróulfr and Ali may have been local chieftains, like those on the west coast of Norway. It is significant that Saxo, who frequently refers to the laws and customs of heathen times, makes no references to a priestly class in Denmark.

For Sweden the evidence is more abundant. Adam of Bremen states in connexion with the great temple at Upsala:

'Assigned to all the gods they have priests to present the sacrifices of the people.'[3]

It does not necessarily follow perhaps from this statement that the duties of these persons were of an exclusively priestly nature. Elsewhere the evidence seems rather to point to a union in Sweden, like that in Norway and Iceland, of priestly duties with secular authority.

Thus we read in *Ynglinga Saga*, 47, that a famine which arose in the days of the legendary king Olaf Trételgja was attributed by the people to the king's remissness in offering sacrifices; and even towards the end of the 11th cent. we read in *Hervarar Saga, ad fin.*, of one Blótsveinn ('sacrificing-Sveinn') obtaining the throne in virtue of his promise to offer sacrifice on behalf of the people, which he actually carried out. Rimbertus[4] describes the formal deification of the Swedish king Ericus; and it will be remembered that the native dynasty, the Ynglingar, traced their descent from the god Freyr.

Thus, while the evidence is perhaps less direct and convincing for Sweden than for Norway, it seems on the whole to indicate a close union from the earliest times between secular and religious power.

(ii.) Except in Tacitus references to priests among the Teutonic peoples are of rare occurrence. In later times we read in the *History* of Ammianus Mercellinus[5] that the priests of the Burgundians were presided over by a chief priest who held his office for life. Jordanes[6] states that the priests of the Goths were of noble extraction.

(iii.) We learn from Bede[7] that the priests of the ancient English were forbidden to bear arms and to ride except on mares. Heathen priests are also referred to,[8] perhaps the most interesting instance being that of Coifi.

Eddius,[9] in his description of the shipwreck of Wilfrid off the Sussex coast, refers to the 'princeps sacerdotum idolatriae' standing before the country-people on a high mound and by his magic arts seeming to cast fetters on the hands of the people of God.

1 Cf. *Landn.* iv. 6.
2 Cf. L. F. A. Wimmer, *Die Runenschrift*, German tr. by F. Holthausen, Berlin, 1887, pp. 341 ff., 359 ff.
3 iv. 27. 4 *Vita Anscharii*, 26.
5 xxviii. 5. 14. 6 *De Rebus Geticis*, ch. 5.
7 *HE* ii. 13. 8 *Ib.* ii. 6, and elsewhere.
9 Ch. 13.

(iv.) Among the Teutonic peoples of the Continent in ancient times the priest seems to have combined to a great extent spiritual with temporal powers. According to Tacitus, his duties were threefold: (1) the consultation of omens on public occasions, together with divination, the casting of lots, and the observation of the sacred horses;[1] (2) duties in connexion with the tribal assembly such as the proclamation of silence at the opening of the meeting, and the administration of punishment at the assembly and in time of war;[2] (3) the guardianship of the sacred groves, symbols, and other holy objects,[3] which they also carried with the host to battle.[4] They no doubt had duties also in connexion with the public sacrifices. Indeed it may be said that their functions as a whole were essentially of a public character. There is little or no trace of any mystical relationship existing between the priest and the god, or of any peculiarly spiritual qualification in the priest such as we find noted, *e.g.*, in the case of prophetesses like Veleda, or in the account of the Druids given by Diodorus Siculus.[5]

(*b*) *Priestess.*—(i.) In Iceland the word *gythja* ('priestess') occasionally occurs,[6] and seems to be applied to women belonging to the ruling families of Iceland (*i.e.* those who held *gothorth*).

In *Kristni Saga*, 2, we are told of a woman Frithgerthr who was 'in the temple offering sacrifices' while Thorvaldr was preaching the Christian faith hard by. The term *gythja*, however, is not applied to her, and it is possible that she was only acting as deputy for her husband, who was absent at the *althingi* ('general assembly'). Mention is made in *Vápnfirthinga Saga*, 10, of a woman called Steinvör, who is described as a *hof-gythja* ('temple-priestess') and who owned a *höfuth-hof* ('public temple') and claimed temple-toll. When she wished to enforce the civil authority of the *gothorth*, she was obliged to apply to her kinsman Brodd-Helgi for help. But that she was conscious of her full religious responsibilities seems to be borne out by the amusing account given in *Kristni Saga*, 5, of a 'flyting' between Thangbrandr the priest and one Steinvör, the mother of the poet Ref, who is without doubt to be identified with the *hof-gythja* of *Vápnfirthinga Saga*. Here we are told that, after she had preached heathenism to Thangbrandr at some length, she made the startling announcement that 'Thor challenged Christ to fight in single combat; but he dared not fight against Thor!'

Beyond this, references to priestesses in the old Scandinavian countries seem to point to persons of a different character, though these references are not very satisfactory.

In *Sturlaugs Saga Starfsama*, 18, we are told of 60 *hof-gythjar* in a temple, which, however, was Finnish. Again in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4, we are told that the goddess Freyja was a *blót-gythja* ('sacrificial priestess'), and that after Freyr's death she kept up the temple and sacrifices at Upsala.

Here also we may mention the story of Gunnarr Helmingr, who is related in ch. 278 of the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*) to have personated the god Freyr after destroying his idol. Freyr's image was kept in a temple in Sweden, and his shrine is said to have been attended to by a young and beautiful woman who was known as his wife, and with whom he used to make an annual progress through the land, driven in a chariot. This person is not actually called a priestess (*gythja*), but at all events she apparently had charge of the sanctuary and interpreted the answers of the god. We may here compare the account of Freyja, who in *Ynglinga Saga*, 13, is said to have upheld the sacrifices at Upsala after the death of Freyr.

(ii.) We have no definite evidence for the existence of priestesses in the strict sense of the term among the other Teutonic peoples. Tacitus speaks of 'numbers of women of prophetic power,'[7] but these recall the *völur* rather than the priestesses of the North. The former existence of a priestess may, however, perhaps be inferred from the account of the sacred grove of the Nahanarvali, which is said[8] to have been under the charge of a priest 'muliebri ornatu.'

IV. *TEMPLES AND SANCTUARIES.*—(*a*) *Iceland.*—(i.) In Iceland the temples formed centres of jurisdiction, one belonging to each of the 39

1 In the last duty he was accompanied by the king; cf. *Germ.* 10.
2 *Ib.* 7. 11. 3 *Ib.* 40, 43.
4 *Ib.* 7. 5 *Bibl. Hist.* v. 31
6 E.g., *Landn.* iii. 4, iv. 10. 7 *Hist.* iv. 61, 64.
8 *Germ.* 43.

gothorth. One of the fullest descriptions of such temples which we possess occurs in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4.

Here we are told that Thórólfr of Mostr set up a great temple to Thor by Thor's river. There was a door in the wall near one end. Inside stood the high-seat pillars containing the pegs which were called *reginnaglar* ('holy pegs'). On one of these pillars the image of Thor was carved.

'The interior of this temple was a very holy place. At the end of the temple farthest from the door there was an annexe like the choir of a church at the present time, and there in the midst of the floor stood a *stalli* which served as an altar, and thereon lay a jointless ring weighing twenty ounces on which all oaths are said to have been sworn. The priest wore this ring upon his arm at all assemblies. On the *stalli* stood also the sacrificial bowl wherein was a *hleitteinn* which served as a sprinkler, wherewith was sprinkled the blood from the bowl which was called *hlaut*. That was the blood which was shed by such creatures as were sacrificed to the gods. In the annexe round about the *stalli* were the gods ranged. To this temple all men had to pay tribute, and they were under an obligation to accompany the temple priests on all such journeys as *thingmen* now take with their chiefs, and the *góthi* kept up the temple at his own cost so that it should not fall out of repair, and in it he upheld the sacrificial feasts.'

Some additional details are furnished by the descriptions of the temple at Kjalarnes in *Kjalnesinga Saga*, 2, 4.

This temple was 60 ft. in breadth, and, like the one built by Ingimundr in Vatnsdaela,[1] 100 ft. in length. Thor was the god most honoured in this temple. The inner sanctuary was circular like the hull of a ship. Thor stood in the midst of it, and other gods on both sides. In front of them stood a *stalli* made with great skill and covered with iron. On it there was a fire which was never allowed to die down. They called it the 'consecrated fire.' On that *stalli* there lay also a great 'ring' of silver. The temple priest wore it on his arm at all assemblies. Men took their oaths on it in all law-suits. On that altar there lay also a great bowl of copper into which was poured the blood which came from the cattle which were sacrificed to Thor or from the men. This blood they called *hlaut*, and (the bowl they called) *hlaut-bolli*. Men and cattle were sprinkled with the *hlaut*, but the cattle which were sacrificed there were used for entertaining the company when sacrificial feasts were held. And the men who were sacrificed were sunk in the pool which was outside by the door, and which was called *blótkilda* ('sacrificial spring'). The temple was surrounded by a wooden fence too high to climb, and both the temple and the fence contained doors that locked. Finally we are told that the beams of the temple were very excellent.[2]

Thorhaddr the Old, like many another, took the temple-mould and the high-seat pillars from his Norwegian temple and used them for his temple in Iceland.[3] We are also told that Jörundr *góthi* raised a temple in Svertingsstathir.[4] Numerous other instances might be cited.

In *Kristni Saga*, 2, heathen sacrifices are mentioned as being offered in a temple at Hvamm. In *Hrafnkels Saga Freysgótha*, 3, we are told that Hrafnkel raised a great temple to Freyr in Athalból. This temple stood on a rock above a deep pool in the river and contained images of the gods which had some kind of robes or ornaments upon them. A temple dedicated to Freyr is also mentioned in *Víga Glúms Saga*, 5, as being 'on the south of the river at Hripkelsstathir.'[5] In ch. 24 of the same saga we read that there were three temples on Eyjafirthr. In ch. 25 we have an interesting confirmation of the accounts of the oath-ring mentioned above. In the temple in Diupadale on Eyjafirthr 'whoever took the temple-oath took in his hand the silver ring which was reddened in the blood of the cattle sacrificed and which weighed fully three ounces.' Possibly the ring of Tomar (Thunor) which was carried off from Dublin by King Charles Malachy II. in 994 was one of the sacred rings upon which oaths were sworn.[6] Here we may compare the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*,[7] where the oath-ring is represented as the most binding form of engagement known to the Danes.

(ii.) Not only the temple itself, but also the land round about, was regarded as sanctuary.

Thus in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4, we are told that Thórólfr of Mostr held as sacred a hill in the precincts of his temple on Thorsnes. Here the *thing* of the men of the Western Firths was held. No one was allowed to turn his eyes thither unwashed, and no blood was to be shed there. Thórólfr's sons preserved the sanctuary inviolate as long as they could; and, when it had been defiled with bloodshed by the Kjallekings,[8] the place was declared unhallowed and the *thing* removed to another part of the promontory, where the *dómhringr* is still pointed out to travellers—'That was one of the holiest of places.'

A curious tradition of sanctity is found in *Landnámabók*, ii. 16.

Authr the Deep-Minded was a Christian. 'She was accustomed to say her prayers at Cross-hills. She had crosses raised there, for she was baptized and a good Christian. Members of her family afterwards showed great reverence for that hill. A *hörgr* was made there when they began to offer sacrifices. They believed that they would pass into the hill when they died.'

(*b*) *Norway.*—(i.) From *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 3, we learn that, before Thórólfr of Mostr left Norway for Iceland, he had charge of Thor's temple on the island of Mostr, and was a great friend of Thor. The framework of this temple was transferred bodily to Iceland. Another island is mentioned in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*[1] as containing a large temple dedicated to Thor. Guthbrandr of the Dales also possessed a temple dedicated to Thor.[2] His predecessor was a great friend of Earl Hákon of Hlathir. They had a temple in common in Guthbrandsdale, which contained figures of Thor and of Hákon's patron goddesses, Thorgerthr and Irpa. Thorgerthr is described as being as tall as a full-grown man and having a hood on her head. Thor was seated in his car, and all were adorned with clothes or ornaments and had gold rings on their arms. This temple and Earl Hákon's temple at Hlathir are said to have been the two chief temples in Norway.[3] When Earl Hákon first took possession of Norway, 'he commanded throughout his whole kingdom that the temples should be maintained,'[4] and later, when the emissaries of the emperor Otto had overthrown the temples of S. Norway, Earl Hákon caused them to be rebuilt and the heathen sacrifices to be re-established.[5]

Some interesting details of one of his temples (in Arkadale) are given in *Faereyinga Saga*, 23.

It stood in the midst of a wood and was surrounded by a paling and adorned with gold and silver, while the roof was lighted with several glass windows. Inside near the door was a figure of Thorgerthr Hölgabrúthr, beautifully adorned. The same story occurs in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 326, where we are told that Olaf stripped Thorgerthr of all her 'gold and silver and fine clothes' and dragged the idol at his horse's tail, finally beating it to pieces with a club and burning it along with the image of Freyr.

Olaf Tryggvason systematically destroyed Hákon's temples and despoiled the idols. He took from the door of the temple at Hlathir the large gold ring that Hákon had had made, and burnt the image of Thor which it contained.[6] In his missionary expedition to Inner Trondhjem he despoiled the temple at Maer, which contained many idols fixed on *stallar*, in the midst of whom sat Thor, 'an image of great size, all adorned with gold and silver.'[7] A curious and interesting account of a temple and image dedicated to Balder in the district of Sogn is mentioned in the *Saga of Frithjóf the Bold*.[8] It has been the custom to cast doubt on this evidence, but the details are not obviously fictitious, and it is difficult to imagine why they should have been invented. The account is at least as reliable as that of *Kjalnesinga Saga*,[9] which is usually accepted as probable.

(ii.) The word *hof* ('temple') frequently occurs in association with the word *hörgr*.[10] What exactly the *hörgr* was we do not know. From *Hyndluljóth*, 10, the *hörgr* seems to have been made of stones:

'He made me a *hörgr* built of stones. Now, this heap of stones is turned to glass.'

But in *Grímnismál*, 16, Njörthr is said to rule over *hótimbruthum hörgi* ('high-timbered *hörgrs*').

[1] Cf. *Vatnsdaela Saga*, 15.
[2] Here we may compare the story given in *Landn.* v. 12 of Ketilbjörn, who was so rich that he ordered his sons to make a cross-beam of silver in the temple which they were building on Mossfell. His sons, however, did not carry out his orders.
[3] Cf. *Landn.* iv. 6. [4] *Ib.* v. 3. [5] Cf. also 9, 19.
[6] Cf. *Annals of the Four Masters*, *sub an.* 994. *Sub an.* 876. [8] Cf. *ib.* 9, 10.

[1] *Flateyjarbók*, 243.
[2] Cf. *Saga of Olaf the Holy* (*Heimskringla*), 118.
[3] Cf. *Njáls Saga*, 87, 88.
[4] Cf. *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 61.
[5] *Ib.* 87; cf. also 313–315.
[6] *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 248.
[7] *Ib.* 268. [8] Ch. 1 and *passim*. [9] Ch. 2, 4.
[10] Cf., e.g., *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, 4.

The phrase '*hörgr* and *hof* high-timbered' occurs also in *Völuspá*, 7. It has been suggested that the word 'high-timbered' is merely conventional and that the *hörgr* was a stone structure as opposed to the wooden temples so common in Norway and Iceland. In *Örvar Odds Saga*, 29, we are told that Oddr 'burnt a *hof* and broke a *hörgr*'; but in the preceding verse both *hof* and *hörgr* are spoken of as being 'burnt.' *Hof* and *hörgr* are spoken of as burnt in ch. 165 of the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Fornmanna Sögur*). But in ch. 141 of the same saga we are told that the king commanded '*hof* and *hörgr* to be broken and burnt.' The *hörgr* is frequently mentioned in connexion with women.

Thus in *Gylf.* 14 the goddesses are said to inhabit 'a *hörgr* which was a very fair house. It was called Vingólf.' In *Hervarar Saga*, 1, Starkathr is said to have carried off Alfhildr as she was in the act of reddening the *hörgr* by night after the great *disarblót*. After the death of Authr the Christian, her relatives made a *hörgr* on the hill where she had set up her crosses.

The word is still traditionally connected with high places in popular speech. Thus, when the land lies deep in snow, the Icelanders say that 'only the highest *hörgar* jut out.' And in the Norwegian patois a dome-shaped mountain is called a *horg*. Perhaps the word is a survival of an older form of religion when places of worship were more primitive than the carefully constructed *hof*. It is obviously connected ultimately with the O.H.G. *haruc*.

(iii.) It will be seen that there are certain obvious discrepancies in regard to the use of the term *hörgr*. It appears in some cases to have been a cairn, but in others a building capable of habitation. Sometimes it is made of stone, in other cases perhaps of wood. The difficulty is increased by the fact that the word is obviously identical with the early German word *haruc*, which is used to gloss the words *nemus*, *lucus*, while the corresponding A.S. *hearg* is also perhaps used for 'grove.' Such sacred woods or groves were probably common in early times, since many place-names are compounded with the word *lundr* ('sacred grove'). Moreover, the usual name for the place of assembly in the North is *thingvöllr*, which must originally have meant 'wood of the assembly,' *völlr* being cognate with O.S. *wald* and O.H.G. *wald* ('forest').

The legendary sanctuary at Glasisvellir[1] was probably connected with a holy grove, and is no doubt identical with Glasir, the name of the tree by Valhöll, Odhin's dwelling-place, mentioned in *Skáldskaparmál*, 34. It is in a forest clearing that the gods meet to decide the fate of Starkathr.[2] According to a mythological poem,[3] the gods meet every day to dispense justice under Yggdrasil's ash. Perhaps we may also instance Tomar's wood,[4] which was situated near Dublin. It has been suggested that this means 'grove of Thor.'

It is noteworthy that the two great assembly places, Frosta and Gaula, are both on peninsulas. Sacred islands may also have been known, as can perhaps be inferred from the recurrence of such names as Njardhrey, Vé-ey, Thorsey, and possibly Halogaland.

(*c*) *Sweden.*—(i.) The great temple of the Swedes was at Upsala.

'The Swedes have a most magnificent temple which is called Ubsola [Upsala] not far distant from the city of Sictona [Sigtuna]. In this temple, which is fitted [?] entirely with gold, they worship the statues of three gods. Thor, the most powerful of them, has his seat in the midst of the couch [?], while Wodan and Fricco occupy places on either side of him. . . . Wodan they represent as armed, just as our people represent Mars, while Thor with his sceptre seems to copy Jupiter.'[5]

'That temple is surrounded by a golden chain which hangs over the roof [?] of the building, and the gleam of which is visible to visitors at a distance; for the shrine itself stands on level ground with hills round it like a theatre.'[6]

(ii.) In the (contemporary) scholium 134 we have an interesting account of a holy grove which stood beside the temple, and which contained an evergreen tree of great sanctity.

'Near that temple there is a very large tree stretching out its branches afar and always green both in winter and summer. No one knows what kind of tree it is. There also is a spring in which it is the practice of the heathen to do sacrifice by sinking a living man in it. If he does not reappear, the prayers of the people will be fulfilled.'

The description of Yggdrasil's ash, which is said to overshadow Asgarthr,[1] is no doubt derived from the Upsala evergreen, as the description of the home of the gods is surely derived from some Northern sanctuary, in all probability the identical sanctuary at Upsala.[2]

There are many other references to this sanctuary in both Norse and Danish authorities, and it was in fact the most famous one in the North. In *Ynglinga Saga*, 12, and in Saxo, iii. 90, its establishment is attributed to the god Freyr, who in the former is represented as having lived and died at Upsala. This is no doubt also the scene of the story of Gunnar Helmingr, although in this story the place is not actually mentioned.

In *Jómsvíkinga Saga*, 12, we are told of a temple in Götland which contained 100 gods and also temple treasure and temple servants to offer the sacrifices, but, apart from the great temple at Upsala, we know little of the heathen temples of Sweden.

(*d*) *Denmark.*—No records of Danish temples appear to have been preserved. The chief sanctuary of the Danes was at Leire. This was no doubt a sanctuary of great antiquity. It is the home of the famous kings of the 6th cent., Hróarr and Hrólfr Kraki (the Hrothgar and Hrothwulf of *Beowulf*). In *Ynglinga Saga*, 5, it is said to have been the home of the goddess Gifjón and her husband Skjöldr, the eponymous ancestor of the Skjöldungar (A.S. Scyldingas), the Danish royal family. Like Upsala, the locality is remarkable for its barrows, some of which date from the earliest times.

The existence of ancient sanctuaries in the old Danish kingdom is also implied by some of the place-names; *e.g.*, Lundr, the name of the old ecclesiastical capital in Skáney, meant originally a 'sacred grove.' Cf. also Véborg (mod. Víborg; 'sanctuary town') and Helganes ('holy promontory') in Jutland; Óthinsé or Óthinsvé ('Óthin's Sanctuary') on the island of Fyen, and Hlésey, besides many other Danish (and Norwegian and Swedish) place-names.

(*e*) *England.*—In England the worship of idols and the existence of heathen temples were well known to Bede. In A.D. 601 Pope Gregory sent a letter to the abbot Mellitus urging that, while he is to destroy the idols in England, he is to leave the heathen temples standing that they may be consecrated for purposes of Christian worship. He says expressly, 'It is their custom to slay many oxen in sacrifice to devils.'[3] The East Anglian king Redwald, who had been converted to Christianity on a visit to Kent, is said to have had in the same temple an altar for Christian worship and an *arula* at which to offer victims to devils;[4] and his son Earconberct is said to have been the first of the English kings who commanded the idols throughout his country to be destroyed.[5] When the Northumbrian Council decided to adopt Christianity, the high priest of the heathen, Coefi, rode to the sanctuary of Gudmanum on the Derwent, cast a spear into it, and commanded his companions to destroy and set fire to it with all its precincts.[6] References of a historical character to sanctuaries in this country are rare, however. But such place-names as Thunresleah, which must originally have

1 Cf. the *Tháttr af Nornagesti*, 1; *Hervarar Saga*, 1.
2 Cf. *Gautreks Saga*, 7. 3 *Grímnismál*, 30.
4 Mentioned in the *War of the Gaethil with the Gaill*, 113.
5 Adam of Bremen, iv. 26. 6 *Ib.* scholium 135.

1 *Gylf.* 15. 2 Cf. also *Skáldskaparmál*, 34.
3 *HE* i. 30. 4 *Ib.* ii. 15.
5 *Ib.* iii. 8. 6 *Ib.* ii. 13.

meant 'grove of thunder,' perhaps indicate the existence of groves sacred to the thunder-god among the ancient English, and there are other reminiscences of heathen worship no doubt preserved in such place-names as Thunresfeld and Wednesbury.

In *Beowulf*, 175, we hear of offerings made *aet haergtrafum*, which perhaps means 'shrines' covered with canopies. The word *haerg*, identical with Norse *hörgr*, is of frequent occurrence standing alone, and is used to translate various Latin terms such as *fanum*[1] and *idolum*. There are other passages in which the word seems to mean a 'grove,' as in German, and it is not uncommon in place-names—*e.g.*, Harrow. A number of other words which appear in Christian usage were presumably applied at first to heathen sanctuaries—e.g., *weofod* ('altar').[2]

(*f*) *The Continent.*—(i.) References to temples on the Continent are rare. In the 6th cent. a Frankish temple was destroyed by Radegund, wife of Chlotar. Gregory of Tours describes a temple at Cologne which contained figures of the gods and in which sacrificial feasts were held. The Frisians seem to have had temples, but the notices are not always clear.

(ii.) The word *fanum*, by which these sanctuaries are usually denoted, is also used of the Irmensul, which, according to Thietmar of Merseburg,[3] was an immense wooden shaft or pillar worshipped by the Old Saxons in a place called Eresburg. According to the *Vita S. Alex.* 3, this pillar was 'set up aloft in the open.' In their own language they call it 'Irmensul, quod latine dicitur universalis columna, quasi sustinens omnia.' It was cut down in the year 772 by Charlemagne, who spent three days destroying the sanctuary and carried off much gold and silver.

Among the heathen practices of the Old Saxons condemned in the *Indiculus Superstitionum* and elsewhere we hear of sanctuaries connected with woods, of springs connected with sacrifices, and of various places which are venerated as holy.

The chief sanctuary of the Frisians was that of 'Fosite's Land.' According to Alcuin's *Vita S. Willibrordi*, 10, it took its name from the god Fosite.

'For *fana* of this god were "constructed" (*constructa*) on it.' This place was held so sacred by the country folk that no one dared to touch the cattle or anything else that fed there. He also mentions a sacred spring on the island.[4]

Adam of Bremen[5] identifies this land with the island of Heiligland (Halogaland). In the *Vita S. Bonifatii*, 23, we read of a sacred oak of gigantic size, the *robor Jovis*, which was cut down by the saint amid the clamorous protests of the heathen.

There is no doubt that sacred trees and groves were of frequent occurrence among all the Teutonic peoples of the Continent. In the *Translatio S. Alexandri*, 3, we are told that the Saxons worshipped trees and streams. Claudian speaks of 'groves grim with ancient religious rites and oaks resembling barbaric divinity.'[6]

The O.H.G. word *haruc*, like the O.N. *hörgr* and A.S. *hearg*, presents some difficulty, being used sometimes to gloss *nemus*, *lucus*, sometimes *fanum*, *delubrum*. It has been suggested by Mogk that the lack of clear distinction between the terms for the natural and the artificially constructed sanctuary is due to the utilization of old sanctuaries as sites for later temples.

(iii.) References to Teutonic temples in earlier times, in the works of Tacitus, are rare and doubtful. In *Ann.* i. 51 it is stated that Germanicus razed to the ground the temple which they called the temple of Tamfana and which was most frequented by those tribes. Again, in *Germ.* 40 mention is made of the *templum* of Nerthus, but it is not unlikely that the word is used loosely for 'sanctuary'—'the holy grove on an island in the ocean,' the home of the goddess Nerthus, who visits the nations in a consecrated car covered with a garment.

'One priest alone is permitted to touch it. He is able to perceive when the goddess is present in her sanctuary and accompanies her with the utmost reverence as she is drawn along by cows. It is a season of rejoicing, and festivity reigns wherever she deigns to go and be received. They do not undertake hostilities or take up arms; every weapon is put away; peace and quiet are then only known and welcomed, until the goddess, weary of human intercourse, is at length restored by the same priest to her temple. Afterwards the car, the garments, and, if you are willing to believe it, the deity herself, are cleansed in a secret lake. This rite is performed by slaves who are instantly swallowed up by its waters.'

The indications given by Tacitus are too vague to enable the site of this sanctuary to be fixed with any certainty, but it is not impossible that it was the Danish sanctuary of Leire. In that case Nerthus may have lived on as Gifjón. Her name, however, is identical with that of the Norse god Njörthr.

According to *Germ.* 9, 'the Germani deem it to be inconsistent with the majesty of the gods to confine them within walls or to represent them after any similitude of a human face; they dedicate groves and woods and call by the names of gods that invisible thing which they see only with the eye of faith.'[1]

Sacred groves are mentioned by Tacitus in several other places. Arminius's forces assemble in a wood sacred to Hercules.[2] Civilis brings his army together in a sacred wood.[3] According to *Germ.* 43, the Nahanarvali had a grove of ancient sanctity. It was in these groves that they kept the sacred symbols.[4] Here also were reared the sacred white horses which were never allowed to do work for mankind, but were employed to draw the sacred cars, when their neighing was carefully observed by the priest and king of the state.

According to *ib.* 39, the Semnones had a wood of immemorial antiquity and holiness. Here on certain occasions there met embassies from all the kindred peoples (the various branches of the Suevi) to celebrate their barbaric rites by the slaying of a man. The grove was held in reverence, and no one was allowed to enter unless he was bound with chains to signify his own humility and the power of the grove.

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For material on burial customs and archæology in general see *EBr*[11], *s.vv.* 'Germany' and 'Scandinavian Civilisation,' with the bibliographies appended.

Convenient edd. of most Norse works, both prose and poetry, are published by Sigurthur Kristjánsson, Reykjavík. An English ed. of all the early poetry with trr. is contained also in the *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, by G. Vigfússon and F. York Powell, 2 vols., Oxford, 1883 (scarce). There are also several German and Scandinavian critical edd. of the Edda poems and of many

[1] *E.g.*, in the passages quoted above from Bede, *HE* ii. 13.
[2] Cf. also *hüsl*, an old pagan word for sacrifice, etc.
[3] *Chron.* ii. 1.
[4] Cf. also *Vita S. Liudgerii*, i. 19.
[5] iv. 3.
[6] *Cons. Stil.* i. 288.

[1] Cf. also *ib.* 7, and *Ann.* i. 61.
[2] *Ann.* ii. 12.
[3] *Hist.* iv. 14.
[4] See art. IMAGES AND IDOLS (Teutonic and Slavic).

of the sagas. The following list of the English translations may be found useful: *The Elder or Poetic Edda*, pt. i., 'The Mythological Poems,' tr. Olive Bray, printed for the Viking Club, London, 1908; *The Prose Edda*, tr. A. G. Brodeur, New York, 1916; *Laxdaela Saga*, tr. M. C. Press[2] ('The Temple Classics'), London, 1906; *Eyrbyggja Saga*, tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' ii.), do. 1892; *Gísla Saga Súrssónar*, tr. G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1866; *Kormaks Saga*, tr. W. G. Collingwood and Jón Stefánsson, Ulverston, 1902; *Viga-Glúms Saga*, tr. E. Head, London, 1866; the *Heimskringla*, containing *Ynglinga Saga*, *The Saga of Hákon the Good*, *The Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*, *St. Olaf's Saga*, etc., tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' iii.–vi.), London, 1893–1905; *The Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*, tr. J. Sephton ('The Northern Library,' i.), do. 1895 (different from the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* contained in the *Heimskringla*); *Íslands Landnámabók* ('The Book of the Settlement of Iceland'), tr. T. Ellwood, Kendal, 1898; *Story of Egil Skallagrímsson*, tr. W. C. Green, London, 1893; *Grettis Saga* ('The Story of Grettir the Strong'), tr. E. Magnússon and W. Morris, new ed., do. 1900; also tr. A. Hight in the 'Everyman's Library,' do. 1914; *Brennu Njáls Saga* ('The Story of Burnt Njál'), tr. G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1861 (also in 'Everyman's Library'); *Hrafnkels Saga Freysgóða*, tr. J. Coles in *Summer Travelling in Iceland*, London, 1882 (contains also *Bandamanna Saga* and the *Thórthar Hraethu Saga*); *Howard the Halt* (containing also *The Banded Men*, and *Hen Thorir*), tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' i.), do. 1891; *Völsunga Saga*, tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon, London and Felling-on-Tyne, 1870; *Three Northern Love Stories* (containing the *Saga of Frithjóf the Bold*, *Viglund the Fair*, *Gunnlaugs Saga Ormstungu*, *Hethinn and Högni*, etc.), tr. E. Magnússon and W. Morris, London, 1875. A list of English trr. of other sagas will be found in Craigie, *Icelandic Sagas*, ch. 7, p. 110; *Beowulf*, ed. W. J. Sedgefield[2], Manchester, 1913; also by A. J. Wyatt and R. W. Chambers, Cambridge, 1914, etc.; *Beowulf* has been translated by J. R. Clarke Hall, C. B. Tinker, F. J. Child, etc.; Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. C. Plummer, 2 vols., Oxford, 1896, tr. A. M. Sellar, London, 1907, tr. V. D. Scudder ('Everyman's Library'), do. 1910.

The most important German texts, chiefly charms, will be found in W. Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*[3], Halle, 1888; and in M. Heyne, *Kleinere Altniederdeutsche Denkmäler*[2], Paderborn, 1877; Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, bks. i.–ix., tr. O. Elton, London, 1894; Jordanes, *The Origin and Deeds of the Goths*, tr. C. Mierow[2], Princeton, U.S.A., 1915; Strabo, *Geography*, tr. H. C. Hamilton and W. Falconer, 3 vols., London, 1854–57; Tacitus, *Annals* and *Histories*, esp. the *Germany*, tr. by many and various scholars (*e.g.*, A. J. Church and W. J. Brodribb), London, 1877; Cæsar, *Commentaries on the Gallic War*, tr. T. Rice Holmes, do. 1908.

N. KERSHAW.

THAGS.—A secret organization of robber-stranglers called Thags existed for centuries in India, but it was put down by Lord William Bentinck's Government in the second quarter of the 19th century. Their history is full of incident and varied interest; here the religious and ethical aspects of the subject must be dominant.

1. **Introduction.**—The word *thag*, usually written *thug*, comes from a Sanskrit root *sthaga* meaning 'conceal,' which in the modern vernaculars becomes *thag* and means 'deceive.' The earliest reference to Thags comes from the middle of the 12th cent., and the first historical information about them from the end of the 13th cent.; but clear and full knowledge did not become available until the time when the organization was put down, about 1830. At that time there were thousands of Thags, well organized and extremely successful. They were all men of intelligence and capacity, most of them Hindus of good caste or respectable Muhammadans. Religion controlled their operations down to the last detail. How far back the fully organized confederacy reaches we cannot tell; but scattered fragments of information make it probable that in all essentials the conspiracy had been the same for several centuries.

2. **Description.**—Thags were ostensibly most respectable men, engaged in business, farming, or something else equally harmless. Their method was to start out in bands of from ten to two hundred in the month of October. They usually posed as merchants, but on occasion adopted other disguises, especially the dress and marks of ascetics. They possessed a secret vocabulary and a number of secret signs, which could be used without danger in the presence of outsiders. They travelled along or near the great roads used by merchants and money-porters, discovered which individuals or companies carried valuable goods or large amounts of gold and silver, and then with much skill and cunning contrived to win their confidence. They would then travel with them, it might be for days or even weeks, until time, place, and all else were favourable to their purpose, when, at a signal, they suddenly set upon the unsuspecting party, strangled them all in a few minutes, buried their bodies, distributed the booty, and decamped. They used a cloth in strangling their victims. Similar methods were practised on the rivers. One of the most extraordinary features of their history is the almost unbroken immunity which they enjoyed: it was only very rarely that a Thag was caught and punished for his crimes.

Thags believed their profession to be a religious duty, and all that they did was done under the sanction of religion. They were fully convinced that the goddess Kālī, the wife of Śiva, called also Durgā and Bhawānī, had commanded them to strangle and to rob, and had laid down all the rules which they followed in the course of their operations. Many Brāhmans were Thags; and, when there was a Brāhman member in a gang, he conducted the ceremonies. The neophyte, whether the son of a Thag or a new accession, was initiated in an impressive religious ceremony, and took a dread oath of absolute fidelity to the brotherhood. Before starting on the season's operations each gang met in a suitable place, and took part in a solemn act of worship. As soon as possible after every successful operation another religious ceremony was carried out. Once in seven days at least the goddess was worshipped, and on the greater occasions animals were sacrificed in her honour. They would not start on a journey, admit a new member, or decide upon an act of murder, unless the goddess granted them favourable omens. In every ceremony she was worshipped, and to her their prayers were offered. No image was used; but the pickaxe for digging the graves of their victims, solemnly consecrated, stood for the goddess, and was believed to be filled with her power and inspired by her to guide them. In every ceremony the offerings of *gur* (*i.e.* coarse sugar) and water were made to the pickaxe; over it every oath was taken; and at all times it was regarded with extreme reverence, confidence, and fear. On every occasion when *gur* and water were offered to the pickaxe, every fully qualified Thag also ate of the *gur* and drank of the water. At the close of each period of operations a percentage of the gains was solemnly presented to the goddess in one of her temples.

Among the rules which guided the Thags perhaps the most noticeable was the law that they must never strangle a woman.

3. **Sources of the system.**—The religious and political conditions of mediæval India provided the soil and the seed from which this extraordinary organization grew. The following facts require to be realized.

(*a*) In all parts of India to-day there exist criminal tribes,[1] *i.e.* tribes whose regular caste-occupation is some form of crime. In each case there is a belief that some divinity has imposed on the tribe the particular type of crime which it practises and has also laid down the rules under which it is followed. It is therefore the duty of every member of the tribe to make the practice of the crime his regular occupation, and to obey all the religious rules which are laid down for his guidance in it. So long as he does so, he regards himself as a religious man. A percentage of the gains is regularly dedicated to the god or goddess who gave the tribe its criminal profession. A few of these tribes profess Muhammadanism, and dedicate their gains to some *pīr* (Muhammadan saint); but they are probably old criminal tribes which have undergone a shallow conversion to Muhammadanism. Criminal tribes are primitive people of very low social standing.

(*b*) All the chief forms of Hindu theology declare that the Supreme is exalted far above the petty distinctions of human

[1] J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915, p. 424.

morality. The idea is to make Him truly absolute, to sever Him in the most decisive way, not only from the earthly and the sensual, but from all human conditions as well. Thus, from the very fact that in Himself He is completely separated from both good and evil, it becomes possible to acknowledge that He is indifferent to them and is equally the cause of both. Hence to suggest that God should bid men do what we call wrong seems to the Hindu to be not only quite natural but also inevitable.

(*c*) The Śākta sect of Hinduism, which worships the wife of Śiva, called Durgā, Kālī, Bhawānī, or simply 'the goddess' (Devī), and possesses a philosophical theology, falls into two sub-sects—the Right-hand and the Left-hand. The Left-hand sect has a cult which contains several extraordinary features. Only one need be mentioned here, viz. that for many centuries not only animal but also human sacrifice was offered. In 1835 the British Government prohibited human sacrifice, but until then it was common in the chief shrines of the goddess in North and Central India. According to the ritual law, only males can be sacrificed to her.

(*d*) In the worship of the goddess in the homes of the people, pots, pieces of metal, and diagrams are more often used than images; and both images and symbols, when duly consecrated, are believed to be filled with the presence and power of the goddess.

(*e*) In modern India there are many groups of ignorant Muhammadans who take part in Hindu worship. They not only join in the great festivals, but also visit Hindu temples and make offerings to the gods, in order to secure immunity from disease and to obtain other boons. Muhammadans of a low type thus readily adopt elements of the Hindu cult.

These facts enable one to realize that, in mediæval India, there might readily appear a community organized on the basis of the worship of the goddess and the practice of murder and robbery. At first it would differ but little, if at all, from an ordinary criminal tribe; and the first Thags would be ignorant Hindus who had been worshippers of the goddess before they formed the society to strangle and rob unwary travellers. To pass from participation in human sacrifice before the altar of the goddess to the search for victims for her on the high roads would be no violent change. Nor would even the thoughtful Hindu be shocked by the doctrine that the goddess had ordered the programme of murder. Hindu theology provides a substantial basis for the idea. Further, the fundamental document on which the worship of the Devī rests[1] is full of blood and horror. The story in that document of her struggle with a demon named Raktabīja and her final triumph over him was made by Thags the starting-point of the tale in which she commands the original Thags to strangle men.[2] The ritual law that only males should be sacrificed to her is clearly the source of the rule that Thags must not kill women. It would also seem quite natural to devotees of the goddess to use the pickaxe as a symbol instead of an image, and they would instinctively believe that the power and the will of the goddess were present in it.

Nor need we wonder that Muhammadans, in order to become Thags, were willing to participate in Hindu worship, since so many are to-day accustomed to supplement Muslim rites with the cult of Hindu divinities.

(*f*) India has usually been ruled, not by one Imperial Government, but by a multitude of petty states, each of which sought only to secure peace and order within its own narrow territory, and cared little or nothing for what happened outside. Nor has the individual Indian ever felt it to be his duty to go out of his way to secure the well-being of the Indian people as a whole. If, therefore, some of the subjects of one of these small states pursued a certain type of crime outside the limits of the state and brought back large gains, whereof they gave considerable percentages to the Government, on the one hand, and to the temples, on the other, both Government and people were usually only too willing to acquiesce in the arrangement, and to do all that was possible to protect the men who brought them so much prosperity.

These and similar facts account for the almost universal immunity which the Thags enjoyed. They were found all over India, were closely bound to one another by oath and interest, and were usually only too well able to take prompt vengeance on any who molested the brotherhood. Thus only an Imperial Government using wide powers could successfully grapple with them.

1 *I.e.* the Chaṇḍī episode in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*.
2 Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, p. 127.

4. **The rise and fall of Thagī.**—It seems clear that the Thag conspiracy was originally a Hindu organization, as we have already suggested, and that it came into being before the Muhammadan conquest of North India (1193–1293). In his *Śrīkaṇṭhacharita* the Hindu poet Maṅkha or Maṅkaka (fl. *c.* A.D. 1150) compares the thievish spring to a Thag.[1] Clearly by his time the community was already well known.

If the community was very successful, it would soon attract indigent Hindus of high caste, and there would be plenty of poor Brāhmans who would be eager to enter. It seems probable that, after the Muhammadan conquest, during one of the many periods when anarchy was wide-spread, the stranglers found unusual opportunities for their depredations, and waxed so rapidly rich that many Muhammadans became Thags and readily acquiesced in the established cult of the goddess. The great success and the wonderful immunity from punishment which the movement enjoyed would be to them clear proof of its divine origin. There is conclusive evidence that Muhammadan Thags looked back with great veneration to Nizām al-Dīn Awliyā, a famous Muslim saint, who lived at Delhi in the first quarter of the 14th cent., and that they regarded him as one of the founders of the system.[2] This fits in perfectly with our theory that, at some time after the conquest, numerous Muhammadans joined the community. It is probable that the event occurred about A.D. 1300. The story that Muhammadan Thags were all descended from seven famous tribes[3] may also have a historical root.

The confederacy lived and flourished for many centuries, and was still extremely prosperous at the moment when it had the ill fortune to attract the attention of the British Government in India. In 1829 special officers were appointed to investigate the system, and a serious campaign was started for the destruction of the whole organization. Within seven years the work was done. The success of this great effort is mainly due to the devotion and genius of Captain, later Major-General, Sir W. H. Sleeman.

5. **Religious and ethical character of the Thags.**—Those Europeans who had extended intercourse with Thags, during the period when the British Government were endeavouring to put the system down, gave very vivid descriptions of the kind of men they were.

(*a*) Every Thag was fully convinced that the goddess had created the system, and that she invariably saved Thags from punishment or disaster, so long as they obeyed the rules she had laid down for their operations. They were also immovably convinced that the consecrated pickaxe was so filled with the presence of the goddess as to be able to guide the Thags in their wanderings and to bring dire disaster on every one who disobeyed.[4]

(*b*) No Thag ever showed the slightest compunctions of conscience for his crimes. Sleeman writes:

'A Thug considers the persons murdered precisely in the light of victims offered up to the Goddess; and he remembers them, as a Priest of Jupiter remembered the oxen, and a Priest of Saturn the children sacrificed upon their altars. He meditates his murders without any misgivings, he perpetrates them without any emotions of pity, and he remembers them without any feelings of remorse. They trouble not his dreams, nor does their recollection ever cause him inquietude in darkness, in solitude, or in the hour of death.'[5]

Never did the strength of religious faith or the extraordinary domination which religion exercises over man's moral nature find clearer illustration.

LITERATURE.—W. H. Sleeman, *Ramaseeana, or a Vocabulary of the Language used by the Thugs, with an Appendix*

1 Garbe, *Beiträge*, p. 137.
2 W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, rev. and annot. ed. by V. A. Smith, London, 1915, p. 491.
3 Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, p. 11.
4 *Ib.* p. 9. 5 *Ib.* p. 71.

descriptive of the Fraternity, etc., Calcutta, 1836; *Report on the Depredations committed by the Thug Gangs*, do. 1840; Meadows Taylor, *Confessions of a Thug* (a novel), London, 1839, new ed., do. 1916; J. Hutton, *Popular Account of the Thugs and Dacoits*, do. 1857; *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Thugs'; R. Garbe, *Beiträge zu ind. Kulturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1903.

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THALES.—See IONIC PHILOSOPHY.

THĀNESAR.—Thānesar (Skr. *sthāṇvīśvara*, *sthāṇu*, a local name of Śiva, *īśvara*, 'lord'; also *sthāṇeśvara*, *sthāṇa*, 'shrine,' and *īśvara*) is a sacred town in the Karnāl District of the Panjāb, lat. 29° 59′ N.; long. 76° 50′ E., on the banks of the river Sarasvatī (*q.v.*). The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsiang, describes it under the name of Sa-t'a-ni-shi-fa-lo, as the centre of the Hindu Holy Land (Dharmakshetra, Kurukshetra) and gives the local legends.[1] It has been identified with the Ostobalasara or Batangkaisara of Ptolemy.[2] In A.D. 1014 it was sacked by Maḥmūd of Ghaznī.[3] The most famous shrine was that dedicated to Chakrasvāmi, Viṣṇu, 'lord of the discus.' The statue is said to have been taken to Ghaznī to be broken up and trodden under foot. It was finally desecrated by Aurangzīb. Enormous crowds of pilgrims visit the place to bathe at eclipses of the sun.

LITERATURE.—A. Cunningham, *Archæological Survey of India Report*, ii. [Simla, 1871] 212 ff.; *IGI* xxiii. 305.

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THANK-OFFERING.—See SACRIFICE.

THEATRE.—See DRAMA.

THEFT.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

THEISM.—**1. Definition.**—The word 'theism' (Fr. *théisme*, Germ. *Theismus*) is a purely modern formation, implying a non-existent Greek *θεισμός* and an equally non-existent verb *θείζω* (on the analogy of *μηδίζω*, *φιλιππίζω*, and the like). As there is a certain vagueness about the meaning of the word in current English, it is necessary to begin this article with a convention as to the sense in which 'theism' will be employed in what follows. The word will be used throughout as a name for a philosophical theory as distinct from a practical religious faith. Perhaps the faith and the theory are never absolutely disjoined, but they are at least logically distinguishable. It may be doubted whether any man wholly untouched by the spirit of adoration and wholly devoid of love to God has ever been a genuine theist in philosophy, and again whether one can be in earnest with a philosophical belief in God without being led on to regulate his life by that belief. But it is at least possible to practise love of God and trust in God without making any conscious attempt to find a speculative explanation of the world. There are many who, in George Tyrrell's phrase, share the faith of Simon Peter without concerning themselves about his theology. The present article will be exclusively concerned with the philosophical conception of God as the ultimate ground of things. Current usage seems to require a further distinction. It seems necessary to discriminate theism not only from atheism (*q.v.*), the denial that God exists, and scepticism or agnosticism (*q.v.*), the refusal to answer any question about the ultimate ground of things, but also from deism (*q.v.*), which, in its way, also treats God as an ultimate ground. We shall probably not depart far from the implications of current language if we agree to define theism as the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (*a*) intrinsically complete or perfect and (*b*), as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship. Belief in a ground of things which is not intrinsically complete and perfect, and consequently no adequate object of adoration, but at best of respect and admiration, would at the present day probably be described by every one as deism rather than as theism. Thus the suggested definition in fact coincides with the famous formula of St. Anselm, that God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest*, 'the being than which none greater can be thought.'[1]

It is evident that theism, thus understood, is incompatible with polytheism (*q.v.*) and also with any doctrine, theological or metaphysical, which asserts a plurality of independent and equally ultimate 'reals,' whether in the form of a dualism between God, the good principle, and an immaterial evil principle (Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism [*qq.v.*]), or between God and matter, or in that of an ultimate plurality of unoriginated 'souls' or 'persons,' or in any other shape. All such doctrines involve the denial that there is any object which answers to the definition *id quo maius cogitari non potest*. For this reason the various modern theories of a finite or limited deity are inconsistent with strict theism. For a deity limited by restrictions arising outside his own nature is manifestly not the source of all reality other than himself, and thus not God in the sense in which we are using that word. And, if the 'limitations' are asserted to be self-limitations, due to the nature of God Himself (as in the philosophy of Hastings Rashdall), we have to face a dilemma. Either the presence of these limitations in the deity is a defect, and the deity is therefore not God in our sense at all, or their presence is not a defect, and there is then no sense in calling them restrictions or limitations, as it is their absence which would, in this case, be the defect.

It is mainly on the ground of alleged difficulties in the notion of the divine Omnipotence that these theories are recommended. But the difficulties seem due to misunderstanding. Omnipotence means only power to do whatever is consistent with God's own perfection. It is no real limitation of the divine power to hold, as most theologians and philosophers have done, that God cannot do what is in itself absurd—*e.g.*, cannot make a false proposition true, or make virtue vice, or annihilate Himself. The old Stoic boast that the sage is in one respect more powerful than God, because he can put an end to his existence if he grows tired of it, is a mere false paradox.

It is, perhaps, more important to be clear on the point that theism, as defined, is equally inconsistent with the type of philosophic monism called by James Ward 'singularism'—the theory that there is only one existent, the Absolute, and that this single existent is the true subject of all significant propositions. If we mean by God a being from whom all else that exists derives its being and who can be worshipped, then the belief in God necessarily implies belief in the real existence of beings who can worship God. To say that God is the source of existence implies that God is not all that exists. From a theistic point of view it is, no doubt, proper to call God, the being from whom all others are derived, the Absolute or unconditioned being, but only on the condition that the Absolute is not equated with all that really exists. The underived source of existence may, in virtue of its unique intrinsic completeness or perfection, be called the *ens realissimum*, but the very use of such a phrase implies that there are other *entia realia*.

It will probably be readily admitted that the *ἓν καὶ πᾶν* doctrine of Spinoza cannot be reasonably called theism, nor have the most distinguished representatives of singularism in

[1] S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, London, 1884, i. 183 ff.
[2] J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 128.
[3] H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, ii. 452 ff.

[1] *Proslogion*, ch. 2.

our own times shown any desire to claim the name of theists. It should be recognized that the popular language about a purely 'immanent God,' as opposed to the 'transcendent God' of orthodox Christian theology, is equally incompatible with genuine theism, inasmuch as it conflicts with the recognition of a real distinction between the supreme source of existence and the dependent existents. It is just this distinction which is vital in a theistic philosophy, and, for this reason, it may be taken as a fair test of the theism of a philosophy whether its way of conceiving the relation of its God to the world is compatible with a real recognition of the divine transcendence.

2. Philosophy and theism.—If we look at the history of European philosophy, it may be said that in the main the general trend of philosophic thought, even independently of the influence of positive religions, has been theistic, at least from the time of Plato to our own day. Even the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, when all the qualifications with which it is enunciated by its author are taken fully into account, has a recognizable theistic tendency and might be said, apart from its blunders about dynamics, to be little more than a very crude reproduction of the 'negative theology' which is really one-half of the orthodox Christian doctrine of God. As will be shown directly, this tendency to theism is a direct consequence of the permanent influence of Plato on all subsequent developments in philosophy. Apart from materialism (*q.v.*), which has never produced a philosopher of the first rank, the main antitheistic influence in modern European philosophy has been that of Spinoza (*q.v.*), which has steadily affected metaphysical thought, perhaps even more outside than within the professionally philosophical schools, from the time of Jacobi and Lessing down to the end of the 19th century. This is partly accounted for by the powerful attraction exercised by the naturalistic strain in Spinoza's doctrine on the devotees of physical science, partly by the tendency of many of the most prominent 19th cent. representatives of the Hegelian line of thought to interpret Hegel (*q.v.*) in a Spinozistic sense.

Whether the Spinozistic interpretation of Hegel is the true one might admit of question, and it has been rejected by such eminent Hegelian students as Hutchison Stirling and J. M. E. McTaggart, in the one case for a definitely theistic interpretation, in the other for a version which has more affinity with the monadism of Leibniz (*q.v.*) than with Spinoza's singularism. But in the main Hegel has become known, at least in the English-speaking world, through the work of philosophers with strong Spinozistic prepossessions, with the consequence that the influence of Hegelian ways of thinking has been definitely hostile to theism. Even among professedly Christian theologians allegiance to Hegel in philosophy has usually led to an extreme 'immanence' doctrine of God which at least compromised the theistic position.

More ephemeral has been the influence excited in the last half of the 19th cent. by the pessimistic atheism of Schopenhauer (*q.v.*), and in the last twenty or twenty-five years by the brilliant, if incoherent, anti-Christian polemics of Nietzsche (*q.v.*). Both the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the antitheism of Nietzsche are, however, too little reasoned and too obviously matters of personal temperament to be regarded as of permanent philosophical importance. The influence of Hegel, also, and still more that of Spinoza, would seem to be for the present a spent force. In the present state of philosophy the most formidable rival to theism as an explanation of the world appears to be the thoroughgoing rationalist pluralism of the 'new realism,' represented at its best by the writings of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Of this doctrine, as well as of the supposed objection to theism arising from the evolutionist's alleged vision of Nature as 'red in tooth and claw,' something is said below (§ 17).

3. Plato.—The importance of Plato as the creator of philosophical theology makes it necessary to begin any serious account of theism as a philosophical theory with a clear statement of the Platonic position, so far as that position was expressed by Plato in his writings. To call Plato the creator of philosophic theology does not, of course, mean that the belief in God is an invention of Plato. As has often been remarked, the general trend of the best Greek thought on the problems of human conduct and destiny—as represented, *e.g.*, by such poets as Aeschylus and Euripides—is in the direction of a vague monotheism. And it cannot be seriously doubted that an earnest practical faith in God was characteristic of Pythagoras and of Socrates. Even the most unreasonable scepticism about the historical good faith of Plato's accounts of his master cannot obscure the fact that Socrates gave up the whole of his mature life to the execution of a mission to which he believed himself to have been called by God and died as a martyr to his calling. But this, so far as we know, was a matter of personal religious conviction rather than of speculative theory. Even Plato himself does not attempt a formal philosophical statement and justification of the belief in God until we come to the *magnum opus* of his old age, the *Laws*. In his best known earlier writings—*e.g.*, the *Republic*—great stress is laid upon the importance for the formation of moral character of an ethically adequate conception of the divine nature. God must be thought of as perfectly good, and current religion must be purged of everything which suggests that there is anything unethical in His character or that His dealings with men have any other purpose than their true good. It is just because God is perfectly good that (*Republic*, *Theaetetus*) the end of life may be said to be to 'become like God.' God fashioned the world and made it the best possible world because it would be unworthy of His goodness to make it otherwise (*Timaeus*). True piety is to be a 'fellow-worker' with God (*Euthyphro*). We are God's sheep and He is our shepherd (*Politicus*). The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and when they depart from us it is to be with Him (*Phaedo*). But this is, of course, the language of religion, not of science, and we are made to understand the difference by the simple fact that nearly all that is said of God, outside the *Laws*, beyond the one emphatic statement about His perfect goodness, is conveyed in 'myths,' *i.e.* in imaginative stories, as to which we are cautioned that we cannot undertake to pronounce on their strict truth. Nor is any attempt made to *prove* either the existence or the perfect goodness of God. In particular the story of creation in the *Timaeus* is, as we are explicitly warned, not to be taken as scientific truth, but as a tale which is the most probable that can be told about matters which lie outside the region within which scientific knowledge is possible. If we did not possess the *Laws*, it would be legitimate, as in fact it is not, to doubt whether Plato did not agree with Kant that reasoned scientific knowledge of God is impossible, though on grounds which are not identical with Kant's. In the tenth book of the *Laws*, however,[1] we have a formal proof of God's existence, wholly devoid of any features of mythical colouring, which is expressly declared to be conclusive. The argument, the main principle of which had been already anticipated in the *Phaedrus*,[2] is as follows. The most universal characteristic of things is motion and change. Now, motions are of two kinds, (*a*) impressed, and (*b*) original or spontaneous. Or, to use Plato's own phraseology, there are motions which are able only to move something else (impressed or communicated movements), and there are motions which 'move themselves as well as other things.' And native or spontaneous movement is logically prior to impressed or communicated movement. We cannot

[1] 887 A–899 E. [2] *Phaedrus*, 245 C–E.

regard all movements as impressed or communicated without falling into an impossible logical *regressus in indefinitum*. Further, 'motion which moves itself' is precisely what we mean when we talk of ψυχή, 'soul.' 'Soul' is simply a shorter name for the κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν δυναμένη. It is just when we see a thing manifestly capable of internally initiated movement or change that we feel bound to say that the thing in question is 'animated' or has a 'soul.' It follows, then, that souls and their various 'motions' (judgment, volition, hope, desire, and the like) are prior to bodies and their motions or changes. All bodily processes are derivative from and dependent on 'motions' of the soul, and it is just for this reason that Plato explicitly denies the doctrine, often imputed to him by the uncritical, that 'matter' can be the principle of evil. Further, good souls, in the degree of their goodness, are sources of orderly and beneficent motions; evil souls, of disorderly and evil motions. Now, the great recurrent motions which science discovers in the universe (the periodic motions of the heavenly bodies) are all regular and orderly and belong to the class of the 'good' motions. Hence they must be due to good souls. (It had been carefully laid down in an earlier passage that all apparent irregularities and anomalies in these motions are only apparent and disappear as our science becomes more adequate.) If, then, we define God as a perfectly good soul, we may say that, since the great motions of the universe are all perfectly orderly, they must be caused by God. God, however, cannot be the only soul, or 'movement that moves itself.' For, though the *magnalia naturae* exhibit perfect regularity, there are also irregular and destructive motions, such as those, *e.g.*, of disease or those due to a wicked will; and these are just as actual as facts as anything else. Thus the facts of the universe bear witness to the existence of souls which are not wholly good. There must be at least one 'bad' soul, which is not God, and there may, of course, be as many more as are required to account for the observed facts. The transcendence of God is thus safeguarded.

Plato's language about the 'bad' souls has been misunderstood both in ancient and in modern times. Plutarch[1] thought that he had discovered in Plato's words the doctrine of an ultimate dualism between a good and an evil world-soul. This view did not find favour with the Platonists of antiquity, but has been revived in modern times by Zeller, from the weight of whose name it has obtained a wholly undeserved consideration. Plato says nothing about an evil principle, in the *Laws* or anywhere else. What he does say[2] is merely that all motions cannot be due to a single soul; there must be at least two, the 'beneficent' and 'that which has power to effect the contrary results.' The whole context suggests that the bad souls of which he is thinking are chiefly those of passionate and ignorant men, which, of course, are numerous. It should further be noted that, in the passage of the *Laws* containing the theistic argument, Plato speaks throughout in the plural of 'gods,' giving the soul which moves the sun as an example of his meaning. This is, however, a mere consequence of the fact that the legislation of the *Laws* is designed for an ordinary Greek community. It is assumed that the State religion of the colony will recognize 'gods many,' and Plato's object is to substitute the heavenly bodies, or rather the souls which move them, as types of regularity and beneficence, for the morally frail and passionate anthropomorphic deities of actual Greek cults. Of Plato's personal conviction of the unity of God there can be no real doubt. The unity of God, 'the best soul,' follows in fact, as we may see from the *Timaeus*, from the unity of the universe. The universe is one and is a rational system; therefore it is the product of one intelligence.[3] That a Greek writing for Greeks should allow himself to speak of θεοί explains itself; what is really significant is that Plato speaks so frequently, and just when he wishes to be most impressive, of θεός.[4]

From the goodness of God, since God is a soul (ψυχή), it follows that everything in the world is governed by a wise and beneficent Providence, and that God's dealings with man are perfectly and inexorably just. Thus the tenth book of the *Laws* definitely creates 'natural theology' as a branch of philosophy for the first time and indicates once for all its main doctrines—the existence and goodness of God, the reality of God's providential government of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and the correspondence between man's destiny and his works. These doctrines together make up what was known as 'natural' or 'philosophical' theology, as distinct from both 'poetic' theology—the stories told of the gods by the poets—and 'civil' theology, which consists in knowledge of the cultus prescribed by the State.[1]

The question whether Plato's theology amounts to a complete theism is not without its difficulties. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, as Burnet has said,[2] Plato regarded his doctrine of God as the central thing in his whole system. It is precisely the activity of God, the perfectly good soul, that connects the world of 'becoming,' *i.e.* 'Nature,' the world of all that we call empirical existence, with the system of εἴδη. The reason why there is a world of 'things' at all is just that God, the perfectly good soul, exists and is eternally active. The perfectly good soul, of course, has a perfect knowledge of 'the Good,' and its activity consists in reproduction or 'imitation' of the Good. Thus all existents other than God owe the very fact of their existence to God, as they owe it also to Him that they are what they are. Still it does not appear that the Platonic God is *all* that later theists have meant by the Supreme. He is an existent, though a perfect one, and beyond all existents there is the system of 'form' or 'numbers.' This is the pattern (παράδειγμα) after which God makes heaven and earth and all that is in them, and is thus something metaphysically prior to God Himself. If we understand by theism the doctrine that God is the sole unconditioned source not only of existents but also of real possibilities, we shall have to say that it is only in Neo-Platonism that Greek philosophy succeeds in being fully theistic. A word or two may be said about the argument by which Plato establishes the existence of God. It contains in itself the germs of more than one of the 'proofs of the being of God' which have become traditional. Its presuppositions are two: (1) the universal validity of the principle of causality, and (2) the regularity of the cosmical motions—the 'reign of law' in the physical world. From the principle of causality, taken together with the assumption that there cannot be an infinite regress in the causal series, comes the conclusion that there must be an original cause (or causes) of all movements, which is 'self-moving'—*i.e.* a 'soul' or 'souls'—and from the regularity of the cosmic motions and the systematic interconnexion between them it follows that the ultimate 'mover' is the perfectly good soul. Thus Plato's reasoning combines in one argument the principle of the cosmological argument from the 'contingency of the world' to the existence of a First Cause and that of the argument from design, which is not degraded by Plato, as it has often been by modern apologists, into an argument from the alleged adaptation of the world to our individual convenience. As understood by Plato, the

[1] *De animae procreat. in Timaeo*, 1014 E.
[2] *Laws*, 896 E. [3] *Timaeus*, 30 D–31 B.
[4] In *Ep.* 13 he writes to Dionysius II. that he will distinguish letters of real importance from those which he is obliged to write as a matter of formal politeness by mentioning θεός and not θεοί in the opening sentences.

[1] The distinction in this form became fixed in consequence of the fact that it was adopted by the Roman encyclopaedist M. Terentius Varro and taken over from him by St. Augustine in the *de Civitate Dei*. The theology of the philosophers was called 'natural,' not, of course, with any thought of a contrast with 'revealed' truth, but because it was held to be scientific and true, unlike mythology, which the poets were believed to have invented, and the cultus of the State, which, as Hobbes puts it, 'is not philosophy but law.'
[2] *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., *Thales to Plato*, London, 1914, p. 335.

argument from design is simply the argument from the intelligibility of the world of actual facts and events to intelligence in the cause which produces and sustains it.[1] Plato's argument is thus an *argumentum a posteriori*, in the correct scholastic, not in the inaccurate Kantian, sense of the phrase *a posteriori*; *i.e.*, it is an argument from the character of a known effect to the character of its cause. That there is a world of mutable things, and that, as scientific insight advances, the processes in this world of mutability are more and more found to exhibit conformity to intelligible laws, are assumed as empirically known truths, and without these empirical premisses the demonstration would not work. There is no hint in Plato of the line of thought which at a later date crystallized into the one genuinely *a priori* argument for the existence of God, the ontological proof, which, if valid, establishes its conclusion without any empirical premiss whatsoever.

4. **Aristotle.**—Aristotle's doctrine of God, though better known to the modern world than Plato's, is simply the Platonic doctrine rather more precisely expressed and shorn of its ethical and practical applications. With Aristotle, as with Plato, the doctrine of God is absolutely central, and the argument is once more based upon the assumption of the causal principle. Like Plato, Aristotle contends that communicated or impressed motion presupposes original or spontaneous motion, and like Plato he regards ψυχή as the one source of spontaneous movement. But here he is led to make a further refinement. The 'motions of the soul' arise from ὄρεξις, 'appetition,' and appetition is always appetition of something apprehended as good (ὀρεγόμεθα διότι δοκεῖ). This apprehension of an object as good is an exercise of νοῦς, an act of immediate intelligent apprehension. The apprehension is not itself a movement, though it gives rise to motions both of the soul and of the body. We must not then be content to trace back all motions to their origin in the 'movement which can move itself,' but behind even this we must look for an 'unmoved mover,' an unchanging initiator of all change. Otherwise we shall simply fall into an indefinite regress, and an indefinite regress in the order of efficient causes is unthinkable (the principle of the argument from the 'contingency of the world'). The unity of the supreme First Mover once more follows from the unity of the physical world. The whole physical world is a scene of 'becoming,' in which the potentialities latent in things are developed into actuality by the agency of efficient causes which are already themselves developed actualities. Behind every process of development lies the agency of such already developed actualities, and thus, just because there really is something and not nothing, there must be some actual agents which have never developed at all, but have been eternally and immutably active. From Aristotle's point of view, all processes of development depend upon the eternally regular and uninterrupted movements of the heavenly bodies. Hence there must be as many 'unmoved movers' as there are independent astronomical movements. Further, astronomical movements form a hierarchy. Each of the 50 odd concentric 'spheres' which Aristotle postulates to account for the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies has its own proper revolution and its own 'unmoved mover.' But there is one sphere which, without being enclosed by any other, encloses all the rest, and, according to the Aristotelian astronomy (which disagrees on this point wholly from Plato), communicates its movement to all the spheres it contains. This is the sphere of the fixed stars, which rotates uniformly on its axis in the period of 24 hours. The 'unmoved mover' of this sphere is consequently God. As that which He moves is one, and its movement is eternal, continuous, and regular, God is also one, eternal, immutable, the First Mover upon whom all motion in the universe depends.[1] So far Aristotle's doctrine is, in substance, that of Plato in the *Laws*, except that Aristotle has dogmatically committed himself to a particular astronomical theory, that of Eudoxus, which, for sound scientific reasons, did not commend itself to Plato. In his conception of the nature of the First Mover Aristotle departs more widely both from Plato and from true theism. God, as Aristotle describes Him, is not a ψυχή, but a νοῦς. And he infers from his doctrine that the First Mover must be unmoved the conclusion that the divine mind, unlike our minds, because it is unmoving, must eternally think one and the self-same object. Further, this object must be adequate to occupy the divine mind through eternity. It follows that the object of God's unbroken Sabbath of contemplation is God Himself. 'He thinks Himself and His thinking is a thinking of thinking (νόησις νοήσεως).'[2] In fact, though without the presence of God there could be no motion in the universe, God is supposed to be wholly unaware of the existence of the universe which He moves. He moves it by being an object of appetition to it, and thus it is aware of Him, but He is no more aware of it than the various objects of our human appetitions need be aware of us and our desire for them. The world's desire after God is precisely and exactly the 'desire of the moth for the star.' This conception, due apparently to Aristotle's own temperamental indifference to the practical life, of course strikes out of philosophical theology the doctrine of Providence and of the righteousness of God's dealings with man. In fact, since Aristotle held that 'goodness of character' is a different thing from 'goodness of intellect,' he is quite consistent when at the end of his *Ethics* he expressly denies that goodness of character or moral goodness is predicable of God.[3] God, in fact, becomes in Aristotle what Aristotle himself would have liked to be, if the conditions of human life would allow it—a mere 'magnified and non-natural' scientific thinker. In respect of this evacuation of all ethical content from the idea of God, Aristotle may fairly be said to be the founder of philosophical deism, as Plato was the founder of philosophical theism. It is clear that to Aristotle and his disciple Eudemus, who identifies the speculative life with the contemplation and worship of God,[4] the First Mover was an object of genuine worship and reverence, though the worship of such a being could have no real connexion with active good works; but a non-ethical deity, who knows nothing of humanity's needs and aspirations, can never become the centre of an enduring religion. Hence it is not surprising that, while Platonism continued throughout later antiquity to be the creed of educated religious men, Aristotelianism was reduced to simple naturalism within half a century of Aristotle's death by the third head of the school, Strato of Lampsacus.[5]

5. **Epicureans.**—The deism of the Epicureans is of no significance for natural theology. For all practical purposes the school were, what their opponents called them, pure atheists, since it was

[1] The notion of an unconscious intelligence or reason as the ground of things is excluded by Plato's doctrine that νοῦς can only exist in a ψυχή (*Sophistes*, 249 A, *Philebus*, 30 C, *Timaeus*, 30 B).

[1] See for all this in particular *Metaphysics*, 1072*a* 19–1073*b* 17, *Physics*, 258*b* 10 ff.

[2] *Metaphysics*, 1074*b* 33.

[3] *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1178*b* 7–23.

[4] τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (*Ethica Eudemea*, 1249*b* 20).

[5] Cicero, *Academ.* ii. 38, *de Natura Deorum*, i. 35; Plutarch *adv. Colotem*, p. 1115.

one of their principal tenets that the gods not merely take no interest in the doings of men but play no part in cosmology; the world has been formed and continues to exist *opera sine divom*. The only use made by Epicurus of gods is a trivial one; their existence accounts for the phantasms of superhuman beings which are seen in dreams.

6. **Stoics.**—In Stoicism, on the other hand, natural theology of a kind plays a prominent part, though the original Stoic doctrine can hardly be called theistic. The theology of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is a materialistic doctrine of immanence. The substance of all that exists is a single body; in fact, the universe is a 'fire.' The cosmic fire is intelligent, and it is this fire that is God. This doctrine, borrowed by the founders of Stoicism from Heraclitus, but put forward with a conscious opposition, which Heraclitus would not have understood, to the immaterialism of Plato and Aristotle, is the nearest counterpart that ancient thought has to show to the Spinozist conception of the one substance with its plurality of disparate but 'parallel' attributes. But with the Stoics it is not, as with Spinoza, thought, but extension, that is the 'Aaron's rod that swallows all the rest' of the attributes.

As to the details of the doctrine. God and the world, though really one, are logically distinguished. At one time in the history of the universe the 'fire,' or God, exists alone in its purity and contains within itself all the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι, or constitutive ratios, of everything. There follows a process of evolution, identified by the Stoics with the 'downward path,' or ὁδὸς κάτω, of Heraclitus, in which the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι of all things are unfolded and a world of diversified existents produced. There is a second and antithetical process, regarded as identical with the Heraclitan ὁδὸς ἄνω, or 'upward path,' and ending in an ἐκπύρωσις, or general conflagration; the plurality of diverse existents is once more converted into the original fire, and God is left once more as the only existent. The whole double process of evolution followed by involution constitutes a 'great year,' and the life of the universe is made up of an endless succession of such 'great years,' each repeating the events of the preceding without variation (a fancy which we know from a fragment of Eudemus preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle[1] to go back to the early Pythagoreans, and which has been revived in our own time by Nietzsche as the doctrine of 'eternal recurrence'). The details of the process of evolution belong to the Stoic physics and do not concern us here. In accord with this doctrine, God is sometimes declared to be the same as the κόσμος, or universe, sometimes distinguished from it. 'They use the word κόσμος in three senses, to mean (1) God Himself . . . who is, of course, imperishable and unoriginate, the artificer of the world-order, who resumes into Himself and again begets out of Himself the whole of being in accord with certain cycles of time; (2) the world-order formed by the heavenly bodies, (3) the composite of these two.'[2] Hence the full definition of God was that God is πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεται, 'a fire of craft [or 'art'] proceeding in order to the generation of a world, containing in itself all the constitutive ratios in accord wherewith all things come to be in the order of destiny.'[3] Strictly speaking, this doctrine, which equates God with the κόσμος, is not theism at all, since it denies that there are any real existents other than God. But religiously the founders of Stoicism, as we see from the well-known *Hymn* of Cleanthes, were fervent worshippers of God. It was characteristic of the school from the first that they insisted strongly on the moral side of theism. Like the Platonists, they were vigorous asserters of Providence and used the doctrine to justify even such things as astrology, prophetic dreams, oracles, and divination. Providence was, however, regarded as identical with absolute predestination, and scientifically explained by the rigid mechanical concatenation of all events in a single causal system. Hence, as may be seen from the controversial essay of Plutarch on *The Contradictions in Stoicism* (περὶ στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων), the devices by which the Stoic philosophers tried to conciliate their optimistic belief in the providential order with their materialistic monism were often really fatal to the ascription of moral goodness to God.

In the writings of the Stoics of the Roman period, from whom the ideas of the school have become familiar to the modern world, the materialistic and fatalistic side of the doctrine is less prominent. They often seem to be teaching a simple spiritual theism. It must be remembered that all these writers are later than, and were greatly influenced by, Posidonius of Apamea (first half of 1st cent. B.C.), who gravely modified the original doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus by contaminating it with Platonism, as his contemporary, Antiochus of Ascalon, tried unsuccessfully to introduce Stoicism into the Academy. It is precisely those among the later Stoics, such as Seneca, who can be shown to depend most completely on Posidonius in whom the monism and materialism of Stoicism is least apparent. To understand the real tendencies of the system, it is important to study it as it was before Posidonius had Platonized it. For this purpose the anti-Stoic essays of Plutarch and the account of Stoic doctrine given in the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius are particularly valuable. Indispensable for special students is H. von Arnim's collection of the complete fragments of the Stoics of the pre-Roman period, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1904–05.

The one really original contribution made by Stoicism to natural theology is the appeal to 'innate ideas' and the *consensus gentium* as an argument for the existence of God. The doctrine of innate ideas (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, *notitiae communes*) is a consequence of the Aristotelian criticism of Plato. According to the theory of method expounded more specially in the *Phaedo* and the central books of the *Republic*, the work of science begins with the provisional assumption of a theory (ὑπόθεσις) to account for a group of observed facts. If the observed facts (τὰ φαινόμενα) agree with the results of deduction from the ὑπόθεσις, the 'appearances' are said to be 'saved' by the theory, and it is so far vindicated. It may still, however, be called in question, and in that case will have to be defended by being deduced from some more ultimate premisses which the impugner himself admits. It thus becomes a task for dialectic (or, as we should say, metaphysics), the highest science of all, to make a critical examination of the provisional assumptions (the unproved postulates) of all the other sciences and to discover the real unquestionable presuppositions of all knowledge. Aristotle insisted, as against this view, that the special postulates of each science must be self-evident when once they have been formulated. For the Stoics this doctrine, that every science depends upon self-evident universal premisses, created a difficulty, as in their theory of knowledge they were, unlike Aristotle, extreme sensationalists, regarding particular sense-perceptions as the foundation of all knowledge. They were accordingly obliged to provide some criticism or test by which those universal propositions which are valid generalizations from sensation may be discriminated from those which are not. An obvious test suggested itself. Generalizations which are made only by certain special groups of men or by particular individuals may fairly be supposed to be due to temperamental, educational, national, or racial bias; those which appear to be made without exception by all men, no matter how widely they differ in temperament, education, national traditions, social institutions, may be presumed to be formed spontaneously, and therefore naturally, *i.e.* as a consequence of the intrinsic character of mind. It is thus reasonable to regard these generalizations as true and thus to take the *consensus gentium* as the best guarantee for the truth of a belief. The Stoic κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, 'common' notions, are thus innate in the very sense in which Descartes afterwards used the word. It is not meant that we come into the world with them already in our possession, but that the formation of them is due to the normal development of intelligence independently of any kind of bias. As the most obvious examples of such common notions the Stoics instanced the beliefs, which they held to be common to all mankind, 'that there are gods and that they care for us.'[1] All this passed, mainly through Cicero, into the natural theology of the 17th century. This explains why modern natural theologians have often been anxious to prove the universal diffusion

[1] Diels, p. 732, 26 = Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[3], Berlin, 1912, ii. 355, 8.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, vii. 70, 137.

[3] Aetius, *Placita*, i. 7, 33 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin, 1879, p. 306). The same definition was given of φύσις, 'nature.' Cf. Cicero, *de Deor. Nat.* ii. 57: 'Zeno igitur ita naturam definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum, ad gignendum progredientem via.'

[1] Diog. Laert. vii. 36, 52.

of the belief in God and why their critics have often laid great stress on travellers' reports which have been supposed to indicate the existence of 'atheistic' savages. The Stoics themselves, in appealing to universal agreement, did not, of course, mean to deny the sporadic appearance of individual atheists. This could be accounted for as the consequence of individual prejudices due to improper education and 'unnatural' institutions. What was supposed to be demonstrated was merely that belief in God and Providence is too widely diffused to be regarded as anything but a spontaneous and 'natural' conviction. The position taken up by some modern apologists who deny that there has ever been a single convinced and sincere atheist is an exaggeration of the Stoic doctrine.[1] It may be added that the degradation of the argument from design or 'intentional causality' into the crude form which it assumes in so much of our popular apologetics is mainly due to the extravagant exaltation of man by the Stoic philosophy. With Plato and Aristotle teleology means simply that the world of historical existents and processes is so ordered that it realizes an end which has absolute intrinsic worth.[2] It is to the Stoics that we owe the coarsening of the thought into the assertion that man and man's convenience and comfort are the intrinsic and absolute good which is the end realized by the cosmic processes. Thus they maintained that plants and animals exist only to furnish man with food and raiment convenient for him, or even with agreeable luxuries.

Porphyry[3] quotes from Chrysippus the statement that 'the gods made us for ourselves and one another, but animals for us, the horse to help us in war and the dog in hunting, leopards, bears, and lions, to practise ourselves in valour upon. The pig was made for nothing but to be sacrificed, and God mixed soul with its flesh like a seasoning to make it readily digestible for us. Shell fish of all kinds and birds he contrived that we might have no lack of soups and *entrées*.'[4] According to Plutarch,[5] Chrysippus carried things so far that he asserted in his work περὶ φύσεως that God made bugs to prevent us from sleeping too long and mice to teach us to take proper care of our cupboards.

7. Neo-Platonism.—In any account of the popular theism of antiquity prominence would have to be given to the utterances of the later Platonizing Roman Stoics, such as Seneca, and to the earnest defence of the ethical side of theism by writers like Plutarch and his contemporary Maximus of Tyre. Plutarch's philosophical essays which deal with the theistic problem are specially interesting, as his determination to treat Providence and the moral government of the world by God as serious matters leads him into sharp and acute criticism not only of the perfunctory deism of Epicurus but also of the Stoic pantheistic necessitarianism (especially in the essay περὶ στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων, which aims at showing that the materialism, pantheism, and determinism of Zeno and Chrysippus are inconsistent with their moral optimism and professed belief in an ethical Providence). Interesting, however, as this theological literature is to the historian of Platonism, it cannot be said to add anything of value to philosophical theism. The Neo-Platonist school, founded in Rome by Plotinus (*c.* A.D. 205–270), worked out for the first time a thoroughgoing metaphysical theism which provided the philosophical basis for the Christian theism of the whole Middle Ages. For the purposes of the present article it will be most convenient to reproduce the main features of this doctrine as it is presented by the great systematizer of the school, Proclus (A.D. 410–485), in his στοιχείωσις θεολογική, *Rudiments of Platonic Theology*.[1] In what follows nothing will be quoted from Proclus which does not form part of the teaching of the whole Neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onwards.

In Plato's own theology, or at least in the statement of it which he gives in his writings, as we have seen, God is not quite all that the Christian theist has usually meant by God. God is the supremely good 'soul' and the source, it appears, of all existents other than Himself. But we are not positively told what is the relation of God to the supreme principles of the Platonic system, the forms (εἴδη, ἰδέαι) or numbers, and in the mythical picture-language of the *Timaeus* these forms (or numbers) are certainly represented as superior to God; they are the pre-existing model or pattern which God contemplates in fashioning the world of finite existents, or, as Plato calls it, the world of 'becoming.' There is no warrant anywhere in Plato for the psychologizing interpretation, often put on his language since the time of Philo of Alexandria, which makes the forms into thoughts of the divine mind. This means in modern language that, though God is regarded as the source of actuality, He is not unambiguously held to be also the source of all real possibility. In Neo-Platonism the further step is taken. God is thought of as the absolute *prius* of everything, and the world of existents as dependent on Him not only for its actuality but also for all its possibilities. God is no longer regarded as a soul or even as a mind, but is simply identified at once with the Good which is described in *Republic*, bk. vi., as the source of 'being and knowledge,' though itself 'on the other side of' both being and knowledge, and with the One which, according to Aristotle, Plato regarded as the οὐσία, or formal element, in the forms themselves and as the same thing as the Good.[2] The One thus becomes in Neo-Platonism a transcendent God of whom nothing can in strictness be predicated. It must not even be said to be good, since it is identical with goodness, not a subject to which goodness can be ascribed as an attribute. Nor must it be said to be or exist; it is not a being or existent, but the transcendent source of all being, and is therefore regularly said to be ὑπερούσιον, 'super-essential,' or 'super-substantial.'[3] God, thus conceived as the transcendent and ineffable source both of actuality and of real possibility (of existences and of 'essences'), is connected with the actual world by the Neo-Platonic theory of causality. The theory is commonly known as that of 'emanation,' but the metaphor of emanation is with Plotinus and Proclus only a metaphor, and the

[1] For a classic statement of the general Stoic view of the place of God in the scheme of things see, besides the famous *Hymn* of Cleanthes preserved in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i. 1, 12, p. 25, 3 (critical text in von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, i. 121 f., also J. Adam, *Texts to Illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle*, London and New York, 1902, p. 54 f., and A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Cambridge, 1891), the eloquent conclusion of [Aristotle] *de Mundo*, 397, b 9 ff. The latter gives the Posidonian version and betrays Academic influence by ending with a direct quotation from the 'admirable Plato' of *Laws*, 715 E–716 A. Cicero's expositions of Stoic theology, based mainly on Posidonius, are too well known to require special mention.

[2] It is significant, as Burnet has remarked, that the very word 'teleology,' as its form shows, is derived not directly from τέλος but from the adjective τέλειος, 'whole,' 'complete.'

[3] *De Abstinentia*, iii. 20.

[4] Cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 37: 'Scite enim Chrysippus, ut clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata: ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit, animantium causa; animantes autem, hominum. . . . Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum.'

[5] *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, 1044 C.

[1] There is no good critical edition of this important work. The least defective is that in F. Creuzer's *Initia philosophiae ac theologiae*, 3 vols., Frankfort, 1820–22.

[2] *Metaphys.* A 987*b* 20: ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν. A 988*a* 14: ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν, τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν.

[3] Here we have the origin of the mystical 'negative way' in theology, and of the familiar scholastic doctrine that nothing whatever can be predicated univocally of God and of any creature, as well as of the proposition *Deus est suum esse*; i.e. in God the distinction between existence and *essentia*, valid for every other existent, ceases to have any meaning. It is from this last thought that the famous ontological argument for the being of God was destined to take its origin.

theory requires to be explained a little more fully, as it was not only influential throughout the Middle Ages but is tacitly presupposed in the famous attempt of Descartes to establish the existence of God in the *Third Meditation*. Causality, as understood by the Neo-Platonists, does not necessarily imply antecedence in time and is always a relation between substantival terms, not between events. The relation is dyadic and subsists between a producer (*τὸ παράγον*) and something which the activity of the producer calls into being (*τὸ παραγόμενον*). The cause of anything is the ground not merely of the existence of that thing but of its being what it is and having the character it has (the cause of its *essentia* as well as of its actuality). Causality is a relation of 'participation' (*μέθεξις*) or 'likeness'; *i.e.*, the effect (*τὸ παραγόμενον*), since it derives the fact that it is and its whole quality from its cause (*τὸ παράγον*), is like its cause, exhibits the same character but in a less perfect form.[1]

The Neo-Platonist theology is strictly creationist, not in the popular sense of regarding the world as having been made at a definite date in the past (all the Neo-Platonists held strongly that Plato, like Aristotle, meant to teach the 'eternity of the world'), but in the philosophical sense of maintaining the causal dependence of everything in the world upon God and upon God alone. What 'really is' and what 'becomes' form a hierarchy of manifestations of the excellences contained 'eminently' in the One, each member of the hierarchy, according as it is at a farther remove from God, exhibiting these excellences in a less perfect way. Proclus adds the further point that the causal activity of the higher principles extends farther down in the scale of being than that of those below them.[2] The One, or God, as we have seen, is 'above being' and is absolutely simple, not because it is void of character, but just because all perfections are completely and perfectly united and interpenetrant in it.[3] The reason why the One creates at all is that the One *is* goodness, and goodness is, of its very nature, active. It must 'overflow.'[4] That which is immediately produced by the 'overflowing' is *νοῦς*, 'intelligence' or 'understanding.' Or rather, since the fundamental inferiority of produced to producer shows itself at this stage in the form of a dualism, it is *νοῦς* together with the objects it contemplates, *τὰ νοητά*, the connected system of scientific concepts. The two are inseparable, for the *νοητά* 'have no subsistence outside the understanding'; they are not a realm of 'things-in-themselves,' for which Neo-Platonism has no room. As mind or understanding is an imperfect image or mirroring of the divine One, so soul is a further image or mirroring of mind. And mind and soul together make up for the Neo-Platonist the whole system of *ὄντα*, real things. Bodies, the natural world as disclosed through the senses, are images of soul and are properly not *ὄντα* but *γιγνόμενα*; they 'are' not, they 'become'—*i.e.*, they are 'appearances,' though we must remember that they really do appear and are the appearances or shows of souls, which are real *ὄντα*. Below these real shadows of real things, just as God was placed above the real things themselves, stands that 'shadow of a shade,' *πρώτη ὕλη*, bare 'stuff,' which neither is nor appears, and, as a mere potentiality of something better than itself, may properly be called *μὴ ὄν*.[5]

Besides being causally dependent on God, the series of *ὄντα* and *γιγνόμενα* is further connected with the One by *ἐπιστροφή*, 'inversion' or 'reflexion.' The effect not merely proceeds from its cause, but is inverted or reflected back into its cause. This is, in fact, a consequence of the identification of the First Cause with the universal Good. For the good of anything is that to union with which the thing in question aspires, and the universal Good is therefore, according to the old definition of Eudoxus, that *οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται*, 'that which all things go for.' As all things have their source in God, so all things find their end or completion in Him. In souls and minds this process of inversion takes place, as Proclus puts it, *γνωστικῶς*, as a *γνῶσις*, or knowing. It is in turning back on their source in contemplation that they come by self-knowledge, and are thus inverted into themselves as well as into it. The soul gets to know itself in learning to know *νοῦς*, and *νοῦς* learns its own true nature in contemplation of the One; in both cases self-knowledge is got by reaching out of one's self towards the higher.[1] Thus the transcendence of God, though it is so complete that we may not even predicate 'being' of Him, in no way interferes with the truth that the whole world 'lives and has its being' in God and has no origin or support but God.[2] The monotheism of this philosophy of religion is, of course, no more affected by the belief of the Neo-Platonists in an elaborate hierarchy of superhuman beings whom they call *θεοί* than the monotheism of Christians by the belief in the various orders of the angelic hierarchy, or that of Milton by his application of the appellation 'gods' to the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost*.

It should be particularly observed that the Neo-Platonic school, by definitely making the One its God and teaching that the One is 'beyond being,' is committed to theism as against pantheism. The world is in the One, but, precisely because the effect is only an imperfect mirroring of its cause, it would not be true to say in the same sense that the One is in the world. The relation between God and the world is that of one-sided dependence. God, or the One, produces *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, and bodies; they do not produce the One. In fact, in the mythology elaborated by Proclus the *ἐγκόσμιοι θεοί* occupy the lowest rank among the orders of beings to whom he gives the name 'god,' thus corresponding to some of the middle ranks of the mediaeval hierarchy of angels.[3]

8. **Anselm.**—As is well known, when the Christian Church began to feel the need of a philosophical foundation for its theology, it sought that foundation primarily in Neo-Platonism. The Neo-Platonic influence was exerted in three main ways—through the Cappadocian Fathers, who, without incurring the condemnation which was passed on the speculations of Origen, incorporated much of Origen's Platonism in their system, through the prominent part played in the development of Christian theology by St. Augustine and Boethius, and through the authority enjoyed by the writings of the supposed Dionysius the Areopagite, a superficially Christianized version of the theological and angelological speculations of Proclus. The Neo-Platonic conception of God thus became part and parcel of orthodox Christian thought. It is this conception that St. Anselm assumes in his famous attempt to prove the existence of God by an argument which, in one form or another, has been a centre of philosophical controversy from the date of its first becoming generally known to our own day—the so-called 'ontological proof' of the existence of God. St. Anselm's own formulation of his argument will be found in chs. 2–3 of the little tract, written before he had been called from his monastery at Bec, to which he gave originally the name *Fides quaerens intellectum* and afterwards that of *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia*. The object of the reasoning is to show that the existence of God is in fact an immediately evident truth. Uncertainty about God's existence is possible only so long as we are unaware of the true meaning of the word *Deus*. The argument, as given by Anselm, runs thus. By 'God' we

[1] The technical phrase of Proclus is that the characters which exist *καθ' ὕπαρξιν*—*i.e.* so as to be properly predicable of it—in the effect exist *κατ' αἰτίαν* in its cause. The scholastic way of putting the matter is to say that what exists *formaliter*—as constituting the *forma* or *essentia*—in the effect exists *eminenter* or *eminentiore modo*, 'in a more excellent manner,' in its cause. It is in virtue of this doctrine that the philosophical theology of Neo-Platonism and orthodox Christianity acquires a positive side. Though we may not predicate of God any 'perfection' (*i.e.* positive attribute) of a creature, yet, since all creatures are produced solely by God, we may say that their perfections are in God 'in a more excellent manner.' Hence, though we are forbidden to predicate anything univocally of God and a creature, we are permitted to reason *per analogiam* from beauty, wisdom, power, goodness in the creatures to the presence of superexcellent beauty, power, wisdom, goodness in the Creator.

[2] This is intended to justify in particular the view that 'bare matter,' though it cannot be regarded as produced by mind or soul, is still created by the One, and so to get rid of the dualism of God and matter.

[3] So the schoolmen maintain, on the same ground, that each attribute of God, power, wisdom, and the rest, *is* God.

[4] As the Christian mystics say, 'love *cannot* be idle.'

[5] The Neo-Platonist 'matter' is thus identical with that of Aristotle, but it is important that it is regarded as the remotest production of the One, not, as with Aristotle, as a principle independent of and coæval with God.

[1] Bodies are incapable of 'inversion into self,' and they are not inverted into their immediate cause, soul, *γνωστικῶς*.

[2] When Kingsley in *Hypatia* makes his Neo-Platonic philosopher misquote St. Paul as saying that it is God who 'lives and has His being' in us, he is going wrong from mere ignorance of the doctrine he is criticizing.

[3] For the sources of the preceding paragraphs see Proclus, *Institutio theologica*, props. 1–6 (unity and plurality), 7–14 (causation, the good), 15–20 ('inversion'), 21, 23, 24, 31–47.

mean 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' It seems that a doubt may be felt about the existence of anything answering to this definition, since Scripture tells us that the fool has said in his heart (*i.e.* has thought) that there is no God. Anselm, in reply to such a 'fool,' argues as follows. Even the fool who doubts or denies the existence of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' must understand what this phrase means before he can doubt or deny that there is such a thing.[1] Thus it is certain that God, as defined, is *in intellectu*—a phrase which means simply that the words 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' have a definite meaning. But, if God were only *in intellectu* (*i.e.*, if there were no object answering to the definition), we could think of something greater than God, for we could at least conceive that such a being was not merely thinkable but real.[2] Thus the argument is that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' exists only *in intellectu*, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' is not 'something than which nothing greater can be conceived,' and this is a formal contradiction *in terminis*. It follows therefore[3] that God cannot be conceived as non-existent and therefore that God cannot be conceived not to exist. How then can it be true that the fool 'has said in his heart' that God does not exist? Only in the sense that the fool attaches no sense or a mistaken sense to the word 'God.'[4] These few lines contain the whole of the famous 'proof'; the rest of the pamphlet is really taken up with the identification of 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' with the universal Good.

Before going any farther, it may be well to make one or two reflexions on the general character of the argument as given by its originator. This is the more necessary as Anselm's reasoning is not quite identical with that of Descartes, who gives his own ontological proof in his *Fifth Meditation*, and it is principally from Kant's criticism of Descartes' argument that the ontological proof is known to modern students of philosophy. It will be noted that Anselm expressly presupposes the Neo-Platonic conception of God; it is the One of Plotinus and Proclus of which he undertakes to prove the reality. We should also observe that Anselm for the first time attempts a proof which is *a priori* in the proper sense of the phrase. The existence of the world is not one of the premisses of his reasoning, whereas with the Neo-Platonists the reality of the many is the starting-point of all argument. Again, it is no valid retort to Anselm to urge that his proof depends upon a definition and on nothing else, but nothing can be proved simply from a definition, since all definitions are merely conventions about the meaning of a sign. Anselm is not, of course, concerned to deny the truth of this account of definitions or to maintain that men are not free to attach any meaning they please to the sign *Deus*. The real question is whether among all our concepts there is just one, the concept of 'an x such that nothing greater than x can be conceived,' which implies *as part of its meaning* the actual existence of the corresponding object. It seems to the writer of this article that Anselm is at least right in maintaining that, if we can frame the concept 'thing than which no greater can be conceived,' we are bound to think of the object thus conceived as actual. To admit that what we are necessitated to think may be false is fatal to all philosophy and all science, and no exception can be taken to Anselm's argument on the ground that it excludes such an ultimate agnosticism. The really difficult question is rather whether there is any such concept as 'thing than which no greater can be conceived.'[5] The problem is not whether, granting that Anselm's definition of God has a meaning, the actual existence of God is included in that meaning, but whether the words given as the definition have a meaning at all or are not rather an 'unmeaning noise,' like the words, *e.g.*, 'line so crooked that none crookeder can be conceived' or 'rational fraction so small that none smaller can be conceived.' This is the difficulty which we shall find arising in connexion with every version of the ontological argument which has been given by metaphysicians. Whatever we may think on this point, it is plain that a proof of the Anselmian type is not what is ordinarily meant in logic by proof or demonstration. Its real object is not to deduce the existence of God from any more ultimate or certain premisses, but to find a definition of God such that, when the definition is substituted for the *definiendum*, the proposition 'There is one and only one God' is seen to be self-evident. The real function of the argument is, like that of an Aristotelian 'induction,' not to demonstrate something, but to 'point something out.'

Anselm's argument was at once subjected to severe criticism by his contemporary Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, in his 'Apology for the Fool' (*Liber pro Insipiente*), a tract which more than sustains comparison for real acumen with the better-known criticisms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Gaunilo remarks that it is one of the premisses of the Anselmian argument that *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest* exists at least in the *intellectus* even of the atheistic fool. It is assumed that God exists *in intellectu*, and the only point discussed is whether He exists also *in re*. But what is meant by this statement? It may mean only that the fool understands the meaning of the statement 'God exists.' But we understand the meaning of many propositions which we know to be false. Hence the existence of God is not proved by simply urging that we know what the theist means when he says that God exists. To make the argument valid, it ought to be shown that the fool cannot understand what the theist means without also seeing that his assertion is true, and Gaunilo denies that Anselm has established this point. Arguing, not as an empiricist, but from Neo-Platonic premisses common to himself with Anselm, he urges that in point of fact we have no positive adequate concept of God;[1] and it adds nothing to our information to be told that God is greater than all the things of which we have positive concepts.[2]

So far Gaunilo (who has been oddly mistaken by some modern critics for an empiricist) is simply playing off the negative or agnostic side of the theology common to himself with Anselm against the positive, and it is significant of his real purpose, which is that of a mystic rather than of an empiricist, that he quietly replaces Anselm's definition of God as 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' by the very different phrase 'that which is greater than all which can be conceived.' He then continues as follows. Even if I admit, what is itself questionable, that I understand the meaning of the phrase 'something which is greater than all which can be conceived,' Anselm's argument cannot force me to admit that there really is such a thing. All that the argument proves is that it would be inconsistent to admit that there is such a thing and at the same time to deny its reality, since, if it is not real, it is not greater than things which are conceived and are real. But the 'fool' is not really convicted of this inconsistency, since all that he admits is, at the outside, that he understands the sense of the words 'something greater than all that can be conceived.' To make Anselm's argument cogent, some proof ought to be supplied that this something actually exists. If this proof is once forthcoming, Anselm's further demonstration that the something in question is all that God is

[1] 'Certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico . . . intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu ejus est, etiamsi non intelligat illud esse' (*Proslogion*, ch. 2).

[2] 'Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil maius cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id, quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod maius est' (*ib.* ch. 2).

[3] 'Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest ut nec cogitari possit non esse: et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster' (ch. 3).

[4] 'Nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est; licet haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla, aut cum aliqua extranea significatione' (ch. 4).

[5] Hobbes and others raised this question very pertinently when they replied to Descartes' argument from our possession of an 'idea of God' that we possess no 'idea' of God.

[1] 'Neque enim rem ipsam quae Deus est, novi' (*Pro Insipiente*, § 3).

[2] 'Nec prorsus aliter adhuc et in intellectu meo constat illud haberi, cum audio intelligoque dicentem esse aliquid maius omnibus quae valeant cogitari' (*ib.* § 4).

held to be will be valid. It is to illustrate this second point that Gaunilo introduces the reference to the famous lost island by which he is principally remembered. If this lost island were described to me as wealthier and better than any inhabited land, I should readily understand the meaning of the words, and the lost island would be 'in my understanding' in the same sense in which God may be said to be in the understanding of the fool. But it would be idle to say that the island must also really exist somewhere in the ocean because it would otherwise not be, as by definition it is, richer than all habitable lands. Finally he contends that it is not, as Anselm had assumed, a *proprium* of God that He can only be thought of as existing. It is true, no doubt, that we who know that God exists cannot think the proposition 'There is no God' true, but neither can we think any other proposition to be false which we know to be true; *e.g.*, I cannot think it true that I do not exist at this moment, because I know it to be true that I do exist. There may be a sense in which it is possible to think of my own non-existence, but, if there is, it is equally possible, in the same sense, to think of the non-existence of God, even though we know that God does exist.[1] This last point, of course, anticipates Hume's criticism that whatever we can think of as existing we can equally think of as not existing, and if sustained is fatal to every argument of the ontological type.

Anselm's reply to his critic is contained in the short *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem respondentem pro Insipiente*. He points out, naturally enough, that Gaunilo's substitution of the phrase 'that which is greater than everything which can be conceived' for 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' alters the character of the argument, and that Gaunilo's reasoning about the lost island is not a real parallel to his own proof, which, as he insists, is applicable only in the case of the concept 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' What he does not prove, but merely asserts, is that this phrase really has a definite meaning and is not a nonsensical or insignificant sound. On this point he is content to say that even the 'fool' must conceive the meaning of the words before he can deny that they stand for a reality.

It is very difficult to follow Anselm here. If his reasoning is sound, it will prove not only the real existence of God but also the existence (in the logician's sense) of nothing, round squares, equilateral right-angled triangles, fabulous monsters, the greatest of all integers, since it is beyond a doubt that the propositions 'There is no such thing as a round square,' 'There are no fabulous monsters,' 'There is no integer which is the greatest of all integers,' etc., are true; and it may then be argued that, since they are true, round squares, etc., must exist in the *intellectus* of the person who asserts the propositions. What Anselm is assuming is, as he himself says, that a proposition cannot be understood unless its 'parts' are severally understood. From this he infers that, if 'there is no such thing as *x*' is a significant proposition, *x* must be a significant term. The assumption is plainly not justified, since my ground for asserting the proposition may be precisely that *x* has no intelligible meaning. The state of the case, then, seems to be that Anselm's argument certainly proves that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' (or 'that which cannot be conceived as not existing') exists *in intellectu*, it also exists *in re*. But the question whether it exists *in intellectu* remains undecided.

9. Thomas Aquinas.—The history of the subsequent fortunes of Anselm's theistic argument is a highly interesting one. In the 13th cent., the golden age of scholastic philosophy, it was widely known and discussed by all the leading thinkers. In the main the mediaeval philosophers seem to have been disposed to accept it until it was rejected as a sophism by St. Thomas, whose great authority has ever since discredited it. The principal 13th cent. texts relative to the subject have been edited with an acute commentary by the Benedictine Augustin Daniels.[1] It is a singular fact that, though all the teachers of the second half of the 13th cent. seem to have felt themselves obliged to make their attitude to Anselm's argument clear, no theologian of the 12th cent. appears to have taken any account of it. The most probable explanation of this silence seems to be that of Daniels, that the circulation of the *Proslogion* was slow and the work unknown to theologians in general until well on into the 13th century. It is certainly not true, as is sometimes said, that acceptance of the argument was confined to the Oxford Franciscans. Of the fifteen scholastics whose writings are examined by Daniels, three (one of whom is Albert the Great) express no opinion on the validity of the proof, ten (including Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Scotus) accept it, only two (Richard of Middleton and St. Thomas) reject it. These facts seem of themselves to show that the discredit into which the ontological argument fell—it will be remembered that, when Descartes revived it in the 17th cent., critics were quick to remind him that he was laying himself open to at least the suspicion of heterodoxy—was due almost entirely to the general recognition of the weight of St. Thomas's criticisms. They are, in fact, so formidable that they still repay the closest attention and are, in the present writer's opinion, altogether on a much higher philosophical level than the better-known polemic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The general position of Thomas is precisely what we should expect from a philosopher whose thought has been moulded partly by Neo-Platonism and partly by Aristotelianism. He holds that the existence of God can be, and has been, sufficiently proved *a posteriori*, by reasoning from the works of God to their Author, and consequently he accepts as valid both the argument from the necessity of an unmoved First Mover (the Aristotelian argument) and the argument from design, in the wide sense of an argument from final or intentional causality (the Platonic argument from order and intelligibility in the world to an intelligent Creator). But he rejects altogether and on principle the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God *a priori* (from a mere consideration of the content of the concept of God).

The most important of the relevant passages in the works of Thomas are *Summa contra Gentiles*, i. 10, 11, and *Summa Theologica*, I. qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. His own view on this question is that the proposition is self-evident if the *essentia* of God is once adequately known, but, since we in this life do not behold the *essentia* of God, His existence is not self-evident to our understanding. It is not immediately evident to us that there is anything 'than which a greater cannot be conceived,' or that 'God cannot be thought not to exist'; on this point St. Thomas is in complete agreement with Gaunilo. Anselm's argument, in fact, is a sophism arising from failure to distinguish between that which is *notum per se simpliciter* and that which is *quoad nos notum*, evident to us. 'For *simpliciter* it is self-evident that God exists, since what God is is his *esse*' ('cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est sit suum esse'; *i.e.*, God's *essentia* or 'what' and His existence are identical). 'But because we cannot conceive what God is, it remains unknown relatively to us.'[2] Anselm's reasoning is fallacious because (*a*) not all even of those who admit the existence of God are aware that God is 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'; and (*b*), even if every one were aware of this, it would not follow that God exists otherwise than *in intellectu*; *i.e.*, all that would be proved is that we can think of such an object without absurdity. So Thomas asserts against Anselm that there is no logical absurdity in supposing the non-existence of God.[3] The same considerations are urged in much the same language in the article of the *Summa Theologica* already referred to. Thomas's own view is[4] that the existence of God can be demonstrated *a posteriori*, by reasoning

[1] 'Cogitare autem me non esse, quamdiu esse certissime scio, nescio utrum possim; sed si possum, cur non et quidquid aliud eadem certitudine scio? Si autem non possum, non erit jam istud proprium Deo' (*ib.* § 7).

[1] *Quellenbeitr. und Untersuch. zur Gesch. der Gottesbeweise im 13 Jahrh. mit bes. Berücks. des Arguments im Proslogion des heil. Anselm*, Münster, 1909.

[2] *Contra Gent.* i. 11. [3] *Ib.*

[4] I. qu. ii. art. 2.

from effect to cause. He relies on five such *a posteriori* arguments,[1] which are (1) the argument from the fact of motion to the First Mover; (2) the parallel argument from causal agency to a First efficient Cause; (3) the argument from possibility and necessity, known more commonly as the argument from the contingency of the world;[2] (4) the argument from the scale of 'degrees of reality,' by which we infer from the existence of greater and lesser goods the existence of a perfect good which is the cause of all lesser degrees of goodness (in virtue of the specifically Neo-Platonic theory of causality already explained); (5) the argument *ex gubernatione rerum*, *i.e.* from final or intentional causality. (Even the processes of inanimate nature are ordered or adapted to the realization of an end or good; this adaptation presupposes an intelligent intention, and, since inanimate things have no intelligence of their own, a supermundane intelligence.) St. Thomas's arguments are thus all of one type. They are all appeals to the principle of causality taken in combination with the denial of the possibility of an infinite regress. Both the appeal to the principle of causality and the refusal to admit the infinite regress are direct inheritances from the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. The former is invalidated if the soundness of the Kantian criticism of speculative theology be admitted; the latter requires reconsideration in the light of what may be called the 'logical realism' of Bertrand Russell and the 'new' realists. Scotus, in the *Scriptum Oxoniense*,[3] restates the Anselmian argument with a modification which seems obviously meant to meet the fundamental point in Gaunilo's criticism and anticipates a line of thought afterwards developed by Leibniz. God is defined as 'quo cogitato sine contradictione maius cogitari non potest sine contradictione,' 'that which can be thought without a contradiction but than which nothing greater can be thought without a contradiction.' The important modification is the addition to the definition of the first *sine contradictione*. As Scotus says, 'in cuius cogitatione includitur contradictio illud dicitur non cogitabile.' It thus becomes a preliminary to the ontological proof to show that God can be 'thought without contradiction'; *i.e.*, that we really have a concept of God, or that the word 'God,' or the phrase employed as by definition equivalent to the word, is not an unmeaning noise. When this condition is fulfilled, Scotus holds, the Anselmian inference from the *esse in intellectu* of the *summum cogitabile sine contradictione* to its *esse in re* is valid.

10. **Descartes.**—Descartes' theism, like that of his mediaeval predecessors, is predominantly of the Neo-Platonic type, and is intimately connected with the assumption, which underlies the reasoning of the *Meditations*, that the principle of causality, in the very form which had been given to it by Proclus, is evident by the natural light of the understanding. The extent to which the thought of Descartes is in fundamentals Platonic is probably not adequately realized by most of his readers. Even the most original feature of his philosophy, the thoroughgoing reduction of natural science to mechanics, is really a reversion from mediaeval Aristotelianism to the standpoint of the early Academy, and the metaphysics of the *Meditations* is thoroughly Neo-Platonic. We quite misconceive Descartes' meaning if we regard the presence of God in his system as an excrescence due to the necessity of artificially bringing together again the artificially sundered worlds of body and mind. Even from the point of view of a merely mechanical interpretation of the world, Descartes is, of course, much more true to the analogies on which mechanical interpretations are founded in assuming the direction of the mechanism by God than those modern half-philosophers who attribute to the cosmic machine an inherent power of directing and repairing itself. He has not forgotten, as the modern materialist tends to do, that behind the most complicated and perfect machinery there is always intelligence which is not that of the machine to start it, to direct its workings, and to repair it. But, beyond this, Descartes has reasons for asserting the existence of God which are wholly independent of his reversion to the mathematical and mechanical standpoint in physics and would have been equally strong if he had adopted any other type of physical doctrine. The theism of Descartes is, in fact, dictated by two considerations—his unqualified acceptance of the principle of causality and his adherence to the conception of the 'Perfect Being' as the only adequate object of the understanding, and therefore the 'natural good' of rational beings (the 'ben dell' intelletto,' to use Dante's phrase). He is a theist, not because he holds the mechanical view of nature, but for the same more ultimate reason which leads him to hold that view, that he is, like the whole Platonic succession, a rationalist and consequently regards the knowledge of the 'Supreme Being' as the culmination of science.[1] The actual proofs of theism offered by Descartes are two. In the third *Meditation* we have the *a posteriori* proof in the special form of an argument from our possession of an idea of God to the existence of God as the cause of the idea. This is, of course, strictly on Neo-Platonic lines. In the fifth *Meditation* the *a posteriori* proof is confirmed by an *a priori* proof which turns out to be, in principle, a restatement of the Anselmian argument with a modification which is by no means an obvious improvement.

The well-known argument of the third *Meditation* runs thus. I have an 'idea' of the 'Perfect' or 'Infinite' Being. My possession of this idea, like any other fact, demands a causal explanation. The explanation cannot be that I am myself the Perfect and Infinite Being and that the idea is derived from my immediate awareness of myself, because I am aware of myself as, in many ways, defective and limited. It is not derived from acquaintance with other persons or things, which are all no less limited and finite than myself; and it has not been obtained by an imaginative combination of the various perfections I have observed separately in different finite things, for internal simplicity is itself one of the perfections which I think of as constituting the 'Infinite Being.' Nor again is 'infinite' a merely negative expression. (If it were, it might, of course, be objected that, when I say 'infinite,' there is no definite concept corresponding to the word.) For in the order of logic the infinite is prior to the finite. If I had not already an intelligible concept of infinity, I could not even be aware of my own finiteness. There is thus only one possible cause of my possession of the idea of the Infinite Being. It must be the effect of a really existing Infinite Being, who possesses *eminenter* or *formaliter* all the perfection which my idea of the Infinite Being contains objectively, *i.e.* by way of representation. God therefore exists, and my idea of God may be said to be the mark which the Creator has stamped on His creature. It may be added that, to argue the point even more generally, I who have this idea could not exist if the object of the idea did not also exist. For, since time is no more than a sequence of moments, each independent of all the rest, conservation, continuance in existence, is logically equivalent to fresh creation at every moment, and it is certain that I have no power to create myself. (This is proved by urging that it is easier to bestow new excellences on what already exists than to create. If then I cannot bestow infinite wisdom or power on myself, as I know I cannot, *a fortiori* I am not my own creator.) If it is urged that my parents are my creators, and their parents in turn their creators, we fall into the infinite regress. Thus the mere fact of the existence of any finite thing is proof of the existence of the Infinite Being; *i.e.*, if anything whose existence requires an external cause exists (and the Cartesian *cogito* assures me of the existence of at least one such thing), there exists also a Supreme Being whose existence requires no external cause (another form of the argument called by St. Thomas the argument from possibility and necessity).

The argument from my possession of an idea of God is Descartes' own substantial contribution to the philosophy of theism. It must be carefully distinguished from the old Stoic appeal to the *consensus gentium*. Descartes' critics were not really hitting a blot in his reasoning when they said that savages and atheists do not possess this idea. Against such objections Descartes' own explanation, that he only meant that, given the knowledge of myself from which he starts, reflective analysis is sufficient to lead to the concept of an Infinite Being, is a sufficient rejoinder. He seems to be equally right in his contention that the concept of an Infinitely Perfect Being is logically implied in my recognition of my own finitude, just as T. H. Green maintains that the recognition of a morally 'better' implies the conception of a 'best.' The real point of weakness in the argument, so far as the present writer can see, lies elsewhere. Descartes is clearly right in maintaining that the concept of a Being who combines all perfections or excellences in the absolute internal simplicity of his own nature is not formed by a process of synthesis; it is clearly obtained by

[1] 1. qu. ii. art. 3.

[2] The argument is that whatever is merely possible or contingent exists at some times but not at others. Hence, if all things are merely possible or contingent, there must have been a time when nothing existed at all. But (in virtue of the principle of causality), if there had ever been a moment when there was nothing at all, nothing could ever have come to be. Hence the fact that there is something now proves that there must be 'something in things' which is *necessary*, *i.e.* incapable of not existing. And the argument from the impossibility of an indefinite regress is then invoked to show that there must be *one* ultimate necessary being.

[3] See the relevant passages in Daniels, pp. 105–107.

[1] Perfecta scientia,' as St. Hilary puts it, 'Deum scire.'

the process of 'passing to the limit,' of which mathematical reasoning furnishes so many examples. But we are not really authorized to infer from our ability to conceive the limit of a series or of a sum of terms that a given series has a limit or a given sum a limiting value. Whether a series or a sum has a limiting value or not has to be discovered by examination in each special case; it is notorious that mathematicians down to a very recent date have been repeatedly led into fallacies by the assumption that limits exist where, in point of fact, they do not. Thus, when we have conceded to Descartes that there is an idea of the Infinitely Perfect Being and that this idea is presupposed in our own judgment that we and other things are finite, it does not follow of itself that the series of existents, arranged in ascending order of perfection (assuming such an arrangement to be possible), must have an actual upper limit. This is the very point which ought to be proved, and has not been proved. Descartes himself was presumably led to ignore the difficulty by the laxness with which he employs the word idea to cover alike memory-images, concepts, and judgments. When once he has allowed himself to call a judgment an idea, it is easy for him to think that he has bridged over the chasm between the concept of God and the judgment that God exists. The whole argument, it will be observed, is based on the combination of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of causality with the doctrine of representative perception. According to the latter doctrine, the direct and immediate object of apprehension, both in sense-perception and in thought, is never an extra-mental reality, but always itself mental or 'in the mind.' When this theory is combined with the view that everything that becomes has a cause and that all causality is imperfect mirroring, we get at once the proposition of Descartes that the cause of any idea must contain eminently or formally at least as much perfection as the idea contains objectively. 'Eminently' here answers to the *κατ' αἰτίαν* of Proclus, 'formally' to his *καθ' ὑπαρξιν*, 'objectively' to his *κατὰ μέθεξιν*.

The *a priori* or ontological argument of the fifth *Meditation* runs as follows. By 'God' I mean a being who has all perfections. But existence is a perfection. Therefore the being who has all perfections has existence; *i.e.* God exists. Or, in other words, just as I see when I analyse the idea of a [rectilinear] triangle that it includes the property of having the sum of the internal angles equal to π, so, when I analyse the idea of God, I find that it includes existence. God therefore exists and exists necessarily. (Thus Descartes seems to assume that there is just one existential proposition, and only one which is, in Kant's sense of the term, analytical, viz. the proposition 'God exists.') The objection that St. Thomas (now the recognized chief authority in all questions of theology) had rejected the Anselmian argument leads Descartes, in his *Reply* to the *First Objections*, to insist vehemently that his own proof is not that of Anselm, but differs on a vital point. The force of his own reasoning depends entirely on the fact that existence is already contained in the concept of God. Anselm[1] had said nothing about this, and that was why St. Thomas was reasonably dissatisfied with his argument; *i.e.*, the all-important point is that, according to Descartes, the proposition 'God exists' is analytic; Anselm had left it an open question whether it might not be synthetic. Historically this modification of the ontological proof is important, since Kant (who appears not to have known the writings of St. Anselm) makes it the main object of his attack on the proof to show that the proposition 'God exists' is synthetic. It is precisely because the proposition is synthetic, though the conditions which make the affirmation of an *a priori* synthetic proposition legitimate are, in this case, not fulfilled, that we can, according to Kant, have no speculative certainty of the existence of God. If Descartes should be right in regarding 'God exists' as an analytic proposition, Kant's antitheological polemic would become a mere *ignoratio elenchi*.

The further peculiarity of the Cartesian argument on which Kant fastens, that it improperly treats existence as a predicate or attribute, is not really of much importance. Whether all propositions can without violence to their meaning be represented as asserting (or denying) a predicate of a subject is an important question for formal logic, but seems to have no relevance to theology. If there is no predicate in the proposition 'God exists,' it must be held, on the same ground, that there is no predicate in such a proposition as 'Joseph dreams' or 'Esau hunts' or 'The rich man died.' *Per contra*, if dreaming, hunting, and dying are predicates in these propositions (as Kant, who professed to regard logic as a science created perfect by Aristotle, ought to hold, and presumably did hold), existence is a predicate in every proposition of the form '*x* exists.' The only question it is relevant to raise about the Cartesian argument is the question whether in the special case of the *ens summe perfectum* existence (whether existence be regarded as a predicate or not) can be asserted to be part of the meaning of a concept.

Whether there is really so much difference as Descartes maintains between his own argument and Anselm's may be doubted. Certainly the definition from which Anselm starts (God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest*) does not specify existence as part of the meaning of the concept. But, since Anselm tries to show that admission of the definition is logically tantamount to admitting that 'God cannot be thought not to be,' the difference between him and Descartes seems to be that Anselm tries to prove the point which Descartes is content to assume without more ado. It is hard to believe, as Descartes does, that St. Thomas, who denied that God is *notum per se quoad nos*, and gave a very sensible reason for his denial, would have regarded the Cartesian version of the proof as anything more than a glaring *petitio principii*.

11. Spinoza.—With Spinoza's attempt to give a pantheistic turn to the Neo-Platonic and Cartesian lines of thought it is not necessary to concern ourselves further than to remark that the whole of the First Part of the *Ethics* is logically no better than one long *petitio*. The first, third, and sixth of the definitions already contain the two assumptions, that God = *substantia* = *causa sui* and that *causa sui* (which is defined as 'that whereof the nature cannot be conceived but as existing') exists. Where the whole doctrine has thus been taken for granted by arbitrary definition, it is really superfluous to add anything in the way of 'proof,' even if the 'proofs' themselves were more free than they are from formal logical fallacy. What Spinoza wholly evades considering is the question, which is really fundamental, whether the definition of *causa sui* is more than a 'meaningless noise.'

One particularly glaring example of Spinoza's singular carelessness about his initial definitions may be noted. He has taken from Neo-Platonism the first and most fundamental notion of his system, that of *causa sui* (*τὸ αὐθυπόστατον* of Proclus). Now, by calling a thing *αὐθυπόστατον*, the Neo-Platonists meant exactly what they said, that it 'causes' or 'produces' itself (*προάγει ἑαυτό*). Hence they confined the name *αὐθυπόστατα* to minds and souls and expressly maintained that the One, or God, having no cause, being unproduced, is not *αὐθυπόστατον*;[1] *i.e.*, they understood *causa sui* in a positive sense. Theologians had done the same thing; as Arnauld said in his comments on Descartes' *Meditations*,[2] no theologian would admit that God is *a se positive tanquam a causa*, but at most that God may be said to be *a se* in a purely negative sense —*i.e.*, in the sense that He is not an effect of anything else. Spinozism succeeds in appearing to satisfy our demand for an object of religious adoration only by a constant equivocation. It defines *causa sui* (=*τὸ αὐθυπόστατον*) in the positive Neo-Platonic sense as *id cuius essentia involvit existentiam* (*τὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ παρακτικόν*) and then asserts of it all that Neo-Platonism had asserted of the uncaused One. To put the point rather differently, it defines God as 'that whereof the *essentia* implies existence' and transfers to God, so defined, what theologians have asserted of a God in whom the distinction between *existentia* and *essentia* is unmeaning. Spinoza commits the paralogism in set terms in the first sentence of the *Ethics*: 'Per causam sui intelligo id cuius essentia *involvit* existentiam, sive id cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens.'

12. Locke.—Locke's proof of theism,[3] which he regards as having an evidence 'equal to mathematical certainty,' though in some ways perfunctory, is in its general character of the Neo-Platonic type. He does not refer to the *a priori* or ontological argument, and refuses to pronounce any opinion on Descartes' own special argument from our possession of an idea of God except to remark that 'It is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation.' (As the context shows, Locke thinks that it would be a true and relevant criticism of Descartes to say that some men have no idea, and others false ideas, of God.) It is not quite clear whether Locke regards the certainty of theism as equal to the certainty with which we know actually perceived facts or the fact of our own existence. He says that we have more certainty of it 'than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us,' and again that 'we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else without us.' This certainty looks as if Locke held (as Descartes did not) that the existence of God is less certain than our own, and

[1] The name of Anselm occurs neither in the *Objections* nor in Descartes' *Reply*. Apparently both he and his critic knew the Anselmian argument only at second hand, through Thomas. Descartes' point, to be strictly accurate, is that his own argument turns wholly on the contention that concepts in general contain only the 'possible existence' of a corresponding object, but the concept of God 'contains the necessary existence' of God.

[1] Proclus, *Instit. theol.*, prop. 40: *ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ αὐθυπόστατον εἶναι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον*.

[2] *Objectiones Quartae*, § 'de Deo.'

[3] *Essay*, bk. iv. ch. 10, 'Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.'

possibly less certain than that of the objects of actual and present sense-perception. But it is also possible that he only means that our certainty in the last two cases is immediate, but in the first depends on an ability, not found in all men, to follow the steps of a deduction. He may not intend to suggest that, to the man who can perform the deduction, its conclusion is inferior in certainty to any immediate cognition, 'intuitive' or 'sensitive.'

Locke's own proof is the usual *a posteriori* one based on the principle of causality and the empirical proposition (guaranteed by the *cogito*) that something (viz. myself) exists. It is also assumed, as usual, that a cause must contain more reality or perfection than any of its effects, as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The argument then becomes this: I exist; therefore I must have a cause; this cause cannot be 'bare nothing'; therefore it is a positive something. Since 'bare nothing' cannot be the cause of anything, therefore the cause of my own existence and that of all other existents must be eternal. (The impossibility of the endless regress and the 'contingency of the world' are not mentioned, but are of course tacitly presupposed.) An effect must derive all its properties from its cause. Therefore the 'eternal cause' must be the most powerful of things. (It is assumed that the cause has not only as much 'reality' as the effects, but more, and further that there can be only one 'eternal cause'—a point which Locke is hardly entitled by his own metaphysics to assume.) There is intelligence in myself, the effect, and therefore there is intelligence (of a higher degree) in the cause. The 'eternal cause' is thus 'most knowing' as well as 'most powerful.' From this Locke thinks it follows that this cause is what we mean by God; whether we use the name or not is a mere matter of vocabulary. 'There is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not.' The rest of the chapter is given to an argument in proof of the immateriality of the eternal cause. The goodness of this cause Locke presumably held, as any Platonist might, to be inseparable from its wisdom. He does not seem to reflect that he has given no reason for supposing either the power or the intelligence of the 'eternal cause' to be perfect. His argument is thus only the familiar one from causality very badly stated and with most of its real premisses left unexpressed.

13. Leibniz.—Leibniz's treatment of the subject is far more adequate. In his system, at least as represented in his best known works, the proposition 'God exists' holds a unique position. It is a 'truth of fact,' and therefore, like all 'truths of fact,' synthetic. But it is the only truth of fact which is capable of demonstration. In general, only 'truths of reason,' analytic propositions, admit of formal demonstration, because the demonstration of a proposition is nothing but its analysis into simpler propositions which are seen on inspection to be identities. This is why the 'principle of contradiction' (A is not non-A) is regarded by Leibniz as the supreme principle of all truths of reason. Truths of fact (which all assert actual existence) do not fall under the principle of contradiction, but under that of sufficient reason, and thus, with the one exception of the proposition that God exists, they are not analysable into identities and cannot be formally demonstrated. The anomalous character of the proposition 'God exists' vanishes, however, when we discover from the papers published by Couturat[1] that Leibniz's real view was that all truths are analytic, the only difference between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact' being that the former can be resolved into identities by a finite number of steps of analysis, the latter require (like the extraction of the square root of an integer which is not a perfect square) an infinite number of intermediate steps.[2] It follows that God, being omniscient, knows all truths of fact *a priori* (*i.e.* sees them to be identities), just as Leibniz says more than once that God sees 'from eternity' in the 'notion' of Peter that Peter will repent of his denial, and in the 'notion' of Judas that Judas will die impenitent, and that the distinction between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact means nothing to him. *Quoad nos* truths of fact are, in general, contingent merely because we cannot perform an infinite analysis. The peculiarity of the one truth of fact which is necessary *quoad nos*, 'God exists,' is merely that this proposition does not require for its proof *a priori* an infinite series of resolutions. In being capable of resolution into identities by a finite number of steps it resembles the truths of reason.

Consequently Leibniz is bound to hold that the Anselmian argument *a priori* from the meaning of the concept of God to the real existence of God is in principle valid. Since he also held that all propositions without exception are predicative, he naturally adopts the form of the argument used by Descartes, viz. that the predicate of the proposition 'God exists' is already implicitly contained in the subject. Descartes' proof is valid, but incomplete. To make it complete it is only necessary to show that the concept of God is a genuine concept, *i.e.* that it contains no contradiction, *i.e.* does not attempt to unite incompatible constituents.[1] Leibniz thinks that this can be shown by the consideration that the 'most perfect' or 'most real' being means the being of whom no simple positive predicate can be denied. (Any being of whom a positive simple predicate could be denied would be without the excellence or perfection for which that predicate stands.) Now, all complex predicates can be resolved into simple ones, and Leibniz holds that all *positive* simple predicates are compossible in a single subject just because they are all positive. If any two predicates are incompossible, one of them must deny what the other affirms. But no simple predicate denies anything. Consequently all simple predicates can 'inhere' in a single subject. This proves that 'the most real' being is possible. And Descartes has proved in the fifth *Meditation* that, 'if the most real being is possible, it is also actual.' Hence the 'ontological' proof, when completed by the preliminary proof that the most real being is possible, is a valid demonstration.[2] There is an obvious weakness in the argument. Leibniz assumes that, if we have one proposition, 'A is B,' where B is a 'simple' predicate, and a second, 'A is C,' and the two are incompatible, the proposition 'A is C' must be capable of resolution into simpler propositions, of which one is 'A is not B.' It ought to follow that, since the propositions 'A is red' and 'A is green' are incompatible, if 'red' is a simple quality, 'green' is a complex. But, in point of fact, green is as much a simple positive 'perfection' as red. This seems sufficient reason for regarding Leibniz's proof that the *ens realissimum* is possible as a failure. A more promising line of thought is suggested by the short memoir of 1701, *De la Demonstration Cartésienne de l'existence de Dieu du R. P. Lami*, where Leibniz is content to argue that the *ens a se* must exist because, if there were no *ens a se*, there would be no real possibilities—a position since made familiar by Lotze's adoption of it. It is worth noting that in the chapter of the *Nouveaux Essais* where Leibniz is commenting on the corresponding chapter of Locke's *Essay* he feels himself, as standing outside the Roman Church, free to say expressly that St. Thomas was wrong in rejecting Anselm's proof and to commend Descartes for rehabilitating it.

Leibniz naturally agrees with Locke that there are several ways of proving the existence of God and that none of the proofs should be neglected. He himself expressly recognizes three proofs besides the ontological.[3] These are (*a*) the cosmological argument from the actual existence of the world to the existence of God as its cause (the standing Platonic-Aristotelian proof); (*b*) the argument from 'eternal truths'—truths which involve no reference to time or particular temporal existents in time, and would still be true if the world of temporal existents had never existed—to the 'eternal' intellect of God as their source; (*c*) the argument from 'pre-established harmony. This is a special version of the teleological argument from the order and purpose revealed in the world to an ordering and designing intellect as its source. Any remarks which the present writer desires to make upon these *a posteriori* theistic arguments will more naturally find their place in a later paragraph. But it should be mentioned that the use of the argument from design introduces a curious contradiction into Leibniz's peculiar metaphysic. From his view that all propositions are predications and that all true propositions can be analysed into identities it follows at once that, as he constantly asserts, every real existent (every monad) is the ground of all its attributes. Since existence itself, on this view, is a predicate or attribute, the world of existing monads ought to be its own ground, and there should be no need of any external cause to account for the order found in it. Accordingly we find

[1] *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz*, Paris, 1903, p. 518 ff.

[2] *Ib.* p. 518: 'Semper igitur praedicatum seu consequens inest subiecto seu antecedenti et in hoc ipso consistit natura veritatis in universum'; p. 519: the law of sufficient reason itself is a consequence of this, for 'alioqui veritas daretur, quae non posset probari a priori, seu quae non resolveretur in identicas, quod est contra naturam veritatis quae (semper) vel expresse vel implicite identica est'; p. 376: 'omnes propositiones existentiales sunt verae quidem, sed non necessariae, nam non possunt demonstrari nisi infinitis adhibitis.'

[1] Cf. what has been said above about the attitude of Scotus, by whom Leibniz may very possibly have been influenced.

[2] *Nouveaux Essais*, iv. 10, § 7: *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis.*

[3] See the discussion of them in B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, ch. ix.

Leibniz himself at times explaining why the actual world, rather than any other equally possible world, exists, by ascribing to the various possible worlds an 'appetence of existence' (*existuritio*) proportionate to their degree of internal harmony, and saying that the most orderly of them is actual just because its *existuritio* is a maximum,[1] but elsewhere, especially in more popular writings, treating existence as something which is conferred on the most orderly and harmonious of the possible worlds by God in virtue of His 'choice of the best.' Unless one is prepared, as the present writer after long study is not, to accuse Leibniz of insincerity, it seems impossible not to recognize here a fundamental inconsistency between his personal religious convictions and the logical requirements of his metaphysical system. If all true propositions are identities, philosophy must be atheistic.[2]

14. Hume.—The most important philosophical treatment of the theistic problem between Leibniz and Kant is unmistakably that of Hume in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (written apparently before 1751, though not published until 1779, three years after the author's death). In judging this work it must be borne in mind that it makes no pretence to expound the theology of the author. It is strictly what it purports to be, a conversation between a supporter of philosophic 'natural theology,' Cleanthes, a violent fideist, Demea, intended as a representative of orthodoxy, and a sceptic, Philo. The responsibility for the positions maintained by the three speakers rests entirely with themselves. Hume abstains from indicating his own sympathies except in the final sentence, where he suggests that the 'opinions' (he is careful not to say 'the arguments') of the 'natural theologian' Cleanthes probably come nearer to the truth than those of Philo, and those of Philo than those of Demea.[3] Hume's real position in natural theology, as in philosophy in general, seems to have been that of a consistent Academic. Genuine scepticism is a rare thing and liable to be misunderstood. So Hume's general philosophy has commonly been mistaken, as by T. H. Green, Huxley, and others, for a shallow sensationalistic phenomenalism. In reality he is neither a sensationalist nor a phenomenalist. He holds that there are insuperable difficulties in the Cartesian rationalism, and that, on the other hand, sensationalism leads to the conclusion that science is an impossibility. Being unable to accept either Cartesianism or sensationalism, and knowing of no third choice in philosophy, he adopts the sceptical attitude of *ἐποχή*, 'suspense of judgment.' There can be no question of seriously regarding principles presupposed in all science as false; at the same time Hume confesses himself unable to justify these principles. His real attitude towards theism seems to have been the same. It is probably true, and, as the letter to Elliot shows, Hume is very unwilling to believe that his leaning towards it rests on nothing more solid than emotional bias, but the alleged proofs of theism are open to criticisms which Hume does not know how to refute, and there are 'appearances' which it is hard to reconcile with the theistic 'hypothesis.' We have not, as it is to be wished we had, convincing proof of its truth, though Hume lets us see that personally he inclines to accept it. His attitude is neither that of a zealous 'infidel' nor that of a 'phenomenalist' and anti-theist. Neither the Hume of contemporary High Churchmen like Johnson and Wesley nor the Hume of Huxley's biography is the Hume of historical fact.[1]

In form the *Dialogues*, like some of Plato's greatest works, are reported conversation. An unnamed narrator informs his friend Hermippus of the discussions between Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea. The narrator, it should be observed, is a theist.

'What truth so obvious, so certain, as the *BEING* of a God? . . . What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But in treating of this obvious and important truth; what obscure questions occur, concerning the *NATURE* of that divine being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence?'

There is no sign of irony in this utterance, and its seriousness is all the more probable that Hume proceeds to dwell on the intellectual difference between the characters of the dialogue, assigning an 'accurate philosophical turn' to Cleanthes the theist, 'careless scepticism' to Philo, and 'rigid inflexible orthodoxy' to Demea.[2] His obvious intention is to predispose the reader to find in Cleanthes the hero of the work. It is with the same object that, until the discussion is near its end, Demea, the zealot for unreasoning faith, is made to regard Philo as an ally against Cleanthes.[3] The intimate correspondence between what Cleanthes says about the impossibility of seriously acquiescing in complete philosophical scepticism and Hume's own utterances to the same effect in the *Treatise of Human Nature* further helps to indicate that we are not to take Philo's estimate of the theistic arguments as meant to be that of his creator. His function is not to refute Cleanthes, but to call attention to the difficulties and weak points in his exposition.[4] The precise position at the opening of the discussion is this. Cleanthes affirms the existence of a 'cause' of the universe and, reasoning by analogy from the products of art to those of nature, holds that this cause is a mind resembling our own. He denies the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians that God is absolutely simple and therefore unknowable in His *essentia* to us, on the ground that this amounts to atheism. Philo and Demea are agreed in opposing him, though for different reasons—Demea because he accepts the negative theology, Philo on the ground that, as we have no experience of 'world-making,' we are not entitled to say that the order in the world presupposes a world-building intelligence. Cleanthes has rested his case on the old Platonic argument from 'orderly motion,' but has admitted that the argument is one from analogy. Philo replies that there is no sufficient basis for an analogical argument. He further appeals to the difficulties of the 'infinite regress.' If matter and mind must be effects of a cause, why must not that cause have a more ultimate cause, and so on *ad indefinitum*? Cleanthes declines to consider the problem: 'You ask me what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my enquiry. Let those go farther, who are wiser or more enterprising.' Philo not unnaturally replies: 'I pretend to be neither; and for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer.'[5] Philo, it must be remembered, calls himself a theist, though he professes to regard the nature of God as totally unknown. The point at issue between him and Cleanthes is that Cleanthes maintains that the 'First Cause' is not only a mind but also 'a mind like the human,' and that the teleological argument is an 'experimental proof' of this. These two points are what Philo disputes and Demea regards as 'anthropomorphist' heresy. Philo, in fact, wishes, like Kant, to maintain that speculative theism is dependent upon the validity of the '*a priori* proof.' If we rely solely on the argument from

[1] Cf. Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz*, Paris, 1901, pp. 224–226, with the passages cited there.

[2] For a useful conspectus of all the more important utterances of Leibniz on the existence of God known before the publication of Couturat's volume of *Opuscules* see Russell, *Crit. Expos. of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 284–291, and, for a 'smashing,' but by no means final, attack on all the four arguments, ch. ix. of the same work.

[3] That this remark is made in good faith seems clear from Hume's letter to Gilbert Elliot of March 10th, 1751, where he speaks of Cleanthes as the 'hero' of the dialogue and asks his friend for any suggestions which will 'strengthen that side of the dialogue,' protesting against the ascription to himself of 'any propensity to the other side,' by which he plainly means the side of Philo. No one could suspect him of 'propensity' to the side of the 'mystic' Demea.

[1] That Hume was personally an orthodox Christian is, to be sure, unlikely, but there is no reason to suppose that he was much further removed from orthodoxy than more than one of the prominent 18th cent. latitudinarian bishops or Scottish 'moderates,' and in his philosophy he never commits himself to any view not compatible with the completest orthodoxy, as orthodoxy was understood in his day. Huxley's anti-clericalism is quite incompatible with Humianism.

[2] There is a certain want of definiteness about the position ascribed to Demea. He is spoken of as a 'mystic' and a depreciator of the powers of reason; on the other hand, he is the champion of the 'simple and sublime argument *a priori*'—an odd attitude for an irrationalist. Hume does not seem to have distinguished between negative theology, the creation of philosophic rationalists, and the scepticism of despair which arises from sheer distrust of reason. Philo's 'scepticism' is quite another thing, a mere declaration that, 'as at present advised,' he has not sufficient material for a definitive conclusion.

[3] Demea is, in fact, so little of a real theologian that he is unaware that it is actually unorthodox to maintain that the existence of God is known only 'by revelation.' Perhaps, like Hume himself, according to Johnson, 'he had never read the New Testament with attention,' and he almost certainly did not know that his position had been formally condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council.

[4] Huxley's exploitation of Philo for an antitheistic purpose rests on the false assumption that it is he who is the real 'hero of the dialogue.'

[5] Hume, *Philosophical Works*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1874–75, ii. 410.

effect to cause, the known effect is not perfect and we are not entitled to infer that its author is free either from intellectual or from moral deficiencies, or even that 'several deities' may not combine to construct a world as many men co-operate to build a house or a ship. 'A man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and hypothesis.'[1] The God of Cleanthes is, in fact, a 'finite deity,' and a finite deity is as bad as none at all. And, if reasoning by analogy be in place at all, analogy suggests that we should look on the material world as an animal of which God is, as with the Stoics, the soul, and thus we shall be led to affirm the eternity of the world (contrary to the position of Cleanthes, who has tacitly assumed that the thing to be accounted for is its origin). Or, again, if the world is more like an animal or vegetable than a watch or loom, why should we not infer that worlds are propagated rather than made? A comet may be the 'egg' of a solar system. Demea, of course, comments on the absence of any data for such 'wild' theories. But this is exactly the point on which Philo wishes to insist; 'we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.' He insists, none the less, that such analogies as we have suggest that intelligence itself is caused by physical generation. Generation, itself an unintelligent process, is explained to be a 'principle of order in nature,' and 'we see every day the latter [intelligence] arise from the former [generation], never the former from the latter.' (It is, of course, obvious that Cleanthes is here making two very questionable assumptions—that the 'rational soul' is generated like the body, and that, because an oak or a spider is not rational, the growth of the one and the instinctive behaviour of the other are not guided by intelligence at all. 'Experience' does nothing to assure us of these negations.) Philo finally reaches the climax of his polemic against the *a posteriori* argument when he urges that the 'unguided' motions of material particles may give rise to 'an uniformity of appearance,' and thus 'account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance' in nature. (As before, he makes the wholly illegitimate assumption that we know from experience that this has really happened. 'This we know to be the case with the universe at present. . . . May we not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter?' Of course, experience does not warrant the statement that there is or ever has been 'unguided matter.') He had himself repudiated the notion that chance has any place in a scientific theory, but he ends by suggesting that the only reason why there is order in the world is that 'it happens' so.[2] Cleanthes reasonably retorts that the degree of harmonious adaptation in the known part of the universe to the needs of an intelligent civilization goes far beyond what Philo undertakes to account for—such order as is necessary 'for the subsistence of the species.' But Philo has made the main point for which he was concerned, that the *a posteriori* argument, taken by itself, is not adequate to establish the existence of the all-perfect or 'most real' being. Accordingly the dialogue now proceeds to consider the *a priori* argument by which the existence of the *ens realissimum* is to be established from an analysis of its own nature. The exposition of this argument is given to Demea, the spokesman of traditional theology, and the objections against it are put into the mouth of Cleanthes, the upholder of the argument from design, as well as into that of Philo. We now find Cleanthes and Philo allied against Demea, as we have hitherto had Demea and Philo combining against Cleanthes. The particular argument regarded as conclusive by Demea is one which ought more properly to be called *a posteriori*. It is, in fact, as he words it, a combination of two of the forms of the *a posteriori* argument admitted by St. Thomas—the argument from the fact of motion to a First Mover and the argument from the possible to the necessary. Since the indefinite regress is illegitimate, in arguing from effects to causes, we must come to a First Cause, and, when we ask why the 'succession of causes' should be what it is and not a different series, we are forced to answer that the First Cause is a 'necessarily-existent Being, who carries the *REASON* of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction.'[3] (This last clause thus gets in the point of the ontological proof under cover of the argument from causality; this may be the justification for calling Demea's reasoning *a priori*. Or Hume may possibly mean that his argument is based simply on the general principle of causality and not on the special character of the effect under consideration, the actual universe.) Cleanthes urges against the proof the five following considerations. (1) No fact can be demonstrated *a priori*. 'Whatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.' This agrees with Thomas's verdict on Anselm except for the fact that Hume disregards the fine distinction between what is evident *in se* and what is evident *quoad nos*. (2) We cannot know that 'the Deity' is a 'necessarily-existent Being' 'while our faculties remain the same as at present,' and therefore 'the words *necessary existence* have no meaning' to us. Here there seems to be a direct contradiction between Cleanthes and St. Thomas. But on looking more closely we see that Cleanthes is merely repeating his former objection in fresh words. By a 'necessary existence' he means one that cannot be thought of as not existing, and St. Thomas also admits that 'our faculties' do not allow us to perceive that God's existence 'flows from His essence.' St. Thomas's argument only went to show that there is a being who exists always. This contention Cleanthes does not refute, but merely denies without giving a reason; 'nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being.' (3) If there must be a 'necessary being,' or a being which cannot be thought not to exist, why may not 'the material universe' itself be this necessary being? 'For aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five.'[1] (4) How can there be a first cause of an 'eternal succession of objects'? (5) In such a 'succession of objects' each may be said to be caused by something that preceded it, but there is no sense in asking for a cause of the whole chain. Demea adds that possibly the 'whole economy of the universe' is 'conducted by a necessity,' undiscoverable to us, which he compares with the arithmetical rule that the sum of the digits of any multiple of 9 is divisible by 9.[2] These reflexions really suggest more than they actually contain. Consideration (4), if thought out, raises the question whether the 'infinite regress' is really an impossibility, and consideration (5) is at least a hint of the more modern doctrine of ultimate pluralism that the universe may consist of a multitude of independent but interrelated constituents. Demea's remark deserves less consideration. It amounts manifestly to the suggestion that the 'material universe' itself may be the 'necessary' being whose existence follows from its 'essence,' and is inconsistent with the objection already urged against the ontological proof, that there is no existent which may not be conceived not to exist.

The discussion now turns to the moral character of the First Cause. Philo and Demea agree in arbitrarily assuming the pessimistic view of the general misery of creation and in particular of man. The case is argued by Philo with an abundance of rhetoric and manifest want of logic which of themselves suggest that Hume is treating him with some irony. That Cleanthes declares that he feels little of this misery himself and hopes that pessimists are not very common is a further indication that it is he who is the spokesman of Hume's own conviction, so far as any of the characters can be said to be so. Demea, of course, means only to infer from the pessimistic estimate of life that the true good of man is not to be found on this side of the grave, and is driven out of the company by disgust when Philo goes on to argue at great length, and with still more obvious begging of the question than before, that all the indications show that the cause or causes of the cosmic order are either incompetent, evil, or indifferent to morality. (It is almost incredible, again, that Hume was not aware that the whole of Philo's eloquence depends on the tacit assumption that nothing is good but pleasure. He merely revives the old Epicurean argument against Providence in its crudest form, and it is no surprise to an intelligent reader when he informs Cleanthes, after Demea's departure, that his real object has been merely to protest against the abuse of the topic of benevolent design by popular preachers. It is not quite so easy to believe him sincere in his assertion that, in spite of all that he has hitherto said, he thinks the evidence of rational design in nature overpowering and regards doubt about the existence of a 'Supreme Intelligence' as 'pertinacious obstinacy.') Philo's final conclusion is that the controversy between theists and atheists is at bottom verbal. The order and design in the world prove that its cause (he quietly abandons his own former objection to the demand for such a cause) bears an analogy, though, no doubt, a remote one, to the human mind. If theists would remember the remoteness and atheists the reality of the analogy, there would be nothing left to dispute. But he objects *in toto* to all 'religion' which goes beyond the intellectual admission of this one proposition (and thus is plainly meant to be insincere in his assertion that his 'philosophical scepticism' is 'the most essential step,' in an educated man, 'towards being a sound, believing Christian'). Deism—bare intellectual affirmation of the existence of an intelligent First Cause which exercises no influence whatever on the practical conduct of life—is manifestly what Philo really means to recommend. (His attack on 'religion' is little more than a denunciation of the 'horrors of the Inquisition' and contains a logical contradiction to which his creator must have been alive. He maintains, on the one hand, that 'religious motives' are so weak, by comparison with others, that 'religion' is impotent to influence conduct for the better, and, on the other, that it is so strong that all the worst evil in life is due to 'priests' who play on the fanaticism of the vulgar for their own interested purposes. It is hard not to believe that Hume is treating his puppet with intentional malice, just as he is treating Demea with malice when he represents him as welcoming Philo's description of the hopeless wretchedness of existence without any suspicion of its drift, though, as an educated man, he must have known what conclusions Lucretius had drawn from the same premisses.) Cleanthes, it is to be noted, listens to this assault on religion almost in silence and leaves Philo with the last word. It is to be supposed that he does not assent, though he may not see his way to 'dissolve the ἀπορία.'

15. **Kant.**—Much more closely knit is the assault on the whole of natural theology in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It should be remembered that Kant had not always been a disbeliever in the

[1] *Philosophical Works*, p. 414. [2] *Ib.* p. 428. [3] *Ib.* p. 432.

[1] *Philosophical Works*, p. 432. [2] *Ib.* p. 434.

possibility of demonstrating theism. In his thesis for his degree,[1] which aims at showing the irreducibility of the principle of sufficient reason to the logical principle of contradiction, he offers a proof, based on the former principle, that 'there is a being whose existence is antecedent to the possibility of itself and of all things, which being must therefore be said to exist with an absolute necessity.'[2] This is, in principle, the contention most fully developed later by Lotze.

As Kant states it, the argument runs thus. 'Possibility' means the absence of contradiction (*non repugnantia*) between the constituents of a 'complex notion.' The 'constituents' are thus presupposed as the 'matter' of the 'complex notion.' Thus a 'possibility' with no presuppositions, a 'possibility' when nothing whatever has been given as actual, is meaningless. It follows 'that nothing can be conceived as possible unless that which is real in every possible notion exists, and, indeed, exists with absolute necessity (since, if you leave this [reality] out of account, nothing whatever would be possible, *i.e.*, everything would be impossible). Further, he urges, this 'necessary reality' must be a single being. The argument for this is that, if we suppose 'the reals, which are, so to say, the matter of all possible concepts, to be found distributed among many existents' (*i.e.*, if we suppose a plurality of ultimate 'reals'), each 'real' will have limitations, *i.e.* 'privations,' negative characters. But negative characters have not, like positive 'realities,' an 'absolute necessity.' The supposed 'reals' will therefore all contain an element of contingency. The being which exists with absolute necessity must therefore be without any limitations and therefore infinite. (Like Leibniz's God, it must be the subject of every proposition affirming a positive 'perfection.') If there were more than one such infinite being, the very plurality would re-introduce contingency. 'Thus God, and one only God, is given as the absolutely necessary principle of all possibility.' Kant thus, by deducing the existence of God from the principle of sufficient reason, is already anticipating the doctrine of the *Critique* that all existential propositions are synthetic without exception. Descartes' ontological argument is pronounced to be invalid, precisely because it attempts to deduce the 'existence' of God from His 'essence' (thus treating an existential proposition as analytic), whereas, in the proof given by Kant, the 'possibility' of God is itself made to depend on His 'existence.'

Kant returns to the subject in his short essay on *The only Possible Proof of the Being of God.*[3] The proof offered is substantially that of his thesis of 1755, divested of scholastic terminology. Existence is not a predicate or determination of a subject, but the absolute positing of the subject itself; *e.g.*, when I am fully acquainted with the whole story of Julius Caesar and know every predicate of the hero of the story, it is still an intelligible question whether this Julius Caesar is a 'real' man or only the hero of a fiction, and by calling him a 'real' man I do not add an $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$ predicate to the n predicates which I have already asserted about him in telling the story. The difference between a 'real' and a merely possible thing lies not in what is posited in each case, but in the way in which it is posited. If I think of a thing first as possible and then as real, the same complex of predicates and relations is posited in both cases; but in the first case this complex is posited hypothetically (a complex of propositions are true about the thing if it exists), in the second case absolutely—*i.e.* categorically. I cannot think of anything as possible unless its predicates are all compatible with one another; *e.g.*, I cannot think of a triangle with four sides as possible, but I can think of a triangle with a right angle as possible. 'Both the triangle and the right angle are the data or material element in this possibility; the agreement of the first with the second in respect to the law of contradiction is the formal element of the possibility.' Since the material element (the data) as well as the formal is required to constitute a possibility, 'the internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence' (*irgend ein Dasein*), and 'it is wholly impossible that absolutely nothing should exist.' (In more modern language this means that the difference between the logically possible and impossible depends on the compossibility of some predicates and the incompossibility of others; thus, that there may be so much as the difference between what is logically impossible and what is possible, there must be predicates, and predicates are predicates of something. Hence there must be something, to be the subject of predicates if the very word 'possible' is to have a meaning.) Thus we get back to the starting-point of the proof of 1755. Possibility logically presupposes actual existence as its foundation. Therefore there is something actual, the elimination of which would destroy all 'internal possibility'; *i.e.* there is 'an unconditionally necessary being.' Kant then proceeds, as in 1755, to prove that the necessary being is one, simple, immutable, and eternal, and, as that which contains the data of all possibilities, is, in fact, the *ens realissimum*. From these attributes it is inferred that 'the necessary being is a spirit (*Geist*),' and this completes the proof that God exists.

It still remains for Kant to show that his form of the argument 'from the possible to the necessary' is the only valid theistic proof. The Cartesian proof of the fifth *Meditation* is set aside on the ground that it treats existence as a predicate. The familiar argument from the contingency of the world (the world is an effect, therefore it has a cause which is itself uncaused and therefore 'necessary') is unsatisfactory. Kant allows in this essay, as he does not in the *Critique*, that the inference to an uncaused First Cause may be valid. It is not so clear that 'this independent thing is unconditionally necessary,' *i.e.* that it cannot even be thought not to exist, since the demonstration of this turns on the principle of sufficient reason, which is not admitted by all philosophers. But, even if the point be conceded for the sake of argument, it is not proved that the absolutely necessary being is what we mean by God, *i.e.* is utterly perfect and utterly One. To establish this point (that 'the necessary being = the perfect being') we require to prove that, 'if X is perfect, X necessarily exists,' and this is just the ontological argument, with its treatment of existence as one predicate among others, over again (a point on which Kant expatiates more fully in the *Critique*). The teleological or, as Kant calls it, the physico-theological proof here, as in the *Critique*, comes off better. Like Hume's Philo (in one of his moods), Kant is convinced that there is such evident system, adaptation, and benevolence in nature that its author must be thought of as One, wise, and good. But, though the argument deserves to be enforced in the interests of practical piety, it is not enough to prove perfect wisdom or benevolence in the Creator, and thus not enough to prove that He is all we mean by God. The same criticism will meet us again in the *Critique*.

The argument for the dependence of the world on a 'necessarily existing being' recurs again, in a slightly different form, in a third 'precritical' work—Kant's inaugural lecture as professor on 'The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World.'[1] As in the two works already considered, Kant assumes the Leibnizian conception of the universe as a complex of simple substances or monads. His object is to show that such a complex must depend for its existence and character upon a supreme and 'necessary' extra-mundane 'substance,' which is God. The theistic argument is more specially contained in §§ 17–22, and runs as follows. The principles of interrelation between a plurality of substances cannot have their complete ground in the existence of these substances. Each substance is indebted for its mere subsistence only to its cause (if it has a cause). But the relation of effect to cause is not *commercium* (reciprocal interaction), but *dependentia* (one-sided dependence), and what we have to account for is the *commercium* of the substances which make up the universe. Not all these substances can be 'necessary,' because, if they were, they would be absolutely without dependence on each other; there would be no *commercium* between them, and they would not form a world at all. The world, or 'totality

[1] *Principiorum Primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio*, Königsberg, 1755 (*Werke*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1838–39, i. 367–400).

[2] *Ib.* § ii. prop. 7.

[3] *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*, Königsberg, 1763 (*Werke*, ii. 109–205).

[1] *De mundi sensibilis atque intellegibilis forma et principiis*, Riga, 1770 (*Werke*, ii. 395–426).

of substances,' is, therefore, a 'totality of contingents'; and 'the world, in virtue of its essence, consists of mere contingents. Moreover, no necessary substance is connected with the world (*mundus*) at all, unless as cause with effect, and therefore not as a part with a whole, since the parts of one and the same whole are connected by reciprocal dependence, a relation which does not affect a necessary being. The cause of the world, then, is an extra-mundane being and not a "soul of the world."' And the necessary being which is the extra-mundane cause of the world is one and not many. For the effects of different 'necessary beings' would stand in no relations of reciprocal dependence, since their assumed causes are not reciprocally inter-related. Hence the unity of the substances composing the world in a single system is a consequence of the dependence of them all on one being, and it follows that this one being is not a mere 'architect of the universe' (*i.e.* δημιουργός), but its Creator. Incidentally also the argument removes the ambiguity which had haunted Leibniz's account of the 'pre-established harmony' to God. It definitely makes the harmony itself dependent on God.[1]

Thus down to 1770 Kant shows no doubt of the possibility of demonstrating theism. The argument on which he relies in all the essays examined is one and the same—the Neo-Platonic argument *a posteriori*—and rests on the assumption that the world as given is an object for which we are bound by the principle of causality to seek an explanation.[2] The proof, as with the Neo-Platonists, aims at establishing the existence of the One—the single, internally simple and perfect, extra-mundane source of all the existents which together make up the κόσμος. The peculiarity of Kant's special version of it is that, to escape the criticisms which had been directed against Descartes, he sets himself to deduce the existence of a 'being which cannot be thought not to exist,' not from the logical concept of *ens realissimum*, but from the consideration that, in the universe itself, some combinations of predicates of the same thing and some combinations of relations between the same things are possible, and others not. The existence of an actual extra-mundane being once established as a pre-condition of the difference in intra-mundane things between what is possible and what is impossible, the internal unity, simplicity, and perfection of the necessary being are then deduced as consequences of its necessary existence. If this line of argument is not fallacious—*i.e.* if it really proves that something 'exists of necessity'—it clearly has the double merit of being free from the objection to the ontological proof, and of being equally untouched by the considerations urged by Philo and Demea in Hume against the *a posteriori* proof. If the principle on which Kant relies—that the possible presupposes the actual—is sound, his argument seems to be a complete speculative demonstration of the 'being of God' reduced to its most succinct expression. Why, then, did Kant, in his later 'critical' years, pronounce the question whether God exists to be transcendent—*i.e.* outside the legitimate limits of speculative investigation—and all 'proofs of the existence of God,' including that for which he had himself formerly claimed 'geometrical certainty,' mere fallacies?

In dealing with Kant's drastic assault on speculative natural theology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we may perhaps distinguish two questions which Kant himself naturally treated as one. It is one question whether Kant has proved that the demonstration of theism is impossible on the assumption that the special doctrine of his *Critique* as to the limits of human knowledge is true, but quite another question whether that doctrine *is* true, and consequently whether Kant has proved the fallaciousness of natural theology unconditionally. The first of these two questions no doubt permits of only one answer. Kant is clearly right when he asserts that all existential propositions are synthetic, at any rate (to repeat the distinction of St. Thomas to which Kant himself pays no regard) *quoad nos*. And it follows at once from this single consideration that, if, as the *Critique* maintains, the synthesis in a synthetical proposition must always in the end be effected by an application of formal 'categories of the understanding' to a material supplied in sensation or sensuous imagination, no synthetical proposition (and, by consequence, no existential proposition) can be affirmed of a subject which is purely 'intelligible,' a νοητόν. And Kant expressly makes this a main point in his criticism of the ontological proof. Unfortunately, however, this doctrine, if carried out to its full logical consequences, would lead to a result which Kant would have been the first to reject. For it follows that there can be no such sciences as pure arithmetic and pure geometry. The subjects about which synthetical propositions are asserted in these sciences are one and all *Objekte des reinen Denkens* no less than the *ens necessarium* or the *ens realissimum* of speculative theology. No element whatever supplied by sense enters into the mathematician's concept of a circle, a parabola, an integer, or a real number. Kant overlooks this all-important point because he assumes throughout his whole reasoning that, before I can demonstrate a proposition in geometry, I must draw the figure, and similarly that, before I can say what the sum of two integers is, I must count the units of which he supposes the integers to consist. The erroneous character of this view has been sufficiently demonstrated by the subsequent history of mathematical science, but ought to have been clear to Kant himself. Even if all geometry, as he tacitly assumes, were metrical geometry, he ought to have seen that Descartes' invention of co-ordinates had already made the drawing of figures in principle superfluous in geometrical science. His conception of arithmetic is even more superficial—in fact, on a level with Aristotle's. As Couturat has correctly observed, Kant's examples are all drawn from the demonstration of singular propositions (such as $7+5=12$). If he had asked himself how any general truth in the theory of numbers is proved (how, *e.g.*, we prove Fermat's theorem), he would have seen at once the inadequacy of his own theories. Indeed, mere consideration of a singular proposition which does not relate to integers (*e.g.*, the proposition $2\cdot5+3\cdot6=6\cdot16$) might have taught him that arithmetic is not the same thing as counting, and even suggested to him that an integer is not a 'collection of units.'

With the discrediting of Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the section of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' containing the famous antinomies, which may now be fairly regarded as a *fait accompli*, our task becomes the comparatively simple one of considering whether natural theology does or does not involve (as Kant alleges that it does) an illegitimate use of the principles of pure logic. From Kant's point of view, to be sure, it does. But this is just because Kant assumes that the only legitimate use of logical principles is their employment to order a material given by sense. If the doctrine of his 'Aesthetic' is rejected, and with it that part of the 'Dialectic' in which he absurdly tries to show that the mathematical doctrine of infinite series leads to antinomies,[1] it is no longer obvious that what Kant calls a transcendent employment of the principles of logic—*i.e.* their employment independently of application to 'the manifold' of sense—need be illegitimate. In fact, it is not clear that the whole of the general theory of arithmetic is not just such an employment of logical principles as 'constitutive of a *Denkobjekte*.' (It is certainly so if, as is probably the case, the series of natural integers can be defined wholly in terms of the primitive indefinables of logic.) One Kantian paralogism, in particular, may be noticed here, as it plays a prominent part in the assault on the theistic arguments. Kant complains that all the arguments for the 'necessary being' based on the causal principle depend on employing this principle, which is a mere rule for ordering the appearances of the sensible world, and has no meaning apart from these appearances, as a means of transcending the world of sense.[2] It might be a sufficient retort that the one form of causality with which we are intimately acquainted is our own volitional activity. In this activity, which is at once efficient and intentional causality, what are connected as cause and effect are not an earlier and a later event in the 'world of sensible appearances,' but the self, which does not belong to that 'world' at all, and an event

[1] 'Commercium itaque omnium substantiarum universi est externe stabilitum per causam omnium communem' (*ib.* p. 22).
[2] Philo, in Hume, it will be remembered, had at least suggested that this need not be the case; the material world may be its own explanation.

[1] On the absurdity of all this see, in particular, the crushing exposure of Couturat, *De l'Infini mathématique*, Paris, 1896, bk. iv. ch. 4.
[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], Riga, 1787, p. 637.

which does belong to it. Kant could not deny the causal relation between the rational self and events in the *Sinnenwelt* without ruining the foundations of his own ethics, but the admission of such causality ought to debar him from attacking natural theology on the ground that it 'uses the principle of causality as a means to transcend the world of the senses.' He only escapes open self-contradiction by his monstrous theory, which is not likely to find a defender at the present day, that the self with which we are acquainted is not the real self at all, but a phenomenal self apprehended by an inner sense. From the point of view of logic, the criticism is equivalent to a refusal to admit the validity of any logical inference from the terms of a series to a limit which is not itself a term of the series. It is not in itself any more absurd to hold that examination of the things and events of the *Sinnenwelt* in the light of the causal principle reveals their dependence on something which does not belong to that world than it is to hold that a series of which every term is a rational fraction can be shown to have a limit which is not a rational fraction. (This is, *e.g.*, the case when we represent a surd 'square root' as a recurrent continued fraction. Each of the 'convergents' is a rational fraction, but the limit of the series is not.) The general argument is thus invalid. No *a priori* reason can be given why the causal principle should not enable us to transcend the world of sense, and the only real question which remains is whether the particular arguments of theists will stand scrutiny on their merits. There is no general logical presumption against them of the kind Kant imagines.

We are thus brought to the consideration of the force of Kant's attack on natural theology taken by itself and apart from its connexion with a general theory of the nature of scientific knowledge which is certainly erroneous. We may therefore confine ourselves to the sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which profess to make a complete enumeration of the possible proofs of the existence of God and to convict each of the 'proofs' of fallacy, together with the 'Critique of all Speculative Theology,' in which Kant sums up his results.[1] The general line of argument is as follows. The scientific interpretation of facts consists in regarding any given actual condition of things as conditioned and asking for the antecedent facts which condition it. When they have been found, science once more requires an interpretation of them on the same lines, and so on *in indefinitum*. Every set of facts has thus to be regarded by the scientific intellect as conditioned by an antecedent state of things which has, in its turn, to be discovered. The scientific 'explanation' of the world is thus a task which, from its nature, can never be completed. Behind every set of conditions, however remote, at which we may arrive there is always a body of still more remote conditions to be discovered. (The conditions, in every case, like the facts they condition, are facts and processes of the *Sinnenwelt*.) The unending regress from conditioned to conditions, however, naturally suggests the thought that the process of explanation would be completed if we could find something ultimate, itself unconditioned but the condition of everything else. Thus we arrive at the notion of a being which 'exists necessarily' and contains in itself the explanation of everything else, the one and only being which is not contingent (*i.e.* a consequence of something other than itself). Next, it occurs to us that, if there is such a 'necessarily existing' being, it must, as the condition of everything else, contain in itself all that is truly real or positive; what is real in all limited and finite things must come to them from it. Thus we identify the *ens necessarium* with the *ens realissimum* ('*dasjenige was alle Realität enthält*'). Finally, since we ourselves, who are among the things dependent on this being, are intelligent moral persons, we 'personify' this being, and thus we arrive at the conception of God as the Supreme Being and source of the world. But the whole process has no scientific worth. The inference to the existence of a 'necessary being' is invalid because it employs the causal principle, which is really only a rule for the interconnexion of sensible events, as a means of connecting the sensible with the intelligible (a general criticism which has already been considered in the last paragraph); we have no positive conception whatever of the character of this necessary being (supposing it to exist), and the attempt to find one by identifying it with the 'most real being' will not stand examination, since it is logically possible that there might be a plurality of 'necessary' beings, each imperfect and finite (one may illustrate by the theory that 'ultimate reality' is a 'society' of unoriginate 'persons' without any Creator); and the attempt to prove the existence of a single 'most real being' directly is a pure sophism. The conclusion then is that, though speculation may suggest to us the possibility that God (conceived after the fashion of the Neo-Platonic 'One') is the source of the world, it can do no more. It cannot even prove that the possibility is more than 'logical'; *i.e.*, speculation may convince us that there is no internal contradiction in the notion of such a being; it cannot show that God is a 'real' possibility—*i.e.*, that there is no incompatibility between the existence of God and the actual facts of the world of experience, if we knew them all instead of being aware of a mere fragment of them. The whole value of speculative theism is to suggest this mere possibility, to warn us that we are not speculatively justified in regarding the sensible world as underived, but must keep an open mind. If, however, apart from all speculative philosophy, there are *practical* grounds for believing in God—*i.e.*, if the reality of absolute moral obligation can only be made intelligible by appeal to our dependence on God—then, for practical purposes, the open possibility is converted into a moral certainty. Kant means, as he explains,[1] that, in shaping the conduct of our lives, *il faut parier*. We must act either on the assumption that moral obligation is absolute or on the assumption that it is not; there is no third course. But all moral obligation, as is shown at length in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*,[2] is absolute, and there is no fact more certain than this. Without God as ruler of the world, however, the system of absolute obligations would be a logically flawless construction ('*in der Idee der Vernunft ganz richtig*'), but would have no 'reality of application to ourselves, *i.e.* would be without motives.'[3] A virtuous man is thus necessitated to a firm rational belief in theism, but that which makes the necessity is not the demonstrative force of the theistic arguments (which in fact is zero), but the virtuous man's immediate conviction of the absoluteness of moral obligations. This is what Kant meant when he described himself as abolishing knowledge to make room for faith.[4] If our unfavourable judgment on the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is justified, we plainly cannot concede to Kant that all speculative theism must be baseless. The theistic arguments must be scrutinized on their merits, not condemned *en bloc* like the generals at Arginusae. With his usual love for formal schematism Kant urges that there can be three and only three ways of trying to prove the existence of the Supreme. We may attempt to

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], pp. 611–670.

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], p. 615. [2] Riga, 1788.
[3] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], p. 617.
[4] He must not be understood in a pragmatist sense. He did not mean that the existence of God is a speculation which a man may accept or decline 'at his own risk,' may adopt 'because up to the present it works,' or because inferences can be drawn from it which gratify the believer. The faith of which he speaks has its foundation in the conviction that the law of duty is absolute, and this proposition is admitted by the good man not as an 'hypothesis accepted at his own risk to see whether it works,' or because he chooses to accept it, but because, being a good man, he sees it to be true and certain.

prove the existence of the 'most real being' entirely *a priori* (*i.e.* without the use of any 'truth of fact' as a premiss) by arguing that existence is included in its very nature — the ontological proof; we may, departing from the strictly *a priori* method, employ the single truth of fact, 'something exists,' as one of our premisses, and then argue to the conclusion that a 'necessary being' exists—the cosmological proof; we may include among our premisses specific assertions about the character of the 'something that exists'; *i.e.*, we may argue from the marks of intelligent and benevolent design in the actual world to intelligence and benevolence in its source—the physico-theological proof. Each of these proofs is now to be shown unsatisfactory. The first is a pure verbal sophism and the second no better, and, as proofs of the existence of God, both the second and third have to be eked out by a silent combination with the first.

The refutation of the 'ontological' proof is one of the best-known passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant speaks of the argument as the 'ontological (or Cartesian) proof.' He examines it only in the form in which it had been revived by Descartes, and was apparently not acquainted with its earlier history. His objection, put briefly, is simply this, that the proposition 'God exists' can only be got out of the concept of 'God' if existence has already been included in that concept. If I define God as a 'really existing *X*,' of course I can make the true proposition, 'If there is such a being as the God thus defined, then that being exists.' But I am not entitled to assert that there is such a being, and consequently not entitled to assert the consequent of the foregoing hypothetical proposition ('God exists') categorically. In fact existence is not a real predicate. The concept 'a hundred dollars' has precisely the same content whether the hundred dollars actually exist in my pocket or not. 'Our concept of an object may contain what and as much as you please, still we must go outside it to impart existence to the object.'[1] Hence the ontological proof is not really a proof of anything. 'The Idea of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most useful Idea, but just because it is merely an Idea it is wholly incapable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone.'[2] Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and exalted concept of the Supreme Being. The present writer does not feel that Hegel's witticisms on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension.' The logical investigations which have issued in the creation of the modern 'exact' or 'symbolic' logic of Frege, Peano, and Russell have made this point even clearer than it could have been to the first readers of the *Critique*. If it is immediately evident that there is a member of the unit-class of which 'supreme being' is the class-name, there is neither room nor need for proof. If this is not immediately evident, proof is wanted. In general it cannot be inferred from the definition of a class that the class has members. If the class 'supreme being' or 'most real being' is an exception, we require proof that it is an exception to the rule, and neither Hegel nor any one else has ever offered anything in the way of proof. Thus, as against Descartes, Kant's argument is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive. Nor does he see that the original Anselmian proof fares any better. It is not directly touched by Kant's denial that existence is a predicate, since Anselm does not rest his case on the assertion that existence is a predicate. But Kant's counter-argument can equally be stated without raising this question. Whether existence is a predicate or not, it is equally true that we are not entitled to infer from the hypothetical proposition, 'If there is a God, that God is an existent,' the categorical proposition, 'God is an existent'; and this is what Anselm tries to do. He is really committed, as every defender of the ontological line of argument must be, to the attempt to prove that it is irrational to suppose that there might have existed nothing at all. In point of fact most of those who have tried to turn the edge of Kant's criticism have not attempted so desperate a task. They have consciously or unconsciously assumed as a premiss the proposition that something exists, and have been content to argue that, since something exists, God exists also. In doing this they tacitly admit the truth of the contention of Kant and St. Thomas that no purely *a priori* proof of theism is possible.

Kant's attack on the cosmological proof is more elaborate and, in the present writer's opinion, less successful. The rejection of the ontological proof does not depend in the least on the acceptance of the peculiar theory of knowledge expounded in the *Critique*. The proof had been rightly treated as a sophism in all the precritical essays in which Kant deals with the foundations of natural theology. The case of the cosmological argument is different; Kant's own precritical proof, based on the need for an actual ground of real possibility, was itself a form of the cosmological proof, and is thus among the inferences now rejected as illegitimate. We may therefore expect to find that the rejection of this type of argument does depend on the special critical theory of the limits of human knowledge, and is thus only valid on the hypothesis that the doctrines of the *Critique* are accepted. The typical form of the proof as stated in the *Critique* for examination is this: (*a*) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being exists; but at least one thing (viz. myself) exists; *ergo* an absolutely necessary being exists; (*b*) a necessary being must be completely determined by its concept; the only concept which thus completely determines an object is the concept of the *ens realissimum*; *ergo* the concept of the *ens realissimum* is the only one by means of which a necessary being can be thought; *i.e.*, a Supreme Being necessarily exists. The argument thus consists of two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, second, the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being.

Kant denounces this cosmological argument with special vehemence, as was only natural in one who had until his late middle age built on it with perfect confidence and then come to distrust it. His tone in criticizing it is not unlike that of a rather unscrupulous attorney determined to secure a verdict against the accused party by fair means or foul. He begins by a charge of general fraudulence. The cosmological proof professes to appeal to experience, but it is really only the old discredited ontological argument dishonestly disguised. For it only uses the appeal to experience to establish the result: 'There is *a* being which exists necessarily.' When we ask what this being is, we are referred back to the *ens realissimum* as the only thing which meets the requirements of the case. Therefore 'it is only the ontological proof from mere concepts which contains the force of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly superfluous.'[1]

The complaint is surely unfair. The objection to the ontological argument did not lie in the concept of the *ens realissimum*, but merely in the absence of an existential premiss. If, then, the new argument supplies the missing existential premiss, it is no objection to it to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the *ens realissimum*. The only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premiss as is really needed. This is what Kant next proceeds to urge.[2] He complains that it ought to be shown that the necessary being is the *ens realissimum*. To prove this, we require to establish two propositions, of which one is the simple converse of the other: (*a*) every necessary being is an *ens realissimum*, (*b*) every *ens realissimum* is a necessary being. But this second proposition is 'determined merely by *a priori* concepts,' and therefore 'the mere concept of the most real being' must be the ground for ascribing to it necessary existence. Thus we commit the fallacy of the ontological proof, the establishment of a proposition by mere analysis of concepts. This criticism seems wholly *verfehlt*. The real objection to the ontological proof was that it aimed at proving an existential proposition by mere analysis of concepts. There can be no logical objection to the attempt to prove by such analysis the hypothetical proposition, 'If anything is an (or the) *ens realissimum*, it is *ens necessarium*,' or the simple converse, 'If anything is *ens necessarium*, it is also *ens realissimum*.' Both these propositions are implications, not assertions of existence; the existential import is brought into the cosmological argument entirely by the preceding proof, or attempted proof, that, if anything exists (as we know to be the case), a necessary being exists. Kant is entitled to contend that this has not been proved; he is entitled to contend that the equivalence of *ens necessarium* and *ens realissimum* has not been made out. He is not entitled to treat the fact that the equivalence is an equivalence of concepts as proof of this second charge. Up to this point he is merely following the recommendation to give a dog a bad name and trust to its hanging him. We now come to the really relevant part of his onslaught. This consists of the following allegations: (1) the inference from the contingent to its cause has a meaning only in the sensible world, but the principle of causality is used in this proof to transcend the sensible world; (2) the argument from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes in the sensible world to a first cause is illegitimate; (3) the very notion of necessity presupposes conditions upon which the necessity in question depends, and it is therefore impermissible to cut short the regress from proximate to more ultimate conditions by the really empty concept of an unconditioned necessity; (4) the proof confuses the mere logical possibility of a concept (absence of internal contradiction) with its transcendental possibility, which 'requires a principle establishing the possibility of performing such a synthesis,' but this latter can only be established 'in the field of possible experiences.' All these objections are valid only on the hypothesis that the Kantian theories about the limits of scientific knowledge are true, and it has already been contended that this hypothesis (involving, as it does, the acceptance of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the consequent recognition of the antinomies of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' as inevitable) is certainly false. In particular, it may be replied to (1) that all use of the principle of causality involves transcending the sensible world; consistent phenomenalism, as the work of such writers as Mach, Pearson, Avenarius, abundantly shows, is bound to eliminate

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], p. 629. [2] *Ib.*

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[2], p. 635. [2] *Ib.* p. 636.

the category of causality from science; to (2) that the 'cosmological argument' is not an argument from the impossibility of an infinite series of events at all. In fact it has been often maintained by thinkers who, like Aristotle, deny that the series of events has a first term, or, like St. Thomas, hold that it can only be known by revelation whether the series has a first term or not. The real bearing of the argument cannot be seen at all, so long as we think of causality, as Kant does throughout the *Critique*, as a mere rule of uniform connexion between earlier and later events. Its real foundation is in the conception of efficient causality (activity or agency). The point of the argument is that, if there is not a First Mover or First Agent (or 'movers' or 'agents' in the plural, as the case may be), the whole history of the world is a mere accident. Things are what they are because there 'happen to be' such and such agents, and the reason why there are just these agents and no others is that there 'happen to be' (or 'to have been') certain others by which the set first mentioned have been produced, and so on *in indefinitum*. This means that there might just as well have been no world at all, or one quite different from that which there is. An ultimate pluralistic realism, no doubt, might maintain this thesis, and we shall have to face it in the sequel. But it is an *ignoratio elenchi* to defend it by assuming phenomenalism *plus* an erroneous theory of the mathematical meaning of infinite series. The phenomenalism is further in flat contradiction with the presuppositions of Kantian ethics, for which it is indispensable that every human self shall be a 'first cause' of its own morally and legally imputable acts. If 'first cause' really means nothing intelligible, Kant's practical philosophy is no better than an idle sporting with insignificant words. One must add that the full force of the cosmological argument is only seen when it is combined with the argument from intentional causality. If the historical world-process has a meaning of any kind, whether its meaning lies in the direction of events towards an end or result or in their internal, quasi-aesthetic harmony, the explanation of it cannot, in the end, be merely that the constituents of the universe happen to be what they are. An ultimate pluralism must, to be consistent, deny that there is any meaning at all in the world-process. But, again, the Kantian phenomenalism affords no valid reason for entertaining this view. As to the last point, it does depend on the special principles of the critical philosophy, and, in particular, on the theory that an appeal to the senses lies at the root of all valid synthetic propositions. As has already been remarked, this theory is sufficiently disposed of by the simple consideration that every proposition in the theory of numbers is synthetic in Kant's sense of the word. In the present writer's opinion, then, Kant's attack on the cosmological argument (which he himself clearly regards as the central feature of his general assault on speculative theism) is a complete failure. He proves neither that the argument from the fact of existence to the existence of a 'necessary being' is fallacious nor that there is any sophism in the reasoning by which he himself had formerly established the equivalence of the 'necessary being' with the perfect or 'most real' being. This does not, of itself, prove that the cosmological argument is valid, but it does prove, if the remarks just made are in principle sound, that Kant's objections to the argument are unfounded. Even the complaint that we have no positive conception of either 'necessary' or 'most real' being only amounts to the true assertion that we do not know what it would be like to be God—a proposition which no reasonable theist, least of all an orthodox Christian theologian, need be concerned to deny. For the matter of that, I do not know what it would be like to be my cat, but that is surely an insufficient reason for denying the existence of my cat's mind.

Kant's treatment of the argument from intentional causality —the physico-theological proof, as he calls it—may be summarized more briefly. This argument, which he reduces to the argument from design, he regards with great respect as the most ancient, most obvious, and soundest of all. He assumes it as an undoubted fact that nature, so far as we know it, exhibits all the marks of intelligent purpose, and admits that it is correct to argue from such marks to a designing intelligence. It does not occur to him to explain away the appearances of order and purpose as merely apparent or as the results of anything in the nature of a struggle for existence. He is content to call attention to the limitations imposed on the argument by the imperfection of our knowledge of nature. It is only a part of nature with which we are acquainted, and any inference from the orderliness and purposiveness of that part to thoroughgoing order and purpose in nature everywhere has at best a degree of probability which falls short of certainty. We cannot therefore be sure even of the unity of the designing intelligence, since we do not know that, if all the empirical facts were before us, they would show absolute singleness of design. Even if we knew all the empirical facts, and knew that they all showed perfect unity of purpose, we could only infer that the intelligence which designed the natural order was very wise, very good, very powerful. We could not argue from any knowledge of empirical facts to infinite wisdom, etc. In particular, we only detect intelligence in the arrangement of the 'stuff' of the world, and thus, even if we knew all the facts, we could not use them as a proof of the existence of the Supreme Being, but at most as a proof of the existence of a demiurge or 'architect of the universe.' Thus, if a theologian appears to demonstrate the existence of God by the appeal to design in nature, it is only because he is illegitimately supplementing his reasoning by a concealed appeal to the ontological argument. In these criticisms, in which Kant is manifestly justified, he is, of course, urging considerations with which Hume had already made Philo confront Cleanthes. It is abundantly manifest that no empirical reasoning can establish the existence of a Supreme Being. Kant's final result, stated with his usual love for pedantic formal distinctions, is given in the section of the *Critique* which bears the special title 'Critique of all Theology based on Speculative Principles of Reason.' Theology, we are told, may be based on revelation or on mere reason. Rational theology, again, may think of its object (God) either as *ens realissimum* without further specification or with a further determination as the Supreme Intelligence. The first is transcendental theology, and its supporters may be called deists; the second is natural theology and is the doctrine of the theist. Natural theology, once more, may conceive God as the source of the order that actually exists (the natural order) or as the source of an order that ought to exist (moral order). It is only consideration of the latter that really gives us a right to postulate the existence of a Supreme Being; speculative theology, which attempts to establish the existence of God as required to explain the order of nature, is, as we have seen, condemned to failure, because it seeks to prove the reality of a being which cannot be an object of possible experience. Its value is simply that it shows us that there is no logical impossibility inherent in the notion of a Supreme Being. Thus it forbids us to assert that we know that there is no God, or that, if there is, He is not an intelligent being or is imperfect and limited like ourselves (it saves us from dogmatic atheism, deism, and anthropomorphism), and thus leaves us free to maintain the existence of a supreme spiritual principle, if the moral order proves to be unintelligible apart from the postulate that such a principle exists. For the present it may suffice to make two observations on this. The denial that God is an object of possible experience depends, of course, on taking a specific view of what is meant by experience. If it is indispensable to an experience that it should have an object into which sense-data enter as constituents (and this is what Kant always assumes), manifestly God cannot be experienced. But it may be observed that it is no ground of objection to speculative theology in particular to say that it claims to give us knowledge about a being which is not an object of 'possible experience' in this sense. The same thing is equally true of arithmetic or any other part of pure mathematics. The integers, *e.g.*, are not objects of experience in this sense; still less would it be possible to maintain that, when one utters the well-known proposition, 'Every integer can be represented as the sum of four squares, of which—except in the case of the integer 0—one at least is not 0,' one is not transcending possible experience. It would be quite impossible to verify the proposition by examining its validity for each successive integer (since there is an infinite number of them). Wherever I make a statement about a class with an infinity of members, I am dealing with an object which is not, in Kant's sense of the words, an 'object of a possible experience.' His doctrine reposes on the theory of his 'Aesthetic' that, in the case of arithmetical propositions, I can justify such an assertion by counting. But, though I could, *e.g.*, prove the proposition quoted to hold good for a few cases by actual counting, I manifestly cannot verify it or any other general proposition of the science by this method of appealing to intuition. Again, we may fairly ask why experience should be assumed to be concerned only with objects which fall under the 'forms of intuition.' Why are the saint's moments of vision to be from the outset excluded from experience? If they are included, the statement that God is not an object of possible experience at once becomes questionable. It is a standing defect of the *Critique* that the concept of experience itself has never been subjected by Kant to careful and searching criticism. The second observation which naturally suggests itself is that the sharp opposition between speculation and practice might prove on a closer examination to be misleading. All that Kant can claim to have shown, even if every one of his charges against natural theology could be sustained, is that the facts of physical nature do not warrant the theistic hypothesis. But it is surely as much part of the task of a speculative philosophy to explain the facts of the moral as it is to explain the facts of the physical order. The absoluteness of moral obligations is a fact of the moral order, and, if this fact is only intelligible from the theistic standpoint, then it may fairly be said that speculative philosophy is committed to theism. This was, indeed, Kant's own conviction, and his hard and fast severance between speculation and practice does less than justice to the view he intends to maintain. It gives rise to the misleading suggestion that he regards theism as a doctrine which is doubtfully true but had better be taught to the proletariat with a view to keeping them out of mischief and making them conveniently submissive to their 'betters.' This was not in the least what Kant meant, but his unfortunate verbal distinction between theory and practice is what gave colour to the jest of Heine that after abolishing God in the first *Critique* Kant revived Him in the second in the interest of his old butler's morals, as well as to the strange view of Bernard Bosanquet[1] that Kant's theism is an 'unessential survival.'

It would be wholly unjust to Kant to confine our attention to the destructive side of his treatment of philosophic theism; even more important is his positive teaching, which will be found most fully expressed in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*.[2] If Kant's object was to destroy the

[1] *Essays and Addresses*, Loudon, 1889, p. 129.
[2] Riga, 1788 (*Werke*, v. 116–153).

old speculative natural theology, it is even more his purpose to replace it by a positive moral theology, and it is probably true to say that it is primarily due to his influence that in our own time it is mainly upon the moral argument that popular theistic philosophy continues to base itself. As the Kantian moral theology has often been very imperfectly understood by its critics, it is necessary to state Kant's real position rather carefully, in order to put in the clearest light the differences between Kant and those who hold that the existence of God remains after all a 'pious opinion,' suggested but not established by the facts of the moral life, or those who hold that it is a doctrine recommended mainly by its comforting character. To appreciate the strength of Kant's position, it is necessary to understand that theism is not in any sense an arbitrary hypothesis tacked on to a system of ethics, or, as Bosanquet calls it, a 'survival' of belated superstition, but a logically necessary part of 'practical' philosophy. The argument starts from premisses which are taken as once for all established in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* and the *Analytic of Practical Reason*.[1] These premisses are as follows. The object which all moral action has in view is the realization of the highest or complete good. The complete good means a state of things in which the reasonable will finds full and complete satisfaction. Such a state of things implies two constituents: virtue (a right state of the will itself), and happiness (by which Kant means, as he says, a condition of things in complete accord with the rational will, *i.e.* the successful domination of rational will in the universe). If only the first constituent were real, *i.e.*, if the will of every rational being were morally wholly good, this would not of itself be enough to satisfy the demands of the rational will itself. We should not think a universe satisfactory or rational if it consisted of beings of perfect morality whose volitions were always defeated and disappointed by the course of things. The only condition of things which would satisfy our rational demand for the triumph of the virtuous will would be one in which every rational being should be happy (*i.e.* should find his volition effective), in proportion to the moral goodness of his will. The highest good—the object of the moral will—is thus a union of virtue with happiness, but a union in which the inner virtue of the agent is the condition and cause of his happiness.[2] So the highest good means a condition of existence in which a rational being is (*a*) deserving of happiness, deserving that his 'will be done, as in heaven so in earth,'[3] and (*b*) has the happiness which he deserves as a consequence of his deserving it. (More briefly, the highest good is that the actual order of things should be a moral order.) But—and here comes in the antinomy which Kant thinks indispensable in a *Critique*—the principle, as distinguished from the object, of the virtuous will is always to act from reverence for the unconditional obligatoriness of the moral law, without any consideration of the results of our conduct. We must, as moral beings, will the highest good, yet we must also, as moral beings, will to do right for its own sake, without even asking the question whether our right actions will result in bringing about this good or not. We cannot escape from this antinomy, as Kant holds we can from those of speculative reason, by dismissing it as illusory. For we are under absolute obligation to be virtuous, and we cannot be really virtuous without desiring the highest good, nor yet can we be really virtuous if we allow this desire to affect our will to do right because it is right, regardless of consequences. Thus, if morality is to be more than an empty dream, the union of virtue and happiness must be realized, though we must not set ourselves to realize it by treating virtuous action as a means to it. The realization of the union must be brought about for us, not by us. Now, experience shows abundantly that in the empirically known system of nature there is no dependence of happiness on virtue. The most virtuous man is not regularly the man whose will is actually done 'in earth,' nor the man whose will is done the man whose volitions are morally purest. The union must therefore be effected for us by a supreme power, not our own, in the 'intelligible world' which disposes the course of events so that, if we could see the whole infinite series at once, we should see that every man is happy in proportion to the degree in which he deserves to be happy. Further, since morality demands not merely that the virtuous shall be happy but that the happiness shall be a consequence of their virtue, we could not regard the union of virtue and happiness as effected by a mere blind 'natural tendency' in things. The virtuous man's virtue must be the motive of the disposing power to make him happy—*i.e.*, this disposing power must be thought of as an intelligent and absolutely holy *will*. Thus it becomes a postulate of morality that there is an absolutely wise and holy Supreme Being. We have already seen that the speculative use of reason in finding an explanation for natural events themselves suggested the hypothesis that there is a Supreme Being, though all our attempts to demonstrate the truth of this hypothesis proved to rest on fallacy. The consideration of the presuppositions of morality now shows us that, unless there is to be a hopeless conflict between our conception of the highest good and the first principle of duty, such a Supreme Being must really exist and, what is more, must be spiritual. Practical reason then does not introduce us to any new idea; if it did, there might be an insoluble conflict between its suggestions and the results of speculative criticism. It only gives us the right to affirm as a reality what speculative reason itself unavoidably suggests as a possibility, the complete dependence of the world on a Supreme Being, and enables us to determine the character of that Being so far as to say that it combines perfect wisdom, holiness, and power. Beyond this moral theology cannot go. It tells us what God must be if the world is to have moral order, and it tells us nothing more. Kant pushes this consideration so far that he is not content to say with the Neo-Platonists and scholastics that we do not know God *secundum essentiam suam*. Recurring to his view that an object of possible experience must have sensuous constituents (must be given in intuition), he in effect denies that we have any experience of God at all. 'Mystics' profess to experience the divine, but for that very reason Kant sets them down summarily as 'fanatics' who must not be allowed a hearing.

[1] That the *Critique of Practical Reason* should be divided, like the *Critique of Pure Reason*, into an 'Analytic' and a 'Dialectic'—of course there can be no 'Aesthetic' in this case—and that the 'Dialectic' must have its antinomy is a pure piece of pedantic formalism which Kant would have done well to dispense with.

[2] The words of this statement are not precisely those of Kant, but have been chosen to express as briefly and untechnically as possible the substance of his thought. It should be carefully observed that the central thought is not egoistic. Kant's point is that the 'ideal spectator,' apart from any consideration of his own happiness, would judge unfavourably of a world in which the will of the truly virtuous man was constantly thwarted by the 'force of circumstances.' My own happiness, as he is careful to state, only comes into the consideration in so far as I am one among the many rational and responsible beings in the universe. Nor is happiness understood in a merely hedonistic way. It is the condition in which things happen 'according to our will'—*i.e.* in which the rational will is really effectual.

[3] In fact, though Kant would have been horrified by so 'fanatical' a phrase, he is at bottom quite agreed with 'Dionysius' that 'deification' (θέωσις) is the ultimate goal of the moral life.

The value of Kant's moral argument for theism seems quite independent of our judgment of the critical philosophy as a whole. The phenomenalism which is the weakest point of the system only affects Kant's unfavourable estimate of specific religious experience. It might, indeed, be said with an appearance of plausibility that God as the source of the subordination of nature to the moral order is only brought in to solve a difficulty which Kant has created for himself by the abstract formalism of his ethics. No Kantian doctrine has come in for more unsparing reprobation than the famous theory that the moral worth of an act depends upon its being done from mere reverence for universal law as such, and is destroyed if any desire for a specific result influences the agent's motives. But, apart from this untenable theory, it may be said, there is really no antithesis between the supreme object of virtuous willing and its true principle; the realization of the good is at once object and principle. And thus the problem which, according to Kant, is solved for us by the existence of God is not a real problem at all. Yet such criticism surely misses the mark. The problem Kant has in mind still remains when the pure formalism of his own conception of the good will has been dismissed. One and the same conviction of the absoluteness of moral values, the right of δικαιοσύνη to control the world, compels us to pronounce the world evil and our own moral striving a vain show if the highest good is not realized or realizable, and also forbids us to aim directly at the realization of this highest good by doing moral evil that good may come out of it or leaving the right undone because the consequences of doing right are judged by us to be, in a certain case, bad. It is certain that good often comes out of moral evil, and that moral integrity itself often demands action which leads to bad results which would not have followed if the agent had been less virtuous.[1] Thus, quite independently of any special Kantian theses in ethics, we are confronted by the dilemma: either the order of things, rightly understood (the intelligible world), is a moral order and realizes the highest good or the highest good is not realized and all moral effort is senseless and foredoomed to failure, in which case the conviction of the absolute value of the good, on which morality is based, is a mere illusion. If this be so, the argument from the reality of absolute moral values to the all-wise, all-holy, and all-powerful Supreme Being, in the present writer's judgment, holds, exactly on the lines on which Kant has conducted it. It is precisely the same argument, divested of its incidental trappings of Kantian 'critical' phraseology, which Solovyof compresses into a sentence when he writes:

'The unconditional principle of morality, logically involved in religious experience, contains the complete good (or the right relation of all to everything) not merely as a demand or an idea, but as an actual power that can fulfil this demand and create the perfect moral order or Kingdom of God in which the absolute significance of every being is realized.'[2]

16. Lotze.—This article cannot undertake to follow the history of the treatment of theism in philosophy beyond Kant with any detail. To do so would require a substantial volume, and it does not seem to the present writer that anything which is new in principle has been added to the arguments for or against theism since Kant's development of the moral proof in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. An exception, however, may be made for Lotze, more particularly on the ground that he has done so much, in the face of Kant's critical repudiation of his own earlier position, to vindicate the speculative argument upon which Kant himself relied until advanced middle age.[1]

It may seem strange to describe Lotze as reasserting the particular version of the cosmological argument which finds in God the necessary actual ground of possibilities, in view of the fact that Lotze himself, in the chapter on the 'Proofs of the Existence of God' in the *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*, professes to have disposed of the cosmological proof in one or two paragraphs of not very profound criticism. Yet an analysis of his own argument will show that, though it is not quite identical with any former statement of the cosmological proof, it really follows the general lines of Kant's pre-critical argument for the 'being which exists with an absolute necessity.' The starting-point of Lotze's train of thought was historically determined for him by the necessity of taking up a definite attitude towards the philosophy of Herbart, and to a lesser degree of Hegel; this special concern with the problems raised in the metaphysics of Herbart further accounts for the very marked influence of Leibniz.[2]

Lotze starts with the fact of incessant change or becoming as the most obvious characteristic of the empirical world. The great problem of the metaphysician is to give an intelligible account of the pre-conditions of this universal fact of change.[3] We can neither dismiss change or becoming as a mere illusion (since, even if you deny all change in the objective world, the illusion itself has to be regarded as a process of change in the inner states of the existents which we call minds or souls) nor resolve the history of the universe into a process of absolute becoming, a wholly lawless succession of disconnected states. This would be fatal to the possibility of all knowledge whatever. Change or becoming, then, is real, and it is always grounded change. This is shown by our success in formulating laws of natural processes. If we find that A is regularly, though not always, followed by B, we must suppose that there is a reason in the state of things in which A was present why A should be replaced by B rather than by P or Q, and, if on special occasions A (which is commonly followed by B) is followed by P, there must again be a reason why it is, on these occasions, followed not by the usual B but by the unusual P. At the stage of reflexion reached in natural science we attempt to do justice to this demand for an intelligible interpretation of change by the view that the world is made up of a plurality of different 'things' (A, B, C . . .), each exhibiting a succession of 'states' (a_1, a_2, a_3 . . . b_1, b_2, b_3 . . . c_1, c_2, c_3 . . .). We then say that the changes of state of the various things are interconnected by laws according to which a definite change of 'state' in one thing (*e.g.*, the occurrence of a state a in A) gives rise to the corresponding change in another (the occurrence of a state b in B). This interpretation of the facts, Lotze urges, cannot be final. If the universe were really a collection of independent existents, or 'things,' how could the occurrence of a change of state in one of these existents be conditioned by changes of state in the rest? The very fact that, *e.g.*, A only exhibits the change from state a_1 to state a_2 on the condition that certain definite changes occur in a number of other 'things'—in a word, the 'interconnexion of things in obedience to determinate laws'—shows that the universe is not an ultimate plurality. We are bound to think of it as *one* being of which what we commonly call the various 'things' are partial expressions or activities. We must amend the statement that the changes of state in a plurality of things are related according to definite formulae into the statement that the one and only real 'thing' has a determinate nature or character of its own which it maintains unimpaired. It is this self-maintenance of the 'living whole'—M, as Lotze symbolically calls it—that requires that the change of which we speak as occurring in the thing A should be compensated in a definite way by connected changes, which we are accustomed to refer to the other things B, C. . . . Strictly speaking, then, every change in any element of M is correlated with changes in all the rest. But some of these changes may be minimal and so escape our notice. Hence we are able for our human purposes to formulate laws which connect a definite change in one element with definite changes in a finite number of others, B, C, D, and treat all the rest of the elements as a remainder R, which is irrelevant. The world, then, is not a plurality but a unity-in-plurality. How the unity is effected is more than we can ever expect to know. We may say, 'The unity is the plurality,' but we must remember that the 'is' here is a copula of which the concrete modality

[1] See the entertaining illustrations of this point in V. Solovyof, *The Justification of the Good*, Eng. tr., London, 1918, pt. iii. ch. 6.

[2] *Ib.* p. 180. The whole of Solovyof's book is worth reading as a corrective to Kant's thesis that philosophical theology is exhausted by the one proposition that God exists.

[1] Lotze's treatment of the subject is to be found partly in his *Metaphysik*, latest ed. Leipzig, 1912, Eng. tr.[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1887; see particularly bk. i. chs. 6–7, with which may be compared the more condensed *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, Leipzig, 1883, Eng. tr., *Outlines of Metaphysics*, Boston, U.S.A., 1886, particularly the chapter 'Of Causes and Effects' (Eng. tr., pp. 57–75), partly in the *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*[3], Leipzig, 1894. A longer and more popularly written exposition is given in *Mikrokosmus*[3], 3 vols., do. 1896–1909, Eng. tr.[4], Edinburgh, 1894, bk. ix., 'The Unity of Things.' Only the general outline of Lotze's doctrine can be dealt with here.

[2] It must be remembered that Lotze was necessarily unacquainted with Leibniz's most important papers, which were mostly unpublished until after Lotze had arrived at his own fundamental doctrines; hence his version of the earlier philosopher's thought is not to be implicitly trusted.

[3] This was precisely the problem which had specially occupied Herbart and the Herbartians.

is not fully known to us. But it is important to be quite clear on one point of the first importance. The one 'living whole' M is not properly described as 'subject to universal laws.' If we think of the world as composed of things subject to general laws, it is quite impossible to give any ultimately intelligible account of the relation between the things and the laws. The absolute *prius* is not a complex of laws, but the concrete M and its individual acts of self-expression and self-maintenance. Since we are part of the contents of M, we can compare facts with facts, recognize likeness and differences, and so come to formulate general propositions. We can even carry this so far as, when we have formed the notions of 'class' and 'member of a class,' to think of M, the real world itself, as one member of a class of worlds, and to speculate on the possibility that there might be others—'possible' worlds, as Leibniz said. Then we may be led, as Leibniz was, into the insoluble problem why just this world M, and not a different one N, is real. But this whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as anterior to the individual facts we call the actualized cases of these laws, rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements would be different, and, if we were among these elements, our views as to what alternatives are possible would be different also. It is a radical error in philosophy to confound logical with metaphysical priority.[1]

How M can be the ἓν καὶ πολλά required by the theory we cannot say in detail. But we can see, at any rate, that M cannot be material. The only thing with which we are acquainted which, even imperfectly, discharges for a part of reality the functions which M must discharge for the totality is the soul which at once has or owns a multiplicity of states or activities and would have no life without them, and is yet aware of its own unity and its distinction from each and all of these states and activities. We are thus driven to think of M in terms of spirit. It must be akin to the soul, but must, at the same time, have all the differences from our souls which result from the consideration that it has nothing outside it, is wholly unique, and can meet with no resistance. We are thus led to think of M as an infinite spiritual and, Lotze adds, personal being, allwise (because its knowledge has not to develop under difficulties and from point to point, like our own), almighty (because it is the absolute *prius*, anterior to all 'law' as well as to all fact), and, above all, all-good (Lotze weakens his case on this point by a half-hearted tendency to take a hedonist view of good, and so to reduce perfect goodness to mere 'benevolence'; a Platonist would have no difficulty, since the all-wise must have complete knowledge of the good, and to know the good is to act it out). M is also 'out of space' and 'eternal,' since geometrical and temporal relations are, and are what they are, as a consequence of M's existing and being what it is. Thus the conception of M with which we began as 'the one real being' passes into the conception of the almighty and eternal God, and the close of our historical retrospect brings us back very close to the position of Neo-Platonism again. It calls for remark that, though Lotze's initial account of M, taken by itself, would suggest a pantheistic or immanence theory, the doctrine, as fully worked out, is definitely theistic. Lotze is careful to guard himself, even when he says that M *is* the world, by adding that 'is' here has a unique sense which it has in no other judgment, and is consequently not the 'is' which occurs in an ordinary identity. Later on we find that each soul, being aware of its own unity, is a real individual distinct from God and from every other soul, though it is from the creating and sustaining activity of God that the soul derives this character. And mere inanimate things are held to be a superfluous hypothesis. There are, according to Lotze, only the one living God and His acts. Some of these acts are souls with a real spiritual individuality of their own. In this way, while avoiding the customary theistic language about the transcendence of God, Lotze secures the same result by maintaining not that God is immanent in the world, but that the world is 'immanent in God.' The limitation of real individuality to souls naturally reminds us of the Neo-Platonic view that souls hold the lowest place in the system of ὄντα, bodies being not ὄντα but γιγνόμενα, 'what becomes,' or εἰκόνες τῶν ὄντων, 'images of ὄντα.' The resemblance with Neo-Platonism is even more marked when Lotze uses his view of M as the metaphysical *prius* of universal laws or eternal truths as a ground for urging that life, truth, and goodness are not, as the Aristotelian phrase has it, 'naturally prior' to God; God is Himself the concrete Life, Truth, and Good.

17. Logical pluralism.—The foregoing statement of the theistic argument as presented by Lotze provides an opportunity for considering the type of ultimate pluralism of which we have spoken as the most serious philosophical alternative to theism. This type of view is best represented in contemporary English philosophy by the writings of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, though, as neither of these authors has ever directly attempted the construction of a metaphysical system, we must be content to indicate the general view to which their studies in logic, ethics, and the philosophy of the exact sciences seem to point. A pluralism of the type in question would take issue with Lotze over the validity of the ground on which he maintains the existence of such a being as M. It would insist on precisely that form of 'dualism' which Lotze assumes to be unthinkable—the 'dualism' of actual existence and hypothetical universal laws. It would be maintained that what we actually find the 'world' to consist of is a plurality of existing things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. These relations, it would be further said, cannot all be reduced, as Lotze assumes, to reciprocal causal inter-connexions. Causal connexion is only one of the many types of relation; there are others, such, *e.g.*, as the mere 'togetherness' or 'compresence' which language represents by the word 'and,' the 'disjunction' symbolized by 'or else,' and so forth, in which causality is not a component at all. Relations are all 'universals,' and no relation is an 'existent,' while 'existents' are all individual. We have to accept it as an ultimate fact which permits of no explanation that specific individual existents stand in certain definite relations to other specific individual existents. To ask why this is so is to ask a question quite as illegitimate as that which Lotze ascribes to the purely mechanical philosophers whom he ridicules for asking 'how being is made.' More particularly, the special problem which leads Lotze to frame the concept of M—the problem how a change of 'state' is brought about, how one thing can exhibit a succession of different states or first have a relation to a second thing and then lose it—would be declared illegitimate. According to the view which has been most elaborately developed by Bertrand Russell,[1] the proposition that at a certain moment A changes its state from a_1 to a_2, or changes its relation to B from R_1 to R_2, if expressed accurately, only means that the whole duration of A's existence can be resolved into two mutually exclusive classes of moments. In any moment of the one class A has the state a_1, or stands to B in the relation R_1; at any moment of the other class A has the state a_2, or stands to B in the relation R_2. And, further, every moment of the one class a_1 comes before any moment of the other class a_2. There is no moment in the whole conjoint class a_1+a_2 at which A has both states or both relations, and no moment at which it has neither. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no such process as that which Lotze calls change, and we live, in fact, 'in a changeless world.' Fully thought out, this view leads to the position, adopted of recent years by Russell, that all existents really exist only at a mathematical instant. What we commonly call one and the same thing or one and the same mind is an infinite succession of different things or minds which we mistakenly regard as one, because the thing or mind which exists at a moment m_2 separated by a minute interval from a preceding moment m_1 is very much like its predecessor. Thus Lotze's argument is invalidated by denying the reality of the facts it is employed to make intelligible. As there are no changes, in the sense in which Lotze understands the word, there is no ground to assert the existence of M to account for them. All arguments for the reality of a 'being which necessarily exists' are thus invalidated; and it is, further, at least highly doubtful whether we can even form the thought of

[1] It will be clear from these last sentences why the present writer regards Lotze's argument for the unity-in-multitude of M as in principle identical with Kant's pre-critical argument for a 'necessary existent' as the foundation of real possibility.

[1] In *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903. The later work of Russell and Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Cambridge, 1910 and subsequent years, does not assume this metaphysic.

a 'being which cannot be conceived not to exist.' Causality, as commonly understood by metaphysicians, likewise disappears. The causal principle reduces to the modest proposition that an observed frequent sequence of an event of the class β on an event of the class α affords ground for the judgment that in cases not previously observed an event of class β is likely to have been preceded by an event of class α. How likely this conclusion is is then a mere problem in the mathematical theory of probability. Whether all events have causes or not remains an open question, and must always remain so. It is clear that such a theory leaves no room for theism in philosophy. If it is really the last word of metaphysics, belief in God loses all rational foundation, though it is, to be sure, still possible that the belief may 'happen' to be true. It must further be admitted that the theory has its strong points. It is by no means obvious that a philosopher is entitled to assume as axiomatic such a conviction about the thoroughgoing interconnexion of all events as Lotze makes the basis of his argument. In what sense or to what degree the 'world' is a unity is a question to which philosophy must find the answer. The interconnexion might conceivably be very much looser than Lotze is willing to admit. And it seems clear that the mathematical analysis by which the particular puzzle about change is eliminated is, *as far as it goes*, entirely justified.[1] Nor yet can it be denied that the very modest statement to which the principle of causality is reduced is all that is required at any rate for the purposes of natural science.

It still, however, remains a question whether we could possibly be content with a logical pluralism of the kind just described as the final answer to our intellectual demand for a rational explanation of the world. For the purposes of the present article it must be enough to call attention to a few of the considerations which suggest that such a theory can only be provisional. One may fairly doubt whether it can really be called an explanation or interpretation at all. The system of interrelated existents with which it presents us as the solution of a perennial intellectual problem seems to be simply the problem itself stated in an unusually abstract way. And it ought to be clear that, when it has been granted to the full that the special problem about the meaning of change has been eliminated, there is a more fundamental problem which the theory has simply left out of account. However true it may be that 'we live in a changeless world'—*i.e.*, that there never is a 'moment' in which anything is 'passing from one state to another'[2]—Lotze's main contention, that the analysis of the universe into relations and existents, which are the terms of the relations, rests on the uncriticized assumption that the successive steps of the logical construction by which we try to make things intelligible correspond exactly to the steps of the real process by which 'being,' so to say, constructs itself, has been left unanswered. Logical pluralism, no less than the 'panologism' of Hegel, simply assumes that the logically prior and the metaphysically prior are identical. The only difference is that the logic of Hegel is so much inferior as logic. To put the point in the simplest possible way, we cannot avoid raising the question why, out of the infinity of relations open to the study of the logician, some and only some are actualized—have existents as their terms. Logical pluralism has no answer to this inevitable question except that 'it happens to be so.' And this is really no answer at all. It amounts to saying not merely that the world might have been wholly different from what it is, but that there might equally well be no actual existents whatsoever. The theory fails to satisfy us for the same sort of reason as that which prevents the ontological proof from producing conviction. Just as that argument assumes that 'there must be something,' so the theory we are now considering assumes that 'there might just as well be nothing.' Now, we cannot prove that there must be something, nor can we prove that there might have been nothing; we have to start from the fact that there is something and that this something has a definite character. Hence, to the present writer, Lotze seems right in contending that it is the character of this something that accounts for the range of logical possibilities itself being what it is, and Kant in arguing that there is an actual ground presupposed by the very distinction between the possible and the impossible. In fact the logical pluralists themselves seem to admit as much when they rightly insist that the so-called laws of thought are laws not of thinking but of things. It is therefore by a rightful exigence of the intellect itself that we are driven to conceive of the structure of the world as explicable only by the metaphysically 'first' character of the 'necessary being'; and, when once we have taken this step, it is not hard to show that the 'necessary being' must have the character of the *ens realissimum*. It must be its own justification, its own *raison d'être*. If so much be granted, it follows at once that, though we can form no adequate positive concept of such a Supreme Being, the least inadequate way in which to think of it is in terms of the highest values known to us—*i.e.* by analogy with the human spirit at its best. How inadequate such an analogy is has always been patent. Even of the human spirit at its best we can only form very inadequate notions from what we see of its actual achievements, and our notion of the Supreme Reality which is the source of our estimates of worth, as of all other possibilities, must needs be doubly imperfect when it has to be framed in so unsatisfactory a way. But we can at least say that such a being must be all that we mean when we think of perfection in ourselves, and infinitely more. If we are not satisfied with theories which, under a disguise, offer us the unexplained detail of the world as its own explanation, it is only in the thought of the detail as throughout conditioned by the living Good that the intellect itself can finally acquiesce. Of course we cannot expect to know in particular how each constituent of this detail is consequent on the character of the Good—why, *e.g.*, it is 'best' for us in particular to be living on the particular planet on which we do live, rather than any other; why there should be just the number of members of our planetary system there are; why the range of colours we can perceive should be neither more nor less extended than it is; and the like. But the conviction that all this detail is as it is 'because it is best' gives an adequate reason why it is what it is, even though we may be quite unable to see why it is best.[1] And it is only the thought of the dependence of the world on the absolute Good which, by removing the artificial severance between the realm of fact and the realm of values, can achieve

[1] The question is *how* far does it go? Is an 'instant' more than a mathematical 'limit'? The 'Theory of Relativity' becomes important at this point (consult A. N. Whitehead, *Enquiry into the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919).

[2] Yet it is surely true, as maintained, *e.g.*, by Whitehead, that 'passage' is just the fundamental fact about Nature, however we choose to analyse it. 'Nature' is, as Plato called it, a γιγνόμενον.

[1] It would be a superficial objection to say that 'because it is worst' would be also an answer to our question. Good (no one has done more to insist on the point than Moore) means something definite and positive. So 'best' has a meaning, but 'worst' has none, any more than 'so crooked that nothing can be crookeder' has.

the solution of the supreme intellectual problem, the reconciliation of science with life.

These considerations suggest certain further reflexions on the limitations of logical pluralism. The whole theory has manifestly been thought out in the exclusive interest of pure mathematics and the application of mathematics in the natural sciences, and for that purpose it works admirably. But there is more in heaven and earth than these sciences take into account. Even within their limits it remains to be seen whether the theory as it stands will really do all that a philosophy of the sciences should. The fundamental difficulty is that it is a consequence of the theory that, as has already been said, the establishment of scientific laws by induction comes to be simply a problem in the theory of probabilities. But the theory of probabilities, taken by itself, seems to give us no ground whatever for attributing to the conclusion of an inductive generalization any finite probability, however small.[1] Science would thus seem to be impossible in principle unless some as yet undiscovered premiss for induction, which is not included in the theory of probabilities, can be unearthed; and it remains to be seen whether such a premiss, if discovered, is consistent with the rest of the theory. Again, the replacing of the individual existents of popular common sense and ordinary science by infinite series of momentary individuals seems an absolutely necessary consequence of the initial assumption of the theory, and, so far as the things of the external world as conceived by common sense, or the constituents of the physical order as conceived by the physicist, are concerned, there might be no difficulty about it.[2] But it is quite another question whether the substitution does not destroy the whole significance of the moral realm, the system of intelligent spirits. It is not merely that it creates a difficulty in psychology, though surely it does create such a difficulty. The immediate witness of consciousness to our identity as subjects of experience is a real fact which no logical theory about the constitution of the world has a right to ignore. It may be that 'the mind thinks not always,' that there are intervals in which each of us is wholly unconscious, though such evidence as we have does not seem favourable to the supposition; but, at least when we are conscious, every conscious act fills an actual interval and yet has its absolutely unitary character. A 'duration,' though a brief one, is necessary to think the simplest proposition, and much more to draw the easiest inference. Yet the thinking of the proposition or the making of the inference is a unitary act only intelligible as the act of a unitary intelligence. It is nonsensical to say that, when I think 'God is,' this thought, as a mental event, is really made up of an infinity of momentary 'mental states' of similar but numerically different minds, or that the 'I' which resolves on a given act and the 'I' which carries out the resolve are each an infinity of different 'I's' with a further infinity of still different 'I's' between them. Only the elementary blunder in analysis of resolving activity into mere succession can account for the promulgation of such a view. It is a still more serious matter that the doctrine is wholly incompatible with the fundamental prerequisites of ethics. This point is capable of being developed in great detail and from more than one side, but in principle it should be enough to say that the denial of permanent personality is fatal to the conception of personality as having moral worth. If we analyse any act upon which a moral judgment would normally be passed into an infinity of momentary phases, no moral predicate can be ascribed to any one of these stages. The moral judgment for approval or condemnation has no meaning if it be applied to any such single stage; to be significant, it must be passed on the whole act, considered as one, and as an expression in act of the inner will of a subject who is one and the same from its first inception in thought to its completion. Similarly the notion of duty loses all its meaning with the relegation of permanent selfhood to the realm of illusion. That an act is my duty in the present situation means that it is something not yet done, but which ought to be done and to be done by me. But if 'I' only exist at a mathematical *punctum temporis*, the proposition that I ought now to do a certain act has no longer an intelligible significance. A merely momentary 'I' can do nothing and can be nothing except just what it is; 'ought' is a category which has no application to it. It is no mere accident that Russell should have dropped significant hints in his latest writings of conversion to the view that moral judgments are only 'subjective,' mere expressions of fundamentally irrational moods. The real outcome of a logical pluralism, put forward as the ultimate truth about what is, is not even that standing dualism of what is and what ought to be of which Lotze complains; it is rather the pronouncement that categories of value (there can be no reason to confine the conclusion to specifically ethical values) are one and all devoid of any real application. For those who cannot accept this result, Kant's moral argument for theism seems to the present writer unanswerable. For it is only if the Good is also the supreme principle of all existence that it becomes possible to understand how what is and what ought to be can form one 'world,' and from the recognition of the Good as the Supreme Being theism follows directly. This seems to be illustrated by the present state of philosophical opinion in our own country. Throughout the thirty years or so, from the seventies of the last century onward, in which Hegelianism, interpreted with a marked Spinozistic bias, was the dominant philosophy in academic circles, there was a natural tendency to make it almost the test of a man's philosophical capacity that his attitude towards the problems raised by the religious life should be an emotional pantheism; atheism was in discredit as indicative (as indeed it is) of lack of interest in or understanding of the whole realm of personal values; theism as a supposed mark of want of logical thoroughness. In the present generation the issues seem to be clearing. Philosophers are certainly tending, though not without exception, to range themselves into two camps. Those to whom the business of philosophy seems to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in providing a logical basis and a methodology for exact science appear to be identifying themselves with the doctrine of logical pluralism and taking up a definitely atheistic attitude which involves the denial of the objectivity of judgments of value; those, on the other hand, who are convinced that the business of philosophy is to make life, as well as science, intelligible, and consequently find themselves obliged to maintain the validity of these categories of worth apart from which life would have no significance, are, in the main, declared theists.

18. Objections to theism.—It may be desirable to add some brief observations on certain types of objections which are often quite sincerely raised against a theistic interpretation of the world. In principle none of these difficulties are novel; most of them find their expression in Hume and may be traced back far behind Hume to the literature of

[1] See the acute discussion by C. D. Broad, in *Mind*, new ser., cviii. 389–404, and the criticisms of P. E. B. Jourdain, *Mind*, new ser., cx. 162–180. Jourdain's criticisms do not seem to the present writer to affect the soundness of Broad's contentions.

[2] But the philosophical interpreters of the 'Theory of Relativity' would have something to say on this point.

the ancient world. Popularly these objections are often called 'scientific,' though their only connexion with modern natural science is that its discoveries enable some of them to be stated in a more impressive way. For the most part they are all summed up in the antitheological assertion of Lucretius that the existing world is too bad to have been created or to be administered by a divine intelligence, 'tanta stat praedita culpa.' Thus it is urged that the suffering of the animal creation is too great, the cost of the 'struggle for existence' too painful, for us to ascribe a world like that we know to a benevolent Creator. Or, again, it is said that an almighty Creator might have made the human race, in particular, such that it would not be exposed as it is to suffering, to constant struggle with its environment, to the consequences of its own mistakes and wrongdoing. It is then inferred that, if there is a superhuman intelligence behind nature, that intelligence is either deficient in wisdom or wanting in goodness. Now, obviously, criticisms of this kind rest upon premisses which may be fairly called in question. One might reasonably doubt whether the pessimistic interpretation of the facts which sees misery predominant everywhere in animal and human life has any real warrant. To an unbiased observer an animal does not seem normally to give signs that it finds its existence miserable, and it is notable that suicide is not common among men, and, unless the stories of the scorpions which kill themselves when surrounded by fire are true, apparently as good as non-existent among the lower animals. The misuse of the metaphorical phrase which describes the process by which species are selected for survival as a 'struggle' is too glaring to need more than a word of comment. If competition plays a prominent part in the economy of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as it does in the economy of commerce, it no more follows that the life of every animal, or most animals (and? vegetables), is one of wretchedness than it follows that all or most business men are hopelessly miserable.[1] Still, of course, it may be said that there is, at any rate, some suffering in the world and that perfect goodness would have permitted none at all. Such an argument, however, tacitly assumes that perfect goodness can have only one end, a hedonistic one, and thus permits of the answer that whatever the end which perfect goodness conjoined with omnipotence would propose to itself—and we clearly are not in a position to say what that end would be—it is at least unreasonable to suppose that it can be the mere promotion of agreeable feeling, an end which even we ourselves regard as a low one. If we could know the purpose of creation, it might well be that we should see that it is entirely good and at the same time could not be attained without the presence of an element of hedonic evil in things. Similarly, with respect to the objection based on the view that it would be 'better' that human beings should have been placed in a world where there were no unfriendly or intractable environment to master, and should have been *ab initio* infallible and impeccable, it is obvious that it loses its force if we decline to assume (1) the hedonistic identification of good with pleasure, and (2) the proposition that the good of the human race must be the sole or at least the principal design of God. If God's aim in dealing with us is to educate us into noble character—a much worthier aim than that of making us comfortable—it may well be that such an end could not be obtained except by the discipline of struggle with our surroundings, with our own mistakes and our own misdeeds. Nor have we the right to assume that the human race must necessarily be the sole or even the chief object of the divine care; we do know, unless ethics is a delusion, that a human soul is a thing of absolute worth; that it is of higher worth than everything else which God has created is more than we can know. Indeed there is a rival objection which proceeds on the opposite assumption. We are asked to think of the enormous spaces revealed to us by astronomy and the number and bulk of the heavenly bodies, and then to reflect on the absurdity of supposing that the fate of the inhabitants of one petty planet can count for anything in the scheme of the universe. Yet it is clear that here, too, the antitheist is reasoning (if it can be called reasoning) upon a false assumption. He is assuming that we know that the absolute worth of a member of the universe is estimated by its bulk and duration. Man must be of little value in the scheme of things because his body is tiny and its lifetime short. Plainly we have no right to make serious objections to the theist's belief in God's care for man on such flimsy grounds. If we do not know that man is the thing of highest worth in the creation, neither do we know that he is not. The one thing which a theist can affirm is that the absolute worth of moral personality must be respected in a system which is the work of God. 'Justorum animae in manu Dei sunt'; that is all we can say, but surely it suffices. If the Good is the principle of actuality, that means that we can say that a thing has come to be because it was better that it should be than that it should not; it is where and when it is because this is better than that it should be otherwhere and otherwhen; that befalls it which does befall it because it is best that it should befall—*i.e.*, God is alike Creator, Providence, and Judge of His creatures. Of course, if we had no grounds at all for our theistic conviction, difficulties like those mentioned might forbid us to entertain it as a mere 'extra' belief. But, if it is true, as has been urged in this article, that speculation and practice alike point to the eternal nature of God as the object in which both find their completion, we have a double exigence of the practical and the speculative reason on the side of theism, and in the presence of such an exigence we are justified in applying Newman's remark that 'a thousand difficulties do not amount to one doubt.' One might add that there is a third exigence—the specifically religious. It would be perhaps a more serious objection to theism than any we have yet considered to urge that our whole procedure in looking for a First Cause is vitiated by one obvious fallacy. The world, it might be said, even if it has attained its present structure as the result of processes which are in the last resort reducible to mere redistributions of unintelligent primary constituents, directed by no mind and having no end, still must, of course, have a perfectly determinate structure, and, as we ourselves happen to be included in that structure, of course we inevitably discover adaptations in our environment to our special needs, and are led to fancy that such adaptations are evidence of the direction of the world by an intelligence, which aims at supplying our needs. But the real fact is simply that it is not the world that has been adapted to us, but we who have learned and are learning to adapt ourselves to the world. If we did not so adapt ourselves, we should not be here, and, if a time ever comes when our capacity for such 'adjustment' of our 'inner relations' to the 'outer relations' is exhausted, we shall cease to be here. If the actual course of events had been different, all the reactions which we now call good, because they further adaptation, might have hindered it, and those which now hinder it might

[1] And is it possible, in the present state of knowledge, to regard 'competition' as playing anything like the part Darwin assigned to it in determining the fate of 'varieties'?

have furthered it. If in such a state of things there had been reflecting beings at all, they, judging from their standpoint, would have called good all that we think evil, and evil all that we think good. They would have inferred benevolent divine activity from the existence of conditions which we should regard as indicating the control of nature by malignant 'diabolical' intelligences; and their inferences would have just as much foundation as ours. These considerations, it might be said, are a *reductio ad absurdum* not merely of all attempts to reason from 'Nature up to Nature's God,' but of the moral argument itself, since they show after all that standards of valuation are and must be in the end purely subjective. Since the human race exists, and so long as it continues to maintain itself, there must, of course, be no irresoluble discord between human estimates of value and the actual conditions of existence. But, as the illustration shows, we have no right whatever to argue from this simple and obvious fact to the dependence of existence on an absolute 'Good.' In fact, any of the races which have 'gone under' in the struggle for existence would be equally justified in asserting that existence depends on the absolute 'Evil.' Here, as it seems to the present writer, we are confronted by the real ultimate difficulty for theism. If there is, after all, no realm of absolute values, a line of thought which is throughout determined by the conviction that the realm of facts and the realm of values cannot be separated must manifestly be futile. It is just the recurrent fear that the 'realm of values' may turn out to be a fiction of our imagination that is, in speculation, the last enemy to be overcome. How is it to be met? The answer, it may be suggested, is the old one, given in the memorable utterance of Pascal: 'Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne me possédais. Ne t'inquiète donc pas.'[1] The sentences may be applied to ultimate doubt about the reality of every kind of human value. Is a man tempted to doubt whether there really is any absolute and certain truth, whether all our 'truths' may not be mere 'human' or even 'personal' points of view, *βροτῶν δόξαι αἷς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής*? Let him bethink himself that it is only because he is not unacquainted with truths that he can frame the notion of the absolutely true, and only because he has framed the notion that he can raise his doubt. So it is only because we are all along secretly aware that there are things which we ought unconditionally to do that the question whether any given accepted obligation is really unconditional can so much as be put. If we knew no beauty, we could not even ask ourselves whether our judgments about beauty rest on illusion. In like manner it is only because the absolutely Good and utterly Adorable has not left Himself without a witness in our hearts that we feel the need of an object to worship and are driven on from the worship of trees, or streams, or animals, or mighty men, or anthropomorphic deities, towards an object in which our adoration can at last find rest because that on which it is directed is adequate to sustain it. Prayer and adoration need no more justification than the questioning attitude towards things which leads to science, or the impulse to make things of beauty which leads to art, or the desire to do right which leads to morality. It is not for nothing that man, as the Greeks said, is the only animal who has a god. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we may fairly say that the Stoic appeal to the *consensus gentium*, though no formal demonstration, still contains a thought which goes to the very root of things. There are, of course, individual men who do not feel the impulse to seek for Him whom they may worship with a *rationabile obsequium*, as there are men with no sense of humour, or men to whom music means nothing, or men who cannot be made to see that the difference between right and wrong is anything more than the difference between what society will allow them to do and what it will not let them do without making them uncomfortable. The existence of such individuals is about as important in any one of these cases as in any other. Nor does the number of such men without a religion seem to be on the increase. In our own day the only effect of persuading men that the Most High is a dream appears to be that they transfer their worship to the demonstrably not most high; we get such quaint aberrations as the Comtist worship of 'humanity,' or the elevation of Marxian Socialism into a faith. The one real question is not what certain individuals are unable to feel the necessity of searching for, but what those who do seek find, *sed quid invenientibus?* The lives of the 'saints' are the real answer of theism to the last insistent perplexities of the doubter who lurks in each of us. Others, without the theist's faith, have often led noble lives; they have fought a good fight with the untowardness of a world which they have believed in their hearts to be stupid or malignant; yet the most clear-sighted among them, like Huxley, have confessed that mortal heroism is a losing game, a battle with the cosmic forces. Such heroes, after all, do but apply to the universe the saying of the Emperor Marcus about base men: 'The finest revenge is not to become like them'; they have revenged themselves on the world. What they lack—and one does not see how the lack is to be made good—is the secret of spiritual joy which belongs to those who are assured that it is the Good which is supreme in heaven and in earth. It would be tempting to develop this argument farther, from a slightly different point of view—that of love. To love, no less than to worship, it may be said, is an ultimate human need. At least, if a man does not feel the imperativeness of the need, we should probably say there was something 'inhuman' about him. And love too, like worship, seeks its adequate object — that which, without any yielding to illusion, a man can love with all his heart and mind and strength. Love, with no limitations, if it is clear-sighted, for us at least must be an *amor ascendens*, and, as it has its source in good (for real love is always for what is good, not for what is evil, in its object), so, unless it can at last rest in the supreme Good, which is good altogether, it must remain unsatisfied. But we cannot here pursue the point farther. Only one thing more will be said in conclusion, and that for the believer in 'science' who scruples at admitting the reality of the Good. Why do we believe in science at all? Why do we, as we must if we have this belief, refuse to entertain the possibility that the 'progress of science' is only bringing us nearer to a point at which the whole construction would be found to culminate in manifest and hopeless contradictions? As a mere logical possibility there seems to be nothing absurd about the suggestion. If we dismiss it, as we do, it is because we believe that knowledge is good, and because in our hearts, whatever we may say with our lips, we believe that the Good is real. Therefore, little as we know of the facts of the world, we work on in confidence that, however drastically the discovery of new facts may compel us to modify our statements of truth and to supersede as provisional results we once thought established for ever, no new fact of the infinity which might be discovered in an endless 'progress' will ever show that 'science' has been a secular nightmare of the race.

[1] *Pensées*, vii. 555 (ed. Brunschvicg, Paris, 1905).

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A. E. TAYLOR.

THEOCRACY.—The term 'theocracy' was coined by Josephus,[1] upon the analogy of 'aristocracy' and 'democracy,' to denote a certain kind of national polity. Any tribe or state that claims to be governed by a god or gods may be called a 'theocracy.' History has many different types; *e.g.*, the theocratic idea underlies Brāhmanism, Islām, the papacy, and the theory of 'kingship by divine right.' Yet there is probably no historical instance of a 'pure' theocracy. Just as the British constitution to-day, while predominantly democratic, has monarchic elements, so of old time the Hebrew commonwealth, for example, while predominantly theocratic, had democratic elements. Different polities are distinguishable historically, not because a single principle exhausts them, but because some one principle is dominant within them. The idea of government by God was the dominant one in Israelite polity. In this way it was unique, as Josephus claimed, among the polities of his time. It is the leading instance of theocracy for all times. It is the only one discussed here.

Theocracy came to Israel by survival. The earliest form of human society, so far as anthropology has yet discovered, was the clan or kindred-group. This appears to have been world-wide. In religion it was 'henotheistic,' a particular god belonging to a particular clan. He was part of it, as much a part as any human member. His relation to it was too many-sided to be summed up in any one word. In some ways a tribe's god was like a father, in some like a captain, in some like a king, and so on. But, as monarchy developed among the Semitic races, the relation of the god to the tribe came to be chiefly like that of a king. So, among them as well as elsewhere, there arose the early 'henotheistic' type of theocracy. Its best-known examples are Biblical: Chemosh ruled Moab, Milcom ruled Ammon, Jahweh ruled Israel, and so on. Sooner or later, however, this kind of theocracy perished in every settled land except one. The gods of such tribes as Edom and Moab passed away, with the tribal independence, before the attack of Assyria, or Babylon, or Persia. In other lands polytheism supervened on henotheism. There the gods slowly became rather an appendage of the state than its rulers. But in Israel the idea of the sole rule of a single God survived all the vicissitudes of history. It survived by development. Its history is the history of the way in which Hebrew thought about Jahweh's rule evolved to meet the varying challenge of national need. To set this out fully would be to write the whole story of Israel. Here a narrower question is in place: the idea of government by Jahweh being constant in Israel, how did the idea of its *method* evolve?

The study of the method of any kind of polity turns largely on the nature of its organs, for almost all civilized governments rule through organs. This is peculiarly so with theocracies, since it is only in legend that gods speak directly to their peoples. Josephus himself, in the very passage where he coins the word 'theocracy,' speaks, not of Jahweh, but of Moses, as 'our law-giver.' In Israel, as elsewhere, the organs of theocratic government were long associated with sacred shrines. Horeb, Shiloh, and Bethel are instances.[1] The shrine, so to speak, gave the organ authenticity. When doubt or dispute arose about Jahweh's Law, appeal would be made to the guardians of some great shrine.[2] These came to form a priestly class. At the great shrines, too, there soon began to be books of Jahweh's *tōrōth*;[3] here as well there were the few men who could write and read books. Traditionally, at least, the original Law had been given, and its first edicts written, at the shrine of Horeb or Sinai.[4] In later times, no doubt, when a Hebrew visited a shrine to learn Jahweh's will, its authorized exponent, the priest, would not only read the appropriate law, but explain it. Sometimes, again, he would need to extend an old principle to meet a new 'case.' So, little by little, the 'Law of Jahweh' would insensibly grow. For early Israel three things were indissoluble—Jahweh's shrine, Jahweh's book, Jahweh's priest. The three together formed the normal organ of theocracy.

The history of pre-monarchic Israel, however, has traces of two other theocratic organs—the so-called 'judge' and the 'prophet.' Of these a distinctive phrase is used: 'the spirit of the Lord came upon' so-and-so.[5] The phrase has variants,[6] but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy.[7] There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot.[8] If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. There was perhaps a similar connexion at first between the shrine and 'prophesying.'[9] Before the days of Samuel the

[1] *C. Apion.* ii. 16.

[1] The 'Ark of God' was originally a kind of movable shrine.
[2] Cf. Ex 21[6] and parallels; 1 S 2[25] 7[15ff.].
[3] Cf. Jos 24[26], Dt 31[9. 24ff.], 1 S 10[26]. [4] Ex 34[4. 12].
[5] *E.g.*, Jg 11[29], Nu 24[2], 1 S 10[10]. [6] Cf. esp. Jg 6[34].
[7] It is possible that historical study will at length speak of three organs here instead of two, distinguishing the 'judge' from the warrior-'saviour.' For it has been implied above that to judge, in the ordinary sense of the word (cf. 1 S 8[1-5]), was a function of the priest in Israel; and this was not confined to priests (*e.g.*, Jg 4[4ff.], 1 S 4[18] 7[6]). Such 'judges' were thought of as organs of the 'spirit of Jahweh' (cf. Nu 11[17ff.]). One who had 'saved Israel' (cf. Jg 3[31] 6[14] etc.) was also such an organ. Not infrequently a 'saviour' became a judge as well, and later Hebrew writers, used to the constant union of the captain and the judge in the king, treated it as constant in the leaders of early times too (*e.g.*, Jg 2[16 D] 3[9f. D]). Yet there seem to have been judges who were neither priests nor 'saviours' (Jg 10[3] 12[8-15]; cf. 1 S 7[16f.] 8[1]). To 'save Israel,' to judge, to serve at a shrine, were distinct theocratic functions, though two of them might unite in a single man.
[8] Jg 4[5] 8[27], 1 S 2[25] 7[15ff.]. [9] Cf. 1 S 8[20f.] 9[19].

Hebrew 'prophet' was probably hardly more than the wandering saint of other Eastern faiths[1]—a man who lived a separate and so a 'holy' life. In all lands these have frequented shrines, for, even where they have no 'official' connexion with the ritual, temples offer the best opportunities for the alms by which they live. The first band of 'prophets' named in the Hebrew records appears as 'coming down from the high place.'[2] Primitive thought does not readily isolate the different organs of a god's activity.

Scholars differ about the degree in which the religion of pre-monarchic Israel surpassed other tribal faiths, but all allow that within the period of the monarchy Hebraism became unique. In that period all the theocratic organs named above persisted, but in persisting changed. Every other Hebrew shrine was eclipsed by the Temple in Jerusalem, and at length disappeared. So, too, the Temple became at last the depository of the one recognized book of Jahweh's Law.[3] In Jerusalem, again, the priesthood of Israel ultimately concentrated. At crises in the history of the Southern Kingdom the high-priest sometimes played a decisive part,[4] and there is evidence that the Temple had a succession of priest-preachers who surpassed all contemporary priesthoods in the loftiness of their teaching and the purity of their lives.[5] Their permanent memorial is the book of Deuteronomy. It was only at the close of the monarchy that they became utterly corrupt—a fate that also befell the 'sons of the prophets'—and even then Jahweh's great witness, Jeremiah, was born a priest. Of the three other theocratic functions found in the times before the kings, two—leadership in war and judgment in peace—which had previously often united in a single person[6] now permanently blent in the king. While, of course, there were inferior captains and subordinate judges, he was both supreme captain and supreme judge. And he was effectively both. A king, unlike the earlier 'saviour,' held permanent office, and, unlike the earlier judge, had power to enforce his decisions. And he was king by the will of God. He was Jahweh's 'son,' as having His mind and acting under His guidance.[7] He was 'the Lord's anointed.' At times even a wicked king fell back upon Jahweh's help at the pinch of his people's need.[8] It is true that one king after another 'did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord,' and so repudiated the righteous God of Israel, but the ideal of a king who, like David, did the will of Jahweh remained a part of the hope of Israel. Ideally the Hebrew monarchy was theocratic.

The chief glory of monarchic Israel, however, was its prophets. They were different indeed from all other 'prophets'! With them the connexion of theocracy with shrines, maintained by the kings,[9] began to loosen. At times, again, the prophet must perforce denounce the priest. Yet the prophets, more than any else, were the true organs of theocracy. 'Thus saith the Lord' was their watchword. They spoke under the impulse of the Spirit. In a sense they kept God alive. It is true that, from the time of Elijah, Israel began to refuse their guidance, that at last the Northern Kingdom rejected it altogether, and that even in Judah they became the leaders only of a 'remnant.' But it was just this 'remnant' that meant so much for the future of the world. Israel is unique among theocracies because of its prophets.

The Exile was a signal proof of their greatness, for no other ancient people survived exile. 'To be carried captive' destroyed, as it was meant to destroy, nations and their gods together. Even in exile, however, Israel believed in the rule of its God. Of this creed the unknown prophet now called 'Deutero-Isaiah' was preacher *par excellence*. The Hebrew of the Return re-crossed the desert under the definite conviction that his God was leading him, as He had led Abraham.[1] In consequence a decisive change in the Hebrew idea of theocracy became complete. From Isaiah onwards the primitive notion that there were as many gods as there were nations had been gradually making way for the belief that there was but one God, and He the master of all nations. Only so could Jahweh save Jerusalem from Sennacherib, or redeem Judah from Babylon. Monotheism now entirely supplanted henotheism. While Israel was still Jahweh's 'peculiar treasure,' His theocracy was no longer limited to Canaan, but swayed the world.

Yet the immediate sequel was disappointing. 'Judaism'—to use the name appropriate after the Return—set out to be a pure theocracy. It rebuilt the old shrine; it gathered the ancient books; at length it made the ancient priesthood paramount. Yet it gradually became a splendid failure. The line of prophets dwindled away. The Jews looked in vain for kings like David. At last no priest dared, in the Lord's name, to add to His Law. And it seemed clear, besides, that the Lord did not rule the world. Theocracies tend to become hierarchies, and hierarchies tend to stagnate. Israel was now a hierarchy, and it looked as though Jahweh would sink to the level of the gods who had done great things in the past, but who did nothing in the present. The Jewish theocracy threatened to 'fossilize.'

Yet it escaped this fate. As the Psalms of the period show, there were always Jews who practised the creed that their God was still alive, and they knew that His time would come. The book of Daniel bears the same witness in a different way. It is the first apocalypse, and all apocalypses are theocratic. So, again, in its own way, is the book of Esther. The distinctive note of this epoch is not really its consummated ritual or its completed law, but its unextinguished hope. Israel believed that the future, as the past, was its God's and its own. There would be a perfect theocracy yet! The Kingdom of God would come!

There were two leading opinions about the way of its coming, readily separable in thought, though not always separated in fact. The one opinion found its aptest expression in the apocalypses. Broadly speaking, these expected a kingdom based on force, in which the Jew would rule all other nations—a kingdom won and maintained by a superhuman organ of God. This opinion laid hold of the external form of the old theocracy, kingship. It had an element of truth in it, for the NT has an apocalypse. In the interval before the perfect kingdom comes Christ does 'over-rule' all things and men, and this is a theocratic idea. Yet the other opinion is final for Christianity. Its earlier exponents were some of the later Psalmists; it lived in the quiet circles that 'waited for the consolation of Israel'; its perfect preacher was Jesus. He accepted the phrase 'the Kingdom of God,' and so looked for a theocracy, but He gave the phrase His own exposition and laid down the true method of the Kingdom's coming. It has been seen above that from the first a man who was the organ of

[1] *E.g.*, 1 S 10. [2] 1 S 10[5].
[3] 2 K 22[8] ('the' book). [4] 2 K 11, 22.
[5] Cf. G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1908, ii. 111 f.
[6] See footnote 7 on p. 287.
[7] Cf. 2 S 7[14]. The idea of a Divine monarch with an earthly vicegerent was quite common in the Semitic world (W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, lect. ii.).
[8] *E.g.*, 1 K 20[13]. [9] 2 S 6, 1 K 12[26ff.].

[1] Cf. Ezr 8[22].

Jahweh was thought of as 'filled with' His Spirit. This was why and how he knew God's will. More than once it had been discerned, even by OT thinkers, that a perfect theocracy, therefore, could come only if all its citizens, and not a few only, had the Spirit of Jahweh.[1] This idea is really central in Jesus' teaching, though He was able to teach it only as men were able to bear it. With the Acts of the Apostles it became explicitly the master principle of Christianity. At the same time there began the evolution of the Christian doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost. There can be a perfect theocracy only when every man acts always under the guidance of the Spirit of God. Here is the culmination of Biblical theocratic doctrine. Yet here also is its euthanasia. For this kind of 'theocracy' does not satisfy the definition given above. It is not a 'theory of national polity.' The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is naturally individual, and as naturally universal, but it is not naturally national.[2] Again, the term 'polity' implies government and its coercions, and one of the marks of the Spirit's sway just is that it is incoercive. Yet the husk of Israel's theocratic idea held a kernel of 'eternal' value. The last human society will be a Kingdom of God.

LITERATURE.—For Josephus's use of the term 'theocracy' see *HDB*, *s.v.*, vol. v. [1904] p. 337 (V. H. Stanton); for the facts about the general Semitic notion of theocracy see W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, London, 1894, lect. ii., and *The Prophets of Israel*, do. 1897, lect. ii.; for the development of the idea in Israel and in the apocalyptic literature see the standard authorities on the religion of Israel, the theology of the OT, and the extra-canonical Jewish books; the corresponding authorities on the NT discuss the relation of the idea of the Kingdom of God to the earlier theocratic doctrine. Separate treatment of the subject is unusual.

C. RYDER SMITH.

THEODICY.—1. The term.—Theodicy (Germ. *Theodizee*, adapted from Fr. *théodicée*, which is compounded of Gr. *θεός*, 'God' + *δίκη*, 'justice') means literally the (or a) justification or vindication of God. Leibniz appears to have been the first to use the word in its distinctive sense. In a letter written in 1697 he spoke of employing it as the title of an intended work,[3] and in 1710 the work duly appeared. The complete title was, 'Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal.' Since Leibniz's time the word 'theodicy' has been in common use.

2. The concept.—In modern usage the scope of the term is vague and ill-defined. Sometimes it is employed, as by P. Janet and G. Séailles,[4] as equivalent to natural theology or philosophy of religion. For those writers theodicy comprises the general problem of religion, though it is also understood by them in a more particular sense, as comprising only the central problems of the nature of God and the relation of God to the world. In either of these senses it may escape the charge of being a theory put forward 'to save the situation.'[5] But in the usual sense it does not so readily escape such a charge. For as a rule the use of the term is more in keeping with its literal meaning, and theodicy is understood as the (or a) vindication of the divine providence or government in view of the existence of evil. The 'theodicean' assumes the validity of the theistic conception of God as powerful, wise, and good, and on this basis seeks to defend the divine administration: he would

'assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.'[1]

3. Origin of the concept.—The need of such a defence and vindication is not felt in primitive religion under polydæmonism, with its animistic or spiritistic view of nature, because under polydæmonism the world is subject to a multitude of spirits both good and evil, who limit each other and are themselves limited by the natural order. Nor is the need felt even at the polytheistic stage of religious belief, with its multitude or hierarchy of gods as distinguished from spirits or godlings, because at this stage thought, if no longer naive and instinctive, is still uncritical, and the gods are conceived as being subject to fate or necessity or as governing a world already given and never properly under their control. At the monotheistic stage of religion, however, where thought is become critical and reflective, the problem of theodicy arises and calls for a solution. Sometimes, as in Persian religion, a dualism in the divine nature is postulated, and the world represented as the scene of a grand conflict between the principles of good and evil, in which good is destined to final triumph; and obviously a dualistic philosophy of religion, if it could be otherwise satisfying, would ease the problem. Under a monistic philosophy of religion, again, the tendency is actually to get rid of the problem, by minimizing evil or even by reducing evil to illusion. This tendency is observable in the cosmic and acosmic pantheisms of Stoicism and Brāhmanism respectively. Only in a philosophy of religion in which God is recognized as wholly good, and evil as truly evil, is the problem of theodicy felt in all its insistence. *Si deus bonus, unde malum?* Christianity, theistically interpreted, supplies such a philosophy, and in the course of Christian history the problem of theodicy received distinctive treatment in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall. Whatever may be said as to the form of that doctrine, it stands for a principle which should be acknowledged in theistic interpretations of the world, namely the principle of human freedom and responsibility. It is not without significance that the classical theodicy or theistic apologia of Leibniz bears in its title not only 'the goodness of God' and 'the origin of evil,' but also 'the freedom of man.'

4. Leibniz's Théodicée.[2]—(*a*) In the problems of theodicy Leibniz had been interested since his boyhood, and he claims to have given more attention to them than most.[3] There are many references to them, certainly, in his correspondence during the last decades of the 17th cent. with Pellisson, Bossuet, and others; and the *Essais* itself also bears ample witness to his long-continued interest in them. It should be remarked, however, that the *Essais* is not, properly speaking, a systematic presentation of the questions involved in theodicy. It is, in Leibniz's own word, a 'tissu'[4] of what he had said and written in the course of the theological and philosophical discussions, centred in Pierre Bayle's works and especially his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, which he carried on with Sophia Charlotte, queen of Prussia. From a letter of Leibniz's written to Sir Thomas Burnett in 1710 it appears that the *Essais* was compiled at the request of his friends and as a memorial to the deceased queen.[5] The book was extraordinarily popular, and apparently the author finds satisfaction in recording that it was welcomed

1 *E.g.*, Nu 11[29], Jer 31[34], Jl 2[28].
2 Except in the sense that every true nation, being an organic part of mankind and set to minister to the whole, is meant to be 'filled with the Spirit' for this office.
3 Cf. J. T. Merz, *Leibniz*, Edinburgh, 1884, p. 101.
4 *A Hist. of the Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1902, vol. ii. pt. iv.
5 Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 380 A; and A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 400.

1 Milton, *Paradise Lost*, bk. i. l. 25 f.
2 See also art. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.
3 *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875–90, vi. 43.
4 *Ib.* vi. 11.
5 *Ib.* p. 10. Sophia Charlotte died in 1705; a common but erroneous impression is that the *Théodicée* was compiled during her lifetime.

by Catholics as well as Lutherans and Evangelicals.[1] No doubt the *Essais* served its purpose well in an age of theological rationalism, and helped to stem the tide of scepticism which was now beginning to threaten the foundations of religion itself.[2] But Leibniz's theistic apologia does not commend itself so readily in our time.

(*b*) It will be sufficient for the purposes of this article to indicate a few salient points in Leibniz's theodicy, for the sake of illustrating the difference between the older and the newer theism in apologetic method and outlook.

(1) *God.*—Unlike most recent exponents of a theistic philosophy of religion, Leibniz was of the belief that the being or existence of God could be demonstrated by purely logical or rational processes. Though he recognized, he did not make much use of, the ontological proof, and the proof, so peculiarly his own, from the 'pre-established harmony' is bound up very closely with his monadology; but the cosmological or ætiological proof and the proof from the eternal truths are both characteristic of his theology or religious philosophy and independent of his ontological scheme. In accordance with the principle of the cosmological or ætiological proof, Leibniz starts from the world of finite existents as contingent and infers an Existent which is not contingent but metaphysically necessary. There must be a sufficient reason or cause, he says, for the existence of the whole collection of contingent things which composes the world, and it is to be found in the Substance which carries with it the reason or cause of its own existence, and which is consequently necessary and eternal; and that Substance can only be God.[3] It may be objected to this argument that it is logically fallacious, as containing more in the conclusion than is contained in the premiss: as the premiss is contingent, so must also be the conclusion.[4] As for the proof from the eternal truths—*i.e.* truths which involve no reference to time or to the world of existents in time—it is largely dependent upon Leibniz's notion of possibility. For Leibniz, as not for Spinoza, the possible was wider than the actual, essence than existence; and he argues that, if the eternal or metaphysically necessary truths are real, and founded on something existent, that existent something must be the metaphysically necessary Being of God, in whom essence involves existence, and to be possible is to be actual. Without God not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible.[5] Against this proof, as handled by Leibniz, it may be urged that it is inconsistent in one who regards the possible as wider than the actual, the essential than the existent, to regard truth as dependent upon existence; and that in any case we cannot on the premisses reach a necessary Being separate from the existent and actual world. In all such arguments indeed, as B. Russell points out, there is difficulty in avoiding Spinozism.[6]

(2) *The world.*—In presenting what may be named his teleological optimism Leibniz still moves on the high plane of metaphysical notions and *a priori* verbal proof, nor condescends to the lower empirical world, to which Bayle would bring him down. Founding upon the principle of sufficient reason and the idea of divine perfection, he holds that this is the best of all possible worlds; for, were a better world than this world possible, God would have chosen it. God is absolutely powerful, wise, and good; and His goodness moved Him to create and produce all possible good, His wisdom led Him by a moral necessity to the choice of the best, His power enabled Him to execute His great design.[7] It is curious to reflect that the Leibnizian optimism may be associated with the most diverse ethical valuations of life, optimistic, pessimistic, melioristic; which gives point to Schopenhauer's objection that, even if this is the best possible world, it does not prove that it is a world good enough to have been actualized.[8] An objection, this, on philosophical grounds, thus meeting Leibniz on his own plane, but it is on empirical grounds that the Leibnizian optimism has been most frequently challenged, from Voltaire's *Candide* down to the present. Nor could Leibniz himself ignore the empirical aspect of the problem of theodicy.

(3) *Evil.*—Accordingly—apart from his metaphysical theory of evil as necessary limitation appertaining to finite existence and the source of both moral and physical evil—we find him emphasizing the instrumental theory, according to which evil, especially physical evil, is to be interpreted as an instrument or means of good. In advocating this theory he sought to counter Bayle's contention that the strength of Manichæism was due to its conformity with an empirical rather than *a priori* conception of the world. Even from the empirical standpoint, Leibniz would reply, physical evil may be reasonably accounted for by the theory of instrumental value; and, as for moral evil, it could not be prevented by God without the subversion of the freedom of self-determination which belongs to spiritual beings and makes morality possible. By other empirical arguments also Leibniz supports his doctrine of optimism, but enough has been said to show that, while his theodicy is forced to recognize the standpoint of experience, it rests primarily—like his theistic proofs—on metaphysical considerations.

(*c*) The difference between Leibniz's theodicy and the modern attitude in theodicy may now be briefly stated. Leibniz approached the problem of evil with a God whose existence had already been proved, as also His character of absolute perfection in power, wisdom, and goodness; and it was therefore an altogether reasonable presupposition on Leibniz's part that this world as being the creation of such a God was the best possible. No matter what exception might be taken to the case as presented, the case itself was excellent. But nowadays, with the spirit of pessimism abroad in society, and the spirit too—not unakin—of anti-religious agnosticism, the problem of evil has become more acute, and one has learned to sympathize with W. James and others in their impatience with Leibniz's optimism and the complacency of his attitude towards, *e.g.*, a dogma like eternal punishment. The 'charmingly written *Théodicée*' is even described by W. James as a piece of 'superficiality incarnate'; as a 'cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm.'[1] Such strictures are too severe, but let them be a reminder of the difference in spirit between the old and the new approach to the problem of evil. It would be quite untrue to say of modern exponents of theism that they compose theodicies 'with their heads buried in monstrous wigs.'[2] The modern theist is conscious of the failure of rationalistic or purely speculative theology to establish its claims, and of the necessity of fundamentally empirical methods in theology if scientific results are to be gained, and he therefore examines the world of experience in face of evil as an empirical problem, with the view of testing the reasonableness of the theistic faith in God as just, holy, and loving. And he is led to recognize that the observed facts of nature and history do not afford an unexceptionable argument for the goodness of God, and that after all the most solid ground of belief in the divine goodness lies in the needs and claims of the religious consciousness.[3] No doubt there would be a *circulus in arguendo* involved here if such considerations were put forward as a solution of the problem of evil.[4] On the one hand, it is by the faith of religion that God is affirmed to be perfectly good, despite the evil to be found in the world of His creation and governance. On the other hand, religious faith is based on the power of religion as a solvent, or at least a partial solvent, of the problem of evil: in religion men seek refuge from the various evils that assail, from without and from within—which shows that a non-rationalistic theism could not offer a real solution of the problem of evil. Nor does it profess to do so.

5. **Theodicy and philosophical reflexion.**—It is not necessary that this article should enter into a comprehensive discussion of the problem of theodicy from the side of philosophical explanation. This will be found in the art. GOOD AND EVIL, where it is affirmed with most students of the subject that 'every proposed solution either

[1] *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, p. 12, note.
[2] Cf. R. Flint, *Agnosticism* (*Croall Lecture*), Edinburgh, 1903, p. 115.
[3] *Théodicée*, 7 (Gerhardt, vi. 106 f.).
[4] Cf. B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 175.
[5] *Théodicée*, 184 (Gerhardt, vi. 226 f.); cf. also *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ix. 45 (Gerhardt, vi. 614).
[6] *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 181, 186.
[7] *Théodicée*, 8 (Gerhardt, vi. 107), 116 (Gerhardt, vi. 167), 228 (Gerhardt, vi. 253 f.).
[8] Cf. H. Höffding, *A Hist. of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1900, i. 364

[1] *Pragmatism*, New York and London, pp. 23, 27.
[2] *The Will to Believe*, New York and London, p. 43.
[3] Cf., *e.g.*, G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 440
[4] Cf. G. T. Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 147.

leaves the old question'—*si deus bonus, unde malum?*—'unanswered or raises new ones.' None the less we should like to express our sympathy with a type of solution—partial as it must be—which is on the lines of Leibniz's theology, but which goes beyond Leibniz in its recognition of human freedom as real, in the sense of implying self-limitation on God's part. Self-limitation does not mean finitude, nor freedom unqualified indeterminism. Such a solution is not only consistent with the moral and religious consciousness, but alleviates also the burden of the mystery of evil; and it lends itself to attractive exposition in the speculative sphere, as in the humanistic or personalistic idealisms which arouse so much interest at present. Yet it still leaves God, as indeed must every theodicy, ultimately responsible for both physical and moral evil. At the same time the recognition of the instrumental worth of evil somewhat relieves the weight of the divine responsibility. Take it first in connexion with the problem of physical evil. Pain and suffering are no doubt largely retributive and to be accounted for as the wages of individual and racial sin. But retribution is not an end in itself, and the positive rather than the negative purpose of physical evil is being more and more emphasized. Through pain, hardship, and loss moral energy may be stimulated and character moulded and shaped to finer issues. In this aspect of it suffering may be twice blessed, blessing those who suffer and those brought into contact with them. Take it also in connexion with the problem of moral evil. Here again the instrumental theory applies, and evil may be regarded as for education and discipline. In fact many theists regard moral evil or sin as having been always under the divine control, and interpret it as necessary like physical evil to human development. It is the discord without which there could be no harmony, the shade without which there could be no light. Through sin man learns his weakness, and his need of strength from on high. Through sin, and its direful effects in society, he learns the meaning of brotherly service and the measure of the sacrificial love of God.[1] Christianity looks for the time when man's moral education shall be brought to completion, and his suffering and sin have served their purpose. Yet, when all is said, the problem of evil remains.

6. Theodicy and the religious consciousness.—The discussion of the problem of evil on empirical grounds, and in particular of the instrumental theory of value, leads us to a consideration of the religious solution. There is a philosophical theodicy, and there is a religious theodicy. In the first, evil is explained—or an attempt is made to explain it—in the light of the divine goodness; in the second, evil is not explained, nor is there any attempt to explain it—it is simply to be overcome. As Eucken has remarked, 'religion does not so much explain as presuppose evil';[2] and, as P. T. Forsyth so well insists, a religious theodicy is not 'an answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle.'[3] In a religious theodicy it is not man who justifies God's ways, but God who justifies His own ways, and that not by accounting for the world's evil, but by saving men from it. While this is said, religion can no more than philosophy escape the problem of evil. For the individual believer in God and His goodness the problem receives a practical solution through the victory of his faith: he estimates life no more by hedonistic standards, but discovers the Supreme Good in moral and spiritual union with God. From the universal point of view the religious solution of the problem may be stated broadly in terms of the teleological idea. The end or purpose revealed in the universe is the creation of free ethical personalities capable of personal intercourse with God and of reflecting as in a flawless mirror the divine image and likeness.[1] To that purpose the presence of evil is subservient, and there are traces of it even in animate nature, which we have too often regarded as merely a field of struggle and carnage.

'There is a legitimate scientific sense,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'in which it may be said that Man is part of the system of Nature and the crown of its evolution; and it is assuredly of some significance that he can find in Animate Nature far-reaching correspondences to his ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.'[2]

We might therefore be content to state our theodicy in the following terms, which give due regard to the fact—made clear in modern science—that our world is still in the making, and which also illustrate the newer empirical as distinguished from the older rationalistic way of approach to the problem of evil, as well as the pragmatic tendency in modern theology and religious philosophy:

'While this world is far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless in view of its general constitution it may be regarded as the best possible *kind* of world in which to have man begin his development, and . . . the evils which exist in the world furnish no good reason for abandoning belief in a God who is both good enough and great enough to meet every real religious need.'[3]

LITERATURE.—References to the problems of theodicy may be found in works on the history and philosophy of religion, dogmatic theology, and general philosophy. See in particular the literature mentioned in the artt. GOOD AND EVIL, PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM. Useful discussions will also be found in the following works, selected chiefly from recent philosophical and theological literature: O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*[2], Eng. tr., 4 vols., London, 1886–88, esp. iv. 1–45; G. T. Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1906; G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914; J. Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., do. 1877, 1885; H. Siebeck, *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, Freiburg i. B., 1893; J. Kremer, *Das Problem der Theodizee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1909; O. Lempp, *Das Problem der Theodizee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1910; J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1889; J. R. Illingworth, in *Lux Mundi*[15], London, 1904; C. F. D'Arcy, *God and Freedom in Human Experience*, do. 1915; B. H. Streeter and others, in *God and the Struggle for Existence*, do. 1919; J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, 2 vols., do. 1920; D. S. Cairns, *The Reasonableness of the Christian Faith*, do. 1918; A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God (Gifford Lectures)*, Oxford, 1917; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1918; C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, London, 1918; J. Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1899; H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, London, 1917; W. S. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, do. 1919; D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, do. 1919; P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God*, do. 1916; R. Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, Eng. tr., do. 1911.

WILLIAM FULTON.

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA.—See ADOPTIANISM, ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY.

THEOGNIS.—Theognis is the name attached to a collection of some 1389 erotic, convivial, reflective, and hortatory elegiac verses whose chief interest for this article is that they are the fullest extant repertory of Greek ethical commonplace in the half-century preceding Plato and the tragedians. The collection begins with invocations to Apollo, Artemis, and the Muses, and a dedication to a young friend Cyrnus, to whom many of the quatrains and couplets are addressed, and whose name may be meant by the seal that perhaps marks their genuineness.[4] But many verses lack this certification. Some are addressed to other

[1] Cf. W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 209.
[2] *The Truth of Religion*, p. 500.
[3] P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God*, p. 220.

[1] It is here that, in a more extended treatment, the 'theodicean' aspect of the doctrine of immortality might be considered.
[2] *The System of Animate Nature*, lect. xx. f.
[3] D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, London, 1919, p. 217.
[4] Line 19.

friends, including a Simonides who may be the poet.[1] After the first 100 lines there is little sequence or coherence of ideas. There are many repetitions, and some of the verses occur in the fragments of Solon, Phocylides, Tyrtæus, and Mimnermus. These considerations, and the fact that quotations in Plato[2] and in a passage attributed by Stobæus[3] to Xenophon are susceptible of various interpretations, raise many problems about the composition of the poem, if it is in any sense a unity, and have given rise to an extensive German literature of hypothesis most conveniently surveyed in E. Harrison's *Studies in Theognis*.[4] Harrison argues plausibly, if not always quite convincingly, that the poems as they stand form a connected sequence. His book concludes with an excellent chapter on the life and times of Theognis. He was a noble of Nisæan Megara, who apparently at one time was also a citizen of Hyblæan Megara in Sicily. He spoke of the terror of the Medes,[5] and is therefore conjectured to have lived to see the invasion of Xerxes. He lived in a time of social and political revolution at Megara, vaguely known to us from three references in Aristotle's *Politics*[6] and from one passage in Plutarch.[7] His temper was embittered by the temporary triumph of the popular party,[8] the loss of his property,[9] and the exile,[10] which was perhaps the cause of the travels in Eubœa, Sparta, and Sicily to which he refers.[11] To these experiences we may trace his pessimism,[12] his cynicism,[13] his harping on the hardships of poverty that constrains a man to deeds to which his will does not consent,[14] his complaint that money makes the man and that mercenary marriages corrupt the breed of men,[15] his emphasis on the virtue of faith[16] or loyalty to caste, club, and mates[17] in times of trial, and his frequent use of 'good' and other ethical terms in the political or social sense.[18]

Too much has been made of this last idea by Theognis's translator J. H. Frere,[19] by Nietzsche, whose own philosophy is largely based upon it, and by Grote, who, however, admits that the ethical meanings are not absolutely unknown.[20] Theognis is merely the chief example, the conveniently quotable *locus classicus*, so to speak, for a natural human tendency. We still speak of the better classes as they did in Aristotle's time,[21] and Homer characterizes menial tasks as the services that the worse sort perform for the good.[22] We cannot infer that the ethical idea was lacking.[23] We can only say that before Plato it was easier to confound pure or absolute ethics with prudential, conventional, tribal, caste, or political morality than it has been since. Much the same may be said of the naive inconsistency between Theognis's general commendations of truth, justice, good faith, and kindliness, and his passionate prayers for vengeance,[24] his (perhaps ironical) counsel to set your heel on the empty-headed demos,[1] to be all things to all men,[2] to adapt yourself to your environment with the protective resemblance of the polyp which takes the hue of the rock to which it is clinging,[3] and to flatter and cajole your enemy well till you have him in your power and then take your revenge.[4] The last precept appears almost as nakedly in one of the noblest Greek poets, Pindar.[5] Plato first laid it down that the good man will not wrong even his enemy, and Plato did not apply the principle to international politics in the Tolstoyan way. Lastly, the erotic verses of Theognis—most of them, to be sure, in a separable and perhaps spurious part of the collection,[6] dealing with themes repugnant to modern feeling—seem to us incompatible with the conception of him as a moralist and still more with the use of his elegies as a school-book. They were indeed, on the hypotheses of R. Reitzenstein,[7] mainly banquet songs. But, however that may be, Theognis's own use of the verb 'admonish'[8] classes them in some sort with the literature of prudential precepts and moral admonition known by the name of ὑποθῆκαι.[9] And no less a moralist in his own esteem than Isocrates recommends the study and excerpting of them as entirely edifying. At any rate, whether in excerpts for school use or otherwise, they were, like Solon and Hesiod, learned by heart by educated Greeks of the 5th cent., and so provide many texts for amplification in Pindar and the Greek drama, and for discussion in Greek philosophy.[10] An exhaustive dissertation on this subject would be of interest, but would require the nicest discrimination. Harrison[11] collects the parallels in Pindar and Bacchylides, some of them perhaps overstrained. It is not easy to determine how many of the resemblances in tragedy are conscious reminiscences. The chorus in Sophocles, *Œd. Col.* 1226 ff., is clearly an expansion of the melancholy lines 425 ff.:

'Not to be born into life were the best for us, creepers on earth's face,
Never to look on the sun's burning and pitiless rays;
Happiest lot of the living is theirs who come quickest to Hell Gate
Laid out quiet and stark, wrapped in a mantle of earth.'[12]

Jebb on *Antigone*, 622, quotes Theognis, 403, as one of the anticipations of the untraced 'quem Juppiter vult perdere dementat prius.' *Antigone*, 297, echoes Theognis, 221, in the sentiment that the man who thinks that he alone is wise is himself void of wisdom. Soph. frag. 356 repeats the commonplace that health is best and justice fairest of things;[13] frag. 525 the humorous fancy that even Zeus cannot please all, whether he rains or holds up.[14] But these are only conspicuous examples of an indeterminate list. When Euripides praises the man who is as true to absent as to present friends,[15] we cannot be certain whether he is or is not paraphrasing Theog. 93–95, and the same holds of the coincidence between *Phœnissæ*, 438–440, and Theog. 717 f. in the sentiment that

1 469, 667.
2 *Meno*, 95 D ff.
3 *Flor.* lxxxviii. 14.
4 Cambridge, 1902.
5 764.
6 1302 B, 1304 B, 1300 A.
7 *Quæst. Græc.* 18.
8 53 ff., 1013–1016.
9 346, 1200, 667 ff.
10 219, 332.
11 783.
12 165–169, 425–429.
13 129 f., 161–164, 209, 275, 299, 360, 375, 615, 621, 653, 857–861, 1135 ff.
14 391, 155, 175, 267, 384, 620, 649, 667 ff., and *passim*.
15 190; cf. H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics*, 2 vols., London, 1892–93, § 233.
16 πιστός, 77, with Plato, *Laws*, 630; cf. 80, 88, 121, 209, 283, 416, 529, 861, 1137, and *passim*.
17 ἑταῖρος, 79, 91, 95, 97, 98, 113, 115, 411, 416, 643, 851, 1169 (the abstract καχεταιρίης).
18 28, 32, 43, 57. For ἀρετή (often in the Elizabethan sense of 'virtue') cf. 129, 147–150 (ethical?), 402, 654, 699. In 865 and 1003 it is courage in battle. For σώφρων, 'sober,' politically, intellectually, or morally, cf. 379, 431, 437, 454, 483, 497, 665, 701, 754, 1138, and Shorey in *A J Ph* xiii. [1892] 361.
19 Reprinted in the vol. containing Hesiod, Callimachus, and Theognis, in Bohn's Classical Library, London, 1856.
20 *A Hist. of Greece*, new ed., London, 1888, ch. 9, *in fin.*
21 *Pol.* 1282.
22 *Od.* xv. 324.
23 Cf. 11, 147–149, 315 ff., 465.
24 337–340, 344, 348, 362, 872.

1 847.
2 63, 213.
3 215–219, a passage much bespoken and imitated. Cf. A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, London, 1917, frag. 307. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, ii. 224, takes it of the traveller who is to do at Rome as the Romans do. Ion, frag. 36, Plutarch, and Pseudo-Phocylides, 47, reprobate the sentiment.
4 363; see J. Girard, *Le Sentiment religieux en Grèce d'Homère à Eschyle*[3], Paris, 1887, p. 157; Schmidt, ii. 312.
5 *Pyth.* ii. 84.
6 1230–1389.
7 *Epigram und Skolion*, Giessen, 1893.
8 ὑποθήσομαι, 27, 1007, 1049.
9 See Isoc. *ad Nic.* 43 f.
10 Antisthenes is said to have written a commentary in five books (Diog. Laert. vi. 16).
11 P. 314.
12 Cf. R. C. Jebb, on Bacchyl. v. 160, in *Bacchylides, the Poems and Fragments*, Cambridge, 1905; and P. Decharme, *Euripide: l'esprit de son théâtre*, Paris, 1893, p. 119 ff.
13 Theog. 255.
14 *Ib.* 24 and 801.
15 *Supp.* 867, *Hippol.* 1001.

wealth is all-powerful. Plato's saying[1] that a spirit of reverence (*αἰδώς*) is a better inheritance than great riches is, the present writer thinks, a distinct reference to Theog. 409. Isocrates, i. 19, equals Theog. 72, and i. 29, Theog. 105.

Among the chief commonplaces of Greek ethics expressed by Theognis[2] are man's dependence on the gods,[3] and his ignorance of what the future has in store,[4] his duties to the suppliant and the guest,[5] and to parents,[6] the doctrine of the mean,[7] of nothing too much,[8] of *κόρος* and *ὕβρις*,[9] the late punishment of the wicked,[10] the dangers of slander [11] and of light oaths,[12] the admonition that all true gains are costly,[13] that ill-gotten gains do not abide,[14] that the lust for wealth is insatiate,[15] and that the boastful word (*ἔπος μέγα*) [16] or the forsworn forecast [17] provokes the gods and invites nemesis, the complaint that shame and reverence are exiled from a degenerate world,[18] and that men value nothing but wealth.[19] Other commonplaces, whether of ethics or of criticism of life, are the immortality of song,[20] the praise of patience,[21] the Anacreontic, Epicurean, or Horatian 'Carpe diem,' evil communications,[22] 'in vino veritas,' [23] there is no perfect man,[24] the ingratitude of children,[25] the foible of censoriousness and self-praise,[26] and the generalized metaphor of the 'counterfeit' man.[27] His convivial and social precepts, his slight anticipations of later motives of satire,[28] and his somewhat cynical, political,[29] or worldly wisdom[30] do not further concern us here. Lines 823 and 1181 are in apparent contradiction on the justification of tyrannicide. Theognis apparently does not mention the confounding of the innocent with the guilty, or the jealousy of the gods except as involved in the nemesis that attaches to the too confident oath.[31]

As an aristocrat he, like Pindar, emphasized nature against teaching.[32] No teacher can put sense into a man,[33] or make a bad man good. Plato[34] finds a contradiction between this and the admonition to associate only with the good because from them you will learn good only. But it is Theognis's belief that it is easier to corrupt the good than to reform the bad. In lines 155–159 there is a suggestion of the noblest thought of mature Greek ethics, the idea that the mutability of fortune and our common frailty impose the duty of leniency and compassion upon all men.[35]

Especially interesting are Theognis's direct appeals and protests to Zeus. He complains that the prosperity of the wicked casts doubt upon the moral government of the world.[36] This, however, is rather a development of the motive of Menelaus's speech in the *Iliad*[37] than the startlingly new thought which Croiset finds in it.[38] Theognis's pro-

[1] *Laws*, 729 B.
[2] See Schmidt, i. 10; A. and M. Croiset, *Hist. de la litt. grecque*, Paris, 1887–99, ii. 148 *f.*
[3] 134, 165, 171, 687. [4] 585, 1075–1078. [5] 143 f.
[6] 131, 821; cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 185 *f.*
[7] 220, 331, 335, 559 *f.* [8] 219, 335, 401.
[9] 151, 153, 603–606, 693. [10] 203. [11] 324.
[12] 399; cf. 1195.
[13] 463 f., 1027 *f.*; cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 286 *ff.*
[14] 198–202; cf. 329. [15] 227, 596, 1158. [16] 159.
[17] 559, 'il ne faut jurer de rien'; cf. Archil. frag. 76; Soph. *Antig.* 388 f.; Pindar, *Ol* xiii. 83.
[18] 291; cf. 86, 635, 647.
[19] 523 f., 621, 1116 ff., 699 ff. [20] 237 ff.
[21] 320, 355, 445, 555, 591, 637, 1029.
[22] 31, 305; cf. Schmidt, i. 272. [23] 99.
[24] 799, 902. [25] 275–278. [26] 611.
[27] 117, 119, 965; cf. Plato, *Laws*, 916 D.
[28] 295, 453, 595, 1215.
[29] 43, 233, 283 ff., 331, 367 ff., 341, 603, 671 (the ship of state), 793, 805, 833, 845, 947.
[30] 303 f., 423, 575, 903 ff., 963. [31] 660.
[32] Schmidt, i. 160; Shorey, *TAPA*, 1910, p. 188.
[33] 430 (*ἐνθέμεν*), 435 (*ἐνθετον*); cf. Arist. *Eth.* x. 9. 3; Plato, *Rep.* 518 C (*ἐντιθέναι*).
[34] *Meno*, 95 C ff.
[35] Cf. Soph. *Ed. Col.* 565–569; Isoc. i. 29.
[36] 373 ff., 743 ff. [37] xiii. 631.
[38] Cf. also Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 270 ff.; and Archil. frag. 84 (6).

test against the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children, which results from the late punishment of the wicked,[1] invites illustration both from the OT and from later ethical literature.[2]

LITERATURE.—The fullest recension of the text is in the latest ed. of T. Bergk's *Poetæ Elegiaci*, Leipzig, 1915. The edd. of Immanuel Bekker (Leipzig, 1815) and F. G. Welcker (Frankfort, 1826) and the critical literature of the subject are discussed in Harrison's book referred to above. Cf. also T. Hudson Williams, *The Elegies of Theognis*, London, 1910.

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THEOKRASIA.—See GREEK RELIGION, vol. vi. p. 421 f.

THEOLOGY.—1. Definition.—Theology may be briefly defined as the science which deals, according to scientific method, with the facts and phenomena of religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis or philosophy of religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief.

According to its etymological meaning, the word 'theology' denotes 'discourse or doctrine concerning God.' In this sense it was used among the Greeks to describe the work of poets like Homer and Hesiod when they wrote of the gods and their doings, and that of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle when they speculated regarding the supreme reality or ultimate ground of all things. In early Christian literature the distinctive appellation of 'theologian' is applied to the author of the Apocalypse, probably because he maintained the divinity of the *λόγος*, asserting the identity of the *λόγος* that became flesh in Christ with God (*Θεός*). In this sense the term is applied to orthodox Greek Fathers like Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen, who distinguished themselves in defending the personality and divinity of the *λόγος*. But doctrine concerning God—His being and attributes—is only one branch or department of theology, as that is now commonly understood. Man's knowledge of God is part of the content of that matter of human experience which is termed 'religion,' and which includes other content also, referring to the world of nature and of man, to sin and death, to salvation and immortal life. And, as science in general deals with some definite department of human experience, it is more in accordance with the proper conception of science to regard theology as that branch of science which deals with the department of human experience known as religion, from which experience man's knowledge of God and divine things is obtained. Theology is the science which, by right use of reason, in accordance with proper scientific method, correlates, systematizes, and organizes the matter of human religious experience in such a way as to reach a unified body of coherent doctrine, fitted to satisfy the mind's demand for truth and to furnish guidance for the practical life.

As the science of religion it deals not merely with the subjective contents of the religious consciousness, or the opinions, emotions, and actions of men in the religious sphere, but also with the objective grounds of religion and the ultimate truth or reality which underlies and explains the religious experience of mankind. It is not merely the science of religions dealing with the various historical religions which have developed among men (though that is a part of it), but the science of religion regarded as an important department of human experience, which claims to be no mere subjective delusion, but to have a real and rational foundation in objective reality or fact.

2. Theology and religion.—As theology is the science of religion, religion precedes and is wider

[1] 731 ff.; cf. 203–208.
[2] Cf. Jer 31[29 f.]; Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, § 140; Schmidt, i. 71 ff.

than theology and furnishes it with the matter with which it deals. In all departments of human life and activity experience, in which feeling, intuition, and volition are the predominant factors and reason or intellection is as yet implicit, precedes theory or science, which seeks to exhibit and make explicit the reason, thought, or principles of truth and reality underlying and accounting for the experience. Thus the use of numbers in the relations and activities of the practical life precedes the science of mathematics; the practical use of speech precedes the science of language; the use of reasoning in practice precedes the science of logic; and the sailing of the seas in ships precedes the science of navigation. So too the experience and use of religion as a practical factor in life's activities precedes the science of religion, or theology. And, as men may attain considerable efficiency and success in various departments of life without having rationalized or reduced their experience to system and exhibited its underlying principles, so men may live a truly religious life and have a rich and full religious experience without having attained to any very clear or coherent system of theology. But, while a man may be religious without being a theologian, religious experience is necessary to enable a man to be a competent theologian; and the fuller and richer his religious experience has been, the more likely is he to prove a trustworthy and satisfactory theologian.

Schleiermacher was so impressed with the importance of the part played by feeling or emotion in religion that he gave it not merely the predominant but the exclusive place. Over against the long prevailing definition of religion as consisting in 'knowing and doing homage to God,' he defined religious piety as in its essence consisting neither in knowledge nor in action but in a determination of the feeling. The root of all religion he held to be man's feeling of absolute dependence on some power or powers other than himself. But this dictum, while it emphasizes the important truth as to the large part played by feeling in religion, if strictly taken, is one-sided and exaggerated, in that it ignores the part played by the cognitive faculty in forming some conception, more or less definite, of the power or powers on which we depend, and the part played by the will in choosing and adopting means for getting into harmony with that Supreme Power or Being, which are elements characteristic of all religion.

In theology, as distinct from religion, the cognitive faculty, or reason, is predominant. It succeeds religion, and seeks by a right use of reason on the matter of experience furnished by religion to evolve out of it a system of connected and coherent truth to which the term 'science' can be properly applied.

3 Theology and science.—The aim of science in any of its departments is to apply reason, with its powers of analysis and generalization and its laws of inference, induction, and deduction, to the data of experience in that department in such a way as to discover the laws or principles underlying and relating the given facts and phenomena and to unify the entire content of experience in that department into a coherent systematic whole or body of truth such as may be described as knowledge of reality. Inasmuch as theology seeks to do this as regards the data of human experience in the realm or department of religion, it is rightly described as a branch of science. The instrument which the scientist makes use of in ascertaining, analysing, and systematizing the facts or data of experience in the department selected for scientific investigation is the reason with its powers and laws of perception, conception, evidence, inference, etc. And reason is the instrument made use of by the scientific theologian in investigating the facts and phenomena of religious experience and building up a science of theology not less than is the case in other departments of science. Lack of clearness as to the place and function of reason in theology is apt to lead to confusion and disagreement as to what theology is and what are its aim and scope. Thus in some quarters it is maintained that theology differs from other sciences inasmuch as the matter with which religion is concerned is given to us by revelation and not by reason as in the other sciences. But this contrast between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge is unsound. Reason is not the source from which, in any case, we get the matter which we build up into science, but merely the instrument by means of which we grasp, analyse, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize that matter which is given to us by revelation from without in experience. This is as true of other sciences as it is of theology. As a matter of fact, the material which we build up by use of reason into the natural sciences, as they are called, such as mechanics, chemistry, biology, etc., is given to us by revelation from without in experience not less than the matter which we seek to build up by use of reason into a systematic scientific theology. The latter is just as much matter of experience, which the reason must seek to apprehend and co-ordinate into a coherent whole of knowledge of the truth, as is the former. The knowledge got by using reason to grasp, co-ordinate, and systematize the given matter of experience is of the same kind in both cases. In both cases it rests ultimately on a foundation of faith—faith in the reliability of our faculties of knowledge (perception, cognition, inference, etc.) and on the ultimate reasonableness or cognizability of all that is given to us in experience. We go on using our powers of perception, cognition, inference, etc., in reference to what is given to us from without in experience, never doubting that the knowledge thus reached is real knowledge or knowledge of truth and reality, even though we may know and realize that our knowledge in any department of experience is incomplete and leaves room for progress. Thus the physicist may realize that he does not know the ultimate nature of matter, the mathematician may be puzzled to explain what space and time are, and the biologist may feel that he does not know what, at bottom, life and consciousness are.

But the fact that there remain unsolved questions of an ultimate kind, in regard to the data of experience in various departments, does not nullify or render valueless the results of scientific investigation and systematization in those departments. It merely shows that our knowledge of what is revealed to us in experience is as yet incomplete, and that an adequate synthesis of knowledge or metaphysic of being has not yet been reached by us, not that such a metaphysic is unattainable. So too with the data of religious experience. It is the function of theology as a branch of science to collect, examine, analyse, compare, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize all that is revealed to us in this department of experience, so as to reach a whole of scientific knowledge in this sphere, as in other departments of experience and knowledge. We must use our reason as far as it will go in synthesizing or giving us rational knowledge of what is given in experience. And, if there are problems of an ultimate kind in this science, as in other sciences, which still remain obscure or inadequately solved, this does not invalidate the knowledge reached by the application of sound scientific method to the data of experience, nor deprive it of the right to be regarded as

science or knowledge of truth. It merely shows that our science in this sphere is incomplete and spurs us on to reach out towards a more comprehensive synthesis of all our knowledge in an adequate metaphysic or philosophy of being.

4. Theology and philosophy.—It is here that the science of religion passes over into the philosophy of religion, that highest form of knowledge which is the consummation aimed at by theology. Science in all its departments is limited and incomplete as knowledge of reality. It leaves unsolved ultimate questions as to the nature and relations of matter and mind or spirit, space and time, life and consciousness. It is the function of philosophy, as the ultimate form of knowledge, to grapple with these ultimate problems and seek a satisfactory solution of them. And it is along the lines of moral and religious experience, and the data furnished thereby, that light on such ultimate problems may most hopefully be looked for.

Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, began a movement in philosophy which has had far-reaching influence on modern theology as well as on philosophy. His contention is that in unifying the given matter of perceptive experience into an ordered and coherent world-knowledge the mind or reason of the percipient subject makes use of forms of perception and cognition which are subjective (*i.e.* belonging to the nature or constitution of the knowing mind), not objective (*i.e.* belonging to the object or reality as it is in itself apart from its being known or cognized). Kant thus concluded that the world of which we have definite knowledge, through grasping and unifying the given matter of experience by means of the subjective forms of perception and cognition, is but a phenomenal world or a world as it appears to a conscious subject endowed with powers of perception or cognition like man, not a noumenal world or thing-in-itself existing exactly thus apart from being perceived or known. Thus exact scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is limited to knowledge of the phenomenal world and cannot reach to ultimate reality. The use of those very forms of perception and cognition which give definiteness to our knowledge makes it knowledge of the phenomenal as contrasted with the ultimately real or thing-in-itself. All scientific or theoretic knowledge is thus knowledge of the phenomenal only. If there be a noumenal world of reality, and if it be in any way accessible to us, this must be in some other way than that of rational knowledge. Kant maintains that access to a noumenal world of reality is gained by us, not through the pure reason but through the practical reason or moral consciousness, by means of which we may and do reach a kind of faith-knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality, which, though not rational theoretic knowledge, such as we have in science, is yet of value for the moral and religious life. This demarcation of the limits of valid, rational, scientific or theoretic knowledge, and differentiation from it of the kind of knowledge got through moral and religious experience or through supernatural historic revelation is characteristic of many theological writers since Kant. The argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is supposed to be conclusive against the possibility of our ever reaching any rational metaphysic or valid theoretic knowledge of ultimate reality. Huxley and Spencer pressed Kant's conclusion into the service of their doctrine that God or ultimate reality is and must remain unknown and unknowable by man, and that therefore a science of theology is impossible. Hamilton and Mansel endeavoured to reconcile the agnostic conclusions of Kant in regard to a rational metaphysic with the acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine as grounded on revelation, not on reason. The Ritschlian school accept Kant's conclusions as to the impossibility of a rational, theoretically valid, knowledge of God or ultimate reality, and so rule out all natural or rational theology as incompetent; but, while eliminating all metaphysic from Christian theology as untenable, they seek to retain in large measure the traditional Christian theology as grounded on a divine historic revelation culminating in Christ, of which Scripture is the record. As with Kant, they seek to find a grounding for this in the immediate deliverances of the moral and religious consciousness, which furnishes them with a basis for 'value-judgments' where valid theoretic knowledge fails. This sharp differentiation between the kind of knowledge got by making use of reason, our cognitive faculty, in grasping, analysing, and systematizing the data of perceptive experience in the sphere, say, of physics or chemistry and the kind of knowledge got by using reason in the same way—call it practical reason or what you will—in grasping, co-ordinating, and systematizing the data of moral and religious experience is arbitrary and unconvincing. The world of reality revealed to us in experience—whether the ordinary perceptive experience which grounds our common knowledge or the moral and religious experience which grounds our religious knowledge—is one whole, and our knowledge of it, however acquired, should be capable of being synthesized as one coherent whole. The attempt of the Kantians and Ritschlians to rule out all metaphysic and natural theology as going beyond the proper limits of the reason, and yet to build up a theology of value-judgments founded on the needs of the moral consciousness or practical reason or on the data of a historic divine revelation, is not satisfying to the inquiring mind that seeks for unity and coherence and consistency in its knowledge. Theology, as the philosophy of religion, is to be looked upon, not as the rival or opponent of rational science, but rather as its copestone and completion.

True theology can never come into conflict with true science. For it includes all the data and verified results of true science among its material or postulates. It seeks to co-ordinate or synthesize all our knowledge into a comprehensive and coherent whole of truth or knowledge of reality, based upon the data of human experience regarded as a whole, tested, analysed, co-ordinated, and systematized by sound scientific methods.

5. Reason and intuition.—Akin to the distinction which Kantians draw between the theoretic reason, which gives us definite knowledge of a phenomenal world, and the practical reason, which gives us vague knowledge of noumenal reality, is the distinction which more recent philosophers such as Henri Bergson draw between reason, or intellect, and instinct, or intuition, as sources of knowledge. Intuition, it is alleged, brings us more immediately into touch with the living flowing stream of reality, of which as individual persons we form a part, and enables us to adapt ourselves thereto more surely and satisfactorily than reason or intellect, whose forms of thought and processes of inference are adapted to matter that is fixed or static rather than to the ever-changing creative flux of actual reality or real time. But this contrast or antithesis between intuition and intellect, like that between faith and reason, is unsound. The intuitions of a rational being are just an implicit form of reason. And it is better in every way for a rational being such as man that what is implicit in consciousness should be made explicit and fitted into the comprehensive synthesis of rational cognition, which alone deserves the name of knowledge. The only supreme

authority and court of appeal for rational conscious beings is reason based on an ultimate ineradicable faith in the reasonableness of our experience, which is the underlying assumption of all science, including theology. To subject reason to intuition or instinct as instrument of knowledge is to incur moral and intellectual bankruptcy which is unworthy of a rational being such as man. It is to take a step downwards towards the brutal condition, not upwards towards the goal of true personality.

For conscious rational beings the only reality which has or can have any meaning is reality which is or may be apprehended by rational consciousness. In the case of reality of which we are, or suppose ourselves to be, dimly aware in subconscious apprehension or intuition, it is assumed that to a more perfect or adequate consciousness this would evidence itself as real. Reality for us means reality apprehended or apprehensible by a conscious being. To affirm an unknown reality may mean simply that we are dimly aware of the existence of some power or force which we have not yet been able to adjust to our incomplete synthesis or scheme of knowledge. But to affirm a reality which is, and which must ever remain, inaccessible to every conscious apprehension is to affirm a contradiction in terms or to use words without meaning.

Practical reason, faith, intuition or instinct, to which some would point as the proper guides in theology rather than what they call the pure or theoretic reason, are all forms of conscious apprehension which enable us to build up the data of experience into some more or less coherent whole of knowledge. The data to be unified and synthesized in a science of systematic theology are not indeed given to us by reason from within, but by revelation from without. Reason, however, is our only proper instrument for the apprehending, co-ordinating, and systematizing of these data.

6. Theology and the Bible.—Some theologians conceive of the task of theology as that of setting forth in coherent systematic form the content of that revelation concerning God, the world, and man of which the Bible is the inspired record. But, while this points to a very important department of theology, it is too narrow a view to take of the scope and function of theology as a whole. There are other materials or data for theological construction besides those furnished by the Bible, which cannot be overlooked or ignored by the scientific theologian who takes a wide and comprehensive view of his subject. The revelation of ultimate reality given in the natural world around us with its varied facts and phenomena, which it is the function of natural science to investigate, furnishes material which the theologian must interpret and construe. So too the course of general human history, which it is the function of historical science to present and elucidate in the light of general principles or laws, affords data of experience which are of value for theological construction. And the moral consciousness of mankind generally, the investigation of which is the special task of the science of ethics, furnishes important material to the scientific theologian to help in the upbuilding of a system of theology. But the revelation given in the history and religious experience of Israel as a nation and of the outstanding personalities among that people, culminating in the fact of Christ and the foundation of the Christian Church, is of such supreme importance and unique significance in the religious sphere that it is customary and convenient to distinguish between the general revelation to mankind as a whole in nature and history and conscience, which is treated of under the heading of natural theology, and the special historic revelation culminating in Christ, which is treated of under the heading of specifically Christian theology, and which may be regarded not as something entirely different from natural theology, but rather as its crown and completion.

7. Classification of theological sciences or disciplines; theological encyclopædia.—Having such a vast and varied material to deal with, theological science has many branches or disciplines with aims and methods differing according to the material dealt with and the purpose kept in view. To elucidate and classify these various disciplines is the function of what is known as theological encyclopædia, which itself constitutes a branch of theological study.

Religion as an object of investigation has two aspects: (*a*) a historical aspect, under which it is to be regarded as a historical phenomenon appearing under various forms among various peoples with characteristics which furnish ample material for historical inquiry and investigation; and (*b*) a normative aspect, under which it appears as a present inner power of life making claim to truth and to the right to regulate individual and social life. This twofold aspect of religion furnishes us with guidance for classifying the branches of theology, which is the science of religion, into two main divisions: (*a*) the *historical or phenomenological* branches, including all those sciences which deal with religion on its phenomenological side as an actual appearance in history; and (*b*) the *normative or constructive* branches, including those sciences which deal with religion as a present-day reality and power, claiming to be truth by which the practical life of man should be moulded and regulated. The distinction already referred to between natural theology and specifically Christian theology furnishes ground for suitable further subdivision of the material falling to be dealt with under these two main divisions, thus affording a basis for a convenient classification of theological disciplines or branches of study.

(*a*) The investigation of religion in its phenomenological aspect may be conveniently subdivided into (i.) a general branch dealing with the phenomenology of the ethnic religions other than Christian that have appeared in history, which will include (1) history of religions, with a descriptive account of the distinctive features and characteristics of religious beliefs as they have appeared in history, (2) comparative study of religion, and (3) psychology of religion in so far as historical investigation can throw light on that; and (ii.) a special branch dealing with the phenomenology of the Christian religion. This will embrace, under the general heading of Biblical science, (4) linguistics, or a study of the Bible languages and the principles of interpretation and exegesis; (5) Biblical introduction, or investigation into text, date, authorship, and historical setting of the various books of the Bible; (6) Biblical history and antiquities, and (7) Biblical theology, which aims at setting forth by means of impartial exegesis the ideas as to God, man, and the world and their relations set forth in the different Biblical writings; and, under the general heading of ecclesiastical history, (8) Church history, or the history of the spread of the Church, (9) history of doctrine, and (10) symbolic, or the history of the different creeds and confessions in which Christian doctrine has been embodied.

(*b*) The investigation of religion in its normative and constructive aspect may be subdivided into (iii.) a general branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the truths of natural religion, including (11) the apologetic of religion generally, (12) natural theology, (13) philosophic ethic; (iv.) a special branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the

truth of Christianity as the highest and final form of religion; this embraces (14) the apologetic of the Christian religion; systematic theology, which includes (15) Christian dogmatic, and (16) Christian ethic; and practical theology, which includes (17) homiletic, (18) liturgic, (19) catechetic, or paideutic, (20) pastoral theology, (21) ecclesiastical polity, and (22) evangelistic theology, or the theory of missions; (v.) the final synthesis of the truths reached in the various theological disciplines, historic and theoretic or normative, which is the aim of (23) the philosophy of religion, in which theology reaches its consummation.

8. Method in theology.—The method to be made use of in dealing with the data of theological science in its various branches will vary with the matter dealt with and the purpose or end in view.

In the historical or phenomenological branches of theology the end in view is simply the ascertainment and accurate presentation of historic fact, and the methods to be made use of are those which are appropriate to historical inquiry in general.

(1) Thus in setting forth the *history of religions* the investigator must make himself acquainted as widely as possible, by observation and inquiry, with the features and characteristics of extant religions as they now appear and are practised among men. He must further acquaint himself with the historic origin and development of these religions by the study of such books, monuments, and other records of the past as are available. Careful observation and industrious inquiry and research are thus the methods most needful for success in this department of theological science.

(2) In the *comparative study of religion* the investigator must use the material furnished by the history of religions, and seek by analysis, comparison, and spiritual insight to show the relations of the various religions to one another and their grading as manifestations of the common spirit of religion. This calls for more of speculative thought and philosophic reflexion, as regards method, than the previous discipline.

(3) In *psychology of religion* the investigator must discuss the origin and form of religion generally from the psychological point of view, and seek to show what part the various mental faculties and capacities—intelligence, feeling, desire, will, imagination, etc.—have in religious experience, and how they enter into and manifest themselves in religions. The methods appropriate to scientific psychology—observation, reflexion, induction, and deduction—have proper application in this discipline.

(4) *Biblical linguistics*, which is the study of the languages in which the Bible was originally written, is just a branch of philology, and the methods of philological study and inquiry have here their proper application. Hermeneutics and exegetics, which deal with the interpretation of the text of Scripture, may be brought in under linguistics.

(5) In *Biblical introduction* the methods of the lower or textual criticism and of the higher or historical criticism have a proper place. Textual criticism investigates the various manuscripts of the Bible that have come down to us and the various readings in the texts of these manuscripts, and seeks by rational principles to get as nearly as possible at the true original text. Historical criticism investigates the evidences of compositeness in different books of the Bible and seeks with the help of tradition and of a knowledge of contemporary history to gain reliable knowledge as to the composition, date, authorship, and historical setting or circumstances of the various books of the Bible, and to estimate their place and function as elements in a progressive revelation.

(6) *Biblical history* deals with the history of the Jewish people and the rise of the Christian Church as recorded in the Bible, while Biblical antiquities has to do with the archæology, chronology, and geography of the Bible.

(7) *Biblical theology* (including Biblical psychology) aims at unfolding and presenting in a clear and orderly form the doctrinal conceptions or ideas presented by the various writers of the OT and NT. It is the crown and completion of Biblical science, and, for those who accept the Bible as the inspired record of a divine revelation, it is of supreme importance for furnishing material towards the upbuilding of a comprehensive, normative, systematic theology. But of itself it is a purely historic discipline, aiming at the accurate presentation of historic fact and recorded thought in an impartial objective way, without meantime taking into account the bearing of that on permanent normative religious truth. The methods to be used in Biblical theology are those of sound philology and impartial scientific exegesis or interpretation, so as to make sure that the ideas or doctrines set forth are those of the various Bible writers themselves, unmodified by any subjective theological bias of the interpreter. The work of adjusting the scheme of thought faithfully gathered from the Scriptures by sound impartial exegesis to a comprehensive scheme of normative systematic theology is the important task of the Christian systematic theologian.

(8) *Church history*, or the history of the spread of Christianity, aims at recounting accurately the gradual enlargement of the area known as Christendom, the conflict of Christianity with anti-Christian forces, and the growth of the Church's constitution and cultus, showing how the polity and worship of the Christian Church developed as time went on, and how divisions over questions of constitution and government and cultus arose among Christians.

(9) The *history of doctrine* describes the dogma, or body of doctrine, accepted by the Christian Church, and traces its development along the centuries.

(10) *Symbolic* gives a more detailed attention to the various 'symbols'—creeds or confessions—that have been formulated from time to time in the Church's history than can be given in a general history of doctrine. These are obviously purely historical disciplines, aiming at the ascertainment and accurate presentation of historic facts, for the achievement of which the proper methods to be used are the methods of impartial historical research and inquiry.

(11) The *apologetic of religion* in general has as its function to inquire into the nature and essence of religion generally and to establish the truth of the religious view of the world over against all irreligious, antitheistic, or agnostic views. It aims at discussing and exhibiting (α) the nature and essence of religion in general; (β) the nature and validity of religious belief and the relation of the knowledge got thereby to the knowledge of natural objects gained through perception and rational cognition; (γ) the truth and reality of what is postulated and affirmed in religious belief, as against atheism, materialism, agnosticism, and other forms of unbelief; (δ) the rational proofs for the existence of God or the ways in which the human mind by valid process rises to the apprehension of supreme personal Spirit as the ultimate reality, from reflective contemplation of the changing natural world and its phenomena, of the course of human history, and of the facts of the moral consciousness; (ε) the evidence contained in the general revelation given to all men for the immortality of the soul and a future state.

(12) Closelyassociated with the general apologetic of religion is that systematic presentation of the truths underlying natural religion to which the name of *natural theology* is usually given. Its aim is to set forth in a methodical orderly way all that may be known concerning God and the world and man, and their mutual relations, from that general revelation which is given in nature, mind, and history. It is the dogmatic of natural religion, as philosophic theism is its apologetic.

(13) Akin to natural theology is *philosophic ethic*, whose aim is to ground a science of practical conduct on the immediate deliverances of the moral consciousness and the knowledge of God and duty derivable therefrom. The ethic of Kant, associated with what he described as a 'religion within the limits of pure reason,' may be taken as illustrative of the aims and methods of philosophic ethic, defective though it may be as a presentation of the results of such ethic, even as his 'religion within the limits of pure reason' is defective as a presentation of the truths of natural theology. In this region of natural theology and philosophic ethic the aim is to reach not merely historic but permanent normative truth, in which the mind of the rational thinker can find rest and by which practical conduct can be regulated. The methods by which alone, if at all, such results can be reached are those of speculative thought and philosophic reflexion on the data of moral and religious experience—not merely of our own personal experience, but of the experience of mankind generally as far as that can be ascertained, analysed, and used as the basis of rational inference, induction, and deduction. A great accession to the material or data of experience, on which a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophical theology and ethic may be grounded, is given us when we take into account the special revelation, culminating in the fact of Christ, of which the Bible is the record. Apart from this, indeed, the data on which natural theology and philosophic ethic seek to build are so incomplete that the probable conclusions reached are lacking in fullness of content and convincing power. The new data of experience furnished by this special revelation not only add cogency to the probable conclusions reached by philosophic theism and ethic, but also bring a greater fullness of content to constructive normative theology, by which it is enriched and made more satisfying to the mind and heart of man.

(14) *Christian apologetic* has as its function to indicate the nature and essence of the Christian religion, grounded on the historic revelation of which the Bible is the record, and to set forth in order the evidences of its truth. It deals with such questions as these: (*α*) the idea of revelation, its spheres and modes, and the manner of its apprehension; (*β*) the idea of inspiration and its results; (*γ*) the trustworthiness of the Bible as a reliable record of fact and experience; (*δ*) the evidences of a progressive revelation of divine things given in the Bible and the significance of the fact of Christ as consummating and completing that revelation; (*ε*) the evidences of the truth of the gospel proclaimed by Christ and its fitness to meet human need and to bring salvation and satisfaction to mankind. Christian apologetic clears and prepares the way for

(15) *Christian dogmatic*, which aims at setting forth in accurate and systematic manner, and in such a way as to show its consistency with all our other knowledge of truth, the intellectual content of the Christian life as that becomes our inward possession on the ground of divine revelation through the receptivity of faith. It presupposes and includes the conclusions reached by philosophic reflexion in the sphere of theism and natural theology, and gives added cogency and convincing power to them and greater richness and fullness of content to our knowledge of God the supreme reality, as not only intelligent personal Spirit but holy loving Father. It is usually subdivided into (*α*) theology proper, or the doctrine of God involving an exposition and justification of the Christian conception of God as triune, which was the prominent feature of Greek Christian theology in the 4th cent. when various forms of unitarianism (Monarchianism, Sabellianism, Arianism) were combated by Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers; (*β*) Christology, or the doctrine of the Person of Christ, to which the attention of the Church was particularly directed after the Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) by the theories propounded by Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches, which were condemned at the Councils of Constantinople (A.D. 381), Ephesus (A.D. 431), and Chalcedon (A.D. 451); (*γ*) pneumatology, or the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, to which attention was first prominently given by the Church when the views of Macedonius were condemned by the Council of Constantinople; (*δ*) anthropology, or the Christian doctrine of man; (*ε*) hamartiology, or the doctrine of sin, which first came to the front in the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius in the 5th cent.; (*ζ*) soteriology, or the Christian doctrine of salvation, which, through Augustine and Pelagius, became an important feature in Western theology, receiving fresh development at the hands of Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, who devoted attention to the redemptive work of Christ and its application to sinful men, and engaging prominently the thoughts of theologians in the Reformation period when the doctrines of justification by faith and reconciliation with God came into prominence; (*η*) ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church and the sacraments, which first received prominence in the early Church at the hands of Cyprian of Carthage (A.D. 250), was further developed by Augustine (in his *City of God*) and Thomas Aquinas (in his *Summa Theologiæ*), and received much attention from Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians at the Reformation and from Ritschl and Anglican High Churchmen in modern times; and (*θ*) eschatology, or the doctrine of the last things, which has occupied a foremost place in recent theological discussion.

(16) *Christian ethic* has as its aim to set forth the content of the Christian life as it works itself out in disposition and action on the ground of the self-activity that is rooted in Christian faith. It looks upon the Christian life from the view-point of man and his duty, while dogmatic looks upon it rather from the view-point of God and His will. Both deal with the same subject-matter, viz. God and man and their relations to one another, but under different aspects or from different view-points, so that, while they belong together to systematic theology, they are most conveniently treated as separate or distinct branches of that science. Christian ethic presupposes the conclusions of philosophic ethic, just as Christian dogmatic presupposes those of natural theology. But it adds new fullness and richness of content and new power to philosophic ethic through the new data of moral and religious experience, centred in the fact of Christ, which it contributes. The first attempts to formulate Christian ethic in separation from Christian dogmatic were made by Lambert Daneau, a French Protestant, in 1557, and G. Calixtus, a Lutheran, in his *Epitome Theologiæ moralis* in 1634. Since the time of Schleiermacher this separate treatment of Christian ethic as a branch of theology has been generally followed in Germany, Britain, and America; and numerous works on Christian ethic have appeared in which

the relevant material is dealt with under different divisions. A convenient division followed in the main by Martensen and other writers is (i.) general introduction, dealing with (*α*) the definition and scope of Christian ethic, its relation to other disciplines, and its place in a classification of ethical systems; (*β*) fundamental conceptions of the science —end, norm, and motive; (*γ*) postulates of the science, theological, anthropological, cosmical, and eschatological; (*δ*) the source of our knowledge of the Christian moral ideal, the content of that ideal, and the means of its realization; (ii.) individual ethic, dealing with the origin and progress of the Christian life in the individual soul and its manifestation in the virtues and graces of the Christian character; (iii.) social ethic, dealing with the realization of the Christian ideal in the various spheres of society—the family, the Church, the State or nation.

Practical Christian theology in its various departments treats of the Christian religion from the point of view of its power to expand and to build up Christian life in the Church. It includes those disciplines that are concerned with the application of Christian theology in the practical sphere. It is art rather than science.

(17) *Homiletic* deals with the art of sermon-making.

(18) *Liturgic* deals with worship and its forms.

(19) *Catechetic*, or paideutic, deals with the religious instruction of the young.

(20) *Pastoral theology* deals with the duties of the pastoral office.

(21) *Ecclesiastical polity* deals with Church government, law, and procedure.

(22) *Evangelistic theology*, or theory of missions, deals with the best methods of propagating the Christian religion at home and among heathen peoples abroad.

The methods appropriate for use in the upbuilding of a scientific normative Christian systematic theology, into which the content of Biblical theology as a historical discipline is taken up and adjusted, are in part the methods commonly made use of by science in general—analysis, classification, inference, induction, deduction, etc.—but partly also the less easily applied methods of philosophic reflexion and speculative thought, by means of which the philosopher must seek to bring unity and consistency into his entire knowledge of the real. The God revealed in the Bible and through Christ and Christian experience — the triune God of Christian revelation—must be related and harmonized through rational thought with the God of the theistic proofs and natural theology, if our theology is to be at once Christian and philosophic.

(23) *Philosophy of religion*, which is the highest stage or form of theology, has for its data the results reached as truth by the use of scientific method in the previously mentioned theological disciplines; and its aim is to combine these elements of truth in a comprehensive synthesis of knowledge, such as will exhibit the relations of the various aspects or parts of truth and their harmonious cohesion in an organic whole of truth or reality. Its special function is to harmonize the results reached by reflective thought along the line of philosophic theism and natural theology with the results reached through believing appropriation of the Christian revelation.

If reason is indeed the means whereby we apprehend and know truth and reality, then we should not rest satisfied until what we accept as true or real is shown to commend itself to our reason as reasonable, and so 'worthy of all acceptation.' We must therefore strive to make our theology rational or reasonable, if it is to be the expression of truth. If, again, the Christian revelation concerning God and the world and man and their relations be true, as Christians believe it is, then the Christian philosopher must strive to make his philosophy and metaphysic religious and so adequate to embrace and express the truth of religious, and specifically of Christian, experience. Only when theology becomes rational and philosophy becomes religious can there be hope of such a union between the two as will yield a satisfactory philosophy of religion which will also be the most adequate and satisfactory metaphysic of being. To reach such a philosophy of religion is the worthy aspiration of the Christian speculative theologian who, while not ignoring the importance of faith alike in science, theology, and philosophy, strives to secure that the faith on which he rests shall be a reasonable faith.

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D. S. ADAM.

THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.—1. Definition and scope.

—Every great religion has two parts, an inner and an outer, a spirit and a body, 'the knowledge of God,' which 'is Eternal Life,' and its dogmas, rites, and ceremonies. The inner part, 'the wisdom of God in a mystery,' spoken of by St. Paul as known to 'the perfect,' is that which has, since the 3rd cent., been known in the West as 'theosophy'; in the East it has been known for ages under its Sanskrit equivalent, *Brahma-vidyā*, 'God-wisdom,' 'God-knowledge,' or 'God-science.' Such theosophy, or mysticism, the direct knowledge of God by man, belongs equally to all great religions, as their sustaining life, and may be possessed by any individual, even outside any religious organization. The Brahmavadins, 'knowers of God,' in Hinduism; the Gnostics, the 'knowers,' who, Origen declared, were necessary to the very existence of the Christian Church; the *shaikh* in Islāmic Ṣūfism—these are typical theosophists from the standpoint of the modern Theosophical Society. No man is truly a theosophist who has not direct knowledge of God, but he may win this through any religion or by his own unaided efforts.

Theosophy, in the modern as in the ancient world, proclaims the possibility of such knowledge, as the inevitable result of the immanence of God. Man is essentially a spiritual being, his self, or spirit, being an emanation from the Universal Self, or Universal Spirit, God, as a ray is an emanation from the sun. Hence, to know himself, his deepest self, is to know God; he can sink in consciousness into the depths of his own being, beyond the body, the passions, the emotions, the mind, the reason; these are all his, but they are not he; he can pass beyond them all, and realize himself as separate from them, the pure 'I,' pure being. This is the universal experience of those who, successfully, seek the Kingdom of Heaven within, and it is followed by the recognition that this Universal Being into which the self opens transcends all the beings in which it is manifested, and is alike in all. Out of this experience, repeated for every one who becomes a knower of God, or theosophist, are built the two fundamental truths of theosophy: the immanence and transcendence of God, and the solidarity, or brotherhood, of all living beings. The realization of the first truth, man's identity of nature with God, as a fact in consciousness, and the subsequent realization of the second, his identity of nature with all around him, by a blending of his self with their self, a conscious dwelling in their forms as in his own—these sum up theosophy in its fullest and deepest sense. The man who has thus reached self-realization in God and in all beings is a theosophist; those who deliberately aim at such self-realization are also generally called theosophists.

The word 'theosophy' has further, historically, a second meaning: it denotes a body of truths, or facts, concerning God, man, and the universe; and these may conveniently be classified under three heads: religion, philosophy, and science.

On these truths is based its system of ethics, rational, inspiring, and compelling. In considering this body of truths we are not studying a system invented and published in modern days; we have to do with what has aptly been termed the Wisdom-Tradition, handed down in all civilized countries, ancient and modern, by a long succession of prophets, teachers, and writers. It may be traced in the *Upaniṣads*, *Purāṇas*, and epics of the Hindus, and in the six systems (*darśanas*) of Hindu philosophy; it underlies many of the Chinese systems, especially Taoism, and is seen in such books as *The Classic of Purity* and in the writings of Lao-tse; it is found in Egypt, as in *The Book of the Dead* and the papyri from which its religion has been re-constructed; it appears in the fragmentary records of Assyria and Chaldæa; in the *Gāthas* and other scriptures of the Pārsīs; in the Hebrew Scriptures as expounded by the Ḳabbālā and the Talmud; in the Christian, as treated by the early Fathers of the Church, and by such Gnostic writers as Valentinus, Basilides, and a host of others; in Pythagoras and Plato, with the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic schools, with Plotinus, Iamblichus, and the theurgists; it is taken up from these by the doctors of Islām and the Ṣūfī mystics; appears in the Rosicrucian students of alchemy and astrology, in Rosenkreutz, Paracelsus, Bruno, Eckhartshausen, Boehme, Eckhart, Vaughan, Bacon, More, Fludd —all these and scores of others have assimilated and handed on the Wisdom-Tradition; it has lent its symbols to masonry, and hidden some of its mysteries in masonic ceremonies; it peeps out of Scandinavian and Celtic folk-lore, out of the Hawaiian legends and Maori traditions, the unburied temples of the Mayas and Quiches, the magic of the Zuñis and other N. American Indian tribes. Its revival and its systematization into a coherent and inter-related body of doctrines, separated from non-essential and irrelevant teachings—this is modern, and is the work of the Theosophical Society, a modern association. But the doctrines themselves are scattered everywhere, through all times, in all places.

The test to be applied to a religious doctrine which claims to be theosophical is catholicity. 'Semper, ubique, et ab omnibus'—such is the test. For all religions come from a single source, the Divine Wisdom, and have as founders divinely inspired men—men who have climbed up the ladder of evolution till they have reached perfection in humanity, and have entered on the superhuman evolution. Such men we call 'masters,' and we regard them as the guides and directors of the evolution of humanity; the similarities in doctrines and ethics, pointed out by comparative mythology and comparative religion, we regard as due to the fact that all the founders of religions are members of the one lodge of masters, possess the same knowledge, and are guided by the same principles.

The universal—*i.e.* theosophical—doctrines of religion are: the unity of God; the manifestation of God as a Trinity for the building of a universe; the existence of graded orders of intelligences, a vast hierarchy of beings, forming the inhabitants, visible and invisible, of a universe, or a solar system. The doctrine of reincarnation, taught in every religion, though in some temporarily overlaid, belongs to the domain of philosophy rather than to that of religion; the immortality, or rather the eternity, of the spirit belongs also to philosophy more than to religion, when dealt with intellectually; the law of action and reaction —*karma*—falls under science, as do the constitution of a solar system and of man.

2. Religious teachings.—(*a*) *The unity of God*, the universal one Existence which is the source of all existences actual and potential, the super-life and super-consciousness in which all lives and consciousnesses inhere, eternal beneath the transitory, changeless beneath the fleeting, unsupported but the support of all, all-embracing, all-containing, the One without a second—this is the central teaching of theosophy as of all religions, the first universal truth of religion.

(*b*) *The Trinity of the manifested God* is the second great and universal truth of religion, and therefore of theosophy. Theosophy speaks of the manifested God as the Logos, borrowing the term from Plato, Philo, and the Fourth Gospel.

'Coming forth from the depths of the One Existence, from the One beyond all thought and all speech, a Logos, by imposing on Himself a limit, circumscribing voluntarily the range of His own Being, becomes the Manifested God, and tracing the limiting sphere of His activity, thus outlines the area of His universe. Within that area the universe is born, is evolved, and dies; it lives, it moves, it has its being in Him; its matter is His breath; its forces and energies are currents of His life; He is immanent in every atom; all-pervading; all-sustaining; all-evolving; He is its source and its end, its cause and its object, its centre and circumference; it is built on Him as its sure foundation, it breathes in Him as its encircling space; He is in everything, and everything in Him. Thus have the Sāges of the Ancient Wisdom taught us of the beginning of the manifested worlds. From the same source we learn of the Self-unfolding of the Logos into a threefold form; the First Logos, the Root of all Being, the *Will* which outbreathes and inbreathes the worlds; from Him the Second Logos, manifesting the two aspects of life and form, the primal duality, making the two poles of nature between which the web of the universe is to be woven—life-form, spirit-matter, positive-negative, active-receptive, Father-Mother of the Worlds—the *Wisdom*, or Pure Reason, "mightily and sweetly ordering all things," sustaining the universe; the Third Logos, the Universal Active or Creative *Mind*, that in which all archetypically exists, the source of beings, the fount of fashioning energies, the treasure-house in which are stored up all the archetypal forms which are to be brought forth and elaborated in matter during the evolution of the universe, the fruits of past universes, brought over as seeds for the present.'[1]

(*c*) *The hierarchy of beings* is the third truth universally accepted: the 'seven spirits before the throne of God'; the primary emanations of the Supreme Trinity; the ranks of secondary Logoi, who rule congeries of solar systems, down to the Logos of a single solar system. In such a system the vast hosts of spiritual intelligences (the *devas*, archangels, and angels of religions), the grades of spirits encased in human bodies, the sub-human intelligences and those not yet even awakened to intelligence—all these, with the solar Logos at their head, form the ladder of lives, and evolve within the system. The sub-human intelligences include all nature-spirits, the gnomes, fairies, etc., who play so great a part in folk-lore, the living though limited intelligences who make all nature a living responsive organism instead of a soulless mechanism, whom little children sometimes see, and who are visible to the ordinary seer.

(*d*) The fourth truth in theosophy is that of *universal brotherhood*, the inevitable deduction from the preceding; since there is but one life in all forms, all forms must be inter-related, linked together, and, however unequal they may be in development, they none the less make one huge family, are 'of one blood.' The universal brotherhood of theosophy differs from the political conception of 'equality,' the foundation of modern democracy, in that it postulates identity of origin and of potentiality, but recognizes varying degrees of development, the latter yielding the hierarchy of beings, or ladder of lives. In this freemasonry resembles it, with its broad division of mankind into the enlightened and the profane, and the subdivisions of the enlightened into degrees and graded officers, uniting the essential equality with a hierarchical order and due subordination. In this both theosophy and freemasonry are in harmony with nature, increasing power going hand-in-hand with increasing knowledge and increasing

[1] A. Besant, *The Ancient Wisdom*.

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responsibility. Wisdom, supported by strength and made manifest in beauty, rules in a true brotherhood, as in nature.

It is interesting to note that these four primary religious truths of theosophy, of universal religion, are but the intellectual formulation—for the instruction of the people—of the two primary spiritual truths directly contacted by the knower of God, the gnostic, the theosophist. The first three are religious dogmas, expressing intellectually the first spiritual truth; the fourth is the expression in the outer life of the second spiritual truth. The spiritual truths can be *known* only by individual self-realization; they may be intellectually taught and believed as the fundamental dogmas of universal religion, theosophy. A dogma is the intellectual presentment of a truth known by the spirit, and believed on external authority.

3. Philosophical teachings. — Philosophically, theosophy is idealistic; consciousness is primary, the one indubitable fact, which can neither be strengthened nor weakened by argument. 'I am' is the testimony of consciousness to itself, and naught can disprove its witness, since every disproof, every argument, must be addressed to that same consciousness, and imply its existence. To the All-Self, matter is but the limitations imposed by Himself on His thoughts; to us, evolving in a universe which is the manifestation of our Logos, matter is His thought, limitations imposed on us by His thought and activity—limitations which we cannot transcend until we can realize ourselves in Him. Human thought, though feeble and undeveloped, is of the same nature as divine thought, and increases its power over matter with its increasing growth; thought is the one creative and moulding power, and, as evolving man realizes this, and so clarifies his lower nature that this aspect of the self can work through it, he becomes the master of that lower nature and of his surroundings, the creator and controller of his destiny. By thought, mastering the science of physical nature, he bends it to his will and utilizes it; by thought, mastering the science of the emotions, he builds virtues and destroys vices; by thought, mastering the science of mind, he subdues its turbulent energies into orderly obedience; by thought, directing will and controlling activity, he brings all things, within and without, into subjection to the self, 'the inner ruler, immortal.' Only by such fit rule and due subjection can man attain perfect health of body, emotions, and mind, and reach the highest good. Hence many of the practical theosophical teachings deal with this power and control of thought.

The eternity of spirit—more loosely spoken of as the immortality of the soul—is an integral part of theosophical philosophy. It is an inevitable deduction from the identity of nature of the human and the universal Self; 'unborn, undying, perpetual,' it is eternal as God Himself. The continuity of consciousness is equally inevitable, since the self is conscious and continuous, and in the self must consequently abide all its experiences, of which a successive survey is memory. The extent to which these memories are carried on by the material sheaths, or bodies, of the self—*i.e.* the survival of the individual and the person—will be better considered under the constitution of man.

The method of the unfolding of this continuous and conscious self in the human kingdom is by reincarnation. Reincarnation is, in fact, the only doctrine of immortality that philosophy can look at, as Hume said.[1] It means that the self, having unfolded to the human stage, appropriates matter from the three worlds (see below) and builds it into bodies, suitable for life in those worlds, beginning in the stage of barbarism, as a savage of a low type. During earth-life he gathers experiences, pleasant and painful; after death he meets the results of these experiences—the lower in the intermediate world, where he suffers in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and the higher in the heavenly world, where he enjoys in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and converts all these experiences into mental and moral capacities. When all are thus converted, he returns to earth-life, bringing with him these capacities wrought out of experiences, into new bodies built to express and utilize them. In these he goes through a similar cycle, gathering, suffering, transmuting, and so on and on; each birth brings the fruitage of the preceding lives to start the new pilgrimage, and this is the inborn character and temperament mental, moral, physical. Step by step he climbs the ladder, working under inflexible and inviolable laws, until he reaches the stature of the perfect man; he passes through all the classes of the school of life until he has mastered all that this world has to teach, and is *asekha*—he who has no more to learn. He is then a man, beyond birth and death, 'fitted for immortality,' ready for work in the larger life.

[1] In his Essay 'Of the Immortality of the Soul.'

4. Scientific teachings.—Theosophy differs from modern science in the fact that it includes under 'science' investigations into superphysical worlds. Its methods are the same: investigation by observation of objective phenomena, reasoning on observations, framing of hypotheses, discovery of invariable sequences (*i.e.* of natural laws), repeated experiments to verify deductions, and formulation of results. It uses the senses for observation, but the senses intensified — supersenses, in fact—responding to vibrations of matter finer than that which affects the physical senses.

As with modern science, so with theosophical—'occult science,' it is usually called—there is a body of accepted facts, laid down by recognized experts and largely reverified by later experiments, and a fringe of modern discoveries, constantly added to, revised, and modified. The accepted facts have been established by generations of occult experts, and their existence is often referred to in the scriptures of various religions; the more accessible of these are being constantly reverified by occult students to-day, but the larger cosmological facts are beyond our reach. Any discoveries made by students are subject to revision and modification, as observations are repeated and the instruments of observation are improved.

(*a*) *The constitution of the universe.*—The broad outline of this comes from the seers of the past, and is largely confirmed in the scriptures. It appears reasonable to us, and is congruous with the observations which we are able to make. The laws of analogy and recapitulation confirm it, for we see its outlines repeated in miniature within our own range of observation, and we see sequences rapidly repeated in miniature which the seers have described as occurring in a universe—as the monian evolution of the kingdoms of nature is mimicked in the growth of the embryo in the womb. A universe consists of seven kinds of matter, or planes, of which the densest is called physical or solid; the next finer, astral, or watery; the next, mental or fiery; the next, spiritual or airy; the next, superspiritual or ethereal; and the two finest, divine. What are called solar systems are all on the physical plane of the universe, and a solar system repeats within itself the seven kinds or states of matter, these subdivisions of the vast cosmic plane forming its planes, or worlds.

Within a solar system these subdivisions can be mostly studied by less developed seers, and we are in a field of research open to the occult student of our own day. We find in relation to our own earth: 'physical matter,' all formed by aggregations of similar physical atoms, similar except that some are positive, some negative; these aggregations are grouped into solids, liquids, gases, and three kinds of ethers; 'astral matter,' formed by aggregations of astral atoms, differing from physical atoms in shape, and grouped into states corresponding to the physical; 'mental matter,' formed by aggregations of mental atoms, again distinguishable by their form, and again grouped as before; the 'spiritual' and 'superspiritual worlds' are formed on the same plan, each having its own type of atom and its own corresponding states of aggregation. Of the 'divine worlds' we cannot directly speak.

(*b*) *The constitution of man* is analogous to that of the solar system, and hence the possibility of knowledge concerning it. As said, he is a fragment of the Universal Self, and he is clothed in the matter of his system. In the divine world dwells his

true self, the monad, and his consciousness appropriates matter from each of the five worlds below in order that he may know and conquer them; as the continuing 'I,' he uses matter from the superspiritual, spiritual, and the finer regions of the mental world; this is the 'spiritual body' of which St. Paul speaks; it grows and evolves through the whole cycle of reincarnation, and beyond, but is not changed or lost in birth or death; probably St. Paul refers to this when he speaks of our 'house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,' which he says 'we have.' It is this spirit in the spiritual body which is the reincarnating Ego, or individual, though the term is often used to indicate only the consciousness working in the finer mental matter, in what is termed 'the causal body,' a subdivision of the spiritual taken separately. When the reincarnating Ego takes a new birth, he appropriates some of the coarser matter of the mental world for his 'mental body,' some of the matter of the astral world for his 'astral body,' some of the matter of the physical world for his 'physical body'; his consciousness, in thinking, uses mental matter; in desiring or sensating, uses astral matter; in acting in the physical world, uses physical matter; these are 'the three worlds' in which his evolution goes on, and in which he is affected by birth and death, and is a personality, or person, *i.e.* the individual, as limited in expression by grosser matter; the mental body is closely related to the brain, though not dependent on it, save for activity in the physical world; the astral body is mainly correlated with the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic ganglia and nerves, and the glands; the three bodies interpenetrate each other, mutually acting and reacting throughout waking life. In sleep consciousness withdraws from the physical body, clothed still in its astral and mental garments, living then in the astral world, and sometimes, on its return, impressing on the physical brain some of its experiences in vivid and coherent 'dreams'; it keeps in magnetic touch with its physical body. In death this magnetic touch is broken off, and the consciousness dwells for a while in the astral world, called often 'the intermediate world,' in relation to those who have passed away from earth. After a while the astral body dies, and the man passes in the mental body into the mental world, or heaven, where he abides for a period extending to many centuries, the length depending chiefly on the richness of his intellectual, emotional, and artistic past life on earth. When he has assimilated all the experiences of this nature accumulated on earth, the mental body disintegrates, the consciousness withdraws to the spiritual body with all it has gathered to enrich the Ego. Then the Ego builds a set of new bodies for a new pilgrimage in the three worlds, and returns to them by birth. Thus the evolution of man is carried on in three worlds, brooded over by the spirit—himself—the spirit garnering the results and unfolding thereby; he is an inhabitant of the three during waking life; of two during sleep and for a period after death; of one during his heavenly life. The lowest, the physical body, is at present the most perfectly organized, and therefore the most capable of receiving impressions from without and transmitting them to the consciousness. The astral body is rapidly becoming organized, and its proper senses are developing, so that it is receiving and transmitting many impressions from the astral world, though generally with a lack of sharpness and accuracy; these include the phenomena of second-sight, premonitions, warnings, visions, perception of phantasms of the living and the dead, etc.—the phenomena to which modern psychology is paying so much attention. An increasing number of people are 'sensitive,' or 'psychic,' and are using the supersenses, *i.e.* the senses of the astral body, more or less consciously. The mental body is becoming well organized in educated people, but more in relation to its organ, the brain, than as an independent vehicle of consciousness, active in its own world. Consciousness, in the mental body, is in-turned rather than outward-turned. The occultist, having by the practice of special methods—meditation, concentration, etc.—artificially forced the evolution of the astral and mental bodies beyond the normal, is, as regards these, many centuries ahead of his time; he uses the supersenses for life in the astral and mental worlds in his waking consciousness, and thus carries on his investigations in them as the physical scientist does in the physical world. The dying of the three bodies, and the building of new ones for each successive life-period, is the cause of the loss of memory of past lives; that memory is in the reincarnating Ego, and is shared by the consciousness when animating the lower bodies only if, in those bodies, the man has realized himself as one with the higher.

(*c*) *The law of action and reaction* is universal, and exists in the worlds of emotion, thought, and spirit as much as in the physical world. Hence a man can build his character as scientifically as he can build up his body, and disregard of the mental and moral laws is as destructive of mental and moral health as disregard of physical laws is destructive of physical health. The study and utilizing of the laws, summed up as *karma*, forms an important part of theosophical work.

(*d*) *Evolution.*—The monad gradually unfolds his powers by coming into touch with matter and appropriating portions of it; he thus passes through the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, until in a highly developed animal the intelligence reaches the human stage; thenceforward reincarnation under *karma* is his means of unfolding. Humanity, on our globe, takes on a fresh type—more delicately organized as to the nervous system—that of a root-race, when a considerable number of reincarnating Egos are ready to develop a higher quality of consciousness. The third, or Lemurian, race, was the first to assume the really human type in the middle period of its evolution—the previous types being embryonic; the surviving remnants of the Lemurian are the negroes and the many negroid peoples scattered over the world. The fourth, or Atlantean, race with its seven sub-races—of which the Toltec, Akkadian, Turanian, and Mongolian peoples are typical—is still the most numerous. The fifth, or Aryan, race has already five sub-races—the Āryans of India, the Mediterranean Āryans (Arabs, the later higher-class Egyptians, etc.), the Iranians, Celts, and Teutons—and has yet to develop two more. These varying types afford to the reincarnating Egos the necessary varieties for their evolution, each Ego taking birth in the races and sub-races as often as is necessary for the unfolding of the qualities characteristic of each.

(*e*) *Human perfection.*—By repeated reincarnations under inviolable law, each man reaping exactly as he has sown, man reaches his temporary goal—human perfection. At the present stage of evolution it is possible for him to reach this goal in advance of the evolutionary term, which will last yet for many millions of years. By strenuous exertions and noble and unselfish living, he may attract the attention of the spiritual guardians of mankind, who will teach him how to quicken his evolution, so that he may enter on 'the path of holiness,' pass through its five initiations—or stages of widening consciousness—and become a 'master,' the last of the five initiations opening the gateway of superhuman evolution. He may then pass into other worlds, or enter the ranks of the guardians of this world, as he wills. From the hierarchy of these guardians have come the founders of world-religions, the lesser prophets and teachers being their disciples.

5. The ethics of theosophy.—These are not definitely formulated into any code, but consist of the highest and purest teachings of the world's noblest saints, prophets, and founders of religions. All that is sweetest and most lofty in the world's Bibles, all that is most inspiring and ennobling in the writings of its philosophers and moralists, forms the ethics of theosophy. As man lives by the highest ethic he can grasp, he becomes capable of appreciating ethic yet sublimer; the theosophist strives to live by the spirit of Christ rather than by any legal code, and, cultivating love, he hopes to be enlightened by the lords of love. Broadly speaking, that which works with the Divine Will in evolution is right; that which works against it is wrong; and the best examples of that Will are found in such divine men as the Buddha and the Christ. These the theosophist looks up to as examples, and strives to reproduce their likeness in himself.

6. The Theosophical Society.—This association was founded on 17th Nov. 1875, in New York City, U.S.A., by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and Henry Steele Olcott. The former was a Russian noblewoman, of extraordinary psychic endowments, and these had been trained and cultivated to the highest point by her 'master,' an Eastern occultist; she gave up social rank, wealth, and family to seek him in Tibet, and spent some years with him near Shigatze, after which, returning to the world, she gave the rest of her life to carrying out his directions. In America she met, at the famous Eddy farmhouse, a man who had won high distinction during the Civil War, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott, and he became her pupil. She endeavoured first to collaborate with the American spiritualists, but, failing in this, she, with Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society; she became its corresponding secretary, an office which she held for many years, and he its president; its organization is due to him and he remained president until his death in 1907, when the present writer was elected as his successor.

The unit of organization is a lodge, of not less than seven members; when a number of lodges, not less than seven, exist in any territory, they may group themselves into a section, or national society, which is self-governing, within the wide limits of the general constitution. The central ruling body consists of president, vice-president, treasurer, recording secretary, a general council consisting of the general secretaries, each elected by his own national society, with not less than five additional councillors, chosen by the general secretaries. It meets once a year and deals only with matters affecting the whole Society; but it may not meddle with the business of the sections, unless there be a transgression of the general constitution. The annual report of 1917 showed 19 national societies, 1074 lodges, with 28,673 active members. Round each lodge are gathered a considerable number of sympathizers and helpers, but these are not entered on the rolls. The headquarters of the Society were first in New York; in 1879 the

founders left America for India, and fixed the headquarters in Bombay; in December 1882 they moved to Adyar, a suburb of Madras, and there the headquarters have since remained. The Theosophical Society owns there an estate of 266 acres, with several fine buildings, and a library which is known all over the world of scholarship as possessing the finest existing collection of *Upanisads*, as well as some unique Sanskrit MSS.

While the Society exists for the purpose of spreading the ideas formulated above, it does not impose belief in them on its members, who, providing they accept the principle of universal brotherhood, are absolutely free to think as they will. Admission to membership is obtained on recommendation of two Fellows of the Society, and the acceptance of the following objects:

'To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour.

To encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science.

To investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.'

The following, written many years ago by the present president, states the general position of the Theosophical Society:

'The Theosophical Society is composed of students, belonging to any religion in the world or to none, who are united by their approval of the above objects, by their wish to remove religious antagonisms, and to draw together men of good will, whatsoever their religious opinions, and by their desire to study religious truths and to share the results of their studies with others. Their bond of union is not the profession of a common belief, but a common search and aspiration for Truth. They hold that Truth should be sought by study, by reflexion, by purity of life, by devotion to high ideals, and they regard Truth as a prize to be striven for, not as a dogma to be imposed by authority. They consider that belief should be the result of individual study or intuition and not its antecedent, and should rest on knowledge, not on assertion. They extend tolerance to all, even to the intolerant, not as a privilege they bestow, but as a duty they perform, and they seek to remove ignorance, not to punish it. They see every religion as an expression of the DIVINE WISDOM, and prefer its study to its condemnation, and its practice to proselytism. Peace is their watchword as Truth is their aim.

Theosophy is the body of truths which forms the basis of all religions, and which cannot be claimed as the exclusive possession of any. It offers a philosophy which renders life intelligible, and which demonstrates the justice and the love which guide evolution. It puts death in its rightful place as a recurring incident in an endless life, opening the gateway of a fuller and more radiant existence. It restores to the world the Science of the Spirit, teaching man to know the Spirit as himself, and the mind and body as his servants. It illuminates the Scriptures and doctrines of religions by unveiling their hidden meanings, and thus justifying them at the bar of intelligence, as they are ever justified in the eyes of intuition.

Members of the Theosophical Society study these truths, and Theosophists endeavour to live them. Every one willing to study, to be tolerant, to aim high, and to work perseveringly, is welcomed as a member, and it rests with the member to become a true Theosophist.'[1]

There have been some offshoots from the Theosophical Society which have become independent of the central organization, but which spread the same truths. There are two international societies, with headquarters in America, and some scattered independent bodies in Germany and Austria.

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A. BESANT.

THEOSOPHY.—Theosophy has characteristics which relate it closely to religion, and somewhat more remotely to philosophy. It also attempts to determine man's place in the universe and to solve the riddles of life and of death. Like religion, it aims at guaranteeing to its followers a more favourable destiny by showing them the way of healing and salvation. Like philosophy, it proposes to have recourse only to the resources which nature, on the one hand, and the human intellect on the other, place at its disposal, and it is by knowledge that it saves men. But the knowledge which it obtains is not grounded on the observation of facts which are within the reach of ordinary intelligences; it is intuitive, dependent on the exceptional clear-sightedness of men on a superior level, and communicated by them to their disciples. There is then a theosophical knowledge, just as there is a religious and a philosophical knowledge. Besides, it may well be that the content is throughout materially the same. Such a concept, *e.g.*, as that of the immortality of the soul may be found in all three. By what distinctive marks then can we recognize that a doctrine is theosophical? Now we know that there is a criterion which makes it possible for us, without risk of error, to distinguish between what is philosophical and what is religious. If a doctrine has been established by means of observation, induction and deduction, it is philosophical; it is religious if there has been concerned in its origination an intuition operating under the influence of feeling and imagination; it is only at subsequent stages that the ordinary processes of the human intellect intervene. Theosophy also begins with affirmations having an intuitive basis, and its constructions may have great emotional and imaginative significance. Having once secured this foundation, it may proceed, like theology, to construct, in accordance with the demands of reason, a system of satisfying coherence. The difference between theosophy and religion lies neither in their ideas nor in their method. It is in the attitude which the religious man, on the one hand, and the theosophist, on the other, assume towards the objects presented. The one hopes to work, by fear, reverence, and adoration, upon the will of powerful beings for his own advantage; the other depends upon himself, upon the immediate efficacy of his own knowledge and action; religion is humble, whereas theosophy is proud.[1]

This self-reliance the theosophist has in common

[1] *Theosophy*, p. 91.

[1] It is to be noticed, however, that, though the suggestion of pride is justifiable in connexion with the esoteric tendencies, the prevailing intellectualism, and calm acceptance of grades of religious capacity noticeable in modern theosophical teaching, yet there is also an element of humility frequently to be found in the modern theosophical attitude. There is a constant reference to teachers or adepts, and it is urged that their teaching should be accepted with implicit faith. The general efficacy of knowledge in obtaining the desired results may indeed be exaggerated and become an incentive to pride, but the individual thinker is not encouraged to depend merely on his own knowledge or even on the knowledge of his contemporaries. He, and they also, must look backwards with reverence to the past and accept the teachings which have been handed down from remote ages and are rediscoverable for men of the present age when the more modern excrescences upon religious systems have been removed.

with the magician. Both—the one more consciously than the other—admit the existence in the universe of hidden forces, for the control of which knowledge of them is sufficient. Both also show individualistic tendencies. They detach themselves from the religious community and break through the tradition officially recognized around them. But we may notice at least this difference between the magician and the theosophist: the one aims at using his power in an external way—he desires to control nature for the advantage or the disadvantage of his fellows; the other is a contemplative, who acts but little except on himself and for his own sake.[1] The theosophical spirit has left a very deep mark upon Indian thought. It is possible to trace its influence from its origin to our own day. India would be for the investigator a remarkable field for study if the chronological sequence of ideas and systems were not enveloped in a darkness which up to the present time has not been penetrated. It is impossible for us to date the most important of the texts from which we derive our information. Many of them are much later than the period when the theories which they set forth were formulated. Under such circumstances it becomes exceedingly difficult to settle the debit and credit side of the account of each school. Perhaps, however, one result may be considered to be now established: there has been in India a continuity of theosophical tendency. The systems interlace with and influence one another. The intuition on which their authors pride themselves consists in perceiving afresh the 'truths' which a kind of heredity has tended to fix in the Indian mentality. The task of the great philosophical schools has to a large extent been that of systematizing the ideas already worked out in the *Upaniṣads*. Buddhism would be unintelligible if the way had not been prepared for it, if not in these very schools, at least in antecedent groups bearing a very strong resemblance to them. And the reformers who have appeared in India in such large numbers since the Middle Ages have drunk at the same source. If, then, we cannot yet dream of giving a strictly historical presentation of theosophical speculations, it is at least not impossible to discern the order in which the principal systems have appeared. We shall follow (1) the development of this thought in circles which are, if not, strictly speaking, Brāhmanic, at least closely related to Brāhmanism (the *Upaniṣads* and the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, and the Yoga); (2) the transformation of theosophy into religion (into Jainism and Buddhism); (3) its incursions into popular religions of long standing, with which it has associated itself, not without a certain sacrifice of its own character and significance; and finally (4) we shall see how modern theosophy in India is dominated by ancient philosophical tradition.

[1] This statement should, however, be slightly modified when applied to modern theosophy in India. On the one hand, this shows an affinity to magic, in that it is greatly interested in the details of existence upon planes other than the physical, and so takes up a slightly materialistic attitude to those existences which are ostensibly non-material. The inhabitants of the astral and mental planes might for practical purposes be described as materializations of spiritual entities. Again, a distinct claim is put forward by theosophy to the discovery and use of hitherto unknown laws of nature, and the power which is thus put into the hands of the expert occultist who is also a theosophist is not altogether different from the power claimed by the magician. But, on the other hand, it must be frankly acknowledged that the modern theosophist in India does not, like some magicians, separate himself from the community to such an extent as to desire to use his powers for merely selfish purposes. Further, the ends at which he aims are ultimately of a spiritual rather than of a materialistic character, and in this he shows his superiority over the Christian Scientist in respect of the excessive attention paid by the latter to the claims of bodily health. It is thus undoubtedly true that the modern theosophist is a contemplative, to the extent that he places the spiritual far above the material, but he is perhaps less inclined than his forefathers in India to be interested merely in his own concerns, and he is more inclined to use for social purposes the powers which contemplation and thought-concentration have secured for him.]

1. The Brāhmanic theosophy.—(1) *The beginnings.*—The two tendencies which characterize Hindu thought throughout its course appear early in Brāhmanic circles. The one is the spirit of tradition: the rites and formulas do not show the expected results unless they are repeated just in the way in which the 'fathers' instituted them at the beginning. Not only will every innovation and every addition be avoided, but an even more necessary requirement is that the sacred acts shall be performed only by those who are in possession of liturgical knowledge, viz. by the Brāhmans. The *dharma*, *i.e.* the rule, which derives its authority simply from its antiquity, thus gradually extends its domination over men's minds. It becomes systematized in one of the six *darśanas*, the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā*. Anxious care in observing traditional forms has created the power of the priesthood. The fathers of families have been deprived of their religious importance to the advantage of the Brāhmans. The gulf between sacred and profane makes itself more and more evident.

Contrariwise, it is the spirit of novelty which manifests itself in the other tendency. During all the Vedic period the treasury of hymns and rites is taking form and being constantly enriched. If the gods have at first made use of these, it is not the gods who have revealed the knowledge of them. The *ṛṣis* have 'seen' and have communicated their visions to men.[1] The gods would have preferred to have the exclusive proprietorship.

Signs of this double tendency are to be found even in the same texts. We may be sure that, in circles as yet differing slightly from one another, tradition and originality existed side by side without offence. Why should they have entered into conflict? Did not both of them find their point of departure in the same hymns? Most of the Vedic deities can scarcely be distinguished from the forces and elements in which they reveal their power. They have almost no characterization, and they represent vaguely the divine which permeates the objects and phenomena of nature. Out of this naturalism, frequently rude in character, there easily emerge the pantheistic conceptions which were so soon to dominate Indian theosophy. Besides, do not ritualists and innovators alike make knowledge the essential condition of religious efficacy? Are not both of them Brāhmans, *i.e.* the heirs of the magicians who were charged at the beginning with the protection of the sacred rite from the pernicious influence of evil spirits? Finally—and most important of all—do not both believe that there is in every being and in every sacred act a mysterious energy which establishes harmony and co-ordination between man and the universe? And are they not now on the earth, like the 'fathers' of ancient times and the gods in the heavens, the depositaries and the agents of this mysterious force, creator of order and of life? When there is the thought of turning the secret power of the sacrifice to the benefit of the individual, with a view to assuring him of happiness beyond the grave and guaranteeing him against a second death which would be final, there are here the essential elements of theosophic doctrine—desire for deliverance from suffering and death, hope to succeed by personal effort, confidence in the saving efficacy of knowledge.

(2) *The ancient Upaniṣads.*—Theosophical thought, which is to be found in germ in the hymns and in the *Brāhmaṇas*, obtains form and consistency in the *Upaniṣads* (*q.v.*). Certainly the authors of those old treatises were far from

[1] See art. INSPIRATION (Hindu).

having broken their connexion with the traditional cult. But they love to give the sacred actions a symbolic interpretation which will relieve them of their mechanical and formal character. A still more significant thing is that they manifest a well-marked esoteric tendency: usually a long time is spent in appealing to the master before he consents to reveal the supreme truth, and the disciple is under obligation not to transmit it himself except to a particularly dear and well-qualified person. The method of discovery is always intuition; thought proceeds by abrupt illuminations. Moving impetuously and boldly, it puts assertions side by side with one another without concerning itself about their contradictoriness. It does not demonstrate; it is content to illustrate by beautiful metaphors and arresting similes.

In an as yet vague form the idea of the essential unity of the universe was implicitly contained in the Brāhmanic theory of sacrifice. There is now posited the existence of a Being in which all that is finds its reality. This Being is called *Brahman*, the name of the energy which manifests itself in the sacred action. It is also designated the *ātman*, *i.e.* the self or the soul of all that lives.

'Let one worship *Brahman*, knowing that he is the reality. Let one worship the *ātman*. The *ātman* has for body the life; for form, the light; for essence space. It can take all forms according to its inclination. . . . It permeates all the world. . . . It is the essence of life; it is the essence of myself.'[1]

Thus the theme is stated which the *Upaniṣads* go on to develop and repeat without intermission.

This Being is one and absolute. He has no determinations. One can say nothing of him except that he is. No definition is possible. We may at least try to name him, so convinced are we still that we know the Being of which we know the name. He is 'that,' *tat*. He is 'No, no,' for we deny every quality, which would serve only to limit him. He is the reality—the reality of realities, *satya satyasya*. Beyond the reach of all comparisons, he is bliss, a negative bliss, and, in consequence, absolute. He is without a second. He is my *ātman*, the reality of *me*. There is an identity between the *ātman* which I am and *Brahman*. 'I am *Brahman*.' 'Thou, thou art that.' The universal soul and the individual soul are one.

The world also is real. It derives its reality from *Brahman*, the only reality. A parallel between the psychical and the cosmical is founded upon the unity between the individual soul and the world soul. The cosmos and the ψυχή are the two aspects of the same reality, and the parallel elements which constitute them sustain themselves upon each other.

Finally, *Brahman* is the reality not only of the individual and of phenomenal existence, but also of transcendental existence. For there are two forms of *Brahman*, the one corporeal, the other incorporeal; the one mortal, the other immortal; the one mobile, the other immobile; the one manifested (*sat*), the other transcendent (*tyat*).[2]

In its individualized form the soul could not have the bliss which is the exclusive prerogative of the Absolute Being. The limited Ego is in contact with the non-Ego, and is unhappy while experiencing the alternations of pleasure and of pain, the impermanence and the vanity of finite things. In truth, 'he who is another than himself is suffering.' This misery is born of individuality and lasts equally long. The active self, the *jīva*, is involved, through its activity, in a series of existences of which each one is determined as to its quality by the quality of the existence which has preceded it. 'According as a man acts, according as he conducts himself, so is he reborn.'[3] 'Through good work a man is reborn in a good state, through evil work in an evil state,'[4] and so on, indefinitely. If the life is evil, it is because the man in his ignorance believes himself a person and says, 'I am such and such a one, this thing belongs to me.' This error and the activities which result from it entangle him in the meshes of a life which ever begins anew. Thus the wise man yearns after repose in the Absolute, in the bosom of a Being in whom alone are permanence and truth. How shall a man succeed in quenching individuality, which is the cause of all suffering? It is not by means of action, since action on the contrary is a source of individual life. Even asceticism has only the value of a propædeutic: it tends towards salvation, but it does not save. One way only is open to the soul desirous of deliverance, and that is knowledge. Knowledge is necessary, not now of rites and their meaning, but of *Brahman* himself. And since knowledge of *Brahman* means realization of the identity of the self and the Being who alone exists, one must be able to say to this Being: 'Thou, thou art the *ātman* of all that exists. That which thou art, I am that. . . . Thou art the Reality.' This saving knowledge can be reached only through inner vision. The individual suppressing his senses destroys all contact with the outer world and finds *Brahman* in himself. 'The eye would not flash forth to meet him, nor word, nor sense, nor works, nor ascetic practices. But if the mind is calm, if the heart is pure, then one contemplates the indivisible *Brahman*. One cannot know him except in the heart.'[1] If the Absolute cannot be grasped, one may at least approach him by intense meditation directed towards the symbols of him, and very especially by meditation upon the mystic syllable *Om*, for 'in truth this syllable is *Brahman*; in truth it is the supreme existence; it is the best fulcrum of existence; it is the ultimate ground.'[2] United with *Brahman*, the individual self has no more a distinct consciousness. 'It is when there are two existences that one hears, sees, and knows the other, but when for any one everything has become his own proper self, how could there be anything which he could see, hear, and understand?'[3] Moreover, absorbed in the Being who is altogether happiness, he shares in this infinite bliss.

(3) *The Vedānta.*—Of the six philosophical schools which claim connexion with Brāhmanism—more exactly, of the six schools which Brāhmanism has claimed as its own and which it has annexed—three only have given assistance to the elaboration of theosophical doctrine. They are the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the Vedānta (*qq.v.*). The last school is the only one of the three which devotes itself to an explicit continuation of the ancient *Upaniṣads*. We shall therefore begin with it, although, very probably, it did not attain its full development until after the two others.

The name Vedānta does not designate a single homogeneous school. There is a strictly monistic Vedānta: reality pertains to *Brahman* alone; all outside of him is nothing but appearance (*advaita*); this is the thesis of Śaṅkara,[4] at the beginning of the 9th century. Other Vedāntins profess a modified monism—the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja (*q.v.*; 11th century). Others finally abandon monism altogether, not in the sense that they put mind and matter over against each other, but because they allow an essential difference between the individual self and the universal self; these last attach themselves to Mādhva (*q.v.*; 12th century). But, however great their differences, the three teachers all invoke the authority of Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, and all three have written on this older teaching a commentary which is the fundamental text of their respective schools.

Rāmānuja has more right than Śaṅkara to claim to continue the teaching of the *Sūtras*. But Śaṅkara more than the two others, more even than Bādarāyaṇa, is in the line of succession to the *Upaniṣads*. While Rāmānuja and Mādhva are explicitly theistic and teach that God, the author of all grace, saves those who give to Him the worship of love and faith, Śaṅkara attributes to God (Īśvara) an apparent existence only, and an accessory rôle in the genesis of salvation. Consequently the history of theosophical doctrines in India is directly concerned with Him alone.

The first *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa thus states the object of the Vedānta: 'Now comes the study of *Brahman*.' To know *Brahman*, it is not enough to open the eyes and the ears and search for Being in the world which surrounds us. Between the Ego and the non-Ego there is an irreducible opposition: the senses and the understanding which perceive and appreciate the non-Ego either transfer to the object the qualities of the subject or transfer to the subject that which they believe they know of the object. In either case external cognition is vitiated by error; the true name of this pretended knowledge is 'nescience' (*avidyā*). Outside of us the senses and the understanding give us only the cognition of the phenomena of 'becoming.' Now Being, in reality, does not 'become'; it is. If it were 'becoming,' it would not 'be'; for it is impossible to see how that which is not could come to be. All becoming is only an appearance, an illusion.

This Being, the only reality, retains in the Vedānta the name of *Brahman*. This is the absolute *Brahman*, without determination, or, as the Vedāntins say, without quality; beyond time and space and causation, for time, space, and causation belong to the world of appearance, of *avidyā*. 'Being is one; all plurality results from false knowledge.' As it is impossible for me to doubt the reality of myself—I could not express this

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, x. vi. 3. 1 ff.
[2] *Bṛh. Ār. Up.* II. iii. 1. [3] *Ib.* IV. iv. 1.
[4] *Ib.* III. ii. 13.

[1] *Muṇḍ. Up.* III. i. 8 f. [2] *Kāṭha Up.* I. ii. 15–17.
[3] *Bṛh. Ār. Up.* IV. v. 15. [4] See art. ŚAṄKARĀCHĀRYA.

doubt except in affirming my existence—'I am *Brahman*,' provided that 'I' am denuded of every quality and of all contingency, of everything which constitutes my individuality. In this way I am *Brahman* entire, for *Brahman*, being absolute, could not have parts.

Nescience is not only a relation between the subject knowing and the object known; it is also the relation which emerges between the absolute *Brahman* and the world of names and forms. To this cosmic power, more particularly, the name *māyā* is given. *Māyā* (*q.v.*) signifies the alteration which takes place in *Brahman* and in the self as both pass from the category of the Absolute into those of time, space, and cause—an illusory alteration, which affects the ultimate Being and the self only in appearance. *Māyā* modifies on the one hand *Brahman* and thus creates the world; but it modifies also in the same way the Ego and creates the individual Egos. By the existence of *māyā* the unqualified *Brahman* becomes the qualified *Brahman*, the effect-*Brahman*, the lower *Brahman*. Śaṅkara gives to this *Brahman* also the name of God, Iśvara; but this God, His attributes, and the world which the lower *Brahman* creates, preserves, and destroys, do not exist save in virtue of nescience; all is phenomenal, illusory. From the point of view of true knowledge, there is neither cause nor effect; neither Iśvara nor world; neither agent nor act; but only Being unchangeable, indeterminate. Under the influence of *māyā*, the *ātman* becomes a *jīva*. The *jīva* becomes individualized through everything which serves it as a substratum, or *upādhi*—the body, the senses, the power of action, and the faculties of knowledge. But the attributes of the *jīva* have no more reality than those of Iśvara. Truly speaking, the self is not a product; it is incorporeal, spiritual, immutable, infinite, one.

For practical purposes and provisionally, both the world and the individual exist. To both of them even Śaṅkara pays considerable attention. Both are subjects and objects of action. Their destiny is determined by *karma*. 'An act cannot be annulled; this is the universal law; or, at least it cannot be annulled except through working out the result.' Action produces life, and life produces action. The self which acts will be reborn for action, and, again, for rebirth. The chain of causes and effects has not had a beginning. How could it have an end? Fortunately, cause and effect, act and result, are the work of nescience. And what nescience has produced, knowledge will destroy. 'As long as nescience has not been abolished, the individuality of the self is not abolished, and the individual soul continues to be the sphere of good and evil.' The individual can, by a knowledge of *Brahman*, escape from *karma* and the misery of a limited life. If he has discovered how he may attain this by a severe spiritual discipline, he can, through concentrating his thought upon himself and by a kind of spontaneous effort, reach the 'perfect vision,' *i.e.*, he can perceive the *ātman* in himself and thus have an intuition of his identity with the supreme *Brahman*. This vision destroys in him the remnants of personality and dissipates the mirage of the empirical world. He is saved. He is *Brahman*, and in consequence he is, in an absolute sense, being, thought, and bliss.

(4) *The Sāṅkhya.* — The Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*) is of ancient origin, for its influence upon primitive Buddhism cannot well be disputed. The main pronouncements of the school are, however, of later date, and several centuries subsequent to the birth of Buddha. Fortunately there are other works—*e.g.*, the *Mahābhārata* and some ancient Buddhistic writings—which mark out the path of development from the *Upaniṣads* to the classical form of the Sāṅkhya. As we now have it, the Sāṅkhya, realistic and atheistical, is Brāhmanical. It has no difficulty in including the Veda among the standards of knowledge. It may be that, originating outside of Brāhmanism, it was at a later date recognized by the latter, and has paid for this advantage by an adhesion, more or less nominal, to the authority of revelation. Nevertheless, as we find in works undoubtedly orthodox the antecedents of several essential doctrines of this system, it is more probable that it has originated from the same circles as those in which the ancient *Upaniṣads* were elaborated. Its genesis can be best explained if it is regarded as a product of reaction against the radical idealism which is implicit in the *Upaniṣads* and develops in the Vedānta.

The Sāṅkhya posits the absolute reality of the empirical world. If it is said that the world of things is the theatre of a perpetual becoming and that it is impossible to predicate being of that which is impermanent, its answer is that a thing is not real only at the moment when it manifests itself; it has also a subtle state, in which it exists potentially in its cause. For the effect is already to be found in its entirety in the cause: 'The effect and its cause are one.' To affirm the reality of things when they are in the subtle state is to assert that they are already substantial. The ordinary man is unable to see them in their causes because his senses are too gross. If, by ecstasy or as a reward of exceptional merit, he intensifies his power of vision, he will perceive the subtle as easily as the gross.

Whether subtle or gross, the world is essentially composite and changing. Now every complex thing implies a simple Being for the sake of whom it is formed; everything that changes changes only for the sake of an immutable Being. Thus, over against a substance composite and changing, the Sāṅkhya philosophy posits a simple and stable substance; with the *prakṛti*, which is the sphere of becoming, it contrasts the *puruṣa*, which is Being. Everything that acts or is acted upon, everything that changes and lives, the object known, the act and the organs of knowledge, all depend upon *prakṛti*. This includes ψυχή as well as φύσις, since, in the living being, the ψυχή must nourish itself like the φύσις, in order to sustain life and growth.

The change which emerges in the physical and psychical universe is a regular evolution, taking the form of a determination, a growing complexity, an increasing materiality. In its creative aspect evolution brings the gross out of the subtle. At the dissolution of the world the gross resolves itself into the subtle. The Sāṅkhya, which has minutely described the successive phases of the evolutionary processes, posits 24 principles (*tattvas*) which are arranged in order, from the *prakṛti*, the common foundation of all phenomenal existence, to the gross elements and their combinations. It is because the *prakṛti* is not simple that it has been able thus to produce all the things of the physical and mental world. It is threefold. It is composed of three factors, themselves substantial, which are called *guṇas*. These are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, goodness, passion, and darkness. It is by their presence in infinitely varying quantities that things affect men differently.

The 18 *tattvas* which in the evolution emerge between *prakṛti* at the one end and the gross elements at the other unite to form the 'characteristic body,' the *linga śarīra*. The *linga śarīra* is subtle and is to the gross body as the cause is to the effect; it explains the differences, both physical and psychical, which distinguish individuals from one another. Whilst the gross body is destroyed by death, the *linga śarīra* passes from birth to birth and constitutes the identity of the individual in the series of its existences. In every life it becomes richer or poorer according to all that a man thinks, does, or resolves. It is like capital which bears as interest the quality of succeeding existence. The characteristics of the *puruṣa*, or the soul, are directly the converse of those of *prakṛti*. The *puruṣa* is simple, immutable, inactive, unproductive, without *guṇas*. It is also multiple. Because all the souls have not the same kind of knowledge, and because some are free and others are still bound, it follows of necessity that there is an infinity of souls. But the *puruṣa* is in itself independent of all individualization to such an extent that we can always speak of it in the singular. The *puruṣa* is light and understanding; it is light without even having anything to illumine; it thinks without even having any object of knowledge.

Being and becoming, both infinite, are not placed simply over against each other. There is a relation established between them which explains creation, knowledge, and salvation. The neighbourhood of the *puruṣa* in fact causes in the *prakṛti* an excitation which leads in it to the formation of a subtle body in connexion with each *puruṣa*. But the subtle body is only the substratum of the conscious life. That emerges in virtue of the immediate presence of the soul. It is the form in which is expressed the relation between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Now this relation involves suffering for the soul. It is real, but it is not inherent in the soul. Because it is real, deliverance is necessary; because it is not inherent, deliverance is possible.

Both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* have to submit to certain consequences of the relation in which they are bound. When illuminated by the *puruṣa*, the modifications which take place in the ψυχή of the individual become conscious. These again are reflected upon the soul, which thus becomes subject to all the interplay of the affections. It is in this roundabout way that the soul arrives at a knowledge of itself. For, though it is the subject of all knowledge, the *puruṣa* cannot know itself directly. This knowledge becomes possible through a reflexion coming from the mirror provided by the internal organ. The *puruṣa*, full of light but inactive, and the *prakṛti*, active but unconscious, stand to each other in the relation of the paralytic to the blind. Their association is discovered to be beneficial for both. In the service of the *puruṣa*, the *prakṛti* is creative, and this creation has no other end than to make knowledge possible for the soul—which knowledge necessarily eventuates in salvation.

A slow and elaborate process is necessary to break the bond and suppress suffering. This is the main intention—not to destroy actual suffering, which on other grounds would be impossible, but to make it abortive in its germ or in the persistent dispositions stored in subtle form in the internal organ. A slow internal struggle brings a man from the natural state—*i.e.* the morbid state—to absolute healing. Works and asceticism may prepare the ground, but it is knowledge which is truly efficacious. By means of study, self-contemplation, and meditation, we may arrive at an assertion of the truth: 'I am not: nothing is mine; this is not me.' One thus gets a direct perception of the distinction between the Ego and the *prakṛti* To establish this distinction is to destroy the bond and to see the *puruṣa* in its absolute purity. Henceforth the soul has no other substratum than itself; there is no further association with the subtle body, no reflexion cast by it; the soul is healed

The *prakṛti* also derives advantage from a deliverance which, in effect, suppresses suffering for it, inasmuch as suffering is not felt except for so long as the *prakṛti* is illumined by the soul. As it would not be creative except in relation to the soul and its salvation, it ceases to be active and returns to the original equilibrium of the *guṇas*. Moreover, this healing has no value except for the liberated soul. 'Since, notwithstanding the infinity of time, there are still souls not liberated, there will be such to all eternity.'[1]

(5) *The Yoga.*—It might be asked if in the history of Indian theosophy the place of the Yoga (*q.v.*) is truly next to the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, if its affinities are not in an altogether different direction and with the group of systems which, though they adopted many theosophical ideas, are obviously theistic and devotional in tendency. Does it not make a place for God, for that Īśvara who is a 'soul apart,' a unique Being, eternal, all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing, exposed to no suffering, to no desire or change? Does not this God show an infinitely benevolent activity on behalf of men desirous of salvation? Does He not vouchsafe spiritual vision to His elect? Does not the *yogī*, to obtain salvation, surrender himself to God with that feeling of complete abandonment which is called *praṇidhāna*? Finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place? What have the recognized means for purifying the body and delivering the soul from the organ of thought to do with the pursuit of *jñāna*, the knowledge which brings salvation?

It is easy to answer these objections. First of all we may remark that the rôle attributed to Īśvara in the scheme of salvation is really secondary. After the preliminary process is gone through, there is no further intervention of divine assistance to second the efforts of the *yogī*, and everything happens as if he had only his own powers to rely upon. Further, the supreme end is not, by any means, as in theistic religions, eternal life in God or near God; what is desired is the absolute isolation of the individual soul. It follows that, probably, when the Yoga came to be systematized, Īśvara was merely a survival of a period when practices of asceticism and sorcery were associated with Śiva, a god whose vigorous personality might seem incompatible with an exclusively human conception of salvation. In fine, Īśvara was no more an inconvenient intrusion in the Brāhmanical Yoga than in the monistic Vedānta; it is even possible that his presence was indirectly the sign of the penetration of the Yoga by the theosophical spirit.

The Yoga, desirous of specially emphasizing the practical conditions of meditation and saving ecstasy, would naturally disregard study and reflexion, since neither of them was of service in securing the marvellous powers for which the *yogī* was ambitious. But, as in Brāhmanizing itself it had adopted very nearly in its entirety the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya, there was really no need to indicate the acquisition of knowledge as among the demands imposed by the need for salvation. This acquisition could have been considered as implicitly prescribed from beginning to end. In any case it is interesting to point out that in an *Upaniṣad* greatly influenced by Yoga ideas, the *Maitri Upaniṣad*, the examination of reflexion had a place among the members of Yoga. Perhaps we have in this a proof drawn from a period before the Yoga became entirely allied to the Sāṅkhya.

In other characteristics the Yoga shows itself faithful to the theosophical spirit. It rests upon very ancient beliefs closely related to magic. The remarkable manifestations of patience, will-power, and intelligence reveal the presence of supernatural faculties and imply in their possessors a new acquisition of energy. Besides, the accomplishment of salvation depends entirely upon personal effort. There is no possible doubt that the Yoga belongs legitimately to the same spiritual family as the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.

[1] *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, i. 158.

Properly speaking, the Yoga is the act by which the senses and the understanding are held in restraint; turned resolutely in one single direction, the mind acquires greater force and certain new faculties. The processes regarded as efficacious had already been employed for a long time when Patañjali formulated his theory of them. If, as is probable, the author of the *Yoga Sūtras* is the same as the illustrious grammarian of the same name, then this spiritual discipline was systematized in the 2nd cent. B.C. But, in the influence which from the beginning it exerted upon Buddhism, we have proof that it goes much farther back. The proper object of the Yoga, as supplied with doctrines by the Sāṅkhya, is, as the first of the *Sūtras* says, 'the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle,' *i.e.* of the understanding. Freed from all *chitta*, the *puruṣa* regains its own nature. We are not concerned, as in the Vedānta, with recognizing by an effort of thought the identity of the Ego and the universal self; nor with distinguishing, as in the Sāṅkhya, the self from that which is not the self; the aim is to bring about the integration of the soul, in which consists her salvation.

The *yogī* pupil has difficult conditions to fulfil. A long and painful process of preparation is imposed upon him, so that he may triumph over all the obstacles inherent in the feebleness of man. It is in the first phase of this process that devotion and the practice of mortification have their parts to play. Whenever this propædeutic has fulfilled its functions, the adept may proceed to exercises which lead to the suppression of the intellectual functions and the detachment of the soul. According to the authoritative scheme, the programme of this gymnastic is divided into eight members. Five of these rubrics aim at the bringing of the body under control. They comprise interdictions and injunctions, prescriptions relative to the positions to be taken in meditation, and others which have for their aim the control of breathing, and, finally, the procedure which has to be followed in restraining the senses and destroying communications between the mind and the external world. There is special insistence upon the regulation of the breath, on the ground that individual life and thought are bound up with respiration, and that to control the one is to dominate the other. When, finally, the body has been purified, it becomes possible to exercise control on thought; three kinds of exercises lead it progressively towards unification, the destruction of individuality, and isolation.

Another method, more violent and more complicated, is founded upon a most bizarre kind of physiology. Through modifying and even stopping the circulation of the vital spirits in the channels of the body, the *yogī* succeeds in suppressing the natural functions of the understanding and in exalting the power of action and of vision. Strange phenomena accompany the last phases of this spiritual process: colours appear which are invisible to the ordinary man; sounds are heard; the *yogī* sinks into a 'mystic slumber.' Sometimes also the strain of so much effort ends in madness. The texts expatiate at great length on the manifold advantages which Yoga brings to its disciples. First of all there are benefits of an entirely mundane character: health, youth, and beauty. Especially there is obtained a 'sovereign power' which enables those who possess it to realize immediately all that they desire, to make themselves at will exceedingly small or big, light or heavy; to control the elements; to guide the will or sentiments of another; to change the nature of substances, to distribute their personality amongst several different bodies, etc. But for the *yogī* the spiritual results have more value. In seven stages the soul obtains liberation, first of all from the external world, then from the hindrances which come to it through its association with the organs of the intelligence and the will. Liberated from the world of results, the soul rejoices in pure tranquillity; dissociated from the internal organs, it tastes the ineffable delights of ecstasy, and reaches without any distraction the state of integration (*kaivalya*) in which is its salvation.

Before leaving Brāhmanic theosophy, we may point out that in more than one characteristic it is very closely connected with Western occultism (*q.v.*). Our theosophists have, like the Vedāntists, a marked tendency towards monism; their anthropology has borrowed much from the Sāṅkhya philosophy; they authorize exercises which are not without analogy to those prescribed by the Yoga.

2. Theosophy as the germ of new religions.—In

Brāhmanism the theosophical doctrines are placed alongside of the old tradition, and religious society remains confined to the old framework. When theosophy is transformed into a religion, the conditions are altogether altered. Henceforth a man becomes a member of a community, not because of his birth, but because of his adherence to a certain belief; the idea and the group are co-extensive. Moreover, theosophy ceases to be a mere intellectual doctrine; it takes entire possession of the individual, and aims at maintaining among its adherents the unity of discipline and of life.

Two religions have sprung from the movement of thought which we find permeating the old *Upaniṣads*, viz. Jainism and Buddhism. Seeing that they are born in the same spiritual environment, it is not strange that they should have many characteristics in common. Their doctrines, their legends, their rules of life, have an unmistakable air of family relationship. The worship itself, in its outer forms, is so similar in various particulars that from the outside one might easily confuse the two systems; witness only the tale of Aśvaghoṣa in which one finds King Kaniṣka worshipping a Jain *stūpa* under the impression that it is Buddhistic. Jainism and Buddhism are both products of the process of crystallization which was a feature of the period of the ancient *Upaniṣads*. Besides Brāhmans practising strict observance of rites and a solitary asceticism, India has been familiar with what one might call wandering cenobitism. The teachers, accompanied by their disciples, go from place to place, not settling down anywhere except during the months of the rainy season. These *parivrājakas*, in the course of instructing their pupils, discuss the most diverse subjects. The groups are not closed. Round about a knot of faithful disciples there gathers a numerous body of adherents and friends. If Jainism and Buddhism have been able to transform themselves into Churches, the reason is that they have understood better than some other *saṅghas* how to attach the laity by solid bonds and to organize the community by fixed rules. There is now no doubt that Jainism is prior to Buddhism. Buddhists themselves do not hesitate to admit the fact. But Jain writings are certainly posterior — and very much so — to those of Buddhism. It may well be that, if there has been borrowing, the Jains have been the debtors. If we begin with them, it is not in order to lay stress on the relative dates, but rather because, on the whole, the Jainist Church has remained more faithful to the theosophical tradition of the *Upaniṣads*.

(1) *Jainism.*—Jainism (*q.v.*) has all the characteristics of a theosophical religion. It puts at the centre of its teaching the doctrine of *karma* (*q.v.*), and shows itself chiefly interested in human destiny. It aims at delivering men from the misery of the *saṁsāra*. It demands that the individual should be the instrument of his own regeneration. It searches for the saving truth beyond phenomena and sensible perception, and, as a consequence, asserts the authority of persons endowed with exceptional faculties of vision and knowledge. It places itself outside the Brāhmanic tradition. Nothing more is heard of Īśvara. Jainism is a 'human' doctrine. Śaṅkara sees in this a reason for its condemnation. Because it opposes to Vedic tradition a new rule, this theologian accuses it of not being 'revealed.' And yet Jainism also makes it a duty for its disciples to have faith in the words of an omniscient master, who made known the way of emancipation, who has triumphed over the world of death, and who, because of this, has received the surname of Jina ('the Victorious').

Perhaps because the Jains appeal to omniscient teachers, they have promulgated a theory of knowledge which forbids any absolute affirmation or denial. Every proposition has a relative value only (*anekāntavāda*); a thing is not thus; in a way it is this; I can say that a thing is not, that it is, and that it is not, that it 'cannot be spoken of,' etc., only if it is understood that these predicates are true merely relatively and under certain reservations (*syādvāda*). As far as one can conjecture from the examples which illustrate the various dialectic 'refractions' (*bhaṅga*), the aim of the *syādvāda* is to show that nothing can be known except in relation to the totality of the universe, where birth, duration, and death rule together, and that, relatively to this indeterminate universe, things are themselves indeterminate. 'Everything is indeterminate by the very fact of its existence.'[1] The aim of this doctrine was to destroy at one and the same time the monistic dogmatism of the Vedānta and the negations of the sceptical schools.

Everything in the universe comes under one or other of the five categories of substances (*dravya*): soul (better, life), space, merit, non-merit, and material molecules. Souls (*jīva*) and molecules (*pudgala*) are infinitely numerous; space, merit, and non-merit are single. Merit (*dharma*) has the effect of furthering the progress of the soul; non-merit (*adharma*) leaves it stationary. The progress of the soul is the consequence of its *karma*.

In fact, the soul is by its nature limited and active. As limited, it has the dimensions of the body, which serves as its substratum; it is lessened and increased along with the body. As active, it receives in virtue of its *karma* an influx of material molecules, which, according to their quality, are black, blue, grey, yellow, rose-colour, and white, and which affect the *jīva* by giving it various colours. This influx of karmic matter is the bond which links the soul to the *saṁsāra*. The individual who aspires to salvation has the task of purifying his soul. By asceticism he eliminates the *pudgala* which stain it. By draining off the acquired *karma*, asceticism is the essential factor in *nirjarā*, or the burning up of the effects of *karma*. Thus one of the characteristics of Jainism is the extreme importance which it assigns to *tapas*. It is not sufficient to annul the past; it is also necessary to prevent the formation of new *karma*. And this desirable result is produced by discipline, by *saṁvara*. In its two principal forms it prevents the entrance of the karmic *pudgala* into the *jīva*; the two forms are control (*gupti*) and good behaviour (*samiti*). By *gupti* the soul represses the activity of the body, of speech, and of the mind; by *samiti* it so behaves as not to injure or offend any one. Reflexion and meditation are also efficacious means of discipline and of defence against the pernicious influx. Right vision (*i.e.* right faith), right knowledge, and right conduct complete the way of deliverance. And, just as an elixir does not heal any one except him who knows it, has faith in it, and applies it properly, so the Three Jewels cannot produce deliverance unless they are united.

Henceforth, liberated from the *saṁsāra*, the zealous Jain is a *siddha*, a perfected being. He is disburdened of all karmic matter. He is without colour. His soul, lightened of every hindrance—like a flame which rises by its own strength—begins its course upwards towards the higher regions of the universe. There he enjoys a happy and eternal existence. *Mokṣa* has the effect of rendering the *jīvas* detached and free.

(2) *Buddhism.*—Buddhism also is a theosophy which has expanded into a religion. If the 'high priest' of Ceylon can give his approval to the catechism drawn up by Colonel Olcott, and, still more, if the communities of Ceylon, Burma, Japan, and Mongolia give their adhesion to the fourteen articles in which the same writer gathers together the fundamental beliefs of Buddhism, the reason lies in the unmistakable affinity between the tendencies of present-day Buddhism and those of Western theosophical societies. But we have no need of external proof to enable us to assert the fundamentally theosophical character of the teaching of Gautama Buddha.

'As the ocean has only one savour, the savour of water, so the doctrines which I teach and the rule which I establish have only one savour, that of salvation.'[2] Buddha wishes to save men, not from sin, but from suffering and death.

He summons all men to salvation. 'The gate of immortality is open for all beings. Let him who has ears come, hear the Word and believe.'[3]

He rejects the authority and traditional knowledge of the Brāhmans. 'In a line of blind men who attach themselves to one another, the first does not see, the man in the middle does not see, the last does not see. Such are the discourses of the Brāhmans. Their faith is without foundations.'[4]

He makes salvation a personal matter for each individual. 'Be your own lamps; be your own refuge. Do not search outside yourselves for a lamp or a refuge.'[5] 'You must yourselves make the necessary effort. A Buddha is only a counsellor.'[6]

Finally, the framework of the building erected by Buddha

[1] *Sarvadarśana Sutras*, p. 29. [2] *Chullavagga*, ix. i. 4.
[3] *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 170. [4] *Ib.* ii. 169 ff.
[5] *Dīgha Nikāya*, ii. 101 (= *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, ch. ii.).
[6] *Dhammapada*, v. 276.

is constructed almost entirely from materials borrowed from the Brāhmanical schools, nurtured in the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*.

The method of salvation which Buddha preaches to men includes rules of life and truths of an intellectual character. But since it is well understood that his teaching has but one savour, there is no hint that men should practise virtue because it is virtue, or search for knowledge because of the practical or intellectual satisfaction which knowledge brings. Morality and learning, in intention at least, are looked at only from the narrow point of view of salvation. Thence come the limits within which they move. In fact, Buddha did not wish to teach either morality or science, but only a therapeutic of the will and a therapeutic of the intelligence. When once a man is healed from moral evil and from error, he may work onwards towards salvation.

(*a*) *Therapeutic of the conduct.*—Only a soul purified by moral discipline can receive with profit the teaching of the Law. The most formidable enemy of salvation is the desire for sensual enjoyment. Sensuality figures in all the lists of depravities, infections, obstacles, and hindrances. It is against sensuality that men have chiefly to struggle. Hence the imperious necessity of exercising constant control over the senses. Of all the virtues vigilance is most characteristic of Buddhistic moral teaching.

(*b*) *Therapeutic of the intellect.*—Knowledge is not less necessary than good conduct. Like good conduct, it has chiefly a negative value. In theosophies closely connected with Brāhmanism knowledge is a working out of deliverance in a positive manner, because upon the topics of God, the world, the soul, and human destiny there is a body of knowledge directly efficacious for salvation. But the point of view of Buddha and his earlier disciples is quite different. That which they want is to deliver the mind from unfavourable thoughts which may hinder the individual or at least lead him in a false way. It can be understood how different are the conditions under which the spiritual struggle presents itself according as one admits or denies the existence of eternal and immutable beings, whether immanent or transcendent or both. Buddha's aim was to show that in the succession of phenomena no cause was revealed which was not itself phenomenal, and to deduce from this proposition the consequences affecting the moral life of the individual. The earliest Buddhism neither knew nor wished to recognize anything other than phenomena. Phenomena, both physical and psychical, constitute *dharma*. In us and outside of us we reach nothing but *dharma*, not because of our mental incapacity, but because neither in us nor outside of us is there anything but *dharma*. The constituents of *dharma* are not hung, as it were, upon a substance of which they are the momentary phases; they are themselves the whole reality. Primitive Buddhism is thus at the opposite pole from the Vedānta, which abstracts from phenomena and regards Absolute Being as the only reality.

Whether subjective or objective, phenomena are incessantly changing, and things are involved in a perpetual flux. Phenomena are just those states of individuals and objects of which the essential characteristic is complexity. Now only the simple and homogeneous can be permanent. The human individual is an assemblage of five kinds of aggregates, and this composite is modified from moment to moment. What is called the individual (*pudgala*) is a series, more or less lengthy, of the phases of composites continually altering. The movement of aggregates, or of combinations of aggregates, does not take place by chance, or without any system. One cause determines the condition of every new combination, and this cause is the quality of the antecedent combination. With conscious individuals, who alone are interested in the theory of salvation, the causal combination is an agent, and his action produces results of two kinds; it manifests itself externally as the immediate cause of phenomena, and internally as a modification of the doer himself of the action. *Karma* may be defined as the reaction of the act upon the subject. This reaction takes place generally at 'the dissolution of the body after death,' in such a way that the binding force of one individual life reappears in another individual life. As Buddhism has discarded every hypothesis not connected with visible forms of existence, it does not posit a subtle body as the vehicle of *karma*, or an Īśvara as the controller of resultants. Even at a distance *karma* is a force which works mechanically. Moreover, it fulfils in Buddhism the function of explaining the congenital differences which are found among men, and of awakening in the hearts of the faithful adherents the feeling of their moral responsibility.

Karma is far from being a doctrine specifically Buddhistic. The same cannot be said of the two sets of rules the discovery of which transformed the potential into the actual *buddha*: the Four Noble Truths and the Twelve Causes. These Buddhism has always claimed as its own. The Truths are suffering, its cause, its suppression, and the way which leads to suppression. 'What is impermanent, that is suffering.'[1] 'The craving for existence and for the cessation of existence are the causes of suffering.'[1] 'The suppression of suffering consists in the destruction of the craving by the complete suppression of desire.'[2] We arrive at suppression by following the Noble Eightfold Path—right knowledge, right willing, right speech, etc. The ultimate significance of the Twelve Causes is to explain suffering without having recourse to any principle except those recognized by Buddhism, viz. the aggregates, *karma*, and the Noble Truths. Through one causal link after another, the life of suffering is connected with its deepest source, viz. ignorance. In this way there is excluded the notion of a soul which would be essentially and incurably suffering. There is eliminated also the interference of a God who imposes the suffering upon His creatures; if the misery came from outside, it would not be in the power of man to put an end to it. It does not belong to the Ego as a permanent substance, and, since the older theosophy had shown that man cannot find God except in and through the Ego, Buddhism, in denying the *ātman*, is compelled also to deny *Brahman*, the original and immanent cause of the universe.

If Buddhism is a theosophy, it is much more a religion. Religion aims at satisfying much more varied needs than does an essentially intellectual doctrine. Religion is a manner of living, and not only a manner of thinking. The necessities of life and of controversy soon compelled Buddhism to extend considerably the range of its practical and dogmatic teaching.

In ethics Buddhism was far from confining itself to the limits imposed by the demands of salvation. In seeking to give the greatest possible effectiveness to its moral pronouncements, Buddhism does not take the trouble to co-ordinate systematically the lessons which circumstances suggest. When it addresses itself to the laity—as frequently happens—it disregards the special conditions of the strictly religious life, and its precepts obtain a universal significance. The exclusive interests of personal salvation are then so far from its thought that the virtues which it enjoins have a social and human value—compassion, charity, humility. Similarly there is an expansion of doctrine. Questions kept in reserve at the beginning soon had to be investigated, and the reason for this was that facility might be obtained for discussing them with rival schools. Ontological and epistemological topics soon became the order of the day. It was inevitable that, even within the limits of Buddhism, some divergent solutions would be proposed. Hence the appearance of sects in which tendencies showed themselves which had hitherto remained latent: the realistic schools of the Sarvāstivādins, the idealistic schools of the Yogāchāras, the nihilist schools of the Mādhyamikas.

The later disciples of Buddha deliberately abandon the prudent agnosticism of their Master. Their speculations are concerned with the transcendental world (*lokottara*). Even the fundamental unity of the universe is affirmed (doctrine of the *tathatā*). It is noteworthy also that Buddha himself, who from the earliest times had been regarded as the perfect example of humanity, comes to represent, in the theory of the Threefold Body, at one and the same time, phenomenal existence, non-sensible existence, and absolute existence—the body of creation, the body of bliss, and the body of the Law.

But, even when considerably amplified, conduct and knowledge are not given more than a negative importance as regards salvation. Upon the soil cleared by them the problem is now to construct the properly religious life. On what plan will this building be erected? It will be no matter of astonishment that, being at once theosophical and religious, Buddhism has conceived a double ideal of life and has proposed two different methods. To become *arhats* and accomplish their own salvation was the aim of the *sthaviras* of the ancient Church; they are the adherents of the Lesser Vehicle. Those of the Greater Vehicle

[1] *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, iv. 26.

[1] *Mahāvagga*, i. vi. 20. [2] *Ib.* i. vi. 21.

aspire to become *bodhisattvas* and believe in religious solidarity.[1] It was enough for the first to transform a sinner into a saint; the others have more ambition; they desire that the sinner, following in the footsteps of Buddha, should become a saviour. It can easily be understood that the way of the *arhat* and the career of the *bodhisattva* separated themselves perceptibly from one another.

(α) *The way to arhatship.*—Conversion makes of the Buddhist a new man. He 'enters into the current.' By an energetic and long-continued struggle he destroys in himself the adverse principles. Two roads to the goal now open up before him. The one is through a series of spiritual exercises. Meditation and intense concentration secure in him serviceable tranquillity (*śamatha*). No more of attachment, no more of desires; the very residues of desire are destroyed. The results of the liberation of the heart are clear vision (*vipaśyanā*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). The other way is that of enfranchisement (*vimokṣa*). The path to the awakening is by ecstatic contemplation (*dhyāna*). From ecstasy to ecstasy the monk rises in eight stages (the *samāpatti*) to a state of being which is neither thought nor the absence of thought. It is the suppression of voluptuous ideas, of discursive ideas, of joy, of breathing—the abolition of the world of forms by that of space, and of the world of space by that of knowledge; of the world of knowledge by that of the non-existence of things, and of the last by that in which there are neither ideas nor the absence of ideas. Arrived at this already very elevated stage, the *arya* enters into possession of superior powers (the six *abhijñā*). But it is necessary to go even higher. A ninth and last *samāpatti* leads to the 'dissolution of all conscious perception,' to 'the awakening,' to *sambodhi*. When one has taken the way of wisdom or of enfranchisement, one becomes an *arhat* (*q.v.*), a saint. The *arhat* has done 'that which he had to do.' When his *karma* is drained off, he will be extinguished without his last thought or his last aggregate giving rise to a further thought or a further combination.

(β) *The way to Buddhaship.*—As the ideal is higher, the method is more complicated. The career of the *bodhisattva* (*q.v.*) demands a long preparation and solemn pledges. There must emerge in the man the 'thought of illumination' (*bodhichitta*), that he should take the vow to do everything to arrive at the goal (*praṇidhāna*); that by an act of will he should 'assign' to the advantage of another his actions and the fruit of his actions (*pariṇāmanā*). Then commences the struggle properly so called. In order to obtain illumination, the *bodhisattva* must provide himself with a double equipment, merit and knowledge. The programme which has to be followed includes acts of worship, rules of conduct, and the practice of meditation. The object is to acquire successively the ten perfections (*pāramita*), each corresponding to a spiritual world (a *bhūmi*). At the end of this long ascent the *bodhisattva* obtains finally the illumination which makes him a *buddha*, *i.e.* a liberator of creatures, an ultra-phenomenal being still sojourning for a time in the phenomenal world.

For *arhat* and *bodhisattva* the eventuality is the same—*nirvāṇa* (*q.v.*), extinction. What does it matter that neither Buddha nor his authorized disciples have said what *nirvāṇa* is? If one knows that it is the abolition of suffering and death, of relative and individual existence, that is enough to make it an infinitely desirable state. If Buddha has gained control over natures of the most diverse qualities, it is just because he has left them the liberty of imagining a *nirvāṇa* conformable to their needs and their aspirations.

Let us take a look backwards. We may agree that Buddhism has certainly characteristic marks of a theosophical system. It regards ignorance as the source of all the evil of living, and knowledge as the panacea of suffering. It seeks to deliver its adherents from the fear of death. It endeavours to upset the Brāhmanical methods of salvation. It denies that texts or doctrines have any direct value for salvation, and it affirms the value of 'vision,' of intuition arrived at by internal concentration and ecstatic meditation. It demands that every man should be the architect of his own salvation, and, even though it multiplies the 'saviours,' it no less emphasizes for the individual the necessity of personal effort. It teaches that knowledge is power, and that spiritual excellence manifests itself outwardly in extraordinary faculties. It breaks through the traditional framework and urges the individual to work without procrastination towards his regeneration and so to arrange matters that this labour shall fill his whole life.

3. **Introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions.**—Brāhmanism in its different aspects was only one of the forms of the religious life; in every period there was also the popular current, powerful, infinitely varied, and mobile. Just as in the sacerdotal tradition minutely elaborated rites occupy the principal place, gods and demons are central in the popular religion, and the worship which is given to them, mixed throughout as it is with superstitions and gross practices, answers more fully to the idea which is generally held of devotion and of piety. These two religious contents have not existed side by side without exerting an influence upon each other. We have here to do only with the influence exerted by the theosophy of Brāhmanism. This influence is only a particular illustration of the growing preponderance which the sacerdotal caste obtained in all the moral life of India, and of which the Buddhistic writings themselves give unmistakable evidence. Nothing is more natural than this primacy. The Brāhmanical families had at their disposal two powerful forces, tradition and cohesion. In a society which was crumbling to its foundations they formed a solid group, cemented by community of interest and of ambitions and reinforced by the habits of knowledge and of virtue. Popular forms of worship, legal and social rules, and secular poetry no doubt flourished to a large extent outside of Brāhmanical circles; but the influence of the latter has none the less succeeded in filtering through at every point. Just as Sanskrit, the scholastic idiom of the Brāhmans, invaded the epic and the drama, the popular style, and the literature of business, so the Brāhmans made themselves the theologians of the sectarian religions. They applied to them the methods of their systematizing temperament. They also introduced into them their conceptions of being, of the world, and of destiny, hesitating less to popularize these conceptions since Buddhism had already deprived them of their esoteric character.

We have in the *Mahābhārata* (*q.v.*) excellent evidence of the appropriation by Brāhmanism of materials which were without doubt independent. This document is all the more significant because it shows clear traces of successive accretions, and because its slow elaboration was carried through during the many centuries when the Brāhmans were gradually establishing their spiritual domination. We may regard the poem as completed, in the form in which we know it, at the time when neo-Brāhmanism was triumphant, *i.e.* in the 4th or 5th cent. A.D. And this voluminous encyclopædia of the traditional knowledge of the Hindus is something more than a witness; it was also one of the agents, perhaps the most effective of all, in the expansion of Brāhmanism in India. Before, during, and after the composition of the great epic, a mass of writings emerge to illuminate or supplement its evidence—sectarian *Upaniṣads*, *Dharmaśāstras* (as the first of which we may regard that which bears the name of Manu), *Purāṇas*, books written in prose or in verse by the numerous reformers of Hinduism or under their influence. Unfortunately the investigation of this rich literature has not yet been completed.

By gaining entrance into works definitely popular, the ideas whose development we have hitherto followed in the texts of a school or in the monastic literature began to exert a powerful influence upon the general thought of India; and nothing proves more effectively the plasticity of religious thought than the faithfulness with which conceptions originally monistic and antitheistic persist, almost

[1] See artt. HĪNAYĀNA, MAHĀYĀNA.

unchanged, in sects permeated with the most ardent devotion.

As in the ancient theosophy, the soul is haunted by the thought of death: 'Every being is in fear of death.'[1] 'Some men in their fear of death have died of fear.'[2] 'The world is under the attack of Mṛtyu. How dost thou not think of it?' 'Do to-day that which you will have to do to-morrow: do this morning what you will have to do to-night. Death does not trouble itself with what one has done or with what one has not done. It seizes a man as a wolf carries off a lamb.'[3] There is not a moment to lose: 'the days pass away; life wears to an end. Rouse yourself and run.'[4]

The new religious conceptions bring home to men the necessity and the way of salvation: 'Let a man search for a remedy through the suppression of suffering and let him apply it without murmuring. Then he will be free from misery.'[5] It is the individual life which is full of suffering and death; it is necessary to get deliverance from it: 'Death has two syllables, for it is *mama*, everything that I consider as my own. *Brahman* has three syllables, *na mama*, for in it nothing is mine.'[6] There is always the same hate of the body and its fugitive pleasures: 'Let one becoming an ascetic, abandon this stinking body, full of filth and urine, subject to old age and disappointment, the abode of maladies, burnt by passions and perishable.'[7] 'All the joys which arise from contact with the world are a source of suffering; they begin: they end; the wise man does not find in them any pleasure.'[8]

How is man to be saved? The means of salvation have become more numerous and more varied. There is nothing more interesting than to mark the persistence of the ancient ideas and the traditional formulas. The new has not destroyed the old. Salvation is the result of an effort entirely personal. 'Strengthening your soul by your soul, vanquish the enemy who reclothes the forms of desire, and who is difficult to strike.'[9] 'The *yogī* is he who finds within himself his happiness, within himself his pleasure, within himself his light.'[10] 'Let a man establish the self by the self and suffer not the self to be overwhelmed, for no man has any other friend than himself, or any other enemy than himself.'[11] Salvation is still the result of knowledge, a knowledge which is acquired by concentration of thought and meditation: 'Knowledge is the best vessel (for traversing the sea of the *saṁsāra*).'[12] To know *Brahman* is to obtain peace 'which has as its final result *nirvāṇa*';[13] it is oneself to become *Brahman*.

As may be seen from the last passages, it is the solution of the Vedānta which obtains most favour of all those proposed by the Brāhmanical schools. Recourse is had readily to the Sāṅkhya when one wishes to analyze the universe and the soul, or to the Yoga for teaching as to the practice of concentration and ecstasy; but the theory of *mokṣa* remains essentially monistic and pantheistic. As far as the evidence gathered from the great epic is concerned, the doctrine which is adhered to is not the radical monism of Śaṅkara (which was indeed later than the centuries during which the *Mahābhārata* was finally redacted), but the monism of the *Upaniṣads* and of Bādarāyaṇa: the world of names and forms is real, but it is *Brahman* who is the reality of its reality. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* does not leave any doubt on this point:

'Others offering me the sacrifice of knowledge, give to me worship as to a being at once universal and individual, who, under various forms, extends himself in every direction.'[14] 'The knowledge of goodness is that through which is seen in all beings the one imperishable Being, a whole in every particular being.'[15] 'One portion of me has entered into the world of living beings, as the soul of the individual, the imperishable portion.'[16] 'The knowledge by which thou wilt perceive all beings without exception in thyself and then in me, will for ever give thee a refuge from error.'[17] 'In the Brāhman, in the ox and the elephant, in the dog and also in the eater of the flesh of the dog, the wise man sees only one and the same being.'[18] 'He who sees me in everything and everything in me, is never far from me, and I am never far from him.'[19]

God is immanent in all beings, but He is not confused with them; He is the principle of life which animates them, the principle of all spirituality.

Finally, He is not only immanent; He is also transcendent. Things are in Him, but He is not in them. The world of phenomena does not exhaust His nature. He has an inferior nature which reveals itself in names and forms, and a superior nature which is also a living soul. He is distinguished from the immortal and imperishable *Brahman* of which He is the foundation, just as He is the foundation of eternal law and perfect blessedness. Thus, without going beyond the limits of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, we can see theism substituting itself for the original pantheism, and a personal God taking the place of *Brahman*. The evolution completes itself in the modified monism of Rāmānuja, and the spiritualistic dualism of Mādhva. The worship of the *guru*, which is so persistent a characteristic of the modern sects, has its source in the same conceptions. God, who is the essential excellence in all beings and in all the categories of being, specially manifests His adorable nature in the persons who behold and who reveal the truth.

When, in a passage from the *Bhagavad-Gītā* which has just been quoted, the god alludes to the 'others,' who offer the sacrifice of knowledge, he puts them over against those who render the worship of love. At once pantheistic and theistic, the poem places on the same level the two methods of salvation—knowledge and *bhakti*. The explanation is that in Hindu thought nothing which has once been acquired is ever altogether eliminated. Tradition and novelty, animism and ritualism, naturalism and theosophy, scholasticism and mysticism—in short, the most contrary ideas—live together in the same minds and in the same writings. In theory the *advaita* may be professed, but in fact the *dvaita*, and even a plurality of co-eternal principles, is affirmed. It is, as it were, tacitly understood that an affirmation has value in itself, and that it is not annulled by adjacent affirmation. In his everyday life Śaṅkara was a Vaiṣṇava—we could hardly imagine this in reading his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*. These men duplicate themselves with wonderful ease. So it is vain to attempt to apply to the *Bhagavad-Gītā* the critical processes devised for Western works. In separating the disparate elements and the successive layers, we should succeed only in ruining the unmistakable artistic beauty of the poem. Works much later than the *Bhagavad-Gītā* exhibit a character equally composite. Theosophic conceptions and formulas are mingled with effusions of an ardent and humble piety. One marks this characteristic in many writings attributed to the founders and poets of the reforming sects, Kabīr, Tulsī Dās, Chaitanya, etc. The most recent representatives of an enlightened Vedānta, Ramakṛṣṇa and Vivēkānanda, also unite the *bhakti-mārga* with a phraseology which has become traditional since the period of the older *Upaniṣads*. There has been formed in India as it were a stock of words, ideas, and illustrations which belongs to every one and from which every one has the right to draw and is in the habit of drawing. One example will be sufficient to show how heavy a weight this theosophy of the past lays upon a thought which in other respects shows itself to be original and independent.

Nānak (*q.v.*), the founder of Sikhism, and his successors connect themselves with the religion of *bhakti*. They teach that a man is saved by the fervent worship of God, or by the worship of the *gurus*, the interpreters of God, and of the Book, the perpetual incarnation of the *gurus*. But the God of the Sikhs is like the *Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads*, and frequently borrows His name from the latter. In His own proper nature He is *nirguṇa*, without attributes; when He creates the world by means of *māyā*, He is also immanent in the phenomenal world and becomes *sarvaguṇa*, endowed with all qualities. In order to be saved, one must discover God in the heart; through self-concentration the mind eliminates all duality. To know God is to make oneself identical with God. God unites with Himself the man who knows Him, and this man is not reborn. As regards this life, salvation wins for him who is assured of it unbounded happiness, and death has no more terrors for him.

[1] *Mahābhārata*, iii. 2. 40.
[2] *Ib.* xii. 283. 9 ff.
[3] *Ib.* iii. 219. 28.
[4] *Laws of Manu*, vi. 76 *f.*
[5] *Ib.* iii. 43.
[6] *Ib.* vi. 5.
[7] *Bhag.-Gītā*, ii. 70 ff.
[8] *Ib.* xviii. 20.
[9] *Ib.* iv. 35.
[10] *Ib.* vi. 30.
[11] *Ib.* iii. 101. 15.
[12] *Ib.* xii. 329. 8.
[13] *Ib.* xiv. 51. 29.
[14] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, v. 22.
[15] *Ib.* v. 24.
[16] *Mahābh.* xii. 291. 44.
[17] *Ib.* ix. 15.
[18] *Ib.* xv. 7.
[19] *Ib.* v. 18.

The great Vaiṣnavite and Śaivite sects are, quite as much as Sikhism, impregnated with theosophy. Their appearance is in itself evidence of an individualism in revolt against the excessive pressure of a religious tradition. Those who assert the authority of the Vedas are ridiculed. The framework in which the divine is placed is broken; no great importance is any longer attached to the name which the gods bear—Śiva or Viṣṇu, the label is different, but it is always the same god. The human framework is also broken; the religious value of caste is denied, and all men are called to salvation. The distinction between the sacred and the profane is abolished. Generally the first concern of the reformers is to put Sanskrit on one side in favour of an exclusive use of the popular language.

'The whole world for me,' says Nānak, 'is a sacred enclosure. Whoever loves the truth is pure.' 'All food and drink which come from God are pure.'[1]

The mechanical and the excessively ritualistic elements in the old religion are removed. Religion tends to become more human, more closely connected with ordinary life; the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has already expressed something approaching a sentiment of human solidarity, then an idea new in India. Moreover, religious tolerance becomes almost universal. Royal inscriptions prove that Brāhmanism, Jainism, Buddhism, Śaivism, and Vaiṣnavism have their representatives in the same families, and the sovereigns extend their favours to all the communities. Is it not clear that religion has become an affair of the individual, and that the son is not in this respect bound to follow the example of his father?

Unfortunately the sects which were originally the boldest very soon fall into the old errors, or, rather, a new tradition, also altogether tyrannical, is established in place of the ancient tradition; or, still more frequently, the older safeguards are restored and most weighty concessions are made to the prevailing ideas. The popular language takes on, in its turn, a sacred character. Caste and restrictions about food recover all their influence. One returns to the old formalism and to the grosser superstitions; and the work of reform, to which men constantly address themselves, has always to be done over again.

Their admission into the popular religions was not a clear gain for theosophical ideas. They remain in the outer courts, in an altogether subordinate position. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* everything that is merely a heritage from the past, a survival, is theosophical. The elements which are truly living and fruitful are of an entirely different origin. The religious emotion and the fervour of feeling which spring up in hearts full of adoration do not come from the *Upaniṣads* or their derivatives. Far from celebrating the triumph of theosophic ideas in India, the sectarian writings rather indicate their failure, since they make salvation depend on the love and grace of a personal and transcendent God.

4. [Theosophy and ancient Indian philosophy.—In dealing with the introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions we have been tracing what might be described as a waning of the influence of theosophy. In the *Gītā* and in the sectarian writings theosophical elements are largely overlaid by materials gathered from other sources. But the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of theosophical teaching. This is to a great extent connected with an incursion of influences from the West and especially with the teachings of Madame Blavatsky and Mrs. Besant. The authority of Madame Blavatsky has been largely discredited, but Mrs. Besant is still a living force and her followers are numerous. Indeed India can claim a larger number of theosophists than any other country in the world. The latest available report (1917) shows 385 Indian lodges, with a total of 7344 members, among whom are some outstanding personalities. Their literary activity is great, at least in quantity, and the flow of publications from the headquarters at Adyar, near Madras, is unceasing and influential. The implicit influence of theosophical ideas is even more important than that which is explicitly allowed, and theosophical literature is frequently to be found in the hands of thinking men who would disclaim any connexion with a theosophical society. The popularity of theosophy is not, however, always due to purely theosophical causes.

Theosophy in India glories in having no creed, and thus claims to appeal to men of all creeds and to interpret for them the hidden values of their respective religions. But, though it is without a creed, theosophy has a threefold aim which is stated by Mrs. Besant, as follows:

(1) 'To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity . . .; (2) to encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; (3) to investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.'[1]

The popularity of theosophy at the present time in India is largely due to a judicious combination of those three aims. Unless we give a very wide interpretation to the term, the two first are not particularly theosophical, but they are universally acceptable, and they thus strengthen the appeal of the third—the only properly theosophical enterprise. The first aim affords an opportunity for an easy transition from religious to political activity and a reinforcement of the former through the popularity of the latter. The second sets itself in seemingly attractive opposition to the harsh judgments of certain apologists for particular religions, and appeals to that specious liberality of mind which finds expression in the oft-repeated assertion that one religion is as good as another. It calls forth the retrospective tendency which seems to be inherent in all theosophy and thus enables theosophy to serve itself as the heir of the ages. Emphasis is laid upon the idea of a hidden tradition which is traced through the magic of mediæval Europe, through the lore of the Knights Templar and the mystics, through Freemasonry and the speculations of alchemists and astrologers, until the ultimate source is postulated in the Great White Brotherhood, a vague and indefinite society which Madame Blavatsky alleges to have existed from time immemorial in the mountains of Tibet and to have delegated one of their number to act as her Master during a period of many years. This mystic brotherhood is believed still to have operative power and to have charge not only of the education and development of the human race, but also of cosmic evolution. Their doctrines embody the truths which are said to be at the basis of all religions, but, on investigating the matter more closely, we find that they are in a very special manner the fundamental principles of Indian thought. Theosophy thus gives a universal importance to Indian philosophical speculation and in so doing inevitably enhances its popularity in India. It levies contributions from all the more important Indian systems, taking from the *Upaniṣads* the doctrine of a fundamental unknowable and characterless Unity, and the identity of the human and the divine; from the Sāṅkhya the idea that spiritual advancement consists in a gradual detachment from the processes of the phenomenal world; from Buddhism the idea of *karma* and transmigration; and from Yoga the conception of various occult methods by which freedom of thought and

[1] Cf. M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, i. 243; cf. i. 43.

[1] *Theosophy* ('People's Books'), London, n.d. [1912], p. 89.

spirit may be won. Further, by an application of its ideas of graded being and of development extended over many generations, it is able to allow a moderate amount of justification even to the grosser forms of the popular religions, and thus carry farther the process of infusing theosophical ideas into the cults of the people which, as pointed out, had but moderate success in earlier centuries.

As in Indian philosophy generally, so in theosophy the ultimate Being is an unknown and unknowable ground of all things, acquiring character as a Logos with the triple functions of will, wisdom, and activity. This differentiates itself into the human monads, having a similar triplicity. The human monad descends through various grades of being until it reaches the causal body, which has also a slightly lower mental aspect, uniting it with the grades of being of which even an ordinary man may be aware, and forming the basis of personality as we know it. The mental body has as its appropriate sphere the heavenly world, but the soul as it proceeds downwards enters also the astral world or the world of emotion and desire, and finally reaches the physical world. Over and over again there is incarnation reaching downwards ultimately to the physical world, and in each incarnation new experiences are obtained, leading, if rightly used, to the development of the soul. The supreme aim of the soul is to rise upwards to its original source, and the degree of ascent will be proportionate to the use it has made of the experiences of each incarnation. The working of the law of *karma* is inexorable. A man will receive the fruit of the deeds done in the body, and according to his good or his evil will be the duration of the period spent on each plane before another incarnation takes place. The aim of the whole process is to get rid of the separating sheaths of personality and reach absorption in the Absolute.

Theosophy is thus definitely committed to the doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration, with, on the one hand, its plausible explanation of the inequalities of human life, its stern insistence on moral consequences, its distant prospect of negative salvation, and, on the other hand, its ethical weakness arising out of its tendency to fatalism and encouragement of procrastination, and its lonely outlook as it traces the succeeding phases of individual development and promises reunion with those we love only in a 'togetherness' of absorption in which the definite character which was the object of our love altogether disappears.

The doctrines of theosophy claim a scientific basis in experience, but this experience is found to be very different from the experience of the ordinary man. It is dependent on the development of our latent powers, by the use of which we may acquire that knowledge which is already possessed by the masters of the human race, the adepts or initiates, and which may give to us a wonderful penetration into the hitherto undiscovered laws of nature. It is at this point that theosophy differentiates itself most completely from philosophy. Once make the initial assumption that the operation of these powers is possible and that the latent faculties can be exercised, and all is easy. We may attain a wonderful amount of detailed knowledge about the lower at least of the super-physical planes. We may discover, *e.g.*, that even during physical life the astral body projects a few inches beyond our physical body, and that it is shaped like an egg; also that various astral bodies are formed by the vibrations of thought and desire, the vibrations of unselfish affection producing bodies of pale rose colour, intellectual effort resulting in yellow bodies, devotional feeling in blue, etc. We may discover also facts on a higher ethical level—*e.g.*, that our prayers produce beings functioning as guardian angels and that our thoughts eventuate in actual astral existences, fulfilling the purposes into which our vague wishes would have been transformed, had opportunity waited upon our desires. In short, with an almost total disregard of the law of parsimony and of the rule against the multiplication of entities, we may explain many of the mysteries of our present life and many of the hitherto unexplained problems of nature by simply transferring the difficulty to a higher plane and 'discovering' beings personally responsible for what previously appeared to be a mysterious occurrence. It is at least doubtful whether modern theosophy in India distinguishes sufficiently between subjective imagination and the controlling power of objective facts, and this considerably lessens the force of the rebuke which it administers to our materialism, diminishes the value of its insistence upon the power of thought and prayer, and weakens its encouragement to explore farther than has yet been done the phenomena of spiritualism and telepathy as well as the more weighty experiences of the mystics of all ages.]

Conclusion.—The history of theosophical ideas, far more than that of religious ideas, allows us to establish the spiritual unity and continuity of India. Moreover, we have here an excellent field of observation for any one who wishes to know the meaning of theosophy, its principles, its aspirations, its method, and its influence upon life. With the idea that Indian theosophy is typical of this form of thought, we shall rapidly pass in review its principal characteristics.

(*a*) The most obvious quality is its concentration on the self, which not only occupies the first place in its scheme of thought, but also concerns itself with the Ego as if it were the only existence—as if everything else existed only for it and in reference to it. This theosophical individualism is both proud and exclusive. The vulgar intelligences, concerned with superstitions and traditional practices, are despised, and with jealous care the precious truth is guarded for a small number of the elect. 'There is nothing in common between popular religion and knowledge.'[1] As if to show clearly the existence of a double current in religious thought, a verse in the *Mahābhārata*[2] says that the gods, women, and the worlds have only one divinity, one *guru* only, but that the Brāhmans have two, Agni and Brahman, the god of sacrifice and the Being without a second.

(*b*) It is always flattering to belong to a privileged group; esotericism was an attractive element in theosophy. And there were others. Those who were terrified by threatening death and mysterious destiny, those who were shocked by the spectacle of physical and social injustice, found in the doctrine of *karma*, *saṁsāra*, and *mokṣa* just the solution fitted to give them moral serenity and courage to live. All the theosophical systems teach some way of salvation; they deliver their followers from the painful prospect of a second death, from an interminable series of lives poisoned by the expectation of death.

(*c*) Another advantage: truth is not arrived at slowly and patiently by study and reflexion; it is grasped by sudden internal vision. Once the premisses have been given by intuition, a rigorous dialectic can construct a system whose scientific appearance has an element of attractiveness for persistently intellectualistic minds eager to 'know.'

(*d*) The intuitive method is not only rapid and apparently trustworthy; it is also very fruitful.

[1] Śaṅkara, *passim*; cf., e.g., *Comm. on the Vedānta-Sūtras*, p. 820.
[2] *Mahābh.*, i. 95. 7.

It reveals that which neither analysis nor induction could discover—the supersensible world. Theosophy thus gives satisfaction to the mystical needs in human nature. Then, when one knows that the sensible world is only an insignificant part of being, and that, side by side with the very limited realm of knowledge, there is an infinite transcendental world, one resigns oneself easily to the most glaring logical impossibilities.

(*e*) Finally, the laws of material nature are not valid except for material bodies. Theosophy has been also a discipline of sublimation and dematerialization. Marvellous perceptions and an indefinite enhancement of intellectual and active powers are also privileges which India has always held in the highest esteem.

If now we ask what theosophy in fact did for individual and social life in India, we shall see that it has had some results which are excellent and others which are harmful. On more than one occasion it has vindicated the rights of the individual and struggled against authorities altogether dependent upon tradition. Theoretically at least, it has placed itself outside of social distinctions. It has made salvation a personal affair of the individual. It has opened the eyes of men to the foolishness of their futile occupations and the vanity of sensual pleasures and temporal possessions. It has taught them to seek for happiness in the contemplative life and in peace of heart. But it has also taught contempt of the ordinary life and of finite existence. It has ignored the possibility of progress in human affairs. It has been a school of pessimism. Its followers have searched for the absolute and the whole, when life can give only the relative and the partial. They have thought it possible to arrive by a leap at truth, when in fact nothing has really been secured by this intuitive method and everything has to be begun over again. It has lowered the dignity of virtue by making it a means and not an end. In condemning action and individualizing salvation, it has shown itself dangerously anti-social. Frequently, it is true, these bitter fruits have not been produced, for it has, on occasion, neglected its fundamental principles. Buddhism, *e.g.*, has preached the highest virtues without making them the instruments of salvation. This is intelligible, for in Buddhism, side by side with theosophy, there is a large dose of humanity.

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PAUL OLTRAMARE.

[Additions in brackets by W. S. URQUHART.]

THERAPEUTÆ.—The Therapeutæ[1] were a radical offshoot of the movement in pre-Christian Judaism which threw up an order like the Essenes (*q.v.*); but, unlike the Essenes, they were purely an Egyptian phenomenon, a religious confraternity, or *θίασος*, residing in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, and particularly on the low hills to the south of Lake Mareotis, leading the life of studious recluses and organized on semi-monastic lines. Outside Egypt, indeed outside this district, they are never heard of. They were a local development.

1. Source of information.—The only authority for the subject is a short treatise *de Vita Contemplativa* (*περὶ βίου θεωρητικοῦ ἢ ἱκετῶν* [*ἀρετῶν*], or, better, *Φίλωνος ἱκέται ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν τόδ'*), included in the works of Philo. It is first quoted by Eusebius.[2] The rise of the monastic movement in the Church drew his attention, and evidently the attention of others, to a tractate which offered striking precedents and parallels for the cœnobitic discipline of Christians, and the general opinion came to be that the Therapeutæ were really Christian monks. This anachronism can be traced from Eusebius and Epiphanius onwards; it flourished right down to the beginning of the 18th cent., when the French scholar, B. de Montfaucon, published his *Livre de Philon de la vie contemplative, etc., traduit sur l'original grec, avec observations, où l'on fait voir que les Thérapeutes dont il parle étoient Chrestiens* (Paris, 1709). So completely had the Therapeutæ been identified with the origin of Christian monachism that even by the 6th cent. *vita therapeutica* had become the Latin equivalent of *ἀσκητικὸς βίος*.

This unhistorical interpretation did one service; it preserved the Philonic treatise. But it was responsible for vehement discussion between Protestants and Roman Catholics—discussion which was so prejudiced that it threw next to no light upon the Therapeutæ (except, of course, to disprove the Eusebian ecclesiastical contention); it was also responsible for an avenging scepticism in the 19th century. To suppose,[3] on the evidence of Eusebius and Jerome,[4] that Philo re-visited Rome *c.* A.D. 44, was impressed or converted by St. Peter, and returned to join this ascetic community of St. Mark's Christian converts near Alexandria, was to expose the *de Vita Contemplativa* to unjust suspicion in a more critical age. The naïve theory provoked an equally naïve scepticism. It is not creditable, but it is hardly surprising, to find that in the 19th cent. the Therapeutæ were almost blotted out of existence. Some Jewish scholars, especially Graetz,[5] seemed as anxious to disavow any connexion with the poor Therapeutæ as Roman Catholics were to dub them monks; they attempted to rid Judaism of these recluses by relegating them to the 3rd cent. A.D. as Christian monks, the treatise being assigned to some Encratitic, semi-heretical source. Other writers[6] also dated the *de Vita Contemplativa* in that period, although they more prudently regarded it as a Jewish sketch of some ideal, ascetic community. It was reserved for P. E. Lucius[7] to twist the stray threads of this scepticism into a stout denial that the Therapeutæ had ever existed except in the imagination of a Christian *c.* A.D. 300, who ingeniously used Philo's name and authority to create a monastic community in the first half of the 1st cent. A.D. This aberration of criticism carried away many writers great and small. French and English scholarship, however, came to the rescue, in L. Massebieau's study,[8] Renan's decisive judgment,[9] and F. C. Conybeare's work.[10] P. Wendland reinforced the defence,[11] and the historical authenticity of the

[1] See *ERE* viii. 782[b]. [2] *HE* ii. 17, ii. 18. 7.

[3] As the *de Vit. Con.* was indubitably Philo's, the only logical way of explaining this panegyric on Christian monks was to make Philo himself a Christian when he wrote it.

[4] *de Vir. Ill.* 8. [5] *GVI*[2] iii. [1863] 463 f.

[6] *E.g.*, M. Nicolas, *RThPh*, 3rd ser., vi. [1868] 25–52, and A. Kuenen, *The Religion of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1874–75, iii. 217–223.

[7] *Die Therapeuten und ihre Stellung in der Geschichte der Askese: eine kritische Untersuchung der Schrift: De vita contemplativa*, Strassburg, 1879.

[8] 'Le Traité de la vie contemplative et la question des Thérapeutes,' *RHR* xvi. [1887] 170–198.

[9] *Journal des Savants*, 1892, pp. 83–93, as already, *ib.* 1874, p. 798 f.

[10] *Philo about the Contemplative Life, or the Fourth Book of the Treatise concerning Virtues: critically edited, with a Defence of its Genuineness*, Oxford, 1895.

[11] *Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift von beschaulichen Leben: ein Beitrag zur Gesch. des hellenistischen Judenthums*, Leipzig, 1896.

treatise was finally vindicated. Whether it was composed by Philo or by some contemporary Jew is another and a subordinate question. The important point is that the treatise is a pre-Christian or non-Christian description of actual recluses in the Judaism of Egypt about the end of the 1st cent. B.C. or the opening of the 1st cent. A.D. Conybeare's edition is the standard authority on the Greek text. His translation[1] is followed in this article. Both he and Massebieau have made out a good case for the hypothesis that the *de Vita Contemplativa* originally was a sequel to the lost Philonic account of the Essenes in the ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Ἰουδαίων, from which Eusebius drew his information. But their interpretation of details in the account of the Therapeutæ is sometimes open to serious criticism.

2. Characteristics.—According to Philo, the Therapeutæ are part of a movement which is known outside Egypt[2]—the more or less organized semi-philosophical, semi-religious retreat from cities and a corrupting civilization to the simple life of retirement. Though the movement is not confined to the environs of Alexandria, it is there that the Therapeutæ are most numerous.[3]

They are Jewish recluses who reside in simple huts, at a short and suitable distance from one another (*i.e.*, they resembled the cœnobites of Pachomius in a later day, instead of being hermits and anchorites). Each hut has a sacred chamber (μυστήριον or μοναστήριον σεμνεῖον), reserved for their sacred books (the Law, the Prophets, the Psalms, and other writings, οἷς ἐπιστήμη καὶ εὐσέβεια συναύξονται καὶ τελειοῦνται, 'by means of which religion and sound knowledge grow together into a perfect whole'). After praying at dawn, they devote the day to meditation upon the Scriptures; these include writings or commentaries (συγγράμματα) 'drawn up by the ancient founders of their sect,' by which Philo probably means the literature current under the names of men like Enoch and Abraham, whom he regarded as the primeval ascetics and recluses, the ideal progenitors of the Therapeutic movement. The method of study is allegorical interpretation (τὴν πάτριον φιλοσοφίαν ἀλληγοροῦντες), and one outcome of it is the composition of sacred hymns. Prayers at sunset close the day. Such is the life in each hut.[4] On the seventh day the various members meet for common worship; they arrange themselves according to age, sitting on the ground with 'the right hand between the chest and the chin, but the left tucked down along the flank.' The senior recluse then delivers an address, to which all listen in silence, merely nodding assent. A partition, ten or twelve feet high, separates the men from the women, so that the latter can hear the speaker without being seen by the male recluses.

The seventh day[5] is their day for relaxation. On the other days no one eats before sunset, and some go fasting almost entirely for three or even six days, in their contemplative raptures. But all use oil (as a physical refreshment, unlike the Essenes[6]), and on the seventh day all 'propitiate the mistresses hunger and thirst, which nature has set over mortal creatures'; the diet is simply water and cheap bread, flavoured with salt, and occasionally supplemented by hyssop. None[7] of your drunken Greek symposia! Philo anticipates Lucian in his scorn of these rowdy gatherings.

Once every seven weeks[8] they assemble for their supreme festival, 'which the number fifty has had assigned to it,'[9] robed in white and with looks of serious joy. At a given sign from one of their leaders they arrange themselves in ranks, raising eyes and hands to heaven ('their hands, because they are pure from unjust gains, being stained by no pretence of money-making') and praying for a blessing on the festival. Then the senior members recline, in order of seniority, upon their cheap, rough couches; on the left side of the room the women also recline. The younger novices wait upon the older members, for the Therapeutæ (like the Essenes)[1] decline to be served by slaves; 'they deem any possession of servants whatever to be contrary to nature,' which makes all alike free at birth. It is not a banquet of luxuries; no wine, only cold water, heated for those who are delicate; no meat—for the Therapeutæ are vegetarians, living on nothing but bread and salt, with hyssop for the more delicate palates, the hyssop being added 'out of reverence for the holy table of offering in the sacred vestibule of the temple,'[2] to signify that the Therapeutæ are too humble to emulate the unleavened bread reserved for the priests. But, before this Spartan meal is eaten, a quiet address or allegorical exposition of Scripture is delivered by the president. The rest listen in breathless silence; but, if the speaker does not make his meaning clear, they are allowed to indicate their perplexity by a slight movement of the head and a right-hand finger. When he is considered to have spoken long enough, all clap their hands three times. A hymn then follows, sometimes composed in honour of God by the singer (*cf.* 1 Co 14[26]), 'either a new one which he has made himself, or some old one of the poets that were long ago.' Each member has to sing a hymn in rotation, while the rest join in the chorus. Only after this religious service of an address and praise—nothing is said of prayer[3]—does the banquet proceed.

The final act of the festival[4] is the famous παννυχίς, or all-night celebration of a sacred singing dance,[5] by men and women in two choruses, each headed by a chosen leader. Each of the choirs, the male and the female, begins by singing and dancing apart, partly in unison, partly in antiphonal measures of various metres, 'as if it were a Bacchic festival in which they had drunk deep of the divine love.' Then both unite to imitate the choral (Ex 15[1. 20-21]) songs of Moses and Miriam[6] at the Red Sea, sung as thanks εἰς τὸν σωτῆρα θεὸν (*cf.* Rev 15[3]). It is a thrilling performance, this choric dance and exulting symphony; 'but the end and aim' of it all 'is holiness' (the exodus symbolizing, of course, the mystical release of the soul from material bondage). Instead of being drowsy after this all-night ecstasy, the Therapeutæ are more wide-awake in the morning than they were at the beginning of their vigil; they turn to the East, 'and, so soon as they espy the sun rising, they stretch out aloft their hands to heaven and fall to praying' 'for a fair day, and for truth and for clear judgment to see with.' Then they separate to resume the ordinary day's contemplation in their separate cells.

Such, says Philo, is the method of life practised by these true 'citizens of heaven and of the universe.' The term 'citizens' is deliberately chosen. They abjure cities, he means, but none the less, indeed all the more on that account, these recluses belong to a higher polity.

3. Religious significance.—A complete renunciation of the world, resembling that demanded by Jesus in Lk 18[29], lay at the foundation of the Therapeutic society. What they abjured was money rather than matter. In the austerity of their zeal they voluntarily handed over their property to others,[8] since absorption in money-making and the cares of life not only took up too much time and thought but also fostered injustice. Having divested themselves of their possessions, 'they flee without turning back, having abandoned brethren, children, wives, parents, all the throng of their kindred, all their friendships with companions, yea, their countries in which they were born and bred.'[9] Philo describes this with a wistful enthusiasm, as he had described the renunciation of Enoch[10] and of Abraham.[11] But he is careful to explain why they prefer solitude to cities. It is only because intercourse with the unsympathetic world would injure them, 'not from any harsh and deliberate hatred of mankind'—a disclaimer[12]

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[1] In *JQR* vii. [1895] 755–769.

[2] Philo is trying not only, as he does elsewhere, to show that the recluse tendency is Greek as well as Jewish, but to link the Therapeutæ to the wide-spread phenomenon of *cultores dei* (*deorum*), as their name of 'devotees' (θεραπευταί) permitted. In this way he seeks to interpret them to his readers, just as he had already (*de Vit. Con.* 1–2) contrasted them with the inferior 'philosophers' of Greece on the one hand, and with the silly Egyptian worshippers of animals on the other. His attempt to explain θεραπευταί as possibly meaning 'healers' of the soul is equally unhistorical. So far as it is not the official title of the community, it means what it meant in the case of the Essenes, whom Philo himself had called θεραπευταὶ θεοῦ. The variant title ἱκέται meant 'suppliants.'

[3] *De Vit. Con.* 3.

[4] So constant is their sense of God's presence that even in their dreams they have visions of nothing but the divine ἀρετῶν καὶ δυνάμεων, while many men talk in their sleep of what they have been studying.

[5] *De Vit. Con.* 4.

[6] Cf. *ERE* v. 398[a].

[7] *De Vit. Con.* 5–7.

[8] *Ib.* 8.

[9] This seems to have been a festival, partly modelled on the five weeks or pentecostal type (for here as elsewhere the Therapeutæ show distinct affinities with Palestine) but celebrated seven times a year, at the expiry of every 49 (7 × 7) days. On the resemblances between this periodical festival and the Feast of Weeks in the book of Jubilees see A. Epstein in *REJ* xxii. [1891] 14 f., 20 f., as well as on the similar institution among the Abyssinian Jews (Falasha).

[1] *ERE* v. 396[b].

[2] *De Vit. Con.* 9.

[3] Is this omission accidental? Or was prayer regarded as a part of private devotion (*cf.* *ERE* x. 191[b])?

[4] *De Vit. Con.* 10.

[5] A trait of popular religious worship in Egypt (*cf.* *ERE* v. 238[a]; and, generally, x. 359[a]).

[6] Miriam, in some quarters of early mystical literature, is the counterpart of Isis, and she plays an important rôle in Gnostic speculations, as Reitzenstein points out (*Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 136 n.). Her popularity among the Therapeutæ is probably another Egyptian touch.

[7] Lightfoot (*Saint Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon*[7], London, 1884, pp. 85, 372) took this to mean sun-worship; but the Therapeutæ did not practise sun-worship any more than the Essenes did (see *ERE* v. 398[a], note 4).

[8] Unlike the Essenes, and the primitive Christians (Ac 2[45]), with whom Eusebius (*HE* ii. 17) would fain connect them on this account, the Therapeutæ did not pool their funds for the benefit of the community.

[9] *De Vit. Con.* 2.

[10] *De Præm. et Poen.* 3.

[11] *De Abrah.* 3.

[12] He had made the same disclaimer of misanthropy in speaking of Abraham (*de Abrah.* 4).

of the *odium humani generis* for which Jews were blamed by the outside world. Philo always protested against the people who withdrew into seclusion, simply because they lacked public spirit. He also anticipated the criticism which might be passed on the Therapeutæ, that they acted from a morbid misanthropy. Hence his defence and admiration of them. The Therapeutæ, in fact, realize for Philo what he had always dreamt of, a small (only a small) number or θίασος of spiritual athletes, acting from the highest of motives, carrying out a counsel of perfection, and capable of making the supreme renunciation in order to attain the highest vision of God and truth.[1] To them he applies his favourite Platonic metaphor of the wealth with eyes (*i.e.* the mystic rapture of the soul enriched with the vision of truth); no wonder, when they possess this inward treasure, that they abandon their blind wealth (τὸν τυφλὸν πλοῦτον)[2] to blind worldlings! For their renunciation does not empty life. It is not a mere negation; it is the soul surrendering to a higher passion for God (ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἁρπασθέντες οὐρανίου), which enriches life past dreams of avarice. The Therapeutæ are recluses and students, but their spirit is an ecstatic yearning for the positive vision of Truth. 'It is as easy to close the eyes of the mind, as those of the body,' Bishop Butler wrote;[3] it is still more easy, Philo felt, to let the eyes of the mind be closed by luxury and money-making, and he applauds the Therapeutæ for sacrificing their great possessions and position in order to keep the higher vision unimpaired.

Another feature of the Therapeutæ which goes to Philo's heart is that their allegorical interpretation of the OT does not render them indifferent to the actual rites and institutions of Judaism. He disliked the ultra-spiritualists[4] who evaporated the historical element in religion, and dropped all adherence to the forms of their faith. But he delighted in people like the Therapeutæ who, *e.g.*, attached, as he did, in his own enthusiasm, a high mystical sense to the number 'seven,' and yet not only kept the seventh day strictly but also celebrated a special festival after every 49 days, out of their reverence for that perfect number and its multiple (7×7). This appeared to him to be a healthy form of mysticism. The Therapeutæ appealed to Philo more than the Essenes did, because they were on old Jewish lines, adherents of the Mosaic law, respectful to the Temple at Jerusalem, and capable of attaining the heights of contemplative ecstasy without abandoning the lowly duties prescribed by the Torah.

A third feature which evidently pleased the gentle Philo was their freedom from angry controversy and flashy rhetoric. With his eye not only upon the quarrels of Greek sages at their symposia but also upon the rabbinic disputants at Jerusalem, he tells of the unostentatious style practised by the Therapeutic speakers, of the rapt attention shown by the audience, and of the respectful demeanour of the gathering — exalting the very virtues which Paul recommended to the showy, noisy Christians at Corinth (cf. 1 Co 14[28f.]). Philo loves them for their quiet demeanour. The Therapeutæ never wasted their time over rabbinic exegesis of the letter of Scripture. They gazed placidly through that, as through a glass, into the mystical significance which held them spellbound. Their wisdom was pure and peaceable; it combined plain living and high thinking, and the sages never lost their tempers.

All this, added to their philosophic aspirations and their distaste for luxury, moved Philo to write his panegyric. He professes that it is nothing but the bare truth. Certainly it is not a Defoe-like work of fiction. At the same time, his enthusiasm probably leads him to idealize the Therapeutæ; a disproportionate amount of space is surrendered to a scornful criticism of the Greek symposia, in which Plato as well as Xenophon is censured; and he forgets to explain how the Therapeutæ lived, if they did no work and held no property. Did they depend, like Buddhists, on charity? It is one of the questions which Philo forgets to answer. The main outline of the sketch, however, has all the marks of accuracy. Though he was not a member of the community, it was so near to Alexandria that he could easily have heard of its life and even visited it. His admiration may have heightened the colours, but it did not invent the content, of his delineation. The tone of his account resembles that in which Izaak Walton, in his biography of George Herbert, speaks of the little settlement of recluses at Little Gidden, under the spiritual guidance of Nicholas Ferrar.

The Therapeutæ were organized on lines resembling the later *lauras* of monasticism in Egypt, *i.e.* in a group or encampment of separate residences, with a common hall for special gatherings; they lived in huts, set close enough for fellowship and for mutual protection against an attack of robbers (which was a common experience of such communities). Plainly, they acted in self-defence when occasion required. The differences between them and the Essenes are patent. The Therapeutæ confined themselves to a life of contemplation; they were a small community of men and women who had been well-born and wealthy,[1] and who lived in a Chartreuse-like retreat; they were not religious communists, and they had no interest in prophecy (their dreams being not of the future but of the celestial order); they fasted, as the Essenes did not, and their relation to women was quite different. Both the Therapeutæ and the Essenes were 'holiness' movements, but the former displayed some unique features, especially the combination of individual contemplation with a periodical outburst of emotional fervour in the common song and dance.

Nothing is known of their history. They are one of the local, transient phenomena of the age that baffle modern curiosity. A single ray of light falls on this tiny community, at the bridge between B.C. and A.D., but we do not know who founded them or what became of them. Philo's description was never followed up by any subsequent writer. Gibbon[2] thought it 'probable that they changed their name, preserved their manners, adopted some new articles of faith, and gradually became the fathers of the Egyptian Ascetics.' This is guess-work, however. A community which was recruited like the Therapeutæ could not survive like the Essenes; so much is clear; and Therapeutism probably was an ephemeral product, an anticipation rather than an ancestor of the later Christian monasticism in Egypt. Abraham E. Harkavy, the Petrograd scholar, in his edition of Kirkisānī, the 10th cent. Karaite savant,[3] points out that Kirkisānī includes among the Jewish sects one called the Margārites, to whom the 'Alexandrine' belonged; this sect practised allegorical interpretation, as a rule abjured laughing, and were called Margārites, or 'cave-folk.' Harkavy identifies the 'Alexandrine' with Philo, and the Margārites with the Therapeutæ, as a branch of the Essenes—a view shared by Bacher,[4] but doubted by Poznański.[5] It seems an interesting, if vague, recollection of the Therapeutæ, lingering in the Judaism which had surrendered its interest in these recluses to the Christian Church.

4. Compositions. — The Therapeutæ were not only ascetics but also students; yet no trace of their literature has survived. (*a*) The λόγος, or hymn, coloured by Jewish Hellenism, which is discussed by A. Dieterich,[6] has been sometimes assigned to them. But it shows euhemeristic syncretism; there is nothing specifically Therapeutic about its language or ideas, and, although it does refer to the rescue of Israel from the Red Sea, this is too general to serve as an identification-mark for the choric song of the Therapeutæ (see above). The Therapeutæ are less analogous to the circle of this hymn than an anticipation of the Encratites (*q.v.*) in their aversion to marriage and their avoidance of wine and animal food.

[1] Cf., e.g., *de Mut. Nom.* 4.
[2] *De Vit. Con.* 2.
[3] *Sermons* (ed. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896), x. § 13.
[4] Cf. *ERE* i. 310[b].

[1] ἀνθρώποις εὐγενέσι καὶ ἀστείοις (*de Vit. Con.* 9).
[2] *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xv. note 163.
[3] *Memoirs of the Oriental Section of the Archæological Society at St. Petersburg*, viii. [1894] 247–319.
[4] *JQR* vii. 703.
[5] *REJ* i. [1905] 19–23.
[6] *Abraxas*, Leipzig, 1891, pp. 138 f., 145 f.

(*b*) Nor is the book of Wisdom distinctively Therapeutic, as some[1] thought.

The emphasis on ὅσιος and on ὁσιότης, rather than on the more outward εὐσέβεια, certainly suggests that Wisdom emanated from some inner circle or set of Jewish pietists, but there are no indications that point decisively to the Therapeutæ, not even the casual use of θεραπεύειν in $10^{9.16}$. $3^{13f.}$ is not in praise of celibacy, and, even if it were, the tendency to exalt celibacy in the later Judaism was not confined to the ascetic cohabitation of the sexes among the Therapeutæ.[2] 4^{7-9} simply echoes the common reflexion that life is measured by its content of wisdom, not by length of years; it has nothing particularly to do with the Therapeutic regulation[3] that seniority was reckoned by the years spent within the society. The allusion in 7^{28}–8^{2} to the wise man being wedded to Wisdom (τὸν σοφίᾳ συνοικοῦντα . . . ταύτην ἐφίλησα καὶ . . . ἐζήτησα νύμφην ἀγαγέσθαι ἐμαυτῷ) resembles the description of the nun-like recluses in the *de Vita Contemplativa*, 8 (for the most part 'aged virgins, that have preserved intact their chastity . . . because of their zeal and longing for Wisdom; with whom they were anxious to live,' in order to bring forth not mortal children but 'the immortal progeny which the God-enamoured soul is alone able to bring forth of itself').[4] But this metaphorical description applies in the one case to men, in the other to women, and it is too general and common (cf., *e.g.*, Sir 15^{2}, Pr 2^{17}) to be confined to the Therapeutæ; in *de Vita Contemplativa*, 8, Philo is speaking as he speaks elsewhere.[5] Finally, the Therapeutic custom of offering prayer at sunrise (see above) was not peculiar to them among the Jews, so that Wis 16^{28} ('one should be before the sun in giving thanks to thee, and one should plead with thee at the dawning of light') need not be a glimpse of these recluses—the less so, that nothing is said about their eastward position by the writer of Wisdom, who is simply moralizing about the story of the manna.

5. **Origin.**—In view of the various Oriental and Hellenistic influences which were playing upon the later Judaism towards the close of the 1st cent. B.C., a phenomenon like the existence of the Therapeutæ, with their celibacy, their aversion to social life, their absorption in a divine θεραπεία, and their mystical speculations, all carried out 'in accordance with the most holy counsels of the prophet Moses,'[6] is not altogether surprising.

'The societies of the Essenes and the Therapeutæ . . . belong, just as the mediæval and modern Hassidic asceticisms belong, to Judaism quite as much as do any of its more normal institutions.'[7]

It is still less surprising to find such a gild or monastic settlement in Egypt. The soil of Egyptian popular religion was full of 'monastic germs'; there were men and women recluses in the Serapeum at Memphis, whose θεράπενσις embraced both study and mystical dreams; the very name of θεραπευταί was connected with the worship of Isis,[8] which also had its mystic raptures, combined with an emphasis on asceticism and celibacy; the climate itself, and the gaunt deserts, stretching away from the cities and townships, invited those who had recluse tendencies. It was in Egypt that the monastic movement of the Church first developed its varied and most distinctive forms three centuries later, and the development was no more surprising upon the basis of primitive Christianity than that of the Therapeutæ or of the Essenes upon the basis of orthodox Mosaism. One of the most suggestive parallels to the Therapeutic discipline is to be found in the contemporary account of the Egyptian philosopher-priests which is given by Chaeremon, the Egyptian ἱερογραμματεύς. It is quoted by Porphyry,[9] and some sentences deserve to be quoted here for the light they throw upon 'monastic' lines of development in pre Christian Egypt.

'They chose sanctuaries (ἱερά) as the place in which to study philosophy, since to dwell with the statues of the gods was in harmony with their utter longing for vision (τῆς θεωρίας). Besides, this gave them security, owing to the reverence felt for the gods, since all men honoured these philosophers as if they were sacred creatures. They also lived in solitude, only mixing with other people at the sacred assemblies and festivals. . . . Having renounced every other employment and all human toils (πόνους ἀνθρωπίνους), they gave up the whole of their existence to the contemplation and vision of things divine . . . for to be in constant association with divine knowledge and inspiration delivers men from all lust (πλεονεξίας), subdues the passions, and rouses life to intelligence (σύνεσιν). They were also studious to be frugal in food and clothing. . . Their hands were always inside their garments. . . . When they were not engaged in purification, they ate bread cut up along with hyssop, as they declared hyssop was extremely potent in purifying bread. . . . They trained themselves to endure hunger and thirst and scanty food through all their life. . . . The day they spent in the worship of the gods (εἰς θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν), singing hymns to them three or four times, at dawn and at eventide.'

The origin of the Therapeutæ lay in Jewish Hellenism, as that was specially affected by its Egyptian environment. Nothing more is required to explain the ascetic and mystical habits of these recluses beside Lake Mareotis. But it would be uncritical to dismiss this problem without some reference to the question which has repeatedly been asked: Do not several traits of the Therapeutic discipline recall Buddhistic monasticism—*e.g.*, the combination of a cœnobitic life with study and devout contemplation, and the vegetarianism? The latter is one of the marks which sharply distinguish the Therapeutæ from the Essenes, who were not vegetarians. But there is at least one feature of the Essenes themselves which is analogous to Indian practices,[1] and it is open to conjecture whether some Buddhistic influence had not penetrated Egyptian Hellenism by the 1st cent. B.C., as it is sometimes held to have penetrated the later Gnosticism.[2]

Robertson Smith,[3] after observing that 'in Egypt, the doctrine that the highest degree of holiness can only be attained by abstinence from all animal food, was the result of the political fusion of a number of local cults in one national religion, with a national priesthood that represented imperial ideas,' added that 'later developments of Semitic asceticism almost certainly stood under foreign influences, among which Buddhism seems to have had a larger and earlier share than it has been usual to admit.'

The Therapeutic avoidance of animal food need not, of course, be Buddhistic; the practice of the Orphic societies in Egypt or of the Neo-Pythagoreanism which affected the Essenes in other ways[4] may account for it as well as for the stress on hymns,[5] the παννυχίς, and some other features. Indeed, so far as our scanty data go, with regard to the Therapeutæ or the Essenes, the evidence does not appear to warrant any hypothesis of direct Buddhistic influence, although the Orientalism which had filtered into Jewish Hellenism, even in Egypt, by the 1st cent. B.C. may have contained some elements of Buddhistic religious tendency. The trade connexions between Alexandria and India, and the intercourse of both countries ever since the 3rd cent. B.C., make it quite possible to suppose that Indian merchants reached Egypt by the 1st cent. B.C. Rohde points this out in another connexion, detailing the Indian and Buddhistic elements in Greek fiction.[6] But the interaction

[1] *E.g.*, Ewald, *The Hist. of Israel*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1880, v. 377, and A. Gfrörer, *Krit. Gesch. des Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart, 1831, ii. 280 f.

[2] *ERE* i. 179; K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911, p. 188 f.

[3] *De Vit. Con.* 8: 'For they do not regard as elders those who can count their years and are merely aged, but, on the contrary, account these to be still mere infants, in case they have been late in embracing the vocation.'

[4] This is the Philo who had written so extraordinarily about Tamar (*Quod Deus immut.* 29).

[5] *E.g.*, in *Cherubim*, 13 f. [6] *De Vit. Con.* 8.

[7] I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 121.

[8] See the Cyzicus inscription, *e.g.*, quoted by A. Mordtmann, in *RA* xxxvii. [1879] 258 f.

[9] *De Abstin.* iv. 6–8.

[1] Cf. *ERE* v. 398[b], note 5. [2] Cf. *ib.* ii. 432, vi. 234

[3] *Rel. of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 302 f.

[4] *ERE* v. 401[a].

[5] This again distinguishes them from the Essenes. Q. A. Bugge, in his recent study of the Essenes (*ZNTW* xiv. [1913] 167 f.), argues that the Palestinian Essenes must have cultivated song and music like the Egyptian Therapeutæ; but there is no 'must' about the matter. Had hymns been a prominent feature of the Essenic cultus, they would have been mentioned by Philo or Josephus.

[6] *Der griech. Roman und seine Vorläufer*[2], Leipzig, 1900, p. 581 f.

was not marked.[1] A trait like the presence of the 'nuns' is almost sufficient by itself to justify disagreement with the verdict of Mansel:

'The Therapeutæ . . . appear to have sprung from an union of the Alexandrian Judaism with the precepts and modes of life of the Buddhist devotees, . . . in their ascetic life, in their mortification of the body and their devotion to pure contemplation, we may trace at least a sufficient affinity to the Indian mystics to indicate a common origin.'[2]

On the other hand, even after allowing for the Neo-Pythagorean and Orphic environment, as well as for the fact that certain phenomena of this recluse life spring up independently on any soil at the touch of organized monasticism,[3] we may leave open the possibility that the Therapeutæ and perhaps the Essenes more or less unconsciously developed features which owed their original suggestion to Buddhistic sources. One of the main reasons for hesitating to admit even this possibility is the fact that Buddhistic influence on Gnosticism, two centuries later, appears to be almost unrecognizable, although Gnosticism might be expected to show distinct affinities with this line of Indian religious practice and speculation.

LITERATURE.—Besides what has been noted in the course of the article, the following may be chronicled as among the few significant contributions which the interminable discussions of the subject have thrown up: the notes of H. de Valois (Valesius), the great 17th cent. editor of Eusebius; Thomas Browne, *Dissertatio de Therapeutis Philonis adversus Hen. Valesium*, London, 1695 (Therapeutæ=converts of St. Mark, who afterwards became the monks described by Palladius); two critical letters by J. Bouhier (*Lettres pour et contre, sur la fameuse question, si les solitaires appelés thérapeutes dont a parlé Philon le Juif, étoient chrétiens*, Paris, 1712), which Conybeare calls 'the best commentary on the *de Vita Contemplativa* ever written'; A. F. Gfrörer, *Krit. Gesch. des Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart, 1831, vol. i. pt. 2, pp. 280–299; and A. Neander, *General Hist. of the Christian Religion and Church*, Eng. tr., London, 1850–58, i. 81–85.

None of the older dictionary or encyclopædia articles deserves mention. The main help has been given by critics of Philo—*e.g.*, H. P. Delaunay, *RA* xxii. [1870–71] 268 f., xxvi. [1873] 12 ff., and in *Moïnes et sibylles dans l'antiquité judéo-grecque*[2], Paris, 1874, pp. 10–57; B. Tideman, *ThT* v. [1871] 177–188; A. Edersheim, *DCB* iv. 368–371; L. Cohn, *JQR* v. [1893] 38–42; J. Drummond, *ib.* viii. [1896] 155–172 (reviewing Conybeare's ed.); and E. Schürer, *GJV*[4], iii. 687–691 (still reluctant to give up his scepticism); or by writers like E. Renan, *Hist. du peuple d'Israël*, Paris, 1887–95, v. 366–380; O. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchthum*, Frankfort, 1897, i. 128 f.; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*[4], Leipzig, 1876–1903, III. ii. 377 f.; M. Friedländer, *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judenthums im Zeitalter Jesu*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 197 f., 265 f.; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im NT Zeitalter*[2], do. 1906, p. 536 f.; E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1908, pp. 321–324; W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity*, London, 1909, p. 63 f.; O. Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, Eng. tr., 1906–11, iii. 1–8, 18 f.; and H. Leclercq, *DACL* ii. 3063–3075.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THERIANTHROPISM.—See LYCANTHROPY.

THEUDAS.—See MESSIAHS (PSEUDO).

THEURGY.—Theurgy (*θεουργία*)—the direct working of God—is closely connected with certain systems of mysticism and theosophy. The word itself is not often used by those who claim that supernatural effects are produced through them by divine action; they more often ascribe the miraculous effects to good 'spirits,' whom God uses for His purposes, and they call this system of divine working 'magic,' frequently 'white magic,' as distinguished from 'black magic,' which is supposed to be the work of diabolical spirits. Vaughan has given a good definition of it. He says:

'I would use the term theurgic to characterize the mysticism which claims supernatural powers generally,—works marvels, not like the black art, by help from beneath, but as white magic, by the virtue of talisman or cross, demi-god, angel, or saint. Thus theurgic mysticism is not content, like the theopathetic, with either feeling or proselytising; nor, like the theosophic, with knowing; but it must open for itself a converse with the world of spirits, and win as its prerogative the power of miracle. This broad use of the word makes prominent the fact that a common principle of devotional enchantment lies at the root of all the pretences, both of heathen and of Christian miracle-mongers. The celestial hierarchy of Dionysius and the benign dæmons of Proclus, the powers invoked by Pagan or by Christian theurgy, by Platonist, by Cabbalist, or by saint, alike reward the successful aspirant with supernatural endowments; and so far Apollonius of Tyana and Peter of Alcantara, Asclepigenia and St. Theresa, must occupy as religious magicians the same province. The error is in either case the same—a divine efficacy is attributed to rites and formulas, sprinklings or fumigations, relics or incantations, of mortal manufacture.'[1]

Some form of belief in theurgy is at least as old as history and literature. Homer's heroes are constantly raised beyond themselves and perform deeds which seem to be done through them by the Olympian divinities who come to their aid. Oriental as well as Grecian mythology everywhere assumes theurgic powers. The eclectic Gnostics, who drew upon many popular religions and sacred books as the sources of their divine *gnosis*, also believed and taught that great divine powers became available to those who were initiated and who thus received something of the fullness—the Pleroma—of the Godhead.

The Neo-Platonists, especially in their later periods, gave new impetus to theurgy and were unwittingly the transmitters of it into Christian circles. Plotinus, the founder of the movement, was a metaphysician of high rank and a noble mystic whose influence on Christian mysticism can hardly be overestimated, but he was not interested in occult knowledge or in theurgic phenomena. His Syrian successors, however, Porphyry and Iamblichus, were concerned with the problem of discovering and applying divine powers or energies in the sphere of human action. Iamblichus, who strongly reveals Gnostic influences, turns the ideas and hypostases of Plotinus into divinities, *i.e.* personified beings, and he holds that these 'intelligences' work wonders in the macrocosm outside and in the microcosm within man. These divine powers come into the soul of the mystic on high occasions, possess it, and enable it to do works beyond human capacity. There are, according to Iamblichus, hierarchal orders of these divine powers in varying ranks, and it belongs to mystical wisdom to know how to invoke the higher and more benign powers and to gain their theurgic assistance. This theurgic system is set forth in Iamblichus' treatise *de Mysteriis*. Proclus, the last important name among the Neo-Platonists, was a much greater philosopher than Iamblichus, but he also expounded a system of theurgy and encouraged belief in hierarchal powers, arranged in triadic orders, who work divinely and mysteriously through those who are raised into union with these higher powers.

Through the Gnostics, through the Neo-Platonists, especially through the Christian Neo-Platonist who wrote under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite, and above all through contact with the pagan world and its wide-spread belief in magic, the Christian Church unconsciously absorbed a multiform faith in theurgy. Angels of many orders, saints who have been glorified, the Virgin Mary and her divine Son, can and do work wonders, it is believed, for faithful worshippers. Water and bread and wine and other elements of nature are by miraculous divine grace transformed into spiritual substances, become, in fact, the real divine presence, and supply to the recipient supernatural powers, which *work* mightily within the soul. Many Roman Catholic saints and many 14th and 15th cent. mystics believed themselves possessed of special theurgic powers. Stigmata of nail-prints were believed to be divinely produced in the hands and feet of Francis of Assisi and of Catharine of Siena. Others had the power to 'levitate' them-

[1] See G. Faber's cautious survey and verdict in his *Buddhistische und Neutestamentliche Erzählungen*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 10–29.
[2] *Gnostic Heresies*, London, 1875, p. 31 f.
[3] *ERE* x. 729 f.

[1] *Hours with the Mystics*, i. 36.

selves and to soar above the earth in moments of possession. Others had the miraculous gift of shedding tears in extraordinary measure or of emitting fragrant odours from their body in periods of ecstasy, while still others underwent profound physical transformations or radiated light like a self-luminous body. The entire field of theurgic phenomena is thus intimately bound up with the psychology of hysteria and auto-suggestion. Automatism of many types is now scientifically recognized. It seems to the 'subject,' when parts of his own body perform functions without his conscious volition, as though some foreign person had entered and possessed him and were using his hands or his feet or his lips. Where the results are beneficent and constructive, it seems natural to believe that divine power has come to his assistance and is working a miraculous work through him, so that theurgy appears, to persons of this type, to rest upon facts of experience.

An immense revival of theurgy came in with the rise of humanism and during the period when science was emerging from the stage of superstition and pseudo-science. This revival was due, in large measure, to the influence of Neo-Platonism and of the Jewish Ḳabbālā, both of which the early humanists studied with zeal and enthusiasm. Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) gave great prominence to the symbolical, mystical, theurgical Ḳabbālā, and he also glorified the writings of the Neo-Platonists. W. R. Inge quotes the following passage from Pico's *Apology* which illustrates the mental attitude of the first humanists:

'One of the chief charges against me is that I am a magician. Have I not myself distinguished two kinds of magic? One, which the Greeks call γοητεία, depends entirely on alliance with evil spirits, and deserves to be regarded with horror, and to be punished; the other is magic in the proper sense of the word. The former subjects man to the evil spirits, the latter makes them serve him. The former is neither an art nor a science; the latter embraces the deepest mysteries, and the knowledge of the whole of Nature with her powers. While it connects and combines the forces scattered by God through the whole world, it does not so much work miracles as come to the help of working nature. Its researches into the sympathies of things enable it to bring to light hidden marvels from the secret treasure-houses of the world, just as if it created them itself. As the countryman trains the vine upon the elm, so the magician marries the earthly objects to heavenly bodies. His art is beneficial and Godlike, for it brings men to wonder at the works of God, than which nothing conduces more to true religion.'[1]

Reuchlin (1455–1522) carried the study of the Ḳabbālā and of Neo-Platonism still farther and laid the basis for the theurgy and magic which swarm in the writings of Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, Valentine Weigel, and, in a distinctly less degree, Jacob Boehme. All these theosophically-minded thinkers believed that it was possible to come into possession of direct divine wisdom or light and thereby to discover the secret of the universe and to use the secret in marvellous theurgic ways. Reuchlin expressed this view, in 1517, in a passage which is translated in the appendix to the *Three Books of Occult Philosophy by Henry Cornelius Agrippa.*[2] He says:

'God, out of love to his people, has revealed the hidden mysteries to some of them, and these can find in the dead letters the living spirit. For Scripture consists of single letters, visible signs, which stand in a certain connection with the angels as celestial and spiritual emanations from God. By the pronunciation of the one, the others also are affected; but with a true Cabalist, who penetrates the whole connection of the earthly with the heavenly, these signs, rightly placed in connection with each other, are a way of putting him into immediate union with the spirits, who through that are bound to satisfy his wishes.'

A still better account of the theurgic operations which are believed to work through those who catch the divine secret and find the light is given in the words of 'J. F.,' who translated Agrippa's *Occult Philosophy* into English in 1651. The passage is in the 'Preface to the Judicious Reader,' and is as follows:

'This is true and sublime Occult Philosophy. To understand the mysterious influences of the intellectual world upon the celestial, and of both upon the terrestrial; and to know how to dispose and fit ourselves so as to be capable of receiving the superior operations of these worlds, whereby we may be enabled to operate wonderful things by a natural power—to discover the secret counsels of men, to increase riches, to overcome enemies, to procure the favour of men, to expel diseases, to preserve health, to prolong life, to renew youth, to foretell future events, to see and know things done many miles off, and such like as these. These things may seem incredible, yet read but the ensuing treatise and thou shalt see the possibility confirmed both by reason and example.'

Once more in modern times there has appeared a recrudescence of theurgy in spiritualistic and theosophical circles. The element of fact in it now, as of old in the days of humanism and of Neo-Platonism, is due to the automatisms, *i.e.* to subliminal action, emerging without the subject of the action being conscious that it is initiated by him. It seems to be done through him and not by him and thus is attributed to God, or to spirits who 'possess' him.

LITERATURE.—Jules Simon, *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1844–45; E. Vacherot, *Hist. critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, 3 vols., do. 1846–51; *Theurgia: or, The Egyptian Mysteries, by Iamblicos*, tr. Alexander Wilder, London, 1912; J. Reuchlin, *De Verbo Mirifico*, Basel, 1494, *De Arte Cabbalistica*, Hagenau, 1517; Agrippa of Nettesheim, *De Incertitudine et Vanitate omnium Scientiarum et Artium*, tr. J. F., London, 1651; Franz Hartmann, *Life and Teachings of Paracelsus*, do. 1896; R. A. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, 2 vols., do. 1860; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, do. 1899; R. M. Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, do. 1914, esp. chapters on Weigel and Boehme.

R. M. JONES.

THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES.—See CONFESSIONS.

THOMISM.—1. Name.—Broadly speaking, Thomism is the name given to the system of philosophy and theology founded by St. Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.*). Strictly speaking, it is the name given to a group of opinions taught by St. Thomas and held by what is known as the Thomistic school, which is mainly but not exclusively composed of Dominicans.

2. Historical survey.—The foundation of Thomism is incontestably due to the personal influence of St. Thomas Aquinas. It should not, however, be forgotten that Albert the Great did much to prepare the way for the birth of the new system, so that the names of both master and pupil will ever remain inseparable in the great work. Although there were many points of contact between the minds of Albert and Thomas, the genius of the one was entirely different from that of the other. The mind of Thomas was more critical than Albert's. The latter does not possess his subject quite perfectly; there is a lack of precision in details and a certain want of synthesis necessary to unify his knowledge. On the contrary, Thomas possesses his matter perfectly; above all, he has a power for order; his precision is nicer and his analysis finer; his vision is more penetrating and more embracing; and his power of analysis is on equal footing with his power of synthesis. Albert revealed to his age an intellectual world unknown to it; Thomas with the débris of the intellectual world of the ancients created a new one. Both aimed at incorporating Aristotle into Christian philosophy and theology. Albert's endeavour has the merit of initiative, but it remained incomplete and only provisional; Thomas with a magician's hand forwarded the work and produced a masterpiece which he embellished with a finish undreamed of by Albert.

Before the time of St. Thomas several attempts had been made to synthesize the sum of human knowledge, but nothing of any great value had been the result. The work of reformation undertaken by St. Thomas was so vast and complicated that it is not surprising that he was at first a little hesitating and diffident; but, as he advanced in

[1] *Christian Mysticism*, p. 269, footnote 2.
[2] Ed. W. F. Whitehead, Chicago and London, 1898, p. 251.

years and learning, his vision became clearer, and at the age of thirty he took up a position that, with regard to most things, was definite and final. Being perfectly familiar with all the problems discussed by philosophy and theology, and having carefully weighed the value of the respective solutions and examined the systematic points of view already attempted, he saw that a perfect system necessarily demanded the unification of the whole of knowledge. This perfect ordering of the whole of knowledge which he bequeathed to the world was due to his sublime metaphysical sense. It is because St. Thomas surpassed the host of thinkers of his time as metaphysician that he produced a unique work.

In philosophy he is the first to proclaim the autonomy of reason; and he has produced his philosophic works without once having recourse to an authority other than experience and reason to establish his conclusions and defend them. Starting from the 'sensible' world as from a secure basis, St. Thomas passes to the region of the absolute, to the highest and purest intellectualism. In theology he proclaims the autonomy of revelation. At the outset he maintains the impossibility of a real conflict between the natural and supernatural orders which have the same source of truth, viz. God. Thus he synthesizes natural and supernatural, nature and grace, faith and reason. To assimilate his thought it is necessary to understand, above all, the functioning of his general synthesis, and especially of his metaphysics, which rules the whole economy of his work. Eclecticism has no meaning with regard to Thomistic doctrines; their value and strength reside essentially in the marvel of their unity and solidarity.

3. Progress of Thomism. — The Dominican order gradually took up the teaching of St. Thomas, but not without opposition; some of its members were still imbued with the doctrines of Augustinism, and these could not be converted to a new system in a day.

Robert Kilwarby, archbishop of Canterbury and a Dominican, condemned St. Thomas's theory of the unity of substantial form, on 18th March 1277. A few years later, however, the English Dominicans were among the most resolute defenders of this doctrine. In Germany Ulrich Engelbert de Strasbourg († 1277) inclined towards Augustinism and the Neo-Platonism of the Arabs. Eckhart († 1327) was much inclined towards Neo-Platonism. Thierry († towards 1315) was an Augustinist strongly influenced by Avicenna: the latter never hesitated to combat the doctrine of St. Thomas.

In France the great adversary of the new system was Durand de Saint-Pourçain. In Italy Umbertus Guidi was punished by the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Arezzo in 1315 for attacking St. Thomas; and the General Chapter of Puy (1344) cautioned Thomas of Naples for opposition to St. Thomas. Many chapters of the Dominican order encouraged and promoted Thomistic doctrines. Worthy of mention are the General Chapters of Paris (1286), of Saragossa (1309), of Metz (1313), of Castres (1329), of Brive (1346). So great indeed was the attachment of the Dominicans to the *Summa Theologica* that the celebrated Spaniard Arnauld de Villeneuve († 1311) wrote a work against the Dominicans in 1304 (*Gladius jugulans Thomistas*), in which he accuses the Dominicans of preferring the study of the *Summa* to that of the Bible. Two centuries later Erasmus formulated the same reproach.[1]

4. Introduction of St. Thomas's writings as text-books in schools.—At the end of the 13th cent. the Bible was the principal text, and the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard was the theological text *par excellence*. The Dominicans introduced the reading of the *Sentences* 'in via Thomae,' *i.e.* according to the thought of St. Thomas. Other schools following this example taught the *Sentences* 'in via Alberti,' 'in via Durandi,' 'in via Scoti,' etc. Not until the end of the 15th cent. did the Dominicans substitute entirely the *Summa* for the *Sentences*.

5. Thomistic polemics.—The fights sustained by the Dominican order during the end of the Middle Ages in defence of their school were (1) to make a good stand against Augustinism, and (2) to defend certain doctrines special to Thomism.

(*a*) *General.*—In favour of Augustinism a great reaction was made by the Friars Minor in a work composed by William de la Mare. The Oxford Dominicans replied in a work known as the *Corruptorium*. A further work, *Correctorium Corruptorii*, was published by two Oxford Dominicans, William de Makelsfeld and Richard Knapwell. At the end of the 13th cent. another general defence of Thomism was written by Robert de Bologne, *Apologeticum pro St. Thoma*. Last of all a great work (unfinished) was written by a celebrated Thomist, Hervé Noël de Nedellec, master at the university of Paris and master-general of the Dominicans, *Defensa doctrinæ Sti. Thomæ Hervæus Natalis*.

Other important works written towards the end of the Middle Ages are *Defensiones theologiæ divi Thomæ Aquinatis*[1] by John Capreolus († 1444), who was called the 'princeps Thomistarum,' and *Clypeus Thomistarum contra modernos et Scotistas*[2] by Pierre Niger († 1481). Diego de Deza († 1523), the illustrious protector of Christopher Columbus, wrote two polemical works in favour of Thomism, of which the more important is: *Novarum defensionum doctrinæ Angelici Doctoris beati Thomæ de Aquinas super quatuor libros Sententiarum quæstiones profundissimæ et utilissimæ* (Seville, 1517).

(*b*) *Special.*—(1) St. Thomas formulated the theory of the unity of the human person by making the intellectual soul the only *form* of the human composite. Against the Averroism (taught at Paris) which held the unicity of intellect for the human species, and against Augustinism, which held the plurality of forms, several treatises were written by Thomists—*e.g.*, by Pierre de Tarantaise, Gilles de Lessines, William de Makelsfeld, Thomas de Sutton, Jean de Faënza, etc.

The General Council of Vienne defined the Thomistic doctrine on this matter, which was further confirmed by the 5th Council of Lateran (1515), and by Pope Pius IX. in a letter to the archbishop of Cologne (15th June 1857).

(2) The question of the nature of religious poverty and its practice by Christ and the apostles was hotly discussed between the Dominicans and the Friars Minor. The discussion became so disastrous that Pope John XXII. condemned as erroneous and heretical the doctrine that Christ and the apostles did not possess anything, or did not perform acts of proprietorship, viz. buying and selling; etc. (12th Nov. 1323, *Cum inter nonnullos*).

(3) There was another theological combat between the Dominicans and the Minors with regard to the blood of Christ shed during the Passion. The Minors said that it ceased to be united to the divinity of Christ, the Dominicans that the union did not cease. Eventually Pope Pius II. forbade both parties to discuss the question further.[3]

(4) The Dominicans strenuously fought against the nominalism[4] of the 14th cent. of which Durand de Saint-Pourçain and William Ockham were the leaders.

[1] *Opera Omnia*, Leyden, 1703–06, iii. 515.

[1] New ed., 7 vols., ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, Tours, 1900–08.
[2] Venice, 1481.
[3] All the literature of this quarrel is to be found in a MS in the Bibliothèque of Paris (*Cat.* 12390, fol. 1–78; also cf. Benedict XIV., *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et beatorum Canonizatione*, bk. ii. ch. 30).
[4] See art. REALISM AND NOMINALISM.

(5) The Averroism against which Albert the Great and St. Thomas fought was renewed again at the beginning of the 16th cent. in Italy. Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan, published a commentary on the *de Anima* of Aristotle (Florence, 1509). A few years later the Council of Lateran (19th Dec. 1513) condemned the teaching of Averroism on the point, and further exacted that professors of philosophy should solve contrary arguments, which Cajetan held only theologians could do.

(6) In the 14th cent. disputes concerning the Immaculate Conception arose. St. Thomas undoubtedly leaves the question unsolved, but he was at great pains to show that the Blessed Virgin was not excluded from the redemption. St. Thomas says that the precise moment of sanctification is unknown; he therefore never propounded the question whether Mary was sanctified at the very instant of conception. He believed it better to be silent on this point, although, had he followed his personal inclination, he had without doubt concluded in the affirmative, as his first declaration witnesses in *IV. Sent.* I. dist. xliv. qu. 1, art. 3, ad 3. But his superior theological sense did not let him, in presence of the silence of tradition and the negative position of many theologians, and in particular the reserved attitude of the Church. The endeavour to drag St. Thomas to the negative or positive side is to force his meaning, since he voluntarily abstained from either.

6. Renascence of Thomism.—In the 14th and 15th centuries there was an intellectual decadence in philosophy and theology. Thomism could not altogether abstract itself from the influence of the time. However, even in the 15th cent. there was notable vitality among Thomists like John Capreolus, St. Antoninus of Florence, and Jean de Torquemada. At the end of the 15th cent. the intellectual life of Thomism received new vigour, which manifested itself in the 16th cent. and continued for two centuries afterwards. In 1551 the General Chapter of Salamanca ordered the text of St. Thomas's writings to be used as text-books in all its schools. Hence at this time the great commentaries began to be written. Cajetan wrote from 1507 to 1522; Conrad Köllin on the *Prima secundæ* (Cologne, 1512); François de Vittoria (whose commentaries remained in MSS) and Barthélemy de Medina from 1577 to 1578; Banez from 1584 to 1594; Sylvester Ferrariensis on the *Summa contra Gentiles* (Venice, 1534). The humanist movement of the 16th cent. had a great influence on certain Thomists. François de Vittoria took the lead; of his disciples the most famous was Melchior Cano († 1560), whose work, *de Locis theologicis*, is a tribute to the humanist movement by its purity and beauty of style. Two new doctrines issued from the humanist state of thought: Ambrose Catharin († 1553) put forward new theories on predestination and grace; and Barthélemy de Medina formulated probabilism. Thomists combated the former doctrine; whilst in answer to the desire of Pope Alexander VII. they combated strongly probabilist doctrines.

7. Thomism and the Council of Trent.—Thomists held an important part in this council. The Thomistic school had grave interests at stake on account of the dogmatic question regarding the doctrine of justification. Of the five members of the commission instituted by Paul III. to study this question three were Dominicans, of whom Barthélemy Spina, master of the Sacred Palace, was the most active. The decree on justification was not drawn up without the help of St. Thomas. The text of the decree as regards the mode of preparation for justification[1] is taken in its every detail from the *Summa*, III. qu. lxxxv. art. 5. The decree numbers six acts preparatory to justification. They are the same in nature, number, and order as in the *Summa* (*loc. cit.*). Also, in the following chapter of the decree the causes of justification are exactly those given by St. Thomas in the *Summa*, I. ii. qu. cxii. art. 4, and II. ii. qu. xxiv. art. 3.

[1] Sess. vi. ch. vi.

The official catechism (published by the council), in which the doctrine of the Catholic Church is contained and which was compiled for the use of the clergy, was drawn up by three Thomists—Leonard de Marinis (archbishop of Lanciano), Gilles Foscarari (bishop of Modena), and François Foreiro (theologian to the king of Portugal).

As soon as the Council of Trent was finished, Pope Pius V. on 11th April 1567 proclaimed St. Thomas a doctor of the Church.

8. Thomism and Molinism.—See art. MOLINISM; also see below § 12.

9. Thomism and Jansenism.—In his posthumous work *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640) Jansenius strove to prove that the new theology, especially that of Molina and Suarez, was against the doctrine of St. Augustine and contrary to the doctrine authorized by the Catholic Church.[1] The *Augustinus* aroused much opposition among the Jesuits. After an examination of the book, the Dominicans found that it militated not only against Molinism, but also against Thomism. Two Dominicans wrote against Jansenius—Alexander Sébille (*de Augustini et SS. Patrum de libero arbitrio interpres thomisticus adversus Cornelii Jansenii doctrinam*, Mayence, 1652), and Bernard Guyard (*Discrimina inter doctrinam Thomisticam et Jansenianam*, Paris, 1655).

[1] See art. JANSENISM.

10. Thomism and probabilism.—The theory of probabilism (*q.v.*) was unfolded by Barthélemy de Medina, a Dominican, in his *Expositio in Primam Secundæ D. Thomæ* (Salamanca, 1577). The Jesuits generally adopted this new theory. But, since the ease with which any opinion could be made probable, provided the contradictory was probable, led to grave abuses, Alexander VII. asked the Dominicans to combat strongly the probabilist doctrines. This they did, and from that time no Dominican theologian has written in favour of probabilism.

11. Neo-Thomism and the revival of Scholasticism.—At the beginning of the 19th cent. Scholasticism (*q.v.*) began to revive, and there followed a revival of Thomism. The encyclical *Æterni Patris* of Pope Leo XIII. (4th Aug. 1879) set up St. Thomas Aquinas as the great model and master of Catholic philosophy and theology. From that time all schools have studied the works of the master and have endeavoured to make his thought their own. The endeavour to keep in touch with the progress of modern science, and to show that the fundamentals of Thomism are in perfect accord with the latest discoveries of science, was set on foot, not, as is sometimes supposed, by the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain University, but by the Thomist Sanseverino, one of the most learned and vigorous promoters of the movement. This is evidenced by his work, *Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata*. This great movement has been fostered and developed by the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, founded by Cardinal Mercier at Louvain. Certain *Revues* are now published in which the teachings of Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism are consistently set forth. The *Revue Thomiste* and the *Revue néo-scolastique de Philosophie* are worthy of mention.

12. Essence of Thomism.—Thomism is above all a system of philosophy and theology Now a

system necessarily implies harmony and solidarity among the doctrines of which the system is built up. In proportion as a system lacks unity, so much is it less of a system. Many philosophers and theologians have endeavoured to give systems of knowledge to the world, but on examination it is found that they lack the first essential of a system, viz. solidarity of thought in every department. If certain principles are laid down in metaphysics, no doctrine in any department of applied metaphysics (as, *e.g.*, in psychology, cosmology, natural theology, ethics, etc.) should be at variance with those principles. Moreover, if a system claims to be a system of the *whole* of knowledge, both of that attained by human reason and of that attained by revelation, then no doctrine formulated by natural reason should be at variance with the doctrines formulated by faith; and conversely. It is evident that, if there be a system of this nature, it is eminently constructive or synthetic. Every stone in the structure must be in its proper place, and, if the building is to stand firm, there must be some grand unifying principle or foundation upon which it is built up. Now, just as in any architectural building there cannot be several foundations, but only one ultimate foundation, so in Thomism there is one fundamental principle unifying the system and imparting harmony and solidarity to every department which it embraces.

13. The fundamental principle of Thomism.—An examination of the various departments of Thomist metaphysics, of applied metaphysics, and of the whole realm of Thomist theology will show that the fundamental doctrines of each department are applications to various matters of a great principle inculcated by Aristotle in his metaphysics. It is the principle of the real distinction between *act* and *potentiality*. One has not far to seek in order to understand what is meant by 'act' and by 'potentiality.' 'Act' means perfection; 'potentiality' means absence of perfection. A thing in the state of potentiality is in an imperfect state, and is therefore capable of receiving what it lacks, viz. some perfection or an act (as it is termed in scholastic language), whereby it ceases to be in a state of potentiality and is brought to a state of having some perfection. There are, as is evident, many kinds of states of potentiality and many kinds of corresponding states of act, but it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of them, since the doctrine underlying them all is one and the same. Furthermore, it is clear that the state of potentiality must be really distinct from the state of act; for, if this be not true, then 'to run' and 'to be able to run,' 'to know' and 'to be able to know,' 'to be hot' and 'to be able to be hot,' are one and the same, which is absurd. Hence there must be a real (extra-mental) distinction between the two states. This principle, then, may be formulated thus: *Between the state of potentiality and the state of act there is a real distinction.* Further, the first unfolding of this principle necessarily implies that that which is in a state of potentiality cannot cease to be in that state unless it be 'moved' from that state by something which is in the state of act; *e.g.*, cold water has the potentiality to become hot, but it is impossible for cold water to become hot unless it be 'moved' from that state by something that actually possesses heat. It will be seen that this conclusion is an immediate inference of the real distinction between potentiality and act. Hence the principle in a more explicit way may be formulated thus: *Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.*

This is the fundamental principle of the entire Thomist system; established at the outset in metaphysics, it is applied without exception to the fundamental doctrines in every department of Thomist philosophy and theology. Whoever draws a single conclusion which is in any way at variance with this principle, although he may hold all other doctrines of the Thomist system, ceases *ipso facto* to be a Thomist.

14. The application of the principle.—(*a*) *In metaphysics.*—The Thomist doctrine of real distinction between essence and existence in created things, wherein essence is conceived as a potentiality and existence as an act, is an application of the principle; likewise the real distinction between substance and its accidents, wherein substance is conceived as in potentiality to the accidents which are its acts or perfections; likewise the doctrine concerning the nature of dimensive quantity, the essence of which is not that it actually extends the parts of a corporeal substance in place, *i.e.* in triple dimension, but that it distributes the parts of that substance within the substance itself (which internal parts are only potentially distributed in triple dimension by dimensive quantity), and that it has the capability or potentiality of *actually* extending those parts in place according to triple dimension. Upon this doctrine of the nature of dimensive quantity is founded the doctrine of the real presence of the whole body of Christ in a small consecrated Host; also the doctrine of the virgin birth of Christ, of His passing into a room, the doors being shut, etc. Likewise the important doctrine of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, is an application of the aforesaid fundamental principle. An analysis of 'that which begins to be (effect) must have a reason (cause) for its inception' shows the underlying great principle.

(*b*) *In psychology.*—The doctrine of the unity of the human composite, viz. that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, and that it is the only form, is an application of the same principle. The 'prime matter,' a pure potentiality, which is informed by the intellectual soul (or act) receives from this act all that makes it body, and human body, and living. Through the same principle it follows that the faculties of intellect and will are really distinct from the substance of the soul, because they are the acts or perfections of the soul, which in regard to them is a potentiality. As a consequence it also follows not only that every faculty is really distinct from its object as potentiality to act, but also that, in regard to it *as object*, every faculty is passive, not active. Hence the important doctrine that the human intellect is a passive, not active, power or faculty, in that it receives, and does not make, its object of thought *as object*.

Further (and this is most important from the point of view of Thomism *versus* Molinism), the human will, which is the faculty of choice, must ultimately be moved to the very act of choosing by something which is in act; and the reason is that, before the act of choosing (given everything necessary for this action save this action itself), the will is in a state of potentiality and must therefore be 'moved' by something outside it to the state of perfection which is 'choosing.' Only God, the *actus purus*, can move the will to the very act of choosing; if aught else did this, the will *ipso facto* would cease to be free. This is the Thomistic doctrine of physical premotion, which is a rigorous application of the aforesaid fundamental principle.

(*c*) *In cosmology.*—In this department of applied metaphysics the fundamental question concerns the precise nature of body, as body. Applying the aforesaid principle, Thomism concludes that

body, as body, is a composite of two principles, one of which is substantial form and the other prime matter. Prime matter is a pure potentiality of which the substantial form is the act; and between the two, as a consequence, there is a real distinction.

(*d*) *In natural theology.*—The classic proof for the existence of God, viz. from the existence of motion in the world, is nothing more than a rigorous application of the same principle. Motion is here taken in its widest sense, embracing not only local motion but every kind of 'passing from potentiality to act.'[1]

(*e*) *In ethics.*—All the doctrines concerning habits and their formation, of the passions, of virtues and vices, of laws, etc., have their mainstay in the same fundamental principle.

(*f*) *In theology.*—For the existence of God see above (*d*). It is only necessary to run through the *Summa* to see that the same principle is fundamental in the doctrines concerning revelation and concerning inspiration (in which is implied the doctrine of cause and effect, and in particular of instrumental causality). By an understanding of the same great principle it is concluded that God alone is pure act with no admixture of potentiality whatsoever, whilst everything created contains both potentiality and act. It is further concluded not only that God's essence is identically the same as His existence, but that His intellect and His will, His attributes of unity, goodness, truth, His knowledge and love are likewise identically the same as His essence. The same grand principle underlies the whole of the doctrine concerning the mystery of the trinity of persons in God. A further application is to be found in the treatise on the angels, whose existence is really distinct from their essence, whose minds and wills are really distinct from their substance, etc. Thus through the whole of the *Summa* one finds the same principle applied. It will be necessary to take only two more cases in order to show the solidarity of Thomistic doctrines. According to St. Thomas, the sacraments are the instrumental causes of grace; they are not mere channels through which grace is infused into the soul; they are real, physical, instrumental causes which produce or infuse grace into the soul. The soul in regard to the sacramental grace that informs it is a potentiality (*potentia obedientialis*), and grace is the act.

The final instance we shall take to illustrate the application of the fundamental principle of Thomism concerns the doctrine of actual grace. Just as in the natural order it was concluded that the human will is physically premoved by God to the act of choice,[2] so in the supernatural order an actual grace is nothing more than a physical premotion in that order. Hence the Thomists speak of 'gratia efficax ab intrinseco,' a grace intrinsically or of its very nature efficacious, and not of grace, intrinsically indifferent, to be made efficacious by consent of the will to accept, or to remain inefficacious by refusal of the will to accept. Thus Thomism, by a relentless logic, applies the great principle to the doctrine of actual grace. To the mind of St. Thomas, in spite of the apparent difficulties, this doctrine is the only logical conclusion. For Thomism the theory of Molina or Suarez bristles with more difficulties in that the theory subverts the doctrines of God as the Prime Mover of all things, of causality, and of the great metaphysical principle: *Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.* In short, for the sake of a difficulty in applied metaphysics (*i.e.* the freedom of the will under God's physical premotion), Molina and Suarez gainsay a principle already established in metaphysics, just as he who, on account of some difficulty in mixed mathematics, gainsays a principle of pure mathematics.

Any conclusion other than the one drawn above wrecks a system of the whole of knowledge in the mind of the Thomist. It is owing to the perfect consistency of application of the grand fundamental principle aforesaid to every department of knowledge that Thomas bequeathed to the world a sublime system remarkable for its perfect unity, harmony, and solidarity of thought.

[1] Cf. *Summa*, I. qu. ii. art. 3, *Prima via.*
[2] See above (*b*).

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THRACE (Θρηΐκη, Θρᾴκη). — Thrace was the name given in classical times to the mountainous region lying north of Greece proper. The inhabitants (Θρῆικες, Θρέϊκες, Θρᾷκες) were a barbarous people, having no close affinities to the Greeks in language, culture, or originally in religion. In the last field, however, their influence on their more civilized neighbours was considerable, beginning early and continuing fairly late. In particular, they appear to have been partly responsible for the remarkable change in the spirit of Greek religion which took place about the beginning of the classical epoch or shortly before it. This change must not be thought of as something revolutionary, akin, *e.g.*, to the conversion of most of N. Europe from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism at the Reformation; for the large majority, probably if not certainly, religious beliefs and practices changed little if at all; it was rather the introduction of a new element, which rendered possible the holding by many Greeks of ideas either unknown to their fathers or existing among them in a very undeveloped form, and largely forgotten when first we hear anything definite about the Greek race.

1. **Origin and history of the Thracians.**—The Thracian invasion of the country which they occupied in historical times is part of a wider movement from the north into the hilly region of the Balkans and the countries west and east of that district (Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one side, the Caucasus and Armenia on the other). The invaders were of Indo-European stock, probably originally from the Carpathians. Driven perhaps by the pressure of Slovak tribes from the region of the Vistula, or possibly from sheer restlessness or desire for fresh

territory, they occupied the country in successive waves. The Phrygians (*q.v.*) and tribes most closely related to them, together with the Armenians, occupied the Asiatic district for the most part; the Thracians seized chiefly upon the European sector. That Thracian and Phrygian were related stocks was already recognized in antiquity,[1] and modern philology, together with arguments drawn from their religious and social organization, inclines us to believe that this is substantially correct. Throughout Greek history the Thracians, or the majority of them, remained politically independent, protected both by their great courage and by the difficult nature of their country; Rome, after much trouble, succeeded in subduing them, the ferocious Dacians finally yielding to Trajan. They remained, however, an intractable people, little influenced by the civilization of their rulers. Finally, about A.D. 400, their ancient priestly tribe, the Bessoi, were converted to Christianity. Some 200 years later a Slovak invasion swept over the country, and from that time begins the history of what ultimately became the Balkan peoples.

2. Ethnology.—The Thracian races fall, broadly speaking, into two groups—a northern and a southern. The latter, inhabiting the region of the Haimos and Strymon, included, besides the Bessoi already mentioned, the Bisaltai, Thynoi, Bithynoi, Sakai, Dioi, Odrysai, and other tribes; the former or Getic group consisted of a smaller number of peoples, individually more important than the tribes just mentioned. Besides the powerful Getai themselves, we must count among them the still more formidable Dacians (Δᾶκοι, Δάκαι, Δῖοι), who are often confused with them, and the Agathyrsoi, whose name seems to indicate that they were held in no great esteem by their Scythian neighbours (the first two syllables are probably to be connected with Zend *agha*, 'bad'), and who appear from Herodotos[2] to have practised the very primitive custom of group-marriage. On the whole, the northern group shows certain cultural affinities with the Germanic tribes, the southern with the Orientals, especially, as already mentioned, with the Phrygians.

3. Language.—As the Thracians seem to have had no knowledge of writing, the few inscriptions we have from Thrace are late and never in the native tongue. There remain, however, a number of glosses, some 36 of which we may take as genuine Thracian words; about 25 names of plants given as Thracian by Dioscorides; and a considerable number of proper names, both of persons (including deities) and of places. From these it appears that their tongue was Indo-Germanic, of the E. European group, having as its nearest ancient congeners Phrygian and Armenian. Traces appear of two distinct linguistic stocks, the result presumably of the blending of two races; and this we may consider along with the fact reported by Herodotos[3] that the cult practised by their chieftains differed from that of the common people.

4. Material culture.—It has been pointed out[4] that Homer does not consider the Thracian culture as an inferior one. In the *Iliad* the Thracians are for the most part the allies of the Trojans; Priam's treasury includes a cup of their giving;[5] the son of Antenor was brought up in Thrace and married there;[6] Rhesos comes to Priam's aid with a strong Thracian contingent.[7] On the other hand, some of them at least trade with the Greeks.[8] No hint is given that they are in any sense savages; in particular, the followers of Rhesos encamp in a soldierly manner.[9] But there is no need to suppose, as Helbig does, that the Thracians of that day, under Phœnician or other foreign influence, were enjoying a short period of 'hothouse' culture which brought them for a time to higher levels than they ever afterwards attained. The true explanation seems to be that Homer knows nothing of the later division between Greek and barbarian, and that the Greeks of his day were not a highly civilized people themselves. A race which lived under the rule of feudal barons, practised the blood-feud, allowed wer-gelt, occasionally mutilated or otherwise ill-treated a dead foe, was not quite free from the custom of human sacrifice, and buried its dead much in the fashion of the historical Thracians,[10] besides keeping up the old custom of bride-price and having only very rudimentary manufactures and handicrafts, was not much superior to the Thracians of historical times. The difference was that the Greeks developed with marvellous rapidity in the next 300 years or so, while the Thracians remained backward.[11]

Passing to classical authors of the later periods, we find our chief account of Thrace in Herodotos.[12] His whole attitude towards the Thracians, while not unfriendly,[1] is clearly that of civilized man describing interesting barbarians; and this is certainly justified. They are, he tells us, a numerous race, of little political importance owing to their lack of unity; their culture is on the whole uniform. They despise agriculture, counting it more honourable to be idle and to live by plunder. They have, however, some arts, as they can weave very good cloth of hemp fibre.[2] To this we may add, what sundry later authors tell us, that they showed skill in making various tools and weapons of iron.[3] They were accustomed to dye their hair and tatu their skin. They were, in some cases at least, polygynous; that they lived under father-right, not mother-right, is clear from the facts that they paid bride-price and that marital jealousy was strongly developed, though the chastity of an unmarried girl was quite disregarded—*i.e.*, their women were apparently thought of chiefly as valuable property, belonging to their fathers so long as they were unmarried—hence the light view taken of their immoralities, for any children that they might bear out of wedlock would also belong to their own family—but afterwards belonging to their husbands, who had paid for the exclusive use of them. When we add that as a race they were cattle-breeders and especially famous for their horses from very early times,[4] it is clear that we shall not be far wrong in comparing them to some one of the principal Basuto peoples, such as the Amazulu, before the latter attained unity of government under T'Chaka. Physically, however, they were at the other end of the colour-scale, being fair-skinned and yellow-haired.

Finally, four points should be noted as giving the clue to many features in their religion. According to the practically unanimous voice of antiquity, (1) the Thracians were desperately brave, having little fear of death; (2) they were excitable, and, in particular, had a bad name for unrestrained indulgence in sexual passion; (3) they were heavy drinkers; and (4) they were intensely fond of music, performing well on both flute and lyre. In addition, their country was a mountainous one, in which caves were no rarity.

5. Religion.—We may take as our starting-point the famous passage of Herodotos, v. 7: 'They worship only the following gods, Ares, Dionysos, and Artemis; but their kings . . . reverence Hermes above all other gods, swear by him alone, and say that they are descended from Hermes.' We must in the first place remember that the names in the above passage are not to be taken too literally. Whereas a modern writer, if he said that a particular race worshipped Buddha, would mean exactly what he said, and the Hebrew prophet[5] who speaks of the name of his God as being 'great among the Gentiles' means his words to be startlingly paradoxical, a Greek always assumes that the gods of all nations are much the same as his own and never scruples to talk of the Egyptian cult of Hermes or the Roman worship of Hera, meaning thereby Thoth and Juno. We shall see that, taken as it stands, Herodotos' statement is true of one deity only.

(*a*) *Ares.*—That Ares is a Thracian deity is a fairly wide-spread opinion. As far back as Homer[6] we find Thrace mentioned as the home of the war-god, and later writers echo Homer.[7] Ares has, moreover, certain non-Greek features; his cult is wholly without any of those higher forms which distinguish, *e.g.*, Apollo or Athene and remains throughout that of a war-god pure and simple. Homer's whole attitude towards him is one of dislike; he supports the Trojans throughout; and in his ritual we find one feature paralleled in Thrace[8] hard to parallel in purely Greek cult—the dog-sacrifice to him under the name of Enyalios at Sparta.[9]

At the same time it must be confessed that none

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[1] οἱ Φρύγες Θρᾳκῶν ἄποικοί εἰσι (Strabo, x. 471).
[2] iv. 104. [3] v. 7.
[4] W. Helbig, *Das Homer. Epos*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 9.
[5] xxiv. 234; we are not told who made the cup.
[6] xi. 222 ff. [7] x. 434. [8] ix. 71 f.
[9] x. 471. [10] See below § 5 (*h*).
[11] The present writer holds the view of Andrew Lang, van Leeuwen, and other scholars that the Homeric poems are substantially the work of one man, and he would put their date about the 10th cent. B.C. For the Homeric customs above mentioned see *Il.* ix. 632, xxii. 371, xxiii. 175 (the poet clearly disapproves strongly of the sacrifice), and xxiii. *passim*, *Od.* xv. 224, 272 ff., xx. 355, and many other passages. Elaborate manufactures or works of art are regularly the work of gods (as *Il.* xviii. 468 ff.) or imported (as *Od.* iv. 615). Simple weaving and the like are done at home, as *Od.* ii. 94. Cf. the account of Thracian arts above.
[12] Chiefly v. 2–8. References to other passages of Herod are cited in the notes. For fuller authorities see Tomaschek, *Die alten Thraker*, i. 111 ff.

[1] Between Greeks as a whole and Thracians as a whole no bitterness seems to have existed. The references to Thracians as bloodthirsty savages are mostly in comparatively late authors—*e.g.*, Hor. *Od.* i. xxvii. 2. The writer is of opinion that the detestable conduct of certain Thracian mercenaries in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. vii. 29) may have had something to do with this, while later their savage battles against the Romans prejudiced the latter against them.
[2] Herod. iv. 74, vii. 75.
[3] References in Tomaschek, i. 119.
[4] Cf. Hom. *Il.* x. 436. [5] Mal 1[11].
[6] *Il.* xiii. 301 and elsewhere.
[7] *E.g.*, Verg. *Æn.* iii. 35.
[8] *Vita Euripidis*, i. (vi.) ταύτην δὲ (τὴν κύνα) Θρᾷκες, ὡς ἔθος θύσαντες ἔφαγον.
[9] Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 290*d*; Paus. III. xiv. 9; Arnob. *adv. Nat.* iv. 25. Such a sacrifice, however, is not wholly unknown elsewhere in Greece.

of the above features are conclusive against his Greek origin. Among a people brave enough, but not fond of war for its own sake, the war-god might well remain 'functional'—too important to be altogether neglected, too unpopular to develop. Among the traditional friends of Troy are also Apollo, Artemis, and at times Zeus himself; not much can be made from a single feature of an obscure ritual;[1] and the references to Thrace need mean no more than that the Thracians, being warlike, had a popular cult of a war-god. And we must remember that the cult of Ares is very old in Athens and Boiotia, and that his name is not only plausibly derived from an Aryan root, which in itself proves nothing, but has a characteristically Greek formation.[2]

We conclude therefore, on the whole, that the Thracians did not originate the Greek cult of Ares, but had from very early times a war-god of their own, about whose ritual we must be content to remain ignorant. It is worth mentioning that Herodotos seems to speak of him as an oracular god in one rather obscure passage.[3]

(*b*) *Dionysos.*—The case of Dionysos is very different, and there is little serious doubt that here Herodotos and the numerous later authors who speak of this god as Thracian are literally correct.[4] The chief arguments in favour of this statement are as follows:

(i.) *Philological.*—The first two syllables of the name are apparently to be connected with the Thracian tribe-name Dioi. Further, a Phrygian inscription gives us the formula *με διως κε ζεμελω*, which almost certainly means 'By heaven and earth.' We thus have a god with a name of which the first part has close Thraco-Phrygian affinities, while the rest is certainly not Greek, whose mother is apparently the earth-goddess of the Thraco-Phrygian stock.[5]

(ii.) *Traditional.*—Strabo definitely calls the cult of Dionysos Thraco-Phrygian.[6] When first we hear of the god at all, it is in connexion with the Edonian king Lykurgos;[7] and his cult is called Thracian far more persistently than that of Ares by authors of all ages. Moreover, all tradition is agreed that he is not genuine Greek. It is true that the usual birth-legend (not the 'Orphic' story; see below) makes him a Theban; but even there he is disowned by his kin and has to win his way into prominence against the vehement opposition of Pentheus;[8] while many similar tales indicate that his cult had to force an entrance into Greece. It is true that many, if not all, of these are misinterpreted ritual tales; but that they were persistently misinterpreted in the same way, as stories of persecution, strongly suggests that a folk-memory of real opposition lies behind the interpretation if not the stories themselves.

(iii.) *Facts of cult.*—On the one hand, very early Greek agricultural festivals either are not Dionysiac, like the Attic Thesmophoria, or present Dionysos as an obvious intruder, like the Anthesteria. On the other hand, the Thraco-Phrygian region is the home of all manner of orgiastic nature-cults,[9] and one detail of the worship of Dionysos which we have good reason to suppose primitive, viz. the oracle, is Thracian and hardly Greek at all.[10] He seems always to have been a wine-god as well as a god of nature in general, and a wine-god we find him in Thrace, which was a wine-growing country very early.[1] Further, he is connected in cult with Sabazios, who is probably Phrygian.

From Thrace, then, his cult spread through Greece some time, probably not very long, before the dawn of Greek history. In Homer he is apparently a foreign god, little known and not much regarded; of the five mentions of him two[2] are certainly interpolations, one[3] is unimportant, the others come in the story of Lykurgos. When we come to the Homeric hymns, however, he is a well-known and important deity, and all later literature is full of references to him. It would appear then that somewhere after the downfall of the Homeric (Achaian) culture, and during the period of reconstruction, of which very little is known, his worship crossed the border and was carried, it is no longer possible to say exactly how, or by whom,[4] to all parts of Greece, meeting with considerable opposition, but finally establishing itself as part of the state religion and becoming largely civilized in the process, though recrudescences of its original barbarism, such as the well-known one in Italy,[5] were always possible.

No detailed description of the cult of Dionysos in Thrace has come down to us from antiquity; but it is not difficult to frame one from various scattered notices,[6] from the wilder and more savage features of his Grecian cult, from the traces of the ancient worship still to be found in N. Greece, and from what we know of similar rites elsewhere.

We learn, firstly, that the most prominent feature of the ritual was a wild orgiastic ceremony held normally, if not always, at night. In this the worshippers worked themselves up into a state of frenzy by dancing and shouting (hence the numerous names of the god, such as Euhios, Iakchos, and perhaps Bakchos,[7] which are derivable from ejaculations or from words meaning 'shout' or 'cry'), to the accompaniment of savage music. They were dressed in the skins of wild animals—we hear especially of fawn- and fox-pelts (*νεβρίδες, βασσάραι*)—and carried the thyrsos, a spear-like implement covered with the sacred ivy, or the narthex (fennel-wand). It is obvious that for an excitable people, not highly civilized, and susceptible to strong sexual emotion, and therefore to nervous emotion of all kinds, including religious enthusiasm,[8] the violent exercise under the stimulating surroundings of their mountainous country in the clear night air would of itself produce an abnormal condition; and this seems to have been further encouraged by the free use of wine and perhaps other artificial stimulants. The result was, at least in many cases, and particularly among their women, a condition of frenzy, involving anæsthesia, abnormal strength and endurance, and other such symptoms, followed by fainting and exhaustion. The natural explanation, to any one at that stage of culture, was that the worshippers were possessed by their god (*ἔνθεοι, κάτοχοι*); and therefore we find them called by his name (*βάκχοι, βάκχαι*). That Dionysos himself was present was

[1] The odd ritual of Ares *Γυναικοθοίνας* (Paus. VIII. xlviii. 4, 5) may point to Amazonianism, which is not Greek. But this is exceedingly doubtful.

[2] The forms *Ἀρήϊος* (Hom. Ionic) and *ἀρεύιοι* (Alkaios) indicate a stem in *-ειν-*; cf. *πρεσβήϊον* and *πρέσβυς*. The root is akin to Skr. *ras*, 'roar.' See C. A. M. Fennell in *CR* xiii. [1899] 306.

[3] vii. 76, *ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἀνδράσι Ἄρεός ἐστι χρηστήριον*. The context is corrupt, and it is uncertain who are referred to, quite possibly not Thracians at all.

[4] The counter-theory, that he is a Cretan deity, is supported by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena*[2], ch. viii.). The arguments for it reduce to (*a*) the fact that a cult of a god of this type did exist in Crete from very early times and remained so powerful that Zeus himself was absorbed by it; (*b*) certain very primitive features of Cretan Dionysiac ritual. But, in view of the overwhelming arguments in favour of Thrace, these phenomena are of little weight. The former is common to many localities; the latter is naturally explained by supposing that the worship of Dionysos, once it was imported, found favour in Crete because it was so like the native worship, and so was but little modified.

[5] *CGS* v. 94. The attempts to make Semele a thunder-cloud or the like are too absurd to deserve more than passing mention. The syllables *-νσσο-* are unintelligible, but possibly connected with the holy mountain Nysa, which is variously located but apparently Thracian in Homer.

[6] x. 471; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 2. [7] Hom. *Il.* vi. 130 ff.

[8] The best known form of the legend is that given in Euripides, *Bacchæ*. Even in this the final birth of Dionysos, from the thigh of Zeus, does not take place in Thebes.

[9] Cf. art. PHRYGIANS.

[10] See Eur. *Hec.* 1267; Arist *ap.* Macrob. *Sat.* I. xviii. 1.

[1] Hom. *Il.* ix. 72; Arist. *loc. cit.*

[2] *Il.* xiv. 325, and *Od.* xi. 325. [3] *Od.* xxiv. 74.

[4] It was an age of wandering prophets (see Rohde, *Psyche*[4], ii. 63 ff.). The favourable reception of the women may have had a good deal to do with it also.

[5] Liv. xxxix. 8 ff.

[6] To save a multitude of quotations, we refer the reader for detailed authorities to the authors cited in the Literature at the end of this article.

[7] The root is perhaps *Fαχ-* (Curtius), in both names, Iakchos being *Fιfαχχος*. Euhios is derived from the well-known cry *εὐοῖ*.

[8] The present writer holds religious and sexual emotion to be essentially the same; see, *e.g.*, W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, and New York, 1902, *passim*. The frequency of 'conversions' and the like during adolescence and the regular employment by mystics of all nationalities of erotic metaphors are among the facts supporting this view.

a commonplace, familiar to us from many literary and artistic representations of the rites, from Euripides to Titian and Keats;[1] the skins in which the worshippers dressed were those of animal *avatars* of the god; and the culmination of the rite was the tearing in pieces and devouring of one of these animals.

It is far from impossible that in some cases the victim was a man or a child. That the Getai practised a form of human sacrifice we know;[2] Themistokles sacrificed three captives to Dionysos *ὠμηστής*;[3] the legends of Pentheus, etc., point the same way; and in the modified Dionysiac ritual of Tenedos[4] the cow whose calf is to be the victim is tended like a woman, and the calf when born has buskins put on it before being killed.

We have so far a quite normal ritual of a vegetation deity, of the kind familiar from the *Golden Bough*.[5] The god visits his worshippers in early spring (the time of most of the festivals),[6] is welcomed by them, and is joined to them by a sort of primitive sacrament. Of the death or expulsion of the worn-out god, later in the year, we do not hear so much, but there are traces of it. In the legend of Lykurgos already referred to the king pursues the god into the sea—the throwing of the vegetation-spirit into water is a very common rite; there was a strong tradition that he had died, and was buried at Delphi;[7] and there is also a legend of his descent into Hades to fetch up Semele.[8] We are therefore, in view of these facts and on the analogy of all similar ritual elsewhere, justified in supposing that his death was part of the ceremonial of his cult; and this belief is strengthened by the curious relic of Dionysiac worship found in Thrace by R. M. Dawkins,[9] in which the death of one of the characters in the mummers' play is a prominent feature. Closely allied with this went the ceremony representing his birth and cradling in the *λίκνον*, or winnowing-fan. The last detail, however, marking him definitely as a corn-god, is Greek rather than Thracian.[10]

In the ritual of Dionysos the forms of the god change bewilderingly. We have reason to suppose him to have been conceived as bull, goat, kid, sheep, serpent, stag, and even pig,[11] for all these animals, besides the fox and perhaps others, were sacred to him, and, as he is at times said to have taken the forms of some of them, notably bull and serpent, we may conjecture that he was more or less identified with the others as well. But in iconography he is always human, and he had human *avatars*, as might be expected from the human sacrifices.

(*c*) *Divine kings; Lykurgos, Pentheus, Rhesos, Orpheus.*—Several of the legends seem to indicate that in Thrace, as elsewhere, there existed kings of the type familiar from the investigations of J. G. Frazer—*i.e.* incarnations of the local god, who ended by being sacrificed, possibly devoured. As the Greeks probably never had had this sort of king—certainly had forgotten it—they naturally misunderstood the legends. Thus none of the above mythological figures exactly correspond to the Frazerian type. Lykurgos persecutes Dionysos; but the form which his persecution takes is a pursuit (probably originally ritual) of the god and his attendants and the flogging of them with the *βουπλήξ*, by which is possibly meant, not an ox-goad, but a whip of bull's hide, a fertilizing *februum* like the hide thongs of the Roman Luperci. He is not torn in pieces by the god's followers, but in one way or another (the legend varies in detail) is punished, by blindness or otherwise, and imprisoned in a cave.[1] Pentheus opposes the Bakchai and is torn in pieces by them. Orpheus is a royal priest of Dionysos and is torn in pieces by the Mainades—an act for which late mythologizers assign sundry fanciful reasons.[2] Rhesos is a vague figure, but it has been urged that his name may be connected with *rex* (Gothic *raiks*) and the royal Thracian name Rhescuporis. After his death he appears—the exact sense and reading are matters of dispute—to be represented by the author of the play bearing his name as becoming an oracular deity or semi-deity (*ἀνθρωποδαίμων*) of somewhat Dionysiac type.[3] Add to all this the facts that the Getic priest-king was called 'god'[4] and that we get as a royal name of frequent occurrence the word Kotys, which is a by-form of Kotyto, and it becomes at least plausible that the cult of Dionysos and other gods of the same kind in Thrace had at its head in early times[5] a priest-king who was the incarnation of the deity and ended by being violently put to death to make way for a fresh incarnation.

(*d*) *Orphism.*—Of the persons mentioned in the last section one is of such importance as to deserve separate treatment, viz. Orpheus. Concerning this priest-king the tradition of antiquity is fairly constant. He is a more or less historical figure;[6] he existed some time before the Trojan War;[7] he was a Thracian,[8] son of King Oiagros and a Muse, usually Kalliope, sometimes Polymnia. He was a priest of Dionysos, founder of Dionysiac mysteries, public and private, and originator of the Orphic *βίος*, *i.e.* way of life.[9] He was also a seer, a magician, a 'theologian' in the Greek sense of the word,[10] a marvellous musician. His home, when exactly localized, is generally said by our earlier authorities to have been Mt. Pangaion, the site of an ancient and famous Dionysiac shrine, while later writers locate him on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebros. After various adventures, the most notable of which was the descent into Hades, familiar in later literature from Vergil's handling of it in the *Georgics*, he was

[1] *Bacchæ*; *Endymion*; the 'Bacchus and Ariadne' in the National Gallery.

[2] See below, § (*g*).

[3] Plut. *Them.* 13.

[4] See Ælian, *Nat. Anim.* xii. 34. The Thracian ritual seems to have been toned down almost into a normal sacrifice.

[5] See for full references the index vol. to *GB*[3], *s.v.* 'Dionysus.'

[6] For a few examples see art. Festivals and Fasts (Greek), *ad fin.*

[7] See Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 365*a*.

[8] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 15.

[9] Described in his art. 'Archæology in Greece (1906–1907),' in *JHS* xxvii. [1906] 284 ff.

[10] Hence Dionysos' title Λικνίτης (Plut. *loc. cit.*); cf. Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* i. 166.

[11] A selection of the relevant passages will be found in *CGS* v. 303 f.

[1] See Soph. *Ant.* 955 ff., and Jebb, *ad loc.*

[2] For examples see Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* iv. 519.

[3] See Rohde, i. 161, who rather too confidently assumes Rhesos to have been a faded god. W. Leaf (*JHS* xxxv. [1915] 1 ff.) goes too far in the opposite direction. On the whole the present writer is of opinion that Rhesos may really have been a half-forgotten king of some Thracian tribe, who after his death was supposed to give oracles. The ancient evidence is to be found in *Il.* x.; [Eur.] *Rhes.* 955 ff.; Polyæn. vi. 53.

[4] Strabo, vii. 298.

[5] Presumably not in historical times, as one can hardly suppose that none of our authors would have mentioned it in that case.

[6] For an isolated expression of doubt see Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 38 (108), 'Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse,' which from the context is almost certainly a denial of Orpheus' existence. But Aristotle may merely have meant to deny his authorship of the 'Orphic' poems.

[7] Contemporary with the Argonauts, according to most versions of their story—*e.g.*, Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 176, and Apollonios Rhodios.

[8] 'Thracius Orpheus' (Ver. *Ec.* iv. 55) is his stock epithet.

[9] *βίος* is perhaps the nearest Greek equivalent of 'sect' or 'persuasion' and greatly resembles the NT use of *ὁδός* (Ac 9[2]). It signifies a form of life depending on certain religious or philosophical principles and is applied especially to the Orphic and Pythagorean bodies.

[10] *I.e.*, not a writer on the theoretical basis of religion in general, or of any particular religion, but one who describes the nature, relationships, etc., of deities. In this sense Hesiod, *e.g.*, is a 'theologian' (*θεολόγος*).

torn in pieces by a band of women, possessed by real or pretended Dionysiac frenzy.[1]

From what is said above it is clear that all this may have some historic foundation—*i.e.*, that the legends regarding him go back to some real happenings in connexion with the ritual of Dionysos. The death of an Orpheus, and consequently his descent into Hades, and presumably also his resurrection in a new incarnation, may have taken place, not once but many times.[2] But tradition crystallized all these forgotten personalities into one picturesque figure, the founder and Messiah of a religion of mystical other-worldliness.

The chief tenets, so far as we can reconstruct them, are as follows.[3] At the end of a long succession of deities[4] comes Dionysos-Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone.[5] This god, while an infant, was beguiled by the Titans, who gave him a mirror and other toys and then tore him in pieces and devoured him, all but his heart, which was saved by Athene. The god was re-created by his father, who swallowed the heart and re-bore the child; the Titans were destroyed by the thunderbolt, and from their ashes sprang man. Man is therefore a creature of mixed origin, containing a divine principle (Dionysos) and an evil one (the Titans). The main object of his existence is to get rid of the latter element—a task which cannot be completed in one lifetime. To further it, however, it is necessary to live in strict ritual purity, avoiding the use of meat, wearing white garments, shunning the polluting presence of corpses and of women in child-birth,[6] and practising chastity,[7] all these being observances well known in ancient ritual and not peculiar to Orphism. In addition, it seems that the higher class of Orphics practised a more or less definite ethical code.[8] Side by side with all this went, as might be expected, a lower, popular form, in which a sort of begging friars drove a thriving trade in indulgences, so to call them, 'persuading not only individuals but cities,' says Plato,[9] 'that their sins can be purged with sacrifices and pleasant merry-makings'; *i.e.*, performing quasi-magical rites, effective *ex opere operato*, quite independently of the moral condition of the person concerned, at prices proportioned to the wealth or superstition of their clients.

To return to the higher forms of Orphism. After a life spent in moral and ceremonial purity the soul of the Orphic believer was rewarded in Hades, apparently for 1000 years,[10] or ten times the supposed maximum length of a human life, while those who had sinned, but not beyond remedy, were punished for the same period. After this came reincarnation, not necessarily in human form. Next came another period in Hades, and so on, the process being known apparently as the *κύκλος*, or cycle of reincarnations.[1] Release from this could be obtained by a series of good lives on both sides of the grave—for apparently each world was the heaven or purgatory of the other. After a triple good life on either side—three on earth and three in Hades—the soul had purged itself from the stain of 'original sin' and was free to enter a permanent paradise, with no more prospect of reincarnation, and in the enjoyment of divine or heroic[2] rank.

This theology, and much besides, was embodied in a large literature, attributed either to Orpheus himself or to his pupil Mousaios,[3] the oldest parts of which probably date from the 6th cent. B.C., while the latest representatives, the *Hymns* and Orphic *Argonautica*, are about 1000 years later.[4] Of this the greater part has perished, and especially the earliest and most valuable part; and we have of undoubted and fairly early Orphic origin only one set of documents, the so-called Petelia Tablets, gold plates found in Orphic graves in S. Italy. It appears from these that a pious Orphic was in the habit of burying with his dead friend directions for his conduct in Hades, to aid him to secure final bliss, since no doubt it was charitable to suppose that the life just completed was the last of the series of good lives required to qualify for escape from the circle.[5]

The tablets present the following picture of Hades. The soul, apparently after long and thirsty wanderings, travels along a road flanked on either side by springs. Avoiding the left-hand spring,[6] it addresses the guardians of the right-hand one, declares itself to be of divine race, and begs for a draught of 'the cold water which floweth forth from the lake of Memory.' The request is granted, and the soul is hailed as having 'endured that which aforetime it had never endured.' It addresses Persephone and the other deities of the under world and is admitted into their society.

The poem to which all these tablets go back is of unknown authorship and date, but it is evident that it or something like it stands behind the passages of Pindar and Plato already cited and also behind much that is to be found in other authors, mostly late. The connecting link is to be found in Pythagoreanism, which, it would seem, found Orphism already established in S. Italy, and incorporated much of its teaching. This results in a confusion between the two systems so complete that it is practically hopeless, with our imperfect documents, to say definitely with regard to any eschatological passage that it is purely Orphic or purely Pythagorean. Through the Pythagorean exiles who reached Greece proper after the dispersion of their communities in Magna Græcia the higher forms of the doctrine became known to Plato, in whom consequently we find side by side strong Orphic-Pythagorean influence and hearty contempt for Orphic charlatanism. Not dissimilar is the attitude of Aristophanes, who, on the one

[1] For full authorities, and variants of the myth, see Gruppe. We give a few of the leading references: priest and founder of mysteries: Eur. *Hipp.* 952 ff.; Aristoph. *Ran.* 1032; Herod. ii. 81; Plut. *Quæst. Con.* ii. 635*e*; seer: Plat. *Prot.* 316*b*; magician: Eur. *Alc.* 966 (973), *Cycl.* 639; musician: Pind. *loc. cit.*, and Verg. *loc. cit.*

[2] Cf. Proclus, *in Plat. Remp.* 398: 'Ορφεὺς ἅτε τῶν Διονύσου τελετῶν ἡγεμὼν γενόμενος τὰ ὅμοια παθεῖν λέγεται τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.

[3] The details varied (see Rohde, ii. 115 ff.; Gruppe, col. 1121 ff.). The Orphic writings being largely lost, much has to be patched together from various sources, many of them obscure.

[4] The theogony does not differ from the Hesiodic in essentials; the chief departures are the insertion of the World-egg laid by Night and of two vague deities, Phanes and Erikapaios.

[5] *I.e.* sky-god and earth-mother. Persephone = Zemelo = the Semele of the Theban myth. The source of the name Zagreus is doubtful.

[6] See esp. Eur. Κρῆτες, frag. 475*a* Dindorf, and *Hipp.* 952.

[7] See *Hipp.* 1002. Hippolytos is apparently represented as the ideal Orphist.

[8] For reference to this see *Hipp.* 992 ff., and Pind. *Ol.* ii. 76.

[9] Condensed from Plat. *Rep.* ii. 364 E.

[10] This is the figure given by Plat. *Rep.* x. 615 A, B; cf. Verg. *Æn.* vi. 748; of these the former is probably Orphic-Pythagorean, the latter contains the Orphic-sounding phrase *rotam volvere*. For other Platonic myths containing similar eschatology see J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, London, 1905; cf. A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*[2], p. 84 ff. In Pind. frag. 98 (110) the soul spends only eight years in Hades (*i.e.* an *oktaeteris*; cf. art. CALENDAR [Greek], § 3) before its final earthly life, after which it attains heroic rank.

[1] The word is found in the Petelia Tablets and elsewhere in Orphic literature. This account of Orphic eschatology is put together largely from Pind. *Ol.* ii. and frag. 98–110. In the latter we take the disputable words ποιναὶ παλαιοῦ πένθεος as meaning 'atonement for her (Persephone's) ancient grief' (at the murder of Zagreus).

[2] The tablets have ἄλλοισι μεθ' ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξεις and also ὀλβιὲ καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο. The confusion is natural enough in a religion which has much to say of the beatified dead (ἥρωες) and also claims divine ancestry for all men. Ordinarily, a Greek sharply differentiated between a god, who did not die at all, and a hero, who had been an ordinary man but continued to live in some way after bodily death.

[3] Plat. *Rep.* ii. 363 C, 364 E, and commentators.

[4] Onomakritos edits and interpolates Musaios in the time of Hipparchos, son of Peisistratos, Herod. vii. 6; Orphic writings falsely called pre-Homeric, Herod. ii. 81.

[5] Text and tr. by G. Murray in J. E. Harrison, *Proleg.*[2], appendix.

[6] Probably Lethe, of which a soul drinks before reincarnation. The finally purified soul has no need to forget.

hand, parodies private mysteries of the Orphic type in the *Clouds* and, on the other, draws in the *Frogs* on the same type of ideas for his half-serious picture of the other world.

Another problem which we cannot solve with any great exactness is the amount of non-Thracian thought which goes to the making of Orphism as we know it. The very name of the founder is in doubt, for, while to some it appears a Thracian name,[1] others point to the occurrence of Greek cognates[2] as indicating it to be Greek. As to the doctrines, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Thracians produced so elaborate and quasi-philosophical a system of reincarnation; this is rather the result of Greek reflexion on Thracian Dionysiac material. Thrace, on the other hand, is the likeliest claimant for the grotesque myth on which the whole system rests; but here again we do not know how much was contributed by obscure superstitions from backward corners of the Greek world. The asceticism we may not unfairly call Thracian, though the details of it are not definitely non-Hellenic.

Exactly what form the Orphic religion took, in its externals, and how long it remained a potent force, cannot be very precisely determined, still less what proportion of the Greek peoples was seriously affected by it. With regard to the first point, however, it would appear that Orphism had but little organization. There was, and could be, no Orphic state anywhere, and, though there was no doubt a considerable number of Orphic congregations (*θίασοι*), there was no central authority to connect them, nor have we any right to suppose that they were identical with each other in doctrine and practice. It was as if there existed a form of Freemasonry in which each lodge was a law unto itself, and there was no very definite common ritual and no recognized means of communication between the various lodges. Also, though many of the greatest individual minds, notably Pythagoras and Plato, and probably Socrates also, were at one time or another affected by the cult, we have no evidence that it was a particularly numerous body. Pythagoreanism, which seems to have been much more organized and had decided political leanings, was still the faith of a minority, as is seen by its helplessness when popular feeling in Italy turned against it; Orphism, being non-political and probably still more the religion of the few, was not persecuted. As to the length of its existence, we have seen that Orphic documents were still being written in the 4th cent. A.D., but, like other productions of that epoch, they show unmistakable traces of syncretism, and of Orphism we have little or nothing outside of literature. Therefore, on the whole, we are disposed to attach less importance than Dieterich does to the undeniable coincidences between Orphic imagery, *e.g.*, and that of certain Gnostic and Christian writings; we would look for the source of that imagery, and the many common points of ritual and belief in Christian and non-Christian cults, to the numerous Hellenized Oriental faiths rather than to Orphism proper, holding that the language which once was chiefly, if not peculiarly, Orphic had become common property,[3] while Orphism itself had become very unimportant. This, however, cannot be considered as settled beyond reasonable doubt.

[1] See Tomaschek, ii. 52.

[2] Orphe, given as a Laconian name in Serv. on Verg. *Buc.* viii. 29; the Bœotian name *Ὀρφώνδας*; *ὀρφός*, the name of a fish in Æl. *Nat. Anim.* xii. 1; and the root of the adj. *ὀρφναιός*.

[3] Thus the 'cold water' of the formula above quoted is found again on Osirian tombs (G. Kaibel, *IG Siciliæ et Italiæ*, Berlin, 1890, nos. 1488, 1705, etc.), and on at least one which is traditionally Greek in its wording, *ib.* no. 1342; finally appearing as the Christian *refrigerium*; cf. the 'water of life' of the NT.

We may now consider briefly the moral value of the Dionysiac and Orphic cults. That they were immoral in the obvious sense is not likely. It is true that Livy,[1] *e.g.*, makes out Dionysiac orgies to have been horrible riots of lust and violence; but he is speaking of a late form of the worship, far from its native place, and has all the Roman prejudice against any secret conventicle—the same prejudice which later gave rise to the same tales about the early meetings of the Christians. But in a broader sense we may say that all such cults were immoral, for they were untrue to Hellenism, replacing its clear envisagement of the facts of life with a misty other-worldliness, sure to lead to intellectual decay, however brilliant the first flowerings of its mysticism might be in such a mind as that of Plato. Not till the nonage of the ancient world did such doctrines really become prevalent; and the overthrow of the Pythagorean communities, primarily political, may be thought of as also an unconscious revolt against a force traitorous to Greek civilization.[2]

(*e*) *Artemis.*—Here we need have no doubt that Herodotos is not to be taken too literally. All we have any reason to believe—since of a Thracian origin of the cult of Artemis properly so called we have not the faintest trace—is that some great nature-goddess was worshipped in that country. We can give at least two names of such deities. Kotyto, or Kotys, though generally spoken of as Phrygian, was also Edonian.[3] Another deity, who was to some extent naturalized in Greece in fairly early times,[4] was Bendis, whose cult is mentioned together with that of Kotyto by Strabo.[5] Of the details of her worship we know but little; the torch-race mentioned by Plato[6] fits well enough with any deity equated with the torch-bearing Artemis, but is by no means peculiar to her; and of the native worship of her we hear chiefly that it was noisy.[7] Probably enough there were a score of such female personifications of the fertility of nature, worshipped with orgiastic rites not unlike those of Dionysos himself, possibly in connexion with him.[8]

(*f*) *Hermes.*—With regard to Herodotos' statement that the Thracian kings especially venerate Hermes, we are not aware that any very convincing explanation has been offered, but, in view of the facts mentioned in the next paragraph, we suggest that he means Hermes Chthonios and identifies with him some one of the deities after the pattern of Zalmoxis.

(*g*) *Zalmoxis.*[9]—Our chief authority for this deity is again Herodotos, who informs us[10] that the

[1] xxxix. 10, and elsewhere in his description of the Bacchanalian affair.

[2] The above account of the origin and progress of Orphism, while in our opinion the correct one, has been controverted by R. Eisler (*Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, Munich, 1910, ch. v.). He endeavours to prove that its origin is due to Asiatic, particularly Persian, influences, and this theory is accepted by some later writers (*e.g.*, Mrs. A. Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life*, London, 1915, p. 274). We hold that, with all deference to Eisler's great learning and industry, his arguments are wholly insufficient for the Orphism of the times of Pythagoras or of Plato, whatever light they may throw on the mongrel system which at the beginning of the Christian era went by that name.

[3] Æsch. *Ἠδωνοί*, frag. 55 Dindorf: *σεμνὰ Κότυς ἐν Ἠδωνοῖς*; cf. the common royal name Kotys.

[4] 419 B.C., see Plat. *Rep.* i. 237 A ff.; cf. schol. *ad loc.* and commentators.

[5] *Loc. cit.* [6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] *βαρβαρικὸς κλύδων*, Procl. in *Tim.* 26*e*.

[8] Or in conjunction with some of the other Dionysiac deities, such as Sabazios (Thraco-Phrygian).

[9] Also called Gebeleïzis (Herod. *loc. cit.*). The name is generally written Ζάλμοξις, but with one exception the MSS of Herodotos give Σάλμοξις. As *σ* and *ζ* are often confused in Thracian, both forms may be correct.

[10] iv. xciv f. Part of this passage, xciv. 4, runs: *οὗτοι οἱ αὐτοὶ Θρῄϊκες καὶ πρὸς βροντήν τε καὶ ἀστραπὴν τοξεύοντες ἄνω πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπειλεῦσι τῷ θεῷ, οὐδένα ἄλλον θεὸν νομίζοντες εἶναι εἰ μὴ τὸν σφέτερον* This has been oddly misunderstood,

Getai worshipped him, and so exclusively that they regarded no one else as a true god, even the heavens themselves. What his nature was we can gather in part from the rationalistic story told of him, that he was a slave of Pythagoras, who, returning home, taught a variant of his master's philosophy, insisting especially on the immortality awaiting the faithful. To prove this, he disappeared for a time, hiding in an underground room; after three years he returned, and so made every one believe that he had been in Hades and was come again. It is noteworthy that the same story is told of Pythagoras himself,[1] and it smacks strongly of the tales, Greek and other, of superhuman persons who live in caves or under mountains and thence return occasionally or in some way intervene in human affairs.[2] With this story we must join the decided suspicion of Herodotos himself[3] that Zalmoxis is a local divinity, not a mortal at all, and the statement of Strabo[4] that he was worshipped in an *ἀντρῶδες χωρίον* in Mt. Kogaionon. He is clearly, like Dionysos himself, a god belonging to the under world, but not excluded from the surface of the earth, on which, we may perhaps suppose from the myth, he was thought to appear every year, as Dionysos frequently did every second.[5] As an infernal deity, he received a curious sacrifice, if sacrifice is the proper term to apply to what seems to have been rather a sort of fantastic messenger service. Once every four years the Getai chose a man by lot, whom they tossed in the air and caught on spear-points. If he died, he was deemed to have become immortal;[6] if not, the god had rejected him, and he was disgraced. Before being tossed, he was charged with the messages of the people to the deity—a curious form of the idea, found among many races, that the dying can take to the dead the mandates of the living.[7]

(*h*) *Other religious practices.*—Besides the cult of definite gods, we have a few facts relative to the general religious attitude of the Thracians. In particular, we have Herodotos'[8] description of a funeral ceremony, which sounds oddly like Homer's account of the funeral of Patroklos. The corpse, if of an important man, lies in state three days, during which mourning and sacrificial feasts go on; finally there comes the actual funeral, when the body is buried or burned, a mound raised, and games of various kinds, the principal one being a single combat, are celebrated. This was the usual rite, and it indicates at any rate high honour paid to the dead.[9] The duel especially may reasonably be thought to be a form of blood-sacrifice. This, in some of the wilder tribes, was no mere form; beyond Krestone, we are told, lived a race which practised *sati*; the favourite wife, chosen, it would seem, after careful examination of the claims of the whole *harîm* by the surviving relatives, was sacrificed by her next-of-kin at the tomb and then buried with her husband.[1] The Trausoi again made a death a subject of rejoicing, and mourned at a birth.[2] We see, then, that the whole of Thracian religion was permeated by the idea of the vast importance of the future life.

(*i*) *Summary: general characteristics of Thracian religion.*—We find in Thrace a religion of a barbarous kind, but by no means incapable of development into something higher and more spiritual. The chief marks of barbarism, besides the revolting character of some of the rites, were (*a*) the largely magical character of much of the ceremonial, unconnected with anything either ethical or spiritual, and tending rather to excite than to elevate; and (*b*) the materialistic conception of the future life. Gods such as Zalmoxis live underground, occasionally intervening for the bodily good of their worshippers[3] and rewarding the faithful departed with drunken feasts; or so one gathers from the rationalizing story of Zalmoxis already quoted, in which he is represented as feasting the Thracians, and the taunt of Plato that the inferior sort of Orphics considered eternal drunkenness the highest possible felicity.[4] This is not to say that Thracian religion was always of a sensual character. It is noteworthy that the northern races, or some of them, had a reputation not only for courage but also for virtue and even for superhuman powers.

Thus the Getai are the 'bravest and most righteous' of the Thracians; the holy Hyperboreans live somewhere near the Thracian region; in and near the neighbouring Scythian country are the sacred and ascetic Argippaioi, the just Issedones, and the Neuroi, who are all magicians, besides the Sauromatai, who are of Amazonian stock; while the glorified shade of Achilles haunts various localities of the Black Sea region.[5]

A great part at least of this persistent attribution of saintly or magical distinction to the northern districts may well have for its justification the natural complement of the strong sexuality of those races—asceticism, which, as we have already seen, was a strong feature of Orphism. Another reason no doubt is simply the fact that many of these peoples were distant and unknown.[6] Yet another is, quite likely, the existence, not of whole nations, but of castes, which were priestly. We have already seen that the Bessoi certainly, and other tribes probably, had divine kings, and this often enough, as in Egypt, means the domination of a sacerdotal clan or caste.

To sum up, therefore, Thrace had, so far as we can learn from the observations of its nearest civilized neighbours in classical times, a religion predominantly chthonian, other-worldly, orgiastic, gloomy, often cruel and barbaric, but not unspiritual—a sharp contrast with the brightness of the characteristic Greek cult of the Olympian deities.

LITERATURE.—(i.) *Ethnology, etc., of Thrace*: J. A. Tomaschek, *Die alten Thraker*, pt. i., 'Übersicht der Stämme,' *SBAW* cxxviii. [1893] pt. ii., 'Die Sprachreste,' *SBAW* cxxx. [1893].

as if *τῷ θεῷ* meant 'their god,' which would involve a contradiction in terms: 'They threaten the god they believe in because they don't believe in him.' The correct translation is of course 'Heaven' or 'Zeus'; cf. lxxix. 1 f.: *ἐπεθύμησε Διονύσῳ Βακχείῳ τελεσθῆναι . . . ὁ θεὸς* (Zeus, not Dionysos) *ἐνέσκηψε βέλος*, and many other passages in which *ὁ θεὸς* means 'sky' or 'heavenly bodies.'

1 Hermippos, *ap.* Diog. Laert. viii. 41. This story is perhaps imitated from the one in Herodotos, which probably is an invention of the Greeks of the Pontos.

2 Examples in Rohde, i. 111 ff.

3 iv. 96. 4 vii. 298.

5 His festivals were regularly trieteric, *i.e.* in alternate years, by the Greek (inclusive) method of counting. Did this originate as a custom of shifting the cultivation every other year, vouched for by Horace, *Od.* iii. 24, 'nec cultura placet longior annua,' as occurring among the Getai? Among a people backward in agriculture the practice may well have varied, the period of cultivation lasting for one, two, or three years in different districts according to the richness of the soil. The author owes this suggestion to Farnell.

6 iv. 93: *Γέτας τοὺς ἀθανατίζοντας* (this becomes their stock epithet); v. 3.

7 The idea is particularly common in modern Greek ballads.

8 v. 8.

9 The exact interpretation given to these facts depends upon the view taken of the origin of *ἀγῶνες* in general. The present writer holds that they do not originate in funeral ceremonies, or connote divine or quasi-divine honours, though they are often associated with both. The duel, however, is, like the Etruscan gladiatorial shows, definitely a sacrificial rite in this case.

1 v. 5.

2 v. 4; cf. Eur. *Κρεσφόντης*, frag. 452 Dind.

3 Plato (*Charm.* 156 D) mentions 'physicians of Zalmoxis' and appears playfully to interpret *ἀναθανατίζειν* as referring to their skill. They were probably a sort of shamans or medicine-men, who may, like their Siberian confrères, have combined medicine and prophecy.

4 *Rep.* ii. 363 D.

5 See Herod. iv. 13, 32–36, 23, 26, 105, 110 f., 55; cf. Lykophron *Alex.* 186 ff.

6 Cf. the piety of the Homeric Ethiopians (*Il.* i. 423).

The former deals chiefly with history and ethnology, the latter with linguistics.

(ii.) *Thracian cults*: L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896-1909, v. (Ares, Dionysos); J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908 (Dionysos; also Orphism); see also the articles 'Beudis,' 'Dionysos,' 'Kotys,' in Roscher.

(iii.) *Orphism and related cults*: see esp. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[4], 2 vols., Tübingen, 1907; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*[2], Leipzig, 1913; O. Gruppe, art. 'Orpheus' in Roscher; E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig and Prague, 1885 (texts).

Further references to ancient and modern authorities will be found in the above works. H. J. ROSE.

THRESHOLD.—See DOOR.

THUGS.—See THAGS.

THUNDER.—See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, STORM, STORM-GODS.

TIBET.—The Tibetans are entitled to be regarded as one of the most 'religious' peoples in the world, if by 'religion' is understood not only 'the belief in spiritual beings,'[1] but also the *binding* influence of that belief, as formulated by their Church, for the better regulation of their worldly actions in everyday life, and for procuring for them by pious observance of the inculcated maxims the satisfying hope of a higher position in the life after death. Not only is the proportion of the population in Tibet which devotes its life to religion greater than that in any other country, being at least about one to eight of the population[2] — monks, nuns, non-celibate priests, and neophytes—but the life of the laity is also dominated and pervaded by their religion to an exceptional extent.

1. Climatic environments.—The peculiarities in the climate and physical character of Tibet, and its topographical position, between the two great civilizations on either side, the Indian and the Chinese, from both of which it has derived the elements of its composite form of Buddhism, explain to a considerable extent the peculiarities of its religion. The vast awe-inspiring solitudes with the rigorous nature of the climate have impressed themselves visibly on the religion of the country. And Nature has contributed, by the massive physical barriers she has erected against access to that land, to maintain to the present day the isolation of that country from the rest of the world, and thus to preserve the more ancient and archaic forms of religion and superstitions.

Perched on the summit of the great plateau of Central Asia, and stretching across over twenty-two degrees of longitude, in the palæarctic region, from the Himālayas to the Kuen-lun mountains and Western China, it includes the loftiest tableland on the surface of the earth. Although generally called a plateau, it is in fact covered with innumerable hills and mountains, cut up by ravines, the stretches of level land being relatively few and far apart. The general elevation of the permanently inhabited tract seldom falls below 11,000 feet above sea-level, while a very great extent of the country exceeds 16,000 feet, which is about the limit there of perpetual snow. Its highest border lies along the Himālayas, rising in mountains, the highest on the globe, from which its surface slopes gradually eastwards into China — a feature explained by the fact that in not very remote geological times the land of Tibet formed part of the bottom of the China Sea of the Pacific; and the writer has picked up fossil shells on the Tibetan side of the Himālayas which were of the same species as those he obtained from similar strata-formations on the outskirts of Peking. This also explains why the Mongolic racial elements and the Chinese forms of civilization predominate in Tibet, and why China has maintained for so long its suzerainty there.

Geographically, it is usual to divide Tibet latitudinally into North (Chang) and South (Kham), the North-land comprising all the Northern and Central and much of Western Tibet, and the South comprising South and South-Eastern Tibet. This division is also generally followed by the Tibetans themselves, though they erect Central and South-Western Tibet (U-Tsang), with their twin centres of Lāmaism, at Lhāsa and Tāshilhunpo, into a separate, and for them the chief, division of their country, which they call Bod (pronounced Pöt). The former division they call sTod-Bod (pronounced Tö-Pöt), or 'Upper Bod,' which is the origin of our modern name 'Tibet,' derived from the phonetic spelling of mediæval European travellers to whom only this northern division was accessible, and latterly applied by Europeans to the whole of Bod, though wrongly so. This is also the source of the Chinese name for the country of T'u-Fan, or 'the land of the *T'u* barbarians of the West.'

The northern division, or Chang, through its extreme altitude, has a terrible climate and is uninhabited for the greater part of the year, being mostly used as summer-grazing grounds by nomad shepherds and traversed by miners and occasional caravans of merchants at that season. It consists of a series of parallel mountain-ranges running east and west, with muddy valleys intervening. In these depressions lie a great number of lake-basins, many of which have no outlet, so that their water is salt, and some of their shores are white with borax crystals. It is an altogether treeless region, interspersed with grassy tracts used for summer pasturage. On the other hand, Central and more especially South-Eastern Tibet, which are of considerably lower elevation, are traversed by the Brahmaputra, and upper reaches of the Irrawady, Mekong, Salween, and Yangtse rivers and their tributaries are for a considerable part wooded, enjoy a less rigorous climate, and are the seat of most of the settled population. But the total population of the whole country is probably not more than 3,500,000[1]—*i.e.* a little less than the entire population of Scotland. Snow falls more or less, even at Lhāsa, in every month of the year.

2. Popular religion.—Living in such a rigorous climate and isolated amidst such severe surroundings, the Tibetan builds his daily fears and hopes on his religion, and, despite its inveterate devil-worship, it is not without its elevating and inspiring influence. The current of Buddhism which runs through its tangled paganism has brought to the Tibetan most of the little civilization which he possesses, and has raised him correspondingly in the scale of humanity, lifting him above a life of semi-barbarism by setting before him higher hopes and aims, by giving milder meanings to his demonist mythology, by discountenancing sacrifice of animal lives, and by inculcating universal charity and tenderness to all living things. Their Buddhism, unlike that of the Burmese, is not, however, an educational factor in secular teaching or in the mysteries of their religion; for the Lāmas, while living on the laity by their ministrations as priests, restrict their learning to themselves, like the Brāhmans and most priestly orders of old, and they contemptuously call the laity 'the dark (ignorant) people' (*mi-nag-pa*) and 'the worldly ones' (*hjig-rten-pa*), though they condescendingly

[1] E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3] i. 424.

[2] The census of the population hitherto taken was that by the Chinese in 1737, which gave the proportion of the Lāmas as one to three of the total population. At the present day about one to eight appears to be near the mark, in accordance with the present writer's own observations and those of W. W. Rockhill.

[1] This is the estimate of W. W. Rockhill (*Land of the Lāmas*, p. 296), and it generally agrees with that of the present writer.

also call them 'the givers of alms' (*sbyinbdag*), at the same time making it understood that it is the donors who benefit most by the exercise of this charity. And certainly the last epithet is well deserved, for the Tibetans, the most priest-ridden people in the world, are among the most lavish in their religious gifts.

Notwithstanding the large amount of non-Buddhist elements in Lāmaism, derived from the pre-Buddhist shamanism of the Bon-cult,[1] it is surprising to find how deeply the everyday life and notions of the laity are leavened by the Buddhist spirit. The doctrine of metempsychosis and its *karma* and the potency of acquired merit by good deeds enters into the ordinary habits and speech of the people to a remarkable extent. Their proverbs, folk-lore, songs, and lay dramas are full of it; and they explain human as well as animal friendships on this principle. Even practices which are clearly dishonest and sinful are at times justified on the same principle, or rather by its abuse. Thus the more sordid Tibetan reconciles cheating to his conscience by naively convincing himself that the person whom he now attempts to defraud had previously swindled him 'in a former existence,' and that justice demands retribution. Congenital defects, even such as blindness, dumbness, and lameness, and also accidents are viewed as retributions due to the individual having in a previous life abused or sinned with the particular limb or organ now affected. Indeed this is the orthodox dogma of Buddha's own teaching and forms the basis of the *Jātakas*, or tales of the previous births of Buddha, which are diffused by itinerant or friar Lāmas, and greatly impress the people; a few of the better-known *Jātakas* in manuscript copy or in block-printed booklets form, with the manuals of ritual and divination, the chief books of those Tibetan laity who are able to read; and they also form the subject of the chief dramas enacted by the laity.

This wide-spread belief in metempsychosis also influences the people in the treatment of their cattle and other dumb animals. They treat these exceptionally humanely, and life is seldom wantonly taken. The taking of animal life unnecessarily, even for food, is largely prohibited, and, although in such a cold climate animal food is an essential staple of diet, the professional butchers are stigmatized as sinners and are the most despised of all classes in the country. Yet human prisoners are at times cruelly tortured and mutilated, possibly in some measure after the example set by the Chinese, and possibly in some measure as a deterrent from crime among a rather lawless people. But nearly every crime, even the most heinous, the murdering of a Lāma, may be condoned by a fixed scale of fines; and, when the fine is not forthcoming, the punishment is inflicted, and the prisoner, if not actually killed, is set free, mutilated or maimed (as there are no prisons), to serve as a public warning to other evil-doers. Many of the maimed and blind beggars who swarm around Lhāsa are criminals punished in this way.

The tolerant spirit of Buddhism has, however, stamped more or less distinctly the national character, the mildness of which contrasts strongly with the rough and semi-barbarous exterior of the people. Testimony to this trait is afforded by the experiences of all intimate observers of the people in their own country, as recorded by the present writer and others. Huc, writing of the lay regent of Lhāsa, describes him as a man whose 'large features, mild and remarkably pallid, breathed a truly royal majesty,' while 'his dark eyes, shaded by long lashes, were intelligent and gentle.'[2]

[1] See below, § 3.
[2] *Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China*[2], Eng. tr., ii. 168.

Similarly Rockhill and others have described many of the headmen and leading Lāmas with whom they came into intimate contact.[1] The spirit of consideration for others expresses itself in many grateful acts of genuine politeness and kindness. Tibetans usually present a stirrup-cup of wine to the departing visitor or traveller, bidding him God-speed and adding, 'May we be able to present you with another as welcome on your return.' The seller of an article other than eatables usually gives his blessing to the buyer in terms such as these: 'May good come upon you,' 'May you live long,' 'May no sickness happen,' 'May you grow rich,' to which the buyer replies with 'Thanks'—'*Thug-rje-chhe*,' literally 'Great mercy,' which recalls the French *merci* tendered on similar occasions.

The personal names of both boys and girls are largely borrowed from mystical Buddhism—*e.g.*, Dor-je-tshe-ring, 'the thunder-bolt of long life,' Dolma (spelt *sgRol-ma*, the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit name Tārā, the Indian goddess of mercy); and the influence of this religious habit is also seen in the names of various places.

The common oaths or plights of asseveration are mainly Buddhist in character. The oath most commonly used by merchants and the laity as an asseveration in ordinary conversation is, 'By the Powerful Saint' (Śākyamuni, *i.e.* Buddha), or 'By the three Holiest Ones'—the Buddhist Trinity.

The non-Buddhist features and practices of the Tibetan religion, however, are also conspicuous, and reflect their pre-Buddhist cult, the shamanistic Bon. The physical environment of their life, in their rigorous climate where they see Nature in her roughest mood, in pitiless fury of storms and cold, terrorizing the brave as well as the timid, has impelled them to worship the more obvious forces of Nature as malignant demons which seem to wreck their fields and flocks, and vex them with disease and disaster. Their inveterate craving for material protection against those malignant gods and demons, as they thought them to be, has caused them to pin their faith on the efficacy of charms and amulets, which cherished objects are seen everywhere dangling from the dress of every man, woman, and child, not even excepting the Lāmas themselves. These charms, as we have seen,[2] are mostly sentences of Sanskrit texts borrowed from mystical Indian Buddhism, and they are supplemented by bodily and other relics of holy Lāmas, such as bits of their dress, crumbs dropped by them, nail-parings, etc.; and by these charms the Tibetans believe that they muzzle or bind or banish the devils.

A more cheerful and graceful side to their worship is seen in their popular practice of planting the tall inscribed 'prayer-flags,' which picturesquely flutter in the breeze around every village, and in the strings of inscribed flaglets which flaunt from house-tops, bridges, sacred trees, and passes, and from other places believed to be specially infested by malignant spirits or sprites.

As the people live in an atmosphere of the marvellous, no story is too absurd for them to credit, if only it is told by Lāmas. They are ever on the outlook for omens, and the everyday affairs of life are governed by a superstitious regard for lucky and unlucky days and the influences of unpropitious planetary portents. Although special divinations are sought from professed astrologer Lāmas in the more serious events in life—in birth, marriage, sickness, and death, and often in sowing, reaping, building, etc.—each layman determines for himself the auguries for the more trivial matters

[1] See, *e.g.*, the description by the present writer of the regent of Tibet (*Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 401 f.).
[2] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Tibetan).

of his ordinary business, for travelling, buying and selling, mending, etc.[1] And yet we are apt to forget that Confucius and Cicero—to mention only these instances—believed in astrological auguries.

Pilgrimages to sacred shrines are very popular,[2] and little is thought of the hardships and expenses of long journeys for this purpose. Every opportunity is seized to visit celebrated shrines and to circumambulate the numerous holy buildings and sacred spots.

Prayers ever hang upon the lips of the people in the intervals of their work and even during their work. But the prayers are addressed chiefly to devils, threatening them with punishment through the saints and deified Buddhas, or imploring them for freedom or release from their inflictions;[3] or they are plain, naive requests for aid in obtaining the good things of this life. At all spare times, day and night, the people ply their prayer-wheels (*q.v.*), and tell their beads and mutter especially the mystic Sanskrit six-syllabled spell, *Oṁ ma-ṇi pad-me Hūṁ!*, '*Oṁ!* the jewel in the lotus *Hūṁ*,'[4] the sentence which, they are led to believe, gains them their goal, the glorious heaven of eternal bliss, the paradise of the fabulous Buddha of Boundless Light (Amitābha) or 'the Boundless Life' (Amitāyus [*q.v.*]). Yet with all their strivings the Tibetans seem never to obtain real peace of mind in religious matters.

3. Bon or pre-Buddhist religion.—The aboriginal pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet is called by the people *Bon* (pronounced *Pön*); and those who profess it are called *Bon-pa*, *i.e.* 'the Bons.' The meaning of the word is unknown. It is essentially a shamanist, devil-charming, necromantic cult with devil-dancing, allied to the Taoism of China, and, like the latter, has become largely intermixed with Buddhist externals. But it still retains its essentially demonist character. It was actively suppressed and its establishments were destroyed by the Tibetan rulers on their conversion to Buddhism from the 7th cent. A.D. onwards, at the instigation of the Lāmas, as it indulged freely in animal and human sacrifices; and it is still strictly forbidden by the Lāmaist hierarchy which holds the temporal rule in Central and Western Tibet. But it is still largely and openly professed over the greater part of Eastern and South-Eastern Tibet, the most populous part of the country, which for many centuries has been under Chinese rule and outside the domination of the Grand Lāmas. Indeed it was an appeal by the people of these provinces to China to protect them and their Bon religion that induced the Chinese to administer these provinces on behalf of the Bons. This unsuspected fact of the wide prevalence of the Bon religion there was brought to light by W. W. Rockhill in his extensive travels in these provinces,[5] where he found it to be much more popular and prevalent than Lāmaism. It was especially popular among the settled agricultural people, whilst the nomads, whose business led them into the territory of the Grand Lāmas, were more attached to Lāmaism. So numerous were its adherents that Rockhill estimated that about two-thirds of the population of Tibet were Bons. In Central and Western Tibet, where the repressive policy of the Lāmas prevents the profession of the Bon cult, it is rare to meet with any Bon priest. The present writer has met only a few itinerant priests who were clandestinely performing their demonist rites for villages in remote places; they were wholly illiterate and uncouth-looking men, exceptionally dirty, with long shaggy hair, and bedecked with little tufts of wool and tiny flags; and they indulged in devil-dancing antics and incoherent chants.

In Eastern Tibet, however, where they are free to practise their cult, the Bon priests live in large flourishing monasteries, which they call *gom-pas*, like the Lāmaist establishments; and they have many images of gods and saints and demons generally resembling in appearance those of Lāmaism, but bearing different names. Their chief god they call gShen-rabs Mi-bo, who is reputed to be a deified priest analogous to the Lāmaist Padma Sambhava. They have bulky printed and MS books of ritual, which Rockhill found to consist of a Sanskritic jargon for the most part interspersed with other meaningless words. The present writer observed that the words in some of their MSS, which are written in the Tibetan script, were the Lāmaist Sanskritic words spelt backwards: the lotus-jewel formula of the Lāmas[1] was spelt 'Muh-em-pad-ni-mo,' thus, while attesting their borrowing from Lāmaism, emphasizing their anti-Lāmaist character. The *swastika* also, which they use extensively, is invariably figured with its ends or 'feet' turned in the reverse direction to that of the *swastika* proper (the feet of the latter turn to the right in the direction of the sun's course), and thus indicate the Bon cult to be of a lunar character, which is evident not only from the bloody sacrifices, but also from the predominance of the dragon-worship therein.

A significant glimpse into the original character of the Bon cult is obtained from the Chinese annals of the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. (*i.e.* before the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet), where the rites of the Tibetans are described:

'The officers (Tibetan) are assembled once every year for the lesser oath of fealty. They sacrifice sheep, dogs, and monkeys, first breaking their legs, and then killing them afterwards, exposing the intestines and cutting them into pieces. The sorcerers having been summoned, they call on the gods of heaven and earth, of the mountains and rivers, of the sun, moon, stars and planets, saying: "Should your hearts become changed, and your thoughts disloyal, the gods will see clearly and make you like these sheep and dogs." Every three years there is a grand ceremony, during which all are assembled *in the middle of the night* on a raised altar, on which are spread savoury meats. *The victims sacrificed are men*, horses, oxen, and asses, and prayers are offered up in this form: "Do you all with one heart and united strength cherish our native country. The god of heaven and the spirit of the earth will both know your thoughts, and if you break this oath, they will cause your bodies to be cut into pieces like unto these victims."'[2]

Even in the Buddhist period, in the 8th cent. A.D., similar bloody rites were celebrated by the professing Buddhist king of Tibet in concluding a treaty with the Chinese.[3]

The attire of the Bon priest in his special celebrations[4] is a coat of mail armour, from the shoulders of which project small flags, and a high-crowned hat bordered by effigies of human skulls and ornamented by flags and tufts of wool; a sword and shield are in the hands to fight the demons. (The black-hatted devil-dancers are of the Bon sect.) On ordinary occasions they wear a red robe, and occasionally have human skulls embroidered on their dress. Their hair is worn shaggy, and not tonsured like the Lāmas. They offer on their altars wool and yak hair, and images of men and animals made of dough, presumably, as shown by the present writer, instead of the sacrificed animal of the primitive cult.

Whilst the present-day Bon religion has acquired many of the externals of Lāmaism, many of the elements of the old Bon religion have been incorporated into the latter, just as so many of the pagan rites of Roman and Celtic heathendom have

1 See art. DIVINATION (Buddhist).
2 See art. PILGRIMAGE (Buddhist), § (*d*).
3 See art. PRAYER (Tibetan).
4 See art. JEWEL (Buddhist).
5 *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet*, pp. 68, 86 f.

1 See art. JEWEL (Buddhist), § 7.
2 S. W. Bushell, 'Early History of Tibet from Chinese Sources,' in *JRAS*, 1880, p. 441.
3 Cf. L. A. Waddell, 'Ancient Historical Edicts at Lhāsa,' in *JRAS*, 1909, p. 941.
4 See the figure in L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 30.

been incorporated into the later Christianity. The reformed Lāmaist Church of the Yellow-hat sect employ many rites which are transparently Bon, such as the necromantic expelling of the death-demon and the demons of sickness, and much of their divination-ritual. The unreformed Red-hat sects practise the old Bon rites to a much greater extent, including the erection of masts attached to dogs' and sheep's skulls, to 'bar the door' to the earth- and sky-demons.[1]

4. Lāmaism and its sects and rites.—The various aspects of Lāmaism and its sects and rites have already been described in previous articles.[2]

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TIME.—1. Introductory.—Temporal characteristics are among the most fundamental in the objects of our experience, and therefore cannot be defined. We must start by admitting that we can in certain cases judge that one experienced event is later than another, in the same immediate way as we can judge that one seen object is to the right of another. A good example of the immediate judgment in question is when we hear a tune and judge that of two notes, both of which come in our specious present, one precedes the other. Another direct judgment about earlier and later is made in genuine memory. On these relations of before and after which we immediately recognize in certain objects of our experience all further knowledge of time is built.

It must be noticed that the relation, as given in experience, connects what we may call protensive events, *i.e.* events that have some duration, and not momentary events or moments. We are not directly aware of events without duration, still less of moments of empty time, and therefore are not directly aware of the relations between such objects. Momentary events, moments of time, and the relations which order them in a series are all known only after a long process of reflexion, abstraction, and intellectual construction. This does not necessarily imply that they do not exist in nature, still less that they are subjective and arbitrary; all that is meant at present is that they are not the objects of direct awareness. Again we must notice that the relations of before, after, and simultaneous with, as given in experience, are not mutually exclusive. Protensive events may very well overlap, and therefore we must recognize that the most general relation between them is that of partial precedence or consequence. Of course, when we become familiar with the conception of momentary events and see how convenient it is, we tend to define partial precedence in terms of them and their relation of total precedence. But the opposite direction must be followed if we want to start with the experienced facts and trace the logical development from them of the scientific notion of time. We must take the experienced relation of partial precedence as fundamental and define momentary events, moments, and the relation of total precedence in terms of partial precedence and events of finite duration.

That such a course is possible is shown by the fact that it has recently been followed to a satisfactory conclusion by Norbert Wiener in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, and by A. N. Whitehead in his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. We may compare the duration of experienced events with the extension of visible and tangible objects, and the relation of partial precedence with the partial overlapping of two extended objects in the field of vision. The problem of defining momentary events, moments, and the serial relation of before and after in terms of protensive events and partial precedence is closely comparable to that of defining material points, geometrical points, and the relations of before and after on a straight line in terms of extended objects and their partial overlapping. The problem for time is, however, easier than that for space, because in the former we have only to deal with a relation that generates a one-dimensional series, whilst with the latter the experienced facts force us to define a three-dimensional manifold.

2. Time and space.—The analogy between time and space has long been recognized; and it will be useful to consider at this point just how far it goes and where it is supposed to break down. Let us consider the likenesses and the alleged differences.

(*a*) *Likenesses.*—(1) Most objects of immediate experience possess a kind of magnitude called extensity, and such objects stand in certain immediately recognizable relations to other objects of the same sense experienced along with themselves. Also the parts of any one such object have relations of this kind to each other. Similarly the objects of our experience have another kind of magnitude called protensity or duration. Such objects have to others of the same kind the relation of partial (or, in special cases, total) precedence, and this relation can be recognized immediately. Likewise the parts of a single specious present can be seen to have this relation to each other.

(2) The relations in each case have magnitude. Just as one object in the field of view can be more to the right of another than a third, so one event in the field of memory or in the specious present can precede another event by a longer interval than some third one.

(3) In each region there is the same close and peculiar connexion between the kind of magnitude possessed by the terms and the kind possessed by the relations. It is possible to say that 'the interval between two events A and B is as long as the duration of some event C, just as it is possible to say that the distance between two sticks laid in the same straight line is the same as the length of some third stick.

(4) It is commonly believed that, when the analysis is made into moments and momentary events, all the events in the history of the world fall into their places in a single series of moments. So too it is supposed that, when the analysis is made into material and geometrical points, all the points in the world take their places in a single three-dimensional series of geometrical points.[1]

(*b*) *Alleged differences.*—(1) It is commonly held that all events have temporal relations to each other, but that psychical events have no spatial relations. This is denied by a small number of philosophers, notably by Samuel Alexander.

[1] *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 484 *f.*

[2] See artt. ABBOT (Tibetan); ATĪŚA; BHUTĀN, BUDDHISM IN; CELIBACY (Tibetan); CHARMS AND AMULETS (Tibetan); CHORTEN; DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Tibetan); DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Tibetan); DIVINATION (Buddhist); FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Tibetan); IMAGES AND IDOLS (Tibetan); INCARNATION (Tibetan); INITIATION (Tibetan); JEWEL (Buddhist); LĀMAISM; LOTUS (Indian); PADMASAMBHAVA; PRAYER (Tibetan).

[1] We shall consider later what the Theory of Relativity has to say as to the impossibility of separating time and space and as to the notion of one single time-series.

Without questioning the possibility of correlating psychical events with positions in space, we must hold that this alleged difference is a genuine one. If in introspection we do contemplate our states of mind in the same sense as in perception we contemplate other objects, it seems clear that our states of mind show no trace of being extended or standing in spatial relations, but do have duration and stand in temporal ones. Alexander would, however, deny that we can contemplate our states of mind. If this be so, it would of course be quite possible that we should fail to become aware of the spatial characteristics of our mental states, even though they possess them; but of course we have no right to pass from this merely negative position to the conclusion that they actually do possess them. Alexander's positive reasons are bound up with a large and complex metaphysical theory into which we cannot here enter. In any case the present difference is merely an external one, and would not affect the essential similarity of space and time.

(2) A much more important point is that time is said essentially to involve the distinction between past, present, and future as well as that between before and after. Now nothing in space obviously corresponds to these distinctions in time.

(3) Closely connected with this alleged difference are a number of rather vague statements often made—*e.g.*, that parts of space co-exist, but that only the present moment exists.

These two supposed differences between space and time may be treated together. They rest largely on confusions into which it is very natural to fall. The distinction between past, present, and future is not one which, like that between before and after, lies wholly in the experienced objects, but is one that rests on the relations between experienced objects and the states of mind in which they are experienced. To begin with, the distinction between present and not-present at any rate may be usefully compared with that between here and elsewhere in space. Here means near my body; elsewhere means distant from my body. If we want an analogy to the distinction between past and future, we can find one in the distinction between things before and things behind our body. It is true, however, that this analogy is incomplete, and that for an important reason, though one extraneous to the nature of time. The reason is that our practical and cognitive relations towards the future are different from those towards the past. We know a part of the past at any rate directly by memory, but we know the future only indirectly by probable inference. There is no analogy to this in space; our knowledge of what is behind our body is of the same kind and of the same degree of certainty as our knowledge of what is in front of it. But we may imagine that a distinction like that between past and future would have arisen for space also, if we had been able to see straight in front of us but had never been able to turn our heads or our bodies round.

The distinction is sometimes drawn that the past is fixed and unalterable, while the future depends, in part at any rate, on our volitions. In what sense is this true?

Without involving ourselves in controversies about free will and determination, we may at least assume that the laws of logic apply to propositions about the future. Hence any proposition asserting the occurrence of any future event must be true or false, and cannot be both. In that sense the future is as determinate as the past. But two points have to be noticed. (i.) However much I may know about the laws of nature, I cannot make probable inferences from the future to the past, because I am not directly acquainted with the future, but I can make probable inferences from the past to the future; i.e., although every possible proposition about the future is even now determinately true or false, I may be able to judge now, from my knowledge of the past and present and of the laws of nature, that some propositions about future events are much more likely to be true than others. (It must of course be remembered in this connexion that a proposition that is actually false may be much more likely to be true on my present information than one that is actually true.) (ii.) I know with regard to certain classes of events that such events never occur unless preceded by a desire for their occurrence, and that such desires are generally followed by the occurrence of the corresponding events. But the existence of a desire for x does not increase the probability that x *has* happened. If it did we might be said to affect the past in exactly the same sense in which we are said to affect the future. Thus the assertion that we can affect the future but not the past seems to come down to this: (*a*) that propositions about the future can be inferred to be highly probable from a knowledge of the past and present, but not conversely, because of our lack of direct acquaintance with the future; and (*b*) that the general laws connecting a desire for x with the occurrence of x always contain x as a consequent and never as an antecedent.

3. Relation of time to logic.—This brings us to the very important question of the relation of time to logic. If we say of any event e that it is present, this proposition will generally be false, and will be true only at one moment. It seems, then, as if the truth of the proposition altered with time. Any other proposition asserting the occurrence of an event—*e.g.*, Queen Anne is dead—seems to be equally at the mercy of time. Then again there seem to be other propositions that are totally independent of time—*e.g.*, $2\times2=4$. These are sometimes called eternal truths; they always state relations between universals, and all our *a priori* knowledge is of such propositions. Lastly, there are propositions which essentially involve time, but claim to apply to any time; *e.g.*, whenever it rains and I am out without my umbrella, I get wet. Thus, on the face of it, there seem to be three kinds of propositions as regards relation to time: (1) eternal truths, which are independent of time because they deal with the timeless relations of timeless objects; (2) hypotheticals asserting temporal relations between classes of events—these contain an essential reference to time, but not to any particular time; (3) propositions which assert the occurrence of particular events, and which *seem* to be true at certain times and false at all others, though this is not really so.

There are two points to notice about the last class of propositions. (*a*) All propositions about events essentially contain a reference to time, and all propositions about particular events essentially contain a reference to the particular time at which the event happens. This reference is not always made explicit; but, until this has been done, we cannot say that the verbal form stands for any definite proposition. (*b*) We have to distinguish between the time at which a judgment is made and the time involved in the proposition that is judged. When the latter is not made explicit in the verbal expression of the judgment, it is a convention of language to assume that the time in the proposition is intended to be that at which the judgment is asserted. Thus, if I say 'It is raining,' this verbal expression, since it clearly intends to refer to a particular event, is incomplete and stands for no definite proposition; for it says nothing about the time at which it rains. It therefore seems to be sometimes true and sometimes false. But, as actually asserted, the words would be taken to express my judgment of the proposition, 'It is raining at the time at which I say "It is raining."' And this proposition is timelessly true or false, subject to a further correction which we shall add in a moment. In fact, whenever we are told that a proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false, we know that we are dealing with an incomplete statement about an event, and that the real state of affairs is that a propositional function of the form 'e happens at t' gives true propositions for some values of t and false propositions for other values. But the propositions themselves are timelessly true or false.

It is important to notice that in practice there is always the possibility of any verbal statement about events, no matter how carefully put, being sometimes true and sometimes false. We are not directly aware of moments of time, and so can date events only by other events. And the persons who read or hear our verbal expressions may know only by some description the event which we use for purposes of dating. Now we can never be certain theoretically that only one unique event answers to any description however complicated, and often there is real ambiguity in practice. Take, *e.g.*, the amended expression offered above: 'It is raining at the time at which I say "It is raining."' To any reader of this article the

expression remains ambiguous, because he knows the event that is used for dating only by the very ambiguous description, 'The writer's statement of the words "It is raining"'—a description which applies to dozens of different events. In practice the difficulty is solved in conversation by the fact that all the manifold circumstances under which the particular conversation takes place go into the description and make it practically unambiguous. In writing, the difficulty is solved practically by using as the origin of dates some event, such as the birth of Christ, whose full description is so complicated that it is almost certain that only one event answers to it. But the theoretical difficulty remains, and so we are tempted to say that any proposition about events is sometimes true and sometimes false. But the proper thing to say is that any verbal expression referring to events, no matter how carefully put, always runs a theoretical risk of ambiguity—*i.e.*, it might with equal propriety make one reader think of one proposition which is true, and another of another proposition which is false.

We can now apply these general results to the special case of events being sometimes future, and then present, and finally past. The statement 'e is present' is essentially incomplete and ambiguous, for, as we loosely say, it is sometimes true and sometimes false. The first thing, then, is to fill in the special time involved in the proposition. We then get 'e is present at t,' where t is some definite moment fixed by some system of dating from a well-known and presumably unique event. What does this statement mean? Assuming that there are such things as moments, it means that e is at the moment t in an analogous way to that in which an object is at a position in space. The statement 'e is present at t' may be compared with the statement 'Mr. Asquith is present at the meeting,' which means that his body is in the place where the meeting is held. In all complete statements of the form 'e is at t' we must understand the word 'is' as standing for a timeless copula, and distinguish it from the 'is' of the present tense, which is contrasted with 'was' and 'will be.' Let us denote the 'is' of the present tense by 'is now.' Then the statement 'e is now present' is an incomplete statement which is interpreted in use to mean 'e is at (or occupies) the same moment as my assertion that it is now present'; 'e is now past'='e was present'='e is at a moment earlier than my assertion that e is now past.' Similarly, 'e will be present'='e is now future'='e is at a moment subsequent to my statement that e is now future.' The laws of logic are of course concerned with the timeless copula, and they presuppose that statements containing tenses are reduced in the way suggested above.

4. **Past, present, and future.**—We see, then, that the real source of the distinction between past, present, and future, and of the difference here between time and space, is that our judgments as well as the events judged about are in time, whilst our judgments about things in space are not in any obvious sense in space. These three distinctions correspond to the three possible temporal relations between our judgments and the events which our judgments are about. These distinctions are important, and they have been enshrined in language because they are correlated with important epistemological and psychological differences. Some states of mind are essentially contemporary with their objects—*e.g.*, the immediate awareness of visual sense-data when I open my eyes.[1] Other states are essentially later than their objects—*e.g.*, memories. If we exclude the possibility of prophecy, we may state the important epistemological proposition that all states of mind which give us an immediate knowledge of existents are either contemporary with, or later than, their objects.

It is important to notice that these statements are not merely analytic. There is a psychical difference between memories and awarenesses of contemporary sense-data which is open to introspection (though, of course, there may be marginal cases where the difference falls below the threshold of distinguishability), so that the statement that the former succeed and the latter are contemporary with their objects is a synthetic proposition.

We must, moreover, take into account the facts described in psychology as the specious present. In the first place, we must say that, if an object be known directly by a state of mind which succeeds it by more than a certain short time t, which seems to be fairly constant for a given individual, the state counts introspectively as a memory, and the object is judged to be past. If the period between the object and the direct awareness of it be not greater than t, the awareness does not count for introspection as a memory, and the object is judged to be present. To say, then, that an object has been present and is now past means that (a) it is (timelessly) the object of an immediate awareness which succeeds it by less than t, and (b) that my statement 'It is now past' succeeds it by more than t. We have still, however, to consider what is meant by the presentness of a state of mind. This seems to mean that, if a state of mind be the object of an act of introspection which suceeeds it by less than a certain short period, the state presents a certain peculiar characteristic which it does not present to any later act of introspection.

We can now deal with such statements as that only the present exists, or that the present is a mere transition from one infinite non-existent to another. These phrases are mere rhetoric rooted in confusions. It is perfectly true, of course, that the whole history of the world is not a complex of co-existing parts (in the sense of parts existing at the same time), as a table is. But this does not mean that it is not a whole, or that one part of it exists any less than any other part. To say that x no longer exists, or does not yet exist, simply means that it occupies a moment before or after my statement about it. At another moment I may make another statement of the same verbal form about x, and, since this no longer stands for the same proposition, it may no longer be true (*i.e.* no longer stand for a true proposition). But this involves no change in x itself. That x exists at a certain moment simply means that x occupies that moment, and this is timelessly true. Similarly, the fact that this moment has a certain temporal relation to any definite assertion that I may make about x is timelessly a fact. That it has different and incompatible temporal relations to various assertions of the same verbal form made by me is also timelessly true, and is not merely compatible with but also a necessary consequence of x's existence at its own moment. An event must continue to *be*, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be present merely means that they precede any assertion that I or my contemporaries can make about them; that both were once present merely means that both are contemporary with some assertions made about them.

[1] It is better for the present not to call these states of mind either perceptions or sensations, because the object of a perception is generally supposed to be a physical object or its state, and this may exist millions of years before the perception—*e.g.*, the perception of a distant star. Similarly, to call these states of mind sensations would lead to misunderstandings, owing to the ambiguities of that word and the widely held belief that sensations do not have objects.

The fallacy which we have to avoid is that of confusing two different senses of co-existence. In one sense the parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those events that occupy the same moment of time co-exist. It is clear that the whole course of history does not co-exist in the second sense, and it is thought that this prevents it from co-existing in the first. Yet this is necessarily false, since it is admitted that events do have and continue to have temporal relations, and therefore they must form a related whole all of whose parts have being. The confusion is increased by the belief that past, present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time in the same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into the temporal relations of states of mind and their objects.[1]

When it is once recognized that the whole course of events is in a certain sense a *totum simul*, it becomes easy to see the answer to the famous theological problem: How can God's foreknowledge of men's actions be compatible with the freedom of men's wills? The answer is as follows. Whether men's wills be free or not, every man's future actions are as completely determinate as his past ones; this is a mere consequence of the laws of logic. If indeterminism be true, then no amount of knowledge about events previous to a moment t, and about the general laws of nature or the particular habits of a man, will enable us or even God to infer with certainty what the man's volition at t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate. These two statements are clearly quite compatible. Finally, in spite of the fact that God cannot *infer* the man's volition at t, He may at any and every moment be directly aware of it in precisely the same way as we are aware directly (and not merely inferentially) of certain events through memories which are themselves later events. The facts that at a certain moment t_1 God can have a state of mind whose immediate object is the volition of a man at some later moment t_2, and that no amount of knowledge of events before t_2 would enable Him to *infer* the volition at t_2, are perfectly compatible; and they cease to be even paradoxical when we compare the case of memory and note that there is no essential difference between past, present, and future.[2]

5. **Reality of time.**—A great many philosophers have been concerned to deny the reality of time. Their arguments fall into two groups: (1) those that depend on the supposed infinity and continuity of time, and are therefore equally applicable to space; and (2) those that depend on the supposed peculiarities of time—*e.g.*, on the distinction of past, present, and future. Before considering the arguments in detail, it will be useful to make some quite general reflexions.

(i.) It is a matter of direct inspection that the immediate objects of some of our states of mind have temporal characteristics. It is as certain that one note in a heard melody is after another in the same specious present and that each has some duration as that some objects in my field of view are red or square and to the right or left of each other. It is then quite certain that *some* objects in the world have temporal characteristics, viz. the immediate objects of some states of mind. Now it is also certain that these objects exist at least as long as I am aware of them, for, in such cases, I am obviously not aware of *nothing*. Hence there cannot be anything self-contradictory in the temporal characteristics found in these objects, for otherwise we should have to admit the existence of objects with incompatible characteristics. Hence there is no obvious reason why temporal characteristics should not also apply to what is not the immediate object of any state of mind. It follows, then, that criticism cannot reasonably be directed against temporal characteristics as such, but only against the descriptions that we give of the temporal characteristics of experienced objects, and the conclusions that we draw from them or the constructions that we base on them. And arguments that refer to the infinity and continuity of time are really directed against a construction based on what we conceive to be the essential characteristics of the time element which is undoubtedly present in the objects that we experience; for we are not directly aware of infinite duration or of the continuity—in the mathematical sense—of time. If we suppose that such criticisms are successful, the conclusion ought not to be either that reality has no temporal characteristics (for it is quite certain that at least some parts of it have), or that time, as an inference or construction extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects to others, is unreal (for this goes much too far). The only justifiable conclusion would be that one particular way of describing and extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects is unsatisfactory, and that it behoves us to look for a better one. This point has not commonly been grasped by philosophers who claimed to disprove the reality of time.

(ii.) It is thus obviously of importance to be clear as to what is the particular view of time that is attacked by special arguments. The important distinction for us to make is this: it is possible to hold (a) that there is a series of moments of time, and that events occupy some of them but are distinct from them, and have temporal relations to each other in virtue of those which subsist between the moments that they occupy; or (b) that there are no such things as moments distinct from events, but that events really do have direct temporal relations to each other; or (c) that there are no moments, and that even events only *appear* to have temporal relations to each other. It is clearly possible to deny (a) without denying (b). To do this can hardly be called denying the reality of time; it should rather be called denying the absolute theory of time in favour of the relative theory. It is only philosophers who deny both (a) and (b) and support (c) who can strictly be said to deny the reality of time. It is quite possible, however, that some arguments might be equally fatal to (a) and to (b).

It will be well at this point to say what we can about the controversy between absolutists and relativists. The absolute theory strictly means that temporal relations between events are regarded as compounded out of two relations—(1) that of an event to the moment of time which it occupies, and (2) the relation of before and after between moments of time. The relative theory holds that there are no moments, but that temporal relations hold directly between events. Its most important philosophical upholder is Leibniz, though he goes a good way farther in the direction of (c); it is also held, with a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion, by many modern physicists of a philosophical bent. We may say that the relative theory stands at one remove, and the absolute theory at two removes, from what we find in the objects of immediate experience. Here we find, as we have seen, events of finite duration and relations of partial precedence. The relative theory replaces these objects by series of momentary events of no duration, and the relations by those of total precedence and simultaneity. The absolute theory takes the farther step of introducing a new set of entities, viz. moments which have no duration and stand in relations of total precedence but never of simultaneity, and a new relation, viz. that between a momentary event and the moment which it occupies.

Neither theory has been very accurately stated by most of its supporters; *e.g.*, Newton, the chief upholder of the absolute theory, was mainly concerned with the measurement of time and the desire for a constant rate-measurer. But the two theories, when thought out, may be reduced to what has been stated above. We may say at once that we know of no way of deciding conclusively between the two. But, although moments and momentary states *may* exist, we now know that all their

[1] The point can perhaps be made clearer by reflecting that a tune has a pattern in time in exactly the same sense as a wall-paper has a pattern in space.

[2] We can, of course, remember much that we could not infer.

work can be done by certain logical functions of nothing but events of finite duration and their relations of partial precedence. Hence both theories may be said to sin by assuming entities which are not necessary to science and cannot be either directly or indirectly verified (viz. momentary events in the relative theory, and moments in the absolute theory), and the absolute theory is the worse sinner of the two. As certain logical functions of what actually exists (viz. certain classes of classes of events), moments do exist; but whether there also exists anything having the same logical relations but of the type of individuals and not of that of classes of classes it seems totally impossible to determine. It is, however, often convenient to continue to speak in terms of moments, and this is harmless for the reasons given above.

We can now deal with the special arguments against time.

(1) Those based on its supposed infinity commonly confuse infinity with endlessness. They generally proceed on the assumption that what is meant by the infinity of time is that it has neither a first nor a last moment. But this would be perfectly compatible with the whole course of time lasting for no more than a second. The fractions between 0 and 1, arranged in order of magnitude, have neither a first nor a last term, and yet the interval between any two of them is less than unity. But all attempts to prove that time or the series of events must have an end fail. So do attempts to prove that they cannot have ends. The most celebrated argument on both sides of this question is contained in Kant's first antinomy. His argument against the endlessness of time, interpreted as charitably as possible, comes to the statement that, because there are definite points in the time-series—in particular, the point which we have reached when we read Kant's argument—therefore the series must have a definite beginning point. Otherwise, Kant says, the series of events could never have reached the definite point which it admittedly has reached. The argument is, of course, a complete *non-sequitur*, for it practically amounts to saying that a series cannot have *any* definite term unless it has *end* points. And this is sufficiently refuted by considering that the number +2 is perfectly definite, although the series of numbers with signs has neither a first nor a last term.

Arguments to prove that time or the series of events in time cannot have a beginning are perhaps more plausible. It is difficult for us psychologically to imagine a first event or a first moment, because all the events that we can remember have been preceded by others. Also there are special difficulties connected with causation in the notion of a first event, which do not apply to a first moment or to a last event. A first event is one which no event precedes, though there may of course be moments that precede a first event. Now, the only plausible general proposition about causation seems to be that, if the whole universe were completely quiescent for a finite time, it could not begin to change.[1] This means that, if the universe be in the same state at any two moments t_1 and t_2 and at all moments between them, it will be in the same state at all moments later than t_1. Now, to say that a change happens at t_1 means that, if the state of the universe at t_1 be s_1, and if it also be s_1 at any later moment t_2, then there is a moment between t_1 and t_2 at which its state is different from s_1. It follows from this definition that to say that a first event happens at t involves that the universe has been in the same state for a finite time before t. And this is contrary to our proposition about causation. If, then, we accept this proposition as an *a priori* truth, there cannot be a first event, though there might be a first event in certain isolated parts of the universe (*e.g.*, the creation of the world) provided that there had never been a first event in other parts (*e.g.*, in the mind of God). But, of course, there remains the doubt whether our axiom about causation be not a mere prejudice masquerading as an *a priori* law.

[1] The universe here must be taken to include God, if there be one.

It must be carefully noted that, if there be a first event, there need not be a first moment of time, and that, if there be a first moment of time, there need not be a first event. Again, if there be a first moment of time and no first event, either there might be no moment, except the first, that was not occupied by an event, or there might be a duration unoccupied by events. These consequences follow from the continuity of time, and have often been overlooked by philosophers ignorant of the mathematical theory of continuity.

Leibniz based his main argument against the absolute theory of time on the fact that, if it were true, there might be a period, finite or infinite, before any event happened. This period must be definite; and yet, the moments of time having no intrinsic difference, there is no reason why it should be ended or limited by one moment rather than another. If, on the other hand, we avoid this by assuming that there is an event at every moment of time, there is no reason for assuming *both* events and moments, for the series of events will suffice.

This argument is a sound one against assuming that there *are* moments, though it certainly cannot disprove that there may be moments. If there were moments, they would doubtless have intrinsic differences, though we could not discover them; we must further recognize some ultimate facts, and one of these might be that the course of events is preceded by such and such a duration of empty time.

We may sum up our conclusions as follows. Arguments to disprove the reality of time from its infinity and continuity either confine themselves to criticizing infinity and continuity as such or introduce considerations about causality. Arguments of the first kind would be equally fatal to *any* infinite or continuous series, and therefore prove too much, for they would destroy the series of real numbers. And we now know that all such arguments do rest on confusions and on an insufficient analysis of the notions of infinity and continuity. There is therefore no reason why the series of moments at any rate should not be either (*a*) endless or (*b*) of infinite length. The second set of arguments can apply only to events and not to the supposed series of moments, because causation is concerned with events and not with empty time. We saw that, if a certain plausible axiom about change be true, there cannot be a first event. This would not, however, prove that the whole series of events has lasted for an infinite time, though the present writer knows of no objection to such a possibility. There is no more objection to the series of events being endless than to any other series being endless—*i.e.*, there is none at all. The result is that all danger of a valid antinomy against time vanishes. (i.) Whether the axiom about change be true or not, it is equally possible that the series of moments shall be (*a*) endless or terminated, and (*b*) of finite or of infinite length. (ii.) If the axiom about change be true, the series of events cannot have a beginning, but may (*a*) have an end or not, and (*b*) be of finite or of infinite length.

(2) Arguments against the reality of time which turn on the distinction of past, present, and future may be dealt with shortly. One argument asserts that the past and the future do not exist, and that the present is a mere point without duration. It is then supposed that what occupies no finite duration cannot be real, and this disposes of the present. An argument of this kind is used

by Leibniz against absolute time, though it would presumably apply to events just as well. It is met, of course, by the consideration that past, present, and future are all always equally real, and that these characteristics do not belong to events as such, but in virtue of the temporal relations between them and certain psychical events.

A somewhat different argument against the reality of time has been produced by J. M. E. McTaggart.[1] His argument is that every event is past, present, and future; and that the attempt to avoid the incompatibility of these predicates by saying that the event has been future, is present, and will be past involves a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. The answer is that, whenever we consider any definite statement about the pastness, presentness, or futurity of an event, we can see that there is no contradiction. Take a definite statement by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is now past and has been present and future. Suppose we interpret this to mean that Queen Anne's death is not the direct object of any awareness (even a memory) which is contemporary with McTaggart's statement, but that it is contemporary with some states of mind (*e.g.*, Lord Bolingbroke's) which precede McTaggart's statement; and that it is later than some thoughts about it (*e.g.*, William III.'s), which also precede the statement. Then those three propositions seem to be timelessly true, perfectly compatible, and to contain all that is meant in the assertion by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is past and has been present and future.

We may conclude, then, that no satisfactory proof has been offered even that absolute time is unreal, still less that the series of events and their direct temporal relations are unreal.

6. Measurement of duration.—It seems to have been the question of a rate-measurer that led Newton to the theory of absolute time. Newton considers a number of periodic events which are roughly isochronous, and compares their rough isochronism with 'absolute time, which flows uniformly.' It is an unfortunate way of introducing absolute time. In the first place, it is of no practical use to any one. Whether absolute time flows uniformly or not, we can only observe events and must use them, or processes based on them, as our rate-measurers. Again, the statement that absolute time flows uniformly is thoroughly obscure. Time cannot be said to flow, for this seems to imply that time changes; and this would make time consist of a series of events in time. Nor is it at all clear what Newton meant by uniformity in this connexion. Presumably the meaning must be that the moments of time form a series like the real numbers. What we really want to know is whether we can find any periodic process such that the time that elapses between corresponding stages in each repetition is the same. But no essential reference to absolute time is involved here. We must beware of confusing the two statements: (1) there are definite intervals of a certain determinate duration, and this duration is independent of our methods of measurement; and (2) there are absolute moments of time, and the interval between any two of these has a definite magnitude. The latter implies the former, but not conversely. The real problem is: Granted that there is a definite interval between pairs of events, how are we to measure it?

There is a special difficulty in measuring intervals of time between events which is not nearly so much felt in measuring the distance between things. This difficulty is in the temporal analogue to superposition. We may carry a rod about with us in space, and we may have fairly good reasons to believe that it has not altered in length. The corresponding procedure in time-measurement is to find some process which can be started and stopped at any moment and can be assumed to have the same period whenever it is repeated. Such processes may be called isochronous. But, even when an isochronous process has been secured, it cannot be used to measure time in the same direct way in which a rod can be used to measure length. A rod will not as a rule fit an exact number of times into what we want to measure; it is therefore divided into a number of equal parts. Similarly we want an isochronous process that can be divided into equal subdivisions which can be easily recognized; *i.e.*, we want a process which itself consists of a number of similar processes which all occupy equal times. Now, it is not nearly so easy to be sure that a process takes the same time whenever it is repeated as to be sure that a rod keeps the same length wherever we use it; and it is much less easy to divide a process into parts that occupy equal times than to divide a rod into parts that have equal lengths. The recognizable divisions in a process of change are largely fixed for us, while divisions on a rod can be fixed by us with marks without affecting the rod as a whole.

Nevertheless the assumptions that have to be made, and the peculiar mixture of observation and convention that is involved, are the same in principle for the measurement of time and of space. The fact is that we can make immediate comparisons both of length and of time with a certain amount of accuracy. We believe that these judgments are the more accurate the nearer the objects to be compared are in time and space, and the more similar the circumstances under which each is inspected. Trusting to these immediate judgments, we see reason to believe that both the lengths of rods and the time taken by processes may vary when the rods are moved or the processes repeated. But we believe that the variation always depends on the fact that change of position in space or time involves change in the relations of the rod or the process to pieces of matter, and that mere changes of position in absolute time and space—if such could be—make no difference. We have learned by experience what are the most important factors that determine change of length or of period, and we can allow for them. It is found that the periods of recurrent processes are, on the whole, more largely affected by changes in the surroundings than are the lengths of such bodies as steel rods.

Our method of determining an ideal rate-measurer is somewhat as follows. We begin with some process which is sensibly isochronous—*e.g.*, the swing of a pendulum, or the time taken for a complete rotation of the earth on its axis. We can judge of this isochronism with a certain amount of accuracy by direct comparison in memory, just as we can compare lengths by looking at them. We can go farther than this. Just as we are greatly helped in our comparison of lengths by putting the objects to be compared side by side, so we can use expedients to help our judgments of the isochronism of processes. If we start two pendulums together and their periods be not exactly the same, the divergence will become more and more marked the longer they swing. If no divergence be noted after many swings, we may conclude that each swing of one takes the same time as the corresponding swing of the other. This does not prove that the successive swings of either are isochronous; for the period of each may be varying according to the same law. But, if we also find that the period of one of these processes synchronizes with the corresponding period of some other

[1] 'The Unreality of Time,' *Mind*, new ser., xvii. [1908] 457–474.

sensibly isochronous process which is physically very different, it becomes very improbable that there should be any law by which the successive periods of two such very different processes alter in precisely the same way. We are therefore justified in concluding *tentatively* that the successive periods of these sensibly isochronous processes are actually isochronous.

The next step is to state all the laws of nature which involve time on the assumption that equal intervals of time are measured by complete periods of such processes. We find, *e.g.*, that, if it be supposed that the successive rotations of the earth on its axis are isochronous, the laws of motion can be very simply stated and are very nearly verified by all the mechanical phenomena that we can observe. So far we are entirely in the region of what can be experienced or rendered very probable from what we experience. But now a conventional element enters. We shall probably find that, when time is measured by an actual physical process and when our laws have been stated in terms of time so measured, a closer investigation shows that there are slight divergences from the laws which cannot be accounted for by mere experimental errors. The last stage in the determination of the equality of times now begins. We argue that the suggested laws are so simple and so nearly true that the most reasonable plan is not to keep the same time-measures and complicate the laws, but to suppose that the laws are rigidly true but the time-measurer not perfectly accurate; *i.e.*, that successive periods of this physical process are not perfectly isochronous. We therefore erect the laws into principles, define equality of times by them, and apply the necessary corrections to our old time-measurer. There is nothing particularly arbitrary about this. We believed, to begin with, as the result of direct judgments assisted by the use of such expedients as have been described above, that a certain periodic process is isochronous. We admitted, however, that deviations from isochronism so small as to escape the notice of any direct method are possible. We then stated our laws in terms of time as measured by this process, and found them to be simple and very nearly true; but, if they are to retain their simple form and become quite true, a small correction must be made in the assumed isochronism of the process. This contradicts nothing that we have deduced from our experience; for we admitted all along the possibility of errors too small for direct detection. The procedure has the least trace of arbitrariness if, as is often the case, we can see the physical cause of the lack of complete isochronism in our time-measurer and can fully explain this lack in accordance with the laws which we have erected into principles. This has happened, *e.g.*, with the earth as a time-measurer, where we can explain its small defect from isochronism, when once we have to assume it, by the frictional effect of the tides acting according to the laws of mechanics. Even when no physical cause can be detected for the presumed lack of isochronism, it is always possible to suggest a hypothetical one. But, in so far as this has to be done, our procedure does become more arbitrary; and a point may be reached where a full explanation of all the phenomena demands a real change in the form of the laws with or without a change in the time-measurer. This has happened in recent years to the laws of motion, mainly through investigations on the movements of small electrically charged particles with a velocity comparable to that of light.

7. Theory of Relativity.—The next point to be considered is the criterion of beforeness, afterness, and simultaneity among events which are not the objects of any one experience. We have seen that in favourable cases we can immediately judge that one event that we experience is after another that we experience. Other people can make similar judgments about events in their experience. But we cannot directly judge of the temporal relations of events which we do not directly experience. Matters are on exactly the same footing with spatial relations. I may be immediately aware that one object in my field of view is to the right of another in the same field, and another man may be able to make similar judgments about his visual sense-data. But it remains to be seen what is meant by saying that an object which A experiences is at the right of one which B experiences; or again what is meant by the statement that of two objects which no one experiences—*e.g.*, two atoms—one is to the right of the other. What is wanted is to be able to date events in a time-series which is neutral as between A's experience and B's, and shall contain events that do not fall into the direct experience of any one. In this problem we must carefully distinguish between two questions which are liable to be confused: (1) How do we come to understand the nature of the relations in the neutral time-series?, (2) How do we know with regard to any two definite events, e_1 and e_2, whether e_1 is before or after or simultaneous with e_2?

The answer to the first question is that the relations in the neutral series are regarded as having the same logical properties as those which we directly experience, or at any rate as being capable of definition in terms of the logical properties of these relations. Possibly a temporal relation as experienced by A has a sensuous particularity different from that possessed by one experienced by B; just as it is impossible to say whether the quality of what A sees and that of what B sees are precisely the same when they say that they perceive the same colour, and no available test can detect any discordance between their experiences. But, of course, the sensuous particularity is what is shed when we consider a neutral time-series, and only the logical properties of the relations (*e.g.*, transitivity, asymmetry, etc.) are important.

The distinction between the space and time of each man's experience and a neutral space and time runs parallel with the distinction between the immediate objects of each man's experience and neutral (or, as we call them, physical) objects. However we suppose physical objects to be constituted, and whatever we suppose to be the relation between our minds and them, it must be assumed that physical objects are in the neutral space, and that their changes take place in the neutral time and make themselves known to us by correlated changes in the immediate objects of our experience.

It is not necessary here to consider how a number of people, $M_1 \ldots M_n$, come to agree that certain events, $e_1 \ldots e_n$, in their respective sense-data are all correlated with the same physical event. But it is necessary to notice that they will find, first of all in the case of sound, that, if their physical laws are to give at all a simple and complete account of what they may expect to hear under given circumstances, they must assume that the sounds heard by various people, and all correlated by them with a single physical event, are not in general contemporary with each other. The greatest accuracy and simplicity is introduced into the laws of sound by supposing that the hearing of the sounds by the various people takes place at times dependent on the positions of their bodies in physical space and on the spatio-temporal position of the single physical event correlated with all these sounds. This example brings out three very important points. (1) The determination of the temporal

relations between events in the minds or in the immediate objects of the minds of different people can be accomplished only when these events have been correlated in some definite way with supposed neutral physical events; (2) the temporal relations then assigned are such as to make the laws telling us what sensations to expect in given circumstances as simple and accurate as possible; (3) it follows from these considerations that the determination of a neutral time-series and of the positions of physical objects in a neutral space must proceed *pari passu*.

Suppose, *e.g.*, that we say that the velocity of sound is v centimetres per second: (1) we want to connect all the known facts about the sounds which people hear under circumstances that can be directly experienced; (2) we want to do this compatibly with the assumptions which have already been made as to what heard sounds are to be classed together as connected with one physical event; and (3) we want our laws which sum up the known facts and anticipate experience to be as simple as is compatible with accuracy. We find that these ends can best be accomplished by supposing that *A*'s hearing of s_a and *B*'s hearing of s_b (s_a and s_b being both correlated with the single physical event *S*) take place at times $t + \frac{x_a}{v}$ and $t + \frac{x_b}{v}$ respectively, where t is the date of *S* in the neutral time-series, and x_a and x_b are the respective distances between the place where *S* happens in physical space and *A*'s and *B*'s bodies as physical objects. We must remember that the correlation of several sounds heard by different people with a single physical event and the assignment of positions in neutral space to physical events are themselves carried out on the same general principles as the datiug of events in neutral time and as the measurement of duration already described; *i.e.*, we start with instinctive judgments of rough accuracy, and then proceed to a more accurate determination of our terms, guided by the general motive of maximizing the accuracy and simplicity of scientific laws.

As we have seen, sound is the first and most obvious case where it is necessary to assume different dates for different members of a group of sense-data which are all correlated with a single physical event. The more accurate researches of science necessitate a similar process for dealing with the sense-data of sight, and so the notion of a velocity of light is introduced. These velocities, once determined, furnish a criterion of before and after among physical events, and, through them, for events in different minds.

Let us denote any moment at *A* by the symbol ${}^a t_r$, and an event which happens at the point *A* at the moment ${}^a t_r$ by ${}^a e_r$. Let us use the same notation for events and moments at *B*. Then we can say: An event ${}^a e_r$ precedes an event ${}^b e_s$ if a disturbance leaving *A* at ${}^a t_r$ reaches *B* not later than ${}^b t_s$. Now it is found that we have no reason to believe that any disturbance travels faster than light. It can be shown that, if the above be our sole criterion for before and after between events at different places, there will be pairs of such events of which we have no reason to say that one is either before, after, or contemporary with the other.

To see this, consider the following case. Let ${}^a e_1$ happen at *A* at ${}^a t_1$. A signal which leaves *A* at ${}^a t_1$ cannot reach *B* *before* a certain moment ${}^b t_2$. Again, a signal that reaches *A* at ${}^a t_1$ cannot have left *B* *after* a certain moment ${}^b t_0$. On our criterion, therefore, ${}^a t_1$ is before any moment that is after ${}^b t_2$ and is after any moment that is before ${}^b t_0$. But how are events at *B* which happen between ${}^b t_0$ and ${}^b t_2$ related in time to the event ${}^a e_1$? Take an event ${}^b e_x$ such that ${}^b t_x$ is between ${}^b t_0$ and ${}^b t_2$. You cannot say that it is before ${}^a t_1$; for a disturbance leaving *B* at ${}^b t x$ would reach *A* later than ${}^a t_1$. But you also cannot say that ${}^a t_1$ is before it; for a disturbance leaving *A* at ${}^a t_1$ would reach *B* later than ${}^b t_x$ (viz. at ${}^b t_2$). Hence on our criterion we can neither say that ${}^b e_x$ is before ${}^a e_1$ nor that ${}^a e_1$ is before ${}^b e_x$. Moreover, there is an infinite number of events at *B* of the form ${}^b e_x$ where x is between 0 and 2. Thus we cannot cut the knot by saying that, since they are neither before nor after ${}^a e_1$, they are contemporary with it. For they are not contemporary with each other. Thus one and only one of the class of events ${}^b e_x$ can be taken to be contemporary with ${}^a e_1$, and the rest, so far as our criterion goes, must be held to be neither before, after, nor simultaneous with ${}^a e_1$. We are thus compelled to recognize that we may have no means of deciding whether a pair of events at different places in physical space are contemporary or not in physical time.

We can, if we like, accept this result, and build up our physics on the assumption that physical time really is non-connexive; *i.e.*, that, though all events have temporal relations to some events, none have temporal relations to all events. This has recently been done very fully and ably by A. A. Robb.[1] Or we may take the more usual course of assuming that physical time really is connexive, but that in certain cases all criteria fail to determine the actual temporal relations which subsist between events in different places. We then must simply make a convention (to return to our example) that one particular event of the class of events at *B*, whose temporal relations to ${}^a e_1$ are left doubtful by our criteria, is contemporary with ${}^a e_1$, and that whatever precedes this one precedes ${}^a e_1$ and whatever follows it follows ${}^a e_1$. It is customary to assume that the event at *B* which comes midway between ${}^b e_0$ and ${}^b e_2$ is contemporary with ${}^a e_1$; but it must be noticed that this is a mere convention, though doubtless the most reasonable one to make. (On our notation this event would naturally be ${}^b e_1$.)

We must notice further that, for this convention to be determinate at all, we must assume that we know that the time-measurer at *B* goes at the same rate as that at *A*, and that both go uniformly. Now, if the time-measurers cannot be moved about, their synchronism can be determined only by sending signals from one to the other—*e.g.*, light-signals. And, even if they can be moved about, our only test for the continuance of their synchronism, when they have been moved apart and are no longer in view together, is by light-signals. On the other hand, the question whether our tests for synchronism by light-signals are genuine tests (*i.e.* involve synchronism in physical time) depends on whether the velocity of light relative to the system containing the time-measurers is constant in time and the same in all directions. And this last point cannot be determined *until* the time-measurers in two places have been synchronized; for it is obvious that to measure a velocity we need to know the time in two places. We see, then, that the possibility of synchronizing time-measurers and the uniformity of the velocity of light stand and fall together, and that neither can be proved independently of the other. If we allow that the velocity of light relative to the system is constant and uniform in all directions, our tests for synchronism and uniformity in our time-measurers are valid; if we allow that the criteria ensure physical synchronism, the physical velocity of light (as distinct from its *numerical* measure on our convention) will be constant and uniform. But neither question is or ever will be capable of independent settlement; and therefore we simply have to make a convention that the meaning to be attached to synchronism in different places is agreement with the tests based on light-signals, and another convention that distances shall be so measured that the measure of the velocity of light relative to the system is independent of time and of direction.

Suppose now that the people on a system *S* determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates in this way, and that the people on another system S^1, moving with uniform translational velocity relative to *S*, determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates similarly. Let them arrange, as they can do, that the time-measurers at the origin of each go at the same rate; and further let them arrange their units so that the velocity of light as measured by each from experiments with sources and mirrors fixed in their own system shall have the same numerical measure. Then (*a*) it can be proved that each will find the same numerical measure for the velocity of light, even though the sources and mirrors be in uniform motion relative

[1] *A Theory of Time and Space.*

to the two systems. (*b*) It is possible to find equations connecting the spatio-temporal co-ordinates which the people on S give to any momentary event which they observe with those which the people on S^1 give to the same event. These are the celebrated transformations of the Theory of Relativity. They are, as we should expect, perfectly reciprocal, since the relative motion of S and S^1 is a perfectly mutual phenomenon. But (*c*) they lead to certain rather startling results. (1) Lengths along and at right angles to the direction of relative motion which are judged to be equal by the people on one system will be judged to be unequal by those on the other. The ratio depends on the relative velocity and on the value of the velocity of light which is common to the two systems.[1] (2) Events in different places which are judged to be contemporary by the people on one system will be judged to occur at different times by those on the other system, and the difference of time will depend on the distance apart parallel to the direction of relative motion.

Although the observers on the two systems thus differ, they cannot criticize each other. Each has pursued precisely the same plan in setting out his co-ordinates and synchronizing his time-measurers. And it would be quite futile for one to claim that his results are the right ones because his system is at rest and the other is in motion. For the relative motion is completely reciprocal, and neither absolute motion nor any consequence of it can be observed. Lastly, it is equally futile for one to say that he is at rest 'relative to the ether,' while the other is in motion; for we know that no experiment whatever has been able to demonstrate motion 'relative to the ether,' and this motion may fairly be dismissed as a fiction. The upshot of the matter is that there is nothing to choose between their respective judgments, and that all the laws of nature can be stated as truly and will have precisely the same form, no matter which of an infinite number of systems in uniform translational motion be taken as the basis for spatio-temporal co-ordinates. This result, with the mathematical consequences that flow from it, is known as the Theory of Relativity. Its philosophical importance is that it enables us to see the tacit assumptions that are made when we talk of events at different places being contemporary; and the fact that measurement of distance is entangled with time, since the distance between two objects at any time involves a decision as to what is meant by the same time in two different places. Though it no more completely refutes the possibility of absolute space and time than does any other argument (for after all it only deals with our numerical measures and leaves it open whether one system of time-measurers is physically uniform and synchronous and one system of space-measures directly represents distances in physical space), yet it helps to render the notions of absolute space and time still more spectral and remote from all possible experience than before. For it enables us to see that there are a certain indeterminateness and conventionality even in the measurement of the distance between physical objects and of the lapse between events; and that therefore what we can know is even at a farther remove than we had thought from the points of absolute space and the moments of absolute time.

The Theory of Relativity sketched above was first fully stated by Einstein in his classical paper, 'Über das Relativitätsprinzip und die aus demselben gezogenen Folgerungen,' which appeared in the *Jahrbuch der Radioaktivität und Elektronik* for 1907. This may be called the restricted Theory of Relativity. It may be briefly characterized as consisting of an experimental fact and a philosophical principle suggested by a great number of facts. The philosophical principle is that, since we can never observe absolute time, space, or motion, even if there be such things, the laws o physical phenomena as learned from experiment and observation must retain the same *form* for acts of observers in uniform motion relative to each other. This persistence of form (or *covariance*, as it is technically called) in the differential equations that express the laws of nature does not in general imply that the actual *magnitudes* measured by two observers in uniform relative motion will be the same.

E.g., an observer moving with his instruments relative to an electrically charged body will detect magnetic as well as electrical forces, whilst one who is at rest with his instruments relative to this body will observe only electrical forces. But the differential equations connecting the effects noted by one observer with each other and with his x, y, z, and t co-ordinates will be precisely the same as those connecting the effects noted by the other observer with each other and with *his* x, y, z, and t co-ordinates.

This principle by itself, however, would be of little use, since it does not enable us to say what connexion exists between the co-ordinates of the two observers. But, if there be some physical magnitude, which is not merely covariant but also *invariant* as between different observers in uniform relative motion, the transformations connecting the two sets of co-ordinates can be found. Now the velocity of light *in vacuo* is found to fulfil this condition; its actual numerical value is found to be the same by all observers. The mathematical consequences of this fact lead to Einstein's set of equations connecting the x, y, z, t co-ordinates of one observer with those of another who is moving relative to the first. The precise significance of Einstein's principle of the 'Constancy of Light Velocity' has been indicated above, and shown to be connected with the way in which we are forced to lay out a system of co-ordinates and to define simultaneity between events in different places.

Einstein's restricted theory has gained many triumphs. It explains at once what is known as Fresnel's dragging-coefficient for light passing through matter that moves relative to the observer. It also accounts for the change of mass with velocity which is observed when small particles move with speed comparable to that of light. The principle necessitates slight changes in the previously accepted form of some of the laws of nature. Maxwell's equations and the equation of continuity in hydrodynamics do indeed at once and without modification fulfil the condition of covariance. But the laws of mechanics, as they stand, are not in accord with the principle and need modifications which only become practically important in dealing with the motion of matter with velocities comparable to that of light.

Considerable philosophic importance, in connexion with the nature of time, attaches to the work of Minkowski.

On the ordinary Newtonian mechanics the form of the laws of nature is unchanged if the three spatial axes be twisted in space about their origin as a rigid body. Now Minkowski showed that the Lorentz-Einstein transformation is equivalent to a twist of the same nature performed on a set of *four* mutually rectangular axes in a four-dimensional space. Three of these axes are the ordinary spatial ones, the fourth is the time axis multipled by c, the velocity of light, and ι, the root of -1. So far the theory must be regarded as a merely elegant mathematical device, since the fourth axis is imaginary in the mathematical sense, and the angle of solution is also imaginary. But, if we do not assume that the geometry of the four-dimensional 'space-time' is Euclidean, a much more important meaning can be attached to Minkowski's interpretation of the relativity transformations. If we suppose the geometry of 'space-time' to be hyperbolic (*i.e.* the geometry of Lobatchewski), the relativity transformation corresponds to twisting a set of four real axes as a rigid body through a real angle about the origin. The axes are now x, y, z, and ct, and c simply depends on the different units that we use in measuring time and space; so that really we are dealing with a four-dimensional

[1] This is the famous Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction.

manifold in which space and time are homogeneous with each other, but whose geometry is not Euclidean but Lobatchewskian.

The work of philosophical mathematicians since Minkowski's death has consisted largely in developing the notion that the ultimate data in the world are events in space-time, *i.e.* events extended both in space and in time. The content of a specious present forms an example of such data. Space and time as used in the sciences only emerge at the end as elaborate mathematical constructions built on the immediately perceptible relations between extended events.

The best exposition of this point of view is contained in A. N. Whitehead's *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, which begins with a severe criticism of the concepts of classical physics and proceeds to elaborate the notions of space, time, and matter from the crude data of sense and their immediately given spatio-temporal relations. It seems hardly possible to doubt that this is the right path for further research, but it demands a combination of philosophical and mathematical abilities of so high an order that few can tread it successfully. Alexander in his *Gifford Lectures* at Glasgow has developed the notion of space-time with great fullness from the purely philosophic side, but, at the time of writing, his lectures have not appeared in print, and it is impossible to give a fair account of his views from the short synopses which are alone available.

It remains to say a few words about the generalized Theory of Relativity. So far we have only considered observers in *uniform* relative motion and have laid down a principle of relativity for them. Einstein has occupied himself in the last few years in removing this restriction and thus bringing gravitation, which fell outside the older theory, into the scope of the Theory of Relativity.

A particle is said to be under the action of no force if it move uniformly in a straight line. But the question whether it moves in a straight line and whether it moves uniformly is clearly relative to our spatial axes and to our measure of time. If, *e.g.*, a particle moves uniformly in a straight line relative to the rectangular axes x and y, it will not do so relative to axes which rotate about the origin in the xy plane. Accordingly, relative to one set of axes it will be said to be under the action of no force, whilst relative to the second set it will be said to be under the forces needed to produce the observed accelerations. Now the 'forces' introduced by these mere changes of our axes of reference are in one respect very much like the force of gravitation. They, like it, affect all forms of matter indifferently and depend only on the mass, not on the special nature of the matter. On the other hand, a genuine gravitational field cannot be altogether transformed away by a suitable change of axes, as a purely geometrical field can be. For any one particle this can be done by choosing axes fixed in the particle, but relative to these axes the other particles in the field will still be accelerated. Now it seems clear that a mere change of axes could not make any difference to the form of the laws of nature, and thus, if gravitation were capable of being transformed away merely by a suitable change of axes, the principle of relativity would assert that the presence of a gravitational field makes no difference to the form of the laws of nature. For the reason mentioned above the principle of relativity cannot be taken in this unrestricted sense. It may, however, be taken to assert that the form of the law of nature is unaltered in a gravitational field up to a certain (as yet undetermined) order of differential coefficients.

It is now necessary to see the bearing of these results on the constitution of the 'space-time' of nature.

It has been proved by Riemann that the metrical geometry of any space is completely determined when the 'linear element,' *i.e.* the interval between any pair of infinitely near points, is expressed as a known function of the differentials of the coordinates. Thus a three-dimensional Euclidean space is completely defined by the equation

$$ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2$$

for the linear element. Now the metrical properties of four-dimensional space-time will be completely determined when ds^2 (the interval of any pair of adjacent points in it) is expressed as a known function of dx^2, dy^2, dz^2, dt^2, $dxdy$, $dxdz$, $dxdt$, . . . etc. In space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of dx^2, dy^2 . . . must be known in order to determine ds^2. In general these coefficients will be functions of x, y, z, t; they are denoted by the letters g_{xx}, g_{yy}, g_{xy}, etc. Any transformation of axes corresponds to a change in these g's and therefore to a change in the form of the linear element. It follows that, as regards forces introduced simply by changes of axis, it is a matter of perfect indifference whether we say (*a*) that the geometry of space-time is such and such and that such and such forces are acting, or (*b*) that the geometry of space-time is such as to produce the appearance of these forces. The g's can be regarded either (*a*) as completely determining the forces on a given assumption about the geometry of space-time; or (*b*) as determining the metrical properties of space-time itself. The extended Theory of Relativity prefers to take the second view of them and to drop all reference to forces; on the first view the g's are of the nature of potentials. Now, in theory, any function whatever might be chosen for the g's. But, in fact, all parts of nature are subject to gravitation. This means that the choice of g's is not absolutely unrestricted, but that in every permissible system of axes for describing nature the g's will be subject to a set of differential equations connecting them with each other and with the x, y, z, and t of that system. These equations then express the law of gravitation and at the same time express it as a fundamental property of space-time.

It is extremely difficult to render Einstein's theory intelligible without mathematics, and the mathematics needed is somewhat formidable. It is hoped, however, that the above slight sketch may illustrate that extreme entanglement of time with space and with matter which undoubtedly occurs in our crude sense-data and is now seen to persist even in the most refined speculations of mathematical physics. It may perhaps be added that Einstein's generalized theory, as distinct from the special philosophic interpretations which may be put on it, is not a mere idle speculation, but has already explained the anomalies in the perihelion of Mercury, and has correctly foretold the amount of deviation in a ray of light due to its passing near a heavy body like the sun.

8. Historically important speculations about time.—Our knowledge of time as of space owes more to the labours of mathematicians and physicists than to those of professed philosophers. The sharp distinction between time and what changes, and between space and what moves in it and is extended, is largely due to the development, first of mechanics, and latterly of electrodynamics.

To the Greeks we owe much less with regard to time than with regard to most matters of philosophic or scientific speculation. This may perhaps be ascribed to the late development of dynamics; the Greek approach to the problems of time was mainly by way of astronomy. Of course, Zeno's celebrated arguments have an important bearing on change and continuity, and, whatever may have been the real intention of their author, they remained the best discussion on these subjects so closely related to time until the final treatment of infinity and continuity by Dedekind and Cantor in the latter part of the 19th century. Time plays an important part in the *Timæus* of Plato; and, although his treatment cannot be called satisfactory, it has the merit of distinguishing time from what is in time.

Plato says that God wished the created world to resemble the intelligible one as far as possible. Now, it was not possible for it to be eternal, and the nearest analogue to eternity which He could provide was to make 'a moving image of eternity.' This is time, and it is closely connected with the motions of the heavens; eternity 'rests in unity,' but the image 'has a motion according to number.' Before the heavens were created, there were no days, years, etc.; but, when God created the heavens, He created these divisions of time also. Time was thus created *with* the heavens, and, if one were to be dissolved, so would the other be. But Plato does not appear to identify time with the motion of the heavens, though it is difficult to see what he supposes it to be in itself. According to Plato, past and future are created species of time which we wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; strictly 'was' and 'will be' are to be asserted only of generation in time, for they are motions. The analogy of the moving image to the eternal

is that the created heavens have been, are, and will be in all time. This view has something in common with that of Spinoza, who makes things as they really are for *ratio* timeless, but holds that this timelessness cannot be grasped by *imagination*, which represents it confusedly as duration through endless time.

Aristotle defines time as 'the number of motions relative to before and after.' Number here appears to mean what is numbered. The now is borne along with the movable as a point may be regarded as moving and making up a line. So in a sense there is only one now, though in another sense there are many nows. This is obviously a very unsatisfactory metaphor, and there seems no reason to think that Aristotle was really clear as to the distinction between time and motion.

The Schoolmen in the main adopted Aristotle's views, though with certain modifications. St. Thomas Aquinas, in the tract *de Instantibus*, discusses time and change with some fullness. He draws a distinction between the time in which angels perform their acts and that in which men and matter operate. The time of angels is discrete, that of men continuous; the difference arises from the fact that continuity is essentially connected with matter, while angels are separated substances. An instant for an angel is the time occupied by a single act; it may thus correspond to a long period in our time. This may be compared with Royce's views about the varying lengths of the specious present in various beings.

In modern philosophy the men who have most concerned themselves with time are Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz argued strongly for the relative view of time in his letters to Clarke, who represented Newton and the absolute theory. His arguments turn mainly on the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz carefully distinguished duration from the relation of before and after, and he compared duration to the extension of matter. Leibniz's view is that time is a system of possible positions of possible events related by before, after, and simultaneous with. He holds that all possible worlds must be in time, though, of course, the particular temporal relations of the actual world are contingent. To make Leibniz's theory coherent, it would be necessary to be much clearer than he is as to the relation between the time-series of each monad and the time-series of the universe. He attempted to explain the relation between successive states of the same monad by saying that the earlier ones have the quality of being desires for the later ones. As an attempt to replace relations by qualities this clearly fails, since 'desire for' anything is clearly a disguised relation. And as an attempt to *define* before and after it also fails; for it is clearly a synthetic proposition that desire for X precedes X. Then again it seems essential to Leibniz's doctrine of the reflexion by one monad of the states of another that we should have some account of the temporal relations between corresponding states in different monads. The state of a monad at a given moment in its own time-series is presumably the reflexion of the *contemporary* states of other monads; but we are not told what is meant by a time-series common to the monads, nor is it clear that this would be consistent with Leibniz's dislike of relations.

The absolute theory of time has never had much philosophic support; there can be little doubt that Leibniz had the better of Clarke. Perhaps the best arguments for absolute time and space are to be found in Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. They do not seem to the present writer to be conclusive, and their author has latterly taken a much more relativistic view.

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume insisted that the notion of time comes from the succession of our ideas. But they never made it clear how their temporal relations are connected with the time that is used in physics. Berkeley and Hume in particular fail to give any reasonable account of the distinction that we certainly make between the temporal order of our ideas and the temporal order of the objects which we claim to know by them. It is a great merit of Kant to have seized on the importance of this point in his 'analogies of experience,' though the distinction will certainly not bear the superstructure which he built on it. He attempted to prove that the distinction involves the permanence of substance (which he seems to identify with the chemical law of the conservation of mass) and the law of causation among experienced objects. But his arguments are entirely inconclusive even to prove that, in order to make the distinction, we must *believe* in these principles; much less to prove, what the transcendental method always tends to confuse with this, that the principles are true.

Time plays perhaps more, and more important, parts in Kant's philosophy than in any other.

(1) In the *Æsthetic* he tries to prove that it is a form of intuition, the form appropriate to the internal sense. This seems to mean that, just as we can only perceive physical objects as being in space, though there is no reason to think that things-in-themselves are spatial, so we can only perceive ourselves and our mental states in introspection as being in time, though there is no reason to think that we really are in time. This certainly seems to raise the special difficulty that, unless we know ourselves as we are and not merely as we appear, we cannot know what our forms of intuition are, but only what they appear to be, whilst Kant's argument certainly assumes that we know what they are. (2) In the *Dialectic*, as we have seen, Kant has an antinomy about time. This apparently would, if valid, overthrow not merely absolute time but also the temporal character of events and the temporal relations between them. We have already seen how grave are the difficulties in the way of any such conclusion, and how entirely powerless Kant's arguments are to prove it. (3) In the *Analytic* time plays an important part in the difficult doctrine of the schematism of the categories. The position seems to be that the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding cannot be applied immediately to the manifold given in sense, even after that has been synthesized by imagination. They have to be mediated through time; thus the category of ground and consequent, which is purely logical, can be applied to the world of sensible experience only after it has been schematized into the temporal form of cause and effect. The whole argument here is confused and weak to a remarkable degree; the principle appears to be that the manifold of sense is provided with temporal characteristics by intuition; that these remain and are elaborated by the syntheses of imagination; and that then the categories can be applied if they be first schematized so that they and the synthesized manifold share the temporal characteristic in common. (4) Kant's critical solution of his own antinomy is that the infinity involved in time is not an actual infinite, as it would have to be if time applied to things-in-themselves, but is only the power that we have of always synthesizing farther than we have yet gone in constructing a temporal series. To this Lotze makes the very pertinent criticism that it surely depends on the nature of things-in-themselves whether we shall be indefinitely supplied with material to synthesize.

The modern development of our knowledge about time is due mainly to two sets of people: (1) philosophical mathematicians, like Dedekind and Cantor, who have given a satisfactory analysis of infinity and continuity, and thus finally refuted all antinomies based on these; (2) mathematical physicists who have been led by their studies in the optics of moving systems to elaborate the Theory of Relativity. The pioneer in this work is Lorentz; the theory itself was first formulated by Einstein; and the mathematical and philosophical consequences have been drawn and elaborated by Einstein, Minkowski, Robb, Whitehead, and others.

It is also necessary to mention among recent philosophers Bergson, in whose works time, nominally at any rate, plays an important part. Bergson holds that the attempt to treat time as similar to space is a perverse one philosophically; it may work very well in dealing with dead matter, but it

shows its falsity in biology, psychology, and philosophy. He also falls foul of the mathematical theory of the *continuum* as applied to time; he admits that it is internally consistent, but denies that it describes what anybody really means by change and motion. Bergson's arguments seem to rest partly on a comparison between change as a sense-datum (*e.g.*, the peculiar characteristic of what we see when we look at the second hand of a watch as distinct from the hour hand) and physical change, and partly on the erroneous view that a whole of related states cannot be a change unless each of its terms be a change. Again, in some of his remarks about memory he seems to suppose that, because a memory-act is a later awareness of an earlier event, the earlier event and the later awareness must somehow be contemporary. Finally, he seems to think that the ordinary view of time is refuted by the facts, of which he is strongly convinced, that no two total states of mind at different times can be exactly alike, that there are not, strictly speaking, distinct elements which can recur as parts of different mental states, and that no amount of knowledge about earlier states will enable us to foretell later ones completely. But Bergson's most characteristic doctrines belong to the subject of change rather than to that of time.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *Historical.* — Plato, *Timæus*; Aristotle, *Physics*; St. Thomas Aquinas, *de Instantibus.* (*b*) *Absolute and relative theories.*—Leibniz, *Letters to Dr. Samuel Clarke*, London, 1917; Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903, i. (*c*) *Reality of time.*—Leibniz; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*; F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed. revised, London, 1902; J. Ellis McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time,' *Mind*, new ser., xvii. [1908] no. 68, p. 437 ff.; H. Bergson, *Time and Free-will*, Eng. tr., London, 1910, and *Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., do. 1911. (*d*) *Measurement of time and Theory of Relativity.*—H. Poincaré, *Science et méthode*, Paris, 1908, and *La Valeur de la science*, do. 1908; H. A. Lorentz, *The Theory of Electrons*, London, 1909; H. Minkowski, *Raum und Zeit*, Leipzig, 1909; L. Silberstein, *The Theory of Relativity*, London, 1914; C. D. Broad, *Perception, Physics, and Reality*, Cambridge, 1914; A. A. Robb, *A Theory of Time and Space*, London, 1911; A. S. Eddington, *Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation*, do. 1918. (*e*) *Physical time as a construction.*—B. Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, London, 1914; A. N. Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919.

C. D. BROAD.

TINNEH.—See DÉNÉS.

TIPITAKA.—See LITERATURE (Buddhist), vol. viii. p. 85[b].

TIRUPATI.—Tirupati, vulg. Tripetty (Tel. Tirupati, *tiru*, Skr. *śrī*, 'venerable,' *pati*, 'lord'), a town in Chittoor District, Madras (lat. 13° 38′ N., long. 79° 24′ E.), is a famous place of pilgrimage, situated on the Tirumalai or sacred hill, usually known to Europeans as Upper Tirupati, in contrast to the lower town at its base. The whole area is considered sacred, and up to 1870 had never been visited by Europeans. Mark Wilks states that he was on duty for eighteen months in the neighbourhood, and, though he frequently climbed the adjoining hills, he could never catch even a distant view of the pagoda.[1] The belief that much crime was committed without detection in the holy town led to the issue of an order by Government that it should be thrown open to the District officials. This at first produced considerable local opposition; but European visits now cause little sensation. The sanctity of this hill-range rests on the legend that it forms part of the sacred mountain Meru. The range has seven principal peaks, each of which is sacred and has a name and legend of its own. One of the peaks, known as Śeshāchalam, 'serpent hill,' takes its name from the belief that it was torn from Meru by Ādi Śesha, the primordial snake, who contended in a trial of strength with the wind-god, Vāyu. Vāyu raised so great a tempest that the peak was blown away and fell to earth in its present position. Near this peak the great temple stands. Little can be seen of it, and no European has been allowed to enter it. It is a building of little architectural beauty or importance, but the cultus of the deity is interesting as an example of the amalgamation of local non-Aryan beliefs with orthodox worship. Within a small chamber lighted by lamps is the idol, a stone image of Viṣṇu, seven feet in height. It represents the god as Chaturbhuja, 'four-armed,' one of the right hands holding the discus (*chakra*), one of the left the conch-shell (*sankha*), the second right hand pointing to the earth to draw attention to the miraculous origin of the holy hill, while the remaining left hand grasps a lotus. The deity possesses 1008 titles, the most common of which are Śrīnivāsa, 'dwelling with Śrī or Lakṣmī,' goddess of prosperity, and Venkaṭachalapati, the title of the sacred hill, which has been adopted into Sanskrit from the Tamil *ven*, 'white,' *kadam*, 'hill slope,' thus showing that the deity was adopted into Brāhmanism from a Dravidian cult. By visitors from the Deccan and N. India he is generally known as Bālāji, which, according to Monier-Williams,[1] is the name of a human incarnation of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa of whom little is known, save that he was remarkable for many extraordinary qualities, and that he lived in the neighbourhood of the sacred hill. Hence visitors to the shrine generally invoke him by the title of Govinda, 'cow-keeper,' one of the names of Kṛṣṇa. It is remarkable, however, that, according to common belief, the image worshipped was originally one of Śiva. The transformation of the Śaiva cult to that of Viṣṇu is traditionally ascribed to the reformer Rāmānujāchārya (born *c.* A.D. 1017). It is said that he procured a conch-shell and discus of gold, which he placed before the image and closed the temple doors. When the shrine was opened next day, it was found that these emblems of Viṣṇu were grasped in the hands of the image, and therefore it was really Viṣṇu. The tangled hair (*jaṭa*), the cobras carved upon the body, and various other peculiarities indicate that it was intended to represent Śiva, and the priests, who are Dīkṣhita Brāhmans, admit that they belong to the Śaiva sect. The god is provided with a consort, Padmāvatī, said to be the incarnation of a mortal woman, and the offerings are believed to have been originally collected to provide for the marriage of the pair. In an ante-room there is a brass vessel with a bag hanging in it, into which money and jewels are placed. On the other side are two gongs, one of which, when struck, utters the name Govinda, the other Nārāyaṇa—both titles of the god. Many pious persons observe the custom of collecting in their homes monthly contributions which are placed in a money-box and finally offered at the shrine.[2] The anthropomorphism of the cult is shown in the belief that the deity annually announces to certain persons that he needs shoes, which they make and present.[3] Various rites indicate the non-Aryan character of the worship. Thus a feast called *Gangājātra*, 'Ganges festival,' is held in the early spring, when a figure is made of clay or straw, before which animals are sacrificed—a custom quite opposed to true Vaiṣnava beliefs. Even Brāhmans, who will not attend personally, send victims. When the sacrifices are over, the image is burned, and much rude merriment follows. Some votaries carry on their heads a structure made of bamboo, resembling a car, adorned with coloured paper, and supported by iron nails that

[1] *Hist. Sketches of the South of India*[2], Madras, 1869, i. 246 n.

[1] *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 267 *f.*

[2] E. Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 352.

[3] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, iv. 310 *f.*

often pierce the flesh of the bearer, who submits cheerfully to the torture. At the *Gangammā* festival held at the temple 'language truly filthy and obscene' is used to the goddess herself.[1] The explanation of this custom is obscure.

'Abusive language is believed in certain circumstances to bring good luck to the person against whom it is directed.'[2]

On this theory the obscenity may possibly be regarded as a form of mimetic magic intended to repel the powers of evil from the deity, and thus advance her powers of promoting fertility.[3]

Again, on the road leading up to the temple 'small stones heaped up in the form of a hearth, and knots tied in the leaves of the young date palms may be seen. These are the work of virgins who accompany the parties of pilgrims. The knots are tied in order to ensure the tying of the *tāli* string on their necks [at marriage], and the heaping up of stones is done with a view to ensuring the birth of children to them. If the girls revisit the hill after marriage and the birth of children, they untie the knot on a leaf, and disarrange one of the hearths. Men cause their names to be cut on rocks by the wayside, or on the stones with which the path leading to the temple is paved, in the belief that good luck will result if their name is trodden on.'[4]

The hope of recovery from sickness and the desire for male offspring are the chief causes of vows being made to the god. The vow need not be performed immediately on receipt of the blessing. Death merely transfers the obligation to the heir, and it is said that the god is never defrauded. A common offering by women is the hair of their heads, which is shorn off by barbers, more than half the women who visit the temple returning with their heads clean shaven. J. A. Dubois[5] describes a custom of binding the idol in chains of silver, apparently with the object of preventing him from leaving the temple. The same writer[6] speaks of the custom of women who desire children passing a night in the temple. He also alleges that at the festival, when the image is taken in procession, the Brāhmans select the most beautiful women as wives of the god; they are branded with a hot iron, and, after serving for some years, are dismissed with a certificate of good conduct which ensures that, as they wander through the country, their wants will be abundantly supplied.[7] By other accounts, when such a woman becomes too old to please the deity, the priests make a mark on her breast, the emblem of the god, and give her a patent certifying that she acted for a certain number of years as one of his wives, that he is now tired of her and recommends her to the charity of the public. H. A. Stuart, however, denies that any dancing-girls attend the god; but he admits that the state of morality among priests and pilgrims has deteriorated, even celibate Bairāgīs and priests taking their paramours with them up the sacred hill. In the Deccan it is very common for a woman to make a vow that, if she is relieved from sickness or other trouble, she will shave her head to the god at Tirupati. After being shaved, she walks thrice round the temple, worships the image, pays a fee to have lighted camphor waved round the idol, receives a pinch of the sugar offered to the god, distributes food to the poor and to the monkeys which swarm round the temple, offers charity, and returns home.[8] The tonsure of children is also performed at the temple.[9]

LITERATURE.—This art. is mainly based on an excellent account of the place by A. F. Cox, *Manual of the N. Arcot District*, Madras, 1881, p. 146 ff., supplemented by later information supplied by its writer. In addition to the authorities quoted, see J. B. Tavernier, *Travels in India*, tr. from ed. of 1676 and ed. V. Ball, London, 1889, ii. 243. For various references to the worship of the god among the people of S. India see also E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, i. 195, 335, 389, ii. 43 f., 112 ff., iii. 42, 461, iv. 310, 326 f.

W. CROOKE.

TITANS.—The Titans, like the Giants (*q.v.*), are potencies belonging to an early pre-Olympian stage of Greek mythology. The two tend to be confused by late authors, but in origin they are distinct. The Titans are distinguished from Giants by the following well-marked characteristics: (1) they are gods (*θεοί*), and as such immortal, whereas the Giants are mortal; *Τιτῆνες θεοί*, 'Titans, gods,' is a fixed formulary in Hesiod's *Theogony*; (2) they are sky-potencies (*Οὐρανίωνες*)[1] as contrasted with the Giants, who are earth-born (*γηγενεῖς*); Titans and Giants alike are to Hesiod the offspring of Earth and Heaven, but the Titans tend skywards, the Giants with their snake-tails earthwards. To Shakespeare Titan is the sun.

'And Titan, tirèd in the mid-day heat,
With burning eye did hotly overlook them.'[2]

To Pausanias[3] Titan, according to the local legend of Titane, is 'brother to the sun,' and Pausanias himself held that Titan 'was great at marking seasons of the year.' Empedocles holds a less specialized and perhaps juster view; he places side by side

'Gaia and billowy ocean and air with its moisture,
And *Æther, the Titan*, embracing the All in a circle.'[4]

The Titan Phaethon is the sun and sun's charioteer; the Titaness Phoebe is the moon; the Titans Atlas and Prometheus are the sky-pillars supporting Ouranos. The Titans are an integral part of that primeval cosmogony of earth and sky, ousted in Greece by the anthropomorphic Olympians, but remembered as part of their Indo-European heritage by the Northern Muses who came to Helicon and taught their lore to Hesiod.

The etymology of Gigas, 'giant,' is uncertain; that of Titan is happily secure, and it throws a flood of light on the function of these sky-potencies of older date and explains in a flash the two Titan myths—(*a*) the Titanomachia, (*b*) the rending of Zagreus, which, but for this etymology, must have remained obscure. Three glosses of Hesychius make it certain that *Titan* means simply 'king.' They are as follows: *τιτῆναι· βασιλίδες* (the word glossed is from a lost play of Æschylus); *τιήνη* (for *τιτήνη*)· *ἡ βασίλισσα*, and *τίταξ· ἔντιμος. ἢ δυνάστης. ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς*. Titan is king, 'honoured one,' but —and here is the interesting point, or rather series of vitally interconnected points—he is the king of the old order, the king-god or divine king, and as such he is a sky-potency, for one main function of the old king-god was to order the goings of the heavenly bodies and generally to control the weather. Here we have that odd blending of physical phenomena with human and social potencies which lies at the back of most gods and certainly of Zeus himself.

The Titanomachia is at once clear. For on the physical point of view it is, as described in Hesiod,[5] just a half-humanized thunder-storm, Zeus, the new sky- and thunder-god, fighting the old sky-potencies; from the theological point of view it is the new anthropomorphism against the old religion of the king-god or medicine-man who controls the weather. The Olympian religion naturally regarded these old Titan kings as criminals, rebels against high heaven, condemned to Tartarus for their sin of *ὕβρις*; they are the counterpart of the arch-Titan Prometheus.

[1] *Madras Government Museum Bulletin*, Madras, 1901, iii. 267 f.
[2] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, ii. 492.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 100.
[4] Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes*, p. 351.
[5] *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], tr. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906, p. 591.
[6] P. 593 f.
[7] P. 601 f.; cf. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, ii. 117; N. Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, Eng. tr., London, 1907-08, iii. 143 f.
[8] *BG* xxii. [1884] 64
[9] J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 97 f.

[1] *Il.* v. 898. [2] *Venus and Adonis*, 177. [3] II. xi. 5.
[4] H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1903, p. 38
[5] *Theog.* 665 ff.

The second Titan myth, the rending of Zagreus, is less transparent, but in the light of the Titan kings even more illuminating, for we catch the king in his earliest stage of all, when he was tribal elder or medicine-man, not yet fully developed into kingship. The Titans, according to a version of the story as early as Onomakritos,[1] lure away the infant Zagreus, dismember, and (in some versions) cook and eat him. The story is an initiation myth based on the familiar initiation ritual of the mock death and resurrection of the initiate. The initiators are the elders or dynasts of the tribe, the embryo-kings.[2] The Titans as old-world kings are well in place; as a form of giant they are absurd. The name Zagreus takes us to Crete, and in Crete we find the Titans in a connexion that again points to initiation mysteries. The Cretans, according to Diodorus,[3] said that in the time of the Kouretes those who were called Titans ruled over the region of Cnossos, where were shown the foundations of the house of Rhea and a sacred cypress-grove of hoary antiquity. These Titans again must have been the old king-medicine-men, contemporary with the Kouretes and, like them, initiators into the 'men's house' of the Mother Rhea.[4] On a red-figured *hydria* in the British Museum[5] Zagreus is depicted as actually devoured by the Titans, and these Titans wear the characteristic dress of Thracian chieftains. We may safely infer that the Titan myth of the rending of Zagreus was known from Thrace to Crete, and we may suggest that it arose in that early stratum of 'satem'-speaking population known to the later Greeks as 'Pelasgian'—a stratum specially addicted to the mystery-cults of the son of Semele.

LITERATURE.—M. Mayer, *Die Giganten and Titanen*, Berlin, 1887. For the Titans as Ouraniones, J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 453–460. The right etymology of Titan from the root *ti*, 'honour,' was first seen by L. Preller, *Gr. Mythologie*[4], Leipzig, 1894, p. 44. Its meaning as 'king' was made clear by F. Solmsen, in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xxx. [1912] 35. The full significance of the 'king' meaning in relation to the mystery-rite of the *omophagia*, as practised in Crete and by Thracian chieftains, was established by A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 655 ff., in relation to his republication of the British Museum vase in pl. xxxvi. The previous literature of the subject will be found in Cook's notes. On p. 655, note 2, he rightly points out that the present writer's former derivation (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908, p. 493, and *Themis*, p. 15) of the word 'Titan' from Τίτᾱνος, 'white-clay man,' is erroneous. As initiators the Titans probably were daubed with white clay, but the name is not derived from the disguise.

J. E. HARRISON.

TITHES.—1. Origin and purpose.—Tithes are connected, on the one hand, religiously, with offerings of firstfruits (*q.v.*); on the other hand, politically, with tribute and taxation. While taxation often took the form of a tenth, the amount might vary, less or more, though the name 'tenth' (*decima*, δεκάτη) was retained. Voluntary offerings to a deity soon became customary, and even necessary, especially where kings began to impose taxation and tribute, and where a god was now thought to be a divine monarch. To keep up his sanctuary was as much an obligation as to keep up the royal person and court. An early example shows this. The people of Tyre paid tithes to Melcarth as king of the city, and the Carthaginians similarly sent their tithes to Tyre.[6] W. R. Smith[7] shows that in this case the tithe was as much political as religious. The voluntary offering necessarily became tribute also, as the ritual of a sanctuary became more elaborate, the sanctuary itself more splendid, and the attendant priests more numerous. Why a tithe or tenth should have been fixed on so generally is not clear, but probably it is connected with primitive views about numbers, or with methods of counting—*e.g.*, by fingers and toes.[1]

In Babylon, whether the tithe was native or borrowed, its use is found in the time of Nebuchadrezzar II. Earlier evidence is so far lacking, and there is no trace of it in the Assyrian period. It was a due paid to the temple of a god from the land, and was paid by all, including the king, who assigned to temples founded by him an annual amount from cultivated lands and from the treasury. Numerous tablets concern tithes, and show that the people were taxed for support of the temple. Tithe was of the nature of a fixed charge on the land and even became negotiable. Such tablets may be regarded as of the nature of a receipt for payment of tithe, which was generally paid in kind—corn, oil, sesame, dates, flour, oxen, sheep, and asses—though this might be commuted for a money payment. One man sometimes paid it collectively for a group of men, and possibly this signifies a systematic collection of tithe in one district by an authorized person.[2] At the same time Babylonian kings had a tithe of all imports, as had also Persian satraps.[3] In S. Arabia tithes were used for the erection of sacred monuments.[4] Cyrus, on the advice of Crœsus, caused his soldiers to devote a tenth of their booty to Zeus.[5] The tithe as a tax on land was well known in Greece and Rome, and the payment of a tithe to temples on special occasions was not uncommon. Pausanias gives many instances of this—*e.g.*, a tenth of war-booty being set aside to make an image or a vessel for a temple.

In Egypt there was apparently greater freedom. Temples were usually provided with lands for their upkeep, but the gods expected to receive a share of the produce of fields, vineyards, orchards, and fish-ponds. The kings in time of war dedicated a tenth of their booty to the temples, as well as of tribute levied on vassal states and of prisoners who were made slaves of the conqueror.[6]

Zoroastrian literature refers to the fourth rank of men—traders, artizans, market dealers, etc.—who should pay a tithe to the high priests and to the king.[7] Chinese sacred literature mentions a tenth of the produce of 'the fields' being annually levied; whether as a religious tribute or not is not clear.[8]

The *Confucian Analects*[9] tell how 'the Duke Gae enquired of Yew Jŏ, saying, "The year is one of scarcity, and the returns for expenditure are not sufficient. What is to be done?"' He desired to take two tenths, instead of the usual statutory single tithe, from the allotments cultivated in common, against which Yew Jŏ protested.[10]

2. Tithe in the Old Testament.—Among the Hebrews the relation of tithes to firstfruits[11] is complicated, and opinions differ as to whether they were distinct or not. Firstfruits would naturally vary in quantity. Tithe expresses more or less a fixed proportion. Perhaps the tithe represents firstfruits made systematic, or different names may have been favoured at different times and in different localities. The tithe is called 'an heave offering' in Nu 18^{24}, but the two are apparently separate in Dt $12^{6ff.}$. In the later legislation firstfruits and tithes appear to be distinguished.

The tithe, which is not mentioned in the Book of the Covenant, appears first in the Northern

1 Paus. VIII. xxxvii. 3.
2 See art. KOURETES AND KORYBANTES.
3 v. 66.
4 See artt. MOUNTAIN-MOTHER and KOURETES AND KORYBANTES.
5 E. 246. 6 Diod. Sic. XX. 14.
7 *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 246.

1 See art. NUMBERS (Introductory).
2 C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, pp. xi, 205 f.; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, U.S.A., 1898, p. 668; G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, tr. M. L. McClure, London, 1894, p. 678.
3 Aristotle, *Œcon.* 1345*b*, 1352*b*. 4 W. R. Smith, p. 247.
5 Herod. i. 89. 6 Maspero, p. 126.
7 *Rivāyats* (*SBE* xxxvii. [1892] 425; cf p. 443).
8 *Shi King*, vi. 7 (*SBE* iii.[2] [1809] 370 f.).
9 Bk. xii. ch. ix. §§ 1-4.
10 J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, i. 119.
11 See art. FIRSTFRUITS (Hebrew).

Kingdom in the time of Jeroboam II. as the material given for a feast at the sanctuary (Am 5^{11}; cf. 4^4), though the feast was one for the rich at the expense of the poor. Here it appears as a fixed tribute. In Gn 28^{22} (E) Jacob promises a tenth of all to God—perhaps a reflexion of later custom, though not necessarily so—and Melchizedec receives a tenth of all (14^{20}). In 1 S $8^{15.\ 17}$ tithe is paid to the king, and perhaps he devoted this to the upkeep of some sanctuaries. The tithe in the Deuteronomic Code is not a forced tribute. The tithe of corn, wine, and oil, with the heave offering, free-will offering, and firstlings of herd and flock, are to be brought to the sanctuary and eaten there as a feast with servants and Levite (Dt $12^{6f.\ 17f.}$). Here the connexion with firstlings suggests that the tithe was the firstfruits of produce, or perhaps included these. This was a private feast at the sanctuary, and may have been a reform due to the fact that the ruling classes, as in Am 5^{11}, secured the best for themselves. It was not a direct due for the priesthood or for public religious services. If, however, the distance to the central sanctuary was too great for the offering to be taken there, it might be commuted for money, and this would furnish the material for the feast at the sanctuary as before (Dt $14^{22ff.}$). Every third year the tithe was to be laid aside to furnish a feast or feasts at home for the Levite, stranger, fatherless, and widow (14^{28} $26^{12f.}$).

Does the tithe here referred to form the equivalent of the firstfruits, the ritual of which, as perhaps forming part of the tithe, is detailed in Dt $26^{1f.}$? Probably they are ultimately the same, including an offering of part as firstfruits, and a feast for Levite and stranger, just as in 18^4 firstfruits are to be given to the priests. If so, the words in 26^{11}, 'Thou shalt rejoice in all the good which the Lord thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger,' would refer to the feast and be equivalent to the feast on tithe of Dt $14^{22f.}$, while the earlier part of ch. 26 would refer to the offering of part as a firstfruits offering.[1]

Is the third year's tithe additional to the tithe given each year, or is it a special form of treating tithe in the third year? Here again opinions differ, but most regard it as a diverting of the usual tithe for the benefit of the local priesthood, who would be deprived of the tithes through the new custom of feasting at the central sanctuary. Others regard it as a second tithe, and this is supported by the LXX, which reads for 'the year of tithing' 'the second tithe,' *τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιδέκατον*. But two tithes in every third year would mean a large amount, and it is unlikely that such demands would be made, or, if made, carried out.

In the Priestly Code tithe assumes the form of a fixed due. A tithe of the produce of the land, of fruit, and of the herd and flocks (*i.e.* of their yearly increase) is 'holy unto the Lord.' If commuted for money, one-fifth part of the value is to be added (Lv $27^{30f.}$). This is probably the tithe of produce referred to in Nu $18^{23f.}$, which was to be given to the Levites, they in turn giving a tenth of it to the storehouse for the support of the priests (cf. Neh $10^{37f.}$), who received now also firstfruits of corn, oil, and wine (Nu 18^{12}). The tithe of cattle and sheep in Lv 27^{32}, which is to be 'holy unto the Lord,' may represent the firstlings used at the Deuteronomic tithe-feast, but claimed later by the priests (Nu $18^{15ff.}$) as apart from the Levites, but it is not referred to in Neh 10^{37}, where the tithe is described (cf. 12^{44} $13^{5.\ 12}$), and may be a later addition. It is, however, mentioned as paid to the priests in To 1^6, by Philo,[1] and in the *Book of Jubilees* (32^{15}). Rabbinic authorities regard it as furnishing, along with a second tithe of produce (Lv 27^{30})—additional, therefore, to the tithe of produce in Nu 18^{21}—a feast for the tither and guests at Jerusalem, as ordained in Dt $14^{22f.}$ The purpose of the Priestly Code was probably to abrogate the law of the tithe in Deuteronomy, but later harmonizers did not take this view and spoke of two tithes, and even three, the third-year tithe of Deuteronomy being regarded as an additional one.[2] The law of P is reflected in Hezekiah's legislation, which ordered that firstfruits and tithes of produce, sheep, and oxen should be brought for the priests and Levites (2 Ch 31^4); hence, if the tithe of animals is in addition to the original law of Lv $27^{30f.}$, it may have come into force after Nehemiah's time.

In Neh $10^{34ff.}$ firstfruits and firstlings and firstfruits of dough were for the priests, and tithes of produce for the Levites—the latter collected by the Levites under the supervision of a priest, and a tithe of the tithe being given to the priests (cf. 12^{44}). The tithe, however, was not always paid to the Levites, as Nehemiah discovered, and they had to cultivate their own land. At Nehemiah's remonstrance it was paid ($13^{10ff.}$). At a later time the priests themselves collected the tithe,[3] and the subsequent history of the Levites in connexion with it is obscure, while they no longer shared in the tithe, either from the time of Ezra[4] or from that of John Hyrcanus.

The Pharisees, as well as the regulations of the Talmud, considered minutely the things to be tithed (Lk 11^{42}), the former even paying tithes of garden herbs—mint, anise, cumin.

Under the Rabbinic system of three tithes referred to above, the first was collected yearly; the second was due in the first, second, fourth, and fifth years; the third in the third and sixth years. Two were thus taken every year, except in the seventh year, when the land lay fallow. The poor's tithe suggested tithing of earnings, all of which was given to them. Extravagant claims were made for the virtue of tithe; *e.g.*, through it Israelites escape the twelve months' punishment in hell which is the lot of the wicked.[5]

Ezekiel's proposed legislation, which marks the transition to P, the first of all the firstfruits of everything is reserved for the support of the priests. There is besides a tax paid to the prince for the support of ritual and feasts out of wheat, oil, and flocks ($44^{30f.}$ $45^{13f.}$; cf. 20^{40}). No mention is made of tithes, nor are the payments to be made to the priests as in P.

3. Early and mediæval Church usage.—In the Christian Church the need of supporting the clergy, who were early withdrawn from secular business, was recognized, but the system of tithe was not generally resorted to for several centuries. Once it did become general, tithe was regarded, on the analogy of its use in the Jewish Church, as *de jure divino*, and supported by such passages as Mt 10^{10}, Lk 10^7, 1 Co $9^{7ff.}$—an argument which Selden was the first to show groundless, in his work on the subject. Until the 4th cent. little is heard of it, and some writers regard the matter from a totally different point of view from that which was later adopted. Irenæus, referring to tithes in the Jewish system, says characteristically that Christians, as 'those who have received liberty, set aside all their possessions for the Lord's purposes, bestowing joyfully and freely not the less valuable portions of their property.'[6] Origen

[1] Cf. S. R. Driver, *Deuteronomy* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1895, *in loc.* The passage in Dt 18^4 assigning firstfruits of corn, wine, and oil, and of wool to the Levites is out of harmony with the other Deuteronomic legislation, if firstfruits and tithe were one and the same.

[1] Philo, *de Præmiis Sacerd.* § 2, *de Carit.*, § 10.
[2] Jos. *Ant.* IV. iv. 3 f., viii. 22; cf. IX. xiii. 3; To 1 7.
[3] Jos. *Ant.* XX. viii. 8, ix. 2, *Vita*, 12, 15.
[4] So the Talmud, *Yebhāmōth*, 86; Ḥullīn, 131; *Kethūbhōth*, 26
[5] *JE* xii. 151*b*. [6] *Adv. Hær.* IV. xviii. 2.

regards tithes as something to be far exceeded in Christian giving,[1] and Epiphanius says that tithe is no more binding than circumcision.[2] Augustine regards the tithe as something due by Christians to God, though he and others are prompted also by the finer ideal of freedom in all Christian giving. It was inevitable, however, that, as the Church spread far and wide, circumstances should make it necessary to fall back upon rule, based upon legal provision, and the old standard of a tenth was set up, and the Christian priest was compared in this matter to the Jewish priest and Levite. Ambrose and many other Fathers accordingly maintain that tithes should be given, but their views were not generally accepted in the Eastern Church. Even in the West there is evidence that 'this species of ecclesiastical property was acquired not only by degrees, but with considerable opposition.'[3] The moral duty of paying tithe was now generally taught, but, even after it was made a matter of law, tithe was paid reluctantly and irregularly. In A.D. 585 the Council of Mâcon ordained its payment, while priests were to use it in helping the poor and in redeeming captives. He who refused to pay it was to be excommunicated. Other councils enjoined it, but it was not until the time of Charlemagne that it became matter of law. In one of his capitularies he ordained it to be paid to churches and clergy. Preachers had already exhorted strenuously towards its payment as tending to Christian perfection, and doubtless it was now more generally rendered. At the same time it has to be remembered that, apart from ecclesiastical law, under Roman law colonists had to pay a tenth to the State as rent from the *ager publicus*. This had already in large measure fallen into the hands of the Church. While the ecclesiastical tithe was usually paid to the bishop, who apportioned it, Charlemagne's capitulary regulates its division into three parts—for the bishop and clergy, for the poor, and for the support of church fabrics. In later times tithe was often appropriated to particular churches and to monastic foundations. Once the payment of tithe became a matter of legal due, excommunication or temporal penalties were decreed against those who refused to pay it. Meanwhile abuses had risen in connexion with the appropriation of tithe. Sometimes, instead of appropriating it to a church, monastery, or diocesan treasury, a proprietor would appropriate it to his own uses or even sell it. It had also become common for ecclesiastics to grant tithes to laymen as an award for service or in recognition of their protection. These were now regarded as evils, and it was set forth as a legal maxim that all tithes are of ecclesiastical origin. Where they had been appropriated by laymen, they were withheld from the Church only by robbery or by feudal grant (*decimæ infeudatæ*). No layman could possess tithes without risking his salvation. Hence the Third Lateran Council of 1179 forbade detention of tithes by laymen as well as transference of them to other laymen. The Council also declared that any one who violated this decree endangered his soul, and would be deprived of Christian sepulture. As a result of this, many tithes were restored to ecclesiastical use. Towards the 13th cent. tithe was also extended from the fruits of the earth, or predial tithes, to all kinds of profit and wages. It was divided by the canonists into (1) predial—derived from the fruits of the ground; (2) mixed—of things nourished of the soil, or those due partly to its productiveness, partly to human skill and labour; (3) personal—from the profits of trade and merchandise. But generally the second division is included in the first. Ecclesiastical law in the Middle Ages laid down precise rules regarding what was tithable and what was not, those who were exempt, the sale or transference of tithe to laymen (a custom which gradually came into use), the superiority of tithe to State taxes, and the like.

[1] *In Num.* hom. xi. [2] *Hær.* 50.
[3] H. Hallam, *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*[11], London, 1855, ii. 145.

4. English law and practice.—In England legislation on the subject seems to date from the latter part of the 8th century. Pope Adrian in A.D. 785 enjoined payment of tithe on the Anglo-Saxon Church. This was confirmed in later ecclesiastical councils and synods, sometimes by royal orders. The idea that the civil grant of tithe dates from an alleged charter of Ethelwulf (A.D. 855) is now abandoned; and in any case it appears to grant a tenth of the land, not of produce.[1] In King Edgar's reign failure to pay tithe was made legally punishable (A.D. 950). Towards this time the growth of parish churches was attended by their endowment with part of the tithe paid by the landowner, who was usually the founder of the church, to the diocesan or monastic treasury. In course of time, and with the extension of the parochial system, it became a matter of legal presumption that the local tithe was the property of the rector. In many places rectories with their tithes were the property of monastic establishments, a vicar being appointed to perform the duties of the charge. The Reformation brought about great changes, and, where the rectorial tithes belonged to monasteries, at their dissolution the tithes became the property of the crown. They were now frequently granted to lay impropriators, thus being completely dissociated from their original purpose. The rectorial tithe was the 'greater' tithe, and such tithe or part of tithe as was paid to vicars was the 'smaller.' The greater tithes were generally predial; the smaller were mixed and personal. These distinctions were practically wiped out by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836, although long before that date commutation of tithe paid in kind for a money payment had been general. By the Act of 1836, tithe, with a few exceptions, was now commuted for a fixed rent-charge, based on a seven years' average of the price of corn—wheat, barley, and oats—the amount being that which formed the legal tithe at the date of the Act. With the difference in values since 1836, the result has not been for the benefit of the recipient of tithe. Further legislation has modified details in procedure. The Tithe Act of 1918 amends the Acts, 1836 to 1891, and orders that the sum payable under these Acts in respect of tithe rent-charge on or before 1st Jan. 1926 shall be the sum payable, as ascertained by the septennial average prices under the Corn Returns Act, 1882, in January 1918. Tithe rent-charge is thus fixed up to 1st Jan. 1926, at £109, 3s. 11d. But the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries shall, after 25th Dec. 1925 and in succeeding years, compute in the same manner as for this septennial average the average price of corn for the preceding *fifteen* years. The sum payable as tithe rent-charge after 1st Jan. 1926 shall be ascertained on this fifteen years' computation.

5. Teinds in Scots law.—In Scotland tithes are known as teinds, and are almost entirely predial, including *decimæ mixtæ*, and only in exceptional cases personal. They were divided into parsonage and vicarage teinds, the former being leviable from grain (wheat, oats, and barley), the latter from natural grass or bog-hay, certain vegetables, butter, cheese, calves, lambs, herring, etc. Where an incumbent was appointed by the patron, he

[1] Hallam, ii. 263.

received the whole teind. In other or 'patrimonial' parishes the teind belonged to the bishop, or to a religious house, and the vicar who served the parish received stipend out of the teinds, sometimes a small part of the vicarage teinds. When teinds first began as such in Scotland is not known with certainty, but they are frequently mentioned in charters of the 12th cent., as well as in writs of that period to enforce their payment. Canons of provincial councils in the pre-Reformation period regulate this payment and appropriation. Many abuses arose regarding teinds, and the decrees of the Lateran Council were often ignored. Certain ecclesiastical lands (*i.e.* lands which were the property of monastic orders) were granted freedom from payment of tithe by papal privileges. When such lands were feued to laymen, this exemption also passed to them. In view of the coming Reformation, ecclesiastics frequently made grants to landowners, called titulars, conferring heritable rights to teinds by feu or by long lease. At the Reformation church lands passed into the hands of laymen by grant from the crown or otherwise, but payment of teind still continued, though the stipends of ministers were entirely at the will of proprietors and were of the scantiest amount. In 1537 the General Assembly petitioned the Privy Council to make permanent provision for the maintenance of ministers. The Council thereupon decreed that one-third of all ecclesiastical revenues should be divided between ministers and the crown. On the rent-rolls being made up, this sum was found to amount to over £6000. But, as a result of imperfect returns, remission, and refusal of payments, much less than half of this sum was available. In 1567 Parliament, under the scheme known as the 'assumption of thirds,' ordered that 'the haill thrids of the haill benefices of this realme' be paid now and for all time coming to ministers until 'the Kirk come to the full possession of their patrimonie, quhilk is the teindes.' This third was never paid in full, but the system remained in force until 1633. While Parliament thus recognized the right of the Kirk to teinds—a proprietary right fully enjoyed by the pre-Reformation clergy—that right was nullified, and teinds had been 'evicted from their former owners, diverted from their former use, and acquired and dealt with by the crown and nobles as their own property.'[1] An Act of 1617 appointed a commission authorized to augment stipends out of teinds, and a number of stipends were so treated. In 1627, as a result of Charles I.'s intention to receive surrenders of alienated church lands and teinds, and of the opposition which this roused, a commission was appointed to deal with the subject and to make provision for churches. Submissions were made to the king by those who had benefited by grants of teinds or were interested in them, and as a result he issued his 'decreets-arbitral,' which were confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1633, and commissioners were appointed to deal with the whole matter. Teinds were to be valued at 'the fifth part of the constant rent which each land payeth in stock and teind where the same are valued jointly,' or, if valued apart, the commissioners were to declare their value. Titulars of teinds were to sell them to heritors at nine years' purchase, but only so far as not already devoted locally to the minister of the parish. The valuation thus made fixed the amount of teind for all time coming, and the minister's stipend was to be paid out of the commuted teinds as a permanent endowment, with a further possible augmentation. Stipend thus forms a paramount claim upon teind. These decrees were confirmed by Act of the Scots Parliament in 1633, and still continue to regulate the right to teinds and the payment of stipends of ministers of the Established Church. The whole matter of teinds was vested in commissioners, but was transferred under the Union of 1707 and subsequent Acts to the Lords of Council and Session, acting as a Court of Commission of Teinds. This Court of Teinds deals with all matters regarding teinds, and in particular hears all claims for augmentation of stipend out of the unexhausted or free teinds, where such exist in the possession of the proprietors after payment of stipend. Such claims can be preferred only twenty years after a previous claim has been upheld.[1]

In valuing teinds under the Act of 1633, the valuation was made either in grain or in money. Where stipend is payable according to value of grain, it is valued according to fiars prices of the county, as determined by a local court who strike the value for the crop and year.

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J. A. MacCULLOCH.

TITHES (Greek).—It is difficult to separate tithes (δεκάτη) and firstfruits (ἀπαρχή), since the tithe is only a special form of firstfruit. Many nations and tribes, if not nearly all, have had the custom of setting apart a portion of their goods for the gods; and when, as was sometimes the case, the king or chief was a sort of god, he took his share by compulsion. It seems to have been a wide-spread belief that some sacrifice was due to the local spirits whenever men broke new ground, built a settlement, or bridged a river; and it was certainly common in very early times to leave a portion of the new land to the possession of the old divinity. Perhaps for the same reason portions of the fruits of the earth were left, or otherwise given to the gods. It is not likely that this portion was always the same fraction of the whole; but the tenth was found to be a convenient fraction early and in many nations, among them the Jews. No doubt the decimal numeration had something to do with this choice.[2] In Greece a few traces are known of the early custom just mentioned—*e.g.*, the sacred groves of Artemis, with game that no men might kill except in a sacred hunt.[3]

The Pelasgians are said by Stephanus to have offered the tithe, which in later days they dedicated at Delphi;[4] and Herodotus[5] tells how the Hyperboreans used to send their annual tithe to Delos. The tithe is not mentioned in Homer; and the earliest records come with the inscriptions, although legendary tithing is spoken of earlier. When Agamemnon conquered Mycenæ, he is said to have dedicated a tenth to the gods.[6] An epic poem, the *Europia*, two lines of which are quoted by Clement of Alexandria,[7] mentions the dedication of tithes at Delphi. The Liparians, on conquering the Etruscans, dedicated a tithe of the spoils at Delphi.[8] After the Persian invasion the Greeks took an oath to tithe all those cities which

1 J. M. Duncan, *The Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland*[3], p. 230.

1 *Green's Encyclopædia of the Law of Scotland*, ed. J. Chisholm, xii. 103 f.; Duncan, p. 313 f.

2 δεκατεύω='I count.'

3 Philostr. *Imag.* i. 28, *Heroicus*, 286=665; Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 9; *IG Sept.*, Berlin, 1892–1908, iii. 1. 654 (2nd cent. after Christ); cf. the ἱερὸν κυνηγέσιον mentioned in Demosth. *c. Aristogeitona*, A, Introd.

4 Stephanus, *s.v.* Ἀβορίγενες; Dionysius, i. 18. 49.

5 iii. 33. 6 Diod. xi. 65.

7 *Strom.* i. 349 (Sylburg). 8 Diod. v. 9

had sided with the enemy.[1] Tithes of that great struggle are also mentioned as being upon the Athenian Acropolis.[2] A helmet exists that was part of a war-tithe, dedicated by Hiero probably from the spoils of Cumæ.[3] Tithes of spoils are recorded also from the battle of the Eurymedon.[4] Tithe is a certain restoration in the inscription that records how the Cnidians built their *θησαυρός* at Delphi.[5] Statues on the Sacred Way at Branchidæ bear the inscription of tithe.[6] Two colossal figures were purchased with the tithe of Platæa;[7] the Clitorians also dedicated another as a 'tithe from many cities.'[8] A bronze Apollo in the Pythium at Athens belongs to the 4th cent.;[9] and an archaic bronze figure of the 'Apollo' type bears the word 'tithe.'[10] Even the private person speaks with pride of the tithes that he offered to Athene, to the amount of more than half a talent.[11] Most of the dedications of arms and spoils are without the distinctive word; but the war-tithe is recorded from the following places: Apollonia,[12] Athens,[13] Bœotia,[14] Branchidæ,[15] Crete,[16] Mantinea,[17] Megara,[18] Sparta,[19] Thessaly;[20] at Delphi by Athenians,[21] Caphyes,[22] Cnidians,[23] Liparians,[24] Spartans,[25] and Tarentines;[26] at Olympia by Clitorians,[27] Eleans,[28] Messenians,[29] Spartans,[30] Thurians.[31]

Other tithes are mentioned in Anaphe,[32] Arcadia,[33] Argolis,[34] Athens,[35] Bœotia,[36] Calabria,[37] Calymna,[38] Crete,[39] Cyrene,[40] Delos,[41] Delphi, Didymi[42] and Epidaurus[43] in Argolis, Halicarnassus,[44] Ithaca,[45] Megara,[46] Naxos,[47] Pæstum,[48] Paros,[49] Rhodes,[50] Samos,[51] Thera,[52] Siphnos.[53] They are dedicated by men or women, or by groups of persons, to Apollo, Artemis, Athene, Demeter, Heracles, Zeus. The articles tithed are all kinds of produce, corn and the fruits of the earth, hunting, fish, gotten minerals, or the profits of trade and industry. Thus we find the Siphnians tithing the output of their mines,[54] the Corcyreans their fish,[55] the Samian merchants their profits.[56] Before the Persian invasion the farmer offers a tithe of his farm;[57] other early dedications of tithes are made by fullers[58] and shipwrights.[59]

[1] Herod. vii. 132: *δεκατεῦσαι*. [2] Dem. *Timocr.* 741.
[3] *CIG*, 16; *IGA*, 510. [4] Diod. xi. 62.
[5] Paus. x. 11. 5; *BCH* xxii. 592.
[6] C. T. Newton, *Hist. of Discoveries at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Branchidæ*, London, 1862–63, inscr. vol., no. 66.
[7] Herod. ix. 81; Paus. v. 23. 1, x. 13. 5.
[8] Paus. v. 23. 6. [9] *CIA* ii. 1154, 1204.
[10] *American Journal of Archæology*, new ser., ii. [1898] 50.
[11] Lys. *Polystr.* 686. [12] Paus. v. 22. 3.
[13] *CIA* i. 334; Paus. i. 28. 2.
[14] *IGA*, 191; *Amer. Journ. Arch.*, new ser., ii. 250.
[15] Newton, p. 777.
[16] *Monumenti Antichi*, iii. [1891] 402 ff.
[17] *IGA*, 100; H. Collitz, *Sammlung der griech. Dialektinschriften*, Göttingen, 1884–1905, i. 1198.
[18] *IG Sept.* i. 37. [19] Paus. iii. 18. 7. [20] *IG Sept. (Thera).*
[21] Paus. ix. 13. 9. [22] *BCH* xviii. 177. [23] *Ib.* xxii. 592.
[24] *Diod.* v. 9. [25] Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 9.
[26] Paus. x. 13. 10. [27] *Ib.* v. 23. 7. [28] *Ib.* vi. 24. 4.
[29] *Die Inschriften von Olympia*, Berlin, 1896, p. 259.
[30] Paus. v. 10. 4. [31] *IGA*, 548.
[32] *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, Berlin, 1895–1908, iii. 257 f.
[33] Collitz, i. 1198.
[34] *Ib.* iii. 3407; *CIG*, 1172; *IG Peloponnesi et Insularum Vicinarum*, Berlin, 1902, i. 580, 977.
[35] *CIA* i. 210. [36] *IG Sept.* i. 1739[16], *IGA*, 191, etc.
[37] *IG Siciliæ et Italiæ*, Berlin, 1890, p. 643.
[38] L. Ross, *Inscr. Græcæ ined.*, Naples, 1834–35, iii. 298.
[39] *CIG*, 2556.
[40] Collitz, iii. 4839, 4840; *CIG*, 5133; *Mittheilungen des deutschen archäol. Instituts*, xxiii. [1898] 22.
[41] *BCH* xxvii. 65, xxx. 214.
[42] Collitz, iii. 3407. [43] *Ib.* iii. 3335. [44] *CIG*, 2660.
[45] *IG Sept.* iii. 1. 654. [46] Paus. i. 42. 5. [47] *IGA*, 408.
[48] *Ib.* 542.
[49] *Mittheil. des deutsch. arch. Inst.* xvii. [1902] 196.
[50] *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, i. 817*a* 3.
[51] *Herod.* iv. 152. [52] *Ib.* iii. 57.
[53] *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, iii. 431.
[54] Herod. iii. 57; Paus. x. 11. 2.
[55] Paus. x. 9. 3, v. 29. 9. [56] Herod. iv. 152.
[57] *CIA* iv. Suppl. 1. 373[121], p. 182.
[58] *Ib.* iv. 373 f., p. 42. [59] *Ib.* iv. 1. 373[234], p. 198.

We also read of a butcher,[1] a courtesan,[2] and others who speak generally of a tithe of their work.[3] Sometimes friends or relatives offer the tithe for another.[4] Some of the female statues of the Acropolis were tithes.[5] See also art. FIRST-FRUITS (Greek).

LITERATURE. — Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Dekate'; Pauly-Wissowa, *s.vv.* *ἀπαρχαί*, *δεκάτη*; H. Lansdell, *The Sacred Tenth*, 2 vols., London, 1906; W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, Cambridge, 1902, ch. ii. and index; J. Selden, *The Hist. of Tithes*, London, 1618; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], do. 1894, pp. 244 ff., 458 ff.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

TLINGIT.—The Tlingit, who occupied the coast of Alaska from Portland Canal to Copper River, were organized into two main phratries and one subsidiary phratral group, and the phratries were subdivided into clans. The character of their country and their manners and customs were almost the same as those of the Haida (*q.v.*), though the northern towns had not adopted the elaborately carved poles so characteristic of the latter, and their potlatches were conducted in a somewhat different manner.

1. Cosmological beliefs.—The outlines of Tlingit belief were like those of the Haida and indeed of the other tribes of the North Pacific coast, but in details there were considerable divergences. Like the Haida, they believed that the earth was flat and the sky a solid vault hung above it like an inverted cup and tenanted by various supernatural beings. The stars were supposed to be towns and their light the reflexion of the sea. The sun and moon were also occupied by special beings, and more regard was paid to the sun than by the Haida. Shooting stars were supposed to be live coals thrown down by departed spirits, and the northern lights were those spirits at play. Under the earth was an old woman called Old-woman-under-the-earth, who supported a great post, on which the solid land rested. According to one story, she was the sister of four brothers, who were favourite heroes of Tlingit mythology, and who in early days travelled all over the world killing harmful animals, putting things in order, and establishing customs for future generations. One of these brothers, Kashkatlk, was a powerful shaman who succeeded where his brothers had failed, and was frequently called upon to restore them to life, while another, Hlkayak, was always getting them into trouble by his impetuous and trifling character. He was suspected of an amour with his own sister, and, when his brothers discovered that their suspicions were well founded, they drove him away, and he became the wielder of the thunder. His sister, overcome with shame, went down into the earth at a place where the extinct crater of Mt. Edgecombe now is, near Sitka, and became Old-woman-under-the-earth. The remaining brothers and their mother were turned into rocks while trying to cross the Stikine River, and they may be seen there at the present day. According to the version of this story told at Wrangell, the sister was also turned into rock at that place and Old-woman-under-the-earth was an entirely different person. Old-woman-under-the-earth liked to receive food and prayers from human beings, and she was especially fond of girls because they made the fires on earth which warmed her. When she did not get enough attention from mankind, she became angry and moved her pole, causing an earthquake. Others said that the earthquake was caused by her anger at some persons who were teasing her, and Veni-

[1] *IGA* 543. [2] Herod. ii. 135; cf. *BCH* xv. 113.
[3] *KAT* 172, *BCH* vi. 19[253].
[4] *CIA* i. 349; Collitz, iii. 3448; *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, ii. 258.
[5] *E.g.*, the pillar base 150 in Acrop. Museum; cf. *CIA* iv. 1. 373[202. 216].

aminoff[1] was told that it was because Raven was angry with mankind and was trying to drive her away in order that the earth might fall into the sea. Though Hlkayak was said to cause thunder, it was more often ascribed, as in the case of the Haida, to a huge bird; the flapping of its wings produced the thunder and the opening of its eyes the lightning; it lived principally on whales, which it carried up into the mountains, and their bones were often found there. Still another story relates that several brothers became wizards in order to rescue their sister from a giant slug which had dragged her up on the side of a steep cliff, and, having learned to fly, afterwards became thunder beings. When a peal of thunder was heard, people shook themselves and jumped into the air, crying, 'Take all my sickness from me.'

2. Supernatural beings.—Except in the general way common to all American tribes, we do not hear much of sky-beings. The 'above-people' of the Haida were said to have been first heard of through the Tlingit, however, and the conception of Tāxēt's house also originated with them, although they did not recognize any special being of that name.

The four brothers have been referred to as the originators of culture and customs, but they by no means supplant Raven, whose personality, functions, and attributes were the same here as on the Queen Charlotte Islands.[2] It is ethnographically important to note that he began his career on the Nass River, and, according to some accounts, returned to its head as his final home.

In connexion with Raven we have the nearest approach to a supreme deity that the Tlingit seem to have possessed, for the heaven-god of the Haida appears to be entirely wanting among them. This personage was called Raven-at-the-head-of-Nass (Nasshakiyehl), and it was from him that Raven obtained the sun, moon, stars, and eulachon to distribute all over the world. Some of the more thoughtful Indians at the present day elevate this being to a position far above that which he occupied aboriginally, but there is no doubt that he always had a real existence. He was called in some stories 'the king of birds,' and Raven was therefore subordinate to him. Up to the present time, however, no account of him has been obtained in the northern Tlingit towns—a fact which may indicate that Tsimshian and Haida influence has been instrumental in creating him.

Although held in considerable regard, killer-whales did not receive a tithe as much attention as among the Haida, nor do they appear to have been associated with points and reefs. Land-otters, however, and the land-otter men (*kushtaka*)—the Tlingit equivalent of the *gagihit*—played a great part in Tlingit mythology and in the rites of shamans, and were viewed with even greater terror. We also find a counterpart of the Haida Property-woman called Tlenahidak, and a counterpart of Master-carpenter. The increased importance of hunting is shown by the conception of Mountain-dweller, who lived far back among the mountains and had a house always abundantly stocked with game. Mountains generally were called upon for a fair wind. Other patron-deities were undoubtedly believed in, but the tendency in this direction does not appear to have been as strong as among the Haida. Another belief peculiar to the Tlingit was in a race of seal-men. When one of these was seen, they poured a bucket of fresh water into the ocean. The grizzly bears and mountain-sheep, which are wanting in the Queen Charlotte Islands, were naturally held in greater regard than there, and, when bears were killed, their skins were hung up and adorned with eagle-down and red paint, being addressed meanwhile with soothing words. If this were not done, it was feared that the bear's relatives would be angry and would kill the hunter. Favourite among Tlingit myths was that of a hunter named Kats, who was captured by a female grizzly bear that killed her bear-husband in order to marry him. His children by her were a famous race of bears known as 'Kats's children.' They destroyed many people and committed great depredations, but were at last killed, and in later times figures of them served as heraldic crests in many of the most prominent families. There were also special tabus regarding mountain-sheep and the handling of their skins.

[1] *Ap.* A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, p. 268 *f.*
[2] See *ERE* vi. 473.

People obtained good luck by grasping at the sun's disk and pretending to put it upon anything that they desired to be lucky. Like the Haida, the Tlingit gave food to any thing or any being that they wished to help them, and called to it, mentioning their wants. Everything was believed to have a spirit connected with it—there was one in every trail that a person followed and in everything that he did.

3. The dead.—The regions of the dead are said to have been three—one below and two above the plane of earth. The first was the country of the killer-whales, and was for those who had been drowned, and the third, or highest, was for those who had died by violence, corresponding to the Tāxēt's house of the Haida. The approach to this place was through a hole reached by a single log, and this was guarded by a person who admitted only such as had perished in the prescribed manner. The trail thither was infested by grizzly bears and other animals. All other persons passed after death to the lower sky-country Sagi-kawu-ani ('souls' home'), which corresponded closely to the Giettlgai of the Haida. The person who was to go thither found himself on a trail, and, following it, came to a fork. One of the two paths had been much trodden upon, while the other was very faint. The former came out on the bank of a river, beyond which were the houses of the departed, but, however loudly the new-comer shouted to the other souls to carry him across, they paid no attention until by chance he yawned, when they exclaimed that a soul had arrived, ferried him over, and gave him food. This river was said to be formed by the tears which women shed over the departed, and therefore it was not good to weep much until one's friend had crossed the river. A story recorded by Krause[1] adds the important fact that only the souls of those who had friends among the spirits got to the other side, the remainder being forced to wander about miserably, and also that the river itself was as green and bitter as gall. The souls were dependent for their food on what their friends put into the fire for them, and all had to do their own work except those for whom slaves had been killed. Cremation, which was well-nigh universal among the Tlingit, was accounted for by the belief that only those whose bodies were burned could go near the fire in the spirit-world, the others being forced to shiver near the doors of the houses. According to Veniaminoff,[2] the path of those whose friends wept much was muddy and watery, but for those whose friends wept less it was smooth and even. A world for wicked persons was sometimes spoken of, called Yehlkiwakawo ('Raven's home'), and would seem to be in the place where Raven lived, but it is possible that the belief was due to missionary influence.

4. Rebirth.—As among the Haida, belief in rebirth was general—so much so that it is said

[1] P. 280. [2] *Ap.* Krause, p. 282.

that a poor person would wish to die in hope of being reborn in a higher position in life. If a pregnant woman dreamed of some dead relative, it was believed that her child would contain his soul, and in consequence the child was given the relative's name. A belief in four rebirths followed by annihilation has also been recorded, but this was perhaps a distorted rendering of the Haida idea of reincarnation.[1]

5. **Shamanism.**—Shamanism reached its highest development among the Tlingit, and nowhere on the coast were shamans of such exalted social rank, so well thought of, or so powerful. When performing, the Tlingit shaman was dressed much like his Haida counterpart, but he also assumed a wooden mask, and, besides being possessed by one principal spirit, he was, if not possessed, at least accompanied, by several subordinate ones. The latter were represented on the masks by small figures round the eyes, jaws, ears, etc., of the principal figure, and were supposed to strengthen the corresponding features of the shaman. Still other spirits had charge of his rattle. With each of the masks went a certain number of songs. One of the most popular spirits was the wood-worm, which enabled the shaman's mind to pierce through anything just as the wood-worm cuts through wood. In addition to his other neck ornaments, the shaman sometimes had a bird's head tied in front. He had an assistant, who took charge of his paraphernalia, beat time for him, and told the other people what to do. This assistant was generally the man who was to succeed to his office. According to Veniaminoff,[2] the successor was a son or sister's son, but for a son to succeed to his father's position seems to have been the exception. The right to certain spirits might be inherited, and in saying that this seldom happened Krause has gone decidedly too far.[3]

Not infrequently the spirit came to a novitiate shaman on the death of his predecessor, but often he was compelled to stay as long as two weeks in the mountains and woods before it showed itself. When it finally made its appearance, it usually sent him the land-otter, the tongue of which he wrenched out, catching the blood on a little bundle of sticks. Krause[4] says that the shaman killed this land-otter by exclaiming 'Oh!' four times very loudly, each time in a different tone of voice. He also notes that none of the sticks in his bundle were retained except those on which the blood had fallen. As the shaman drew out the tongue, he exclaimed, 'May I be skilful in my new calling,' 'May I be able to charm and dance well,' etc. The tongue was afterwards concealed in the bundle, which was then kept in an out-of-the-way place, for, if an uninitiated person were to come upon it, he would lose his reason. The skin he removed carefully and preserved as a visible mark of his calling, but he buried the flesh in the earth. The part played by land-otters in shamanism and in mythology generally inspired the Tlingit with such respect and dread that, before the coming of the Russians, they would not shoot one of them.

If a person could not otherwise succeed in becoming a shaman, he might go at night to the grave of some dead shaman and take from the body a tooth or the end of one of the little fingers, and place it in his mouth. A shaman who did not observe certain regulations carefully might be killed by his own spirits, and, on the other hand, he could throw them into one who did not believe in him and destroy him.

The great exhibitions or performances of the shamans were undertaken only during the new or full moon. Shamans then called upon their spirits to bring good fortune and health to their town and people. From the morning of the day before that appointed until the following morning none of the relatives of the shaman who were to assist him might eat or drink. They cleansed themselves internally by drinking water and introducing a feather into the throat to bring on vomiting. At sunset all entered the appointed house, which had been thoroughly cleansed and provided with new floor-planks. Then the shaman came out from behind a screen and began to run round the fire, his friends singing all the time, until the spirit came to him.

Veniaminoff[1] divides the spirits that spoke through shamans into spirits from above, land-spirits, and water-spirits. The first were the souls from the above-country already referred to. The land-spirits appeared in the form of land-animals, but were said to be the spirits of those who had died a natural death and who had their dwellings in the distant north. The water-spirits appeared in the forms of sea-animals, and were in fact the spirits of those animals. According to Krause,[2] every Tlingit, whether shaman or not, had his own protecting spirit, but this belief does not seem to have assumed the importance which it bears among the inland Indians.

6. **Witchcraft.**—As shamanism had reached its highest development with the Tlingit, so also had witchcraft, which might almost be described as a diseased shamanism. A wizard accomplished his object by obtaining some portion of the person or clothing of the victim and laying it by an unburned body, among the ashes of a burned body, or on the body of a dog. When a person was suspected of being a wizard, his hands were bound behind his back and he was imprisoned in an empty hut without food and with nothing to drink but sea-water. There he was kept until he confessed, lost his reason, or died, unless his friends were powerful enough to liberate him. The person who confessed to having bewitched any one was forced to wade out into the sea with the medicine or compound which had caused the illness and to scatter it upon the water, accompanying his actions with certain formulæ. Instead of being imprisoned, a suspected wizard was sometimes bound hand and foot and exposed on the beach for the rising tide to cover him. Sometimes he was dealt with in a still more summary manner. Among other accomplishments, wizards and witches were universally believed to possess the power of flight.

7. **Charms, etc.**—The principal families and many in humbler circumstances kept charms to bring wealth and good fortune. They believed in all sorts of signs, which they extracted from, or rather read into, natural phenomena, and they thought that natural phenomena would be affected by the breaking of this or that tabu. After a person had died, his body was carried through a temporary hole in the side of the house, and a dog, dead or alive, was thrown out after it, either that the spirits might follow it out of the house or that the dead man might be protected in his journey to the spirit world.

LITERATURE.—The monumental work of A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, Jena, 1885, is the authority on the subject. Most of the important mythological material contained in I. Veniaminoff and other early writers has been gathered into it. See also J. R. Swanton, 'Social Condition, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationship of the Tlingit Indians,' in *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 391ff., and 'Tlingit Myths and Texts,' *Bull. 39 BE* [1909]; F. Boas, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 801ff. JOHN R. SWANTON.

TOAD.—See ANIMALS.

[1] See art. HAIDA, § 17. [2] *Ap.* Krause, p. 284.
[3] P. 286. [4] P. 285.

[1] *Ap.* Krause, p. 291. [2] P. 292.

TODAS.—The Todas are a small community, about 700 in number, living on the undulating plateau, about 7000 ft. above sea-level, of the Nilgiri hills in Southern India. They are a purely pastoral people who eschew all other occupations. They are provided with the products of agriculture by the Badagas, a Canarese tribe who also live on the plateau, while the Kotas, allied to the jungle peoples of Southern India, furnish their metal-work and pottery. Except for these commercial relations, the Todas form a wholly separate community and have few other relations with the Badagas or Kotas. With the Kurumbas, a jungle tribe living on the slopes of the Nilgiris, the Todas have even less frequent relations, and these arise chiefly out of the Toda belief that the Kurumbas are sorcerers.

1. **Social organization.**—The people are divided into two sections called the Tartharol and the Teivaliol, each of which is strictly endogamous, though irregular unions are allowed between men and women of the two. Each section is divided into a number of exogamous clans. Each clan owns a number of villages, or *mad* (commonly called *mand*), and takes its name from the *etudmad*, or chief of these villages. The villages are small settlements, sometimes consisting of only one or two houses with a dairy and buffalo-pen. They are scattered over the hills, but most of the villages of a clan are near one another. Each clan is divided into two divisions called *kudr*, 'horn,' which should properly be, and usually are, only two in number. These divisions are of importance only in ceremonial. Another division of the clan is the *polm*, by which the sharing of communal expenses, such as those incurred in the repair or rebuilding of the chief dairies of the clan, is regulated. The Todas recognize the existence of the family, or *kudupel*, as a social unit, and this often corresponds with the *polm*. One clan, the Melgarsol, has an exceptional position in that, though belonging to the Tartharol, it shares many duties and privileges with the Teivaliol.

Descent is always patrilineal. A man belongs to the clan of his father. The effect of fatherhood is not determined by marriage, however, but by a ceremony of giving a bow and arrow which takes place at the seventh month of pregnancy. This ceremony is not performed at every pregnancy, but a person is regarded as the child of the man who was the last to perform this ceremony with his or her mother.

The Todas practise polyandry, nearly always of the fraternal type.[1] Formerly this practice was possible in a pure form owing to the existence of female infanticide. Though girls are probably sometimes killed at birth, the practice is now less frequent. There is still a considerable excess of men, but polyandry is often combined with polygyny, producing a state which may be regarded as a variety of group marriage.[2] In addition to orthodox marriage there is a regular system of unions in which a woman has connubial relations with one or more men called *mokhthodvaiol*. This kind of union may take place between a Tarthar man and a Teivali woman or *vice versa*, thus differing from marriage proper, which is confined to members of one section. The orthodox marriage is between cross-cousins, and this institution is reflected in the nomenclature of relationship which in several respects resembles that of the Tamils. The cross-cousin is classified with the spouse, the mother's brother with the father-in-law, and the father's sister with the mother-in-law. Betrothal in infancy is customary, and this practice is probably responsible for a custom of transferring wives from one man to another which has now become very frequent. The custom seems to have been originally one by means of which a widower could obtain a wife in a community where, through the practice of infant betrothal, every woman is already bespoken, but it has now become a process set in action whenever one man desires the wife of another.

The people are governed by a council of five called the *naim*, one of the members of which should properly be a Badaga. This council is chiefly engaged in settling disputes arising out of the transference of wives. It is also the business of the *naim* to arrange when ceremonies shall be performed, especially those of the more important dairies. There is a headman called *monegar*, but he is chiefly concerned with the payment of the assessment to the Government, and the institution is almost certainly recent. On the other hand, the headship of the clan is certainly an old institution. Its functions are not especially important, and this also holds good of the headship of the *kudr* and *polm*.

2. **Religion.**—The Todas believe in certain superior beings who may be regarded as gods, and speak of them as 1600 or 1800 in number, but these are the customary Toda expressions for an indefinitely large number. The two most important are Ön and Teikirzi. Ön is a male deity who presides over Amnodr, the world of the dead. He is believed to have created the Todas and their buffaloes and to have been himself a dairyman. More important in the minds of the people is Teikirzi, a female deity, who is believed to have lived on the Nilgiris and ruled the people. Most of the Toda social and ceremonial laws are ascribed to her ordinance. These two deities are not especially connected with hills, but nearly all the others seem to be hill-deities, each being associated with a special hill-top. Two are river-gods, associated with the two chief rivers of the district.

The ritual of the Toda religion is concerned almost exclusively with the buffaloes and the treatment of their milk. The dairies are the temples; the dairymen are the priests; and various incidents in the lives of the buffaloes, such as their movements from one grazing ground to another, the first milking, and the giving of salt, have become the occasion of ceremonial which has a religious character. This ritual stands in a definite relation to the gods, for these beings are mentioned in the formulas of the dairy ritual, the general character of which indicates that they must be regarded as prayers. The names used for the deities in these prayers differ from those used in ordinary speech, and form part of a series of expressions called *kwarzam*, in which special names of deities, buffaloes, dairy utensils, and other objects are uttered, preceded by the word *idith*, said to mean 'for the sake of.' The dairies and the buffalo-herds form a somewhat complicated organization, especially among the Tartharol. Every village has a number of buffaloes devoid of any element of sanctity, and their milk is churned in a dairy, also devoid of sanctity, with no special ritual. Most of the buffaloes, however, belong to herds with special names with varying degrees of sanctity, and in correspondence with these there are great differences in the elaborateness of the ritual with which the milk is treated and in the ceremonial regulations of the lives of the dairy-priests. This complicated system is confined to the buffaloes of the Tartharol, the Teivaliol having only one variety of sacred buffalo, but the most sacred kinds of dairy of the Tartharol must be tended either by Teivali men or by men of the Melgars clan, which occupies an intermediate position between the two main sections.

[1] *ERE* viii. 427. [2] *Ib.*

The lowest grade of Tarthar dairy is called *tarvali*. Its ritual is comparatively simple and is confined to the evening milking and churning. When the dairyman enters the dairy, he bows down and touches the threshold with his forehead, touches certain dairy vessels ceremonially, lights the lamp, and utters a prayer before beginning to churn. After churning he holds the churning-stick to his forehead, uttering the sacred syllable 'Oṁ.' He also repeats the prayer of the dairy after milking.

The dairy next in order of sanctity differs in the possession of a bell (*mani*). The dairyman is not allowed to put his food on the ground; both curd and milk are put on the bell with the utterance of the sacred syllable; and the chief milk-vessel is beaten three times with the bark of the sacred *tudr* tree (*Melioma pungens* and *Wightii*), the same syllable being uttered. The dairymen of this grade are allowed to sleep in the ordinary hut only on certain days of the week. Ordinary people are not allowed to drink the milk of buffaloes tended at this dairy.

Certain villages have dairies with special features of ritual, but the next kind of dairy in order of sanctity which occurs in every Tarthar clan, except the Melgarsol, is the *wursuli*, the dairyman of which must be taken either from the Teivaliol or from the Melgars clan. The restrictions on his conduct are more numerous and the ritual of milking and churning is more complex, special features being that he wears his cloak in a particular way, and that the proceedings of both morning and evening have an equally ceremonial character. In many dairies of this rank there are two rooms, the inner of which contains the more sacred dairy vessels. The dairyman, or *wursol*, is allowed to sleep in the village and have intercourse with women only on two nights of the week.

All these dairies are situated at the villages where the people live, though they may be at some distance from the dwelling-houses. The highest kind of dairy, called the *ti*, on the other hand, is situated far from the villages. Each herd has several dairies, all of which are remote from the dwelling-places of the people. The dairyman, called *palol*, must be of the Teivaliol, and his attendant, the *kaltmokh*, must come either from the Teivaliol or from the Melgars clan. The *palol* is not allowed to visit a village or have intercourse with any persons other than dairymen of his own rank, his *kaltmokh*, and men of the Melgars clan who are privileged to visit the *ti* dairy and drink butter-milk. Intercourse with women is entirely forbidden except on one occasion after the *palol* has held office for eighteen years. The ritual of the *ti* is far more complex than that of any village dairy. In this dairy the vessels are more numerous and have special names different from those of the less sacred forms of dairy. The more sacred vessels, viz. those which come directly into contact with the milk of the buffaloes, are always kept in an inner room, together with the bell or bells, and are not allowed to come into contact with the vessels which, being used to contain the products of the churning, are regarded as less sacred. The details of milking and churning are more elaborate and more strictly regulated than in the village dairies, and the prayers are longer and more frequently repeated.

The proceedings when the buffaloes move from one grazing ground to another have a definitely ceremonial character. This is especially elaborate in the case of the *ti* dairies. The more sacred vessels are carried by the *palol*, while the others are taken by the *kaltmokh*, assisted by a man of Melgars, who leads the way. There are elaborate ceremonies of purification of the dairy which is about to be occupied, and a special prayer for the welfare of the buffaloes is offered before going to rest. On the following day there is a ceremony in which the *kaltmokh* takes a leading part. His head and body are rubbed with a mixture of milk and clarified butter, and he is given a ball of a special kind of food larger than he can possibly eat, the remainder of which he has to leave on the spot where the ceremony has taken place. An invocation is uttered that evils of many kinds may afflict the boy, and this is followed by another invocation that these evils may be averted. At some dairies milk and butter are rubbed on certain stones.

Before entering upon office every dairyman undergoes certain ceremonies which may be regarded as a kind of ordination. These increase in complexity with the increasing sanctity of the dairy, but the chief feature common to all is a process of purification by drinking and washing with the water of a stream which is used only for ceremonial purposes. The ceremony is named either after this process or after the act of lighting a lamp, this being the first duty of the newly ordained dairyman. An important part of the ceremony is the use of certain leaves to rub the body and as drinking vessels. The ordinary dairyman uses the leaves of a bramble for this purpose, while the *wursol* and *palol* use the leaves and bark of the sacred *tudr* tree. Another feature is the use of the special kind of cloth which is worn by the *palol*. A fragment only is used by the lower grades, while the *wursol* and *palol* assume a complete garment of this material. The village dairyman of the lower grades touches the various vessels of the dairy, beginning with the less sacred, as the final stage of his ordination, while the *wursol* and the dairymen of certain other villages touch a buried vessel, called *mu*, specially disinterred for the occasion. The ordination of the *palol* is preceded by a qualifying ceremony in which after certain purifying rites the candidate in a state of nudity receives food from an old woman. Though the woman must be past the age of child-bearing, the original object of the rite is probably to test whether the candidates are likely to submit successfully to the abstinence which is incumbent upon the holder of the office of *palol*. In the ordination ceremony proper of the *ti* dairy the rites of purification last for a whole week, and in the later stages of the ceremonial the candidate drinks water from the sacred *tudr* leaves three, seven, and nine times seven times. The *palol* touches a bar of the opening into the pen in which the sacred buffaloes are enclosed at night as the final act with which he enters into office.

An important ceremony of another kind is named after the buttermilk, called *pep*, which is put into the milking-vessel before milking is commenced. A vessel called *mu* is kept buried in the buffalo-pen of the chief village of each clan, and, if this has been tampered with, or if a dairy has been defiled or the bell of the dairy has been taken to a funeral, a new vessel has to be procured and consecrated, the ceremony, however, being called the consecration of the buttermilk. The chief feature of the ceremony is the sanctification of the new vessel with the earth of a buffalo-pen taken from the footprints of one of the buffaloes.

Another ceremony is performed about the fifteenth day after the birth of a calf to one of the sacred buffaloes, and still another when salt is given to the buffaloes. There seems to be little doubt that the great ritual development of the business of the dairy is connected with a belief in the sanctity of the milk of the sacred buffaloes. At the present time the buffaloes themselves are not regarded with any special veneration, and it would seem as if this had been transferred to certain cattle-bells called *mani*, so old that their tongues have been lost, and to the vessels which come directly into contact with the milk of the buffaloes, while another specially sacred object is the vessel, called *mu*, which is buried in the buffalo-pen of the chief village of each clan (see above).

3. Sacrifice and offerings.—An important ceremony is one in which a male buffalo-calf is killed and its flesh eaten, this being the only occasion on which a Toda should eat the flesh of a buffalo. At the *ti* dairy the ceremony, which may be regarded as sacrificial, takes place three times a year; at the other dairies it should probably be annual, but now takes place more frequently. After a prayer in which the calf is asked to appear to certain deities, and after it has been stroked with leaves of *tudr*, the animal is killed by being struck with a log of the *tudr* tree, the bark and leaves of which are prominent in the dairy ritual. The right fore-limb is of especial importance, being placed near the middle of the fire at which the flesh is roasted and eaten together with the pelvis, feet, and head by the dairyman.

There is an annual ceremony in which a fire is lighted by the *palol* at the foot of certain hills, the summits of which are believed to be occupied by gods. Clauses are added to the ordinary prayer asking that fruit may ripen and honey abound.

The ceremonies which have been described are performed regularly, and their occasions arise chiefly out of the necessary events of the pastoral life, the last described standing alone in its reference to vegetation and means of subsistence other than those provided by the buffaloes. The cere-

monies now to be described are more occasional and depend on the commission of some act which has offended the gods and thus brought illness or some other misfortune upon the offender. In these cases the central feature of the ceremony is an offering to the gods of either a buffalo or a buffalo-calf, a piece of the cloth worn by the more sacred dairymen, or a ring.

The simplest kind of offering, often made when some mistake has occurred inadvertently in a ceremony, is to undertake not to kill or part with a buffalo, but allow it to die a natural death. In this case there is little ceremony, the donor simply stating that he is giving the buffalo to the gods while he salutes an elder. A more ceremonial offering of a buffalo-calf is made if a misfortune is ascribed to some serious offence against the dairy, such as stealing milk or its products, quarrelling in the dairy, or going to it in an impure state. In this case the calf is given by the offender to the people of the other *kudr* of his clan. All members of the *kudr* of the offender have to leave the village for a month, at the end of which, after purification with fasting, the calf is driven across certain ceremonial stones to be received by members of the other *kudr*. For minor offences a piece of cloth or a ring is offered with similar rites, the offering passing in every case from the *kudr* of the offender to the people of the other *kudr* of the clan. In all cases prayers are offered, which include in some cases supplications for the health of the people and their buffaloes.

4. Divination.—The offerings just described are made as the result of the finding of diviners called *teuol*, or god-men. The decisions are given when the *teuol* are in a state of frenzy and in a language which is said to be Malayalam. It is believed that they are the utterances of some of the gods. The diviners are often consulted at funerals, usually to discover the cause of death or illness either of men or of buffaloes, or the cause of any harm which has happened to a dairy or its contents. In the case of illness they usually find either that the patient has committed some offence against the dairy or that he is the victim of the sorcery of the Kurumbas.

5. Birth and childhood ceremonies.—Two ceremonies are performed during pregnancy; in the first the wrists of the woman are burnt while she is undergoing seclusion, while the second ceremony is that already mentioned in which the presentation of a bow and arrow determines the fatherhood of the child. Various ceremonies occur at the end of a period of seclusion which follows childbirth. Until a child is three months old no one but the mother is allowed to see its face, and at that age a ceremony is performed in which the face is uncovered and the child is allowed to look at the sun. Ceremonies are also performed when the name is given, when the ears are pierced, and when a lock of hair is cut, the last ceremony only taking place on the day after the second funeral (see below) of a Tarthar man.

6. Death.—The funeral ceremonies are very elaborate and take place on two different occasions often separated by many months. At the first ceremony the body is cremated on a pyre, the orthodox position being face downwards. Several rites are performed before cremation, among them being one in which a cloth is given by a near relative of the deceased to men who have married into the family, the cloth being then placed on the corpse by the wives of these men. In the case of a man the cremation is preceded by a ceremony in which earth is thrown three times into a buffalo-pen by the Teivali dairyman at a Tarthar funeral and by the relatives if the dead man is one of the Teivaliol. In most Tarthar clans the body is placed before cremation in a special three-roomed dairy. Buffaloes are killed, varying in number in different clans. In each case the right hand of the dead man is made to clasp one of the horns, and lamentations are uttered in which each person addresses the dead buffalo by the same term of relationship as he would use to the deceased. Immediately before the body is burned, it is swung three times over the fire upon a representation of a bier. When the body is consumed, a piece of the skull is recovered from the ashes and kept, wrapped with some of the hair in a cloak, for the second funeral ceremony. In the interval these relics are kept in a special village, where they are saluted by any Todas who visit the place. Formerly the body was smoke-dried, after it had been eviscerated, if the cremation ceremony was delayed.

At the second funeral ceremony the earth-throwing rite is repeated. At a Tarthar funeral a ceremony is performed in which the relics are sprinkled with the blood of a buffalo mixed with the bark of the *tudr* tree. This is done by a Teivali man, wearing the cloak in which the remains have been wrapped, after which he touches the remains with a bow and arrow. Buffaloes are killed, as at the first ceremony, and the men dance with a tall pole obtained from Malabar. During the following night the final ceremony takes place, in which the relics together with a number of other objects are burned within a stone-circle. The ashes are interred at an opening in the circle, and the grave is covered with a stone. A bell is then rung and a new pot broken on the stone, after which all go away without turning back to look at the resting-place of the ashes.

The dead are believed to go to a place called Amnodr in the west and below the earth. The god On presides over this world of the dead, where the people live much the same kind of life as on earth. The dead travel to Amnodr by a definite route, which differs in some respects for Tartharol and Teivaliol. In each case the dead perform acts on the way by which they lose their love of the earth and regain the vigour of health. They have also to cross a bridge of thread, running the risk of falling into a river full of leeches. Those Todas who have offended against the dairy or have been selfish and jealous are thus delayed in their journey to Amnodr. One of the Tarthar clans, that of Taradr, has an Amnodr, distinct from the rest, at Perithi in the Wainad, where there are still some Toda settlements.

7. Sacred days and numbers.—Many Toda ceremonies must be performed on definite days of the week, and this is probably connected with an institution in which each clan has one or more days on which a large number of activities are forbidden. Thus, on the *madnol*, or village day, neither dairymen nor women are allowed to leave the village, and nothing may be sold or taken away. There are various restrictions on conduct, and funeral and other ceremonies may not be held. Among the Tartharol there are similar restrictions on days sacred to each kind of dairy, so that in a village which has dairies of several different kinds few days of the week are left for the performance of the ordinary activities of life.

Sacred numbers are very prominent in the ritual, three and seven being the most important. Many ritual acts are performed three times, a threefold rite being usually associated in the dairy ceremonial with the utterance of the sacred syllable 'Oñ.' This number is also prominent in the funeral rites, especially in connexion with the ceremonial throwing of earth and the swinging of the body over the pyre before it is burned. The sevenfold performance of ceremonial acts only occurs in the

dairy ritual and is especially prominent in the ordination ceremonies. Several of the most ancient lamps of the dairy are said to have had seven cavities or seven wicks.

8. Sorcery.—Two kinds of sorcery are practised, in one of which an incantation is uttered over some hair, preferably that of the person it is designed to injure. This is then hidden in the thatch of the proposed victim's hut. In the other form the sorcerer uses a bone or lime, which is then buried near the village of the proposed victim. In each case the incantation resembles the ordinary form of prayer, but with less explicit reference to the gods. It consists mainly of an enumeration of the misfortunes which it is hoped may fall upon the victim. The trouble is removed or averted by a corresponding formula as the result of negotiations with the sorcerer to whom the misfortune has been ascribed by one of the diviners.

There are many points of similarity between the ceremonial of the Todas and that of the Hindus, the sanctity of the milk-providing animal being an important feature common to both. There is reason to believe that the two main sections of the Todas differ in origin, and it is probable that the Teivaliol represent the earlier settlers and that they mixed with an indigenous people who practised interment of the dead preceded by some kind of mummification. The Tartharol seem to be later comers, who either brought the practice of cremation or accentuated its importance. The complexity of the dairy ritual is probably due to their influence, and they seem to have adopted the practice, so frequent in India, of employing the earlier settlers as their priests.

A point of especial interest is the relation of the Todas to the stone-circles and other megalithic structures on the Nilgiri hills. The people at present take little interest in these monuments, and this is intelligible if they were erected by the older stratum of the population represented by the Teivaliol, whose beliefs have been put into the background by the greater influence of the purely pastoral Tartharol. Stones of various kinds enter into the ritual of the dairy. The burial of the ashes at the entrance to a stone-circle at the end of the second funeral and the ritual throwing of earth into the buffalo-pen at both funeral rites suggest that the body was once interred in a buffalo-pen, and this is perhaps confirmed by the burial of the dairy-vessel called *mu* in a pen and by the sanctification of this vessel with earth taken from this spot. These features of ritual point to the circular pens as part of the culture of the older people, and in this connexion it is noteworthy that the most ancient dairies are circular and afford characteristic examples of the round house with conical roof. It may also be noted that these dairies are surrounded by stone walls, in one case by two such walls.

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TOHUNGANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TOKEN.—In its broadest sense a token is any portable object serving as a sign or proof of authenticity or credit, by which the issuer guarantees that the claim indicated by the token will be satisfied on its presentation in the proper quarter. In numismatics it signifies a coin-like piece of metal or other material representing money of much more than its intrinsic value, for which money the issuer undertakes to redeem the token when presented; it is also loosely applied to tickets admitting to certain privileges, such as the holy communion, or serving instead of letters of recommendation or other forms of credential.

1. Antiquity. — Many vague statements have been made as to the use of tokens or *tesseræ* (*symbola*, *synthemata*) for identifying persons who had been initiated into mysteries, but nothing of the kind has been identified. *Tesseræ* were largely used in Roman times for giving admission to shows or entitling to share in the distribution of grain (*tesseræ frumentariæ*), and some of these bear Christian symbols (one is extant in ivory bearing an anchor, two fishes and AΩ). No Christian *tesseræ hospitalitatis* (memorials of hospitality for which a return might be claimed when they were presented) have been identified as extant. *Tesseræ* were also used as credentials, serving instead of *litteræ commendatitiæ* or *commendatoriæ*.[1] Such *tesseræ* would have been used when persons were sent to confessors in prison to minister to them. *Tesseræ* may also have been used to identify the faithful when they desired admission to religious gatherings. Such use is *a priori* possible and probable, but it is important to remember that nothing of the kind, so far as is known, has survived from antiquity bearing a specially Christian character. Even among pagan *tesseræ*, those relating to religious bodies are rare. A certain number are extant bearing the names of the *magistri* and other dignitaries of the *sodalitates* who made distributions at festivals, such as the *magistri Minervales*; there are also *tesseræ* inscribed 'Sacr(a) Lani(vina) iuven(alia),' which were used at the festival of the college of Iuvenes at Lanuvium.

As regards Byzantine times, a certain number of *tesseræ* of churches, convents, confraternities, and other pious institutions have been described; they may have served, as in the West, for the distribution of alms and also for the control of various payments due to the personnel of churches and religious bodies. Such are, *e.g.*, an anonymous bronze *tessera* with the busts of the Virgin and St. Demetrius, and another with God the Father (inscr. ἅγιος ἅγιος ἅγιος) and a bunch of grapes on the reverse, which, it has been suggested, may have been used for the remuneration of cantors. The pieces used for charitable distributions are inscribed (in Greek) with such texts as 'He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord,' 'Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.'

2. Méreaux of the Roman Catholic Church.—The token, or *jeton de présence*, issued to the clergy in collegiate churches as a record of their presence at mass, at the canonical hours, and at other offices, in order that they might claim the statutory payment for their services, was most commonly known as a *méreau*. The Latin word *merellus* (*merallus*, *maralus*, etc.) is of uncertain derivation. Other names met with are: *plomb* (*plonc*, *plommet*, *plumbus*, etc.), even when made of other metal than lead (*plommez de cuyvre* at Aire in 1527), *enseigne*, *signum*, *marque*, *manuel*, *palot* (*pallotus*), *moneta capituli*, *simbolum*, etc. Many of these terms, signifying merely distribution-token, on the presentation of which a share in funds or privileges could be claimed, were not confined to the tokens of religious bodies, but extended to all kinds of corporations. It is uncertain when *méreaux capitulaires* were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a *distributio nummorum matutinalium* does not necessarily refer to such *méreaux* as distinct from ordinary coins, and the *méreaux* which are mentioned in charters of 1167 and 1173 are passes, or *tesseræ* of identification,

[1] Cf. the phrase of Tertullian, *de Præscript.* xx.: 'dum est illis [*i.e.* ecclesiis] communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis.'

without any special connexion with religion. The earliest undoubted documentary reference to their use in churches seems to date from 1375, when Charles V. granted to the canons of the collegiate church of Langeac (Haute Loire) the right of having struck at the Royal Mint of St. Pourçain *merelli* for distribution to clerks and canons present at offices; they were to be of copper, lead, or tin, and to be carefully distinguished by their types, which are specified, from coin of the realm. None of these seems to have been identified. Next in date comes a reference in 1401. In a clause of his will Charles VI. ruled that the distributor of the Sainte Chapelle 'ne baille les méreaux jusqu'à la fin des heures de Notre Dame.' In a letter of 18th July 1401 he announces his intention of carrying out during his lifetime the new system outlined in his will; no one of the clergy who misbehaved or absented himself was to receive *méreaux*. A 15th cent. statute ordered that on every Saturday all the canons, chaplains, and clerks of the Sainte Chapelle should attend in the pay-room and bring their *méreaux* to show what each had earned. But there are extant church-*méreaux* which by their style must be earlier than the documents referred to, and the substitution of these for the custom of paying in actual money at the time, or for pricking in, or for tallies, may date from early in the 13th century. In 1557 the canons of Mâcon claimed that they had had for 'more than three or four centuries' the right of distribution of leaden *jetons* for the payment of choristers and other priests serving in the church; what foundation their claim possessed is not known. Nearly all the examples known come from France or the Low Countries, where *méreaux* were also used by abbeys, convents, hospitals, infirmaries, parish churches, and confraternities. The popular English term 'abbey token' for what are really reckoning-counters must not be taken to prove the existence of the custom in England; there is no evidence for such use in this country.[1]

Such tokens were cashed from time to time by the receivers of the various funds on which they were issued; sometimes they could be exchanged by the cellarer for victuals; and they often had a modified circulation. As long as this did not extend outside, so as to encroach on the currency of the realm, no objection was raised to any body issuing such *méreaux*. But, when it was the custom, as it was at Saint-Amé (Douai) or at Arras (where *méreaux* were used inscribed 'merellus mandati pauperum'), for the clergy to give away such tokens, entitling to portions of victuals, as alms to the poor, it is easy to see how the circulation might extend outside. In 1577 the Cour des Monnaies had to forbid the use of *méreaux* issued by the chapter of Autun except for distributions to the clergy; they had got into circulation in the town. In the case of certain pieces, especially of places in the Low Countries, it is matter of dispute whether they are really church-*méreaux* or base coins, of which the circulation was enforced by local authorities; such are the lead *deniers* of the Abbesses of Maubeuge, which circulated throughout Hainault until they were forbidden in 1541, the copper *deniers* of Notre Dame de Termonde, the 'yellow-money' of the chapter of Notre Dame de Cambrai. The rare *méreaux* of Carthusian foundations, such as the Certosa at Pavia or St. Mary Magdalen at Louvain, were used not for the remuneration of the clergy, but for alms-giving. A similar subsidiary use of *méreaux* is illustrated by the custom at Lembeke (near Eecloo, E. Flanders), where *méreaux* were used for the distribution of alms under the foundation of G. Kerremans (1717); tokens of the value of two *patards* were given to each of the poor who attended at catechism in preparation for communion, and of one *patard* to children who were zealous in preparation for their first communion.

The metal of which church-*méreaux* are made is usually lead, copper, or brass; the ruder specimens in the baser metal may be cast in moulds, but a large proportion are struck from engraved dies. The slate moulds used for casting the *méreaux* of the parish church of St. Julien at Ath, mentioned in letters-patent of 1478, are still in existence. Non-metallic substances such as leather or paper could also be used, but specimens in such material, if they survive, are very rare; a find made in demolishing a wall of the cathedral of Limoges seems to indicate that *méreaux* of leather were used there.

A few typical inscriptions and types found on *méreaux* may be mentioned. The St. Omer pieces are inscribed 'Mo(neta) Ecc(lesiae) Santi Audomari,' with the arms of the chapter, and 'Presentibus dabitur'; those of St. Martin des Champs read 'Distributio pro beneficiatis.' The series of the Ste. Chapelle dating from after 1448 reads 'Capella Reg(u)alis Palacii Parisiensis.' An ordinance of that year shows that those used for prebendaries and cantor bore a long cross with the crown of thorns on it, those for chaplains and clerks had a royal crown; other kinds then in use were ordered to be withdrawn: such were pieces marked with a cross, lance-head, and nail, representing relics in the chapel. Some series bear the names of the various offices for which they were used, as *matines, prime, tierse, missa, sexte, nonne, vespres, comp(lies)*. Dates do not appear before the 16th century. The value in money which the pieces represent is frequently expressed as 'VI . D . T' ('six deniers tournois'). A series mentioned in the archives of St. Pierre d'Aire (Artois), and described by Rouyer,[1] may be given as typical.

There were (*a*) *plombs des matines* or *deniers Marchant*, worth one *denier Parisis*, distributed daily after matins, and paid from the fund known as *du Marchant*; these occur from 1484 to 1637; (*b*) *plombs de la Croix* or *de la procession du vendredi* and the *plombs Lambert* or *du trésorier*; these represent particular foundations, and were of different values, given to canons, cantor, or other clergy; they are not mentioned after the 17th cent.; (*c*) *plombs obituaires*, i.e. *monetæ anniversariorum*, given to those who assisted at anniversary obituary services; (*d*) *plombs des heures canoniales*, instituted 20th June 1571, distributed to each canon present at the canonical hours; (*e*) *plombs des revêtus*, distributed in the 17th and 18th centuries at the masses said at the high altar to the canons who assisted the celebrant as deacons or sub-deacons; (*f*) *plombs des jours capitulaires*, for ordinary meetings of chapter, from 1571 onwards; (*g*) *plombs des chapitres spirituels*, from 1758, for chapters dealing specially with matters of cult; (*h*) *plombs des vicaires*, poor priests or clerks employed by canons to take their more arduous duties, as early as 1465; (*i*) *plombs de la confrérie de Notre Dame Panetière*, or *plombs du Salve*, from about 1520 down to 1790, for offices of the confraternity.

Some specimens of the *moneta anniversariorum* have survived; one belonging to St. Pierre d'Aire has on the obverse a death's head, on the reverse a bone and a key in saltire between three stars. Another inscribed 'Moneta anniversariorum' has a crowned *A* between two lilies; on the other side 'Requiescant in pace,' the mark of value 'XII.,' and three lilies. Yet another is inscribed 'Obit solenel' and dated 1585; and there is a pair of *méreaux* inscribed 'Orate Deum pro vivis' and 'Orate Deum pro defuntis' respectively.

A subsidiary use of tokens, more or less corresponding to the use as communion passes,[2] has at times prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church. There is a tradition that Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's time made use of such tokens in order to distinguish those who conformed from those who did not. Communion certificates in the shape of tokens or tickets were given to those going to communion at St. Andrew's, Glasgow, from 1840

[1] See, however, § 6 below.

[1] *Rev. num. fr.* xiv. [1849] 363 ff.

[2] Described in § 3 below.

to 1850. At certain churches in Rome communicants at Easter receive them after they have been present.

3. Tokens of the Reformed Church. — The earliest mention of *méreaux* (*marreaux*, *marrons*, *marcqs*) in the Reformed Church abroad is in the registers of the Geneva Council; on 30th Jan. 1560 Calvin advised their introduction, but there is no evidence that they were actually used at Geneva before 1605. On the other hand, the French Protestants immediately adopted Calvin's suggestion, and there are tokens of the Walloon Church at Amsterdam as early as 1586. These tokens (which in the first Helvetic Confession are called *tesserœ*) were used for quite a different purpose from that of the *méreaux* of the Roman Catholic Church; they were certificates, issued to all persons considered after examination to be satisfactory in regard to religious knowledge and moral character, admitting them to partake of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In 1584, *e.g.*, Mme. Duplessis-Mornay and all her household were refused tokens for communion at Montauban because she dressed her hair in the court fashion instead of wearing the Huguenot hood. Extant specimens of these French Reformed Church tokens seem to be not earlier than the 17th cent.; they bear appropriate types, such as a chalice, or a shepherd feeding his flock, and the initials of the names of the churches, and sometimes dates; such inscriptions as 'Ne crains rien, petit troupeau' also occur. Copper *méreaux* with an angel-shepherd, and the inscription 'In unum conducam reliquum Israel, Mich. 2,' or 'Christ est le pain de vie,' of good 17th cent. workmanship, were probably made for Protestants in Paris. Another similar piece reads 'Christ habite en nos cœurs par foy,' and bears a flaming heart transfixed by two arrows.

The first French church to employ this kind of *méreaux* was at Nîmes (before 1562). Except at Sedan and Troyes (where it was introduced in 1564), none of the Reformed churches of the East is known to have used it. It was especially popular in Poitou, no fewer than 45 churches in that district being represented. Such pieces are commonest from 1740 to 1840, and are often very rude, being the handiwork of the elders themselves. The material is usually lead, tin, or a mixture, and they are most commonly cast (five moulds are extant), though some are struck. The French Reformed church at Erlangen in Bavaria began to use *méreaux* in 1689, and the same mould has remained in use down to present times.

In England the books of St. Saviour's Church, Southwark, show that communion tokens were used as early as 1559. It was the custom at Southwark to collect Church dues by 'selling the communion'; thus, in 1596, 2000 tokens were sold at 2½d. each; and a similar practice prevailed at St. Peter Mancroft, Norwich. At Durham and elsewhere in the 17th cent. it was the custom to take Easter reckonings of such people as partook of the holy communion, and account with them and deliver and receive tokens. The names of communicants were written down, and they received tokens which at the time of the administration of the sacrament were demanded again, so that it might be known who had paid their Easter offerings and who had failed to do so. The use of tokens in Presbyterian churches in England was derived from Scotland towards the end of the 17th cent., but the earliest actually bearing a date is of 1724 (Etal). Tokens are known of the Established Church of Scotland, the Independent Presbyterian party, the Reformed Presbyterian Church, or Cameronians, the English Presbyterian Church, the Associate Secession Congregation, the Relief Church, the General Associate Congregation, the United Associate Congregation, the United Presbyterian Church, and the Free Church of Scotland. Printed cards have now, as in Scotland, generally ousted metallic tokens.

But it was in Scotland that the sacramental token was most generally used. By the law of the Church of Scotland, no one was permitted to come to the Lord's Supper unless he or she had been provided with a communion token, which was issued after examination had shown the would-be communicant to be of good character and properly instructed. The tokens were sometimes kept as certificates of character, serving the same purpose as ancient *tesserœ*. The Scottish tokens were at first probably written or stamped cards; such 'tickets' were in use as early as 2nd May 1560 at St. Andrews, and continued often to be used after metal tokens were introduced; the word 'ticket' is frequently used indifferently of either. Written tickets were used as late as 1656. The date of the introduction of metal tokens has not been determined. The use of them has continued in both the Presbyterian Churches and in the Scottish Episcopal Church down to the present day, although in the larger towns they have been almost entirely superseded by printed cards. Recently established denominations, such as the United Free Church and the Free Presbyterian Church, appear to use only the latter. The metallic tokens are most often made of lead, tin, or a mixture, but brass, iron, copper, and even leather (the last only at the Secession congregation at Ceres, 1743) have been employed; the Crown Court Chapel, London, and the Presbyterian Church at Charleston used silver tokens, and for the first Reformed Presbyterian Church of New York they were made of ivory. They are generally cast in stone moulds, but are sometimes struck from dies. The oldest extant dated piece is of 1648, but a dated one of 1588 is recorded (Glasgow). At first they were distinguished merely by the initials of the parish (and this occurs as late as 1866); later came the initials of the minister, with 'M.' prefixed. Incuse numerals sometimes indicate the table to which a communicant was admitted when the number was very large. Religious symbols (heart, burning bush, vine, lily, chalice and bread) appear towards the end of the 17th century. The Covenanters' conventicle tokens bear simple texts, such as 'Holiness to the Lord,' without indication of parish or date; and texts are common from the beginning of the 19th century. The cross, which is common on Episcopalian tokens, also occurs on some of Presbyterian origin. In some large towns we find the burgh arms and the initials of the deans of gild. Views of churches first appear in the 18th century.

From Scotland the Presbyterians naturally carried the usage, not only to England, but to other countries such as Ireland, where the oldest dated token known to have been struck is that of the Old Presbyterian Congregation of Larne, of the year 1700. Stamps and moulds for many of these Irish tokens are illustrated by G. R. and D. Buick.[1]

4. Monnaies des innocens et des fous. — A curious phase of Church life is illustrated by satirical 'coins' issued by the bishops and other dignitaries (including archbishops, cardinals, and even popes) who were elected by the clergy at the ecclesiastical saturnalia known as the *fêtes des innocens* or *fêtes des fous*. Such festivals flourished, according to documentary evidence, from the 13th to the 17th cent., especially at Amiens, but also at other places such as Chartres, Reims, Laon,

[1] See reference under Literature.

Senlis, St. Quentin, Roye, Péronne—chiefly therefore in the north of France, but also as far south as Besançon. These dignitaries issued tokens struck in lead, bearing such inscriptions as 'Joha. Fournier eps. S. Aug. 1560,' 'Moneta nova Adriani Stultorum Pap(e),' 'Moneta epi(scopi) innocen(tium),' as well as texts such as 'Homo non in solo pane vivi(t),' 'Iudica Domine nocentes me,' 'Stultorum infinitus est numerus.' The types are sometimes saints, as on Jean Fournier's piece just mentioned, which was struck by the Augustinians at Amiens and bears St. Augustine. Rebuses are also in common use. Most of these pieces come from Amiens, and bear dates from 1499 to 1583. The custom of issuing tokens on these occasions also prevailed at Thérouanne, Lille, and perhaps Aire, but in those places no attempt was made at humour, and the types are religious or allegorical.

5. **The boy-bishops.**—The boy-bishops who were elected at certain churches in England on St. Nicholas' Day and held office for a week are also supposed to have issued leaden coins. The extant specimens, which seem all to come from Bury St. Edmunds, all bear a head of St. Nicholas or a mitre and are modelled more or less on the groats and pence of the 15th century. They are usually inscribed with an invocation to St. Nicholas on the obverse; on the other side we find inscriptions such as 'Ave rex gentis,' 'Aye rex gentis Anglor. Mile,' 'Ecce nova facies quia, Ecce reges Angel-or(um).' The words 'Ave rex gentis Anglorum miles Regis angelorum' are the beginning of an anthem for the Feast of St. Edmund. The constant association of these pieces with St. Nicholas suggests that they were issued by the boy-bishops. On the other hand, it has been argued that they were used for the same purpose as the *méreaux* or *jetons de présence* described in § 2. It would, it is true, be strange if such a method of distribution were confined in this country to a single chapel (that of the Hospital of St. Nicholas) in St. Edmundsbury; but this argument cuts both ways. Another Bury piece inscribed 'Siglum Gilde Sci. Nicho(lai)' round the bust of the saint on the obverse, and on the reverse 'Congregacio Duooe' round the letters 'S T N,' appears to be connected with the Gild of the Translation of St. Nicholas; but from the published description it may perhaps be a seal and not a token.

6. **Church tokens of the Near East.**—The right of coinage by sacerdotal authorities has always existed in the Levant and is revived in periods of stress. During the Russo-Turkish War the churches and convents and the Jewish communities of Constantinople issued much token-money for small change. After the Peace of San Stefano the Turkish authorities called in from the provinces all the metallic token-money issued in the first half of the 19th cent., but the custom still persists. Silver, copper, and lead were issued for the metallic tokens, but many of these issues took the form of small cardboard tickets of different colours. Typical examples are the silver 'obol of St. Irene' (from Smyrna), the copper of St. George's (from Smyrna), dated 1775, and the cardboard pieces of the churches of Maronia (20, 10, and 5 paras, 1894), of St. George at Apolloniada (Apollonia ad Rhyndacum, 10 and 5 paras), of St. Michael at Goulion near Apollonia (10 and 5 paras, 'legal tender inside the church'), of St. John the Divine at Yeronda (Didyma, 5 paras); while the Sefarite synagogue, the synagogue of Akrida, and other Jewish communities are represented by both copper and cardboard.

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(2) *Roman Catholic Church.*—The literature is very scattered. Besides the index to the *Revue numism. franc. s.v.* 'Méreaux,' see esp. J. Rouyer, 'Notes pour servir à l'étude des méreaux,' *Rev. num. fr.* xiv. [1849] 356–377, 446–464; 'Méreaux de la Sainte Chapelle,' *ib.*, new ser., vii. [1862] 481–497; J. de Fontenay, *Manuel de l'amateur de jetons*, Paris, 1854; A. Forgeais, *Collection de plombs historiés trouvés dans la Seine*, do. 1862–65, 3rd ser., 'Variétés numismatiques'; A. Chassaing, 'Méreaux de la collégiale de Langeac,' *Rev. num. fr.* III. iii. [1885] 179–182.

(3) *Reformed Churches.*—J. de Pétigny, 'Méreaux des églises calvinistes,' *Rev. num. fr.* xix. [1854] 67–80; E. Delorme, 'Le Méreau dans les églises réformées de France,' *Bull. Soc. Hist. Prot.* xxxviii. [1888] 204–213, 316–325, 371–381, 483–492; H. Gelin, *Le Méreau dans les églises réf. de France*, Saint-Maxent, 1891; J. Rouyer, 'Méreaux de cuivre frappés à Paris . . . pour l'usage des protestants,' *Rev. num. fr.* III. xi. [1893] 385–405; T. Burns, *Old Scottish Communion Plate*, Edinburgh, 1892; E. F. Herdman, *Sacramental Tokens of the Presbyterian Churches in England*, Morpeth, 1901; G. R. and D. Buick, 'On a Small Collection of Presbyterian Communion Tokens,' in *Ulster Journal of Archæology*, ix. [1903] 17–30; A. J. S. Brook, 'Communion Tokens of the Established Church of Scotland,' *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scot.* xli. [1906–07] 453–604.

(4) *Monnaies des innocens.*—J. R. [igollot], *Monnaies inconnues des Evêques des Innocens, des Fous, etc.*, Paris, 1837; A. Danicourt, 'Enseignes et médailles . . . trouvées en Picardie,' *Rev. num. fr.* III. v. [1887] 49–67; A. Demailly, 'Inventaire d'une sér. inéd. de monn. des Evêques des Innocents, etc.,' *Mém. Soc. Ant. de Picardie*, xxxvi. [1908] 1–170.

(5) *Boy-bishops.*—D. H. Haigh, 'Leaden Tokens,' *Numism. Chronicle*, vi. [1843] 83–90; C. Roach Smith, 'Pilgrims' Signs and Leaden Tokens,' *Journ. Brit. Archæol. Assoc.* i. [1846] 200–212.

(6) *Near East.*—A. Sorlin-Dorigny, 'Droit de monnayage des communités non-musulmanes,' *Rev. num. fr.* III. i. [1883] 216–223.

G. F. HILL.

TOLERATION.—1. The policy.—The word 'toleration' in its legal, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal application has a peculiarly limited signification. It connotes a refraining from prohibition and persecution. Nevertheless it suggests a latent disapproval, and it usually refers to a condition in which the freedom which it permits is both limited and conditional. Toleration is not equivalent to religious liberty, and it falls far short of religious equality. It assumes the existence of an authority which might have been coercive, but which for reasons of its own is not pushed to extremes. It implies a voluntary inaction, a politic leniency. The motives that induce a policy of toleration are various, such as mere weakness and inability to enforce prohibitory measures, lazy indifference, the desire to secure conciliation by concessions, the wisdom to perceive that 'force is no remedy,' the intellectual breadth and humility that shrink from a claim to infallibility, the charity that endures the objectionable, respect for the right of private judgment.

However lamentable the fact may be, it should not surprise us that greater intolerance has been found in Christian nations than among any other peoples. Polytheism allows of an indefinitely enlarging pantheon. Its theology admits the existence of separate national gods among the various nations. But monotheism not only denies the existence of any such divinities; it regards the homage offered to them as a derogation from the worship due to the true God. Christianity, therefore, as well as the Judaism on which it is based, is necessarily intellectually intolerant. The same idea applies to Muhammadanism, which is always an intolerant religion as regards doctrine, even when it is not actively persecuting alien faiths. Then both Christianity and Muhammadanism claim to be universal religions; they are essentially aggressive; and the positive missionary work which this fact implies easily passes over into overt acts for the repression of idolatry and polytheism, contrary as they are to the genuine Christian temper. Add to this the fact that moral earnestness, at its best mounting to enthusiasm, in extreme cases degenerating into fanaticism, urges the devotees of a missionary religion towards a militancy which the hereditary adherents of non-aggressive religions have less inducement to adopt. When paganism is not tolerant, this is generally due to resentment against those who have attacked it, unless political motives are the real grounds of action. The persecution of Elijah and the adherents of Jahweh by Jezebel was occasioned by the prophet's vehement opposition to the introduction of the rites of the Phœnician Baal into Israel. The persecution of the Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes was due to their refusal to admit Hellenizing practices into their national life.

2. Indian toleration.—It has been asserted that Hinduism is the most tolerant of religions. This may be true as regards others than Hindus, because, being entirely racial and hereditary, it cannot proselytize. Judaism is also racial and hereditary, but not exclusively so, because it can admit proselytes. Hinduism has no opening for such. Accordingly, it must tolerate alien faiths, unless, like Tibetan Buddhism, it forbids immigration. Aśoka, the Constantine of Buddhism in India (3rd cent. B.C.), had monuments of his legislation cut in stone expressing his liberal treatment of religion as follows:

'The king, beloved of the god, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion, whereof this is the root—to reverence one's own faith and never revile that of others.'

The Muhammadan invasion put an end to tolerance in India by introducing cruel persecution of Hinduism with a wholesale destruction of the temples; but this was intermittent, the incursions of Turks, etc., taking the form of raids, from the 11th till the 17th cent., when the Mughal empire was established in Delhi. Akbar, the most famous of the Mughal emperors, aimed at combining all the inhabitants of his religion in his own eclectic theism. He held disputations in his palace every Friday when Brāhmans, Buddhists, and Parsis expounded their views as freely as Muhammadans.

3. Greek toleration.—The toleration of the Greeks for great varieties of religious beliefs may be attributed to their intellectual breadth, but also to the syncretism which admitted a plurality of divinities into its pantheon. Accordingly, as Adam remarks,

'There was comparatively little persecution for religious beliefs in Greek antiquity. Religious institutions and ceremonies were carefully guarded; but in respect of dogma the limits of toleration were very wide. We may infer from a remark of the Platonic Socrates that the Athenians in general cared little what a man believed, so long as he did not attempt to proselytise.'[1]

The Orphic believers, who, as the same authority states, were 'analogous to modern dissenters,' were tolerated since they showed no sign of abstaining from the religious services which the city ordained. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, were attacked because they used their religious organization for political ends.[2] The death of Socrates appears to have been due mainly to animosity against the philosopher on account of his friendship with proscribed leaders of the aristocratic party. He was seventy years old at the time, and his daring teaching had long been tolerated without any interference on the part of the authorities.

4. Roman toleration.—It was a principle of Roman state policy to allow conquered nations to continue the practice of their indigenous religious rites ('Cujus regio ejus religio'). The old Latin cults were not propagandist, and they admitted of alien rites for alien peoples. Nevertheless difficulties arose, imposing limits on this easy tolerance in several ways: (1) by provincials coming to Italy and even to Rome with a claim to bring their own religions with them; (2) by missionaries of these alien faiths propagating them and by Roman citizens adopting them; (3) by the enforcement of the new state worship of the emperor throughout the empire; (4) by the dread of dangerous magic and the suspicion of immoral and cruel proceedings among the adherents of the foreign cults; (5) by a notion that public calamities might have been caused by neglect of the worship of the old divinities ('atheism'). But there were differences. The Twelve Tables had forbidden the introduction of new gods into Rome. Nevertheless for commercial reasons the Jews had a dispensation granted them to practise their religion in various parts of the empire, including the imperial city. But they were supposed to be confined to their own quarters in each locality—the ghetto. They spread their ideas, however, especially among women of the upper classes—in particular in Rome and Damascus, where it became the fashion to 'Sabbatize.' At first the Christians obtained tolerance on account of their Jewish origin, and it was not till their separation from the Jews became marked that they were interfered with by the authorities; nor was that the case at once even then. The Acts of the Apostles shows us Christians protected by Roman magistrates and police when attacked by Jewish mobs. By the time of Nero, however, in Rome the distinction between the two communities had become evident, and then the Christians were no longer sheltered by the licence for Jews. Christianity was not a *religio licita*. It is true that many unlicensed cults were winked at, in particular the religions of Syria and Egypt—the worship of Mithra, the Dea Mater, Serapis, etc. This was due to their great popularity. Christianity was not popular; it was too stern on the vices of paganism. W. M. Ramsay has shown reason for thinking that the tolerance of the Flavian emperors did not secure the protection of the Christians from local outbreaks. Nevertheless, on the whole, previous to the great Decian persecution the authorities were not disposed to initiate active measures against them. When Pliny wrote to Trajan expressing his perplexity at the Christianity of Bithynia and the consequent desertion of the pagan altars, the emperor replied ordering him (1) not to seek out the Christians, (2) to discourage informers, but (3) to punish convicted persons who had been brought before him for judgment. This rescript has been described by some as a persecuting order and by others as a decree for the easing of the case of the persecuted Christians. In fact it was both. Evidently Trajan was opposed to active persecution and favoured a policy of leniency; but his clear pronouncement requiring the punishment of definitely convicted Christians left no alternative but sentence of death for such people. This was the first formal order to that effect. Previously Christianity was implicitly illegal; henceforth it was to be explicitly illegal. In this respect the rescript was a limitation on the Roman policy of toleration. The persecution which had been carried on with exceptional ferocity at Lyons and Vienne under the gentle Marcus Aurelius was stayed by his worthless son Commodus owing to the intercession of his concubine Marcia, who appears to have been a Christian catechumen. This act of toleration cannot be raised to the level of state policy. It was purely personal in its origin, and it emanated from an unprincipled character.

When the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians, the persecution which he had instigated was brought to an end by his son Gallienus, who issued a rescript in A.D. 260. It has not been preserved. But Eusebius[1] quotes a letter from this emperor to the bishops of Egypt written in the following year, in which he gives directions in accordance with his rescript. He there states that he has issued an order throughout all the world encouraging all to come out of their religious retreats and ordering that no one may molest them. Eusebius adds that there is another ordinance addressed to other bishops in

[1] J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, p. 7; cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903.

[2] See Adam, p. 355.

[1] *HE* vii. 13.

which the emperor grants them permission to recover their cemeteries in which they worshipped (*τόποι θρησκευσιμοί*). Gallienus's rescript has been claimed as the first Roman edict of toleration; but Uhlhorn and Harnack have shown that our knowledge of it does not indicate that Christianity was now made a *religio licita*. Two things only are ordered: the Christians are not to be molested; their property is to be restored. Since the churches had registered themselves as burial clubs and mutual benefit societies (*collegia fratrum, collegia tenuiorum*), it was in their social relations and with regard to their possession of property that Gallienus was now protecting their rights. Nevertheless, although Christianity was still illegal, in point of fact, since it was not to be molested, this was a policy of toleration. It cannot be justified on grounds of consistency; but practical politics are often guilty of inconsistency and prove themselves all the more humane for their freedom from legal pedantry. In the line that Gallienus was taking we see the exact opposite to his father's calculating measures of repression, devised with the deliberate, but now hopeless, design of stamping out Christianity. Gallienus's mild policy by no means gave to the Christians the legal rights which could assure them against future persecution. They enjoyed in consequence a whole generation of immunity from attack; but all along this was in a condition of unstable equilibrium, since nothing had been done to settle it on a sound legal basis. We might compare the situation to that of the Stuart 'Indulgences.' Christianity was not yet a *religio licita*.

Legalized toleration did not appear till after the last and greatest persecution. It was then seen in two stages. The first of these was spasmodic, insincere, and illogical, but still definite and effective. Galerius, the fierce instigator of the persecution which bears the name of the senior emperor Diocletian, who had been his reluctant associate in it, seized with death-bed terrors, issued the most extraordinary decree ever conceived by a Roman emperor (April, 311). Galerius first takes credit to himself for endeavouring to bring the Christians back to the ancient laws and discipline of the Romans, and, after a jibe at their divisions, for which he suggests he has supplied a wholesome corrective, he gives orders that his subjects may again be Christians ('ut denuo sint Christiani') and hold their assemblies, 'provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline.' Galerius concludes with the remarkable sentence, 'and for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god.'

Toleration was not yet the settled policy of the empire. Where it was practised, it was too much subject to the caprice of the individual ruler. Maxentius at Rome was openly anti-Christian and Maximin Daza elaborated subtle devices for the destruction of Christianity; even later, during part of his period of government, Licinius favoured the pagans to the detriment of the Christians. The final stage was reached in the Edict of Milan. That magnificent Magna Charta of religious liberty issued from a meeting of Constantine with Licinius at Milan towards the end of the year 312, after the defeat of Maxentius. Maximin's evasion of the order of toleration granted by Galerius was the occasion which gave rise to it, but the new edict was much more statesmanlike than its curious predecessor, resting on a broader basis, breathing a nobler spirit, and establishing a surer policy. It was issued throughout the whole empire in the year 313. The Edict of Milan is the work of the great emperor Constantine, who induced his colleague Licinius to join him in it. There can be no doubt that Constantine was thoroughly convinced by the enlightened principles that it contains. His colleague's assent must be ascribed to political necessity, and subsequent events showed that Licinius was by no means loyal to it except under compulsion. Unfortunately the original rescript has been lost, but Licinius's edition of it, sent out a few months later, has been preserved, both the original Latin by Lactantius,[1] and a Greek translation, slightly differing verbally, by Eusebius.[2] The toleration granted is absolute and unconditional. It is expressly applied to the Christians, for whose benefit it clearly shows that it was primarily intended. But it also includes devotees of all other religions. This went far beyond the spirit of the ancient world, and indeed only occasionally and in the teaching of exceptional and rare minds has such toleration reappeared until quite modern times, when it has been seen in Cavour's dictum of 'a free Church in a free State.'

Constantine did not live up to his own principle. No sooner did he adopt Christianity than he began to patronize it, and his patronage soon took the form of interference and control. The Christian emperors were rarely more tolerant than the Church of their day; and, as this Church was stern in the denunciation of heresy and schism, too often the imperial government stepped in to give effect to the ecclesiastical sentence. Sometimes it went farther, the emperor taking sides and enforcing his own will, if for orthodoxy against the heretics, if in favour of heresy, as in the support of Arianism by Constantius and later by Valens, against the Catholics. Later emperors interfered in the Christological controversies with the Nestorians and the Monophysites. The iconoclastic emperors were regarded as persecutors of the Church when they took strong measures to put down image-worship. Therefore, while Christianity is not only tolerated but legalized as the religion of the State, the policy of toleration so brilliantly anticipated by Constantine is now buried out of sight, like an untimely birth. The tables are turned, and paganism, ceasing to persecute, comes to be itself persecuted. First magical rites are prohibited as dangerous to the State and the citizens; then the worship of the old gods is prohibited and their altars and temples are demolished. Theodosius II. is the most conspicuous figure in this anti-pagan crusade. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the Christian emperors never went the lengths in murderous violence to which the persecuting pagan emperors had gone. There was nothing approaching the devastating Decian and Valerian persecutions. On the rare occasions when the death penalty was inflicted this was nearly always for magic and sorcery, not as the suppression of a false doctrine but for the extirpation of a dangerous practice. The persecution of paganism naturally led its champions to preach toleration. Libanius argued for the principle of absolute toleration. The pagan reaction under Julian was based on a profession of tolerance, but the emperor was not entirely true to his profession.[3]

5. Early Christian toleration.—The early Christian Fathers advocated toleration, not merely in self-defence, but on principle. Tertullian was most emphatic in asserting this principle:

'Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putaverit colere, nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debeat, non vi: cum et hostiae ab animo libenti expostulentur.'[4]

Lactantius maintained the inherent wickedness of persecution.[5] The bigotry which appeared among the Fathers of the 4th cent. was not allowed to prevail without protest. Athanasius advocated a conciliatory attitude for winning heretics back to the faith. While Augustine denounced heretics and schismatics—especially Pelagians and Donatists—Hilary of Poitiers was a thoroughgoing advocate of toleration. Ambrose condemned the persecution of the Priscillianists, and Martin of Tours denounced it as an atrocious crime because it went so far as killing. The Fathers were slow to sanction the death penalty for heretics; Augustine, while advocating milder measures of persecution, was opposed to this extremity.

6. Mediæval toleration.—During the early part of the Middle Ages persecution was comparatively rare, even in the case of sorcery, which, it was thought, could be counteracted by the more potent

[1] *De Morte Pers.* 48. [2] *HE* x. 5.
[3] Cf. art. PERSECUTION (Early Church).
[4] *Ad Scapulam*, 2. [5] See *Div. Inst.* v. 20.

influence of the rites of the Church. But with the rise of the Inquisition in the 13th cent. a greater rigour of ecclesiastical discipline crushed out the spirit of tolerance.

7. Toleration in the Renaissance and the Reformation.—The irreligious and pagan habits that accompanied the Renaissance issued in an easy indifference which favoured an unprincipled tolerance. But the intellectuality and breadth of view that it engendered went farther and gave rise to a reasoned doctrine of toleration. Sir Thomas More, while sanctioning persecution, admitted the abstract excellence of the opposite course. Montaigne's scepticism and liberal idea of life made for tolerance. On higher grounds Erasmus laboured incessantly for the same end, combining inimitable wit with immense learning, exposing the folly as much as the wickedness of ignorant, narrow-minded persecution. The duty of absolute toleration was insisted on by Castellio, a Frenchman, who had been a friend of Calvin when the Reformer was a professor at Basel. Denouncing the execution of Servetus, he argued that, if the end of Christianity be the diffusion of a spirit of beneficence, persecution must be its extreme antithesis, and that, if persecution can be the essential element of a religion, that religion must be a curse to mankind.

Most of the Reformers were not advocates of universal toleration; but Zwingli regarded error as not inherently blameworthy and held that it should be tolerated. He went farther and showed a comprehensive appreciation of human excellency apart from religious differences.

Lælius Socinus was a pronounced advocate of religious liberty, and a clear assertion of the principle is put forth in the Socinian Catechism of Rakow. The German Anabaptists and the Dutch Arminians also advocated this principle.

8. The German settlement. — The Peace of Augsburg (1555) was arranged between the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans; it excluded the Reformed Church, both Zwinglian and Calvinistic, as well as all the minor sects. Further, this arrangement left it to the princes of the several states to decide which of the two permissible types of religion should be adopted and imposed on their subjects. Disagreements between the two parties concerned and the exclusion of the Reformed Churches led to the Thirty Years' War. This was concluded with the Peace of Westphalia (24th Oct. 1648), to which there were three parties —the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Reformers. It made provision for none of the minor sects. The princes were allowed to pass from one of the three religions to the other and to require their selected religion to be imposed on their subjects to the exclusion of all other religions, or to admit other religions, as they saw fit. This right was called the *jus reformandi*. It implied a limited and optional toleration.

Subsequently two influences arose to widen the conception of religious liberty: (1) pietism, which, as both non-dogmatic and charitable, tended towards universal toleration; and (2) the effect of the school of natural law. Pufendorf maintained that no one could be compelled to embrace a given religion and held it to be a fatal necessity that dissensions should exist within the Church. Christian Thomasius, the typical illuminist, bases the principle of religious liberty on his fundamental conception of law. He distinguishes morality from law, on the ground that law is coercive while morality cannot be coerced. Much more is this the case with religion. The difference between the spheres of the prince and the clergy is that it is the duty of the prince to coerce and the duty of the clergy to teach. The clergy should fight heresy with instruction, not by appealing to the secular arm. While urging these principles in all his works, Thomasius devotes three treatises especially to the exposition of them, viz. the two 'Programmata,' *Programma de tolerantia dissidentium in controversiis religionis* (1693) and *Programma varia testimonia Martini Lutheri de tolerantia dissidentium in religione complectens* (1697), and the more popular work in the vernacular entitled *Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten* (1696). In these works he maintains that all dissidents are to be tolerated so long as they do not disturb the public peace. Frederick William I. of Prussia used the *jus reformandi* in favour of allowing Roman Catholics to live in his Protestant state, and his son Frederick the Great adopted a policy of toleration for all religions with the cynical idea that, since they arose only from the ignorance of the people, they were equivalent in the region of dogma and to be distinguished only by their greater or less ethical import. Thus, since morality is independent of articles of faith, absolute religious liberty should be conceded. In a rescript of 15th June 1740 he says: 'All religions are equal and good so long as those who profess them are upright people.' There was a temporary reaction under Frederick William II., after which the right of religious liberty spread first through Prussia and then through the other German states, although the territorial state recognition of the three favoured religions remained—a policy of general toleration, but not of religious equality.

9. England and America.—In the 16th cent., under the Tudors, the extreme Puritan party, which had shared with other Protestants in the persecutions of Roman Catholic times, did not obtain religious liberty. But the principle of toleration was maintained by the Baptists and the Congregationalists, although there were some limits to the applications of it. The early Congregationalists would exclude from its privileges both Unitarians and Roman Catholics, the latter as themselves a persecuting party and a danger to Protestant liberty. But John Robinson, a large-minded man of liberal views, drew up a covenant for the Pilgrim Fathers who sailed in the 'Mayflower' and founded New England. The first instrument of this covenant conferred equal civil and religious rights on every member of any commonwealth. A little later the colony of Maryland, founded by a charter from Charles I., granted toleration to Roman Catholics as well as to Protestants. Its first law runs as follows: 'No person professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be in any way molested or discountenanced for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof.'

The Pilgrim Fathers, who had claimed liberty at home, have been blamed for the inconsistency of intolerance in their own colony when they were settled in America. The defence is that the exclusive theocracy that they established implied that they regarded themselves as a Church rather than as a State, and as such would refuse membership to unfit persons in accordance with a fundamental Congregational principle. But they have often been unfairly accused of narrowness through a confusion of two different positions—that of the early settlers in New England who had come from John Robinson's church in Holland and were the real Congregationalist immigrants, and that of the Puritans who settled later in Massachusetts. The latter were Presbyterians who had never adopted the principles of religious freedom. It was not until the separation from England that complete equality in religion was established in the United States.

10. The English problem.—In the 17th cent. neither the bulk of the Presbyterians nor the Episcopal party as a whole had any idea of toleration. Under the early Stuarts Laud and the High Church, having the upper hand, persecuted the Presbyterians. Under the Long Parliament the Presbyterians tried to force the Covenant on the whole nation. Cromwell took a wider view and ordered his 'triers' not to molest Protestant godly men who preached the gospel, whatever their ecclesiastical principles might be, and he gave the Jews a legal footing in England.

At this time the Baptists, the Congregationalists (then known as Independents), and the Quakers maintained the principle of religious liberty—the last-named body basing it on their doctrine of the inner light, which excluded all ecclesiastical and official interference with the individual soul. The protest of the five Independents at the Westminster Assembly (1643), which was mainly Presbyterian

in composition, maintained the right of religious liberty.

Later, on the Presbyterian side, Richard Baxter laboured for large measures of comprehension, and John Goodwin, generally regarded as a Congregationalist, but described by Rufini as 'a Puritan *sui generis*—a rationalist Puritan,' maintained that every religion, sect, or schism should be tolerated so long as there was no attempt to interfere with the security of the State. Milton, claimed by both Presbyterians and Congregationalists, but not wholly committed to either party, in triumphantly vindicating the freedom of the press, pleaded eloquently for religious toleration. In the *Areopagitica* he showed that persecution was both unnecessary for the preservation of truth and a hindrance to the discovery of truth. He would tolerate all Protestants, including Socinians, Arminians, and Anabaptists, but not Roman Catholics. On the Anglican Church side the more liberal-minded writers were in favour of toleration and comprehension. Chillingworth affirms that Protestants are inexcusable if they do violence to the consciences of others. He holds it to be a great sin to force on other people our own interpretations of Scripture, arguing that this was the cause of all the schisms and discords of Christianity. John Hales took a similar line in his tractate *Schism and Schismaticks* (1636). Jeremy Taylor, in his famous *Liberty of Prophesying* (1646), was contending for freedom of speech against the tyranny of the Covenant under the Long Parliament.

The reaction at the Restoration and the passing of the Act of Uniformity (1662), followed by the Conventicle, Five Mile, and Test Acts, narrowed the State Church position and imposed great disabilities on Nonconformists; these were to some extent relieved a little later by James II.'s Indulgences, but at the expense of the rights of Parliament. Legal toleration did not appear till the Revolution. In the Declaration of Breda Charles II. promised to respect tender consciences; but, when well established on the throne, he had not the moral courage to stand to his word.

William III. obtained his invitation to England mainly as the champion of religious liberty. His aim was to bring about an agreement between the Church of England and Protestant Dissenters. While in his own country, he had been profoundly affected by the ideas of the Dutch Arminians. In England his most trusted adviser, Bishop Burnet, had adumbrated the policy which the king afterwards adopted in a *Modest and Free Conference between a Conformist and a Nonconformist* (1663). William first aimed at comprehension in 'A Bill for Uniting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects.' The failure of this measure to pass in the House of Commons necessitated another line of action.

II. The Act of Toleration.—The Act of Toleration, which was passed in the year 1689, gave relief to Nonconformists from their chief disabilities; but it did not grant complete religious liberty; much less did it establish religious equality in the eyes of the law. It exempted Nonconformists from the pains and penalties of the Act of Uniformity, the Conventicle Act, and the Five Mile Act; at the same time it required people who desired to avail themselves of its privileges to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and make a statutory declaration against Romish superstitions, and it ordered Nonconformist ministers to subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England with the exception of three—those referring to the traditions of the Church, to the homilies, and to the consecration of bishops and priests, a fourth exception, that of the article on infant baptism, being allowed for Baptist ministers. Further, it enacted that every Nonconformist place of worship should be certified by a bishop, an archdeacon, or a justice of the peace. Quakers were allowed to make a solemn declaration instead of taking the oaths and were required to declare their belief in the Trinity and in the inspiration of the Bible. Neither Roman Catholics nor Unitarians were included in the concessions allowed by this Act, and even orthodox Nonconformity was still illegal, the persecuting laws remaining on the statute-books, and only the exaction of their penalties being forbidden. While this measure was logically inconsistent, it was practically serviceable as far as it went. It secured a considerable amount of toleration.

The same year (1689) saw Locke's first *Letter Concerning Toleration* published anonymously in Holland in Latin. It was translated into English immediately. A second and longer letter, and a third longer still, followed in reply to answering letters. Yet a fourth letter completes the series in Locke's work; this is not finished. The collection has become a literary classic on the subject of toleration. Locke bases his argument on the ground that the rightful sphere of the State is wholly confined to externals and does not extend to religion, which is internal. He holds that not only the doctrines and 'articles of faith,' but also 'the outward form and rites of worship,' are out of the province of the civil magistrate. Such a position goes beyond toleration. Logically it involves disestablishment, because, if the State is not competent to deal with religious matters at all, it follows that it should not patronize or support a favoured religion any more than persecute a religion of which it disapproves. With regard to persecution, Locke holds that it is anti-Christian, since love of our fellow-men is of the essence of Christianity, and it cannot be maintained that persecutors are actuated by love to their victims in the cruelties which they perpetrate. But, while on these principles Locke would tolerate Jews as well as all Protestant sects, his toleration does not extend to Roman Catholics or atheists. With regard to the former, though he does not name them in his argument on the subject, he says:

'That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince.'[1]

He would also exclude persons who hold views subversive of society and atheists, who, he considers, are to be included in that category.[2] Thus he regards both these parties as obnoxious to the State and to be excluded from toleration on political grounds, not for their religious views. Locke carries his idea of toleration beyond the political sphere to the ecclesiastical, arguing for liberty of thought within the Churches themselves. He writes:

'What think you of St. Athanasius's Creed? Is the sense of that so obvious and exposed to every one who seeks it; which so many learned men have explained so different ways, and which yet a great many profess they cannot understand? Or is it necessary to your or my salvation, that you or I should believe and pronounce all those damned who do not believe that creed, *i.e.* every proposition in it? which I fear would extend to not a few of the church of England; unless we can think that people believe, *i.e.* assent to the truth of propositions they do not at all understand. If ever you were acquainted with a country parish, you must needs have a strange opinion of them, if you think all the ploughmen and milkmaids at church understood all the propositions in Athanasius's Creed; it is more, truly, than I should be apt to think of any one of them; and yet I cannot hence believe myself authorized to judge or pronounce them all damned: it is too bold an intrenching on the prerogative of the Almighty; to their own Master they stand or fall.'[3]

Under Queen Anne the toleration that had been obtained by the accession of William and Mary was threatened by the Schism Act, which made it illegal under heavy penalties for any one to keep a

[1] *Works*, new ed., London, 1823, vi. 46. [2] *Ib.* p. 47.
[3] *Ib.* p. 410 f.

private school or teach in a seminary unless he signed a declaration of conformity to the liturgy of the Church of England and obtained a bishop's licence to teach on production of a certificate that he had taken the communion according to the rites of the Church of England during the preceding year. The queen's death stayed the execution of this drastic measure, and it was repealed in the reign of her successor, George I. From this time onwards toleration with regard to religious views and practices was firmly established; but its limitations were still numerous. It was the minimum of concession to those who had previously been the victims of persecution. Active persecution was no longer allowed. But the negative policy of exclusion and prohibition left galling grievances long unrelieved. Toleration is far from religious equality. The very practice of it involves an exalted position of power enjoyed by the people who tolerate as opposed to an inferior position in which the tolerated are living. It is not inconsistent with the monopoly of privileges by the one class and the refusal of them to the other. If those privileges are rights of citizenship, toleration is even possible side by side with serious injustice. The tolerated may be denied political power, the parliamentary and municipal franchise, the opportunity of election as members of Parliament or of corporations, access to public schools, colleges and universities, whether as pupils or as teachers, and a host of other national rights and privileges. So it was that under the Georges, and even throughout much of the 19th cent., Nonconformists, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, Jews, and others suffered from various forms of exclusion. The abolition of the Corporation and Test Acts, Catholic Emancipation, the admission of Jews to Parliament, the permission to dispense with the member's oath extracted in order to meet the case of Mr. Bradlaugh, the throwing open of the universities to Nonconformists, the enlarged foundation of grammar schools, and the extension of popular education generally, irrespective of ecclesiastical distinctions, were all steps beyond mere toleration towards the goal of religious equality—a goal which in several directions its advocates have not yet completely attained.

12. Toleration in France.—The fight for religious liberty which was waged principally in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and England during the 16th and 17th centuries passed on to France in the 18th century. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had conceded toleration for Protestants; the revocation of that Edict (1685) restored and aggravated persecuting intolerance. Bayle established the intellectual basis of toleration in his *Dictionnaire* and in a work entitled *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ: Contrain-les d'entrer*—a refutation of the misuse of a text popular with persecutors from the time of Augustine. He holds it to be immoral to compel men to profess religion in which they do not believe, and also irrational, because it discourages the discovery of truth. No one, he maintains, has a right to claim such complete possession of truth as not to need to compare his ideas with those of other men. Montesquieu, in *De l'Esprit des lois* (1748), argues for religious liberty and exposes the futility of coercion. Rousseau, in his *Contrat social*,[1] affirms the complete liberty of individual beliefs; nevertheless, holding that intolerance is inherent in Christian dogma, he would abolish this and establish a civil profession of faith in truths indispensable to a well-organized social life, including that of the existence of God. But it was Voltaire who by his scathing sarcasm did more than any other man in France during the 18th cent. to put an end to persecution and secure tolerance for the Protestants.

[1] Bk. iv. ch. 8.

The ideas of these champions of religious liberty powerfully moulded the course of the French Revolution in regard to religion and the universal toleration that has since prevailed in France.

13. The present situation.—A policy of toleration now obtains throughout Western Europe, North America, the British, French, and Italian colonies, and India, where it is a safeguard of peace and good order under British rule. It is established in Japan and practically observed throughout the provinces of China. It is also practised generally throughout S. America. Eastern Europe and Western Asia are still excluded from its privileges. The exclusiveness of Tibet is national rather than religious in character. Thus it is apparent that the policy of toleration has been adopted throughout the greater part of the civilized world.

Apart from the liberalizing of legislation, great progress has been made by means of Modernism in Roman Catholic countries and by the general spread of Christian charity, culture, knowledge of history, scientific methods of criticism, and the study of comparative religion, by the softening of manners, by scepticism, and by religious indifference, all tending to cool the ardour of the persecuting spirit and so to establish toleration. The champions of liberty now resent the use of the term as representing a gracious concession on the part of the privileged and claim to go far beyond it in their demand for the abolition of all theological and ecclesiastical privileges and the establishment of absolute religious equality.

Cf. also artt. PERSECUTION.

LITERATURE.—The literature of toleration is immense. A few of the more important works are Tertullian, *ad Scapulam*; Lactantius, *Divinæ Institutiones*; Vincentius, *Epistolæ*, 93, 17; Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, 13th cent.; Faustus Socinus, *Opera*, 2 vols., Irenopolis, 1656; Milton, *Areopagitica*, London, 1644; John Goodwin, *Plea for Liberty of Conscience*, 1644; Locke, *Epistola de Tolerantia*, Gouda, 1689, Eng. tr., London, 1689; P. Bayle, *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ: Contrain-les d'entrer*, 2 vols., Cantorbery, 1686, *Supplement du Commentaire*, etc., Hamburg, 1688; S. Pufendorf, *De habitu religionis Christianæ ad vitam civilem*, Bremen, 1687, Eng. tr., London, 1698; C. Thomasius, *Disputatio an haeresis sit crimen*, 1697; Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, Paris, 1762; F. M. de Voltaire, *Traité sur la tolérance*, do. 1763, etc.; J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, London, 1859; Jules Simon, *La Liberté de conscience*[5], Paris, 1872; J. C. Bluntschli, *Gesch. des Rechtes der religiösen Bekenntnissfreiheit*, Elberfeld, 1867; P. Schaff, *The Progress of Religious Freedom as shewn in the Hist. of Toleration Acts*, New York, 1889; H. Fürstenau, *Das Grundrecht der Religionsfreiheit nach seiner geschichtl. Entwicklung und heutigen Geltung in Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1891; M. Creighton, *Persecution and Tolerance*, London, 1895; Wallace St. John, *The Contest for Liberty of Conscience in England*, Chicago, 1900; L. Dubois, *Bayle et la tolérance*, Paris, 1902; L. Robert, *Voltaire et l'intolérance religieuse*, do. 1904; Luigi Luzzatti, *La Libertà di Conscienza e di Scienza*, 1909, French tr., Paris, 1911; G. Bonet-Maury, *Hist. de la liberté de conscience en France (1598–1905)*[2], do. 1909; W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, auth. ed., London, 1910; A. A. Seaton, *The Theory of Toleration under the later Stuarts*, Cambridge, 1911; H. F. Russell Smith, *The Theory of Religious Liberty in the Reigns of Charles II. and James II.*, do. 1911; Lord Acton, *Hist. of Freedom and other Essays*, London, 1907; Francesco Rufini, *Religious Liberty*, Eng. tr., do. 1912; J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of Freedom of Thought* (Home University Library), do. 1913.

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TOLERATION (Muhammadan). — Muslim toleration may be considered under two distinct aspects, with respect to (i.) the faithful themselves, and (ii.) non-Muslims.

(i.) Within the circle of the Muslim Church the basis for toleration is found in the saying traditionally attributed to Muḥammad: '*Ikhtilāfu ummati raḥmatun*,' 'Difference of opinion in my community is a (manifestation of divine) mercy.' In accordance with this principle, it has been possible for the four schools (*madhhab*) of theologians and legists into which the Sunnīs are divided, viz. Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī, to exist side by side, and for each of them to permit difference of opinion even in its own midst. There has been

abundance of controversy between these schools, but instances of open violence have been rare.[1] A similar basis for toleration was found in the traditional saying of the Prophet: 'My community will become divided into 73 sects,' and rendered possible the ample sectarian development in the Muhammadan world. Instances have occurred from time to time of the persecution of one sect by another,[2] but a more characteristic feature of the Muslim Church has been the freedom allowed to the exposition of religious doctrine, and the common sentiment of princes and people has generally condemned intolerance on the part of professed theologians.[3]

(ii.) The recognition of rival religious systems, as possessing a divine revelation, gave to Islām from the outset a theological basis for the toleration of non-Muslims. Judaism and Christianity are represented in the Qur'ān as forms of the primitive faith given to man and taught by a series of prophets from Adam onwards:

'Men were of one religion only; then they disagreed with one another.'[4] 'Mankind was but one people; then God raised up prophets to announce glad tidings and to warn, and He sent down with them the Book with the truth, that it might decide the disputes of men.'[5]

But Jewish and Christian teachers had corrupted the purity of this primitive faith, which Muḥammad as 'the seal of the prophets'[6] came to proclaim anew.

This recognition of a common God is put forward in the Qur'ān as the basis for friendly relations with the followers of rival creeds, in the following verses:

'Say to those who have been given the Book and to the ignorant, Do ye accept Islam? Then, if they accept Islam, are they guided aright; but if they turn away, then thy duty is only preaching.'[7] 'Those who have inherited the Book after them [*i.e.* the Jews and the Christians] are in perplexity of doubt concerning it. For this cause summon thou [them to the faith], and walk uprightly therein as thou hast been bidden, and follow not their desires; and say, In whatsoever Books God hath sent down do I believe; I am commanded to decide justly between you; God is your Lord and our Lord; we have our works and you have your works; between us and you let there be no strife; God will make us all one, and to Him shall we return.'[8] 'Dispute ye not, save in kindliest sort, with the people of the Book; save with such of them as have dealt wrongly [with you], and say ye, "We believe in what has been sent down to us and hath been sent down to you. Our God and your God is one, and to Him are we self-surrendered."'[9]

Muslim theologians have found a sanction for the toleration of religions other than Judaism and Christianity in passages such as the following:

'To every people have We appointed observances which they observe; therefore let them not dispute the matter with thee, but summon them to thy Lord: Verily thou art guided aright: But if they debate with thee, then say: God best knoweth what ye do.'[10] 'If any one of those who join gods with God ask an asylum of thee, grant him an asylum in order that he may hear the word of God; then let him reach his place of safety.'[11] 'They who had joined other gods with God say, "Had He pleased, neither we nor our forefathers had worshipped aught but Him, nor had we, apart from Him, declared anything unlawful." Thus acted they who were before them. Yet is the duty of the apostles other than plain-spoken preaching?'[12]

The clearest injunction of toleration is in the verse, 'Let there be no compulsion in religion,'[13] and forcible conversion is condemned in the words:

'But if thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the world would have believed together. Wilt thou then compel men to become believers? No soul can believe but by the permission of God.'[14]

In harmony with the injunctions of the Qur'ān is Muḥammad's letter to the bishops, priests, and monks of Najrān promising them the protection of God and His apostle for their churches, their religious services and monastic institutions, and freedom from disturbance or any interference with their rights, so long as they remained faithful to their obligations.[1] He permitted the Jews in Medīna to practise their own faith, until their implacable hostility led to their expulsion from the city, and he gave instructions to Mu'ādh b. Jabal, whom he sent on a mission to Yaman in 10 A.H., that he was not to compel any Jew to abandon his religion.[2]

The teaching of the Qur'ān and the practice of the Prophet thus served as a clear basis for toleration of the Christian and Jewish faiths. As mention is made of the Sabians in the Qur'ān,[3] they also were considered to have received some divine revelation and therefore to be entitled to toleration; it is possible that the Harranians (*q.v.*) and Mandæans (*q.v.*) claimed to be Sabians in order to enjoy the same toleration.[4] Their practice of heathen rites naturally gave offence to orthodox Muslim feeling, and the khalīfah al-Qāhir (932–934) is said to have consulted the jurist Abū Sa'īd al-Istakhrī as to whether the Sabians should continue to be tolerated or not, and was told that, as they were neither Jews nor Christians, but worshipped the planets, they ought to be exterminated; however, the khalīfah allowed the Sabians to buy themselves off and disregarded the decision of this pious theologian.[5] About forty years later his successor, Ṭā'i'li-amrillāh, promulgated a fresh edict of toleration in favour of the Sabians, guaranteeing to them protection for themselves, their wives, and property, and free access to their temples and places of prayer, and the undisturbed performance of the rites of their religion.[6] Their last temple was not destroyed until 1230, and then by the heathen Mongols.[7]

Political expediency, and the desire of the jurists of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra to make the religious law tally with the accepted practice, prompted the extension of a similar toleration to such faiths as were not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but were found to have adherents in the rapidly growing Muhammadan empire; *e.g.*, when Arab rule was extended into Persia, it was averred that Muḥammad had given directions that the Zoroastrians were to be treated exactly like the Ahl al-kitāb ('people of the Book').[8]

The Zoroastrians appear to have been but little disturbed in the exercise of their cult up to the period of the fall of the 'Abbāsid dynasty.[9] There is even an account of a Muhammadan general (in the reign of Mu'taṣim, 833–842) who ordered an *ātaṣ* and a *mu'adhdhin* to be flogged because they had destroyed a fire-temple in Sughd and built a mosque in its place.[10] In the 10th cent., three centuries after the conquest of Persia, fire-temples were to be found in almost every province.[11]

Even the Manichæans (*q.v.*), though not entitled to toleration according to Muhammadan law, survived as a separate sect until the end of the 10th cent.; in the reign of Ma'mūn, Yazdānbakht, the leader of the sect, held a public disputation with the Muslim theologians in Baghdād.[12]

The severe condemnation of idolatry in the Qur'ān[13] seems to have made any toleration of idol-worshippers impossible for a Muslim ruler, but already in the reign of Hārūn Muslim law had granted the privilege of paying *jizyah* to idolaters—worshippers of idols, fire, and stones—and thus gave them a place among the tolerated cults.[14] The khalīfah 'Uthmān, in dealing with the heathen Berbers, followed the precedent of 'Umar in regard to the Zoroastrians, and allowed them to pay *jizyah*.[15] In India the Brāhmans appear to have paid *jizyah* from the earliest days of Arab domination,[16] and to have been allowed to retain their faith undisturbed, but the building of new temples was held to be illegal.[17] Though during the later Muhammadan conquests there was a considerable destruction of Hindu temples, the settled Muhammadan governments appear often to have respected the state endowments granted by the former Hindu rulers to religious foundations, as was done in the case of the temple of Brahmanābād in the province of Sind, where Muhammadan rule was first established in India. At a much later date, in the 16th cent., the Muhammadan government of Bengal is said to have raised the large sum of £100,000 a year by licensing the worship of Jagannāth in Orissa,[18] and even Ḥaidar 'Alī and Tīpū Sulṭān, usually so notorious for their

1 See *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 178 f.
2 See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
3 C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Le Droit musulman,' *RHR* xxxvii. 174–184; I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 94 ff., *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 51–53, 183–185.
4 x. 20. 5 ii. 209. 6 xxxiii. 40. 7 iii. 19.
8 xlii. 13–14. 9 xxix. 45. 10 xxii. 66–67. 11 ix. 6.
12 xvi. 37. 13 ii. 257.
14 x. 99, 100; cf. xvi. 84, xxiv. 53, xlii. 47, and lxiv. 12.

1 Cætani, *Annali dell' Islām*, ii. 351.
2 Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al Buldān*, p. 71.
3 ii. 59, v. 73.
4 Al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871–72, i. 320.
5 Al-Nawawī, *Biographical Dictionary*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1842–47, p. 725.
6 Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, ii. 537 f.
7 *Ib.* i. 232. 8 Balādhuri, pp. 71 (*fin.*), 79, 80.
9 D. Menant, 'Les Zoroastriens de Perse,' *RMM* iii. [1907] 212.
10 Chwolsohn, i. 287.
11 Mas'ūdī, *Les Prairies d'Or*, Paris, 1861–77, iv. 86; see art. GABARS.
12 Al-Nadīm, p. 338.
13 iv. 115–120, xxi. 98–100, lxvi. 9, etc.
14 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, p. 73.
15 Balādhurī, p. 80, lines 16–17.
16 Elliot, *The Hist. of India*, i. 176, 476.
17 *Ib.* iii. 380.
18 W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, xviii [London, 1877] p. 190.

intolerance towards their Hindu subjects, made grants of money to the monastery of Śringēri, one of the most famous shrines in S. India.[1] The same tradition survives in present Muhammadan states in India, such as Ḥaidarābād and Bahāwalpūr, which still assign revenues for the support of Hindu temples.[2]

Even in such a barbarous country as Baluchistān the Hindus enjoyed religious toleration in consideration of their payment of *jizyah*. 'They were free from persecution and molestation; in any dispute with the tribesmen they could appeal to their protector or the headman for a fair hearing and a fair settlement; the honour of their women was respected; their religion was tolerated; no one tampered with their customs.'[3]

The non-Muslim living under a Muhammadan government was styled a *dhimmī* (lit. 'one with whom a compact has been made'), and the conditions under which he lived were supposed to be regulated by the agreements made with the Muslim conquerors as they extended their dominion over various cities and districts. As an example of such an agreement, the conditions may be quoted that are said to have been drawn up when Jerusalem came under Muslim rule in A.D. 638:

'In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate! This is the security which 'Umar, the servant of God, the commander of the faithful, grants to the people of Aelia. He grants to all, whether sick or sound, security for their lives, their possessions, their churches and their crosses, and for all that concerns their religion. Their churches shall not be changed into dwelling-places, nor destroyed, neither shall they nor their appurtenances be in any way diminished, nor the crosses of the inhabitants nor aught of their possessions, nor shall any constraint be put upon them in the matter of their faith, nor shall any one of them be harmed.'[4]

The theory was that the *dhimmī*, in return for tribute paid and in consideration of good behaviour, received protection from the Muslim government and immunity for life, property, and religion. Tradition attributed to the Prophet a warning against the disregard of this compact: 'Whoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made [*i.e.* a *dhimmī*] and lays on him a burden beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser.'[5] 'Whoever torments the *dhimmīs*, torments me.'[6] A similar consideration for them was shown by the khalīfah 'Umar, who in his testament enjoined on his successor: 'I commend to your care the *dhimmīs* of the Apostle of God; see that the agreement with them is kept, and that they be defended against their enemies, and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength.'[7] Similarly, 'Alī, when he appointed Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr governor of Egypt in 36 A.H., bade him do justice to the *dhimmis*.[8] In a like spirit, the Turkish code ordains that the *dhimmīs* are not to be disturbed in the exercise of their religion.[9]

The actual practice appears to have varied according to local conditions and the character of the local government; and by the 2nd cent. of the Hijra, when some codification was made of the law relating to the *dhimmīs*, more harsh and intolerant regulations had come into force than those of earlier times. But in the first century of Arab rule the various Christian churches enjoyed a toleration and a freedom of religious life such as had been unknown for generations under the Byzantine government. We have the contemporary testimony of the Nestorian patriarch, Īshō'yabh III. (A.D. 650–660), who, writing to the primate of Persia, says:

'The Arabs, to whom God at this time had given the empire of the world, behold, they are among you, as ye know well; and yet they attack not the Christian faith, but, on the contrary, they favour our religion, do honour to our priests and the saints of the Lord, and confer benefits on churches and monasteries.'[1]

Indeed, the Church to which this ecclesiastic belonged exhibited a remarkable expansion under Muhammadan rule; missionaries were sent from Persia to China and India, both of which were raised to the dignity of metropolitan sees in the 8th cent.; about the same period the Nestorians gained a footing in Egypt, and later spread the Christian faith right across Asia, and by the 11th cent. had gained many converts from among the Tatars.[2] But by the 2nd cent. of the Muhammadan era the condition of the Christians had become less tolerable. The victorious armies that established Arab rule over Syria and Persia appear to have been little swayed by religious considerations, and under the rule of the Umayyads the Christian and other non-Muslim religious communities seem to have been little regarded except as sources of revenue; but under the 'Abbāsids a change in the attitude of the government made itself felt. The orthodox reaction which supported this dynasty and the union of the spiritual and temporal power which characterized it tended to make the administration of the existing laws more oppressive. In the course of the long struggle with the Byzantine empire the khalīfahs had had occasion to distrust the loyalty of their Christian subjects, and the treachery of the emperor Nikephoros was not improbably one of the reasons for the harsher treatment initiated by Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–809), who ordered the Christians to wear a distinctive dress and give up to Muslims the government posts which they held. But the prescriptions of the jurists and theologians[3] were often more intolerant than the actual practice of the government, and it would be rash to assume that the treatment meted out to the non-Muslim population corresponded exactly with the principles which they laid down. Hārūn's great jurist, Abū Yūsuf,[4] leaves no alternative to the Arabs of the Riddah (*i.e.* the Defection, after the death of the Prophet) or to the idolatrous Arabs, except death or the acceptance of Islām, but Cætani[5] has proved that the early conquerors had no power to enforce such a principle, and historical facts do not show that any such alternative was actually imposed on the heathen Arabs.

But protests against cruelty towards the *dhimmīs* are not wanting in the works of Muslim legists themselves; *e.g.*, Abū Yūsuf[6] claims for the *dhimmīs* gentle treatment; they are not to be beaten when called upon to pay *jizyah*, or to be made to stand in the sun, or to be tormented in any way; and he makes an earnest appeal to his patron, Hārūn, on their behalf:

'It is incumbent on the commander of the faithful (may God grant thee his aid!) that thou deal gently with those that have a covenant with thy Prophet and thy cousin, Muḥammad (the peace and blessing of God be upon him!), and that thou take care that they be not wronged or ill-treated and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength, and that no part of their belongings be taken from them beyond what they are in duty bound to pay, for it is related of the Apostle of God (the peace and blessing of God be upon him!) that he said, Whosoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made [*i.e.* a *dhimmī*] or imposes a burden on him beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser on the day of judgment.'[7]

Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī († 1512) maintains that the majority of Muslim jurists hold that the *dhimmī* must be treated with kindness and consideration and not with contempt, when he comes to pay the

[1] *Annual Report of the Mysore Archæological Department for the Year 1916*, Bangalore, 1917, pp. 73–75.
[2] M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, v. 246; *Punjab States Gazetteers*, vol. xxxviA. [Lahore, 1908] p. 183.
[3] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. iv. [Calcutta, 1913], *Baluchistan*, pt. i. p. 175.
[4] Ṭabarī, i. 2405.
[5] Balādhurī, p. 162; Yaḥyā b. Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Leyden, 1896, p. 54, *ad fin.*
[6] Al-Makīn, *Historia Saracenica*, Leyden, 1625, p. 11.
[7] Abū Yūsuf, p. 71.
[8] Ṭabarī, i. 3247, line 1; cf. his instructions to Ma'qil b. Qays, i. 3430, line 14.
[9] M. d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman*, Paris, 1820, iii. 44.

[1] J. S. Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Rome, 1719–28, vol. iii., pt. i., p. 131.
[2] J. Labourt, *De Timotheo I. Nestorianorum Patriarcha*, Paris, 1904, p. 37 ff.
[3] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
[4] P. 73, *ad fin.*
[5] ii. 829, v. 337 f. [6] P. 70. [7] P. 71.

jizyah.[1] Commenting on this passage nearly two centuries later, al-Birmāwī († 1694) enters a protest against such fanatical glosses on *Qur'ān*, ix. 29, as are referred to in art. PERSECUTION, and holds that the phrase 'being humbled' implies only conformity to the regulations of Islām in regard to the *dhimmīs*, and that these words give no justification for the rough treatment sometimes inflicted on a *dhimmī* when he paid *jizyah*—*e.g.*, that he should be made to stand with bent head and back before the collector of the tax, who should slap his face and pull his beard—for (as he rightly says) there is no evidence that the Prophet or any one of the khalīfahs acted in such a manner.[2]

A powerful influence in the direction of toleration in a period when feeling was acerbated against the Christians, and when the disorder in Muhammadan administration made their position more precarious and exposed them to the tyranny of local officials, was the extension of the religious orders, especially that of the Qādiriyyah, and the popularizing of that mystical presentation of religious thought in which devout Muslims found consolation after the devastations of the Mongol conquests. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī († 1166), the founder of the order referred to, emphasized the virtues of charity and meekness, and his attitude and that of his followers towards the Christians was kindly and sympathetic.[3] The tendency of Persian mysticism was opposed to any emphasizing of religious differences, and the teaching of the poets who wrote under the influence of this mystical movement often made for tolerance; a well-known example is the story of Abraham in Sa'dī's *Būstān*,[4] in which the patriarch is rebuked by God for refusing his charity to an aged fire-worshipper on the ground of his infidelity. But in the present article attention may rather be drawn to instances of toleration in contrast to the fanatical usage of legislation; *e.g.*, though the so-styled Pact of 'Umar[5] forbade the building of new churches, there was considerable variation of opinion among the Muslim legists themselves on this question, from the more liberal Ḥanafī doctrine, which declared that, though it was unlawful to build churches and synagogues in Muslim territory, those already existing could be repaired if they had been destroyed or had fallen into decay, while in villages where the tokens of Islām were not apparent new churches and synagogues might be built, to the intolerant Ḥanbalī ruling that they might neither be erected nor be restored when damaged or ruined. Some legists held that the privileges varied according to treaty rights: in towns taken by force no new houses of prayer might be erected by *dhimmīs*, but, if a special treaty had been made, the building of new churches and synagogues was allowed. But, like so many of the lucubrations of Muslim legists, these prescriptions bore but little relation to actual facts. Schoolmen might agree that the *dhimmīs* could build no houses of prayer in a city of Muslim foundation, but the civil authority permitted the Copts to erect churches in the new capital of Cairo. The fact that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz (717–720) ordered the destruction of all recently constructed churches, and that more than a century later the fanatical al-Mutawakkil (847–861) had to repeat the same order, shows how little the prohibition of the building of new churches was put into force; and both Christian and Muhammadan historians record numerous instances of the erection of new churches, some of them buildings of great magnificence.[1] Al-Muqtadir (908–932) even gave orders himself for the rebuilding of some churches at Ramlah in Palestine, which had been destroyed by Muhammadans during a riot.[2]

Muslim law made death the punishment for apostasy (*q.v.*), and the convert to Islām was not allowed to return to his former faith, but instances are not unknown of a more tolerant view vindicating freedom of conscience in such cases.

Even the mad Ḥākim (996–1020), whose persecutions caused many Jews and Christians to abandon their faith, ordered the churches that had been destroyed to be rebuilt, and the property settled on the churches that had been taken from the Christians to be restored to them, and allowed the unwilling converts to return to their old faith.[3] It is stated by more than one Muhammadan writer that Moses Maimonides under the fanatical rule of the Almohads in Spain feigned conversion to Islām, but fled to Egypt and there openly declared himself to be a Jew; that towards the end of his life a Muslim jurisconsult from Spain denounced him for his apostasy and demanded that the extreme penalty of the law should be inflicted on him for this offence; but the case was quashed by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. 'Alī (one of the most famous of Muslim judges and prime minister of Saladin), who authoritatively declared that a man who had been converted to Islām by force could not rightly be considered to be a Muslim.[4] Jewish writers, jealous for the honour of their great co-religionist, have disputed the accuracy of this story, though the first who narrates it, Ibn al-Qifṭī, was himself a contemporary of Maimonides;[5] but in reference to Muhammadan toleration it is of interest to note that the decision of al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil is reported without contradiction or condemnation. In the same spirit, when Ghāzān, ilkhān of Persia (1295–1304), discovered that the Buddhist monks who had become Muhammadans at the beginning of his reign (when their temples had been destroyed) only made a pretence of being converted, he granted permission to all those who so wished to return to Tibet, where among their Buddhist fellow-countrymen they would be free once more to follow their own faith. J. B. Tavernier[6] tells a similar story of some Jews of Ispahan who were so grievously persecuted by the governor 'that either by force or cunning he caused them to turn Mahometans; but the king (Shāh 'Abbās II. [1642–1667]), understanding that only power and fear had constrained them to turn, suffer'd them to resume their own religion and to live in quiet.' The Yazīdīs who were forced to accept Islām under the oppressive rule of Badr Khān Beg in 1844, were permitted by an imperial firman to return to their own creed three years later.[7]

The practice of Muhammadan governments seems, generally, to have been to leave to each separate protected community the management of its internal affairs, and to permit the religious leaders to administer the laws as to marriage, inheritance, etc., in accordance with the ordinances of the particular faith as accepted by the persons concerned, in some instances in criminal cases also,[8] though, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, there was no obligation resting on the Muhammadan government to recognize the decisions of such a judge or on the *dhimmīs* to conform to them.[9] But, if an appeal was made to the Muslim judge, he would decide the case on the basis of the Qur'ān and Muslim law, and some jurists held that the State could even insist on the application of Muslim law in cases of inheritance in which the public treasury would thereby derive more benefit than if the special law of the *dhimmīs* concerned

[1] *Fatḥ al-Qarīb*, ed. L. W. C. van den Berg, Leyden, 1894, p. 625 f.

[2] *Ḥāshiya 'alā sharḥ Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī*, Cairo, 1879, p. 326.

[3] T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*[2], p. 329.

[4] ii. 37–54, ed. O. H. Graf, Vienna, 1858, p. 142 f.

[5] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan), vol. ix. p. 767.

[1] For examples see Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*[2], pp. 66–68.

[2] Eutychius, *Annales*, ed. L. Cheikho, Paris, 1906–09, ii. 82.

[3] Ibn Khallikān, *Biographical Dictionary*, tr. MacGuckin de Slane, Paris, 1843–71, iii. 451.

[4] Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ta'rīkh al-Ḥukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert, Leipzig, 1903, p. 318, line 5, p. 319, lines 16–19; Abu'l Faraj, *Ta'rīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, Beirut, 1890, p. 417 f.; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'ah, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, ed. A. Müller, Königsberg, 1884, ii. 117.

[5] See A. Berliner, 'Zur Ehrenrettung des Maimonides,' in *Moses ben Maïmon: sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss. Zur Erinnerung an den siebenhundertsten Todestag des Maimonides*, Leipzig, 1914, ii. 103 ff.

[6] *Six Voyages through Tartary to Persia and the East Indies*, Eng. tr., London, 1677, p. 160.

[7] G. P. Badger, *The Nestorians and their Rituals*, London, 1852, i. 133 f.

[8] Arnold[2], p. 146.

[9] Mawardī, *Constitutiones Politicæ*, ed. M. Enger, Bonn, 1853, p. 108 f.

were applied.[1] It is recorded of Khayr b. Nu'aym, a judge in Egypt about the middle of the 8th cent., that, after hearing the cases of the Muslims inside the mosque, he would sit on the steps outside the gate in the afternoon and hear the cases of the Christians and Jews, testing the value of the evidence of the witnesses by inquiring into their credibility among their co-religionists.[2]

An important testimony to the toleration of Muslim rule is the fact that persecuted Christian and other sects took refuge in Muhammadan lands, to enjoy there the undisturbed exercise of their several cults. When the Byzantine emperor, Leo, in 714, instituted a persecution against the Montanists and the Jews, forcibly compelling them to submit to baptism, while some burnt themselves alive rather than suffer the loss of religious freedom, others fled for safety into the neighbouring Arab territory.[3] The persecuted Spanish Jews at the end of the 15th cent. took refuge in Turkey in enormous numbers.[4] The Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical house of Hapsburg;[5] and the Protestants of Silesia in the 17th cent. looked with longing eyes towards Turkey and would gladly have purchased religious freedom at the price of submission to Muslim rule.[6] The Cossacks, who belonged to the sect of the Old Believers and were persecuted by the Russian State Church in 1736, found in the dominions of the sultan the toleration which their Christian brethren denied them.[7]

Of toleration in the Muhammadan world generally it may be said that it was more operative in the earlier centuries of the Hijra than in the days of the decline of the khalifate or the unhappy period of the Mongol conquests or in modern times when the pressure of Christian Powers exasperated Muslim feeling. The civil government has as a rule been more tolerant than the clergy, and the regulations of jurists have seldom been put into force with all their rigour; though practice has varied with time and place, the persecutions[8] that have occurred have been excited by some special and local circumstances rather than inspired by a settled principle of intolerance. The judgment of A. de Gobineau is on the whole justified by the facts of history:

'Si l'on sépare la doctrine religieuse de la nécessité politique qui souvent a parlé et agi en son nom, il n'est pas de religion plus tolérante, on pourrait presque dire plus indifférente sur la foi des hommes, que l'Islam. Cette disposition organique est si forte qu'en dehors des cas où la raison d'Etat mise en jeu a porté les gouvernements musulmans à se faire arme de tout pour tendre à l'unité de foi, la tolérance la plus complète a été la règle fournie par le dogme. . . . Qu'on ne s'arrête pas aux violences, aux cruautés commises dans une occasion ou dans une autre. Si on y regarde de près, on ne tardera pas à y découvrir des causes toutes politiques ou toutes de passion humaine et de tempérament chez le souverain ou dans les populations. Le fait religieux n'y est invoqué que comme prétexte et, en réalité, il reste en dehors.'[9]

To this sober conclusion of the historian may be added the eloquent outburst of one of the Spanish Muhammadans who was driven out of his native country on the occasion of the last expulsion of the Moriscoes in 1610:

'Did our victorious ancestors ever once attempt to extirpate Christianity out of Spain, when it was in their power? Did they not suffer your forefathers to enjoy the free use of their rites at the same time that they wore their chains? Is not the absolute injunction of our Prophet, that whatsoever nation is conquered by Musalman steel, should, upon the payment of a moderate annual tribute, be permitted to persevere in their own pristine persuasion, how absurd soever, or to embrace whatever belief they themselves best approved of? If there may have been some examples of forced conversions, they are so rare as scarce to deserve mentioning, and only attempted by men who had not the fear of God, and the Prophet, before their eyes, and who, in so doing, have acted directly and diametrically contrary to the holy precepts and ordinances of Islam which cannot, without sacrilege, be violated by any who would be held worthy of the honourable epithet of Musalman. . . . You can never produce, among us, any bloodthirsty, formal tribunal, on account of different persuasions in points of faith, that anywise approaches your execrable Inquisition. Our arms, it is true, are ever open to receive all who are disposed to embrace our religion; but we are not allowed by our sacred Alcoran to tyrannize over consciences. Our proselytes have all imaginable encouragement, and have no sooner professed God's Unity and His Apostle's mission but they become one of us, without reserve; taking to wife our daughters, and being employed in posts of trust, honour and profit; we contenting ourselves with only obliging them to wear our habit, and to seem true believers in outward appearance, without ever offering to examine their consciences, provided they do not openly revile or profane our religion: if they do that, we indeed punish them as they deserve; since their conversion was voluntarily, and was not by compulsion.'[1]

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TOLSTÓY.— 1. Early life and manhood.—Lev Nikoláevich Tolstóy (1828–1910), novelist, social reformer, and religious mystic, was born on 28th Aug. (O.S.), 1828, at Yásnaya Polyána ('Bright Glade'), the home of the family, in the government of Tula, about 130 miles south of Moscow. Lev was the youngest of four sons. His mother having died when he was three, and his father five or six years later, the boy went in 1840 to the university town of Kazán in eastern Russia, where he lived under the charge of an aunt, whom he held in grateful remembrance. After two years' study he left the university without a degree. The blame is usually laid upon the professors, but some portion of it must be attributed to Tolstóy's own dissipated and irregular life. Returning to his estate, he interested himself in the life of his peasants, with the disappointing results recorded some years later in his *A Morning of a Landed Proprietor* (1856). He admits that he did not really know their life, and that he was aiming at their betterment only from the outside. It was, however, the beginning of that interest in 'the people' which led him at last to throw in his lot with the peasants and the poor. In 1851, to escape from the idle dissipation of his class, he fled to the Caucasus, where he wrote his earliest works—*Childhood*, *A Morning of a Landed Proprietor*, and *The Incursion*—and planned *The Cossacks*, sold ten years later to pay a gambling debt.

Childhood (1852), *Boyhood* (1854), and *Youth*

[1] *REJ* xxix. [1894] 209–211.
[2] Al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-Quḍāh*, ed. R. Guest, London, 1912, p. 351.
[3] Michael the Elder, ii. 489–490; Theophanes, *Chronographia* (*PG* cviii. 810, 812).
[4] La Jonquière, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, new ed., ii. 501.
[5] *Ib.* i. 266; J. Scheffler, *Türcken-Schrifft*, 1664, § 45 f.; T. Gasztowtt, *La Pologne et l'Islam*, Paris, 1907, p. 51.
[6] Scheffler, § 48. [7] La Jonquière, ii. 482.
[8] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
[9] *Les Religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie centrale*, Paris, 1865, p. 24 f.

[1] J. Morgan, *Mahometism Explained*, London, 1723–25, ii 297 ff., 345.

(1856) form an autobiographical fragment, thinly disguised under fictitious names. Here, as elsewhere, Tolstóy doubles himself, to bring out the dual nature, the natural and the spiritual man of which he was always conscious in himself. Irténev represents the lower nature, his friend Nekhlyúdov the higher. The latter reappears in the *Landed Proprietor* and in *Resurrection*, just as in *War and Peace* Pierre Bezúkhi, and in *Anna Karénin* Konstantín Levín, are Tolstóy himself in that struggle between flesh and spirit which ended only with life. There is truth in Leo Wiener's statement that even the Christ of his religious writings is still the image of the author, and that 'it is Christ-Tolstóy that becomes the final and lasting stage of his spiritual evolution.'[1] This autobiographical fragment reveals Tolstóy as an awkward child, morbidly sensitive to his appearance; a boy, confessing frankly every shade of evil in his heart, such as the rise of sexual feeling; and a youth 'in search of an ideal,' whose one faith was in the possibility of virtuous perfectibility. Beyond this, his creed, though retaining the forms of the Orthodox Church, had become dust, ready to crumble at a touch. Yet we see the beginnings of many things which appear and reappear in his writings to the end—a shame of being rich while others want, a deep hatred of injustice, and the clear poetic vision of Nature and her loveliness.

The Cossacks (1863) represents Tolstóy's revulsion from the artificial and vicious life of cities and his class. The natives had their vices, but they sinned naturally and frankly, and thus escaped the deeper corruption of hidden immorality. In contrast with their bold outdoor life, Tolstóy saw himself (the Olénin of the story) as a degenerate weakling.

Joining the army in 1851, Tolstóy commanded a battery at Sevastopol; and in his three sketches —*Sevastopol in December, 1854*, *Sevastopol in May, 1855*, *Sevastopol in August, 1855*—we find the seeds of thought that were to fructify in his *War and Peace*, and many an indignant denunciation of the violence by which nations are governed. The conviction of the sheer wickedness and brutality of war sank deep into his soul and grew with the years. The sketches probably saved his life; by the emperor's orders the young man was removed to a place of safety. On the fall of Sevastopol in 1855 he was sent with dispatches to St. Petersburg, and his career as a soldier came to an end.

Of this period, and up to his marriage in 1862, Tolstóy could never afterwards think without shame. Between 1857 and 1861 he travelled in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, England, and Belgium, to study their educational methods, wrote many books on education, and started schools for peasant children on his estate. Yet alongside this generous interest in 'the people' the tides of the passions of the natural man never ceased to flow. His own words in his *My Confession*[2] frankly reveal this moral duality:

'I cannot recall those years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to duels to kill; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour of the peasants; I punished them, fornicated, and cheated. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder—there was not a crime which I did not commit, and for all that I was praised, and my contemporaries have regarded me as a comparatively moral man. Thus I lived for ten years.'

On 23rd Sept. 1862 Tolstóy married Sófiya, second daughter of a Dr. Behrs of Moscow, who bore him thirteen children, several of whom died in infancy. Fifteen years of unbroken domestic happiness followed. Tolstóy was busy with his schools, his works on education, the management of his estate, and, above all, the writing of his greatest novels, *War and Peace* (1864–69) and *Anna Karénin* (1873–77), in which appear all the problems round which his mind never ceased to work—war, the peasants, the land and the serfs, education, the universal duty of manual labour, and, at the root of all, religion and the ethical duties flowing therefrom. Then suddenly, to the dismay of the literary world, Tolstóy cast aside the art in which he was acknowledged the greatest living master, and devoted the remainder of his life to moral and religious tales for peasants and children, and an examination of the Gospels, the Creed, and the foundations of violence on which he believed the entire system of civil government rested. His literary ambitions had been treason to the deepest convictions of his soul. The literary caste set up to teach what they did not know, and for the sake of his family he had shared their delusions:

'The new conditions of my happy family life completely drew me away from all search for the general meaning of life. All my life during that time was centred in my family, my wife, my children, and, therefore, in cares for the increase of the means of existence. The striving after perfection, which before had given way to the striving after perfection in general, after progress, now gave way simply to the striving after making it as comfortable as possible for me and my family. Thus another fifteen years passed.'[1]

The struggle to break away from this treason to the higher life led to great family unhappiness, and ultimately to his mysterious and tragic end.

2. Ethical and religious ideas.—Tolstóy's principal works after his 'conversion' are *My Confession* (1879–82), *Critique of Dogmatic Theology* (1880–82), *The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated* (3 vols., 1880–82), *My Religion* (1884), *What shall we do then?* (1884–86), *Moral and Religious Tales*, *The Kingdom of God is within you* (1893), *What is Art?* (1897), and *Resurrection* (1899), his last great novel, in which he sums up his indictment of Church and State and the entire structure of society. It is from this vast mass of literature that we must now attempt to deduce the religious and ethical convictions into which, with endless vacillations, Tolstóy finally settled.

(1) Tolstóy's fundamental conviction is that the one purpose of life is to know God by bringing all relations of humanity into harmony with His will. In reply to the decree of the Holy Synod which excommunicated him in 1901 he states his creed:

'I believe in God, whom I understand as Spirit, as Love, as the beginning of everything. I believe that He is in me and I in Him. I believe that God's will is most clearly and comprehensibly expressed in the teaching of the man Christ, whom to understand as God and pray to I consider the greatest blasphemy. I believe that the greatest true good of man is the fulfilment of God's will, but His will is this, that men should love one another and in consequence of this should treat others as they wish that others should treat them, as, indeed, it says in the Gospel that in this is all the law and the prophets. I believe that the meaning of the life of every man is, therefore, only in the augmentation of love in himself; that this augmentation of love leads the individual man in this life to a greater and ever greater good, and gives after death a greater good, the greater the love is in man, and at the same time more than anything else contributes to the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world, that is, of an order of life with which the now existing discord, deception, and violence will give way to free agreement, truth, and brotherly love of men among themselves. I believe that there is but one means for success in love, and that is prayer, not public prayer in temples, which is directly forbidden by Christ (Matt. vi. 5–13), but such as Christ has given us an example of,—solitary prayer, which consists in the establishment and strengthening in our consciousness of the meaning of our life and our independence of everything except God's will.'[2]

(2) Tolstóy warns us that, when he calls God 'Father' and speaks of His 'will,' he is not to be understood as meaning that God is a personal being. He admits that, when he prays, he is inconsistent with his doctrine of the impersonality of God: it is a necessity forced on him by the fact that he himself is a person. The doctrine of the Trinity is blasphemy. Metaphysical speculations conceal God; nothing reveals Him but love in its

[1] *Lev N. Tolstóy: an Analysis of his Life and Works* (*Complete Works of Count Tolstóy*, tr. and ed. L. Wiener, xxiv. 293).
[2] Ch. ii. (*Works*, xiii. 8 *f.*).

[1] *My Confession*, ch. iii. (*Works*, xiii. 16).
[2] *Answer to the Decree of the Synod* (*Works*, xxiii. 235 *f.*).

application to human life. The fundamental idea of *The Kingdom of God is within you* is that God is, in every man, the revelation of life and the power by which man lives and acts upon the world. Whatever approves itself to the God within has divine sanction and right. Since God thus acts naturally through man, miracles are impossible.

(3) Tolstóy's conception of Christ passed through many fluctuations. In the Crimea he dreamed of a new Christianity 'purged of dogma and mysticism,' giving happiness here on earth. At his brother Nikoláy's funeral he projected 'a Life of Christ as a Materialist.' After reading a German work on the Gospels he inclined to agree with the author that Christ never existed. In the end, while admitting His existence, he denied indignantly His divinity. 'To recognise Christ as God is to renounce God.'[1] On the theory of His divinity the Temptation becomes absurd—'God is tempted by God Himself.' The miraculous Birth is an invention to cover His mother's shame. The Resurrection is 'a trite, contemptible invention,' contrary to reason and needing the invention of other miracles to support it. He is 'the living Christ' only in the sense in which all men live on in the spirits of those who come after them. Jesus is grouped with other great religious teachers of the world, such as Confucius, Buddha, Lao-tse. These views are asserted with a peculiar earnestness: 'I am standing with one foot in the grave, and I have no need to feign.' The truth is that Tolstóy had almost a personal interest in thus emphasizing the human side of Christ: he found in it those elements of wavering of which he was conscious in himself. The Temptation, the shrinking of His soul at the visit of the Greeks, the agony in the Garden, the cry 'My God, my God' on the Cross, seemed to bring Him nearer to his own weaknesses and vacillations. There was even a moment, he held, when Christ resolved to use violence against violence and advised His followers to sell their garments and buy swords; and it was only in the Garden that He was able to overcome the terrible temptation by prayer.

(4) Tolstóy's attitude to Scripture settled down into acceptance of nothing that did not commend itself to the God within himself. The OT is non-essential to Christianity. The Church doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture—myths, miracles, contradictions, immoral stories, and all—only commits the soul to untruth. Yet he admired the OT stories and the Gospel parables as the highest form of art, taught them to the peasant children in his schools, and advocated that cheap unabridged copies be given them, not one word omitted:

> 'The book of the childhood of the race will always be the best book of the childhood of each man. . . . There is no book like the Bible to open up a new world to the pupil and to make him without knowledge love knowledge.'[2]

After giving elaborate interpretations of the Four Gospels, he warns his readers against all interpretations: let each man read for himself in the spirit of a little child. To get nearer the original meaning he learned Greek; and he used his new-found instrument in the most uncritical and arbitrary way. The Four Gospels were the heart of the Bible; the Sermon on the Mount was the heart of the Gospels; and a few sayings of Christ formed the heart of the Sermon. Whatever in Scripture did not harmonize with these few sayings and Tolstóy's vast 'private interpretation' of them was set aside without scruple as no part of the true original teaching; and, as one has said, if he cleared away superstitions of the Church, he created others of his own.

[1] *Three Letters on Reason, Faith, and Prayer* (*Works*, xxiii. 472).

[2] *The School at Yásnaya Polyána* (*Works*, iv. 308, 310).

(5) In substance, Tolstóy reduces Christianity to five commandments of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount:

(*a*) *Thou shalt not be angry* (Mt 5^{21-26}).—He takes this prohibition absolutely, omitting 'without a cause.' It forbids, not killing merely, but the anger from which violence flows. In his own experience he found that contempt was the root of anger; and, since contempt was possible only to inferiors, he strove to divest himself of the worldly possessions, standing, and privileges which gave him a false sense of superiority over those who were sons of the one Father. If it be said that Christ in this passage speaks of the penalty of judgment and fire for this sin, Tolstóy replies that He never prescribed this penalty, the mention of which only indicates the severity of His condemnation of it. In his discussion of Mt 23 he does not seem to recognize that Christ's indignation against the Pharisees must be a breach of His own law against anger, if understood in the absolute sense.

(*b*) *Thou shalt not commit adultery* (Mt 5^{27-32}).—Tolstóy interprets the words in v.[32], 'saving for the cause of fornication,' as meaning that the husband by divorcing his wife 'causes her also (as well as himself) to commit adultery.' His views pass through several stages and are influenced by his own early lapses. For the first fifteen years of his married life his ideal for woman was the duty of motherhood. He disapproved of celibacy and held that monogamy is 'the natural law of humanity.' The close of *What shall we do then?* is an impassioned appeal to women to fulfil 'the highest act of life,' the duty of maternity. *Domestic Happiness* (1859), however, warns against basing the happiness of marriage on the romantic fever of the senses called love, from which motherhood is the true escape. This view persists through *War and Peace* and *Anna Karénin*. In the latter a young and beautiful woman, married to a man much older than herself, turns to feed her starved heart to an illicit passion; and the suicide in which she ends is, in the author's intention, far less the punishment of her infidelity to her husband than of her unfaithfulness to her lover and their child—the burning out through jealousy of her lover's affection, and her unworthiness of her own maternity. The *Kreutzer Sonata* (1889) marks the extreme development of his views—a sordid story of the murder of a guilty wife and the acquittal of the husband on the ground that he had merely defended his honour. The title implies that in Tolstóy's view Beethoven's music irritates and hypnotizes soul and sense into crime. His final position is given in his *Epilogue to the Kreutzer Sonata* (1890), written to defend himself against many attacks. In substance, he demands an absolute chastity, whether in the married or in the unmarried life. The teaching of the gospel is 'in the first place that a married man must not be divorced from his wife, in order to take another, and that he must live with the one with whom he has come together (Matt. v. 31–32; xix. 8); in the second place, that for man in general, both married and unmarried man, it is sinful to look upon woman as an object of enjoyment (Matt. v. 28–29), and, in the third place, that for an unmarried man it is better not to marry at all, that is to be absolutely chaste (Matt. xix. 10–12).'[1] He admits, however, that this absolute chastity is not a precept, but an ideal, to which the race is meant to approximate. To the objection that this ideal would annihilate the race he replies coolly, Why not? Both Church and science foretell an end of the world; why should it not come through the increase of virtue?

(*c*) *Thou shalt not swear* (Mt 5^{33-37}).—This means much more than mere simplicity and truth of speech: 'Yea, yea; nay, nay.' Christ forbids us to bind ourselves by an oath to any human power or authority. To do so is to abjure the freedom of conscience, which is the divine within us, and to make ourselves the slaves of a human will which may be the enemy of the will of God. It is the deliberate renunciation of Christianity. In short, this command of Christ strikes at the root of all military power, since all armies rest on an oath of allegiance to some human authority; and this plain command the Church explains away, knowing that, if it were obeyed, the entire structure of society, and its own institution as part of it, would fall to the ground.

(*d*) *Resist not evil* (Mt 5^{38-42} 7^{2-5} etc.).—This doctrine of non-resistance dominates all the rest of Tolstóy's teaching. It was the first command of Christ which he understood, and it opened the meaning of all the others. Physical force, being an outrage on the freedom of conscience, which is the Kingdom of God within the soul, must never be applied to make any man do what he does not wish to do. Compulsory military service, the whole system of civil and criminal law and government, parliaments, courts, judges, police, jails, taxation, even the payment of debts—all stand condemned as unchristian. Property must be abolished, since it rests on force; it is not merely theft, but murder, because human life is the price paid for it. He prophesied the bankruptcy of the present system of violence; and, were he alive, it is conceivable that he would point to the Great War and the horrors of Bolshevism as the fulfilment of his prophecy. Non-resistance is the only way to destroy violence. 'As fire does not put out fire, so evil does not put out evil.' Given a non-resisting community, 'no enemies—neither Germans, nor Turks, nor savages—would kill or torture such people.' His fanatical and uncompromising Russian mind admitted no limits to this doctrine. If he saw a madman attack a child or a horde of savages fall on his own wife and children, this command of Christ forbade him

[1] *Works*, xviii. 430.

absolutely to protect them by force. The worst that can happen by not resisting is death, whereas to resist is to 'act contrary to the law of Christ, which is worse than death.' We need not hesitate to say that this carries the doctrine to the point of insanity. The natural instinct of a normal conscience is to protect the weak and the defenceless from a drunkard or a madman.

(*e*) *Wage no war* (Mt $5^{43-45.\ 48}$, Lk $6^{32ff.}$).—The five commandments of Christ form five widening circles: (1) the individual heart—harbour no anger; (2) man and woman, the family—avoid carnal lust; (3) private worldly relations with others—bind the conscience by no oath or promise; (4) relations to the State—resist no evil by force; (5) the human race—regard no nation as your enemy: 'If they make war on you, submit, do good, and wage no war.' It is absurd to say that Christ, who forbade anger to the individual, now allows anger, and murder which is the fruit of anger, to communities and nations.

From the Sevastopol sketches, on through *War and Peace*, *The Kingdom of God is within you*, and innumerable pamphlets, etc., Tolstóy never ceased to strip war of its 'glory' and to hold up its naked falsity, cruelty, and bestiality. Under all its fine names its true purpose is murder. Three causes are named: '(1) the unequal distribution of property, that is, the robbing of one class of people by another, (2) the existence of a military class, that is, of people educated and destined for murder, and (3) the false, for the most part consciously deceptive, religious teaching, in which the young generations are forcibly educated.'[1] Patriotism is the chief war-criminal—a sentiment fostered by pageants which hypnotize the people into 'loyalty,' by alliances with or against other nations, based on an unreal love and a created hate. There is no such thing as a good patriotism, the aim of all patriotism being that of 'Deutschland über Alles,' to exalt our own nation over others, by violence if need be. It is this sentiment that puts into the hands of rulers a diabolic weapon, making possible military conscription and all the cruelties, atrocities, and bestialization of invasions and battlefields. The one remedy is the substitution for love of country of love for man as man, and the refusal of individuals to submit to military service, be the consequences what they may. Tolstóy had a profound distrust of peace congresses and courts of arbitration, because 'the decision of the court of arbitration against the military violence of the states will be executed by means of military violence.'[2]

(6) Following out his doctrine of human freedom, Tolstóy attacked all current forms of education as the forcible ruin of life and ethics. The schools on his estate were based on absolute freedom. The children came when they pleased, sat where they liked, were at liberty to speak, had no home lessons to torture them. Yet the order and attention were perfect. The teaching included walks in the fields, explanations of natural sights and sounds, history, folk-tales, stories and parables from the Bible, by far the finest instrument of education. Tolstóy wrote a series of tales, which had a great success in Russian schools; but he held that it is the peasant children who can teach us to write, not we them: they are nearer the original harmony of beauty, truth, and goodness than men, whose education has been a system of destroying that harmony. His views are summed up thus:

'I am convinced that the school ought not to interfere in that part of the education which belongs to the family; that the school has no right and ought not to reward and punish; that the best police and administration of a school consist in giving full liberty to the pupils to study and settle their disputes as they know best.'[3]

He opposed 'popular education' because it was not popular, but compulsory, based on violence, and hated by both parents and children, who forgot its artificial results as quickly as they could.

'Schools which are established from above and by force are not a shepherd for the flock, but a flock for the shepherd.'[4]

From infant school to university the system was arbitrary, mechanical, and out of relation to life and its needs. To compel all child-natures to pass through a standardized system, without freedom of choice, is torture. In fine, education has become an elaborate system of demoralizing child-nature, which is good, in the interests of the world and its evils. At an early age it severs the natural bond of parent and child, and of the great mother, Nature herself, and it does so in a way which fosters lying, hypocrisy, and vice, and destroys individuality.

(7) In *What is Art?* Tolstóy sweeps aside with contempt all theories of mere æsthetics and 'art for art's sake,' and reduces the criteria of art to the following: (1) art must spring from a genuine feeling in the artist; (2) this feeling must have the power of infecting others with the same emotion; (3) it must have the power of uniting men by this infection of a common hope, joy, love, or whatever it be; if it separates men, it is not art. The more widely it unifies men, the more worthy is it of the name. 'Upper class art,' dependent on an artificial training, springs from no living infectious emotion in the artist, who has to write, paint, etc., to please his rich patrons, who lead idle, artificial, and parasitic lives. Such art grows ever narrower in its appeal, and its patrons ever prouder of its exclusiveness, whereas 'great works of art are only great because they are accessible and comprehensible to every one,' like the story of Joseph and the parables of Christ. Whole generations of artists, singers, poets, players, artisans, workmen, are practically serfs for the production of false exclusive art—an art which is simply the expression of the pride, sensuality, and weariness of life of the men and women who pay them.

All good art, being universal, depends on universal emotions which unify men by infection. What these are is revealed by 'the religious perception' that all human good is contained in 'the fraternal life of all men, our love-union among ourselves.'

Hence 'the Christian art of our time can be and is of two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception of man's position in the world in relation to God and to his neighbour—religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the simplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible to all men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—universal art. Only these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our time.'[1]

The name of art is denied to emotions which divide men, as patriotism, or religious sectarianism, or the honour given for wealth, education, rank, or profession. The theory has met with much ridicule; but, making allowance for some exaggeration in Tolstóy's dislike of the conventional forms in which every art seeks expression, we may agree with Kropotkin that *What is Art?* is a much-needed protest against the over-artificiality into which modern art has drifted.

(8) Tolstóy's doctrine of the future life may be described as a kind of pantheistic immortality. His novels overflow with studies of death and the process of dying. The higher ranks meet death with reluctance and complaining, the poor with cheerfulness and faith. Of Natálya, the old stewardess in the home of his childhood, he says: 'She executed the best and highest act of this life,—she died without regrets or fear.'[2] During the period of his 'conversion' thoughts of suicide became so strong that he had to hide a rope that hung in his dressing-room and could not trust himself to go out hunting with a gun. There was no meaning in life, no end to which it moved. He was saved from suicide by the discovery that the end was God, God in whom he lived, and moved, and was. The fear of death is a 'superstition' due to the fact that men live in a mere fragment of their own nature and of the world, and this the lower fragment of their carnal and personal being, instead of their rational consciousness in its relation to the sum of things, which is God. Life is given to be a ministry of life to the world, and

[1] *Who is to Blame?*, Letter on the Transvaal War (*Works* xxiii. 458).
[2] *Concerning the Congress of Peace* (*Works*, xxiii. 440).
[3] *The School at Yásnaya Polyána* (*Works*, iv. 237).
[4] *On Popular Education* (*Works*, iv. 15).

[1] *What is Art?*, ch. xvi., tr. Aylmer Maude, London, 1905 (of this tr. Tolstóy in a Preface says: 'I request all who are interested in my views on art only to judge of them by the work in its present shape.' The tr. is from the original MS, and is free from the mutilations of the Russian censor).
[2] *Childhood*, ch. xxviii. (*Works*, i. 136).

it lasts just so long as this ministry is being fulfilled. To cast it away in suicide when it becomes unpleasant to us is sinful, partly because just then is probably the time when this ministration truly begins. Moreover, it is in this life of universal ministry that man finds the only true immortality. Personal immortality is impossible, because true life is the deliberate sacrifice of all personal ends. Resurrection and reincarnation would be nothing better than a return to the carnal and personal relations which are spiritual death. Life is an ever onward movement of reason and love, and the only real death is to arrest the movement at any given point. Live onward beyond the old self, and life becomes a living part of the growing good of the world. This is the life eternal and the only true immortality for man.

3. **The last phase.**—The life of the great Russian ended in a mysterious tragedy of conscience. For many years his life consisted of a struggle to bring his practice into harmony with his principles by escaping from his class, his wealth, his family. In *My Religion*, written in his fifty-sixth year, he lays down five conditions of human happiness: (1) a life that does not break the link with Nature—the open sky, sunlight, fresh air, soil, plants, animals; (2) work, physical labour, giving appetite and sleep; (3) family life; (4) a free and living intercourse with all the various classes of mankind; (5) health, and a natural and painless death. These conditions are open most widely to the peasant, and grow narrower the higher you rise in the privileged classes, the Tsar, *e.g.*, holding intercourse with none but a few of his jailers. Hence Tolstóy's later years were one long effort to transform himself into a peasant; and the asceticism which formed part of his strangely complex nature finally struck out the third condition, the family life. He transferred to his wife the responsibility of managing his estates, and, although he continued to live in the family mansion, it was, as far as possible, as a poor man working with his hands. It was a compromise which gave no peace of conscience. More than once he left his home intending never to return, but family affection always drew him back. The family friction which resulted is portrayed in the form of fiction in *Walk in the Light, while ye have Light* (1888). One's sympathies are not entirely on the husband's side; the countess had much cause for complaining that the burden of the children, the estates, and the publication of his books was transferred to her shoulders. In spite of a true affection between them, they drifted apart.

Tolstóy's actual departure from his home came about through the question of the copyright of his works. From 1882–83 the countess, to counterbalance her husband's neglect of the estates, became the publisher of his writings; and in 1894 she deposited in a public museum for safety large quantities of his manuscripts, producing evidence afterwards that they were given her by Tolstóy. This was done, evidently, to protect herself from a deliberate attempt by one of his disciples, V. G. Tchertkóf, to deprive her of them and of all control of their publication. In 1891 Tolstóy, having convinced himself that to make money by his moral and religious writings was sinful, made public announcement that any one was free to publish his works written from 1881 to the time of his death. About the same time he gave Tchertkóf the right of first publication, in Russian and in English, of his future writings. Although this was almost equivalent to copyright, Tchertkóf was not satisfied with it, and set about a long series of intrigues to induce Tolstóy to make a will in his own favour, and without the knowledge of the countess, on the ground that only through him would his works be published in accordance with his publicly expressed wishes. An unhappy aspect of the affair is that his youngest daughter, Alexandra, was in the intrigue against her mother. After many tentative wills had been drawn up and signed, a final one was made on 22nd July 1910, bequeathing all his productions and the manuscripts themselves into the full possession of his daughter Alexandra. An 'explanatory note' stated his wish that 'all papers extant at the time of his death shall be handed to V. G. Tchertkóf, that he may examine such documents and publish what he may consider suitable.' This will was signed on the stump of a tree near Tchertkóf's house, after a long series of unscrupulous intrigues, and when the old man of eighty-two was fast breaking up in both body and mind. At 5 o'clock on the morning of 28th Oct. 1910 he left his home for ever, accompanied by his daughter Alexandra and his disciple Dr. Makovitsky. His son Ilyá, in his *Reminiscences*[1] of his father, traces his flight to the intolerable moral torture of the dilemma of confessing all to his wife or of repudiating the will. He started with no object but to hide himself somewhere, anywhere. He went first to see his sister Mary, a nun of the Shamárdino convent, and expressed to her his intention of taking a peasant's cottage and living near her; but his daughter, fearing that her mother should discover his whereabouts, carried him off secretly, with the intention of securing a passport and leaving Russia. The old man, however, was nearing his end. At Astápovo he had to be removed to the house of the stationmaster, where he lingered on till the morning of Sunday, 7th Nov. 1910 (20th, N.S.). Tchertkóf, professing to guard him from intrusion, refused to allow the countess—who had learned where he was only through a message from a newspaper office—to see her dying husband until he was in the article of death and past the power of recognizing her.

Thus passed away in darkness the greatest of modern Russians. Nevertheless, he had attained moral and spiritual unity as nearly as was possible to a nature so vast and turbulent. The common idea that his life is broken into two distinct parts is a mistake. His 'conversion' is simply the emerging into clear consciousness of those ideals of truth and right towards which we see him striving even in the midst of his most dissolute life. His fixed idea was God, and, in spite of all appearances, the effort to make God all and in all gave to his life a great and solemn unity. He was like a wild tumultuous river with the fall of the mountains behind it, thwarted by rocks, gorges, precipices, but never ceasing to turn and twist and foam around and over every obstacle in its thirst for the sea.

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TOLTECS.—1. Origins.—The beginnings of the Toltec peoples are enveloped in the fogs of mythology. Their origin is rather mysteriously attributed to the acts of a certain hero-god, Quetzalcoatl ('a twin'), compounded of two words *quetzalli*, a plume of green feathers, and *coatl*, a serpent, in other words, a plumed-serpent (-god). Some wild speculations and pious conjectures have identified him with St. Thomas, and others with the Messiah. Another mysterious hero-god (personage) who has been closely linked with Quetzalcoatl was Votan, the reputed founder of the civilization of the Mayas, for a time a contemporary and rival people with the Toltecs.

In the pre-Toltec period of history in Mexico and Central America the Nahua and the Maya were the two leading civilizations. Quetzalcoatl, the plumed-serpent divinity, was the creator of man,[2] the founder of the new order of things among the Nahua peoples. Like the Maya peoples of Yucatan and Central America, the Nahuas did not confine

[1] *Reminiscences of Tolstoy*, Eng. tr., London, 1914.
[2] Bancroft, *NR* iii. 272, 275.

their colonies or activities to any one area of territory, though their main settlement was on the plateau of Mexico. In the 6th and 7th centuries the Toltec Chichimec tribes, representing the Nahua power, migrated from Central America and settled down on the Mexican plateau, in proximity to the wonderful lakes of that region.[1] Of the Nahua tribes who made their homes in this region the Toltecs were one of the prominent sections, the beginnings of whose separate and independent existence cannot be sharply depicted.

2. **History.**—At the opening of historic times the Toltecs were in possession of Anáhuac (a section of the plateau of Mexico) and outlying territory. While the civilization was old, the name Toltec was new, possibly derived from Tollan or Tulan, the original capital of the empire. The boundary lines of the Toltec sovereignty cannot be fixed, though it probably did not exceed that of the Aztec domain of later times. It is thought to have extended so far west as to have covered Michoacan, which was never conquered by the Aztecs, and stretched eastward to the Gulf of Mexico, including also the Totonac territory of Vera Cruz. The many tribes and peoples of which the Toltec empire was composed cannot be identified by name with any of the later nations found in Anáhuac. Outside the so-called Toltec empire, the peoples, particularly in the north, were regarded as barbarians and were popularly known as Chichimecs.

From the 7th to the 12th cent. the Toltec empire was in the main ruled by a confederacy which resembled the alliance of a later time between Mexico, Tezcuco, and Tlacopan with capitals at Culhuacan, Otompan, and Tollan respectively. Each capital in its turn became the dominant force in the confederacy. Tollan on the river Quetzalatl is reputed to have reached the highest point in culture, splendour, and fame. It is now represented by the little village of Tula, about 30 miles north-west of the city of Mexico. Culhuacan was the only one of the three capitals of the confederacy to survive by name the bloody revolution by which the empire was finally overthrown, and to maintain anything of her earlier greatness. The confusion and often contradiction between the numerous reports and records and manuscripts of the native and Spanish writers lays a heavy burden upon a historian; but Bancroft and Nadaillac are apparently faithful to the best evidence available in those writers. Let us make a survey of the history and constitution of the Toltec empire, so called, during its five centuries of domination in the central plateau of Mexico, based on the representations of Bancroft and Nadaillac.[2]

The pre-eminent personage in the beginnings of this new agglomeration of tribes and peoples was Hueman the prophet. It was through his line that a powerful priesthood ruled the destinies of the Toltec empire from its inception to its downfall. The government was in reality a theocratic republic, in which each leader directed his own tribe both in war and in peace, but all were more or less subservient to their spiritual leader in all matters of national import. Seven years after the arrival of these peoples in Tollan the heads of families and chiefs met in assembly and decided to change their form of government, and establish a monarchy, in order to consolidate their strength against any possible future challenge to their rights as a people. On the advice of Hueman, the chiefs sent an embassy to the reigning king of the Chichimecs to ask for a son or other relative to be crowned king over the Toltecs, accompanied by a specific requirement or agreement on the part of the Chichimec king that the Toltecs should ever be a free and independent people, owing no allegiance whatever to the Chichimecs, although the two powers would enter into an alliance for mutual defence and aid. The Chichimec king was only too ready to seize such an opportunity, and sent back with the embassy his second son with the required guarantees, to be crowned first king of the Toltecs at Tollan under the royal name of Chalchiuh Tlatonac, 'shining precious stone.' This young king, by his splendid bearing, fine character, intelligence, and amiability, immediately won the admiration and affection of the people. His coronation and accession to the throne took place about the first quarter of the 8th cent., between 710 and 720.[1] Immediately after his accession the young king and his counsellors laid down a law that the time limit of a king should be 52 years, at the end of which he should abdicate in favour of his oldest son, to whom he might, however, act as adviser. If the king should die before the time limit had been reached, the unexpired term should be filled by magistrates elected by the people. The next task of the king was to find a wife to provide an heir to the throne, so that the dynasty might be perpetuated. The amiable young king left this choice entirely to his subjects—at least so the records say—to their joyful satisfaction. Their choice fell upon the daughter of Acapichtzin, who himself had been a candidate for the throne when it was proposed to found a kingdom. Two Nahua documents give a rival story of the beginnings of the monarchy, but the main features are not so widely different.[2]

Chalchiuh Tlatonac, the first Toltec king, died at the end of 52 years and was buried in the chief temple, about A.D. 771. His son and successor was Ixtlilcuechahuac. He had a peaceful and prosperous reign. The signal event of his rule, and near its conclusion, was a meeting of all the wise men under the direction of the old prophet Hueman. This assembly collected all the Toltec ancient and modern documents, and after a prolonged conference and careful investigation, compiled the *Teoamoxtli*, 'book of God.' On its pages they inscribed the Nahua annals from the creation down; also their religious rites, their governmental system, laws, and social customs; their methods of agriculture; their arts and sciences, and especially astrology; their methods of computing time and interpreting their writings. To these wealthy pages was added a chapter on the forecast of the future events of the kingdom, including the disaster through which it was crushed and destroyed.

The third king, Huetzin, succeeded to the throne about 823. The fourth king, Totepeuh, sometimes given as the second king of Culhuacan, came to his father's throne at the end of 52 years; and handed it down at the same time limit to his son Nacaxoc, the fifth king at Tollan, who was succeeded by Nauhyotl, or Mitl. This sixth reign stretched over 59 years. During all these six reigns there was great advance made in building new cities, beautifying old cities, erecting new temples, one of especial magnificence at Quauhnahuac and another at Tollan rivalling even the Temple of the Sun at Teotihuacan, a city which surpassed Tollan in extent and beauty. These more than 300 years saw the Toltec empire well and prosperously established over a large territory and many peoples.

Looking back at some of the details of those reigns, we gather a few significant facts. The annals of Culhuacan mention Totepeuh (the fourth Toltec king) as the second king of that city. He waged several successful wars, notably in the province of Huitznahuac, where he found, conquered, and married a princess Chimalman, who bore him an heir named Ceacatl Quetzalcoatl. This notable scion of the royal family succeeded in establishing certain laws of succession which prevailed down to the end of the empire; but the most far-reaching act was the conclusion of an alliance between the crowns of Culhuacan, Otompan, and Tollan. Each king was to be independent in his own domain; but in affairs of general interest the three rulers were to constitute a council, in which the king of Culhuacan was to rank first, with a title almost equivalent to emperor. Otompan took the second rank and Tollan the third. The date of the formation of this confederacy or empire was about A.D. 856.

After Quetzalcoatl had ruled in Culhuacan about ten years, he met obstinate opposition to his authority from his enemies. He was a radical reformer whose ideas ran counter to those of the reigning pontiffs. He modified much of the religious ritual and abolished human sacrifices. These sacrifices had had a first place from pre-Toltec times at Teotihuacan, and more or less general acceptance in Culhuacan and Tollan. He absolutely prohibited them in the temples of Tollan, and so stirred up the enmity of the powerful priesthood of Otompan and Culhuacan. The nobility of Tollan also, who resented the curbing of their religious liberties, became jealous of their brothers of equal rank among other peoples of the empire. Nevertheless, Tollan became the metropolis of the confederacy. In the magnificence of her palaces and temples, in the skill and fame of her artists, if not in her population, Tollan surpassed all her rivals on the plateau. This was too much for the other centres, and active aggressive opposition, political,

[1] *NR* v. ch. iii.
[2] *Pre-historic America*, Eng. tr., new ed., London, 1895.

[1] *NR* v. 244 ff. [2] *Ib.* v. 248-250.

magical, and religious, raised its weapons of warning. Quetzalcoatl's aversion to the shedding of blood is said to have caused the abandonment of his throne, against the ardent wishes of his more warlike friends, and his crossing over to the eastern part of the plateau of Huitzilapan in 895. His successor in Tollan, Nacaxoc, known under several other names, was the fifth king of the Toltecs.

The reign of Nauhyotl, or Mitl, the sixth king of Tollan, was marked with great prosperity and peace. His entire energy and strength were devoted to the promotion of the glory of his city, where he re-affirmed and carried out the reforms of his predecessor. Cholula, a rival sacred city, really stirred him to vigorous action, in building greater temples and more attractive shrines to prevent pilgrimages from Tollan to the rival city. He also built superb temples in other provinces to the south outside the boundaries of Anáhuac.

Nauhyotl, or Mitl, at his death, was succeeded by his queen, Xiuhtlaltzin, who reigned four years. She showed wonderful wisdom and skill in her direction of public affairs, and her death was greatly lamented by her subjects. Her son and successor was Matloccoatl, whose reign covered 949 to 973; he was succeeded by Tlilcoatzin, who ruled from 973 to 994, and who was followed by Tecpancaltzin. The records of this period are almost a blank, except that in Culhuacan Quetzallacxoyatl was succeeded in 953 by Chalchiuh Tlatonac (II.) and the latter in 985 by Totepeuh, the second king of that name.

We now approach the period when the Toltec empire was descending the slopes of ruin. The annals of this period are scarlet with the sanguinary struggles between the powerful tribes and bands from the north and north-west and the civil and religious authorities of the empire. The extensive records of the period of the downfall of the Toltec empire are confusion worse confounded. They abound with tales of marvel and mystery, as if intending to throw dust into the eyes of the reader.

Spanish writers still speak of Tollan as the empire, but Nahua documents find in that city the 'occurrences which caused the destruction of the Toltec power.' Whether this is the truth or not, it seems that a battle was fought between the king of Culhuacan and the king of Tollan, and, while this contest was going on outside the city, a party of invaders was admitted into Tollan. Civil strife followed in the streets between three rival sects, until the city itself was nearly in ruins. The three allied powers fought each other, and later there came a period of famine and pestilence in the land. These events occurred between 1040 and 1047.

Defence was so weakened, the reins of government so loosened, that dependencies took advantage of their opportunity to renounce Toltec authority and declare their independence.

The other Toltec cities of power, Culhuacan, Otompan, and Tezcuco, seem to have gone down before Tollan. Invaders from the north and north-west, from the powerful Chichimec tribes and Nahua peoples, fell upon the weakened Toltecs without mercy and took possession of all their cities and territory. The cities of the confederacy were plundered and burned except Culhuacan, whose king seems to have made a 'delivering' alliance, about A.D. 1000.

The Toltec power was overthrown. The last years of its struggle for existence are inextricably mixed. Plots, intrigues, battles, invasions, assassinations, blot the escutcheon of the once noble kings of the Toltec empire. Many of the nobility of the Toltecs are said to have migrated before the storm burst. They went to foreign provinces with their families, their treasures, and their other movable wealth. But the Toltec peoples of the humbler classes remained in Anáhuac. Some of them are said to have maintained a national existence for a time in Culhuacan, and possibly in Cholula. But they finally became the subjects of the invaders, whose language and customs were probably identical with their own. Even the sanguinary records do not warrant us in believing that the Toltecs as reported were reduced to merely a few thousands in number. The Toltec collapse was the fall of an empire, not the annihilation of a nation. The succeeding period was a struggle to secure the authority which fell from the hands of the Toltec rulers.

3. **Physical features and culture.**—The Toltecs, we are told,[1] were tall, well built, with clear yellow complexions; their eyes were black, their teeth white, their hair black and glossy, their lips thick, their noses aquiline, and their foreheads receding. They had thin beards, and little hair on their bodies. Their mouths made an agreeable impression, but their facial expression was severe. They were brave, cruel, and vengeful, and their religious rites were sanguinary.

They were intelligent, eager to learn, and are said to have been the first [in Mexico] to construct roads and aqueducts; they used the ordinary metals except iron, cut precious stones, built houses of stone laid up in lime mortars; knew how to spin, weave, and dye cloth; and built mounds similar to those found so plentifully in the Mississippi valley.[2] Their cities were marvels of construction, beauty, and durability. Their temples were ornate with sculptured bas-reliefs and hieroglyphics, cut in porphyry, basalt, and obsidian.

Their commerce was important and pioneering. Their products were exhibited yearly at fairs, spread before the public in the cities of Tollan and Cholula. Though they seemed not to have used iron, they did work in gold, silver, copper, tin, and lead. They were skilled in making fine jewellery, in which precious stones, such as emeralds, turquoises, and amethysts, were mounted. Cholula was famous for its pottery in the form of vases, utensils for the house, idols for the temples, and ornaments for the people.

The weapons used by the Toltecs were slings, bows and arrows, spears, and darts pointed with silex, obsidian, porphyry, copper, or bone. The warriors wore padded cotton armour, practically impenetrable to arrows or javelins, and so heavy that a warrior once fallen could not always get up again. Their round shields of light flexible bamboo were decorated with feathers and covered with cloth or the skins of animals which they had killed in hunting. The shields of the chiefs were decorated with plaques of gold as a mark of their rank.

4. **Human sacrifice.** — Prisoners of war were often sacrificed to their gods. Funeral ceremonies were also accompanied by the burning of women upon the funeral pile of their husbands; this the women joyfully accepted because it opened to them the door into the first celestial sphere, where they could follow their husbands and thus avoid Mictlan, a gloomy and solitary abode.

5. **Religion.**—The religious system of the Toltecs is a chaos of ceremonies and ritual, so entangled with the pre-Toltec era and modified in the subsequent Chichimec-Aztec period that little definite and specific can be affirmed beyond those items already mentioned above in § 2. Even the many extracts from native and Spanish writers given by Bancroft and Nadaillac convey merely a hazy idea of the so-called religious systems of the Nahua nations of which the Toltecs were a part. Their multitudinous polytheism only adds to the confusion and attests that religion, mysticism, and mythology were such a conglomerate of everyday life that even the alleged documents of native writers could not disentangle them.

6. **Calendar and hieroglyphic language.**—The so-called Mexican calendar, found on a block of porphyry uncovered in the old city of Mexico in 1790, probably supplies us with the Aztec astronomical cycle. The Mexicans kept a solar year, and a lunar year only for religious holidays; the latter was divided into periods of thirteen days, corresponding to the phases of the moon.[3] The Toltecs (and Mayas) had a month of twenty days, apparently based on the normal number of a man's fingers and toes.[4] The key to the ancient hieroglyphic language of the peoples of Mexico and Central America, as found on their great monuments at Palenque and Copan and other remarkable ruins, is practically lost.[5] A few signs are known, but, until a sure key is established, we shall have to rely mainly on the native sources, as reported to and by Spanish writers, for any information regarding the hieroglyphic era of the pre-Aztec, and even of the Aztec, peoples.

Even the most comprehensive works on the Toltecs are inadequate and insufficient in method to clear up the problems that native and Spanish authors pour out on the table of the modern student of ancient Mexico.

[1] Nadaillac, p. 275 f. [2] *NR* i. 24. [3] Nadaillac, p. 306.
[4] See art. CALENDAR (Mexican and Mayan).
[5] *NR* ii. 119.

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I. M. PRICE.

TOMB.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.

TONGANS.—1. Introduction.—Tonga—or at least the Tonga of this article—is the name of a group of islands in the Western Pacific, lying to the north of New Zealand, the east of New Caledonia, and the south of Fiji and Samoa. It is sometimes known as the Friendly Isles, the name given it by Captain Cook. The Tongans who inhabit this group are a tiny nation of the Polynesian race. Although few in number—about 20,000 only—their nationality is clearly marked, and they can easily be distinguished from their neighbours the Fijians and Samoans. Typical Tongans are tall, large-limbed, of a light coffee colour, with upright forehead and straight hair; but a little acquaintance with them shows that there has been an admixture with a race that was short and had receding foreheads. This agrees with their traditions, which state that, when the Tongans came to the group, some five or six centuries ago, it was already occupied by an aboriginal race. Traces of these have been found in one of the volcanic islands, but the vestiges have not been scientifically examined. Still it is clear that the Tongans, and Polynesians generally, have emigrated from a distance; and the most probable theory is that of Fornander, that they came from the head of the Persian Gulf.

Old navigators used to speak of the Tongans as 'the most splendid savages in existence,' and they were certainly the terror of the neighbouring groups, all of which are said to have been once conquered by them. They acknowledge themselves to be mentally inferior to the European; but it cannot be said that they come very far behind; and occasionally students at Tubou College have achieved results that could be equalled only by the best pupils in English schools. A fair measure of the size of their brains may surely be found in their language, which contains, it is estimated, at least 10,000 words in use. The verbs have about 20 voices, and the pronouns are developed to such an amazing extent that there are more than 100 ways of saying 'our,' against two in English, 'our' and 'our own.' As the adjectives, too, have many degrees of comparison, and there are more than two articles, shades of meaning can be produced to an almost infinite extent. That the Bible translates well into a language like this is not surprising; but geometrical treatises, and such works as Milton's *Paradise Lost*, can also be well rendered.

Physically, then, and mentally, the Tongans stand high; and it comes as a surprise that their spiritual development, as represented by their old religion, was low. Their pantheon was a medley, and their theology unredeemed by any gleams of philosophy as in the religion of India.

2. The gods of Tonga may be divided into three classes.

(1) In common with other parts of Polynesia, their great gods comprise the two groups of the Tangaloa and the Maui (pronounced Mow-y: Mow as in *now*). The *Tangaloa* were the earlier group, and consisted of Tangaloa 'Eiki ('Lord Tangaloa,' or 'Tangaloa the Elder'), Tangaloa Tufunga ('Tangaloa the Smith, Carpenter, or Artificer,' who made axes and built canoes), and Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo ('Tangaloa the Sender-forth-of-sound'). The *Maui* group consisted of five persons: Maui Motu'a ('Old Maui,' or 'Maui the Father'), Maui Loa ('Maui the Tall'), Maui Buku ('Maui the Short'), and Maui 'Atalanga ('Maui the Vigorous Planter'). This last had a son called Maui Kijikiji (pronounced Kitsikitsi: 'Maui the Violent, the Mischievous'), who was, of course, the grandson of Maui Motu'a.

There were, however, older gods than any of these. One was called Tama-bo'uli-ala-mafoa ('Son-of-the-Darkness-that-can-have-a-dawn'). Some accounts represent him as the original deity. Another of the primitive gods was 'Eitu-matubu'a ('Eitu-of-the-olden-time'). He is spoken of as the father of the Tongan people. Another of these gods was Hikule'o, the Tongan Satan. *Hikule'o* means 'the echo,' and there is no doubt that this was the original signification of the name; but as it *might* mean 'Watching Tail,' the legend grew up that the tail of this deity was so long that when he, the god, went about, the tail kept watch at home. But even now the Tongans, when they hear an echo, say it is Hikule'o walking in the woods; and the other explanation was evidently an afterthought.

These with others were the original gods of Tonga. By and by a division of departments took place. To the Tangaloa was assigned the Sky (or Heaven); to the Maui group the Under World; and to Hikule'o the World and Bulotu (Hades). But in order to keep Hikule'o in his place, as he was a god that delighted in mischief, a cord was attached to him, one end of which was held by Tangaloa in the sky, and the other by a Maui in the under world, to prevent his leaving Bulotu to damage the world. This division was effected by an older god than any, namely, Taufulifonua ('Frequent-Upsetter-of-the-land'), who also assigned the sea to Hemoana, and the woods and dry land generally to Lube (the Dove). Hemoana's name is sometimes pronounced Heimoana, and the present writer *believes* that Tongavalevale spoke of him as Hea-Moana, though he is unable to speak positively on that point. *Hea-Moana* would signify 'Hea-of-the-deep-sea'; *Hemoana* would be simply 'the Deep Sea'=Oceanus. His shrine was the banded sea-snake. These were the Olympian gods of Tonga; but, with the exception of Hikule'o, they were rarely worshipped, and few if any temples were erected in their honour. The exception is due to the fact that Hikule'o was a mischievous god, and must therefore be propitiated.

(2) The second class of gods were an inferior race, who had their shrines in animals, birds, fishes, trees, whales' teeth, clubs, and even stones. Yet these were the gods worshipped by the people, and their temples were to be found in every village. Here are a few of them: Tu'i 'Ahau ('King of the town of 'Ahau'), whose shrine was a volcanic stone of peculiar shape; Tu'i Lalotonga ('King of Rarotonga,' or perhaps of the world below Tonga), whose shrine was the dragon-fly; Taliai Tubou (the god of the reigning dynasty while yet heathen),

whose shrine was a shark [Mariner renders *Taliai Tubou* by 'Wait there, Tubou,' which is certainly incorrect; Taliai Tubou was probably the name of a king]; Bulotu Katoa (the Pleroma of the Spirit World, who presided over hurricanes, and agriculture), whose shrine, we think, was a tree at Kolonga [Mariner mentions several the present writer has never heard of: Tubou Toutai ('Tubou the Mariner'; Tubou is the familiar designation of the king, and one of his family is usually called Tubou Toutai); Hala'evalu ('Eight Ways'; also the name of a chief); 'Alo'alo ('the Fanner'), the god of wind and weather, rain, harvest, and vegetation; Tu'i Bulotu ('King of the Spirit World')]. Other gods resided in the turtle, the cuttle-fish, the kingfisher, etc. Fonokitangata's shrine was a war-club. These were, so to speak, the private gods of the people, and the shrine of each was tabu to its worshippers. Thus the people of Te'ekiu were forbidden to eat the octopus, that being the shrine of their god. In the neighbouring villages, however, it would be freely eaten. In Nomuka one particular family were thus debarred from eating turtle, while the rest of the town were free to partake of that delicacy.

(3) In addition to these there were a number of supernatural beings whose position in the Tongan pantheon is not clear. They were looked upon as gods, and the term expressive of highest deity was applied to them; but they were never worshipped, nor were temples built to them. On the contrary, they were looked upon with contempt, and their follies freely portrayed and laughed at. It is curious to see these ascriptions of high divinity and expressions of contempt standing side by side. Is it that these were the gods of the inferior race which the Tongans found in the group when they landed?

Take an instance or two. Jiji and Faiga'a were two goddesses in this class, who had set their affections on a Tongan of great masculine beauty called Bajikole. He, tired of their attentions, plaited two large baskets of cocoa-nut leaves, put one goddess in each, and, shouldering them like a Chinaman, conveyed them into the bush, and hung them on the branch of a tree, and left them there for two years, until the baskets rotted, and they fell to the ground. They made another attempt on his affections, and he finally got rid of them by inveigling them into his fish traps, and leaving them at the bottom of the sea, where they lay until Tangaloa took pity on them, and sent a god to release them. Take another instance. In this case also it was two goddesses, who set out to meet a mortal lover. While waiting for him, they took off their heads to dress their hair. Suddenly his footsteps were heard, and they put their heads on again; but in the hurry one of them put hers on hind before; and when she attempted to move, her face went one way and her legs another. It is extremely puzzling to meet with tales like these, referring to those to whom the titles of highest deity are given: and yet, after all, they do but recall the vagaries of the Olympian deities as described by Homer, when

'Unextinguished laughter shook the skies.'

On the subject of ancestor-worship, Mariner speaks positively (vol. ii. p. 97): 'That there are other Hotooas or gods, viz. the souls of all deceased nobles and matabooles.' The present writer was disposed to agree with him at first, especially as it was a custom of the people to go to the cemeteries to pray, even after a sacrifice had been presented at the temple. But further inquiry has convinced him that they did so because they fancied themselves nearer the spirit-world in such places. Intelligent chiefs like Valu, who were acquainted with heathenism, are equally positive in the other direction, and deny that they looked upon the spirits of deceased chiefs as gods. We think the truth lies between the two statements, and that Mariner himself gives us a key to the solution of the question. In vol. i. p. 376, he speaks of Feenow as being frequently inspired by the spirit of Mumui (a late king of Tonga). Now we can readily understand that in such circumstances Feenow would pray to Mumui, and others would join him; so that in time Mumui would be looked upon as a god. This would account for such gods as Tu'i Lalotonga, Tu'i 'Ahau, Taliai Tubou, and others. All the inquiries of the present writer negative the assertion that the spirits of chiefs as a general thing became gods. We may then look upon the gods of the first class as primitive, brought by the Tongans from their original home, and the third class as the gods of the aboriginals whom they conquered. The second class contained also some primitive gods, but was recruited largely from the spirits of ancestors—*i.e.* the spirits of certain deceased chiefs by whom kings and notable personages fancied themselves to have been possessed.

The other point the present writer made special inquiries about was whether the Tongans worshipped the clubs, whales' teeth, animals, trees, stones, etc., before which they placed their offerings, or the god who was supposed to be temporarily residing in them. The answer was decisive. The clubs, trees, etc., were simply the *vaka*, the god itself was spiritual. *Vaka* signifies a 'mode of conveyance,' usually a canoe, but also a carriage, or anything by which one is conveyed from place to place.

Probably we may see here a development of their spiritual ideas. The oldest class—Tangaloa, Maui, Hemoana—were undoubtedly corporeal. Their bodies performed all the functions of human bodies, and they were inflamed with human passions. But the Tongans had long ceased to pray to them, and scarcely any vestiges of their worship remained when the missionaries came. The third class of gods, too, were corporeal, but there are no signs of worship being paid them at any time. These two classes existed side by side; but long before the introduction of Christianity both had been discarded as objects of worship, which was paid only to the second class. In other words, the Tongans had worked out a theology, which had, at any rate, this noble feature in it, that God was a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit.

The general Tongan term for supernatural beings is *fa'ahikehe*. This is often shortened into *fa'ahi*, and when the adjective *lahi* ('great') is added—*fa'ahi lahi*—the idea conveyed is that of full deity. *Fa'ahi* signifies properly 'a party,' 'a side' (as in cricket); or it may be short for *fa'ahinga* = 'kind,' 'class,' 'race,' 'species,' 'genus.' *Kehe* = 'other' (ἕτερος, not ἄλλος), so *fa'ahikehe* is 'different folk,' 'other kind of people.' The usual word for 'God' is *'Otua*. Mariner spells it *Hotooa*, but there is no *h* in it. The inverted comma represents a guttural, a half *k*, which is one of the difficulties of the language. It is not readily recognized by the European ear, and is mostly neglected by foreigners, while being as intractable as the Ayin in Hebrew. The present writer has failed to find any derivation for *'Otua*, or meaning other than 'God,' and believes it to be a primitive Polynesian word. In some parts of the Pacific it appears as *Atua*.

The other great word is *'Eiki* = 'Lord,' which is used as in English for both earthly and heavenly lords. Hence it is not so high a term as *'Otua*. Indeed it seems sometimes to mean only 'supernatural.' Thus a corpse is called *ha me'a faka'eiki*, which apparently signifies 'a thing belonging to the spirit world.' Probably Mariner was thinking of this when he said (vol. ii. p. 130): 'The human soul after its separation from the body is termed *hotooa*, *i.e.* a god or spirit.' He is certainly wrong in that statement. It is clear that *'eiki* was not the original form of the word, which the laws of the language point out to have been *ikeiki*.

We must not pass over the fact that the members of one of the dynasties of kings were regarded as gods. This was the earliest line of kings, and their title was *Tu'i Tonga* ('King of Tonga'). They were certainly looked upon as in some sense divine beings; and instances are on record of prayers being offered to them. Words applied only to the gods were used in addressing them; such as *'Ei*, already referred to, *ha'ele*, and *'afio*, used of the movements of deity. The face of the Tu'i Tonga was termed the 'sky,' and to him, as the representative of the gods, were presented the 'first-fruits.' This ceremony, called the *'inaji*, or 'portion,' is described by Mariner (vol. ii. p. 196). When a Tu'i Tonga died, he was said to be 'missing' (*kala*), and he was buried in a *ziggurat*, or pyramid

of steps. This was called a *langi*, or 'heaven'; and many of them remain in tolerable preservation, and excite the wonder of the visitor by the huge size of many of the stones, some of which measure over 20 ft. in length.

Many, probably most, of the names of the Tu'i Tonga have been preserved, and their history curiously reminds us of the story of the Carlovingians and Merovingians in France. One of the Tu'i Tonga, called Takalaua, was murdered, and his son and successor Kau'ulufonuafekai, from weariness or fear, devolved the duties of government on his younger brother, reserving to himself the honours and emoluments of the office. His brother assumed the title of Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua ('King of the Takalauans'), and soon got all the power into his hands, the Tu'i Tonga becoming a *roi fainéant*. After a few generations, however, the Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua became effete, and the government was handed over to another branch, called the Tu'i Kanokubolu ('King of Kanokubolu,' the town in which he lived). This is the title of the present dynasty. Representatives of the other two lines, however, still exist, but the titles are not used. The representative, however, of the Tu'i Tonga holds even now a quasi-sacred position, and is still addressed as the gods used to be; and words sacred to deity are used for all his movements.

Mariner mentions another semi-divine person called the Veachi (vol. ii. p. 80). This part of his narrative is very perplexing, as neither Veeson nor Thomas nor any of the modern chiefs knows anything about him.

The word used all over Polynesia for 'religion,' 'worship,' 'prayer,' etc., is *lotu*. Fortunately this has a meaning in Tongan, and signifies 'a seeking for something that is hard to find.' Thus when famine prevails, the people *lotu kai, i.e.* go all over the land looking for food. It is also used for the restlessness of a caged animal seeking an outlet, and for the cry of an animal for its mate or companions. This is not the only word common to Polynesia which finds its meaning in Tongan. *Tabu* (or *taboo*), now of world-wide use, signifies in Tongan that something which might be opened is closed. These and other considerations lead one to think that the Tongan language comes nearer than most of the dialects to the original Polynesian tongue.

3. **The religious rites of the Tongans** were few. There was nothing in their religion corresponding to our idea of worship. If they wanted something —rain, fair winds, good crops, successful fishery— or if they wished to prevent some calamity—such as sickness, death, hurricanes, war — they would seek the favour of a god, would offer sacrifice and pray. But to come into his temple, to worship, to sing his praises, to dwell upon his attributes—this was a foreign idea altogether. Hence there was very little in the Tongan religion to cultivate the conscience, or to control the passions, or to elevate the thoughts. Mariner thinks otherwise, and we would gladly believe his favourable report of the Tongan character. But all our information—and much of it goes back to Mariner's time—contradicts his statements. He even contradicts himself. The Feenow he speaks so highly of was a monster of iniquity; and there is no doubt that for centuries theft, murder, lust, treachery, and almost everything in the catalogue of evil, have been rife in Tonga. No man's life or property, and no woman's honour, was safe for a day.

They never went to their gods empty-handed; a piece of kava root for making the native drink was a *sine qua non*. Baskets of food, too, were usually brought in addition, and presented to the god or his priest. One of the party would then state the object of their visit, and implore the deity to grant their request, or use his influence with the gods of Bulotu in their favour. Sometimes the priest would remain silent; at other times he would object that their gifts were too small. If he spoke at all, he spoke as the god, being supposed to be 'possessed' by the god at the moment. John Thomas says (Farmer's *Tonga*, 128): 'Often there was another person present, the friend of the god, who acted as mediator, and addressed the priest on behalf of the offerers.' Hingano, a chief lady of great age, described to the present writer how she and others would take baskets of food to the door of Taliai Tubou's temple in Nuku'alofa, and, bowing down, would implore the god's favour. Shortly a white (*sic*) foot would be protruded from beneath a curtain, which they would kiss and then retire.

If their object was to deprecate a calamity, as in a case of sickness, the rite assumed a darker hue. Fingers were cut off, wrapped in banana leaves, and presented; or children were strangled, and their bodies brought as a sacrifice. When prayers were offered to Fonokitangata, the sacrifice was always an adult. Generally a man obnoxious to the community was hunted down and killed, and his body brought in a basket and laid before the priest; but Mariner speaks of a chief of rank being killed in one instance. The offerers, clothed in old and dirty mats, and wearing necklaces of chestnut leaves, would squat on the ground at a distance, and weep and beat their breasts, while the priest, holding in his hand a war club, the shrine of the god, would listen to their prayers with his eyes fixed upon the club or upon the ground. Sometimes he would reply in his ordinary voice, but more often in unnatural tones, as if some one were speaking in him; and frequently he would begin to shake as if in a fit, and to roll about and foam at the mouth. Any words he might utter whilst in this condition were eagerly caught up as the direct utterances of the god. After a while the shaking would cease, and the priest, striking the ground with the club, would announce that the god had departed. Mariner (vol. i. p. 160) has a good description of this kind of possession; and he evidently thought that the phenomena were not altogether voluntary, but that a real possession of some kind took place—a belief which was shared by some of the earlier missionaries.

4. **The Tongans believed in the immortality of the soul.** Mariner, Veeson, and Thomas are agreed on this point.

Veeson says (Farmer's *Tonga*, p. 131): 'One day they were conversing about a person that was lately dead, and said, "He goes to the island through the sky." "How can he be," said I, "in that place, when he is dead, and his body here? Did you not bury him some moons ago?" But all they answered was, "But he is still alive." And one took hold of my hand, and, squeezing it, said, "This will die, but the life that is within you will never die"—with his other hand pointing to my heart.'

Mariner and Veeson, too, agree in stating that this immortality is enjoyed only by the upper classes: the souls of the Tu'as, or common people, die with their bodies. This, no doubt, was the belief of the upper classes, who looked down upon the Tu'as as little better than animals; but it is no evidence of the belief of the Tu'as themselves. Thomas says more truly: 'Of the faith of the common people there was no certainty.'

The 'island' referred to was called Bulotu, and 'through the sky' meant 'over the horizon.' Bulotu is, the present writer thinks, a primitive Polynesian word, and is the name for Paradise in all the dialects. It was situated west or north-west of Tonga, and could be reached by sea. At least the ballads speak of canoes touching there; but how the disembodied spirits got there is not stated. Mariner tells us (vol. ii. p. 101) that Bulotu was believed by the Tongans to be a large island, stocked with all kinds of useful and

ornamental plants in a state of high perfection, and that when these were plucked others would immediately occupy their place. The whole atmosphere was filled with a most delightful fragrance; there were also beautiful birds of all kinds, and abundance of hogs—all of which were immortal unless killed to provide food for the gods. At the moment a bird or a hog was killed, another living bird or hog came into existence. Further on he gives another account of Bulotu brought by a canoe which touched there:

'The crew landed, and proceeded to pluck some breadfruit; but to their unspeakable astonishment, they could no more lay hold of it than if it was a shadow. They walked through the trunks of trees, and passed through the substance of the houses without feeling any resistance. They at length saw some of the gods, who passed through the substance of their bodies as if there was nothing there.' The gods were supposed to have no canoes, not requiring them; 'for if they wished to be anywhere, there they are the moment the wish is felt.'

Now, is this again a development? For the ballads, which date from a time long antecedent to the visit of Mariner, give a very different description. According to them, everything in Bulotu was material. Its entrance was guarded by a woman with eight tongues. There was a large canoe for the gods to voyage in, which was called Langotangata ('the human-rollered'), because it was dragged down to the sea on living rollers, each being a human being. The same trees grew as on earth: cocoa-nuts, breadfruit, yams, etc.; and provision was made for the favourite pastimes of chiefs. There were eminences for netting wood-pigeons, reefs for shark-catching, *'ulua* to be fished, and gigantic clams to be dived for. Ovens of food were cooked as on earth, and kava was prepared and drunk. The houses had solid posts, and the roofs were constructed in the usual way. One of the halls in Bulotu was panelled with the pupils of men's eyes 'which sparkled and flashed.' The women had a hall lined with mirrors—a veritable crystal palace. There was a *Vaiola*, or Fountain of Life, whose waters were so potent that a child plunged into it grew up to manhood in a few days. There was also a *Vai-lolofafanga*, or Fountain of Perfumery, and other delights of women (see 'Voyage of Faimalie,' *Tubou College Magazine*, vol. iii. p. 39).

5. **Cosmogony.**—The earliest chapters of the Tongan genesis ran somewhat as follows:

Some seaweed and slime clung together, and were carried away by the sea, and washed up on the island of Totai in Bulotu. By and by there grew up between them a large metallic stone called Tou'iafutuna ('Pregnant-how-long-ago!'). Suddenly it began to shake, and sent out a sound like thunder; and, splitting, there sprang out a male and a female twin. The male was called Biki ('Sticky') and the female Kele ('Slimy'). Again the huge stone rolled about as if there was an earthquake, and other twins sprang out: the male called Atungaki (?), and the female Maimoa'alongona ('Vagaries-of-sound'). Again the stone groaned, and twins sprang out, called 'Land-turtle' and 'Sea-turtle.' Again the stone sounded and earthquaked, and twins sprang forth, Hemoana (the Sea-snake), and Lube (the Dove).

They grew up and married, *i.e.* the first pair and the second and the third. The eldest child of Biki and Kele was a son, Taufulifonua ('Frequent-overturner-of-the-land'[1]). The next was a girl called Havea-lolofonua (Havea-of-the-underworld'). The second pair had a girl called Vele Lahi, and the third pair a girl called Vele Ji'i. (*Vele* signifies 'longing' or 'desire'; *Vele Lahi*='Desire the Elder,' *Vele Ji'i*='Desire the Younger'). Sticky and Slimy created a new land called Tonga Mama'o ('Distant Tonga'), and put on it Taufulifonua and Havea-lolofonua.

[The next incident is unprintable, but is a realistic setting of the words, 'And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.' They were ignorant even of the sexual function, which they discovered only by accident. The result was a boy called Hikule'o ('the Echo,' the Tongan Satan: see above).]

Then Havea said to Vele Lahi and Vele Ji'i, 'Come and marry your brothers as I have done, for there is no man for you.' They did so, and Vele Lahi gave birth to the Tangaloas, and Vele Ji'i to the Maui family. Then Taufulifonua divided the heaven and earth as stated above.

In process of time the Tangaloas ordered Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo to go down and see in what condition the world was. So he entered into the Kiu (? 'Sea-lark'), and went down, and flew in all directions, but could not see any land, only shallows. Then went he up to heaven and reported to the Tangaloas that there was no land, only something that looked like shallows. Said the heavenly chief, 'Wait seven nights, and then go again and see': so Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo remained seven days in the sky, and then went down to look at the shallows. The bottom was evidently coming up, and he reported to heaven, 'It looks like a reef.' He said also, 'I can find nothing to stand on and rest.' So they said, 'Go to Tangaloa the Smith, and let him throw down the dust of the pumice he sharpens his axes with.' So Tangaloa Tufunga did so, and threw down the dust of his grindstone, and produced the island of 'Eua. On this being reported, Tangaloa was sent down to stand there and watch. By and by a bit of the shallows would become dry, and ultimately a large land grew up, which consisted, however, only of sand. Tangaloa reported, 'My land is large, but nothing will grow on it.' Then said Lord Tangaloa, 'Take this seed, and set it in the land you have discovered.' It was a *fue* (convolvulus). So he set it, and it overspread the land. Then said he, 'There is vegetation enough, but no people': and Lord Tangaloa and the other heavenly chiefs replied, 'Go and split the root of the *fue*.' He did so, and it rotted and produced a grub. So he reported to the sky, 'A great thing is lying in the *fue* I split.' They ordered him to cut it in two, and to call the head Kohai ('Who is it?') and the tail Koau ('It is I'). He did so, and both parts became men: as did also a little piece that had adhered to his beak. This was called Momo ('Little Bit'): and he with the other two were the first men.

Now at that time Maui the Elder ordered his family to go on board a canoe, and fish up lands. There were four Maui in the canoe: Maui Loa, Maui Buku, and Maui 'Atalanga with his son Maui Kijikiji; and they took their mother Vele with them. She was the maker of mats and fine robes. They called at Manuka, a part of Samoa that was already above the waters. And Maui Kijikiji, leaping ashore, went to get a fish-hook. Meeting the chief's wife, he ravished her; and she, taking kindly to him, revealed her husband's secret, that the magic fish-hook, which would bring up lands, was not a bright and glittering one, but an old and rusty hook, stuck in the reeding. So they got the hook, and, having tried it successfully near Samoa, sailed on boldly, and pulled up Tonga and many other groups of islands. When they came to 'Eua, and saw the three men, they asked whether they had any women; and on their replying 'No,' they went and fetched three, so that they might have one each.

At that time the sky was very low, and an ironwood tree that stood in Tonga reached quite up to heaven. So 'Eitu-Matubu'a was wont to climb down, and visit the earth; and, cohabiting with a woman in one of the islands, had a child by her called 'Aho'eitu. When he grew to man's estate, he asked who and where his father was; and was directed by his mother to climb up the ironwood tree, and seek him in the sky. He finds him, is recognized, and sent to play with his brothers, who become jealous, and finally kill and eat him. 'Eitu, finding this out, makes them vomit into a large tub, and covers the *disjecta membra* with the leaves of the tree of life (*Nonu*). By and by the fragments cohere, and ultimately 'Aho'eitu is found sitting up alive. His brothers are punished by being turned out of heaven, and have to serve 'Aho'eitu on earth, who becomes the first Tu'i Tonga, superseding the children of the 'grub.' The Maui afterwards pushed the sky higher up, as it is at present.

Now the Maui dwelt in the under world, but one of them, Maui 'Atalanga, said to his brethren, 'Have you any objection to my living on the earth, if I visit you from time to time? And they said, 'No.' So 'Atalanga went up to the earth, taking his young son Kijikiji with him. He lived in Vava'u, and married a mortal wife. Now Maui 'Atalanga did not plant in Vava'u; for he was a mighty planter, and there was not land enough; so he had his plantation in the under world. He kept this, however, a secret from his son Kijikiji, for he was such a mischief. But Maui Kijikiji tracked his father by his footsteps, and, seeing him lift a bush and descend into the earth, waited a while and followed him. Many tricks did he play, until one day his father sent him to Maui the Elder to get a fire-stick. Kijikiji kept quenching the fire and going back for more. At last old Maui told him to take the whole log. This was of enormous size, but the young Maui took it up with ease. Old Maui, who had not recognized his grandson, perceiving that he was a superhuman being, challenged him to wrestle—with the result that the elder Maui was thrown and left for dead. 'Atalanga, hearing of it, strikes his son with his spade and kills him. On going, however, to see how his father was faring, he finds the old man alive, and rather pleased than not with his defeat by his grandson, and angry with his son for having killed him. They apply, however, the leaves of the tree of life, and Maui Kijikiji revives. His next exploit is to carry some fire from the under world to earth, in spite of the efforts of his father to prevent him. They then devote themselves to fighting with and destroying the monstrous animals that infested the world—a huge rat, a gigantic bird called the Moa, a lizard, and some carnivorous trees, etc. Maui 'Atalanga is at last devoured by a huge dog that lived in a magic cave which opened and closed automatically; and his son, after killing the dog, died of grief for his father, etc.

[1] *Tau* is sometimes intensive. This would then mean 'complete-overturner.'

LITERATURE.—The principal authorities on the state of Tonga in early times are these: William Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*[2], London, 1818; G. Veeson, *Authentic Narrative of Four Years' Residence in Tongatabu*, do. 1810; S. S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, do. 1855. [Mariner's is a most valuable work. He gives evidence

of being possessed of no common ability, and of an excellent memory; and, if the present writer has ventured to differ from him, it is for the following reasons: (1) the shortness of Mariner's stay—only 4 years; (2) his obvious want of acquaintance with the niceties of the language; (3) the considerable time that elapsed between his leaving Tonga and the writing down of his reminiscences; (4) the fact that the present writer's acquaintance with Tonga extends over a period of 40 years; (5) that most of his information was taken down from the lips of the 'Last of the Bards,' a once heathen chief called Tongavalevale, who was the repository of their folk-lore and ballads; (6) that he has had access to the unpublished journals of the Rev. John Thomas, Wesleyan minister, who went to Tonga in 1826, and was the first missionary to make a lengthened stay.]

J. EGAN MOULTON.

TONGKING.—Ethnographically Tongking is divided into two parts: South Tongking, the special domain of the Annamese race, and North Tongking, bounded on the north by the Annamo-Chinese frontier, on the east by the sea, on the west by the range where the waters separate into the Red and Black Rivers (Song-Koi and Song-Bo), and on the south by a line bisecting the provinces of Kwang-Yen, Bac-Giang, Thai-Nguyen, Tuyen-Kwang, and Yen-Bay. This Upper Tongking has an area of 54,700 square kilometres, and a population of 374,528, belonging to 26 different ethnic groups. There are no Annamese or Chinese except officials and merchants; the country is peopled chiefly by Tai, Man, or Yao, Pa-Teng, Meo, Lolo, Muong, and a very small number of representatives of far more ancient ethnic groups, such as the La-tchi (La-ti) and the Keu-Lao.

I. *TAI.*—The Tai element, most important in point of numbers (239,179 individuals—about 60 per cent of the total population), is divided into numerous sub-groups, the most important being the Thô (146,000), who are found round Cao-Bang, the Nung (66,000), and the Black Tai (14,500). The Tai have a strong admixture of Chinese and Annamese and are thus closely related to the Siamese and Laotians.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Tai are strong and of a lively disposition, careless, fond of pleasure and play, and extraordinarily indolent. This race seems to be on the decrease; there are few births, and infant mortality is very high. They are not absolutely averse to mixed marriages: their daughters may marry Chinese or Annamese if they choose, and their sons take wives from any variety of the race whatever, even from the Man; these mixed marriages produce a stronger and more provident race than the pure Tai.

The Tai live in the plains and low valleys by preference. Their houses are, as a rule, built on piles, the ground-floor being reserved for live-stock and poultry, the upper storey for the inhabitants. The Nang and several other tribes dress like the Chinese; the rest of the Tai follow the Annamese fashion, but wear much brighter colours—indigo blue is almost universal—and far more ornamentation. Rice is the staple food. The Tai also use beans, sweet potatoes, and gourds; pork is their most usual meat, chickens and ducks being reserved for feast-days; they also eat fish. Tea is their chief beverage, though they sometimes drink too much wine or spirit made from fermented grain. The use of tea and betel is practically universal among them; opium is confined to the rich.

The Tai are essentially farmers. They cultivate rice, maize, buck-wheat, beans, peas, sweet potatoes, and sesamum. Industry and commerce are practically non-existent owing to the indolence of the race. They can, however, distil alcohol, weave cloths, make rich embroidery, and do fine basket-work. The Thô even spin a little silk.

2. Religion. — On their original animism the Tai have superimposed a confused mixture of Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas, derived from the Chinese and Annamese. A few priests or lettered men have a vague knowledge of the cosmic system of the *di-kinh*.

They believe that the primordial principle of nature gave birth to the male and female principles, from which issued everything and everybody. The male principle is the sun, the sky, the intellectual soul of men; the female is the dark earth, the moon, the vital and sensual soul of beings. Man has three subtle souls, or *hôn*, which emanate from the male principle, and seven or nine (according as the sex is male or female) vegetative souls, or *viá*. At death these *viá* return to the earth whence they came, while the *hôn* go to the infernal regions. Here we see the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of the transmigration of souls and their purification by punishment. After undergoing the punishments which they have merited, they may approach the throne of the emperor of Jade, the supreme Taoist idol.

The great majority of the people, a most superstitious race, confine themselves to the worship of the evil spirits which infest the air and lie in wait for man even in the most insignificant actions of his life. These are combated by means of forethought and offerings, and especially by the help of more powerful good spirits which are rendered propitious by devoted worship. Among the good spirits the genius of the hearth and the tutelary deity of the village are held in highest honour; of the evil spirits, which have different names in the various Tai groups, the most dreaded are the spirits of people who have died a violent death and the chicken-spirits that insinuate themselves into people, especially women, and give them the evil eye. Of course the Tai believe in white and black magic, spells, lots, and philtres.

Their priests are chiefly sorcerers, who earn their living by offering sacrifices to the spirits, exorcizing the sick, and warding off all the evils invoked against man. They also choose the material with which to build villages or houses, the propitious day for beginning any work, etc. Among the Tai they are nearly all connected with an official cult, but there are independent sorcerers and sorceresses.

The only temples that the Tai possess are small rustic pagodas, nearly all dedicated to the tutelary genius of the locality.

Their religious festivals are borrowed from the Annamese; but among certain tribes, particularly the White and Black Tai, there are some festivals which seem peculiar to the race. (1) *Kin lao mao* ('drink,' 'alcohol,' 'drunk') takes place in September. All the inhabitants of the village meet in one of their houses for a banquet, which is followed after sunset by music and singing. The feast lasts three days, during which no one may enter or leave the village. (2) *King pang* ('to eat bread') takes place in January. It is characterized by round dances to the accompaniment of chants. Among the White Tai it is the women who dance, among the Black Tai the men. (3) *Kin tien* ('to eat coined money') takes place in December in honour of the dead. It lasts three days, with banquets, dancing, and singing. Both men and women take part.

Ancestor-worship exists among the Tai, but only a more or less slavish imitation of Annamese ritualism. It is practised chiefly among the Thô, who preserve the names of their ancestors to the fourth generation, make offerings at prescribed times, and train their children to honour the dead as the protectors of the hearth. Only those who have died a natural death have a place on the family altar; those who have died a violent death, out of doors, have only a small outside altar, usually built in the garden.[1]

3. Myths and legends.—Among all the Tai is found the tradition of a universal deluge, from which the god of the earth saved only a brother and a sister—a poor but pious couple—who shut themselves at his command inside a hollow pumpkin, with some rice for provision. After the subsidence of the waters the present-day races were born from the union of this couple.

4. Medicine.—The Tai regard nearly every illness as the work of evil spirits, and the best medicine is the sorcerer; the more enlightened members of the race sometimes admit that there are natural ailments, which they treat with simples and mineral products borrowed from the Chinese pharmacopœia.

[1] It should be noticed that the Tai know nothing of the property called *hu'ô'ng hoa* in Annam—an inalienable part of the patrimony reserved to meet the expense of the cult of the dead and the upkeep of the tombs. As a rule after a few months, at most after four years, the Tai have nothing more to do with the tombs.

5. **Marriage.** — Although the manners of the Tai are not so free and easy as those of the Laotians, youths and maidens meet freely to sing and play—which often leads to sexual relations; all that Tai morality requires is that there be no tangible proofs of these relations, and hence recourse is had to abortive measures or the suppression of children.

The father is the unquestioned head of the family, yet it is only among the highly Annamitized Tai that he chooses a mate for his child; among the Tai of the right bank of the Red River the young people make their own choice. The proposal is made by a go-between; the young man pays a dowry, and the engagement is settled after a sorcerer has compared the genealogical forecasts of the couple, in order to see whether any supernatural influence opposes their union. The engagement is generally long—from three months to three years—and is rather expensive for the *fiancé*, who is expected to give a great number of presents. The engaged couple are bound to observe the strictest reserve; they are not allowed to take any notice of each other until the wedding-day, while they have complete liberty in their relations with the other young people of both sexes. The marriage-ceremony itself is borrowed from the Annamese.

The outstanding characteristic of marriage among the Tai—with the exception of the Thô in the west, the Nung, and the Thô-Ti—is the quaint custom of separating husband and wife after the celebration of their union: among some tribes the wife spends a fortnight with her parents and a fortnight with her husband; among others she cannot go to her husband except when invited. This state of affairs comes to an end with the appearance of pregnancy, or, in cases of sterility, at the end of the fourth year of married life, when the wife takes her place at the family hearth. As the separated husband and wife retain complete liberty of behaviour outside with people of their own age, Tai morality suffers some strange drawbacks from this custom. The Tai youths marry usually between twenty-three and twenty-five, the girls between sixteen and eighteen.

The Thô of the west and several other tribes practise marriage by adoption and marriage by contract also. A poor young man can enter a rich family without paying the usual dowry, on condition that he takes his father-in-law's name, and lives with and works for his father-in-law. Should he wish later to live apart with his wife, he is liable to pay an indemnity to his father-in-law. A young man can also marry without paying a dowry and without changing his name, by undertaking a contract to serve his wife in her father's house for a stated number of years—from four to seven. If he dies before the contract has expired, his widow is responsible for his debt. These two forms of marriage, which are not held in high esteem, entail no long engagements and no costly wedding-feasts.

Polygamy is allowed by the Tai, but seldom practised; the number of wives is usually limited to two, only the first having honour and authority at the hearth, the other being practically her servant. Among the White Tai, however, the daughter of a chief has the rights of first wife, no matter when she is married. The Tai woman, though she enjoys a life of perfect freedom in her youth, becomes after marriage a sort of beast-of-burden; all the hard work in the fields and in the house falls on her. She has no real individuality till she becomes a mother. Divorce is rare; by right only the husband can seek it; in actual life it is the wife who applies for it. Repudiation is still more rare and is nearly always due to sterility.

6. **Birth.**—The house of the mother is forbidden to strangers during and for a certain time after confinement. If they did enter, they might themselves be contaminated and bring harm to the child. The confinement is made known to those outside by a branch of shaddock and a piece of coal among the Thô of the west, by a piece of wood, a knife, and a green branch among the Thô of the east, fastened to the ladder of the house. The first visitors to enter the house of the mother have to pass over a burning brand or a pail of water, into which red-hot iron is plunged. The Tai woman is delivered nearly always in a standing position, holding on to ropes with her hands. The eastern Thô alone light a brazier on the camp-bed whither she is afterwards carried. The placenta is secretly buried by the midwife. The birth is announced with libations to the ancestors by the head of the family. A propitious day is chosen for putting the child in the sack that does duty as swaddling. The choice of a name is surrounded with the same superstitious fears as are found among the Annamese, and the same unpleasant designations are chosen.

7. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—The Tai originally practised cremation and still do so for certain chiefs. As a rule they have now adopted burial. Funeral honours are paid only to men over 18 years of age and to married women. The rites are imitations of those of the Annamese. The medicine-man determines the position of the coffin and the situation of the grave. The deceased is dressed in his best clothes and a pair of new sandals, and is put into a coffin containing about 10 kilogrammes of ashes. On the bier are placed some duck-feathers to help him to ford the rivers of the other world, and a pencil and paper for him to make his wishes known. On the day of burial—usually the third after death—the corpse is placed on a paper catafalque and taken to the cemetery with great ceremony. The one idea at this juncture is to prevent the dead from returning to torment the survivors at home and at the same time to protect him from evil spirits. It is for this purpose that the medicine-man is employed; he brandishes his sword at intervals round the coffin and the mourners, who strew the road with gold and silver paper in order to tempt the evil spirits to stop and gather it up. The coffin is then put into the grave under the protection of the medicine-man's sword; food is placed on the tomb, near which the catafalque is burned—a house for the dead in the other world. Among the Chong-Kia Tai, when the coffin has to cross a river, the children stretch a piece of cloth from side to side for the souls of the dead, to keep them from wandering. Commemorative rites are not observed regularly by the Tai, except where they are very much under Annamese influence.

8. **Tabu.**—There seems to be only one kind of tabu among the Tai, viz. the entering or leaving a village during a local festival. Strangers are warned to turn back by notices placed outside the village.

II. *MAN.*—This Chinese name, which means 'barbarous,' 'rude,' is applied in Tongking to the ethnic group of the 'children of Pan-Hù or Phien-Hù,' who claim to be descended from the union of the dog Pan-Hù with the daughter of the emperor of China, whose inveterate enemy had been vanquished by Pan-Hù. The Man, or Yao, probably inhabit the high parts forming the basin of the Li-Kiang in the north, and are about 50,651 in number in N. Tongking and much more numerous in the west than in the east. Their various groups have been classified in six great families issuing, they say, from the six sons of Pan-Hù: the Man Côc, or 'horned Man'; the Man Tiên, or *sapèque*

Man; the Man Lan-Tien, or 'indigo-tinted Man'; the Man Quân Trăng, or 'blue-trousered Man'; the Man Quân Côc, or 'short-trousered Man'; and the Man Cao-Lan, or 'great rainbow Man.' The Man Côc, most numerous and most important, live in the highest parts of the country; lower down are the Man Tiên; the Lan-Tien hardly ever are found at a greater altitude than 300 metres; the others follow by various stages to the borders of the deltic plains; as a rule, they all find life in the valleys uncongenial.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Man are not so tall as the Tai, but are more robust, more intelligent, and much more active. As they have no rice, their staple food is maize, vegetables, and yams. They eat meat sparingly, chiefly pork, rarely buffalo or ox, never the dog—for this is the totem of their race. They do not chew betel, but both men and women smoke tobacco and the rich consume opium.

Their houses are built sometimes on the ground, sometimes on piles, and sometimes half-and-half. A random group of these houses forms a village, and the village is scarcely ever surrounded by a wall. The Man borrow their style of dress from either the Chinese or the Annamese according to their locality. The women's garments are embroidered on the skirts, facings, neck, and sleeves with bright red and blue designs so intricate and elaborate that it takes three years to embroider one costume. Their hair-dressing is also elaborate, and is nearly always finished off with a large turban having coloured edging and embroidery.

The Man are essentially agriculturists; but they are also good blacksmiths, and can make the trinkets that their women use, and also paper from bamboo-fibre. They are good fishers and hunters.

2. Religion.—Their beliefs are like those of the Tai, but even more confused—a few vague notions from the three great religions of China; but the mass of the people are animists, though not quite so superstitious as the Tai. Ancestor-worship is held in great honour among them. They have the same flood legend as the Tai. The Man have only a few pagodas dedicated to the tutelary deity of the village. They are nearly always built against a fruit-tree. They have medicine-men who present offerings, exorcize spirits, and work cures. The reputation of these sorcerers varies with the Man Côc according to whether they have or have not received complete initiation to the third degree. Among the other tribes initiation generally comprises only one degree. The Man worship consists in sacrifices, songs, and dances. They observe the Chinese feasts with varying regularity. They have also two curious local feasts celebrated with great pomp, especially by the Man Côc. The one takes place every three years in certain tribes, every five years in others, and commemorates the rescue of the Man race when—so long ago as to be in the region of hypothesis—it was shipwrecked in sight of the Chinese coast on its way from an island in the east. The second feast, called 'the great fast,' comprises five days of extraordinary pomp, and occurs only once in ninety years. We have no data of any value on its origin or symbolic meaning.

3. Medicine.—Their medicine comes from the Chinese, but the Man would not believe in the efficacy of any medicine that was not accompanied by incantations and exorcisms.

4. Metamorphism.—The Man believe that their neighbours, the Mao, have a third cutting of teeth in their old age, and after death escape from their graves and reappear as tigers.

5. Marriage.—The Man do not attach much importance to virginity. When a child is born before marriage, it is suppressed without a thought of the law which demands a fine for such an offence. Violence is also punished by a fine. The young people themselves, and not their parents, arrange their marriages. The young man makes his choice, then tells his parents, who send a go-between to make proposals to the parents of the girl. After examining the genealogical forecasts, the go-between may, at a second visit, discuss the amount of the dowry and the presents to be offered by the suitor. The engagement is concluded when the young man himself brings all or some of the presents. All intercourse between the engaged couple is stopped until the wedding-day, which is signalized by the customary banquets; the couple drink a cup of rice-wine together and prostrate themselves before the ancestral altar. They live together after the marriage-ceremony. The daughter-in-law must scrupulously avoid touching her husband's parents, though she serves her father-in-law at table.

The Man are also familiar with marriage by adoption and contract. Among the Man Cao-Lan the newly-married couple do not live together until two or three months after the marriage-ceremony. Among the Man Quân Trăng the marriage is preceded by a term of three years spent by the young man in his future father-in-law's house, the girl being usually about thirteen or fourteen at this time. The youth may marry her at the beginning of the three years on condition that he indemnifies his father-in-law for the three years' service which he owes. If pregnancy occurs during this term, the parties are bound to each other; if the youth changes his mind before the end of the term, he can leave without paying or receiving anything; if he is dismissed, he can claim an indemnity for the service rendered. After marriage the couple serve seven years in the paternal home of the husband.

Polygamy is practised among the Man; the number of wives is usually restricted to two, the first alone having authority in the house. The Man Quân Trăng allow polygamy only in exceptional cases. The material status of woman is high among the Man, the men doing all the heavy work; her legal status is different; she is the property of her husband, who can give her away and repudiate her. She, on the other hand, is not allowed to leave him. In cases of adultery the husband has the right to send his wife back to her parents and reclaim the dowry that he paid for her; if he keeps her, he can claim damages.

6. Birth.—From the third month of pregnancy sexual relations cease, and the woman abstains from fat, green vegetables, and garlic. She is not allowed to sew or embroider except outside her house. The Man Lan-Tien believe that, if a pregnant woman were the first to cross a new bridge, it would fall; that the touch of such a woman spoils rice and alcohol; the Man Quân Trăng, on the other hand, keep her away from these things for her own sake, in case they should cause miscarriage. The birth is announced to outsiders by a bunch of grass hung on the door among the Man Côc, by threads stretched across the door among the Quân Trăng; no announcement is made among the Lan-Tien. The Man woman is delivered sitting on a little stool. No fire is put under the bed after delivery. The placenta is taken far away and hidden in a hole in a tree or rock; it is buried under the mother's bed among the Man Lan-Tien; if eaten by an animal, it would bring misfortune on the child. Children born out of wedlock among the Quân Trăng belong to the mother; but the father, if known, is liable to pay a fine and give two months' service free in the house of the mother's parents to repay them for the loss of work caused by the birth. They practise adoption freely and thus receive into their families many Annamese children as their own.

7. Death and disposal of the dead.—The Man Côc used to burn their dead, and this custom survives west of the basin of the Red River. The Lan-Tien nearest the delta buried only those over fifty; the Quân Trăng buried all the heads of families. The burial rites are copied from the

Annamese. The Man Côc do not make 'the white silk soul' or catafalque; a sorcerer of the second degree exorcizes the tree from which the coffin is to be made so that the tree-spirit may not come to torment the dead.

III. *PA-TENG.* — The Pa-Teng, about 200 in number, live near the Man on the heights separating the Red River and the Clear River (Song-Ka). They are often classed with the Man, but are really separate linguistically. Their beliefs and customs are practically those of the Man.

IV. *MEO.* — The Meo, or 'cats,' numbering 21,471, are found in Cao-Bang, Bao-Lac, Lao-Kay, and Coc-Len as well as in the provinces of Thai-Nguyen and Yen-Bay. They claim to have come originally from the Chinese provinces of Yun-Nan, Kwei-Chu, and Tse-Chuen. Their last invasion into Tongking, in 1860, was very violent.

1. **Physical characteristics.**—The Meo are little and squat, very vigorous on their short legs, brave, hardy, and independent; they can be very abstemious, but are inclined to eat and drink heavily. Maize is their staple food; they eat very little meat, and drink a great deal of alcohol, but tobacco is not used and betel is unknown among them. Their rustic huts, of *pisé* or mud, are dirty to repulsiveness.

2. **Religion.** — Their traditional beliefs are borrowed from China and are very unprecise and wavering. They dread evil spirits—among others, the souls of beheaded people and of the unburied dead. A vague form of ancestor-worship is practised; it amounts to a few prayers and offerings of food, which are quickly consumed by the survivors. They are familiar with the flood-legend of the couple saved in the hollow pumpkin. Their priests are sorcerers.

3. **Marriage.**—Paternal authority is not strong. The young people make their own choice of mates, and marriage is accomplished through a go-between. In some districts the suitor has both to pay a dowry and to serve his future parents-in-law for two years before marriage. The Meo marry freely with other ethnic groups. Marriages are always accompanied by dances, songs, and games; if the bridegroom cannot afford the expense, he may leave it for his father-in-law to bear, on condition that he and his wife give so many years' work in payment. Marriage by capture is also found: the youth may carry off the girl who has been denied him, and he atones for his offence by paying a heavy dowry. Polygamy is allowed, but is not practised except when the first wife has no children. In adultery the husband has the right to kill the culprits, but as a rule he is content with repudiating his wife and taking back the dowry.

4. **Birth.**—There is nothing to mark the house on the occasion of a birth; the mother is delivered sitting and remains indoors for 33 days. The placenta is buried in front of the house, if the child is a boy; under the fire-place, if it is a girl.

5. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—The Meo bury their dead. The watch by the corpse consists of three days' feasting and dancing; the children of the deceased invite him to join in the banquets, and even slip a piece of food between his teeth. By the side of the corpse, which is dressed in new clothes and fixed in an upright position to a wall of the hut, a dead dog, killed for the purpose, is placed. The two are bound together by a strip of paper going from the dog's mouth to the dead man's wrist. The dog's duty is to guide his master in the other world. The coffin and the body are taken to the grave separately; the body is carried on a litter and is followed by the sorcerer, the family, and some friends, while guns are fired to frighten the evil spirits. When the grave is filled in, the litter is broken over it, some food (which must be renewed for several days) is placed on the tomb, and the funeral-procession returns to a banquet at the deceased's house.

V. *LOLO.*—The Lolo, a people almost certainly originating in the Brahmaputra valley, are about 2300 in number in Tongking and live chiefly in the region of Bao-Lac.

1. **Physical characteristics.**—Of medium height, muscular and well built, with fine regular features and a copper complexion, they recall to the Western mind the Bohemians of Europe. They are luxurious and indolent, marrying only among themselves; but their race is degenerating through the use of opium. Their chief foods are rice, maize, vegetables, and gourds, meat being reserved for festivals. They make alcohol from fermented maize. They use no betel and very little tobacco, but indulge in opium to excess.

Their houses are built on piles in the rich villages; in poor villages they are wretched huts placed on the ground. In dress the Lolo resemble the Chinese or the Thô according to locality, but their garments (those of the women in particular) are shorter and much more elaborately embroidered. The Lolo are great agriculturists and hunt and fish a little.

2. **Religion.**— Their beliefs and psychical life vary according as their villages are next a Tai, Man, or Meo clan. Their chief cult appears to be that of evil spirits, and they countenance ancestor-worship, theoretically. They also have the story of the flood and the survival of their ancestors in a pumpkin.

3. **Marriage.** — Marriage, which takes place during the night, comprises no religious ceremonies, but simply banquets and dances. After marriage the wife lives only two or three nights with her husband, and then returns to her parents until pregnancy privileges her to take her place in her husband's home. Marriage by capture is practised, the captor paying a double dowry. Adultery is punished by the death of both offenders. Polygamy exists only in theory.

4. **Birth.**—The rites connected with birth have no peculiarities among the Lolo. Adoption is of frequent occurrence, either by free consent or as the result of a bargain, and is the occasion of great festivities.

5. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—Burial takes place, without ceremony and in presence of relatives only, three days after death. For nine days in the case of a man, eight for a woman, and six for a child, the family keep a fire burning on the tomb, and after that take no more trouble. Certain tribes exhume the dead, after one or three years, with great pomp, and put the head or all the bones into a little wooden box, which is then placed on a neighbouring rock, where the survivors can see it while at work. Their ancestor-worship is very crude. The place of the tablet is often taken by a representation of the dead made from an orchis stem and little bits of paper, placed against a partition or between the wall and the roof of the hut.

6. **Tabu.**—Women after puberty are forbidden to eat pork, chicken, duck, or dog, and must not even cook their food in dishes which have been used for preparing these foods; hence the necessity of two fire-places and two utensils in a Lolo house.

VI. *MUONG OR MON.* — The Muong or Mon are an ethnic group centring in the province of Hoa-Binh. They are of uncertain origin, but appear to be closely connected with the Annamese, whom they resemble strongly in physical type, dress, and customs. Their religion is a development of the popular animism of the Annamese.

It should be noted that in one thing they are very different from the Annamese: among the Muong the relations between the sexes before marriage are very free. Whenever a girl becomes pregnant, her family and that of her seducer are made to pay a fine to the village. As among the Annamese, the blood-test is applied when the father of a child denies his paternity. Marriage is celebrated according to the Annamese rites. Accouchement takes place on a camp-bed under which the usual fire is kept burning, and the house is marked to outsiders, after the delivery, in the

same way as among the Annamese. The placenta is buried underneath the house itself. The dead are buried in accordance with the Annamese rites. The corpse is placed in a coffin made from a hollow tree-trunk and set up in front of one of the doors of the hut. Outside, and facing it, there stands on a bamboo tripod a basket containing a little dog killed for the purpose, some rice, alcohol, and incense-sticks. A special cord binds the tripod to the coffin. After the coffin has been let down and the grave filled in, a wide-mouthed jar is emptied near the stone which marks the position of the dead man's head; and, if rain-water comes and fills this jar again, it shows that the grave has been well chosen and it brings a thousand blessings to the survivors. The bodies of the *quan-lang* (village chiefs) are kept, it appears, for three years before burial in front of the ancestral altar; a long bamboo tube leading from the hermetically-sealed coffin right up beyond the roof of the hut preserves the hut from mephitic vapours.

VII. *KEU-LAO.*—The Keu-Lao, of whose origin and customs we know next to nothing, form an ethnic group of seven families in the neighbourhood of Dong-Vâu.

VIII. *LA-TCHI.* — The La-tchi or La-ti are about twenty in number and live in the village of Chi Ka, near the upper valley of the Song-Chay. Though resembling the Annamese of the delta in physical type, they claim to be aboriginals. They are very little known and seem to live like the Meo. Their characteristic trait is their abstention from pork, the diet *par excellence* of the Far East, because, they say, their orphaned ancestors were fed by a sow.

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ANTOINE CABATON.

TONGUE. — **1. Physiology.** — The essential organ of taste is 'the mucous membrane which covers the tongue, especially its back part, and the hinder part of the palate.'[1] Here are found certain cells, arranged in groups which are known as 'taste-buds' and are connected with two cranial nerves. Sensations of taste are intermingled with accompanying sensations of touch, and often of smell.[2]

'There appear to be distinct terminal organs for bitter tastes, for sweet tastes, for acid tastes, for salt tastes, and possibly for other tastes, all differing from the terminal organs for tactile sensations, and from the structures, whatever they may be, which are concerned in general sensibility.'[3]

Modern knowledge of the physiology of taste began (1665) with Malpighi (1628–94), who employed the newly invented microscope.[4] The sense of taste was grouped by Aristotle under that of touch, both operating only through immediate contact.[5] Pliny notes that the human palate also possesses the sense of taste, and he gives many details about the variety in the tongues of animals.[6] An Anglo-Saxon leech-book, in prescribing 'for men in whom the string under the tongue is badly swollen,' says that 'through the string first every disorder cometh on the man.'[7] But the chief significance of the tongue for primitive thought is obviously in regard to the faculty of speech, to which it contributes, together with the throat and lips, in the modulation of the voice. That vibration of the vocal cords which is called 'voice' is modified by the varying shape of the resonant chamber formed by the mouth. The tongue, however, is not indispensable to speech; Huxley refers to a case in which conversation remained quite intelligible though the tongue had been completely amputated.

2. Localization of psychical function.—This characteristic of primitive thought concerning the physical organs[1] is frequently illustrated by primitive practices in regard to the tongue. Since the nervous system and the minuter structures of the tissues were unknown to the ancients, the tongue was thought to possess an *inherent* faculty of speech, as something residing in it, so that the faculty or its special qualities could be transferred by acquisition or assimilation of the tongues of specially gifted animals or men.

Thus, among the Tlingits of Alaska, the chief of the spirits sends the candidate for shamanism 'a river-otter, in the tongue of which animal is supposed to be hid the whole power and secret of shamánism. . . . If, however, the spirits will not visit the would-be shamán, or give him any opportunity to get the otter-tongue as described above, the neophyte visits the tomb of a dead shamán, and keeps an awful vigil over night, holding in his living mouth a finger of the dead man or one of his teeth; this constrains the spirits very powerfully to send the necessary otter.'[2] 'In Bohemia the tongue of a male snake, if cut from the living animal on St. George's Eve and placed under a person's tongue, will confer the gift of eloquence.'[3] 'A North American Indian thought that brandy must be a decoction of hearts and tongues, "because," said he, "after drinking it I fear nothing, and I talk wonderfully."'[4] In S.E. Australia 'one of the Wakelbura was observed to take the tongue out of a certain grey-and-white lizard called Bungah, and give it to his little son, a child of about thirteen months old, and gave as a reason for doing so that after eating the tongue his child would soon be able to talk.'[5] 'When a child is late in learning to speak, the Turks of Central Asia will give it the tongues of certain birds to eat.'[6] The converse is illustrated by the belief that the saliva of a queen touching the tongue of a bird gave it human speech.[7] Among the Nubians, 'before the tongue of any animal is eaten, the tip is cut off; on human analogy they believe that "here is the seat of curses and ill-wishes."'[8] It is a common custom of hunters to cut out the tongues of animals that they have killed. Perhaps 'the removal of the tongues is sometimes a precaution to prevent the ghosts of the creatures from telling their sad fate to their sympathising comrades, the living animals of the same sort, who would naturally be frightened, and so keep out of the hunter's way.'[9] The cannibal practice of eating the tongue of a slain enemy is partly based on the idea that the localized qualities are in this way acquired.[10]

3. Ordeals.—The idea of the localization of psychical function and its ethical qualities underlies different forms of the tongue-ordeal.

Lady Anne Blunt records an interesting case of this in connexion with a dispute as to the parentage of a child: 'The matter, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by a live coal being placed upon her tongue.'[11] Here the original thought seems to have been that the truth would be elicited when the inherent falsehood of the tongue was, if necessary, burnt out. Similarly, in case of theft among certain W. African tribes, use is made of a needle which the operator 'thrusts through the tongue of each member of the household in succession, to discover the thief, it being believed that it will fail to pierce the tongue of the person who committed the theft.'[12]

Reference to the tongue-ordeal among E. African natives was recently made in the British House of Commons: 'A native chief was investigating a case of cattle theft in the presence of

[1] T. H. Huxley, *Lessons in Elementary Physiology*, new ed., London, 1900, p. 354.
[2] G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*[2], London, 1904, p. 195.
[3] M. Foster, *A Text-book of Physiology*[6], pt. iv., London, 1900, p. 1519.
[4] M. Foster, *Lectures on the Hist. of Physiology*, Cambridge, 1901, pp. 94, 100.
[5] *De Anima*, bk. ii. ch. 10. [6] *HN* xi. 37.
[7] J. F. Payne, *English Medicine in Anglo-Saxon Times*, Oxford, 1904, p. 153.

[1] See art. BODY, vol. ii. p. 755 ff.
[2] *NR* iii. 147, quoted by H. Spencer, *Descriptive Sociology*, London, 1873–1910, i. 266 n.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 270.
[4] *Ib.* p. 147. [5] Howitt, p. 402.
[6] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 147.
[7] *LP* i. 97.
[8] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 111. The thrusting out of the tongue in derision or contempt (Is 57[4]; Livy, vii. 10; Cicero, *de Oratore*, ii. 66 [266]) may be in origin a concentrated curse.
[9] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 269 f., where numerous examples and parallels will be found.
[10] J. Robinsohn, *Die Psychologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 64, 67.
[11] *A Pilgrimage to Nejd*[2], London, 1881, i. 10.
[12] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 201.

the District Commissioner, Mr. Dundas. The chief called on the accused, one of his people, to go through the native form of ordeal by fire, by licking a hot knife. Mr. Dundas did not prohibit this procedure, but took care that the knife was not sufficiently heated to burn the tongue of the accused.'[1] An ordeal of a different kind is undergone by the medicine-man in certain tribes of Central Australia. The tongue is mysteriously mutilated, and 'remains throughout life perforated in the centre with a hole large enough to admit the little finger.'[2] But this may rather be an example of the frequent practice of mutilating an organ before its special use in order that it may be used with impunity (cf. circumcision, etc., at puberty).

4. Religious usages.—The tongue is not often named as a separate offering in the rites of sacrifice.

The Homeric Greeks concluded a feast by casting the tongues of the victims upon the fire, over which they poured the drink-offering.[3] 'According to some accounts, the tongues of the victims were assigned by the Greeks to Hermes, as the god of speech, or to his human representatives, the heralds.'[4] The Yakut made a special sacrifice, for a sick man's recovery, of tongue, heart, and liver, consuming the rest of the meat themselves.[5] In the horse-sacrifice of the shamanists of N. Asia the tongue of the sacrificed animal is torn out (in order to make its spirit dumb under the shaman's control?).[6]

Honey was placed on the tongue of one who was being initiated into Mithraism, as was the custom with newly-born infants;[7] we may compare with this the ceremonial tasting of milk and honey by those being baptized into the Christian faith.[8] In this connexion may be noticed the miracle of healing ascribed to Martin of Tours, wrought by anointing the tongue of a dumb girl with oil after exorcism.[9] The wide-spread rule of silence (*q.v.*) during particular religious ceremonies falls beyond the scope of this article, but the idea of the localization of function probably underlies the Indian usage recorded by Devendranath Tagore:

'On another elephant sat the Rajaguru (religious preceptor of the Raja) dressed in the ascetic's brick-coloured robe, and silent. He had his tongue encased in wood, lest he should speak.'[10]

5. Penalties.—In the light of these illustrations of the fundamental idea of localized function (or 'diffused consciousness'), we may better understand certain barbarous mutilations widely practised by way of penalty or revenge. These have often survived into times relatively more civilized than those of their origin, when the idea that first prompted them has been lost, viz. the idea of penalizing the guilty organ in which the original evil resides.

The Laws of Hammurabi enacted that in certain cases an adopted son denying his new parents was to have his tongue cut out.[11] According to 2 Mac., when the seven brethren were being tortured, the king 'commanded to cut out the tongue of him that had been their spokesman' (7[4]). Judas Maccabæus, 'cutting out the tongue of the impious Nicanor, said that he would give it by pieces to the birds' (15[33]). Maximus and two other opponents of Monotheletism were dragged from Rome to Constantinople, where their tongues and right hands were cut off, before they were driven into exile.[12] Blasphemy for the fifth time was punished by excision of the tongue, according to a law (1347) of Philip of Valois (1293–1350).[13] Evagrius writes of the heretic Nestorius: 'I learn from one who wrote an account of his demise, that when his tongue had been eaten through with worms, he departed to the greater and everlasting judgment which awaited him.'[14] The instinct which doubtless created this legend worked also in Fulvia's savage action, when she thrust her needle through the tongue of her dead enemy, Cicero.[1] 'The Clarendon Papers, quoted by Southey, state that at Henley-on-Thames, as late as 1646, it was ordered that a woman's tongue should be nailed to a tree, for complaining of the tax levied by Parliament.'[2]

6. 'Figurative' usages.—The selected evidence already given will prepare us to recognize a deeper meaning in many phrases of ancient literature which the modern mind is apt to dismiss as simply figurative and poetical. The Biblical usages will sufficiently illustrate this. The quality of 'a backbiting tongue' is as inherent as that of 'an angry countenance' (Pr 25[23]); a lying tongue hates those that it wounds (26[28]); the tongue devises wickedness, like a sharp razor (Ps 52[2]); Job asks more literally than most readers suppose, 'Is there injustice on my tongue?' (6[30]). The Servant of Jahweh declares that his Master has given to him the disciple's tongue, that he may know how to help the weary by his words (Is 50[4]). In the Messianic future the tongue of the stammerers will be prompt to speak plainly (32[4]), the tongue of the enemies of Israel will consume away in their mouth (Zec 14[12]). The tongue is not named in the well-known narrative of Isaiah's call (Is 6), but the cleansing of his lips by the live coal illustrates the principle of the localization of psychical function. So in the NT, when the tongue is said to defile the whole body, and to be a restless evil, full of deadly poison (Ja 3[6. 8]), there is a hidden intensity of meaning derived from primitive thought. The importance of this is seen in regard to such a phenomenon as the 'gift of tongues,'[3] which implies that the local and quasi-independent organ has been taken possession of by the Spirit of God. This is more difficult for the modern mind to conceive sympathetically than it was for the ancient, largely because we have lost touch with the idea of the localization of psychical function and ethical attributes, and have replaced it by that of the cerebral centralization of consciousness.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 269 f. (where a number of primitive practices in regard to the tongue are collected in a long footnote); J. B. Mayor, *The Epistle of James*[3], do. 1910, pp. 219–221, discusses the ethical aspects of the use and abuse of the tongue. See also H. Wheeler Robinson, art. 'Tongue' in *DAC*.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

TONGUES.—See CHARISMATA.

TONSURE.—Tonsure is the shaving or cutting of the hair after a particular fashion as a sign of reception into the clerical order and to the privileges pertaining thereto. As a rite it is preparatory to the reception of holy orders, and is administered by the bishop or by a mitred abbot or by certain privileged priests in whom its administration has been vested by the pope. At first it was part of the ceremony of ordination, but was separated from it towards the end of the 7th century. The origin of the tonsure is obscure, but from passages in the Fathers it is clear that long hair in men was considered effeminate or worse, and this was particularly true in the case of monks. Epiphanius censures some Mesopotamian monks for their long hair against the rule of the Church, and Jerome is particularly indignant at the custom.[4] A monk's hair had thus to be cut short, though not shaven, as this was the custom with the priests of Isis.[5] The earliest tonsure was probably no more than a close cutting of the hair of the entire head, though this may have become a shaving of the whole head after the manner of

1 As reported in the *Manchester Guardian* of 6th May 1914.
2 Spencer-Gillen[3], pp. 523–525, with accompanying photograph. A Hebrew name for an enchanter is 'a master of the tongue' (Ec 10[11]).
3 *Od.* iii. 333–341.
4 *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 270, where references will be found.
5 F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 146.
6 W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*[2], Leipzig, 1893, ii. 26.
7 F. Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*[3], Brussels, 1913, p. 162.
8 *ERE* ii. 386[b].
9 Sulpicius Severus, *Dial.* iii. 2; cf. Mk 7[33-35].
10 *The Autobiography of Maharshi Devendranath Tagore*, Eng. tr., London, 1914, p. 131.
11 C. H. W. Johns, *The Oldest Code of Laws in the World*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 42, § 192; cf. S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*, London, 1903, p. 134.
12 W. F. Adeney, *The Greek and Eastern Churches*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 130.
13 Fernand Nicolay, *Hist. des croyances, superstitions, mœurs, usages et coutumes (selon le plan du Décalogue)*, Paris, 1902, i. 380 (numerous other examples given).
14 *HE* i. 7.

1 C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, new ed., London, 1904, iii. 206.
2 Edward Eggleston, *The Beginners of a Nation*, London, 1897, p. 67.
3 See art. CHARISMATA, vol. iii. p. 370.
4 Epiph. *Hær.* lxxx.; Jerome, *Ep.* xxii. 'ad Eustoch.,' § 28.
5 Herod. ii. 36; Martial, xii. 29.

the Nazirites and those under a vow (Nu 6^{18}, Ac 21^{24}).[1] It may also have been adopted by monks as a symbol of a penitential life, since penitents had their hair shorn. This is the Eastern form of tonsure, or that of St. Paul. Bede tells how Theodore of Tarsus, before being consecrated by Pope Vitalian in A.D. 668, waited four months for his hair to grow, that it might be shorn into the shape of a crown (the second or Western form of tonsure, or St. Peter's), 'for he had the tonsure of St. Paul the apostle, after the manner of the Eastern people.'[2] The Petrine tonsure consists in leaving only a circlet of hair round a shaven crown, this symbolizing the crown of thorns or the crown of Christ's royal priesthood. It had displaced the Pauline form in the West, and is first mentioned by Gregory of Tours (6th cent.), and was worn by Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590–604), who sent Augustine to England.[3] It is ordered in the 41st canon of the Council of Toledo (A.D. 633)—that 'all clerics must shave the whole front part of the head, and leave behind only a circular crown' of hair on the lower part. While tonsure arose as a monastic custom, it was soon adopted by all clergy, probably before the end of the 6th cent., and the Quinisext Council of 692 appoints it for such lesser orders as readers and singers.

A third form, that of St. John—or of St. James, as its upholders claimed—seems to have been peculiar to the Celtic Church, and occasioned great controversy with the missionaries from Rome, who were astonished to find it in use in Britain, and vigorously combated its use. Nevertheless it continued to be used long after the Synod of Whitby (A.D. 664), which decided against it. What precisely its nature was is uncertain. The Irish Druids are known to have used a tonsure, perhaps denoting servitude to the gods, as it was customary for a warrior to vow his hair to a divinity if victory were granted him.[4] The Druidic tonsure seems to have consisted in cutting all the hair on the anterior part of the head from ear to ear, except a small patch at the forehead.[5] This was looked upon as the tonsure of Simon Magus, regarded as the archdruid or Magus. It has been thought that the Celtic Christian tonsure resembled this and was retained through national feelings. But there was apparently some difference, possibly slight, and it is hardly likely that, while other Druidic observances were banned, this would be retained. Two views are held regarding the Celtic Christian tonsure. (1) It left the hair long at the back, the upper part of the front being shaved so as to leave a band of hair round the forehead from ear to ear.[6] This view was first mooted by Thomas Innes, who says:

'The tonsure of the Scots was not fully round and did not reach the hindermost part of the head, and therefore resembled a crescent or semi-circle.'[7]

(2) All the front of the head was shaved, to a line from ear to ear, behind which the hair was grown.[1] Each of these forms has strong supporters, but the former is probably confirmed by Ceolfrid's account of his discussion with Adamnan, who wore the Celtic tonsure, and to whom he said:

'You who think you are advancing to the crown of life which has no end, why do you wear on your head the representation of a crown which has an end, as Simon Magus did? His tonsure resembled a crown in front but on closer inspection was seen to be imperfect.'[2]

The adherents of the Petrine tonsure generally ascribed the origin of the Celtic to Simon Magus, by way of contempt, or, for the same reason, to the swine-herd of King Loigaire MacNeill.[3] At an earlier time St. Patrick, who was tonsured after the then prevailing Roman manner, viz. the whole head shorn, tried to induce its adoption, but apparently in vain.[4] According to Bede, the community at Iona and the others subject to it accepted the Petrine tonsure about A.D. 716, but other Britons did not conform then.[5] The Celtic tonsure, carried by emigrant Britons to Armorica, was known there in the 9th century.

The Latin form of tonsure with regulars leaves often no more than a circlet of hair; with seculars it is smaller. According to the Synod of Placentia (A.D. 1388), it was to be of the breadth of three fingers. Once the tonsure has been received, it must always be retained.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited, see E. Martène, *de Antiquis Ecclesiae Ritibus*, Venice, 1783; artt. 'Tonsur' in *PRE*[3], and in H. J. Wetzer and B. Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*[2], Freiburg i. Br., 1882–1901. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

TONSURE (Buddhist).—There is no mention of tonsure, and no regulation as to the method to be adopted in wearing or not wearing the hair, in the 227 original rules of the Buddhist order of mendicants. But in the *Khandhakas*, or collection of subsidiary and supplemental rules, completed at the end of the first century after the Buddha's death, we find the following paragraphs:

1. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to wear long hair. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a minor breach of the regulations [*i.e.* of a *dukkaṭa*]. I allow you, O Bhikkhus, hair that is two months old, or two inches long.'

2. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to smooth the hair with a comb, or with a snake's hood [*i.e.* with an ivory instrument so shaped], or with the hand held in that shape, or with pomade, or with hair-oil.' . . .

3. 'I allow you, O Bhikkhus, the use of razors, of a hone to sharpen the razors on, of powder prepared with Sipāṭika-gum to prevent them rusting, of a sheath to hold them in, and of all the apparatus of a barber.' . . .

4. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have the hair of your heads or on your face cut by barbers, nor to let it grow long.' . . .

5. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have your hair cut off with a knife.'[6]

We should not draw, from the fact of these paragraphs being found among the subsidiary rules, any conclusion that they belong to a later time than the original rules. The subsidiary rules refer quite often to what were evidently older customs in the order, and only legalize and give authority to practices already followed, though not mentioned in the older rules. But we should notice in the first place that there is no mention of scissors. The reason of this is curious; scissors had not then been invented. This is confirmed by an exception to rule 5 above. If a *bhikkhu* had a sore on the head, and the hair round it could not be removed by a razor, then a knife might be used.[7] In this case no doubt, if scissors had been

[1] And also as a mark of servitude to God, since Roman and Greek slaves had their heads shaven.

[2] Bede, *HE* iv. 1.

[3] Greg. *Vitæ Patrum*, xvii.; Joannes Diac. *S. Gregorii Magni Vita*, in *PL* lxxv. 230.

[4] Adamnan, *Life of St. Columba*, ed. W. Reeves ('Historians of Scotland'), Edinburgh, 1874, p. 237; J. H. Todd, *St. Patrick: his Life and Mission*, Dublin, 1864, p. 455; P. W. Joyce, *A Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 234; J. Rhys, *The Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom* (*HL*), London, 1888, p. 213, *Celtic Britain*[4], do. 1908, p. 73f.

[5] L. Gougaud, *Les Chrétientés celtiques*, Paris, 1911, p. 198, quoting *MS Cotton, Otho E*, xii. fol. 112b.

[6] J. Dowden, 'An Examination of Original Documents on the Question of the Form of the Celtic Tonsure,' *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, xxx. [1895–96] 325 ff.; John Smith, 'de Tonsura Clericorum,' Appendix to Bede, *HE* (*PL* xcv. 327 f.).

[7] *Civil and Eccles. Hist. of Scotland*, *A.D. 80–818* (Spalding Club Publications, xx.), Aberdeen, 1853.

[1] Reeves, *Introd.* p. cxiv; Todd, p. 487; Bede, v. 21.

[2] The tonsure here referred to was a mere segment with a half circlet of hair in front and the hair worn full behind.

[3] Bede, v. 21; Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 74; Gougaud, p. 197.

[4] A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, Oxford, 1869–78, ii. 292, 328.

[5] Bede, v. 22.

[6] *Vinaya*, ii. 107, 134, tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 69 f., 138 f.

[7] The word *satthaka* (*Vin.* ii. 115) has been rendered 'scissors by Sten Konow, *JPTS*, 1909, p. 55. But this cannot be right See Buddhaghoṣa as quoted in *Vinaya Texts*, iii 90.

then known in the Ganges valley, their use would have been allowed, at least as an alternative.[1]

The members of the order, we see, were to be shaven, not only on the face, but all over the head; and the shaving had to be performed, not by a barber, but by fellow-members. Why was this the rule? Undoubtedly because this was the custom previously followed by the *religieux* belonging to the other orders that we know to have been older than the Buddha's time. It was only natural that men who had devoted themselves to the higher life, and whose main duty was the learning by heart and the repetition of texts dealing with the higher life as they conceived it, should have thought it becoming to themselves to avoid, not only the use of fashionable clothing, but also the elaborate hair-dressing then habitually used by men of the world. The medallions carved in bas-relief on the stone railings round the Bharhut tope may serve as illustrations of these turban-like arrangements, in which strips of brocaded cloth are intertwined with the hair (left long), the faces being clean shaven.[2] Though the sculptures are later in date, earlier texts confirm the general style by descriptions ambiguous without the help of such illustrations.

There is one passage in a very early text, about the same age as the five paragraphs, which confirms the suggestion that those paragraphs probably give us the earliest customs as to shaving followed in the order. That is *Dīgha*, i. 90, in the *Ambaṭṭha Suttanta*, where a Brāhman, reviling the adherents of the new movement, and in fact referring to the Buddha himself, calls them 'shavelings, sham friars, the off-scouring of our kinsman's heels.'[3] It is clear that, in the view of the compilers of this passage, the members of the order had their heads shaven. Another such passage is preserved in the popular anthology called *Dhammapada*, 264, which says: 'Not by his shaven crown is one a *samaṇa*' (a member of any order of *religieux*, a 'religious'), if he be irreligious. It should be noticed that the technical word used is not *bhikkhu* (a member of the Buddhist order), but *samaṇa*, which included non-Buddhist orders also.

In the much later legend of the Great Renunciation—it is at least about seven centuries later than the event which it purports to relate—we are told that the first act of the future Buddha after he had 'gone forth' was:

'Taking his sword in his right hand, and holding the plaited tresses of his hair, and its twisted decoration with his left, he cut them off. So his hair became two inches long, and lay close to his scalp curling from the right, and so it remained his life-long; and his beard the same.'[4]

Now the oldest representations of the Buddha that we possess—the so-called Græco-Buddhist bas-reliefs and statues—are an endeavour to reproduce the coiffure thus described. This story, therefore, as to the imperfect form of the tonsure habitually followed by the Buddha himself, must have been credited, incredible as it seems to us, at the date of those sculptures, not only in the Ganges valley, but also beyond the present frontiers of India, in the extreme north-west. In the second place, the inventors of the story ascribe to the Buddha the belief that every *religieux*—not only Buddhists, for there were none then—should have the hair cut quite short. In other words, they claim a pre-Buddhist origin for the custom followed in the Buddhist order. Perhaps the whole episode is merely invented as a popular explanation of the odd rule as to two inches in the first of the five paragraphs quoted above.

[1] *Vinaya*, ii. 134, tr. *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 139.
[2] See figs. 21 and 22 in Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, pp. 94–97.
[3] The whole episode is translated in Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 112 ff.
[4] *Jātaka-nidāna*, p. 64 (vol. i. of the *Jātaka*, ed. Fausböll).

At the present time the *bhikkhus* in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon hold theoretically to the two-inch rule, but in practice never appear in public without the head and face clean shaven. The numerous sects of Buddhists in Tibet and Mongolia, China, and Japan have long ago forgotten, if they ever knew, the ancient rule. But we have no exact particulars as to when and where they have enacted and carried out any newer rules of their own.

LITERATURE.—*Vinaya Piṭaka*, ed. H. Oldenberg, 5 vols., London, 1879–83; T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1880–85 (*SBE* xiii., xvii., xx.); Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* ('Story of the Nations' ser.), London, 1903, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1899–1910 (*SBB* ii., iii.); *The Jātaka, with its Commentary*, ed. V. Fausböll, tr. Rhys Davids, London, 1877–97, i.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

TONSURE (Chinese).—**1. Confucian.**—Confucianism, being a system of ethics, has no priests or monks. The tonsure is therefore unknown in it.

2. Buddhist.—(*a*) *Monks.*—The Buddhist tonsure was brought into China by monks from India. The whole head is shaved once a month or oftener. With boys brought up in monasteries, being either dedicated by their parents to a religious life or bought by the monks for that purpose, the tonsure takes place early, but with others the age is often eighteen or twenty. At the reception of a novice the liturgy directs that the introducer of the candidate shall ask the chapter assembled that the tonsure may be granted. This acceded to, the vows are taken.[1] A rite which is apparently a constant sequel of the tonsure consists of the branding of the head with from three to eighteen small circular spots.[2] A mutilation of one or more fingers is also sometimes undergone. An explanation of the Buddhist tonsure given by some of the Chinese is that it indicates the 'desire to put away . . . everything of the world, so that the monk does not claim as his own even his hair.'[3]

(*b*) *Nuns.*—Aspirants are received at the age of ten into the nunnery, and their novitiate continues till they are sixteen. During these years only the front part of the head is shaved, but all the hair is shaved when they become nuns. A woman desiring to become a nun must obtain the consent of parents, husband, or guardians.

'One of these must act as sponsor to her at the time of initiation and must hand the razor to be employed in shaving her head to the Prioress who is to perform the ceremony.'[4]

3. Taoist.—(*a*) *Monks.*—Taoist monks shave all about the crown, but the rest of the hair is allowed to grow long and is gathered together into a top-knot fastened by a wooden article like the back of a tortoise.[5] In some cases all the hair is allowed to grow.[6]

(*b*) *Nuns.*—Taoist nuns do not shave their heads, but have their hair done up on the top of their heads.[7]

4. Dislike of the tonsure.—Though Buddhism has benefited largely in the past from the favour of emperors, the tonsure has often been very obnoxious to the governing classes in China, who doubtless took it as the outward sign of the celibate priesthood, which severs its connexion with the family, entirely against Chinese ideas of the paramount importance of domestic life. Memorialists inveigh strongly against it. The following are instances:

In A.D. 624, in a memorial to the emperor requesting the suppression of Buddhism, it was stated that it caused people to

[1] L. Wieger, *Buddhisme chinois*, Ho Kân Fu, 1910, i. 151.
[2] S. Couling, *Encyclopædia Sinica*, Shanghai, 1817, s.v. 'Tonsure'; *The Chinese Recorder*, Shanghai, ix. [1878] 181 ff.
[3] J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, London, 1866, ii. 241.
[4] *Woman's Work in China*, vii. [1883] 27 ff.
[5] W. Milne, in *The Chinese Repository*, xiii. [1844] 25.
[6] Doolittle, ii. 243.
[7] J. H. Gray, *China*, London, 1878, i. 104.

'shave their heads and abandon their ruler and their parents.'[1] The memorialist says again: 'Before the Western Tsin Dynasty [A.D. 256–317] reigned, the ruling dynasties enacted stringent laws by which the people of the Middle Kingdom were prevented from shaving the head at pleasure.'[2]

In A.D. 995 an edict threatened severe punishment to those who were 'shaved surreptitiously' without first obtaining permission of their district prefect to become monks or nuns.[3]

In A.D. 1408 it was decreed that, 'if any person surreptitiously took the tonsure to become a monk,' he should be punished with a term of hard labour, and after that become a husbandman.[4]

The determination of the Chinese Government to keep the tonsure as well as the age of receiving it under their control is seen in other enactments. Taoists are also mentioned in some of these cases.[5] Eight blows was the punishment under the Manchu dynasty to Buddhist or Taoist who in the one case took the tonsure and in the other did up his hair on his own account.[6] At the same time monks were not allowed to go about without the tonsure, and pupils adopted by the Buddhist clergy had to be tonsured. Those in monasteries without the tonsure had to return to secular life, being neither monks nor laymen.[7] This was the case also in A.D. 1458 for those who had been tonsured after twenty, but the culprits were to be banished for life;[8] and in A.D. 1537 it was decreed that not only those who privately shaved their heads, but also their parents, neighbours, and helpers,[9] were to be punished.

5. Ridicule of the tonsure.—The tonsure of the Buddhist lends itself to the derision of the Chinese, who are very susceptible to anything that opens a way to mockery or banter. One term applied to the Buddhist monk is 'bald-headed ass,' another is 'bald-headed thief.'[10] As a further example of the way in which the shorn and shaven priest is despised may be instanced the curious custom of shaving the head of a young boy in order that the evil spirits may think that he is of no consequence—in fact worthless to the parents—and thus pass him by uninjured. The boy is then called 'Buddhist priest.' The present writer saw an instance of this in the case of a neighbour's son in Canton.[11]

6. The Manchu tonsure.—A species of tonsure was practised by every male except monks in China under the Manchu rule of the country. The hair is now allowed to grow, instead of the greater part of it being shaved off.

7. Tonsure of children.—Young children's heads are also shaved to a large extent. The first shaving of an infant's head, when a month old, often has a religious character, being done before an idol or the ancestral tablets.[12]

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the footnotes.

J. DYER BALL.

TONSURE (Hindu).—*Chūḍā*, 'tonsure,' is the name of an ancient rite in India, also called *chūḍākaraṇam* or *chūḍākarma*, *chaulam*, which is performed on boys, sometimes on girls also, and derives its name from the tuft of hair left on the top of the boy's head (*chūḍā*). According to the ancient rule, this rite is to be performed when the boy is three years old, or, in the lower castes, in his fifth or seventh year. The boy is dressed in new clothes, and placed on his mother's lap. A barber cuts his hair with a razor, while sacred verses from the Veda are recited. The hair is thrown on a heap of cow-dung, and afterwards dug into the ground (see Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, Strassburg, 1897). It is interesting to note that this rite, as pointed out in Gerini's monograph on the tonsure rite in Siam, has spread into Siam, together with other Brāhmanical institutions. In India it has been invested with some legal importance, the Sanskrit lawbooks stating that a boy on whom the ceremony of tonsure has been performed in the family of his birth is no longer capable of being affiliated to another person (see Jolly, *Tagore Law Lectures*, Calcutta, 1885). The tonsure rite is carefully kept by many castes of the present day, though the time of its performance varies. Thus the Kanoj Brāhmans of Poona perform the rite when a boy is from six months to two years old; the Lingayats, after a year; the Vanis, at any time from six months to five years. Sometimes the child is taken to the village temple for the ceremony, or after its performance (see the *Bombay Gazetteer*, *passim*; Rai Bahadur L. B. Nath, *Hinduism*, Meerut, 1899). The tonsure rite is supposed to belong to the common heirloom of Indo-European nations, because similar rites and superstitions occur in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, and, particularly, among some Slavic nations, such as the Servians and Bohemians.

LITERATURE.—J. Kirste, 'Indogermanische Gebräuche beim Haarschneiden,' *Analecta Graeciensia*, Graz, 1893; Potanski, *Die Ceremonie der Haarschur bei den Slaven und Germanen*, Cracow, 1896.

J. JOLLY.

TOPHET.—Although the OT references to Tophet, the scene of the Moloch sacrifices in the Valley of Hinnom, leave no doubt as to its great importance in the popular religion of Judah in the period before the reformation under Josiah, the place itself is mentioned only in the following places: 2 K 23^{10}, Is 30^{33}, Jer $7^{31f.}$ $19^{6.\ 11.\ 12-13}$. The similar word in Job 17^{6} is clearly not to be understood in this connexion. The original pronunciation of the word, which is transliterated in the LXX Τάφεθ or Θαφέθ, is unknown, the Masoretic pronunciation in this case, as in others, being due to the substitution of the vowels of בֹּשֶׁת, 'shame.' Moreover, the etymology of the word is quite uncertain, and it cannot be determined whether the final *t* is radical or is merely the feminine ending. In Is 30^{33} indeed the form is תָּפְתָּה, which, if the text could be trusted, would be evidence of the former alternative, unless the word should be understood as having a double feminine ending such as יְשׁוּעָתָה (Ps 3^{3}). But against this supposition is the fact that the word is construed as masculine in its immediate context. In any case, since, with the exception of Is 30^{33}, it always has the definite article or is capable of being so pointed, it is evident that it is not strictly a proper name. We may reasonably infer that there were several *tophets*, although we know only of the one which was situated in the Valley of Hinnom.

Robertson Smith,[1] arguing from the fact that 'at the time when the word תֹּפֶת first appears in Hebrew, the chief foreign influence in Judæan religion was that of Damascus (2 K 16),' sought to connect the word with the Aramaic *tfaya*, which means a 'stand or tripod set upon a fire . . . of which we might, according to known analogies, have a variant *tfāth*. The corresponding Hebrew word is אַשְׁפַּת (for *shfāth*), which means an ashpit or dunghill, but primarily must have denoted the fireplace.' But this explanation of the word by an Aramaic etymology takes for granted that the cult practised at the *tophet*, or at any rate the precise ritual of the cult, was a comparatively new-fangled thing in the 7th cent. B.C., and there are grave difficulties in such an assumption. Even if Ahaz did bring from Damascus a new contrivance for burning the children's bodies, why should it have kept in Hebrew its Aramaic name, when the Hebrew language itself possessed the same word with the ordinary dialectic difference? When the same king introduced in Jerusalem the innova-

[1] *The Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 377.

[1] J. J. M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, Amsterdam, 1903, p. 37.
[2] *Ib.* p. 39. [3] *Ib.* p. 73 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 83.
[5] *Ib.* pp. 97, 114. [6] *Ib.* p. 100; also see p. 80.
[7] *Ib.* p. 114. [8] *Ib.* p. 85. [9] *Ib.* p. 88.
[10] E. J. Dukes, *Every-day Life in China*, London, 1885, p. 183, and see also Chinese-English dictionaries.
[11] Also see Gray, i. 112, note 1.
[12] Doolittle, i. 122 f.

tion of a great stone altar, it was called by the Hebrew word for 'altar,' not the Aramaic. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that such a practice as the sacrifice of the first-born should have been suddenly introduced into Jerusalem as late as the 8th cent. B.C. When it is considered how hard debased superstitions have died in our own country—if indeed they are dead—we can understand the survival or even the recrudescence in Palestine of aboriginal superstitions, but not the adoption of so terrible a rite as human sacrifice by a people who had reached an altogether higher level of religion. The OT is unintelligible unless it is recognized that the population of Palestine in the days of the kings of Judah and Israel was not so homogeneous as later writers imagined it to have been, and that the true-born Israelites were in a minority. In a fusion of races there is, no doubt, a tendency for the higher to be drawn down to the level of the lower. When a man of fairly good intelligence, but not possessed of any strong religious convictions, marries a thoroughly superstitious woman, it is the wife's superstition rather than the husband's intellect that will be the dominant factor in the household. And that the sacrifice of the first-born was a deeply-rooted Canaanite cult is proved not only by the excavations at Gezer,[1] but also by more than one passage in the OT. It is most significant that the E document of the Pentateuch represents God as commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Gn 22^{2}), and that the same document in its legislation (Ex $22^{29f.}$) puts the first-born of men and cattle on exactly the same level, not requiring the redemption of the former as is ordered in Ex 34^{20} (J). And that a law allowing, if not requiring, the sacrifice of the first-born was at one time issued in Jahweh's name is evident not only from Ezk $20^{25f.}$, but also from Jeremiah's protest (7^{31}; cf. 19^{5}) that Jahweh had never commanded or contemplated any such cult. Although Ahaz is the first king of Judah of whom it is definitely stated that he sacrificed his first-born, it would be unsafe to conclude that he was the first who actually did so; for what had been done by earlier kings unheeded may well have called forth a vehement protest in the days of Isaiah. Certainly, if the stories of David recorded in the books of Samuel are based on a sound tradition, and are not merely what later prophets of the non-reforming party thought David must have done, there would be no difficulty in supposing that even David had presided over the Moloch cult at the *tophet* in the Valley of Hinnom. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, as the story of the Rechabites proves, certain strata of the population remained till a late period aloof from and uncontaminated by the Canaanite elements, and it is doubtless these non-Canaanite elements that we ought to credit with the attempts made from time to time to abolish the worst of the pre-Israelite superstitions which threatened to swamp the religion of Jahweh. There is no reason to question the statements in the book of Kings that reforms were attempted in the days of Asa and of Jehoshaphat.

While it is not improbable that the method of burning the bodies at the *tophet* in the Valley of Hinnom was the same as that adopted elsewhere,[1] it is by no means clear that either the cult itself or its ritual came from Damascus. It must not be overlooked that the *tophet*, or at any rate the place of the *tophet*, is called in Jer 19^{6} 32^{35} 'the high places of the Baal.' The point of Jer 7^{32} is that in the massacres which may be expected corpses not slain in sacrifice will be buried at the *tophet*—proof of the impotence of the *tophet* sacrifices to avert the divine wrath.

Robertson Smith, in discussing the meaning of Is 30^{33}, writes as follows:

'It appears that Tophet means a pyre, such as is prepared for a king. But the Hebrews themselves did not burn their dead, unless in very exceptional cases, and burial was equally the rule among their Phœnician neighbours, as is plain from researches in their cemeteries, and apparently among all the Semites. Thus, when the prophet describes the deep and wide pyre "prepared for the king," he does not draw his figure from ordinary life, nor is it conceivable that he is thinking of the human sacrifices in the valley of Hinnom, a reference which would bring an utterly discordant strain into the imagery. What he does refer to is a rite well known to Semitic religion, which was practised at Tarsus down to the time of Dio Chrysostom, and the memory of which survives in the Greek legend of Heracles-Melcarth, in the story of Sardanapalus, and in the myth of Queen Dido.'[2]

But surely at a time when sacrifices were being offered to Moloch, *i.e.* the king, at the *tophet*, a statement that a *tophet* has been prepared for a king must have suggested the ritual of the Valley of Hinnom; the prophet declares with grim Hebrew irony that a *tophet* has indeed been prepared for a king, only in this case the king will be the victim and not the recipient of the sacrifice.

How long *tophets* remained in Palestine it is impossible to say. It is asserted (2 K 23^{10}) that the one in the Valley of Hinnom was defiled by Josiah; but this statement occurs in a passage which appears to be secondary, and, even if Josiah tried to put a stop to the cult, there may have been a recrudescence of it after his death; and beyond the limits of his diminutive kingdom it probably continued considerably later. It is difficult to see why Jeremiah should have published his denunciation of the *tophet* in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, if it had been abolished once for all in the eighteenth year of Josiah. And if, as seems probable, Deuteronomy is to be dated in the 6th cent. B.C., it is evident that as late as that time it was still necessary, at least in some parts of Palestine, to protest against the sacrifice of children (Dt 18^{10}). Moreover, the prophecy in Is 30, though based on a genuine utterance of Isaiah, bears many evidences of having been modified at a later date, and, if Asshur here, as in $11^{11.\ 16}$ and $19^{23f.}$ (cf. Ezr 6^{22}), means the Seleucid empire, the king referred to in the present form of the passage may be Antiochus Epiphanes. It is certainly not impossible that in some outlying districts of Palestine, such as Ammon, Moab, or Edom, the cult associated with the *tophets* held its own down to the 2nd cent. B.C.

LITERATURE.—S. D. F. Salmond, art. 'Tophet, Topheth,' in *HDB*; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894.

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TÔRÂH.—See LAW.

TORCH (Greek and Roman).—In common with other races, the Greeks and Romans held many festivals at night, when torchlight was a practical

[1] That the skeletons found at Gezer belonged to children who had been sacrificed appears more natural than the explanation adopted by J. G. Frazer (*GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 108 f.), nor is the greater age of some of the children whose skeletons were found in Tell Ta'annek conclusive proof to the contrary. It is evident that the redemption of the first-born must have been a not uncommon custom before it was required by law (Ex 34). Parents would endeavour to save their children by substituting some other victim, and, if all went well afterwards, would assume that the god had been satisfied. In time of great distress, however, it would be imagined that the god had not been contented with the substitute and demanded his real due. See art. REDEMPTION.

[1] 'The human holocaust is not burned on an altar, but on a pyre or fire-pit constructed for the occasion. This appears both in the myths of Dido and Heracles and in actual usage. At Tarsus a very fair pyre is erected yearly for the burning of Heracles; in the Carthaginian sacrifice of boys the victims fall into a pit of flame, and in the Harranian ox-sacrifice the victim is fastened to a grating placed over a vault filled with burning fuel: finally, Isaiah's Tophet is a broad and deep excavation filled with wood exactly like the fiery trench in which, according to Arabic tradition, the victims of 'Amr b. Hind and the martyrs of Nejrân found their end' (Robertson Smith[2], p. 376 f.).

[2] P. 372 f.

necessity, and need have no particular religious significance. But the torch was also important in various ceremonies where its presence was not merely utilitarian; and in many cases where it may have been originally used for merely practical purposes it acquired a sacred or symbolic meaning. In agricultural festivals, *e.g.*, the use of fire is a well-known rite, although its precise significance may be doubted. Mannhardt and Frazer have collected a large number of customs which illustrate fire-ritual as a means of promoting the growth of crops and animals.[1] The underlying idea may sometimes be a belief that earthly fire represents the sun; and torches, carried over the fields, may be the means, by sympathetic magic, of 'making sunshine.' It is more probable, however, that the fertility which the use of fire is believed to cause is to be explained by its purifying power.

In Greek myth and ritual the torch is specially connected with Demeter. According to the Homeric hymn, the goddess, after the rape of Persephone, rushed wildly in search of her daughter with lighted torches in her hands. The hymn deals with the Eleusinian mysteries, and it is probable that the actual rites observed by the initiated were attributed to the example of the goddess. The Eleusinia[2] included a 'torch-day' (*lampadum dies*), when the *μύσται* roamed along the shore with torches. They supposed themselves to be imitating the wanderings of Demeter; but the original meaning of the rite was doubtless to purify the land and ward off pestilence from the crops. In the same way the early Eleusinians seem to have purified their children by making them pass over the fire, as the myth of Demophon, in the same hymn, appears to indicate.[3] The most solemn ceremonies at Eleusis took place at night, when the hall of the mysteries (*μυστικὸς δόμος*) was lit by torches. One of the chief officials was called the 'torch-bearer' (*δᾳδοῦχος*), and a priest bearing the same title took part in another festival (the Lenæa), and assisted at a rite of purification or atonement of sin.[4] Juvenal[5] speaks of the torch as the special emblem of the Eleusinian priest.

The torch is an attribute of various Greek deities besides Demeter. Persephone has the same emblem as her mother. In literature and art we find the torch regularly associated with Hecate, perhaps as a moon-goddess.[6] Artemis is also commonly represented with a torch in literature[7] and in art from the 4th cent. B.C. Here the torch may be the symbol of a moon-goddess; but Farnell,[8] who holds that Artemis was originally an earth-goddess, thinks that it belongs to her as a deity of vegetation. The torches which in art are a frequent attribute of the Mænads are perhaps best explained by reference to their nocturnal festivals. Finally, Ares sometimes carries a torch, an appropriate emblem for the god of war.[9]

In Greek custom the most conspicuous example of the use of torches is in the torch-race (*λαμπαδηφορία*, *λαμπαδηδρομία*, or, most often, simply *λαμπάς*). This competition is best known as Athenian; but it is also recorded for other Greek states, and Alexander included it in most of the festivals which he established in various cities. In Athens the torch-race was a feature of various festivals, in honour of Prometheus, Athene (in the Panathenæa), Hephæstus, Pan, Bendis, Hermes, and Theseus. It was even held in the festival of the dead (*ἐπιτάφια*). The date of its institution is unknown, but it was first held in honour of Prometheus, the fire-bringer, at whose altar the competitors lit their torches. As regards the festival of Pan, we know that the race was instituted after the battle of Marathon. At the Bendidea it was run on horseback, and was a novelty in the time of Socrates; elsewhere the race was on foot. The competitors were apparently chosen from the several Attic tribes. The torch was passed from one member of a team to another, at fixed intervals along the course, and the victory rested with the team whose lighted torch first reached the goal—an altar on which fire was kindled with the torch. This procedure gave rise to the famous simile of Lucretius ('et, quasi cursores, vitaï lampada tradunt'), the idea of which is found in Plato.[1] An equally famous line in Æschylus[2] also refers to the race, although the exact point is doubtful.

Æschylus might possibly have meant that all the runners in the winning team have an equal share in the victory, the last no less than the first; but more probably he refers to the fact that the winning torch was handed in by the last to receive it. This man would be first in relation to the rival teams, but last in relation to his own.

The Greeks themselves explained the torch-race as a commemoration of the gift of fire by Prometheus;[3] but the original motive must have been something more than a mere commemoration. The essential feature seems to lie in the transference of fire from one altar to another at the greatest possible speed. It is probable, therefore, that the underlying idea is the need of carrying fire from a pure source to take the place of a polluted fire. At Athens all fires were extinguished before the race began (at least in the Promethea), and were rekindled from the new fire. A belief in the pollution of fire is shown in the Argive custom of extinguishing fire after a death, and rekindling it from another source *ὡς μεμιασμένον*.[4] Similarly the fires at Platæa were defiled by the presence of barbarians, and new fire was brought from the sacred hearth of Delphi. The attraction of such a rite to the cults of Prometheus and Hephæstus needs no explanation. Athene, too, might well have adopted a torch-race, as being the patron of handicrafts and metal-working, for which fire was a necessity; but more probably she claimed the torch-race as the supreme head of the city. The race seems less appropriate to the other gods, with the possible exception of Pan. The theory that he was a sun-god cannot be accepted; but fire certainly played a part in his ritual, and an ever-burning lamp was maintained in his cave under the Acropolis. Most probably, however, the Athenians instituted the race in his honour to commemorate his appearance to the runner Phidippides after the battle of Marathon. Once established, the race became popular, and was attached to other festivals without any special religious fitness.

The Romans had no torch-race, and the torch was less prominent in their ritual than in Greek religion. But the same ideas can be traced in Italy as appear in Greek fire-rites, although it is not always possible to distinguish the indigenous from the borrowed element; *e.g.*, the festival of Diana at Aricia (Nemi) no doubt belongs to a primitive Italian stratum, but it is impossible to say how far Greek influence may have modified its

[1] W. Mannhardt, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme*, Berlin, 1875, p. 497 f.; J. G. Frazer, *GB*[2], London, 1900, iii. 313, and *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, do. 1913, vol. i. ch. v.

[2] See art. MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), § 1 (*a*).

[3] See E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Freiburg i. Br., 1894, p. 29; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 365 f.; T. W. Allen and E. E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns*, do. 1904, p. 9 f.

[4] Suidas, p. 1404: Διὸς κῴδιον; L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896–1909, iii. 161 f.

[5] xv. 140.

[6] Roscher, p. 1888 f.; but see also *CGS* ii. 509 f.

[7] First in Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 206.

[8] *CGS* iii. 459.

[9] Cf. Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 27.

[1] Lucr. ii. 78; Plato, *Laws*, vi. 776.

[2] *Agam.* 314: νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.

[3] Hyginus, *Astron.* ii. 15; *Anth. Pal.* vi. 100.

[4] Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 24.

details. In this festival women whose prayers before child-birth the goddess favourably heard bore lighted torches to her shrine. It is difficult to say whether this custom is a survival of a purificatory rite (Diana representing a forest deity or the goddess of agriculture) or whether the torch is only a symbol of the moon-goddess, who was the natural patron of women in child-birth.

In Greek and Roman private life the torch was an important feature in marriage, as the bridal procession took place at night or towards evening. As early as Homer[1] there is mention of this torch-light procession. It was the duty of the bride's mother to light the nuptial torch.[2] In Italy the bride was also escorted to her new home by torch-light, under the protection of Juno Domiduca or Iterduca. Hence the god of love, both in Greece and in Rome, is often represented with a torch—an idea no doubt assisted by the common conception of love as a 'fire.'

The torch had also funereal associations to the Romans, being used to light the pile on which the corpse was burned. Those who applied the torch averted their faces.[3] The 'two torches' (of marriage and death) are mentioned by Propertius[4] and Ovid.[5]

LITERATURE.—The λαμπαδηφορία has been frequently discussed—*e.g.*, by A. Mommsen, *Heortologie*, Leipzig, 1864, p. 232; P. Foucart, in *Revue de Phil.* xxiii. [1899] 112; N. Wecklein, in *Hermes*, vii. [1872] 437; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Lampadēdromia'; J. R. S. Sterret, in *AJPh* xxii. [1901] 393.

E. E. SIKES.

TORRES STRAITS.—See NEW GUINEA.

TORT.—See DELICT.

TORTOISE.—See ANIMALS.

TORTURE.—*Quæstio*, said Baldus de Periglis, an interpreter of that word of dire significance in Roman law, 'is a certain kind of inquisition made for the purpose of tearing out the truth ('eruendae veritatis') by torments and bodily pain.' Few institutions have more signally failed even to afford rational excuse for their evil existence as a method of extracting evidence. Starting from a deep instinct of violence, it consistently made manifest its inherent viciousness, which no fundamentally good intention could redeem and no humane afterthought of qualification and exception could withhold from pernicious and cruel consequences. Unlike the ordeal (*q.v.*), which was in some measure an appeal to a fairly equal chance, torture was without even the negative virtue of offering a percentage of probabilities of right and truth in its results. It is difficult to think of any principle which could make it really assist in evoking truth from reluctant witnesses or reliable confession from accused persons. The one point of affinity to ordeal was the resort to torture when there was a deficiency of direct legal evidence. Its basis in injustice is shown not only in its penalizing the innocent and unconvicted, but in the fact that its applicability was long confined in both Greece and Rome to slaves—significant of its palpable unfitness for freemen. It never was universal, though in ancient use among Assyrians, Egyptians, Medes, and Japanese; it does not appear in the early laws of Chinese, Hindus, or Jews. There is no mention of it in the OT record. The metaphoric heaping of coals of fire on the head probably refers to torture, as appears from a Muhammadan penalty of a live coal laid on a lascivious palm. From a remote age torture prevailed in Greece for slaves, and, although freemen were generally exempt, the exemption was overborne in cases of conspiracy and murder. Slaves in Athens were subject to torture in causes civil as well as criminal. At times the actions were determined by balancing the testimonies of the slaves of the opposing litigants put under the pressure of the wheel, the ladder, the rack, or the burning tile. Grecian practice has not transmitted any code; that was reserved for Roman law, which unfortunately hardened into permanence the crude tradition of force which it shared with Greece.

In this exposition we are not dealing with torture as a method of punishment, to which some speculations give an earlier place than belongs to the torture of witnesses or accused persons. It is as a process for obtaining testimony or confession, chiefly in causes criminal, that torture has historically played its most unreasoned and baneful part. In the Roman Republic it had wide currency in spite of sharply defined restrictions which instructively exhibit the efforts, too tardily made and not thoroughgoing enough, to modify and restrain an institution for which abolition was the only remedy. And yet credit must be given to the insight and humanity of some of the distinctions made. The exemption of freemen gave way under imperial impulses when lese-majesty was imputed. The general safeguard that there must be vehement presumptions of guilt before resort to the torture was clear enough in theory, but was widely ignored in practice. Most curious fact of all perhaps is the frankness of the authorities grouped in the *Digest* on the primary desirability of doing without torture, on the frailty and peril of the method as an engine for ascertaining facts, on the delusive character of confessions induced by modes which were tests not of truthfulness but of physical endurance, and on the danger to third parties from the allegations wrung from men willing to say anything to save themselves. Evidence of slaves under torture was declared inadmissible against their masters, but there were exceptions of some intricacy. The apostle Paul (Ac $22^{24ff.}$) pleaded with success his right as a Roman freeman as a protection from examination under the scourge. Mainly used only in causes criminal, the institution made good its footing in some civil causes also. Exemptions of minors, patricians, priests, and pregnant women were inapplicable when charges of treason were made. The direction of Antoninus Pius that torture was not to be used to secure betrayal of alleged accomplices was as wise as it was humane, but the very object of getting at other culprits came ultimately to be a main occasion of its employment. The provisions of the *Digest*[1] and the *Code*[2] systematize several contradictory doctrines 'de quaestionibus' illustrative of a considerable development. The emperors were not long in discovering what Dante was to illustrate by extreme examples, that treason was the worst of crimes. This was the creed too of Anglo-Saxon as well as of later feudal criminal law, and it encouraged violent processes of detection. In Rome the kind of torture with widest currency was that of the *equuleus*, or rack, which passed on as perhaps the worst legacy of Roman law to mediæval Europe.

The abolition of the barbarian ordeal by the Lateran Council of 1215 left a vacuum which was partly filled by a still worse expedient—the Roman method of 'tearing out the truth.' Under the Salic law ordeal and torture had co-existed, but the latter for slaves only, the provisions obviously echoing Roman practice. The Ripuarian code apparently countenanced ordeal alone. The renaissance of Roman law explains the return of torture after some measure of abeyance. In

[1] *Il.* xviii. 492.
[2] Eur. *Iph. in Aul.* 732, *Phœn.* 344, *Med.* 1027.
[3] Virg. *Æn.* vi. 224. [4] iv. (v.) 11, 46. [5] *Her.* xxi. 172.
[1] xlviii. 18. [2] ix. 41.

France and Italy it seems to have re-established itself during the 13th century. Continental charters cited by Du Cange[1] gave exemption from torture. Its French name, *gehenne*, was fit enough. There were many modes—the *brodequin*, the *estrapade*, the *chevalet*—all used in the *question préparatoire*, preliminarily in the trial, and in the definitive *question préalable* after conviction to disclose accomplices. In England, though without place in the common law, it was practised as an abuse notably in the anarchy under King Stephen and in King John's processes of extracting treasure from the Jews. The *peine forte et dure*, however, or torture by pressure of weights to compel a prisoner to put himself 'upon the country' or verdict of a jury, appears about 1300. Under Edward II. in 1311 papal inquisitors in the trial of the Templars applied torture admittedly never legally countenanced in England before. Though long without regular sanction in the courts for crime, the practice of torture crept in with what may be called council government under the Tudors. As always, secret courts favoured secret methods, and torture loved the darkness. With Shakespeare and other Elizabethan dramatists 'rack' and 'strappado' were household words. Coke might excommunicate the institution from the common law, but Coke and Bacon alike countenanced it in practice when the scent of treason was strong.

In Scotland the law and practice appear to have nearly paralleled the state of things in England. Isolated examples of torture, such as that given by way of punishment to the murderer of James I., may have been preceded, as one annalist asserts, by judicial torture at his trial. So late as 1542 the point of law was established that a confession procured by torture was null. George Buchanan, in spite of the risks that he himself had run from the Inquisition, recognizes without censure the obtaining of proofs by torture. The deplorable inhumanities resulting from the witchcraft craze, nurtured in Scotland by the sapience of the demonologist James VI., and absolutely paralleled by the like frenzy in England and France, were a distressing combination of the mischiefs of torture with a recrudescence of the ordeal. The victims were often old, miserable, and insane; the pitiful and pitiless mania, however, was not merely a British but equally a European crime; its creed on the Continent was of one context with that in Britain; everywhere the witch-finders used the same methods of pain. It was the last stage of a sort of common law of torture, although the variety of local usage shows a wide range of divergence in detail. In the Covenant time a last outburst of persecuting zeal revived the decadent engine of violence. A dubious tradition traces the thumbikins in Scotland to a Russian origin.[2] Museums of torture such as those of Nuremberg, The Hague, and the Tower of London—competitions in horror as they are—unite in a kind of commonplace of malignancy. Authorities on torture in like manner dwell with the same tedious insistence on the *indicia*, or preliminary evidences needed to justify torture, and on the conditions of its infliction. The *Summa Angelica*, a great cyclopedia of instruction to confessors, enjoins the interrogation to judges in confession whether they had put people to torture without sufficient *indicia*, which was very rightly classified as a deadly sin. Now and again a tractate of law and practice of torture, such as that of Paulus Grillandus, breaks away from its companions in the great folio vol. xi. of Zilettus (1584) by its superior realism. Grillandus distinguishes with grim precision the five degrees of torture: now a mere threat, now a suspension on the rack for the space only of an Ave Maria or a Paternoster, now a graver suspension for the space of a Miserere, now for a period which might reach into hours, and, last degree of all, where the victim's limbs, weighted down, were jerked and twisted till the agony was greater than the amputation of the hand. It is marvellous how men endured such torments, but that they did so is attested by occasional observations by the judges or assessors of court who wrote the treatises. Grillandus, *e.g.*, drawing upon his experience at Pisa and at Rome, registers the wonderful case of a most cunning thief whose absolute impassiveness was ascribed to certain words that he whispered when the torture was applied until a slip of paper was found bearing as a charm the Scriptural text (well known for its use in amulets) 'Jesus autem transiens.' Finally, however, with the charm removed altogether, this stout malefactor defied the torture again by his whispered invocation so that it was necessary to abandon the torture. And still greater cases, the commentator concludes, were seen at Milan and Rome when certain words touching the milk of the Virgin enabled the victim to go through the torment as if he slept. This particular variety of charm was reported to be no less effective as a counter-charm, but Grillandus shows no faith in its potency as an aid to the prosecutor.

An unfortunate feature of torture was its adoption by the inquisitorial courts of the Church for the investigation of charges of blasphemy, heresy, and the like. Was persecution not, like the Inquisition itself, a confusion of a secular with a sacred function, in which the analogy of treason to an earthly potentate carried priests of religion to extremes not compatible with the conception of a majesty which, though wounded, was divine? Whatever of error lurked in the concept itself, the tribunal which was its executive of vindication added to the wrong in principle by a series of false directions of the practice in prosecution. It surely was a blunder worse than a crime to adopt methods which doubly branded with public odium courts which were designed by processes of barbarism to repress the freedom of the human mind. The fact that already by the middle of the 13th cent. papal dispensations to churchmen were needed for irregularities in the use of torture casts a lurid light on the procedure. No safeguard of institutions is so sound as publicity—the liberty of moderate criticism, the freedom of defence, and the avoidance of the abuses which wait upon invisible dungeons and courts. Secrecy inevitably means tyranny and obscurantism. The refusal of counsel for the accused was a fundamental and far-reaching error in a 'court of inquisition into heretical depravity,' which by its very object tended to unite the zeal and interest of both prosecutor and judge against the heretic. The double sanction of royal and ecclesiastical authority sometimes enabled the machinery against heresy to be used for political rather than spiritual ends. The most notorious persecution of the 16th cent. was in the Netherlands, and torture was the keynote of its procedure. The Renaissance had not wholly escaped the persecutions which rose to their evil eminence during the transition period in which the swaying boundary-line came to a stand between Lutheran reform and Roman orthodoxy. In 1532 the Constitutions of Charles V. codified for Germany a system which incorporated torture among the fundamentals of procedure. His establishment of the Inquisition in 1550 inaugurated a period of atrocities perhaps worse than any other in human history. Philip II. of Spain found in the Duke of Alva a spirit of

[1] *Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis*, new ed., Niort, 1883–87, vi., *s.v.* 'Quæstio.'

[2] Maclaurin, *Arguments and Decisions*, preface, p. xxxvii.

merciless executive in the Netherlands, scarcely less jealous of public liberty than of private creeds, and Alva's *horrenda gloria* of death penalties earned for him not only his downfall but also the execration ever since attached to his name. Out of that fierce time aptly came its strange definitive and callous expression in a contemporary book, the *Praxis Rerum Criminalium* of Josse de Damhoudère, a councillor under both Charles and Philip in the Netherlands, published in French and Latin in 1554 and repeatedly afterwards, remarkable among other things for its matter-of-course attitude to torture, which makes only too intelligible the excesses of practice under the most illustrious and excellent Alva, whose honour and sagacity a preface in some editions incidentally extols. Woodcuts queerly illustrate the varieties of crime, while seven whole chapters on torture make transparent the vices of a system the radical barbarity of which, despite its antiquity of sanction expounded by generations of civilian glossators and jurists, all its touches of humanity—and there were some—were hopeless to redeem. Damhoudère harrows the modern soul perhaps most by his passionless exposition as of a principle doubtless imperfect, yet itself of the nature of things. Leading modes indicated are by the rope (*i.e.* the rack), by water forced through the mouth, by oil internally administered, by burning pitch or lime, by hunger, cold, or the thumbscrew, by mice or parasites that gnawed the flesh, or by fire intensified by basting the body with oil—these were only a few of at least fourteen species of torments. What wonder that Damhoudère after this enumeration should consider that torture often could most happily (*felicissime*) be applied by scourging alone? Two pictures complete the impression, one showing a victim girt and twisted with ropes and swung stretched out with weights at his feet, the other an idyllic group of the doctors, knights, priests, old men, children, and prospective mothers, who were benignly excusable from torture.

It was a law from which no conceivable evolution could eliminate the initial anomalies (1) of punishing an accused by torture before he was found guilty or a witness before he was proved a perjurer; or (2) of torturing an accused after conviction when torture was no part of the sentence, and when the judge's function was ended and the process was no part of the trial. These were dilemmas from which no escape was ever devised, and they gave effectual leverage to criticism when—late in the day, it must be owned—the opposition developed energy enough to make abolition of torture a direct object of humane propaganda. Illustrious opinions against torture were many; those in its favour were perhaps less illustrious. Augustine, Ulpian, Quintilian, and Montaigne could be cited on one side, and Demosthenes, Aristotle, Bodin, and Pothier on the other. But the lawyers were indifferent, and their neutrality and acquiescence gave the practice a long lease of life. Roman tradition persisted little shaken in Europe till Beccaria and Voltaire threw a new intensity into attack on abuses, and the objection to torture passed from being a mere dissent into a positive and earnest movement to repeal what was at once a futility and a cruel injustice. From the middle of the 18th cent. until the beginning of the 19th the Continental countries by degrees followed the example of repeal set by Great Britain. Torture had died out in England by the middle of the 17th cent.; it was abolished for Scotland by statute in 1708. Its extinction on the Continent has been assigned in Prussia to 1740, in Portugal to 1776, in Sweden to 1786, in France to 1789, in Russia to 1801. But in the last-named country it is said that so late as 1906-07 political prisoners underwent grievous treatment in a 'museum of torture' comprising brutalities in which 'scorching of the feet at the fire' was among the least revolting. In the Far East the persistence of the evil has been still greater. In China the usage has long held, and presumably still holds, place as a fundamental law. But in Japan it was abolished in 1876. Suspicion, however, obtains that in Oriental lands, despite reforms and prohibitions, illegitimate torture is still secretly carried on. One main fact in Europe is perhaps that, while the lawyers 2000 years ago already saw the fallacy and futility of torture, seventeen centuries had passed before its abolition was taken firmly in hand. The many generations of clerical jurists and judges did no better than the laymen, accepting the institution and 'passing by on the other side,' if indeed the ecclesiastical tribunals were not the worst offenders. The divorce of the judges from all legislative function has much to answer for in checking the critical initiative of amendment sometimes induced by judicial experience. Abolition at last came neither from the logic of the law nor from the impulse of the Church, but from the impassioned zeal of humanitarian philosophy.

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TOTEMISM.—1. Introductory.—The word 'totem' is derived from *ototeman*, which in the Ojibwa and cognate Algonquian dialects means 'his brother-sister kin.' Its grammatical stem *ote*, meaning the consanguine kinship between uterine brothers and sisters, the group of persons recognized as by birth or adoption collectively related together as uterine brothers and sisters who cannot intermarry, is never used alone.[1] The word was introduced into the English language by J. Long[2] in the form of *totam*. This he wrongly defined as the favourite spirit which each of the savages (Chippewa or Ojibwa) believes watches over him, adding:

[1] J. N. B. Hewitt, in *HAI* ii. 787.

[2] *Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, London, 1791.

'This *totam* they conceive assumes the shape of some beast or other, and therefore they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal whose form they think this *totam* bears.'[1]

The first to give an account, accurate as far as it goes, of totemism on the American continent was Peter Jones, himself an Ojibwa chief, but an ordained Wesleyan Methodist minister and missionary to his tribe. He wrote the *History of the Ojebway Indians*, published without a date in London after his death, which took place in 1856. He says:

'Their belief concerning their divisions into tribes is that many years ago the Great Spirit gave his red children their *toodaims*, or tribes, in order that they might never forget that they were all related to each other, and that in time of distress or war they were bound to help each other. When an Indian in travelling meets with a strange band of Indians, all he has to do is to seek for those bearing the same emblem as his tribe; and having made it known that he belongs to their toodaim, he is sure to be treated as a relative. Formerly it was considered unlawful for parties of the same tribe to intermarry, but of late years this custom is not observed. . . . Each tribe is distinguished by certain animals or things, as for instance the Ojebway nations have the following toodaims: the Eagle, Reindeer, Otter, Bear, Buffalo, Beaver, Catfish, Pike, Birch-bark, White Oak-tree, Bear's Liver, etc. etc. The Mohawk nation have only three divisions or tribes—the Turtle, the Bear, and the Wolf.'[2]

What Jones calls a tribe is now usually called a clan or gens, meaning a group, not necessarily localized, of persons regarded as united by a bond of kinship real or fictitious, extended beyond the family properly so called to a brotherhood bearing the same name and including strangers who have been formally adopted into it. This brotherhood or clan may, and frequently does, extend also beyond the boundaries of the local body called by Jones a nation, but now usually known as a tribe.

In the meantime Sir George Grey, then governor of S. Australia, in the account of his travels in W. Australia, drew attention to the similarity between the Australian *kobong* and the American totem, describing the *kobong* at some length and giving genealogical lists to illustrate the mode of descent.[3] A series of articles in the *Fortnightly Review*[4] on 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' by J. F. McLennan was suggested, at all events in part, by Grey's observations. It was this series of articles, with McLennan's important but erroneous speculations, which finally brought the subject of totemism before the scientific public in Britain. Among others whose attention they attracted were Lord Avebury (then Sir John Lubbock) and W. Robertson Smith. It was especially the use made of totemism by the latter in the speculations embodied in his important work, *The Religion of the Semites*, that started the controversies incessantly waged on the subject from that day to this.

2. Definition; plan of the article.—Totemism as exemplified in N. America and Australia, where it has been found in the fullest development, is a form of society distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) it is composed of clans or bands of men each united among themselves by kinship real or fictitious, a kinship frequently extending beyond the limits of the local tribe; (2) the clan is distinguished by the name of some species of animal or plant, or more rarely of some other natural phenomenon, such as the sun, rain, etc.; (3) the species or object which gives its name to the clan is conceived as related to the clan, and to every member of it, in some mystic way, often genetically; and in this case every individual specimen of the object, where it is an animal or plant, is regarded as belonging to the clan; (4) such species or object is usually the subject of a religious or quasi-religious emotion, and every individual specimen is the subject of tabus or prohibitions: subject to certain limitations, ceremonial or in self-defence, it may not be injured or killed, or (where eatable) eaten; (5) moreover, as in all societies organized on the basis of kinship, the members of the clan are entitled to mutual defence, protection, and resentment of injuries. They may not marry or have sexual intercourse within the clan.

These characteristics are general, but they vary to some extent not merely from area to area, but from tribe to tribe. After detailing a few typical examples, it will be necessary to mention others where totemism seems to be decadent, and then to consider whether it has ever prevailed among peoples where it is not now to be found, and lastly to inquire into its origin. Various influences tending to modify, submerge, or destroy it will be indicated from time to time in the course of the article.

3. Typical examples.—(*a*) *America.*—Somewhat fuller accounts than that of Peter Jones are now available concerning the totemism of the Ojibwas. They were divided into about 40 exogamous totemic clans, of which those of the Crane, Catfish, Loon, Bear, Marten, and Wolf were the principal, and the first five appear to have been the original. The other clans are said to have been formed by the segmentation of these. Nearly all the clans are named from animals of either land or water. Members of a totem-clan were held to be closely related to all other persons of the same totem, even though belonging to different tribes.[1] We have no information whether the Ojibwa clans regarded themselves as having descended from the totems whose names they bore; but the clans of some other Algonquian tribes claim such descent. Thus, among the Delawares or Lenape the Tortoise, Turkey, and Wolf clans (the three chief clans of the tribe),[2] among the Sauks the Fox, Eagle, Bear, Beaver, Fish, Antelope, and Raccoon clans,[3] among the Menomini the Bear, Golden Eagle, Wolf, and other clans,[4] and among the Ottawas the Carp clan,[5] are specified as tracing their lineage to the animals after which they are named; and in the last-mentioned tribe the Bear clan ascribed its origin to a bear's paw without explaining the precise nature of the relationship. However this may be, the Ojibwa Bear clan was held to resemble the bear, its totem, in disposition. The members were surly and pugnacious, the acknowledged war-chiefs and fighting men of the community; the war-pipe and war-club were committed to their custody. The Crane clan took its name (Bus-in-as-see, 'Echo-maker') from the loud, clear, ringing cry of the crane; members of the clan were thought to possess naturally a loud ringing voice, and they were the acknowledged orators of the tribe.[6] We are not informed whether in their personal appearance, dress, or ornaments the Ojibwa totem-clans were ordinarily in the habit of imitating the totem-animals, as some other tribes do. The Abenaki, also an Algonquian tribe, painted their totems on their arms, breasts, and legs.[7] An Ojibwa sometimes had the figure tatued on him, or carried some

[1] P. 87. [2] P. 138.
[3] *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in N.W. and W Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 225 ff., 391.
[4] New ser., v. [1869] 407 ff., 562 ff., vi. [1870] 194 ff.

[1] J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 46 ff., citing various authorities.
[2] *Ib.* p. 40, quoting J. Heckewelder, *Trans. Hist. and Lit. Com. Amer. Phil. Soc.* i. [1819] 246 f.
[3] Mary A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, p. 8.
[4] W. J. Hoffman, *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. i. pp. 39–41, 43.
[5] Frazer, iii. 55–67, citing *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, new ed., Paris, 1781, pp. 168–172.
[6] *Ib.* p. 55, citing W. W. Warren, *Coll. Minnesota Hist. Soc.* v. [1885] 43 ff.
[7] Hoffman, p. 65 n., quoting J. A. Maurault, *Hist. des Abenakis*, Quebec, 1866, p. 23.

other token by which his totem might be known.[1] Unfortunately our reports are chiefly confined to the social aspects of the Ojibwa organization, so that we have little or no information as to the religious outlook. Religion is inextricably mingled with other aspects of savage life; hence we may be sure that it reacted upon social and political life. Among their neighbours, the Sauks or Musquakies, dances in honour of the totems were held. At these dances — a religious exercise — those who took part were covered with masks and dresses to resemble the totemic animals, so dreadful that the women were seriously frightened, and the old masks were therefore destroyed and milder ones substituted.[2] Special ceremonies were performed by the Bear clan of the Ottawas to soothe a bear when they killed it, including an offering to the dead animal of its own flesh. When a member of that clan or of the Carp clan died, he was buried, whereas by command of the totem a member of the Great Hare clan was cremated — at least, whenever he died at a distance from home.[3] Among the Menomini a member of the Bear clan who, when hunting, met a bear would apologize and ask forgiveness before killing it; and no member of the clan could eat of the meat (though members of other clans might do so) except the hunter himself, who was permitted to eat of the paws and head, the bones of the head being carefully preserved in a place of honour in the wigwam as a relic of the totem-animal to which due reverence must be paid.[4] The Ojibwa reckoned descent and kinship through the father only; but there is some evidence that they formerly reckoned through the mother only — a change possibly accelerated by white, and particularly missionary, influence. Such a change is known to have occurred elsewhere.[5]

The Iroquois, a confederacy of six tribes in what is now the state of New York, on the other hand, were matrilineal. They were organized in totemic clans, of which all of them possessed three—the Bear, Wolf, and Turtle—some of them eight. There is some reason to think that the larger numbers were derived by segmentation from the three original clans, though it is possible that, in some of the cases at all events, the number of the three clans may have been augmented by the adoption of captives from other tribes, who formed separate clans. The clans were exogamic, but in the eight-clan tribes they were formed into two phratries. The members of the clans were not allowed to marry indiscriminately into any other clan; they could marry only into a clan of the opposite phratry, the phratry thus becoming the exogamic unit in place of the clan. On the social side of Iroquoian totemism we have fairly full information. The members of a clan were united for mutual defence and the resentment of injuries; and the phratries, where the tribe was organized in phratries, had certain important functions at the death of a chief and the election of his successor.[6] On the religious aspect, however, our information is sadly deficient. There is one account by a chance traveller, in which the Iroquois were stated to believe in their descent from the turtle (or tortoise), the bear, and the wolf—their three chief totems;[7] and among their myths one has been preserved by a scientific inquirer relating how the turtle became a man and the progenitor of the Turtle clan.[1] But neither L. H. Morgan nor Horatio Hale, to whom we are indebted for nearly all that we know of the organization of the Iroquois, has told us anything concerning the intimate relations between the totem and its clan, or the aspect in which the totem was regarded by the clan, or the members by one another.

The Iroquois, however, had one custom common to a number of N. American tribes. Each clan had a stock of personal names appropriated to it only, which other clans of the same tribe were not permitted to use, so that, if a person's name was known, it was possible to say to what clan he belonged. To such a length was this custom carried by some tribes that, when the clan organization began to decay, a child could be assigned to another clan than that into which by hereditary descent he was born, by the simple process of giving him one of the personal names belonging to the latter clan—at all events if the clan recognized the child and thereby confirmed the choice.[2] The clans of some of the N. American tribes performed ceremonies for the control of their totems for the common good of the tribe. This was the practice, *e.g.*, among the Omaha.[3] But its utmost development is found in the south-west of the United States among the various tribes of Pueblo Indians.[4]

(*b*) *Australia.*—In Australia totemism has been crossed, and among some tribes superseded, for exogamic purposes by a system of marriage-classes.[5] The consequent variation in the social arrangements of the different tribes has introduced a confusing factor into the totemic organization. Among those tribes whose organization has been least affected is the Dieri, inhabiting part of the Lake Eyre basin in S. Australia. They possess a number of clans of which the names of 27 are known. Their totems belong chiefly to the animal world; but the list includes some vegetable totems and such objects as rain and red ochre. It seems to be common to all the tribes in the Lake Eyre basin, though it is not ascertained whether all the totems are recognized by every tribe. Each tribe, like some of the Iroquois tribes, is divided into two moieties, or phratries, some of the clans belonging to one phratry and the rest to the other. These phratries are called by the Dieri Kararu and Matteri respectively; and, as among the Iroquois, not only the clan but also the phratry is exogamous. A Kararu man must marry a Matteri woman, and conversely a Matteri woman a Kararu man; but within the limits of the opposite phratry the mate may belong to any clan. Both the clan and the phratry descend in the female line, the children in all cases taking those of the mother.[6] The Dieri clans do not claim their totemic animals or plants as ancestors. More than one legend accounts for them.

According to one story, the totems (*murdus*, properly *madas*) came out in an unfinished condition from the earth in the midst of Lake Perigundi and lay on the sandhills around the lake until the warmth of the sun strengthened and raised them up as human beings, whereupon they separated in all directions. Hence the *madas* (totemic clans) are now scattered all over the country. According to another story, a malignant *mura-mura*, or supernatural being, was killed by the people for his misdeeds, but came to life again. He followed footprints, and, finding the people busy fishing, opened his mouth and swallowed water, fish, and men. Some escaped, running off in all directions, and to every one as they ran he gave a *mada*. In proof of the story, rocks are pointed out which are said to be the body of the *mura-mura* in question, and his teeth.[7]

If we may trust one account, the Dieri do not regard the animal or plant which is their totem as sacred, but will kill or eat it.[8] It is not, however, certain that we can rely on this statement. Its author, for a long time a mounted constable in the district, and hence brought much into contact with

[1] Frazer, p. 59, quoting Edwin James, *Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner*, London, 1830.
[2] M. A. Owen, p. 51 f. [3] Frazer, iii. 67, 66. [4] Hoffman, p. 65.
[5] E. S. Hartland, *Mem. Amer. Anth. Assoc.*, iv. [1917] 48; cf. Frazer, iii. 58; cf. also the derivation of 'totem' at the beginning of this article.
[6] L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London, 1877, pp. 70–98, *League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-ne, or Iroquois*, new ed., New York, 1904, i. 74–120; H. Hale, *The Iroquois Book of Rites*, Philadelphia, 1883, pp. 48–75. These are all summarized by Frazer, iii. 7 ff.
[7] Frazer, iii. 18, citing T. Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York*, London, 1823.

[1] 2 *RBEW* [1883], pt. ii. p. 77.
[2] Morgan, *Ancient Soc.*, p. 78; Hartland, pp. 35, 40. See, on the organization of Iroquoian clans, *Amer. Anthrop.* xix. [1917] 392 ff.; also Frazer, iii. 13, 42.
[3] 3 *RBEW* [1884], pp. 238, 240 f., 248; cf. p. 227.
[4] See below, § 4. [5] See below, § 4 (*b*).
[6] Howitt, p. 90 ff. [7] *Ib.* pp. 476, 779–781.
[8] *JAI* xxiv. [1895] 168.

the natives, was, we know, mistaken in other matters with respect to them. In general throughout Australia the clansmen regard their own totem with reverence.

Thus, in the Wakelbura tribe we are expressly told that the totem-animal is spoken of as 'father.' 'For example, a man of the *Binnung-urra* (Frilled-lizard totem) holds that reptile as sacred, and he not only would not kill it, but would protect it by preventing another person doing so in his presence. Similarly a man of the Screech-owl totem would call it "father," and likewise hold it sacred and protect it. . . . A man who was lax as to his totem was not thought well of, and was never allowed to take any important part in the ceremonies.'[1] In the tongue of the Wotjobaluk *yauerin*, 'flesh,' is used for totem, indicating the close relationship of the totem and the totem-clan.[2] Grey, writing of the tribes of W. Australia, reports that 'each family [clan] adopts some animal or vegetable as their crest or sign, or *kobong*, as they call it,' and that 'a certain mysterious connection exists between a family and its *kobong*, so that a member of the family will never kill an animal of the species to which his *kobong* belongs, should he find it asleep; indeed he always kills it reluctantly, and never without affording it a chance to escape. This arises from the family belief that some one individual of the species is their nearest friend, to kill whom would be a great crime. Similarly a native who has a vegetable for his *kobong* may not gather it under certain circumstances and at a particular period of the year.'[3] So far is this belief in a connexion between the totem-clan and its *kobong* carried that in the Wakelbura tribe, 'when a man could not get satisfaction for an injurious action by another, he has been known to kill that beast, bird, or reptile which that man called "father," and thus obtain revenge, and perhaps cause the other to do the same, if he knew of it.'[4] Such is the influence of belief that the killing of a man's totem has been known to hasten his death.

An interesting development of totemism in Australia is the assignment of a number of sub-totems to each totem. Thus in the Wotjobaluk tribe the Deaf Adder totem has for sub-totems the Native Cat, Black Swan, Tiger-Snake, Sulphur-crested Cockatoo, Crow, and Dingo; and the other totems have similar lists.[5] Where, according to the peculiar exogamic regulations, the phratries developed into marriage-classes, the sub-totems were attached to the latter. Ultimately the result was to divide the universe between the various classes and sub-classes—a result expressed in diagrammatic form in accordance with the points of the compass by the Wotjobaluk, who buried their dead orientated to agree with the diagram thus obtained.[6] What the reason was for assigning these sub-totems to the different totems and classes has not been ascertained; to us it seems arbitrary. At any rate the Australian native extended the regard for his totem to the sub-totems comprehended in the totem-clan or class to which he belonged.

A man of the Buandik tribe, we are told, 'does not kill or use for food any of the animals of the same sub-division with himself, excepting when hunger compels; and then they express sorrow for having to eat their *warigong* (friends) or *tumang* (their flesh). When using the last word they touch their breasts to indicate the close relationship, meaning almost a part of themselves.'[7]

Another custom developed extensively in Australia, but (as already intimated) not unknown among the Sioux in N. America, and elsewhere, is that of the performance of ceremonies by a totem-clan for the purpose of exercising control over the totem—*e.g.*, for multiplying its numbers, especially where it was edible, or for ensuring its capture, or, where it was injurious, for driving it away. The *intichiuma* ceremonies of the Arunta have by the investigations of Spencer and Gillen become the best known; they are perhaps the most elaborate, but by no means the only, ceremonies of the kind. The Dieri and other tribes perform such ceremonies, though it is not clear in all cases that the performers are confined to members of the totem-clan. From the analogy of cases both in Australia and in the islands of Torres Straits we may probably assume that they are. Whether these ceremonies should be called religious or magical is a question of terminology, though it seems certain that the performers are under the influence of emotional excitement such as we usually connect with religious rites.

Little is known about the relations of the clansmen in Australia among themselves. From vague references by Howitt and others it would seem that they enjoyed mutual defence and responsibility. But offences were brought before a tribal council, by whose decision blood-revenge was pursued in a quasi-legal manner and, if resisted, ultimately involved the whole tribe in the blood-feud.

(*c*) *Africa.*—Another area in which totemism has been found is that large portion of Africa which is occupied by the Negro and Bantu races. Of the totemism of some of these peoples, particularly of the Negroes, our information is fragmentary. Concerning the Tshi-speaking Negroes of the Gold Coast we have on the whole most information. They are divided into totemic clans, or 'families,' of which the principal are twelve in number, viz. Leopard, Buffalo, Dog, Parrot, Plantain, Corn-stalk, Servant, Red-Earth, Palm-oil-Grove, Abadzi, and Dumina or Dwimina. The meaning of the names of the last two clans is uncertain. The last is probably a local variant of the name of the Nsonna, or Bush-Cat, clan; and, according to some accounts, Abadzi, which may mean 'cannibal,' is another name of the Ntwa, or Dog, clan. About certain of the clans little or nothing beyond the name is known, and questions of identity arise on some of them. These difficulties are incidental to traditional lore where we are dependent upon natives who are not familiar with all the clans about which inquiries are made. To the Leopard clan the leopard is sacred, though members of it are reported now to abstain from the flesh of all the *felidæ*. No member may kill a leopard; if he were to do so by accident, he would exclaim, 'I have killed my brother,' and would put palm-oil on the wounds. If he sees a dead leopard, he must scatter shreds of white cloth upon it and anoint the muzzle with palm-oil, as a sign of respect and sorrow. If a dead leopard is brought into the town, the members of the clan smear themselves with chalk (a sign of mourning) and bury the body. If on a journey a member of the clan were to meet a leopard, he would turn back. The Buffalo, Bush-Cat, Dog, and Parrot clans abstain from eating the totem-animal. The Bush-Cat clan, it is said, abstain from killing not only a bush-cat, but also a crow, under penalty of sores on their bodies. Formerly, if they found a crow or a bush-cat dead, they would bury it, and with the crow a piece of white cloth, with the bush-cat a piece of speckled cloth. The traditional accounts which have reached us of the origin of these clans do not generally claim genetic descent from the totem.

One account states that 'people originally came from the earth, sky, sea, mountains, and the animals, etc., that came with them are their totems'; *e.g.*, the Parrot clan came with the parrots on their loads; the Dog clan came from a river with a broom and with a dog carrying fire.

Other clans, fewer in numbers and conjectured to be of more recent origin, claim that they are descended from an actual animal which possessed the power of assuming human shape at will. In the case of two such clans tales belonging to the Swan Maiden type are told to account for them. The totem-animal is revered. It is addressed as 'grandfather,' a title of respect used in addressing the kings of Ashanti. It is supposed to help the clansmen in various ways; and restraint is said to be placed upon it in order to compel it to grant the wishes of the tribe. There are no marks or dresses distinguishing the clans; but, when a member of

[1] Howitt, p. 147 *f.*
[2] *Ib.* p. 241.
[3] *Journals*, ii. 228.
[4] Howitt, p. 148.
[5] *Ib.* p. 121.
[6] *Ib.* p. 453 *f.*
[7] L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 168 f., quoting a correspondent; cf. E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, do. 1886–87, iii. 460.

the Leopard clan dies, the mourners (clansmen) make spots on their bodies with red, white, and black clay to represent a leopard, and scratch the figure of a leopard on the wall of the house and on the coffin. The Nsonna clan in the like case put white clay or white cloth round their necks, because the crow which the clan respects has a white band round its neck. The clan is always matrilineal and exogamous; and it has a common burial-place. There is said to be a belief that at death a clansman becomes or transmigrates into an individual of the totemic species, and, further, every clansman's life is bound up with one such individual, so that, if it dies, he will also die.[1]

The Bantu have for the most part advanced from maternal to paternal descent, though among some tribes we find an intermediate stage. This has not been without its effect upon their totemism, which in several ways varies from the pattern of true matrilineal totemism. The Bechuana, who occupy the centre of S. Africa, are divided into a number of independent 'tribes' generally called by totemic names and having totemic practices and beliefs. In many cases, however, these 'tribes' are not true totemic clans. Since the wife always goes to reside with her husband, the result of the change to paternal descent is to collect the members of the clan together, instead of distributing them as in a matrilineal people, and hence the clan tends to become identified with the geographical and political tribe. Every Bechuana tribe is ruled by a chief, whose totem is recognized as that of the tribe. The political conditions were such that before the European occupation of the country members of a tribe who were discontented with their chief used to desert him and go to a neighbouring rival, with whom they were sure of a welcome. Thus a powerful chief was liable to be reduced to weakness, and perhaps conquered by a neighbour, if his rule was unpopular. It followed that a tribe frequently comprehended members of many totemic clans. But they all accepted the chief's totem, and in time became indistinguishable from the true clansmen, though we do not read of any formal adoption into the clan or of any blood-covenant. The chief is always addressed by the name of the totem, as 'O Crocodile!' 'O Lion!' The Bechuana word for 'totem' is *siboko*, which has led Van Gennep to propose the name 'sibokism' to distinguish the S. African variety of totemism. The chief's totem is held sacred, and the animal, plant, or other object is regarded with fear and reverence.

Thus the Banoku, 'they of the porcupine,' are reported to 'sing,' *i.e.* 'feast, worship or revere' that animal. 'When they see any one maltreat that animal, they afflict themselves, grieve, collect with religious care the quills, if it has been killed, spit upon them and rub their eyebrows with them, saying: "They have slain our brother, our master, one of ours, him whom we sing." They fear that they will die if they eat the flesh of one.' Yet they doctor a new-born child with it, mixed with the juice of certain plants.[2] The Bakuena, 'they of the crocodile,' call the animal their father; 'they celebrate it in their festivals, they swear by it, and make an incision in the ears of their cattle, by which they distinguish them from others.' They call it 'one of them, their master, their father.' Similar practices are recorded of other clans. 'No one dares eat the flesh or clothe himself with the skin of the animal the name of which he bears. If this animal is hurtful, as the lion, for instance, it may not be killed without great apologies being made to it and its pardon being asked. Purification is necessary after the commission of such a sacrilege.' The Bataung, 'they of the lion,' 'carefully abstain from touching his flesh as other people do; for how could one think of eating his ancestor?' Nor does even the chief dare to wear, like other chiefs, a lion's skin by way of royal mantle.[3]

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 206; J. M. Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws*, do. 1897, p. 4; *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 178 ff.

[2] T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, tr. J. C. Brown, Cape Town, 1846, p. 176.

[3] *Ib.* p. 213 f.; E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, London, 1861, p. 211.

But totemism is decadent among the Bechuana, and has been so for a period which probably dates from before the coming of the European,[1] due partly to the change to paternal lineage, partly to the political conditions, and partly to the keeping of herds of cattle, a custom that seems to have been adopted from the Hottentots.

America, Australia, and Africa are the three chief areas in which totemism has been found widely spread and fully developed. It will be perceived that each of them has its own type, though variations in detail are found in individual tribes and peoples. The remaining areas are India and Melanesia.

(*d*) *India.*—In India totemism is found only among the non-Aryan tribes, and chiefly among the Dravidians. Of these we may take the Orāons on the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur in Bengal as representing the type. Though they have to a great extent emerged from the hunting and pastoral stages of culture, totemism 'still forms the fundamental feature of their social organization in so far as kinship, marriage, and relations of the sexes are concerned.' They are divided into a number of exogamous clans distinguished by names supplied by 'the fauna and flora of their past and present habitats'; and to these, 'with the acquisition of a knowledge of agriculture and the use of metals, a few new totem names have been since added.' The animal and vegetable names amount in number to 62. There are also (probably of more recent origin) two mineral totems, those of Iron and Salt; two which may be called place-totems, viz. Bāudh, an embanked reservoir of water, and Jūbbi, a marsh or surface-spring; and two which belong to a class known elsewhere, called 'split-totems' as involving tabus of a portion only of an animal or vegetable, and frequently known by the name of that portion. Among the Orāons these split-totems are Anvir (rice-soup) and Kispōttā (pig's entrails). Sexual union within the totem-clan is reckoned incestuous, though at the present day, if a marriage takes place in which the rule is infringed wittingly or unwittingly, the offending pair, after paying a fine and giving a feast to the clansmen by analogy with the usual caste practice in India, are formally re-admitted to the tribe and their union is thus legalized. The remaining ordinary totemic tabus are observed. 'An Orāon must abstain from eating or otherwise using, domesticating, killing, destroying, maiming, hurting or injuring' his totem. A wife, in addition to the tabus of her own clan, is required to observe those of her husband's while she actually resides in his village. Men of the clan whose totem is any kind of tree may not go under the shade of the tree or use its produce in any shape. But some modifications have been introduced where the totem is an indispensable article of diet or household use.

Thus members of the Paddy clan abstain only from eating the thin scum on the surface of rice-soup when left standing in a cool place; members of the Salt clan abstain only from taking raw salt, the tabu not extending to food or drink in which salt is an ingredient or flavour; members of the Iron clan abstain only from touching iron with their lips or tongue; members of the Pig clan are forbidden only to eat the head of the pig; members of the Bārā clan, of which the *Ficus Indica* is the totem, may eat the fruit whole, but not by dividing it in two.

On the other hand, the tabus of some clans have been extended to objects having a real or fancied resemblance to the totem or bearing the same or a similar name.

Thus members of the Tiger clan not only have to observe various tabus in reference to the tiger and to the wolf, but also must abstain from eating the squirrel's flesh, since the squirrel is striped like the tiger, and they may not marry in the month of Māgh (December–January) because the name Māgh rhymes with *bāgh*, the Hindi word for 'tiger.'

[1] W. C. Willoughby, *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 298.

In this case the foreign word *bāgh* points to a late and highly artificial origin for such a tabu, which is obviously due to the timidity of superstition. Other additional tabus have been suggested to be due to the fusion of clans, just as some 'split-totems' may have arisen from the opposite process of the division of clans.

'The general attitude of an Orāon to his clan-totem is that of a man to his equal—to his friend and ally,' though some periodical practices seem to indicate a more religious regard—at any rate for its effigy. But totemism is now in decay, as it is over the rest of India. An unintentional breach of a tabu is no longer believed to entail any serious consequences, though looked upon with social disapproval. There is no difference between the clans in personal dress or adornment, nor is a man supposed to partake of the qualities of the totem. There are very few traditions of the origin of totem-names. Such as there are do not reveal any belief in the descent of the clan from the totem, but rather in some other relation between the totem and the human ancestor of the clan. The Orāons are patrilineal.[1]

(*e*) *Melanesia.*—In Melanesia (including New Guinea and the islands of Torres Straits) there is a tendency to associate with the principal totem of a clan a number of subordinate totems which have been called 'secondary,' 'subsidiary,' or 'linked' totems. The western islands of Torres Straits have for many years been the scene of successful missionary enterprise. Under this influence the totemism which formerly existed among the people has almost disappeared. But twenty years ago the members of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition, who spent some time on the islands, were able to recover very definite evidence of its existence. The population was divided into a number of exogamous totemic clans. As a rule each clan had subsidiary totems in addition to its chief totem. 'In some cases two or more clans might have the same chief totem, while differing in their subsidiary totems'—which looks like the fission of an original clan. Members of a clan were distinguished by wearing an emblem of the totem, or more rarely bearing it in cicatrices or keloids on the flesh. Personal belongings also, it is said, were adorned with a representation of the owner's totem. Descent was reckoned in the male line; but adoption seems to have been practised. In conformity with patrilineal reckoning there was a tendency to a geographical distribution of the clans. This, however, was apt to result in quarrelling; and the missionaries had accordingly succeeded in inducing the people, at all events of one of the islands, to abandon the localization of the clans.

'The solidarity of the totem-clan was a marked feature in the social life of the people, and it took precedence of all other considerations; not only so, but there was an intimate relationship between all members of the same totem [-clan] irrespective of the island or locality to which they might belong and even warfare did not affect the friendship of totem-brethren. Any man who visited another island would be looked after and entertained as a matter of course by the residents who belonged to the same totem as himself.'[2]

The clans were grouped in two classes or phratries. On the island of Mabuiag these two phratries were respectively known as 'the children or people of the Great Totem' and 'the children or people of the Little Totem.' The former comprised the Crocodile, Cassowary, Snake, and Dog clans (all land animals); the latter the Dugong, Shovel-nosed Skate, Shark, Ray, and Green Turtle clans (all water animals). On this island there is no sufficient evidence that the phratries regulated marriage during recent times; but there is reason to think that they were exogamous on some other of the islands. Members of a clan might not kill or eat the totem; but this did not apply to the Dugong and Turtle clans, for both dugong and turtle were important articles of food on the islands, which are somewhat barren. Members of the clan, however, were not allowed to eat of the first dugong or turtle caught, but might partake of those subsequently caught. They performed ceremonies to entice the animals to the island and ensure a good season. They could, on the other hand, by magical rites with the contrary intention, prevent them from coming. A mystical relation was held to subsist between the totem and the clan. He was said to be 'all same as relation, he belong same family.' The Cassowary, Crocodile, Snake, Shark, and Hammer-headed Shark clans were reputed to be truculent and to like fighting. The peaceable clans were the Shovel-nosed Skate, Ray, and Sucker-fish; while the Dog clan was sometimes peaceable and at other times quarrelsome—all like the totem-animal. Certain of the clans, possibly all, had formulæ which they repeated in going into a fight, and which were either magical or in the nature of invocations to the totem. The prayer is in some stages of civilization near akin to the spell.[1]

4. Decadence of totemism.—The foregoing examples will sufficiently indicate the chief characteristics of totemism in the five great areas in which it has been found. It is apparent that in each area totemism was by no means a new phenomenon. It arises in a low condition of savagery and is connected in its typical forms with matrilineal descent. But, even before contact with Europeans, it had begun to assume forms very divergent from what we understand by normal totemism, leading in some cases to degeneration and disintegration.

(*a*) *America.*—Among the divergences found in N. America those of the coast-dwellers of the north-west are the most remarkable. The Tlingit, inhabiting S. Alaska, are divided into two exogamous phratries or classes, called after the raven and the wolf respectively;[2] and these two phratries are again divided into a number of totemic clans. The members of a clan are believed to be related to one another more closely than to those of other clans even of the same phratry. They reckon descent through the mother and as a consequence are not gathered at one place, but distributed as social groups and not geographical. Yet each clan usually derived its origin (and most of them, at the present day, their names) from some village or camp which it once occupied. They seem, however, to have had alternative names (if F. Boas's account is correct) derived from the animal, or one of the animals, which they claimed as a badge. In point of fact the emblems or representations on the north-western coast, generally called totems, are rather badges or crests. The clans of each phratry, indeed, all use the totem of the phratry; they also use a number of other badges, some of which are the special property of the clan, or of some sub-clan, and are guarded with much jealousy. They carve and paint the badge on the so-called totem-poles erected in front of the dwelling-house, or on a grave. These poles are, however, less frequently erected by the Tlingit than by some of their neighbours. The badge is also exhibited on many other articles of property, worn as a mask or hat used as a disguise at dances, potlatches, and funeral ceremonies, and painted

[1] S. Chandra Roy, *The Orāons of Chōtā Nāgpur*, Rānchī, 1915, p. 324 ff.; cf. Frazer, ii. 284 ff., and the authorities there referred to.

[2] A. C. Haddon and W. H. R. Rivers in *Reports of the Cambridge Anthrop. Exped. to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–03, v. 161.

[1] Haddon and Rivers, *ib.* v. 153–186.

[2] J. R. Swanton, *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 407, suggests that these two phratries may have had a racial origin.

on the faces of the clansmen. It is not now held that the clan or phratry is descended from the totem or animal represented, though it may be suspected that in former times this was believed. At present stories are told by the clan or sub-clan claiming a badge of its acquisition by an ancestor through an adventure with the animal in question, such animal being often conceived as of superhuman power.

As Frazer points out, many of 'these tales have the true totemic ring about them; they point clearly to the former identification of the clanspeople with their totems, which is only another way of saying that the present people are supposed to be descended from the totemic animals.'[1]

To this it may be added that, according to Boas's report, 'the animal and a member of its clan are considered relations. Thus the wolf gens will pray to the wolves, "We are your relations; pray don't hurt us!" But notwithstanding this fact they will hunt wolves without hesitation.'[2]

The truth is that the more or less permanent settlement of all the tribes along the coast—at least from the Tlingit to the Kwakiutl—in villages, and their increasing civilization, have led to the division of the population into ranks or castes and to a continually higher value being set on the crests or badges as marks of rank and wealth, and as symbols, if not guarantees, of descent from a distinguished ancestor. This has resulted in an accumulation of crests, some clans or sub-clans obtaining a larger number than others; and some of the crests were used by more than one clan.

'The great majority of Tlingit personal names referred to some animal, especially that animal whose emblem was particularly valued by the clan to which the bearer belonged.'[3]

Of these names many seem to have been peculiar to one or other of the clans. The solidarity ordinarily subsisting between members of a clan is found, among the Tlingit, rather between the members of a phratry.

'According to the unwritten Tlingit law it was incumbent upon everyone belonging to a phratry to house and feed any other member of that phratry who should visit him, no matter from how great a distance he might come'; and it was a mark of good manners, therefore of high caste, not to abuse such hospitality.[4]

Any serious collision at a potlatch arising out of the rivalry of opposing parties of dancers was averted or stayed by the host's people, who rushed between them bearing the emblem of their phratry or making the call of the animal whose name was that of the phratry. When a man died, the funeral ceremonies were conducted by the opposite phratry, who were afterwards entertained at a mourning feast by the relatives of the deceased. On the whole it may be conjectured that the two phratries represent original totem-clans, out of which the existing clans or groups, whether social or local, have developed. There was also reckoned among the Tlingit population a small group at Sanya, called the Nexádi ('People of Nex,' a creek in the neighbourhood), who stood outside both phratries and might marry into both. They bore the Eagle crest or badge and had personal names having reference to the eagle. They were doubtless a small intrusive population, which Swanton, the latest investigator of the Tlingit, suggests as perhaps of Athapascan derivation.[5]

Coming down from north to south along the coast and islands of Alaska and British Columbia, we find a similar organization, differing however in detail, among the various peoples, with an increasing emphasis laid on rank and the possession of crests, until we reach the Kwakiutl. The Kwakiutl proper (or Southern Kwakiutl, as they are often called to distinguish them from the Heiltsuk, their northern congeners) are organized in 'tribes,' which in turn are subdivided into exogamic groups distinguished not, as a rule, by totemic names but by the collective form of the name claimed as that of an ancestor, by geographical names, or by 'names of honour.' The evidence seems to show that they are neither definitely patrilineal nor matrilineal in descent, but in a state of transition, since a child may belong to any 'clan' or exogamic group to which one of its ancestors belonged at the arbitrary discretion of its parents. Each exogamic group, like the ordinary clan of several of the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, had a number of personal names appropriated to it; and to assign a child to such a group it was enough to give it one of these names. In this way it appears to have become *ipso facto* a member of the group; it might even belong to more than one at the same time. What was more important in Kwakiutl society was the possession of crests and the privileges that they carried. These were obtained in three several ways: (1) they might be inherited by direct patrilineal descent from an ancestor who acquired them through an adventure in the course of which he obtained the protection and guidance of a *manitu*, or spiritual helper, for himself and his descendants; direct inheritance of this kind, however, was comparatively rare; (2) more usually they were obtained by marriage; the payment of a bride-price secured not only the bride, but also the right of membership in her 'clan' or exogamous group, the crest and privileges of the bride's father, and a good deal of other property; (3) the third method was to obtain them by killing the owner, as in the case of the position and privileges of the King of the Wood of Nemi. The privileges include not only the use of the crest but also the right to the membership of certain societies and the ownership and exclusive right to practise certain dances connected with the ceremonials of the societies. They are, however, not acquired for the benefit of the son-in-law in the case of marriage, but for his successor, whoever he may be. Seeing, moreover, that the number of noblemen is fixed, and there is only one person at a time who personates the ancestor and has his rank and privileges, the person entitled must wait for a vacancy before he can be admitted to them. He may wait in vain; for before a vacancy occurs the owner may change his mind, or even after the person entitled has obtained the privileges he may devest them and confer them upon some other successor.

This is manifestly not totemism, for the societies operate only during the winter, when they dominate the social organization to the exclusion of the kinship and local groups. It may have been influenced by true totemic conceptions, from which it may even have sprung. But its cause must be sought in the increasing power of wealth, the consequent development of rank, and the desire for display.[1]

The transformation that thus seems to have overtaken totemism among the Kwakiutl is in process also among the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico and Arizona. Here the cause is different. In these tribes, originally organized in totemic clans and phratries with matrilineal descent, the struggle for existence in an arid country has evolved a sense of dependence upon the supernatural powers and a religious ritual and elaborate ceremonies, partly religious and partly magical, for the production of rain and maize. At first these ceremonies appear to have been performed by the appropriate clans, as we have found in other areas. In some cases they are so still, as among the Zuñi, but aided and superintended by the priests of the various deities. In other cases,

[1] iii. 273 f.
[2] *Report of 59th Meeting of British Assoc. 1889*, p. 819.
[3] Swanton, *26 RBEW*, p. 421.
[4] *Ib.* p. 427.
[5] *26 RBEW*, pp. 396–449; Boas, *Rep. Brit. Assoc. 1889*, p. 819 ff.

[1] Boas, *Rep. U.S. National Museum, 1895*, Washington, 1897, pp. 334, 338, 340, 342, 358.

as among the Hopi, the Snake clan has been superseded for this purpose by an 'order' or society, the members of which were probably at the beginning recruited exclusively from the clan. The rule is now somewhat less strict, embracing others besides members of the clan, though the members of the society are limited.[1] In fact the latest inquiries appear to show that the societies or fraternities have broken away and become quite independent of the clan organization.[2]

(*b*) *Australia.*—Turning to Australia, we find that among the Central tribes the totemic clans have been carried far towards their complete conversion into societies performing magico-religious rites, the object of which is the multiplication of the totemic animal or plant. The Warramunga hold that the totem-clans originated each from a single ancestor, half-beast, or half-plant, from whose body emanated a number of spirit children; and the descendants of the clan are all animated by these spirit-children. The ceremonies are here performed by the clan in a definite order, representing in dramatic fashion the traditional history of the clan. The Warramunga and the tribes to the north of them are definitely patrilineal with exogamic clans; but the members of the clan in every generation are believed to be continual reincarnations of deceased ancestors. The Arunta, on the other hand, have ceased to regulate their marriages by totemic exogamy and now regulate them solely by class-divisions consisting of the pristine moieties of the tribe, which have been doubly subdivided, so that they are now eight in number. There are various places in the territory of the tribe which are totemic centres believed to be haunted by the spirit-children of the original ancestors. One of these spirit-children is held to have entered the body of every pregnant woman, according to the totemic centre near or at which she first felt herself pregnant. In this way the 'clan' of the child is ascertained, and in no case does it depend upon that of the father or mother. The resulting group passing under a totemic name is clearly no true clan.

'There is no such thing as the members of one totem [-group] being bound together in such a way that they must combine to fight on behalf of a member of the totem [-group] to which they belong.'

Inasmuch as every death is supposed to be due to witchcraft, revenge has to be taken by somebody. Normally this duty would fall on the clansmen of the deceased. But among the Arunta it would seem to be the members of the local group who undertake it.

'In fact,' say Spencer and Gillen, summing up the subject, 'it is perfectly easy to spend a considerable time amongst the Arunta tribe without even being aware that each individual has a totemic name'; but the fact of his belonging to one or other of the divisions governing marriage is soon apparent.

These groups thus passing under totemic names perform under the direction of their respective headmen from time to time, as the headman concerned decides, the ceremonies known as *intichiuma*. These ceremonies are not, like those of the Warramunga, the property of the entire group, but each of them belongs to a specific individual, who alone has the right of performing it or of requesting others to do so. One consequence of this is that they are not performed in a definite series: they are fragments and may be given in any arbitrary order. They have ceased to be a representation of the traditional history of the group; they have become mere magical rites. Further, in the tribes both south and north of the Central group, consisting of the Arunta and their immediate neighbours, a man is forbidden to kill, injure, or eat his totem. In some of the tribes, though patrilineal, the prohibition also applies more or less absolutely to the totem of the clansman's mother—probably a relic of an older matrilineal condition. Among the Arunta, however, there is no such prohibition. Indeed the members of a totem-group are expected to eat of the totem during the ceremonies; and they have liberty to do so at other times, though only sparingly. The conclusion from these and other facts is irresistible that the Central tribes of Australia are finding their way out of normal totemism, and that of these tribes the Arunta and their immediate neighbours to the north (the Kaitish, Unmatjera, and others) are the farthest advanced on the road. Their totemic organization is not merely decadent; it is obsolescent. Such remains of it as persist are preserved only as societies held together for the performance of certain magical or religious rites and as the carriers of certain religious traditions, but no longer as organic social groups.[1]

But decadent totemism often takes another course in its transformation. In most totemic communities it is customary to assemble the growing youths for the purpose of what are generally called the puberty ceremonies. By means of these ceremonies the youths of the tribe are taken from their mothers' care and out of the society of women and children, are submitted to tests of courage and endurance, educated in sexual matters and in the customs and traditions of the tribe, and fitted henceforth to take their part in the life of the tribe as adult and fully admitted members. Such initiation rites are prominent all over Australia. Among the Central tribes they have been developed beyond all others. They have been made very severe, not to say cruel; they have been elaborated into four distinct stages and protracted through years, though not of course continuous during that period. Their performance is everywhere one of the important occasions on which the tribe comes together. The members are summoned by special messengers with traditional formalities. But the actual performance of the greater part of them is secret, in the sense that no one is allowed to witness or take part in it who has not previously been in a similar manner initiated.

(*c*) *Africa.*—There is evidence of the existence of totemism in W. Africa from Senegambia southward in almost all the populations. In many places, however, where it is decadent or obsolete it is replaced by secret societies which dominate or supplement the nominal government. Thus at Old Calabar there is a very powerful society known as Egbo, divided into numerous grades. The king is the head. It has in a rough and ready way the whole administration of the law in its hands.[2] Farther south, in the cataract region of the Lower Congo, is a secret society known as Nkimba. According to the latest researches, it is entered about the age of puberty. The candidates are chosen by the *nganga*, or medicine-man. The ceremonies take place in the forest, where the camp is jealously guarded from all intrusion. There the candidates remain for a period variously stated as from one or two months to five or six years. They are painted white, and a narcotic is administered. They are subjected to a number of tests, such as the imposition of a new name and an oath of secrecy, and to flagellation. They are circumcised, if not already in that condition. They are taught a new language, and it is believed

[1] The various minutely detailed accounts of the Pueblo Indians and their ceremonies have been admirably summarized by Frazer, iii. 195 ff.

[2] A. L. Kroeber, 'Zuñi Kin and Clan,' *Anthrop. Papers of the Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, xviii. [New York, 1917] 145 n., 150 ff.; J. W. Fewkes, *19 RBEW* [1900], pt. ii. p. 965.

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 34, 112–127, 167–211, 467–473; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 143–225.

[2] H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908, p. 115 ff.; *Journ. African Soc.*, iv. [1905] 306. Cf. art. SECRET SOCIETIES (African).

by the women and other non-initiated that they are put to death and brought to life again. They are instructed in the religious beliefs and moral rules to which they must in future conform. Various prohibitions are enforced during and after their retirement. If approved for the purpose, they may become fetish-priests or medicine-men; otherwise they become simply adult men, ready to take part in public life. This is obviously little more than the puberty rites of ordinary totemic peoples; but there is reason to think that the Nkimba tends to become more magical in its purview. Those who have passed through it have acquired a character in some degree sacred and mysterious; a special tie is established between them; they regard one another as brethren and render mutual aid. Another society called Ndembo, often confounded with the Nkimba, exists on the Congo. A Ndembo is not held periodically, but one is established whenever the elders of the village direct. It appears to have a specially sexual aim; men and women are admitted, and sexual licence is said to be encouraged in the camp; and to such a length is the comedy of death and resurrection carried that, on returning after the conclusion of the ceremonies, those who have been subjected to them pretend to have lost all remembrance of their previous life, act in the most foolish manner, and are only gradually recalled to ordinary sense and behaviour. The object of the Ndembo appears moreover to be more specialized, more decidedly magical, than that of the Nkimba.[1] It seems probable that all these secret societies have been developed from, or at least deeply influenced by, the initiatory rites of totemic tribes.

The Herero of S.W. Africa, who have been massacred and almost entirely destroyed by the Germans, offer a peculiarly difficult problem, not yet entirely solved. They were divided into clans called *eanda* (plur. *omaanda*) reckoning descent exclusively through the mother. A tradition of their origin is related, deriving it from a pair who emerged from the trunk of an *omborombonga* tree in the far North, whose children were all daughters fructified by contact in some way or other with various objects of the external world. These objects became the totems of their descendants. Among them may be enumerated the sun, rain, the tree, the marmot, the koodoo, the chameleon, besides others the significance of whose names is disputed. The members of an *eanda* called themselves brothers-in-law (not brothers) of the totem. The blood-feud attached to the *eanda*, which moreover, formerly at least, was exogamic. Side by side with the *eanda* stands another organization, apparently of more recent origin, the *oruzo* (plur. *otuzo*). The *oruzo* descends exclusively in the paternal line. It is also totemic; and among the totems appear the chameleon, the sun, the koodoo, rag, necklace of beads. The members of an *oruzo* are distinguished by the mode of dressing their hair, by their food-tabus, and by special sacrificial regulations. The colour and shape of the horns of the cattle which an *oruzo* possesses also differ from those of every other *oruzo*. The institution of the *oruzo* is attributed to the medicine-men; and there can be little doubt that it is specially a religious organization for the maintenance of the sacred fire of the family and the worship of ancestors. All cattle belong to the *oruzo*, for the Herero are a pastoral people, and their wealth consisted of cattle until the Germans deprived them of their stock. The cattle never descended to or through females, at all events if there was a male descendant to inherit them. The food tabus of the Herero are probably not all totemic. The Herero have no totemic badges or signs.[1] The totemism prevalent among them is thus widely divergent from the common type. Its twofold organization is manifestly the result of a conflict between matrilineal and patrilineal institutions. How that conflict originated is obscure; but it is obviously not unconnected with the growth of ancestor-worship and the introduction of herds of cattle among a hunting and perhaps rudely agricultural people, and the consequent changes of mode of life and social arrangements. The country which they now inhabit is steppe, almost desert, and quite unsuitable for agriculture. After the rains there is for a time abundant pasture, which at other seasons must be sought in the deep and sheltered dales with which the land is intersected. The change to a pastoral life may be surmised to have occurred when or shortly before they penetrated to their present possessions, not probably more than five or six centuries ago. The consequent development of their institutions is even yet incomplete.

At the other extremity of the area occupied by the Bantu are found the Baganda, the most highly civilized of the race. They were governed by kings probably descended from a Hamitic stock which conquered the country several centuries ago.

'The Baganda are divided into a large number of totemic clans, the members of which observe the two fundamental canons of normal totemism, since they abstain both from injuring their totem and from marrying a woman of the same clan.' Each clan has a principal and a secondary totem, and takes its name from the former. 'Both totems are sacred to members of the clan, who may neither kill nor destroy them. Other people, however, may kill or destroy them for a reasonable purpose, without hurting the feelings of members of the clan.'[2]

The Baganda trace their lineage in the male line; but a woman's children were taught in infancy to respect her totems and to avoid them. When they grew up, they adopted their father's totems and ceased to regard those of their mother. Yet they were forbidden to marry into their mother's clan. For these and other reasons it seems clear that descent had originally been reckoned in the maternal line, and that, as in the case of the Herero, though on different lines, the transition had been recently and incompletely effected.[3] Like the clans of certain N. American tribes, each clan had special names appropriated to its children; hence the clan to which a man belonged was recognized by his name.[4] The king had a large harem. His children, however, took the totem of their mother; and it was naturally deemed an honour for a clan to give a king to the realm by means of the union of one of its female members with the king. From this honour certain clans were excluded for reasons which are now unknown. To obviate this some of the excluded clans joined more favoured clans, so that their daughters might marry the king and have children who might be in the succession to the throne. Another reason for the union of clans was to better the position of a despised clan. Clans so associated obtained the right to use the totem of the more honourable clan; yet they were so little regarded as relations by the members of the latter that intermarriage between members of the two clans was not forbidden. The Lung-fish clan (the largest of all) also was in an exceptional position in that its members were not subject to the rule of exogamy.[5] The totems are usually some species of animal. A few species of trees and other vegetables are found as totems, besides beads and other articles of human manu-

[1] E. de Jonghe, *Les Sociétés secrètes au Bas-Congo*, Brussels, 1907, p. 15 ff.

[1] F. Meyer, *Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero*, Berlin, 1905, p. 25 ff.; E. Dannert, *Zum Rechte der Herero*, do. 1906, p. 11 ff.; Frazer, ii. 356; [S. African] *Folklore Journal*, i. [Capetown, 1879] 37 ff., ii. [1880] 61; *Report on the Natives of S.W. Africa and their Treatment by Germany*, London, 1918, p. 37.

[2] Frazer, ii. 472 f.

[3] Hartland, *Mem. Amer. Anthrop. Assoc.*, iv. 18.

[4] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 135.

[5] *Ib.* pp. 187, 137, 148, 134.

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facture; and 'split-totems' and other anomalous totems (as a tailless or a spotted cow, and rain-water from roofs) are not unknown.[1] Notwithstanding the existence of a system of law and administration of justice, the sense of clan-solidarity remained strong. The blood-covenant was practised and was considered more binding than common oaths.[2] Murder was rare; but cases of murder and manslaughter, when they occurred, were taken up by the clan. The clan of a murdered man might accept and share a fine, instead of insisting on the punishment of death; and, on the other hand, the clan of the wrong-doer contributed to the payment. 'When a member of a clan wished to buy a wife, it was the duty of all the other members to help him to do so'; when a person got into debt, or was fined, the clan combined to assist him to pay the debt or fine.[3] Thus the totemism of the Baganda, while preserving many, if not most, of the essential features normally present, departs widely from more typical totemism. The religious aspect, though not quite absent, has fallen into the background before polytheism and the cult of the dead. The kingship and the organization of the kingdom have been imposed by a non-Bantu conquering people, which brought a military class, imperfectly assimilated by the bulk of the people when the English occupation took place. This people probably introduced domestic animals, some of which have become totems; and its influence is perhaps also to be traced in the 'split-totems.' Secondary totems are met with elsewhere, as we have seen.

Totemism is decadent also among the tribes of the Congo. It there manifests itself chiefly in tabus, though totemic tabus are only a few of the tabus observed. Among the Bangala of the Upper Congo the totem-animal may not be killed or eaten. A woman after marriage observes her husband's totem as well as her own. A child born to them takes the totems of both parents, until a council of both families determines which totem it is to take permanently—usually the father's. The Bangala are patrilineal.[4]

(*d*) *India.*—In continental India the decadence of totemism has been caused chiefly by the spread of Hinduism, and with it the extension of the caste system. The origin of caste has not yet been entirely cleared up. Within the Hindu system it is largely, if not mainly, occupational. As applied to the Dravidian and other races of the peninsula, it is transforming, or has transformed, independent tribes into castes; and by means of legends, some of them doubtless consciously forged to manufacture claims, these tribes have succeeded in gaining reluctant and often strongly contested admission as castes into the Hindu social hierarchy. The Reddi or Kāpu, the largest caste in the Madras Presidency, are probably descended from a Dravidian tribe which in the early centuries of our era was powerful in India. They are now a great caste of cultivators, farmers, and squireens in the Telugu country and rank next to the Brāhmans in Hindu society there. They are divided into a number of sections, for whose names fanciful etymologies have been found, and for some of them legends have been invented. One of these sections, the Panta Kāpus, are again severed into two endogamous divisions. But they are said also to have true totemic septs, of which the following are examples:

(1) Magili (*Pandanus fascicularis*): the women of this sept do not, like those of other castes, adorn themselves with the flower-bracts; and a man of the sept 'has been known to refuse to purchase some bamboo mats, because they were tied with the fibre of this tree'; (2) Ippi (*Bassia longifolia*): this tree and its products must not be touched by members of the sept; (3) Mancham (cot): members of this sept avoid sleeping on cots; (4) Arigala (*Paspalum scrobiculatum*): members of this sept do not use this grain as food; (5) Chintaginjalu (tamarind seeds): these seeds may not be used or touched by members of the sept; (6) Puccha (water-melon): the fruit may not be eaten by members of the sept.

Moreover, the names of various exogamous Kāpu septs are suggestive of totemism, such as the Cow, Grain, Buffalo, Sheep, Fowl, Goat, Elephant, as well as various plant-names, though others, such as Cart, Army, Hut, Harrow, Woman's Skirt, Plough, are more doubtful.[1]

This is not an uncommon type of caste. It suggests that the caste in question is a transformed tribe, and that the divisions of the caste originate from totemic clans, many of which retain their totemic names and some of their tabus, though other subdivisions have forgotten them or originated in a different manner. The Khangārs are a low caste of village watchmen and field-labourers in the Central Provinces, almost certainly of non-Aryan origin. They are divided into numerous exogamous septs, all of which are said to be totemic. 'The members of the sept usually show veneration to the object from which the sept takes its name.' Thus the Barha sept is named from *barāh*, 'pig,' this sept worshipping the pig; the Chirai from *chiriya*, 'bird,' this sept revering sparrows; the Ghurgotia from *ghora*, 'horse,' towards which the members practise certain observances; the Kasgotia from *kāusa*, 'bell-metal,' which is tabued by the sept; the San from *san*, 'hemp,' pieces of which are placed by members of the sept near their family god. The Hanumān sept is so called from the monkey-god, and the Viṣṇu sept from Viṣṇu, the god worshipped by it.[2]

In the United Provinces there are also many tribes and castes, probably of Dravidian origin, among whom totemism is traceable. Such are the Agariya of Mirzāpur, who have seven septs, all exogamous and apparently of totemic origin: the Markām named from the tortoise, which the members will not kill or eat; the Goirār from a certain tree which they will not cut; the Paraswān from a tree (*Butea frondosa*) which they will not cut and whose leaves they will not use for platters; the Sanwān from hemp (*san*), which they will not sow or use; the Baragwār from a tree (*Ficus Indica*) which they will not cut or climb and from the leaves of which they will not eat; the Banjhakwār, said to be named from *beng*, 'frog,' which the members of the sept will not kill or eat; and the Gidhlē, the members of which will not kill or even throw a stone at a vulture (*gidh*). The Agariya are patrilineal; and they have been deeply influenced in other ways by Hinduism. Indeed they call themselves Hindus in religion, though they worship none of the regular Hindu deities. There are, however, traces of a previous matrilineal condition. They practise tatuing, and many of the marks inscribed on their bodies are probably totemic in origin, 'but the real meaning has now been forgotten, and they are at present little more than charms to resist disease and other misfortunes, and for the purpose of mere ornament.'[3] The social and political conditions of India are such that almost the only possible relics of totemism consist in the names of the septs and the prohibitions of marriage within the clan and of eating, killing, or using the totem. Hindu influence leads to the ascription of descent to human beings rather than to animals or plants, concerning which tales are told to account for the totemic name and observances. The organization of the tribe or caste by means of a council and the police regulations render unnecessary the union of members for mutual protection. Hence, and owing to the universal tendency of caste to subdivision, the sense of solidarity is greatly weakened and is daily decreasing in force.[4]

[1] Roscoe, p. 133 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 268.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 20, 266, 268, 12.
[4] *JRAI* xl. [1910] 365.

[1] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, iii. 222 ff.
[2] R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iii. 439.
[3] W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, i. 1 ff.
[4] See H. H. Risley, *The People of India*[2], ed. W. Crooke, London, 1915, pp. 95–109, for a general consideration of the evidence; and, for the evidence itself, also his *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1891–92, *passim*; Crooke,

(*c*) *Melanesia.*—There are signs that totemism was developing in the islands of Torres Straits into an anthropomorphic cult. Traditions are found of culture-heroes associated with various clans. Of these Sigai and Maiau on the island of Yam appeared first in the likeness of a hammer-headed shark and a crocodile respectively. For each of them a shrine was erected, the essential feature of which was a turtle-shell model representing either a hammer-headed shark or a crocodile; under each of these was a stone in which the spirit, the so-called *augud* ('totem'), resided.

Uninitiated persons were not allowed to visit these shrines, 'nor did they know what they contained: they were aware of Sigai and Maiau, but they did not know that the former was a hammer-headed shark and the latter a crocodile; this mystery was too sacred to be imparted to uninitiates. When the heroes were addressed it was always by their human names, and not by their animal or totem names.'[1]

Each was associated in his animal form with one of the two phratries or groups of totem-clans. Warriors before going to battle prayed to them. Totem-dances were celebrated and songs were sung, which were believed to have an effect upon the weather, by the shark-men and crocodile-men, dancing separately and wearing feathers coloured white or black according to the party to which they belonged. On Mabuiag and Muralug the hero was Kwoiam, a warrior-hero, who himself was called an *augud*. In the Muralug group of islands he was regarded as the 'big *augud*' and 'the *augud* of every one in the island.'

He is said to have made and worn 'two crescentic objects of turtle-shell, which blazed with light when he wore them at night-time, and he nourished them with the savour of cooked fish. These objects were termed *augud*; . . . and they became the insignia of the two phratries into which the old totem-clans of Mabuiag were grouped.'[2]

'When attacking an enemy the warriors formed into two columns, each of which was led by a head-man who wore the Kwoiam emblems.'[3]

Like Sigai and Maiau, he possessed a sacred shrine. It was situated on the island of Pulu; there his crescentic emblems were kept, and thence they were taken with certain ceremonies to be borne before the appropriate phratry in war.[4]

A similar evolution has been observed in Fiji.

'The people of the interior of the island [of Viti Levu] form a number of independent communities which may probably be regarded as tribes, and each of these has a number of divisions and subdivisions, which in the relatively high development of Fijian society have departed widely from the character of the septs into which a totemic community is usually divided. The animals from which descent is traced, and whose flesh is prohibited as food, are usually associated with the larger groups which seem to correspond to tribes, though the divisions of the tribe often have sacred animals or plants peculiar to themselves in addition to those which are *tabu* to them as members of the tribe.'[5]

Rivers goes on to give examples.

The tabued animal of the people of Cawanisa is an aquatic creature called the *dravidravi*, from which they believe themselves descended; and none of the divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves. The sacred animal of the Nadrau or Navuta people is the *qiliyago*; some of its divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves, the Wailevu division eating neither the dog nor a fish called *dabea*, the Kaivuci respecting the snake. Other animals were held sacred in other parts of the island, the people believing in descent sometimes from the tabu animal of the tribe, sometimes from that of the smaller group. Marriage is regulated by kinship alone, and there is no evidence at present of totemic exogamy. It is manifest that this kind of totemism is widely divergent from what is usually reckoned normal totemism. Nor is this to be wondered at, seeing how far Fijian civilization has progressed. Yet it presents 'the three characteristic features of the institution: belief in descent from the totem, prohibition of the totem as an article of food, and the connection of the totem with a definite unit of the social organization.' Rivers discovered evidence among these hill-tribes 'that the sacred animals had become gods, which had, however, retained their animal form definitely.' Certain rules of conduct given to the Nadrau people by the bird *qiliyago* showed an early stage in the evolution of a god from the totem-animal. In the Rewa district in the low country things had gone a step farther. 'Here each village had a deity called *tevoro*, with a name which usually showed no sign of an animal origin, but in many cases these deities had the power of turning into animals, and in such case the people of the village in question were not allowed to eat the animal.' Thus the people of Lasakau, a division of Bau, had a *tevoro* who turned into a bird called *sese*. 'The bird could not be eaten, and here, as in the hills, it was clear that the restriction extended to the whole people and was not limited to either of the two divisions of which the Lasakau people are composed.'[1]

These are not the only cases which he mentions; but they are probably enough to render the evolution plain.

It is almost unnecessary to remark that totemism may decay, especially where it comes under European influence, by simple neglect.

Thus the Winnebago, a Siouan tribe of N. America, tracing their descent from animals who were transformed into human beings and became ancestors of the various clans, treat the totem-animal in no way differently from other animals, hunting it and eating it if edible. Descent is patrilineal, and a child used always to take a name of his father's clan; but this is falling into desuetude. The reckoning of descent has become irregular; and the sacred bundle of the clan occasionally now passes out of clan-possession.[2]

Again, the Diegueno of California were all formerly totemic. Descent is paternal. Clan exogamy is still observed by many of the clans, but not by all. Some, like the Blue Wild-Cat clan, regard the totem-animal as brother. But many of the clan-names have ceased to be totemic, and the clans have become, or are becoming, mere local groups. The clan-name is frequently taken as a personal or family surname under modern conditions.[3]

Such cases may be found elsewhere than in America.

5. Traces of totemism among non-totemic peoples.—Over a large area of the globe, embracing Europe, the greater part of Asia, S. America, and Polynesia, the north of Africa, and the extreme north of N. America, inhabited by the Eskimo, totemism is now unknown. But among many of the peoples of these regions certain beliefs and practices have been reported which seem to bear traces of a former prevalence.

(*a*) *Polynesia.*—Rivers' discoveries, just referred to, in Melanesia find their analogies in Tonga and Tikopia.

In the former he learned that 'each family had its *otua* [a Polynesian word, usually written *atua*, meaning "god" or "ancestor"], some of which were animals and some stones, while a man might also be an *otua*. Examples of animal *otua* were the octopus, the flying fox, and the pigeon. . . . An animal was never eaten by those whose *otua* it was, and I was told,' he says, 'that there was definite belief in descent from the animal.' Similarly on the island of Tikopia he found a number of animals called *atua*. 'Some of these animal *atua* belong to the whole community and may be eaten by no one on the island; others belong to one or other of the four sections into which the people are divided.' Thus the octopus is the *atua* of the Kavika; but it is forbidden as food not only to them but also to the whole people. The Taumako may not eat the sea-eel or a bird called *rupe*—prohibitions limited to this division of the people. The Fangalele may not catch an *one* fish. The Tafua may not eat the fresh-water eel, the flying fox, or the turtle, the two latter 'being also prohibited as food to the whole community, though regarded as especially sacred to the Tafua.' There was also evidence that the Kavika were believed to be descended from the octopus, the Taumako from the eel, the Tafua from the flying fox; and it was believed that one man of this division became after death a fresh-water eel, while two men of the Fangalele became, the one an *one* fish, the other a *moko* bird. There are also plant and vegetable *atua*, to which corresponding restrictions attached.[4]

Thus there is reason to think that totemism had at one time existed and had left traces attributable to no other cause. Elsewhere in Polynesia there are relics more or less distinct of the same conditions.

(*b*) *Egypt.*—We are naturally reminded of Egypt. The origin and early development of Egyptian religion are obscure. What we find is that in the earliest period known to us by the

Tribes and Castes of N.W. Provinces and Oudh, passim; and the other works referred to in Crooke's notes to Risley's observations. Cf. also Crooke's observations in *PR*[2] ii. 148–159.

[1] A. C. Haddon, in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 185.

[2] *Ib.* p. 184. [3] *Ib.*

[4] *Reports Camb. Anthrop. Exped.* v. 373 ff., 367 ff., 80; Frazer, ii. 18–24.

[5] W. H. R. Rivers, *Man*, viii. [1908] 134.

[1] *Man*, viii. 134 f.; *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 158.

[2] *Amer. Anthrop.*, new ser., xii. [1910] 212. 214.

[3] *Univ. of California Publications*, xiv. [1918] 167 ff.

[4] *JRAI* xxxix. 156 ff

monuments each nome or district had its own peculiar object of adoration in some animal, which was regarded with indifference or, in consequence of local quarrels, with hostility in the adjacent nomes. Moreover (in spite of changes during the country's long history, in spite of the evolution into higher polytheism and of the syncretism which gradually won its way, at all events among the educated classes), the same attitude towards these animals prevailed to the end. One nome venerated the ibis, one the crocodile, one the cat, one the gnat, one the ram, one the *oxyrhynchus* fish, and so on. Some of these are domesticated animals; in the earliest period, however, domesticated animals do not appear. The monarchy seems to have been introduced by a people which invaded Egypt and conquered the aborigines. The invaders carried the standard of a falcon, from the name of which (*ḥeru*) that of Horus, later regarded as the last of the gods who reigned over Egypt, is derived. When the objects of adoration took human form, becoming anthropomorphic gods, these were identified with various animals, and are represented on the monuments with the heads of the appropriate animals. The animals remained sacred, as their numerous mummies attest; and various legends were told to account for their relation to the respective gods. At Bubastis, where the cat was venerated, the goddess Bast had her seat; Ombos, where the crocodile was honoured, was the sacred town of the crocodile-headed god, Sebak; the ram-headed god, Khnûm or Ammon-Rā, was worshipped at Thebes, and there precisely was the place where the sheep was revered. As a result of the unification of the country under the kings, syncretism in theology spread, and the various gods tended to be identified with one another and with the animals honoured in the different towns. At length the myth and worship of the culture-hero, Osiris, prevailed throughout the land; and his myth included a story of how the various gods fled, 'disguised in brutish forms,' from the rage of his enemy Typhon. In short, all sorts of devices are adopted to account for the local gods and animals venerated in the different cities and districts and to unify the religion. These devices were probably known to, or at least accepted by, the educated classes only. All the other classes remained attached to their local deities.[1] The evidence points to the prevalence at one time in the valley of the Nile of a form of totemism, which possibly included various trees and other vegetables (for these, though less prominent than animals, are not unknown in Egyptian religion), and which by a series of steps was slowly merged and elevated into a polytheistic worship tending ever in the minds of the educated more and more to monotheism.[2]

Of the original social organization, however, we know little beyond the fact that it was matrilineal. The woman was mistress of the house; the husband on marriage was received as a guest or went to reside with her. Those men who could afford it kept harems, the members of which were under the governance of the chief wife. It is a probable conjecture from the available information that society was constituted of clans, in later ages directly or indirectly giving birth to trading and other gilds. The custom of the husband going to reside with his wife secured the local concentration of the clan and facilitated the conversion of the clan-settlement into the nome and the dominance of a single animal-totem in each nome.

[1] A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, ii. ch. xv.; E. Naville, *RHR* liii. [1905] 357 ff.; *RHR* li. [1905] 238; A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, chs. vii.–viii.

[2] A. H. Sayce, *The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 116.

All this was doubtless the result of the agricultural occupations of the people. What were the relations of the members of the clan to one another or to the totem we are not informed.

(*c*) *Greece.*—Scientific controversy has raged over the question whether remains of totemism are discoverable in ancient Greece. Salomon Reinach, Toutain, and Van Gennep have been the protagonists. Andrew Lang pointed out the various remains of animal-worship among the Greek peoples — in Thessaly the Myrmidons claiming descent from the ant and revering ants; in the Troad and the islands the mice sacred to Apollo Smintheus and a tribe referred to by an oracle as mice; the adoration of the wolf at Delphi and Athens and of the sheep on Samos; the descent of Tennes, the hero of Tenedos, from a swan; the invocation of Hecate as a dog and the sacrifice to her of a dog;[1] the Artemis of Arcadia, identified with Callisto, a nymph who is fabled to have been metamorphosed into a she-bear, from which the Arcadians claimed descent; the similar tale of the Brauronian Artemis in Attica, served by girls called bears, dancing with the gait of bears and probably in archaic times wearing bear-skins; and a hundred other such myths, rituals, and metamorphoses.[2] Nor has he been alone in discerning that such cases pointed to a primitive totemism, outgrown and misconstrued before the dawn of authentic history. The social organization of Athens has also been examined. The γένος and φατρία have been pronounced parallel in all essentials with the organization of the Australian totemic clan and phratry.[3] There are good reasons for suspecting that originally matrilineal descent was the rule, of which vestiges subsisted down to historical times.[4] Though this view has been challenged,[5] and it is undoubted that agnatic descent prevailed in historical times, the suspicion is not without solid foundation. Probably the pre-historic population of the period called the Mycenæan age was matrilineal and was conquered by a patrilineal military people from the north, who formed the dominant classes in the Homeric age, and under whom Greek society was transformed and reorganized. On the whole we are justified in accepting with L. R. Farnell the theory that various remarkable cults—the Arcadian worship of Zeus Lycæus and of Artemis Calliste, the Attic worship of Zeus Polieus, and perhaps some others—can be explained only by a survival of what is in effect totemism.[6] But, if so, then other cults and myths of which the connecting links have been lost may with the more likelihood be assigned to the same origin.

(*d*) *Ireland.*—Over the rest of Europe the traces of totemism are still more uncertain. They will be found, as in Greece, if at all, on the side of belief and practice which may be called quasi-religious rather than in social observances such as marriage restrictions; for under the dominance of Christianity and the social ideas, Hebrew and Roman, carried with it society has been shaped for two millenniums. In Connemara and the islands off the west coast of Ireland persons bearing the name of Conneely, who are descended from the clan Conneely, an old family of Iar-Connaught, claim 'that they have seal's blood in them, and that is why they are such good swimmers.'

A story is told of some members of the clan who at a distant period were changed into seals. Since then, it is said, no Conneely can kill a seal without afterwards having bad luck.

[1] *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, i. 277. [2] *Ib.* ii. 211.

[3] A. W. Howitt and L. Fison, *JAI* xiv. [1885] 142 ff.

[4] Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909, i. 265, ii. 18.

[5] L. R. Farnell, *ARW* vii. [1904] 70; H. J. Rose, *FL* xxii. [1911] 277 ff.

[6] *CGS*, Oxford, 1896–1901, i. 41, 58, 91, ii. 434, 441 (cf. iv. 116, v. 106; and J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, *passim*, esp. ch. v.).

Seals are said to be regarded with profound veneration. They are called Conneelys, and are said to be the souls of departed friends. We are told that 'in some places the story has its believers who would no more kill a seal, or eat of a slaughtered one, than they would of a human Conneely.'[1]

Both in Ireland and in the Scottish isles are stories and customs which point to an extinct totemism as the best explanation; and the same explanation has been offered, with more or less probability, of various beliefs and practices in Wales and England as well as in other European countries.[2]

(*e*) *W. China.*—In W. China among the Lolos, an aboriginal mountain people of Szechwan, there is something more than traces of totemism.

Their 'surnames always signify the name of a tree or animal or both tree and animal,' and 'these are considered as the ancestors of the family bearing the name. This name is often archaic. Thus the surname Bu-luh-beh is explained as follows:—Bu-luh is said to be an ancient name for the citron, which is now known as *sa-lu*. The common way of asking a person what his surname is, is to inquire "What is it you don't touch?" and a person of the surname just mentioned would reply "We do not touch the *sa-lu* or citron." People cannot eat or touch in any way the plant or animal, or both, which enters into their surname. The plant or animal is not, however, worshipped in any way.

People of the same surname may marry if there is no obvious relationship. There are, however, groups of two or three surnames amongst whom intermarriage is forbidden; and no explanation of this is given. There are also groups of two or three surnames who are called comrades, and intermarriage amongst them is favoured.'[3]

The Chinese themselves are on a higher plane of civilization, and totemism is unknown. But from sundry prohibitions its existence has been suspected. Among some other peoples of S.W. Asia and various islands of the Indian Archipelago totemism has been either found or suspected. In Madagascar and in the Polynesian islands a number of superstitions have been ascribed with more or less probability to an original totemism no longer forming part of the social organization.

(*f*) *American.*—In Central and S. America also customs and beliefs have been interpreted as traces of totemism. Thus in Peru, where the various clans were localized, each clan worshipped its ancestor, and the tendency seems to have been for such objects of worship to assume the form of an animal, vegetable, or some other natural phenomenon. Each clan, moreover, had a distinctive dress. But our information is too imperfect to permit of a definite opinion on the subject.[4] The Bororo of Brazil claim to be araras (a bird with a red plumage) and believe a neighbouring tribe, the Trumai, to be water-animals, while a certain cannibal tribe is descended from the jaguar.[5] In N. America it was usual for a young man at adolescence, or a man who wished to acquire special powers, to go out into the woods and fast for days in order to acquire a guardian spirit, which usually took the form of an animal. It was revealed to him in a vision in which his austerities culminated; and when it took the form of some animal, a portion or symbol of that animal became his fetish or medicine. Thereafter he obeyed the restrictions and prohibitions believed to have been communicated to him by the vision. There was a tendency among some tribes, particularly in the north-west, for the guardian spirit (*súlia* or *manitu*) to be inherited by his descendants. And some writers have seen in this the origin of totemism.[6] A variety of the practice in Central and S. America is known under the name of nagualism (Quiche *naual*, 'the knowing one' or 'sorcerer'), in which some natural object, commonly an animal, is believed to have a parallel relation with a human being, so that for weal or woe their fates are mutually dependent. The *nagual* is sometimes chosen by divination for an infant at birth, but more often obtained, like a *manitu*, by fasting and prayer.[1] It seems that the *nagual* is a purely personal acquisition and is not inherited like the *súlia*. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the belief of the Bororo nor the *manitu* or *nagual* of other tribes has the marks of true totemism. It has no relation to a clan, nor is it in any way related to the social organization: where the *manitu* descends, it is only to the children or remoter issue of the original possessor, and in such case the descent has only taken place under the influence of patrilineal kinship.

(*g*) *Australia.*—In Australia among the Kurnai and some other tribes of the south-east the two sexes have animals respectively regarded as their protectors, with whom the life of individual members of the sex is supposed to be bound up. Fights between the sexes on behalf of their sex-totems often occurred, as a means, or a preliminary, to marriages.[2] Here again, and for the same reason as in nagualism and the other American beliefs just referred to, the sex-totems are, whatever their origin, entirely unconnected with true totemism.

6. **Origin.**—The origin of totemism has been the subject of much discussion and speculation among anthropologists. It is only necessary here to refer to a few of the hypotheses offered. That which is identified with the name of Hill-Tout has already been incidentally dealt with. Though accepted by some American anthropologists, it has not generally found favour on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the totem-animal or vegetable, and so for ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use,[3] has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Spencer and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of Rivers of the Melanesians, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and childbirth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans derived respectively from ancestors who originated from the animals or fruits.[4] Such a theory, however, encounters the same difficulties as the theory which ascribes the origin of totemism to the *manitu* become hereditary.

Earlier than either of these theories Frazer had suggested 'that the key to totemism might be found in the theory of the

[1] *FLJ* ii. [1884] 259; *FLR* iv. [1881] 104; C. R. Browne, *Proc. Roy. Irish Academy*, 3rd ser., v. [1899] 262; *JAI* ii. [1873] 448 f.; G. L. Gomme, *Archæol. Rev.* iii. [1889] 219.

[2] G. L. Gomme, *loc. cit.*; N. W. Thomas, *FL* xi. [1900] 227 ff.; *RHR* xxxviii. [1898] 295; S. Reinach, *Cults, Myths and Religions*, Eng. tr. i. 1.

[3] *JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 105.

[4] E. J. Payne, *Hist. of the New World called America*, Oxford, 1892–99, i. 400, 403 n., 462, 463; *Man*, xiii. [1913] 116.

[5] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 352.

[6] C. Hill-Tout, *Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada*, 2nd ser., ix. [1903] 61; and *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 326 ff.

[1] O. Stoll, *Die Ethnologie der Indianerstämme von Guatemala* (Suppl. to *AE* i.), Leyden, 1889, p. 57; D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*[3], Philadelphia, 1896, p. 122, and *Nagualism*, do. 1894, p. 59; D. D. Granada, *Reseña Histórico-descriptiva de antiguas y modernas Supersticiones del Rio de la Plata*, Monte Video, 1896, p. 591.

[2] Howitt, p. 148.

[3] *Fortnightly Rev.*, new ser., lxv. [1899] 647 ff., 835 ff.

[4] Frazer, iv. 57 ff.

external soul, that is, in the belief that living people may deposit their souls for safe keeping outside of themselves in some secure place, where the precious deposit will be less exposed to the risks and vicissitudes of life than while it remained in the body of its owner.'[1] This hypothesis, though founded on a widely spread practice and belief, has not, he frankly admits, been confirmed by further research, inasmuch as 'the evidence which connects this theory of external human souls in animal bodies with totemism appears to be insufficient to justify us in regarding it as the source of the whole institution.'[2]

Andrew Lang, towards the close of his life, was led to emphasize the social aspect of totemism. He advocated a theory similar to that first propounded by Herbert Spencer, and adopted by the German scholar, J. Pikler,[3] that the origin is to be sought in names. According to this theory, bands of men, having been given names from outside, either by way of distinction or as nicknames, accepted these names and came to fancy that they themselves were in a mystical connexion with them, or rather with the things signified by the names, and then the course of social organization, from one cause or another, led first to the preference for wives of another band having a different name, and subsequently to a positive prohibition to marry a woman of the same band and necessarily having the same name—in other words, to clan-exogamy.[4] The influence of names, and the inveterate tendency to regard a name as a real objective existence belonging to and having a mystical connexion with the person or thing signified by it, are practically universal in the lower culture. But why these names were appropriated and accepted by the various bands is left unexplained. Lang apparently agrees with Frazer that the institution of exogamy is distinct from totemism, and that totemism as a matter of fact preceded exogamy.[5] It certainly is a usual, but not quite invariable, accompaniment of it. Lang indeed offers explanations of the origin of exogamy, but it cannot be said that his speculations are more satisfactory than those of previous inquirers.

A. C. Haddon some time ago hazarded a suggestion of the 'possible origin of one aspect of totemism.' It is that there were numerous small human groups in favourable areas, each occupying a restricted range in which a certain animal or plant or group of animals or plants might be specially abundant, and that they consequently utilized these as a food-supply and for other purposes, the superfluity of which could be bartered for the superfluities of other groups.

Thus 'the group that lived mainly on crabs and occasionally traded in crabs might well be spoken of as "the crab-men" by all the groups with whom they came in direct or indirect contact. The same would hold good for the group that dealt in clams or in turtle, and reciprocally there might be sago-men, bamboo-men, and so forth. It is obvious that the men who persistently collected or hunted a particular group of animals would understand the habits of those animals better than other people, and a personal regard for these animals would naturally arise. Thus from the very beginning there would be a distinct relationship between a group of individuals and a group of animals or plants, a relationship that primitively was based, not on even the most elementary of psychic concepts, but on the most deeply seated and urgent of human claims, hunger.'

Here Haddon agrees with Lang that the name of the group was probably imposed from without and adopted by the group thus named. Once accepted, the name and the regard for the animal, or whatever was the object signified by the name, would result in a mystical connexion being held to exist between the object and the human group, which might issue in the object being tabued instead of used as originally, and, on the other hand, in magic being worked to secure a continuous supply of the object. As part of the tabu, or incident to it, exogamy, originating in a preference for women of contiguous groups, might be developed.[1]

E. Durkheim, envisaging chiefly the Australian evidence, considers totemism as a religious institution. According to him, it is the religion of a sort of anonymous and impersonal force manifested in various animals, men, and emblems, none of which possesses it entire, but all of which participate in it. It is the god adored in all totemic cults; but it is an impersonal god without name or history, immanent in the world, diffused in an innumerable multitude of things. It is, in short, *mana* (*q.v.*) or *orenda*. It is not, however, represented under its abstract form, but is conceived as a species of animal or vegetable—in a word, under a sensible form—each group of men taking for ensign the animal or vegetable diffused most plentifully in the neighbourhood of the place where the group was accustomed to assemble. The totem is really only the material form under which this immaterial substance, this energy diffused through all sorts of heterogeneous beings (which is the sole object of the cult), is represented to the imagination. It is the symbol not only of the impersonal totemic principle or god, but also of the definite society, the clan, of which it is the totem. It is the standard, the emblem, by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible sign of its personality, the mark borne by every one that makes part of the clan, whether men, beasts, or anything else. All are sacred in varying degrees; but most sacred of all—more even than the totem-animal or other object itself—is the artificial standard or emblem of the clan. Since all who communicate in the same totemic principle are sacred, the totem is the source of the moral life of the clan, and all are morally bound to one another, with definite duties towards one another of help, vendetta, and so forth. The totem is thus not only a material but a moral force, which may easily transform itself into a divinity properly so called. Totemism therefore is bound up with the organization of society. It is practically assumed as the earliest form of religion and of society everywhere.[2] In the striking work of which the main thesis is here imperfectly summarized Durkheim elaborates this thesis with infinite pains and abundance of illustrations. But everything rests on the assumption of primitive universality, which no attempt is made to prove. Large spaces of the world, however, remain in which totemism has never yet been found. More or less probable traces of it may, indeed, be discerned in these areas; or they may hereafter be discovered. Meanwhile Durkheim's theory remains a brilliant conjecture, and nothing more.

In its insistence on an attitude towards nature and on a psychology different from that of civilized mankind it avoids the rock on which most of the hypotheses heretofore considered have split. This was also emphatically laid down, as the condition of success in solving the question of the origin of totemism, by E. Reuterskiöld, a Swedish scholar, in an article which appeared almost contemporaneously with Durkheim's work. This article is an extension of part of a previous essay by the same author published in 1908. He urges that totemism is connected with an impersonal conception of life. A group of men are allied with a group of animals. There is nothing personal, nothing individual, in their union. It is an association peculiar to the primitive mode of thought, which does not compare one thing with another: if it finds likeness between them, it identifies them. For primitive man the individual is nothing; the group or the species is

[1] Frazer, p. 52. [2] *Ib.* p. 55.
[3] *Der Ursprung des Totemismus*, Berlin, 1900.
[4] Lang, *The Secret of the Totem*, chs. vi. and vii.
[5] iv. 9.

[1] A. C. Haddon, Presidential Address to Anthropology Section, *Report of 72nd Meeting of Brit. Assoc.*, *1902*, p. 745 ff.
[2] *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, pp. 269, 294, 334, etc.

everything. Man did not picture himself as lord of creation. He did not sever himself in thought from other living creatures; he was only a part of a great community. He felt himself closely united with a kind of animal living in his neighbourhood and coming in touch with him. It was no accident that he associated himself with one or other species. Totemism has its various sides—religious, magical, and social. These were in the origin undistinguished from one another. The distinction between them came later, with the development of individualism and analysis.[1]

In this way Reuterskiöld would explain the origin of totemism. Without saying that he has completely solved the question, the opinion may be expressed that he has realized the conditions of primitive life and thought sufficiently to define at all events some of the conditions to be fulfilled and so lead to a solution. In endeavouring to explain the attitude towards nature of the tribes of Central Brazil Von den Steinen not only says that they draw no strict line of demarcation between man and brute; he uses the emphatic expression that, to understand it, 'we must think the boundary completely away.' There is thus no impediment to their assimilating themselves to one or another animal. Indeed, the Bororo declare, as we have seen, that they are red araras, not that they will become araras after death, nor that they were araras in a previous existence, but that they are araras here and now. From this attitude of mind we can see how it follows that in their stories human modes of life and thought are attributed to the lower animals, and indeed, as frequently in savage tales, it is often impossible to say whether the actors are human or brute; it follows also that marriages between the former and the latter are in the tales contemplated without aversion or are even regarded as natural, and that interchanges of shape are quite ordinary incidents. It is no question of naming. Totemism is founded on something deeper than that. It assumes a community of nature between men and other creatures; and the existence of the individual is ignored, except as a small and subordinate part of a group, thought of as a whole. It was part of the organization of society which is bound up with the general concept of the world indicated above—a concept by no means confined to totemic peoples, but not always issuing in the same type of organization. How or why particular totems were chosen is a difficult question, but, however interesting, relatively unimportant.

In strict acceptation of the term totemism is not a religion. The respect of the clan for its totem arises out of the attitude of mind just explained. The relation of the clan to its totem assumes a mystical aspect and generates an intense feeling of kinship. This frequently is expressed in the belief that they are descended from the totem-species. As civilization evolves, this belief becomes modified into the shape of a story of the adventure of a human ancestor with the totem-species. Although regarded with reverence and looked to for help, the totem is never, where totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god or a person with powers which we call supernatural. In fact, in that stage of culture totemism usually co-exists with the cult of the dead and often with the worship of other spirits and gods accurately so called.

Its connexion with the social organization, on the other hand, is very intimate. Probably beginning in a more or less inchoate recognition of kinship, it develops the clan-feeling and the clan-organization and by means of clan-exogamy binds the whole tribe together. Whether exogamy actually precedes totemism in point of time or not, there can be no doubt that the interaction of the two strengthens and develops it, until exogamy is seen as an essential element of totemism in its full force. When, in the course of evolving civilization, totemism begins to decay, exogamy may and often does continue to exist independently. And the cases are numerous where the clan-system and exogamy have arisen and existed for long periods without any other element of totemism, so far as we know. So various are the forms of totemism that it has been maintained with plausibility that they are due to a fortuitous concurrence of causes which has united elements originally diverse but tending to converge into a system on the whole marvellously similar wherever it obtains, just as the disintegration, and in many cases the dissolution, of the system have historically been due to a concurrence or a sequence of causes of the opposite kind.

[1] *ARW* xv. [1912] 12 ff. The author's previous work, to which reference is made, is entitled *Till frågan om uppkomsten af sakramentala måltider med särskild hänsyn till Totemismen*, Upsala, 1908.

LITERATURE.—The most comprehensive account of totemism is J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols., London, 1910. It is indispensable to every student of the subject, and it includes a reprint of his early work, *Totemism*, Edinburgh, 1887, and of his subsequent artt. in *The Fortnightly Review*, new ser., lxv. [1899] 647 ff., 835 ff., and lxxviii. [1905] 162 ff., 452 ff. Other important works are Andrew Lang, *Social Origins*, London, 1903, *The Secret of the Totem*, do. 1905, and his earlier work, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1887; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], Edinburgh, 1894; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896; four artt. by L. Marillier, on 'La Place du totémisme dans l'évolution religieuse,' in *RHR* xxxvi. [1897] and xxxvii. [1898]; Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, vols. i. and ii., Paris, 1905–08, Eng. tr., London, 1912, *Orpheus*, Paris, 1909; J. Toutain, 'L'Hist. des religions et le totémisme,' in *RHR* lvii. [1908], and A. van Gennep's reply in *RHR* lviii. [1908]; A. A. Goldenweiser, 'Totemism, an Analytical Study,' in *JAFL* xxiii. [1911], with replies by R. H. Lowie in *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xiii. [1911], by A. Lang, *ib.* xiv. [1912], by W. D Wallis, *ib.* xv. [1913], and the consequent discussions, including an art. by A. A. Goldenweiser, in *ib.* xx. [1918]. Articles bearing on totemism will be found in various volumes of *ASoc*, 1897–1907. Works in German are numerous, but of less importance. The remaining literature in English will be found in the usual anthropological periodicals and other works published in England and America, many of which have been referred to in the text. Other important works have been indicated in the course of the article.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

TRACTARIANISM. — See OXFORD MOVEMENT.

TRADE.—See COMMERCE.

TRADE UNIONS.—A trade union has been defined as 'a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment.'[1] This definition would not be regarded as an adequate account of the objects of a trade union by many labour leaders of the present time, but it may stand with the proviso that there are large questions of politics and industrial reconstruction which under modern conditions have a direct or indirect bearing upon the 'improvement of conditions.' The underlying basis of the movement is the power of combination, and the progressive realization of this power by the masses of the workers in various countries has gone far to revolutionize the face of civilization. Labour is no longer a suppliant pleading for justice, but a strong man armed, presenting demands which he has the power to enforce. How will that power be used? The time seems appropriate for a consideration of the ethical aspects of the trade union movement.

1. **Historical.**—Trade unionism, like parliamentary government, is the child of the passionate instinct of the British people for civic freedom. It has been transplanted to the colonies, adopted by the working people of every nation in Europe, carried

[1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 1.

across the Atlantic to America. It pervades the whole world of intelligent white labour, but England was its cradle.

Attempts have been made to trace its descent from the craft gilds (*q.v.*) of the Middle Ages, but those institutions are to be regarded as associations of masters rather than of men, and there is little or no evidence of the existence of permanent associations of wage-earners before the 18th century. It was then that the differentiation between employer and employed became more and more marked until a great gulf was finally set between them by the transformation of industry effected by the introduction of machinery and the institution of the modern factory system of production on a large scale. The trade union movement was a direct response to the change of conditions.

In the early part of the 18th cent. continuous associations of wage-earners generally took the form of friendly societies, with sick and funeral funds attached; but, as the century wore on, and the effects of the industrial revolution, in divorcing the worker from the instruments of production and degrading his position, became more apparent, they inevitably assumed a different character. The meetings of the clubs afforded opportunities for talk about questions of wages and conditions of labour, and we find Adam Smith writing:

'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and discussion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.'[1]

This was what the early trade unions appeared to be to the governing classes of those days—'a conspiracy against the public'—and they were only taking the same view as had been taken by the governing classes long before. Combinations of workmen were held to constitute a danger to the State, and from early times a series of statutes had been directed against them. The earliest of these appears to have been the statute 33 Edw. I. c. 1 (1305).

It stamped as conspirators 'all who do conféder or bind themselves by oath, covenant or other alliance, as relates or extends to combinations or conspiracies of workmen or other persons to obtain an advance of, or fix the rate of, wages, or to lessen or alter the hours or duration of the time of working, or to decrease the quantity of work, or to regulate or control the mode of carrying on any manufacture, trade, or business, or the management thereof.'

From this it may be seen that labour questions, including the limitation of output, were much the same in the first part of the 14th cent. as they are to-day. The statute goes on to declare 'combinations or conspiracies of masters, manufacturers, or other persons' to be equally illegal; they too were regarded as constituting a danger to the State; and the principle that all combinations, whether of masters or of men, should be suppressed in the interest of the public may be said to underlie most of our earlier industrial legislation. But, as time went on, the tendency was for the laws against labour to be rigidly enforced, while those in its favour were very laxly administered or allowed to fall into oblivion.

The Act of Edward I. was followed by a series of others of the same nature. In the 18th cent. they became more and more frequent with the rise of the new associations. At least fifteen were enacted in the reign of George III. before the year 1800. That year marks an epoch. The whole of the existing Combination Acts were consolidated in a new law which made all associations of workmen (and of employers) illegal, and membership of such an association a criminal offence (39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 106).

The position of the workers now was that, while no attempt was made to extend already existing State regulations as to wages, hours, and conditions of employment so as to apply them to the altered circumstances of the times—and many of them had become practically inoperative—they were debarred by statute from what seemed the only chance of escape, association for mutual protection. But, in spite of this, associations were formed, some of which, as the direct result of this repressive legislation, took the form of secret societies with strange oaths and revolutionary rites, and the next twenty-five years were full of trouble and discontent. Eventually by the Acts 5 Geo. IV. c. 95 (1824) and 6 Geo. IV. c. 129 (1825) the Combination Laws were repealed and association for the purpose of regulating wages or hours of labour was expressly legalized.

The position of the trade unions was now secure. Some forty-five were discovered in 1824 to have managed to maintain a precarious existence in spite of the Combination Laws, but, when the laws were repealed, trade unions sprang into life all over the country. The next few years were a period of great industrial activity, and the work of organization was taken in hand in earnest. It was also a time of great political activity, and soon after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832 we find that the unions had already accumulated members and funds sufficient to make them a distinct power in politics. They threw themselves heartily into the movement initiated by Robert Owen—the membership of his 'Grand National Consolidated Trades Union' in 1834 has been estimated at half a million—but on the whole stood aloof from the Chartist movement which played such an important part in the history of the working classes between 1837 and 1848. Between 1850 and 1860 trade unionism made rapid strides on the old lines, and then there was a marked increase of political interest with the Reform Bill of 1867 as its centre.

The Trade Union Act of 1871 marked another stage. Though the repeal of the Combination Laws had left the workers free to combine, all combinations 'in restraint of trade' were still illegal. The funds of any such society therefore did not enjoy the protection of the law, but were at the mercy of any official who had access to them. As a matter of fact the trust had been very seldom abused, but the position was unsatisfactory, and the Act remedied it, and also strengthened the position of the unions in other respects. In 1875 a further Act recognized employers and workmen (they were no longer called master and servant) as equal parties to a civil contract, and 'peaceful picketing' during a strike was expressly permitted. Thus 'collective bargaining, with all its necessary accompaniments, was after fifty years of legislative struggle finally recognized by the law of the land.'[1]

Ten years later the movement entered upon a new phase. The leading spirits were no longer content to proceed steadily upon the old lines, and John Burns and Tom Mann became the apostles of a more militant and aggressive creed. A 'new unionism' came into existence which was inspired by the doctrines of socialism (*q.v.*). Its spirit was manifested in the labour unrest of 1889–90. This has been in its turn outpaced by the still newer unionism of the 20th cent., which is syndicalist instead of socialist and regards the general strike as its weapon. But, at all events up to the outbreak of the war in 1914, the great bulk of trade unionists seem to have been content, as Joseph Clayton has said,

'to proceed steadily on the old lines—distrusting revolutionary sentiments, favouring the return to Parliament of their officers, of whose abilities and honesty they are well aware, believing that by collective bargaining they can achieve a more comfortable life for themselves and their families and that

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, bk. i. ch. 10.

[1] Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 275.

legislation of a social character is also needed to improve their position.'[1]

Beyond the outbreak of the war we do not propose to go.

The total number of trade unions in existence at the end of 1913 is given in the *Labour Year Book* as 1135 with a membership of just under four millions—more than double what they had been ten years before.

2. Moral and economic justification of trade unionism.—No one would be likely to deny that trade unions are a necessary feature of modern industrial life, and most people would admit that they are on the whole a salutary feature. Our forefathers may have been sincere in their belief that the State could not afford to allow such associations to exist, that they constituted a real danger to the public; but in those days there was little knowledge of the conditions under which the 'lower classes' lived and little sympathy with the workers themselves. Moreover, the existing order was taken for granted. It was recognized that there were evils which called for alleviation, but the ideas of the most sympathetic did not get farther than palliation; prevention was beyond their scope. Such attempts as were made in early times to regulate industry by legal enactments were crude; and, when the great crisis of the 18th cent. arrived and there was the most urgent need of strong and intelligent control, there was no one who saw the meaning and implications of the change. The industrial revolution went its way unfettered; the old industrial order was swept away and chaos supervened; whole classes of workers became involved in a condition of unparalleled servitude, poverty, and degradation. But the governing classes failed to realize that, if there was a possible element of danger in the existence of combinations of workers, the existence of such a state of things was a far greater danger and in addition an intolerable disgrace to any civilized country. From the fetters riveted upon us in those evil days we as a nation have been for a century endeavouring with infinite struggles and effort to set ourselves free. The conscience of the public was at last aroused, but long before it was aroused the workers had learnt to help themselves; the State at last awoke to some sort of a sense of its responsibilities, but the driving power which lay behind the various enactments was the power of the associations of workers. This is the first and broadest ground of justification of unionism. It has laid the foundations of a new industrial order, and those foundations were laid in the power of two far-reaching ideas—the realization of the power of combination and the conception of the organization of labour.

Another debt which the country owes to trade unionism is the emancipation of large sections of its population from the cold and selfish individualism of past days. It is a debt which is not generally realized and seldom acknowledged; but no one who knows anything of the actual working of trade unions, or is brought much into contact with their members, can fail to see how strong the bonds of fellowship are, how clearly the members realize their dependence upon one another, how ready they are to bear one another's burdens if occasion arises. Trade unionism is full of paradoxes, and none of them is more striking than that action which appears to be hard and selfish is found sometimes upon investigation to be based upon the most unselfish motives, or that practices which intelligent workers themselves admit to be unjustifiable in theory are invested with a strong moral sanction as the only means for the protection of the weak.

[1] *Trade Unions*, London, 1913, p. 27.

On these two broad general grounds—that it has pointed the way to the establishment of a new industrial order, and that it has recalled us to a sense of a forgotten side of our social order—it may be said that the trade union movement has abundantly justified itself. We shall now proceed to consider some of the special manifestations of its activity which have been at different times the subject of criticism.

(*a*) *Strikes.*—The strike (*q.v.*) has always been the trade unionist's most effective weapon. He can do much to protect himself by the method of mutual insurance or collective bargaining, but the strike gives him the power of bringing pressure to bear if he desires to enforce an agreement or to secure an improvement in wages or conditions of labour. The question whether it is a fair weapon is therefore fundamental. At present the right to strike has been practically acknowledged by the law, but the concession has only been gradual. At first all strikes were regarded as conspiracies and illegal; then there came a stage at which the right to strike was tacitly acknowledged, but the courts condemned them on the ground of assumed 'malicious intent'; next attempts were made to discriminate between different kinds of motive; and now the tendency seems to be to uphold the right to strike as such.

The relation between employer and employed has been regarded in law since 1875 as a civil contract between two theoretically free and equal individuals. It is in some cases a contract of very short duration, but it does not differ in nature from longer contracts. A weekly-wage-earner is in this respect in the same position as a highly placed salaried official. He therefore has the right to terminate his contract when he pleases, so long as he does not contravene its terms. But the essence of a strike is that it is the simultaneous termination of many contracts, and it derives its power from the fact that it is inconvenient or even harmful to the employer, and generally meant to be so. Now no one would deny that any worker where wages are inadequate or conditions intolerable has the right to say to an employer, 'I will not work for you for such wages or under such conditions.' Nor will it be denied that many of the workers have a right to say this simultaneously as a joint protest. Finally, it is hard to see how they would be wrong in endeavouring to persuade others to do the same. If these three points are conceded, the right to strike is established in principle.

The strike then, regarded as a protest, is a lawful weapon, but the days are long past when strikes were simply protests. To-day in the majority of cases they are used as weapons of offence. Even as such they are doubtless often justifiable, but weapons of offence are used to threaten or to inflict injury: that is what they are for; and, if it is conceded that the use of such weapons is allowable in industrial warfare, there would seem to be need of some controlling power to see that they are used fairly. A strike may be simply an instrument of tyranny and oppression.

Moreover, the whole question has assumed a new aspect in recent years as the result of closer association between different classes of workers and the enormous increase of power which the strike has derived from their simultaneous action. A strike on a large scale is no longer a mere matter between employers and employed: the whole nation may be affected. An unpleasant feature of some recent strikes has been the frank admission by their promoters that it was their deliberate intention to cause such general inconvenience and even injury as would force a settlement in their favour, simply to put an end to them. Such

action is narrow and selfish and is condemned by public opinion. In no civilized country can any one body of men be allowed to hold the nation to ransom at their pleasure. The State is greater than any of its component parts, and is morally bound to take measures to protect the nation as a whole from exploitation by any section of it.

The question of picketing is closely connected with that of strikes. A strike really is a device to starve an employer out; its efficacy depends upon the completeness with which his supplies of labour can be cut off. It is therefore of the first importance to the strikers to see that no one else takes their place, and that none of the workers continue their work. Hence an elaborate system of sentries and pickets. There is nothing to be urged against 'peaceful persuasion,' but it is obvious that, at a time when strong emotions are aroused, such a practice needs careful watching if the persuasion is not to be allowed to degenerate into intimidation or even violence.

The Act of 1875 rendered liable to a fine or imprisonment 'every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority *watches or besets* the house or other place where such other person resides or works'; but declared that attending at or near the house or place 'in order merely to obtain or communicate information' shall not be deemed watching or besetting.

(*b*) *The limitation of output.*—There are some things about trade unionism which will never be understood unless they are regarded as projected against a background of injustice and petty tyranny. The deliberate limitation of output is one of them. It has been, and is still, the practice of some unions not to allow their members to do more than a given amount of work in a given time. A bricklayer, *e.g.*, may not lay more than a given number of bricks in a day. This practice is unjustifiable from the economic point of view, because the object of industry is production and the worker who systematically produces less or worse work than he might is not true to his trade. It is also morally unjustifiable because every one is bound in honour to accomplish to the best of his ability the task which he has taken in hand. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this. On what grounds then is it defended? On the ground that it is the only protection that can be devised for the weak against the lowering of the rate of wages by an unscrupulous employer. It was found that an employer who had already agreed to a certain piece-rate, on finding that the best of his men were earning wages which seemed to him in his short-sightedness preposterous, went back upon his word and proceeded to cut the rate, with the result that the slow or weak among the workers were no longer able to earn the weekly wage which he himself had considered as fair when he fixed the original piece-rate. Labour, in order to remove any such excuse for a lowering of wages, resolved that no member of the trade, whatever his strength or speed, should be allowed to outpace the rest. The best workers were called upon to make a sacrifice, but it was made readily and it rested upon altruistic motives. It is an anomaly, and it is injurious to industry. As the progressive organization of industry proceeds, the need of it will probably disappear. Meanwhile it remains, not without a touch of pathos, as an indication of the dislocation which has invested in the eyes of the workers a practice which they would not really defend with the sanction of self-sacrifice.

(*c*) '*Ca' canny.*'—The policy of limitation of output is sometimes adopted upon less defensible grounds. We do not refer to those cases in which a man does less than he might, or as little as he can contrive, out of personal resentment towards an employer or as a protest against a system which he believes to be unjust. Such cases are not uncommon, but it is doubtful whether any union would deliberately support them with its formal sanction. But many unionists believe that there is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that there will not be enough to go round if the standard of production per man is too high. This 'lump-of-labour' doctrine of the worker is the complement of the old 'wages-fund' theory of the capitalists of the 19th cent., who believed that there was only a certain sum available for wages, and that, if one set of workmen got more, it meant that of necessity another set would get less. Both were equally fallacious. There is neither a fixed amount of work nor a fixed sum available for wages; both are elastic. The way to increased wages lies through increased production, for it is out of the value of the product that wages, like salaries and the cost of raw materials, are paid. To limit production is to lessen the fund out of which wages are paid. There is also a belief that, if the best workmen are allowed to force the pace, the result will be a subtle reduction of the standard of earnings of the average worker—a 'bell-wether' is regarded as an abomination—and the best protection against this danger (which is a real one) is held to be a sort of standardization of output comparable to the standardization of hours and wages in which the workers have found protection and safety. But it seems indisputable that, if the best workers in a trade are circumscribed and shackled, the whole trade must be the worse for it, workers included.

(*d*) It is difficult to estimate the truth of the charges of tyranny, intimidation, and violence which have often been brought against the trade unions. There have doubtless been many cases of such things in the industrial history of the last 150 years. Violence has been used against employers; intimidation and violence have been used against other workers who failed to come into line. What we want to know, and what is very difficult to find out, is to what extent, if at all, the unions have condoned such action. We should be safe, however, in asserting that violence forms no part of the trade union programme, and we may go further and say that with the growth of trade unionism there has been a distinct improvement in the conduct of strikes. Violence and bloodshed are certainly less common now than they were.

(*e*) It has been said that the organization of labour on modern lines is an idea which we owe to the trade unions. Has this organization in some cases been carried too far? Employers often complain that they find themselves fettered and obstructed by trade union regulations which seem to them to be merely meticulous and vexatious. There is probably some truth in this. Trade unionism, on its defensive side, has surrounded itself with an elaborate system of bulwarks against every conceivable possibility of an attack. These regulations are not arbitrary; the initiated know that they are applications in detail of some principle which the workers regard as important. They are born of mistrust, and they will not disappear until employers and employed learn to understand one another better and feel that they are co-partners in the same enterprise. But it should be realized that industry cannot work in chains.

Trade unions are 'an inevitable product of modern economic life.' They are now almost universally recognized, and the recognition is based upon the fact that the conditions of labour are now group conditions and that the worker who forms a simple unit of a large group is powerless

to bargain successfully with an employer. The employer occupies a superior strategic position, and the worker's only hope is in association. It is undeniable that, where large associations of industrial units are formed, there is a danger of tyrannous action, and the larger the association, the greater the danger; but it is equally undeniable that the circumstances of the time seem to call for such associations, and the danger should be confronted. The advantages to be gained are great, and the danger can be met with the assistance of the legislature and the law-courts.

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TRADITION.—The word 'tradition' means, etymologically, 'handing over.' The conception of tradition, therefore, implies (*a*) a 'deposit' which is handed over, and (*b*) 'depositaries,' *i.e.* persons who are in possession of the deposit, and are commissioned to preserve it and transmit it to successors. Most religious systems claim to bear within themselves a deposit, consisting of ceremonial, myth, dogma, or ethic, or of some of these elements, revealed by some ultimate divine or quasi-divine authority, and meant to be handed down to posterity by a succession of duly qualified trustees. This article discusses the part which the principle of tradition has played in the history of Christianity.

1. Christ and Jewish tradition.—There is not much uncertainty regarding the attitude of the Founder of Christianity towards the Jewish tradition which He found already in existence. He was Himself a member of the Jewish Church, and disclaimed any idea of being a rebel against it: 'Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil' (Mt 5^{17}). It would be generally agreed that His object was, not to abolish the traditional Mosaic deposit or to annihilate the depositary society—the 'congregation of the Lord,' the 'Israel of God'—but rather to develop and expand the then existing Jewish Ecclesia into the 'Kingdom of God' and to reform and purify the deposit by blending it with the gospel, or 'good news,' of a glorious age to come. In regard to the reform of the deposit, He insisted primarily upon its re-moralization. The classical passage for this is, of course, the famous saying about Corban (Mt 15^{1-20}, Mk 7^{9-23}), with the affirmation, which follows, that it is not the things which go into a man, but those which come out of the man, that defile the man. This may appear, at first sight, to challenge in principle the whole conception of the ceremonial deposit and brusquely to deny any spiritual value to outward observances. It certainly claims an infinitely higher place for ethical values as compared with ceremonial precepts; it might be taken, further, to imply that the sole seat of religious authority for a pious Jew lay in the written Word, the *Tôrāh*, and that the oral tradition of the Rabbis was comparatively worthless. An even stronger implication as to the transitory nature of the Rabbinical tradition is contained in the saying about the 'new wine' and the 'old wine-skins' (Mk $2^{21f.}$, Mt $9^{16f.}$), though it is to be noted that Luke (5^{39}) appends a saying which may seem to point in the other direction—'The old (wine) is better.'

It may perhaps be said also that, to a certain extent, Christ demanded the re-intellectualization of the deposit. The authority of tradition is subordinated, not merely to that of the moral law embodied in the written Word, but to that of common sense. This is illustrated by His various sayings on the subject of the Sabbath. The impression which we gain from a review of the teaching of Christ, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, is that His attitude towards the Rabbinical tradition was simultaneously both reverential and critical, both conservative and progressive. There are two other pieces of evidence which should be considered in this connexion. Opinions differ as to the amount of historical value which should be assigned to the Fourth Gospel; but it is to be presumed that the exceedingly hostile attitude assumed by the Johannine Christ towards 'the Jews' is at least based upon genuine reminiscences of one side of the teaching of Jesus; and the declaration that the worship of the future was to be conducted neither on Mount Gerizim nor at Jerusalem, but throughout the whole earth, 'in spirit and in truth,' represents an attitude as anti-Rabbinical as it is possible to conceive. On the other hand, sayings recorded by 'Matthew,' the specifically Jewish evangelist, seem to represent Jesus as a whole-hearted supporter of tradition, though a severe critic of the moral shortcomings of its depositaries. 'Not one iota or one vowel-point shall pass away from the law until all be fulfilled' (Mt 5^{18}) is a passage in which the characteristic Jewish doctrine of the eternity of the *Tôrāh* seems to be proclaimed; He adds that, unless the zeal of His converts for the literal observance of the Law exceeds even that of the scribes and Pharisees, they cannot hope to enter into the Messianic Kingdom (5^{20}). The official, as distinct from the personal, authority of the Rabbis appears to be affirmed in the saying, 'The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe: but do not ye after their works,' etc. ($23^{2f.}$). Another saying in the same chapter contains the warning that Christ's insistence upon the supreme importance of moral conduct is not meant to imply any contempt for ceremonial minutiæ, in their proper place: 'Ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, judgement, and mercy, and faith: but these ye ought to have done, and not to have left the other undone' (v.^{23}). On the other hand, it is fair to remember that the denunciations of the hypocrisy and quibbling casuistry of the Rabbis recorded by St. Matthew equal in intensity and bitterness the Johannine Christ's most vehement invectives against 'the Jews.' It seems probable that the Rabbinizing utterances in the First Gospel represent ironical sayings of Christ, which the first evangelist has misunderstood and taken literally, in accordance with his Judaistic presuppositions.

We may sum up this section of our inquiry by observing (*a*) that, in the view of the Founder of Christianity, the Jewish Church was in any case destined to be expanded and transformed into the 'Kingdom of God,' and that His attitude towards Jewish tradition must, therefore, have been of an interim and provisional nature, which will not necessarily give us the clue to His attitude towards the whole principle of tradition, as such, in religion; (*b*) that, for the time being, He had no desire to deny the value or divine origin of the main body of the Jewish deposit; it seems that His invectives against the *de facto* depositaries had reference rather to their personal shortcomings than to the official authority which they claimed; (*c*) that He insisted upon the subordination of the existing oral tradition to the authority of Scripture, the moral law, and common sense; and (*d*) that He was a deadly foe to that tendency towards the hypertrophy of ceremonialism, and the evanescence of moral and intellectual content, which is familiar to the historical student as the weakness to which traditional religions are peculiarly liable.

2. Christ and Christian tradition. — We now approach a question on which opinions are, and have been for many centuries, acutely divided. It seems clear that Christ did not, on any showing, contemplate the eternal permanence of the Jewish tradition; but did He Himself mean to found a new one? Did He design to promulgate a new

deposit, a body of dogmatic and ethical truth revealed by Himself for the first time? Did He mean to found a society as the guardian of this deposit and its authorized expounder? Did He institute a class of depositaries within the society, empowered to decide as to its true contents in cases of dispute? Or did He mean to make a complete breach, in theory and principle, with the great religions of the ancient world as they had historically grown up, and to propagate, not so much an organized religion as a philosophical point of view or a mode of emotional feeling? In other words—Is Christianity to be regarded as the perfect traditional religion, the crown and flower of that whole process of traditional evolution which may be traced down the centuries, possessing a deposit of immutable truth and authentic, life-giving sacraments, and preserved by a majestic, supernatural society, a Kingdom which is in this world, yet not of it? Or was Christianity, as designed by its Founder, meant to involve a complete break with the past, and an entirely fresh start upon non-dogmatic, non-sacramental, non-ecclesiastical lines?

3. The 'Catholic' view of tradition.—It is a well-known fact that at the present day three-quarters of Christendom would return an unhesitating affirmative to the question, Did Christ intend to be the Founder of a traditional religion? We may refer to this great majority of Christians as the 'Catholic' part of Christendom—not with the object of begging any controversial questions, but merely in order to have a convenient label for denoting that system of faith and practice which is, in its general outlines, common to the 'pre-Reformation' Churches—*i.e.* to the Roman, Eastern Orthodox, Coptic, Abyssinian, Armenian, Syrian Jacobite, Chaldæan, and Malabarese communions—and which was inherited by them from the ancient undivided Church of the Græco-Roman Empire, of which they are fragments. The 'Catholic' view of tradition maintains that the deposit of faith (*depositum fidei*) was partly taken over by Christ from the existing Jewish Church and partly revealed by Him to His apostles and other hearers during His earthly life and especially during the 'great forty days,' which, according to St. Luke (Ac 1^3), intervened between His resurrection and ascension, and during which He spoke of 'the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.' He thus committed to them—either by stamping with His own approval certain already existing Jewish beliefs or by Himself revealing fresh truth for the first time—in germ and essence the great doctrines of the orthodox faith and the system of sacraments which He instituted for the salvation of mankind. He told His adherents that they were to consider themselves as being the true Israel, *His* Ecclesia, which, in some sense, He would build upon Peter as a foundation (Mt 16^{18}). With this divinely-founded society He promises to be present all the days, even unto the consummation of the age (28^{20}), and to it He promises to send the Paraclete, who would guide its members into all truth (Jn 16^{13}). These promises are interpreted by 'Catholics' as guaranteeing the 'infallibility' of the Church in the interpretation and definition of the authentic contents of the deposit. It is, further, believed that within the Church the special task of preserving (and, when need should arise, of defining) the deposit was committed by Christ to the twelve apostles and to their successors, the bishops.

According to this view, therefore, all that Christ instituted was (1) a deposit (no doubt embodied at first in a way of life, rather than in an exactly formulated creed, and expressed, so far as it was verbally expressed at all, in pictorial rather than logical or metaphysical terms), and (2) a depositary class, consisting of the twelve men whom He had designated, in apocalyptic language, as the satraps of the future Kingdom. It would be hardly correct to speak of Him as having instituted the depositary body, the Church, inasmuch as this was conceived of as being, not a new society, but the only orthodox remnant of the old Jewish Church. But in these rudimentary beginnings the possibility of a magnificent development was given. The living force of the Christian tradition spontaneously generated the same complex mechanism for its own preservation and perpetuation as may be seen, endeavouring to struggle into existence, in the fields of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. The first element in this apparatus to appear was the canon of Scripture. At first the only Scriptures which the Christian Church possessed were those of the Jewish Church, or, rather, of the Jewish Church as it existed outside Palestine. The Bible recognized in most parts of the earliest Christian Church was the Septuagint Old Testament, containing the books now called Apocrypha; so that, from the first, the oral tradition, vested in living depositaries (the apostles and their successors), was, to a certain extent, controlled by the existence of written documents, believed to embody some at least of the main constituents of the deposit. The Marcionite controversy of the 2nd cent. compelled the Church to form a collection of apostolic writings for the purpose of demonstrating the identity of the deposit, as she maintained it, with that committed by Christ to the original depositaries, and refuting the Gnostic claim to possess a secret tradition other than, and opposed to, the ecclesiastical tradition. This apostolic collection became canonized as 'the New Testament' of equal authority and inspiration with the original Scriptures, the 'Old Testament' of the Jewish Church.[1] In the 2nd cent., too, we observe the first beginnings of the baptismal creeds, brief formulæ whose threefold structure was derived from the threefold invocation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the solemn words of baptism, and intended to summarize the essentials of the orthodox faith in a form which could be committed to memory by persons of the weakest intellectual capacity.[2] The canon of Scripture and the baptismal creeds were thus the two great contributions of the 2nd cent. to the organization whereby the Catholic deposit was perpetuated and safeguarded against any essential change of content. The last great development of apparatus for safeguarding the authenticity of the deposit is to be found in the institution of ecumenical councils—the characteristic invention of the 4th century.[3] In the 2nd and 3rd centuries it had been possible for Hippolytus, Irenæus, and Tertullian to appeal to the unbroken succession of the bishops and to point to their unanimous consent as a proof of the authenticity of the ecclesiastical tradition, as against the alleged secret traditions of the various Gnostic sects. But towards the end of the period of persecution it came to be realized that the bishops themselves, the chief depositaries of the faith, might disagree as to its content; and these disagreements could only be resolved, in Christianity as in Buddhism, by the expedient of summoning a council representing, in theory or in fact, the complete body of chief depositaries, *i.e.* the total episcopate of the world. The object of a council was not so much to discover fresh truth as to determine what, as a matter of fact, was the doctrine which had been believed in the Church from the beginning. Hence, though each bishop

[1] See art. BIBLE IN THE CHURCH, I. 2 *f.*
[2] See art. CONFESSIONS, 8.
[3] See art. COUNCILS (Christian: Early, to A.D. 870).

had, in theory, the right to put before the council that version of the faith which he had received from his predecessors and which had been handed down to his local church from its first founder, the greatest weight was naturally attached to the testimony of the great 'apostolic sees.' Complete unanimity in the acceptance of one particular version of the faith would, of course, have stamped it in the minds of Catholic Christians as unquestionably authentic and apostolic; but, if complete unanimity had been possible of attainment, it would probably have been unnecessary to summon councils. The principle was, therefore, arrived at that an overwhelming majority of the depositaries, especially if it included the occupants of one or more of the great apostolic sees, had the same authority as the whole body. This principle is expressed by St. Vincent of Lerins when he says, or implies, that the consensus of 'paene omnes' is as good as that of 'omnes [sacerdotes].'[1] Hence it follows that a small minority of the depositaries, contumaciously refusing to submit to the authority of the majority, necessarily becomes schismatic. Another famous expression of the right of a majority among the depositaries to decide what is the true version of the deposit is to be found in St. Augustine's celebrated aphorism: 'Securus iudicat orbis terrarum, bonos non esse, qui se diuidunt ab orbe terrarum in quacumque parte terrarum.'[2]

It is true that most of the so-called ecumenical councils were not actually representative of the total episcopate of the world. They became ecumenical in virtue of their acceptance, immediate or gradual, by the majority of bishops. We are here concerned solely with theory, and need not go into the question as to how far theological controversies during the first thousand years of Christianity were merely the reflexion of political, national, or racial antagonisms. It is sufficient to note that each of the great decisive doctrinal formulations of the conciliar period was followed by a split between the majority, which accepted, and the minority, which rejected, it. Thus, after Nicæa and Constantinople, a separate, 'non-juring,' Arian Church came into existence among the Goths and other northern barbarians; after Ephesus a 'non-juring' Nestorian Church[3] was constituted in Syria and Persia; after Chalcedon the Monophysite Church,[4] which still includes most of the Christians of Egypt and Armenia, split off from the rest of Christendom. But, whilst shedding, so to speak, these dissentient bodies round its periphery, the 'great Church,' the Church of the majority of the depositaries, the Church of the Græco-Roman Empire, the 'Melkite' or 'Imperial' Church, as it was derisively called by the Eastern schismatics, held together round the imperial throne and the great apostolic see of Rome, maintaining its majestic unity unbroken, with the brief exceptions of the Zenonian and Photian schisms, for a thousand years. In the 'Great' or 'Melkite' Church, as it stood on the eve of the Great Schism of 1054, the fourfold structure of traditionalism, towards which the Buddhist and Zoroastrian faiths had been dimly groping their way, had come into full, explicit, and conscious existence, in the most imposing and magnificent form which has ever existed upon earth. The Church, the hierarchy, the canon of Scripture, and the ecumenical councils are all there, each fulfilling its harmonious part in the task of preserving, elucidating, and defining the apostolic deposit.

4. The Reformation and tradition. — The Reformation (*q.v.*) was, in essence and in its earlier stages, a revolt not so much against the authority of the deposit or of its Founder as against that of the existing depositary class in Western Europe—a revolt occasioned by the corruption and exactions of the pope and the hierarchy. In the first fervour of indignation against the vices of the clergy it seemed necessary to deny the whole principle of a body of men divinely commissioned to safeguard the Christian revelation. The mental outlook and *Weltanschauung* of the earlier Reformers was just as scholastic as that of the mediæval theologians, and demanded, just as imperiously, a clear-cut body of dogmatic theology as an essential element in religion. Hence, only those elements in the deposit were discarded the rejection of which followed immediately from the rejection of the hierarchy; and a new basis of authority had to be found for the Christian tradition. This basis was found in 'the Bible, and the Bible only.' We have seen that, for Catholic Christians, the structure of the orthodox faith was raised upon two pillars—the oral tradition of the Church and the Scriptures. The logical effect of the Reformation was to knock away the first of these pillars, leaving the second standing; and so adamantine was (and is) the cohesion and solidarity of orthodox Christianity that for three hundred years it was able to remain practically intact throughout Protestant Europe, balanced upon the solitary surviving pillar. The last hundred years have witnessed the gradual erosion of this pillar, through the continual dropping of the rains of Biblical criticism, and the consequent collapse in those regions of the superincumbent structure. This result, however, could not then have been foreseen. The great orthodox Protestant theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries only designed to modify the Catholic theory of authority in the following sense:

'We quite agree with the Catholic in holding that there *is* a changeless deposit of eternal truth, and that this was imparted by Christ our Lord to the apostles as depositaries, during His earthly life and the "great forty days"; but we deny that the functions of the apostles as depositaries were meant to be transmitted, or were transmitted, by them to any successors. Their functions as guardians of the truth were purely temporary, and ended at their deaths. They were, however, divinely inspired to write the New Testament, in which, together with the Old Testament, the deposit is fully and sufficiently contained. Thenceforward, the sole authority for the content of revealed truth was and is to be found in the written Word of God; and councils and synods have no authority other than that which may attach to the piety and learning of their members.'

It would, perhaps, be unfair to assert that this doctrine of the Bible, isolated and abstracted from the life of the teaching Church, as the sole fount of religious truth, necessarily presupposes the mechanical theories of 'verbal inspiration' which prevailed during the era of Protestant scholasticism, though it certainly did much to encourage them. Two difficulties, however, at once made themselves felt: (1) 'If the authority of the Church is practically *nil*, how do we know what "the Bible" is, *i.e.* what books ought to be included in the canon and what not? Because, hitherto, it has only been on the authority of the Church that we have believed in the canonicity and inspiration of these particular books.' (2) 'As some parts of the Bible are admittedly written in an obscure style, how are the unlearned to decide what the true meaning is?' The former difficulty, which the Catholic theologians of the counter-Reformation were not slow in pressing upon their opponents, at once raised the question of the canonicity of the Apocrypha, books which were uncongenial to the Reformers because of the passage (2 Mac 12^{43-45}) commending prayers for the dead. A similar difficulty was created for many Protestant Christians by the *prima facie* incompatibility of the Epistle of St. James with Lutheran solifidianism—a fact which caused Luther to describe it as an 'epistle of straw.' The second was emphasized by the fissiparous tendencies which immediately began to manifest themselves in reformed Christendom, converting it into a chaos of sects, which ranged from the high scholastic orthodoxies of Luther and Calvin down to the Arianism of Socinus and the crazy extravagances of the Münster Anabaptists. The patent contradiction between the Protestant theory of the simplicity and obviousness of the meaning of Scripture and the infinite diversity of opinions held by those who professed to accept it as the sole authority for the outlines of the Christian deposit was satirized in the celebrated couplet of Werenfels of Basel:

'Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.'

[1] *Commonitorium*, iii. 6. [2] *C. Epist. Parmen.* III. iv. 24.
[3] See art. NESTORIANISM. [4] See art. MONOPHYSITISM.

To the former of these objections the Reformers replied by taking the short Palestinian canon of the OT, as now held by the Jewish Church, on the ground that (as Jerome had urged) the Jews must surely themselves know what their own Scriptures were (thus abandoning the primitive Christian tradition which had taken over the longer, Septuagintal canon from the Hellenistic Jew) and by affirming that, so far as the NT Scriptures were concerned, their authority was manifest on the face of them, in virtue of the sublimity and elevation of their style and doctrines. This reply obviously settled nothing as to the disputed case of the Epistle of St. James, inasmuch as the question at issue between Luther and his opponents on the subject of this book was precisely this—Were its doctrines to be called 'sublime' or pernicious? To the second question, also, no very satisfactory reply was ever given. In logic the orthodox Protestant divines were compelled to maintain, and did in fact maintain, that the whole system of Nicene and Chalcedonian doctrine could be deduced with unerring certainty from the text of the NT, given a prayerful and reverent spirit on the part of its readers. But the 'subordinationistic' passages in St. Paul's Epistles (cf. 1 Co 11^3 15^{28} etc.) and those in which the Logos and the Spirit are apparently identified (cf. Ro $8^{9f.}$, 2 Co 3^{17}), together with the patent fact that Socinus and his followers regarded themselves as 'prayerful' and 'reverent,' must have made the orthodox Protestants doubt in their inmost hearts whether the matter really was as simple as this; and hence they sometimes show signs of being, unwillingly, driven back upon the conception of a teaching Church as the authorized interpreter of Holy Writ.[1] The Thirty-Nine Articles characteristically take up a position which may be interpreted as consistent either with the Catholic view of tradition and Scripture as joint authorities for the truth of the deposit or with the Protestant conception of the book of the Scriptures as the sole authority, independent of any living exponent.

So we are told that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation,'[2] that the three creeds are apparently only to be believed 'because they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture,'[3] that 'General Councils may err, and sometime have erred,' and that 'things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.'[4] On the other hand, 'the Church . . . hath authority in controversies of faith' and is 'a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ.'[5]

So far as a coherent conception of the relations of tradition to Scripture can be wrought out from these statements, it has been attained by Hooker, whose *Ecclesiastical Polity* appears to be based on the now antiquated assumption that the Chalcedonian theology can be deduced from the text of the NT as directly and irresistibly as the movements of the heavenly bodies can be deduced from a set of astronomical tables. A characteristic and explicit expression of the thoroughgoing Catholic view within the Anglican Communion is to be found in Thorndike's declaration that an indispensable mark of the true Church is 'the preaching of that word and that ministering of the sacraments which the *tradition* of the whole Church confineth the sense of the Scriptures to intend.'[6]

It is well known that the new Protestantism of the Continent would go much farther than the old in its attack upon the Catholic tradition, and that it would in fact dispute not merely the authority of the depositaries, but that of the deposit and the Founder Himself. Its contentions may be summed up under two headings, (1) philosophical and (2) historical. (1) *Philosophical.*—Starting from Kant's denial of the validity of the categories of the theoretical understanding within the noumenal sphere, Ritschl (*q.v.*) and his followers would deny the possibility of a deposit of intellectual truth altogether. Owing to the creaturely limitations of man's understanding, intercourse with God is a matter of emotional feeling and right conduct, not of strictly intellectual apprehension. (2) *Historical.*—It is admitted that the essence of the Catholic deposit and of the traditional conception of Christianity can be traced back from the ecumenical councils, through the sub-apostolic writers, into the NT itself; and the modern liberal Protestant finds no difficulty in allowing their natural sense to such passages as 2 Th 2^{15}: 'Stand fast, and hold the *traditions* (τὰς παραδόσεις) which ye were taught, whether by word, or by letter of ours'; 3^6: 'Withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the *tradition* which they received of us'; and notably to the Pauline, or deutero-Pauline, injunction, τὴν παραθήκην φύλαξον (1 Ti 6^{20}), in which 'the deposit' is expressly mentioned.

It would now be conceded that St. Paul regarded Christianity as a dogmatic, sacramental deposit, of which the 'apostles' were, in a general sense, the depositaries. But it is contended that in this respect there is an absolute gulf between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul; that Jesus regarded Himself merely as a teacher of ethics, or as the prophet of a new eschatological enthusiasm; that the movement which He initiated was of a purely emotional kind, though fraught with an *Interimsethik* valid only for the very brief period of time which, in His view, remained before the collapse of the existing world-order and the inauguration of the New Kingdom; and that, as Jesus believed in the imminence of this catastrophe, He could have had no idea of promulgating a deposit or constituting a depositary class. On this view it is Paul himself who was the real founder of Catholic Christianity. It was he who transformed the vague and formless apocalyptic enthusiasm of the first Christian generation into a mystery-cult, with wonder-working sacraments; it was he who taught Christendom to identify the Prophet of Nazareth with the Logos of Platonic and Stoic metaphysic, thereby laying the foundations upon which later ages were to build the elaborate structure of Trinitarian and Christological dogma; it was he or his immediate successors who taught primitive Christians to regard themselves as members of a mystic international brotherhood, the new Ecclesia or Congregation of God, thereby institutionalizing Christianity as a Church and a hierarchy. It is obvious that this view, if it can be historically sustained, destroys the whole traditional conception of Christianity by severing the connexion between the deposit, as it stands, and its alleged founder. The history of Christianity then becomes exactly analogous to the history of Mazdæism and of Buddhism. It is the history of the gradual overlaying of the teachings of the founder by dogmatic, sacramental, mystical, and hierarchical integuments derived from other religions: 'Catholicism' is to authentic Christianity what Lāmaism is to primitive Buddhism. The classical expression of this view is still, perhaps, Harnack's great *History of Dogma*, in which the majestic pageant of Church history is exhibited as a gradual working out of that 'acute secularization' of Christianity initiated by the well-meaning, though mistaken, desire of St. Paul to commend the new religious movement to persons who had grown up in the atmosphere of the Hellenic and Anatolian mystery-religions. It follows from this view that the whole of the 'Catholic' deposit, including the great central doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, must be discarded, and not merely those comparatively peripheral portions of it which were dropped by the great 16th cent. Reformers; so dogma as an essential element in Christianity will disappear entirely, and institutionalism will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the practical efficiency of religion. Despite the many conscious or unconscious attempts that have been made to becloud the issue, this question, Is the Catholic deposit *in toto* substantially what was promulgated by Christ, or is it a vast mass of Græco-Roman accretion which has nothing whatever to do with His authentic teaching?, is the primary and crucial question that lies before the religious thought of Europe at present, and will probably have to be answered decisively, in one sense or the other, before one hundred years are over.

5. Recent developments.—Within the sphere of traditional Christianity three additional developments deserve brief mention. These are all, it may be observed, confined to the Western or Latin Church, as in the East the era of petrifaction, which set in with the death of St. John of Damascus and precludes the possibility of development, still holds sway. (1) The first of these is analogous to what may be noticed in the case of Lāmaism, viz. the tendency to concentrate the functions of the depositary class in the hands of a single chief depositary or supreme pontiff. So, within the Roman Church, the pope was declared by the Vatican Council of 1870 to be endowed, when performing his office of supreme pastor and teacher of Christians, with the same infallibility (*q.v.*) as that which Catholic traditionalism attributes to the Church; and this belief is concisely

[1] Cf. the affirmation of the *Confession of Würtemberg*: 'Credimus et confitemur quod . . . haec ecclesia habeat jus judicandi de omnibus doctrinis,' quoted by E. C. S. Gibson, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, London, 1896, p. 513.
[2] Art. 6. [3] Art. 8. [4] Art. 21. [5] Art. 20.
[6] *Theological Works*, 10 vols., Oxford, 1844–56, iv. 895.

summed up in the 'I am tradition' of Pius IX.—a remark in which an unfriendly critic might discern a recrudescence of the old priest-king idea. (2) The second development is the tendency, analogous to what we see in Judaism, with its attempts to form 'a hedge around the Law,' to protect the real deposit by surrounding it with a kind of secondary deposit as with an armour. In Judaism this protective armour or integument was supplied by the *dicta* of the Rabbis. In Latin Catholicism the opinions of theologians have, in practice, come to assume the same position. Outside the central nucleus of the deposit, consisting of doctrines which are strictly *de fide*, there is a fringe, or penumbra, of 'pious opinions' which are *proxima fidei*, based, not upon the decrees of ecumenical councils, but upon the *consensus theologorum*. To deny these opinions is not indeed heretical, but may be censured as 'temerarious' or 'offensive to pious ears.' In practice the distinction between the dogmas of the primary deposit and the pious opinions of the secondary does not appear to be very clear; and even local traditions regarding the authenticity and sanctity of particular holy places and objects, which in principle are merely a matter of ordinary human evidence, are sometimes treated with as much respect—and criticism of them is as much resented—as though they belonged to the inner nucleus of the deposit of faith. (3) The third development represents a reaction against the former two, and is popularly called 'Modernism.' In its extreme French and Italian forms, Modernism (*q.v.*) is logically identical with the extreme Ritschlian Protestantism sketched above. It denies that Christ meant to promulgate a deposit, or would have had any authority to do so if He had so meant; and regards Him rather as a religious genius, not exempt from the errors and limitations of His age and country, who merely gave the first impulse to a wave of emotional feeling, which has reverberated down the centuries and is still affecting myriads of human souls. This view is, of course, entirely destructive of Catholic traditionalism as described above. In England, Germany, and America, however, the Modernist movement has taken a more moderate form; and, within the Anglican Church, the corresponding movement has raised a very interesting problem—that of the relation between the spiritual contents of the deposit, which the Anglican Modernist would not deny that Christ promulgated, and the conceptual forms borrowed by the early Fathers and councils from Greek metaphysic to contain it. Whilst the Anglo-Catholic would maintain that the Church was divinely inspired to choose the right conceptual forms, and that these, having received ecumenical sanction, cannot be discarded by the individual believer, the Anglo-Modernist regards the forms as having no more than a purely human authority, and as capable from time to time of variation or even of supersession.[1] The question of the depositary class does not seem to have been directly raised in these discussions, but it is probable that the Anglo-Modernist would regard the whole Church or Christian people, and not any specialized class within it, as being the depositary.

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[1] Cf. W. Sanday and N. P. Williams, *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*, for an exhaustive comparison and contrast of these two points of view.

TRAGEDY.—See DRAMA.

TRAINING (Religious).—Religion is an attitude towards God. It expresses itself in acts of appreciation of values by individuals and groups. These actions are rooted in the basal instincts. They may be few and irregular; they may be gross expressions of wild passion; or they may be refined and well-disciplined reactions of the whole personality in the presence of eternal values. The differences are determined chiefly by training the inner life to react consistently to higher ideals and motives, and by training conduct to habitual and adequate expression of appreciation.

There is a broad sense in which religious training is a feature of all forms of religion, from primitive animism with favourite incantations up to the cultured forms of ritual, all transmitted to successive generations by imitation and other educative processes. But this article deals only with the specific types of religious training now practised or proposed in the English-speaking world.

By religious training is meant a systematic effort to preserve, improve, propagate, and transmit religious life, by methods commonly used in education, such as imitation, instruction, discipline, and inspirational and ideal-forming agencies, in correlation with other means of promoting religion. It goes even farther in some minds; and not without justification the claim is made that educational training, no matter how secular or technical, is not complete or adequately motivated unless in its aim and spirit it leads up into that social purpose which is the chief part of religion (Herbart, Coe).

1. **Background.**—The types of religious training which now prevail have arisen by connected development (1) out of a long and diversified history of maladjustment between childhood and the Christian Church, (2) out of numerous artificial theologies and individualistic theories of religion, and (3) out of an utter lack, until recently, of any psychology of religion or of childhood.

(1) The historical background of religious training may be found (*a*) in the stereotyped forms of worship and religious expression handed down to successive generations through church and family life; (*b*) in the catechism and confirmation class, where formal drill and authoritative doctrine and precept have long produced educational results of some importance in religious life. (*c*) A nearer background exists in the modern Sunday schools, first with their memorized Bible lessons, and since 1870 with their uniform lessons taught by rather feeble hortatory methods.

(2) The theoretical background is found in an individualistic theology. The corner-stones of this theology were the natural sinfulness of every man, the impending judgment of punishment therefor, and the miraculous atonement of Jesus Christ, which made possible the repentance and pardon of the individual sinner. The supernatural factor was magnified; the human ways and means were subordinated, and the ethical discrepancies passed unnoticed. The process was conceived as judicial on the basis of a retributive penology now discarded in the best judicial practice. The instruction given was not regarded primarily as educative, but rather as dogmatic, evangelistic, and hortatory. No important significance was attached to the teachings of Jesus about the growth of the spiritual

life or the conditions of the ground into which the seed shall fall.

The social gospel lately found to be so conspicuous in the teaching and life of Jesus was unknown. For lack of it the process of salvation was essentially self-regarding, which is doubtless the main reason why Christianity has been so long and slow in making its way in the world. When the era of modern missions dawned, three significant things happened. (*a*) The individual gospel was proclaimed from social and really Christian motives, and the result was good so far as it went, but incommensurate with the effort expended. (*b*) Actual conditions in mission fields and the emergence of social ideals at home forced an expansion of missionary aims so as to include social service—a gospel which was not always well correlated with the other. (*c*) As soon as this social gospel had time to reveal its character and possibilities, results became overwhelming; and the missionary prayer is no longer for the opening of doors, as it was a half-century ago, but for teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, and skilled workmen, by hundreds, to carry a full-orbed Christian civilization into all the lands whose Macedonian calls are coming unsolicited.

(3) Until the last quarter of the 19th cent. psychology was a thing remote from religion. It had not then as now stressed the unity of the self, as against a number of more or less independent 'faculties' bearing little relation to religion. Nor had child psychology made known the extent to which the mind is at first rudimentary, and subject to the continuous and slow changes which the long human infancy makes possible.

Psychology and social and educational science have found no place in the theory of religion until the last generation, and even yet there are those in every religious body who shudder at the thought of applying scientific methods to the propagation of religion. But it is out of these diverse conditions ancient and modern that a theory and practice of religious education is now rapidly taking shape.

2. Theory and aim.—There is a type of religious education which perpetuates the theoretical background of intellectualism and individualism. Its propositions are arranged in logical order, and not in the order in which they arise in human experience. They are held to be authoritative, and are taught in dogmatic form. Under this theory the service which education renders to religion is to make these formulæ known, and here the service ends.

Under the other type the service rendered by education to religion is much broader. The knowledge to be imparted is not dogmatic but inspirational; not an end, but a means to spiritual values; not generalized and abstract, but presented concretely and made illuminating to the pupil's present life. This type of religious training includes habits of worship, attitudes towards the natural world, ideals of life, deeds of service, the relations sustained to the smaller and larger groups of one's fellow-men, and, in fact, every form of useful expression which can be given to inner spiritual life.

(1) The theory on which any adequate plan for religious training is based includes the following fundamental ideas as to the development of religion. (*a*) The presence of the religious life is felt not only in worship and in the conventional forms of religious expression, but especially in character and in social purpose, which subordinates all interests to the supreme values of life. (*b*) The religious life is a continuous growth, not a thing produced artificially, or judicially instituted at the moment of a passing experience. (*c*) This growth involves not a special organ or faculty, but the whole personality. It involves even the group of persons, and it tends to realize in them their oneness with the larger whole of society and of the world in God. (*d*) Finally, the growth of the religious life is normal, vigorous, and healthy, in proportion as its true nature is understood, as favourable conditions for its growth are provided, and as consistent work and painstaking devotion are given to its cultivation.[1]

(2) The following educational facts and principles are also involved in the theory of religious training. (*a*) The subject of an educative process is a person with all his inherited equipment of race instincts and family traits, as well as his undeveloped mental, moral, and religious powers. It is the business of education, not to eradicate or supplant any of these, but to develop and cultivate them, and subordinate them to the highest ends. (*b*) Education is more than instruction. It not only builds up many and rich concepts, which shall serve as a basis for judgment and action by a member of society; but it also takes measures to establish desirable habits, and to create ideals of commanding dignity and emotional power. (*c*) Education uses concrete materials for this purpose. It selects for its use those human experiences best fitted in character and grade to accomplish the particular purpose in view. The treasures of the race have become very rich in such material, so that the selection and preparation of it is a task demanding the skill of educational experts.

(3) The thing that is aimed at in religious education is (*a*) to put one as early and as completely as possible in possession of that rich treasure of experience which has come down from the past, and has been gathered from the ends of the earth, especially those parts of it which are richest in their meanings for a man's life in the world with other people and as a worker with God. (*b*) A further aim is to turn the full force of that experience, in the form of socialized ideals and purposes, as a motive power upon conduct and upon the ordering of the programme of life. This is an individual aim, but it is far more. It enlists churches, homes, and communities in this motivation of conduct for the well-being of society at large. (*c*) It is believed that the instruction to be gathered from the parable of the soils (Mk 4^{2-20}) is a lesson of education, in which the minds mellowed by long processes of nurture are those which respond quickly and whole-heartedly to the evangel. Such nurture would seem therefore to be the most direct and effective way of co-operating with the Spirit of God for the evangelization of the world.

3. Content.—Since religion and its promotion are understood to be, to some extent at least, an enterprise in education, it is necessary to choose for such instruction that material which will be most fruitful religiously. Rather vague ideas prevail on this subject, due to lack of critical analysis of the values to be sought, and to incomplete knowledge of how to produce and conserve those values.

The educational reformers of a century ago established the principle of gradation of material—*i.e.*, that the ability of children to understand and master material changes as they grow older. The material must therefore be chosen with reference to this changing ability; *e.g.*, the incident of a boy robbing a bird's nest can be understood and remembered by a five-year-old child, but the moral interpretation of the same incident is better suited for a mind several years older.

The fallacy of catechetical instruction is partly a pedagogical one. It consists in presenting adult abstractions to children—in offering strong meat instead of milk to babes. A similar

[1] George A. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, New York, 1917.

fallacy has vitiated much of the Bible teaching in Sunday schools where 'uniform' lessons have been chosen for young and old alike. If the children had a story which they could understand and remember on one Sunday, they must feed on Prophets and Epistles for several weeks before they might expect another children's lesson. Of course adaptations by editors and teachers could do something to overcoine the discrepancy in grading, but it is only making the best of a bad case. It is wholly unnecessary for religious instruction to be subjected to these hindrances, now that the principles of grading are understood and have been applied to the materials used in religious training.

There is also a religious fallacy in catechetical instruction, appealing as it does exclusively to the intellect with logical propositions dogmatically conceived and expressed. The emotional and social aspects of the child's religious life are the first to be required for the development of ideals and the motivation of conduct. The intellectual formulations satisfy better the mature religious needs of adults, and the different needs of children should be provided for.

In selecting and grading the materials for religious education there are a number of considerations to be provided for.

(1) The language of religion must be acquired. As in any field of human experience, the language and the thought develop together. Some terms are advanced and technical, but many are elementary. The history and practice of religion, the reading of the Bible, and the social environment offered by a religious community can make familiar to children, nurtured in such an atmosphere, all the elementary concepts of religion, and the words and phrases which express those concepts. They can make known a few of the landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

A properly graded curriculum therefore provides for young children a selection of simple Bible incidents on subjects within their experience, or a like class of subjects taken from biography, literature, and life. For this purpose one may choose stories about children, animals, natural objects, and the things familiar to childhood, especially those which contain some of the language and forms of religion, but none of the generalizations and abstract principles in which religious teaching is so often couched.

(2) The child inherits certain capacities for a moral and religious life. But each individual must shape his concepts of that life from the examples of other experiences seen and heard by him. His education consists in becoming acquainted with these selected experiences of others, in reading meaning into them, and in shaping his own habits, judgments, and ideals, with reference to the experiences so set before him. This formation of concepts represents a later stage of religious development than the language stage mentioned above, but the later mingles with the earlier stage, and they move forward together. A class of more meaningful experiences is chosen for this purpose, such as the parables of Jesus, tales of moral heroism, events in which service and sacrifice are exemplified, the revealings of motives and of character and of loyalty to persons and to ideals, and the superiority of moral and spiritual values over those values which are chiefly carnal and commercial.

It is therefore the business of religious education to bring into the life of youth an abundance of human incidents rich in moral and religious meaning; to present these experiences with sufficient detail and pedagogical skill to assure them an atmosphere, an emotional vitality, and some permanence; and to give definite guidance to each youth in the construction of his own habits, judgments, and ideals, out of the concrete materials furnished to him. The selection of material for this purpose out of the Bible or from other sources is the most responsible and difficult task of religious education. It is also the point at which failure has been most complete in nearly every curriculum thus far proposed for religious training.

(3) While it belongs to the province of science and general education to develop in youth a conception of the causal connectedness of the world and of its unity, consistency, and organization under natural law, it is a well-known fact that this is not generally done. Such reflexions arise more frequently in connexion with religion than elsewhere, and it is proper that religious education should provide in place of discarded cosmologies a better instruction, which can serve the common people as a credible philosophy of nature. Nothing can do more to disintegrate religious faith and moral integrity than lack of a believable philosophy of the world. Such a philosophy is entirely within the mental compass of enlightened youths; and they have a right to it as a support for their faith and as a part of their education. Indeed they will have it. The only uncertainty is as to how good or how poor a philosophy they shall work out for themselves if wise help is withheld from them.

For the few but important lessons on this subject the creation stories and a few other portions of Scripture will serve as occasion for wise and modern instruction. A few of the great chapters in the history of science are required. These need to be correlated, not only with the names of discoveries and inventors, but with the forward movements in the world's life, and the human values which they have enhanced.

(4) A task of religious education still more important is the interpretation to young minds of the world of human life. We live and act in a world of purpose and meaning, as well as in a world of natural law and causal connexion. It is out of this purposive life that real values arise; and it is with those values that religion is concerned. There is no gain for religion in knowledge of the Scripture, or of the facts of nature, and no benefit in formal covenants and ordinances, unless in the human heart there is an ideal which throws over all these things an emotional glow that enriches them with meaning and value. It is doubtless the same thing that is spoken of as the Spirit of God in the human heart taking the things of Christ and showing them to us.

Religious teachers generally try to do this. Most expository Bible teaching is so intended. So also is the preaching. But the efforts are desultory, and the results are not cumulative. A need is felt for a programme or a definite policy, based on a sound philosophy and on educational principles, to give continuity and cumulative effect to the propagation of religion. It can hardly be claimed that such a programme has yet been proposed, although efforts have been made in that direction, and in some cases with gratifying results.

The choice and arrangement of material awaits a fuller agreement upon Christian ideals and the fundamental philosophy of religion. In this task the interpretation of the world of human life is the chief factor. What is called the social gospel has already gone far to supplement and modify the individualism of the former day. But 'a theology for the social gospel,' as Walter Rauschenbusch calls his book,[1] has not yet formulated itself in popular thinking. In the light of such a theology and philosophy, there is required a re-defining of the virtues and of the unifying principle by which those virtues are correlated in the good man. The new sense of the structural character of society, the place and function of the individual within the structure, and the interactions between the structure and its members must have much weight in determining what the content of a religious education curriculum ought to be, and what educational aims and values ought to be conspicuous in that material.

(5) The great issues over which men and nations have struggled in the world's forward movement need to be made known to young people, and

[1] New York, 1918.

their meanings interpreted. Such issues were drawn in OT times by the prophets against royal and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Jesus defined an issue between the Pharisees and the new religion of the inner life. Every forward step, every reform, every moral and spiritual achievement from that day to this, can be of great service to those whose motives and ideals are forming. They are needed as a background for the tasks and problems of to-day, as a guide in defining present and future issues, and as an inspiration to loyalty in trying situations. Here will appear biographies of men and women who have caught visions of an improved world and have helped to realize those visions. Here also belong the rise and fall of institutions in response to the changing needs of the world. Out of such rich and varied sources are being selected the graded and sifted materials for a curriculum of religious training.

4. Method and organization.—While the history of pedagogy has been progressive, and general education has profited by every improvement, religious training has been slow to take up improved methods. Memoriter catechetical teaching is still common. Hortatory and semi-expository teaching of the Bible is quite general in church schools, the aim being evangelistic and not primarily educative.

There is a marked tendency to reconstruct, not only the curriculum in ways already indicated, but also the method and organization. In method these changes consist in a larger use of direct narrative in connexion with concrete story material used in the lower grades; the immediate oral reproduction by pupils of the narrative so presented;[1] the increased use of pictorial and graphic representation, and the tendency to substitute for the leaflet, pamphlet, or bare Bible specially prepared text-books of a more permanent and attractive character.

But the most important tendency is towards things to be done, as an expression in real life of the moral and religious impulses, as they awaken in childhood and youth. Daily conduct, positions taken on moral questions before associates, missionary work, community betterment, neighbourly and charitable work, and worthy social activities in general, offer a welcome field for religious training in this growing aspect. Out of such activities arise deeper and truer thinking and finer emotional responses than any didactic method can produce.

Modern forms of church organization provide for a department of religious training in the local church. This department is free to adopt methods in harmony with improved educational and religious ideas, and to introduce a curriculum something like that outlined above. Only in those local churches where the broad full meaning of religious education has been discussed and appreciated has the reconstruction taken place. But the number of these churches is increasing; they are profiting by experience; and their results are watched and reported.

In several American communions, notably the Protestant Episcopal, the Congregational, and the Presbyterian, important steps have been taken to reconstruct the denominational machinery on educational lines. Numerous officials are employed to propagate the principles and ideals of religious training in the local churches, and to aid in the installation of better systems. These methods are especially successful in missionary fields, (1) because there the need is more obvious, and (2) because these fields are not bound by tradition to antiquated methods as many of the churches are.

While the prospect for the future of religious education is best in the direction of denominational organization, there is also a distinct movement on foot for community organization disregarding ecclesiastical divisions, or at least bringing them into co-operation.[1] This plan calls for a local board and a superintendent, who shall inaugurate a school system parallel to the other system or systems in the same community. Less time would be required for the religious than for the general and vocational schools; yet the effectiveness of it cannot be estimated by the time spent. In addition to the direct values of such training the material of general education is re-interpreted and given new meaning and dignity from the spiritual aspect. Teachers who have training in the principles of education, as well as personal fitness and inspiring leadership, soon make apparent the large possibilities of religious training, both in its own field and in its effects on the whole structure of society.

In Britain and in some other European countries the schools supported at public expense are expected to furnish some instruction of a religious nature. Recognition is made of denominational preferences, and teachers are assigned to groups with this in mind. In France religious instruction is entirely excluded from all public and private schools of general education, and the members of religious orders are disqualified as teachers. This of course does not prevent the teaching of religion in the churches. In the United States of America religion is excluded by the laws of the States from the public schools; but entire freedom is given for this instruction under church or community supervision. In some States the pupils are released for one session each week from required attendance at a public school on condition of spending that time under approved religious instruction, proportionate credit being given if such work is satisfactorily done.

In general it may be said that the ideals and content of religious education have been reconstructed in accordance with modern ideas. The realization of the better ideals has been achieved in a limited degree, and every year marks distinct gains. But the progress is retarded (1) by conservative traditions among earnest religious people, who have not seen the spiritual values in a religious life conceived developmentally and socially; (2) by inadequate conceptions of and facilities for training in religious activity and self-expression, and (3) by lack of united and trained leadership in the re-organization of religious education in local communities. It seems to be the task of Christian colleges to raise up a generation of men and women who have the religious and educational ideals and the ability and enthusiasm to organize them into the life of our time.

A good central organization for the study of religious education, for the comparison of results, and for the promotion of this large interest in the life and thought of the world exists in the Religious Education Association (Henry F. Cope, Secretary, 1440 East 57th Street, Chicago, Ill.). It was founded in 1903 by representatives of all religious faiths. It has held important annual conventions, mostly in American cities. These conventions have done much to shape thought, guide effort, and stimulate experiment. The volumes of the bi-monthly magazine of the Association entitled *Religious Education* furnish much material in the history and discussion of this subject.

Other related articles in this Encyclopædia may be referred to as follows: EDUCATION (Moral), CHRISTIANITY, CHURCH, CONFIRMATION, CATECHISMS, BIBLE, SUNDAY SCHOOL.

LITERATURE.—H. F. Cope, *Religious Education in the Church*, New York, 1917; B. S. Winchester, *Religious Education and Democracy*, do. 1917; W. W. Smith, *Religious Education*, Milwaukee, 1909; W. S. Athearn, *The Church School*, Boston, 1914; G. A. Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals*, New York and London, 1904, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago and London, 1917; E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, London and Boston, 1910.

WILLIAM JAMES MUTCH.

TRANCE.—See HYSTERIA, DHYANA, YOGA.

TRANSCENDENCE.—See IMMANENCE.

[1] W. J. Mutch, *Graded Bible Stories*, Ripon, Wis., 1914.

[1] W. S. Athearn, *Religious Education and American Democracy*, Boston and Chicago, 1917.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. — The term 'transcendental' plays an important part in Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason*—'transcendental æsthetic,' 'transcendental analytic,' etc.—and through the influence of the critical philosophy the term has become familiar in modern thinking and even in popular literature. Kant did not originate the term; but he gave it new vigour and a new orientation.

1. Pre-Kantian transcendentalism.—(1) *Use of the term in scholastic logic.*—Before Kant's time 'transcendental' and 'transcendent' were familiar terms in the scholastic logic and were practically equivalent in meaning, although he sharply distinguished between them. To the scholastic logicians these terms were used of those most general notions that could not be subsumed under the ten Aristotelian categories. They rose beyond or transcended them. Spinoza uses 'transcendental' in this sense of the most general notions and gives his view of how psychologically they originate.[1] Strictly speaking, these *transcendentalia* or *transcendentia* belonged to a realm above ordinary categorical logical thinking and as such were beyond the province of logic proper. Various enumerations of these transcendental notions are given. Albertus Magnus gives *ens, unum, bonum,* and *verum*; and very generally these, along with *res* and *aliquid*, make up the list of the six *transcendentalia*. Their interrelations are stated and various subtleties regarding them introduced by different schoolmen. *Ens* was as a rule regarded as super-transcendental, the rest being passions or modifications of being (*passiones entis*). This category in scholastic philosophy was pretty much what the 'Absolute' is in modern philosophy.[2]

(2) *Use of the term in theology.*—To the schoolmen, however, logic was only the handmaiden of theology, and so we find these terms more or less always moving into the area of theological speculation. These transcendental notions had their reality in the mind of God, who is transcendent *par excellence*. The passage in Augustine[3] where he posits the transcendental ideas in the divine mind became classical and is quoted by all the great mediævalists. It is historically the fusion of Greek thought with Christian experience. Plato speaks of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) as transcending being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας),[4] and Plotinus uses the phrase often.[5] Transcendent is simply the Latin equivalent of ἐπέκεινα, 'beyond.' At times this tendency became extreme, as in the case of Erigena and the mystics who speak of God as above all predicates—ὑπεραληθής, ὑπέρσοφος, ὑπεραιώνιος, 'above truth,' 'above wisdom,' 'above eternity.'

Transcendentalism in theology, then, means the position that God's knowledge and character are perfect, absolute as distinct from man's knowledge, which is imperfect, and from man's virtue, which is immature; as such it is part of the very essence of theology and the unmovable conviction of religion. But it may become falsified through over-emphasis and dangerous through over-refinement of subtlety. Ordinary living religious experience speaks of the divine in plain speech, ascribing to God organs, actions, passions, movement, change, purposes, and this is done without any feeling of incongruity—even when the divine spirituality is clearly recognized. Transcendentalism becomes over-subtle when it objects to this, and it is usually when religious experience is at a low ebb and beset by foes that this form of transcendentalism gains a hearing. Even in the OT, as Schultz points out,[1] we have the beginning of reflective transcendentalism. It is more evident in the Septuagint translation and in the post-Biblical Jewish literature, and it operates dominantly in Philo until God becomes the Great Unknowable. In the history of Christian theology we find the superimposition of this metaphysical and mystical transcendentalism on the direct religious thought of the NT. Edwin Hatch, in his famous Hibbert Lectures,[2] maintains that the great creeds of Christendom buried religion under this metaphysic; and in his zeal he has overstated the case; for transcendentalism in the sense of God's absoluteness is an integral part of religion and of theology, but, when it makes this a mode of throwing discredit on man's knowledge and of undermining man's notions of right and wrong, when it empties God of feeling, purpose, and initiation, then it becomes false and dangerous.

It is better to deal here with the special forms of transcendentalism in this sense, before discussing the Kantian and post-Kantian usage of the term, as these forms of thinking have their roots in a soil different from that which is specifically and dominantly under the influence of Kant.

2. Extra-Kantian transcendentalism. — Transcendentalism in the theological and philosophical sphere means, in a general way, the recognition of God as exalted in thought and character above man and sensible objects. It is thus contrasted with phenomenalism, naturalism, and materialism, and, one may say, also agnosticism, for, although the agnostic may grant the existence of such a Being, the concession is of no value either for knowledge or for morality. In this sense every religious view of the world is transcendental. When, however, we ask what the relation between man's knowledge and virtue and God's is, the real problem of transcendentalism emerges, and, according to the answer given, thinkers fall into different classes, which for purposes of clearness may be distinguished as follows.

(1) *Extreme transcendentalism.*—Those who hold that God is utterly incomprehensible to us, and that knowledge and virtue in Him are quite different, not only in quantity but also in quality, from what we mean by these terms, are extreme transcendentalists in the sphere of ontology. Modern examples are Hamilton and Mansel, who, borrowing a Kantian distinction, maintained that our predicated knowledge of God is regulative not speculative truth, that it was given, not to satisfy the reason, but to guide the practice of man, not to tell us what God is in His absolute nature, but what He wills us to think of Him in our present conditioned state. This phase of transcendentalism arose as a protest against what Hamilton calls 'the scheme of pantheistic omniscience so prevalent among the sequacious thinkers of the day.'[3] Speculative theologians have always had leanings towards this mode of reasoning regarding the divine, and its influence can be traced in theology from the days of Origen. While the ordinary religious consciousness speaks of God as wise and good, and cannot help so doing, yet these terms in reality do not apply to Him, and are to be understood anthropopathically. He has deigned

[1] *Ethics*, pt. ii. prop. xl. schol. 1.

[2] For the scholastic logical usage consult C. von Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, Leipzig, 1855–70, iii. 245 ff.; J. Veitch, *Institutes of Logic*, Edinburgh, 1889, p. 175; Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, Edinburgh, 1860, iii. 198; also Reid, *Works*[2] (ed. Hamilton), do. 1849, p. 687 f.; R. Eucken, *Gesch. der philosoph. Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879.

[3] *De Diversis Quæstionibus*, i. 46.

[4] *Rep.* 509 B.

[5] *E.g.*, *Enneades*, v. i. 6, where God is described as ἐπέκεινα ἁπάντων, 'beyond all things.'

[1] *OT Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, ii. 114.

[2] *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Church*, ed. A. M. Fairbairn, London, 1890, ch. ix.

[3] *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, etc., London, 1852, pp. 1–37, quoted by H. L. Mansel, *The Limits of Religious Thought*[4], p. 191.

to accommodate this revelation to our limited intelligence, but it is, after all, only an accommodation (*συγκατάβασις*), and the true method of theology is to strip away all these predicates and to proceed *via negationis*. The danger here is obvious, viz. forgetting of the truth that man is made in the image of God, and forgetting that thinkers are apt to cut apart God and man, and thereby religion and reason alike become unreal and untrustworthy. Under this impulse religious men fall back on an authority which has no basis in our rational or moral nature, or on some occult faculty apart from reason; and others, strictly adhering to the working of the understanding, leave the transcendental sphere of Being alone. Outside the small circle illuminated by the understanding there may be Something, but to us it is unknown and unknowable. Agnosticism as regards ultimate reality is the result of this attitude.

(2) *Religious transcendentalism.*—Others, again, maintain also God's transcendental character, but they hold that man's knowledge is accurate as far as it goes, that in quality, though not in quantity, it is the same as God's, and that morality in man can not be different in essence from what it is in the divine, that the pathway of true knowledge and moral progress leads to God. God's revelation is certainly an accommodation, but this accommodation itself is an education of man by God, progressing from less to more and conserving in its more perfect stages continuity with the earlier, and besides the process is self-correcting. J. B. Mozley[1] gives a very fair view of this position as regards the OT. God dealt with men as they were, but in such a way as to lead them onwards and upwards. Man makes God in his own image, but it is because God first made man in His image. Augustine, who often speaks of God as incomprehensible—as indeed every religious mind must do, so that Hamilton has no difficulty in compiling a catena of such passages from various writers—yet maintains that our intellectual and moral strivings are but a returning to the Source whence intelligence and goodness spring. The human mind and heart participate in transcendent knowledge and goodness, and the aim of theology is to ascend by this road to God; only to man the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary to initiate and guide this quest. The method here is not so much that of negation as of eminence (*via eminentiæ*), and it differs from pure philosophical or epistemological transcendentalism both in its insistence on the need of grace and in its proper valuation of other aspects of experience besides the pure intellect. It is this that 'Rabbi' Duncan has in view when he defines transcendentalism as 'the denial of that which renders man's knowledge an inferior kind of knowledge';[2] and it is in this sense that F. D. Maurice is a transcendentalist when in somewhat exaggerated fashion he fathers on Mansel's theory such frightful consequences.

(3) *Epistemological transcendentalism.*—Distinct from this again is what one may call pure epistemological transcendentalism, according to which the highest knowledge in man becomes identical with, and indistinguishable from, the divine knowledge. Thus Boethius:

'Sense judges figure clothed in material substance. Imagination figures alone without matter. Thought transcends this again, and by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which is contained in the individual. The eye of intelligence is yet more exalted, for overpassing the sphere of the universal it will behold absolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's vision.'[3]

From the plane of intelligence, according to Boethius, all the contradictions of the ordinary experience are reconcilable. Thus to God they harmonize, and to us as far as we look at them from this point of view. No one can fail to notice the similarity between this and the method of modern absolutist transcendentalism, with its solving of contradictions and its transcendental intuition. This school speaks in such a way as to lead the ordinary reader to suppose that the individual can attain by knowledge to the divine point of view—a claim which it is extremely difficult to distinguish from omniscience.

(4) *Moralistic and mystical transcendentalism.*—The term, however, may be applied, and often is applied, to those who are keenly conscious of the limitations of the human mind, and impatient and sceptical regarding its slow ratiocinative processes, but who hold that man's moral nature or his feelings or intuitions can give immediate access to the divine. Typical thinkers of this school are Pascal, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl. They lay stress on the supremacy of the heart—'The heart makes the theologian'—or on the value of feelings or intuitions; and a strong current to-day draws many along the pathway of the subconscious towards God. Thus we have schools of moralistic and mystical transcendentality. They disparage reason and logic, and find refuge in the alogical departments of the soul. The so-called New England transcendentalism[1] combines both mysticism and moralism with a large element of vague eclecticism, but it may, for purposes of classification, be included here.

3. Kantian transcendentalism.—To appreciate modern transcendentalism both in its philosophical and in its more popular application, we must briefly review Kant's view of knowledge.

(1) *The factors in knowledge.*—To Kant knowledge—mathematics and the physical sciences—involved two factors, one due to the activity of the mind, the other due to sense-data. He did not doubt the fact of knowledge itself, nor did he concern himself with its psychological origin. He found in knowledge a synthesis of these two elements. Nothing could form the subject-matter of knowledge but what came from sense-data, but then sense-experience itself was a chaos without the principles supplied by the understanding and the activity of the mind; even perception itself required space and time—mental forms. To him God, the world, and the soul could not become the objects of scientific knowledge and therefore they were transcendent; *i.e.*, they were outside the limits of possible knowledge. There can be no doubt that Kant had a horror of those who spoke familiarly of God, as if He were an object of sense-perception, and that his real anxiety to mark clearly the boundaries of possible knowledge was largely due to fear of intrusion from this quarter. He thus distinguishes clearly between 'immanent principles which apply solely within the limits of possible experience' and transcendent principles 'which are intended to reach beyond these limits.'[2]

Kant did not deny the reality of God, or of the soul, or the ultimate essence of matter, but he did strongly insist that the pure reason got into hopeless difficulties when it tried to apply the principles valid in the sphere of phenomena to these extra-phenomenal entities. To him we owe the very prevalent modern view that science has its own domain—it includes all knowledge, though not all reality—and religion and morality have their domain; that the marches between them should be clearly defined; and that there should be no raids, excursions, or alarums from one side or the other.

(2) *Transcendental principles.* — Having thus excluded transcendent realities from the domain of the understanding, because we can have no scientific knowledge of them, he shows that in knowledge itself there were principles like causality—the categories, in short—which were not due to sense-data. Those principles are transcendental (as distinct from transcendent), which means both that they are not due to sense and that they can be shown to constitute knowledge. Without sense-data they are empty, but sense without them is blind.

Transcendental to Kant then means constitutive

[1] *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, London, 1877.
[2] *Colloquia Peripatetica*[3], ed. W. Knight, Edinburgh, 1871, p. 111.
[3] *Consolation of Philosophy*, tr. H. R. James, London, 1897, p. 189.

[1] See § 4 (1) below.
[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig 1853, iii. 245.

of valid knowledge, and a transcendental inquiry, such as his own critical method, 'concerns itself, not so much with objects, but with the way in which we know objects in so far as this may be possible *a priori*.'[1] What reality in itself may be is not the aim of the critical philosophy to determine, but to find out that element in knowledge which makes it valid and to guard knowledge against the admission of anything which cannot be scientifically known. Kant is not concerned with ontology but with epistemology, and the two to him are not identical. Kant thus sharply distinguishes between transcendent and transcendental. He uses the former term in a disparaging sense, while the latter means constitutive of knowledge—what makes knowledge possible.

'The term *transcendental*,' says R. Adamson, 'probably has, for English ears, an unpleasant ring, and will suggest metaphysical efforts to transcend experience. It must be understood, however, that *transcendental* method is simply the patient and rigorous analysis of experience itself. For any question or theorem which might pass beyond possible experience, Kant reserved the term *transcendent*; and the distinction, if not the mode of expressing it, is accepted by all his successors. Neither in Kant nor in Fichte is there anything in the slightest degree resembling what is commonly called metaphysics.'[2]

David Masson[3] traces through all history two tendencies in regard to the origin of knowledge—one fathering all knowledge on sense-experience (this may be called empiricism), the other maintaining that 'there are elements in knowledge, the origin or reason of which transcends or lies beyond the horizon of historical conditions.' Historically it is the conflict of these two that we find in the controversy between Locke and Leibniz or between Mill and Hamilton. The transcendental position is summed up in the famous phrase: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu—nisi ipse intellectus.' There is no doubt that Kant is a transcendentalist in this sense, yet for him transcendental meant something different. He is not interested in innate ideas or intuitions. He is dealing with knowledge as it exists, not as it grows, and he finds in it what sense alone does not explain, but rather what explains sense, unifying forms or principles, supplied by the mind itself, which give receptivity to sense-data and combine them together into adequate knowledge. Ultimately the formal unity of the mind itself is involved in knowledge. Thus he might agree even with the physiological psychologist in his analysis of knowledge and yet maintain the necessity of the unity of the mind.

(3) *Pure and practical reason.*—Although Kant maintained that God, the world, and the soul as noumenal realities could not be objects of knowledge or constitutive of knowledge—that they were not transcendental in his strict sense of the term—yet he allowed that they were present in knowledge regulatively. The mind was constrained to aim at unity, and this striving was due to the regulative influence of these ideas of the reason. It is this part of his system that he himself calls transcendental or critical idealism. As ideas in the mind they were transcendental, though only regulatively so; yet in themselves as realities they are transcendent as far as knowledge goes—they are beyond the bounds of knowledge. Sometimes indeed he speaks of the reality of the material world as the 'transcendental object,' where we might expect him, if he were strict in his own use of terms, to use transcendent. And he speaks of it in such a way as to suggest a *substratum* which is the outward cause of our perceptions, but for the understanding it is simply x, an unknown quantity. His transcendental object is the limit which our understanding can reach in dealing with phenomena from the side of the receptivity of mind, just as 'the transcendental unity of apperception' is the limit on the side of the mind's synthesizing activity. Neither of these is noumena for the understanding, for it knows nothing of noumena.[1] If one were to regard this only as Kantianism, the first review of the *Kritik*—that of Christian Garve of Breslau, in the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* of 19th Jan. 1782—might have force:

'This work . . . is a system of the higher or transcendental idealism—an idealism which embraces both mind and matter, transforms the world and ourselves into ideas, and represents the objective world as derived from appearances which the understanding combines in the interdependent whole of experience. . . . The cause of these ideas is to us unknown and unknowable.'[3]

But what pure reason cannot attain to, practical reason can. Morality needs transcendent realities as postulates, and, because the sphere of morality is to Kant more real than, or as real as, the sphere of knowledge, this postulation is necessary and valid. The transcendent of knowledge becomes the transcendental of morality. God, the world, the soul, freedom, and immortality become real here. We cannot prove their existence, it is true, by cognitive methods, but they are imperatively demanded by the facts of the moral life, of which facts he had no doubt.

4. **Post-Kantian transcendentalism.** — Kant's system was profound in its effects, different thinkers adopting those parts of it which served their turn, so that the complexion of their transcendentalism is determined by their point of contact with his view. His influence touched the English-speaking world at first largely through the works of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.

(1) *The teaching of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.*—Coleridge's philosophical function 'may be defined by saying that through him was transmitted an opportune suffusion of Kant and Schelling into England as of light softened through a stained-glass medium, and that into this suffusion he also resumed whatever of Anglo-Platonism had been floating long neglected in the works of old English Divines.'[2] Thus the distinction between the 'reason' and the 'understanding' became familiar, and 'transcendental philosophy' acclimatized in English speech. The reason could overcome the impotence of the understanding and get hold of unseen realities.

'As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy, which is therefore properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and *re*-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as *transcendent*.'[4]

It is clear that Coleridge has no interest in accurately reproducing Kant. To him transcendentalism is just emphasis on the spiritual side of man's nature, and this is the meaning also to Carlyle:

'The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Teufelsdröckh is, that with all this Descendentalism, he combines a Transcendentalism, no less superlative; whereby if on the one hand he degrade man below most animals, except those jacketed Gouda Cows, he, on the other, exalts him beyond the visible Heavens, almost to an equality with the Gods.'[5]

Under the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, and the general romantic movement of the time,

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, iii. 49.
[2] *Fichte* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh, 1881 p. 112, note.
[3] *Recent British Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1865.

[1] See J. P. Mahaffy and J. H. Bernard's ed. of Kant's *Kritik*, London, 1889, ch. xiv., and also his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, ed. J. P. Mahaffy, London, 1872, Appendix B.
[2] Quoted by W. Wallace, *Kant* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh, 1882, p. 60.
[3] Masson, *Recent British Philosophy*, p. 54.
[4] S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, London, 1817, vol. i. ch. 10 (Everyman's Library ed., do. 1906, p. 129).
[5] *Sartor Resartus*, bk. i. ch. 10.

transcendentalism came to mean the recognition of supersensible realities, and the spiritual nature of man—that man was more than 'an omnivorous biped that wears breeches.' A passage from Coleridge shows the influence of this attitude in the sphere of interpretation:

'The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old religion,
The power, the beauty, and the majesty
That had their haunt in dale, or piny mountain,
Or forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring,
Or chasms, and watery depths; all these have vanished;
They live no longer in the faith of reason.
But still the heart doth need a language.'[1]

The faith in 'the light that never was on sea or land,' 'the vision and the faculty divine,' the fight against a crude interpretation of man's spirit as ultimately matter, and the protest against literalism in all its forms, characterize transcendentalism at this stage; and this is still the sense of the word in extra-philosophical literature. In New England Emerson and others, rebelling against an orthodoxy that tended to make men wholly sinful and corrupt and the will of man necessarily in bondage, and impatient of dogmas derived from a revelation confined to one book, initiated a movement that got the name 'transcendentalism' more in derision than in honour, but the term was accepted, and the claim made that all the best in the world's thought was here included. Carlyle, who, in spite of his sympathy with Emerson, saw in this movement an extravagant disregard of facts and an enthusiastic eclecticism, warned Emerson against the dangers ahead:

'You seem to me in danger of dividing yourselves from the Fact of the Universe, in which alone ugly as it is can I find any anchorage.'[2]

James Martineau—himself a transcendentalist in the Carlylean sense, whose intellectual history is a pilgrimage from the bondage of empiricism—does not take Emerson seriously. No doubt New England transcendentalism became extravagant, welcoming the ravings of the Swedenborgian and of the unregulated mystic as possible revelations, yet it never became a system, and its airy optimism is explicable and defensible as a protest and a reaction; yet to its influence is largely due the fact that to many, if not to most, in our day transcendentalism means hopeless and unwarranted idealism — unworkable dreaming. It was not patient enough to be lasting, and, with all its boasted catholicity and insight, it was blind to the facts that gave the old orthodoxy its seriousness and its power of rejuvenescence. On the other hand, it was a refreshing and liberalizing movement.

(2) *Science and transcendentalism.*—Kant's influence was felt in a very different quarter—among those whose interests were devoted to science. Thus Lange, the historian of materialism, interpreting Kant, as he thought, confines man's knowledge of reality to the results of science, but contends for a world above this created by our moral and spiritual needs—an unsubstantial world of ideals, a transcendentalism which is like a painted cloud; and this attitude has more or less existed since, differing according to the amount of reality the individual thinker gives to this beautiful but airy realm. It is found in the historian Buckle, and has been well described as a 'consolatory private transcendentalism.'[3] Herbert Spencer's magnanimous handing over of the Unknowable to religion is an example of this 'private transcendentalism.' It is due to a one-sided exploitation of Kant without regard to Kant's moral certainty. To Kant the moral nature of man planted man in an intelligible real world, although knowledge left him only in the phenomenal, with just a glimmer of the noumenal breaking through, but this transcendentalism which, as in Lange's case, pretends to be its lawful heir finds the phenomenal the real, and the transcendental the vague and the shadowy.

Others more alive to the reality of religion have sought to place this transcendentalism side by side with scientific results, while conscious all the time of the hostility between the two. Thus W. H. Mallock[1] attempts to hold by the results of science and yet to allow the demands of religion validity; and this attitude was prevalent in the past century.

In psychology the theory of psycho-physical parallelism exhibits the same tendency—a species of eirenicon between phenomenalism and transcendentalism. The results of science are accepted; its principles are unquestioned; and then these same facts are explained as if nothing but psychical data were involved. It is a truce born of perplexity—a compact that real issues will not be raised on either side. It is not difficult to see how closely related to Kant these tendencies are, for it may not unfairly be said that he himself adopted without questioning the results of science and also the deliverances of a spiritual philosophy due to religion and held them both without consistently uniting them.

Paulsen, one of Kant's most faithful modern disciples, contends that science will never give up its claim to explain everything mechanically; yet metaphysics must give to this realm of science an idealistic interpretation. One may be the most rigid materialist at one moment, and yet be wholly transcendentalist as a philosopher at another. The scientist will never admit any supernatural agent, and the only way of peace is to admit his claim; yet somehow to transform all into spiritual reality is the task of the philosopher. It is because of this felt dualism that transcendentalism in its pure form as absolutism claims for itself to be the true heir and rightful corrector and interpreter of Kant.

(3) *Absolute transcendentalism.* — 'Transcendentalism' in modern philosophy is used of that world-view known at times as absolutism, objective idealism, neo-Hegelianism, or rationalism. The term 'transcendentalism' traces this system historically to Kant's theory of knowledge. As we saw above,[2] 'transcendental' to Kant meant at least two things. (*a*) Those principles in knowledge which in the nature of the case did not originate in sense-experience are transcendental. In this sense of the term Kantianism allied itself with that tendency in British thought which recognized *a priori* or original data both in knowledge and in morality—what may be generically named intuitionalism. Leibniz's famous revision of the empirical formula may be taken as the watchword of this school: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu *nisi ipse intellectus*.' The controversy between Hume and Reid, between Mill and Hamilton, is one between psychological empiricism and psychological transcendentalism, just as the controversy between hedonism and intuitionism is a phase of the same in the sphere of ethics. This was the outstanding question in British philosophy for many a day. Masson in his *Recent British Philosophy* gives a readable account of the state of matters in his time, and 'transcendentalism' is used by him of those systems which recognize in the mind more than sense-data. Spencer considers it one of the merits of evolution that it supplied a means of reconciliation between these opposing views. According to him, what was native to the individual was the residuary deposit of racial experience. Thus evolution reconciled empiricism and transcen-

[1] *The Piccolomini*, act ii. sc. iv. l. 123 ff.
[2] *Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson*, London, 1883, ii. 11.
[3] Masson, p. 249.

[1] *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, London, 1902.
[2] See § 3.

dentalism. (*b*) But 'transcendental' meant to Kant constitutive of knowledge—those principles which, though not due to experience, yet made experience itself coherent, above all, the unity of the self. All the content of knowledge came from experience, but the active self made knowledge. Besides, reason had as regulative principles the ideas of the self, the world, and God, and in its practical working reason got into touch with these realities. It was this side of Kant's teaching that issued in transcendentalism, as it came to be understood in English-speaking countries in the first half of the 19th century. Hamilton welcomed the Kantian system chiefly because he found it in harmony with the limits of our knowledge as propounded by himself, but others welcomed it because in their view it taught that man by his reason was more than a mere creature of the senses. Thus Carlyle, in his paper on Novalis,[1] points out that German transcendentalism denies the absolute existence of matter, that it makes space and time forms of the understanding; therefore to God 'Time and Space are not laws of His being but only of ours,' and so He is omnipresent and eternal; and 'the black Spectre, Atheism . . . melts into nothingness.' Again the transcendentalists recognize a higher faculty than understanding, viz. reason. Thus the invisible world is brought near us, and we feel in every thought that in God 'we live, and move, and have our being.' It was in this way that transcendentalism also at first became known in America.[2]

The transcendental unity of the self which Kant understood of the individual knower, and which by theoretical reason gave him no substantial subject or soul, was raised by Kant's successors in Germany to the level of a universal principle and an active subject, and thus knowledge was made adequate to grasp all reality. Reality now became subject and object, and epistemology became ontology. The transcendent of Kant vanished completely; it became immanent in knowledge. Fichte laid stress on the creative activity of the self in such a way that the object, the world, was called into being by the subject. Schelling, whose views changed considerably from one stage in his history to another, regarded the Absolute as the background of subject and object alike, but itself a *neutrum* of indifference, and he made intellectual intuition the eye by which intelligence grasped this whole. Hegel tried to do equal justice to both subject and object: 'the real is the rational,' and 'the rational is the real,' and Absolute Spirit is the whole, which becomes conscious of itself through a dialectical process. For some time this mode of thinking, through its novelty and obscurity, was unintelligible and obnoxious to English thinkers,[3] but, when it did take a hold in Britain, it was with such force that it conquered the philosophical chairs in our universities with few exceptions, and exercised an orthodox tyranny against which it was difficult to contend. To Hamilton,[4] who viewed with extreme repugnance the philosophy of the Absolute, must be attributed the revival of philosophical speculation in Britain, and his pupils were able to understand the German philosophy which then was an enigma and a puzzle to others who in Britain interested themselves in speculation.

[1] *Miscellaneous Essays* (People's Edition), London, 1872, ii. 183 ff. The essay was originally published in the *Foreign Review* [no. 7] in 1829.

[2] See J. Veitch, *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*, Edinburgh, 1869, p. 421 ff.

[3] See J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1865, Preface.

[4] See his 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned' (*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, pp. 1 ff., 605) where he ascribes the theory of Schelling and Hegel to Cardinal de Cusa—a sufficient indication of the value he placed on it.

(4) *Modern developments.*—Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysic*[1] was perhaps the first systematic exposition of transcendentalism in our tongue, although others had by that time acquainted themselves at first hand with its varied expositions in Germany—some repelled by it (*e.g.*, John Cairns),[2] others enthusiastic in their advocacy (*e.g.*, Hutchison Stirling, whose *Secret of Hegel* was an elaborate attempt to make Hegel intelligible to English-speaking students). It was, however, through the teaching and writings of Thomas Hill Green (*q.v.*) that transcendentalism became a philosophical force in Britain. Evolutionism, while it attempted to reconcile the older empiricism and transcendentalism, did so from below, by trying to relate man's knowledge and man's morality with animal life and animal activity in general, but the new transcendentalism, while acknowledging that in one sense man is a part of nature, yet explained knowledge and morality from above. Knowledge, according to this view, is explicable as the reproduction in man of the eternal self-consciousness of God, and morality is the realization of the immanent Eternal. The following passage from William James describes the spread of this movement in Britain:

'For many years adherents of this way of thought have deeply interested the British public by their writings. Almost more important than their writings is the fact that they have occupied philosophical chairs in almost every university in the kingdom. . . . It follows from their position of academic authority, were it from nothing else, that idealism exercises an influence not easily measured upon the youth of the nation—upon those, that is, who from the educational opportunities they enjoy may naturally be expected to become the leaders of the nation's thought and practice. . . . Carlyle introduced it, bringing it as far as Chelsea. Then Jowett and Thomas Hill Green, and William Wallace and Lewis Nettleship, and Arnold Toynbee and David Ritchie—to mention only those teachers whose voices are now silent—guided the waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Isis. John and Edward Caird brought them up to the Clyde, Hutchison Stirling up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey and up the Severn and Dee and Don. They pollute the bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Cam and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain. The disaster is universal.'[3]

'Transcendentalism' came to be used of this new movement, although the term was not a favourite one with the idealists themselves. It was used by Henry Sidgwick[4] especially of the teaching of Green; by A. J. Balfour,[5] who contributes a chapter of criticism, and who even then could say:

'In English-speaking countries it is within the narrow circle of professed philosophers, perhaps the dominant mood of thought; while without that circle it is not so much objected to as totally ignored.'[6]

William James used it of all objective idealists, however these may differ among themselves, while Caldwell uses it of Bosanquet's teaching in his *Gifford Lectures*, which he describes as 'the last striking output of British transcendentalism or absolutism.'[7]

(5) *Neo-Hegelianism and Christianity.*—What gave this philosophy its vogue, to begin with at any rate, in Britain was undoubtedly the fact that to many minds it appeared as a *defensor fidei*. It seemed to supply an answer to materialism and empiricism on the one hand, and a vague scepticism and agnosticism on the other. It could be preached, and was preached often, by men who adopted the familiar phrases of sacrosanct religious thinking which were associated in the public mind with Christian values, and thus it came to be regarded

[1] Edinburgh, 1854.

[2] See A. R. MacEwen, *Life and Letters of John Cairns*, London, 1895, pp. 160–163.

[3] *A Pluralistic Universe* (*HL*), London, 1909, p. 53 f.

[4] *Outlines of the Hist. of Ethics*[2], London, 1888.

[5] *The Foundations of Belief*[2], London, 1895.

[6] *Ib.* p. 137.

[7] *Pragmatism and Idealism*, p. 14.

as a type of Christian philosophy. Hutchison Stirling found in Hegelianism a new version of Calvinism. Green used it to demolish the traditional English sensationalism and hedonism, and amidst the scepticism which prevailed regarding the historical elements of Christianity used it to rear a Christianity of ideas and ideals, from which dualism we are still suffering—witness the controversies concerning the historic Jesus and the eternal Christ. John Caird, afraid of the inroads of Spencerian and Manselian scepticism and Huxley's agnosticism, found in Hegel's teaching an ark of refuge and a citadel of defence. It was thus a movement of deliverance, of reform, and of religion. Not a few of its most zealous advocates were men destined for theology who found here a more congenial home. But, as time went on and this system began to be developed, the difficulties, tendencies, and obscurities inherent in it, as well as the dangers, revealed themselves. Just as in Germany Hegel's system allied itself at first with orthodox theology and then, in the hands of Strauss and Feuerbach, swung back to practical atheism and materialism, so also in our own country time has made it plain that this system is no guarantee of Christian faith or morals. Green[1] speaks with philosophic sorrow of those who find in poetry and religion the satisfaction for their ideals and aspirations, though they harbour scientific views which contradict these. He is sorry because such people do not proceed to frame or adopt a coherent philosophical system; forgetting that what gave transcendentalism its interest and vitality among the educated was not its speculative scheme—that was always a puzzle more or less—but the idea that this philosophy conserved spiritual values, and that what is fast loosening its hold on this class to-day is the feeling, rightly or wrongly entertained, that these interests are being betrayed or disregarded in the interests of the coherence of the system itself. To begin with, it is widely felt that transcendentalism speaks too confidently of its own power to present a perfectly explicable view of the world—to exhibit all reality in thought categories. Its manner is apt to strike the observer as being haughty and supercilious, and its language would lead one to think that a claim to something like omniscience is arrogated—a claim so contrary to our broken experience as human beings, and so opposed to that humility which serious thinkers have always regarded as the fitting attitude for all searchers of truth.

(6) *Faith and knowledge.*—No one has done more among our professional philosophers to abate this soaring gnosticism than Campbell Fraser, with his insistence on the function of faith as lying at the very basis of knowledge itself, as accompanying and regulating its advance all along its operations. Reality is richer than thought, nor is it possible to factorize reality into thought terms. The limits of human knowledge are obvious even in the most daring schemes of rationalism, and philosophy has again to face the problem of the relation between faith and reason.

Again, it is felt that transcendentalism does not do justice to the reality of the external world. To it the external world is only an object for a subject, and the tendency of all idealistic schemes is to lapse into solipsism. This solipsism may be of the human individual or of the One Supreme Subject, but in essence it is the same. Sidgwick suggested the term 'mentalism'[2] as a more adequate description of this tendency. Whatever term we use, the tendency itself is undeniable, and the reaction is seen in the movement known as neo-realism,[3] but the tendency is acutely felt by reasonable idealists, as, *e.g.*, by A. S. Pringle-Pattison;[4] yet one wonders if his own view of creation is not just a residuum of this old leaven of mentalism which he cannot purge out of his system. He has no difficulty in regard to the creation of souls, which, if it means anything, means something new, but he cannot admit the creation of matter. Yet, if God existed in His fullness before any person now living existed—if such an assumption is tolerable—why should creation as applied to matter be considered incredible? It is futile to try to explain matter as thought-elements, either in the mind of man or in the mind of God. When a philosopher arrives at such a view, it is surely the sane course for him to examine his reasoning again.

(7) *The problem of personality.*—The personality of man in this system, as we see from its modern developments, becomes insecure, or, if that danger is avoided, it is at the price of God's personality that man's is safeguarded. Thus there are those who, like Bosanquet, lay stress on the Supreme Personality or Individuality, and tend to make men but aspects of this Being's life. Others lay stress on man and make God the totality of men—a college or community of spirits, eternal *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*. To conceive of God as a perfect personality, above and apart from men and the world, and yet originating and sustaining both, seems an absurdity to this scheme of thinking.

'History is the biography of the Absolute; science the natural history of the Absolute; philosophy the self-consciousness of the Absolute, recalling and arranging its past being in unconsciousness, and discovering thereby the laws of its own thought.'[3]

The outcome is seen in a book like Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, in which the Absolute is everything—God, men, nature, spirits good and evil—and yet somehow it is all that in the bliss of an absolutely consistent whole. Personal idealism, pragmatism, and, above all, theism, will never take such a theory seriously.

5. **The task of philosophy.**—The modern world is alive to the fact that the intellect alone is not man, and that reality is not to be construed solely by its means. Emphasis is now laid on the will and the emotions as well, with the result that the moral life—the sphere of ideals—is given its own place. When this is recognized, then it becomes clear that reality is not a perfection which the mind has to mirror, but an ideal which has to be achieved. Nothing is more deadening and more untrue than to think of reality from man's point of view as a perfect 'is'; for the moral life at any rate reality is in ideals—'the best is yet to be.' Thus only can man's freedom be saved from the cloudland of illusion, and thus only can evil and sin—the root of all our intellectual as well as of all our moral problems—be faced as our moral nature imperatively calls on us to face them. Our duty in regard to these, unless our whole nature be itself a delusion, is not so much to explain them as to abolish them. To tell us that 'this very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order'[4] is to treat man's moral nature with insincerity. Transcendentalism has no eschatology, because to it the Absolute—*i.e.* all that is—is already perfect and cannot be more so, and yet a philosophy or a religion without an eschatology offers nothing to man's needs, imposes a veto on man's passion for reformation, and does away with

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, p. 2.
[2] The term 'mentalism' or 'immaterialism' is also used by James S. Ferrier.
[1] See art. REALISM.
[2] *The Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*), Oxford, 1917, ch. x.
[3] Cairns, in *Life*, by MacEwen, p. 163.
[4] J. Royce, *The World and the Individual* (*Gifford Lectures*), New York and London, 1900–01, ii. 385.

his felt need of redemption. These are some of the difficulties that most modern thinking men feel in regard to modern transcendentalism, and the recognition of them has led to a very general revolt against it in recent years from within the philosophic world itself. Pragmatism, neo-realism, neo-Kantianism, personal idealism, are but some of the phases of this revolt. It cannot be said that these views, any or all of them, are free from difficulties; and at the present moment it is impossible to say what the future may have in store for philosophy. The best we can wish for it is that it free itself from the tyranny of phrases and become intelligible and interesting; that it may have the humility to attempt to solve real problems that perplex men; that it be freed from its disdain regarding men's abiding convictions; that it abstain from any language which would throw doubt on the great ideals and values of life; and that it realize the necessity of satisfying the heart as well as the head. God, nature, man—these are the realities. Transcendentalism tends to forget the second, and to make the first and third co-equal; pragmatism forgets the first, and naturalism the first and third. The task of philosophy is concerning these three, and transcendentalism is valuable when the claims of naturalism become exorbitant; but it must not, without becoming false, succumb either to humanism on the one hand or to pantheism on the other.

LITERATURE.—The *OED* gives an idea of the variety of meaning attached to the word 'transcendental,' and R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosoph. Begriffe*[3], 3 vols., Berlin, 1910, gives the philosophical usage. For the pre-Kantian logical usage and the mediæval theological usage the Histories of Philosophy and of Theology must be consulted. For New England transcendentalism see art. EMERSON. Joseph Cook, *Transcendentalism*, Boston, U.S.A., 1877, is a vigorous popular criticism of Emersonianism in the interests of orthodoxy. The literature under artt. COLERIDGE and CARLYLE is instructive for the early influence of German transcendentalism in a popular form in Britain.

A short account of the history of British transcendentalism, or absolutism, is given by Robert Mackintosh, *Hegel and Hegelianism*, Edinburgh, 1903, chs. vi. and vii. O. Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtl. Grundlage*, Berlin, 1878, and *Development of Theology*, Eng. tr., London, 1890, gives the history of post-Kantian idealism from a theological point of view. J. H. Stirling, T. H. Green, John Caird, Edward Caird, J. Watson, H. Jones, W. Wallace, J. Royce, J. Macbride Sterrett, G. S. Morris give a version of Hegelian transcendentalism of a religious character. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1902, is mainly negative. For the revolt against transcendentalism in Germany see H. Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, Berlin, 1911. French philosophy since Cousin and Renouvier, down to Bergson, has been more or less generally anti-rationalistic and personalistic. James Seth, *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, London, 1912, is instructive for English thinking; an older book by D. Masson (quoted above) deals with Mill and Hamilton—the conflict between transcendentalism and intuitionism. The works of A. Campbell Fraser, Henry Sidgwick, and A. J. Balfour lay stress on primitive convictions and are in spirit against Hegelian gnosticism. See the literature under artt. NEO-KANTIANISM, REALISM, and PRAGMATISM. William Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*, London, 1913, gives ample information as to anti-rationalistic literature in Britain, Germany, France, and America.

D. MACKENZIE.

TRANSFORMATION.—See METAMORPHOSIS.

TRANSMIGRATION.

Introductory and Primitive (N. W. THOMAS), p. 425.
Buddhist (M. ANESAKI), p. 429.
Celtic (G. DOTTIN), p. 430.
Egyptian (W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE), p. 431.
Greek and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 432.
Indian (R. GARBE), p. 434.
Jewish (M. GASTER), p. 435.
Teutonic (B. DICKINS), p. 440.

TRANSMIGRATION (Introductory and Primitive).—Reincarnation is the passage of the soul from one body to another, usually of the same species, among higher races often with ethical implications, the lot of the soul on earth being determined by its behaviour in a former life. Transmigration, metempsychosis, and other terms are often used in an almost identical sense, but also in a vaguer way, implying at times that the soul itself assumes an animal form, sometimes permanently, sometimes only as a prelude to another reincarnation or to final destruction or absorption. Somewhat different is the creed which may be termed 'alternation of existences'; it involves the belief that man is double, a counterpart in another world corresponding to the earthly body or embodied soul in this world and taking the place of the latter when its turn comes to quit this world. Separate existence, reincarnation, annihilation, and transmigration are the possibilities that present themselves to the primitive mind when it inquires into the fate of the soul. We cannot say why one belief rather than another has been adopted in any specific instance; but it is clear that the resemblance of children to parents (or other relatives) has played some part, especially in W. Africa. The complex of beliefs is therefore to some extent a semi-scientific creed, taking the place of a biological account of heredity, and based on reasoning that we can follow. It seems equally certain that the widespread belief in transformation (or change of bodily form) during life must have had its effect on eschatological doctrine; and here the creed goes back to what must be some of the most archaic elements of human speculation. Those two factors are, however, at times to some extent combined, when a rise or fall in the scale of existence is put down to the merit or demerit of previous births. Both in reincarnation and in transmigration doctrines the life or lives that succeed the human life on earth are sometimes regarded as limited in duration, sometimes as indefinitely prolonged; where some accident interferes with the due course of reincarnation, the lot of the soul may be a kind of third state, neither reincarnation nor annihilation (or absorption), but separate existence (as an evil spirit).

Many widely distributed customs appear to be connected with the belief in reincarnation. Thus, in Africa and America children are buried by the wayside, near the mother, under the eaves, or in other situations that would in the eyes of the natives facilitate reincarnation; in parts of Central Australia and in Africa people are buried in the place of their birth.[1] But it must be recalled that, generally speaking, the common feeling that it is well to be buried with one's own people implies no more than the view that this is necessary to ensure the solidarity of the family in the future life. The custom of killing the first-born[2] has been explained for some areas by the belief that this child is, in special measure, an embodiment of the father or grandfather; and the abdication of a king, as in Tahiti, in favour of an infant son has been put down to the same cause. The belief in transmigration again in certain areas has led to the sacrosanctity of certain species, and the totemism (*q.v.*) of some regions, such as S. Africa and Oceania, has been referred to this origin.

[1] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory and Primitive), § VII. 3 (*c*).
[2] See art. FIRST-BORN (Introductory and Primitive), § 3.

A well-developed scheme of reincarnation or transmigration, if we except the anomalous case of the Central Australian tribes, as to whose real belief there is some doubt, is generally found only among peoples who either have attained a certain stage of culture, as in India, or have almost certainly been in contact with or influenced by a higher culture, as among W. African tribes. The W. African tribes among which a reincarnation creed has been recorded in more or less detail are the Mandingo, Ewe, Edo, and Ibo. The belief is also known among the Yoruba, who lie geographically between the Ewe and the Edo; but details of their ideas on the subject are lacking.

1. **West Africa.**—(*a*) *Mandingo.*—As regards the Mandingo, we have only a summarized account of their beliefs,[1] which differs widely from another account from a portion of the area;[2] a summarized account is always liable to mislead, and, in view of the large divergences recorded in other areas in the transmigration and reincarnation beliefs, it is prudent to await further details from the French territories before classifying the belief as aberrant.

According to Delafosse, every living being and every natural phenomenon depends for its nature on a *niama*, 'dynamic spirit'; the word *nia* is applied to a genius, *niama* to a spirit, which may be that of a genius, a human being, a sacred object, an animal, a rock, etc. The *niama* of a dead man can reside where it likes—in the corpse, in the hut, in a sacred object, or in the body of a living being whose *niama* it absorbs. Certain magicians attribute their powers to the possession of the *niama* of a genius or of a dead man. The *niama* of a man for whom the due rites have not been performed may reincarnate itself in a solitary animal, or in a human being, who goes mad. It is therefore clear that, though the *niama* may be reincarnated, it is by no means invariably the case, and, where reincarnation takes place, it differs in kind from the reincarnation in which the more easterly tribes believe (see below). Side by side with the *niama* we have the *dia*, or breath of life, which passes at death into another being; it is not the object of any cult; it is found only in living beings and passes only into another being of the same species, save on the rare occasions when it animates the body of a totem. This belief is, in form, on all fours with those of other Negro tribes; but it is hardly possible to speak of reincarnation, which implies some degree of identity, some measure of personality.

According to Monteil, the Khassonke believe that *dya* is soul, force, or shadow, while *ni* means breath; if this is correct, the meanings are just the reverse of what they are in the foregoing account of Mandingo beliefs, and it seems clear either that we are in the presence of a far-going disintegration of creed or that, as has probably happened farther east, the belief has come from without and has been worked up by each tribe in its own fashion. In any case it seems improper to give a generalized account of the beliefs of a mass of tribes if such varied views have to be regarded as identical.

(*b*) *Ewe.*—According to the Ewe belief, every man has two souls—a *luwo agbedo*, or life-soul, and a *luwo kuto*, or death-soul; the former is visible when a man casts a short shadow, the latter when he casts a long shadow. The death-soul accompanies a man into the grave and then goes to the land of the dead; the life-soul leaves the body at death and goes sighing mournfully and seeking for a resting-place; each man has also a breath-soul. That the shadow-soul is more than a shadow is clear from the fact that sleep is attributed to the absence of the shadow-soul, waking to its return, and dreams to its activity outside the body.

The land of the dead appears to be the same as Amedzowe, the place of man's origin—a land not on earth, but in heaven, where everything corresponds more or less closely to the things of this life. In Amedzowe are yams, corn, cotton, bush, and all that surrounds a man in this life, not, however, in bodily form, but spiritually, so to speak; and the human inhabitants of Amedzowe live and thrive on these things in their spiritual form. Life in Amedzowe, however, is more than a duplication of this world; for, when a child dies soon after birth, a priest may declare that it was a great king in Amedzowe and has died in order to return to the scene of its former glories. Conversely, the things of this world may influence the course of events in Amedzowe; if a man remains too long away from the other world, he will fall ill, for the dwellers there prepare to break down his hut; and, to save him, his associates in this world must each bring a blade of grass and lay it on the roof of his house, as a symbol of the re-roofing of his spiritual house. In Amedzowe a man has a spiritual aunt (*tasi*) and other relatives; from her he must obtain permission to leave the world of spirits and come to the world of men.[1] Some of those who come to this world are so dearly loved by their spiritual relatives that they have to give a promise, called *gbetsi*, to return after a short time; these are the children who die young; this promise has been personified and is regarded as in some measure an evil genius, for it incites men who break it to evil deeds and especially to suicide or to acts that will bring about a violent death. Generally speaking, the lot of a man in this life and his abilities are determined by the fate announced to him by his *tasi*; but here, as elsewhere, there is a fundamental contradiction in the creed of the Ewe, for, as will be seen below, the *aklama*, or genius, is also held responsible for a man's lot in this life.

Side by side with this curiously untheological creed we find the belief that Mawu, the supreme god, is a dweller in Amedzowe and is the king who sits in judgment on the departing soul before it takes up its abode in this world. Not only so, but we find also the view that the lot of man, or at least his term of life, is determined, if not by Mawu, at any rate by Mawu's intercession with Death, whom he begs to spare one of his earthly children. If, as appears to be the case, the Ewe beliefs are the result of syncretism, there can be no doubt as to which are the older elements in their creed; for the god of death, Ogiuwu, is found also among the Edo, from whom they were separated by the Yoruba influx, and whose views as to reincarnation at the present day come much closer to those of the Ibo, their neighbours on the east.

There is, however, another side to the Ewe beliefs; this is the *aklama*, *kla*, or, in the language of the neighbouring Twi, *okra*; it is often identified with the *luwo*, but an older and more correct conception seems to be that it is a genius or tutelary spirit. Another authority says that *kra* is the collective name for *ńunu*, all the spiritual beings that surround a man, whether they be evil or good, human or demonic. Westermann connects the word *aklama* with Efik *akaña*, a promise to return to the other world. If this derivation is correct, the conception of *aklama* as a tutelary spirit has arisen in the same way as that of its counterpart, *gbetsi*, by the personification of a promise, but Efik is a member of a different group of languages and topographically remote; the derivation must therefore be received with caution; it is none the less possible that both words are derived from the same root or form, especially if it should be the case that the reincarnation idea has been introduced from without or fostered in its growth by foreign influence.

Every man has a *kla*, or, perhaps, properly speaking, one or more, for the *aklama* figurines worshipped by a man are often in duplicate, male and female, in any case with only a single arm, as an indication of the identity of *aklama* and human being. Children sometimes carry an *aklama*

[1] Delafosse, *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, iii. 165.
[2] C. Monteil, *Les Khassonké*, p. 14[6].

[1] It is perhaps not without significance that the *tasi* is the father's sister; for the Ewe are matrilineal, or at most in a transition stage; and we can hardly suppose that the father's sister has normally such influence in the family; the belief in question therefore either must be young or, more probably, has come to them from without.

figurine on their backs, and, in the case of twins, each carries the figurine of the other; it is not without importance that these twin figurines are found in areas, such as Sierra Leone, where the reincarnation belief is not found, at any rate at the present day. One name for these figurines is *ame we luwo*, 'the soul of a man'—a phrase which makes clear the present deeply-rooted confusion between *luwo* and *aklama*. The *aklama* lives in Mawuwe, probably the same as Amedzowe, till Mawu gives it permission to enter a man, which it does before birth; the child to which it is assigned is known in advance, however; for the priest can interrogate the *aklama* as to the future lot of the unborn child. In some places the *kla* receives offerings annually, probably on the birthday of the child, for the *kla* is named from the day of the birth and is also known as the younger brother of Mawu. The *aklama* seeks only the welfare of his ward, so long as the latter fulfils his obligations; otherwise he may punish him with disease, madness, or other ills, or, more properly, may allow him to fall a victim to them. The obligations just mentioned include abstention from certain foods, generally, or for a period, or on certain days. In some unexplained way the *aklama* is associated with a man by virtue of his being made by Mawu out of certain earth; for, when a thief has a thievish son, it is said that Mawu formed both of the same earth, and hence their *aklama* are alike. A man comes to the world with his character formed once for all, and it seems in reality to be that of his *aklama*; a man's nature (*dzogbe*) is said to leave him at death, and, though it is believed to be conditioned by his *aklama*, it seems difficult to distinguish them.

So far as we have gone, there has been some confusion between *aklama*, *dzogbe*, and *luwo*; after death this confusion is increased. The images of the *aklama* are broken in pieces or thrown away, for their owner needs them no longer. The *aklama* seems now, like the *luwo*, to be termed *ɲoli* ('ghost' or 'spirit') and is questioned a few days after death to find out who was responsible for his death. The final destination of the *ɲoli* is Tsie or Agume, the place under the earth, the road to which passes through a river; Kutiame is the ferryman, and his fee is twelve cowries. Another account says that the dead man meets Liagbe at the entrance of a town, and she questions him as to his deeds in this life; she has a great wound, which he must lick; and, though this is a detail on which we have no other information, it seems highly probable that Liagbe should be identified with the spiritual aunt (*tasi*).

Native beliefs are rarely so clear and unambiguous as a written account commonly assumes them to be; but it is impossible to study the foregoing summary without feeling that syncretism must be reckoned with as a possible explanation. A knowledge of the beliefs of the peoples to the east of the Ewe can only strengthen the probability of this explanation; for here too we find diverse ideas combined, and some of them agree so closely with the Ewe creed that any possibility of separate origin must be rejected; at the same time, the general balance of the elements of the creed is so different, and the terminology so different (except where the creeds agree, as noted above), that we can hardly accept the theory of a common origin of the whole complex as the explanation of the points of agreement, which are not relatively numerous.

(*c*) *Edo.*—The Ewe language is closely akin to the Edo and forms a member of the group of languages named from the best known member, which is spoken in Benin city and the neighbourhood. It is somewhat surprising that as regards the subject of this article the terminology differs *in toto* from that of the Ewe, as is made clear by the following table:

	Ewe	Edo	Ibo
Genius	*aklama*, *kla*	*ehi*, *ekosi*, *ima*	*či*, *eri*; cf. *ikeŋga*.[1]
Shadow (soul)	*luwo*	*agogo*	*onyinyo*, *ndò*.
Breath	*gbogbo*	*eti*	*ńdò*, *ume*, *uzu*.
Spirit		*orio* (?)	*mwo*.
Ghost	*ɲoli*		cf. *akalagoli*.[2]
Ward			(*ńw*)*ago*.
Other world	Amedzowe	Elimi	Owamwo, Okwa.
Promise	*gbetsi*		*akaŋa*; cf. *ikeŋga*.

Broadly speaking, *ehi* corresponds to our idea of soul, for the *agogo* is said to disappear on the day that a man's body is put into the grave; in the Kukuruku country there are traces of belief in a breath-soul (*eti*), which does not, however, correspond to the *dya*, for *eti* is said to be the breath of *ehi*, which dies in Elimi before it comes to this world. Osa (god) is said to take a man's *eti* to Elimi, where it turns into a man with a body (*i.e. ehi*). Two *ehi* are usually distinguished, *ehinehi* (*ehinowa*) and *ehinoha*, sometimes identified with *ekosi*, sometimes with *ehogai*, the *ehi* of a childless person. Some say that *ehinowa* is in Elimi, while *ehinoha* is on the back of a man's neck; others say that *ehinoha* is a man's shadow in Elimi, or that *ehinowa* is on the top of a man's head; the latter statement was qualified by the addition that there was another *ehi* in Elimi. Some say that *ehinowa* comes to earth when a man dies, thus reproducing the idea of alternation already found among the Ewe, others that *ehinoha* lives in Elimi and comes to earth as *ehinehi* when a man dies. It is also said that *ehinowa* goes at death to Elimi and returns for sacrifices and offerings; in Elimi this *ehi* may lay claim to a woman for whom his earthly counterpart paid bride-price without being able to secure her as a wife. Some say that *ehinowa* is sent by Osa to animate a child already conceived, others that it brings a child to a man, others again that it 'does things for a man,' *i.e.* is his genius. *Ehinoha's* functions are equally a matter of opinion; it is on the back of a man's neck, or is the servant of *ehinowa* and takes sacrifice to him in Elimi, or lives in Elimi and comes to earth when its ward dies, or is a man's shadow in Elimi, where *ehinowa* is also, or corresponds to *ere*—a man's enemies (perhaps, rather, evil spirits), to whom he sacrifices on the road.

We reach a somewhat different cycle of ideas when we find *ehinoha* regarded as a 'bush soul,' injury to which means sickness for the human being. It is also said to be the 'king of the bush' and to be richer than *ehinowa*; when it receives a sacrifice, it is satisfied and turns its back. The prevailing view is undoubtedly that *ehi* brings a child from Elimi but is not identical with it; some say that the dead go to Elimi and are reborn seven times in the same or another family, alternately as male and female. Though there is some confusion between the *ehi*, they seem to be clearly distinguished from the man himself; they are real genii, but so far bound up with their human counterpart that his health is sometimes regarded as dependent on the state of the bush *ehi*. On the whole, the *ehinoha* is a bad genius that leads a man astray, spoils things, and, so far as the identity of man and *ehi* is accepted, refuses to remain in this world. The word *ehi* is found in Kukuruku in the form *ezi*, with which may be compared the Ibo *eri*,[3] *ezi*.

(*d*) *Ibo.*—Among the Ibo, who number several millions, there is much diversity of view; but only a small percentage of the tribes have been adequately investigated; the following summary relates to the Awka and Asaba districts. West of the Niger the belief is that an entity known as *či*, sometimes identified with *eri*, sends the new human being into the world; the reincarnated person and the reincarnation are known respectively as *ago* and *ńwago*. The *či* is normally a dead person, but in some areas may be the father or mother of the child. East of the Niger the *či* is in the main, like *ikeŋga*, a personal protective deity, with only slight traces of a connexion with the reincarnation belief; there is no explicit statement that the *či* sends a child into the world. The *ikeŋga* may perhaps be equated with the Ewe *gbetsi*, especially if, as seems probable, it is etymologically connected with Efik *akaña*, the promise to return to the other world. The Ibo are quite clear in their belief that a person is reincarnated, normally in his (or her) own family, at any rate if he has been buried with his fathers; children of tender years will assure the inquirer with the utmost solemnity

[1] A personal protective spirit. [2] Evil spirit.
[3] ɾ represents a breathed r.

that they are their deceased grandfathers or grandmothers; and the identity of the ancestor is determined by divination. A child that speaks before it opens its eyes is said to be relating what it saw in Owamwo and is at once exposed in the *ajoifia*; it is also asserted that a man who has been unlucky in one existence may decide, on opening his eyes for the first time in a new life, that it is the same world in which he was unhappy before, and resolve to give up the struggle, whereupon the new-born child dies on the spot.

The relation between *či* and *ago*, west of the Niger, may be compared with that of godchild and godparent; the relation sets up a bar to marriage, and a man may not even marry into the *umunna* (sept) of his *či*; two people who have the same *či* may not marry, nor yet may their children, though apparently a man may marry the fellow *ńwago* of his sister. There is a saying that the child who is one's *ago* (*ńwago*) should have been the child of a man's own loins; both must be of the same quarter; if the *či* has no heir of his own, the *ago* inherits the property. Curiously enough, the *onye bi owe*, the reincarnated person, who is sent into the world by the (living) *či*, and who ought by analogy to stand to the child in a closer relation than the *či*, is in point of fact regarded as a comparative stranger; he may come from another *ebo* (quarter) or from a different tribe altogether, and his ritual prohibitions do not concern the child, who has to observe those of his *či*.

There are traces of the view that *či* and *ńwago* form two links in a continuous chain, at any rate where the *či* is not a living person, the *ńwago* of one generation being the *či* of the next; and this affords a satisfactory explanation of the views as to prohibitions. At the same time, it must be remembered that the *či* is properly a personal protective deity, in fact a personal *alose*, and that the facts are, in other directions, best accounted for on this hypothesis; it must not, however, be forgotten that east of the Niger an *alose* may be the *či*, or, according to another account, may itself be reincarnated. East of the Niger also we sometimes find the view that the *ago* goes to the next world with a dead man, while the *oglisi* pegs that represent it are thrown away; so that here the *ago* is regarded as the *či*; it is, at any rate for a time, to some extent represented by the *ndičie*, or ancestral figurines. Curiously enough, the *umunna* (sept) claims to have a collective *ago*, just as it has a collective *ndičie*, though in the nature of things an *ago* which sends to this world a corporation, not individual human beings, is unthinkable.

West of the Niger there is a good deal of confusion between *či* and *eri*, which is properly a genius, and may perhaps originally have been a breath-soul (cf. Kukuruku *eti*, 'breath').[1] If this is the case, *eri* is now none the less distinct from the man, for ceremonies are performed to bring it to the house, and in many cases it is identified with *či*. Perhaps two streams of belief flowing together, one placing *či* in Owamwo, the other locating *eri* in this world, have coalesced, so that ideas associated with *či* came to be attached to *eri*, and *vice versa*.

[1] The following forms may be compared:

Edo	Sobo	Kukuruku	Ibo
ehi, eti	*eri*	*esi*	*eri.*

Cf. also the undoubtedly related words for 'ear':

eho	*ero*	*ezo*	*nti* (=*eti*).

It has been pointed out that the words *akaŋa* and *ikeŋga* are in all probability connected etymologically; it is by no means unlikely that *kla* and *aklama* are from the same root; for *la* and *na* may well be alternative forms of a suffix, and the transition from *kala* to *kla* is a well-established phonetic change in W. Africa. There is some reason for supposing that the original idea is that of a promise, though in Ewe the term *gbetsi* is now used in that sense, while *aklama* has become a genius; but further research is needed in other areas before any definite pronouncement can be made. It is tempting to connect the root *ka* with the Egyptian *ka*, which was a double of the man and believed to be after death, with the mummy, a denizen of the tomb;[1] but, though there are clear traces of mummification in W. Africa, probably due to Egyptian influence, and though nothing is more probable than that Egyptian ideas in traversing the continent would have undergone fundamental changes, there is no positive evidence to connect any of the beliefs mentioned above with any article of the Egyptian creed.[2] The possibility of Egyptian influence must, however, be kept in mind, for Egyptologists appear to accept the evidence produced by L. Frobenius[3] as to Egyptian influence in the present Yoruba area in the 6th cent. B.C. That the terms of the Yoruba language show no connexion with those cited above is of no importance, for there can be little doubt that the Yoruba tribe has come down from the north and may not have been in occupation of the area in question, if indeed it existed, at the period in question.

2. South Africa.—In many parts of S. Africa, and sporadically in other parts of Africa, there is a belief that the dead are transformed into certain species of animals, or at any rate that they assume this form to appear to the survivors; it has been maintained, not quite convincingly, that some Bantu tribes[4] suppose themselves to be transformed at death into their totems. This belief is, however, definitely reported from the west coast, among the Siena and the Twi, as well as in the north-east of the Congo Free State. Among the Zulu the transformation is supposed to be into a species of serpent.

3. Madagascar.—In Madagascar the belief in transformation is also found, though here doubtless of Indonesian origin; and we see a different lot in the future state assigned to various social grades; this is of course a common feature of eschatological doctrine not connected with the theory of moral retribution.

4. Central Australia.—According to Spencer and Gillen, the tribes of Central Australia believe that children are reincarnations of their ancestors (totem) and are continually reborn;[5] but the testimony of Strehlow, a witness well acquainted with the language of the Arunta tribe, directly contradicts this;[6] for he maintains that the native belief is that the soul of every man goes at death to the Isle of the Dead, there to be annihilated by a flash of lightning; in certain cases it is believed that a totem-ancestor is himself reborn, but after this reincarnation he does not return.

[1] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

[2] In modern Egyptian folklore the *quarina*, equated by Seligman with the *ka*, is held to be the spiritual counterpart of a man, which has nothing to do with his immortal soul; it plays the part of a good or bad angel. It is of course possible that this resemblance to present-day W. African beliefs is due to convergence; we can hardly assume that both are simple replicas of ancient Egyptian beliefs, nor yet that the course of development has been identical; but there is at least a *prima facie* case for inquiry.

[3] *Und Afrika Sprach*, Berlin, 1912.

[4] See art. BANTU AND S. AFRICA, § 3 f.

[5] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 123, 127; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 145, 174.

[6] *Globus*, xci. [1907] 285, xcii. [1907] 123; see also literature below.

Strehlow's account of Aranda (Arunta) belief is as follows:

The totem-ancestors dropped some of their *churinga*, which were transformed into trees, rocks, etc., from which proceed *ratapa*; these are completely formed boys and girls of reddish colour and have both body and soul; they are invisible to ordinary mortals. When a woman passes a spot (*kuanakala*) where the transformed body of an ancestor is, and where consequently the *ratapa* associated with that ancestor dwell, one of the latter, when it recognizes a suitable (*i.e.* of the correct clan) woman, enters her body and causes various symptoms. The child belongs to the totem of the ancestor associated with the spot.

There is a second method by which an ancestor impregnates a woman, but this does not seem to imply any kind of reincarnation, though the ancestor is called in both cases the *iningukua* of the child. The ancestor is said to come out of the earth and throw a small bull-roarer (*namatuna*) at a suitable woman, in whose body it takes human form.

Both kinds of impregnation are said to be equally frequent, and the difference is recognized in the face of the child, which is narrow in the first, broad in the second kind.

An *iningukua* can also, very rarely, enter a woman's body in person; and a child thus originated has light hair; in such a case the soul goes at death like other souls to the Isle of the Dead, and is annihilated by a flash of lightning. There is therefore no question of repeated reincarnations, and only in the third case can we really speak of an Aranda belief in the doctrine, so far as can be seen from Strehlow's narrative.

This account agrees with much of what is reported by Spencer and Gillen;[1] though these authors speak of reincarnation of ancestors, they really mean an incarnation of spirit-children left behind by the totem-ancestors. And even among the Aranda we hear of the totem-ancestors[2] living in water-holes.

Perhaps it is most probable that large local variations of belief account best for the differences between Strehlow and the English authors. In this connexion the account of R. H. Mathews[3] is of interest, though it must be remembered that he is probably relying on information derived from others. Some of the Chingali believe in repeated reincarnations of ancestors, and a change of sex occurs each time;[4] others say that women are not reincarnated and consequently deny at any rate the change of sex; the northern Chingali deny the reincarnation creed altogether and come very near the doctrine set forth by Strehlow for the Aranda.

5. Other areas.—The totemism of Indonesia[5] and Oceania[6] has been traced both by Wilken and by Rivers to the belief that the sacrosanct animal species is the residence of ancestral souls. Transmigration theories are also found sporadically in New Guinea (*q.v.*) and N. and S. America. The Bororo Indians of Brazil believe that they become *arara* birds after death and in dreams; other tribes say they pass into other birds. The *arara* is kept as a pet and mourned at death, though the wild bird may be killed for its feathers; yet the Bororo say, 'We are *arara*.' According to von den Steinen, the earliest form of the belief was that the native said, 'I have a bird,' not 'I am a bird,' which flies at night and which remains as the natural form of the person when a magician or other evil-disposed being hinders his return to human form (*i.e.* causes his death). But it is only in parts of Australia and W. Africa that these forms of eschatological creed are an element of real importance.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], xii., *Bibliography and General Index, s.v.*; *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 385; N. W. Thomas, *Anthropological Report on the Edo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, 2 pts., London, 1910, *Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, 6 pts., do. 1912–14; K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 353, 512; B. Hagen, *Unter den Papuas*, Wiesbaden, 1899, p. 225; A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904; *Baessler-Archiv*, ii. [1911] 73; M. Delafosse, *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, Paris, 1912; C. Monteil, *Les Khassonké*, do. 1915; C. Strehlow, 'Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien,' in *Veröff. städt. Völker-Museum Frankfurt a. M.*, 1908 ff., i. ii. [1908] 51 ff., etc. N. W. THOMAS.

TRANSMIGRATION (Buddhist).—Theoretically Buddhism teaches neither the existence of the soul nor its transmigration, but insists on the revolution, or 'stream' (*saṁsāra*), of existences. In its practical influence on the popular mind, however, this doctrine amounted to much the same as any other doctrine of transmigration. It amalgamated everywhere with the animistic conception of the soul, whether human or other; it inspired the people with the feeling of a certain continuity of life-relationships through various existences; it impressed the popular mind with a degree of fatalism—the belief that every event in one's life was the result of past deeds. The doctrine, when formulated, contained more or less sensuous descriptions of the better lives in the heavens, besides horrifying details of purgatorial existences; and these aspects of the teaching resulted in the growth of a respectable volume of visionary literature during the course of the history of the religion in various countries.[1] Thus, in spite of the higher doctrine of the ideal Buddhist perfection in *nirvāṇa*, and in spite of the psychological and metaphysical formulations of the teaching of *karma* and *chitta*, the Buddhist conception of transmigration may be treated in the same category as other doctrines of the same kind.

According to the regular teaching, the *saṁsāra* consists in an indefinite revolution of renewed existences produced and prolonged according to the qualities of the *karma* (*q.v.*), which is the matrix as well as the *vis a tergo* of the enduring existences. It is said repeatedly:

'No beginning is known of the eternal revolution (*saṁsāra*) of the beings, streaming and flowing to and fro [in the ocean of births and deaths], being covered by ignorance (*avijjā*) and fettered in thirst (*taṇhā*).'[2]

In this vast ocean of renewed births there are innumerable streams of existences, conditioned by their respective deeds and retributions, flowing uninterruptedly not only in the continuity of the individual being but also in the solidarity of a group of existences. Now the groups of existences are classified into five *gatis* ('courses,' 'modes of life') — the heavenly life, the human life, the animal life, the ghostly life, and the purgatorial (or hellish) life; or into six, by adding the *asura* (or furious spirits).[3] Another classification is that of the *bhava* ('being') or *loka* ('realm,' the cosmic installation of beings) into three — the formless heavens, the heavens with forms, and the material worlds with desires and greed.[4] In this connexion it is to be noted that the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration emphasized the affinity and solidarity of the *karma* and all its consequences within a group of existences, whether a specific world in the cosmic system, the local division of the abode, or the class division in social life; in short, any and every link, material, physical, moral, emotional, intellectual, or social, is the cause and a manifestation of the solidarity of existence due to the common *karma*. The principle of the solid-

1 Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 156 f., 161.
2 Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 445.
3 *Proc. Roy. Geog. Soc. Queensland*, xxii. [1907] 75 f.
4 Cf. Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 148.
5 See art. INDONESIANS.
6 See artt. AUSTRALASIA, MELANESIANS.

1 In *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 254–262, Mahā-Moggallāna, the great disciple of Buddha, well versed in supernormal attainments, narrates to his fellow-monk Lakkhana his visions of beings tortured and purified in the purgatories and the causes of their sufferings. Thence we have a long series of similar narratives, for which see, *e.g.*, the opening of the *Mahāvastu* (ed. E. Sénart, Paris, 1882–97, i.), or B. Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, nos. 561, 677, 679, 706, etc.
2 *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 178 f., etc.
3 See art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist), esp. §§ 5–8.
4 The five or six circles are graphically represented in the *bhavachakra* (the cycle of existence), for which see art. AJANTA, on the *Nidāna* (vol. i. p. 258[b]).

arity is the *karma*, and its manifestation is the *bhava* or *dhātu*, the latter of which means the characteristics (common to the beings within a group), the specific circle of existence, community, common destiny.

How the different *dhātus* are produced; what are the reciprocal actions and reactions of the psychical factors and environmental factors in the process of the development of *karma*; what are the conditions of the individual *karma* being attracted to and incorporated into the common *dhātu*—these and associated questions gave rise to varied speculations in the Buddhist schools, the whole forming a web of subtle argument and grotesque fancy, in which are mingled Buddhist cosmology, psychology, ethics, and sociology. This is a subject which awaits further investigation.[1]

The practical effects of the Buddhist doctrine of *saṁsāra* were a deepening and broadening of the feeling of the continuity of life. Though often vulgarized through its amalgamation with animistic beliefs, the effect of the doctrine was to extend affection and attachment in human relationships to the former and coming lives, even to animal and plant life, which was held to be continuous and closely associated with human life, and to elaborate those sentiments through the belief in deeper causes, remoter connexions, and wider aspects of being than those of the present life.

This point can be illustrated from the folk-lore and literature of every Buddhist people, and one of the flowers of romantic literature—the Japanese literature of the 11th cent.—is dominated by this sentiment of continuity. There the delicate yet strong tie of human affection was associated with the idea of its continuity through lives beyond death, as well as with the idea of nature as inspired by physical surroundings and their changes. Unfortunately both W. G. Aston and Karl Florenz, in their histories of Japanese literature, hardly touch this point.

Another point in the effect of the teaching of *saṁsāra* is the belief in the occasional appearance of persons who can remember their former lives. In fact, it seems that Buddha himself regarded this faculty as one of his supernormal attainments (*iddhi*) and one of the criteria of saintliness. Everywhere in Buddhist literature we find mention of the three special faculties (*tevijjā*)—the divine vision, the divine hearing, and the clear recalling of one's former lives (*pubbenivāsa*). This belief gave rise to a rich literature of *Jātaka* (*q.v.*) and the allied literature of *Nidāna* and *Avadāna*, which aimed at supplying that belief with concrete illustrations and impressing believers with the close association of the lives of Buddha and Buddhist saints with those of all other beings, besides inculcating morals by the stories. Thus it was no wonder that some persons claimed to have the same faculty, whether by chance or as a result of training. The folk-lore and legends of Buddhist countries are full of instances, and a noteworthy point in them is that many of those endowed persons are children, whose remembrance of their own former lives is mostly said to lose its vividness as they grow older.[2]

LITERATURE.—See artt. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist), JĀTAKA, KARMA, and the literature cited there.

M. ANESAKI.

TRANSMIGRATION (Celtic).—**1.** There are two passages which clearly assert the belief in metempsychosis among the ancient Celts. Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14) tells us that the principal point in the teaching of the druids is that the soul does not perish, but, after death, passes from one body into another. Diodorus completes the evidence of Cæsar and states it precisely:

'Among the Galatæ [Gauls or Germans] the doctrine of Pythagoras prevails, namely, that the souls of men are immortal and after a fixed number of years begin to live again, the soul entering into a second body' (v. 28).

But is Diodorus giving the teaching of Pythagoras or that of the Celts? If the former, it would be wise to attach only a relative importance to the precision of his words; if the latter, it must be admitted that, according to the belief of the Celts, the passage of the soul into another body does not follow immediately upon death, and that, while the soul awaits its reincarnation, it continues to live, though under conditions which are not those of the life on earth. This interpretation would make it possible to reconcile the passages in Cæsar and Diodorus with the evidence of ancient writers who have transmitted Celtic conceptions regarding the future life in which the idea of metempsychosis does not occur.

Diodorus goes on to say:

'Therefore, during the funerals of the dead, they throw into the funeral pyre letters written to the dead relatives in the expectation that the dead will read them.'

It seems, therefore, that the man whose body was burned acted as a messenger between the living and the ancestors whom he was about to meet again in the other world. It is the idea of the immortality of the soul and of another world that is emphasized by the Latin writers.

Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells that there was an ancient custom among the Gauls of lending each other sums which were repayable in the lower world, so firmly were they persuaded of the immortality of the soul. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life among the *manes*, adds that they burn and bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postponed the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time when debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world; there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kindred in the expectation that they would rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-seated beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (*inferos, manes*); but Lucan is not content with that superficial assimilation:

'You assure us, Druids, that it is not the silent dwellings of Erebus nor the pale kingdoms of Dis who inhabits the depths, at which the souls arrive; the same breath directs their members in another world ['orbe alio'], and, if your songs declare what can be known, death is in the heart of a long life' (*Pharsalia*, i. 449–456).

There has been an endeavour to fix the meaning of 'orbe alio.' In the Latin of the time of Lucan it can mean only 'another region of the earth' and not 'another celestial globe' (see S. Reinach, *RCel* xxii. [1901] 454).

The commentaries on the few and vague Greek and Latin texts which bear upon the ancient Celtic belief in metempsychosis do not lead to any further precision. In particular, we cannot determine whether the teaching of the Celts was borrowed from the Pythagorean school. Such was, however, a tradition of antiquity. The passage from Diodorus quoted above lacks clearness, but as early as the beginning of the 1st cent. B.C. Alexander Polyhistor (frag. 138 [*FHG* iii. 239]) wrote that Pythagoras had the Gauls (Γαλάται) as disciples. Timagenes (*ap.* Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 9) seems to connect the organization of the druidic corporations with Pythagoras with regard to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Valerius Maximus (II. vi.) declares that he would consider the belief in the immortality of the soul a foolish thing if it were not for the fact that the belief of the Gauls on that matter agreed with that of Pythagoras. But the Celtic doctrine, though showing analogies with the Pythagorean doctrine, was not identical with it: it did not distinguish between the fate of the wicked and

[1] Cf. *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 140–177, and artt. ABHIDHARMA KOŚA VYĀKHYĀ, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

[2] See Lafcadio Hearn, *Gleanings in Buddha-Fields*, Boston and New York, 1897, ch. x.; H. Fielding, *The Soul of a People*, London, 1898, pp. 324–343.

that of the just; the other life is neither a punishment nor a recompense, and, in fact, the idea of justice is entirely absent from the Celtic conception.

2. We have another source of information in the legends preserved by Irish epics, which tell of historical personages and seem for the most part to be anterior to Christianity.

In the middle of the 6th cent. of our era St. Finnen met at Mag Bile (Moville, Co. Down) a warrior named Túan Mac Cairill, who lived all alone in his den; at first he would not allow the saint and his disciples to enter his dwelling, but he ended by making them welcome and showing them hospitality. They refused to accept anything from him, however, until he had told them of his adventures, which were by no means ordinary. Túan Mac Cairill had come from Spain to Ireland 312 years after the Flood along with the first inhabitants, Partholon, the son of Sera, and 24 couples. When the number of immigrants had increased to 5000, an epidemic destroyed them one after another, until only one survived to tell the tale, that one being Túan Mac Cairill. For 22 years he was the only inhabitant in Ireland; then Nemed, son of Agnoman, who also came from Spain, landed on the island, after a storm, with four men and four women. On his arrival Túan went into hiding; he fasted for three days, and, having lain down to sleep one night, he awoke in the morning in the form of a stag. He led the herds of deer in Ireland until the extinction of the race of Nemed. Then he became a boar, and remained in that shape as long as the men of Semion, son of Stariat, from whom the Firbolg are descended, were in possession of Ireland. He next became a vulture during the reign of Beothach, son of Iarbonel, an ancestor of the Tuatha Dé Danann; and, once more, a fish, when the sons of Milé conquered Ireland. One day he was caught by a fisherman, brought to the wife of king Cairell, cooked, and eaten by her. At the end of the usual period he was born again as an infant and was called Mac Cairill, *i.e.* son of Cairell. Up to his second birth as a man Túan had lived 320 years: 100 as a man, 80 as a stag, 20 as a boar, 100 as a vulture, and 20 as a fish.

Certain details of this metempsychosis should be noticed: in all his successive shapes Túan preserved the consciousness and recollection of his previous existences, and his human intelligence persisted during his lives in the bodies of animals; his metamorphosis took place only when he had reached the extreme limits of old age and decrepitude; it occurred only in the neighbourhood of the house in which he lived during his first life as a man; and, finally, his change of body took place only after a fast of three days.

There is another Irish legend dealing with metempsychosis, though in a less varied and definite manner than that of Túan—the history of Mongán, son of Fiachna.

One day Mongán had a discussion with his *filí*, Forgoll, as to where king Fothad Airgdech, who was slain by the Fian Caoilte, had fallen. It was agreed that if, in the space of three days, Mongán failed to prove that Fothad had fallen at the river Larne in Ulster, and not at Duffry in Leinster, as Forgoll maintained, his goods and his person should become the property of the *filí*. Mongán's wife broke into lamentations which increased as the time went on, but Mongán waited calmly in the firm belief that a witness would come from a distant country to attest the truth of his statement; for Mongán heard the steps of the mysterious traveller from afar. On the third day, at nightfall, a warrior appeared, who, when brought into the presence of Forgoll, pointed out the exact spot where Fothad had been buried, and even gave the inscription on his tomb. While narrating the death of Fothad, the warrior called Mongán as witness to the truth of his story, and named him by the name of Fionn. The warrior was Caoilte, and Mongán was thus a reincarnation of Fionn, living about three centuries after him. The legend gives us no information about the incarnations of Fionn between the end of his first life and his reincarnation in Mongán, but probably they were similar to those of Túan Mac Cairill.

Other Irish legends allude to cases of metamorphosis, but they do not seem to take place at the end of a life. There are also epic stories presenting beings which have had a second birth, but those beings belong to the world of fairies and have no bearing upon the study of human metempsychosis.

3. The Welsh romances also contain numerous examples of metamorphosis. Perhaps there are traces of metempsychosis in the romance of Taliesin, in which he tells in verse of all the places where he has been since the beginning of the world, and in the poem entitled *Kat Goddeu* ('Battle of Goddeu'), in which the poet enumerates all the shapes which he has taken: sword, star, book, eagle, ship, serpent, etc. But the story of Taliesin is preserved only in MSS of the 17th cent., and the ancient poems attributed to the celebrated bard of the 6th cent. cannot be earlier than the 12th. It is difficult to disentangle the real archaic elements contained in them.

To sum up: it is practically only in the texts of the writers of antiquity that definite evidence is found of a Celtic belief in metempsychosis: among the Irish, metempsychosis is an exceptional phenomenon, a kind of privilege enjoyed by heroes; what we find among the Welsh is a literary tradition rather than the traces of an ancient belief. Whatever may be the ingenuity of modern scholars, it cannot on this subject make up for the lack of documentary evidence.

LITERATURE.—H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Le Cycle mythologique irlandais et la mythologie celtique* (*Cours de littérature celtique*, ii.), Paris, 1884; *The Voyage of Bran, son of Febal*, ed. K. Meyer, 'With an Essay upon the Irish Vision of the happy Otherworld and the Celtic Doctrine of Rebirth,' by A. Nutt, London, 1895–97.

G. DOTTIN.

TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian).—There are three different ideas which refer to changes of personality: (1) the union with a god, (2) the transmigration of the soul into an animal for a life-time, (3) the voluntary metamorphosis of the person temporarily into another form for his own benefit.

(1) The *divine union* is often stated in the *Book of the Dead*, as 'I am Ra' or 'I am Thoth'; this was the person entering into such union with the god that he had all the compelling power and safety of the god. Even in the earliest inscriptions, on the cylinders before the 1st dynasty, the dead is *sen*, or brother, to a god; or *sensen*, allied, associated, in touch, or united, with a god.

(2) The question of *transmigration* has been disputed. The Greek authors refer to it as an undoubted belief; but there seems to be no Egyptian text which refers to the idea. Two scenes have been supposed to indicate it; these are judgment scenes (Seti I. sarcophagus and tomb of Rameses III.)[1] showing a pig being driven from the judgment. Yet, as referring to justified men, it cannot be the soul driven away as a pig. In most judgment scenes there is present the devouring monster, a blend of hippopotamus and crocodile, waiting to devour the guilty; but no such monster appears where the pig is, and so it seems likely that the pig is the flesh-eating animal, driven away so as to be quite apart from the justified king. The Greek testimony is so strong that it seems unlikely to have all been derived from the metamorphoses. As all the authors are post-Persian, it is possible that the idea really did blend with Egyptian belief during the Persian occupation, when other Indian ideas came into Egypt, such as asceticism. Transmigration is plainly stated in the *Korē Kosmou*, of the Persian period, probably about 500 B.C.[2] After this it is natural that the Greek writers, Herodotus, Plato, Theophrastus, Plutarch, and others, should ascribe the belief to the Egyptians of their times, unconscious that it was a new importation.[3]

(3) The belief in *metamorphosis* (*q.v.*) was general, as a magic process. The earliest Egyptian tale turns on a wax model being transformed into a living crocodile. The *Book of the Dead* has a series of magic chapters (76–89) to give power to the dead person to be transformed into 'whatever form he pleases,' into a golden hawk, a divine hawk, a god, a lily, the god Ptah, a phœnix, a heron, a swallow,

[1] I. Rosellini, *Monumenti del Culto*, lxvi., Pisa, 1834; J. G. Wilkinson, *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, new ed., London, 1878, iii. 467.

[2] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity*, London and New York, 1909, pp. 43, 47.

[3] See passages quoted in Wilkinson, iii. 462–464.

an earth-worm, or a crocodile; and lastly the power of being united to its own body. The following examples are parts of chs. 86, 89, and all of 88:

'I am the Swallow; I am the Swallow. I am the Scorpion-bird (or white bird), the daughter of Rā. . . . And that which I went in order to ascertain, I am come to tell. Come, let me enter and report my mission. And I, entering, and ascertaining who cometh forth through that gate of the Inviolate one, I purify myself at that great stream, where my ills are made to cease, and that which is wrong in me is pardoned, and the spots which were on my body upon earth are effaced. . . . Here am I, and I come that I may overthrow mine adversaries upon earth, though my dead body be buried' (86). 'For I am the Crocodile god in all his terrors. I am the Crocodile god in the form of man. I am he who carrieth off with violence. I am the almighty Fish in Kamurit. I am the Lord to whom one bendeth down in Sechem' (88). 'Oh, thou who bringest; oh, thou runner who dwellest in thy Keep, thou great god; grant that my soul may come to me from whatsoever place wherein it abideth. . . . Let my soul (*ba*) be caught and the spirit (*khu*) which is with it, wheresoever it abideth. Track out among the things in heaven and upon earth that soul of mine, wherever it abideth . . .' (89).

LITERATURE.—J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1912, p. 277, and works quoted above. W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

TRANSMIGRATION (Greek and Roman).—I. *GREEK.*—The notion of transmigration (παλιγγενεσία),[1] *i.e.* the passage after death of the human or animal soul from the mortal body to a new incarnation in another body of the same or another species, necessarily rests upon a belief that the soul itself is immortal, or at any rate more lasting than the body. Pherecydes,[2] who was born about 600 B.C. and is reputed to have been the teacher of Pythagoras[3]—which does not necessarily mean more than that he was earlier in time—is said to have been the first to introduce the doctrine. On the other hand, Herodotus[4] declared that it was the invention of the Egyptians and was derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of Pherecydes and Pythagoras, who were already dead. It is, however, impossible to accept Herodotus' account, because (1) the best authorities are inclined to doubt whether the Egyptians ever held the doctrine in question,[5] and (2) the Greek evidence indicates that the belief, if not indigenous, goes back to a remote past. Moreover, the notion that Pythagoras was influenced by Indian modes of thought with which he became acquainted in Ionia or elsewhere[6] is altogether unconvincing. The truth seems to be that a belief in the transmigration of human souls into other bodies after death was a relic inherited from the primitive or savage ancestors of the European peoples. It is expressly attributed to the Gauls,[7] and less explicitly to the Thracians and Scythians.[8] In fact it must have developed independently in many parts of the world,[9] without direct transmission from place to place, especially in connexion with the idea that the limited supply of souls necessitates the reappearance of the same soul in various earthly bodies. Thus in popular tales the change of a man into a beast involves the assumption that, though the body is different, the soul remains the same; *e.g.*, in the metamorphosis of Odysseus' companions into swine their intelligence remained unaffected.[10] Not that this popular tradition ever became widely effective: except for one not very clear example,[1] stone inscriptions show no trace of a belief in transmigration, while Euripides refers to a second incarnation as an actual impossibility, whose realization might have been welcome as a divine instrument of discrimination between the good and the bad.[2] But, although there is nothing to show that the belief struck deep, or was cherished outside certain particular circles, it was brought into prominence by the religious upheaval which undoubtedly took place in the 6th cent. and became associated with the worship of Dionysus and the Orphic cults. Thus the notion that the soul is imprisoned in the body as in a dungeon is attributed by Plato and his commentators to the Orphic mystics.[3] Two famous passages in Pindar presuppose the doctrine of transmigration. In one of these Persephone sends the souls back to earth in the ninth year when they have been purified from their ancient sorrow;[4] and in the other those who have thrice made their abode on either side of death are destined at last to reach the islands of the blest.[5] It seems more likely that Pindar derived this doctrine from the Orphic mysteries than indirectly through the Pythagoreans.[6] The prevalence of this mystical belief and its religious potency are illustrated with remarkable clearness in certain inscriptions on golden tablets found in S. Italy, near Rome, and in Crete, which are chiefly attributed to the 4th or 5th centuries B.C. and published as an Appendix to J. E. Harrison's *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 660 ff. One of these contains some words which form part of the appeal of the purified soul: 'I have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel; I have passed with eager feet to the Circle desired.' This refers to the mystical Wheel of Fortune which in its revolutions symbolizes the cycle of successive lives necessary to be traversed by the harassed soul before its final release. This specific cycle of progress, as well as the more general conception of a κύκλος in human affairs, is traditionally attributed to the Orphic-Pythagorean sphere of thought.[7] In the Orphic hymns[8] this has so far developed as to include a statement that an exact reproduction of the movements characteristic of the present world-era may be expected when the revolving wheel comes round to the same point again; but it is not easy to reconcile this with the opportunity which, as we have seen, is given to particular souls to obtain their release.[9] Aristotle's reference to the Orphic poems as an authority for the opinion that the soul enters the body from outside in the process of respiration accords well enough with the doctrine now under discussion.[10] Further, the Orphic prōhibition of a diet of animal flesh, evidenced by Euripides and Aristophanes,[11] points in the same direction.

In popular estimation[12] transmigration is particularly associated with the name of Pythagoras. Much of what has been established as belonging to the Orphics, the imprisonment of the soul in the body as a retribution for past ill-deeds, the undeviating recurrence of the cycle of existence,[13] the prospect offered of ultimate escape after purification,[14] and the abstinence from a flesh diet—limited, however, by the reservation that it did not apply to the flesh of such animals as are

[1] Serv. on *Æn.* iii. 68. [2] Suid. *s.v.*
[3] Diog. Laert. i. 118, viii. 40. [4] ii. 123.
[5] How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, London, 1912, *ad loc.*; cf. art. TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian).
[6] T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, i. 127.
[7] Cæs. *de Bell Gall.* vi. 14; Diod. v. 28.
[8] Pomp. Mela, ii. 18. [9] *PC* ii. 2 ff.
[10] Hom. *Od.* x. 240 and the schol.

[1] *Epigr.* ed. G. Kaibel, Berlin, 1878, p. 304.
[2] *Herc. Fur.* 653 ff. [3] *Phæd.* 62 B, *Cratyl.* 400 C.
[4] Frag. 96 Schr. [5] *Ol.* ii. 68.
[6] E. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1881, i. 71; but see schol. on v. 104.
[7] See a note by the present writer on Soph. frag. 871.
[8] Frag. 225. [9] Frag. 226.
[10] *De Anim.* i. v. 410*b* 28. [11] *Hipp.* 951; *Ran.* 1032.
[12] Cf. Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, iv. i. 131, *Twelfth Night*, iv. ii. 54.
[13] Diog. Laert. viii. 14; Zeller, i. 474, note 2.
[14] E. Rohde, *Psyche*[5], Tübingen, 1910, p. 165, note 2.

offered in sacrifice to the Olympian gods[1]—is established for the Pythagoreans by not less convincing testimony. It would seem, therefore, that, when founding his brotherhood, Pythagoras appropriated much that was characteristic of contemporary religious asceticism. Nevertheless the reincarnation of souls in various bodily shapes is so closely associated with the person of Pythagoras that he must be held to have inculcated it with peculiar vigour. There is a good deal of legendary matter relating to him, most of which can be traced to the authority of Heraclides Ponticus.[2]

To this source we owe the famous story that it was permitted to Pythagoras to retain the memory of his previous incarnations, and that he established his credibility on the occasion of a visit to the Heræum at Argos by identifying as his own, before seeing the inscription, the shield of Euphorbus, son of Panthus, which he was bearing when slain by Menelaus before the walls of Troy.[3] Heraclides was also responsible for the statement that Pythagoras claimed to have lived as Æthalides, the son of Hermes and herald of the Argonauts, before he became Euphorbus, that as Æthalides he obtained from his father Hermes the offer of any gift he might choose save immortality, and that thus he received the privilege of remembering his previous fortune while on the earth and in Hades. After Euphorbus died, he became Hermotimus and subsequently Pyrrhus, the Delian fisherman, before his final re-birth as Pythagoras.[4] Further, Pythagoras declared that after the lapse of every 207 years his soul returned to the light of the sun.[5] Accordingly, if the birth of Pythagoras is placed in 572, the date of Euphorbus will be 1193 and of Æthalides 1400.

There is, however, much better evidence than these fables that Pythagoras seriously taught the doctrine in the almost contemporary verses of Xenophanes:[6] they say that once, as he was passing by, he pitied a dog that was being beaten and exclaimed: 'Beat him no more; for his soul is my friend's, as I recognized when I heard his voice.' It was therefore his belief that the same soul could dwell in a beast as in a man, and that there is a universal kinship between all living things.[7] He did not hesitate to ascribe reasonable souls to animals, holding that the activity of their reason was impeded by the unsuitability for its exercise of their physical organs.[8] Aristotle describes the possibility of any soul taken at random passing into any body as a Pythagorean fable.[9] The punishment of souls for their misdeeds by successive incarnations in corporeal dungeons was a theme developed by the Pythagoreans in a manner hardly to be separated from the Orphic,[10] and the results of their joint influence are to be found in the Platonic myths.

Empedocles in his poem entitled 'Purifications' (*καθαρμοί*) took over the doctrine of transmigration from the Orphic-Pythagorean school without making any attempt to combine it with his philosophical system. Indeed it is difficult to see how it was possible for him to advocate the immortality of the soul consistently with his doctrine that the vitality of the soul is the result of an aggregation of corporeal substances. Thought and consciousness are concentrated in the blood which envelops the heart.[11] Aristotle's assertion that, according to Empedocles, the soul is compacted from all the elements[12] is generally discredited as a misconception; and his further remark in the same passage that each of the elements is soul is equally misleading. But, even if the materialism of Empedocles is somewhat less explicit than is sometimes represented, logical justification is still to seek for his pronouncement concerning the punishment of guilty souls in a purgatory lasting for 30,000 years[1] and his personal experience of the wretchedness of the wandering spirit which is harassed by its weary passage through air and sea and earth: 'Ere now have I been a youth and a maiden, a bush and a dumb fish in the sea.'[2] A discrimination of the degrees of transgression is involved in the assignment of the less base souls to the higher forms of animal or plant life: these inhabit the bodies of lions among beasts or appear as bay trees in the world of vegetation.[3] The best of them become prophets, bards, physicians, and chieftains, and at last return as divine beings to the company of the gods.[4] As a consequence of this doctrine Empedocles, like the Pythagoreans, prohibited the eating of flesh and the slaughter of animals, which he stigmatized as the shedding of kindred blood, the murder of a son by his father or of a father by his son.[5]

In several of his dialogues, particularly in the *Phædo*, *Phædrus*, *Republic*, and *Timæus*, Plato associates the doctrines of the immortality and pre-existence of the soul with its transmigration. The variations to be found in his descriptions are not of serious moment and do not admit of being discussed in detail.

According to the *Phædo*,[6] those who in this life have failed to emancipate themselves from the burden of the corporeal element cannot rise to the purer element above, but, being dragged down into the visible world, haunt burial grounds as ghostly apparitions until they are again imprisoned in another body. Of these the sensual become asses or similar animals, the violent and unjust wolves or kites, but those who, though lacking the philosophic impulse to virtue, have lived an ordinary respectable life may become bees or ants, or even men who in their next incarnation prove themselves just and moderate. Only those who have devoted themselves in this life to philosophy are entirely exempt from any further incarnation and pass to the pure ethereal homes destined for them in the upper world.[7] In the *Phædrus*[8] the souls of the dead are punished or otherwise treated according to the measure of their human actions for 1000 years, until the period of reincarnation arrives, when they are allowed a limited area of choice, so that it often happens that the soul of a man comes into life as a beast, and that of a beast which had formerly been human again enters into the body of a man. A much more elaborate account is given in the myth of Er the son of Armenius, how a great variety of choice comprising the lives of every animal and of men in every condition is offered to the allottees whose time for reincarnation has arrived. The order of choice is determined by ballot, but even the soul which drew the last lot had plenty of opportunities for selection left. The narrator of the myth was a witness of the choices made by some of the famous heroes of antiquity; how Orpheus chose to be a swan, Thamyras a nightingale, Ajax a lion, Agamemnon an eagle, and Thersites a monkey, while Odysseus, who drew the last lot, wearied of his former ambition, was delighted to find still available for him the life of an ordinary man free from all anxiety.[9] In the *Timæus*[10] the creator fashions as many souls as there are stars, and distributes one to each star, in order that later, after a period of contemplation, they may be embodied in human form. If during the time of probation the soul lived well, he would return to his ethereal habitation; but, if he failed, he would suffer a new incarnation as a woman; and, if his wickedness continued, he would sink down among the beasts until his corporeal taints had been thoroughly purged away. In the same dialogue Plato explains the evolution of birds and other animals as arising from the deterioration of human souls. Birds, with their feathers taking the place of hair, are developed from men who are harmless but light-minded. The four-footed beasts of the earth were originally men who had never given themselves up to the study of philosophy, since they no longer heeded the revolutions in the head, but followed the impulses of those parts of the soul which are situated in the breast.[11]

Critics have not been entirely agreed as to how far Plato was a serious believer in transmigration,[12] some holding that the entire description was purely a play of fancy, and others that, though he may have credited the successive incarnations

[1] Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 85; Aristoxenus, *ap.* Diog. Laert. viii. 20, makes the prohibition apply only to the ram and the plough-ox.
[2] Pauly-Wissowa, viii. 476.
[3] Hor. *Od.* I. xxviii. 10; Ov. *Met.* xv. 160 ff.; schol. Hom. *Il.* xvii. 28.
[4] Diog. Laert. viii. 4, 5; schol. Ap. Rhod. i. 645; schol. Soph. *El.* 62.
[5] Diog. Laert. 14. [6] B 7 Diels.
[7] Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 19.
[8] Aët. *Plac.* v. xx. 4 (H. Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin, 1879, p. 432, 15).
[9] *De Anim.* i. 3. 407*b* 22.
[10] For an attempt to distinguish Pythagoreanism from Orphism see F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, London, 1912, p. 198 ff.
[11] B 105 Diels. [12] *De Anim.* i. 2. 404*b* 11.

[1] B 115, 6 Diels. [2] B 117 Diels.
[3] B 127 Diels. [4] B 146, 147 Diels.
[5] B 136, 137 Diels. [6] 81 E.
[7] *Ib.* 114 C. [8] 249 B.
[9] *Republic*, 617 D–620 D.
[10] 41 D. [11] *Ib.* 91 E.
[12] See the authorities quoted by J. Adam in his note on *Rep.* 618 A.

of human souls, he cannot have extended his belief to their passage into animal shapes. It should of course be noticed that all these descriptions, if not actually parts of a myth, have a mythical colouring, and must be read subject to the warning given by the Platonic Socrates in the *Phædo*:[1]

'No sensible man will affirm that these matters took place exactly in the way that I have described. But to hold that either this or something like it is the truth in regard to our souls and their habitations, appears to me, *now that the soul has been shown to be immortal*, to be no unreasonable or unworthy venture.'

So long as this limitation is borne in mind, there is no valid reason for mistrusting Plato's sincerity.

Transmigration does not cohere with the Stoic doctrine of the soul's nature; but there are some grounds for thinking that **Posidonius** held the pre-existence and immortality of the soul in the limited sense in which it was possible for a Stoic to affirm them consistently with a belief in the *ἐκπύρωσις*.[2] It was, moreover, natural that a Stoic should speak of a periodic reincarnation[3] as a consequence of the dogma that every conflagration introduces a new era in which the experience of the past will be exactly repeated. But that either Posidonius or any of the Stoics believed in a series of successive incarnations within the limits of the current world-period is, notwithstanding the isolated statements of certain of the doxographical sources,[4] open to very grave doubt.[5]

According to **Plotinus**, the future destiny of the soul depends on the use it has made of its several functions and capacities during each particular incarnation. Hence we should constantly strive upward, not yielding to the images of sense or carnal cravings.

Thus he who has exercised his human capacities again becomes a man, but those who have lived by sensation alone become animals. If, without yielding to active passion, they have remained immersed in sluggish perversity, they may even become plants.[6] There is always retribution for an ill-spent life: the bad master becomes a slave, the abuser of wealth a poor man; the man who has murdered his mother becomes a woman and is murdered by a son.[7] On the other hand, those souls which are pure and have lost their attraction to the corporeal will cease to be dependent upon body. So detached, they will pass to the region of being and the divinity, which cannot be apprehended by a human vision as if it were akin to the corporeal.[8]

II. *ROMAN.*—There is no evidence among the Romans of an indigenous belief in transmigration, but several of their poets acknowledged the influence of Greek speculation, and of Plato and Pythagoras in particular. Horace mentions[9] the 'Pythagorean dreams' of Ennius, who thought that his soul had once inhabited the body of Homer and earlier that of a peacock.[10] Vergil, in a famous passage,[11] takes more serious notice of Pythagoreanism, when he describes the purification of souls in the under world, and their return to human bodies after the completion of the cycle of 1000 years. Ovid[12] introduces Pythagoras himself making an eloquent appeal against the slaughter of animal life, based upon the identity of the soul-substance which permeates our bodies and theirs.

LITERATURE.—The best sources of information are the works of E. Rohde, T. Gomperz, and E. Zeller mentioned above. For Pythagoras see art. PYTHAGORAS; also A. E. Chaignet, *Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1873; and for Plato J. A. Stewart, *Myths of Plato*, Oxford, 1905; and E. S. Thompson's ed. of Plato, *Meno*, London, 1901, pp. 286-297.

A. C. PEARSON.

TRANSMIGRATION (Indian).—The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is in India the presumption which underlies not only Buddhism and Jainism, but also the philosophical systems of the Brāhmans and the whole of Hinduism. In the ancient Vedic period it had as yet no existence. At that time the Indian peoples were still filled with a keen delight in life, and the righteous man looked forward to eternal continuance of existence after death. They believed that good men ascended to heaven to the companionship of the gods, and there led a painless existence, free from all earthly imperfections—a happy life, which was usually depicted as an enjoyment of sensual pleasures, but was yet occasionally conceived in a higher spiritual sense. The necessary consequence of this belief was the view (very rarely expressed in the Veda) that the souls of the wicked sank down into the abyss of hell. This naive representation of the soul's fate after death experienced a real change when, suddenly and without any transitional stages that we can perceive, the Indian people was seized by the oppressive belief in transmigration, which holds it captive to the present day. The conviction that every individual enters again after death upon a new existence, in which he gathers the fruit of merit earlier acquired, and has to endure the consequences of sins previously committed, meets us for the first time in a work belonging to the second period of Indian literature, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 'the Brāhmaṇa of the hundred ways.' Since then this thought has been regarded in India as a doctrine that needs no proof, which only the adherents of a crude materialism could doubt. It is a significant fact—to which H. Oldenberg first drew attention—that belief in transmigration at its very first appearance in the literature assumed the form of the harassing thought of a continual recurrence of death. How this belief, which lies at the root of Indian pessimism, could take the place apparently immediately of the innocent joy in life which greets us in the ancient times in the hymns of the Rigveda is an interesting question, but one that can be answered with only a certain measure of probability. Certainly the Indian doctrine of transmigration is not to be derived from one definite source alone; there are undoubtedly several streams of thought, which hardly admit of being definitely traced, but which were distinct in their origin. In order to ascertain the main source, we must have recourse to general folk-lore.

Among peoples in a low stage of civilization in very many parts of the earth there is found the belief that the souls of men after death pass into the trunks of trees or the bodies of animals, but especially into the bodies of birds, reptiles, and insects. Hence a choice is open to us between the following alternatives. We must suppose either that the Aryans of India, when they came into closer contact with the rude aboriginal inhabitants of the Indian peninsula, received from them the idea of the continued existence of men in animals and trees, and appropriated it to themselves; or that this conception had maintained its hold upon the lower strata of the Aryan people themselves from savage times, and then in an age adapted to constructive speculation thoughtful men had set themselves to develop from it the theory of transmigration. The second of these two possibilities is the more probable. Whatever view, however, may be accepted as correct, under any circumstances the primitive belief—whether it be that of the Indian aboriginal tribes or that of the lower strata of the Aryan people—gave merely the first impulse to the formation of the doctrine of transmigration; for no primitive people possesses more than the conception of the immediate prolongation of human existence in animals and trees. Among

[1] 114 D.
[2] A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, Berlin, 1892, pp. 250-255.
[3] M. Ant. xi. 1.
[4] Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, pp. 175, 571. 19, 587. 19, 614. 13.
[5] Rohde, ii. 325 n.
[6] *Enn.* iii. 4. 2.
[7] *Ib.* iii. 2. 13.
[8] *Ib.* iv. 3. 24.
[9] *Epist.* II. i. 51.
[10] Pers. vi. 10.
[11] *Æn.* vi. 743.
[12] *Met.* xv. 98-142, 153-258.

the Aryans of India the theory, as it meets us for the first time in the literature, appears already fully formed in the shape of belief in a permanently continued but ever-changing existence. And the different forms under which the individual lives are in their rank, and the measure of happiness or misery which they experience is regarded as dependent on moral conduct. At the basis of the Indian conception of transmigration lies the immovable conviction that there is no unmerited happiness and no unmerited misery, that each man shapes his own fortune down to the smallest details. This conviction has given to the Indian people a power to endure suffering which has often enough excited the wonder of foreign observers.

Since the Indian recognized that no explanation of the apportionment of happiness and misery, of joy and sorrow, by the moral state of the individual was to be found in the present life, he concluded that man's fate is determined by his good and evil deeds in a former existence. A moral qualification, therefore, according to this view, attaches to the soul; and this corresponds exactly to the sum of its good and evil deeds, and demands reward or punishment in the next existence, if not in the present.

Granted, then, that we endure in the present life the consequences of our own behaviour in the past, the conditions must have been precisely the same in the previous existence; the joy and sorrow that we experienced therein were again the consequences of our own actions in a preceding life, and so on without end. For that part of the individual, therefore, which was involved in the cycle of existences no beginning could be assigned. It was thus that quite early in India the theory of the endless pre-existence of the soul was developed; and the doctrine of the soul's eternal duration in the future was inferred according to the law that that which is without beginning is also endless, and in accordance with the ancient popular view of the permanence of personal existence in heaven. The belief in the eternity of soul was followed by belief in the eternal existence of the universe.

Life for the ease-loving Indian was overshadowed by the belief in transmigration. The thought of wandering perpetually through the bodies of men, animals, and plants, of being compelled in each existence to experience more pain than joy, and perpetually to renew the pangs of death, occasionally also to sojourn for a time in hell—this thought must have been dreadful for the Indian. Nor would he be sufficiently compensated by the prospect of being able to gain heaven by his merit, and to raise himself to divine honours. For with the very ascent to divine honours no more than a transitory success has been gained. Even the gods, according to the transmigration theory, are involved in the cycle of existence, the *saṁsāra*, and must again descend to lower forms of life when their time comes round, that is, when the power of former merit is exhausted through the enjoyment of divine position and honours. The popular gods, therefore, have ceased to be eternal and omnipotent beings, as they were in Vedic times.

According to this view, therefore, the wheel of existence rolls on without rest or intermission, and hurries living creatures perpetually to renewed suffering and renewed death. Naturally, then, the question must have been raised whether there is no deliverance, no release, from this constantly renewed existence upon earth.

The hypothesis that once in the course of time the previous deeds of a living being may meet with their complete reward or punishment, and that, therefore, the basis for a re-birth may and will disappear, was not made in India. According to the Indian view, when a living being dies there always remains a remnant of merit and guilt still unrewarded and unpunished, from which is derived the germ of a new existence. Even sacrifice and deeds of piety or asceticism cannot deliver from the necessity of renewed birth and death. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* it is said that the powers of death which pursue men from one existence to another may be appeased by sacrificial offerings, and that by such offerings release may be obtained from the return of death. This thought, however, is soon abandoned, and is supplanted by the conviction that no sacrifices can do more than secure temporary happiness in higher forms of existence.

Since, then, in India it had become the supreme aim of spiritual endeavour to find this release, the issue could not fail to be the conviction that success had been attained; not by the way which had been previously followed and which no longer afforded inward satisfaction, but by the way of *knowledge*, which, in fact, might be trodden only by a few. In the knowledge of the essential nature of things, which is veiled from ordinary sight, was found the means of deliverance from the pressure of worldly existence. This saving 'knowledge' removes 'ignorance,' *i.e.* the empirical view of the universe which is natural to man, but is mistaken and perverted. With ignorance disappears also desire, which fetters man to existence, and is the cause of all action; as, on the other hand, successful resistance to the desires of the senses promotes the entrance of knowledge. Saving knowledge has the power—to use the technical Indian expression—of 'consuming the seed of works,' and so making impossible for all future time a continuance of migration.

The entire course of thought as hitherto developed is already contained in substance in the ancient *Upaniṣads* (*q.v.*). For them saving knowledge consists in the recognition of the sole existence of the Brahman, the soul of the universe, of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, and especially of the identity of the individual soul, the *ātman*, with the Brahman. In what way the saving knowledge is conceived in Buddhism, in the religion of the Jains, and in the philosophical systems of the Brāhmans (Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya), must be ascertained from the respective articles. Cf. also art. MOKṢA.

LITERATURE.—Leopold von Schroeder, *Indiens Literatur und Cultur*, Leipzig, 1887; A. Barth, *Religions of India*[3], London, 1891; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906; A. E. Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*[2], London, 1891; H. Haigh, *Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, London, 1903.

R. GARBE.

TRANSMIGRATION (Jewish).—Metempsychosis, or the migration of the soul (Heb. *gilgūl*, 'rotation' or 'cycle'), is a doctrine which forms part of a system of esoteric mysticism tolerated rather than approved or furthered by Judaism. Its beginnings are difficult to trace. Whether they were Egyptian or Indian—probably through Gnostic or Manichæan intermediaries—this doctrine, no doubt, had to accommodate itself to other Jewish conceptions before it could be assimilated and adopted, and it had to undergo such a profound modification as to give to Jewish metempsychosis a character of its own.

The belief in the migration of the soul presupposes the existence of the soul; and a whole esoteric system about the creation of the soul, and the conception of sin and redemption, are the fundamental principles upon which such a doctrine must rest. The relation between spirit and matter, soul and body, must be determined, as must the question of pre-existence as well as that of the finality of soul and body. An attempt will here be made to do justice to these problems, however succinctly. The questions of punishment and reward, of God's

justice and mercy, are also involved. It must be borne in mind that any theory, if it was to be accepted by Jews, had to be subjected to a process of close adaptation to the fundamental principles of Judaism, and must not run counter to the Law. Now, if migration of the soul is to be accepted as a part of philosophic speculation concerning sin and redemption, it has to formulate its theory in accordance with Judaism.

1. **Creation of souls.**—God is the creator of everything; therefore souls are His creation. But does God continue His act of creation? Does He continually create souls as soon as any human being is on the point of being born? The answer of the believer in metempsychosis is that He does not. His creation came to an end with the close of the sixth day. At the beginning the souls were created. The power of God is thus limited to what He had done on that occasion. Before creating Adam, God had finished the creation of all the souls of man, but, His work of creation being overtaken by the end of the sixth day, He did not continue it, and produced only those evil spirits which hover between the pure divine soul and the earthly matter (the *mazziqîm*; see art. MAGIC [Jewish]).

A distinct line of demarcation is not drawn, however, and, as will be seen, a soul can assume the form of a demoniacal spirit. The souls created, then, are of a limited number, as the creation was only a limited act, and had to come to an end at a definite period of time. These souls are God's creation, not any emanation from God. This very essential point should be remembered, for it separates Jewish metempsychosis widely from Buddhist. The souls at the end of the migration are not absorbed into a kind of divine pantheistic fluid; they are conceived as having an individual existence; they live separately and fully conscious of their individuality; they dwell in the heavenly halls or in Paradise in rapt contemplation of the divine glory; thither they are allowed to return at the end of their peregrination through the lower world. The souls of the born and the unborn, of those who have already been in the sublunar world and of those who have not yet been in that world, are dwelling together in the heavenly halls, or in the treasury of God (Dt 32^{34}). No clear distinction is made between these two categories of souls. It is all so vague in this world of theosophic speculations, and contradictions are not seldom found; schools of thought have sometimes blended their teaching without any successful attempt at harmonizing contradictory views. All that comes is readily accepted, so long as it is not diametrically opposed and so long as it comes as an ancient mystical tradition. Thus the pre-existence of all human souls affects the Messianic eschatology. The soul of the pre-existing Messiah is fully conscious of its own individual pre-eminence in this world. Though a spirit, the Messiah dwells among the other souls, and He is fully aware of the tribulations of the people of Israel; He weeps over their sufferings and anxiously asks the angel who is in His company when the time will arrive for His revelation (M. Gaster, *Chron. of Jerahmeel*, London, 1899, xx. 9). Moses in his ascent to heaven sees the souls of the great and pious, of those who have lived upon earth, and of those who are to come to life hereafter—among others David and Aqiba (*ib.*). This view is found also in the book of Enoch and in other Apocalypses, though the theory of migration is not there clearly connected with it.

The one definite outcome is that no new souls are created for each child that is born, the number of souls being limited. Everything created has a specific purport. Even the angels have not been created without purpose. They are God's messengers; they carry out His wishes and commands in the heavens above and on the earth beneath; above all, they are created for the purpose of singing to their Master and of praising Him in angelic choirs. Such, then, is the purpose of the entire creation. The angelic action is typical of the human man, the highest and most perfect creature after the angels. He must by his action approach the divine, and his whole life must be a long-sustained hymn of praise to God. But man, made of the dust of the earth, cannot rise to such perfection unless the divine soul lifts him up and unless the divine Law guides him steadily upwards towards heaven. His life is a constant struggle between the grossly material inclinations inherent in his earthly nature and the high spiritual promptings of his divine soul. According to the way in which he inclines, his soul will become more or less contaminated by the contact with matter; it will lose more and more of its spiritual lustre and purity. For man has absolute free will; he is master over his own actions. This is an axiom; otherwise the whole principle of reward and punishment has to be abandoned. And yet, with that naive inconsistency so characteristic of this mystic philosophy, predestination is not excluded. Nothing happens which has not been pre-ordained, yet no attempt is made to bridge this gulf.

2. **Incarnation of souls.**—The souls have been created for a specific use; they must enter human bodies; but the choice is not left to them, either of the bodies to be selected or of the time of entry and the time and manner of exit. As soon as a woman conceives (see art. BIRTH [Jewish]), an angel appears before God with the sperm, and God decrees the future life of the yet unborn babe. Its whole life is thereby determined—whether it will be rich or poor, high-stationed or lowly, wise or foolish, long-lived or short-lived, good or bad, pious or wicked; even its future helpmeet is proclaimed in heaven to the joy and satisfaction of the heavenly hosts. In order to obviate too glaring a contradiction in a later version of this legend of the 'Creation of the Child' (see Gaster, *Jerahmeel*, ix. 19 f.), the moral qualifications of the future man and woman have been omitted. The soul, which is very reluctant to give up its heavenly abode and enter the human body, especially if the shell is that of a wicked one, is forcibly seized by the angel and carried through the bliss of heaven and the agony of hell, to see the reward for good actions and the punishment for evil deeds. Although the soul forgets it all with entry into this world, yet a dim recollection remains, a subconscious image, which is the guiding principle in elementary recognition of good and evil. Every man has within himself a standard of right and wrong given to his soul in its premundane existence. Another version (*Zôhār*, ii. 96*b* ff.) describes the incarnation of the soul in the following manner:

> God created all the souls from the beginning, in the very form in which they would afterwards appear in this world. He beheld them and saw that some of them would be wicked. At the time when the soul is to descend, the Lord calls it and says, 'Go to such and such a place.' The soul replies, 'Let me remain here and not be defiled in that other world.' The Lord answers, 'From the beginning thou hast been created for the purpose of getting into this world.' Then the soul submits, and descends against its will. The Law which helps the soul says to it, 'See how the Lord had mercy on you. He has given you His precious pearl (the Law) to help you in this world, so that ye may return pure.' But, if laden with sin, the soul must obtain purification so as not to be delivered to Gehinnom; for two rows of angels and demons are waiting for the soul; the good to lead to Eden and the evil spirits to Gehinnom; and to be saved from punishment the soul migrates from body to body.

3. **Life of the soul on earth; migration; defeat of evil spirits.**—Now the soul begins its course upon earth. It must endeavour to obtain the

absolute mastery over the body and not to become its slave. In the first entry the soul is absolutely pure and without blemish. It is not met by the obstacle of 'original sin.' The principle upheld throughout is that 'each man dieth by his own sin' (Ezk 18^{20}). But the weakness inherent in matter soon makes itself felt, and, moreover, there are the temptations placed in its way through the envy and spite of the evil spirits (*mazziqîm*), who, though they partake of some spiritual character, are imperfect compared with the pure soul, and are anxious to drag it down to their own level.

A still greater cause lies at the root of this attempt of the evil spirits to lead the pure soul away—a desire to frustrate by the means of sin and transgression the divine plan of creation. God has created the world and man in it for His glory. Through trial and trouble man must win the crown of eternal bliss. The finite number of souls forms part of this divine plan. A term is thereby set for man's spiritualization, for an infinite number of souls might make that end impossible of being reached. But, as there is a limited number, it is obvious that the desired consummation would set in as soon as the last soul had passed through the human body, or, rather, had entered the last human body. For then all the souls created would have fulfilled their mission upon earth, and all the human beings through whom they had passed would have reached the highest degree of moral development of which they were capable, so that the progress of mankind and of the world would have attained its ultimate goal, or, to put it in the words of the mystics, the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth would then be established, the time reached for the advent of the Messiah. Already in the Talmud the saying is found, 'The son of David will not come before all the souls in bodies will come to an end.' The power of the evil spirits would then be entirely broken, and only good would reign in the world. The spirits, therefore, try to entice the soul and defile it by all manner of temptation and sin. The result is that the contaminated soul must be kept out of the heavenly bliss, and the divine plan is effectively checked. Like a 'shell' (*qᵉlîfāh*), the evil spirits surround the soul, making the material covering still more impenetrable to light and truth, as they are clinging close to the body like an additional covering. In the later development of this system the evil spirit 'cleaves' to the body of the person whose soul is to be obstructed, and the spirit is then called *dibbûq*. It has entered into a more intimate connexion with the body, and is no longer an outer covering, or *qᵉlîfāh*, originating from the 'other camp,' the *sîṭrā aḥarāh*.

But the demons strive in vain to impede the steady development and unfolding of God's plan. They may delay its speedy consummation; they cannot indefinitely frustrate it. The soul which has been contaminated can be purified again; the sin committed can be atoned for, and even here the means is given to the soul to achieve its own purification. The soul retains its own consciousness and is sensible to its own failings; it realizes the bitterness of punishment and the tragedy of not being allowed to ascend on high and stand again before God in its pristine purity. For it flits about the world as a disembodied spirit, hovering between heaven and earth, and waiting for the chance of atonement or punishment. This comes to it by being re-embodied, and thus the soul migrates from one being to another. It is not made clear, however, whether the soul in this new incarnation remembers its former existence or whether it realizes it when it is leaving this second body, and continues its migration until all the blemish has been eliminated. This transmigration is thus the means of defeating the work of the evil spirits, of hastening the emptying of the divine treasury of unborn souls, and of bringing about the close of the cycle and the advent of the Messiah.

4. The justice of God.—(*a*) *Theories of rewards and punishments.*—The migration of souls is made to serve another and still higher and more direct purpose, the justice of God. The grave problem which has haunted every form of faith has been: how to reconcile the happiness of the sinner and the trials and sufferings of the pious and good with the justice of God. Every religion has endeavoured to form a theodicy. Most of them have relegated the solution of this problem to the life after death, finding the answer in rewards and punishments to be meted out in another world filled with bliss and unutterable torments. Such teaching presupposed the eternity of the soul, and in some form or another a combination of soul and body if the latter is to suffer the torment of hell, unless it was supposed that the souls would continue an individual conscious existence capable of enduring torments as well as rejoicing in heavenly bliss. This is, however, not the place to follow further this extremely complicated problem. It was, after all, a subtle way out of the difficulty, and it was not quite free from a possible reproach of selfishness. The goodness of the soul or the purity of life obtained for that individual soul alone happiness and bliss. No one else was directly benefited by it, except perhaps that such a good and pious man served as an example to others. But the world in general apparently had nothing from him, and his virtuous life led nowhere except to his own exaltation. Not so with the belief in the migration of the soul. Here, upon earth, in the sight of all, the sinner—whosoever he might be—had to expiate his sins. Here he had to suffer for the wrong committed, and here obtain, as it were, the pass for the heavenly regions. By this slow purification and reunion with the other purified souls, moreover, a cycle was completed, at the end of which the Messianic period would begin. By his actions the whole world would benefit, and the general progress and welfare of mankind would be hastened and consummated.

Thus the soul of Adam, because he had sinned, had to begin a period of migration through other bodies and thus pass through David, who, by the sin which he had committed with the wife of Uriah, impeded the complete purification of Adam's soul. But, by its final entry into the last descendant, the Messiah would also bring about the desired result meant by the divine plan when Adam, the first man, was created.

The soul of Abel passed into Moses, or, according to another theory, the soul of Adam passed into Moses, who sinned at the rock, and then into David, who sinned with Uriah's wife, and, finally, into the Messiah, thus linking the first with the last.

There are, as it were, successive incarnations of the same pre-existing soul, and for their sakes the world has been created. There cannot be any doubt that these views are extremely old. Simon Magus raises the claim of former existences, his soul passing through many bodies before it reaches that known as Simon. The Samaritan doctrine of the *taheb* teaches the same doctrine of a pre-existing soul which was given to Adam, but which, through successive 'incarnations' in Seth, Noah, and Abraham, reached Moses, for whom it was originally formed and for whose sake the world had been created. The element which is absent here is that of migration for the purpose of purification. The latter gives to 'migration of souls' a peculiar character. Not only is the world perfected thereby (*tiqqûn*), but the sinner expiates his sin in this world in the new existence in which his soul reappears. It may enter the body of a pious man, and by his good deeds he will cleanse the dross still adhering to the soul and facilitate its ascent

on high. If the pious suffer, it is only and solely for sins committed in a previous existence, and thus suffering is not a punishment for sins now committed, but a 'purgatory' for evil deeds of a former life. The explanation of the prosperous sinner is not quite so clear. Here use had been made of the other doctrine of punishment and reward after death. The sinner benefits from the good deeds that he had performed in a previous existence. He prospers now, so that *all* his reward is eaten up by him in this world, and nothing but punishment and tortures is reserved for him in the life after death. This presupposes that the soul of the wicked is beyond 'redemption' in this world, and is sent to Gehinnom for punishment. This seems to be the view taken by 'the Saba' in the *Zôhār* in the passage quoted above (§ 2). The cycle of the soul is thus broken. It is not made quite clear how it is to be completed; but it seems that, according to some, a soul which has just sunk to this lowest level of contamination, instead of being sent to Gehinnom, becomes an evil spirit in this world, which is anxious to enter living bodies for torment or for that punishment which starts from the lowest rung of the ladder and is to lead up to the highest without recourse to punishments in 'hell.' Such a soul becomes a *dibbūq*. To exorcize it, to free it from this temporary existence as quickly as possible, and thus hasten the new cycle of evolution, is a meritorious deed, a real *tiqqūn*, an 'improvement' and perfection.

No attempt is made to reconcile these two separate systems of punishment and reward; they are often mentioned side by side in the *Zôhār* and other kabbalistic treatises. In the Targum to Ec 8^5 the suffering of the pious and the happiness of the wicked have already been explained in a somewhat similar manner, inasmuch as the pious suffer for small sins in order to enter afterwards directly into heaven, and the sinner enjoys the fruit of some good deeds here, so that hereafter he is to go straight to torment and punishment.

(*b*) *Kabbalistic theory.*—The kabbalist, however, adds and superimposes the new theory of suffering and happiness, not for sins and good deeds performed in the person's lifetime, but for sins done during previous existences. The punishment was expected to fit the crime. Thus, if a man had sinned by his eyes, he would be reborn blind or suffering with his eyes, and, similarly, every other part of the body would then be affected by the sin committed through that part in the previous existence. Moral sins would have to be expiated in a similar manner; for, according to some of the oldest and most accredited teachers, transmigration is not limited to that from one human body to another human body. The soul of the wicked passes also into animal bodies corresponding with the character of the sin. In later schools the transmigration has been extended also to plants, stones, and metals. As an example of the former it may be stated that the soul of an adulterer passes into the body of a female stork, for it is believed that the storks punish adultery with death.[1] Thus an explanation was found for the prohibition of mixing various kinds of seeds and the cross-breeding of animals, for they disturbed the normal laws of nature and caused great suffering to the souls of such mixed products. Similarly, the peculiar command of marrying the deceased brother's wife (*yibbūm*) has its reason and justification in this doctrine of migration. The soul of the childless man cannot return to its source, for the soul has remained barren and is cut short in its earthly career before it has been able to pass through all the stages of purification. Hence the reason why the child born was to be called 'in the name' of the deceased, though it does not follow that it must bear the same name. In fact, the child of Ruth, which was a 'restorer of souls' to Naomi, did not bear the name of Ruth's dead husband. The new-born babe would receive the soul of the dead and continue his earthly life.

[1] The Heb. name for stork is *ḥăsīdhāh*, which, by a popular etymology, may be explained to mean 'the chaste' or 'the pious.'

5. **Number of migrations.**—There is a difference of opinion as to how many times a soul would migrate before it had run its entire course. The majority of kabbalists incline to the opinion that no soul migrates through more than three bodies. The real course is that in which the soul has performed the whole of the 613 commandments of the Law, by which alone perfection is attained. For the shortcomings in one existence the soul is punished in the next, and then also performs some good deeds. Others think that the soul passes through a greater number of changes. It is held that the fate of the soul of the sinner is decided after three migrations, at the end of which a thoroughly wicked soul becomes an evil spirit—a demon—while that of the pious may be reincarnated times without number. In this case the ascent of the soul from the lower to the higher degree of purity and perfection is asserted.

6. **Various other theories; purposes of metempsychosis.**—It is held that builders of the Tower of Babel were divided into three categories, which were punished in accordance with the degree of wickedness of which they were guilty. The first lost the unity of language, and were dispersed upon the face of the earth. The second—a more daring category—were changed into all kinds of animals, and their souls were sent into animal bodies. The third—the thoroughly wicked section—were changed into demons. The change of the body of Nebuchadrezzar into a wild animal, as told by Daniel (Dn 4^{33}), lent further countenance to the possibility of a human soul dwelling in an animal body. The rules for slaughtering special animals and for the blessing by which the cutting is accompanied rest upon the same principle of thereby possibly saving a penitent soul from dwelling too long in the body of an animal. It is liberated by a religious act which assists it in its further migration. All this forms part of the *tiqqūn*, the improvement and perfection of the world, the preparation for the Messianic rule. The covenant before Mt. Sinai was made by God with *all* the souls which He had created: 'Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but with him that standeth here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is *not here with us* this day' (Dt $29^{14f.}$), for He did not speak only to those who were there, but also to those who were not there on that day, in their material form, *i.e.* in human bodies.

By this migration of good souls to good men and contaminated souls to sinners and evil-doers a certain affinity of souls was established, which led to the identification of such souls in the various stages. As mentioned before, the soul of Abel or of Adam was that of Moses, and the souls of the ten brothers of Joseph became the souls of the ten martyrs whom the legend described as contemporaries. In fact, this tendency of recognizing the older souls in more recent bodies developed in the later schools of kabbalistic speculations established by Luria, Vital Calabrese, and others into a regular system. Lists have been drawn up and books have been compiled (*Sēpher hag-Gilgūlîm*, Frankfort, 1684), in which the reincarnations of the good and evil men of the past have been duly recorded. Such spiritual genealogies—if we may use such a term—have found their way even into bibliographical and historical compilations. In

addition to the complete reincarnation, there came the newer doctrine of impregnation (*ʿibbūr*). The soul of a good man is sometimes not strong enough to fight successfully the temptations of the world, and another soul is temporarily grafted upon that which he already possesses, so that it is made almost unassailable. The older teaching runs that the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. In the same manner a soul is grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vindication of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.

7. Date and origin.—This doctrine of migration is nowhere to be found systematically developed. Wherever it occurs, it is tacitly assumed as well known, and no explanation is given in detail. It has, therefore, been pieced together and reconstructed by the present writer mostly from the Zoharistic literature, viz. the *Zôhār*, the *Zôhār Ḥādāsh*, and the *Tiqqūnîm*, which represents a more or less homogeneous view on migration, whenever it is referred to. While these are by far the most complete writings, they are by no means the oldest. This brings us to the question of the date and probable origin of this doctrine among the Jews.

All the beginnings of esoteric teachings are lost in the mist of antiquity, and, when such doctrines finally see the light of day, they have, as a rule, a long history behind them. It is, therefore, a fallacy to date the origin of metempsychosis among the Jews from the time when it becomes known publicly in the 9th or 10th century. The masters of the occult science never doubted its Jewish character or its old origin. Was it not part of that heavenly mystery handed down from Adam on through all the great men of the past? With great ingenuity they endeavoured to find proofs for it in the Scriptures by means of an exegesis which was fantastic in the extreme. A few examples will suffice. They are taken at random from the *Zôhār*, and they are found in large numbers in Manasseh ben Israel, *Nishmat Ḥayîm*, bk. iv. chs. 8–10.

'Till thou return unto the ground' (Gn 3^{19}) is interpreted to mean that the body alone returns to the ground; the spirit, however, is reborn.

'Naked shall I return thither' (Job 1^{21}) is interpreted literally as meaning 'to the womb,' *i.e.* being reborn.

'The word which he commanded to a thousand generations' (Ps 105^{8}) is interpreted to mean that it refers to the same soul passing through innumerable generations, for God's command had been given once to all the souls, and these souls are reincarnated over and over again.

'One generation goeth, and another generation cometh' (Ec 1^{4}). The fact that the passing away of the generation is mentioned first is a proof that this must have existed before; otherwise it ought to read 'one generation cometh and another generation goeth.'

'Which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive' (Ec 4^{2}) is interpreted to mean that the living are still uncertain as to the future fate of the migration of their souls.

A proof of 'impregnation,' or the addition of a soul, is also deduced from the following verses: 'Ye shall therefore separate between the clean beast and the unclean,' etc. (Lv 20^{25}), meaning that a clean soul shall be added, not an unclean. 'Shall flocks and herds be slain for them, to suffice them?' etc. (Nu 11^{22}), is taken to mean the addition of souls. 'O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh,' etc. (Nu 16^{22}), means also those that are added to strengthen them 'should one mar sin' whose soul proved too weak, as it had no support. 'Doeth good to his own soul' (Pr 11^{17}) means that a man attaches another soul to himself.

The letters of the name of Ad(a)m have been taken as the initials for *A*dam, *D*avid, *M*oses, and *M*essias; hence it was proved that the soul of Adam passed through all these. The letters of the name M(o)sh(e)h (Moses) are the initials of *M*oses, *S*eth, and *H*abel (Abel); hence the soul of Abel passed through Seth to Moses. The numerical value of the letters of the names of the ten tribes corresponds to the numerical value of the names of the reputed ten sages who suffered martyrdom. These examples could easily be multiplied from later kabbalistic literature, but they all follow the same line of argument. There cannot, however, be the slightest doubt that the doctrine of metempsychosis was borrowed from other religious systems, and is not Jewish at all. It will remain an open question whether the denial of the resurrection of the dead attributed by Josephus (*Ant.* XVIII. i. 4 [16]) to the Sadducees implies denial also of reward and punishment, or whether it extended only to the life beyond the grave, and that they believed in the reward and punishment in this world. His allegation that they believed that the soul died with the body is too strange to be accurate. The vindication of God's justice would most easily be found if it means that the soul migrates from one body to another, as they did not deny the divine origin of the soul. Whatever the remoter origin of it may be, it cannot be gainsaid that the atmosphere of Palestine was saturated with mystical and esoteric teachings of every kind, one among them being that of metempsychosis. The Gnostics and Manichæans held fast to it; Neo-Platonism did not deny its possibility, and thus almost insensibly it crept into Judaism. The Palestinian Targumim show traces of it, inasmuch as in some places they speak of a second death (so Dt 33^{6}), which can only mean at least a life twice repeated upon earth; this is possible only if the soul migrates from one body to another (so also Baḥya, *ad loc.*; cf. also Targum to Is 22^{14}). Saadya Gaon († 942) in the 10th cent. inveighs against such tenets, held, as he says, by a certain Karaite sect, although it was probably rather a mystical heterodox section of Rabbanite Jews who believed also in the migration of souls. A few centuries later Abraham Bedaresi (1280), a rationalist philosopher, in his letter to R. Solomon ben Adreth, no. 8, protested against this doctrine; but they were the only opponents, for the wave of mysticism was rising steadily with the narrowing of the political outlook and the change of social conditions. With the appearance of the *Zôhār* the older kabbalistic literature was pushed into the background, and many an ancient mystical treatise was forgotten, unless it became embedded in the *Zôhār*—*e.g.*, the treatise by 'the Saba,' 'the venerable' (*i.e.* Rab. Hamnuna), in the form of a commentary on the Biblical section '*Mishpāṭîm*,' Ex 22, which is found now in the *Zôhār* Ex 94^{a}–114^{a}. In older writings, *Qānā* and *Bāhîr*, and in those of Naḥmanides (1263), R. Solomon ben Adreth (*c.* 1300), and Isaac of Akko (*c.* 1330), faint traces of this doctrine can be detected. They show that in these mystic schools echoes of the older theory of metempsychosis had been heard and recorded. Whenever referred to, it is always an ancient tradition. Since the 13th cent. the *Zôhār* has swayed the mind of the larger section of a Jewry despondent and broken by ruthless persecution.

The dark Middle Ages began for the Jews when they came to an end for the other nations in Europe. The writings of Rekanati (14th cent.)

and Bahya (14th cent.) prepared the way for the development.

Palestine—in a lesser degree the adjoining Babylon—seems to have been throughout the centre of mystical speculations. Thither Nahmanides had gone, and a great school flourished in Akko for some centuries from the 12th onwards. The flow of the Spanish emigrants at the end of the 16th cent. was also towards Palestine. In Safed there arose the school of Luria (1534–72; commonly known by the initials of his name Ari=*R*abbi *I*saac *A*shkenazi), Vital Calabrese, Cordovero, Poppers, and others. Among other doctrines, they developed, in the writings *Kavvānôth*, *Ēṣ Ḥayîm*, etc., much further the tenets of metempsychosis as a punishment for the wicked and an exalted reincarnation for the pious. The *tiqqūn*, or improvement of the world by delivering souls from the chain of migration, became one of the prominent features of this school, which led to that of the Hasidim. Remarkable legends of such deliverance are henceforth told. Every pious and great kabbalist performed them, none, however, so effectively as the master Luria himself. The history of the deliverance of such a soul in Safed is one of the most vivid autobiographies of a 'wandering soul' (first published in the *'Ēmeq ham-Melekh* of Nāphtali Herz, Amsterdam, 1648). The belief that certain persons are the *gilgūl* of other persons who had lived before them is still strongly held by those to whom the *Zōhār* is an inspired book and the teaching of divine revelation. This belief strengthens in them the concept of God's righteousness, and the conviction that, if the time were hastened for all the created souls to pass through the human body, the advent of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God upon earth would be hastened.

LITERATURE.—The books mentioned in the course of this attempt at a synthetical exposition of the doctrine of metempsychosis—the first of its kind—form the only literature that can profitably be mentioned. Manasseh ben Israel, *Nishmat Ḥayîm*, bk. iv., treats it apologetically. A. Franck, *La Kabbale*[3], Paris, 1892; A. Jellinek, *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Kabbala*, Leipzig, 1851–52; D. H. Joël, *Sohar*, Leipzig, 1849, have incidentally, of course, referred briefly also to this apparently unimportant section of kabbalistic Zoharistic speculation. See also literature to art. ḲABBĀLĀ.

M. GASTER.

TRANSMIGRATION (Teutonic).—It is clear that the doctrine of metempsychosis was held by the early Teutonic peoples, though the amount of evidence is limited and for the most part dates from a time when heathen beliefs, if not forgotten, were at least misunderstood. Such evidence as exists is chiefly derived from Scandinavian records. The only reference in early poetry is to be found in *Sigurðarkviþa hinn skamma*, 45, where Hogni refuses to hold Brynhild back from self-destruction:

'Let no man stay her from the long journey, and may she never be born again (*aptrborin*).'

More striking evidence for the belief is furnished by the prose passages contained in *Helgakviþa Hjorvarðssonar* and *Helgakviþa Hundingsbana*, ii. At the end of the former it is said that Helgi and Sváva, the hero and heroine, were born again (*endrborin*); in the latter we are told that the heroine Sigrún was Sváva reincarnate, and later that both she and her husband Helgi Hundingsbani were born again as Kára and Helgi Haddingjaskati. A reference is given to *Káraljóð*, a poem now unfortunately lost, which dealt with the adventures of these persons. Moreover, in the *Gautreks Saga*, c. vii., Starkaðr is reviled as an *endrborinn jotunn*, a 'giant' reincarnate; his grandfather Starkaðr is said to have been a *jotunn* (c. iii.).

With the introduction of Christianity metempsychosis came at last to be regarded as 'an old wives' tale.' For a time it still survived among the half-heathen population: to his horror St. Olaf found himself regarded as the reincarnation of a legendary king, one Olafr Geirstaðarálfr (*Flateyjarbók*, ii. 135).

It is not to be overlooked that in all these cases the men—though not the women—bear the same names in each incarnation. As among certain primitive peoples of the present day, the name is regarded as something more than a mere label; it is intimately connected with the soul of its possessor, so that a child inheriting the name of a dead person necessarily inherits the soul as well. An interesting reference to this belief may be cited from *Flateyjarbók*, i. 255: Thorsteinn Uxafót, a follower of Olafr Tryggvason, is visited in a dream by the ghost of a man called Brynjarr; it bestows a treasure on him and asks in return that one of Thorsteinn's children should be baptized under the name Brynjarr, since it desires a Christian reincarnation for its heathen soul.

In the *Islendinga Sogur* there are no actual references to metempsychosis, though the practice of naming children after lately deceased kinsmen (*Njals Saga*, ch. 89, *Eyrbyggja Saga*, ch. 12, *Laxdœla Saga*, chs. 36, 56) points to the existence of some such belief. But the passage in *Sturlunga Saga*, ix. 42—*þótte þeim nu Kolbeinn aptr kominn ok endrborinn*—is no true instance of this kind, since Thorgils Boðvarsson, referred to here, was born in 1226, nineteen years before the death of Kolbeinn Arnorsson, of whom he seemed to be the reincarnation. To the present day, however, it is believed in Norway and Iceland that, if a ghost appears to a pregnant woman in her sleep, it is seeking a namesake (*gaar efter Navnet*); and accordingly the child is baptized with the name of the dead person (cf. K. Maurer, *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, v. 99). Sophus Bugge, moreover, states that he had heard *reise upp atte* ('raise up again') used in the west part of Telemarken with reference to the naming of a child after a dead person (*Home of the Eddic Poems*, London, 1899, p. 333).

Among the other Teutonic peoples the evidence for anything in the nature of metempsychosis is very meagre. An Anglo-Saxon charm (T. O. Cockayne, *Leechdoms, Wortcunning, and Starcraft of Early England*, London, 1864–66, iii. 66 ff.; C. W. M. Grein, *Bibliothek der angelsächs. Poesie*, Göttingen, 1857–65, i. 326 ff.) advises a woman who cannot bring forth a child to step thrice over the grave of a dead man, using an incantation for the safe delivery of her offspring. It is a question much in need of investigation whether the same idea can be traced in certain usages said to be practised in connexion with burial-places of the heathen age in various parts of Northern Europe.

It may be mentioned in conclusion that Appian (*Hist. Rom.* iv., 'de Rebus Gallicis,' 3) describes the Germans who followed Ariovistus as 'scorning death because of their hope of rebirth' (*θανάτου καταφρονηταὶ δι' ἐλπίδα ἀναβιώσεως*). In view of what is said of the Gauls by Diodorus, v. 28, and Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 454 ff. (with the scholia), it is not unlikely that the reference here is to a belief in metempsychosis, though one cannot deny the possibility that Appian's statement may be due to a misunderstanding of the Valhalla doctrine.

LITERATURE.—G. Storm, *Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi*, ix., new ser., v. [1892] 199–222; K. Maurer, *Zeitschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde*, v. [1895] 93 ff.; P. Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 35–37; O. L. Jiriczek, 'Seelenglauben und Namengebung,' in *Mitt. der Schles. Gesellsch. für Volkskunde*, i. 3 [Breslau, 1895] 30–35.

BRUCE DICKINS.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION.—See EUCHARIST.

TRAPPISTS.—Trappists is the popular name for the Reformed Cistercians, or Cistercians of the Strict Observance, now the chief division of the order.

The art. MONASTICISM[1] outlines the successive reforms named after Benedict, Cluny, Cîteaux. By 1600 the Cistercians themselves had yielded to the spirit of luxury, despite the restoration in Spain promoted by Martino de Vargas. Though Richelieu and Mazarin furthered many attempts to recall them to the letter of their vows, and though their centralized constitution might have facilitated this, a general reform was refused. Here and there a few abbeys did return to the ideals of St. Stephen Harding, the Jansenist reform of St. Cyr and of Port Royal being well known. Armand-Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé (1626–1700), abbot *in commendam* of La Trappe from the age of ten, abandoned court life in 1662 and entered one of the reformed abbeys as a novice. Two years later, having again professed, he came to take charge of his own inaccessible Norman abbey. Finding that the few monks had not shared his experience and would not share his ideals, he pensioned them off and colonized the place from other reformed abbeys. The community improved on the original austerities, taking only one vegetarian meal daily, abstaining from literature and from speech except for urgent purposes. The ideals were published by de Rancé in his *Traité de la sainteté et des devoirs de la vie monastique* (1683), and in his posthumous *Règlemens généraux de l'abbaye de la Trappe* (1701); but only a single community of nuns and two Italian monasteries adopted them. For a century they were unimportant, though other Reformed Cistercians undertook missions to Africa which had some temporary success.

The French Revolution broke up the home; the abbey was suppressed, and the premises were converted into a foundry for cannon. This was the real birth of the order. In 1791 Dom Augustine de Lestrange, master of the novices, took a score of monks to Val Sainte, Switzerland, imposing a rule stricter than ever; postulants flocked in; colonies were sent to many lands; a congregation was formed, and Dom Augustine was appointed father abbot. When the Trappists were hunted to Poland, Germany, and Italy, their zeal only increased. A nunnery was formed at Stapehill near Wimborne; a party of monks that wandered through Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois returned to France on the fall of Napoleon, occupying La Trappe and Belle Fontaine; presently five priories were established in France, and a great college at Soligni. Before his death in 1827 Dom Augustine saw abbeys grow up in Belgium and Italy, besides two more in France. One was founded at Coalville in Leicestershire and named after the great Bernard. The cowl of his friend Alberic was taken in 1848 by an expedition from La Meilleraye in Brittany, which settled in Kentucky at an abbey named Gethsemane. Mount Melleray in Ireland sent another colony to Dubuque in Iowa, and both establishments thrive, though all the fathers are aliens. A second Irish abbey arose at Roscrea in Co. Tipperary.

Outward disasters again intensified the spiritual life. La Trappe was destroyed by fire in Aug. 1871; 1450 fathers and brothers were again expelled from France in 1880; but the austere ideals were embraced by nearly all Cistercians outside Austria-Hungary. After two constitutional changes they were formally recognized in 1892 as the Order of Reformed Cistercians, with an abbot-general at Rome; and this success was crowned six years later by the purchase of the original premises of Cîteaux. In 1903 they were expelled from France in common with most other congregations; two communities went to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, one to Oregon, one to Brazil; two tiny groups have taken refuge near Kingsbridge and Salisbury. Belle Fontaine has endeavoured to uphold the agricultural ideals of St. Benedict, especially by its Canadian offshoots at La Trappe, where the Ottawa joins the St. Lawrence, at Lake St. John, and in Manitoba. No establishment in England offers even to its co-religionists any educational, medical, or philanthropic service. Settlements in Japan, China, Syria, Asia Minor, Algeria, Belgian Congo, and Natal have undertaken mission work, but no impartial observer has anything to say as to results. The finest Protestant tribute is that an abbey is 'an asylum for the poor and helpless, the shipwrecked, the conscience-stricken, and the broken-hearted.'[1]

Attached to each of the 71 monasteries and annexes is a body of brothers who do the rougher field work; in all there are about 2000 of these, and 1600 professed fathers. Twenty-one priories contain 2000 nuns and lay sisters. Three Italian monasteries still follow the rule of de Rancé as once used at La Trappe, but do not belong to the Reformed Cistercians; they have only 50 members.

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W. T. WHITLEY.

TRAVANCORE.—Travancore (Malayālam Tiruvitānkūr, 'place where the goddess of prosperity resides'), a native state in the extreme south-west of the Indian peninsula, takes its name from Tiruvankod, 30 miles south of the capital, Trivandrum.

'It has been truly remarked that "it will be difficult to name another land which, within so narrow limits, combines so many, so varied, and such precious natural blessings."'[2]

1. History.—Travancore is said to have formed part of the ancient kingdom of Kerala. During the 11th cent. A.D. it was conquered by the Cholās; in the 13th cent. it was invaded by the Pāndyās of Madura. The present kingdom was founded in the first half of the 18th cent. by Mārtānda Varma, and in 1795 it became a protected state under the British Government. Since then it has enjoyed prosperity under a well-regulated government, and it has been conspicuous for the maintenance of order, religious toleration, and encouragement of education.

2. Area and population.—The area of the state is 7593 sq. miles, and the total population at the census of 1911 was 3,428,975, of whom 93·8% are rural and 6·2% urban. The density of the population is high: 452 per sq. mile for the whole area, and 686 if mountains, lakes, and forests are ex-

[1] Vol. viii. p. 792 f.

[1] J. L. Allen, *Century Magazine*, new ser., xiv. 484.

[2] *IGI* xxiv 2 f.

cluded. The people are of the usual S. Indian Dravidian type, and they preserve many characteristic usages, in particular the matriarchal forms of the household and system of marriage.

'Among the Marumakkatāyom [Malayālam *maru*, 'next,' 'other,' *makkal*, 'children,' *tāyam*, 'portion'] Hindus the family is matriarchal, *i.e.*, traces its descent from a common ancestress. The Tarwād [Malayālam *taravātu*, *tara*, 'village,' *pātu*, 'place'], as the family is called, consists of brothers and sisters and the descendants of the latter along the female line. The eldest male member, called the Kāranavan ['originator'], manages the Tarwād. In such a system the wives and children of the male members have no place. It may happen, however, that a Kāranavan may be allowed to bring in his wife and children to live in the Tarwād, but this is not necessary, nor have they any legal status in the family. The male members who are married usually visit their wives in the houses of the latter. When, however, under modern conditions, they feel able and inclined to support themselves, living apart from the Tarwād, they settle with their wives in houses of their own. In this way the putting up of separate homesteads receives a stimulus. But the Tarwād, as such, is split up only when a partition takes place with the consent of all the members. Among Makkatāyom Hindus the joint family does not generally continue single after the lifetime of the parent, especially the male parent. At the death of the father the sons divide and go and live in separate houses with their wives and children, the mother residing with one of the sons in the original household. The unmarried sons, if any, usually live with the mother. In regard to the Nampūtiri Brāhmans, however, the eldest son alone marries, the other sons living with him in the family.'[1]

The chief castes are the Nāyar ([*q.v.*] honorific plural of Nāyan; Skr. *nāyaka*, 'leader') numbering 592,655, best known on account of their peculiar marriage customs.[2] The Izhuvans or Illavans, who take their name from Izham, the Malayālam name for Ceylon, are immigrants from that island, cultivate coco-nut and palmyra palms, make the drink known as toddy (Skr. *tāla*, 'the palmyra tree'), and distil country spirits; they number 546,265. The Pulayans (*pula*, 'pollution'), numbering 185,314, are agricultural labourers. The Channān or Shānān (Tamil *shāru*, 'toddy') cultivate the palmyra palm and make coarse sugar. Brāhmans number 55,643; among them the most remarkable are the Nambūrī, Nambūtirī, or Nambūdrī (Malayālam *nambu*, 'the Veda'; *othu*, 'to teach'; *tiri*, Skr. *śri*, 'holy'), who aim at following the original Vedic rites and practise elaborate rules of purification, while they allow the younger sons of the family to enter into polyandrous relations with Nāyar women.

3. Religion.—Classified by religion, the population consists of: Hindus, 2,282,617, 66·57%; Christians, 903,868, 26·36%; Muhammadans, 226,617, 6·61%; animists, 15,617, ·46%; Jews, Buddhists, and Jains, 100.

(*a*) *Hindus.*—Of the triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, the cult of Viṣṇu is most popular; in the form of Ananta Padmanābha ('the endless, from whose navel springs the lotus') he is the patron deity of the state, with a famous temple at the capital Trivandrum, which is visited by crowds of pilgrims. Among the minor deities the following are the chief: Vighneśvara ('obstacle Lord'), the Gaṇeśa or Ganapati of other parts of India; Subhramaṇya, Skanda, Kārttikeya, or Velāyudha, like Gaṇeśa a son of Śiva, the guardian who protects the helpless and punishes the wicked—a cult special to the Tamil and Malayālam peoples; Śāsta ('ruler'), Aiyappan or Aiyanār ('honourable father'), the most popular minor deity, chief of the ghosts (*bhūta*), who rides over the land mounted on a horse or elephant, sword in hand, to disperse all obnoxious spirits. Besides these the lower classes worship a host of godlings or minor spirits, male and female, the females attendants of the goddess Bhadrakālī, the males classed as followers of Śiva.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 41.

[2] H. H. Risley, *The People of India*[2], London, 1915, p. 206 ff.; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, London, 1912–13, ii. 22 ff.; V. Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, ii. 352 ff.; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, v. 307 ff.; E. Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*, London, 1891, pp. 116 f., 452 f.

(*b*) *Christians.*—These show a notable increase, from 498,542 in 1881 to 903,868 in 1911. The Hindu compiler of the *Travancore Census Report* for 1911 writes:

'It may be remarked here that the degeneration of the socio-economic institution of caste that showed itself in the sequestration and neglect of the labouring classes, the indifference of lay and ecclesiastical Hindu bodies in the matter of the preservation of their faith as a living force in the intellectual and moral life of the people, the atmosphere of unsuspecting toleration one breathes on all sides, the great sympathy and help accorded by the rulers of the State, the status which the religion itself enjoys, and last but not least, the self-sacrificing zeal and devotion of the missionaries as a class and of the pioneers in particular—all these gave vigour to the work and assured the results. While natural increase has been unsteady and irregular, propagandist activity has been such as to make it difficult to reduce to definite proportions the augmentation which it succeeds in bringing about—so rapid and great it has been.'[1]

The following are the details of the Christian population: Syro-Roman, 293,407; Syrian Jacobite, 202,059; Roman Catholic, 173,724; Congregationalist, 81,573; Reformed Syrian, 74,866; Anglican, 56,251; Salvationist, 16,794. The Church Missionary Society commenced work in 1816, the London Missionary Society in 1806, the Salvation Army in 1891.

(*c*) *Muslims.*—Muhammadan missionaries are said to have visited Malabar as early as A.D. 710, and the story of the conversion of the last of the Perumāls suggests that traders from Arabia arrived as early as the 8th cent. A.D.[2] In more recent times, under the rule of Haidar 'Alī and Tīpū Sultān of Mysore (A.D. 1761–99), compulsory proselytism added large numbers to the faith. The present Muhammadans are either indigenous, immigrants from the Coromandel Coast, or recent settlers from Arabia, Sindh, Gujarāt, Kachh, or Bombay, who came for purposes of trade. The first differ little from the Hindu population except in matters of belief. Those who were converted by the Musalmān kings of Mysore are known as Moplah (Malayālam Māppila, probably 'great child,' an honorary title conferred on converts), or Jonaka, Shonaga, a corruption of Yavana, 'Greek.' The Moplahs are notorious fanatics, and in several cases bodies of them have fiercely resisted British troops. The Mettan are descendants of old Musalmān merchants and of their converts. The Tulukkan (Skr. Turashka, 'Turk') belong to the immigrant class.

(*d*) *Animists.*—Animism prevails widely among the hill tribes. Spirits (*chāvu*, *chāvar*, 'death,' 'the dead') are invoked by those afflicted with disease or suffering from starvation, a long string of the names of ancestors being recited. These spirits are of two kinds: (1) those who have met with a violent death from wild animals; (2) those who have died before the age of seven. They are propitiated by animal sacrifice and oblations of spirituous liquor on a platform erected for the purpose. The forest spirits must be propitiated before a tree is cut, and special patches of the forest are left uncut because they are supposed to be inhabited by some spirit. The hill people also worship godlings who possess neither priests nor temples, the oldest member of the family offering sacrifices and oblations to trees in which they are believed to dwell. Totemism has not been recognized among the hill tribes, but they respect the cow and will not kill the elephant, the vehicle and manifestation of Śāsta. In November–December, the harvest season, they worship their weapons and tools, bows, arrows, sickles, and knives

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[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 195.

[2] *Ib.* p. 104 ff.

of Bhāratavarṣa or India, London, 1893; S. Mateer, *Native Life in Travancore*, do. 1883, *The Land of Charity*, do. 1871.

W. CROOKE.

TREASON.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

TREATIES.—1. Their place in international law and ethics.—The history of treaties, as formal agreements between nations, ratified by the respective governments, throws some light on the development of international ethics; and the formulæ and ceremonies connected with the sanctions employed at various times, to give validity to the pacts, are of interest to the historian of religion. Throughout the whole of antiquity the gods presided over all treaty-making, and the oath was a predominant factor; the transition from ancient to modern times is marked by a steady decline of this religious element. For the present purpose the juristic aspect of treaties may be ignored. But it is necessary to define their general position in regard to law. They belong to the sphere of what is known as 'international law'; but the rules known as international law 'lie on the extreme frontier of law,'[1] and it is only more convenient, not necessarily more correct, to treat them as a branch of law rather than of morals. The difficulty of regarding them as properly a branch of law lies in the fact that there is no fixed authority (unless it be a universal League of Nations) that can lay down and enforce these rules as between nations, and the rules are liable to be broken with impunity by any nation that has the power and the will to defy them. No pact between two nations can bind a third which was not a consenting party. But treaties, which are one of the most important means by which 'international law' is laid down, are valuable as a record of the development of morality, for the very reason that they 'express national opinion in a peculiarly deliberate and solemn manner.'[2] The history of treaties accordingly illustrates the growing sense of nations—which, by a legal fiction or a bold metaphor, are moral persons[3]—for morality in international relations. It also illustrates the constant struggle to discover some means of enforcing the observance of pacts.

'Upon a scrupulous fidelity in the observation of Treaties, not merely in their letter but in their spirit, obviously depends, under God, the peace of the world. *Pacta sunt servanda* is the pervading maxim of International, as it was of Roman Law.'[4]

In the earliest times of which we have record this fidelity was reinforced by religious ceremonies, calling of the gods to witness, with oaths and imprecations.[5] In modern times these religious appeals, as also the giving of pledges, hostages, and the like, have generally fallen into desuetude except in the case of treaties with savages, and the observance of treaties has been left to the conscience of the parties; but, as this could no more be relied upon than when it required to be fortified by oaths, one of the chief objects of treaties in modern times has been the establishment of a balance of power in one form or other, so as to make the violation of them a risky undertaking. Finally, the impossibility of obtaining permanent equilibrium between groups of nations has raised the question of a universal League of Nations, which, in the form which it has assumed in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, may be regarded as the highest development that the treaty has so far reached, since, by creating a determinate authority capable of enforcing the rules, it seeks to merge international law and (so far as law can make men moral) international morality in one. Previously to this treaty, little had been done in this direction beyond the general recognition that promises and signatures are futile, and that the only security lies in 'the establishment of a just and stable order.'[1] But how to ensure that the wrongdoer who, feeling himself strong enough, wantonly violates his word and destroys the peace of the world or breaks the laws of war shall be punished has seemed an insoluble problem, since his very act implies an assurance of impunity. W. G. F. Phillimore suggested[2] that each state that is a party to a treaty should contract with each and every other state that is a party, that, in the event of war between it and any other state that is a party to the treaty, it will observe towards the state with which it is at war all the agreed rules of the laws of war; and, if the rules are violated, then any other state party to the treaty may consider it an offence against itself that the law has been violated, such violation being considered an indirect injury, by reason of the lowering of the standard of conduct. The weak point of this arrangement is that interference on the side of law and order is merely permissive; it requires to be made imperative, and its scope extended so as to cover the maintenance of the peace of nations, and not merely the observance of the laws of war.

It is generally agreed that 'international morality—if not international law—calls upon every State to use every means at its disposal, without giving offence—for example, friendly suggestion, moral suasion—to prevent the outbreak of war, or, when it has begun, to help the contending parties to compose their differences. A war between two nations directly or indirectly concerns all nations, members as they are of the international community. There is not and there cannot be any principle of law, of ethics or of religion, prohibiting peaceful States from doing their utmost to bring about a cessation of carnage and devastation.'[3]

The League of Nations converts this negative into a positive injunction to interpose, and removes the offence from the most forcible methods of doing so. For art. 16 of the Covenant of the League declares that any resort to war in breach of its covenants by a member of the League is an act of war against all other members, which is to be met by a complete severance of relations of every kind, personal, financial, and commercial, with the offender, supported by the necessary military force. The provisions of this article may even be extended to cover the case of a state which is not a member of the League and refuses, in the case of a dispute, to adopt the obligations of membership. It is obvious that even this machinery will not suffice to suppress the ambitions of a state that feels itself strong enough to defy the greater part of the world; but it is equally obvious that such a state will be less ready to take the plunge than it would be if no such machinery existed.

Although the experience of the Great War of 1914–18 dashed the high hopes which were entertained as a result of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, it is unreasonable to regard those proceedings as a mere 'misprint in the world's history.' They were attended by the representatives of nations so numerous and so important that it was possible to say that in the result of their deliberations 'we have what may be regarded as the common judgment of mankind expressed in the most solemn manner in which an international engagement between nations is capable of expression' on such vital questions as the desirability of substituting arbitration for war.[4] For the first time, too, an international court was established

[1] W. E. Hall, *Treatise of International Law*[4], Oxford, 1895, p. 17.
[2] *Ib.* p. 9.
[3] De Garden, *Hist. générale des traités de paix*, vol. i. p. ii.
[4] R. J. Phillimore, *Commentaries upon International Law*, i. 56.
[5] See artt. OATH.

[1] W. G. F. Phillimore, *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace*, p. 146.
[2] *Ib.* p. 167.
[3] Coleman Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 75.
[4] Choate, *The Two Hague Conferences*, p. 34.

to give effect to the principle agreed upon by the conference. Now it is true that this solemn judgment was abrogated by the wanton action of a single one among the signatories, and the whole fabric of international relations tottered. But the foundation remains, to which The Hague Conferences contributed certain elements of solidity, if only by producing unanimity among a greater number of nations than had ever before been parties to a treaty. Such unanimity was secured again among an even greater number, and, when a fresh start was made in 1919, the problem of securing adequate sanction for the engagements between the nations by means of a League of Nations was attacked with the more insight and chance of success, because it was known wherein the old conferences had failed.

Among the chief reasons for the failure of treaties to preserve the peace are the misconception of their object as the termination of war merely, and not also the establishment of permanent peace, and the lack of elasticity in their terms. If they are drawn merely to settle the questions outstanding at the time, without care being taken not to sow the seeds of fresh conflict by imposing harsh conditions, restraining progress and liberty and ignoring the claims of the peoples concerned, they do little more than temporarily suppress forces which break out with the greater violence at the first opportunity. For the same reason, they should not be so rigidly drawn as to prevent reconsideration in the light of new conditions, and should include the necessary machinery for such reconsideration.[1]

2. Historical development: antiquity.—(*a*) The earliest treaties of which we have any detailed record relate to the two cities of Lagash and Umma, on either side of the Shatt-el-Hai in Babylonia.[2]

Entemena, patesi of Lagash (about 2850 B.C.), records an arbitration of earlier date in the time of Mesilim, king of Akkad. The actual patesis of Lagash and Umma are not named; the dispute is settled by the gods; the god Enlil presides over the conference and invites the parties to make the treaty; the boundary is fixed at his command by Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and by the city-god of Umma; even Mesilim acts only at the command of his goddess Kadi. This is obviously an extreme instance of the religious sanction; the parties are supposed to live and move and have their being entirely in their local gods.

A second treaty between the same two cities was made about 2900 B.C. by Eannatum, patesi and king of Lagash, and Enakalli, patesi of Umma. A great boundary-ditch was dug, and the plain of Gu-edin, which was in dispute, was restored to Ningirsu, god of Lagash. Shrines to Enlil, Ningirsu, and other gods were erected along the new frontier beside the pillars of delimitation, and it was doubtless at the altars of these shrines that the parties took oaths in ratifying the treaty: 'On the men of Umma have I, Eannatum, cast the great net of Enlil. I have sworn the oath, and the men of Umma have sworn the oath to Eannatum.' He invokes the vengeance of Enlil on the men of Umma if they 'alter this word.' He also invokes other gods, to whom he has made suitable offerings, to enforce the treaty.

In the third treaty, the terms of which were imposed on Umma by Entemena of Lagash (about 2850 B.C.), we have a similar imprecation: 'If the men of Umma ever violate the boundary-ditch of Ningirsu or that of Nina, in order to lay violent hands on the territory of Lagash . . . then may Enlil destroy them, and may Ningirsu cast over them his net, and set his hand and foot upon them.' The imprecations recall those which are invoked on the violators of Babylonian boundary-stones; naturally the same means were employed to secure the validity of legal engagements of all kinds.

(*b*) The famous treaty between Rameses II. and Khetasar (Hattusil), prince of the Hittites (*c.* 1300 B.C.), is recorded in three copies, of which two are hieroglyphic, at Karnak and in the Ramesseum, while the third is the Hittite-Babylonian version, or rather fragments of two copies thereof, from Boghaz Keui.[3] Two Hittite envoys brought the text of the treaty written on silver tablets, the design of which is described:

On one side 'a figure in the likeness of Setekh, embracing the likeness of the great chief of the Kheta, surrounded by the words: "The seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens; the seal of the treaty which Khetasar . . . made." That which is within the frame of the design is the seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens. That which is on its other side is a figure in the likeness of the goddess of Kheta, embracing the figure of the princess of Kheta, surrounded by the following words: "The seal of the Sun-god of the city of Arinna, the lord of the land; the seal of Petikhep, the princess of the land of Kheta, the daughter of the land of Kezweden, the priestess (?) of Ernen, the mistress of the land, the votaress of the goddess." That which is within the frame of the design is the seal of the Sun-god of Arinna, the lord of every land.'

Thus the treaty is reinforced by being placed under the seals of the gods themselves. In addition we find the following invocations, corresponding to similar paragraphs usually attached to other documents which were intended to be permanently valid:

'As for the words of this contract . . . a thousand gods, male gods and female gods, of those of the land of Kheta, together with a thousand gods, male gods and female gods of those of the land of Egypt, they are with me as witnesses to these words: "the Sun-god, lord of the heavens," and various other gods, including those "of the mountains and the rivers of the lands of Kheta and of Egypt, of the heavens, the earth, the great sea, the winds, and the clouds."' These are invoked to desolate the house, the land, and the subjects of the violator of the treaty, and, as for him who keeps it, to preserve his health, and his life, together with his issue, his land, and his subjects.

(*c*) The covenants recorded in the OT are for the most part between single persons; but certain forms and ceremonies were doubtless common to such covenants and international treaties. Such were the setting up of a pillar and a heap of stones as witness, the invocation of the God of Abraham and the God of Nahor, Jacob's oath 'by the fear of his father Isaac,' and the sacrifice and eating of bread in the mountain, in the covenant between Jacob and Laban (Gn 31^{44-54}). The treaty between Isaac and Abimelech (Gn $26^{28ff.}$) is similarly accompanied by feasting and oath-taking. In Joshua's peace with the people of Gibeon the princes of the congregation swore by the Lord God of Israel (Jos $9^{15.\ 19}$). The ceremony of cutting an animal in twain and passing between the halves was used by the Hebrews in covenants between God and man (Gn $15^{7ff.}$, Jer $34^{18ff.}$),[1] as by other nations in connexion with purification and oath-taking; but the derivation of the phrase כרת ברית from this division of a victim is doubtful, to 'cut a covenant' being rather parallel to ὅρκια τάμνειν and *fœdus ferire* or *percutere* or *icere*;[2] whether these phrases refer to the cutting down of the victim, however, seems uncertain.

(*d*) The writers of antiquity give details of a number of more or less picturesque ceremonies accompanying oath-taking in treaties between less civilized nations. Of these the most important is the blood-covenant.[3]

The Scythians mixed wine with their own blood in a bowl, dipped their weapons into it, took oaths and uttered imprecations, and finally pledged each other in the mixture.[4] The Arabians made the incision with a sharp stone, smeared the blood on seven stones, and invoked Orotalt (Dionysos) and Alilat (Urania).[5] The *locus classicus* is Tac. *Ann.* xii. 47 (the Armenians suck each other's blood): 'id foedus arcanum habetur, quasi mutuo cruore sacratum.' It was also in later days a Saracen custom, and it was a reproach to Isaac Angelus that he conformed to it in making peace with that nation.[6] Other ceremonies are collected by Dumont.[7] In China the

[1] Graham Bower, in *Grotius Soc. Papers*, iii.

[2] L. W. King, *Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, pp. 101 ff., 126 ff., 164 ff.

[3] R. von Scala, *Die Staatsverträge*, i. no. 13; *Mitt. der deutsch. Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin*, no. 35, p. 13 ff.; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905-07, iii. [1906] 373-391; S. Langdon and A. H. Gardiner, *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, vi. [1920] 179-205. The passage quoted is from the Egyptian version, in which the Egyptian scribe has turned the Hittite sun-goddess into a male deity.

[1] E. J. Pilcher, in *PSBA* xl. [1918] 8-14.

[2] E. McClure, *ib.* p. 41.

[3] See art. BROTHERHOOD (Artificial).

[4] Herod. iv. 70.

[5] Herod. iii. 8; cf. i. 74: Medes and Lydians.

[6] Nicetas Choniata, *de Isaacio Angelo*, ii. 5 (536); *PG* cxxxix 775.

[7] *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. i. p. xxxiv ff.

blood-covenant was also in use, and treaties were confirmed by oaths and imprecations and accompanied by the sacrifice of an ox. In a treaty of 544 B.C. the formula is: 'May the gods of the hills and the rivers, the spirits of former emperors and dukes, and the ancestors of our seven tribes and twelve States watch over its fulfilment. If any one prove unfaithful may the all-seeing gods smite him, so that his people shall forsake him, his life be lost, and his posterity cut off.'[1]

(*e*) Coming to the Western nations, we find that the international relations depicted in the Homeric poems, though primitive, include the making of truces, with oaths, for the burning of the dead;[2] oaths, invocation of the gods, imprecation on the treaty-breaker, with sacrifice and feasting, also accompany a treaty between Greeks and Trojans.[3] In the historical period in Greece we find certain primitive survivals, as when Aristeides administered the oath to the Greeks and took it himself on behalf of the Athenians, throwing pieces of hot iron (*μύδροι*) into the sea. But as a rule the oaths are the ordinary ones (*νόμιμοι ὅρκοι*) in the name of the chief gods (*ὅρκιοι*); or, as in the alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantineia, and Elis (420 B.C.), the instruction is that each party should swear its most binding national oath over perfect victims (*τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων*). The tendency is to increase the number of gods invoked, in the futile hope of increasing the force of the oath.

In a treaty between Carthage and Philip v.[4] in 216 B.C. the following deities are invoked: Zeus, Hera, Apollo, the Genius (*δαίμων*) of the Carthaginians, Heracles and Iolaos, Ares, Triton, Poseidon, the gods of the army (*θεοὶ οἱ συστρατευόμενοι*), the Sun, Moon, and Earth, the rivers, harbours, and waters, all the gods who rule Carthage, all the gods who rule Macedon and the rest of Greece, all the gods who preside over the campaign (*οἱ κατὰ στρατείαν*). The Magnesians in allying themselves with Smyrna (mid. 3rd cent. B.C.)[5] swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Ares, Athene Areia, Artemis Tauropolos, the Sipylene Mother, Apollo ὁ *ἐν Πάνδοις*, all the other gods and goddesses, and the Good Fortune of King Seleucus. The Smyrnæans substitute Aphrodite Stratonikis for Apollo and omit the Good Fortune of the king.

The inscriptions frequently omit the instructions as to the gods in whose names the oaths are to be taken, prescribing merely the nature of the undertaking, as:

'I will fight for the Bottiæans who enter into the pact, and will keep the alliance with them faithfully and without guile, showing all zeal according to the pact; and I will bear no ill-will because of what has happened in the past.'[6]

Formulæ of imprecation frequently accompany the oath; in the simplest form (as in the alliance between Athens and Corcyra in 375 B.C.)[7] it is: 'If I keep the oath, may much good befall me, but if not, the contrary'; but destruction is sometimes invoked on the perjurer and all his house.[8] The inscriptions give some information as to the machinery for administering the oath.[9] The more distinguished the oath-taker, the more solemn was the oath. Frequently the oath was taken *en masse*; thus in the peace with Selymbria (408 B.C.)[10] the Athenian generals, trierarchs, hoplites, and 'any one else who was there' took the oath for Athens, while the whole people of the Selymbrians swore on the other side. Provision was sometimes made to keep the consciences of the parties alive by a periodical renewal of the oath—*e.g.*, at each Olympiad (Eretria and Histiæa)[11] or every year (Athens and Dionysius I.).[12]

The gradual moralization of international relations in the Greek world is well illustrated by the treaties of *asylia*, which have for their object to do away with the rough-and-ready methods of reprisals between individuals or states.[1] The most famous instance is the treaty between Œantheia and Chaleion (5th cent.), restricting seizures to the open sea, imposing fines for breach of the regulations, and prescribing the proper tribunals for trying cases.[2] The Greek attitude to the ethics of treaties does not differ from that of other nations; practice also, as usual, fails to conform to precept, and there is the customary laying of the blame for breach of oath on the other party.

Archidamos before Platæa calls the gods and heroes of the Platæans to witness that it was they and not the Lacedæmonians who first broke their oath.[3] The Athenians took the trouble to record a breach of faith by the Lacedæmonians on the stone on the Acropolis which bore the text of the broken treaty.[4] Again, the Athenians and Ceians inscribed on a stone the names of certain people of Iulis who had broken faith and been condemned to death; these people, however, returning to Ceos, tore up the stone; and, finally, the Athenians again provided for the restoration of the stone with the names of the offenders (363 B.C.).[5]

(*f*) Roman usage shows, as might be expected from the Roman legal genius, a more highly organized conception of international relations. The whole procedure of making treaties was laid down, and carried out by a definite body of officials, the college of *fetiales*, whose function was[6] to be the guardians of good faith in international relations.[7] This religious body represented the Roman people in all public international acts, such as making war and peace. Their origin was early, and was attributed to one or other of the kings; in fact neighbouring communities, such as the Latins and Samnites, had analogous magistrates, so that the institution must have been Italic in origin. The derivation of their name is uncertain. There were twenty in the college, one from each *curia* of the two primitive tribes, Ramnes and Titienses, men of good family, in early days at least of course non-plebeians. Their head was known as the *magister fetialium*. A fetial mission for contracting a peace consisted of at least two, the *pater patratus* and the *verbenarius*. The procedure was as follows, supposing that the peace was to be made outside Rome.

The *verbenarius* inquired whether he and the *pater patratus* were to make peace; if so, he asked leave to take the *verbenæ* (*herba pura*, or *sagmina*), *i.e.* a piece of turf from the soil of the Capitol, which rendered the persons of the mission inviolable (we may compare the legal fiction by which the site of an embassy is now considered to be the territory of the nation it represents). The fetials also carried with them sacred vessels, the sceptre of Jupiter Feretrius, and a flint knife (representing Jupiter Lapis, a primitive touch) from his temple. The *pater patratus* wore priest's clothing, not of linen, and a woollen fillet on his head. The *verbenarius* selected him from his colleagues by touching his head with the *sagmina*. They proceeded to the place selected, and, in presence of the generals and armies, and the fetials of the enemy, the terms of peace were read, and the *pater patratus* swore to them on the sceptre of Jupiter Feretrius, calling to witness Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, and all present. He then slew a pig[8] with the flint knife, invoking death on the Roman people if they should break the peace. Then he threw away the stone (a detail recalling the throwing away of the axe in the Attic Buphonia) saying: 'If I wittingly violate my oath, may all others prosper, while Jupiter casts me out, even as I cast away this stone.'

The scene of the swine-sacrifice by fetials is represented on Roman coins of the time of Augustus commemorating the ancient treaty between Rome and the Gabines, and an analogous sacrifice by warriors, evidently engaged in making a treaty of some kind, is a common type on other Roman coins, as well as on those of the Italic revolt

1 C. Phillipson, *Internat. Law and Custom of Anc. Greece and Rome*, i. 387 f., who adds that 'amongst the uncivilized races of to-day the formal oath, imprecation, and sacrifice—sometimes of human victims—are the invariable accompaniments of the conclusion of treaties.'
2 *E.g.*, *Il.* vii. 375 f., 408 f.
3 *Ib.* iii. 103 f., 268–301, iv. 156 f.
4 Polyb. vii. 9.
5 Michel, *Recueil d'inscr. grec.* 19.
6 *IG* i. 52; *c.* 422 B.C.
7 Hicks and Hill, *Greek Hist. Inscr.* no. 106.
8 Michel, *loc. cit.*
9 See Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Fœdus.'
10 See Hicks-Hill, no. 77.
11 Michel, 7.
12 Hicks-Hill, no. 112, if the restoration is correct.

1 See Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Fœdus,' p. 1204.
2 Von Scala, i. no. 58.
3 Thuc. ii. 74.
4 *Ib.* v. 56. 3.
5 Hicks-Hill, no. 118.
6 Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 15 (86).
7 See A. Weiss in Daremberg-Saglio, and E. Samter in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.*; Phillipson, *Int. Law and Custom of Anc. Gr. and Rome*, ii. ch. xxvi.
8 Cf. Virg. *Æn.* viii. 641.

against Rome in 91–88 B.C.[1] When Livy[2] describes a similar ceremonial among the Carthaginians, substituting a lamb for a pig, he is perhaps only attributing Roman customs to them; Polybius[3] is careful to distinguish, saying that the Carthaginians swear by their own gods, while the Romans perform the ceremony evidently regarded as peculiar to themselves. After the ceremony the fetials signed the text and brought it to Rome, and the whole college pledged itself to secure that it should be duly observed. It is hardly too much to say that the account given of the functions of the fetials reveals as highly organized a system, and as dignified a conception of the legal essence of the treaty, as has ever been realized. But it is a mistake to suppose that this organization is the expression of a high ethical standard.[4]

3. **Middle Ages and modern times.**—(*a*) The *Pax Romana* makes records of treaties during the empire scanty.[5] The swearing of oaths lingers on into the modern period.

In the treaty between Justinian and Chosroes (A.D. 561) the 12th article contains the invocation of God and the prayer that God may be compassionate to him who keeps the peace and may fight on his side, but that he may be the adversary of the deceitful man who seeks to overthrow the pact. The oath taken in the treaty of Andelot between Guntram, king of Burgundy, and Childebert, king of Austrasia (A.D. 587), is 'by the name of Almighty God and the indivisible Trinity, and all things divine, and the awful Day of Judgment.' In 842 Louis II. of Germany and Charles II. of France swear 'per Domini Dei amorem et Christiani Populi et nostram communem conservationem.' A treaty made in the 12th cent. by the city of Spalato[6] contains an imprecation: 'in the name of the Triune God, of the 118 Fathers, the 12 Apostles and all the Saints.' The oath is sometimes taken over relics, but most commonly over the Holy Gospels; *e.g.*, in the peace between Pope Alexander III. and the Emperor Frederick I. (1177) the representatives swear: 'Iuramus in manibus vestris super haec sancta Dei Evangelia quod pacem . . . bona fide servabimus, et absque fraude. Sic Deus nos adiuvet, et haec Sancta Dei Evangelia.'

The formula 'jurer en son âme,' 'jurare in animam suam,' appears frequently in treaties between England and France or the Low Countries.

Excommunication was the logical sequel to violation of a treaty-oath (as specified, *e.g.*, in the truce for the renewal of the Treuga Domini at the Council of Narbonne, 1054). Gradually the oath fades away into the promise.

In the treaty of commerce between Henry VII. and Philip, Duke of Burgundy (1495), the commissioners, in a declaration 'to all faithful Christians . . . Eternal Greeting in the Lord,' *bona fide* promise and oblige themselves, on the pledge and obligation of all their goods present and to come, to procure the observance of the treaty; these obligations are to be delivered to the deputies of each side in the church of the Virgin Mary at Calais. The king's undertaking to ratify the agreements made by his commissioners is given '*bona fide* and on the word of a King,' and the duke promises '*bona fide* and on the word of a Prince.' In the treaty of 1604 between Philip III. of Spain and James I. of England the gradual obsolescence of the oath is markedly visible in the clause: 'They shall make a like promise on the word of a King and Prince, and even swear on the Holy Gospels, if they are thereto required by the other party.'

The most modern example of an oath is said to be that taken in the cathedral of Soleure in the alliance between France and Switzerland in 1777. Thus finally disappeared that element which was, 'in a certain sense, the underlying basis of the whole body of the ancient laws of nations.'[7]

It was not uncommon for a party to a treaty to obtain absolution from his oath.

Thus Maximilian I., a few months before the League of Cambrai (1508), had made a treaty with Venice; one of the articles of the League summoned him by a papal brief to the aid of the Church and gave him reasons for breaking his oath. The pope dispensed François I. from his oath taken in the Treaty of Madrid (1526) and Henri II. from his oath at Vaucelles (1550).

A second clause was sometimes inserted, intended to prevent any party from seeking, or accepting the offer of, dispensation from his oath (*e.g.*, in the cession of the Spanish crown to Charles III. in 1703).[1] But, since release from this second obligation could obviously be obtained in the same way as from the first, it was as futile as an attempt to prevent the repeal of a law by inserting a clause imposing a death-penalty on any one who should propose such repeal. Modern treaty-custom recognizes the vanity of all such artificial supports to good faith.

The most sweeping and perhaps most futile example of absolution from a treaty-oath is provided by the bull of Pope Innocent X. describing numerous articles in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as 'null, vain, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, condemned, reprobated, frivolous, void of force and effect,' and dispensing anybody who pleased from his oath taken thereto.[2] The explanation of this outburst lies in the fact that this treaty was 'the first fundamental pact of Europe which struck at the root of the foreign temporal authority of the Pope.'[3]

The king in recent treaties merely engages and pronounces upon his royal word that he will sincerely and faithfully perform and observe the terms of the contract.[4] Finally, the parties to the Treaty of Versailles (1919) merely 'agree' to the covenant of the League of Nations and the closing formula is simply: 'In Faith Whereof the abovenamed Plentipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.'

(*b*) Religious formulæ are also used to a considerable degree as introductory clauses from mediæval times onwards, but in this feature treaties merely fall into line with all important documents. The commonest introductory formulæ are 'In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity' (*e.g.*, in the treaty between Charles the Simple and Henry I. of Germany, 926, or in the Treaty of Vienna, 9 June 1815) and 'In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.' A more florid style is naturally observable in the treaty between Frederick II. and Abu-Zakaria-Yahia, king of the Saracens of Tunisia, in 1231.

'In nomine Dei misericordis, miseratoris. Incipimus cum laude Dei maximi et, invocatione illius prelaudata, petimus prosperitatem. Laus Deo, scienti abscondita, futura, extantia, qui est eternus, post finem omnis viventis.'

The importance of the religious sanction made it long a moot point whether nations of different religions could make valid treaties with each other (a point, however, which Grotius decided in the modern sense), or, again, whether it was obligatory on all Christian nations to be leagued together against the infidel. In modern times it is recognized that treaties are governed by natural law alone, and the religious element, either in the content or in the phraseology of treaties, has naturally become much less discernible—to such a degree that the profession of Christian principles in the Holy Alliance (26th Sept. 1815) between Austria, Prussia, and Russia makes a deep and justifiable impression of insincerity.

In this remarkable alliance (the real object of which was anti-revolutionary) the contracting parties 'solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish in the face of the whole world their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which . . . must have an immediate influence on the Councils of Princes and guide all their steps as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections.'

It is significant that the pope was not invited to join this alliance, and that Britain was prevented

[1] H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, London, 1910, ii. 56, 98, 332, etc.
[2] xxi. 45. [3] iii. 25.
[4] J. S. Reid, in *JRS* vi. [1916] 172.
[5] For treaties before Charlemagne see Barbeyrac's *Supplément* to Dumont's *Corps universel diplomatique*, from Charlemagne onwards Dumont's work itself, and for the modern period the various collections, especially Martens'.
[6] Dumont, i. 88.
[7] Phillipson, *Int. Law and Custom of Anc. Gr and Rome*, i. 389.

[1] J. J. Schmauss, *Corpus Juris Gentium*, Leipzig, 1730, ii. 1165.
[2] Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 208.
[3] R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 58.
[4] Oakes and Mowat, *Great European Treaties*, p. 4.

from doing so 'by the forms of the British constitution.'[1]

(*c*) Apart from professions of this sort, the actual protection of the religious freedom of peoples involved in a settlement by treaty has often formed the subject of special articles.[2]

An early and remarkable instance is in the treaty between Justinian and Chosroes, in A.D. 561, in which a special article provided that Christians in Persia should enjoy freedom of worship, and on their own part should not attempt to make proselytes among the Magi. In modern times the Treaty of Westphalia marked an advance in religious toleration. The Treaty of Paris in 1763, recognizing the conquest of Canada, made special provision for liberty to the new Roman Catholic subjects of the king of Britain to follow their own religious worship. The Treaty of Oliva in 1660 (between Poland and Sweden) protected the co-religionists of either power in the territory of the other. In 1867, when Russia ceded Alaska to the United States, it was provided that the civilized inhabitants should not be interfered with in their religion. And in 1913, by the Treaty of Constantinople, Muslims resident in Bulgarian territory were guaranteed the enjoyment of religious liberty, and the name of the sultan as khalif was to continue to be pronounced in their public prayers. 'It is incumbent on the acquiring sovereign to allow to the inhabitants of the annexed territory the free exercise of their religion when it is not incompatible with good order and the fundamental dictates of morality. The obligation is not, of course, a legal one, but its sanction is rooted more deeply than that of positive enactments.'[3]

Hence the necessity of actual stipulations, such as those enumerated, is not usually felt.

(*d*) Of more importance, as indicating moral progress, than professions relating to religious principles, or even than provisions for religious freedom, is the degree of solicitude shown by the contracting parties for the general interests of the people. W. G. F. Phillimore[4] remarks that, except in the matter of religious toleration, the Treaty of Westphalia paid scant regard to the interests of the people. From 1648 to the recognition of American independence in 1783 the chief consideration in treaties is paid, as in older days, to the rights and interests of sovereigns and reigning families. In the next period, down to 1859, there is increased recognition of the rights of states. Still, by the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, *e.g.*, states and populations were trafficked in, with absolute disregard of the peoples concerned, who might as well have been slaves or cattle.

Since 1859 'little regard is paid to the supposed rights and interests of individual sovereigns or reigning families, and a new principle has arisen, viz. the rights of nationalities.'[5]

4. Conclusion. — Certain moral considerations which arise in connexion with treaty-making and treaty-breaking may be stated, though no solution is necessarily offered of the questions involved.

(*a*) The construing of treaties is a matter of equity. They are covenants *bonæ fidei*, and are not therefore to be technically construed.

'Discrimen actuum bonae fidei et stricti juris, quatenus ex jure est Romano, ad jus gentium non pertinet.'[6] The principle of the *Digest*, 'voluntatem potius quam verba spectari placuit,' applies with especial force.[7] 'There is no place for the refinements of the courts in the rough jurisprudence of nations.'[8]

In antiquity a famous instance of the breach of this principle was the murder of Hippias by Paches.[9] The classical example in modern writers, however, is the action of the French who, having destroyed the fortifications of Dunkirk in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht, proceeded to construct a still stronger place at Mardick, a few miles away. The principle by which a provision may be 'extended' so as to include a case to which the same reason applies as applied to the case originally envisaged, or may be 'restricted,' so that an ally excludes the application of a provision to a case obviously improper (as when, having promised to aid an ally in all its wars, it is asked to join in an unjust war)—this principle of extensive or restrictive interpretation assists contracting parties in adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of the treaty.[1]

(*b*) Since governments are representatives of justice, morality, and religion, it is assumed[2] that a treaty containing an engagement to do or allow that which is contrary to morality or justice is invalid. 'Pacta, quae turpem causam continent, non sunt observanda.'[3] Since a large number of treaties are forcibly imposed on a conquered by a conquering state, it is obvious that this principle provides innumerable opportunities for dispute and repudiation, under the next heading.

(*c*) How far is a treaty invalidated by the employment of force on the part of one of the parties? To this it is generally agreed to answer that there is no force in the plea that one of the parties consented through fear, or in face of superior force, such as would invalidate a private contract, since such treaties are only a way of terminating war, which is entirely determined by force. 'No inequality of advantage, no lesion, can invalidate a Treaty.'[4] But it is equally clearly held that treachery or duress exerted against the representative of a state amply justifies the repudiation of a treaty. The classical instance is Napoleon's extortion of terms from Ferdinand VII. at Bayonne.

(*d*) Fraud is also clearly held to invalidate a treaty, for then there is no real freedom of consent on the part of the deceived party.[5] The distinction is sometimes a little delicate between positive fraud and *suppressio veri*.

In the negotiations for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) Webster suppressed a map which was favourable to the British cause. The map could have been found, as Greville admitted, if the British authorities had caused proper search to be made, and Lord Ashburton agrees that he had no legal cause for complaint.[6] Yet it is to such cases as this that the remark of Hall[7] may be applied: 'It is recognized that there is an international morality distinct from law, violation of which gives no formal ground of complaint, however odious the action of the ill-doer may be.'

(*e*) The question of how far a party can liberate itself from obligations has been brought into special prominence by Germany's repudiation of its pledge to Belgium in 1914. To the doctrine that 'necessity, when real and *bona fide*, overrides the obligation of the promise' R. J. Phillimore[8] replies:

'It is manifest that the State, like the Individual, which takes advantage of every change of affairs to disengage itself from the obligations of a solemn covenant, weakens the foundations of that good faith on which the peace of the world depends.'

So too Hall:[9]

'Modern writers, it would seem, are more struck by the impossibility of looking at international contracts as perpetually binding, than by the necessity of insisting upon that good faith between States without which the world has only before it the alternatives of armed suspense or open war, and they too often lay down canons of such perilous looseness, that if their doctrine is to be accepted, an unscrupulous State need never be in want of a plausible excuse for repudiating an inconvenient obligation.'

Pedants such as those on whom Frederick the Great relied to justify his acts are to be found in all ages and countries. The Conference of London (1871) made the declaration:

'It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.'

This declaration, which was signed by all the

1 Oakes-Mowat, p. 34.
2 W. G. F. Phillimore, *Three Centuries*, pp. 55 f., 145; Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 309.
3 Phillipson, *loc. cit.* 4 *Three Centuries*, p. 14.
5 *Ib.* Doubts are already being expressed as to the permanent value of this principle; cf. Sir A. W. Ward, *Securities of Peace*, p. 9.
6 Grotius, *de Jure Belli ac Pacis*, ii. 16. 11; see R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 79.
7 L. 16. 219. 8 Hall[4], p. 356.
9 Thuc. iii. 34.

1 R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 96 f.
2 *Ib.* ii. 64 and 111. 3 *Dig.* II. xiv. 27. 4.
4 R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 63; cf. Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 162.
5 Hall[4], p. 342.
6 Crandall, *Treaties, their Making and Enforcement*, p. 14.
7 P. 15. 8 *Comm.* ii. 100. 9 P. 366.

leading Powers of Europe, was provoked by Russia's attempt to evade its obligations under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, on the ground that lapse of time had changed the conditions. Although no specific declaration to the same effect appears to be included in the covenant of the League of Nations or in the treaty with Germany, the case seems to be covered by article 16, which provides for the prevention or punishment of breaches of covenant in general.

(*f*) How far does honour demand the intervention of one of the guarantors, in the case of a collective guarantee, when agreement is not reached between all parties?[1] Bluntschli holds that each guarantor is bound to act separately in such a case. Lord Derby (in connexion with the Luxemburg Convention of 1867) held that honour (but not legal obligation) compelled each guarantor, in concert with the others, to maintain the engagements; but that, if concerted action was not obtainable, then a guarantor would have the right, but not necessarily the legal obligation, to act. It is obvious that this difficulty could be avoided by care in drafting, and that, unless Bluntschli's view be accepted, the collective guarantee is not likely to be very valuable until we have reached a higher code of international honour than prevails at the present time. The covenant of the League of Nations meets the case by making joint intervention obligatory on all its members.

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TREES AND PLANTS.—1. Introductory.—All plants are sacred. This principle of the followers of Zoroaster lies at the root of all plant-lore, all tree-cults. All plants possess the gifts of immortality and health.[2] The subject enters into every form of religion, and its ramifications are traceable in different aspects and degrees from the tree of life to the May-pole. It rests on the earliest conceptions of the unity of life in nature, in the sense of communion and fellowship with the divine centre and source of life. The oak of Mamre, the ash Yggdrasil, the *ashērāh*, the oak of Dodona, the *Ficus ruminalis*, the Bodhi-trees, the pine-cones, and the seven-branched candlestick, even the modern Christmas-tree with its lights and its fruit and its fillets, are instances of the vast area in folk-lore, tradition, and social custom which has been influenced by early reverence for the sacred tree.

The sacred tree is thus deeply rooted in the primitive religious ideas of the human race. The spring, the rock, the tree are all visible manifestations of the divine spirit. They are found associated in the most ancient sanctuaries as different symbols of life; and this life, in earth or water or tree, is one with human life. The same divine spirit lives and works in all and manifests itself in each and all. The secret of religion is the recognition of this life as divine; its duty is the obligation of fellowship and worship which comes of this recognition.

In the earliest stage the sacred tree is more than a symbol. It is instinct with divine life, aglow with divine light. It is at once the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This animistic stage is traceable in folk-lore and myth, in traditional survivals in later ritual, and in savage cults in more recent and even modern times. In the history of religious development it lies behind the historic era. The burning bush, living and aglow with the divine voice, gives a conception of this earliest stage.

In the second stage the sacred tree is planted in holy ground. It is representative of the deity. It is the dwelling-place of the deity. The priest-king is its champion, and is himself the embodiment or incarnation of the god.[1] It is as priest-king at Mamre that Abraham arms his trained servants and leads them against the kings of the earth. It is an archaic survival in an archaic fragment (Gn 14^{18L}). The champion of the tree-god must be loyal to the cult. A new sanctuary must be consecrated by the planting of the sacred tree, though not always of the same tree. The oak-Zeus of Dodona adopted under certain conditions the white poplar and the plane. Abraham, the champion of the oak or terebinth of Mamre, planted a grove, *i.e.* a tamarisk, at Beersheba. Agamemnon, as guardian of a sacred tree, and himself enjoying the divine title *ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν* and worshipped as a chthonian Zeus in Laconia, planted a plane-tree at Delphi and another at Caphyæ in Arcadia.[2] These plantings are examples of the second, or representative, stage of tree-worship.

The third is the symbolic stage. The 'grove,' or *ashērāh*, the common adjunct of the Canaanite shrine, is the most familiar example of this stage. It was a wooden pillar, representative like the living tree of the deity, 'the token of the deity's presence or a magnet for attracting it.'[3] There are traces of it in the sanctuaries at Samaria (2 K 13^{6}), at Bethel (23^{15}), and even in the Temple at Jerusalem (23^{6}).

The differentiation of the one deity into the 'gods many and lords many' of local and national cults led to the iconic representation of the tree-god. The stump takes human shape. The Hermæ, wooden or stone pillars swelling towards the top, were crowned with the head of Hermes. The rude figure of Priapus as protector of gardens was of a similar character. The *caduceus* of Hermes, a wand with a triple shoot, may refer also to his origin as a tree-god.[4] Silvanus is represented in a similar form, with his sacred pine and also with the *caduceus* as a symbol. And in this connexion the statement of Pausanias

[1] Hall, p. 360. [2] *RGG* ii. 506.

[1] A. B. Cook, *CR* xvii. [1903] 277. [2] *Ib.*

[3] L. R. Farnell, *ERE* vi. 397b.

[4] O. Seyffert, *A Dict. of Classical Antiquities*, ed. H. Nettleship and J. E. Sandys, London, 1904, pp. 285 f., 515; Mrs. Philpot, *The Sacred Tree*, do. 1897, p. 76.

and Pliny is significant, that in ancient times the images of the gods were made of wood.[1] And with the differentiation of the deity into the gods of the nations there came the differentiation of the tree into the trees sacred to the several gods. The oak was specially sacred to Zeus. The *Ficus ruminalis* of the Palatine was originally the sacred tree of Rome, though Juppiter was associated with the oak on the Capitoline Hill.[2] The cult, in early times as wide as the world, was narrowed when no sanctuary could be dedicated to Apollo which was unfavourable to the growth of his sacred laurel.[3]

Primitive worship was essentially an act of fellowship and communion with the deity. The vestment of the worshipper was the sheep-skin or the goat-skin specially sacred to the deity worshipped, as the white robe of righteousness is the symbolic vestment of the Christian worshipper. This is generally traceable in theriomorphic cults, as in the Lupercalia. But it is traceable also in tree-worship. The victor in the Olympic games was treated as the human representative of the tree-god. He was decked with olive and crowned with a helmet filleted and crested with the twig of the sacred tree.[4] The English Jack-in-the-Green of the old May-day sports and the Kentish Holly-boy and Ivy-girl of the Shrove-tide revels[5] are reminiscences of this worship.

Sacrament and worship are closely linked together. In the archaic tradition of Abraham (Gn 14^{18}) Melchizedek, king of Salem, brought forth bread and wine; and he was 'priest of the most high God' (El Elyon). Sacramental communion with the deity is the essence of the mysteries, and the mysteries belong to the primitive stages of religion: 'I fasted; I drank the kykeon; I took from the basket.' This was the touching of the *sacra*, the sacramental core of the mysteries of Eleusis. They were rites sacred to Demeter the Earth-Mother.[6] She is the Mountain-Mother (*q.v.*), the mother of the gods, represented with her pillar-shrine, the pillar of her sacred tree. She may be compared not only with Isis, but with Hathor and her sacred sycamore. Hathor nourished the wandering souls in the cemeteries of Egypt with food and drink. The Cretan Demeter in her mysteries nourished her mystics in life. The mysteries of Dionysus belong to the same cycle of ideas. Dionysus combined in himself the rites of the beer-god Sabazios of Thrace and of the mystery-god Zagreus of Crete.[7] The *haoma* of the Persians, the *soma* of the Hindus, the *ambrosia* of the Olympian gods, were all means of sacramental communion, a partaking of the tree of life.[8]

The sacred tree, instinct with the divine life, is vocal with the word and the will of the deity. A prominent feature of the Zeus-cult of Dodona was its oracle. 'And the giving of oracles was a chthonian prerogative.'[9] David is to consult the oracle of the mulberry-trees before he attacks the Philistines (2 S 5^{24}). God called unto Moses from the midst of the bush in Horeb (Ex 3^{1-4}). The sacred tree is alight with the wisdom of God. To partake of the acorns of Zeus was to acquire wisdom and knowledge.[10] The burning bush points to the symbolic meaning of the seven-branched candlestick in the Temple. It is a budding and blossoming almond (Ex 37^{17-24}). The imagery of the rod out of the stem of Jesse, and the Branch growing out of his roots, the setting of the sevenfold gift of wisdom, is another illustration of the same truth (Is 11^{1-3}; cf. LXX). And this again illuminates the meaning of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gn 2^{17}). It is the oracle of the God of righteousness, as the seven lamps are 'the eyes of the Lord . . . beholding the evil and the good' (Ps 15^3; cf. Zec 4^{10}, 2 Ch 16^9). The tree of knowledge is the oracle of religious and moral wisdom.

[1] Philpot, p. 32. [2] *Ib.* p. 28.
[3] *Ib.* p. 36. [4] *CR* xvii. 274 f.
[5] See art. SHROVE-TIDE.
[6] J. E. Harrison, *The Religion of Ancient Greece*, London, 1905, p. 48.
[7] *Ib.* p. 53. [8] Philpot, pp. 122–127.
[9] *CR* xvii. 179. [10] Philpot, p. 36.

2. The animistic stage in tree-worship.—The tracing of this stage in its original simplicity is almost as elusive as animism itself. In pre-historic times it was already being absorbed in higher religious conceptions and revelations, in the higher physical and religious and ethical development of the human race. Jahweh 'finally triumphed over the *bᵉʿālīm*, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them.'[1] This is the principle in all religious development. The burning bush was not merely the oracle of Horeb; it was the dwelling-place of Jahweh (Dt 33^{16}). The fable of the trees and the bramble king was spoken 'by the plain [oak or terebinth] of the pillar that was in Shechem' (Jg 9^{6-21}). It is a survival of ancient religious conceptions, an apologue or parable familiar in early tree-worship. The story of the thistle and the cedar is another (2 K 14^9).[2]

'Tree-worship pure and simple, where the tree is in all respects treated as a god, is attested for Arabia . . . in the case of the sacred date-palm at Nejrān. It was adored at an annual feast, when it was all hung with fine clothes and women's ornaments.'[3]

The sacred *erica* in the temple of Isis at Byblos was said to have grown round the body of Osiris. It was a stump wrapped in a linen cloth and anointed with myrrh. It represented the dead god. It is suggested that this explains the mystery of the draping of the *ashērāh* (2 K 23^7).[4] There are similar survivals in Greek ritual. Incense was burned and the tree was decked with fillets and honoured with burnt offerings. Mrs. Philpot gives[5] an illustration of a fruit-tree dressed as Dionysus—another example of draping as part of this early ritual. Cook in his exhaustive monograph on the cult of the oak-Zeus[6] has traced it through all the earliest sanctuaries of the Mediterranean area, especially in Dodona and Crete, and has given his conclusion as follows:

'Zeus was at each of these cult-centres conceived as a triple divinity (sky-god+water-god+earth-god) dwelling in a sacred oak and served by a priestly-king, who was regarded as an incarnation of Zeus himself and whose duty it was to maintain the sun's heat by magical means.'[7]

The Minotaur, the Ægean horns of consecration, and the axe[8] are also features in this ancient ritual.

This survey of the primitive cult is a key to the early worship of the sacred tree, not only in Celtic folk-lore and Gaulish sculpture, but in the survivals of pagan worship. E. Clodd gives a study of the 'primitive pagans' of S. Nigeria which sums up the animistic conception of tree-worship.

'A recent traveller among the "primitive pagans" of Southern Nigeria reports this speech from a native: "Yes, we say, this is our life—the big tree. When any of us dies his spirit does not go to another country, but into the big tree; and this is why we will not have it cut. When a man is sick, or a woman wants a child, we sacrifice to the big tree, and unless Oso'wo wants the sick man, our request is granted. Oso'wo lives in the sky, and is the Big God. When any of us dies away from this place, his spirit returns to the big tree."'[9]

Among the Hamitic tribes the crude animism has developed into a sort of polytheism with one highest god, Wāq.[10] He is the big god of the big tree of Nigeria.

[1] *ERE* ii. 291ᵇ.
[2] W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, Edinburgh, 1889, p. 126.
[3] *Ib.* p. 169. [4] *Ib.* p. 175 n. [5] P. 31.
[6] *CR* xvii. 174 ff., 268 ff., 403 ff.; xviii. [1904] 75 ff., 325 ff., 360 ff.
[7] *Ib.* xvii. 403. [8] *Ib.* xviii. 35.
[9] *Animism*, London, 1905, p. 74. [10] *ERE* i. 56ᵇ.

The tree-cult of the aboriginal Africans is to-day largely associated with ancestor-worship. Trees planted round the graves of their ancestors acquire a sacred character. The great tree on the verandah of a dead man's home becomes the shrine of his spirit. And it is held that the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship. One tree is hailed with the words: 'Holy art thou, our ancestor.'[1] The facts must be accepted, but the inference may be questioned. The polytheism and the ancestor-worship are both to be traced to the more primitive forms of animism represented in Ægean evidence as the cult of the Great Spirit or the oak-Zeus. They are both due to the principle of differentiation in the development of religious conceptions.

'Anthropomorphism is in some cases preceded by theriomorphism, but theriomorphism is never generated out of anthropomorphism.'[2]

All life in primitive ages is one, and in its movement inspires fear, not only the fear of God, but the 'fear' of Isaac (Gn 31^{42}). It is Jacob who 'sware by the fear of his father Isaac' (31^{53}). And Jacob by his wrestling attained the title of Israel (32^{28}). Abraham was the priest-king of Mamre, Melchizedek the priest-king of Salem. At Olympia and probably at Dodona the challenge of the priestly king gave rise to a regular athletic contest.[3] Minos as priest-king of Cnossus had a reign of limited duration. He was king for a period of nine years, when he withdrew to the Idæan cave to hold converse with Zeus.[4] Theseus, by his victory over Minos under the guise of Taurus, succeeded to the sun-king's rights as champion of the oak-Zeus.[5] Is it not evident that, behind and prior to the hero-worship of Theseus and the veneration for Israel, there is the ritual and there are the *sacra* of the deity, whether Zeus or El Elyon or Jahweh, the Great Spirit of primitive animism?

3. The sacred plantation.—The planting of the sacred tree or grove is a farther step in the development of tree-worship. The primitive priest-king does it as champion of the tree-spirit, under the conscious guidance of God. Eden is the most familiar example of a sacred plantation (Gn $2^{8f.}$). The practice of primitive religion colours the language and imagery of poet and prophet (cf. Nu $24^{6f.}$, Ps 104^{16}, Is 61^{3}). The riddle and parable of Ezekiel has new meaning when read in the light of early ritual:

'A great eagle . . . came unto Lebanon, and took the highest branch of the cedar: He cropped off the top of his young twigs, and carried it into a land of traffick; he set it in a city of merchants. He took also of the seed of the land . . .; he placed it by great waters, and set it as a willow tree. And it grew, and became a spreading vine of low stature' (Ezk 17^{3-6}; cf. vv.$^{22-24}$).

In Ægean art the living tree is represented sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of three, or in groves. It is at times close to an altar, or even growing from it; in one case the goddess sits under it. The palm-tree, the fig, and the cypress are most frequent; but the pine, the plane, and the vine also appear.[6] It may even spring from the *bucrania*, or 'horns of consecration,' which themselves represent the sacred bull, the theriomorphic representation of the oak-Zeus.

At Athens the original cult was that of the oak:

'Nondum laurus erat; longoque decentia crine
Tempora cingebat de qualibet arbore Phoebus.'[7]

There are in the Caryatides, or nut-maidens, traces of a nut-grove, the nuts themselves being known as the acorns of Zeus. Later, after this first stage of substitution, 'Zeus took over the olive.'[8] These ἀθῆναι, or nurses of Zeus, gave their name to the city, and later to the goddess whose cult overshadowed that of Zeus on the Acropolis.[1] In the Academy at Athens there were twelve sacred olives in the precinct of Athene.[2] Demeter had her sacred oaks, and the boy who pronounced the Eleusinian formula at Athenian weddings, *ἔφυγον κακόν, ηὗρον ἄμεινον*, was wreathed with oak and thorn.[3] There was a grove planted for Demeter at Dotium by the Pelasgians before they migrated from Thessaly to Cnidus. And Ovid, telling the story of the judgment on Erysichthon, speaks of the tree of Demeter as an oak, adorned with fillets and tablets by the people.[4]

These plantings are wide-spread, and traceable to the earliest sites. Hercules planted two oaks at Heraclea Pontica in Bithynia.[5] Æneas planted a huge oak-tree, lopped and decked as a trophy, on the tomb of Mezentius the Etruscan. The crown of golden oak-leaves from Vulci implies that the Etruscan kings were representatives or champions of the oak-Zeus. The tree planted by Æneas was itself identified with the king: 'manibusque meis Mezentius hic est.'[6] The identification of tree, god, and king is general. Romulus and Remus were worshipped in the Comitium under a sapling planted from the *Ficus ruminalis* on the Palatine. The Bodhi-tree of Anurādhapura, long the capital of Ceylon, is over 2000 years old. It was planted by Tissa—a branch of the original Bodhi-tree, at Gayā in India.[7] The sanctuary of 'Uzzā at Nahla near Mecca consisted of three trees[8]—another link with the wide-spread cult of a triple tree-god, as sky-god, water-god, and earth-god in one.

The chain of evidence is unbroken from East to West; the triple-headed gods of Gaul, sitting cross-legged on their throne as in India, point to closer contact with the neolithic age than even Greece and Syria. The sacred flint of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline Hill at Rome, the 'antiquum Jovis signum,' the home of Jupiter Lapis, has been regarded as an unhafted neolithic celt, preserved among the aborigines of Latium from an immemorial past.[9]

The sacred tree, the sacred plantation, was the seat of authority, the seat of judgment. The Romans met for council 'in aesculeto.' The senate of the Galatian Celts met at a place called Δρυνέμετος, doubtless sacred to their national cult: *κελτοὶ σέβουσι μὲν Δία, ἄγαλμα δὲ Διὸς κελτικὸν ὑψηλὴ δρῦς.*[10] Deborah the prophetess 'dwelt under the palm tree of Deborah, . . . and the children of Israel came up to her for judgment' (Jg 4^{5}; cf. 1 S 22^{6}, Jg 6^{11}). In 458 B.C. the Roman envoys were sent to complain that the Æqui had broken a treaty concluded in 459. They were bidden to make their complaint to a huge oak on Mount Algidas under the shadow of whose branches the Æquian commander had his quarters.[11] The *prætorium* under the sacred oak is certainly a primitive trait.[12]

A sacred rowan-tree in Ireland derived its origin from the rowan of Dubhros, the Black Forest, in Co. Sligo.

The tree had grown from a quicken-berry dropped by the Tuatha Dé Danann, who had brought it from the Land of Promise. It was guarded by a giant named Searbhan, who could only be slain by three blows from his own club, and had a single broad fiery eye in the middle of his black forehead. He was overcome by Diarmait, the culture-hero of Irish folk-lore.[13] He

[1] *ERE* i. 164b. [2] *Ib.* i. 573a.
[3] Cf. Ovic., *Met.* i. 446. [4] *Od.* xix. 179; Strabo, 476.
[5] Cook, *ClR* xvii. 411.
[6] *ERE* i. 142–144; cf. Cook, *ClR* xvii. 407.
[7] Ov. *Met.* i. 450 f.; cf. Cook, *ClR* xviii. 84: Drymas, Ægeus, Codrus.
[8] Cook, *ClR* xviii. 86.

[1] Cook, *ClR* xviii. 86. [2] *ERE* i. 59a.
[3] *ClR* xviii. 84.
[4] *Ib.* p. 76; Ov. *Met.* viii. 738 ff. [5] *Ib.* p. 79.
[6] Verg. *Æn.* xi. 5–16; *ClR* xviii. 362.
[7] *ERE* i. 599b. [8] *Ib.* i. 660b.
[9] *ClR* xviii. 365.
[10] Max. Tyr., *Dissert.* viii. 8; cf. *ClR* xviii. 79, 369.
[11] Livy, iii. 25. [12] *ClR* xviii. 365.
[13] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*2, p. 355 ff.

dwelt in a hut among the branches and was so great a magician that he could not be killed by fire, water, or weapons of war.

Here again there is the sacred tree, the fierce-eyed guardian, triply inviolate, the challenge, and the contest so frequently met with in the legends of the sacred grove. And in Danu (the Welsh Don), the goddess-mother of the Tuatha Dé Danann, is there not a link with the Demeter of Greek myth, and in the name itself an echo of the Δάν (acc. Δᾶν) of the oak-Zeus, and of Jana, Diana, Artemis on the slope of the Aventine? She is the earth-goddess, the Dea Dia of the Romans, the Dan of the Dorian Greeks: *οἱ γὰρ Δωριεῖς τὴν γῆν δᾶν λέγουσι καὶ δίαν.*[1]

4. The sacred stump.—The Lion Gate at Mycenæ is one of the earliest aniconic representations of the worship of the sacred tree. The pillar of which the lions are the supporters tapers downwards like the ancient Herm.[2] The subject has been very fully treated in art. POLES AND POSTS; but some further links may be noted.

The pillar-shrine of Cnossus with its sacred doves is recognized by Cook as a 'conventionalised but still aniconic form of a triple tree-Zeus.'[3] The Lydian cult of Zeus *ἀσκραῖος* was connected with the oak. A coin of Halicarnassus represents him 'as a bearded god crowned with rays and standing between two oak-trees, on each of which is a bird.'[4] In the same city there was a cult of Aphrodite *ἀσκραία*. This cult gave its name to the city of Aphrodisias.

The coins of this city 'show the leafless trunk of a tree with three branches. Sometimes the three branches rise separately from an enclosure of trellis-work. Sometimes they spring from a single trunk, on either side of which is a naked man wearing a Phrygian cap: the one on the left wields a double-axe; the one on the right kneels or runs away, turning his back upon the tree [a feature still preserved in folk-lore]. Sometimes . . . the tree is flanked by two lighted altars.'[5]

The priest of the Cappadocian cult of Bellona at Rome is represented with a branch in one hand and the two-headed axe in the other—a further link with the oak-cult of Crete.[6]

Amid the early rites of Etruria and the *sacra* of Rome there are further associations with this cult. Hermes is represented in a fragment of Aristophanes as *τρικέφαλος*; so also is Janus on a coin of Hadrian.[7] Janus is also represented with a spear; and his title Quirinus is understood in reference to the oak-god. The Sabine *curis*, the oaken spear, the Quirites, the men of the oaken spear, are thus related to Janus Quirinus or Jupiter Quirinus.[8] The spear is a variation of the sacred stump. The tree-god is often represented by a post, sceptre, or spear.

The *trixylon* associated with Juno Sororia and Janus Curiatius is a symbol of this triple Janus. It consisted of two vertical beams and a cross-bar, the rude form of a cross. The 'yoke' under which the conquered were forced to march was of three staves or spears, and is also traced to the cult of Janus Quirinus. The door-posts (*januæ*) were sacred to him, as the threshold was to the Earth-Mother.[9]

The sprinkling of the blood on the door-posts in Hebrew ritual (Ex 12[7], Ezk 45[19]) and the shaking of the threshold in the vision of Isaiah (Is 6[4] RV) are examples of the same cycle of ideas—the sacredness of the posts and the threshold as tokens of the Deity.

The *caduceus* is another variation of the sacred rod. It consisted of a triple shoot, the central shoot forming the handle, the two side shoots being folded back into a double knot. The elder lends itself to this by its opposite shoots, and the tree is tabu in the folk-lore of the West. It is not lucky to burn it. Judas hanged himself from an elder-bush. The *lituus* of the augur is another variation of the sacred rod. So also the mysterious twisted rods used in what is probably a funeral procession in the decoration of Etruscan tombs at Norchia and Tarquinii.[1] In the fresco at Tarquinii, while most of the figures have the twisted rod, 'the symbol of the Etruscan Hades,' one of the leading figures has the *lituus*, and prominent among these is the hammer borne aloft, 'a frequent emblem of supernatural power.'[2] The figure of the god with the hammer is frequently met with on Celtic monuments.[3] The Y cross with its mystic Pythagorean meaning has also some ancient link with these Etruscan rods.[4] A hazel-twig of this shape is in use as the divining-rod for tracing water.

The Etruscan *lucumones*, or kings, were representatives of Jupiter. Their crown was of golden oak-leaves, with acorns, gems, and fillets. They acted as vice-gerents of the oak-god. Their golden *bulla* was the symbol of the sun-god—another link with the oak-Zeus. They used a sceptre with an eagle, and were preceded by the lictor bearing the axe with the bundle of rods. Cook suggests that these may be a conventional substitute for the trees of the tree-god.[5] These were all part of the royal insignia of the ancient king. Is it not possible to trace the origin of the English regalia to the same source?

In the Inventory of 1649 are enumerated the 'large staff with a dove on the top, formerly thought to be all gold, but upon trial . . . found to be the lower part wood within and silver-gilt without'; the 'small staff with a fleure de luce on the top . . . found to be iron within and silver-gilt without'; 'one staff of black and white ivory with a dove on the top'; and the two sceptres, one with the cross, and one with the dove.[6]

These are all symbols of authority, such as are found in the *sacra* of the ancient races of Europe. The sceptre with the cross, the wooden rod with the dove, the rod with the 'fleure de luce' may be compared with the tau-cross, the blossoming stump, and the dove-pillars of the Etruscan and Ægean cults. The rods laid up before the Lord in the tent, 'one for each father's house' (Nu 17[2] RV), 'twelve rods,' and the budding of Aaron's rod (v.[8]) point to similar associations on Semitic soil. And the cross with its *spolia opima* was the most honoured sign of Jupiter Feretrius at Rome. The *feretrum*, from which he took his name, was the lopped trunk of the ancient oak, venerated by the shepherds of old, forming a wooden cross to which votive armour was attached.[7] The cross in the folk-lore of Rome was a sign of the primitive oak-cult—a token of the presence of the oak-king, a shrine for the offering of the trophy of right to the oak-god.[8] Was Pilate altogether unconscious of this when he said: 'What I have written I have written' (Jn 19[22])? And was St. Paul too in his 'foolishness of preaching,' and in his witness to the power of the Cross and of Christ crucified, unconscious of the other tradition of the power of the cross, when he wrote:

'Unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God' (1 Co 1[23f.])?

5. Trees many and gods many.—The sacred tree signified universally in primitive ages the presence of the deity. The one tree with its nursery-grove was the shrine of the one God. But east and west, in hill or in valley, in north aspect or in south, the tree varied.[9] And, as the tree varied in species, the god varied in name. Then the tree and the god of the clan grew to be the tree and the god of

1 *Etymologicon Magnum*, ed. F. Sylburg, Leipzig, 1816, p. 60. 8; *ClR* xvii. 177.
2 Seyffert, pp. 50, 285.
3 *ClR* xvii. 407.
4 *Ib.* 416.
5 *Ib.*
6 Seyffert, p. 96.
7 *ClR* xviii. 367, n, 19.
8 *Ib.* pp. 369, 378.
9 *Ib.* p. 369.

1 G. Dennis, *The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*, London, 1848, i. 253.
2 *Ib.* pp. 310–312.
3 G. Grupp, *Kultur der alten Kelten und Germanen*, Munich, 1905, p. 154 f.
4 Dennis, i. 253.
5 *ClR* xviii. 361 f.
6 W. H. Stacpoole, *The Coronation Regalia*, London, 1911, p. 33.
7 *ClR* xviii. 364 f.
8 Verg. *Æn.* x. 423. xi. 15 f.
9 Verg. *Georg.* ii. 109–113.

the district, and in turn the tree and god of the nation. The parable of the bramble king (Jg $9^{8ff.}$) is true to fact. The olive, the fig, the vine had established their fame and their rule; they would not submit to another; the bramble had ambition to rival even the cedar of Lebanon.

Trees many led on to gods many.[1] The oak-Zeus at Athens took over the olive. Apollo remained true to his sacred laurel. This development is most marked in Greek art and Roman verse:

'Populus Alcidae gratissima, vitis Iaccho,
Formosae myrtus Veneri, sua laurea Phoebo.'[2]

The Semitic nations stand apart from this tendency to assign a particular tree to a particular god,[3] whether from reaction to monotheism or from adherence to the primitive conception of the oneness of the divine spirit. They had sacred trees in great number, but they were all sacred to one god localized in village, clan, or nation. In India each Buddha had his own tree, and Gautama himself, after having passed through 43 incarnations as a tree-spirit, eventually found wisdom under the sacred tree of Brahmā, the *pipal*-tree, or *Ficus religiosa*.[4]

This triumph of the gods over the nations and the consequent interlacing of the tree-cults, sometimes by expansion, sometimes by absorption, resulted in certain cases in the distinction between tree-gods and tree-demons. As the *jinn* or *genii* of the Arabs were gods out of touch with men, outlaws, dehumanized, 'abominations of Moab and Ammon,' so the wood-demons of the German forest or the Polynesian islanders were the foes and the dread of their conquerors—or their neighbours. And in the controversy between the supporters of ancestor-worship and the supporters of animism based on the presence in nature of the divine spirit this wide-spread belief in wood-demons and unlucky trees is in favour of the latter. In an age when 'every valley had its king,'[5] and every hill its shrine and its sacred tree, as in these islands in Celtic times, and when feuds were frequent between clan and clan, the jealousy of the clan would separate between god and god, and between tree and tree, and people the forest-clad hills with every form of terror and danger. The only bond of safety was in the nation's god and in the king as the champion of his rights. All around was danger and death: 'for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God' (Ex 20^5; cf. 2 Co 11^2). This is the language of religion, not the language of ancestor-worship; and it may be traced in tree-worship and demon-lore from earliest times.

A blasted or stricken oak might be the messenger of misfortune:

'De coelo tactas memini praedicere quercus.'[6]

The Abors in Assam regarded the rubber-tree as the abode of two malignant spirits; another haunted the plantain and stinging-nettle.[7] The satyrs and devils of the OT, the *jinn* of the Arabian stories, the centaurs and cyclops, fauns and dryads of Greek and Latin mythology, the wood-maidens, wild-men, and elves, the wild-women of the Tyrol, and the green-ladies of Neufchâtel, in their different degrees of mischief or maliciousness, were haunting terrors of the old world.[8] The Neraïdes of Macedonian folk-lore are tree-spirits. It is not well to lie down in the shade of a tree, for it is there that the tree-demons appear. At this day the country-folk avoid especially the plane, the poplar, and the fig-tree, for these are favourite haunts of fairies.[9]

[1] Verg. *Georg.* ii. 116 f. [2] Verg. *Ecl.* vii. 61 f.
[3] Philpot, p. 39. [4] *Ib.* p. 14.
[5] C. I. Elton, *Origins of English History*[2], London, 1890, p. 238.
[6] Verg. *Ecl.* i. 17. [7] *ERE* i. 33[a].
[8] Philpot, p. 52 ff.
[9] G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 244.

In Ireland ghosts and apparitions haunt isolated thorn-bushes.[1] To call up the Tolcarne troll near Newlyn, an incantation was necessary, and three dried leaves must be held in the hand, 'one of the ash, one of the oak, and one of the thorn.'[2]

'Sing Oak, and Ash, and Thorn, good Sirs,
(All of a Midsummer morn)!
England shall bide till Judgment Tide,
By Oak, and Ash, and Thorn!'[3]

The creation myth of the Tanganarin natives in Australia holds that Punjil fashioned man out of the bark of a tree. Another tree was tabu, and haunted by a bat; the tabu was broken; the tree was violated; the bat flew away, and death came into the world.[4] Daphne is the name both of the laurel and of the spirit within it. The *numen* of a palm-tree is not called Tamar, but Ba'al Tamar. The former conception is Indo-European, the latter Semitic.

'The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature. . . . The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the object and its *ba'al*.'[5]

Among the nymphs were Philyra, the linden, Rhœa, the pomegranate, Helike, the willow, and Daphne, the laurel. Mrs. Philpot notes:

'In later times an attempt was made in some cases [*e.g.*, Daphne in Laurum, Lotis in Lotum, Dryope in Arborem][6] to explain the connection by metamorphosis . . . but it is extremely probable that this was an inversion of the primitive nexus.'[7]

The classic passages for the oak of Dodona are Hom. *Od.* xiv. 327 f., xix. 296 f. In Hom. *Il.* xvi. 233 f. the oracle is mentioned; Vergil refers to it in *Georg.* ii. 15 f. The oak was also sacred to Ceres;[8] before harvest worship must be rendered to her, and the worshipper must be crowned with a wreath of oak.[9] The willow is associated with Hera at Samos, and with Artemis at Sparta. Artemis was the goddess of the nut-tree and the cedar in Arcadia, of the laurel and the myrtle in Laconia.[10] The laurel is sacred to Apollo; the priest-king Anius is guardian of the tree and the shrine.[11] The olive is specially connected with the cult of Athene at Athens. The pine is associated with Pan and Silvanus, the cedar with the Accadian deity Ea, the sycamore with the Egyptian goddess Nuit (Hathor). The cypress was sacred among the Persians, and in the West, together with the poplar, it belongs to the chthonian deities. The vine and the ivy were closely connected with the rites of Dionysus.[12] The ash and the elm appear in Scandinavian mythology as the first man (Ask) and the first woman (Embla), and the ash Yggdrasil is connected with the court of the gods.[13]

Celtic folk-lore has many points of contact with the ancient oak-cult of the Mediterranean area, with variations due to local developments under northern conditions. The *δρύτομος* of Dodona, the *αἰγειροτόμοι*, or poplar-fellers, at Athens, the *κισσοτόμοι* at Phlius,[14] have their representative in the tree-felling god Esus on the Paris monument.[15] The ancient axe-ritual of Dodona, Crete, and Etruria appears in the sculptures of Sucellos and other deities in Celtic lands.[16] On the Trier monument the deity is felling an oak-tree on which are three cranes. The Tarvos trigaranus, the bull, before the oak-tree, with two cranes on the back and one between the horns, is another variation of the Paris altar.[17]

[1] W. Y. Evans Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*, Oxford, 1911, p. 70.
[2] *Ib.* p. 176.
[3] Rudyard Kipling, *Puck of Pook's Hill*, London, 1906, p. 32.
[4] *ERE* i. 34, 36[a], ii. 36[b], 45[b]. [5] *Ib.* p. 285.
[6] Ovid, *Met.* i. 452, ix. 345, 350–393.
[7] P. 59 f. [8] Ovid, *Met.* viii. 741–743.
[9] Verg. *Georg.* i. 347–350. [10] Philpot, p. 29.
[11] Verg. *Æn.* iii. 79–82. [12] Philpot, *passim*.
[13] *Chambers's Encycl.* new ed., Edinburgh, 1888, *s.v.* 'Ash.'
[14] Paus. II. xiii. 3. [15] Grupp, p. 153.
[16] *Ib.* pp. 154–156. [17] *Ib.* p. 166.

The cult of Cernunnus supplies another link. He is represented in the Cluny Museum with stag's horns, the ring on each horn referring to the sun.[1] In the silver bowl from Gundestrap in Denmark he is cross-legged, Buddha-like, with stag's horns, and on his right a stag and a bull.[2] In a wax tablet at Pesth he is called Jupiter Cernenus; on a Rheims monument he is with a stag and an ox, and at Saintes with several *bucrania*. The presence of the sun-wheel in Paris, and the bull-masks at Saintes, point to his original identity with the Zeus of Crete. In one case he is represented with a chain.[3] His name is almost certainly connected with the horns. In folk-lore he probably survives in Windsor Forest as Herne the Hunter, who walks

> 'round about an oak, with great ragg'd horns;
> And there he blasts the trees, and takes the cattle,
> And makes milch-kine yield blood, and shakes a chain
> In a most hideous and dreadful manner.'[4]

It is not unlikely that the Horn-dancers of Abbots Bromley in Staffordshire commemorate some early pagan rite connected with the oak-cult of Zeus Cernunnus. Bagot's Park is a celebrated oak-forest. The village-games in old times took place round the Beggar's Oak. Though now held early in September, in Robert Plot's time (1641–96) they took place about Christmas. The dancers wore stag-horns (reindeer, kept in the church). It is noteworthy that the Pesth tablet of Jupiter Cernenus has also an echo in a modern dance—a horned figure among the mummers of Mohacs on the Danube.

The oak also entered into the ritual of invoking Zeus as a rain-god. On the Lycæan mountain of Arcadia was a shrine sacred to Zeus, in which was a spring to which the priest went in time of drought. He touched the water with a sprig of oak, when a vapour would rise and spread in fruitful showers over the land. In Brittany the fountain of Barantin in the Forest of Brécilien served the same purpose. Water was thrown on a slab near the spring, and rain would then fall in abundance, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The well was near the fabled shrine of Merlin, one of the Celtic types of the sun-hero, and it was overshadowed by a mighty tree. Rhys suggests that the spring, the tomb, the slab, and the tree 'all belonged to the Celtic Zeus.' There is a similar story connected with the Snowdonian tarn Dulyn, the Black Lake, where the slab was called the Red Altar.[5] There is also in the moorlands of Staffordshire, near Ipstones, a strong spring overshadowed with oak and mountain-ash long known as the Thundering Well. The name alone remains, but it may be grouped among the sites sacred to the Celtic Zeus as rain-god. Within the last few years a Celtic chambered tomb has been discovered within a short distance of the well.

The ash is also among the sacred trees of Ireland. In the parish of Borrisokane, Co. Tipperary, there was in 1833 a huge ash called the Big 'Bell' tree.[6] The name is derived from the word 'Billa,' which occurs in Magbile, 'the plain of the old tree,' the present Moville.[7] This name has been connected by Windisch with *bile* or 'Beli,' king of Hades, the consort of Danu. This Beli represents Cronos in his darker character as Death, and suggests that the Big 'Bell' trees of Irish folk-lore were ash-trees sacred to the Celtic Cronos.[8] The ash was also sacred to the Celtic Silvanus: 'Silvane sacra semicluse fraxino.' He presided over woodlands, clearings, and gardens.[9]

[1] Grupp, p. 164. [2] *Ib.* p. 283. [3] *Ib.* p. 164.
[4] Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, IV. iv. 29.
[5] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*[2], p. 183 ff.
[6] W. G. Wood-Martin, *Traces of the Elder Faiths of Ireland*, London, 1902, vol. ii. pp. 155–160.
[7] *The Martyrology of Gorman*, ed. Whitley Stokes (Henry Bradshaw Soc. Publications, ix.), London, 1895, p. 319.
[8] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 678. [9] *Ib.* p. 65.

The white-thorn has also its sacred associations. It is unlucky to cut it down. A 'lone thorn' is regarded with special veneration. Christianity took over its sanctity. The Crown of Thorns was said to have been made of white-thorn. An old thorn near Tinahely, Co. Wicklow, is still called 'Skeagh Padrig,' or 'Patrick's book.' In Britain 'the holy thorn' of Glastonbury has similar venerable associations. The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The yew among the Druids was a symbol of immortality.[1] Celtic folk-lore has many other traditions of tree-worship. The first man sprang from an alder, the first woman from a mountain-ash. The berries of the rowan are a charm against all disease. There are also trees which were inauguration trees. One, an old sycamore in Coollemoneen in the parish of Killadown, is called 'the honey-tree.' A tree in the parish of Kilmactaign is called 'the fern-tree,' *i.e.* the alder.

6. Tree-offerings and tree-rites.—The cult of the sacred tree had its offerings and its rites. There are even survivals of the offering of the highest sacrifices. The natives of the Vindhyan uplands of India until lately offered human sacrifices to trees.[2] In the animistic worship of the Ainus the worship is vocal.[3] At the close of the bear-festival the head of the bear is set up on a pole, called 'the pole for sending away,' and the skulls of the other animals which are hung up with it are called 'divine preservers' and are at times worshipped.[4] This is a link with the *bucrania* which form so integral a part in the sacrificial tokens of Aryan worship. Plutarch states that Theseus on his return from Crete put in at Delos, and instituted a dance in imitation of the mazes of the labyrinth.

> 'He danced it round the altar Keraton which was built entirely of the left-side horns of beasts.'[5]

This was known as the 'crane dance,' and is certainly in some way associated with the cult of the Celtic tree-god Sucellos or Esus with his three cranes, and with the Tarvos trigaranus of the Paris monument.[6] A note in Langhorne's Plutarch states that the crane commonly flies in the figure of a circle, which together with the *swastika*, or conventional labyrinth sign, is symbolic of the sun-cult. The dance round the May-pole and the Jack-in-the-Green festivities within our own memory in May Fair, London, are survivals of the same rites.

The griffins in Assyria and in Asia, in their attitude of devotion,[7] have their counterpart in the vision of the Temple in Ezekiel:

> 'And it was made with cherubims and palm trees, so that a palm tree was between a cherub and a cherub' (41[18]).

In a Mexican MS the tree breaks into two branches in the shape of a tau-cross, each branch with three blossoms; the tree is surmounted by a parrot, and is supported by two men, standing, each with his right hand raised in the attitude of devotion.[8]

Trees were hung with votive offerings. In India the sacred banyan-tree is represented with six elephants in the act of worship.[9] In Egypt it is the sycamore with jars and fruit, and the worshipper before it has the right hand raised.[10] Elsewhere it is a tree sacred to Artemis, hung with the weapons of the chase.[11] Wreaths were worn and garlands were carried in various Greek rites; and this use of wreaths points to some analogy with tree-worship in the two pillars before the Temple at Jerusalem.[12] Robertson Smith gives a coin from Paphos with similar detached pillars before a temple, each surmounted above the cornice by a dove as in the rude pillar-shrine of Crete. Whether

[1] Grupp, p. 145. [2] *ERE* i. 35[b]. [3] *Ib.* p. 248[b].
[4] *Ib.* p. 250[b].
[5] Plut. *Lives*, tr. J. and W. Langhorne, new ed., London 1823, i. 55.
[6] Grupp, p. 165. [7] Philpot, p. 6. [8] *Ib.* p. 17, fig. 9.
[9] *Ib.* p. 42. [10] *Ib.* p. 44. [11] *Ib.* p. 45.
[12] W. R. Smith, p. 469.

they were candlesticks or not, they were wreathed in pomegranates.[1] On the eastern gateway of the Buddhist tope at Sānchi the sacred tree is represented with worshippers. It divides into two main branches, like that in Mexico, and there are two smaller trees, one on either side. The central tree is being wreathed in garlands.[2] The Bodhi-tree of Kanakamuni breaks into three branches and is also hung with festoons.[3] This custom still survives in the West. Rhys has collected recent evidence from Glamorganshire of holy wells overshadowed by thorn or other trees, on which rags were fastened.[4] And the present writer some thirty years ago saw a bush hung with red rags in one of the islands of Aran off Galway. It is one of the last relics of the cult of the sacred tree, like the practice of 'touching wood' to avert a change of 'luck,' still in use in this country.

The tree is also a trophy of victory. As late as the 4th cent. of the Christian era a pear-tree at Auxerre was hung with trophies of the chase and venerated as a god.[5] The 'Stock-im-Eisen' in the centre of Vienna is the stump of a sacred larch, now studded and bound in iron, the last remains of trophies with which it was originally hung. The Irmensul had a similar origin.[6] Romulus celebrated his victory over the Cæninenses by his institution of the *spolia opima* in honour of Jupiter Feretrius:

'He cut down a great oak that grew in the camp, and hewed it into the figure of a trophy: to this he fastened Acron's whole suit of armour, disposed in its proper form. Then he put on his own robes, and wearing a crown of laurel on his head, his hair gracefully flowing, he took the trophy erect upon his right shoulder, and so marched on, singing the song of victory before his troops. . . . This procession was the origin and mould of future triumphs.'[7]

The 6th cent. Gallican poet Venantius Fortunatus, author of the *Vexilla regis*, who lived when the honour of the sacred tree was still more familiar to the Gauls than the shame of the Cross, lifts up the old faith in his great hymn of the Passion:

'Pange lingua gloriosi proelium certaminis
Et super crucis tropaeo dic triumphum nobilem,
Qualiter redemptor orbis immolatus vicerit.
. . . . . .
Crux fidelis inter omnes arbor una nobilis
Nulla tamen silva profert fronde, flore, germine:
Dulce lignum dulci clavo dulce pondus sustinens.'[8]

7. The tree of life.—The sacred tree was the source and the sustenance of life. Worship, sacrament, and mystic charm are closely linked together. The *soma*-plant, the Iranian *haoma*, is the sacred food of the gods in Asia, and corresponds to the *ambrosia* of the Greek world.[9] The Vedic *amṛta* or *soma* had in it the principle of life and was withheld from ordinary men: it was, however, to be taken by the initiated.[10]

In Sparta, in early times, the dead were laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive. In the forest land of northern Europe hollowed oaks were used in the burial of the dead.[11] The practice among the Oddfellows of each member dropping a sprig of sweet herbs on the coffin in the grave is a survival of the same early rites. In Abyssinia the branches and twigs of the ghost-tree are used by the pagan Kunamas as a protection against sorcery and as charms and amulets at childbirth and death.[12] In Babylonia the idea is more strictly defined. The god Nin-gish-zida is 'master of the tree of life.'[13] In time of drought the priest of the Lycæan Zeus let down an oak-branch to the surface of the water.[1] Codrus, when he devoted his life to his country, dressed as a woodman. Cook notes:

'If the last of the Athenian kings on so solemn an occasion appeared as an oak-cutter armed with an axe, we may be sure that this was no mere disguise but the ancient ritual costume of an oak-king.'[2]

The cult of the sacred tree embraces the highest rites in life and in death. The rite of tree-marriage in India in its surviving forms is mainly conventional.[3] The idea of reincarnation may in some cases explain it, but the rites seem to point to other and more primitive ideas. The Agariā, a Dravidian tribe of Chotā Nāgpur, have a special regard for the *sāl*-tree, which is used at their marriages.[4] The *bali*, or totem, system prohibited marriage between those who have the same totem. Among the Marathas the *devaks*, or marriage-guardians, though they no longer form a bar to the union of two worshippers of one *devak*, still have some share in the marriage-rite.

'The *devak* is usually some common tree such as the bel, fig, banyan, or the sami. In its commonest form it is the leaves of five trees, of which one, as the original *devak* of the section, is held specially sacred. It is worshipped chiefly at the time of marriage.'[5]

It has already been suggested that in primitive ages every valley, as Elton says, had its own king. Each king would be the champion and priest of the sacred tree, and this tree as indwelt by the divine spirit would be sacramentally united in all rites of initiation or other social *sacra* with the tribe or clan. The five leaves represent a pentapolis, or group of five states, one or other, as in ancient Rome,[6] choosing the common priest-king of the five, preference therefore being given to the leaf which represented his sacred tree. Similar customs banning all marriage within a totem-clan have been observed among the Bantu tribes of S. Africa. The mushroom totem of the Awemba is an example of a vegetable totem.[7]

Again, it would appear that the root-idea in the animistic cult of the sacred tree is religion rather than totemism or ancestor-worship; these are perhaps only relics of the primitive age—results of anthropomorphic development and differentiation, degenerate conceptions of the earlier animistic principle of the unity of the divine spirit of life.

The mistletoe-bough in the Christmas feast and 'kissing under the mistletoe' are relics not only of the oak-cult of the Druids, but of its connexion with primitive marriage-rites. This cult rests on the authority of Pliny,[8] and the special virtues ascribed to mistletoe are also referred to by him. Cook has some valuable notes on the mistletoe, which give support to Frazer's conjecture 'that the sun's fire was regarded as an emanation of the mistletoe.'[9] Cook bases his argument on the cult of Ἴξιος Ἀπόλλων at Ixiæ in Rhodes, a town named after the mistletoe. The cult is not definitely referred to in connexion with the oak, but 'it is probable, because the Rhodians regarded the oak as the sun-god's tree.' In the story of the punishment of Ixion there is, he suggests, another link between the mistletoe and the sun-cult. Ixion was the father of Peirithoüs, whose constant associate was Dryas.

'The relationship thus established between Ἰξίων the mistletoe and Δρύας the oak is scarcely fortuitous.'

A scholium on Euripides, *Phœn.* 1185, reads:

'Zeus in his anger bound Ixion to a winged wheel and sent it spinning through the air. . . . Others say that Zeus hurled him into Tartarus. Others again, that the wheel was made of fire.'

This flaming spin-wheel has been commonly understood as the sun-god. Cook concludes:

[1] Cf. 2 Ch 4[12f.].
[2] Philpot, p. 15, fig. 8.
[3] *Ib.* p. 41, fig. 19.
[4] Rhys, *Celtic Folk-Lore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 354 ff.
[5] Philpot, p. 20.
[6] Baedeker, *Oesterreich*[22], Leipzig, 1890, p. 17; *ERE* ii. 45[a].
[7] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 98.
[8] H. A. Daniel, *Thesaurus Hymnologicus*, Halle, 1841–55, i. 163.
[9] *ERE* ii. 13[b]
[10] Philpot, p. 125 f.
[11] *ERE* ii. 18[a]
[12] *Ib.* i. 56.
[13] *Ib.* ii. 295[b].

[1] *CIR* xviii. 88; Paus. VIII. xxxviii. 3.
[2] *CIR* xviii. 84.
[3] *ERE* viii. 431.
[4] *Ib.* i. 180; cf. i. 233.
[5] *Ib.* ii. 338[b].
[6] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 182.
[7] *ERE* ii. 852 f.
[8] *HN* xvi. 44; *ERE* iii. 295[b].
[9] *GB*[2] iii. 455; *CIR* xvii. 420.

'It has not, however, been hitherto observed though indeed the fact is obvious, that Ἰξίων is derived from ἰξός and that the mistletoe was on Greek soil thus intimately associated with the sun-god.'[1]

An old Staffordshire custom of keeping the mistletoe-bough throughout the year and then burning it in the fire under the Christmas pudding probably rests on some tradition of the perpetuation of the sacred fire. The mistletoe represented during the winter the 'sap of the oak,'[2] and this formal burning of it, like the feeding of the sacred fire of Vesta from the oak-grove of the Palatine slopes, expresses the principle of life. It has not been customary to use mistletoe in the decoration of churches at Christmas; but W. Stukeley[3] reports a curious custom from York:

'On the Eve of Christmas Day they carry mistletoe to the high Altar of the Cathedral and proclaim a public and universal liberty, pardon, and freedom to all sorts of inferior and even wicked people at the gates of the city, towards the four quarters of Heaven.'[4]

There was in Plutarch's time a shrine of Fortuna Viscata on the Capitol at Rome. This may be the Fortuna Primigenia near the temple of Jupiter, where stood the oak of Jupiter Feretrius.

The *rota Fortunæ* survived till lately at Douai, when about midsummer 'a large wheel called the *roue de fortune* was carried in procession before a wicker-work giant known as *le grand Gayant*, and other figures called *les enfants de Gayant*. These wicker giants were certainly the Druid divinities, whose colossal images of wicker-work are described by Cæsar':[5] 'Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent; quorum contexta vimi-nibus membra vivis hominibus complent: quibus succensis, circumventi flamma exanimantur homines.'[6]

The mistletoe-bough and the various customs connected with it are all survivals of the solar cult, and, with the wreaths, axes, spears, cranes, and doves, point to the true meaning of the worship of the sacred tree. The mistletoe-bough is made the type of the Golden Bough:

'Quale solet silvis brumali frigore viscum
Fronde virere novâ, quod non sua seminat arbos,
Et croceo fetu teretes circumdare truncos:
Talis erat species auri frondentis opaca
Ilice.'[7]

The yew was also regarded as a symbol of immortality.[8] The name *eburos*, mid-Irish *ibhar* (*Taxus*),[9] enters into place-names and clan-names —*e.g.*, Eburacum (York), Eburodunum (Yverdon), Eburones. The last-named is an instance of a tribe or clan taking its name from a tree-deity.

There was a yew in Belach Mughna in the west of Leinster—'a great sacred tree, and its top was as broad as the whole plain. Thrice a year did it bear fruit: it remained hidden from the time of the Deluge until the night on which Conn of the Hundred Battles was born, and then it was made manifest. Thirty cubits was the girth of that tree, and its height was three hundred cubits. However, Ninine the poet felled that tree.'[10]

Cell-eo in the *Martyrology of Gorman* is the 'church of yews.' And there is an ancient hallowed site in Staffordshire, with only the memory left of its All Saints' dedication, the New Year festival of the Celts, which is now marked by the Hanchurch Yews. The churchyard yew is an ancient symbol of the tree of life.

In the story of Eden the command went forth: 'Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die' (Gn $2^{16f.}$).

No ban is put on the tree of life till the command is broken. Was the tree hidden like the yew of Mughna? Could it be found only by those initiated and instructed, as in the quest of the Golden Bough? It stood in the midst of the garden:

'Latet arbore opaca
Aureus et foliis et lento vimine ramus,
Junoni infernae dictus sacer: hunc tegit omnis
Lucus, et obscuris claudunt convallibus umbrae.'[1]

Was it so shut in and shadowed that it could not be found? Is there anything parallel in the imagery to that of the Cretan labyrinth?

It has been suggested that in an earlier version of the Eden story there was but one tree, the tree of life, and it is to be noted that in Gn 3^3 the tree with its forbidden fruit is described as being 'in the midst of the garden,' as is the tree of life in 2^9. And in most of the myths of paradise there is the conception of the one tree.

The Norse Yggdrasil in its complexity is the central tree of the universe: 'The chief and most holy seat of the gods is by the ash Yggdrasil. There the gods meet in council every day. It is the greatest and best of all trees, its branches spread over all the world and reach above heaven.'[2]

The garden reached by the Chinese king in quest of the glories of paradise had 'a wondrous tree in its midst, and a fountain of immortality, from which four rivers, flowing to the four corners of the earth, took their rise.'[3] The central tree with its fruit in the old willow pattern dish is a familiar illustration:

'The Chinese temple, there it stands
And there's the tree of many lands'—

in other words, the universe-tree of China.

Hercules, in the garden of the Hesperides, 'conquered the protecting dragon and secured the golden sun-fruits from the central tree.'[4] The garden of Indra contained five wonderful trees, the chief of which was the *paridjata*, 'the flower of which preserved its freshness throughout the year, contained in itself every scent and flavour, and gave happiness to whoever demanded it. It was, moreover, a test of virtue, losing its splendour in the hands of the sinful, and preserving it for him who followed duty.'[5]

It was but a step in the development of myth to differentiate between the tree of life and the tree of knowledge; and it was a step in the revelation of truth. The tree of life has the promise of immortality and bliss.

The sacred books of the Parsis state that 'the original human pair, Maschia and Maschiana, sprang from a tree in Heden, a delightful spot where grew homa or haoma, the marvellous tree of life whose fruit imparted vigour and immortality. The woman at the instance of Ahriman, the spirit of evil, in the guise of a serpent, gave her husband fruit to eat and so led to their ruin.'[6]

The story of Eden ends in ruin, but it is ruin which has the promise of regeneration (Gn 3^{15}). There is the way of the tree of life, and Christian mysticism found it in the way of the holy Cross. The drama of religion closes with the vision of the holy city, New Jerusalem, and the throne of God and of the Lamb:

'In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations' (Rev 22^2).

Ethics and religion have each their part in keeping 'the way of the tree of life' (Gn 3^{24}); they are the supporters of the wheeling sword, the whirling flaming circle of the solar disk, the most sacred symbol of the Sun of Righteousness.

8. The tree of knowledge.—The oracle is an integral part of tree-worship.

Joshua at Shechem 'took a great stone, and set it up there under an oak, that was by the sanctuary of the Lord. And Joshua said unto all the people, Behold, this stone shall be a witness unto us; for it hath heard all the words of the Lord which he spake unto us' (Jos $24^{26f.}$).

It was a witness to the oracle at Shechem. The 'plain of Meonenim' is the 'terebinth of the diviners (Jg 9^{37}). In Africa the trees planted round the ancestral graves were tended by women whose oracles were listened to in times of crisis.[7] Tree-divination was practised by the Ainus.[8] The oracular virtue of the oak of Dodona was assigned to the depths of its root.[9] The oracle was

1 *ClR* xvii. 420.
2 *ERE* iii. 295b.
3 *Medallic History of Carausius*, London, 1757–59, ii. 163 f.
4 J. Brand, *Observations on Popular Antiquities*, ed. H. Ellis and J. O. Halliwell, new ed., London, 1848, i. 525.
5 *ClR* xvii. 421.
6 *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 16.
7 Verg. *Æn.* vi. 205–209.
8 Grupp, p. 145.
9 H. Pedersen, *Vergleich. Grammatik der kelt. Sprachen*, Göttingen, 1909–11, i. 365.
10 Whitley Stokes, *The Martyrology of Œngus the Culdee* (H. Bradshaw Soc. Publications, xxix.), London, 1905, p. 259.

1 Verg. *Æn.* vi. 136–139.
2 *The Prose Eddas*, tr. G. W. Dasent, Stockholm, 1842, *sp.* Philpot, pp. 113–115.
3 *Ib.* p. 134.
4 Hesiod, *Theog.* 215 ff.; Philpot, p. 136.
5 Philpot, p. 129.
6 *Ib.* p. 130.
7 *ERE* i. 164a.
8 *Ib.* i. 248b.
9 Philpot, p. 94.

chthonian. The witch of Endor raised spirits from the earth (1 S 28^{13}).

'Altior ac penitus terrae defigitur arbos;
Aesculus in primis: quae quantum vertice ad auras
Aethereas, tantum radice in tartara tendit.'[1]

At Delphi the sacred laurel of Apollo grew in the cleft of the rock.[2] The chthonian rock-altars on the Areopagus at Athens are carpeted in spring-time with asphodel. Did this suggest the phrase, *κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα*, in Hom. *Od.* xi. 539, xxiv. 13? Both passages are assigned to the very latest or Athenian stratum of the Odyssey.

The rustling in the mulberry-trees (2 S 5^{24}) has its counterpart in the story of Æacus. He consulted an oak, a sapling from Dodona:

'Tu mihi da cives: et inania moenia reple.
Intremuit, ramisque sonum sine flamine motis
Alta dedit quercus.'[3]

The sacred cedar of the Chaldæans was not only the tree of life but 'the revealer of the oracles of earth and heaven.' The name of Ea, the god of wisdom, was supposed to be written on its core.[4]

The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The mystical fountain known as Connla's Well was overshadowed by nine mystical hazel-trees. The nuts were of the richest crimson colour and teemed with the knowledge of all that was choicest in literature and art. The nuts fell into the spring, where they were eaten by the salmon which frequented the spring. Therefore the salmon was the wisest of all things. In the story of Kulhwch, in the *Mabinogion*, the salmon of Llyn Llyw is stated to have been the first animal created, and its memory to surpass that of the eagle, the owl, the stag, and the blackbird. The source of its wisdom was the many-melodied hazel of knowledge.[5] The culture-god of the Celtic world has been identified with Mercury, and with the Gaulish deity Ogmios, the god of eloquence and wisdom. His name in Welsh survived in the word *ofydd*, one skilled or versed in anything. In Ireland he appears as Ogma, one of the ancient Goidelic group of the Tuatha Dé Danann. He was in a special sense the diviner or discloser among the gods.[6] The divining-rod is the surviving relic of the tree-oracle, and the hazel is the favourite tree from which it is cut. In France it was the custom to cut it on Wednesday, Mercury's day. This also points to the association of the hazel with the Gaulish Mercury. He was known also as the god 'qui vias et semitas commentus est,' and the custom of beating the bounds with a hazel-switch is another link with ancient rites.

Irish literature represents crimson nuts as forming the food of the gods.[7] The crimson berries of the mountain-ash explain its sanctity. It has been suggested that it is the original counsel-tree of the Northern races.[8] In Ireland the mountain-ash and the birch are still held sacred, and in Staffordshire in the 17th cent. Plot states that it was held dangerous to do wanton damage to the tree.[9] It is still, under the name 'wicky,' a favourite tree in the country districts. Evelyn[10] states that it was held in such veneration in Wales that it was found in every churchyard. It is still found in old burial-grounds in Yorkshire. In Derbyshire a little cross made of the witch-wiggin is held as a protection against witchcraft. The rites observed in cutting it belong to the earliest ages of tree-worship. It was to be cut on St. Helen's Day. It must be cut stealthily from a tree never seen before, and carried home by any way save that by which the wood-cutter had gone on his secret and sacred quest.[1] As the care-tree it has been taken over by the Church in the rhyme:

'Care Sunday, care away,
Palm Sunday, and Easter Day.'

Care Sunday is Passion Sunday, the Sunday before Palm Sunday.[2]

The holly is the Irish *cuilenn*, the Welsh *celynen*, the O.E. *holegn*; it is not a variant of 'holy.' The persistence of its red berries in winter and its Christmas associations give it a high place among the trees of the north. It enters into place-names in Ireland, as in Druimm Cuilinn, now Drumcullen, barony of English, King's County. More noticeable is its occurrence as a personal name, Macc Cuilinn, bishop of Lusk.[3] The effigy of the Holly-boy in the Kentish Shrove-tide revels may be regarded as a substitute for the oak with its ancient religious association. At the close of the revels it was burned.[4] The Christmas burning of the Yule-log is another link in the same chain, as the burning of the mistletoe-bough is the evidence of the continuity of the sacred fire.

The Christmas blossoming of the Glastonbury thorn and the Christmas-tree (of late introduction in England), with its lights and flowers and fruits, have been associated with the 'strange blossoming power of nature connected with St. Andrew's Day' (30th Nov.). These were transferred in the Middle Ages to the Christmas festival.[5]

'Christmas-Eve was given to the memory of Adam and Eve, and this led to the Paradise-plays which formed a prelude to the Nativity-plays. The Cross of Christ was held in ancient legend to have been made of "a tree which had sprung from a slip of the Tree of Knowledge." In the Paradise-play this tree was brought in laden with apples and decked with ribbons.'[6]

The lights form an integral part of the earlier ideas of this tree-ritual.

In old Icelandic legend there is the story of a mountain-ash at Mödhrufell which on Christmas Eve was covered with lights that the strongest gale could not extinguish. These lights were its blossoms. In French legend, Perceval comes across a tree illuminated with a thousand candles; and in another story Durmals le Galois twice saw a magnificent tree covered with lights from top to bottom.[7]

In Icelandic folk-lore lights are seen in the rowan-tree, and in Celtic folk-lore the scarlet berries of the rowan-tree are the source of wisdom. Is there not here a link between the light of wisdom and the bright fruit belonging to the tree of knowledge? The flamens wore the scarlet tuft in their caps.[8]

'Simonides tells us that it was not a white sail which Ægeus gave, but a scarlet one, dyed with the juice of the flower of a very flourishing holm-oak, and that this was to be the signal that all was well.'[9]

The story of Ægeus and Theseus has its parallel in the sign of the 'scarlet thread' at Jericho (Jos 2^{18}).

The rod of Aaron was the rod of the priesthood, and the priest's lips were to keep knowledge (Mal 2^{7}).

At the return from Captivity 'the Tirshatha said unto them, that they should not eat of the most holy things, till there stood up a priest with Urim and with Thummim' (Ezr 2^{63}). The breastplate of judgment contained these sacred lots (Ex 28^{30}). The sacred oracles are in the charge of the priest: 'for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts' (Mal 2^{7}).

The rod was the token of this authority; and the rod of Aaron was a rod of almond. The Hebrew word for 'almond' is *shāḳēdh*, connected with the root 'to watch.' It is the tree of watchfulness, the tree of light. Jeremiah of the priests of Anathoth, in the opening of his prophecies, sees the vision of an almond-rod. It is the token of the watchfulness of God:

[1] Verg. *Georg.* ii. 290–292. [2] Philpot, p. 98.
[3] Ovid, *Met.* vii. 628–630. [4] Philpot, p. 131.
[5] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*[2], pp. 554–556.
[6] *Ib.* p. 5 ff. [7] *Ib.* p. 356.
[8] J. Holden MacMichael, *Antiquary*, xlii. [1906] 369.
[9] *Ib.* p. 370. [10] *Ib.* p. 371.

[1] Macmichael, *Antiquary*, xlii. 422.
[2] *Ib.* p. 426.
[3] *Martyrology of Œngus*, pp. 382, 431; cf. 202 f.
[4] Brand, i. 68. [5] Philpot, p. 167.
[6] *Ib.* p. 169. [7] *Ib.* p. 171 f.
[8] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 189 n.
[9] *Ib.* p. 51; cf. *EBi.* col. 4316.

'Then said the Lord unto me, Thou hast well seen: for I will hasten my word to perform it' (Jer 1^{12}).

And in the open vision of death it would seem that the blossoming of the almond-tree symbolizes the light of the presence of God (Ec 12^{5}), the light of wisdom and knowledge: 'Because the preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge' (12^{9}).

The early cult of the sacred tree among the Jews left its mark in the Temple of Jerusalem. Robertson Smith notes that, as the two pillars Jachin and Boaz, so also the golden candlestick had associations with this ancient cult.[1] The pillars were wreathed with pomegranates; the candlestick was a budding and blossoming almond. If the former witness to the tree of life, the latter witnesses to the tree of knowledge.

Light was the first of the gifts of life; and it is in the light alone that religion can fulfil the duties of life. A Babylonian seal figured by Mrs. Philpot shows the sacred tree with seven branches, three on the right and four on the left, with a fruiting branch drooping on either side. On the right is a figure sitting with outstretched hand, the head crowned with the horns of a bull; on the left is another figure sitting, without the bull-mask, but with a snake behind it.[2] It recalls in some points the story of Eden; but it is also a link in the development of the seven-branched candlestick of the Temple.

The sacred twig, the sacred fire, the priest-king who is guardian and champion of both, and who is also the representative of the majesty of the sun, each and all witness 'at sundry times and in divers manners' to the religious fellowship and communion which man enjoys with the divine spirit. Silent adoration is called for in the presence of the tree of life. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is vocal in the light of divine wisdom:

'And I turned to see the voice that spake with me. And being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks; And in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man . . . and his voice as the sound of many waters' (Rev $1^{12\text{-}15}$).

This voice is the voice of divine wisdom, vocal at Dodona and Cnossus and Delphi, vocal in the burning bush, and vocal to-day in 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and ghostly strength, the spirit of knowledge and true godliness . . . and the spirit of God's holy fear.'[3] And this fruit of the Holy Spirit is the fruit of the sacred tree:

'And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him' (Is $11^{1f.}$).

It is true to-day, as in the earliest ages of animistic religion, that 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Ps 111^{10}).

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the footnotes.

THOMAS BARNS.

TREE OF KNOWLEDGE, TREE OF LIFE.—See TREES AND PLANTS.

TRIADS.—See TRIMŪRTI, TRINITY.

TRIMŪRTI.—Though the *Rigveda* does not contain the conception of a supreme spirit manifested in three forms (*trimūrti*), which is the Hindu doctrine of the Trinity, it contains elements which have contributed to form that belief. In the first place, Agni as the god of fire has three forms: he is the sun in the sky, lightning in the aerial waters, and fire on earth. On this idea is based much of the mysticism of the Vedic period, and it is reflected in the ritual by the threefold character of the sacrificial fire. Secondly, in prayers such as 'May Sūrya protect us from the sky, Vāta from the air, Agni from the earthly regions,'[1] appears a tendency to reduce all the gods to manifestations of three chief deities, each representative of one of the three divisions, sky, air, and earth. Yāska[2] tells us that his predecessors in Vedic interpretation held that all the gods could be reduced to three, Agni, Vāyu or Indra, and Sūrya, though he himself does not adopt this view. A further step towards the amalgamation of the gods is seen in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*,[3] which holds that Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya are all sons of Prajāpati, the creator god.

The further development of the doctrine occurs only in the later *Upaniṣads* as the outcome of the adoption of the principle of the absolute (*brahman* or *ātman*). In the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*[4] or *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* the highest self (*paramātman*) is identified with Brahman (by which Brahmā is probably meant), Śiva, Hari, and Indra; the identification with Hari is probably a later interpolation, as it spoils the metre, but it is doubtless an old change in the text. In the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad*[5] Brahmā, Rudra, and Viṣṇu appear as forms (*tanavaḥ*) of the absolute, which itself is incorporeal, and again[6] are declared to correspond respectively with the *rajas*, *tamas*, and *sattva* aspects of the absolute. The same triad is found in other texts such as the *Prāṇāgnihotra*, *Brahma*, *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya* and *Rāmottaratāpanīya Upaniṣads*.

The comparative lateness and esoteric character of the doctrine are shown by the almost total absence of the conception from the epics, where it appears definitely only in the statement of the *Mahābhārata*:[7]

'In the form of Brahmā he creates; his human form [*i.e.* Viṣṇu] preserves; in his form as Rudra will he destroy; these are the three states of Prajāpati.'

This is the classical form of the doctrine which is repeated in the *Harivaṃśa*, in Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava*, and not rarely in the later literature. The personality of the trinity is varied slightly according to sectarian preferences; thus in the Śaiva view[8] the absolute, which is Śiva, is manifested as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Bhava, the last a personal form of Śiva; the Nimbārkas and other sects[9] identify Kṛṣṇa with the absolute, distinguishing him from Viṣṇu as one of the trinity. There is some uncertainty whether the formation of the definite idea of a trinity was preceded by the conception of Viṣṇu and Śiva as merged in a unity, attested by the term Harihara, which appears first in the *Harivaṃśa*; this view, however, is rendered probable by the fact that the epic appears to have identified Viṣṇu and Śiva as equals before it combined Brahmā with them as their peer. A characteristically late idea recognizes a trinity of the Śaktis, or personifications of the power of the three gods: Vāch or Sarasvatī as that of Brahmā; Śrī, Lakṣmī, or Rādhā as that of Viṣṇu; and Umā, Durgā, or Kālī as that of Śiva. For this there is no Vedic parallel, though in the *āprī* hymns of the *Rigveda* a triad of sacrificial goddesses is found in Sarasvatī, Iḍā, and Bhāratī.

Serving as it does to reconcile rival monotheisms with one another and with the philosophic doctrine of the absolute, the theory of the Trimūrti presents no such close similarity to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as to render derivation from Christian influences either necessary or probable, though chronologically the existence of such influence is

[1] P. 467 f. [2] P. 130.
[3] *Book of Common Prayer*, Order of Confirmation; cf. Is $11^{2f.}$ LXX.

[1] x. clviii. 1. [2] *Nirukta*, vii. 5. [3] iv. xii. 2.
[4] x. xiii. 12; cf. P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 252, n. 2.
[5] iv. 5, 6. [6] v. 2.
[7] III. cclxxii. 46—an interpolation, according to E. W. Hopkins, *Great Epic of India*, New York, 1902, p. 184.
[8] *Liṅga Purāṇa*, I. xviii. 12.
[9] R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (= *GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 79.

quite possible. It is, however, conceivable that the idea developed under the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which possesses the notable triads of Buddha, Dhyāni-buddha, and Dhyāni-bodhisattva on the one hand, and of the Dharma-, Nirmāna-, and Sambhoga-kāyas of a Buddha on the other. The Buddhist art of Gandhāra, followed by that of Tibet, China, and Japan, is prone to depict groups of three deities, Buddhas, or *bodhisattvas*, and it is to this influence that we may assign the existence of such sculptures as that from the cave of Elephanta, Bombay, which presents the three gods in one statue, and affords the inspiration for the *ekā mūrtis trayo devāḥ* of the *Matsya Purāṇa*,[1] a passage often wrongly interpreted to mean 'One God and three persons.'

LITERATURE.—J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, iv.[2], London, 1873; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (=*GIAP* iii. 1), Strassburg, 1897; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, do. 1896; A. B. Keith, *Indian Mythology* (=*Mythology of All Races*, vi.), Boston, 1917; A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, Eng. tr., London, 1901; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *JRAS*, 1906, pp. 943–977; N. Söderblom, in *Transactions of the Third Internat. Cong. for the History of Religions*, ii. [Oxford, 1908] 391–410.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

TRINITARIANISM. — See TRINITY, RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

TRINITY.—1. The term and concept. — (*a*) The term 'Trinity' (from Lat. *trinitas*) appears to have been first used by Tertullian,[2] while the corresponding Greek term 'Triad' (*τριάς*) appears to have been first used by Theophilus the Christian apologist,[3] an older contemporary of Tertullian. In Tertullian, as in the subsequent usage, the term designates the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Spirit.

(*b*) Although the notion of a divine Triad or Trinity is characteristic of the Christian religion, it is by no means peculiar to it. In Indian religion, *e.g.*, we meet with the trinitarian group of Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu; and in Egyptian religion with the trinitarian group of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, constituting a divine family, like the Father, Mother, and Son in mediæval Christian pictures. Nor is it only in historical religions that we find God viewed as a Trinity. One recalls in particular the Neo-Platonic view of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality, which was suggested by Plato in the *Timæus*; *e.g.*, in the philosophy of Plotinus the primary or original Realities (*ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις*)[4] are triadically represented as the Good or (in numerical symbol) the One, the Intelligence or the One-Many, and the World-Soul or the One and Many. The religious Trinity associated, if somewhat loosely, with Comte's philosophy might also be cited here: the cultus of humanity as the Great Being, of space as the Great Medium, and of the earth as the Great Fetish.

(*c*) What lends a special character to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is its close association with the distinctive Christian view of divine incarnation. In other religions and religious philosophies we meet with the idea of divine incarnation, but it may be claimed that nowhere is the union of God and man so concrete and definite, and so universal in its import, as in the Christian religion. As Augustine said,[5] if in the books of the Platonists it was to be found that 'in the beginning was the Word,'[1] it was not found there that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.'[2] It is the very central truth of Christianity that God was historically manifest in Christ, and that He is still revealed in the world as the indwelling Spirit of the Church or community of Christ's founding. This Christian faith in the incarnation of the divine Word (*λόγος, sermo, ratio*) in the man Christ Jesus, with whom the believer is united through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the distinctive basis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

2. The development of the doctrine.—The limits of this article preclude any attempt to trace in detail the development of the Trinitarian idea from its beginnings in the Bible to its final formulation in the orthodox creeds. In various articles of this Encyclopædia this ground is traversed, such as the comprehensive art. GOD; the artt. on particular developments of ancient Christian thought like the Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Cappadocian Theologies; the artt. on individual Christian theologians like Athanasius and Augustine; the artt. on heretical phases of Christological and Trinitarian belief like Adoptianism, Arianism, Monophysitism, Nestorianism. It will be convenient, however, to take here a general conspectus of the development in question.

(*a*) The *Old Testament* could hardly be expected to furnish the doctrine of the Trinity, if belief in the Trinity is grounded (as stated above) upon belief in the incarnation of God in Christ and upon the experience of spiritual redemption and renewal through Christ. It is exegesis of a mischievous, if pious, sort that would discover the doctrine in the plural form, 'Elohim,' of the Deity's name, in the recorded appearance of three angels to Abraham, or even in the *ter sanctus* of the prophecies of Isaiah. It may be allowed, however, that the OT ideas of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God are adumbrations of the doctrine, as recognizing the truth of a various self-revealing activity in the one God.

(*b*) In the *New Testament* we do not find the doctrine of the Trinity in anything like its developed form, not even in the Pauline and Johannine theology, although ample witness is borne to the religious experience from which the doctrine springs. None the less Christ is acknowledged as the eternal Son of God and the supreme revelation of the Father, and the quickening Spirit of life is acknowledged to be derived 'from on high.'[3] And so, when the early Christians would describe their conception of God, all the three elements—God, Christ, and the Spirit—enter into the description, and the one God is found to be revealed in a threefold way. This is seen in the baptismal formula,[4] 'In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' which at least reflects the usage of the apostolic Church, and in which the members of the Trinity are already all three associated together. It is also to be seen in the familiar words of St. Paul,[5] 'The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost.' This last has been called, and justly so, the great Trinitarian text of the NT, as being one of the few NT passages, and the earliest of them, in which the three elements of the Trinity are set alongside of each other in a single sentence. If the passage contains no formulated expression of the Trinity, it is yet of great significance as showing that, less than thirty years after the death of Christ, His name and the name of the Holy Spirit could be employed in conjunction with the name of God Himself. Truly, if the doctrine of the Trinity appeared

[1] J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, Oxford, 1920, p. 149.

[2] 'Custodiatur *οἰκονομίας* sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit' (*adv. Praxean*, 2).

[3] *τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ* (ii. 15). But perhaps the earliest appearance of the term is in Clem. *Excerpt. ex Theod.* § 80; cf. A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 7 vols., London, 1894–99, ii. 209 n.

[4] *Enn.* v. 1, cited by C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1918, p. 43.

[5] *Conf.* vii. 9; cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, London, 1911, p. 236.

[1] Jn 1[1].
[2] Jn 1[14].
[3] Lk 24[49].
[4] Mt 28[19].
[5] 2 Co 13[14].

somewhat late in theology, it must have lived very early in devotion.

(*c*) The story of the Trinity in *ecclesiastical history* is the story of the transition from the Trinity of experience, in which God is self-revealed as the Father or Creator and Legislator, the Son or Redeemer, and the Spirit or Sanctifier, to the Trinity of dogma, in which the threefold self-disclosure of God is but the reflexion, as it were, of a threefold distinction within the divine Nature itself. With the transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma the theological statement tends to lose touch with the gracious figure of the historical Christ. In the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed, in which the Eastern development of the doctrine of the Trinity culminated, the dogma still retains its connexion with its positive ground and basis in the incarnate life of Christ; but in the Athanasian Creed, which represents the form which the dogma finally assumed in the West, it appears to have lost the connexion altogether, and to move entirely in the transcendent realm.

Five stages in the dogmatic development may be distinguished.[1] (1) The formal identification of the pre-existent Christ (of the Pauline and Johannine theology) with the Logos of Greek philosophy. In the NT the identification is in the practical rather than speculative interest, but in Justin Martyr and the apologists it may be regarded as the first step in the logical process whereby the historical figure of Jesus Christ was caught up into the purely speculative sphere. (2) The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son (hitherto regarded primarily as the cosmological principle of revelation and not therefore co-eternal with God). This doctrine, due to Origen, which may be expressed in other words as the eternal Fatherhood of God, entered into the Athanasian theology. Formulated in the interests of the divinity of Christ, it conserved also—as against Sabellian views—the distinction between the Father and the Son. On the other hand, the subordinationism it implied and acknowledged, while countering dyotheistic and tritheistic tendencies, lent support to the Arian conception of the Son as a creature, especially after the Origenist theory of eternal creation (which enabled Origen himself to regard the Son as still primarily a cosmological principle) had been abandoned. (3) The doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. This was affirmed against Arianism at Nicæa, where the concept—if not as yet the actual term—*homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος) as applied to the eternal Son was amply vindicated. As Athanasius taught, in jealous regard for the divineness of the Christian incarnation and redemption, there was an absolute likeness between the Father and the Son, and also a co-inherence or mutual immanence (*περιχώρησις, circumincessio*) of their Persons.[2] (4) The doctrine of eternal distinctions within the divine Nature, according to the formula of 'three Hypostases in one Ousia or Substance' (*τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μία οὐσία*). To the Cappadocian theologians (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) we owe the final settlement, for which this formula stands, of the dogmatic terminology. In distinguishing between *hypostasis* and *ousia*, the former denoting a real principle of distinction within the divine Nature and the latter the divine Substance or Nature (*φύσις*) itself,[3] they sought to lift the orthodox doctrine out of the Sabellian modalism which recognized no distinction in reality between the Father and the Son, so impairing the significance of the historical Christ, and at the same time to vindicate it against the opposite error of heathen polytheism (tritheism), of which it was so often accused. Moreover, the Cappadocians gave to the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the definite place and character which He now possesses in the Eastern orthodoxy, as being also a Hypostasis in the Godhead, consubstantial with the Father, and proceeding from the Father through the Son. (5) The doctrine of the double procession from the Father and the Son (the *filioque* clause, added to the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed on canonically indefensible grounds[1]) —a doctrine which represents the difference between Western orthodoxy and Eastern (with its view of procession as from the Father alone, the unitary source of deity[2]); which was conceived, in the interests of the divine unity, as counteractive of the subordinationism contained in the Eastern formulas; and which under Augustine's influence found its way into the Athanasian Creed. Curiously enough, the Athanasian Creed (so called) thus differs theologically from the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed in its original Eastern form on a point on which Athanasius's own sympathies would have lain with the Eastern symbol. The Greek (Athanasian) theology found the divine unity in the Father, the one fountain-head of deity, so leaving room for the conception of the Son and the Spirit as subordinate to the Father. The Roman (Augustinian) theology found the divine unity in the divine Nature or Substance, with the result that, as the distinctions between the three Hypostases or Persons became weakened under the doctrine of the co-inherence, so attractive to the non-metaphysical Westerns,[3] there remained no proper foothold—so to speak—for the doctrine of subordination.

3. The statement of the doctrine.—(*a*) The ecclesiastical doctrine whose stages of development have been indicated may be briefly stated as follows, and the form of statement would commend itself as a whole alike to the Western or Roman Catholic and the Protestant Church. For, although the doctrine of the Trinity was the subject of much discussion, dogmatic and speculative, in the Middle Ages and at the Protestant Reformation, and has been since, it has been formulated all along on the lines of the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants—generally speaking—yield formal adherence to these symbols, and the old orthodoxy remains still the new.

(*b*) There are then (as the statement may run) three Persons (Hypostases) or real distinctions in the unity of the divine Nature or Substance, which is Love. The Persons are co-equal, inasmuch as in each of them the divine Nature is one and undivided, and by each the collective divine attributes are shared. As a 'person' in Trinitarian usage is more than a mere aspect of being, being a real ground of experience and function, each divine Person, while less than a separate individuality, possesses His own hypostatic character or characteristic property (*ἰδιώτης*). The hypostatic characters of the Persons may be viewed from an internal and an external standpoint, *i.e.* with reference to the inner constitution of the Godhead or to the Godhead as related to the cosmos or world of manifestation. Viewed *ab intra*, the hypostatic character of the Father is ingeneration (*ἀγεννησία*), of the Son filiation, of the Spirit procession; wherefore, 'the Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is

[1] Cf. W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 142.
[2] Cf. Jn 17[21].
[3] See, further, art. TRITHEISM, §.

[1] Cf. T. B. Strong, *A Manual of Theology*[2], London, 1903, p. 168 ff.
[2] *μία πηγὴ θεότητος.* [3] Strong, p. 170.

eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.'[1] Viewed *ab extra* (for Love functions externally as well as internally, is centrifugal as well as centripetal[2]), the hypostatic character of the Father is made manifest in creation, whereby a world is provided for beings who should be capable of experiencing fellowship with the divine Love; the hypostatic character of the Son in redemption, whereby the alienating power of sin is overcome; and the hypostatic character of the Spirit in sanctification, whereby human nature is quickened and renewed and shaped to the divine likeness. Yet, while this is said, as there is no separation in the unity of the Godhead, so the one God is manifested in the threefold work of creation, redemption, and sanctification; moreover, each of the Persons as sharing the divine attributes is active in the threefold work, if with varying stress of function. Verily the doctrine of the Trinity *exit in mysterium*.

(*c*) It should, perhaps, be emphasized that the Trinitarian statement is never tritheistic, in the sense of affirming three separate self-conscious and self-determining individualities in the Godhead. When it is affirmed that there are three Persons in one God, the word 'person' is used archaically, and not in the modern sense of a centre or core of personality. It was a word employed by Tertullian[3] as on the whole the best word by which to convey the idea of an inner principle of distinction or individuation (*ὑπόστασις*); and it was a good enough word when it bore a vaguer and more flexible meaning than it bears nowadays in Western Europe. To say that there are three separate personalities in the Godhead would be polytheism. To say that there are three eternal principles of distinction or modes of subsistence in the Godhead is not polytheism—although in the speculative construction of the Trinity it might lead, and has sometimes led, to a theoretical pluralism or polytheism.

4. The speculative construction of the doctrine.—(*a*) Although the Christian Church soon came to look upon the Trinity as an incomprehensible mystery of revelation, which reason might not probe, her theologians have not refrained whether in ancient or in modern times from speculation upon the doctrine. In mediæval times, indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity was 'the high school of logic and dialectic.'[4] Then, as before and since, recourse was often made to the principle of analogy, in order to throw light upon the mysterious notion of tri-personality in the Godhead. It is a principle that has received classical treatment at the hands of Augustine, who employed in particular the analogies of the human self-consciousness and the relationship of love. It is not pretended, however, that by such analogies the doctrine of the Trinity may be rationalized. And, clearly, such analogies fail on one side or the other to satisfy the conception of 'three Persons in one Nature.' On the one hand, the psychological analogy of the self-consciousness does justice to the unity of the Nature, but not to the distinction of the Persons. This is as true, it has been remarked,[5] of Dorner's construction founding upon Hegel's 'being in itself, being for itself, being in and for itself,' as of Augustine's 'memory, understanding, and will'[6] (in each of which he found the whole rational nature expressed), or, as we might add, of his 'mind, self-knowledge, and self-love.'[1] On the other hand, the social analogy of love does justice, more or less, to the distinction of the Persons, but not to the unity of the Nature. In this case the three elements of the analogy are the loving subject, the loved object, and the mutual love which unites them. The subject and the object possess, to be sure, more than sufficient independence for the purpose in view, but it is difficult to see how the love which unites may be accepted as a distinct person, even in the vaguest sense of that term. The application of the psychological analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the *theoretical* interest attaching to the traditional dogma for which the Logos-conception stands, namely, the explanation of the relations between God and the world. On the assumption that the human individual is a microcosm, bearing traces of the divine Personality upon him, it would seek to make more intelligible the unity in diversity, or more precisely the unity in triplicity, affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Again, the construction of the Trinity which is founded upon the social analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the *practical* interest attaching to the traditional dogma, namely, the vindication of the truly divine character of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. On the assumption that the love-created social unit is the real microcosm, it would make more intelligible the triplicity in unity which is also affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Perhaps the social analogy has been the more influential of the two. It certainly offers a picture of the inner constitution of the Godhead that corresponds to the Christian Gospel: 'The love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in the Eternal Son; the Father and the Son are for ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of the Divine Love.'[2]

(*b*) In modern constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity there is a tendency to make much of the microcosm of human personality as carrying traces of macrocosmic Reality. God is to be interpreted, it is said, according to the teleological principle of the highest, and human personality is the highest thing we know. The result is that, as C. C. J. Webb[3] has indicated, we hear a good deal nowadays, even in non-Unitarian Christianity, of 'the Personality *of* God,' whereas the historical doctrine is that of 'Personality *in* God.' This raises the question whether the future of Christianity lies in its associating itself with the modern philosophical movement of personalism or in the renewal of its old alliance with Platonism. Into such a question we may not enter, but we would cite a recent instance of a discussion of the Trinity in which human personality figures as the key to the mystery of the Godhead. It is S. A. McDowall's[4] contention that there is more than analogy between human and divine personality, there is also identity in their nature. The Trinity within us is more than suggestive of the truth that in God personality is also triune. If we might borrow the language of Julian of Norwich,[5] the 'made Trinity' actually points to 'the unmade blessed Trinity.' If the Godhead be a Personality, it must indeed be a unity, but the unity—like the unity of human personality—is composed of three persons, which, although not self-existent but completely interpenetrating, are differentiated from each other by the stress of their individual functioning.[6] Personality, whether in God or in

[1] *Westminster Confession*, ii. 3.
[2] Cf. S. A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, Cambridge, 1918, p. 53 f.
[3] *Adv. Praxean*, 11 f.
[4] Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vi. 183.
[5] T. Haering, *The Christian Faith*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1913, ii. 918.
[6] *Memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*; cf. *de Trin.* ix.–xv.

[1] *Mens, notitia, amor*; cf. *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 26.
[2] Strong, p. 166.
[3] See *God and Personality*, lect. iii.
[4] Pp. 62 f., 95.
[5] Cf. W. R. Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, London, 1907, p. 28.
[6] McDowall, p. 108.

man, could not really exist if it did not thus involve an internal manifold.[1] For the elaboration of these positions reference must be made to the book itself. The discussion is cited here only as illustrating a recent tendency in the application, in Trinitarian speculations, of the principle of analogy.

5. Economic and essential trinity.—(*a*) The transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma is describable in other terms as the transition from the economic or dispensational Trinity (*τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως*) to the essential, immanent, or ontological Trinity (*τρόπος ὑπάρξεως*). At first the Christian faith was not Trinitarian in the strictly ontological reference. It was not so in the apostolic and sub-apostolic ages, as reflected in the NT and other early Christian writings. Nor was it so even in the age of the Christian apologists. And even Tertullian, who founded the nomenclature of the orthodox doctrine, knew as little of an ontological Trinity as did the apologists; his is still the economic or relative conception of the Johannine and Pauline theology. So Harnack holds,[2] and he says further[3] that the whole history of Christological and Trinitarian dogma from Athanasius to Augustine is the history of the displacement of the Logos-conception by that of the Son, of the substitution of the immanent and absolute Trinity for the economic and relative. In any case the orthodox doctrine in its developed form is a Trinity of essence rather than of manifestation, as having to do in the first instance with the subjective rather than the objective Being of God. And, just because these two meanings of the Trinity—the theoretical and the practical, as they might also be described—are being sharply distinguished in modern Christian thought, it might be well if the term 'Trinity' were employed to designate the Trinity of revelation (or the doctrine of the threefold self-manifestation of God), and the term 'Triunity' (cf. Germ. *Dreieinigkeit*) adopted as the designation of the essential Trinity (or the doctrine of the tri-personal nature of God).[4]

(*b*) It should be observed that there is no real cleavage or antithesis between the doctrines of the economic and the essential Trinity, and naturally so. The Triunity represents the effort to think out the Trinity, and so to afford it a reasonable basis. The first Christians had with St. Paul a saving experience of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the love of God, and of the communion of the Holy Ghost;[5] and the theologians of the ancient Church sought to set forth the Christian experience in logical terms of reason. In the effort they were led, inevitably, to effect an alliance between the gospel of their salvation and the speculative philosophy, and more especially the Platonism, in which they had been trained, while, in making room for the Christian gospel within the world—not altogether hospitable—of the Greek philosophy, they found themselves translating their empirical knowledge of God—the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ—into a doctrine of diversity or multiplicity, as distinguished from merely abstract unity, within the divine Nature itself. In other words, in thinking out the Trinity they arrived at the Triunity. None the less the greatest and most influential of the Christian Fathers, Origen, Athanasius, Basil and the Gregories, Augustine, all acknowledged that, for all the light thrown upon it in the Biblical revelation, the divine Nature remained for them a mystery transcending reason.[6]

[1] McDowall, p. 218.
[2] *Hist. of Dogma*, ii. 209, 260. [3] *Ib.* iii. 8.
[4] Cf. W. N. Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1898, p. 161.
[5] Cf. 2 Co 13[14].
[6] Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, London, 1907, ch. vi.

(*c*) It is claimed, however, especially by Catholic thinkers, that, logical mystery as the Trinity undoubtedly is, it not only conserves the spiritual values of the Gospel, but may be said to enshrine or encasket them. The Athanasian Creed, *e.g.*, is declared to be in effect a sublime and magnificent hymn of the Christian faith, having a power all its own to stir and uplift the souls of believers with the greatness and mystery of the divine redemption in Jesus Christ. That being so, it may be allowed that there is justice in the contention that acceptance of the Triunity does not commit one to the adoption of obsolete modes of thought, but only to acceptance of the authoritative Christian tradition which the terms of the Greek philosophy served to symbolize, and with whose continued vitality they have become invested.[1]

(*d*) But in consequence of a wide-spread failure, especially within the Protestant Church, to appreciate the symbolism in which the traditional Christian convictions are embodied, and to recognize in the doctrine of the Three in One any more than a sacred mysterious formula, modern Christian theology is thrown back more and more upon the historical revelation in Jesus Christ and the inward experience of Christian believers as the practical ground and basis of Trinitarian doctrine, being less concerned with what God is in Himself than with what He has shown Himself to be—less concerned with the Trinity of essence than with the Trinity of manifestation. It is part of the modern empirical movement in theology, chiefly associated with the names of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. When thus employed practically, as interpretative of Christian experience, rather than theoretically, as a doctrine of reality beyond and even apart from experience, the Trinity may be regarded as summarizing the different ways in which the knowledge of God may be held. (1) He may be thought of as the self-disclosed God and, as such, known to men as the ultimate and absolute Being, whose ways are past finding out. (2) He may be thought of as the self-disclosing God and, as such, known to men in nature and history and, above all, in the character and purposes of Jesus Christ. (3) He may be thought of as the self-imparting or self-communicating God and, as such, known to men as indwelling power. God revealed, God revealing, God abiding—in these three ways God makes Himself known, and they correspond to the elements of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian formula. If then, theoretically, the Trinity is 'the affirmation of a full rich life in God as distinct from all abstract and barren conceptions of his Being,' it is, practically, 'the affirmation that the true nature of God must be learned from his historic revelation in Christ, and from the experience which Christ creates.'[2]

(*e*) Doubtless such a statement is liable to the charge of Sabellianism (modalistic Monarchianism), but it may readily be defended against such a charge. In Sabellianism the divine nature is an abstract undifferentiated unity known only in three successive modes or manifestations, none of which is complete or permanent; they are but names,[3] and may not be translated into fundamental factors in the divine experience. Here the elements of the Trinity are acknowledged to be rooted eternally in unseen reality, so that God is always the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, although known through the threefold self-manifestation or not known at all.

(*f*) In the system of Christian theology the

[1] Cf. Illingworth, p. 238. [2] Adams Brown, p. 162.
[3] Epiphanius, *Hær.* lxii.: *ὡς εἶναι ἐν μίᾳ ὑποστάσει τρεῖς ὀνομασίας*; cf. J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, 3 vols., Paris, 1909-12, i. 349, 483 *f.*

doctrine of the Trinity does not usually fit well into the general doctrine of God, and often bears the character of a doctrine apart. There is much to be said for Schleiermacher's view—in his case reflecting, it may be, a Sabellian attitude—that the Trinity falls to be discussed at the end of the dogmatic system. One could not properly speak, he urged, of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit until one had expounded the Christian faith regarding the Son and the Spirit. None the less, it is quite possible vitally to relate the Trinity, conceived scripturally as a Trinity of manifestation, to the general Christian conception of God.[1] (1) There is no difficulty with the doctrine of the Father, who in the new formula as in the old is God in all His fullness of being and life; from which fullness the Son and the Spirit subtract nothing. (2) The doctrine of the Son is not without difficulty in this connexion. The old formula rested on the assumption that the divinity of Christ (the Christian conviction of which was the experiential ground of the doctrine of the Son) was to be discovered in the metaphysical constitution of His person, and accordingly by the way of analysis, whereas the new formula founds upon the principle that the secrets of personality do not yield themselves to 'searching' but to observation, and that accordingly the divinity of Christ is to be traced and recognized, if anywhere, in the unfoldings of His character and life. Moreover, the old formula also implied that there existed a fundamental difference of nature between God and man, so that the incarnation of the divine Word was nothing if not a stupendous miracle. The new formula, under the ruling modern conception of divine immanence, would imply that the divine-human Christ may be reached along the lines of God's normal working in His world. God is to be conceived as always present and active in the world, manifesting Himself continuously in nature and history, yet manifesting Himself supremely and fully only in the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ we have at once true man arising out of humanity and true God coming forth from the Godhead. In other words, Jesus Christ is the perfect expression of the divine Nature in terms of human character and life. With such a new criterion of divinity, and such a new conception of the relationship between the divine and the human, an assured place may be found—it is claimed—for the doctrine of the Son in the modern doctrine of God. (3) The doctrine of the Spirit may also be seen to be fulfilled in the new doctrine of God towards which modern Christian thought appears to be advancing. For the Spirit is but the immanent God Himself, working more freely in the souls of men as righteousness and power because of the new channels of influence He has opened up for Himself through Jesus Christ. In short, God Himself (ὅλος θεὸς) is the Father revealed; God Himself is in Christ revealing; God Himself is the Holy Spirit abiding. The form of the ancient dogmatic conception may be changed, but the substance of it remains. Still as of old we know God in His threefold relationship to men, and in each relationship we have very God Himself. Wherefore we may still unite in ascribing glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.

LITERATURE.—See the histories of Christian doctrine by A. Harnack, F. Loofs, R. Seeberg, J. Tixeront, G. P. Fisher, J. F. Bethune-Baker; also works on dogmatic theology, such as the classical expositions of John of Damascus, Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvin; and, among modern expositions, those of F. Schleiermacher, A. E. Biedermann, M. Kähler, F. H. R. Frank, H. Martensen, I. A. Dorner, R. Rothe, F. A. B. Nitzsch, J. Kaftan, T Häring, T. B. Strong, C. Hodge, W. Adams Brown, W. N. Clarke. Among special discussions see Augustine, *De Trinitate*; D. Waterland, *The Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity* (*Works*, Oxford, 1856, vol. iii.); F. C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtl. Entw.*, 3 vols., Tübingen, 1841–43; G. Krüger, *Das Dogma von der Dreieinigkeit und Gottmenschheit*, do. 1905; F. Schleiermacher, *Über den Gegensatz zwischen der sabellianischen und der athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität* (*Werke*, Berlin, 1835–64, i. 2); J. R. Illingworth, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, London, 1907; W. Adams Brown, *The Trinity and Modern Thought*, New York, 1907. See also relevant matter in recent works like H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, Cambridge, 1882; R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, London, 1901; R. L. Ottley, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, 2 vols., London, 1896; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, Edinburgh, 1912. In *HDB*, *DCG*, and *DAC* there are elaborate articles, with bibliographical notes, on the Scriptural and early Church doctrine of the Trinity. See also the literature under art. GOD.

W. FULTON.

[1] Cf. W. N. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, Edinburgh, 1909.

TRITHEISM.—1. Definition.—Tritheism (Gr. τρεῖς, 'three,' and θεός, 'God') is the belief in three Gods. As such, it is a form of polytheism, defined as the belief in many Gods or in more Gods than one.

2. Christianity and tritheism.—So far as the present writer is aware, no historical religion may properly be called tritheistic. Where divine triads or trinities are found, they are not distinguished from other divinities as true or real gods from idols. (1) On the other hand, the charge of being tritheistic has often been preferred against the Christian religion, as presented in the doctrine of the Trinity. (2) The Christian Church has, however, expressly dissociated itself from Trinitarian views tending to tritheism. (3) Moreover, liability to the charge of tritheism is regarded as sufficiently damaging also to speculative constructions of the Trinity. In what follows the writer would expound these three statements one by one.

3. The charge of tritheism.—(*a*) The accusation of being tritheistic, which has often been made against Christianity, is in a sense justified. For undoubtedly the doctrine of the Trinity has been, and is still, conceived among simple uneducated Christians in a naively tritheistic way. Sometimes also a naive tritheism is found even in theological statement, as when in so-called transactional theories the Atonement is represented as the result of a bargain between the first and second Persons of the Trinity.

(*b*) But the Christian religion, like other historical religions, must be judged by the affirmations of its best and most representative minds, and not by the crudities of the uninstructed or the aridities of theological pedantry. It is affirmed by the representative minds of Christianity that the accusation of tritheism is unjustified, being largely founded upon misunderstanding of the theological terms in which the Trinity is formulated. They would insist that there is a world of difference between the formula, 'There are three Gods,' or even the formula, 'There are three distinct or separate individuals in the class known as God,' and the formula in which the orthodox doctrine may be summarized, 'There are three Persons in one God.' In fact the Trinity is declared to be at bottom an assertion of the divine unity. If in the light of the Christian revelation we are led to affirm three eternal distinctions in the Godhead, we must still hold fast to the old faith of Israel's prophets and say, 'These three are one.' Admittedly, however, there are ambiguities and associations to mislead in the Trinitarian terminology. In particular, the ambiguity of the word 'person' is allowed to be a source of much misunderstanding. To set forth the true theological meaning of this word should be enough, it would be added, to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity against a charge so obnoxious as that of tritheism. We are

reminded in this connexion of how the early Christian thinkers abhorred the suggestion even that in affirming the Trinity they were reinstating heathen polytheism.

It should be remembered[1] that there was no word 'person' in the vocabulary of the Greek-speaking theologians, who shaped the doctrine of the Trinity to the authoritative form it assumed in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed. 'Person' (Lat. *persona*, 'an actor's mask'), as it appears in the Athanasian Creed, was intended to represent the Greek *ὑπόστασις*. Now 'hypostasis' ('sediment' or 'dregs,' lit. 'standing under or below') was used about the beginning of the Christian era to signify a real concrete existence or actuality in contradistinction to a mere appearance having nothing solid or permanent underlying it, such as a comet in comparison with a rainbow. Through Origen's influence it came to be employed in the theological terminology as the designation of a member of the Trinity, as in the Cappadocian formula, 'Three Hypostases in one Nature or Substance' (*φύσις, οὐσία*).[2] 'Hypostasis' then stood for a real independence—a real principle of individuation or distinction—*within* the Being of God, and ceased to be regarded, as in the Stoic use, as theologically equivalent to *οὐσία* or *φύσις*. It may be that the term 'hypostasis' as applied to the members of the divine Trinity suggested an independence or individuality of too complete a sort, as though the Father, Son, and Spirit were as separate in the class God as Peter, James, and John in the class named man;[3] but this suggestion was corrected, at least for speculative minds, by the Logos-Christology deriving from St. John and St. Paul, in which the idea of immanent distinctions in the unity of the Godhead received recognition. On the other hand, the tritheistic suggestion was in a sense accentuated for the Latin-speaking theologians by the selection, due probably to Tertullian,[4] of the word 'person' as the translation of *ὑπόστασις*. Though *persona*, as its original meaning might show, implied only a temporary and superficial kind of individuality (an implication more definitely conveyed by *πρόσωπον*, lit. 'face,' by which *persona* was often rendered in the later Greek theology), it implied also the dignity and worth of a rational nature. A 'person' in the early centuries of the Latin Church was an individual viewed in a legal aspect (the word often meant a litigant or a party to a contract as well as a player) as the subject of rights and duties, if not as yet in the philosophical sense of a self-conscious and self-determining Ego—a sense which has attached itself to the word in modern times. Yet even the ancient legal and relative associations of 'person' would impart ambiguity to its theological use, especially in popular thought, and the ambiguity would tend to increase in European usage as the word approximated more and more to the modern philosophical sense of personality. So it is not surprising that there has been a strong tendency to tritheism in Western theology, especially among the people; and that non-Christian thinkers, notably Jewish and Muhammadan, have so often viewed the doctrine of tri-personality in God as virtual or veiled tritheism.

4. **Tritheism as a heresy of dogma.**—(*a*) Although aberrations from the orthodox doctrine were in the East towards a modalistic Monarchianism (Sabellianism) rather than tritheism, it was in the East—among the Greek-speaking theologians—that a form of tritheism actually arose to meet with the condemnation of orthodoxy. The movement in question illustrates the reaction of Christological discussion and controversy upon the doctrine of the Trinity. Christology lay in the heart of the Trinitarian dogma, and the development of Christology naturally led to a revision of the dogmatic terms.

(*b*) As a definite phase in the history of Christian thought tritheism appeared *c.* A.D. 550 in Monophysite circles, being associated chiefly with the names of John Askusnages and John Philopon. The latter, an Alexandrian philosopher and a distinguished Aristotelian, of whose work entitled Διαιτητής important fragments have been preserved in the writings of John of Damascus,[5] appears to have been the most influential of the school. As a Monophysite John Philopon was opposed to the Chalcedonian description of the Person of Christ as consisting of 'one person in two natures' (*ἓν πρόσωπον* or *μία ὑπόστασις ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*), and contended that Christ's was a single nature compounded of the divine and the human. That is to say, in Christology *φύσις* or *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* were to be viewed as synonymous terms.

(*c*) When this Christological position is applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, the question is at once raised as to whether the orthodox formula of three Hypostases in one Substance can be maintained. If one *οὐσία*, is there not but one *ὑπόστασις*; if three *ὑποστάσεις*, are there not three *οὐσίαι*? The affirmative to the first question leads to a form of Unitarianism, the affirmative to the second to a form of tritheism.

(*d*) John Philopon started from the consideration of the three *ὑποστάσεις* and reached, accordingly, a tritheistic conclusion as to the divine *οὐσία* or *φύσις*: *ἑστω τρεῖς φύσεις λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος.*[1] So he and his followers were named by their opponents 'tritheists' (*τριθεῖται*), although we are told[2] that they would not actually have confessed themselves as believers in three Gods. If theirs was a theoretical, it was not also a practical, tritheism, like the Trinitarian notions of the transactional theorists mentioned above (which amply justified the protest of the earlier Unitarians). It appears, however, that John Philopon admitted the notion of a common Nature (*οὐσία κοινή*), if holding it in what might have been named later a nominalist sense; but Damian[3] (578–605), the Monophysite patriarch of Constantinople, held so pronouncedly realistic a view of the one Substance, at the same time apparently regarding the three Persons as true reals or separate individualities, that, like Peter the Lombard in a later day, he was accused of teaching a Quaternity rather than a Trinity, and his followers were labelled 'tetradites' (*τετραδῖται*). The tritheists were definitely opposed in the name of the orthodox dogma by John of Damascus, who in seeking to emphasize as against them the unity of the Godhead gave—as Augustine did—a modalistic flavour to his theological exposition.[4]

5. **Tritheism as an error of speculation.**—It has been remarked[5] that in the tritheistic movement (so called) and the counter-movements it evoked we may find the roots of the mediæval controversy between nominalism and realism. The remark is illustrated by the case of Roscellin, the best-known representative of the older nominalism. According to Roscellin, universals were not reals, but merely subjective conceptions (*flatus vocis*).[6] And, if this principle holds of the Nature or Substance of God, then the Persons of the Trinitarian formula must be regarded as distinct self-consciousnesses, and the unity of the Godhead as but a nominal and generic unity. Thus on philosophical principles Roscellin reached a theoretical tritheism, which, however, at Anselm's instance, was condemned at Soissons in 1092.[7] And over and over again, from the beginnings of Christian theology down to the present, speculative constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity have had to encounter—sometimes in the irony of things—the damning charge of being tritheistic. In the ancient Church, as Callistus accused Hippolytus of dyotheism, so Dionysius—maintaining the Roman tradition of unspeculative adherence to the

[1] See the recent discussion of Trinitarian terminology in C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1918, esp. lect. ii.

[2] Cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* xxxix. 11 f.

[3] Greg. Nyss. ii. 188, and other writers quoted by R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1895, § 21, d.

[4] *Adv. Praxean*, 11 f.

[5] *De Hær.* 83.

[1] Leontius, *de Sectis*, actio v. c. 6, quoted by J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, 3 vols., Paris, 1909–12, iii. 196; cf. also Photius, *Biblioth.* codd. 21, 24, 75; John of Ephesus, *Hist. Eccl.* v. 1–12.

[2] Timothy, *de Receptione Hæreticorum* (*PG* lxxxvi. 1, col. 61).

[3] *Ib.* col. 60.

[4] In *de Fide orthodoxa*. For summary discussions of Tritheism as a heresy of dogma reference may be made to the artt. 'Johannes Askusnages,' 'Johannes Philoponus,' in *PRE*[3] ix. and the art. 'Tritheistischer Streit' in *PRE*[3] xx.

[5] A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 7 vols., London, 1894–99, iv. 126 n.

[6] Cf. Anselm, *de Fid. trin.* 2 f., *Ep.* ii. 35, 41.

[7] Roscellin and the nominalists were dubbed by Anselm *dialectice hæretici* (*de Fid. trin.* 2); cf. F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*[3], Halle, 1893, § 60, 4.

unity of the Godhead—preferred the accusation of tritheism against Origen's teaching.[1] Yet Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son entered into the orthodox formulas, and a follower of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, mightily championed the unity of the Godhead against the polytheists (tritheists).[2] Again, in the mediæval Church even Abelard was suspected of tritheism, and yet it was Abelard's aim and endeavour to mediate between the extremes of a tritheism like Roscellin's and pure modalism, and his sympathies lay with modalism rather than tritheism.[3] Once again, if it is not invidious to select so modern an instance, W. Adams Brown comments as follows on W. N. Clarke's constructive presentation of the essential Trinity:

'It is hard to see how these "centres of conscious life and activity" can be distinguished from separate personalities.'[4]

And yet W. N. Clarke[5] so emphasizes the Trinity of manifestation, as distinguished from the Trinity of essence, as to be far away indeed from tritheism. It all illustrates the fact that, while the doctrine of the Trinity, as set forth in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds, will have no traffic with tritheism, it is difficult in the theological exposition of the dogma to steer a safe course between tritheism and a Sabellian modalism (in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are merely three modes or aspects of the one God)—which serves to give point to Augustine's famous remark that the alternative to the affirmation of the three Persons is silence: 'dictum est tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.'[6]

LITERATURE.—See art. TRINITY. W. FULTON.

TRUST.—In the wide sense of confidence in a supernatural Power on which man feels himself dependent, trust enters as an element into practically all religions from the lowest up to the highest. Savages rely on their fetish to bring them success in the chase, and other peoples on their national god to give them victory in war. But such trust possesses no ethical quality and need not further detain us. Only when the superior and supernatural Power is conceived in more or less ethical fashion can a trust emerge that has ethical and religious value. Religious trust, in the only sense worth considering, is confidence in and reliance upon the eternal Power on which we hang, as one that is working towards a worthy end and guiding the course of events in wisdom and goodness. It is the trust that comes to expression in Ps 36[5ff.]:

'Thy lovingkindness, O Lord, is in the heavens; thy faithfulness reacheth unto the skies. Thy righteousness is like the mountains of God. . . . And the children of men take refuge under the shadow of thy wings.'

Were the facts of life uniformly of a kind to render the moral purpose and control of God obvious and unmistakable, the exercise of trust would make no particular demand on our energies. Since, however, they are far from being so, the world not seldom seeming to ride roughshod over man and his values, trust always carries with it the idea of a triumph over difficulties. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is presented in the light of an act of heroism: 'He endured, as seeing him who is invisible' (11[27]).

Trust of this kind is not of course to be looked for in the religion of primitive races or in religions that are merely national. Nor does it emerge with any distinctness in the pantheistic religions of India. The Indian conception of the world-order as governed by the principles of *karma* and *saṁsāra* (transmigration) is not at bottom ethical, and the corresponding piety consists not in submission to that order as something good, but in the desire to escape from it, and in the exercises through which the goal of absorption in Brahman is attained. Bhāgavatism, it is true, acknowledges a single God who is personal and gracious; and in its conception of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, as the way of deliverance from the wheel of birth and rebirth, resignation appears, if not as a constituent, at least as a fruit.[1] But *bhakti* is far less ethical trust than a mystical 'abiding' in the 'Adorable,' and the piety of Bhāgavatism as mirrored in the *Bhāgavad-Gīta*, intense though it is, is for the most part of the usual Indian type.

In the religion of the Greek dramatists, of Plato, and of the later Stoics, trust holds an assured though not a prominent place. Sophocles expresses the conviction that, however things may seem to us in our short-sightedness, if we could only see the purposes of the gods in their totality, we should know them to be good, and that 'nothing to which the gods lead man is base.' Of the just man Plato declares:

'Even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and in death: for the gods have a care for any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue.'[2]

Even more striking are the words of Epictetus: 'Do with me what thou wilt: my will is thy will: I appeal not against thy judgments.'[3] In the *Epinomis*, a dialogue wrongly ascribed to Plato, it is said: 'Pray to the gods with trust.'[4] And of Socrates Xenophon says that he must have believed in the gods, since he trusted them: *πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν*.[5]

But, though in the higher Greek religion trust had a firm basis provided for it and secured a certain amount of recognition, its full significance was far from being realized. Nowhere do we find it put forward as a central element in piety or a spring of strength and goodness. It was in the Hebrew prophets and their spiritual successors that it first really came into its own. Everywhere in the Bible we are met by utterances of fervent and steadfast trust in God. And its religious importance is clearly recognized. Isaiah sees in it the only source of safety: 'If ye will not trust, ye shall not be established' (7[9]). Jeremiah speaks to the same effect: 'Cursed is the man who trusts in man and makes flesh his arm, and whose heart turns aside from Jahweh. . . . Blessed is the man who trusts in Jahweh and whose confidence Jahweh is' (17[5.7]). To trust in Jahweh and do good is presented in Ps 37 as the sum of religion. In the NT the idea of trust, deepened by a new feeling for God's care for the individual, occupies a position of still greater prominence. Outside the Synoptic Gospels, however, it is to a large extent merged in the idea of faith (*q.v.*). It is faith in the sense of belief that is established as the condition of salvation. This change of emphasis—as we shall see, it amounts to nothing more—is intelligible when we remember that the gospel was preached as, in the first place at least, a message to be received. None the less it created for the Church a serious problem and one that had to wait long for a satisfactory solution. The problem has to do with the mutual relations of faith and trust. By St. Paul,[6] and also in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith

[1] Cf. Harnack, iii. 90, 93. [2] *Ib.* iii. 101 f.
[3] *Ib.* vi. 182.
[4] *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 152.
[5] In his *Outline of Christian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1898, and more especially in his *Christian Doctrine of God*, do. 1909.
[6] *De Trin.* v. 9.

[1] See art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA.
[2] *Rep.* x. 613 (tr. B. Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*[3], Oxford, 1892, iii. 329).
[3] Quoted from A. Schenkl, *Epicteti Dissertationes*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 158, by L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905, p. 205.
[4] *πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχου*, quoted by W. H. P. Hatch, *The Pauline Idea of Faith (Harvard Theological Studies*, iii.), Cambridge, Mass., 1917, p. 69.
[5] *Memorabilia*, I. i. 5. [6] *E.g.*, Ro 4.

is conceived in a way that makes the two practically identical. But what if its object is thought of as a doctrine which must first be assented to before trust can enter? In that case faith, while including trust, will contain in addition a purely intellectual element, either intellectual submission, if the doctrine is authoritatively given, or intellectual insight, if it is the product of a rational process. Adopting the first alternative, the older Protestant theologians in their analysis of faith established *notitia* and *assensus* as the necessary preliminaries to *fiducia*. The vice of this solution is that it destroys the independence of faith—in other words, of religion—by binding it to an act external to it and without moral quality. The faith described by Paul as trust in God is presented as at bottom subjection to the Church or the Bible as the guarantor of religious truth. And its independence is equally subverted if, adopting the second alternative, we regard it as receiving its object from philosophical reflexion. The true solution of the problem lies in the recognition that in faith itself there is a cognitive element, and that its object is given not in the form of a doctrine, but in the form of an ideal value. Face to face with the great values that are supremely embodied in the life and cross of Jesus and that are summed up in the conception of a kingdom of the good, we affirm them on the ground of their worth as the manifestation of the eternal Power that works at the heart of things, the eternal Reality on which the universe no less than our human life is founded. Faith is nothing else than just this feeling for the ideal and, above all, the moral values and this affirmation of their cosmic significance. So interpreted, it is one and the same thing with trust in God, for what is trust in God but trust in the good as the central might on which we and the whole universe hang? If there is a difference, it is that in the idea of faith the emphasis falls on the cognitive aspect, and in the idea of trust on the volitional.

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the footnotes and those given in art. FAITH (Christian). W. MORGAN.

TRUSTS.—See ECONOMICS.

TRUTH.—See ERROR AND TRUTH.

TSHI-SPEAKING TRIBES.—See NEGROES AND W. AFRICA.

TSIMSHIAN.—The Tsimshian belong to the northern group of coast Indians, but differ markedly from the Haida and Tlingit (*qq.v.*) in language. Their social organization is also somewhat divergent, since instead of two phratries they have four —Eagle, Wolf, Kanhada, and Gyispawaduweda—each embracing many small local groups or clans. There are three chief Tsimshian divisions: the Tsimshian proper, living on the lower Skeena River and the coast to the south, the Niska of Nass River, and the Kitksan of the upper Skeena. The last does not border on the coast and is intermediate between the coast tribes proper and the true interior tribes of Athapascan lineage. Most of the information that we possess regarding Tsimshian religion is from the Niska, but there seems to have been little difference between their beliefs and those of the other divisions.

1. **Cosmological beliefs.**—The earth was believed to be flat and circular. It was supported by a man named Amala ('smoke hole'), who lay on his back and held upon his chest a spoon made of the horn of the mountain-goat. This was filled with grease, and in it stood a pole, on which the earth rested. When he became tired, he lifted the pole, and the earth shook. The pole, with the earth on it, was turning round in the bowl of the spoon, the grease in which served to make it revolve easily. Sun, moon, and stars belonged to the sky and did not turn with the earth. This reference to the turning of the earth seems to point to White influence, but the association of grease with the being under the earth is paralleled by something related of the Haida Atlas, Sacred-one-standing-and-moving, and is probably genuinely aboriginal.

2. **Supernatural beings.** — The supernatural beings, so far as we are acquainted with them, were much the same as those among the Haida (*q.v.*). They had a supreme heaven-god called Laha ('on the air'), a perfect counterpart of the Haida Power-of-the-shining-heavens. From the information regarding him gathered by Boas, however, it seems that he approached much nearer to the monotheistic idea of a supreme being.

'Heaven is the great deity who has a number of mediators called Neqno'q. . . . Heaven rules the destinies of mankind; Heaven taught man to distinguish between good and bad, and gave the religious laws and institutions. Heaven is gratified by the mere existence of man. He is worshipped by offerings and prayer, the smoke rising from fires being especially agreeable to him. Murderers, adulterers, and those who behave foolishly, talking to no purpose, and making noise at night, are especially hateful to him. He loves those who take pity upon the poor, who do not try to become rich by selling at high prices what others want. His messengers, particularly sun and moon, must be treated with respect. Men make themselves agreeable to the deity by cleanliness. Therefore, they must bathe and wash their whole bodies before praying. For the same reason they take a vomitive when they wish to please the deity well. They fast and abstain from touching their wives if they desire their prayers to be successful. They offer everything that is considered valuable—eagle-down, red paint, red cedar bark, good elk-skin lines, etc. The offering is burnt.'[1]

The ethics of this, especially in the matter of acquiring wealth, seems so different from the aboriginal code found elsewhere that it is probable that the native informant's statements were tinged with missionary teaching, and that Heaven, or Laha, was elevated to a position above that which he occupied in earlier days. There can be no doubt, however, as to the existence of a sky-god 'first among equals.'

The Tsimshian prayed less often to their heaven-god than to the minor deities, or 'mediators,' whom they generally asked for food and fair weather. Sometimes they prayed to the supernatural beings collectively. The most important 'mediators' are stated to have been the sun and moon, spirits appearing in the shape of lightning strokes, and animals. The Raven, also called Skämsem, was believed in and had the same functions and general character as among the Tlingit and Haida. They also believed in the sea grizzly bear, or Hagulâk, which may have been originally a Haida conception, since his home was called Helahaidek ('near the Haida country'). In his house he had four kettles called Lukewarm, Warm, Hot, and Boiling. The killer-whales seem to have been his servants, since they were known as 'Hagulâk's men.' There was also a one-legged man similar to the Master-hopper of the Haida.[2]

Besides praying to the deities, a person could force them to grant his desires by rigid fasting. He had to abstain from food and from seeing his wife for seven days, lying in bed motionless all that time. Then he might rise, wash himself, comb the right side of his head, and paint the right side of his face, after which he might look at his wife. A less rigid form of fasting extended over four days only. To make the ceremony very successful, the man's wife must join him, but, if the wife should be untrue to her husband, the effect of the fasting would be destroyed. Whatever twins wished was believed to be fulfilled, and they were appealed to especially to control the

[1] Boas, in *Rep. of Brit. Association for Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 845 f.

[2] See art. HAIDA, § 19.

weather and bring eulachon and salmon. Numbers of tabus governed hunting and fishing, particularly the fishing of eulachon, which run into the Nass River in great numbers and are, or were, a principal source of wealth to the people. The first of these fish to be caught were roasted on a peculiarly-shaped frame made of elder-berry wood and with special ceremonies, the man who handled it praying meanwhile for an abundance of fish.

3. The dead.—The principal world of the dead was reached by following a trail and crossing a river. According to one story, a man who fainted and passed to the spirit-world was saved by a perforated stone hung round his neck as an amulet, which thwarted the endeavours of four shamans to remove his heart. Whether those who had died by violence or drowning went to regions distinct from the others is not recorded. At least at the mortuary feasts food was put into the fire for the dead.

4. Shamanism.—Nothing is known of Tsimshian shamans which would in any way distinguish them from those of the Tlingit and Haida, except that their bodies, like those of the common people, were cremated.

5. Witchcraft.—The wizard cast his spell by putting some article taken from the victim into a box containing portions of a human body. Strings were fastened inside this box, and, if the wizard wished his victim to die slowly, he fastened the object some distance above the body, but, if he desired him to perish at once, he cut the string, thereby precipitating the object upon the body. Afterwards he had to go round the house in which the person whom he had killed by witchcraft was lying, and later he had to walk round his grave and rub himself, pretending to cry all the time. Unless he observed these rules, he would himself perish. If it was believed that a person had been killed by witchcraft, the Tsimshian would take out his heart and lay a red-hot stone against it, wishing at the same time that the wizard might die. If the heart burst, it was expected that their wish would be fulfilled; if not, it was a sign that their suspicions were unfounded.

LITERATURE.—Nearly all the available Tsimshian material is contained in F. Boas, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 801 ff., report vi. *ib.* 1890, p. 562 ff., report x. *ib.* 1895, p. 523 ff., in *Bull. 27 BE* [1902], and in *51 RBEW* [1909–1910].

JOHN R. SWANTON.

TUKĀRĀM.—In Tukārām there culminates an important section of the *bhakti* school[1] and his verses have all the authority of a 'Veda' for most of the twenty million Marāṭhī-speaking people of one of India's noblest races, among whom are to be found some of the greatest Indian reformers of the day. Both for his poetic genius and for his unique place in the people's heart he is happily described as 'the Robert Burns of India' who marks 'the era of the efflorescence of Mahārāshtra's people.'[2]

1. Sources.—(*a*) *Biographical.*—Two serious difficulties confront the modern biographer of Tukārām. (1) All the Marāṭhī *Lives* of Tukārām are drawn almost exclusively from a single authority, the poet-saint Mahīpati (1715–90), whose accounts in the *Bhakti Vijaya* (chs. xlviii.–li.) and the *Bhakti Lilāmṛita* (chs. xxv.–xl.) were written in 1762 and 1774 respectively, more than a century after Tukārām's end in 1650, 'long enough for legends to grow.' (2) We have 'no authentic and properly sifted account of his life,' but only 'a mass of legends and traditions that have gathered round Tukārām'[3] and show a distinct 'tendency towards deification.'[4] Yet we have 'at least some facts of historical accuracy to start with,'[5] and Mahīpati's 'detailed legends . . . seem to be in every way as deserving of being critically worked out as those of the early Christian martyrs to which they often bear a strong resemblance.'[6]

A few sources earlier than Mahīpati have been indicated recently by V. L. Bhawe. Besides (1) Tukārām's autobiographical poems (see below) and (2) the *abhangs* of Rāmēshwar Bhaṭṭ, the leading disciple of Tukārām,[1] there are (3) a brief life of Tukārām by his grandson, Gōpāl Buwa, (4) the autobiography of Bahināībāī, another disciple of Tukārām who dictated her own life-story, giving the names of some of Tukārām's contemporaries who figure prominently both in Mahīpati and in Tukārām's own poems,[2] and (5) a source a century earlier than Mahīpati, a work written by one named Krishnadās Bairāgī on Keśav Chaitanya Sampradāya, which gives the important '*guru*-succession' of Tukārām and helps us to settle important dates in his life, this work being quoted by name and its facts given by one Niranjan.[3] Some would add a sixth source earlier than Mahīpati, in Narahari Mālu, author of *Bhaktikathāmṛita*, but he must be pronounced utterly untrustworthy, though he is followed by a few Marāṭhā authors.[4]

The investigation concerning biographical material has gone far enough to conclude with safety that, despite much unsifted tradition, 'miracle and wonder-working,' Mahīpati's account has a solid substratum of historical accuracy. Moreover, he uses his sources with discrimination, rejecting what he discovers to be unreliable.[5]

(*b*) *Autobiographical.*—The true text of Tukārām's writings has not yet been critically ascertained, and between the several collections there is a wide difference as to the number of poems included, ranging from 4621 in the edition generally accepted[6] to 8841 in one[7] described by R. G. Bhandarkar as 'uncritically made.'[8] Even the former is based on MSS admitted to have been 'corrected,' 'further corrected,' and 'arranged.' The problem remained in abeyance for fifty years until Bhawe in 1919–20 edited and published the first two instalments, numbering about 1300 poems, of what he claims is 'Tukārām's Original Gāthā,' written by one of Tukārām's fourteen disciples, one Santājī the Oilman whose MS[9] bears a date in one place three years earlier than Tukārām's death. All that can be said at present is that scholars are patiently investigating the problem of a critical text of Tukārām's writings. His verses were probably all extempore and were taken down by at least one or two of his immediate disciples. It is almost certain that every collection contains poems which are not really his, and we are also quite unable to fix their chronological order—a serious disadvantage. They are practically our only source of information regarding his teaching.

2. Life.—Penetrating 'a wilderness of surmise and guess,' we are safe in deciding that Tukārām was born the same year as John Milton, in 1608, though later research may push the date farther back. From at least seven generations Tukārām inherited a devotion to the god Viṭhobā of Pandharpūr.[10] It is first as a Śūdra grain-seller in his own native Dēhū, eighteen miles north-west of Poona, that Tukārām comes before us. His father Bōlhōbā, having married off his three sons with lavish outlay, sought to hand over his business to the eldest, whose predilection, however, for an unworldly life led to this responsibility falling on Tukārām at the early age of thirteen. The first four or five years appear to have been prosperous, but they were followed by a succession of disasters in business and home, so that young Tukārām's capital disappeared. Many stories are told illustrating his honesty, simple-mindedness, and spiritual devotion, Viṭhobā being represented as his unfailing helper on all occasions. All these stories probably have a solid basis of fact.

A great famine in 1629, during which his elder wife[11] died crying for bread, was the last in a succession of sorrows which led him to give up all business and worldly attachment. Sitting on the river bank with his younger brother Kānhōbā, he threw into the stream his half of the business papers and handed over the remainder to Kānhōbā, while he dedicated himself wholly to Viṭhobā.

The spirit of poetry came to him in a dream, commanding him to complete the unfinished task

1 See artt. BHAKTI-MARGA, MYSTICISM (Hindu).
2 D. Mackichan, *The Indian Interpreter*, vii. [1912] 165, 173.
3 W. B. Patwardhan, *The Indian Interpreter*, vii. 19.
4 *Poems of Tukārām, Indū Prakāsh*, ed. Bombay, 1869, p. 2.
5 Patwardhan, *The Indian Interpreter*, viii. [1913] 11.
6 L. J. Sedgwick, *JRASBo*, no. lxv. vol. xxiii. [1910] p. 127 f.

1 See *Bhaktililāmṛit*, ch. 40. 209.
2 V. L. Bhawe, *Mahārāshtra Sāraswat*, Poona, 1919, pp 193, 242 f.
3 *Ib.* p. 190, note 1. 4 *Ib.* p. 391. 5 *Ib.* p. 374.
6 *Indū Prakāsh*, Bombay, 1869, now out of print.
7 By Tukārām Tātyā, Bombay, 1889.
8 *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, in the *Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*, Strassburg, 1915, p. 94.
9 Bhawe, *Tukārām's Original Gāthā*, vols. i.–ii., Thana, Bombay, 1919–20.
10 See art. PANḌHARPŪR.
11 His wife Rakhmābāī being 'constitutionally asthmatic,' he had married another, Jijābāī or Āvalī, daughter of a well-to-do Poona merchant.

of his great predecessor Nāmdēv, *bhakta* and poet. In another dream he received his all-important *gurū-mantra* — *Rām - Krishna - Hari*, the secret mystic formula which finally initiated him as a Hindu teacher. This was at the hands of one Bābājī Chaitanya of the line of Rāghav Chaitanya and Keśav Chaitanya—a possible indication that Tukārām had some connexion with the Chaitanya sect of the Vaiṣnavites. A series of events setting forth his dealings with Brāhmans constitutes the most important part of his life-narrative.

One such story provides an interesting Hindu parallel to the Quaker doctrine of the sacramental significance of every meal. A Chinchwād Brāhman, Chintāmanī Dev, had invited Tukārām to dine with him, and, the Śūdra's plate having been laid the usual distance from the Brāhman's, Tukārām made the strange request that two more be laid, one for his own god and another for Ganpati, worshipped by his host, his explanation in an autobiographical poem being: 'If you enjoy a meal in faith, God sits down to dine with you.' Another event, one of the most critical in his life, demonstrates Tukārām's reverence for Brāhmans, even at the height of his renown. Rāmēshwar Bhaṭṭ, a Brāhman scholar jealous of the Śūdra's fame, had not only moved the public authorities against him but had personally enjoined silence upon him. 'But what of the poems already written?', asked their docile author. 'Throw them into the river,' was the cruel reply, and into the river the whole bundle went, covered with a stone. It was Tukārām's darkest hour, but, to the astonishment of all, several days later the sheets were seen floating on the river and were taken out unharmed. Rāmēshwar's deep repentance followed, the poet replying in gentle verse: 'If your mind is pure your enemies will be your friends.' And it was true enough in this case, for Rāmēshwar became his lifelong disciple.

Of the many incidents illustrating Tukārām's religious views one is of a Vedāntist Brāhman who persisted in reading to this Vaisnavite *bhakta* a pantheistic treatise to which Tukārām agreed to listen only on condition that he might be covered with a blanket. When the blanket was lifted after an hour's reading, Tukārām was found seated with his fingers in his ears, his defence being that he could not listen to the Advaita doctrine that God and His worshippers were the same.

The miraculous is found interwoven throughout Tukārām's life-story. His birth is viewed as an incarnation. He performs many miracles to help the poor. Viṭhobā miraculously intervenes at every point to vindicate and deliver his faithful devotee. In this legendary material is to be included, unquestionably, the account of Tukārām's 'ascension' on which Mahīpati has expended all his powers, giving rise to the popular Hindu belief[1] that Tukārām was carried away to Vaikuntha (the Hindu heaven) in the car of Viṣnu. The probability is, as suggested by P. R. Bhandarkar, that 'he met his death by drowning,' in the holy river of his own village, in 1650, whether by what is called *jalasamādhi*, or prearranged drowning, as in the case of some other Indian *sādhus*, or whether 'the constant expectation of God's coming to fetch him away produced an illusion, and in obeying a fancied call from the opposite bank he ran into the river and was drowned, it is very difficult to say.'[2] The various traditions concerning Tukārām's influence after death must also be regarded as legendary.

3. **Autobiography.**—Though there is as yet no critical edition of Tukārām's *abhaṅgs*[3] in existence, his autobiographical poems are generally accepted, and his self-revelations give the impression of being sincere and genuine. Of his kindness and unselfish service for others, on which Mahīpati dwells so often, he himself tells us nothing, his autobiographical verses being wholly concerned with the personal and spiritual side of things. 'It is his own religious life that occupies his soul.'[4] The *abhaṅgs* classified as 'autobiography' in the English translations of the poems by J. N. Fraser and K. B. Marāṭhē[5] number over 500, and there are many hundreds more given up to confession, invocation, and aspiration. He tells us but little of his life in the world, though he often dwells on his guilt and misery. The poems of self-accusation, about 300, reveal a sense of sin whose depth is rare in Hindu literature, though his relation to God is personal and pantheistic by turns.

'Fallen of fallen, thrice fallen am I' (343). 'I am a great fallen sinner. . . . My heart is witness to me that I am not redeemed' (126). This conviction of sin is often closely associated with extreme mental depression: 'False is "mine," false is "thine." False is Tukā, false is his faith. He speaks falsehood to the false' (2345). Sorrow, resulting from the death of parents, favourite wife, and eldest son, and from business failures, clearly led him to his self-dedication: 'It is well, O God, that I became a bankrupt, and was crushed by the famine; this is how I repented and turned to thee' (113). And his dedication was complete: 'Rank, race, colour, creed and caste—all are gone' (2790).

Patwardhan has made a 'tentative' effort to depict Tukārām's long inward struggle.[1] That this earnest pilgrim reached some worthy goal would appear from the poems, about 80 in number, under the heading 'Triumphant Happiness' in Fraser and Marāṭhē.

'I have found a sea of love, an inexhaustible flood. I have opened a treasure of spiritual knowledge; it diffuses the lustre of a million suns arisen in thy worshippers' souls' (573).

This, however, is by no means his habitual mood, which is rather one of despising his self-complacency. He has a passionate desire to help and serve those around, and, though he is far too often censorious, sometimes to the point of coarseness, yet he has something to say of constructive worth to his age and people. And it is chiefly as a preacher that he views himself. Though he lays no emphasis on Vedic lore, he has nevertheless a message invested with authority.

'These are not my words: I am a hired servant of Viṭhobā' (1420). Earnest and sincere preachers are badly needed, for there are impostors who eat and drink and who do even worse: 'Their desires are set on shawls and pots and money.' 'Matted hair and ashes are a scandal when the mind has no patience and forbearance' (1199). 'Such people sink themselves and destroy the ship of salvation,' but a true preacher 'rescues others by the sweet perfume of his words.'

4. **Experience of bhakti.**—To fathom Tukārām's deepest secret we need to explore his experience of *bhakti*, the 'clinging affection of the heart' for a personal God, though the god in Tukārām's case was a village-idol, surrounded by Puranic gross mythology and superstitious animism. The idol he worshipped was even one 'standing for both' Kṛṣna and Śiva,[2] but whether Tukārām recognized this plurality of gods at Pandharpūr we cannot say. In this unpromising soil Tukārām's *bhakti* grows, with pantheism and idolatry as twin-stems on the same tree. And, though his *bhakti* is too often a mere emotion, fugitive and fleeting, with more of longing than of satisfaction, it is yet free from those sensual extravagances that have degraded some forms of Indian *bhakti*. In Tukārām we probably see Indian *bhakti* at its best.

If it be asked in what Tukārām's *bhakti* experience consisted, the answer might be given in the words of the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtra*: 'surrendering all actions to God and feeling the greatest misery in forgetting God.'

'Tukā has his home in the Inconceivable' (1578). 'Whereso-ever I go, thou art my companion: thou takest me by the hand and guidest me. As I walk along, I lean on thee' (2149).[3] 'No particular time is necessary,' says Tukārām, 'for the contemplation of God, it should be done always.'[4] And again: 'God is ours, certainly ours, and is the soul of all souls. God is near, certainly near, outside and inside.'[5]

His deep sense of sin offered a serious obstacle to the quest of his soul.

[1] See L. R. Pāngārkar, *Śrī Tukārām Caritra*, Poona, 1920, pp. 495–512.

[2] *Two Masters: Jesus and Tukārām*, Bombay, 1903, p. 11.

[3] An *abhaṅg* is an Indian metre, somewhat irregular, words rhyming at certain intervals.

[4] J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, London, 1920, p. 300.

[5] *The Poems of Tukārām*, 3 vols., Madras, 1909–15; the references by simple figures below are to this useful work.

[1] See Fergusson College Magazine, vol. i. no. 3 [1910], pp. 4–16.

[2] See J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, p. 301.

[3] See also a poetic rendering in N. Macnicol, *Psalms of Marāṭhā Saints*, Calcutta, 1919, p. 71.

[4] Narayan G. Chandāvarkar, *Speeches and Writings*, Bombay, 1911, p. 527.

[5] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 95.

'The Endless is beyond, and between him and me there are the lofty mountains of desire and anger. I am not able to ascend them, nor do I find any pass.'[1] 'I know my faults, but I cannot control my mind . . . I am a slave of the senses' (1369).

Did 'any pass' over the 'mountains' ever appear on his horizon? He would appear to have had glimpses of one.

'I know not how to cleanse me of sin, so I have seized thy feet. . . . If thou dost take a thing in hand, what is impossible?' (2035). 'Thou hast saved many a humble, many a guilty, many a sinful man. Tukā dwells at thy feet; preserve him, O God' (248). 'What prayer can I put up? . . . Up till now, I felt sure that some of my service had been accepted. Now nothing but the struggle is left me: I see no sign of assurance in him who stands hand on hip'=Viṭhobā (3010). 'Though I made myself ceremonially pure, some impurity would still cling to me' (2968).

Inward purity thus becomes the prime necessity. 'What I delight in is purity of heart' (2632). 'What you need is a clean heart and a spirit at peace' (2309). 'Blessed are the pious, for their heart is pure. . . . Their hearts are filled with devoted love' (894).

The urgent question therefore comes to be: How shall this purity be realized? Ceremonies are unavailing, as are also pilgrimages.[2] Tukārām has full confidence that God can fulfil His child's desire, and to the crucial question how the divine blessing is to be obtained the answer comes repeatedly: 'It is *bhāva*' (812).

'My single-minded *bhāva* has put an end to pilgrimage to and fro' (2773). 'God comes quickly and stands where he finds *bhāva*' (3671). 'Tis *bhāva* that moves us and is fitly called the means of salvation' (2597). 'Without *bhakti* and *bhāva* everything else is useless trouble.'[3] 'Lay reasoning or learning aside in a bundle, for here *bhāva* is the one great criterion.'[4]

What is *bhāva*? His modern interpreters are not always clear. Bhandarkar says that it is 'faith, love, or the pure heart,'[5] and also that it has different meanings in different contexts.[6] Sometimes *bhāva* is that heart-religion which is guarantee of the vision of God without conscious effort, a parallel being found in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* reference to 'those who by the heart know the Supreme Spirit who dwells within.'[7]

Bhakti, therefore, as experienced by Tukārām, seems to have concerned itself chiefly with realizing a change of heart. 'The great precept of religion is to hear God in the heart' (812). And, with a change of heart, he longs for some assurance of the change:

'Whether I am indeed God's child, truly accepted by him, how am I to know? How shall I know of a surety that my heart is purer, my mind less tainted with anger? For if love be not in my heart how has my heart been changed?' 'Fortunate, indeed, are those persons in whose heart dwells forgiveness.'[8]

Three lines of solution appeared to Tukārām: concentrated personal meditation on God and His saints, persistent self-examination that shall root out self-esteem, and such utter self-abandonment to God that no voice shall be desired but His.[9] Deep humility, simple faith in the divine protection, and complete abandonment of self to God comprise another triple secret of *bhakti*.[10] Tukārām had travelled a long rough road in quest of peace. *Yoga* he had found unavailing, as well as *mantras*, austerities, and the five fires. On the summit of *bhakti* he found three graces whose fragrance reaches us in his pages: pity, pardon, peace.

'He who gives to God simple-hearted devotion . . . within his soul there dwell pity, pardon, peace.'[11] 'There is no Saviour of the needy save God alone: in Him are pity, pardon, peace.'[12] 'Where pity, pardon, peace abide there God dwells. Thither He runs and makes His home . . ., and where these graces have free play He tarries.'[13]

[1] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 96.
[2] *Ib.* p. 95. [3] *Ib.* p. 95.
[4] Bhandarkar's tr., *Marāṭhī Writings*, Bombay, 1919, p. 223.
[5] *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 109.
[6] *Marāṭhī Writings*, p. 187.
[7] *Ib.* p. 187 f.
[8] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 97.
[9] Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism*, pp. 40, 54, *Marāṭhī Writings*, pp. 315–321.
[10] *Ib.* p. 431 f. [11] *Ib* p. 436.
[12] *Ib.* p. 581. [13] *Ib.* p. 535 f.

5. Teaching.—Tukārām is never systematic in his psychology, his theology, or his theodicy. He oscillates between a Dvaitist and an Advaitist view of God and the world, leaning now to a pantheistic scheme of things, now to a distinctly Providential, and he does not harmonize them. He says little or nothing of cosmogony, and, according to him, God realizes Himself in the devotion of His worshippers. Likewise, faith is essential to their realization of Him: 'It is our faith that makes thee a god' (1785), he says boldly to his Viṭhobā. On the other hand, God makes Himself accessible to man's feeble apprehension by means of visibility, the idol thus becoming a proof of divine condescension: 'He has embodied himself in forms to suit our pleasure' (1753). Man is a child of God. Indeed, the figure of childhood is pressed sometimes so far as to sacrifice reverence and dignity, the same applying to Tukārām's view of God as Mother, though in the latter he finds a solution of many perplexities. All this deals with man's 'natural' state, but separation has entered, sin being viewed variously. It is sometimes a mere breaking of caste rules, sometimes a breach of morality, and again, and very often, it is *mīpaṇa*, a word often on his lips and perhaps best rendered by 'self-centredness,' though this is inadequate. We have seen how deep was his sense of sin and what means of salvation were disclosed to him. Brāhmanical or mystic intuition and verbal theology were deprecated as much as austerities. Men should waste no time in argument, but throw themselves at God's feet. Specific hindrances to salvation are found in the above *mīpaṇa*, in indulgence of desire, fear of ridicule, learning, and disputation. What the religious life meant to him we have already seen. Mere renunciation leads to nothing, and indeed everything is worthless save a personal experience of religion. Tukārām's 'good man' must possess humility, peaceableness, kindness, truthfulness, contentment, and simplicity.

He is mostly despondent of his fellow-men: 'I am sick of mankind' (994), and for relief he turns to 'the saints,' about whom he has hundreds of verses, setting forth their calling, character, and service to mankind. At the other end of the scale of creation animals call forth his real sympathy. Whether he held to *ahiṁsā* is not quite clear. Reincarnation he accepts (972), but he is not sure whether to prefer mortal rebirth, for the power of God's name could break his *karma*. Conscious communion on earth was far preferable to being merged in the unconsciousness of Brahman.

Patwardhan has shown that Tukārām's 'doctrine of *bhakti*' comprised a conception of the Divine Motherhood which gave Tukārām a God of love and tenderness, a sense of human insufficiency which led to conflict between faith and 'the flesh,' devotion thus being frustrated by human frailties, and a defective view of life 'that was at best one-sided. His end was individual, the peace and solace and beatific rest of his own restless soul. . . . Tukārām was a pessimist in regard to this world. . . . The *bhakti* of the future ought to be broader based, fuller veined, and larger souled.'[1] A defect sometimes pointed out is that the claim of human need 'is a rare mood and very seldom expressed in his poems'[2] and that 'there are but few traces of the passion of winning others.'[3] It is a 'defect,' however, very largely repaired by his self-forgetting service as set forth in the pages of Mahīpati.

6. Relation to Hinduism.—Tukārām acquiesced in the greater part of the conventional Hinduism of his day while himself living on a loftier plane. Often therefore he speaks with two voices. Temple ceremonies he does not condemn, but his heart aspires to something higher. About Viṭhobā, however, there is no kind of ambiguity, for, as an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa or Viṣṇu, Viṭhobā was the bigger half of Tukārām's spiritual life,

[1] *Indian Interpreter*, vii. 19–30.
[2] N. Macnicol, *Psalms of Marāṭhā Saints*, p. 31 f.
[3] Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, p. 300.

though again faith was always the channel. Inwardly he experienced the living God, though outwardly it was an idol he worshipped.

'There is scarcely a theological or philosophical system to be found in his writings, but so far as philosophical thinking may be traced, he tends to be a monist.'[1] 'Tukārām was thus a devotee only of Viṭhobā of Pāṇḍharpūr and a monotheist in this sense. Though he worshipped the idol at the place, still he had always before his mind's eye the great Lord of the universe.'[2]

In some verses indeed he holds that the stone idol was a mere stone, neither embodying nor symbolizing the divine. The inconsistency of such a position he appears to have realized, but he does not solve it. Hence the millions in the Deccan who follow him in idolatrous practices and the thousands who share his theistic aspirations have both much to support them. Hence too a theistic society like the Prarthanā Samāj[3] so recently as 20th June 1920 failed to pass a resolution that 'any member who performs a domestic or any other ceremony with idolatrous rites or worships any idols while performing such rites will *ipso facto* cease to be a member of the Bombay Prarthanā Samāj.'[4]

A similar ambiguity exists in his references to caste and holy places. Caste was accepted by Tukārām as an institution of the Hindu world, and he did not carry to its logical conclusion his conviction that God does not consider a man's caste, all His worshippers being equally dear to Him (2077). In personal inward religion Tukārām was democratic enough, but he was too much of the 'mild Hindu' to fight the battle of religious rights and privileges.

Tukārām was in no sense a 'reformer,' as the word is commonly understood: he was a sage with lofty principles in a degenerate time, a sage who for lack of courage, conviction, or inspiration allowed his protests to lapse after he had uttered them.

7. Influence.—Tukārām has quite a unique place in the inner life of his own people. Besides the Vārkarīs, a pilgrim sect devoted to him, every member of which visits Paṇḍharpūr not only at the two annual festivals but on other *ēkādaśīs*, or 'monthly-elevenths,' named *vārīs*, and whose preachings of equality and disregard of caste have been 'a valuable counterpoise to Brāhman domineering,'[5] there are some fifteen million Deccan peasants of all castes and creeds who sing his verses in the fields by day and in companies around some flickering lamp at night. His poems form a substantial part of the hymn-book of the Prarthanā Samāj (*q.v.*) of Western India, now in its ninth edition and containing 500 of his *abhaṅgs*. His terms 'Viṭhobā, Pāṇḍuraṅg' etc., being unacceptable to *ēkēśwarīs* (monotheists), the simple term 'God' has been substituted.[6] That Tukārām has exercised a great nationalizing and democratizing influence among the people of the only Indian nation that has ever ruled over any considerable portion of India can hardly be doubted. His moralizing force cannot be said to have been so great, in view of idolatrous conditions in the Deccan to-day. But the Viṭhobā of Tukārām still inspires a phenomenal type of devotion in his devotees. From as far distant as Madras, women have been known to make at Viṭhobā's shrine the hair-offering called *vēnīdān* (*vēnī* = 'braid,' *dān* = 'gift') by having their heads shaved as do Brāhman women at Gaya, and all Paṇḍharpūr pilgrims have such an affection for their god that no *darshan* is complete without the pilgrim's head touching Viṭhobā's feet. No fewer than 140,000 people take this *darshan* at a single festival, at the rate of 12,000 daily. Some of them accomplish the journey by prostrating their form at every step in honour of Viṭhobā, some thus rolling along for more than 40 miles;[1] one case is known of a man rolling like a log from Nāgpur, hundreds of miles away, at the rate of two miles a day, the journey taking two years.[2] Tukārām's moving verse has done not a little to inspire this tragic devotion in men and women alike.

All attempts to classify Tukārām have failed. He was neither an orthodox Hindu nor a Hindu Protestant. He lived according to the rules of a gigantic religious system with much of which he disagreed while enjoying an inward experience transcending the system, for spiritual intercourse with God and His 'saints' was the sum and substance of Tukārām's religion. He belongs therefore to none of the stereotyped forms, and, to be understood and appreciated at his proper worth, he must be approached without any kind of dogmatic prejudice, whether Hindu or Christian. Those who have no definite creed and who follow no organized system find in him a kindred spirit. He cannot be classed as a mystic, for he had no extraordinary visions, and he followed Hindu rules of living. We may regard him as a devoted theist living his own inward life amid idolatrous surroundings.

'You can find much in Tukārām's poetry that runs parallel with the teachings of Christ save its principles and spirit. These latter, eclectics easily read into his words, and when they cannot do so they put them there. Tukārām was one of the greatest saints of India, and as such he has influenced and is still influencing the devotional trend of his own people. In the case of us Christians he is one of the most powerful of sidelights. Only a few weeks ago he threw me into the very arms of my Lord.'[3]

At the close of an examination into 'The Alleged Indebtedness of Indian Theism to Christianity' the conclusion is reached:

'Certainly either Tukārām was actually in contact with Christian teaching, which is by no means improbable, or he was a remarkable instance of a *mens naturaliter Christiana*.'[4]

Of these two alternatives we incline to the second, as there has been no evidence adduced as yet pointing to Tukārām ever having been 'in contact with Christian teaching,' and, while he has much kinship with the NT writers, none of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Church, with the possible exception of faith, can be traced in his pages.[5] The kinship is indeed so close that a knowledge of his poems, at least in their English translation, should be regarded as an indispensable preparation for missionary work among his people. That nearly three centuries ago Tukārām should have proclaimed so clearly the inefficacy of all merely external rites and should have insisted so constantly on inward experience as the one essential of true religion offers to the Christian evangelist a most useful point of contact with the people of India.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. For a fuller treatment of the subject see J. N. Fraser and J. F. Edwards, *Life and Teaching of Tukārām*, Madras, in the press.

J. F. EDWARDS.

TULASĪ-DĀSA.—1. Life.—Little is certainly known about the life of Tulasī-Dāsa (commonly pronounced 'Tulsī Dās'), the greatest poet of mediæval Northern India, beyond two or three dates and a few accidental particulars mentioned in his writings.

A life of the poet is said to have been written by his friend and companion, Vēṇī-mādhava Dāsa. It is referred to by Śiva

1 Farquhar, p. 300.
2 Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 95.
3 See art. PRARTHANĀ SAMĀJ.
4 *Subōdh Patrikā*, 27th June 1920, with *Dhyānodaya* comments, 1st July 1920.
5 *BG* xx. [1884] 471–473.
6 Bhandarkar, *Marāṭhī Writings*, pp. 506–513

1 *BG* xx. [1884] 470.
2 J. Murray Mitchell, *IA* xi. [1882] 155.
3 N. V. Tilak, in an unpublished paper.
4 N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, London, 1915, p. 279.
5 See J. Murray Mitchell, *JRASBo* iii. [1849] for the opposite view.

Siṁha, who wrote in the latter half of the 19th cent., but no copy of it is now known to exist. We have two personal documents relating to the poet—a deed of arbitration, and an entire book of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*, both in his own handwriting.

There are numerous traditions concerning him, some of which may be accepted with considerable confidence. He is said to have been born at Rājāpur, in the present United Provinces of Bāndā, about A.D. 1532, and to have been a Sarwariā Brāhmaṇa of the Parāśara *gōtra*.[1] His father's name was Ātmārāma, and his mother's Hulasī, his own name being Rāma Bōlā. In one of his verses[2] he tells us that he was abandoned by his parents immediately after his birth, and with great probability it is assumed from this that he was one of those unfortunate children known as *abhuktamūla*, born under the beginning of the currency of the asterism Mūla. Such a child is said to be destined to destroy its father, and the only remedy is to abandon it on its birth, or, at best, so to arrange that its parents shall not look upon its face during the first eight years of its existence. He was picked up by a wandering Sādhu, who, in token of the sacred leaf used in the ceremony of purification of the infant, renamed him Tulasī-Dāsa ('Servant of the *tulasī*-plant'), and by this name he was henceforth known. With this Sādhu, who was probably also his *guru*, or spiritual preceptor, Narahari-Dāsa, he wandered all over Northern India. From his *guru* he learnt the story of Rāma,[3] but owing to his ignorance (? of Sanskrit)[4] he could not at first grasp its importance. At length, after frequent hearings, he learnt it so far as his intelligence would allow, and then determined to write it in the vernacular for his own benefit and for that of others similarly situated. When he grew up, he lived as a householder, and married a girl named Ratnāvalī, the daughter of one Dīnabandhu Pāṭhaka, by whom he had a son named Tāraka, who died at an early age. He was devoted to his wife and could not bear to be separated from her. She was a firm Vaiṣṇava, and on one occasion, when she had gone on a visit to her people, she reproached him for following her and for not showing equal affection to Rāma. Struck with remorse, Tulasī at once left her and took to an ascetic life. He is said to have seen her only once again in after years, and then not to have recognized her. With his head-quarters at first in Ayōdhyā and subsequently in Benares, he made long journeys over Northern India preaching the gospel of Rāma. At first he met with considerable opposition, but his holy life and his attractive personality conquered all obstacles, and, even in Benares, the head-quarters of Śiva-worship, he won universal respect. His fame as a poet spread far and wide and gained him many friends and followers, the most famous of whom were Rājā Māna-siṁha (Mān Singh) of Ambēr († 1614) and the celebrated 'Abdu 'r-Raḥīm Ḫānḫāna (1556–1627). A wealthy landowner of Benares named Ṭōḍar Mall (who is to be distinguished from Akbar's finance minister of the same name) was one of his closest friends, and a touching poem which Tulasī-Dāsa wrote on his death has survived among his most cherished verses. After Ṭōḍar Mall's death his heirs quarrelled as to the disposal of the property, and referred the matter to Tulasī-Dāsa as arbitrator. The deed of arbitration in his handwriting is still in existence and is dated Sambat 1669 (= A.D. 1612).

[1] No fewer than four places claim the honour of being his birthplace. The claim of Rājāpur is that best established. His caste has been a subject of dispute. According to some authorities, he was a Kānyakubja Brāhmaṇa.

[2] *Vinaya-pattrikā*, 227, 2.

[3] *Rām.* i. 30.

[4] He was never a good Sanskrit scholar, and some of his few verses in that language contain grammatical blunders.

Bubonic plague appeared in India in 1616, and lasted for eight years. The poet seems to have been attacked by it, for one of his minor works, the *Hanumān Bāhuka*, describes his sufferings from some such disease. After temporary relief he had a relapse and died in Benares in A.D. 1623.[1]

2. Works.—More than twenty formal works, besides numerous short poems, have been attributed to Tulasī-Dāsa, but some of these are certainly apocryphal, and others are of doubtful authenticity. The most generally accepted list mentions twelve, viz. six minor and six major. The minor works are the following: (1) *Rāma-lalā-Nahachhū*, (2) *Vairāgya-saṁdīpinī*, (3) *Barawai Rāmāyaṇa*, (4) *Jānakī-maṅgala*, (5) *Pārvatī-maṅgala*, (6) *Rāmājñā*. The six major works are (7) *Kṛṣṇagītāvalī*, (8) *Vinaya-pattrikā*, (9) *Gītāvalī*, (10) *Kavittāvalī*, (11) *Dōhāvalī*, and (12) *Rāmacharita-mānasa*.

Tulasī-Dāsa was a Smārta Vaiṣṇava; *i.e.*, while a worshipper of Rāmachandra, he also adhered to the tradition (*smṛti*) of ordinary Hinduism and followed the general religious customs of his caste. This involved, among other things, the worship of the god Śiva and the practice of eating his meals apart. In both respects he differed from the more thorough Vairāgī Vaiṣṇavas, who had abandoned tradition, and who worshipped only Viṣṇu in one or other of his incarnations and ate in company. During his stay in Ayōdhyā he associated with these Vairāgī Vaiṣṇavas and there composed the first three cantos of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*. Subsequently, being unable to agree with them on points of discipline, he migrated to Benares and there completed the poem.

His devotion to Rāmachandra as an incarnation of the Supreme is illustrated by the above list of works. With two exceptions (nos. 5 and 7) they all deal directly or indirectly with that deity. No. 7 is a collection of hymns in praise of Kṛṣṇa, another incarnation of Viṣṇu. No. 5 is a short poem describing Śiva's marriage with Pārvatī, a subject also treated at some length as an episode in the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*. As already stated, Tulasī-Dāsa paid special reverence to Śiva as a great and kindly god, although by no means on a level with Rāmachandra. It was Śiva who, out of love for the world, communicated Rāma's history to Pārvatī and thereby made it known to mortals.

A brief notice of each of the works named above will suffice.

(1) *Rāma-lalā-Nahachhū.*—The genuineness of this is disputed. It is a short poem describing the 'nail-paring' ceremony at the investiture of Rāmachandra with the sacred caste-thread. This ceremony is a village rite still kept up on such occasions and at weddings in Oudh and Bihār, and the whole poem is in rural style and in rural metre.

(2) *Vairāgya-saṁdīpinī* ('Kindling of Quietism') describes the true nature of holiness. It advocates *vairāgya* (absence of passion), and the description of the perfect peace resulting from absolute self-surrender to the Deity is not without poetic beauty.[2]

(3) The *Barawai Rāmāyaṇa* is a summary of the history of Rāmachandra in the Barawai metre. It is very short and, as we have it, probably incomplete. It is rejected by some authorities.

(4) *Jānakī-maṅgala* and (5) *Pārvatī-maṅgala.*—These are two short works celebrating the marriages of Sītā to Rāmachandra and of Pārvatī to Śiva respectively. The authenticity of both is doubtful. In no. 4 the order of events differs from that given by the poet in his more important works. The

[1] See G. A. Grierson, *Proceedings ASBe*, 1893, p. 147 ff.

[2] The whole has been translated by G. A. Grierson in *IA* xxii. [1893] 198 ff.

Pārvatī-maṅgala is dated Sambat 1643 (= A.D. 1586).

(6) *Rāmājñā.*—This is a collection of verses to be used as omens previous to undertaking a journey or other important task. The contents are in the main a history of Rāmachandra in seven chapters, each of seven septads of verses, or 343 in all. The omen is found by selecting a verse by lot—a kind of *sortes Virgilianæ*. It is dated Sambat 1655 (= A.D. 1598).

(7) The *Kṛṣṇagītāvalī*, the first of the major works, has been already referred to. As its subject demanded, Tulasī-Dāsa wrote it, not in his customary Awadhī, but in the Braj Bhākhā dialect. It is one of the least read of the poet's works, but well repays perusal, as it contains many beautiful passages. He has entirely avoided debasing religion by that association with eroticism which spoils so much of the literature devoted to Kṛṣṇa.

(8) The *Vinaya-pattrikā* ('Petition') is one of the most important works of the poet, in which his most intimate feelings towards the Deity and that Deity's relations to the human soul are displayed with a freedom from reticence and poetic fervour that have rarely been equalled.

An interesting legend accounts for its origin. Tulasī, harassed and terrified by persecution, writes this petition to Rāmachandra—the loving, almighty, God—appealing for His protection. The whole forms a series of prayers, addressed, one by one, to the various minor gods as door-keepers and courtiers of the Supreme, and then, in an outburst of passionate entreaty and self-humiliation, to the Deity Himself. The final verse tells how, as in the case of an earthly monarch, the petition was granted under Rāma's own signature.

The *Vinaya-pattrikā* is one of the most admired works of the poet, but the difficulties of its language have discouraged many readers. The intense fervour of the writer often carries him into an extremity of passion, bursting forth in an elliptical style very different from the limpid beauty of his narrative poems. Again, the very form of the poem militates against its easy comprehension. It is a petition to a sovereign, expressed in a courtly vocabulary full of high-flown words and phrases. These belong to the nature of the case and are here most appropriate, but they do not tend to make the poem comprehensible to any one who is not a Sanskrit scholar. In spite of these surface defects, this admirable work deserves the closest study from any one who would become acquainted with the religious history of India. We have here a man whose influence for good over generations of Indians cannot be exaggerated, laying bare the inmost recesses of his heart, and openly proclaiming that at which other writers with the same experiences have only dared to hint. It is a book of confessions, but the confessions of a pure and faithful soul.

(9) In the *Gītāvalī* Tulasī-Dāsa appears in a new character, that of a *māgadha*, or panegyrist. It is a book of songs intended to increase in his readers their love for a tender, loving God. Again, as elsewhere, the love which he teaches is that of a child to his father. For the songs he has used the Braj Bhākhā dialect as the traditional vehicle of expression, and the dominant tone is not, as in the *Vinaya-pattrikā*, passion, but sweetness and charm. In this way he gives the whole history of Rāmachandra in a delightful style, quite different from that of his formal epic. There is no verse in the book which is not a complete little picture, and most attractive of all are those in the first book, in which he tells of the baby life of his hero and his brothers. It is a true gospel of the infant Rāma.

(10) Different again is the *Kavittāvalī*. Here the poet, in the character of a *vandin*, or bard, tells of the glory of Rāma, so as to encourage the faithful with a picture of the Deity's power. The language is Awadhī mixed with Braj Bhākhā. No work of Tulasī-Dāsa shows his extraordinary mastery of vocabulary so well as this. His subject is heroic, and, without having needless recourse to Sanskrit, he writes in a heroic style. In the battle scenes the words themselves by their very sound echo the clash of arms and the cries of the combatants, and, in the description of the burning of Lankā, the crackling of the flames. The narrative closes with the sixth book. The seventh, which is nearly half of the whole, consists of a number of short poems in the *kavitta* metre written at different times and here collected by their author. They have no direct connexion with the preceding books, and, being full of personal allusions, form a valuable source of information as to the poet's times and experiences. It is here that we learn about his birth and parentage and about the persecutions to which he was subjected, and from one verse we gather that the date of the compilation was somewhere between A.D. 1612 and 1614. A supplement, in the same metre, is the *Hanumān Bāhuka*, already referred to, in which he tells how he was attacked by plague.

(11) *Dōhāvalī.*—The title means a collection of verses in the *dōhā* metre, and it is by no means certain what is meant by it. There is a work of this name (see below), but some authorities maintain that the list alludes to a poem called the *Rām Satsaī* ('Seven hundred verses [also in this metre] in Praise of Rāma'). Many good scholars consider that this was written, not by the poet, but by another author of the same name. It is a rather tasteless production, but, if genuine, is not without importance, as the fifth chapter gives in great detail what purports to be the poet's doctrine regarding works as opposed to faith.[1] The difficulty in the way of accepting the work now called the *Dōhāvalī* as that referred to in the list is that it is largely composed of verses already occurring in the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*, the *Rāmājñā*, and the *Rām Satsaī* itself. Out of a total of 572 verses no fewer than 258 have been so identified, and there are quite possibly more. If genuine, there must have been a nucleus of original verses to which subsequent admirers have added others, so as to compile a kind of anthology of the poet's best *dōhās*. This is the present writer's opinion, and, if it is correct, the final recension must have been sufficiently long after the composition of the *Rām Satsaī* for the latter to have become recognized as the work of our poet.

(12) The *Rāmacharita-mānasa* ('Lake of the Gestes of Rāma') is commonly called the *Tulasī-kṛta Rāmāyaṇa*. This epic, the poet's greatest achievement, and also, in point of time, probably his first, was begun in A.D. 1574, when its author was about 43 years of age, and upon it his fame chiefly rests. It has been described as the Bible of ninety millions of people, and is certainly more familiar to every Hindu of Northern India than our Bible is to the average English peasant. There is not a Hindu of Hindōstān proper, whether prince or cottar, who does not know its most famous verses and whose common talk is not coloured by it. Its similes have entered even into the language of Indian Muslims, some of whose most ordinary idioms, though they know it not, made their first appearance in this work.[2]

The life of Rāmachandra, considered as an incarnation of the Supreme, is here dealt with in a formal epic. The subject is the same as that of the celebrated Sanskrit *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, but the epic of Tulasī-Dāsa is in no way a transla-

[1] Tr. G. A. Grierson in *IA* xxii. [1893] 229 ff.

[2] See G. A. Grierson, 'Tulasī Dāsa, Poet and Religious Reformer,' *JRAS*, 1903, p. 447. Much of what follows is condensed from this paper.

tion of that work. We have an independent story, built on the same foundation, but differing from it in the treatment of episodes and in important details.[1] The author himself states that he has taken his account from many different sources, and it has been shown that the principal of these, besides Vālmiki's work, were the *Adhyātmā Rāmāyaṇa* (a section of the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*), the *Bhuśuṇḍī Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Vasiṣṭha Saṁhitā*, and the *Prasanna-rāghava* attributed to Jayadēva.[2]

As illustrating the estimation in which this poem is held in India, the following very popular legend may be quoted. Rāmachandra denoted his approval of Vālmiki's epic by appending his signature to a copy of it. Thereupon the monkey-god Hanumān, with his nails, wrote another *Rāmāyaṇa* upon a rock, and took it to Rāma. The latter approved of it also, but said that, as he had already signed Vālmiki's copy, he could not sign another; he had better show it to that poet. He did so, and, as Vālmiki saw that it would eclipse his own work, by a stratagem he induced Hanumān to fling it into the sea. Hanumān, in complying, prophesied that in a future age he would himself inspire a Brāhmaṇa named Tulasi, who would recite his (Hanumān's) poem in the tongue of the common people and destroy the fame of Vālmīki's epic.

There can be no doubt that its reputation is well deserved. The *Rāmacharita-mānasa* is one of the great epics. It has its prolixities and its episodes that jar upon European tastes, but, even so, no one can read it without being impressed by its high poetic merit. The various characters are vividly and consistently described, and live and move with all the dignity of a heroic age. The style is most admirably varied. There is the infinite pathos of the passage describing Rāma's farewell to his mother; the rugged, harsh language telling of the horrors of the battlefield; when occasion requires it, a sententious, aphoristic method of dealing with narrative, teeming with similes drawn, not from the traditions of the schools, but from nature herself; and, suffusing all, a life-giving atmosphere of the purest poetry. To us its weakest side is that which, to a Hindu, is its strongest—the character of its hero. To the poet, Rāmachandra is necessarily, as God manifest on earth, a perfect character. Even when the old story shows him performing unknightly deeds, Tulasī must call them virtues and plead that the end justifies the means. Or, again, the foulest treachery, such as that of Vibhīṣaṇa towards his brothers, is extolled because the traitor is accepted and rewarded by the hero.[3] But this is one of the obligations of the story and of the author's view of the divinity of Rāma. The human characters are to our ideas far more sympathetic. There are the impetuous and loving Lakṣmaṇa; Sītā, the ideal of an Indian wife and mother; Bharata, constant and tender, the model of the true *bhakta*; and Rāvaṇa—the Satan of the epic—destined to failure, and fighting with all his demon force against his fate.

One of the most striking features of the poem is the writer's capacity for seeing things. More than any other literature, Indian poetry has its stock similes—the lotus, the water-lily, the bee, the moon, and so on. Even the best Sanskrit poems often give the impression of being largely the work of the closet, not of the open air. Tulasī-Dāsa employed the same old similes—he would not have been Indian if he had avoided them—but thousands of others are his own. Little expressions—the turn of a sentence or an apt epithet—show how he had seen and studied the world for himself.

It would be a great mistake to look upon him merely as an ascetic. He was a man that had lived. He had been a householder—a word of much meaning to an Indian—and had known the pleasures of a wedded life, the joy of clasping an infant son to his bosom, and the sorrow of losing that son ere he had attained his prime. He appealed not to scholars, but to his countrymen as a whole, the people whom he knew. He had mixed with them, begged from them, prayed with them, shared their pleasures and their yearnings, and, on the other hand, had contracted intimate friendships with the greatest men of the emperor's court. All this we find reflected in the pages of his writings.[1]

His works have suffered the fate which has befallen those of other famous Indian authors. Imitators have written poems which they have passed off as his, and numerous *kṣēpakas*, or apocryphal additions, have been inserted in his epic. He has suffered too from the attentions of commentators without end, most of whom have wasted energy in discovering hidden meanings in the simplest passages, while they discreetly avoid the real difficulties. Finally, his epic has actually been translated into Sanskrit, and there are critics who have maintained that the translation is the original, and that the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* is nothing but a barefaced theft of another's poetry.[2]

3. Religious ideas.—The religious ideas of the poet are of great importance in the history of India. Seventh in descent of teacher and pupil from the great Rāmānanda (*q.v.*), he was a thorough Vaiṣṇava and follower of the *Bhakti-Mārga* (*q.v.*). He taught that there is but one Supreme Being, and that man is by nature sinful and unworthy of salvation. Nevertheless the Supreme, in His infinite mercy, became incarnate in the person of Rāmachandra to relieve the world from sin. Rāma has returned to heaven, where, besides being the ineffable Supreme, he is still Rāma, and where, in consequence, we have now a God who is not only infinitely merciful, but who knows by actual experience how great are man's infirmities and temptations, and who, though Himself incapable of sin, is ever ready to extend His help to the sinful being who calls upon Him. On all this follows, as a corollary, the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man, and the duty which man owes to his neighbour. His definition of sin is that which is contrary to the will of Rāma, and it is only by acknowledging this, and by abandoning himself to utter loving faith in Rāma's power to save him from its thraldom, that a man can escape from the weary round of perpetual transmigration. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God and of the necessity of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, had long been known. In Northern India Rāmānanda had been its great exponent, and Tulasī-Dāsa put forward no novelty. His claim for consideration is that his teaching was successful. His own pure life and the magic of his poetry have done for the *Bhakti-Mārga* what the eloquence of hundreds of other teachers failed to do. The fact that he was a Smārta Vaiṣṇava must not be forgotten. He belonged to no sect, and founded no sect, but was just an ordinary Hindu, accepting all the Hindu mythological machinery. While worshipping Rāma as the Supreme, he paid adoration to Śiva and the other gods. His attitude to them was much the same as that of the official teaching of one branch of the Christian Church: to Rāma alone he offered λατρεία, to the others δουλεία, to Śiva ὑπερδουλεία.

A few words must be devoted to the poet's use of the word *māyā*. Occasionally he refers to it in terms that can only be interpreted as meaning the influence which hides Bráhma from the soul—the *māyā* of the Śiva-worshipping Vēdāntins, to whose doctrines he was strongly opposed. But all his

[1] *E.g.*, the account of the great battle outside Laṅkā is quite different.

[2] See L. P. Tessitori, *Il 'Rāmacaritamānasa e il Rāmāyana*, reprinted from *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, xxiv. [1911] (reviewed by G. A. Grierson, in *JRAS*, 1912, p. 794 ff.), and Sītā Rām, in *JRAS*, 1914, p. 419 ff.

[3] The authors of the *Hindī Navaratna* (pp. 88, 289) point out that, with one exception, none of the numerous Hindī poets who told the tale of Rāma ever thought of condemning Vibhīṣaṇa's conduct. The exception is Kēśava-dāsa, a court poet who lived amid knightly surroundings. He also has the courage to condemn Rāma's treatment of Sītā.

[1] Cf. *JRAS*, 1903, p. 452.

[2] See G. A. Grierson, in *JRAS*, 1913, p. 133 ff.

uses of the word in this sense are merely cases of similes and the like, and in no way form part of his real teaching. We may attribute this use of the word to his own association with the worship of Śiva. Elsewhere he employs the word in two different senses: in one it means merely 'magic,' and is the evil force used by demons in their combat with Rāma's army; in the other it represents a combination of the Gnostic demiurge and the Christian 'Tempter';[1] it is a personality, a female, subordinate to the Supreme, and, to a certain extent, His agent. In the latter capacity she sets the whole world dancing, yet she herself is set a-dancing, like an actress on the stage, by a movement of the Lord's eyebrows. She sullies every one, even the gods, with her temptations; and the Deity sometimes sends her forth specially to tempt some pious person who begins to show overweening pride.[2] As the world, the flesh, and the Devil in one, she leads mankind to sin, but, if a man has true *bhakti*, he is surely armoured against her, and she cannot approach him.[3]

Above all, Tulasī-Dāsa taught that the Supreme is a personality. While not denying the existence of the *Nirguṇaṁ Bráhma* of the *Upaniṣads*—a being totally devoid of all qualities, of whom the only thing that can be said is 'he is not this or that'—he maintained that the idea of such a being was beyond the comprehension of the human mind, and that the only God whom it was possible to adore was the personal (*saguṇa*) manifestation of the impersonal (*nirguṇa*).[4]

The practical result of the general adoption of Tulasī's religious attitude has been of the greatest importance to Northern India. In the poet's own time the masses of Hindōstān had two alternative religions open to them. One was the crude polytheism of the worship of village godlings, the other was the Kṛṣṇa-cult. The first still exists, but controlled and thrust into the background by Tulasī's faith. What the Kṛṣṇa-cult becomes among the uncultivated masses the religious fate of Bengal has shown. It inevitably tends to become a sex-worship, and its text-books teem with the most passionate, most licentious descriptions of the love adventures of Kṛṣṇa among the herdmaidens. All else is lost, and there gradually develop the unnameable horrors of a Śākta-cult. Upper India has been saved from this by Tulasī-Dāsa.

LITERATURE.—G. A. Grierson, 'Notes on Tul'si Das,' *IA* xxii. [1893] 89, 122, 197, 225, 253 (this is the only complete account in English of the poet's life and works; a few errors in it have been corrected in the preceding pages), 'Tulasī Dāsa, Poet and Religious Reformer,' *JRAS*, 1903, p. 447 ff.; Gaṇēśa-vihārī Miśra, Śyāma-vihārī Miśra, and Śukadēva-vihārī Miśra, *Hindī-Navaratna*, Allahabad, 1910 (an account in Hindī of the nine great writers in that language); cf. the same authors' *Miśrabandhu-vinōda*, Khaṇḍwā, 1913, p. 304 ff. (a general history of Hindī literature in the same language).

Numerous edd. of all the poet's works have been published in India, but few of them possess critical value. Two excellent edd. of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* have been published, viz. that issued in 1889 by the Khaḍga-vilāsa Press in Bānkipur and that issued in 1903 by the Kāśī Nāgarī-prachāriṇī Sabhā of Benares. Both are critically edited and have elaborate introductions dealing with the poet's life and writings. For those not familiar with the language the writer can recommend a good ed., with a line-for-line Hindī commentary and much general information concerning the poet, by Rāmēśvara Bhaṭṭa, Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904. The same editor has issued from the Indian Press, Allahabad, 1913, a similar ed. of the *Vinaya-pattrikā*, which can be recommended to students. It is believed that it is intended to issue all the poet's works in this series.

A good, if somewhat literal, Eng. tr. of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* has been made by F. S. Growse (1st ed., Allahabad, 1880–81). It has been several times reprinted in India.

G. A. GRIERSON.

[1] For a full account see *Rām.* vii. dō. 70 ff., Benares edition.
[2] *E.g.*, the divine saint Nārada (*Rām.* i. dō. 128 ff., Ben. ed.).
[3] *Rām.* vii. ch. 116, Ben. ed.
[4] See *Rām.* vii. dō. 13 and following *chhand.*

TUNGUS.—1. Area, distribution, number, and history.—The name Tungus is usually derived from the word Tung-hung ('Eastern barbarians'), by which these people were known to the ancient Chinese. They call themselves Avankil (sing. Avanki) or Donki. The Tungusic tribes are the most widely distributed of all the native tribes of Siberia; they live in small groups all over Siberia as far west as the river Taz, as far east as the island of Sakhalin, as far north as the Arctic shore, and as far south as the middle of Manchuria. In spite of this distribution, the language and social anthropology of these tribes are the least known of all the Siberian peoples, the Samoyed, Turkic and Mongolic tribes, and Koryak and Chukchi, even the Gilyak and the Ainu, having had more space given to them in anthropological literature than the Tungus. As a reason for this may be cited the fact that the Tungus usually live in the interior of the continent, in places difficult of access and, with the exception of the Lamut, far away from the coast. The total number of Tungus belonging to the various tribes was 76,504 in 1897, while in 1911 there were only 75,204.

The Tungusic tribes are usually divided into Northern Tungusic and Southern Tungusic. Of these the Northern Tungusic group comprises: (1) Samogir, (2) Nigidal, (3) Olchi, (4) Oroki, (5) Manegu, (6) Tungus proper (including Lamut and Orochon). The Southern Tungusic group comprises: (1) Manchu, (2) Daur, (3) Solon, (4) Gold, (5) Orochi.

The Northern Tungus are at the stage of reindeer culture like the Magdalenian man in Europe, though at the same time they know the use of iron, which they brought from their more southern home. They belong to the Neo-Siberian group. The Southern Tungus are horse nomads, cattle-breeders, and fishermen, and in some places also agriculturists, and in the towns artisans. The Siberian Tungus emigrated from Manchuria partly in the seventh and partly in the thirteenth century after the Mongolic conquest, but their armies had probably invaded Siberia frequently even in the pre-Christian era. The first Tungus subdued by the Russian authorities in Mangazei in 1603 were the Tungus of the lower Tunguska. In 1615 a large Tungus force was defeated by the Russians on the Yenisei, and about 1623 all the Tungus of Central Siberia were forced to pay taxes. The Tungus of the Amur country, together with their territory, were made subject to Russia about fifty years ago.

Although the Northern Tungus live now under a very primitive culture, their pedigree goes as far back as that of the Turkic people, and they therefore present a case of degeneration under the influence of environment. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in their folk-tales, which in comparison with the really primitive tales of the Samoyed are rather sophisticated. The old Chinese chroniclers used to comment on their two powerful neighbours as barbarians of inferior culture, *i.e.* their north-western neighbours in the pre-Christian era, the Turks of the present day, and their north-eastern, the Tungus. But, as both of them appear under a variety of tribal and dynastic names, it is difficult sometimes to know which of these peoples are of Tungus and which of Turkic race. They are more easily classified by their customs and characteristics, while the Mongols, whose name, used in a broad sense, is applied to both these races, seem to have no characteristic cultural features and are probably a mixture of the two races influenced by their steppe environment more than the Turks and Tungus, and brought to prominence through Jenghiz Khan's (himself a Mongol) conquest.

There are several peoples mentioned by the Chinese who can with some probability be considered to be of Tungus race. Such are (1) the Sushen, who lived north of the Liao-Tung peninsula and paid tribute in arrows and arrowheads to the emperors of the Shang dynasty (1766–1154 B.C.); (2) the Sienpi, who occupied an important strategic position in the Korea and north of China before the Great Wall was constructed (221–209 B.C.); these were the peoples who helped to cause the movement of the Hiung-nung westward, who in their turn pushed the Yue-chi (Turks) to Djungaria; in the 2nd cent. A.D. one branch of the Sienpi, the Jwen-Jwen (Zhu-Zhu) rose to power, but they are not heard of after the 6th cent., when the Tu-Kiu (Turks) emancipated themselves from the Jwen-Jwen yoke; (3) the Tlu, who in the 3rd cent. A.D. lived in the forest between the Upper Temen and Yalu rivers; (4) the Moho (Uki), who in the 7th cent. A.D. inhabited the valley of Sungari and who were the founders of the state of Puhai; (5) the Khitans, who in 925 overthrew this dynasty and founded the Liao (Iron) dynasty; (6) the Niu-chi (Yu-chi), who in their turn overthrew the Liao dynasty in A.D. 1125 and lived in the Shan-Alin uplands; their dynasty was called Kiu (Golden); Jenghiz Khan subdued them in 1234, but in the 14th cent. the Niu-chi reasserted themselves and founded the Manchu dynasty, which in 1644 occupied the throne of China after the Ming dynasty and reigned till 1912.

There are certain characteristics and customs common to most of those peoples as well as the modern Tungus. One is the extensive use of the bow and arrows with iron or stone blades. The arrows are of definite type and adaptable for the use of poison. The arrows and skins are also used for the payment of taxes. Other characteristics are the use of richly-adorned aprons, by both sexes, the braiding of the hair into two plaits, also by both sexes, the breeding of pigs, and the exposing of the dead by placing them on high platforms. These habits are not associated with the Turks and were probably imposed on the Chinese by the Tungus. Thus Marco Polo calls the Chinese empire by the tribal Tungus name Khitai (Cathai), and the Russians call it that even now.

a. Linguistics.—Since the time of Castrén the Tungusic tongues have been classed with the Ural-Altaic group, and, as they have not been sufficiently well known, even modern linguists like Tucker call them 'uncultivated,' while the fact is that, although the language of the Tungus (with the exception of the Manchu and Dauri) has not reached the stage of being written language, in grammatical forms, especially in verbal forms, we see a greater variety of simplifications than in many Aryan languages. The Manchu writing is in a modified form of Uiguric, the old Turkic character based again on the Soghdian.

The linguistic division, based on the results of the most recent researches, is into four groups: (1) the well-defined Manchu group, including Sibo, (2) the Gold group, including Olcha, Orochi, and Orok, (3) Tungus proper, including Lamut, Managir, Solon, and Daur, (4) Sanagir and Negda (on the lower Amur). The extent of this group is problematical, as it is possible that it can be united with group (3).[1]

The Northern Tungus dialects are preserved in a purer form than the Southern, which have come under Mongolic and Chinese influence, yet these differences are not very important, and we can use linguistics as the surest means of tracing the existence of Tungusic tribes in any given region. In many places the Tungus use another language as well as their own.

As in language, so also in social anthropology and shamanistic religion, we can see a certain connexion between all the Tungusic tribes. But the preservation of their own language is not necessarily an indication of the preservation of their physical type.

3. Physical type.—As has been said, there has been contact between the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Tungus-Manchu since the 11th cent. B.C. and probably earlier, but it was based chiefly on conquest and on intermarriage among members of the royal families. Migrations *en masse* did not begin, as far as is known, till the 7th cent. and during the time of Jenghiz Khan. It is probable that the Koreans are a Chinese-Tungus mixture and that the Tungus have played a greater rôle than is known in the formation of the modern Japanese nation.

Deniker places the Tungus among the Northern Mongolians, whom he defines as people with oval or round faces and prominent cheek-bones, who inhabit Manchuria, Korea, Northern China, and Mongolia. He places the Kalmuk alongside of the Manchu and the Northern Tungus hunters. Maak, Schrenck, and Mainoff point out the difference in physical type between the Northern and the Southern Tungus. This is also supported by the present writer. Broadly speaking, the difference consists in this, that the Southern type approaches the so-called Mongol type (almost high stature, round and low-headed), while the Northern type approaches the type of the Eastern Palæo-Siberians (low stature, intermediate or long-headed, and average or high-headed). While the mixture of the Southern Tungus with other neighbouring tribes has been going on for so long that it is very difficult to make any record of it, and the Manchu type practically disappeared among the population of north-east China, the Northern Tungus, especially those isolated in the Arctic region, are comparatively unmixed, or in any case it is easy to trace their mixture. This is especially true in the case of the Tungus between the Lena and the Yenisei, who live in thoroughly Tungus or Tungus-Yakut land, while the Tungus between the Lena and the Okhotsk Sea live scattered among the Palæo-Siberians (Koryak, Chukchi, and Yukaghir). The latter were the secondary object of study of the Jesup Expedition of the U.S.A. some ten years ago, while the Tungus between the Yenisei and the Lena were studied by the Oxford-Philadelphian Expedition in 1914–15. The only racial admixture that has to be considered in the case of the Arctic Tungus between the Yenisei and the Lena is with the Yakut.

With the help of the genealogical method in dealing with the social anthropology of the North-Western Tungus (in North Central Siberia) it is possible to distinguish the following grades of Tungus metisation.

(A) The *Tungus*, whose genealogical table, as far back as could be recorded, does not show any foreign admixture; (B) the *Tungus-Yakut*, who call themselves Tungus, and are such linguistically and socially, but who have begun in the last two generations to intermarry with the Yakut; (C) the *Dolgan*, who were Tungus, but who for a long time have intermarried with the Yakut and have created socially, physically, and linguistically a new type; they consider themselves to be a separate nation, their language approaches more nearly to the Yakut, and in physique they look more like the Tungus; (D) the *Tungusized Yakut*, who live in the western part of the Yakutsk territory, and the eastern part of the Turukhansk country, all on the Tungus land; the other Yakut call them Tungus (Tongus); they are in a minority among the Tungus.

The Tungus-Yakut approach in their stature, and head and facial forms, to the Yakut (*q.v.*), who, on the whole, are of a more Mongolic type than the Northern Tungus, while the Dolgan, though they stand further from the pure Tungus than the Tungus-Yakut do, are yet in all these three aspects more like the Tungus than like the Yakut, or, we might say, they return to the physical type of the Tungus.

4. Technique. — Most of the Siberian Tungus are at the stage of reindeer-culture, though they differ from such *pur sang* reindeer-breeders as the Lapps or the Eskimo in that their technique is not so highly specialized and their carvings and drawings on reindeer-bone or mammoth-ivory are not so perfect; very few of them have any knowledge of making half-underground huts, most of them still having fur tents similar in structure to those in their original southern home. In spite of centuries spent in a land where there are no horses, or only the small Siberian ponies which are used for driving but not for riding, they still preserve their old habits of horse-riding, exchanging the horse for the reindeer. In mythology and religion also their southern origin is apparent from time to time. Thus on the grave of a deceased shaman must be placed driftwood figures of a goat, a horse, or a dromedary—animals which have not been known to them for many generations.

The Tungus who do not live in the tundra as reindeer-breeders, but inhabit the steppes and the forest, are mostly hunters, and occasionally horse- and cattle-breeders. Only in the Amur and Baikal region do we find stationary groups.

Among the Northern Tungus iron is much more used than among the Samoyed. Until quite

[1] This table is the result of a verbal communication from W. Kotwicz, the Tungusic scholar of Petrograd University.

recently tatuing was common among the Tungus of the Yenisei, charcoal alone being used as colouring matter, and no bright colours.

One of the most characteristic features of the original Tungus costume is the beautifully decorated apron, which has in some places degenerated into a small covering for the sexual organs. Birch-bark is not so much in use as among the Ostyak, but the typical Tungus canoes are made of birch-bark sewn into shape. The Tungus ornaments are typical of a migratory people. They have no permanent style—we do not see on them either the conventionalized zoological-anatomical figures of the Samoyed or the rich ornamental designs of plant form so often met with among the neighbouring tribe of Yakut. Yet in their mode of life the Tungus exhibit more neatness, more cleanliness, and more reserve than any other tribe of Northern Asia, and probably this was the reason for the classic name that Castrén gave them, however few he saw. He called them 'the gentry of the Siberian aborigines.'

5. **Sociology.**—The original Tungus social division was into clans, named after the clan-ancestor or the river on whose banks they dwelt. At the present time the remnants of the clans are grouped together into local groups, with local river and other names. This arrangement was forced upon them by the Russian Government, but their internal organization and government, as far as it goes, rests with their council of elders and a prince, elected for three years and re-elected as many times as they wish. Langa, a Hukachar prince, and a great shaman of the Llimpiisk Tungus of the Yenisei tundra, has been prince for twenty-five years.

Married people are always known as the 'father of So-and-so,' 'the mother of So-and-so,' even if the Russian Christian name is used—*e.g.*, Ivan's father.

(*a*) *Marriage.*—Marriage restrictions are very numerous. Not only are blood-relations and clan-relations debarred from marrying, but two brothers of one family may not marry two sisters of another family. The exchange of children in marriage is not allowed, except among the Pankagir Tungus. The terminology connected with relationship by marriage is regulated by the age-classes. Thus *kynniv* would be the name used by the husband for the father, elder brother, and other male relatives of his wife, and *anikynniv* for her elder female relatives, while for his wife's younger male relatives he would use the term *kutetiv*, and for her younger female relatives *kukim*. There is a special relationship, called *kalliv*, between two men who have married sisters. The reindeer which plays a part in the marriage ceremony, *i.e.* on which the bride rides to the bridegroom's home, is called Havakin (from the god Havaki) among the Yenisei Tungus and Savakin among the Tungus of the Okhotsk region. This reindeer is never used for any work, and is never searched for if he gets lost. When he grows ill or old, he is killed, but not eaten. He might be called the reindeer of the bride's individual spirit. The most important feature of the match-making is the settlement of the *kalym* (wife-price).

(*b*) *Birth.*—At childbirth the woman is considered unclean, and is obliged to go away from the tent for confinement. After three or four days she returns from her seclusion and is purified by jumping three times through the fire. Hickisch[1] says that the placenta is eaten. Among the Tungus of the Yenisei-Lena region the placenta is usually hung on a tree or a pole in a skin bag. On the whole, a Tungus woman gives birth to her child very easily. If, however, there are any complications, the Tungus and also the Yakut woman is placed in a kneeling posture, with her hands tied to the tent poles, and subjected to a forcible massage with a log of wood by the woman who attends her. To help his wife, the Tungus husband cuts down a tree and drives a wooden wedge into it. If this has no effect, a shaman is summoned.

(*c*) *Burial.*—All the belongings of the dead man are placed near his body. The classical way of burying a man was to sew a reindeer skin round the body and put it in a coffin standing on four high poles or on a high platform,[1] while a woman was buried on the ground and covered over with trees. Among the sea and river tribes the dead were often buried in small canoes. Now the Russian mode of burial in the ground prevails, except where the ground is frozen. The *chum* (tent) where the death occurred is promptly removed to another place. On leaving the place where a dead person had been buried, his relatives used, in olden times, to let fly two or three arrows towards him.

(*d*) *Initiation of a shaman.*—A young shaman (*haman*), who has shown signs of devotion, wisdom, and nervous sensibility, is prepared for his office by an old shaman, who teaches him the secrets of the shaman's assistant spirits. After a year or more of frequent intercourse with the young shaman, the old shaman gives him the shaman's coat and drum. The shaman's chief spirits are: *etigr*, in the form of a long serpent, who has power over epidemics, sickness, and all manner of diseases; *iiniany*, in human form, with eagle's wings, on which he carries the shaman from place to place, who also protects animals from diseases; *arkunga*, a prophet-spirit; and lesser spirits such as *khaniny*, *miryada*, *torunga*.

The shaman's coat (*hamahek*) must be made of wild reindeer hide. His cap (*haarken*) is an iron circlet with representations of wild reindeer antlers. His boots are called *haman unta kupuri*, and his belt *angayaptun*. Hanging from the lower edge of his coat he has a fringe of reindeer- or fox-skin, called *chiurukta*. A fringe at the back, longer than the others and with a bell at the end, is called *irginde*. Projecting from his shoulders are the 'iron elk antlers of the shaman' (*arkalan*). On the *gilde* (iron circles attached near the antlers at the back) hang pieces of iron (*budiiar*), which are the shaman's arrows against *hargi* (malicious spirits). In the middle of the back of the shaman's coat are hung representations of the sun and moon. These are considered the most important features of his costume, and the sun is often sewn on a piece of skin taken from the head of a bear. *Gagk*, the swan, is on the back, and *ukang*, the diver, on the front of the coat. *Gieli*, a fish (*taimen*) frequently met with, is also represented there, and so too are *kandi*, 'the shaman's *dakali*' (small birds). On his apron (*haman haalme*) there are also representations of the sun and moon, and the shaman's staff (*haman tyevim*) has a human face (of an ancestor) and bear's feet. Sometimes a human face is found on the sun which is hung on the skin from the bear's head. All these accessaries suggest ancestor-man-bear-worship, as also do the traditions. All the objects used by the shaman have their special names; the shaman's cap, *e.g.*, is designated by a different word from that used for an ordinary cap, and, if a common term is used, the word *haman* is prefixed. The shaman's drum is oval in shape, and the drumstick, *giho*, is long and narrow, with jingles.

6. **Gods and spirits.**—Animism is highly developed in the Tungus religion. The spirits living everywhere in nature have to be propitiated. They are more or less independent of the highest god, Havaki. The mischievous spirits in folk-tales are called *chiulugdy* and *gamondo*. Both these creatures use a special 'bad language,' which occurs in the tales and is understood by the shamans. The malevolent spirits are called *hargi*. The chief *hargi* lives in the virgin forest (*taiga*) of the north. He has enormous eyes placed outside his face and a flat nose, and the black hair on his head and face is like the *taiga* after a storm. He can assume the form of an enormous bear, a wolf, or a bison. The Tungus of the Nerchinsk

[1] *Die Tungusen*, p. 84.

[1] The name given to this old form of coffin is *buni mongin*.

and Yakutsk districts call the *hargi* spirits *buni*; to the *buni* of the water they give the name *garan*, and to the *buni* of the earth that of *dorokdi*. The stronger the influence of Christianity, the worse becomes the character of the *buni*. Then there are other spirits, the spirit-owners of flies, of various animals, and even of thieves, *shuro*.

The chief god, Havaki, is anthropomorphic, but is connected with the sun. Sometimes the sun with the face of a man in it is supposed to represent him. Among the Tungus of the present generation the conception of the highest god is very vague, though the conception of spirits living everywhere in nature has still a strong hold on them all, Christian and non-Christian.

7. Sacrifices. — Private sacrifices of food are offered without any special preparations, but the sacrifices to the spirits connected with fertility are more important and must therefore be performed in the presence of a shaman, who knows the method of procedure. Thus the spirit-owner of wild reindeer is propitiated by an offering of the head of a mountain-sheep. The chief abode of this spirit, according to the Yenisei Tungus, is on the rock Hulgadzyakit, between the Upper Kureika and Lake Chirinda. The spirit-owner of lake-fish inhabits a place near Mount Umtupkan, to the east of Lake Chirinda, and at the beginning of the fishing season ceremonies are held to propitiate him. To ensure success in trapping, the Tungus will use in the construction of the traps at least one piece of wood which has been used by a shaman during his shamanistic performances. But the *turu*, or stick, which is the 'tree on which the shaman climbs to the sky,' is never used for this purpose, being too sacred. It is too *hooma*—a word used to express an idea similar to that of Melanesian *mana*.

8. Animal worship.—The veneration of the bear is especially highly developed. When a bear is killed and brought home, a ceremony called *kuk* is held. The heart and liver of the bear are cut into pieces, cooked, and divided among those present (exclusively males). Each person, before eating his piece, bows before the bear and assures him that it was the Russians who killed him, and not the Avankil (Tungus). Another remnant of a ceremonial bear-dance is *ikandzyedzyem* ('we are singing'). The bones of the bear must be placed just as they are in a bag, and hung on a tree. If one bone is lost, the spirit of the bear will hold the hunter responsible for it.

The eagle is also treated with great veneration, and it is expressly forbidden to kill him. For both these animals the Tungus use that adjective which they also use in speaking of heroes, *i.e. hooma*.

To all other animals which are not especially venerated the Tungus always behave, as they say, 'carefully,' lest the animal should become extinct. When a slit is made in the ear of the reindeer for purposes of identification, the hair that is cut off must not be thrown away, but must be hung on a tree or put in some safe place. The head and feet of the wild reindeer must not be thrown away; a special platform is sometimes erected for their reception, while the teeth of the wild reindeer are kept as *tygak* (amulets). There is a fox custom which drives the procurers of fox-skins to despair. After the fox has been trapped, his muzzle is cut off and carefully preserved. The skin may then be used, but the meat must be placed safely on a platform.

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TUNIS. — See AFRICA, BERBERS AND N. AFRICA.

TUPI-GUARANI.—See BRAZIL.

TURKS.—I. *ETHNOLOGY.*—**1. Origin of the name.**—The terms 'Turk,' 'Turkish,' and 'Turkic' are used in two different senses: to designate either those peoples belonging to the Turkic linguistic family or those peoples from Asia who appear from time to time in military history under leaders of Turkic speech. With the advance of ethnological knowledge, the former use is being abandoned for the wider term 'Turanian,' and the latter practice is falling into disuse. The name 'Turan' is much wider than the term 'Turk' and in any case is not synonymous with it. It must be noted that, while we hear of the Turks under that name in S. Russia even in the 1st cent. A.D., they only established themselves in Turkestan ('Land of the Turks'), the country named after them, in the 4th cent. A.D. Before that the country was known as Iran or Iranistan ('Land of the Iranians'), and stretched farther west into the present Iran. Thus one must be careful not to confuse the archæology of Turkestan relating to the Iranian period with that which can be ascribed to the Turks.

The earliest information about the Turks, to be found in the Chinese annals from 2356 B.C. onwards, alludes to them under the name of Hiung-nung, or slaves of the Hiung, while the name Tu-Kiu, or Turks, becomes prominent in the 6th cent. A.D. only when a prince of the Assena dynasty, Tiumen, rose to power. But we hear of the name Turk in connexion with the Turkish invaders of Europe in the pre-Christian era. Pomponius Mela in the 1st cent. A.D. calls them Turcae and says that they live near the Budini, and Pliny the Elder in the same century uses the name Tyrcae of a people in the neighbourhood of the Don. Though the various Turkic invaders of Eastern and Western Europe were chiefly known by the names of their leaders (Kipchak, Nogai, Seljuk, Osmanli), the name Turk as a generic term for the whole race is that most frequently used up to the present day. The Turks themselves with the exception of some Anatolian Turks call themselves by a dynastic or clan name.

2. Origin of the race.—The Chinese annals refer to the Hiung-nung as their north-western barbarian neighbours, and make a distinction between them and their north-eastern neighbours, the Tung-hung, afterwards the Tungus. The third Central Asiatic race, the Mongols, do not seem to have so long a pedigree, and it is possible that they form a branch of the Tungus or the Turks, or are a combination of both left behind and isolated on the steppes. This may be so, if we assume that the Turks and Tungus are two independent races which entered into the composition of the sub-races of Japan, China, and Tibet. The analysis of the funda-

mental types of both these races shows striking differences, but in comparison with the North and South Asiatic type they may both be called Mongoloid. Even assuming that the Tungus and Turks, as well as the Mongols, are the closest descendants of the original *homo Asiaticus*, yet, when they first appear in history, the two races differ widely in language, physical type, and culture. If the remains of bronze culture in the Upper Yenisei valley with burial masks, some of which are prominently Aryan in character, can be definitely ascribed to the early Turks, who knows whether their Mongoloid type was not after all an acquired character due to their mixture with the Mongoloids?

So much for the anthropological evidence as to the origin of the Turks. Not less important from the point of view of the folklorist is the origin of the race as explained by tradition. Perhaps the most wide-spread is the legend (found also among the Mongols) of a she-wolf, or white she-wolf, who found and reared an abandoned boy, subsequently the founder of the Turkish race. This she-wolf, Ak-biuri, saved the little boy from the bad god Erlik and brought him to Altun-dagh ('Golden Mountains') to an Altun-kii ('Golden Cave'). Two days later the boy began to call her mother, and six days later he began to call her father. De Guignes suggests that this is merely a version of the Roman tradition brought back by the Huns after they returned from their invasion of Europe.[1] But as a matter of fact the story might have travelled in the opposite direction, or the origin might have been independent, for the Chinese describe the shields of the Turks as having representations of a wolf before the approximate date of the Roman story. Then almost as widely spread is the legend of their first ancestor being the eldest son of Japheth, son of Noah. It is hard to ascertain whether the legend relating to still another ancestor, the son of the virgin-widow, Alanqua, has also a Biblical background.

3. Cradle of the race. — There are several hypotheses as to the geographical position of the original home of the Turks. H. H. Howorth seeks it in the southern parts of the Altai (Altun-dagh). Richthofen considers the region of the Amur, Lena, and Selenga their problematic original home. Parker suggests not the Altai Golden Mountains but some other mountains of the same name in the present Chinese province of Kin-Shan.

Recent archæological discoveries in the Altai-Sayan region as well as study of the aborigines of the forest regions of these mountains support Howorth's theory.[2] While it is still difficult to know with certainty to whom to attribute the bronze remains of the Minusinsk, called by the Russians by the vague name of 'Chud' remains (*Chujoi*, 'stranger'), there is no reason not to suppose that the country was inhabited always by the Turks, who were influenced in their bronze culture by some Iranian people from Central Asia, though also by the Chinese. The investigation of the bronze culture in the region of Kuban (N. Caucasus) will probably throw light on this question, if the Kuban culture is found to be more similar to the Minusinsk than to the other bronze stations in E. Russia—*e.g.*, the Ural (Perm). However, the fact that the customs and implements of the pre-bronze era (neolithic and late palæolithic) persist through the bronze period (probably 8th–3rd cent. B.C.) and the iron age and to some extent even till to-day points to the conclusion that the bulk of the population there remained the same, *i.e.* Turkish. The implements referred to are those used in the preparation of food and for agriculture.

The popular explanation that the bronze culture of Minusinsk is the work of a peaceful agricultural people of a higher type than the Turks, afterwards destroyed by the invasion of iron culture nomad people, who were, as no one now doubts, Turks, is not based on historical facts. We do not hear of the destruction of an empire at the stage of bronze culture in the Chinese annals—a fact worth noting—though mention of less significant movements at the beginning of the iron age from Central Asia towards the north-west is fairly frequent. If we assume that the pre-bronze and bronze age inhabitants of the Altai were of Turkic stock and in danger of invasion from the south-east or west, there is no reason why they themselves should not develop warlike industries which the so-called iron age remains represent. The bronze industry survives for some time during the next period, but the arrowheads, spears, daggers, and stirrups are produced in greater quantities than non-military bronze objects. The example of the Great War has shown us how easy it is to divert industrial power from one channel to another.

Most of the graves of the iron age in the Altai-Sayan district are communal, called by the Turks *chaa-tas* (the Russians call them *kurgans*), and are probably war graves. The inscriptions to be found on some of the burial stones all date from the iron age.[1] Those on the Southern Yenisei are earlier (about the 6th and 7th cent. A.D.) than those south of Lake Baikal along the Orkhon. The language of these inscriptions is one of the old Turkish dialects, the Uigur, belonging to a people politically very prominent to whom are attributed the remnants of Karakorum as their capital. Thus the earliest cultural remains of the Turkish race are nearer to Western than Eastern Asia, and the Turks at this early stage of their history, even if we take only the iron age, were living on a higher level of civilization compared with their near neighbours than they do now. It would seem that their subsequent mixture with invaders coming from the East has lowered their standard of culture, though in their subsequent history they several times developed local civilizations, notably under the Timurids in Turkestan and under the Ottomans in Byzantium.

But of course the attribution of cultural remains of the bronze and iron ages to the Turks does not carry them very far back, considering the antiquity of Chinese history. The first mention of the Turks here appears in 2356 B.C., while the bronze remnants of Minusinsk may be dated about 700–300 B.C. This was the time when unknown bronze flourished in the Volga-Kama-Ural district and in Scandinavia around the Baltic, when Greek settlers round the Black Sea and in Scythia were producing wonderful local art, when in Persia Darius and Xerxes were encouraging the development of local civilization which was in turn overturned by Alexander, who set up Hellenistic polities in its place. But Minusinsk was in neither of these circles, and its resemblance to Scythian culture is counterbalanced by its similarity to the Chinese. Then the second culture, that of the iron age, coincides with the rule of the Arabs over the Sasanid Persians and with the empire of the Khazars on the Lower Volga.

The attribution of both bronze and iron periods on the Yenisei to the Turkish race does not necessarily decide the question of the place whence

[1] J. de Guignes, *Hist. générale des Huns*, 4 vols. in 5, London, 1756–58, vol. i. pt. ii. bk. i.

[2] A. V. Adrianoff, *Travels to the Altai and beyond the Sayan Mountains in 1831*, Omsk, 1888, *Sketches of the Minusinsk Country*, Tomsk, 1904; J. R. Aspelin, 'Sur l'âge de bronze altai-ouralien,' *Compte-rendu Congrès international d'Archéologie à Stockholm*, 1874, i. 562; N. N. Kosmin, 'Chern,' *Sibirskiya Zapiski*, no. 3 [1916], pp. 95–112, 'Tuba,' *ib.* no. 4 [1918], pp. 23–49; O. Montelius, 'Orienten och Europa,' *Antig. Tidskrift*, xiii., Stockholm, 1864; A. M. Tallgrèn, *Collection Zaoussailov au Musée historique de Finlande*, i. Helsingfors, 1916; *Collection Tovostine des antiquités préhistoriques de Minusinsk conservées chez le Dr. Karl Hedman à Vasa, Chapitres d'Archéologie sibirienne, Soc. Finlandaise d'Archéologie*, Helsingfors, 1917.

[1] P. M. Melioranski, 'Decipherment of the old Turkic Inscription on a Stone found in the Aittam-Oi in the Village of Kenkolsk in the Aulieata District,' *Mem. E. Sect. I.R.Arch.S.*, 1899, xi. 1–4, pp. 271–273; O. Donner, 'Sur l'origine de l'alphabet turc du Nord de l'Asie,' *Journ. Soc. fin.-ougr.* xiv. [1896] 1; V. Thomsen, 'Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées,' i. 1894, *Mém. Soc. fin.-ougr.*, 1894, v. 54, 1896, i. 224.

they sprang. All we know now of the inhabitants of the Iish (Russ. Chern) or Black Forest of the Altai points to this, however, that their present character and customs are results of their environment and are similar to the customs and character of the earliest inhabitants of those regions. The original Turks were not steppe nomads living by warfare and constantly changing their camping places, but cattle-breeders and agriculturists devoted to their fields and forests and knowing the system of slave labour, while so advanced politically as to form confederations. Perhaps the most important proof of the origin of the Turks in the Altai region is the resemblance of the art found in the old picture writings in the region to the art of the most primitive and typical Turks of the present day, whether in the form of cattle brands or rock drawings. Further, the burial customs of these people seem to have been unchanged by time and are now practised as in the place of their origin. There must have been in all ages Turkic tribes living on the outskirts of the empires whose mode of life was more nomadic and who consequently mixed to a greater extent with other nomads. Those tribes were, however, not the true Turks as described in the Orkhon inscriptions, but Kazaks, who correspond to the Russian Cossacks, or frontier half-military guards.

The hypothesis of the Altaian origin of the Turks is in opposition to the theory launched some 50 years ago by Castrén and since uncritically accepted by some Finnish and Russian ethnologists (Otto Donner, Klementz), that the Samoyed originated in the Altai and Sayan Mountains and migrated from there to the north. If, further, the Samoyed are identified with the Finns, as they are by some people, the Finns, who in modern times developed the high culture of the Scandinavians, become the ancestors of the bronze age people of Minusinsk.

The linguistic authority of Castrén seemed sufficient to make people accept his theory without investigation, but his whole hypothesis was based on the supposition of the historian Fischer in the 18th cent. that the inhospitable region of the Arctic could not be the home of the Samoyed on account of its frigid character and poverty. The only support was of a linguistic character, that at the time of Castrén some Tatar clans in S. Siberia (the Kamashints) could speak Samoyed. Moreover, this theory holds that many other Tatars, of Uriankhai and Minusinsk, like the Koibal, Soyon, Beltir, and Karagass, are Turkicized Samoyed, one branch of which was pushed by the advance of the Turks towards the north. Such is Castrén's theory.

That the Samoyed might have originated further south than they are now is possible, but they must have always been fairly far north. All their present culture, which can be called 'reindeer' culture, shows that they are under the influence of a period of Arctic environment too long to trace their origin. The few linguistic observations of the Samoyed tongue in S. Siberia only prove that some of the clans of the Samoyed migrated from the north further south. Neither in physical type nor in customs do either of these doubtful Samoyed resemble the real Samoyed. While an uninterrupted chain of ethnological and, above all, archæological evidence, as well as Chinese and Arab historical mentions, ties the Turks to the Black Forest of the Altai mountains, from which they spread at an early date over the Sayan and Orkhon, no archæological remains can be ascribed to the Samoyed, and no ethnological evidence supports the theory of Castrén.

The relationship between the Samoyed and Finnic races is still an open question, but in any case historical and archæological evidence of early Finnish culture does not go further east than the Ural (Perm). By dismissing, therefore, the Samoyed-Altaian theory, one dismisses also the claim of the Finns to an Altai-Sayan cradle. Possibly further archæological discoveries may reveal still earlier Turkic inscriptions than those of the Yenisei, but they can only be found more to the south, since the inscriptions to the east of the Yenisei, *i.e.* the Orkhon, are one or more hundred years later. The relation between the Minusinsk bronze antiquities and the archæological remains of the steppes of the Black Sea attributed to the Scythians has been recently studied carefully, and a close resemblance was found.[1] Minusinsk was taken in this respect as a centre from which this culture spread towards the Black Sea. This is important as throwing light on the puzzle of the origin of the Scythians, though no one can doubt now the kinship, if not identity, of the Eastern Scythians and the Turks. If the cradle of the Turks is to be sought in the forest of the Altai with its environment which encourages a sedentary and agricultural mode of life—and the steppes and valleys between the Altai and Baikal are full of evidences of the sedentary culture of this people—it is still true that in comparison with the old Chinese, the Turks, especially their eastern branches, must be considered barbarians. Besides, there never has been a uniform culture spread over the various Turkic nations, nor did they ever live in a mass undivided by foreign races. This is why it is difficult to be certain whether some of the clans mentioned first by the Chinese and then by the Arab writers can be considered Turks. It is much easier to make this distinction among the contemporary Turks, even though they appear also under various names of Tatar, Tuba, or Osmanli.

A few words must be said about the name 'Tatar.' R. G. Latham[1] points out that the less we use the term Tatar or Tartar, the sounder will be our ethnology. He also calls attention to the mistake of coupling the Manchu and their dynasty with the Tatars. One of the earliest mentions of the word 'Tatars' is found in the old Turkish inscriptions of the Orkhon ascribed to Bilge-Khan.[2] About this time (8th cent.) the 'Otuz-Tatar' ('Thirty Tatar') lived to the east and south-east of Baikal and were dependent on the Turkish confederacy. Chinese history does not mention them till the 9th century. According to N. A. Aristoff,[3] the Otuz-Tatars were originally Turks, while the Mongolian scholar Bichurin is inclined to call them Mongols. In the same inscription on the Orkhon is a mention of the 'Tokuz-Tatars' ('Nine Tatars').

The term 'Tatar' is closely connected with the term 'Tatan.'[4] The people living in the present Khalka from the 9th cent. were called Tatan. They were divided into many *aimán*, or unions of clans. The strongest of these were the Mongol, Taigut, Kere, and Tatar.[5] These were divided into clans, but all of them used the tribal name of Tatan. The Mongols successfully fought the Niuchi (Tungus) in the middle of the 12th cent., and towards the end of this century the Mongol ruler, Temujin, was elected head of all the Tatans and a great part of China under the name of Jenghiz Khan. The house of the Mongol-Tatan reigned from 1206 to 1638. The Mongol *aimán* of the Tatan confederacy subdued the Tatar *aimán* before they started on their European conquest, but it is doubtful whether all the Tatan accepted the name of this one *aimán*. On the contrary, the name Mongol came into greater prominence than that of Tatan or Tatar through Jenghiz Khan. It is probable, however, that some of the Jenghiz Khan hordes were known to their neighbours as Tatan. When Carpini came as an envoy from the pope to the Khan Kuyuk, he may have made a mistake between Tatan and Tatar, so in the 13th cent. all the geographers named the land between the Caspian and the Chinese Seas Great Tartary. It is perhaps because the Chinese historians often called Tatan 'Tata' (a mistake now corrected by them) that many Asiatic scholars, such as H. J.

[1] E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 261.

[1] *Descriptive Ethnology*, 2 vols., London, 1859, i. 265.

[2] P. M. Melioranski, 'On the Orkhon and Yenisei Monuments with Inscriptions,' *Journ. Min. Educ.*, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 882.

[3] 'Notes on the Ethnic Composition of the Turkic Tribes and Nations' (Russ.), *Liv. An. Times*, 1896, iii.–iv. p. 295.

[4] J. Bichurin, *Notes on Mongolia* (Russ.), St. Petersburg, 1828.

[5] *Ib.* i. 129, 221–227.

von Klaproth,[1] confuse the two names Tatan and Tatar.

The first people to call all Mongols Tatars were probably the Russians, and they gave this name also to the tribes who had settled along the Volga, and who seem not even to have been Tatan but various Turks brought within the Mongol-Tatar army, who after the death of Jenghiz Khan were pleased to regain their independence. At the present day Tatars, whether on the Volga, in the Crimea, the Caucasus, or Siberia, represent a fairly pure strain of Turks. Among the problematic Turks may be placed the Scythians, Parthians (though their descendants, the Turkomans, are among the most representative Turks now), Yue-chi (whose descendants, the Rajputs, are certainly a non-Turkic people), and Ye-tha, or Ephthalites, called also White Huns (these seem to have been different in type and habits from the Huns who migrated westward). All these peoples are variously ascribed to the Tungus or Turks; some others, as the original Bulgars and Avars, are sometimes counted as Turks, sometimes as Finns; and the Nogai, Kipchak, and Usbeg are regarded as either Mongols or Turks. The Dungans are placed between the Chinese and Turks, and the Horsak (Sokra and Horpsa) are the Buddhist Turks of Tibet. Finally, the Usuni (Wusun) are attributed by some to the Turks and by some to 'Aryans' of Central Asia. Some other peoples are without doubt Turks, as the Hiung-nu, Khakas, Kirgis, Uigur, Tukiu (Assena), Seljuk, Khazar, etc.

II. *Division of the modern Turks.*—The distribution of the Turks is so wide and their geographical environment so varied that it is difficult to speak of the Turkish type from an ethnological standpoint. Politically, too, what is called Turkish is often only Muhammadan and quite different in nationality. We find that in the pre-war Turkish empire of Asia Minor, N. Africa, and S.E. Europe there were far fewer Turks in an ethnological sense than there were in the pre-war Russian empire.

i. The Siberian Turks.—1. Yakut.—See art. Yakut.

2. Siberian 'Tatars.'—According to religion, the Siberian Tatars can be divided into two groups: Muhammadans and shamanists. The Muhammadans are: (1) the Tobolsk Tatars, in the Tobolsk government, (2) the Barabine (Baraba) Tatars, in the Kainsk district, (3) the Chulim Tatars, in Mariinsk district, (4) the Tomsk-Kuznietsk Tatars, in the Kuznietsk and Barnaulsk districts. The shamanists are: (5) the 'Chern,' or Black Forest Tatars, in the Biisk district, (6) Teleut and Telengit, in Biisk and Kuznietsk districts, (7) Kumandints, in Kuznietsk and Biisk districts, (8) Shorts and Lebedints, in Kuznietsk district, (9) Kyzyl and Kamashints, in Achinsk district, (10) Koibal, Sagai, and Kachints, in Minusinsk district, (11) Karagass, in the forest of Nijne-Udinsk district. The total number of Siberian Tatars in 1911 was about 250,000.

The Tatars of the Tomsk government speak their native Turkic language, and only 30 per cent of them know Russian as well. In the Yeniseisk government only 12 per cent know Russian. The Teleut of the Kuznietsk district are perhaps the most Russified, while the Telengit along the Bia and the Katun are all baptized, and partly Russified, partly Mongolized. The following natives seem to be mixed with the Yenisei-Ostiak and Samoyed, or, as some think, are Tatarized Samoyed: the Kumandints, Shorts, Lebedints, Kyzyl, Kamashints, Koibal, Kachints, and Karagass. The most genuine Turks are those 'Tatars' who inhabit the region of the Altai forests—the 'Chern' Tatars.

ii. Central Asiatic Turks.—The Central Asiatic Turks, all of whom are Muhammadans, can be divided according to their mode of life into (*a*) steppe nomads, and (*b*) village- or town-dwellers. The steppe nomads are: (1) the Kirgis or Kazak, (2) the Kara-Kirgis, (3) the Kara-Kalpak, (4) part of the Turkomans, (5) part of the Usbegs. The village- and town-dwellers are: (6) Sarts, (7) Taranchi, (8) most of the Usbegs (with the Kipchak), (9) most of the Turkomans.

1. Kirgis-Kazak and Kara-Kirgis. — The Kirgis-Kazak live in the northern and eastern part of the Aral-Caspian basin, and in the Orenburg steppes, so they are lowlanders. The Kara-Kirgis live on the slopes of Pamir, Altai, and Tian-Shan. They are mountaineers. There are, however, other Kirgis, to whom this name may be applied historically and ethnologically, who lived from the 6th cent. A.D. in the Yenisei valley and migrated to Semirechie, forced forward by the advances of the Russians in the 18th century. They are often identified with the 'Khakas' (Castrén, Klementz, Kasmin, Radloff), and the inscriptions found in the valley of S. Yenisei are attributed to them. The Kirgis-Kazak call themselves Kazak, *kaz* meaning 'goose,' *zag* meaning 'crow,' *i.e.* the steppe birds, the free birds of the steppe. The Russians call them Kirgis-Kazak to distinguish them from their own Cossacks (Kazak). The Kirgis-Kazak derive themselves from the Usbeg, and they derive the Kara-Kirgis from dogs. But the Kara-Kirgis call themselves brothers of the Kirgis-Kazak, and in fact are probably one of their branches. Out of 4·7 millions of these Kazak only about 400,000 are Kara-Kirgis.

The Kirgis-Kazak were divided into three groups, called *orda*—the southern, or great *orda*, 'Ulu-dschus,' the little *orda*, 'Kishi-dschus,' to the west, towards European Russia, and the middle *orda*, 'Orta-dschus,' in the typical steppe country. But, when they began to mix with one another and to increase in numbers, they divided into clans, and each clan had its own *tamga*, or clan symbol, with which the horses and dromedaries were marked. The heads of the clans were called Sultans, while the nobility was called Tiuri or Ak-suek, 'White Bones.' They trace their ancestry from Jenghiz Khan, notwithstanding that the latter was a Mongol. All the other people were called Kara-Suek, 'Black Bones.' Lately, however, marriage prohibitions between these castes have been withdrawn, and the social division is based on material considerations.

The felt hut of the Kirgis is called *yurta*, and a group of *yurta* is called *aul*. Herds of sheep, horses, and dromedaries are their chief form of property. In sharp contrast to their lightly-built houses are their graves, especially among the Turkestan and Semirechie Kirgis. They look like small towers and are made of bricks and clay. The subjugation of the Kirgis by the Russians began in 1734 and took more than 90 years—even during the Great War some groups of Kirgis considered themselves independent.

2. Kara-Kalpak.—The Kara-Kalpak, or 'Black Caps,' are akin to the Kirgis-Kazak, and live in Turkestan, especially in the Syr-Daria district, where they form half of the population. They number about 134,000 (1911). They seem to be taller than the other Kirgis, and lead half-sedentary lives, part of them being agriculturists. Some 20,000 of them live in Khiva.

3. Sarts.—The Sarts (1,847,000 in 1911) were originally a mixture of the original Iranian inhabitants, the Tajik, with their Turanian conquerors,

[1] *Mémoires relatifs à l'Asie sur les Tatares*, 3 vols., London, 1826–28.

the Usbeg. They busy themselves with commerce, but occasionally take to agriculture and cotton-plant growing, in which they are not as successful as the Tajiks, though they know the use of the *arika*, irrigation canals. All the Sarts speak Turkish, and are Muhammadans (Sunnite); they have many followers of the Ṣūfī order. In physical type they approach nearer to the Iranians.

4. **Taranchi.**—The Taranchi are very like the Sarts. They also live in winter in villages, *kishlak*, and their summer houses are called *sakla*. They migrated to Russian Turkestan from Kulja at the same time as the Dungan after Kulja passed to China. They number about 83,000 (1911) and live in the Semirechie country, in the Ili basin, and partly in the Transcaspian country. They are agriculturists, especially busying themselves with vegetable gardens, but prefer commerce. They are Muhammadans, but their women do not cover their faces as the Sart women do.

Besides the Taranchi there are various Turkish tribes on the Eastern slopes of the Tian-Shan, in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, who are the supposed descendants of the Uigur. Their language is sometimes called Turki, and is possibly one of the oldest types of Turkish. They form the most easterly branch of the Central Asiatic Turks, and probably remained behind when the first westward movements began. They ruled in Kashgaria from the 10th to the 12th century. Though in time they became Muhammadans, early Nestorian teaching has left its traces; they still use the Syriac alphabet and possess a book of the 11th cent. in this writing, called *Kudatku Billik*. They are a 'free self-governing people.' Some of them have been to Mecca (800 miles to the Siberian Railway, then through Odessa to Jedda). They consider Stamboul their religious and political capital. The Turks and generally the Muhammadans in Asia are more prosperous than the Buddhists, though the Buddhists are protected by the Chinese Government.

The Kirei of N.W. Mongolia are supposed to have come from the source of the Amur. In the 11th and 12th centuries the Kirei were an important power, and were probably of Nestorian creed. Whether the mythical Prester John (a Christian priest who reigned in some Christian Asiatic kingdom) was their king it is difficult to say. They are not heard of for a long period after the time of Jenghiz Khan. They now differ from the Buddhist Mongols in being Muhammadans. They live on the banks of the Upper or Black Irtish and the greater part of the Western Altai pastures and the Jungaria plains as far as Lake Zaisan. They train hawks, falcons, and golden eagles for hunting such game as gazelles, foxes, and even wolves. Like the Kazak, they claim Jenghiz Khan (a Mongol) as their ancestor.

5. **Usbeg.**—The Usbeg (about 600,000 in 1911; including Kipchak, about 660,000) form the majority of the inhabitants of the Samarkand district and parts of Ferghana and Syr-Daria districts. In Bokhara and Khiva they are the ruling people, like the Osmanli in Turkey. Their name is probably derived from Usbeg Khan of the Golden Horde (1312–40); in the 16th cent. they founded in Turkestan the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara. They are a mixture of three elements: Turks, Iranians, and Mongols. The Turkish element is probably predominant, though in the case of the Usbeg of Khiva it is the Iranian type that predominates. Since the Usbeg exchanged their nomad life for a sedentary one, their customary law, *adat*, has lost ground, and is being replaced by written law, *sharī-at*. Father-right is very strong, but the position of women is on the whole better than among the Sarts and Tajiks. Though the Usbeg now imitate the Sarts in making huts covered with clay, and live in small villages encircled by walls like fortresses, here and there the old felt *yurta* is still found.

6. **Turkomans of Transcaspia.**—The Turkomans live to the number of about 600,000 in the Transcaspian territory and also partly in Persia, Khiva, and Bokhara. Until the Russian occupation of Merv they were nomad horse-breeders. Although some of them were subject to Persia, their boast has been that 'not one Persian could cross their frontier without a string round his neck.' In 1881 the Russians destroyed their power by capturing their principal fortress, Geok-Tepe, and their slave trade has been suppressed. They now live in clay or raw brick houses, and, in some places, in Russian wooden houses. They are Muhammadans, but follow the unwritten customary law. The clan division is still strong, and all migrations are made in clan groups. Endogamy is enforced. As the male population is abundant, the *kalym* for the wife is very high, and in some places the unmarried men form 27 per cent of the population. On the whole they seem to be a democratic people.

The chief clans of the Turkomans are: (*a*) the Chaudors (Chaudur), in the north-west part of Ust-Urt and the Karaboghar Gulf; near (*b*) the Yomuts or Yamuds, extending from Khiva across the Ust-Urt and along the shore of the Caspian to Persia; (*c*) the Goklans or Goklens, settled in the Persian province of Astarabad; they are said to be the most civilized and friendly of all the Turkomans; (*d*) the Tekkes (Taka), who were the most important tribe when the Russians conquered Transcaspia; they are first heard of in the peninsula of Mangishlak, but were driven out by the Kalmuks in 1718 and subsequently occupied the Akhal and Merv oases; the Russians inflicted a crushing defeat on them at Geok-Tepe in 1881; (*e*) the Sakars inhabit the left bank of the Oxus near Charjui; (*f*) the Sarik (Saruk) are found in the neighbourhood of Panjdeh and Yulatan; (*g*) the Salor (Salore), an old and important tribe, suffered much in the course of fights with the Tekkes, and in 1857 migrated to Zarabad in Persian territory near the Harirud; (*h*) the Ersazis (Ersars) are now found chiefly near Khoja Salih; they were once a very important tribe on the upper Oxus.

The Central Asiatic territories, which belong to Russia, have a total population of from five to six millions, of which at least from four to five millions are Turks. Eastern or Chinese Turkestan has a population of about two millions, excluding Kulja and Jungaria. Jungaria has about 600,000 and Kulja 150,000, the overwhelming majority in all these three provinces being Turks. Besides the Turks of the north we find some Mongols, and in the east and south Tibetans.

iii. THE VOLGA 'TATARS.'—The Volga Tatars are those Turks who have been settled on the Lower Volga since the Hunnic invasions, and, since their hold has been strengthened by frequent invasions, they are partly mixed with the Mongols, the Finns, and, since the 13th cent., the Russians. After the break up of Jenghiz Khan's empire they belonged to the great *orda* of Kipchak (Kipchak being mainly a political and not a racial term). After the fall of the Kipchak the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan continued to exist. The Khanate of Kazan was conquered by Russia in 1552, the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1557.

1. **Kazan Tatars.**—The Kazan Tatars number more than a million, and their centre is in the government of Kazan, though they extend on both banks of the Volga as far as the government of Saratov.

2. **Astrakhan Tatars.**—The Astrakhan Tatars, to the number of some 50,000, live at the mouth of the Volga. Some of the Volga Tatars, such as the Cheremiss, Chuvash, and other middle Volga tribes, and the Bashkir, are supposed to be of Finno-Ugrian origin, but they are now Turks in speech and Muhammadans in creed and social life. Muhammadanism was introduced among the Volga Turks in the 10th century.

3. **The Bashkir.**—The government of Orenburg

is a great district for the Mordvins and the Bashkir. The latter are also found in Ufa, Perm, Samara, and Vyatka governments. Latham[1] says that the Bashkir are as entirely Turks in language and features as are the Kirgis. They are shepherds, herdsmen, but above all bee-masters. After the battle of 1552, when the power of the Tatars of the Volga was broken, the Bashkir submitted themselves to Russia, against whom they have not ceased to rebel. Their number is about 392,000.

4. **Teptyar.**—A typical mixture of races, something like that of the Chulim Tatars of Siberia, where it is difficult to define which racial element predominates, are the Teptyar. When the Khanate of Kazan fell, a mixed population of Turks, Cheremiss, Votiak, Chuvash, and Mordvins fled to the east of Ural; out of these has arisen a population which the other Turkish tribes call Teptyar; they are partly shamanist, partly Muhammadan.

iv. THE PONTUS OR CRIMEAN AND NOGAI TATARS.—The Khanate of the Crimea, originally Nogai (a political division of Tatars similar to the Kipchak who came there in the 13th cent.), was by the middle of the 16th cent. more or less Osmanli politically. In 1778 they became independent, but in 1784 became subject to Russia. They are known as excellent agriculturists and growers of grapes and tobacco.

The hill tribes of the Crimea who migrated there before the Nogai in the 11th or 12th cent. from Asia Minor, and are probably a branch of the Seljuk, are shepherds. The culture of the Crimean Tatars is more like that of Kazan and Astrakhan Tatars than like that of the Osmanli. Their total number is about 300,000. The same Nogai Tatars are to be found in Lithuania and Rumania to the number of 5000. They are now mostly Christian, and mixed with the local population.

Another branch of the Nogai occupied the country between the Tobol and the Yaik rivers at the beginning of the 17th century. They were transplanted by Peter the Great to the banks of the Kuma and Kuban, but a small group remained behind at the mouth of the Volga and are called Kundur Tatars.

The Nogai are very Mongol in physiognomy. Some people attribute to them the tumuli of the Orenburg government.

v. WESTERN TURKS.—1. **Turks of the Caucasus.**—The Turks of the Caucasus—properly speaking, the Azarbaijan Tatars—are the inhabitants of the province of which Tabriz is the capital. They number about two millions. They seem to be Turks speaking a Yagatai dialect, who invaded Persia during the Seljuk period (11th cent.). They are also called Iliyet, *i.e.* tribes or clans. Each clan has its own *ilkhani*, appointed by the Shah.

Some of these clans are: (*a*) the Kajara, near Astrabad; the present dynasty of Persian Shahs comes from this tribe; (*b*) the Ayshars of Azarbaijan province (a group of these immigrated to Anatolia and live now in Anti-Tawins); (*c*) the Shekakis; (*d*) the Karakoyunlu; (*e*) the Karagazli; (*f*) the Bahalu; (*g*) the Inamlu; (*h*) the Kashkai, who probably arrived at Herat before the Persians.

Azarbaijan Tatars are mixed with the Persians; other Turks of the Caucasus, living in the mountains along the upper parts of the rivers Cheghem, Baksan, and Kuban, are mixed with the natives of the Caucasus and are physically of local type.

2. **Turks of Anatolia.**—(*a*) *Osmanli and Seljuk.*—The term Osmanli or Ottoman, used in a strict sense, means 'descendant of Osman,' a chief who gathered round him a nation at the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century. Recent researches have proved[2] that the Osmanli Turks (who until the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe never called themselves Turks, but always Osmanli) are a tribe of Turks who lived in Persia for a considerable time before they moved to Asia Minor. It was probably as refugees before the advance of the army of Jenghiz Khan that they appeared in the 13th cent. and with the permission of the Seljuks of Konia settled on the Asiatic remnants of the Byzantine empire. As the Osmanli have no written history before the capture of Constantinople, all that we know about their early history is founded on tradition. Their clan is supposed to be descended from Khorasan, but we know more about Ertogul, who was the father of Osman. Osman owned only the small territory of Sugur, and it is not certain (Gibbons) that he and his people were Muhammadans, like the Seljuks, until he married into a Muhammadan family. It was the political unrest in E. Europe that helped the descendants of Osman to conquer all the Balkan Peninsula and Byzantium. The invasion of Asia Minor by Timur at the beginning of the 15th cent. stopped but for a very short time the successes of the Osmanli in Europe. If we consider that the Osmanli were originally only a small clan, and that the Seljuk and other Turks looked down upon them and did not join with them, we must conclude that the bulk of the Osmanli nation was recruited from some race other than the Turkish. Recently the name Osmanli became the term applied to all the subjects of the pre-war Turkish empire.

Many of the Turks of the old Byzantium who belonged to the Osmanli empire were not Osmanli in the strict sense. Thus the supposed remnants of the Seljuks of the 11th cent. are called Koniots. It is interesting to note that Byzantine authors mention a Turkish colony which settled in Macedonia on the river Vardar in the 9th century.

(*b*) *Turkomans.*—The Turkomans of Anatolia are spread all over Anatolia, but are specially numerous in the central part and in E. Taurus. They are more Mongolian in type than the Osmanli or Seljuk. They are nomads, but not to the same extent as the Yuruks. Their summer residences (*yaila*) are close to their winter houses (*kishla*). Some of them are Shī'ahs, others Sunnites. They seem to have been first heard of in Anatolia in the 12th cent. and are mentioned by the historians Nicetas and Anna Comnena as 'Turcomans.'[1] They were opposing both Seljuk and Ottoman rule and probably migrated from C. Asia under their own political régime.

(*c*) *Yuruks.*—The Yuruks live chiefly in the mountains, but also in the plains from Smyrna to the E. Taurus. They are typical nomads.

Old ethnologists sometimes mistook the religious communities of the Muhammadan sects for distinct Turkish nations—*e.g.*, the Kizil-Bash (*q.v.*), or Red Heads, living in the Angora region of Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus.

III. *RELIGION.*—We shall deal only with the religion of the Turks before they accepted Muhammadanism; it has persisted up till now among some Turks of Central Asia and Siberia. There is evidence (the Buddhist writings in Uigur character) that some of the Central Asiatic Turks were followers of Buddha about the 8th century. Still more has been heard about Christian Nestorian influences. In fact, there is a permanent sign of these in the form of Uigur written characters modelled probably on the Soghdian. The Arabs captured Samarkand in 706, but Muhammadanism in Central Asia was introduced later, and to some extent it is still spreading. The original religion of the Turks is a shamanism of

[1] *Ethnology*, i. 378.

[2] H. A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1916.

[1] W. M. Ramsay, *The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor* London, 1917.

the Southern type, *i.e.* with a well-marked dualism. Their shamanistic ceremonies and mythology are more highly developed than those among any other shamanistic people. It is this religion that can be called genuinely Turkish.

1. Gods and spirits.—The highest good god is Yulgen, while the symbol of evil is Erlik, who lives in the darkness. Another higher being is Kudai, who is a sort of medium between men and the highest beings. The spirit owner of the hearth is called Bel, and was so called by the Turks who were responsible for the old Yenisei inscriptions; several names of the gods appear in them. Then there are seventeen high rulers ruling over various parts of the Turkish lands. The Altai ruler is called Altai-Khan, and lives in the source of the river Katun. Yulgen himself is so good-natured that, when he wants to punish men for failing to give him sacrifice, he asks Erlik to do it. Yulgen is very often identified with the idea of the sky, Tengri, or with light, Yaryk. The sky is generally the home of all good spirits. Ara-neme or Tengri Yulgen lives in the seventh sky. He has a mother, three sons, and twelve daughters. His eldest son is the god of thunder and rain, and his third son, Timur-Khan, is the god of war. One of his peculiarities is that an arrow passed through his throat and since then he stutters. Kun, the sun, is of female sex, while the moon, Ai-ada, is a husband of the sun. All the mountains, forests, lakes, and rivers have their spirit owners, *eelu*, whose functions are not quite clear. They seem rather benevolent if propitiated. The same cannot be said about the spirit assistants of Erlik, called *kara-neme*, who, even if propitiated, may be found harmful. They are known also under the names of *kurémes*, *asa*, *rozyr*. Images of gods and spirits are made of various materials and are called *tyns* or *kurmes*.

The chief office of the shaman is to use his sacred drum (*tiungiur*) and keep off by its sound the malevolent spirits. The shamans themselves are in some tribes of two types, some to ward off the bad powers (black shamans) and some to propitiate the good powers (white shamans, who are very often not professional but merely heads of the families).

The goddess of birth is held in great regard; her name among the Altai Turks is Umai, among the Siberian Tatars and the Yakut, Ayisit.

2. The soul.—The Turks of the Altaian Black Mountains (Chern) consider the soul of a man to be composed of several parts or of several independent souls. Each of these performs a special function—*e.g.*, the *tyn*, from *tynip*, 'I breathe.' One can hear the *tyn's* sound when it leaves the body. *Tyn* and another soul, the *suzy*, are man's vitality. The *suzy* (from *su*, 'water,' and *uzak*, 'long,' *i.e.* 'long-lived') can leave the body for a while, but, if it is absent too long, the *tyn* perishes. The *kut* is another kind of vitality (*kutup*, 'I vanish'). Its absence causes disease. The *tula* is a soul implying wisdom which differentiates man from animals, who do not possess it. The *sur* is a man's shadow (*surmet*, 'picture'). After a man's death the *sur* continues to dwell in the house for about forty days, but it keeps its independent existence even when it goes to another place; this soul, and one called the *sune* (*su nep*, 'I advise'), seem to survive man and are ultimately reincarnated.[1]

3. Ceremonies.—Sacrifice to the sky is one of the most persistent ceremonies found among the old and modern Turks. It is called *tigir* (*tayi* among the Minusinsk Turks) and is performed every third summer. No women are allowed to assist at the ceremony, which is held on the top of a mountain in a sacred birch spinney. The old fire (*ulug ot*) is made, and after many incantations a new fire is lighted from the old one. It is protected by the shamans lest it should go out, which would mean a catastrophe for the tribe. A he-goat or a ram is sacrificed, but no blood must be shed and no cry heard from the sacrificial animal.

During the sacrifice to Yulgen among the Altaians similiar precautions are taken, and the whole fore-quarters of a horse are boiled on the 'old fire,' while the hind-quarters are boiled on the new fire. During both ceremonies each head of a family attaches a thread of flax to the sacred birches—that is the path for their wishes to go to the high being—and eagle feathers attached to the threads carry them farther up. The meat boiled on the old fire is then taken round in the direction of the sun and burnt on the same fire. If the smoke goes up in a straight line, the sacrifice is accepted. Then only a feast is held, and the choicest meat is offered to the *kam* shaman, or medicine-man. Among the Kirgiz he is called *baksa* if belonging to the same clan, or *duana* if belonging to another clan. The meat prepared on the new fire is consumed, while remnants of the feast together with the implements used are burnt again on the old fire.

The birch plays a very important rôle in all Turkic ceremonies, and, whether the Turks live in steppes or tundras, birches are either brought from the forest regions or are symbolized by driftwood poles. This as well as veneration of forest animals and birds (and not steppe or tundra animals) seems to point again to the forest origin of the race.

The summer sacrifice to Yulgen (called also Bai-Yulgen) lasts for two or more days, and it is usually on the second day that the shamanistic performances are held. The *kam* is preparing for a journey to the various spirits and gods living in the skies above. He ceremonially feels various spirits represented on his drum. While the company eats the offered meat, the *kam* sings:

'Accept this, O Kaira Khan!
Master of the drum with six horns
Draw near with the sound of the bell!
When I cry "Chokk!" make obeisance,
When I cry "Me!" accept this!'

Then he offers a garment to Yulgen with a song:

'Gifts that no horse can carry—
Alas! Alas! Alas!
Gifts that no man can lift—
Alas! Alas! Alas!
Garments with triple collar
Turn them thrice before thine eyes,
Let them be a cover for the steed,
Alas! Alas! Alas!
Prince Yulgen, full of gladness,
Alas! Alas! Alas!'

Then only the shaman summons all the spirit assistants represented on the drum to enter it. He sings and then is silent for a while, and a noise of various birds and animals, whom he is imitating, is heard. Then he begins to beat his drum and to dance round the people, touching them occasionally with his drum or drumstick. The fire is extinct, the shaman's voice becomes weaker, and the sound of the crackling of the birch in the middle of the room indicates that the shaman has fled to the skies. Sometimes the *kam* gives an account of what he sees while he travels, sometimes only after coming back. In the sixth sky he encounters the moon, in the seventh the sun, and from the highest sky he can reach—only a few *kams* reach the ninth sky—he prays to Yulgen:

'Lord, to whom three stairways lead,
Bai-Yulgen, possessor of three flocks,
The blue vault which has appeared,
The blue sky that shows itself,
The blue cloud that whirls along,

[1] V. L. Wierbicki, *The Natives of the Altai*, Tomsk, 1893, pp. 73-78

The blue sky so hard to reach,
Land a year's journey distant from water,
Father Yulgen thrice exalted,
Shunned by the edge of the moon's axe,
Thou who usest the hoof of the horse;
O Yulgen, thou hast created all men
Who are stirring round about us.
Thou, Yulgen, hast bestowed all cattle upon us,
Let us not fall into sorrow!
Grant that we may withstand the evil one!
Let us not behold Kermes,
Deliver us not into his hands.'[1]

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TURKESTAN.—See TURKS, MONGOLS.

TUSCARORA INDIANS.—See IROQUOIS.

TUSHES AND OTHER PAGAN TRIBES OF THE CAUCASUS.

—The Caucasus presents, as is well known, one of the most remarkable ethnological and linguistic regions in the world.[2] The reason is not far to seek: this narrow neck of land between the Black Sea and the Caspian has formed for centuries a bridge between S.E. Europe and Asia Minor. Armenians and Iranians (Tāts) press up from the south; Slavs and Tatars descend from the north; at least one Iranian people, the Ossetes,[3] has forced its way into the very centre of the region. In the midst of these intruders are the Caucasians proper, guarded by the mountain-system of the Caucasus.

The religious history of the Caucasian peoples is analogous to their political and ethnological records; only linguistically and (for the most part) racially have they maintained their independence. Of their ancient paganism but one fragment of any value has been preserved. Regarding the 'Albani,' who occupied the eastern portion of the country between the Terek and the Kura,[4] Strabo writes thus:

'The gods they worship are the Sun, Juppiter, and the Moon, but the Moon above the rest. She has a temple near Iberia. The priest is a person who, next to the king, receives the highest honours. He has the government of the sacred land, which is extensive and populous, and authority over the sacred attendants, many of whom are divinely inspired and prophesy. Whoever of these persons, being violently possessed, wanders alone in the woods, is seized by the priest, who, having bound him with sacred fetters, maintains him sumptuously during that year. Afterward he is brought forth at the sacrifice performed in honour of the goddess, is anointed with fragrant ointment, and is sacrificed together with other victims. The sacrifice is performed in the following manner. A person, having in his hand a sacred lance with which it is the custom to sacrifice human victims, advances from the crowd and pierces the heart through the side, which he does from experience in this office. When the man has fallen, certain prognostications are indicated by the manner of the fall, and these are publicly declared. The body is carried away to a certain spot, and then they all trample upon it, performing this action as a mode of purification of themselves.

The Albanians pay the greatest respect to old age, which is not confined to their parents, but is extended to old persons in general. It is regarded as impious to show any concern for the dead or to mention their names. Their money is buried with them; hence they live in poverty, having no patrimony.'[1]

He also states,[2] on the somewhat dubious authority of Megasthenes, that the Caucasians practised coition in public and ate the corpses of their dead relatives.

The religious history of the Caucasus is as varied as its other records. Central Caucasia was not converted to Christianity until the 4th cent., and the gospel first penetrated E. Transcaucasia after the defeat of Khusrau (Chosroës) I. by Justinian in the middle of the 6th century. Mazdaism, on the other hand, was introduced into E. Caucasia in the Arsacid period (186–265), and in E. Transcaucasia it had superseded Christianity by the time of the rise of Islām in 646. In consequence many Caucasian peoples possessed a religion which was an undigested mass of primitive paganism, Mazdaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism. Among certain tribes, notably the closely kindred and geographically contiguous Tushes, Pshavs, and Khevsurs, this state of affairs still obtains, as was also the case among the Dadianic Svanetians until their nominal conversion (or, rather, reconversion) to Christianity in 1865.

So far as present conditions are concerned, the religions professed by the Caucasian peoples are as follows:

(1) Georgians (Karthvelians): Lazes, Ajars, Yengiloi, Kabardinians, and Cherkess, Muhammadan (the two latter relatively recent converts from Christianity); Tushes, Pshavs, Khevsurs, Svanetians, and Abkhases, pagan (or semi-pagan); Mingrelians, Imeretians, Gurians, and Grusinians, Georgian Christians.[3]

(2) Eastern Caucasians (Chechens, Avars, Kazikumyks, Kyrins, etc.), Muhammadans.

(3) Turko-Tatars (Kumyks, Kirgis, Kakmyks, etc.), Muhammadans or Lamaists.

(4) Iranians: Tāts, Muhammadans; Ossetes, semi-Christians or semi-Muhammadans, with numerous pagan survivals.

(5) Armenians, Christians.

The present article is restricted to the pagan or semi-pagan peoples of the Caucasus, especially the Khevsurs, with whose religion that of the Pshavs and Tushes is practically identical.[4] These peoples possess an interest greater than their numbers seem to warrant. Like so many Oriental religious systems, such as Manichæism (*q.v.*) and the religions of the Mandæans, Nusairis, Kizil Bash, Yezidis (*qq.v.*), etc., they present a syncretism analogous to late classical developments or to the Græco-Egyptian system.[5]

1. Tushes, Pshavs, and Khevsurs.—The Tushes, Pshavs, and Khevsurs are three small, contiguous tribes of Karthvelian stock, numbering, in 1912, 6600, 11,000, and 7700 respectively;[6] and their religious systems are so similar that they need not be discussed separately.

(*a*) *Sanctuaries.*—The *khati*, or place of prayer and sacrifice,[7] is synonymous with the community

[1] M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, London, 1914, pp. 298–303.

[2] The best ethnological maps of this region are by N. von Seidlitz, in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, xxvi. [1880] Taf. 15; R. von Erckert, *Der Kaukasus und seine Völker*, Leipzig, 1887; *Dorožnaya karta kavkazkago kraya*, Tiflis, 1903; *Etnografičeskaya karta kavkazkago kraya*, Tiflis, 1909 (cf. the review by A. Dirr, in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, lvii. [1911] pt. 2, p. 94 f.); and, for the Karthvelian region only, by H. Schuchardt, in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, xliii. [1897] Taf. 6. For the Tushes, Pshavs, and Khevsurs see also the special map by G. Radde, in *Izvěstiya kavkazkago otděla imp. russ. geograf. obščestva*, xi. [1880]. For an ethnographic map in the 1st cent. B.C., see J. de Morgan, *Mission scientifique au Caucase*, ii. pl. xiv., and for the distribution of the various tribes according to the classical authors, see the map by B. Latyshev, in his *Scythica et Caucasica*, ii.

[3] See art. OSSETIC RELIGION.

[4] De Morgan, ii. 191–196.

[1] XI. iv. 7 f. (=p. 503 C). [2] XV. i. 56 (=p. 710 C).

[3] Cf. W. F. Adeney, *The Greek and Eastern Churches*, London, 1908, pp. 344–348.

[4] For the Ossetes see art. OSSETIC RELIGION.

[5] See artt. ATTIS, CYBELE, GRÆCO-EGYPTIAN RELIGION, etc.

[6] A. Dirr, in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, lviii. [1912] pt. 1, p. 138.

[7] The word *khati* properly means 'idol,' 'image'; it is also used to denote an 'angel,' or personification of heaven or nature, possibly as being an 'image' of the Supreme God (cf. Merzbacher, *Aus den Hochregionen des Kaukasus*, ii. 75, 90 f.).

itself; and so completely has *khati* lost its primary meaning of 'image' that prayer is made to it quite as earnestly as to its divinity, the *batoni-khati* ('image-lord'). The *khati* usually stands on a hill, in a grove of trees (planes, oaks, etc.) which are considered holy, which no axe may touch, and beneath which no wild animal may be killed. The sanctuary always consists of more than one building, surrounded by a rude stone wall. A small chapel, artlessly constructed of irregular slabs, contains the 'image,' the *drosha* (banner of the clan, borne in battle, and regarded with awe),[1] and the costly silver vessels from which the sacred beer, brewed in the *khati*, is drunk, etc. Near the *khati*, but within a hedge of its own, is a small, dark building to house the brewing apparatus, drinking-cups, and the like; and close by, under the shade of a great tree decked with rags, etc., is an altar, about 1½ m. high, which is adorned with humble offerings, while over it is a bowl with an aspergillum, and behind it frequently stands a stone idol. By the altar is a stone-paved pit into which the blood of the sacrificial victim flows through a quadrangular opening; and feet and bones of sheep, kine, etc., bear witness to the zeal of the worshippers. Near this usually stands another altar-shaped column resting on a square base; and on it are piled horns of wild animals, brought as offerings to the sanctuary. A special hut is erected for brewing the beer, which only the proper servants of the *khati* may prepare; and *darbasi*-dwellings and assembly-places are provided for the ministers of the shrine. The sacred vessels (mostly of silver and often bearing Christian symbols) are jealously guarded against profanation or theft; and at high festivals the worshippers drink from them the sacred beer.[2]

As the terrestrial home of the celestial *khati*, the *khati*, in its aspect of place of prayer and sacrifice, serves as means of communication between heaven and earth, so that in each crisis of life it is visited for prayer to the divinity dwelling there. While almost every village has its own *khati*, three, all dedicated to St. George (see below [*d*]), possess special sanctity—those in the villages of Gudani and Khakhmati, and the *khati* of Karatis-Jvari in Likoki. The two former are the oldest in Khevsuria, and all three enjoy large estates.

The *khati* of Gudani is called 'leader of God's hosts' and contains the chief *drosha* of the Khevsurs. It possesses great power against theft (hence it is invoked when a raid is to be undertaken) and against disease, insanity, and sterility. The *khati* Sameba-Zrolis-Ziseri, in the village of Ukan-Khalo, is the special patron of hunters and thieves, and has peculiar power over the clouds. The *khati* of Karatis-Jvari is particularly potent against all evil spirits, which appear in the form of hedgehogs, swine, etc.; and his sacrifice, in case of misfortune, is a goat, which, it should be noted, is offered only to evil spirits. In the village of Atabe is a *khati* dedicated to St. Kvirik, lord of the mainland, whom all angels obey, and who has his throne next to God.

(*b*) *Priests.*—Some uncertainty prevails concerning the various orders of the priesthood. The lowest rank is that of the *shulta*, of whom each *khati* has three, chosen annually from the community by the *khuzi* and the *dekanossi*. The *shulta's* duties are to guard the property of the sanctuary, to supervise and assist the agricultural work on the land belonging to the *khati*, and to see the harvest safely garnered. Like the other ministers of the *khati*, they must lead a blameless life, and for several weeks before each feast intercourse with women is forbidden. They may not enter the *darbasi*, this privilege being reserved for the higher functionaries.

The next in ascending rank are the *dasturi*, chosen by the *khuzi* from the community, either for a definite period or for an individual feast. Their name is of Persian origin (Pahlavi-Pers. *dastūr*), but in the Iranian priesthood the *dastūrs* occupy the highest rank.[1] The duties of the Khevsur *dasturi* are to receive the barley from the *shulta*, prepare the firewood, obtain the wild hops (cultivated hops may not be used), and brew the sacred beer. During this process they must be barefooted, bareheaded, and ungirdled, may not leave the sanctuary, and are forbidden to speak.[2] At the festivals they must prepare and serve the food of the *khuzi* and *dekanossi*, and perform a like service for the attendant worshippers. When the *khuzi* slays the sacrificial offering (*svaraki*), the *dasturi* and *dekanossi* hold its feet, and they sprinkle the sacrificiant and his family with its blood. During four weeks previous to a feast the *dasturi* must refrain from conjugal relations and may not go near a *boseli* (menstruation-hut). While the *shulta* are all equal in rank, there are various degrees among the *dasturi* according to the periods for which they are chosen; and, together with the *shulta*, they administer the finances of the *khati*.

The real priest of the *khati* is the *khuzi*, who is chosen, not by the community, but by the soothsayer (*kadagi*) or seeress (*mkitkhavi*). A future *khuzi* is usually a man of standing, favourably known for shrewdness and eloquence; and the sign by which he is elected is normally illness of himself or of one of his relatives (failure to recover from such illness, however, means that he has been rejected by the *khati*). Once chosen, the *khuzi* cannot be removed against his will; he is deemed holy, and no one dares insult him by word or deed. On the other hand, a man selected by *kadagi* or *mkitkhavi* cannot refuse to accept the dignity of *khuzi*, under penalty of divine anger. The *khuzi's* duties are the performance of religious rites (some of which, in much distorted form, are of Christian origin, as shown by their invocation of the Trinity) and the offering of prayers, which—for material blessings alone—are addressed to the *batoni-khati* (as the mediator of the divine will) rather than to the supreme deity. The *khuzi* also slaughters the *svaraki* by cutting its throat, and he and the *dekanossi* receive its skin and half of its flesh. He performs marriages, conducts festivals for the dead, blesses the people at the great feasts, and foretells the outcome of illness by placing the cap and girdle of the afflicted person under his pillow and dreaming over them.[3] He is likewise the guardian of the sacred *drosha*, before which the people kneel when it is shown them on high festivals; and at such times he solemnly curses any who may possibly prove traitors, holding high a bowl of beer and pouring it on the ground with the words, 'So may the house, the family, the fortune of the faithless be emptied!' Like the *dasturi*, he must observe the utmost purity before festivals, even an erotic dream sufficing to defile him.

The *khuzi* is assisted by several *dekanossi*, likewise chosen by the *kadagi* or *mkitkhavi*, and bound by the same rules as govern him. With the *dasturi* they hold the sacrificial victim while he cuts its throat; with him (or for him, if he is prevented from taking part in the festival) they repeat the prayers and bless the people; and they light the candles in the *khati*.[4]

[1] Cf. art. BANNERS.

[2] The emphasis laid on the sacred beer may be a reminiscence of the Indo-Iranian *soma-haoma* rite (see artt. HAOMA, SOMA), despite the wide-spread custom of drinking intoxicants in connexion with sacred ceremonies (see *ERE* v. 79).

[1] See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Iranian).

[2] The prohibition of speech (cf. also below, p. 487) looks very like a survival of Zoroastrianism (see *SBE* v. [1880] 109, 290–292, xviii. [1882] 135, xxiv. [1885] 283 f.); but, on the other hand, to go barefoot and ungirdled are heinous sins in Mazdaism (*SBE* v. 106 f., 287).

[3] Cf. art. INCUBATION, of which this dreaming is really a form.

[4] The *khuzi*, *dekanossi*, *dasturi*, and *shulta* roughly correspond respectively to the fourfold hierarchy of bishop, priest,

A somewhat problematical figure in the hierarchy[1] is the *khevis-beri* ('valley-elder'). It seems, on the whole, that he was originally the political or administrative head of the valley, and as such was the bearer of the *drosha* and the leader of the army. In this manner he naturally became protector of the *khati*, and so developed by degrees into a religious leader, particularly as his older political importance steadily diminished. Traces of this, however, yet remain. He is still the one who uplifts the *drosha* at certain feasts; and, unlike the *khuzi*, *dekanossi*, *dasturi*, and *shulta*, he inherits his dignity; and it is only in the case of extinction of a family in which the office of *khevisberi* is hereditary that he is chosen by the *khuzi*. He is the faithful transmitter of ancient ritual; but his precise relation to the *khuzi* is uncertain.

(*c*) *Sorcerers.*—Among the Khevsurs sorcerers and priests co-operate. The *kadagi* is chosen at New Year by *khuzi* and *dekanossi*. Usually he is neurotic, and he delivers his messages in the characteristic manner of shamans.[2] He is the mouthpiece of the *khati* and is consulted in all important events of life, especially in cases of illness, when he designates the particular offering necessary to propitiate the deity whose anger has caused the affliction. In certain *khatis*, as in Khakhabo, the *kadagi* even has the right to carry the *drosha*. The female counterpart of the *kadagi* is the *mkitkhavi*, who is often a hysteriac. Despite the restrictions imposed on all other Khevsur women, the *mkitkhavi* holds rank equal to that of the *kadagi*. The *mkitkhavis* divine by means of water, grains of corn, etc.; and, if they declare that the cause of an illness is a deity's desire to obtain the person afflicted, the latter is clad in white, and a vow is taken that his hair shall be uncut for three years, etc.

There is another class of sorceresses, the *mesulta*—women and girls who sustain a peculiarly close relation to the supernatural world. To approach the spirits of the departed, the *mesulta* lies upon the ground, grows pale, and falls into deep slumber, often broken by a gentle murmuring, which is regarded as converse with the dead. Since, however, too much speech regarding the other world is dangerous, the *mesulta*, on awakening, uses language which is intentionally obscure. If a child falls ill before reaching the age of two years, the *mesulta* is consulted. She tells from what departed spirit the illness comes; and the child's name is changed to that of the deceased in question (in similar illness of an older child the aid of the *kadagi*, not the *mesulta*, is sought).

(*d*) *Deities.*—Reminiscences of Christianity are so numerous that it is not always easy to say exactly what is essentially the religion of the Khevsurs and kindred tribes. The supreme deity is Morigi, creator and omnipotent, who dwells in the seventh heaven and is the god of the living, whereas Christ is the divinity of the dead.[3] The Trinity, occasionally invoked in prayers, is regarded as three angels; the Blessed Virgin receives honour as one of the chief angels; and SS. Peter and Paul are the angels of wealth and abundance. Morigi leaves the actual administration of the world to his delegates, the *khatis*, each of whom has his special function and is aided by two messengers (*esauls*), one good and the other evil, through whom the *khati* rewards or punishes mankind. The *esauls* united form the heavenly host (*lashkari*; Arab. *laškar*, 'army'), to which the 'sisters' of the *khati* also belong. A special shrine is erected to these 'sisters' in the *khati* of Khakhmati, and there three maidens from Kajeti (the land of the demons) dwell—Ashe, Simen, and Samdsimari—who are represented as children and who, when sent by the *khati*, cause the children of the guilty to fall ill.[1]

The principal deity, for all practical purposes, is the patron saint of the Caucasian region, St. George of Cappadocia, from whom the land of Georgia is popularly supposed to have received its name.[2] The majority of churches in Georgia are dedicated to him, as are the three chief *khatis* of the Khevsurs—Gudani, Khakhmati, and Karatis-Jvari. He not only causes the herds to multiply, but he heals animals and men and protects his worshippers in time of peril. He is, furthermore, a storm-god and solar deity, and his throne is on a lofty mountain,[3] whence he sends upon the fields of the wicked the hail which his servants, the *divs* (Av. *daēva*, 'demon'), bring from the sea at his bidding. To avert his wrath, no work is done in the fields on Mondays, Fridays, and Saturdays from June till harvest, special watchers being appointed to see that this tabu is not violated. Chapels are erected in his honour on hill-tops, to which pilgrimage is made annually; and at Khakhmati sacrifices are made to his dog, a wind-demon, for having once protected the Khevsur herds against a band of devils.

(*e*) *Festivals.*—The chief Khevsur festivals fall about Easter, Ascension Day, and New Year's Day. The most important is celebrated in the *khati* of Gudani, beginning on Good Friday and lasting four days; but in memory of our Saviour's thirst (Jn 19^{28}) bread and salt alone are eaten, and only a little beer may be drunk. Twelve weeks later the great national festival, said to commemorate the liberation of the land from foreign invasion, is celebrated at the *khatis* of Khakhmati and Karatis-Jvari, and also throughout Pshavia and Tushetia. At these festivals the number of sacrificial victims is very large, from 500 to 600 sheep and 20 to 40 cattle being offered at Khakhmati alone, and the quota of each family being at least five sheep. The priests receive the skin and half of the flesh, which is salted to keep, the remainder being cooked by the *dasturi* and eaten by the assembly, together with bread and abundant beer. This beer is solemnly blessed by *khuzi* and *dekanossi*, after which the *dasturi* presents it first in the sacred silver vessels to these priests and then to the laity;[4] but it is consumed so generously that the festival frequently degenerates into a drunken revel. Women are not admitted to the feasts and may not pass beyond a certain line in the *khati*,[5] where they receive their share of beer and viands. Near a *khati* on a hill in the village of Arkhoti is a special *nishi* (place where a saint has performed a miracle) for children, and to this are brought loaves baked expressly for them.

deacon, and subdeacon of the Orthodox, Roman, and Anglican Churches, and this may indeed be their origin; it is less likely that they are reminiscences of the *zarathushtrotema*, *andarzpat*, *ratu*, and *mobed* of Zoroastrianism (for whom see art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD [Iranian]).

[1] Cf. the divergent opinions cited by Merzbacher, ii. 85.

[2] See art. SHAMANISM.

[3] The seven heavens represent Jewish Talmudic tradition (see *JE* i. 591, vi. 293); for Morigi as god of the living cf. Mt 22^{32}; and the concept of Christ as god of the dead is probably borrowed from the doctrine of His descent into Hades (1 P 3^{19}).

[1] This explains the function of the *mesulta* in healing infants.

[2] Stemmer, in Wetzer and Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*², Freiburg, 1882–1901, v. 330; cf. also *AS*, April, iii. 101 ff. In reality, however, 'Georgia' is probably derived from Pers. Gurj(istān), the name of the land in question (Adeney, p. 344, note).

[3] Cf. the mystic awe associated with the mountains Kasbek in Ossetia (Merzbacher, i. 848–853) and Elburz, the latter being called Orfi Itub ('Abode of the Blest') by the Abkhases, Ashka Makhua ('Mountain of the Gods') or Nash Hamakho ('Holy Height') by the Cherkess, and Jinn Pādišāh ('Lord of Spirits') by the Turkish-speaking tribes (*ib.* i. 599–601); its name is derived from the Persian Albūrz (Av. Hara Berezaiti), itself a famous abode of *divs* (cf. *ERE* viii. 507ᵃ).

[4] Apparently a reminiscence of celebration of the Eucharist.

[5] Probably reminiscent of the narthex of early Christian churches.

(*f*) *Status of women.*—Until a daughter-in-law has entered the household, a Khevsur woman's life is one of toil. She not only aids her husband in working in the fields and tending the cattle, but must also mow and thresh, bring wood and water, cook food, make clothing, etc. When her son brings home his bride, however, the mother-in-law becomes the administrative head of the house, and nothing may be done without her approval.

(*g*) *Marriage and divorce.*—Betrothal frequently takes place while the future bride and groom are still children; and in such a case the boy's father is obliged, until the girl reaches maturity, to send annual presents to the bride's father, while at New Year a brother or sister of the groom takes to the bride a 'luck-loaf' (*bedis-kveri*), which she is bound to eat. The marriages are always arranged by a female marriage-broker, who takes some small present from the parents of the groom to the father of the bride. After betrothal the girl may seek no other alliance, and theft of her by another man entails severe consequences on him and her, besides being a deep disgrace to the intended groom and his family. Marriage between persons even remotely akin is strictly forbidden, with the result that, since all the inhabitants of a village belong to a single family, men and women of the same community very seldom wed.

On the marriage day the father of the groom sends to the bride's father, by two men of standing, two sheep, one of which is killed at the *khati*, the other in the bride's house. The girl's mother bakes two large festival loaves (*kada*), and all the maidens of the village escort the bride, with her parents and kinsfolk, to the end of the village, where one of the *kadas* is eaten. The bride's escort now return home, while the bride, with some of her more distant relatives, follows the two men sent by the groom's father, all but the girl being mounted on horseback. During this journey the second *kada* is eaten, and when she reaches the village which is to be her future home the bride is met by all its inhabitants, the distance which they come to greet her being proportionate to the respect shown her. Arrived at the groom's house, the bride is entertained in a separate room by the women of the family, while her escort are feasted. Meanwhile the groom hides till summoned by the feasters; and he then receives the place of honour, but may share in neither banquet, song, nor dance, being permitted to drink only a single glass of brandy. The women likewise are debarred from the men's feast and dance, this being probably a Muhammadan survival, since no such restriction exists among the Christian Karthvelians. This revelry usually lasts three days, during which the groom may not come near his bride; and bride, groom, and escort then return to her home, where a similar feast is given. The groom now goes back to his own village, where he remains an entire year, forbidden to visit even the village of the bride, the only exception being when the groom has no parents, in which case his bride remains with him from the first to manage his household. When the year has expired, the groom sends his nearest kinsmen to fetch the bride, who is again escorted by some of her own relatives. The *dekanossi* and *khevis-beri* are now summoned, and the former sews together the garments of the bridal pair in token of their union, while the girl's mother prepares the nuptial bed, to which she leads the wedded pair. After the first three nights, the groom no longer shares this bed, but seeks his bride only by stealth; and it is not until the birth of their first child that the pair live together openly. The conjugal act involves ritual defilement for three days.

Despite the absence of outward manifestations of affection, and notwithstanding the life of toil imposed upon the married woman, she occupies a position of great respect. Except for very rare instances, she guards her fidelity to her husband with extreme care; and if convicted of adultery, she takes her life. Her symbol of wifehood is her kerchief (*mandili*); and if she throws this between two men who are fighting, they must at once desist from their quarrel.

The older form of wedding among these tribes was marriage by capture, which is still frequent, usually with the connivance of the girl. This is regarded as an insult to the kinsmen of the man to whom she was betrothed, and the robber's relatives must pay them a fine of 16-30 cows and make rich presents to the girl's father. In addition to this, the brothers and cousins of the girl insult the robber by 'jumping on the roof' (*banse shekhtoma*) of his house until he slaughters a sheep and gives them a young ox and a copper kettle If, however, the girl is carried off against her will, a deadly feud arises between the kinsmen of the robber and those of the intended bride and groom, often resulting in destruction of property and life, while the girl seeks an opportunity to escape to her chosen husband.

Polygamy is permitted, but is rare unless the wife is sickly, ages prematurely, or bears only girls; but if a second wife is taken, the husband must give five cows to the family of the first.

The bride brings a dowry with her, but the groom has no claim upon it, whereas the wife has the right to make herself a new dress annually at her husband's expense. The property of husband and wife is kept separate, and neither may be the other's heir. Sons alone may inherit; if the marriage is childless, or only girls are born, the village is the heir.

Divorce is rare, for, even if a wife is thus dismissed for laziness, barrenness, or sickliness, her husband must pay her 16 cows for the marriage and one cow for her work during each year of wedded life except the first and the last. A divorced wife may marry again, and is still entitled to a new dress each year at her first husband's expense. On the other hand, any children of the first marriage belong to their father; and though a temporary exception is made in the case of an unweaned infant, this child also goes to its father as soon as it is grown. A man is deeply disgraced if his wife leaves him; and in such a case she must promise never to marry another man, a violation of this pledge formerly involving the death both of the woman and of her second husband.

Under no circumstances may a man ill-treat his wife—a rule which is enforced by the entire community. Since the family (*ojakhi*) is strictly subordinated to the community (*tamoba*), so that ostracism involves entire forfeiture of communal protection, rights to communal pasturage, etc., the ruling of the *tamoba* is one of much effect in all departments of life in the individual household.

(*h*) *Death and disposal of the dead.*—Death being believed to defile the house, the moribund are carried into the open air, and there breathe their last, surrounded by the members of their household. Since the corpse is deemed a source of uncleanness, its preparation for its final resting-place is the duty of young, unmarried persons (lads for males, and girls for females) called *narevebi* ('defiled'),[1] who shear the head of the corpse (if it be male), clothe it in a shroud of white and red,[2] and dig for it a long, narrow, shallow, stone-lined grave, in which it is laid uncoffined.[3] Contact with *narevebi* entails defilement; and they may not enter their own homes until (after five or six days) they have taken repeated cleansing baths. For a year the kinsmen of the deceased let their beards grow, wear old clothes turned inside out (thus hiding the usual adornments of dress), and carry no weapons. The departed (unless a child, who is unwept) is formally bewailed, the men lamenting silently, the women aloud; and one of the latter recites or sings laudations of the deceased, the others joining in the refrain. A funeral feast is prepared and blessed by the *khuzi*, who also recites an ancient prayer containing reminiscences of the Old and New Testaments.

The corpse is borne to the grave by the *narevebi*, while the kinsmen and other male residents of the community stand weeping softly at the boundary of the village. Of the family only the widow accompanies the body to its final resting-place, and she leads the dead man's completely caparisoned horse,

[1] Cf. the Iranian *nasā-sālārs* (see *ERE* iv. 503 f.).
[2] For minor variations see Merzbacher, ii. 97, note 3.
[3] In certain regions wooden coffins are coming into use.

which bears his clothes and weapons, as well as food and drink for his journey to the other world. Arrived at the grave, she strikes the horse thrice, saying, 'Serve thy master in the future life as faithfully as thou hast served him here below.'[1] The widow is escorted by wailing women, eulogizing the departed, and when the corpse is laid in the ground, one of them falls into ecstasy, describing the arrival of the soul in the abode of the blest. At most only a few loaves are buried with the corpse, or, in the case of a child, some apples or the like. The horse is given to the nearest or dearest kinsman (usually the maternal uncle), and is carefully tended throughout its life. It may carry neither man nor burden, and to sell it is to disgrace its late owner, who still needs it to ride before his departed kinsmen in the other world. If, however, certain specified conditions permit its sale, the purchaser pays only half its actual value, and the seller must provide a substitute; for it is, in reality, the property of the dead.

While burial is now practised by the Caucasian tribes under consideration, the older form of disposal of the dead was to lay them in small house-like structures above ground. The characteristic form of this corpse-house is thus described by M. Kovalevsky:[2]

They are, 'as a rule, situated on the summit of hills. In shape they are like a prolonged quadrangle; they are constructed of stones put together without cement, and have two entrances, one on the southern and one on the northern side.' Within, 'on both sides of a passageway which is left free, stone ledges at a certain level from the earth are to be seen with the mummified bodies of the deceased either sitting or lying on them. Different objects, belonging to everyday life, but no armour, are found in these burial places, where the wind freely enters and birds are likely to come.'[3]

Immediately after the return from the grave, an ox is killed; and the relatives and *narevebi* thrice take a piece of its roasted liver into their mouths and spit it out, this being called 'the re-opening of the mouth' (*sapiris khsno*), since, until this rite is performed, they are denied both meat and milk. Meanwhile the other mourners are entertained with bread and cheese; and on the following day the flesh of the roasted ox is eaten by the relatives and the *narevebi*.

The 'keeping of silence' (*piris abshera*)[4] is likewise a noteworthy mourning rite. On the day of burial the nearest relatives of the deceased choose two men and one woman from his kinsfolk and shut them in a room where a fire is burning. After partaking of a large milk-loaf, they may not utter a word until the '*khuzi* of souls' comes at evening and blesses the loaf, which they turn about themselves thrice. They then go silently home, and each lays a piece of wood at the window of the dead man's house, after which speech is permitted, and they may share the general meal.

A second festival in honour of the deceased is held a few days after his burial; and at this time there is a horse-race[5] in which the victor receives the weapons, etc., of the departed, although they are not actually given him until a year has elapsed. Throughout this year the soul of the dead is supposed to visit his earthly home and to protect it, so that on the second Saturday of Great Lent a special meal (*sulta-kreba*, 'assembly of souls') is prepared for him. Various gifts are laid near loaves of bread placed on the ground, and these become the property of any one who hits them with arrow or bullet; the men then visit the *khati* to drink beer brewed at the expense of the community, while the women, gathered in the house of mourning, lament the dead and drink to the repose of his soul.

The great memorial feast (*tzel taveri*) is held at the expiry of the year. The mourners now cut their hair and beards, don new clothing, and feast so bountifully that excessive potations frequently lead to confusion and quarrels. This feast may also be given by a bachelor or childless widower in his lifetime for the weal of his soul in the future world; but he may not partake of it himself, although, as he hides from the feasters, he may listen to their laudations of him, thus playing the *rôle* of the dead and securing the benefits of the other world which his lack of posterity would otherwise deny him.

(*i*) *Heaven and hell.*—Heaven is a huge fortress, many storeys in height, reaching to the sky. It is illumined by the sun, and on its edge is a great spring, from which the blest drink joyfully.[1] The righteous are graded according to merit as regards the storeys in which they dwell, and each Sunday they receive from God their celestial food, the very sight of which assuages their hunger. Hell, on the contrary, is a dark,[2] square abode to which devils take the damned. Between this world and the next is a perilous bridge, at whose farther end the judges of the dead are seated.[3] Sinners fall into a shoreless river of tar, where they swim in eternal agony, tormented by terrible thirst, while special sins have special punishments, liars and slanderers, *e.g.*, having boiling water poured over them.

(*j*) *Miscellaneous.*—The blood-feud (*q.v.*) flourishes among the Khevsurs, but presents no noteworthy features, although it may be observed that the maternal uncle is especially prominent, either as the avenger of the murdered or as the first to be attacked by the avengers of the slain. Only compensation may be claimed for the murder of women and children; and for non-fatal injuries to men a regular tariff of much minuteness is in force, even murder itself being commutable by a *wergeld*.[4]

In a case of mere suspicion the accused may clear himself by a solemn oath, taken in the *khati* at night. Here an interesting survival of Iranianism is seen in the fact that, while taking oath, the accused holds a live cat, which is deemed the most unclean of all animals,[5] and prays that the corpse of the real murderer, and the corpses of all who might have proved his innocence, but failed to do so, may be followed by a cat in the future world. Or, after food has been placed on the grave of the murdered, one of the latter's kinsmen draws a drop of blood from an ear of the accused and of his kinsmen, cursing the suspected person, if he be guilty, to be the servant of his victim in the life to come. After this both parties share the food, and reconciliation is complete.[6] If, after condemnation, the guilty man refuses to pay the fine imposed upon him, the creditor may demand such payment from some third person whom he chooses without the knowledge of that person. This man, called *mzevali*, may transfer the debt to a fourth, doubling the amount; and the fourth to a fifth, again doubling the sum, and so on, until the debt, enormously enlarged, finally devolves again on the original debtor, who must pay the whole. No one may refuse to be a *mzevali* under penalty of having erected, near his house, a stone image smeared with human excrement, and with a cat or dog[7] hung on a stick thrust into it, the whole being accompanied by a curse. Such disgrace results in ostra-

[1] Formerly the horse was doubtless sacrificed at the grave.
[2] *Archæological Review*, i. [1888] 321.
[3] This form of superterrene disposal of the dead, to which the Avesta distinctly refers (*Vend.* v. 10; cf., further, D. Menant, *Les Parsis*, Paris, 1898, pp. 183 f., 213 f.), is fairly wide-spread, being found not only among Tushes, Pshavs, and Khevsurs, but also in Ossetia (Merzbacher, i. 690, 815–818), Seistan (G. P. Tate, *Seistan*, Calcutta, 1910–12, p. 276), Baluchistan (*IGI* vi. 283), and the Hindu-Kush (G. S. Robertson, *The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush*, London, 1896, p. 641 ff.). A highly developed form is probably to be seen in the so-called 'Tomb of Cyrus' (for a description of which see A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, pp. 280–293). A somewhat similar idea is found in the rock-tombs of the Achæmenian kings, the entrances to which imitate the portals of a palace; and these have analogues in Asia Minor (R. Leonhard, *Paphlagonia*, Berlin, 1915, pp. 242–287) and in Judæa (*JE* iii. 436 f., vii. 145 f.). In the light of his further studies, the present writer believes that his note on ancient Persian burial rites (*ERE* iv. 505) requires considerable revision; and the connexion between this superterrene disposal and primitive Persian and Caucasian dolmen-burial (J. de Morgan, *Mission scientifique en Perse*, Paris, 1894–1905, iv. 15–58, and *Mission scientifique au Caucase*, i. 41–82), cliff-burial or rock-burial (for examples at Pandrān, in Baluchistan, see *IA* xxxii. [1903] 342 f.), and the Zoroastrian *dakhmas* (*ERE* iv. 504) also requires consideration.
[4] Cf. above, p. 484[b], note 2.
[5] The Ossetes have a similar custom (Merzbacher, i. 819).

[1] Evidently a reminiscence of Rev 22[1].
[2] This idea is probably Iranian in origin (cf. *Arta Viraf*, ed. and tr. M. Haug and E. W. West, Bombay, 1872, chs. xviii., liv., and *SBE* v. 114, xviii. 57, 75).
[3] This may be either Iranian or Muhammadan (see *ERE* ii. 852).
[4] For details see Merzbacher, ii. 50–56.
[5] See *SBE* xviii. 419.
[6] For details see Merzbacher, ii. 56–58.
[7] Probably Muhammadan in origin, since Islām, unlike Zoroastrianism, abhors the dog (*ERE* i. 512; T. P. Hughes, *DI*[2], London, 1896, p. 91[a]).

cism of the *mzevali*, who can avert it only by paying the amount demanded, killing a sheep, and sharing it with his opponent and with invited witnesses, after which 'the souls are set free.'

2. Svanetians. — The Svanetians, numbering about 16,500 in 1912, are the modern representatives of the Soanes or Suani of Strabo and Pliny.[1] Their religion is by no means so interesting as that of the Khevsurs, etc., and primitive elements are far less prominent.[2] From Iranianism they retained a sort of prayer to the sun and moon; from Christianity a form of anointing a child by its mother in lieu of baptism, and a veneration for Christ, the Virgin, and St. George; from Judaism a reverence for Elijah; and they still abstain from work on the three Sabbaths—Friday of the Muhammadans, Saturday of the Jews, and Sunday of the Christians. They practise the strictest endogamy, only residents of the same village being permitted to wed—possibly (though by no means certainly) an Iranian survival.[3] Superfluous female children were formerly smothered as soon as born. Burial might take place only in clear weather, rain (in view of the great precipitation) being regarded as ill-omened; and food was laid on the grave for the soul's journey to the other world.

3. Importance of Caucasian religion. — The rather scanty fragments of paganism found in the Caucasus are of more interest than appears on the surface. The Karthvelian stock seems to have had its original home much farther to the south in Asia Minor and to have been driven steadily northward by the invaders who established their empires in Mesopotamia.[4] Thus they found an abode in eastern Cappadocia, Pontus, Armenia, and the Caucasus; but under pressure of Armenians from the west, and of Iranians from the south,[5] they had reached, by the time of Strabo,[6] a territory extending from the lower course of the Kelkid Irmak to that of the Kura, and thence to Lenkoran on the Caspian, the northern boundary being the Caucasus range. The Karthvelian group thus represents the descendants of the ancient Colchidians, Soanes, Iberi, and Albani,[7] the latter corresponding to the Khevsurs, Pshavs, Tushes, and kindred tribes.

If this theory is correct, from the modern paganism of these three Karthvelian tribes we may infer the general character of the religion of a once considerable part of eastern Asia Minor. But perhaps we may go a step farther. We then have a knowledge that in Asia Minor there were at least three zones of religion: one represented by an orgiastic nature-cult, shown by the worship of Cybele and Attis (*qq.v.*) in the west and north; the second exemplified by the developed polytheism of the Hittites (*q.v.*) in the centre and south; and the third characterized by a primitive type of religion, mixed with shamanism, in the east. The enthusiasm of the orgy appealed to the decaying faiths of Greece and Rome; the polytheism, with a high degree of civilization, yielded only slowly to its foes; but the primitive savagery, with a low grade of civilization, was driven by invaders of higher type to the recesses of the Caucasus, where it still lingers, commingled with reminiscences and influences of the nobler religions of Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism.

[1] Strabo, xi. ii. 19 (=p. 499 C); Pliny, *HN* vi. 4; see especially de Morgan, ii. 182 *f.*, 188 *f.*

[2] For a summary see Merzbacher, i. 372–375, and for a description of a Svanetian funeral see *ib.* pp. 447–450. A like statement holds good for the Abkhases, who numbered about 60,000 in 1912 (see especially Žanašvili, in *Izvěstiya kavkazkago otděla imp. russ. geograf. obščestva*, xvi. [1894] 1–64).

[3] Cf. *ERE* viii. 456–458.

[4] For an outline of this history see de Morgan, i. 27 *f.*, 197, ii. 121–129, 274–280.

[5] See de Morgan, ii. pl. xi. ('Les Colonies aryennes dans le Caucase et l'Arménie'), for the course of these migrations. His suggestion (ii. 276; cf. i. 22, ii. 105 *f.*) that the Karthvelian group corresponds to the ancient Vannic is scarcely supported by what little we know of Vannic religion (see art. ARMENIA [Vannic]). It is equally doubtful whether the Hittites (*q.v.*) can be regarded as akin to the modern non-Aryan Caucasians, despite his arguments (i. 23, 26, 197, ii. 64).

[6] De Morgan, ii. pl. xiv. ('Carte ethnographique du Caucase au 1er siècle de notre ère').

[7] See above, p. 483.

LITERATURE.—The principal literature on the paganism of the Caucasian tribes (chiefly in Russian) has been summarized by G. Merzbacher, *Aus den Hochregionen des Kaukasus*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1901 (esp. ch. xiii. for the Svanetians, and ch. xxvii. for the Khevsurs, Pshavs, and Tushes). Nothing of importance on this subject has appeared since; of earlier literature not specified by Merzbacher, mention may be made of M. Kovalevsky, 'Om dyrkan af förfädren hos de kaukasiska folken,' in *Ymer*, 1888, pp. 111–122. For the scanty classical accounts of the Caucasus and its inhabitants see B. Latyshev, *Scythica et Caucasica e veteribus scriptoribus Græcis et Latinis*, 2 vols., Petrograd, 1893–1906. For ethnology and ancient history see esp. E. Chantre, *Recherches anthropologiques dans le Caucase*, 4 vols., Paris, 1885–87; J. de Morgan, *Mission scientifique au Caucase*, 2 vols., do. 1890; S. Zaborowski, 'Le Caucase et les Caucasiens,' in *Revue anthropologique*, xxiv. [1914] 121–133. LOUIS H. GRAY.

TUTELARY GODS AND SPIRITS.—

The conception of a tutelary guardian genius or guiding spirit believed to protect and watch over certain persons and objects appears to arise as soon as the powers of observation and generalization are sufficiently developed to bring about a systematized scheme by which natural phenomena come to be divided into classes and assigned to particular departmental deities and spirits. In some cases high gods are associated with special functions—*e.g.*, in Mexico, where Tlaloc is regarded as the god of rain and water, and therefore has the special office of fertilizing the earth.[1] But more frequently it is the numerous spirits by which primitive man supposes himself to be surrounded that become the patrons or guardians of individual men. Any extraordinary event that demands the help of an intervening agent provides the impetus to penetrate more deeply into the nature of the supernatural powers and to establish a more intimate alliance with them. Thus, to the primitive mind, the constant motion of water is controlled not by natural law but by some supernatural agency resident within the stream. At first it appears simply as a mystic impersonal force, but, as the mind becomes capable of more definite ideas, the conception of a spiritual being having personality is evolved.

The Trojans, *e.g.*, originally regarded a sacred river as containing *mana* (*q.v.*), and, in consequence, they sacrificed a bull to the stream by throwing the animal into the water whole and entire. 'In later times, when they had reached the animistic stage, an altar was erected by the side of the river on which a bull was offered, the belief being that the spirit in the water came out and consumed the essence of the sacrifice.'[2]

As soon as the notion of a local spirit allied to a natural object is developed, the desire to seek the aid of the supernatural being speedily follows. The Iroquois at their festivals thank the good spirits and every object that ministers to their wants for the assistance rendered by them.[3] In process of time a tutelary guardian genius is assigned to every individual, whose special function it is to guide, protect, and warn the man under his care. This guardian spirit may be acquired in various ways and take different forms. It may reveal itself at birth, or may await the 'crisis' reached at puberty. It may be the spirit of some ancestor or great chief or mighty magician; or it may belong to a deity whose dwelling is not with men. From these spirits the personal name and even the nature of an individual are frequently received, and to them man naturally looks for guidance and protection.

[1] H. H. Bancroft, *NR* iii. 324.

[2] E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, London, 1917, p. 226.

[3] E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], ii. 205.

1. Forms of guardian spirits.—(*a*) *Placenta.*—Among the Kooboos, a primitive tribe of Sumatra, the navel-string and afterbirth 'are the good spirits, a sort of guardian angels of the man who came into the world with them and who lives on earth; they are said to guard him from all evil. Hence it is that the Kooboo always thinks of his navel-string and afterbirth before he goes to sleep or to work, or undertakes a journey.'[1] If he were not to think of them, he would deprive himself of their care. The Battas, another tribe of Sumatra, believe that each man, in addition to his external soul, has 'two invisible guardian spirits (his *kaka* and *agi*) whose help he invokes in great danger; one is the seed by which he was begotten, the other is the afterbirth, and these he calls respectively his elder and his younger brother.'[2]

Among the northern tribes of Central Australia the navel-string is frequently cut off with a stone knife and, with the afterbirth, hidden in a hole in the ground or some other concealed spot, the belief being that, were it not preserved, the child would die, since it is thought to contain its spirit.[3] Here we find the germ of the belief which, in its more developed form, attributes to the placenta, etc., the function of a tutelary genius.

In Iceland it is an ancient belief that 'the child's guardian spirit or a part of its soul has its seat in the chorion or fœtal membrane, which usually forms part of the afterbirth, but is known as the caul when the child happens to be born with it. Hence the chorion was itself known as the *fylgia* or guardian spirit. It might not be thrown away under the open sky, lest demons should get hold of it and work the child harm thereby.' If it were buried under the threshold where the mother stepped over it when she rose from bed, the child in after life had a guardian spirit in the shape of a bear, eagle, wolf, ox, or boar.[4]

(*b*) *Animals.*—Not infrequently a man's guardian spirit is thought to manifest itself under the form of an animal.

Among the Ibans or Sea Dayaks of Borneo the *ngarong*, or spirit-helper, after having in a dream appeared in human form, makes himself known in the likeness of an animal. 'On the day after such a dream the Iban wanders through the jungle looking for signs by which he may recognize his "Nyarong," and if an animal behaves in a manner at all unusual, if a startled deer stops a moment to gaze at him before bounding away, if a gibbon gambols about persistently in the trees near him, if he comes upon a bright quartz-crystal or a strangely contorted root or creeper, that animal or object is for him full of a mysterious significance and is the abode of his "Nyarong."'[5] It does not, however, follow that every Iban has a *ngarong*. Many a young man goes out to sleep on the grave of some distinguished person or in some wild and lonely spot and lives for some days on a very restricted diet, hoping that a *ngarong* will come to him in his dreams, but only one in 50 or 100 men is fortunate enough to have his wish gratified. When the *ngarong* takes on an animal form, all individuals of that species become objects of special regard to the Iban, and he will not, of course, kill or eat any such animal. Even if the *ngarong* changes its form, he will continue to respect the species in which it first appeared. The cult may spread through the whole family, the children and grandchildren being under an obligation to respect the animal-form to which the *ngarong* belongs.

Among the Omaha Indians an animal as a guardian spirit is assigned to every man at puberty, and so close is the bond uniting them that the man is supposed to acquire the qualities of the creature that is his guardian. If, in the vision which determines his tutelary genius, he sees an eagle, he will have a keen and piercing foresight; if, on the other hand, it is a bear that appears to him, he will be slow and clumsy and therefore likely to be killed in battle.[6] This belief, that a man acquires the nature of the animal that is his guardian, has led the Thompson Indians of British Columbia to perform a mimic battle before setting out on the warpath, in which each man portrays on his body and imitates the sounds of his guardian animal.[7] Similarly in W. Africa, when a man is initiated into a secret society, the animal that he sees in his dream during his 'magic sleep' becomes his guardian spirit or patron.[8]

In Central America nagualism[9] is one of the ancient forms of worship which still flourish. It 'consists in choosing an animal as the tutelary divinity of a child, whose existence will be so closely connected with it, that the life of one depends on that of the other.' The animal is selected in one of three ways—(1) by priestly divination; (2) by the father and friends drawing animal figures on the floor of a hut at the mother's confinement, the figure that remains at the moment of delivery being the guardian; (3) by noticing the bird or beast first seen by the watchers after the confinement.[10] Sometimes a child's *nagual* is discovered by means of a calendar, in which all the names, places, and provinces of beasts, birds, fish, stars, etc., are recorded. Some of these horoscopes have a wheel painted on them; others portray a lake surrounded by the *naguals* in the form of various animals.[1] This method—employing astrological calculations based on a written document—is obviously a later development of nagualism.

Among the Algonquins of N. America the tutelary genius is known as a *manitu*, or supernatural being, associated with streams, cataracts, rocks, mountains, and forests. In nearly every case it manifests itself under the form of a beast, bird, or reptile of uncanny appearance, although occasionally it assumes human proportions. At the age of puberty youths are made to retire to a solitary place to undergo a period of fasting. The first thing that appears in a dream to the novice is regarded as his guardian spirit, to whom he looks in after life for guidance and protection. The man destined to be a warrior will have a vision of an eagle or a bear, a serpent will appear to the future medicine-man, a wolf to the hunter. To complete the bond, a portion of the guardian is worn about the person, which is regarded rather as an embodiment than as a representative of a supernatural power. It therefore seems that the guardian spirit is only one of a large class of spirits to which the common name of *manitu* is given.[2] The same belief is found among the Iroquois and Hurons, the genii being called *okies* or *otkons* instead of *manitu*.

2. Functions of guardian spirits.—(*a*) *The relation of guardian spirits to totems.*—Among some of the Algonquin tribes a man's guardian is identical with his clan totem, but, since the former belongs solely to an individual, while the latter is the inherited possession of every member of the clan, the tutelary genius cannot be explained in terms of totemism.[3] The similarity between the clan totem and the guardian spirit has led several anthropologists to derive the one from the other.[4] On this hypothesis the clan totem is simply the guardian spirit of an ancestor, who acquired it for himself in a dream at puberty, and through his influence and credit succeeded in transmitting it by inheritance to his descendants, who form a clan, and regard as their totem the animal in which the tutelary genius manifested itself.

Thus, in the case of the Iban, Hose and McDougall think that 'it seems difficult to deny the name "individual totem" to the species' comprehended under the name of *Ngarong*. Similarly when 'all the members of a man's family and all his descendants, and, if he be a chief, all the members of the community over which he rules, come to share in the benefits conferred by his *Ngarong*, and in the feeling of respect for it and in the performance of rites in honour of the species of animal in one individual of which it is supposed to reside. In such cases the species approaches very closely the clan-totem in some of its varieties.'[5] Unfortunately, however, for this theory, on the authors' own evidence there are no signs of clan totemism in Borneo.[6]

For support of this view of the origin of totemism (*q.v.*) its advocates are driven to various American theories such as those of F. Boas, who thinks that the totems of the Indians of British Columbia have been developed from the personal *manitu*; and of Alice C. Fletcher, who is led to a similar conclusion by a study of the totems of the Omaha tribe. In this connexion, however, it should be remembered that, while it is perfectly true that guardian spirits are occasionally inherited among certain N. American tribes, and not acquired for each individual separately,[7] and therefore in process of time may become the totems of the clans, yet, since inherited guardian spirits are usually regarded as less powerful than those acquired by individuals,[8] they are hardly likely to be taken over as the protectors of the clan. Moreover, there is no evidence forthcoming that a totemic

1 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 162, n. 2.
2 *Ib.* p. 223 f., n. 2. 3 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 607 f.
4 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 199 f.
5 C. Hose and W. McDougall, 'The Relations between Man and Animals in Sarawak,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 200. For the spelling see Hose-McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, ii. 109, n. 2.
6 *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 207.
7 J. Teit, *The Thompson Indians of Brit. Columbia* (*Memoir Amer. Museum Nat. Hist., The Jesup N. Pacific Exped.*, vol. i. pt. iv.), New York, 1900, p. 356.
8 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 256 f.
9 See art. ANIMALS, § 28. 10 *NR* iii. 458.

1 D. G. Brinton, 'Nagualism,' *Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc.*, vol. xxxiii. no. 144 [Philadelphia, 1894], pp. 25, 32.
2 J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 373 f.
3 Tylor, 'Note on the Haida Totem-Post,' *Man*, ii. [1902] 2 ff.
4 E. S. Hartland, *FL* xi. [1900] 68; A. C. Haddon, *Report of 72nd Meeting of Brit. Assoc.*, 1902, p. 742; W. H. R. Rivers, 'Totemism in Polynesia and Melanesia,' *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 176 ff.; C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 109; F. Boas, 'The Kwakiutl Indians,' *Report U.S. Nat. Mus.*, 1895, p. 336; H. Hubert and M. Mauss, 'Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie,' *ASoc* vii. [1904] 32 ff.
5 ii. 109. 6 ii. 99.
7 Teit, *Thompson Indians*, p. 320 ff.
8 Teit, *The Shuswap*, Leyden and New York, 1909, p. 605.

clan has actually grown up in this way either in America or elsewhere. Where the original conditions are supposed to be typically manifested—*e.g.*, in the Banks Islands[1]—no trace remains of the existence of clan totemism, except perhaps in a few very doubtful survivals in secret societies. Again, we must not lose sight of the fact that in America and the Pacific, as compared with Australia, we are dealing with a relatively advanced, not to say degenerate, form of totemism,[2] and that this 'American theory,' as we may call it, of the origin of the institution rests entirely upon a few cases derived from the N. American Indians. In Australia, where the custom is seen in a much more primitive form, there is no evidence of guardian spirits becoming clan totems, while in Africa examples are also wanting. We therefore conclude that the theory which seeks the origin of totemism in the personal guardian spirits of individuals is devoid of proof, at any rate in the present state of our knowledge.

(*b*) *Guardian spirits of houses and villages.*—In most of the W. African tribes there is a class of ancestral spirits called 'the well disposed ones,' whose function is to protect and benefit their particular village or family, acting in conjunction with the village or family fetish. It is supposed that the spirit of a man lingers about a house some time after his death, and, although it is able to injure the children and others by embracing them, it performs the office of a guardian to the family by keeping off evil spirits.[3]

The Kenyahs recognize a minor deity called Bali Atap, who 'protects the house against sickness and attack, and is called upon in cases of madness to expel the evil spirit possessing the patient. A rude wooden image of him stands beside the gangway leading to the house from the river's brink; it holds a spear in the right hand, a shield in the left; it carries about its neck a fringed collar made of knotted strips of rattan; the head of each room ties on one such strip, making on it a knot for each member of his roomhold.' Another god, Bali Utong, brings prosperity to the house.[4]

'In Tonquin every village chooses its guardian spirit, often in the form of an animal, as a dog, tiger, cat, or serpent,' although occasionally a human being is selected.[5] The Khonds have tutelary deities of house, village, groves, etc., which survive in the later Hinduism. The *Rigveda* recognizes Vāstoshpati, the 'lord of the house,' to whom the law[6] orders oblations to be made. This Vedic divinity is associated by W. Windisch with Vesta and Hestia, and compared to the Celtic *vassus, vassallus*, originally 'house-man,' and thus associated with the 'king of the house-men.'[7] In Hinduism, however, a female deity, Jara, is assigned to the guardianship of the house. Although she is represented as a demoniac power, she is friendly towards her votaries, provided that she is worshipped with incense, food, flowers, and so forth.

The Ainus have a fetish called Inao, invested with life, whose function is to look after the health and general well-being of the family. His special dwelling-place is in the north-east corner of the hut, at the back of the family heirlooms. Occasionally, in times of trouble, he is brought out from his corner, stuck in the hearth, and there prayed to by the head of the family. He is supposed to have been sent down from heaven to be the husband of the goddess of fire, and to help her to attend to the wants of men, and therefore he is called 'the ancestral governor of the house.'[8]

3. Offerings to guardian spirits.—Since guardian spirits exercise such a powerful influence over the lives and destinies of men, it is not surprising that they are frequently the recipients of offerings to appease their wrath or secure their favour and beneficence.

The Thai of Indo-China, *e.g.*, offer firstfruits of rice at harvest to the guardian spirit of the family before the household partake of the new crop. Besides the firstfruits at harvest, 'the guardian spirit receives some of the parched grain in spring' at the time when the first thunder of the season is heard. 'When all is ready, the rice is served up together with fish, which have been caught for the purpose, on a table set in a corner which is sacred to the guardian spirit. A priest drones out a long invitation to the spirit to come and feast with his children; then the family sits down to the table and consumes the offerings. At the close of the banquet the daughter-in-law of the deceased ancestor [*i.e.* the guardian] hangs up a basket containing rice and fish for his use in the corner, after which she closes the shrine for another year.'[1] The same people believe that large animals of the forest — wild oxen, buffaloes, rhinoceroses, elephants, etc.—have their guardian spirits, and, in consequence, the prudent hunter is careful to exorcize the invisible guardians so that they may not harm him when he eats the flesh of the animals killed in the chase. Spirits are also supposed to guard the clearings to which the deer come by night to drink, and the hunter must sacrifice a fowl to them from time to time in order to secure his prey.[2] A similar custom prevails among the Indian tribes about Green Bay, Lake Michigan. Every creature is regarded as having a particular guardian spirit, and therefore, when a young girl seized a mouse to eat it, her father first fondled it tenderly to appease the *genie* who has charge of mice, in order that his daughter might not suffer from her meal.[3]

Among the Ewe-speaking natives of Togoland (W. Africa), before the new yams are eaten, 'every house-father takes a raw piece of yam and goes with it to his loom (*agbati*) and prays: "May the Artificers take this yam and eat! When they practise their art, may it prosper!" Again he takes a raw yam and goes with it under the house-door and prays: "O my guardian spirit (*aklama*) and all ye gods who pay heed to this house, come and eat yams! When I also eat of them, may I remain healthy and nowhere feel pain. May my housemates all remain healthy!" After he has invoked their protection on his family, he takes a cooked yam, crumbles it on a stone, and mixes it with red oil. With this mixture he goes again to his loom and prays as before.' Again he crumbles a cooked yam and prays first at the entrance of the homestead, then under the house-door: 'He of my guardian gods and he of the watchers of the house who likes not yams mixed with oil, let him come and take the white yam from my hand and eat!'[4]

Among the Kayans of Borneo and several of the African tribes it is customary at sowing a rice-field to reserve a certain portion at the entrance for the guardian spirits, who at harvest are invited to come and take their share. It is supposed that they will content themselves with eating the grain in their private preserves and not poach on the crops destined for the use of man.[5]

'In the Tenimber and Timor-laut Islands, East Indies, the first-fruits of the paddy, along with live fowls and pigs, are offered to the *matmate*,' or spirits of ancestors, 'which are worshipped as guardian spirits or household gods.'[6] The Yorubas of the Slave Coast sacrifice fowls to their guardian spirit (*olori*), which is supposed to dwell in the head, by mixing some of the blood of the animal with palm-oil and rubbing it on the forehead.[7] The *tindalo* in Florida, one of the Solomon Islands, are also approached by sacrifice on certain occasions—*e.g.*, before a planting, a voyage, or a fight.[8] The N. American Indians offer dogs and horses to the 'medicine bag,' to which they look for safety and protection through life.[9]

Among some of the Algonquin tribes, when a man's guardian spirit is identical with his clan totem, should he be compelled to kill the sacrosanct animal, due apology would be paid to it before destroying it, certain portions of the flesh being preserved as an offering to the *man'ido* (guardian).[10] Herein again lies an important distinction between a tutelary genius and a totem, even when the two are inseparable. The former is regarded as so intimately associated with an individual that prayers and sacrifices may with impunity be offered to it, but the latter is more closely concerned with the food group or clan and therefore is seldom the recipient of offerings from individuals. Apart from the evidence of Carl Strehlow, that the hymn which is sung at the *intichiuma* of the kangaroo describes the offering of a morsel of kangaroo fat to make the fat of the kangaroos increase,[11] the act of oblation can hardly be said to form a part of the totemic rites in Australia—the home of the most elementary form of totemism.[12] We therefore conclude that tutelary gods and spirits have arisen out of animistic and theistic conceptions rather than from ideas connected with totemism, although it is undoubtedly

[1] *JRAI* xxxix. 176 ff.
[2] A. Lang, *Method in the Study of Totemism*, Glasgow, 1911.
[3] Mary H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*[2], London, 1901, p. 112.
[4] Hose-McDougall, *Pagan Tribes*, ii. 13 f.
[5] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 401 f.
[6] *Laws of Manu*, iii. 89 (*SBE* xxv. [1886] 91).
[7] 'Vassus und Vassallus' in *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königl. sächs. Gesell. (philol.-histor. Classe)* ii. [1892] 174.
[8] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 97.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 121 f.
[2] A. Bourlet, 'Les Thay,' *Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 619.
[3] *Relations des Jésuites*, 1672, p. 38, quoted by Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 133 f.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 60 f.
[5] *Ib.* i. 233 f. [6] *Ib.* ii. 123.
[7] A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1894, p. 125 f.
[8] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 132.
[9] Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 391, 400.
[10] W. J. Hoffman, 'The Menomini Indians,' *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. i. p. 64 ff.
[11] *ZE* iii. [1871] 12, verse 7.
[12] Cf. art. SACRIFICE (Introductory and Primitive).

true that in America the doctrine of the clan totem has developed side by side with that of the guardian spirit conceived as an animal. Elsewhere, however, the patron spirit is much more closely allied to animism and theism. Wherever animistic conceptions prevail, there the notion of a tutelary genius will be found in some form or other. As spirits give place to gods, the spiritual guide and protector of individual men has his place in the pantheon, till in the Christian Church the doctrine of a guardian angel watching over, succouring, and defending the faithful on earth is raised to a higher and more spiritual level. 'Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?' (He 1^{14}). This is the function of the guardian angels in the NT; they are to lead men safely to the kingdom of heaven by helping them to attain salvation.

It is not the Biblical conception that angels are the personification of nature powers, or merely the means of securing the favour and help of supernatural beings. They are consistently represented as a body of created spiritual beings intermediate between God and man (Ps 8^5), whose function it is to act as messengers to mankind or attendants upon God's throne (Dn $7^{9f.}$, Ps 91^{11} 103^{20}, Is 6, Gn 16, Jg 13, Lk $1^{11.\ 26}$). Jerome thinks that every individual, whether baptized or not, has from his birth an angel commissioned to guard him,[1] while Chrysostom[2] and Basil hold that only the baptized enjoy the privileges of having a tutelary angel. Thomas Aquinas teaches that only the lowest orders of angels are sent to men, and therefore they alone are guardians.[3] No doubt the Biblical account of the ministry of angels was inherited from the world-wide doctrine of tutelary gods and spirits, and to an extent influenced by it, but at the same time it is evident that the line of development has been on a higher and more spiritual level.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

TUTIORISM.—See RIGORISM, PROBABILISM.

TWINS.—The birth of twins in the human species is an event so unusual that it has almost everywhere drawn popular attention and evoked expressions of emotion, varying from extreme terror through the whole gamut of fear, repugnance, suspicion, anxiety, perplexity, hope, and joy. The first impulse seems to be to regard twins as unnatural and monstrous, and therefore as portending evil. The unfortunate babes and their mother have been looked upon as guilty of a serious crime—a crime calculated to call down the vengeance of the higher powers. Accordingly they must be at once put to death, and the offence repudiated and cleared from the land. Or their birth has been taken to be a message from the divinity conveying a warning of impending evil, only to be thrust aside by their immediate slaughter or by a variety of superstitious observances, intended by abstinence and humiliation to avert the threatened calamity.

1. Tabu of twins: its mitigation, ceremonies, and superstitions.—Among the peoples by whom this view of the birth of twins has been taken are those of Australia, the East Indian Archipelago, nearly the whole of Africa, the greater part of the aboriginal population of America, the population of the north-east of Asia, the non-Aryan tribes of India, and the backward classes and populations of Europe. In ancient times similar beliefs are reported of the Assyrians and Babylonians, the Aryan population of India, and the Egyptians. Where the superstition has the fullest power both mother and children are at once put to death.

A typical illustration of this proceeding is found among the Negro population of the Niger Delta. Even when the mother is allowed to live, she becomes an outcast and must pass the rest of her days in the forest. If she ventures near a town or village, any paths that she may use will be defiled and unfit for the inhabitants. 'She must not drink from the same spring or water-supply as her own people; she must not touch anything belonging to them. The consequence is that the mothers of twins simply die from hunger and exposure, or they take their own lives.' A slave-woman is the professional killer of twins She takes each child by the feet and the neck and breaks its back across her knees. 'The bodies are then placed in an earthen pot and taken into a dense part of the bush and there left to be devoured by wild animals and insects. In some parts of this district the children are not killed, but simply thrown into the bush to be devoured.' It is no wonder that 'May you become the mother of twins!' is reckoned a frightful curse, and quarrelling women do not need to utter it in words: it is sufficient to hold up the fist, raising the index and middle finger in a V form, and the gesture is understood.[1]

The Negro peoples of W. Africa are very severe against the offence of giving birth to twins.

Among the Ibo such an event defiles the whole quarter, the inhabitants of which 'are obliged to throw away all the half-burnt firewood, the food cooked and the water brought in the previous night—everything, in a word, in the shape of nourishment, solid or liquid.'[2]

Mitigation of the law has, however, taken place. The mother is not always put to death or driven into the forest to die of hunger and exposure. At Arebo in Benin, if her husband be a man of wealth, he may redeem her with another victim.[3] More generally there are provided 'twin-towns'—cities of refuge, to which these unfortunate women may escape, or to which they can go when expelled from their own homes. There they must reside for a time to undergo purification. The period is stated by Mrs. D. Amaury Talbot,[4] speaking of the Ibibios, near the mouth of the Cross River, to be twelve moons. This, we may be sure, is the least penance that can be imposed on them.

Leonard writes that 'the women, looked on as unclean for the rest of their lives, are obliged to reside in villages, which are known as Twin-towns, or the habitations of defiled women, appointed for that particular purpose. From this time forth the husband, whether he be head of the house or not, is obliged to maintain a wife who has been so defiled; although at the same time he is strictly forbidden to cohabit or to have any dealings with her, being, as he is in every religious and personal sense, human and spiritual, divorced from her. But in spite of the fact that to him, as well as to all the members of his or her community, the woman is unclean and therefore tabu, the penalty of death being inflicted on both in the event of their breaking the law in this direction, she is allowed to form connections, but on no account to marry with strangers, or men belonging to outside communities, and the offspring resulting from such intercourse becomes, as a matter of course, the property of her husband, or the head of the house. . . . But in the event of the defiled woman herself bearing twins again, these must be destroyed unknown to any one. For, if known, the probabilities are that the death of the mother would be demanded by the household and the community as well. Or if not killed, she would be driven into the bush and left to die, although, if discovered by a stranger, he is at liberty to claim her as his own property,—that is at least if he feels inclined to run the risk of a venture so truly provocative of offence.'[5]

In Ibani, westward of the Ibibio country, the mother was, and perhaps is still, quarantined in an out-of-the-way hut for sixteen days, after which she went through a ceremony of purification by the priests. The father, or head of the house, was required to offer certain sacrifices. The threatened evils were thus averted, and the purified mother was then received back into the family circle.[6] Among the Ibibios, however, if the mother die in childbirth of twins, she may not be carried to burial by the ordinary door of the hut or along the ordinary paths of the village; she is borne through a hole broken for the purpose in the wall of the hut and along a path specially cut through the bush.[7]

1 *Comm. in Matt.* 18^{10} (bk. ii. § 139).
2 *In Ep. ad Coloss.* hom. iii.
3 *Summa Theol.* I. qu. cxiii. art. 4.

1 *JAI* xxix. [1899] 57; C. Partridge, *Cross River Natives*, London, 1905, p. 38; *Journ. Afr. Soc.* vii. [1908] 66.
2 A. G. Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, London, 1906, p. 461.
3 *ZVRW* xxx. [1913] 95, citing W. Bosman, *Nauwkeurige Beschryving van de Guinese Goud-Tand-en Slave-Kust*, Amsterdam, 1709, ii. 335; cf. M. H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, London, 1899, p. 455.
4 *Woman's Mysteries of a Primitive People*, London, 1915, p. 24.
5 P. 460. 6 *Ib.* p. 459.
7 Mrs. Amaury Talbot, p. 215.

The lot of the children in Nigeria and adjacent countries has also been mitigated, to the extent that one only of them is now in most places put to death.

The Bassari of Togoland, *e.g.*, preserve the boy if the twins are of different sexes, or the stronger of the two if of the same sex, and bury the other alive in a big pot. A fowl is offered and cut in two. Half of it is buried with the condemned twin as a reminder to the latter of its close relationship with the surviving twin, so that the spirit of the buried child may not avenge itself on the survivor. Subsequently-born twins are both buried alive. Women who have borne twins, though apparently not driven away, are not allowed to take part in the agricultural labour (a woman's special work) of sowing and harvest, until the dead twin has reappeared as a subsequent child.[1]

A similar modification of the children's fate is found among the Bantu tribes. On the Lower Congo one of the twins is often neglected and starved to death. The reason given for this is that the mother does not like the extra trouble involved in caring for the two; but it is doubtful whether this is a sufficient explanation. When a twin dies, or is thus starved, it is buried at cross-roads, like a suicide or a man struck by lightning. A piece of wood is carved into an image of a child and put with the live twin, that the latter may not be lonely; and if the second child die, the image is buried with it.[2] The custom of giving the survivor a wooden figure in place of the twin that dies is also found among the Negro Yorubas and other W. African tribes, both Negroes and Bantu. It is said to keep the survivor from pining for the deceased, and to give the spirit of the deceased a habitation.[3] This arises from the special sympathy alleged to exist between twins, of which we shall find illustrations elsewhere.

Twins are regarded by the Kafirs of the south-west as scarcely human, and their mother is taunted with the disgrace. Yet, until Chaka stopped the custom, a twin was specially sought out, as being fearless and wild, to lead an attacking army in war. Among the Zulus twins are not counted in the number of children. One of the twins is always killed, remaining of course nameless. Nor is the survivor given a name until he is about sixteen years old, but before he is circumcised. If the survivor die, he is not allowed to be mourned, for fear of angering the *amatongo* (the ancestral spirits). If both twins are hidden, and so preserved, it is deemed they are united by sympathy as one flesh; and, if one die afterwards, he must not be mourned, lest the other should suffer.[4] To the Basukuma, or Bagwi, south of Lake Victoria Nyanza, the birth of twins is a great calamity, foretelling as it does a prolonged drought and great suffering among men and cattle. Consequently, when other means fail to produce rain, twins, if they can be found, are put to death.[5]

In British E. Africa the Akikuyu and the Akamba also regard the birth of twins as very unlucky; and the babes are, or perhaps one of them is, killed and thrown into the bush. Among the Akikuyu, however, the ban is limited to a first parturition; in such a case the twins are believed to prevent their mother from bearing again. But, among both the Akikuyu and their ethnically allied neighbours the Akamba, the birth of twins to a cow is deemed still more disastrous. Accordingly the calves are, or at least one of them is, always slaughtered, and among the Akamba the cow also, while the Akikuyu content themselves with putting a necklace of cowries, doubtless by way of amulet, round her neck. What is no doubt a modern alleviation permits one of the twin children to be given to a family of a different clan, becoming thus the child of that family, all relationship with its natural parents being severed. Another alternative among the Akamba, as likewise among the Nilotic Negro Dinkas, prescribes the substitution of goats for the sacrifice of the babes.[6]

The neighbouring Nandi, a Nilotic Negro tribe, look upon the birth of twins as an inauspicious event, and the mother is unclean for the rest of her life. Doubtless in earlier days she was put to death or expelled from the community. Even now her life must be a burden to her. 'She is given her own cow, and may not touch the milk or blood of any other animal. She may enter nobody's house until she has sprinkled a calabashful of water on the ground; and she may never cross the threshold of a cattle kraal again.' Special names, as is often the case, are given to the children.[7] The El Konyi, a branch of the Nandi, in the Elgon district, have rendered her lot a little less intolerable. But even there she is shut up for a while in the hut, and elaborate purificatory ceremonies must be performed with a medicine-man's assistance before she is released. Even if a cow produce twin calves, ceremonies are performed, and they are redeemed with the slaughter of a sheep.[1]

In both N. and S. America the custom of putting twins, or at least one of them, to death seems to have been universal.

The aborigines of the northern part of the upper basin of the River Amazons allege a curious reason for their dislike of twins. To give birth to twins is to descend to the level of the beasts—a thing to be avoided at all costs. The unfortunate mother therefore will leave the second child (or, if of different sexes, the girl) in the lonely spot in the bush whither she has, in accordance with custom, retired alone to be delivered.[2] The Salivas on the Orinoco call the mother nicknames, saying she is a rodent. Their objections, however, seem to go deeper than this; for the Saliva husband believes that the second twin is the offspring of adultery. A chief has in fact been known to give one of his wives a whipping in public for having dared to bring forth twins, and to threaten the others with similar consequences if they did the same.[3] From a pastoral letter by the archbishop of Lima in the year 1649, quoted by von Tschudi, it appears that the Peruvians of that date offered twins and children born feet first to some *huaca*, or supernatural being, and preserved their bodies or buried them in their houses.[4] Other records show that the birth of twins was regarded as unnatural and unlucky and demanding sacrifices and ceremonies lasting many days.[5] The North-Eastern Maidu of California who inhabited the foothills and western slopes of the sierra regarded the birth of twins as an exceptionally bad omen. The mother, it is said, was often killed and the newly-born children were either buried alive with her body or burned.[6] Among the Seri of the Californian Gulf 'triplets are deemed evil monsters and their production a capital crime.'[7]

In Australia the usual reason assigned for killing one or both twins is the economic reason that the mother has not enough milk for them, and moreover cannot rear them and also get her food. This is of a piece with the prevalent custom of infanticide, even of a single child, when the mother already has one dependent upon her. But among some tribes at least it does not appear to be the only reason.

Among the Euahlayi the husband suspects his wife of infidelity. Among the Aruntа, where twins are reported as of extremely rare occurrence, they are attributed to two spirit-individuals entering the mother's body at one and the same time. By the northern tribes they are destroyed as something uncanny.[8]

On the island of Nias twins are universally disliked and dreaded.

In the province of West Nias it is believed that they will grow up evil doers; if a boy and girl, they are specially evil, the one will become a murderer and the other a poisoner. Formerly the younger used to be hung on a tree in a sack, there miserably to perish. The Dutch government and missionaries, it seems, have put an end to this cruelty. But the natives are still shy even of the parents. The father gets a priest to make a magical image of a board roughly cut in human shape, which is put up in the house as an amulet to prevent a second such misfortune. Until it is ready, the parents dare not speak to any other persons, lest they make them sick and give them jaundice; nor will their neighbours of the same *kampong* enter the house where the birth has taken place until the image is put up. At Lolowua in East Nias both children are thrust alive into a sack, taken far from the *kampong* and hung up in the bush, together with the after-birth. The house in which they have been born is avoided by other women, lest they incur the same misfortune. At Lahewa in North Nias the birth of twins is feared because it is held that, if they are allowed to live, some other members of the family must die. It is thus a matter of self-defence to put them to death. Their birth is moreover a sign of evil, such as failure of harvest, fire, epidemics, cattle-disease, and the like, threatening the whole *kampong*.[9]

[1] *Globus*, lxxxi. [1902] 190.

[2] J. H. Weeks, *FL* xix. [1908] 421, 423.

[3] A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, London, 1894, p. 80; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, do. 1897, p. 473; R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, do. 1904, pp. 206, 270.

[4] Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, London, 1906, p. 45 ff.

[5] J. F. Cunningham, *Uganda and its Peoples*, London, 1905, p. 305.

[6] C. W. Hobley, *JRAI* xl. [1910] 435; W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, p. 149; C. Dundas, *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 519, xlv. [1915] 301; C. W. Hobley, *The Ethnology of the A-Kamba*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 61; A. H. Post, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts*, Oldenburg, 1890, p. 334.

[7] A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi, their Language and Folklore*, Oxford, 1909, p. 68.

[1] K. R. Dundas, *JRAI* xliii. 67.

[2] T. W. Whiffen, *FL* xxiv. [1913] 45, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, pp. 120, 150.

[3] W. E. Roth, *30 RBEW* [1915], pp. 320, 325, quoting J. Gumilla, *Hist. Nat. . . . del Rio Orinoco*, Barcelona, 1791, i. 189.

[4] J. J. von Tschudi, *Peruvian Antiquities*, Eng. tr., New York, 1853, p. 176.

[5] *Globus*, xc. [1906] 305, citing *Documentos ineditos del Archivo de Indias*; cf. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 266.

[6] R. B. Dixon, *Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. [1905] 230.

[7] W J McGee, *17 RBEW* [1898], pt. i. p. 281.

[8] J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 39; J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, i. 549; K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, do. 1905, p. 51 f.; Spencer-Gillen[a], *passim*, Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 609; C. Strehlow, *Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral Australien*, Frankfort-on-Main, 1907–11, i. 14.

[9] J. P. Kleiweg de Zwaan, *Die Heilkunde der Niasser*, The Hague, 1913, p. 177.

Among the Kayan of Borneo, the motive alleged for exposing one of the twins in the jungle is to preserve the life of the other; for it is believed that a sympathetic bond exists between twins 'which renders each of them liable to all the ills and misfortunes that befall the other.'[1]

In Madagascar also twins were put to death.

Among the Antambahoaka the excuse for this treatment was that they would in any case die, or if not they would go mad or would sooner or later attempt the life of their parents. In the province of Imerina it was apparently the custom formerly to kill the twins. More recently, though this custom was abandoned, the parents were requfred to hand one of them over to a relative; and, if a woman belonging to the royal family gave birth to twins, both they and the mother were sent away and lost their rank.[2]

Exposure or murder by violence is in fact a common fate of one or both twins—a fate they share with other children deemed unlucky, such as misshapen babes or, as in Madagascar, those born on certain days which are subject to tabu.[3] Gradually, however, this untoward fate has, among many peoples, been lightened. The twins are still regarded as uncanny or even dangerous, but ceremonies are performed to ward off the evil.

The Ewe of Togoland, W. African Negroes, hold them to be fetish-children: in that capacity they must not be put to death, but they will not live long; they will die and go back to the fetish. Meanwhile, as a mark of distinction they wear special beads; and their parents set up in the corner of the house a fetish of a pair of buffalo-horns and in some districts a carved wooden doll or puppet. If any of their kin fall sick, presents are brought to the twins or to the fetish, and the twins propitiate the fetish. In the former German administrative district of Anecho the birth of twins is the occasion for a feast of eggs and beans boiled with the leaves of certain shrubs to all women who have already borne twins—a feast repeated every year afterwards. In the same district the twin-fetish is also invoked at a funeral feast on setting up two posts with a dog's skull bound upon them as a 'medicine.' At Great Be in the district of Lome-land, on the day when twins are born, an old woman who has herself borne twins comes and leads the father and mother out of the door, the one to the right, the other to the left in reverse directions round the house and then back into the house, in order that the twins may not die. Four months later the twins are taken, preceded by two young people playing on the flute, to the so-called twin-market, where some women who have already borne twins are found offering goods for sale (though this is not a regular market); and an old woman formally buys a few things for the twins. The object of this ceremony is to be able to say that the twins have been to market, for, until this is accomplished, the mother cannot leave the house. On their return they receive their names, and the father prepares the name-giving feast for the relatives, and also for those women of the village who have borne twins. Sometimes an unborn child is promised as wife to a man conditionally on its proving a girl. If one of the twins be a girl thus betrothed before her birth, the wooer performs a curious ceremony. On the day of the birth, after the circumambulation of the hut by the parents, he performs the same march seven times with some grass in his mouth, a hat of palm-bast, and leaves on his arm. Many spectators witness this ceremony by which he ratifies the compact and expresses his intention of marrying the girl. But he must take care not to laugh, otherwise he will go out of his mind. It is deemed more favourable that both children should be of the same sex. It is said that, if one of the twins die, the survivor carries about for the rest of his life a small wooden figure as a memento of his dead twin.[4] In another district, among the Konkomba, it is reported that a wedding gives occasion for no feast, except when a twin marries; then a great feast takes place, because twins are fetish-children.[5] The various peoples of Togoland, indeed, attach much importance to the birth of twins. Among the Ho, a tribe of Ewe, when twins, a boy and girl, are born, neither of the parents may eat or speak until an elaborate series of purificatory ceremonies, accompanied by feasting and the drinking of palm-wine, has been performed over them by others who are also parents of twins and who are paid for the rites. If these customs were omitted, the twins would become cripples. To the twins and their parents the flesh of hussar-apes and rats is forbidden. If any one shoot a hussar-ape, the parents of twins are expected to beat him with a stick.[6] The exact relation between the hussar-ape and twins is difficult to determine. It has been claimed that the hussar-ape and the long-tailed monkey (*Meerkatze*, a species of *cercopithecus*) are 'individual totems' of twins, and that twins may never kill or eat the latter, whereas they may kill, but may not eat, the former. Twins while asleep are said to go in the shape of these animals into the fields to eat maize; and if one such creature be killed, the corresponding twin will die. When the parents cultivate land, they sow a patch with maize for the special behoof of the twins thus changed, that they may be able to eat the grain; and the patch in question is never harvested. When one of the twins dies, a long-tailed monkey is sought in the forest and called by the name of the deceased child into a calabash, which is closed as if it were within and brought home to be honoured.[1] These are not exactly totemic superstitions; but they disclose a belief in the identity of, or at least an intimate personal connexion between, twins and these apes, such as we shall find in British Columbia between twins and salmon.

The Akoviewe, another Ewe tribe, have somewhat similar superstitions. The father of twins is forbidden to eat the flesh of hussar-apes; nor may he eat the remains of fruits eaten by these creatures. When the midwife sees that twins are about to be born, she relinquishes her place as soon as one is born lest she be afflicted with consumption, or at least a cough which will last the rest of her life. Certain vegetables and fruits are laid in the water wherewith the mother and children are bathed. A special feast with drinking of palm-wine is provided for the people of the surrounding villages. No presents must be made to one of the twins only, but both must be treated alike.[2] Among another tribe, the Kpence, neither parent must leave the house until the twin-customs have been performed. These consist, as among the Akoviewe, in the drinking of palm-wine, which is provided for all who give the twins cowries, and in a feast for all who come together from the outlying villages. The parents of twins already born come together to perform the customs and to dance, and the twins are carried on the neck that every one may see that the customs are carried out for them. These customs are very expensive. Twins must be clad alike so long as they are children.[3] They must eat yams a month earlier than other people, otherwise they will die.[4]

Notwithstanding the practices and beliefs just mentioned, the Ewe are said to look upon twins with favour.

For the Ho the birth of twins is a very great joy; it is regarded as better than riches. Among the Fo, another tribe of Ewe, such births are frequent. The children are regarded as children of Ohoho, a supernatural being with whom indeed they seem to be identified. Not only twins, but three children at a birth are favoured. A prayer for twins and triplets is even offered on certain occasions. The last-born is looked upon as the highest in rank. Special names are appropriated to children thus born. Special customs even in eating are prescribed to the mother. A woman who has borne twins wears round the neck a chain or string of beads as evidence of the honourable fact. Whatever the relation of Ohoho to the twins, he receives a cult, and in case of their danger or serious illness sacrifices are offered. A bank of clay is made just outside the entrance of the hut, where the cult is performed. If one of the twins is a girl, and she dies before the other, a wooden figure is made and stuck beside the clay-bank, to prevent the death of the boy—a custom disregarded if the boy happens to die first.[5]

It must be obvious, from these elaborate regulations, that, if the Ewe and their immediate neighbours favour the birth of twins and triplets, their joy is not without trembling. Such births are not in the order of nature; they are uncanny, equivocal; and, though they may be a blessing, if the proper precautions be not strictly observed they may be quite the reverse. Twins are credited with special connexions with the spirit-world: they are fetish-children; they are more or less identified with a supernatural being, or with certain of the lower animals whose shape they have power to take. Another observer in fact says that every unusual or remarkable event places the Ewe in an extraordinary situation with regard to his divinities, so that he must seek by special performances to re-enter into harmony with the upper world; consequently the birth of twins, as one such event, is not a joyous fact, but an evil omen.

The parents, he says, are kept in the hut for twenty-five days or longer, that they may not look on the heavens before the twin-customs have been carried out, else either in parents or in the children an unnatural change would take place: they would become like iron bars—possibly by the act of the lightning-god, whose badge or emblem is an iron bar. The account he gives of the customs is not identical in all particulars with those already mentioned; but their effect appears to be the same, and he notes that the details vary from district to district.[6]

[1] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 156.

[2] A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, p. 176; Rendel Harris, *Cult of the Heavenly Twins*, p. 23.

[3] See artt. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.

[4] *ZVRW* xxvi. [1911] 24, 46, 96, 100, 127.

[5] *Ib.* xxvii. [1912] 92.

[6] J. Spieth, *Die Ewe-Stämme*, Berlin, 1906, p. 202 ff.

[1] *Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 457, vii. [1912] 91.

[2] Spieth, p. 616. [3] *Ib.* p. 694. [4] *Ib.* p. 708.

[5] *Anthropos*, vii. 89–92; Spieth, p. 308; *Globus*, xcvii. [1910] 247.

[6] C. Spiers, *ARW* xv. [1912] 163. The same view of joy with trembling and anxiety seems to result from what we are told

Turning from the Negroes to the Bantu, we find that the ambiguous position of twins is well exemplified by the Thonga.

Among them the customs vary, as among the Ewe, in different districts. Formerly one at least of twins was put to death. In some places this custom continues; elsewhere their advent is a cause of rejoicing, and women even wish for twins and beg from the happy mothers a portion of the fat wherewith they smeared their bodies, in the hope by the same means to obtain a similar result. Yet in some groups (tribes or 'clans') which do not put twins to death their birth is considered a special defilement. The mother is at once removed from the hut, which is burnt together with its contents. She is placed in a shelter behind the village. All the women assemble and start out in all directions to draw water in old calabashes from all the wells and pools of the neighbourhood. As they go, they sing an invocation to the rain, and on returning they throw the water over the mother and babes, who are further purified by the medicine-man with a drug which he has prepared. The details of their purification vary to some extent; but, until it is accomplished, no one in the village is allowed to eat, and the following day work in the fields is forbidden, for it would prevent the fall of rain. The mother in her shelter outside the village is allowed no communication with the other inhabitants, except possibly one girl who helps her in nursing the twins. To remove the defilement, she must pass it on, like that of a widow, by means of incomplete sexual intercourse, to four men successively. The first three of these victims at least will die in consequence. After each sexual act the medicine-man prepares a vapour-bath for her. When all four acts are accomplished, she returns to her parents' house, and there entertains a lover whose relations with her result in another child. She thus completes her purification, and her husband fetches her home. But in some places she is not admitted through the doorway: she crawls through a hole made in the back of the wall; and the husband is subjected to certain rites. The twins themselves are treated in many respects differently from ordinary children. Usual ceremonies are omitted; they are weaned earlier; and there is a general antipathy to them. Special precautions to protect them and their mother are also taken on the occasion of a ceremonial mourning visit.[1]

On the other side of S. Africa, in what was German territory, the Herero consider the birth of twins as 'the greatest and most fortunate event which can happen to a mortal Omuherero.'

Both father and children are specially privileged. Yet the parents are immediately placed under a tabu; they may not speak or be spoken to, nor have any contact or intercourse with any one except those who wait on them, who are known, as well as the children and their parents, by the epithet of 'twins' (*epaha*); they are ejected from the village; all clothes and ornaments are taken off them; and they receive in exchange a few old worthless skins. Messengers call together the whole 'tribe,' and every one must appear with all his cattle, else he will be bewitched and die. The father goes to meet his guests and is received, as if he were an enemy, with all sorts of missiles, while the women raise a terrible lamentation. This, however, is only ceremonial. He with the other *epaha* meets them at the village, where each of the visitors brings him an offering, and, if male, is 'consecrated' in return by him, if female, by the mother. A hut is then built for the parents, and an ox is slaughtered, which all the people must taste, beginning with the parents, and a small piece of the meat is held to the toes of both twins. The remaining meat is taken to the parents' newly-built hut, of which they then take possession. During the following days the father goes in procession round the village, visiting two or three houses each day. At every house the ceremonies are repeated: the offerings are made to him, the 'consecration' by him, the slaughter of an ox, the cooking and ritual tasting of its flesh are repeated, and the remainder is carried to his house. When he has finished the circuit of his own village, he commences that of the neighbouring villages. If the meat becomes too plentiful, he asks for living cattle instead of slaughtered, and adds them to his own herd. No one will dare to refuse him. Every father of twins has the right to represent the chief of the village, when the latter is absent, in his priestly functions. A twin boy also possesses all the priestly privileges: for him there is no meat, no milk forbidden, and nobody would dare to curse him. When the chief of the village dies, he inherits the priestly dignity associated with the chieftainship.[2]

It would seem, therefore, that the tabu encircles the twins and their parents not as accursed but as sacred; the curse rests on the community, and the offerings made to the father and the 'consecration' he bestows are intended to avert it and restore and redintegrate the ordinary life.

The Baganda regarded twins as due to the direct intervention of Mukasa, the god of Lake Victoria Nyanza, who was said to show his esteem for certain women in this manner; and great care and numbers of tabus were necessary to retain his favour. The position was evidently one of great delicacy; for any mistake on the part of the parents, or any sickness that befell the twins, was looked upon as the result of the god's anger, which might extend to the whole clan. The word 'twins' might not be mentioned until the rites were at an end. The persons of the parents were sacred. They wore a distinctive dress, and no one might touch them. The mother could not go out of doors by day without covering her head. No one was allowed to enter the house except the husband and wife, and a few relatives. The men and the women were required to enter through a separate opening cut for each sex in the back of the house. The doorway was blocked up. The nails and hair of both parents were not cut until the ceremonies had all been completed, save that at one point in the rites the father's hair was shaved in a particular fashion. The ceremonies were lengthy. They included the beating of special drums, a round of visits to the father's and mother's parents and to the members of both clans, at which there were feasts and dancing, a curious rite referred to below, and a final ceremonial dance by women. The father during the ceremonies wears on his ankles a number of small bells, to give notice of his coming and prevent molestation. He is privileged to enter any one's garden and take what produce he pleases to feast his guests. In fact, being under the god's protection, he may do almost anything he likes. When the ceremonies are completed, his tabu is not yet over. For this he must wait until he has taken part in the next war. He must then take the bundle of hair and nails of which he has been shorn in his purification and cram it into the mouth, or tie it round the neck, of the first enemy he kills. It is only after this that he ceases to wear a distinctive dress and returns to ordinary life. The twins themselves remain sacred all their lives. A special ceremony was performed when a twin went to war for the first time and killed a man. If twins died in infancy, their deaths were announced with a euphemism and they were embalmed, placed in a new cooking pot, and buried in waste land. Women avoided their graves lest the ghost should enter them and be born again of them. There was no mourning for them, but, if the ceremonies were incomplete, they were continued as though they were still alive.[1] The neighbours of the Baganda, the Bahima or Banyankole, possess a Twin totem-clan. Yet among them, even in the Twin clan, twins are the subject of tabu. They must not, however, be spoken of disparagingly, lest an ancestral ghost overhear and be angry.[2]

It is needless to detail the ceremonies to which the birth of twins gives occasion among other Bantu peoples. Though differing among the various tribes, they are all founded upon the feeling that the birth is an uncanny event, often expressly ascribed to divine intervention. Fortunate it may be for the parents; to the community in general it is a source of peril and ill omen, which must be bought off by gifts and ceremonies; and, until those ceremonies are completed, the twins and their parents are as a rule secluded from intercourse with the world. Sometimes, but rarely, as among the Bushongo of the Upper Congo, the birth of twins is frankly welcomed as a very happy occurrence.[3] Even where general rejoicing takes place, it is a joy with trembling. The tabu is enforced; and special rites must be performed to restore the normal relations of the people.

Among the Masai, a Hamitic tribe of E. Africa, the birth of twins, which is not very rare, causes the greatest pleasure, especially if both be boys.

To mark their parents' pride, a thong of leather adorned with cowries is hung round the neck of each; and, while the elder is retained by the mother, the younger is often nursed by one of her fellow-wives. No tabu and no ceremonies are reported.[4]

It may be noted here that, wherever the birth of twins, as among the Masai, is stated to be comparatively frequent, they are received with more or less favour.

The Lattuka, a Nilotic Negro tribe of the Sudan, among whom twins are rare, while apparently not regarding them per-

of other Negro peoples (L. Desplagnes, *Le Plateau central nigérien*, Paris, 1907, p. 233; *Journ. Afr. Soc.* ix. [1910] 179, x. [1911] 31, xvi. [1917] 43; *ZVRW* xxx. 95; Leonard, *Lower Niger*, p. 462; *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903] 90).

[1] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, ii. 394–400; cf. also his *Les Ba-ronga*, do. 1898, p. 412 ff., and *Rev. d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie*, i. [1910] 149, 167.

[2] E. Dannert, [South African] *Folk-Lore Journal*, ii. [Cape Town, 1880] 104 ff., also his *Zum Rechte der Herero*, Berlin, 1906, p. 20; F. Meyer *Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero*, do. 1905, p. 61.

[1] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, pp. 64 ff., 81, 124, 358, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 32–35, 49, 53, 60, *Man*, x. [1910] 42 f.; cf. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 384, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 482.

[2] J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 117, *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 100, 107.

[3] E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *Notes ethnographiques sur les Bushongo*, Brussels, 1911, pp. 112, 57, 56.

[4] M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 51.

sonally with disfavour, hold that they threaten misfortune to their father. If he went hunting buffaloes, he would be killed or wounded; and, if he wounded an antelope, it would escape him. He therefore takes precautions by not leaving the village until the spell is broken by another woman bearing twins, or his wife another child.[1]

In India and adjacent countries twins are generally held to be inauspicious, though there are differences in this respect. All the peoples, however, seem to be agreed that the birth of twins of different sexes is serious. It is held that their connexion in the womb has been too close: it has been sinful, amounting to prenatal incest.[2]

Among the inhabitants of the Siamese Malay States, while twins (a rare occurrence there) are considered lucky, it is otherwise with triplets: they are accursed.[3] In any case, it is considered by the Kurmi and Kawar of the Central Provinces that the sympathy between twins is dangerously close, and various rites are adopted to break their connexion, else, if misfortune or death happens to the one, the other also will suffer or die.[4] The Tang Khul Nagas of Assam are divided in opinion. Some villages welcome twins; others object to having among them a woman who gives birth to more than one child at a time, looking (like some of the S. American tribes) upon her as a lower animal. At Ukhrul, if both are boys, their father is regarded as a descendant of some cannibal line like the tigers, and he ought to be carefully watched. It is interesting to note that the villages where they are welcomed connect them with fruitfulness of the crops.[5]

On the island of Celebes it is held by the Macassars and Buginese that one of twins is often a crocodile. The same curious belief is found in Java, where it is said that on such occasions a double offering is brought to the crocodile for his 'humanity'; and at Windesi, New Guinea, a story is told of a woman who gave birth to twins, one of them an iguana.[6] The Balinese, at least among the highest castes, call twins of different sexes 'betrothed'—a practice which Wilken traces to an origin from a time when no forbidden degrees were yet in existence, and when such twins at marriageable age used to be made to marry one another.[7] The idea, persisting into a later stage, might account for the imputations of prenatal incest just referred to. In some of the Moluccas twins are not regarded with favour. In these they are often attributed to superfetation; and in the Babar Archipelago one of them is sent to another village—in earlier days death was probably its doom.[8] In other islands, on the contrary, they are desired, and are looked upon as the gift of the sky-god or male principle,[9] though they are even then in some islands handed over to kinsmen to be brought up.[10] In the Aaru Archipelago, where they are much desired, they are looked upon as an omen of a good tripang and pearl harvest.[11] The Melanesian peoples of Eastern New Guinea regard twins with disfavour; among the Southern Massim the mother was formerly permitted to put one to death, while among the Northern Massim she is ridiculed as a pig.[12] Their kinsmen of the Banks Islands, on the other hand, favour them; but, if boy and girl, they are regarded as man and wife. Rivers thinks that in former days such twins were probably killed—an opinion supported by the practice and belief of the natives of the Duke of York Islands and New Britain.[13] On the whole, in the neighbouring Solomon Islands twins are liked; in Florida Island only there is said to be a suspicion of double paternity; while in Lepers' Island they are conjectured to be the gift of a certain supernatural being named Tagaro.[14] It may be further mentioned, to illustrate the opposite opinions that may be held by even the same race, that in New Ireland, since to bespell a woman might cause her to bear twins, it is to be inferred that they were not there desired.[1] On the Micronesian island of Yap, an outlier of the Pelew Archipelago, one of twins was given to a relative, else they would both die—an obvious attempt, as in the Moluccas and the Central Provinces of India, to break the connexion between them.[2] The Igorots of the Philippine Islands assign a different reason for the same custom: it is to avert the evil omen of their birth.[3] The Ainus allege that one of them would die.[4]

To the Gilyaks of the island of Sakhalin twins are a source of disquiet, if not of fear. Such births are said to be relatively common, and usually either both boys or both girls. One of the pair is believed to be offspring of the Mountain-man, a supernatural being haunting mountain and forest, with whom the people are careful to keep on good terms. This child ought to be returned to his formidable parent as soon as possible; but, since there is no means of identifying him with certainty, both twins must be treated alike. In consequence of this origin, twins after death are not cremated as other corpses are, for fear that the Mountain-man will punish all who take part in the funeral by loss of their eyesight. Even the parents have by the birth become related to the Mountain-man and must be buried also. Twins are believed to be endowed with superhuman powers, and are, so long as they live, regarded with terror. But those who die early are chiefly feared, for, having returned to the supernatural world before they had time to become accustomed to men and to feel themselves as their likes, they have special power to harm them. Their family therefore place a small model of a Gilyak *yurte* either inside or outside the dwelling and put into it a carved wooden figure representing the deceased. To this figure they bring offerings every day of portions of their own food; and the practice is continued for three generations. At last the great-grandchildren take the figure from the dwelling to a neighbouring mountain with great ceremony and there leave it, and with it a final offering of food. Then for the first time the community feels safe in neglecting any further observances. On account of this fear of twins, women and girls are strictly forbidden to listen to tales of twins, nor may women even accept gifts of small household furniture from acquaintances who have given birth to twins, lest the misfortune of twins should in either case be communicated, though this liability does not attach so seriously to gifts of objects of metal. The names of twins once bestowed are retained; no other children are allowed to have the same; nor does a twin ever take the name of a deceased elder of the family, according to the usual custom.[5]

The ancient Assyrians held the birth of twins to be a calamity, except in the royal family.[6] Modern Syrians, on the contrary, if the evidence of refugees at Boston may be trusted, regard it as bringing good luck.[7] According to modern Egyptians about Karnak, one of twins may be a wild cat, whose soul goes out at night on the prowl, when the owner is asleep.[8] To the Bulgarians twins are a misfortune, to avert which the mothers of bride and bridegroom at the wedding simultaneously drink brandy.[9] Even in the north-east of Scotland twins are so far regarded as unlucky that one of them, even though married, will be childless.[10]

On the American continent also twins were regarded as mysterious.

The Shuswap, who occupy part of the Fraser River and Columbia River basins in British Columbia, expressly hold them to be 'great mystery.' Though the mother's husband is deemed to be their real father, the black bear generally, but sometimes the grisly bear, or the deer, is believed to have influenced their birth. Whichever animal it was, it appeared to the mother in dreams and became the *manitu*, or spirit-protector, of the children throughout their lives. They are deemed lucky on this account; but it does not prevent their tabu. At their birth their parents shift camp to the woods, even in midwinter; and they are not allowed near other people for four years. During this time the father or, if he dies, the mother washes and scours them every day with fir-branches—a common method of cleansing from pollution.[11] The southerly neighbours of the Shuswap, the Ntlakapamux of the lower Fraser River and Thompson River basins, say that the mother is usually apprised beforehand by the repeated appearance of the grisly bear in her dreams. The children are accordingly treated differently from other children, and are called 'grisly-bear-children' or 'hairy feet.' The grisly bear is their *manitu*. Their parents are under tabus like those of the Shuswap. Special ceremonies are performed at their birth, and they are during the first four years washed like Shuswap twins. It was held that a birth (especially of twins) immediately changes the weather.[12] Farther inland the Déné treat the bear when caught

[1] *Emin Pasha in Central Africa*, London, 1888, p. 237. Speaking generally, the Nilotic Negroes rejoice with trembling.

[2] Ancient India: authorities collected by Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 183 ff.; cf. *ARW* v. [1902] 271, 273. Kashmir: *Census of India*, 1911, xx. 145. Panjab: *ib.* xiv. 302. Baluchistan: *ib.* iv. 87. Central Provinces and Berar: *ib.* x. 158; R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Cent. Prov. of India*, London, 1916, iv. 73. Todas: W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 480. Cochin: L. K. Anantha Krishna, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, Madras, 1909–12, i. 272. Nāga Tribes of Manipur: T. C. Hodson, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 133 f. Khasis: P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, do. 1907, p. 127.

[3] N. Annandale and H. C. Robinson, *Fasciculi Malayenses*, London, 1903–04, ii. 64.

[4] R. V. Russell, iii. 396, iv. 73.

[5] *Census of India, 1911*, iii. [*Assam*] pt. i. p. 77; cf. *FL* xxi. [1910] 311.

[6] G. A. Wilken, *De verspreide Geschriften*, The Hague, 1912, iii. 86 n., iv. 147; cf. *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 212.

[7] Wilken, i. 459.

[8] J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, pp. 74, 176, 355.

[9] *Ib.* pp. 136, 238, 264, 392, 450.

[10] *Ib.* pp. 136, 355. [11] *Ib.* p. 264.

[12] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of Brit. New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 488, 705.

[13] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 145; *JAI* xviii. [1889] 292; Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 174. Cf. the Balinese.

[14] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 230.

[1] P. G. Peekel, *Religion und Zauberei auf dem mittl. Neu-Mecklenburg*, Münster, 1910, p. 127.

[2] *Globus*, xci. [1907] 142.

[3] F. H. Sawyer, *Inhabitants of the Philippines*, London, 1900, p. 258.

[4] A. H. Post, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, p. 335.

[5] B. Pilsudski, *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 760.

[6] *RHR* lxv. [1912] 407, reviewing C. Fossey, *Présages assyriens*; *ARW* v. 272.

[7] *JAFL* xvi. [1903] 136. [8] *ARW* xvi. [1913] 629.

[9] *ZVRW* xxxi. [1913] 247. [10] *FL* xxv. [1914] 349.

[11] *Jesup N. Pacific Exped. Publications*, New York and Leyden, 1900 ff., ii. 586, 589; cf. *Rep. Brit. Ass.*, 1890, p. 644.

[12] *Jesup N. Pac. Exped.* i. [1900] 310, 374.

with the greatest consideration and respect, and propitiate it. Among their observances neither a dog nor a menstruating woman nor the father of twins, as long as both twins are alive, is allowed to touch it. The reason is that these are all legally impure, and it is feared that the fellows of the victim will be so irritated by unclean contact that they will henceforth stubbornly avoid the traps or snares of those guilty of such a slight. The father of twins is required to offer gifts to the community 'to wash out his shame.'[1] The Nez Percés in the north-west of the United States, on the other hand, welcome twins as lucky both to the family and to themselves.[2]

The Nutka of Vancouver Island and the Kwakiutl, who inhabit the northern end of the island and the opposite shore of the mainland, connect twins with salmon. The former, though not exactly identifying them with salmon, believe them to be in some way related to them. Hence the parents, whose banishment from the village extends only to two years, among their various tabus and rites, must avoid fresh food, particularly salmon. Wooden images and masks representing birds and fish are exhibited round the hut and near the adjacent river by way of invitation to birds and fish to visit the twins and be friendly to them; the father moreover sings certain songs with the same intention. It is believed that the salmon accordingly throng to see them, and the birth of twins is an omen of a good salmon year. If the omen be not fulfilled, it is a presage of their early death.[3] The Kwakiutl regard twins as having in their previous existence been actually salmon. They therefore warn them against going near the water, lest they be retransformed into salmon. A stricter tabu than those of the tribes mentioned above rests on the parents; for they must separate for sixteen months and each pretend to be married to a log, with which they lie down every night. During this period they are required to perform certain ceremonies and conform to certain observances. Among others the father may not catch salmon, the mother may not dig clams, else both salmon and clams will disappear; and the parents may not borrow canoes or paddles, or their owners would have twins. The birth of twins causes permanent backache to the parents; to avert this each parent procures for intercourse with the other a person of the opposite sex, who will, it is believed, be attacked by the backache instead. On the other hand, young women who desire to bear children squat and lean over the pit above which twins have been born. At the death of a twin no one is allowed to wail for him; and among the observances the surviving twin is washed in the water used to wash the corpse.[4] Traces of a similar belief to that of the Kwakiutl are found among the Skqomic, a Salishan tribe farther south, with reference to another kind of fish called *tsaí anūk*; and, as everywhere else in British Columbia, the parents are subject to a strict tabu and purification.[5] In Mexico the Tlaxcalans call twins snakes; and they are believed able to cure bites of serpents and other animals, as well as pain or inflammation of the tendons, especially of the feet and ankles. Triplets will be kings.[6] It is believed by the Yuchi, formerly of Georgia and Alabama, that twins and deformed or abnormal children are sent by 'the supernatural beings to be guides to the people,' and they are accordingly taken great care of.[7] There is some evidence that among the Cheyenne twins were a subject of tabu.[8]

2. Origin, parentage.—Many peoples entertain the belief that a human father can beget only one child at a time. This has led to the suspicion, as among the Saliva of the Orinoco and the Euahlayi of New South Wales already noted, that the second child is due to the mother's infidelity. The same belief is attributed to the Chibchas and to the Hottentots.[9] It is held also by the peoples of the Warri District of Nigeria.[10] It was formerly entertained in Europe. The father had the right of deciding on the birth of a child whether it should be brought up or destroyed; and, if he had any suspicion as to his wife's loyalty, the child was often put to death. On this ground definitely it was held excusable to expose or put to death twins and triplets. A number of mediæval legends among the Germans and other Teutonic peoples are elaborations of this theme.[11] The belief in superfetation is almost a necessary corollary to the belief that the twins are due to two fathers. Hence also the second-born child is commonly held to be the elder or higher in rank, as among the Negroes.

But there is another, and perhaps older, view, more widely held, that they are the result of divine impregnation.

In W. Africa we have seen that they are called 'fetish-children.' To the Fo of Togoland they are the children of Ohoho. The Efiks of Calabar, the Ikwes of the Upper Cross River, and the Ibibio pronounce one of them to be the offspring of an evil spirit.[1] So the Warundi of E. Africa attribute them to an 'incubus,' and regard their birth as a favour, which the jealous spirit is likely to recall, or to take the mother or her husband in payment for it. To obviate this, the important event is celebrated by a variety of ceremonies, including songs, dances, and gifts to the parents (nominally oblations for the spirit), which have a way of disappearing as by enchantment. Two entirely black sheep are bought for the twins; they must preserve and care for them as long as they live. The sheep in turn are said to be the children's guardians, the receptacle and symbol of their spirits, their fetish.[2] In Indonesia likewise the birth of twins is ascribed to a demon. One of them, according to belief in the island of Nias, is due to superfetation caused by such a being, as is also the birth of an albino. Other causes are recognized in the eastern province of the island, as roughness or anger on the mother's part towards her parents or sister, continued cohabitation during pregnancy, or the eating of a double fruit. To the last we shall recur. Like the Warundi, the North Niasese fear that some other members of the family will die if the twins are allowed to live; and they are therefore put to death. They are also held to be an omen of various kinds of calamity.[3] The Bakaua of New Guinea think that 'evil spirits have had a hand in the game,' wherefore one of the twins is killed.[4] According to the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon, one of the twins is the offspring of an *anito* (ghost of the dead). The quieter one, therefore, or the larger, is put in a pot and buried alive.[5] The Buck of Demerara also regard twins as the offspring of an evil spirit named Pernowhari.[6] In Essequibo a British commissioner reports that a native medicine-man not many years ago ascribed an outbreak of sickness to one of twins who had just been born. He said it was the child of a *kenaima*, a wizard or person of supernatural powers, because 'a woman could not naturally produce two children at a birth'; and the unfortunate child at his instigation was burnt alive.[7] The Melanesians of Lepers' Island hold that twins may be the gift of a spirit called Tagaro; in Florida Island there is a suspicion of the mother's infidelity to her husband, but it is generally accepted that she has trespassed on the sacred place of a ghost 'whose power lies that way.'[8] In the Moluccas twins are attributed to the sky-god, Upulero, probably as father.[9] This belief may be compared with that of the Thonga tribes of S.E. Africa, who call twins 'children of heaven' and in this capacity ascribe to them special powers; and the mother is called Tilo, 'heaven.'[10] The ancient Peruvians held that one of twins was the son of the lightning, to which they prayed as the lord and creator of rain, and the earthly parents were made to undergo divers tabus and ceremonies. There is some evidence that they offered the twins, probably to the lightning; at any rate, if they died young, the bodies were enclosed in pots and kept in the dwelling-house as sacred things.[11]

As among the Gilyaks one of twins is taken to be the offspring of the Mountain-man, so their neighbours the Ainus of Sakhalin believe one of them to be that of a supernatural being, on the ground that one man can beget only one child at a time. This is a perpetual shame to the mother; and there is reason for believing that one is destroyed at birth, as indeed the oldest account expressly affirms. At all events the Ainus state that only one survives, and that one of human paternity. It is also said that, like the Japanese, they hold that, when twins are born, the younger is bold, strong, and lucky, while nothing distinguishes the elder from ordinary men. They, however, seek by means of sacrifice, prayer, and talismans to prevent such births. They avoid women who have given birth to twins; but, contrary to the Gilyaks, they hold that nothing is so likely to convey the infection as objects of metal.[12] Farther

[1] *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 129, 975.
[2] H. J. Spinden, *Mem. Amer. Anthr. Assoc.*, vol. ii. pt. iii. [1908] p. 246.
[3] *Rep. Brit. Assoc.*, 1890, p. 591 f.
[4] *Ib.* 1889, p. 847; *ib.* 1890, pp. 610, 614; *ib.* 1896, pp. 574, 577; *Jesup N. Pac. Exped.* iii. [1905] 322, 375; cf. *31 RBEW* [1916], p. 887 (a Bellabella tale).
[5] *Rep. Brit. Assoc.*, 1900, pp. 481, 523 f.
[6] F. Starr, *Notes upon the Ethnog. of S. Mexico*, Davenport, Iowa, 1900, p. 22.
[7] F. G. Speck, *Ethnol. of the Yuchi Indians*, Philadelphia, 1909, p. 110.
[8] *JAFL* xxi. [1908] 315. [9] *ARW* v. 272.
[10] *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 107.
[11] Jacob Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, Göttingen, 1854, p. 456; J. and W. K. Grimm, *Deutsche Sagen*, Berlin, 1818, ii. 90, 233, 291.

[1] Partridge, pp. 38, 257 f.; Mrs. Amaury Talbot, p. 23; *Anthropos*, vii. 89.
[2] J. M. M. Van der Burgt, *Un grand Peuple de l'Afrique équatoriale*, Bois-le-Duc, 1904, p. 71 f.
[3] E. Modigliani, *Un Viaggio a Nías*, Milan, 1890, p. 555; De Zwaan, p. 178.
[4] R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 400.
[5] A. E. Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot*, Manila, 1905, p. 60.
[6] *FL* xv. [1904] 343, citing *Demerara Daily Chronicle*, of 27th Jan. 1904.
[7] Rendel Harris, *Cult of the Heavenly Twins*, p. 5, quoting the report.
[8] Codrington, p. 230.
[9] Riedel, pp. 136, 238, 264, 392, 450.
[10] Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, ii. 294, *Les Ba-ronga*, p. 412.
[11] *GB*[3], pt. i., *Magic Art*, i. 266 f., citing the Jesuit J. de Arriaga; von Tschudi, p. 176 f.; *Globus*, xc. [1906] 305. Cf. *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 369 f.
[12] *Anthropos*, v. 770; Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 161.

north, on the mainland of Asia, the Kamchatkan tribes ascribe twins to 'the wolf in the forest.' The birth of twins is consequently not only a misfortune but also a sin (intensified if both are girls); every one promptly runs out of the house, leaving the mother and children alone. To prevent such an event, the Itâlmens (one of the tribes) set up a figure of a wolf, made of grass, pretending that it is the husband of the young women, and renewing it year by year.[1]

The somewhat indefinite ascription by the various tribes of the north-western coasts of N. America to grisly bears and other land animals, or to salmon or other fish, indicates rather a belief that twins are a reincarnation of such creatures than that they are directly generated by them upon the mother, though these beliefs are by no means far apart.

The Lillooet considered that the twins were the real offspring of the grisly bear; but some held that he 'acted through' the husband. Twins were by many said to be 'grisly bears in human form,' and, when a twin died, his soul went back to the grisly bears and became one of them. When a twin died, his body was deposited in a fir-tree far from graves and human habitations, and the grisly bear was supposed to take it away.[2]

The belief in reincarnation is very wide-spread; it has been discussed by the present writer in his *Primitive Paternity*.[3]

The Semang, a Negrito tribe of Perak, hold that certain birds are the souls of human beings; they are born as children in consequence of being eaten by women; and, when a woman eats a soul-bird with its egg, the result is twins.[4]

Pregnancy caused by various kinds of food is a wide-spread superstition discussed in *Primitive Paternity*, ch. ii. Twins are attributed by many peoples to the eating of double fruits and similar things.

The belief on the island of Nias has already been referred to. It is shared in the E. Indies by the Malay populations of Sumatra, the Tagalas of the Philippines, and the Malagasy; in S. America by the Arawaks and the aborigines of Paraguay; in W. Africa by the Ibibio, in Europe by the Germans, the Magyars, and the French of Poitou.[5] There is even a trace of it in England around Malvern, where it is said that nuts are a presage of the number of children to be born in the year, and 'double nuts presage a considerable number of twins.'[6] Among the Zulus, it is said, other objects in pairs are not eaten, nor are two articles at once received from the hand of another, lest the birth of twins result.[7] The Euahlayi, an Australian tribe, think that babies hang on trees ready to enter into any passing woman; and twins are attributed, as among the Arunta, mentioned above, to two baby-spirits hanging on one branch and dropping on the same woman. But it seems that the woman's husband is reluctant to acknowledge more than one of them.[8] This points to the superstition of double paternity discussed above. On Mabuiag, in Torres Straits, twins are ascribed to the act of a magician, or to the mother when pregnant touching or breaking a parasitic plant.[9] Among the Maidu of California it was thought that, if the father wore two caps at the time of conception, twins would be produced.[10] In some of the Molucca Islands the same result was caused by the mother lying on her back at the time of conception.[11]

3. Powers.—Twins are believed to possess extraordinary powers.

An account is given in a Chinese narrative dating from the 14th cent. of a magician who procured the fœtus from a woman pregnant of twins to use it for the purpose of divining; and it is remarked that special 'spiritual power' was attributed to the fœtus of twins.[12] Among the Iroquois twins are believed able to foretell future events and perform other remarkable things; but they are said to lose the power if a menstruating woman prepares their food.[13] So the Golahs of Liberia hold that twins have the privilege of learning things by means of dreams. They are thus able to see and identify bush-goats in which, according to native belief, human beings are reincarnated. They lose the privilege, however, if they eat of animals which they have so identified, for they would be eating men.[1] This power appears to extend into adult life. Twins among the Igarra of S. Nigeria are able to prognosticate with regard to the offspring of a pregnant woman, but only while children. They are ascribed to good spirits and looked upon with favour as among some other peoples. The younger of the two is regarded as the elder; but both must be treated exactly alike: any favouritism will lead to the death of one of them. They cannot be poisoned, for no poison will have any evil effect on them.[2] The Thonga about Delagoa Bay, who regard twins with hostility, utilize a twin girl, when the caterpillars of a beetle called *nunu* swarm in December or January, to lead the procession of women who have been employed in collecting the insects from the bean-stalks to throw them into a neighbouring lake with a spell to get rid of the plague.[3] On the occasion of the cattle-plague at Dobischwald, in Austrian Silesia, a bonfire is made to drive the cattle through; and twin brothers are necessary to fell the tree of which the fire is made.[4] The Polish peasant, as a spell against 'the pest' (probably the cattle-plague), causes a furrow to be drawn around his field by a pair of twin oxen led by twin brothers.[5] Twins are credited in Lower Nubia and Egypt with the power of shape-shifting, to the extent at least of becoming cats at night and stealing milk and food and eating chickens. This can be prevented only if the father, immediately after their birth, puts them in a cold oven for a short time.[6] The Hausa suppose twins to have a special power of picking up scorpions without injury.[7] The belief of the Tlaxcalans of Mexico in the curative powers of twins has been mentioned above. The Kwakiutl also attribute to them powers of curing disease. The British Columbian and other tribes of the north-west attribute to twins a variety of extraordinary powers. They influence, or at least prognosticate, success in hunting, and the plentiful supply of salmon and other fish, though among some tribes they may not themselves catch salmon. On the other hand, they are exposed to danger of various kinds and must be carefully protected by ceremonies and otherwise.[8] Among the Negroes of the Sherbro in the colony of Sierra Leone there is a practice of resorting to twins for dealing with various complaints, most usually by women. 'Twin-houses,' or *sabo*, each consisting of a small rude framework covered with a thatch of grass, form a sort of shrine. Upon a wooden grid beneath the thatch is spread a white cloth, on which are put lumps of concretion from an ant-hill; and a white streamer floats from a rough pole in front of the structure. This little shrine is set up *ad hoc*, and is served by two persons who are of twin birth, but not necessarily of the same mother. Under their direction and to their profit, the two twin-houses are erected and a ceremonial dance is arranged. A fowl is then sacrificed and the patient is washed all over by these two priests of the *sabo* in medicine provided by them.[9]

The powers of twins are sometimes extended to their parents.

To cure a sprain, the mother of twins is in Ceylon made to trample the limb every evening for a couple of days.[10] Among the Brahuis of Baluchistan, to cure the tertian fever, a twin is called on to knot a blue thread five or seven times, and this is hung round the patient's neck and is believed to drive the fever away.[11] In Maryland it is asserted that the mother of twins has power to drive whooping-cough from a child by giving it a piece of bread and butter.[12] Among the Baganda a ceremony apparently intended to communicate fertility to the plantains is performed by the father and mother, and an effigy of each child is made, partly consisting of a plantain-flower.[13] Among the Basoga, on the north-east of Lake Victoria Nyanza, the birth of twins is a joyous event, though both the twins and their parents are subjected to tabu and ceremonies to render them innocuous. In the north-western district the persons of both father and mother are sacred; the former goes on a round of visits, and is believed to carry blessing wherever he goes. In the central district the children are held to be of divine origin. Their mother must sow her seed before any woman of her clan. The twins must be brought to the field of any clanswoman who is about to sow; and the sowing is performed in their presence.[14] The Bateso, a Nilotic tribe bordering on Lake Kyoga, welcome the birth of twins, though they and their mother are secluded, as among the

1 *GB*³, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 178, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 173 n.; Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 163, both citing G. W. Steller, *Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka*, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1774.

2 J. Teit, *Jesup N. Pac. Exped.* ii. 263; cf. iii. 375.

3 London, 1909, vol. i. ch. 3.

4 W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 4, 215 f.

5 Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, pp. 129, 168, 401; *JAI* xxii. [1893] 209; W. E. Roth, *50 RBEW* [1915], pp. 320, 325; Mrs. Amaury Talbot, p. 23; Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, i. 37, citing various authors.

6 Mrs. E. M. Leather, *The Folk-lore of Herefordshire*, London, 1912, p. 256.

7 D. Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, p. 48.

8 Parker, p. 50.

9 *Rep. of Cambridge Anthrop. Exped. to Torres Straits*, v. [1904] 198.

10 *Bull. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. [1905] 230.

11 Riedel, p. 74.

12 J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, vi. 1340.

13 F. W. Waugh, *Iroquois Foods*, Ottawa, 1916, p. 59.

1 *Anthropos*, vi. 1038. 2 Leonard, p. 462.

3 Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, ii. 401.

4 *GB*³, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 278.

5 W. J. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*, Chicago, 1915, i. 215.

6 *Man*, x. 26.

7 A. J. N. Tremearne, *Hausa Superstitions and Customs*, London, 1913, p. 94.

8 *Brit. Assoc. Rep.*, 1889, p. 847, 1890, pp. 574, 591, 614, 644, 1900, p. 481; *Jesup N. Pac. Exped.* ii. [1908] 586, 620, iii. [1905] 822.

9 T. J. Alldridge, *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, London, 1901, p. 149.

10 *IA* xxxiii. [1904] 57.

11 D. Bray, *The Life-history of a Brahui*, London, 1913, p. 106.

12 *JAFL* xii. [1899] 273.

13 Roscoe, *Baganda*, p. 67 f., *JAI* xxxii. 38.

14 Roscoe, *Northern Bantu*, pp. 217, 219, 235.

Basoga, while the father pays visits to members of his own and his wife's clans, communicating the blessing of increase wherever he is received.[1]

In fact, it is chiefly in the control of the weather and the promotion of fertility—two results closely connected with one another—that the powers possessed by twins are generally held to lie.

Power over the elements, especially over rain and snow, is almost universally attributed to them by the natives of British Columbia. The Shuswap hold that, if a twin bathe in a lake or stream, it will rain.[2] The Tsimshian think that whatever twins wish for is fulfilled—among other things the weather. Therefore they pray to wind and rain, 'Calm down, breath of the twins!'[3] Among the Kwakiuti by swinging a ceremonial rattle they can cure disease and procure favourable winds and weather.[4] Nutka twins produce rain by painting their faces black and then washing them, or by merely shaking their heads.[5] In the Central Provinces of India one of twins will prevent injuries to crops from excessive rainfall or hailstorm by painting his right buttock black and the left any other colour and standing in the direction of the wind; at harvest-time husbandmen (apparently not necessarily twins) adopt this course for the abatement of a gale.[6] In S. Africa twins are said to be able to foretell the weather by their feelings; this seems to be a relic of a belief in control of the weather, control having faded into prediction.[7] A little farther north, the Bathonga, in case of drought, employ a ceremony to cause rain. The women, stripped or covered at most with a grass petticoat, go in procession led by a mother of twins to the grave of twins, or of an abortion, buried in a dry place, and pour water on it, or dig up the remains and bury them again in the mud near the water.[8] Among the Wanyamwesi of what was German E. Africa a twin about to cross a river, stream, or lake, or in a storm on a lake over which he is sailing, fills his mouth with water and spurts it out, saying, 'I am a twin.' The object of this ceremony is to prevent harm befalling him or his companions.[9] At Upoto on the Upper Congo, where rain is usually abundant, a twin is called in to make excessive rain cease. He puts some rain-saturated earth on the fire, and calls upon the rain to cease and the earth to dry up. Here twins also are credited with occult power which enables them by blessing or cursing to cause the success or failure of a hunting or fishing expedition.[10] In Gabun, French Congo, the images of twins, preserved after ceremonies performed over them, are apparently held to ensure the continued fertility of their mothers.[11] From a consideration of the traditional disappearance of Romulus, the first of the legendary kings of Rome, who, it will be remembered, was one of twins, J. G. Frazer has made the ingenious conjecture that the ancient Romans 'shared the widespread superstition that twins have power over the weather in general and over rain and wind in particular.'[12] The superhuman powers of Gilyak twins and the posthumous cult of such as die have already been referred to.

4. Cult of divine twins.—So far, abundant reason has been given for the conclusion that twins, being out of the ordinary course of nature, are held by many peoples to be children of extraordinary powers, or of portentous and even dangerous birth, and consequently that they, or at least one of them, must be at once exposed or put to death, and, where this practice is abandoned or has not arisen, they and their mother (frequently their father also) must be surrounded with tabus; and they are invoked for various purposes, chiefly for rain and fertility. Rendel Harris, who has investigated the subject, has in a series of works established the existence, from a remote antiquity, in Mediterranean countries of a cult of divine twins, some indications of which are also found elsewhere. The twins of Greek legend, Castor and Polydeuces (called by the Romans Pollux), have of course long been known, and other twins of less renown have been recognized. But the wide range of the cult, and the number of cases in which twins have been worshipped, had not previously been understood. Castor and Polydeuces with their sister Helen were traditionally the children of Leda, born, in some versions, out of an egg. Tyndareus, king of Sparta, the husband of Leda, though regarded by Homer as their father, was credited in some accounts with the paternity of Castor only, the other two being the children of Zeus. It has been mentioned above that this belief in a divided paternity of a multiple birth is not unusual among the lower races; it is therefore one of the marks of the archaic origin of the cult of Castor and Pollux. The former, being the son of a mortal father, was himself mortal. Pollux, however, obtained from Zeus the boon of sharing his immortality with his brother and living with him alternately a day under the earth and a day with the gods. Their legend attributed to them a number of adventures; and they were worshipped as *θεοὶ σωτῆρες*, protectors of travellers by water, and thence of travellers in general, the guardians of hospitality and of oaths, and were represented as riding on magnificent white steeds. As twins they were connected with the sky, with thunder and storms; hence probably not only their patronage of travellers by sea, but also their character as Dioscuri, sons of Zeus, and their reputation as divine spearmen. By virtue of their descent from Tyndareus, they were special patrons of the kings of Sparta.[1] Other twins were also known in Greece—Herakles and Iphikles, Amphion and Zethus, and others male and female. Rendel Harris has also made out a good case for the existence of twin-sanctuaries in the peninsula and adjacent islands, leading to the inference that the twin superstition in Greece was not different from that found in other quarters of the globe.

The worship of the Dioscuri early passed to Italy, where it is attested on the coins of Magna Græcia and the mirrors of the Etruscans. It became firmly established at Rome after the well-known didymophany at the battle of Lake Regillus.[2] But from the very beginnings of the city the twin superstition seems to have been accepted. The tale of Romulus and Remus is conclusive on the point. They built Rome, as Amphion and Zethus built Thebes, one brother slew the other—neither of these incidents is by any means strange in legends of twins—and the surviving twin disappeared in a thunderstorm, doubtless another way of expressing his relation to the sky and the storm-cloud.

The Aśvins, perhaps originally divine horses before they became charioteers, are well-known figures in the *Rigveda*. They are rain-makers, probably connected with the lightning—certainly with the sky; they grant fertility to men as well as to the earth, and they aid the sailor and the traveller. In Asia Minor and Palestine the cult of the Twins appears from a very ancient date. Esau and Jacob and other twins found in the Hebrew Scriptures are personages whose pristine form and attributes it is no longer possible to recover from the attrition of time and the erasive energies successfully wielded by generations of pious editors. Traces, however, of the twin-cult linger in the names of various places, like Ibn Alraq, near Jaffa, which has been identified with a place called in the book of Joshua Bne Baraq, 'sons of lightning'; and the account in the second book of Maccabees of the defeat by Judas Maccabæus of Timotheus almost certainly contains a Dioscuric tradition. Barca in N. Africa, a colony of Cyrene, seems to be connected with lightning; and the *silphium* plant, which was sacred to the Twins, is the emblem of Cyrene upon its coins. The Pharos at Alexandria was dedicated to the saviour-gods. There is reason for suspecting legends, and perhaps the cult, of divine twins among both the Phœnicians and the Arabs.

1 Roscoe, *Northern Bantu*, p. 265.
2 *Jesup N. Pac. Exped.* ii. 587; cf. *Brit. Assoc. Rep.*, 1890, p. 644, 1900, p. 481.
3 *Brit Assoc. Rep.*, 1889, p. 847; *31 RBEW*, p. 545.
4 *Brit. Assoc. Rep.*, 1890, p. 614.
5 *Ib.* p. 592. 6 *IA* xxviii. [1899] 111.
7 D. Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, p. 47.
8 H. A. Junod, *Rev. d'Ethnog. et de Soc.* i. 141, *Life of a S. Afr. Tribe*, ii. 296, 334, *Les Ba-ronga*, pp. 412, 416.
9 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 268 *f.*
10 Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 85.
11 R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, pp. 309, 314.
12 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 183.

1 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 48 *f.*
2 L. Preller, *Römische Mythologie*[3], Berlin, 1881–83, ii. 300.

Farther north it is quite clear that Edessa was from ancient times a seat of the Twin-cult. The Twins were there known as Monim and Aziz. When Christianity superseded the old paganism, Jesus Christ and the apostle Thomas took their place. The Syriac *Acts of Thomas* shows that Thomas, or Judas Thomas, as he is called, was regarded as the twin of Christ. With his Lord's assistance he performs in the legend a number of deeds which are beyond doubt Dioscuric. Among the apostles James and John seem also to have been regarded as twins: whence probably their *sobriquet* Boanerges, 'sons of thunder.' In various countries of Europe there are vestiges of Dioscuric cult in historical writers like Tacitus and in popular tales. A pagan altar has been found at Notre Dame, Paris, with a dedication by the boatmen of the Seine to certain Celtic divinities, and among them the Heavenly Twins. The ancient gods all over Europe and the Christian East have been succeeded by saints who perform similar functions and are often called by similar names. Many of these are in pairs or triads, and some of them are explicitly reputed to be twins or triplets, not merely in Christian profession and martyrdom, but by birth. They have frequently assonant names, or names which are variants of one another, according to a wide-spread custom of calling twins by names specifically given to twins, or names which are echoes of each other. A few of these may be mentioned from Rendel Harris's list.

Such are Speusippus, Eleosippus and Meleosippus, martyrs, of Langres, whose cult spread westwards from Cappadocia; Florus and Laurus, builders (in Russia, patron saints of horses) and martyrs; Protasius and Gervasius, martyrs, whose relics Ambrose opportunely found at Milan for the confusion of the Arians; Cosmas and Damian, physicians and martyrs, whose cult seems to have been known from the Euphrates to Kent. Others might easily be enumerated.

The electrical phenomenon sometimes appearing on the masts and yards of vessels during a storm in the Mediterranean was anciently held to be a manifestation of Castor and Pollux; and it was a good omen when the light was double.[1] This same phenomenon is now credited to St. Elmo, a patron saint of sailors, whose name occurs in a variety of forms, and of whom nothing whatever is known. Rendel Harris has shown reason for believing that in some of its forms the name is connected with Remus, who with Romulus was commemorated at San Remo on the coast of Italy. Romulus and Remus preceded Castor and Pollux in the veneration of the Romans. They were exposed, according to the legend, in a rude boat on the Tiber; and from floating on the river they probably made their way, like other figures of the Twins, to sea as the patrons and protectors of seamen and voyagers.

Several pairs of mythical twins are found on the western continent. Of these the best known are the twins of Iroquoian tradition, Ioskeha and Tawiscara.

According to their legend, a woman named Ataensic fell down through a rift in the sky upon the primeval waters, for there was no land as yet. By the advice of the turtle the animals dived, brought up soil, put it on the turtle's back, and so formed the earth to receive the falling heroine, who was pregnant and promptly gave birth to a daughter. The daughter became in her turn pregnant of two boys, Ioskeha and Tawiscara. The latter was evil of nature: he refused to be born in the natural manner, and, breaking his way out through his mother's side or armpit, ended her life with his own birth. The brothers grew up. Ioskeha went about providing the earth, until that time arid, with water. But the evil twin attempted to foil him by creating a gigantic frog to swallow all the water. A quarrel ensued, as in the case of Romulus and Remus and other twins in the Old World. Ioskeha, using the horns of a deer, vanquished Tawiscara, whose weapon was only a branch of the wild rose, and drove him away to the extreme west, his blood gushing from him at every step and turning into flint as it fell. The victor then established his lodge in the far east, opened a cave in the earth and brought forth all kinds of land animals, formed men, instructed them in the art of making fire and in the growing of maize; and it is he who imparts fertility to the soil.[1] Ioskeha is therefore the culture-hero and divine helper of the Huron-Iroquois; and the deeds and combat of the Heavenly Twins are the foundation of their mythology.

[1] Pliny, *HN* ii. 37.

Without pausing to consider any other N. American twins, we may turn to Peru.

From before the times of the Incas the Peruvians seem to have worshipped as creator a god whose name has come down to us as Ataguju, conjectured by Brinton to be properly Atachuchu, 'lord of the twins.' From him proceeded the man Guamansuri, who seduced the sister of certain Guachamines, 'rayless ones' or 'darklings.' She proved pregnant and produced two eggs, but died in putting them into the world. From these eggs emerged two brothers, Apocatequil and Piguerao, names which have also suffered some deformation. Apocatequil was the more powerful. By touching his mother's corpse, he brought her back to life; he slew the Guachamines, who had destroyed his father; he released the race of Indians from the soil by turning it up with a golden spade. The thunder and lightning were due to him; thunderbolts were his children. Stones held to be thunderbolts protected from lightning, gave fertility to the fields, and were esteemed as love-charms. 'In memory of these brothers, twins in Peru were deemed always sacred to the lightning; and when a woman or even a llama brought them forth, a fast was held and sacrifices offered to the two pristine brothers, with a chant commencing *A chuchu cachiqui*, "O Thou who causest twins," words mistaken by the Spaniards for the name of a deity.'[2]

The Bakaïri, a Carib tribe in the northern part of the Amazon basin, have a legend of twins who were culture-heroes.

The Bakaïri were then few and oppressed by the jaguars, who are indistinctly imagined with traits of both the lower animals and humanity. Their mother, captive to the jaguars, became pregnant by sucking two finger-bones of Bakaïri killed by the jaguars. She died before giving birth to her children; and they were cut from her body by the Cæsarian operation. The boys, who are called Keri and Kame, were fostered by the jaguar, their mother's captor. They had not yet human form, but manipulated one another to complete it. They then avenged their mother's death on their foster-father. With the help of the vultures they procured the sun and moon. They stole fire from the fox (*canis vetulus*). From the Ochobi water-snake they obtained water and made the rivers. From various animals they got hammocks, sleep, stones to build houses, arrows, tobacco, manioc, and cotton. They invented flutes and dancing. They made various tribes of men; and Keri is honoured as the ancestor of the Bakaïri. They quarrelled, but made the dispute up again. Finally they disappeared, nobody knows whither.[3]

There are other mythical twins in S. America, but the subject need not be pursued.[4] In New Zealand, Melanesia, and Micronesia there are moreover legends of two brothers, or a band of brethren, who appear to be culture-heroes, though the opposition of beneficent and malicious or of wise and stupid brethren is also developed; but they are not specifically described as twins.

If we inquire into the origin of the cult, it seems clear that the Dioscuri, as the sons of Zeus, were regarded as divinities of light. It has been long ago pointed out that their appearances are represented as taking place in the middle of the summer about the first full moon after the solstice.[5] So also there can be little doubt that the Aśvins in India were divinities of the dawn and possibly the evening twilight. From divinities of light they would naturally pass to wield, or personify, the lightning (Zeus's weapon) and the storm. They came to be looked upon as protectors from the violence of the elements, and thence of voyagers on river or sea, and, by extension of the idea, of travellers generally. Their powers would gradually grow until they covered a still larger area of human life. The same connexion with light and lightning is to be traced on the American

[1] The original authority is *Jesuit Relations*, x. *Hurons* [1636], Cleveland, U.S.A., 1896, p. 125. D. G. Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, New York, 1868, p. 169, *American Hero-Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 53, amplifies the story from other sources.

[2] Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, p. 152; J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikan. Urreligionen*[2], Basel, 1867, p. 327.

[3] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 372 ff.

[4] Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, p. 155; P. Ehrenreich, *Die Mythen und Legenden der südamerikanischen Urvölker*, Berlin, 1905, p. 44.

[5] Preller[3], ii. 302.

continent, where they further tended to become culture-heroes. But this does not account for their duality, except in so far as they may be held to represent the morning and evening, the dawn and the disappearance of light. It is perhaps due to an innate tendency in the human mind to repeat, to echo, to balance, or to contrast. This psychological quality constantly exhibits itself in every department—in philosophy, theology, mythology, literature, art, ethics. It is responsible for the dualism of the great religions, for the frequent reduplication of incident in a fairy-tale, for the symmetrical grouping of figures in a work of art, and for dramatic nemesis. In the domain of mythology and religion, whether pagan or Christian, it has doubtless been emphasized by the mystery attaching to the comparatively infrequent phenomenon of human twins. The beneficent and maleficent sides of their tabu are expressed in the opposition of characters and frequently in the double pedigree.[1]

5. **Afterbirth as twin.**—The Baganda hold a curious belief that the afterbirth, or the navel-string (there is a variation as to this between the two accounts given by Roscoe, to whom we are indebted for the information), is the twin or double of the child to whom it belongs.

The afterbirth was enclosed in a broken cooking-pot, covered with leaves and placed at the root of a plantain-tree—if a boy, at the root of a plantain from which beer was made; if a girl, at the root of a plantain used as a vegetable. We are told that 'the afterbirth was called the second child, and was believed to have a spirit, which became at once a ghost.' On account of this ghost the plantain was guarded, to prevent any one not belonging to the clan from partaking of the beer made from it, or of the food cooked from it; else the beer or the food, by being consumed, would be lost to the clan, and the child would then die in order to follow the ghost of its twin. To obviate this catastrophe, the grandfather ate the food and drank the beer, so retaining the ghost of the afterbirth in the clan. More elaborate was the care taken of the king's umbilical cord, to which the ghost of the afterbirth attached, and which was always spoken of as if it were the afterbirth itself: hence probably the confusion between afterbirth and cord. A special officer, called the *kimbugwe*, who was second only to the *katikiro*, or prime minister, was appointed to the charge of it. He occupied an enclosure next to the king's, in which was a temple built for the 'twin.' Once a month at new moon he carried the 'twin,' wrapped as it always was in bark-cloth, into the presence of the king, who took it out of its wrappings, inspected it, and returned it to the *kimbugwe*. He then exposed it in the doorway of the temple for the moon to shine upon it, anointed it with butter, wrapped it up again, and restored it to its place in the temple. When the king died, the *kimbugwe* made way for a new *kimbugwe* to take charge of the new king's 'twin'; but it still remained his duty to care for the old king's 'twin,' and to provide for the upkeep of its temple and enclosure. In due time the dead king's jaw-bone, to which the king's own ghost was believed to adhere, would be added to his 'twin' and kept at the temple, where he would continue to be venerated.[2] Even the jaw-bone and umbilical cord of the god Kibuka were preserved in his temple on an island of Lake Victoria Nyanza; and they are now in the Ethnological Museum at Cambridge.[3]

To the south of Uganda and west of the great lake, in Kiziba, formerly in German territory, similar customs and beliefs prevail.

The afterbirth, we are told, is considered as a kind of human being, and on the birth of twins the children are spoken of as four, instead of two, each afterbirth being looked upon as a child.[4]

In ancient Egypt also there seem to be traces of the same idea.

Monuments of the earlier dynasties show an object which has been identified as the king's afterbirth carried upon a standard in procession, together with the usual symbolical standards of animals. Its use continued to the end of the Egyptian kingdom, though its shape was gradually conventionalized. The goddess represented as presiding at the birth of Queen Hatshepsut wears on her head an object remarkably like the reliquary containing the navel-string of Kibuka; and in other representations the same goddess wears a vase-like object which may be intended for such a reliquary. Though there are not many texts referring to the afterbirth or navel-string, importance—not to say sanctity—does seem to have been attached to 'the umbilical cord of Osiris.' Horus is described as rescuing it from Seth and depositing it 'in its place in Herakleopolis,' or, as the Egyptians called the city, 'House-of-the-Child-of-the-King.' It has also been suggested that the object carried on his head by the moon-god Khons (and perhaps Khons himself) was evolved from the Pharaoh's afterbirth. There was some relation in Uganda between the moon and the royal 'twin.'[1]

In this connexion the common Hamitic strain in the ancestry of the royal houses both of Egypt and of Uganda will be remembered. At present, however, the interpretation of the Egyptian evidence has hardly got beyond the conjectural stage.

LITERATURE.—The only writer who has made a special study of the subject is J. Rendel Harris, whose three volumes, *The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends*, London, 1903, *The Cult of the Heavenly Twins*, Cambridge, 1906, and *Boanerges*, do. 1913, are indispensable. The principal sources of information apart from these are to be found in works dealing with the customs or the myths of various peoples, as indicated in the references above.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

TYPOLOGY.—1. Definition and scope.—Typology is the science, or rather, only too often, the curious art, of discovering and expounding in the records of persons and events in the OT prophetical adumbrations of the Person of Christ or of the doctrine and practice of the Christian Church. It is thus a branch of that method of interpreting Scripture which is sometimes called 'spiritual' and sometimes 'mystical,' as opposed to the literal or grammatical interpretation. Origen, as is well known, spoke of several subdivisions of this 'spiritual' method, and highly favoured it. It was not his invention. Already both pagan and Jewish writers had found in it an admirable expedient for extracting edification from passages in their sacred books which seemed to be trivial, perplexing, or even of doubtful moral worth, if taken at their face value. It flourished particularly at Alexandria, and was much used by Philo. The practice of allegorizing the OT Scriptures became so popular, and the defining line between allegorizing and typology in the strict sense is so uncertain, that it is necessary at the outset to refer to the former; both branches of this mystical interpretation, as used by Christian writers, aimed at elucidating the latent principles of Christianity in the OT, but, if a definition between them is demanded, it is supplied by Herbert Marsh (bishop of Peterborough, 1819–39) in these terms:

'According to one mode [*i.e.* typology] facts and circumstances . . . have been applied to other facts and circumstances, of which they have been described as representative. According to the other mode [*i.e.* allegorizing] these facts and circumstances have been described as mere emblems'; or, again, 'An allegory is a fictitious narrative, a type is something real.'[2]

This last sentence requires some modification: allegorizing may accept the historical truth of the narrative treated, but does not depend upon it; typology, the bishop holds, demands its historical truth. Van Mildert brings us nearer to the true test when he says:

'It is, indeed, essential to a Type, in the Scriptural acceptation of the term, that there should be competent evidence of the Divine *intention* in the correspondence between it and the Antitype.'[3]

Again, Westcott says:

'A type presupposes a purpose in history wrought out from age to age. An allegory rests finally in the imagination, though the thoughts which it expresses may be justified by the harmonies which connect the many elements of life.'[4]

Any account, however, of the history of typology must take into consideration the fact that this

[1] See art. DOUBLES.

[2] Roscoe, *Baganda*, pp. 52, 54, 235, 110; *JAI* xxxii. 33, 45, 63, 76.

[3] Roscoe, *Baganda*, p. 303; *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, ii. 197; A. M. Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Archæology*, iii. [1916] 199.

[4] H. Rehse, *Kiziba, Land und Leute*, Stuttgart, 1910, p. 117.

[1] C. G. Seligmann and M. A. Murray, *Man*, xi. [1911] 165; Blackman, pp. 199, 235.

[2] *Lectures on the Criticism and Interpretation of the Bible*, Cambridge, new ed., 1838, lect. v. pp. 350, 354.

[3] *An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture-Interpretation* (*BL*), Oxford, 1815, p. 239. But see A. B. Davidson, *Old Testament Prophecy*, p. 236 f. for a criticism of this view.

[4] *The Epistle to the Hebrews*[3], London, 1903, p. 202.

distinction between type and allegory was not at all times recognized, and there must always be room for difference of opinion as to how far the interpretation offered of any passage 'rests finally in the imagination.' One characteristic feature of the history of typology is the divergence of opinion as to the limits of justifiable exposition of types.

The fundamental principle at the heart of this method of interpretation is that of the continuity of revelation and the divine unity of Scripture. In days when the historical sense and the recognition of progressive revelation were still inchoate it was the natural way of evidencing this unity of revelation. It is the product of the ages when history was regarded as a series of catastrophic events rather than as the unfolding of an age-long process, and it was therefore of immense value as a means of showing that history is not a mere series of accidental events, but the accomplishment of a divine purpose. Thus, though typology, as a branch of serious theological study, is now generally discredited and practically obsolete, surviving only for devotional and homiletic purposes, it is not deserving of the scorn to which not only its outworn usefulness but also the arbitrariness and fancifulness of some of its former champions expose it. In any case the place it holds in the NT itself deserves careful study. It is proposed in this article to discuss (1) the extent and character of typological references in the NT, (2) the general history of typology in later times, and (3) its strength and weakness as a method of interpretation.

2. In the New Testament.—From the first it was an integral and essential feature of the gospel of Jesus Christ to establish and maintain an unbroken connexion with the old covenant. Jesus was aware that His teaching was such as to precipitate a cleavage with the traditions of the Jews. He therefore emphasized the essential unity: 'I am not come to destroy but to fulfil.' In the synagogue at Nazareth He expounded Is 61 as a scripture that day fulfilled in the ears of His hearers. He saw in John Baptist the fulfilment of the 'Elijah' prophecy. After His resurrection He expounded to His disciples 'in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself.' He taught that they 'testified to' Himself. Further, He illustrated His message from OT parallels, as when He referred to Elijah at Zarephath, and Elisha and Naaman (Lk 4^{25-27}). On two occasions He is recorded to have referred in particular terms to events of the old covenant, viz. the sign of the prophet Jonah, and the lifting up of the brazen serpent. At these we must look more closely.

Concerning the sign of the prophet Jonah, Matthew ($12^{39f.}$) interprets the sign as Jonah's confinement in the belly of the whale foreshadowing Christ's burial and rising. Luke ($11^{29f.}$) omits this application (though Plummer[1] contends that it is implied in δοθήσεται). Matthew and Luke agree in giving the application that the contrast between the penitence of the Ninevites and the impenitence of the Jews at the preaching of a greater than Jonah is the warning sign. We have to inquire therefore whether Mt 12^{40} is an interpolation by the evangelist, and also whether Jonah can be justly regarded as a type. The story is now generally accepted as an allegory of the experiences of Israel, and as such is typical of Christ, in so far as the whole history of Israel is prophetic, but, regarded as a personal history, the story of Jonah corresponds so little with the ministry of our Lord in principle, and offers so many difficulties in detail, that the suggestion worked out by Sanday,[2] that Mt 12^{40} is not a saying of Jesus, is very attractive.

With regard to the reference to the brazen serpent, apart from the difficulty of treating the discourses in the Fourth Gospel as the actual words of Jesus, the case is clearer. But the treatment is markedly on broad lines of principle and suggestiveness rather than detailed and exhaustive. The incident referred to was already regarded as mysteriously embodying a spiritual principle (Wis $16^{6f.}$), especially as it apparently contravened a divine law.[3] Jesus intimates that that principle will be revealed in His own ministry, and the terms in which He speaks of it are such as to express that principle in the broadest possible way, for the lifting up of the Son of Man is a conception not exhausted by reference to the manner of Christ's death. In a very similar way Jesus spoke of His Body in terms of the Temple, because the Temple 'as the seat of God's presence among His people'[1] exhibited a principle to be more perfectly fulfilled by the Body of Christ.

Our Lord's example in this matter of reference to the OT Scriptures may be summed up as a full recognition that the principles of truth enshrined in the OT were to receive in Himself a fuller and clearer explication, and that therefore the OT Scriptures are full of teaching concerning Him; His practice therefore encourages us to search the Scriptures for the revelation of such principles, but it may be questioned if we can derive from His teaching any justification for the exploitation of formal resemblances or for indulgence in the fascination of elaborate working out of details.

Throughout the NT the same reverence for the dignity and true spiritual value of the OT is marked. Even in those books which show the clearest leanings towards mystical interpretation, in instances where the correspondence seems most far-fetched (*e.g.*, Mt $2^{15, 23}$), or the argument most alien to our modern ways of thought (*e.g.*, Gal 3^{16} or 1 Co 10^{4}), the respect for the old covenant as a real revelation and the loftiness of purpose sharply distinguish the writers of the NT from even their immediate followers. Nothing in the NT can be compared with the puerilities of such a work as the *Epistle of Barnabas*, which degrades the old covenant to 'a mere riddle of which Christianity is the answer,'[2] and which solemnly sees in Abraham's 318 men a foreshadowing of the Cross of Jesus, because the Greek numerals are T I H![3] Even in the Epistle to the Hebrews—a work clearly influenced by Alexandrian methods of thought—the OT is never merely allegorized, and the restrained treatment of the figure of Melchizedek and of the Tabernacle ritual in that book affords a marked contrast to the fanciful elaboration with which both have been treated by later writers. A recognition of typological methods of thought is essential for a true understanding of the NT.

The extent of possible typological references is remarkably small.

Patrick Fairbairn[4] gives the following list. But he has to confess that even this would be regarded by some as too long a list.

Persons: Adam, Melchizedek, Sarah and Hagar, Ishmael and Isaac, and by implication Abraham, Moses, David, Solomon, Jonah, Zerubbabel, and Joshua.

Events: the preservation of Noah, the Passover, the Exodus, the passage of the Red Sea, the giving of manna, the veiling of Moses' face, the water flowing from the smitten rock, the serpent in the wilderness, and some other events (see 1 Co 10), besides the Tabernacle with its furniture and services.

At any rate it is important to note that all these references occur quite naturally and that nowhere is there any sign of a studied exploration of the OT for possible types.

3. History of typology.—This may for convenience be divided into three groups rather than periods, though each group corresponds roughly to a period in the history of the Church.

(*a*) The first is that of the apologetic use of types to prove as against Jewish or pagan objector the antiquity of the Christian faith or to refute heretics. The very purpose of the apologists exposed them to fancifulness. Whereas the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews would show his readers that what they valued in the old covenant was but a shadow preparing the world for better and enduring things to come, Justin had to show that what the Jew

[1] A. Plummer, *St. Luke* (*ICC*)[4], Edinburgh, 1901, p. 306.
[2] *Inspiration*[3] (*Bl.*), London, 1896, lect. viii., note A, p. 432.
[3] Justin, *Dial.* xciv.

[1] B. F. Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John*, London, 1882, on Jn 2^{19}.
[2] Westcott, *A General Survey of the History of the Canon of the NT*[6], London, 1889, p. 46.
[3] Gn 17^{23}; *Ep. Barn.* ix. 8.
[4] *The Typology of Scripture*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1845–47, [6]1880, i. 40.

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objected to in the Christian gospel lay hidden in the Jewish Scriptures. We can understand how he came to hold that the outstretched arms of Moses at Rephidim prefigured the cross of Christ, or even how the bells on the high priest's garment were a mystical foreshadowing of the apostolate.[1] Against heretics the aim was partly to refute the very fanciful interpretations of those false teachers who, as Hippolytus puts it, 'by seducing those ignorant of the holy Scriptures into such like fancies make fools of them.'[2] The Catholics met such errors, not by a rejection of typical or allegorical interpretations, but by the application of a canon of truth or tradition, which limited typological exploration to the treatment of narratives in the canonical books and to the illumination of truths revealed in Scripture — a limitation not always observed in later times. When we come to Origen, we find him using and extolling the allegorical method because so he could reply to Celsus's objection to some passages in the OT. Herein he simply took over the already long-established method of dealing with difficulties in Homer. His intellectual greatness saved him from the extreme rashness of his predecessor Clement, though he adopted his recognition of a manifold sense of Scripture (viz., on the one hand, the literal or grammatical; and, on the other, the allegorical, anagogical, and tropical). It must be remembered that, though Jerome accuses Origen of allegorizing to such an extent that 'historitatis auferat veritatem,' Origen recommended the retention of the literal sense where it was profitable, but the literal often failed to edify (*πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἐλέγχεται, ἀδύνατον ὂν τὸ σωματικόν*),[3] and then the superiority of the spiritual over the carnal was made manifest, and again that Origen did not regard his interpretations in the least as 'resting finally in the imagination,' for he says:

καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι Μωσῆς ἑώρα τῷ νοὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ νόμου, καὶ τὰς κατὰ ἀναγωγὴν ἀλληγορίας τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων παρ' αὐτῷ ἱστωριῶν.[4]

(*b*) The school of Alexandria, inheriting this tradition from so great a master, carried the discovery of mystical significance in the Scriptures to excess, finding in the method a vast field of opportunity for the edificatory use of the Bible. The school of Antioch resisted this use; Theodore of Mopsuestia entirely rejects allegorical interpretations. Time showed both how attractive and how dangerous the practice was. Arnobius points out how well the method meets the need of pagan writers, but calls attention to the fact that in the lack of any sound rule of interpretation anything can be proved from the Scriptures.[5] Tyconius Afer endeavoured to establish rules for the proper surveying of the 'forest' of Scripture, and to systematize what he calls the 'reduplicationes' of the Bible. Being a Donatist, he fell under the condemnation of Augustine, who speaks slightingly of his work.[6] Augustine's own rule is thus summarized:

'Iste omnino modus est, ut quicquid in sermone divino neque ad morum honestatem neque ad fidei veritatem proprie referri potest, figuratam esse cognoscas.'[7]

On the whole the Latin writers were more restrained than the Greek, more tenacious of historicity, and therefore more inclined to typical interpretation proper than to what is merely allegorical; yet Jerome, for all his criticism of Origen's methods, is himself fairly free in dealing with Scripture. As time went on, the ignorance of the original Hebrew that fell upon the Church removed one of the surest restraints against unprofitable fancifulness.

[1] *Dial.* xiii. xc.
[2] *Ref. omn. hær.* v. 8.
[3] *De Princ.* iv. 20.
[4] *In Evang. Ioann.* vi. 2.
[5] *Adv. gentes*, v. 32 ff.
[6] In *de Doctrina Christiana*, iii. 30 (42).
[7] *Ib.* iii. 10 (14).

(*c*) The third group or period is that in which typology took its place in constructive theology, and begins with the Schoolmen. Their task was to prove that the Christian faith is rational and to reconcile it with the doctrines of the current Aristotelianism. In the first stage of Scholasticism reason was subjected to faith. The example of the Fathers in admitting a threefold sense of Scripture was generally followed. Erigena indeed speaks of an 'infinite sense,' and was led by his mysticism to use the allegorizing method freely; the Scriptures to him were as a peacock's feather, every particle glittering with divers colours. Rabanus Maurus admits a fourfold sense. Others went farther, acknowledging a sevenfold or even an eightfold sense. In the later stages of Scholasticism, particularly after the rise of the theory of the twofold nature of truth, and the spread of mysticism, some schools practically scorned the literal interpretation of Scripture on the ground that 'litera occidit, spiritus vivificat,' and 'carried this often to such an extreme, as to leave scarcely a trace of the simple meaning.'[1] It must be acknowledged that some, like Hugo of St. Victor and St. Thomas Aquinas, tried to restrain such indulgence.[2]

The combined influences of the Revival of Learning and the establishment of the Bible as the sole *regula fidei* brought about in the writings of the Reformers a very much sounder attitude. Both Luther and Calvin are remarkable for the sanity and critical acumen of their commentaries. Reaction from Scholastic fancies and a new reverence for the plain teaching of Scripture produced this result; but soon the demand for popular expositions of Scripture (and perhaps the dearth of really scholarly teachers) brought typology into great favour, and it became a definite branch of hermeneutics. In this connexion the name of Cocceius of Leyden in the 17th cent. is prominent, although he adopted no definite system, and seems to have been content with a formal resemblance to justify typological interpretations. Others, however, did endeavour to systematize the method.

Salomon Glassius published at Jena in 1623–36 a work in five books called *Philologia Sacra*, of which one part is devoted to the study and classification of types. His work was incorporated in English in Benjamin Keach, *Tropologia: a Key to Open Scripture Metaphors and Types*, London, 1681, and is referred to as a principal authority by T. H. Horne, *An Introd. to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures*, the first ed. of which (in 3 vols.) appeared in 1818–21, the tenth and last being issued (in 5 vols.) in 1856. Glassius divides types into two main classes—'innate,' or those specifically asserted to be such in Scripture, and 'inferred.' These are further subdivided, the first into those which Scripture 'expresse ostendit' or 'tacite insinuat,' the second into those which are 'oblati' or 'contorti.' The last are to be rejected. He adds nine canons for classifying or recognizing types. The canons are not particularly helpful, but they afford the author the (to him) valuable opportunity of refuting Bellarmine's recognition of a type of the Mass in the story of Melchizedek—a recognition, of course, far older than Bellarmine. The fact reveals one reason why the Protestant theologians were anxious to find clear rules to govern typology. Other popular works on the subject were Thomas Taylor, *Moses and Aaron, or the Types of the OT opened*, London, 1653; Samuel Mather, *OT Types Explained and Improved*, do. 1673, rewritten by Catherine Fry and published in 2 vols. in 1834 under the title *Gospel of the Old Testament* (regarded by some as the fullest exposition of the subject); and K. Vitringa, *Observationes Sacrae*, 3 vols., Franeker, 1689–1708.

The last named deplores the rise of rationalism, and certainly the rationalistic and unimaginative temper of the 18th cent. was inimical to the practice of typology. Something of the 18th cent. methods of thought affects Marsh's *Lectures on the Criticism and Interpretation of the Bible*, and here we find a quite definite rule as to the scope of typology laid down. He will admit no types except those which Glassius had called innate. He defends this

[1] T. A. Liebner, *Hugo von S. Victor*, Leipzig, 1832, quoted by K. R. Hagenbach, *A Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880–81, ii. 171.
[2] 'Pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae' (*Summa*, I. qu cii. art. 1).

position with much good sense and learning, though it is really a confession of weakness and inability to discover the principles which govern the practice of the NT writers.

At the beginning of the 19th cent. the subject attracted attention. It was much affected in circles influenced by the Evangelical Revival. Typology engaged the eloquence and learning of the Bampton lecturers in 1814 (Van Mildert) and 1824 (J. J. Conybeare), and of the Hulsean in 1826 (Temple Chevallier), besides giving rise to a good deal of other literature. But the spread of scientific criticism and the study of ancient religions, and before long of comparative religion, were destined to strike a death-blow to typology as a recognized branch of hermeneutics.

The religion of the Jews was for a time regarded as beneath the notice of the student of religion, and, when it came into its own again, a much broader view of the relation between the old and new covenants held the field. Thus De Wette wrote that the entire OT is a great type of Him who was to come, and that Christianity lay in Judaism as leaves and fruit lie in the seed.[1] Again, Clausen finds the foundation of the connexion between the 'deeper apprehension and the immediate sense' in the law of general harmony by which all individuals, in the natural as well as in the spiritual world, form one great organic system.[2] The impress of the modes of natural science upon this utterance did not recommend it to those whose conception of the supernatural and providential alienated them from the rising naturalism, but the effects of modern methods of scientific study are already apparent in Fairbairn's *Typology*, since the publication of which no standard work on typology has appeared. It survives now principally in devotional works or in the expositions of those to whom the results of Biblical criticism are still unwelcome. Sometimes it is pursued with dignity and real spiritual value (as in the works of Andrew Jukes), but sometimes with a distressing puerility or even offensiveness. It must be acknowledged that, on the other hand, modern writers of the critical school have unduly ignored the importance of typology—an attitude to which that of Edwin A. Abbott offers a brilliant exception. In his view the NT, and particularly the Fourth Gospel, is full of typical suggestions. In this way, believing the author to record what he took to be facts, but with a definite spiritual intention, he reconciles the rejection of the historicity of the narrative with the retention of its spiritual import. In a word, he allegorizes the records, while acknowledging that the author believed that he was recording facts, but facts with a typical significance.

This view is of importance in two respects. First, it reminds us of the fact that the symbolic significance of things and words held a far greater place in the thought of ancient times than it does with us, who have learned to form abstract conceptions and to search for exact definitions. *E.g.*, the NT writers can speak of the 'blood of Christ' without explanation, in a manner that perplexes us. In the second place, it is based on a fundamental principle of sound interpretation, viz. the endeavour to discover what the original author of any document meant to convey. When we read of Melchizedek, or the ritual of the Tabernacle, or of David, it is not enough to ask what those passages may suggest to us; we must first ask what they suggested to the original readers. If the principles of truth which they then suggested be one with the principles more clearly seen in the fuller revelation in Christ, then the imperfect revelation may be regarded as typical of the fuller yet to come, because so mankind was being prepared for the clearer light. Now, David's career is so presented in the OT as to subordinate the imperfections of his character to those qualities which suggested the ideal of a perfect Shepherd-King; the ritual of the Tabernacle was such as to awaken a sense of sin which the sacrifices could never satisfy, and the figure of Melchizedek held up to men (even if the story be simply legendary) a dim conception of a Priest-King greater than Abraham or the priesthood of Aaron's line. Inasmuch as such dimly seen ideals are the result of God's spirit working in the human spirit, we can justly speak of a divine intention in these records, and, without disregarding the human element or ignoring the original meaning, we see in them the gradual unfolding of a divine purpose, much as we can see in the lonely flowering of the first snowdrop an earnest of the summer glory of the garden.

4. The strength and weakness of typology.—The passing of typology need not cause alarm. Just as the discovery of the law of evolution necessitates a broader sweep of investigation on the part of those who to-day put forward the argument from design, but has not invalidated that argument, so our conception of the oneness of revelation is to-day based on a broader view of the OT, but is not therefore the less true or the less deeply founded. Typology not only bred fancifulness and, what was worse, quarrelsomeness among the theologians, but it tended to reduce revelation to the character of a jig-saw puzzle, for, at least in many interpretations, the types are scattered haphazard through the OT, and are quite unrecognizable as such until the antitype is revealed. Any one who has studied the works of art which typology has inspired will remember the chaotic confusion of the typical series as compared with the order of the antitypical. To-day we recognize the guiding hand of God in history as the typologists could not, and so see a deeper and truer continuity of revelation. But that in its day this system of expounding the mystical relation between the OT and the NT had a marked educational value can be seen from the widely popular *Biblia pauperum*, illuminated MSS of which exist as early as the 13th cent., and from a development of it, *Speculum humanæ salvationis*, of which over 200 MSS survive. The invention of printing made these works still more widely popular. The same fact is evidenced by works of art ranging from the frescoes in the catacombs, through mosaics such as those in Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome[1] or San Marco in Venice, down to the magnificent series of windows in King's College, Cambridge. Indeed this connexion of typology with Christian art suggests the very close association of typology with æsthetics. That love of mystery which is almost universal has in reality an æsthetic aspect; for some it is satisfied in the dramatic ritual of the Mass, and for those who repudiated this conception of worship it has been satisfied by the exploration of the mystical sense of the OT, somewhat as the Qur'ān supplied decorative motifs in Moorish art. This seems likely to give a permanent vitality to devotional typology, especially since the revival of popular mysticism. A word of caution may be offered. The history of typology shows how easily devotion may degenerate into fancifulness and unprofitable exercise of ingenuity. Only the most chastened of saints and the most self-restrained of scholars are immune from this danger; typology has always flourished in times of ignorance and

[1] Quoted from an article in J. C. H. Bähr, *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*, Heidelberg, 1837, i. 16.
[2] *Hermeneutik des NT*, Leipzig, 1841, p. 335.

[1] On these cf. J. P. Richter and A. C. Taylor, *The Golden Age of Classical Christian Art*, London, 1904, a work full of references to early typology.

decay of learning, but its suggestions are not without value and helpfulness if they are received gratefully, much as one might derive illuminating thoughts from the contemplation of a sacred picture, rather than as revelations possessing dogmatic authority.

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UDĀSĪS.—The Udāsīs are the principal religious order of the Sikhs (*q.v.*). Also known as Nānak-putrā, 'sons of Nānak,' the founder of Sikhism, they are probably the oldest of the Sikh orders, but ascribe their foundation to Srī Chand, Nānak's elder son. The term *udāsī* is derived from Sanskrit *udās*, 'sad,' and means 'sorrow' or 'sadness.' The Udāsīs were separated from the active or militant Sikhs by the third *gurū* of that sect, Amar Dās, but he did not excommunicate them, as is sometimes stated. This separation is also ascribed to Arjan, the fifth of the Sikh *gurūs*. Whoever effected it, the severance marks the cleavage in the Sikh sect which definitely ranged it against the Muslim Mughal power, leaving the Udāsī order still in touch with orthodox Hinduism. Nevertheless the tenets of the order, deeply coloured as they are with Hindu asceticism, did not prevent its finding many followers among the descendants and disciples of the Sikh *gurūs*. Thus the sixth *gurū*, Hargovind, is said to have allowed Srī Chand to adopt Gurdittā, his eldest son, into the order by making him his direct disciple—a statement not free from chronological difficulties.

The Udāsī order was at an early period divided into four chapters (*dhuān*, lit. 'fires'). Their founders were Bābā Hasan or Hasna, Phūl, Gondā, and Al-mast—all four said to be disciples of Gurdittā. Of these founders the first bears a Muhammadan name (Hasan) and the last a purely Arabic title, *al-mast* denoting one drunk with love or devotion. Al-mast Sāhib, or 'the holy ecstatic,' is now represented at Nainī Tāl and Jagannāth, places far from the Panjāb and Sikh-dom alike. Gondā Sāhib is revered at Shikārpur in Sind, as well as at a shrine near Amritsar in the Panjāb, while the other two possess shrines in the Panjāb hills only. This distribution points to efforts made by the earlier *gurūs* to spread Sikhism, or at least a quietist type of it, over India generally. The followers of these four chapters constitute the senior assembly (*barā akhārā*) of the order, its junior, or *chhoṭā akhārā*, having been founded later by Pherū, a disciple of Har Rāi, the seventh Sikh *gurū*. In theory all Udāsīs are celibate, but those who are so in practice are styled Nangā (or 'naked') Udāsīs. Sir Edward Maclagan, however, gives a different explanation of the term Nangā.

> He describes their usual dress as red in colour, but 'a large section of them go entirely naked, except for the waistcloth, and rub ashes over their bodies. These, like the naked sections of other orders, are known as Nange; they pay special reverence to the ashes with which they smear their bodies, and which are said to protect them equally from either extreme of temperature. Their most binding oath is on a ball of ashes.'[1]

As smearing the body with ashes symbolizes also death to mundane things, the Nangā Udāsīs are probably strict celibates, and hence the Nange are correctly so described. Another chapter of the order, sometimes said to be one of the four *dhuān*, is called the Bhagat Bhagwān, or 'devoted to God' (Bhagwān). Its tradition connects it with Hinduism, for, it is said, a Sannyāsī, by name Bhagatgir, once visited the shrine (*derā*) of Bābā Nānak, the founder of Sikhism, when on his way to Hinglāj, a great place of Hindu pilgrimage in Baluchistān. Nānak's grandson, Dharm Chand, poured food into Bhagatgir's bowl, but failed to fill it. The addition, however, of a pinch of *karāh prasād*, or sanctified meal, blessed with the words, *Srī wāh gurū*, 'All hail to the *gurū*,' caused the bowl to be filled forthwith. This miracle converted Bhagatgir. It was confirmed when the goddess Hinglāj appeared to him and his companions as they kept their vigil before Nānak's shrine and thus fulfilled the object of their pilgrimage. Bhagatgir and his followers became disciples of Dharm Chand, assuming the title of Bhagat Bhagwān. The principal *akhārā*, or meeting-place, of the chapter is at the Bibiksar tank at Amritsar, but it also has subordinate *akhārās* at Barelī and other places in Hindustan and claims no fewer than 370 *gaddīs*, or monastic foundations, in eastern India. The Bhagat Bhagwāns wear the matted hair (*jaṭṭa*) of the Sannyāsī, with a chain round the waist, and smear their bodies with ashes. But in their beliefs they accept Nānak's precepts and follow his rules as to eating and the like.

Yet another chapter is the Sangat Sāhib, which is admittedly not one of the four *dhuān*. Gurū Har Rāī had a cook, named Pherū, whom he taught, investing him with a black girdle and cap, and sending him as a commissary to the southern Panjāb—his native country—and towards the Indus, with a mission to collect the dues paid by the Sikhs to the *gurūs*. When Gurū Govind Singh abolished this system and destroyed the *masands*, or commissaries, whose oppression had caused grave discontent, Pherū made no resistance, though no one dared arrest him, and waited on the *gurū*. Impressed by his righteousness, the *gurū* gave him half his *pagrī*, or turban, in token that he was admitted to a share in his *gurū's* authority, and promised that his following should prosper. The *gurū* further bestowed on him the title of Sangat Sāhib, 'holy companion,' and sent him back to the scenes of his former activities, where he increased the number of his followers. In or before 1896 the Sangat Sāhib, as the chapter is called, established a peripatetic *akhārā*. One of its most noted disciples, an ascetic named Santokh Dās, worked many miracles. The Sangat Sāhibīās, or adherents of the chapter, are numerous and influential in the south and west of the Panjāb, but, as their traditions show, they are not completely under the control of the Sikhs or the regular Udāsīs. Another tradition assigns

[1] *Census of India, 1891*, vol. xix., *Punjab and Feudatories*, p. 152.

the foundation of the chapter to a follower of the famous Sultān Sakhī Sarwar, who was converted by Gurū Govind Singh, and it undoubtedly comprises many who used to affect the cult of that saint and perhaps still combine with it their acceptance of Sikh doctrine. The chapter, however, possesses the Brahmbhūt *akhārā* at Amritsar and an institution at Lahore, so it is distinctly affiliated to orthodox Sikhism, and in the great Sikh State of Patiāla, where it is called the Bakhshīsh Sangat Sāhib, it pays special reverence to the *Ādi Granṭh*, or original *Granṭh* ('Book') of Bābā Nānak, and has an *akhārā* of its own, distinct from those of the four *dhuān*. Lastly must be mentioned the Rāmdās Udāsīs, a sub-order ascribed to another Gurdittā (who was a grandson of one of Bābā Nānak's converts) and established by one of the later *gurūs* in a monastery at Rāmdās, where the sub-order possesses a fine temple, at some distance from Amritsar. Each subdivision of the Udāsīs has its own organization for collecting and administering funds. Each is presided over by a head abbot (*srī mahant*), to whom the ordinary *mahants*, or monks, are subordinated.

The Udāsīs generally are recruited from all Hindu castes and will take food from any Hindu. Sometimes, but not invariably, or even usually, congregated in monasteries, they are generally found wandering to and from such sacred Sikh places as Amritsar, Dera Nānak, and Kartārpur in the Panjāb, but they are also said to be numerous in the Mālwa to the south of it, and at Benares. The principal seats, however, lie in the central Panjāb and in the District of Rohtak, where Sikhism is by no means dominant. Their usages are not uniform. Some wear long hair like Sikhs, others matted hair like Sannyāsīs, and others again cut the hair. Some affect the *tilak*, or caste-mark, others avoid it. The dead are often cremated in the Hindu way, but apparently are sometimes buried. When a body is burnt, a *samādh*, or mausoleum, is erected to some Udāsīs, but this privilege must be confined to those of special sanctity or *mahants*. While the majority are ascetics, some frankly engage in secular callings. Maclagan gives the following picture of their relations with the Panjāb villagers:

'In Ludhiāna the Udāsīs are described as mostly Jāṭs by origin, the *chelā* or disciple and successor being usually chosen from this tribe, and are found to be in possession of the *dharmsālās* in Hindu villages, where they distribute food to such as come for it and read the *Granṭhs* both of Bābā Nānak and of Gurū Gobind Singh, although they do not attach much importance to the latter. The head of the college is called a *mahant* and the disciples *chelās*. They live in Sikh as well as in Hindu villages, and it is probably on this account they do not quite neglect Gurū Gobind Singh. They rarely marry; and if they do so, generally lose all influence, for the *dharmsālā* soon becomes a private residence closed to strangers. But in some few families, such as that of Jaspāl Bāngar, which keeps a large *langar* or almshouse going, it has always been the custom to marry, the endowments being large enough to support the family and maintain the institution; but the eldest son does not in this case succeed as a matter of course. A *chelā* is chosen by the *mahant*, or by the family. If a *mahant* whose predecessors have not married should do so, he would lose all his weight with the people. The great shrine at Dera Bābā Nānak, in the Gurdāspur District, is in the custody of a community of Udāsi *Sādhs*, whose *mahant* used to be appointed with the consent of the Bedis. Another shrine at the same place known as Tāhlī Sāhib, from a large *tahlī* or shisham tree[1] which grew close to it, was founded by Srī Chand, and is also looked after by *mahants* of the Udāsi order.'[2]

Thus the Udāsīs display all the normal features of an Indian religious order—a lofty ideal, readily abandoned in practice, professed adherence to a reformed faith, tempered by judicious compromise with the established system, and the inevitable evolution from an ascetic celibate order into a hereditary caste. In the last phase of the Sikh régime the Nānakputras had sunk to employment as escorts to caravans, their sacred character as 'sons of Nānak' ensuring them against attack.

[1] *Dalbergia sissoo.*

[2] *Census of India, 1891*, xix., *Punjab and Feudatories*, p. 153.

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H. A. ROSE.

UDYĀNA.—See SWĀT.

UGRA, UGRIAN OSTIAKS.—See OSTYAKS.

UGRO-FINNS.—See FINNO-UGRIANS.

ŪKHARS.—See RŪKHARS.

ULTRAMONTANISM.—Ultramontanism is the term applied, often in a hostile or critical spirit, to the tendency to centralize in the papacy the doctrinal teaching and government of the Catholic Church. More vaguely still it is applied in general to extreme Roman Catholicism, to the tendency to emphasize all that separates Catholics from other Christians or from other men. Often enough it is used, quite inappropriately, as a mere nickname for ordinary Catholics who are conscious of their obligations as members of a universal Church. Thus the Catholic parties in the German and Belgian Parliaments have been called Ultramontane, though they would certainly not admit that they take their politics from Rome.

Historically the word 'ultramontanus' was in occasional use in Central Europe from the 11th cent. onwards in a merely geographical sense, just as 'citra-montanus' was used in Italy, to describe a man who lived south of the Alps. It does not seem to have been commonly used with any theological significance till the 17th cent., when it was applied to those who opposed the prevailing Gallican tendencies in France. The counter-reformation in general, and especially the pontificate of Sixtus V. at the close of the previous century, had done much to organize the central administration of the Church, while, on the other hand, the growing power and self-consciousness of the French monarchy tended to insist upon, and to express more definitely as principles, Gallican practices which might be traced back to the 13th century. It is in opposition to Gallicanism (*q.v.*) that Ultramontanism has its most definite meaning, and Fénelon, the Jesuits, and others who opposed the ecclesiastical policy of Louis XIV. and the Four Articles of 1682, were, in a sense, the first Ultramontanes. In the 18th cent., when the influence of religion was at its lowest, Gallican principles kept a strong hold on the French Church, but they found their most complete expression in the writings of the German Febronius and in the policy of Joseph II. The Ultramontanism which opposed Gallicanism and Josephism was little more than the assertion of the universal character of the Church, which both these systems tended to obscure, and an effort, far from successful till the 19th cent., to assert the right of the Church to live her own religious life without the constant interference of the State.

Formal Gallicanism, with its Four Articles, may be said to have been destroyed in France by the Revolution. The fall of the *ancien régime* liberated the Church; numbers of the more Gallican clergy were discredited by joining the Constitutional Church; and Catholicism was purified and revivified by suffering and persecution. No more striking manifestation of papal power had yet been seen than the act which, in accordance with the Concordat, practically deprived thirty-seven bishops of their sees. The Concordat was thus an Ultramontane act, and, though Napoleon added to it the Gallican *articles organiques* and, when he quarrelled with the pope, tried to make the Four Articles the law of the State, nothing could restore the old pre-

Revolution Gallican system. The spirit, however, survived and inspired both the statesmen of the restored monarchy and many of the more old-fashioned clergy, yet the Restoration was also the period in which the Ultramontane movement of the 19th cent. received its most powerful expression in the writings of Joseph de Maistre, de Bonald, and Lamennais. These men realized that the Revolution had destroyed the old foundations on which men had rested their habits of thought and action, and that a fresh start had to be made. De Maistre knew that the revolutionary spirit was still abroad, stronger perhaps than ever, and his *Du Pape* (1819) is an appeal as much to practical utility as to principle. It is only the Christian Church which has in it the strength to overcome 'the Revolution'; and without an infallible papacy the Church is, like the States-General, reducing the monarchy to a shadow and therefore slipping back into revolution. He was disappointed with the immediate effect of his book, but his rigid, authoritative mind had great influence on the Ultramontanes of the middle of the century. A man of far greater intellectual power than de Maistre, the Vicomte de Bonald emphasized the weakness of the individual man in finding out for himself the essential principles of thought and conduct. What a contrast between the disagreement of philosophers and the agreement of practical men about practical matters! The individual reason rightly, therefore, falls back for support on the convictions of society and on tradition. This 'traditionalism' Lamennais combined with the Ultramontanism of Joseph de Maistre. Lamennais's passionate temper always made him push a thing to its extreme limit, and he turned de Bonald's trust in tradition into a universal test of truth. The voice of the pope was for him the expression of this 'universal consent.' In his first stage he combined legitimacy with Ultramontanism; in his second he appealed to the people and tried to make democracy the exclusive ally of the Church. The *Avenir*, which Lamennais and his friends edited in 1831, was probably the most brilliant expression of the earlier stage of 19th cent. Ultramontanism. The enemy which the *Avenir* fought was the Gallican tradition of State control over the Church which had been reinforced by the revolutionary doctrines of State-absolutism. The aim was liberty—liberty of conscience, of association, of education, of the press. Devotion to Rome was the great instrument of liberty, for the papacy represented the universal aspect of the Church and was independent of the different governments. It provided also an element of fervour and historic sentiment at a time when Europe, under the influence of the Romantic movement, was casting off the 18th cent. and all its works and recapturing the power of religious enthusiasm. The exclusive form in which Lamennais's ideas were expressed ultimately set Rome itself against him, but the movement continued under wiser men, Lacordaire, Montalembert, de Ravignan, and others. They succeeded in all but destroying the old Gallican spirit and in putting a new life into the French Church. In the Revolution of 1848 the Church, which had been so unpopular in 1830, exercised a powerful influence.

The defeat of Gallicanism, however, brought out a division in the Ultramontane ranks which the struggle had concealed. The Falloux Law, which was passed under the Second Republic and which broke down the old State monopoly of education, led to the first open breach. On one side Montalembert, Falloux, and Dupanloup were prepared to make concessions to the State in order to secure an invaluable piece of legislation, and because they shared in the ideas of their time so far as these were not definitely opposed to Catholic principle. On the other side were a number of Catholics whose policy became characteristically identified with a newspaper, the party of the *Univers*. Louis Veuillot, the editor of the paper, may without much exaggeration be called the leader of the party; he was certainly its noisiest and most popular mouthpiece. The aim of this school went much farther than merely to acquire for the Church the control of her own religious life. They wished to secure for her the predominance which in an ideal world the spiritual would have over the temporal, and which in fact the Church did partly enjoy in the Middle Ages. Such an aim was incompatible with the ideas and practices prevailing among a people who were far from being mediæval in faith, but Veuillot and his party were prepared to fight for it by bitter antagonism to free-thinkers, by opposition often bitter enough to those, even should they be bishops, whom they considered lukewarm Catholics, and by making the most of the support of the State, if it should happen to be on their side, even when that State was the autocratic Second Empire. The archbishop of Paris himself, Sibour, brought out the difference between the two schools in a letter to Montalembert (1853):

'When twenty-five years ago,' he said in substance, 'we boldly professed ourselves "Ultramontanes," the Ultramontane school was then a school of liberty. We defended the independence of the spiritual power against the encroachments of the temporal power, but we respected the Constitutions of the Church and of the State. The Pope was not the whole Church nor the Emperor the whole State. On the one side there were bishops and councils with a real authority, on the other aristocratic and democratic elements with their rights. No doubt there are times of crisis when both the Pope and the civil government may override all rules. The old Ultramontanes admitted this, but they did not turn the exception into a rule. The new Ultramontanes have pushed everything to extremes and accepting to the full the idea of power they have argued extravagantly against all liberties whether in Church or State.'[1]

Another French bishop could write that the fanaticism of the *Univers* had done more harm to religion than that of Voltaire. It is indeed difficult at first to understand Veuillot's popularity among French Catholics. He seems the most perfect representative of that 'insolent and aggressive faction' which never tired of calumniating their brethren in the faith and of trying to force their private opinions on the Church. For men not of the faith, whom he considered its enemies, for free-thinkers, for 'the race of Cain,' he had no pity. He had never any hesitation in distinguishing between the wheat and the tares. Yet the *Univers* was read in nearly every *cure* in France, and Veuillot appealed far more than Montalembert to most French Catholics. To begin with, he was intensely democratic. Himself a man of the people, he was always thinking of the people. It was his passionate desire to protect the simple from the aggressive irreligion of the bourgeois free-thinker, while his fondness for the extreme point of view in controversy, his scorn of moderate opinions, and his intolerable abuse of the military metaphor in matters of religion were more in sympathy with French character than the constitutionalism of the Montalembert school.

It must be added that the extreme character of French Ultramontanism under the Second Empire is partly to be accounted for by the reactionary policy adopted by Pius IX. when he returned from the exile to which he had been driven in spite of his liberal reforms. To the world at large the most complete expression of this reactionary policy was the Syllabus of 1864. More sympathy would be felt now than in optimistic mid-Victorian days for a document which declared that the world had gone astray by the neglect of God and of Catholic principles. At the time, however, what appeared

[1] Cf. Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, iii. 104.

to be a declaration of war against 'modern civilization' was taken as an official confirmation of all the excesses of the *Univers*.

'Ultramontanism' is a word much used in German politics and religious controversy of this period, but so heavy was the hand of the Erastian State in the first half of the 19th cent. that the word meant no more than the natural claim of German Catholics to manage their own spiritual affairs. Josephism survived longer in Germany than Gallicanism in France, and it was reinforced first by the current German philosophy of State-absolutism and later by the growth of conscious German nationalism. There was an important Catholic revival in the twenties and thirties, closely connected with the Romantic movement, but it had little effect on religious politics. The first struggle for liberty and the first victory occurred not in any of the Catholic states but in Protestant Prussia. The imprisonment in 1837 of the aged archbishop of Cologne and the support given him by Pope Gregory XVI. led to a popular movement in his favour and a general protest against the action of the Government. When Frederick William IV. came to the throne in 1840, he inaugurated a new policy and Prussia, by the freedom which she allowed the Catholics, became a model for other German states. The Revolution of 1848 extended this liberty to different parts of the country, but it was followed by a reaction, especially in S.W. Germany. Two schools began to be distinguishable in the fifties. One was that of Mainz, led by Bishop Ketteler, with the *Katholik* as its organ, devoted mainly to practical work and social problems, but in close union with Rome and therefore soon to be called Ultramontane. Closely connected with it was the more learned group of Würzburg, where Denzinger, Hettinger, and Hergenröther were teaching. The rival school was that of Munich in alliance with the Bavarian Government and the University. Its leading spirit was Döllinger, and it was interested mainly in the philosophical and historical aspects of theology and was very jealous of any Roman interference with German science. The education of the clergy came to be a subject of much controversy, for in Germany seminary and university training had long gone on side by side. A number of the bishops distrusted the theological teaching and the atmosphere of the universities, while Döllinger and the Munich school suspected intensely the training given by the Jesuits in the German College in Rome, were contemptuous of Roman theology, fought against the revival of Scholasticism, and dreaded the spread of Jesuit influence in and through the German seminaries. In time they came to see in the power of the State a means of checking this 'Romanization,' and Döllinger, who had fought for the Church against Josephism and been called an Ultramontane in 1848, now began to appeal to the State against Ultramontanism. Yet among the German Ultramontanes there was little of the extravagance of the *Univers*. No doubt, as controversy grew more bitter, there were violent language and personal attack on both sides, and the air had to be cleared in Germany, as elsewhere, by the Vatican Council.

In Italy the more extreme Ultramontanism was represented by the *Civiltà Cattolica*, a review published in Rome under the editorship of Carlo Curci and a small number of Jesuits who were a curiously independent body and often quite out of sympathy with their more moderate brethren across the Alps and even in Italy. The *Civiltà* was notorious for its support of the *Univers*, for its extreme papal doctrines, and for its personal attacks on more liberal though equally devoted Catholics.

There was an echo of these continental battles even in England in the controversy which was aroused by the reviews edited by Acton and his friends, first the *Rambler* and then the *Home and Foreign Review*. These reflected, though in a more moderate form, the views of Döllinger and the Munich school. On the other side the lead was taken by William George Ward and the *Dublin Review*. Neither side disputed the authority of strict definitions of dogma; but the controversy turned on the amount of respect due to the general guidance of Rome. Acton claimed absolute liberty outside dogmatic definitions, while Ward looked to the papacy for positive direction. A loyal Catholic, he maintained, should accept not only the defined teaching but the 'doctrinal intimations' of Rome.[1]

Underneath these controversies of the sixties we seem to see two tendencies at work. The more liberal Catholics wished, in various degrees, to keep in touch with the times, to make the best of the learning, the thought, the science, the political conceptions of the age. With some this might and did lead to a real contempt for traditional Catholic practices and methods. The Ultramontanes, on the other hand, felt the danger which lay in excessive sympathy with the 'spirit of the age.'

'The "Rambler" . . . appeared to Mr. Ward to worship the modern ideal, both in ethics and in politics, with an unreserve which was quite inconsistent logically with the principles of Christianity.'[2]

Ward had no hope in the movement led by Döllinger. To him contemporary thought was moving away from Christianity, and the one essential thing was to react against it, to preserve the purity of the faith and of Catholic ideals. Push this point of view farther, much farther than Ward ever pushed it, and you come to Veuillot's extravagances with his conflict between the 'race of Abel' and the 'race of Cain.' Now the papacy under Pius IX. undoubtedly took the Ultramontane side, and the liberals found themselves more or less in opposition to the tendencies prevailing in Rome, while the Ultramontanes were anxious to make these tendencies prevail everywhere and, in opposition to the nationalism of the day and the attacks on the temporal power, to magnify the authority of Rome in the government and teaching of the Church. Veuillot, *e.g.*, looked forward to the time when papal bulls would take the place of all conciliar deliberation. Thus it is that the question of the doctrinal authority of the pope was raised and that the Syllabus led to the Vatican decree of infallibility. Yet there is a certain unreality about the controversies which raged round the Council in 1869 and 1870, for the number of those who actually disbelieved in papal infallibility was small indeed. The papal Definition of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 had been accepted universally. What most of the opposition feared was the added governmental authority which they conceived the decree would give to the pope, the increase which it would produce in all those centralizing and autocratic tendencies which they dreaded.

'I am much more concerned,' said Montalembert, 'about the government of the Church than about the definition of Papal Infallibility.'[3]

It is obvious too that the opposition of Dupanloup and the 'Inopportunists' was due to the fear that the Definition would lead to conflict with the State and would emphasize the differences between the Church and modern society. The language of the more extreme Ultramontanes in speaking of the pope as 'inspired,' or in such mad phrases as 'when the Pope thinks, it is God who meditates

[1] W. Ward, *W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival*, p. 146.
[2] *Ib.* p. 139. [3] Lecanuet, iii. 456.

in him,' must have contributed not a little to make the 'liberals' fear that the Definition might mean the triumph in the Church of the more extreme faction.

The Definition came, after months of discussion, in a form more moderate than even such Ultramontanes as Ward had originally expected. It had the effect of making a clearer distinction between the doctrinal and the administrative functions of the papacy. It is no longer possible for an Ultramontane to claim that every utterance of the pope on matters of faith is protected by God from error. Papal infallibility is defined and in so far limited, and the conditions laid down in the Definition have seldom, if ever, been satisfied by the papal doctrinal pronouncements of the last forty years.

Ultramontanism became, therefore, a vaguer term after 1870. The party of the *Univers* continued, indeed, to exist and to carry on its controversial methods in support of the temporal power of the pope or of the royalist movement in France. It saw in a political *coup d'état* the only defence against the attack which from 1879 onwards the Republican party directed against Catholic education, the religious orders, and other forms of Catholic life. Louis Veuillot died in 1883, but the *Univers* remained the most popular of Catholic newspapers until its place was partly taken by Paul de Cassagnac's Bonapartist *L'Autorité*. It seems absurd, however, to call this party Ultramontane, seeing that at least during the pontificate of Leo XIII. its aims were opposed to those of the papacy. The pope was anxious to reconcile the Catholics with their governments both in France and in Germany. In Germany he succeeded in bringing the *Kulturkampf* to a close, though at the cost of putting pressure in 1886 on the so-called Ultramontanes of the Centre party, in order to secure their support for Bismarck's seven years' army estimates, whilst in France his policy of urging the French Catholics to accept the Republic met with much opposition from the royalists.

In a sense, however, the term 'Ultramontanism' may be rightly applied to the administrative centralization which is a mark of papal policy since the middle of last century. The enthusiasm felt so widely among Catholics for Pius IX., the great prestige of Leo XIII., a conscious reaction against disruptive national movements, the mere improvement in the means of communication—these are some of the causes which explain such a centralization. It was a particular feature of the pontificate of Pius X. and of the measures which he took against 'Modernism.' It has certainly helped to protect the unity and the tradition of the Church in the midst of growing hostility or at least indifferentism, and often enough Rome has proved more broad-minded than the local ecclesiastics. Thus two of the greatest bishops of the second half of the century, Ketteler and Manning, were appointed by the direct action of the papacy. Many Catholics would, however, welcome a reaction in the direction of the constitutional traditions of the Church, especially in such matters as the election of bishops and their synodal meetings.

LITERATURE.—It is difficult to give a bibliography on so general a subject. For the Gallican controversy see art. GALLICANISM; for 19th cent. Ultramontanism, F. Nielsen, *History of the Papacy in the XIXth Century*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1906. An excellent study of the question is to be found in Wilfrid Ward, *William George Ward and the Catholic Revival*, do. 1893; E. Lecanuet, *Montalembert d'après son journal et sa correspondance*, 3 vols., Paris, 1895–1902, contains the best account of the controversy with Veuillot. For a defence of Veuillot on general grounds cf. Jules Lemaître, *Les Contemporains*, do. 1888–98, vi. For the Catholic controversies in Germany cf. G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse: le Catholicisme*, 4 vols., do. 1905–09. For the Vatican Council see art. COUNCILS (Christian: Modern); for the measures taken by Pius X. against the Modernists see art. MODERNISM.

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'UMAR AL-KHAYYĀM.—Although much has been written by European biographers concerning the celebrated astronomer and poet of Nīshāpūr. 'Umar ibn Ibrāhīm al-Khayyām or al-Khayyāmī, generally known in Persia as 'Umar Khayyām, the greater part consists of legends derived from late and untrustworthy sources, while the facts of his life and character remain singularly obscure, notwithstanding that since 1897 one contemporary and several early notices have become available. Khayyām or Khayyāmī is a family name, and does not indicate that either 'Umar or his father was a tent-maker by trade. The dates of his birth and death are uncertain. Probably he was born between A.D. 1025 and 1050, and the evidence of his contemporary, Niẓāmī 'Arūḍī, shows that his death took place after 1115 and some years before 1135, and that he was buried at Nīshāpūr in the Ḥīra cemetery;[1] the date A.D. 1123 given by some authorities may well be correct. On chronological grounds alone, the story of his friendship at Nīshāpūr with two school-fellows who afterwards rose to eminence—Niẓāmu 'l-Mulk, the great vizier of the Seljūq sultans Alp Arslān and Malikshāh, and Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ, chief of the so-called 'Assassins'—is extremely improbable; and, though it occurs in the history of the Mongols by Rashīdu'ddīn († A.D. 1318), it must be regarded as a fiction.[2] 'Umar received the education of a scholar, including literature, natural science, theology, philosophy, and medicine. We possess two treatises on algebra and geometry from his pen;[3] of seven other works on scientific and metaphysical subjects only the titles have been preserved.[4] Adopting astronomy as a profession, he was chosen in A.D. 1074 to take part in, and apparently to preside over, a commission of astronomers appointed by Niẓāmu 'l-Mulk and Sultan Malikshāh for the purpose of reforming the calendar.[5] Their labours resulted in the institution of the Jalālī era, named after the honorary title (Jalālu'ddīn) of Sultan Malikshāh, and in the publication of the astronomical tables known as *Zīj-i Malikshāhī*, which were edited by 'Umar Khayyām.[6] Like most mediæval astronomers, 'Umar practised astrology, and two of his predictions are recorded by Niẓāmī 'Arūḍī,[7] who observes that 'Umar had no great belief in such prognostications. During the period of disturbance following the death of Malikshāh (A.D. 1092) he seems to have left Nīshāpūr. He was at Balkh in A.D. 1112–13, and at Merv two years later.[8] Possibly it was at this time that he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, 'not from piety but from motives of prudence, and, when he reached Baghdād on his homeward journey, refused to meet the learned scientists of that city who were eager to become acquainted with him.'[9]

Besides a few Arabic poems, 'Umar wrote a number of Persian quatrains (*rubā'iyyāt*). That he was regarded as a writer of occasional verse rather than as a poet appears from the fact that his name is not mentioned at all in the oldest extant work containing biographies of Persian poets, the *Lubābu 'l-Albāb* of 'Aufī (*c.* A.D. 1220),

[1] *Chahār Maqāla*, tr. E. G. Browne in *JRAS*, 1899, p. 806 *f.*

[2] E. G. Browne, 'Yet more Light on 'Umar-i Khayyām,' in *JRAS*, 1899, p. 409 ff., *Literary History of Persia*, ii. 190 ff.

[3] F. Woepcke, *L'Algèbre d'Omar Alkhayyámí*, Paris, 1851, *Catalogue of the Oriental MSS in the Leyden Univ. Library*, Leyden, 1851–73, iii. 40.

[4] E. D. Ross, 'The Life and Times of 'Umar Khayyām,' biog. introd. in Methuen's ed. of Edward Fitzgerald's version of the *Rubā'iyyat*, with a commentary by H. M. Batson, London, 1900, p. 73 ff.

[5] Ibnu'l-Athīr, *Kāmil*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leyden, 1868–74, x. 67

[6] Ḥājjī Khalīfa, *Lexicon Bibliographicum*, ed. G. Flügel, London, 1835–58, iii. 570.

[7] *JRAS*, 1899, p. 806 ff. [8] *Ib.* p. 806 *f.*

[9] Ibnu'l-Qifṭī, *Ta'rīkhu 'l-Ḥukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert, Leipzig, 1903, p. 244.

and only incidentally by Daulatshāh (end of the 15th cent.); moreover, the author of the *Chahār Maqāla*, who treats of poetry and astrology in separate sections, places 'Umar among the astrologers and makes no reference to his poems. The most ancient MS, preserved in the Bodleian Library and dated A.D. 1461, contains 158 *rubā'īs*; a facsimile of this text has been published by E. Heron-Allen.[1] In later MSS and editions the number of quatrains is very much larger. The question as to their authenticity was first raised in 1897, when Valentin Schukovski published in Russian in *al-Muẓaffarīyé* (a *Festschrift* in honour of Baron Victor Rosen) his famous article entitled "'Umar Khayyám and the "Wandering" Quatrains.'[2] Here Schukovski shows that 82 quatrains ascribed to 'Umar are to be found in the works of other Persian poets. Since the publication of his article the number of 'wandering quatrains' has risen to 101, representing 46 different poets[3]—a total which would be enormously increased if the entire field of Persian poetry were explored in a systematic manner, and if account were taken of anonymous quatrains, either written as variations on those which already formed part of the collection or added to it for no better reason than that, 'Umar being specially and pre-eminently a quatrain-writer, it was natural to ascribe to him any favourite *rubā'ī* of which the authorship was unknown. Even in the oldest and presumably least adulterated MS the proportion of 'wandering quatrains' already discovered and assigned to their proper authors is about 12 per cent. Of the remainder many are likely to be genuine, but we have no means of identifying the original 'Umarian nucleus or determining its size. The whole collection must be viewed, not as the work of an individual, but as an anthology reflecting various aspects of Persian spiritual and intellectual life and covering a period of six centuries.

It follows that the character of 'Umar Khayyām cannot be read in the *Rubā'iyyāt* attributed to him, which give expression to diverse and often radically inconsistent modes of thought. Two notices, however, cited by Schukovski from writers of the 13th cent. throw some light on the matter.[4] The first, by Ibnu'l-Qifṭī (see reference above), describes 'Umar as a man who tried to conceal his want of religion and shrank from uttering his real opinions. Concerning his poetry, Ibnu'l-Qifṭī remarks that it is widely circulated and reveals an irreligious spirit to those who look below the surface, although its literal sense is sometimes in accord with the teaching of the Ṣūfīs.[5] He then quotes four Arabic verses, of which the following is a translation:

'If my soul is content with a livelihood sufficient for my needs, which is gained by the labour of my hands and arms,
I am safe from all changes and accidents, and care not whether Time threatens me or flatters my hopes.
Have not the revolving heavens determined to reduce all happiness to misfortune?
Therefore, O my soul, abide patiently in thy sleeping-place: its towers will not topple down until its foundations have collapsed.'

Najmu'ddīn Dāya († A.D. 1256), author of a mystical treatise entitled *Mirṣādu'l-'Ibād*, reckons 'Umar among those unhappy philosophers and materialists who have gone astray from the truth, and quotes two sceptical quatrains[6] as evidence of his 'utter shamelessness and corruption.' This passage is important because it shows that an ardent Ṣūfī of the 13th cent. looked upon 'Umar as an enemy to mysticism; and, inasmuch as the *rubā'īs* quoted are probably authentic, we cannot but agree with his judgment so far. The charge of materialism, when brought by Ṣūfīs and theologians against scientists and philosophers, carries no weight: 'Umar is as unlikely to have been a materialist as he is likely to have been a free-thinker and pessimist. It should be noted, further, that the name Khayyām occurs in twelve quatrains, and constitutes at least a presumption in favour of their authenticity, and that these, together with the two quoted by Najmu'ddīn Dāya, exhibit the principal elements of the *Rubā'iyyāt*, viz. hedonism, philosophical contempt for the *profanum vulgus*, attacks on the orthodox, lamentations for the cruelty of fate, meditations on the incompatibility of a supreme intelligence with the sufferings of life and on the nothingness of man, hope of divine mercy, and a certain morality which recognizes the duty of doing good to others. 'But the Ṣūfī mysticism seems to be excluded, although the poet often makes use of Ṣūfistic terms.'[1]

LITERATURE.—Besides the literature given in the footnotes: E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, London, 1906, ii. 246–259; R. A. Nicholson, Introd. to the ed. of Fitzgerald's version of the *Rubā'iyyāt*, do. 1909; J. B. Nicolas, *Les Quatrains de Khèyam*, Persian text and French tr., Paris, 1867.

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UNCLEAN.—See HOLINESS, TABU.

UNCTION (Christian).—As a religious rite, and apart from social usages, unction was taken by the Christian Church immediately from the Jews, though for some purposes it was borrowed by the Jews from other nations. In the OT unction was used in the 'consecration' of priests, kings, prophets, and places.[2]

1. In connexion with the complete rite of baptism.—This use of unction was almost universal from very early times up to the Reformation.

(*a*) *The New Testament.*—It is disputed whether the apostles used unction in the rite of Christian initiation. In 2 Co $1^{21f.}$, 1 Jn $2^{20.\ 27}$, all Christians are said to have been anointed. This is undoubtedly metaphorical, but it perhaps points to the actual use of oil in the apostolic age before or after baptism, at least in some places; as it was then certainly in use for other purposes,[3] the metaphor would in that case be more apposite. On the other hand, in Acts, where two accounts are given,[4] in which in addition to the baptism proper the laying on of hands is described, unction is not mentioned. Tertullian certainly thought that the apostles used it in connexion with baptism, for he traces it back to the 'primitive discipline' of the OT.[5] It is possible that it was used in the apostolic age in some places, but not in others, and it is noticeable that laying on of hands and anointing are not for this purpose joined together in the NT, though they were both there used for other purposes.[6] Or it is possible that the custom of anointing at baptism arose in sub-apostolic times, being due to a literal interpretation of the NT metaphor.[7]

(*b*) *The subsequent ages.*—After NT times or at least from the middle of the 2nd cent. onwards unction was used, sometimes preceding, sometimes following, immersion, or both before and after. But it is necessary to note that, originally and for many centuries, immersion and its complement, which in the West from the 5th cent. onwards has been known as 'confirmation,' were as a normal

1 London, 1898.
2 A full abstract by E. D. Ross appeared in *JRAS*, 1898, p. 349 ff.
3 A. Christensen, *Recherches sur les Rubā'iyāt de 'Omar Ḫayyām*, Heidelberg, 1905, p. 30.
4 *JRAS*, 1898, pp. 354 ff., 361 ff.
5 See art. ṢŪFĪS.
6 Nos. 126 and 508 in *The Quatrains of Omar Khayyám*, ed. and tr. E. H. Whinfield, London, 1902

1 Christensen, p. 35 f.
2 See §§ 4, 5, 6 below.
3 See § 2 below.
4 Ac $8^{14ff.}$ $19^{2ff.}$.
5 *De Bapt.* 7.
6 Cf. Mk 5^{23} $6^{5.\ 13}$ 7^{32} $8^{23.\ 25}$, Ac 28^{8} etc.
7 See, on the one side, F. H. Chase, *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, London, 1909, p. 59; on the other, H. J. Lawlor, art. CONFIRMATION, vol. iv. p. 2^{a}.

rule a single rite; and it is immaterial to consider whether any particular anointing belongs to the one part or to the other.

We get no light on the subject in the scanty literature of the first three quarters of the 2nd cent.; but it is to be remarked that unction is not mentioned in the *Didache*, though it gives the words of baptizing into the threefold Name.[1] Towards the end of the century Tertullian tells us that unction was administered after the immersion, as a long-standing custom;[2] Irenæus says that the Gnostic Marcosians used it in the parody of Christian baptism;[3] and early in the 3rd cent. Hippolytus says that the Naassenes (or Ophites) used it.[4] Theophilus of Antioch also mentions unction as being the reason of the name 'Christian,'[5] and thus implies his belief that the custom was apostolic.

Irenæus and Hippolytus, in the works mentioned, do not actually say that the Catholics used unction, though we may infer this from the fact that the Gnostics were clearly copyists in their baptismal rites; but the matter is now set at rest by the fact that the 'so-called *Egyptian Church Order*' in all its versions has unction, in this case before as well as after immersion (though the fragmentary Latin version, which appears to be the oldest, is wanting in the description of the rite before immersion). R. H. Connolly has shown that this Church Order, at least in the main, dates back to Hippolytus himself.[6]

Later in the 3rd cent. the custom of anointing at baptism is attested by Cyprian[7] and Origen;[8] but it was not used by the Novatians.[9] There are frequent references to unction in connexion with baptism in the Church Orders and in the Fathers from the 4th cent. onwards; there was usually an anointing before immersion and either one or two anointings after: if two, then the presbyter administered the former, the bishop the latter. But a peculiar custom prevailed in the early Syrian Church. There we find only one anointing, and that before immersion, so that in this Church the 'confirmation' took place before the rite at the font, instead of after it, as everywhere else and as in the NT.

The evidence for this custom is now full and complete;[10] it continued till the 5th or 6th century. Probably Severus (patriarch of Antioch, A.D. 512–519) introduced the post-baptismal unction among the West Syrians (Monophysites), and the catholicos Ishû'yahbh III. (A.D. 647–658) among the East Syrians (Nestorians). The only known exception is in a commentary ascribed to Ephraim,[11] where an unction after immersion is mentioned. But this work is probably not Ephraim's. These commentaries are a catena of notes on the OT, many by Jacob of Edessa, some headed 'Of Ephraim,' though the heading is often doubtful, and the extracts may be paraphrases rather than quotations. If at any point they are not in accord with attested sayings of Ephraim (as is the case here), we may safely conclude that they are not his.

The ordinary custom, then, from the time of Hippolytus, was to have an anointing before, and at least one after, immersion; in that case ordinary olive oil was generally used before immersion and chrism or unguent (*μύρον*) after, the latter being oil mixed with balsam, spices, etc. But there are several exceptions. In Theodoret[12] 'chrism of *μύρον*' is used before immersion; in the Armenian and East Syrian rites oil is used throughout.

(*c*) *At the effeta.*—This was a ceremony in the West (called in Spain *effetatio*) which took place several days before baptism, and was named from the Aramaic *Ephphatha* ('Be opened'), the ears and nose being touched. For this ceremony oil was originally used, as we see in John the Roman Deacon's *Epistle to Senarius*[1] and in the works of Ildephonsus, bishop of Toledo.[2] Afterwards, as in the *Gelasian Sacramentary*[3] and in later pontificals, saliva was used instead.

In several authorities, such as Ambrose,[4] the *Bobbio Missal*,[5] the *Stowe Missal*,[6] Alcuin,[7] and Amalarius of Metz,[8] neither saliva nor oil is explicitly mentioned at the effeta itself; but in the *Gregorian Sacramentary*[9] and the *Gelasian*, and often elsewhere, the effeta takes place just before the anointing of shoulders and breast. It is quite possible that this anointing may be the unction which takes place just before immersion, put into an earlier position.

(*d*) *In consecrating the font.*—In both East and West oil or chrism or both were often poured in the form of a cross into the water at the consecration of the font. This we find in Ildephonsus[10] in Spain; at Rome in the *Ordo Romanus Septimus*;[11] in Gaul in the *Missale Gallicanum Vetus*,[12] also in the *Bobbio Missal*[13] and the *Missale Gothicum*;[14] and in most Western pontificals. It is also common in the East. It is mentioned in the writer who poses as Dionysius the Areopagite;[15] and is found in the Greek rite of baptism,[16] and the Armenian,[17] the Coptic, West Syrian, Maronite, and (in some MSS) the East Syrian.[18]

(*e*) *During the catechumenate.*—There are a few traces of an earlier unction than that of the effeta mentioned above. Augustine, speaking of our Lord's anointing the blind man with the clay in Jn 9[6], says that Jesus 'perhaps made him a catechumen.'[19] This may refer to a custom of unction at the reception of candidates into the catechumenate. In Spain Isidore of Seville speaks of catechumens being anointed before they became 'competentes,' *i.e.* accepted candidates for baptism.[20] The Roman Synod held A.D. 402 speaks of their being anointed at the third scrutiny.[21] But the phrase 'oil of catechumens' usually means the oil administered just before immersion, as opposed to the chrism administered after. In the later Western authorities three oils are distinguished: (1) 'holy oil,' to sign the 'heathen child' on the breast and between the shoulders before immersion;[22] (2) 'holy chrism,' after immersion; (3) 'sick man's oil.'[23]

(*f*) *Consecration of the chrism.*—In the West the chrism was ordinarily hallowed by the diocesan bishop, in the East by the patriarch, on Maundy

[1] § 4 (*c.* A.D. 500).
[2] *De Cogn. Bapt.* i. 27 *f.* (7th cent.).
[3] Ed. H. A. Wilson, Oxford, 1894, p. 114.
[4] *De Myst.* i. [3].
[5] J. M. Neale and G. Forbes, *Ancient Liturgy of the Gallican Church*, Burntisland, 1855–67, p. 269.
[6] F. E. Warren, *The Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church*, Oxford, 1881, p. 210.
[7] *Ep.* xc. (8th cent.).
[8] *De Eccl. Off.* i. 23 (9th cent.).
[9] Ed. H. A. Wilson (Henry Bradshaw Soc., xlix.), London, 1915, p. 54.
[10] *De Cogn. Bapt.* 109.
[11] § 10 (in J. Mabillon and M. Germain, *Museum Italicum*, Paris, 1687–89, ii.).
[12] Mabillon and Germain, i. 324.
[13] Neale and Forbes, p. 268.
[14] Ed. H. M. Bannister (H. Bradshaw Soc., lii.), London, 1917, i. 77.
[15] *De Hier. Eccl.* ii. 7 (*μύρον*).
[16] F. C. Conybeare, *Rituale Armenorum*, Oxford, 1905, p. 403.
[17] *Ib.* p. 95; H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, Würzburg, 1863, i. 387, 394.
[18] Denzinger, i. 207, 276, 346, 373.
[19] *In Johan.* tract. xliv. § 2.
[20] *De Eccl. Off.* ii. 21. [21] Can. 8.
[22] See § 1 (*c*) above.
[23] Ælfric, *Ep.* ii. (*c.* A.D. 1000), in H. Soames, *The Anglo-Saxon Church*[3], London, 1844, Suppl. p. 12 f.

[1] § 7 (*c.* A.D. 120?). The view of J. Armitage Robinson, that the *Didache* only represents a piece of false antiquarianism, and does not give us a true picture of Christian life, is perhaps not very probable (*JThSt* xiii. [1912] 339 ff.; and *Barnabas, Hermas, and the Didache* [Donnellan Lectures], London, 1920, Appendix A).
[2] *De Bapt.* 6–8; cf. *de Res. Carn.* 8, *adv. Marc.* i. 14.
[3] *Hær.* I. xxi. 3 *f.* [4] *Ref.* v. 2.
[5] *Ad Autol.* i. 12 (*c.* A.D. 180).
[6] *The So-called Egyptian Church Order and Derived Documents* (*TS* viii. 4), Cambridge, 1916.
[7] *Ep.* lxx. [lxix.] 2.
[8] *In Lev.* hom. vi. § 5, *in Rom.* hom. v. § 8; but we have these in the Latin translation only.
[9] Theodoret, *Hær. Fab. Compend.* iii. 5 (5th cent.).
[10] For the evidence see art. CONFIRMATION, and R. H. Connolly, *The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai* (*TS* viii. 1), Cambridge, 1909, p. xlii ff.
[11] *In Joel* 2[24]. Lawlor (*loc. cit.*) suggests that the word *'mîdhê* ('baptized') here means 'baptizandi.' But in view of Syriac usage this is impossible.
[12] *In Cant.* i. 2.

Thursday; so, in the West, in the *Gregorian*[1] and *Gelasian*[2] *Sacramentaries*. Leo the Great implies that the same custom existed in Egypt in the 5th century.[3] Proterius, bishop of Alexandria, was murdered on that day, and Leo says that 'the hallowing of the chrism has failed.' But in the East Syrian and Malabar rite, where ordinary oil is used instead of chrism, it is consecrated by the presbyter at the time of baptism;[4] a little of the 'holy oil' said to be descended from St. John is added.[5] There were elsewhere some exceptions. At the first Council of Toledo (A.D. 400) permission was given to consecrate chrism at any time.[6] In Gaul it was perhaps consecrated on Palm Sunday.[7] Formerly the Armenians sometimes allowed diocesan bishops to consecrate the oil,[8] but this is now confined to the catholicos.

The rule that bishops alone may hallow the chrism is laid down in the West at the first Council of Toledo,[9] by Pope Innocent I.,[10] at the second[11] and third[12] Councils of Carthage, at that of Hippo,[13] by Augustine,[14] at the Council of Vaison in Gaul,[15] and at the second Council of Seville,[16] by Amalarius of Metz,[17] and by Thomas Aquinas;[18] also in Egypt, early in the 4th cent., by Didymus of Alexandria.[19] But in time of persecution in 'Africa' presbyters were allowed to consecrate the chrism, as John the Deacon tells us.[20] In the West the oil, as opposed to the chrism, was ordinarily consecrated at the time of the service by the officiant, whoever he might be.

(*g*) *Meaning of the unction.*—Originally the anointing was considered to be the consecration of the Christian to the royal priesthood.[21]

So Tertullian compares the baptismal unction to the anointing of the Aaronic priests.[22] The same idea is found in the 3rd cent. in the *Older Didascalia*;[23] and (emphatically) in the derived *Apostolic Constitutions*.[24] Jerome, apparently alluding to unction, and using the word 'baptism' in its widest sense, says that 'the priesthood of the laymen is baptism.'[25] The idea of consecration to the priesthood is also found in Augustine,[26] Ambrose,[27] John the Deacon,[28] Isidore of Seville,[29] Alcuin,[30] and his disciple Rabanus Maurus,[31] and became a commonplace. The consecration was specially connected, by John the Deacon, Alcuin, and many others, with the anointing of the head immediately after immersion.

A special significance was attached to the post-baptismal unction[32] in places where the laying on of the hand was dying out, or was less emphasized, and even in Egypt, where that ceremony was long retained. The gift of the Spirit, elsewhere associated with the imposition of the hand, was then ascribed to the unction.

This is the case with Sarapion of Thmuis in Egypt,[33] Ambrose (probably),[34] and even Pope Innocent I.[35] The North Italian author of the *de Sacramentis* says that at the signing (with chrism) the bishop (*sacerdos*) invokes the Holy Ghost in His sevenfold gifts.[36] Even Augustine[37] and Pacian of Barcelona[38] speak in the same sense. In the East, where the imposition of the hand in confirmation died out early, we should expect the same thing; and Cyril of Jerusalem[39] says that the object of the *μύρον* is to convey the Holy Ghost. Narsai (an East Syrian) apparently calls the unction 'the drug of the Spirit, and certainly says that the Spirit is given by it.[1]

In the developed Eastern rites we sometimes find the association of the gift of the Spirit with the chrismation; explicitly in the Coptic rite in the prayer at the unction after immersion,[2] and in the Ethiopic.[3] Other Eastern rites are confused on this point, but, as immersion and confirmation are never separated in them, they are not particularly careful to ascribe a special significance to one or other part of the service.

(*h*) *Unction at the reception of heretics.*—This is in reality part of the question which we are now considering. For, as all agreed that the Holy Spirit could not be given outside the Church, even in the great controversy between Cyprian and Pope Stephen as to heretical baptism in the 3rd cent., the ceremony used when heretics were converted and admitted to the Church had normally as its object the reception of the Holy Ghost. It was the custom in the West and in 'Africa,' and originally (it seems) in at least some parts of the East, to receive heretics by the imposition of the hand. But in places where the latter ceremony was less emphasized they were received by unction.

This was the case in Didymus of Alexandria,[4] at the councils of Orange on the Rhone[5] and of Epaon in Burgundy,[6] and at the Trullan Council of Constantinople.[7] Basil also directs the reception of heretics by unction,[8] and Gregory the Great says that this was the custom in the East.[9] Theodoret says that the Novatians were anointed on reception, because they did not use unction in baptism.[10]

2. Unction of the sick.—The early history of this subject has too often been considered, by writers of all schools of thought, merely from the point of view of post-Reformation controversies. It is more profitable to put these, in the first instance, on one side, and to deal with the purely historical question of the use by the Early Church of unction for sick people, whatever was the purpose of such unction. In the opinion of the present writer, it will be found that the evidence for unction of the sick is very much the same, as regards time, as that for unction in connexion with baptism, the only difference being that, while for the latter the evidence of the 2nd cent. is stronger than that of the 1st, for the former the case is reversed, and the evidence for unction of the sick, which is strong in the apostolic age, is less so in the age which followed it. It will be found, it is believed, that the commonly expressed opinion on this subject will have to be reconsidered.[11]

(*a*) *The New Testament.*—Unction of the sick is mentioned as having been used during our Lord's ministry: in Mk 6[13] the Twelve 'anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them.' In the subsequent period it is commended by St. James;[12] the sick man is to call for 'the presbyters of the church,' who are to pray over him, 'having anointed him with oil in the name of the Lord,' and this 'prayer of faith' is both for bodily healing and for forgiveness of sins. We read also of our Lord anointing with saliva[13] in performing cures; and of the figurative anointing of the eyes with eye-salve in the Apocalypse.[14] The 'oil and wine' used by the Good Samaritan had no religious significance,[15] though they have received a spiritual interpretation. The passage in St. James is referred to by Origen[16] and Chrysostom.[17] The

1 Ed. Wilson, p. 49. 2 Ed. Wilson, p. 69 ff.
3 *Ep.* clvi. 5.
4 Denzinger, i. 372; G. B. Howard, *The Christians of St. Thomas and their Liturgies*, Oxford, 1864, p. 33.
5 A. J. Maclean and W. H. Browne, *The Catholicos of the East and his People*, London, 1892, pp. 247, 269.
6 Can. 20.
7 L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[3], Eng. tr., London, 1903, p. 320.
8 Denzinger, i. 55. 9 Can. 20.
10 *Ep. ad Decent.* 3. 11 Can. 3 (A.D. 387 or 390).
12 Can. 36 (A.D. 397). 13 Can. 24 (A.D. 393).
14 *De Bapt. c. Donat.* v. 28. 15 Can. 3 (A.D. 442).
16 Can. 7 (A.D. 619). 17 *De Eccl. Off.* i. 27.
18 *Summ. Theol.* III. qu. lxxii. art. 3.
19 *De Trin.* ii. 15. 20 *Ep. ad Senar.* 7.
21 1 P 2[5. 9], Rev 1[6] 5[10] 20[6]. 22 *De Bapt.* 7.
23 F. X. Funk, *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum*, Paderborn, 1905, i. 210.
24 iii. 16 (*c.* A.D. 375). 25 *Adv. Lucif.* 4.
26 *De Civ. Dei*, xx. 10. 27 *De Myst.* vi. [30].
28 *Ep. ad Senar.* 6. 29 *De Eccl. Off.* ii. 25.
30 *Ep.* xc.
31 *De Inst. Cler.* i. 30 (9th cent.).
32 Or, in the early Syrian Church, to the unction before immersion.
33 *Sacramentary*, § 16 (*c.* A.D. 350).
34 *De Myst.* vii. [42]. 35 *Ep. ad Decent.*
36 iii. 2 [8] (*c.* A.D. 400?). 37 *Serm.* 227 (Benedictine ed.).
38 *Serm. de bapt.* 6 (4th cent.).
39 *Cat.* xxi. [*Myst.* iii.] 3 (A.D. 348).

1 Connolly, *Lit. Hom. of Narsai*, pp. 43, 45.
2 Denzinger, i. 209. 3 *Ib.* p. 230.
4 *De Trin.* ii. 15. 5 Can. 1 (A.D. 441).
6 Can. 16 (A.D. 517). 7 Can. 95 (A.D. 692).
8 *Ep. canonica prima*, clxxxviii. 1 (4th cent.).
9 *Ep.* xi. 67, ad Quiricum (6th cent.).
10 See § x (*b*) above. 11 See § z (*b*) below.
12 Ja 5[14f.]. 13 Mk 7[33] 8[23], Jn 9[6. 11].
14 3[18]. 15 Lk 10[34].
16 *In Lev.* hom. ii. § 4. 17 *De Sacerd.* iii. 6 [§ 196].

latter implies that the unction of the sick was still practised in his day: he is speaking of the power of the priest to forgive sins.

(*b*) *2nd and 3rd centuries.*—The first known reference to the unction of the sick after St. James applies to the reign of the emperor Septimus Severus (A.D. 193–211), or more probably to a time before his accession. Tertullian says[1] that the Christian Proculus Torpacion had once (*aliquando*) healed 'Severus, the father of Antoninus' [Caracalla] by anointing. If unction was used for the healing of a sick heathen, *a fortiori* it would be used for Christians. It might be held that this was a purely medical use of unction. But any possible doubt on this head has been taken away by the investigations of R. H. Connolly with regard to the *Egyptian Church Order* (already referred to).[2]

In the Latin as well as in the Ethiopic version of this Church Order there is a form given for the blessing of the oil for the sick, offered apparently by the laity.[3] This form we may with confidence assign, with the great bulk of this work, to Hippolytus of Portus, and therefore we have evidence of unction of the sick at Rome early in the 3rd century. The form states that the unction is for the healing of the body, but nothing is said of spiritual blessing. This new evidence shows that we must correct the statement of the committee of the Lambeth Conference of 1908, that 'there is no clear proof of the use of unction for the sick in the Christian Church until the fourth century'[4]—a statement which has been frequently repeated.

(*c*) *From the 4th cent. onwards.*—In the 4th cent. we have a series of Church Orders which show that unction of the sick was a common practice. In the *Testament of Our Lord*[5] a form is given for blessing oil and water for healing; this prayer is independent of the Hippolytean form, and much fuller; it incidentally refers to spiritual benefits. The oil would be for application, the water for drinking. The *Apostolic Constitutions* give a form[6] for consecrating oil and water by the bishop, or in his absence by the presbyter; this refers to healing, but incidentally also to demons and other spiritual ills. This form is not found in the epitome (of the eighth book of *Apost. Const.*) known as the *Constitutions through Hippolytus*.[7] In the *Canons of Hippolytus*[8] oil for the sick and first-fruits are blessed; no form is given, but 'Gloria Patri' is added. In the *Sacramentary of Sarapion*[9] oil and bread and water for the sick are blessed, doubtless by the bishop, as the book contains only the portions of the services said by him.

The form contains the words 'Let every Satanic energy . . . depart from . . . these thy servants,' and it has been suggested that this shows that the oil was consecrated at the time of use.[10] Elsewhere in this work there occurs, after the anaphora, a 'prayer concerning the oils and waters that are offered' [by the laity]. In both these prayers bodily healing is primarily asked for, then spiritual blessings, and protection against demons and the like. A form for consecrating oil for the sick is found also in G. Horner's *Statutes of the Apostles*.[11]

In the above works the people seem to have brought the oil (and water and bread) for the sick to be blessed by the bishop or presbyter, and then to have applied it themselves, in spite of Ja 5[14]. At the same time they also brought firstfruits to be blessed.

We have a good deal of other evidence of the use of unction for the sick, the earliest referring to Egypt.

Palladius, bishop of Helenopolis, in his *Historia Lausiaca*, describes how the monks of that country in the 4th cent. used oil for the sick—Benjamin of Nitria,[1] Macarius of Alexandria,[2] and John of Lycopolis.[3] The first of these monks healed the sick by touch of the hand or by oil consecrated by himself. Sozomen also tells us how the monks of Egypt in that century anointed a paralytic with oil and healed him;[4] and Rufinus makes a similar statement.[5] On the other hand, Athanasius mentions only imposition of the hand in healing the sick; the Catholics would not allow an Arian to lay a hand on a sick man's head.[6] Thus unction and laying on of the hand were alternatives, and we see the same thing in the NT: Mk 5[23] 6[5] 7[32] 8[23. 25] [Mk] 16[18], Mt 9[18], Lk 4[40] 13[13], Ac 9[12. 17] 28[8]—all of our Lord and the disciples.

In the 4th cent. Chrysostom says that the sick were healed with oil from the church lamp,[7] and this was afterwards a common practice.[8]

In the 5th cent. Pope Innocent I., asked if the sick might be anointed with chrism (*sanctum oleum chrismatis*), and if bishops might anoint, answers in the affirmative; the oil blessed by the bishop may be applied by any Christian if necessary, but it cannot be applied to penitents, because it is of the nature of a sacrament.[9]

Some eighty or more years later Cæsarius, bishop of Arles († 542), says in one of his sermons: 'Whenever any sickness comes, let the sick man receive the body and blood of Christ and then anoint his body,' and the promise made by St. James will be fulfilled.[10] And in another sermon he says that it is better than magic uses to go to the Church and receive the body and blood of Christ, and faithfully and copiously to anoint (*perunguerent*) oneself and one's own with blessed oil, and to receive not only healing of the body, but also remission of sins, as James the apostle says.[11]

Here then, in the beginning of the 6th cent., it is contemplated that the sick man should ordinarily anoint himself, though the oil has previously been consecrated.

From the 6th cent. onwards we read of the 'oil of the cross' in healing. This was oil touched by a relic of the true cross, and was considered to be especially efficacious.[12]

Among the Easterns we find the use of oil for the sick to be almost universal.

(*d*) *Armenians* in practice anoint only sick priests, not deacons or lay people.

The *Instruction in the Christian Faith*, by Chosrov, says that the unction is for the healing of the body and the forgiveness of lighter sins; the apostles sometimes laid hands on the sick, and sometimes anointed; unction is not essential, but prayer is, and, if necessary, this sacrament may be administered without the anointing of oil.[13]

The earliest mention among the Armenians of unction as a preparation for death is *c.* A.D. 800; and no rite for the anointing of the sick is found in any ancient euchologion or *mashtotz*.[14] The old Armenian office for the visitation of the sick consists of prayers and communion.[15] Denzinger mentions an Armenian custom of anointing the faithful (not only the sick) on Maundy Thursday with butter (not oil), blessed by the bishop.[16]

(*e*) *East Syrians* (*Nestorians*).—In the *Ṭakhsā*, or Missal, it is directed that the holy oil of baptism is not to be used for consecrating churches or for anointing the sick;[17] for unction of the sick

1 *Ad Scap.* 4. 2 See § x (*b*) above.

3 Connolly, *So-called Egyp. Church Order*, p. 176; E. Hauler, *Didascaliæ apostol. fragmenta Veronensia Latina*, Leipzig, 1900, i. 108.

4 *Report*, London, 1908, p. 188. For a possible reference to oil, water, and bread for the sick in Clement of Alexandria (*Excerpta*, 82) see F. E. Brightman in *JThSt* i. [1900] 261.

5 i. 24 f. (*c.* A.D. 350). 6 viii. 29 (*c.* A.D. 375).

7 Given by Funk, ii. 72 ff.

8 Can. iii. (4th cent. ?); ed. H. Achelis, *Die Canones Hippolyti* (*TU* vi. 4). Leipzig, 1891, § 28 f.

9 § 17 (*c.* A.D. 350).

10 J. Wordsworth, *Bishop Sarapion's Prayer Book*, London, 1899, p. 77*n*.

11 London, 1904, pp. 162–178. This is in a long interpolation, and the date is not certain.

1 *The Lausiac Hist. of Palladius*, ed. C. Butler (*TS* vi. 1, 2), Cambridge, 1898–1904, § 12 (ii. 35 f.).

2 § 18 (ii. 47 ff.). 3 § 35 (ii. 100 ff.).

4 *HE* vi. 20, 29.

5 *Ib.* ii. 4. F. E. Brightman gives other instances in *JThSt* i. [1900] 260.

6 *Encycl. Ep.* 5. 7 *In Matt.* hom. xxxii. § 6.

8 See § x (*f*) below; several other instances are given by W. E. Scudamore in *DCA* ii. 1454 f.

9 *Ep. ad Decent.* 8 (A.D. 416). The authenticity of this letter has been questioned, but without much probability. As late as the beginning of the 8th cent. Bede, in his *Exposition of the Epistle of St. James*, says, on Innocent's authority, that laymen may anoint themselves.

10 *Serm.* 265, § 3, col. 437, in the appendix to vol. v. of the Benedictine ed. of Augustine (also *PL* xxxix. 2238).

11 *Serm.* 279, § 5, Ben. ed., col. 465 (also *PL* xxxix. 2273).

12 For this and similar oils see *DCA* ii. 1453.

13 T. E. Dowling, *The Armenian Church*, London, 1910, p. 135 f.

14 *Ib.*

15 It is given in F. C. Conybeare, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 114 ff.

16 i. 190.

17 Syriac text (Urmi, 1890), p. 147. This part has not been translated into English.

a single collect is appointed, and is to be said by the priest when he blesses the oil.[1] In this Church *ḥnānā* (lit. 'mercy'), dust from the tombs of the martyrs, is mixed with oil and water and applied to the sick person.[2] In the ordination of presbyters prayer is offered that 'they may lay their hands on the sick and they may be healed.'[3]

(*f*) *The Copts* have an office of the 'holy oil' which they call 'the lamp' (*φανός*);[4] imposition of hands is included in it, and seven presbyters officiate. The Greek Orthodox also have a direction to anoint the sick with 'the holy oil from the lamp.'[5]

(*g*) *The West Syrians* (*Jacobites*) also have an office for blessing 'the oil of catechumens, which is also the oil of the sick.'[6]

(*h*) *The Orthodox.*—Here seven priests, if they can be had, administer the oil. The Russian *Longer Catechism* says[7] that unction with oil is a sacrament, in which, while the body is anointed with oil, God's grace is invoked on the sick to heal him of spiritual and bodily infirmities; and it then quotes Mk 6^{13}, Ja $5^{14f.}$.

(*i*) *Unction of the sick in England.*—Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, in his *Capitulare* (A.D. 680), says that Greeks allowed presbyters, if necessary, to make the exorcized oil and chrism for the sick, but Romans confined the consecration of it to the bishop.[8] The *Excerptiones* of Egbert, archbishop of York (A.D. 732–766),[9] say that the sick are to be anointed with oil hallowed by bishops (*sacerdotibus*), and that the presbyter is to have the eucharist always ready, that the sick may not die without communion.[10] King Edgar's *Canons* (A.D. 960) order every priest to have unction for the sick.[11]

Ælfric's[12] *Canons* (*c.* A.D. 1000) direct the priest to 'have hallowed oil apart for children [*i.e.* for confirmation], and apart for sick men, and always to anoint the sick in bed. Some sick men are fearful, so that they will not consent to be anointed' [they feared that unction would kill them]. If a man is anointed and recovers, and then once more falls sick, he can again receive unction; it is not an ordination, but in it is healing and forgiveness.[13]

The form of blessing the oil is given in the *Pontifical of Egbert*, archbishop of York.

It prays that it may be to every one who touches it for protection of mind and body, for the driving away of all pains and all infirmities, and every sickness of body; and refers to the anointing of priests, kings, prophets, and martyrs.[14]

The form in the present *Roman Pontifical* is nearly the same.

In the later instances we see the restriction of the administration of the oil to a priest. This led to the practice of extreme unction, and then unction was made to precede the last communion. The anointing of the sick was retained in the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI. (1549), and was on the forehead, and explicitly for the healing of both soul and body. It was omitted in the Second Prayer-Book (1552), but restored by the Non-jurors.

3. **Extreme unction.**—When the anointing of the sick came to be looked upon principally as a preparation for death, it received this name, which properly means 'the last of the unctions' but was popularly understood to mean unction administered to those *in extremis*; it was no longer, unless in exceptional cases, for the healing of the body, but was for spiritual benefit only. The name is not found before the end of the 12th cent.; it appears first in Peter Lombard;[1] after that it became common. But the idea itself is found in the 10th cent., in Ælfric.[2]

We find frequent directions on the subject in the Middle Ages. The Synod of Exeter under Bishop Quivil (held in 1267) says that extreme unction is for the healing of the body and for forgiveness of sins; it is not the least venerable of the sacraments, and no money is to be exacted for it; the clergy are not to absent themselves from their parishes except of necessity, lest any die without confession, viaticum, and extreme unction; some ignorant persons refuse to receive this last-mentioned rite, and the clergy are to preach about it.[3] The Synod of Worcester under Bishop Woodloke (held *c.* 1308) has the same directions, except about the money.[4] And in Scotland we find similar rules in the 13th century. Every sick person over 14 years of age in danger of death should receive extreme unction, and no fee is to be charged. It may be repeated if necessary, and no restriction is laid down on this point.[5]

Aquinas deals at length with extreme unction in the supplement to his *Summa Theologica*, written between 1265 and 1271. He says[6] that it is a sacrament because it avails for the remission of sins, whereas the oil of catechumens [administered before baptism] does not do so. This sacrament was instituted by Christ Himself, though He promulgated it through the apostles; some, however, think that He left it to the apostles to institute.[7] Olive oil is the convenient 'matter,' as in Ja $5^{14f.}$, and it is to be first consecrated by the bishop, as in all other unctions.[8] Extreme unction must have a 'form,' as all other sacraments of the new law have; this form is a prayer, as in St. James, but the intention of the minister is expressed in the words 'By this holy unction,' etc.[9] Aquinas proceeds to deal with the theological significance of the rite. It avails for the remission of sins, as St. James says, and also for the healing of the body, just as immersion in baptism cleanses the soul through the cleansing of the body.[10] It does not impress 'character,' like ordination or confirmation, seeing that it may be repeated.[11] Aquinas then deals with the minister of extreme unction. It cannot be conferred by a layman, like baptism, as it is not so necessary, nor yet by deacons, for St. James speaks of 'presbyters'; but the administration is not confined to bishops alone.[12] With regard to the recipients of extreme unction, Aquinas remarks that it is not for those who are in health, nor for all the sick, but only for those who are near death. It is the last remedy which the Church can confer. It is not for madmen, unless in lucid intervals, nor for young children, as it is a remedy for actual sin, not for the relics of original sin, unless indeed these are strengthened in some way by actual sin. Only certain portions of the body, not the whole, are to be anointed, the mutilated being anointed on that part which is nearest to the lost limb.[13] Further, extreme unction can be repeated without injury, but not in the same illness.[14] Elsewhere Aquinas says that by it men are prepared for worthy communion [*i.e.* the viaticum]; it is inferior to baptism and the eucharist, and is not of necessity, but is for progress in the Christian life.[15]

Maskell[16] gives the rite of extreme unction from the *Sarum Manual* (his copy is dated 1543):

After a prayer referring to Ja $5^{14f.}$ and asking for restoration to health ('sal..ti pristinæ restituere'), the priest anoints the eyes, ears, lips, nostrils, hands (the laity on the palms, the priests on the outside, as they had already been anointed on the palms at ordination),[17] the feet, and the back, or in the case

1 Syriac text (Urmi, 1890), p. 98.
2 The directions are given in Denzinger, ii. 517 f.
3 *Ib.* ii. 236. 4 *Ib.* ii. 484.
5 J. Goar, *Euchologion*, Paris, 1647, p. 436 (2nd ed. Venice, 1730); see also § 2 (*c*) above.
6 Given in Denzinger, ii. 551. We may contrast the direction among the East Syrians given in § 2 (*e*) above.
7 R. W. Blackmore, *The Doctrine of the Russian Church*, Aberdeen, 1845, pp. 97, 239.
8 § 35; E. Martène, *De Antiquis Ecclesiæ Ritibus*[3], Antwerp, 1736–38, I. vii. 3, § 7; L. d'Achery, *Spicilegium*, Paris, 1723, i. 487. For Bede see § 2 (*c*) above.
9 But they are probably later than Egbert; see *DCB* ii. 51b.
10 D. Wilkins, *Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ*, London, 1737, i. 103.
11 W. Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*, London, 1846–47, i. p. ccxxiv.
12 There was an archbishop of Canterbury, and one of York of this name, nearly contemporary, and a homilist who was perhaps different from both.
13 Maskell, i. pp. ccxxv, ccxxxiii.
14 *The Pontifical of Egbert*, ed. W. Greenwell (Surtees Society), Durham, 1853, p. 120.

1 *Sent.* IV. ii. 1. 2 See § 2 (*i*) above.
3 Cap. 6; Wilkins, *Conc.* ii. 134 f.
4 Wilkins, ii. 294 f.
5 *Ecclesiæ Scoticanæ Statuta*, ed. J. Robertson (Bannatyne Club), Edinburgh, 1866, ii. 34, 58.
6 Qu. xxix., art. 1. 7 Art. 3.
8 Art. 4–6.
9 Art. 7–9; see below for the 'form.'
10 Qu. xxx., art. 1 f. 11 Art. 3.
12 Qu. xxxi. 13 Qu. xxxii.
14 Qu. xxxiii. 15 III. qu. lxv., art. 3.
16 *Monumenta*, i. 83. The *Rituale Romanum* has almost the same directions (ed. G. Catalani, Padua, 1760, i. 332 ff.).
17 See § 4 below.

of a female the front. At each anointing he prays for forgiveness in these words: 'By this unction and His most tender mercy, may the Lord forgive thee whatsoever thou hast done amiss through sight' (hearing, etc.). A psalm is said between each anointing, and after the unctions a blessing is given, referring to purification of mind and body. Then follows a prayer which has special reference to the sick man's approaching death, but this is not in the Bangor MS quoted in Maskell's note, and seems to be later than the rest. The sick man is then communicated if he is capable of retaining what he swallows; otherwise he is assured that spiritual communion suffices, and the well-known words are quoted: 'Tantum orede et manducasti.'[1] In the *Pontifical of Magdalen College*, probably of Hereford or Canterbury and of the 12th cent., the first prayer mentioned above ends differently; here there is only one unction, in which the references to the various senses are combined.[2] In this *Pontifical* two different prayers follow the blessing, referring to the forgiveness of sins.

Only one priest is mentioned in the *Sarum Manual* as administering unction, but Walter Raynold, archbishop of Canterbury (1313–37), speaks of *sacerdotes* in the plural; and W. Lyndwood glosses this by saying 'two at least, except in case of necessity.'[3] Raynold says that all over fourteen years of age should receive extreme unction;[4] and also that it can be repeated only if a year has elapsed.[5]

The oil was consecrated on Maundy Thursday;[6] and this was the case also at Rome.[7] By a constitution of J. Peckham, archbishop of Canterbury (1278–94), any unused oil was burnt.[8]

The Council of Trent says that extreme unction was instituted by our Lord as a sacrament of the NT, outlined (*insinuatum*) by St. Mark, and commended to the faithful and promulgated by St. James. The 'matter' is oil blessed by a bishop, for the unction represents the grace of the Holy Spirit, and the 'form' is 'By this unction,' etc.[9] The effect is primarily forgiveness and strengthening of the soul, and occasionally restoration of bodily health; the ministers are bishops and presbyters. Extreme unction is to be used for those who appear to be dying; if they recover and then again fall ill, it may be repeated.[10] See also art. EXTREME UNCTION.[11]

4. Unction at ordination.—The idea of anointing at ordination is consecration to God and endowment with His gifts. The custom is derived from the OT, where kings, high priests, priests, and prophets are anointed.

In Ex 29[7], Lv 8[12], Moses anoints Aaron, whose anointing is also mentioned in Ps 133[2], Sir 45[15]. In Ex 28[41] 29[21] 30[30], Lv 8[30] 10[7], Aaron's sons are anointed as priests; in Lv 21[10], Nu 35[25], high priests in general receive unction. In 1 K 19[15f.], Hazael, Jehu, and Elisha are anointed. The unction of prophets in Ps 105[15], Is 61[1], is perhaps metaphorical. The anointing was with olive oil and spices in Ex 30[23ff.].

The same conception is found in the name 'the Christ,' 'the Messiah' ('the Anointed One'), as in Lk 4[18], which quotes Is 61[1], in Ac 4[26f.], which quotes Ps 2[2], in Ac 10[38], and in He 1[9], which quotes Ps 45[7]; cf. also Dn 9[24].

But, while in Eastern ordinals we frequently read of anointing in a metaphorical sense, the actual unction at ordination was confined to the West.

[1] 'Only believe, and thou hast eaten.' The saying is from Augustine, *in Johann.* tract. xxv. 12 (on Jn 6[28f.]), 'crede et manducasti'; but he is not speaking specially of spiritual communion.

[2] Ed. H. A. Wilson (H. Bradshaw Soc., xxxix.), London, 1910, p. 190.

[3] *Provinciale seu Constitutiones Angliæ*, Oxford, 1679, bk. i. tit. 6, 'Cum magna reverentia.'

[4] *Ib.* [5] *Ib.*, tit. 7.

[6] *Ib.*, tit. 6, 'Cum sacris.'

[7] E. G. C. F. Atchley, *Ordo Romanus Primus* (Library of Liturgiology and Ecclesiology), London, 1905, p. 97.

[8] Maskell, i. p. ccxl. [9] Ct. Aquinas above.

[10] *Canones et Decreta*, sess. xiv., 'de Sacr. Poen. et Extr. Unct.,' 1–3.

[11] The subject of unction of the sick is treated very fully by F. W. Puller (*The Anointing of the Sick*, London, 1904), but the present writer had not the advantage of having seen that book before compiling this article. Puller gives at length the evidence of which only an outline is here attempted. He is specially concerned to refute the later teaching about Extreme Unction and to advocate what he argues to be a more primitive use. His argument is greatly strengthened by R. H. Connolly's investigations as to the 'so-called *Egyptian Church Order*'; see § 1 (*c*) above.

(*a*) At the consecration—or, as it was originally called, the ordination—of a bishop unction is not so ancient as the laying on of the hand, or as the custom of putting the book of the gospels on the elect's head. But it is found at Rome in the 5th century.

Leo the Great says: 'Now there is a nobler rank of Levites [deacons], there are elders [presbyters] of greater dignity, and priests [bishops] of holier anointing ['sacratior est unctio sacerdotum'].'[1] Elsewhere he says that 'it is not the prerogative of earthly origin which obtains the unction, but the condescension of divine grace which creates the bishop,'[2] and that 'the unction of the Holy Spirit consecrates priests.'[3] It is just possible, but not likely, that the unction here is only metaphorical.

In the 6th cent. Gregory the Great refers to this unction of the bishop;[4] and it is found also in Gaul, but not in 'Africa,' and perhaps not in Spain.[5] In *Egbert's Pontifical*, of the 8th cent., both head and hands were anointed;[6] and this was the case at Rome also.[7] In England the bishop's head was twice anointed, first with chrism mixed with oil, then (just before the unction of the hands) with chrism only; on each occasion was said:

'May thy head be anointed and hallowed with celestial blessing in the pontifical order, through the unction of holy chrism and oil and our blessing, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, Amen.'[8]

(*b*) Unction at the ordination of a presbyter was not the custom of the earlier Roman Church, as Pope Nicholas I. explicitly states in 864.[9] It is not in the *Leonine Sacramentary* nor in some MSS of the *Gregorian*;[10] but it became general in the West after the 9th cent., and was introduced at Rome. Amalarius of Metz († 837) says that in Gaul the presbyter's hands were anointed at ordination by the bishop.[11] In *Egbert's Pontifical* the presbyter's head was also anointed,[12] but this seems soon to have been dropped.

(*c*) Unction of the hands at the ordination of deacons seems to have been a peculiarity of the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon rites; it is mentioned in Gildas's *Epistle*[13] (*c.* A.D. 560) and in *Egbert's Pontifical*.[14]

In all these cases the unction of the hands was on the palms.[15]

5. Unction at the coronation of kings.—The idea of this unction was the same as that of the unction at ordination. It is taken from the OT.

In 1 S 9[16] 10[1] 16[13] Samuel anoints Saul and David; in 2 S 2[4] men of Judah anoint David (so metaphorically Ps 89[20]); in 1 K 1[34. 39] Zadok and Nathan anoint Solomon, Zadok applying the oil; in 1 K 19[15f.] Elijah anoints Hazael and Jehu; in 2 K 11[12] 'they made [Joash] king and anointed him.' Hence comes the phrase 'the Lord's Anointed' in 1 S 16[6] and elsewhere, also in La 4[20], and even of Cyrus in Is 45[1]; and in Jotham's parable, Jg 9[8], the trees 'anoint a king over them.'

This unction is first mentioned as a Christian custom in the Acts of the sixth Council of Toledo[16] (A.D. 638). The Visigoth kings in Spain were anointed at their inauguration. We read of unction at that of King Wamba in 672.[17] And in

[1] *Serm.* lix. 7 (*de Pass. Dom.* viii.).

[2] *Ib.* iii. 1 (on the anniversary of his consecration).

[3] *Ib.* iv. 1.

[4] *In I. Reg.* ch. 10, quoted by J. Morinus, *Commentarius de sacris Ecclesiæ Ordinationibus*, Paris, 1655, IV. vi. 2. § 2.

[5] Morinus, § 1.

[6] Ed. Greenwell, p. 3; Martène, vol. ii. col. 101.

[7] Morinus, § 2. [8] Maskell, iii. 263, 269.

[9] E. Hatch, in *DCA* ii. 1514[b].

[10] Ed. H. A. Wilson, p. 6. This also applies to the consecration of bishops (Wilson, p. 5).

[11] *De Eccl. Off.* ii. 13. [12] Ed. Greenwell, p. 24.

[13] § 106; see art. ORDINATION (Christian), vol. ix. p. 543[b].

[14] Ed. Greenwell, p. 21; Martène, vol. ii. col. 100; see also cols. 110, 179.

[15] See § 3 above.

[16] J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio*, Florence and Venice, 1758–98, x. 659–674. On the whole subject of the inauguration of kings see R. M. Woolley, *Coronation Rites*, Cambridge, 1915. The 'cornu illud de quo reges unguebantur' of the *Pilgrimage of 'Etheria'* ('Silvia') refers, not to Christian practice, but to a supposed relic of OT times (Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[3], p. 510).

[17] Woolley, pp. 33, 120.

France Pippin, father of Charlemagne, was anointed in 750.[1] But in these cases there is no mention of crowning, and the anointing was the central feature of the rite.[2] On the other hand, the emperors who were crowned for many centuries at Constantinople—for no emperor was crowned at Rome before Charlemagne—appear not to have been anointed before the 9th cent. (when Basil the Macedonian [867–886] is thought to have received unction),[3] or, as some believe, not before the 12th or 13th cent.;[4] in the latter case the earlier references are metaphorical only. In the Greek rite of coronation as fully developed, and hence in the Russian rite which is derived from it, unction is a prominent feature.[5] It is uncertain if Charlemagne was anointed *as Roman emperor*.[6] It will thus be seen that unction at the inauguration of kings is earlier than at that of emperors. Both England and France claimed to have a miraculous chrism sent down from heaven for the purpose.[7]

The Abyssinians have the custom of unction at the coronation of the Negus; it is probable that this is not derived from European practice, but is directly deduced from Holy Scripture.[8]

The coronation service for an English king found in *Egbert's Pontifical* is the most ancient of those extant; it is printed by Martène[9] and Maskell,[10] and the latter gives in his notes a collation of the same service in the *Leofric Missal*. In Egbert the king is anointed once only, on the head, one of the bishops ('unus ex pontificibus') saying the prayer, and the others anointing him. There is here no coronation of a queen-consort, though we find one later (with unction), in the 10th century.[11] There was more than one recension of Egbert's office; that called the *Liber Regalis*, which probably dates from the time of Edward II., remained almost unchanged till the coronation of James II.[12] In the service in the *Sarum Pontifical* given by Maskell[13] the king's hands, head, breast, shoulder-blades, and elbows ('ambae compages brachiorum') are anointed.[14] The custom of anointing has been retained in England ever since the Reformation, at the coronation of a king, of a queen-regnant, and of a queen-consort. Notices of unction at the coronation of James I. and his queen, of Charles I., Charles II., James II., William and Mary, and Victoria may be found in *Hierurgia Anglicana*.[15] At the coronation of George V. the king was anointed thrice in the form of a cross (four Knights of the Garter holding over him a rich pall of silk or cloth of gold): first on the crown of the head, then on the breast, then on the palms of both hands.[16] Charles I. was anointed first on the palms of the hands, then (after a prayer) on the breast, then between the shoulders, then 'on the boughs of both arms,' then on the crown of the head;[17] this followed the more ancient custom. The English coronation rite is the only remaining office in Christendom where the full rites of the anointing and all the details of solemn investiture are still extant.[18] The chrism was, before the coronation, consecrated by the Dean of Westminster if a bishop, otherwise by the Archbishop of Canterbury; but in the case of William and Mary the oil was blessed in the coronation service itself; this addition to the latter was dropped from the time of Anne.[1]

In France Napoleon I. was anointed on head and hands at his coronation; and his consort Josephine likewise.[2]

In Scotland unction was first allowed at a king's inauguration in 1329.[3] After the Reformation there were four Scottish coronations: James VI. was crowned in 1567, when one year old; his consort, Anne of Denmark, was crowned in 1590; Charles I. was crowned as King of Scotland in 1633, Charles II. in 1651; at the first three coronations unction was used, but not at the last.[4]

On the continent of Europe we find anointing retained at coronations in the reformed rite at Prague in 1619, in Prussia in 1701, in Denmark from 1559 to 1840, in Sweden from 1675 till our own day, and in Norway in modern times.[5]

6. Unction at the consecration of churches, etc.—This also is taken from the OT.

Jacob anointed the stone in Gn 28[18], and S. R. Driver remarks that this was a very common idea among primitive peoples.[6] The tabernacle was anointed in Ex 30[26] 40[9], Lv 8[10], Nu 7[1]. In Is 57[6] we read of the pouring of a drink-offering to the 'smooth stones of the valley.'

From an early date churches and altars were consecrated with chrism.

We read of this in Gaul at the councils of Agde or Agatha[7] and Epaon,[8] in the *Canons* of Egbert of York,[9] in his *Pontifical*,[10] in Isidore of Seville,[11] Rabanus Maurus († A.D. 815), the disciple of Alcuin,[12] and Walafrid Strabo († A.D. 849).[13] In the *Sarum Pontifical*[14] twelve places in the church and the altar are anointed with chrism; holy water is also used. But neither oil nor chrism was used in reconciling a desecrated church.[15]

We find the same custom in the East. In pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (*c.* A.D. 500?) the altar is consecrated with unguent (*μύρῳ*).[16] The West Syrians (Jacobites) use chrism in consecrating altars,[17] as also do the Greeks.[18] From the 8th cent. we read of the Armenians consecrating churches with unguent,[19] even in the case of the rededication of a desecrated church.[20] Among the East Syrians (Nestorians) the consecration of a church is called *syāmīdhā* ('laying on of the hand') and is of two kinds, with and without oil; the former is for new or rebuilt churches, or for rededicating a church which has been desecrated owing to some very grave cause, and must be performed by a bishop; the latter is intended for use after minor accidents or breaches of the ecclesiastical law, and may be performed by priests commissioned by the bishop. In the former each wall and the altar and the outer lintel of the sanctuary door towards the nave are signed with the oil in the form of a cross.[21]

In the *Sarum Manual* of 1543 bells also are dedicated with oil and chrism,[22] and, at a much earlier date, in *Egbert's Pontifical*.[23] Similarly the Armenians dedicate with chrism the semantron—a wooden board struck by a mallet, and much used by Eastern Christians to call the people to church.[24] The Armenians also solemnly dedicate a cross, even for private use, with unguent.[25] In *Dunstan's Pontifical* the chalice is anointed when it is dedicated.[26]

1 Woolley, p. 34. 2 *Ib.* p. 167. 3 *Ib.* p. 179.
4 F. E. Brightman, in *JThSt* ii. [1901] 383 ff.
5 Woolley, pp. 25, 29, 177.
6 See the discussion in Woolley, pp. 40, 169.
7 *Ib.* pp. 73, 103. 8 *Ib.* pp. 30, 180. 9 ii. 10, ord. 1.
10 iii. 74. It may also be seen in the Surtees Soc. (ed. W. Greenwell), p. 101. Some think that it is later than Egbert.
11 Woolley, p. 65. 12 *Ib.* p. 69.
13 iii. 3. In his notes Maskell refers to earlier authorities also.
14 *Ib.* pp. 19, 22.
15 New ed. revised by V. Staley, London, 1902–04, ii. 118, 121–124, 283 f.
16 D. Macleane, *The Great Solemnity of the Coronation*[2], London, 1911, p. 80. In this work the full office is given with elaborate notes.
17 *Ib.* p. 328. 18 *Ib.* p. 314.

1 Woolley, pp. 80, 86. 2 *Ib.* p. 107.
3 *Ib.* p. 137. 4 *Ib.* pp. 80, 138 f.
5 *Ib.* pp. 143–156.
6 *The Book of Genesis* (Westminster Com.), London, 1904, p. 267.
7 Can. 14 (A.D. 506). 8 Can. 26 (A.D. 517).
9 Can. 51 (A.D. 732–766). 10 Martène, ii. 13, ord. 2.
11 *Ad Leudef.* 10. 12 *De Inst. Cler.* ii. 45.
13 *De Reb. Eccl.* 9. 14 Maskell, i. 163, 185 ff.
15 *Ib.* iii. 308 ff. 16 *Hier. Eccl.* iv. 12.
17 E. Renaudot, *Liturgiarum Orientalium Collectio*[2]. Frankfort-on-Main, 1847, ii. 57.
18 Goar, *Euchologion*, pp. 837 f., 842.
19 Conybeare, *Rit. Arm.* p. 6. 20 *Ib.* p. 33.
21 A. J. Maclean and W. H. Browne, *The Catholicos of the East*, p. 303 f.
22 Maskell, i. 158 f. 23 Ed. Greenwell, p. 118.
24 Conybeare, p. 39; see also Maclean-Browne, pp. 210, 213, 251.
25 Conybeare, pp. 46, 51.
26 Martène, ii. 13, ord. 4. For further details as to unction at the consecration of churches and altars see art. CONSECRATION.

In England the Caroline divines used oil in consecrating churches. The Puritans objected that 'they shew us that the church, by the bishop's anointing some stones thereof with oil, and sprinkling others with water, and using from the Roman pontifical some more prayers, some more ceremonies upon it, becomes a ground more holy.'[1]

7. Unction of a dead body.—From the first the Christians prepared the body for burial either by embalming or with spices and unguents (*μύρα*);[2] this was in contrast to the Roman custom of cremation. References to the Christian usages in this respect are found in Tertullian,[3] Clement of Alexandria,[4] Minucius Felix[5] (early 3rd cent.?), and in the *Acta* of Tarachus, a martyr in the Diocletian persecution (A.D. 304).[6]

As an ecclesiastical act we find it, in the East, in pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; the hierarch [bishop] and the rest salute the dead body, and the hierarch pours oil on the departed, just as before baptism the candidates are anointed with the oil of the sacred chrism.[7] In Goar's *Euchologion* we read of a corpse being anointed just before burial with oil from church lamps, or of a cinder from the thurible being placed on it.[8] This custom is also found in the books of the East Syrians (Nestorians) and of the Armenians, where clergy anoint the departed, the Armenians calling it a sacrament;[9] but in practice, while in the case of a departed dignitary the East Syrians retain the solemn final kiss of peace, they do not appear to use unction.[10] The office used by the Armenians for the purpose may be seen in Denzinger.[11] In the West, Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, says that dead monks were carried to church and anointed on the breast with chrism before the mass.[12]

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

A. J. MACLEAN.

UNDER WORLD.—1. Origin of the belief.—The wide-spread conception of an under world in religion and myth is generally, though not invariably, associated with the dead. An under world of the dead is not the only conception of their dwelling-place: spirits may lurk about the place of burial or linger among the abodes of the living; they may dwell in distant regions or islands, or they may ascend to a place in the sky. These conceptions may be held simultaneously, especially where differences of rank or ideas of retribution suggest separate places for different classes of souls. They are also connected, especially in the lower culture, with the idea that man has several souls which after death separate and abide in different localities. They may also result from the mingling of different tribal or racial beliefs.[13] We do not know what ideas the earliest men had regarding the dead, or how soon the belief in a spirit or soul, apart from the body, was entertained. But, while it must have been obvious that death had brought about some difference between the dead and the living, it is doubtful if the dead were ever regarded as absolutely extinct and cut off from all life and action. The wide-spread and early custom of burial, the practice of placing articles by the corpse, and the feeding of the dead at the grave, all suggest the contrary. It is not improbable, therefore, that the dead man was regarded as passing some kind of existence in the grave. The grave was his house, and it was this idea perhaps that led to the custom of making very elaborate tombs for the dead, of which the chambered barrow forms an example. That the dead lived on in the grave, while their return among the living was feared, is also suggested by the belief that they could come from it in the body—in which we find the root of the vampire belief[1]—and by the customs of heaping a mound of earth or placing heavy stones on the grave, and binding the dead with cords.[2] Many folk-traditions represent the dead as coming in the body from the grave,[3] and the idea of their still living in the grave or barrow is seen clearly in early Scandinavian tradition. Thus the grave was in itself a small under world. This was more emphasized where several persons were buried in one tumulus or grave, or where the separate graves of members of one family or clan lay side by side. The grave or graves as a subterranean dwelling-place easily passed over into the conception of a hollow region under the earth, an under world where the dead lived. At whatever time the conception of the soul, spirit, or shade arose, it did not alter this belief. The spirit might come and go from the grave or inhabit with other shades the larger under world.

The formation of a belief in an under world was also aided by observed phenomena. The sun seemed to rise out of the earth or sea in the east and to sink into these again in the west. What then more natural than to suppose that during the night it passed through some underground region, to emerge again in the morning? This under world (sometimes thought of as beneath the sea into which the sun seems to sink) through which the sun passed was then associated with the abode of the dead, and in many descriptions of the latter we are expressly told that, when it is night here, it is day there, and *vice versa*. Hence, too, the entrance to the abode of the dead is not always near at hand, but far off, usually towards the sunset, and their dwelling-place is reached only after a long and perilous journey.

Yet for many races the under world was not visited by the sun. Being under the earth, it was a dark and gloomy place, and this was accentuated by the fact that those who inhabited it were shades or shadows. Here, too, we may see another conception leading to the idea of another world. The eyes of the dead were closed; they were in darkness. Their shades were faint replicas of living beings, seen only in dreams and darkness. Where could such have their abode? The grave was a dark, hollow place, and men knew also that caves leading into the interior of earth grew darker as the entrance was farther left behind. There must then be a dark, hollow place within the earth, fit abode for those now shut off from light.

Thus the under world may be a shadowy, undesirable place, or, again, it may be a reflexion of the upper world, now light, now dark, as the sun visits or leaves it.

2. The under world in ancient religions.—It is surprising that cultured races in the past hardly abandoned the belief in a gloomy under world. The Babylonians called this region Aralu, and it was conceived as a vast underground dwelling, as 'the land without return,' the dark abode of all the shades of the dead, with its entrance in the west, the region of sunset. The sombre goddess Eresh-Kigal and the terrible god Nergal ruled over it. Seven walls, pierced by as many gates,

[1] *Hierurgia Anglicana*, new ed., ii. 237.
[2] Lk 23[56].
[3] *Apol.* 42, *de Idol.* 11; and, for embalming, *de Res. Carn.* 27.
[4] *Pæd.* ii. 8 [62].
[5] *Octavius*, 12.
[6] § 7; T. Ruinart, *Acta primorum martyrum*[2], ed. R. Massuet, Amsterdam, 1713, p. 436.
[7] *Hier. Eccl.* vii. 8.
[8] P. 538.
[9] Denzinger, i. 190.
[10] Maclean-Browne, p. 287.
[11] ii. 523 f.
[12] *Capitulare*, § 115 (A.D. 668); see also d'Achery, i. 490.
[13] On these varying conceptions see artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE; STATE OF THE DEAD.

[1] See art. VAMPIRE.
[2] For many examples see J. G. Frazer, 'On Certain Burial Customs as illustrative of the Primitive Theory of the Soul,' *JAI* xv. [1886] 64–104.
[3] J. A. MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 102 f.

surrounded this place of terror, where 'dust lay thick on door and bolt,' where the shades dwelt with dust for their food, in darkness and gloom, among terrible evil spirits and demons. All these ideas are vividly set forth in the story of the descent of Ištar to Hades. How far other conceptions of a better region or of retribution were held by the Babylonians need not be discussed here. Gloomy as was the fate of the dead in Aralu, there was a worse fate, viz. where burial rites had not been performed and the spirit had to wander, consumed by gnawing hunger and feeding on offal.[1]

The older Hebrew conception was not dissimilar, and the strong desire to be buried in the family grave or by the side of relatives suggests that Sheol or Hades, like the under world elsewhere, was 'originally conceived as a combination of the graves of the clan or nation.'[2] The shades (*rĕphāîm*) dwelt in the under world, outside the rule of Jahweh, distinguished from each other according to their state on earth, but in a region of darkness, dust, and silence. The state of the shades in Sheol is seen from such passages as Ps 115^{17}, Job 7^{9} $10^{21f.}$, Is $14^{9f.}$, Ezk $32^{17f.}$. While the later belief was generally different from this, it still kept the idea of an under world, but now generally as an intermediate state of the dead, waiting for the day of judgment in different compartments of it, better or worse, for the righteous or the wicked. Sometimes it was a place of torment for the wicked at death, or it or a subterranean Gehenna became the place of torment after the judgment.[3]

An under world does not appear consistently in Egyptian beliefs regarding the dead, their state and locality, which were of a conflicting nature. In the earliest period, and indeed all through the later periods, the soul was associated with the body in its sepulchre, leaving it and returning to it. An under world is spoken of here and there, probably connected with the grave. But many other regions—on earth's surface or in heaven—were open to the dead. In the Osirian religion the blissful abode was in heaven or elsewhere, and it was sometimes regarded as lying in a deep hole under the earth.[4] The theology of the religion of Rā pictured the soul traversing the other world in the bark of the sun by night, passing through guarded gates into twelve successive regions, peopled by gods, demons, and the dead. These regions were either underground or in what corresponded to an under world—the valley through which the sun passed behind the Mountain of Sunset until it reappeared in the east. This was the Duat, or Tuat, the hidden part of the world.[5]

According to O. Schrader, the primitive Indo-European conception of the realms of the dead was that the ancestral spirits dwelt in the earth. They made no distinction between this region of the dead and the tomb.[6] In Vedic times in India, probably as a result of the newer custom of cremation, Yama's kingdom, to which the spirits of the fathers went (the *pitṛs*), was a heavenly one, but it is probable that it had formerly been a subterranean region.[1] The Vedic hells as well as those of Brāhmanic and later Hindu belief are abysses of the under world;[2] yet even in the earlier (Vedic) period we hear of the fathers being in the earth, and in the age of the epics Yama's realm is in the south, beneath the earth.[3]

The Greeks preserved the idea of an under world of the dead, Hades, the hidden place, intact for a long period. See art. UNDER WORLD (Greek).

The Roman under world, Dis, was the abode of the *manes*, and this belief was connected with the earlier one, that the soul rested with the body in the tomb. In the Comitium at Rome the *lapis manalis* covered an opening which was supposed to lead to the underground abode of the shades, whence they came up to be fed on the days when the stone was removed. Other approaches to the under world were known—*e.g.*, the cave of Avernus at Naples. But to the Romans the under world was never such a definitely expressed object of belief as it was to the Greeks.

The Scandinavian and Teutonic under world, Hel, the hollow place, was perhaps an extension of the hollow barrow or tumulus in which the dead were supposed to live feasting and occupying themselves with the good of their kindred. Though later conceived as a gloomy place of punishment, this description applies more properly to Niflhel, lower than Hel. All men at first went to Hel,[4] which, in the Elder Edda, is hardly a place of gloom. As described in *Balder's Doom*, a road leads through the under world by grassy plains to the mighty hall of Hel (*i.e.* the goddess who rules over Hel). Walls are decked with shields, and beer stands ready on tables.[5] The myths seem to prove that Mimir's fountain of immortal mead and his grove, and Urd's fountain, were in the under world.[6]

Similarly in the old mythology of the Finns and of the Esthonians the region of the dead is an under world. By the Finns it was called Tuonela, and, possibly through Christian influences, it had come to be regarded as a place of punishment. The Esthonians called their under world Porgu, and it was supposed to be reached through a cave.[7]

The old native religion of Japan, Shinto, regarded the dead as still living in the tomb, but the Japanese also had a belief in a dark and repulsive under world called Yomi ('darkness') and Ne no kuni ('the root country'), with divinities of death and plague. Though not specifically said to be the region of the dead, it would appear to have been, as the name Yomi is used for the state of the dead or the grave, while the place itself, regarded as a region of corruption, suggests the decay of the tomb. Yomi was later identified with the Buddhist hell.[8]

3. The under world in the lower culture.—Among the lower races opinions as to the locality in which the dead exist are as various as in the beliefs of the higher races, but the conception of an under world frequently occurs, and its nature and conditions are described with great detail.

[1] A. Jeremias, *The Babylonian Conception of Heaven and Hell*, tr. J. Hutchison, London, 1902; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, U.S.A., 1898, p. 563 ff., *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1911, ch. vi.; art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS, § 4.

[2] R. H. Charles, *EBi*, col. 1339.

[3] See art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 10; R. H. Charles, 'Eschatology' in *EBi*, *Critical Hist. of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism, in Christianity*, London, 1899.

[4] W. Max. Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, xii.), Boston, U.S.A., 1918, p. 176.

[5] A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 109 f.; A. Wiedemann, *The Realms of the Egyptian Dead*, tr. J. Hutchison, do. 1901; E. A. T. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, do. 1904, i. 170.

[6] *ERE* ii. 30 f.; A. Bergaigne, *La Religion védique*, Paris, 1878–83, i. 77 f.

[1] E. Hardy, *Indische Religionsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 23.

[2] See *Rigveda*, vii. 104.

[3] A. Berriedale Keith, *Indian Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vi.), Boston, 1917, pp. 101, 159.

[4] *Fáfnismál*, x. 39.

[5] G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 182.

[6] See art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic).

[7] A. von Schiefner, *Kalewala*, Helsingfors, 1852, Rune 15; W. F. Kirby, *The Hero of Esthonia*, London, 1895, i. 100, 124.

[8] W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, pp. 106, 181, 187; B. H. Chamberlain, *Ko-ji-ki*, Yokohama, 1883 (*TASJ* x, Suppl.), p. 36; art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Japanese), § 1.

Such an under world, sometimes situated beneath the sea, is known to some of the tribes of New Guinea, sometimes as a place resembling this world, sometimes much superior to it, while, as with the Waga-Waga, it is said that, when it is night here, it is day there, and *vice versa*, suggesting that it is visited by the sun during our night.[1] A region under the sea, called Tsiabiloum, is the place of spirits, according to the New Caledonians — a delightful place, far more fertile than earth, where sickness, death, toil, and darkness are unknown.[2] In many parts of Melanesia the other world is above ground, often on a distant island, but in the eastern group of islands it is below the earth and is called Panoi and other names. It is a peaceful place and on the whole resembles the upper world. But, according to some, the spirits die there, and then revive in another Panoi, situated below the first.[3]

Generally in Polynesia, while a superior heavenly region was reserved for men of rank or for those slain in battle, there was an under world for all the other spirits of the dead, called Po, or Sa-le-fee, or other names. This region was mainly regarded as a gloomy, undesirable place, though sometimes, as in Raratonga, it was pleasant and bright.[4]

In N. America the Eskimo have a belief in various regions for different people, but among the different tribes the under world constantly appears, now as a better, now as a worse place.[5] The American Indian tribes are far from uniform in their beliefs; the under world of the dead is found mainly among the tribes of the south-west, but sporadically elsewhere. It is reached after a long journey, and is generally a pleasant region, and also the place whence the first men emerged on earth's surface.[6] Occasionally, as with the Tlingit, the underworld abode is one of several, and it is to it that drowned persons go.[7] Similar distinctions, according to rank or manner of death, occurred with the Mexicans, whose under world, Mictlan, was a gloomy place, reserved for those who did not go to one of the other regions. This resembled the dismal under world of the Peruvians, the place allotted to the bulk of the people. An under world of the dead is less frequently met with among the S. American tribes—*e.g.*, the Matacos, the Muyscas, and the Patagonians, who thought that vast underground caverns contained the souls of the dead. None of these were unpleasant places.[8]

Among African tribes, both Bantu and Negro, the belief in an under world is very common. This country of the dead is usually reached through a cave or hole in the ground, or through a pool or lake. Especially with the Bantu it is a region much like the earth, with villages, forests, rivers, etc., but among some Negro tribes it is less desirable, as some of their sayings suggest.[1] Stories of descent by the living to this underground region are widely spread over Africa.

4. The under world in Christian belief.—Through both Jewish and pagan influences the locality of the souls of the dead in Christian belief was placed beneath the earth, either as an intermediate state, with part of it as a paradise region (Irenæus, Tertullian), or, more generally, a place of punishment. This belief is illustrated from theological writings, legends, poems (*e.g.*, Dante's *Inferno*), and art. It has now ceased to be a vital part of Christian belief.

5. The under world as fairyland.—In the art. FAIRY it is shown how frequently the abode of the fairies, dwarfs, and such like beings is underground, and various theories for this folk-belief are discussed—*e.g.*, that which regards fairies as spirits of the dead.

6. Divinities of the under world.—The divinity who reigns over the under world is frequently a personification of that region itself, and this is more particularly the case where, *e.g.*, Earth and Under-earth are conceived as personified in one being. The earth-goddess is also the ruler of souls (*e.g.*, Demeter or Persephone), with the under-earth people, the Δημήτριοι or ὑποχθόνιοι, as her subjects.[2]

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the footnotes. See also artt. STATE OF THE DEAD, DESCENT TO HADES (Ethnic).

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

UNDER WORLD (Greek).—The Greek conception of the under world is the product of a long process of evolution. The following strata can be clearly determined.

1. An under world which is strictly local, and in which the attributes of the dead are purely physical.—This conception is well expressed in a vase in the Central Museum at Athens. This archaic vase is of the type known as 'prothesis,' a class of vase used in funeral ceremonies and decorated with funeral subjects. Two mourners stand lamenting, one on either side of a grave, erect on which is a 'prothesis' vase. Within the grave itself is represented what the mourners believed the grave to contain: (*a*) the *eidola*, little winged figures of the dead, and (*b*) a great snake. The under world was to the vase-painter strictly local; it was the grave itself. The little winged *eidola*, shrunken men, represent the individual dead, strengthless and vain; the great snake represents the collective might of the dead, the δαίμων of life and reincarnation, the immortality of the γένος or tribe. This δαίμων in human form was the tribal hero, in later monarchical days the king, like the ancestor of the Athenians, envisaged as half-man, half-snake. He was essentially a local power, and to him the fertility of the local earth was due; his temple was his tomb. This belief in the snake-hero was essentially the faith of a settled people of agriculturists to whom the local earth with its perennial crops was all-important—a people who practised field-magic. With the heroic age, its shiftings of peoples, its conquests and migrations, the conception of the under world, dependent like all other religious conceptions on social developments, was bound to change. This brings us to the next development or stratum.

2. An under world remote, non-local, Pan-Hellenic—in a word, the Homeric or heroic under world.—In *Odyssey*, xi., the so-called *Nekuia*, we have a description of an under world which, though its kernel is undoubtedly local, *i.e.* Bœotian, has become in virtue of many accretions Pan-

[1] A. Goudswaard, *De Papoewa's van de Geelvinksbaai*, Schiedam, 1863, p. 77; J. L. D. van der Roest, *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, xl. [1898] 164 f. (Papuans of Windessi); R. E. Guise, *JRAI* xxviii. [1899] 216 (Hood Peninsula); M. J. Erdweg, *Mittheilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxii. [1902] 297 (Tumleo); G. Bamler, in R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 514 f. (Tami); C. Keysser, in Neuhauss, iii. 149 (Kai); S. Lehner, in Neuhauss, iii. 472 f. (Bukaua); C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 655 f.

[2] R. P. Lambert, *Mœurs et superstitions des Néo-Calédoniens*, Nouméa, 1900, p. 13 f.

[3] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, pp. 273, 275 f.

[4] See, for further details, artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 3; POLYNESIA, § 9.

[5] F. Boas, *6 RBEW* [1888], p. 588 (Central Eskimo); E. W. Nelson, *18 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. p. 423 (Eskimo of Bering Strait).

[6] *11 RBEW* [1894], pp. 68 (Sia), 512 (Mandan), 517 (Hidatsa); *17 RBEW* [1898], pt. i. p. 292 f. (Seri); *NR* iii. 528 (Navaho); H. B. Alexander, *American Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, x.), Boston, 1916, pp. 147, 274.

[7] *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 460 ff.

[8] I. A. Baldrich, *Las Camareas Vírgenes*, Buenos Ayres, 1890, p. 12; T. Falkner, *A Description of Patagonia*, Hereford, 1774, p. 142 f.

[1] See artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage), § 5; BANTU AND S. AFRICA, § 4; NEGROES AND W. AFRICA, § 3; Alice Werner, *African Mythology* (=*Mythology of all Races*, vii.) Boston, ch. iv. f.

[2] See art. EARTH, EARTH-GODS, § 7 f.

Hellenic. This under world is no longer a local grave, but a vast remote kingdom of the dead, separated from the living world by the stream of Okeanos, but in confused fashion accessible by a trench dug in the earth. The old conception partly lives on. This under world of Homer reflects of course the Homeric social structure. We have the great mass of the people represented by the 'strengthless heads of the dead,' who 'sweep shadow-like around,' and with whom Odysseus holds no converse; and we have the souls of great particular heroes, who, after drinking of the black blood, can hold converse with the living. Instead of the collective δαίμων, the snake, we have individual aristocratic heroes who emerge in truly heroic fashion. The function of these splendid Homeric dead is not to fertilize the earth for their successors, but to live on themselves after their kind, though in more shadowy fashion. They are no longer either physical or local; they are functionless—no longer perennial, but merely immortal and quite non-moral.

To the literary *Nekuia* of Homer must be added the great fresco of Polygnotus, the Nekuia painted by him in the Lesche at Delphi of which Pausanias has given us a detailed account.[1] The Nekuia of Polygnotus is, if we may trust Pausanias, based not on the *Odyssey* but on another Bœotian epic now lost, the *Minyad*. In it stress is laid on a new element just dawning in the *Nekuia* of the *Odyssey*, and this brings us to our third stratum.

3. An under world which is moralized, containing new elements—retribution and purification.—These two elements appear very clearly in a black-figured amphora at Munich.[2] To the right is Sisyphos rolling up his stone, to the left the Danaids are filling their bottomless cask. Sisyphos stands for retribution, the Danaids mark the transition to purification.

In the *Nekuia* of Homer Odysseus, after he has had speech of various heroes whom he has known in the upper world, sees as in a vision, but does not speak with, Minos the judge of Hades, Orion the mighty hunter, and the great criminals Tityos, Tantalos, Sisyphos. Of these figures the two first are marked by one great characteristic: they are doing in Hades what they did in the upper world. Minos, who judged Crete, is judging in Hades; Orion is still hunting wild beasts. But the three 'criminals' have been usually supposed to be, not carrying on their normal pursuits, but being 'tormented.' S. Reinach has brilliantly and conclusively shown that the three 'criminals' also are depicted as carrying on their earthly activities; it is only a later moralizing age that supposes them 'tormented.' We will take only one instance—Sisyphos rolling his stone. Sisyphos is the ancient king of Corinth, and, like all other ancient kings, a δαίμων of weather and sky powers. He controls the sun; in a sense he is the sun. It is his business to roll the ball of the sun, the huge stone, up the steeps of heaven, whence eternally it rolls down again. The senseless punishment becomes intelligible as a periodic function eternally incumbent. Hades is peopled with the δαίμων powers of an elder world; it is the dower-house of antique religion.

The Danaids are analogous figures; but about them have grown up accretions more complex; they stand not only for retribution but also for purification, and they are ultimately connected with the mystery-cult of Orpheus. Primarily, however, they are quite simple figures; they are the daughters of the old Danaos, king of Argos. He makes the weather, and they make the rain; they are well-nymphs, projections of ancient rain-making ceremonials; they carry water in order that water may well forth from sky and earth. They are depicted as on the vase pouring water in a *pithos*-well, the bottom pierced to communicate with and fertilize the earth. But their labour is ceaseless, *i.e.* periodic, year by year. But, when their nature as rain-makers is forgotten, the ceaseless labour is thought of as a punishment, a retribution; they are 'condemned to carry water in leaky vessels'; they, the fertility-bringers, are doomed to endless, barren toil. What was their crime? But for Pausanias,[1] we could never have guessed. He saw in the Nekuia at Delphi figures represented as carrying water in broken vessels, and he explains them as 'of the number of those who held the Eleusinian mysteries to be of no account.' They are the uninitiated, never purified in the upper world; they ceaselessly seek purification in the world below. Thus the well-nymphs, with their simple physical function as perennial fertilizers, have been moralized by a later and mystical theology.

In the Hades of Homer there are no water-carriers, no uninitiated, for Homer knows nothing of the mysteries. His theology has reached the retribution, but not the purification, stage. But from Homer onwards, as has recently been shown by Gilbert Murray, the conceptions of bliss and torment are in ancient literature, and we may add in ancient art, 'always connected with the mysteries,' whether Orphic or Eleusinian. The mental pictures of Heaven and Hell which were current in ancient times and are still to a certain extent traditional among us are based on the actual ritual of the mysteries. The scenery and arrangements, so to speak, of the other world are, in the first instance, projections of the initiation-ceremonies. Such is the purgatorial water-carrying of the uninitiated Danaids.

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UNEMPLOYMENT.—See EMPLOYMENT.

UNIATS.—See SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.

UNIFORMITY.—See LAW (Natural), ORDER.

UNITARIANISM.—Unitarianism, an English term derived from the Latin *unitarius* (first used of a legalized religion in 1600[2]), is applied to a mode of religious thought and organization founded on the conception of the single personality of the Deity in contrast to the orthodox doctrine of His triune nature. The corresponding term 'Trinitarian' was first used in the modern sense by Servetus in 1546. The adjective 'Unitarian' has sometimes been employed beyond the limits of Christianity—*e.g.*, in connexion with Muhammadanism; this article deals only with the development of modern Unitarianism on Christian lines. The place of the corresponding doctrine in the NT and the early Church must be studied in the usual authorities on historical theology.

1. Beginnings on the Continent.—The general movement of humanism at the opening of the 16th cent. led to a variety of speculation which was largely stimulated by the publication of the Greek text of the NT by Erasmus (1516). His omission of the famous Trinitarian verse, 1 Jn 5^7, and his aversion to the scholastic type of disputations produced a marked effect on many minds. The earliest literary trace of anti-Trinitarian tendencies is usually found in a treatise of Martin Cellarius

[1] x. 28–31. [2] Jahn Cat. 153.

[1] x. xxxi. 11. [2] See § 4 below.

(1499–1564), pupil of Reuchlin, and at first a follower and friend of Luther. In 1527 he published at Strassburg a work entitled *de Operibus Dei*, in which he used the term *deus* of Christ in the same sense in which Christians also might be called *dei* as 'sons of the Highest.' The first treatise of Servetus (1511–53), *de Trinitatis Erroribus*, followed in 1531. The minds of the young were on the alert. Teachers, theologians, lawyers, physicians, mathematicians, men of letters and science, were all astir. They travelled and discussed, and new views were carried far and wide. In Naples a young Spaniard, John Valdes, became the centre of a religious group of noble ladies for the study of the Scriptures till his death in 1541; and in 1539 Melanchthon found it necessary to warn the Venetian senate of the existence of widespread Servetianism in N. Italy. Out of this circle comes Bernard Ochino (1487–1565) of Siena, who passes slowly through Switzerland to London, serves as one of the pastors of the Strangers' Church (1550–53) till it is broken up by Queen Mary, takes shelter again in Zürich, and finally migrates to Poland in 1559, and joins the anti-Trinitarian party. There Catherine Vogel, a jeweller's wife, had been burned at the age of 80 in 1539 at Cracow for believing in 'the existence of one God, creator of all the visible and the invisible world, who could not be conceived by the human intellect.'[1] An anti-Trinitarian movement showed itself at the second synod of the Reformed Church in 1556, and in 1558 secured a leader in the person of a Piedmontese physician, George Blandrata. Dutch Anabaptists started various heretical movements, and David Joris of Delft (1501–56) declared in his *Wonder-book* (1542) that there is but 'one God, sole and indivisible, and that it is contrary to the operation of God throughout creation to admit a God in three persons.' Thousands of Protestants from Germany, Alsace, and the Low Countries, migrated to England in the reign of Henry VIII., and the Strangers' Church under Edward VI. contained also Frenchmen, Walloons, Italians, and Spaniards.

2. Beginnings in England.—English thought was not unaffected. In the 15th cent. Reginald Peacock, bishop of Chichester, had opened the way by his two treatises, the *Repressor of overmuch Blaming of the Clergy*[2] and the *Book of Faith*,[3] to the discussion of the relative values of Scripture, tradition, and reason as grounds of faith, and had pleaded for freedom of investigation. Lollard and Anabaptist diverged in different directions from orthodoxy along independent lines. On 28th Dec. 1548 a priest named John Assheton abjured before Cranmer the 'damnable heresies' that 'the Holy Ghost is not God, but only a certain power of the Father,' and that 'Jesus Christ, that was conceived of the Virgin Mary, was a holy prophet . . . but was not the true and living God.' In the following April a commission was appointed to search out all Anabaptists, heretics, or contemners of the Common Prayer. A number of London tradesmen were brought before this body in May. The opinions which they recanted included the statements 'that there was no Trinity of persons; that Christ was only a holy prophet and not at all God; that all we had by Christ was that he taught us the way to heaven.'[4] Occasional executions took place, such as that of the surgeon George van Parris, of Mainz, in 1551 for saying that God the Father was the only God, and Christ was not very God. The Eastern counties, being in constant communication with Holland, supplied most of the victims, down to Bartholomew Legate, of Essex, who declared Christ a 'mere man,' but 'born free from sin,' and who was the last sufferer by Smithfield fires (1612), and Edward Wightman, who was burned a month later at Lichfield, charged with ten various heresies as incongruous as those of Ebion, Valentinus, Arius, and Manes.[1] One foreign teacher, Giacomo Aconzio (Latinized as Acontius, born at Trent about 1520), held his own through the troubled times. Engineer and theologian, philosopher and lawyer, mathematician and poet, he came to England in 1559, and received a post at Elizabeth's court, which he managed to retain even when Bishop Grindal excommunicated him two years later for advocating tolerance to Anabapists. In his *Stratagemata Satanæ*[2] he drew a distinction between articles of faith necessary to salvation and beliefs derived from them which might be matters of dispute. Adhering to Scripture, he declared the Father to be 'the only true God'; affirmed the moral, not the essential, filiation of Jesus Christ; and asserted the subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Father. But the time was not yet come for his full influence in England.

3. Types of speculation.—Three types of speculation were thus in the European field by the middle of the 16th century. (1) That of Servetus was founded on the 'dispositio' of Irenæus and the 'economy' of Tertullian;[3] the Trinity was a Trinity of manifestations or modes of operation; when God is all in all (1 Co 15^{28}), 'the Economy of the Trinity will cease.'[4] His theology was Christocentric: 'There is no other person of God but Christ . . . the entire Godhead of the Father is in him.'[5] (2) Many of the Anabaptists were Arians. (3) A humanitarian view of Jesus, recognizing a miraculous birth, was beginning to claim attention. The last of these succeeded in establishing itself in the east of Europe before English Unitarians began to move.

4. The Socinian development.—When Blandrata reached Poland in 1558, he found that there were already some anti-Trinitarians in the Protestant synod. Seven years later they were excluded, and they consequently formed a small group which refused to call itself by any other name than Christian, though other titles (such as the Minor Church) were sometimes applied to it. In 1579 the settlement of Faustus Socinus in their midst led to the establishment of a new theological type to be long known in Western Europe as Socinianism (*q.v.*).

Socinus (1539–1604) belonged to a distinguished Italian family, the Sozini, in Siena. His uncle Lelius Socinus (1525–62) had evaded the Inquisition by flight to Switzerland in 1547. He became the friend of Calvin and Melanchthon; he visited England; he travelled to Poland. He did not escape controversy and suspicion; he would not deny the doctrine of the Trinity, but he would accept it only in the words of Scripture. Faustus Socinus was of a more aggressive temper. At twenty-three years of age he published his *Explicatio primæ partis primi capitis Evangelii Johannis*,[6] in which he ascribed to Christ only an official and not an essential deity. A long series of works followed, and in 1578 he accepted an invitation from Blandrata, then in the service of Prince John Sigismund of Transylvania, and went to Kolozsvár. Blandrata had invoked his aid against Francis Dávid, who rejected all forms of

[1] Wallace, *Antitrinitarian Biography*, ii. 139, quoting Polish historians.
[2] Ed. C. Babington (Rolls series, xix. 1, 2), London, 1860.
[3] Ed. J. L. Morison, Glasgow, 1909.
[4] Gilbert Burnet, *Hist. of the Reformation of the Church of England*, London, 1679–81, bk. i., new ed., Oxford, 1829, ii. 229.

[1] Anti-Trinitarian opinions were developed in the first Baptist Church founded in London in 1613, by Thomas Helwys. See W. H. Burgess, *John Smith, the Se-Baptist*, London, 1911.
[2] Basel, 1565.
[3] *De Trin. Error.* p. 48.
[4] *Ib.* p. 82.
[5] *Ib.* p. 112 *f.*
[6] Rakow, 1662.

cultus addressed to Christ.[1] Socinus pleaded for the *adoratio Christi* as obligatory on all Christians, and urged that the *invocatio Christi* should not be forbidden. In 1579 he settled in Poland, where the rest of his life was spent. The members of the Minor Church were converted to his views, which found expression in the *Racovian Catechism* issued in Polish in 1605, a year after his death.[2] A Latin edition followed in 1609. The Polish adherents of Socinus failed, however, to hold their ground. Deprived of their right to office, their leaders were powerless. Roman Catholic reaction triumphed. Their college at Rakow was suppressed, and finally in 1660 they were offered the option of conformity or exile. Some went to Germany and Holland; some carried their worship to Transylvania, and maintained a slender separate existence till 1793. But the influence of Socinus was perpetuated in the massive volumes of the *Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum quos Unitarios vocant*, published at Amsterdam (1665-69). His theology rested on a rigid view of the authority of Scripture.[3] The modern methods of historical criticism were of course unknown. Philosophy raised no difficulties about the supernatural, but reason started objections from the side of the multiplication-table.

'The essence of God is one,' says the *Racovian Catechism*, 'not in kind but in number. Wherefore it cannot in any way contain a plurality of persons, since a person is nothing else than an individual intelligent essence. Wherever then there exist three numerical persons, there must necessarily in like manner be reckoned three individual essences, for in the same sense in which it is affirmed that there is one numerical essence, it must be held that there is one numerical person.'[4]

But Socinus admitted the application of the term 'God' to Christ in an inferior sense (Jn $10^{34ff.}$), and argued from Jn 3^{13} that after his baptism Christ had been conveyed to heaven, where he had beheld his Father, and heard from him the things which he was afterwards sent back to earth to teach. Raised again to heaven after his resurrection, he was made the head of all creation, with divine authority over the world, and in that sense God. He was thus no 'mere man,' and deserved divine honour. Modern Unitarianism has departed widely from this Christology. Apart from the necessarianism of Priestley, it is nearer to Socinus in its view of human nature, which he treated (against the Calvinists) as endowed with free will, and capable of virtue and religion. But the Polish Unitarians did not regard it as intrinsically immortal. A future life would be a gift direct from God, its conditions being made known by Christ. For those who did not fulfil them there was no hell, only extinction.

Unitarianism acquired ecclesiastical status also in the adjoining province of Transylvania. In 1563 Blandrata was invited by Queen Isabella to the court of her son Prince John Sigismund. At Kolozsvár (Klausenburg) he was brought into contact with Francis Dávid, who had been sent by his Roman Catholic teachers to Wittenberg. There Dávid had passed into Lutheranism, but afterwards, dissatisfied with its doctrine of the sacraments, he joined the Calvinists. His distinction led to his appointment (1564) as bishop of the Hungarian churches in Transylvania. Under Blandrata's influence he began to doubt the separate personality of the Holy Spirit, and became involved in discussions with the Calvinist leader, Peter Melius. In these debates Melius is said to have first used the word *Unitarius*. Dávid was strong enough to carry large numbers of clergy and laity with him. In 1568 a royal edict was issued, granting entire freedom of conscience and speech, and giving legal recognition to 'the Four Religions,' Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism (or Reformed), and 'the Klausenburg Confession.' More than 400 preachers with their churches, and many professors in colleges and schools, ranged themselves under Dávid's supervisorship. Dávid, however, soon advanced another step, and questioned the propriety of prayer to Christ. Blandrata's attempt to influence him through Faustus Socinus (1578) did not convince him, and in the following year, under a Roman Catholic prince, Dávid was tried for innovation in doctrine and sentenced to imprisonment. Five months later (Nov. 1579) he died in the castle of Deva in his seventieth year.

The name *Unitarius* first appeared in an authoritative document in a decree of the Synod of Lécsfalva in 1600. It was formally adopted by the Church in 1638. For two centuries after Dávid's death the community was in frequent danger from political and religious vicissitudes. Their churches were transferred to Calvinists or to Roman Catholics; they were deprived of their schools; they were debarred from public office. A statute of 1791, however, confirmed their position as one of 'the Four Religions,' and they have since enjoyed ecclesiastical peace.[1] They have now about 140 churches, chiefly among the Szeklers of Transylvania, with a few in Hungary, including a vigorous modern foundation in Buda-Pesth. Till 1919 their bishop sat in the Hungarian House of Peers. At Kolozsvár they have a university, and they have devoted great attention to education. No doctrinal subscription is imposed upon their ministers, and under the influence of progressive change, and contact with Unitarian teaching in England and America, the Socinian Christology has been abandoned. The official hymn-book of 1865 made no provision for the worship of Christ.

5. **Growth of Unitarianism in England.**—The teaching of Socinus gradually made its way into England. The Latin version of the *Racovian Catechism* was sent to England with a dedication to James I.; it was formally burned in 1614. Two Socinian works appear in the first two catalogues of the Bodleian Library (1620–35), but a considerable number may be traced in the catalogue by Thomas Hyde in 1674. Bishop Barlow, himself once librarian, in *Directions for the Choice of Books in the Study of Divinity* (originally drawn up in 1650 and expanded after 1673), named numerous others in connexion with a syllabus of the principal questions at issue between Socinians and other Reformed communions.[2] Theology was deeply concerned with the claims of the Roman Catholics on the one hand and the controversies of the Puritans on the other, and from the days of Richard Hooker (1553–1600) a series of writers discussed the respective authority of the Church, the Scriptures, and reason. Doubtless revelation was necessary, but Scripture was its medium. If it was the teacher of theology, what was theology, asked Hooker, but the science of divine things? and 'what science,' he went on to ask, 'can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason'?[3] The Arminian revolt against Calvinism tended in the same direction, and 'the ever memorable' John Hales (1584–1656), when he

[1] See below.

[2] The town of Rakow, founded in 1569, was the ecclesiastical base, with a school and university (1602).

[3] His treatise *de Auctoritate S. Scripturæ*, written in 1570, was first published at Seville, and claimed by a Jesuit Lopez as his own. Commended in 1728 in a charge by Bishop Smallbrooke, it was translated into English by Edward Combe in 1731.

[4] Eng. tr. by Thomas Rees, London, 1818, § iii. ch. i. p. 83.

[1] Cf. Michael Lombard Szentabrahámi, *Summa Universæ Theologiæ Christianæ secundum Unitarios*, Klausenburg, 1787. The above was written before the great majority of Unitarian Churches passed under Rumanian rule by the Peace of 1919.

[2] *The Genuine Remains of Dr. Thomas Barlow, late Bishop of Lincoln*, London, 1693.

[3] *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. iii. ch. viii. 11, ed. Keble, Oxford, 1836, i. 473.

left the Synod of Dort after hearing Episcopius expound Jn 3[16], 'bid John Calvin good-night.'[1] A stream of protest flowed on against the attempt to define the mysteries of the Godhead beyond the terms of Scripture. It had been the plea of Acontius in the *Stratagemata Satanæ*; and William Chillingworth (1602–44) owned him as his teacher of the mischief of creeds which led to the 'persecuting, burning, cursing, damning of men for not subscribing to the words of men as the words of God.'[2] Chillingworth was indebted for acquaintance with Socinian literature to Lord Falkland. He had seen some volumes in the rooms of Hugh Cressy of Merton College, Oxford, who 'claimed to have been the first to bring in Socinus's books.' Cressy afterwards became a Benedictine monk; Falkland was designated by John Aubrey 'the first Socinian in England.' Other and wider influences were at work. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) in his *de Veritate*[3] analysed the whole faculties of the mind, and discovered among its *notitiæ communes*, innate, of divine origin, and indisputable, certain 'common notions' of religion in five articles. These he exemplified historically twenty years later in the *de Religione Gentilium* (completed in 1645), one of the earliest treatises in comparative theology. The great authority of Grotius (1583–1645) gave special weight to his exposition of Christianity in the *de Veritate Religionis Christianæ*.[4] He discourses of the attributes of God, but is silent about His triune nature. He proves that there was such a person as Jesus, that he rose from the grave and was worshipped after his death. He vindicates his character as Messiah, but never mentions the Incarnation. His *Annotationes* on the NT were equally free from traditional dogma. It was not surprising that Stephen Nye, the author of the *Brief History of the Unitarians also called Socinians*,[5] should affirm that he 'interpreted the whole according to the mind of the Socinians.' Under such influences diversity of opinion was recognized as inevitable. Writers so different as Hales, Jeremy Taylor,[6] and Milton[7] declare in almost the same words that heresy is not a matter of the understanding; the faithful pursuit of reason did not make a heretic; the mischief lay in the influences that perverted the will. Chillingworth thought it possible to reduce all Christians to unity of communion by showing that diversity of opinion was no bar to it. That all Christians should think alike was an impossibility; it remained for them to be 'taught to set a higher value upon those high points of faith and obedience wherein they agree than upon those points of less moment wherein they differ.'[8] Such writers did not adopt the theology of Socinus, but they were in agreement with him in his plea for Scriptural statements rather than dogmatic creeds. 'Vitals in religion,' said Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), the leader of the Cambridge Platonists, 'are few.'[9]

Meanwhile an occasional English traveller like Paul Best (1590–1657) had visited Poland and returned infected. Milton noticed in the *Areopagitica*[10] the 'stay'd men' sent by 'the grave and frugal Transilvanian' to learn the 'theologic arts' of England. The danger of Socinianism was spreading. The Convocations of Canterbury and York agreed in June 1640 to prohibit the import, printing, or circulation of Socinian books; no minister should preach their doctrines; laymen who embraced their opinions should be excommunicated.[1] A series of angry writers denounced them with shrill abuse. Parliament made the denial of the Trinity a capital crime (1648), but an English translation of the *Racovian Catechism* was published in 1652 at Amsterdam, followed by *A Twofold Scripture Catechism* from the pen of John Biddle in 1654. These works led the Council of State to order John Owen, whom Cromwell had made Dean of Christ Church and Vice-Chancellor of the university of Oxford, to prepare a reply. His *Vindiciæ Evangelicæ* appeared in 1655.

'Do not *look* upon these things,' he wrote with heat,[2] 'as *things afar off* wherein you are *little concerned*; the *evill* is at the *doore*; there *is* not a *Citty*, a *Towne*, scarce a *Village* in *England*, wherein some of this poyson is not poured forth.'

6. Influence of Biddle and Locke.—John Biddle (1616–62) has often been called the father of English Unitarianism. Sprung from the family of a Gloucestershire yeoman, he came up to Oxford in 1634, and graduated M.A. in 1641. The Gloucester magistrates appointed him shortly after to the mastership of the free school in the parish of St. Mary de Crypt. There his Biblical studies led him independently to doubt the doctrine of the Trinity, the particular difficulty being the deity of the Holy Ghost. Imprisonment in Gloucester and at Westminster did not prevent him from publishing his views, which became more and more opposed to the prevailing orthodoxy. Released in 1652, he founded for the first time gatherings for the exposition of the Scriptures on anti-Trinitarian lines, and these developed into regular meetings for worship. Biddle's catechism shows distinct Socinian influence in the views that Christ as man was taken up into heaven to be instructed for his prophetical office, that God's love was universal, and that Christ died to reconcile man to God, not God to man. But Biddle did not adopt the Socinian practice of prayer to Christ. In spite of imprisonment and exile in the Scilly Islands (1654–58) he gathered followers in increasing numbers. They were sometimes called Biddelians, sometimes Socinians, but they are said to have preferred the name Unitarian to all others.[3]

The death of Biddle in 1662 and the Act of Uniformity checked the movement as an organization for worship, but it continued as a mode of thought. The constant plea for a return from the creeds to the Scriptures led Milton finally into an Arian Christology. Thomas Firmin (1632–97), a wealthy and generous mercer, who had been the friend of Biddle and also had close relations with Archbishop Tillotson (1630–94), promoted the circulation of literature. The *Brief History of the Unitarians, also called Socinians*, was published at his request in 1687. The Toleration Act of 1689 excluded those who denied the Trinity on the one side, and Roman Catholics on the other. But an active controversy broke out the following year, which resulted in the production of a long series of Unitarian tracts (1691–1705) largely financed by Firmin, in which the chief ecclesiastical disputants, John Wallis and William Sherlock,[4] were cleverly played off against each other, and the argument was enforced on grounds of Scripture and early patristic testimony. The Unitarian influence was so strong that Parliament found it necessary (1698)

[1] Letter of Anthony Farindon (17th Sept. 1657) prefixed to the *Golden Remains*, London, 1659.
[2] *The Religion of Protestants*, Oxford, 1638, iv. § 16, referring to Acontius, vii.
[3] Paris, 1624, London, 1633.
[4] Leyden, 1627. [5] London, 1687.
[6] In the *Liberty of Prophesying*, London, 1646; ed. 1817, sect. ii. p. 32.
[7] In his last tract, *Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration*, London, 1673, p. 6.
[8] *Religion of Protestants*, iv. § 40, p. 209 f.
[9] *Moral and Religious Axioms*, ed. Salter, London, 1753.
[10] London, 1644.

[1] Canons iv. and v. [2] 69.
[3] The name has been found by Alex. Gordon in a controversy between Henry Hedworth and William Penn in 1672. The pamphlets are preserved in the Friends' Library at Devonshire House, Bishopsgate, London, E.C.
[4] Cf. John Barling, *A Review of Trinitarianism*, London, 1847, p. 71; John Hunt, *Religious Thought in England*, 3 vols., do. 1870–73, ii. 201 ff.

to threaten the profession of the obnoxious heresy with cumulative penalties amounting to the loss of all civil rights, and three years' imprisonment. But in the meantime a new and powerful influence had entered the field. In 1695 John Locke (1632–1704) had published his treatise on *The Reasonableness of Christianity*.

Locke's *Letters concerning Toleration*[1] and his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*[2] had already placed him at the head of contemporary English thinkers. It was a lamentable sign of the heated temper of the time that the inquiry into the essential nature of Christianity was published anonymously. Locke did what Grotius and Hobbes (in the *Leviathan*[3]) had done before him. He went back to the Gospels and the first preachers of the new faith, and found that their message consisted in the proclamation of Jesus as the Messiah, the proof of this character resting on his fulfilment of prophecy and his miracles, especially the Resurrection. He had indeed already confided to his journal in 1681 the pregnant remark that the miracles were to be judged by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the miracles. But he could still say in 1703 that the Scripture had God for its authority and truth without any mixture of error for its matter. This did not, however, prevent him from recognizing the occasional character of the apostolic letters; and in the paraphrases of the Epistles of St. Paul[4] (published after his death), by treating their teaching as relative to the age and persons for whom it was designed, he really laid the foundation of the historical method. His whole theory of knowledge, however, and his polemic against innate ideas, led him to fall back on the conception of revelation, and to find in Scripture an ultimate authority for religious truth. Meanwhile the violence of some of the Trinitarian controversialists drove many minds along the paths already trodden by Milton and Sir Isaac Newton in the direction of some form of Arianism. William Whiston (1672–1752), who had succeeded Newton at Cambridge as Lucasian professor in 1703, was deprived for this heresy in 1710; and it was in the background of the treatise of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) on *The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*,[5] though he objected to the ancient Arian statement, 'there was [a time] when there was no Son.'

The formularies of the Church of England prevented anything like general change within its ranks. But Protestant Dissent was not organized on the basis of dogmatic creeds. The English Presbyterians under the leadership of Richard Baxter (1615–91) had ardently desired comprehension in the Establishment, but they had as ardently repudiated what they called 'human impositions.' Driven out of the Anglican Church, and unable to create a Presbyterian polity, they found themselves side by side with the Congregationalists in 1689. When they took out licences for places of worship, their trustees avoided doctrinal tests, though they themselves were mainly Calvinistic. They often devoted their chapels to 'the worship of God by Protestant Dissenters.' Sometimes the Presbyterians were named, sometimes the Independents, sometimes both conjointly. They reserved to themselves, in the language of Timothy Jollie of Sheffield (1659–1714), 'liberty to reform according to Scripture rule in doctrine, discipline and worship.'[6] The way was thus open to gradual theological modification. The process was slow, and its operation unequal in different places. Pastors and people did not always move together. The transition through varying types of Arianism naturally took place at varying rates: *e.g.*, Nathaniel Lardner (1684–1768), after resting in Clarke's Arianism, finally abandoned it in his *Letter* on the Logos.[1] The result was that at the beginning of the 19th cent. nearly 200 chapels were occupied by Unitarians, whose principles were unfavourable to sectarian activity. When the Manchester Academy (now Manchester College, Oxford) was opened in 1786, its first principal, Thomas Barnes, who dedicated it 'to Truth, to Liberty, and to Religion,' was himself an Arian. His colleague, Ralph Harrison, became a Unitarian. True to the practice of their forefathers, the founders refrained from imposing any tests on either tutors or students. The Presbyterian Board, established in 1689, governs the Presbyterian College at Carmarthen—the continuator of a series of academies, the first of which was founded on the same basis by Samuel Jones, sometime fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, one of the 2000 ejected ministers of 1662.

7. The work of Priestley and Belsham.—The process of theologic change was promoted from another side. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), bred among the Independents, threw off the Calvinistic theology of his youth, and, after resting a little while in Arianism, reached in 1768, while minister at Leeds, a simple humanitarian view of the person of Jesus. His scientific studies had already gained him the fellowship of the Royal Society (1766), and his *Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity*[2] carried his name in 30,000 copies all over England. His industry, his wide range of knowledge, his clearness of thought and style, his fearless utterance, his untiring earnestness, his elevation of purpose and purity of life, his simple piety, secured for his theological and philosophical teaching a dominant position in Unitarian thought. At Doddridge's Academy at Daventry he had studied Hartley's *Observations on Man*,[3] and adopted a materialist view of human nature. But this in no way impaired the religion which he learned from the Gospels. The teachings of Jesus, guaranteed by his miracles and triumphantly established by his resurrection, supplied him with a positive ground for faith; and the identification of the God of revelation with the Sole Cause of all phenomena, including every form of human activity, created a type of religious sentiment which long pervaded Unitarian devotion. In his *Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated*[4] he affirmed that his doctrine should produce 'the deepest humility, the most entire resignation to the will of God, and the most unreserved confidence in his goodness and providential care.'[5] Among the Yorkshire acquaintances of Priestley was Theophilus Lindsey (1723–1808), vicar of Catterick on the Tees. A movement had been started by a small group of the clergy of the Establishment for the relaxation of the terms of subscription. The failure of a petition to Parliament led Lindsey to resign his living (1773) and make his way to London. There in 1774 he opened an auction-room in Essex Street, Strand, as a Unitarian chapel, and thus 'first organized Unitarian Dissent as a working force in the religious life of England.'[6] He used the Anglican liturgy adapted to 'the worship of the Father only.'

The London movement was reinforced in 1789 by the appointment of Thomas Belsham (1750–

1 London, 1689–92. 2 London, 1690.
3 London, 1651.
4 *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians*, London, 1709.
5 London, 1712.
6 *Pastoral Cars Exemplified* (funeral sermon for his father), London, 1704, p. 28.

1 *A Letter writ in the Year 1730, concerning the Question whether the Logos supplied the Place of a Human Soul in the Person of Jesus Christ*, London, 1759.
2 London, 1770. 3 London, 1749.
4 London, 1777. 5 § ix.
6 J. H. Allen, *Hist. of Unitarians*, etc., p. 152.

1829), once like Priestley an Independent, to a theological tutorship in a college at Hackney. A scholar of no small attainments, he wielded a vigorous pen, and took a leading share in promoting the development of denominational activity. This was opened in 1791 by the foundation of the 'Unitarian Society for promoting Christian knowledge and the Practice of Virtue by the Distribution of Books.' Lindsey, Priestley, and Belsham were its leaders. The preamble and rules, drawn up by Belsham, contained the first public profession of belief in the proper unity of God, and of the simple humanity of Jesus Christ, in opposition both to the Trinitarian doctrine of three Persons in the Deity and to the Arian hypothesis of a created Maker and Preserver of the world. The love of civil and religious liberty prompted a petition the next year (1792) for the abolition of the penal laws affecting religion, to which Charles James Fox lent his aid, and this was accomplished in 1813 (so far as Unitarians were concerned) by the repeal, through the efforts of William Smith (1756–1835), M.P. for Norwich, grandfather of Florence Nightingale, of the clauses of the Toleration Act which rendered the profession of Unitarianism illegal. Meanwhile local Unitarian associations had been founded, and a denominational literature was springing up. Chapels long closed were reopened; new congregations were assisted; a Unitarian Fund was started; and missionaries were sent out to various parts of the kingdom. Endowed by the Act of 1813 with civil rights, the Unitarians proceeded to form an association for protecting them (1819); and finally in 1825 a number of separate organizations were amalgamated in the British and Foreign Unitarian Association. This body was created to promote the principles of Unitarian Christianity. But its founders refrained from imposing any definition of them on its adherents. In the spirit of the English Presbyterians of a century and a half before, they left each member free to interpret them for himself.

The type of Unitarianism then prevailing was largely shaped by the writings of Priestley and Belsham. There were still Arians of different degrees (designated as 'high' and 'low') among both ministers and congregations. But the emphasis of controversy fell more and more clearly on the humanity of Jesus, and the proof of this lay in the Scriptures. The doctrine of their plenary inspiration was indeed denied. Criticism had already distinguished different documents in Genesis. The narratives of the birth of Jesus were inconsistent with each other, and one or both might be rejected. But both the OT and the NT contained 'authentic records of facts and of divine interpositions,' and Charles Wellbeloved, principal of Manchester College, York, could write in 1823:

'Convince us that any tenet is authorised by the Bible, from that moment we receive it. Prove any doctrine to be a doctrine of Christ, emanating from that wisdom which was from above, and we take it for our own, and no power on earth shall wrest it from us.'[1]

On this basis Jesus was presented as 'a man constituted in all respects like other men, subject to the same infirmities, the same ignorance, prejudices and frailties,'[2] who was chosen by God to introduce a new moral dispensation into the world. For this end the Holy Spirit was communicated to him at his baptism. He was instructed in the nature of his mission and invested with voluntary miraculous powers during his sojourn in the wilderness, and, thus equipped as the Messiah, was sent forth to reveal to all mankind without distinction the great doctrine of a future life in which men should be rewarded according to their works. Of this the supreme proof was found in the Resurrection, to which his death on the cross as a martyr to the truth was a necessary preliminary; and he was destined to reappear to raise the dead and to judge the world. From this scheme all theories of atonement and satisfaction disappeared. Priestley with his usual frankness had admitted that a necessitarian 'cannot accuse himself of having done wrong in the ultimate sense of the words.'[1] But, though this type of Unitarianism was deficient in the sense of sin and produced a curious reluctance to recognize the existence of a 'soul,' its teachers lived habitually at a high moral tension, demanding a constant conformity of the will of man to the will of God. Associated with the emphatic assertion of the Father's wisdom and beneficence, such views naturally anticipated the final victory of good. Thomas Southwood Smith (1788–1861) in his *Illustrations of the Divine Government*[3]—a book warmly admired by Byron, Moore, Wordsworth, and Crabbe—powerfully impressed on Unitarian thought the doctrine of universal restoration, which had already found utterance in one of Cromwell's chaplains, and gained various champions (Hartley among them) in the 18th century.[3]

8. Legal difficulties.—The modifications of belief which had brought many of the occupants of chapels erected by Presbyterians and Independents to Unitarian theology at last aroused the attention of those who remained orthodox. Besides a number of meeting-houses, the Unitarians were in possession of two important trusts—Lady Hewley's Charity in York (1704), and Dr. Williams's Trust in London (1716). A suit was instituted against Lady Hewley's trustees in 1830. Legal proceedings were slow and costly, and on 23rd Dec. 1833 judgment was finally given against them. One of the trustees was the minister of St. Saviourgate Chapel (which Lady Hewley had habitually attended), Charles Wellbeloved. It was at once seen that the whole tenure of the chapels was endangered. A long period of litigation followed, but the Law Lords finally confirmed the first decision in 1842. Meanwhile numbers of suits were threatened for the recovery of the buildings, burial-grounds, and endowments which had descended in undisputed succession through generations of pastors and laity. Between Lady Hewley's pastor, John Hotham, and Charles Wellbeloved there had been but one ministry, that of Newcome Cappe (1755–1800); the three pastorates covered 144 years. In the presence of such continuity of tenure the claim of the existing occupants was irresistible, and in 1844 the Dissenters' Chapels Act, introduced by the Government, gave the needed relief. Without naming either Presbyterians or Unitarians, it secured to such Dissenting congregations as had no creeds or tests the right to change their opinions as they saw fit in the lapse of time.[4] The chapels subsequently built by Unitarians, and the funds raised for the support of their ministers, have been almost invariably founded on the principle known as 'open trust.' The consciousness of this historic evolution supplies the key to the conflict of tendencies in modern Unitarianism between the impulse to theological denominationalism and the desire to realize on however small a scale the 'Catholic communion' which had been the ideal of the English Presbyterians who followed Baxter.

9. Martineau and the modern school.—The most potent personal influence in the latter direction was that of James Martineau (1805–1900) (*q.v.*).

[1] *Three Letters to Archdeacon Wrangham*[2], London, 1823, p. 51.

[2] Belsham, *A Calm Inquiry into the Scripture Doctrine concerning the Person of Christ*, London, 1811, p. 447.

[1] *Illustrations of Philosophical Necessity*, 1777, § xi. (*Works*, ed. Rutt, iii. 518).

[2] Glasgow, 1816.

[3] See art. UNIVERSALISM.

[4] Cf. the speech of W. E. Gladstone, on the second reading, *Parliamentary Debates on the Dissenters' Chapels Bill*, London, 1844, p. 165.

In his first work, *The Rationale of Religious Inquiry*,[1] he abandoned the position of the older Unitarianism, which would have accepted the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, and everlasting torments, if they could be found in the Scriptures. 'No seeming inspiration,' he affirmed, 'can establish anything contrary to reason.'[2] Three years later in the famous Liverpool controversy (1839), in the midst of incisive criticisms of the evangelical scheme of salvation, he laid the foundations of a new view of revelation no longer as a communication of truth, certified by miracles, but as an appeal to the conscience and affections—and a fresh interpretation of the moral life on the basis of free will instead of necessity. Meanwhile he was reading Strauss, and soon reached the conclusion that belief in miracles was not essential to Christianity. The Messianic function of Jesus was thus undermined. Wellbeloved had already insisted on the contemporary significance of many of the prophecies supposed to refer to Christ. When the miracles were disowned, the second guarantee of the supernatural character of Jesus fell away: the followers of Locke found themselves deprived of their 'reasonable' Christianity, and the faith of Christ seemed to become only a superior kind of natural religion. Martineau meanwhile pursued a double line of study. In a group of articles in the *Westminster Review* he expounded the Tübingen reconstruction of the origins of Christianity on its critical side, while on the philosophical he vindicated the communion of the human spirit with the Divine, and presented Jesus as the expression, within the limits of our nature, of the righteousness and love of God. Revelation was thus transformed from supernatural instruction into the realization of more exalted character; its medium was not a written word, but a higher personality. To establish the principles of spiritual theism and find a place in man's soul for that 'dwelling in God and God in him' which Priestley had described as the highest type of personal devotion was the aim of a long series of brilliant articles in the *Prospective* and *National Reviews*, which culminated in two great treatises, *Types of Ethical Theory*[3] and *A Study of Religion*.[4] By these works, as well as by his sermons and occasional *Addresses*, he exercised an influence which went far beyond his own denomination, so that Gladstone described him as 'the greatest of living [English] thinkers.'[5]

Other writers were not inactive beside him. The saintly John James Tayler (1797–1869), in his *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*,[6] delineated with singular breadth of view and literary charm the significance of contrasted principles of authority and freedom; and from his pen came the first formal discussion of the Johannine question in England in his *Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel*.[7] A long series of scholars had pleaded for the revision both of the text and of the translation of the NT; and, by the advice of the veteran John Kenrick, George Vance Smith was invited to join the company of the Revisers (1870). In James Drummond (1835–1918) Unitarianism possessed a theologian of the older school of learning, whose works on *The Jewish Messiah* (1877), *Philo Judæus* (1888), *Inquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel* (1903), and *Studies in Christian Doctrine* (1908) maintained the tradition of devout scholarship. John Relly Beard (1800–76) led the way to modern dictionaries of the Bible by his *People's Dictionary of the Bible*,[1] and made other valuable contributions to theological literature. Cultivated laymen, also, such as Edgar Taylor, Samuel Sharpe, and H. A. Bright, rendered no small services to the Unitarian cause. Most influential of all, perhaps, in its protest against prevailing supernaturalism was *The Creed of Christendom*[2] by William Rathbone Greg. Francis William Newman and Frances Power Cobbe found many readers; and the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker, together with the studies of Max Müller, opened the way to religion beyond the bounds of Christianity. The Hibbert Trustees, who sought to promote the spread of Christianity in 'its simplest and most intelligible form,' were the first to inaugurate in 1878 a series of lectures on the history of religions, and Manchester College included that subject in its theological course as early as 1875. The discourses of Martineau, J. Hamilton Thom, and Charles Beard provided varied illustration of the preacher's power; and the sermons and hymns of Stopford Brooke, after his withdrawal from the Church of England in 1880, presented, with a rich glow of poetic beauty, the main features of religion as understood by Unitarians.

10. **Church organizations.**—While English Unitarians have been active in education and philanthropy (witness their domestic missions in important urban centres, established on unsectarian principles after the visit of Joseph Tuckerman of Boston, Mass., in 1833), they have not attempted to secure large numerical increase. New chapels have been built, but denominational zeal has never been active. Congregational independence has been sturdily maintained. In 1882 a National Conference was organized, which has now 365 congregations in the United Kingdom on its roll, but they have no common name. Proposals for united action on Presbyterian lines were made by Martineau in 1888, but the demand for congregational autonomy defeated them. The individualism fostered by the constant plea for liberty is unfavourable to the growth of corporate church-life. Generous funds have been raised in aid of ministers' incomes and insurance, and the Conference has found it necessary to lay down educational qualifications for access to these benefits, and has thus constituted an accredited class of religious teachers. Unitarianism has thriven actively in some districts of Wales, but it has little hold in Scotland. The oldest of its congregations north of the Tweed was founded at Edinburgh in 1776. In Ireland Thomas Emlyn was prosecuted at Dublin in 1703 for denying the deity of Christ. Ulster Presbyterianism witnessed a movement against subscription which culminated in 1726 in the formation of a separate Presbytery of Antrim on a non-subscription basis. Many of the ministers passed through Arianism to Unitarianism, and in 1830 the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster was formed. At the same time, largely through the zeal of Martineau, then assistant pastor in Dublin, an Irish Unitarian Christian Society, embracing both individuals and congregations, was established in Dublin, which was merged (1835) in an Association of Irish Non-subscribing Presbyterians and other Free Christians, including the Presbytery of Antrim, the Synod of Munster, and the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster. Finally, in 1910 the Antrim Presbytery and the Ulster Synod united for purposes of church government under the name of the Non-subscribing Presbyterian Church of Ireland.

11. **Unitarianism in America.**—Unitarianism in America sprang out of the Congregational order

[1] London, 1836.
[2] *Rationale*, p. 127.
[3] 2 vols., Oxford, 1885.
[4] 2 vols., Oxford, 1888.
[5] J. E. Carpenter, *James Martineau, Theologian and Teacher*, London, 1905, p. 413.
[6] London, 1845, new ed. by J. Martineau, do. 1876.
[7] London, 1867.

[1] 2 vols., London, 1847–48.
[2] London, 1851, 8th ed., 2 vols., 1883.

of the New England churches. Their theology was Calvinistic, but the 17th cent. foundations were based upon religious covenants instead of dogmatic creeds. Thus the First Church in Boston affirmed:

'We . . . do hereby solemnly and religiously promise and bind ourselves to walk in all our ways according to the rule of the Gospel, and in all sincere conformity to [Christ's] holy ordinances, and in mutual love and respect to each other, so near as God shall give us grace.'[1]

The way was thus open, as in English Dissent in the 18th cent., to gradual theologic change. The literature of the Trinitarian controversy passed across the Atlantic, and the leaven of discussion in the works of Sherlock and South, Clarke and Whiston, supplemented by the writings of the Unitarian Emlyn, began to produce its effect. A slow movement towards Arianism and Arminianism set in, invigorated by reaction against the 'great awakening' under Jonathan Edwards (1735) and the early preaching of George Whitefield (1740). Jonathan Mayhew (1720–66) and Charles Chauncy (1705–57), pastors in Boston, led the way towards a more liberal faith. Under the ministry of James Freeman (1759–1835) the congregation of King's Chapel purged their Anglican liturgy of all references to the Trinity (1785). By this act, says the historian of the chapel, the first Episcopal church in New England became the first Unitarian church in the New World. The writings of Priestley and Lindsey were freely circulated, and at the end of the century the doctrine against which they protested had been rejected by all the Boston ministers but one. The name Unitarian was indeed rarely attached to the churches, but the mode of thought and worship prevailed more and more widely. It was found all the way from Portland (Maine) to Charleston (S. Carolina).

In 1803 William Ellery Channing (1780–1842) came to Boston and began the ministry which so powerfully influenced Unitarian thought. In reaction against a still powerful Calvinism, with its doctrines of human depravity, the wrath of God, and the atoning sacrifice of Christ, he proclaimed 'one sublime idea,' which he defined as 'the greatness of the soul, its divinity, its union with God by spiritual likeness, its receptivity of his Spirit, its self-forming power, its destination to ineffable glory, its immortality.'[2] This was the real challenge to New England orthodoxy; it operated with no less force in dispelling the materialism of Priestley and giving a fresh impulse of spiritual life to Unitarianism on both sides of the ocean. With this exalted view of man's true being, Channing declared himself surer that his rational nature was from God than that any book is the expression of His will; and reason and conscience were thus enthroned in the ultimate seat of judgment. Neither philosopher nor scholar in the technical sense, he exercised by his religious genius and the force of his ethical appeal a far-reaching influence both in the United States and in Europe. 'Always young for liberty,' he protested against every form of sectarian narrowness. He cheerfully took the name Unitarian because unwearied efforts were made to raise against it a popular cry, and he never was in any sense a Trinitarian. But he believed in Christ's pre-existence; he accepted his miracles. He would not, however, exclude from his fellowship the stoutest humanitarian, though he might repudiate the miracles altogether. For such a mind denominational aggressiveness was impossible, and this spirit was infused into the leaders of the movement which culminated in the foundation of the Divinity School of Harvard University in 1816, when the Unitarian controversy was at its height.

'It being understood,' said the constitution, 'that every encouragement be given to the serious, impartial, and unbiassed investigation of Christian truth; and that no assent to the peculiarities of any denomination be required either of the Students, or Professors, or Instructors.'

The movement of which Channing was the most distinguished representative soon demanded some kind of organization. Literature must be circulated, congregations assisted, and churches built. In 1825, on the same day on which English Unitarians formed their association,[1] the American Unitarian Association was constituted. A noble line of eminent scholars, theologians, historians, jurists, poets, statesmen, accepted its principles and gave dignity to its profession of faith. It was not long, however, before new forces appeared on the field. The study of German philosophy produced a school of New England transcendentalism. Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82) (*q.v.*) resigned the pulpit of the Second Church in Boston on the question of the observance of the Lord's Supper, and six years later his famous 'Address to the Harvard Divinity School' (1838) signalized the breach of the new thought with the older views of revelation and miracle. Theodore Parker (1810–60) emphasized the same theme in a much criticized sermon on 'The Transient and Permanent in Christianity' (1841), followed by his widely read 'Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion' (1842). A new type of Christianity without miracle was thus presented, emphasizing the divine immanence in nature, and holding up the religion of Jesus—the love of God and the service of man—as the 'absolute religion.' Unitarianism fell into the snare from which Channing would fain have saved it, and developed an orthodoxy of its own. When Henry Whitney Bellows of New York proposed to organize the churches (1865) in a National Conference, and its members adopted the declaration that they were 'disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ,' a group of bolder spirits formed a 'Free Religious Association,' where Emerson's name appeared first on the list. In 1894, however, the Conference repudiated all authoritative tests, and simply accepted 'the religion of Jesus, holding, in accordance with his teaching, that practical religion is summed up in love to God and love to man.'[2] The developments of criticism, science, and philosophy, the study of comparative religion, the desire for the widest possible fellowship, and the growing demands of philanthropy, have all contributed to broaden the outlook in every direction, and in 1900 the 'International Council of Unitarian and other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers' was formed in Boston. It has since held large and successful gatherings in London, Amsterdam, Geneva, Boston, Berlin (1910), Paris (1913), and Boston (1920), assembling a wide representation of different nationalities and faiths.

As in England, so also in America, Unitarianism has been an important influence in religious thought. It represents a mode of approach to the great problems of human life and destiny in which it is closely allied with the time-spirit. Its looseness of denominational organization makes its advance over so vast an area slow and hesitating, but its churches steadily increase, and in 1918 the list (including Canada) comprised 490 societies. The Divinity School at Harvard University gradually broadened out under the administration of Charles W. Eliot (1869–1909) into a school of scientific theology and independent research. The Meadville Theological School (Pennsylvania), founded in 1844, and the Unitarian Theological

[1] Allen, p. 171.
[2] J. W. Chadwick, *William Ellery Channing*, Boston, 1903, p. 246, quoting without date 'one of the letters of his later life.'

[1] See § 7.
[2] George Willis Cooke, 'Unitarianism in the United States,' *EBr*[11] xxvii. 596.

School at Berkeley (California), founded in 1904, have remained more definitely within Unitarian lines.

12. **World-wide influence.**—(*a*) *The Colonies and India.*—The British Dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, all have Unitarian churches. English and American Unitarians are also in close touch with the Theistic churches of India, and with Unitarian work in Japan, and receive students from the Far East into their theological colleges, besides sending out representative ministers to preach and lecture.

(*b*) *Germany.*—Continental thought has been affected by the same general influences which produced the Unitarian movement in England and America. The writings of the English Deists of the 18th cent. helped to foster German rationalism, and the critical study of the Scriptures led to the abandonment of doctrines of mechanical inspiration and Biblical authority. Belief in miracles was partly undermined by the influences of science and philosophy; and the *Leben Jesu*[1] of D. F. Strauss, together with the investigations of F. C. Baur into the development of the early Church, opened new paths for the historical treatment of the origins of Christianity. The results reached by Baur were modified by the subsequent researches of some of his own pupils, but a powerful school of thought, led by teachers such as H. Holtzmann (Strassburg), C. Holsten (Heidelberg), Carl von Weizsäcker (Tübingen), A. E. Biedermann (Zürich), R. A. Lipsius (Jena), O. Pfleiderer (Berlin), reached a position which was substantially Unitarian, though it did not employ the name or lead to withdrawal from the State Church. In 1863 a liberal union was founded under the title of the 'Protestantenverein,' which gave practical expression to this mode of thought. It still exists, though in a state of somewhat diminished activity. Recent theological liberalism has tended to take one of two directions. Under the influence of Albrecht Ritschl (*q.v.*) of Göttingen, a higher value has been ascribed to the person of Jesus, quite apart from external miracle, than was usual among the older 'liberal' theologians. Among the leaders in this direction are A. Harnack, W. Herrmann (Marburg), and H. H. Wendt (Jena). On the other hand, the study of Christianity in connexion with the religions of the empire has led younger scholars to emphasize its relations with contemporary phenomena; and along these lines the late professors W. Wrede, J. Weiss, and W. Bousset, and the brilliant group led by H. Gunkel, E. Troeltsch, C. Clemen, H. Weinel, W. Heitmüller, and H. Lietzmann have all been working. The valuable translation and commentary issued under the general editorship of Johannes Weiss,[2] and the long series of *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, represent the general attitude of liberal theology on the problems of primitive Christianity.

(*c*) *France.*—A similar movement of thought, though more limited in range, may be traced in France, since the appearance of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*,[3] within the Reformed Church, represented especially by A. Coquerel (*fils*), Albert and Jean Réville, and a distinguished group of scholars and preachers. When the 'Séparation' took place in 1905, the Reformed Church split into two bodies, the 'National Union of Evangelical Reformed Churches' retaining a Confession of 1872, and the liberal group designating itself the 'National Union of Reformed Churches,' which is powerfully represented in the Theological Faculty of Paris, and exercises the greater influence both in the pulpit and in the press. Liberal Lutherans like Maurice Goguel and Eugène Ehrhardt share the same general view.

(*d*) *Switzerland.*—Swiss Protestantism has been affected in like manner. The abolition of formal tests of orthodoxy by the Genevan Church opened the way for a type of Christianity essentially Unitarian; and in German Switzerland the theologians of Basel and Zürich have made important contributions to both Biblical and dogmatic studies on similar lines. Practical interest in social questions is now to some extent withdrawing attention from the critical and historical inquiries of the older liberalism, and even leading to a partial reaction towards the language and ideas of orthodoxy.

(*e*) *Holland.*—A similar tendency shows itself in Holland. In the second half of the 19th cent. the Dutch Reformed Church, the Remonstrants, the Mennonites, and the Lutherans were all affected by the philosophical and scientific modes of thought which generate Unitarian theology. Scholars like J. H. Scholten, A. Kuenen, and C. P. Tiele educated successive generations of students in the newer methods of critical investigation. Many of the younger ministers of the present day, however, without returning to orthodoxy, are more inclined to recognize spiritual values in some of the old doctrines of the Church, and, while they claim to be 'liberals,' are at the same time unwilling to be classed as 'modern.' Their view of human nature is not optimistic. The natural man must be regenerated by the Spirit of Christ; for this generation there is no other way.

(*f*) *Other countries.*—In Italy a little group, assisted by various university professors, is conducting a monthly periodical, *La Riforma Italiana*, on Unitarian lines with the names of Mazzini and Channing blazoned upon its cover. There are Unitarian congregations in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The veteran poet Matthias Jochumssen in Iceland (†1920) espoused the same cause, and communicated his enthusiasm to his countrymen in the United States. Even among the educated negroes of Lagos on the W. African coast religious thought has produced spontaneously an active movement in the same direction.

LITERATURE.—R. Wallace, *Antitrinitarian Biography*, 3 vols., London, 1850; J. J. Tayler, *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*[2], ed. James Martineau, do. 1876; G. Bonet-Maury, *Des Origines du Christianisme unitaire chez les Anglais*, Paris, 1881, tr. E. P. Hall, *Early Sources of English Unitarianism*, London, 1884; A. Gordon, *Heads of English Unitarian History*, London, 1895, and *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Unitarianism'; J. H. Allen, 'The Unitarians,' in *A Hist. of the Unitarians and Universalists in the United States*, New York, 1894, pp. 1–246; S. A. Eliot, *Heralds of a Liberal Faith*, 3 vols., Boston, U.S.A., 1910; biographies of Martineau, Channing, and Theodore Parker.

J. E. CARPENTER.

UNITED BRETHREN.—See MORAVIANS.

UNITED EVANGELICAL CHURCH.—See LUTHERANISM.

UNITED FREE CHURCH.—See PRESBYTERIANISM.

UNITED METHODIST FREE CHURCH.—See METHODISM.

UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.—See PRESBYTERIANISM.

UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH.—These provinces, in which Oudh, a separate jurisdiction since its annexation in 1856, was included in 1877, were up to 1902 known as the North-West Provinces. The change of title was mainly due to confusion with that of the

[1] 3 vols., Tübingen, 1835.
[2] *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1906.
[3] Paris, 1863.

North-West Frontier Province, which was formed out of some Districts of the Panjāb. The joint jurisdictions of Agra and Oudh extend between N. lat. 23° 52′ and 31° 18′, E. long. 77° 3′ and 84° 39′, with a total area of 107,267 sq. miles and a population in 1911 of 47,182,000. The Provinces contain a hilly and submontane tract to the north-west; Bundelkhand, a part of the Central Indian plateau to the south; while the central and more important region constitutes the W. and Central Indo-Gangetic Plain, the basin watered by the rivers Ganges and Jumnā (*qq.v.*). The Districts between these two main rivers until they join at Allāhābād (*q.v.*) are known as the Duāb, 'land of the two waters.'

1. **History.**—The United Provinces form one of the best-known historical regions of India. The aboriginal population, wrongly classed as Dravidian (*q.v.*) by Risley, was probably of the Mon-Khmer stock. These 'pre-Aryans' have left traces in stone implements in the hills and plains, cup-marks on boulders in the northern hills, and cave paintings in the Kaimūr range to the south. At some unknown date, possibly about 1000 B.C., the so-called 'Aryans' who had been settled for a considerable period in the E. Panjāb[1] seem to have moved gradually eastward, and the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* epics describe the fortunes of two bodies of Kṣatriyas, one to the west with their capital at Hastinapur (*q.v.*), the other at Ayodhya, the modern Ajodhya in the Faizābād District. One wave of invaders or colonists seems in the early period to have moved along the base of the Himālaya into Magadha or Bihār; the other occupied Madhyadeśa, the 'Middle Land,' or the Duāb and its surrounding Districts.[2] For the earliest period there is no settled history till the time of Gautama Buddha (*c.* 407–487 B.C.). The next fixed date is that of Chandragupta Maurya (321–297 B.C.), the Sandrocottus of classical writers, who rose to power after the invasion of Alexander the Great. His grandson was the famous Aśoka (*q.v.*), three of whose pillar edicts have been found in the Provinces. We know little of the Kushān or Śaka invaders who entered India about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. The Gupta dynasty rose to power from about A.D. 320 until 450, when the first Hun invasion took place. This is remarkable because many of the Rājput (*q.v.*) houses sprang from its chiefs. In 1018 Mahmūd of Ghaznī, the first Muhammadan invader, raided the Provinces, and under the early Muhammadan kings Delhi was the capital, being succeeded by Agra early in the 16th century. Bābur defeated the Afghān king Ibrahīm in 1526 and founded the Mughal empire, which with its capital at Agra or Delhi, under Humāyūn, Akbar, Shāhjahān, and Aurangzīb, lasted till the death of the last in 1707. Then commenced a period of anarchy until by treaty with Asafu-d-daula, Nawāb of Oudh, most of the eastern portion passed into the hands of the British. This was followed by further large cessions as the result of the Marāṭha war in 1803. In 1833 the Provinces were separated from Bengal and placed in charge of a lieutenant-governor. Since that time the only serious disturbance of order occurred in the Mutiny of 1857.

2. **Ethnology.**—The population is of a mixed type, made up of the pre-historic Mon-Khmer stratum leavened by successive entries of foreigners: Aryans, Scythians, Huns, Musalmāns. In the E. Gangetic Plain there is considerable congestion, the density of population rising to 706 per sq. mile. The people occupy 106,020 villages and 435 towns (of which 24 rank as cities), the most important in order of population being Lucknow, Benares, Agra, Cawnpur, Bareilly, Meerut. Muhammadans favour a town life much more than Hindus; out of 1000 of each faith only 72 Hindus as compared with 269 Musalmāns are urban. This concentration in towns is one cause of the progress of Islām.

3. **Religion.**—Hindus (85·04 %) are much in excess of Muhammadans (14·77 %) or Christians (·38 %), but now Hindus are slowly decreasing, and there is an increase in Muhammadans and Christians. The progress of Islām is not to any great extent the result of direct propaganda, but is due largely to social conditions. Muhammadans are more prolific; they live more in towns and under less insanitary conditions than Hindus; their diet is more varied and liberal, and they are less addicted to the use of drugs like the preparations of hemp; they marry later and allow widows to remarry, while high-caste Hindus prohibit widow-marriage. On the other hand, their women suffer in health from seclusion (*parda*), and, being confined to the house, they are more liable to attacks of plague.[1]

(*a*) *Brāhmanic Hinduism.*—What has been termed Brāhmanic Hinduism is the creed of the better classes, while the lower castes are largely animistic. It is impossible to draw the line between these forms of belief, which in all grades of society converge and intermingle. Orthodox Hinduism is regulated by a body of Brāhmans numbering 4¾ millions, many of whom enjoy a high reputation for sanctity, act as domestic priests, or study theology, philosophy, and ethics at sacred places like Benares. Those of a lower grade act as guides at places of pilgrimage, cast horoscopes, and practise various kinds of magic. The majority, however, exercise no religious functions, and make their living by agriculture or domestic service, or take employment in the army or the police. Some of the most sacred places of Hindu pilgrimage are found in these Provinces: Hardwār, shared by Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas; Mathurā, devoted to the cult of Kṛṣṇa; Prayāg or Allāhābād, the sacred junction of the Ganges and Jumnā.[2]

(*b*) *The development of monotheism.*—An important development in recent times is the tendency to adopt a form of monotheism.

To quote R. Burn, 'the general result of my enquiries is that the great majority of Hindus have a firm belief in one Supreme God, called Bhagwān, Parameshwar, Ishwar, or Narain. Mr. Bailie made some enquiries[3] which showed that this involved a clear idea of a single personal God; but I am inclined to think that this is not limited to the more intelligent, but is distinctly characteristic of Hindus as a whole. . . . There has been much discussion as to whether this monotheistic idea has been a natural result of contact with Islām or Christianity. As pointed out above, however, the idea of a single personal God was not unknown to Hindus long before they came into touch with adherents of these two religions, and I am inclined to think . . . that the tendency of Hinduism, with all its eclecticism and elasticity, is to develop more on the lines of indigenous beliefs, than on an entirely new direction copied more or less from some foreign religion.'[4]

'The Hindu who is a Śaiva or a Vaiṣṇava has no real place for Parameshwar in his religious ideas, and would probably explain his presence by saying he was Śiva or Viṣṇu. According to the Purānic philosophy, Parameshwar is the universal spirit when manifested as a personal god, who, according as he is dominated by activity (*rajas*), goodness (*sattva*), is separated from the divine personalities, Brahmā, Śiva and Viṣṇu. This, however, is merely stated to explain his relation to them; for it is a recondite theory which does not trouble the ordinary Parameshwar worshipper. To him Parameshwar is the supreme personal God, who made the world, is pleased by good and displeased by evil deeds, but is too much exalted to trouble much about mundane affairs. If the Hindu is not professedly a Śaiva or a Vaiṣṇava, he will look on Śiva and Viṣṇu as on the whole

[1] See artt. DELHĪ, vol. iv. p. 543, PANJĀB, vol. ix. p. 605.
[2] Manu, *Laws*, ii. 21.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xv., *United Provinces and Oudh*, pt. i. p. 108 ff.
[2] See art. PILGRIMAGE (Indian), § 7.
[3] *Census of India, 1891*, vol. xvi., *N.-W. Provinces and Oudh*, pt. i. p. 197.
[4] *Ib.* p. 73 f.

subordinate to him, though much more valuable helpers in times of trouble. Still, nebulous as his idea of Parameshwar may be, it makes him at bottom a monotheist. But it is to some extent wrong to say that he "worships" Parameshwar. He may or may not repeat his name in the morning, and occasionally he has the *Sat Nārāyaṇ Kathā* recited in his honour; but this is all. It is a waste of time to importune a god with prayer and sacrifice when his attitude is one of suave aloofness; and the Hindu reserves his attentions for the minor gods and godlings.'[1]

(*c*) *Islām.*—The local distribution of Muhammadanism is dictated partly by historical, partly by economic causes.

'The Muhammadan is found chiefly where Muhammadans held sway in the past: in Meerut and Rohilkhand Divisions, the "Home Counties" of the Moghul Empire, in Agra, Farrukhābād, Jaunpur and Oudh, all centres of Muhammadan States or provinces. In Cawnpore, Allāhābād and other districts with large cities, his tendency to urban life is sufficient to explain his numerical strength; this is also a factor which affects his presence in such historically Muhammadan centres as Agra, Meerut, Lucknow, Fyzābād, and Bareilly.'[2]

(*d*) *Jainism.*—Jains, numbering 75,427 in 1911, show a tendency to decrease. The city mercantile class, deficient in virility owing to their sedentary habits, produce small families, and, as E. A. H. Blunt reports, the country Jain shows little enthusiasm for or knowledge of his religion.

'The truth seems to be that whatever theoretical differences may exist between Jainism and Hinduism, yet the followers of the same creeds in the same community do not differ very greatly in their practice. The bar to their intermarriage is no more insuperable than between Roman Catholics and Protestants. . . . Men of to-day think less about religion because the stress of modern conditions leaves them less time for other than mundane affairs. The active pursuit of religion, which means the active performance of ritual, is postponed to old age; the official or professional man takes to religion when he retires.'[3]

It is natural also that, when a Jain girl is married into a Hindu family, she rapidly succumbs to the influence of the more popular faith. Jainism being reticent and unenterprising, she naturally adopts religious usages which enjoy more prestige and which are regulated by Brāhmans, whom Jains themselves employ for their domestic rites.

(*e*) *Sikhism and other faiths.*—Sikhs, numbering 15,186, are foreigners, mostly sepoys or policemen. Parsis, Jews, and Brāhmans are also foreigners and possess little influence, while Buddhists, representatives of a faith once dominant, now number only 780, and are mainly confined to the Tibetan frontier, with a few Nepalese, Chinese artizans, Magh cooks, and other smaller groups.

The Ārya Samāj is chiefly confined to the upper and educated classes, and seems as yet to have made little impression on the peasantry.[4]

(*f*) *Christianity.*—Christians show a remarkable increase. The propaganda began with the visit of a Roman Catholic priest to Agra in 1578. It became active through the work of Henry Martyn at Cawnpur in 1810. In 1811 the Baptist Missionary Society, and in 1813 the Church Missionary Society, entered the field. Christians, including those in the Native States, numbering 58,518 in 1891 and 102,955 in 1901, increased to 179,694 in 1911.

'The new convert, may be, is no better than his predecessors; but a new generation, the children of the first generation of converts, is growing up. If the missionaries could and can get little out of that first generation, the second generation is in their hands from their earliest years. The children of the converts, born in Christianity, are very different to their parents; their grandchildren will be better still. It is this which provides the other side to the black picture so often drawn of the inefficiency of Christian conversion. And this generation is now beginning to make its influence felt. The Hindu fellows of these converts have now to acknowledge not only that they are in many ways better off than themselves, but that they are better men. And this has undoubtedly contributed to the better esteem in which Christians are regarded. . . . A convert, no doubt, is still outcasted, but he is now regarded as a member of a fresh caste, and Hindus bear with his idiosyncrasies as they do with those of any other caste.'[1]

LITERATURE.—R. Burn, *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xvi., *N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, 3 pts.; E. A. H. Blunt, *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xv., *United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, 2 pts.; W. Crooke, *The N.-W. Provinces of India: their History, Ethnology, and Administration*, London, 1897, *The Tribes and Castes of the N.-W. Provinces and Oudh*, 4 vols., Calcutta, 1896; V. A. Smith, *The Early Hist. of India*[3], Oxford, 1914; A. A. Führer, *The Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions in the N.-W. Provinces and Oudh*, Allāhābād, 1891; H. M. Elliot and J. Dowson, *The Hist. of India, as told by its own Historians*, 8 vols., London, 1867–77; *IGI* xxiv. [1908] 132 ff.

W. CROOKE.

UNITY.—See CHURCH.

UNIVERSALISM.—1. **Uses of the term.**—The word 'universalism' has been used in at least three distinct senses. (*a*) It is convenient to take first in order the use of the word which is in fact the most modern. It designates the setting aside of the belief that a nation or a race is privileged to enjoy the special protection and favour of God, or of a deity whom it recognizes as peculiarly its own; and contemplates all nations and races as standing, actually or potentially, in one and the same relation to one and the same God. Universalism in this sense has become current largely owing to the influence of F. C. Baur; its opposite is particularism. In the OT the view of the special relation of a deity to a people is expressed in such passages as Jg 11[24], when Jephthah says to the Amorite: 'Wilt not thou possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God hath dispossessed from before us, them will we possess.' The steps by which this particularism yielded to the larger thought, first of Jahweh's rule over all peoples as God above all gods, and next as being the only God, whose sway is universal, but who has chosen Israel as His special care, are sufficiently familiar. There are within the pages of the OT occasional indications of a desire to extend to other nations the Messianic hope and the kingdom of God.[2] In the NT we are familiar with the distinction between the universalism of St. Paul and of the Lucan writings,[3] in contrast with the exclusiveness of the Jew and the Judæo-Christian, who, if they did not entirely disapprove the proffer of the gospel to the Gentiles, yet wished to make conditions and impose practices which St. Paul strongly repudiates. In the NT the larger view seems to win its way from the announcement of a salvation which, beginning from Israel, shall be unto all peoples, to the Apocalyptic vision of the 'great multitude which no man could number, out of every nation, and of all tribes and peoples and tongues,'[4] and of a New Jerusalem whose gates are never shut.

(*b*) The second use of the term 'universalism' has to do with the theological question of the extent of the benefit wrought by the atoning death of Christ, and with the relation of the Calvinian doctrines of election and predestination (*qq.v.*) to the expressed purpose of the gospel, that all men might be saved. The Arminians had maintained, as the second of their five points, 'that Jesus Christ by His death and sufferings made an atonement for the sins of all mankind in general, and of every individual in particular,' but they went on to say that none could be partakers of this benefit but those possessing a true faith, which can belong only to those who are regenerated by the operation of the Holy Ghost. This was condemned as error by the Synod of Dort (1618). There were many, however, who desired to mitigate the lan-

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 126 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 107. [3] *Ib.* p. 112.
[4] See *ERE* ii. 57 ff.; *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 132 ff.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 145.
[2] See, *e.g.*, Is 19[22-25].
[3] *E.g.*, Gal 3[28], Col 3[11], Ac 10[35] 17[24-26].
[4] Rev 7[9].

guage of absolute predestination and particular redemption. Among these were John Cameron, professor in the Protestant seminary of Saumur (1618–22), and his pupil, Moyse Amyraut, professor of theology at Saumur (1633). The aim of both was to vindicate for the Deity a larger and more real benevolence and goodwill to mankind than was contemplated in the Canons of Dort. They postulated a general will to save all men, but, in order to be effective, this required to be reinforced by the exercise of a particular will. The merits of Christ's passion and death were in themselves sufficient, but not efficient for all men. In other words, though the impetration is universal, the application is individual: the general will is not a will *decreti* but *præcepti*, and it may be wholly resisted by mankind in bondage to sin. The universality of salvation is conditioned; the promise is *sub conditione fidei*. A similar distinction is made between objective grace, an offer of pardon to all, and subjective grace, which is the application to the individual by the particular will of God. The special action of grace is variously described: sometimes it seems identical with 'effectual calling'; in other connexions it is that which brings a man to the knowledge of the truth, and, acting through the intellect upon the heart, brings about conversion.[1] The doctrine of this school is known as 'hypothetical universalism.' Its promulgation led to some persecution of Amyraut in France, to the withdrawal by the Swiss Reformed Churches of their students from the seminary at Saumur, and the elevation of that of Sedan in its place as the centre of French Protestant orthodoxy. Amyraut and his friend Paul Testard were summoned to appear before synods of the Reformed Church of France at Alençon (1637) and Charenton (1644–45); they were acquitted on all charges of heresy, but this acquittal was strongly reprobated by the rigid Calvinists of the Reformed Church. It was, however, approved and defended by the learned Jean Daillé (Dallæus) (1594–1670), pastor of Charenton, who published in 1655 *Apologia pro duabus Synodis Nationalibus*. The position of the High Calvinists was defended by Friedrich Spanheim (1600–49), professor at Leyden, in his *Disputatio de gratia universali* (1644), followed by *Exercitationes* (1646).

The controversy spread to England, where John Davenant (1576–1641), bishop of Salisbury, who had attended the Synod of Dort, was engaged in finding a 'middle way' between the Remonstrants and the Supralapsarians, and did this with a special reference to the *Gallicana Controversia*, in his *Dissertationes duæ de Morte Christi et de Prædestinatione*, published at Cambridge in 1650. John Owen had already denounced the 'error' of universal redemption and those 'who try to go a middle way between the Churches of France and the Arminians,' especially in his anonymous work *Salus Electorum Sanguis Jesu* (1648). The term 'universalist' was applied to the advocates of universal redemption perhaps first by Obadiah Howe, whose work, *The Universalist Examined and Convicted*, appeared in 1648. The controversy engaged the ready pen of Richard Baxter, then at Kidderminster, who thus alludes to his early work upon it:

'Another Manuscript that lyeth by me, is a Disputation for some *Universality of Redemption*, which hath lain by me near Twenty years unfinished . . . partly because at last came out after *Amyraldus* and *Davenant's Dissertations*, a treatise of *Dallæus*, which contained the same things, but especially the same Testimonies of concordant Writers which I had prepared to produce.'[2]

This work, entitled *Universal Redemption of Mankind by the Lord Jesus Christ*, was published in 1694 by Joseph Reid, who had been Baxter's assistant and had transcribed his MS in the year 1657.

It is to be remembered that throughout this period the doctrine of 'general redemption' was being taught by the early English Baptists, known as General Baptists from their opposition to the doctrine of particular election. Of these the first was Thomas Helwys (1550?–1616?), who had been the chief supporter of John Smith's little congregation in Amsterdam, and had been baptized by him, and who returned to England after Smith's death in 1612. He set forth the doctrine of general redemption in a document of a few pages printed in 1611 and entitled *A Short and Plaine Proof by the Word and Workes of God . . . that all men are redeemed by Christ*. He was the founder of congregations in London and the home counties.

(*c*) Universalism in the third sense denotes the doctrine held by persons and churches called 'Universalist.' With some minor differences, all such agree in the belief in the final salvation of all mankind. The opponents of this doctrine are designated by its adherents as partialists or limitarians.

The assertion and defence of this doctrine are based mainly on the language of the NT, as, *e.g.*: 'All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; . . . and this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing' (Jn $6^{37.39}$). 'And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me' (12^{32}). 'As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive' (1 Co 15^{22}). 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself' (2 Co 5^{19}). 'That . . . he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth' (Eph 1^{10}). 'God our Saviour; who will have all men to be saved . . . for there is one God' (1 Ti $2^{3.4.5}$). 'For the grace of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men' (Tit 2^{11}). 'The Lord is . . . not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance' (2 P 3^{9}). 'And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world' (1 Jn 2^{2}). 'Death and hell were cast into the lake of fire' (Rev 20^{14}).

In scriptural argument the Universalist contention has mainly turned on the following points:

(1) The purpose of God: see Ac 3^{21}, ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, where the recovery of a primal condition, once forfeited, is certainly indicated; the end is to be as the beginning.

(2) The means and sanction of such recovery by the office and work of Christ. 'Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life' (Ro 5^{18}). 'That he by the grace of God should taste death for every man' (He 2^{9}).

(3) The nature of the ultimate salvation. 'Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all' (1 Co 15^{24-28}). The consummation is reached by the divine indwelling in every human soul.

2. Universalism in Patristic literature.—When the expectation of a speedy coming of the end and a Messianic reign of a thousand years on earth died away in Christian circles, attention was directed to the idea of a world-process, involving an evolution of a spiritual realm, supplanting the material universe, which Gnosticism in its various forms had made familiar. Christian Platonism set itself to combine the promises of the gospel with the more spiritual elements of Greek philosophy. When the Christian philosophers of Alexandria undertook to set forth a true gnosis, as against the several false ones, they had to exhibit salvation on the scale not of the individual, but of the cosmos.[1]

In the view of Clement of Alexandria († A.D. 220) God's purifying discipline of man extends beyond this life.

[1] See art. AMYRALDISM.

[2] *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, London, 1696, bk. i. pt. i. p. 123.

[1] See art. ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY.

Death is the means whereby the soul is made more immediately subject to redeeming influences, and through correction and repentance may rise to various stages of spiritual development, the highest of which is eternal communion with infinite goodness, love, and truth. This is the completion of that likeness of God wherein man was made at the beginning.

Origen († A.D. 254) extended the notion of the discipline of souls much farther both in scope and in detail. His mind was at once more laborious and more speculative than Clement's.

He conceived a chain of existences in which the human life of this world is but a link. Souls arrive from an infinite past, in which their experience and their discipline have been carried on with the most varied results, to exercise here their privilege of free will, to rise or to sink according as they have accepted or resisted the spiritual influences that are perpetually striving for their redemption. Into future æons beyond this life Origen carries the divine work of leading souls towards the goal of all sentient being, which is attained in likeness to God, for in the end God will be all in all. Fallen angels and demons will be rescued to share with mankind the ultimate salvation. It is to be noted that, when Origenism was anathematized as heresy, under Justinian (A.D. 541–543), it was not his view of the universality of salvation that was condemned, but then, as afterwards, his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and of the final salvability of devils.

Gregory of Nyssa († A.D. 394) moves towards the same result from his central conviction as to the ultimate annihilation of all evil. For he says:

'If God will be in all existing things, evil, plainly, will not then be among them.'[1] 'The resurrection is nothing else than the reconstitution of our nature in its original form.'[2] Nothing that had its origin from God will fall out of His kingdom. When all the evil that is intermingled with things that are is melted out by cleansing fire, everything that originated from God will become such as it was from the beginning, before the evil entered into it.

The same view was taken by Didymus of Alexandria († A.D. 395), who explicitly endorsed Origen's opinion on the conversion of devils.

Among the later Fathers of the Church in the East it suffices to mention Theodore of Mopsuestia († A.D. 428), an opponent of Origenism, who maintained that sin and its penalty were both agents in the moral purposes of God as conducive both to self-knowledge and to repentance, and thus effective for the restoration of the wicked.

The current of Alexandrian thought came again to the surface in the 9th cent. in the mind of John Scotus Erigena († A.D. 877), in the form of a pantheistic theodicy. He predicts, at the conclusion of a complicated and somewhat inconsistent scheme, the absorption of all into the divine; wickedness, death, and misery are all transformed into goodness, life, and blessedness; and the *consummatio mundi* is that God is all in all.[3]

In the period immediately preceding the Reformation some form of belief in universal salvation is found in connexion with very various forms of doctrine and life; *e.g.*, this belief is seen in combination with the Antinomianism of the Brethren of the Free Spirit (*q.v.*), and the fanatical asceticism of the Albanensian Cathari.[4]

3. Universalism in Germany.—A certain prevalence of Universalism among the German Anabaptists has been attributed to the influence of Hans Denk, scholar and mystic (1495–1527), but his extant writings do not show that he gave it any prominence in his teaching. That the Anabaptists were largely credited with such opinion is evident from cap. xvii. of the *Augsburg Confession* (1530), where there is formal condemnation of the Anabaptists 'who believe that there will be an end of the punishments of the damned and the devils.'

At the end of the 17th cent. and the beginning of the 18th controversy was very rife on three points—the eternity of punishment, the millennium, and the restitution of all things. A number of the publications of this time, especially on the last-named topic, are embodied in a great work published in three volumes folio at Frankfort in 1701–10, entitled *Μυστήριον ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων, oder das Geheimniss der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, compiled by Johann Wilhelm Petersen (1649–1727). Petersen had been professor at Rostock and a prominent divine of the Lutheran Church. He was deposed from office in 1692, because of his having embraced Universalist opinions, to which he had been converted by his wife, Johanna Eleanora von Merlau. She had been influenced in this direction before her marriage by the writings of the English mystic, Jane Lead, whose opinions were widely circulated in Germany by her disciples, who constituted the Philadelphian Society.[1] Petersen was a very voluminous writer, and both he and his wife contributed largely to the contents of the great compilation.

For many years after the appearance of Petersen's work a great number of writings, for and against the doctrine of restoration, were published. On the orthodox side appears the great name of Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1694–1755). On the other side the most remarkable publication, in permanence and popularity, was the little work entitled *The Everlasting Gospel*, which, having run through many editions in Germany from 1700 to 1745, was destined to achieve wide influence in America. It professed to be written by Paul Siegvolk, but it is known that the author's real name was Georg Klein-Nicolai, for which Paul Siegvolk is a transparent disguise, effected with the aid of German, Latin, and Greek.

Such subjects as eternal punishment were from this time open to latitudinarian treatment in Germany, but it remained for F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834) to give to his contemporaries and successors a definite direction towards Universalism. Among systematic theologians the one who has most closely followed Schleiermacher (*q.v.*) in his eschatology is the Zürich professor, Alexander Schweizer (1808–88).[2]

4. Universalism in England.—It has been inferred, from a mandate of Simon Langham, archbishop of Canterbury, dated 5th Nov. 1368,[3] that doctrines of universal salvation, extending even to the salvability of devils, were current at that time in England. A number of opinions are condemned as erroneous, extending from the possible salvation of Saracens, Jews, and pagans to beliefs such as, *e.g.*, 'it is not possible that one should be damned for original sin without actual sin,' and that the nature of demons may not be essentially irreparable. This mandate is addressed to the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, and it is surely more probable that it intends to deal with the possible re-appearance of Origenistic speculation in academic disputations than with any popular advocacy of such views.

The 42nd of the English Articles of 1553 has for its title 'That all men shall not be saved at the length,' and it runs:

'They also are worthy of condemnation who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion, that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered paines for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice.'

It is generally admitted that this condemnation is directed against Anabaptist opinions promulgated by foreign refugees who had then recently come to England in large numbers and been permitted to establish churches. Such doctrine is not attributed to the English Lollards, save probably in one document, viz. *The Protestation of the Clergy of the Lower House within the Province of Canterbury, with Declaration of the Faults and Abuses which heretofore have and now be within the same, worthy*

[1] *De Anim. et Resurr.* [2] *Ib.*
[3] *De Divisione Naturæ*, v. 30. [4] See art. ALBIGENSES.

[1] See art. PHILADELPHIANS.
[2] H. R. Mackintosh, 'Studies in Christian Eschatology,' in *Exp*, 8th ser., viii. [1914] 128 ff.
[3] D. Wilkins, *Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ*, London, 1737, iii. 75.

special Reformation (1536), where, under no. 4, we read:

'That if there be a place where they [souls departed] be punished, God is not yet born, nor He that shall redeem the world.'

Here, obviously, not a doctrine of temporary punishment, but one of no punishment at all, is condemned. The return of foreign Protestants to their own countries on the accession of Queen Mary (1553) probably accounts for the withdrawal of the Articles 40, 41, and 42.

It would have been strange if, in the general outburst of the most diverse religious opinions from 1640 onwards, the maintenance of universal salvation had not found a place. It is warmly advocated in a little anonymous book entitled:

'Divine Light, manifesting the love of God unto the whole world: with the True Church.

Wherein the holy Spirit of Truth manifesteth the Glory of God in Christ, exalting Christ, a spiritual Christ, and All-saving Jesus; shewing that Christ is a sure Foundation, and chief Corner-Stone for all Spirituall building, unto the raising up lively hopes for all People to proceed in Beleeving the greate Mercies and loving-kindnesses of our God in Christ, in whom God hath redeemed us his saints, and *All*; having wrought all things for us, and all in Christ, wherein wee are made perfect.

Sent forth by the Minister of the Lord Jesus, whom He hath appointed his servant for the Good of All:

In bringing Glad Tidings of Good Things unto the whole Creation. Esai 52. 7. 13.

. . . . . .

The Lord will worke for the manifestation of his Truth in this his due time. Printed in the year 1646.'

The author does not deny that the elect are found in every age, but they are those who are chosen to proclaim to the world general redemption and the holy covenant. It is evident that the work attracted much attention, for in *A Testimony to the Truth of Jesus Christ as also against the Errours, Heresies and Blasphemies of the Time and the Toleration of them, Inscribed by the ministers of Christ within the Province of London, December 14, 1647*, we find that the 'errours against God's eternal decree of Election and Reprobation' are taken verbatim from the *Divine Light*. Under date 4th Feb. 1646 the Lords and Commons put forth an order for a day of public humiliation 'for the growth and spreading of Errors, Heresies and Blasphemies,' and among the 'errors' enumerated are two, referred to *Divine Light*:

'(*a*) "That God's eternal election is of all men, one as well as another"; (*b*) "that all shall be saved at last, both men and devils, and that they that deny it are the great Antichrist; that true faith is to believe it; and that though this Faith of general redemption were but in three persons only in the world, it should be sufficient to save all the rest of the Creation."'[1]

In the so-called Draconic Ordinance, passed by Parliament in 1648, while deniers of the Trinity are threatened with death, those who maintain that all men shall be saved are declared liable to imprisonment.

Another vigorous little tract, of six pages, written by Henry Horn and published in 1653, deserves mention in connexion with the *Divine Light*, viz. *The Light of God spreading itself in all the dark Corners of the Earth; with glad Tydings to all People, with a Restauration of all Things, and the Lyon's Power overthrown.*

At this time three men were itinerating in the country, preaching Universalism, and gathering small bodies of adherents. They often preached in churches, but more frequently challenged the clergy in public disputation after the manner of the 'gifted brethren' of the army. These were William Erbury (1604–54), Gerrard Winstanley († 1652), and Richard Coppin († 1659). The last-named was frequently imprisoned; his works largely consist of accounts of debates with his clerical opponents and his judges. One of his chief contentions is that there may be redemption from hell, and in support of this he argues that, in Biblical language, 'everlasting' does not mean 'endless.'

[1] *Hell broke loose*, London, 1646, p. 5.

The latter point is elaborated at length by Samuel Richardson, a Baptist, in his work entitled *Of the Torments of Hell: The Foundation and Pillars thereof discovered, searched, shaken and removed, with infallible Proofs, that there is not to be a Punishment after this Life, for any to endure, that shall never end*, printed in 1658, and reprinted in *The Phœnix*, ii. [1708]. In this little work the author carries himself beyond the end proposed, and convinces himself of the ultimate salvation of all men.

In 1661 appeared an anonymous treatise entitled *A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the Chief of his Opinions*, reprinted in *The Phœnix*, i. [1707]. The author was George Rust, who in 1667 became bishop of Dromore. His statement of Origen's opinions is not mere exposition, but reveals the author as more than favourable to the notion of universal restitution.

A classic of Universalist literature was being produced at this period by Jeremiah White (1629–1707), Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and chaplain to the Protector. The book was not printed until 1712, and did not then bear the author's name. The title is *The Restoration of all Things, or a Vindication of the Goodness and Grace of God, to be manifested at last in the Recovery of his whole Creation out of their Fall. Rev xiv. 6.* White approaches his subject from the predestinarian side; his style is forcible, simple, and dignified, reminding the reader of the Cambridge Platonists.

Isaac Barrow (1630–77) had already approached the subject from the Arminian side in his sermons, nos. 39–42, 'The Doctrine of Universal Redemption Asserted and Explained.'[1]

Thomas Burnet (1635?–1715), Master of the Charterhouse, towards the end of his life, wrote a Latin treatise, *de Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium*, which he circulated in MS among his friends, strictly enjoining that it was not to be printed. After his death, however, it appeared in print (1727), and subsequently in an English translation (1733). The author is perhaps not very clear as to the processes and stages by which the soul after death arrives at the general resurrection and the last judgment, but he is unmistakably opposed to the doctrine of endless punishment. He maintains, however, that this doctrine should not be publicly discredited, but used as a deterrent from sin in popular teaching.

Archbishop Tillotson (1630–94) held that the Biblical language as to future punishment is to be regarded as a divine threatening of wrath to come, which in God's mercy may not be literally realized.

The views of George Cheyne (1671–1743) inclined towards Universalism.

Popular preaching of Universalist doctrine had a brief success in London under the vigorous advocacy of James Relly (1720–78). He had been a convert of Whitefield's, and was for some time a preacher among his adherents, but he espoused the doctrine of a 'finished salvation' in Christ, maintaining that all sin and all suffering for sin had been accomplished and ended in the passion of Christ, and that mankind has therefore expiated all offence in the person of Christ, its corporate head. The only offence for which man is still accountable consists in the disbelief or the ignoring of this fact. Relly made a convert of John Murray, who in 1770 carried his doctrine to America.

Elhanan Winchester (1751–97) came from America in 1787, and in the following year published *The Universal Restoration Exhibited in Four Dialogues*. He gathered a large congrega-

[1] *Works*, London, 1830–31, iii.

tion in Parliament Court, London, and was succeeded there, on his return to America in 1794, by William Vidler (1758–1816), who had been a Baptist minister at Battle, and, on embracing Universalism in 1792, had been expelled, with his congregation, from the Kent and Sussex Association of Baptist Churches. Vidler was not successful in maintaining a large congregation in London, but did great service to the cause he advocated by establishing in 1797 a periodical entitled *The Universalist's Miscellany*, which in 1802 became *The Universal Theological Magazine*. This continued from 1797 to the end of 1805, and was succeeded by *The Monthly Repository* (1806–37), a valuable record of men and movements on the liberal side of the old dissent.

Universalism, apart from any attempt at the organization of a Church, found an advocate in Sir George Stonhouse († 1793), a Syriac scholar of eminence, who had spent much time in the examination of Syriac MSS in Continental libraries. At Oxford he had been a member of the little band of Methodists over whom John Wesley presided, nicknamed the Holy Club, and had maintained, against his fellow-members, the doctrine of universal restitution. In later life he resided at East Brent, Somerset, and was much interested in a society formed in the neighbouring parish of Burnham and called the Burnham Society, 'to study philosophy and polemic divinity and debate on the difference of religious opinions, in brotherly love.' The minutes of the society record discussions on the pre-existence of souls and universal restitution.[1] Stonhouse published (anonymously at Bristol in 1761) *Universal Restitution a Scripture Doctrine*, and two subsequent volumes on the same subject in 1768 and 1773.

Another independent study is *The Restitution of All Things: An Essay on the Important Purpose of the Universal Redeemer's Destination* (1785), by James Brown, chaplain of the British garrison at Savannah in the Province of Georgia. The author is apparently quite unaware of any efforts or any books of purport similar to his own.

At the close of the 18th cent. Universalism began to spread among English Unitarians. John Prior Estlin, of Bristol (1747–1817), published *Discourses on Universal Restitution* (1813), directed principally against the doctrine of the final annihilation of the wicked. A more generally interesting treatment of the subject was put forth by T. Southwood Smith (1788–1861), in his *Illustrations of the Divine Government* (1816).

David Thom (1793–1862), minister of the Scotch Church, Rodney Street, Liverpool, having been licensed by the Presbytery of Glasgow, was in 1825 censured and suspended by that Presbytery upon charges of heresy, which, however, lay entirely within the sphere of Calvinistic doctrine. His adherents formed an independent congregation, which soon became known as Berean Universalists, for Thom now espoused the doctrine of a 'finished salvation,' analogous to that of Relly, and constructed on a distinctly Calvinistic basis. His works consisted of laborious and often paradoxical interpretations of Scripture, but in 1850 he republished Jeremiah White's *Restoration of All Things* with a historical preface. The same year marked the appearance of a magazine, *The Universalist*, edited by Richard Roe, to which Thom became a constant contributor, his efforts being largely devoted to restraining the Unitarian tendencies of contemporary Universalism, especially in the United States.[2]

Universalism has, at a later time, been approached from various sides by writers within the Church of England, notably F. W. Farrar,[1] Andrew Jukes,[2] and Alfred Gurney.[3]

5. Universalism in Scotland.—As early as 1755 certain small congregations in the Merse (Berwickshire) which had been associated with the Reformed Presbytery (a branch from the Cameronian side of the Scottish Covenanters) united in declaring their belief in 'the boundless love of God and the universal mediation of Christ.' Feeling the need of a pastor, they solemnly set aside three young men considered fit for the office, and, after a day of consecration and prayer, determined by lot which of the three should be recognized as their pastor. The lot fell upon James Purves (1734–95). This was in 1769; and, as they desired to have direct recourse to the Scriptures of the prophets and apostles as the source of true knowledge, ecclesiastical and civil, Purves was directed to apply himself to the study of the original tongues, and for this purpose went to the University of Glasgow. In 1776, many families of the original body having settled in Edinburgh, he was appointed pastor over them, but did not relinquish his relation with the societies in the Merse. Purves having publicly advocated Universalist views, his congregation in 1792 adopted the title of Universal Dissenters. Later, in 1813, it became generally known as Unitarian. In 1812 T. Southwood Smith became minister of the congregation, the charge having been vacant since the death of Purves. During the period of his ministry he studied medicine, and, having graduated M.D. in 1816, became subsequently well known as a pioneer of sanitary reform. The congregation is now represented by St. Mark's Chapel, opened in 1835.[4]

Neil Douglas (1750–1823), who in 1809 seceded from the Relief Church, established Universalist congregations in Greenock and Glasgow, and preached in many other places. His successor, William Worrall († 1828), continued his work, and congregations were established in Glasgow, Greenock, Johnstone, Paisley, Ayr, and Falkirk, which united in an annual conference. He published three volumes of a periodical entitled *The Gospel Communicator*. Probably a survival of his activity is to be seen in the Universalist Church of Stenhousemuir, Larbert, the only congregation in the United Kingdom still bearing the title Universalist.

James Morison (1816–93) founded the Evangelical Union in 1843 on the basis of three universals: universal love of God, universal atonement of Christ, universal work of the Holy Ghost. Declaring that the sacrifice of Christ was for all men everywhere, Morison stops short of universal salvation; the obstacle, in his view, is not, as in Amyraldism, the lack of special grace in the individual, but 'unbelief, the only obstacle to salvation which the death of Christ has not removed.'[5]

6. Universalism in America.—The progress of Universalism in America has found a competent and judicious historian in Richard Eddy; hence its main lines may be readily traced and succinctly stated.

The first advocates of universal salvation were probably the German Baptists, called Dunkers or Tunkers,[6] who were settled in Germantown, Pa., as early as 1719, and there established a church. They brought or imported Universalist books from Germany, and among them was *The Everlasting Gospel*, attributed to Paul Siegvolk (see above). The translation and printing of this, which may

[1] Extracts, etc., were printed in 1798.
[2] D. Thom, *Sermons with Memoir*, London, 1863.

[1] *Eternal Hope*, London, 1878.
[2] *The Second Death and the Restitution of All Things*[12], London, 1887.
[3] *Our Catholic Inheritance in the Larger Hope*, London, 1888.
[4] *MS Register of Minutes, St. Mark's Chapel, Edinburgh; and Historical Account*, printed in 1908.
[5] W. Adamson, *Life of the Rev. Dr. James Morison*, London, 1898, p. 127.
[6] See art. SECTS (Christian).

be regarded as the primary document of American Universalism, is probably due to the influence of G. de Benneville, who, after having suffered persecution for preaching Universalism in France and Germany, settled in Pennsylvania in 1741. The title runs thus:

'The Everlasting Gospel, commanded to be preached by Jesus Christ, Judge of the Living and Dead, unto all creatures, Mark xvi. 15. concerning the Eternal Redemption found out by him, whereby Devil, Sin, Hell and Death, shall at last be abolished, and the whole Creation restored to its primitive Purity; being a testimony against the present Anti-christian World. Written in German by Paul Siegvolk, and translated into English by John S[echla]. Germantown: Printed by Christopher Sower, MDCCLIII.'

There is abundant evidence that in the latter half of the 18th cent. Universalism was spreading widely in the Episcopal, Congregational, and Presbyterian Churches. Controversy was roused especially by the anonymous publications of Charles Chauncy, of Boston (1705–87), *e.g.*, *Salvation for all Men* (1782). But the organization of societies on a basis distinctly Universalist is due to John Murray (1741–1815), who, deserted on account of his Rellyan views by his former friends in Whitefield's Connexion, and broken by domestic afflictions, had determined to seek refuge and obscurity in the New World. The ship that bore him and was making for New York was driven by a storm into shoal water off the coast of New Jersey. It became necessary to land part of the cargo, and of this Murray was left in charge. Wandering on shore, he came to a settlement called Good Luck, and met with its founder, an aged man named Thomas Potter, who, in addition to his farm buildings, had built a meeting-house, and confidently expected that the Lord would send him a preacher. He hailed Murray as the heaven-sent messenger of the gospel, and constrained him to preach. An inscription on a granite boulder now marks the spot where Potter and Murray met, and records that on 30th Sept. 1770 Murray first preached in America. For some time after this Murray itinerated as a preacher among orthodox Baptists, until in 1774 he settled at Gloucester, Mass., with a congregation many of whom had been already influenced by the teaching of Relly. Here in 1779 some of these joined with Murray in a church covenant; this marks the earliest form of organization among American Universalists.

Murray's later ministerial life was spent in Boston, but at this time a new centre of Universalist activity was formed in Philadelphia by the labours of Elhanan Winchester. Winchester's followers, who were at first known as Universal Baptists, joined the adherents of Murray in organizing 'The First Independent Church of Christ commonly called Universalists.' A convention, held in Philadelphia in 1790, drew up Articles of Faith and a plan of church government. The third of these Articles runs:

'We believe that there is One Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, in whom dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily; who, by giving himself a ransom for all, hath redeemed them to God by his blood; and who, by the merit of his death and the efficacy of his Spirit, will finally restore the whole human race to happiness.'

Murray and his adherents adopted these Articles in 1791, and subsequently altered them in a Rellyan direction. But the personal friendship of Murray and Winchester could not avert divergence between their followers; for, while Murray advocated a 'free and finished justification' obtained at once by the expiatory suffering of Christ, and summed up in the words 'no future punishment,' the adherents of Winchester suspected a perilous tendency to Antinomianism in these views, and Winchester's own teaching included an elaborate eschatology involving a millennial reign of Christ with the saints on earth, their ascent into the heavenly places, the conversion of this world into a lake of fire for the age-long punishment of devils and wicked men, and the ultimate purification and elevation of both to final sanctification.

Another view which would appear to be more definitely Antinomian in tendency than Murray's was propounded by Caleb Rich of Warwick, Mass. (1750–1821), and attained a certain local ascendancy. According to this, as at the creation the soul was inserted into the mortal frame, so now with each individual soul; it remains untainted by the deeds and desires of the flesh, and at the dissolution of its material envelope rises again to God in its original purity.[1]

Notwithstanding these divergencies, it is remarkable that in Aug. 1803 the Convention of Universalist Churches of New England, held at Winchester, N.H., in which 38 societies were represented, agreed upon a Profession of Faith which is still the standard of American Universalism. This, known as the Winchester Profession, is as follows:

'Article I.—We believe that the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments contain a revelation of the character of God and of the duty, interest, and final destination of mankind.

Article II.—We believe that there is one God, whose nature is Love, revealed in one Lord Jesus Christ, by one Holy Spirit of Grace, who will finally restore the whole family of mankind to holiness and happiness.

Article III.—We believe that holiness and true happiness are inseparably connected, and that believers ought to be careful to maintain order and practise good works; for these things are good and profitable unto men.'

The general consensus marked by the Winchester Profession prepared the way for a new departure, and for the commanding influence of a new leader in the person of Hosea Ballou (1771–1852). He published in 1805 *A Treatise on Atonement* (subsequently much revised). This little work severed Universalism from its origins in Calvinism, and lifted it from controversy to a level of affirmation and construction. It sought to build up a theology on the one postulate of God's universal and everlasting love. Ballou finds the reality of atonement not in the appeasing of God's wrath and the reconciliation of God to man, but in the reconciliation of man to God.

'To believe in any other Atonement than the putting off of the old man, with his deeds, and the putting on of the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness, is carnal-mindedness and is death.'[2]

While he emphasizes God's dealings with man in the way of moral discipline and retributive justice in the present life, and insists on the continuity of the divine judgment of the individual from day to day, he anticipates that death will in some way so quicken the powers of the soul and enlighten all spiritual faculties that nothing that can be called penal lies before it in a future state. Though he did not lay stress upon the doctrine of no future punishment, his implicit adherence to it had certain definite consequences. Ballou rejected the deity of Christ, and thus espoused Unitarianism some years before it became dominant in the Congregational churches of Boston. But the Unitarians were strongly opposed to Ballou's views as to death and the future life, and Channing went so far as to say that Ballou ascribed 'the power to death of changing and purifying the mind,' thus 'burying moral evil in the grave.' Another consequence was what is known as the 'Restorationist Controversy,' which proceeded intermittently from 1817 until 1831, and led to an actual division in the Universalist body. It began with a friendly controversy between Hosea Ballou and Edward Turner, published in a periodical called *The Gospel Visitant*. Ballou took the side of no future punishment, but declared that at that time he was not absolutely convinced on the subject.

[1] Cf. with this the view attributed to Helen Burns, *i.e.* Maria Brontë, by her sister, Charlotte Brontë, in *Jane Eyre*, ch. vi.

[2] *A Treatise on Atonement*[14], Boston, 1902, p. 123.

In 1822 a further stage was reached, in which Jacob Wood, who wrote under the name 'Restorationist,' gave evidence of the difference of opinion which at this time prevailed in the Universalist body, and of the incompatibility of the two doctrines—viz. that 'of universal salvation at the commencement of a future state' and that 'of the final restoration of all men by Jesus Christ,' adding:

'The doctrine which admits all characters alike to heaven at death, is subversive of a just distinction between virtue and vice.'

This diversity of opinion led to an actual schism. In 1831 a number of Universalist churches formed the Massachusetts Association of Universal Restorationists, which continued for ten years. The great majority, including many who had a doctrinal affinity with the Restorationists, strongly disapproved of the secession. The seceders, while adopting the Winchester Profession, altered, in 1833, the first clause of Art. iii. so as to read:

'We believe in a retribution beyond death, and in the necessity of faith and repentance.'

The 'no future punishment' creed disappeared in 1878 as the motto of Universalism, when the Universalist ministers of Boston and its vicinity approved a declaration of faith, in which these words occur:

'We believe that repentance and salvation are not limited to this life . . . Salvation, . . . whether effected here or in the future life, is salvation by Christ, and gives no warrant to the imputation to us of the "death and glory" theory.'

Art. ix. runs:

'Whatever differences in regard to the future may exist among us, none of us believe that the horizon of eternity will be relatively either largely or for a long time overcast by the clouds of sin and punishment, and in coming into the enjoyment of salvation, whensoever that may be, all the elements of penitence, forgiveness, and regeneration are involved. Justice and mercy will then be seen to be entirely at one, and God be all in all.'

Already for many years the objections to Universalism from the side of the Unitarians had been disappearing, as the views here stated were gaining ground among Universalists. The Universalists, combining a liberal faith with an evangelical fervour, appealed to many whom the drier light of Unitarianism did not reach, and without any formal alliance the two denominations have been constantly associated in social efforts and religious sympathy.

In 1903 a centennial meeting, held at Winchester, N.H., re-affirmed the Profession in its original form. In 1899 the following 'conditions of fellowship' had been appended to Art. iii. in a general convention held at Boston:

'The acceptance of the essential principles of the Universalist Faith, to wit: (1) The universal fatherhood of God; (2) the spiritual authority and leadership of His son, Jesus Christ; (3) the trustworthiness of the Bible as containing a revelation from God; (4) the certainty of just retribution for sin; (5) the final harmony of all souls with God.'

The latest statistics of the Universalist Church in America record the names of over 600 recognized ministers, and a still larger number of parishes and meeting-places; seven in Canada, some of which have fellowship with Universalist conventions in the United States. There are numerous women's missionary societies and mission circles; a regular mission is maintained in Japan, and a congregation has been formed in Cuba. There are also eight colleges, theological schools, and academies.[1]

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JAMES EDWIN ODGERS.

[1] *Universalist Register and Year Book, 1918.*

UNIVERSALITY.—1. **Definition.**—The universal is defined by Aristotle as 'whatever may naturally be predicated of many things,'[1] or 'that is called universal which naturally belongs to more than one thing.'[2] The important word in these definitions is 'naturally.' It is explained by the following:

'I call that universal which belongs to the subject, distributively, essentially, and as it is what it is';[3] in scholastic terms, 'which is true *de omni*, *per se*, and *quatenus ipsum*.'

By *de omni* Aristotle means 'in every case and always.' *De omni* is merely the enumerative or collective universal. *Per se* and *quatenus ipsum* explain the 'naturally.' There are four senses of *per se*: (1) when the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, (2) when the subject is part of the definition of the predicate, (3) that which is not predicated of any other subject, (4) when the subject itself is the cause of the predicate. Aristotle says the expressions *per se* and *quatenus ipsum* are the same, but he seems to have in view *per se* in the first and the second sense only; for he has just said that whatever is universal is inherent in things necessarily, and subsequently he says that everything is inherent in either of those ways or according to accident, but accidents are not necessary.[4] This is what Aristotle means by universal in the strict sense—the primary universal, the universal as it occurs in mathematics, as when we say that triangles have their internal angles equal to two right angles, or that two contradictory predicates, 'straight' or 'curved,' imply the notion line.

Grote and Prantl reduce the third and fourth senses to the first. Grote says of the third:

'The predicate must not be extra-essential to the subject, nor attached to it as an adjunct from without, simply concomitant or accidental.'

Of the fourth sense he says:

'The like distinction holds in regard to events: some are accidentally concomitant sequences, which may or may not be realized (*e.g.*, a flash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey); in others, the conjunction is necessary or causal (as when an animal dies under the sacrificial knife).'[5]

The same identifications are made by Prantl:

The latter explains the third sense of *per se* thus: 'what is enunciated not in predicative manner as property, but as individual substance, remains identical with itself in the multiplicity of possible predicates.'[6]

Prantl expressly identifies the fourth sense of *per se* with the first. The third and fourth are both regarded as resting upon the activity of the creative concept and its necessary causality.

The meaning of Aristotle seems to be this. In certain cases attributes are essentially conditioned by the nature of the subject in which they are found, but we do not see this. The predicates may not after all be true *de omni*. Similarly with regard to events. The nature of the living thing may essentially condition the effect of the wound, but after all it may not. Such wounds may not be always fatal. We cannot, therefore, make such universals the basis of a demonstrative science. We do not see the primary universals or the necessity which belongs to such universals.

This interpretation of Aristotle, common to Prantl and Grote, is in accordance with the scholastic treatment of demonstration, especially the *demonstratio potissima*. The property of risibility as flowing from the definition of man as a rational animal is an illustration of the third sense of *per se*. Risibility was supposed to belong to man essentially. This is certainly not evident in itself and has led to an extremely different interpretation of Aristotle, put forward by Saint-

[1] *De Interp.* vii. [2] *Met.* (vi.) vii. 13 (1038[b]).
[3] *Anal. Post.* i. 4.
[4] *Ib.* i. 4, 6; cf. H. Aldrich, *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*[4], ed. H. L. Mansel, Oxford, 1862, Appendix K.
[5] George Grote, *Aristotle*, London, 1872, i. 312.
[6] Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, i. 122.

Hilaire and Mansel. With regard to the third sense of *per se*, both interpret it as referring to the existence of the substance. Saint-Hilaire says:

'The individual substance is never necessary; and, moreover, it is for itself alone, and is never in a subject other than itself.'

As to the fourth sense he says:

'No more does it carry in itself a character of necessity; thus in the example chosen by Aristotle, there is no necessity that the man die by strangulation; for there is a crowd of other totally different causes of death.'[1]

This would restrict the universal and the necessity it involves to the first two senses of the words *per se*. In this restriction Mansel agrees with Saint-Hilaire, and puts forward a theory of the demonstrative syllogism which limits it to the demonstrations of mathematics.

2. The two universals. — The truth is that Aristotle has two universals—the primary universal, where subject and predicate are co-extensive and convertible, which is characterized by necessity, and another universal in which this is not the case. In one passage he says:

'By universal, here, I mean that which is not convertible with its subject.'[2]

His object is to show that such a universal, unless it issues in a primary universal, is valueless for science. The universal in the strict sense belongs to mathematical science and other deductive sciences; the other universal belongs to the uniformities of co-existence and sequence which experimental science investigates. Locke, Dugald Stewart, and Mansel have regarded deductive science, especially mathematics, as involving an essentially distinct logical procedure from that of the inductive sciences. J. S. Mill seeks to reduce mathematics to the inductive level. Mediæval thought and Platonism tend to enlarge the scope of demonstration. The teaching of Aristotle is the same as that of Locke, Stewart, and Mansel.

It is this distinction of the two universals which some later logicians seem to have in view. Petrus Hispanus distinguishes between predicable and universal. Predicable is affirmed of many things, but universal exists in many things.[3] Others make the distinction turn upon whether in the proposition we tell of the subject *quid sit* or *quale sit*—what it is or what are its attributes or characters. According to this, that only is a universal which is predicated of inferior classes; but a predicable which is also predicated of co-ordinate classes would not be a universal. There are thus five predicables, but only two universals—genus and species.[4]

3. The problem of universals. — The above doctrine of universals considers the universal as its nature is affected by the precise relation in which the predicate can stand to the subject in a proposition; and the distinction of universals which it sets up affects the consideration of universals taken in their widest sense. The most difficult problem relating to universals—a problem still unsettled—is that concerning their existence. Do they exist only in the mind? If outside the mind, where? Are they mere names?

4. Plato and Aristotle. —

'Two things,' says Aristotle, 'may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science. But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas.'[5]

'They at the same time treat the Ideas as universal substances, and again as separable and individual. That this is not possible has been shown before. The reason why those who say the Ideas are universal combined those two views in one, is that they did not make the Ideas substances identical with sensible things. They thought that the sensible particulars were in a state of flux and none of them remained, but that the universal was apart from these and different. And Socrates gave the impulse to this theory, as we said before, by means of his definitions, but he did not *separate* them from the particulars; and in this he thought rightly, in not separating them.'[1]

These remarks of Aristotle are aimed at the Platonic theory of Ideas—the theory as expounded in the earlier dialogues. Whether in the later dialogues the Platonic theory undergoes a change we shall consider below. Aristotle knows of no such change. Plato's theory as conceived by Aristotle is as follows:

Plato supposed that there existed, besides the individual things of sense, which are continually changing and passing away, another kind of beings, apart from matter and movement, which he termed Forms or Ideas, by participation in which each individual and sensible thing is made to be what it is. These Ideas are eternal and self-subsistent. Material things participate in them, and are copies of the Ideas, which in themselves exist in an intelligible region apart from the world. When we, on perceiving sensible things, form general concepts, we, according to Plato, revive by reminiscence the recollection of the Ideas, with which we were familiar in a previous state. What we term a general concept is the Idea in its subjective existence as an intelligible form in our intellect. Archer Butler[2] and others have distinguished the Platonic Idea from the general concepts of the understanding; but this separation is rejected by Bonitz and Zeller.[3]

Whatever may be thought of this theory, it is remarkable that the most essential objections to it have been brought forward by Plato himself in the *Parmenides*.

'Perhaps,' says Jowett, 'there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power than that in which he assails his own theory of Ideas. The arguments are nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle.'[4]

The difficulties—how without division or multiplication the Ideas can participate in the many, or the many in the Ideas; the necessity of a still higher universal to unite the Idea itself with its corresponding phenomena; the so-called third-man argument; most serious of all, the uselessness of Ideas for knowledge, arising from their disconnexion with our minds and with phenomena—are here set forth.

'The perplexities,' says Jowett, 'which surround the one and many in the sphere of the Ideas are also alluded to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever been answered by any one else who separates the phenomenal from the real.'[5]

This statement may be allowed to stand, but the question arises: Did Plato separate the phenomenal and the real, or did he unite them? The answer is: He did both. 'Separation' is a category of the spatial and temporal. The Idea is spaceless and timeless,[6] yet it does not exist in total aloofness from phenomena. It is in this way that we answer the difficulties which have been raised in this connexion, and which have led to the theory of a 'later Platonism.' There is in reality no essential change. The force of these objections — perhaps derived from the Megaric school, perhaps pressed home by Aristotle—was no doubt felt by him. But what happened in this case is what in such cases always happens. The old point of view is retained and an effort is made to show that it answers the new questions. In this respect there is a striking parallel between the later philosophy of Plato and that of Fichte. Originally, in Fichte, the Ego projects from itself a purely phenomenal world. Schelling showed

[1] J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, *Logique d'Aristote traduite en Français*, Paris, 1839–44, iii. 24.
[2] *Anal. Post.* ii. 17.
[3] Petrus Hispanus, *Summulæ logicales*, tract. ii.; cf. R. Sanderson, *Logicæ Artis Compendium*, Oxford, 1707, bk. i. ch. ii.
[4] Burgersdyk, quoted by Mansel in Aldrich, *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*, p. 24.
[5] *Metaphysica*, 1078b 28, tr. W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1908.

[1] *Metaphysica*, 1086a 32.
[2] *Lectures on the Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*[2], p. 370 f.
[3] *Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, p. 241, note 42.
[4] *The Dialogues of Plato*[3], tr. B. Jowett, Oxford, 1892, iv. 5 (Introd. to *Parmenides*).
[5] *Ib.* p. 7.
[6] *The Parmenides of Plato*, ed. T. Maguire, Dublin, 1878, p. xxvi.

that the world in its turn produces the Ego, and thus 'turned over a leaf' in the history of philosophy. The Absolute is in the world, therefore, as well as in the Ego. Fichte in his later philosophy seeks to show that his Absolute—the Ego, pure Being—is the active living power in phenomena. In the *Philebus*, *Sophist*, and *Timæus* Plato does the same. The Idea is spaceless and timeless, but nevertheless one with mind and life and power in the phenomenal world.

It is just in this that the change wrought in the philosophical standpoint by Aristotle consists. He denies the transcendent existence of the Idea or universal, and places it in the composite world of matter and form. The world thereby ceases to be merely phenomenal. Matter itself becomes something positive. It is no longer a mere negativity. The centre of gravity has passed from the ideal to the real world. Both Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines have been called realism. Both affirm the reality of the Idea or Form; but in Plato it is a reality above the world, in Aristotle in the world. Aristotle rejects the detached existence of the universal. He holds that the subjective concept is related to the objective reality, but in place of the transcendent existence of the Ideas, in contradistinction to individual objects, he regards the Essence or Form as immanent in the things. The precise nature of this immanence, in Aristotle, has been a matter of dispute. According to Hamilton,[1] he has been viewed as 'a Realist, a Conceptualist, and a Nominalist, in the strictest sense.' The questions at issue are formulated by Porphyry thus: whether genera and species do really exist in nature, or in mere conceptions only; whether, if existing, they are bodies or incorporeal; whether they are inherent in the objects of sense or disjoined from them.[2] Even though Aristotle brought down the Idea from its super-celestial sphere and embodied it in things, it still has an existence in the Divine Being, the Form of Forms. If the Divine Mind be one with things, *i.e.*, if Aristotle be interpreted pantheistically, we have still the questions as to the nature of this union—the unity and multiplicity of the Idea. If the Divine Mind be different from things—*i.e.*, if he be interpreted theistically—the Idea has a transcendent existence, if not in itself, still in the Divine Mind where the unification of the Idea lies; and what is the nature of it is the subject of the great controversy between nominalism and realism in the Middle Ages. The difficulty consists in this: that, if the universal is merely something repeated over and over again, in individuals, then genera and species fall asunder into merely resembling individuals, essential community of nature is denied; but, if such repetition be rejected, and the universal be considered as some one thing throughout the individuals, then the plurality becomes merely phenomenal and illusive. Extreme representatives of realism, like William of Champeaux, held that the universal exists for itself as a universal in individual things, and were thus led into pantheism.[3]

5. Moderate realism.—In the moderate realism of St. Thomas Aquinas we have a fusion of Aristotelian and Platonic realism. St. Augustine had already interpreted Plato's Ideas as the thoughts which God had of things before He created them. St. Thomas Aquinas admits the existence of the universal or the Form in a threefold sense, *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*.[4] The universal *ante rem* corresponds to the Platonic Ideas, understood as archetypal ideas in the mind of God—the patterns in the Divine Intellect after which all things were made. With regard to the universal *in re* or *a parte rei*, the universal nature does not exist as the same in the individuals as it exists in them objectively. It is only alike in them. We, in our consideration of it, regard it as a unity or community of nature, as one and the same in all. The universal nature exists as a universal, in the human intellect, by virtue of its power of recognizing the common nature. This is the universal *post res*. But, if the universal, as universal, exists thus only in the act of recognition in the mind, we seem to be impaled on the difficulty of Parmenides, which he put to the youthful Socrates, and which is briefly this: What then is this common nature which is known by the mind? Moderate realism answers this question by its doctrine that universals are fundamentally in things. 'Universalia sunt formaliter in mente fundamentaliter in rebus ipsis.'

> 'To the universal nature thus fundamentally taken, it does not essentially belong, to be one or many, in the intellect or out of the intellect, in individuals or outside them, communicable to a number or incommunicable.'[1]

If we ponder on this universal, we shall not find it so very different from the timeless and spaceless Idea of the *Philebus* and *Sophistes*. At any rate, it approaches the conception by which Plato sought to allay the difficulties and doubts he himself raised in the *Parmenides*.

6. The Scotist formalism.—It was almost inevitable that this doctrine, placing at the roots of things an Essence or Form in itself subject to no individualizing conditions, should beget a new form of realism. This is precisely what did happen. Duns Scotus distinguishes carefully between the unity of an individual and the unity of a universal nature. The last he conceives almost as certain modern logicians conceive the unity of a variable in a propositional function. The universal appears in the particular individual things, but it is apprehended as universal by the understanding. In itself it is neither particular nor universal, but just what it is. It is something antecedent to universality and particularity, but, as antecedent in itself, indifferent to either.[2] This is what distinguishes the realism of Duns Scotus from the earlier realism of Bernard of Chartres or William of Champeaux, that universals are not apprehended as *actu* such in objective reality.[3] This would be to reduce them to individual unities; or, rather, numerically the same nature would pervade the individuals. In the system of Duns Scotus a primitive universal unity—matter—is progressively pluralized and individualized by form, almost as a single throb of Bergson's *élan vital* is broken into its manifold reverberations in nature. Each throb, however, is in Scotus a system of unities; and it is evident that these universals, if they are neither to be pluralized in the individuals nor consolidated into a single being in a real universal, must be conceived as passing over into the individuals, and yet as each retaining its own unity in them. This is the view that underlies the doctrine of formalism elaborated in the Scotist school. Universality is thus conceived as in the things, not by a distinction of reason, as moderate realism would hold, not by a *distinctio realis*, as extreme realism would hold, but by a formal distinction, which still allowed it to be identified with the series of individual things.

7. The realism of Francis de Mayronis.—It is obvious that such a view approaches very close to

[1] Reid's *Works*, ed. Hamilton, p. 405, note 1.
[2] Porphyry, *Introd.* ch. i. [3] Prantl, ii. 130.
[4] *Ib.* iii. 110 ff.

[1] Thomas Marie Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, 3 vols., Paris, 1884, i. 317.
[2] Prantl, iii. 208.
[3] Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ii. 802; cf. Couturat's *variable* (*Encycl. of the Philos. Sciences*, i. 148 f.).

the doctrine which regards the universal as such as existing in things, and, if we regard this universal as numerically one with the universal as contemplated by the Divine Mind, we are in danger of being led back to a pantheism such as was actually held by Bernard of Chartres. If now we are to escape such pantheistic conclusions, there is one, and only one, way of escape within the same general point of view: it is to give the universal a self-existence, as Plato did, independent of the Divine or any mind. This step was taken by the greatest of the disciples of Scotus—Francis de Mayronis. Relations are divided by Mayronis into *relationes secundum esse* and *relationes secundum dici*. The former are between things which in their entire being fall under the category of relation; the latter are between things which, taken by themselves, are absolute, but are understood with reference to something else and remain entitatively distinct from the relation into which they enter.[1] This corresponds to what has been recently called the monistic and the monadistic view of relations. To Mayronis, however, it is a classification of relations, not of theories about relation. Such relations are moreover real, not mere *relationes rationis*, and have a being distinct from the existence of the things between which they exist. The relation between the subject and object of knowledge is so distinct from its terms that it exists separately—from which it follows that ideas are veritable entities.[2] Universals in themselves therefore exist neither in the soul nor in things. They are not a something as against another something; but they are something as against nothing or as against a mere mode or manner of being. They are eternal in the negative sense of being timeless. They are not necessary, nor are they contingent. They have an intelligible being from themselves essentially distinct from God. With Duns Scotus, Mayronis distinguishes between *esse essentiæ* and *esse existentiæ*. It is the latter *esse* that comes from God. To the same kind of being—*esse essentiæ*—belongs the *primum principium complexum, i.e.* the principle of contradiction, which he regards as a hypothetical copulative proposition.[3] In all this we may see in Francis de Mayronis a mediæval 'new realist.'

8. **Nominalism.**—The realism of the Scotists tends towards pantheism or else to the setting up of uncreated entities independent of the Divine Mind. The only other course is to identify completely the universal with individual things, *i.e.* to give up the universal as such, to recognize only individual things—the doctrine of nominalism. It has been sometimes questioned whether mediæval nominalism is really nominalism and not rather conceptualism. With regard to the early nominalism, it is hard to put any other interpretation on the opinion attributed to Roscellinus by Anselm, that universals are *flatus vocis*. His pupil Abelard is supposed to have approached more nearly to the conceptualist standpoint. But what is cited in support of this points really the other way. Abelard bases his view on that definition of the universal which is given by Aristotle and quoted at the beginning of this article, and which is based on the proposition. What Abelard seems to mean is that the universality arises from the universal statements we are able to make, and not from anything intrinsic in the thing. This metaphysical denial implicitly carries with it the rejection of conceptualism. And the same implicit rejection must be attributed to Occam, although Hamilton says that 'the later Nominalists, of the school of Occam, were really Conceptualists.'[1] Occam's doctrine is called 'terminism.' The *conceptus* is *id quod terminat actum intelligendi*. This is not something that exists *subjectively* in the mind, but something that exists *objectively*. The universality is not therefore something in the mind, but is the result of the act of the mind by which it gives signification to the term. It is in accordance with this that he claims for understanding an intuitive knowledge of objects of sense, rejects *species sensibilis* and *species intelligibilis*, merges the *intellectus possibilis* in the *intellectus agens*.[2]

9. **Modern philosophy; the psychological problem.**—All the problems of modern philosophy have been set to it by mediæval philosophy. The problem of the universals is no exception. The schools of Aquinas, Scotus, and Occam present to modern philosophy a problem which had to be solved psychologically. What constitutes the community of nature between general thoughts within us and things outside us? We have seen that, metaphysically, philosophy has been driven in Occam to give up the belief in a common nature in things.

(1) *Hobbes.*—In modern philosophy we find the psychological consequence in Hobbes. The idea of a common nature in thoughts is given up. Thoughts are as individual as things. 'There is nothing,' says Hobbes, 'universal but names.'[3]

(2) *Locke.*—To Locke, on the other hand, all knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Names can be general only if they stand for general ideas. Locke has been termed a nominalist. It has even been stated that he could be interpreted as a realist. But, if conceptualism means finding the universal in the idea, then Locke is what he has been generally considered, a conceptualist.

According to Locke, 'the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general . . . by considering them as they are in the mind, such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representations of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas.'[4] 'General ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult), for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.'[5]

(3) *Berkeley.*—This doctrine Berkeley, the protagonist of modern nominalism, attacked in the Introduction to *The Principles of Human Knowledge*.

'Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell. For myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the idea of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of a man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract

[1] Stöckl, ii. 869.
[2] Rousselot, *Etudes sur la Philosophie dans le moyen âge*, iii. 71; Hauréau, *De la Philosophie scolastique*, ii. 392.
[3] Prantl, iii. 285–287.

[1] Reid's *Works*[8], p. 406, note 2.
[2] Stöckl, ii. 988, 992. 3.
[3] Hobbes, *Human Nature*, London, 1650, ch. v. § 6 (*English Works*, ed. Sir W. Molesworth, London, 1839–45, iv. 22).
[4] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1690, bk. ii. ch. xi. § 9.
[5] Bk. iv. ch. vii. § 9.

general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid—which last are the two proper acceptations of *abstraction*.'[1]

Berkeley explains precisely what he means by universality:

'It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised—*universality*, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature *particular*, are rendered universal.'[2]

In the edition of 1734 he says:

'And here it must be acknowledged that a man may *consider* a figure merely as triangular; without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. *So far he may abstract.* But this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent *idea* of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.'[3]

(4) *Hume.*—Berkeley's doctrine on this subject was pronounced by Hume to be 'one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic of letters,' and he believes that he himself adopts it; but Hume's view was essentially different. Berkeley had said that all general *names* signify indifferently a great number of particular ideas.'[4] Hume attributes to him the opinion 'that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them.'[5] This is Hume's own doctrine. He holds that the idea before the mind is always some particular idea. Abstract ideas are in themselves individual, but, when we have found a resemblance among several objects, we apply the same name to all. The name, being applied to other individuals, different in some respects from the idea we have first on hearing it, does not revive the idea of all these individuals, but the custom of applying the name to them and a readiness to survey any of them, which produces any other individual one for which we have occasion. It is clear that Hume differs from Berkeley in this, that he does not recognize, as Berkeley did, the power the mind has of regarding the individual idea as representing and standing for the class to which it belongs. In Hume the idea is particular, and only possesses the power in association with the name of calling up other particular ideas. The nominalist doctrine, as it appears in Berkeley and Hume respectively, determines the counter-conceptualist doctrines of Reid and Brown.

(5) *Reid.*—Reid contends that Berkeley unwillingly or unwarily grants all that is necessary to support abstract and general conceptions:

'If a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, he must have some conception of this object of his consideration; for no man can consider a thing which he does not conceive. He has a conception, therefore, of a triangular figure, merely as such. I know no more that is meant by an abstract general conception of a triangle.' 'He who considers Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, must conceive the meaning of those abstract general words *man* and *animal*, and he who conceives the meaning of them has an abstract general conception.'[6]

(6) *Brown.*—According to Brown, the feeling of resemblance in certain respects is the true general notion, or general idea, as it has been less properly called, which the corresponding general term expresses.[1] Brown holds that between the perception of two or more objects and the invention and employment of the general term there must rise in the mind an intervening general notion of resemblance, the feeling or notion of the resemblance being immediately subsequent to the perception. It is the omission of this stage of the process that constitutes in his view the error of the nominalists. Thus, as Reid regards the power of considering a figure merely as triangular, or Peter merely as man, as a proof of having the abstract and general conception, so Brown regards the circumstance of felt resemblance between two or more objects as the general notion of such objects. Brown has been criticized by Hamilton, but J. S. Mill in his *Logic* has been influenced by Brown's view.[2]

(7) *James Mill.*—James Mill held that a general idea is that of a combination of individuals belonging to the class. The word 'man' calls up the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals. The name 'man' is the name of every individual and of the whole combination.[3] This confounds general and collective terms. 'Tree' does not mean a wood.

(8) *Hamilton.*—According to Sir W. Hamilton, the opposing parties are really at one. The whole controversy arises from not distinguishing the images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence. The solution depends on the distinction expressed in German by the terms *Begriff* and *Anschauung*. The images of the imagination, which were what Berkeley and the nominalists meant by ideas, are individual.[4]

If it were only this distinction that was wanting, the controversy would have ended long ago. Not to mention the schoolmen, the distinction was present to Berkeley himself.[5] The really important question is, What is the relation between thought proper or pure intellection and imagination? Is the image always necessary to the realization of the concept? Hamilton held that it was:

'The concept *horse*, I say, cannot, if it remain a concept, that is a universal attribution, be represented in imagination; but, except it be represented in imagination, it cannot be applied to any object, and, except it be so applied, it cannot be realised in thought at all.'[6]

This is what Hamilton termed the 'relativity of concepts.'

(9) *J. S. Mill.*—When this view of the relativity of the concept to the image is adopted, there is but little difference between the conceptualism of Hamilton and the nominalism of J. S. Mill.

According to Mill, 'We have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention, we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were able to conceive them separately from the rest.'[7]

The distinction between Hamilton's view and Mill's thus reduces itself to that of 'a potential universality as against an universal potentiality,' but in neither writer is there an attempt to account for or to show the necessity of the relativity of the concept, or, what is the same thing, the power of a partial consideration of an idea to lead out beyond it.

(10) *Mansel.*—A different view of the relation

1 Berkeley, *Works*[2], ed. Fraser, i. 242.
2 *Ib.* i. 247. 3 *Ib.* i. 249. 4 *Ib.* p. 250.
5 *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Green and Grose, i. 325.
6 *Works*[3], p. 408.

1 *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*[19], Edinburgh, 1856, p. 296.
2 Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, ii. 303 ff.; J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, bk. i. ch. v. § 3, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 3 note; cf. W. S. Jevons, *Pure Logic*, London, 1864, pp. 133–135.
3 James Mill, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, new ed., London, 1869, i. 268.
4 *Ib.* ii. 296 ff.
5 Berkeley, *Works*[2], ed. Fraser, ii. 325.
6 Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, i. 135.
7 Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*[4], London, 1872, p. 393.

between the concept and the image is taken by Mansel:

'I see lying on the table before me a number of shillings of the same coinage. Examined severally, the image and superscription of each is undistinguishable from that of its fellow; but in viewing them side by side, *space* is a necessary condition of my perception; and the difference of locality is sufficient to make them distinct, though similar, individuals. The same is the case with any representative image whether in a painting, or in the imagination waking or dreaming. It can only be depicted as occupying a certain place; and thus as an individual, and the representation of an individual. It is true I cannot say it represents this particular coin rather than that; and consequently it may be considered as the representative of all, successively but not simultaneously. To find a representative which shall embrace all at once, I must divest it of the condition of occupying space. . . . If we substitute Time for Space the same remarks will be equally applicable to the objects of our internal consciousness.'[1]

Mansel seems thus to have thought that the concept embraces all objects under it, simultaneously. But, if this were so, it would be a collective, not a general, concept. In the case selected—the shillings—the image may be regarded as identical with the concept, and this image and concept are alike indifferently representative of any shilling. As Hamilton says:

'The whole generality [of concepts] consists in this—that though we must realise them in thought under some singular of the class, we may do it under any.'[2]

(11) *Problem of the synthetic power of the concept; Hegel and Lotze.*—This, however, raises the important question of what is meant by 'realising under.' Mansel's doctrine is that the concept, to become universal, must be divested of all present relation to the image. The latter is only called in to verify its possibility. The existence of such imageless thought has been the subject of important investigation by H. J. Watt and others of the Würzburg school.[3] Without entering into the psychological inquiry, it may be pointed out that there must be some element in the concept by which it relates itself to the image and some element in the image by which it corresponds to the concept. Many are inclined to find this element in tendency or will, as that which gives vitality and meaning to the concept. It would be nearer the truth to say that will is will, and tendency is tendency, only through the concept. We have already remarked that Hamilton did not attempt to explain the relativity of the concept. It is nevertheless the underlying problem of his 'law of the conditioned' and 'conditions of the thinkable systematized.' It may be said to be the fundamental principle of Hegel's *Logic*. And it is precisely this feature of the concept as a sort of intussuscipient principle that Lotze has in view when he says:

'Of the true universal, on the other hand, which contains the rule for the entire formation of its species, it may rather be said that its content is always precisely as rich, the sum of its marks precisely as great, as that of its species themselves; only that the universal concept, the genus, contains a number of marks in a merely indefinite and even universal form; these are represented in the species by definite values or particular characterisations, and finally in the singular concept all indefiniteness vanishes, and each universal mark of the genus is replaced by one fully determined in quantity, individuality, and relation to others.'[4]

In the last chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle asserts the existence of a faculty—the organ of primary truths, the basis of demonstrative science—by means of which reason can pierce the objects of sense and penetrate to the universal and the cause. The whole of mediæval philosophy assumes such a power. Aquinas, Scotus, Occam, all alike imply it. Modern philosophy uniformly rejects it. Empiricism expressly denies it. Idealism denies any real essences distinct from thought. But, if intellect and its laws are in correlation with, and form an organic unity with, space, if the inner essences of things and the forces which control them determine, and are determined by, spatial relations,[1] it will follow that the formulæ of physical and chemical text-books are no mere descriptive statement, no mere analytical elaboration of working concepts, but that these concepts are, as Hegel, Hamilton, and Lotze by implication describe them, concepts of entities and forms of energy which really exist, move, and are moved.

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UNIVERSE.—See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY, ESCHATOLOGY, NATURE.

UNPARDONABLE SIN.—See SIN (Christian).

UPANIṢADS.—The Sanskrit treatises or dialogues known as the *Upaniṣads* are the expression of the philosophical speculation of Indian sages and teachers during many centuries. The period of their fullest fruition, when with most originality and insight Hindu thinkers proposed to themselves and to the circle of their pupils solutions of the world's greatest mysteries, both mental and spiritual, is supposed to have been from the 8th to the 6th cent. before our era. The *terminus a quo* is the age of the *Brāhmaṇas*; for the *Upaniṣad* literature appears as tertiary strata after the early Vedic poetry and the prose treatises of the *Brāhmaṇas* with their minute ritual and ceremonial observances. The strata perpetually overlap, and the limits suggested are to be understood only in a broad and general sense. There can be little doubt, moreover, that substantially the earliest *Upaniṣads* antedate the rise and extension of Buddhism in the 5th and following centuries. Buddhist teaching appears in the most important respects to be dependent on doctrines and premisses already formulated and expounded in the older *Upaniṣad* literature. There are many, however, and perhaps insuperable difficulties in the way of drawing up a precise genealogical scheme of doctrinal and literary development in India or for its sacred books. In their present form neither the Buddhist nor the more ancient *Upaniṣad* treatises are free from the contamination of later elements. For the majority of the *Upaniṣads* no such early origin can be claimed, although all or practically all give more or less definite expression to ancient speculative thought. Many that pass under the name are of comparatively recent date, originating in the early centuries of the Christian era. Some also are to be referred to an altogether later time.

1. **Title and date.**—With regard to the meaning and implication of the title *Upaniṣad* itself there is little or no doubt. It is derived from the

[1] *Prolegomena Logica*[2], p. 16 f.
[2] *Lectures on Logic*, i. 129.
[3] See F. Aveling, *On the Consciousness of the Universal and the Individual*.
[4] Lotze, *Logic*[2], Eng. tr. ed. B. Bosanquet, Oxford, 1888, i. 52.

[1] See artt. SPACE, POWER.

Sanskrit root *sad*, 'to sit down,' 'to be seated,' with the prefixed prepositions *upa* and *ni*. Originally therefore it implied the sitting down at the feet of the teacher, the attitude of the pupil who respectfully listens to his master's words. In ordinary usage, however, the word is employed to express the doctrine itself which the teacher inculcates, and, finally, mystical or secret doctrine in general. It is in this sense that the *Upaniṣad* teaching is the *Vedānta*, the end (*anta*) and aim of the Veda, the substance and sum of all true wisdom; and in practice, and in all the Brāhmanical literature, the word is thus confined to the highest and most abstract teaching or knowledge, the speculative doctrines which are regarded as within the province of *śruti*, divine revelation. Its use as a title of the treatises in which the doctrines are conveyed may be compared to the Greek εὐαγγέλιον, or the English 'Gospel.'

The native Indian equivalent of *upaniṣad* is *rahasyam*, 'secret,' 'hidden.' The latter term apparently always connotes the idea of secrecy or concealment of a text or doctrine, the knowledge of which should be communicated only to those who are accounted worthy. Thus in one passage it is enjoined that the father shall teach the doctrine to his eldest son, 'but to no one else, whoever he may be.'[1] This conception of a secret or esoteric knowledge has always determined the treatment by the Hindus of their sacred writings, and in many of the sects is maintained to this day as an inviolable principle of their religion.[2]

The number of these treatises is very considerable. A late collection cites more than 100 names. And, if all works, early or late, that inculcate mystical teaching or propound special theories or doctrines concerning the unseen are to be regarded as having just claim to the title *Upaniṣad*, there would seem to be no reason why such treatises should not be indefinitely multiplied at the present time. The total number, according to Barth,[3] 'amounts to nearly 250,' including an 'Allah' *Upaniṣad*, assigned to the time of Akbar. Most of the later *Upaniṣads* are sectarian in character, and with more or less fidelity expound *Upaniṣad* doctrine from the point of view of the popular religions, exalting Viṣnu or Śiva, or endeavouring to promote the discipline and teaching of the Yoga, or with other limited aim. Many are attached more especially to the *Atharvaveda*, and of these the majority are of comparatively late origin. The treatises quoted or referred to by Śaṅkara in the 9th cent. in his commentaries on the sacred texts are usually and no doubt correctly supposed to be the oldest. They all, however, contain earlier and later material, strata of thought or language which have been worked up and welded together, and have all undergone modification and interpolation at the hands of later teachers and revisers. These older works are few in number, and together with some of the earlier Atharvan treatises may be regarded as forming the *Upaniṣad* group of the sacred writings in the more restricted sense of the term.[4]

2. Authorship.—Of the authors of these treatises nothing is known with certainty. Many names of teachers or authorities have been preserved, and in some instances the documents themselves contain lists or genealogical tables of descent, which trace the origin of their doctrine and confirm its authority by appeal to ancient divine sanction. It is probable that for a considerable period the teaching was entirely oral, within the care and custody of the schools of learning. The names recorded, so far as they are genuine, are those of the heads of the several schools. Within these schools the doctrines taught were regarded as a sacred and secret trust. On this subject most of the older treatises contain strict and similar injunctions. In the more ancient *Upaniṣads* also the instruction is generally conveyed in the form of dialogue, the teacher replying to the questions or answering the doubts of his disciples, who seek from him an exposition of the highest knowledge or a solution of the problems and mysteries of this life and of the future after death; sometimes also, in Socratic fashion, the teacher is himself the questioner. Essentially therefore the dialogues represent and give expression to the unsatisfied longings of the human mind and heart.

3. Classification.—It is usual to classify these older treatises in three or four groups, which may be distinguished not only by the character and fullness or otherwise of their teaching, but by the style and diction which they employ, and the more or less archaic nature of their composition. It is not possible, however, to go beyond a provisional and general statement or to have much confidence in details of arrangement which may find expression in a definite scheme of chronology. As a whole the *Upaniṣad* literature is later than the *Āranyakas* (*q.v.*) and earlier than the condensation of philosophical rule and precept into mnemonic *Sūtras*. The internal dependence and succession set forth below is substantially that of Deussen, to whose work all students of Indian literature and philosophy are greatly indebted. On broad lines and in substance the arrangement may be accepted, at least provisionally. With our present knowledge broad and tentative conclusions only are justified. Earlier and later elements in thought and style and composition are not always separable, or capable of being assigned to their right position in the history of the texts. Some treatises, notably perhaps the *Śvetāśvatara*, which in its extant form and on general grounds is placed comparatively late in the chronological order, contain archaic elements, on which have been imposed later doctrines until the various strands of thought are almost inextricably interwoven, and the teaching presented is with difficulty reduced to self-consistency.

[1] *Chhānd.* III. xi. 5; cf. *Maitr.* vi. 29: 'this most mysterious secret shall be imparted to none who is not a son or a pupil, and who has not yet attained tranquillity.'

[2] Cf. Pr 239, Mt 76; Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., p. 10 f., who points out that in Greek philosophy the same thought recurs of a doctrine too sacred or difficult of apprehension to be allowed to become the property of all.

[3] *Religions of India*[3], Eng. tr., p. 65 f.

[4] The eleven *Upaniṣads* known to Śaṅkara, substantially at least in the form in which they are now extant, have been translated by Max Müller in *SBE*, vols. i. and xv. These are the *Chhāndogya*, *Kena*, *Aitareya*, *Kauṣītaki*, *Īśā* (or *Vājasaneyi*), *Kaṭha*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Taittiriya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Śvetāśvatara*, and *Praśna*. Renderings of these and others are available in all the principal languages of Europe and India. It is of course probable that Śaṅkara was acquainted with other treatises of *Upaniṣad* character, some of which may be among those which have been preserved; but, if so, they are now known under different names. The Sanskrit texts are published in many series, and also separately; see the 'Literature' at the end of this article.

(1) The oldest group consists of six treatises, written in prose of an archaic style. At the head of the group are the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣads*, which are acknowledged to be the most complete and authoritative exponents of *Upaniṣad* doctrine. The other members of the group, in the order named, are the *Taittiriya*, *Aitareya*, *Kauṣītaki*, and *Kena*. The last-named is composed partly in verse, and as regards its teaching also seems chronologically to approximate to the second group.

(2) In the second group the composition is almost entirely metrical. The oldest and most independent member of the group is the *Kaṭha* or *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad*. There follow the *Īśā*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Mahānārāyaṇa*. The authors of the *Īśā* and *Śvetāśvatara* are said to be directly indebted to the *Kāṭhaka* both in doctrine and in expression; and a similar mutual relation is maintained between the last three treatises on the list. In all these the leading principles of the *Upaniṣad* teaching, which in the earlier group appear to be in a formative stage and open to discussion, are apparently regarded as established doctrines.

(3) In the treatises of the third group there has been a return again to prose, but the prose is of a type distinct from that of the earlier *Upaniṣads*, and approximates to the style of the classical Sanskrit. The group consists of three members only, *Praśna*, *Maitrāyaṇīya*, and *Māṇḍūkya*. The inference with regard to their later origin is hardly disputable, and is

sustained by the character of the teaching which they present.[1] Two at least of these, *Praśna* and *Māṇḍūkya*, together with the *Muṇḍaka* in group (2), are attributed to the *Atharvaveda*.

(4) By far the larger number of the *Upaniṣad* treatises are sectarian in character, or belong to the *Atharvaveda* or the systems and schools of the principal sects. For the most part they are written in prose, more rarely in verse, or in prose and verse interminglied. Their doctrine or teaching varies with the sect to which they belong. They apply *Upaniṣad* principles to sectarian ends, and to establish the religious doctrines of their several creeds. The most interesting perhaps and important are those attached to the Yoga philosophy. With not a little force they urge and maintain the fundamental doctrines of the Yoga faith. Many, but not all, of the *Upaniṣads* of this group are accessible in modern renderings. Thirty or more are usually enumerated as the oldest and most instructive: *Ātmabodha*, *Nārāyaṇa*, *Mahā* (Vaiṣṇavite); *Atharvaśiras*, *Kaivalya* (Śaivite); *Brahmavidyā*, *Jābāla*, *Aruṇeya*, *Sannyāsa*, *Yogatattva* (Yoga, or Sannyāsa), etc.

4. Translation and interpretation.—The difficulties of translation and interpretation of these treatises are considerable. Like the other scriptures of the Veda, the texts have certainly been preserved in the Śākhās with fidelity and accuracy from ancient times. Previous, however, to a final determination of form and limits they were evidently treated with much freedom, being revised, re-edited, interpolated, or abridged, and in general made to conform to later or individual standards of orthodoxy and belief. A considerable number of them were made accessible for the first time in a Western rendering at the beginning of the 19th cent. by Anquetil du Perron, who worked from a Persian translation in the year 1656 of a collection of 50 *Upaniṣads* known as *Oupnek'hat*.[2] The text itself is the strangest medley of Latin and Persian, with Sanskrit words transliterated or adopted, almost unintelligible without a key. As is well known, Schopenhauer (*q.v.*) regarded the publication as epoch-making in the history of Western philosophy and made it the basis of his own system.[3] Thirty years later Rāmmohun Roy, the great Indian reformer and founder of the Brāhma Samāj (*q.v.*), published English translations of several treatises. He was followed in English, French, or German by H. T. Colebrooke, E. B. Cowell, P. Regnaud, O. Böhtlingk, A. Weber, and others. The most important and satisfactory renderings are those by Max Müller in *SBE*, and by Deussen in his *Sechzig Upanishad's*. The latter contains introductions to the several treatises which are of great value.

5. Contents and analysis.—A brief analysis of the older and doctrinally the more significant treatises will enable a fair conception to be formed of their general scope and character. Often the *Upaniṣads* are not easy to analyse on account of the desultory nature of their style and contents. The abrupt changes of subject, the absence of any logical method or arrangement, the universal employment of metaphor are constant stumbling-blocks in the way of classification or orderly analysis. The entire treatment is suggestive rather of intimate oral instruction than of methodical exposition. There is little development of thought, nor is any attempt made to set forth a progressive and complete exposition of the truth as the authors conceive it. The most important writings are the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chhāndogya*.

[1] For a full statement of the reasons for the order adopted, and the mutual dependence of the several treatises, see Deussen, p. 22 ff.

[2] *Oupnek'hat* (*id est*, *Secretum tegendum*), originally published in 1801–02 in 2 vols. Each vol. contains an Introduction: *Monitum ad Lectorem*, followed by a *Dissertatio*, and a prefatory note on the Persian text on which the translation is based. The Latin rendering is succeeded by lengthy *Emendationes et Annotationes*, *Animadvertenda*, and *Supplementum*; and at the close of vol. ii. an explanation is given of the technical Sanskrit terms used in the text. See also Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's*, p. 830 ff.

[3] See Max Müller, in *SBE* i. p. lviii ff., who gives an example of du Perron's style from his rendering of the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*.

(*a*) The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is the most interesting, as it is the richest in content, of all the *Upaniṣads*, and presents the most systematic exposition of doctrine. It is attached to the Vājasaneyin school of the *Yajurveda*, and in its present form is appended to and forms part of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, of which, according to the Mādhyandina śākhā, it forms the last of the fourteen *kāṇḍas*, or collections, into which the *Brāhmaṇa* is divided. In the Kāṇva śākhā, or school, it is the seventeenth book. The *Upaniṣad* in its existing form is composite, and not the work of one author. It comprises six *adhyāyas*, or chapters, of which the last two are of later date and adopt a different theological and philosophical standpoint, especially, as it seems, with regard to the doctrine of transmigration. The first four *adhyāyas* are Vedāntic, and of these the earlier two exhibit the philosophic doctrine of the *ātman*, which is represented as superseding and transcending the polytheistic worship of the gods. The third and fourth chapters may be regarded as the kernel of the treatise, in which is recorded the final teaching of the *Upaniṣads* in its essential and most characteristic form. In reply to questions addressed to him Yājñavalkya with elaborate detail and subtlety expounds the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* or the *ātman*. If the name represents a real individuality, and is not merely a title under whose shelter many convergent thoughts and reasonings have found expression, Yājñavalkya may claim a place with the greatest thinkers of the world or of any age.

The earlier chapters of the first *adhyāya* are to a large extent occupied with symbols and fanciful plays upon words. *Mṛtyu*, or death, is at the beginning of things, and produces successively the elements, speech (*vāch*), the Vedas, sacrifice, etc. The whole is explained as intended to promote the worship of Virāj. The third chapter is the *Udgītha Brāhmaṇa*, representing under the form of a contest of the *devas* and *asuras* in song (*udgītha*) the antagonism of good and evil. The *asuras* defeat all the senses in turn, but are themselves overcome by the agency of *prāṇa*, or the breath, and victory remains with the *devas*. The passage is too long to quote, but is a good example of the allegorizing method of the *Upaniṣads*. In the fourth and following chapters various cosmological theories and processes, more or less fanciful, are set forth, concluding with the fundamental assertion of the unity of the self (*ātman*) with the triad *nāma*, *rūpa*, *karma*, or name, form, and work, as examples of which are given *vāch* (speech), *chakshus* (the eye), and *ātman*, *i.e.* the bodily or lower self. 'Thus that being a triad is one, that self (*ātman*); being one, it is that triad (*i.e.* the *ātman*); therefore is it immortal, guarded (covered) by the true. *Prāṇa* (breath) is the immortal, *nāmarūpa* (name and form) are the true; by these is the breath guarded.'

Following upon the teaching of the first *adhyāya*, the second expounds the true *vidyā*, the higher knowledge or doctrine of the *ātman*, with which the last paragraph of the first *adhyāya* seems to form a link. The first chapter, which is found in substance also in *Kauṣ.* iv., is remarkable in that it represents a Brāhman as seeking enlightenment from a ruler of Kṣatriya race, Ajātaśatru of Benares (Kāśī), who refutes his erroneous conceptions of the *Brahman* and makes known to him the real truth concerning the nature of the *ātman*. This representation of the dependence of a Brāhman upon Kṣatriya instruction is usually understood, and probably rightly, to be indicative of an early condition of Indian society, in which the Brāhmans did not hold the practical monopoly of all knowledge which was theirs in later times; they were equalled or surpassed by members of the warrior caste. The discussion makes free use of metaphor and simile, and many passages present difficulties of interpretation. In the first chapter Gārgya Bālāki, a Brāhman, proposes a series of definitions or identifications of the *Brahman*, which are in turn shown to be defective. Its true nature is then explained under the figure of profound slumber (*suṣupti*); the sleeper is at rest, unconscious, no longer subject to any external disturbance or influence. 'From that *ātman* all *prāṇas* (senses), all worlds, all *devas*, all creatures proceed. The secret (*upaniṣad*) therefore is "the true of the true" (*satyasya satyam*, or "the reality of the reality," *i.e.* the most essential reality). The *prāṇas* are the true, of them he (the *ātman* or *Brahman*) is the true.' . . . 'The forms of *Brahman* are two, material and immaterial, mortal and immortal, the lasting and the transient, being and other-being (*sat* and *tyad*, this and that, the real and the unreal). . . . Further, with regard to the *ātman* this is the material, which is distinct from the breath and the ether within the body (*ātman*); this is the mortal, the permanent, the *sat*. Of this material, this mortal, this permanent, this *sat*, the essence is the eye, for it is the essence of the *sat*. Breath, however, and the ether within the body are

immaterial; this is the immortal, the impermanent, the *tyad*; of this immaterial, this immortal, this impermanent, this *tyad*, the essence is the *puruṣa* (person) in the right eye; for it is the essence of the *tyad*. . . . Accordingly its significance (*ādeśa*, instruction, rule) is expressed by *neti neti* (not so, not so); for beyond this, that you say it is not so (*iti na*), there is nothing further. Its name however is "the reality of reality" (*satyasya satyam*); that is the senses (*prāṇās*) are the real, and it is their real.'[1]

The fourth chapter expounds the doctrine of the true *Brahman*, the all-comprehending and universal Self, in the form of an instruction given by Yājñavalkya, as he is about to abandon the world for the life of a recluse, to his wife Maitreyī. The narrative is repeated with unimportant variations in IV. v., and seems there to be more in place.[2]

'"If, sir, this whole earth, full of wealth, were mine, should I thereby be immortal?" "No, no," Yājñavalkya replied, "as the life of the rich would be thy life. There is no hope of immortality by wealth." And Maitreyī said: "What is the worth to me of that whereby I do not become immortal? What my lord knoweth declare to me." . . . And Yājñavalkya said: "Not indeed for the love of husband is the husband dear; but for the love of the self (*ātman*) the husband is dear. Not indeed for the love of wife is the wife dear; but for the love of the self (*ātman*) the wife is dear."'

The same formula is then repeated for sons, wealth, cattle, the Brāhman and Kṣatriya castes, the worlds, gods (*devas*), Vedas, creatures.

'Not indeed for the love of all is all dear; but for the love of the self (*ātman*) is all dear. The self indeed is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be heeded, O Maitreyī. When the self indeed has been seen, heard, perceived, known, then all this is known.

Who knows the Brāhman caste other than in the *ātman* (self) him the Brāhman caste rejects; who knows the Kṣatriya caste other than in the *ātman* him the Kṣatriya caste rejects; who knows the worlds other than in the *ātman* him the worlds reject; who knows the gods other than in the *ātman* him the gods reject; who knows the Vedas other than in the *ātman* him the Vedas reject; who knows the creatures other than in the *ātman* him the creatures reject; who knows everything other than in the *ātman* him everything rejects. This Brāhman and Kṣatriya caste, these worlds and gods, these Vedas, all these creatures, this all, it is the self (*ātman*).'

'As the sea is the meeting-place of all waters, of all contacts the skin, of all tastes the tongue, of all scents the nose, of all forms the eye, of all sounds the ear, of all thoughts the mind (*manas*), of all sciences the intellect, of all actions the hands . . . the feet of all movements, speech of all the Vedas; as a lump of salt has no within or without but consists entirely of taste, so indeed that *ātman* has no within or without but consists entirely of knowledge; having arisen from these creatures (elements), into them it again vanishes; after death there is no consciousness.'

'For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other, smells the other, tastes the other, greets the other, hears the other, perceives the other, touches the other, knows the other, but where the self (*ātman*) alone is all this, how should he see another, smell another, taste another, greet another, hear another, perceive another, touch another, know another? How should he know him whereby all this is known? He, the *ātman*, is "not so, not so" (*neti neti*); incomprehensible for he is not comprehended, indestructible for he is not destroyed, unattached for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he is not pained nor suffers harm. How then should one know the Knower?'

After a fifth chapter, in which the doctrine of *Brahman* is set forth and elaborated under the symbol of honey (*madhu*), the *adhyāya* concludes by reciting the stem or genealogical tree (*vaṁśa*), giving in succession the names of the teachers by whom the doctrine has been transmitted, leading up to *Brahman* and Svayambhū the self-existent.

Apart from the divine or mythological origin to which the succession is traced it is impossible either to affirm or to disprove the correctness of the names given in these lists. It is sufficiently probable that the fame and names of the masters of the schools would be preserved within the schools themselves, and not likely that the lists are entirely due to imagination or invention. The presence of the records here would seem to indicate that the two *adhyāyas* once formed a separate whole, which has been more or less interpolated, and incorporated with other parts into a single treatise. A similar list, coincident with this for two-thirds of its length, is found at the close of the fourth *adhyāya*, and a different and shorter genealogical stem at the end of the *Upaniṣad*. There are variations also in the two recensions of the text.

The Yājñavalkya books, *adhyāyas* III. and IV., begin with his acceptance of a challenge by King Janaka, which none of the other Brāhmans venture to take up. In nine chapters questions on abstract and metaphysical problems touching the life after death and the nature of the self are put to him by his rivals, and by his successful dealing with these he vindicates his claim to be the wisest of all. The ninth chapter concludes with a renewed challenge on the part of Yājñavalkya to meet any questions put to him, but no one ventures to assume the rôle of questioner. The book is in general introductory, asserting the authority and predominance of the great teacher, who is to expound the ultimate truth in the dialogue of the succeeding *adhyāya*.

In the first chapter of the book King Janaka Vaideha repeats various definitions of *Brahman* that have been given to him, as speech (*vāch*), breath (*prāṇa*), sight or the eye (*chakshu*), hearing (*śrotra*), mind or will (*manas*), the heart (*hṛdaya*). Yājñavalkya has no difficulty in proving that these are imperfect explanations, useful approximations to the truth, but not the truth itself. In the second and following chapters Yājñavalkya assumes the part of instructor, still under the control, from which it is difficult or impossible to escape, of simile and metaphor. *Brahman* is the *puruṣa* in the eye, mysterious, and to be described only in negatives (*neti neti*, 'not so, not so'). The self is the true and only light, within the heart, self-illuminating and himself the light of all.

'Then is a father not a father, a mother not a mother, the worlds not worlds, the gods not gods, the Vedas not Vedas. Then a thief is not a thief . . . a mendicant not a mendicant, a hermit not a hermit; unvexed by good, unvexed by evil, he has then overpassed all the sorrows of the heart.

Though he then sees not, yet is he seeing, though he sees not; for there is no interruption of seeing for the Seer, because he is imperishable; but there is no second, no other, distinct from him, that he could see.'[1]

A similar assertion is made with regard to the senses of smell, taste, speech, hearing, thought, sensation or touch, knowledge; all designed to show that the affirmations and predicates of ordinary life are meaningless when applied to the *ātman*:

'Where there is as it were another, then would one see the other, smell the other, taste the other, address the other, hear the other, think the other, feel the other, know the other. A solitary ocean is the Seer, without a second (*advaita*); that is the Brahma-world, O King.'[2]

The fourth chapter further illustrates and explains the nature of the *ātman*, the fifth is the instruction to Maitreyī, as in II. iv., and the sixth and last chapter of the *adhyāya* gives the *vaṁśa*.

The fifth *adhyāya* opens with an invocation, asserting the twofold nature of the *Brahman*, and quotes an old authority for the saying that *Brahman* is space (*kha*, 'ether'), 'the ancient air-filled space.' There follows the well-known parable of Prajāpati and his disciples:

'The three (races of) Prajāpati's sons, gods, men, and *asuras*, lived as students with their father Prajāpati. Their period of studentship finished, the gods said: "Be pleased to tell us, sir." He said to them this syllable *Da*. "Have you understood?" he said. "We have understood," they said, "you bade us subdue ourselves (*dāmyata*)." "Yes," he said, "you have understood."

Then the men said to him: "Be pleased to tell us, sir." He said to them this same syllable *Da*. "Have you understood?" he said. "We have understood," they said, "you bade us be generous (*datta*)." "Yes," he said, "you have understood."

Then the *asuras* said to him: "Be pleased to tell us, sir." He said to them this same syllable *Da*. "Have you understood?" he said. "We have understood," they said, "you bade us be merciful (*dayadhvam*)." "Yes," he said, "you have understood."

This same divine voice, the thunder, repeats *Da Da Da*, that is, Subdue yourselves, Be generous, Be merciful. Therefore should these three be enjoined, self-restraint, generosity, mercy.'

The further chapters of the book relate for the most part to types or similes of *Brahman*, which are explained as more or less adequate representations of the truth. The most interesting is the exposition of the significance of the four feet (*pada*) of the *gāyatrī*, the sacred invocation or 'Magnificat' of the Brāhmans.[3] Each foot has a special meaning. The fourth (*turīya*) is the bright foot (*darśatam padam*), and symbolizes the bright or shining one, the sun or the *puruṣa* in the sun. The last chapter is an invocation of Āditya, or the sun, repeated in *Vājas. Up.* XV.–XVIII.

[1] *Bṛhad.* II. iii.; cf. III. ix. 26, IV. ii. 4, iv. 22, v. 15. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find English equivalents for the Sanskrit terms which are employed. The 'lasting' and 'transient' are from the point of view, as it were, of human appreciation, as the hills are lasting and a spiritual vision is fleeting or transient. Max Müller renders by 'solid' and 'fluid'; Deussen has 'das Stehende und das Gehende.' The negative doctrine of *neti neti* is the extreme refinement of *Upaniṣad* teaching with regard to the nature of the higher *Brahman*.

[2] Cf. also *Chhānd. Up.* VI. xiii., VII. xxiv.

[1] *Bṛhad.* IV. iii. 22 f. [2] *Ib.* 31 f.

[3] *Rigveda*, III. lxii. 10, v. lxxxii. 1; cf. VI. iii. 6.

The sixth and final *adhyāya* is *khila*, additional or supplementary.[1] It supplies little new information or teaching, and is in parts even more highly metaphorical and difficult. The usual genealogy or list of successive teachers follows, and Yājñavalkya's authority is claimed for some at least of the instruction offered.

(*b*) It is hardly necessary or worth while to follow through in similar detail the *Chhāndogya*, which shares importance with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* as the most ancient written source of *Upaniṣad* doctrine. It is attached to the *Sāmaveda*, and is divided into eight chapters, or *prapāṭhakas*, not all of which are parts of the original treatise. There has been combination, adaptation, and insertion; but no data are available for determining the changes that have been made or for restoring the primitive form. The additions or interpolations are probably more numerous than the losses.

The treatise is highly charged with symbolism. Meditation on the sacred syllable *Om* is enjoined, which is the essence (*rasa*) of all things, and is the *udgītha*, on which in its successive forms as *prāṇa*, *vāch*, etc., the *devas* meditate in their rivalry with the *asuras*.[2] *Om* is the immortal imperishable sound (*svara*), and is identified with *prāṇa*, *praṇava*, or the *udgītha*, to the syllables of which a symbolical interpretation is given.

(*c*) The *Kaṭha* or *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad* is placed by Deussen at the head of his second class, the ancient metrical *Upaniṣads*. It belongs to the literature of the Black *Yajurveda*, of which the Kaṭhas formed a well-known school; and it is perhaps the best-known of the *Upaniṣads*, having been rendered into English by Rāmmohun Roy in the early part of the 19th century. Since that date many editions and translations have been published. Its historical and literary affinities are not easy to determine. Deussen finds evidence of direct dependence of the *Īśā* and *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads* upon the *Kāṭhaka*; and that the *Śvetāśvatara* has exercised an indirect and less powerful influence upon the two other members of the group, the *Muṇḍaka* and *Mahānārāyaṇa*. The general classification may be accepted, but the details of interrelationship are still very obscure.

The text of the *Upaniṣad* consists of two *adhyāyas* or six *vallīs*, the first three of which contain the story of Nachiketas and the three gifts which he obtained from Death, the all-knower. The fourth *vallī* is a further exposition by Death of the mystery of the *Brahman*, and a polemic against pluralism. In the fifth and sixth *vallīs* the *ātman* or *Brahman* is described under various figures or metaphors, the one Self and lord, all-comprehending, self-existent, the eternal thinker. They who discern the Self within are wise and secure to themselves eternal happiness and peace. The legend of Nachiketas is found also in the *Brāhmaṇa* of the Black *Yajurveda*,[3] and is there explanatory of a well-known religious rite. To judge from analogy, the myth was probably invented to account for the existence of a rite which bore this name, the original circumstances or foundation of which had been forgotten.

Nachiketas is the son of Vājaśravasa, a religious householder, who at the call of religion is represented as making the voluntary surrender of all his worldly possessions (*sannyāsa*) in order to provide for his spiritual interests. The name perhaps signifies 'unnoticed,' 'unobserved,' and was designed, as in many other instances, to secure that the child should be inconspicuous, and 'unobserved' by the watchful powers of evil. Vājaśravasa distributes all his goods in alms, and Nachiketas, knowing that the *sannyāsa* of the father involves the giving away of the son also, is anxious to learn his fate. His father replies that he will give him to Yama, signifying thereby that filial relations and claims have thenceforward no meaning for him, as being dead to the world. Nachiketas takes the answer literally, and goes off to the house of Yama, where he stays for three days, and in the absence of the master of the house is left without entertainment. Yama on his return is annoyed that a Brāhman guest has been thus inhospitably treated, and offers him in compensation three gifts, which he is to choose for himself. There is no difficulty with regard to the first two gifts. They are granted in full and without hesitation. For the first Nachiketas asks that the anger or indifference of his father may be overcome, and that he may be moved to kindness and consideration towards himself. The second request is for an explanation of the fire-sacrifice, the ritual of which Yama expounds, and promises that it shall henceforth bear his name, the Nachiketas rite; a knowledge of the three Nachiketas fires and rightful performance of the sacrifice will ensure for the sacrificer heaven and abiding peace. The difficulty arises with the third boon:

'When a man is dead, there is a doubt—some say He is, others He is not. This I would fain know, taught by thee. This is the third gift that I choose.'

'Hereon even the gods of old have been in doubt. Hard to understand and recondite is this subject. Choose another boon, Nachiketas; do not urge me, excuse me this.'

'True that the gods have hereon been in doubt, and thou thyself, O Death, hast acknowledged it to be hard to understand. But no teacher may be found so capable as thou; no other boon is comparable to this.'

'Choose long-lived sons and grandsons, cattle in plenty, elephants, gold, and horses; choose rich possessions on the soil, and life for thyself as many years as thou wilt.

If there is a boon equivalent in thine eyes, choose it—wealth and long life. Be lord over the wide earth, Nachiketas; I grant thee consummation of all desires.

Whatever desires are difficult to realize here below, ask according to thy will—noble maidens with their chariots and music, not to be won by men, I give them thee for service. Ask me not, Nachiketas, concerning death.'

'What profit has a man of these things, O Death, evanescent as they are, that impair the vigour of all the senses? A full life-time even is brief. Keep your chariots, dance and song.

Man's happiness consists not in wealth. Shall we grasp wealth, whensoe'er we see thee? Our life is but as long as thou dost ordain. This boon, however, alone do I choose.

Who that has had foretaste of that which perishes not nor changes, mortal and fettered here to earth, would find pleasure in a long life, when he has given due thought to beauty and indulgence and pleasure?

That, O Death, on which doubt rules here below, declare to us what will be in the great Hereafter. No other boon does Nachiketas choose than that which unlocks this mystery.'[1]

Yama is under the necessity of yielding; and he begins by congratulating Nachiketas on his preference for knowledge rather than wealth or pleasure. But it is not an easy way:

'Though anxiously sought it is not to be gained when taught by common men, and without a teacher access thereto there is none—so small that it eludes the grasp of the mind.

Reasoning will not find the way, but taught by another it is easily learnt. It is thine now; a true seeker art thou; an inquirer such as thou is to be desired.'[2]

The exposition then begins with the identification of the sacred syllable *Om* (*q.v.*) with the *Brahman*. It is one of the most commonly chosen metaphors of the *Upaniṣad* writers:

'This syllable is *Brahman*, this syllable is the Supreme; he who knows this syllable, whatever he wishes is his.'[3]

The text then sets forth in metaphysical terms the nature of the transcendent Seer (the *ātman*) and the conditions under which he may be known.

'The Seer is not born, and does not die; he has no origin and no descent. Unborn, eternal, abiding is that Ancient One. He dies not, when the body dies.

If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks himself slain, they both are in error; there is no slayer, and no slain.

Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self is concealed here in the heart of the creature. Free from desire and from grief, his senses subdued,[4] a man sees the majesty of the *ātman*.

Sitting he moves far; lying he goes everywhere. That god of joy and not-joy who save myself has power to know?

Bodiless in the bodies, changeless in the changing, the wise man discerns the *ātman*, great, all-pervading, and is saved from sorrow.

Not by dissertation nor by wisdom nor by much sacred lore is that *ātman* to be gained; only by him whom he chooses is he to be gained; to him the *ātman* discovers his own being.

He who has not desisted from evil, who is restless, ill-content, whose mind is not at ease, even by knowledge cannot gain him.

Him to whom Brāhman and Kṣatriya are alike indifferent,[5] and death would be diminution,[6] who could really find?'[7]

In the third *vallī* the Self, the highest *Brahman*, is the charioteer sitting in the chariot (the body), *buddhi* (intellect) guides the car, *manas* (mind or will) is the reins, the senses are the horses, the objects of sense the road on which they run:

[1] Cf. *Chhānd. Up.* v. i. f.; *Kauṣ. Up.* II. iii., III. iii.; *Praśna Up.* II. iii.

[2] Cf. *Bṛhad. Up.* I. iii. 1 ff.

[3] III. i. 8; see *SBE* xv. p. xxi ff.; Deussen, p. 262 f.

[1] I. i. 20 ff. [2] I. ii. 8 ff. [3] *Kaṭha*, I. ii. 16.

[4] *Dhātuprasādāt*, Deussen, *gestillten Sinnendrangs*; cf. *Taitt. Ār.* x. x. 1; *Śvet. Up.* III. xx. The variant reading *dhātu: prasādāt* is followed by Max Müller, 'by the grace of the Creator' (*SBE* xv. 11; Deussen, *Sechzig Upan.* p. 274 f.).

[5] *Odana*, as food merely for the body; cf. *Ep. Phil.* iii. 8.

[6] *Upasechanam*, a diluent, relaxation of power, and therefore inconceivable.

[7] *Kaṭh.* I. ii. 18–25.

'He who has understanding, is self-controlled and ever pure, he reaches that realm whence there is no rebirth.

He who guides his car with understanding, wisely handles the reins (*manas*), he wins through to the goal of his journey; there where is the highest place of Viṣṇu.

Higher than the senses are material things, higher than material things is the mind, higher than the mind is the intellect, higher than the intellect is the great Self (*ātman*).

Higher than the great Self is the undiscerned (*avyaktam*), higher than the undiscerned is the *puruṣa*, higher than the *puruṣa* there is nothing; that is the goal, the highest way.

In all creatures it lies hidden, the *ātman*, invisible, discerned only by the keenest intellect. The touchstone of the finest is the fine.'[1]

Nachiketas therefore obtains his boon:

'He who has perceived that which is beyond hearing or touch or sight, undecaying, without taste or smell, eternal, without beginning or end, higher than the great, unchanging, he is delivered from the jaws of death.'[2]

The remainder of the *Upaniṣad* presents variations of the same theme and is of interest not only for the reiteration and emphasis of central doctrines, but also for the picturesque metaphors which it employs to set them forth. The inadequacy of these and of all metaphors is acknowledged, but they are aids to the mind in its attempts to comprehend the incomprehensible. He is *prāṇa* (breath), *agni* (fire), the *puruṣa* in the midst of the body, lord of the past and the future. In reality the *Brahman* is undifferentiated. 'He goes from death to death who sees difference here.' Through almost the whole of the fourth *valli* there runs the refrain, 'This is that,' reality is one and indivisible.

The *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad* gives a stronger impression of unity and of singleness of design and thought than most of these treatises. There is little to suggest diversity of authorship or revision and alteration of the text. It is probable that changes of this nature have taken place, but they have been on a comparatively small scale. The recurrence of the name of Nachiketas at the close of the first and second *adhyāyas*, with the assurance of salvation to those who possess the knowledge of the mystery of the *ātman*, expounded to him by Death, has been supposed to indicate the union into one of two treatises, originally distinct. The inference is hardly justified by the context and the form under which the name appears. It is perhaps more probable that the verse in which it occurs at the end of the *Upaniṣad* is an insertion.

(*d*) One of the most difficult of the *Upaniṣad* treatises both in form and in interpretation is the *Śvetāśvatara*. In the introduction to his translation of the *Upaniṣad*[3] Max Müller expresses this view, and further in a few lines controverts the idea that the name ('the white mule') implies Christian authorship or participation. Not only is the language abrupt, entangled, and defiant of the rules of grammar, but the thought seems repeatedly to lose itself and to represent not one but many phases of doctrine and belief. Not the less perhaps on this account it is of very great interest. Among the more important *Upaniṣads* this treatise is the leading exponent and representative of Sāṅkhyan doctrine, and it is in the *Śvetāśvatara* that the earliest use of the name Sāṅkhya with a technical connotation appears to occur. To reconstruct its history with any certainty—a writing doubly palimpsest, as it has been termed—is probably impossible. It is a medley of thought and teaching in which almost every phase of Hindu philosophical speculation seems to struggle for expression. Nothing is known of the Śākhā of the *Śvetāśvatara*, the school within which the scripture was guarded, studied, and taught. Together with the *Kāṭhaka*, *Taittirīya*, and others it was recognized as belonging to the Black *Yajurveda*.

It is probably right to regard the original basis or nucleus of the *Upaniṣad* as Vedāntic. It was known to the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, and Saṅkara wrote a commentary upon it. The relation of the individual and the universal Self is asserted and discussed from an entirely Vedāntic point of view. On this basis, however, were superimposed theistic and sectarian statements of belief and doctrine, which introduced freely the dogmas of the sects, and even the names of sectarian divinities. Sāṅkhya and Yoga conceptions also, intermingled and reiterated, and in some parts predominant, contribute to form a whole which, as it appears in the extant literature, is probably the result of some centuries of discussion and revision in the schools. The *Upaniṣad* therefore does not readily lend itself to explication and analysis. Its moods change too rapidly to be fixed and indexed. The text also is in many instances corrupt, and out of various readings, which seem to be more or less conjectural, it is sometimes only possible to select that which appears to give a tolerable sense.

The treatise begins with an interrogation and a challenge: What is the cause, the ultimate principle and groundwork, of all? and the answer is *Brahman*. Whence is our birth, our life, our sustenance, and at whose bidding do the joys and sorrows come that we endure? Speculative replies are dismissed as incredible, as that time, nature, necessity, etc., either alone or in combination, should be the final cause. The individual Self is then depicted, the divine essential force (*devātmaśakti*), revealing itself as self or soul through and under the veil of its qualities (*guṇa*), figuratively described as a wheel with many spokes, etc.; by the practice of meditation and self-discipline (*dhyānayoga*) the seers learnt to know this hidden force. Verse 7 supplies the Vedāntic interpretation: in the highest *Brahman* the triad (of the user, the used, and the governor, *bhoktṛi*, *bhogya*, *preritṛi*, *i.e.* the Self, the universe, and God) become one;[1] nothing further remains to be known, everything has been declared under triple form, and this is *Brahman*. The following verses of the chapter are descriptive of the Self under various figures or illustrations; self-knowledge is to be obtained by meditation on the sacred syllable *Om*.

The first seven verses of the second *adhyāya* are a hymn in praise of Savitṛ, made up for the most part of 'tags' from the *Vājasaneyin* and *Taittirīya Saṁhitās*. The rest of the chapter is written in the spirit of the Yoga, adoration of the god who is above and behind all phenomena.

The opening of the third *adhyāya* again is sectarian; Rudra is creator, sustainer, lord of all. The (impersonal) *Brahman* is higher than all, and those who know the great *puruṣa*, shining as the sun beyond the darkness, are immortal. The *puruṣa* is the incarnate Self (*ātman*).

'Without hands or feet he grasps and moves, eyeless he sees, earless he hears. He knows what can be known, but none knows him; him they name *puruṣa*, the first, the great. Smaller than the small, greater than the great, he dwells as the *ātman* in the heart of the creature. Passionless, by the grace of the creator one sees him unmoved (*akratum*, lit. 'without will,' Deussen, *willensfreien*), the great lord. I know him, the unaging Ancient, the self of all, all-pervading, omnipresent; for him rebirth is stayed, whom the seers proclaimed immortal.'[2]

The fourth *adhyāya* exalts the sun-god, whose functions and attributes are figuratively expounded and interpreted in a Vedāntic sense. Peace and immortality are the possession of him who knows the god, Śiva, the eternal, creator of all, dwelling in the heart of man:

'Of him there is no image whose name is Great Majesty. His form is not visible, none ever sees him with the eye. They who with heart and mind know him thus dwelling in the heart become immortal.'[3]

The section ends with a brief prayer to Rudra.

The fifth *adhyāya* contains teaching on the two themes of knowledge and ignorance, of the means of deliverance from the latter, and of the *Brahman* as transcending all. He manifests himself in various ways, 'migrating through his own works,' and is seen new in this and now in that shape, incarnate under many forms. In the sixth and last *adhyāya* neither nature nor time is the source of all, but *Brahman* alone. He is the beginning and cause of all, the one god, hidden in all beings, without parts or attributes, immortal, the lord, protector and ruler of the universe. This is the supreme mystery in the Vedānta, not to be communicated to one who is unworthy.

6. History of doctrine.—It would seem, therefore, that the characteristic central doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, the doctrine of *Brahman* or the *ātman*, was at first developed and systematized within Kṣatriya circles and at the courts of kings. This combination of royal functions with the mood of a philosopher or a poet was not unfamiliar to Oriental experience. The Brāhman, on the other hand, occupied himself almost exclusively with

[1] *Kaṭh.* iii. 8–12. [2] *Ib.* iii. 15. [3] *SBE* xv. p. xxxii.

[1] Cf. i. 12. [2] III. xix ff. [3] IV. xix f.

the ritual and the securing of his class ascendancy; and only later adopted a doctrine of the universe which had been formulated by others, but which harmonized with his modes of thought, and lent itself readily to his schemes for the establishment of his own predominance on the basis of secret or superior knowledge. These references to a Kṣatriya monopoly of the highest knowledge, imparted by kings to Brāhmans at their request, have been preserved and handed down within the Brāhman literary schools, and it seems improbable that such statements would have been allowed to pass if they had not been in accord with the facts. Probably also the doctrine and several duties of the *āśramas* (*q.v.*), whether widely practised or not, afforded an opening and facilities for the assimilation of the new knowledge. In later times the position was reversed, and with the establishment of intellectual and class pre-eminence the Brāhmans confirmed their claim to a monopoly of the supreme wisdom; and this was conceded to them the more readily as the other castes became more and more immersed in political intrigue or business enterprise. In the issue, by perseverance and the skilful use of opportunity, the Brāhmans secured the first place in knowledge as in honour, and were regarded as the depositories of the secrets of wisdom and right instruction.

7. **Essential doctrine.**—This highest and most treasured teaching, for which divine authority was claimed, was formulated as the cardinal doctrine of the *Upaniṣad* literature, an idealistic monism, which consisted essentially in the assertion that all is one, 'one only without a second,' and as a necessary corollary that the material universe as it manifests itself to and is approached through the bodily faculties is unreal (*māyā*). Only *Brahman*, the unknown Self (*ātman*), is in possession of a real existence. *Brahman*, moreover, is an abstract impersonal neuter, not an individual or masculine. The attribute of personality, as all other attributes, is denied to him, and he or 'it' can only be defined, if such may be called definition, by negatives (*neti neti*). The human self, the self of the living being (*ātman* or *jīvātman*), is subject to delusion only so far as it imagines itself to be an individual, distinct from all other selves. In reality it is itself the supreme Self (*ātman*), identical with *Brahman*; there are not two or many selves; but *Brahman* and every so-called individual self are one and the same. There is no 'difference,' in the realm of true understanding and insight. 'One only without a second' (*ekādvitīyam*) expresses the ultimate thought and the fundamental postulate of the speculation of the *Upaniṣads*; or, as the doctrine has been formulated by Deussen and others in the form of an equation which summarizes *Upaniṣad* teaching in this respect,

Brahman = *ātman*.

The formula is not of course due to or used by the authors of the *Upaniṣads* themselves.

8. **Secondary teaching.**—This idealistic and monistic doctrine of the sole reality of *Brahman* underlies all the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*. Although not peculiar to the Indian literature, it is there developed in its most complete form and carried to its utmost logical conclusion. A considerable portion, however, of these treatises expounds what is generally known as the doctrine of the lower *Brahman*, a compromise or concession to the view which the ordinary man takes of the universe as stable, for all practical purposes permanent, conditioning his daily life, limiting and satisfying his outlook upon reality. This teaching was avowedly for those, and for those only, who were incapable of comprehending the higher knowledge, whose mind worked within the limitations imposed by the faculties of the body. For these there was constructed or traditionally maintained a cosmology or doctrine of the universe, in which *Brahman* appears as the creator of a real world, which is then informed, sustained, and its working ensured by his universal and vitalizing presence. In this sense *Brahman* is immanent in the universe, which has no existence apart from him, and will ultimately be resolved or cease to be, returning into the source from which it came. *Brahman* therefore in the cosmological theory of the *Upaniṣads*, which is throughout secondary and does not contain or convey the secret of the highest knowledge, becomes individualized, endowed with properties and capacities, and an apparent or provisional reality is allowed to the universe and to the souls therein. The human *ātman* or *jīvātman* possesses a measure of freedom and individuality of its own, it thinks and determines, and of its own free and enlightened will promotes its return to the *paramātman*, the supreme soul whence it was derived. Thus far therefore the *Upaniṣads* may be said to contain the germs at least of a real theism. It is for the most part in the later treatises and especially in the *Śvetāśvatara* that these doctrines are set forth. They were not, however, developed on theistic lines, and it is probable that they represent speculation or belief which was in its origin entirely independent of the severe idealism of the *ātman* doctrine, tentatively harmonized with the latter and subordinated to it in the *Upaniṣad* teaching. All things would ultimately return to their primitive source, and their impermanent and unreal character would be made manifest. Thus the higher doctrine or faith was conserved under the forms and as the ultimate truth of the lower.

9. **Psychology.**—To the same secondary teaching belongs the psychological doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, so far as these treatises may be said to present a consistent or coherent doctrine concerning the human soul. It is evident that this teaching also is derived from external sources, originally independent, and only artificially and with difficulty accommodated to the fundamental presupposition of *Upaniṣad* thought. Where all souls are one, and there is no difference, there is no room and no need for a psychology. On the lower plane of teaching, however, souls created by or emanating from *Brahman* are in a certain sense distinct and individual, although this impression or conviction of distinctness is ultimately due to *māyā* and to *māyā* alone. Some provision therefore must be made for their return, their final and universal reunion with *Brahman*, if a permanent duality was to be avoided. The last alternative as a solution of the mystery of the soul's nature and existence did in fact find expression in some of the *Upaniṣads* in premonitions and intimations of the later doctrine of the Sāṅkhya, which is avowedly dualistic. In general, however, the psychological teaching expounds two independent themes or subjects—the states of the soul, and the means or methods of its return. No definite connexion is made between these, or any relation suggested. They are due to different systems of thought, and no attempt apparently is made or regarded as necessary to co-ordinate them. The latter doctrine, including especially that of the two paths, is closely related to the wider doctrine of predestination.

The four conditions or states of the soul are: (1) the waking state; (2) dream-sleep, in which the soul remains conscious and active in its dreams; (3) dreamless slumber, *suṣupti*, *suṣupta*, in which the soul is passive, and unconscious of its environment; (4) *turīya*, *turya*, *chaturtha*, the 'fourth' state, which is more or less artificial, and

is unknown to the older *Upaniṣads*. It was perhaps invented to secure or complete the correspondence with the four *āśramas*, the *turīya* being the sublime but undefinable state to which the *sannyāsin* had attained. The three earlier states received also mystical names: *vaiśvānara*, that which is common to all, the habitual mode or outlook of all men; *taijasa*, luminous, vigorous, intense; *prājña*, intelligent. Similar states or stages are familiar in the experience of European and other mystics.

(1) The waking state is the normal condition of the natural man, who without reflexion accepts the universe as he finds it, believing it to be real. The mystical title *vaiśvānara* is apparently intended to suggest that to the natural faculties of all such men the same physical universe presents itself.

(2) In dream-sleep the soul fashions its own world in the imagery of its dreams, 'the spirit serves as light for itself.'[1] To the dreamer the scenes and experiences through which he passes in his dreams appear real, and in this his dream-world no other has part. The illusion of duality, however, is still maintained; there is one who knows and another that is known. In other passages the spirit is represented as quitting the body during the dream-sleep and wandering hither and thither, returning sometimes only with difficulty to its accustomed home.

(3) In the third state all distinct consciousness of knowing subject and known object is superseded, the human spirit is one with the eternal Knower, the supreme intelligence, *prājña ātman*. In the teaching of the earlier *Upaniṣads* this is apparently the final state, the consummation of bliss in union with *Brahman*. 'When a man has fallen so sound asleep, and has so completely and perfectly been lulled to rest that he knows no dream-image, that is the Self, that is the immortal, the fearless, that is *Brahman*.'[2]

(4) The introduction of a fourth state appears to have been based upon a recognition of the transitory character of the *suṣupti*. The slumber is interrupted, and the spirit of the slumberer may then return to the waking state in which it is troubled and anxious, and the external visible universe is regarded as a real object of knowledge. 'When the three states named have ceased, and the spiritual subsists alone by itself, contrasted like a spectator with all existing things as a substance undifferentiated, set free from all existing things, this spiritual state is called the *turīya*.'[3] In this state the *ātman* has realized a permanent union with *Brahman*, which is not liable to interruption by any return to a lower condition; nor is it interfered with or destroyed by engaging for a time in any of the illusory activities of ordinary life. Worldly duties and employments do not affect the soul that is one with *Brahman*.[4]

10. **Eschatology.**—The Indian doctrine of the two paths, the *devayāna* and the *pitryāna*, the way of the gods and the way of the fathers, by one or the other of which the souls of the dead make their way from this world to a future abode of happiness or misery, presents easily recognized parallels to similar teaching in other faiths. That the theory was of independent origin in India admits of little doubt. Later it was elaborated and brought into close association with the kindred doctrine of transmigration and was then carried far by wandering Indian missionaries; and in this way it may not improbably have suggested or influenced the beliefs of other peoples, especially the Mithraic teaching concerning the ascent of the soul to the highest heaven. As early as the *Rigveda* reference is made to the *devayāna* as the path by which Agni bears the offerings to the gods, and on which the gods themselves descend to partake of the sacrifices. On the same road the faithful worshipper ascends through successive stages or 'stations' to the highest felicity in *Brahman*. The passages in the *Upaniṣads* which enumerate the 'stations' give no indication of the origin of the theory, nor attempt to explain its meaning or significance. The earliest is probably *Chhānd.* IV. xv. 5 f.:

'He (who knows this) . . . (after death) goes to light (*archis*, brightness, *i.e.* of the funeral fire), from light to day, from day to the light half of the moon, from the light half of the moon to the six months of the sun's northward movement, from the months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the lightning. Thereupon an unearthly guide (*puruṣa*) conducts them to *Brahman*. This is the path of the Devas, the path of *Brahman*. They who proceed thereby do not return to the changing life of man.'[1]

The *pitryāna*, on the other hand, is the way of darkness, for ignorant and defiled souls, and progress is marked by analogous but contrary stations; *e.g.*, the dark half of the moon is substituted for the light half, etc. Those who travel on this road do not reach the year or the sun, but are detained in the moon till their *karma* is exhausted, after which they return to earth, and are again subject to rebirth:

'But those who in a village fulfil their religious duties and give alms (*i.e. gṛhasthas*) go to the smoke, from the smoke to the night, from the night to the dark half of the moon, from the dark half of the moon to the six months of the sun's southward movement. They do not attain to the year. From the months they go to the world of the fathers (*pitṛloka*), from the world of the fathers to the ether, from the ether to the moon. . . . Here they dwell as long as aught remains (*i.e.* of *karma* and its consequences), then return again by that way to the ether, from the ether to the wind (*vāyu*). Having become wind he (the *gṛhastha*) becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes vapour, having become vapour he becomes cloud, having become cloud he descends in rain. These then are born as rice or corn, herbs or trees, sesamum or beans. . . . They who have lived a good life in this world will as a reward attain a good rebirth as a Brāhman, or a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya; but they who in this world have lived a shameful life will attain a shameful rebirth, as a dog or a pig or an out-caste (*chaṇḍāla*).'[2]

There is thus in the *Upaniṣads* tentative if somewhat indefinite teaching with regard to the fate of the soul at and after death. Two conceptions were apparently involved, which were in all probability originally independent and belonged to different orders of ideas. Neither of them was due in its inception to the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads*, but both were derived from external and pre-existing sources. The thought of a return of the soul to the earth, to be embodied again in human or animal form, or even in the form of an insect or plant, is common to nearly all primitive peoples, and is undoubtedly of great antiquity. The distinct thought of a recompense of felicity or suffering in another world for the deeds done upon earth is neither universal nor so old. It has usually been accepted as an alternative to the earlier view of the soul's future destiny, superseding or displacing but not amalgamating with it. The contribution which the *Upaniṣad* thinkers made was in effect to combine these ideas by transferring the retribution from an unknown and future sphere to the known and visible present, and by asserting the precise equivalence of the recompense after death to the deeds, good or evil, of the earthly life. Thus all the elements of the Indian doctrines of *karma* and transmigration are found in the oldest *Upaniṣads*. They obtain here their final and fullest expression. No evidence or proof, however, is offered in support of these theories, nor is any reference given to previous history or development, which might explain or justify the statements made. They are supported, as is all the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*, by an appeal to the authority of eminent teachers of the past. It seems strange that no attempt should be made to fortify so important a doctrine as transmigration by reference to analogy, or to a wider and reasoned view of life as a whole. They are simply recorded as the definite and complete statement of the final destiny of the soul.

11. **Summary.**—Thus a very considerable part of this literature is occupied with doctrines that belong to the lower *Brahman*, and are avowedly inferior to the ultimate and supreme truth that *Brahman* is all in all. They are half-truths,

1 *Bṛhad.* IV. iii. 9.
2 *Chhānd.* VIII. xi. 1; cf. *Bṛhad.* IV. iii. 21 ff.
3 *Sarvop.* 8; cf. *Māṇḍ.* vii.; *Maitr.* vi. 19, vii. 17.
4 On the states of the soul see Deussen, p. 296 ff., and the references there given. Deussen regards the introduction of the fourth stage as due in part to the increasing prevalence of the Yoga doctrine, which involved the belief that by intense meditation, abstinence, and self-control the union of the human spirit with the one eternal spirit might be secured.

1 *SBE* i. 68; cf. *Chhānd.* v. x. 1 ff., *Bṛhad.* VI. ii. 15 f., *Kauṣ.* I. ii. 8.
2 *Chhānd.* V. x. 3 ff. (*SBE* i. 80 ff.); cf. Deussen, p. 334 ff. and references.

guiding and controlling the practical life of the universe, which lose interest and significance when the full truth is apprehended by the soul. 'He who knows' need not concern himself about any of these matters, whether of belief or practice. This doctrine, the doctrine of the *ātman*, alone is 'true' in the exact sense of the word. And the consciousness of this seems always to underlie the most precise exposition of doctrines, which in form at least conflict with it. *Brahman* alone is real; all else is *māyā*, illusion. This word appears first in its technical meaning in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, where so many conflicting trains of thought meet and find a home. Essentially, however, and apart from its late literary expression, the doctrine of the universe as shadowy and unreal is far older in India than the literary employment of the term *māyā* would suggest. It is presupposed in most of the teaching that concerns the material universe, and is more or less consciously accepted by all Indian sects at the present day. The man who knows this, that *Brahman* alone exists, is truly wise. He realizes the unreal elusive character of the things that are seen, and has apprehended the supreme truth that *Brahman* only *is*, and that he himself is *Brahman*.

12. Ethics.—The *Upaniṣads* also enforce ethical teaching, but in a desultory manner. There is a considerable element of moral and religious instruction, commending a practical life of sobriety and devotion in sincerity and love of the truth. It is undoubtedly this ethical content that has given to these treatises their unique position among the sacred books of the Hindus. Self-restraint, generosity, loving-kindness are cardinal virtues, the observance of which is incumbent upon all who seek deliverance from the entanglements of this world and final union with the Supreme. The aim and purpose for all and each is release from the *saṁsāra*, the perpetual round of rebirths, and return to the original and eternal source of all in God. Thus the ethical teaching of the *Upaniṣads* is essentially self-interested and individualistic; virtue is to be practised for the sake of personal and private advantage in the cessation of rebirth (*punarmṛityu*, repeated or reiterated death), when the soul reaches its final end in the one Supreme. The morality taught in these books is therefore negative rather than positive. It is a doctrine of abstinence from all that would hinder the severance of worldly bonds, rather than of positive delight in that which is good. The ideal of a devout life is that of the *sannyāsin*, the ascetic, who has renounced all, and is self-centred in profound and uninterrupted meditation. The doctrine thus expounded is that upon which Buddhism has drawn, in the Hīnayāna at least, for its ideal of the perfect monk, and is closely connected with the later Yoga, in which the teaching was systematized and carried to extremes of asceticism and self-torture. In its essential elements it is undoubtedly older in India than the period of the *Upaniṣads*, and gives expression to the austere quality which is native apparently to some forms of Indian religious life. The *Upaniṣads*, moreover, never lose their hold of idealism. To this all other teaching is subordinated. The veil of *māyā* is cast over all. And neither in ethics nor in theistic statement is there the same conviction or earnestness that is apparent in the exposition of the monistic doctrine of the *Brahman*.

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ii. *Translations*: F. Max Müller, *The Upanishads*, in 2 vols. (*SBE* i. and xv.), Oxford, 1879 and 1884; P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897; A. H. Anquetil du Perron, *Oupnek'hat (id est Secretum tegendum)*, Latin tr. from Persian and Sanskrit, with dissertations, annotations, etc., 2 vols., Strassburg, 1801–02; F. Mischel, *Das Oupnek'hat*, German tr., Dresden, 1882; Rammohun Roy, *Translation of the Cena Upanishad, one of the chapters of the Sāma Veda*, according to the gloss of the celebrated Shankarāchārya, Calcutta, 1816, *Translations of the Ishopanishad, one of the chapters of the Yajur Veda*, do. 1816, also of the *Kuṭh.* and *Mooṇḍuk*, do. 1819; E. Roer, *The Bṛihad Aranyaka Upaniṣhad*, with the commentary of Sankara Āchārya, the gloss of Ānanda Giri, Eng. tr. of text and of part of the commentary, do. 1848–74; *The Upanishads, the Taittiriya, Aitareya, Svetāśvatara, Īśa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Munduka and Mandukya*, tr. from E. Roer, ed. with an Introd. by Manmatha Nath Dutt, do. 1907; O. Böhtlingk, *Bṛhadāranjakopanishad in der Mādhjamdina Recension*, St. Petersburg, 1889; S. Sitarama Sastri, *The Upanishads* (in Sanskrit and English) and Sankara's *Com.* (in English), Madras, 1898 ff.; Śriśa Chandra Vasu, *The Upanishads* (in Sanskrit and English), *with the commentary of Mādhavāchārya* (in English), Allahabad, 1909 ff.; *The Twelve Principal Upanishads*, Eng. tr., with notes from the com. of Sankarāchārya, and the gloss of Ānandagiri, published by Rajaram Tukaram Tatya, Bombay, 1906; *The Minor Upanishads*, with original text, introd., Eng. rendering and commentaries, printed and published by Swami Virajananda, Mayavati, 1913; K. Nārāyaṇasvāmi Aiyar, *Thirty Minor Upanishads*, Madras, 1914; L. D. Barnett, *Some Sayings from the Upanishads*, done into Eng. with notes, London, 1905; *Selections from the Upanishads*, translated into Eng. with notes from Sankara Acharya and others, ed. J. Murdoch, Madras, 1895.

A. S. GEDEN.

URIM AND THUMMIM.—See DIVINATION (Jewish).

USURY.

Babylonian (C. H. W. JOHNS), p. 548.
Christian (J. DOW), p. 550.
Hebrew (W. H. BENNETT), p. 555.
Jewish (J. ABELSON), p. 556.

USURY (Babylonian).—'Usury' is a wide term and commonly covers many transactions, distinct in their origin and purpose; and it is doubtful whether any custom existed in Babylonia which exactly anticipated any modern interpretation of the term. Interest on loans, rent of estates, wages, anything paid to any one for the use of anything the right to which is not thereby alienated, may be brought under the heading usury from one point of view or another. It would not, however, be accurate to regard this as a definition of usury for the purposes of this article, nor would it be advisable to limit the meaning to either the exaction of exorbitant interest or ruinous charge for accommodation. In fact it may be doubted whether the Babylonians contemplated any transaction with which they were acquainted as answering to anything we understand by usury.

We must remember that the foundation of economic affairs was, from the earliest times with which we are acquainted to the latest for which we have evidence from cuneiform sources, the farming of sheep and cattle or of agricultural produce. In consequence, the natural increase

of flocks and herds being at least 200 per cent per annum, that of crops in the fertile soil of Mesopotamia at least 400 to 500 per cent, the rate of interest was excessively high according to our standard. But such returns, given security from loss by misfortune or disorder, must have led to a rapid increase of wealth. A fortunate possessor must soon have owned more than he could possibly protect. He was bound to employ others as shepherds or labourers merely to conserve his property. Unless he could command the services of slaves or subjects, he had to pay for such services. He might, and in Babylonia usually did, allot a portion of his flock to some shepherd to tend, demanding back after the pasturing and breeding season, his own again with a stipulated rate of increase, which we may loosely call usury. He might let out his farm or part of it to husbandmen, demanding a stipulated share of the crops, and leaving the rest as wages for the labour expended. Whether this constituted usury or not may depend on whether the amount demanded as return from the labourer bore a more or less reasonable relation to the average crop likely to be obtained. The reasonableness of the transaction depended upon many considerations which would be differently regarded then and now. In cases where a man's former prosperity had enabled him to realize his profits in the more stable form of money, he might lend that money as an accommodation to one who had less or even none, on the understanding that he was to receive again his own with usury, but where to draw the distinction between fair interest and usury must depend, not only on the custom of the country, but also on the yield it might reasonably be expected to produce when invested directly in agriculture or farming.

So long as the return for the accommodation which a creditor demanded kept well within the naturally expected profit to be made by the borrower, both were sharers in the benefits brought about by the accommodation. The abuses which might constitute usury arose by a demand for excessive return or by failure to accept responsibility and share in unexpected and unavoidable loss which fell on the borrower. It must early have occurred to the lender to demand security for his loan. By an early established custom the person of the debtor was held as security. This personal security extended over all the borrower's possessions. The debtor who failed to pay had to work off his debt somehow, and it was recognized as fair that the members of his family should be called upon to help him to discharge his debt. Thus he might assign any or all of his family—wife, children, or slaves—to work off his debt. This was to their advantage as much as to his, for they were thus secure of a living, though precluded from the profit of their labour, while, if he was bankrupt, he had no means of providing for them any more than for himself.

But the situation was full of possibilities of oppression, and the rich or prosperous man would soon have become master or partial owner of his poorer brethren indebted to him. So long as such a master treated his dependents fairly, and the land was secure from foreign conquest, a few rich men with a large industrious body of well-treated servants, certain of adequate maintenance, might well constitute a prosperous community. But the raids made in war, the spoliation of the rich man's capital, or the failure of a crop must have reduced the dependents to great misery. The tendency to accumulate wealth in the hands of a few avaricious men might work in the same direction through the tendency to strike hard bargains with labour. A benevolent or far-sighted ruler must early have seen that an overworked or underfed population would grow discontented and so be unreliable in case of invasion to maintain the security of the land against foreign aggression. Hence legislation was introduced to check the abuses which might lead to an undue exploitation of labour by capital.

The celebrated Code of Ḫammurabi, the best-known body of legislation dealing with the subject, which we must regard as the outcome of innumerable other attempts in the same direction, devotes a large part of its regulations to controlling the tendencies of the state of society to permit oppression by the exaction of unfair enforcement of the literal terms of what had been entered upon as a free contract. These regulations of the code are already dealt with in the art. LAW (Babylonian), vol. vii. p. 817 f., and may be briefly summarized here. When a debtor owed for rent or share of crops and was unable to pay by reason of the failure of the crops not due to his own negligence, he was allowed to postpone payment to the next year. It was not legal to insist on the payment of any debt in one special form of tender, though this was often specified in a contract. Produce was made legal tender in any case, thus obviating the difficulty of its realization in a land where money was scarce, and equalizing the variations of exchange. The right of a creditor to seize the person of the debtor or of his dependents, and hold him or them in servitude until the debt had been worked off, was an obvious opening for great abuse, but was modified by the Code. By its enactment that such service should not excuse ill-treatment and, in any case, should not extend beyond three years, it clearly eliminated much injustice. The text of the Code as treated in art. LAW (Babylonian) was not then complete; but a contemporary, or at least very early, copy from Nippur[1] gives one of the lost sections enacting that, if a man borrow grain or money from a merchant and has not grain or money sufficient to repay him, he shall give the merchant whatever he has in his power in place of the debt that he owes in the presence of the city elders, and the merchant may not decline to accept it. This was a far-reaching enactment, and may be suspected of aiming specially at indebtedness to foreigners, or at any rate to men not exactly neighbours. By far the larger number of debts of which we have any record were owed to the temples, which stood to the people in the relation of agricultural banks. Their advances were of the nature of loans to tide over scarcity at seed-time, or to meet the expense of harvest operations when the last year's produce had already become exhausted, though a fresh crop was now in sight. They were mostly for a short term without interest, interest being demanded only in the case of delay to repay at the fixed time. Many of these temples were large land-owners, and also owned numerous flocks or herds. They, like other great owners, often farmed on the *metayer* system, furnishing to their tenants seed, agricultural instruments, and working animals, while advancing wages in kind. The numerous records of temple transactions which have reached us, due to the recovery of large temple archives, may easily have distorted the picture that we are able to draw of social life at that period, but they must have dominated the general custom. The landlord on this system was bound by that custom and his own interest, as well as by humanity, to see that his debtor, who was his tenant, should not be oppressed at any period of the year by want, tending to paralyse his efforts for their mutual profit.

In spite of all such regulations it is evident

[1] See *AJSL*, April, 1915, p. 225.

that debt and the servitude to which it led were very common features of Babylonian society. It was further met by a general amnesty from debt, or *seisachtheia*, proclaimed by many a sovereign apparently to inaugurate his new reign, to secure popularity and encourage loyalty and thereby to achieve power to maintain his rule. The ability thus to remit debts doubtless lay in the power which the king had over temple revenues, as the temples were the chief holders of credit. Their responsibility to the citizens who sustained that credit was never lost sight of. They were called upon to redeem members of their city who became captives in war if these were without means to redeem themselves. The temples were stewards of their wealth for the god who watched over the welfare of his people. The loss to certain members of debts unpaid was a loss to the community at large who had furnished the source of their wealth, but, as this was the result of prosperous years, it might fairly be taxed to equalize over a term of years the incidental losses due to accident or bad seasons, to the 'hand of God,' or to enemy action. To grant such an amnesty, which seems to have involved a general release from debt and the restoration of liberty to prisoners and hostages for debt, was regarded as an 'establishment of equity' and was the prelude to fresh legislation. It is not completely clear that this amnesty touched private debts; it had in view rather debts to the temples, which were naturally in the power of the king. If private indebtedness was cancelled, it is difficult to see how injustice to the private creditor was avoided or what compensation he could have received for the forfeit of his capital and interest.

Most writers on the subject appear to have regarded the rates of interest charged for loans as exorbitant, but the high interest is associated in all periods with oriental custom and economic conditions. The multiplication of capitalists and the competition between them for investments have reduced the rate of interest under modern conditions to what we regard as fair, but any national scarcity of raw material or capital is bound to raise the rate again. Practically the risk involved determines the rate charged for a loan. Professional money-lenders were then more rare, and had to take greater risks. The profits which a borrower was able to secure by actual trading or farming were so high that accommodation for interest was less attractive to the lender unless the rate was high.

LITERATURE.—For the laws regarding usury see C. H. W. Johns, *The Oldest Code of Laws in the World*, Edinburgh, 1903, §§ 45–126; for the *metayer* system, *ib.* § 253. See also Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, do. 1904. For the financial position of the temples, C. H. W. Johns, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, Philadelphia and London, 1915. For *seisachtheia*, M. Schorr, 'Eine babylonische Seisachthie aus dem Anfang der Kassitenzeit' (*SBAW*, 1915, pt. 4); S. Langdon, *PSBA*, 1914, p. 102.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

USURY (Christian).—1. In the New Testament.—The words of Jesus contain allusions to borrowing and lending, but, as we should expect of one who refused to be a judge and divider (Lk 12[14]), there are no direct precepts to guide the Christian conscience. Mt 5[42] and Lk 6[34f.] are but exhortations to an open-hearted charity. The Parable of the Talents (Mt 25[14-30]) and the Parable of the Pounds (Lk 19[11-27]) allude to banking and interest, but in casual phrases, not in the pith and marrow of the teaching. Borrowing itself would be frequent enough in that age and country, not so much of the commercial type,[1] but more of the loose and personal kind, as between friend and friend, kinsman and kinsman. The shiftless Oriental is a ready if somewhat conscienceless borrower, and the Syrian peasant who to-day loans out his earnings in petty usury doubtless had his like-minded ancestor in the changeless East.[1] The ethic of these personal borrowings was adequately covered by the general principles enunciated by Jesus; there was no call, nor was it His method, to deal with usury as an economic and commercial factor.

What mattered for the future centuries was that by His life and example even more than by His words the great Master had suggested a certain attitude towards this world's goods. Himself reared among the poor and needy, He lived the life of a travelling teacher without home or material possessions; to those who left house and kindred and lands for His sake He had promised everlasting life (Mt 19[29]); and to the rich young ruler, morally perfect though he claimed to be, He had given the arresting command to sell all and give to the poor (Mt 19[21]). Among the slaves and the folk of the lower orders who formed the majority of the early converts such teaching was treasured and, it may be, unduly emphasized; its potency appears in the communistic movement of Acts (4[32]) and in the fact that from the beginning dear to the heart of the Christian society was the care of the poor. It is as but one phase of a general attitude to this world's goods that we must explain the Church's dislike of usury. In their simple, fraternal communities, with their pervasive atmosphere of kindly charity, the hard bargainer for gain was a chilling and unwelcome intruder, the personification of the spirit of the alien world without.

2. In the Fathers.—The early Fathers looked upon usury with severe disapproval. They may have been influenced in certain cases by the classical moralists, but the determining standard for them was the OT legislation and the general principles of the NT teaching, more especially a strained interpretation of Lk 6[35].

Tertullian,[2] Cyprian,[3] and Clement of Alexandria[4] accept as still binding on Christians the OT precepts (Ex 22[25], Dt 23[19], Ps 15[5], Ezk 18[8]), the first-named regarding the prohibition of interest as only a preparation for the higher demand of the Gospel to forgo even the capital: 'Quo facilius assuefaceret hominem ipsi quoque foeneri perdendo cuius fructum didicisset amittere.' Apollonius ranks usury with games of chance.[5] Lactantius condemns it.[6] The Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries write to the same effect, only with a rising vehemence that suggests that the evil was increasing in decadent times. To Chrysostom it is *συνδεσμος ἀδικίας*,[7] to Ambrose it is *rapina*,[8] Augustine places it in the category of crime: 'Audent etiam foeneratores dicere, non habeo aliud unde vivam. Hoc mihi et latro diceret, deprehensus in fauce; hoc et effractor diceret . . . et leno . . . et maleficus.'[9] Basil[10] and Gregory of Nyssa[11] in homilies of like spirit denounce the usurers as a breed of vipers that gnaw the womb that bears them.

The standpoint of the Fathers, however, is not to be explained as a mere narrow reading of Scripture: it is the view of men whose Christian conscience abhorred the exploitation of the defenceless and unfortunate. The practice of usury is regarded throughout this period not as an economic but as a moral question. Borrowing was still largely for the urgent personal needs of poor men who were fit subjects not for exaction but for charity. It was the soulless miser—living safely and meanly, gloating over his gains ill-gotten by pitilessly farming the necessities of the needy—who sat for the portrait of the usurer and drew the fire of the preacher. The Christian conscience was finely sensitive to the obligation of charity. Wealth was the gift of God, and men were but stewards, *dispensatores* not *possessores*.

[1] See art. 'Interest,' in *DCG*.

[1] G. M. Mackie, *Bible Manners and Customs*, London, 1898, p. 84.

[2] *C. Marc.* iv. 17. [3] *Test.* iii. 48.
[4] *Strom.* ii. 18. [5] *Ap.* Eusebius, *HE* iii.
[6] *Div. Inst.* vi. 18. [7] *Hom. lxii. in S. Matt.*
[8] *De Bono mortis*, xii.; cf. *de Tobia, passim.*
[9] *In Psalm.* cxxviii. [10] *Hom. in Ps.* xiv.
[11] *Oratio c. Usurarios*

'Understand then, ye rich, that ye are in duty bound to do service, having received more than ye yourselves need. . . . Be ashamed of holding fast what belongs to others. Imitate God's equity and none shall be poor.'

This note struck in *The Preaching of Peter* is typical. To a teacher like Ambrose rights of property were a creation of avarice; charity or almsgiving was an act of simple justice.[1] In all this the Church is moving in the realm of precept and ideal; law on the subject is not yet.

3. **In the canons of the Councils.**—Antagonism gradually hardened into prohibition,[2] as the Church developed in power after Constantine. At first she deals only with her own clerics, who, as guardians of ecclesiastical property, must have had practical difficulties and temptations. By the 17th canon of the Council of Nicæa deposition is prescribed for usurious clerics. In the statute of the Council of Elvira (305–306) ordering expulsion from the Church of any person 'si vero in ea iniquitate duraverit' the mention of laymen is doubtful, but by 345 we find the Council of Carthage declaring it reprehensible in laymen. This view is repeated by the Council of Aix-la-Chapelle (789), and by the 9th cent. ecclesiastical law becomes positive in extending the prohibition to the laity: bishops are to require all Christians to abstain from usury and to punish the recalcitrant.[3] Legislation threw its net ever wider as the evil increased, and the whole armoury of ecclesiastical pains and penalties was turned upon the offenders. Thus a canon of the 3rd Lateran Council (1179) ordained that 'manifest usurers shall not be admitted to communion, nor, if they die in their sin, receive Christian burial.' The 2nd Council of Lyons (1274) went farther, forbidding any community, corporation, or individual to permit the letting of houses to foreign usurers. Spiritual penalties are reinforced by civil: by another canon the wills of unrepentant usurers were declared invalid, thus bringing usury definitely within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.[4] The Council of Vienne (1311) brought matters to a climax, declaring the civil law on usury as of no effect and branding as a heretic any one who pertinaciously held that usury was not sinful.

4. **In the Middle Ages.**—This growing stringency indicates the advance of a tide that could not be checked. 'Since in almost every place the crime of usury has become prevalent,' admits the canon of the 3rd Lateran. Significant is the concession made in favour of the Jews by the 4th Lateran: only grave and excessive usury is forbidden them. By the 11th cent. commerce was finding new channels; towns were arising, markets opening, and thus problems of trade became urgent. Churchmen themselves needed large sums for building and for Crusades. This activity in the money market called for readjustments and new methods. The Church had to reconsider her whole attitude to trade and economic practice. The old view that business was an evil, with its roots in covetousness, had to go. The interchange of goods by which men lived had to be accepted; only its methods must be jealously examined. Christian principles had to be applied in detail. Over against Roman law, as codified by Justinian and studied in the schools, Churchmen had to set forth their own rule and standards. This task fell to the Schoolmen, pre-eminent among whom stands Thomas Aquinas. Even as he formulates his judgments on usury he has to make concessions, and, once one gap is made in the hedge of restriction, other gaps appear as the centuries pass, until it becomes a question whether there is a hedge at all.

The scholastics based their judgment on more than the OT and gospel precepts.[1] (*a*) They accepted the dictum of Aristotle,[2] made familiar to us from *The Merchant of Venice*, that barren metal does not breed. Money was regarded merely as a medium of exchange; the modern concept of capital had not been evolved. The fact was overlooked that the money borrowed could purchase, *e.g.*, a cow, and a cow does breed. (*b*) Roman law distinguished between consumptibles (*e.g.*, a loaf) and fungibles (*e.g.*, a house). In *mutuum* the thing borrowed was for consumption; its whole value lay in its first use; the use and the substance were inseparable; an adequate compensation was made when an equal quantity was returned. In this category money was ranked. When A borrowed money from B, his ownership over it was absolute; it was more than *possessio*, it was *dominium*; the process of exchange had the quality of a sale, and to sell an article and then charge for the use of it was unjust.

This, then, was the decision of the canonist conscience: in itself the loan of money did not justify a charge for its use. In those days of limited opportunity for investment it was doubtless often a gain to the lender to find a man willing to accept custody of the money, so long as it was returned intact. And the Schoolmen were ready to face the logic of facts and to make allowance for special cases. The custom sprang up of admitting compensation on various extrinsic grounds.[3]

(*a*) Bargains were not kept. A delay in payment might inflict serious loss. Was there to be no compensation? Certainly. So the lender was allowed to fix a fine to be paid if the bargain was not kept, the *pœna conventionalis*, and this fine was frequently as high as the amount of the original debt. This sum represented the difference between the creditor as he actually was and as he should have found himself had the bargain been kept—hence the name *interest*, 'that which is between.' As the civil law had allowed the defaulting debtor to be imprisoned or even to become a slave, this money payment was really a milder punishment.

(*b*) Suppose a man who had lent his money were compelled himself to borrow at a high rate of interest through the failure of the debtor to repay. For such a real expense capable of proof compensation was allowed by practically all Schoolmen—*damnum emergens*.

(*c*) By handing over money to another the lender deprived himself of the gain he might have made in various ways (*lucrum cessans*). Aquinas disapproved of this as a basis of claim, a future gain being regarded as too hypothetical. It was selling what did not exist and by a hundred chances might never exist. But this plea by the 15th cent. gained wide acceptance.

(*d*) Another extrinsic title which won its way to approval later than the others was that based on the risk—*e.g.*, in maritime ventures—that the sum borrowed would not be restored (*periculum sortis*).

(*e*) Once delay in payment (*titulus moræ*) was recognized as a reason for compensation, the practice easily sprang up of lending gratuitously for a short period and charging for delay beyond that period. This was but a step from the modern method of calculating interest.

It was not only by these strictly guarded avenues that money could pass for gain; the Middle Ages offered two other modes of investing money: (*a*) rent-charges, and (*b*) partnership.

(*a*) A squire drawing a fixed rent for a piece of land could transfer to another that right. Real productive property (*res frugifera*) was the indispensable basis for this contract; but the privilege was extended later to shops, toll-rights, etc., so that even the small trader and artisan could raise money to expand their business in this way.

(*b*) The stay-at-home merchant could entrust his goods to an agent—*e.g.*, the owner of a trading ship—and might bargain for a share of the profit of the venture. This partnership assumed many forms, the approval of the canonists requiring two conditions: (1) the investor remained the owner of his capital; and (2) he shared in the risk, thus earning a moral right to a share of the profits.

In view of all these gaps in the hedge, it is difficult to maintain that the ban on usury seriously hampered trade and commerce. Indeed, no school-made dictum would have been suffered

1 Cf. A. J. Carlyle, in *Property*, London, 1913, ch. v.
2 Endemann, *Grundsätze der canonistischen Lehre*, § 2.
3 Council of Meaux (845), can. 55.
4 W. J. Ashley, *An Introd. to English Economic History and Theory*[9], i. 150.

1 *E.g.*, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. lxxviii.
2 *Politics*, i. 3, § 23. 3 Cf. Ashley, ii. 397 ff

long to impede forces so potent as the trading instinct in man and the international necessity of commerce. The masses during these centuries still lived largely by agriculture and the primitive crafts. Neither artisan nor farmer had a big margin of wealth to tide over ill-health or bad harvests or grievous taxation. In such conditions the petty usurer was a temptation and a snare, as he is to-day in similarly undeveloped communities — *e.g.*, India and Egypt. Moreover, interest calculated per month, as was the system then in vogue, resulted in exorbitant charges. As the zealous guardian of the poor and the distressed, the Church was probably wise to keep her ban on usury. Her policy was certainly a long step in advance of the pagan practice by which the debtor was suffered to fall to the status of a slave. After the inroads of the barbarians, moreover, there was a period of chaos; commerce was stagnant rather than seeking for new outlets. What wealth an impoverished society possessed was swallowed up in the necessities of life; only after her recovery would there be free wealth for development, and that found open channels in partnerships and rent-charges. When capital was thus scarce and lending the monopoly of a few, unlimited freedom to impose interest would have led to abuse and produced a social cancer in that unripe age. Further, the Church was not herself detached from the realities of the economic world. She was one of the largest holders of property and monies, and Churchmen, as stewards of that material wealth, were driven to find ways and means of investment. The lessons of their own practical difficulties were not lost on them, as in their experience of the *montes pietatis*.

The Franciscans, with their sensitiveness to the needs of the poor, instituted at Orvieto (1463), Perugia (1467), and elsewhere these philanthropic loan-funds with a view to giving small loans to the poor on the security of pledges. 'But,' writes Ashley, 'even with papal patronage and the promise of spiritual and temporal advantages to those who should subscribe towards so charitable a work, the managers of the *montes* found it necessary to make a small charge for the loan in order to cover working expenses.'[1]

A wordy warfare followed between the various orders, resulting in the notable judgment of the Lateran Council of 1515 by which the *montes* were allowed to levy moderate interest, provided their object was to cover working expenses and not to make a profit. Such a verdict could not fail to have far-reaching effect. The Church which had resisted usury in the interests of the poor was now compelled to allow moderate interest to an institution which existed on behalf of the poor. The Council itself apparently felt that the question had reached a new phase, and re-defined usury thus:

'This is the proper interpretation of usury, when gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing not in itself fruitful (such as a flock or a field), without labour, expense or risk on the part of the lender.'

The controversy on the triple contract in the 16th cent. also shows forces moving towards the admission of interest. A capitalist class was emerging—a process that was aided by the large profits made by traffic in Indulgences for which the Church herself was responsible. The powerful banking house of the Fuggers of Augsburg was behind John Eck who championed this method of investment at the University of Bologna in 1515, and John Major argued with cogency in its favour.[2]

Three different contracts with three different men were allowed: (1) a contract of partnership, (2) a contract of insurance against loss of capital, (3) a contract of insurance against fluctuation of profit. Could a merchant make all three contracts with one man? That meant that his capital was guaranteed, so was a fixed return. Was this usurious?

At Bologna there was no decision. Yet the campaign taken up by Major and others might have achieved success but for the wave of reaction that came with the counter-reformation. Liberal opinion was swamped, and a reversion was made to a stricter standard by the bull *Detestabilis Avaritiæ* of Sixtus V. (1586), which revived the sternest condemnation of usury as 'detestable to God and man, as condemned by the sacred canons, and as contrary to Christian charity.'[1]

5. **The Reformation and after.**—The yoke of authority was broken by the Reformation and it was inevitable that in the freer atmosphere of Protestantism the binding strictures on usury should be cast off. Not that that process was unopposed. On the contrary, the removal of the Church's ban only showed how strong was the popular sentiment against the practice; witness Martin Luther's earlier deliverances on the subject.[2] These are not the scientific judgments of the theologian, but rather the utterance of a son of the people, feeling keenly that oppression at the hands of the nobles and rich city merchants which led to the peasants' rebellion; there was also in the case his Christian fury against the Jewish usurers' ensnaring of his fellow-believers.[3] His zeal for moral reform tended to swing him back to the strictest standard of the Fathers. He called on ministers to preach against usury (1540). In more reasoned mood, however, in cases where the participators are not poor, he allows rent-charges on real land and interest that compensates for actual loss (*damnum emergens* and *lucrum cessans*), provided the charge is moderate (four or five florins to the hundred).[4]

Melanchthon professes to accept the traditional, Scriptural prohibitions.[5] But a practical guiding consideration to his mind is whether the usury is so immoderate as to have a disintegrating effect on the commonwealth, a consideration forced upon him doubtless by his study of classical times:

'Societas civilis non potest esse perpetua cum non servatur aequalitas . . . Exhauritur ergo altera pars et non servatur aequalitas, sicut res ipsa ostendit ubi concessae fuerunt immoderatae usurae. . . .'[6]

He allows a payment 'supra sortem,' not only in cases of *damnum emergens* and *lucrum cessans* to those engaged in lucrative trade, but even where there is no *titulus moræ*, provided always the interest is moderate: 'Licet stipulari de eo quod interest etiam ante moram.'[7]

It was left to Calvin, however, to finally open the sluice, and that, too, without any such intention on his part. His standpoint is really the same as that of his contemporaries.[8] Only he wrote to Œcolampadius a guarded opinion, the substance of which was seized on and the reservations slurred over. The opinion expressed was not for everybody. He hesitated to make any concession, feeling, on the one hand, that to condemn usury altogether was to impose restrictions severer than the Lord Himself desired, and, on the other hand, that, if he yielded an inch, some would take an ell. And what he feared came to pass.

[1] Ashley, ii. 450.
[2] *In iv. Sententiarum*, dist. xv. qu. 49.

[1] The Catholic Church has been slow to give official sanction to usury. As late as 1745 the *Vix Pervenit* of Benedict XIV. follows canonist lines. Not till 1830 did the Holy Office allow, in a particular case, that interest could lawfully be taken for money lent to merchants who were in lucrative trade. Cf. J. M. Harty, 'Historical Evolution of the Catholic Teaching on Usury,' in *Irish Theol. Quarterly*, iv. [1910] 17.
[2] *Sermons*, 1519, 1524.
[3] *Letter against the Sabbathers*, 1543.
[4] G. Schmoller, *Zur Gesch. der nationalökonomischen Ansichten in Deutschland während der Reformationsperiode*, Tübingen, 1861, p. 110 f.
[5] 'Haec divina testimonia amplectamur et sciamus usuras vere displicere Deo' (*de Contractibus* [*Opera*, ed. H. E. Bindseil, Halle and Brunswick, 1843–60]).
[6] *Ib.* [7] *Ib.*
[8] *Comm. in Ps* 15[5]: 'Sciamus ergo contractus omnes quibus alter ex alterius damno lucrum inique captat quocunque tandem nomine vestiantur damnari'; cf. *Serm. in Dt. xxiii.*

Lk 6^{35}, the letter runs, has been badly twisted from its real sense; Jesus merely wished to correct the vicious custom of the world whereby men readily lent to the rich, who could pay back, and not to the poor. Dt 23^{19} was political and not to bind us further than reason and equity allowed. The strictures in the Psalms and Prophets were applicable to the Hebrews: our circumstances are different. The Aristotelian argument, to which Ambrose and Chrysostom subscribed ('pecunia non parit pecuniam'), is of no great moment. It is a specious quibble. Interest proceeds from money as naturally as rent from a field or house. A money gain is allowed for the use of a house. So money can be made fruitful when land is purchased and yields a yearly revenue. The argument is clinched by an illustration. A rich man, A, well endowed with landed property and other income, is short of ready money. Another man, B, is not so rich, but has abundance of ready money. A asks B for a loan of money. B could easily buy land for himself or he could have the land bought with his money hypothecated to him till the debt was repaid. Suppose instead of that he contents himself with the interest, the fruit of the money, is that to be condemned when the harsher contract is reckoned fair? That would be nothing else than playing with God, a child's game.

While thus Calvin does not condemn all usury, he does not give it indiscriminate approval, nor will he countenance it as a trade. Finally, he lays down seven conditions, the important being that usury was not to be demanded of men in need or distress; poor brethren were to be considered; the welfare of the State was to be safeguarded; and the legal rate was not to be exceeded.[1]

A world eager for commercial freedom found it convenient to drop Calvin's qualifications, while his concessions were seized on as authority for a new standard. When the theologian had yielded the principle, the jurist was ready to rush in and establish the case at all points. Molinæus[2] demolished with meticulous detail the old arguments of the canonists. Though his book was placed on the Index, it was freely republished and circulated widely. More especially in the Netherlands, where Reformation principles were spreading and commerce was developing, the new views found open ears. Salmasius preached the cause in a series of brilliant volumes;[3] but practical needs were probably more eloquent than argument. In Germany early in the 16th cent. several State legislatures began to allow *Interesse*, when stipulated in advance, and in 1654 the imperial diet did likewise. In Italy, under the shadow of Roman Catholicism, discussion did not arise till late, but in the busy commercial towns, by allowing interest to be bargained for beforehand from an early period and exploring other avenues of ingenuity, the prohibition of usury was rendered ineffective. In France the power of the Church maintained the ban until the Revolution. Not till 1789 was the prohibition removed. Turgot's *Mémoire sur les prêts d'argent*, the classic vindication of usury in France, did not see the light till 1789.

6. Opinion in England.—Christianity arrived in the infancy of English civilization and stamped her character from the beginning on social and political developments. Accordingly, the attitude of mind shown towards usury in popular literature[4] and in early statutes is in harmony with the teaching of the Church. Indeed it would appear that not till the Jews arrived after the Conquest did the trade become a problem at all. The English people have always been healthily disposed towards commerce—indeed their very existence depends upon it—and they would be prompt to protest if the ban on usury were found restricting trade. What emerges is the opposite: a keen desire to grapple with and shackle the traffickers in usury. Complaints were often made that the ecclesiastical courts were not stringent enough.[5] Progressive civilians sought further powers to stamp out the evil—*e.g.*, in the ordinance framed by the London municipality in 1363.[1] The exact point of offence is defined in the revised statute (1390) which describes usury as 'a promise for certain without risk.' The wide-spread bitterness towards the Jew was one other illustration of the popular verdict against usury. The very exorbitance of the interest allowed—2d a week per £1, *i.e.* 43⅓ per cent—was enough to breed odium, and kings made rather a questionable use of these strangers. Feeling rose so high that the Jews were expelled in 1290, and in the following century (1376) the citizens of London called for the same measure against the Lombards, the agents of the grievous papal exactions, who had taken over the detested trade.

The way to change was prepared by the relaxations of the canonists themselves, but more by the fact that in the 15th cent. money transactions were altering in character. The borrowers were no longer poor men in need, nor barons suddenly confronted with some savage taxation or a levy for a crusade. Traders making good profits now needed money for developing business; they were willing and ready to pay for loans. And many began to find themselves in better times with a margin to invest: the phenomenon of capital was emerging. Still, when Henry VIII. in 1545, under the guise of limiting charges, really sanctioned interest at 10 per cent, he was probably in advance of public opinion. At any rate a wave of reaction followed, and the Act was repealed under Edward VI. Warm controversy marked the closing decades of the century. On the one side, divines who 'too much squinted towards Moses' preached a stricter standard than even the canonists and attacked rent-charges and partnerships.

The 'little more' of interest was likened to a sixth finger, a monstrosity; the usurers were as ivy on the oak, all-devouring. 'To what shall I liken this generation? They are like a butler's box; for as the counters at last come to the butler, so all the money cometh to the usurer.'[2]

There are indications of resentment of another kind caused by the arrival of a 'new rich' and the dispossession of old families by these 'ungracious pettie Brokers.'[3] Irresistible forces, however, drove the other way. 'But goode Lorde, how is the worlde changed,' writes Thomas Rogers, 'that which Infidels cannot abide, Gospellers allowe.'[4] The Reformation had broken the old spell of authority, and disciples of Calvin found ready listeners. Henry Bullinger and others spread abroad the newer view that usury was forbidden only so far as it was 'biting.' But, as Cunningham has it,

'The most important factor was the revolution in English commerce which occurred during the 16th century; for various circumstances had combined to bring about an entire recasting of the ordinary business system of the country. For one thing, the exclusive trading of the great gilds had suffered a series of severe blows and it was open to anyone to engage in commerce and win its rewards. The great improvements in the management of estates—as well as the planting of new industries—brought much wealth into the hands of many citizens all through the country. . . . For the first time in the history of England the circumstances were present which rendered the general formation of capital possible.'[5]

The Act of 1571 marks the victory of the liberal school. The rate was lowered to 8 per cent in 1624, but more significant was the fact that in that measure no attempt was now made to distinguish between usury and interest. The controversy smouldered on, but really for the time being the question had been settled by the advent of capital and the consequent changed conditions of commerce. The point at issue altered to the rate

1 *Johannis Calvini Epistolæ et Responsa*, ed. Beza, Geneva, 1575, p. 355.
2 *Tractatus contractuum et usurarum redituumque pecunia constitutorum* (1546).
3 *De Usuris* (1638), *de Modo Usurarum* (1639), *de Fœnere Trapezitico* (1640).
4 *E.g.*, *Piers Plowman*, under 'Avarice.'
5 W. Cunningham, *Christian Opinion on Usury*, p. 45.

1 *Liber Albus*, tr. H. T. Riley, London, 1861.
2 Henry Smith, *Works*, ed. Thomas Fuller, i. 99.
3 Thomas Lodge, 'An Alarum against Usurers,' London, 1584 (*Complete Works*, Glasgow, 1883, i. 14).
4 See W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. ii. sect. 189.
5 *Ib.* sect. 190 (*b*).

of interest, for the limitation of which Thomas Culpepper, Josiah Child, and others pled. John Locke entered the lists with *Some Considerations of the Consequences of lowering the Interest and raising the Value of Money* (1691), but it was in another connexion that he made his most significant utterance, anticipating the next phase of the controversy: 'For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything.'[1] Jeremy Bentham's classic *Defence of Usury* also indicates a fundamental fact which makes this a perennial question, 'The children who have eaten their cake are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs.'[2]

The repeal of the usury laws in 1839 appeared to be 'the end of an auld sang.' But the freedom was abused. The usurer with his merciless exactions again came under control by the Money-Lenders Act of 1900, which requires the registration of their business names and addresses and allows the court, where the lender prosecutes for debt, to cancel the contract if the rates are excessive. Petty loan business, however, still survives.

7. The modern phase of the problem.—History repeats itself in the present phase of the controversy. Usury has come to mean exorbitant interest, but the legitimacy of interest is still debated. The early attacks on usury were motived by the Church's sympathy with the oppressed poor; the latest attack finds its strength in the plea that interest is an unjust tax on the labouring classes.

'But observe, my Lord,—and observe as a final and inevitable truth—that whether you lend your money to provide an invalided population with crutches, stretchers, hearses, or the railroad accommodation which is so often synonymous with the three, *the tax on the use* of these, which constitutes the shareholder's dividend, is a permanent burden upon them, exacted by avarice, and by no means an aid granted by benevolence.'[3]

Henry Smith said that the usurer was like a butler to whom all the counters returned. What offends the moralist to-day is that money is lent by those who have abundance and returns to them to increase that abundance, the increase being the unpaid dues of labour, which alone, the argument runs, produces wealth.

'It is not only that "every gate is barred with gold," but that year by year the burden of the past is becoming heavier on the present. Wealth passes down from father to son like a gathering snowball, at the same time as industry gets massed into larger and larger organizations, and the guidance and spirit of industry is taken more and more out of the hands of the worker and given to the capitalist.'[4]

By interest, then, the socialist claims, the rich are made richer and the poor poorer and the stability of the social organism is disturbed—the evil that Melanchthon had feared.

Is interest, then, an unjustifiable tax that could be eliminated? The experience of the Franciscans with their *montes pietatis* and Proudhon with his Exchange Bank[5] may well give pause. In spite of the strength of the socialist indictment, neither in theory nor in practice has the way out been demonstrated. The contention that labour alone creates value and that interest is the unpaid wage of the labourer and therefore wrong is not established unless it is reckoned that the service rendered by capital involves no sacrifice. The waiting or abstinence of the capitalist has not been swept out of court in spite of Lassalle's picture of the 'ascetic millionaires of Europe . . . like Indian penitents or pillar saints . . . holding a plate towards the people to collect the wages of their abstinence.'

'It is not true that the spinning of yarn in a factory after allowance has been made for the wear-and-tear of the machinery, is the product of the labour of the operatives. It is the product of their labour, together with that of the employer and subordinate managers, and of the capital employed; and that capital itself is the product of labour and waiting: and therefore the spinning is the product of labour of many kinds, and of waiting.'[1]

Could even a socialist community abolish interest and so give the labourer the full value of his labour? The difficulty lies in the fact that so many kinds of labour are not immediately productive. A vintage is harvested in 1920 and valued at hundreds of pounds. But in 1940 that value has increased enormously. Can labour be recompensed according to the value in 1940? It would be simple if the labourers could wait till 1940. But can they? Somebody must wait, and that is the plea for interest—the price of waiting. Interest has been defined as 'human impatience crystallized into a market rate . . . the premium that a man is willing to pay for this year's over next year's goods.'[2]

Only if all labour yielded products of immediate use could the community return to each man each year value for his whole labour. But in a progressive society effort must constantly be made for bettering conditions: expenditure must be put forth on schemes that can yield no immediate return. If the present generation is to hand on to the next finer means of transport and a nobler social equipment, can they do so without denying themselves a portion of the value of their labour? Is sacrifice not inherent in progress? A socialist state might possess itself of much capital, but that capital would not be inexhaustible. Some day the question would arise: where is the capital to come from for these improvements? How can a wage be paid to those engaged in these enterprises with deferred returns except by raising some contribution from other fields of labour? This could be done only by raising the price of other goods above the cost of their labour value, or by paying the labourers less than the value of their labour. Thus the socialist society has to impose a burden upon its citizens and deny them the full value of their labour just because of this fact that certain goods take time to mature; *i.e.* the element of waiting cannot be eliminated, and the price of that waiting must be paid.

'The complaint against interest is after all only a complaint that the great advantages of rapid progress cannot be had for nothing.'[3]

What practical policy can be suggested? It is admitted that laws directed against the usurer simply lead to more exorbitant charges to cover the risk of breaking the law. The most successful antidote is the co-operative bank, which meets the needs of those most subject to temporary distress, such as the artisan and the peasant farmer. The popular dislike of interest springs from the worker's resentment towards the idle rich. That privileged individuals should draw from a community enough for a life of idleness and luxury 'will always be regarded as a fundamental immorality.'[4] But, as Cassel goes on to point out, that really calls for a more equal distribution of the nation's wealth rather than tampering with the method of interest. Society must consider rather the methods by which superabundant wealth comes into a few idle hands—as the laws of inheritance, unearned increment, and all forms of monopoly. Meantime the concern of the Christian Church is not to dictate any particular economic method but to maintain a zealous watchfulness over all developments in behalf of her ideals of justice, charity, and brotherhood.

[1] *Of Civil Government* (*Collected Works*, London, 1777, vol. ii. ch. v. § 40).
[2] London, 1787, letter x.
[3] John Ruskin, 'Usury,' *On the Old Road*, London, 1885, ii. 223 f.
[4] W. Smart, pref. to Böhm-Bawerk.
[5] C. Gide and C. Rist, *A Hist. of Economic Doctrines*, tr. R. Richards, p. 308 ff.

[1] A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics*[5], London, 1910, p. 587.
[2] Irving Fisher, *Elementary Principles of Economics*, p. 371.
[3] G. Cassel, *The Nature and Necessity of Interest*, p. 179.
[4] *Ib.* p. 182.

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JOHN DOW.

USURY (Hebrew).—**1. Terms.**—These do not throw much light on the moral and religious ideas connected with the subject.

לוה, 'borrow,' also means 'join,' and has been supposed to imply the dependence of the borrower on the lender, but it is more probable that there is no connexion between the two uses of the root. שׁאל, 'ask,' is also used in the sense of 'borrow,' and the *Hiph.* in that of 'lend.' עבט is used for 'borrow on pledge (or security),' and the *Hiph.* for 'lend on security'; חבל is similarly used. As the last two roots are also used in the sense of 'bind,' they have been supposed to imply the binding of the debtor to the creditor. Nouns from these roots are used for 'pledge' or 'security.' ערב is used for 'be surety,' 'give pledges,' etc. For 'lend at interest' we find נשׁה, נשׁה, and נשׁך; נשׁך='interest.' *Nmashakh* also means 'bite'; and *neshekh* is supposed to mean 'something bitten off,' or to refer to the injurious and ruthless behaviour of a creditor in exacting interest. The AV 'usury' for *neshekh* simply meant 'interest' when AV was translated, and the suggestion which it now makes of exorbitant interest is misleading; it is simply 'interest,' as far as the mere word is concerned, apart from the implications of any special context. Thus the obviously neutral word תַּרְבִּית, EV 'increase,' from רבה, 'to be great,' is often used as a parallel and synonym of *neshekh*; and the word is rendered in the LXX by τόκος, and in the Vulg. by *usura*, which are simply the ordinary words for 'interest.'

2. History.—Debt plays only a small part in the OT, partly, no doubt, because it was not an important factor in primitive times, though it became more so as Israel grew more civilized and life more complex. In an agricultural community the failure of the crops might lead to borrowing (Neh 5[3]). A man might be involved in debt by becoming security for a friend (Pr 6[1]). In later times taxation for a native government or for the payment of tribute to a foreign suzerain was a source of debt (Neh 5[4]). As far as the OT is concerned, debt always seems to have originated from such causes; the OT has little or nothing to say about the spendthrift who got into debt through sloth or extravagance. Moreover, commercial borrowing, which is a source of profit to the borrower, though known at a very early period in Babylon—*e.g.*, in the time of Ḥammurabi—does not seem to have existed in ancient Israel. There is no certain and definite information as to the rate of interest. The clause Neh 5[11], 'Restore . . . the hundredth part of the money,' has been understood to mean that interest was at the rate of one per cent per month, 12 per cent per annum, and that creditors were to forgo their interest; but most recent authorities—*e.g.*, Batten, *ICC*—read *mashsha'th*, 'interest,' for *m'ath*, 'hundredth.' Twelve per cent would probably be too moderate, the interest being determined mainly by the urgent need of the borrower. The consequences of debt might be serious; loans were sometimes obtained on the security of land or houses, *i.e.* on mortgage; when the debtor could not pay, the creditor took the property. Where there was no such security, the debtor and his family might be sold as slaves (2 K 4[1-7], Neh 5[4f.]).

3. Moral and religious significance.—Like other misfortunes, the distress which necessitates borrowing is sometimes regarded as judgment on sin (Dt 15[6] 28[12. 44]), and it is one of the characteristics of the wicked man that he borrows and does not repay (Ps 37[21]). But usually the OT sympathizes with the debtor and seeks to help and protect him; his position is regarded as the result of unavoidable misfortune. It is the duty of the prosperous man to help his poor neighbour in distress by benevolent loans; it is not to be a pure matter of business (Dt 15[7-11], Ps 37[26] 112[5], Pr 19[17]). Necessaries are not to be pledged; thus the widow's ox, or her clothing, or a millstone are not to be taken in pledge (Dt 24[6. 17], Job 24[3]); clothing when pledged must not be kept over night (Ex 22[26] JE, Dt 24[13]). In fact the OT does not regard with approval the practice of taking pledges (Job 22[6] 24[9]).

In view of the fact that the insolvent debtor and his family might be sold as slaves, Ex 21[2-11], which directs the emancipation of the Israelite slave at the end of the seventh year, was an attempt to give some measure of relief to the debtor. This attempt is carried to an extreme in Dt 15[1-6], which appoints a שְׁמִטָּה, EV 'release,' at the end of every seven years, when all debts were to be cancelled. The sequel shows what a large-hearted generosity the Deuteronomic writer demanded from his fellow-countryman: 'Beware that there be not a base thought in thine heart, saying, The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and thine eye be evil against thy poor brother, and thou give him nought' (15[9]). There is, however, no evidence that the law was ever enforced; it is on the face of it impracticable. Indeed, the Deuteronomic writer himself seems conscious that he is only setting forth an ideal. This appears from 15[4]. We may set aside the AV 'Save when there shall be no poor among you,' and adopt the RV 'Howbeit there shall be no poor with thee,' *i.e.* no one shall need to borrow, 'for Jahweh will surely bless thee . . . if only thou diligently hearken unto the voice of Jahweh thy God, to observe to do all this commandment.' As Driver says in his comment on this passage, there will be 'no occasion for the present law to come into operation, if only the nation so comports itself as to merit Jehovah's blessing.' On the other hand, if Israel disobeyed other commandments, so that there were poor, the nation was not likely to observe this particular ordinance; in either case, it would be a dead letter; so it seems to have been. Other authorities propose the less probable rendering, 'Howbeit there *should* be no poor in thee,' *i.e.* the nation should establish a social system which would make poverty impossible. The Priestly Law of jubile (Lv 25) has a similar object to the release. It provides that at the year of jubile all land shall go back to the family to which it originally belonged, and that an Israelite sold for a slave through poverty shall be treated as a hired servant and released. As the loss of the family inheritance or of personal freedom was often due to debt, this law would have mitigated the unhappy consequences of what we should call bankruptcy. Here again this law, like that of the release, was a dead letter. Nevertheless, these laws are evidence of the anxiety of the legislators that neither an individual nor a family should be permanently ruined by insolvency.

A persistent feature of OT teaching is the prohibition of interest as between Israelite and Israelite, although interest may lawfully be taken from a foreigner (Ex 22[25] JE, Dt 23[19. 20], Lv 25[36. 37] H, Ps 15[5], Pr 28[8], Ezk 18[8-17] 22[12], Neh 5).

Interest would often be exorbitant, and indebtedness the occasion or pretext for fraudulent and unjust claims, successfully asserted through the corrupt administration of the law or by sheer violence. There can be no doubt that borrowing and its consequences contributed to the transference of the land from the yeoman farmers to comparatively few wealthy landlords against which the prophets protested. Doubtless the evils of the system largely arose from exorbitant interest, and from the rapacious and unscrupulous behaviour of creditors; but, as has already been pointed out, *neshekh*, EV 'usury,' is not usury in its modern sense of excessive interest, and we cannot give it that meaning in the OT passages in which it occurs; it means interest generally. It is true that Ex 22^{25} specially refers to the poor, but even there Benzinger and Nowack are probably wrong in holding that it means only excessive interest; and in later passages there is no ground for any such limitation. As we have said above, the writers had not commercial loans in view, and their teaching was not intended to apply to interest in that connexion. The objection to interest seems to rest on two main grounds: (1) that the prosperous man with a superfluity should help those in difficulties, suffering from want; if gifts were impossible or undesirable, at least there should be free loans; (2) as in modern times, it was constantly the interest that ruined the debtor, where he might have repaid the capital, so that the social evils which crushed the poor were largely associated with interest; the simplest and most effective remedy seemed to be to prohibit interest altogether. In other words, the principle involved is that wealthy men should see in the misfortunes of their fellows a claim for generous assistance and not an opportunity for adding to their wealth by exploiting the need of the unfortunate.

The prohibition of interest and the other provisions in favour of debtors, like many other humane provisions in the OT, apply only to Israelites; lending to foreigners is expressly allowed (Dt 23^{20}), and is spoken of as a privilege granted by God to the faithful Israelite (Dt 28^{12}). This is another example of the particularist attitude often found in the OT.

LITERATURE.—See sections on 'Debt' in *Heb. Arch.* of Ewald, Benzinger, and Nowack; the commentaries on the passages cited, especially Driver on Ex 22^{25} (*Cambridge Bible*, Cambridge, 1911) and Dt 15^{1-8} (*ICC*, Edinburgh, 1896); and the present writer's artt. 'Debt' and 'Usury' in *HDB*.

W. H. BENNETT.

USURY (Jewish).—**1. General views of Mishnāh and Talmud.**—In the Mishnāh and Talmud usury is indicated either by the Biblical word נֶשֶׁךְ or, as is more frequently the case, by the term רִבִּית. Both terms denote money, food, or any article which a man gives on loan to his fellow-man, on the condition that the latter repays something for the loan in addition to the original sum lent. The discrimination made in modern times between 'usury' and 'interest' is unknown to Jewish law. All 'increase,' whether large or small, is prohibited. Judaism has ever regarded the lending of money by one Jew to another Jew as merely a way of relieving the latter's temporary distress, an act of pure charity. The basic assumption is that the borrower is poor and wants money to satisfy his own personal wants. It is one of the 365 'negative' precepts of Judaism that a Jew may not lend on interest to another Jew. This prohibition is based on Lv 25^{37}, 'Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals for increase.' Another of the 365 'negative' precepts of Judaism is that a Jew may not borrow from another Jew on interest. This is derived from Dt 23^{19}, 'Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother'—the peculiar 'Hiphil' form of the verb (מַשִּׁיךְ) leading the Rabbis to infer that the prohibition is aimed in this case at the borrower.[1] Likewise the Judaism of Talmud and Mishnāh forbids any Jew to be an intermediary or agent or surety or witness in any usurious transaction between Jew and Jew. The Rabbis by a curious exegesis derived this prohibition from the redundancy of the phraseology in Ex 22^{25}, 'If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.' The mediæval Jewish codes lay it down that, in the case of a Jew who has become a convert to another religion, it is forbidden to a Jew to lend to, or borrow from, him on interest. Likewise it is forbidden to a Jew to lend to, or borrow from, a Karaite Jew on interest.

2. Different kinds of usury.—The Talmud and the mediæval Jewish codes enumerate several kinds of 'increase' (רִבִּית). These are (*a*) רִבִּית קְצוּפָה, *i.e.* 'fixed increase,' (*b*) רִבִּית אֲבָק, *i.e.* 'the mere dust of increase,' (*c*) רִבִּית קְרוּץ, *i.e.* 'the semblance of increase,' (*d*) רִבִּית דְּרָדִים, *i.e.* 'increase payable by some means other than money.' They all refer, of course, to dealings between Jew and Jew. The first of these denotes the ordinary transaction where interest in money is paid direct on a loan, in violation of the express command of Scripture. The second (often called 'Rabbinical increase' as distinguished from the first, which is frequently known as 'increase under the Mosaic Law') denotes interest paid in some indirect way connected with bargain and sale, or interest the amount of which was not stipulated nor mentioned at all when the loan was first transacted but which was paid more or less gratuitously by the borrower or taken voluntarily by the lender with the consent of the borrower. It also covers cases where interest was paid by the borrower on the mere anticipation of a loan. A rule of this kind would forbid, on the ground of usury, the sale of futures, made when the market-price has not yet been fixed. Thus the Talmud says:

'A man should not say to his neighbour "Give me a kor of wheat and I will return it at threshing-time" because the market-price of wheat might rise in the meantime and the lender would profit.'[2] Or, again, 'a lender may not lodge in the borrower's house free of charge nor may he rent anything from him at less than the standard rate.'[3]

The third of the four above-mentioned kinds of 'increase' refers to interest paid out of sheer gratitude for a past loan or as the motive for inducing a future one. *E.g.*, after repayment of a loan a borrower might send a gift to the lender on the mere grounds that the lender's money had been in his (the borrower's) hands. This is forbidden. Or, again, if A has received a loan from B, he should not greet B in the street (out of gratitude) unless he had been in the habit of doing so before. A borrower should not consent to be a tutor to the son of the lender, gratuitously, unless he had been this before receiving the loan. The fourth form of 'increase' is illustrated by the case of a Jew who, after receiving a loan from a friend, honoured the latter by allowing him to perform some religious duty in connexion with synagogue-worship or home-ritual.

It is astonishing to read what an emphasis the Talmudic Rabbis laid on all these sins of 'moral' usury. A loan from one Jew to another should be an act of kindness without the least expectation of profit. This, the OT view, was upheld by the Rabbis inexorably, in spite of changed times and conditions.

Turning again to the already-mentioned four species of 'increase,' we should say that (*a*) רִבִּית

[1] See T.B. *Bābhā Mᵉṣī'a*, 61*a*.
[2] *Ib.* 75*a*. [3] *Ib.* 64*a*.

אָסוּר, where charged, was recoverable at law, before the Jewish court ('Beth Din'). If the defendant refused, he was flogged by order of the court, until he consented to pay. The case of (*b*), אֶסֶךְ רִבִּית, was different. This was not recoverable. But, if the lender desired 'to fulfil his duty in the sight of Heaven,' it was obligatory on him to return the interest to the borrower. In other words, it was an act of religion, not of law.

According to the mediæval Jewish codes, the prohibition against taking or giving interest was suspended in the two following cases:

(*a*) Acting Rabbis or teachers of the Law, in borrowing from, or lending to, one another articles of food such as grain, etc., were allowed a fixed interest up to 20 per cent. But such charges were not to be made with frequency lest they might thereby set an undesirable example to the laity. As Rabbis were not commercial men, such transactions were not to be regarded as usurious. It was merely one of the ways of Rabbis helping one another and helping themselves at the same time. It hence came under the heading of 'charity' rather than 'usury.' (*b*) Money left by bequest or gathered for the support of orphans or the poor, or for the upkeep of schools for religious instruction or for the building of a synagogue, might be lent out on interest. This relaxation was made inevitable by the fact that in most countries of mediæval Europe Jews were precluded by the prevailing laws from investing any funds in landed property, and, as all the usual avenues of commerce were closed to them, they felt complete justification in investing public funds on what was, in the strict sense, an undeniably usurious basis.

3. Usury as between Jew and Gentile.—According to Maimonides,[1] a Jew lending money to a Gentile is religiously bidden to charge interest. Maimonides regards this as one of the 'affirmative' precepts of Judaism, deriving it from Dt 23[20], which, according to him, should be translated 'unto a stranger thou *must* lend money on *interest*.' But this view of Maimonides has been severely criticized by the later Jewish legalists and codifiers, and has never found acceptance generally. The prevailing Jewish doctrine is simply that in all transactions between Jew and Gentile interest may be given and taken by both parties.

Commerce is unsectarian. Usurious transactions, as was natural, frequently involved both Jew and Gentile. Hence it was only to be expected that, where Gentile intervention took place in a loan between Jew and Jew (and *vice versa*, where Jewish intervention took place in a loan between Jew and Gentile), there should be a temptation on the part of a Jewish lender or borrower to find a loophole for taking or paying interest, and thus evading the Jewish prohibition of usury as between Jew and Jew. The mediæval Jewish codifiers were well aware of all these contingencies, and their enactments on many a nice point in this connexion are very searching. Here, *e.g.*, are a few specimens culled from the *Shūlḥān 'Ārûkh* of Qaro:[2]

'Suppose the money of a Jew is deposited in the hands of a non-Jew who went and lent it to another Jew on interest. If the non-Jew was responsible for the safety of the money then the Jew is allowed to receive the accruing interest. But if the non-Jew is not responsible for the safety of the money, then interest is prohibited.' 'Suppose the money of a non-Jew is deposited with a Jew. If the latter is responsible for its safety then he may not lend it to a Jew on interest. But if he assumed no responsibility for the money, then he is allowed by Jewish law to lend it to a Jew. But he must not do this because it might convey a wrong impression.' 'A Jew says to a non-Jew, Come and lend out my money for me on interest [to Jews] and I will pay you wages for your work. This is prohibited, because the money belongs to the Jew and his clerk has no responsibility. But if a non-Jewish money-lender asks his Jewish clerk to do the same, the latter is allowed by Jewish Law to do it. But, in fact he must not do it on account of the wrong impression which might be conveyed.' 'Suppose a Jew borrows from a non-Jew on interest, then it is forbidden for a fellow-Jew to be a surety unless the lender distinctly stipulated that in case of default of payment he would not make the first claim against the surety [who would then sue the borrower and thus infringe the prohibition of usury as between Jew and Jew].'

These are but a few instances out of a large number given in the *Shūlḥān 'Ārûkh*.

4. History underlying the Jewish laws concerning usury.—In OT times the Israelites were essentially an agricultural people with no genius for commerce. It was feared that usurious transactions between one Israelite and another might result in the alienation of one tribe's inheritance into the hands of another. This would mean an open violation of the law in Nu 36[7], 'So shall not the inheritance of the children of Israel remove from tribe to tribe; for every one of the children of Israel shall keep himself to the inheritance of the tribe of his fathers.' But usurious dealings between Israelite and non-Israelite were not looked upon as likely to lead to an infringement of this Mosaic Law. On the contrary, it was felt that any gain accruing to the Israelites from such transactions might be most usefully applied to the development and enrichment of the soil of the Holy Land. In later times, in the epoch of the Mishnāh and the Talmud up to the 5th cent. A.D., the Jews mostly dwelt in agricultural settlements in Babylonia, Palestine, and other parts of the world. The Talmudic legislators then found it necessary to enact the law of אֶסֶךְ רִבִּית as mentioned above. Jewish farmers and agriculturists were to be financed by their co-religionists free of all interest. Such was the humanitarian spirit of brotherliness breathed by the Mosaic Law. Were usury permitted even in the slightest degree, debts would grow to such proportions that the creditors would eventually confiscate the entire property of the debtor, and the solidarity of the Jewish people would be utterly broken up. But no such enactments were applicable to the cases of usurious dealings between Jews and Gentiles. There was no love between these two branches of mankind; and, as the Gentile was allowed by law to charge the Jew exorbitant interest, the Jew had no alternative but to do likewise. In fact so hard did the lot of the Jew become through the oppressive measures of the Church that he felt himself justified in adopting no matter what expedients for protecting himself and defeating the foe. In Judaism the duty of self-preservation eclipses all other laws.

The year 1179, however, brought about a vital change. Pope Alexander III. in that year excommunicated all Christian usurers, so that henceforward Christians were debarred by canon law from taking usury. The Church decreed that all taking of interest was forbidden by Scripture as well as opposed to the laws of nature. It made no difference whether interest was low and reasonable, or high and extortionate. But, as canon law did not apply to Jews, the Church put no bar in the way of Jewish usurers; and kings soon found out how useful these Jews could be to the depleted exchequers of their realms. There are many instances in European history generally where wealth amassed by Jewish money-lenders fell into the hands of the king either during the life-time of its owner or after his death. There was a process of squeezing the Jew, sponge-like. Indeed, so indispensable did Jews become to the impoverished coffers of the State that many a mediæval monarch objected to their forced conversion to Christianity, because, once Christians, they would come within the net of canon law, and the annexation of their money would be forbidden. Thus, as Joseph Jacobs has shown, kings actually demanded to be compensated for every Jew converted to Christianity. In spite of the strongest protestations by the papal authority against usury in any form, the kings and princes of mediæval Europe were really the arch-usurers of their day. The rate of interest charged by the Jewish money-lenders was excessively high. But they were forced to this course by the pitiless rapacity of the governments as well as by the inhuman laws then in vogue which put the severest restrictions upon the Jews

[1] *Yad Hā-ḥāzākā*, 'Laws of Lending and Borrowing,' vi. 6.
[2] *Yōreh Dē'āh*, 'Laws of Usury,' 169.

in their efforts to earn an honest and reputable livelihood. The would-be Jewish trader was shackled. In England, Spain, and many other European countries he was absolutely forbidden by law to follow most of the trades and handicrafts which were open, without question, to all other citizens; and when, in rare instances, freedom was given, it was penalized and embittered by the imposition of special taxation. The Church left the Jews nothing to do except to deal in money or second-hand clothing.

But it would be erroneous to suppose that the usurers of the Middle Ages were confined solely to Jews. The increasing spread of commerce and commercial enterprises in those days made it imperative for governments to devise expedients for evading the canonical embargo upon usury. Italy was the first European country to start this evasion. Others soon followed—with the result that the competition between the Christian (chiefly Italian) and Jewish money-lenders in England became so keen as to render the Jews less indispensable than they formerly were to the English Exchequer. Their expulsion from England by Edward I. was the corollary of this fact.

5. The views of modern Judaism on usurers and usury.—The somewhat disproportionate tendency of Jews in recent times to follow the trade of money-lending may be set down as a piece of sheer atavism. Racial characteristics have a way of surviving long after the original causes which created them have disappeared. But it must be strongly emphasized that money-lending is considerably on the decrease among Jews of the 20th century. Commerce, handicraft, the professions of law, medicine, dentistry, literature, art and science generally—the young Jews of the present day are entering these callings in great numbers and with great gusto. Many of them are recruited from the ranks of the poorest parents. The trade of usury is looked upon with shame; and the usurer is stigmatized as a reproach to his people. In some Jewish communities to-day the money-lender is forbidden to have any voice in the affairs of the Synagogue and is socially tabued by the better classes among his co-religionists.

In fine, the attitude of modern Judaism towards usury practically coincides with the attitude of the Judaism of the OT, the Mishnāh, the Talmud, and the mediæval codes. The attitude of the OT is summarized in Ezk 18^{13}, '[He] hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shall he then live? he shall not live . . . his blood shall be upon him.' On this passage the comment of the Talmud is, 'The money-lender is compared to a murderer.'[1] The Mishnāh[2] includes the usurer among those who are disqualified from giving evidence in a court of law. The *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh*—the code on which modern orthodox Judaism, whether as creed, law, or life, is based—says:

'When can usurers be considered as having returned from their evil ways and as being again admissible as witnesses in a court of law? When they have torn up all the documents on which the principal and interest due to them from clients are recorded, with the complete and final resolution that they will never again lend on interest, not even to non-Jews. They must also restore to their former clients all the interest they have ever taken from them. If they can no longer identify all their clients they must devote the money to communal purposes.'[3]

These voices of the past are still expressive of general Jewish opinion to-day.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the footnotes, see Joseph Jacobs, *The Jews of Angevin England*, London, 1893; W. J. Ashley, *An Introd. to English Economic History and Theory*, do. 1888-93, vol. i.; I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, do. 1896; H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., do. 1891, iii.; *JE*, art. 'Usury'; J. D. Eisenstein, *Ōẓār Dīnīm Ōō-minhāgīm*, New York, 1917, art. 'Ribbit.'

J. ABELSON.

[1] T.B. *Bābhā Meṣī'a*, 61b. [2] *Sanhedrin*, iii. 3.
[3] See *Ḥōshen Mishpāt*, xxxiv. 29.

UTILITARIANISM.—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—The term 'Utilitarianism' is used for both an ethical theory and a practical movement. The practical movement will be dealt with under II. 3. ii. below. As an ethical theory it signifies that the ultimate end is and ought to be general happiness, and that those actions are right which bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number. In Mill's words: 'The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.'[1] Or, as Sidgwick says, 'By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory,' first distinctly formulated by Bentham, 'that the conduct which, under any given circumstances is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.'[2] By happiness Sidgwick means pleasure and absence of pain; and pleasure he defines as 'feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable;—desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling.'[3]

For utilitarianism Sidgwick prefers 'some such name as Universalistic Hedonism.'[4] He says 'universalistic' in order to show that the utilitarian end is general, not individual, happiness. Cf. Mill: The utilitarian standard 'is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.'[5] Hedonism (*q.v.*) is a general term including all systems of ethics which regard pleasure as the end actually aimed at (psychological hedonism), or as the end that ought to be aimed at (ethical hedonism). We may say that strictly the latter is alone worthy of consideration, for psychological hedonism, if true, makes any system of ethics irrelevant. But the earlier utilitarians based their theory of general happiness on the psychological assumption that man always desires pleasure. 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.'[6] Even J. S. Mill did not clearly distinguish between psychological and ethical hedonism.

The name 'utilitarian' (taken from 'utility' in the sense of pleasure and exemption from pain) was first used by Bentham in 1781. In 1802, writing to Dumont, he said: 'To be sure a new religion would be an odd sort of a thing without a name: accordingly there ought to be one for it—at least for the professors of it. Utilitarian (Angl.), Utilitairien (Gall.) would be the more *propre*.'[7]

In his earlier writings Bentham used the word 'utility' with great freedom. In later life he preferred to speak of 'felicity' or 'happiness' as pointing more clearly to the ideas of pleasure and absence of pain. 'Utilitarian' had been so little used by Bentham that J. S. Mill believed himself to be the first to apply it to those who accepted the greatest happiness principle. Mill tells us that he found the word in Galt's *Annals of the Parish*. It is there used to designate people who held certain revolutionary views current at the end of the preceding century. It was through Mill that 'utilitarian' and 'utilitarianism' became the generally accepted names for the party and the creed.

II. *HISTORICAL.*—Utilitarianism, both as an ethical theory and as a practical movement, is English. The idea of the greatest good for the greatest number is no doubt to be found in Greek philosophy, in the Stoic conception of the 'citizen-

[1] *Utilitarianism*[13], London, 1897, p. 9 f.
[2] *The Methods of Ethics*[7], IV. i. § 1, p. 411.
[3] *Ib.* II. iii. § 1, p. 131. [4] *Ib.* IV. i. § 1, p. 411.
[5] *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 16.
[6] Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, I. i. (*Works*, Edinburgh, 1859, i.).
[7] *Works*, x. 92, 390

ship of the world.' Leibniz, again, by establishing the general good or happiness as the end of law and of morality, is spoken of as the precursor of utilitarianism.[1] And the French materialists of the 18th cent., especially Helvétius, Montesquieu, and von Holbach, were to some extent occupied with the same ideas. But the movement to which the name is given is an English movement, and, while it demands fairly exhaustive treatment historically, the historical account may be confined to English writers.

1. We must begin with **Hobbes**. The theory of association, which played so large a part in the earlier utilitarian speculation, can be traced to him, although he never worked it out. His influence, which continued for two centuries, is best seen in the effect it produced upon those who opposed his theories. His conception of man as an unsocial and egoistic being with an insatiable desire for power, and his notion of morality as political obligation, had to be answered. And these answers were often the means of modifying the philosophical beliefs of his opponents, among whom were the utilitarians.

The answer to Hobbes made by the Cambridge Platonists does not concern us here. A contemporary of theirs, however, **Richard Cumberland**, foreshadowed utilitarianism in his *De Legibus Naturæ*, published in 1672. This work was lengthy and confused, and utilitarian principles were combined with others. Cumberland's object was to prove, as against Hobbes, that morality was natural, man being by nature social. He defined good as 'preservation,' following Hobbes here, but he included in preservation both perfection and happiness. Most stress was laid on the latter, and most practical use was made of it in the working out of the theory. Individual happiness, he held, must coincide with the good of all because of the Divine sanction: 'The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiest state of every, . . . and therefore the Common Good is the supreme Law.'[2]

A popular fallacy makes **Locke** (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 1690) the founder of English utilitarianism. Moral action was necessarily felicific to Locke, but this he held in common with other non-utilitarian moralists. He did not adopt the greatest happiness principle, and he did not work out the pleasure side of his theory. Empiricism, largely due to him, was, of course, of immense importance in the development of utilitarianism.

An answer in the 18th cent. to the unmitigated egoism of Hobbes came from the Moral Sense school. Their method was psychological rather than rationalistic, and took the form of a new account of human nature. Of this school **Hutcheson**, through his emphasis on benevolence, approached nearest to the position which utilitarianism was to take up, and from Hutcheson came the formula 'the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers' which, slightly changed, becomes so familiar in Bentham. Bentham states that he got this formula from Priestley. That was probably a mistake, as it does not occur in Priestley's works.[3] The exact formula used by Bentham, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' is found in a translation (1767) of Beccaria's *Dei Delitti e delle Pene*. Whether it was suggested to him by Hutcheson is not known.

In 1731 there was published anonymously a small dissertation prefixed to Law's translation of King's *Origin of Evil*. It was entitled *Preliminary Dissertation: concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality*. The author was **John Gay**. This was the first definite statement of the utilitarian position. Brown, Tucker, and Paley are the logical successors of Gay. Their theories, so far as essentials are concerned, may be regarded as expansions of Gay's outline. In the *Dissertation* Gay treats first of the criterion of virtue, then of motive, and lastly of the theory of association, which was the psychological groundwork of his theory of ethics. The 'immediate criterion' of virtue Gay found in the will of God. But, as God must will the happiness of men, the latter is the 'criterion' of God's will. Happiness is defined as a 'sum of pleasures.' The motive of the moral agent is egoistic, for all desire is desire of pleasure. Gay is then faced with the fundamental difficulty which beset all the utilitarians, up to and including John Stuart Mill, of proving the coincidence of the pleasure of the individual and of society. For, if men were and could be actuated only by a desire for their own pleasure, it was manifest that the coincidence of the pleasure of the individual with general pleasure must be proved before the latter could become an object of desire. Gay met this difficulty with his theory of 'sanctions.' He enumerated four sanctions—the natural, the social, the legal, and the religious. He emphasized the last, for he realized that there is no sanction which can ensure the complete coincidence of the pleasure of society and the pleasure of the individual except the supernatural sanction. It is their emphasis on this sanction which constitutes Gay, Brown, Tucker, and Paley theological utilitarians, and which, starting as they did with the selfish theory of the moral motive, renders their system of utilitarianism alone consistent. In his discussion of the supernatural sanction Gay brings out clearly his theory of obligation, which became the accepted one. The moral imperative was not categorical but conditional, he held—conditional on the required action being a means to the happiness of the individual. Complete obligation to virtue could then come from God only, for He alone could make the coincidence between 'my happiness and general happiness' perfect.

> 'Thus those who either expressly exclude, or don't mention the will of God . . . must either allow that virtue is not in all cases *obligatory* . . . or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind be any obligation to *me*, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?'[1]

The latter part of the *Dissertation* is given up to the discussion of psychology. The psychological basis for ethics Gay found in association. Through the law of association other things beyond the pleasure of the individual might be desired as proximate ends, though the ultimate end was pleasure. In this way altruistic desires might be developed. Gay held it unimportant that the ultimate motive was always egoistic. If a man helped another, his immediate motive being kindness, the fact that his ultimate object was to benefit himself was of no consequence.

It has seemed worth while to discuss Gay's treatise rather fully because, though it consisted of only 30 pages, was published anonymously, and attracted little notice at the time, it contained all the essentials of theological utilitarianism. In fact we find no important modification of Gay's utilitarianism made by any one until we come to John Stuart Mill.

In 1740 **David Hume** published his first treatise on Ethics, being book iii. of the *Treatise of Human Nature*. The *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* was published in 1751. Hume's standpoint was very different in the two works. It is

[1] See H. Höffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, 2 vols., London, 1900, i. 368.
[2] *De Legibus Naturæ*, London, ch. 1.
[3] See W. R. Sorley, *A History of English Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1920, p. 220.

[1] *Dissertation*, p. xxi.

unnecessary to discuss the cause of this change; so far as concerns ethics, the *Inquiry* seems to represent his real position. In his analysis of the moral motive in this work Hume approaches modern utilitarianism. But he exercised no influence until the time of J. S. Mill. In the *Treatise* Hume makes the moral motive ultimately egoistic; his position is substantially that held by Gay, and afterwards found in Hartley, Brown, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, and James Mill; whereas in the *Inquiry* his account of human nature implies originally altruistic as well as egoistic tendencies. Disinterested benevolence is natural.

'Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the *selfish* and *social* sentiments or dispositions, they are really no more opposite than selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain.'[1]

Hume's treatment of the moral motive is more important than his treatment of the principle of utility. He accepted the latter, but he did not use it consistently in his analysis of the virtues.

Between Hume's two works there appeared *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations* (1749) by the physician **David Hartley.** In this work Hartley elaborated the theory of the association of ideas in a way which greatly influenced the later associational school and especially James Mill.[2] Hartley was not a typical associationist-utilitarian. Much of his work was given up to theological discussions. He accepted the utility principle, but, like J. S. Mill, he held that there were qualitative differences in pleasures. In practice also he seems to have held that conduct should be guided by 'obedience to the Scripture precepts' rather than by consideration of consequences. He was probably the first to raise the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus.

'It is impossible,' he says, 'for the most sagacious and experienced persons to make any accurate estimate of the future consequences of particular actions, so as, . . . to determine justly, what action would contribute most to augment happiness and lessen misery.'[3]

2. Theological utilitarianism. — Just twenty years after Gay's *Dissertation* there appeared the *Essays on the Characteristics* (1751) by **John Brown.** In 1768 the first volumes of Tucker's *The Light of Nature Pursued* were published, and in 1785 came Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.* Brown, Tucker, and Paley, along with Gay, are the exponents of theological utilitarianism, the first definite form which utilitarianism took, and which in its time exercised an immense influence. A generation trained in Locke was not disposed to adopt the system of the Moral Sense school, but welcomed the rival system whose groundwork was a conception of consciousness as composed of separable atoms, sensations and ideas, aggregated into clusters.

The outline of theological utilitarianism was found in Gay's *Dissertation,* and neither Brown, Tucker, nor Paley added anything vital to it, though they amplified and popularized it. J. S. Mill says that Brown in his *Essays* on Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* produced an able argument for utilitarianism. It is to the second of the essays that Mill refers. Brown's argument was, in brief, that common sense pointed to conduciveness to happiness as being the essence of virtue. He argues that 'those very affections and actions, which, in the ordinary course of things, are approved as virtuous, do change their nature, and become vicious in the strictest sense, when they contradict this fundamental law, of the greatest public happiness.'[4]

The ultimate end Brown gives as the 'voluntary production of the greatest happiness.'[1] The moral motive, he holds, is egoistic. 'The only reason or motive, by which individuals can possibly be induced to the practice of virtue, must be the feeling immediate, or the prospect of future private happiness.'[2] How can the end and the motive be reconciled? 'The lively and active belief of an all-seeing and all-powerful God' alone can do it, a God 'who will hereafter make them happy or miserable, according as they designedly promote or violate the happiness of their fellow-creatures.'[3] This is all entirely in line with Gay. Brown did not touch psychology. For that he definitely refers his readers to Gay.

Abraham Tucker was an extraordinarily prolix writer. There are seven volumes of *The Light of Nature Pursued.* The first four appeared under the name of 'Edward Search' in 1768; the last three were issued posthumously. Like Gay, Tucker turned his attention to psychology, and, like him, he held that ultimately men were egoists—though not in the sense of Hobbes. Altruistic tendencies were explained by contiguity and translation. Tucker was a convinced determinist. Free agency is to him no more than the dependency of actions upon volition.[4] The will follows the strongest motive. All this was thoroughly consistent with the Lockean groundwork and with the ordinary utilitarian theory of obligation. Two points remain to be stated. Tucker says that there are no qualitative distinctions in pleasure. This had been implicit in Gay and others. The second point has reference to the hedonistic calculus. Tucker argued, and Paley followed him here, that there must be general rules of expediency, and that these must be followed rather than any effort made to calculate the probable felicific consequences of any particular act. Tucker states many of the modern objections to the calculus.

'Our tastes,' he says, 'varying as much as our faces makes us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments. . . . Nor do we judge much better of our own pleasures, for want of being well aware of their aptness to cloy upon repetition and to change their relish perpetually according to our disposition of body or mind or the circumstances we happen to stand in.'[5]

In 1785 **William Paley** published his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.* Paley received a complete philosophical system from his predecessors, and he acknowledged freely the debt he owed, in especial to Tucker's *Light of Nature Pursued.* But he applied and popularized their principles, and that so successfully that they are now associated almost exclusively with his name. His definition of virtue—'the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness'[6]—lends itself easily to caricature. Though his views did not differ in any essential from those of the previous theological utilitarians, he emphasized more unpleasantly than any of his predecessors the selfishness of the moral motive, and the doctrine of rewards and punishments after death. He was consistent on obligation. 'We can be obliged,' he said, 'to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by.'[7] It is possible, however, to make too much of the weaknesses of theological utilitarianism as found in Paley, and to forget the sound sense of most of his teaching. In computing the consequences of actions he taught that we must consider what would ensue if all men acted as the individual was acting. '"Whatever is expedient, is right." But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the long run.'[8] The particular consequence of

[1] IX. ii. (*Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, London, 1907, ii. 255).
[2] See art. ASSOCIATION.
[3] *Observations*[6], London, 1834, p. 504.
[4] '*On the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*'[2]; *Essays*, II. iii. 134.
[1] '*On the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*'[2]; *Essays*, II. iii. 137.
[2] *Ib.* II. vi. 159.
[3] *Ib.* II. ix. 210.
[4] Cf. *Light of Nature Pursued*, I. xxiv.
[5] *Ib.* I. xxii. § 11.
[6] *Principles*, I. vii.
[7] *Ib.* II. ii.
[8] *Ib.* II. viii.

forgery is a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill: the general consequence is the stoppage of paper-currency.[1] And he brushed aside the specious argument that an act done in secrecy brings no general ill consequences. 'Those who reason in this manner do not observe, that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured: namely, that secrecy, whenever secrecy is practicable, will justify any action.'[2] Paley analysed the commonly accepted morality of his time to prove that considerations of utility underlay it, and he applied the utility criterion to pressing problems of the age. He exercised very considerable influence, and his *Principles* became the standard text-book at Cambridge.

3. **Empirical utilitarianism and the philosophical radicals.**—i. *Ethical theory of Bentham.*—**Jeremy Bentham** was born five years after Paley, but he lived until 1832, Paley having died twenty-seven years before. Paley went to Cambridge, and Cambridge became the centre of his form of utilitarianism. Bentham went to Oxford, but it was in London that he gathered disciples round him and founded his school. The *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* was printed in 1780, but it was not published until 1789, four years after Paley's *Principles* had appeared, and only then through the insistence of Bentham's disciples, jealous of their master's fame.

Bentham made little mention of his indebtedness to his predecessors, but of Hume's *Treatise* and of the treatment of utility in it he said: 'For my own part, I well remember, no sooner had I read that part of the work which touches on this subject, than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes.'[3] Priestley also, according to his own account, influenced him. Apart from these acknowledgments, and those to French and Italian utilitarian writers, he states his ethical position as though it were original to himself. So far as his theory is concerned, the only originality lay in his treatment of the hedonistic calculus. At the same time utilitarianism will always be associated with the name of Bentham. There is no doubt that the hold it obtained on men's minds was largely due to his thorough application of the utility principle in the spheres of economics, jurisprudence, and politics, and to his gathering round him a devoted group of followers who applied, taught, and popularized his doctrines.

Bentham's ethical theory is found chiefly in three works—*A Fragment on Government* (1776); *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), where, however, the author's first concern is with jurisprudence rather than with ethics; and the *Deontology* published posthumously in 1834. J. S. Mill held that the *Deontology* had been considerably altered by John Bowring, who edited it. The crude egoism of Bentham's theory is more apparent in it than elsewhere, but there seems no reason to doubt that it substantially represents his views.

Bentham assumed dogmatically the hedonistic end, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' His 18th cent. individualism led him to picture society as composed of a number of separate and largely antagonistic units. As J. S. Mill put it in his 'Essay on Bentham,' written at a time when he was emerging from the influence of Bentham:

'Bentham's idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three sources—the law, religion and public opinion.'[4]

[1] *Principles*, II. viii. [2] *Ib.* II. vii.
[3] *A Fragment on Government*, I. xxxvi. footnote.
[4] Mill, 'Essay on Bentham,' in *Dissertations and Discussions*, i. 362.

Bentham's point of view with regard to sanctions was somewhat different from that of the theological utilitarians. They used sanctions to prove the ultimate harmony of the interests of each with the interests of all. For this reason they laid stress on the religious sanction. Bentham's attitude was that of a political reformer rather than a theorist. He strove for reform of the constitution and of law—for a system of penalties which would make it the interest of the individual to act for the general good. He did not attack the problem of cases where no system of legal rewards and punishments could bring about this coincidence.

The list and number of sanctions differed in the three ethical works, but in the *Principles* Bentham mentioned four. They are practically the sanctions of Gay—the physical sanction, or the material consequences of actions such as 'disease produced by dissipation'; the political sanction, or legal penalties and rewards; the moral sanction, or public praise and blame; the religious sanction, or the effect of religious hopes and fears. The last was of little importance: 'As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction, as regard a future life, of what kind these may be, we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation.'[1] Bentham's teaching on sanctions is summarized by himself in the following passage:

'It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made* to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be *done*, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be *made* to do it, but either pain or pleasure. . . . There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately, they may be termed the *physical*, the *political*, the *moral*, and the *religious*: and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed *sanctions*.' In a footnote he adds: 'Sanctio, in Latin, was used to signify the *act of binding*, and, by a common grammatical transition, *any thing which serves to bind a man*: to wit, to the observance of such or such a mode of conduct.'[2]

Bentham, driven by the determination to have some weapon with which to attack abuses consecrated by custom, elaborated the hedonistic calculus. The morality of an act, he said, was to be decided not by 'intuition,' but by a scientific calculation of the consequences of the act in terms of pleasure. In order that the calculation should be scientific certain things must be taken into account, viz. the intensity and duration of the pleasure, its certainty, its propinquity (Sidgwick points out that this has no *locus standi* unless it affects the certainty), its fecundity, or 'the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind,' and its purity, or 'the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind.' The extent of the pleasure, or the number of people affected, should also be taken into account and the whole so balanced that the total quantity of pleasure attendant on an act should be known.

Quite consistently Bentham disallowed any difference in quality in pleasure: Other things being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. 'Each to count for one and no one for more than one' was the principle according to which pleasure should be distributed.

ii. *The practical movement.*—Bentham used his greatest happiness principle for the reform of the constitution of law, especially criminal law. His political theory was in harmony with his psychology. Members of Parliament, he held, must be restrained, and constrained, to act for the general good; so he urged that government should be put into the hands of all, and advocated universal suffrage, voting by ballot, and annual parliaments.

[1] *Principles*, I. iii. § 10. [2] *Ib.* I. iii. §§ 1, 2.

In 1776 Bentham's first work, *A Fragment on Government*, was published anonymously. Towards the end of his life the *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform* appeared, and *The Constitutional Code* was published posthumously. Not only political theory but also jurisprudence received attention at his hands. 'He found the philosophy of law a chaos,' Mill said, 'and left it a science.'

Bentham attracted a band of disciples and founded a school. It is to the efforts of his disciples that we owe the publication of the bulk of his works, for Bentham seems to have been indifferent to the fate of his writings. Among all Bentham's followers James Mill had the greatest ability. He joined Bentham in 1802. From that time the philosophical radicals were a group of men with a definite ethical, political, and economic faith. J. S. Mill said of this creed:

'It was not mere Benthamism but rather a combination of Bentham's point of view with that of the modern political economy and with the Hartleian metaphysics. Malthus' population principle was quite as much a banner and point of union among us as any opinion specifically belonging to Bentham.'[1]

Bentham and James Mill were contemporary rather than successive leaders of the school, as Leslie Stephen makes them out to be. Mill lived only four years after Bentham's death. A prominent part was also played by George Grote, the two Austins, and, last of all, J. S. Mill. In 1824 the *Westminster Review*, the organ of the school, was first published, and did much to spread its creed. Psychology was supplied by James Mill in his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*. Mill adopted the association psychology of Hartley, but discarded his cumbersome physiological theory. His theories of the self, the external world, and belief — largely Hume's position—were also accepted by the school. In economics the views of Ricardo and Malthus were adopted. As they held the theory of the iron law of wages, the only method of amelioration lay, they thought, in restraining the increase of population. Their general policy was one of laissez-faire, and this attitude was a contributory cause to their disappearance from politics. They returned some members to the first reformed parliament, but they were afterwards swallowed up by the Whigs.

iii. *John Stuart Mill.*—J. S. Mill spoke of his father as 'the last of the 18th century.' He himself was a transition thinker, and many of his inconsistencies are explained by his endeavour to reconcile hedonism and idealism—to reconcile Bentham and Coleridge, styled by him 'the two great seminal minds of England in this age.'

J. S. Mill gradually moved away from the position of Bentham and his father. In 1826 came what he called 'a crisis in my mental history,' when he fell under the influence of German idealism.

'I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be obtained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end.'[2]

In 1835 Mill published in the *London Review* an answer to Adam Sedgwick's criticism of Paley. Under the influence very largely of Sedgwick and of W. Whewell the theological utilitarianism of Paley had lost its prestige in Cambridge. In his reply to Sedgwick Mill indicated what was his own theory of human nature—that man is originally altruistic. After his father's death he spoke out more plainly, and in 1838 there appeared in the *London and Westminster Review* his 'Essay on Bentham.' The substance of his criticism of Bentham is that his reading of human nature was too narrow. He 'failed in deriving light from other minds.' Nor were his nature and circumstances such as to furnish him with a 'correct and complete picture of man's nature and circumstances.'[1] The influence of the idealism of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, Sterling, and Maurice can be traced in the following paragraph:

'Man is never recognised by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness. Even in the more limited form of Conscience, this great fact in human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or in the next.'[2]

In his small work *Utilitarianism* Mill united the two ends of pleasure and spiritual perfection by his theory of qualitative differences in pleasure, and conscience reappeared there as the internal sanction to be added to Bentham's external sanctions. In an essay published in the *Westminster Review* in 1852, entitled 'Dr. Whewell on Moral Philosophy,' Mill, probably under the influence of Mrs. Taylor, whom he had just married, reverted to the narrower and more orthodox utilitarianism which he held in early life. This essay of Mill's, however, was only one move in the controversy between himself and the leaders of the school of 'Paley reversed.' That school, led by Sedgwick and Whewell, after superseding Paley in Cambridge, found itself confronted with a new Benthamism—a Benthamism which in the hands of Mill maintained its hold on men's minds by means of a wider interpretation of human nature.

Mill's defence of utilitarianism which appeared in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1861, and was published in book form in 1863, was largely directed against the Cambridge school.

'I must again repeat,' he said, '. . . that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.'[3]

As Sorley says, Mill claimed for utilitarianism that 'it is not selfish, because it regards the pleasures of all men as of equal moment; it is not sensual, because it recognizes the superior value of intellectual, artistic, and social pleasures as compared with those of the senses.'[4]

Mill separated himself most completely from his predecessors in teaching that pleasures differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively. 'It is quite compatible,' he said, 'with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others';[5] and again, in the oft-quoted words, 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied'[6]—in all of which he really surrenders the utilitarian position and strikes a responsive note in the hearts of those who feel the inadequacy of a hedonistic ethic. For hedonism Bentham's position is the only consistent one: Quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. If there are higher and lower pleasures—and common opinion would seem to agree with Mill here—some other standard than pleasure is set up. Pleasure is no longer the criterion. It would not, moreover, be correct to regard this as a passing phase in Mill's mental

[1] *Autobiography*, new ed., London, 1908, p. 60.
[2] *Ib.* p. 81.
[1] 'Essay on Bentham,' in *Dissertations and Discussions*, i. 350.
[2] *Ib.* p. 359.
[3] *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 24 f.
[4] W. R. Sorley, *A Hist. of English Philosophy*, p. 258.
[5] *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 11.
[6] *Ib.* p. 14.

development. In *Liberty* his mind was turning that way when he took for the motto of his third chapter von Humboldt's saying, 'the end of man is . . . the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.' His paragraph on qualitative differences in pleasure contrasts, however, with his statement a few pages earlier in the *Utilitarianism* as to the theory of life on which the utilitarian ethic was grounded—'namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things . . . are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.'[1]

Mill departed from Bentham also in his emphasis on the internal sanction of conscience, which he defined as 'a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.'[2] That the growth of conscience was largely dependent on right education—on the attaching of the appropriate sanctions to acts—that psychologically it was to be explained by association, Mill held with Bentham. But he also held that the core of conscience was the 'social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures. . . . The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body.'[3] Here he follows Hume and Hartley in attributing to man natural altruistic tendencies, in crediting him with 'sympathy,' as opposed to Bentham's theory of self-interest as the motive of action.

Mill's often criticized 'proof' of utilitarianism rested on the doctrine of psychological hedonism.

> 'The only proof capable of being given,' he said, 'that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. . . . In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. . . . No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.'[4]

The word 'desirable' may mean 'what can be desired' or 'what ought to be desired.' If we interpret it in the former sense, Mill meant that it was psychologically possible to will 'general happiness.' It is more probable that he meant 'ought to be desired.' Sidgwick says:

> 'Mill must be understood to mean in saying that "the general happiness is *desirable*" that it is what each individual *ought* to desire. . . . But this proposition is not established by Mill's reasoning, even if we grant that what is actually desired may be legitimately inferred to be in this sense desirable'—and this passing from the is to the ought is surely by no means an obvious step. He continues: 'For an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a different part of the general happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any individual; and Mill would certainly not contend that a desire which does not exist in any individual can possibly exist in an aggregate of individuals.'[5]

Thus Mill's attempt to prove that general happiness is the ethical end failed.

His account of sympathy also, though important, is not always consistent. From his statement of psychological hedonism it appeared that man was originally a wholly selfish being actuated by desire for his own personal interest. In that case sympathy would be originally selfish. Mill never admitted that. At times he laid the greatest stress on man's social disposition. But if man is social, he is sympathetic by nature.

[1] *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 10. [2] *Ib.* p. 41.
[3] *Ib.* p. 46. [4] *Ib.* p. 52 f.
[5] H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*[7], III. xiii. 388.

For fuller account of the Mills see art. MILL, JAMES AND JOHN STUART.

The most distinguished of Mill's younger associates was Alexander Bain of Aberdeen. Bain was a thoroughgoing utilitarian. His most important work, however, was done in psychology: *The Senses and the Intellect* was published in 1855 and *The Emotions and the Will* in 1859. For associationism he said the last word that can be said. The point of chief interest in his ethics is his treatment of disinterestedness. 'To obtain virtue in its highest purity, its noblest hue,' he said, 'we have to abstain from the mention of both punishment and reward.'[1] 'So far as I am able to judge of our disinterested impulses, they are wholly distinct from the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. They lead us, as I believe, to sacrifice pleasures, and incur pains, without any compensation.'[2] Sorley says of Bain: 'He had no illusions—except the great illusion that mind is a bundle of sensations tied together by laws of association.'[3] In the light of this metaphysical theory of the self—with slight variations the accepted theory of the utilitarians—it is easier to understand the utilitarian conception of an end which is a succession of pleasant feelings, 'a sum of pleasures,' and which left reason out of account.

4. Evolutional utilitarianism; Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen.—Spencer's ethical views are found chiefly in the first and last parts of the *Social Statics* and in *The Principles of Ethics*. The first part of the latter, *The Data of Ethics*, was published separately in 1879; the remainder of the *Principles* in 1892–93. The *Social Statics* was published in 1851, eight years before Darwin's *Origin of Species*. But even at that date the evolutionary hypothesis had taken hold of Spencer's mind—it was in the air. Then Darwin, by his investigations into the origin of species, by his researches into the variation of forms found in different natural surroundings, by his emphasis on the principle of natural selection as explaining these variations, gave a wide-spread currency to the evolutionary theory. Nor must the part which A. Russel Wallace played be forgotten. Darwin also saw, however, that natural selection alone would not explain evolved conduct, for the more evolved conduct is, the smaller a part does natural selection play, because civilized society protects the unfit and does not allow them to be exterminated. This difficulty was overcome by the—now largely discredited—hypothesis of the transmissibility of acquired characters. Evolution by natural selection—or, in his own phrase, 'survival of the fittest'—and by means of the transmission of acquired characters was for Spencer the explanatory and synthesizing principle of all knowledge.

Ethics, however, was Spencer's main interest. Everything else led up to this. For his ethics see art. SPENCER, HERBERT, 2 (5). Our concern here is with the relation of Spencer's ethical system to utilitarianism. We have to see why he himself called it 'rational utilitarianism' as opposed to the empirical utilitarianism of Mill, and why it is generally known as evolutional utilitarianism. Spencer's opposition was directed against the method of utilitarianism, not against its greatest happiness principle. He accepted pleasure as the good, though even here he was not consistent. 'Life is good or bad,' he said, 'according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling.' 'The good is universally the pleasurable.' Pleasure is the end and is 'as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary

[1] A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*[3], London, 1880, p. 297.
[2] *Ib.* p. 295. [3] *Hist. of English Philosophy*, p. 262.

form of intellectual intuition.' But Spencer was an evolutionist as well as a utilitarian, and at other times we find the good defined as 'preservation of human society' or 'quantity of life measured in breadth as well as length.' It is true that he stated that conduct tending to preservation of life was good because life involved a 'surplus of agreeable feeling.' 'The implication . . . is that conduct should conduce to preservation of the individual, of the family, and of the society, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery.'[1] This supposition is never proved. At times he emphasized progress and pictured an ideal society, rather than happiness, as the ethical end. At times the emphasis was on being, at other times on happiness or well-being.

It was the method, however, rather than the end of empirical utilitarianism that Spencer opposed. His object was to find 'for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large, a scientific basis.' He criticized specifically the hedonistic calculus of Bentham, and emphasized the value of general rules (as indeed had been done by most utilitarians with the exception of Bentham) rather than particular decisions in individual cases. He wrote to Mill:

'The view for which I contend is that morality properly so-called—the science of right conduct—has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.'[2]

To get the premisses whence deductions could be made Spencer turned his attention to 'absolute ethics' as opposed to 'relative ethics'—absolute ethics being the ethics of an ideal society where conduct was perfectly adapted and produced pleasure unalloyed with pain. Spencer did not seem to appreciate the fact that, if such a society existed, the question of morality would not arise, for by hypothesis all conduct was perfectly adapted to social environment—there was no conflict of desires. From study of this ideal society Spencer considered it possible to deduce general rules as to what 'conduct must be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial.' He had then to consider further how these general rules were applicable to existing society. By this method relative ethics would be derived from absolute ethics. The extraordinary artificiality of this is apparent. Spencer himself admitted that the method had not turned out to be so fruitful as he expected. The four principles which he found for the guidance of conduct cannot be said to be derived from absolute ethics. They were justice, negative beneficence, positive beneficence, and enlightened self-interest. Justice was non-interference.

'Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.'[3] This principle owed its origin to Spencer's pronounced individualism rather than to any study of absolute ethics. Negative beneficence required that each man must perfectly fulfil his own nature 'without giving unhappiness to other men in any direct or indirect way.'[4] Besides positive beneficence there was enlightened self-interest which demanded that, 'whilst duly regardful of the preceding limitations, each individual shall perform all those acts required to fill up the measure of his own private happiness.'[5]

Spencer's system is not held, at least in Spencer's form, by any thinker of the present day.

In 1882 **Leslie Stephen** published *The Science of Ethics*. In the preface he associated himself with the utilitarians in the words 'writers belonging to what I may call my own school, to Hume, Bentham, the Mills, G. H. Lewes, and Mr. Herbert Spencer.'[1] He did not follow Spencer in defining the good as length and breadth of life; he defined it as the 'health of the social organism.' 'Society may be regarded as an organism,' he said. This organism implied 'a social tissue, modified in various ways so as to form the organs adapted to various specific purposes.' The working of evolution could be seen in the social organism.

Leslie Stephen was opposed, like Spencer, to the hedonistic calculus. 'Life is not a series of detached acts,' he said, 'in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different causes.' Like Spencer he held that the evolved state was necessarily a happy one. The radical criticism of Stephen's theory, as of all evolutionary theories of ethics, is that he took what is, namely the trend of evolution, and identified it with the ideal, with what ought to be.

5. Rational utilitarianism; Henry Sidgwick.—E. Albee in his *History of English Utilitarianism*, published in 1902, spoke of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* as 'the last authoritative utterance of traditional utilitarianism.' Though a utilitarian, Sidgwick differed in some ways from all his predecessors. He was 'a Utilitarian,' but 'on an Intuitional basis.'[2] He found in certain fundamental 'intuitions' the basis of his system, whereas the earlier utilitarians were opposed to all forms of intuitionism, though in J. S. Mill a new spirit of understanding and appreciation of the rival school had begun to show itself. Sidgwick, further, though an ethical hedonist, discarded psychological hedonism, which had formed part of the stock-in-trade of preceding utilitarian writers, including J. S. Mill.

Sidgwick's analysis of the nature of desire was very similar to Butler's. 'Our conscious active impulses,' he said, 'are so far from being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for ourselves, that we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulses, directed towards something that is not pleasure, nor relief from pain.'[3] He naturally discarded also the utilitarian theory that extra-regarding impulses were not primary but were due to 'association' and 'translation.'

'So far as we can observe the consciousness of children, the two elements, extra-regarding impulse and desire for pleasure, seem to coexist in the same manner as they do in mature life. In so far as there is any difference, it seems to be in the opposite direction; as the actions of children, being more instinctive and less reflective, are more prompted by extra-regarding impulse, and less by conscious aim at pleasure.'[4]

By ridding utilitarianism of psychological hedonism Sidgwick did good service. And he cleared the ground of the psychological difficulty as to how the individual can will the pleasure of others when it conflicts with his own pleasure. Only the form of the difficulty, however, was changed, not the reality; for, though Sidgwick saw the possibility, he found himself, at the end of his analysis, unable to see the reasonableness of gratifying a desire for the happiness of others when opposed to individual interest. The problem took the following shape for him. A fundamental moral intuition (at one time called a deduction from two intuitions and expressed differently at different times) directed a man to prefer his own lesser good to the greater good of another. This was the formal principle of benevolence (formal because the nature of the good was not yet known) which provided the 'proof' of utilitarianism. Sidgwick's further 'proof' that the nature of the good was pleasure

1 *Principles*, ch. iii. § 9*f*.
2 *Social Statics*, i. vi. § 1.
3 *Autobiography*, ii. 88.
4 *Ib.* i. iii. § 2.
5 *Ib.* i. iii. § 2.

1 Preface, p. vii.
2 Preface to the 6th and subsequent editions of *The Methods of Ethics*.
3 *The Methods of Ethics*7, i. iv. 52.
4 *Ib.* i. iv. 53.

amounted to little more than the acceptance of what purported to be the verdict of common sense. He arrived too rapidly at the conclusion that the good was desirable sentient life, and from that it was no great step to define it as pleasure.

Sidgwick found a second principle—the maxim of prudence, that 'one ought to aim at one's own good on the whole'—to be as fundamental as that of benevolence. This maxim, when one's own good or pleasure is emphasized rather than good 'on the whole,' brought confusion into Sidgwick's theory. He admitted that there were times when a choice had to be made between individual and general pleasure and when all mundane sanctions failed to reconcile them. To rationalize his system a harmony between universal and particular reason had to be shown. This harmony depended on the existence of a supernatural Being. Unable to accept the Christian faith and gaining no positive assurance from psychical research of an all-good and all-powerful Being, Sidgwick left his system with the dualism in it unresolved. For a further account of Sidgwick's ethics see art. SIDGWICK (HENRY).

6. Present-day utilitarianism.—Little has to be said about utilitarianism after the time of Henry Sidgwick. To-day it is not a theory of paramount importance in ethics.[1] As J. S. Mackenzie says, it is still the dominant view among writers on economics, but it has ceased to have much hold on English ethical thought.[1] Two schools can be distinguished. One contains Sidgwick's disciples. E. E. Constance Jones, who may be taken as representative of this school, has under the title *Rational Hedonism* re-stated Sidgwick's position and met objections to it.[2] Another school, that of the rationalist utilitarians, has found a spokesman in J. M. Robertson. In his *Short History of Morals* Robertson calls Sidgwick's ethical logic inconclusive, 'leaving as it did that earnest thinker conscious of a need for a future state.'[3] There is, however, an unresolved antagonism in Robertson's own theory. For, while accepting the greatest happiness principle as the ethical end, he says, 'there can be no stronger "obligation" than that of following your own happiness as you see it.' The two ends, he thinks, would often be in harmony owing to the individual's natural altruistic tendencies, or to pressure exerted by society or the working of conscience. A man 'cannot, unless he is abnormally selfish, escape discomfort in knowing that he has practised injustice or failed in reciprocity.'[4] But what of the 'abnormally selfish' man? In Robertson's theory, no blame, in the ethical sense, attaches to him for his failure to act for the common good. He is what he is through no fault of his own. The criminal is the result of 'pathological conditions,' or a 'product of maleducation or stress of circumstances.' Free will is demolished and with it moral responsibility. 'For the critical utilitarian . . . the bad character remains bad, baseness remains baseness, the liar a liar, the thief a thief; and his task is simply to try to guard himself and society against each form of evil in the best way, as society guards against the madman, in whose case even the free-willer recognizes the physical causation.'[5] And what of the man, not necessarily abnormally selfish, who in spite of the discomfort of conscience, acts contrary to the interests of others, doing what appears to himself to be for his own pleasure? He is, on Robertson's principles, doing that which is his own strongest 'obligation'; nor does any blame attach to his action, for by hypothesis he cannot act otherwise than he does—which does not seem to leave much room for either ethical theory or moral conduct.

1 *Introduction to Social Philosophy*[2], Glasgow, 1895, p. 433.
2 E. E. Constance Jones, art. SIDGWICK (HENRY), vol. xi. p. 500, and artt. in *IJE* vi., and elsewhere.
3 J. M. Robertson, *A Short Hist. of Morals*, London, 1920, p. 447.
4 *Ib.* p. 362. 5 *Ib.* p. 449.

III. *CRITICAL.*—**1. The utilitarian theory of duty.**—Utilitarianism failed signally in dealing with duty. It tended to 'identify duty with coercion; to change the "ought" if not into a physical "must," at least into the psychological "must" of fear of pain and hope of pleasure.'[1] This was the natural outcome of the psychological hedonism on which the ethical theory was based. Bentham said of pleasure and pain that it was for them alone not only 'to point out what we ought to do' but 'to determine what we shall do.'[2] On this basis he was consistent in adding in the *Deontology* that it was 'very idle to talk about duties,' and that 'ought is a word that ought to be banished from our vocabulary.'

According to psychological hedonism, all desire was desire for pleasure, and the strongest desire excited by the keenest pleasure moved to action. Bain said:

'Wherever two present sensations dictate opposite courses, there is an experiment upon the relative strength of the two. The resulting volition discloses the stronger, and is the ultimate canon of appeal.'[3]

On such a foundation as this no place is left for the concept of moral obligation.

But the consciousness of duty could not be ignored—the consciousness of something higher than and conflicting with inclination, in the light of which inclination 'ought' to be suppressed. Utilitarians accordingly dealt with the duty consciousness empirically by explaining its genesis and function. It owed its origin, they said, to sanctions external or internal; pleasures and pains so attached to acts that the individual forbore to follow his first inclination and to act for his own selfish interest, and acted for the interests of all. Now there is no doubt that an individual is brought to a consciousness of moral obligation and to a knowledge of particular duties through social influences. It is not here, but in its account of the ultimate nature of moral obligation, that the utilitarian explanation is inadequate.

Later utilitarianism, as represented by Sidgwick and his school, was not hampered by psychological hedonism. Sidgwick said:

'It seems then that the notion of "ought" or "moral obligation" . . . does not merely import (1) that there exists in the mind of the person judging a specific emotion . . . nor (2) that certain rules of conduct are supported by penalties which will follow on their violation. . . . What then, it may be asked, does it import? What definition can we give of "ought," "right," and other terms expressing the same fundamental notion? To this I should answer that the notion which these terms have in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition.'[4]

Sidgwick thus refused to resolve the 'ought' into anything else. As we have seen in the account of the views of J. M. Robertson, rationalist utilitarianism has no place in its system for moral obligation. The 'ought,' as understood by the ordinary moral consciousness, is excluded from any determinist system. For this reason, it is not certain that on a thoroughgoing analysis of the system of Sidgwick and his school any logical place would be found for the concept of moral obligation.

2. Motive and intention.—The controversy as to whether the proper object of moral praise and blame is 'motive' ('spring of action') or 'intention' (the 'object of desire') is a historic one. 'An action done from duty,' Kant said, 'derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be obtained by it, but from the maxim by which it

1 J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, London, 1909, p. 355.
2 Bentham, *Principles*, I. i.
3 *The Emotions and the Will*[3], London, 1880, p. 401.
4 *The Methods of Ethics*[7], I. iii. 31 f.

is determined.'[1] In opposition to this we have the utilitarian position. 'There is no such thing,' Bentham said, 'as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.'[2] And J. S. Mill: 'The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention.'[3] 'Intention' Mill defined as 'what the agent wills to do,' as opposed to motive, 'the feeling which makes him will so to do.' It is important to note that Bentham and the Mills were entirely consistent in holding that moral quality did not lie in motive. On their own theory, that pleasure was the only motive, they could have come to no other conclusion.

'Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good.'[4]

The sharp line drawn by utilitarianism between motive and intention has had a considerable influence. It has tended to induce other moral theories which rested on a truer psychological basis to make a separation between motive and intention, attributing moral quality to one only. Secondly, it has tended to make morality external. With regard to the first point the truer attitude seems to be to regard motive and intention as distinguishable but not separable—as the affective and ideational sides of the same thing—and to hold that moral judgment belongs to the two taken together, to the whole moral act. Dewey's definition of motive and intention puts this well: 'Intention is the outcome foreseen and wanted; motive, this outcome *as* foreseen and wanted.'[5]

With regard to the second point, utilitarianism, finding moral quality to reside in consequences, though in 'attempted' consequences, made morality an external thing. According to Mill:

'The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent *wills to do*. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual *disposition*—a bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.'[6]

The last part of this paragraph seems to point to character as the final object of moral judgment, and to make it a good in itself. This, however, is illusory. At the end of ch. iv. Mill states the position clearly in the following words:

'This state of the will [will to do right] is a means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.'[7]

3. The hedonistic calculus.—J. M. Robertson says that the great task which faces moralists to-day is a system of 'applied ethics.'[8] Utilitarianism professes to supply a scientific calculus—the hedonistic calculus of Bentham—which renders this system of applied ethics possible.

Bentham summed up his schema of mensuration in the lines:

'*Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful*, pure—
Such marks in *pleasures* and in *pains* endure.
Such pleasures seek, if *private* be thy end:
If it be *public*, wide let them *extend*.
Such *pains* avoid, whichever be thy view:
If pains *must* come, let them *extend* to few.'[1]

While still adopting Bentham's calculus, most of his successors plead not for a fresh inquiry into every act but for rules founded on well-considered utility.

Is the utilitarian calculus *theoretically* possible? Some moralists, including J. S. Mackenzie, have denied that it is. The calculus implies that a quantitative judgment is applicable to pleasures, that a certain intensity can be balanced by a certain duration of pleasure. The difficulty about the calculus, however, is not theoretical but practical. There is no known unit of mensuration. Further, pleasure-pain values vary according to persons, times, and circumstances. Albee says that the one really fatal objection to the calculus in his opinion is that urged by Spencer in the *Social Statics* that 'there would necessarily be an important shifting of the scale of hedonic values with every stage of intellectual or moral progress (or decadence), whether on the part of the individual, the community, the nation, or the race.'[2] This practical difficulty, the lack of scientific precision, is intensified when we remember that the pleasure-pain consequences have to be estimated for all 'whose interests appear to be concerned.'[3] Who are these? Our own family? Our fellow-countrymen? The present generation? Or must we act so as to promote the welfare of future generations? J. S. Mill did not limit happiness to mankind. The good act is one by which happiness is 'to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.'[4] This widening of the scope of the calculus is in keeping with the modern conception of organic life as a whole. In practice, however, utilitarians have narrowed the scope of the calculus, which seems to point to its failure as a scientific rule.

4. Pleasure the ethical end.—Against those utilitarians who said that pleasure was the only thing which could be desired some critics of utilitarianism have held that pleasure cannot be the object of desire at all, and that, if not an object of desire, it cannot be the ethical end. It seems, however, truer to hold that pleasure may be desired, and further that pleasurable things may be, and often are, desired because they are pleasant. Nor should we, with Green, deny the possibility of a 'sum of pleasures' as the ethical end, for by this is meant no more than pleasure lasting as long as possible and as intense as possible.

The first criticism of pleasure as the ethical end that must be made is that it lacks the *quality of virtue* which the moral consciousness demands in the good and affords no explanation of the essence of the particular virtues. Huxley's statement, 'If it can be shown by observation or experiment that theft, murder, and adultery do not tend to diminish the happiness of society, then, in the absence of any but natural knowledge, they are not social immoralities,'[5] has simply to be denied.

J. S. Mill's admission of a qualitative difference in pleasures is really an admission that for moral conduct one must transcend pleasure as either the supreme standard or the supreme good. Further, as Green said, there must be permanence in the ethical end. Pleasure does not fulfil this requisite. 'And after all it does seem a pretty definite and

1 *Theory of Ethics*[6], tr. T. K. Abbott, London, 1909, p. 16.
2 *Principles*, ch. x. § 2.
3 *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 27, footnote.
4 Bentham, *Principles*, ch. x. § 2. x. footnote.
5 J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 250.
6 *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 27, footnote.
7 *Ib.* p. 61. The controversy between the utilitarian and the intuitionist is perhaps the most far-reaching of ethical discussions, and Spencer's reconciliation is a false one, while Sidgwick's position is really a confession that both are true but irreconcilable—a dualism. James Martineau is the greatest modern exponent of intuitionalism, as against either utilitarianism or evolutionism, and there can be little doubt that in general men of high moral sense feel that 'because right is right to follow right were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.' As Mill agreed, it makes a great difference in our estimation of the person what motive he acts from, and our estimation of the person is the main factor in the case.
8 *Short Hist. of Morals*, p. 429.

1 Bentham, *Principles*, IV. § 2, footnote.
2 E. Albee, *A Hist. of English Utilitarianism*, London, 1902, p. 387 f.
3 Bentham, *Principles*, ch. iv. § 5.
4 *Utilitarianism*[13], p. 17.
5 *Nineteenth Century*, i. [May, 1877] 537.

important point to take, that transient pleasures have in them no element of progress, contribute nothing to the permanent interests which unify (or, in fact, constitute) a life.'[1] And it is too *simple*. Utilitarianism attracts by its simplicity, but it is simple because it fails to do justice to all the facts of life. Man's nature cannot be explained in terms of feeling only.

Again, pleasure lacks *motive efficiency*. Utilitarianism has dispensed with the categorical imperative, and in itself it has no driving power.

Is there no truth, then, in the theory that the good is pleasure? There is the truth that the good must be pleasant, otherwise it cannot be an object of desire. The nature of the good is not pleasure, and yet pleasure is a result and accompaniment of the good. 'Man's chief end is to glorify God,' but those who glorify God will experience pleasure in the highest degree. They 'enjoy Him for ever.' And the glorifying of God involves the promotion of the well-being of humanity, which is not inconsistent with the promotion of pleasure. Kant based his argument for immortality on the fact that reason demands the harmony of pleasure and virtue, and since they do not always or ever perfectly unite here they must on the ground of rational congruity be at one somewhere.

Utilitarianism as an ethical theory is weak, but as a principle of political action it is not without its working value.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the books referred to in the article, mention may be made of the following: W. L. Courtney, *Constructive Ethics*, new ed., London, 1895; C. Douglas, *John Stuart Mill*, Edinburgh, 1895, *The Ethics of John Stuart Mill*, do. 1897; T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*[5], Oxford, 1906; C. B. Roylance Kent, *The English Radicals*, London, 1899; J. MacCunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*[2], do. 1910; H. R. Marshall, *Mind and Conduct*, New York, 1919; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], Oxford, 1886; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals*, Edinburgh and London, 1907; G. de Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, London, 1921, pp. 242–246; J. Seth, *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, London and New York, 1912; W. R. Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*[2], London, 1904; Leslie Stephen *The English Utilitarians*, do. 1900.

A. W. HASTINGS.

UTRAQUIST.—See HUSSITES.

V

VADAGALAIS. — See PRAPATTI-MARGA, SECTS (Hindu), § 4.

VAIRĀGĪ.—See BAIRĀGĪ.

VAIŚĀLI.—The ancient city of Vaiśālī (Viśālā of *Rāmāyaṇa*;[2] Pali Visālī; Chinese Fei-shê-li) was equally sacred to the Jains and the Buddhists long ago. It is now represented unquestionably by the village named Basār or Basārh (not Besarh or Bēsārh, as in nearly all books), situated in the Hājīpur subdivision of the Muzaffarpur District of the Bihār and Orissa Province, in 25° 59′ N. and 85° 8′ E. The site of the city occupies a space about ten miles in circuit, which includes several villages besides Basārh and many ruined mounds. The most interesting group of remains, situated near the village of Bakhirā at the north-west corner of the site, probably stands outside the line of the city walls, which, so far as is known, appear to have been built of mud, not masonry. The largest and most prominent mound, evidently the site of the fortified palace or headquarters of the local ruler, stands in the south-east corner of the city area and is called Bisālgarh, 'the fort of Rājā Bisāl,' the eponymous hero of the place. The village of Basārh is on the south and south-west of that mound. The identity of Vaiśāli with the group of remains associated with the village of Basārh is conclusively proved by the survival of the ancient name with only slight modifications; by geographical bearings taken from Patna and other places; by topographical details as compared with the description recorded by Hiuen-Tsiang (Yuan-Chwang), the Chinese pilgrim in the 7th cent.; and by the finding on the spot of sealings of letters inscribed with the name Vesāli. The documents, which were addressed to officials and other residents, have totally disappeared. The sealings found number about 1000, of which two or three bear the name of the town. The collection ranges in date from about 200 B.C. to A.D. 500, and is of much interest for many reasons, but need not be further described here, as it gives no information concerning the history of religion.

Although the site of Vaiśāli has been visited and described by three professional archæologists, Cunningham, Bloch, and Spooner, their explorations, owing to limitations of opportunity, have been extremely slight and superficial, so that in reality very little is known concerning the local remains of antiquity. The area of the city seems to offer tempting possibilities for future inquirers. No distinct local tradition of the ancient glories of the city has survived. The identity of the site has been completely forgotten by the people, and is known only to a few students of Indian antiquities. No pilgrims visit the ruins, and no considerable modern temple or shrine exists among them. Yet few places in India have stronger claims upon the veneration of both Jains and Buddhists. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, commonly spoken of as the founder of the Jain Church, belonged to a noble family of Vaiśāli, where he was born and spent all his earlier life. After he had entered upon the ascetic career, he is said to have resided in his native town or the immediate neighbourhood for twelve rainy seasons, during which travelling was unlawful for persons of his profession. The Jain scriptures often mention Vaiśāli.[1] The archæologists have not sought for Jain remains on the site, and nothing in their reports would lead the reader to suppose that the Basārh area was the birthplace of Jainism, as it is known to moderns.

Brāhmanical tradition ignores Vaiśāli almost completely, and no remarkable event in the history of orthodox Hinduism seems to be connected with the locality, although in the 7th cent. the territory of which Vaiśāli was the capital contained several scores of Hindu temples, besides hundreds of Buddhist monasteries, mostly dilapidated and deserted. The Jain establishments at that time were still numerous, and remains of them must survive. Nobody has thought of even looking for them. Such attention as the site has received has been bestowed almost exclusively on efforts to trace Buddhist holy places described by Hiuen-

[1] H. Barker, in *Mind*, 1904, p. 418.

[2] I. i. 47, st. 13 in Schlegel's text.

[1] The best account of the life of Mahāvīra is that in ch. iii. of Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson's *The Heart of Jainism*, which gives a summary of the conflicting legends of the various sects. See also H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, pt. i. (*SBE* xxii.), and art. AJĪVIKAS.

Tsiang. The discovery of the sealings mentioned above was accidental in the first instance. The earlier Chinese pilgrim, Fa-Hian, who visited Vaiśāli at the beginning of the 5th cent., mentions only a few of the most notable sacred buildings which were then standing. His account implies that in his time the city was inhabited and that the holy places were maintained. The sealings establish beyond doubt the fact that during the reign of Chandragupta II. (*c.* A.D. 375–413), at the time when Fa-Hian was travelling, Vaiśāli was an important place, governed by a prince of the imperial Gupta family. It was in the province of Tīra or Tirabhukti, the modern Tirhut. The decay of the city and the gradual desertion of the Buddhist institutions took place in the interval between A.D. 405 and 637, the approximate respective dates of the visits of Fa-Hian and Hiuen-Tsiang. The ruin of the city may be ascribed to the decline of the Gupta power and the troubles connected with the Hun invasions of the 5th and 6th centuries. Nothing is known concerning the local history between the days of Buddha, about 500 B.C., and the visit of Fa-Hian nine centuries later.

In the time of Buddha Vaiśāli was the capital of the Lichchhavis, a tribe, people, or nation who were regarded as a section of the Vṛji (Pali Vajji) nation. But Hiuen-Tsiang distinguishes the Vaiśāli territory from the Vṛji country to the north-east, roughly equivalent to the modern Darbhangā District. The origin and affinities of the Lichchhavis, who certainly were foreigners, afford much room for speculation. Spooner seems to suggest that they were domiciled Persians. The writer of this article believes that they were of Mongolian race, akin to the Tibetans and other Himalayan peoples. They had many peculiar customs, quite different from those of ordinary Hindus. Manu[1] treats them as Vrātya Kṣatriyas, who did not observe fully Hindu *dharma*. They lived under the government of an aristocratic oligarchy or senate, of which the president was called king. The legendary splendours of their capital are often mentioned in Buddhist books. The *Dulva*, or Tibetan *Vinaya*, thus describes them:

'There were three districts in Vaiśāli. In the first district were 7000 houses with golden towers; in the middle district were 14,000 houses with silver towers; and in the last district were 21,000 houses with copper towers: in these lived the upper, the middle, and the lower classes, according to their positions.'

The city was imagined as a kind of earthly paradise, beautified by splendid buildings and charming parks, in which countless birds made melody. The Lichchhavis were believed to have lived in a round of continuous festivities. The chiefs waged war with both Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru, the kings of Magadha with whom Buddha had dealings. The city, according to an early tradition in the *Dulva*, was reckoned among the six great cities, the other five being Śrāvastī, Saketa, Champā, Varānasi (Benares), and Rājagṛha.

The political pre-eminence of Vaiśāli at an extremely ancient period is indicated by the strange story in the *Bhadda-Sāla Jātaka*.[2]

We are told that the wife of Bandhula, commander-in-chief of the Śrāvastī kingdom, felt a longing incident to the condition of pregnancy, and insisted on her lord taking her to Vaiśāli, because, she said, 'I desire to go and bathe and drink the water of the tank in Vesāli City where the families of the kings get water for the ceremonial sprinkling.' Although it is impossible to explain the allusion fully, it is clear that the water from a particular tank at Vaiśāli was essential for the lawful consecration of 'the kings,' whoever they may have been. The Lichchhavis resisted Bandhula and were all killed.

Vaiśāli stood on the ancient royal road leading from Pāṭaliputra (Patna) to Nepāl, the line of which is marked by four Aśoka pillars and other notable ancient remains. The city thus was in direct communication with the imperial capital and with many places of high importance in the olden time. The distance from Patna is about 27 miles in a direction a little west of north. The Lichchhavis and their city disappear from view for about eight centuries from 500 B.C. to A.D. 300, when they reappear as the source from which Chandragupta I. (*q.v.*), the founder of the imperial Gupta dynasty, derived his power. That chief married a Lichchhavi princess, and his powerful son, Samudragupta (*c.* A.D. 330–375), habitually described himself as the 'son of the daughter of the Lichchhavi.' Probably the Lichchhavis of Vaiśāli had been subject to the suzerainty of the Kushans, had become independent when the Indo-Scythian dynasty waned, and then had made themselves masters of Pāṭaliputra. Their own city certainly held an honourable position in the reign of Samudragupta's successor, Chandragupta II. (*q.v.*). At a later date we hear of a Lichchhavi dynasty of Nepāl. The city then vanishes again from history. When Hiuen-Tsiang visited it about A.D. 637, it was almost deserted, and he had to lodge in a small monastery occupied by a few monks of the Lesser Vehicle. They showed him all the sites of the Buddhist holy places according to the notions they had adopted 1100 years after the events of Buddha's lifetime. Among the showplaces was the site of the meeting of the Second Council.[1]

The group of remains near Bakhirā at the north-west corner of the city alone can be identified satisfactorily with objects described by Hiuen-Tsiang. It is impossible to doubt that the Aśoka lion-pillar still standing is that seen by him, or that the tank beside it is his 'monkey-tank.' If the locality should ever be explored properly at any future time, as the site of Taxila is being examined by Sir John Marshall, many interesting discoveries may be anticipated, and further identifications of monuments may be possible.

[1] *Laws*, x. 22. [2] No. 465 of Cambridge tr., vol. iv. p. 94.

LITERATURE.—Vaiśāli is mentioned eight times in the Pali *Jātakas* (see Eng. tr. ed. E. B. Cowell, Cambridge, 1895–1913, Index vol., *s.v.*). Other Buddhist literature frequently refers to the town in connexion with the Second Council (see art. COUNCILS [Buddhist]), the residence of Buddha (*q.v.*), and the distribution of his relics (see art. RELICS [Eastern]). The accounts of the Chinese pilgrims Fa-Hian (ch. xxv.), and Hiuen-Tsiang (Yuan-Chwang) may be read in any of the trr. with variations. The statements of the Tibetan *Dulva* are tr. by W. W. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884. The copious Jain literature about Mahāvīra is cited by A. F. R. Hoernle, annual address in *Proceedings ASB*, 1898, and H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, pts. i. and ii. (*SBE* xxii. [1884], xlv. [1895]). See also A. A. Guérinot, *Essai de bibliographie Jaina*, Paris, 1906, and 'Notes de Bibliographie Jaina,' in *JA*, 1909, pp. 47–148. Ch. iii. ('The Life of Mahāvīra') in Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, London, 1915, supplies particulars not available elsewhere.

The geographical position, topography, and ancient remains of the site are discussed in *IGI* vii. [1908] *s.v.* 'Basārh'; A. Cunningham, *Archæol. Survey of India Rep.*, i. [Simla, 1871], xvi. [Calcutta, 1883]; T. Bloch, *Ann. Rep. Archæol. Survey of India for 1903–04*, Calcutta, 1906, pp. 73–122, with survey map; D. B. Spooner, *ib. for 1913–14*, do. 1917, pp. 93–185; V. A. Smith, 'Vaiśāli,' *JRAS*, 1902, pp. 267–288; and F. E. Pargiter, *JASB*, vol. lxvi. pt. i. [1897], p. 89.

For the Lichchhavis (*al.* Nichchhavi, Litsabi) see V. A. Smith, 'Tibetan Affinities of the Lichchhavis,' *IA* xxxii. [1903] 233–236; and S. C. Vidyabhusana, 'The Licchavi Race of Ancient India,' *JASB* lxxx. [1902], no. 2; but the subject needs further investigation.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

VAIŚEṢIKA.—The name of one of the six philosophical systems of the Brāhmans. Just as we are able to establish a close relationship between the two oldest systems, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, and between the third and fourth, the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, a third pair is formed by the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in connexion with the Nyāya, the latest of the systems. Both the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya teach the origin of the universe from atoms (*aṇu*, *paramāṇu*, *kaṇa*), and

[1] See art. COUNCILS (Buddhist).

therefore introduce an entirely new element into the world of Brāhman thought. Further, both systems have in common the precise definition and arrangement of logical ideas upon which their influence and fame depend. These common characteristics have led to a complete fusion of the two systems in the later philosophical literature of India, and to a failure to distinguish Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya doctrines on the part of earlier European students of Indian thought. Now, however, for a long time access to the original sources has enabled us to determine the originally distinctive character of the two systems. The Nyāya used to be regarded erroneously as the earlier, and it is only recently that the priority of the Vaiśeṣika has been recognized.

Its founder bears the name of Kaṇāda, Kaṇabhakṣa, or Kaṇabhuj. All three names have the same meaning, viz. 'devourer of atoms'; whence it follows that these titles must have been originally terms of mockery bestowed on account of the atomistic character of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Such harmless nicknames, which in course of time have become real names, are often met with in the Indian world of letters.

Kaṇāda is supposed to have composed his textbook, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, between 200 and 400 A.D. In it he proposes to teach the true discernment of all that may be known, and for that purpose assumes six categories, which in his judgment comprehend all existing things. In discussing these categories and their subdivisions, he treats of the most diverse problems, especially in cosmology and psychology, so that a complete system of philosophy is built up upon his doctrine of the categories. The following are the categories: 1. substance (*dravya*); 2. quality (*guṇa*); 3. movement or action (*karman*); 4. association (*sāmānya*); 5. difference (*viśeṣa*); 6. inherence (*samavāya*).

To the category of substance are assigned: earth (*i.e.* all organic bodies and all inorganic substances with the exception of the remaining four elements), water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and the organ of thought (*manas*). To begin with, it appears to us strange that time and space are included among substances. Kaṇāda's conception of substance, however, is wider than ours; he intends by it that which has qualities and movement, and is the immediate basis of phenomena. The difficult question as to the nature of time and space, to which Kant was the first to give a final answer, is discussed, strangely enough, only incidentally and occasionally, in the whole of Indian philosophy. In this respect the Sāṅkhya philosophy has made a distinct advance, in that it regards time and space as two qualities of the eternal matter regarded as a unity.

The exposition of the category of substance affords Kaṇāda the opportunity of setting forth his atomic doctrine, which is derived from Buddhist sources. This has been shown by W. Handt in his treatise on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[1] According to the doctrine of Kaṇāda, the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are eternal and uncreated. Although they themselves have no extension, their heterogeneous nature is the cause of the extension and visibility of the combinations of atoms. How this is to be understood, and where the visibility of these combinations begins, on these points Kaṇāda himself—to judge from the silence of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*—does not seem to have propounded any definite views. Later teachers of the school set forth the theory that an aggregate of three atoms (*try-aṇuka*)—others say, of three double atoms (*dvy-aṇuka*)—possesses extension, and that it is visible in the shape of the dust mote (*trasareṇu*) dancing in the sun light.

The whole of this doctrine is vigorously combated in the philosophical works of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, and indeed for reasons obvious on both sides. The adherents of these two systems assert that, if the individual atoms do not possess extension, the aggregate cannot be extended; for every quality of a product is determined by the similar quality of its material cause.

The cosmogony of the Vaiśeṣika system depends upon its theory of the atoms. It is also dominated by the wide-spread Indian conception, that periods of creation and destruction of the universe follow one another in regular order; and on each occasion the evolution and decay of the universe are effected in the same way and by the same causes. The following explanations are in conformity with the exposition of W. Handt,[1] only that they do not begin, as he does, with the dissolution of the universe, but with its development.

During the period of dissolution, by which, however, the three infinitely great and therefore eternal and unchanging substances, ether, space, and time, are unaffected, no combination of the four elements of gross matter takes place, nor any union between the numberless individual souls and the atoms. But the souls retain their merit and demerit in a latent condition in the shape of dispositions. When the retributive force of merit and demerit with all its inevitable consequences, which here also, just as in the other systems of Indian philosophy, is the power that urges the universe on its course, is again aroused, the period of dissolution comes at once to an end. The souls therefore unite afresh with the atoms; and by this means a movement is started in the atomic elements which marks the beginning of a new creation of the material universe. This movement first originates in the atoms of the air, giving rise to double atoms, and through them to the gross material air which rushes forth and fills space. Thereupon within the elements of air the atoms of water combine together, whence in the same way the great ocean of the universe is produced. Within this ocean again the earth atoms come together, and form after the rise of double and triple atoms the solid mass of the firm earth. Finally, the element of fire comes into being, its atoms also combining in the same way within the water. Its origin is effected within the water, which in a certain sense represents the guard that restrains the destructive force of the fiery element, in order that its destroying power may be prevented from interfering with the organic course of the evolution of the universe. After the material universe has thus come into being, empirical existence begins afresh for the souls. These unite with bodies in accordance with the consequences of their work, still unexhausted from the preceding world-cycle; and in a new series of existences heap up for themselves merit and guilt, and earn reward and punishment until the cycle comes to an end. In the Sāṅkhya philosophy no cause is assigned compelling the dissolution of the universe; but in the Vaiśeṣika the process of its dissolution is accounted for in a very remarkable way. By their continual wandering through numberless bodies the souls are so weakened and exhausted that they need a long period to recruit. Just as living creatures upon earth after the sufferings and toils of the day sink at night to sleep, and remain for a time unconscious and without experience of pleasure or pain, so a universal night spreads over the universe, wherein the individual souls may recover from the sufferings of the *saṃsāra*. It is evident that so remarkable an explanation was not possible in a system which,

[1] *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeshika-Philosophie nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Rostock, 1900.

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 56–58.

like the Sāṅkhya, maintained that souls were destitute of qualities. Only a soul that actually experiences, wills, and knows could be thought of as in a condition of exhaustion. That, in fact, the Vaiśeṣika philosophy does conceive of souls as endowed with qualities of their own will be understood from a consideration of the second category.

The process of the dissolution of the universe goes on, then, in the following manner. The affections disappear which are evoked by the action of merit and demerit in the individual souls, and which form the bond between body, the senses, and the external world. The motive force therefore is restrained which maintains the cycle of existence. The bond is consequently broken which exists by the power of merit and demerit between the material atoms and individual souls. The four atomic elements are now dissolved in regular succession, the earth in water, the water in fire, the fire in air. The process of the dissolution of the atomic elements is effected in the reverse order to that of the formation of the material products from the atoms, affecting first the triple atoms, and after their destruction, when only double atoms remain, seizing in turn upon these, so that finally each of the four elements maintains its existence in the form of isolated atoms.

From this statement of the cosmology of the Vaiśeṣika system, which the original texts present in connexion with the category of substance, we turn to the category of *quality*. This category comprises the ideas of colour, taste, smell, touch (together with temperature), number, extension, individuality, connexion, separation, priority, posteriority, knowledge, joy, pain, desire, aversion, and will. This list Śaṅkaramiśra enlarges in his commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* I. i. 6, with seven other qualities, which, though included in the seventeen preceding, yet in his opinion deserve special mention. They are weight, fluidity, adhesiveness, sound (the characteristic quality of the ether, which is the medium of the undulations), after-effect (or self-reproduction, *saṃskāra*, manifesting itself in three ways, as continuance of movement in obedience to a given impulse, elasticity, and memory), finally, merit and demerit.

It will be seen that this enumeration comprises mental as well as material properties. This affords Kaṇāda an opportunity under the category of quality of developing his psychology. Contrary to the philosophical teaching of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, mental qualities according to the Vaiśeṣika system are attached directly to the soul, as has been indicated above, but only in the form of dispositions. For no psychological process is possible for the soul that finds itself in an isolated condition. It is only in consequence of the soul's union with the organ of thought (*manas*) that its faculties are capable of activity. Both souls and the organ of thought are eternal substances; but the soul is all-pervading, *i.e.* not bound down to time and space, while the organ of thought is an atom. The latter is the intermediary between the soul and the senses, since urged by the soul it betakes itself on each occasion to that sense through which the soul desires to perceive or to act (for the capacities of walking, speaking, etc., are, according to the Indian view, comprised under the idea of the senses; a distinction is therefore made between the senses of perception and action). Thus the organ of thought continues to move as long as it is actuated by a process of perception or a bodily activity. If it rests motionless in the soul, the union of the latter with the senses ends, and no perception or act or experience is possible.

Kaṇāda declares the organ of thought to be an atom, because in his view different perceptions or other psychological processes do not take place simultaneously, but always one after the other, though frequently in exceedingly swift succession. On account of its minute size as an atom the organ of thought can unite at any given instant only with a single sense, and can only convey the idea of a single object. If the organ of thought were omnipresent like the soul, or if the soul could enter into immediate relation with the objects of knowledge, all objects would be simultaneously perceived. As the organ of thought, on the one hand, imparts the quickening power to the soul, so, on the other, it acts as a kind of check by preventing the soul from exercising more than one function at the same time.

The subdivisions of the third and fourth categories, those of movement (or action) and association, are of little significance. Difference, the fifth category, on the contrary, holds an important place in the Vaiśeṣika system, inasmuch as by virtue of it the difference of the atoms renders possible the formation of the universe. The name, therefore, of the entire system, Vaiśeṣika, is derived from the word for difference (*viśeṣa*).

From the very beginning, the sixth category, inherence (or inseparability), the enunciation of which reflects great credit on the insight of Kaṇāda, attracted the attention of Sanskrit scholars. This conception is clearly distinguished from that of occasional or separable connexion, which is regarded as a subdivision of the category of quality. The relation expressed by inherence subsists, for example, between the whole and its parts, the genus and the species, the particular object and the general idea with which it is associated, between a thing and its properties, between movement and that which is moved.

Later teachers added to these six categories a seventh, *non-existence*. This conception is one which has proved very injurious not only to the development of logic, but also to philosophical speculation in the later works of all schools. Bearing in mind the negative tendency of all Indian thinking, we can readily understand how Indian philosophers were led to work out this idea with ever-increasing refinement. Of this the division of the category of non-existence into four subdivisions furnishes a ready proof. Instead of 'future existence' the Indian says 'prior non-existence'; 'posterior non-existence' for 'past existence.' The simple relation existing between two things that are not identical (to give the usual example, between a pot and a cloth) is described as 'mutual (or reciprocal) non-existence,' and the actual impossibility of a thing (as of the son of a barren woman) as 'absolute non-existence.'

LITERATURE.—F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, ch. ix.; M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], London, 1893; L. Suali, *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia Indiana*, Pavia, 1912; B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam, 1918; *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, ch. x., tr. by Cowell and Gough[2], London, 1894; *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms*, tr. by A. E. Gough, Benares, 1873.

R. GARBE.

VAIṢṆAVISM.—1. Introductory.—The term 'Vaiṣṇava' is applied to that Hindu sect the members of which worship in a special way Viṣṇu, as contrasted with the two other greater sects, the Śaiva, or worshippers of Śiva, and the Śākta, or worshippers of Śakti, the female personification of energy. Their worship is not to be confounded with the orthodox worship paid by the higher classes of Hindus to Viṣṇu as their individual patron deity (*iṣṭa-devatā*). Like Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism is a form of monotheism, the setting aside of the triune equality of Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu in favour of a single god.

No attempt has been made at the more recent enumerations to collect statistics of the numbers of these sects. Few of the rural classes follow any

distinctive sect, and it has been found impossible to record the numbers of their adherents with any approach to precision.[1]

2. The development of the worship of Viṣṇu.—Since the Vedic period the development of the cult of Viṣṇu has undergone many modifications. Though he is an important deity in the mythology of the *Brāhmaṇas*, Viṣṇu occupies only a subordinate position in the *Rigveda*, his essential feature being that he takes three strides, interpreted by some authorities to mean the rising, culminating, and setting of the sun, but more probably meaning the course of the solar deity through the three divisions of the universe.[2] The later development of his personality has been fully investigated by R. G. Bhandarkar, who traces its stages as follows: in the 5th cent. B.C. a religious reform arose like that which gave origin to Buddhism and Jainism, but based on theistic principles; this soon assumed a sectarian type in the form of the Pāñcharātra or Bhāgavata religion;[3] this, again, was combined with the cult of Nārāyaṇa, 'the resting-place or goal of gods'; soon after the Christian era the Ābhīra tribe of shepherds contributed to it their tribal hero Kṛṣṇa; in the 8th cent. this faith, the predominant feature of which was *bhakti*, or love, came into contact with the doctrine of spiritual monism and world-illusion promulgated by Śaṅkarāchārya (*q.v.*); the hostility to spiritual monism gathered to a head in the 11th cent., when Rāmānuja (*q.v.*) made strenuous efforts to displace it by the religion of *bhakti* in a re-invigorated form; he was followed in the north by Nimbārka, who advocated the cow-herd element and enjoined the cult of Rādhā, mistress of Kṛṣṇa; the same policy was continued in the 13th cent. by Madhva or Ānandatīrtha, who established the doctrine of pluralism and brought into prominence the name of Viṣṇu as supreme god; in the north Rāmānanda added the cult of Rāma, and his successor Rāmānuja that of Nārāyaṇa; Kabīr in the 15th cent. preached strict monotheism, the cult of Rāma, and condemned idolatry; Vallabha in the 16th cent. founded the erotic cult of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, and Chaitanya in Bengal that of the boy Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, a corruption which led to the degradation of Vaiṣṇavism; in the Deccan Nāmdev and Tukārām discarded the worship of Kṛṣṇa-Rādhā, cultivated a more sober type of worship, disseminated their ideas not in Sanskrit but in the vernacular languages, preached pure love of God, and laid stress on personal purification of heart and morals as necessary to salvation.[4]

3. Viṣṇu and his incarnations.—Vaiṣṇavism has thus developed on several distinct lines according as the object of devotion, Viṣṇu, varies in his manifestations, incarnations, or 'descents' (*avatāra*). This theory tends towards syncretism, the absorption of the lower animal-gods or totems of the more primitive tribes into the Brāhmanical pantheon. The incarnations of Viṣṇu are sometimes enumerated as six, ten, or twenty in number; but the most important are those of Kṛṣṇa and Rāma.[5] The cult of Rāma goes back in the *Vāyu Purāṇa* to about the 5th cent. B.C.; in the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, which in its original form is based on pre-Buddhistic materials, while its kernel was probably composed before 500 B.C., and the more recent portion was probably not added till the 2nd cent. B.C. and later,[1] Rāma is depicted as a high-souled hero, and thus with his faithful wife Sītā he won the affections of the Indian people. But it was not till the 11th cent. of our era that his cult was fully developed. This cult is described in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, which seems to go back to the Gupta period (A.D. 320–455).[2] The tenth book of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* has exercised a more powerful influence than any other work of its class, was translated into Hindī by Lallū Rām Kavī under the title of *Prema Sāgara*, 'The Ocean of Love,' and is now the most popular manual of the cult of Kṛṣṇa.[3] The cult of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa seems to be mentioned by the Greek traveller Megasthenes; and, if it prevailed in the period of the first Maurya emperors, it must have originated long before that time, and probably owes its development to that stream of thought which began with the *Upaniṣads* and culminated in Buddhism and Jainism.[4] Kṛṣṇa seems to have been a local deity known as Gopāla, 'cow-herd,' or Govinda, probably a later form of Govid, 'finder of cows,' which was an epithet of Indra.[5] He was worshipped by the Ābhīra shepherds, who wandered with their flocks over the region from Mathurā to Dwārkā. With this pastoral deity, by a process of syncretism, was combined the cult of an ocean-god of the western sea localized at Dwārkā. How far this cult was influenced by Christianity, brought by nomad tribes like the Gurjaras from Central Asia, is still a question of controversy.[6] The imperfect combination of the cults of Mathurā and Dwārkā is shown by the vagueness and inconsistencies of the legends which were invented to account for the later Kṛṣṇa cult.

4. The subdivisions of the Vaiṣṇavas: influence of the creed: sacred places.—The subdivisions of the Vaiṣṇavas follow the teaching of the great missionaries, of whom an account has elsewhere been given.[7] The most important is that of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, founded by Rāmānuja, the followers of whom are more numerous in Southern than in Northern India. The second school is that of Madhva, or Ānandatīrtha, who preached the doctrine of duality (*dvaita*), in opposition to the non-duality of Śaṅkarāchārya. The third follows the teaching of Rāmānanda, whose characteristics were that no distinction was made between the Brāhmans and the so-called 'untouchables,' and the use of the vernacular tongues as the medium of his teaching. The fourth is the Vallabhāchārya, whose worship of the *guru* has led to much scandal.[8]

Vaiṣṇavism is essentially monotheistic, while Śaivism is often ultimately pantheistic or, rather, is apt to relapse into pantheism, though it, too, is monotheistic.[9]

'Taken as a whole, one of the chief characteristics of the United Provinces population is a real and unaffected kindliness. Vaishnavism would certainly appeal to them, and if adopted, would tend to enhance the very quality which would cause its adoption.'[10]

It represents to a large extent the Buddhistic

[1] *Census of India, 1901*, vol. i., *India*, pt. i. p. 362; *ib. 1911*, pt. i. p. 114 f.

[2] A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (=*GIAP* III. i.), Strassburg, 1897, p. 37 f.

[3] See art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA.

[4] R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* III. vi.), Strassburg, 1913, p. 100 ff.; see artt. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 702 f., BENGAL, vol. ii. p. 492 f., KABĪR, KABĪRPANTHĪS, vol. vii. p. 632 ff., Tukārām.

[5] Bhandarkar, p. 41 f.; J. Dowson, *A Classical Dict. of Hindu Mythology and Religion*, London, 1879, p. 361.

[1] A. A. Macdonell, *A Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1900, p. 309.

[2] V. A. Smith, *The Early Hist. of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 21 ff.; art. PURĀNAS, vol. x. p. 452.

[3] Macdonell, *Hist. Sanskrit Lit.*, p. 302; *Prema Sāgara*, tr. F. Pincott, London, 1907; F. S. Growse, *Mathurā*[3], Allahabad, 1883, p. 52 f.

[4] Bhandarkar, p. 9; J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, Calcutta, 1877, p. 201; Growse, p. 279.

[5] Bhandarkar, p. 35 ff.

[6] *Ib.* p. 38; Growse, p. 67 ff.; J. Kennedy, 'The Child Krishna, Christianity, and the Gujars,' *JRAS*, October, 1907, p. 951 ff.; G. A. Grierson, 'Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the Nestorians,' with discussion, *ib.* April, 1907, pp. 311–335, 447–503.

[7] Art. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 703 ff.

[8] *Ib.* p. 705; see also artt. RĀMĀNUJA; MĀDHVAS, MADVĀCHĀRIS: RĀMĀNANDĪS, RĀMĀWATS.

[9] *Census of India, 1911*, xv., *United Provinces*, pt. i. p. 128 ff.

[10] *Ib.* p. 130.

type of life and morals, in which regard for the sanctity of life (*ahiṃsa*), human and animal, is a predominant feature.[1] Tod records that the spread of Kṛṣṇa-worship among some of the Rājputs (who generally, being warriors, favoured the Śaiva cult) exercised an ameliorating influence on their life and manners.[2] On the other hand, Dubois expresses a less favourable view of the sect in S. India.

'The feeling of aversion which orthodox Brahmins entertain for Vishnavite Brahmins is shared by Hindus of all castes. A stigma of reproach appears to cling to them. It cannot be the case, however, that the disfavour with which they are regarded is entirely due to their worship of Vishnu. I think it must be largely imputed to their excessive pride and arrogance, their extreme severity, and their supercilious manners; for though all Brahmins share these characteristics, it is generally acknowledged that the Vishnavites display them in an intensified form.'[3]

Again, the erotic tendency of some Vaiṣṇava literature, particularly in connexion with the cult of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, has aroused opposition among the more sober-minded Hindus, and it must be noted that the rival cult of Rāma is singularly free from excesses of this kind. Growse remarks on one set of their poems:

'If ever the language of the brothel was borrowed for temple use, it has been so here.'[4]

In Bengal the licentious habits of some orders are notorious.

'The Bairāgī and Bairāgan [male and female] Vaishnavas are of evil repute, their ranks being recruited by those who have no relatives, by widows, by individuals too idle and depraved to lead a steady working life, and by prostitutes. Vaishnavi or Boistubi, according to the vulgar pronunciation, has come to mean a courtezan.'[5]

In N. India the cult of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa is specially observed at Mathurā (*q.v.*) and the adjoining towns of Brindāban and Gokul (*qq.v.*); Viṣṇu is worshipped at Purī as Jagannāth (*q.v.*); he has a famous shrine at Badarīnāth (*q.v.*); in Gujarat Kṛṣṇa is worshipped at Dwārkā; at Pandharpur in the Sholāpur District, the Deccan, Viṣṇu is worshipped as Viṭhobā; in the south his chief seats are Conjeeveram and Tirupatī. The Vallabhāchāryas have their chief temples at Gokul and at Nāthdwāra in the Mewār State of Rājputānā. Rāma-worship centres in the scenes described in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Ayodhyā, Chitrakūt, and Nāsik.

LITERATURE.—Many of the authorities have been quoted in the article. The Vedic texts connected with Viṣṇu have been collected by J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1858–72, iv.[2] [1873] 63 ff. The Vaiṣṇava sects are described by H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1861–62, i. 30 ff. On the connexion of Kṛṣṇa-worship and Christianity see J. Kennedy, 'The Child Krishna, Christianity, and the Gujars,' *JRAS*, October, 1907, p. 951 ff.; G. A. Grierson, 'Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the Nestorians,' *JRAS*, April, 1907, pp. 311–335, 447–503, with the discussion, and his art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 539 ff., and the note in *JRAS*, April, 1913, p. 144. On Vaiṣṇavas in general see *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 530 ff.; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, and London, 1896, p. 338 ff.; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, p. 95 ff.; W. Ward, *View of the Hist., Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos*[3], Serampore, 1815, ii. 6 ff.

W. CROOKE.

VALENTINIANISM.—Valentinianism is a form of Gnostic teaching which originated with Valentinus, about the middle of the 2nd century. The term is a somewhat vague one, for Valentinus was generally regarded as the chief master of gnosis, and all the Gnostic schools were affected in some degree by his influence. His name was often attached to systems which had borrowed from him superficially, as well as to those which had grown directly out of his teaching.

[1] H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (=*GIAP* III. viii.), Strassburg, 1896, p. 68 ff.; V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, Oxford, 1919, p. 38 f.

[2] J. Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, Oxford, 1920, ii. 619.

[3] J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 122.

[4] P. 215.

[5] J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, London, 1883, p. 161.

1. Life and writings of Valentinus.—Of the life of Valentinus only a few scattered notices have come down to us. He was born on the coast of Egypt, at the end of the 1st or the beginning of the 2nd cent., and was educated at Alexandria. For some time he worked in that city as a Christian teacher, but eventually migrated to Rome, where he lived during the period between the episcopates of Hyginus and Anicetus (A.D. 137–166). He must have come forward as a Gnostic teacher before his arrival in Rome, for Justin mentions him among the conspicuous heretics,[1] and appears to have discussed his theories in the *Syntagma*, written about A.D. 160. Epiphanius states that he first became the head of a sect in Cyprus, and that he broke with the Church because he was passed over in the election of a bishop. A personal grudge of this kind is, however, commonly imputed to famous heretics in the controversial writings, and there is no reason to doubt that Valentinus advanced towards his later position by a natural process of reflexion, which would be stimulated by the Gnostic atmosphere of the Alexandrian Church. It is more than probable that he never formally detached himself from orthodox Christianity.

Valentinus was the author of a number of writings which have now perished, with the exception of a few fragments. His works included hymns, homilies, epistles, and possibly a treatise entitled *Sophia*. A late tradition makes him the author of a Gospel, but of this there is no evidence. His adversaries themselves pay tribute to his eloquence and intellectual power, and their testimony is fully borne out by the meagre specimens of his own writing which have been preserved. His system as a whole is known to us only from hostile witnesses, whose acquaintance with it had been formed at second hand; but through this obscuring medium it is still possible to recognize in Valentinus the foremost of the Gnostics, and one of the most gifted and versatile minds of the early Church. He was at once a poet, a philosopher, and a great religious teacher. Out of the chaotic materials of Gnostic tradition he constructed a harmonious body of thought in which there are not a few elements of real speculative value.

2. Sources.—Of the patristic accounts of Valentinus the earliest was that of Justin, and an outline of it has possibly been preserved in Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* I. xi. 1–3. Hippolytus described the system in an early work which is now lost, but can be partially reproduced from pseudo-Tertullian, Philaster, and Epiphanius. Our remaining sources are Irenæus, Tertullian, and the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus; but Tertullian is for the most part directly dependent on Irenæus. Hippolytus and Irenæus—the two cardinal authorities—are broadly in agreement, but their differences are sufficient to prove that they worked independently. Preference has often been given to the account of Hippolytus, which is shorter, clearer, and more symmetrical. But a number of indications make it almost certain that Irenæus is closer to original sources, although he has presented his material with little discrimination, and has confused the teaching of Valentinus himself with that of his disciples. The notices of the controversial writers are supplemented by the *Excerpts from Theodotus*, a selection of passages from an early Valentinian writer which is appended to the *Stromata* of Clement of Alexandria. The value of this source is much impaired by the difficulty of arranging the detached sentences in any intelligible order, and by the intrusion of comments which cannot with certainty be distinguished from the text. A curious problem arises from the similarities in thought, and occasionally in lan-

[1] *Trypho*, 35.

guage, between the *Excerpts* and the account in Irenæus. A direct connexion is not probable, but there is reason to believe that the writer quoted by Clement and the main authority consulted by Irenæus have made use of the same document. In addition to the sources enumerated, we have the *Fragments* of Valentinus himself, by which we are enabled in some degree to check and interpret the evidence of the patristic writers. A number of fragments have also been preserved from the works of later Valentinian teachers—notably the Letter of Ptolemæus to Flora, which is quoted at full length by Epiphanius,[1] and the extracts from the commentaries of Heracleon, which are given by Clement and Origen.

3. **The system of Valentinus.**—It is stated by Irenæus[2] that Valentinus adapted the principles of current Gnosticism to a doctrine of his own; and his system clearly betrays this dependence on earlier phases of the Gnostic movement. At Alexandria he can hardly have failed to come into personal contact with Basilides, and the influence of the older teacher is apparent in various details of his system (*e.g.*, the multiplication of æons, the doctrine of the passions as alien spirits invading the soul, the conception of the hebdomad as the sphere of the Demiurge). To Basilides, too, he may have owed the impulse to build a philosophical theory on the basis of Gnostic tradition. For the most part, however, he reverts from Basilides to the older Gnostic constructions. It seems to have been his purpose to form a comprehensive system which should gather up in itself the more valuable elements of all previous gnosis. To this we may attribute the complexity of detail which marks the system, and which has sometimes been set down to later elaboration. From this too we can best explain the remarkable diffusion of Valentinian gnosis. All the Gnostic sects were able to recognize in it their own characteristic tenets, brought into a larger context, and impregnated with a deeper meaning. As Valentinus borrowed from the earlier types of Gnosticism, so he adopted many suggestions from those Eastern religions which lay behind the whole Gnostic movement. The division of æons into groups of eight, ten, and twelve recalls the similar grouping of divinities in the Egyptian religion. The conception of the Pleroma as made up of thirty æons has its obvious counterpart in the thirty supreme gods of Zoroastrianism. Some of the details in the history of Sophia and the Soter appear to be taken directly from the Syrian and Phrygian myths of the mother-goddess rather than from their Gnostic analogies. But, while thus elaborating the mythological framework, Valentinus informs it, to a far greater extent than any of his predecessors, with a philosophical significance. Hippolytus may be right in his contention that the system is largely indebted to the Pythagorean theory of numbers; but the chief philosophical influence (as Hippolytus himself acknowledges) is undoubtedly that of Plato. Valentinus endeavours in his own fashion to work out the Platonic conception of an ideal world reflecting itself in the world of visible things. His doctrine of the soul as longing to be restored to the kingdom of light from which it has fallen is ultimately derived from Plato. The Gnostic mythology, as remoulded by him, partakes in some measure of the character of the Platonic myths. His æons are no longer separate divine beings but aspects of the nature and activity of God. They spring from one another not by a process of birth, but by one of emanation. The traditional episodes of the Gnostic history of redemption are more than half allegorized into inward experiences in the life of the soul. Gnosticism in the hands of Valentinus attempts to transform itself into a real philosophy, offering a solution of the metaphysical problems of the origin of evil, the relation of spirit to matter, the creation of the world, the nature and destiny of man.

With Valentinus the distinctively Christian element is much more pronounced than in earlier Gnosticism. He had begun his career as a Christian teacher, and perhaps never regarded himself as alienated from the Church. So far as can be ascertained, he instituted no peculiar rites or sacraments to mark out his following as a separate sect. All through his system we can trace the desire to bring his thought into as close relation as possible to the Christian teaching, and with this intention he makes a continual appeal to Scripture. In no recorded instance does he fall back on the esoteric writings which were favoured in Gnostic circles. His practice is rather to make use of the Scriptures acknowledged by the Church, OT and NT alike, and to read the esoteric meaning into them by a forced application of the allegorical method. But, while he thus appeals to Scripture in order to commend his teaching to orthodox Christians, he regards it as at best a secondary source of revelation. This is apparent as well from his highly subjective mode of interpretation as from his explicit statement:

> 'Many of the things written in the public books are found also written in the Church of God. . . . The law written in the heart is the people of the Beloved' (*i.e.* the spiritual race has come from God, and is itself an immediate source of divine knowledge).[1]

Not only does Valentinus accept the Christian Scriptures, but in his scheme of redemption he makes room for Christian believers as the 'psychical' class, intermediate between the 'pneumatic' and the 'hylic.' Earlier Gnosticism had allowed only for the higher class, predestined to life, and the lower, in which all spiritual potentialities were lacking. In the Valentinian system the third class is also capable of salvation, although in an inferior degree. This estimate of the 'psychic' natures was not due, as the Fathers complain, to arrogance and exclusiveness, but to a genuine solicitude for the mass of ordinary Christians. But the Christian affinities of the system are most clearly discernible in its central motive; for its various speculations all converge in a doctrine of redemption, in which the chief place is assigned to Jesus. The redemption is conceived, in the first instance, as the deliverance of the spiritual element from matter, but it was connected, at least in Valentinus's own teaching, with a pure and lofty ethic.

> 'The heart is cleansed by the expulsion of every evil spirit; . . . and when the only good Father visits it, it is sanctified, and gleams with light; and he who possesses such a heart is so blessed that "he shall see God."'[2]

It would be too much to say that with Valentinus Gnosticism joined hands with Christianity, but we may fairly credit him with a sincere endeavour to mediate between the two forms of teaching. He sought, on the one hand, to bring Gnosticism into closer sympathy with the Church and, on the other, to secure the Church's recognition of the elements of truth in Gnosticism.

The Valentinian system as described by the Fathers, whose evidence is consistent, in the main, with that of the *Fragments*, falls into two clearly marked divisions: (1) the events within the Pleroma, (2) the history of the creation and redemption. One difficulty, however, which has often been considered as of paramount importance, meets us at the outset. According to Irenæus, the æon who stands at the head of the Pleroma has a female consort, while Hippolytus, who is here supported by the *Fragments* and the *Exc. Theod.*, speaks of one supreme principle who is the

[1] *Hær.* xxxiii. 3. [2] I. xi. 1.

[1] *Frag.*, quoted in Clem. *Strom.* vi. 6.
[2] *Ib.*, in *Strom.* ii. 20.

source of all being. Irenæus himself admits that on this point there was difference of opinion among the Valentinian schools. The discrepancy is not, perhaps, so serious as might appear at first sight, especially when we remember that for Valentinus the æons tend to be little more than metaphysical abstractions. He apprehends the supreme principle as a unity, but as still containing within itself the possibility of distinction. This, indeed, is the presupposition of the whole system—that the original unity was capable from the first of a self-unfolding into the multiplicity of being.

The supreme æon, whether conceived as monad or as dyad, is moved by an inner necessity of love to impart his fullness, and by a process of emanation there arises the series of æons which constitutes the Pleroma. Bythos and Sige put forth Nous and Aletheia, from whom proceed the two pairs, Logos-Zoe and Anthropos-Ecclesia. These four pairs, or 'syzygies,' make up the ogdoad, which is complete in itself—a Pleroma within the Pleroma. The process of emanation is then continued by the two lower pairs of the ogdoad. Logos and Zoe project the five syzygies of the decad: Bythios-Mixis, Ageratos-Henosis, Autophues-Hedone, Akinetos-Syncrasis, Monogenes-Makaria. From Anthropos and Ecclesia proceed the six syzygies of the dodecad: Paracletos-Pistis, Patrikos-Elpis, Metrikos-Agape, Aeinous-Synesis, Ekklesiastikos-Makariotes, Theletos-Sophia. When the Pleroma is thus constituted, it is enclosed within itself by Horos (the boundary), which, according to Irenæus, is also interposed between Bythos and Sige and the remaining æons. The doctrine of the Pleroma is borrowed by Valentinus from older Gnosticism, but is modified in the light of metaphysical principles. Absolute Being goes forth from itself in the æons of the ogdoad, while in the decad and dodecad the powers immanent in these higher æons are drawn out and determined, first on the ontological, then on the more active, side. It will be noted that in these lower pairs the male is designated by an adjective, the female by a substantive—in keeping, apparently, with the Valentinian doctrine that the female contributes a vague substance, on which the male imposes form. The harmony of the Pleroma is broken by the presumption of Sophia, the youngest æon, who aspires, by one account, to comprehend the unknowable Father, by another, to create like the Father in virtue of her sole activity. She produces an abortion, but, on the prayer of the other members of the Pleroma, two new æons, Christos and the Holy Spirit, are put forth by Nous and Aletheia, and separate Sophia from her formless offspring. It falls out of the Pleroma, but is sought out by Christos and the Spirit, who endow it with form and then return. As a thank-offering for the restored harmony the thirty æons in fellowship put forth a new æon, Jesus.[1]

The second part of the system is concerned with the events outside of the Pleroma, after the departure of Christos from the lower Sophia (called in Irenæus by the Aramaic equivalent 'Achamoth'). Bereft of her helper, she is afflicted by the four passions of fear, grief, perplexity, and supplication; and Jesus, the common fruit of the Pleroma, is sent forth to be her consort and deliver her. Her passions are detached from her and become independent principles—the fear changing into psychic, the grief into hylic, the perplexity into demonic, substance, while the supplication takes the form of a path of repentance. (A simpler type of the myth derives the four material elements from the passions of Sophia.) The psychic sphere is called, as in Basilides, the hebdomad, and is presided over by the Demiurge, while below this sphere is the cosmos, and lowest of all the chaos of unformed matter. From the Demiurge proceed the souls of men, but he is controlled, unawares to himself, by his mother Sophia, and as a result of this twofold influence certain souls are spiritual, others psychic, the rest belonging wholly to the element of matter in which they are incarnated. For the redemption of human souls Jesus is produced by the immediate power of Sophia, and is born of Mary. It was assumed by all Valentinian schools that his body was non-material, and Valentinus compares it, in one of the extant *Fragments*, to water conveyed by a canal. As to the nature of his body, however, there was a divergence of views which led, as will presently be noted, to important consequences. The redemption accomplished by Jesus extends to all souls that are not hopelessly estranged from the higher world, but the pneumatic and psychic partake of it in different mode and measure. The former belong by their nature to the higher sphere, and require nothing for their deliverance but the moulding influence of gnosis imparted by Jesus. Their goal is an ascent into the Pleroma, where they are finally mated with angelic beings. Psychic souls attain to salvation by faith and good works, by which, with the aid of Jesus, they make up for their inherent deficiency; and the sphere to which they are raised is the heaven of the fallen Sophia. In each of the three worlds, therefore (the Pleroma, the lower heaven, the cosmos), a deliverance is necessary, and is effected in each case by a different redeemer. Sophia is saved by Christos, her offspring by Jesus, the fruit of the Pleroma, while Jesus, the son of Mary, redeems the souls of men. It may be inferred from several indications in the *Exc. Theod.* and the earlier account of Hippolytus that the three Saviours were sometimes conceived as aspects of a single redeeming power, and this may have been the original teaching of Valentinus.

From this brief survey of the system it is evident that Valentinus conserves, and even accentuates, the mythological traits of older Gnosticism, while seeking, as far as possible, to rationalize them. Instead of unmeaning names, the æons bear designations which imply intellectual or religious qualities. The several stages of the history are determined not by astral conceptions but by a speculative scheme, carefully thought out, though in many respects obscure. Valentinus, moreover, has made a deliberate attempt to overcome the dualism implicit in all Gnostic thought. The cause of Sophia's fall, and of the consequent origin of evil, is not so much a sin as a presumption, due to an impulse in itself good. Her fall takes place within the Pleroma, where she continues to abide. The Pleroma no longer stands in sharp opposition to the lower world but is linked up with it and is the ground of its existence. The Demiurge, though an inferior power, is imperfect rather than evil, and his work is capable of being transformed into something higher. The worlds without the Pleroma are copies of it on a lower plane, and at each descending stage its history is repeated. One of the most significant of the changes due to Valentinus is the addition of Horos to the Gnostic cosmogony. For the Oriental conception of two opposite realms of being he substitutes the Greek one of a limit, preserving all existences in their due place and order. To a Greek instinct we may likewise assign the pervading thought that the divine activity, at each stage of the cosmic process, impresses form on formless substance. But with all his effort Valentinus does not succeed in resolving the dualism which lay at the foundation of Gnostic theory. It is tacitly assumed that from the beginning there existed along with God a world of alien matter or not-being. This is capable, in varying degrees, of being moulded by the divine Artist, but in the end there is a residuum with which He can do nothing. The world of utter chaos is left over to the demons; the 'material' souls can look for no participation in the Redeemer's gift.

4. Underlying purpose of the system.—Valentinus is at once a philosopher and a religious teacher, and from this double point of view we must consider the underlying purpose of his system.

(1) On the one hand, he seeks to bring the abstract and inaccessible God into relation to the actual world. The Pleroma is the first outgoing of God from Himself, the manifestation of the Absolute in a sphere of being which is still, in some sense, one with Him. This process of self-unfolding is continued on an ever-descending scale until at last the divine principle is merged in the depths of matter. A hymn of Valentinus, preserved by Hippolytus, gives vivid expression to this normative idea.

'I behold all things suspended by spirit; I perceive all things borne on by spirit—flesh suspended from soul, soul upheld by air, air suspended from æther, and fruits produced from Bythos, and the child born from the womb.'

Matter, it is here implied, is linked with the cosmos, the cosmos with the lower heaven, this with the Pleroma, and this again with Bythos, from which absolute source all being has its birth. In another striking passage[1] Valentinus compares the world to an imperfect image of God, which is inscribed, however, with the name of Him whom it represents so as to authenticate it:

[1] A variant account in Iren. I. xi. 1 (apparently supported by the *Exc. Theod.*) makes Sophia herself fall from the Pleroma, and give birth to Christos, along with a kind of shadow. Christos separates himself from his mother and returns to the Pleroma, and Sophia, left with the shadow, produces another son, the Demiurge.

[1] Quoted in *Strom.* iv. 13.

'The form is not exactly to the life, but the name supplies what is wanting in the effigy; the invisibility of God co-operates with that which has been fashioned.'

Thus the whole universe is conceived as an infinite gradation of being, instinct, though ever more faintly, with the power which has called it forth. Valentinus, in other words, is struggling with the idea which had hovered before the minds of Greek thinkers ever since the days of Plato, and which finally received its classical form in Plotinus. His thought is disguised and hampered by the Gnostic imagery in which he clothes it, but from the philosophical point of view he may be classed as one of the chief precursors of Neo-Platonism.

(2) The philosophical interest is, however, subordinate. Valentinus was primarily a theologian, and it was in the effort to solve religious problems that he was led to the speculations on which he bases his system. The controversial writers, who are intent on exposing the absurdities of the heretical teaching, are chiefly occupied with these strange speculations; but they are far less prominent in the surviving utterances of the Valentinians themselves. The *Fragments* and the *Exc. Theod.* only touch on them incidentally. Heracleon, in the extracts from his commentaries which we possess, makes hardly any reference to the Pleroma, and the questions which he discusses are intrinsically as much Christian as Gnostic. His suggestions are considered seriously and sometimes accepted by Clement and Origen. The Valentinian theology, like that of the Church, has its centre in the problem of redemption, but this is approached from the metaphysical, instead of the ethical or mystical, side. Redemption, as understood by the Gnostic thinkers, is the deliverance of spirit from the material element in which it has become entangled. How is this fall of spirit out of its native sphere to be explained? No answer is possible except that some disaster has taken place in the spiritual world, and the Gnostic sets himself to discover its nature and origin. Not only so, but he is required to show how the primal error has been corrected. There can be no redemption for men on earth unless we have the assurance that order has been re-established in the upper world; the restoration, like the fall, must begin from above. Valentinus, therefore, sets out from the doctrine of the Pleroma, and the redemption achieved in heavenly places after Sophia, by her error, had destroyed the original harmony. But these speculations form only the background of the system. They supply a prologue in heaven, which is not to be mistaken for the real drama, although it provides the key by which it must be interpreted. Valentinus, like the orthodox teachers, is occupied all along with the redemption accomplished by Jesus, and differs from them chiefly in his endeavour to correlate it with a universal redemption. This involves him, however, in further differences, which affect his whole religious attitude. In spite of his desire to construe the universe as the harmonious unfolding of a single principle of being, he is compelled, like other Gnostic thinkers, to fall back on an ultimate dualism. The fall of spirit cannot be metaphysically explained unless it is assumed that from the beginning there existed something alien to God. This duality reveals itself in the world of men as well as in the cosmos generally. Souls differ from one another in kind, and are not capable of the same redemption. Valentinus makes a genuine effort to break through the exclusiveness to which all previous Gnostics had stood committed. At the risk of inconsistency he recognizes the intermediate class of 'psychical' men, and it is one of the chief objects of his system to find a place for them within the scope of the redeeming process. But in the end he is driven back on the traditional Gnostic doctrine that only the spiritual can be truly saved, and that their salvation is nothing else than the inherent prerogative of their nature.

'Ye are originally immortal, and children of eternal life, and ye would have death distributed to you, that ye might spend and lavish it, and that death may die in you and by you; for when ye dissolve the world, and are not yourselves dissolved, ye have dominion over creation and all corruption.'[1]

In this remarkable saying Valentinus appears to hint at a lofty doctrine of the obligation resting on 'spiritual' men in virtue of their privilege. They are placed in this world of death, or have voluntarily entered it, in order that they may co-operate with the higher powers, and that through them the dominion of death may at last be utterly destroyed. In the light of such a saying it is impossible to doubt the noble religious temper of the great Gnostic. The very doctrine which in other leaders of the movement had served to foster a spirit of egoism and of contempt for the inferior mass of men is transformed by him into a supreme motive for human service. Yet the conception of one class of men who are marked out as essentially different from others is none the less made prominent. These higher natures alone are destined to a true redemption, and for them the work of a redeemer is hardly necessary. Like others they acknowledge Jesus as their Saviour, but what they receive from him is little more than the apprehension of their own native excellence as the children of light. It is this failure on the part of its noblest representative to reconcile the Gnostic teaching with Christian ideas that stamps it most unmistakably as alien, in its fundamental character, to the gospel.

5. Subsequent history of Valentinianism.—The history of Valentinianism after the founder's death is very imperfectly known to us, but there is evidence that the sect extended itself rapidly, and found adherents in Italy, Gaul, N. Africa, Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. Tertullian describes it as in his time 'frequentissimum plane haereticorum collegium.' According to Hippolytus, it came to be divided at an early date into two schools—the Eastern, or Anatolic, and the Western, or Italic—and the fact of this division is confirmed by the *Exc. Theod.*, which purport to give the doctrines of 'the so-called Eastern Valentinianism.' The schism, we are told, was brought about by a difference of opinion as to the nature of the earthly body of Jesus. The Easterns maintained that he assumed a pneumatic body, while the Westerns taught that his body was psychical, the Spirit descending on him at his baptism in the likeness of a dove. Both of these views are represented in the *Exc. Theod.*, and from this it has been inferred that the division cannot have been so sharp as Hippolytus affirms, or that it must have followed some other line of cleavage. Clement, however, may have made his extracts from several writers, belonging to different schools, or Theodotus himself may have quoted from other Valentinians, with whom he was not in full agreement. Why the dispute should have turned on an issue that appears so secondary and artificial it is difficult to say. It may be that the Christological controversy which was to rend the Church a century later was anticipated in some fashion by the Gnostic thinkers. More probably the question as to the nature of the Redeemer's body served merely to focus some radical difference of view as to the scope and purpose of the redemption itself. At all events, it is significant that the sect was divided on a matter that concerned not the speculative construction, but the doctrine of the Person of Christ. We have here a strong confirmation of the view that Valentinianism was much more closely allied to

[1] *Strom.* iv. 13.

orthodox Christianity than the records of the Fathers might lead us to suppose. This conclusion is further borne out by the extant writings of the two leaders of the school who were next in influence to Valentinus himself, and both of whom appear to have been his personal disciples—Ptolemæus and Heracleon.

(*a*) *Ptolemæus.* — In his system as a whole Ptolemæus adhered closely to Valentinus — so much so that Irenæus has made little effort to discriminate his separate teaching. He added, we are told, new and more complicated details to the æonology, and thought of the æons as personal beings, not merely as modes and aspects of the divine nature. In his doctrine of redemption he laid peculiar emphasis on the relation of the work of Christ to that of the Demiurge. But besides the notices in the Fathers we possess the Letter of Ptolemæus to Flora—the one document of 2nd cent. gnosis which has come down to us complete. In writing to a Christian of whom he hoped to make a convert, Ptolemæus would no doubt present his views with studied moderation, but his Letter, however we regard it, must be taken as an authentic statement of Valentinian doctrine. It deals with the specific question of the validity of the Law, and distinguishes (1) a Law given by God Himself, (2) a Law proceeding from Moses, (3) a Law appended by the elders to this Mosaic code. In the Law given by God three elements are likewise distinguished: (1) spiritual precepts, which are of permanent value and were endorsed by Jesus; (2) commandments, which were only for a time and were abrogated by Jesus; (3) ordinances that must be interpreted in a typical or symbolic sense. The teaching of Jesus is accepted throughout as the one criterion of truth. Ptolemæus betrays his Gnostic presuppositions by identifying the God of the Law with the Demiurge, whom he conceives as an inferior and imperfect God, just rather than absolutely good. But the Letter is evidence that the Valentinians not only were interested in Christian problems but also could discuss them with a sober and critical judgment which we too often miss in the orthodox theologians.

(*b*) *Heracleon.* — The name of Heracleon is attached by Epiphanius to a fantastic mythological system, but this account of his teaching may confidently be set aside, in view of the considerable fragments which have been preserved from his own commentaries. It may be gathered from these that he accepted the Valentinian construction, but that he employed it chiefly as a background for understanding the redemptive work of Jesus. Like Valentinus, he recognizes three classes of men, and makes the salvation of the 'spiritual' consist in an inner enlightenment by means of gnosis. He appears to concede, however, that even the spiritual natures are capable of a fall. He holds, too, that after being saved themselves they must re-enter the world and help to redeem the 'psychic.' In his conception of the Person of Christ he adopts a strongly docetic position.

(*c*) *Marcus.*—If Ptolemæus and Heracleon stand for a Valentinianism which had much in common with orthodox Christianity, a different tendency is represented by Marcus, who flourished about the same time. For the doctrines of Marcus we have practically no other source than Irenæus, whose account of their superstitious and immoral character is perhaps coloured by prejudice. None the less it is evident that Marcus developed the ideas of Valentinus in a one-sided fashion and thereby distorted them. The characteristic feature of his system is number-symbolism. From the numerical values of divine names he seeks to discover the nature and order of the æons and the mode by which the world has come into being. The Valentinian theory of redemption is connected by Marcus with the ideas of contemporary magic and astrology. He formed a sect which seems to have stood quite outside of the Church, with institutions of its own and special baptismal rites, accompanied by exorcisms. From such a development as that of Marcus it was manifest that the Valentinian system, in anything like its original form, could not long maintain itself. In the hands of the master and his more enlightened disciples it was capable of serving a genuine philosophical and religious interest. But it had been evolved by an artificial process from the crude speculations of primitive Gnosticism, and reverted in course of time to the earlier type.

For several centuries Gnostic sects continued to arise which called themselves Valentinian, and which preserved the language and occasionally some of the ideas of Valentinus. The *Pistis Sophia* and the other Coptic writings may on this ground be assigned to the Valentinian school, although their connexion with it is otherwise remote. We hear of Valentinians in Italy about A.D. 360, and in Spain at the end of the 4th century. But these late survivals belong to the general history of the decline of Gnosticism, and the true Valentinian movement had exhausted itself within two or three generations of the founder's death.

LITERATURE.—The subject of Valentinianism is discussed in all the general works bearing on Gnosticism (*q.v.*). The *Fragments* of Valentinus were first collected in J. F. Grabe, *Spicilegium SS. Patrum*[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1714, which is still valuable. They are reproduced, with commentary, in A. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristentums*, Leipzig, 1884, in which the patristic accounts of the system are also fully discussed. One of the ablest of modern accounts of Valentinianism is that of E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, Paris, 1913, pp. 39–245. The relation of the *Exc. Theod.* to Irenæus is discussed by F. W. Dibelius, *ZNTW* ix. [1908], x. [1909] 230 ff. G. Heinrici, *Die Valentinianische Gnosis und die heilige Schrift*, Berlin, 1871, and R. A. Lipsius, art. 'Valentinus,' in Smith's *DCB* iv. 1076 ff., are still indispensable. The most useful work on later Valentinianism is A. E. Brooke, *The Fragments of Heracleon newly edited from the MSS*, Cambridge, 1891 (=*TS* i. 4).

E. F. SCOTT.

VALHALLA.—See BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic).

VALIDITY.—1. Introductory.—The notion of validity (from Lat. *validitas, validus, valere*, 'to be strong') is largely employed in modern post-Kantian thought, and receives a wide and various application. A comprehensive discussion of the notion is a desideratum, and would form a useful introduction to the philosophical and scientific disciplines, including philosophy of religion. In treating of it one must reckon with the fact that validity is a 'nebulous phrase'[1] in philosophical usage, so that it is difficult to invest it with a clear and unambiguous meaning. The terms with which it appears to be most frequently associated, with which indeed it is often identified, are those of truth and value. Thus the validity of a judgment has been described as its corrected value,[2] the validity of an argumentation or inference its truth-producing virtue,[3] or—as it might otherwise be expressed—its truth-conveying capacity. Lotze's valuable and suggestive treatment of the term[4] has done much to fix its use in philosophy; and it seems to the present writer that an examination of Lotze's discussion will serve to bring out the general nature and scope of validity. An examination, further, of the distinction between

[1] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1897, p. 376.

[2] L. T. Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1896, p. 486.

[3] *DPhP* ii. 748.

[4] *Logic*[2], Eng. tr., 2 vols., Oxford, 1888.

origin and validity will illustrate the application of the notion.

2. The datum of thought.—With Lotze the discussion of validity belongs to the doctrine of thought, and the problem of validity arises first in connexion with the ideas or rudimentary concepts composing the material with which thought sets out upon its work of reflexion. The first operation of thought is to convert impressions (its ultimate antecedents) into ideas or meanings, so as to prepare 'logical building-stones'[1] for its subsequent structures. As a result of this operation each impression receives a certain objectivity or validity.

Thus 'green' or 'red,' *e.g.*, remains an object for consciousness as such after the cessation of the external stimulus which produces the impression. We no longer present it to ourselves 'as a condition which we undergo, but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself, and which continues to be what it is and to mean what it means whether we are conscious of it or not.'[2]

Moreover, its validity or objectivity of meaning for ourselves is confirmed and tested in the experience of others.[3] But the validity or objectivity of an idea, meaning, or thought-content is not validity or objectivity in the sense of some kind of real existence independent of thought. Logical objectification, which converts subjective impressions into objective ideas, cannot give external reality, or reality beyond thought; so that no question of ontological as distinguished from logical validity is here raised. Indeed it is matter of indifference whether certain parts of the world of thought indicate something 'which has besides an independent reality outside the thinking minds, or whether all that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it, but with equal validity for them all.'[4]

In his discussion of the Platonic world of ideas[5] Lotze offers a sharper representation of the nature of validity, describing it as an ultimate and underivable conception designative of reality apart from existence and occurrence. The reality of an idea or thought-content is similar to that which belongs to truths and laws; and, though wholly unlike the reality belonging to things or events, it is a form of reality which the mind cannot but acknowledge.

'We all feel certain in the moment in which we think any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely recognized it; it was valid before we thought about it and will continue so without regard to any existence of whatsoever kind, of things or of us.'[6]

The idea or thought-content is thus essentially eternal or timeless, being independent of its manifestations in the reality of existence or of its realization in the reality of thought (as occurrence or event). So Plato taught. It is true that Plato ascribes existence to the ideas or universal notions, but it is Lotze's contention that he does not thereby seek to hypostatize their eternal validity into an existence at all resembling the existence of things or events. Here the traditional interpretation of the Platonic doctrine is affirmed to be on wrong lines.[7] Plato's supercelestial world of ideas, without local habitation, and composed of pure intelligence, has no sort of affinity with what we ordinarily call the real world (and Plato may be said to indicate this in the very sublimity of the language in which he describes its wondrous landscape).[8] But the traditional interpretation, though false, is not without excuse. For in the Greek tongue there was no technical equivalent for validity or reality not inclusive of existence, and it was impossible for Plato to predicate reality of the ideas without at the same time substantiating them, or subsuming them under the general denomination of substance, existence, or real being (*τὸ ὄν, οὐσία*). Even Aristotle was forced to attribute to the ideas a secondary sort of existence (*δευτέρα οὐσία*). From all which it should appear that validity may be regarded with Lotze as the designation in modern philosophy of reality apart from actual existence—yet predicable of the existent.

The doctrine of validity, as we may have gathered, grows in the course of Lotze's discussions, and attaches in its developed form to the product of thought, but our chief interest in it under this head is in relation to the datum of thought, or the object of thought as such; and the question may now be asked, Can we accept the test by which Lotze would recognize the validity of the idea or thought-content—the test or mark, as already noted, of being a self-identical object for all consciousness? The sameness of the presentation of the idea is declared to be the sufficient criterion of its validity. This is, at any rate, the consistent Lotzean doctrine, and it goes hand in hand with the notion that thought is equipped at the outset of its reflective task with a systematic body of ideas or concepts. But, just as this notion is vigorously assailed in recent logical theory, so also is the aforesaid criterion of validity. Validity belongs to an idea, it is urged, not because it is an identical object or content of thought for all consciousness (any subjective construction like the 'chimæra' or the 'centaur' might be made to acquire validity according to the Lotzean measure of it), but because it is a determining factor in controlling or directing the movement of experience. 'Validity always refers to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an asserting of connection—not to the meaning as detached and contemplated.'[1] Or, as it is otherwise put, the meaning or idea as such possesses its validity in its 'dynamic' and not its 'static' reference.

3. The process of thought.—The problem of validity is here concerned with the relation of thought as a logical process or activity to thought as a product or issue. The distinction involved is depicted by Lotze, in a well-known metaphor, as the distinction between the winding ascent and the clear prospect.[2] According to Lotze, the thinking act or process is essentially subjective, and the formed product essentially objective. This he illustrates, on the one hand, from the variety of the paths leading to the summit and, on the other, from the sameness of the scene which eventually unfolds itself before the eyes of the wayfarers. But is it a purely formal or subjective validity that belongs to logical forms and laws? A purely formal validity, implying no kind of relation between the logical activity and real existences and events is—as we may well agree—inconceivable. No single logical operation could be carried through, even as a mere subjective process of thought, 'unless the object upon which it is exercised contained in itself some characteristic which invited or at least allowed it.'[3] As the tool must fit the hand, so it must also fit the thing.[4] The forms and laws of thought cannot be 'mere singularities of our mental organisation,' but must exhibit 'a constant and regular adaptation to reality.'[5] Or—to recur to the former metaphor—just as the ascent and the summit are comprised within the same geographical territory as the landscape which opens at length to the traveller's gaze, so there must be some sort of relationship between the logical operation and

[1] i. 13. [2] i. 14; cf. ii. 203. [3] i. 8.
[4] i. 16. [5] ii. 200–222. [6] ii. 212.
[7] But see J. Royce, *The World and the Individual* (*Gifford Lectures*), 2 vols., New York, 1901, i. 227.
[8] Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*[2] (*Gifford Lectures*), Oxford, 1920, p. 346.

[1] J. Dewey, in *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago, 1903 p. 75; see also footnote, p. 76.
[2] ii. 279. [3] ii. 253. [4] i. 8. [5] i. 6

what takes place in the object-matter[1]—unless the sceptical contention holds that, for aught we know, the process of thought may not mediate a valid knowledge of reality at all.

But, while the subjective processes of thought are more than merely formal, they are not to be regarded as constitutive of the valid world. In forming conceptions, in classification, in judgment and inference, we do not go through processes which take place in things.

'The world of valid truth does not' in Lotze's view of it 'undergo a series of contortions and evolutions, paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps, the succession of tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the course of our own thinking.'[2]

The activity of the various logical processes is not of a constitutive but of a strictly intermediate and instrumental value. The winding path is only a means to the attainment of the prospect, and must be left behind; the scaffolding[3]—to cite another well-known illustration—is only a means to the construction of the building, and must be taken down to allow the full view of the result. In each case, however, it is a necessary and indispensable means. This illustrates Lotze's contention that, despite the subjectivity of the thinking process, its results may still be objectively valid. Although the principle of reality is not discoverable in the process, it may still be present in the product. How this may be Lotze is hard put to it to show; but that it is so, that subjectivity does not necessarily imply invalidity, is one of his 'most invincible convictions.'[4]

The difficulties that beset Lotze in his endeavour to interpose between the scepticism that could not admit the validity of thought for reality and the idealism that in making thought determine reality seemed to find an ultimate identity between them were largely due to the externalism of his representation of the relation between the thought-process and the thought-product; and one sympathizes with the plea of the 'genetic logic' that the activity and the content of thought should be viewed more historically, from the standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement and readjustment of experience. 'It is no mere accident of language that "building" has a double sense—meaning at once the process and the finished product.'[5] The product of thought is simply the process carried on to its completion. There can be no possible divorce or separation between the formal and the material in thought. In the activity of thought we are not cast loose from dependence upon material conditions and circumstances. It is only when thinking is improperly regarded as a merely formal activity, having validity or meaning in abstraction from the actual content of experience, that the general problem arises of the validity of the thinking process.

4. The product of thought.—What now of the validity of the ideas which result from the reflective process, after the work of thought has been done upon them, and they have been harmonized and made coherent with the rest of experience? That it is a real validity we do not doubt, though Lotze's test of it—namely, sameness of presentation for all consciousness—remains unconvincing. But is it a real validity in more than a logical sense? Is it ontologically or metaphysically real? It must be freely admitted that on Lotzean principles the final product of thought belongs still to the sphere of ideas and falls short of the reality of existence. If the reality of existence is not found in the logical forms of the concept, judgment, or inference, no more is it to be found in the logical thoughts themselves.

Lotze's failure to bridge the gulf between the world of organized ideas and the reality of existence, so that 'no shade that wanders in that realm which is valid without existing, can take upon itself the body of actuality, and be,'[1] may be chiefly traced again to the externalism involved in his initial assumptions. For, in discovering the sole material for thought in the inner world of ideas, he makes a separation in the very beginning between thought and real existence. Thus it is the externalistic relation, not of the process of thought to the product, but of the datum of thought to reality, that is now in question. On Lotzean principles the realm of thought is, as it were, an inviolate continent that reality cannot invade, only surging and breaking upon its coast. Or, rather, reality is the inviolate continent, and thought is the surging sea. Accordingly, in the end thought must still be confined in its operations to the inner world of ideas, and the ideal remain separated from the real—although, as already noticed, Lotze himself clung resolutely, even in face of the principles of his logic, to his belief in the ontological reference in the subjective idea. But it is left to other faculties than thought—to perception, experience, intuition, feeling—to be the means of enabling the mind to establish contact with reality and attain objective truth.

From the 'genetic' standpoint in logic it is maintained that this twofold objective reference, in the beginning and the end of the work of reflexion, should be interpreted historically, 'as indicating a particular place of generation and a particular place of fulfilment in the drama of evolving experience.'[2] Again, from a standpoint of metaphysical idealism according to which the relation between thought and reality is organically conceived it is maintained that reality must be present in the beginning of the thinking process if it is to be reached at the end, and must co-operate with the activities of thought in the production of results.[3]

5. Origin and validity.—(*a*) *Introductory.*—A consideration of the question of origin and validity should throw further light upon the notion of validity. From the revolutionary standpoint of pragmatism it may be a 'musty old antithesis'[4] that is here involved, but the distinction between origin and validity is generally regarded as one of real importance in philosophy, and as worthy of fresh discussion in the light of the new emphasis upon development or evolutionary growth.[5] In the thought of D. G. Ritchie it was a distinction of cardinal significance, and it received a many-sided application at his hands.[6] R. R. Marett[7] offers a statement of the distinction in application to ethical theory. But his statement may readily be generalized; when generalized, it might run thus: origin represents the point of view from which judgments are explained by reference to their historical development, validity is the point of view from which they are explained by reference to their present worth and significance. There appears to be fairly general agreement among recent writers that, while the difference between the two points of view is not to be glossed over, there is a danger of falsifying judgments in abstracting from conditions of origin and development.

[1] ii. 280.
[2] Dewey, p. 77; Lotze, ii. 252–282, also ii. 283.
[3] i. 9.
[4] H. Jones, *The Philosophy of Lotze*, Glasgow, 1895, p. 80.
[5] Dewey, p. 79.
[1] Jones, p. 230. [2] Dewey, p. 84. [3] Jones, p. 384.
[4] F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*[2], London, 1912, p. 244.
[5] Cf. J. B. Baillie, 'Truth and History,' in *Mind*, new ser., vii. [1898] 506–522.
[6] See *Philosophical Studies*, ed. R. Latta, London, 1905, *passim*; also *Darwin and Hegel*, London, 1893, Essay on 'Origin and Validity.'
[7] In *Personal Idealism*, ed. H. Sturt, London, 1902, p. 224.

(*b*) *In logic.*—First consider the distinction between origin and validity as applied to logic, taking logic as designative of the whole philosophical discipline which has to do with the question of validity in knowledge. Here the problem of origin and validity is that of the relation between psychology and logic in respect of the treatment of thought. A clear distinction between the two disciplines used to be drawn in this respect. Psychology, it was said, describes the conditions under which thought originates as a psychical process; logic views thought apart from such conditions and in reference to the standard of truth and reality. In other words, psychology was held to be a purely descriptive science, and logic purely normative or regulative. To psychology fall questions of genesis and history; to logic questions of authority, worth, value.

'Logic is not concerned with the manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence, but with their value, when they have somehow or other come into existence, for the carrying out of intellectual operations.'[1]

But in the recent logical movement there is a strong tendency to supersede or dispose of this antithesis between origin and validity, or, as it is expressed less epistemologically, origin and value. It is said that judgment, with conception and inference, depends for its significance, for the measure of its validity, upon the stage of organization in which it begins; and, accordingly, the appraisement of the claim to validity should not be made in abstraction from the actual conditions and circumstances of origination.[2] Psychology should enter into logical evaluation.

None the less 'philosophical logic' abides by its essential position. While acknowledging the importance of genetic and historical considerations, it still affirms with Lotze that psychological analysis fails to reveal the complete significance of the operations of thought. The problem of validity or worth transcends the natural history of mental products. Indeed, as B. Bosanquet puts it, natural selection is not at all interested in natural history. 'It is being equal to the whole situation' (*i.e.* to the situation not of yesterday but of to-day) 'that is the criterion for logic as for morals.'[3]

(*c*) *In ethics and politics.*—From the above it would appear that in logic there is no irreconcilable difference between the 'genetic' and the 'philosophical' theorists, between the standpoints of origin and of validity; and one is prepared for a similar conclusion in ethics and politics. The tendency to dispose of the distinction between origin and validity certainly here exists, and again reflects the recent emphasis upon the genetic and historical. But, if the study of ethics and politics means only 'translating the present into terms of the past,'[4] then we need not be astonished at the prevalence in our time of ethical and political scepticism. To trace the ancient pedigree of an idea or institution is not, however, to explain it fully or really, much less to explain it away, and empty it of all ideal meaning. The line of ethical development, *e.g.*, may be traced from the lowest stage of customary morality to the recognition of the inherent goodness of the moral life,[5] without thereby necessarily affecting the question of the validity of the moral judgment. A pernicious custom or fantastic belief may be the antecedent and the partial cause of a moral rule now rightly regarded as binding. Sociological fact spells in philosophy neither validity nor invalidity.[1] On the other hand, it may be contended from the side of philosophy that but for the immanence of the ideal in the historical process there would be no ethical and political, *i.e.* no sociological development at all. The evolution of society is only properly interpreted in teleological as distinguished from mechanical terms—in terms of the *vis a fronte* rather than the *vis a tergo*. Validity is to be put before origin, intuition before evolution. But, while this is said, we are not compelled to recognize with the intuitionist or formalist in ethics, or with the 'natural rights' theorist in politics, the existence of any *a priori* norm independent of the life of society. To recognize such a norm or standard would indeed reduce to confusion the notion of moral or political personality. The categorical imperatives of intuitionism in ethics and of the theory of 'natural rights' in politics are not immediate self-evident data, but possess the mediate validity attaching to moral and political ideals which must be shown to be constitutive of ideal society.[2]

(*d*) *In religion.*—The distinction between origin and validity should be maintained also in religion, if at the same time the effort should be made, as in logic, ethics, and politics, to reconcile the two standpoints. Recent study in the history and psychology of religion has accentuated the tendency to neglect or confuse the distinction between the origin and the validity of religious ideas. Religion is traced in its historical development from its beginnings in the animism or spiritism of tribal religion,[3] through the polytheism of national religion, to the monotheism of universal or spiritual religion; and it is sometimes thought that the history of the evolution of religious belief is its sufficient explanation. Or, again, religion is investigated in its psychological origin and stated in terms of human need, emotional, cognitive, practical; and, again, it is sometimes thought that the psychological genesis of the religious experience is its sufficient explanation. But the question of validity is not superseded by the historical and psychological methods of study. Religion no more than morals or logic is to be handed over to the historian or the psychologist. Their explanations are provisional, their interpretations but working hypotheses. The last word on religion is not with the historian or psychologist as such, but with the metaphysical philosopher. And, even if the metaphysician can find no place for religion within the system of his thought, it does not follow that the idea of God is false and the religious consciousness an illusion.

If we are truly to interpret the historical religious development of mankind, must we not again postulate—as in the history of morals—the immanence and directing activity of the ideal? And, if we are truly to interpret the nature of religious experience, must we not postulate a reality corresponding to the object of faith? At every stage of religious culture the object of faith and worship is claimed to be trans-subjectively real. Inasmuch, however, as the reality of religion transcends the mundane order of experience, this ontological claim is incapable of scientific proof. But the cognitive element implied in religious faith should not on that account be ignored or its claim disallowed. Apart indeed from belief in the validity of the objective reference of religion the values of the religious experience can hardly

[1] Lotze, i. 34; cf. also i. 10, ii. 246 f., 251; also D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 134–171.

[2] Cf. Dewey, pp. 14 f., 62 f.

[3] B. Bosanquet, *Logic*[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1911, ii. 273.

[4] Ritchie, p. 282.

[5] Cf., *e.g.*, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2 vols., London, 1906.

[1] See, further, on origin and validity in ethics, W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1918, pp. 54–72.

[2] Cf. R. Latta, in Ritchie, p. 41.

[3] For a pre-animistic or non-animistic theory of the origin of religion see R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, London, 1909.

be maintained. 'Faith divorced from reality, like the flower severed from its roots in the earth, is doomed to wither and die.'[1]

Where the objective reference of religious faith is held to be a reality and no illusion, it must still be allowed to the standpoint of origin that it is impossible to make a rigid separation between psychological fact and logical meaning. Just as in secular and scientific knowledge a judgment having the appearance of immediate certainty is often found to involve subjective experience, so a palpable element of subjectivity enters often into the judgments of religion. *E.g.*, when the mystical visions of the mediæval saint shape themselves into direct and immediate revelations of the transcendent mysteries of Catholic dogma, we can hardly fail to detect the influence of the subjective or psychological factor in experience, especially if we have followed the course of the dogmatic development in Christendom.[2] A parallel might be cited in the claims of modern 'spiritualism,' whose communications from the dead — even granted that they have a real foundation—are sometimes quite obviously the product of a liberal Protestant eschatology.

Yet, when all allowance is made for subjectivity in religious experience, the consciousness of the Beyond—of the Beyond that is within—still remains, with the problem attaching to it of the validity of religious knowledge. While we have asserted that the ontological postulate implied in the religious consciousness is not scientifically verifiable, we do not thereby confess the invalidity or irrationality of the analogical mode of reasoning which religious philosophy has perforce to adopt in common with scientific theory, but of which it makes a more characteristic use. We must not here enter into a defence of the method of analogy in theistic argumentation, and in particular of the application to divine reality of the anthropomorphic ideas of personality, purpose, and value. It is a merit, to our mind, of the personalistic trend in recent philosophical thought that it finds the only possible clue to the interpretation of God and divine things in the analogy of human experience at its best and highest. But we may be permitted to observe that in the modern theistic use of the *analogia hominis*, which is reflective and critical, only a general agreement and correspondence, and not an identity, is affirmed between God and man in their personal aspects. Nor does it follow from the vindication of the analogical method in religious philosophy that any particular analogy is ultimately valid. Beyond the general logical or epistemological question, Is the method of analogy capable of conveying religious truth?, lies the ontological inquiry, Does the method of analogy actually convey it in such and such a case? Thus here, as in connexion with the process of thought in general, the problem of validity passes into the wider problem of truth.[3]

See also artt. ANALOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, TELEOLOGY, VALUE.

LITERATURE.—References to the subject are to be found in general works on logic and metaphysics, also in works on the philosophies of science, history, and religion. The books of which the present writer has made the most use are cited in the footnotes. See also F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, London, 1883; J. N. Keynes, *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*[3], do. 1894; F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic*, do. 1912; J. M. Baldwin, *Thoughts and Things; or, Genetic Logic*, 2 vols., do. 1906, 1908; C. Sigwart, *Logic*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., do. 1895; F. Paulsen, *Introd. to Philosophy*, Eng. tr., do. 1895; H. Sidgwick, *Philosophy: its Scope and Relations*, do. 1902; B. P. Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, New York, 1897; E. Troeltsch, *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*, Tübingen, 1905; L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, London, 1913; Carveth Read, *The Metaphysics of Nature*[2], do. 1908; F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914; B. P. Bowne, *Personalism*, Boston and New York, 1908; F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*[2], London, 1912; R. R. Marett, *Psychology and Folk-Lore*, do. 1920; H. Höffding, *La Pensée humaine*, Fr. tr., Paris, 1911. WILLIAM FULTON.

VALLABHA, VALLABHĀCHĀRYA.—The strength of Hinduism lies in its manysidedness, its power of adapting itself to the various tendencies of human nature, both the good and the evil. Of this we have a conspicuous illustration in the numerous sects that arose in the course of the development of the Vaiṣnava form of this religion.[1] Already in Śaivism (*q.v.*) the same desire to appeal to different sides of human nature had been manifested in the various aspects in which the character of the god Śiva had been presented—as the impersonation of the dissolving processes of nature as well as of its eternal reproductive power, as the typical ascetic and as the learned sage. But this variety in the characters ascribed to the god does not appear to have resulted in a corresponding variety of sects of the type that is seen in Vaiṣnavism (*q.v.*). In Vaiṣnavism, with its worship of a god who was believed to have manifested his sympathy with the world's suffering by frequent descents upon the earth (*avatār*), the masses of the people found the elements of a religion that seemed to bring God near to their faith and love. The personal element in religious life began to have fuller play, and with this the tendency to split into subdivisions or sects speedily revealed itself. Notwithstanding its rigid conservatism in religion regarded as a social institution, the Hindu mind has always shown a marvellous receptivity of new doctrine, provided the new teacher fulfils the Hindu idea of a religious leader and does not place himself in antagonism to the social system with which Hindu life is bound up. Of this type were Rāmānuja (*q.v.*) and Madhva (*q.v.*) of S. India, and the founders of the two earliest sects of Vaiṣnavism, Vallabha in Upper and Western India, and Chaitanya (*q.v.*) in Bengal. The teaching of the former two was based on distinctive philosophic views as to the ultimate problem of the relation of the Supreme Spirit to the human spirit and to the material world; the latter two, while also holding their own distinctive doctrines in regard to the philosophical question, made devotion to Kṛṣṇa and his worship the real centre of their systems. The sects founded by these four teachers are the principal sects of Vaiṣnavism. In addition to these many other minor sects came into existence such as the Rāmānandīs (*q.v.*), or Rāmāwats. Among the Vaiṣnava sects are also included reforming movements such as that of Svāmī Nārāyaṇa, whose teaching was a protest against the revolting immoralities of the Vallabhāchāryans, while the theistic Kabīrpanthīs (*q.v.*) and the Sikh sect founded by Nānak (*q.v.*) find a place in the same list.

1. **Life of Vallabha.**—The Vallabhāchārya sect owes its foundation to Vallabha, who, together with his direct descendants who succeeded him in the headship of the community, was regarded as an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa or as embodying a portion of Kṛṣṇa's essence. The story of Vallabha's birth has come to us with many legendary accretions intended to enhance his authority as a religious teacher and to increase the reverence of his followers.

Vallabha was born about A.D. 1479. He was the second son of a Tailinga Brāhman named Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭ, who along with his wife fled from Benares, where a violent dispute had taken

[1] G. Galloway, *The Principles of Religious Development*, London, 1909, p. 257.

[2] Cf., on St. Teresa, G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914, p. 255.

[3] For a useful discussion of the principles of analogy, teleology, and value in religion see Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 334–360.

[1] See art. SECTS (Hindu).

place between Muhammadans and Sannyāsīs. They found themselves in a wild spot called Champāraṇya, and here the child was born. The legend narrates how a palace of gold sprang up on the lonely spot where the child was born, how the gods showered down flowers, and how divine music filled the air. The parents, trusting in the promise of Kṛṣṇa that their child should be one of his incarnations, left their infant to the protection of the god. On their return journey, after peace had been restored at Benares, they again passed through the place where they had deserted the helpless infant. They found the child alive and well, playing in the midst of a flame of sacrificial fire. They brought him to Benares and gave him the name of Vallabha. When the child reached the age of six or seven, he was placed under the tuition of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭ. The legend, which is written in Brjbhāṣā, goes on to describe the rapidity of his apprehension, which enabled him in the course of four months to master the four *Vedas*, the six *Śāstras* (schools of philosophy), and the eighteen *Purāṇas*. At the age of eleven he lost his father, and, bidding farewell to Gokul, a village on the left bank of the Jumnā, he started on a pilgrimage through India. At a certain town in the south of India he made a rich merchant of the place, named Damodardās, a convert to his doctrine. These two travelled thence to Vijayanagar, where the ancestors of Vallabha on his mother's side lived. At the court of Kṛṣṇa Dēva, the king of the place, Vallabha engaged in a religious disputation with the Śaivas. The king was so pleased that he bestowed on Vallabha rich presents of gold and silver, one portion of which he devoted to the manufacture of a handsome golden waist ornament for the image of the deity in a temple in the city, another to the discharge of debts incurred by his father, retaining only a fourth for his own use.

His success in disputation led to his being elected by the Vaiṣṇavas as their chief with the title of *ācārya*. From this dates the rise of his great influence. He continued his pilgrimage for nine years throughout different parts of India, accomplishing a journey of over 12,000 miles. Returning to Brindāban, he is said to have been honoured by a visit from the god Kṛṣṇa in person, who enjoined him to introduce the worship of Bāla Kṛṣṇa, the infant Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa in his adolescence, which subsequently became widely diffused under the name of Rudra Sāmpradaya.

Vallabhāchārya ultimately settled at Benares. Among the works which he produced there during this residence or during earlier visits to the city was a commentary on the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*. During his lifetime Vallabhāchārya is said to have made 84 devoted proselytes to his doctrine.

2. The Mahārājā Gosāinji. — Vallabhāchārya was succeeded in his *gādī*, *i.e.* his position as *ācārya*, by his son Viṭhalnāth, his eldest son having died soon after his father. This Viṭhalnāth, the second *guru* of the sect, proved an able successor. Like his father, he made long journeys, visiting the same places and in addition extending his travels to Dvārka, through Cutch, and to Mālva and Mevār. Turning southwards, he came to Paṇḍharpur, the seat of the worship of Viṭhoba among the Marāṭhās of the Deccan. He is said to have made 252 disciples. His proselytes came from many classes — Banias, Bhāṭṭias, Kunbīs, Sutārs, Lohārs; a few Brāhmans and Musalmāns were also among his adherents. All, though of various castes, enjoyed the privilege of eating together at the same table—a privilege that was soon rescinded.

Viṭhalnāth, who was known by the name Gosāinji, took up his residence at Gokul, the birthplace of Kṛṣṇa, and was frequently designated Gokul Gosāinji, a name adopted by his male descendants. After his death each of his seven sons established his own *gādi*. They dispersed themselves throughout India in order to diffuse their doctrines. Each claimed to be an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa and made numerous proselytes.

The fourth son, Gokalnāth, was the most celebrated of these propagators of the new doctrine. He infused vitality into the tenets of the community both by his teaching and by his writings, and his descendants have always claimed pre-eminence among the members of the sect. They keep themselves separate from the other communities, while these profess equal veneration for all. It was probably about this period of the dispersion of the sons of Viṭhalnāth that those religious heads first acquired the title of Mahārājā or Mahārājā Gosāinji. The descendants of these Mahārājās now number probably over 70, of whom about ten have their seats in Bombay and one or two at each of the following places: Surat, Ahmadabad, Nagar, Cutch, Porabandar, Amreli, Jodpur, Bundi, Koti. Only two or three of them have any knowledge of Sanskrit; the rest are grossly ignorant and indulge in the worst forms of luxurious living. They endeavour to live up to the title which has been given them in respect of costly apparel and dainty viands. They aspire to the acquisition of wealth and property, and, as their votaries are drawn very largely from the wealthier and more luxurious communities and are for the most part very scrupulous in the observance of religious custom, and as the Mahārājās, on the other hand, are not modest in their exactions, the opportunities of the latter for fulfilling their worldly ambitions are ample. At their various seats they possess temples with residences attached. There they celebrate daily their special worship in the presence of crowds of followers, men and women, and indulge in those licentious practices which have won for them, especially in later times, a shameful notoriety.

The process by which this development was reached is profoundly instructive to the student of Indian religion and is in strict analogy with the history of many other religious and spiritual movements.

3. Hedonistic tenets. — The Vallabhāchāryans have often been called the Epicureans of India, and the history of their cult can be traced through stages similar to those which marked the development of Epicurean morals. Epicurus started from a particular view of the constitution of the world. On it he based his conception of the *summum bonum* as *ἀπαθία*, freedom from anxiety and mental disturbance, but having no explicit association with grossness and sensuality of life. In the hands of his successors these features soon revealed themselves in the coarsest type of hedonism—a result which might have been anticipated from the hedonistic root of the founder's teaching. As of Epicurus, so of Vallabha it may be said that there is no reason to believe that he held the doctrine or sanctioned the practice which by a natural process evolved themselves in the teaching of his successors. His life was not unlike those of the other founders of religious sects in his time. His personal activity was that of a teacher of religion. He made long pilgrimages and gathered, through the influence acquired by his life and teaching, devoted disciples. But his teaching contained the hedonistic root from which all subsequent evils were to spring. He too started from a specific conception of the relation of the Supreme Spirit to the finite spirit. His philosophical tenets have been traced back to the teaching of Viṣṇu Svāmī, a commentator on the texts of the *Veda*; Vallabha taught that individual human spirits were like sparks from the Supreme Spirit and, though separate, identical in essence with it.

On this he based his view that asceticism was not the way by which man should commend himself to God. He maintained that God was not to be worshipped by fasting and self-mortification, that the individual soul was entitled to reverence as a portion of the Supreme Soul, and that the body which enshrined it should be fostered and not subjected to the austerities enjoined in ascetic systems. The 'way' which he advocated was summed up in the name *puṣṭi-mārga*, the way of eating, drinking, and enjoyment.

It has been already indicated that the Vallabhāchārya cult attached itself to Kṛṣṇa, *avatār* of Viṣṇu, and especially to Kṛṣṇa in his adolescence, Bāla Kṛṣṇa, whose amorous sports with the *gopīs*, or cowherdesses, of Mathurā, the modern Mattrā, are the theme of the tenth book of the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*. This book was translated from Sanskrit

into Brjbhāṣā under the name of *Premsāgar* ('Ocean of Love'). It was selected by Vallabhāchārya as the foundation of his system. The original purpose of the book was, it is held, to symbolize spiritual devotion under the figure of earthly love; but in its interpretation by succeeding Mahārājās of the sect it was converted into a code of vicious immorality, not only sanctioning, but enjoining, the most hideous sensuality.

4. **Cult of the guru.**—The *Siddhānta Rahasya*, ascribed to Vallabhāchārya and claimed by him as a direct revelation from God, deals with themes of a different order. It contains the doctrine of the origin of sin and the mode of its expiation. It consists of only about a dozen lines in Sanskrit, in the course of which we find a characteristic suggestion as to the supreme importance of the *guru*, the Gosāinji, the mediator between God and the sinner:

'The offering which has (in the first instance) been enjoyed by its owner is not acceptable by the god of gods. Therefore, in the first instance, in all doings everything should be dedicated.'[1]

The dedication in the first instance, here referred to, is that which takes place when the offering is made to the *guru*, through whom it reaches Kṛṣṇa, of whom he is the manifestation. Of the terrible use made of this doctrine evidence is given below. Another writer of this school is even more explicit in his assertion of the lofty claims of the Gosāinji:

'Whoever holds his *guru* and Śrī Thākurji [the god] to be different and distinct shall be born a *sichāna* [a kind of bird]. Whoever disobeys the orders of his *guru* shall go to Asipatra and other dreadful hells and lose all religious merits.'[2]

Śrī Gokalnāth, that fourth son of Viṭhalnāth above referred to, in his *Vachanāmṛt* ('Nectar of Precept'), in his exposition of the *pushṭi-mārga*, dwells with even more precision on the fate of those who disobey their preceptors:

'He who getting angry in his heart maligns his *guru* and utters harsh terms towards his *guru* becomes dumb, and after that he becomes a serpent. He is then born a creature of the region of the vegetable kingdom, and after that he is born a creature of the region of the dead. As he remembers Śrī Bhagavān [god], in the same way he remembers and repeats in his mind the name of his *guru*.'[3]

Another of the books of the sect runs riot in its laudation of Śrī Gosāinji or Viṭhalnāth, the second in this dynasty of *gurus*.

'He is possessed of all virtues; he is the very personification of the most excellent being [God]; he is all incarnations. He is himself the creator of the endless crores of worlds wherein his glory is diffused all over.'[4]

In the *Gurusevā*, another production in the same line, it is said:

'When Hari [God] is displeased with any one, the *guru* saves him [the sinner] from the effects of the god's displeasure. Therefore a Vaiṣṇava should serve his *guru* with his body and money. The principal *gurus* are Śrī Āchāryaji and Śrī Gosāinji and the whole family called the Vallabha family. The worship of the *guru* is to be performed in the same way as the worship of God.'[5]

This high claim made on behalf of the *guru* is not confined to this one sect. The attitude of many Hindus towards their chosen *gurus* is often marked by a similar reverence; the peculiarity of the claim made on behalf of these Vallabhāchārya *gurus* is that it is put forth on behalf of a family line, a kind of religious dynasty, not of a *guru* chosen in each case by the devotee, but of one who is set over him in virtue of the right of birth and natural succession. This is quite in keeping with the title borne by these Mahārājās and the worldly ambitions with which it was associated. It may also be said to be the root of all the degeneracy and moral corruption that have made their name and the name of their sect so notorious.

5. **Initiation rites.**—In all Vaiṣnava sects there is a special ceremony of initiation into the community accompanied by the repetition of a formula expressing reverence for either Kṛṣna or Rāma. In the Vallabhāchāryan sect this rite may be administered at the early age of three or four years. In some parts of India it is performed at a somewhat later age. A rosary or necklace, called *kaṇṭhi*, of 108 beads made of *tulsi*-wood is passed round the neck of the candidate for initiation, and he is taught the use of the eight-syllabled prayer: '*Śrī Kṛshṇaḥ śaraṇam mama*,' 'The blessed Kṛṣna is my refuge.'[1]

There is a second initiation called *samarpaṇa*, or dedication, which, in the case of males, takes place in the eleventh or twelfth year, and, in the case of females, upon marriage or shortly before it. This rite is also called *Brahmasambandha* ('union with Brahma'). The formula repeated on this occasion begins with the eight-syllabled formula of the first initiation and continues thus:

'I who am suffering the infinite pain and torment produced by enduring for a thousand measured years separation from Kṛṣna do to the worshipped Kṛṣna dedicate my body, organs of sense, life, heart and other faculties, and wife, house, family, property with my own self; I am thy slave, O Kṛṣṇa.'

There is nothing in this formula that goes much beyond the expressions of devotion that one meets with in other forms of Hindu worship. In form it does not go beyond the '*tan, man*, and *dhan*' that enters so constantly into the expression of Hindu devotion. But the sense in which this dedication was enjoined and accepted by the Vallabhāchāryas is made clear in a commentary on Vallabha's *Siddhānta Rahasya*. The commentator, who was no other than the celebrated Gokalnāth, the grandson of Vallabha, the famous fourth son of the second *guru*, Viṭhalnath, thus expounds the formula:

'Therefore in the beginning, even before ourselves enjoying, wives, sons, etc. [*putrādi* includes daughters along with sons] should be made over because of the expression *sarva, vastu* ['all things'] occurring in the text. After marriage, even before using her ourselves, the offering of her [the wife] should be made with a view to her becoming usable [by ourselves].'

6. **Sensual practices.**—In this conception we have the *fons et origo* of the gross sensuality that is bound up with the religious practices of this sect. The amorous deeds of the adolescent Kṛṣna, who is the object of its worship, were understood in their literal carnal sense, and union with Kṛṣna was sought through carnal union with the *guru*, or religious head, who claimed to be the incarnation of the god, through whom alone the god was accessible to the worshipper. It is only when one realizes the hold which this interpretation of the above-quoted formula of initiation took of the blind votaries of these *gurus* that one can conceive the possibility of the debauchery that has so long disgraced the religious exercises of this community, through so many generations. The husband who regards with complacence the desecration of the virtue of his wife, the father who consents to the violation of his daughter by these debauched pretenders to religious sanctity, is obsessed with the monstrous delusion that spiritual gain can come to him and his through the sensual indulgence of his spiritual guide. The male worshipper is himself eager to submit to any degradation that appears to do reverence to these high-priests of defilement. He drinks with avidity the water that has been wrung out of the wet garments of this filthy being, eats with relish the remnants of his meals, chews over again the *pān supāri* (leaf with betel-nut) which has been spat out of the mouth of this divine *guru*,

[1] *Siddhānta Rahasya*, quoted in *Hist. of Sect of Mahārājās*, p. 80 f.
[2] Tract by Harirāya, quoted in *Hist. of Sect of Mahārājās*, p. 82.
[3] *Vachanāmṛt*, quoted in *Hist. of Sect of Mahārājās*, p. 82.
[4] Brjbhāṣā MS, entitled *Aṣṭākohar Ṭīka*, quoted in *Hist. of Sect of Mahārājās*, p. 83.
[5] *Gurusevā*, quoted in *Hist. of Sect of Mahārājās*, p. 84.

[1] Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], p. 185 f.

The immorality of the temple-worship quickly spread itself into the whole life of the community. The *rās mandalī* (carnal love-meeting) became a well-known institution in many places. The purpose of these gatherings was to re-enact the scenes of the mythological story of Kṛṣṇa's amorous sporting with the *gopīs* by the waters and in the woods of Mathurā.

Doctrines and practices such as have been described were bound to call forth, sooner or later, protests from within the community itself. With the spread of education and other enlightening influences some of the better spirits awoke to shame and indignation. One of these was Karsandas Mulji, a resident of Bombay, who in 1856 raised his voice and in the columns of the *Satya Prakāsh* ('The Light of Truth'), a weekly paper, began to fulminate against the exactions and corrupt practices of the Vallabhāchāryan Mahārājās. The Mahārājās had at that time suffered a few set-backs to their pretensions. These furnished an opportunity to the dissatisfied in the community. The Mahārājās had begun an attack on the Brāhmans, of whose influence with the people they appear to have become jealous. Those of their own community who were eager to see abuses among themselves corrected undertook to assist the Mahārājās in their conflict with the Brāhmans on condition that they would reform their own practices. The Mahārājās, yielding to this pressure, agreed to accept the proposed reforms, which, among other things, demanded the cessation of the adulterous behaviour of the Mahārājās towards the women of their families, especially in the winter temple-service at four o'clock in the morning, and of the violation of the young girls of the community. The reformers aimed also at relief from the heavy money exactions which the Mahārājās knew so well how to levy by means of threats of their displeasure. To these and to some other demands of a minor character the alarmed Mahārājās gave an unwilling consent, stipulating that the agreement should not come into operation for a year. Further, the Mahārājās had been worsted in their attempt to secure exemption from appearance in courts of justice, their objection to appear in person being due to the idea that it would be a degradation to them to sit lower than a European. The High Court of Bombay refused to entertain their claim. When, during an action, a litigant proposed to subpœna the Mahārājās as witnesses, they closed their temples, and their followers, who could not take their meals without paying the morning adoration to the Mahārājās and the image, were kept without, fasting. These fasting followers were released from their unhappy plight only on their subscribing a bond, which pledged them to obey the Mahārājās and to undertake in no circumstances to summon them to a court of justice. All this gave rise to a large amount of newspaper criticism, which tended to weaken the prestige of the Mahārājās.

In 1860 the Mahārājā of Surat came to Bombay and, by presiding at the distribution of prizes at the Gujarāti Girls' Schools, appeared to place himself on the side of social reform. Invited to a meeting at which the question of the remarriage of widows was to be discussed, the Mahārājā appeared among the opponents of the suggested reform and apparently got the worst of it in this public discussion. The editor of the *Satya Prakāsh* then challenged the Mahārājā to a discussion in the press. The Mahārājā ventilated his views through the columns of the *Sadharmavardhak* ('Promoter of our Religion'), a paper published under his patronage. The editor of the *Satya Prakāsh* replied in an article entitled 'The Primitive Religion of the Hindus and the Present Heterodox Opinions,' which set forth the heterodox character of the sect of the Mahārājās. In the course of this article he made certain allegations regarding the Mahārājās which became the subject of an action for libel. This article appeared in the year 1860. In the following May the Mahārājā filed an action for libel against the editor and the printer of the paper. The leading men of the Bhāṭṭia community, at the instigation of the Mahārājā, attempted to interfere with the course of justice by resolving that none of the caste, under pain of excommunication, should give evidence against the Mahārājā. This action on the part of the leaders of the community led to a charge being brought against them for conspiracy, on which they were found guilty and sentenced to heavy fines. The Mahārājā libel case came on for hearing on 26th Jan. 1862. This *cause célèbre* occupied the High Court during 24 sittings spread over a period of 40 days. Thirty witnesses were examined for the plaintiff and the same number for the defendant (Karsandas Mulji), some of the latter being men of learning and eminence in the community. The case excited the most profound interest among the different communities in the city. It led to a complete exposure of the lives and practices of the Vallabhāchāryan Mahārājās. The verdict was in favour of the defendant on the main issue of justification, with costs, and for the plaintiff on the defendant's plea of 'not guilty,' without costs. With respect to this part of the plea the Chief Justice took the view that a public writer could not make an attack on the character of an individual in his private capacity, although he might be depraved and an adulterer, and besides that the defendant was not justified, without previous knowledge of the plaintiff's misconduct, in publishing an attack on him, although the allegation subsequently turned out to be true. The Puisne Judge, on the other hand, held that the article was an attack not on the private character of the plaintiff, but on his character as a Mahārājā, or religious preceptor, and that the defendant was quite aware of the existing practices of the sect. The issue of the trial was a complete success for the defendant reformer, an important victory for the cause for which he stood, and a crushing exposure of licentiousness in the high places of religion.

Many who witnessed this trial more than fifty years ago must have hoped that the death-blow had been given to the prestige and to the licentious practices of the Vallabhāchāryan Mahārājās. But the astounding fact is that the Vallabhāchāryan Mahārājās still continue to flourish. About twenty years after the trial a Mahārājā of the sect was found guilty of complicity in a mail robbery and sentenced at Rajkot to a term of imprisonment. One might have expected that the entire Vallabhāchāryan community would have been shocked by this revelation of depravity in a religious leader. This aspect of the case seems to have affected them little. The sentence to imprisonment moved the community on other and quite different grounds. They were stricken with horror at the thought of the danger to the caste of their Mahārājā that was involved in his being condemned to eat the prison food. Leading merchants in Bombay organized a meeting at which it was resolved to petition the Government to relax the prison rules in favour of this sacred personage! Needless to say, their petition was unheeded. Probably in no other country than India would it have been possible for any system to survive such exposure.

This episode in the history of the Vallabhāchāryas has been narrated here for these reasons, that it led to the full disclosure of the real character of the teaching of this sect and of the width of the gulf which lies between morality and religion in the current conceptions of multitudes of the people of India, and that it also illustrates the powerlessness of public opinion, as it exists in India, to grapple with social customs that rest on religious sanctions having their roots deep down in the amorphous soil that is the product of ages of pantheistic thinking.

LITERATURE.—A clear statement of the place of the Vallabhāchāryans is contained in M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891. A very full history of the sect, with a detailed account of the Mahārājā libel case, will be found in a *Hist. of the Sect of Mahārājās or Vallabhāchāryas in W. India*, London, 1865. The chief authority of the sect is the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, the tenth book of which, containing the history of Kṛṣṇa, was translated into Brjbhāṣā with the title *Premsāgar* ('Ocean of Love'). Among the books of the sect are the following: the *Bhagavat Tīkā Subodhini*, the *Siddhānta Rahasya*, both ascribed to Vallabha, the *Vachanāmṛt* ('Nectar of Precept'), ascribed to Śrī Gokalnāth (a kind of commentary on the *Pushti-mārga*), *Gurusevā* ('Guru-Worship'), *Virchita Bhakti Siddhānta Vivṛti* (a commentary by Gokalnāth on the above *Siddhānta Rahasya*, the work of his grandfather), the *Pushti Pravāha Maryādā Tīka* by Harirāya, the *Viṭhalesha-ratnavivarana*, and numerous minor tracts in Sanskrit ascribed to the chief founders of the sect.

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VALUE.—1. **The nature of value.**—Value is one of the last of the great philosophic topics to have received recognition, and even now the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has an article only on economic value. Its discovery was probably the greatest philosophic achievement of the 19th cent., but opinions on the subject are not yet crystallized, and it is still one of the growing points of philosophy and one which seems likely to overshadow older issues. Reflexion at present commonly starts from the antithesis of 'fact' and 'value,' and the difference between the standpoints of 'description' and 'appreciation.' It is widely held that consciousness of value differs in kind from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon fact. It is an attitude assumed towards fact, a weighing of fact in relation to an agent, and his feelings, desires, interests, purposes, needs, and acts; and it expresses his appreciation (approbation) or reprobation (depreciation) of it in this relation. It follows (1) that a certain subjectivity, or, better, a relation to personality, is inherent in all values; (2) that values arise out of the mind's practical attitude, when it reacts upon stimulation, and that for a purely theoretic or contemplative view no values would exist; (3) that values are something superadded upon the other qualities of objects by the mind, in order to express their relation to its purpose and acts, and do not inhere in objects *per se*. Indeed they seem to be even more subjective, variable, and personal than the 'secondary' qualities of objects, and hence are often called 'tertiary' qualities. Nevertheless they are also objectified and projected into objects, when these are regarded as valuable objectively and *per se*, or when the 'validity' of actual valuations and of existing values is called in question. Hence 'superpersonal' or 'over-individual,' and even 'eternal' and 'absolute,' values are recognized by many philosophers. Moreover, the genesis of values and their relations to the objects of desire to which they refer, to the value-feelings which accompany them, and the *valuation-processes* and value-judgments by which they are reached, instigate to a number of psychological inquiries, while their validity raises the deepest questions of epistemology, metaphysics, and religion. All the questions raised, moreover, are complex and contentious, and have had a history which it is not easy to unravel.

2. **The history of the notion.**—Historically the importance of the problem of value has been recognized very slowly, gradually, and grudgingly, and, moreover, its philosophic history is obscure, no early philosophy having made it central, or even expressly considered it. In the light of subsequent developments, however, we may trace its emergence to the Platonic doctrine (in *Republic*, vi.) of the Idea of Good. When Plato conceived the Good as the culmination of the Ideal world and as the principle which was to unify, systematize, and organize all the other 'forms,' he was really putting 'value' above 'being,' conceiving it as the supreme principle of explanation, and expressing the same thought as Lotze, when he declared that the beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. For he was proposing to view all being teleologically, and to make its relation to a 'good' or end (an ethical notion) essential to its being. This was to affirm not only the objective validity of the 'tertiary' qualities, but also their supremacy over the others. Plato, however, did not himself develop this line of reflexion, nor succeed in inducing philosophers in general to investigate the problem of values. To the more naturalistic they seemed all too human to be attributed to ultimate reality. Spinoza's wholesale repudiation of their objectivity, at the end of bk. i. of his *Ethic*, is typical in this respect. The modern developments of the subject proceed from Kant, who, however, came upon it rather incidentally at the end of his philosophic career, and apprehended its significance very imperfectly. Kant's philosophizing had ended in the theoretic *impasse* that certain vitally essential beliefs (in God, freedom, and immortality) could not be scientifically justified. Yet they had to be presupposed, he believed, for purposes of action; *i.e.*, to carry on life it was necessary to act *as if* they were true. He devised therefore the notion of a practical postulate, which was to be practically imperative without being theoretically cogent, attaching it to the Moral Law of unconditional obligation, and endowing it with objects of 'faith,' which were to be carefully distinguished from objects of knowledge. He thus established (1) a dualism between faith and knowledge which had obvious interest for theology, and (2) a supremacy of the practical over the theoretic reason, which was more fruitful, because less naive, than Plato's. The latter result tended to raise 'values' above 'facts,' though the former at first masked this consequence, and it took subsequent philosophy a long time to overcome the Kantian dualism. Both, however, were prolific of further developments, divergent from the main line of post-Kantian speculation, which was too intellectualistic to notice that, just as the existence of fact must be conditioned for us by our knowledge, so our knowledge must in turn be conditioned by our interests and the prospective value of the objects of our cognitive endeavours. For a long time the investigation of value was carried on only in Germany, and even there progress was slow. The first (probably) to see that here was a new problem was F. E. Beneke (1797–1854), the only empirical psychologist among the German philosophers of his time, and hence a victim of Hegel's intolerance. Already in his *Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten* (1821) he sees that, if the science of morals is practical, the notion of value lies at the root of it. He lays it down that the value which we attribute to a thing is determined by the pleasure which it has excited in us, and he makes the whole of ethics depend on feelings of value. In his *Grundlinien des natürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie* (1837–40) he makes it more explicit that valuations arise in the mind as reactions upon stimulations and depressions produced by the things of the external world, distinguishes between subjective and objective valuation (*Wertgebung*), and traces the growth of 'dispositions' to value and to desire. R. H. Lotze (1817–81) revived the Platonic idea that good ranks above being, wanting metaphysic to show that what *ought* to be conditions what *is* (*Metaphysik* of 1841), and that 'Nature is directed to the accomplishment of Good,'[1] and interpreted the 'ontological' proof of the existence of God as meaning that the totality of value cannot be utterly divorced from existence. In the endeavour to vindicate value he had the sympathy of his theological colleague at Göttingen, Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89), who agrees with him that the facts of concrete experience are the source of our general notions, and not, as Platonism has always held, pale reflexions of the latter. Hence personal experience is not deducible from metaphysics, but *vice versa*.[2] Ritschl, however, started rather from the Kantian dualism of faith and knowledge and tried to differentiate them still further. Faith he equipped with distinct objects, those of religion—an independent method, which it shared with ethics and æsthetics—distinct from that of metaphysics and science, and formulated in value-judgments, differ-

[1] *Microcosmus*[4], Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1894, i. 396.
[2] *Theologie und Metaphysik*, Bonn, 1881, pp. 32–40.

ent in kind from theoretical judgments, though equally capable of validity and certainty. It was therefore to misconstrue the essential meaning of religious affirmations to take them as expressions of theoretic insight rather than of moral trust. It is mainly to Ritschl that is due the current antithesis between value-judgments and judgments of fact, and the attempt to regard the sciences as different in kind according as they use the one or the other. Ritschl, however, recognized that this separation could not be really carried through. He observes:

'All continuous cognition of the things which excite sensation is not only accompanied but also guided by feeling' (pleasure-pain, as indicative of value for self, by way of enhancement or inhibition), and 'in so far as attention is necessary to attain the end of knowledge, will becomes the vehicle of the purpose of exact cognition; the proximate motive of will, however, is feeling, as expressing that a thing or an activity is worth desiring. . . . Value-judgments therefore are what determine all connected knowledge of the world, even when it is carried out in the most objective fashion. Attention during scientific observation . . . always declares that such knowledge has a value for him who exercises it.'[1]

This seems to render all theoretic judgments dependent on, and subordinate to, value-judgments; but Ritschl distinguishes between concomitant and independent value-judgments. In the sciences value-judgments accompany the theoretic, whereas 'independent value-judgments are all cognitions of moral ends or impediments thereto in so far as they excite moral pleasure or displeasure, or otherwise set the will in motion to appropriate goods or to ward off evils.' The religions also are composed of such independent value-judgments expressing man's attitude towards the world. From Ritschl's position it was easy to pass to that of W. Windelband (1848–1915), who, while sharply distinguishing between judgments and evaluations or judgments about judgments (*Beurteilungen*), emphasized that the latter are involved in every judgment in that it affirms or denies, approves or disapproves. Logic, therefore, becomes a science of values, a third normative science, along with ethics and æsthetics, and like them aims at the discovery of universally valid 'norms.' Philosophy becomes the critical study of the universally valid values; their recognition is its duty and its aim.[2] Windelband was followed by H. Rickert[3] and H. Münsterberg (1863–1916).[4] The Austrian schools of C. von Ehrenfels (1850–) and A. Meinong (1853–1920) devote themselves to the discussion of the objects and sorts of values, and their relation to desire and will, the laws of the valuation-process, and the accompanying feelings, and apply to all values the economic law of marginal utility. The rise of pessimism and the influence of Schopenhauer (1788–1860), by raising the question of the value of life as a whole, emphasized the importance of values. F. W. Nietzsche (1844–1900) effectively drew attention to the transformations of values, and set himself, before he went mad, to bring about a 'transvaluation' (*Umwertung*) of all the accepted values. Josiah Royce (1848–1917) acclimatized the distinction between appreciation and description in the English-speaking world with his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892), and since then there has been a good deal of (rather unsystematic) discussion of the problems of value, especially in America, though the intellectualistic bias of the dominant 'idealism' has been unfavourable to it. The pragmatists, however, were glad to recognize the presence of valuations in cognitive processes, as a proof of the fictitious nature of 'pure' thought and 'absolute' truth. They emphasize the human, purposive, and personal character of value, tend to regard all values as relative, primarily to the particular situation which is valued, and declare the existence and efficacy of values to be plain, empirical facts.

[1] *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[4], Bonn, 1895–1900, iii. 194 f., Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1900, p. 204.
[2] *Präludien*, Freiburg i. Br., 1884.
[3] *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*[2], Tübingen, 1904.
[4] *The Eternal Values*, Boston and London, 1908.

3. **Sorts and criteria of value.**—As the result of this historical development it is generally admitted that distinct species of value exist, though there is no agreement as to what they are. However, it is clear that several sciences have been specialized to study them. Thus (1) *economic* value has long been recognized as a fundamental notion of political economy, which, ever since Adam Smith, has divided it into value in use, *i.e.* the utility of objects for human purposes, or, as J. S. Mill said, their 'capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose,' and value in exchange, *i.e.* their power to induce or compel people to pay (other valuables) for the use of them. The former is simply teleological value, which refers to the relation of means and end; the latter arises when an object is not only useful but also difficult to procure, and is the special concern of economics (*q.v.*).

(2) That *ethics* deals with values is also agreed, though there is much dispute as to what the specific ethical values are and how they are related.

(3) *Æsthetic* values are also beyond dispute.

(4) *Pleasure* must be regarded as a positive and *pain* (unpleasantness) as a negative value, since even the most ascetic do not really succeed in holding that pleasure is, or in denying that pain is, as such bad. The opposite doctrine, that all values are ultimately reducible to pleasure-pain, is commoner, but need not disturb the classification of values. For, even if the question whether objects are valuable because they give pleasure or give pleasure because they are desired (valued) were decided in favour of the former alternative, it would still be true that the other values are at least relatively independent. Consciousness of value does not directly imply consciousness of pleasure-pain, nor vary concomitantly with it; *e.g.*, in conscious wrongdoing an ethical value which is felt not as pleasant, but as painful, is nevertheless recognized. Similarly the æsthetic value of a work of art may be recognized, which is yet declared to give no pleasure and to leave the spectator 'cold.'

(5) It has been mentioned that, according to the school of Ritschl, the objects of the *religious* consciousness are really values, and affirmations about them are essentially value-judgments. And, though other theologians dissent from it, this view gets considerable support both from the psychology of religion, which interprets religious beliefs as expressions of spiritual needs, and from every theological admission that faith, as well as reason, is operative in the apprehension of religious truth.

(6) There are good reasons for recognizing the distinctiveness of *biological* or *survival*-values. For they are capable of objective scientific study, and cannot be simply represented, as Herbert Spencer thought, by the hedonic values. Pleasures are not always conducive to life, nor are all pains evil. The relations of survival to pleasure-pain are complex; so are its relations to the ethical values, as is vividly brought out by the ethics of pessimism. Moreover, the survival-values enter into all other values: the value of every being, belief, and institution is affected by its survival-value—between the limits of such a high degree of positive value as to compel universal assent and so high a negative value as to entail complete extinction and universal reprobation.

(7) Several schools of philosophy hold that logic is the science of *cognitive* values, and that truth is the positive, error the negative, value; and this

treatment is often implied also where it is not avowed. It would seem to be borne out by the far-reaching analogy between logic, ethics, and æsthetics as 'normative' sciences, and proved by the conformity of logic with the criteria generally used to distinguish values.

As criteria two primary oppositions appear to be used: (1) that between existence and value, the 'is' and the 'ought.' Even though there are in man natural tendencies to approve of what has succeeded in establishing itself, and to bring into being what is considered worthy of being—*i.e.* both to realize ideals and to idealize the actual—there remains a considerable discrepancy between the existent and the valuable. It cannot (ordinarily) be argued that, because a thing exists, it is valuable, or that, because it is valuable, it must exist. What is need not be what ought to be, nor need what ought to be exist. Hence the 'laws' of a science of values are not natural uniformities, but 'norms,' *i.e.* precepts or imperatives; they formulate not what actually does happen, but what ought to happen 'normally,' *i.e.* if the persons concerned recognize and submit to the order proper to the subject.

(2) Values appear to be positive and negative. As they express the attitude of a subject to an object, they indicate the acceptance or rejection, pursuit or avoidance, of the former, the attractiveness or repulsiveness of the latter. They occur therefore in couples of antithetical predicates, both admitting of degrees of intensity. Hence values may compensate, cancel, or neutralize each other, and the final value of an object may vary according to the balance between its positive and negative value, or become practically *nil*. A state of consciousness which is 'neutral,' and an object which is 'indifferent,' are cases of such zero values.

(3) All values are disputable. They involve a relation to a valuer whose valuation need not be correct, and need not be accepted. The allegation of a value, therefore, is not equivalent to its validity. All values are to be understood as primarily claims to value, which may be allowed, disallowed, or reversed, when other values are considered. In some cases such reversal is normal: thus, if *A* and *B* are enemies or have opposite interests, what is 'good' for *A* is normally 'bad' for *B*, and *vice versa*.

With the aid of these criteria the following kinds of value can now be enumerated. (1) *Hedonic* values are the pleasant (positive) and the unpleasant or painful (negative). (2) *Æsthetic* values are the beautiful (positive) and the ugly (negative); also the attractive-repulsive, the fitting-improper, the noble-vulgar, the elegant-coarse, and many others. (3) *Utility* values are the good (positive) and the bad (negative); also the useful-useless. These last, though they properly have reference to the relation of means and ends ('the good'), naturally pass over into ethics, when this science is conceived 'teleologically,' *i.e.* as the science of the final end or supreme good. (4) Other *ethical* values, relative to other conceptions of ethics, are marked by the oppositions of 'good' and 'evil,' 'right' and 'wrong,' 'ought' and 'ought not.' 'Good' and 'bad' seem sometimes to be used absolutely in ethics, but this usage hardly proves the existence of 'absolute' values. On closer inspection, the meaning is seen to be good or bad *for* the ethical end, however that is conceived. (5) *Religious* conceptions reveal their character as values by the frequency of such dualistic antitheses as God-devil, salvation-damnation, election-reprobation, holy-sinful, sacred-profane; also by the frequency with which religious arguments turn out to be postulates of faith. (6) *Logic* falls into line with the values 'true' and 'false,' 'truth' and 'error.' These also claim to be absolute; but whether what is believed true is so may be disputed, just as whether what is believed good, or right, or beautiful, or valuable, or conducive to survival actually has the value which it claims. Even what is felt as pleasant is not always conceded to be a 'true' pleasure, nor is every 'imaginary' pain said to be 'real.' This illustrates also a further confirmation of the whole doctrine, that the various value-predicates are freely transferable from one species of value to another.

4. **Value and fact.**—The recognition of logic as a science of values entails a radical revision of the antitheses between fact and value, existence and value, the 'theoretic' and the 'practical.' If all 'truths' are values, there can be no absolute separation of the practical, the sphere of values, from the theoretic, the sphere of facts. Facts, being the objects of truths, must all imply values, and it must be vain to search for any existence which is wholly free from valuations. Now this is precisely what history shows. (1) The search for 'true reality' in pure and unadulterated 'fact,' uncontaminated by any work of the mind, in an unconditional datum which has merely to be recognized, has always been vain. Only the moral to be drawn is not, as idealism supposes, that reality is the work of 'pure thought.' The thought which cannot be rooted out is a valuing thought, which is aiming at ends and selecting means, and accepting, rejecting, and variously manipulating the data presented to it in the whole process of 'recognizing' reality. Thus the absolute antithesis between fact and value collapses, because fact without value cannot be found. (2) The very fact that it is considered so desirable to find it proves that it is impossible to do so. For the importance attributed to the discovery of fact, and the eulogistic sense in which 'reality' is opposed to 'appearance' or 'illusion,' are, in fact, values. This comes out especially in doctrines about the 'degrees of reality,' which are plainly degrees of value, or about the distinction between 'reality' and 'existence.' (3) It is not psychologically possible to reach any 'fact,' except by a process permeated throughout by values, viz. a purposive endeavour to attain an end ('good') by a choice of the 'right' means, which implies selective attention, preferences for what seems valuable, and the influence of concomitant value-feelings and of a variety of prejudices and forms of bias. (4) Lastly, it seems a conclusive logical reason for holding that every 'fact' alleged must contain a latent value, that it claims not only to be 'true' but also implicitly to be better than any other judgment it was possible to make under the circumstances. Its maker was probably aware of this, and consciously preferred it to all alternatives that occurred to him; but, even where he did not think of any, they remain logically conceivable, and hence the actual judgment is only justifiable by its logical claim to be the best. Hence the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from even the merest and most stubborn 'fact.'

Nor, conversely, can a recognition of fact be wholly eliminated from knowledge. Pure value exists as little as pure fact. It would be pure fancy or sheer postulation, and neither fancies nor postulates are elaborated without regard to fact. They are made to be realized, and, when they are recognized as impossible, their value is destroyed or impaired. It is said to be 'no use' to postulate the impossible or to cherish utterly unrealizable ideals. This recognition of fact, however, is always relative to the existing state of knowledge, and may be modified as knowledge grows. Knowers are often conscious of this, and assume their facts for the purposes of an inquiry or a science, hypo-

thetically and experimentally. Hence it is not to be supposed that what is taken as fact, and formally is 'fact,' must remain so. It may turn out to be only a methodologically convenient 'fiction.' In general it may be concluded that, since values inhere in all the 'facts' that are recognized as such, they are themselves facts, and that the antithesis between values and facts cannot be made absolute. Values are not simply fortuitous and gratuitous additions to facts, which are merely subjective and should be eliminated by strict science, but are essential to cognitive process and compatible with any sort and degree of objectivity. Facts too are always reactions—upon prior facts—and are generated by their evaluation; and, moreover, these prior facts may have been merely hypothetical constructs recommended by their prospective value.

5. Value and existence.—It would seem to follow from the relations between value and fact that values cannot be denied existence in any world that can exist for man, and this in several senses. (1) They are operative in and on human minds, and find expression in human acts and embodiment in human institutions; (2) they can occur in, and relatively to, any universe of diction, however fanciful; (3) hence also in ideals and fictions, both of which are sometimes said to be incapable of real existence, and cited as objections to the connexion of values with existence. But both must be so related to real existence as to be applicable to it and to conduce to its successful manipulation. Otherwise they become false ideals and futile fictions. Also an ideal which is recognized as impossible appears to lose *pro tanto* its obligatoriness and power of attraction. 'Ultra posse nemo obligatur.'

Whether it is possible to infer the existence of a valuable object from a recognition of its value alone is a question of great importance for religion. For the objects of the religious consciousness appear to be largely or wholly of this kind, and the religious 'proofs' of their existence to be ultimately such inferences. They are, moreover, stubbornly persisted in, in spite of the protests of common sense against their validity, and have an important function also in the other sciences, in which they are not recognized so openly, but masquerade as 'axioms' and '*a priori* truths.' In discussing then in its generality this inference from value to existence, we should remember that all values are initially claims, which may fail of validation; hence it will hardly seem valid to rest the reality of the valuable objects on what may be an unsound claim, viz. on the demand for them alone, unsupported and unconfirmed by experience. Logically they are to start with nothing but postulates. It may be legitimate to take them as methodological principles, but even then they must be regarded as hypotheses to be assumed experimentally, until they have adequately approved and verified themselves by their applications to the actual problems which they concern. For example, it may be legitimate to extract from the actual pursuit of ends and of happiness by men the methodological assumptions that all things are to be regarded as tending towards a supreme all-embracing end and towards universal happiness; but can it be maintained that *therefore* such an end is actually operative, or that perfect happiness (*i.e.* everlasting and unalloyed pleasure unaccompanied by pain) is possible? To justify such inferences two further assumptions would seem to be required, viz. that the whole of reality is conformable with human nature and bound to satisfy its demands. Now these assumptions, traditionally described as the axiom of the ultimate rationality of existence, are evidently themselves nothing but values for which existence is postulated, and, if they are to be admitted as axiomatic truths on their own assurance, it is difficult to see what limits can be set to the postulation of objects of desire. Even as it is, methodological postulates are given great, and perhaps undue, facilities in verifying themselves, because, so long as they work at all, their failures can always be ascribed to the imperfection of our knowledge, and so are not counted against them. Thus nothing short of total failure to predict the course of events need lead us to abandon the postulate of their 'causal connexion.' Hence the testing of a value-postulate always, in a sense, presupposes its truth—though not in any sense that makes this presupposition alone a sufficient reason for regarding it as absolutely true; still it is better to get a postulated value confirmed by experience than to accept the mere recognition of value as an adequate guarantee of its existence. What kinds and amounts of experimental confirmation are to be considered adequate to verify the existence of postulated objects of value will naturally depend on the specific subject-matter, and, as in addition the various values sought and got need not be in harmony with each other, and some may prefer one sort and others another, and as, moreover, the relevance of some of the values found to the existences to be proved may be called in question, opinions will probably long continue to differ on these matters.

6. Value and validity. — It follows from the above that the transition from value to validity is by no means a matter of course, though this is often assumed, both as regards ethical and as regards logical values. In both cases the motive is the difficulty of validating value-claims, which is a long, and indeed theoretically an unending, process. Hence the temptation to allege absolute and self-proving values which are independent of their working in experience. The absolute values alleged, however, are only formal claims, as comes out very clearly in Kant's account of the absolute value of personality and of the 'law' of duty. The declaration that every person should be treated as an end in himself is merely a recognition of the formal claim that every person makes to be so treated (even though he never is so treated, and apparently could not be, in the actual order of things), which may serve as a definition of personality; while the moral 'law,' that duty should be unconditionally fulfilled, is merely a paraphrase of the obligatoriness of the ought-value; in neither case is any light thrown on the questions how, concretely, any one should be treated, or what, concretely, his 'duties' are. Similarly every judgment formally claims to be true, absolutely and unconditionally, and, as it mentions no restrictions to its claim, it may be said to be so; but, as this is so, however false a judgment may turn out to be, it establishes no presumption in favour of its real truth. Thus it is quite possible, and indeed necessary, to inquire whether the values claimed are really possessed, and to question the validity of the values actually recognized. This indeed is one of the chief occupations of a critical philosophy. It means that the problem of value occurs also in the sphere of values; the antithesis of 'ought' and 'is,' which was supposed to differentiate value and fact, arises again over the value of values, when they are taken as facts for the purpose of assessing their value. The explanation perhaps is that error and failure are possible in all human operations, and hence also in the estimation of values. The values which are claimed are subject to revision and correction, and, if it is decided that they are, but ought not to be, they can be called either 'false' or 'wrong'; for it is intrinsically as legitimate to use the value-

predicates of logic as those of ethics to describe their failure.

The difficulty of determining the precise connexion between value and validity is, however, largely due to the obscurity of the notion of validity itself. We are accustomed to regard validity at first as an absolute and (theoretically) unquestionable degree of value, and to illustrate it from the ideal validity of logic and of ethics. On examination, however, this sense of validity appears to be merely formal, and to be nugatory or null as a guarantee of real value. For in both these sciences the valid and the valuable fall apart. Neither is the valuable necessarily valid, nor is the valid necessarily valuable. Every moral order makes extensive use of inferior moral motives; every science uses probable but invalid reasonings. Whether the ideal validity is ever reached, or would be valuable if it were, seems more than doubtful. Hence it seems proper to reduce the meaning of validity to a high, or generally recognized and practically indisputable, degree of value, and to make value determine validity, and not validity value.

7. Value and valuation.—If value is conferred upon an object by a personal attitude towards it, it is clear that all objects can be valued by being included in a valuation-process. Many objects, however, are so variously valued according to circumstances, or are so rarely important enough to be valued at all, that they are conceived as neutral or indifferent *per se*. So it is only if an object is constantly valued in a particular way that its value adheres to it and it comes to seem intrinsically valuable. For it then emancipates itself from the personal valuation and makes its valuation look like a mere recognition of an already existing value. Values acquire objectivity in other ways also. Thus the personal reaction expressed in a value-judgment carries a formal claim to universality, since every one initially regards himself as the measure of all things, until he is instructed by the dissent of others. This claim therefore maintains itself only while it is not disputed, and should not be taken as more than methodological. By the comparison of value-judgments it appears that different persons value very differently; hence many value-judgments, being in dispute, are regarded as 'merely subjective.' About others many or all are found to agree, and these may thereby acquire every degree of 'objectivity.' Thus objects which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values. A value that has risen to be objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though, under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite. Thus, once a literary work is ranked as a 'classic,' its value remains uncontested, even though few care for it or even read it, except for examination purposes; and King Midas no doubt continued to think gold most valuable in spite of his inability to digest it. It cannot always be assumed therefore that, because a value is current and is recognized, it is fully functional, any more than that it is right.

There are then plenty of objective values, which any valuer encounters and has to recognize as given. But they may nevertheless all be conceived as products of valuation-processes, and as presupposing prior value-judgments. For when the valuation of an object has been repeated and has grown familiar, the conscious and reflective value-judgment becomes superfluous, and an immediate apprehension of value results, just as immediate perception supersedes judgment about familiar objects of cognition. In other cases, it is true, this process does not occur in the history of the individual, but it can then be traced in that of the race, whose achievements the individual inherits. An object may, *e.g.*, be apprehended as pleasant, beautiful, or right, without a judgment or process of valuation; but the immediacy of its value-claim is no bar to any inquiry into why it is so valued, how it has come to be so, and whether it ought to be so, and really is as beautiful, right, or pleasant as it seems to be. Hence the values which are psychically data, and psychologically immediate, may always be logically mediated and made objects of valuation-processes and explicit value-judgments. They then function as facts to be evaluated.

8. Transvaluations.—The process of reflective reconsideration of given values continually leads to changes in their status. Hence 'transvaluations' must be regarded as normal and entirely legitimate occurrences in every sphere of values, though they are not everywhere as socially prominent as in the annual changes of the fashions.

As Dewey says, 'All valuation is in some degree a revaluation. Nietzsche would probably not have made so much of a sensation, but he would have been within the limits of wisdom, if he confined himself to the assertion that all judgment, in the degree in which it is critically intelligent, is a transvaluation of prior values.'[1]

One sufficient reason for this is that, strictly speaking, it is not psychologically possible to repeat a valuation. The second time the valuation has lost its novelty, and the delight of discovery is gone; it is acquiring familiarity and beginning to breed contempt or indifference; or again it is growing easier, and the resistance to it is diminishing, as habituation renders it less repugnant. Moreover, valuations necessarily vary according to the changes in the organic needs which condition them. His tenth penny bun will neither taste as good nor be valued as highly by a hungry boy as his first. No doubt these changes in value are little noticed because many of them are slight, unimportant, and ephemeral; but they would anyhow be obscured by the general bias in favour of stability. Unless it is discounted, it will hardly be recognized that stable values are exceptions rather than the rule. They bulk large because they are attended to and selected. Their stability is always more or less a construction for methodological purposes, like the extraction of stable objects out of the flux of happenings. It is always to some extent a fiction, because it is never absolute, and because there are no eternal values, none that endure unchanged and untransformed by new valuations for ever, unless it be life itself —so long as that lasts. It may even become a dangerous illusion, if its character is not understood, and it is made an obstacle to salutary and necessary changes. In such changes the old values always condemn the new, and *vice versa*, often with tragic results. Transvaluations are the stuff out of which heroes and martyrs of 'reform' or 'loyalty' are made, at every step in human progress. The question of what is the right value is unanswerable for the time being, because it is precisely the question which is being fought out. But we can predict that such changes will always be opposed, for there is always a conservative and a progressive party with respect to any change. These party attitudes are essentially valuations, as any one can discover from himself, if he is open-minded, and also distracted, enough to have a 'cross-bench mind' and to feel the force of both the opposite contentions. Nor are these the only conflicts which may lead to a change of values. Every society, and nearly every soul, is full of conflicts between opposing valuations, and any variation in their relative strengths may entail a change in values. The chief agency which blinds

[1] *Essays in Experimental Logic*, London, 1916, p. 386.

us to these transvaluations is the stability of words; for these change their form much less rapidly than their meaning.

9. **Conclusions.**—The above survey of the problems of value may be regarded as confirming most of the preliminary points noticed in § 1. The philosophic importance of the subject has been attested by the great variety and universal prevalence of values. The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as a recognition of the supremacy of the category of personality, has maintained itself and proved a clue to the labyrinth of values. It also renders somewhat nugatory the psychological debates of the schools of Meinong and von Ehrenfels as to whether values are rooted in feeling, will, or desire. For a personal attitude is a concern of the whole man and not of psychological abstractions. If, however, it is thought necessary to pick one among such psychological phrases, it is probably best to say that value is a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, towards an object of interest. For few are likely to dispute that 'interests' are relative to personality. This relativity, however, is not to be regarded as importing any objectionable subjectivity into values, just because it proves to be the source also of their objectivity. For it turns out that all objects are pervaded by values and constituted for man by valuations, and hence their avowed values may just as rightfully belong to them as the values latent in their other qualities. Accordingly the opposition between value and fact breaks down. 'Facts' are themselves values, values established in the endeavour to analyse out the factor of givenness contained in experience, and presupposing purposive manipulation of apparent 'facts.' They are thus 'made' things, though they are not made out of nothing, but out of previously recognized facts which are subjected to criticism to determine what they 'really are.' Values are also acts in so far as they presuppose valuations, purposive manipulations of data, and judgments; also in that they have prospective reference to action, and are intended to guide it. Accordingly, the belief that values belong to the practical side of life is well founded, and even truer than it seemed; for in ultimate analysis logic also is a science of values. Its 'theoretic' values presuppose purposes, selections, choices, and judgments which are acts, and do not differ in kind from those which are openly 'practical.' It is clear also that the notion of value as something gratuitously superadded upon fact must be modified, if it is interpreted as meaning that values are something unreal, artificial, and optional. Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they are ejected from it only by an effort of abstraction, which is relative to certain restricted purposes, and is never quite successful. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us.

LITERATURE.—The literature is extensive but scattered, and often raises the questions about value only incidentally and in connexion with other problems. The historical part of it has been mentioned above in § 2; the modern is still largely contained in periodicals, in English especially in the *Journal of Philosophy and Psychology* (from 1915), in discussions conducted between W. M. Urban (vol. xiii. [1916] nos. 17, 25, xiv. [1917] 12, 26, xv. [1918] 15), J. Dewey (xii. [1915] 19, xv. 10), H. W. Schneider (xiv. 6, 26), R. B. Perry (xiv. 7), D. W. Fisher (xiv. 21), F. C. S. Schiller (xii. 25, xv. 19), W. R. Wells (xv. 18), etc. In *Mind* artt. by S. Alexander (new ser., i. [1892] 31 ff.), J. S. Mackenzie (iv. [1895] 425 ff.), O. C. Quick (xix. [1910] 218 ff.), may be mentioned. From the German literature on 'axiology,' A. Meinong, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, Graz, 1894, *Ueber Annahmen*, Leipzig, 1902; C. von Ehrenfels, *System der Werttheorie*, 2 vols., do. 1897–98; J. C. Kreibig, *Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie*, Vienna, 1902; G. Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1892–93, and *Philosophie des Geldes*, Leipzig, 1900; H. Maier, *Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens*, Tübingen, 1908, must be mentioned. In English W. M. Urban, *Valuation its Nature and Laws*, London, 1909, is as yet the only work expressly and solely devoted to the theory of values, but the importance of the subject is being recognized in all quarters. Cf. B. Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, London, 1912, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, do. 1913, for the absolutist attitude towards the subject; H. W. Stuart, in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by J. Dewey and others, Chicago, 1903, and in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917; H. M. Kallen, 'Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art and Religion,' *ib.*; F. C. S. Schiller, *passim*, esp. in *Humanism*[2], London, 1912, chs. i., iii., and ix., for the pragmatist; also J. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge, 1918, ch. xvi. § 2; and C. T. H. Walker, *The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value*, Oxford, 1919.

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VAMPIRE.—1. Introduction.—A vampire may be defined as (1) the spirit of a dead person, or (2) his corpse, re-animated by his own spirit or by a demon, returning to sap the life of the living, by depriving them of blood or of some essential organ, in order to augment its own vitality. This forms a particular aspect of the general belief that ghosts, or spirits sent by sorcerers, can annoy the living in various ways, or cause their sickness or death.[1] The vampire is often one who has died an untimely death, or whose after life is unhappy, or a dead sorcerer, wizard, or other obnoxious person. Blood being a well-known soul- or life-vehicle, it was supposed that ghosts (or vampires) were eager to obtain it, as is seen from the well-known example of the shades for whom Odysseus sacrificed sheep on his visit to Hades,[2] as well as from the custom of pouring blood upon graves. Tylor suggests that, when it was seen how certain persons grew thin and bloodless day after day, the easy explanation was that a nocturnal ghost or demon was sucking out their life.[3] Hence the vampire belief might originate. The superstition is also connected with the fear which is aroused by the dead, partly because they are often seeking or calling the living, and, in those aspects of it which concern the return of the revitalized corpse, it is an extension of what may have been a primitive conception, viz. that the dead have a life of their own in the grave, which was, in fact, often erected as a kind of house, more elaborate than the houses of the living. Many tales both from savage and from barbaric peoples show that the dead are still living in the tomb and can encounter any intruder upon it (as in Scandinavian belief), or come forth from it to talk and feast with the living or to cause them annoyance. It was also held that a malicious spirit might take possession of a corpse and vitalize it for sinister purposes. The boundary-line between life and death seems to have been but vaguely defined. To prevent the return of the dead, whether bodily or as a ghost, many precautions were in use—*e.g.*, enclosing the grave with a high fence, piling heavy stones upon it, diverting the course of a stream in order to bury in its bed and then permitting it to flow as before, binding the corpse securely (though this was done for other reasons also) or mutilating it.[4]

2. Range and examples of the vampire superstition.—While the most gruesome examples of this superstition (the vampire as a revitalized corpse) are to be met with among the Slavic peoples, in modern Greece, and in China, it is found in many other parts of the world and has been entertained in remote ages. It is not easily separated from

[1] See, *e.g.*, *ERE* i. 540.

[2] *Odyssey*, xi. 34 f.; H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*[3], Philadelphia, 1898, p. 113 ff.; cf. art. BLOOD, § 7.

[3] *PC*[3] ii. 191.

[4] Numerous examples are given by J. G. Frazer, 'On Certain Burial Customs as illustrative of the Primitive Theory of the Soul,' *JAI* xv. [1886] 65; and in artt. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory), § XI., INDONESIANS, § 12; J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, Paris, 1908–10, i. 471; H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*[3], London, 1916, p. 271.

other beliefs of a like kind. Not only the dead, whether in bodily or in ghostly form, prey upon the living, but demons also, who sometimes have originated from ghosts, suck the blood of the living or feed on corpses.

Beliefs of this kind regarding spirits of certain dead persons are found sporadically in Polynesia, Melanesia, Indonesia, in India, and among African and South American tribes. Among higher races traces of the idea of the dead feeding on the living are found among the ancient Babylonians and other Semites, and in Egypt regarding the *khu*. In ancient Scandinavia the idea that the dead were alive in their barrows gave rise to the belief that they might become unhallowed monsters of the vampire kind, as is seen from the *Grettis Saga*. Parallels occur in Saxon England and among the early Teutons and Celts. In modern Greece the vampire belief has prevailed for many centuries, but largely moulded by Slavic influences.[1] The Slavic superstition holds that various persons become vampires after death. The corpse is revitalized and thirsts for blood. Its ravages begin with relatives, then it attacks other victims, and these in turn become vampires. When the grave of a suspected vampire is opened, the corpse is found undecayed, the lips stained with blood. Its ravages occur by night: the grave must be re-entered by cock-crow, else the vampire must remain wherever he is, stiff and helpless. A great epidemic of vampire superstition occurred in Hungary in the 18th cent., which was investigated by a royal commission.[2] In China a vampire belief exists, and offers a curious parallel to that of the Slavs.[3]

3. Rites of riddance.—Among the Slavs, when a grave is opened and the corpse is found to be fresh, swollen with blood, and life-like, it is transfixed through the region of the heart with a stake of aspen or maple (Russia), blackthorn or hawthorn (Serbia), but this must be done with one blow, for two blows would restore it to life. A suspected corpse is also buried in this way. A vampire at Laibach in 1672 is said to have pulled out the stake and thrown it back.[4] A person who committed suicide was often buried at cross-roads, the body transfixed with a spear or stake, in Britain and elsewhere, in order that the ghost might not walk, but perhaps in earlier superstition lest it should become a vampire. This was forbidden in England by law in 1824.[5]

Sometimes also the head of the vampire was cut off.[6] The heads of murderers whose spirits the living feared were also cut off and destroyed, or set between the legs or beneath the body. Another effectual way was to burn the corpse to ashes, but care was taken to drive back into the fire every creature which might come from it—worms, snakes, beetles, birds, etc.—lest the vampire should have embodied itself in one of them, and so resume its foul work. This was done among the Slavs, and in Bulgaria a sorcerer armed with a saint's picture is supposed to drive the vampire into a bottle containing some of its foul food, and, when corked up, the bottle is thrown into the fire.[1] In Greece any corpse which is found not to have suffered dissolution, as well as any suspected of being a vampire, was, and even now still is, exhumed, cut to pieces, and burned, to prevent its further wandering as a *revenant*. Boiling water or oil was poured on the grave, and the heart was torn out of the body and dissolved in vinegar.[2] This is a reversion to the old pagan custom of cremation of the dead, and, in spite of Slavic influences, the Slavic method of staking the body is not in use.

In China suspected corpses were allowed to decay in the open air before burial, or, when buried, were often exhumed and burned. In the absence of the corpse from the grave, the coffin-lid was removed, thus letting in fresh air, which prevents the body from re-entering it. When the corpse was roaming about, rice, red peas, and pieces of iron were strewn round the grave; it could not pass these, and was found stiff and dead on the ground, and could then be burned.[3]

To guard against the attacks of vampires, various charms, amulets, sacred symbols, and magic herbs are commonly used in the various countries where the belief exists.

4. Love motive in the vampire belief.—Sometimes the vampire may have intercourse with the widow or other woman. This is part of a widespread belief that the dead or ghosts can have sexual union with the living, and, as far as revitalized corpses are concerned, this motive is found in the ancient Greek story of the girl Philinnion, who after her death was found with the youth Machates in her father's house as his lover, leaving him at dawn.[4] In such stories as this the vampire is linked to the ghostly *mahr*, or nightmare, in its erotic aspect on the one hand—the *mahr* comes into a room through the keyhole, as the vampire does—and to the mediæval *succuba* on the other, in so far as the latter, like other erotic demons, preys upon the vital powers of man, so destroying them.

The vampire-lover theme is also illustrated by the 'Dead Rider' cycle, as in Burger's *Lenore* or Scott's spirited version, *William and Helen*. Burger's poem is based on the folk-belief that a dead man appears to those dearly loved—lover, wife, or child—because they sorrow so much, or in order to draw them to the grave. The living person rides with him on horseback or follows him, ignorant that he is really dead. Usually they reach the churchyard. The corpse sinks into his house—the grave—and the living barely escapes being entombed, or sometimes dies at the grave. Of this there are Scandinavian, Icelandic, Albanian, Breton, Scots, and English versions, and it is even found among the Araucanians as a purely native tale.[5]

5. Vampire and wer-wolf.—Attention has been drawn elsewhere[6] to the connexion between the kindred superstitions of the vampire and the wer-animal. The main links are that the dead may become wer-wolves or other wer-animals and prey on the living,[7] and, as in Greece and among the

[1] J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folk-Lore and Ancient Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 361 ff.; Leo Allatius, *De quorundam Græcorum opinationibus*, Cologne, 1645, ch. 12 ff.

[2] J. Máchal, *Slavic Mythology* (=*The Mythology of All Races*, iii.), Boston, 1918, p. 231 f.; A. Calmet, *Traité sur les apparitions des esprits et sur les vampires*, new ed. ii.

[3] J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, v. 723 ff.

[4] W. R. Ralston, *Russian Folk-Tales*, pp. 271, 324, *Songs of the Russian People*, p. 413.

[5] H. J. Stephen, *New Commentaries on the Laws of England*[8], London, 1868, iv. 152; R. Hunt, *Popular Romances of the West of England*, do. 1865, p. 253; Frazer, *JAI* xv. 66. Cf. *ERE* iv. 419[b].

[6] See reff. in Frazer, *JAI* xv. 66; Ralston, *Russian Folk-Tales*, p. 324; K. Helm, *Altgerman. Religionsgeschichte*, Heidelberg, 1913, p. 138; *ERE* iv. 433[a].

[1] Ralston, *Russian Folk-Tales*, pp. 314, 324; J. Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies and of the Ghost World*, London, 1895, p. 177; Tylor, *PC*[3] ii. 193.

[2] Lawson, pp. 371, 488, 502 f.; J. T. Bent, *The Cyclades*, London, 1885, p. 45.

[3] De Groot, v. 725, 744, 749 f.

[4] Phlegon, *Mirabilia*, 1; for vampires taking the form of men to deceive women cf. *ERE* i. 538[b].

[5] N. F. S. Grundtvig, *Danske Kæmpeviser*, Copenhagen, 1847, no. 90; J. Arnason, *Icelandic Legends*, tr. G. Powell and E. Magnusson, London, 1864–66, i. 173; A. Dozon, *Contes albanais*, Paris, 1881, p. 231; T. H. de La Villemarqué, *Barzaz-Breiz*[4], do. 1846, i. 271 f.; Sir Walter Scott, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, London, 1839, p. 319 ('Clerk Saunders'); *County Folk-Lore* (*Suffolk*), i., do. 1895, p. 81; A. H. Keane, *Man Past and Present*[2], do. 1920, p. 419; cf. also H. H. Floss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib*[10], Berlin, 1913, i. 608.

[6] In art. LYCANTHROPY, § 4.

[7] Cf. also *ERE* v. 527[b].

Slavs, that the man who was a wer-wolf in his lifetime becomes a vampire after death.

A further link of connexion is found in the fact that both vampires and wer-wolves are believed to cause storms, drought, famine, and cattle-plague; both are killed by an aspen stake; and the vampire is sometimes the offspring of a witch and a wer-wolf (or the devil).[1] While the wer-wolf is often a witch or wizard who has assumed animal form, both of these are often blood-suckers and eaters of human flesh, with all the perverted tastes of a vampire.[2]

The earth personified, occasionally as Cerberos, was sometimes supposed to be an eater of the dead.[3] Demoniac beings of the under world were also represented as eaters of the dead—Chimæra, Eurynomos, the Egyptian 'eater of hearts' or 'eater of the dead,' etc.[4]

6. The vampire in literature.—Such a superstition has naturally attracted some attention in literature. Byron has an effective passage referring to it in *The Giaour*. His prose work on the subject (unfinished) was completed by Polidori and dramatized by Charles Nodier. Hoffmann introduces it in one of the tales in *The Serapion Brethren*. It is also the subject of Théophile Gautier's *La Morte amoureuse*, and of a story in J. S. Le Fanu's *Green Tea*. But the whole superstition has received the most effective treatment, with the greatest verisimilitude, from Bram Stoker in his *Dracula*,[5] which embodies in a striking manner all that is believed on the subject in Transylvania.

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VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS.—

The Indians of Vancouver Island are not a homogeneous people, but belong to three clearly defined groups. The northern part of the island is occupied by tribes of Kwakiutl speech; they are closely related to tribes occupying the mainland of British Columbia to the east and for a considerable distance north of Vancouver Island. The south-eastern part of the island is occupied by Coast Salish tribes. These are but a comparatively small section of the widely spread Salish stock, who are distributed south into the United States as far as the lower Columbia Valley. The remainder of the island—roughly speaking, the southern two-thirds of the west coast—is inhabited by a group of tribes variously known as Nutka (from one of the best known tribes of the group) or Aht. These Indians are almost entirely confined to Vancouver Island; the extreme north-western part of Washington, however, in the neighbourhood of Cape Flattery, is occupied by the Makah Indians, an offshoot of the Nutka group. The Kwakiutl and Nutka tribes are quite clearly, if somewhat remotely, related in speech. The Salish languages may also prove to be related to Kwakiutl and Nutka, but only remotely so at best. These three groups of tribes exhibit numerous interinfluences, the dominant position, on the whole, being held by the Kwakiutl Indians of the north. In this article the religion of the Nutka Indians will be taken as the type for the aborigines of Vancouver Island. Data on the other tribes will be found in art. SALISH.

Beliefs and practices of a more or less definitely religious character enter so largely into almost every phase of Nutka life that it is not altogether easy to mark off religion as a separate subject for ethnologic treatment. For practical purposes the subject of Nutka religion may be considered as embracing the beliefs in supernatural beings of various sorts, prayer, the acquisition of 'power' either by means of amulets and the help of definite beings or by means of the performance of secret rituals of predominantly magical content, shamanism and witchcraft, beliefs in souls, tabus of various sorts and other beliefs of more or less clearly religious reference, and public rituals.

1. Supernatural beings.—It is very difficult to classify the various beings of a supernatural order that are recognized in Nutka belief. They range all the way from a Sky Being, who seems almost on the point of becoming comparable to our own conception of a Supreme Being, down to patrons or guardian spirits (*genii loci*) of specific objects, such as individual cedar trees or house-beams. The line between beings endowed with a more or less distinctive personality and mere amulets is strangely difficult to draw, as, midway between these two types, there are a considerable number of monsters whose only *raison d'être*, so far as humanity is concerned, is that some part of their body can be utilized for amuletic purposes. On the whole, the personality of the majority of Nutka supernatural beings cannot be said to be very firmly defined. As regards their relation to humanity, they might be classified as objects of prayer, beings capable of granting 'powers' of a great many different sorts, beings that are impersonated in rituals, generally in ritualistic dances, beings that figure in myths and family legends, and beings that are visibly represented, by those privileged to do so, as crests. This classification is not a mutually exclusive one, however, as many supernatural beings appear in more than one connexion.

Thus, the Wolf is important in ritual, legend, and crest representation, and is believed to grant 'powers' or 'medicines.' On the other hand, the Whale is important as a crest and mythological being, but does not figure in public ritual, while hunting powers and other gifts are bestowed by him in legends and by virtue of inheritance of such legendary gifts rather than directly in the actual present. Differing from the Whale is the Thunder-bird, in that he is not identified with an actual animal species, and that he is very frequently, perhaps most frequently of all beings, impersonated in ritual performances. Again, such a being as the Ahlmakoh, a kind of demonic wood-spirit, plays an important part in ritual and as an amulet-dispenser, but is never represented as a crest (his mask is used only in connexion with a ritual).

It is difficult in some cases to tell whether a particular type of being is conceived of as a single personality, like the more important gods and goddesses of the Greeks, or as embracing a class of numerous individuals, like our fairies. The latter is probably far more often the case, though true examples of individualized beings undoubtedly also occur. Sometimes the Indians themselves seem to waver between contradictory conceptions, as in the case of the Thunder-bird. He is generally, it seems, thought of as a distinct individuality (legend has it that there were originally four Thunder-bird brothers, but that three of them were destroyed by the Woodpecker), yet the tendency to localize his home on some particular mountain-peak and the necessarily different localizations current among the different tribes have led in the

[1] Ralston, *Songs*, pp. 409, 411.

[2] For examples see Mary H. Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, London, 1897, p. 490; *ERE* iii. 158[b], vii. 237[a], viii. 345[b]; cf. C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 117, note 1; W. Crooke, *PR* ii. 263; Apul. *Metam.* i. 11 *f.*; cf. *ERE* viii. 288[b]; *NR* iii. 152; H. J. Bell, *Obeah*[2], London, 1893, p. 165 *f.* For other examples see *ERE* i. 212[a].

[3] Cf. Hecate as *σαρκοφάγος*, in the Orphic Hymns, like the stone sarcophagus.

[4] Lucian, *Dial. Mort.*, xxx. 1, *Nekyom.*, 14; Paus. x. xxviii. 4; W. Max Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*The Mythology of All Races*, xii.), Boston, 1918, p. 179; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 49 ff. For other examples see *ERE* iii. 207. Cf. A. N. Didron, *Christian Iconography*, tr. M. Stokes, London, 1886, ii. 141.

[5] London, 1897.

minds of some to the rationalizing conclusion that there is more than one Thunder-bird in existence.

In a class by himself is the Sky Chief, who enters hardly at all into the life of the natives except as an object of prayer. He is believed to dwell in the sky and to be, in a general way, the dispenser of life and happiness to mortals. He is not represented either pictorially or in rituals, and never, so far as known, occurs as a character in the mythology, not even as creator or transformer. So pale is his personality that one might be tempted to look for Christian influence, were it not for the obviously standardized form, and hence presumably great age, of the prayers addressed to him.

As in all Indian mythologies, a large number of animals are represented as human or semi-human characters in Nutka myths, many of them being endowed with supernatural powers. Few of these, however, can be considered as of interest in a purely religious connexion; the attitude of the Indian towards many of them is comparable to our own in reference to the fantastic characters of a romance or fairy-tale or even, not infrequently, to the purely human characters of a modern novel. The Raven, *e.g.*, while important in some of the more northern Pacific Coast tribes as a creator or transformer, plays the part in Nutka mythology purely of a greedy trickster or buffoon, comparable to the European Reynard the Fox. The belief that animals are descended from human-like beings of the mythological period finds its counterpart in the belief that animals to-day, when out of sight of people, divest themselves of their animal blankets and look, talk, and act like ordinary human beings. Most of the animals represented in the mythology and a large number not so represented are impersonated, by means of face paints, masks, and ceremonial regalia, in the dances of the Wolf ritual (a few of these dances are the Raven, the Woodpecker, the Sea-gull, the Wasp, the Halibut, the Octopus, and the Deer). Even in this connexion, however, it is doubtful if the animal beings themselves, as a whole, have further religious significance than that their representation has become associated with a ritual which is charged with the quality of religious emotion. The animal dances as such seem to be of interest largely as pantomimic performances. Among all these animal beings, however, there are at least some that have a degree of religious importance. 'Powers' may be obtained (or were legendarily obtained) from the Wolf, the Whale, the Hair-seal, the Sea-otter, the Shark, the Beaver, and others. Of particular importance among these is the Wolf. The Wolves are believed to form a supernatural community of their own, with four special fast runners of the chief and the Raven as news-teller. They are looked upon with great reverence—an attitude that finds its fullest expression in the Wolf ritual, founded, according to its origin legends, by the Wolves themselves.

In the mythology we also meet with a number of human-like figures that belong to the supernatural world without being identified with either animals or monsters. Here belongs the creator Kapkimiyis, who created the first man out of the thigh of the first already existent woman, made the island of Tsisha, the home of the Tsishaath tribe descended from them, and assigned them the various foods, animal and vegetable, that they and their descendants were to use. Kapkimiyis is evidently a purely local figure, and he is doubtless paralleled by local creators in the other Nutka tribes. Another important figure in the mythology is Kwatiyat, a sort of creator or, better, transformer, who experienced many curious adventures and did much to give the world its present shape. The rock-carvings in the interior of Vancouver Island are believed to be his work. He is still alive, but it is not known where he resides. With him is often associated his brother, who, like the Raven, is a trickster. Another transformer is known as Causing-everything-to-be-different. His work consisted chiefly in transforming various maleficent monsters into the relatively harmless animals that we know to-day.

We need no more than refer to a few of the host of powers with which the Nutka Indian peoples the land, the sea, and the air. The Heitlik, 'Wont-to-glide-to-the-ground,' is a snake-like, scaly being who darts out lightning with his red tongue. He is generally represented as gliding on the rocks, coiling up or down a tree, or coiled like a belt about the Thunder-bird. When seen, a bit of his tail should be lopped off and preserved as an amulet for success in whaling and other sea-mammal hunting. The Yaai are fairy-like folk that dwell on the summits of mountains. They wear feathers on their heads and are associated with fire and the *aurora borealis*. They are peculiarly elusive beings, frequently dissolving into foam. A supernatural bird, the Mikhtach, said to resemble a female mallard duck, is a potent source of luck in hunting. The Ahlmakoh, already referred to, is a kind of forest ogre, evidently related to the Nutlmis, or Fool-dancer, of the Kwakiutl; his nasal mucus is valued as an amulet for invulnerability. The Chiniath are brownie-like woods-folk who do all sorts of strange things, such as hunting for sea-cucumbers as though they were seals; they give power to those who are fortunate enough to see them. The Pokumis are wild and elusive beings, transformed from human beings that have become estranged from human ways or overcome by intense cold. The Pokumis are often represented in the pantomimic dances of the Wolf ritual. The Shishchikuhl is a large animal-like monster who lives inside a mountain and whose red hair is a powerful amulet for success in war. A two-headed being, the Totohtsaktso, reddish in colour and with a tail attached to each of his heads, is particularly virulent as 'medicine'; a small part of his body is a powerful amulet in both war and hunting. He is doubtless the Nutka equivalent of the Sisiutl so often represented in the art of the Kwakiutl Indians. The Tsatsokhta is an enormously strong being with red, shaggy hair and with his right foot large, his left extremely small. The earth of his tracks is a strength-giving 'medicine.' One of the most important of Nutka supernatural powers, in ritual and legend as in the acquirement of 'medicine,' is the Hena, a class of beings conventionally represented by, but not actually believed to be identical with, quartz crystals. They have the power of incredibly rapid flight and make a loud, whizzing noise. They have become closely associated in Nutka belief with the Wolf ritual, their characteristic sound being identified with the supernatural whistling that is believed to emanate from the wolves and that is imparted to the initiates of the ritual. It is therefore not surprising that the quartz-like Hena is held to be found also in the body of a wolf, of whom it forms a sort of subsidiary soul.

It is remarkable that the power emanating from most of the supernatural beings of the Nutka is intimately bound up with some amulet-like or fetish-like object, generally some part of his body that is, often with considerable violence, taken from him. The conception of a benevolent attitude towards the seeker after 'power' and of a spiritual guardianship over him—a conception that prevails among so many American Indian tribes—is, on the whole, signally absent here. It is present in some degree in the legendary accounts of ancestral experiences of the acquisition of power, yet even here the chief emphasis is always placed on the supernatural object acquired and handed down or on the privilege of ceremonially representing such an experience, not on the notion of a mystic relationship.

2. Prayer.—Prayer is often held to represent religious feeling at its purest, particularly when the prayer is individual and of unstandardized form. Among the Nutka Indians prayers are, so far as known, always of strictly standardized form. They are either sacred songs sung at a ritual by a group or by an individual in the presence of the community (such prayers, *e.g.*, are addressed to the Wolves of the Wolf ritual or in the rite of exorcism in the same ritual) or they are private, and indeed secret, spell-like formulæ addressed to the Sky Chief in the course of the important secret rituals referred to below. The feeling that animates the former class of prayers is perhaps more intensely emotional; it may be characterized as fear or awe glorified into exaltation. The latter class have more of a magical

than purely religious connotation, and this in spite of the fact that they are addressed to the nearest approach that the Nutka have to a generalized Supreme Being. They are self-seeking in tone; more often than not they directly plead for a superiority in success at the expense of others.

Generally the secret ritual prayers are for some specific gift, as wealth, success in hunting or fishing, good luck in love, proficiency in the performance of a ritualistic act, or whatever else, good or evil, one may desire the fulfilment of. As a rule, however, the specific prayer is preceded by a more general *tichsimich*, or prayer for life.

A typical example of such a 'life prayer' is: 'Look down on me, O Chief, have pity on me. Cause me to be alive. Cause to be sent back whatever evil words may be said of me by any one. If at any time one prays in secret for my death, may I cause his curses to recoil on himself; may I cause him to swallow his own [evil words]. Cause me to be without affliction, O Chief. Grant me, O Chief, thy wealth [or whatever else one desires]. . . .'

While the private prayers of the Nutka are strictly standardized in form, the texts of the prayers seem to differ considerably according to the varying family traditions. Here, as throughout Nutka life, family exclusiveness in matters of privilege and secret lore is much in evidence.

3. Acquisition of power; secret rituals.—Like so many other primitive peoples, the Nutka feel the necessity of continuous supernatural assistance in the pursuit of the ends of life. The individual must, whenever possible, eke out his own powers by the support of some of the mysterious influences that surround him. Prayer can do much for him; the mere possession of an amulet or fetish or 'medicine' probably more; still more efficacious is a token resulting from an encounter with a supernatural being. The handling of all such tokens, as well as of all supernatural objects or animals not actually identifiable with specific beings, is regularly hedged about by various tabus. Generally fasting and a period of sexual continence are required, also absence from the home. A token may not be lightly rejected, if disaster is to be avoided. One must also know beforehand just how it is to be utilized, what one must do or say in order to secure the benefits of its supernatural influence. Frequently one must be careful to take only the right half. Frequently, also, it may not be taken into the house, but must be kept in a secret spot in the woods. Its power may be communicated by rubbing or other handling, or a small piece of it may be directly used as an amulet; thus a bit of it may be inserted in the cedar-bark wrapping of a sealing or whaling harpoon. Every Indian possesses a considerable number of 'medicines,' for various purposes and of different degrees of potency. Their possession is generally a secret to all but the immediate heirs of their acquirer or inheritor; certain 'life medicines' may even be kept entirely secret until the approach of death. It is interesting to note that the mere possession of secret or magical lore is itself 'good medicine.' As one parts with knowledge, his power of resistance to adverse influences is lessened.

It is not always possible to secure the special assistance derived from supernatural helpers or inherited fetishes. Hence the main reliance of the Nutka Indian for the success of his hunting, fishing, or other ventures is on the punctilious performance of certain private magical ceremonies that we have termed 'secret rituals.' There is an astonishing number and a bewildering variety of such rituals. Every family possesses, by secret inheritance, enough to guide it safely through life. Sometimes several versions of a magical ritual—one derived, say, from the paternal, the other from the maternal, tradition—are known by an individual, but they may never be combined or confused. The secret rituals are always performed in a hidden spot at a considerable distance from the house; for the more elaborate rituals the various families have prepared spots deep in the woods, often near pools or in caves. The rituals range in complexity from comparatively simple magical performances, prayers, and spell-pronouncements lasting but a single night to elaborate ceremonies extended over a month or more. The former are either abbreviated versions of more elaborate rituals or relate to the easier quests, such as salmon-trolling; the latter are concerned with the more hazardous or exacting pursuits, such as whaling, sea-lion hunting, or sealing. Each secret ritual is in effect a prayer and magical compulsion toward some desired end—success in trapping fish, spearing cod, harpooning sea-otter, whaling, acquiring wealth, gaining love, bewitching an enemy; even the satisfaction of such unusual desires as success in stealing or the learning of a raven's speech may be compassed by the performance of a magical ritual. The details of each ritual differ according to specific family tradition and the nature of the end sought. The constant features seem to be prayer, the pronouncement of spells, the observance of tabus, rubbing with 'medicines,' bathing and rubbing down with hemlock branches (until the skin peeled, in the practice of the hardier aspirants for success), the wearing of cedar-bark and feather regalia and the laying on of symbolic face-paints, and, most important of all, the performance of magical actions. In principle these actions are dominated by the philosophy of sympathetic magic and by the symbolic efficacy of imitation and the handling of effigies.

Thus, the aspirant for success in whaling may spend hours diving into a pool and coming up to the surface and blowing in imitation of a whale or, bent over the ground, in humping his back like that of the whale; or he may make out of twigs rude effigies of a whaling canoe, its occupants, harpoon and floats, and the hunted sea-mammal.

The magical practices not infrequently included bizarre or revolting features, such as rubbing with the skulls of one's ancestors or the use of a newborn babe that had been stolen, killed, and had its eyes gouged out (a symbolic representation of the whale that is blind to his pursuer and allows himself to be caught). Needless to say, these secret rituals have little or no purely social bearing. The magic ritualist may, however, be accompanied by a close relative, say a son or nephew—frequently, in the more elaborate types, by his wife. Not the least interesting thing about the secret rituals is their dependence for success on a proper calendric placing. The most auspicious season for their performance is the period between the winter and summer solstices, when the days are progressively longer; during a given month it is the days of the waxing moon that should be chosen. The symbolism of this is as obvious as it is world-wide. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that what little precision of solar and lunar observation the Nutka Indians attained was conditioned by the necessity of correctly delimiting the span of auspicious days.

4. Shamanism. — The Nutka shaman, or medicine-man, is such by virtue of supernatural power personally acquired by him or, at least theoretically, by right of inheritance from an ancestor who had himself (or herself) acquired such power. Properly speaking, the acquirement of shamanistic power[1] is on a par with the acquirement of any other type of supernatural power, as for hunting or fishing. In either case the possession of power may be due to the magic inhering in the performance of a secret ritual, to the acquirement of a supernatural token or amulet-like object ('medicine'), with or without the inter-

[1] See art. SHAMANISM.

position of a supernatural being, or to the inheriting of a family 'medicine.' What distinguishes the medicine-man is the function exercised by his power, the class of being from whom it is derived, and the manner of holding and exercising this power.

The main functions of the medicine-man are the location of disease, generally conceived of as a worm-like malefic object that has been lodged in the body of the sufferer by an ill-wisher, the detection, if required, of the causes of the disease, and its removal. The divining, in a trance-like state, of future or distant events and the supernatural causation of disease are also frequently within the province of the medicine-man, but need not be.

The supernatural beings and 'medicines' that bestow shamanistic power are rarely the same as those that give power for other purposes. There is a long list of eerie or unusual objects whose discovery and retention are believed to make a man a shaman—at least to a limited extent, for a really powerful shaman has generally a number of sources of supernatural guidance. The specific beings that grant shamanistic power belong to two classes, 'birds' and 'fish.' Certain birds—*e.g.*, ducks—certain land animals, and certain fish are believed to be powerful shamans themselves and to meet once a year in a doctoring contest. The leader of the 'birds' is a supernatural bird known as Khwini, or Khwili, who is said to belong to the Sky Chief; the leader of the 'fish' is a small eel-like marine fish. The former has the greatest shamanistic power of all. The shamanistic being (animal) bestows power not so much by way of a dream, as so commonly in aboriginal America, as by the amuletic virtue of his own body. This is in accord with the general materializing tendency that pervades Nutka religion.

The power of the 'medicine' amulet or being is, in the case of the Nutka shaman, exercised by virtue of its actual presence in his body. A shaman's supernatural power (*manitu* [*q.v.*]) is not a mystic influence that guides him, but resides in a concrete object that he is believed to keep inside his hand or chest. A powerful shaman may have half-a-dozen or more such 'medicines' in his chest, in supernaturally reduced form. These are never made visible to the laity except on special occasions, such as at a very severe illness or during the *tsayek* ritual, when the shaman may hold them up for inspection. The shamans are believed to have the power of causing their 'medicines' to fly through the air to any place or person desired. The wide-spread conception of the 'flying' or 'shooting' of disease-causing substances seems, by an easy transition, to have been transferred to the Nutka materializations of the *manitu* concept. The *modus operandi* of the Nutka shaman differs according to circumstances. The usual methods are: sucking of the part affected (actually or supposedly), manipulation after rubbing the fists against the hands, resuscitation by uttering certain syllables in a conventional manner, and the singing of specific medicine songs. These songs are often dreamed during the performance of a secret ritual for the attainment of shamanistic power.

5. Soul beliefs and supernatural phenomena.—The Nutka Indians say that the course of life is like the walking of a man on a straight line as thin as a hair. If he misses a single step, he drops down and dies. The soul or living essence of a human being is conceived of as a wee mannikin, a shadowy doublet, which can be held in the palm of a shaman. It may leave the body through the crown of the head, but may either return of its own accord or be brought back through the ministrations of a shaman. If it fails to return, it means that it has reached the land of disembodied spirits, that its possessor, in other words, is dead. It is then referred to by a term, *cheha*, which may be rendered 'ghost,' but which is more freely used to refer to any discarnate spirit and even to any eerie or highly unusual being, such as an elephant. The ghost is always thought of as evil, and great efforts are taken to rid of its malign influence a house in which a person has died.

Distinct from the soul is the *hlimaksti*, often translated 'heart.' This is not the anatomical heart, but the mind or 'soul' in its psychological, not theological, sense. It is the seat or principle of intelligence characteristic of human beings alone, and is generally localized in the heart or breast.

According to one legend, the creator Kapkimiyis made a vertical column of ten faces, stuck close together, and put it into the breast of the first man as his seat of intelligence. This is the *hlimaksti* of to-day. If all ten faces look in one direction, the man's will is strong; if five look one way, five the other, he is in a state of evenly-balanced hesitation. The first woman had no *hlimaksti* put inside of her; hence women are believed to be more flighty and less intelligent than men.

The life after death is supposed to be located in an under world, which is divided into a 'good' and a 'bad' section. In the 'good' quarter are little streams in which spring-salmon run and form the food of the ghostly inhabitants. The spring-salmon of the world of the living are believed to be sent up here by departed spirits. The occupants of the 'bad' quarter of the underground world eat lice. In the opinion of some Indians, the dead turn into wolves or owls. This belief does not necessarily exclude the other.

As among all primitive peoples, there is a vast number of beliefs current among the Nutka in regard to supernatural phenomena and relations. Only a very few of these need be touched upon here. An eclipse of the sun or moon is caused by a supernatural being known as Codfish-in-the-sky, who holds the luminary in his mouth. During an eclipse each of the Indians would rush off to perform a secret ritual for trolling fish. The magical concept at the basis of this practice is evident: the fish eventually trolled for was to bite just as the Codfish was biting the eclipsed sun or moon. Another very curious belief is referred to by the term 'going off to another place.' The Indians believe that at two unknown periods during the year a big tide comes in at night and shifts about everything in the village, houses and all. After a short time, during which it is difficult to keep awake, everything is shifted back to its proper place. Should one be lucky enough to keep awake during this periodic shift, and be engaged in a secret ritual, he is certain to prove successful in whatever he is praying for.

Perhaps the most interesting belief concerning the relation of human beings to the supernatural world is that which regards twins as salmon incarnations. So much is this taken as a matter of course that it is believed that a twin child involuntarily bursts into tears when it sees a salmon being treated cruelly. Both twin children and their father are subject to many onerous tabus, and the children are not expected to live long. The significant thing about twin fatherhood is that it makes of the father a mere instrument of the salmon-world. The appearance of twins is looked upon as a harbinger of an unusually big salmon run, and the father devotes all his energies during the fishing-season to the singing of songs, the performance of secret rituals, and the observance of tabus intended to propitiate the salmon and provide his fellow-villagers with a maximum catch. Should he disregard the injunctions of the

salmon-world implied by the birth of twins, dire misfortune is certain to befall him.

6. Rituals. — Ceremonialism, both social and religious in character, is very prominent in Nutka life. It is somewhat arbitrary to divide ceremonies into the two classes, as, on the one hand, a religious quality (some sort of legendary or supernatural background) is rarely absent from even the most matter-of fact or casual ceremony (say, a naming feast or invitation ceremony), while, on the other, every more properly religious ceremony, such as the elaborate and peculiarly sacred Wolf ritual, is given the setting of a secular *potlatch* (giving feast) and regularly contains numberless features that have a purely social, not religious, significance. The two major ceremonies of primarily religious connotation are the Wolf ritual (known by the natives as *tlokwana*) and a shamanistic performance termed *tsayek*. The former undoubtedly has a native Nutka nucleus, but has been much influenced by the winter feast of the Kwakiutl Indians. The latter ceremony is primarily at home among the more southern Nutka tribes; it is also found among the Coast Salish and Quileute (north-west coast of Washington).

The Wolf ritual differs considerably among the various Nutka tribes in its origin legend and in its ceremonial details. In essence it is a quasi-dramatic representation, at least in native theory, of certain legendary occurrences.

Just as a young man or woman, in the legendary past, is believed to have been carried away by the wolves to their supernatural home, to have been taught many religious dances and songs, and to have returned to his people with these immaterial gifts, so, in the ceremony of to-day, the novices, who are to be initiated into the ceremony, are represented as seized by wolves that break into the village and as carried off into the woods, there to be taught particular dances, which, after they are rescued by the villagers and exorcized, they perform among their own people in a state of religious frenzy. The dances vary greatly in character, but are largely pantomimic, referring either to animals, occupations, or supernatural beings. Many of them are inspired by a spirit of savage recklessness that may take the form of self-torture or ceremonial killing. The association of all those (novices and old initiates) who dance a particular dance into a 'secret society' is a very much more weakly developed concept than among the Kwakiutl. On the other hand, the individuals who are banded together throughout the ceremony as wolf-performers, by hereditary right, may be looked upon as constituting a true confraternity.

In a rather vague way the Wolf ritual may be interpreted as a kind of placating of the powerful supernatural beings that appear to us as wolves, but there can, in actual fact, be no talk of a definite function of the ceremony. It is a complex historical growth that serves as a traditional setting for the public expression of religious emotion (awe and exaltation) and for the satisfaction of certain artistic needs. Even the spirit of ribald humour finds expression in it. To a large extent, also, the purely religious and artistic motives are overlaid by the desire, so characteristic of West Coast culture, to enhance one's social prestige by display and a lavish expenditure of wealth. As usual with great tribal ceremonies, it undoubtedly means different things to different temperaments.

The *tsayek* ceremony is ostensibly undertaken, like so many other great tribal ceremonies among American Indians, for the cure of a sick person who has not profited by ordinary shamanistic treatment. The main feature of the ceremony is the singing of a peculiar type of songs, accompanied by beating of sticks and certain conventional gesticulations and jumps. Each Indian that takes part in the ceremony sings a number of such *tsayek* songs that have become his property by family inheritance. Novices who are to be initiated into the *tsayek* ceremony sing these songs for the first time. In the course of the ceremony another and more advanced type of initiation takes place—that of those who have had some supernatural shamanistic experience, or who have a hereditary shamanistic right, into the formal status, often theoretical rather than actual, of shaman. This part of the ceremony offers suggestive parallels to the well-known Midē'wiwin of the Ojibwa and other Algonquian tribes. Indeed, the two types of initiation, *tsayek* proper and shamanistic, may be looked upon as constituting a series of degrees not unlike the more intricately developed system of shamanistic degrees current among the Algonquian tribes.

LITERATURE.—The information in this art. is based on the author's MS notes. For further literature on Nutka religion see: F. Boas, 'The Nootka,' in *Sixth Report on the North-western Tribes of Canada, Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Leeds meeting, 1890, pp. 582–604, 'The Nootka' (religious ceremonials), in *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (*Report of the United States National Museum*, 1895), pp. 632–644; E. Sapir, 'Some Aspects of Nootka Language and Culture,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser. [1911], 15–28, 'A Girl's Puberty Ceremony among the Nootka Indians,' *Transactions of Royal Society of Canada*, 3rd ser., vol. vii. [1913] sect. ii. pp. 67–80; G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868; James G. Swan, *The Indians of Cape Flattery* (*Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, vol. xvi. pt. viii. [Washington, 1870] pp. 1–106). For literature on Kwakiutl religion see: G. M. Dawson, 'Notes and Observations on the Kwakiootl People of the Northern Part of Vancouver Island and adjacent Coasts,' *Proceedings and Transactions of Royal Society of Canada*, vol. v. [1887] sect. ii. pp. 63–98; F. Boas, 'The Kwakiutl,' in *Sixth Report on the North-western Tribes of Canada, Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Leeds meeting, 1890, pp. 604–632, 'Notes on the Kwakiutl,' in *Eleventh Report on the North-western Tribes of Canada, Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Liverpool meeting, 1896, pp. 569–580, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*, pp. 311–737. For literature on Coast Salish religion see: F. Boas, 'The Lku'ñgEn,' *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Leeds meeting, 1890, pp. 563–582, 'The Lku'ñgEn' (religious ceremonials), in *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*, pp. 644–646; C. Hill-Tout, *British North America, I. The Far West, The Home of the Salish and Dené*, London, 1907, 'The Salish Tribes of the Coast and Lower Fraser Delta,' *Annual Archæological Report*, 1905, Appendix to Report of Minister of Education, Ontario, pp. 225–235, 'Report on the Ethnology of the Siciatl of British Columbia, a Coast Division of the Salish Stock,' *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 20–91, 'Ethnological Report on the StsEēlis and Sk'aúlits Tribes of the HalkōmēlEm Division of the Salish of British Columbia,' *ib.* pp. 311–376, 'Ethnological Studies of the mainland HalkōmēlEm, a Division of the Salish of British Columbia,' *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Belfast meeting, 1902, pp. 355–449, 'Notes on the Sk'qō'mic of British Columbia, a Branch of the great Salish Stock of North America,' *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, Bradford meeting, 1900, pp. 472–549. EDWARD SAPIR.

VANNIC RELIGION.—See ARMENIA.

VASUBANDHU.—

Vasubandhu (*c.* A.D. 420–500), the second of three brothers of a Kauśika Brāhman family, was born at Puruṣapura (Peshawar) in Gandhāra (Kandahar), and is one of the most prominent figures in the history of Buddhism. His not less celebrated elder brother, Asanga, is well known as the first propounder of the Yogāchāra school of Buddhism, *i.e.* Buddhist idealism. Of the youngest brother, Viriñchivatsa, we know nothing.

1. Life.—There are three different traditions concerning Vasubandhu's life: (1) *The Life of Vasubandhu*, translated by Paramārtha into Chinese;[1] (2) *passim* in *Si-yu-ki* ('Records of the Western Countries') by Hiuen-Tsiang, (3) the Tibetan tradition in Tāranātha, etc. The general drift of them is as follows:

Vasubandhu, a contemporary of Vikramāditya (=Skandagupta, A.D. 455–480), and his son Bāladitya (*c.* 485–) took orders in the Sarvāstivāda (realism) school, having studied under Buddhamitra (Manoratha, according to Hiuen-Tsiang) the whole of the sacred books, *i.e.* the three collections (*Tripiṭaka*), of the school to which he belonged. Afterwards he studied the doctrines of the Sautrāntika (the school which accepts the *Sūtra* as its sole authority), thinking them more reasonable, in many points, than those of his own school, and he determined to formulate an eclectic system out of the two lines of doctrine along which his mental activity had been directed. In order to do so, it was indispensable for him first

[1] B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1463.

to acquire a thorough knowledge of the Sautrāntika doctrines. With this object he went to Kaśmīra (Kashmīr), the headquarters of the study of the doctrine, carefully disguising himself and assuming a false name, lest the scholars of that country should be jealous and refuse to instruct him. There, for many years, under the guidance of Saṅghabhadra, he studied the doctrine, against which he would, however, frequently dispute, basing his objections on the teachings of the Sautrāntika itself. Skandila, the teacher of Saṅghabhadra, had his suspicions aroused by the extraordinary ability of the unknown student, and at last ascertained that he was none other than Vasubandhu, whereupon he advised him secretly to go back to his own land, lest some factious people should kill him. Vasubandhu therefore returned to his home, where he composed a poem of 600 verses called the *Abhidharmakośa*,[1] a compendium of *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā*,[2] and sent it to Kaśmīra. The king of Kaśmīra and the scholars were at first delighted with it, imagining that he was expounding and propagating their doctrine; but, on the advice of Skandila, who knew that the compendium was not quite favourable to their sect, the author was asked to write an explanation. So he expounded the verses in a prose commentary, with the addition of seven verses and one chapter on the non-Ego. These verses together with the commentary are called *Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra*.[3] Vasubandhu afterwards travelled to Ayodhyā (Oudh) and was converted by his brother Asaṅga to the faith of the Mahāyāna, and composed many treatises in defence of his new creed, with commentaries on various Mahāyāna works. He died there (in Nepāl, according to Tibetan tradition) at eighty years of age.[4]

2. Works.—Vasubandhu's first literary undertaking seems to have been the composition of his *Paramārthasaptati* ('Seventy [Verses] on the First Principle'), in which he refuted and destroyed all the ground principles of the Sāṅkhya philosophy as put forth in the *Sāṅkhya-śāstra* by Vindhyavāsa, by whom Buddhamitra, Vasubandhu's teacher, had been defeated in an ecclesiastical dispute. This fact gave general satisfaction, and King Vikramāditya rewarded him with three lacs of gold.

Before turning to his Buddhist works, we may make a few additional remarks. First, it must be borne in mind that about the 2nd cent. B.C. Kātyāyanīputra founded the Sarvāstivāda school and composed the *Jñānaprasthāna* ('First Steps to Knowledge'), a simple catalogue *raisonnée* of the technical terms of his doctrine as contained in previously published 'six-branch-treatises' (*ṣaṭpāda-śāstra*). At the beginning of the 2nd cent. A.D. a very detailed commentary on this work, called *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* ('Thorough Discussion of the *Abhidharma*'), was composed by 500 *arhats* of Kaśmīra. In this work we have not only a detailed explanation of the text, but also a minute discussion of each topic, so that the commentary became immediately a mine of dogmatics and the sole authority for the sect, by whom it was widely studied in Kaśmīra. Hence its special name *Kaśmīra-vaibhāṣika* ('Vibhāṣā-follower of Kaśmīra'). This Sarvāstivāda doctrine is realistic and teaches a direct perception of external objects. Its rival doctrine is that of the Sautrāntika, which, though also realistic, asserts an indirect perception instead of a direct one. The two doctrines were the most influential in Hīnayānism. Vasubandhu, though originally a Sarvāstivādin, was a free-thinker, and did not blindly follow either his orthodox tenets or his lately adopted Sautrāntika ideas. Scholars designated his guiding principle 'a preference of reason,' and his eclecticism is shown in his celebrated work *Abhidharmakośa*, called by native scholars 'the ingenious treatise.'

It is divided into eight treasure-houses (*kośasthāna*):

(1) Elements	natural and supernatural in general.
(2) Power	
(3) Worlds—effect	natural in special.
(4) Actions—cause	
(5) Passions—auxiliary circumstances	
(6) Sages—effect	supernatural in special.
(7) Sacred knowledge—cause	
(8) Meditation—auxiliary circumstances	

In addition to the above eight sections, one section, called *Pudgala-viniśchaya* ('Exposition of Personality'), is devoted to the argument of the non-Ego. This he composed when invited by the Kaśmirean Vaibhāṣika to explain the object of his work. To the first chapter a dogmatical explanation of the word *Abhidharma* is prefixed. It says that *Abhidharma* means 'confronting the thing,' *i.e.* insight. The thing to be confronted is of two kinds. The one aimed at is *nirvāṇa*, or final beatitude; the other mediated by is the four verities, or immanent characters of things. This confronting of things, *i.e.* insight, is called pure. It is the final *Abhidharma*. This pure insight can be called into existence by preliminary insight and teaching; the former consists in innate, acquired, and exercised insight; the latter implies the use of many standard works of the sect indirectly conducive to the origination of pure insight. These preliminary elements are called the conventional *Abhidharma*. As Vasubandhu in his work sums up the essential contents of the *Abhidharma* literature of his predecessors, and as this literature is the main source of his treatise, his work is entitled *Abhidharmakośa* ('Repository of the *Abhidharma*'). In this way he set forth concisely all noumena and phenomena and the *rationale* of the non-Ego, derived chiefly from the sources of the Sarvāstivāda school, but some tenets were taken from the Sautrāntika school and sometimes he introduced his own views.

Although Vasubandhu sympathized in his work with the Sautrāntika and showed his preference for it as the more reasonable, he was by no means satisfied with these realistic speculations, in which he was immersed until he came to the second stage of his philosophical development. When converted to Mahāyānism, he adopted the subjective idealism of that school, which he completed and systematized in his not less celebrated epitomic composition *Vijñaptimātratā-triṁśaka* ('Thirty [Verses] on "Mere Idea"').[1] The philosophical school based on this treatise teaches that all phenomena, both material and non-material, originate in mind, which is divided according to its action into eight 'ideas' (*vijñānāni*), viz. (1–5) five ideas belonging to the five sense organs, (6) idea of mind (*mano-vijñāna*), (7) mind-idea (*mano-vijñāna*), or stained mind-idea (*kliṣṭa-mano-vijñāna*), (8) receptacle-idea (*ālaya-vijñāna*). The seeds (*bīja*) or possibilities of all phenomena are retained in the eighth idea, whence comes the so-called objective world, in consequence of which we are disturbed and rove about in painful efforts after peace. If we once fully understand that nothing else exists but mind, then the objective world ceases to exist for us, and those eight confused ideas are turned into eight kinds of enlightened wisdom (*jñāna*) by means of which we can unite in the *tathatā* ('thusness') which transcends speech and thought.

The *Abhidharmakośa* and *Vijñaptimātratā-triṁśaka* are the two most celebrated of Vasubandhu's twenty odd works, and represent the successive development of his philosophical views.

It seems that towards the end of his life he reached a quite different phase of belief. He composed 24 verses entitled *Longing for the Birth* (in Sukhāvatī, *i.e.* the Paradise of the West), being a summary of the *Aparimitāyus-sūtra*,[2] to which he subsequently added a commentary. These verses with the commentary, regarded as one work, are called the *Aparimitāyus-sūtrōpadeśa*.[3] From them we see that he believed in the Amitābha (*alias* Aparimitāyus) doctrine, *i.e.* the doctrine of salvation by the grace of the Author, while in the two former phases of Buddhism through which he had passed no such idea occurs, nor is the name of Amitābha even mentioned.

LITERATURE.—*Life of Vasubandhu*, tr. from the Chinese by W. Wassilieff, in his *Buddhismus*, Germ. tr., St. Petersburg, 1860, pp. 235–243, and by J. Takakusu, in *Tong-pao*, Leyden, 1904; Hiuen-Tsiang, *Si-yu-ki*, *passim*, French tr. by Stanislas Julien, *Mémoires sur les contrées occidentales*, 2 vols., Paris, 1857–58, Eng. tr. by S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, 2 vols., London, 1884; Tāranātha, *Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, Germ. tr., ed. A. Schiefner, Leipzig, 1869, p. 118 ff.; J. Takakusu, 'A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu,' *JRAS*, Jan. 1905; Pu-kwang, *Ko-sha-lung-ki* (commentary on *Kośaśāstra*), i. 33.

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[1] Nanjio, no. 1270. [2] *Ib.* no. 1263.
[3] *Ib.* nos. 1267 and 1269.
[4] For a complete list of his Buddhist works see Nanjio, Appendix i. col. 371 *f.*; cf. J. Takakusu, 'A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu,' *JRAS*, Jan. 1905.

[1] Nanjio, no. 1215. [2] *Ib.* nos. 25, 26, 27, etc.
[3] *Ib.* no. 1204.

VEDAS.—See LITERATURE (Vedic and Classical Sanskrit), VEDIC RELIGION.

VEDĀNTA.—*Vedānta* in Sanskrit signifies the 'end or final aim of the Veda.' The word was employed at first to denote the older *Upaniṣads* (see art. UPANIṢADS), but generally serves as the name of the most wide-spread of the six philosophical systems of the Brāhmans (*i.e.* Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya). In the Vedānta the pantheistic doctrine of the Brahman, the All-One, is systematically developed, and placed on a philosophical foundation. The founder of the Vedānta, or rather the first teacher who made a formal presentation of it (in the *Vedāntasūtras* or *Brahmasūtras*) was Bādarāyaṇa.[1] Since, however, his treatise is set forth in the form of aphorisms—precisely like the *sūtras* or 'clues' of the other philosophical schools of India—which in themselves are completely unintelligible, it is impossible to gain a satisfactory knowledge of the system from his work alone. This is first supplied by the expositions of the numerous native commentators, of whom the most important was the renowned Vedāntist Śaṅkara, who lived *c.* A.D. 800. Besides expounding the *Brahmasūtras*, Śaṅkara composed a large number of commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, and wrote several independent treatises on the Vedānta philosophy. It is reasonable to suppose that the conceptions of Śaṅkara agree in all essentials with the views set forth by Bādarāyaṇa. Nearly all educated Hindus in modern India, except in so far as they have embraced European ideas, are adherents of the Vedānta; and three-fourths of these accept Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*, while the rest are divided among the varying explanations of the system offered by one or other of the remaining commentators.

The fundamental proposition of the Vedānta philosophy is in agreement with the doctrine of the ancient *Upaniṣads*, viz.: 'the ātman (*i.e.* our self or our soul) is identical with the Brahman, the All-Soul.' Since, then, the eternal and infinite Brahman, the power that works in everything, cannot consist of parts, or be subject to change (for everything that consists of parts, and is liable to change, is perishable), it follows that every one is essentially not a part or an emanation of the Brahman, but is Brahman entire and indivisible. Nothing real exists besides Brahman; 'there is one only, without a second.' Therefore in India the Vedānta doctrine in the form in which Śaṅkara has presented it is called the 'doctrine of non-duality.'

In opposition to the fundamental thought of the Vedānta, as thus set forth, is arrayed not only experience, which teaches the existence of a manifold variety of persons and things, but also the ceremonial law of the Veda; for the latter is based upon the belief in transmigration and retribution, and therefore takes for granted a multitude of individual souls. This twofold contradiction is refuted by the assertion that both experience and the ceremonial law of the Veda depend upon the 'ignorance' (*avidyā*) natural to every man, by which the soul is prevented from distinguishing itself from the body, the psychical organs and other controlling influences, and from recognizing that the empirical universe is an illusion (*māyā*). In truth, the entire world of phenomena is merely a delusion, comparable to a *fata morgana*, which disappears on closer examination; or like a dream-image, which seems real only to the sleeper, but vanishes in waking hours.

There is only one thing in the universe which is unaffected by this power of illusion—our self, the soul. This self admits of no proof, but it also stands in no need of proof, for it is in itself the basis of all argument, and therefore is already established antecedent to any possibility of proof. Similarly, also, it cannot be denied, for every one in denying it assumes and testifies to its existence. The self, moreover, cannot be anything distinct from Brahman, since Brahman alone exists. Everything that is asserted of the Brahman—pure, spiritual nature, omnipresence, eternity, etc.—holds good, therefore, of our soul. Here in our inner self we must look for knowledge. In himself alone, in the depths of his own being, can man find the solution of the riddle of the universe, and know the only true real.

Whence 'ignorance' arises, by which the true condition of things is hidden from us, the Vedānta philosophy does not inquire. It tells us only that ignorance is removed by 'knowledge' (*vidyā*), or 'universal perception' (*saṁyag-darśana*). If this universal perception has been attained, and thereby the illusory nature of everything that is not soul, and the absolute identity of the soul with Brahman understood, the determining conditions for the earthly existence of the soul are removed. For this earthly existence is itself indeed only an illusory appearance. He who knows 'I am Brahman' has gained emancipation from the *saṁsāra*.

Since Saṅkara recognizes the unconditional authority of the *Upaniṣads*, he is compelled to take account of their entire contents, which to a considerable extent are in opposition to the doctrine here set forth. He accomplishes this by setting up two systems side by side with one another—(1) the higher or esoteric knowledge (*parā vidyā*), which adopts the metaphysical standpoint, and proclaims the doctrine of the non-dualistic Brahman, as it has just been stated, to be the absolute truth; and (2) the lower or exoteric knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), which takes its stand at the popular empirical point of view, and offers a popularly religious explanation of the universe. While in the 'higher knowledge' the Brahman is free from all attributes and qualities (*nirguṇa*), in the 'lower knowledge' it appears endowed with the attributes of personality (*saguṇa*). It is owing to ignorance that these attributes are ascribed to the Brahman, for men who cannot rise to the height of the metaphysical standpoint need an object of worship. In the lower knowledge, therefore, the Brahman appears as a personal God, who creates and rules the universe, and rewards or punishes men according to their deeds. The universe also is looked upon as real, and the statements of the Upaniṣads with regard to the wandering of the soul through innumerable bodies hold good. The lower knowledge teaches that the soul is constrained by the psychical organs, the bodily senses, the vital principle, and the moral determination, that under such limitations it completes the cycle of metempsychosis, and that by believing worship it may attain to the lower personal Brahman. Union, however, with the lower Brahman, the Brahman of attributes, is merely an inferior temporary lot. Complete deliverance is attainable from the metaphysical point of view solely by the knowledge of the higher Brahman, the Brahman without attributes. Everything that is taught in the lower knowledge is worthless for him who has learnt to know himself as the eternal indivisible Brahman; for he understands that the lower Brahman is a product of ignorance, that qualities are attributed to it merely for the purposes of worship which do not really belong to it, and in the light of the supreme knowledge are seen to be an illusion. He who has attained to this knowledge is no

[1] For a remark regarding his date see art. MIMĀṀSĀ.

longer led astray by the delusive appearance that surrounds him. In complete indifference towards the course of the world he awaits the end of his life, the continuance of which is explained on exactly the same principles as in the Sāṅkhya (see the art. SĀṄKHYA). At death the wise man is lost in Brahman.

Among the commentators who dissent from Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Vedānta, and who represent one or other of the philosophical and religious standpoints of various sects, the most renowned is Rāmānuja, who lived in the 11th cent. after Christ. Rāmānuja (*q.v.*) in his exposition of the system approximates to the lower exoteric knowledge of Śaṅkara, and as an adherent of the Pāncharātra doctrine introduces into Bādarāyaṇa's treatise views which are nearly related to the Christian standpoint, but are alien to the true Vedānta doctrine. In his view the individual souls are not identical with the supreme soul, *i.e.*, as he represents it, with God, but are separate and distinct as in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The cause of their earthly existence is not 'ignorance,' but unbelief; and deliverance is union with God, to be gained not by 'knowledge,' but by believing love (*bhakti*) towards God. In the history of the Vedānta philosophy, therefore, the same theistic tendency makes its appearance which may be observed under the form of the system of Yoga in the further development of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

LITERATURE.—In his *Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems* (Allahabad, 1859) F. E. Hall enumerates no fewer than 310 Sanskrit works on the Vedānta; and even in the most recent times no year passes without the appearance in all parts of India of numerous treatises on this philosophy written partly in Sanskrit and partly in the vernaculars. The best and most detailed presentation of the Vedānta doctrine as interpreted by Śaṅkara is to be found in P. Deussen's *System des Vedânta*, Leipzig, 1883; cf. also A. Barth, *Religions of India*[3], London, 1891; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, ch. iv., and *Vedânta Philosophy*, London, 1894; M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], London, 1893; H. Haigh, *Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, London, 1903; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906; *Vedânta-Sûtras*, with commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, tr. by G. Thibaut in *SBE*, vols. xxxiv. xxxviii. xlviii.; P. Deussen, *Die Sûtras des Vedânta*, tr. Leipzig, 1887; *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, tr. by Cowell and Gough, 2nd ed., London, 1894, ch. xvi.; M. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedânta*, Heidelberg, 1910.

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VEDDAS.—1. Geographical distribution and mode of life.—The Veddas, the aboriginal inhabitants of Ceylon, are to be regarded as the island representatives of the short, long-headed, pre-Dravidian jungle tribes of India. Formerly they extended over the whole island (for there is no reason to doubt that the Yakkas of the *Mahāvamsa* were Veddas); now the few surviving relatively pure-blooded Veddas who do not practise agriculture are to be found in the park country of Uva, while communities carrying on a rough cultivation, whose members have more foreign blood in their veins, exist in the poorer part of the Eastern Province and that part of the North Central Province known as Tamankaduwa.

At the present day the Veddas may be divided into three classes, viz. forest, village, and coast Veddas, each showing certain characteristic social features. The forest Veddas, reduced in number to a few families in the wildest parts of the island, have alone kept up their old mode of life. Living on game, honey, yams, and fruit, they are still able to collect these in sufficient quantity not only to support life, but to leave a surplus to barter with the 'Moormen' on their annual visits or to take into the nearest Sinhalese village to exchange for iron, cloth, pots, and occasionally rice and coco-nuts. So long as this sort of life is possible, communities are necessarily small and the old mode of habitation in caves and rock shelters persists, but where the country is less wild the Sinhalese have killed down the game to such an extent—even where they have not settled—that the Veddas have been obliged to take to cultivation, and for this purpose they have organized themselves in villages and at the same time have commonly intermarried with the Sinhalese. It is in this way that the second class of Veddas, the village Veddas, have originated; indeed the process has been going on for hundreds of years, and there is evidence that centuries ago there were 'Vedda' communities—*i.e.* communities with enough Vedda blood to be called Veddas by their contemporaries—politically organized and having chiefs who were in constant relation with the Sinhalese court. This process of contact metamorphosis has had as its most striking result the complete loss of the original Vedda (non-Aryan) language, while the identity of the relationship systems of the Veddas and Sinhalese is presumably to be attributed to the same cause. The coast Veddas are Veddas settled in the coastal area of the Eastern Province who have intermarried with the local Tamils, whose physical type they have acquired and whose beliefs they largely share. In the following account the term 'Vedda' must be taken to mean forest Veddas, unless village Veddas are specifically mentioned.

The Veddas have never been metal workers, and, although they have no traditions concerning the use of stone implements, the quartz artefacts described by the cousins Sarasin and others must, at least provisionally, be attributed to them. The iron blades to their arrows, their axe-heads and irons for 'flint and steel' strike-a-lights, are the only metal tools they use. These arrow heads and axes were noted in the 17th cent. by Robert Knox, who mentions the silent trade for metal in exchange for flesh and honey practised by the wilder Veddas.

Apart from their skill as hunters the Veddas have but the bare beginnings of a few arts and crafts. They make no pottery except where they have learnt it from the Sinhalese. Personal ornaments scarcely exist, yet the rocks of some of the caves bear very rough drawings of men and animals and the skin bag in which honey is collected. They are drawn by women and were said to have no religious or other special significance. The Veddas have no musical instruments, but during their dances they frequently beat time with their hands on the abdomen; and C. S. Myers, who has examined phonograph records of their songs, considers that they are simpler in structure than any other native songs hitherto published, and indeed represent the very beginning of melody-building.

2. Social organization.—The Veddas have a clan organization with descent in the female line; the clans are exogamous, though this rule is not strictly adhered to. Two intermarrying clans, the Morane and Unapane, are considered superior to the others, with whom they should not intermarry. Monogamy is the rule and divorce is unknown, the correct marriage being the cross cousin, especially with the daughter of the mother's younger brother. A high standard of sexual morality is maintained in both the married and unmarried. There is close comradeship between a man and his wife's father; an unmarried man assists his mother's brother, his actual or potential father-in-law, in most activities, and this association continues after marriage. A man's *baena* (sister's son, daughter's husband) is always welcome to hospitality in cave or hut, when other relatives would not intrude. Though descent is in the female line, inheritance is in the male line. A Vedda has little personal property, his axe and bow and arrows being his most important possessions, but land, or, more strictly speaking, hunting and fishing rights, the tenancy of certain caves, as well as the right to the combs of the rock bee on definite tracts of land, descend from father to son, or are presented to a son-in-law on his marriage.

The Veddas have no regular chieftainship, but the eldest man of each small group exercises considerable authority, the importance of such men being enhanced by the Sinhalese and other officials,

who naturally make a point of dealing with the most intelligent and authoritative member of a group.

3. Religion.—The basis of the Vedda religion is the cult of the dead, and the Vedda point of view can be best appreciated by considering the customs observed when a death takes place. When a man, woman, or child dies, the body is left in the cave or rock shelter in which death from sickness occurred. The body is not washed, dressed, or ornamented in any way, but is allowed to lie in the natural supine position and is covered over with leaves and branches. The cave is then deserted for some years, and, if any bones are left when the Veddas return, they are thrown into the jungle. When an attempt is made to discover the reason for the desertion of the place of death, the usual answer is to the effect that 'if we stayed we should be pelted with stones,' and some Veddas, including the least contaminated, definitely stated that it was the spirit, or *yaka* (fem. *yakini*, pl. *yaku*), of the dead man who would cause stones to rain on anybody staying near the corpse. Although fear of the dead (expressed by leaving the site of death) occurs among all the wilder Veddas, a few old men were by no means confident that all men on their death became *yaku*; no doubt the spirits of important and influential men survived, but whether this applied to quite ordinary individuals was more doubtful, and in one community there was a special ceremony the object of which was to settle this point.

Each Vedda community consists of a small number of families who, since cousin marriage prevails, are doubly related by blood and marriage; the *yaku* of the recently dead, called collectively the Nae Yaku, are supposed to stand towards the surviving members of the group in the light of friends and relatives who, if well treated, will continue to show loving kindness to their survivors, and only if neglected will show disgust and anger by withdrawing their assistance or even becoming actively hostile.[1] Hence it is generally considered necessary to present an offering to the newly dead, usually within a week or two after death, though a few Veddas stated that they would not hold a Nae Yaku ceremony until they specially required the help of the *yaku*, or until misfortune threatened or overtook them. Among most Veddas the offering must consist of cooked rice and coco-nut milk, the food that every Vedda esteems above all others; but betel-leaves and areca-nut are often added, and the oldest survivor of a small group of 'wild' Veddas said that this offering would in the old days have consisted of yams and water, if, as was often the case, coco-nuts and rice could not be obtained.

In each community there is one man, called *kapurale* or *dugganawa*, who has the power and knowledge requisite to call the *yaku*; and in the ceremony of presenting the offering called *Nae Yaku Natanawa* (literally, 'the dancing of the Nae Yaku') this man calls upon the *yaka* of the recently dead man to come and take the offering. The *kapurale* (who may conveniently be spoken of as the shaman) becomes possessed by the *yaka* of the dead man, who speaks through the mouth of the shaman in hoarse, guttural accents, saying that he approves of the offering, that he will assist his kinsfolk in hunting, and often stating the direction in which the next hunting party should go. Besides the shaman, one or more of the near relatives of the dead man may become possessed, but this, though common, is not invariable. The *yaka* leaves the shaman soon after he has promised his favour and success in hunting, the shaman always collapsing as the spirit goes. After the ceremony all the men, women, and children of the group who are present eat the offering, usually on the spot on which the invocation took place, though this is not absolutely necessary. It was clear that this eating of food which had been offered to the *yaku* was an act of communion, and an essential part of the ceremony which was thought to bring health and good fortune; for some communities even anointed the heads of their dogs with the milk of the offering, explaining that this was done because of their value.

Besides the *yaku* of the recently dead there are other important *yaku*, chief among whom are Kande Yaka and his brother Bilindi Yaka. Kande Yaka is the spirit of an ancestor, a mighty hunter in his day; he is invoked to give success in hunting, and during the ceremonial dance given in his honour a realistic pantomime of tracking and killing a deer is performed. Spirits of the dead were believed to go to Kande Yaka and become his attendants, and immediately after death it was necessary for a spirit to resort to Kande Yaka in order to obtain permission to accept offerings from his living relatives, and to obtain power from him to assist them in return for their offerings, or to cause them injury in the event of their bad behaviour. Thus Kande Yaka, who is of especial assistance in hunting, becomes lord of the dead. We have, however, little doubt that to the majority of Veddas Kande Yaka is especially the *yaka* who gives success in hunting, and that his relation to the dead does not leap to their minds on the mention of his name as does the idea of his helpfulness in hunting; for Kande Yaka was essentially a friendly and helpful *yaka*, who, unlike many other *yaku* usually beneficent, never sent sickness; in fact, Kande Yaka the spirit scarcely differs as patron of hunters from Kande Wanniya the mighty hunter, still living and showing kindness and helpfulness towards the people among whom he dwelt.

The Nae Yaku, Kande Yaka, Bilindi Yaka, and certain other *yaku* doubtless belong to the primitive Vedda culture, and to this day these are the important *yaku* among the wilder Veddas. But centuries of contact with Sinhalese and Tamils have led to the recognition of a number of Sinhalese and Tamil dæmons (or gods) as *yaku*. Thus, running roughly parallel with the three conditions of Veddas mentioned in § 1, three stages of development can be recognized in the Vedda religion: (1) the cult of the dead, including the cult of the spirits of recent ancestors, *i.e.* of the Nae Yaku and the *yaku* of certain Veddas who have been long dead and may well be regarded as heroes; the most important of these is Kande Yaka; (2) the cult of foreign spirits, who have become naturalized and have taken the friendly protective nature of the Vedda *yaku*; the cult of the *yaku* of a number of named 'Vedda chiefs' may be considered to belong to this stratum; one of these, Panikkia Yaka, is the canonized spirit of one Panikki Vedda, *i.e.* Panikki the Vedda, who is mentioned in a 16th cent. manuscript; this man, who seems to have been the chief of a group of mixed Vedda and Sinhalese blood, was in fairly intimate contact with the Sinhalese court; (3) the cult of foreign spirits who, though not generally regarded as such, have retained their foreign nature and are, in the main, terrible or even hostile. Another feature of this stratum of thought is the endowment of true Vedda *yaku*

[1] The benevolent nature of the Vedda *yaku* is very noticeable and contrasts with the malignant character of almost all Sinhalese *yaku*. The Sinhalese attitude towards the spirits of the dead generally is fear, while that of the Veddas may be called love; there is certainly a desire for, and belief in, the possibility of companionship and communion with the kindly dead on appropriate occasions.

with foreign attributes. The god Skanda, or Kanda Swami, as he is often called in Ceylon, is worshipped at Kataragam in the south of the island, chiefly by Tamils. There are no Veddas in this district now, but formerly the forests in the neighbourhood were inhabited by Veddas who were known as the Kovil Vanamai Veddas, *i.e.* 'Veddas of the temple precincts,' and they cannot but have been much influenced by the worship at the great temple. In the Eastern province the present writers met some Veddas who were known by the same name, and witnessed a dance performed seven days after the death of a member of the community. Here the *yaka* of the dead man was said to go to 'the Kataragam God' before joining Kande Yaka. Among most village Veddas Indigollae Yaka had taken the place of Kande Yaka; he gives good fortune in hunting and is invoked in the Nae Yaku ceremony. Gale Yaka was also important among village Veddas, but possibly in some localities this is only another name for Indigollae Yaka. Among the wilder Veddas Gale Yake was never mentioned, and Indigollae Yaka, if known at all, was looked upon as a foreign spirit attendant upon Kande Yaka.

The *kiriamma*, literally 'the grandmothers,' are the spirits of Vedda women; many are named and seem to be specially associated with rocks and hill-tops. From one aspect they have a malignant character, for, though they are said to love children, they often steal them and cause their death through sickness. Veddas gathering rock-honey will usually propitiate them by an offering of honey.

The worship of the *yaku* consists essentially of ceremonies during which the shaman or chief performer dances himself into an ecstasy—a condition, we have no doubt, of genuine dissociation of consciousness—during which he is thought to be possessed by the *yaka* whom he invokes. These dances are often pantomimic, and, though in different localities the ceremonial varies, especially as regards elaboration, the ritual of each dance is fixed by tradition. Various objects are proper to certain *yaku*, the most important being the *aude*, a ceremonial representation of an arrow, the blade from 8 to 16 inches long, hafted into a wooden handle considerably shorter than the blade. Ordinary arrows are also used in dances, while for some ceremonies an elaborate set of properties is required. It was noticed that, once an article was used in connexion with the *yaku*, it was not placed on the ground. The *kirikoraha*, literally 'milk bowl,' a vessel filled with the white juice squeezed from coco-nut meat, was a necessary part of the ceremonies in which Kande Yaka, Bilindi Yaka, or the Nae Yaku were invoked, and the main features of the dance centred round this bowl. No attempt is made here to describe any of these ceremonies;[1] it may, however, be mentioned that women never take part in the dances, though they are always present, and may become possessed by the *yaku*.

The method of invocation of the *yaku* is essentially the same in all Vedda ceremonies; an invocation is sung by the shaman and often by the onlookers, while the shaman slowly dances, usually round the offering that has been prepared for the *yaku*. Sometimes the invocations are quite appropriate and consist of straightforward appeals to the *yaka* for help, or recite the deeds and prowess of the *yaka* when he too was a man. But at other times the words seem singularly inappropriate; probably in many of these instances they are merely the remains of old Sinhalese charms that are not only displaced from their proper position and function, but have become so mangled in the process as to have become incomprehensible. As the verses are recited over and over again, the shaman dances more and more quickly, he unties his hair, which falls over his face as he throws his head forward, his voice becomes hoarse, his speech staccato, his movements spasmodic, and his eyes take on a fixed expression; he is then possessed by the *yaka*, and, although he does not lose consciousness completely and can co-ordinate his movements, he does not in his normal condition retain any precise recollection of what he has said and has only a general idea of the movements he has performed. When the shaman is in this condition, another member of the community always follows him, often with hands upon his waist, ready to support him if he should fall. This often happens, the shaman falling backwards apparently unconscious; the condition does not, however, last long, the performer suddenly regaining his feet and continuing to dance. Trembling and shivering—which certainly occurs—is said to mark the entry of the *yaka* into the shaman. When the *yaka* leaves the shaman, the latter always falls back exhausted. Partial collapse during the ceremony does not necessarily indicate the departure of the *yaka*.

[1] See for these C. G. and B. Z. Seligman, *The Veddas*.

The invocations by which the Veddas call upon the *yaku* fall into two main groups: the first, distinguished by their simple form, are straightforward requests to the spirits of the dead to provide game and yams, or to show their loving kindness by partaking of the food provided by their descendants; the second group, embracing a considerable range of beliefs, are all longer and more complicated and often contain references to events which happened before the spiritual beings to whom they are addressed attained their full power as *yaku*. In nearly all the invocations animals and articles of food are not mentioned by their usual name, but described by periphrases. Only the simplest invocations have been selected as examples; many are very complicated and undoubtedly show Sinhalese influence, while the Veddas themselves either give them meanings quite different from those of the texts or have lost the significance entirely and are content to intone sounds almost or quite meaningless to them. The two following invocations (nos. 1 and 2)[1] to the Nae Yaku are from a forest and a village community respectively:

(1) 'Salutation! Salutation! Part of (our) relatives! Multitude of relatives! Having called (you) at the (right) time (we) gave (you) white sambā (rice); (you) ate, (you) drank. Do not think any wrong (of us); we also eat (and) drink.'

(2) 'Our father who went to that world come to this world. Take the rice. Come quickly to place (for us) the sambar deer, to place the spotted deer. Take this betel leaf. Come very quickly. Come quickly my mother's people. Take the rice, take the rock honey, take the betel leaf. To place the sambar deer, to place the spotted deer, come very quickly.'

The next (no. 16) is an invocation to Kande Yaka, and the fourth (no. 24) is sung when collecting rock-honey:

(16) 'King of the Hills, who continues to go from hill to hill, cause rain. (He is) the Wanniyā of the Chief place of the hill, who causes to fall the hoofs of excellent sambar deer, from foot (print) to foot (print), from Rērannē Damanē (the grass plain of teals) to Kandē Damanē (the grass plain of the hill).'

(24) 'Lady New Goddess, (you) must show (me) a bee-hive to-day. Having chopped (it out) I will hide (it) and go.'

As already stated, possession by the *yaka* is to be considered as due to a dissociation of personality; the traditional movements, words, and music all tend to bring about a more or less automatic condition which seems to be more easily induced the longer the practitioner has been shamanizing. Nor must the somewhat prolonged training of the shaman be forgotten. The present writers are convinced that there is no trickery about these ceremonies.

The shaman invoking a *yaka* holds or exhibits the special object (*e.g.*, the *aude*) proper to that *yaka*, and it seemed to be thought that the *yaka* first comes to this and then enters the body of the shaman. Each *yaka* has his traditional mode of behaviour. The shaman possessed by Kande Yaka goes through the pantomime of tracking and killing sambar deer; Bambura Yaka spears a wild boar and is wounded by it before he succeeds in killing it; Dola Yaka smokes out rock-bees' nests and collects the honey. These pantomimes are often extremely dramatic. The *yaku* examine the offerings set out for them, and, if favourable, express approval, some straightway prophesying

[1] The numbers preceding the invocations here given refer to those in ch. x. of the present writers' monograph, where all the invocations collected are printed and their meaning discussed.

good hunting (each in his own department); for, though Kande Yaka is patron of all food supplies, there are other *yaku* each of whom is separately invoked for help in getting yams, rock-honey, and tree-honey. The *yaku* have their methods of showing approval of the offerings; usually they scatter some of the food, sometimes they feed a favoured member of the community or place leaves dipped in the sacred food upon his chest, or, putting his arms on his shoulders, the shaman, gasping and quivering, delivers a message of good omen from the *yaku*. Sometimes a *yaka* asks why he has been called. Is it because any one is sick? And, if any one is brought forward, he will feed him or anoint him with sacred food which is thought to cure the sickness.

The manifest object of most ceremonies is to obtain food, but there is no suggestion that any of them are performed to increase the food supply, as are the *intichiuma* ceremonies of Australia. They are also performed to cure sickness, and it is in this connexion that the *Pata Yaku* ceremony may be mentioned. This ceremony is held for a pregnant woman, that she may have safe delivery. Masses of bast are used on all the various properties necessary for the *yaku*; hence the name, signifying 'bark *yaku*.' No reason could be given for any figure in the dance, nor was there any known tradition connected with it, as was the case with most other ceremonies. A noticeable feature of the dance was that it was necessary for the woman's father to take part in it and that he dropped an arrow on the ground several times and leapt over it. Certain Sinhalese demons known as the Pata Yaku personify disease, but these have no connexion with bast, and it is impossible to say why the Pata Yaku should have been taken over from the Sinhalese.

Apart from the tendency, already mentioned, of certain *yaku* to be associated with hill-tops, no definite locality is considered their home; on the other hand, they are certainly not thought of as being habitually in close proximity with the living. Magical practices play a very small part in the life of the Veddas; their charms we believe to have been taken over from the Sinhalese, and it certainly is no exaggeration to say that the Vedda conception of the supernatural is embodied in their *yaku* beliefs, to whose influence usual or unusual events are alike attributed. No creation traditions or myths referring to the natural features of the country could be discovered among the wilder groups of Veddas.

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C. G. and B. Z. SELIGMAN.

VEDIC RELIGION.—DEFINITIONS.—With a view to avoiding confusion, it is advisable to define at the outset the sense in which each of the three terms 'religion,' 'mythology,' and 'magic' (witchcraft) is to be employed in the present article. Religion means, on the one hand, the body of beliefs entertained by men regarding the divine or supernatural powers, and, on the other, that sense of dependence on those powers which is expressed by word in the form of prayer and praise, or by act in the form of ritual and sacrifice. Mythology means the body of myths or stories which give an account of gods and heroes, describing their origin and surroundings, their deeds and activities. Mythology is thus included in, though not coextensive with, that aspect of religion which is concerned with belief. Magic means that body of practices which, instead of seeking to gain the goodwill of divine, beneficent powers by acts of worship, is largely directed against demoniac and hostile agencies, and aims at affecting the course of things directly, without the intervention of deities. Magic as such, being essentially different from religion and representing a more primitive stage of belief, is excluded from the scope of this article except where, as is sometimes the case, it is inextricably mixed up with religious ritual.

1. MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.

By the general term 'Vedic religion' is here understood the religion of the Vedic period of Indian literature, which extends from some time after the Aryan immigration into the north-west of India, that is, from at least as early as B.C. 1300, down to about B.C. 200.

Vedic religion is peculiarly important as a branch of study. It is not only the earliest body of religious beliefs preserved in a literary form, but it also represents a more primitive phase of thought than is recorded in any other literature. It can, moreover, be traced step by step through the various stages of its development. It is, finally, the source of the religion of the modern Hindus, which can thus be historically followed up to its origin throughout a period of well over 3000 years. As a natural result of its value to the investigator of religious thought in general, the study of Vedic religion gave birth, in the latter half of the 19th cent., to the sciences of Comparative Mythology and Comparative Religion.

2. STAGES OF VEDIC RELIGION.

Three main successive stages may be clearly distinguished in the religion which is recorded in three corresponding phases of Vedic literature, viz. in (*a*) the Vedas, (*b*) the Brāhmaṇas together with the Sūtras, (*c*) the Upaniṣads.

(*a*) The religion of the four **Vedas**, regarded as a whole, is concerned with the worship of gods largely representing personifications of the powers of nature; the propitiation of demoniac beings comes only to a limited extent within its sphere.

The oldest and most important of the four Vedas, the Rigveda, from which considerable portions of the others are borrowed, is a collection of metrical hymns containing a large mythological element. These hymns are mainly invocations of the gods meant to accompany the oblation of Soma juice and the fire sacrifice of melted butter. The polytheism of this Veda assumes in its latest hymns a pantheistic colouring. Only a very few of its hymns are connected with witchcraft.

The hymns of the Atharvaveda, on the other hand, consist largely of spells meant for magical application, while their religion is pronounced pantheism.

The contents of the two other Vedas are entirely sacrificial in purpose. The Sāmaveda is almost exclusively composed of verses borrowed from the Rigveda to be applied in the ritual of the Soma sacrifice. The Yajurveda consists of ritual formulas, largely in prose, which, not being directly addressed to the gods, are practically of a magical type. The religious phase which it represents is, in spirit, identical with that of the Brāhmaṇas.

(*b*) The **Brāhmaṇas** are discursive theological treatises in prose dealing with the Vedic ritual; while the Sūtras, text-books composed in a very concise style, largely condense and systematize the contents of the Brāhmaṇas or add new material on domestic and everyday observances. The main difference in the mythology of the Brāhmaṇas, as compared with the Rigveda, is their recognition of a father-god as chief of the deities; while the general character of their religious belief is explicit pantheism. As to cult, they represent a ritual system which, in complexity of detail, far surpasses anything the world has elsewhere known.

(*c*) Though generally forming a part of the Brāhmaṇas, as a continuation of their speculative side, the **Upaniṣads** really represent a new religion

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which is in virtual opposition to their ritual or practical side. This new, purely pantheistic religion is dominated by the doctrine of transmigration, a doctrine unknown to the Vedas, and only incipient in one of the Brāhmaṇas. A world-soul takes the place of the father-god of the Brāhmaṇas. Its nature is the main object of speculation; and the identity with it of the individual soul is the great fundamental doctrine of the Upaniṣads. The religious aim now is no longer the obtaining of earthly and heavenly happiness by sacrificing correctly to the gods, but the release, as a result of true knowledge, from re-birth by absorption in the world-soul.

3. Vedic Religious Beliefs.

The following account of Vedic beliefs, which are almost entirely mythological, starts from the statements of the Rigveda, to which the subsequent developments of the Vedic period are, if of sufficient importance, in each case added.

(*a*) Cosmogonic beliefs.—Judged by their fragmentary references to the origin of the world, the poets of the Rigveda usually regarded it as having been mechanically produced like a building, the material being wood, and heaven and earth being supported by posts. The agents in the construction are regularly either the gods in general or various individual gods.

The last book of the Rigveda, however, contains a few cosmogonic hymns which represent other views. One of these (x. 90), though among the latest of the period, preserves a very primitive belief. It accounts for the origin of the world from the body of a primeval giant, whom the gods sacrificed. His head became the sky, his navel the air, and his feet the earth; while from his various members the four castes were produced. This being, called Puruṣa, or man, and interpreted pantheistically in the hymn itself as 'all this, both what has become and what shall be,' reappears as the world-soul in the Atharvaveda and the Upaniṣads.

There are, again, two cosmogonic hymns of the Rigveda which explain the origin of the universe, philosophically rather than mythologically, as a kind of evolution of the existent (*sat*) from the non-existent (*asat*). In another hymn of the same type, the agency of a creator (*dhātā*) is, after the evolution of the ocean through heat (*tapas*), introduced to produce in succession sun and moon, heaven and earth, air and ether. There is also a hymn (x. 121) in which heaven and earth and the great waters are described as the creation of Hiraṇya-garbha, the golden germ, who is said to have arisen in the beginning, to be the one god above all gods, and is finally invoked as Prajāpati, lord of all created things. It is to be noted that in the cosmogonic hymns the waters are commonly thought of as coming into existence first. In the Atharvaveda the all-god appears as a creator under several new names, especially as Skambha, 'support'; also as Prāṇa, 'breath'; Kāma, 'desire,' and others.

The cosmogony of the Brāhmaṇas requires the agency of the creator Prajāpati, who is not, however, always the starting-point. Sometimes the waters come first: on them floats the golden germ (*hiraṇya-garbha*), from which arises the spirit that produces the universe. This contradiction is due to the theories of evolution and of creation being combined. One cosmogonic myth of the Brāhmaṇas describes how the submerged earth was raised by a boar. The latter in post-Vedic mythology developed into an *avatār* of Viṣṇu.

(*b*) Theogonic beliefs.—Heaven and earth are ordinarily regarded in the Rigveda as the parents of the gods in general. It is only very rarely that other gods are spoken of as parents of the rest; thus Dawn is once said to be the mother of the gods, and both Brahmaṇaspati and Soma are mentioned as their father. The cosmogonic hymns connect the origin of the gods chiefly with the element of water; but one of them describes the gods as born after the creation of the universe.

(*c*) Origin of man.—The Vedic beliefs regarding the origin of the human race were somewhat fluctuating; the ultimate source of man was, however, always thought to be divine. Agni, the god of fire, is at least once said to have begotten the race of men, and certain families of seers are regarded as independently descended through their founders from the gods. Usually, however, the human race is traced to a first man, either Manu or Yama, both of whom are sons of Vivasvat, a solar deity.

4. The Vedic Gods.

The Vedic Indian believed in the existence of a large number of supernatural beings, varying in character and power. They comprise two main groups: on the one hand, gods who are almost exclusively benevolent and receive worship; on the other hand, demons who are hostile and whose operations have to be counteracted by the help of the gods or by ritual expedients. The divine powers, again, may be classed as higher gods, whose power pervades the world and controls the great phenomena of nature; and as lesser divinities, whose activities are restricted to a limited sphere or are conducted on a smaller scale: for instance, tutelary deities and elves. The divine nature is further shared by men of days gone by: ancient heroes who are associated with the deeds of the gods, and ancestors who live with the gods and receive worship like them. Finally, at the bottom of the scale, we find many inanimate objects and implements which are deified, being invoked and worshipped like divine beings.

A. *The Higher Gods.*

The gods are usually stated in the Rigveda and Atharvaveda, as well as the Brāhmaṇas, to be thirty-three in number; but there are occasional deviations or inconsistencies in regard to this belief. Troops of deities, such as the storm-gods, are, of course, not regarded as included in this number. The thirty-three are, in the Rigveda, divided into three groups of eleven, distributed in earth, air, and heaven, the three divisions of the universe. These three groups, now containing eight, eleven, and twelve deities respectively, appear in the Brāhmaṇas under the name of Vasus, Rudras, and Ādityas.

Gods originally mortal.—The gods, as has already been shown, were believed to have had a beginning. But they were not thought to have all come into being at the same time; for the Rigveda occasionally refers to earlier gods, and the Atharvaveda speaks of ten gods as having existed before the rest. Certain deities are, moreover, described as the offspring of others. The Atharvaveda and the Brāhmaṇas also expressly state that the gods were originally mortal, adding that they overcame death by the practice of austerity. The same thing is implied in the Rigveda, where the gods are said to have acquired immortality by drinking Soma or by receiving it as a gift from Agni and Savitṛ. In the post-Vedic view, the immortality of the gods was limited to a cosmic age.

Their physical attributes.—The gods of the Veda are anthropomorphic in appearance. The parts of their bodies, which are frequently mentioned, are in many cases, however, little more than figurative

illustrations of the phenomena of nature represented by the deity. Thus the arms of the sun are nothing more than his rays; and the tongue and limbs of Agni merely denote his flames. Some of the gods appear equipped as warriors, especially Indra; others are described as priests, especially Agni and Bṛhaspati. All of them drive through the air in luminous cars, drawn chiefly by steeds, but sometimes by other animals.

Their food.—The favourite food of men is also that of the gods, consisting of milk, butter, grain, and the flesh of sheep, goats, and cattle. It is offered to them in the sacrifice; this is either conveyed to them in heaven by the god of fire, or they come in their cars to partake of it on the litter of grass prepared for their reception. Their favourite beverage is the exhilarating juice of the Soma plant.

Their abode.—The home of the gods is described as heaven, the third heaven, or the highest step of Viṣṇu (the zenith), where, cheered by draughts of Soma, they live a life of bliss.

Their attributes.—The most prominent characteristic of the Vedic gods is power; for they are constantly described as 'great' and 'mighty.' They regulate the order of nature and vanquish the great powers of evil. They hold sway over all creatures: no one can thwart their ordinances or live beyond the time they appoint; and the fulfilment of wishes is dependent on them. Their omniscience, which is restricted within narrow limits, is seldom referred to. It is an attribute which is emphasized in the case of Varuṇa only. The Vedic gods are benevolent beings who bestow prosperity on mankind, the only one in whom injurious traits appear being Rudra. They are, moreover, moral according to the standard of an early stage of civilization. They are described as 'true' and 'not deceitful,' being friends and protectors of the honest and righteous, but punishing sin and guilt. They are not, however, above employing craft against the hostile, and occasionally practise deceit even without the justification of a good end.

Since, in most cases, the Vedic gods have not yet become dissociated from the physical phenomena which they represent, their figures are indefinite in outline and deficient in individuality. Having many features, such as power, brilliance, benevolence and wisdom in common with others, each god exhibits very few distinctive attributes. This vagueness is further increased by the practice of invoking deities in pairs—a practice making both gods share characteristics properly belonging to one alone. When nearly every power can thus be attributed to every god, the identification of one deity with another becomes easy. There are, in fact, several such identifications in the Rigveda. The idea is even found in more than one late passage that various deities are but different forms of a single divine being. This idea, however, never developed into monotheism, for none of the regular sacrifices in the Vedic period were offered to a single god. Finally, in other late hymns of the Rigveda, we find the deities Aditi and Prajāpati identified not only with all the gods, but with nature as well. This brings us to the beginning of that pantheism which became characteristic of later Indian thought.

Henotheism.—The practice of invoking individual gods as the highest, frequent even in the older parts of the Rigveda, gave rise to Max Müller's theory of the 'henotheism' or 'kathenotheism' of that Veda, which he defines as 'the belief in individual gods alternately regarded as the highest,' the god addressed being for the moment treated as an independent and supreme deity, alone present to the mind. Criticism has, however, shown that we have here only to do with an exaggerated form of praise which does not amount to a distinct type of religious thought.

The Vedic gods may most conveniently be classified as deities of heaven, air, and earth, according to the threefold division suggested by the Rigveda itself.

1. Celestial gods.—The historically oldest among the gods of the sky, as going back to the Indo-European period and identical with the Greek Zeus, is Dyaus, Heaven. The personification here hardly went beyond the notion of paternity (Dyauṣ pitar = Ζεῦ πάτερ, Jūp-piter). Dyaus is generally coupled with Pṛthivī, Earth, when the two are celebrated as universal parents. He is once described as armed with a bolt, and, in another passage, as smiling through the clouds in allusion to the lightening sky.

Another and much more prominent deity of the sky is Varuṇa, the greatest of the Vedic gods beside Indra. He, too, dates from an earlier period, for in name he is probably identical with the Greek Οὐρανός, and in character he is allied to the Avestic Ahura Mazda. Varuṇa is the chief upholder of physical and moral order (*ṛta*). By his ordinance heaven and earth are held apart; he regulates the course of sun, moon, and stars; he causes the rivers to flow and the clouds to fertilize the earth with rain. Omniscient, he witnesses men's truth and falsehood. He is angry with sinners, whom he severely punishes, binding them with his fetters. But he is gracious to the penitent, releasing men not only from their own sins, but from those committed by their fathers. The prayer for forgiveness of guilt is characteristic of the Varuṇa hymns, which in general are the most exalted and ethical in the Veda. With the development of Prajāpati as creator and supreme god in the later Vedas, the importance of Varuṇa waned, till in the post-Vedic period he retained only the dominion of the waters as god of the sea.

Five gods represent various aspects of solar activity. The oldest of these, Mitra, the 'friend,' probably a personification of the sun's beneficent power, is an inheritance from the Indo-Iranian period, being identical with the Persian sun-god Mithra, whose cult became so widely diffused in the Roman empire during the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D. In the Rigveda he has almost entirely lost his individuality, and is hardly ever invoked except in association with Varuṇa.

Sūrya, etymologically allied to the Greek Ἥλιος is the most concrete of the solar deities, this being the regular name of the luminary. He is the husband of Dawn. His car, often referred to, is generally described as drawn by seven steeds. He is the soul of all that moves or is fixed, all creatures depending on him. He prolongs life, and drives away disease. His eye and his all-seeing power are often spoken of; and he is besought to declare men sinless to Mitra and Varuṇa.

Savitṛ, the 'stimulator,' represents the quickening activity of the sun. Bestowing immortality on the gods as well as length of life on man, he also conducts the spirits of the dead to where the righteous dwell. To him is addressed the most famous stanza of the Rigveda (iii. 62. 10), with which he was in ancient times invoked at the beginning of Vedic study, and which is still repeated by every orthodox Brāhman in his morning prayers. It is called the *Sāvitrī* from the deity, or the *Gāyatrī* from the metre:

> 'May we attain that excellent
> Glory of Savitṛ the god,
> That he may stimulate our thoughts.'

Pūṣan, the 'prosperer,' personifying probably the bountiful power of the sun, appears chiefly as a pastoral deity, who protects cattle and guides

them with his goad. He is a guardian of paths; and, knowing the ways of heaven, he conducts the dead to the abode of the fathers.

Though occupying quite a subordinate position in the Rigveda, and less frequently invoked than the four gods just mentioned, Viṣnu is historically the most important of the solar deities; for he has become one of the two great gods of modern Hinduism. His three strides, typifying doubtless the course of the sun through the three divisions of the universe, constitute the central feature in his mythology. His highest step is heaven, the abode of the gods. He is frequently said to have taken his three strides for the benefit of man. This general trait is illustrated by the Brāhmaṇa myth in which Viṣnu assumes the form of a dwarf as an artifice to recover the earth, now in possession of demons, by taking his three strides. Viṣnu's characteristic benevolence was in post-Vedic mythology further developed in the doctrine of his *avatārs* ('descents' to earth), or incarnations for the good of humanity.

Uṣas (cognate to *Ἠώς* and *Aurora*), goddess of dawn, the daughter of Dyaus, is the only female deity invoked with frequency in the Rigveda, and is the most graceful creation of the Vedic seers. Being a poetical rather than a religious figure, she did not, like the other gods, receive a share in the Soma offering.

The **Aśvins** ('lords of steeds'), twin gods of morning, sons of Dyaus, eternally young and handsome, are addressed in many hymns. They very frequently receive the epithet *nāsatya*, 'true.' Uṣas is born at the yoking of their car, on which their spouse Sūryā, daughter of the sun, accompanies them. They are characteristically succouring deities. Delivering from distress in general and from shipwreck in particular, they are also divine physicians. They have several traits in common with the two famous horsemen of Greek mythology, the *Διόσκουροι*, sons of Zeus and brothers of Helen. The origin of these twin deities is obscure; it is perhaps most likely that they represent either the twilight, half dark, half light, or the morning and evening star.

2. ATMOSPHERIC GODS.—Indra is the dominant deity in the aerial sphere. While Varuṇa is the great moral ruler, Indra is the mighty warrior. Indra is, indeed, the favourite and national god of the Vedic Indian. An indication of this is the fact that more than one-fourth of the Rigveda is devoted to his praise. He is a mythological creation of an earlier period; for Indra is a demon in the Avesta. Though he is more anthropomorphic than any other Vedic god, his original character is still tolerably clear. He is primarily the thunder-god, and his conquest of the demon Vṛtra is the central feature of the mythology which surrounds him. Hence *Vṛtra-han*, 'slayer of Vṛtra,' is his chief and specific epithet. Armed with his bolt (*vajra*), elated by copious draughts of Soma, and aided by the Maruts, or storm-gods, Indra engages in the fray. The fight is terrific; for heaven and earth tremble with fear as the conflict rages. The constant repetition of the combat corresponds to the perpetual renewal of the phenomena of the thunderstorm which underlie the myth. The result of the victory is the release of the waters for man and the recovery of the light of the sun. Indra thus became a god of battle whose aid is constantly invoked in conflicts with earthly foes. He is often described as the protector of the Aryan colour, and vanquisher of the black race. One of his commonest epithets is *śakra*, the 'mighty one' (which in the Pāli form of Sakka became his regular name in Buddhist literature). Certain immoral traits appear in Indra's character. He occasionally indulges in acts of capricious violence, such as slaying his father or shattering the car of Dawn. He is greatly addicted to Soma, which he drinks in enormous quantities to stimulate him in his warlike exploits. One entire hymn of the Rigveda (x. 119) consists of a monologue in which Indra, inebriated with Soma, boasts of his greatness and power. While Varuṇa, after the period of the Rigveda, gradually sank into obscurity, Indra in the Brāhmaṇas became the chief of the Indian heaven (*svarga*), and even maintained this position in the period of the Purāṇas, though, of course, subordinate to the trinity Brahmā-Viṣnu-Śiva.

Three of the less important deities of the air are connected with lightning. **Trita**, a somewhat obscure god with the epithet *āptya*, 'watery,' mentioned only in detached verses of the Rigveda, seems to represent the 'third' (*tritas* = Greek *τρίτος*) form of fire. He goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, both his name and his epithet occurring in the Avesta. In the Rigveda he appears as a presser of Soma, who aids Indra in slaying Vṛtra and the three-headed demon Viśvarūpa, or performs the latter exploit himself. He kindles the celestial fire, and even appears as a form of fire. His home is hidden and remote. As almost identical in origin with Indra, he was ousted by the latter at an early period. In the Brāhmaṇas he appears as one of three sons of Agni, the other two being Ekata and Dvita. In the epic poetry Trita survives only as the name of a human seer.

Apām napāt, 'son of waters,' also goes back to the Indo-Iranian period. Rarely mentioned in the Rigveda, he is described as clothed in lightning and shining without fuel in the waters. He thus represents the lightning form of fire as produced from the thundercloud.

Mātariśvan is referred to only in scattered verses of the Rigveda as a divine being who (like the Greek Prometheus) brought down the hidden fire from heaven to earth. He was originally, in all likelihood, conceived as an aerial form of Agni, with whom he is sometimes actually identified. His character then underwent a transformation; for in the later Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, and the post-Vedic literature he appears as a wind-god.

It is somewhat remarkable that **Rudra**, the early form of the post-Vedic Śiva, who in the Rigveda occupies a very subordinate position, like that of Viṣnu, should have risen to parallel pre-eminence with Viṣnu in a later age. Rudra is usually described as armed with bow and arrows, but sometimes he appears with a thunderbolt and lightning shaft. He is fierce and destructive like a wild beast, being 'the ruddy boar of heaven.' The most striking feature of the hymns addressed to him is fear of his terrible shafts and deprecation of his wrath. For he slays men and cattle, and assails with disease. He is, indeed, the one malignant deity of the Vedas. His malevolence, however, unlike that of a demon, is not the only side of his character. For he is a healer as well as a destroyer, being even lauded as the greatest of physicians. Thus he is often besought not only to preserve from calamity, but to bestow welfare on man and beast. The euphemistic epithet **Śiva**, 'auspicious,' which begins to be applied to him in the Rigveda, grows more frequent in the later Vedas, till it finally becomes his regular name in post-Vedic mythology. With the increasing use of this epithet, the malevolence of Rudra becomes more pronounced in the later Vedas. The White Yajurveda, which adds various disgraceful attributes, furnishes the transition to the terrific and repulsive Śiva of Hindu mythology. The exact basis of Rudra is somewhat obscure; but the inference from the evidence of the Rigveda seems to be justified that he originally represented the destructive agency of the thunderstorm. His un-

canny and baleful traits have, however, also been explained as starting from the conception of a deity of mountain and forest whence storm and disease attack man and beast.

The sons of Rudra and Pṛśni (the 'mottled' cloud-cow) are the Maruts, or storm-gods, also often called Rudras, a group of thrice seven or thrice sixty deities, the constant allies of Indra in his conflicts. They are described as like fires at their birth, and as 'born from the laughter of lightning.' They are young warriors, armed with spears and battle-axes, wearing helmets and decked with golden ornaments. Their headlong course is often graphically depicted. They ride on golden cars which gleam with lightning: with their fellies they rend the mountains and shatter the lordly trees of the forest. They share to some extent the destructive as well as the beneficent traits of their father Rudra. Their lightning-bolt slays men and kine. But they also bring healing remedies, apparently the rains with which they fertilize the earth.

The god of wind is not a prominent deity in the Rigveda. Under the more anthropomorphic form of Vāyu he is chiefly associated with Indra. As Vāta (the ordinary name of wind), he is described in a more concrete manner (often in connexion with the verb *vā*, 'to blow,' from which the word is derived), being coupled only with the less anthropomorphic god Parjanya.

A personification of the rain-cloud is Parjanya, son of Dyaus. He is not a prominent deity, being invoked in only three hymns of the Rigveda, which, however, describe his activity in the rainstorm very vividly. He quickens the earth with rain, causing abundant vegetation to spring up. He also bestows fertility on the animal world. He thus comes to be spoken of as 'our divine father.'

The waters, Āpaḥ, are praised as divine powers in four hymns of the Rigveda. They are celestial, abiding in the home of the gods. The aerial waters are the mothers of one of the forms of Agni, Apām napāt, son of waters. But, as flowing in channels and having the sea for their goal, the waters are also terrestrial (cf. 3). They are young wives, mothers, goddesses who bestow boons and come to the sacrifice. They not only bear away defilement, but cleanse from moral guilt, the sins of violence, cursing, and lying. They also grant remedies, healing, long life, and immortality.

3. TERRESTRIAL DEITIES.—Rivers are not infrequently personified and invoked in the Rigveda. Thus the Sindhu (Indus) is celebrated as a goddess in one hymn, and the Vipāś (Biās) and Śutudrī (Sutlej), sister streams of the Panjāb, in another. The most important and oftenest lauded is, however, the Sarasvatī. Though the personification goes much further here than in the case of other streams, the connexion of the goddess with the river is never lost sight of in the Rigveda. In the Brāhmaṇas, Sarasvatī has become identified with the goddess of speech, and in Hindu mythology she appears further modified as the goddess of eloquence and wisdom, invoked as a Muse, and regarded as the wife of Brahmā.

Earth, or Pṛthivī, the broad, nearly always associated with Dyaus, is often spoken of as a mother. The personification is rudimentary, the attributes of the goddess being chiefly those of the physical earth.

By far the most important of the terrestrial deities is Agni, god of fire. Next to Indra, he is the most frequently invoked of the Vedic gods, being celebrated in about one-fifth of the hymns of the Rigveda. It is only natural that the personification of the sacrificial fire, the centre of the Vedic ritual, should engross the thoughts of the poets to such an extent. *Agni-s* (Lat. *igni-s*) being also the ordinary name for fire, the anthropomorphism has not proceeded far. The bodily parts of the god have an unmistakable connexion with the various aspects of the sacrificial fire. Thus Agni is called 'butter-backed,' 'butter-faced,' and 'butter-haired,' with reference to the oblation of *ghī* (*ghṛta*) cast on the flames. His teeth, jaws, and tongues are associated with the action of burning. Agni is borne on a brilliant car, drawn by two or more steeds, which he yokes to bring the gods, for he is the charioteer of the sacrifice.

Beyond his sacrificial activities, little is said about the deeds of Agni. It is otherwise mainly his various births, forms, and abodes that occupy the thoughts of the Vedic poets. Agni is usually called the son of Dyaus and Pṛthivī, sometimes also the offspring of Tvaṣṭṛ and the waters. But owing to the daily production of Agni from the two firesticks, they, too, are his parents. He is then a newborn infant, also called 'son of strength' because of the powerful friction required to kindle the flame. He wakes at dawn, for the fire is lit every morning. He is thus the youngest of the gods; but he is also old, having conducted the first sacrifice.

As not only terrestrial, but sprung from the aerial waters and having been brought from heaven, Agni is often spoken of as having a triple character. This threefold Agni is the earliest Indian trinity, probably the prototype not only of the later Rigvedic triad of Sun, Wind, Fire, connected with the three divisions of the universe, but also of the triad Sun, Indra, Fire, which, though not Rigvedic, is still ancient. There may be a historical connexion between this triad and the conception of the later Hindu trinity of Brahmā-Viṣṇu-Śiva. This triad of fires may, further, have suggested, and would explain, the division of a single sacrificial fire into the three which form an essential feature in the cult of the Brāhmaṇas.

As kindled in innumerable dwellings, Agni is also said to have many births. He assumes various divine forms and has many names; in him are comprehended all the gods, whom he surrounds as a felly the spokes. Though scattered in many places, he is one and the same king. It was probably from such speculations on the nature of Agni that an advance was made to the conception of a unity pervading the many manifestations of the divine which has been noted above (p. 603[a]).

As the deity most intimately associated with the everyday life of man, Agni is spoken of as an immortal who has taken up his abode among mortals in human dwellings, and is constantly called a 'guest' and 'lord of the house.' Being the conductor of the sacrifice as well as the summoner of the gods, he is very frequently described as a 'messenger,' who moves between heaven and earth. Agni is, however, most characteristically called a 'priest,' usually by the generic terms *ṛtvij* and *vipra*; or specifically 'domestic priest' (*purohita*), oftenest of all 'invoker' or 'chief priest' (*hotṛ*). He is, in fact, the great priest among the Vedic gods, as Indra is the great warrior. Agni is a mighty benefactor of his worshippers, whose enemies he consumes. The benefits which he confers are chiefly domestic welfare and general prosperity, while those which Indra grants are mostly the rewards of victory.

Agni is frequently spoken of in the Rigveda as a 'goblin-slayer,' a trait surviving from what is perhaps the oldest phase of the cult of fire as warding off the attack of evil spirits.

Since the Soma sacrifice forms, by the side of fire-worship, the other main feature in the ritual of the Rigveda, the personification of the juice of

the Soma plant is naturally one of its most prominent deities. Judged by the number of hymns addressed to him, Soma is third in importance among the Vedic gods, coming next to Agni from this point of view. Since the plant and the juice are constantly before the eyes of the priests as they sing the praises of the god, the personification is vague. The imagination of the poets dwells chiefly on the processes of pressing and straining, which it overlays with chaotic imagery and mystical fancies of almost infinite variety.

As the most important of herbs, Soma is spoken of as 'lord of plants' or as their king, being also designated 'lord of the forest.' There are many references to Soma growing on the mountains. Heaven, however, is regarded as its true and original home; and the myth of its having been brought down to earth by an eagle (*śyena*) is often alluded to.

The mental stimulation produced by drinking Soma is expressed by one of the poets of the Rigveda with the words: 'We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods.' Its exhilarating power is, however, dwelt upon chiefly in connexion with Indra, whom it inspires in his mighty conflicts with the aerial demons. Soma thus came to be regarded as a divine drink, which bestowed immortality on the gods, being called *amṛta* (allied to Greek ἀμβροσία), the 'immortal' draught. Hence the god Soma places his worshipper in the imperishable world of eternal light and glory, making him immortal where Yama dwells. Healing power is similarly attributed to Soma. The juice is medicine for the ailing man, and the god heals the sick, making the blind to see and the lame to walk.

In some of the latest hymns of the Rigveda, Soma begins to be somewhat obscurely identified with the moon. In the Atharvaveda and the Yajurveda this identification is explicit in several passages. It is already a commonplace in the Brāhmaṇas, which explain the waning of the moon as due to the gods and fathers consuming the ambrosia of which it consists. One of the Upaniṣads, moreover, states that the moon is king Soma, the food of the gods, and is drunk up by them. In post-Vedic literature, finally, Soma is a regular name of the moon. This somewhat remarkable coalescence of Soma with the moon must have started from the exaggerated terms in which the poets of the Rigveda describe the celestial nature and brilliance of Soma. It was doubtless furthered by the imagery in which the poets of the Rigveda indulged. Thus Soma is spoken of as swelling in the waters (with which it was mixed), and Soma in the bowls is once even compared to the moon in the waters. Soma is often called *Indu*, or 'drop.' This word shared the fate of Soma, also becoming a regular name of the moon in the post-Vedic period.

Soma must already have been an important feature in both the mythology and the cult of the Indo-Iranian period; for the Avestan Haoma shows many points of agreement, in both directions, with the Soma of the Rigveda.

4. Abstract deities.—One result of the advance of thought, during the period of the Rigveda, from the concrete towards the abstract was the creation of abstract deities. Of the two classes which may be distinguished, the earlier and more numerous one seems to have started from epithets which were applicable to one or more older deities, but which came to acquire an independent value, as the want of a god exercising the particular activity in question began to be felt. When the type was once established, the creation of direct abstractions of this kind became possible. We have here names denoting either an agent (formed with the suffix *-tṛ* or *-tar*, the Lat. and Gr. *-tor*, *-ter*), such as Dhātṛ, 'creator,' or an attribute, such as Prajāpati, 'lord of creatures.' The *agent gods* are nearly all of rare occurrence, appearing for the most part in the latest book of the Rigveda. Thus Dhātṛ, an epithet of Indra and Viśvakarman, appears also as an independent deity who creates heaven and earth, sun and moon. In the post-Vedic period Dhātṛ has become one of the regular names of the creator and preserver of the world. Of rarer occurrence are Vidhātṛ, the 'disposer,' Dhartṛ, the 'supporter,' Trātṛ, the 'protector,' and Netṛ, the 'leader.' The only agent god mentioned with any frequency in the Rigveda is Tvaṣṭṛ, the 'fashioner' or 'artificer,' though no hymn is addressed to him. He is the most skilful of workmen, having among other things fashioned the bolt of Indra, and a new drinking-cup for the gods. He shapes the form of beings and presides over generation. He is a guardian of Soma, which is called the 'mead of Tvaṣṭṛ,' and Indra drinks it in his house. He is the father of Saraṇyū, wife of Vivasvat and mother of the primeval twins Yama and Yamī. The origin of this deity is obscure. He may in the beginning have represented the creative activity of the sun; having then, because of his name, become the centre of attraction for myths illustrative of creative skill, he finally came to fill the place of a divine artificer in the Vedic pantheon. Oldenberg thinks that Tvaṣṭṛ, the 'artificer,' was originally a direct abstraction of artistic skill. He regards the solar deity Savitṛ, the 'stimulator,' whose name is similarly formed, as from the outset an abstraction of this type.

There are a few other abstract deities whose names were originally epithets of older gods. They are of rare and late occurrence in the Rigveda, their appellations being mostly compound in form and representing the supreme god who was being evolved at the end of the Rigvedic period. The historically most important among these is Prajāpati, 'lord of creatures.' Originally an epithet of such gods as Savitṛ and Soma, the name is mentioned in a late verse of the last book of the Rigveda as that of a distinct deity in the character of a creator. Prajāpati is often in the Atharvaveda and the White Yajurveda, and regularly in the Brāhmaṇas, recognized as the chief and father of the gods. In the Sūtras he is identified with Brahmā, his successor in the post-Vedic age. Similarly, the epithet Viśvakarman, 'all-creating,' appears as the name of an independent deity, to whom two hymns of the last book of the Rigveda are addressed. In the Brāhmaṇas, Viśvakarman is expressly identified with the creator Prajāpati, while in post-Vedic mythology he appears, doubtless owing to the name, as the artificer of the gods (like Tvaṣṭṛ in the Rigveda). Hiraṇya-garbha, the 'golden germ,' once occurs in the Rigveda as the supreme god, described as the 'one lord of all that exists.' In the Yajurveda he is expressly identified with Prajāpati, and in the later literature his name appears chiefly as a designation of Brahmā. In one curious instance it is possible to watch the genesis of an abstract deity of this type. The refrain of a late hymn of the Rigveda refers to the unknown creator with the interrogative pronoun *ka*: 'What god should we with sacrifices worship?' This led to the word Ka being used, in the later Vedic literature, as an independent name of the supreme god. In the Atharvaveda Rohita, 'the red one' (whose female form is Rohiṇī), has become a distinct deity in the capacity of a creator, the name having originally been an epithet of the sun. The only abstract deity of this type occurring in the oldest as well as the

latest parts of the Rigveda is Bṛhaspati, 'lord of the spell,' of whom Brahmaṇaspati is a frequent doublet. He has been regarded by Roth and other Vedic scholars as a direct personification of devotion (*brahmā*). To the present writer it seems more likely that he is only an indirect deification of the sacrificial aspect of Agni, with whom he is often identified. As the companion and ally of Indra, Bṛhaspati has been drawn into the myth of the release of the cows, which he is frequently described as delivering from the demon Vala. His most prominent characteristic is, however, his priesthood. As the divine *brahmā* priest, he seems to have been the prototype of the god Brahmā, chief of the later Hindu trinity. The name Bṛhaspati itself survived in post-Vedic mythology as the designation of a sage, teacher of the gods and regent of the planet Jupiter.

The second and smaller class of abstract deities comprises personifications of abstract nouns. There are seven or eight of these occurring in the last book of the Rigveda. Two hymns are addressed to *Manyu*, 'wrath,' and one to *Śraddhā*, 'faith.' *Anumati*, 'favour' (of the gods), *Aramati*, 'devotion,' *Sūnṛtā*, 'bounty,' *Asunīti*, 'spirit-life,' and *Nirṛti*, 'decease,' occur in only a few isolated passages. These abstractions become commoner in the later Vedas. Thus *Kāma*, 'desire,' first appears in the Atharvaveda, where the arrows with which he pierces hearts are already referred to; he becomes in post-Vedic mythology the well-known flower-arrowed god of love. In the same Veda *Kāla*, 'time,' and *Skambha*, 'support,' are cosmogonic powers, while *Prāṇa*, 'breath,' and some other analogous abstractions are identified with Prajāpati. *Śrī*, as a personification of beauty or fortune, does not begin to appear till the Brāhmaṇa period.

A purely abstract deity, often incidentally celebrated throughout the Rigveda, is Aditi, 'liberation,' 'freedom' (literally 'un-binding': *a-diti*), whose main characteristic is the power of delivering from the bonds of physical suffering and moral guilt. She, however, occupies a unique position among the abstract deities owing to the peculiar way in which the personification seems to have come about. She is the mother of the small group of deities called Ādityas, often styled 'sons of Aditi.' This expression at first most probably meant nothing more than 'sons of liberation,' according to an idiom common in the Rigveda and elsewhere. The word was then personified, with the curious result that the mother is mythologically younger than some at least of her sons, who (*e.g.* Mitra) date from the Indo-Iranian period. The goddess Diti, mentioned only three times in the Rigveda, probably came into being as an antithesis to Aditi, with whom she is twice mentioned there and several times in the later Vedas. The Atharvaveda speaks of her sons, the Daityas, who in post-Vedic mythology are demons, enemies of the gods.

5. GODDESSES, in general, play an insignificant part in the Vedas, taking no share in the government of the world. The only one of importance is Uṣas (p. 604[a]). Next comes Sarasvatī, who, however, ranks with only the least prominent of the male deities. Very few others are celebrated in even as much as one entire hymn. Such are *Pṛthivī*, Earth (p. 605[a]); *Rātrī*, Night, the sister of Dawn, conceived not as dark, but bright with stars; *Araṇyānī*, goddess of the forest; and *Vāc*, goddess of speech. Others are only sporadically mentioned. Such are *Puraṃdhi* and *Dhiṣaṇā*, goddesses of plenty. Less often referred to are *Rākā* and *Sinīvālī*, spoken of as bountiful goddesses; in later Vedic texts they appear as the presiding deities of full and new moon respectively. *Kuhū* is also mentioned in these texts as a personification of the new moon. *Iḷā* is a sacrificial goddess, the personification of the oblation of milk and butter. With her is also mentioned *Mahī* or *Bhāratī*, another sacrificial deity. The wives of the great gods are still more insignificant, being mere names formed from those of their consorts, altogether lacking in individuality. Thus *Agnāyī*, *Indrāṇī*, *Varuṇānī* are the names of the spouses of Agni, Indra, and Varuna respectively. *Rudrāṇī*, as the wife of Rudra, first appears in the Sūtras. The 'wives of the gods' (*devānām patnīs*), occasionally mentioned as a group in the Rigveda, have a special place assigned to them, apart from the gods, in the cult of the Brāhmaṇas.

6. DUAL DIVINITIES.—A peculiar feature of Vedic religion is the invocation of pairs of deities whose names are combined as dual compounds. About a dozen such pairs are celebrated in entire hymns, and about half a dozen more in detached verses of the Rigveda. By far the largest number of hymns is addressed to the couple Mitra-Varuṇa, though the names most frequently compounded in the dual are Heaven and Earth (*dyāvāpṛthivī*). Most likely the latter pair, having been associated as universal parents from the Indo-European period onwards, furnished the analogy for this dual type. They are also often called the Two Worlds (*rodasī*) in the Rigveda.

7. GROUPS OF DEITIES.—Among the creations of Vedic mythology we also find a few more or less definite groups of deities, generally associated with some particular god. The Maruts who, as we have seen (p. 605[a]), attend on Indra, form the most numerous group. Under the name of Rudras, they are also occasionally associated with their father Rudra. The smaller group of the Ādityas, of whom Varuṇa is the chief, are constantly mentioned in company with their mother Aditi. Their number in the Rigveda is stated to be seven or, with the addition of *Mārtāṇḍa*, eight; while in the Brāhmaṇas and later it is regularly twelve. One passage of the Rigveda enumerates six of them: Mitra, Aryaman, Bhaga, Varuṇa, Dakṣa, Aṃśa; Sūrya was probably regarded as the seventh. A much less important group, without individual names or definite number in the Vedas, is that of the Vasus, whose leader is, in the Rigveda, generally Indra, but in later Vedic texts generally Agni. In the Brāhmaṇas their number is stated to be eight. There are, finally, the Viśvedevās, or all-gods, who are invoked in many hymns. It is an artificial sacrificial group, intended to include the whole pantheon, and thus to ensure the omission of no deity when all were meant to be invoked. But in spite of its name, this comprehensive group was, strange to say, sometimes conceived as a narrower one, associated with others like the Vasus and Ādityas.

B. *LESSER DIVINITIES.*

1. ELVES, GENII.—Besides the higher gods already described, a number of lesser divine powers are known to the Rigveda. The most prominent of these are the Ṛbhus, a deft-handed trio who by their marvellous skill acquired the rank of deities. Among their five main feats of dexterity, the greatest consisted in transforming the bowl of Tvaṣṭr into four shining cups. The bowl and the cups have been variously interpreted as the moon with its four phases or the year with its seasons. The Ṛbhus further exhibited their skill in renewing the youth of their parents, by whom Heaven and Earth seem to have been meant. The myth of the Ṛbhus having rested for twelve days in the house of the sun is probably an allusion to the intercalation of twelve days at the winter solstice, so as to bring the lunar year of 354 days into harmony with the solar year of nearly 366 days.

Occasional mention is made in the Rigveda of an Apsaras ('moving in the waters'), a celestial water-nymph, the spouse of a corresponding genius named Gandharva. Occasionally more Apsarases than one are spoken of. In the Atharvaveda and later, the Apsarases form a class, regularly associated with the Gandharvas; and though they are still connected with the waters and clouds, their sphere is here, as well as in the Yajurveda, extended to the earth, where they haunt the different varieties of fig-trees called Nyagrodha, Aśvattha, Udumbara, and Plakṣa, in which the music of their cymbals and lutes is heard. In the Brāhmaṇas they appear as nymphs of great beauty, devoted to song, dance, and play. Several individual names of Apsarases are mentioned in the later Vedas, but the only one occurring in the Rigveda is that of *Urvaśi*. In an obscure hymn (x. 95) she engages in a dialogue with her earthly spouse *Purūravas*, whom she has forsaken. The myth of their alliance is told more fully in one of the Brāhmaṇas. *Gandharva* is, in the Rigveda, a single being (like the Gandarewa of the Avesta), who dwells in the aerial sphere, guards the celestial Soma, and is (as in the Avesta) connected with the waters. In the later Vedas the Gandharvas form a class associated with the Apsarases in a stereotyped manner, and are brought into relation with marriage and with wedding ceremonies. In the post-Vedic period the Gandharvas have become celestial singers.

2. TUTELARY DEITIES.—There are a few divinities of the tutelary order, guardians watching over the welfare of house or field. One of these is *Vāstospati*, 'lord of the dwelling,' rarely mentioned in the Rigveda, where he is invoked to grant a favourable entry, to remove disease, and to bestow protection and prosperity. The Sūtras prescribe that Vāstospati should be propitiated when a new house is to be occupied. *Kṣetrasya pati*, 'lord of the field,' is besought in the Rigveda to grant cattle and horses and to confer prosperity. The Sūtras state that he is to be worshipped when a field is ploughed. *Sītā*, the 'furrow,' is once invoked in the Rigveda to dispense crops and rich blessings. In a Sūtra she appears as the wife of Indra. Here, too, *Urvarā*, the 'arable field,' with her garland of threshing-floors, is supplicated to bestow welfare.

C. *HEROES.*

The heroes of the Rigveda are all ancient seers or priests. (1) The most important of them is Manu or Manus (which also means 'man'), the ancestor of the human race, styled 'our father' by the poets, who also speak of the sacrificers of their own day as 'the people of Manu.' Regarded as the son of Vivasvat, he bears the patronymic Vaivasvata from the Atharvaveda onwards. He is thus a doublet of Yama as progenitor of mankind. He is represented as the institutor of sacrifice. Soma is said to have been brought to him by the bird, and Indra is described as drinking the Soma of Manu to fortify him for the conflict with Vṛtra. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Manu plays the part of Noah, being saved in a ship from a deluge, which has swept away all other creatures, by a fish (in post-Vedic mythology an *avatār* of Viṣṇu). Manu then became the ancestor of the human race through his daughter Iḷā, who was produced from his offerings. (2) Atharvan is frequently mentioned in the Rigveda as an ancient fire-priest, who practised devotion along with Father Manu. In the Atharvaveda he appears as a companion of the gods, being related to them and dwelling in heaven. The name is also found in the plural as that of group of fathers. In the Atharvaveda, the Atharvans are described as destroying goblins with a magical herb. (3) Dadhyañc, son of Atharvan, is a sacrificer who kindled Agni in the days of old. A myth told about him is that the Aśvins gave him a horse's head, with which he proclaimed to them where the mead of Tvaṣṭṛ was to be found. Indra is also connected with this myth; for he is said to have discovered the horse's head, and with the bones of Dadhyañc to have slain ninety-nine Vṛtras. (4) Atri is one of the ancient seers most frequently mentioned in the Rigveda. The myth of his deliverance from a fiery chasm by the Aśvins is often referred to. He is also said to have found the sun when hidden by the demon Svarbhānu and to have placed it in the sky. The Atris are a family of seers to whom the authorship of the fifth book of the Rigveda is attributed. (5) Kaṇva is another ancient seer and sacrificer often spoken of in the Rigveda. He is said to have been befriended by Agni, Indra, and the Maruts; and to have been specially aided by the Aśvins, who restored his eyesight. Most of the hymns of the eighth book of the Rigveda are attributed to his descendants the Kaṇvas. (6) Kutsa is one of the very few Vedic heroes who exhibit warlike traits. He is chiefly connected with the Indra myth. Riding on the same car as Indra and acting as his charioteer, he is even invoked with Indra in the dual. He is especially associated with Indra in slaying the demon Suṣṇa. When Kutsa was pressed by his foes, Indra tore off the wheel of the sun to aid him. Nevertheless Indra sometimes appears as hostile to Kutsa, delivering him into the hands of an enemy. Several hymns of the first and ninth books of the Rigveda are assigned by tradition to the seer Kutsa. (7) Much less frequently mentioned in the Rigveda is the seer Kāvya Uśanā, whose characteristic feature is wisdom. He, too, is associated with Indra. He is said to have fashioned for Indra the bolt for slaying Vṛtra; and once joins him and Kutsa in slaying the demon Suṣṇa. (8) Some names, moreover, appear predominantly or exclusively in the plural as representing families or groups of ancient seers, who, if in some cases historical in origin, have become invested with mythological traits. A frequently mentioned group of this kind are the Aṅgirases, who are closely associated with Indra in the myth of the capture of the cows. They are described as seers who are the sons of the gods, and who by sacrifice obtained immortality as well as the friendship of Indra. They receive offerings of Soma, and are invoked like gods. When used in the singular, *aṅgiras* is nearly always an epithet of Agni, who is called the first seer Aṅgiras or the chief Aṅgiras. The word *aṅgiras* appears to be etymologically identical with the Greek ἄγγελος, 'messenger.' This points to the Aṅgirases originally having been regarded as messengers between heaven and earth, attendant on Agni. But if they were mythical in origin, they came to be regarded as an actual priestly family, the composition of the ninth book of the Rigveda being attributed to them. This is also indicated by the compound term Atharva-aṅgirasaḥ, 'the Atharvans and Aṅgirases,' a designation of the Atharvaveda which occurs in that Veda itself as well as later. (9) Another group of ancient priests are the Bhṛgus, chiefly connected with the myth of the communication of fire to men. The Indian Prometheus, Mātariśvan, brought the hidden Agni from heaven to the Bhṛgus, who established and diffused the sacrificial fire on earth. In two or three passages of the Rigveda they are referred to as if an actual tribe of bygone days. In the later Vedic literature, Bhṛgu is the eponymous hero of a tribe, and regarded as a son of Varuṇa. (10) A definite numerical group of

ancient priests, but rarely referred to in the Rigveda, are the 'Seven Seers' (*sapta ṛṣayaḥ*). They are associated with the gods and called divine. Their number may have been suggested by the seven technical priests, of whom they would then represent the prototypes. In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa they are regarded as the seven stars in the constellation of the Great Bear, and are stated to have themselves been originally bears. This identification was doubtless brought about by the sameness of number in the two groups, aided by the similarity of sound between *ṛṣi*, 'seer,' and *ṛkṣa*, which in the Rigveda means both 'star' and 'bear.' (11) The above groups are all spoken of as 'fathers,' and nearly all of them, besides a few others, are mentioned as races of ancestors to whom worship is paid. Those thus characterized in the Rigveda are the Navagvas, Vairūpas, Aṅgirases, Atharvans, Bhṛgus, Vasiṣṭhas. The last four, whether mythical in origin or not, appear in the historical aspect of families to which the composition of the Atharvaveda and two books of the Rigveda was attributed.

D. *Animals.*

Animals play a considerable part in the mythological and religious ideas of the Veda. (1) Among them the **horse** is prominent as drawing the cars of the gods. There are also mentioned in the Rigveda at least four individual steeds, probably all representing the sun, which are regarded as deities and objects of worship. The most notable of these is *Dadhikrā* or *Dadhikrāvan*, to whom four hymns are addressed. He is described as a swift and victorious steed, regularly invoked with Uṣas, occasionally with Agni, the Aśvins, Sūrya, and others. The divine horse *Tārkṣya*, addressed in one short hymn of the Rigveda, is a god-impelled mighty steed, a vanquisher of chariots, speeding to battle. In one or two later Vedic texts Tārkṣya is referred to as a bird; and in the epic and later literature he is identical with the swift bird Garuḍa, the vehicle of Viṣṇu. A third steed, several times mentioned, is *Paidva*, spoken of as white, a dragon-slayer, a conqueror invincible in battles, worthy to be invoked like the god Bhaga by men. Lastly, there is *Etaśa*, the swift steed who draws the bright form of the sun, but also contends in a race with Sūrya. (2) The **cow**, however, is the animal which occupies the most important position in Vedic mythology and religion. Cows, representing beams of light, draw the car of Dawn. Rain-clouds, especially in the Indra myth, are personified as cows; Pṛśni, the mother of the Maruts, being an individualization. The bountiful clouds are doubtless the prototypes of the many-coloured cows, mentioned in the Atharvaveda, which yield all desires in the heaven of the Blest, and which are the forerunners of the Cow of Plenty (*Kāmaduh*) of post-Vedic poetry. The animal herself is already regarded as sacred in the Rigveda; for one of the poets impresses on his hearers that she should not be killed, and she is frequently designated by the term *aghnyā*, 'not to be slain.' She is even addressed as a goddess; and the divinities Iḷā, Aditi, and Pṛthivī are sometimes conceived in the form of a cow. In the Atharvaveda the worship of the cow as a sacred animal is fully recognized. That the tendency to deification had already begun before the Aryans entered India is proved by the evidence of the Avesta, which shows that the sanctity of the cow is at least as old as the Indo-Iranian period. (3) In the Rigveda the **goat** is the animal that draws the car of Pūṣan. This is also the form of the divine being Aja Ekapād, 'the one-footed goat.' In the later Vedic literature we occasionally find the goat connected or identified with Agni. (4) The **ass** appears in Vedic mythology only as drawing the car of the Aśvins. (5) The **dog** is met with in the form of the two brindled hounds of Yama, chief of the dead. (6) The **boar** has, in the Yajurveda, a cosmogonic character, as the form assumed by the creator Prajāpati when he raised the earth out of the waters. From this conception the boar incarnation of Viṣṇu was developed in Hindu mythology. (7) The **tortoise** has, in the later Vedas, acquired a semi-divine position; for in the White Yajurveda he is spoken of as 'lord of waters,' and in the Atharvaveda he appears under the name of Kaśyapa, beside or as identical with Prajāpati, receiving the epithet *Svayambhū*, 'self-existent.' In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Prajāpati is said, when producing all creatures, to have changed himself into a tortoise. This transformation became, in Hindu mythology, the tortoise incarnation of Viṣṇu. (8) A **monkey** named Vṛṣākapi appears in an obscure myth told in a late hymn of the Rigveda as a favourite of Indra. (9) Another late hymn contains a panegyric of **frogs** as bestowing cows and long life. (10) The bird frequently figures in Vedic mythology, as the **eagle** (*śyena*) that brings the Soma to Indra. *Noxious animals* in Vedic mythology generally appear as demons or exhibit demoniac traits. (11) The **serpent** is here the most prominent. This is the form which the powerful demon Vṛtra, the foe of Indra, is thought to possess; for he is frequently designated as *ahi*, 'the snake.' The serpent, however, also shows a beneficent aspect in the divine being Ahi Budhnya, 'the dragon of the deep,' who is supposed to dwell in the fathomless depths of the aerial ocean. In the later Vedas, the serpents (*sarpāḥ*) are mentioned, along with the Gandharvas and others, as a class of semi-divine beings that dwell on earth, in air, and in heaven; and in the Sūtras, offerings to them are prescribed. In the Sūtras, we for the first time come across the Nāgas, human beings in appearance, but serpents in reality. In the Hindu period, serpent-worship is found all over India. Since there is no trace of it in the Rigveda, while it prevails widely among the non-Aryan tribes, the conclusion seems justified that, when the Aryans overspread India, the land of serpents, they found the cult diffused among the aborigines and borrowed it from them.

E. *Deified Inanimate Objects.*

Besides the great phenomena of nature, various features of the earth's surface, as well as artificial objects, are treated as deities in the Vedas. This is a fetishistic worship of inanimate things chiefly regarded as useful to man.

1. *Mountains* are frequently addressed as divinities in the Rigveda, but only along with other natural objects, such as rivers and plants, or in association with gods. *Parvata*, 'mountain,' is even invoked with Indra in the form of a dual compound. Besides rivers and waters, already mentioned as terrestrial goddesses, *plants* (*oṣadhi*) are regarded as divine powers. One entire hymn of the Rigveda is devoted to their praise, chiefly with reference to their healing powers; the Atharvaveda refers to a medicinal plant as 'a goddess born on the goddess earth'; and the Black Yajurveda prescribes an animal sacrifice to plants for the obtaining of offspring. Large trees, called 'lords of the forest' (*vanaspati*), are also sometimes addressed as deities, mainly in association with waters and mountains.

2. Various *sacrificial implements* are deified. The most important is the *sacrificial post*. It is praised and invoked in a whole hymn of the Rigveda, in which posts set up by priests are described as gods. The *sacrificial litter* (*barhis*) is also dei-

fied, and the '*divine doors*,' by which the sacrificial enclosure is entered, are goddesses. The *pressing stones* (*grāvan*) are addressed as deities in three hymns of the Rigveda; spoken of here as immortal, unaging, more mighty than heaven, they are invoked to drive away demons and destruction. The *mortar and pestle* used in pounding the Soma plant are invoked in the Rigveda. In the Atharvaveda divine power of the highest order is ascribed to *ucchiṣṭa*, the 'remnant' of the sacrifice, as well as to various sacrificial ladles. The agricultural implements named *śuna* and *sīrā*, probably the ploughshare and the plough, are invoked in a few verses of the Rigveda, and, in the ritual, receive the offering of a cake.

3. *Weapons*, finally, are sometimes deified; armour, bow, quiver, arrows, and drum being invoked in one of the hymns of the Rigveda. The drum alone is also celebrated in an entire hymn of the Atharvaveda.

4. *Idols* seem not to have been known in the age of the Vedas; at all events they first begin to be referred to in the later additions to the Brāhmaṇas and in the Sūtras. One verse of the Rigveda, however, seems to allude to some image of Indra.

5. *Material objects* treated as symbols of deities are occasionally mentioned in the ritual literature. Thus the wheel (*cakra*) represents the sun in various ceremonies; and it appears in Hindu mythology as one of the weapons of the solar deity Viṣṇu. A piece of gold, sometimes in the form of a disk, also indicates the sun on certain ritual occasions. A symbol must have been used by the phallus worshippers (*śiśnádevāḥ*), who are mentioned with repugnance in the Rigveda. In the post-Vedic period the phallus or *liṅga* became typical of Śiva's generative power, and its worship is widely diffused in India at the present day.

5. Demons.

a. The demons which are often mentioned in the Vedas are of two kinds. The higher and more powerful class, the aerial foes of the gods, are generally called **Asuras** in the Atharvaveda and later. This word, however, rarely means 'demon' in the Rigveda, where it usually preserves the older sense of 'being of mysterious power,' and denotes a god (*ahura* in the Avesta). The earlier notion of the conflict between a single god and a single demon, as exemplified by Indra and Vṛtra in the Rigveda, gradually made way for that of the hostility of gods and demons as two opposing hosts. This is the regular view of the Brāhmaṇas. Here the Asuras, no less than the gods, are regarded as the offspring of Prajāpati; here, too, the Asuras often vanquish the gods at the outset, being finally worsted only by artifice.

In the Rigveda the terms *dāsa* and *dasyu*, properly the name of the dark aborigines overcome by the conquering Aryans, are frequently used also to designate aerial demons, adversaries of the gods. A group of demons are the **Paṇis** ('niggards'), primarily the foes of Indra, who with the aid of Saramā tracks and releases the cows hidden by them.

Of individual demons, by far the most frequently mentioned is **Vṛtra**, the 'encompasser,' the formidable opponent of Indra. His mother being called Dānu, he is also sometimes alluded to by the metronymic term *Dānava* (which later becomes the name of a class of demons). Another powerful demon is **Vala**, the personified cave of the cows, which he guards, and which are set free by Indra and his allies, notably the Aṅgirases. Other demon adversaries of Indra are **Arbuda**, described as a wily beast, whose cows Indra drove out; **Viśvarūpa**, son of Tvaṣṭṛ, a three-headed demon slain by both Trita and Indra, who seize his cows; and **Svarbhānu**, who eclipses the sun (his successor in Hindu mythology being Rāhu). There are several other individual demons, generally described as Dāsas, and slain by Indra in favour of protégés: such are Suṣṇa, Śambara, Pipru, Namuci, Dhuni, and Cumuri, besides some half dozen others who were originally, in all likelihood, terrestrial foes.

b. The second or lower class of demons are terrestrial goblins, enemies of men, as Asuras are of gods. By far the most common generic name for them is **Rakṣas.** They are nearly always mentioned in connexion with some god who destroys them. The much less common term *yātu* or *yātudhāna* (primarily 'sorcerer') alternates with *rakṣas*, and perhaps denotes a species. Terrestrial demons appear in the shape of various animals or birds, having also the power to assume human forms in order to deceive. With human shape they often combine some monstrous deformity; they are even described as blue, yellow, or green in colour; they are male and female, have families, and are mortal. Greedy for flesh and blood, they attack men by entering into them, thus causing disease and madness. As they prowl about at night, and the sacrifice is the main object of their malignity, Agni is naturally the god oftenest opposed to them, and most frequently invoked to burn, ward off, or destroy them. An important group of goblins, scarcely alluded to in the Rigveda but often mentioned in the later Vedas, are the **Piśācas**, eaters of raw flesh or of corpses. Besides some other groups of goblins of lesser importance, there were included in Vedic belief many other hostile agencies, such as those of disease, which it was one of the main tasks of magic to counteract. Only a few among the groups of terrestrial spirits were thought to be, after the manner of elves, helpful to men, as in harvest work, or in battle by terrifying the foe.

6. Religious Practice.

a. The cult of the Vedic Indian has three aspects. It endeavours, in the first place, to win the favour of the gods, who are almost without exception benevolent. It further aims at warding off the hostility of the demons, who are malevolent, here having recourse to practices which for the most part are not of a religious, but of a magical character. Lastly, its attitude towards ancestors is a combination of its treatment of gods and of demons; for, while ancestors receive worship as divine beings, means are taken to prevent them from unduly prolonging their uncanny presence among the living.

b. The worship of the gods has two sides, finding expression either by word or by act. Praise of their greatness and power, or prayer for welfare and forgiveness of sin is addressed to them on the one hand; sacrifice consisting of food and drink is offered on the other. Prayer and praise, which include frequent invitations to the sacrifice, are largely metrical in form, entirely so in the Rigveda. **Prayer** in the Vedas is almost entirely of the ritual type, intended to accompany a ceremony, or at least to form part of a liturgy. In the creative age of the Rigveda new prayers were produced for ritual purposes; but in the age of the later Vedas, with the development of a system which foresaw almost every desire and prescribed the offering to ensure its fulfilment, prayer was nothing more than the mechanical application of ready-made formulas. It is doubtful whether, even in the earliest period, much room was left, owing to the highly ritual type of the worship, for independent prayer. The latter could hardly in any case have gone beyond the expression of a concrete desire addressed to a particular

deity; it could certainly not have had the character of a communion of the worshipper with divine powers. Prayer was, however, by no means necessarily accompanied by a ceremonial act. Thus the hymns of the Rigveda addressed to Uṣas were recited without any attendant offerings; the same was the case, according to the ritual texts, with the prayers to Agni, Uṣas, and the Aśvins in the morning litany of the Soma sacrifice, as well as with the daily invocations muttered at the morning and evening twilight devotions.

As the hymns of the Rigveda, in addressing prayers to a god, aim at securing his goodwill, they are, in the first place and to a large extent, panegyrics which praise the greatness and power, the mysterious nature, and the exploits of the deity in question. The petition for the gifts hoped for, when the favour of the god has thus been won, is then briefly added. The benefits desired are almost entirely of a material, not of a moral, kind. They are mainly expressed by such general terms as treasures and blessings, protection and victory; when stated in detail they consist in long life and vigorous offspring, cattle and horses, cars and gold; or the punishment of enemies, niggards, and Brāhman-haters by their goods being taken away and bestowed on the pious. Rarely does the worshipper pray that his thoughts may be righteous, that he may refrain from doing what displeases the gods, that he may be reconciled to an offended deity, or delivered from the bonds of guilt; and his supplications lack the note of passionate appeal, deep aspiration, mental struggle, or humble submission to the divine will. As regards its efficacy, prayer was held to be scarcely less potent than sacrifice in gladdening and stimulating the gods. But a hymn had to be composed with faultless art, 'as a skilful workman constructs a car'; it had to be freed from imperfections 'as grain is winnowed with the flail.' Then it invigorated the god like draughts of Soma, stimulating him to new deeds; then it increased the mighty strength of Indra so that he slew the dragon. When prayer is thus thought, even in the Rigveda, to exercise the direct influence of a spell, magic is already beginning to encroach on the domain of religion. A similar tendency is observable in regard to the sacrifice which accompanied the prayers to the gods.

c. The general character of the Vedic sacrifice is essentially supplicatory, as it aims only at the obtaining of future benefits to be bestowed by the gods, and is not concerned with the past. What seem to be expiatory sacrifices are in reality of this order also, for they are accompanied by supplications that the guilt incurred should not be punished. Such expiatory sacrifices are of two kinds. They are either intended to mollify the wrath of a god aroused by the transgression of his divine will, being generally offered to Varuṇa, the guardian of moral order and punisher of sin; or they aim at removing guilt as a kind of impalpable substance much as if it were a disease, producing this result either by the aid of a god, especially Agni, or by means of fire, water, medicinal plants and spells, which are supposed to burn, wash, purge, or drive it away without the invocation of divine powers. This latter type belongs mainly to the sphere of the Atharvaveda, where magic supplants religious practice. Even a sacrifice made in fulfilment of a vow, after a god has granted a boon, is in reality only a supplicatory offering postponed, as when in the Atharvaveda Agni is promised an offering in the name of a lunatic, if the latter recovers his reason; or when, in the Brāhmaṇa story of Śunaḥśepa, the childless king vows, if a son is born to him, to sacrifice that son to Varuṇa. Thank-offerings in any true sense are unknown to the Vedic cult, the very verb 'to thank' not being found in the vocabulary of the language. An approach to the notion of a thank-offering is only to be found in a Sūtra passage, in which certain sacrifices are prescribed on a man regaining his health.

The conception of the effect of sacrifice which prevails in the Rigveda is that the offering wins the favour of a god and induces him to fulfil the accompanying prayer. The Soma offering satisfies, gladdens, strengthens the god, who loves the sacrificer and hates the niggard. The reward that follows is a voluntary act of the god, resulting from the benevolent attitude induced by the offering. It is not regarded as the repayment of a debt, though the sacrificer feels that the god cannot well help requiting him. While conscious of being in the presence of a mighty being, the sacrificer does not look on himself as infinitely far removed from the god, who is his old friend, and whose right hand he grasps. Even in the Rigveda, however, traces are already to be found of the notion that the sacrifice exercises compulsion not only over gods, but also over natural phenomena without requiring the co-operation of the gods. Here again we have the intrusion of magic into the domain of religion. In the ritual of the Brāhmaṇas we find that the latter has already been largely supplanted by the former.

d. The Vedic ceremonial was essentially based on the use of a sacrificial fire, 'the mouth of the gods,' into which the offerings were cast, and by which they were conveyed to the gods. Exceptionally only, fire was not the instrument of sacrifice. Thus the oblations to aquatic deities were cast into water, those to the dead were placed in small pits at the funeral sacrifice, while offerings to Rudra and demons were thrown into the air, hung on trees, buried, or disposed of in other ways. In the ritual there was beside the sacrificial fire a litter of grass (*barhis*), the soft seat on which the gods sat down to enjoy the offering. On this litter, according to the ritual texts, the oblations were deposited for a time, before being committed to the flames which conveyed them to heaven. Thus the gods were conceived as partaking of the sacrifice both on the litter and in their celestial abode. Agni is even invoked, in one and the same passage of the Rigveda, to bring the gods to the sacrifice and to take it to them in heaven (vii. 11. 5). This contradiction is doubtless to be explained by the survival of the litter in the ceremonial, from the time when offerings were presented on it alone. The burning of the litter at the end of the rite may perhaps originally have formed the transition to offering sacrifices in fire.

In the Vedic ceremonial, even of the earliest period, we have to distinguish between the simpler ritual of the single domestic fire and the more complicated and technical ritual conducted with the three fires, which are independent of the former, though they may originally have arisen by its division. The single domestic fire was maintained by every head of a family, who performed the rites connected with it himself. The three fires were set up only by men of position and wealth, becoming a centre round which the sacrificial activity of many Brāhmans and priests revolved. Certain regular rites, such as the daily morning and evening sacrifice or the new and full moon ceremonies, were performed in essentially the same manner with the three fires as with the one, the ritual of the latter, however, being simpler. But the domestic rites were conducted with the one only, while the Soma sacrifice could be carried on with the three only. The chief of

the three fires, called Gārhapatya (doubtless representing the old domestic fire of the hearth), was the only one always maintained, the other two being taken from it for every sacrifice requiring their employment. It was used for the practical purposes of heating the vessels and preparing the offerings. The second, the Āhavanīya, situated to the east, was that in which the gods received their offerings. The third or Dakṣiṇa fire, placed in the south, the quarter specially connected with the souls of the dead and evil spirits, was used for offerings relating to those two classes of uncanny beings. About this fire and the pits dug around it, the ritual of the sacrifices to the manes chiefly moved.

When a fire was established for purposes of the cult, it was either produced by means of the fire-sticks (called *araṇīs*, and consisting of a lower slab of soft and a drill of hard wood) or fetched from certain places, as the house of a rich owner of herds or of a great sacrificer. At the four-monthly sacrifices offered at the beginning of the seasons and at the Soma sacrifice, a new fire was rubbed and united with the old Āhavanīya, doubtless with the intention of giving it new vigour.

e. With regard to the material of the sacrifice, the Vedic Indian, as a general principle, offered to the gods what was his own favourite food. It comprised the chief produce of the dairy and of agriculture: milk, in its various forms, and butter, together with the two principal kinds of grain, barley and rice (the latter, perhaps, not being used in the earliest period), cooked or baked in different ways. Among these, the products of the cow were unmistakably believed to have a more sacred and mystical import. In the cult of the dead, libations of water were characteristic. As beef and goats' flesh, less frequently mutton, were the principal kinds of meat eaten, cattle, goats, and sheep were the usual victims in the animal sacrifice, the he-goat, it would seem, being regularly offered on all lesser occasions. On the other hand, animals the flesh of which was either not eaten at all or only exceptionally eaten, such as the pig, dog, deer, as well as fish and birds, were not sacrificed to the gods. It is true that, in the rare and costly horse-sacrifice, an animal was offered the flesh of which was never a regular article of diet. This is, however, to be accounted for by the intrusion of magic into the domain of sacrifice; for the intention underlying the ceremony was to transfer the swift power (*vāja*) of the horse to the royal sacrificer. This sacrifice was, indeed, akin to a peculiar tendency in the sacrificial ceremonial, to offer to a god what corresponded to his special individuality. Thus to the goddesses Night and Morning was offered the milk of a black cow having a white calf. In the animal sacrifice, a victim was often chosen which agreed with the deity not only in sex, but in colour and other qualities. The starting-point of this practice was probably the notion that the eater acquires the qualities of the animal he eats, and that his strength is increased most by eating the flesh of the animal most like himself. Thus the mighty Indra, who is constantly called a bull in the Rigveda, commonly receives the sacrifice of a bull, as also of a buffalo, to which he is often compared. The sun-god Sūrya has a white he-goat offered to him.

The victim was killed by strangulation, and without bloodshed. With an evident desire of avoiding blood-guiltiness, it was addressed with such verses as 'Thou dost not die; no harm is done thee; thou goest to the gods by pleasant paths.' The ceremonial dealing with the disposal of the carcass was divided into two distinct sacrificial acts. In the first place, after an incision had been made, the caul (omentum) was extracted, being thereupon cooked and solemnly offered to the gods. This rite was concluded by the distribution of presents to priests and by purifications. The second act of the ceremonial consisted in cutting up the carcass into parts, certain sections of which were offered to the gods, while others were eaten by the priests. What remained was distributed among sacrificers, priests, and Brāhmans. A magical rather than a religious notion underlies the practice of men eating the remnants of the sacrifice of which the god has first partaken; for those remnants must have been regarded as of the nature of a medicine, which transfers to man the divine blessing connected with the sacrifice, or the particular power implied in the individual offering. The separate sacrifice of the caul was perhaps a relic of a time when that was the only portion of the victim which, owing to its agreeable odour, was presented as a burnt-offering to the gods. The blood of the victim was, in the Vedic ritual, not eaten, but was poured out as an offering to the Rakṣases or lower demons, who were regarded as fond of blood, and who similarly received the offal of the grain used in making baked offerings. Analogously, offerings made to beings thought to have an uncanny nature, such as Rudra or the souls of the dead, were not partaken of by the sacrificer. Thus a bull offered to Rudra might not be eaten or even brought into the village; and funeral cakes presented to the manes might only be smelt.

In connexion with the animal sacrifice, the interesting question as to whether the human sacrifice was known in the ritual of the Vedas suggests itself. The only certain trace of such a sacrifice is to be found in the important ceremony of building the brick fire-altar (called *agni-cayana*). Here it is prescribed that five victims—man, horse, ox, ram, he-goat—are to be sacrificed to different gods, and their five heads walled up in the lowest layer of the edifice. The object of this ceremony, which was a magical rite rather than an actual sacrifice, was to give stability to the altar. It is mentioned in the Śatapatha Brāhmana as the custom of a not very remote past, for which other rites had been substituted. The human sacrifice (*puruṣa-medha*), which the ritual books describe in detail, was probably only an innovation invented to imitate the horse-sacrifice. But of any actual human sacrifice there is no certain trace in Vedic India. Neither the evidence of ancient stories, like that of Śunaḥśepa, nor the evidence of various Buddhist legends, is by any means conclusive.

Not only were food and drink presented to the gods to satisfy their hunger and thirst, but an intoxicant, of which the sacrificer also partook, was offered to them. This was the juice of the Soma plant, which was pressed, mixed with milk or other ingredients, and presented to the gods. Soma was certainly not the popular drink of the Vedic Indian, whose favourite intoxicant was called *surā*. How, then, is it to be accounted for that, in this case, he did not offer to the gods what he liked best himself? The explanation is that, having during the Indo-Iranian period been adopted in the cult instead of the earlier mead of the Indo-European age, it retained, by the force of tradition, its old-established position even in the Vedic cult.

Occasionally we find that objects which do not constitute food are sacrificed. Thus a man who desires the possession of deadly weapons sacrifices iron nails. Here again we see the intrusion of witchcraft; the sacrifice becoming a means of obtaining something analogous to the objects offered.

f. Priests.—Vedic India was already far removed from that primitive condition of things in which every man was his own priest, and did not require

the services of persons possessing technical knowledge as intermediaries between him and the divine powers. On the contrary, it is certain that, even in the period of the Rigveda, there already existed a priestly class qualified by special knowledge and magical qualities to act for others in the difficult and dangerous intercourse of man with gods and spirits. There were, indeed, already a number of sacerdotal families, like the Vasiṣṭhas and Viśvāmitras, in which the art of praying and sacrificing correctly was practised as a hereditary calling, all of them employing the same cult, notably that of the Soma sacrifice, practically in the same way. There were no public priests; for there was no public worship of a national, tribal, or even congregational character. Vedic worship was of an essentially private type, sacrifice being performed on behalf of its individual institutor (*yajamāna*) by the priests who acted for him and whose prayers belonged to him. This, coupled with the fact that idols were not used, accounts for the absence of temples in Vedic India.

Two sacerdotal types have to be distinguished in the Vedic cult: the domestic priest (*purohita*), whose function it was to superintend the worship of his employer; and the officiating priest (*ṛtvij*), who had to play a certain prescribed part in an individual sacrifice.

The Purohita was generally in the service of kings only, though Brāhmans occasionally appeared in an analogous capacity in the houses of men of high position. That the employment of a Purohita in a royal household was considered essential is indicated by a Brāhmaṇa passage which states that the gods would not eat the food of a king who had no Purohita. The domestic priest was appointed by the king, and held his office for life, being often succeeded by his son. In the ceremony accompanying the appointment, the same verse was employed as when the bridegroom takes the hand of the bride in the wedding rite. The Purohita was, in fact, the king's right hand man, giving the directions for all the royal ceremonies and sacrifices. Even in the Rigveda the whole prosperity of the country is said to depend on the Purohita, 'the guardian of the realm,' and the Purohita Devāpi at the sacrifice employs a spell to procure rain on behalf of his royal master, while in the Atharvaveda another Purohita uses spells to secure victory in battle.

Of the sacrificial priests there were several, with definite functions and technical names, the chief being the Hotṛ or 'invoker,' the Udgātṛ or 'chanter,' the Adhvaryu or officiating 'sacrificer,' and the Brāhman or superintending priest; in the period of the Rigveda the Hotṛ was the most important, later the Brāhman became so. The Purohita was probably not any one of these, though he might be employed to perform the functions of one of them; in the earlier period he sometimes appears acting as Hotṛ, in the later as Brāhman. Thus in the Rigveda the Purohita Devāpi is chosen as a Hotṛ, and Agni is called both a Purohita and a Hotṛ.

The Rigveda contains a list of seven kinds of sacrificial priests, and this was probably the regular number, not only then but in the Indo-Iranian period. Seven priests still appear in various parts of the sacrificial ceremonial in later times, though, with the development of the ritual, additional ones were otherwise employed. The Avesta, which has eight sacrificial priests, probably added one to the original number. It is, in any case, a striking fact that the Zaotar, the leading priest who recites the Gāthās in the Iranian Haoma sacrifice, corresponds, in both name and function, to the Hotṛ who recites the verses of the Rigveda in the Vedic Soma sacrifice. The most important of these seven Vedic priests were the Hotṛ and the Adhvaryu. It was the duty of the former to recite the hymn which, in the chief libations of the Soma sacrifice, celebrated a particular god and invited him to drink Soma. When the hymns of the Rigveda were composed, their seers (*ṛṣis*) themselves doubtless played the part of the Hotṛ at the sacrifice; and that the latter was, in the earlier period, regarded as the leading priest is clear from his furnishing the type for Agni, the priest god. The Adhvaryu performed the practical part of the ceremonial, tending the fire and the litter, arranging and cleaning the utensils, pressing and offering the Soma. The remaining five acted as assistants to one or other of the two chief priests. The Agnīdh, or 'fire-kindler,' helped the Adhvaryu in tending the sacrificial fire. The Upavaktṛ or 'exhorter' (known also as Praśāstṛ, 'director,' and Maitrāvaruṇa, 'priest of Mitra and Varuṇa'), whose duty it was to give various orders to other priests, plays the part, in the animal sacrifice, of the only assistant, and in the Soma sacrifice, of one among the several assistants of the Hotṛ. The three other priests of the ancient list belong to the Soma ritual exclusively: the Potṛ, or 'purifier,' and the Neṣṭṛ, or 'leader,' became quite unimportant in the later Vedas, while the main function of the Brahman was to recite hymns addressed to Indra, in the same way as the Hotṛ, whose assistant he was. In the later ritual this priest came to be called Brāhmaṇācchaṃsin, while the old name, Brahman, acquired the technical sense of the priest who superintended the whole sacrifice, and whose duty it was to know the three Vedas.

g. Sacrifices. — The Vedic cult consisted of regularly recurrent or of occasional sacrifices. Our knowledge of the former is derived from the ritual literature, for there are only few and obscure traces of them in the hymns of the Rigveda, which is almost exclusively concerned with the Soma sacrifice. It is, however, probable that they were performed, at least in their main features, during the earliest Vedic period. These regular sacrifices are of three kinds, as connected with the course of the day, the month, and the year, being performed, respectively, twice a day, twice a month, and three times a year. Each of the first two kinds could be conducted, though without any difference in ceremonial form, either with the single domestic fire or with the three sacrificial fires. On the other hand, the annual sacrifices, which were celebrated at the commencement of the three seasons, required the greater ritual of the three fires. It was a general characteristic of all periodic sacrifices that they were never addressed to one single god.

The daily rites took place morning and evening. They consisted, on the one hand, of fire-offerings to the gods, and, on the other, of gifts of food presented to all beings. The latter comprised offerings placed on the threshold and elsewhere for the deities and spirits in and around the house; a libation to the souls of the dead in the southern quarter; food scattered for dogs and birds; and meat and drink given to needy human beings.

The monthly sacrifices, which were celebrated at new and full moon, consisted of cooked oblations or of cakes offered to the gods. Among the numerous deities receiving them, the most prominent was Indra.

The seasonal sacrifices were offered every four months, at the beginning of spring, of the rains, and of the cool weather. Throughout these the Maruts are the most prominent deities. In the ceremonial which inaugurates the rainy season, Karīra fruits are offered with a view to procuring rain and consequent plenty. Then also two figures of dough covered with wool, and intended to represent a ram and a ewe, are sacrificed in order to

promote the increase of flocks. In these two offerings the influence of magical notions is clearly observable. With the seasonal celebration of the rains was combined a great expiatory sacrifice with which Varuṇa was specially associated.

In the ceremonial of the third or autumn sacrifice was included an offering to Rudra Tryambaka, intended to avert his attacks from the flocks and to conciliate his healing power. At a place where four roads meet, the abode of uncanny beings, a flat cake was deposited on or buried in a molehill, to indicate that it was presented to the mole as the animal of Rudra, who would thus refrain from injuring other animals. With this ceremonial was combined a great sacrifice to the dead, a kind of All Souls' festival.

We now turn to the extraordinary sacrifices, which are not limited to any fixed period. One of these is the independent form of the animal sacrifice. According to the ritual texts, it should take place annually; but the statements as to the time of year it should be performed are fluctuating and indefinite. Another form of the animal sacrifice is included in the Soma sacrifice.

Of all forms of cult the Soma sacrifice appears as the most important in Vedic literature. It was, however, probably not so important in actual life, as few could have possessed means sufficient for its performance. As compared with the recurrent sacrifices, it rather bore the character of an extraordinary act of liberality practised by the rich towards gods and priests. Though the time for its performance was not definitely fixed, later texts recommend the spring as the most suitable period. Soma was not offered to different gods according to circumstances, like a cooked oblation or an animal victim. On the contrary, it was offered, within the stereotyped scheme of the three pressings of Soma made at morning, noon, and evening, in honour of a prescribed series of gods intended to include all deities except perhaps Rudra. In this ceremonial the important gods were all addressed by name, the lesser ones being included in the comprehensive term Viśve devāḥ, or 'all-gods.' The Soma sacrifice, in fact, constituted a general carouse for gods as well as for priests. Indra was, however, the most important deity and the central figure of the whole ceremony; thus the Soma pressed at midday belonged to him alone in addition to his share of the morning and evening libation. The ceremonies of the Soma sacrifice were of a complex nature. Even the simplest and fundamental form of it, the Agniṣṭoma ('praise of Agni'), required the ministration of sixteen priests. This rite occupied only one day; other Soma sacrifices lasted for several days, up to twelve; while another class, called *sattras* or 'sessions,' sometimes extended to a year. These prolonged Soma sessions formed an unimportant exception to the rule that every sacrifice was performed for a single individual; for here a number of Brāhmans combined in such a way that each, while officiating as a priest in the usual manner, was accounted a sacrificer (*yajamāna*). The texts which deal with the Soma sacrifice furnish sufficient details for a complete picture of its ceremonies, which in the main were doubtless the same in the period of the Rigveda. Numbers of priests and lay spectators thronged the sacrificial ground, on which burned the three fires strewed around with sacrificial grass. Between the fires was the *vedi*, an oblong shallow excavation somewhat narrowed in the middle and covered with a litter of grass for the reception of the offerings to the gods. Scattered about were to be seen sheds, posts for tying up victims, the seats and fire-altars of the various priests, vessels containing water for various purposes, pressing implements, tubs, and bowls for Soma. Among them moved about the officiating priests and their assistants, in whose midst were to be seen the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) and his wife, emaciated by initiatory asceticism. The priests were engaged in preparing or offering the sacrificial cakes and the libations of milk; in sacrificing eleven he-goats to various gods; in pressing, purifying, mixing the Soma juice; in pouring it into or out of various vessels, presenting it to the gods, or drinking their share. All these operations were accompanied by the calls, recitations, chants of the priests as they carried out the details of the ritual, which were far too numerous to indicate here.

The Soma sacrifice was preceded by a protracted ceremony of initiation (*dīkṣā*), which was undergone by the sacrificer and his wife, and was followed by another of purification (*avabhṛtha*). Both of these ceremonies were probably known to the Rigveda. The Dīkṣā belongs to the ancient type of magical rites which were intended as a preparation for intercourse with gods and spirits by producing an ecstatic condition. It consisted in seclusion and various forms of asceticism (*tapas*) ending in physical exhaustion. Fasting was a chief element in the preparation for this as well as other rites. A preliminary bath was taken, as in the wedding ceremony, for the removal of injurious substances which would nullify the effects of the initiation. On the other hand, no bath might be taken during the course of the Soma sacrifice, for it would have been regarded as washing off the sanctity communicated by the Dīkṣā. As in the funeral and some other rites, the hair and beard were cut off and the nails pared, because they were considered impurities.

In the ceremony called *avabhṛtha* ('carrying down' to the water), with which the Soma sacrifice terminated, the black antelope skin and the sacred cord used by the sacrificer and his wife since the beginning of the Dīkṣā were thrown into the water along with the Soma shoots which had been pressed out and the sacrificial utensils which had been in contact with the Soma. Finally, the sacrificer and his wife, as well as the priests, descended into the water to wash off the supernatural powers which they had acquired, and on emerging put on fresh garments. The offerings and texts which accompanied the Avabhṛtha ceremony were chiefly addressed to Varuṇa, the god who delivers from guilt.

h. Rites of family life.—As the Vedic wedding ceremony had in its main features probably come down from the Indo-European period, it retained much that belongs to the domain of witchcraft rather than that of religion. Thus the act, on the part of the bridegroom, of taking the hand of the bride, was intended to place her in the power of her husband. The seven steps which the young couple took and the food which they ate together were meant to establish friendship and community. Future abundance and male offspring were aimed at when the bride, after being conducted to her husband's house, was placed on the hide of a red bull and took upon her lap the son of a woman who had borne only living male children. The worship of the gods, on the other hand, was somewhat in the background during this ceremony. It was chiefly concerned with Agni, the god most closely connected with domestic life. Thus the husband led his bride three times round the newly-kindled nuptial fire, which it was the duty of the couple to maintain henceforth throughout their lives as their domestic fire. The invocations addressed to the gods were mostly of the nature of benedictions. The long wedding hymn from the Rigveda was also recited. Various offerings, moreover, were made, especially one of parched grain strewn by the bride with hollowed hands

After sunset the husband led his bride out of the house, and, as he pointed to the pole-star and the star Arundhatī, the young couple exhorted each other to be constant and undivided for ever. The wedding was followed by three nights of conjugal abstinence, meant doubtless to exhaust the patience and divert the attacks of hostile demons.

Similarly, in the rites performed both before and after birth for the welfare of children, the magical aspect predominated over the sacrificial. Thus a powdered drug was dusted into the nostrils of a pregnant woman to ensure the sex of her offspring being male; and unripe fruits of the Udumbara tree were attached to her in order to communicate to her child the exuberant maturity which that fig attains.

On the tenth day after birth, when the period of impurity was over, the ceremony of giving the child his name was performed. In the third year the rite of tonsure, accompanied by an oblation, took place. The boy's hair was cut and arranged so as to be worn in accordance with the custom of the family. The hair which was cut off was buried. A similar ceremony was performed when the beard of the youth at the age of sixteen was shaved.

But by far the most important rite connected with boyhood was that of initiation or 'introduction' (*upanayana*) to a religious teacher, which took place at the respective ages of eight, eleven, and twelve in the case of boys of the first three castes. Standing at the sacred fire, the preceptor invested the boy, whose head had been shaved, with a girdle, which he wound round his waist three times from left to right, at the same time pronouncing certain formulas. He then grasped the boy's hand and, placing his own on the pupil's heart, recited a verse indicating that he had assumed power over the boy's will. On this occasion the youth also received a garment, a staff, and a sacred cord to be worn over one shoulder and under the other arm. During the whole course of his subsequent apprenticeship, the religious pupil (*brahmacārin*) was required to practise chastity, to refrain from certain kinds of food, to tend his preceptor's fire with fuel, and to beg food in the village. But his chief duty was to study the Veda and to learn the famous Sāvitrī stanza from the Rigveda as an introduction to that study. By the rite of initiation, which was regarded as a spiritual birth, the pupil had become one of the 'twice-born,' qualified to eat the remnants of sacrificial offerings. Though this ceremony is not even alluded to in the Rigveda, it must have been known at that time, for it can be traced back to a still earlier age. The evidence of the Avesta shows that among the ancient Persians a youth of fifteen was received into the community of Zoroaster with a sacred cord; and among primitive peoples similar rites have been found all over the earth to symbolize reception into the community of men as an entry into a new life. This ancient rite was in India transformed into a spiritual ceremony which gave admission to the community of those qualified for the study of sacred knowledge.

The period of apprenticeship was terminated by the ceremony called *samāvartana*, or 'return,' the main element of which was a bath intended to indicate symbolically that the quality of religious studentship (*brahmacarya*) was washed off.

The funeral rites, finally, belong to the sphere of the domestic ritual; it will, however, be more convenient to deal with them later as part of the ceremonial relating to death and the future life.

i. Rites relating to public life.—Even in ceremonies which assumed a public character because connected with the person of the king, the sacrifice was still instituted by him as an individual; and though prayers for the country and the people might be incidental to it, there existed no form of sacrifice which was offered in the name of the tribe or the nation. In the royal ceremonial, magical practices were, as we found to be the case in the domestic ritual, more prominent than sacrificial acts. The first of these celebrations calling for description are the consecration (*abhiṣeka*) of the king and the royal inauguration (*rājasūya*). Neither of these is mentioned in the Rigveda, and they were probably developed in the later Vedic period; but the magical elements which they contain are most likely very old. Both these celebrations included Soma rites. In the consecration ceremony the king was seated on a chair covered with a tiger skin and made of the wood of the Udumbara, the tree which to the Indian was typical of plenty. A cup, also made of Udumbara wood, was filled with a fluid compounded of butter, honey, rain-water, and other ingredients. With this fluid the king was anointed or rather besprinkled. In the Rājasūya a similar besprinkling took place; but it was followed by a series of further rites intended to secure success of all kinds. These included a symbolical raid on a herd of cows; the discharge of arrows at feeble relatives of the king, who were plundered; and a game of dice in which a cow was the stake, and which was won by the king.

Another ceremonial, regarded as still more dignified and efficacious, was the Vājapeya ('draught of vigour'), a kind of Soma sacrifice, which might be performed not only by kings, but even by men of royal descent or of the Brāhman caste. Its most characteristic feature was a chariot race, evidently a magical rite intended to secure for the sacrificer the swift power embodied in the horse. It also included a rite called the 'ascent of the post' (*yūpārohaṇa*). A wheel made of wheaten flour, and symbolical of the sun, was placed on the top of a sacrificial post. Mounting by means of a ladder, the sacrificer grasped the wheel as he uttered the formula, 'We have reached the sun, ye gods.' On descending to the ground he seated himself on a wooden throne and was besprinkled as in the inauguration ceremony. This part of the Vājapeya rite aimed at the attainment of exalted position.

The splendour of royal ceremonial, however, culminated in the horse-sacrifice (*aśva-medha*). It was not a thank-offering, as might at first sight be inferred from the words of the Brāhmaṇa description of each king who performed it, 'He victoriously traversed the earth and offered the horse-sacrifice.' It was in reality a supplicatory sacrifice offered, after military successes, for the fulfilment of the king's highest wishes in the future. According to the ritual texts, this sacrifice is addressed to the gods in the aggregate, but with special reference to Prajāpati (an evidently late trait); but there are indications that it may originally have been addressed to Indra the Vṛtra-slayer, an obvious god to associate with a rite which is a glorification of military heroism. The horse itself represents swift vigour, a quality which the king aims at obtaining and increasing in himself by means of this sacrifice. The ceremony was begun by bathing the horse, when a four-eyed dog (that is, one with two spots above its eyes) was killed with a club by a man of low origin. The horse, having been consecrated, was allowed to roam about free for a year, guarded by a retinue of armed youths. During the interval the sacrificial ground was the scene of various offerings and rites, while stories were recited, chants sung, and lutes played. High and low, young and old, took a share in the pomp of the ceremonial. At

length, when the year had come to an end, the horse was sacrificed during the course of a Soma offering of three days' duration. In the later Vedic ritual the horse is accompanied by a number of other victims; but in the Rigveda (two hymns of which are concerned with the horse-sacrifice) mention is made only of Pūṣan's he-goat, which announces the offering to the gods. Before the carcass was cut up, the chief consort of the king lay down beside the dead horse, while obscene conversations were carried on between the priests and the women of the royal household. Before the caul was offered, the priests propounded and solved riddles among themselves, as they had already done at a previous stage of the ceremonial. The whole rite concluded with a purifying bath at the end of the third day.

7. Death and Future Life.

A. *Beliefs.*—a. The soul, variously called *asu*, 'spirit,' *manas*, 'mind,' *ātman*, 'breath,' *prāṇa*, 'respiration,' was thought to be separable from the body during unconsciousness, and to continue its existence after the body had been destroyed by cremation or burial. But, though imperishable, it was not believed to prolong life as a mere spirit or shadow, but to retain its personal identity in a corporeal state; for the body, purified by the power of Agni and freed from all imperfections, shares in the existence of the other world. The doctrine of transmigration is not to be found in the Vedas; its beginnings are met with in the Brāhmaṇas, where the notion of repeated births and deaths in the next world appears; but it shows itself fully developed even in the oldest Upaniṣads, and must have been generally accepted by 600 B.C., since Buddha would not otherwise have received it into his system without question.

The spirit of the deceased proceeds upward through the air on the path trodden by the fathers (*pitara*) to the realm of eternal light. It is natural that Agni, who burns the corpse, should have been regarded as the conductor of the soul on its journey. Arrived in heaven, where he recovers his former body in a complete and glorified form, the departed meets the fathers who revel with Yama, and receives from the latter a resting-place. According to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the dead, on leaving this world, make their way between two fires, which burn the wicked but allow the good to pass. The latter proceed either by the path which leads to the fathers or by that which leads to the sun. The Upaniṣads also hold that there are two paths for the good: by the one, those who possess complete knowledge of the world-soul go to Brahmā; by the other, those whose knowledge is imperfect reach the world of heaven, whence, after the fruit of good works has been exhausted, they return to earth to be born again. On the other hand, those who are ignorant of the self go to the dark world of evil spirits, or are reborn on earth. To illustrate the mystery of the future life, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad tells the myth of Naciketas, who, on visiting the realm of death, is informed that those who have not enough merit for heaven and immortality fall again and again into the power of death and, entering upon the cycle of existence (*saṃsāra*), are born repeatedly with a body or as a stationary object; that he who controls himself reaches Viṣṇu's highest place; but that there is no hell for the unworthy.

b. Heaven.—The abode of the fathers and Yama is situated in the highest or third heaven, where is eternal light. It is also described as the highest point of the sun or the highest step of Viṣṇu. Here is a tree in the shade of which Yama drinks with the gods. In the Atharvaveda it is stated to be a fig-tree (*aśvattha*). Heaven is believed to be the reward of the righteous, of heroes who risk their lives in battle, of those who practise rigorous penance, and, above all, of those who bestow liberal sacrificial gifts. The Atharvaveda is full of references to the bliss in store for the latter.

The deceased, on entering heaven, see again father and mother, wives and children. Sickness is left behind; bodily imperfections or frailties are unknown; and old age cannot prevail. There are neither rich nor poor, neither oppressors nor oppressed. The life of the blest is passed among the gods, more especially in the presence of the two kings Yama and Varuṇa. Here the sound of the lute and of songs is heard; streams of Soma, *ghī*, milk, honey, and wine flow; and there is spirit-food and satiety. Bright, many-coloured cows, which yield all desires, are at hand. The life in heaven is thus one of indolent material bliss, devoted to sensual joys. In the Upaniṣads the life in the heaven of the gods, being followed by re-birth, is a lower and transient form of bliss; only those who know the truth reach the higher stage, the condition of changeless joy and unending peace which results from absorption in the world-soul.

c. The blest who dwell in the third heaven are called *pitṛs* or 'fathers.' By these are generally meant early ancestors who made the paths by which those who have recently died join them. Different races of them are distinguished (p. 608), the Aṅgirases being more especially associated with Yama. The fathers are also spoken of as lower, higher, and middle; as later and earlier; all being known to Agni, but a few only to their descendants. The fathers are fond of Soma, feasting with the gods and leading the same life as they do. Being immortal, they are even spoken of as gods. Great cosmical actions, like those of the gods, are sometimes attributed to them; thus they are said to have adorned the sky with stars, and to have placed darkness in the night and light in the day. As the burning of the corpse was in no sense a sacrifice, the corpse-devouring Agni was distinguished from the Agni who wafts the offering to the gods; and, similarly, the path of the fathers from that of the gods. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa goes further, discriminating between the heavenly world (*svarga loka*), that is, the world of the gods, and that of the fathers (*pitṛ-loka*). The fathers are prayed to like the gods, being entreated to hear and to protect their worshippers, and to refrain from punishing their descendants for any sin humanly committed against them. They are also besought to give riches, offspring, and long life to their sons; individual ancestors being sometimes invoked by name. Coming to the sacrifice on the same car as Indra and the other gods, they drink the pressed Soma as they sit on the litter of grass to the south (the quarter of the dead). They arrive in thousands and range themselves in order on the sacrificial ground. They receive oblations, which are, however, different from those offered to the gods.

d. The chief of the fathers is Yama, to whom three hymns of the Rigveda are addressed. He is only spoken of as a king who rules the dead, but it is implied that he is a god as well. He is, as is natural, specially associated with Agni, the conductor of the dead. Yama is the son of Vivasvat and of Saraṇyū, Tvaṣṭṛ's daughter. He was a mortal, who chose death and abandoned his body. Finding out the path for many, he passed to the other world, whither the ancient fathers have gone. Having been the first of mortals that died, he is called 'our father.' As a mythological creation, Yama goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, corresponding to Yima, son of Vivahvant,

in the Avesta. The most probable conclusion to be drawn from the available evidence seems to be that Yama represents the chief of the souls of the departed, as having been the first father of mankind and the first of those that died. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the Avesta Yima is the ruler of an earthly paradise. It is, perhaps, also borne out by the appearance of Yama and his sister Yamī in the character of twins in a hymn of the Rigveda, where the very repudiation of their incest points to the existence of a belief in the descent of mankind from primeval twins. Some scholars have, however, identified Yama with various phenomena of nature, such as Agni, the sun, or the moon. In the Rigveda Yama's foot-fetter (*paḍbīśa*) is referred to as parallel to the bond of Varuṇa, and his messengers that seek the lives of men must have inspired feelings of dread. It is not till the Atharvaveda and the later mythology that Yama becomes more closely associated with the terrors of death, and assumes the character of a regular god of death; though even in the epic his domain is not limited to hell.

The owl and the pigeon occasionally appear as Yama's emissaries; but his regular messengers are two dogs, described as four-eyed, broad-nosed, brindled, brown, sons of Saramā. They guard the path to the other world or wander about among men, keeping watch on them; and they are besought to grant continued enjoyment of the light of the sun. Their functions seem to have been thought to consist partly in tracking out among men those who are to die, and partly in keeping guard on the path over those who are about to enter the realm of Yama. The conception of a watch-dog of the dead goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, as shown by the evidence of the Avesta, where a four-eyed hound is stated to keep guard at the head of the bridge which leads to the other world. If the epithet *śabalas* ('brindled') is identical with the Greek *κέρβερος*, the notion of a dog of death must go back even to the Indo-European age.

c. Hell.—As the virtuous, in the opinion of the Vedic seers, were rewarded in the future life, it is natural to suppose that they believed in some kind of abode for the wicked. The evidence of the Ṛigveda cannot, however, be said to go beyond showing that this was regarded as an underground darkness. But there can be no doubt that the belief in a regular hell exists in the Atharvaveda, which speaks of the house below, of black and lowest darkness, the abode of goblins and sorceresses, called *nāraka loka* as contrasted with *svarga loka*, the heavenly world of Yama. The torments suffered in this infernal region are also once described. It is not, however, till the period of the Brāhmaṇas that the notion of future punishment appears fully developed. Thus the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa states that every one is born again after death and, being weighed in a balance, receives reward or punishment according to his deserts. Nothing is said in the Vedas of a final judgment or of a destruction and renovation of the world.

B. *THE CEREMONIAL.*—**a. Funeral rites.**—Cremation was the normal method of disposing of the dead in Vedic times. That burial was also practised to some extent is undoubted, though the ritual books have no rules regarding it, except in so far as the bones of the cremated are interred. The predilection of the Vedic theologians for the god of fire was most probably the reason for incineration having already become the almost universal practice among the Aryans in India. The beard and hair of the dead man were cut off and his nails trimmed; his body was anointed, decked with a garland, and dressed in a new garment, which he was intended to wear in the next world. The corpse was then carried or driven to the burning ground; a bundle of twigs was tied to it, in order to efface the footsteps and so prevent death from making its way back to the living. The dead man was then exhorted, with verses from a funeral hymn of the Rigveda, to go by the ancient paths, past the two dogs of Yama, to the fathers. The widow, who had mounted the pyre and lain down beside the corpse, was now called upon to rise and take the hand of her new spouse (her husband's brother). That the ceremonial excluded the burning of the widow is undoubted; but the ritual act which was required to recall her to life shows that her ascent of the pyre was symbolical of the actual immolation of bygone times. Indeed, it must be assumed that this ancient custom, though not sanctioned by the Vedic ritual, survived through the Vedic period in the families of military chiefs. Having by their example gradually spread to other classes, it became, in later times, a universal practice throughout India. If the deceased was a warrior, his bow was taken from his hand, an indication that at one time it was burned with him; if he was a sacrificer, his combustible utensils were placed with him on the pyre. Here we have a survival of the ancient custom of providing the dead with the chief articles of their property for use in the next life. At the same time as the corpse was burned, a cow and a he-goat were sacrificed. These animals, however, did not represent property, but were intended as a means of deflecting the consuming power of fire to them as substitutes for the corpse; and, by a fiction, Agni was supposed not to burn the dead man, but to send him 'done' to the fathers.

The mourners, on returning from the burning ground, bathed, changed their clothes, and refrained from looking round. On entering the house of the deceased, they touched purifying or auspicious objects such as water, fire, or cow-dung; and finally removed the sacrificial fire of the dead man by some aperture other than the door.

A death was followed by a period of impurity, varying from three days to ten, according to the degree of kinship. As the return of the soul was feared during this time, the surviving relatives took constant precautions to avoid infection. Thus only food which was bought or presented by others was eaten, evidently to guard against introducing anything tainted into the system.

Generally on the third day, what remained of the bones of the cremated man was collected, placed in an urn, and temporarily buried, to the accompaniment of the Rigvedic verse, 'Approach thy Mother Earth.' During this ceremony the deceased was no longer thought of as in the realm of Yama, but as actually present. This inconsistency is no doubt due to a primitive belief surviving beside the more recent conception of life in the heavenly world.

Last of all—according to the Brāhmaṇas, after the lapse of years—a burial mound was erected, the bones being exhumed for the purpose of removal to a suitable spot. During the following night music was performed, cymbals being beaten and the lute (*vīṇā*) played, the female mourners repeatedly going round the bones with their left hands towards them. On the following morning, the bones were taken to a place, out of sight of the village, where the ground was free from thorns but permeated with roots. A hole or furrow having been made, the bones were deposited and a mound of stone and earth was erected over them. Grain was scattered on the mound as food, while milk and water were poured into small pits dug around it, as drink for the deceased. When the mourners returned, various precautions were taken to pre-

vent death from following the living; thus a stone or a clod was deposited as a boundary. The Rigveda refers, in a funeral hymn, to the erection of a stone to divide the living from the dead.

Though the Vedic Indian retained many primitive beliefs in the ceremonial concerned with the future life, he had advanced far beyond the terrors which inspire the funeral rites of the savage. The verses which he employed in that ceremonial, while combined with much petty ritual and betraying much zealous care for his own well-being, at the same time reflect trust in the gods, as guardians of the dead, and filial piety towards ancestors. If we find here no traces of deep feeling and genuine sorrow, this is largely due to the fact that the impersonal formulas contained in the ritual textbooks are the only available evidence for this period.

b. Spirits.—The most striking contradiction in the Vedic view of the future life was the belief, though the Rigveda describes the deceased as conveyed direct to the fathers by the funeral fire, that the dead man did not join the fathers at once, but continued to lead a separate existence near the living for a year. The soul in this intermediate stage was distinguished by the name of *preta*, 'departed spirit,' as opposed to the ancestral spirits fully recognized as *pitara*, 'fathers.' During this transitional state it did not receive the regular monthly oblation to the manes of the sacrificer, but was honoured individually with separate offerings. At the end of the period it was received into the community of the fathers with a special ceremony which, strange to say, has nothing to do with that accompanying the final burial of the bones. Vedic literature has nothing to say about ghosts in any other sense than that of Pretas. There is, however, a passage in the Yajurveda stating that one who sheds the blood of a Brāhman will be excluded from the world of the fathers; and the evidence of early Buddhist texts may perhaps justify the inference that, even in the Vedic period, there was a belief in ghosts as spirits in the exceptional state of suffering torments on earth in punishment of guilt.

c. Ancestor-worship.—It remains only to sketch briefly the cult of the Vedas in so far as it was concerned with the dead. The regular sacrifice to ancestors, offered to father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, was celebrated every month at new moon. It was called *śrāddha* or 'offering given with faith' (*śraddhā*). For the purposes of this rite, a space was marked off in the south-east, the region which was sacred to the manes, and which the performers faced during the whole ceremony. Then the sacrificial fire was fetched and the food for the dead, consisting mainly of rice, but also of other offerings, prepared. Three small pits, a span long and four fingers broad and deep, having been dug and bestrewn with Darbha grass, an odd number of Brāhmans were seated, entertained, and received gifts. Libations to Soma associated with the fathers, and to Agni, conductor of the sacrifices to the dead, were also offered. A firebrand having been placed beside the pits to drive away demons who might have intruded themselves among the fathers, the latter were summoned to the offering and invoked to bestow wealth on their descendants. Jars of water were then set down beside the pits; the sacrificer took one with his left hand and, pouring water into the pits, mentioned the name of the ancestor to whom the offering was made. Grasping the sacrificial ladle also with his left hand, he placed one-third of the food in the form of a cake in each pit, invoking the fathers to partake of the offering. In conclusion, pieces of cloth were presented to the ancestors as clothing. The whole ceremony was interspersed with verses addressed to the fathers.

Our knowledge of this ceremonial is entirely derived from the ritual works of the Vedic period. There is nothing about it in the Rigveda, as it is not accompanied by hymns to the mighty gods with whom that Veda is concerned. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, in its essential features, it already existed in the earliest Vedic age; for its general character is extremely primitive: there is no trace of the souls of the dead abiding in heaven; the gifts offered to them are not sent up by the sacrificial fire, but are placed in the earth; and the spirit waits in or on the earth to be fed and clothed. The only details which probably do not go back to the times of the Rigveda are the offerings to Soma and Agni, as well as the presence of Brāhmans.

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VEGETARIANISM.—In this article an attempt is made to confine the discussion to those portions of the subject which ultimately have a practical bearing, even though the way may lie through the investigation of some rather complex ethical principles. The omission of all investigation into the history of vegetarianism is dictated not only by fidelity to this aim, but also by the consideration that in this particular subject no sound inferences as to modern problems can possibly be drawn from any records of the past. It is, *e.g.*, interesting to learn that the poet Ovid wrote in favour of a vegetable diet as being natural to primitive man. But what we want to know is how far his words were effective. They may have been, and yet no one has recorded the effect; or they may have been dictated at first by dismay at the sight of great excess in flesh food. They are anyhow by themselves no evidence of vegetarian practice; and, if they were, we should be unable to connect it securely with the gradual decline of Rome. In short, at all times the important question has been, not the practice of an exceptional minority, but that of the mass of the population—just the large complex fact which has never been recorded.

That omission leaves two principal aspects of the question to be considered: (*a*) the physiological argument, which is treated as of subordinate importance, owing to the evidence to be gathered from facts being still very incomplete; and (*b*) the ethical argument, including our duty to the lower animals, the bearing of the example of Christ, and the question how far a non-flesh diet is a help to the higher life.

1. The physiological argument.—In several treatises on vegetarianism much has been written on the physiological effects of a flesh or non-flesh diet, but very little of any value. The truth is that before any scientific conclusion can be arrived at—in other words, before any broad inference can be drawn from experiments—the question must be so far simplified that it becomes abstract: that is to say, experiments have to be conducted under conditions which do not obtain in ordinary life

It is impossible to make sure that any two sets of experiments deal with the same data; *e.g.*, no one could ascertain how great in any given case has been the influence of mind upon the bodily tissues. Wonderful records are given of endurance exhibited by vegetarians on a spare diet of fruit, and of prolonged effort not only of brain but of muscle. But it is quite uncertain whether the spirit of the individuals in question has not affected the result so as to make it useless as a guide in cases where such spirit is wanting. Again, the more the problem is considered, the more formidable grows the question of time. Supposing, *i.e.*, that a fair number of individual lives have been under observation and in all cases the health has been well maintained on a vegetarian diet, it is still open to a sceptic to insist that an examination of the next generation, or perhaps the next two or three, is required before the experiment can be deemed conclusive or scientific. If any one is convinced that the children of vegetarians are born infirm—in other words, that the human stock loses vigour if abstinence from meat becomes general—it is ridiculous to urge in answer that facts yield anything like a scientific disproof of the contention. No experiments which can pretend to be exhaustive have yet been made, and there is very little likelihood of any such being undertaken. Supposing—what is not easy to suppose—that some hundreds of adults allowed themselves to be subjects of experiment, there is no guarantee that similar results would be gained from people who were victims of compulsion or involuntary abstainers, or from enthusiastic votaries of a new cult, or from men and women of different antecedents and different occupations. Thus the condition of a convert to a particular diet at the age of 40 is not a sure indication of what would be the effect of a similar diet on another man of the same age, still less on another of 20, or on a child of 10 years old, or on a woman of any age.

Moreover, the question is obscured by the varieties of diet comprised under the title 'vegetarian.' Large numbers of people abstain from meat, but not from fish; others from brown meat, not from chicken; others eat meat once a week; others eat eggs, but no meat or fish, and so on. Then there is the complex question of starchy foods and sugar. A sound opinion seems to be that the mischief caused by too much starch is quite as serious as that due to the uric acid found in meat. Add to all these uncertainties the startling differences in different constitutions, anyhow for a time, and the incredible skill and delicacy required before any chemical analysis can certify food-values with any precision, and it is indisputably clear that the physiological question concerning diet is not at present advanced beyond the stage where rough probability is the only guide to conduct. In other words, we must be prepared to find that in the absence of sure knowledge there has been and is and will be a proportionate amount of dogmatism.

It is further noteworthy that, in this country at any rate, inquirers are debarred from what would seem a promising source of information, viz. the medical profession. For not only has there always been and is still a reluctance on the part of medical men as a profession to undermine the importance and prestige of science by preaching the sanative power of unassisted nature, but it appears that till quite recently the preparation for the practice of medicine has not included any study of dietetic questions or of food-values. Thus in a matter of great complexity, which for our enlightenment requires bold but very careful experiment and the most scrupulous observation of results, little or nothing has been done which could give promise of a scientific induction. We are thrown back on amateur and haphazard experiments, and it may be said that such innovations on convention and tradition as have been effected have been introduced by outsiders and rather obstructed than favoured by medical opinion. To this professional attitude parallels from other professions could be easily adduced. Hence, when it is claimed for vegetarianism that the case in its favour is rooted in science and can be proved by experiment, no cautious student of the subject will yield a ready assent. The truth is that the strongest arguments for it are based on other considerations which are not, strictly speaking, scientific. That is to say, many individuals are convinced that their health has been permanently benefited by forgoing the eating of meat—nor has any one the right, scientifically speaking, to doubt the truth of their conviction—but, if the number of such were ten times what it is, it would still be illogical to argue that the residue of mankind would benefit to an equal degree. Among the complexities of the subject is the difficulty of ascertaining how far the experiment in any case has been fairly tried, at what age, after what antecedents, and, perhaps most important of all, with what degree of faith. For, along with other uncertainties, many individuals have experienced a varying amount of discomfort in the early stages of the new régime. Of those a considerable proportion, totally unable to face this or any discomfort, abandon the attempt and give themselves out as evidences of vegetarian failure—a testimony wholly worthless in reality, but quite sufficient to deter most of us from such an innovation in our habits. Equally fallacious are the indications afforded by the physique of foreigners, especially Orientals, though the crudest generalizations, based, if on anything at all, on nothing better than travellers' unverified gossip, frequently pass current as substantial evidence. Such facts, indeed, as have been accurately observed and reported can obviously give ground for nothing better than conjecture.

2. The ethical argument.—The appeal to human compassion in the matter of the treatment of animals, though logically cogent, has been made with very little success even in this country, where the sentiment of kindness towards animals is strongly developed, as compared with that of other European peoples. If man could prove that flesh-foods were indispensable to his existence, of course there would be nothing more to be said. Nor would it be denied that, if such food maintained him in rude health more certainly than any other, he is right to eat it. But humane vegetarians assert that neither of these contentions can be verified, that, on the contrary, so large a proportion of mankind has subsisted in vigour on fruits and herbs for many generations together that the plea of necessity breaks down in presence of admitted facts. If this be so, no defence is possible of the practice of taking the lives of animals. Moreover, as long as man accustoms himself to kill them for food, knowing or suspecting that he could live quite well if he spared them, his whole attitude towards them is vitiated by selfishness. Very few individuals can concern themselves seriously or for long together about the welfare of animals while they are conscious that society as a whole condones the slaughter of them for no other reason than that flesh foods are preferable, or that a certain amount of inconvenience would be caused by a change of diet. Till the ethical question is fairly faced, the general conscience is violated by the daily commission on the largest scale of an act which we uneasily suspect to be a crime. Further, unless there had been a conspiracy to hide the facts, the hideousness of the slaughter-house

system would long ago have roused public sentiment to a pitch of fury; and even now, assuming what is very doubtful, that the butchering is as painless as possible, there remains against man's whole treatment of his helpless fellow-creatures the broad indictment that to rob millions of them of life unnecessarily is a kind of murder.

It is difficult to say what answers to the above arguments are made, as public opinion is too lax on the question and custom is too strong to have allowed the matter to be fairly discussed. The truth is, an enormous majority of people are too much under the yoke of custom to be awake to the moral appeal. Many would readily admit that they cannot meet it, nor are they at pains even to excuse themselves save on the plea of convenience. Meanwhile it would be difficult to measure the mischief caused to our social life by this particular form of heedlessness. Compared with foreigners, Britons are peculiarly sensitive to the claims of the animal kingdom. Such kindness as we show is based on religion, but is also the outcome of an inherited sentiment, powerful to-day, but, it must be admitted, of somewhat recent growth. If, then, both sentiment and religion are flouted by any particular custom, and little or no protest is raised against it, the very foundations of our moral principles are assailed by a deadly form of insincerity, all the more deadly for being largely unsuspected. Indeed, if these considerations are sound, we, as a society, are under the ban of Christ's denunciation of the Pharisees, who were guilty in proportion as they were blind.

But there must be plausible arguments for a practice so general as the slaying and eating of animals. Probably the most prevailing is the idea that it makes on the whole for health. The physiological aspect of the question must be dealt with separately. Here it is only necessary to observe that, granted the fact, there need be no dispute as to the principle asserted. It may be conceded that man is on so much higher a plane than animals that his welfare must take precedence of theirs in all cases where there is a direct conflict. But that there is such a conflict is exactly what the humanitarians deny. They maintain that the evidence of fruits, cereals, etc., being sufficient to support human life in full vigour is abundant; and their main argument is not that men should suffer in order to spare animals, but that, as long as there is reason to believe that animal flesh is no better (indeed is inferior) as food for man than fruits and vegetables, it cannot be right to kill animals and eat them.

To this it is replied that, if abstinence from meat became general, intolerable evils would result, such as the means of livelihood being taken from millions of workers, and the loss of skins which are needed for clothing and which are supplied at present from animals bred or preserved for food. There would be a prospect also of large industries being destroyed and thousands of workers being thrown out of employment.

One obvious answer to these misgivings is that they are based on the assumption that a vast revolution in diet could come about suddenly. There is of course no reason to assume anything of the kind, least of all in a country where conservative prejudice on this subject is adamantine. But that is not the kind of answer that touches the conscience. The truth is, the results of conduct in this case, as in many others, are far too uncertain to be worth arguing about. Nor would there be any need to forecast the future with the laborious precision which is often affected, if once it were made clear that obedience to divine law means obedience in spite of uncertainty as to results. The training of the Apostles was directed to this end throughout, that they should walk by faith and not by sight. But to limit obedience to occasions of utility is to destroy its faithfulness. Thus, if man recognizes the claims of animals to good treatment, it is futile to defend the slaughter of them because the results of the opposite line of conduct are not easy to foresee. This is the point at which religious considerations supplement ethical. If we believe that God has committed animals to us, we are bound to treat them kindly, even if the results were likely to be far more inconvenient than they possibly could be. Indeed, the experience of food shortage has taught us that all the difficulties supposed to be inherent in vegetarianism are faced without hesitation as soon as the situation is understood. In other words, professing followers of Christ ignore what is admittedly a divinely sanctioned claim, but recognize it as soon as ever 'provision for the flesh,' against which St. Paul (Ro 13^{14}) and our Lord (Mt 6^{25}) warn us, seems to be in question.

A more solid objection is advanced when it is urged that the Founder of our religion and the Pattern of our conduct did Himself habitually partake of animal food. How can humane-minded people take their stand on a divinely sanctioned law which the Son of God Himself disobeyed?

To face this objection fairly, it is necessary to point out that the oft-quoted parallel of Christ's silence concerning slavery is not at first sight applicable. Against slavery He did undoubtedly establish principles of charity between man and man which were certain, if followed, to overthrow the institution sooner or later. But it cannot be said that any teaching of His can be quoted which bears at all directly against the practice of slaying animals for food; and it is quite legitimate to argue that He had no such objection to the practice on humane grounds as He must have had against the practice of depriving a fellow-man of his liberty. Moreover, the question is not, 'Why did He refrain from denunciation?' so much as, 'Why did He participate in the practice?'

The explanation must take account of the main purpose which—as far as we can grasp it—the Saviour set before Himself in His work on earth. From no other point of view can the fragmentary character of Christ's ethical teaching be understood. But any adequate statement on such a theme would range far beyond the limits of this article. This much, however, may be said, that, in proportion as any interpretation of Christ's work falls short of the full doctrine of the NT as to His person, it will fail in explaining the gaps in the ethical teaching. In other words, if Jesus is regarded only as a divinely-gifted prophet, His life and teaching were not only abortive, but needlessly so. With slight precaution He could have escaped an early death and extended His teaching and the sublime example of His conduct for other fifty years. There is no way of meeting this criticism except by holding fast to the Christology of St. Paul and St. John. The task before the Lord was not to teach mankind, but to save them by His incarnation, death, resurrection, and the gift of the Holy Spirit from heaven. Now, while engaged on this task, He gave just enough time to evangelization to reveal what human life would be if men lived it in the full conviction and certainty of God's love and presence among them. The revelation was grievously misunderstood at the time and subsequently, owing to men's tendency to turn the gospel into a burden of moral law, more crushing than that of Moses because more spiritual and exacting. Therefore the teaching was in the main barren of precepts dealing with everyday conduct. The danger of literalism of interpretation was imminent, and we may con-

clude that, if Jesus had given us anything like a complete code of moral precepts, or even a full picture of a sinless life extended far into old age, our attention would have been diverted finally and completely from the difficult task of understanding His work of redemption to the far simpler but hopeless endeavour to live up to the level of His moral example—*i.e.*, to reject God's scheme of salvation owing to utter inability to rise up to its meaning. Hence the Saviour refrained from all attempt to guide His followers by rules, but gradually taught them—what they are still very slow to learn—that their lives were to be quickened by the Holy Spirit whose indwelling was to be to them their strength and inspiration for all time. In view of this prospect, we can understand why His ethical teaching was so suggestive but so paradoxical, so figurative, and incomplete. It was designed, not to save us from the trouble of thinking, but to turn our thoughts to the Comforter whom He promised to send.

But, in considering the moral example of Christ, we have to recognize the fact that He resolutely declined to gratify the expectation of the Jews that He should set before men a pattern of conduct to be imitated unintelligently. Not only the Pharisees but all mankind are ready to go through almost any unpleasantness if thereby they can escape the pain of recasting their ideas. From the beginning of His ministry, however, Christ set Himself sternly against this temper. His first word spoken in public (Mt 4^{17}) was an echo of the Baptist's injunction: 'Change your minds: for the Kingdom of the Heavens is come nigh.' Clearly the Lord intended that deep principles should be learned by men, and that, as they were learned, human conduct should change. Supposing, then, that He had set Himself in opposition, not specifically to a principle of conduct, but to a social custom the meaning of which was widely misunderstood, that would have been an attempt, foredoomed to failure, to improve human life without human co-operation; for it is certain that moral improvement cannot be achieved if we do not know what we are doing and why we are doing it.

Therefore Christ taught principles based upon the fact of God's Fatherhood, one of them being that the human body was to be honoured. This was taught not by a formulated rule, but by the fact of the Incarnation as soon as it was accepted. Hence, in the course of the history of Christianity, social customs have to be considered and modified in accordance with the underlying principle of reverence being due to our bodies made in the image of God. Thus the question of the kind of food that we eat arises naturally as the Incarnation is gradually being better understood.

Further, Christ's life on earth was an exhibition of divine power triumphing in and through the uttermost of created weakness. By His endurance of that weakness He manifested His personal strength, inherent and inalienable, as the Son of God.[1] Now that strength was the strength of a Redeemer, a Transformer, an Uplifter. Christ found mankind sunk in evil prejudices and evil customs. He took upon Himself our poisoned nature, as it was, that He might cleanse and reinvigorate it; what He did not do was to better the conditions so as to make His task easier. He took on Himself all the disabilities which resulted from human blundering, to show how, not so much in spite of them but by means of them, He could triumph over Satan. Hence the freedom from temporary restrictions and the universality of His teaching.

It is therefore strictly relevant to the main question to ask what kind of food best helps us in our endeavour to show reverence to our bodies, while at the same time we assert our mastery over them. There is no dispute as to the latter duty, but there is much haziness of mind in regard to the former, due to ignorance which can be dispelled only by experience of the effects of a reformed diet. Vegetarians learn them with surprise, yet they all seem naturally to result from nothing more than the relieving of the body and the mind from constant injection of poison. One that is discovered, but remains for obvious reasons unpublished, is that a 'simple' diet, consisting principally of fruit, lettuces, and 'unstarchy' foods, secures *cleanliness for the inside of our bodies*, in contrast to the noisome defilement which in flesh-eating societies has come to be taken as a matter of course. Here there is no room for dispute. If a certain diet promotes cleanliness while another causes dirt, that is enough reason by itself for preferring the former. It is then a question of fact which can only be tested by experience. Again, vegetarianism favours moderation in diet; and if —as seems to be the case, and has indeed been certified by the restriction of diet in time of war—most people clog their energies by needlessly taxing their digestions, it remains that a diet free from poison is to be preferred. True, elaborate cooking encourages excess, whatever the diet be; but, as the poison of meat is a stimulant which is followed as usual by a reaction, and as the reaction is a certain languor which feels like hunger but has nothing to do with it in reality, there is a peculiar danger in a diet of flesh which vegetarians for the most part escape. It will be noticed that it is here assumed that excessive eating is common. We need not give all the evidence for this assumption. Perhaps the most distinct indications were given during the ration-time in 1917 and 1918 that the prevalent fashion of excess had been mainly among men who could afford superfluous food, between the ages of 40 and 60, when advancing years dictate the wisdom of a gradually diminishing diet, but when also it is quite easy to maintain by skilful cooking the craving of a palate-appetite almost at the level that it kept at 30 years of age. Our social customs, our prejudices, and our cooking all make real moderation in eating difficult; and among the influences that favour excess, meat-eating followed by a nerve-reaction that is mistaken for hunger must be numbered.

In this connexion, however, the most serious indictment against flesh-eating has still to be mentioned. Meat is a stimulant, and its heating properties act upon the system by increasing the power of the animal in man. By meat-eating, in other words, the temptation to sensuality of all kinds is strengthened.

No sooner is this affirmation made than it is traversed as follows: either (*a*) it is flatly denied, and instances of vegetarian or quasi-vegetarian yet sensual peoples are adduced; or (*b*) it is contended that, if any immunity from animalism is secured, it is at the cost of diminished bodily vigour.

(*a*) No arguments are more fallacious than those which rest on a false induction. The whole question is far too complex to allow of certainty. We can guide our conduct by probability only, and probability admits of degrees. If we confine our attention to ourselves—the British people—the evidence, as already remarked, yields no scientifically certain results. It is nevertheless very weighty and cogent as a guide to conduct. We know something about the temperament of our own people, practically nothing about foreigners' temperament, such as that of the Hindus or the Japanese. That is to say, while it is very difficult

[1] R. M. Benson, *The War-Songs of the Prince of Peace*, London, 1901, i. 117.

to exclude other influences, such as heredity, religion, and social habits, even when we are considering ourselves alone, it is wholly impossible in the case of foreigners. In other words, evidence as to the physiological and spiritual effect of a certain diet in England is of some value for English people, but of less value for foreign white people, and practically of no value whatever for people so different from us as the yellow or the black races. The evidence, then, which it is worth while considering is that which is drawn from British people; and, further, it may be drawn from the experience of those who have made the experiment, while very little weight can be attached to the affirmations of those who have not. For, while a large majority of young men, all flesh-eaters, are troubled with strong sensual desires to which a huge proportion give way, the constant asseverations of those, the minority, who have made the change, to the effect that continence has forthwith become easier for them, remain uncontradicted in reality, no matter how often they are ridiculed.

Moreover, the benefit, it cannot be too often insisted on, is not only relief from certain troublesome physical sensations but a marked purification of thought and desire. 'Mali mores sunt mali amores,' said St. Augustine, and no cause of life-wreckage has been more fatally operative than the attempt to check bad actions without eradicating the desire. If, then, converts to vegetarianism who have tried both forms of diet are the only witnesses in possession of first-hand evidence, and if their testimony is practically unanimous and wholly unshakable in confidence as to the reform of their diet being to them an immense assistance to the higher life, we are bound to conclude that, in a difficult and complex question, we have here in good sooth a solid foundation on which to build, a real light in the darkness, a veritably guiding principle. Especially is this the case when we remember that the matter is far too personal to admit of publication. A little *a posteriori* evidence given confidentially outweighs all noisy *a priori* contradictions.

Nothing, however, is easier than that a principle admitted in theory should be denied in practice. If people meant what they say when they deplore the ravages of venereal disease, they would eagerly grasp at anything that held out any hope whatever of mitigating the power of the temptation, no matter if their personal convenience suffered thereby, or even if they themselves were called on to undergo real prolonged discomfort. No such excuse, however, is available. The only real obstacles to change are the most stubborn: hatred of change, positive dread of a new idea, both confirmed by deep and wide-spread misunderstanding.

(*b*) The objection that a non-flesh diet lowers the bodily vigour must be met with a flat contradiction, as very nearly all the evidence points to the contrary, except in abnormal cases. It is true that for a time a *sudden* change from a full meat diet to a régime of vegetables strictly so called may mean under-nourishment, if the foods are not carefully chosen. Or a still more disastrous blunder is made in substituting a huge amount of innutritious vegetables for beef and mutton—a sure way of inducing corpulence and lowering vitality. The right method is to make the change gradually and discover by experiment and counsel both the amount and quality of the nourishment required. Other benefits found in many cases to result from a non-flesh diet, especially if it avoids the danger of excess of starch and is diminished with advancing years, are as follows: (1) equability of spirits and immunity from depression, especially on waking in the morning—many would admit that this evil is due to heavy feeding over night, but it is not generally known that it is chiefly due to the meat poison; (2) immunity from rheumatism, lumbago, and gout; (3) reduced requirements of sleep; (4) comparative indifference to cold; (5) cure or mitigation of sea-sickness, mountain-sickness, headache, languor, etc. It is asserted by vegetarians that all of these may be expected after an interval of time varying in different cases, from the change of diet, and that so-called failures are either abnormal cases or due to want of perseverance.

Other objections are advanced not because of their cogency but as excuses for maintaining the *status quo*. It is urged that a vast industry would be destroyed and many thousands of caterers deprived of their livelihood. The whole force of this argument rests on the absurd assumption that all classes of the community would make the change suddenly. What is far more relevant is the prospect of a great stimulus to the wholesome cottage industry of fruit-growing, allotments, and agriculture generally. But it should be borne in mind that, granted the cogency of the ethical arguments, Christians ought not to be in a hesitation as to the results. Faith in God means that, in the long run anyhow, suffering is diminished by right action and never increased.

Summary.—For the sake of establishing principles which might serve to guide conduct, the history of vegetarianism is of little use. Nor can it be contended that the physiological effects can be stated with anything like scientific cogency. Numberless individual testimonies in its favour could be quoted against a comparatively small number adverse. But the induction is too narrow to allow of any conclusions being drawn which can be reckoned more than very probable. Once, however, so much as probability is conceded, the ethical argument becomes irresistible. Two considerations alone would establish this assertion: (1) the slaughter of animals being unjustifiable unless its necessity can be proved; (2) the practical certainty that flesh foods are stimulative to the animal passions, especially of the adolescent male, unless the consumption of them is restricted to a level hardly possible of attainment. Other benefits of a fruitarian and light farinaceous diet concern such exceedingly important departments of life as interior cleanliness and, of course, health of body, and therewith the paying of due reverence to it; equability of spirits, and increased capacity for sustained hard work, both bodily and mental. Where a fair trial of the reformed diet has been given, it must be conceded that in these respects the individual testimonies in its favour are very numerous and convincing. Against all this, however, are custom, prejudice, misunderstanding, ignorance, and social inconvenience, much exaggerated but sufficient to demand thought and care. These forces, though for the most part inert, will probably check any considerable advance in the direction of change for many years to come.

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E. LYTTELTON.

VENDĪDĀD.—See AVESTA.

VESTAL VIRGINS.—See HEARTH, HEARTH-GODS, PRIEST (Roman).

VESTMENTS.—See DRESS.

VICARIOUS SUFFERING.—See SUFFERING.

VIKRAMA ERA.—The era known by the name of Vikrama, or more fully Vikramāditya, or, according to the Jains, Vikramārka, is that commonly used by Hindus over all N. India, except in Bengal, where reckoning by the Śaka era (*q.v.*) is preferred. It is commonly called *Saṁvat*, an abbreviation of *Saṁvatsara*, 'year,' but that word is sometimes used in connexion with dates expressed in other eras. The Vikrama era is also current in Telingāna, or the Telugu country, and in Gujarāt. Most authors place its initial point in 57 B.C., but, according to Fleet, 58 B.C. is correct. The year is luni-solar, consisting of twelve lunar months, harmonized with the apparent motion of the sun by an elaborate system of intercalation and omission, which may be studied in the technical chronological works by Jacobi, Sewell, and other scholars who are cited in some of the publications mentioned at the end of this article. In N. India the Vikrama year begins in the month Chaitra or Chait (March–April), but in Gujarāt it begins seven months later in Kārtika or Kārtik (Oct.–Nov.). We also hear of localities where the year began either in Āṣāḍha or Āṣārh (June–July), or in Mārgasiras, or Māgh (Jan.–Feb.). Another variation arises from the practice of sometimes reckoning the month to end with the full moon (*pūrṇimānta*), and sometimes taking it to end with the new moon (*amānta*). The year, in any case, never coincides exactly with a year A.D., so that no summary formula of conversion will give more than approximate results. Commonly the subtraction of 57 from a V.E. date gives the year A.D.; *e.g.*, 1857 V.E. is equivalent to the period from 27th March, 1800, to 15th March, 1801 A.D., according to Cunningham's tables for a year beginning with the month Chait. Another complication is caused by the use in Rājputāna of a variety of the era called A-nanda, 'without *nanda*,' the term *nanda* being taken as equivalent to 90. An A-nanda year V.E. is converted roughly into a year A.D. by adding (90–57) 33. Thus 1857 V.E. A-nanda would be approximately 1890 A.D. instead of 1800, as according to the ordinary (*sa-nanda*, or 'with *nanda*') reckoning. The bardic poet Chand, who habitually uses the A-nanda form, was unjustly accused of erroneous dating until his practice was understood.

A Hindu date may be expressed in an 'expired' year, as, when we say a man is 70 years of age, we mean that he has completed 70 years; or it may be expressed in a 'current' year, as when we say that an article was written in 1918, meaning the unfinished year at the time of writing. The causes mentioned above, besides others, make the exact conversion of V.E. into A.D. dates a difficult business. Tables must be consulted, but they do not always agree, and detailed calculation of the equivalent of a date requires an expert.

The name Vikrama or Vikramāditya appears not to have been applied to the era until quite a late date, in the 10th or 11th century A.D. In Gupta times (5th and 6th cent.) the era was known as that reckoned according to the practice of the Mālava tribe (*gaṇa*), who inhabited Mālwā, then including S. Rājputāna. Probably the era originated in that area, perhaps at Ujjain, the ancient capital, from which the Hindus reckoned longitude. At that period the years were sometimes called *kṛta* (lit. 'made'), apparently with reference to a Vedic 4-year cycle of which the first year was termed *kṛta*.[1] No record is known of any *rājā* Vikrama or Vikramāditya at Ujjain or elsewhere in 58 or 57 B.C., from whose accession the epoch of the era might be reckoned, as tradition affirms that it actually was reckoned. But it is possible that such a *rājā* may have existed, and the presumption is that the name Vikrama as applied to the era should be that of the king who established it. It is also possible that one of the later kings bearing the common title of Vikrama or Vikramāditya may have become associated with the era by erroneous tradition. The strongest candidate for the honour of being considered the original of the *rājā* Bikram (Vikrama) of popular legend is Chandragupta II. (*q.v.*), Vikramāditya (*c.* A.D. 375–413). Hoernle suggests Yaśodharman (*c.* A.D. 520), who may possibly have borne the same title. Both kings ruled over Mālwā. The origin of the era remains unknown, nor is there any clear evidence to show how, when, or why the name was changed from 'the era according to the practice of the Mālavas or the Mālava tribe' to 'the era of [King] Vikrama.' The subject has been much debated by archæologists without positive result.

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VINCENT A. SMITH.

VIMUTTI.—See MOKṢA.

VINAYAS.—See LAW (Buddhist).

VIRGIN BIRTH.—I. Ethnic.—(1) A wonder birth or a supernatural birth is one of the commonest ideas in folk-tale and myth. In not all of these, however, is there what can strictly be called virgin birth. The latter certainly does not occur where ancient myths of the birth of heroes, great men, or kings are concerned. In spite of direct evidence of true human descent, myth told how a god was their real father. Plato and Augustus were said to be sons of Apollo, the kings of Egypt sons of a god and a human mother. In these myths also the mother is already wedded, and the divine parent is father in a purely physical sense and has a material form, in that form taking the place of the husband. In many folk-tales and sagas where the conception of the child is supernatural, and due to contact with or to swallowing some substance, or to the breath or glance of a man or divine being falling on the woman, or to many other causes, the woman is already married, and the birth is not, strictly speaking, a virgin birth. In this aspect these stories are parallel to ritual customs in which married women desirous of having children make use of certain substances, certain means, certain rites, to aid or perhaps to cause conception.

[1] *Epigraphia Indica*, xii. 319.

There are, however, a number of stories, both from the lower and from the higher culture, in which a virgin bears a child because she has swallowed a pebble, a blade of grass, or some other substance.'

Poshaiyánne, a hero of the Sia of New Mexico, was born of a virgin who had eaten two nuts. Fo-hi, who founded the Chinese Empire, was the son of a virgin who ate a flower which had clung to her garment when bathing.

Sometimes pregnancy is caused by mere contact with an object, by bathing, or by the sun's rays. But, while such stories regarding virgins or at least unmarried girls (and this distinction is an important one, considering the commonness of prenuptial unions) are fairly numerous in the lower culture, it is certainly an exaggeration to say that 'the Virgin-Mother myth is universal in Paganism.'[1]

E. S. Hartland, in his work, *Primitive Paternity*, maintains that these stories, the corresponding rites to cause pregnancy, and many other factors have resulted from a former universal ignorance of the physical causes of conception, still alleged to exist among Australian tribes. While his arguments are weighty, it still remains doubtful whether this ignorance ever actually was so wide-spread. The universal existence of the couvade would seem to imply knowledge of fatherhood. Whether in supernatural or in virgin birth the child born is often the metamorphosed form of some substance swallowed by the woman, and that again is a man or hero who has taken the form of that substance, in order to be reborn. Yehl, the culture-hero of British Columbian tribes, frequently transformed himself into a small object which was swallowed by a woman, and he was then reborn. With the Arunta of Australia a spirit of a totemic ancestor enters a woman and is reborn from her. Conception, with the Arunta, is not supposed to result at all from intercourse, though that may prepare the way for it.[2] Perhaps, therefore, we may say (1) that it has been widely believed that sexual intercourse is a condition, rather than a cause, of birth or of conception;[3] or (2) that conception might be due to more than one cause. In any case, in the stories which tell of a supernatural birth the stress is more often upon the metamorphosis of the substance swallowed than upon the miraculous birth.

On the other hand, the theories of the Freudian school with regard to the relation of myths and folk-tales to dreams in which there is 'wish-fulfilment,' and in which the unconscious supplies a symbolism and various sets of transpositions, afford an explanation of such legends of supernatural and virgin birth without reference to this hypothetical ignorance of the cause of conception.[4] In support of this the mythical act of conception actually occurs in a dream in some of the stories in question—*e.g.*, that of Buddha's mother and the white elephant and that of the mother of St. Molasius.[5]

(2) Although virgin birth has been asserted of Zoroaster, this is hardly supported by the accounts in the sacred books. A substance called 'the Heavenly Glory,' created by Ahura Mazda, mingled with all the stages of birth in Zoroaster's ancestral line. The sacred books tell how his father ate a plant containing the *fravashi* of Zoroaster, and how both his parents ate food containing his substance. But this leads up to his actual physical generation. So, also, when myth tells how the future saviour Saoshyas would be born of a girl, this is because some of the *semen* of Zoroaster, preserved through long ages, will enter her womb.[6]

(3) The myths of Buddha's birth came into being long after his historic existence, while, in being based on transmigration, they expressly contradict his own teaching. Buddha, existing in heaven, decides to be born again on earth for the enlightenment of men. For this purpose he chooses his father and mother, and this puts his virgin birth (also commonly asserted of him) out of court. His mother dreamt that, in the shape of a white elephant, he entered her womb. Next day this dream was interpreted by several Brāhmans, who told Suddhana that he would have a son, the Buddha. The ordinary physical generation is implied, but to this is added the supernatural element of Buddha's pre-existence, as in the Arunta theory of birth. Later stories, however, alter the dream into an actual occurrence. It is nonsense to speak of his mother as 'Maya the virgin.'

2. **The Virgin Birth of Christ.**—The narrative of the Virgin Birth of Christ is found in Mt $1^{18ff.}$ and Lk $1^{26ff.}$, *i.e.* in the only Gospels which profess to record the event of the Birth. The alleged silence of the rest of the NT is no necessary proof of its non-acceptance—*e.g.*, by St. John or St. Paul. It was universally accepted without contradiction in the early Church, except among the Ebionites, even some Gnostic groups approving of it. Ignatius, soon after the death of St. John, witnesses to it most emphatically, and 'everything that we know of the dogmatics of the early part of the second century agrees with the belief that at that period the Virginity of Mary was a part of the formulated Christian belief.'[1] The first denials of it came mainly from Deistical writers in the 18th cent., and later objections come generally, though not wholly, from those who reject the 'supernatural' aspect of Christ's personality. The accounts in Matthew and Luke appear to be independent of each other, while they yet correspond as to the main fact. Matthew's narrative is written as if from Joseph's point of view, Luke's from that of Mary, and these, as the original repositories of the knowledge of the fact, have been regarded as the respective sources from whom the narratives were drawn. The story itself is apparently older than either of the accounts of it. The silence of Mark need not be viewed seriously, as it is no part of his purpose to relate the story of the Nativity, while he uses the significant phrase 'Son of God' (1^1).[2] This applies equally to John, though his language regarding the Incarnation has been thought to presuppose the Virgin Birth—*e.g.*, 'the Word became flesh' (1^{14})—while his reference to believers being born 'not of blood . . . but of God' $(v.^{13})$ may presuppose the divine element in Christ's conception as the symbol of Christian regeneration. There is nothing to show that St. John repudiated the story.

The reading in some Patristic quotations which makes the passage itself refer to Christ, 'who was born . . .', has been accepted as the true one by some critics, but need not be pressed.

St. Paul's silence is regarded as weighty, yet he does not repudiate it, and, while its use might have added weight to his arguments for Christ's divinity and pre-existence, he does not formally refer to it, just as he makes scanty reference to any fact of Christ's earthly life, outside the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. Perhaps he wrote before it was generally known; certainly before it was known from the Gospels. Orr has argued with truth that St. Paul regarded Christ's entrance into the world as 'no ordinary act,' and his references to it have always 'some significant peculiarity of expression'—*e.g.*, Ro $1^{3f.}$ $5^{12ff.}$ 8^3 ('God sending his Son'), Ph 2^7 ('becoming [RVm] in the likeness of men'), Gal 4^4 (*γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός* instead of the more usual *γεννητός* elsewhere used by him).[3] St. Paul's doctrines of Christ as the Second Man from heaven and of His freedom from the taint of Adam's sin almost imply belief in the Virgin Birth.

Orr also suggests a significant parallelism between the phraseology of Ro $1^{3f.}$ and Lk 1^{35}.

The passages of Matthew and Luke are found in all the MSS and Versions, and cannot be regarded as interpolations. They do not differ in style from

[1] J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*[2], London, 1910, p. 292.

[2] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 150; Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, ii. 274.

[3] Cf. art. INCARNATION (Buddhist), vol. vii. p. 186[b].

[4] See F. Ricklin, *Wish-fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales*, tr. W. A. White, New York, 1915, p. 52 and *passim*; I. H. Coriat, *The Meaning of Dreams*, London, 1916, p. 136 f.

[5] T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, London, 1880, p. 63; S. H. O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica: A Collection of Tales in Irish*, do. 1892, ii. 19.

[6] *SBE* xxiii. [1883] 195.

[1] J. R. Harris, *The Apology of Aristides=TS* i. [1891] 25.

[2] 'The words are omitted in a few authorities, some of which are weighty; but they may be accepted as possibly genuine' (*The Gospel according to St. Mark*, ed. A. Plummer, Cambridge, 1915, p. 1).

[3] J. Orr, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, London, 1907, p. 114 *f.*

the rest of the Gospels,[1] and probably always formed an integral part of these. It has been suggested, however, that, if Lk $1^{34f.}$ be excised, as a later insertion, the narrative reads smoothly, and the Virgin Birth drops out.[2] In view of the facts, and also with regard to other changes which require then to be made (in 1^{27} 2^{5}; cf. also 1^{57}, which implies that the announcement is of something wonderful), this purely subjective criticism seems arbitrary. Generally the arguments based on the *form* of the phraseology in Lk 1^{26-35} are grotesque;[3] and no critic has yet shown, by himself writing a Virgin Birth narrative, what precisely was most fitting for Mary and the angel respectively to have said.

It has been argued that Mary and Joseph showed no consciousness of Christ's supernatural personality, as they should have done, granting the Virgin Birth. That consciousness, however, is found in Jn ($2^{1f.}$), who does not mention the Birth. On the other hand, the verses Lk $2^{33.\ 48f.}$ are alleged to contradict any such consciousness. But do they? What more natural than that One who to all outward appearance was an ordinary infant and youth should momentarily be so regarded in spite of any profounder consciousness? The argument takes no account of human nature.

In Lk 2^{33} the 'marvelling' may be a mere continuance of the wonder already excited. Note also the suggestion of Mary's consciousness of who her Son was in 2^{49-51}. There is no evidence that she was one of the 'kinsmen' in Mk 3^{21} who thought Him 'beside Himself.'

The references to Joseph as father of Jesus in Mt 13^{55}, Lk 4^{22}, Jn 1^{45} 6^{42} represent current opinion (the Jews, Philip before becoming a disciple) which is merely reported, not endorsed. Legally Joseph was His father, and even Mary could so speak of him (Lk 2^{48}), as Luke ($2^{27.\ 41.\ 43}$) speaks of His 'parents.' How else could they speak colloquially of one who stood *in loco parentis*? On the other hand, that Joseph was not actually His father may have been known, and this popular knowledge in the form of an aspersion on Mary's character[4] (cf. Jn 8^{41}) may be the source of the slanders in Celsus and Rabbinic works. In the earliest Gospel Jesus is 'the carpenter, the Son of Mary' in popular view (Mk 6^{3}), and this was evidently a contemptuous reference, not as in the parallel passage in Mt 13^{55}, 'the carpenter's son' (cf. Lk 4^{22}, 'the son of Joseph'). The references to Rahab, Tamar, and Bathsheba in the genealogy of Matthew may have an apologetic aspect. Such women 'played an honoured rôle in the history of the Davidic lineage. Mary's character, he proceeds to argue, was not irregular. How much less, therefore (the inference is), are Jewish objections to her and to Jesus justified!'[5]

The genealogies are alleged to contradict the Virgin Birth as showing the Davidic descent of Jesus through Joseph. The two genealogies are independent and have been adopted by the evangelists from existing documents. Do they represent more than a legal connexion? The writers who tell of the Virgin Birth see no contradiction in giving this descent, and in any case modify the genealogy by the phrases used in Mt 1^{16}, Lk 3^{23}. Not impossibly Mary was also of Davidic descent and related to Joseph.[6]

Those who regard the Virgin Birth as mythical trace it to (*a*) Jewish, (*b*) pagan sources. (*a*) The Jewish source is found in Is 7^{14}. No Jew, however, ever applied this to the birth of the Messiah, though it was in accord with Matthew's method to use it as pointing to an event otherwise known to him. Other critics have conclusively proved that the myth of virgin birth was unknown to Jewish thought. (*b*) Many have therefore sought its origin in pagan mythology, some going so far as to assume an Oriental myth, for the existence of which there is no evidence whatever. The other mythical sources are those discussed in § 1, and it must be obvious that they have nothing whatever in common with the stories of Matthew and Luke: in these there is no idea of physical procreation as there is in Greek myths, and all such myths were regarded with abhorrence in Christian circles. Any comparison of Matthew and Luke with such pagan myths (notwithstanding that these show the human feeling that extraordinary personages should have an extraordinary origin) will prove that we are moving in a different atmosphere—in the one reticence, in the other lack of it and a piling up of mystery. Matthew and Luke give no explanation of the mystery. They feel that here is a fitting introduction to a life such as the world had never seen before, and to the events of that life they immediately pass on. With sublime simplicity they use no words but those of the angelic messenger (Mt 1^{20}, Lk 1^{35}). Divine power, the power of a spiritual God, causes the Incarnation through the Virgin Birth. The reticence is marked in comparison with the exuberant language of the Apocryphal Gospels, and, if the Virgin Birth narratives are mythical, no myth was ever expressed in such bald and restrained language. The comparison with pagan myths has been influenced by knowledge of the lack of reticence in later Christian art and theology, into which pagan elements have crept. What we find there is, however, quite foreign to the Gospels.

3. Doctrinal significance of the Virgin Birth.—Only the briefest statement is possible here. It has been held that belief in the divinity of Christ, in the Incarnation, is possible without a belief in the Virgin Birth. While this is not to be denied, the fact undoubtedly remains that those who reject the latter are generally those who in greater or less degree reject the former. It is impossible for any one to say, granting the Incarnation, that virgin birth may not have been necessary to it. An absolutely unique personality such as Christ's demands some new beginning, just as it was consummated on earth by the Resurrection. An Incarnation inaugurating a new humanity, itself to be creative in the lives of men, implies some new kind of birth, and the Virgin Birth is not out of harmony with this new step in development. The pre-existent Logos taking human flesh is a new event in history: the Virgin Birth adequately supplies the means to this, and no other method is even suggested in the NT. Such an Incarnation is itself so wonderful that the additional event of virgin birth hardly makes any further demand on faith.

While virgin birth is not the ground of Christ's sinlessness through the absence of human paternity —the handicap of a predisposition to sin being presumably as transmissible by motherhood alone —yet it is apparently connected with it through 'the power of the Holy Ghost,' in both Matthew and Luke. The miraculous conception is in direct relation to the subsequent personality and function —'It is he that shall save his people from their sins' (Mt 1^{21}); 'that which is to be born shall be called holy' (Lk 1^{35}). The assumption is that the unique birth coupled with the dynamic and ethical power of the Spirit excluded the natural disposition to sin. The sinlessness of Christ was that of a

[1] F. C. Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, Cambridge, 1904, ii. 258; A. Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, tr. J. R. Wilkinson, London, 1907, p. 96 f.

[2] P. W. Schmiedel, 'Mary,' *EBi*, col. 2956.

[3] *E.g.*, by Schmiedel, *loc. cit.*, and C. Clemen, *Primitive Christianity and its Non-Jewish Sources*, Eng. tr., p. 289.

[4] A. C. Headlam, *CQR* lxxix. [1914] 23.

[5] J. Moffatt, *Introd. to the Literature of the New Testament*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 251. Cf. T. Zahn, *Introd. to the New Testament*, Eng. tr., ii. 537 ff.

[6] R. J. Knowling, *The Virgin Birth*, p. 32, quoted in Orr, p. 105.

new Personality, human and divine, and it was fitting that such a Personality should be embodied in One whose earthly existence was uniquely conditioned. Whatever the link between sinlessness and virgin birth may be, 'a sinless man is as much a miracle in the moral world as a virgin birth is a miracle in the physical world.'[1]

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J. A. MACCULLOCH.

VIRGIN MARY.—See MARY.

VIRTUE.—See ETHICS AND MORALITY.

VIRTUES.—See SEVEN VIRTUES.

VITALISM.—See ABIOGENESIS, BIOGENESIS.

VIVISECTION.—Etymologically the term 'vivisection' denotes the cutting of living animals under any conditions and for any purpose. But it has come to be associated with experiments made on the vertebrates below man for the advancement of medical science, whether with or without pain. To define vivisection, therefore, as 'the infliction of real and serious suffering on a vertebrate living animal for scientific purpose'[2] is misleading.

1. The justification of experiments on animals.—Experiments accompanied by pain were undoubtedly performed on animals before 1876 in this country, and in other countries more generally and perhaps less reservedly. Their ostensible object was to promote man's knowledge of physiology and pathology. A committee of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, *e.g.*, made experiments before that date on a number of animals to discover some better means for the resuscitation of persons apparently drowned, in order to give assistance to the Royal Humane Society. In the course of these experiments animals were half-drowned and kept in water three, four, or five minutes.[3] As a matter of fact, from the time of Galen of Pergamos (born A.D. 131) painful experiments on animals were practised, and from them unquestionably knowledge of anatomy as well as of physiology and pathology was gained. Thus Harvey was enabled to establish the circulation of the blood; Hunter its collateral circulation; Claude Bernard discovered glycogen in the liver; Sir Charles Bell laid bare the intricacies of the nervous system, and the names of Pasteur and Koch will always be associated with the most far-reaching of all pathological discoveries—those connected with micrococci. That pain accompanied the experiments by which these and other steps in medical science were reached, that prolonged pain was frequently inflicted, that medical students were taught by experiments made before them by their professors, and that they not infrequently experimented on their own account—all these facts are generally admitted. And the admission justifies the determined attempts to put an end to experiments on animals made in the past by 'the Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals from Vivisection' and other anti-vivisection societies. It is, however, only fair to add that during the thirty years immediately preceding 1876 the 'torture' of animals under vivisection had been materially lessened by the discovery and use of anæsthetics.

But, apart from the cruelty which was practised, a principle of importance was involved, viz. whether medical science was to depend for its progress on the casual observations of the doctor or was to be promoted by experiment also. In the former case progress would be minimized owing to want of control over the phenomena; in the latter case the time, method, and subject-matter would be determined by the investigator. No responsible person contests the fact that science advances mainly by selective experiments, or that all knowledge shows sooner or later the way to practical utility. There is no sense in reviling winter sowing because in April there are no crops. Experiments on animals have enabled us to fight the causes of disease, instead of dealing with the symptoms. If, in the process of acquiring knowledge by experiment, pain is inflicted in some degree, this must be counter-balanced, in forming our judgment, by the greater pain we thereby learn to prevent. Unfortunately this fact has been overlooked as a rule in the controversy about vivisection, and so the remark of Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton before the Royal Commission of 1906 was to the point:

'If you want to do good in a particular way, and want to know how you can do it effectively, give your heart a rest, and your brain a chance.'[1]

2. Findings of the Royal Commission.—The year 1876 marks a turning-point in the history of vivisection. Since that year protests against the 'torture' of animals have become, in this country at least, an anachronism. A Royal Commission, consisting of Viscount Cardwell, Baron Winmarleigh, W. E. Forster, Sir John B. Karslake, T. H. Huxley, J. E. Erichsen, and R. H. Hutton, was appointed on 22nd June 1875 to 'inquire into the practice of subjecting live animals to experiments for scientific purposes, and to consider and report what measures, if any, it may be desirable to take in respect of any such practice.' The Commission issued its report on 8th Jan. 1876.

Its conclusion was that it is 'impossible altogether to prevent the practice of making experiments upon living animals for the attainment of knowledge applicable to the mitigation of human suffering or the prolongation of human life; . . . that by the use of anæsthetics pain may in the great majority of cases be greatly mitigated; that the infliction upon animals of any unnecessary pain is justly abhorrent to the moral sense of Your Majesty's subjects generally.'

The Commission finally recommended that the practice of experiments on living animals should be regulated by law and placed under the control of the Home Secretary.

The first result of the findings of the Commission was the passing of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876 (39 and 40 Vict. c. 77). By it all experiments on animals by an unlicensed person were prohibited, and ordinarily experiments were confined to a registered place; all licences were to be vouched for by one or more of the presidents of six great scientific bodies and by a professor; the use of curari as an anæsthetic was disallowed; invertebrate animals were excluded from the operation of the Act; and a series of restrictions on

[1] A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics; or, Christianity defensively stated*, Edinburgh, 1892, p. 410.
[2] S. Coleridge, *Vivisection, a Heartless Science*, London, 1916, p. 3.
[3] *Vivisection: the Royal Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the Royal Commission*, p. xix.
[1] *Evidence of Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton*, p. 70.

experiments were imposed, especially one which insisted that 'the animal must during the whole of the experiment be under the influence of some anæsthetic of sufficient power to prevent the animal feeling pain,' this being modified by a subsequent section which allowed one series of experiments without anæsthetics on a prescribed certificate and for given reasons. One important fact had not come to light at the passing of this Act. Bacteriology as a science was but beginning its career. Hence all the evidence given before the Royal Commission dealt with current physiology, and when the Act was passed it was soon found that it made no provision for experiments by inoculation, which are now 95 per cent of the whole. Accordingly, these had to be allowed for, and they are brought under certificate A and certificate B.

3. Legal regulation of experiments.—Under the powers conferred by the Act of 1876 on the Home Secretary, certificates marked A, B, C, E, EE, or F are granted to licensed persons.[1] Certificate A allows experiments to be made without anæsthetics when anæsthesia would necessarily frustrate the object of the permitted experiment. As a matter of fact, no cutting operations are performed under this certificate; it sanctions inoculations, feeding, and similar procedures only, which involve no cutting; and the animal has to be killed under anæsthetics, if it be in pain, as soon as the result of the operation is ascertained. In view of the somewhat grotesque statements which are frequently made about the prevalence of cruelty under the existing law, it will be advantageous to state the nature of the 'pain condition' now prevailing. Additional safeguards against the infliction of pain have been provided, in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission of 1906, by strengthening the special condition (known as the 'pain condition') which is endorsed on the licence in respect of all certificates which either dispense with the use of anæsthetics or allow the animal to recover from the anæsthetic (provisos 2 and 3 of sec. 3). The 'pain condition' now runs as follows:

'If an animal, after and by reason of any of the said experiments under the said Certificate . . . is found to be suffering pain which is either severe or is likely to endure, and if the main result of the experiment has been attained, the animal shall forthwith be painlessly killed.

If an animal, after and by reason of any of the said experiments, is found to be suffering severe pain which is likely to endure, such animal shall forthwith be painlessly killed, whether the main result of the experiment has been attained or not.

If any animal appears to an Inspector to be suffering considerable pain, and if the Inspector directs such animal to be destroyed, it shall forthwith be painlessly killed.'

Certificate B allows an animal to be kept alive after the initial operation, where a more or less prolonged observation is necessary to the scientific success of the experiment. Certificate C allows experiments to be made in illustration of lectures, but under anæsthesia. Certificates E and EE permit experiments on dogs or cats, and certificate F on horses, asses, or mules.

The best proof that the administration of the Act has been satisfactory is afforded by the findings of the second Royal Commission on Vivisection appointed in 1906, which published its report in 1912. The report was signed by all the Commissioners; it recommended no change in the text of the Act of 1876, but suggested, without recommending, a special certificate for all experiments on dogs; it recommended certain increased restrictions and safeguards, which were adopted by the Home Office. It may be added that an unsuccessful attempt to pass a Dogs' Protection Bill was made in 1919 in the House of Commons.

4. Practical conclusion.—Few questions have roused more embittered feeling than that engendered by the belief that lower animals were being callously and uselessly 'tortured' by medical men and others. Men felt that the humaneness inculcated by centuries of Christian teaching was being wantonly abandoned, and the outcry was in proportion to the nearness to man of the animals which were used for experiment. Invertebrate animals were passed over as being negligible, and it was with man's nearest friends, the dog, the cat, and the horse, that sympathy was most loudly expressed. Frequently, however, an adequate sympathy for the sufferings of man himself was wanting to supplement that felt for these lower animals. No sufficient recognition was made of the fact that without experiments on animals doctors would frequently have no option save to experiment on their patients, for want of the knowledge which experiments on animals could alone secure. And, as it is, much of the success attending treatment for diseases connected with the blood, with the alimentary canal and the digestion of food, and with the central nervous system, springs from knowledge gained by experiments on animals. Especially is this the case with diseases due to infection by microbes. As the Royal Commission of 1876 pointed out,

'It was by observation that Dr. Jenner discovered the immunity from small-pox of those who had contracted cow-pox. But it was by experiments upon cows that the origin of the cow-pox, a disease stated to be derived from "grease" in the horse, was ascertained.'

Pasteur's discovery of the activity of micro-organisms in fermentation was the beginning of antiseptic and aseptic treatment of wounds, by which thousands of human lives have been saved and indescribable suffering removed, and with which the name of Lord Lister will be always connected by a grateful world. The treatment of tuberculosis and diphtheria and the protective treatment against tetanus and rabies are dependent on knowledge gained by experiments on animals. In the same way the nature of cholera, bubonic plague, typhoid fever, epidemic meningitis, Malta fever, and other curses of mankind is now understood, and the road to their annihilation opened. When we weigh the suffering caused to hundreds of thousands of human beings by these plagues against that far less pain caused by inoculation to a comparatively small number of mice, rats, guinea-pigs, and rabbits, we realize how irrational it is to agitate for the total prohibition of vivisection. The method of regulation, not suppression, adopted in this country does justice at once to the unquestioned claims of the lower animals to kindly treatment and to the duty of man to his fellows—the duty of using his reason in the age-long task of diminishing and finally extinguishing that particular form of evil which goes by the name of disease.

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VOLCANOES. — See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

VOLITION.—See WILL.

VOLTAIRE.—François Marie Arouet, who is known to us as Voltaire, was born either at Chatenay or in Paris in November 1694. His father, François Arouet, had been treasurer to the Chambre des Comptes, and his mother, Marie

[1] Certificate D, which was based on section iii. subsection b. 4 of the Act allowing experiments 'for the purpose of testing a particular former discovery,' is no longer issued.

Catherine Daumart, was born, we are told, of a noble family of Poitou. Voltaire afterwards took his name from a small property in his mother's family, though it has been maintained that it was derived from an anagram on his signature Arouet L. J. ('le jeune'); but the fact that in the dedication to his *Œdipe* he signed 'Arouet de Voltaire' proves that he did not take the second name in order to cast the other into oblivion. Voltaire was thus born in a state of moderate affluence, and he was sent to the Jesuit College Louis-le-Grand, which bore the high reputation for learning possessed by schools of that order. Here he was not only distinguished intellectually but was pointed out by his tutor as the future 'coryphæus of deism in France.' On leaving college, he came into touch with the Abbé de Châteauneuf, who had been a friend of his mother, and who was his godfather; he brought him into relation with Ninon de l'Enclos. That remarkable woman, who had had the courage to reject Madame de Maintenon's offer of an invitation to the court on condition that she should become *dévote*, was now very old, but she maintained her freshness of spirit, and she soon discerned the remarkable character of the boy and left him a legacy for the purchase of books. Already he deplored in verse 'his Jansenist of a brother' and declaimed a poem, called the *Moïsade*, by J. B. Rousseau[1] (though the author attributed it to Voltaire), which portrays Moses as an impostor. Perhaps it was from Ninon that Voltaire first learned the lesson whose influence pervaded all his life, that the spirit of man is free, and that men are entitled to form their judgments for themselves. The society into which young Voltaire was launched was indeed a dissolute one. It represented a reaction against the hypocrisy and intolerance of the court of Louis XIV., and its wit was frivolous and its literary efforts trifling. The Abbé Chaulieu, a versifier of some merit, exercised much influence on Voltaire and typified the outlook of the society in which he moved.

Naturally M. Arouet, the father, was shocked at the company kept by his son, and by the fact that he began to write a tragedy instead of learning law. He finally dispatched him to the Marquis de Châteauneuf, brother to the Abbé, and French ambassador in Holland; but the young man became entangled in a love affair and the ambassador sent him home. The love, if such it was, was soon forgotten, but Voltaire, to the despair of his father, was determined to live in the world in which he had got a footing, mingling with the nobles and more bent on versifying than occupying an office-stool, in spite of the fact that he had matriculated as a lawyer. A friend of his father took pity on him and brought him to a château near Fontainebleau, where he became engrossed in the study of history—a study which resulted later on in the production of *La Henriade* and *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*. Louis XIV. died in 1715, and there followed an outburst of satires on the memory of the monarch who had enjoyed such adoration. One of these was termed *Les j'ai vu* and concluded, after describing the evils which in his short life the writer had seen, the crowded prisons, the unjust taxes, with 'And I am but twenty years old.' Though Voltaire was actually twenty-two, he was falsely accused of being the author, and in May 1717 he was cast into the Bastille, where he remained till April 1718, being allowed to return to Paris in the following October. This was not his first détention; he had been sent out of Paris as early as 1716, owing to verses that he had written regarding certain distinguished personages.

[1] Not to be confused with Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Confinement in the Bastille, which was perhaps not very severe, had little effect on Voltaire's spirits, for here he sketched out the poem of *La Ligue*, corrected his tragedy *Œdipe*, and even wrote gay verses on his misfortune. *Œdipe* was performed in 1718 with great success, and this was the first of his dramatic works, which were to follow one another in such marvellous succession. Before this he had written only fugitive pieces, including an ode which had vainly contested for a prize given by the French Academy. Afterwards he went on with his great work, the *Henriade*, and also wrote the tragedy of *Artémire* (1720), which was much more severely criticized than was the *Œdipe*. Everywhere the young poet was welcomed, though he appears to have again been banished for a season from Paris for his intercourse with the enemies of the regent, and more especially with Richelieu and de Gortz. With Madame de Rupelmonde he visited Holland and saw J. B. Rousseau at Brussels. Voltaire read his *Épître à Uranie*, and Rousseau recited his works to him, but the two men separated as irreconcilable enemies. Voltaire returned to France in 1722 and in 1724 produced *Mariamne*, which was on the same lines as *Artémire* under new names and plot; then came the famous *Henriade* under the name of *La Ligue*. Voltaire as author of this wonderful trilogy—*La Henriade*, *Œdipe*, and *Mariamne*—may be said to have made his mark in literature. The idea of being the eulogizer of King Henry IV. had inflamed his imagination since his twenty-first year, and he had begun to write in the Bastille. His idea was to dedicate the work to the king of France (Louis XV.), and the dedication was written, but there were difficulties in regard to censorship, and it did not appear. The book was issued in 1723 at Rouen after an abortive effort to get it published by subscription at The Hague. An English edition (1726) was dedicated to the queen of England, consort of George II. The poem is often compared with the *Æneid*, and it has a place in French literature which brings it into comparison with the classics of ancient days. The subject was a great one, and, while it adheres to historic facts, there is in the work a fine sense of morality, and above all that deep love of humanity and liberty which characterizes its author's best writings. Condorcet says that the *Henriade* was born in the century of reason, and the more progress made by reason among men, the greater will be its circle of admirers. Unfortunately for the truth of this dictum, life and dramatic power are also necessary to make a work such as this immortal, and these are lacking in the poem. Perhaps it was not possible for Voltaire to write a great epic: it required a depth of thought and concentration that was not his. Also the age was possibly too critical and superficial.

In 1722 Arouet the elder died, implacable to the last as regards his gifted son, who was now definitely known by his famous name of Voltaire. The latter was living a life of social pleasure, visiting country-houses,—those of Sully, Villars, etc. — composing verses *d'occasion*, arranging theatricals, and writing all the while with set and definite purpose. He loved the country, but dreaded the loss of precious time spent in country-house pleasures. Change of scene seemed necessary to him; he was ever passing from one place to another in a way that was astonishing in those days of comparatively fixed abode. It was a life of quick impressions, but not entirely one of self-indulgence, for Voltaire never forgot that his work claimed his first endeavours, and he never hesitated to speak his mind with perfect vigour. One would have imagined that that work would have given

him an established place in society and caused his person to be respected, but, if he himself might be tempted to think so, he got a rough awakening.

Voltaire was dining, as he often dined, with the Duke of Sully. There he met the Chevalier de Rohan, who took it amiss that Voltaire's sentiments did not agree with his own. 'Who is that young man,' he asked, 'who contradicts me in tones so loud?' 'My lord,' Voltaire replied, 'it is one who bears no great name but who wins respect for the name he bears.' A few days later the chevalier took revenge upon the young man by causing his lackeys to administer a caning to him at the duke's door. Sully refused to interfere, and, stung by rage, Voltaire obtained instruction in the use of the small sword and challenged de Rohan. The family of the latter prevented him from fighting, and Voltaire was thrown once more into the Bastille, where he was kept for sixteen days.

This was in April 1726, and on 2nd May he was allowed to leave for England, accompanied by an escort as far as Calais.

Voltaire's journey to England was not only a turning-point in his life, but a factor in the economic and intellectual history of France. One can imagine the spirit in which he went there, burning with indignation at the manner in which he had been treated by the laws or customs of his country. He passed into the country of Newton and Locke, of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, of Swift and Pope—a country which allowed men to speak without let or hindrance of what they had experienced or believed. Voltaire had become known as a writer of verse and tragedy; now he felt it to be his mission to become the liberator of his countrymen from bondage and false beliefs. 'Voltaire left France a poet, he returned to it a sage.'[1] Newton's careful examination of facts strongly appealed to the young man, and his mind was specially drawn towards the Newtonian theory of attraction as well as to Locke's appeal to experience as the basis of all knowledge. Metaphysics—even the metaphysics of Descartes—took on a new aspect to him. The *Lettres philosophiques, ou Lettres sur les Anglais* draw attention to the many matters in which the country in which he was living was in advance of that of his birth. He was but a refugee from the Bastille, and his country was still in a condition of feudalism with an aristocracy which was exempt from certain forms of taxation. In England, on the other hand, he saw intellectual eminence honoured and rewarded; even administrative posts were granted to distinguished men of letters, whilst the liberty of the press was absolute. We cannot wonder that the *Lettres* were publicly burned by decree of the French Parliament.

The tragedy of *Brutus* was the firstfruits of Voltaire's visit to England, expressing as it did the aspirations of an oppressed people. The next twenty years of Voltaire's life, between his leaving England and going to Berlin, were a prolific period. The dates of his most famous tragedies are as follows: *Brutus*, 1730, *Zaïre*, 1732, *Mort de César*, 1735, *Alzire*, 1736, *Mahomet*, 1741, *Mérope*, 1743, *Sémiramis*, 1748, *Tancrède*, 1760. The *Mort de César* was a brave venture, for not only did it deal with ground well trodden by a greater dramatist than Voltaire himself, but it was a play without love scenes or women, and in three acts only, and thereby a complete innovation. Its republicanism, too, was sufficient to cause its publication to be at first prohibited in those days of tyranny. Its author came into further contact with the authorities over an attack he made on the excommunication of a celebrated actress, who on her death was refused burial rites. But, though Voltaire was ever ready to take up real causes of oppression, he was far too susceptible to any vulgar calumny, and his time and talents were used in petty quarrels unworthy of a man of intellect and position. His struggle was by his writings to win for himself a place in public esteem which would secure for him the goodwill of the populace. *Ériphyle* was not a success, but *Zaïre* had the tender note that appealed to the sentiments of the human heart. *Adélaïde du Guesclin*, though on similar lines, did not take the public fancy. It was followed by the *Temple du Goût*, a criticism of past and living writers. The *Lettres philosophiques* had been burned in 1734. There appeared in them certain notes, now well known, in criticism of Pascal, which were specially resented, and the causes mentioned before made it thoroughly detested. The *Épître à Uranie* its author felt himself constrained to disavow and ascribe to Chaulieu, now dead—an action impossible to justify. In 1729 Voltaire began that poem which has made his name famous or infamous, and which was his amusement for many years of his life. *La Pucelle d'Orléans* is an indefensible attack on the memory of a great deliverer of the writer's country, and it cannot be justified from either a historical or a moral point of view. It was constantly being quoted to eager listeners, and the publication of it was a constant peril hanging over its writer's head. Voltaire all this time was in constant trouble with his many critics, one of the chief of whom in 1735 was Défontaine, who attacked him in *La Voltairomanie*. This was a reply to Voltaire's *Le Préservatif*. There was much personal abuse on Défontaine's part, in which Voltaire's private life and relationship to Madame du Châtelet were involved.

This was a time of persecution and humiliation for Voltaire, but it was also a time of happiness and prosperity, for the fortune which his enormous output, in addition to his speculations, brought him left him a liberty which he never before possessed. He wanted riches and independence, and he got them. Then between 1733 and 1749 he formed that connexion with Madame du Châtelet which proved such a strong influence on his life. It was a strange friendship—one of comradeship rather than passion. The 'divine Emily' was a student of a very serious type, and she made the kind of surroundings which Voltaire required for his very serious work, in the famous château of Cirey in the independent duchy of Lorraine. Here these two wonderful people—for Madame du Châtelet was a brilliant and accomplished woman—studied Newton, quarrelled sometimes, made friends again, worked literally day and night together, and even competed together for a prize offered by the Academy (on so uninspiring a topic as the propagation of fire), though taking, characteristically enough, opposite views on the subject. Voltaire wrote on the philosophy of Newton, and Madame du Châtelet co-operated with him. Voltaire was deeply interested in scientific questions, but he had no real aptitude for science; his mind was not that way inclined, and an enemy went so far as to say that he was the man who could 'best write down what other people have thought.'[1] Voltaire was therefore well advised to devote himself to poetry and philosophy rather than become a second-rate savant.[2] He followed this advice, and at Cirey produced *Alzire*, *Zulime*, *Mahomet*, and his *Discours en vers sur l'Homme*, whilst he also wrote the *Histoire de Charles XII.* and prepared the *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, and collected the materials for his *Essai sur l'hist. générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*. All the while he was not stationary at the château, but moved about from place to place—Amsterdam, Brussels, Berlin, etc.—always glad to return to his settled home again. Paris was free to him after 1735. His

[1] John Morley, *Voltaire*, p. 58.

[1] Morley, p. 120.

[2] Condorcet, *Vie de Voltaire*, p. 166.

own sovereign, Louis XV., would have none of him, and Frederick, now king of Prussia (1740), took advantage of Voltaire's fear of how his writings might cause him trouble, and tried to secure his presence by an offer of protection. A constant correspondence took place between the two, as well as a *soi-disant* diplomatic visit on Voltaire's part to the king.

Voltaire's historical writings occupied him greatly at this period of his life. He is not remembered as, properly speaking, a historian, but his historical works are all written in reference to the times in which he himself lived, and hence their interest for us to this day. They are full of intelligence and good sense, with moralizings which are to the point and are yet combined with an irony which is characteristic of the author. His *Siècle de Louis XIV.* is specially interesting, inasmuch as he was able to make use of his own private information and of memoirs hitherto unpublished, like those of Saint-Simon. He gives a very full account of the government, commerce, and industry of the time. In fact, he had in view not only to write a history of the period with which he dealt, but also to relate the history of the human mind in that wonderful epoch of history. He worked with great diligence, passing the whole day at his desk, and, despite frequent ill-health, never seemed to tire.

Madame de Pompadour was Voltaire's first friend at court, and through her he was asked to celebrate the marriage of the dauphin in a court piece called the *Princesse de Navarre*. In view of this work, which he regarded very lightly, he was made in 1745 historiographer of France—a position once jointly held by Racine and Boileau—and given thereby a certain protection as well as a salary of 2000 livres. But above all he desired to obtain admission to the Academy, and before this was possible he wrote to Latour, head of his former school, professing his devotion not only to religion but also to the Jesuits. He achieved his end in 1746. But he did not long hold a place in royal favour, for libels poured upon him, worse even than before. Crébillon was given the pre-eminence as an author by Madame de Pompadour and others, and everything was done that could be done to humiliate and discourage him.

In 1749 Madame du Châtelet, the friend of sixteen years, died. Her companionship had meant much to Voltaire, and his life with her had been on the whole useful and not without dignity. Frederick of Prussia, who had for long corresponded with Voltaire and had formerly urged his migration to Prussia, came to the throne in 1740, and renewed his blandishments. The result was that in July 1750 Voltaire arrived at Potsdam. He was received with the greatest respect by his remarkable host and endowed with a pension; but the step was one which he had every cause to regret. By his action he even gave offence in his own country and to Louis XV., his king, little appreciated as he had been by him before. He thought he would find liberty and peace in his new abode, but he found on the intellectual side obscurantism only. The Academy of Sciences, founded by Sophie-Charlotte under the direction of Leibniz, had fallen on evil days. The king was mainly concerned about drill and orthodox theology, and Berlin was far behind Paris in civilization, being in many ways but a mediæval town. The association of these two, the greatest figures in Europe, will always be a matter of the profoundest interest to mankind. But actually the combination was disastrous. Frederick was Voltairean, it is true, but his interests were centred in the establishment of the Prussian ascendancy and the transformation of the face of Europe. Voltaire's task was a no less momentous one, for his aim and object were to change the intellectual outlook of the Continent and destroy the old spiritual ascendancy. But the two men moved in different planes—nothing could have made them agree—and during the two and a half years spent by Voltaire as Frederick's guest there were constant and undignified quarrels and stupid practical jokes of a spiteful sort. It was all unworthy, and we cannot wonder that the visit came to an untimely end. Voltaire was no easy guest, always looking out for insults, which were not hard to find. There is a famous and cruel saying which La Métrie quoted as having been applied to Voltaire by the king: 'I require him a year longer . . . one sucks the orange and casts away the skin.'[1] Voltaire was grasping, while Frederick was parsimonious; he quarrelled with Lessing and got into not too creditable financial transactions. But, despite all this, and the fact that he was asked to criticize and amend the king's verses, Voltaire made progress with the *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, and the famous *Dictionnaire philosophique*. There was doubtless a certain fellow-feeling between the two men, who were at one in their hatred of superstition and prejudice; but there was a strong disagreement too, and Maupertuis was the means of bringing this disagreement to a head. Maupertuis was an ancient rival of Voltaire, and a quarrel arose between the two. The one issued *Lettres*, the other the *Diatribe du Docteur Akakia*. The king was at first amused, but the *Diatribe* was proscribed and ordered to be burned. Voltaire had, however, according to his wont, sent copies away, which were printed, and the king was annoyed by this and placed him under arrest. After a sort of reconciliation Voltaire finally left Potsdam in 1753 and went to Leipzig, there to stay with the Duchess of Saxe-Gotha, for whom he commenced the *Annales de l'Empire*, a popular history of Germany, which he himself did not rate highly. Subsequently he journeyed to Frankfort, where he and his niece, Madame Denis, were arrested and kept for three weeks under guard. Frederick tried to put the blame on another, but the matter caused much resentment, and Voltaire told his friends that the king had 'a hundred times kissed the very hand which he had just caused to be enchained.'[2]

On leaving Frankfort Voltaire went to Colmar in Alsace, where he completed his *Annales* and spent nearly two years, and where he thought of settling. But France seemed impossible, as persecutions threatened; he happened on one occasion to go to Geneva to consult Tronchin, and its beauty, language, and liberty captivated him; consequently he settled in a country-house outside the town, named Les Délices. Even that resting-place did not seem perfectly secure, and, in order to have retreats from the persecution of the Catholics on the one hand and the extreme Reformed party on the other, he bought houses in the different territories and in turn inhabited Tournay, Ferney in France, and Les Délices close to Geneva. It was at the last place that he and Madame Denis, his widowed niece, made their home and set up a considerable establishment.

The year 1754 was, so to speak, a dividing time in Voltaire's life. After a stormy period of combat and fear he passed from dependence to independence and comparative freedom. He was wealthy—not from the proceeds of his works, but from speculations—and was able to set up a theatre and keep open house, whilst he could print as he wished in Geneva. He was no longer dependent on the great as formerly, but received them into his house on equal terms. It promised to be a

[1] Letter to Madame Denis, Berlin, 2nd Sept. 1755.
[2] Condorcet, p. 206.

peaceful life, but he meant to devote himself to political work, to obtaining a change in the constitution of European states such as would bring them more into line with that of England. He wished above all to procure economy of public money, to put an end to persecution and intolerance, and he carried on a vast correspondence with these ends in view. He was ambitious, desired to produce and to teach. He might indeed be compared to a great European instructor—one whose work was to enlighten nations which were not too favourably disposed to receive the instruction offered them. He was not an idealist perhaps, but he had the good of his fellow-countrymen at heart, and there was no better place from which to preach his gospel of the deliverance of mankind from the thraldom of the oppressor than the republics of Berne and Geneva.

His literary work went on apace. The first play to appear was *L'Orphelin de la Chine*, composed when he was in Alsace and performed in 1755. His peace was, however, disturbed by the piratical publication of *La Pucelle*, which forced him to finish and issue it himself. By its means there was plenty of reason given to the enemy to blaspheme, although it may be possible to argue that it aims at the destruction of hypocrisy and superstition. It is impossible, if so, not to wish that a better and less gross manner of bringing about that result had been adopted and that more respect had been shown for a famous woman and patriot. He also wrote at this time the poem entitled *La Loi naturelle* and the *Désastre de Lisbonne*. The first was burned by the parliament at Paris because of its attack on intolerance and the fear of where such opinion would lead. The second was in antagonism to the orthodox view of the origin of evil, and was condemned in consequence. In 1759 he published *Candide*, undoubtedly one of the best of all his works of the romantic and philosophic type. It is an ironical satire on the optimism of Leibniz, and is extremely amusing as well as full of a commonsense type of wisdom, so that it can be read in the present day with as much pleasure as when it was first published. At the end of it there is the famous injunction to himself and his readers to 'cultivate one's own garden.' Voltaire also made a free translation of Ecclesiastes and part of the Song of Solomon. In 1757 the first edition of his collected works appeared. This was published under his own supervision, and to this edition there was added the *Essai sur l'hist. générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, a work undertaken in order to influence Madame du Châtelet in favour of the study of history. This work involved an immense amount of research and labour that must have been irksome to a man of quick wit like Voltaire, who was neither an earnest student nor a metaphysician. But his historical writing was never dull. He grouped his facts and interpreted these in a wide way, giving them life and significance. His reflexions may not be very profound, but they are full of common sense and just. He obtained the best material available and put it to the best use in his power. On the whole he was scrupulous and critical in respect of the value of his evidence. Satire and wit were always at his command.

In 1765 Voltaire sold Les Délices and settled at Ferney, where he occupied the position of a country gentleman, and where he was visited by most of the celebrated men of the day in Europe. He corresponded voluminously and even came into touch with his former friend King Frederick. Diderot and d'Alembert launched their great project of the *Encyclopédie* while Voltaire was still at Berlin, and with their object, the free and open statement of the facts of science and philosophy, he was in the most intense sympathy. Hence from Ferney he wrote a number of articles for the work. That work had to be printed in secrecy, and, when it once became known, it was speedily proscribed. The writers were known as the *philosophes* and *encyclopédistes*, and among them the chief was often named 'the patriarch of Ferney.' The latter was as usual ready to make reply to the ignorant attacks made on the writers who numbered among them those most distinguished in the literary world; and a series of lampoons was the result. One of these is known by the name of *L'Écossaise*, a comedy in which a calumniating journalist is introduced.

At the age of sixty-six Voltaire wrote *Tancrède*, dedicated to Madame de Pompadour. This work was admired by Gibbon[1] and translated by Goethe, and it has always been considered one of the author's best dramas. But he was not only concerned with literature, for the human side of him was ever conspicuous.

His admiration for the great Corneille was profound, and his notes on some of Corneille's works are classic. Though he might criticize where he thought criticism due, none recognized more fully the greatness of this man of whom France was so justly proud. His grand-niece was, he heard, in distress, and at once Voltaire said that it 'was the duty of a soldier to succour the niece of his general.'[2] Consequently he brought her to Ferney and provided for her education, and with wonderful tact and good feeling he caused her to believe that she owed her support to the proceeds of her uncle's writings.

Another case, much more remarkable, is that of Calas. This old man, a Protestant, had been broken on the wheel because his son was found dead and he was accused of poisoning him, although there was not the slightest evidence of the fact. The accusation rested on the statement, quite unwarranted, that Calas feared his son's turning Catholic and therefore brought about his death; in consequence the son was regarded as a martyr. The father died, but Voltaire took enormous trouble to have the sentence annulled and to prevent the other members of the family from being convicted as accomplices; and, in the end, after years of work, he was successful. During the three years which were taken up with this matter Voltaire stated that 'not a smile passed over my face but that I reproached myself for it as though I had committed a crime.'[3] No wonder that when he came to Paris in triumph before his death he was acclaimed as the saviour of Calas.

Sirven's case was somewhat similar, but he had time to save himself and take refuge with the protector of the oppressed and persecuted, and he was consequently secure.

But it must not be assumed that it was only those of another faith than that in which he had been brought up whom Voltaire succoured. He was ready to help any one oppressed in whatever way, and whatever his professed religion. The Jesuits even, his old instructors, whose order was destroyed—'the friends of letters and enemies of reason,' as Condorcet calls them—enlisted his sympathy, and one of them, persecuted by the Jansenists, became his almoner at Ferney. Possibly he was not without his use when Voltaire's own enemies blasphemed. But free-thought was speeding apace, and persecution did little, if anything, to stem the tide. Jean Jacques Rousseau was writing, and his writings were being circulated abroad. Political feeling was strong against a privileged and effete aristocracy. And yet the most astonishing events occurred, like the case of a young soldier named La Barre, about seventeen years old, who was accused of defacing a crucifix placed on the bridge of Abbeville. The lad was executed with horrible barbarity, and this aroused a blaze of indignation in Voltaire's bosom, although he had some cause to fear for himself, seeing that the *Dictionnaire philosophique* was in a manner involved (it was burned with La Barre's body). No wonder that he exclaimed, 'I am tired of hearing that twelve men were able to establish Christianity; I should like to prove that one is capable of destroying it.' We cannot forget Voltaire's efforts on behalf of our own Admiral Byng, who retired before the French at Minorca and was

[1] *Decline and Fall*, ch. lii., note 98.
[2] Letter of 7th Nov. 1760. [3] Condorcet, p. 240.

shot in 1757. 'In this country,' says Voltaire of England in *Candide*, 'it is well to put an admiral to death now and then to encourage the others.'[1]

This side of Voltaire's character—his righteous indignation with injustice and indefatigable efforts after restitution when injustice had been inflicted—is the side which attracts us most. He, perhaps the greatest personality in Europe (for Frederick was his only rival till the star of Goethe rose), endowed with a power of sarcasm and of invective of the most incisive kind, had the power to act, and it is entirely to his honour that in those difficult times he did act without fear and without delay. His humour was the bitter humour of the man who felt that things were too desperately bad to be taken entirely seriously, but this sardonic merriment did not prevent his practical action. His correspondence, which forms in some ways the most interesting part of his voluminous writings, is full of expressions of his inmost feelings regarding the events that were occurring daily around him. The iron burned deep into his soul, and he was given the power to foresee what was wholly realized only later on and then was dealt with by the terrors of revolutionaries.

There is another side to Voltaire's character which is more difficult to fathom. When he built his new manor house, he also built a small church with the inscription on it 'Deo erexit Voltaire.' And his correspondence shows him to be apparently anxious to prove himself to be all things to all men. He was likewise always ready to shelter himself through anonymity, and even to ascribe his works to another, though the other was dead and unable to defend himself. No doubt the times were bad and men's lives had to be preserved; but, whatever the customs of the day, this action was far from heroic. Then there is the famous communion made on 1st April 1769, followed by a public protestation of respect for the Church. His impish delight in forcing the priest to administer the communion to him, though forbidden by his bishop, and his 'forgiveness' of the bishop, is not an edifying spectacle, any more than the fact that Voltaire had himself made temporal father of the order of Capuchins for the district of Gex—an act done probably to annoy the bishop of Annecy. Even his sympathizers were scandalized by these actions, and in regard to them and many others no real justification seems possible. Voltaire was a deist, but that he regarded orthodox Christianity in any other way than as a scoffer is unthinkable, and this is the rôle he played throughout. He scoffed at the ordinary optimistic point of view, whether it was that of the philosopher or that of the ordinary believer. He was always ready to criticize and show the errors incipient in any positive creed or system of philosophy, but he never reached a constructive system either of spiritual belief or of social theory. Indeed he did not appear to have constructive power any more than great originality, but his interest in theological matters is apparent from his constant references to them. His religion, though it partook of negation, was not of the wholly negative character of that of some of his contemporaries, nor did it partake of the nature of the beliefs of Rousseau. Voltaire denied what he believed to be false, and that included practically all that he had received as religious tradition from the past. But it left a sort of possibility for the future which seemed to satisfy many of his successors, bald and empty and unfruitful as it might seem to be. 'I shall always be convinced that a watch proves a watchmaker and that the universe proves a God.'[2] And Voltaire's attacks on religion were not philosophic. His was a mind of extreme lucidity, which took hold of detailed facts that he held to be false and on which he poured derision as well as argument. He tried to cover the teaching of the Church on miracles, *e.g.*, with ridicule. With Rousseau Voltaire had little in common. Rousseau's sentimentalism made but little appeal to the older man's reasoning mind. Rousseau had repelled Voltaire's offers of assistance and shelter, and that was one cause of their estrangement, but their writings were antipathetic to one another, and Rousseau's effusions seemed to Voltaire false and his conduct hypocritical.

Voltaire's long life at Ferney—it lasted almost twenty years—has made a deep impression on mankind. Here he was growing into an old man on whom the eyes of Europe were constantly set either in deep dislike and fear or in admiration. He was in continual controversy, whether with the republic of Geneva or with the clerics. His hospitality to every kind of man, whether from Russia, England, or Germany, was constant and ungrudging. His niece, Madame Denis, who was unattractive and not agreeable in temper, kept house for him on a lavish scale, and he became a sort of 'hotel-keeper for Europe.' The winters were cold, but the life suited one who was glad to evade the distractions and intrigues of Paris, and doubtless for a man who was constantly subject to illness it tended to the prolongation of life. He wrote perpetually, corresponding with every civilized court and with distinguished persons of every country. Not only did the great men of the earth write to the patriarch but also every one, young or old, who wished for advice on literary or speculative questions. Many thousands of Voltaire's letters are now in existence, and they are full of wit, if not always pleasant reading.

Paris, much as he hated its atmosphere and resented its treatment of him in the past, had the same attraction for Voltaire as it has for all its children, and in 1778 he set out for the metropolis. His departure was bemoaned by his tenants and the peasantry of the Pays de Gex, a district which by his wise management he had caused to prosper exceedingly. Voltaire, as we know, managed his own monetary matters to great advantage, and he also had the business faculty which is necessary to make a countryside prosperous. At the same time he took an acute interest in politics abroad, more especially in the war between Russia and Turkey and the partitioning of Poland. By this time Louis XV. had died (1774), and Turgot was in power, greatly to Voltaire's satisfaction. He hoped everything from the advent of this great minister, who worked hard to bring about the reforms in economics that Voltaire so keenly desired; and his fall in 1776 brought him near to despair. But he had conceived a desire to see his tragedy *Irène*, now completed, produced, and above all to revisit the city from which he had been absent for thirty years. Nothing could be more flattering than his reception. Admiring crowds pressed around him, and jealousy was silent before the great old man whose personality had so impressed itself on the nation. People threw themselves at his feet and kissed his garments, for he was greeted as the true vindicator of the cause of humanity against oppression, more even than as a great and famous writer. 'They will kill me with joy,' he said, and indeed this proved but too true. *Irène* was performed amidst tears of enthusiasm; the author's bust was crowned in the theatre, and it was difficult for him to pass through the surging masses of people. 'Long live Voltaire! Long live the *Henriade*, *Mahomet*, and *La Pucelle*!' they cried. The Academy, after all its coldness to him

[1] Condorcet, p. 245.
[2] *Corr.*, 1744, letter to M. M. Kahle.

in early days, lavished honours upon him. Franklin was in Paris, and Voltaire insisted on speaking to him in his own tongue and blessing his grandson in the simple words 'God and liberty.' And the great man was not idle. He was revising his *Essai sur les mœurs*, and he had a scheme for a new dictionary to be issued by the Academy, and he even himself undertook the first letter in it. But all this was too much for a man of 84. Sleep went from him, he took more opium than was good for him, and finally died on 30th May 1778. The Abbé Gaultier confessed him some time before his death, and it was declared by him that he died in the Catholic religion in which he was born. 'I am about to appear before God, the Creator of the universe,' he wrote. 'If you have anything to say to me, it will be my duty and privilege to receive you.'[1] When he was in the act of death, the curé of Saint-Sulpice tried to get him to give a more detailed statement of his beliefs, and, as he was frustrated in this, made difficulties about his burial. Finally, however, Voltaire was buried at the Monastery of Scellières in Champagne, where his nephew was abbé, in time to avoid the interdict of the bishop. There was also objection made to the usual service for one of the members of the Academy; the king of Prussia, however, held a service at Berlin in his memory and himself wrote his *éloge*. In 1791 the body was removed to the Panthéon, but later it was disturbed and taken away, like so many others.

Voltaire's personal appearance is perhaps better known than that of any literary man of his time. He was extremely thin, almost like a skeleton in old age, with bright piercing eyes and a 'mocking smile,' and he wore a wig. He had a great attraction for women and a certain devotion to them, but this was for the most part of a platonic kind, and in any case he did not, like so many of his contemporaries, allow himself to be carried off his feet by it. His life was never indecent, judged by the standards of his time, whatever his expressions may seem to us to be. His powers of work were prodigious, and, though not physically strong, he often worked for eighteen or twenty hours on end. He was interested in medicine and has the credit of recommending inoculation for smallpox when it was hardly thought of. His conclusion as to health matters is given in a letter to M. Bagieu, a well-known surgeon: 'I have come to the conclusion that every man must be his own doctor . . . above all he must know how to suffer, grow old, and die.'[2] Sometimes he is seen bargaining and quarrelling about sums of no importance, and then inordinately munificent on another occasion. From such contradictoriness of nature he may be painted black or white, as the sympathies or prejudices of the observer dictate. To many of his own and later generations he was the most sinister figure of his age, and his writings (excepting some of his historical works) the most harmful in the 18th century. Others regard him as the deliverer of the oppressed and the champion of liberty. He wrote with the utmost ease and lucidity. He was a prince among journalists, and his output was enormous, as the 80 volumes of his writings testify. What he wrote was written as from himself and not as the views of those who had written before, though he had a wonderful power of absorbing the work of others. Goethe, after enumerating all the gifts which great writers should have, denies him only two—depth and finish ('Tiefe und Vollendung').[3] He was no philosopher, but a child of the 'Illumination'; *i.e.*, he belonged to the school of those who saw facts so clearly that there seemed no possibility of error in them. It was the time of cataloguing and arranging, the heyday of encyclopædic knowledge. Yet all Voltaire's work was impressed with his own individuality. He seemed to have the power of seeing the truth that others were groping after, and, when he came upon a false belief, he ran atilt against it without hesitation. He could not be called a sceptic, for he had his own beliefs clearly defined and certain: his was no doubting spirit. 'My reason tells me that God exists; but it also tells me that I cannot know what He is.'[1] There were occasions on which he lied, but the lies were lies begotten of the circumstances of life which he was ready to justify. His vanity was apparent to all, but that again was the conscious vanity of the man who felt himself to be above his fellows. He was money-loving, but he loved money because it redeemed him from a position of subservience and gave him the power he required. He had another side which proved him ready to be generous and hospitable in the extreme, so that he cannot be truly called avaricious or miserly. He was by nature a politician, and, as entrance to the politics of his country was denied to him, he showed what could be done on a small scale in his own domains and passionately supported reforms, fiscal and political, in his country. He did not live to see that his teaching bore fruit in a manner none could foretell, though many must have anticipated it when they saw how vain the efforts after orderly reform had proved. Such men as Voltaire were never used, and never had a chance of being used, for the amelioration of the conditions of their country. Such as he, who had an intense love of humanity, and on whom the misery of the common people under their unjust taxation rested like a constant cloud, were set aside. His reception in Paris as a human benefactor might have enlightened the rulers of the time.

Voltaire loved the stage from his boyhood onwards, and among his works there are 50 or 60 *Théâtre* pieces of various merit. The interest in his tragedies is often said to be too purely intellectual; *i.e.*, love plays little part in them. This is characteristic of the writer on whom in manhood affection never seemed to take any passionate hold. His poetry is fluent, and the usual criticism is that its fluency is excessive. Hence the *Henriade*, great as is its theme (and the theme is one that specially appealed to Voltaire), is not the really great poem that he intended it to be. He wrote many comedies, but no one could say that real humour, such as we find in Sterne, was present in Voltaire's writings. Of wit he had an ever-ready store, and his subjects knew too well of his powers in caricature. But Voltaire had not the terrible bitterness of Swift. His romances and tales appeal to the largest section of readers, if we except his historical works. They are delightful to read to this day. *Candide* gives us an admirable specimen of his style. *Zadig* and others attack the orthodox view of Biblical events, though not the larger idea of Providence. The most numerous of his writings, however, if we except his *Correspondance*, are his historical works, of which the best known are *Charles XII.*, *Louis XIV.*, *Louis XV.*, and the *Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand*. The first is celebrated for the attractive way in which it is written, the ease of its style, and clearness of its narrative. With his *Essai sur les mœurs* he breaks with the old forms, so unsatisfying, as he explains, to an intelligent reader like Madame du Châtelet, and he gives us a sense of proportion which was absent from the writings of those who had made sacred

[1] *Corr.*, 21st Feb. 1778, letter to the Abbé Gaultier.
[2] *Ib.*, 10th April 1752.
[3] Note on Voltaire in Goethe's translation of *Le Neveu de Rameau* by Diderot.

[1] *Corr.*, October 1737, letter to Mlle. Quinault.

history their pivot. Of course he runs to the opposite extreme, as always, and makes his work too much a polemic against the old prejudiced beliefs. As in the *Catéchisme de l'honnête homme*, Church and Bible history is either parodied or misrepresented in the way that was so common long after Voltaire's day. The history of the Church was to him for the most part a history of imposture and fraud. Voltaire was not a great scholar in the historical sense, despite his vast stores of knowledge. His merit was to have a large and comprehensive view of the subject with which he dealt. This largeness of vision is indeed the quality which most impresses itself upon us when we think of this great man. The mark he left on European thought will never be effaced.

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VOLUNTARISM.—See WILL.

VOLUNTARYISM.—1. Introductory.—The historical illustrations of this article have been taken largely from Scottish Church history, for Scotland, in a special degree, has been the battle-ground of spiritual independence, and it is there that the theory of voluntaryism has been most fully developed and most clearly defined, but it is there also that it has never yet been realized.

Five different theories of the relation of Church and State may be distinguished and enumerated.

(1) *The Erastian.*—This is the view that the authority of the State is supreme in every department of the citizen's life, whether civil or spiritual. For the question of whether this view dates from and owes its origin to Erastus and whether Erastus himself was an Erastian see art. ERASTIANISM. The most notorious instance in British history of pure Erastianism, in the opinion of many, is the decisions of the Court of Session in Scotland and of the House of Lords in England that led to the Disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843.

In the second Auchterarder case Lord President Hope said: 'What makes the Church of Scotland but the Law? They are the Church of Scotland only so far as the Law has established this Church.'[1] In the Stewarton case the same judge said: 'The spiritual authority of an establishment cannot exist in law, except in so far as the Legislature has allowed or sanctioned that authority'—an opinion which was corroborated by Lord Wood: 'The Church, as an establishment, is the creation of statute.'[2]

'The decisions as to all of them (in the Auchterarder, Lethendy, Strathbogie, Culsalmond, and Stewarton cases) were uniformly founded on the one general law, laid down with cumulative deliberation and emphasis, that the Kirk derives "all its powers" and "its whole authority" from Parliament and the laws of the realm . . . and that the jurisdiction of the church Courts is derived from and defined by the State.'[3]

It is only just, however, to note that the subordinate standard of the Church, the *Westminster Confession of Faith*, speaks with two voices on the relation of the Church and State. In one passage it enunciates the principle that 'God alone is lord of the conscience, and hath left it free';[4] in another the principle of spiritual independence is not less clearly enunciated: 'the Lord Jesus, as king and head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate';[5] but in other passages this document is as frankly Erastian as, if not more so than, the decisions of these judges and the reasons by which they are supported.

'The civil magistrate . . . hath authority, and *it is his duty*, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered and observed. For the better effecting whereof *he hath power to call synods*, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.'[6]

(2) *Hildebrandism.*—According to this theory, the Church's authority is final not only in things spiritual but in things civil as well. This theory takes its name from Hildebrand, the family name of Pope Gregory VII., and finds its most memorable illustration in the excommunication of Henry IV. and his pilgrimage to Canossa. For three days he stood in the courtyard of the castle, in midwinter, clothed only in the hair shirt of a penitent, till he was absolved and restored by the pope. Excommunication, by the civil law of the empire, involved deposition; no excommunicated person could sit on the throne. Indirectly, therefore, if not directly, the enthroning and the dethroning of monarchs was part of the authority to which the Vatican laid claim.

The claim of the Free Church of Scotland in 1843 has been described as Vaticanism or Hildebrandism, but the assertion is groundless. The core of the claim of the Free Church of Scotland and of those secessions by which it was preceded was the right to regulate their spiritual concerns, confession, worship, discipline, without interference from the State—a claim that differs in two essentials from that of Rome.

(*a*) The finality of the authority of the State in temporal matters, including Church property, was not questioned. The decisions of the Legislature and Law Courts might be unjust and oppressive, involving hardship even to persecution, but the right of the State to pass these laws and to enforce them was not disputed or resisted.

(*b*) The Free Church, unlike the Church of Rome, claimed no authority over the conscience of the individual.

(3) *Co-ordinate jurisdiction.*—Establishment in England and Scotland has been described by many under this conception. The Church, it is argued, existed before the State and still exists independently of it. She framed her own creed and constitution and adopted them: she organized her own courts and defined their sphere and jurisdiction. The State, recognizing that these things were in accordance with the teaching of revealed religion, or accepting them as such on the authority of the Church, inscribed the Creed in its statutes,

[1] *Reports of the Court of Session*, Dunlop, iii. p. 197.
[2] *Special Report on the Stewarton Case* (Bell and others), pp. 53, 72.
[3] A. Taylor Innes, *Church and State*, p. 227.
[4] Ch. xx. [5] Ch. xxx. [6] Ch. xxiii.

ratified the Church's claim to jurisdiction in her own sphere, and voted support from the nation's exchequer. If moreover, it is argued, Church and State would restrict themselves respectively to their own sphere, they need never come into conflict.

Co-ordinate jurisdiction is the ideal outlined and advocated by Thomas Chalmers in his *Lectures on the Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Establishments* (1827) and later in his *Lectures on the Establishment and Extension of National Churches* (1838), but Chalmers had to confess that his ideal had not been realized. The cause of establishment had been vindicated in argument, in his opinion, but his grief was that the cause had suffered defeat at the hands of those who believed in it, but stultified their convictions by submitting to the jurisdiction of the State in the sphere of the Church.

(4) *Nominal establishment with real and effective endowment.*—This theory is that the function of the State is only to furnish monetary support, and it is not for the State to intervene or to judge whether the creed and constitution on which the Church had been established had been departed from or not, an ideal which seems to be the objective of the articles declarative of the constitution of the Church of Scotland and the proposals for union with the United Free Church, but, as these articles and the question they involve are still *sub judice*, they will not be further referred to in this article.

(5) *Voluntaryism.*—The voluntary takes high ground and argues from first principles. The Church is the Bride of Christ, and the phrase is more than a figure. There is so much of reality in it that, if the Church enter into a wedded relation with any earthly institution, the loyalty and obedience which she owes to her King and Head are thereby imperilled.

The Church's sphere is faith and conduct; but these are questions of conscience, and conscience must not be forced. Liberty of conscience is one of the first principles of religion. The only weapons of the Church are moral and spiritual. The weapon of the State is force. The entry of the State into the sphere of conscience is thereby *de facto* debarred.

Liberty of conscience implies universal religious toleration. Religious toleration connotes religious equality. Each of these principles, argues the voluntary, is traversed by Church establishment. Not only is loyalty to Christ imperilled by alliance with the State, but history has proved that such alliances are impossible without situations arising often in which the Church must choose between the will and command of the State and the will and command of Christ.

Conscience is forced by establishment, for State support directly or indirectly comes from all classes and creeds, and people are compelled to support what they may or may not get benefit from, and in many cases for the propagation of doctrines which they do not believe.

Toleration is traversed, for the principle of intolerance is the same whether it be expressed in the form of active persecution or in that of passive disability. Equality and justice are traversed wherever one Church or one creed is favoured, privileged, provided for more than others.

Voluntaryism is thus reached by the path of deduction. The voluntary takes his stand on great *a priori* principles of justice, liberty, equality, and, in particular, spiritual independence, of which he holds that voluntaryism is the logical and indisputable corollary. It is reached equally by the path of induction. It is supported by masses of evidence accumulated from the history of the Church in every age. The Church was never so vital, so convincing, so fruitful as in the first three centuries before her alliance with the State. The spiritual activities of the Church in modern times in every field of service (Home Mission, Foreign Mission, Church Extension, liberality)—not to speak of the inward graces of the spirit—have been confessedly greater and more fruitful in voluntary churches than in those allied with the State.

Not less convincing are the testimonies of those who, previously to the disestablishment of the Church of which they were members, not only believed in the principle but believed also that the existence of religion in their country was bound up with the alliance of Church and State, but after their experience of disestablishment moved rapidly to the opposite pole of opinion. Lyman Beecher wrote:

'It was as dark a day as ever I saw. The injury done to the cause of Christ, as we then supposed, was irreparable. For several days I suffered what no tongue can tell. And yet it was the best thing that ever happened to the State of Connecticut. It cut the Churches from State-support: it threw them wholly on their own resources, and on God.'[1]

Colonel Sanderson, formerly M.P. for North Armagh, whose every sympathy was strongly biased against disestablishment, politically as well as religiously, declared that he voted against the disestablishment of the Irish Church, but he would undo that vote if he could: 'He believed the Irish Church at the present moment was stronger and more spiritual than it ever was before.'[2]

2. Voluntaryism and Scripture.—The argument against State support is often rested upon Scripture, but the argument is not final. The passages most frequently quoted and relied upon are:

1 Co 9^{14}: 'Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel'; Jn 18^{36}: 'My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews'; 2 Co 10^{4}: 'For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but [spiritual or] mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds'; Gal 6^{6}: 'Let him that is taught in the word communicate unto him that teacheth in all good things.'

Now it must be premised that the weight of the Scripture argument depends upon the interpretation and application of the passage. So convinced a voluntary as the late Principal Cairns acknowledged this frankly in a lecture delivered in the Synod Hall in 1882.[3]

'The voluntary principle is, in one sense, held by all Christians. They all admit the duty and privilege of giving for religious purposes, according to 2 Cor. ix. 7, "Every man according as he purposeth in his heart, so let him give; not grudgingly, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver." All Christians agree likewise that this principle in some way or other embraces the support of Christian ministers and ordinances and put their own construction on such passages as 1 Cor. ix. 11. 13. 14. . . . Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. *The peculiarity of the Voluntary Principle (so called) lies in giving such texts an exclusive interpretation so as not to take anything beyond the free-will offerings of the Church.*'[4]

Confessedly, then, the weight of the Scripture argument rests upon the interpretation of these passages. Scripture authority would be final only if one interpretation were possible. But that is not maintained.

1 Co 9^{14}, the great proof text of voluntaryism, may be correctly rendered: 'even so did the Lord give instructions or directions that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel.' The instructions referred to, doubtless, were those given on the occasion of the mission of the twelve and the seventy, but most of these were local and temporary in their nature: some of them assumed the power of miracle; others inculcated a voluntary poverty and dependence on Providence ('no purse, no scrip') compatible only with a temporary and unique Providential dispensation, but abrogated afterwards by our Lord when He said: 'But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip: and he that hath no sword,

1 *Disestablishment in Connecticut*, quoted in J. Barr, *Scottish Church Question*, p. 139.
2 *Glasgow Herald*, 21st June 1902, quoted in Barr, p. 140.
3 *Synod Hall Lectures*, Edinburgh, 1882.
4 The italics are the present writer's.

let him sell his garment, and buy one' (Lk 22^{36}). Many of the apostle's instructions in his epistles were local and temporary, and the fact that he still considered this instruction valid for the Church in Corinth does not prove its validity for all time. To say that such an instruction debars the Church in every age from taking any help except from its own members is surely an irrelevance.

Jn 18^{36} and 2 Co 10^{4} enunciate the same principle that the Church as such will not resort to the weapons of force, but the inference that she will never in any circumstances accept help from a civil power as such is not a self-evident corollary from it. Gal 6^{6} is an exhortation to liberality on the part of the individual Christian. To say that the Church as such is thereby forbidden to accept a contribution from the State is a *non sequitur*.

Isolated passages from the OT or the NT for or against disestablishment and disendowment are so differently interpreted and applied by different writers, and these interpretations are so coloured and biased by the writer's position, that definite conclusions cannot be rested upon them.

3. Voluntaryism in history.—The first quarter of the 4th cent. was signalized by three remarkable edicts: (1) an edict of Galerius signed also by Licinius and Constantine, a *venia indulgentia*, by which the last great persecution was brought to an end; (2) the edict of Milan (A.D. 313), a declaration of universal religious toleration; (3) proclamation by Constantine 'to the Peoples of the East' (A.D. 323), in which toleration is based on the principle of justice.

The logical issue of the edicts of Constantine was voluntaryism, but the practical issue of his action and influence was State-Churchism. His personal benefactions were very large, and the gifts of an imperial autocrat can hardly be distinguished from those of the State. The whole weight and wealth of the Byzantine Empire under Constantine and his sons in the middle of the 4th cent. were put in the scales on the side of Christianity, and it was established and endowed as the religion and the worship of the empire.

Space limits us to two or three great names in the voluntary succession.

(1) *Dante Alighieri.*—

> 'Ah, Constantine! to how much ill gave birth,
> Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower,
> Which the first wealthy Father gain'd from thee.'[1]

(2) *John Milton.*—

'It concerns every man's conscience to what religion he contributes. The civil magistrate is entrusted with civil rights only, not with conscience. . . . That which each man gives to the minister, he gives either as to God or as to his own teacher. If as to God, no civil power can justly consecrate to religious uses any part either of civil revenue which is the people's and must save them from other taxes, or of any man's property, but God by special command as He did by Moses, or the owner himself by voluntary intention and the persuasion of his giving it to God. If he gives it as to his teacher, what justice or equity compels him to pay for that which religion leaves freely to his choice whether he will learn or no, whether of this teacher or another and especially to pay for what he never learned or approves not, whereby, besides the wound of his conscience, he becomes less able to recompense his true teacher . . . most of all are they to be reviled and shamed who cry out with the distinct voice of notorious hirelings that if ye settle not our maintenance by law, farewell the Gospel, than which nothing can be uttered more false nor ignominious, and I may say more blasphemous against our Saviour who hath promised without this condition both the Holy Spirit and His presence with the Church to the world's end.'[2]

No clearer or weightier exposition of the principle of voluntaryism and the sense of justice to which it appeals has anywhere been given.

(3) *John Locke.*—Locke's *First Letter on Toleration* is a powerful exposition of the motto from which it begins: 'Absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty is the thing that we stand in need of'—an exposition that would have been weightier still, had it been carried to its logical issue from the magistrate to the Government by which the magistrate is appointed.

(4) *A. R. Vinet.*—

'How will it be possible to persuade the state that it has no right to superintend services for which it pays . . . whoever pays is master: whoever accepts payment, accepts servitude.'[1]

(5) *Henry Alford.*—Coming, as it does, from one of the most scholarly and most spiritually-minded men in the Church of England, the thoroughgoing voluntaryism of Alford is remarkable.

'The next term is, the severance of the Church from the State. Whether years, or decades of years be taken for the accomplishment of this:—however it may be deprecated, and however opposed;—accomplished it will certainly be . . . God's arm is thrusting it on, and man's power cannot keep it back.'[2]

Voluntaryism as a principle was not professed by the founders of the Secession and Relief Churches in Scotland or by the Free Church of Scotland at the Disruption. In Scottish Church history it is a practical corollary rather than an *a priori* principle. The claim of spiritual independence, and the growing certainty that it could not be realized in a State Establishment; the conviction that State support for one branch of the Church was unjust and forced the conscience of those who did not belong to it or believe in it; the conviction, also, on the part of many that State alliance and support were contrary to the teaching of Scripture, led the former United Presbyterian Church almost unanimously, and a large majority of the former Free Church of Scotland, to adopt voluntaryism as the polity of the Church. The leaders in that movement were the Principals of four colleges—John Cairns, Robert Rainy, Thomas M. Lindsay, and George C. Hutton of Paisley.

The Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1869, the Welsh Church in 1909, the bill becoming operative in 1911, the Church in France in 1905. No Church is established in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa; there is none in the United States. The only English-speaking nations in which establishment still exists are England and Scotland.

4. Questions.—(1) Is voluntaryism compatible with the conservation of endowment? James Barr, in his recently published *Scottish Church Question*, the most effective and comprehensive contribution to the subject yet produced, holds that it is not.

'What we on our part insist on is that none of the endowment shall go to ecclesiastical uses.'[3] 'It is a needless precaution so far as the main bodies of non-Presbyterian Protestant Dissenters in Scotland are concerned, for to their honour, they would not accept State endowments.'[4]

Some, however, have claimed for themselves the designation of 'pure voluntaries' who deprecated the alienation of the endowments. Speaking in the Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland in 1882, W. Robertson Smith said:

'I will stand here as a Free Churchman, but perfectly free to say as I do now, that while I am a loyal Free Churchman, recognizing the value of the act of 1843, I also stand here as a voluntary—a pure voluntary';

but Robertson Smith made it clear that he did not take exception to accepting relief from the State.

Objection to endowment rests on three grounds: (*a*) it is anti-Scriptural—to which it is replied that that is a matter of interpretation and of circumstances; (*b*) it is contrary to sound political economy that a State should give monetary help without determining and enforcing the conditions on which it is administered—to which it is replied that, if the State is satisfied with the wisdom and conscience of those to whom the money is given in trust, its duty to itself and to its citizens has been fulfilled; (*c*) it is incompatible with the principle of spiritual independence; it is not possible that a Church should be State-endowed and spiritually free. A distinction, however, may be drawn, and

[1] *Inferno*, tr. H. F. Cary, xix. 118.
[2] *Considerations*, etc., 1659.

[1] *An Essay on the Profession of Personal Religious Conviction, and upon the Separation of Church and State*, tr. C. T. Jones, p. 382 f.
[2] *Essays and Addresses by Henry Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury*, p. 166.
[3] P. 58. [4] P. 159.

has been drawn, between an endowment and a donation.

'It is perhaps conceivable that the State should make *a donation* to the Church without imposing conditions, but that it should make permanent provision for the ministers of religion and impose no conditions is not for a moment to be thought of.'[1]

Furthermore, when it is remembered that many believe that morally as well as legally the endowments are the property of the Church, that the State has never really owned them, but only administered them, that the alienation and secularization of these endowments would be morally unjust and religiously harmful; when further it is remembered that centuries of undisturbed possession establish a prescriptive right in law as well as in equity, it seems clear that one may claim to be a voluntary and yet hold also that the endowments of the Church should not be secularized.

(2) Voluntaryism appeals so often to conscience that one is constrained to ask, Is it possible to be a State-Churchman and yet to be sincerely conscientious? Does voluntaryism claim a monopoly of conscience? Was Ebenezer Erskine not true to his conscience when in 1735 he wrote:

'Whenever it shall appear that the established Judicatories are heartily adopting the cause of Christ, purging and planting His house according to His will and the solemn covenant lying upon the land and giving justice to His oppressed members throughout Scotland, I hope not only to return to communion but to enter the gates of our Zion with praise'?[2]

Thomas Chalmers was loyal to his convictions and conscience when, in his opening address to the first Free Church Assembly, he declared, 'We are not voluntaries,' and when in 1827 and 1838 he bent the weight of his massive intellect and pure heart to the vindication of Church establishment as being right and expedient. The voluntary is conscientious according to his light; so also is the State-Churchman. To say otherwise would be a 'railing accusation' on one side or the other.

But, if both are equally convinced and equally conscientious, it follows that the conscience of a sincere State-Churchman is forced and wronged by disestablishment in the same measure as the conscience of a sincere voluntary is forced and offended by an existing establishment. The argument leads to a moral dilemma. Neither side could press its conviction if the conscience of another were thereby offended.

Solvitur ambulando. The question is one for men as citizens of the State more than as members of the Church; some convinced voluntaries have held that it should not be touched by the Church *qua* Church. In a democratic Government like our own the will of the State is the will of the majority of its people. If that majority believe that the best and wisest way in which national religion can be expressed is by a national Church, their right to establish such a Church cannot be impugned. If, on the other hand, the majority believe that a national Church is a public inequity and a wrong to religion, their right to disestablish and to disendow cannot be questioned.

The voluntary ideal is a Free Church in a Free State. The trend of public opinion everywhere is towards it; its realization is inevitable. The principle has been recognized and embodied in Queen Victoria's Proclamation to the native religions when she assumed empire in India.

'Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observance but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law: and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.'

The justice of that Proclamation to many minds is self-evident; but what is just in India is just all the world over, and the day will come when justice shall be done.

By what path will it come? It may come by way of the State or by way of the Church. State-compelled voluntaryism sounds like a contradiction in terms. Voluntaryism for the individual is real only when it is spontaneous. Compulsory voluntaryism may force the conscience of the State-Churchman as really as State-Churchism forces the conscience of the voluntary. Let voluntaryism get its majority and power, and, on the ground of abstract justice, it is entirely justified in enforcing its convictions on the nation. The true voluntary will, however, hesitate to do it. He will rather suffer wrong than inflict it on the conscience of another.

Voluntaryism may come by way of the Church. Conviction in favour of it is growing rapidly not only in Free Churches but in those allied with States. The proposed union of the two great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland and the tentative approaches towards union on the part of the Church of England and Nonconformists are full of hope and promise. The voluntary conviction in each of these unions would leaven the whole lump, and voluntaryism would come by a great free-will surrender and sacrifice in which these Churches would denude themselves of every State-conferred privilege, prerogative, preferment, and prestige and take their place on the platform of toleration and equality with all the Churches of the land.

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VONDEL.—1. Early life and writings.—Joost van den Vondel (1587–1679), the greatest of Dutch poets and one of the greatest religious poets of the Counter-Reformation, belonged by descent to the South Netherlands, his parents being natives of Antwerp, pious 'Doopsgezinde,' or Baptists, who were driven by religious persecution to settle at Cologne, where the poet was born in 1587. The lovely opening stanzas of his *Olyftack aen Gustaef Adolf*, written when that town was threatened by the Swedish army, recall his earliest experiences. While he was still a child, his parents migrated, first to Utrecht and later to Amsterdam, where his father soon acquired a considerable business in the hosiery trade. Vondel's younger brother was thus enabled to obtain a good classical and legal education, but the poet entered his father's business and was a self-educated man. As an exile from the south, he became early a member

[1] Andrew Henderson, *Synod Hall Lectures*, Edinburgh, 1883, p. 63.

[2] A. R. MacEwen, *The Erskines*, p. 85 f.

of the Chamber of Rhetoric, 't Wit Lavendel (White Lavender), to which most of the Brabanters in Amsterdam belonged; and his earliest plays and poems are written in the style of the *Rederijkers* and of the Bible plays which, under the influence of the Renaissance and the Reformation, had taken the place of the mediæval moralities. The poems show also, like some of Milton's first verses, traces of an admiring study of the French Protestant poet Du Bartas. His wife took over the management of the hosiery business, and Vondel set himself to the task of repairing the defects of his literary education. He took up the study of Latin, French, Italian, and ultimately Greek. Seneca and later Sophocles became his models in tragedy. Besides metrical versions of Sophocles' *Electra* and *Œdipus Rex*, he made complete translations, at one time or another, in prose or verse of Virgil's *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Æneid*, of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and of Horace's *Odes* and *Epodes*. But classical influence in Vondel never repressed the spontaneously lyrical inspiration of his poetry or modified the passionately Christian temper of his mind. From first to last the poetry of Vondel has two great sources of inspiration—God and his native country; and, whatever form his poetry may take, its master-quality is always lyrical—ardour and sweetness, fertility and subtlety of thought, a music of verse which is at every turn the full and resonant counterpart of the changing moods of his exalted mind. He wrote few or no love poems. Only once or twice in his long life does the current of his private feelings of joy and sorrow rise to the surface in a lyric of joy or sorrow. His personal interests were merged in his passion for great causes, patriotic and religious.

The first conflict which evoked the full strength of Vondel's religious feeling and poetic genius was the critical struggle between the Remonstrant Arminians, supported by the magistrates and cultured circles, and the Calvinist Contra-Remonstrants with the common people behind them, which ended with the Synod of Dort and the execution of Oldenbarneveldt. Vondel's soul was moved to its depths, and about 1618 he attacked Prince Maurice and the preachers under the thin veil of a classical tragedy on the subject of Palamedes. He had to go into hiding and was fined for his boldness. Vondel found a more effective outlet for his feelings in a series of satires, begun about this time and continued at intervals throughout his life. The best of these, the fiery *Geuse Vesper of Sieckentroost*,

> 'Had hij Hollandt dan gedragen
> Onder zijn harte,'

and the *Rommelpot van Hanekot*, where the mutual amenities of the Calvinist clergy are portrayed under the figure of a roost full of gobbling, scratching, fighting cocks, are popular songs handled by a poet of genius. The *Decretum Horribile* is an impassioned denunciation in Alexandrines of the doctrine which consigned infants to eternal perdition. *Roskam* and *Harpoen*, in the same verse, are more quiet and argumentative expostulations against endless theological hatred and strife. The *Uitvaert van Apollo* and *Speelstrijdt van Apollo en Pan*, written when his *Lucifer* was driven from the stage, read like folk-songs into which a great poet has blown a music as winged and sweet as the *Hymn of Pan* by Shelley. None of Vondel's poems have preserved their popularity so entirely as the satires.

It would be out of place to give here any full account of the secular poems which flowed from Vondel's pen hereafter till the end of his long life. A large number of them are political and occasional pieces, descriptive and lyrical in character, written to celebrate the sea-power of Holland, the birth of a prince to the House of Orange, the victories of Frederick Henry by land or of van Tromp and de Ruijter by sea, the building of a new Stadthuis at Amsterdam, the visits of royal persons, the marriages and deaths of his friends. He was the laureate of Amsterdam when that city was the heart of the Netherlands, and the Netherlands almost the heart of Europe, responsive to every movement from Sweden to Spain, from England and France to Turkey, and looking out over the seas to the East and West Indies. Here we must confine ourselves to the history of his religious development and some of the chief poems in which his devout and ardent feeling found expression, dramatic, didactic, and lyrical.

2. Attractions of Roman Catholicism.—The steps which led Vondel into the Church of Rome have nowhere been clearly indicated by himself, but they are not difficult to trace. As a 'Doopsgezind' he had been brought up to reject the doctrine of predestination as formulated by the Calvinists.[1] That movement had its ultimate source in the desire to find in the Reformation not so much a new creed as a new life, a closer personal and spiritual communion with God; and for Vondel himself it is clear that Christianity was primarily a movement of the heart, a passionate love of God, a faith in God's love to man as revealed in Christ. To him Calvin's doctrine seemed an outrage on that faith and love. The bitter fanaticism of the Contra-Remonstrant preachers appeared equally hostile to the spirit of Christian love. Moreover, as a poet and lover of the culture of the Renaissance, he ranged himself with the poets, dramatists, and men of learning, like Grotius, the object of his warmest admiration, who found their chief friends and patrons in the magistrates and middle class who were also the supporters of the Arminian movement. In short his religious and artistic sympathies alike drew him to the side of the Remonstrants. But he had no sympathy with the somewhat Epicurean and sceptical spirit of some of the humanists, as Hooft, who took the same side. Religion was for him the first of interests. Further, within his own Baptist communion were differences that disturbed him and doctrines enunciated to which he could not subscribe. In the *Antidotum tegen het Vergift der Geestdrijvers* (1626) he ranges himself against the supporters of the doctrine that the private spirit is a source of inspiration and instruction equal or superior to the written Word. He does not go further in this poem. He does not ask whether the interpretation of Scripture may be left to the individual enlightened by the Spirit. But events showed that this was the question on which his mind was busy, that he was in search of an authority able to allay such storms of conflicting dogma as had swept over the Netherlands and brought to the scaffold one of the saviours of his country. The trend of Vondel's mind was diametrically opposed to that of Milton, who was a republican in politics, and became always more hostile to the recognition of any organized Church, any authoritative interpreter of Scripture, any mediator between the Scriptures and the individual conscience and reason.[2] An uncompromising adherent of authority in the State, Vondel could not rest till he found a centre of authority in religion.

It was not till the autumn of 1641 that he took the final step, but in the interval he was busy with Church history and legend. In the *Olyftack aen Gustaef Adolf* (1632), an appeal for the safety of Cologne, he recalls, like Milton, how

[1] See art. ANABAPTISM, II. 1 (2).
[2] See art. MILTON, vol. viii. p. 844ᵃ.

'The great Emathian conqueror bid spare
The house of Pindarus,'

but elaborates more fully the legend that Alexander the Great spared Jerusalem at the intercession of the high-priest. Like Milton also, Vondel was planning in these years a heroic poem, and the subject he selected was the conversion and victories of Constantine. He had reached the battle of Aquileia when his wife died, and the poem was never completed nor any part of it published. He turned to tragedy, and prepared for the new Amsterdam theatre a classical tragedy on the legendary history of Amsterdam, *Gijsbrecht van Aemstel*, supplying the details of his plot from the description of the destruction of Troy in the second and third books of the *Æneid*. The best things in the play are the beautiful choruses on married love and on the Massacre of the Innocents; but the sympathetic treatment of Roman Catholic rites and beliefs throughout the play warned his countrymen of the coming change which was consummated in the autumn of 1641. With the *Gijsbrecht*, too, Vondel began a long series of dramas on Biblical subjects or saints' legends, but including two patriotic plays — *De Batavische Gebroeders* and the beautiful pastoral *De Leeuwendaalers*. Vondel did what Milton in the same years would probably have done had he not turned from poetry to political and religious controversy. But Vondel had ready to his hand, what Milton would not have found in England,—a theatre to perform his religious plays.

The relations of the Protestant Reformation and the drama were complex, and differed in different countries.[1] In general Protestantism was antagonistic to the stage generally, on much the same grounds as the early Church, and especially to the realistic presentation of the great mysteries of the Christian faith in the miracle- and mystery-plays. But, on the other hand, the moralities lent themselves to polemical ends, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic; and the educational interest of the time found a useful instrument in dramas composed in Latin — *e.g.*, the *Jephthes* and *Baptistes* of Buchanan and the flourishing drama, Terentian and Senecan, on Scriptural subjects, of Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries. From both of these sources were descended the naive Biblical plays of the Chambers of Rhetoric, the kind of play with which Vondel had begun. But the Eglantine, the most famous of the Amsterdam Chambers, and its successor the Academy, founded by Coster, a minor dramatist, preferred secular plays, native farces, romantic plays of the English type, but without their poetry, and classical plays. The new Theatre which finally took the place of Coster's Academy was opened with Vondel's *Gijsbrecht*, and it was here that all his subsequent plays were presented with elaborate and gorgeous staging and scenery. These plays differ from his earliest experiments simply in their more classical form, as that was understood, their closer resemblance to the Latin plays of Grotius.

3. Vondel and Milton.—Vondel's genius was not dramatic, and his ardent piety still further limited his dramatic treatment of its themes. He was incapable of letting his artistic genius so far get the upper hand of his didactic purpose as to create a great figure like Milton's Satan. His favourite hero is the pious and submissive saint whose first virtue is unquestioning obedience to the will of God as revealed by God's priest. The result is sometimes even painful, as in *De Gebroeders*, a play on the subject of the expiatory murder of Saul's sons, in which David's piety is shown by his becoming accessory to a crime at the bidding of a pious and politic high-priest. Vondel's temper is more attractively expressed in plays whose hero is some young saint of pure and ardent piety, like Joseph in the two plays with which he followed up his translation of Grotius's drama on the subject of Joseph's temptation, *Joseph in Dothan* and *Joseph in Egypten*, or again in the beautiful character of Jephtha's daughter in *Jephtha*. The most famous of all his plays, the *Lucifer*, will not bear comparison dramatically with the great opening books of *Paradise Lost*. Vondel gives as the motive for the rebellion of Lucifer the announcement that Christ will take on Him the nature of man and thereby raise humanity to a higher level than the angels, following the tradition that the Incarnation was independent of the Fall. With his eye upon the Rebellion in England, to which he was passionately hostile, he presented the revolt more in the form of a mutiny among the angels, in which Lucifer allows himself to be pushed to the front, concealing his deeper ambitions under a veil of zeal for the rights and privileges of his order—a Cromwell, in short, as royalist sentiment interpreted Cromwell's policy and career. For Milton also disobedience to the absolute and unconditioning will of God is Satan's crime, but there was in Milton the temper that rebels, and he was on Cromwell's side, and the apologist of regicide. His feelings and imagination got the better of his theology and gave us the great dramatic and human figure of Satan as he is presented to us in the opening books. Vondel's strength did not show itself in dramatic creation, nor, any more than Milton's, in philosophical or mystical interpretation of the inexplicable episode; but in descriptive and lyrical poetry—the opening picture of Eden, the final conflict of angels in the air, a great naval battle as between angelic van Tromps and diabolic Blakes, and the choral odes—*e.g.*, that on God which closes the first act:

'Wie is het die zoo hoogh gezeten,
Zoo diep in 't grondelooze licht.'

All Vondel's plays show the same weakness in the portrayal of heroic and dramatic characters, the same descriptive and lyrical qualities. Such a pious and complete acceptance of the Christian view of life as Vondel's leaves little room for tragedy such as that of the Greeks or Shakespeare; for it eliminates those conceptions of fate and chance and the enigma of human life of which such tragedy is an expression.

4. Teaching of the plays.—The teaching of the plays is in general simply Christian and Biblical; only latently is it specifically Roman Catholic, as in *Jephtha*, where Vondel makes Jephtha's sin his stubborn reliance on his own conscience rather than on the authority of the priest whom he consults. Vondel's more purely Roman Catholic sentiments found expression in lyrico-didactic poems such as the *Brieven der Heilige Maeghden* (1642), saints' letters modelled on the *Heroides* of Ovid; the *Altaer-geheimenissen* (1645), an impassioned didactic on the sacrament of the Mass, the Scriptural and ecclesiastical authority for the Roman Catholic view of the mystery, the worship of the Host, and the rites with which that worship is invested: *De Heerlijckheit der Kercke* (1663) on the glory of the Church; and the *Bespiegeling van Godt en Godtsdienst* (1662) on the attributes of God.

More interesting than these to the reader of to-day, especially the non-Catholic reader, are those poems in which Vondel pours forth, with no didactic purpose, his personal feelings in strains which reveal what a fullness of happiness the devotional richness of the Roman Catholic Church brought to him as to the English poet Crashaw. *De Koningklycke Harp*, a brimming river of song

[1] See art. DRAMA (Introductory), § 5.

in praise of David's Psalms, the *Opdraeght aen De Heilighe Maeght*, prefixed to the *Brieven* mentioned above, a white flame of adoration, are good examples; but perhaps most touching of all are the shorter, simpler lyrics evoked by the death of his wife, his little son 'Constantijntje 't zalig kijntje,' his daughter, and his granddaughter. The *Uitvaert van myn Dochterken*, written in 1633, is an unrelieved cry of sorrow, simple but perfect in form. The corresponding *Uitvaert van Maria van den Vondel* (1668) is a hymn of resignation to God's will that hardly breathes regret.

'When this our earthly life hath ended
Begins an endless life above,
A life of God and angels tended,
His gift to those that earn His love.

. . . . . .

What from that Unity is severed
Must here in weary exile roam,
On earth no resting-place discover,
In Heaven her fatherland and home.

. . . . . .

Her dying breath went out to God
Whither all hearts must turn at last,
The goal, the rest, the perfect portion;
And in that prayer all sorrow passed.'

The resignation which such poems breathe was displayed by Vondel in the heroic close of his life when the aged poet sacrificed his whole fortune to redeem the debts of a worthless son and spent ten years of his life in the service of his native city as an official in the public pawnshop—a very Dutch pound for Pegasus. He died in 1679 at the age of ninety-two.

5. **Place as a religious poet.**—The personal note of the last poems cited is even historically the most important; for the significance of such poets as Crashaw and Vondel, emphasized by the supreme place which the latter holds among the poets of a country which had been in the vanguard of the Reformation, is that it reveals the importance of the Counter-Reformation, where it was that the Protestant movement had miscarried, had ended, not as its leaders anticipated, in a victory of Christ's Church over Antichrist, but in a definite rending of the seamless garment, a division leaving truth and untruth, good and evil, on either side. In its eager quest of a purer and more Scriptural creed and simpler worship, its impatient desire to root out the tares of 'human' traditions and ceremonies, Protestantism had outrun the human heart, had ignored the depth and power of the instincts of which those beliefs and rites were the expression. The idea of a united Christian Church speaking with authority; the significance of the sacraments, above all of the Eucharist—the 'This is my body,' 'This is my blood'; the devotion to the person of Christ and its overflow in the cult of the Virgin and saints—there were in Protestant countries and churches of all denominations hearts to which these things had only to be presented to make immediate and irresistible appeal. Some of the most interesting movements in Protestantism since the 17th cent. have represented the effort of individuals to recover these sources of devotion without sacrificing Protestant loyalty to Scriptural and historical truth; and there have been corresponding movements in the Roman Catholic Church to secure a higher level of Scriptural and historical truth without any sacrifice of traditional devotion. Vondel is not a poet of the calibre of Dante or Milton; there is nothing striking and original in the content of his thought; but a poetry so resonant and harmonious, uttering with perfect sincerity the passionate ardours and exultations of a great Christian soul—a Roman Catholic poet in a Protestant country—can never be without significance for the student of religious thought and feeling in Western Europe since the Reformation.

For the student of the drama too there is an interest, corresponding to that of the religious drama of Calderon, in this last survival in a Protestant country of the drama of the Middle Ages.

'The Spanish drama,' says a recent writer, 'like the Greek but unlike the English, had not cut itself adrift from its religious origins, and so remained a far more truly national institution than the English drama ever became after the Reformation.'[1]

Vondel's drama is throughout religious and patriotic. If it is not completely national, it is because the religious spirit which it expresses is not that of the great body of the Dutch people and because it does not do full justice, as Shakespeare's did, to the secular interests of the nation as these had taken shape and colour under the quickening influence of the Renaissance.

LITERATURE.—The most complete bibliography, up to date, is J. H. W. Unger, *Catalogue of Writings, etc., by J. van den Vondel*, Amsterdam, 1907, *Bibliographie van Vondels Werken*, do. 1888. See also G. Kalff, *Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letterkunde*, Groningen, 1906–12, iv. 333–336. The best ed. of Vondel's works is that of J. van Lennep, in 25 vols., Leyden, 1888–94; Geeraardt Brandt, *Leven van Vondel*, Amsterdam, 1682, ed. Eelco Verwijs, 1866, is the classical biography. A complete list of Vondel's dramas, not including translations, in order of production is: *Het Pascha* (1612), *Palamedes* (1625), *Hierusalem verwoest* (1629), *Gijsbrecht van Aemstel* (1637), *Maeghden* (1639), *De Gebroeders* (1639), *Joseph in Dothan* (1640), *Joseph in Egypten* (1640), *Pieter en Pauwels* (1641), *Maria Stuart* (1646), *De Leeuwendaalers* (1647), *Lucifer* (1654), *Salmoneus* (1657), *Jephtha* (1659), *Koning David in ballingschap* (1660), *Koning David Herstelt* (1660), *Samson* (1660), *Adonias* (1661), *De Batavische Gebroeders* (1663), *Faëton* (1663), *Adam in ballingschap* (1664), *Zunchin* (1667), *Noah* (1667). *Joannes de Boetgezant* (1662) is a short didactic epic suggested in part by G. B. Marino's *La Strage degli Innocenti*. For the religious drama of the Reformation see art. DRAMA (Introductory), § 5; C. H. Herford, *Literary Relations of England and Germany in the 16th Century*, Cambridge, 1886; and W. Creizenach, *Gesch. des neueren Dramas*, Halle, 1893–1909, vol. ii. bk. i. and elsewhere. Note also G. Edmunson, *Milton and Vondel*, London, 1885; H. J. C. Grierson, *The First Half of the Seventeenth Century* (in 'Periods of European Literature' ser.), Edinburgh, 1906, p. 193; and Kalff, *op. cit.*; *Vondel's Lucifer*, tr. L. C. Van Noppen, New York, 1898.

H. J. C. GRIERSON.

VOODOO.—Voodoo is devil-worship and fetishism brought from the Gold Coast of Africa by negro captives to the United States and West Indies. Its chief sacrifice is a girl child, referred to by the initiates as 'the goat without horns.' When a child is not available, a white kid takes its place. Excepting at the great semi-annual festival when the 'goat' is drugged, killed, and eaten, black dogs, cocks, and hens are cruelly sacrificed by being slashed so that their bowels fall out. There is a regular priesthood to intimidate and rob the devotees. These sometimes have the name *papaloi* and *mamaloi*, more frequently *pappy* and *mammy*, used as a prefix to their given names. The head of the circle or association of priests and priestesses has the title of 'king'; *e.g.*, King Alexander was long the head of the cult in the south-western states. The entrance into the priesthood is won by many and difficult tests. The aspirant (man or woman) must endure hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold; must go sleepless, unless commanded to have the dream-tormented sleep induced by drugs; must eat offal and drink the ooze of garbage. While enduring this, he must keep a calm mind and strong will, and memorize the power of various poisons, from rattlesnake venom, stramonium, and water-hemlock to putrid liver and earth from under carrion. Also he must acquaint himself with the properties of healing herbs, such as red clover for cancer, dock for liver trouble, boneset for fever, etc. He must learn to make luck-balls, tricken-bags, hands-of-love, fingers-of-death, and other fetishes, and lay up in his memory the incantations which he must mumble as he works and the number of times he must repeat them, for numbers are very important

[1] John Eglinton, *Anglo-Irish Essays*, 1917, p. 59.

in his magic.[1] He must, above all else, concentrate his will, so that, by the time he is considered a finished product of his school, he is a hypnotist of power. When he has satisfied his teachers as to his acquirements, he is set to lead a season's dances, these being fire-, snake-, and moon-dances. The fire-dance is the most important, and is called 'the dance of the Old Master' (meaning the devil). It is given at mid-summer and mid-winter in a lonely field or ravine, around a great fire of wood and tar. At a little distance is a sort of altar at which the 'goat without horns' is sacrificed. It has already been stupefied with some sort of narcotic. Each dancer gets a quivering fragment, and then hops and whirls and howls more frantically than ever. It is only justice to say that the priests swear that no child has been killed for a dance for fifty years. The moon-dances are the same unregulated caperings, indulged in when the moon is full. The performers start in a circle, clasping hands. At a signal from the leader, all start running round a big stone which is set in their midst, and, soon breaking away from one another, begin to caper and howl and yelp compliments to the moon, such as 'Pretty moon! Old Master's moon! Ho-ho! I love you, pretty moon.' The snake-dances are given by the owners of snakes at any time. The reptiles are brought out in their baskets and set down uncovered in the midst of a dancing circle. They are expected to be torpid, but occasionally one tries to escape and, being trodden on, bites a naked foot, but no serious consequences follow if the dancer is not too maddened to apply an embrocation of snakeweed (*liatris scariosa*), which is kept in readiness.

It is not really necessary for a voodoo to have great knowledge of poisons, for such is the power of suggestion on the ignorant and superstitious that, if a negro imagines that he has been 'hoodooed,' 'witched,' or 'cunjered,' he pines away and dies, unless some one can be found whom he considers a voodoo of greater powers, to minister to his mind diseased and root out death-compelling terrors by the tricks and baubles of his nefarious profession. Few white people realize the menace of voodoo due to its absolute power over a certain class of minds. MARY A. OWEN.

VOTIVE OFFERINGS (Greek).—**1. Definition and terms.**—The votive offering may be defined as a permanent memorial dedicated of free will to a supernatural being. It thus differs from the sacrifice (*q.v.*), which is not permanent, and from the tax, which is not given of free will. Tithes and firstfruits are properly not included, since they are neither; yet they must be considered, since a votive offering may be given in consequence of them.

The custom may safely be assumed for the whole history of worship on Greek soil. In the most ancient sanctuaries, such as those of Crete, Argos, Olympia, Sparta, Ephesus, these offerings are found in every stratum down to the earliest. At least small vessels that once held some kind of perishable offering are found in large numbers everywhere, and these also in the beehive tombs extend the practice to ancestor-worship. Such vessels, however, may be there by accident, simply because the sacrifice could not be presented without them; and the argument must be based on more significant things—human-like figures or animals which meet us in the sanctuaries just named. These are of course not the only offerings that may be assumed for the early age; other kinds that are found later may well have been found there, but, when the material was less lasting or more precious than clay, they had less chance of escaping destruction or theft. The custom seems, however, to have been extended and systematized in the time between Homer and Hesiod. In Homer the formula varies: we have no special word for act or thing (*ἄγαλμα, ἀνάψαι, κρεμάσαι,* and *θεῖναι, δῶρα* and *διδόναι* being used of other things as well); but in Hesiod we first meet with the technical *ἀναθεῖναι,* and inscriptions of about the same age have *ἔθηκεν, ἀνέθηκεν, ἔστησεν,* and *ἵσατο.* Shortly after this the terms used for the votive offering become generally fixed: *ἀνατίθημι* and, as its passive, *ἀνάκειμαι,* with the noun *ἀνάθημα* (*ἀνάθεμα, ἄνθεμα, ἄFτημα*), being used to distinguish such things from gifts to human beings (*δῶρον, διδόναι*). These terms remained until in the 4th cent. and later they lose their force. These changes probably correspond to psychological changes,[1] the offering being considered at first as a gift to the god, then as a gift from the giver, and finally the religious feeling being swallowed up in self-glorification. The shifting centre of gravity changes the character of the gift, and at last robs it of its value.

2. Occasion.—The offerings might be given on any occasion, customary or special, public and private; but, whether state or person was the giver, the principle remained the same. Our classification therefore is only made for convenience.

(*a*) *Customary.* — There are many records of customary offerings at the recurrent feasts. Such are the dedication of a *πέπλος* to Athene every four years at the Great Panathenæa, and a *πέπλος* to Hera at Olympia every four years, and a *χιτών* to Apollo at Amyclæ;[2] Alcman's *Partheneion* seems to describe a similar gift to Artemis Orthia at Sparta.[3] We know that many other ancient images were clothed,[4] and it is not unreasonable to suppose that these customs did not stand alone. The periodical washing and dressing of images is common in the East, and its ancient character is obvious. Hecuba indeed gives a fine robe to Athene,[5] but the records of the public and customary dedications do not go beyond the 6th century. A *θεωρία* sent to an oracle carried with it votive offerings as well as sacrifice. Hyperides describes how one of them dressed and decorated the statue of Dione at Dodona,[6] and an oracle from the same place demanded sacrifice with the gift of a bronze table for the gift that the Athenian people had sent.[7] Other records show a silver *φιάλη* as the customary gift of a *θεωρία*; we find them year after year at Branchidæ, where fourteen cities dedicate in one year,[8] and at Delos.[9] So the Athenian colonies sometimes sent gifts to the great feasts of Athens.[10] It is reasonable to assume that the practice was customary at public feasts.

The private worshipper who took part in a festival was certainly expected to offer something. There are occasional allusions to this;[11] but it may be safely inferred from the preservation of thousands of little saucers of the same shape and make, and of anthropomorphic figures of certain types. These are found in most ancient shrines in regular series from the earliest strata; and, whatever they meant, we may assume them to have been sold by the priest to visitors for the purpose of dedication. The worshipper may very likely have taken the

[1] Ten is so unlucky that it must never be said, four is the luckiest, and four times four times four is the devil's own number.

[1] See Piepers, *Quæstiones Anathematicæ*, p. 20.
[2] Paus. v. xvi., vi. xxiv. 10, III. xvi. 2.
[3] T. Bergk, *Poetæ Lyrici Græci*, Leipzig, 1878, Alcman, 23; H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, London, 1900, p. 6.
[4] Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, p. 275.
[5] *Il.* v. 87, vi. 301. [6] Hyp. *Euxen.* 35.
[7] Dem. *Meid.* 531. [8] Rouse, p. 278.
[9] *BCH* vi. 29 ff., 144, xiv. 408, xv. 125.
[10] *CIA* 339, 340 (5th cent.).
[11] *E.g.*, the Andanian inscription, H. Collitz, *Sammlung der griech. Dialekt-Inschriften*, iv. [Göttingen, 1899] 4689, 91 and at Delphi.

opportunity then to present some special petition; so that it is impossible to be certain of the occasion for any one.

But there are a large number of objects, common in the Archaic period and later, that can best be explained as memorials of the act of worship. Such are the well-known statue of Rhombus at Athens, bearing a calf over his shoulders, just as the modern Greek does still on Good Friday.[1] There are several similar figures known; and large numbers of little clay figures carry some offering, often representing a lamb or pig, cock, dove, or other bird, fruit, flower, or garland, which have been found in Athens, Calaurea, Corcyra, Crete, Cyprus, Dodona, Ephesus, Naucratis, Sparta, Tegea, Thebes. Others, again, are grouped in a ring-dance, and there are single figures who bear pipes or harp or play upon some musical instrument, who carry in the hand a bowl or jug or lustral spray or a jar of water on the head, who clap the hands or uplift them in the attitude of worship. A peculiar variety are the figures of Artemis found in Corcyra; the goddess stands facing, and a votary is seen in the act of dancing before her.[2] Others are depicted in ritual costume, and may be priests or priestesses. The most remarkable of these are those discovered in Crete and Ephesus. In a shrine at Cnossos were found figures elaborately painted, representing a female in ceremonial dress, holding and girt with snakes; similar figures, less elaborate, at Palaikastro and Gourmies;[3] at Ephesus, perhaps priestesses, and probably the eunuch priest.[4] Relief-carving reached its perfection in the 5th cent.; and then and later the sacrifice, the libation, and the feast are commemorated in reliefs. The worshipper may dedicate the clothes actually worn in doing the rite; even models of them have been found made in porcelain.[5]

(*b*) *Occasional.*—Here fall the great majority. State or person may return thanks thus for victory in war or deliverance from peril; and the person often marks by an offering the date of some event such as marriage and retirement from active life. Any supposed wrath of a deity may be met with a propitiatory offering, and the sin of the human being thus expiated.

3. Motive.—The motive may be thanksgiving, prayer, or propitiation, chiefly the two former. Help or deliverance from peril and success in some undertaking are the commonest occasions of the act. With a prayer the votive offering was sometimes given in anticipation, to keep the god in mind of the prayer; if we may draw a deduction from the customs of modern Greece, this would be common in cases of sickness. The crew of Odysseus, intending to steal the oxen of the sun, vow to build him a temple if they return to Ithaca;[6] and Crœsus appeased with rich gifts the oracles of Apollo and Amphiaraus, which had guessed his riddle and were angry with him for his unbelief.[7] For unbelief a worshipper at Epidaurus was ordered to offer a silver pig,[8] and other indications exist that small offerings were made for a breach of etiquette.[9] Fixed fines or confiscations differ from these in being compulsory. For bloodguilt propitiation was not uncommon. Temples are recorded as being built for this cause;[10] and after the murder of Pausanias the Delphic oracle commanded that his statue be dedicated in the Brazen House, whence he was dragged forth to die.[1] The nine archons at Athens swore to dedicate a golden statue (*ἀνδριάς*) if they should break the laws.[2] One inscription mentions as the motive of dedication 'fear of the wrath of the twin Tindarids.'[3]

4. Classification.—A certain number of the worshipper's gifts are of direct use in the god's service. Such are temples or shrines and the articles used in them. Temples dedicated on a special occasion are recorded in legend and in history. Danaus erects a temple to Apollo in Argos, in memory of an omen which encouraged him in seizing the kingdom;[4] Heracles and Theseus do the like. The temple of Apollo at Bassæ commemorates the deliverance of a city from pestilence, and that of Hera in Sparta deliverance from flood.[5] The murder of a tyrant was expiated by the temple of Artemis at Tegea.[6] A colonnade is built in some religious precinct with the spoils of war, as that of the Athenians at Delphi;[7] so with certain of the Treasuries at Delphi.[8] Parts of a temple might be specified, as the pillars of that in Ephesus dedicated by Crœsus;[9] this becomes very common in late times, when it often means no more than that some official paid for repairs or even arranged for them. Altars are a common dedication, especially late, some being apparently memorials of a ritual act.[10] Garments for the idol have already been mentioned. Many articles of intrinsic value, such as ornaments or coins, may have been given as valuables; but these are generally appropriate to the occasion, as we shall see.

Another class consists of what may properly be called *ἀγάλματα, οἷς ἀγάλλεται ὁ θεός*. The *ἀκροθίνια*, or choice pieces, are given from spoils of war—as the throne of Xerxes, the manger of Mardonios,[11] statues from the temples of a conquered foe.[12] So also any rarity—the stone swallowed by Cronus, the sceptre of Hephaistos, Dædalus's wings, mammoth bones.[13]

But in the great majority of things dedicated, even if they have material value, the ideal value predominates: they are in fact appropriate to the occasion. We may classify these: (*a*) image of the deity, (*b*) the act or process blessed by the deity, (*c*) the winnings, (*d*) the tool or means.

(*a*) *Image of the deity.*—In all the great shrines large numbers of clay figures are found that must represent the deity. These are sometimes not differentiated: the same seated type does duty for Athene in Athens or Demeter in Tegea. Others have attributes, as Artemis with a fawn or other animal, Athene armed cap-à-pie, Zeus with the thunderbolt. Probably the small figures reproduced the general aspect of the cult-image; anyhow it is impossible to say that the attributes suited the occasion. The naked male figures found in Bœotia, in the shrine of Apollo Ptoan, and many other places, were probably meant for the god;[14] and so also the *κόραι* of Athens and Delos were probably meant for the goddess.[15] Some in each class are dedicated as a tithe or firstfruit;[16] and the armed bronze Athene dedicated by a baker-woman[17] shows that there need be no connexion of the type and the occasion.

1 Paus. III. xvii. 7, 9.
2 Arist. *Const. Ath.* 7.
3 *IGA* 62*a*.
4 Paus. II. xix. 3.
5 *Ib.* VIII. xli. 7, III. xviii. 8.
6 *Ib.* VIII. xlvii. 6.
7 *Ib.* x. xi. 6.
8 *Ib.* x. xi. 5.
9 Herod. i. 92; *Brit. Mus. Excavations at Ephesus*, i. 294.
10 Rouse, p. 354.
11 Herod. ix. 20–24, 70, VIII. 121.
12 Paus. VIII. xlvi. 3, v. xxv. 5; Rouse, p. 117.
13 Paus. x. xxiv. 6, IX. xl. 11; Justin, *Parœnet.* 34; Paus. VIII. xxxii. 5.
14 Rouse, p. 307; those inscribed are dedicated to Apollo.
15 *Ib.* p. 306.
16 *Amer. Journ. of Arch.*, new ser., II. 50; *GA* IV. i. 373. 9, p. 179.
17 *Cat. Acrop. Mus. Bronzes*, 260; *JHS* XIII. [1893] 124.

1 *CIA* IV. 1. 372, 235; Rouse, p. 284 ff.; *BSA* VIII. [1901–02] 96, fig. 55.
2 *BCH* XV. pl. VII.
3 *BSA* IX. [1902–03] 75 ff., figs. 54, 56; X. [1903–04] 217. Some are called the goddess and some the votary; but there is no reason why they should not all be votaries.
4 D. G. Hogarth, *Excavations at Ephesus: the Archaic Artemisia*, 2 vols., London, 1908, pl. XXI. 2, XXIV. 7. 11.
5 Rouse, p. 370; *BSA* IX. [1904–05] 81.
6 *Od.* XII. 343.
7 Herod. i. 50–52.
8 *Cure Inscr. of Epidaurus*, 59. 39.
9 Rouse, p. 312 f.
10 *Ib.* p. 313 f.

Perhaps the figure of the nursing mother may be a goddess in her beneficent aspect; but these seem more likely to represent the devotee. Later, the god's benevolent activity is represented in a series of reliefs, which show Asklepios and his attendants curing the sick.[1] With less confidence, the same may be held for a few other classes of reliefs. These begin late in the 5th century.

(*b*) *Act or process blessed by the god.*—The earlier examples are simpler in conception. We would include here the warrior armed, a type that goes back to the 7th cent. at least, sailors rowing their galley, the victor in his car with Victory driving, the jockey on his courser, the athlete[2] with his proper attributes or in proper pose, the hunter with his game, the dairy-farmer milking his cow, perhaps the peasant in hat and cloak.[3] Here also we would place the common statuettes of the nursing mother and the various scenes of childbirth, which are becoming more common with the progress of excavation.[4] These must sometimes represent the devotee, and it is reasonable to assume that they always do, in the absence of direct proof that they represent the deity. A more summary representation is a bronze stoneram from the Athenian acropolis, inscribed so as to leave no doubt as to its meaning: *τὴν ὀκείαν (=ὀχείαν) με τἀθεναίαι ἀνέθηκεν.*[5] This may give the key to interpret other figures of rams, bulls, and horses, which are found everywhere.[6] A complete scene of animal life is not uncommon: brood-mare suckling a foal, stag attacked by hounds, or the hound alone, hawk gripping hare.[7] There are vast numbers of other animals, which more probably belong to the next class. In many cases the figure may be a simple reminder of a tale to which the key is lost, like the figure of an ass that prevented a surprise by his bray,[8] or that of a frog which directed a traveller to a spring.[9] An early series of painted tablets found at Corinth depicts every stage of the staple industry of the place, pottery-making, together with hunting and farming and vine-dressing; later, athletic contests were often commemorated by a relief.[10]

We may perhaps add the rather rare instance of a workman dedicating his first or chief piece of work, or a model of it. The most definite instance of the 'masterpiece' is Lycinus's pot, inscribed, *Λυκῖνος ἀνέθηκεν τῆι Ἀθηνάιαι τὸ πρῶτον ἠργάσατο.* Mandrocles, who could not place his bridge over the Hellespont in the temple of Hera, placed a picture of it instead.[11] A summary memorial of healing was often a model of the part affected. These have now been discovered in very ancient deposits of Crete and Ephesus; hitherto they have been very common from the 4th cent. B.C. to our own day, and hardly known before.[12] In Ephesus was also a real human tooth, bound with gold wire (for hanging?).[1] Things outworn may be regarded as similar memorials of the act blessed. There is little record of this in early days: the earliest is an epigram of Simonides,[2] but there is enough to show that the thing might be. Later, its sentiment won favour for it, and it became common. So the lame man dedicates his crutch or the sick man his bandage; children dedicate their toys at puberty; and clothes worn in time of peril are dedicated by the survivors.

(*c*) *The winnings.*—The oldest and most important group of these are the spoils of war, which are found everywhere, dedicated to practically all gods, from the earliest times to far into the Christian era. The trophy itself is a war-dedication; and the warrior made his gift to the god whom he believed to have helped him, *i.e.* usually to the patron of his own city or tribe. It is rather mean to dedicate a small model of spoils, but it seems to have been done. In Olympia, Delos, Lusi, and Crete have been found useless or miniature models of shields, helmets, loinguards, cuirasses, and knives, besides others, such as axes, which may be memorials of war.[3] So with the athletic prize: from Hesiod's tripod in the 8th cent.[4] to the prize tripods at Athens and the Triopia, *stlengis*, vase, or crown here or there, and the iron sickle at Sparta,[5] there is plenty of evidence of the custom. Models in gold of cornsheaves, silphium, olives, or vine doubtless display thanks for a good harvest; and perhaps some of the numerous animal models, which include every domestic kind and most game, are due to the hunter's gratitude.[6]

(*d*) *The tool or means.*—Sometimes the soldier dedicated the arms or weapons used in battle; sometimes the athlete dedicated his chariot or his quoit or leaping-weight. Later, we have models of sickles, wine-presses, and the like recorded in literature. There is not much evidence of this, but there is enough to show that the thing was done.[7]

It should be noted that, wherever the worshipper's figure appears, he is depicted as engaged in some significant act. His portrait, as such, is never dedicated by himself. The human being never appears except when something of the ideal is implied. There are some apparent exceptions; but in Greece they are only apparent, and, if not apparent, they are not Greek. Later, beginning in the 4th cent., all this changed; and the honorific statue came in just when the votive offering became a means of self-glorification. The old spirit hardly survived except in cases of dedications for relief from sickness and peril.

LITERATURE.—G. Piepers, *Quæstiones Anathematicæ*, Leyden, 1903; E. Reisch, 'Griechische Weihgeschenke,' *Abhandlungen des archäol.-epigraph. Seminares der Univ. Wien*, Vienna, 1890; W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, Cambridge, 1902; F. Ziemann, *De Anathematis Græcis*, Königsberg, 1885.

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1 Rouse, p. 217 ff.
2 The athletes at Olympia appear to differ somewhat, as the right to erect a statue was an honour.
3 Rouse, p. 361 f.; *Athenische Mittheilungen*, xxx. [1905] 65 ff., pl. iv.; *BCH* xxvii. [1903] 300, pl. viii.; xxviii. 1904, p. 201, fig. 21. The last is in the attitude of worship. The first two are called Pan by their editors.
4 A very early series has been found in Crete; others at Ephesus (Hogarth, p. 313); Rouse, p. 255 ff.
5 *Cat. Acrop. Mus. Bronzes*, 527.
6 Rouse, p. 75 ff. 7 *Ib.* p. 76; Hogarth, p. 146.
8 Paus. x. xviii. 4. 9 *Anthol.* vi. 43.
10 Rouse, pp. 81 f., 175 ff.
11 *BCH* ii. 522, 547; Rouse, p. 367.
12 *BSA* ix. 374 ff., pl. xii.; Hogarth, pl. vii. 35, 36, 39–42, 47, 48, p. 196.

1 Hogarth, pl. xxix. 7. 2 *Anthol.* vi. 52.
3 Rouse, p. 116; *BSA* viii. 253, xi. 306. Possibly these were currency, as axes certainly were and are in some parts (Rouse, p. 389, pl. i., ii., fig. 63).
4 Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 654.
5 Rouse, p. 366; *BSA* xii. 361, 384.
6 Rouse, p. 368. 7 *Ib.*

VOWS.

Buddhist (M. Anesaki), p. 644.
Chinese (R. F. Johnston), p. 646.
Christian (A. J. Grieve), p. 649.
Greek and Roman (A. C. Pearson), p. 652.
Hebrew (J. E. McFadyen), p. 654.
Hindu (J. Jolly), p. 656.
Jewish (M. Joseph), p. 657.
Teutonic (S. G. Youngert), p. 659.

VOWS (Buddhist).—1. Vows at ordination.—The primitive and most fundamental form of taking vows in Buddhism consisted in expressing one's confession of faith on the occasion of ordination (*upasampadā*). The words uttered at ordination before the master of the ceremony were the regular formula (*kamma-vāchā*) of taking refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Sangha, repeated three times as a rule.[1] This profession of faith was associated with other professions—of personal purity, of the determination to practise all the precepts and rules of conduct ordained by the Buddha—for the newly ordained was, after the regular profession, instructed in the rules of discipline, and therein was implied the vow to observe the rules. The procedure and methods of the ceremony differed among the schools of Buddhism, and various doctrines developed as to the efficacy of the ceremony, its influence upon the life of the ordained, its relationship with the other branches of Buddhist training, etc.[2] The more important aspect in the development of the practice and doctrine was the Mahāyāna conception of vow-taking, *i.e.* its significance in the ethics of the *bodhisattva*.

2. The vow of a bodhisattva.—As is seen in the art. Prayer (Buddhist), prayer in Buddhism amounted to taking the vow to perfect oneself on the way to *bodhi* and thereby to save others. It takes, as a rule, the form of vows (*praṇidhāna* or *praṇidhi*) taken by a *bodhisattva* (or any other Buddhist) before a master Buddha, who gives assurance (*vyākaraṇa*) that the vow-taker shall finally attain full Buddhahood; the task of the vow-taker is then to dedicate all his good qualities and meritorious deeds for the realization of his high purpose. The specific methods and points in the acts of dedication (*pariṇāmanā*) are copied from the special vows attributed to the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* of the past, recorded in various texts. As a specimen we cite here a passage from the 'Lotus' (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*) where Buddha Śākyamuni tells his all-saving power:

'There shall never be any being,
Who, having heard the truth of Buddha, shall not attain Buddhahood;
For the vow taken by all the Buddhas is this:—
"Let me lead them to Bodhi, by accomplishing (my works)."
Throughout future days Buddhas will expound
Many billions of the threads of truth;
They shall reveal this unique road (*eka-yāna*)
And preach thereby the truth for the Tathāgataship.'[3]

The 'unique road' is explained as working out in life the stability of truth, the continuity of existence. Being is one throughout all existences, and therefore the ardent intention expressed in a *bodhisattva's* vow and his work of salvation can induce other beings to the same zeal and life, while the assurance given by his predecessor not only encourages him in the work of salvation but has a mysterious, or metaphysical, efficacy to help him in the progress of *bodhi*.[4]

3. The communion of the vow-takers.—The vows are destined to be fulfilled not only by means of earnest intention and ardent work on the part of the vow-taker but also in virtue of the assuring help rendered him by the master Buddha and of the mutual reaction between all the vow-takers. This is due to the metaphysical continuity of existences and to the consequent reciprocation among the vow-takers, *i.e.* *bodhisattvas*, of the works of dedication done in fulfilment of their vows. The realm of existence is likened, in a metaphor often used, to a net in which every knot is studded with a brilliant diamond and all those diamonds mutually reflect their lustre and figures. Every one in the realm does perpetually affect, more or less, all others by his or her ideas and deeds, good or bad, noble or mean. The intention and resolution (*chittotpāda*) are the preliminary to the vow, and the consequence is the dedicatory work; but these three phases are one in their essential nature, not only on the part of an individual vow-taker but in the communion of all the vow-takers, of the past, present, and future, because these phases and the individuals are but manifestations of the *bodhi-chitta*,[1] one and the same throughout all the realms of existence.[2]

Seen from this point of view, all the branches of Buddhist training are but accessories to, or methods of carrying out, the vows solemnly pledged. This is why in various texts a special emphasis is put on the practice of taking vows.

The Penitence of Manjuśri, *e.g.*, enumerates the six methods of practising faith, which are: (1) penitence, (2) invocation (of all the Buddhas), (3) entreatment (to reveal truths), (4) adoration, (5) dedication, and (6) taking vow.[3] Similarly the *bodhisattva* Samantabhadra vows to accomplish the following work: (1) reverence towards all the Buddhas, (2) adoration of the Buddhas, (3) the practice of offering and giving, (4) confession, penitence, and absolution, (5) emulation of meritorious deeds, (6) entreating the Buddhas to turn the wheel of truth, (7) entreating them to live among human beings for ever, (8) perpetually observing Buddhist discipline, (9) constantly adapting oneself to fellow-beings, and (10) the practice of universal dedication.[4]

4. Further examples.—The Buddhist ideal was to emulate the *bodhisattvas* of the past, and we have many records of vows taken by historical or imaginary personages. These were an expression of emulation as well as a source of inspiration, because in Mahāyāna Buddhism every one is a potential *bodhisattva*, and it is within the reach of a common mortal to emulate a *bodhisattva* and to pledge himself to similar tasks. We may cite here the vows taken, in the presence of the Buddha Śākyamuni and his great disciples, by Queen Śrīmālā, of Benares, the alleged daughter of King Prasenājit, of Kośalā. The vows consist of ten preliminaries and three great vows, wherein she says:

'I shall never cherish any thought of breaking the precepts which I have now accepted. From to-day up to the attainment of Buddhahood I shall never cherish any idea of pride toward the elders . . . I shall never arouse any angry thought toward any fellow-being . . . I shall never envy any others in their bodily excellence or beauty . . . I shall never arouse arrogant thought concerning all things, whether subjective or objective . . . I shall never accumulate wealth for my own sake but give out all that I shall receive for helping poor and suffering people

1 See art. Prayer (Buddhist).
2 For illustration of this point see *The Garland of the Bodhisattva's Previous Work*, in a Chinese tr., perhaps a Mahāyāna development of the *Jātaka-mālā*; see B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1092; cf. art. Prayer (Buddhist), vol. x. p. 169.
3 *The Penitence of Manjuśri* (Nanjio, no. 1091).
4 In the *Bhadra-chari*, or *Samantabhadra-chari-praṇidhāna-gāthā*; see K. Watanabe, *Die Bhadracari*, Leipzig, 1912, text and translation.

1 See *SBE* xiii. [1881] 115, etc.; *JRAS*, 1875, pp. 1–16.
2 See, *e.g.*, *Mahāvastu*, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882, i. 2; *SBE* xxxvi. [1894] 251–258.
3 *SBE* xxi. [1884] 53.
4 See D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 398, for a typical *bodhisattva* vow taken from a Chinese version of the *Suvarṇa-prabhā*.

. . . I shall practise the four embracing methods (*sangraha*) not only for myself but for the sake of all beings, and thus, being free from attachment, never being weary (of my work), and being without any entanglement in the mind, shall embrace all fellow-beings into the same communion . . . Whenever I shall meet any unfortunate people, orphans, deserted, imprisoned, or suffering from various mishaps and tribulations, I shall never leave them unhelped nor stop until they will be saved and freed from sufferings, through righteous means . . . Whenever I shall see any people offending rules of decency or committing crimes, I shall never pass by them without trying to correct them but try to persuade or coerce them, according to the degree and nature of the offences. For persuasion and coercion are the methods of perpetuating righteousness; and when righteousness is perpetuated, the beings in the heavenly resorts grow in their number while those in the woeful resorts diminish, and thus the wheel of truth will perpetually be turned, to the benefit of all beings. . . . I shall never cease to embrace the perfect truths, since thus, and thus alone, we can remain mindful of the Buddha, the Communion and the Pāramitās.

Now, let me take the vow to save innumerable fellow-beings and to attain the perfectly right view of truth throughout all my coming lives. Let me take the vow to preach the truth to all without ceasing, on my having realized the perfect truth. Let me take the vow, for the sake of embracing the perfect truth, to dedicate my body, my life and my wealth for guarding the truth.'

Here ends the vow of the queen, and the book adds a comment:

'When Bhagavā listened to and accepted these vows taken by the Queen, all the innumerable vows taken by the *bodhisattvas* were caused by him to be embraced into and consummated in the three, just as all material existences are embraced in space.'[1]

We have here an instance of the vow intended for normal training in Buddhist morality.

In contrast to the peaceful intention of the queen's vow, we have another type of the vow to persevere in persecution and missionary activities. We are told in the 'Lotus' how the Buddha Śākyamuni, before entering the Great Decease, prepared his disciples, both human and superhuman, for the hard tasks to be achieved and the difficulties to be encountered by them after the Master's death. Then the *bodhisattvas* pledge themselves in the presence of the Buddha to remain faithful to his admonition and warning, even after he passes away, and to fight opponents and persecutors, even in remote countries. The ardent zeal and passionate tone of this vow sometimes aroused the fighting spirit in combative Buddhists and gave them a consoling assurance of the righteousness of their cause.[2] Apart from the question of the period and circumstances of the composition of the book, we have here a counterpart to the missionary charge and an extension of the story of Punna, the first missionary to the barbarous Sunās.[3]

5. The 'prime vow' of a Buddha as a redeeming power.—Just as the vow taken by a *bodhisattva* served as an inspiration and incentive to Buddhist morality, the vow accomplished by a Buddha furnished the occasion for adoration and devotion to the achiever of the wonderful vow. A *bodhisattva* is a being on the way to *bodhi*, while a Buddha is one who has reached the end of the way, where he has established a paradise to receive those who believe in his power. His vow is fulfilled, as shown in the glories of his paradise, and is called the 'prime' vow (*pūrva-praṇidhāna*), while its actual efficacy manifests itself in the saving power, more or less vicarious, of the Buddha. We see here a special stream of Buddhist faith developed out of the metaphysical conception of the power of vow-taking—a stream which was further divided into various branches according to the respective nature of the vows taken by several Buddhas.

Of the vows attributed to Buddhas who on that account became objects of specific worship we take two most important cases—that of the Buddha Bhaiṣajya-guru (the Medicine-Master), the lord of the eastern paradise Viśuddhi-vaidūrya, and that of the Buddha Amitābha (the Infinite Light), the lord of the western paradise Sukhāvatī, the Land of Bliss. Apart from the questions pertaining to the mythical origin of these Buddhas and their paradises, we note here an interesting contrast between their respective vows and between the streams of religious faith based on their worship. The lord of the eastern paradise pledges himself, among other things, to save the sick and other sufferers and to give them immediate comfort, while the lord of the Land of Bliss promises to take to his paradise all those who cherish a pious faith in his saving power. Thus the Medicine-Master was a supernatural medicine-man, and his worship became a religion of healing, while the Buddha of Infinite Light was almost a vicarious saviour, and the faith in his redemptive power developed into a pietism, a Christianity within Buddhism, so to speak.

Let us now see the vows taken by Bhaiṣajya-guru. The story is that, while he was still a *bodhisattva*, he pledged himself to the following twelve vows:

'(1) Let me, on attaining Buddahood, realize all the supernatural glories of a Buddha's body which illumines all the realms of existence, and induce all beings to the same glories.

(2) Let me realize all the luminous splendours and thus illumine all those who are shrouded in darkness.'

[(3)–(5) amount to vowing that all beings be induced to Buddhist perfection.]

'(6) Let me release all the crippled, mutilated, blind, deaf, lepers, sick of every description, from their sufferings and have them furnished with wholesome limbs or body.'

[(7) Saving of helpless and unfortunate.]

'(8) Let me save women suffering from the diseases peculiar to their sex and let them be transformed to men.'

[(9) Saving of those entangled in illusions.]

'(10) Let me release all those who would be imprisoned, punished, tortured or sentenced to death, if they should implore in my name.

(11) Let me release all those who, being starved, commit offences for getting food, by giving them, first, delicate food and then giving them a saturation in the taste of truths.

(12) Let me save all those who, being destitute of clothings, would be attacked by cold or heat, insects and worms, by giving them all kinds of fine clothings, decorations, perfumes.'[1]

Here we see a Buddhist counterpart of the Vedic Sūrya or Aśvins, and it is no wonder that Bhaiṣajya-guru was worshipped for the sake of immediate helpfulness.

In the myth of the western paradise the Buddha Amitābha was once a monk Dharmākara, who vowed to furnish a paradise for the pious souls and accomplished the task by a long and severe self-training and by supplying to his believers his name as the sole means of calling forth his saving power. The vow is taken before the Buddha Lokeśvararāja as the testimony, and consists of three parts. The first part is chiefly in praise of the Master Buddha and is an expression of the vow-taker's determination to imitate and emulate him.[2] The second part consists of the forty-six[3] specific terms of Dharmākara's intention and purpose in furnishing a paradise in the west and inducing all beings, without distinction of good and bad, of wise and fool, to share the glorious and blissful life in the paradise.[4] The last part is the consummation of the second and takes the form of a passionate committal to carry out the plan, and even of a compelling call to the universe to respond to his ardent intentions and to give an assurance of the final attainment.

Here we see the Buddhist conception and practice of taking a solemn vow developed to a faith in the saving and redeeming power of the vow.

Finally let us add a remark on a modification, or degeneration, of the vow to curse or magic formula — the case with the Tantric form of Buddhism. Here we see a circuit of the idea of *praṇidhāna*, starting from entreatment and petition and resulting in the use of the vow and prayer

[1] In the *Śrīmālā-devī-siṃhanāda* (Nanjio, no. 59).

[2] For the stanzas of the vow, called the 'Stanzas of Perseverance,' see *SBE* xx. [1885] 259–261; for a man who believed himself to have carried out the vows in his life see M. Anesaki, *Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet*, Cambridge, Mass., 1916, esp. pp. 39–42.

[3] See *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, iv. 60–63.

[1] *The Prime Vows of the Tathāgata Bhaishajya-guru* (Nanjio, no. 170).

[2] *Sukhāvatī-vyūhā* (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii. [1894] pp. 7–9).

[3] Forty-eight in a Chinese version, a number which hence has become sacred among the Amita-Buddhists in China and Japan.

[4] *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. pp. 12–22.

for compelling the divine power to fulfil the demand expressed or implied in the formula.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the article see: artt. BODHISATTVA, ETHICS (Buddhist), PRAYER (Buddhist); L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1909, pp. 301–312; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 65; D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907, p. 307 *f.*; J. W. Inglis, 'The Vows of Amida,' *JRAS*, N. China Branch, xlviii. [1917], pp. 1–11; M. Anesaki, 'The Idea of Moral Heritage in the Japanese Family,' *The Open Court*, xxxi. [1917] 227–238.

M. ANESAKI.

VOWS (Chinese).—1. Vows in ancient China.—The earliest historical records of China, as of other countries, are mainly concerned with the activities of rulers and with internal and external warfare. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first vows or oaths mentioned in Chinese annals[1] were taken by the princes and great officers of the various feudal states of the empire, and that the occasion of such vows or oaths was usually the conclusion of a treaty of peace or alliance, or a similar event of public importance.

The customary term for the ceremonial taking of a vow or entering into a covenant was *méng-shih*. The two characters comprising this ancient term are still in common use, though usually found in different combinations. They are explained thus. *Shih* is equivalent to *yüeh-hsin* and *méng* to *li-shêng*. *Yüeh* signifies a bond or covenant, and is still used to denote an international treaty. *Hsin* means 'good faith' or 'sincerity.' The signification of *li-shêng* is less transparent. There is no difficulty about *shêng*, which means 'a sacrificial animal.' The character *li* is an unusual substitute for *lin*, which means 'to approach,' 'to draw near to,' and is a euphemism for 'to slaughter.' Hence the combination *li-shêng* signifies 'to slaughter a sacrificial animal.' Thus the term *méng-shih* is a concise expression meaning 'a covenant entered into with sincere heart and confirmed by the slaughter of a sacrificial animal.'

The sacrificial animals chiefly used in ancient China on the occasions of a solemn oath-taking were oxen and pigs (by princes and great fiefs), dogs (by ministers and officials), and fowls (by the common people). The method of procedure was as follows.

A pit was prepared in the ground (called *K'an*), at the edge of which the animal was slaughtered. The victim's left ear was held by the master of ceremonies or by the person undertaking the vow; and immediately after the slaughter the ear was cut off and deposited in a dish called *chu-p'an*. Then blood was taken from the victim and poured into a goblet called *yü-tui*.[2] When this part of the ceremony had been carried out, the vow or oath was written in the blood collected in the *yü-tui*, and the oath-taker also used the blood to smear his own mouth.[3] The tablet on which the words were inscribed (called *tsai shu*) was placed on the carcass of the victim, which was then buried in the prepared pit.[4] The covering of the victim with soil was an essential part of the ceremony, as it was equivalent to calling upon the earth to be witness of the vow.

There was an officer known as *Ssŭ-mêng* ('Director of Covenants') whose special duty it was to superintend ceremonies of this kind. His functions were to some extent of a priestly character. He also made copies of the inscribed tablets, and either deposited them among the official archives or (in the case of covenants between private persons) became himself their custodian.[5] It was also this officer who administered the oath to persons who had revolted against the Government and had subsequently returned to their allegiance. Other officers who had certain duties to perform in connexion with these ceremonies were the Grand Minister of Justice (*Ta-Ssŭ-K'ou*) and the Guardian of the Imperial Ancestral Temple and Treasury (*T'ien-fu*), who were responsible for the safe-custody of certified copies of covenants made between the emperor and the great vassal princes.[6]

[1] See art. ORDEAL (Chinese).

[2] See *Le Tcheou-Li*, tr. E. Biot, Paris, 1851, ii. 247. *P'an* and *tui* are terms used for two kinds of sacrificial vessel. That they were supposed to be, and perhaps were, decorated or inlaid with pearl and jade respectively is indicated by the words *chu* and *yü*—the Chinese names for those substances.

[3] The technical term for smearing the mouth was *sha*. See *The Chinese Classics*, tr. J. Legge, Hongkong, 1861–72, ii.[2] 487.

[4] See Biot, ii. 359. [5] *Ib.* ii. 359–361. [6] *Ib.* ii. 314.

Numerous instances of vows and oaths taken by the princes of the Chinese states in the early historical period may be found in the famous narrative of Tso (*Tso Chuan*).[1] A good example of these early covenants is the following, which belongs to the eleventh year of Duke Hsiang (562 B.C.).

'All we who covenant together agree not to hoard up the produce of good years, not to shut one another out from advantages that we possess, not to protect traitors, not to shelter criminals. We agree to aid one another in disasters and calamities, to have compassion on one another in seasons of misfortune and disorder, to cherish the same likings and dislikings, to support and encourage the royal House. Should any prince break these engagements, may He who watches over men's sincerity and He who watches over covenants, [the Spirits of] the famous hills and [of] the famous streams, the kings and dukes our predecessors, the whole host of Spirits, and all who are sacrificed to, the ancestors of our 12 (13?) States with their 7 surnames:—may all these intelligent Spirits destroy him, so that he shall lose his people, his appointment pass from him, his family perish, and his State be utterly overthrown!'[2]

Some of the old commentators and moralists began at a very early period to complain that the frequency of sworn covenants and formal vows was detrimental to sound morals, because, when solemn engagements were lightly made, they were apt to be lightly violated. Cases were known, in Chou-dynasty China, of covenants that were broken 'before the blood smeared on the mouth was dry.' It was held that in the golden age of the 'holy kings' vows and covenants were unknown (*ku chê pu mêng yeh*), and that the simple spoken word required no vow or oath to make it binding. It was pointed out that the making of many solemn protestations fostered distrust between state and state and also between rulers and ruled. In the 'Classic of Poetry' (*Shih Ching*) we read of a king who added to the disorders of his kingdom by entering into frequent covenants with the vassal princes; for he showed thereby that he had no confidence in them and lived in fear of rebellion.[3] Commentators also observe that no formal covenants were known before the Yin dynasty (1766–1122 B.C.) and that this was precisely the time when the State began to be disturbed by rebellious movements. Oaths and vows were introduced only 'when loyalty and sincerity had worn thin and men's hearts were perplexed with doubts.'

It will have been noticed that these State covenants were really the ancient Chinese equivalents of modern treaties; and the vows or oaths that accompanied such engagements practically corresponded to the modern seals and signatures of plenipotentiaries. The violation of a covenant was therefore nothing more or less than what we should call the wilful breaking of a treaty.

2. Vows of friendship.—Chinese social life has for ages been characterized by five 'relationships,' each of which implies certain rights, privileges, and duties. These are the relationships between 'sovereign and minister' (this will probably be reinterpreted to mean 'citizen and State' if the Republican form of government proves permanent), 'husband and wife,' 'father and son,' 'elder brother and younger brother,' 'friend and friend.' Friendship thus often assumes the importance of a recognized social institution, with its appropriate rules, customs, and traditions. When two or more Chinese decide to become 'friends' in what may be called the institutional sense of the term, they become bound to one another by solemn vows which are sometimes accompanied by a ceremonial mingling of blood. This is supposed to create a bond identical for all practical purposes with that of blood-kinship. The following example of a vow

[1] Tr. J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, v.

[2] *Ib.* p. 453. It may be noted that there were instances of treaties with smearing of lips as late as the wars between the Chinese and the Tatars (*c.* 1131).

[3] See Legge, iv. 340 *f.*

of friendship is taken from the official annals of the Sung dynasty.

'We . . . will cling together like serpents and dragons inextricably coiled. When one of us attains riches and honour he will share his prosperity with the others. May he who breaks this vow receive divine chastisement.'

After uttering these words, the parties would prick their arms and let the blood flow into a goblet. Of the mingled blood each took a sip, thus becoming the 'blood-brother' of the other.[1] If 'sworn brothers' wish to terminate the relationship, they must do so in a formal manner. This is sometimes known as 'withdrawing the incense-stick' (*pa hsiang-t'ou-tzŭ*).[2]

A few foreigners have become the 'brothers' of Chinese officials and others, though probably in these cases the ceremony is abbreviated and simplified. H. A. Giles describes how, in 1868, he became the 'younger brother' of the influential court eunuch, An Tê-hai.[3] A similar relationship has also been entered into between various Chinese emperors and some of their chosen subjects; *e.g.*, Shêng Tsu (10th cent. A.D.) and Hsing Tsung (11th cent. A.D.) of the Liao dynasty both became 'bound brothers' (*chieh wei hsiung-ti*) of certain trusted friends. In modern times the Chinese Government (especially under the Manchu dynasty) has shown itself extremely hostile to this custom, and indeed made it a punishable offence.

Soon after the accession of the Manchus it was decreed that for persons of different surnames to salute each other as brothers (*chieh pai hsiung-ti*) was an offence punishable by a hundred blows. In 1661 the death-penalty was decreed against 'sworn brothers' who took part in the ceremonies of blood-smearing and the ritual burning of paper slips on which vows were written. A slightly less rigorous law was enacted in the seventeenth year of K'ang-hsi (1668), but membership of sworn brotherhoods was still an offence punishable by flogging and, in aggravated cases, by death. The death-penalty was reduced to 'a hundred blows' if there was no blood-drinking or smearing and no burning of vows. In 1671 a further law enacted that persons guilty of joining sworn brotherhoods were liable to three years' banishment to the frontiers; but in 1673 a new law made a clear distinction between harmless brotherhoods and those which were regarded as criminal. The blood-smearing and drinking, and the formal consignment of the written vows to the keeping of the gods by means of fire, constituted the decisive evidence of guilt in its most serious form.

Formal vows of friendship between women are not unknown. They salute each other as 'dry sisters' (*kan chieh*). One method of entering into this relationship is for each of the two women to hold the end of a straw over the village well and to call upon a divinity known as 'the Peach-Flower Maiden' to witness the compact.

3. Vows of secret brotherhoods and societies.—The reasons for the severity with which 'sworn brotherhoods' have been treated by the Chinese Government are not far to seek. Secret fraternities, all the members of which are bound by inviolable vows to be loyal to one another as against the whole world, are very apt to become a danger to almost any form of government, especially if that government is controlled by an alien dynasty that has supplanted a native one. In ancient times, nevertheless, it was considered a right and proper thing that men should take vows of co-operation and mutual aid. The *Chou Li* declares that 'by entering into mutual engagements accompanied by vows the people are taught to extend brotherly love to one another and to put away apathy.'[4] A commentator on this rather enigmatic statement is worth quoting.[5]

'There are different ways,' he says, 'in which people show their apathy and laziness. They do not hurry to give help to those who are in danger or suffering hardship, thus they are lacking in charity and sympathy. It is therefore a good thing that people should be stimulated by means of solemn vows to aid one another in distress, to support one another in sickness, to extend a friendly hand to those who need it, to help one another in times of anxiety or peril, and to be faithful to one's word as long as life lasts, setting aside all petty personal considerations[1] that might cause delay or give an excuse for laziness.'

This remarkable description of the social value of vows seems strangely modern; it might almost serve as a statement of the ethical basis of the Boy Scout movement. Chinese history affords innumerable instances of vows of this kind entered into and most faithfully carried out by bands of associates or members of social groups. Where the ethical ideal falls short is in the fact that the obligation to succour the distressed is not usually regarded as of general application, but concerns only fellow-members of the oath-bound fraternity. Yet this depends, of course, on the specific purposes for which the fraternity has been constituted; and sometimes they far transcend the individual or collective interests of the members, even if they do not go so far as to include all mankind within their purview.

The most famous and memorable Chinese example of a vow entered into for purposes that went far beyond the private interests of those concerned was 'the Vow of the Peach-garden,' whereby the three heroes Liu Lei, Kuan Yü, and Chang Fei (2nd and 3rd centuries A.D.) bound themselves to fight for the preservation of the reigning dynasty against the attacks of the Yellow-Turban rebels.[2] We are told that the ceremony (which took place in Chang Fei's peach-garden) consisted in the sacrifice of a black ox and a white horse and in the taking of a vow to the following effect:

'We swear to regard one another henceforth as brothers, to unite our abilities and our hearts, to bring succour to the miserable, to raise up the fallen. We will serve our country and give peace to the people. Though we were born on different dates we wish to die together on the same day. Our hearts are open to the inspection of the divine powers of Heaven and Earth. If any one of us proves false to his duty and forgetful of his obligations, may God and man unite to destroy him.'

This celebrated 'Vow of the Peach-garden' has been imitated countless times, especially by members of societies formed for purposes of mutual protection. Such societies, indeed, are still formed from time to time; several new ones sprang into existence among the tens of thousands of Chinese labourers who worked behind the fighting lines in France during the Great War.[3]

It is interesting to note that the Peach-garden Vow was 'often referred to by the Triad Society,' and that its members were 'exhorted to emulate the faithfulness to each other and loyalty to their cause of the heroes who took it.'[4] The vows of the Triad Society were thirty-six in number.[5] It is characteristic of China that the first of them is a vow of filial piety. After repeating the vows, each candidate is required to take a lighted incense-stick and dip it in a bowl of water. As the light is extinguished, he says, 'If I prove false to my vows, may my life go out like the fire of this stick of incense.' The master of ceremonies ('incense-master') then takes up a porcelain basin and dashes it on the ground, saying, 'May such be the fate of all traitors.' He proceeds to take up the paper on which the vows are written, and sets fire to it. By this means it is supposed that the vows pass from the material into the spiritual world and are received by the divine powers, who will register them in the archives of heaven and inflict punishment on traitors. The next part of the ceremony consists in cutting off the head of a cock, as an indication of the grim fate that will befall any one who betrays the cause. The incense-master then drops some of the dead cock's blood into the water in which the incense-sticks were extinguished; and each of the candidates pricks one of his fingers and lets the blood drop into the same vessel or (sometimes) into another bowl containing wine. The ashes of the burnt papers on which the vows were written are put into the bowl containing the mingled blood of

[1] Cf. art. BROTHERHOOD (Artificial), § 2 ff.
[2] Cf. L. Wieger, *Moral Tenets and Customs in China*, tr. L. Davrout, Ho-kien-fu and London, 1913, p. 519 f.
[3] *Adversaria Sinica*, no. 9, p. 310.
[4] Biot, i. 197.
[5] This commentator, Chêng O, who belonged to the Sung dynasty, is not quoted by Biot.

[1] Literally, 'even if one has to go with cap tied over one's unbound hair,' *i.e.* before one has completed one's toilet. The expression is taken from Mencius. See Legge, ii. 336.
[2] Cf. Favre, in the *T'oung Pao*, vol. xix. (Leyden, 1919] no. 1, p. 1 ff. See also H. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine*, pt. i. vol. ii. [Paris, 1912], no. 4, p. 346.
[3] For details see Favre. Cf. art. SECTS (Chinese).
[4] William Stanton, *The Triad Society or Heaven and Earth Association*, Hongkong, 1900, p. 1.
[5] *Ib.* pp. 61 f., 118 f.

the candidates, and the bowl is then handed round and sipped by each in turn. This concludes the ceremonies of initiation, after which the new members of the society are hailed by the old ones as 'brothers.'[1]

Sisterhoods are less common than brotherhoods, but by no means unknown. Detailed information regarding them is lacking, but mention must be made of the Golden Orchid Society (*Chin-Lan Hui*), which is described by H. A. Giles as 'a secret association of unmarried girls who bind themselves not to cohabit with their husbands after marriage (which they are unable to avoid) but to leave them and return to their old homes or go elsewhere.'[2] It has been said that members of this society would commit suicide rather than break their vow.[3]

4. Religious vows.—(*a*) *Buddhism.*—In China as in other Buddhist lands there are vows for both monks and laymen, those of the former being naturally much stricter and more comprehensive than those to which laymen subscribe. Sometimes, however, lay Buddhists of both sexes voluntarily bind themselves by one or more of the obligations which are ordinarily binding only on the monkhood. There is a society of lay vegetarians which is said to have been founded in the T'ang dynasty by the fifth and sixth 'patriarchs' of the Ch'an school of Buddhism. Members of this society are known as *chai kung* ('fasters'), a term which is also applied to those who take vows of temporary vegetarianism during their pilgrimage to a sacred mountain.

The fact that practically the whole of Chinese Buddhism[4] belongs to the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) explains the existence of religious vows of which little or no trace can be found in primitive Buddhism. The great models of all such vows are those which are supposed to have been taken by the *bodhisattvas*. These vows are numerous—in the *Wu-liang-shou-sūtra* they are forty-eight in number[5]—but they are practically all summed up in the formula, 'So long as there remains a single being who has not attained Buddhahood, I vow that I will not become Buddha.' The 'vows' of the *bodhisattvas* (*praṇidhāna*) may be described as expressions of will which, through the intensity of the selfless emotion that inspires them, are instrumental in bringing about a realization of the desired conditions.[6] The Mahāyāna, as J. J. M. de Groot has shown, 'admits the creative power of thought,'[7] and indeed this is insisted upon so frequently that it may be regarded as one of the fundamental principles of Buddhist psychology. This fact is apt to be ignored by those who dwell upon the 'vain repetitions' said to be characteristic of Buddhism in practice, and who do not understand that the repetitions are believed to reinforce the creative power of thought to which the spoken words give expression.

We have already seen that forty-eight *bodhisattva*-vows are preserved in a famous *sūtra*; but according to another classification only four are essential. These 'four great vows' (*ssŭ hung shih-yüan*) are as follows: (1) the vow to save the world, *i.e.* not to rest until all beings in the universe have been brought to salvation; (2) the vow to destroy in oneself all evil and the passions that produce evil; (3) the vow to study and practise the *dharma*, *i.e.* the law of Buddha, with a view to the attainment of wisdom and virtue; (4) the vow to attain the perfection of Buddhahood. These vows are related to the *San Kuei*—the 'Three Refuges' (the Buddha, the Law, and the Church)—common to both Vehicles. The second and third (the destruction of evil and the cultivation of virtue) have reference to the Buddha and the Law, and to self-development (*tzŭ li*); the first (the helping of others and bringing them to salvation) has reference to the Church or community, which, in the Mahāyāna, includes all beings in the universe (*li t'a*).[1] The full accomplishment of the three first vows will lead automatically to the accomplishment of the fourth—the attainment of universal Buddhahood.

There are several other classifications of *bodhisattva*-vows, but we need not give a detailed analysis. It will be sufficient to refer to the ten vows set forth in the *sūtra* known as the *Ta-Pei-Hsin T'o-lo-ni Ching* (the Dharani '*Sūtra* of the all-Pitiful Heart').[2] In this *sūtra* Kwan-yin (Avalokiteśvara) is represented as being the inventor or teacher of these vows; hence the recital of each is followed by an invocation of the name of this *bodhisattva*. The vows are (1) to become acquainted with the true faith; (2) to attain spiritual vision; (3) to lead others to salvation; (4) to be charitable; (5) to embark on the ship of *prajña*, 'wisdom'; (6) to cross the ocean of bitterness (life and death); (7) to be steadfast; (8) to attain *nirvāṇa*; (9) to join the company of the saints; (10) to become one with the Dharmakaya (the mystical body of the eternal and universal Buddha).

The vows taken by Buddhist monks on their reception into the order, or on subsequent occasions, may be conveniently studied in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, called in Chinese the *Fan-wang-ching*.[3] The 35th and 36th sections of this popular *sūtra* deal with the vows which should be taken and constantly retaken by 'every son of Buddha' (*ko Fo tzŭ*). They bind him to regard his parents and religious teachers with respect and devotion, to associate only with virtuous companions, to study the scriptures and perform good works, and to obey the commandments of Buddha in all things. He must be ready to sacrifice life itself rather than allow himself to act or think in such a way as to hinder the realization of these ideals.[4] Similar vows should be taken by those who seek to attain mystical illumination by practising the rules of *dhyāna*.

In the *Tso-Ch'an-I*, written by the monk Tsê-Ch'an for the guidance of such aspirants, it is stated that the novice should begin by cultivating an attitude of love towards all beings, and should then make a 'great vow' (*fa hung shih-yüan*) to devote himself earnestly to the spiritual welfare of others and not to seek salvation or enlightenment for himself alone (*pu wei chi shên tu ch'iu chieh-t'o*).[5]

It will be seen from the foregoing that the Buddhist vow is practically a self-dedication to an ideal of conduct of which the central feature (in the Mahāyāna) is the service of others. But, apart from what may be described as the 'official'

[1] Stanton, *The Triad Society*, pp. 61–66.
[2] *A Glossary of Reference to Subjects Connected with the Far East*, Shanghai, 1900, p. 108.
[3] S. Couling, *Encyclopædia Sinica*, Shanghai, 1917, *s.v.* 'Secret Societies,' p. 501.
[4] See art. China (Buddhism in).
[5] *SBE* xlix. [1894], *Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts*, pt. ii. (*The Larger Sukhāvativyūha*, § 8), pp. 12–22. Cf. R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913, pp. 96–98; J. W. Inglis, 'The Vows of Amida' in *JRAS*, North-China Branch, xlviii. [1917] 1 f.
[6] See D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907, pp. 238–241.
[7] De Groot, *Le Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, Amsterdam, 1893, pp. 5 f., 95; cf. also p. 164 f.

[1] The terms *tzŭ-li* and *li-t'a* constitute a concise statement, from the Mahāyānist standpoint, of the essential difference between the Small and the Great Vehicles. *Tzŭ-li* (to benefit oneself) is regarded as the ideal of the Small Vehicle, and *li-t'a* (the helping of others) is regarded as the characteristic ideal of the Great Vehicle. The combination of the two (*erh li yüan man*) is aimed at by Mahāyānists.
[2] B. Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 320.
[3] *Ib.* no. 1087.
[4] For Chinese text and French tr. see De Groot, p. 66 f.; cf. pp. 160–168. See also L. Wieger, *Hist. des Croyances religieuses et des opinions philosophiques en Chine*, Ho-kien-fu, 1917, p. 483 ff.
[5] As far as the present writer is aware, there is no European translation of this work.

vows, there are others which have sole reference to the spiritual needs or personal aspirations of the individual who utters them.

One of the most remarkable and comprehensive is the vow which is said to have been taken by a monk of the Sung dynasty named Jui Chien, who dwelt as a hermit on the sacred mountain of Wu-t'ai. It was to the following effect: (1) that he would never allow his eyes to look upon forbidden sights; (2) that he would never allow his ears to listen to forbidden sounds; (3) that he would never allow his mouth to utter forbidden words; (4) that he would never allow his mind to be occupied by forbidden thoughts.

Of the numerous vows made for particular objects or in view of particular circumstances it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. Sometimes a Buddhist will make a vow to recite a certain number of *sūtras* or portions of *sūtras*, in which case beads are often used to count off each completed recital.[1] Sometimes he will register a vow to go on a pilgrimage, or to supply oil for keeping a lamp burning in some shrine for a term of years, or to burn a certain number of sticks of incense before the image of a *bodhisattva*.[2] Some, again, will undertake to print and circulate copies of a favourite *sūtra*.

One such person, *e.g.*, vowed that he would cause 1000 copies of the Diamond *Sūtra* to be printed and given away if his mother were cured of sickness. The emperor Yung-chêng (1723–35) vowed that he would feed a stated number of monks in return for seasonable weather.

Sometimes the vow is accompanied by some act of austerity or even self-mutilation, though the latter is contrary to Buddhist law.

A monk of the 12th cent. named Tsun-Shih, who belonged to the famous monastery of Kuo-ch'ing at the foot of the T'ien-t'ai mountain in Cheh-kiang, made a vow to devote himself to the propagation of the teachings of the T'ien-t'ai school, and in proof of his sincerity burned off one of his own fingers before an image of the *bodhisattva* P'u-hsien. A similar act, showing regrettable fanaticism but great fortitude and powers of endurance, was performed by a monk who died less than ten years ago. Having made a vow of self-dedication to religion, he burned off two of his fingers. Throughout the rest of his life he was known as Pa-chih-t'ou-t'o, 'the eight-fingered ascetic.' He rose to be abbot of one of the most prosperous monasteries now existing in China (the T'ien-t'ung Ssŭ, near Ningpo) and to be head of the newly-founded Association of Chinese Buddhists.

Various opprobrious epithets are bestowed on members of the monkhood who have broken their vows (especially the vows of chastity and vegetarianism) or have been expelled from their monasteries for misbehaviour. Among these are such terms as 'slanderer of the Three Holy Ones,' 'shameless one,' 'obstruction on the holy pathway,' 'bald-headed huntsman,' 'cassock-wearing robber.'

All the Buddhist or quasi-Buddhist sects which have played so prominent a part in the political as well as the religious life of China in the past have their characteristic rituals and vow-formulas.[3] But in many cases these societies have very little to do with religion and merely make use of religious formulas in order to inspire their members with a due sense of the binding nature of their vows. This is so in the case of the Tsai-Li Society, one of the most flourishing organizations of the kind in N. China. It professes to be associated with the cult of the *bodhisattva* Kwan-yin, but its activities are of a social and ethical rather than a religious nature, and in any case its slight religious basis is almost as much Taoist as Buddhist. It is said to have sprung from the dreaded White Lotus Society, and, though it has apparently long ceased to meddle in politics, it was dreaded by the authorities up to the time of the Boxer movement, if not later.[4] It flourishes in the leased territory of Wei-hai-wei, but has never given any trouble to the British authorities there. Its members take vows to abstain from strong drink, opium, and tobacco. When a member is known to have broken his vows, he is expelled from the society and is said to be *pu tsai*, a phrase meaning 'not present'—a common Chinese euphemism for 'dead.' The phrase implies that the disgraced member is 'dead' to the society. There is a play on the word *tsai*, which also forms part of the society's name.

[1] See De Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, Amsterdam, 1903, i. 225 *f.*

[2] For a short account of some of these vows see H. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine*, pt. i. vol. ii. no. 4, p. 342 *f.*

[3] Much useful information is contained in De Groot's *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, already cited; but allowance must be made for the author's strong prejudices, and especially for his antipathy to Confucianism.

[4] See Stanton, p. 6.

(*b*) *Taoism.*—(1) The vows of Taoists are similar to those of Buddhists. In this, as in many other respects, modern debased Taoism has merely adapted the usages of Buddhism. The *bodhisattvas* who are supposed to hear and register the vows made by pious Buddhists are of course replaced by Taoist divinities. The three goddesses (*Niang-niang*) whose worship flourishes on the sacred mountain of T'ai-shan in Shantung, on Miao-fêng-shan near Peking, and many other places, are among the divinities most often resorted to for the purpose. Several of the mountains consecrated to Taoist worship (such as T'ai-shan and Hua-shan) have been the scenes of pitiful tragedies enacted by those who have vowed to sacrifice their lives in return for favourable responses to prayers made on behalf of parents or others. These and other mountains possess 'suicide cliffs' (*shê-shên yai*), over which religious fanatics have hurled themselves to death in fulfilment of rashly-made vows; and, though this practice has always been discountenanced and even forbidden by the officials, it is not even yet quite extinct.[1] From such acts of fanaticism it may be gathered that a Chinese rarely fails to keep a vow that he has once made, provided that it is physically possible for him to fulfil it. The Chinese are, and always have been, too fond of making vows. They certainly do not act in accordance with the good advice of Ecclesiastes, 'Be not rash with thy mouth'; but it must be admitted that they would readily endorse the other principle laid down by the same Hebrew writer—'When thou vowest a vow unto God, defer not to pay it. . . . Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay.'[2]

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes.

R. F. JOHNSTON.

VOWS (Christian).—1. New Testament.—(*a*) *The word.*—The discussion starts naturally with a consideration of the data afforded by the earliest Christian books, the writings of NT, but these are scanty and to some extent irrelevant. The word 'vow' (*εὐχή*) occurs twice (Ac 18^{18} 21^{23}), but in both cases the atmosphere is Jewish rather than Christian. In the first instance Paul (or Aquila) has his hair cut at Cenchreæ, 'for he had a vow.' Whether the making or the redemption of the vow is meant is not clear; if the latter, it was probably in connexion with some escape from danger. The second passage is similarly connected with the hair-offering. To avert the reproach of anti-Judaism, Paul, at the request of the Jerusalem elders, associates himself with four men about to be 'purified' on the termination of a vow, and bears the expense of their hair-cutting and probably of their sacrifices—a custom not uncommon among rich Jews on behalf of their poorer brethren. On the Nazirite vow (Nu 6), of which these incidents, and the account given by Hegesippus[3] of James the Just, are illustrative, and the significance of the hair as the seat of the devotee's life, see artt. NAZIRITES, VOWS (Hebrew), and W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 483.

Two other NT passages may be glanced at. One is the vow made by forty Jews to fast until they had killed Paul (Ac $23^{12f.}$), but this is at least as much an oath as a vow. The other is the 'Korban' passage (Mk 7^{9-13} = Mt 15^{3-6}) in the teaching of Jesus, a reference to cases in which the keeping of a vow conflicted with duty to parents. The case of Ananias (Ac 5) has no pertinence, though Roman theologians find a precedent for vows in the community of goods supposed to have existed in the early Jerusalem Church.

[1] See art. SUICIDE (Chinese).

[2] Ec $5^{2.4.5}$.

[3] Eus. *HE* ii. 23.

(*b*) *The thing.*—When, however, we consider the basal ideas of vows as solemn promises and engagements offered to a personal God, the NT has something vital to say. The service and gift here are nothing less than the whole personality and its powers (*e.g.*, Ro 6^{11-13} 12^{1}, Gal 2^{20}, 2 Co 5^{15}), dating from the hour of baptism and the entry on a consciously Christian life. The undertakings therein involved may be called a vow, though nothing is promised which is not obligatory. It is the natural response of the soul to the appeal of redemption, the expressed impulse of the new life. This impulse is partly a desire to show gratitude and devotion, partly a desire for increasing perfection by growing intimacy with the Saviour, and further involves a claim to continued and new blessings. Thus the vow has its approach to a covenant.

In the narrower sense a vow is the promise of something not generally regarded as already obligatory, not strictly owed to God. The starting-point here is to be found in passages of NT where, though the word is not used, the idea (of asceticism) is present — *e.g.*, in the references to fasting, poverty, and virginity. The most probable interpretation of the curious counsels given by Paul in 1 Co 7 is that he is dealing with cases of spiritual marriage in which man and woman united in taking a vow of continence. Parallel to this is the reference in Ignatius:

'If any one is able to abide in chastity to the honour of the flesh of the Lord, let him so abide without boasting. If he boast, he is lost, and if it be known beyond the bishop, he is polluted.'[1]

What one notices in this reference to a vow of celibacy or of continence is its privacy as opposed to the publicity which was of the essence of the Jewish vow. The Christian is not to parade his vow, but to realize that his chief danger is pride and vainglory.

2. The early Church and vows of virginity.—On early Christian asceticism, especially as regards celibacy, see artt. ASCETICISM (Christian) and CELIBACY (Christian). There are abundant evidences within NT that by the end of the 1st cent. virginity was often looked upon as superior to marriage and indicative of a higher spiritual life, and this opinion gained ground extensively and rapidly in the sub-apostolic and ancient Catholic ages, especially as regards the clergy. The latter half of the 3rd cent. was a period of increasing stringency, for, while Cyprian[2] had advised that young women who felt they could not maintain their virginal vows should marry, the 19th canon of Ancyra (A.D. 314) says that such vows are perpetually binding and that to break them is as bad as committing bigamy. By the 4th cent. the unmarried state had come to occupy the place that martyrdom had held during the persecutions, and is a favourite theme with such Fathers as Athanasius and the Cappadocians. Chrysostom rhapsodizes over the lustrous sanctity of virginity, though he has to bewail the reverse side of the picture, 'the broken vow, the frequent fall.' Fulgentius († 533) in his *de Fide* lays it down that vows of chastity are perpetually binding on both men and women. Those who vowed themselves to virginity had their names formally recorded, and the vow was made an impressive ceremony.[3] The 15th canon of the 2nd Council of Toledo (A.D. 567) is evidence that the secular arm was invoked to aid the ecclesiastical, by imposing divorce on a monk who had married; but in general the episcopal court was able to deal with such matters itself, and the bishop could modify the penalty according to circumstances.[4] For a statement of what was expected from virgins we may refer to Jerome's treatise on the subject and his letters to Eustochium (xxii.) and Demetrias (cxxx.). The thirty years' interval between these epistles may account for the milder and less fanatical tone of the second.

The subsequent history of vows of celibacy belongs mainly to the story of monasticism (*q.v.*). Poverty, chastity, and obedience are the triple cord of the monastic life. They had been required from its early days, and the great Benedict of Nursia, while making obedience still more absolute, added what was known as the 'vow of steadfastness.'

'Henceforth the door of the monastery opened only inwards. Formerly, if the monk forsook his cell and married he was liable to penance, but his marriage was not annulled. Now such marriages were declared, *ipso facto*, void, and the offender was compelled to return. The vow, written out, was laid upon the altar, those who could not write signing it with their mark.'[1]

The Trappist (Reformed Cistercian) 'vow' of silence seems rather an injunction and comes under the vow of obedience.

3. Patristic evidence. — A few examples of general references to vows in the Fathers may be given. Eusebius[2] says that it was customary for vows to be taken at the tombs of martyrs, and Hilary[3] says that they are effective and helped by the Holy Spirit only when taken in a church with due ceremonial. In his day the usual personal vows were those of abstinence, chastity, and fasting.

The opinion of Augustine is interesting:

'If in Scripture a vow is usually termed εὐχή, being called a prayer, we must understand particularly that kind of prayer which we offer when making a vow, *i.e.* πρὸς εὐχήν. But everything we offer to God is vowed, and above all the offering of the holy altar, in which is implied the greatest of all our vows that by which we vow to be in Christ, as members of His body.'[4]

Commenting on Ps 76, he encourages the taking of vows as an inspiration to otherwise unaided strength. Among the customary vows in his time were those between man and wife either to be faithful to each other or to abstain from intercourse with each other, and those on the part of the rich either to show hospitality to all 'religious' persons or to give their goods to the poor and embrace the 'religious' life.

Ambrose contributes something. In *de Off. Minist.* III. xii. he lays down the general proposition that we must make no promise that is wrong, and, if we have made an unjust oath, we may not keep it. He illustrates his contention from the familiar cases of Herod and Jephthah. In his funeral oration over his brother Satyrus he says:

'We now recognize that thy departure hence was obtained by thy vows to the holy martyr Lawrence.'[5]

There are other references to vows to martyrs,[6] but they seem to be of the nature of prayers for martyral intercession. In the Satyrus oration, § 35, he says:

'Not that I was ignorant of his condition, but a certain kind of prayers and vows had so clouded the sense of common frailty, that I knew not how to think anything concerning him except entire prosperity.'

Ambrose is also responsible for the clear distinction between *præcepta* and *consilia*, on which see below.

4. The mediæval doctrine; consilia evangelica.—In the theology of the mediæval and modern Roman Church the subject of vows occupies a large place. It is bound up with the concept of works of supererogation.[7] The doctrine of good works

[1] *Ad Polyc.* 5.
[2] *Ep.* 4 (Oxford ed.), 61 (*PL*).
[3] Chrys. *de Sacerd.* iii. 16 f.
[4] Canons of Chalcedon, 16.
[1] E. Backhouse and C. Tylor, *Witnesses for Christ*[3], London, 1899, p. 185.
[2] *Præp. Evang.* xiii. 7.
[3] *In Ps.* lv. 1.
[4] *Ep.* cxlix. 'ad Paulinum,' § 16.
[5] § 17.
[6] *Exhort. Virg.* iii. 15, *de Viduis*, ix. 55.
[7] See art. MERIT.

rests in the first place on the Augustinian doctrine of grace together with the idea of the universal working of God. Strictly speaking, a meritorious work is inconceivable, but, on the other hand, free man is bound to acquire merit before God and through it to make satisfaction for his sin — a notion compounded of Jewish legalism and Stoic moralism and found as early as Tertullian. The Stoics also supplied a distinction between *medium* and *perfectum*, and the Jews emphasized special and unusual virtues—*e.g.*, To 12^{9}. Certain NT passages (Mt 19^{16-22}, 1 Co 7^{25-40}) were regarded as similarly indicating a graded valuation of works. In time the doctrine of *consilia evangelica* ('evangelical counsels') was developed. The term is used in contrast with *præcepta* ('commands'), and the distinction, though traceable in Hermas,[1] Tertullian,[2] and Cyprian,[3] is first expressly formulated by Ambrose.[4] We find it in Augustine, though two tendencies are visible. For, while the external and literal observance of the counsels (*e.g.*, poverty, virginity) is commended as a higher standard of morality procuring greater merit, he sees the danger of measuring the ultra-moral by this standard, since all conduct is judged in the light of inward moral intention.

For many centuries, in the heyday of monasticism, the first consideration outweighed the second, but in Thomas Aquinas[5] the other tendency again appears. Commandments are given 'about those things which are necessary to attain the end of eternal felicity,' but the counsels 'about those things by which one may obtain this end better and sooner.' In general the counsels deal with poverty, chastity, and obedience, but there was an enumeration of twelve culled from the Sermon on the Mount, including, *e.g.*, the injunctions 'Love your enemies' and 'Resist not evil.' Aquinas[6] puts it that perfection consists *essentialiter* in the command of love, but *instrumentaliter* depends on the counsels. Generally speaking, the disregard or non-observance of the counsels is not sinful, though their observance entails greater perfection and greater reward. They are 'auxiliary norms toward the discernment of those obligatory commands which govern a Christian in his particular circumstances.'

5. Roman Catholic doctrine.—Roman theology classifies vows as personal (applying mainly to oneself) and real (applying to external objects and circumstances); also as perpetual or for a definite time; also as solemn (publicly pronounced before the Church like the monastic vows or the subdiaconate implicit vow of celibacy) or simple. The doctrine of works of supererogation drew vows of all kinds, even simple and private vows, within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Dispensations can usually be granted by the bishop, but in five cases by the pope alone. Vows that prejudice the rights of a third person and vows made by minors without parental consent are inadmissible.

6. Protestant and evangelical views.—Half a century before Luther, Johann Pupper von Goch in the *de Libertate Christiana* and *Dialogus* maintained that God has given but one law and set before all Christian people one kind of perfection. Luther declared for the all-embracing nature of the baptismal vow and combated Aquinas's idea that the higher degrees of love are not commanded. He condemned all breaches of the law alike and would not allow 'inferior' perfection, though this sin God forgives on condition of faith with daily repentance. Monastic vows he declared not only invalid but sinful and idolatrous, and the *Augsburg Confession* and *Apology* and the *Schmalkald Articles* follow his lead. They also oppose the Roman doctrine of evangelical counsels as setting up works of supererogation, admitting private revenge, and casting doubt on the civil commonwealth.

With regard to special vows (promises made to God from motives of gratitude or devotion or as a means of deepening the spiritual life) he was tolerant, though not putting any stress on them. Calvin, however, while giving pride of place to the baptismal vow and championing Christian freedom against the Roman doctrine, was more convinced of the utility of particular vows by which a Christian might in some signal way express his gratitude, or strengthen his will-power. In this connexion it is worth recording the testimony of the *Westminster Confession of Faith*, ch. xxi. 5, where it is said that religious oaths and vows, solemn fastings, and thanksgivings upon special occasions are an addendum to the 'ordinary religious worship of God.' Ch. xxii. 'Of Lawful Oaths and Vows,' includes the following paragraphs:

'v. A vow is of the like nature with a promissory oath, and ought to be made with the like religious care, and to be performed with the like faithfulness.

vi. It is not to be made to any creature, but to God alone: and that it may be accepted, it is to be made voluntarily, out of faith, and conscience of duty, in way of thankfulness for mercy received, or for the obtaining of what we want; whereby we more strictly bind ourselves to necessary duties, or to other things, so far and so long as they may fitly conduce thereunto.

vii. No man may vow to do any thing forbidden in the word of God, or what would hinder any duty therein commanded, or which is not in his power, and for the performance whereof he hath no promise of ability from God. In which respects, popish monastical vows of perpetual single life, professed poverty, and regular obedience, are so far from being degrees of higher perfection, that they are superstitious and sinful snares, in which no Christian may entangle himself.'

The 'proof texts' adduced are as follows: (v.) Is 19^{21}, Ec 5^{4-6}, Ps 61^{8} 66^{13c}; (vi.) Ps 76^{11}, Jer $44^{25f.}$, Dt 23^{21-23}, Ps 50^{14}, Gn 28^{20-22}, 1 S 1^{11}, Ps $66^{13f.}$, Ps 132^{2-5}; (vii.) Ac $23^{12.\ 14}$, Mk 6^{26}, Nu $30^{5.\ 8.\ 12f.}$, Mt $19^{11f.}$, 1 Co $7^{2.\ 9}$, Eph 4^{28}, 1 P 4^{2}, 1 Co 7^{23}.

Modern Biblical criticism had not yet been born. Similarly in the *Larger Catechism* vowing unto God is included among the 'duties required in the Second Commandment,'[1] and sinful vows among the 'sins forbidden in the Third Commandment.'[2]

7. Conclusion.—There are certain ethical duties which the community, whether ecclesiastical, civil, or social, imposes upon the individual and which he accepts (marriage vows at least in part may be reckoned in here), and there are others of a more particular kind which the individual imposes on himself either to develop his spiritual life or to express his gratitude to God for some special mercy. It is quite legitimate to argue that these are implicit in the general vow taken at baptism or on conscious entrance into the Christian circle. It is also evident that all action is conditioned by circumstance, and circumstance may vary so that what seems to-day a clear and positive duty may to-morrow occupy quite a subordinate place. It is possible for a formally expressed vow to become a burden on the conscience, and it then exposes the soul to extra peril. In any case special and formal vows are best left to extraordinary circumstances, and normally it is well simply to lay one's impulses earnestly before God with a prayer for the grace of perseverance and constancy. A closing word may be said about the 'counsels.' Alongside the 'commandments,' whether 'of God' or 'of the Lord,' there are not only the 'commandments' of Paul, which hardly concern us here (1 Co 16^{1} 7^{17}), but also his 'judgments' (1 Co 7^{3-6}, 2 Co $8^{10.\ 8}$), counsels whose acceptance presupposes a divine *charisma* (1 Co 7^{7}). Making all allowance for time and place, the apostle's counsels still have pertinence, and 1 Co 7, like Mt $19^{11f.}$, furnishes a basis for distinguishing between an 'advisory

[1] *Mand.* iv. iv. 2, *Sim.* v. iii. 3.
[2] *De Exhort. Cast.* iv.
[3] *De Habitu Virg.* xxiii.
[4] *De Viduis*, xii.
[5] *Summa*, II. i. qu. 108, art. 4.
[6] *Ib.* II. ii. qu. 184, art. 3.

[1] Qu. 108. [2] Qu. 113.

norm' and the absolute force of a command. This, however, is not to admit the whole Roman doctrine of *consilia evangelica*.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references cited in the art. see J. Bingham, *Origines ecclesiasticæ*, London, 1840, VII. iii. 7 f., iv. 2, XVI. vii. 9; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. 88, qu. 184, art. 4, *In IV Sent.* d. 36, qu. 1, *Opusc.* 18 (al. 22) c. 24; F. Daab, *Die Zulässigkeit der Gelübde*, Gütersloh, 1896; art. 'Vows' in *CE* and appended bibliography; and sundry works on moral theology—*e.g.*, Simon and Paderborn (Roman Catholic) and Rothe and Hase (Protestant). A. J. GRIEVE.

VOWS (Greek and Roman).—1. Greek.—We understand by a vow a conditional promise made by the worshipper to the divine power. The condition is the rendering of aid; and the vow, thus strictly regarded, is the proposal of a bargain that the recipient of the favour required shall make suitable recompense. Viewed in relation to prayer (*q.v.*),[1] the vow is intended to add cogency to the request and to help towards its fulfilment. The fulfilment of a contingent vow is often pledged by the security of an oath, as when the nine archons at Athens on entering office swore at the altar in the market-place that they would dedicate a golden statue, if they transgressed the laws during their term.[2] But, of course, a promise may be ratified by an oath which lacks the essential conditions of a vow, as when Odysseus undertook to bring Philoctetes to Troy, offering in the event of failure to yield his life to any one who might choose to take it.[3] Further, to the Greek conception a vow could not be merely negative; a definite offering must be promised as a return for the favour to be granted.[4] If therefore the Nazirite vow taken by St. Paul (Ac 18[18]) involved merely an act of abstinence or consecration promised by way of thanksgiving for escape from danger,[5] it would not be a vow in the full sense of the term as explained above. It frequently happens that, although we have reason to suppose that a vow has been made, evidence is lacking of the conditions imposed. Thus in the version of Iphigenia's sacrifice referred to by Euripides[6] and Cicero[7] we are simply told that Agamemnon vowed to Artemis the fairest thing born in his kingdom within a particular year. Among the very numerous examples of 'votive' offerings recorded in literature and inscriptions there are comparatively few where it can be determined with certainty whether the consecration was made by way of thanksgiving or in fulfilment of a vow.[8] The illustrations which we propose to give have been taken from sources where the evidence is unambiguous. It should be added that several inscriptions which have been preserved and were attached to votive offerings bear as a label the statement that the dedication is in consequence of a vow.[9]

(*a*) *Public vows.*—It may be stated generally that vows were made in times of fear and danger. Women especially, Plato[10] tells us, and men too when they are sick or in trouble, if alarmed by dreams or apparitions, are apt to consecrate the occasion by vowing sacrifices and promising the building of temples. Times of war, especially when the existence of the State was imperilled by hostile attack, often gave occasion for vows to be made in public on behalf of all.

Hector bade his mother Hecuba promise the sacrifice to Athene of twelve heifers, if she would have pity upon the city of Troy and its inhabitants.[11] In historical times the most famous of such public acts of intercession was the vow of the Athenians made before the battle of Marathon offering to sacrifice to Artemis a number of she-goats equal to that of the enemy who might be killed in the impending fight. But so many corpses of the enemy were found that it was impossible to procure the victims; and consequently it was resolved to compromise the liability and to sacrifice 500 every year. The custom was still maintained in the life-time of Xenophon.[1] This famous vow is parodied in Aristophanes,[2] where the sacrifice of 1000 goats is offered to Artemis so soon as the price of anchovies is down. Before Salamis a vow was taken by the Greeks to destroy the Medizing states and to consecrate their goods.[3] The oath said to have been taken before Platæa to found in that town a festival *Eleutheria* to be celebrated perpetually[4] is considered to be apocryphal. Herodotus, discussing the motive which impelled Cyrus to place Crœsus and fourteen Lydian youths on a pyre for sacrifice, recognizes the prevalence of human sacrifice among Oriental nations by suggesting that Cyrus may have so acted in fulfilment of a vow.[5] Heracles, before the capture of Œchalia, vowed the dedication to Zeus of altars and tributes of fruit-lands.[6]

Before entering upon a campaign, it was customary to offer to the gods a share in the spoils as a reward for their assistance.[7] Similar obligations were undertaken in the crises of civil war or when national interests were seriously endangered.

Cypselus offered, if he succeeded in his attempt to become master of Corinth, to dedicate all the property of the citizens to Zeus, and evaded the extremity of the hardship imposed upon them by exacting a tithe of their goods for ten successive years.[8] On the other hand, Moxus the Lydian, after he had freed his countrymen from the tyranny of Meles, ordered them to fulfil his vow by handing over a tithe of their possessions to the gods.[9] In the hope of freeing themselves from the horrible tribute of human lives exacted by Minos the Cretan king, the Athenians are said to have promised Apollo that they would every year dispatch a sacred embassy to Delos.[10]

(*b*) *Private vows.*—We may now pass to vows made by individuals in order to save lives dear to them on occasions of peril.

Peleus vowed that, if Achilles came back safe from Troy, he would dedicate a lock of his son's hair, together with rich sacrifices, to the river-god Spercheios.[11] Similarly Berenice vowed a lock of her hair to the gods on the occasion of her husband, Ptolemy Euergetes, starting on an expedition to ravage the Assyrian borders.[12] So long as the owner is exposed to a special peril, the hair remains uncut, but, when he has safely passed through the crisis or has reached a certain age unharmed,[13] a lock is rendered in thanksgiving to the protecting power. Hector, about to meet Ajax in single combat, promises that in the event of his success he will dedicate the spoils in the temple of Apollo.[14] Telemachus urges his mother Penelope to vow the sacrifice of hecatombs to the gods, if Zeus should grant retribution for the wrongs they have suffered.[15]

The successful completion of a sea-voyage was frequently celebrated by offerings to the gods.[16]

Eurylochus, on behalf of the companions of Odysseus, when they prepared to kill the oxen of the sun-god, offered to build a splendid temple in his honour, if he would grant them a safe return to Ithaca.[17] Diogenes, in peril on the Carpathian sea, vows to dedicate his cloak to the Bœotian Cabirus, if he escapes safe to land.[18] An epigram of Callimachus parodied these vows by describing the dedication to the Samothracian Cabiri of a salt-cellar which by providing its owner with frugal meals had enabled him to escape from the storms of debts.[19]

In the same way the traveller by land who has safely completed his journey dedicates his felt hat to Artemis in the due accomplishment of his vows.[20] We have a copious record of dedications by those who successfully competed in the ordeal of the great Games.[21] Many of these must have been made in consequence of previous vows such as that of Xenophon of Corinth, who, as a competitor for the Olympic crown in 464 B.C., vowed that, if successful, he would consecrate 100 *lερόδουλοι* for the service of the temple of Aphrodite in that city.[22]

Many examples of vows are connected with the ordinary incidents of family life. A mother makes and pays vows for the safety of her child.[23] The

[1] εὐχή is used for 'vow' and 'prayer' alike; cf. the combination of *vota* and *preces*, which frequently occurs in Latin (*e.g.*, Stat. *Theb.* xi. 616, where of course *vota* has the wider sense).
[2] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* vii. 1, lv. 5.
[3] Soph. *Phil.* 618.
[4] Headlam on Æsch. *Ag.* 924.
[5] Jos. *BJ* II. xv. 1.
[6] *Iph. Tauris*, 21.
[7] *Off.* iii. 95.
[8] Hor. *Od.* i. 5. 15, or *Anth. Pal.* vi. 164, as compared with Verg. *Æn.* xii. 769.
[9] W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, Cambridge, 1902, p. 328 f.
[10] *Legg.* 909 E.
[11] Hom. *Il.* vi. 274 ff.
[1] Xen. *Anab.* iii. 2. 12.
[2] *Eq.* 660 ff.
[3] Herod. vii. 132, with the commentators' notes.
[4] Diod. xi. 29.
[5] Herod. i. 86.
[6] Soph. *Trach.* 238 ff.
[7] Dem. *Epist.* i. 16.
[8] [Arist.] *Œcon.* 1346*a* 32.
[9] Nicol. Damasc. frag. 24 (*FHG* iii. 371).
[10] Plat. *Phæd.* 58 B.
[11] Hom. *Il.* xxiii. 144 ff.
[12] Catull. lxvi. 8 ff.
[13] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 198.
[14] Hom. *Il.* vii. 82 ff.
[15] Hom. *Od.* xvii. 50.
[16] Rouse, p. 228.
[17] Hom. *Od.* xii. 345.
[18] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 245.
[19] *Ib.* vi. 301.
[20] *Ib.* vi. 199.
[21] Rouse, p. 149 ff.
[22] Pindar, frag. 122.
[23] Xen. *Mem.* ii. 2. 10.

dedication consequent upon the parent's vow is frequently in the form of a portrait-statue of the child,[1] which is offered to Æsculapius or Apollo on condition of the cure of sickness.[2] Or it may be the patient himself who makes the vow, as is indicated in parody by the tricky vow of a devotee of Bacchus to abstain from strong drink for 'a hundred suns' in the event of recovery from fever.[3] The Greek Anthology furnishes several examples of vows made to Ilithyia or Æsculapius if they will grant a safe release from the pains and dangers of child-birth.[4] The appropriate offerings in such cases were articles of dress or jewelry.[5] Sometimes the condition of the vow is the granting of a good harvest;[6] more often it is relief from the stress of poverty.[7] There is even on record the promise of a sacrifice, if the god will make a curse effective upon an enemy.[8]

(*c*) *Penalty for infraction.*—The infraction of a vow was visited with a suitable penalty;[9] and this might be directed against the community of which the transgressor was a member, as we have seen that, according to one form of the story, the Greeks were punished with adverse winds at Aulis for the default of their leader Agamemnon. It rarely happened that the favour of the gods was so confidently anticipated that offerings were made to them in advance; Polynices, who dedicated statues to Aphrodite and Ares before starting from Argos on his expedition against Thebes,[10] was not an encouraging example. But no doubt confidence was more frequent in the daily requirements of domestic need.[11]

2. Roman. — Whereas with the Greeks vows tended more and more to become a matter of individual concern, as being employed chiefly in the critical moments of domestic life, and the records of vows offered publicly on behalf of the whole community are comparatively scanty, at Rome the conditions were entirely different. It is true that we have sufficient evidence that here also individuals menaced with danger applied for the assistance of the gods with promises of offerings or sacrifice. The illustrations to be found in Vergil should not be set down to the influence of his Greek models.

Æneas, shipwrecked on a foreign coast, promises sacrificial victims as a reward to the disguised Venus, whom he recognizes as a goddess.[12] Ascanius calls upon Jupiter to direct his arrow, vowing gifts and the sacrifice of a bullock in the event of success.[13] Cloanthus promises a sacrifice to the sea-gods on condition of victory in the boat-race.[14]

Copious evidence will be found in inscriptions of the frequent occurrence of vows in the private life of the Romans. As an example we may mention the inscription from Sora[15] in which the two brothers Vertulei dedicate a tithe to Hercules in payment of their father's vows. From the time of Augustus onwards the formula *VSLM* ('votum solvit lubens merito') is regularly employed.[16] A collection of these private votive inscriptions has been made by A. de Marchi, *Il culto privato dei Romani*, i. 271 ff.

Nevertheless, the characteristic formalism of the Roman religion is chiefly apparent in the administration of the public vows. A regular contract is drawn up between the State and the deity concerned, and its conditions are publicly announced (*nuncupatio*); the form of words necessary in accordance with sacred law is prescribed by the priest (*concipere vota*); a solemn engagement (*suscipere vota*) is entered into by the official who represents the State; in his public capacity he becomes liable to carry out the vow (*votum solvere, reddere*); and, if he fails, the breach in the sacred compact must be duly punished. The State representative is thus, during the period between the undertaking of the vow and its fulfilment, in the position of an accused person awaiting his trial (*voti reus*);[1] and, so soon as the condition was fulfilled, he was cast in the terms of his bond (*voti damnatus*).[2] Sometimes an estimate was made of the cost involved, and the sum required was entered in the public records. The cost of the celebration of *ludi magni* on a solemn occasion during the Second Punic War was assessed at the figure of 333333⅓ sesterces—a number evidently chosen for its magical potency.[3]

One of the usual occasions for the making of vows was at the opening of a war.

Thus Acilius Glabrio, at the commencement of the war against Antiochus, vowed a celebration of *ludi magni* for ten days with gifts laid on all the *pulvinaria*, if the war should be satisfactorily brought to an end.[4] Augustus, at the beginning of the campaign which was closed by the battle of Philippi, vowed a temple to Mars Ultor, which he dedicated forty years later.[5] App. Claudius, in the thick of a battle with the Samnites, exclaimed: 'Bellona, if thou givest victory to-day, I vow thee a temple.'[6] Marius before the battle of Vercellæ was said to have vowed a hecatomb as the price of victory.[7] Marcellus, having vowed a temple to Honos and Virtus, was met, when he proceeded to its execution, with a technical objection by the pontiffs that a single *cella* could not be dedicated to two deities.[8]

An outbreak of pestilence was another occasion on which extraordinary vows were usually made. On the occurrence of such a visitation, among the vows to be fulfilled on the cessation of the plague we find the dedication of a temple to Apollo,[9] the oblation of gifts and sacrifices to Apollo, Æsculapius, and Salus,[10] and the institution of public holidays (*feriæ*) and ceremonial processions (*supplicationes*).[11] These and similar rewards suitable to the particular occasion or to the functions of the god whose favour is to be enlisted meet us continually in the pages of Livy.

Thus the Pythian Apollo was offered a tithe of the booty for assistance rendered in the capture of Veii.[12] The most remarkable example of votive dedications was the consecration of a *ver sacrum*, *i.e.* the sacrifice of all living animals to be born within the limits of a particular spring. There is only one instance on record in historical times, that is to say, at the beginning of the Second Punic War in 217 B.C.[13] The vow was actually performed twenty-one years later.[14]

Sometimes the condition imposed upon the divine agent was the continuance of the commonwealth in its then present condition for a period of five[15] or ten years.[16] The specification of a definite time-limit forms a link between the extraordinary vows and those which were repeated regularly after the lapse of a certain period. Thus, every year on 1st January the consuls, suitably attended, climbed the Capitoline hill, made a solemn sacrifice of white oxen in fulfilment of the vow made the previous year, and entered into a new obligation for the year to come in order to secure the safety of the State.[17] From the year 30 B.C. onwards a special vow was made for the safety of the *princeps* and his house;[18] and at a later date the rite was fixed to be performed annually on 3rd January.[19] Similarly, when sacrifice was made at the opening of a new *lustrum*, a vow was made of a new offering to become due after the expiration of the quinquennial period.[20] In imperial times a custom grew up of making vows for periods of five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years.[21] This may have been

[1] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 357.
[2] Rouse, pp. 210, 329.
[3] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 291.
[4] *Ib.* vi. 146, 147, 148, 270.
[5] Rouse, p. 252; *Anth. Pal.* vi. 270, 274.
[6] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 41.
[7] *Ib.* vi. 190, 231, 300.
[8] Rouse, p. 339, note 2.
[9] Hom. *Il.* i. 65.
[10] Paus. ii. 25. 1.
[11] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 209.
[12] *Æn.* i. 334.
[13] *Ib.* ix. 626.
[14] *Ib.* v. 234.
[15] *CIL* i. 1175.
[16] *E.g.*, *ib.* i. 1462.

[1] Verg. *Æn.* v. 237.
[2] Verg. *Ecl.* v. 80; Liv. xxvii. 45.
[3] Liv. xxii. 10.
[4] *Ib.* xxxvi. 2.
[5] Ov. *Fast.* v. 550 ff.
[6] Liv. x. 19.
[7] Plut. *Mar.* 26.
[8] Liv. xxvii. 25.
[9] *Ib.* iv. 25.
[10] *Ib.* xl. 37.
[11] *Ib.* xli. 21.
[12] *Ib.* v. 21.
[13] *Ib.* xxii. 10.
[14] *Ib.* xxxiii. 44.
[15] *Ib.* xxx. 27.
[16] *Ib.* xlii. 28.
[17] Ovid, *Pont.* iv. 4. 27 ff.; Liv. xxi. 63.
[18] Dio Cass. li. 19.
[19] Plut. *Cic.* 2.
[20] Val. Max. iv. 1. 10; Sueton. *Aug.* 97.
[21] *E.g.*, *CIL* iii. 8706.

partly due to their substitution for the old *lustra*, and partly to the periods of five and ten years for which Augustus assumed the imperial power, starting from the year 27 B.C.[1] The establishment of the empire not unnaturally gave rise to a multiplication of the vows offered on extraordinary occasions by courtiers anxious to testify their devotion to the reigning Cæsar and his household. Tacitus records vows made for the safe return of Tiberius from a campaign,[2] for the safety of the dying Claudius,[3] and for the safe delivery of Poppæa.[4]

We have seen that the choice of the god whose aid is invoked—*e.g.*, Æsculapius or Bellona—is determined by the occasion of the desired intervention. In the fierce struggle of a decisive battle, as a final effort to leave no possible means of victory untried, it was sometimes determined to appeal to the enemies' gods and to offer them an inducement to transfer their protection. The classical instance is the offer of the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of Lake Regillus to dedicate a temple to Castor, the patron deity of Tusculum.[5] A special application of this practice was the solemn rite of *evocatio*,[6] according to which, before the final assault was delivered against a beleaguered city, its gods were summoned to abandon it and to accept a new resting-place at Rome. In this way Juno was invited to leave her home at Veii and follow the fortunes of the conquerors.[7] An interesting account of the whole matter is given by Macrobius,[8] who remarks that the Romans endeavoured carefully to conceal the name of their protecting god, in order that others might not employ against them the device which they used against Corinth and Carthage as well as against Veii and other Italian towns. He records the *formulæ* which were employed at the siege of Carthage and points out that the *evocatio* of the gods must be carefully distinguished from the simultaneous *devotio* of the hostile garrison and citizens who were handed over to the dominion of the deities of the under world Dispater, Veiovis, Manes, and Tellus. To these powers a sacrifice of three black sheep was offered at the same time. The *devotio* of the enemy appears here as the consequence of the *evocatio*;[9] but the term was specifically employed when during the progress of a battle the Roman commander made a vow to the infernal powers that he was prepared to sacrifice either his own life or that of a Roman citizen serving under him on condition that in return for this surrender the annihilation of the enemy's forces was assured.[10] The peculiarity which distinguished the *devotio* from the offering of vows in general was that the forfeit was rendered in advance to the divine promiser in the assurance that the required service would be forthcoming. Our knowledge of the custom rests almost entirely upon Livy's account of the self-sacrifice of P. Decius Mus in the battle with the Latins in the neighbourhood of Vesuvius in 340 B.C.,[11] and of his son at Sentinum in 295 B.C. during the course of the war against the Etruscans and their allies.[12] Even if these events are not to be regarded as historically true,[13] the particulars of the ritual and formularies adopted are sufficient to prove the antiquity of the custom. If the person whose life was pledged fell in battle forthwith, the sacrifice was considered acceptable and the result assured.[1] If the Roman general who made the vow did not meet with his death, he became *impius*, and was excluded from participation in public and private *sacra*;[2] but, if the vow was made for the self-immolation of a legionary soldier, and the sacrifice of his life was omitted or rejected, he could obtain expiation by the burying in the ground of a *signum* at least seven feet high and the offering of a piacular sacrifice, and the place where expiation was made became *locus religiosus*.[3] The development of *devotio* in later times as an act of self-sacrifice for the emperor[4] does not concern the present subject.

LITERATURE.—Besides works referred to above see I. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*[2], Leipzig, 1885, iii. 264 ff.; A. Pernice, *SBAW*, 1885, p. 1146 ff.; W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, p. 204 ff.; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, [2]1912, p. 319 ff., and in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Devotio'; G. E. Marindin, in Smith's *Dict. Ant.*, London, 1890, ii. 981[b].

A. C. PEARSON.

VOWS (Hebrew).—By a vow a person brings himself under a sacred obligation to God (or to some particular god) to do something or to refrain from something. The thing he vows to do is something which goes beyond the normal demands of his religion, and the thing he vows to refrain from is something permissible in normal circumstances—*e.g.*, the enjoyment of food, the fruit of the grape, sexual intercourse. The motive of the vow is usually desire to secure divine help, and its form is usually expressed conditionally: if God does something for the man, the man will do something for God, something with which He is believed to be well pleased.

In the OT a vow is unconditionally valid only when it is made by a person whose will is not subject to the challenge of another—*i.e.* by the head of a house (the father or husband), a widow, or a divorced woman (Nu 30). A wife (Nu 30^{6-8}) or an unmarried daughter (30^{3-5}) could of course make a vow; but the husband in the one case, and the father in the other, had the right of veto. If, however, this right of the husband was not immediately exercised, the vow of the wife was held to be valid: it could not properly be cancelled by a subsequent disavowal on the man's part; if he did so cancel it, the guilt of non-fulfilment attached to him, not to the woman. The 'strange' woman of Pr 7, who is married, is represented as making vows and inviting a paramour to the sacrificial feast (7^{14}) which is a frequent accompaniment of the vow (cf. 1 S 1^{21}, Ps 66^{13-15}). There are no extant regulations in the OT governing the vows of an unmarried son.

Vows must have been practised from immemorial antiquity; they are as old as the feeling for God and the experience of distress. They are attested for every period from the patriarchal to NT times (Ac $21^{23ff.}$ $23^{12.\ 21}$), and they seem to have played a more prominent part in religious practice as time wore on. Early historians record vows, but there is no early legislation on the subject. This first appears in a simple form in Deut. (7th cent. B.C.); but in the later (post-Exilic) literature vows are the subject of minute legislation—a fact which indicates extensive indulgence in the practice. This is confirmed by numerous references in later books—Prophets and Psalms (Is 19^{21}, Jon 1^{16} 2^{9}, Job 22^{27}, Ps 22^{25} 50^{14} 56^{12} 65^{1} 76^{11}).

Illustrations of vows from the period of the judges and the early monarchy are as follows: (i.) Jephthah vows that, if Jahweh give him victory over the Ammonites, he will sacrifice to Him the first human being (this is the implication) that comes out of his house to meet him (Jg $11^{30f.}$); (ii.) Hannah

1 Dio Cass. liii. 13. 2 *Ann.* iii. 47. 3 *Ib.* xii. 68.
4 *Ib.* xv. 23. 5 Liv. ii. 20.
6 For possible traces of the following of this custom by the Greeks see the present writer's *Fragments of Sophocles*, London, 1917, ii. 105 (frag. 452).
7 Liv. v. 21. 8 iii. 9.
9 Wissowa regards this as a case of *consecratio* rather than *devotio* (Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 901).
10 Liv. viii. 10. 11. 11 *Ib.* viii. 6-10.
12 *Ib.* x. 28.
13 T. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Eng. tr., London, 1877, i. 366. The report of the *devotio* of a third Decius at the battle of Ausculum (Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 61) in 279 B.C. is certainly apocryphal (Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2285).

1 Liv. x. 28. 13. 2 *Ib.* viii. 10. 13. 3 *Ib.* viii. 10. 12.
4 τὸν τῶν Ἰβήρων τρόπον (Dio Cass. liii. 20).

vows that, if Jahweh give her a son, she will dedicate him to the life-long service of Jahweh, and no razor shall come upon his head (1 S 1^{11}); (iii.) Absalom, while in exile in Aram, vowed that, if Jahweh brought him back in safety to Jerusalem, he would serve Him (*i.e.* worship Him—with sacrifice) at Hebron (2 S 15^{8}). To these may be added—though not in the same sense historical—Jacob's vow to make the pillar at Bethel a sanctuary and to pay God tithes, if He furnished him with food and clothing and brought him safely back to the land he was leaving (Gn $28^{20\text{-}22}$). As an illustration of vows of abstinence may be taken the curse which Saul invoked, in the course of a battle with the Philistines, upon any one (and, by implication, upon himself) who would eat any food before the evening (1 S $14^{24\text{ff.}}$), and the vow attributed to David—whether historical or not—that he would not enter his house, ascend his bed, or give sleep to his eyes, till he had found a place for Jahweh (Ps $132^{2\text{-}5}$). The nazirites, according to the later law, abstained, while the vow was upon them, from wine, from contact with the dead, and from cutting the hair (Nu $6^{1\text{-}8}$); the Rechabites not only abstained from wine, but refused to practise agriculture or to live in houses (Jer $35^{6\text{f.}}$). The abstinence, however, which accompanies such vows is to be interpreted not as arbitrary privation, but as a tabu 'incident to the state of consecration, the same taboos, in fact, which are imposed, without a vow, on everyone who is engaged in worship or priestly service in the sanctuary, or even everyone who is present in the holy place.'[1] Uriah's refusal to enter his house or deal with his wife (2 S 11^{11}) is explained by his being a warrior on campaign, and war is a sacred activity.

Most of the vows from the early period reveal the prominence with which at that time national interests bulked in the mind of the individual, whose chief duty and privilege was to promote the religious, military, or political welfare of his people, and thus to promote the interests of the national God, which were bound up with those of His people. Jephthah and Saul, *e.g.*, desire victory over the enemy of their nation and the nation's God; David is represented as passionately concerned with the suitable worship of that God. Even in that early period, however, the individual had a life and interests of his own: Jacob and Absalom long for a safe return, and Hannah for a son. As, through the collapse of the State, the individual came into ever-increasing prominence as a religious unit, vows affecting purely individual interests became increasingly common, and even the vicissitudes of ordinary life must have offered many occasions for them. The Psalms preserve some of the songs sung by grateful worshippers at the payment of their vows, *i.e.* when they brought their 'sacrifices of thanksgiving' (*e.g.*, Ps $22^{22\text{-}31}$ $66^{13\text{-}20}$ 116). In particular, the various stanzas of Ps 107, with its repeated appeal to the worshippers to give thanks to Jahweh (vv.$^{1.\ 8.\ 15.\ 21.\ 31}$), give us a glimpse of the sort of occasions on which anxious hearts made vows and grateful hearts paid them: in each stanza deliverance from some distress is contemplated—from the perils of a journey across the wilderness or on the sea, from sickness, prison, etc. Ps 116^{13} preserves for us the interesting custom (cf. Mt 26^{27}) of raising in the hand the 'cup of salvation' when invoking the divine name in connexion with the payment of vows. The Psalms abound in expressions of overflowing gratitude which are manifestly the sincere utterance of much happy experience of divine deliverance, and profound joy in the privilege of performing the vows (which would frequently take the form of sacrifice) made in the hour of distress.

The readiness to vow, however, had its dangers. Instinct and legislation alike (Lv $22^{17\text{-}23}$) prescribed that nothing short of the best was good enough for Jahweh—a male without blemish, if the offering was an animal; but vows made in haste were often repented at leisure, and offerings of inferior worth (*e.g.*, a blind, lame, or sick animal) were made—a practice which evokes the fierce indignation of Malachi ($1^{8.\ 14}$). There is no obligation to make a vow (Dt 23^{22}); but, once made, there is a solemn obligation to keep it in the form in which it was made (Dt $23^{21.\ 23}$, Nu 30^{2}). It must cost the offerer something, whether in money, effort, or privation; and deliberately to evade or reduce the cost to which one has voluntarily and without compulsion committed oneself is to be guilty of a breach of faith which invites the divine vengeance. But many were willing to run the risk, as we may infer from Pr 20^{25}, Ec $5^{4\text{-}6}$: the latter passage (v.^{6}) shows that men sought to evade their obligation with the plea that their vow was the result of an inadvertence. The inconsiderate levity with which vows were made and the specious religious pretexts on the basis of which men withdrew from moral obligations (cf. Mk 7^{11}) go to show the danger to which in certain circles religion was exposed of losing its ethical content. The excuse of inadvertence stigmatized in Ec 5^{6} is not contemplated by the Law, which peremptorily demands that a vow must be kept; probably therefore such cases were subsumed—at least in the mind of the worshipper—under the general provision for cases where an oath was subsequently found to involve consequences which the speaker had not contemplated when he made it; relief from a rash oath could be secured after confession and the presentation of a trespass-offering (Lv $5^{4\text{-}6}$). The OT characteristically considers the vow rather as an external act than in its inner quality and implications: it does not, *e.g.*, discuss cases in which the fulfilment of a vow might be found to collide with some higher (*e.g.*, ethical) obligation. That was the problem by which Jephthah was confronted, but to him it was hardly a problem at all; his belief, on the one hand, in the sacredness and irrevocableness of the vow and, on the other, in the rightness—at least on unique occasions—of human sacrifice contributed to make his decision inevitable, with however sore a heart he reached it.

The thing vowed was very frequently an animal, but it might also be money, a house, land, or a person. When an animal was offered, the sacrifice was accompanied by an oblation, as in the case of the other sacrifices (Nu $15^{3\text{ff.}}$). Money given to sacred prostitutes could not be accepted at the sanctuary in payment of a vow (Dt 23^{18})—it was 'tainted' money. As the thing vowed must be something extra to normal demands, nothing could be vowed—such as firstlings—on which Jahweh already had a claim (Lv 27^{26}). If an animal technically unclean and therefore unfit for sacrifice had been vowed, it was sold at a price put upon it by the priest, and the money was given to the sanctuary. If the man who vowed the animal wished to retain it, he could do so by paying the estimated price with an addition of 20 per cent (Lv $27^{11\text{-}13}$). The same procedure was followed in the case of a house that had been vowed ($27^{14\text{f.}}$), and, with certain modifications, in the case of land ($27^{16\text{-}25}$). The value of the land was determined by the distance of the next year of jubilee: for the complete period the basis of valuation was 50 shekels for an acreage seeded with a *homer* of barley, the value being reduced (apparently at the rate of a shekel a year) as the year of jubilee approached. If the land belonged by inheritance to the man who vowed it, he could secure the reversion of it in that year to himself by paying 20 per cent in addition to the price as ascertained on the above basis; if he failed to do this, it went to the priests. If, however, the land had not been originally his own but purchased, it reverted in the year of jubilee to the original owner.

In the older period human beings could be dedicated to the god by a vow in one of several ways—by actual sacrifice (Jg $11^{30\text{ff.}}$), by service at a sanctuary (1 S 1^{11}), or by the nazirite life (Jg 13^{5}). Since, however, in the post-Exilic period human sacrifice had passed away and the service of the sanctuary was exclusively in the hands of the Levites (Nu $3^{5\text{ff.}}$), only the nazirite vow—and

[1] W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.* p. 482.

that in a modified form (temporary, not now life-long)—remained (6[26f.]). But, though the custom of vowing human beings was no longer possible, the shadow of it remained in the practice of substituting for the person a sum of money determined by the age and sex of the person, 50 shekels being payable for a man and 30 for a woman between the ages of twenty and sixty, when the powers were presumably at their highest, and smaller sums for those under twenty and over sixty (Lv 27[1-7]). These estimates doubtless often represented a substantial demand on the financial resources of the worshipper; the priests would have many motives of both a higher and a lower kind for insisting that he must not escape with an offering which had cost him little or nothing (cf. the noble words of David in 2 S 24[24]). They stood to gain heavily by the practice of vows, as what was vowed to God was as good as made over to them (Lv 27[21]). But the OT shows here its customary regard for the poor by providing that in their case these demands should be relaxed: they are only to pay according to their ability, as estimated by the priest (Lv 27[8]).

Persons devoted by the ban could not be redeemed; they must be put to death (Lv 27[29]). This law had doubtless chiefly in view the destruction of Canaanite idolaters: it could have been enforced, or applicable, only in early times (Jos 6[21]; cf. 1 S 15[3]); for the later age it would suggest little more than the obligation of uncompromising hostility to idolatry.

An examination of the vows recorded and of the laws regulating vows throws some light on the character both of the worshipper and of his God. The vow was born in a sense of need or an experience of distress (Ps 66[14]). The things that men desired were deliverance, prosperity, health, children, victory; and the God to whom the vows were offered was believed to be pleased with sacrifice (even—in the early period—with human sacrifice). The circle of ideas with which vows were associated is priestly rather than prophetic, and there is an externalism and a quasi-commercial conception of the relation between God and man which is alien to the higher prophetic spirit. But, though vows in the later period were sometimes lightly made and dexterously evaded, the manifest emotion with which many a singer in the Psalter records his gratitude to God as he pays his vows shows that they must often have represented a warm and genuine religious experience. They are an implicit confession of the speaker's recognized insufficiency, and their fulfilment is the expression of his gratitude for the experienced help of Jahweh (cf. Jer 33[11]). It is no accident, however, that vows play practically no rôle at all in the NT, where the demand is for a consecration not occasional but continuous, and for a consecration not of gifts but of the entire personality.

LITERATURE.—Artt. on 'Vows' in *HDB*, *EBi*, and *PRE*[3]; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 381 ff.; B. Stade, *Bibl. Theologie des AT*[2] (ed. A. Bertholet), Tübingen, 1911, pp. 60 f., 69 ff.

JOHN E. McFADYEN.

VOWS (Hindu).—Vows are a highly important element in the Hindu religion. Thus, according to a Sanskrit lawbook, a Brāhman ascetic must keep the five vows (*vrata*) of abstention from injuring living beings, of truthfulness, of abstention from theft, of continence, and of liberality, besides five minor vows, such as abstention from anger, purity, etc. (Baudhāyana, ii. 18. 1, 3). Brāhmanical students were subject to restrictive rules of the same kind during their residence with a teacher, and they had to undertake, moreover, special vows when learning particular portions of the Veda, such as the *Sāvitrivrata*, in connexion with the study of the sacred prayer called *Sāvitrī*. The five great *vratas* of the Jainas, 'I renounce all killing of living beings, lying, stealing, sexual pleasures, all attachments whether great or small,' are evidently formed upon the Brāhmanical model. Nor are the five commandments (*pañcasīla*) of the Buddhist canonical books essentially different from the five Brāhman vows, especially as they are supplemented like the latter by five other vows which are binding on the Buddhist monk only. On his entrance into the Order, the would-be Buddhist had to raise his joined hands and to declare: 'I take refuge in the Buddha, in the Law, in the Congregation.' Many different Brāhmanical *vratas*, in the sense of self-imposed devout or ceremonial observances of any sort, are described in the Purāṇas, and have passed from them into the mediæval and modern Sanskrit Digests of Religious Usages, such as Hemādri's *Caturvargacintāmaṇi* (written c. 1300 A.D., printed in the *Bibliotheca Indica*), which devotes more than 2300 pages to the subject of *vratas*, most of them to be performed and repeated on certain stated days of the year. Thus the *puṣpadvitīyāvratam* (i. 382), to be performed on the second (*dvitīyā*) of the bright half of every month for a whole year, beginning with the month of Kārttika, consists of eating nothing but flowers or blossoms (*puṣpa*) during all those days, and presenting the Brāhmans at the close of the *vrata* with flowers made of gold and with a cow. As a recompense for performing this *vrata* a man obtains heavenly enjoyments and a metallic car. For seven consecutive re-births he will be imbued with a knowledge of the Vedas and of the Vedāṅgas, and will live in happiness for a long time, surrounded by his sons and grandsons. In the case of the 'bull-vow' (*vṛṣabhavratam*), which is undertaken on the eighth of the bright half, one bestows a bull clad in a white robe and decked with ornaments, the spiritual reward consisting in a long residence in the heaven of Śiva, followed by re-birth in the station of a king. One performing the 'river-vow' (*nadīvratam*) should, within certain intervals, worship seven different sacred streams, each for one day, offering milk in water, giving water-pots filled with milk to the Brāhmans, subsisting on nothing but milk himself, bathing far from the village, and taking food at night only. At the end of the year he should give a *pala* of silver to the Brāhmans. By so doing he will enjoy a long and prosperous life, and will in a future birth be free from disease, eminent, virtuous, and rich, enjoying the position of a king, or of a distinguished Brāhman (ii. 462). By the side of these comparatively simple rites, we find others with a more complicated ceremonial; but the ingredients of fasting, gifts to Brāhmans, offerings to deities, etc., recur in nearly all these endless *vratas*, which give a nice round of religious observances, entailing spiritual blessings and natural comforts for the whole of the Hindu year. The *Vratarāja*, which is considered the leading Sanskrit treatise on *vratas* in W. India at the present day, contains a description of no fewer than 205 *vratas*. The performance of *vratas* is nowadays specially common among women, and this may be an ancient custom, considering that in Kālidāsa's drama Urvaśī, the queen, when desirous of effecting a reconciliation with her husband, sends for the king, inviting him to undertake a certain *vrata* in common with her; and that the Sanskrit lawbooks exhort wives to perform their *vratas* together with their husbands. Speaking of modern *vratas*, R. C. Bose observes: 'When the boy is sent to the *Pātsālā* (school), the girl at the age of five has to begin her course of *vratas*.' The first *vrata* is the river Pūjā, instituted after the example of the goddess Durgā, who performed this ceremonial that she might obtain a good husband, Śiva being considered a model husband. On the last day of

the Bengali year, two little earthen images of the goddess Durgā are made by the girl and worshipped by her. The next two *vratas* are those of Hari or Kṛṣṇa, and of the ten images. Then comes the *Sajāti vrata*, in performing which the girl repeats a volley of abuses against her *satīn*, or rival wife in the possible future, in order to avert the dreaded evils of polygamy. Of *vratas* to be practised by a married woman, the *Sāvitrīvrata* is made specially prominent by Bose. This *vrata* derives its name from the ancient legend of the faithful Sāvitrī, who through her devotion revived her deceased husband. It is annually celebrated in the Bengali month of Jyaiṣṭha both by women whose husbands are alive and by widows who are desirous of averting the evils of widowhood in a future birth. In the former case the husband is worshipped by his wife with sandal and flowers, and she cooks a good dinner for him. The prayers are read by the priest, who gets his usual fee and all the offerings. This *vrata* should be performed regularly for fourteen years, at the end of which the expense is tenfold more, in clothes, bedding, brass utensils, and an entertainment to Brāhmans and friends, than in the previous years. The *Sāvitrīvrata* has also been described by Ward, who mentions, besides, the *Adūrasiṁhāsanavrata*, at which 30 different wives of Brāhmans are entertained, one on each day, during the month of Vaiśākha; and the *Pañcamīvrata*, a *vrata* on a large scale extending over a period of six years, and including many partial or total fasts, and various gifts to Brāhmans on the part of the woman who is to perform this *vrata*, and various acts of worship on the part of the officiating Brāhmans, the whole ceremony closing with a grand dinner to Brāhmans and others. Ward calls the *vratas* a very lucrative source of profit to the Brāhmans. He defines them as unconditioned vows to perform religious ceremonies, distinguishing them from conditional vows consisting of a promise to present offerings on condition that the god bestow such or such a benefit. Vows of this kind are, *e.g.*, when a man promises to sacrifice a goat, or to present two loads of sweetmeats, or cloth, ornaments, money, a house, etc., if the god grant his request to have sickness removed, or to become the servant of some European, or for riches, a house, a wife, and son. Bose observes that vows made in times of sickness are fulfilled.

LITERATURE.—*The Laws of Manu*, tr. by G. Bühler, *SBE*, vol. xxv., Oxford, 1886; M. Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], London, 1893; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*; Mandlik, *Hindu Law*, Bombay, 1880; W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos*[3], 2 vols., London, 1817; R. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as they are*, Calcutta, 1881.

J. JOLLY.

VOWS (Jewish).—As the OT amply indicates, vows were a familiar feature in the religious life of Israel in former days (see art. VOWS [Hebrew]).

In the Apocrypha the references to the subject are few.

'Let nothing hinder thee,' says Ben Sira, 'to pay thy vow in due time; and wait not until death to be justified [*i.e.* 'to pay thy debt']. Before thou makest a vow, prepare thyself, and be not as a man that tempteth the Lord.'[1]

Philo[2] has some interesting observations on vows.

The word of the good man, he says, should be his oath, firm and unchangeable, founded steadfastly on truth. Therefore vows and oaths should be superfluous.[3] If a man swear at all, he should swear not by the Divine Name, but by the sacred name of his parents or by some of the great objects of nature, which are ancient and, in accordance with the will of their Creator, never grow old.[4] Once made, a vow should be sacred, particularly if it were made 'with sober reason and deliberate purpose.' (Philo would thus seem to open the door to an annulment of vows made rashly and without due consideration of what they involved.) Some men, Philo continues, make vows 'out of wicked hatred of their species, swearing, for example, that they will not admit this or that man to sit at the same table with them, or to come under the same roof.'[1] And he adds impressively: 'Sometimes, even after the death of their enemy, they keep up their enmity. I would recommend such men to seek to propitiate the mercy of God that so they may find some cure for the diseases of their souls.' He then proceeds to explain the Mosaic laws concerning vows in his characteristic allegorical fashion.

All the invective of the religious teachers failed to kill the practice of vow-making. The Talmudic Rabbis were forced, accordingly, to legislate for the popular inclination to it in their turn, and, since that inclination survived long after the Talmudic age, the codifiers had to adapt the Talmudic enactments to the needs of their day, and even to amplify them. Two whole tractates of the Talmud—*Nedarim* ('The Laws on Vows') and *Nazir* ('The Laws on the Nazirite')—are devoted to this subject. The laws on vows are embodied in Joseph Qaro's *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh* (16th cent.), the latest of the great codes, and a separate section, consisting of 33 chapters, each containing many paragraphs, is devoted to them. To give even a summary of this extensive and intricate legislation is obviously impossible here. Its magnitude and complexity are themselves an indication of the large place which vows occupied in Jewish life in former times, and of the importance attached to the subject by the Rabbinical mind. The contents of the first chapter of the treatise on vows in the *Shūlḥān 'Ārūkh* are, however, interesting as an illustration of the spirit in which the Talmudic and the later teachers approached the subject. The title of the chapter is: 'Which Vows are Praiseworthy and which Improper?' For, besides a desire to preserve the inviolability of the vow, the great anxiety of the Talmudic doctors and of their successors was the prevention of useless vows which failed to minister either to religion or to morality. Among such vows were those made hurriedly or frivolously. There were also vows imposing upon the persons taking them a needless austerity and self-mortification.

Thus, when a beautiful youth under a vow of Naziriteship presents himself to Simon the Just (3rd cent. B.C.), the sage asks him reprovingly, 'How couldst thou have consented to destroy thy fair locks?'[2]

The chapter in Qaro's work to which reference has just been made[3] opens with the following monition, borrowed, like most of the prescriptions of the codes, from the Talmud:

'Be not habituated to make vows;[4] he that makes a vow is called wicked.[5] This of ordinary vows; but, as to vows made for holy ends, it is a positive duty to fulfil them. Even vows for charitable purposes are not desirable; if one have the money, let him give it straightway without a vow, and if not, let him defer his vow until he have it [which obviously means that, in either case, a vow is undesirable]. It is "permissible" to make a vow in time of trouble. He that saith "I will study this or that chapter of the Torah, and, fearing lest he may be slothful, binds himself to study it by a vow, his vow is permissible, as is that of one who, fearing for his strength of purpose, fortifies by a vow his determination to fulfil a certain precept of the Law."[6] He that takes a vow in order to strengthen his good resolves, and to improve his way of life, is a man of energy, and worthy of praise. For example, if he be a glutton, and abstains by vow from meat for one year or two, or if he be a drunkard and denies himself wine for a time or for life, or if, proud of his comeliness, he becomes a Nazirite [as a penance]—all such acts are a service of God, and to them the Talmudic Sages refer when they say that "Vows are a protecting hedge to renunciation."'[7] And the concluding utterance is instructive: 'But, in spite of their being a service of God, it is well that a man should not make many vows of self-denial; rather let him abstain without a vow.'

The saying is typical of the Jewish spirit, which looks askance at vows, often made to be broken, and at asceticism, which makes for inefficiency in the great work of life. For, according to the

1 Sir 18[22]; cf. Epistle of Jeremiah, 35.
2 Ed. Bohn, iii. 255 ff.
3 The Essenes gave practical effect to this opinion. See Jos. *BJ* II. viii. 6.
4 Cf. Mt 5[34ff.].
1 Cf. the interesting parallels, or contrasts, in *Mishnāh Nedarim*, iii. 3, xi. 3.
2 *Nedarim*, 9*b*.
3 *Yorē Deāh*, 203.
4 Cf. *Nedarim*, 20*a*.
5 Cf. *ib.* 22*a*.
6 Cf. *ib.* 8*b*.
7 Cf. Maimonides, *Hilc. Nedarim*, end; *Abhōth*, iii. 13.

Jewish idea, the true servant of God, nay, the true man, is he who takes his full share of the activities of the world and harbours no scorn for its legitimate pleasures. Voluntary renunciation springing from an ennobling sense of freedom, not servitude to a despotic asceticism, is the Jewish ideal. The one is the mark of the strong; the other is the self-condemnation of the weak. For the rest, the following enactments may be cited:

All vows, to be valid, must be uttered aloud.[1] Boys of twelve and girls of eleven, provided they understand the meaning of their act, are capable of making vows;[2] on the other hand, in accordance with the Pentateuchal precept, a father may annul the vows of his daughter, and a husband those of his wife, if they involve hardship to the daughter or the wife.[3] A man, moreover, may impose some restriction upon himself by vow; he cannot so restrict others.[4] Moreover, vows the fulfilment of which is made impossible by *force majeure* are, *ipso facto*, null.[5] The formal annulment of vows can be effected only by an expert Rabbi or by three laymen specially indicated for the duty by repute and experience.[6]

It will have been seen that, like the Biblical teachers, the Rabbis were opposed to vows on principle. Simon the Just only once approved of the taking of a vow—when the youth, in the story above cited, explained that he had become a Nazirite as a penance for having fallen in love with his own beauty. 'Would that there were many such Nazirites in Israel!' he exclaimed. But his objection, generally speaking, held, and it was shared by later eminent teachers like Hillel and the first Gamaliel.[7] He that made a vow built an idolatrous altar, and he that fulfilled a vow offered sacrifice on it.[8] Jephthah is cited as the type of such transgressors; his vow was a worship of Baal.[9] The Nazirite is commanded in the Pentateuch (Nu 6^{11}) to bring a sin-offering. 'In what has he sinned?' the Talmud asks. 'In having abstained from wine,' is the answer.[10] On the other hand, a vow, duly made, must be scrupulously fulfilled; Heaven itself testifies against the man who breaks his word.[11] Further, the Supreme is pictured as thus exhorting Israel, 'Take heed that ye break not your vows, for he that does so will come to break his oaths, and that would be to deny Me, and so to commit mortal sin.'[12] 'He shall not break his word' (Nu 30^2)—the Scriptural utterance is the basis and starting-point of much of the Talmudic legislation concerning vows, and so sensitive was the Rabbinical mind to the sacredness of the vow, and to the danger of its being infringed by the common folk, that one Rabbi—Jehudah Gaon, of Sura (*c.* 750)—forbade even the study of tractate *Nedarim*.

Despite these facts the Rabbis have been accused of too readily 'opening the door,' to use their own phrase, to evasions or, more correctly, to annulment of vows. The prescriptions in *Mishnāh Nedarim*, ix., have been specially cited in support of this charge. But it is only necessary to read these enactments intelligently and fairly in order to vindicate their underlying motive. Far from being animated by a loose regard for morality, they have an ethical intent, that of saving persons who have made virtually impracticable vows from the guilt of breaking them, and of preventing the hardship and injustice which their fulfilment will entail upon others. Men would make vows in a fit of ill-humour, or in a morose and anti-social temper, from which it was only kind to them, and just to the members of their family or to their neighbours, to release them.[13] But even such undertakings were not lightly cancelled. They had to be annulled formally by recognized and competent authority. On the other hand, a vow made by order of the court could, under no circumstances, be set aside by any authority whatsoever.[1] A further charge of a different character has been brought, doubtless with reason, against ancient Jewish practice in regard to vows. In the Gospels the Pharisees are condemned for making vows under circumstances which involved a positive violation of the express commands of the Mosaic Law (Mt 15^4, Mk 7^{10}). That, in the Middle Ages, divergent practices, varying with the authorities immediately concerned, prevailed with regard to granting absolution from vows is unquestionable. Some Rabbis were more lenient in the matter than others. But this difference of practice was due to the varying importance attached to the two opposing considerations which have already been mentioned. One Rabbi would lay the greater stress upon the desirability of preventing the violation of vows, and so be inclined to grant dispensation from them; another would think more especially of the sanctity of the vow itself, however lightly made, and however trivial its character, and so refuse dispensation. A familiar instance is that of a man who vowed to give up gambling. The temptation to break such a vow was particularly strong. Should this consideration justify its annulment? Or should the man be held to his vow notwithstanding? So great was the dread of breaking the plighted word that we find a Jew of the 16th cent. swearing that he would never swear![2]

Here reference may appropriately be made to the formula for the annulment of vows which ushers in the service in orthodox synagogues on the Eve of the Day of Atonement. Deriving its name *Kol Nidrē* ('All Vows') from its initial words, it runs as follows:[3]

'All vows, bonds, oaths, etc., wherewith we have vowed . . . and bound ourselves, from this Day of Atonement unto the next . . . lo, we repent us in them. They shall be annulled, made void and of none effect. . . . Our vows shall not be vows; our bonds shall not be bonds; and our oaths shall not be oaths.'

And, since the congregation may have sinned by violating its vows in the past, the declaration is immediately followed by the verse (Nu 15^{26}):

'And all the congregation of the children of Israel shall be forgiven, . . . for in respect of all the people it was done unwittingly.'

This declaration has provided anti-Jewish writers with much welcome ammunition. Here, they have contended, is a proof that the word of a Jew cannot be trusted, seeing that he absolves himself from his vows and promises beforehand, in his very synagogue, and on the most solemn day in the year. The accusation is the fruit either of ignorance or malevolence or of both combined. The best answer to it is supplied by the unequivocal doctrine of the Rabbinical teachers in all ages, who warned their people that their very 'Yea' and 'Nay' must be truthful,[4] and that it is even more sinful to deceive a Gentile than a Jew.[5] The history of the declaration completes the defence. Owing its origin, at some unknown period not later than the early Gaonic age, to the dread of violating vows, it was nevertheless viewed with stern disapproval by the greatest authorities.

1 *Yorē Deāh*, 210; *Shebuōth*, 26*b*.
2 Maimonides, *Yad, Nedarim*, xi. 1; *Yorē Deāh*, 233.
3 *Mishnāh Nedarim*, x. 1 ff.
4 *Siphrē* to Nu 30^2. 5 *Mishnāh Nedarim*, iii. 1 ff.
6 *Yorē Deāh*, 228; *Bekhorōth*, 36*a* ff.
7 *Nedarim*, 9*b*, 22*a*. 8 *Ib.* 22*a*. 9 *Ta'anith*, 4*a*.
10 Jer. *Nedarim*, 36*d*. 11 *Ib.*
12 *Nedarim*, 20*a*; *Yalqut Shimeoni* to Nu 30^1.
13 See *Mishnāh Nedarim*, iii. 1, and cf. the passage from Philo, above.

1 For further information on this subject see S. Schechter, in C. G. Montefiore's *Hibbert Lectures* for 1892, p. 557 ff.
2 Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 392 ff., 109 ff.; for the ethical as well as the legal aspects of vows and oaths see I. Aboab, *Menorath Ha-maor* (14th cent.), II. ii. 2.
3 The formula exists in many variants; the version given in this article is taken from the *Service of the Synagogue*, London, 1904 (the authorized Festival Prayer Book of the Anglo-Jewish community), Day of Atonement, pt. i. p. 15.
4 *Bābhā Mĕṣī'ā*, 49*a*; *Siphra* to Lv 19^{36}; cf. Mt 5^{37}.
5 *Hullin*, 94*a*; *B. Qamma*, 113*b*; *Tosefta B. Qamma*, 10. 15; *Shūlhān 'Arūkh, Hoshen Mishpat*, 366 ff., and the mediæval moralists *passim*.

'I hear,' said one of them (R. Natronai [8th cent.]), 'that a formula called *Kol Nidrē* is used in certain congregations, but we have never received it from our fathers.'

'A stupid custom'—so others styled it, and the majority of their fellow-Gaonim shared their opposition.[1] Their condemnation would probably have been sterner still if they had known the declaration in its later form. In their time it had a retrospective effect only, and was, therefore, comparatively harmless. Nor, according to one weighty opinion, was it intended to apply to personal and private vows, but only to those made by the leaders of a congregation, in their official capacity, for congregational purposes, either without due forethought or under duress.[2] It certainly applied, at most, to such personal vows as affected only the individual making them; it could not possibly cover vows involving the rights of others, for absolution from them under such conditions was impossible under the Talmudic law.[3] But unfortunately a Rabbi (Meir ben Samuel [11th cent.]) took it into his head to change the wording of the declaration so as to give it a prospective meaning. The original phrase 'from the past Day of Atonement to this Day of Atonement' was altered into 'from this Day of Atonement to the next,' which is the existing version in some Prayer Books; and thus a weapon was placed in the hands of the enemy, which he was not slow to use. It need hardly be said that the Rabbi who made this ill-conceived alteration was actuated by innocent motives. Dispensation from vows already taken was, he held, impossible save at the hands of competent authority, which might not be available; better, then, he argued, to annul vows in advance. Thus, in both of its forms, the declaration owes its place in the Day of Atonement Prayer Book to that fear of the violation of vows to which repeated reference has been made, and to a natural desire to safeguard those who made them from the penalty for such violation. Certainly, ignorant persons may have been misled by the formula into making vows thoughtlessly; but they did so in spite of its real object, not in virtue of it, and their mistake was severely castigated by authority. Such persons were declared to be incapable of giving evidence in a court of justice.[4] But the ignorant malpractices and the unhappy misunderstandings that have resulted from the introduction of the formula sufficiently condemn it; and there are ancient congregations in which, owing possibly to these considerations, it has never been adopted. If it survives anywhere to-day, despite its crude and misleading phraseology, it is partly because of the force of old associations, especially powerful on an occasion so solemn as the Day of Atonement, and partly because of the moving and cherished melody to which it is sung. In modern Reform congregations it was expunged from the Prayer Book nearly a century ago. All that was of value in it—the tune—was retained; the declaration itself went the way of all unmeaning survivals.

Finally it may be pointed out that vows of a monastic character were almost unknown among the Jews, for the good and sufficient reason that the monastic idea made little or no way among them. The Essenes furnish the outstanding exception. After novitiate those desirous of being admitted into that order took a solemn vow—Josephus styles it 'tremendous oaths'—binding them to piety towards God, justice and forbearance towards men, obedience to authority, fidelity to truth, and secrecy as to the doctrines of the society. They seem also to have imposed chastity upon themselves; but since, as K. Kohler has pointed out, they joined the order, as a rule, after the prime of life, they must not be deemed, because of their submission to this restriction, to have necessarily set at naught the characteristically Jewish duty of procreation. They lived the ascetic life of the Nazirite; but whether they took the Nazirite vow is uncertain.[1] The Essenes, however, stand practically alone in Jewish history. From time to time religious associations came into existence, the rules of which bound the members (*ḥaberim*) to holy living—to devotional exercises, to scrupulous rectitude in the daily life, and to works of benevolence. But these societies were, at the very most, brotherhoods rather than orders. In some cases the offspring of the mystical temper, and intended to minister to the mystical life, they were, however, far from monastic. There was nothing of the cloister in them. The associates lived in their own homes and, in a greater or less degree, busied themselves in worldly affairs. The bond that united them was purely voluntary, and any member could free himself from it at will. In such cases a vow of initiation was out of the question.

LITERATURE.—I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896; A. Büchler, *Der galiläische 'Am-ha 'Areṣ*, Vienna, 1906; I. Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst*, Leipzig, 1913; H. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866–78; Hamburger's *RE*, artt. 'Gelübde,' 'Nasir,' 'Kol Nidre'; *JE*, artt. 'Essenes,' 'Nazarite,' 'Vows'; L. Löw, *Gesammelte Schriften*, iii., *Die Lebensalter in der jüdischen Literatur*, Szegedin, 1875; *MGWJ* liii. [1909] 269 ff.; C. G. Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures*, London, 1892; Philo Judæus, ed. Bohn, London, 1854–55; S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser., London and Philadelphia, 1908; I. H. Weiss, *Dor Dor we-Dorshaw*, Wilna, 1904.

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VOWS (Teutonic).—Vows were solemn promises which were made before some deity or superior power, and by which the person making the vow undertook within a given time or in the future to perform a particular act, to obtain a purpose, to bestow a gift, or to devote himself to some person or thing—as, *e.g.*, in a sworn brotherhood. Such vows were rather common among the Teutons both in the North and in Germany, and they were considered absolutely sacred and inviolable. A person not redeeming his vow or his promise was considered an out-caste, and no regard was paid to him. Among the ancient Teutons all offerings and sacrifices were carried out with great attention and seriousness. They were generally closed with much hilarity and drinking, and then all kinds of promises were made for the future while the goblets were drunk, each of them devoted to some special divinity or to the memory of some great name. The Braga-goblet was the most imposing of all. Of such an occasion we have a description in the *Heimskringla*:

'First Odin's goblet was emptied for victory and power to his king; thereafter, Njord's and Freya's goblets for peace and a good season. Then it was the custom of many to empty the Braga-goblet; and then the guests emptied a goblet to the memory of departed friends, called the remembrance-goblet.'[2]

This goblet was not drunk to Bragi himself, but was emptied before him to the honour of some great person or name, or before some great undertaking. At the larger festivals, such as the Jol (or Midwinter) festival, the vow was made while touching the golden-bristled boar of Frey, which was prepared for the common meal, so that the vow should be made sacred by all that is honourable and great.

Vows were made at funerals of earls, kings, and other great persons, as may be seen from the

[1] Weiss, *Dor Dor*, 4. 17. 16; see art. 'Kol Nidre' in *JE* and Hamburger. It must, however, be pointed out that, influenced by the Talmudic permission (*cf. Nedarim*, 23*b*), it was the custom of some pious Jews privately to annul their vows at the advent of every New Year festival.

[2] Weiss, *op. cit.*

[3] *Tur Oraḥ Ḥayim*, i. 619; see also footnote to Hamburger's art., p. 97.

[4] See the references in *JE* vii. 541.

[1] See art. ESSENES; Jos. *BJ* II. viii. 2 ff.; Philo, ed. Bohn, iii 523 ff., iv. 2 ff.; art. 'Essenes,' in *JE*, p. 228.

[2] *Heimskringla*, i. 77 (*Saga of Hakon the Good*, ch. 16).

Ynglinga Saga, ch. 36, where we read that King Ingjald at the funeral festival of his father rose when the Braga-goblet was filled in order to offer his vow, promising that he would extend his kingdom one half in each quarter of the world or die.[1] At funeral occasions all sorts of promises were made which could in any manner be connected with the wish of the deceased.

A typical funeral vow or a series of such vows may be quoted from *King Olaf Trygvason's Saga*:

'King Svein made a magnificent feast, to which he invited all the chiefs in his dominions; for he would give the succession-feast, or the heirship-ale, after his father Harald. A short time before, Strut-Harald in Scania, and Vesete in Bornholm, father to Bue the Thick and to Sigurd, had died and King Svein sent word to the Jomsborg vikings that Earl Sigvalde and Bue, and their brothers, should come to him, and drink the funeral-ale for their fathers in the same feast which the king was giving. The Jomsborg vikings came to the festival with their bravest men, forty ships of them from Vendland, and twenty ships from Scania. Great was the multitude of people assembled. The first day of the feast, before King Svein went up into his father's high seat, he drank the bowl to his father's memory, and made the solemn vow, that before three winters were past he would go over with his army to England, and either kill King Adalred (Ethelred), or chase him out of the country. This heirship-bowl all who were at the feast drank. Thereafter for the chiefs of the Jomsborg vikings was filled and drunk the largest horn to be found, and of the strongest drink. When that bowl was emptied, all men drank Christ's health; and again the fullest measure and the strongest drink were handed to the Jomsborg vikings. The third bowl was to the memory of Saint Michael, which was drunk by all. Thereafter Earl Sigvalde emptied a remembrance-bowl to his father's honour, and made the solemn vow that before three winters came to an end, he would go to Norway, and either kill Earl Hakon, or chase him out of the country. Thereupon Thorkel the Tall, his brother, made a solemn vow to follow his brother Sigvalde to Norway, and not flinch from the battle so long as Sigvalde would fight there. Then Bue the Thick vowed to follow them to Norway, and not flinch so long as the Jomsborg vikings fought. At last Vagn Aakeson vowed that he would go with them to Norway, and not return until he had slain Thorkeld Leire, and gone to bed to his daughter Ingebord without her friends' consent. Many other chiefs made solemn vows about different things. Thus was the heirship-ale drunk that day, but the next morning, when the Jomsborg vikings had slept off their drink, they thought they had spoken more than enough. They held a meeting to consult how they should proceed with their undertaking, and they determined to fit out as speedily as possible for the expedition; and without delay ships and men-at-arms were prepared, and the news spread quickly.'[2]

Any vow or promise was made sacred by placing one's foot upon a stump or a stone and saying, 'Here I stand and promise that I shall accomplish this matter,' which was then mentioned and the conditions of the vow given.[1] Those promises were no doubt, offered to make certain undertakings more sure—*e.g.*, to win such-and-such a woman, whom the maker of the vow wanted to secure for himself or for somebody else, to avenge a crime or an injury, to obtain an honour or any such thing which required honest personal effort—and they were often made in the interest of higher duties so as to render the act itself morally binding.

Sworn brotherhoods were mostly entered into by young men who had been brought up together or who had formed close friendships because of peculiar experiences. The ceremony was as follows.

The sod of a selected piece of ground was loosened and cut in three oblong slices, which were raised and held up by the spears of the covenanters, so as to form an arch under which they let drops of their blood from self-inflicted wounds freely flow in the fresh and open soil, vowing to be faithful to one another in life and death. Such men would afterwards be inseparable and never failed one another. The one would always avenge the injury done to the other, which meant in case of death that he had to take the life of the slayer, even though that one be a relative or a highly exalted person. In later times of ancient Teuton history sworn brotherhoods were the most sacred of all covenants, no one ever thinking of breaking a vow thus made or even considering such a thing possible.[2]

It is apparent that vows as sacred obligations entered into public life in various manners, and also that mutual behaviour thereby became more pregnant and dependable. Even to this day it is very common in countries of the North to demand, or at least to request, that certain promises be made sure by the oath, neither before the court nor in the way prescribed for judicial proceedings, but as a vow made to a friend or to the second party of the contract; for, where such a vow has been taken, one feels assured that the promise will hold.

LITERATURE.—*EBr*[11], *s.v.*; E. H. Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, Berlin, 1891, pp. 197–253; Paul Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1903; G. O. Hyltén-Cavallius, *Wärend och Wirdarna*, Stockholm, 1863, i. 154–175; *Sveriges Hednatid af Oscar Montelius*, do. 1877 (in *Sveriges Historia fran äldsta tid till vara dagar*, p. 338 *f.*); A. M. Strinnholm, *Svenska Folkets Historia*, do. 1834–36, i. 122 *f.*, ii. 600–602; J. Enander, *Förenta Staternas Historia*, Chicago, 1875, i. 122-130; Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, bks. i.–ix., tr. O. Elton, London, 1894; Snorri Sturlason, *Heimskringla*, tr. Samuel Laing, and ed. R. B. Anderson, in the 'Norrœna Library,' 3 vols., New York, 1897; Vilhelm Grönbeck, *Menneskelivet og Guderne* (*Leg og Löfte*), Copenhagen, 1912, p. 64. Cf. also lists of literature under artt. SACRIFICE (Teutonic) and SALVATION (Teutonic).

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W

WAGES.—See ECONOMICS, EMPLOYMENT.

WAHHĀBĪS.—Named after 'Abd al-Wahhāb, this Muhammadan community has its headquarters in the part of Arabia called Nejd, but is also represented in Mesopotamia, India, and Africa.

1. **Tenets.**—The aim of the founders of the community appears to have been ostensibly to restore Islām to its original purity, as taught by Muhammad and practised by his converts. Hence, when their system was examined by Sunni experts in Cairo, it was found not to differ from the ordinary orthodoxy. Their pretext for branding all other Muslims as idolaters lay in the practice of visiting the tombs of saints and appealing to them in emergencies, which the Wahhābīs identified with the practice of the pre-Islāmic pagans that is repeatedly condemned in the Qur'ān. Hence they destroyed such tombs, when they got the opportunity, not even sparing that of Muhammad in Medīnah. One of their enemies summarizes the points wherein they differ from the orthodox under ten heads.

(1) They regard the Deity as having bodily form, with face, hands, etc.
(2) Reasoning has no place in religious questions, which must be settled solely by tradition.
(3) The source of law called 'Consensus' is rejected.
(4) The source called 'Analogy' is rejected.
(5) The opinions of the compilers of codes have no authority, and those who follow them are unbelievers.
(6) All Muslims who do not join their community are unbelievers.
(7) Neither the Prophet nor any saint may be employed as intercessor with the Deity.
(8) Visits to the tombs of saints, etc., are forbidden.
(9) Oaths by any one but God are forbidden.
(10) Vows to any one but God are forbidden, as is also the practice of sacrificing at the tombs of saints and prophets.

It is doubtful whether no. (5) is correct, as the Wahhābīs are said to be followers of the system of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal († A.H. 241), the adherents of which were notorious in 'Abbasid days for their interference with pilgrimages to the tombs of

[1] Snorri Sturlason, *Kongesagaer*[2], Christiania, 1906.
[2] *Heimskringla*, i. 160 (*King Olaf Trygvason's Saga*, ch. 39).

[1] Cf. *Hardar Saga*, 14; *Hoensa Thoris Saga*, 12; *Fagrskinna*, 55.
[2] Strinnholm, *Svenska Folkets Historia*, ii. 511–515. Cf. also art. BROTHERHOOD (Artificial).

saints; in A.H. 323 the khalīfah Radi issued a rescript against them.[1] European travellers lay stress on their tabu of tobacco and all drugs that benumb or stupefy, and their objection to the use of silk in any part of the attire, and of ornaments of gold, silver, or gems. Practices of which their history gives evidence are the massacre of the women and children as well as the men of their Muslim enemies, and the mild treatment of the tolerated communities; these were characteristic of the early Khārijīs, whose revolts were brought about by deviations from the rigidity of Islām. If it be true, as has been asserted, that they suppose the Qur'ān to have been mutilated by the third khalīfah, they retain therein the notion which brought about the earliest Khārijī movements. Their iconoclasm bears some resemblance to the practice of the Khārijīs called Qarmaṭians, with whom they are not otherwise connected.[2]

2. History.—The history of the Wahhābīs appears to have been written exclusively by European travellers; there is therefore some uncertainty about the origins of the system. As early as 1764 it attracted the notice of Carsten Niebuhr, who brought the first mention of it to Europe. There are contradictory statements about both the birthplace and the tribe of that Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb from whose patronymic the sect derives its name. Born in Central Arabia about 1730, he is said to have travelled as a student and merchant, and to have attached himself to one Muḥammad b. Sa'ud, chief of Ḍira'iyyah (about 46·20 E. long. 25 N. lat.), who married his daughter and became his first disciple. To what extent these persons contemplated from the first the establishment of an independent state cannot now be ascertained; Palgrave,[3] whose account of this matter is more than ordinarily romantic, makes Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb allure Ibn Sa'ud with a definite promise of the sort. It is clear that the two made their resolve to restore Islām to its original purity a ground for attacking their neighbours, at first, it is said, with a force of seven men mounted on camels; but a little initial success carries such adventurers a long way where, as in Central Arabia at the time, there is no organized government. Muḥammad b. Sa'ud had before his death extended his authority over 'Ariḍ, Qasim, Ḥaṣa, Dowāsir, and Sulayyil, and become master of all the provinces situated between the Ḥijāz and the Persian Gulf, with the exception of Qaṭif.

Under the successor of Muḥammad b. Sa'ud, his son 'Abd al-'Azīz, the Wahhābīs came into collision with the outposts of the Ottoman Government, and attacked and plundered Imam Ḥusain, where they massacred the inhabitants. This was in 1801, and in the following year the Wahhābī chief, who had for some time been struggling with the then sharīf of Meccah, Ghalib, was able to wrest from him the important town of Ṭa'if. Owing to the supineness of the Ottoman Government and the incompetence of the pashas who attempted to oppose the Wahhābīs, the latter progressed with great rapidity; in 1803 Sa'ud, son of 'Abd al-'Azīz, took Meccah, where, however, Ghalib, having adopted Wahhābī tenets, was allowed to resume his government; and in 1804 Medīnah was also taken after its port, Yanbo, had fallen. The tomb of Muhammad was robbed of all its ornaments and treasures. By this time Sa'ud was chief of the community, his father 'Abd al-'Azīz having been assassinated in 1803. Raids were made by Wahhābī officers in the direction of the Yemen, which, however, was not permanently occupied. Though the new rulers of the Ḥijāz did not actually abolish the pilgrimage, fear of them kept away the pilgrim caravans from Persia, Syria, and Egypt.

Muḥammad Ali, on whom the government of Egypt had been conferred by the Porte in 1804, with an express injunction to reconquer the sanctuaries, took no serious step in that direction till 1809, not even prohibiting the export of food from Egypt to Arabia, though that measure would have rendered the position of the Wahhābīs in those cities difficult. After two years of preparation the pasha of Egypt sent his son Tuzun, a man famous for his personal courage, at the head of an expedition, which seized Yanbo in Oct. 1811. In the following year he succeeded in reconquering Medīnah; and in Jan. 1813 Meccah and Ṭa'if also were recovered. In this year Muḥammad Ali himself took the command in Arabia, and fought with varying results against Sa'ud till the death of the latter in the following year; he was succeeded by his son 'Abdallah, with whom peace was made by Muḥammad Ali in 1815, after each party had won some considerable victories. Muḥammad Ali returned to Egypt; but the terms of peace could not be carried out, and in the following year the pasha's son (or stepson), Ibrahim Pasha, was sent out to reduce what remained of Wahhābī power; in 1818 he took Ḍira'iyyah, the Wahhābī capital, and obtained possession of 'Abdallah's person; the latter was taken to Cairo and sent thence to Constantinople, where he was executed.

A Turkish governor was left in the Nejd by Ibrahim Pasha when he returned to Egypt; a son of 'Abdallah, named Turki, who had escaped when the capital was taken, succeeded in re-assembling the Wahhābī forces and expelling the governor. A new capital, Riyaḍ, was chosen by Turki for the renovated state; and under this chief, who reigned till 1830, several of the provinces which the Wahhābīs had formerly held were recovered. He was assassinated in that year by a cousin, but was succeeded by his son Faiṣal, who was greatly helped in securing his accession by one 'Abdallah Ibn Rashid, whom he rewarded with the hereditary possession of the province Shamr. Faiṣal, however, was attacked by an officer sent against him by Muḥammad Ali, captured and sent off to Egypt, where he remained a prisoner till he was released by 'Abbas, son of Muḥammad Ali. Returning to Arabia, he easily obtained recognition in Nejd, and his dynasty is still established in Riyaḍ, the dynastic name being Ibn Sa'ud. The province of Shamr became detached during Faiṣal's reign, and the dynastic name of the ruler is Ibn Rashid. His capital, Ḥaiel, has been visited by several European travellers, who have maintained a continuous history of these states.

From 1842 to 1872 the Wahhābī empire in Arabia was split up into the following communities: (1) dynasty of Ibn Sa'ud holding Riyaḍ and Ḥasa, (2) the emirate of Ḥaiel, (3) the city 'Unaizah with the tribe of the name and dependencies, (4) the city Buraidah, (5) the town Shakra, (6) the state and city Ḥariq-Hutah, (7) the tribe Ḥarb, (8) the tribe 'Utaibah, (9) the Mutair. From 1843 to 1870 the second of these was governed by two capable rulers, Ṭilal and Mat'ab; in 1872 the emirate was seized by one Muḥammad, who, after putting to death possible rivals in his own family, endeavoured to bring the remaining communities under his rule. Ultimately in the spring of 1891 most of the above-named communities formed a league against the emir of Ḥaiel, under the leadership of Zamil, ruler of 'Unaizah. On the side of Ibn Rashid there were, in addition to his own forces, the Ḥarb and the Mesopotamian Shamr. Ibn Rashid succeeded in inflicting on the league a crushing defeat, and became master of all their towns, including Riyaḍ,

[1] Miskawaihi, *Experiences of the Nations*, tr. D. S. Margoliouth (in the press [1920]), i. 364.

[2] Cf. artt. KHAWĀRIJ, CARMAṬIANS.

[3] *Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, i. 376.

where he installed one of the Ibn Sa'ud family as ruler, remembering that the founder of his own dynasty had been a creature of Ibn Sa'ud. Since this date the ruler of Riyaḍ has emancipated himself from Ibn Rashid's control, and in the intrigues which preceded the Great War of 1914–18 the latter favoured Germany, whereas the former favoured Britain.

3. Wahhābism in India.—Wahhābism was introduced into India by one Sayyid Aḥmad, who was born in 1786–87 in Rai Bareli, and started a revivalist movement among the Muslims of India, with headquarters at Patna, before he made the pilgrimage to Meccah which was the occasion of his conversion to the Wahhābī system. Returning to India in 1824, he gained a following in Peshawar, and in 1826 started military operations against the Sikhs, in which he had considerable success; national dissensions, however, broke out among his followers, and in 1831 he met his death at the hands of the Sikhs. The movement was continued by some of his disciples, who obtained dominion over a large extent of territory along the left bank of the Indus, which, however, they lost in 1847, when the Wahhābī troops surrendered to a British force. Patna continued to harbour a number of Wahhābīs, who are said to have taken part in the Indian Mutiny. For about twenty years after the mutiny had been quelled attempts were made by Wahhābī preachers to stir up risings against the British in different parts of the Peninsula and to found Wahhābī states.

The Indian Wahhābism is said to differ from that of Arabia in its identification of one or other of the founders of the system with the Mahdi of the Sunnis, whereas in Arabia this term was not used.

4. Literature.—It does not appear that the founders of the system in Arabia did more than issue letters and manifestos; and at this day there is no printing-press in Riyaḍ or (probably) in Ḥaiel. Such literature as the system has produced is mainly Indian, and in Persian or Urdu; but there is some anti-Wahhābī literature in Arabic, emanating from Mesopotamia—*e.g.*, *al-Fajr al-Sadiq fi'l-radd 'ala munkiri-twassul wal-karamat wal-khawariq* by Jamil Efendi Sidqi Zahawi (Cairo, A.H. 1323).

5. Life and conduct.—The Wahhābīs appear from the commencement of the system till our time to have maintained the institutions of orthodox Islām with far greater rigidity than other Muslim communities. Like the early Muslim leaders, the first generations of Wahhābīs propagated their views mainly with the sword; with the introduction of Arabia into the Pax Britannica more peaceful methods are coming into vogue, and the following description by a recent visitor to Riyaḍ gives an idea of both the practices and the aims of the Arabian Wahhābīs at the present day:

'In this city men live for the next world. Hundreds are studying in the Mosques to go out as teachers among the Bedouin tribes. It is the center of a system of religious education that takes in every village of Central Arabia, and imparts the rudiments of an education to much the larger part of the male population of the various towns. Great efforts are being made now to educate the Bedouins. Men pray five times a day in Riyadh. In the winter the roll is called at early morning prayers, and also at the service in the late evening. Absentees are beaten with twenty strokes on the following day. In the summer duties in the date gardens and elsewhere are considered a valid excuse for praying at home. Only a few years ago a man absented himself some days from all prayers and was publicly executed for so doing. It is safe to say that there is one city on earth where men are more interested in the next world than they are in this one. Late dinners are unknown. The evening meal is eaten an hour before sundown so that there may be time for religious readings and exhortations before going to bed. That is the regular program in the house of the great chief himself.'[1]

LITERATURE.—J. L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, 2 vols., London, 1829, French tr., Paris, 1835, ii. 253–470 (this tr. continues the history somewhat later than the original); W. G. Palgrave, *Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, 2 vols., London, 1865; E. Rehatsek, 'Hist. of the Wahhabis in Arabia and in India,' *JRASBo* xiv. [1880] 274–401; C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1888; Eduard Nolde, *Reise nach Innerarabien, Kurdistan und Armenien*, Brunswick, 1895; *al-Manar*, xii. [Cairo, A.H. 1327] 390–396.

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[1] P. W. Harrison, in *The Moslem World*, Oct. 1918, p. 418.

WAKANDA.—See MANITU, ORENDA, MANA, PLAINS INDIANS.

WAKASHAN.—The Wakashan linguistic family consists of two main branches: the Kwakiutl, extending from the Tsimshian country southward to the northern end of Vancouver Island, and the Nutka of the west coast of Vancouver Island and the extreme north-western corner of the State of Washington. The northernmost Kwakiutl, usually known as Heiltsuk, were divided into clans governed by mother-right, but the Kwakiutl divisions, while not true gentes, inclined to be patriarchal, although crests descended to a man's daughter's son rather than to his own son, thus showing a confused or mixed system of descent. The Nutka tribes were divided into a number of septs of varying rank, which were not, however, exogamic. If a man married outside of his sept, his children belonged to that which stood higher socially, but, if he married inside, the descent was patrilineal.

I. *KWAKIUTL.*—**1. Supernatural beings.**—The principal Kwakiutl deity was the sun, called Atā ('the one above'), Kanskīyi ('our brother'), Kansnōla ('our elder brother'), Amiaeket ('the one to whom we must be grateful'), Gyīkamae ('chief'), and Kautsōump ('our father'). The last of these names is said not to have been used until after the advent of Europeans, but this is not quite certain. He was frequently addressed in prayer in such words as 'O chief, take pity upon us'; and in bad weather the steersman of a canoe would say to him 'Take care of us, chief.' His son Kanikilak ('with outspread wings') largely takes the place of the northern transformer, Raven. He descended from heaven and wandered over the face of the whole earth, giving man his arts, customs, and institutions. He also was addressed in prayer. Raven, however, appears as well, and the stories told of him resemble those related by the Haida, Tlingit, and Tsimshian (*qq.v.*). Besides being partially displaced by the sun's son, he shared his functions of trickster with Mink, who was often even more prominent.

A host of lesser spirits were believed in, but they were not especially different from those found elsewhere in America, except the spirits concerned with the great winter ceremonials. Twins were believed to be transformed salmon and were supposed to have power over the winds and weather. When a salmon was killed, its soul was believed to return to the salmon country.

2. The dead.—After death a man's soul, which was thought to have its seat in the head, became a ghost, or *lâlenok*, the sight of which was deadly. These *lâlenok* either lived in a place under ground called Bebēnakaua ('the greatest depth') or roamed through the woods. They might not enter a house, but hovered round the villages, causing bad weather. The name Bebēnakaua is said not to have been used before the advent of the Whites, but the idea for which it stands was certainly aboriginal. Ultimately the *lâlenok* was reborn in the first child of a relative. Probably Bebēnakaua was not the only region of the dead, for one story speaks of a man whose soul went to live with the sun before it was reborn.

3. Shamanism.—The common name for a shaman among the Kwakiutl was *naualak*, but, when

curing diseases, he was called *heilikya* or *pakala*. Disease was supposed to be caused either by some foreign object in the affected part, such as a stick, piece of skin, bone, or quartz, or by the absence of the soul from the body. In the former case the shaman moistened the place where the disease had its seat from a small dish of water, went through the usual incantations to the accompaniment of his rattle, and finally sucked out the disease and showed it to the bystanders. Sometimes he used whistles and blew the disease from the hollow of his hand into the air. When the soul had left the patient's body—a fact which the shaman discovered by feeling the patient's head and the root of his nose—the shaman caught it and replaced it in the head, its proper seat. Sometimes it was seen in his hand in the shape of a bird or mannikin. The shaman was also able to cause disease by throwing something into his victim's body. The secrets of the shaman proper or medicine-man were derived from Haialikyawe, the ancestor of the gens of that name. One of the secret societies, however, the Mamaka, conferred power to catch the invisible disease-spirit—which was supposed to be constantly flying through the air in the form of a worm—and throw it back upon one's enemies.

4. Witchcraft.—True witchcraft was of two kinds. In one the person was made sick by having a portion of his clothing buried with a corpse. The second, called *eka*, was more complicated:

> A portion of a person's body, or clothing that had received perspiration from him, was obtained and roasted before the fire along with fragments of a corpse; then they were ground up together, sealed in a piece of skin or cloth, and placed in the hollow of a human bone. This in turn was placed inside a human skull and the whole deposited in a small box, which was afterwards buried in the ground so as to be barely covered with earth. Almost on the top of this a fire was built so as to warm the whole, and, while it burned, the wizard beat his head against a tree, naming and denouncing his enemy. This was done secretly and at night or in the early morning, and was repeated at frequent intervals until the enemy died. Such a spell might be removed, however, by finding and unearthing the box—carefully, lest a sudden jar prove fatal to the sick man—and then unwrapping the contents, covering them with feathers, and throwing them into the sea. It might also be removed by some one going over the bewitching ceremonies again, the second ceremony serving to undo the first.

5. Eclipses.—When an eclipse of the sun or moon took place, it was supposed that those bodies were being swallowed, and to liberate them the Kwakiutl burned blankets, boxes, and food. They also made noises to frighten away the enemy and sang 'Haukuä!' ('Throw it up!').

II. *NUTKA.*—The Nutka are treated in art. VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS.

III. *MAKAH.*—The Makah Indians around Cape Flattery in the State of Washington are merely a colony of Nutka from Vancouver Island, but their beliefs show certain points of divergence.

1. Supernatural beings and cosmology.—Like the other Nutka, they worshipped a supreme being, whose name was spoken only to those who had been initiated into the sacred rites and ceremonies. One name for this being was Chabatta Hatartstl, or Hatartstl Chabatta ('the great chief who resides above'). He was said to be called upon by individuals only when they were alone, and probably received very little actual attention, the worship of the people being paid as usual to a multitude of inferior deities residing in animals, plants, and other natural objects. Swan[1] cites only one case where to his personal knowledge the supreme deity was directly addressed, but he was told that a person who wished to talk to him retired into the mountains when the moon was full, washed in a pond, and rubbed his limbs with cedar boughs, which are liked by the deity on account of their fragrance. In the same way a man acquired his individual guardian-spirit. The sun (Kléseakarktl) was considered the representative of the supreme being, and it was the object to which the young were told to direct their prayers when they were awakened and made to bathe before daylight. They then called upon him to let them live. The north, south, south-east, east, west, and north-west winds were each supposed to be produced by the blowing of a certain spirit. Stars were believed to be the souls of individuals or of animals formerly existing on earth, and lunar eclipses were ascribed to a *tooshkow*, or 'cultus' cod, endeavouring to eat up the moon, which was believed to be composed of a jelly-like substance. The *aurora borealis* was caused by a small race of Indians in the far north who lived on ice-floes and were cooking seal and walrus meat. Comets and meteors were supposed to be spirits of departed chiefs, and the rainbow a malignant spirit connected with the thunder-bird and having powerful claws with which it seized any one coming near.

[1] 'The Indians of Cape Flattery,' in *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, xvi. 61f.

2. Shamanism.—Male shamans formerly went through a certain ceremony called *kahaip* in order to acquire supernatural powers. Sickness was believed to be occasioned by a demon, which entered the victim's mouth when drinking at a brook or pierced his skin when bathing in sea-water. It assumed the form of a little white worm, which the shaman knew how to extract. During the operation he washed his hands frequently and warmed them at the fire; finally he caught the demon, squeezed it, blew through his hands towards the roof of the house, and assured the patient that it was gone. An injured bone was renewed by binding over it the bone of a dead person. There were also female shamans or, rather, doctors, who knew the uses of herbs and acted as midwives. Still other individuals were supposed to have power over the winds and weather.

3. The dead.—After death the souls were supposed to reside in the earth, where they existed, deprived of their bones, and received flesh and skin only as fast as it decayed from their material bodies. The usual tales are told of persons who had been to this region and had returned. Little opportunity for such a return was given, however, since to look upon the face of a corpse was considered unlucky, and the Makah consequently bound the body at once tightly in a blanket and laid it away in the grave-box.

LITERATURE.—The Kwakiutl are treated in F. Boas, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 801 ff., report vi. *ib.* 1890, p. 562 ff., and their secret societies in Boas, 'The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians,' in *Report of the United States National Museum* for 1895, Washington, 1897 (this also touches upon secret societies among other tribes in the same region). The Nutka are treated in report vi. 'On the N.W. Tribes of Canada, and their Washington colony, the Makah, by J. G. Swan, 'The Indians of Cape Flattery,' in *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, xvi. [Washington, 1870]. Much valuable material may be had from J. R. Jewitt, *A Narr. of the Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, Middletown, Conn., 1815, and from G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868.

JOHN R. SWANTON.

WAKE.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.

WALDENSES.—The Waldenses are a Protestant Church, bearing among its own people the name of Vaudois, derived from the geographical situation of its origin and headquarters among the southern valleys of the Cottian Alps, through which run the tributaries of the Pellice and the Po, and which are approached from Turin across the plain of Piedmont. Thus situated as a community of hardy mountaineers far away from the town life of Italy, and with interior valleys still more remote into which to retreat in times of

danger, this Church was able to develop and maintain its own individuality and to withstand the attacks of opponents in a way that has almost suggested the miraculous. We need to realize the physical geography of the area in which it grew up in order to understand its rare characteristics and account for its sturdy independence and heroic achievements. Legend has been busy weaving fanciful impossibilities into the fabric of its story. But a sufficient substratum of solid fact remains to account for the importance that has been attached to so small a group of people who have produced no thinkers, writers, or scholars sufficiently eminent to give them world-wide fame. It is the romance of their story that first calls attention to them. Then the frightful persecutions from which they suffered, appealing to the sympathy of the great Protestant Powers, connected them with the larger politics of Europe, especially when Cromwell interposed to champion their cause and Milton immortalized their sufferings in a great sonnet. Over and above these facts critical questions concerning their origin have attracted the attention of scholars and aroused the energies of controversialists, with the consequence that a literature has grown up round the Waldensian name quite out of proportion to the small number of simple folk to whom it has been attached.

I. *ORIGIN.*—The question of the origin of the Waldenses has been complicated by controversial considerations. While Roman Catholic writers have settled the matter by regarding these people as simply the followers of Peter Waldo of Lyons, they themselves repudiate this view and push back their beginnings to the age of primitive Christianity. Thus they deny that they first appeared as a sect of heretics breaking off from the historic Church, and claim to have preserved the purity of the faith through the ages, while all the rest of the Church was degenerating and accumulating the corruptions against which they protested from the first.

1. Claim to apostolic origin.—This claim is first met with in a Dominican monk at Passau in the year 1316,[1] who states that the Waldenses declare that they are the most ancient of all the sects, some even saying that this sect 'duravit a tempore patrum.' It was but a step from this position to add that the Waldensian Church was founded by St. Paul when on his way to Spain. A little later a woman under examination for heresy is said to have made a similar statement. It is not met with again earlier than a letter of Barbe[2] Morel written in 1530 and addressed to Œcolampadius.[3] But it was adopted by Robert Olivétan and published in the preface to his translation of the Bible in 1535, and from that time onwards it was universally adopted by the Protestants, who thus came to honour the Waldenses as the one Christian Church that had preserved the primitive faith of NT times. Its adoption by Beza, its appearance in the Confession of 1541, the assertion of it by Leger in the preface of his history, the encouragement it obtained from Samuel Morland, the British envoy in Savoy, all helped to confirm its popular acceptance. It even came to be regarded as the primary source of Calvinism, an ingenious way of accounting for its otherwise suspicious resemblance to that type of Reformation theology. But now it has been pointed out that no trace of this notion can be found in any of the early Waldensian writings. The inquisitor Moneta of Cremona, discussing the source of Waldo's heresy, makes no mention of the theory of apostolic origin. Nor is there any evidence of the existence of the Waldensian Church as a separate community maintaining primitive NT ideas for more than a thousand years from apostolic days till it emerged in the times of mediæval persecution. Its total seclusion as well as the maintenance of its purity uncorrupted throughout all these centuries would demand a double miracle, for which no evidence is forthcoming. Then this very purity of doctrine in conformity with the NT is exactly what the Protestants claimed to have recovered at the time of the Reformation. In so far as that claim cannot be entirely justified, since Protestantism is not merely a return to the apostolic type of Christianity, but, with all its effort to conform to the NT standard, still a historical development true to the spirit of its age, the same must be said of the Waldensian type of Christianity. Therefore, if we admitted the theory of apostolic origin, we should have the further marvel of a line of development in the solitude of the Alpine valleys leading to much the same results as were obtained by the Reformation theologians in their fresh studies of the NT, unless we were to conclude that Protestantism as a whole was an outgrowth of Waldensian teaching; and we are sufficiently well acquainted with its genesis in the minds of the German and Swiss reformers to know that this was not the case.

2. The time of Sylvester.—A second theory of the ancient origin of the Waldensian Church is that it arose at Rome in the time of the episcopate of Sylvester, when that bishop, after baptizing Constantine, put the Church under the power of the emperor; whereupon a colleague of the bishop protested, broke off communion with Rome, and retreated into the Vaudois valleys. Thus the Waldensian movement is represented as being a reaction against the corruption of the Church in the 4th century. This theory has been combined with the claims to apostolic origin, with the suggestion that the secluded Church, already some centuries old, now received an accession of refugees who found a welcome home in its primitive simplicity. It is given by the inquisitor Moneta,[1] as held by 'the Poor Men of Lyons.' But the want of evidence during the intermediate period, which is fatal to the claim to an apostolic origin, is also applicable to this theory, though the intermediate centuries are not quite so many. Moreover, Sylvester did not baptize Constantine. Nor had the Church preserved the primitive simplicity advocated by the Waldenses uncorrupted until the age of Sylvester, as the upholders of this theory have maintained. Thus its basal assumption is discredited by history.

3. The time of Claude of Turin.—Claude, bishop of Turin in the 8th cent., under Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, revived the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, but ignored the High Church side of Augustine's teaching, according to which the Church was the appointed medium of communication between God and man, resisting the papal claims, and denying that St. Peter had received power to bind and loose. He had crosses as well as images removed from his churches, in all these matters anticipating the Reformation. Accordingly Leger, Muston, and other Waldenses, understanding the churches of the Vaudois valleys to have been included in Claude's diocese, maintained that, if their separation from the Roman Catholic Church could not be traced back to primitive times, their distinctive movement should be attributed to the influence of this French bishop, who has been described as a Calvinist before the Reformation. That Claude may have had some

[1] *Contra Valdenses*, in *Maxima Bibliotheca veterum Patrum*, Lyons, 1677–1707, xxv. 262 ff.

[2] The title 'barbe' (Romance for 'uncle') was employed by the Waldenses for their clergy, perhaps as distinguished from the Roman Catholic title 'father' for a priest, and at the same time as suggestive of an affectionate relationship; also as a cryptic term, a 'commonplace' in times of persecution.

[3] See A. Scultetus, *Annalium Evangelii . . . decades duo*, Geneva, 1618, pp. 295, 306.

[1] Comba, p. 90.

influence among the mountaineers in leading them towards the freer, simpler type of religion, and so preparing for their subsequent breach with Rome, is likely enough. But there is no evidence that he was in any sense the founder of the Waldensian Church as a separate community or the originator of Protestantism in it. There is no indication of the existence of such a church for centuries later than the time of Claude. Besides, it is very improbable that this bishop should have succeeded in originating a vigorous, independent organization in a remote corner of his diocese while he did nothing of the kind at Turin or in the more civilized towns nearer his metropolis. Champions of the antiquity of the Waldensian Church as a distinct community in separation from Rome claim a mass of Romance literature in the libraries of Geneva, Zürich, Grenoble, Paris, Cambridge, and Dublin in support of this contention, maintaining that it is (1) representative of the views of that Church, and (2) of great antiquity. But a critical examination has made it clear (1) that much of this literature is of Roman Catholic origin and not marked by characteristics peculiar to the Waldenses, and that some of it is Hussite, and (2) that none of it gives evidence of coming from an earlier date than the 14th century.

One of these documents, entitled *Nobla Laiczon* ('Noble Reading'), is a poem setting forth Christian doctrine of the Waldensian type which Perrin, Leger, Muston, Monastier, and other writers declare contains a statement that 1100 years have passed since the origin of the New Testament. But in a copy of this work discovered in the Morland MSS it was seen that the tail of an Arabic 4 has left some traces, so that the original reading would have been 'mil e 4 cent anz.' Another MS in this collection has 'mil e CCCC anz.' Further, a MS of the NT at Zürich, which had been assigned to the 12th cent., is found to be dependent on Erasmus' Greek Testament. Lastly there is the 'Waldensian Confession of Faith,' for which a pre-Reformation origin had been claimed, as composed in the year 1120; but now it has been discovered that this date is not written by the original hand, and also that the MS 'copies almost word for word the utterances of the Reformer Bucer as given in Morel's report of his negotiations with that divine and Œcolampadius.'[1]

The statement of Muston[2] that in the year 1096 Urban II. described the Vaudois as 'infected with heresy' is founded on a mistake, since no such reference to these people is to be found among his bulls.[3]

4. Albigenses.—The Albigenses, or Catharists, were near neighbours, occupying the northern and French side of the mountains, the southern and Italian valleys of which were inhabited by the Waldenses. But there does not seem to have been much intercommunication across the great Alpine barrier. The national and racial distinction between the two populations would tend to keep them apart. Moreover, there is not the slightest trace of Catharist doctrines in the Waldensian Church. That this Church should not have received any infection of the Manichæan teaching, with which the Albigenses are said to have been imbued by an emigration from Eastern Europe, and yet have received their comparatively innocent Protestant principles from this tainted source, is not at all probable. On the other hand, we have little or no first-hand information about the tenets of the Albigenses, the reports of which come to us through the suspicious channel of their enemies' accounts of confessions under torture. We may well admit that a common spirit of resistance to the dominance of Rome, and similar efforts at realizing a more spiritual type of worship than was generally seen in mediæval Catholicism, may have led to mutual encouragement in these respects. What must be affirmed, however, is that certainly the Waldensian is not a direct offshoot of the Albigensian movement.

[1] J. H. Kurtz, *Church History*[10], Eng. tr., London, 1892, 2ii. 471 f.
[2] *L'Israël des Alpes*, Paris, 1851, vol. i. p. xxxii, n. 2.
[3] Comba, p. 154.

The supposed connexion between the Waldenses and the Albigenses was championed in England by several writers, of whom the most notable was G. S. Faber, *An Enquiry into the History and the Theology of the ancient Vallenses and Albigenses* (1838). But in the same year the idea was completely demolished by S. R. Maitland in *Facts and Documents illustrative of the History, Doctrine, and Rites of the ancient Albigenses and Waldenses* (1838). Lastly, Charles Schmidt of Strassburg made an exhaustive examination of the question, giving the legend, as Comba says, its *coup de grâce*.[1] See, further, art. ALBIGENSES.

5. Various later influences. — It may well be that various influences tended to cut off the Vaudois from continuous close Roman influence. Their isolated geographical situation would minimize intercommunication, and at the same time their life as mountaineers would foster a spirit of independence and its simplicity keep them from the materializing influence of a sumptuous ritual. Then the Gothic and Lombard invasions would associate ecclesiastical with political aloofness. For a time these people came under the wave of Arian dominance. We cannot regard the Waldensian faith as in any sense a product of Arianism, and yet the local separation produced by the heresy would tend to engender a habit of independence. Arnold of Brescia, a disciple of Abelard, executed at Rome in 1155, was a strenuous opponent of the temporal claims of the papacy. He contended that sacraments administered by priests who were not living an apostolic life were invalid. Lucius III.'s bull of excommunication (1184) shows that he left followers behind him whose influence may well have lingered in Northern history till it was merged in that of the definitely anti-papal Waldenses. But Leger, in setting his name at the head of the list of barbes, was confusing it with that of another Arnold. Then, on both sides of the Alps, those parts of France and Italy respectively which were nearest to the Waldensian valleys witnessed during the Middle Ages repeated protests against the abuse of images and materialistic forms of worship. With greater probability Peter of Bruys (1104–25) is claimed by Comba, Gay, and others as one of the precursors and originating influences of the Waldenses.

Unfortunately our knowledge of Peter's tenets is almost confined to the statements of Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny.[2] It would appear that he ascribed the highest authority to the Gospels, especially the teachings of Jesus contained in them, finding a second and lower authority in the Epistles. It is not clear how he regarded the Old Testament. He taught believers' baptism and repudiated the efficacy of infant baptism, rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation and the Mass—perhaps even going so far as to give up the observance of the Lord's Supper as a rite of the Church—repudiated the custom of prayers for the dead, denied the sanctity of church buildings, and carried out an iconoclastic crusade against the use of crosses. Döllinger's association of the Petrobrusians with the Cathari has been shown to be erroneous.[3] Peter was twenty years combating what he regarded as the superstitions of the Church, especially the 'Roman idolatry.' Beginning in the obscure village of Bruys high up among the Alps, his influence spread through Narbonne, Guyenne, and Gascony, and was for a time centred at Toulouse, where he enjoyed great and growing popularity. Nevertheless, at the instigation of the monks of St. Gilles, he was seized by a mob and publicly burnt, without any legal trial, and also without any interference from the authorities. Peter of Bruys was followed as a reformer by Henry of Cluny, who was condemned at the Council of Pisa (1134), but escaped, and was again imprisoned in 1150 at Toulouse, where he died. His supposed connexion with the famous abbey of Cluny is a mistake; so is the claim that he was an Italian; he seems to have been a Swiss born at Lausanne. Henry followed Peter in protesting against corruptions in the Church, especially the degeneration of the clergy, whom he persuaded to marry their concubines. Unfortunately, as in the case of his predecessor, our knowledge of this reformer is chiefly dependent on information supplied by his enemies, according to which the result of his energetic activity was that the altars were abandoned and the sacraments of the Church despised.[4] Farther than this we cannot go. We have no record of Henry's

[1] *Hist. et doctrine de la secte des Cathares ou Albigeois*, Strassburg, 1849, ii. 267–270.
[2] *Adversus Petrobrusianos hæreticos*, *PL* clxxxix. 719–850.
[3] A. H. Newman, *American Soc. of Church Hist.* [New York, 1892] iv. 183–189.
[4] *Acta Epis. cenomanensium*, in J. Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, Paris, 1723.

specific doctrinal teaching and cannot say that he shared Peter of Bruys' primitive Protestantism. Apparently his protests were on moral rather than on theological grounds. Meanwhile there was a spirit of revolt in the air and a growing desire for a more spiritual religion than was commonly met with. On the other hand, the Council of Tours (1163) excommunicated both the Petrobrusians and the Henricians. The Humiliati have been claimed as precursors of the Waldenses; but they were simply workmen's gilds in Lombardy, many of whose members joined the new religious movements, but who were not themselves formative influences in them.

6. Waldo and the Poor Men of Lyons.—The Christian name Peter commonly attached to the reformer appears to be due to later tradition and usage. His name is given in French as Valdes, in Latin as Valdesius, Valdenius, Gualdensis, in Italian as Waldo. Again we have to turn to the prejudiced account of enemies for most of our information about this reformer. It is from an anonymous writer at Laon, however, that we obtain the story of his conversion.

He had been enriched by the practice of usury when in 1173, after being deeply impressed by the legend of St. Alexius, describing how the saint had given all his property to the poor and gone on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, he was directed by a theologian to the words of Christ in Mt 19^{21}. Thereupon, making over his landed possessions to his wife, and distributing the rest of his property among the poor, he first of all gave himself to the study of the Gospels, the Psalms, and other parts of Scripture as well as some patristic writings, which he got two friendly priests to translate for him into the Romance dialect.

After taking a formal vow of poverty and going through the streets begging his way and preaching his message of self-abnegation, he gathered about him a group of followers, who in turn went about with the same message and became known as the Poor Men of Lyons. They travelled in strict observance of Christ's directions to the Seventy (Lk 10^{1-4}), going two and two, without staff or scrip, their feet only in wooden sabots, preaching repentance and exhorting people to return to the purity and simplicity of the primitive Christians. Forbidden to preach by the archbishop, they replied with the apostolic defence in Ac 5^{29}, and later (1179) appealed to the Third Lateran Council, under Alexander III., for recognition, only to have their request scornfully denied—although the pope himself had received Waldo kindly and he is said to have been secretly ordained by one of the cardinals. Daring to persist in their preaching, they were put under the ban at the Council of Verona (1184), presided over by Pope Lucius III. They had no wish to break off from the Church, nor did they imagine that they were opposing its doctrine, ritual, or government. They claimed to be loyal sons of the Church, called to lead their erring brethren back to the ways of their ancestors, and this entirely as a practical reformation of life and conduct. Nevertheless their refusal either to recant or to be silent and their condemnation by the ecclesiastical authorities forced them into a position tantamount to open rebellion. Then this condemnation, followed by an edict of Barbarossa, drove the Poor Men of Lyons out of the city and scattered them abroad, only however to spread the seed of their message the more effectually through Southern Europe. Thus they found their way into Provence, Dauphiné, the valleys of Piedmont, Lombardy, Lorraine, Flanders, Picardy, Germany, Spain, and even as far as England. Since Waldo and his followers had not been condemned for any doctrinal heresy, but only for a breach of discipline in preaching without ecclesiastical authority, strictly speaking they should have been prosecuted as schismatics rather than as heretics. Nevertheless the determined opposition with which they were met implies that their free handling of Scripture gave offence to the theologians, and in point of fact, like the followers of Peter and Henry, they were denounced as heretics. They had their own ministers (called *ministri*), chosen annually for the administration of the communion, which was only once a year. Waldo remained at the head of the community (*societas*) till his death, selected and ordained the ministers, and admitted the new members, though he did not claim to be a bishop. The conditions of membership, called 'conversion,' were renunciation of private property and an ascetic life, separation of husbands from wives, and three days' fast in the week. It is said that they repudiated indulgences, purgatory, and masses for the dead, and denied the efficacy of the sacraments administered by unworthy priests. If so, they certainly would be deemed heretics. But the question of the full contents of their preaching is obscure. A literal application of the teachings of Christ contained in the Gospels was its chief theme, as it had been that of their founder, and, they being for the most part simple folk, without any theological training, it would be pedantic to try to fix any definite theology upon them. We do not know much about the later days of Waldo; he died in Bohemia in the year 1217.

7. The fusion.—An inquiry into the origin of the Waldensian Church brings us to the result that it grew out of a fusion of the work of Waldo and the Poor Men of Lyons with the movements originated by Arnold of Brescia, Peter of Bruys, and Henry 'of Cluny.' It came to contain elements in the teaching of these four leaders, and it rounded into a definite form and ripened into a distinctly organized Church with its own specific teaching in parts where their fourfold influence had been felt, and this not till the latest and most vigorous of these movements, that of Waldo, came into contact with the earlier types. Thus, while the old Waldensian claim to primitive and even apostolic antiquity is abandoned, and it cannot be maintained that Waldo found a Church of evangelical teaching in the Vaudois valleys ready to welcome him and learnt more from it than he imparted to it, neither is it right to say that the Waldenses are simply the followers of Waldo of Lyons. It does not appear that he simply founded the community *de novo*, or that its evangelical and Protestant character is entirely due to his influence. The ideas were in the air, the spirit was alive and awake, when Waldo and his Poor Men came with apostolic fervour to embrace them and blend them with their own version of the teaching of Jesus. There were Arnoldists, Petrobrusians, and Henricians before Waldo, existing as scattered religionists. But it was his movement that gathered in the harvest of their lives and brought about the formation of a Waldensian Church.

II. *MEDIÆVAL PERIOD.*—Disputations in 1175–76 between the barbes Olivier and Sicard and their bishop Montpeyroux having alarmed the neighbouring clergy, two or three years later the pope, Alexander III., sent the cardinal of St. Chrysogone, Henry of Citeaux, and Reginald, bishop of Bath, then on his way to the Lateran Council, accompanied by the monk Walter Mapes and the priest Raymond of Daventry, to Toulouse to inquire into the matter. Two barbes came there with safe conducts, Bernard of Raymond and Raymond of Baimiac, to be examined by John of Bellesmains, bishop of Poitiers, and then to Narbonne to be examined by Bernard of Fontcaude, under the presidentship of the English priest Raymond of Daventry. It is this Raymond who first uses the name 'Waldenses' (*Vallenses*)—as far as it can be traced back—in his sentence of condemnation, which must be dated 1179 at latest, because, as already said, Raymond was then on his way to the Lateran Council as an attendant of the bishop of Bath. The next year Bernard of Fontcaude wrote a book entitled *Adversus Vallenses*

et Arianos.[1] It seems that these discussions arose out of the union of the Petrobrusians and Henricians with the Poor Men of Lyons in Provence. About the same time Waldo's followers united with the Arnauldists in Lombardy. Thus the Waldenses of France and Italy were united, and their union was cemented by persecution. A sentence of excommunication by the Council of Verona cleared the remaining followers of Waldo out of Lyons and drove them to Provence, Dauphiné, the valleys of Piedmont, Lombardy, and some even to Germany. So numerous had they become in Provence that Innocent III. sent his best legates to suppress them in the years 1198, 1201, and 1203, on the third occasion including in his embassy a Spanish bishop and the great St. Dominic, who conducted a succession of disputations with little result till 1207, when the legate Peter of Châteauneuf was killed. Two years later the pope had recourse to a crusade. In 1210 the emperor Otho ordered the archbishop of Turin to drive the Waldenses out of his diocese, and in 1220 the Statutes of Pignerol forbade the inhabitants to harbour them. Some fled to Picardy, and Philip Augustus drove them on to Flanders. Some came to Mayence and Bingen, where 50 were burnt in 1232. They were seen early in Spain, condemned by Church councils, and harried by three of the kings. In 1237 Pope Gregory IX. sent a bull to the archbishop of Tarragona which resulted in fifteen of the heretics being burnt, King Ferdinand himself casting wood on the fire. In course of time these Spanish Waldenses were exterminated. In this century Waldensian churches in Germany sent candidates for the ministry to study at a Waldensian college in Milan. Martyrs to their faith suffered death in Germany during the two following centuries. Bohemia, where Waldo died, became an important field of Waldensian activity. Forty years after the founder's death the inquisitor of Passau named 42 places as nests of the heresy. The king Otakar started persecution, which became most severe in 1335 under Pope Benedict XII. The rise of the Hussite movement led to a fusion of some of the two groups of reformers under the name of Taborites, the most famous of whom was the barbe Frederic Reiser, who spent 25 years in visitations among the Waldenses in Bohemia and Austria and was burnt at Strassburg in 1458. Austria had been reached as early as the 13th cent., and in 1315 the inquisitor of Krems denounced 36 localities as infected with the heresy and secured the burning of 130 martyrs, the most illustrious of whom was the bishop Neumeister, who was burnt at Vienna; he is said to have declared that there were more than 80,000 Waldenses in the duchy of Austria! The end of this century witnessed a terrible persecution in Styria. Meanwhile the movement was spreading in Italy under an organized itinerant mission, the missionaries travelling as pedlars and preaching over many districts. They prospered especially at Milan, where they had a college under John of Ronco, who was appointed to the headship for life, in spite of Waldo's disapproval, which resulted in a division into two groups, the French group and the Italian and German group. The Lombards appointed their own chief pastor (*præpositus*), and he, as well as their ministers (*ministri*), held office for life, while Waldo and the French Waldenses on his authority elected annual leaders to administer the Lord's Supper and serve as pastors. Another and more vital division between the two parties arose out of the teaching of the Italian Waldenses that the sacraments could not be efficacious if administered by priests of unworthy character, while the French Waldenses did not accept this view. Holding the Roman Catholic priests to be morally wrong in many of their practices, because unscriptural, the Italians repudiated all their sacraments. At the same time this branch of the Waldenses insisted most strongly on close adhesion to NT teaching and practice generally and on rejection of everything in the Church which lacked that authority. Thus they were the more thoroughgoing anti-Romanists. In May 1217 six members of the two parties met at Bergamo to draw up terms of agreement, but failed (1) on the question of the salvation of Waldo, which the Lombards made conditional only on his repentance of his wrong-doing in condemning their views, while the French regarded it as absolute; (2) on the question of the validity of sacraments administered by unworthy ministers, denied by the Italians, allowed by the French. Nevertheless fraternal intercourse came to be established in course of time between these two branches of Waldenses. In the 15th cent. there was a very influential number of the Waldenses in central Italy. The Inquisition records reveal the existence of groups throughout the whole of this region. In Calabria the Waldenses from Piedmont, who had been sent for to cultivate a great estate, proved themselves most effective missionaries, winning over most of the population of the district. These converts obtained exceptional privileges of religious liberty and flourished for 250 years, after which they were almost exterminated by a wholesale persecution.

While the French Waldenses seem to have developed the episcopal form of government with the three orders—bishops, priests, and deacons—in spite of Waldo's greater simplicity of ministerial functions, the Italians worked out more of a presbyterian type of church, each church being under a pastor with whom was associated in government a consistory of laymen, and a synod met once a year composed of an equal number of ministerial and lay members.

The valleys on the Italian side of the Cottian Alps now became the centre and chief home of these Waldenses, so that in course of time their very name (in French 'Vaudois') was regarded as geographical, and it was asserted that Waldo took his surname from that of the inhabitants of this district after joining their religious movement, whereas later researches have shown that there is no justification for this view, and it must be admitted that the name of the Church is derived from that of the founder of the society of the Poor Men of Lyons. In the 15th cent. these valleys came under the rule of the duke of Savoy. Then followed a time of severe persecution. In 1434 its violence drove numbers to emigrate. The inquisitor Acquapendente visited the valley of Luserna in 1475, and, disapproving of the religious views and practices of its inhabitants, roused their overlords to compel submission to his orders, with the result that a few years later there was a rebellion which led in 1484 to the interference of Duke Charles I., who was able to bring about a peaceful arrangement between the two parties. The first serious attack with armed forces took place under Philip II., who became regent of the duchy of Savoy in 1490, and duke in 1496. It was in 1494, during his regency, that Philip launched an expedition against the Waldenses of the Luserna valley, only to meet with so disastrous a defeat that he at once made peace with them, guaranteeing them liberty for 40 years. It is not easy to be clear as to the theological views of the Waldenses during this period. The notion that, when the Reformation broke out, the Protestants were surprised to find their ideas anticipated by the inhabitants of the Alpine valleys, who had pre-

[1] See Gay, *Hist. des Vaudois*, p. 16, n. 1.

served them from primitive times, proves to be a delusion. When we do meet with a Waldensian statement of belief, this is subsequent to the Reformation and characterized by doctrines and phrases distinctive of Swiss and German theologians of that movement. The earlier Protestantism was partly negative, in the rejection of Roman Catholic teachings and practices which could not be justified by the NT, and, in so far as it was positive, a return to the simplicity and spirituality of worship believed to have been characteristic of the primitive Church. Waldo and his immediate followers relied mainly on the Gospels. The ordinance of poverty thought to be required by the teachings of Christ was not universally adopted, nor did it long continue in operation. On the other hand, the Pauline theology, so emphatically and elaborately taught both by Luther and by Calvin, does not appear to have been brought forward by these earlier Protestants. There was no tendency among them to elaborate a system of theology. The barbes were drawn for the most part from the peasantry, and the college at Milan in which they were trained had to begin with the most elementary instruction in reading and writing. The great requisite was ability to read the Gospels and familiarity with their contents. Here we have the religious teaching of the mediæval Waldenses.

III. *Reformation period.*—**1. First contact with the Protestants.**—When the Reformation broke out the only organized opponents of the papacy on the Continent were the Waldenses and the later Hussites, who were called the Bohemian Brethren, but whom the Protestants as well as Roman Catholics designated Waldenses. In 1522 these Bohemians sent two of their ministers on a visit to Martin Luther with a message of congratulation and encouragement, and ten years later they sent a confession of faith, entitled *Apologia veræ doctrinæ eorum qui vulgo appellantur Valdenses*, with a eulogistic preface. Subsequently communications were maintained by the missions of successive deputations. In 1540 the Bohemian Brethren sent a deputation to confer with Calvin in Strassburg. Driven out of their own country in 1548, they took refuge in Poland, where they united with the Protestant churches which they found there. Calvin then wrote to the Reformed churches of Poland, 'I hope for every kind of good from your union with the Waldenses (avec les Vaudois).'[1] Meanwhile the churches of the Alpine valleys took steps to come into contact with the new reforming movement, and in 1526 the synod of Laus (Pragela), in which 140 barbes took part, having received confusing reports, sent the barbes Martin Gonin and Guido of Calabria both to Switzerland and to Germany to make inquiries and bring back some of the Protestant writings.

Their report and the literature which they circulated among the churches helped to draw them into contact with the Reformers. Four years later the synod which met at Marindol decided to consult the principal Swiss Reformers on several points of doctrine, organization, and discipline, for which purpose they sent two barbes, George Morel and Peter Masson, who visited and conferred with Farel and Haller, and at Basel received a fine response to their questions from Œcolampadius, who then sent them on to Strassburg, where they were well received by Bucer, who gave them an equally full and explicit reply. Morel published the Waldensian questions and the Reformers' replies in a work now at Dublin.[2] The same year the two delegates returned by way of France, when Masson was put to death at Dijon; but Morel was able to bring back their report to the Waldensian churches. This was discussed at a synod in Piedmont, held apparently in 1531. The discussion resulted in a division of opinion, and the formation of two parties, known respectively as 'Conservators' and 'Innovators,' the former holding on to their old position, the latter accepting the new Protestant teaching. This indisputable fact affords clear evidence that the pre-Reformation Waldenses were not simply hidden Protestants, cherishing the doctrine subsequently held by the Swiss and German Reformers. On the other hand, like the Hussites, with whom they practically coalesced in Hungary, and the descendants of the Lollards still in hiding from persecution in England, they were ready to fraternize with the new opponents of the papacy, though some did not adopt all their views. Liberation from the yoke of Rome, the abandonment of mediæval ritual which was regarded as idolatrous, spirituality of worship, and the popular use of the Scriptures in the vernacular as the authoritative standard of faith and discipline were Waldensian characteristics, which found welcome support from the powerful new Protestantism that was making so great a stir in the world.

2. Association with the Swiss Reformation.—The differences of opinion among the Waldenses of the valleys and their division into two parties on the question of accepting the Protestant views which their delegates reported to them led to the desire for fuller knowledge and conference with leading Reformers. With this end in view a general synod was convoked in 1532 under the chestnuts of Chamforans at Angrogna, in which the Reformers Farel, Saunier, and Olivétan met a large assembly containing laymen as well as barbes. Three recommendations, which rose out of the previous consultations with Œcolampadius and Farel, were then read: viz. (1) the adoption of public worship by the Waldensian churches instead of secret meetings, (2) an absolute condemnation of the custom of some of the Waldenses in attending Roman Catholic services, (3) an acceptance of the Reformers' views on predestination, good works, oaths, the denial of obligatory confession, Sunday fasts, marriage of the clergy, and the two sacraments. Farel's enthusiastic eloquence carried the great majority of the assembly with him in a vote for adopting these propositions, though some of the barbes protested against them on two grounds, (1) as unnecessary, (2) as casting a reflexion on those who had hitherto led the churches happily. Olivétan remained for three years travelling among the valleys and setting up schools. Meanwhile—the next year after the synod of Chamforans—two barbes who had been conferring with their brethren in Bohemia returned with a long letter conjuring the Waldenses of the valleys to weigh well the question of adhesion to the proposals of the foreign teachers. Accordingly a synod was at once called at Prali to reconsider the question; but it adhered to the previous decision, with only a handful of dissentients. The chief differences between the Waldenses and the Swiss Protestants had been based on the question of the degree in which everything must be determined by the authority of Scripture. Both parties held, as against the Catholic position, that this was the one supreme authority; but, while the Swiss theologians would allow of nothing which was not expressly taught in the Bible, the Waldenses had held that only those tenets and practices of Catholicism which were expressly contrary to Scripture need be condemned. But now the closer adhesion to the Swiss Reformed Church tended to assimilation of views and practices and subsequently to the adoption of Calvinism.

3. Olivétan's Bible.—One important and lasting outcome of the friendly intercourse between the Waldenses and the Swiss Reformers was the production of the first Protestant French translation of the Bible. Waldo had translated some portions into the Romance vernacular dialect; but most of his publications had been destroyed by the Roman Catholic authorities. In the conference at Chamforans, Farel and Saunier urged the Waldensian barbes to bring out a new translation of the whole Bible in the French language. This work the barbes persuaded Olivétan to undertake. Olivétan was a cousin of Calvin; he had been educated at the university of Paris and at Orleans; on accepting Protestantism he had escaped to Strassburg, and later he had come to Geneva. He accepted the task, and completed it in 1535. Considered better in the OT portion than in the NT, Olivétan's version is the basis of the later French versions, or rather revisions.

4. The new order.—In course of time the Waldenses on the French side of the Alps, who for the most part consisted of Conservators, were fused into French Protestantism. Then persecu-

[1] Gay, p. 49.

[2] J. H. Todd, *Books of the Vaudois preserved in Trinity College, Dublin.*

tion in Bohemia and also in Southern Italy nearly exterminated the churches of this communion in those parts, leaving Piedmont and the Italian valleys of the Cottian Alps, the Vaudois country, as its only important habitat, though this very persecution scattered many of its victims among the Swiss and German Protestant states. It took some 20 or 30 years to supply adequately trained ministers and organize the worship, discipline, and teaching of the Waldensian Church in the valleys on the lines agreed upon in the conference with the Swiss Reformers. The linguistic difficulty was one cause of delay. The Swiss theologians could preach only in French, the Italian ministers, educated in the college at Milan, only in Italian. Neither knew the Romance dialect which was used in the villages of the valleys. Instead of taking the course usually adopted by missionaries and themselves learning the provincial dialect, the French- and Italian-speaking teachers induced the peasants to learn the languages of these teachers, so that they could be used in the church services. Until this curious change had been effectively completed, the movement could not make much progress. Meanwhile Piedmont came under the power of France. This was in 1536 — under Francis I.; and the French domination lasted till 1559. The first governor appointed by the French king (1537) was William of Fürstenberg, a resolute Protestant, who proved friendly to the Waldenses, and, on being sent into Germany, left his secretary Farel, a brother of the Reformer, in charge of the valley of Luserna. This man set to work vigorously furthering the Reformation and abolishing the Mass which the Catholics were still celebrating at Angrogna — an act of violence which provoked reprisals on the part of René of Montejean, the governor of Turin, who sent soldiers into the valley, sacked its villages, and imprisoned the barbes. The governor, returning to the province in 1539, released them, and Francis then left the Waldenses of Piedmont in peace for seven years, while he was persecuting those on the French side of the Alps. Henry II., succeeding to the throne of France in 1547, was also severe on the northern Waldenses; but Caraciolo, his governor of Piedmont, was friendly to them, and persecution did not break out in this district till 1550, when the inquisitor Giacomelli sent for the syndic of Angrogna and imprisoned him at Turin. War put a stop to further proceedings. In 1555 a number of fully trained ministers came from Switzerland to take charge of the congregations in the valleys, together with some Swiss pastors who travelled about inducting them and regulating the new order of worship in the French language, also a colporteur who distributed the service books among the villages. Many 'temples' were built, and by 1556 the new form of worship was being conducted in all the parishes. Thereupon two commissioners were dispatched from Turin with directions to stop these services. The villagers disobeyed the edict, and an arrest of the pastors was ordered. But proceedings were stopped owing to the influence of Swiss and German authorities with the French Government. Thus another respite was secured, during which the Waldensian Church was being fully organized and equipped with capable ministers. This is a significant fact, in view of the terrible times that were to follow. The discipline and leadership now secured proved to be invaluable in arming the Waldenses to make one of the most magnificent stands for religious liberty ever recorded in the annals of history.

IV. *PERIOD OF GREAT PERSECUTIONS (1540–1690).* — **1. Persecution of early Protestants.** — **Although the** Waldenses had been liable to persecution as heretics from the first and had suffered from some severe outbreaks previous to the Reformation, there were times of lenient treatment—a fact which, if not logical, was indicative of the absence of rigorous lines of demarcation. But now their open co-operation with the Swiss and German Protestants allowed of no ambiguity as to their quarrel with Rome, and consequently stern measures of oppression were taken against them. The political arrangement formally adopted in Germany as a refuge from civil war and practically operative in other countries left the religion of each state to be that of its prince or other ruling authority. In democratic and republican Switzerland this worked smoothly, since it meant the dominance of the faith of the majority. But it was otherwise with a country such as France under an autocratic ruler, and accordingly in 1534 there was a wholesale destruction of the Waldensian churches of Provence. Piedmont was subject to the rule of the duke of Savoy, and therefore it depended on the will of that prince, or sometimes rather on that of his overlord, whether the practices of the Waldensian Church in that province should be sanctioned or measures taken to suppress them. Another feature of the consequent contest is the fact that it was by no means one-sided. Those sturdy mountaineers were not meek martyrs led as lambs to the slaughter. They carried the war into the enemy's camp, and the first outbreak of persecution directed against them was an act of reprisal for the suppression of the Mass at Angrogna. Then the Waldenses became in a literal sense a Church militant, taking to the field in arms and fighting valiantly for their liberty of worship, with hardy heroism and at times with brilliant success. The outstanding personality of this period is Scipione Lentolo, born at Naples, but said to have come from a Roman patrician family, who became a priest, a doctor of theology, and preacher at Venice and Ferrara, at the latter of which places he was converted to Protestantism. Accused of heresy for his preaching at Lucca, he was imprisoned and sent to Rome. Escaping first to Sicily and then to Geneva, he there came in contact with Calvin, who appointed him pastor of St. Jean in the Waldensian country. Not confining his activity to this parish, he visited other valleys, and even went down to the plain of Piedmont on an evangelizing tour. When persecution broke out, he got refuge for fugitives in the valleys and encouraged the people everywhere to stand true to their faith. Lentolo is the author of the earliest history of the Waldenses and the chief authority for that of the persecution of his own times. This history was virtually unknown till in 1897 Comba called attention to a copy of it in the Berne Library; eight years later it was reprinted and published, and thus a flood of light was thrown on the persecution with which the author was so closely connected. Expelled from the valleys in 1566, he ministered in the Engadine and carried on literary work till his death in 1599.

The principal persecution with which Lentolo was brought into contact led to 'the war of della Trinità.' Philibert, the duke of Savoy at this time, though personally averse to the molestation of his mountaineer subjects, was compelled by the papal nuncio, backed up by France and Spain, to issue an edict requiring them to attend the Mass and forbidding their holding Waldensian services. On their disobeying this order, he sent an army under the command of della Trinità to enforce it. This commander, arriving in November 1560, met with such strenuous opposition that he consented to allow a deputation of barbes to go to the duke and present their plea for religious liberty, while he went into winter quarters at La Tour. The

deputation was treacherously treated at Turin, in order to compel them to abjure their faith. Accordingly, on their return in the spring, the indignant mountaineers rose in a mass and repulsed every attack of della Trinità at Luserna, at Angrogna, at Prali, with the result that Philibert was glad to come to terms with the heretics, leaving them at peace to carry on their Protestant services (5th June 1561). At the same time a persecution to the extent of extermination was carried out by Spanish troops at the instigation of the grand inquisitor, Michele Ghislieri (later Pope Pius v.), in Calabria, where, in spite of wholesale slaughter in the 13th cent., some representatives of the early Waldenses had persisted in maintaining the faith of their fathers, and had now welcomed the new Protestant movement. Two thousand were put to death and 1600 imprisoned. In Piedmont, after this, attempts were made successively by missions of Jesuits and by Capuchin friars, sometimes with the aid of soldiers, to bring the mountain villagers back into the fold of the Church; there followed several local persecutions, exactions of fines for supposed offences, and violent seizures of churches and even a sanguinary war in the year 1624, in which both sides suffered severely. The most important Waldensian leader of this time was Peter Gilles, an inspiring preacher and vigorous polemical writer, who died in 1644.

2. **The great persecution under Louis XIV.**—The determined loyalty of the Waldenses to their faith, combined with their amazing military prowess and the reluctance of the duke of Savoy to harass his mountaineer subjects—a policy rarely undertaken excepting under pressure from France—had secured them treaties of peace with liberty of worship. For a quarter of a century they were very little molested. In 1650 Charles Emmanuel II., the young duke of Savoy (only 15 years old), came to the throne. Behind him was the real power, his mother the duchess, daughter of Henry IV. and Mary de Medici, granddaughter of the notorious Catherine de Medici, the author of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Thereupon a 'Council of the Propagation of the Faith,' consisting of the chief councillors of State and Church dignitaries, was established in Turin. Five years later there was issued the 'Decree of Gastado,' ordering all Waldensian families in the plain back into the mountains and the sale of their lands within 20 days, unless they would renounce their Protestantism. This was in the depth of winter, and much suffering was involved, which they endured courageously. A little later (17th April 1655) the marquis of Pianezza was dispatched with an army of 15,000 men to La Torre—the key of the valleys—although at this very time there were deputies in Turin attempting to negotiate terms of settlement. The Waldenses first retreated to the mountains. But, on their assailants offering to treat with them, they opened the passes, and some of them fraternized with the soldiers, eating at the same tables. This was the prelude to wholesale massacre throughout the valleys of Luserna and Angrogna. Jean Leger, the author of the monumental history of the Waldenses, is the leading barbe of this period and the inspirer of his people. He enumerates 1712 martyrs. A great number who had hidden in a cave at Castelluzzo, the castle-like mountain above La Torre which dominates the entrance to the valleys, were dragged out and flung down the precipice. These were the

> 'slaughtered saints, whose bones
> Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold . . .
> Slain by the bloody Piemontese, that rolled
> Mother with infant down the rocks'

of Milton's famous sonnet. This was before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and it sent a shock of horror through Europe. Cromwell proclaimed a fast and got Milton to draw up a letter to the king of France and the Protestant princes. He also sent Sir Samuel Morland to the duke of Savoy to convey his vigorous protest by word of mouth. Morland visited the valleys and brought back information together with some Waldensian books which are now deposited at Cambridge. His published results of investigations on the spot are one of our historical sources for this period.

The interference of so powerful a ruler as Cromwell had an immediate effect. Mazarin directed the duke to put an end to the persecution and grant an amnesty to the Protestants. This was settled on 18th August in the 'Patentes de grâce' of Pignerol. But it did not result in a real or lasting peace inasmuch as the Piedmontese did not respect its terms, and accordingly in 1663 they rose in rebellion. Contrary to the treaty stipulations, the duke's authorities began to restore the fort at La Torre, ordered all foreign pastors out of the province, commanded the principal heads of families to answer charges of disloyalty, and, on their failing to appear, condemned them to death in their absence, and compelled Leger to escape out of the country by ordering his execution. The governor of the fortress of La Torre, Count Burbolorneo di Bagnolo, repeatedly sent troops into the valley of Luserna, and their devastations drove the inhabitants into the mountains. Janavel and a body of outlaws, called banditti by the Piedmontese, took up the cause of the persecuted villagers and repeatedly attacked the duke's soldiers. On 6th August the duke issued an edict condemning all the Waldenses to death as rebels. The war continued till the end of the year, by which time Janavel had 2000 followers, who occupied a number of advantageous positions. Meanwhile the persecuted people sent messengers to Switzerland and Holland begging for help, and their great leader Leger made good use of his enforced absence from home in travelling about to urge the plea. The duke got little satisfaction from the war. At Angrogna, after his soldiers had been ravaging the neighbouring villages, he lost 600 men and the two captains Sanfront and della Trinità. This had been a dishonourable expedition, because at the very time he was pledged to a truce while conducting negotiations with some Waldensian deputies, aided by an embassy of Swiss mediators at Turin. The public conferences with these emissaries from Switzerland were followed by a month of private discussion, till at length, on 14th Feb. 1664, the ducal government issued the 'Patente of Turin.' This covenant granted an amnesty to all the Waldenses except their victorious leader Janavel, who was ordered out of the country, and liberty of worship in their own way without molestation, except at St. Jean (Leger's parish), where the Protestant worship was prohibited. It is much to the credit of Janavel that this hero of the war consented to his own exile without protest for the sake of a peaceful settlement of his people. Twenty years of liberty now followed.

3. **The exile.**—In the year after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (*i.e.* 1686) Louis XIV. sent a demand to his cousin Victor Amadeus II., the duke of Savoy, that he would treat his Protestant subjects as the French king was treating the Huguenots. He found some ground for this interference with a foreign government in the fact that fugitives from his terrible persecution were taking refuge in the Waldensian valleys. The result was that the duke ordered the Waldenses to discontinue their religious meetings on pain of death and the confiscation of their

property; their churches were to be razed to the ground; their pastors and schoolmasters to leave within fifteen days under pain of death and confiscation, and to renounce all claim on a pension; and all their children to be educated as Roman Catholics. The Waldenses, assembling at Angrogna, dispatched two envoys to Turin to plead for their pledged rights; but they were refused an audience. On hearing of the terrible plight of their co-religionists, the Swiss Protestants held a conference at Baden, which decided to send envoys to Turin on behalf of the Waldenses. Accordingly the brothers De Muralt, selected for this mission, went to that city and obtained an audience with the duke on 13th March. The result was a proposal of Victor that his Protestant subjects should be allowed to emigrate to Switzerland. It was with the utmost difficulty that the De Muralts persuaded the mountaineers to accept this suggestion of voluntary exile (in an assembly at Serre, 4th April). On 9th April the duke signed a decree permitting the emigration. In spite of this fact, some of the Waldenses who had agreed to accept it were arrested and imprisoned. Not believing that the decree was being adhered to, the people prepared to resist the authorities to the last. Then, with the aid of soldiers sent by Louis XIV. as well as his own men, Victor sent expeditions up the Luserna and Perosa valleys. By the end of the year 9000 had been killed and 12,000 carried off as prisoners, many of them to perish in the dungeons of Piedmont. 'The valleys are deserted,' wrote Catinat, the leader of the invading troops, at the completion of his work. Among those who escaped to Switzerland was Henri Arnaud, who was to be the leader of the return from exile and whose narrative is our principal authority for this period. Victor declared all the property of the Waldenses confiscated, and he reckoned the heretics to be extirpated. But there were 200 fugitives lurking in the mountain caves, who afterwards descended at times to the terror of the immigrants from the plain who had taken possession of their homes. The duke sent messengers bidding them escape to Switzerland, but after sending these to consult Janavel and Arnaud they declared that they would resist till death. Victor had no mind to keep up the war with these brave mountaineers, and he agreed to let them go to Switzerland with their arms and baggage, to allow their imprisoned relatives to accompany them, and on their arrival there to permit all the imprisoned Waldenses, for whose liberation they had been holding out, when offered an earlier opportunity of escape, to follow them. The persistent guerilla warfare of this handful had secured the release of all the surviving Waldenses. Early in 1687 the prisons were opened, and the prisoners, now reduced to 3000, set off on their terrible journey across the Alps for Geneva, by the Mont Cenis route, a journey which occupied on an average twelve days, during which many perished in the snow. But, in spite of the protest of the Swiss against the flagrant breach of treaty, children under twelve years of age were detained to be educated as Roman Catholics. The fugitives came in driblets, and the last detachment did not arrive till the end of August. Their reception at Geneva was very hospitable, and by degrees they were settled in various Swiss towns and generously supported by Holland, England, and Germany. But they were anxious to return to their valleys, and the duke of Savoy was so much annoyed at one or two futile attempts that he induced the Swiss authorities to have them removed farther away, and arrangements were made by which they were received in Brandenburg, Prussia, Württemberg, and the Palatinate.

4. **The return.**—In spite of their scattered condition in the centre and north of Europe, the Waldenses were able to creep back and gather in Noyon on the Lake of Geneva to the number of nearly 1000 fighting men with their wives and families; and on the evening of 16th Aug. 1689, eluding the vigilance of the Swiss authorities, they embarked in boats hired for the purpose and crossed to Savoy, led by Turel de Die, in the unexplained absence of their appointed captain Bourgeois, and accompanied by Arnaud and two other pastors, one of whom, however, Cyrus Chyon, was arrested at the moment of departure. Six days' travel by mountain paths brought them to Mont Cenis, and four more over and down to the valley of the Jaillon. There—to quote Arnaud's figures—they were met by 2500 French soldiers under the command of the Marquis of Larry, whom they defeated with the loss of 600 men, while the Waldenses only lost 15 killed and had 12 wounded in the battle, after as many as 116 lives had been sacrificed to the hardships of the journey. They entrenched themselves at La Balsiglia at the back of the valley of San Martino for the winter. Arnaud was now both their pastor and their commander in the field. Mountain warfare was carried on throughout the spring of 1690, and the returned exiles gradually succeeded in regaining possession of their valleys. Then a combination of England, Holland, Germany, and Spain so crippled the power of France that the duke of Savoy was glad to make overtures to the Waldenses. But no satisfactory arrangement was reached as yet. Meanwhile fresh detachments were still returning from the more remote parts of their exile, and by the end of 1690 Arnaud had succeeded in settling them in their valleys. They had to wait four years for a definite edict regularizing their position and with it recognizing their religious liberty. This was issued by Victor on 23rd May 1694. The pope, Innocent XII., denounced the edict, whereupon the senate in Turin repudiated the papal decree and forbade publication of it in the duchy under penalty of death. Though now enjoying freedom in their valleys, the returned exiles would have been in sore straits if it had not been for the relief which was sent to them from Holland and England. William and Mary, and later on Queen Anne, interested themselves warmly in their heroic fellow-Protestants, as Cromwell had done in a previous generation.

V. *LATER HISTORY.* — 1. **Policy of Victor Amadeus (1694–1730).**—Although the Waldenses now had their homes and religious liberty guaranteed by a decree of the duke, they were still often tyrannically dealt with. Victor had broken with Louis XIV. and become allied with William III. of England by the treaty of the Hague. The Waldenses had then contributed soldiers to a joint military expedition, one result of which was that Val Perosa was taken over from France and incorporated in the duchy. During the war the Waldenses had enjoyed religious liberty and had been able to hold their synods without any hindrance from the Government; in 1697 they petitioned the duke to allow their co-religionists of Val Perosa to be incorporated in their Church. This was refused, and these people had to leave the country in order to obtain freedom for their religion, going to Germany, where they founded a colony at Gochsheim. The next year the duke ordered all French Protestants in his dominions to leave the country within two months under penalty of death. The consequence was the exile of 2883 persons, including seven pastors. Changeable as a weather-cock, on the outbreak of the war of the Spanish succession, Victor wrote personal letters to the Waldensian

pastors urging them to encourage recruiting in his service and even appealed to the Camisards and other French Protestants, whom he had banished five years before, to return and join his army. When the war was over, those French Protestants who had responded to his invitation were again expelled, and in 1707 he even sent back the Swiss parsons whom he had welcomed only eight years earlier. In 1708 Victor took possession of the valley of Pragela, whereupon its Protestant inhabitants were delighted to have the duke's permission for a visitation of Waldensian pastors; but he soon changed his policy and ordered these people to observe the Roman Catholic festivals. His policy all along was opportunist, with a strong leaning to the Roman Catholic side when he was free from the necessity of conciliating his Protestant subjects. There was no depending on his word. When the people of Pragela protested against his later treatment of them, the leading Waldenses in the valley were arrested and imprisoned; in 1716 the Protestant schools were closed; in 1720 the Reformed worship was absolutely forbidden in the valley. From time to time there was imprisonment of recalcitrants till the climax was reached in 1730, when, in spite of the intercession of Frederic William I. of Prussia, all the Waldenses in the valley were ordered to abjure their faith or leave the country. They elected the second course, and by the end of the year 800 exiles had gone over into Switzerland.

2. **The 18th century.**—During the remainder of the century, until Piedmont felt the effect of the French Revolution, the Waldenses had no eventful experiences. Though guaranteed rights of religious liberty, they suffered from time to time from exactions and restrictions by the Government, which showed that they were only allowed to exist on sufferance; and, when they complained against local acts of injustice, their complaints met with little consideration. Thus in 1733 a decree was issued forbidding them to leave their valleys; in 1740 a hospice was founded at Pignerol for the education of Waldensian children; in 1748 a bishop was appointed there to work for their conversion to Rome, and the *Opera dei prestiti* which exists in the present day was then founded, in order to assist Roman Catholics to buy land from the Waldenses; in 1756 they were forbidden to hold meetings outside the temples; kidnapping of children was a common and growing practice. Gay reprints an elaborate document entitled *Compendio degli edditti concernenti i Valdesi*, containing a host of vexations, enactions, and restrictions which emanated from the senate.[1] Meanwhile, in common with Protestantism throughout the rest of Europe, the religion of the Waldenses now suffered from decline of spiritual vigour. The Arian movement in England affected some of the pastors, and after that the Continental 'rationalism.' During this period they received pecuniary help from Holland and from England under encouragement from George II. and George III.

3. **Period of the Revolution.**—The Revolution brought an interval of complete religious liberty to the Waldenses owing to the French Republic being established in Piedmont in 1798. On 19th December all civil government authority over the Church was abolished; on 31st December liberty and equality were proclaimed for all kinds of religion, and early in the new year absolute liberty of the press and the abolition of the Inquisition. The Waldenses were unavoidably mixed up with the war of the Revolution when the absence of Napoleon in Egypt enabled the Russians and Austrians to invade Piedmont. After at first siding with the French, to whom they owed their liberty, the Protestant mountaineers, driven into a corner, gave the allies a pledge of neutrality. In spite of this agreement, the Austrians availed themselves of the military opportunity to involve the Waldenses in trouble on charges of plotting and collusion with the French and on other accusations. These vexatious proceedings, however, do not justify Gay in describing the action of the Austrians as 'a crusade' against them.[1] During the three and a half years when Lombardy and Piedmont were governed as a republic the chief grievance of the Waldenses was their pastors' loss of pecuniary aid from England owing to their association with the French. But, on receiving a petition from 'the Table'—their central governing body—for assistance, the executive commission issued a decree reducing the Roman Catholic parishes from 28 to 13 and granting the revenues of the suppressed parishes to the Waldensian pastors, and by this means half their salaries were secured. Thus the Church now obtained support from State funds. The valleys had taken over the administration of national property. But, after the establishment of the French Empire, Napoleon issued a decree sequestrating this property and so depriving the pastors of the contributions which they had received from them during four years (25th March 1805). The following May, however, when the emperor was at Turin, he granted 'the Table' an audience, when he treated its members very graciously and invited them to present to him a statement of their wishes. Accordingly an open-air meeting was held at St. Jean, which drew up a petition on three points: (1) the grievance of the sequestration of the State funds out of which the pastors' salaries had been made up after the loss of aid from abroad; (2) a request for the application of the Organic law of the Reformed Churches of France to the valleys; (3) a plan or organization for grouping the parishes in five consistorials.[2] In reply Napoleon agreed to restore the sequestrated funds and to allow three consistorials in the valleys. The cringing flattery with which the emperor was approached in this matter, and the painful anxiety shown about the recovery of money grants, do not reflect much credit on the representatives of the heroic Church of Leger and Arnauld and its stand for religious liberty. A further mark of Government favour is seen in the grant of land for the erection of the temple at St. Jean, the Waldensian cathedral, which was dedicated with great *éclat* on 1st Nov. 1806.

4. **19th cent. vicissitudes.**—During the first half of the 19th cent. the Waldensian Church passed through great vicissitudes of fortune. For 34 years, from the fall of Napoleon in 1814 till the Revolution of 1848, it was oppressed under the rule of the king of Sardinia, who actively espoused the papal cause. On Victor Emmanuel I. coming to the throne, the Waldenses of Piedmont sent to Turin a deputation, which had an audience with the king, but obtained no response at the time. Meanwhile the Jesuits had been put in charge of education. The State funds which Napoleon had allowed the pastors to resume were again withdrawn; the only mitigation of the hardship against which the Table protested was a partial remission of dues from the valleys. Charles Felix (1821–31) was much more severe. When the Table asked for an audience at his accession, he insolently answered that all they needed was to become Catholics. It was only after repeated appeals that they were allowed to hold a synod. When the Waldenses reopened their college at La Torre, they were peremptorily ordered to close it again. Charles Albert (1831–48) was also severely re-

[1] *Hist. des Vaudois*, pp. 152–155.

[1] P. 164.

[2] Gay, p. 171.

pressive with the Waldenses till near the end of his reign. Charvay, whom the king appointed bishop of Pignerol in 1835, announced that all the old laws against them should be enforced. When the English ambassador interceded on their behalf, the king ordered them not to appeal to foreigners and forbade the coming of alien visitors among them. All along they were excluded from the universities, the learned professions, and commissions in the army. But at length, even before the Revolution of 1848, the current of European opinion was running so strongly in favour of religious liberty that Charles Albert abandoned his harsh treatment of the Waldenses. On 5th January of that year he granted an audience to the Table, which gratefully acknowledged the legislative reforms and removal of hard enactments he was granting to all his subjects, but which at the same time appealed for relief from the laws especially adverse to their Church. They were well received, and on 17th February the king issued an edict of emancipation, granting the Waldenses the full civil and religious rites enjoyed by other subjects, including access to the public schools and universities, and allowing them to give their Protestant religious teaching in their own schools. The good news was welcomed in the valleys with illuminations and bonfires. A Waldensian congregation was now formed at Turin, and it became a home for refugee Protestants from all parts of Italy. In 1854 there was a division owing to the objection of these refugees to come under the government of the Table and its old rigorous rules. The use of the French language in the services was another ground of complaint. The division spread to other congregations, in which we may regard the malcontents as liberalizers and progressives, and also as protestant Italian patriots in their desire for the use of the Italian language just when a new spirit of a united Italian patriotism was sweeping the country. The result was a split, and the formation of the 'Free Church' (Chiesa Libera) of which Luigi Desanctis, a learned and eloquent priest and theologian of the Inquisition at Malta, who had become a convert to Protestantism, was leader. After serving as pastor of this church for ten years he left it, owing to its adoption of J. N. Darby's views—the Plymouth Brethren position, which allows of no stated ministry—rejoined the Waldenses, and became their professor of theology at Florence and the editor of their journal, *Eco della Verita*, till his death in 1869. The chief leader of the Free Church, after Desanctis had left it, was Alessandro Gavazzi, an ex-Barnabite father from Naples, who subsequently became an eloquent hero of Italian emancipation, accompanying Garibaldi as his chaplain and also enthusiastically supporting Victor Emmanuel as 'the only saviour of Italy as Jesus Christ is the only Saviour of sinners.' In 1870 a general assembly of the Free Church was held at Milan, when a simple Biblical confession of faith was drawn up, and the next year another assembly at Florence adopted rules of a constitution recognizing the pastoral office—as against the Plymouth Brethren idea—arranging for annual assemblies, and appointing an evangelization committee. It now took the title 'Unione della chiesa libera in Italia.' Some of the congregations, still adhering to Darby's views, broke off from this body and formed themselves into a community, which they ventured to designate simply 'Chiesa Christiana.' On 1st May 1884, with the exception of these people, the various evangelical congregations in Italy inaugurated an annual evangelical conference with a view to Church unification. Owing to the Baptists and the Methodists not altogether agreeing with the position taken up by the Waldenses and the Free Church, the two latter bodies took their own course for coming together on condition that the Free Church adopted the confession and Church order of the Waldenses.

5. **Present condition.**—The following facts concerning the present condition of the Waldensian Church have been supplied by the Moderator, Signor Ernesto Giampiccoli.

This Church holds its old position in the Alpine valleys, and since 1848 (the year of liberation) it has spread throughout the Peninsula and the Islands. There are now more than 200 towns and villages outside the original valleys where congregations, large or small, have been formed. The full membership of the whole Church amounts to about 25,000; but there is a much larger number of adherents. For their training the ministers spend three years in the theological college at Florence (which is soon to be transferred to Rome) and at least one more year in a foreign university. They are ordained at the annual Synod in Torre Pellice. The Waldensian Church is in the Alliance of Reformed Churches of the Presbyterian order. Besides its mission work in Italy, it has missionaries working in Africa in connexion with the Missions évangéliques de Paris, and also in connexion with the Swedish missions. It maintains four high schools for boys and girls—the only Protestant high schools recognized by the Government — also hospitals, orphanages, and other benevolent institutions. The Waldensian Church is absolutely independent of the State, and it enjoys complete liberty in all branches of its activity. The worship is in the main the same as in the kindred Evangelical Churches of France and Switzerland, the liturgies being almost identical; but there is a tendency to introduce congregational responses in the morning service. Neither the narrower type of Calvinism nor advanced liberalism is to be found in the present teaching of the Church, which is what is commonly known as 'Evangelical.' This Church is still progressing, though slowly. It always has been and still is hampered with financial difficulties, although it receives assistance from abroad and the contributions of its own members are increasing.

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WALTER F. ADENEY.

WANG YANG-MING. — Wang Yang-ming (A.D. 1472–1529), known also as Wang Shou-jen, Wang-shen, Wang Peh-an, and Wang Wen-ch'eng, was a Chinese statesman, strategist, reformer, and scholar of note during the Ming dynasty, specifically during the reigns of Hung Chih, Cheng Te, and Chia Ching. Like many other Orientals who had posthumous honours conferred upon them, Wang has had hero-stories associated with his career. In early youth he began to exhibit unusual ability as a student. At twelve he is

reported to have made inquiry of his teacher concerning the most important thing in life. When the latter said, 'Study to become a Chinshih' (an academic degree of about the same rank as the Ph.D.), Wang replied, 'Study to become a sage: that is the first and greatest occupation.' At twenty-one he was decorated with the degree of Chüjen; at twenty-eight he was made Chinshih; and a little later he received the highest academic honour the Government could bestow, the degree of Hanlin.

Having unjustly incurred the hostility of the eunuch Liu Tsing when he was thirty-five, he was sent as a disgraced official into the Government dispatch service in the province of Kweichow. His biographer describes Lungch'ang, where he was stationed, as a resort of venomous snakes and poisonous worms, inhabited by babbling barbarians with whom he could not converse. It was a critical situation: in suspense over his own fate, realizing that at any moment a decree from the capital might order his death, he found his followers one by one falling ill. Nothing daunted, he chopped wood, carried water, and made soft-boiled rice for them, cheering them with songs and stories of home. In view of his own precarious position, he had a sarcophagus made for himself. In the midst of these adversities the chief subject of his meditation was the conduct of a sage under similar circumstances. One night at midnight the great enlightenment came, and suddenly he realized what the sage meant by 'investigating things for the sake of extending knowledge to the utmost.' Overjoyed, he unconsciously called out, and, arising from his couch, paced the floor. 'I was wrong,' he said, 'in looking for fundamental principles in things and affairs. My nature is sufficient to solve all the problems of existence.' From that time on he was a faithful defender of idealism in opposition to the realism of the philosopher Chu, whose commentaries, then as now, were esteemed the final authority.[1]

At the age of thirty-nine Wang was restored to honour and promoted to the magistracy in Lulinghsien in Shansi. As time passed he held numerous positions of trust and honour in the Government. He was President of the Court of Ceremonies, Military Governor of Kiangsi, first assistant to the President of the Censorate, President of the Board of War at Nanking, Viceroy of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh, and was made Earl of Hsinchien with the title of 'Master of the Banqueting Office and Pillar of the Government.'

His greatest military campaign was undoubtedly conducted while he was Military Governor of Kiangsi, against the rebellious Prince Ch'en Hao (Prince Ning), who, it was feared, might utilize the down-river current and invade the capital. Wang first sent up several memorials advising the emperor of the rebellion; then by a series of subterfuges he misled the rebellious prince, finally engaging him in battle near Poyang Lake at Huangchiatu and Patzunao, and taking him prisoner of war. His success aroused the jealousy of several officials, to which we may ascribe the fact that his philosophic point of view was attacked and branded as heterodox.

It was not, however, as strategist and statesman that Wang made his largest contribution to human welfare, but rather as a great moral reformer, who may justly be ranked with Socrates in his appreciation of moral values and his emphasis upon fullness of life and moral integrity as of far more worth than fame or gain. He found himself intellectually fettered by a conventional interpretation of classic literature which was just as firmly fixed and as rigidly observed as the most hallowed religious traditions of any other Oriental civilization. He insisted upon a rationalization of the interpretation of the Four Books and the Five Classics that would give room for progressive adjustment. The highest values of life, he held, are realized only through development; apart from development life must prove a miserable failure. That he lacked the modern scientific approach to the problem does not detract from the fact that he had a glimpse of the developmental character of human institutions, and that this standpoint will invariably result in moral progress, if it is thoroughly assimilated.

When, at the time of his enlightenment, he gave utterance to the dictum, 'My nature is sufficient,' he laid the foundation upon which the entire structure of his philosophy and ethics rests: man's mind holds the key to all the problems of the universe. Nature—or experience, as we would call it—is the stuff out of which the universe is made. If nature at large is the macrocosm, then human nature is the microcosm; and for Wang human nature was the human mind.

Pointing to the flowers and trees on a cliff, a friend one day said to him: 'You hold that there is nothing under heaven outside the mind. What relation exists between my mind and these flowers and trees on the high mountain?' Wang replied: 'When you cease regarding these flowers, they become quiet with your mind, and when you see them, their colours at once become clear. From this you may know that these flowers are not external to your mind.'

This is undisguised idealism in which the microcosm creates as truly as the macrocosm. In the great all-pervading unity of nature the most differentiated and highly specialized portion is the human mind. It manifests the only creative ability within the reach of man's knowledge. Wang asserted again and again that the mind is natural law, and as such is the embodiment of the principles of Heaven.

The ground-pattern of his philosophy may be summarized as follows.

(1) Every individual may understand the fundamental principles of life and of things, including moral laws, by learning to understand his own mind, and by developing his own nature. This means that it is not necessary to use the criteria of the past as present-day standards. Each individual has the solution of the problems of the universe within himself.

(2) On the practical side, every one is under obligation to keep knowledge and action, theory and practice together; for the former is so intimately related to the latter that its very existence is involved. There can be no real knowledge without action. The individual has the spring of accurate knowledge within his own nature, and should constantly carry into practice the things that his intuitive knowledge of good gives him opportunity to do.

(3) Heaven, earth, man, all things, are an all-pervading unity. The universe is the macrocosm, and each human mind is a microcosm. This naturally leads to the conceptions liberty and equality of opportunity, and serves well as the fundamental principle of social activity and reform.

Wang's philosophy is to-day held in high esteem by Japanese students and is being extensively read by the Chinese. His system is a direct product of the Oriental mind; as a rationalizing and socializing force it strikes a sympathetic chord in China and Japan.

During the last days of his life the charge of heterodoxy was frequently brought against him. At his death no hereditary honours were conferred upon him, but instead an order from the emperor prohibited the dissemination of the 'false doctrine.' However, in the first year of the emperor Lung Ch'in he was by imperial order made Marquis of Hsinchien and given the posthumous title of Wench'eng ('Perfect Learning'). In the twelfth year of the emperor Wan Li an imperial order was issued to sacrifice to Wang in the Confucian temple, after sacrificing to Confucius. In the city of Yüyao, Chekiang, Wang's ancestral home, an image of the great teacher has been erected in a small temple on a hill.

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[1] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Chinese), § 4.

Press, Shanghai. See also F. G. Henke, *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming* (tr. from the Chinese), Chicago, 1916, 'The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming,' *JRAS, North China Branch*, xliv. [1913] 46–64, 'The Moral Development of the Chinese,' *The Popular Science Monthly*, lxxxvii. [1915] 78–89, 'Wang Yang-ming, a Chinese Idealist,' *The Monist*, xxiv. [1914] 17–34; Paul S. Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*, New York, 1911, Index.

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WAR.—Human warfare is not merely the climax and the symbol of the strife which pervades the realm of nature: it is itself an institution which has been involved in the struggle for existence, and which has had to adapt itself to a changing environment. The institution is rooted in a deep instinct and an inveterate habit of the race; but it has also come into conflict with powerful forces, emanating from the intellectual, the moral, and the religious life of mankind, which have been bold enough to summon it to judgment, have had considerable success in regulating its violence, and have proposed and attempted various methods for its abolition. The present article will trace the impression made upon war by morality and religion, examine the spiritual issues to which it gives rise, and discuss the desirability and the possibility of the cessation of armed conflict among the nations.

I. *NAME AND DEFINITION.*—The term 'war' is popularly applied to any conflict between nations, communities, or other large social groups in which violence is used for the settlement of a quarrel. Cicero defines it as 'genus decertandi per vim' in distinction from the method of argumentation (*disceptatio*).[1] In ethical discussion it has been defined as 'conflictus multorum contra multos extraneos': it is not a state of general antagonism, but a conflict in which matters are forced to an issue; it is the affair of many or of masses, and the name may not lightly be used to dignify sedition.[2] In legal definitions the term has been limited to conflicts in which the belligerents are states, or at least combinations which can reasonably claim a higher status than bands of rioters or brigands.

'War is a contest carried on by public force between states, or between states and communities having with regard to the contest the rights of states.'[3]

The aspects of war on which the genius of language fixed in its coinage of words may still to some extent be recognized.

(*a*) *Approach and assault.*—Πόλεμος, from root *pel*, akin to πέλας, πλησίον (perh. *pello*), seems to express the idea of going at, or 'going for.'[4] πλήσσω, *plango*, may be from the same root. 'Battle,' O.Fr. *bataille*, L.L. *battualia*, from root *bhā*, 'to smite,' with Celtic cognates, recalls the blows and the clash of arms.[5]

(*b*) *A contest between two adversaries.*—*Bellum* is commonly explained from the alternative form *duellium* as the quarrel which it takes two to make—'quod duabus partibus de victoria contendentibus dimicatur.'[6]

(*c*) *An intense effort.*—*Krieg*, O.H.G. *Kreg*, *Kric*, *Kriec*, laid stress on the excited and strenuous exertion, and later on the gain which resulted.[7] O.H.G. *Wic*, with derivatives, seems to have had the same primary and secondary meanings.

(*d*) *Confusion and tumult.*—The word 'war,' late A.S. *werre*, O.H.G. *Werra*, L.L. *werra*, Fr. *guerre*, if connected (as commonly) with *wirr*, *verwirren*, may have sprung from the observation that 'every battle of the warrior is with confused noise' (Is 9^5 AV), or that war upsets the general order of things. The root may, however, be *ver*, preserved in *Wehr*, *wehren*, weir, beware, guard (cf. *vereor*), when the term would be an illustration of the habitual apologetic tendency to attribute to all wars the character of self-defence.

(*e*) *Organized movement.*—Heb. מִלְחָמָה, from root לָחַם, 'to set in order,' draws attention to the ordered action of the battle array.

(*f*) *The fateful plight.*—A.S. *or-lege*, O.H.G. *Or-loge*, Dan. *or-log*, may reflect the fatalistic mood which is fostered in war, or the common experience that nowhere else is man so surely in the hand of God and so little certain that he can himself control the issue. This interpretation has been supported by connecting the verbal group with the Norns, the Moirai or Parcæ of the North.[1]

II. *THE PREVALENCE OF WAR.*—War has been one of the most constant and distinctive features of human history, and it may even be thought to be a sinister peculiarity of the human species that hordes should pursue hordes of the same kind with a persistent purpose of rapine and destruction.

The pre-historic age, which extends over tens of thousands of years down to about 5000 B.C., enjoys a fairly pacific reputation. If it was usually raining, as Ratzel puts it, the age was at least free from the thunderstorm and the devastating floods of war.[2] Man being the *animal inerme*, furnished by nature with no more formidable weapons than fists and teeth, he was too much preoccupied by his designs on the beasts, and by theirs against himself, to meddle much with his own species except when rival claims emerged over a hunting-ground, or at a later stage over pastures and wells (Gn $13^{7f.}$ $26^{19f.}$).

'Pastoral man,' it is observed, 'hardly needs tools, or weapons either, for it is to the common interest of pastorals to range apart, and on the steppe there is room enough for all.'[3] 'It is doubtful,' it is added, 'if serious war was known in Europe until the Bronze Age was established.'[4]

Historic times have their landmarks in the rise, the conquests, and the fall of great military states. In the period of Oriental antiquity martial races moulded the history of China and India. Further west, and in the central current of history, arose the powers of Egypt and Mesopotamia, which during thousands of years engaged in an ever-renewed struggle for supremacy, while in the intervals Mesopotamia was the scene of a fierce and prolonged conflict, waged with alternating success, between the rival peoples of Babylonia and Assyria. From these centres of empire there also proceeded frequent campaigns against sedentary or migratory peoples which raised a threatening front in Western Asia, or which tempted warlike kings by prospects of sovereignty and spoils. In the end Assyria was overthrown by Babylonia, Babylonia by the Persians, and a Persian empire entered on its course with a similar programme of conquest and tribute that brought it into collision with Greece.

In the age of classical antiquity, when the scene shifted to the Mediterranean, and the Greeks and Romans assumed the chief rôle, war continued, notwithstanding the growing culture, to be regarded as the most honourable and almost the most urgent of human pursuits. Men had now iron weapons in their hands, and the Aryans had arrived on the central European stage to show how effectively they could be used. The Greeks made their advent as barbarian conquerors from the north, who served themselves heirs to an older civilization that had developed its powers and accumulated its treasures in the Levant. Thereafter they went on fighting with little intermission—against the Trojans, as they said, for Helen of the glorious tresses and for honour, but doubtless also with an eye to dominion and the wealth of Anatolia, against the Persians in maintenance of their racial independence, against one another from cupidity, ambition, or jealousy; while even in their exhaustion they could claim for Greek arms a considerable share in the conquests of Alexander the Great, and in the creation of his grandiose but short-lived empire. In the meantime the Romans, dug from the same pit, and similarly equipped, gradually made themselves masters of Italy, settled the long-drawn and hard-

[1] *De Offic.* i. 11.
[2] E. Elbel, *Theologia Moralis*, Paderborn, 1891, ii. 50.
[3] T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law*[4], London, 1910, p. 331.
[4] G. Curtius, *Grundzüge der griech. Etymologie*[4], Leipzig, 1873.
[5] A. Fick, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogerman. Sprachen*, Göttingen, 1890–1909.
[6] Festus the Grammarian. [7] Fick, art. 'Kreiga.'

[1] J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Göttingen, 1841.
[2] *Die Erde und das Leben*, Leipzig, 1902, ii. 672.
[3] J. L. Myres, *The Dawn of History*, London, 1911, p. 18.
[4] C. F. Scott Elliot, *Prehistoric Man and his Story*, London, 1915, ch. xxvi. 'War and Iron.'

fought issue between the Semites and the Aryans through their victory over Carthage in the Punic Wars; and by the beginning of our era, notwithstanding the distractions of civil broils, they had subjugated and embraced within their empire a great part of the known territories of the three continents. Under the Roman emperors it seemed for two or three centuries as if the curse of war had wrought its own cure, and the world had been saved by the sword from the sword, but the hope was short-lived, and the Pax Romana proved to be only a lull that heralded more furious storms.

The period of antiquity came to a catastrophic end, and the Middle Ages were ushered in by the Teutonic migrations, which reduced the Roman empire to ruins, and gave new masters, with a fresh deposit of population, to its richest and fairest provinces. The outcome was that for the next ten centuries Europe was afflicted by wars of every known kind—between imperial dynasties like the Carolingian and peoples which repudiated their sway; between the new-born nations as in the Hundred Years' War of England and France; between rival claimants to a throne, as in the English Wars of the Roses; between the central authority as represented by a king and feudal aristocracies which magnified regional and particular interests; between the governing classes and oppressed populations which sought redress or revenge in social war. Religion supplied additional motives and occasions. In the early Middle Ages the armies of Islām penetrated into the heart of Europe, and at a later date Christendom retaliated in prolonged and sanguinary Crusades for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre.

The modern age, dating from the beginning of the 16th cent., has perhaps had more intervals of repose, but it has found evil compensation in the magnitude of the struggles and the destructiveness of the operations. Instinct and tradition disposed the European rulers to seek an extension of their dominions whenever opportunity arose, while the discovery of the new world offered to the possessors of sea-power the prospect of unlimited aggrandisement and wealth. The possibilities of effective warfare were also enormously increased, in the centuries that followed the invention of gunpowder, by the enlistment of science in the improvement of the instruments of destruction. During the last four hundred years the outstanding fact in the political history of Europe was that one great power after another—Austria, Spain, France, Germany—sought to become the master of the Continent, while at each stage the nations which felt themselves threatened formed combinations which should be strong enough to frustrate, and which also deemed it prudent to anticipate, the development of ambitious and aggressive schemes. The programme of Britain was to rule the seas, and to avert a European hegemony. The result was that almost every generation witnessed a European war of the first magnitude—among them the Thirty Years' War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Napoleonic Wars, and finally the World War of 1914–18, which has cost Europe the lives of 10,000,000 picked men, decimated wide areas of Europe by famine and disease, swallowed up one-third of the accumulated wealth, and shaken to its foundations the moral order no less than the economic fabric of society. The peace of the modern world has also been disturbed by the ferment due to the assertion of the ideals of democracy and nationality in opposition to the arrangements of an existing order. The democratic cause has its military monuments in the English Civil War of the 17th cent., and in campaigns of the French Revolution, but for the most part it has pursued its triumphant progress without the necessity of sanguinary, or at least of prolonged, fighting. The spirit of nationality, which developed in the 19th cent. with extraordinary fervour, promoted war in several ways. On the one hand, it claimed independent sovereignty for populations which could establish a claim to nationhood on physical or historical grounds, and thus came into collision with existing imperial structures, giving rise to wars of emancipation such as those which liberated the Greeks and the Balkan peoples from the rule of the Turks, and the convulsions which have dissolved the heterogeneous Austrian empire. On the other hand, the national spirit fosters the ideal of the consolidation of separated kinsfolk in a single state, and this aspiration dictated the mid-century policy of Prussia which achieved the desired unification of the German people through the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866 and the Franco-German War of 1870. Imperial ambitions also proved to be a natural sequel to the fulfilment of national aspirations. Within the great realms trouble has arisen, apart from any racial antithesis, in connexion with the respective rights of a central authority and of the subordinate members: in the 18th cent. the American colonies, in assertion of colonial rights against imperial claims, fought the American War of Independence; in the 19th cent. the Southern States of the Union affirmed the indestructible rights of particular states in opposition to the prerogatives of an indestructible Federation, and the matter was brought to an arbitrament in the American Civil War. Finally, the modern world has had grave warning that, if the religious war is obsolete, religious enthusiasm has been replaced by a more violent fanaticism rooted in political and social ideals, as was evidenced in some of the phases of the French Revolution and most recently in the spirit and the efforts of Soviet Russia.

III. *THE CAUSES OF WAR.*—War is traceable to elemental desires and passions of human nature. According to Hobbes, its threefold root is the desire of gain, the fear of injury, and the love of glory.

'In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, . . . for any sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.'[1]

This analysis is useful, but it unduly simplifies the psychological problem.

(1) The desire for gain, in the narrower sense intended by Hobbes, has doubtless supplied the principal impulse to warlike aggression. Territory, with the attendant booty of various kinds, has been the usual stake in war, coveted alike by peoples and by dynasties. At the same time cupidity in the matter of territory has often been associated with other motives involving lesser degrees of culpability, and even trenching on the realm of the virtues. Account has justly to be taken of the frequent play of fairly reputable reasons—as the pressure of famine or scarcity, resulting from drought or the increase of population, the defence and development of trading interests as vital to the subsistence of a commercial nation, the migratory impulse, the spirit of adventure, and also the consciousness of a mission to develop waste or neglected regions of the globe, and to conquer and take charge of people for their own good.

(2) The fear of injury, as well as the resentment due to actual injury, has unfailingly prompted to defensive war when resistance was possible, and

[1] *Works*, London, 1839, iii. 'Leviathan,' p. 112.

often when it might well be deemed hopeless. The interests which nations have usually been prepared to defend at all costs are, in addition to their territory, their jurisdiction and their honour. It has also been commonly accepted that a palpable and growing threat to these interests justifies a nation in seizing a propitious opportunity for an anticipatory or preventive war.

(3) The desire of glory has in the main been a dominant motive of the great conquerors and of their armies, but it has also taken possession of peoples. Apart from such ambition, indignation at a national insult has proved to be capable of evoking the utmost effort and self-sacrifice.

(4) The desire of power is an additional motive which cannot be entirely resolved into cupidity. It is true that power may be sought as the means of appropriating territory and increasing the wealth of a people, but nations as well as individuals find satisfaction in the exercise of power as an end in itself. This desire manifests itself positively in the attempt of a nation or class to acquire dominion over others. The love of power for its own sake has been an important factor in the movements which established the great empires of history, and it has been not less conspicuous in struggles for the supremacy among allied states—as illustrated in the ancient rivalry of Athens and Sparta, and in the modern contest of the German principalities which issued in the hegemony of Prussia. It has also supplied much of its energy to civil strife, and on occasion has kindled the flames of civil war. The desire of power comes into collision with the spirit of liberty. The demand for liberation is the natural response to the policy of domination, being rooted in the same appreciation of power; and, as the assertion and extension of the power of one nation or class presupposes the abridgment of the power of another, a system of imperial rule or of autocratic government involves the permanent possibility of wars directed to the achievement of national independence or of political revolution.

(5) The passions of hatred and revenge have also furnished a relatively independent motive. A nation can take up an attitude that is on a still lower plane than brutal selfishness; it can become inspired by a hatred of the diabolic kind which makes it disregard even the counsels of self-interest for the satisfaction of inflicting deadly injury on a loathed enemy. The spirit of hatred has sometimes been engendered by centuries of conflict or oppression, sometimes it has had its spring in deep-seated differences of racial character and culture.

(6) Finally, a religious zeal which can no more be resolved into self-interest than hatred has been the cause, and not merely the pretext, of many wars. Zeal for the glory of God at least co-operated with lust of booty to inspire the onslaughts of Islām, and it blended with the spirit of adventure in the Christian Crusades.

IV. *THE REACTION AGAINST WAR.*—The most general explanation of war is that men and nations have a legitimate desire for the goods of wealth, honour, and power, and that they are tempted to grasp them by force instead of earning wealth by labour, and honour and power by service. Human nature, however, embodies other principles to which this peculiar method of acquisition, with its inevitably cruel accompaniments, has constituted a challenge, and which have reacted against it in varying degrees of criticism and opposition. The complex constitution of man exhibits along with his ingrained selfishness a vigorous sense of justice and a lively capacity of sympathy; and at least one of the belligerents must usually have been conscious of a gross violation of his sense of justice, while the butchery and the atrocities attending the stricken field and the sack of a city, when reviewed in cold blood, must often have excited the commiseration even of the conquerors. The general conscience, accordingly, from an early date, pressed for a certain ethical regulation of the occasions and of the practices of war. The great religions strongly supported the ethical plea. At the animistic stage, it is true, religion was practically indifferent to moral considerations, but the faiths which captured the mind of Asia and Europe were agreed in representing it as normally a part of religion to do justly and to love mercy even in the waging of war. Philosophy, with its distinctive appeal to rational considerations, has also contributed to foster and diffuse critical and reforming opinion through its disciplines of Moral Philosophy and Jurisprudence. The theoretical work was followed up in the 19th cent. by international conventions and conferences which established a fairly authoritative code of International Law.

The moral reaction against war has culminated from time to time in the assertion that war is essentially immoral, and in the repudiation of any traffic with it, in any cause whatsoever, as an unworthy compromise. It will be convenient to deal first with this radical position, which is supported by a considerable show of moral authority, before proceeding to trace the influence of religion and morality in the discrimination of just and unjust wars and in the humanization of the conduct of war.

V. *THE LAWFULNESS OF WAR.*—There have doubtless been men in all ages who have objected to war, and refused to have any hand in fighting. They could be determined to this attitude either by sheer cowardice, or by counsels of prudence natural to a difficult or desperate situation, or again by the conviction that the shedding of human blood was a criminal outrage, and in any case a futile way of attempting to oppose and prevent wrong-doing. At the risk of their principle being mistaken for cowardice, voices have been raised on the heights of moral idealism in absolute condemnation of war and all its works.

i. THE RELIGIOUS JUDGMENT.—1. **The older religions.**—While the Vedas are sufficiently warlike, and Brāhmanism gives a consecration to the military caste, the mild spirit of Hindu religion tended to view war under the repugnant aspect of murder.

'Alas! we are engaged in committing a heinous sin, seeing that we are making efforts for killing our own kinsmen out of greed of the pleasures of sovereignty. If the sons of Dhritarāshtra, weapon in hand, should kill me in battle, me weaponless and not defending (myself), that would be better for me.'[1]

The influence of Buddhism was cast on the same side.

'If you desire to honour Buddha,' said a Brāhman who successfully mediated between two belligerents, 'follow the example of his patience and long-suffering.' 'Conquer your foe by force, you increase his enmity; conquer by love, and you will reap no after-sorrow.'[2]

The teaching of the OT prophets contains a decided pacifist strain. They condemned wars of aggression as magnified schemes of murder and plunder, and they were disposed to think defensive wars useless or unnecessary—useless, since a wicked nation would not escape punishment; unnecessary, since a righteous or repentant nation might safely dispense with armaments, and look for protection to the omnipotent Ruler of history (Is $31^{1.\ 5.\ 8}$). It may, however, be questioned whether the prophetic attitude meant more than that non-resistance was the duty of Israel in the special circumstances of the situation and time (Jer $28^{12ff.}$). The great prophets lived at a period when it was a manifest inference from the providential order of the world

[1] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, *SBE* viii. [1882] 42.
[2] *Life of Buddha*, *SBE* xix. [1883] 328 f.

that a pacific and submissive policy was the duty of their little border-state, and they might well have judged differently of the duty of a nation to which had been providentially entrusted a larger and more promising political mission than was open to Israel under the conditions of the 8th and 7th centuries before the Christian era.

2. The bearings of the Christian ethic.—The teaching of our Lord and of His apostles includes precepts which on a first impression appear to rule out all traffic with war as inconsistent with the moral ideal. Not only is there a law of love, which condemns the passions that incite to aggression, but there is a law of meekness, expressed in non-resistance, which suffers the aggressor to work his evil will.

'Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also' (Mt 5^{38-40} RV). 'Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you' (v.$^{43f.}$).

'Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord' (Ro 12^{19}).

The precepts were enforced by the example of Jesus, who 'left an example that ye should follow his steps,' and who, 'when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously' (1 P $2^{21.\ 23}$).

As to the bearing of this teaching on the lawfulness of war, there have been two schools of Christian opinion.

(*a*) *The literalist interpretation.*—The view was widely prevalent in the early Church that war is an organized iniquity with which the Church and the followers of Christ can have nothing to do. This sentiment was expressed, though with varying degrees of lucidity and emphasis, by Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Cyprian, and Lactantius.[1] The allusions to the subject are often casual, and the pacifist testimony sometimes does no more than affirm the undeniable position that the Church differed from the kingdoms of this world in that it cherished no schemes of conquest, equipped no military forces, and did not dream of propagating the faith, or even of resisting persecution, by armed rebellion. But the position was also definitely taken up that war as such was an institution of the realm of darkness, and some were quite emphatic that a professed Christian should not be mixed up with the foul and devilish thing.

'It is not lawful,' says Lactantius, 'for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself.'[2]

The prohibition of military service was partly due to the consideration that the soldier was required to compromise his faith by participation in the pagan rites associated with Roman warfare, and to jeopardize his character by association with brutal and licentious comrades, but objection was also taken on principle to the military profession, and was supported by arguments such as these—that the military oath was inconsistent with the pledge of loyalty to Christ, that Christ had warned His disciples against taking the sword (Mt 26^{52}), that, if the lesser strife of litigation be forbidden, much more is the greater (1 Co 6^{7}), that, if it be unlawful to fight on our own behalf, it is also unlawful to fight in the quarrels of others,[3] and especially that in war men fight to kill, and that intentional killing is murder.[4] The last consideration so impressed the general ecclesiastical mind that certain canons of the period excluded a soldier from the Lord's Table till penance had been done for the blood that had been shed.[1]

The literalist view, which had its exponents throughout the Middle Ages and at the Reformation, was made a cardinal tenet of 'the people called in scorn Quakers.'

'Whoever can reconcile this, Resist not evil,' says R. Barclay, 'with, Resist evil by force; again, Give also thy other cheek, with, strike again; also, Love thine enemies, with spoil them, make a prey of them, pursue them with fire and sword; or, Pray for those that persecute you, with, persecute them by fines, imprisonment and death itself; whoever can find a means to reconcile these things, may be supposed also to have found a way to reconcile God with the Devil, Christ with Antichrist, Light with Darkness, and good with evil.'[2]

The doctrine has recently been popularized by Tolstoi, who developed it in the thoroughgoing fashion which would also sweep away the whole of the machinery by which civilized states repress and punish crime. The justification offered for war, he says, is that it seeks to repair or avert injury, while the command of Christ is that we offer no resistance to injury. The practice of war is no less inconsistent with the injunction to love our enemies. It may be objected that Jesus does not prohibit war in set terms. But 'a father who exhorts his son to live honestly, never to wrong any person, and to give all that he has to others, would not forbid his son to kill people on the highway.'[3]

(*b*) *The reasoned judgment of the Church.*—The mind of the primitive Church, so far as reflected in the NT, does not join in the unqualified condemnation of war. The Church of the apostolic age found solace in apocalyptic dreams which presupposed that the final redemption of humanity would follow upon appalling conflicts between the powers of heaven and hell, of which the Christian saints, who would be collected in a camp, would at least be sympathetic spectators (Rev 20^{9}). In any case the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces a glowing panegyric on warrior saints of the Old Dispensation ($11^{32ff.}$), while the book of Acts welcomes Cornelius the centurion to the Christian society ($10^{1ff.}$). During the succeeding four centuries, as has been exhaustively shown by Moffatt in the article cited, the Church as a whole declined to be committed to the extreme position. From Tertullian himself we learn that there were numerous Christians in the Roman army by their own choice, and that the Church did not condemn them. Clement of Alexandria taught that the position of a soldier was governed by the Pauline principle that a man should 'abide in that calling wherein he was called.'[4] Diocletian found so many Christians in the army that he deemed it a danger to the State, and Constantine was impressed by their importance as a military asset no less than as a political influence. When Christianity became the religion of the empire, the general tendency, exemplified by Eusebius, was to support the civil power by the benediction of military service. The Council of Arles in one of its canons appears to have visited ecclesiastical censure on those who abandoned the army even in time of peace from conscientious scruples.[5] Some even thought that the sword might be drawn in a holy war for the extirpation of idolatry.[6] Ambrose eulogized the warlike courage which prefers death to bondage and disgrace, and claimed the OT

1 For particular utterances and shades of opinion see J. Moffatt, art. 'War' in *DAC*, Edinburgh, 1918.
2 *Div. Inst.* vi. 20.
3 Tertullian, *de Corona*, *de Idololatria*.
4 Basil of Cæsarea, *Ep.* 188.

1 *Canons of Hippolytus*, 13, 14.
2 *Theologiæ vere Christianæ Apologia*, Amsterdam, 1676, Eng. version, 1678, ch. xv.
3 *My Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1889, p. 101.
4 *Protrept.* x. 100.
5 'De his qui arma projiciunt in pace, placuit abstineri eos a communione' (J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectic*, Paris, 1801 ff., ii. 471).
6 Firmicus Maternus, *de Errore profanarum Religionum*, Migne, *PL*, xii. 1048.

warriors as spiritual ancestors. He even adopted the classical maxim that one who does not defend a friend from injury is as much at fault as he who commits the injury.[1] Augustine was forced to face the question by the havoc of the Teutonic migrations and the peril of the empire, and his active mind fully explored the subject and laid down the lines on which in the main the thought of the Churches has subsequently moved.

That war is sometimes lawful on Christian principles is maintained by Augustine on these and other grounds: (*a*) that it has been and may be waged by appointment of God;[2] (*b*) that the case of a wanton and rapacious attack by one nation on another falls under the same category as the crimes of murder and burglary, and should presumably be similarly dealt with;[3] (*c*) that John the Baptist did not require the soldiers to abandon the service, but only exhorted them to do violence to no man and be content with their wages.[4] The implications of the Sermon on the Mount are most fully discussed in the Epistle to Marcellinus, which was called forth by the pagan objection that the precepts of non-resistance were inconsistent with public policy, and would prove ruinous to the State.[5] The precept to turn the other cheek to the smiter, Augustine says, cannot be taken literally. What it requires is an inward disposition of patient good-will towards the aggressor, and it does not prescribe any uniform manifestation of the disposition in act, as appears from the fact that Jesus Himself at least protested against violence (Jn 18^{23}; cf. Ac 23^{3}). We ought always to cherish the spirit of clemency, and be willing to render good for evil, but 'many things have to be done in which we have to pay regard not to our own kindly inclinations but to the real interests of others, and their interests may require that they should be treated, much as they may dislike it, with a certain benignant asperity': 'Cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, feliciter vincitur, quoniam nihil infelicius est felicitate peccantium, qua poenalis nutritur immunitas, et mala voluntas velut hostis interior roboratur.'[6] At the same time war is merely a means to the end of peace.[7] It is better and more glorious to achieve peace by peaceable means than by war.[8]

Thomas Aquinas replies as follows to objections founded on the teaching of Jesus.

(*a*) 'Jesus said that he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.' But 'to take' means 'to use without warrant,' and the words only prohibit unauthorized or private persons from drawing the sword. (*b*) 'War is inconsistent with the command that we "resist not evil" (Matt. 5: 38) and "avenge not ourselves."' But these injunctions are fulfilled by the cultivation of a placable spirit, and cannot require us to do mischief by allowing wickedness to go unpunished. (*c*) 'If the peacemakers are blessed, war-makers are accursed.' But war may be the best or the only means of attaining the end of peace.[9]

Luther held that the gospel presupposes natural rights and duties, and vigorously defended the Christian soldier.[10] Calvin argued that war is a branch of the work of retributive justice which has been entrusted by God to the civil magistrate, and that it has the same moral justification as the police measures which protect the citizens against the criminal population.

Whether it be a king who does it on a big scale, or a scoundrel who does it on a small scale, he is equally to be regarded and punished as a robber. It is no breach of the command, 'Thou shalt not kill': the slaying of the authors of the unjust war is an execution, the judge is God, and the fighting men who defend the right are merely God's instruments. If it be objected that the NT does not expressly permit Christians to fight, it is to be observed that the NT does not undertake to legislate about civil polity, and that it presupposes the OT, in which the greatest men of God, like Moses and David, were mighty men of valour in the service of God.[11]

The topic received prominence in the leading Protestant Confessions, which found it desirable to allay any misgivings that might be felt by princes as to the political implications of evangelical religion. The modern Protestant literature of Christian Ethics[12] is in general agreement with the Roman Catholic moralists.[13]

[1] *De Officiis Ministrorum*, i. 35, 40.
[2] The refs. are to the Benedictine ed., *Opera*, Venice, 1729–35, *Contra Faustum*, viii. 405*e*.
[3] *De Civ.* vii. 92*d*. [4] *Ep.* 138, ii. 410*b*.
[5] *Ib.* [6] ii. 415*g*.
[7] *Ep.* 189, 'ad Bonifacium,' ii. 699*b*.
[8] *Ib.* 229, 'ad Darium,' ii. 836*d*.
[9] *Summa Theol.* II. ii. qu. xl. art. i., 'Utrum bellare semper sit peccatum.'
[10] *Ob Kriegsleute auch im seligen Stande sein können*, 1526.
[11] *Inst. Rel. Christ.*, 1559, bk. iv. ch. xx. 10–12.
[12] See esp. R. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*[2], Wittenberg, 1867–71; H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1892, div. ii.
[13] Cf. Elbel, *Theol. Moralis*, ii. 'de Bello.'

The ultra-pacifist interpretation of Christian duty, while plausible, really rests on a superficial view of the ethical system of Christianity. It ignores an observation which is now a commonplace of the science of Comparative Religion, viz. that, in distinction from the nomistic religions which attempt to lay down hard-and-fast precepts prescribing the action to be taken or avoided in particular situations, the ethical scheme of Christianity consists essentially of a stock of principles, accompanied by some illustrations of how they are to be applied in practice. Had Christianity been a nomistic religion, it would have distinctly enacted that 'war is always sin,' or would have enumerated all the cases in which it is lawful; being a religion of the spirit, it bequeathed to the Christian Church, and to all others that claim the Christian name, the task of forming a Christian judgment upon a diversity of concrete questions and situations as they may arise. Again, the original Christian ethic, so far as elucidated in detail, was chiefly illustrated from the individual sphere. While the OT is mainly concerned with the nation, the NT is mainly concerned with God and the soul; and the consequence is that little was done to illustrate the application of Christian principles in the political departments of thought and action, which for the most part lay outside the purview of the primitive Church.

There are, now, besides non-resistance, two other principles, deeply embedded in the teaching of Jesus, which demand to be carefully weighed before a judgment is formed as to the lawfulness of war in the abstract or the sufficiency of a particular occasion of war. The doctrine of retributive justice, to begin with—that wickedness ought to be and will be punished—filled at least as large a space as the doctrine of non-resistance in the circle of Christ's thought. He pronounced upon Jerusalem an inevitable doom because of its obdurate blindness and disobedience (Mt $23^{37ff.}$), and He drew the picture of a last judgment in which the wicked and impenitent would be punished according to their works (Mt $25^{31ff.}$). The idea of penal retribution, moreover, is the central and inspiring thought of the apocalyptic sections of the NT, represented by eschatological discourses of Jesus (Mt 24), the Pauline Apocalypse (2 Th 2), and the book of Revelation. And, if it be a law of the universe that wickedness ought to be restrained and punished, if God Himself, while ready to forgive on condition of repentance and submission, and ever taking the initiative towards reconciliation, fights against the obdurate rebels of His dominions with all the resources of His providential order, not to speak of the menaces of apocalyptic prediction, it may well be thought incredible that Christianity has made it criminal for a nation to be a fellow-worker with God in restraining the powers of wickedness and in seeing justice done upon the earth. The ultra-pacifist school thinks fit to impose upon the nations a code of morality and a plan of procedure which, if absolutely binding, would entail grave censure on God Himself and give ground for an indictment of the methods of His government of the universe.

Further, in forming a Christian judgment as to the lawfulness of war, respect must be chiefly paid to the master-principle of the Christian ethic, which is love of man as man. It is of course evident that, if Christian charity were universal, there would be no more war, and also that, if war took place, a belligerent animated by Christian love at its highest reach would differ in vital respects from any pattern shown in history. But the essential feature of love is that it seeks the welfare of its objects, not necessarily that it seeks it by the measures suggested by easy good nature

—as is sufficiently familiar in the discipline of the family and in the social provisions of the penitentiary and the gaol. The law of love, now, has three main applications for a nation—in reference to the race as a whole, in reference to a particular enemy, and in reference to its own population; and in the face of unjust aggression the law of love may actually urge a demand for forcible resistance on a threefold ground. The interests of the race may require it: a nation is no benefactor of mankind if it does nothing to support, and even contributes to undermine, the general arrangement that the world is a realm of moral order. That the nation which checks and chastises another in a criminal enterprise is in a real sense its benefactor is supported by the contention of Plato in the *Gorgias* that it is a greater evil to commit injustice with impunity than to be punished for it, inasmuch as the wicked who go scot-free are deprived of the valuable remedial discipline of merited chastisement. Again, the Christian law of love lays special stress on what may be called duties of guardianship, which were exemplified in the attitude of Jesus towards the house of Israel, towards Jerusalem, towards little children, and towards those who were called 'his own.' And in considering the duty of a state in regard to war, it has to be remembered that, while in one point of view it is a collective personality which has to think and act as one, in another point of view it consists of those who rule and of those whose interests are committed to the trust of the rulers. It is therefore absurd to maintain that it can be a postulate of Christian morality that the rulers of a nation are under obligation, not merely to sacrifice themselves, but to take the responsibility of sacrificing others who instinctively look to them for protection, and of abandoning old men, women, and children to privations, sufferings, and moral perils. The Christian spirit was surely better interpreted in the mediæval code of chivalry.

The literalist view also overlooks a serious difficulty as to the possibility of rendering an act of national self-sacrifice of unquestionable sacrificial value. The suggestion is that, even as Christ suffered Himself to be led as a lamb to the slaughter, so a Christian people might dutifully, and with similar profit, suffer a national crucifixion; but it is forgotten that for a sacrifice there is needed a stainless as well as a willing victim, and no nation that is or has been has remotely possessed the spotless perfection, not to speak of the willing mind, which would qualify it for a literal imitation of Christ in this regard, or give promise that if attempted it would produce effects in any degree comparable with the effects of the sacrifice once offered on Calvary.

Christian thinkers have, then, to take their orders from the whole Christ and not a fragmentary Christ—from the Christ who is the expression of the complete moral purpose of God, the revelation of justice and love as well as meekness. And from this standpoint it may be maintained with a good conscience that Christianity makes room for warfare in co-operation with God in a world which teems with violence and injustice, breaks His laws, and challenges His righteous authority. But, while the principles of meekness and clemency have no title to be the sole determinant of the international relations of a Christian state, they ought to make their influence effectively felt as maxims of co-ordinate dignity and authority: they ought to have such recognition that every concession short of the impossible should be made to avert war, hatred and revenge should be ruled out from deliberation as the most dangerous and short-sighted of counsellors, magnanimity should prevail in the day of victory, and after the struggle everything should be attempted to obliterate the evil memories and to promote sincere and lasting reconciliation.

The question as to whether a Christian may lawfully bear arms is governed by the decision as to whether a nation may lawfully engage in war. Clearly it cannot be wrong to give personal assistance towards the execution of a necessary and righteous task. The debt which a man owes to the State is even greater than that which he owes to his parents, and the desertion of parents in sickness or old age is not more discreditable than the refusal by a citizen of such service as it is in his power to render to his fatherland in its time of distress or peril. It is less easy to define his duty in the case of a war which he thinks unjust, and in which he is compelled to fight; and all that can be said is that, except in a case of manifestly flagrant injustice, the average person has reason to credit the chosen rulers of a civilized state with possessing more knowledge and wisdom than himself, and at least as great a sense of responsibility. Those who refuse to fight from a genuine conviction that it is unlawful to shed blood are wisely treated with consideration in the modern world, inasmuch as conscience, even when uninstructed, is an asset which a nation cannot disparage and flout without grave injury to its higher life.

Recent events have revived interest in the relation of ministers of religion to military service. The claim to immunity was very generally made for heathen priesthoods, and allowed by the secular power.[1] The question did not arise in the circumstances of the Christian Church in the early centuries.[2] The popes and bishops of the mediæval Church were often involved in war, and could even foment it in support of their worldly interests, but the official teaching was that it was unlawful for all clerics who belonged to the *ordines majores* to take a direct part in the shedding of blood. The conclusion of Thomas Aquinas is to this effect:

'Cum bellica exercitia hominem maxime a divinorum contemplatione avertant, et ad humani sanguinis effusionem tendant, minime clericis ac spiritualibus personis bellare licet, nisi in necessitatis articulo.'[3]

Military service, it is added, is inconsistent with the clerical office on two grounds—it is inconsistent with the cultivation of a spiritual temper and the discharge of pastoral duties, and in particular those who are ordained to minister at the altar should rather be eager themselves to suffer as martyrs than think it seemly to spill the blood of others.[4] The Lutheran Church has followed this tradition,[5] and the Anglican Church re-affirmed its adherence to it during the recent war by forbidding the clergy to offer themselves for combatant service. The Reformed Churches, narrowly so called, while agreeing that in ordinary circumstances ministers have an all-important spiritual function to perform in war and should abide in their calling, have taken a broader view of what is covered by the accepted condition 'in articulo necessitatis,' and have occasionally left it to ministers, as was lately done by the Church of Scotland, to judge for themselves as to whether the necessity was such as to require them to offer their services as fighting men to the State. On the question of principle it may be observed that it is difficult to maintain the view that the clergy as representatives of Jesus Christ ought to refrain

[1] 'Druides . . . militiae vacationem, omniumque rerum habent immunitatem' (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14).

[2] 'Nec ad arma jam spectat usus noster' (Ambrose, *de Offic. Ministrorum*, i. 35).

[3] II. ii. qu. xl. art. 2.

[4] Cf. Elbel, ii. 54: 'an liceat etiam clericis pugnare.'

[5] H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, div. ii. p. 236.

from all violence and the shedding of blood, and at the same time to resist the Quaker contention that the same prohibition extends to persons of every class who profess and call themselves Christians. Further, while it is generally admitted that the clergy may and ought to encourage the soldiery to fight in a just cause, in the ordinary judgment of mankind a person who thinks it wrong or degrading to do a thing himself ought not to aid and abet others in doing it. The argument based on 2 Ti 2[4] can be used with equal force in support of the view that the clergy should not be distracted from their spiritual work by the cares of married life or by the discharge of the duties of any civic office. It may be added that the traditional attitude of the Church seems to have been largely determined by the interest felt in magnifying the distinction of priesthood and laity, and by the reflex influence of the mediæval sacramental doctrine.

ii. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VINDICATION. — The verdict of ethical philosophy, ancient and modern, has been that under certain conditions war is justifiable, and non-resistance blameworthy and even immoral. The Greek view was summarily expressed by the inclusion of courage among the four cardinal virtues. Justice, according to Cicero, involves for nations as for individuals the duty of preventing injury and of exacting punishment and reparation. The modern schools have their varying conceptions of the ground of obligation and of the nature and basis of natural rights,[1] but there has been practical unanimity as to the moral justification of self-defence when one nation is assailed by the ambition and cupidity of another. From the intuitionist point of view there is an eternal and immutable moral law attested by conscience, which includes the requirement that nations shall render to all their due, and, in the absence of other machinery for making the law effective, it is held to be the duty of the particular nation to do what lies in its power to enforce and safeguard this obligation. From the utilitarian standpoint repressive and punitive action is held to be called for in view of the disastrous effects which unrestrained injustice would produce for particular nations and the general life of the race. The doctrine of non-resistance, Herbert Spencer argues, is anti-social, as it involves the non-assertion, not only of one's own rights, but of those of others, while it holds out no prospect of leading to the desirable end of international peace.[2]

The findings of the jurists, while reflecting the varieties of ethical theory, are at one in giving an affirmative answer to the question, 'an bellare unquam justum sit.' Grotius argues that recourse to war is permitted and approved by the law of nature, by the consent of the many and of the wise, and by the law of nations, as well as by the divine law which was promulgated and attested in the Scriptures. The law of nature has two branches—the course dictated by natural instincts, and the principles approved by reason. This law intimates its permission of war through the universal instinct of self-preservation, accompanied as it is by nature's disclosure of purpose in the provision of means of defence to all creatures, and also by the voice of reason which makes it clear that the well-being of society is incompatible with the unchecked reign of violence.[3]

By the law of nature, says E. de Vattel, the nations are under an obligation to do justice and also have the right to be treated with justice; and 'it would be in vain that nature gave us the right of not suffering injustice, and required others to be just towards us, if we could not legitimately use compulsion when they refuse to acquit themselves of this duty.'[1]

Some recent treatises find it sufficient for their purpose that the practice of war is a human custom, and they prefer to leave to philosophy the treatment of the question of the ultimate justification.

VI. *THE DISTINCTION OF JUST AND UNJUST WARS.*—The primitive view was that fighting was as natural and proper as any other means of acquiring wealth and servants, and the only matter needing careful consideration was the prospect and the cost of success in a particular venture. From a comparatively early period, however, the moral consciousness drew a distinction between just and unjust wars, and procured for the distinction such recognition that almost every belligerent has been anxiously concerned to make out that he had the sanctions of morality and religion on his side.

1. **The distinction in the non-Christian religions.**—The distinction of just and unjust wars was impressed on the princes of China and India by the higher religions of the East. Greek religion did something to develop a conscience in regard to occasions of war, at least as carried on among the Hellenic tribes. The Romans understood that it was the will of the gods, not merely that wars should begin and end with solemn ceremonies, but that they should be waged only with a view to redress or security, and they were taught that their piety in these respects had been rewarded by the series of victories which safeguarded and extended their empire.

The general view represented in the OT was that wars of aggression, such as were waged by the insatiable and arrogant Asiatic empires, were wicked and criminal, and that wars waged for the defence or liberation of a people, like those organized by the Judges and the good kings, were in accordance with justice and the known will of God. The criminality of the heathen wars of conquest was not held to be inconsistent with the observation that they were sometimes used for the merited chastisement of other peoples: the guilt was the aggressor's, God's were the wisdom and the power that made the wrath of man to praise Him, and that in the end over-ruled the evil for good. The prohibition of the war of conquest was, however, subject to exceptions—even from the point of view of the prophetic idealism. It was an axiom of the historical writers, even of those of the prophetic school, that the conquest of Canaan by their fathers had been abundantly justified, partly on the ground of an ancient promise and of the provisional occupation by the patriarchs, partly because the conquest and even the extermination of the Canaanites had been richly deserved by their impiety, their corruption, and their cruelties (Jg 1[5], 1 S 15[3]; cf. Jos 10[40]). For the expedition of Cyrus against Babylon a similar moral and religious sanction was asserted (Is 45[1]). The contribution of Islām was to elevate into a rule the commission given in the OT in the war against the Canaanites, and to glorify as most just and necessary the war of conquest which is waged for the conversion or the punishment of unbelievers. 'They who believe fight for the religion of God.' 'Give to those who misbelieve glad tidings of grievous woe.'[2] The Qur'ān is full of exhortations to fight against misbelievers and hypocrites,[3] with promises of Paradise to those who should fall in the holy warfare.[4]

2. **The standard of the classical moralists.**—The argument of Plato in the *Laws* is to the effect that rulers should organize their realms with a view to virtue and peaceful prosperity as the chief

[1] D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, London, 1894, pt. i.
[2] *Social Statics*, new ed., London, 1902, p. 116.
[3] *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, 1646, Cambridge, 3 vols., 1853, Washington, 1913.

[1] *Le Droit des gens*, 1758, Washington, 1916, ii. 5.
[2] *SBE* vi. 173 ff. [3] *Ib.* pp. 176–180, 183–186, etc.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 27 ff., 31 ff., 37 ff., ix. 63, etc.

end, and that military provisions should be relegated to a quite secondary place. At the same time he accepted the view that Greeks and barbarians were natural enemies, and that the code of justice was barely relevant to their relations. For Aristotle it was the self-evident duty of a state to defend itself, and to enrich itself by war as a legitimate way of acquiring property; and he also justified the war of conquest against outside nations on the ground that there are peoples which are destined by nature to servitude, and which are properly coerced if they do not voluntarily accept their destiny.[1] The discussion of the subject by Cicero is important as a summary of the ethical reflexions of classical antiquity which was also to serve as a useful legacy to the later guides of the Christian Church.

He condemns the common view that the use of peace was to prepare for war: peace is to be kept in view as the end, and war regarded as a means which is sometimes unhappily necessary to secure a satisfactory peace.[2] It is the irrational and brutal way of ending disputes. Unjust wars are those which are prompted by covetousness of the possessions of others. Just wars are of different types, according as they are required for the safety of the State, when measures are taken to ward off injury, and to secure reparation and punishment, or are prompted by the honourable motive of succouring those who have a claim to assistance on the ground of natural ties or of treaty-obligations. To fulfil the requirements of justice it was further necessary that the demand for satisfaction, and an eventual declaration of war, should be made in due religious forms.[3]

These principles, it may be added, made it possible to offer a tolerable moral apologia for the proceedings of the Roman empire: when a war could not be plausibly represented as defensive, it could at least be conceived as partaking to some extent of the character of a war of honour on behalf of allies, or of a war of chivalry on behalf of an oppressed and wronged population.

3. The judgment of the Church.—The need of an official Christian criterion emerged with the union of Church and Empire, and guidance was given by Augustine with considerable obligation to Cicero.

He had no difficulty in deciding that there are unjust and just wars—the unjust represented by the contemporary barbarian onslaughts on the Empire, the just by the efforts of the Empire to defend itself and the cause of civilization. 'Inferre autem bella finitimis, et inde in caetera procedere, ac populos sibi non molestos sola regni cupiditate conterere et subdere, quid aliud quam grande latrocinium nominandum est?'[4] Such wars have their spring in the worst of passions—'nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si qua similia.'[5] Just wars are those which are waged to inflict punishment, or to secure reparation for injury, or (as in OT) by express commandment of God.[6] So terrible, however, are the calamities of war—veritable games in honour of the devils[7]—that it should only be entered on under stress of the direst necessity.[8] He also laid it down that war may only be lawfully undertaken by a prince and carried on by a regular soldiery.[9] The caveat is put in that victory in war is not necessarily to be ascribed to the deserts of a belligerent.[10]

Thomas Aquinas laid down three criteria of a just war: it must be waged by a prince invested with legitimate authority, against an enemy who has deserved punishment, and with the intention that good shall be promoted and evil removed.[11]

Following on the Decrees of Gratian the subject was elaborately treated by Suarez, Ayala, Gentilis, and other Canonists. They were agreed in vindicating defensive and punitive warfare, but developed some differences of opinion in regard to the ethics of conquest, the powers of the pope in sanctioning wars and annexations, and the lawfulness of war against infidels and heretics.[1]

Protestantism generally reproduced the Augustinian criterion of just and unjust wars. The representatives of the Lutheran and Anglican schools were peculiarly emphatic in branding rebellion as one of the most criminal types of unjust war. According to Luther, the worst tyranny ought to be submissively and patiently endured, inasmuch as every nation richly deserves chastisement, and on the other hand tyrants will be adequately punished in the future state of retribution.[2] With still greater solemnity, even ferocity of language, is the iniquity of rebellion established in the Anglican *Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion*. The reasons given include the following in addition to the two mentioned above:

Rebellion had its prototype in the apostasy of Lucifer; monarchy is of divine right, being a copy of the divine rule; rebels will be punished with eternal damnation; history abundantly proves that it is as foolish and futile as it is wicked; subjects are no fit judges of the goodness or badness of a prince; rebellion is not a single sin, but 'the puddle and sink of all sins against God and man.'

The unjust war, according to Calvin, is one inspired by cupidity, and the just war is one in which a prince, as vice-regent of God, undertakes to coerce another nation which has embarked on a murderous and marauding enterprise.[3] He urged the usual arguments against rebellion, but with a significant addition:

'When misgovernment becomes intolerable,' he says, 'deliverance may be expected from God, whose way it is either to raise up avengers from among his servants, or to use for his purpose agents who may be pursuing different purposes of their own.'

On this principle it could be contended by the Puritans that rebellion against Charles I. became lawful when God raised up a deliverer in the person of Oliver Cromwell. The Scottish Church emphasized another qualifying doctrine, that obedience to kings ceases to be a duty when they make demands inconsistent with the laws of God, and in the National Covenant the subscribers accordingly bound themselves to maintain their sacred cause with 'their best counsel, bodies, means, and whole power against all sorts of persons whatsoever.'

The modern literature of Christian ethics has in the main reproduced the ideas of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin. One of the most interesting discussions is contributed by Rothe, who justifies aggressive war against a nation whose lusts may have made it a chronic disturber of the peace, and also defends the war of conquest, at least in extraordinary times, as legitimate in order to the replacement of a lower by a higher civilization, or for the correction and improvement of a nation which has become effete and degenerate.[4]

4. Jurisprudence and philosophy.—The classic treatises on international law deal elaborately with justificatory causes and unjust occasions of war. To Hugo Grotius more than any other it was due that political realism was called to account in the name of justice and humanity, though in some matters he applied the ethical principles with a measure of timidity.

Grotius recognizes three forms of just war—in the maintenance by a nation of its own interests, in interposition on behalf of others, and in duty towards God. A nation is entitled and even bound to maintain its own interests by the defence of the life, honour, and property of the citizens, by the exaction of reparation for injuries and insistence on the fulfilment of obligations, and by the punishment of the aggressors.[5] War may be lawfully undertaken by a nation on behalf, not only of its own subjects, but also of its allies, its friends, and of fellow-men as such.[6] The impious creed which denies the two

1 *Politics*, i. 8.
2 'Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine injuria in pace vivatur' (*de Offic.* i. 35).
3 'Nullum bellum esse justum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur, aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum' (i. 36).
4 *De Civ.* vii. 92*d*.
5 *Contra Faustum*, xxii. viii. 405*a*.
6 *Quæst. in Josue*, iii.[2], 584 *f*. 7 *De Civ.* vii. 76 *f*.
8 'Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas' (*Ep.* 189, ii. 699*b*).
9 *Contra Faustum*, xxii. viii. 405*a*. 10 *De Civ.* vii. 454*d*.
11 *Summa*, ii. ii. qu. xl. art. 1.

1 For a review of the literature cf. E. Nys, *Le Droit de la guerre*, Brussels, 1883, sect. iv.
2 *Op. cit.* 3 *Inst. Rel. Christ.* iv. 20
4 *Theologische Ethik*, 5 vols., Wittenberg, 1867–71, § 1160.
5 *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, bk. ii. ch. ix.
6 ii. 25. 3–6.

fundamental articles that there is a Deity, and that He cares for human affairs, is a doctrine so dangerous to the world as well as dishonouring to God that it may well be forcibly repressed in the name of human society.[1] War may not be entered on through blind fear of another nation, or a supposed utility that is not supported by absolute necessity. It is a monstrous doctrine that war is justifiable against a neighbour on the mere ground that his power is increasing and may continue to grow.[2] Other insufficient pretexts are the refusal of women in marriage, the desire of better lands, the purpose of imposing a more beneficent government, and imperial and ecclesiastical projects.[3] Again, while atheism may justly be suppressed, war is not justified against nations on the mere ground that they refuse to embrace the Christian religion, unless the unbelievers cruelly persecute Christians on account of their faith.[4] Rebellion is generally to be condemned although it may be justified by necessity—as when a prince invades the privileges of a free people, or abdicates, or betrays the cause of his subjects, or generally acts as their enemy.[5] On the other hand, the fact that a population does not enjoy liberty is not sufficient ground for rebellion. If they have come into servitude in a legitimate way, they should be content with their condition.[6]

The subject is also minutely treated by Vattel, and on similar lines—the shade of difference being that he allows more justification for the anticipatory war, and that he feels less hesitancy in apologizing for rebellion in justification of natural rights.[7]

The Scottish School of Jurisprudence is so far identified with the view that 'aggression is a natural right, the extent of which is measured by the power which God has bestowed on the aggressor,' and that 'the right of aggression justifies an application of force.'[8]

The criterion of justice has likewise been applied to wars in the schools of Moral Philosophy. Kant emphatically affirmed the lawfulness of defensive wars, and specified as criminal types the war for dominion (*bellum subjugatorium*) and the war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*). He refused to concede the moral title of one state to attack another on the mere ground of its iniquities (*bellum punitivum*).[9] Hegel affirms the paramount duty of a nation to preserve and develop its individuality, and holds that this may give a title to a great nation, as the best representative of the world-spirit for the time being, to embark upon wars of conquest. As against such an elect member of the human family, other peoples can assert no natural rights.[10] W. R. Sorley has criticized the 'defensive selfish' theory no less than the 'offensive selfish' theory as unethical, and makes the criterion to be whether a war contributes to the establishment of a higher civilization.[11]

The distinctive features of the public opinion of the 19th cent. were that the religious war is an anachronism, that a war of conquest against civilized nations is criminal, that oppressed nationalities have a sacred right of rebellion, and that there is a moral privilege, if not a duty, of chivalrous interposition on behalf of the wronged. On the other hand, the jurists were increasingly disposed to disclaim the office of directors of conscience to the nations in the matter.

'It is not possible,' says Hall, 'to frame general rules which shall be of any practical value, and the attempts in this direction which jurists are in the habit of making result in mere abstract statements of principles or perhaps of truisms, which it is unnecessary to reproduce.'[12]

What is the value of this chapter of the history of thought? It must be admitted that a review of the subject is calculated to raise misgivings as to the judicial capacity of the human mind, if not even to foster moral scepticism. The general result was that, while it was agreed both by the many and by the wise that morality should regulate the occasions of war, there was serious difference of opinion as to the prohibitions actually involved in the moral law, the parties who had to judge of its application to particular situations were so biassed by their interests and passions as to be incapable of equitable judgment, and the enforcement of ethical demands practically depended on whether it happened to coincide with the advantage of a state or states to lend its support to a righteous cause. The lesson to be drawn is that, if the demands of morality are to be properly expounded and enforced in this sphere, the task must be proceeded with under different conditions, and the problem must be formulated in a different way. If the chaotic situation of the past were replaced by a society of nations, the problem of just and unjust wars would be simplified, inasmuch as the typical form of unlawful war would be an act of rebellion against the general body in which a particular state broke the law that prohibits aggressive military action, and defied the authority supporting the law. Under these conditions the great question for ethical reflexion would be, not what wars were just or the reverse, but what were the rights which particular nations were entitled to assert or to have safeguarded. This subject is no doubt a difficult one; and it is probable that much would have to be adjudicated upon from the point of view of equity rather than in accordance with the provisions of a cast-iron statutory code. There would, however, be a good guarantee for just judgment in the fact that the elaboration of the code of rights would be undertaken by representatives of the general mind of the race, for whom the criterion would be the greatest good of the whole, and that in the application and enforcement of the recognized law the parties directly interested would play a subordinate part.

VII. *HUMANIZATION OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR.*—The ancient tradition was 'Væ Victis!' The penalty of defeat was the extremity of ruin and humiliation. The invaded country was ruthlessly devastated, the captured city was commonly sacked and destroyed, neither age nor sex could count on immunity, and a whole population might be put to the sword. If the practice was commonly less thorough than the theory, this was probably due not so much to clemency as to the reflexion that a ruined and depopulated country could pay no tribute, and that the services or the ransom of slaves gave more permanent satisfaction than the slaughter of captives. Such was the general spirit of warfare at the advent of certain of the great religions, and they vindicated their claim to the title of ethical by embodying provisions which represented a real advance on the primitive ferocity of mankind.

1. **The curb of the religions.**—The *Laws of Manu*, while showing no scruples about aggressive and acquisitive war, make a strong plea for humane fighting.

'What the King has not (yet) gained, let him seek (to gain) by (his) army.'[1] 'Let him plan his undertakings (patiently meditating) like a heron; like a lion, let him put forth his strength; like a wolf, let him snatch (his prey); like a hare, let him double in retreat.'[2] At the same time he is to conduct war mercifully and even chivalrously. 'When he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire.' 'Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) with flying hair, . . . nor one who is naked, . . . nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (foe). Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow), nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight, (but in all these cases let him) remember the duty (of honourable warriors).'[3]

The ethical inspiration of the religion of Israel left its mark on the regulations for the conduct of war. Israel was familiar with the ferocity of Oriental warfare, to which a religious consecration

1 ii. 20. 44–46.
2 ii. 22. 7–14.
3 i. 4.
4 ii. 22. 5–6, 1. 5, 7.
5 ii. 20. 48 f.
6 ii. 22. 11.
7 *Le Droit des gens*, i. 4.
8 J. Lorimer, *The Institutes of Law*[2], Edinburgh, 1880, pp. 414–419.
9 *Gesammelte Schriften*, 1902–12, i. 4, *Rechtslehre*, vi. 347.
10 *Werke*, Berlin, 1832–40, *Philosophie des Rechts*, viii. 433.
11 'The Ethics of Conquest,' *Blackwood's Magazine*, Edinburgh, Dec. 1898.
12 W. E. Hall, *International Law*[6], p. 60.

1 *SBE* xxv. [1886] 232. 2 *Ib.* p. 233. 3 *Ib.* p. 231.

was sometimes given by the application of the doctrine of the *herem*, or ban (Nu 21^{24}, Jos $6^{17f.}$ etc.). It could imitate its neighbours in the ruthless devastation of territory (2 K 3^{19-25}), the massacre of conquered communities (1 K 11^{16}), the mutilation of captives (Jg 1^{6}), and the murder of pregnant women (2 K 15^{16}). It would appear, however, that Israel had a general reputation for clemency (1 K 20^{31}), and that the treatment meted out to their enemies was 'not to be compared to the Assyrian devilries.'[1] The subject of atrocities bulks largely in the prophetic invective.

Amos thunders against the nations for the cruelty and perfidy that marked their methods of warfare, and judgment is denounced against Damascus because it has threshed Gilead with threshing-instruments of iron; against Gaza because it has sold Israelites into captivity; against Tyre because it has violated a treaty; against Edom because of its pitiless vendetta against Israel; against Ammon because it ripped up the woman with child that it might enlarge its border; against Moab because it burned the bones of the king of Edom with lime (chs. 1–2).

The Deuteronomic legislation did something in this field to sustain its general character for humanity. It provides that the inhabitants of a city which capitulates are to be treated with clemency, and that, if it be carried by assault, the non-fighting population is only to forfeit its liberty ($20^{11f.}$ 21^{10}). It was also forbidden to cut down fruit trees during the siege of a city 'since the tree of the field is man's life' ($20^{19f.}$).

Among the great religions Islām alone upheld the ruthless traditions of Oriental warfare. As it was a religious duty to fight for the faith, so the worst excesses of war were given the character of a righteous judgment on the infidel, and the forfeits demanded of the vanquished by the law of the savage were passed on to the faithful as their natural rights.

'O thou prophet, fight thou strenuously against the misbelievers and hypocrites, and be stern towards them, for their resort is Hell, and an evil journey shall it be.'[2] 'The reward of those who make war against God and His Apostle and strive after violence in the earth, is only that they shall be slaughtered or crucified, or their hands out off and their feet on alternate sides, or that they shall be banished from the land.'[3]

It should be added that some Muhammadan peoples have their share of human kindness, and that they have also found it necessary to compromise with their exterminating doctrine as a condition of being allowed to retain political power and even to occupy the planet.

2. The Græco-Roman period and its spirit.—During the classical period the traditional usages of war were somewhat softened. Although vengeance was pitilessly wreaked on an enemy who had inspired deadly fear or hatred, and although the principle still held that a victorious soldiery was entitled to the compensations of pillage and outrage, there was a milder strain in the Aryan constitution, which re-asserted itself in cold blood. While the Greeks did not evolve a code of international law, there was a minimum of common morality which a common religion enjoined on all Greeks alike. The chief elements of the code were the rights of the alien (ξενός), the sacred immunity of the herald, pious treatment of the slain (whose corpses might not be mutilated and should not be left unburied), and merciful treatment of prisoners. Unconditional surrender, if voluntary, carried with it a right to mercy; conditional surrender, if confirmed by an oath, was to be respected; and a captive had a title to be liberated (though it was doubtful if the captor was compelled to accept it) on payment of a fixed sum. These rules were believed to be sanctioned by divine authority, and the Amphictyonic Councils, which represented unions of tribes and cities, also lent their influence to mitigate the rancour of war.[1]

Roman warfare retained enough of the old ruthlessness and savagery, as appears from the detailed records of massacre and pillage in the campaigns of conquest. The claims of mercy, however, are stated by Cicero in terms which probably do not greatly overstate the working theory of the later period.

A distinction is drawn between wars in which a state fights for its existence and those in which it contends for power and glory, and he observes that, while the former inevitably take on a merciless and murderous character, the latter may be and often are fought out with comparative clemency. The treatment of an enemy depended on what manner of enemy he was. Those who were of evil character—arrogant, cruel, and perfidious—were properly scourged without mercy, while it was a dictate of nobility as well as of prudence to deal magnanimously with those who were decisively beaten, and who were no longer a source of danger. He lays stress on the duty of acting honourably towards the enemy, and enlarges on the magnanimity of Pyrrhus, who declined to hold his prisoners to ransom, on the ground that, if fortune had granted them their lives, the conqueror might well grant them liberty.[2]

3. The mediæval period.—In the fighting of the early Middle Ages there was some relapse into primitive ferocity due to the fact that the conflict was between civilization and barbarism, and the stakes were the material foundations of existence. Writing in the very throes of the world-struggle, Augustine recalls that the tradition even of heathen Rome recommended clemency and magnanimity, and urges that war be conducted in accordance with the merciful precepts of the gospel.[3] When the outline of a cosmos re-emerged, Christianity was already generally professed, and it contributed, in conjunction with the nobler elements of the European character, to the formation of a chivalrous ideal, which in some particulars toned down the hideousness of war. The Church, as the moral guide of the nations, took the matter into consideration, and in its canon law framed rules which were leavened by the Christian spirit.

4. The modern advance.—In modern times regulations for the conduct of war have been humanized to an extent that has been a welcome offset to the multiplication and intensification of the horrors due to modern inventions. The forces making for this improvement were the Christian leaven working in European society and the developing moral reflexion of the civilized world, and those happily met in the personality and equipment of Hugo Grotius, theologian, moralist, and lawyer, and became widely operative through the influence of the treatise *de Jure Belli ac Pacis*.

After expounding the general theory and practice of the conduct of war, he proposes in the name of humanity a list of amendments and mitigations (*temperamenta*) in regard to the treatment of the persons and the property of the enemy.[4] The general principle insisted on is that the right to slay, enslave, confiscate, etc., is not absolute, but is limited by consideration of what is necessary to break an enemy's resistance or to obtain reparation for injury inflicted.

During the 18th and 19th centuries there was a marked development of the cosmopolitan and humanitarian spirit, accompanied by much ethical reflexion in the departments of International Law, Moral Philosophy, and Christian Ethics. The common-sense benevolence of the 18th cent., as voiced by Benjamin Franklin, saw no reason why the law of nations, which had already discarded something of the old savagery, should not go on improving; and Franklin proposed that, when nations were at war, immunity should be granted to cultivators of the earth, fishermen, merchants and traders in unarmed ships, artists, and mechanics working in open towns, also that rapine and privateering should be abolished and that hospitals

[1] A. R. S. Kennedy, art. 'War' in *SDB*.
[2] *Qur'ān*, lxvi. 9. [3] *Ib.* v. 39.
[1] A. H. J. Greenidge, *A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History*, London, 1896, pp. 16–18.
[2] *De Offic.* i. [3] ii. 415*g*, 416*c*.
[4] Bk. iii. chs. xi.–xxiv.: 'Circa jus interficiendi, vastationem, res captas, captos,' etc.

should be respected. In the treatises on International Law, which was sedulously cultivated during the period, the humane trend was strongly accentuated, and the doctrine was even ardently developed by some continental writers that war ought to remain a conflict of states as such, in which the non-combatant citizens might rank as neutrals. While the Roman Catholic Church brought its canon law up to date, Protestant theology was prolific in systems of Christian Ethics, which at least made it clear that the spirit of Christian morality required radical reform of the usages of war. Definite and valuable practical results were achieved by the Geneva Convention of 1864 which dealt with the treatment of the wounded, the sick, and prisoners.[1] The Hague Tribunal covered practically the whole ground, except that it was only permitted to glance at the topics of arbitration and disarmament.[2] The chief provisions illustrating the ethical progress were as follows.

(A) *Methods and weapons of war.*—(*a*) In re-affirming the principle that the right to injure the enemy is not unlimited, the Hague tribunal prohibited poisoning, treacherous wounding and killing, declarations that no quarter will be given, and the improper use of flags of truce. (*b*) It prohibited attacks on and bombardment of defenceless towns, and unnecessary destruction of edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity. (*c*) It prohibited the sack of captured cities. (*d*) It laid down that prisoners are entitled to be provided for and relieved. (*e*) The treatment of the sick and wounded was put on a much better footing. It was provided that ambulances and military hospitals are to be respected; that persons employed in this work are to be protected and returned to their posts, that wounded and sick soldiers are to be cared for and treated, to whatever nation they belong.

(B) *Treatment of the enemy's country when occupied and of property therein.*—The rights of private property were asserted—both as against pillage by individuals and as against confiscation by the enemy state. Wanton destruction of property was forbidden. Requisitions in kind or in services were only to be demanded from communes or inhabitants for the necessities of the armies of occupation. The inhabitants could not be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country.

The two other main subjects dealt with are commerce with the enemy during hostilities, and the law of reprisals.

During the recent war there were doubtless grievous violations of these humane regulations—notably in the use of poisonous gases, the wanton destruction of property, and the occasional refusal of quarter—but that the modern world had reached a higher level of morality than antiquity was still in evidence in the fact that, in the most gigantic and desperate struggle in history, law and order were to a large extent maintained in occupied territories, prisoners were not as of old callously butchered or reserved for the slave mart or the gladiatorial spectacle, and the sick and wounded found themselves under the shelter of the Cross and tended by the ministrations of the Good Samaritan.

VIII. *THE DESIRABILITY OF ENDING WAR.*—The general judgment of mankind upon war is that it is a scourge of the nations which, along with famine and pestilence, makes up the dread trinity of human woes. This estimate rests on considerations which have certainly not lost in force in modern times.

(1) War is organized destruction of the harvest of civilization and of those who produce it. It impoverishes a country in two ways—by diverting labour from productive to unproductive tasks, and by annihilating wealth which had previously been accumulated by peaceful industry. It also sets at naught the civilized doctrine of the sanctity of human life, and replaces the beneficent efforts of science to save and husband life by measures which directly or indirectly sweep away whole masses of population. The ever-increasing efficiency of the instruments and methods of destruction has still more decidedly given to modern warfare an aspect of folly and clothed it with a suicidal character. The conquerors, hardly less than the vanquished, have emerged from the World War bleeding, dazed, exhausted, and doomed to shoulder almost intolerable burdens.

(2) The tragedy of the waste of life is aggravated by the circumstance that the victims are the *élite* of the nations. War, as Æschylus says, is a gold-merchant, with whom his customers do most unprofitable business.

> 'From each home once there went
> A man forth: him it sent
> Each knows; but what are these return?
> A little dust, an urn.'[1]

A Greek epitaph puts the point pithily: *Ἄρης οὐκ ἀγαθῶν φείδεται ἀλλὰ κακῶν.*[2] While the machinery of nature works for the survival of the fittest, the winnowing of war results in the elimination of the fittest, and the more so in latter-day warfare, which gives little advantage to the strong, the skilful, and the wise, in the carnage of the frontal attack and of the fire-swept zone.[3]

(3) In fighting man reverts to the sub-human plane. The badge of humanity is the possession of reason, which at least suggests that man ought to try to settle his disputes by rational methods.[4]

(4) War makes an appalling addition to the miseries of the human lot. A whole world of cruel suffering is compressed by Sallust into his list of the horrors of ancient war:

'Rapi virgines, pueros; divelli liberos a parentum complexu; matres familiarum pati quae victoribus collibuissent, fana atque domos exspoliari; caedem, incendia fieri, postremo armis, cadaveribus, cruore, atque luctu omnia compleri.'[5]

With more detail and colour but hardly more impressiveness, a great preacher depicts the horrors of the battle-field, the agonies of the occupied country, the ravages of want and sickness, the desolated lives, and the broken hearts.[6] It is a service rendered by realistic fiction that it has shown how dearly purchased even by the fighting man is 'the one crowded hour of glorious life' which itself under modern conditions may be like nothing so much as the death of a poisoned rat in a hole.[7]

(5) War, when looked at as a whole, is a gigantic moral evil. The aggression which sets in motion and sustains the strife has its dynamic in lusts and passions that defy and reverse the recognized maxims of morality. Even a just war sets the heart of a nation aflame with hatred, malice, and revenge. War turns the moral world upside down and sanctions a temporary suspension of respect for life and property and truth. It is therefore probably inevitable that it should be waged with some grim accompaniment of unlicensed outrage and of unchained vice. Experience also shows that the moral chaos of war makes its influence felt later on in a certain hardening of a people's heart, and a perversion of their moral sentiments, and also in a ground-swell of unrest, licentiousness, and crime which continues to surge after the actual tempest has subsided.

To this indictment there has been opposed a eulogy of war, which has some basis in facts, but fails to establish that the blessings traced to the experiences could not otherwise be obtained, much less that it is desirable to perpetuate war

[1] Text in L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, London, 1906, ii. app. iii.

[2] *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907*, Carnegie Endowment, 1918.

[1] *Agam.* 441 f., tr. W. Headlam, Cambridge, 1910.

[2] J. W. Mackail, *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology*, London, 1891.

[3] D. Starr Jordan, *The Human Harvest*, London, 1907.

[4] Cicero, *de Offic.*; cf. Ennius, 'Pellitur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res, Spernitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur (*Carminum Reliquiæ*, ed. L. Mueller, Petropolis, 1884).

[5] *De Catilinæ Conjuratione*, § 51.

[6] Robert Hall, *Miscellaneous Works*, London, 1839, 'Reflections on War.'

[7] Tolstoi, *War and Peace*; E. Zola, *La Débâcle*, Paris, 1892; B. Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder!*, 2 vols., Dresden, 1891; Bairns father's cartoons.

as the condition of like benefits accruing in the future.

(1) The progress of human civilization, it is said, has been due to nations which came to the front in war, were organized and steeled by war, and won through war their power and title to guide or serve the world. 'If progress stops war on one side, it makes it on another, and war is its instrument.'[1] Few indeed would so far venture to criticize the course of history as to deplore that, *e.g.*, Rome made herself mistress of the world, or that the Anglo-Saxons conquered and settled Britain, and that their descendants took forcible possession of the greater part of North America, as well as of Australia and New Zealand. Such events have a certain ethical justification, since self-realization is a right if not a duty of nations, while under former conditions a people was practically thrown back on war as the one form of enterprise by which to supply its vital wants and in which to find scope for great native powers. At the same time it may not be forgotten that the after-world owes the most valuable elements in its spiritual heritage to the culture of the Greeks and the religion of the Jews, both of which peoples went down in the military struggle, and it is not unreasonable to expect that in the future great races will find it possible to come to their own in the leadership and service of the world without the necessity of proving their superiority and claiming their opportunities by the exercise of brute force.

(2) War is necessary, it is said, to preserve the vitality of a state and avert degeneracy. 'No Body can be healthfull,' says Bacon, 'without *Exercise*, neither Natural Body, nor Politique: And certainly, to a Kingdome or Estate, a Just and Honourable Warre is the true *Exercise*.'[2] One might reply that it gets sufficient exercise, if it has a mind to work, in subduing the earth and developing industry and commerce, and that in any case there are more healthful forms of exercise than gashing the body and spilling its life-blood. Probably what Bacon meant was to give discreet utterance to the maxim of statecraft that a foreign war is the best recipe for grave domestic dissensions, but to this assertion the reply is that sedition is more sanely and humanely treated by measures of political and social reform. That nations become effeminate and degenerate in peace, and because of peace, has been often asserted, and no doubt it has sometimes happened that a nation, on being guaranteed peaceful security, has become idle and vicious. But the charge often amounts to no more than that a people, as the result of a long period of peace, has become unskilled in the use of the soldier's tools, and the experience of the recent war showed that peoples which according to theory should have become weak and spiritless had preserved unimpaired throughout a commercial era the strongest ancestral qualities of their stock.

(3) War, it is said, has not its equal as a school of the virtues. The modern militarists are able to collect opinions in support of this tenet from eminent moralists of all ages. And undoubtedly there are qualities, distinctive of the soldier as such, which contrast impressively with the unbridled egotism that runs rampant in times of peace and prosperity—as courage, obedience, self-discipline, endurance, comradeship, self-sacrifice. It is, however, incredible from the point of view of the moral order that the only way in which individuals can be given the opportunity to reach the heights of virtue is that nations should continue to plan and perpetrate crimes against one another. Fortunately the facts do not warrant the inference of the moral indispensableness of war. For one thing the virtues in question to a great extent are merely brought to light, not engendered, by the experiences of war. In so far as they are created and developed by war, the same end could be achieved by other means, since the world contains enough of peril, adventure, and opportunities of sacrifice to provide material for a training of youth that would yield similar ethical results, while it might guard more effectively against such concessions as are made in the school of warfare to the evil forces which are summarily comprehended under the names of the Devil and the flesh.[3] German Social Democracy has undertaken to provide a disciplinary equivalent in the economic field for the advantages of military training.

(4) War, it is said, has supplied much of the inspiration and impetus which have promoted the higher developments of the life of the race. The great achievements of the nations in war have usually been followed by a golden age of spiritual achievement—in literature, in philosophic thought, and in art.[4] Even great religions in their origins, and subsequent religious revivals, have been closely connected with the throes of the nations incident to the deadly struggles of war. It appears that the tension and excitement of war stimulate the human spirit to put forth its utmost powers, quicken its interest in the capital problems of existence, and also deepen its insight and increase its receptiveness. But it is also a tenable view that the spiritual achievements of the race would have been greater, not less, had not war made its appalling drafts from generation to generation on the best energies and material of the race, and that the gains credited to war are really due to the alchemy of the over-ruling Providence which is able to do something to turn a curse into a blessing. That religion on the whole has profited by war is more than doubtful: the religious revival is a lesser fact in the midst of most wars than the bewilderment or eclipse of faith, the unsettlement of moral maxims, and the diffusion of a pessimistic philosophy.

IX. *THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CESSATION OF WAR.*—The belief that war will eventually cease has been entertained on various grounds.

(*a*) It is held that God's purpose with the world is to establish in it a Kingdom which will be a realm of peace, as well as of righteousness and love, and that the omnipotent and all-wise God may be depended on to carry His purpose into execution. This confidence was the ground of the OT prediction that in the Messianic age 'they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks; nation shall not lift up the sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more' (Is 2^4). The prediction has naturally been accepted by the Church as a promise of God vouched for by inspired prophets, but apart from the authority of the prophets it is inevitable that those who share their faith in the divine government of the world should share their conviction that universal peace is an end worthy of God which He will eventually attain in spite of human perversity and opposition.

(*b*) The hope of permanent peace has been based on a belief in the essential goodness of human nature, which it is supposed has sufficient idealism to respond in the long run to the message of justice and the appeal of brotherhood. Short of this it is held that as the human race grows more humane and refined, it will turn in disgust from the wild and brutal work of war. The hope is based on thus much of fact, that human nature has deep unrecognized and unrealized possibilities of an ethical kind, but the optimism resting on this foundation is happily reinforced by other considerations.

(*c*) The self-interest of the nations as a whole requires them to take measures for the abolition of war. The great difficulty, says Rousseau, is not even so much the wickedness as the stupidity of the rulers of states, who would be pacifists if they understood their own interests.

'They do not need to be good, generous, disinterested, public-spirited, humane. They may be unjust, greedy, putting their own interest above everything else; we only ask that they shall not be fools, and to this they will come.'[1]

The same view is taken by Kant, who says that even a race of devils, provided only they were intelligent, would be forced to find a solution other than war for their disputes. 'Nature guarantees the final establishment of peace through the mechanism of human inclinations.'[2] The view that the nations will eventually be driven by considerations of interest to protect themselves against war has been urged with renewed force in recent times on the ground that the civilized nations are now so intimately interdependent through trade and finance that in fighting one another they infallibly injure themselves, that as a fact the victors suffer hardly less than the vanquished,[3] and that the destructiveness, not to speak of the cost, of modern armaments is so terrible that persistence in war will imperil the very existence of civilization.[4] These arguments have been powerfully reinforced by the latest chapter of history.

(*d*) The eventual cessation of war, further, has been expected as the culmination of the process which has already annulled the right of the individual to take into his own hands the redress of his private wrongs. The civilized states have all succeeded in instituting machinery which checks and punishes individual wrong-doers who

[1] J. B. Mozley, *Sermons*, Oxford and Cambridge, 1876, p. 125 f.

[2] 'Of the true Greatnesse of Kingdomes and Estates' (*Essays*, ed. W. A. Wright, London, 1865, p. 127).

[3] Cf. William James, *Memories and Studies*, London, 1911, ch. xi. 'The Moral Equivalent of War.'

[4] Ruskin, *Crown of Wild Olive*.

[1] *Œuvres*, Paris, 1839, iv. 280.

[2] *Werke*, 'Zum ewigen Frieden,' viii. 366.

[3] Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, London, 1910.

[4] I. S. Bloch, *Is War now Impossible?*, Eng. tr., London, 1899.

may be minded to rob or murder, and it seems to be essentially the same problem with which the race has to deal in repressing crimes attempted by particular nations against other members of the human family. The same necessity, as Kant points out, 'which forced men to take steps to insure the security of individuals within the particular state will compel the nations to take similar measures for their protection against violence and robbery.'[1] In opposition to this view it has been maintained that the nations have not the same reasons for instituting a system for the maintenance of international law and order that a nation has for repressing crime within its own borders. It is not so necessary, it is said, to regulate the reciprocal relations of states as the reciprocal relations of fellow-citizens, since the former are not so inextricably bound up together as the latter, and, further, a state has no right to limit its independence to the same extent to which the individual consents when he submits to the laws of his country.[2] But those objections have been weakened since the 18th cent.—the first by the ever-increasing economic solidarity of the nations, the second by the demonstration afforded by the British Empire and the United States of the possibility of reconciling the rights of a central authority with the enjoyment of a satisfactory regional autonomy.

(*e*) An optimistic attitude is justified in view of the progress that has been made towards the pacific organization of areas and populations within which war formerly raged as part of the order of things. There has been a steady expansion of the areas within which war is regarded as illicit and even impossible. The history of Britain illustrates the evolutionary process. Time was when there were seven kingdoms in England, and at least three in Scotland, which were chronically at war among themselves; later, war between England and Scotland had the aspect of a natural necessity, while the situation was further complicated by a chronic feud between Scottish Highlands and Lowlands, and by struggles between king and barons. But the stage was eventually reached at which the interests of each part of the country and all sections of the population were entrusted to the wisdom and equity of the representatives of the whole body, and the notion of a war between north and south, or other sections of the population, would be scouted as insane and unthinkable. Similarly the territorial conflicts of former days are no longer possible between the Departments of modern France or the provinces of unified Italy. It is reasonable to believe that at no distant date the problem which was solved by particular nations will be solved by Europe as a whole, and that to future generations European war, if not impossible, will be stamped with the criminal character of civil or fratricidal war.

Some of the counter-arguments are weighty, but not unanswerable.

(1) It is said that, as war has prevailed from the beginning, so it will prevail to the end. But it has been the destiny of man to grapple with the most dire and formidable evils, and the marvellous progress he has made in knowledge, power, and skill seems to presage that he will master all ills in his domain save the menace of death.

'Æons rolled behind him with thunder of far retreat,
And still as he went he conquered and laid his foes at his feet.'[3]

(2) The law of the world, we are reminded, has been progress through struggle, and the nations may not expect to escape from it. But it is not necessary that the struggle should continue to be carried on by the method of violence, and it is quite conceivable—and indeed in accordance with analogies—that it should come to be confined to rational forms of emulation and competition.

(3) Human nature, it is also said, contains within itself the permanent possibility, nay, the guarantee of war—in its ingrained selfishness, its cupidity, its ambition, and its passions of hatred and revenge. But, even if we grant a root of wickedness in human nature, it is also true that it contains traits of divine nobility, which might be mobilized with success in support of altruistic and chivalrous ideals. Moreover, as already pointed out, nations may be expected to find out, as individuals have done, that fighting is at least bad and may even be ruinous policy.

(4) Religion has contributed the arguments that the permanence of war may be expected from the justice, and even from the goodness, of God. The argument from the divine justice is that God has ever punished guilty nations, and that, racial sin being inveterate, He will needs continue to employ the scourge of war as the necessary and appropriate method of the expression of His holy wrath. It is true that national sins entail punishment, and that wars have often been used as the means of chastisement, but God has ample resources of other kinds in the providential order by which to reveal His anger against national corruptions. It has also been argued that God's goodness moves Him to send wars upon the earth to prevent mankind from fixing their affections on earthly things. 'There is hardly to be found a child of fortune,' says Campanella, 'who would desire to exchange his terrestrial paradise for a celestial one; and so God applies a salutary remedy by sending upon us wars and persecutions.'[1] Similarly Hegel observes that hussars and sabres discourse much more impressively than preachers on the edifying text of the instability and vanity of earthly things.[2] But surely there is enough of irremediable misery in human life to undertake the work of weaning our affections from this world. Another branch of the religious argument founds on NT predictions of the persistence of wars and rumours of wars. These, however, belong to the apocalyptic stratum, which is concerned with events expected at the end of the world, and have nothing to do with the period during which the human race is appointed to work out its destiny under the conditions of a natural development.

The immediate outlook.—While there is reason to hope for the eventual abolition of war, it is not to be forgotten that each successive generation is disposed to military adventure by its fresh energies and its youthful inexperience. Although no generation wants two great wars, every generation seems pleased to have one. Moreover, our world is full of tension which involves the possibility of manifold future conflicts. There are many antitheses which, in addition to the legacies of hatred from the past, disturb the present and menace the future. The antitheses are (*a*) between the unreconciled forces of autocracy and democracy, (*b*) between nationalities and empires, (*c*) between nationality and nationality, (*d*) between parties representing individualistic and communistic theories of social organization, while in the distance there even loom possible conflicts (*e*) between continent and continent and (*f*) between the dominant white race and the coloured races which it has taken under its tutelage. It was therefore vitally urgent that the world should take advantage of the present revulsion of feeling to place things on a better footing, and to secure that war shall be rendered, if not impossible, at least more difficult and odious, and more dangerous to those who play with the fire.

X. *METHODS OF SECURING PERPETUAL PEACE.*—There are three ways in which war might cease: (1) there might be no more aggression; (2) there might be no more resistance; (3) there might be a political organization whose function was to preserve peace. The first and second methods have been the dreams of prophets and idealists. The third has entered in different ways into history and practical politics.

(1) Clearly there would be no more war if all nations refrained from anything of the nature of aggression. This implies, however, a moral transformation of the race such as may not be looked for in the present dispensation, and the hope of such radical conversion has chiefly been cherished as a sequel to the Second Coming and a visible reign of Christ on earth.

(2) The end, also, would obviously be attained if those whose interests were assailed consistently agreed to offer no opposition, but to show forgive-

[1] *Op. cit.* [2] E. de Vattel, *Le Droit des gens*, preface.
[3] William Watson, 'The Dream of Man,' *Poems*, London, 1905.

[1] *De monarchia Hispanica*, Amsterdam, 1640, p. 349.
[2] *Loc. cit.*

ness and goodwill. It is possible that, if this could be tried, it would have the effect of shaming hatred and aggression out of the world.[1] But it seems even more probable that, if a nation could confidently depend on immunity in wrongdoing, this would give a fresh impetus to criminal impulses. In any case the method is not practicable, as there is nothing about which human nature feels more strongly than injustice, and nothing in which men in the mass are less disposed tamely to acquiesce.

(3) Political organization might attain the end by one nation conquering the rest and compelling them to keep the peace, by nations forming themselves into two or more groups to hold one another in check, or by all the nations, or the great majority, forming a society of nations for the maintenance of peace on the basis of a recognized code of law. The last arrangement, finally, might develop into a world republic with particular countries as its provinces.

(*a*) *The imperialistic method.*—While the empires in one point of view have been centres of aggressive warfare, in another point of view they have made for peace within the area embraced in their dominion, and have compensated for loss of liberty by according protection and ensuring tranquillity. The great conquerors have usually quieted any compunctions of conscience by the reflexion that the end of their fighting would be peace, and that peace would be the more widely extended and the better assured the greater and more thorough their conquests. Rome gave a practical demonstration that the power strong enough to master the nations of the civilized world was able to solve the problem of preserving a general peace. The Middle Ages inherited the Roman tradition, and inclined to believe that the ideal was the unification of the world under emperor and pope as representatives of the divine sovereignty.

'Dante imagined a single authority, unselfish, inflexible, irresistible, which could make all smaller tyrannies to cease, and enable every man to live in peace and liberty, so that he lived in justice. He could conceive of its accomplishment only in one form, as grand as it was impossible—a universal monarchy.'[2]

The Holy Roman Empire was seldom, if ever, the effective master of Europe; during modern times there has been no acknowledged master; and the struggle for the hegemony among the European nations which has formed so large a part of modern history was doubtless prompted, not only by ambition and cupidity, but by the desire to give to Europe the ruler that it needed to bring its miseries, including the bloodshed, to an end. Napoleon has left it on record that he sought to conquer Europe, not only for glory, but to bless it with lasting peace. The Holy Alliance, formed after 1815, undertook to keep the peace, but unfortunately attached even more importance to its futile policy of stemming the rising tide of democracy. It was at least a tenable theory, favoured by some German historians, that, if Germany made itself master of Europe by the might of its sword, it would serve itself heir to the pacific mission of Rome. But this programme came into collision with deep-seated prepossessions—the prediction of Rousseau was twice fulfilled that no nation is strong enough to contend with the rest of Europe, and the course of events has happily shut up the world to attempting a co-operative solution.

(*b*) *Defensive alliances.*—For the last 400 years Europe has witnessed combinations of nearly equal strength which made it hazardous to itself for any single state, however powerful, to develop aggressive designs. The system of the balance of power was no doubt better than none in a world that was unceasingly threatened by dreams of ambition and cupidity, but it had too little of an ethical basis—naked interest being palpably dominant on both sides—and as it was deemed proper to guard against the growing strength of a possible enemy as well as to repel actual injury, the general result was, not to avert war, but to make war almost the chronic experience of Europe, and, when it occurred, to extend the area of the convulsion and to increase the horrors of the struggle.

(*c*) *The League of Nations.*—The third method is that the nations, and at least as a beginning the civilized nations, should form themselves into a confederation for maintaining peace on the basis of an accepted code of rights and obligations. Such an organization was adumbrated in Greek and Germanic confederations, but the idea is modern of working out a scheme to embrace the whole of Europe and the rest of the civilized world, accompanied by a recognition of moral relations with the other divisions of mankind.

The idea of a European League of Nations was conceived by Henri IV. of France, who imagined that the great powers might be persuaded by the offer of certain adjustments and compensations to renounce their special aspirations, and to bind themselves to resist any attempts to disturb the agreed settlement.[1] To the Abbé of St. Pierre belongs the honour of having opened the modern discussion in his *Projet de la paix universelle*. As fundamental articles of the League he proposed the following:

(1) 'There shall exist henceforth between the European sovereigns signing the five articles a perpetual alliance.'

(2) 'Each of the Allies shall contribute, in proportion to his actual revenues, and the charges of his state, to the expenses of the Grand Alliance.'

(3) 'The Grand Allies, for the termination of their present and future differences, have renounced and renounce for ever, for themselves and their successors, the method of arms and are agreed always to adopt henceforth the method of conciliation, through the mediation of the rest of the Allies at the meeting-place of the General Assembly, and in case of mediation being unsuccessful they agree to submit to the judgment of the Plenipotentiaries of the other Allies, a majority of votes to determine the matter provisionally, three-fourths finally after the lapse of five years.'

(4) 'If any one of the Grand Allies refuse to execute the findings and the regulations of the Grand Alliance, negotiate contrary treaties, or make warlike preparations, the Grand Alliance shall arm, and take offensive action against the power in question, until it shall have complied with the said findings and regulations, or given security for the reparation of the injuries caused by its hostile measures, and made good the military expenses as estimated by Commissioners of the Grand Alliance.'

(5) 'The Allies agree that the Plenipotentiaries, by a majority of votes, shall definitely regulate in their permanent Assembly all the articles which shall be judged necessary and important, in order to procure for the Grand Alliance more stability, security and other advantages, but the fundamental articles shall be unalterable save by unanimous consent of the Allies.'[2]

As regards the basis of the Concordat, it was proposed that the *status quo* should be accepted and maintained.

'To facilitate the formation of this Alliance, it is agreed to adopt as fundamental actual possession and the execution of the latest treaties, and to guarantee to each Sovereign jointly, and to his house, all the territory and the rights which he actually possesses.'[3]

The main features of the project were reproduced in an influential essay by Rousseau, who laid stress on the following points as essential—that such a League must include all considerable states, that it must have a judicial tribunal and an executive, and that it must have at its disposal sufficient force to prevent secession. In his final

[1] 'Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule' (*Dhammapada*, *SBE* x. 5). 'Odium reciproco odio augetur et amore contra deleri potest' (Spinoza, *Ethica*, iii. 43).

[2] R. W. Church, *Dante, an Essay, and tr. of De Monarchia*, by F. J. Church, London, 1878, p. 90.

[1] M. de B. Sully, *Mémoires*, 10 vols., Liége, 1788, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1805, iv. 406 ff.

[2] *Œuvres de politique et de morale*, 15 vols., Rotterdam, 1738, i. 21–31 (Eng. tr., London, 1814).

[3] P. 23.

judgment on the scheme Rousseau declared it to be hopeless to expect to convince autocratic sovereigns and self-seeking ministers that they would find it to their interests to fall in with the project. The presupposition of its success was to get rid of autocracy, and this operation might prove too painful and costly.

'A Federative League,' he concludes, 'can only be established by revolution, and who then would venture to say that its coming is more to be desired or feared?'[1]

The subject was advanced by Kant, who, while owing much to St. Pierre and Rousseau, went somewhat deeper into the conditions of lasting peace.

'The greatest problem set to the human race,' he says, 'is the formation of a political organisation under which justice will be dispensed to all, and a branch of this is the subordination to law of the external relations of the particular states.'[2]

The goal of the development on the international side is a *Völkerbund*, in which every state, even the smallest, may expect the maintenance of its security and its rights, not from the exercise of its own power or from its own decisions, but from the collective power of the League, and from judicial decisions of its collective will.[3] He lays down the following among other conditions of enduring peace:

(1) A treaty of peace should not contain matter provocative of future wars. (2) No existing state should be annexed by another through inheritance, barter, sale, or gift. (3) Standing armies should be abolished. (4) National debt should not be accumulated in support of foreign policy. (5) No state should interfere in another's domestic concerns.

Kant also expresses the opinion that perpetual peace has the best chance of being achieved under republican institutions, although he is careful to point out that a republic may exist in substance without democratic forms.[4]

No recent writer has done so much to commend the scheme as Léon Bourgeois, who played a leading part in the judicial discussions of the Hague Conferences.[5] His definition of the essence of the scheme is that the nations should agree upon a code of national rights and bind themselves as a whole to enforce it. This would correspond to the conditions under which internal order is maintained by civilized states. The other presupposition of the preservation of peace is effective machinery for enforcing decisions.

(1) 'There can be no veritable peace save under the reign of justice. To have material peace it is necessary to have first realised moral peace, and there can be no moral peace if the rights of any are felt to be, or really are menaced. Rights must be determined before they can be guaranteed.'

(2) 'The organisation of a jurisdiction which guarantees these rights is the essential condition of the establishment and the maintenance of peace.'[6]

The project was translated into a political institution by the Treaty of Versailles, which, incorporating the Covenant of the League of Nations, came into force on its ratification by Germany and Austria, and by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.[7]

General Scope.—(*a*) *Ends.*—Promotion of international co-operation and achievement of international peace and security. (*b*) *Means.*—Acceptance by contracting parties of obligations not to resort to war, prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations for the establishment of understandings of international law as rules of conduct, maintenance of justice and respect for treaty obligations (Preface).

A. *Membership.* — (1) *Original members*—those named as signatories and those named who shall sign within two months. (2) *Later adherents*—any named self-governing state or colony on the strength of a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and on acceptance of the obligations of the League and special regulations of the Assembly (art. i.).

B. *Organization.* — *Assembly and Council* (art. ii.). 1. *Assembly.* — *Membership* — representatives of the members of the League. *Time and place of meetings*—stated and occasional. *Competent business*—any matter within its sphere of action and affecting the peace of the world. *Voting strength*—each member to have one vote, and not more than three representatives (art. iii.).

2. *Council.*—*Membership* — representatives of the principal allied and associated Powers, and of four other members to be selected by the Assembly—in the first instance Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain. Representatives of other members may have a permanent seat, and selective representation may also be increased. *Time and place of meetings*—stated and occasional. *Competent business*, as before. Occasional representation of members of the League when their interests are affected. *Voting power*—one member one representative only and one vote (art. iv.).

Decisions of Assembly and Council, unless otherwise provided for, to be unanimous. First meeting to be summoned by President of the United States (art. v.). A permanent Secretariat at the seat of the League. Expenses to be shared by the members and officials (art. vi.). *Seat of the League*—Geneva in the first instance. No sex disqualification for offices (art. vii.).

C. *Reduction of armaments.*—General aim — reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement of international obligations. Plans for reduction to be submitted by the Council to the Powers, and adhered to after acceptance. Private manufacture of munitions to be discouraged and in any case reported on (art. viii.).

D. A Watching Commission to report on diligence in the execution of provisions of artt. i.–viii. (art. ix.).

E. *Basis of action.* — Guarantee of existing rights against external force. 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League' (art. x.).[1] The Council to advise upon the means of fulfilling this obligation (art. xi.).

F. *Peaceful settlement of disputes.*—Disputes likely to lead to a rupture to be submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council (art. xii.).

(1) *Arbitration.*—(*a*) Suitable matters—interpretation of a treaty, alleged facts constituting breach of an international obligation, extent and nature of reparation for injury, (*b*) court to be specially agreed on, (*c*) undertaking to abide by award, (*d*) Council to propose steps for carrying out award (art. xiii.). Court of International Justice a permanent institution. Its functions—to arbitrate as requested, and to advise the Council (art. xiv.).

(2) *Inquiry.*—(*a*) Failing agreement to arbitrate, members agree to submit dangerous disputes to the Council for investigation. (*b*) One party may effect the submission to the Council. (*c*) The Council will endeavour to effect a settlement. (*d*) If the Council does not succeed, it will publish a report of its findings (whether unanimous or by a majority); if the award is unanimous, the members agree not to go to war with the power complying with the recommendations; if there is no unanimity, members are free to take such action as they deem necessary to maintain right and justice. No report shall be made on a matter which by international law falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a party (art. xv.).

G. *Sanctions.*—Penalties for a resort to war in breach of artt. xii., xiii., xv. (*a*) Economic boycott. (*b*) Employment of armed force contributed by the governments on the recommendation of the Council. (*c*) Material support, financial, economic, and military. (*d*) Expulsion by the covenant-keeping powers of a covenant-breaking member (art. xvi.).

H. *Disputes between Powers outside the League.* — Such Powers are invited to act as if subject to the obligations of members, and to be dealt with accordingly. If both parties refuse, the Council to make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities (art. xvii.).

I. *Open diplomacy.*—All future treaties and international agreements to be registered and published (art. xviii.).

J. *Advisory and precautionary function of Council.*—Advises members to reconsider inapplicable treaties and to consider threatening international conditions (art. xix.).

K. *Inconsistent obligations and understandings.*—Abrogation and release therefrom to be sought (art. xx.).

L. *Treaties* of arbitration and regional understandings directed to peace *unaffected* — especially Monroe Doctrine (art. xxi.).

M. *The mandate.*—(*a*) Application—to territories released by the war and to backward or immature races. (*b*) Mandatories—advanced nations who can best undertake the responsibility, and are willing to accept it. (*c*) Types of mandate—to give administrative advice and assistance (*e.g.*, to former portions of the Turkish empire); to administer territory, subject to consideration for order and morals, and the grant to other nations of equal opportunities of trade and commerce (*e.g.*, in S. Africa), to administer territory as an integral portion of an empire (S.W. Africa, Oceania). The mandatories to make an annual report to the Council (art. xxii.).

N. *Wider aims of the League.*—Improvement in the conditions of labour, just treatment of natives, control of slavery and the opium and liquor traffic, and of trade in arms, secure freedom of communication, the prevention and control of disease (art. xxiii.).

International Bureau and matters of kindred concern to be placed under the direction of the League (art. xxiv.).

[1] But cf. xi. and xix. on possible development.

[1] *Œuvres*, ed. 1839, iv. 256–288.

[2] *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (*Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1902, viii. 24).

[3] *Zum ewigen Frieden*, viii. 341; Eng. tr., *Perpetual Peace*, London, 1903.

[4] P. 349 ff.

[5] *Pour la Société des nations*, Paris, 1910.

[6] P. 10 ff.

[7] *The Covenant of the League of Nations with a Commentary thereon presented to Parliament*, June 1919.

Humanitarian agencies to be encouraged and promoted (art. xxv.).

O. *Amendments to the Covenant*—to take effect when ratified, a member dissenting having the remedy of withdrawing from the League (art. xxv.).

The Covenant of the League of Nations is founded on a skilful compromise between the dictates of ethico-political theory and considerations of political expediency. Of the two elements of the combination, the lower was necessary if it was to come into existence, and the development of the higher may safely be left to the future as its custodian and trustee.

The Covenant embodies provisions and regulations which involve a notable advance in the moralization of international relations. That the leading nations should form themselves into a confederation whose object is the preservation of the peace of the world on the basis of justice and right; that they should pledge themselves to refer their differences to arbitration, or at least take advice about them, and renounce the resort to arms until the resources of reason and conciliation have been exhausted; that they should agree in principle to the limitation of their armaments, and be willing to discuss with one another concrete proposals for a reduction; that they should consent to keep one another informed as to treaties and military preparations; and finally that they should arrange to call to account and punish any disturber of the peace—these provisions mark an enormous improvement upon the principles of foreign policy which have made and coloured tragic centuries of European history and which issued in the catastrophe of the World War. On the other hand, the Covenant, recognizing that a new system must gradually evolve out of the pre-existent order, adapts itself as far as possible to the conditions of the world in the first quarter of the 20th century. The states retain unchallenged possession of their sovereign rights. It is not suggested that they should resolve themselves into the constituent provinces of a world-republic.[1] Deference is shown to the natural sensibilities of sovereign states by making the functions of Council and Assembly advisory, except in cases where the action of a particular state involves a violation of the terms of the League, or involves a menace to the peace of the world. Again, it is arranged that the great Powers shall wield authority and influence in the affairs of the League in a degree that reflects their economic and military strength, since the Council consists in the main of the representatives of a group of first-class states, instead of being made to rest on the popular Assembly. The constitution in short is not democratic, but aristocratic or oligarchical. Further, possession of territory and rights as from the date of the European settlement is recognized as constituting a foundation of right which is on the whole defensible from the point of view of justice as well as of national aspirations; and an undertaking is given that possession will be defended by the League at least against the aggression of external powers. This undertaking is, however, qualified by the provision that developments threatening the peace of the world—which might well arise from internal disorder, or the uprising of a subject population against an existing fabric of empire—would be held to be a matter on which the League would properly make more or less forcible representations to the state immediately concerned. Finally, the foreign dominions embraced in empires are regarded as lawful possessions, and the title is even strengthened on the ethical side by the doctrine of the mandate which exhibits imperial rule under the ideal aspect of friendly protection, civilizing tutelage, and moral guardianship.

The tasks assigned to the League of Nations will be of no ordinary difficulty. It will have to play the part of an impartial arbiter among the nations, and the representatives of the various powers in Council and Assembly will be predisposed to work primarily for the interests of their respective countries. It will have to give decisions in accordance with justice, and it is not easy to define justice, and to work out its implications in a world occupied by peoples which differ so widely, not merely in numbers and power, but in their capacities, their deserts, and their ability to be of service to the rest of mankind. It will require sanctions—in the last resort it must be able to compel respect for its authority and to coerce covenant-breaking nations by force of arms, and, while nations will readily go to war in defence of patriotic interests, it will be less easy to procure popular support for mere police measures which are dictated by far-seeing and disinterested international policy. These difficulties, however, are not altogether novel; they have already been experienced in other spheres of political action and development, and, as the League of Nations is an institution which the world requires, there is good reason to hope that the intelligence, the public spirit, and the resolution of mankind will prove able to cope with the essential problems of the situation.

The League of Nations, founded to protect the peace of the world, will itself no doubt breed new occasions of strife. It represents the first stage of a political development; and the analogous history of other forms of political organization suggests the probability of manifold conflicts on questions of its constitution and its powers. It starts, as has been observed, with the concession of oligarchical privileges to a minority, and the commonalty of the nations—now represented, as it were, by an Assembly and tribunes—may be expected to agitate for a more democratic constitution which would give equal voting rights to each state, and arrange that the Council should grow out of and depend upon the collective will of the whole body. The League, again, will naturally develop an increasing sense of its own importance, and will be ambitious to claim for itself the larger powers which are felt to befit a central authority, while the particular states will be jealously on their guard against action which savours of encroachment upon their independence and sovereignty. It may be added that the law which forms the basis of the judgments of the League will also afford occasion for controversy, as the League starts with a somewhat meagre outfit of moral precepts in its doctrines of non-aggression and self-determination, and it will be found necessary to do further thinking in regard to the chief good of the human race and the equitable application of an accepted moral ideal to particular peoples and to concrete historical situations. But if experience leads us to anticipate such struggles, the analogies of political history, and not least of the history of Britain and of the United States, justify the hope that working solutions will be found which will be a practical satisfaction of what is legitimate in the conflicting claims of the whole and the parts. It may somewhat confidently be predicted that the constitution will become increasingly democratic, and also that the League, while treating as sacred the domestic autonomy of the peoples, will acquire a steadily-extending authority and influence over the relations of particular states to one another and to the whole.

The endeavour to end war is only the negative side of the task of the League of Nations. The

[1] On the different ideal of the Federal World State and reasons for thinking it Utopian see L. Oppenheim, *The League of Nations and its Problems*, London, 1919, p. 18 *f.*

positive side is to persuade the nations to do more to bear one another's burdens, and to enrich one another's lives by reciprocal service.

'Of the constructive work we have an augury in the earnest thought which has already been given to the conditions of labour in the covenanting countries, and to the principles which have been laid down for the amelioration of the common lot. It will, moreover, obviously be the duty of the League to encourage, by every means in its power, the chief form, and one of the most beneficent forms of national co-operation, viz. the freest and fullest interchange in honest commerce of the products of the fields and the workshops of every continent and clime. Imagination may even take a wider flight, and picture a time when nation will seek to serve nation by imparting what the other may lack out of the manifold riches of a higher civilization.'[1]

In its spiritual aspect this idea is not novel: it is an ancient possession of the Christian Church, underlying its enterprise of Foreign Missions, but little has been done to act on the idea in other fields. There is room for philanthropic schemes through which each civilized people as such will make an adequate contribution towards the provision of the rudiments of rational knowledge, and especially of modern medical skill, for the benefit of the savage and semi-civilized races of mankind. A great philanthropic opportunity was lost in the two years following the war, when the peoples of Great Britain and America might have agreed to ration themselves so that they might be in a position to release the necessaries of life and some comforts for the starving populations of Europe. The response to the call of the Russian famine is, however, of good omen for the future. One very practical service would be to arrange that all manufacturing nations got an adequate supply of raw materials. It may be added that the success of the League in developing the positive and constructive activities will be an important factor in determining the success of its efforts to avert armed conflicts. It is a law of human nature that an evil habit is best overcome through the expulsive power of a new affection, and, if the nations are to cease to have the desire to devour and plunder one another, it is imperative that, through reciprocal offices of service, they should learn to think of one another with kindly and grateful feelings, and respect one another as fellow-workers in the common cause of humanity.

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W. P. PATERSON.

WAR, WAR-GODS.

Celtic (G. DOTTIN), p. 691.
Chinese (R. F. JOHNSTON), p. 692.
Greek and Roman (E. A. GARDNER), p. 694.
Semitic (S. A. B. MERCER), p. 698.

WAR-GODS (Celtic).—At the time of the migrations of the Celts a war-god, whom the Greeks identified with Ares and the Romans with Mars, seems to have been the chief god worshipped by the Celtic tribes.[2] Gods guide their migration and bring the army to a stop on the territory destined for it;[3] to the gods they dedicate all or part of the booty in victory;[4] to them they sacrifice victims before the combat[5] and prisoners after victory;[6] in their honour they raise the war-cry.[7]

[1] W. P. Paterson, *Recent History and the Call to Brotherhood*, Edinburgh, 1919.
[2] Callim. iv. 173; Florus, ii. 4; Sil. Ital. iv. 200–202; Amm. Marc. xxvii. 4. 4.
[3] Justin, xxiv. 4. 3; Livy, v. 34.
[4] Florus, i. 20. 4. [5] Justin, xxvi. 2. 1.
[6] Diod. Sic. xxxi. 13; Paus. x. 22. 3.
[7] Livy, v. 38.

The war-god to whom the Celts dedicated Roman arms in 223 B.C. is called Vulcan by Florus;[1] the one to whom the Gauls sacrificed men is called Saturn by Varro.[2] The ancient Celts probably had a goddess of war; this goddess has been identified by the Greeks with Athene,[3] and by the Romans with Minerva.[4] It was in the temple of this goddess that the Insubres kept their ensigns of war.[5]

Cæsar gives us no more definite information; he mentions Mars third among the five chief gods of Gaul, and adds that Mars directs wars, and, after the issue is decided, the spoils are usually dedicated

[1] ii. 4.
[2] Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 19; cf. Dion. Hal. i. 38. 2.
[3] Polyb. ii. 32. 6. [4] Justin, xliii. 5. 5.
[5] Polyb. ii. 32. 6.

to him; when the Gauls have carried off the victory, they sacrifice all the living beings that they have taken and gather the booty to one place; in many of the tribes' heaps of war booty may be seen in the sacred places.[1] We must come to the Gallo-Roman inscriptions of Gaul, Great Britain, and Central Europe—with the Celtic epithets which there accompany the name of the god Mars—to get an idea of the variety of the war-deities of the Celts. Whereas 18 epithets of Mercury have been found, 15 of Apollo, 7 of Juppiter, and 3 of Minerva, we can count 50 of Mars; and these epithets of Mars are particularly numerous in Great Britain. Some of them have a local meaning, in which cases it is not certain that we have to do with a Celtic god; we may be in presence of local cults of the Roman god Mars. But of the 40 epithets that remain after the local epithets have been deducted 8 are used alone as well as along with the name of Mars—*e.g.*, Toutatis, which is probably a variant of the name Teutates,[2] which scholiasts of Lucan elsewhere identify with Mars, and the god Esus, also mentioned by Lucan. They are probably, therefore, the very names of the indigenous gods assimilated to Mars. As regards the others, it is probable that at least a number of them also indicate Gaulish deities. And it is impossible to ascertain whether some epithets of Minerva do not denote war-goddesses. Further, Mars Loucetius is associated in two inscriptions with Nemetona, who is undoubtedly a war-goddess, and Mars Cicolluis is associated with Litavis, whose bellicose character is undoubted, since in an inscription she is replaced by Bellona as the consort of Mars. Dio Cassius[3] mentions among the Britons of the time of Boudicca the worship of a goddess of victory, Andata or Andrasta, to whom human sacrifices are offered, and whose name presents a close resemblance to that of Andarta, a goddess of the Vocontii, on whose territory have been discovered the majority of the altars of Victory that belong to Southern Gaul.

The information that has come down to us from antiquity is so imperfect that we can merely state that the ancient Celts had numerous gods and goddesses of war, and it indicates several details of their worship. But we have no figured representations of war-deities among the numerous Gallo-Roman bas-reliefs, unless we regard as such the wheel-bearing horseman who tramples under his horse's feet the monster dragon. The characteristic symbols of the Gaulish gods—the wheel, the hammer, and the cup—can hardly be interpreted as warlike. As for the attempts to explain by means of Celtic languages the names and epithets of the Gaulish gods assimilated to Mars, they supply only vague characteristics—Albiorix, 'the king of the world,' Belatucadros, 'comely in slaughter,' Caturix, 'the king of combat,' Leucetius or Loucetius, 'the brilliant.' We have no reason to believe that the Mars of Gaul had, like the Mercurys, many famous temples in Gaul. Doubtless the Roman pacification allowed as few as possible of their cults to subsist. Nevertheless we find in an inscription of the Rhine valley mention of a temple of Mars Camulus.[4]

From the text of the Irish epic, which has preserved some details of ancient Celtic mythology, we may glean some notions of war-gods and goddesses, and etymology helps us to recover others. In Cormac's *Glossary* Nét is described as 'a battle-god of the heathen Gael.' The king of the Tuatha Dé Danann, Nuada, has been identified with the Deus M[ars] Nodons known from inscriptions from Great Britain. Neman, the name of Nét's wife, has been connected with Nemetona, the Gallo-Roman goddess, consort of Mars; and the name of Nét has been compared to the first part of the name Nantosuelta, associated in a Gallo-Roman inscription with the god Sucellus, 'the good striker.' In the mythological cycle and in the Cúchulainn cycle three fairy warriors appear—a kind of valkyries with the power of changing into animals—the first Morrígan, wife or granddaughter of Nét, or wife of Dagda, the second Macha, granddaughter of Nét, the third Badb, wife or granddaughter of Nét, all three daughters of Ernmas, one of the Tuatha Dé Danann. The name Badb, which in Irish means a scald-crow, and which has a variant Bodb, has been compared to the second part of the name of a Gallo-Roman goddess [C]athu-bodvæ, in Irish Badb-catha, 'battle-crow.'[1]

It is much more difficult to discover traces of the ancient Celtic gods in the tradition and literature of Wales than in the Irish literature of the Middle Ages. Nevertheless scholars are probably right in identifying Nudd, the father of Gwyn, in whom was 'the force of the demons of Annwfn,' with the god Nodons of Romanized Great Britain.

This, then, as far as the evidence of the ancients and the epics of the Celts of the British Isles enable us to reconstruct it, is the fragmentary pantheon of the war-gods of one of the most warlike races of ancient Europe.

LITERATURE.—W. M. Hennessy, 'The ancient Irish Goddess of War' in *RCel* i. [1870–72] 32–57; J. Rhys, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom* (*HL*), London, 1888; H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de littérature celtique*, 12 vols., Paris, 1883–1902; C. Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, *Hist. de la Gaule*, vols. i.–ii., Paris, 1908–09; G. Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*[2], do. 1915. G. DOTTIN.

WAR-GODS (Chinese).—China has no god of war, if by that term we imply a belief in the existence of a divine being similar in functions, characteristics, or divine attributes to Ares or Mars. This, however, is not inconsistent with the fact that war, in China as elsewhere, has usually kept itself in close touch with religion. We read in Tso's famous Commentary on the *Ch'un-Ch'iu* of Confucius that 'the great affairs of a State are sacrifice and war';[2] and the latter unaccompanied by the former was a thing unheard of. A Chinese writer has recently remarked that from the earliest historic times up to the date of the Boxers (and he need not have drawn the line there) his countrymen have never ceased to regard supernatural or spiritual agencies as constituting an essential portion of the national military equipment.[3]

It is not surprising, then, that among the most ancient ceremonial rites mentioned in Chinese classical literature are those which were carried out during warfare by rulers of states and leaders of armies with the direct object of invoking the aid of the unseen powers and impressing the troops with the belief that those powers would protect and help them in the hour of battle. The two most solemn ceremonies in ancient China connected with war were known as the *lei* and the *ma* sacrifices.

Very few details regarding them have come down to us, and we cannot always be sure that the records we possess are altogether worthy of trust. It is clear, however, that the *lei* was a sacrifice to God (T'ien or Shang-Ti) and that it was offered on many solemn state occasions. The ceremony could be performed only by the sovereign himself, because it was the 'Son of Heaven' alone who had the prerogative of offering

1 Cæsar, vi. 17; cf. Livy, v. 39. 1.
2 Lucan, i. 444. 3 lxii. 6 f.
4 *CIL* xii. 2571.

1 See art. CELTS, § VI. f.
2 J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, vol. v. pt. ii. p. 382 (Chinese text on p. 379).
3 Yi Pai-sha, in the Chinese monthly journal *Hsin Ch'ing-nien*, vol. v. no. 1, p. 17.

sacrifices to Heaven.[1] It was not exclusively associated with war, but it was always offered when an army was about to be set in motion and seems to have been regarded as pre-eminently a military sacrifice.[2]

The *ma* was offered on the field of battle or at the army's halting-places. There is great uncertainty with regard to this sacrifice; the most probable view is that it was offered to T'ien or Shang-Ti, but that certain minor divinities were also invoked or associated with that high deity—namely, the local tutelary powers who might be expected to object to the intrusion of armed forces into their private spheres of activity or who might feel outraged by the shedding of blood on soil that was under their special protection.

It is highly improbable that the early Chinese ever regarded warfare abstractly, as a quasi-institution, or that they ever felt the need of nominating a deity to preside over it as 'god of war.'

1. Kuan Yü or Kuan Ti, 'god of war.'—Although it is not correct to say that the Chinese pantheon contains a Mars, there are several famous warriors who, having shown themselves to be stout fighters and unselfish patriots during their earthly lives, have been deemed worthy of having their names and 'spirit-tablets' enshrined in a kind of national Valhalla or 'Temple of Military Heroes,' just as the names and tablets of great sages and philosophers and other public benefactors have been enshrined in the 'Hall of Worthies' or the 'Temple of Confucius.' It is the most celebrated of these national heroes who has been so often described as 'god of war' and as 'the Chinese Mars';[3] and, although neither term is strictly applicable, and the latter is certainly inadmissible, the former may be retained if only because it has passed into common usage among Western writers on China and because there is no very suitable term in our language by which it could be replaced. We should be careful to remember, however, that the Chinese have never lost sight of the fact that their god of war was once a man like themselves and lived at an epoch which Chinese annalists do not consider very remote. Even now his manhood is by no means altogether merged in his divinity; and, though he is regarded as a worker of miracles and has certainly been the object of much superstitious devotion, this seems hardly sufficient to justify us in regarding him as more than a very potent saint.

Though dead heroes have always been honoured in China, and the custom of 'canonizing' those who deserved well of their country either in peace or in war is a very ancient one,[4] it was not till China had fallen into a state of military decadence that a distinct cult of great soldiers began to take a conspicuous place in the religious life of the Chinese people. Kuan Yü had been dead about eight hundred years when the Sung emperors set him up as the central figure in a national cult that has lasted to this day.

Kuan Yü, a native of the village of Ch'ang-p'ing in Hsieh-chou (Shansi province), was born A.D. 162 and died in 219. He lived during the time of disunion and strife that is commonly known as the period of the Three Kingdoms, and he is regarded as the most romantic figure in one of the most romantic epochs of Chinese history. Of abnormal size and strength, he distinguished himself above all his contemporaries by his prowess and courage and by his chivalrous sense of honour. The influence of the drama, coupled with that of a great novel known as the *San Kuo*—both full of fantastic details which can have had little or no foundation in fact—have raised him to a pitch of popularity which is really independent of his position in the official roll of divinities or saints and would hardly be affected by the total withdrawal of official recognition. His surname is unknown; for Kuan was merely adopted by him in order to conceal his identity during his flight from his native place after he had entered upon his career of glory by slaying a tyrannical magistrate. Later he accidentally made the acquaintance of two other celebrated characters of the period—Liu Pei and Chang Fei. The three became devoted and lifelong friends and entered into a relationship of sworn-brotherhood by taking the famous 'oath of the peach-orchard.'[1] The leader of the three was Liu Pei, who was or declared himself to be a descendant of the founder of the Han dynasty and eventually carved his way to the throne of one of the Three Kingdoms—that of Shu—largely through the devotion and generalship of Kuan Yü. After a brilliant career which was not too uniformly successful to be monotonous, he was captured by the forces of Sun Ch'üan and executed.[2] Ten years or (according to another authority) forty-one years after his death he was given the posthumous title of *Chuang Mu Hou*, 'Marquis of Martial Dignity,' and various other titles were added throughout the centuries.

There is some doubt as to the exact date upon which Kuan Yü first acquired the high-sounding title of *Ti*—a term which is usually translated 'god,' but for which the word 'emperor' is, in this and many similar cases, a more fitting equivalent. The generally accepted date is 1594, when the emperor Wan-Li bestowed the title of *Hsieh-T'ien Hu-Kuo Chung-I Ta Ti*, 'In-harmony-with-Heaven Protector-of-the-State Loyal-and-Righteous Great Emperor.' For some reason not much notice seems to have been taken at first of this addition to Kuan Yü's honours, for he continued to be designated by his old title of 'Marquis.' This was brought to the notice of the emperor Hsi Tsung (T'ien-ch'i), who in 1624 issued an edict declaring that the commands of his late majesty Shên Tsung (Wan-Li) were to be carried out, and confirming the titles, including that of *Ti*, conferred upon Kuan Yü by that monarch. From that time to the present the 'god of war' has been generally known as Kuan Ti.

2. Yo Fei, hero of the Sung dynasty.—The figure of Kuan Ti looms far larger than life-size through a mist of romance created by the popular drama and by the great novel of *The Three Kingdoms*. Were it not for this fact, his place in the affections of the Chinese people might long ago have been disputed by another great national hero—Yo Fei. This high-souled patriot lived nearly a thousand years after Kuan Ti; there has been much less time, therefore, for the growth of legends. As a historical figure, however, it may be questioned whether Yo Fei should be regarded as in any way inferior to Kuan Ti either as soldier or as patriot.

Yo Fei was a native of the province of Honan. As a boy he was studious, but the natural bent of his mind soon showed itself in the fact that his favourite books were those which discussed warfare and military tactics, such as the *Ping Fa* of Sun Tzŭ, described by its recent English translator as 'the oldest military treatise in the world.'[3] As he grew up, Yo Fei became a noted archer, and soon distinguished himself in martial exploits against the Golden Tatars, who were at that time engaged in gradually driving the Sung dynasty from the plains of Northern China. Had Yo Fei been adequately supported by the Court and Government, it is possible that the invaders would have been expelled from China. Unfortunately he incurred the active hostility of the powerful Ch'in Kuei, the emperor Kao Tsung's trusted minister.[4] It was this minister who was mainly responsible for the cession of Northern China to the Tatars. At any rate he appears to have entered into a treasonable agreement with Wu Shu, a Tatar prince, to bring about a peace advantageous to the invaders. Yo Fei earnestly desired to continue the struggle, and stoutly opposed the purchase of peace by a disgraceful cession of territory. When compelled to retire and leave the enemy in possession of territory that he felt quite competent to defend, he made bitter complaints that the fruits of his ten years of strenuous labour had been destroyed in a single day. As a vigorous opponent of the peace policy, Yo Fei was regarded by Ch'in Kuei as a dangerous enemy. He caused charges of treachery to be trumped up against him and in 1141 succeeded in having him arrested. Shortly afterwards Ch'in Kuei personally issued a secret order for his summary execution, which was duly carried into effect; and it was falsely reported to the throne that Yo Fei had died a natural death in prison. As time went on, the true history of the events that led to Yo Fei's betrayal and death gradually came to be known among the people, and, though Ch'in Kuei lived fourteen years longer, loaded with honours and high in the good graces of his sovereign, he has earned an immortality of infamy in his country's annals. On the other hand, the name of the warrior whom he defamed and slew has gathered fame and honour with the passing of the centuries, and his temple, which is situated near the margin of the beautiful Western Lake, outside the walls of Hangchow, is

[1] Cf. the *Li Chi* (*SBE* xxvii. [1885] 116, 225; xxviii. [1885] 212).
[2] *SBE* xxvii. 218.
[3] *E.g.*, by H. C. Du Bose, *The Dragon, Image and Demon*, New York, 1886, p. 128; W. E. Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, London, 1913, p. 288; H. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine*, Shanghai, 1911–15 (*Variétés sinologiques*, no. 39), vi. 59.
[4] Cf. *SBE* xxviii. 207 f.

[1] See art. Vows (Chinese).
[2] For accounts of Kuan Yü see H. A. Giles, *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, London, 1898, nos. 1009 and 1803; and Doré, vi. 54 f.
[3] *Sun Tzŭ on the Art of War*, tr. L. Giles, London, 1910.
[4] H. A. Giles, *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, no. 392.

a place of pilgrimage for all Chinese who love their country and wish to show their reverence for the memory of a national hero.

The gradual elevation of Yo Fei to a place among China's patron-saints and divinities began in the reign of Hsiao Tsung (1163–1189), who succeeded the weak and vacillating Kao Tsung on the throne of the Sung empire. That ruler restored the honours and titles of which Yo Fei had been deprived after his impeachment. He also ordered a re-burial of his body, and gave a large sum of money to defray the cost of an official funeral. It was further decreed that a temple should be built and dedicated to the hero, and funds were provided for the performance of periodical sacrificial rites.

3. The cult of military heroes or 'war-gods' under the Republic.—As Kuan Ti was specially venerated by the late Manchu dynasty, it would not have been surprising if the victorious revolutionaries had decided to treat that divinity with cold disdain and to abolish the official rites connected with his cult. The establishment of a nominal Republic has not had this result; but Kuan Ti's position is not precisely what it was before 1911. In the third year of the Republic (1914) it was decreed by the President (Yüan Shih-k'ai) that the 'Military Temple' was to be devoted to the cult not of Kuan Ti alone but of Kuan Ti and Yo Fei and twenty-four other celebrated military leaders and patriots. Kuan Ti and Yo Fei were to share the highest honours equally, and the twenty-four others were to be regarded as their spiritual 'associates.' Nothing was done to interfere with the existing Kuan Ti temples or their rituals; but a new temple was dedicated to Kuan Ti and Yo Fei and their associates. The temple chosen for the purpose comprises a large group of buildings immediately to the north of the palace of Prince Ch'un, ex-prince regent and father of the young emperor Hsüan T'ung. It was erected by the imperial government about a quarter of a century ago and was intended for use as an ancestral temple for Prince Ch'un, but had never actually been used as such when the dynasty was deposed. When it was taken over by the Republican Government, it was speedily converted into what might be described as the 'mother-church' of the reorganized cult of military heroes. The main buildings of this temple are covered with beautiful coloured tiles and stand in spacious courtyards. The principal hall or chapel is called the *Wu Ch'êng Tien*, 'Hall of Military Perfection,' in contradistinction to the *Ta Ch'êng Tien*, or 'Hall of Great Perfection,' the principal sanctuary in the Temple of Confucius. The interior, with its magnificent timber pillars and its richly-decorated roof, is impressive in the stately simplicity of its arrangements. There are no images. The canonized heroes are represented by their 'spirit-tablets'[2] only—*i.e.* plain oblong pieces of wood, each bearing the name of the person whom it represents. In the place of honour at the north side of the hall, facing the entrance, stand two tablets side by side, somewhat larger than the others. These are the tablets of Kuan Ti and Yo Fei. It is to be noted that Kuan Ti's tablet does not bear all his titles or the highest of them. He is merely *Kuan Chuang Mu Hou*, 'Kuan the Marquis of Martial Dignity,' the earliest of his posthumous titles. The designation on Yo Fei's tablet also consists of four characters—*Yo Chung Wu Wang*, 'Yo the Prince of Loyalty and Martial Prowess.' On the east and west sides of the hall stand the tablets of the twenty-four 'associates,' twelve on each side, all well-known historical characters.

The reorganization of the cult of heroes was based on sound considerations of practical statecraft and national expediency. The main objects were to encourage patriotic ideals among the people, to raise the public estimation of the profession of arms, and to inspire the soldiers themselves with military zeal and professional pride. On the occasions of the periodical ceremonies appointed to be carried out in honour of the twenty-six heroes army commanders are enjoined to bring their troops to the local 'Military Temple,' so that they may be spectators of the rites and have an opportunity of showing their reverence for the memory of the great soldiers of past days. The troops are also expected to take oaths of allegiance and good conduct. The first ceremony at Peking took place in January 1915. General Yin Ch'ang, as deputy for Yüan Shih-k'ai, led his officers and soldiers to the newly-established temple, and there they took the military oaths, which may be summarized as follows: (1) to be loyal; (2) to be obedient; (3) to protect the people of China from enemies; (4) to be ready to die for their country; (5) to be diligent and zealous in their duties, to respect their superiors and comrades, and to be true and upright in speech and action; (6) to abstain from taking part in political movements and from joining political societies or parties.

The ceremony is as simple as it is impressive, and, though Christian missionaries have asserted that it fosters superstition and 'shows in a painful manner the backward strides that are being taken by the Government,'[1] such complaints show a curious lack of sympathy and understanding. The religious significance of the cult is, indeed, very slight. The soldiers are not called upon to subscribe to any dogmas or beliefs regarding the powers or functions supposed to belong to the objects of the cult, nor do they prostrate themselves before any idol. They are merely expected to bow the head as they file past a row of wooden tablets bearing the honoured names of those who fought and in many cases died for their country.[2] Surely no more fitting place could be chosen for administering the military oaths of loyalty, obedience, and self-sacrifice than a building which has been dedicated to the memory of the heroes who are believed to have been the highest Chinese embodiments of those ideals.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. A large proportion of the material has, however, been taken from untranslated Chinese sources. R. F. JOHNSTON.

WAR, WAR-GODS (Greek and Roman).—**1. Greek.**—The importance of war in early communities must always have been such as to bring it into close relation with the worship of the gods. In fact we usually find that it is one of the chief functions of any god to help and protect his people in war; and that they regard it as a matter of the highest importance to secure his approval for any such enterprise. In civilized warfare the conventions and rules generally observed, such as the sanctity of heralds and other envoys, or the inviolability of a truce, were also under the protection of the gods. But the ritual of declaration and conclusion of war was not so highly developed among the Greeks as among the Romans.

A curious instance is recorded by the scholiast on Eur. *Phœn.* 1377, who states that before trumpets were invented torches were used as a signal at the beginning of a battle; these were borne by two priests of Ares, one from each army, who were alone inviolable.

Here we seem to see some approach to an international sanction under divine authority; another custom is the truce always allowed by the victors

[1] This sentence occurs in an account of the ceremony as held in a provincial city. See *North China Daily News* (Shanghai), 7th Oct. 1915.

[2] A short account of the proceedings at Peking appeared in the *North China Daily News*, 26th Jan. 1915. Similar ceremonies have been regularly carried out ever since, both in Peking and in the Provinces. The spring ceremony in 1920 took place on 31st March, and in Peking the President (Hsü Shih-ch'ang) was represented by the general who had attended the proceedings on behalf of Yüan Shih-k'ai.

to the defeated army for collecting and burying the dead.

A typical example of a truce between combatant armies occurs in the *Iliad*, where a solemn sacrifice is made, and over it a curse is invoked from the gods on whoever may break the oath; but the gods are those who preside over the oath rather than over war.

In these cases both parties alike appeal to the same gods; in them we see merely a particular application of the principle that the gods, and Zeus as the chief god, enforce honour and mutual faith in all relations between strangers.

Examples like these are not, however, concerned with gods of war as such. The function of a war-god was above all to give victory to his own people, and to preside over such preparations as were likely to lead to it. These functions are sometimes attributed to a special deity, but more often to the chief god, or to the god who takes any town or people under his particular protection. Conversely, it might be an effective measure to withdraw from the enemy the protection of their own special divinity.

A good example is the secret expedition made by Odysseus and Diomed to carry off the Palladium, or sacred image of the war-goddess of Troy, because its presence prevented the capture of the town. A clear and instructive example of the gods to whom victory is ascribed occurs in an inscription found at Delphi, in which the Selinuntians say 'they are victors by the aid of the following gods—Zeus and Phobos (Fear) and Herakles and Apollo and Poseidon and the Tyndarids (Dioscuri) and Athene and Malophoros (Demeter) and Pasikrateia (Persephone) and the other gods—but above all of Zeus.'[1]

Here are to be noted the reiterated insistence on the predominance of Zeus in this capacity, and the placing next to him on the list of Phobos—here probably to be regarded, like other epithets of gods in the list, as a name for Ares himself rather than as a satellite of his. Some of the other divinities in the list are elsewhere regarded as especially givers of victory to their devotees; but the whole is probably to be regarded rather as an enumeration of the chief deities of the State cultus.

In the Homeric poems we constantly find the gods not only as givers of victory and as strong partisans of one side or the other, but also as actually mingling in the fray among mortal combatants. This, however, though it applies to all the other gods, is not true of Zeus, who decides the issue by his will and imposes it by his emissaries. So in all great national crises or deliverances due to a successful war the victory is ascribed to Zeus, especially under his title of Eleutherios ('the Liberator'). Thus at Platæa, in commemoration of the decisive victory over the Persians, games called Eleutheria were celebrated at the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, and a race between men in armour was the chief event. An emblem of this power of Zeus is the ægis (*q.v.*), which he lends to Apollo[2] to turn the battle against the Greeks, and which is constantly worn by Athene. It has the power of causing terror and flight among those against whom it is shaken, and is used only by these three deities. All three have a specifically warlike side. Apollo was honoured in the festival of the Boedromia at Athens and of the Karneia at Sparta, both of a warlike character; he was especially the leader and giver of victory to the Dorians. After the Persian wars all the Greeks who had participated in the struggle set up a common thank-offering to him at Delphi. The same victory was attributed by the Athenians to their patron goddess, and commemorated in offerings or statues on the Acropolis; and the Platæans who shared in the battle of Marathon set up, from their share of the spoils, a temple and statue at Platæa to Athene Areia as goddess of war. Another epithet of Athene which was probably of a warlike character was Nike, goddess of victory. Athene Nike had an altar and shrine on the bastion south of the entrance to the Akropolis and guarding its approach; on this bastion was erected, in the time of Perikles, the little temple which commemorated in its reliefs the victories of the Greeks over the Persians. The goddess is sometimes called 'Wingless Victory' by a misconception; as a form of Athene she was distinct from the winged figure of Victory so common in Greek art of all periods. This latter Nike is a mere impersonation of victory, whether in the games or in war. She has no separate cultus before the time of Alexander, and no place in mythology. She is placed on the hand of Zeus or of Athene in their great statues, and so is regarded as their satellite. Winged victories are often to be seen crowning victors—but usually athletic, not martial ones—making sacrifices, and decking trophies. Famous statues of Nike are set up to commemorate victories in war—the best known are that by Pæonius dedicated to Zeus by the Messenians at Olympia, and that from Samothrace, now in the Louvre, placed on a ship to record a naval victory of Demetrios Poliorketes. It has been rightly observed that she is in each case represented as the messenger rather than the giver of victory. Trophies, set up on the field of battle, were regarded as dedications—presumably to the god to whom the victory was ascribed. They were protected thus by a religious sanction, for they appear usually to have been respected even when set up in enemy territory.

The deities so far mentioned preside over war only as one side of their activities, and as a necessary part of their protection and help to their chosen people. In **Ares**, on the other hand, we recognize a specialized god of war. It has indeed been suggested that his functions were once of a wider character, perhaps among the Thracians or some other foreign people; but there is little trace of any such character in Greek mythology or ritual.[1] Some confusion has arisen in this matter from the misleading identification of Ares with the Roman Mars. Ares fares but poorly at the hands of the poets from Homer down. In the *Iliad* he is wounded by a mortal and overthrown by Athene; Sophocles actually calls him 'the god unhonoured among gods,'[2] and the aid of other deities is implored against him; and this not as the war-god of an adversary, but as representing the horror and evils of war and pestilence. He is thus essentially the destructive god, delighting in slaughter; yet his worship, so far as we can judge, does not appear to have any connexion with the ritual and belief associated with terrible 'chthonic' powers or the possible spiritual influence which could arise from such belief. On the other hand, the name of Ares often occurs in conventional expressions and epithets applied to warriors implying military prowess; but in such cases it seems to be used as an impersonation of war rather than with any mythological reference. So too in expressions like 'Ares destroyed him' in an epitaph or, in a hymn to Apollo, 'He stayed the Ares of the Gauls,' it even seems as if the name of Ares was used by preference for the power of the enemy. One of the earliest and best attested shrines of Ares in Greece, that on the Areopagus at Athens, was said to have been founded by the Amazons, terrible women warriors of foreign origin who were defeated by Theseus. Whatever the origin of Ares, he seems in all these cases to represent the brutal and barbarous or 'barbarian' side of war, which is overcome by the Greeks with the help of their gods of civilized warfare. Such an impression is confirmed by the legend that tells how Herakles,

[1] C. Michel, *Recueil d'inscript. grecques*, Brussels, 1900, no. 1240.

[2] *Il.* xv. 229.

[1] *Cf.* art. THRACE.

[2] *Œd. Tyr.* 215.

the typical Greek hero, by the aid of Athene, slew Kyknos, the son of Ares, in spite of Ares' attempt to support him. Ares indeed takes his place among the gods in their usual assemblies, and in such common exploits as the battle against the Giants; but even here he does not perform a leading rôle.

Ares is associated with a goddess Enyo (cf. his epithet or by-name Enyalios), who, however, has little mythological personality. His association with Aphrodite (which was given a scandalous turn by the poets from Homer down) is probably due to his having in some places a warrior-goddess as consort, who was identified, *e.g.*, with the armed Aphrodite worshipped at Corinth—very probably a survival from primitive worship. Phobos, or 'Fear,' is either his satellite or another name for himself, rather in the sense of Terror, but is a mere impersonation, though sometimes represented on shields and similar objects—possibly originally with the magic intention of inspiring terror in the enemy. There are also dæmons of battle or strife who delight in slaughter, Eris (Strife) and the like; and Keres, dæmons of death, who drag away the corpses of warriors; but these belong to poetical imagination, at least in their artistic form. A curious myth about Ares is that he was bound in a pot for twelve months by the Aloadæ.[1] Similar stories of the binding and hiding of a malevolent spirit are known to folk-lore; a similar notion is found in the binding of Satan for a thousand years (Rev 20[2]).

To sum up, the gods who presided over war in Greece fall into two classes: those who gave 'the civilized art of war' and 'the tempered civic courage exalted by Aristotle and other Greek moralists,' and Ares, who inspired 'the brute battle-rage,' with which 'the Greeks had little sympathy.'[2] With the advance of ethical feeling in religion, the latter became the representative of the spirit of destruction and of barbarian rather than Hellenic warfare, though his cult still survived in many cities.

2. Roman.—In the religious usages of war, and in the beliefs as to war-gods and the practice of their ritual, Rome differs from Greece in two respects: (1) Mars, the specialized war-god, was also in many ways the chief national god, and so differs widely from Ares, with whom the Romans identified him; and (2) the ritual and observances of war were far more elaborate and more definitely prescribed, and were to a great extent under the charge of special priestly officials.

In addition to Mars, Janus, Jupiter, and Quirinus are concerned with war, though not as their special function. Janus, as the spirit of doorways, is usually first among gods to be invoked, in connexion with every going out and coming in. His temple in Rome appears to have consisted of two doorways, with a kind of court between them. Here an image of Janus, with a head facing each way, was set up as guardian of the threshold. But this statue probably belongs to a later stratum of belief and ritual; originally the doors themselves were the symbol or even the habitation of the god. This temple was open in time of war and closed in time of peace—a custom which has puzzled mythological speculators alike in ancient and in modern times. Virgil[3] seems to regard war as being shut up within the doors and released when they are opened; Horace[4] speaks of the bars that shut in Janus, the guardian of peace. Virgil at least records the custom, common to other Latin towns as well as Rome, that the king or the consul should formally open the doors as a declaration of war. An explanation that has appeared probable to modern mythologists, as to Ovid,[1] is that the door was left open during an expedition so that there might be no obstacle to the return of those who had gone forth. The gates are said to have been closed during the reign of Augustus for the first time but one since the reign of Numa.

The worship of Jupiter was also in many ways associated with war. The most conspicuous example is in the case of the *spolia opima*, which consisted of the spoils of an enemy leader slain in single combat by the leader of a Roman army. These are said to have been first dedicated by Romulus in a temple to Jupiter Feretrius which he established for the purpose. In this temple was kept the sacred stone, Jupiter Lapis, which was taken with them by the *fetiales* when they went out to ratify a treaty, and by which they swore on other solemn occasions. The god was probably in primitive times thought of as immanent in this stone and in the oak-tree on which Romulus hung the spoils. The rites of war connected with this primitive temple were later eclipsed by those of the great temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This temple is especially associated with the celebration of the triumph which was the highest honour that could be given to a victorious general. The most remarkable feature of the triumph was that the general was actually invested with the insignia of the god, borrowed from the temple for the purpose, and had his face painted with vermilion, in imitation of the image of the god. He proceeded from the Campus Martius through the Forum to the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and there deposited the laurels from his *fasces* and the laurel branch which he carried on the knees of the god, thus assigning to him the glory.

The worship of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount belonged to the Latins generally rather than to Rome in particular; but it was adopted into the Roman State cultus. The celebration of the Feriæ Latinæ in his honour was the first duty of the consuls on their assuming office; and military disasters were attributed to its omission. A triumph was celebrated on certain occasions on the Alban Mount in honour of Jupiter Latiaris, especially by generals who had not obtained the Senate's sanction for a triumph in Rome. Other epithets of Jupiter which are obviously of a military character are Victor and Stator. There appear to have been three temples of Jupiter Victor in Rome, dedicated on various occasions; that of Jupiter Stator on the Palatine, on the spot where the flight of the Romans before the Sabines was stayed, was attributed to Romulus; it was renewed in consequence of a vow in battle against the Samnites. Jupiter was also worshipped in various forms as protector and giver of victory to the emperors on their military expeditions; and in the later imperial age the *imperator* is often portrayed with the attributes of Jupiter—an extension of the practice followed earlier in the case of a triumphing general.

The most important priestly college connected with the military side of the worship of Jupiter was that of the *fetiales*, who were concerned with questions of international faith and the sanctity of solemn pledges made in the name of the god. Their special functions were the demands for reparation in cases of international offences, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace and of treaties. They had the inviolable character of sacred envoys, and carried with them on their expeditions the sacred stone and the sceptre from the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, and the sacred vervain gathered on the Arx (*sagmina*). Their spokesman was the *pater patratus*. In demands for reparation (*clarigatio*) three intervals of ten days were allowed. If by the thirty-third day satisfaction was not given, war was declared. This was done by the *pater patratus* hurling a spear over the enemy's frontier. When this in later times became impracticable owing to the distance of some military expeditions, a parcel of land near the temple of Bellona in Rome was ficti-

[1] *Il.* v. 385 ff.
[2] *Æn.* vii. 607 ff.; cf. i. 294.
[2] *CGS* v. 407.
[4] *Ep.* II. i. 255

[1] *Fasti*, i. 279 f.

tiously converted into enemy soil, its boundary being marked by the *columna bellica*; and the spear was cast into this instead. A war declared by these formalities was called a *iustum piumque bellum*, not in any moral sense, but simply in that all the ritual had been correctly followed out so as to secure divine sanction. At the conclusion of a treaty or truce at the end of a war the consul could only make a *sponsio*, or agreement, which did not become binding upon the people until it was ratified by the *fetiales* with a special form of sacrifice. In all these observances Jupiter is appealed to rather as the guardian of international faith and honour than specifically as a war-god; but they are closely associated with war as supplying the religious sanction without which success could not be expected. The *fetiales* naturally acquired some knowledge of international law, and were sometimes appealed to on a question of procedure.

It has been much disputed among mythologists whether **Mars** should be regarded as specifically a war-god; the opinion appears now to prevail that, although this side of his functions was prominent in early times and predominant in later, it was not the most primitive or the most important. Mars appears to have been a god of the land, not only in Rome, but also in many other Italian states. It is noteworthy that he had no temple within the *pomœrium* at Rome. This is explained by some authorities as indicating a notion that his presence was undesirable or a desire that civil strife should not exist within the city; but it is more probably connected by others with the notion that he was god, not of the town, but of the country both cultivated and wild, especially the latter. For this reason he was able to protect his worshippers when they ventured out on warlike expeditions. Similarly the spring and autumn ceremonies in his honour, such as the dances of the Salii with the sacred shields (*ancilia*), are by some associated with the beginning and end of the campaigning season, and so with the activity of the war-god. But it has been pointed out that similar dances occur among many peoples in connexion with the cult of the powers of vegetation or the processes of agriculture at the most critical seasons of the year, and were intended to arouse the sleeping forces of such powers, or to avert or exorcize malignant influences. This may well have been the original meaning of these dances in honour of Mars, though they doubtless acquired a warlike meaning in quite early times. Though Mars had no temple within the city of Rome, sacred objects connected with his worship were preserved in some of the most ancient shrines in the city. The spears of Mars (*hastæ Martis*) were kept in the *sacrarium* in the Regia, at the foot of the Palatine, and were shaken by a consul before entering on a campaign with the words: 'Mars, vigila'; these were evidently regarded as the symbol of the god, who was in early times probably thought to be immanent in them; their spontaneous shaking was regarded as a portent. In the Hall of the Salii on the Palatine were kept the sacred shields. These were of a very ancient pattern similar to those used in the Mycenæan age in Greece. One of them was believed to have fallen from heaven in the time of Numa; and the safety of the city was thought to be dependent on its preservation, as in the case of the Palladium at Troy. Numa had eleven other shields made to match it; and these were annually carried round various altars in the city by the Salii in the month of March; they were ceremonially purified and put away by the Salii in October. The Salii on their way executed a kind of war-dance and beat the shields with sticks. Another ceremony in honour of Mars which was given in later times a warlike significance was that of the October horse; the winning horse in a race was sacrificed, and his head fixed up on the Regia, though here too later investigators see a rite originally agricultural in intention. The sacrifice took place at the altar of Mars in the Campus Martius.

The identification or contamination of Mars with the Greek Ares, and the universal tendency of poetical mythology, led to Mars being more and more regarded as the god of war, the protector of Roman armies and of soldiers in general; and he has come to be thought of only in this aspect in mediæval and modern times. His association with the first month of the year in the old Roman calendar is probably due to agricultural rather than to military influences. A remarkable custom in connexion with Mars was the *ver sacrum*, which was decreed to him in times of pestilence or disaster. In accordance with this all animals and human beings born within the succeeding spring were to be sacrificed or devoted to the service of the god. In the case of human beings this devotion took the form of being sent forth beyond the boundaries of the State. Hence arose colonies of a military character, with Mars as their leader and founder. The foundation of many Italian cities was attributed to Mars; but legends like that of Romulus, who was said to have been borne to the god by Rhea Silvia, show an anthropomorphism alien to primitive Italian religion, and are probably of Greek origin.

Another Roman or rather Italian war-god is **Quirinus**, who was later identified with Romulus. He seems to belong to the Sabine settlement on the Quirinal Hill, though he came to be adopted as one of the chief divinities of Rome, and even to represent the peaceful or citizen side of the god, as Mars Gradivus represents the warlike side; but he is expressly identified with Enyalios or Ares. It is significant that the three classes of *spolia opima* were offered, the first to Jupiter Feretrius, the second to Mars, and the third to Quirinus.

Other minor divinities connected with war have little mythological significance. **Bellona** had a temple in the Campus Martius, which was dedicated after a vow made in battle in 296 B.C.; close to it was the *columna bellica* mentioned in connexion with the *fetiales*. She seems, however, to have been little more than a personification, and her cult is of no great importance. She was later identified with an Asiatic warrior-goddess, or with the old Sabine Nerio. Nerio is by some writers regarded as the consort of Mars, but Nerio Martis is more probably to be explained as the strength or courage of Mars—an aspect, so to speak, of the god's manifestation. In later times Victoria, Virtus, and other impersonations were frequent, especially in art.

It is obvious that, in important undertakings such as military expeditions, sacrifice and divination would play a prominent part, especially among a people who, like the Romans, showed extreme anxiety to keep in right relations with divine powers. These, however, need not be more than mentioned here, since they are fully treated under their proper headings. A remarkable instance of *devotio* is that in which, at a critical moment of the battle, a general 'devotes' himself and the enemy's forces.

A well-known example is the case of P. Decius Mus in 340 B.C. Here the devotion was said to be due to a dream; but the rites and formula provided by the *pontifex maximus* seem to show that the act had official precedents. The case of Codrus at Athens is similar. Decius Mus was instructed to address in his *devotio* 'Janus, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, the Lares, the gods Novensiles and Indigetes, the gods of his own people and the enemy, and the Manes.'

The formula is instructive, as giving in accepted order the divinities to whom the result of war is ascribed; it confirms what we learn from other sources as to the order assigned to war-gods in Roman religion. It is noteworthy also that the national gods both of Rome and of the enemy are invoked. The custom of *evocatio* is thus recalled, by which, as after the capture of Veii and of Carthage, the national gods of the enemy were

invited to desert his city and transfer themselves to Rome.

In all these matters, as in all other Roman religion, we find an elaborate and highly developed ritual, with every possible safeguard against unintentional oversights. The personal character of the gods concerned comes to be realized only gradually and in later times under Greek influence, but is so strongly developed in later literature that it is by no means easy to recover the primitive meaning of the various rites and of the divine powers who were invoked.

The ensigns (*signa*) of Roman troops and the eagles (*aquilæ*) of the legions 'were objects of religious worship to the Roman soldier.'

'The "birthday of the eagle" was celebrated as that of the legion; the "genius of the signa" is mentioned in inscriptions. We read in Livy of an oath "by the signa and the eagles," and in Tacitus of a commander who saved himself from the fury of a mutinous legion by "embracing the signa and the eagle and putting himself under the protection of their sanctity."'[1]

In camp they were placed in a kind of small chapel. At Rome they were kept in the *ærarium*; hence it would seem that their sanctity was due rather to military feeling than to any official recognition or early sanction.

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E. A. GARDNER.

WAR, WAR-GODS (Semitic).—The earliest extant Semitic inscriptions, whether on stone, baked clay, papyrus, or parchment, whether Babylonian, Egyptian, or Hebrew, tell of wars between tribes and nations. From the time of Mesilim, before 3000 B.C., through that of Eannatum, the military genius of Lagash, of Lugal-zaggisi of Erech, the conqueror of the whole of Mesopotamia, of Sargon I., of Gudea, or of Hammurabi, to that of Ašurbanipal or of Nabonidus, wars and rumours of wars never ceased; from the time of the earliest Egyptian inscriptions to that of the latest the kings and rulers of Egypt are pictured smiting their foes; and from the time of the Exodus to the final fall of Jerusalem the Hebrews as a nation were warriors, and long before they became a nation—if tradition be trusted—they were subject to the same condition. The Babylonians, Assyrians, and Hebrews were warlike peoples, especially the Assyrians. But, although Egypt had her great military pharaohs at all periods of her history, such as Sesostris III., Thutmose III., Amenhotep II., Seti I., and Rameses II., she was not a great military nation.

I. *BABYLONIAN.*—1. **War.**—The quarrels and feuds between rulers of early Babylonian city-states were the beginnings of strife which later developed into the elaborate warfare of the Assyrians. The king or head of the city, originally the patriarch of the clan, was the centre of all public life. As priest he was the *šangu*, as representative of the god he was the *patesi*, and as war lord he was the *šarru*. Wars were begun by him and were carried on under his direction. But all wars were really the affair of the gods.[2]

Warlike operations were usually of a military nature. But as early as the time of Samsu-iluna wars were carried on at the head of the Persian Gulf partly on land and partly by the use of boats. The Assyrians, indeed, although not seamen themselves, built a navy with the aid of Phœnician boat-builders, and Sennacherib employed Phœnician sailors in the pursuit of Merodach-baladan across the Persian Gulf. But the Neo-Babylonians not only had developed a great merchant fleet, but also had become a considerable naval power.

From the earliest times in Babylonia the support of warfare was considered a public obligation, and those who were unfit for actual fighting were expected to furnish money to pay for a fighting unit. The army was recruited by conscription, each district being responsible for its quota. This militia, called the *ṣābē* or *ummanâte*, were subject to immediate call by the king. The levy (*dikutu*) was under the direction of a special officer, called the *nâgiru*, who saw to it that no liable person escaped, and, if a man so far forgot himself as to harbour a defaulter from the levy, he was put to death.[1] All estates had to furnish troops at the command of the king, who could even impress the produce of the land and could also commandeer labourers for civilian purposes. By the time of the Ist Babylonian dynasty there is evidence of a regular standing army of professional soldiers, recruited partly from natives, but mostly from Amorites and from the inhabitants of other conquered territories. The body-guard of the king consisted of most trustworthy native soldiers. In the absence of the king the troops were led by the *tartannu*, or commander-in-chief, who often conducted the military campaigns. The armies of the Assyrians were well officered. These officers formed a semi-caste of a military character, were paid with land, a house, and a garden, were assigned sheep and cattle, and received in addition a regular salary. But they were always at the service of the king, conducting especially the works of mobilization. In case of capture every effort was made to procure their ransom. Soldiers were well paid, were rewarded with land and a cow, and good discipline was observed among them. They were divided into cavalry and foot-soldiers, and a careful register of them was kept. The whole army was divided into companies of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and sometimes tens. In Assyria the army was still more highly developed until the time of Ašurnaṣirpal, who had created a fighting machine such as the ancient world had never seen before. The military unit in Assyrian times was the bowman, who was accompanied by his pikeman and shield-bearer. According as Assyria became more and more a conqueror of foreign peoples, she condemned forced labour at home, as in the case of Sargon II., exempted certain cities from the obligation of the levy, as in the case of Ašurbanipal, and depended upon her vast numbers of mercenaries, hired from conquered countries. The Neo-Babylonian army was modelled on that of Assyria, making extensive use of hired troops.

The Stela of Vultures, which depicts the successful war of Eannatum of Lagash, in the name of his god Ningirsu, against Umma, gives an excellent idea of some of the materials of war in that early period. In one battle, in which 6600 (or perhaps 3600) men were slain, the troops were drawn up in a solid phalanx with long spears, protected by huge shields. The lance-bearers carried an axe, and were protected by shields which were borne by the soldiers in the front rank. Each shield protected two soldiers. The shields were probably of leather with bosses of metal, as were also the conical helmets, which extended down the neck, and were furnished with ear-pieces. A chariot is represented on the stela, but it was undoubtedly drawn by asses, for the use of the horse was not known till the Kassite period. Military standards were common in early Babylonian times. The royal weapons consisted of a long lance or spear, wielded in the left hand, and a curved mace or throwing-stick. Naram-Sin is represented armed with battle-axe, bow, and helmet. In his chariot the king carried a flat-headed axe and a number of light darts, some fitted with double points. It was Dungi of Ur who adopted the bow as a national weapon.

[1] H. Stuart Jones, *Companion to Roman History*, p. 215.
[2] See below, 2.

[1] *Code of Hammurabi* (hereafter cited as *CH*), ed. R. F Harper, Chicago, 1894, § 16.

After the introduction of the horse by the Kassites[1] cavalry took the place of chariots. Chariots were still used, but only on comparatively level terrain, and even then they were more ornamental than useful. The cavalry at first used only the bow and arrow, but later the spear was used and the horseman was furnished with a complete coat-of-mail. In Assyrian times infantry was divided into light- and heavy-armed troops. The light-armed troops wore little clothing—usually only a kilt and a fillet round the head—and were armed with spears. The heavy-armed wore sandals, a coat-of-mail over the tunic, a long fringed robe (over which was a cuirass), and a peaked helmet; they carried a short sword, and were furnished with a long rectangular shield of wicker-work covered with leather. Infantry were usually divided into archers and spearmen. Sennacherib abolished the long robe of the heavy-armed infantry and substituted leather greaves and boots. He also established a corps of slingers clad in helmet and breastplate, leather drawers, and short boots; and also a company of engineers or pioneers, furnished with double-headed axes, conical helmets, greaves, and boots. The Assyrians fought with metal weapons. Their spear-heads and arrows were usually of bronze, more rarely of iron; their coat-of-mail consisted of bronze scales sewn to a leather shirt; and many shields were of metal, though others were of wicker-work covered with metal. The army was supplied with abundant wagons for transportation of baggage, food, furniture, tents, ladders, and battering-rams; and much skill was expended upon the building of canals and fortifications.

Wars were waged very often for the sake of booty and spoils, and the usual demand made by the victor of the vanquished was payment of tribute. The favourite method of attack was by surprise, but, when that was impossible, a frontal assault was made. Many inducements were offered the foe to surrender, none being more common than the proclamation of the prowess of the reigning king; but very often a third party intervened to bring about peace and conclude a treaty, as in the case of Mesilim of Kish, who was instrumental in settling a dispute between the kings of Umma and Lagash. Peace was declared and a treaty made.

2. War-gods.—The early Babylonians, like other primitive folk, peopled their world with gods. Every mysterious phenomenon—sun, moon, vegetation, storms, water, and all the forces with which men were brought into frequent contact—was the abode of gods or demons, and usually the latter were shunned and the former propitiated. Around the abode of the gods men gathered and formed a settlement, which was often called after the god, just as Shuruppak was named from the god Shuruppak. Such a deity was always a war-god, for his people depended upon him for defence. War was not incompatible with the character of a god, for did not Ea and Apsu, Enlil and Tiamat, Marduk and Tiamat, engage in deadly warfare? So, when one city made war upon another, it was because their gods were at feud, and because their gods had ordered the strife.

The war between Umma and Lagash, as told on the Stela of the Vultures, was waged by the command of the god of Umma upon the territory of Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and Ningirsu, backed up by Enlil, joined battle. It was Zamama, god of Kish, who achieved victory over the land of Khamazi, just as it was Aśur, the great Assyrian war-god, who won military fame for Assyria.

And, when peace was declared and treaties were made, it was the gods who did it, for Mesilim records the treaty of peace which the gods of Umma and Lagash themselves had drawn up. The city-gods were thus the real kings and rulers, and so the very title *patesi*, borne by early rulers of Babylonian states, designated them as representatives of their state-god, for it was a religious title. This explains how it happened that certain Babylonian kings, desiring to enhance their own power, assumed the title of *ilu*, 'god'; and, when a *patesi* felt himself powerful enough to risk the displeasure of his own god, he would appeal to the god of a city other than his own, when the petition was for something which the foreign god alone could procure.[2]

[1] The earliest mention of a horse in Babylonia is found on a tablet of the Ist Babylonian dynasty (*OLZ* x. [1907] 638 f.).

[2] *E.g.*, Ur-Nina appealed to Enki (Ea) for a favourable oracle, when planning to build the temple of E-ninnu.

Whenever, as often happened, two or more settlements amalgamated into one city or state, the various gods sometimes amalgamated, transferring the attributes of all the gods to the strongest god, with whom all the others were identified. But sometimes the various gods remained independent, the most warlike retaining the title of war-god. Hence, while every city- or state-god was originally a war-god, yet when, by amalgamation, a state acquired a pantheon, only one of the members of that pantheon, as a rule, retained the title of war-god. Then all wars were carried on in the name of that particular god. And so it was that, while the Babylonians of the period of Ḥammurabi recognized many gods, Marduk was the war-god[1] *par excellence*, although Nabu was also recognized as a war-god. The following are the Babylonian and Assyrian deities who retained more or less of their warlike characteristics.

Enlil, son of Anu and chief god of Nippur, whose temple was the mighty E-kur, was primarily a storm-god, and he had his origin and home in a mountain. Although he is most commonly known as a storm- and vegetation-god, he was also, as patron deity of the mighty city of Nippur and head of an early Babylonian pantheon, 'king of the gods,' 'father of the gods,' and husband of the great goddess Ninlil. But he never lost that attribute which was ascribed to all early Babylonian gods, viz. 'warrior.' He was the 'mighty warrior,' and, as such, retained his place as supreme war-god when Nippur, his own city, became mighty. Among all the other cities that came under the sway of Nippur no one possessed a war-god as powerful as Enlil, and so Enlil, the son of Anu, and consequently solar deity, became the official war-god of Nippur. No one could hope to fight victoriously against Enlil;[2] hence his fame as a great warrior-god.[3] As all gods were represented by symbols, as seen on the numerous *kuddurus*, or boundary-stones, so Enlil was symbolized by his weapon, an 'ensnaring net which encircles the hostile land,'[4] and is pictured carrying away his enemies who are entangled in his net.

Ištar, or, according to the Sumerians, Ninni or Innina, was daughter of Enzu, and 'mistress of the lands.' She was also 'mistress of heaven and earth,' and had her home in Uruk. The word 'Ištar' is Semitic, and perhaps indicates that she was a vegetation-goddess, if *iš* be from *giš*, 'tree,' 'wood.'[5] She was considered a solar deity at a very early period, and is referred to as the 'light of heaven and earth.' But with the passage of time she assumed other attributes. She was the mother-goddess *par excellence* and the goddess of love; she was identified with Venus as the 'queen of heaven'; she was the patroness of law and order; she was the raging storm that devastates heaven and earth; and she and Tammuz were associated in a way suggesting the female and male principles of life. But more than all else she was 'mistress of battles'[6] and 'mistress of war and battle.'[7] She is the *muttabbilat kakkê*, 'the bearer of arms,' the 'goddess of battle and warfare, who goes by the side of the king, favourite one, the terrible one of his enemies.'[7] Her warlike

[1] After Ḥammurabi's conquest of Rim-Sin, and his control of Nippur, Enlil, the chief Sumerian deity, lord of many city-states, surrendered his chief attributes to Marduk.

[2] *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Texts, etc., in the British Museum* (hereafter cited as *CT*), xv. 11. 22.

[3] T. Paffrath, *Zur Götterlehre in den altbabylonischen Königsinschriften*, Paderborn, 1913, pp. 112–123, 218–220.

[4] *WAI* iv.[2] 27, no. 4, 58.

[5] F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 74 (hereafter cited as *SAK*).

[6] *CH* xxvii. *a*, 92 f.

[7] A. T. Clay, *Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collection*, New Haven, 1915, p. 58.

character is excellently brought out in Ašurbanipal's dream.[1] As a war-goddess she is frequently (and as early as 3000 B.C.) depicted on seals, where she is usually represented with clubs, scimitars, bows, and other weapons, leading captives to the king.[2] In the Gilgamesh epic Ištar is a war-goddess, and in the time of Ḫammurabi, and more especially in Assyrian times, she was 'mistress of war and of battle.' As Assyrian war-goddess she became the consort of Ašur and was the special war-protector of Assyrian kings. Ašurbanipal's description of the warlike Ištar is famous,[3] and, when he founded his capital at Nineveh, he established there the cult of Ištar of battles. In fact, the goddess became so popular in warlike Assyria that she was identified with three great shrines, Nineveh, Arbela, and Kidmuru, and became sometimes three separate goddesses, although usually only two, because of the comparative unimportance of Kidmuru. There was an Ištar of the north as well as of the south—a differentiation which resulted in the belief in a male and female Ištar.[4] As a male Ištar was the morning star, and as a female she was the evening star. To the very end of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty she was the war-goddess, who carried quiver and bow and flew to battle like a swallow.[5] Her symbol as war-goddess was the lion and the five- or eight-pointed star Sirius, but sometimes she was symbolized by a bow.[6]

Ištar, as goddess of war, was identified with several other goddesses of war, especially Išḫara,[7] who was 'lady of conquest'[8] and 'lady of victory over the lands';[9] **Innini**, who, originally a goddess of light and the star Venus, because of warlike qualities ascribed to the stars, was regarded by the Sumerians as a conquering deity,[10] the 'lady of battle,'[11] and was represented in a standing position leading a captive by a string inserted in his nose,[12] her symbol being the bow;[13] **Anunit**, who was worshipped as a goddess of battle at Agade and Sippar, of whom Nabonidus said that he built a temple

'to Anunit the lady of battle, she that bears bow and quiver, who executes perfectly the command of Enlil her father, who exterminates the foe, who annihilates the evil, who walks before the gods, who at sunrise and sunset renders favourable my omens.'[14]

She is also identified with **Antu**, a heavenly deity, whom Ḫammurabi calls the Aštar of Agade,[15] and with **Ajā**, a goddess of light and of war; with the warlike **Ninni**, to whom Eannatum on the Stela of Vultures ascribes his victory; and with **Nana**.

Marduk, 'the first-born son of Ea,' was originally a solar deity, but his warlike character became prominent in the time of the Ḫammurabi dynasty, when his city, Babylon, became great. When the creation legends were recast, during this same dynasty, Ḫammurabi's war-god (often addressed as such in hymns[1]), Marduk, was the warrior-hero who slew Tiamāt, the spirit of chaos. He became so great that a (shortlived) custom arose of identifying all gods with him.[2] His greatness outlived the Assyrian empire, when he was called Bel-Marduk, having absorbed the characteristics of the old god Bel, second person of the triad, Anu, Bel, and Ea, and lived on till the end of the Neo-Babylonian period. He is often pictured as a warrior with scimitar,[3] and his symbol was the flaming sun.

Nergal, son of Enlil, was originally god of the midday or scorching sun, and was often identified with Šamaš. He then was associated with disease and death, and from that he developed into a war-god. As such he was called *Marduk ša kabli*,[4] 'Marduk of war,' 'the lord of spears and bows,'[5] *ur-sag karradu*, 'the warrior,' the great sword-god,[6] and, as destruction that accompanies war, he was identified with the planet Mars. He first became known as a war-god during the Ḫammurabi dynasty, and continued so throughout the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods.

Ninib,[7] son of Enlil and god of Nippur, was originally a solar deity, and, as first-born of Ea, was a vegetation- and water-god. As early as the Ḫammurabi dynasty he was called *Marduk ša âlli*, 'Marduk of strength,'[8] and in Samsuiluna's reign he was called 'the great warrior.'[9] He is addressed as 'mighty god, warrior, ruler of the Anunnaki, controller of the Igigi.'[10] In a text translated and discussed by Pinches in *PSBA* xxviii. [1906] 203–218, 270–283, Ninib is fully described as a war-god of the mountains. He is called 'the lord, the destroyer of the mountains, who hath no rival,' 'the warrior who is like a steer'; and he is said to collect his army in order to spoil the land of the enemy. In Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian times, especially the former, Ninib continued to be 'the destroyer of the king's enemies' and 'the mighty one of the gods.' He was symbolized as a wild bull, as a double-headed raven, and later as an eagle.

Nin-dar-a, husband of Išḫara, was called 'the warlike king,'[11] and **Nin-dub** was compared to a warrior.[12] **Ningirsu**, chief god of Lagash and son of Enlil, is called the 'warrior of Enlil,'[13] and is identified in this rôle with Ninib. On the Stela of the Vultures he is shown clubbing the enemies of Lagash, whom he has bound in a net; and he is symbolized by the divine storm-bird. **Nin-giš-zida**, son of Ninazu, prototype of Ninib and protective god of Gudea, was perhaps also a war-god, although no reference to him as such has been found. **Nin-šakh**, prototype of Ninib, and **Nin-si-a**, called also Nin-du-a, are also thought to have been war-deities. **Ramman**, whose ideogram is IM, and who is identified with Adad, Mer, and Iškur, was known as early as the time of Ḫammurabi as a 'warrior,'[14] although he is the storm-god *par excellence*. From the time of Ḫammurabi, however, he was recognized as a war-god, except

[1] E. Schrader, *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, ii. [1890] 249 ff. (hereafter cited as *KB*).
[2] W. H. Ward, *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910, pp. 155 ff., 248 ff., *Cylinders and Other Ancient Oriental Seals*, New York, 1909, nos. 90, 91; J. de Morgan, *Mission scientifique en Perse*, Paris, 1894–96, vol. iv., pl. x. and p. 161 ff.
[3] S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914, p. 106.
[4] M. Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1905–12, i. 539.
[5] *KB* iii. 1. 113, 2. 105; G. A. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896, pp. 103, 44.
[6] Langdon, pl. i. no. 1.
[7] *CT* xxiv. 18 rev. 7; S. A. B. Mercer, *The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature*, Paris, 1912, p. 43 ff.
[8] *KB* iv. 72, 28.
[9] L. W. King, *Babylonian Boundary-Stones and Memorial Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1912, p. 47.
[10] A king of Erech addressed her as 'lioness of battle' (*RA* ix. 114, 27).
[11] *SAK*, p. 74 f.
[12] Ward, *Seal Cylinders of W. Asia*, p. 157; *SAK*, p. 172.
[13] K. Frank, *Bilder und Symbole babylonisch-assyrischer Götter* (*LSSt* ii. 2), Leipzig, 1906, p. 19.
[14] *Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*, iv. 228, 22–26.
[15] *CH* iv. 48; *i.e.* the Aštar of early Semites. She is the 'Anat, queen of heaven, mistress of the gods, who was goddess of war in Egypt.

[1] *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, v. 281.
[2] M. Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York and London, 1911, p. 102.
[3] Ward, *opp. citt.* p. 163 ff., and nos. 92–94.
[4] Jastrow, *Aspects of Relig. Belief*, p. 102.
[5] King, *Babylonian Boundary-Stones*, p. 47.
[6] *LSSt* i. 6.
[7] Properly transcribed Nin-Ib, perhaps 'lord of Ib' (*CT* xxiv. 1, 5; xx. 4*b*), sometimes transcribed Ninip, Nirig, Ninrag, Enu-rēštū, En-maštu, Anušat, Ninurta, and finally Nin-urāša.
[8] Jastrow, *Aspects of Relig. Belief*, p. 103, *CT* xxiv. 50.
[9] A. Poebel, *Babylonian Legal and Business Documents*, Philadelphia, 1909, p. 79.
[10] P. Jensen, *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 470–472.
[11] *SAK*, p. 74. [12] *Ib.* p. 94.
[13] *Ib.* pp. 26, 90, 98. See Paffrath for many references to him as war-god.
[14] *CH* xxvii. *a*, 64.

in Assyria, where he played just one rôle, that of god of storms. In Babylonia he was associated—*e.g.*, by Nebuchadrezzar I.—with Ištar, as war-deity, and was pictured with a club.[1] Samaš (Sumerian Babbar), although the sun-god *par excellence*, was known as 'the conqueror of foreign lands,'[2] and as such was a war-god, whose weapon was 'the great net.'[3] Sukamuna was a Kassite god of war, whose symbol was the midday sun, and, therefore, a destructive power like Nergal. Tur-lil-en, a Neo-Babylonian deity, was described as 'breaking the weapons of the enemies.' Zamama, patron deity of Kish, was early associated with Ištar as a war-god,[4] and was called *Marduk ša tahazi*, 'Marduk of battle,'[5] as well as 'the king of battle.'[6]

Ašur, the great god, Assyria's war-god *par excellence*, was originally a solar deity, his symbol representing a sun-disk with protruding rays. Then he developed into a god of fertility—a corn- and water-god—and finally became a war-god. According as Assyria became more and more militaristic, so Ašur's attribute as war-god became more and more all-absorbing, until he became the dominating character in Assyrian religion. His divine city depended upon the location of the royal residence, and from there all warfare was carried on in his name. His popularity was due to Assyria's military prowess. He is always associated with mighty weapons (*kakka danna*), and is he 'who protects the troops.' The disk as his symbol was surmounted by the figure of a warrior.[7]

II. *EGYPTIAN.*—1. War.—While some classical writers say that Egypt was divided among the king, priests, and warriors, others assert that from the beginning Egypt was a peaceful country. At any rate it can truly be said that the Egyptians never admired a military career, nor were the conditions under which they lived favourable to the development of a military nature; *e.g.*, Egypt was shut in geographically from the rest of the world; there were no great peoples in her neighbourhood to contend with, and no fertile lands within her reach to covet. Nevertheless, from the very first Egypt was called upon to wage war. Her literature attests this, and her earliest nome standards are, in all probability, military in character. Pre-dynastic and proto-dynastic monuments, such as the Palette of Nar-Mer, preserve evidence of warlike conflict, and Uni, a nobleman of the VIth dynasty, tells of important wars (although they are the only known important ones of the Old Kingdom) carried on against the Bedawîn in the time of Pepi I.[8] There were other military expeditions during this early period, and by the time of Sesostris III. of the XIIth dynasty rather formidable armies were mustered. Yet, when compared with the wars of later periods or with those of Assyria, these military expeditions of the Old and Middle Kingdoms must be pronounced mere razzias—raids for loot, slaves, cattle, gold, etc.

Nor was the period of disintegration which followed the XIIth dynasty conducive to the growth of militarism. But the conquest of Egypt by the Hyksos (*q.v.*) breathed a new spirit into the land. The foreigners must be ejected, and Egypt proved herself, under Ahmose I., equal to the occasion. Thenceforth she began her career of conquest under the empire-builders, Thutmose III., Seti I., Rameses II., and Rameses III. She became a great military power, and took up the offensive against her erstwhile Asiatic masters. Rameses II. even developed a military caste, and for a while the military profession ranked high. Her military character, however, was not enduring; the Egyptians lacked that gallantry and chivalry which are essential to a truly military character. There is evidence that the Egyptians were as destructive to the living and as savage to the dead—whose corpses they often mutilated—as other peoples, although Diodorus[1] seeks to excuse their conduct.

Nor were the Egyptians a naval people, although they possessed considerable fleets of merchant ships, which navigated the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Nile. But the same great national crisis which developed a strong army and a shortlived liking for conquest developed also a navy. When Ahmose I. attacked the Hyksos, he did so by sea as well as by land. Of course there were warships before his time. Uni escorted his flotilla of merchantmen from Elephantinê down the Nile to Memphis; Kheti II. of the IXth dynasty had ships; and Sesostris III. re-made a canal in the First Cataract through which his warships could pass. By the time of the XVIIIth dynasty a real navy had developed, and was employed in connexion with the campaigns in Syria. Although Rameses II. had a considerable fleet, the first king to recognize the true importance of the navy was Rameses III., who established a fleet in the Mediterranean and another in the Red Sea. The naval battles of this king are splendidly pictured at Medinet Habu. With the exception of the battle with the Hyksos,[2] the battles of Rameses III. are the only real naval conflicts known to Egyptian history. The navy, like the army, soon deteriorated, and never more played any important part in Egypt, not even in the time of Cleopatra, who is credited by Orosius[3] with a fleet of 170 large ships.

Egyptian religion never condemned war. The most ancient of Egyptian wars were among the gods themselves or between gods and men; and so Egyptian kings in making war claimed divine example. The Egyptians named all wars revolt, because they were presumed to be against the Egyptian gods. The duty of the king was to avenge the gods of impiety, the word for 'impiety' (*aaditiw*) being the same as for 'enemy.'[4] In short, all war was moral, ideal, supernatural, and sanctioned by divine precedent.

In earliest Egypt there were soldiers who were selected from all parts of the political district, and, as early as Pepi I., conquered territories were compelled to contribute men in case of war. But there did not exist an army in the modern sense of the term. In the Middle Kingdom there were professional soldiers who were called 'followers of his majesty.' They were divided into companies of 100 men, and they garrisoned the palace and the strongholds of the royal house from Nubia to the Asiatic frontier. They were the nucleus of a standing army. In case of actual war the great nobles, or nomarchs, sent their quota of men, whom they had carefully trained, armed with bows and arrows. Then there were contingents supplied by the estates of the great temples, besides mercenaries of friendly chiefs. These armies were often called upon to do guard duty, as in the case of the army of Sesostris I., which was employed in the defence of labourers. With the rise of the Empire, and as a result of the Hyksos overlordship, a regular army was gradually developed. It had

1 Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, p. 176 ff.
2 *SAK*, p. 206.
3 *Ib.* p. 16 f.
4 *CH* xxiv. *a*, 23 f.
5 Jastrow, *Aspects of Relig. Belief*, p. 103.
6 King, p. 47.
7 See, further, J. Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 89–96.
8 J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, i. 311–315.

1 i. 78.
2 C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, 12 vols., Berlin, 1849–60, iii. 12*d*.
3 vi. 19.
4 K. Sethe, *Urkunden der 18. Dynastie*, Leipzig, 1905–09, iv. 5 f.

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two grand divisions, composed of experienced troops who had learned tactics in Syria. These two grand armies were divided into divisions, each division named after a god—*e.g.*, Amen, Rā, Ptah, etc. Military schools were established and barracks abounded. In fact, military training began in childhood, when gymnastics, archery, and the use of the battle-axe and javelin were taught. The trained and disciplined troops of Egypt were often the subject of artists and sculptors, and the drilling of recruits, racing, jumping, war-dances, and sieges were often depicted.[1] Rameses II. held regular councils of war,[2] and Diodorus[3] preserves a tradition that the military formed one of the three classes into which Egyptian society was divided. In spite of all, however, Egypt never possessed an army equal in discipline and equipment to those of Assyria.

During the height of Egypt's military power the soldier was well treated. He was allowed, free of all charge, eight acres of land, he was free from forced labour when on active service, he could not be cast into prison for debt, and he was expected to provide himself with the necessary arms and everything requisite for a campaign. If he were brave, distinctions and other signs of honour were showered upon him. As early as the VIth dynasty mercenaries were employed, and these were allowed to retain their own arms and customs. The peoples most commonly engaged to fight the wars of Egypt were the 'Nine-bow Barbarians' from Nubia, the 'Shardana' from Europe, the Libyans, and the Syrians. The last-named were so frequently employed that the term *ḥarw-srj*, 'young Syrian,' became a common word for soldier. Most of the army of Rameses III. were mercenaries, and after his reign these men were so much accustomed to the country that they in turn as foreigners conquered and dominated Egypt—such were the Libyans, the Sudanese, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans.

In early Egypt some soldiers carried a large bow, had one or two ostrich feathers on their head, and a narrow band around the upper part of their body; others carried a large shield and a spear, or a small shield, over which skin was stretched, and a battle-axe; still others carried no shield but had a large axe, a lance, and a sling. During the Empire regiments of light infantry carried a javelin, a lance, and a dagger, or a short straight sword; the heavy infantry bore spears and a curved sword. The cavalry were armed with the battle-axe, and most of them carried shields made of bull's hide, while bronze helmets were worn, although a more common head-dress was a thick quilted cap, the colour of which varied with the regiment, some with fringes, others with tassels. The archers were the most important soldiers in the army. They were divided into companies of foot- and chariot-archers. They wore quilted helmets with coloured tassels. The arrows were about 34 inches long, and were of wood or reed tipped with metal. They sometimes carried an axe or boomerang.[4] Cavalry was not known till the Hyksos period, for it was these Semites who introduced the horse into Egypt. Thenceforth chariots drawn by horses and cavalry became very popular. Sheshonk I. is reported to have had 60,000 horsemen in his army which marched into Palestine.

The weapons of the earliest Egyptians were very simple. At first they consisted of large stout sticks. But later the offensive weapons were bow, spear, javelin, sling, sword, dagger, knife, falchion, axe, and club; defensive arms were metal helmet or quilted head-piece, coat of armour, and shield.

The Egyptians fought best behind walls, and many forts were therefore built in Egypt, especially at the Second Cataract and on the north-eastern boundary of Egypt. Towns were fortified, such as Pelusium, Syene, Elephantinê, Semneh in Nubia; and Thutmose I. fortified the island of Tombos at the Third Cataract. In the great campaigns of the Empire materials of all kinds for siege, such as scaling ladders and battering-rams, for transportation, such as wagons and baggage-trucks, and for convenience, such as chairs, tables, and elaborate tents, were provided. Each company had its own standard, which was held in admiration; and each regiment was furnished with musical instruments, usually trumpets and drums.

The only Egyptian campaign conducted on any definite plan was that of Rameses II. against the Hittites. But there is evidence of the use of a great deal of strategy in the manœuvres of the soldiers of Thutmose III., and especially in the way in which Joppa was taken by Thutiyi. Armies were drawn up in well-arranged battle-array, with due regard to the wings, centre, and flanks. The many Egyptian inscriptions afford an excellent idea of the way in which Egyptian battles were fought, such as those at Megiddo, Kadesh, and the early wars in the time of Pepi I. A favourite company-formation with the Egyptian was the phalanx, with the heavy infantry in the centre and light infantry and archers disposed round them. Light-armed regiments were also left free for skirmishing and for flanking movements, such as those which were so well carried out at Kadesh by Rameses II. The Egyptian phalanx became so famous that Crœsus used it most effectively against Cyrus.

War at all times and especially under the Theban monarchs was a means of procuring slaves and booty. The demand for tribute does not appear before the Asiatic conquests, although ransom seems to appear as early as the civil wars which preceded the XIIth dynasty. In order to prove to the king the completeness of victory, warriors were in the habit of cutting off the hands and sometimes the heads[1] of the vanquished and placing them in heaps before him. But the Egyptian was always glad when peace came and a treaty was drawn up. The most famous treaty in Egyptian history, and the most detailed known to the ancient world, was that drawn up between Rameses II. and Ḥattusil II. the Hittite king.[2]

2. War-gods. — Originally every social group had its god, and every god was, in a sense, a war-god. When smaller groups amalgamated into larger cities and nomes, the gods of the constituent groups amalgamated into the god of the most powerful unit in the group, just as Sekhet and Ḥathor were absorbed into Amon of Thebes, and to him were ascribed the characteristics of the absorbed gods. If the age was warlike, one of the attributes of such a deity would be that of war-god. Whenever the age and location were not warlike, the war attribute of the deity receded into the background. Thus it is that previous to the Hyksos period there are no prominent Egyptian war-gods. As a matter of fact, the Egyptians never of themselves developed great war-gods; those deities in their pantheon who retain their warlike attributes are Asiatic, and were introduced during the Empire. Yet the idea of war-deities was well known in Egypt from earliest times. Did not Horus battle with Set, and did not every king, as son of Horus, have to fight the god's enemies? The fierceness of the wars with the Hyksos was due to the fact that Egypt's gods were at war with the hated gods of the Asiatics.

The following deities, almost all of whom are foreign, are the war-deities known to Egyptian literature. **Āāsīth** is usually represented as a woman armed with shield and club, riding a horse into the battle-field. She is a war-goddess of Semitic origin in whom W. Max Müller sees the counterpart of Esau. A stela set up by Seti I. at Redesiyeh, on the road to the gold-mines of Mt. Zābārā, connects her with the desert. **Amon-Rā**, one of the primeval deities of Egypt, whose chief seat of worship was at Thebes, became very prominent as a war-god in the XVIIIth dynasty as a result of the victories of that period. **An-ḥôret**, or Anhur, local god of Abydos, was god of the dead, but was also represented as a man standing with a spear in his raised hand. He was a warrior-

[1] See, *e.g.*, J. G. Wilkinson, *The Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1878, *passim*, esp. i. 192.
[2] *RTr* viii. 128 *f.* [3] i. 54.
[4] Excellent illustrations of Egyptian soldiery are to be seen in Lepsius, iii., and in Wilkinson.

[1] Lepsius, iii. 128.
[2] W. M. Müller, *Der Bündnisvertrag Rameses' II. und des Chetiterkönigs* (*MVG* vii. 5), Berlin, 1902.

god, and as such became identified in the Greek period with Ares. **'Anat**, 'queen of heaven, mistress of the gods,' was an Asiatic goddess of war. She was the same as the Sumerian An, with Semitic feminine termination, Antu. She is represented as sitting with a spear in one hand and swinging a battle-axe. She is probably the same as the goddess referred to by Ḫammurabi.[1] **Anthyt** was a Syro-Phœnician war-goddess, represented with shield and spear in the right hand and club in the left. Her cult was associated with N. and S. Syria, where cities were named after her—*e.g.*, Bath-Anth. **Antæus**, probably another name of the same goddess, is known only in late sources. She was worshipped at Antaiopolis, and was represented as a warrior or hunter with a high feather on her head and clad in Roman armour. **Asthyrthet** of Apollinopolis was introduced into Egypt in the XVIIIth dynasty. She is the same as Astarte, a Syrian war-goddess, and was depicted as a lion-headed human figure, driving a chariot drawn by four horses over her prostrate foe. **'Asît** may be another form of Asthyrthet. **Bār**, or **Pa-Bār**, was a Syro-Phœnician war-god, the Baal of the OT. He was introduced into Egypt in the XVIIIth dynasty. Originally he was the personification of the burning and destroying heat of the sun and of the blazing desert wind. He was worshipped in the neighbourhood of Tanis, and was a favourite of Rameses II., who compared himself with Bār. **Bast**, 'lady of the East,' as well as Sekhet, was a personification of heat and light, and was renowned as a destroyer of the enemies of the sun-god and of the deceased. **Bes**, of 'the land of Punt,' was a god of complex character, but as a god of war and slaughter he carried two knives in his hands. As a warrior he was represented wearing a short military tunic, and holding in his left hand a shield, and a short sword in his right hand. As a war-god he appears in the XVIIIth dynasty. **Ḥeru-Behuṭet** is a form of Horus, under which he waged war with Set or Typhon. His symbol is the Sphinx at Gizeh. Another form of Horus is **Ḥeru-Sept**, the smiter of the Menti, and god of battle; and still another form of Horus, who 'loved an hour of fighting more than a day of rejoicing,' is **Ḥeru-Themā**, the piercer, and, as such, a god of war. **Mafiet** is a war-goddess, whose symbol is the sign 'to follow,' *śems*. **Menthu** was an ancient Egyptian war-god, whose seat was at Thebes. He is represented in human form with a bull's tail and head of a hawk. His head is surmounted by a sun-disk between double plumes. Sometimes he is depicted as a hawk-headed sphinx. He is represented with bow and arrows, a club, and a knife. He is seen on the prow of the sun-boat and slays the demon with his lance. He was an old local god, a personification of the destructive heat of the sun, but in later times he became Mentu-Rā. He was Rameses II.'s patron war-god. **Neith** was worshipped in the Delta in pre-dynastic times. While she was, at an early period, a personification of a form of the great inert primeval watery mass, she was later represented with bow and arrows, and as such was considered a war-goddess as well as a goddess of the chase. **Nephebet** and her twin-sister **Uatchet** were destroyers of the enemies of the gods. **Reshpu**, or Resheph, had his centre of worship at Ḥet-Reshep in the Delta, but was an imported Syrian deity. In Egyptian texts he is called 'lord of the two-fold strength among the company of the gods.' He is represented as a warrior with spear and shield in the left hand, and club in the right hand. As his Semitic name shows, he was a personification of the burning and destruction of fire and lightning. **Sekhmet**, or Sekhet, 'the powerful,' is represented wearing a solar disk on her head, symbolizing the warlike attributes of the sun. She was called 'the fiery one emitting flames against the enemies' of the god, and her duty was to scorch and consume the enemies of her father. **Up-Uaut**, 'the opener of the way,' was originally a war-god, who opened the way for troops through the enemies' land. He is sometimes represented in the prow of the boat of Rā.

III. *HEBREW.*—**1. War.**—Although the ideal of the great prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries was peace, war was approved by the prophets of early Israel. The Hebrew people were not unwarlike, and with them, as with other Oriental peoples, war was sanctioned by the deity. From the earliest to the latest times in the history of Israel Jahweh fought for His people, and they followed Him to battle. Before battle oracles were consulted to learn Jahweh's will;[1] prophets of Jahweh were appealed to for guidance;[2] and prayer was offered up to Him before the attack.[3] Jahweh Himself called His consecrated one to battle;[4] priests of Jahweh sounded the alarm with trumpets;[5] and campaigns were begun with sacrificial rites.[6] In fact, warfare was a holy calling, with which tabu was associated,[7] for to 'prepare' or to 'sanctify' war was to carry out initiatory religious rites.[8] The camp was a holy place because Jahweh was there,[9] and there were the sacred ephod[10] and the ark of Jahweh.[11]

The Hebrews did not possess an army worthy of the name till the time of the monarchy. Gideon's band numbered 300, and the Danites had a force of 600. At this early period warfare consisted of raids and forays. All males were collected by the recognized leader,[12] to whom friendly tribes allied themselves.[13] But, besides a bodyguard,[14] Saul had a standing army of 3000 men.[15] Israel's army was divided into thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens.[16] As early as the time of David steps were taken to recruit a regular army, and it was placed under the command of Joab as commander-in-chief. Besides that, David himself had his own bodyguard of from 400 to 600 men. Mobilization was announced by sound of the trumpet throughout the land.[17] An interesting picture of mobilization in Israel can be seen in Is 22^{6-8} and in Ezk $21^{33ff.}$. It is described as the drawing of the sword from the sheath. Sometimes a formal declaration of war was made, as in the case of Amaziah of Judah against Jehoash of Israel,[18] but more often spies were sent out,[19] and hostilities began in spring.[20] In later times regular mercenaries were employed,[21] and under Herod soldiers were trained in Roman fashion.

Hebrew armies up to Solomon's time consisted only of infantry, light and heavy. Heavy arms consisted of a round helmet of bronze, a coat of mail, bronze greaves, a sword of iron, a spear, and a lance. Light arms comprised bow and arrows and a small shield. Solomon introduced cavalry and chariots, and had 12,000 cavalry, 1400 chariots, and 40,000 chariot horses. The troops had ensigns, banners, and standards, and were furnished with tents or booths, but each soldier was obliged to provide his own food, though sometimes regular provision was made for him.[22] Guards were placed round the

[1] *CH* iv. 48. To the same cycle of divine beings belong Ištar of Nineveh and Astarte, mistress of horses, who was confused with the warlike Sekhmet, all of whom were known and recognized as war-goddesses in Egypt.

[1] Jg $20^{18ff.}$, 1 S 14^{37} 23^{2} 28^{6} 30^{8}.
[2] 1 K 22^{5}, 2 K 3^{11}.
[3] 1 Mac 3^{53} 4^{30} $5^{32f.}$.
[4] Is 13^{3}.
[5] 2 Ch 13^{12-16}.
[6] 1 S 7^{8-10} 13^{9}.
[7] 2 11^{11}, Dt 20^{7} 23^{10}.
[8] Jer 6^{4} 22^{7} $51^{27f.}$, Mic 3^{5}, Jl 3^{9}.
[9] Dt 23^{9-14}.
[10] 1 S 14^{18}; see W. R. Arnold, *Ephod and Ark* (*Harvard Theol. Studies*, iii.), Cambridge, Mass., 1917.
[11] 1 S 4^{3}.
[12] Jg 11^{11}.
[13] 1 S $11^{3ff.}$.
[14] 1 S 22^{14}.
[15] 1 S $13^{2ff.}$.
[16] 1 S 8^{12} 17^{18} 18^{13}, 2 S 18^{1}, 2 K 1^{9} $11^{4, 19}$, 1 Mac 3^{55}.
[17] Jg 3^{27}, 1 S 13^{3}, 2 S 15^{10}.
[18] 2 K 14^{8}.
[19] Jos 2^{1}, 1 S 26^{4}, Nu 13^{17}.
[20] 2 S 11^{1}, 1 K $20^{22, 26}$.
[21] Jos. *Ant.* xiii. viii. 4, xiii. 5.
[22] Jg 20^{10}.

camps,[1] which were changed three times during the night.[2] The Hebrews inherited the fortresses of the Canaanites, but Solomon built his own, such as that at Hazor, Megiddo, etc. They usually stood on hills. Special battering-rams and catapults were constructed for siege work.[3]

Hebrew forces were drawn up either in line or in three divisions, a centre and two wings. There was also a rearguard for protection during the march and to take care of stragglers.[4] Sometimes, instead of a general conflict between two opposing forces, a decision was left to two opposing groups of equal but limited number,[5] or even to two opposing individuals.[6] There was a battle-cry to inspire courage,[7] and the order to retreat was given by sound of the trumpet.

Strategy was not unknown to the Hebrews: Joshua made a night attack after a rapid night march to relieve Gibeon;[8] circumvention was practised by David;[9] Joshua surprised the Canaanites at the waters of Merom;[10] David executed a flank movement against the Philistines;[11] the men of Israel made a successful feint against the Benjamites at Gibeah;[12] and Joshua captured Ai by ambush.[13]

The victor was hailed with song,[14] and victory was celebrated with public thanksgiving;[15] but prisoners were sold as slaves[16] and often treated in a savage manner.[17] The spoil was divided equally between those in battle and those in camp;[18] a portion was reserved for the Levites and as a tribute to Jahweh;[19] part was reserved for the king;[20] and sometimes armour was dedicated as a trophy.[21]

The ideal in prophetic Israel was peace[22] brought about by Jahweh.[23] The end of hostilities was signified by the blowing of the war-horn,[24] and ambassadors negotiated terms.[25] Treaties were drawn up and signed,[26] and defensive and offensive alliances were made.[27]

2. War-god.—Pre-historic Hebrews were undoubtedly polytheists, or at any rate henotheists; they recognized the existence of other gods and worshipped them; but, so far as we know, they never developed a pantheon such as we see in Babylonia and Egypt. In historic times the Hebrew people tended more and more towards monotheism, and, although they recognized the existence of other gods even as late as the 7th cent. B.C., yet they never recognized any other deity than Jahweh as their national god. So to Jahweh were ascribed all the characteristics which belonged to a pantheon. The derivation of His name is uncertain, but as good a guess as any is that it is derived from the verb *hawa*, 'to fall,' and, in the causative, 'to prostrate.' Whether this be so or not, there is abundant evidence to prove the warlike character of Jahweh. He it was, as a warrior, who brought His people out of Egypt, and who drove out the nations before Israel; He revealed Himself to Joshua as the captain of His hosts; His angels led the hosts of Joshua and Barak, and gave David victories over Aram and the peoples round about. It is true that He was considered a mountain-god, being associated with Sinai-Horeb, and, as such, a storm-god, controlling and regulating the weather; He was *baal* of the land, and therefore a vegetation-god; He was perhaps a lion-god,[1] and an ox-god;[2] and He was god of heaven and of earth; but He was pre-eminently 'a man of war,'[3] whose peoples' victories were His 'righteous acts,'[4] whose exploits were recorded in the 'Book of the Wars of Jahweh,'[5] and whose favourite servant was the warrior David, a man after Jahweh's own heart;[6] Israel's battle-cry was 'the sword of Jahweh and of Gideon';[7] and Meroz was cursed because it did not come to battle, 'to the help of Jahweh.'[8]

The title 'Jahweh Ṣebāōth,' whatever its original meaning, designates Jahweh as god of battles.[9] The term *Ṣebāōth* may have referred sometimes to the hosts of heaven. But warlike qualities were ascribed to the stars not only by the Hebrews,[10] but also by the Babylonians. It may have referred sometimes to Israel as a people.[11] But it certainly had reference to the title of Jahweh as leader of the armies of His people Israel.[12] The term as used in the OT regularly denotes armies of men, and it formed the title of Jahweh as war-god. A similar title is found applied to the Babylonian Tišpak, who is called *Marduk ša ummani*, 'Marduk of hosts,' and Tišpak was a war-god.

Jahweh's emblem, as war-god, was an ark. Eleven of the occurrences of Jahweh Sebāōth in the books of Samuel are connected with the ark. It was the symbol of the presence of Jahweh,[13] and was perhaps a throne upon which Jahweh sat,[14] when He was carried into war, just as the Babylonians carried their gods on thrones in processions. In fact, the ark was so closely associated with Jahweh, as war-god, that it was identified with Him,[15] and was greeted as if it were Jahweh Himself.[16]

LITERATURE.—With the exception of T. G. Pinches, 'The Babylonian Gods of War and their Legends,' *PSBA* xxviii. [1906] 203–218, 270–283, a discussion of Ninib, there is no separate article, monograph, or book on this subject. Besides E. A. W. Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols., London and Chicago, 1904, and literature referred to in this article, the author has made full use of the original inscriptions. In the case of the Hebrews, the standard Dictionaries of the Bible have been consulted, besides **Nowack** and **Benzinger**.

S. A. B. MERCER.

WATER, WATER-GODS.

Primitive and Savage (E. O. JAMES), p. 704.
Babylonian (S. A. B. MERCER), p. 708.
Egyptian (S. A. B. MERCER), p. 710.
Greek and Roman (E. A. GARDNER), p. 712.
Hebrew and Jewish (M. GASTER), p. 713.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 716.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Primitive and Savage).—Since water is a first need of man in a primitive state of culture, it is little wonder that it is regarded as possessed of *mana* (*q.v.*), and that, in consequence, it figures prominently in magico-religious cult.

1. Water in seasonal rites.—J. G. Frazer is undoubtedly correct when he says:

'At a remote period similar modes of thought, based on similar needs, led men independently in many distant lands,

[1] 1 S 25^{13} 30^{10}. [2] 2 Jg 7^{19}, 1 Mac 12^{27}.
[3] Ezk 4^{2} 21^{22}, 2 Ch 26^{15}.
[4] Jg 7^{16}, 1 S 11^{11}, 2 S 18^{2}, 1 Mac 5^{33}.
[5] 2 S 2. [6] 1 S 17. [7] Jg 7^{20}, Am 1^{14}.
[8] Jos 10^{9}. [9] 2 S 5^{23}. [10] Jos 11^{7}.
[11] 2 S $5^{22f.}$. [12] Jg $20^{20f.}$. [13] Jos $8^{3ff.}$.
[14] 1 S 18^{6}. [15] Ex $15^{1ff.}$, Jg $5^{1ff.}$, 1 Mac 4^{24}.
[16] 2 K 5^{2}, 1 Mac 3^{41}. [17] 2 S 8^{2} 12^{31}, 2 K 15^{16}.
[18] Jos 22^{8}, 1 S $30^{24f.}$, Nu 31^{27}.
[19] Nu $31^{28.30}$. [20] 2 K 14^{14}, 1 Ch $18^{7.11}$.
[21] 1 S 21^{9} 31^{9}. [22] Hos 2^{18}, Is 2^{4}, Mic 4^{3}.
[23] Ps 46^{9}. [24] 2 S 2^{28}. [25] Is 33^{7}.
[26] 1 K $20^{30f.}$ ^{34}. [27] 1 K $22^{2ff.}$.

[1] Hos 5^{14} 11^{10} $13^{7ff.}$.
[2] 1 K 12^{28}, Am 4^{4} 5^{5} $7^{9ff.}$.
[3] Ex 15^{3}. [4] Jg 5^{11}. [5] Nu 21^{14}.
[6] 1 S 13^{14}. [7] Jg 7^{18}. [8] Jg 5^{23}.
[9] 1 S 17^{45}. [10] Jg 5^{20}. [11] Ex 7^{4} 12^{41}, Jer 31^{9}, Ps 44^{10} 60^{12} 108^{12}. [12] 1 K 2^{3}.
[13] Jos $6^{4f.}$, 1 S $4^{3ff.}$, Nu $10^{35f.}$ $14^{44f.}$. [14] Jer $31^{6f.}$.
[15] 1 S $4^{7f.}$ $6^{8f.}$. [16] Nu $10^{35f.}$.

from the North Sea to the Euphrates, to celebrate the summer solstice with rites which, while they differed in some things, yet agreed closely in others; that in historical times a wave of Oriental influence, starting perhaps from Babylonia, carried the Tammuz or Adonis form of the (midsummer) festival westward till it met with native forms of a similar festival; and that under pressure of the Roman civilization these different yet kindred festivals fused with each other and crystallized into a variety of shapes, which subsisted more or less separately side by side, till the Church, unable to suppress them altogether, stripped them so far as it could of their grosser features, and dexterously changing the names allowed them to pass muster as Christian.'[1]

In Mesopotamia the year is divided into two seasons—the rainy and the dry. The welfare of the country depends upon the abundant rains which continue uninterruptedly for several months. In the earliest period to which the history of the Euphrates valley can be traced, a system of canals existed, serving the purpose both of irrigation and of avoiding disastrous floods. It is not surprising, therefore, that the early Babylonians regarded water as possessed of *mana*, and in later times that it became for them the abode of spirits and gods. Similarly, commerce, following in the wake of agriculture, would lend an additional importance to water as a means of transportation, which again would find expression in a cult of water-spirits. As notions of departmental deities arose, these spirits would assume the rôle of gods ruling over the various functions formerly controlled by lesser spirits.[2]

Now, we know that Tammuz was an ancient personification of the sun of the springtime, his name consisting of a Sumerian phrase *Dumu-Zi*, 'true (or faithful) son of the deep,'[3] and that he was the first lover of Ishtar, the great mother-goddess. He became her consort, was slain by the goddess, and descended into the under world, whither Ishtar went in quest of him. The promise made to her by Gilgamesh to present him with a chariot of lapis-lazuli, and to shelter him in a palace of plenty, unmistakably points to the triumph of the sun when vegetation is at its height. Tammuz and Ishtar, like Gilgamesh and Ishtar, thus represent the combination of the two principles which bring about life, and upon their separation follow death and decay. It appears from the fragmentary documentary evidence that the early Babylonians supposed that every year the goddess went to 'the land of No-return,' and that during her absence man and beast alike could not discharge their sexual functions, so intimately was Ishtar associated with fertility. If Tammuz was a personification of the springtime sun, and if his return from the under world bore a direct relationship to the revivification of nature, he must have been intimately connected with fertility. But the close relation that existed between vegetation and the water supply in the Euphrates valley would inevitably lead to his association with a water cult, and to his rites being performed about midsummer.[4]

At the festival of Tammuz in Babylon the image of the god was washed with pure water, just as in the summer festival the image of Adonis was thrown into the sea at Alexandria, and in Greece 'the gardens of Adonis' were similarly treated, to secure a due supply of fertilizing rain.[5] But originally it must have been the *mana* in the water, and not the deity, that was regarded as the means by which the desert in the springtime was suddenly made to blossom as the rose. It was not that primeval man was so overawed by the miracle of spring, the radiance of the flowers, and the singing of the birds; it was not that his heart went out in gratitude to the High God who was the giver of all good things. Rather it was his will to live that he uttered and represented in his elaborate spring and summer ceremonies—the promotion of life and fertility in plants, animals, and man. Since water is one of the essential factors in the preservation of life and the growth of the crops, it naturally plays a conspicuous part in rain-making ceremonies and other seasonal rites among primitive people.

2. Water as a rain-charm.—Water is widely used in ceremonies for bringing rain.

In Australia, among the Arunta, a group of people have water for their totem, and the men of the totem are assembled from time to time by their *alatunja*, or leader (a celebrated rain-maker residing in the Rain Country), to make rain.[1] In the rites that ensue water does not play a part, the ceremonies, according to Frazer, representing a rising storm.[2] Among the Kaitish tribe of Central Australia, on the other hand, rain is made by the head man of the water totem pouring water over stones out of which the rainbow was supposed to have arisen, and over himself,[3] just as in Russia a man called the 'rain-maker' sprinkled water from a vessel on all sides to produce rain.[4] The Torajas of Central Celebes pour water over the grave of a famous chief to procure rain. After that they hang a bamboo full of water over the grave, a small hole having been pierced in the lower end of the bamboo, so that the water drips from it continually. The bamboo is kept refilled with water until rain drenches the ground. Conversely, if dry weather is desired, the rain-doctor (*sando*) assiduously avoids touching water during the performance of his functions. He does not bathe or wash himself, he drinks nothing but palm-oil, and, when crossing a stream, he is careful not to step in the water. Should rain afterwards be wanted, he has only to pour water on his fire, and immediately the rain will descend in sheets.[5] In India the Brâhman rain-maker had to bring himself into union with water by touching it three times a day as well as on various special occasions, to make himself, as it were, an ally of the water-powers, and to guard himself against their hostility.[6] The Ba-thonga, a Bantu tribe in S. Africa, think that droughts are the result of the concealment of miscarriages by women. To procure rain they bury a pot in the ground and cause it to be filled with water by girls who have not attained the age of puberty, till it overflows into four channels which run in the direction of the cardinal points of the compass. The women then hold a rain-dance, and pour water on the graves of prematurely born infants and of twins to 'extinguish' (*timula*) them, thereby removing the cause of the drought.[7]

In S.E. Europe, at the present day, rain is made by pouring a pail of water over a boy or girl clothed from head to foot in grass, flowers, or corn.[8] H. S. Moore records a similar practice at Poona (India). When rain is needed, the boys dress up one of their number in nothing but leaves and call him 'king of the rain' (*mrilj raja*). They then visit all the houses in the village, the householder sprinkles the rain-king with water, and makes offerings of food to the party.[9] In Rumania a clay figure is substituted for a living person in the rain-making rites. The image, which represents Drought, is placed in a coffin and carried by children in a funeral procession, with a burning candle before it. Finally, the coffin and candle are thrown into a stream or well.[10] In France images of saints until recently were dipped in water to procure rain, just as the Shans drench statues of Buddha with water when the rice is perishing from drought.[11] In Arcadia, in the classical period, the priest of Zeus dipped an oak branch into a certain spring on Mount Lycæus in times of drought, to cause the water to send up a misty cloud, from which rain would soon fall.[12] The Athenians sacrificed boiled, not roast, meat to the season because they imagined that the water in the pot would be transmitted to the gods, and return to them as rain.[13]

That the use of water as a rain-charm was directly connected with fertility is shown in the custom of clothing the person (or image), apparently the personification of vegetation, in leaves, corn, vines, etc., before water is poured on him. In support of this view may be quoted the European spring celebrations of St. George's Day.[14] It is

[1] *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 250.
[2] Cf. art. TUTELARY GODS AND SPIRITS.
[3] H. Zimmern, *Der babylonische Gott Tamuz*, p. 6 (in the *Abhand. der Konigl. sächs. Gesellschaft der Wiss.* xx. [Leipzig, 1909] 701, 722).
[4] M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 547, 682.
[5] R. Rochette, *RA* viii. [1851] 97-123.

[1] Spencer-Gillen[s], p. 189 ff.; cf. art. RAIN.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 261.
[3] Spencer-Gillen[s], p. 294 ff.
[4] W. Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1877, p. 342.
[5] A. C. Kruijt, in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, xliv. [1901] 6, 8 ff.
[6] H. Oldenberg, *The Grihya-Sûtras*, ii. (*SBE* xxx. [1892]) 72 ff.
[7] H. A. Junod, *REth* i. [1910] 139.
[8] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 272 f.
[9] *The Cowley Evangelist*, May 1908, p. 111 ff.
[10] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 273 f.
[11] *Ib.* p. 307 f.
[12] Pausanias, VIII. xxxviii. 4.
[13] Athenæus, xiv. 72, p. 656 A.
[14] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 75.

difficult to avoid the conclusion that originally these rites were performed to promote vegetation, and secure an abundant food supply, just as, until quite recently, water was thrown on the last corn cut at harvest in this country to procure rain for next year's crops.

3. Water in purification ceremonies.—Just as water naturally suggests to the primitive mind the process of fertilization, so it appears to the savage as the normal means of washing away material or spiritual pollution. As this subject has been treated separately,[1] we shall here confine our attention to the ceremonial use of water, the universal cleanser, in ritual purification.

After childbirth and menstruation, and in fact after sickness generally, the contagion is removed by a bath, while the contagion of death and the sins of the penitent are often got rid of in the same way. It is a common belief that the effect of contact with a sacred object must be removed by washing before a man may freely mix with his fellows.

Thus the high-priest was required by the Jewish Law to wash himself and put off the garments which he had worn in the holy place before coming forth from the sanctuary after offering his burnt offering (Lv $16^{23f.}$). Likewise Greek ritual decreed that, after offering an expiatory sacrifice, the offerer must wash his body and his clothes in a river or spring before he entered a city or his own house.[2] In like manner, among the Jews the contact with the book of the Law or a phylactery 'defiled the hands,' and called for an ablution.[3] Among the Matabele of S. Africa, before the people ate of the new fruits they went down to the river to wash,[4] and before changing from one food to another the Eskimos must wash themselves,[5] as a kind of 'rite de passage.'

(*a*) *Childbirth.*—Birth, the attainment of puberty, marriage, death are great personal events associated with the mysteries of life, and at these times the individual is especially exposed to mystic and dangerous sacred forces. A pregnant woman is, in consequence of her condition, a dangerous person and one to be avoided until all traces of her 'sacredness' have been removed. Similarly, a newly-born infant is in fullest contact with the sacred world, and, therefore, he is subject to attacks from malignant influences, from which he must be guarded by rites. Like his parents, he is unclean, and, in consequence, some form of regeneration is necessary to remove this original taint.

The mother and child among the Koragars of West India are ceremonially unclean for five days, when both are restored to purity by a tepid bath.[6] The Hottentots considered a mother and child unclean till they had been washed and their bodies smeared with other purifying agents. Lustrations with water are common in W. Africa. The Mantras of the Malay Peninsula require their women to bathe after childbirth, and among the indigenes of India the custom also prevails.[7] The Aztec midwife washed the infant with the prayer, 'May this water purify and whiten thy heart: may it wash away all that is evil.'[8] The lustration speedily took definite form in the Mediterranean religions, and passed from the idea of washing away of defilement and sin to that of spiritual new birth. In the Isis rites the baptism with water was thought to raise the mortal to the divinity, although it is not clear that there was any ceremonial purification of the new-born infant with water in Greece. It appears that the rite called ἀμφιδρόμια, in which the infant was carried round the domestic hearth, took the place of a baptism by water.[9]

(*b*) *Initiation and marriage.*—Water is sometimes substituted for other purificatory rites (such as tatuing, setting the novice on a smoking fire, scourging, etc.) in initiation ceremonies.[10]

(*c*) *The shedding of blood.*—To the primitive mind nothing is more uncanny than blood. Life and death are the great primeval mysteries, and all the substances that are associated with the inner principle of either partake of this sacredness. For the savage what is sacred is also dangerous and a source of contagious impurity. Therefore, when a man has shed blood, he is tabu until the 'miasma' has been removed by purification rites.

In New Guinea warriors are secluded for about a week after their return from battle, during which time they may not come in contact with their wives, and they may not touch food with their hands. On the fifth day of his seclusion a man who has taken life walks solemnly down to the nearest water, after having been smeared with the spleen and liver of a kangaroo, and, standing straddle-legs in it, washes himself.[1] Among the Basutos warriors go straight from battle to a stream, where they purify themselves and their implements of war by washing away the tabu in the water, and putting themselves out of reach of the revenge of the slain.[2] Similar rites are performed by the Akikuyu, in which the final ablutions consist in cleansing with water.[3] In the Pelew Islands the young warriors, on their return from their first fight, are shut up for three days, and then, after smearing their bodies with charmed leaves and betel, bathe together as near as possible to the spot where the killing took place.[4] When a Pima Indian killed an enemy, he was tabu for sixteen days, and retired to the groves along the river bottom, or wandered about the adjoining hills. During this period he was forbidden to touch his head or his face, and before he might go to his home he had to bathe in the river, no matter how cold the temperature.[5]

(*d*) *Death.*—Contact with death and the spirit-world is a strong source of impurity in primitive society and, therefore, is the cause of tabus and purification rites. Bathing and fumigation are the most usual methods of purification. See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory), vol. iv. p. 434, § XIV.

(*e*) *Disease.*—Water is frequently regarded by primitive people as having the power to wash away sickness, especially if the disease is in the nature of skin eruption. The miraculous cure of Naaman ($2\ K\ 5^{10}$) reflects an ancient Semitic belief in the efficacy of water as a cure of leprosy. Of all inanimate things that which has the most marked supernatural virtues among the Semites is running (or, as the Hebrews said, 'living') water (cf. Nu $21^{17f.}$, Ezk $47^{9.\ 12}$). It is, therefore, not surprising that certain wells and rivers were credited with the power of healing.

In Babylonia a sick person was sprinkled with water while the priest pronounced certain sacred formulæ, having the power of 'cleansing' a patient from sickness. The water was specially sanctified for this purpose, and drawn from such sacred streams as the Tigris and Euphrates. One or more springs, and a *bît rimqi*, or 'bath-house,' were attached to every large temple, where purification rites were performed. Details of the rites varied in different cities, and there are indications that, even in later times, they were performed on the banks of running streams—perhaps a survival of the period when the incantation ritual did not form part of the official cult.[6] To this day a 'bath-house' is sometimes attached to synagogues, whither women resort monthly to cleanse themselves—a reminiscence, perhaps, of the old Semitic purification ritual, now restricted to women.[7]

The importance of water as a means of healing must have been greatly reinforced by the growth of Baal-worship, in which the deity as the giver of life was specially connected with life-giving waters. The indignation of Naaman when he was told to wash in Jordan, and his confidence that the rivers of Damascus were better than all the waters of Israel, probably arose from the idea that the Jordan was a sacred healing stream of the Hebrews, just as Abana and Pharpar were the sacred rivers of the Syrians, and not from any astonishment at being asked to perform a purification rite with which he must have been well acquainted. In the time of Antoninus Martyr[8] patients frequently bathed ceremonially by night

[1] See art. PURIFICATION (Introductory and Primitive).
[2] Porphyry, *de Abst.* ii. 44.
[3] W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, new ed., London, 1907, p. 452.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 70 f.
[5] *6 RBEW* [1884–85], p. 595. [6] *JAI* iv. [1874–75] 375.
[7] E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], ii. 432 f.
[8] B. de Sahagun, *Hist. general de las cosas de Nueva España*, Mexico, 1829, vi. 37.
[9] Schol. Plato, *Theæt.* 160 E.
[10] See examples in art. PURIFICATION (Introductory and Primitive), vol. x. p. 463 f.

[1] *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 213 f.
[2] E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, Eng. tr., London, 1861, p. 258.
[3] *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 264.
[4] J. Kubary, *Die socialen Einrichtungen der Pelauer*, Berlin, 1885, pp. 126 ff., 130.
[5] *26 RBEW* [1904–05], p. 204 f.
[6] M. Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York and London, 1911, p. 312 f.
[7] *JE* viii. 588.
[8] *De Locis Sanctis*, vii.; cf. Jn 5^{2-4} 9^{11}.

in the thermal waters of Gadara, and in the Middle Ages it was still believed that he who bathed in the springtime in the source of the Euphrates would be free from sickness for the whole year.[1]

In Europe water figures conspicuously in folk-lore as a means of preventing and curing disease.

Thus at Vitrolles in the south of France, during the Midsummer rites, the young people bathed in a pond in order that they might not suffer from fever during the year, and at Saintes-Maries they watered the horses to protect them from the itch.[2] Similarly, in Sweden, certain holy springs are supposed to be endowed with wonderful medicinal virtues on St. John's Eve, and many sick people resort to them for the healing of their infirmities.[3] At Stoole, near Downpatrick, in Ireland, on Midsummer Eve three wells, to which extraordinary virtues are attributed, are 'thronged by crowds of halt, maimed and blind, pressing to wash away their infirmities with water consecrated by their patron saint, and so powerful is its efficacy on their minds, that many of those who go to be healed, and who are not totally blind, or altogether crippled, really believe for a time that they are by means of its miraculous virtues perfectly restored.'[4] At Marsala in Sicily the sick resort to a spring in a subterranean grotto, called the Grotto of the Sibyl, to be cured of their diseases by bathing in the water,[5] just as on the same day the people of Copenhagen used to go on a pilgrimage to a neighbouring spring to heal and strengthen themselves in the water.[6] The famous grotto at Lourdes, which has been the reputed source of so many miracles since the alleged appearance of the Blessed Virgin to Bernadette Soubirous on 11th Feb. 1858, belongs, perhaps, to a different category, since the existence of the spring was unknown to the inhabitants prior to the apparitions.[7]

4. Water as a means of divination.—The use of water in divination has been common both in ancient and in modern times among people in a primitive state of culture.

Thus the Tahiti seek to discover the identity of a thief by digging a hole in the floor of the house in which the robbery occurred, and filling it with water; a priest then invokes the aid of his god to conduct the spirit of the thief to the water, so that his image may be reflected in it and perceived by the diviner.[8] In S.E. New Guinea a criminal's face is thought to be seen in a pool of water into which coco-nut oil has been squeezed.[9] The Malays discover a thief by two people holding a bowl of water between their fingers and presenting to it in writing the names of the suspected persons; at that of the guilty man it twists around and falls to the ground.[10] Among the Bahima of Central Africa a medicine-man puts herbs and coffee-berries into a pot of water and ascertains the wishes of the gods according to the direction in which the berries lie.[11] The Eskimos determine the fate of a man who has not returned from a voyage by causing a wizard to gaze into a tub of water.[12] In Greece the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the gods was declared by casting offerings into holy wells. If the gift was accepted, it sank; if it was unacceptable, it was cast forth.[13] At Delphi, to the east of Apollo's temple, there was a sacred spring which proceeded from a narrow gorge shut in by rocky walls, the waters of which were supposed to be oracular. The priestess of Apollo therefore drank of the sacred spring and chewed the sacred laurel before she prophesied.[14]

In Babylonia as early as the reign of Urukagina, king of Lagash (*c.* 2800 B.C.), there is evidence of divination by oil, and from the texts of a later period (*c.* 2000 B.C.) it appears that the method adopted consisted in pouring oil on the surface of water in a bowl, and determining future events by the behaviour of the bubbles when the water was struck.[15] In one of the texts the method is traced back to the legendary founder of the *bârû* priesthood.[16] Two of the texts, dating from the Hammurabi period, describe the signs to be observed in the mingling of oil and water, together with the interpretation thereof.[17] On the early monuments there is also an interesting allusion to the use of this method of divination by a ruler of the Cassite period (*c.* 1700 B.C.), before undertaking an expedition to a distant land to bring back the statues of Marduk and his consort, which had been carried off by an enemy.[1] In ancient Egypt divination did not play so conspicuous a part as in Babylonia and in the Hellenic world. The Egyptian texts do not mention hydromancy, although we know from the classics that Anubis was invoked by a vase full of liquid or a flame.[2] In the story of the homeward journey of Joseph's brethren (Gn $44^{1\text{-}15}$) from Egypt to Palestine mention is made of a divining cup (vv.[5. 15]), the purpose of which would seem to have been that of detecting a thief. 'Know ye not that such a man as I can indeed divine?' There is good reason to believe, however, that the episode connected with Joseph belongs to the Hyksos period,[3] and that the custom of divination by water was introduced into the valley of the Nile from the east by the invading 'shepherd kings.'

In modern times among the Slavs at Ceklinj, in Crnagora, maidens gaze into a well at daybreak on St. George's Day, till their eyes fill with tears and they think they see the image of their future husbands reflected in the water.[4] In the Highlands of Scotland apples and a sixpence were put in a tub of water at Hallowe'en for oracular purposes. The person who could extract either of these articles from the water with his mouth without using his teeth was regarded as likely to be very lucky. Similarly three plates were placed on the hearth, one filled with clean water, another with dirty water, and the third empty. A blindfold youth then knelt in front of the hearth and groped about till he put his finger in one of them. 'If he lighted on the plate with the clean water, he would wed a maid; if on the plate with the dirty water, he would marry a widow; and if on the empty plate, he would remain a bachelor. For a girl the answer of the oracle was analogous. . . . But to make sure, the operation had to be repeated thrice, the position of the plates being changed each time. If the enquirer put his or her finger into the same plate thrice or even twice, it was quite conclusive.'[5]

An oracle may very readily pass into an ordeal, where the person accused of a crime is tested by being subjected to a process which would normally prove fatal, or at least injurious to him. People accused of witchcraft and other offences are frequently tested by being compelled to drink water into which a poisonous substance has been placed. If the stomach rejects the draught, the accused is declared innocent and released; if, on the other hand, it is retained or evacuated by purging, he is pronounced guilty.[6]

5. Water-spirits and water-gods.—To say with Tylor that a 'belief in the existence of spiritual beings' constitutes the 'minimum definition of religion' is to forget that the outlook of primitive man is towards the sacred and mysterious rather than in the direction of the spiritual. Psychologically the religious sense manifests itself on the emotional side before the mind is capable of forming definite notions like spirits or gods. Primitive man sees around him certain phenomena which puzzle him, and, long before he has evolved a 'belief in spiritual beings,' he has come to explain mysterious objects in terms of the supernatural. Now, water is most certainly calculated to arouse in the primeval consciousness the animatistic attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious. Upon it man depends for his very existence, through its agency he sees the desert made to blossom as the rose, and in it he beholds the manifestation of life and movement, and even the power of death and destruction. He regards it therefore as possessed of *mana*, and, in consequence, sacred. But there is always a tendency to personify the sacred. The mysterious roll of thunder becomes associated with the voice of the tribal All-Father, and the magic downfall of rain is explained as the work of spirits or gods. So with water. Originally the Trojans regarded their sacred river, Skamandros, as containing *mana*, and by way of oblations cast live bulls and horses into its depths. In later times, when they had reached an animistic or theistic stage, Homer speaks of altars or shrines being erected on the river-bank, on which a bull was sacrificed, the belief being that the spirit in

1 W. R. Smith, p. 183.
2 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 194.
3 L. Lloyd, *Peasant Life in Sweden*, London, 1870, p. 261.
4 Quoted from *Hibernian Magazine*, July 1817, by Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 205 f.
5 *GB*[3], pt. v., *Adonis*, i. 247.
6 *Ib.* p. 248; cf. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], Berlin, 1875–78, i. 489.
7 Cf. art. LOURDES.
8 W. Ellis, *Polyn. Researches*, London, 1830, ii. 240.
9 H. Newton, *In Far New Guinea*, London, 1914, p. 89 f.
10 Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 540 f.
11 J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 135.
12 D. Crantz, *Hist. of Greenland*, London, 1767, i. 214.
13 W. R. Smith, p. 178.
14 Lucian, *Bis accusatus*, i.; cf. Pliny, *HN* ii. 232; Paus. IX. x. 5; *CGS* iv. 188 f.
15 *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1906, iii. pl. 2 ff., v. pl. 4 ff.
16 H. Zimmern, *Rituattafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschwörer und Sänger*, in *Beiträge*, Leipzig, 1896–1901, ii. 82 ff.
17 *Cun. Texts*, iii. pl. 2–5.

1 H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* v. pl. 33, col. ii. 8.
2 Pliny, *HN* xxxiii. 46; Plutarch, *de Iside*, lxi., lxiv.
3 E. A. W. Budge, *A History of Egypt*, London, 1902, iii. 133 ff.; W. M. Flinders Petrie, *A History of Egypt*, do. 1894, i. 233 ff., *Egypt and Israel*, do. 1911, p. 27.
4 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 345.
5 *Ib.* pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 237 f.
6 See art. ORDEAL (Introductory and Primitive).

the water, or the god of the stream, was capable of departing from his element to consume the essence of the offerings in the holy place on the shore.[1] We do not suggest, in quoting this example, that a stratigraphical evolution took place in early times. On the contrary, we regard the assumption of strata in the evolution of religion as the fundamental error in the universalistic form of the comparative method as adopted by Frazer.[2] The conception of the sacred river is undoubtedly psychologically a more rudimentary notion than the more complex animistic and theistic beliefs. But it can hardly be said that there was a pre-animistic era in the history of religion, when animism was not and nevertheless religion of a kind existed.[3] Some sort of animism may have been a primary condition of the most primitive religion of mankind, but it would seem that the vaguer and more comprehensive animatistic conception surrounded such objects as water from the beginning.

Among people in a more developed state of culture water-spirits and water-gods are of frequent occurrence. Stories of the Perseus and Andromeda type have been found from Japan and Annam to Scandinavia and Scotland, and, although the details vary with the locality, the central feature is always connected with the sacrifice of a human victim (generally a virgin) to a water-demon. It is, therefore, highly probable that these legends reflect a real custom of sacrificing girls to be the wives of water-spirits, since we know that girls are frequently married to river-gods, etc., in primitive society.[4] The custom may have arisen from the belief that water-spirits are the bestowers of life and fertility, whose kindly gifts of rain from above and springs from below produce pasture for the cattle and fruits for the service of man. In Syria the life-giving operation of Baal was connected with springs, streams, and underground water, and therefore the Baalim had their seats on the banks of rivers and by deep watercourses, in spots of natural fertility.[5] As authors of fertility in general, it is in accordance with the working of the primitive mind that these water-spirits should come to be regarded as the bestowers of offspring. Accordingly we find that barren women frequently betake themselves to a stream known to be inhabited by a water-spirit, and bathe in the waters.[6] Down to classical times girls bathed in the Skamandros before their marriage, praying as they did so, 'Skamander, take my virginity.'[7]

Sometimes, however, human beings are cast into water simply as a propitiatory sacrifice to appease the wrath of the indwelling spirit. The frequency with which maritime people are reminded of the dangers of the sea would naturally lead to a belief that water-spirits are dangerous and malignant beings capable of assuming monstrous forms.

Thus the Warramunga of Central Australia perform elaborate ceremonies to coerce a gigantic but purely mythical water-snake who is said to have destroyed a number of people.[8] The Tarahumares place their houses at a distance from the water, and never sleep near it when on a journey lest they should be molested by the indwelling spirit. Whenever they make weirs to catch fish, they are careful to offer fish to the water-serpent of the river.[9] To ensure a good catch of fish the fishermen of Efiat throw a human victim into the water at the mouth of the river,[1] and in the St. George's Day rites in England the Green George was thrown into the water to secure the favour of the water-spirits, as well as to make the meadows green in summer.[2] The idea of propitiating a malignant water-spirit is undoubtedly the underlying motive in the legend of Perseus and Andromeda, and in its mediæval counterpart of St. George and the Dragon.

LITERATURE.—Authorities have been given in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Babylonian).—**1. Water.**—The Babylonians divided their universe into three parts—the heavens, the earth, and the sea—which they personified as the gods Anu, Enlil, and Ea respectively. Each element was considered divine. But more emphasis was placed upon the divinity of the sea, because the water of 'the great deep' was considered the element out of which all things were generated. This 'great deep,' or Apsu, encircled the earth, was the source of all irrigation, and was the home of Ea, the god of waters. The Euphrates and the Tigris as children of the great deep were 'the soul of the land' and 'the bestower of blessings' respectively. But there was a sense in which the waters were regarded as an agent of destruction, viz. in their appearance in the form of violent rains and floods. Under this aspect they were personified as Tiamāt, the Tēhōm of Gn 1, an aspect which is much emphasized in the Old Testament. There Tēhōm is opposed to Jahweh, and is the cause of much dread to the people.[3] In Babylonia, however, the beneficent aspect of water comes more to the front. It was not only one of the commonest of natural phenomena, appearing as rivers, streams, seas, lakes, ponds, brooks, springs, fountains, wells, mist, dew, rain, hail, snow, ice, vapour, fog, and clouds, but also indispensable to men, animals, and vegetables. Water was divine and holy, and as such was worshipped as a god. It played a very important part in omens and oracles and all kinds of magic. It could dispel demons, wash away disease, and purge from sin. It acted as a divine power in decisions by ordeal, and in it flowed the blood of the gods.

The Babylonians believed that all waters were peopled by living creatures, actual and mythical, some of which were beneficent and others harmful. The *anunnaki* (*a*, 'water,' and *nun*, 'strength') were probably beneficent water-spirits, and the seven[4] *utukku* were demons of the sea. Both spirits and demons were controlled by Ea, or by the ferryman who kept watch over the river of death, who was called Arad-Ea, 'servant of Ea.' Water, being thus associated with divine beings, was usually considered the source of life, and at Eridu there was a sacred spring which figured in early Babylonian mythology and incantation rituals.

Because of its sacred properties, water played the chief rôle in incantations. Ea, by virtue of his being a water-god, was the most prominent figure in the ritual of incantations, being called the great physician. But Marduk, in later times, usurped much of his power, and always acted as mediator between the patient and Ea. The Ea-ritual in incantations involved washing and sprinkling of the body of the patient with water from the Euphrates or Tigris or from some bubbling source coming directly out of the earth. Then an image was made of the demon or sorcerer who controlled the victim, and it was placed in a boat. The image was drowned in sacred water, and the patient was relieved.[5]

2. Water-gods.—Babylonia was always sorely dependent upon her streams and canals, and this partly accounts for her numerous water-gods. But

[1] *Il.* xx. 4, v. 7, xxi. 130.
[2] E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, London, 1917, pp. 2, 153 f.
[3] R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914, p. ix.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 150, 152 f.
[5] W. R. Smith, pp. 100, 102.
[6] S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, Chicago and London, 1902, p. 117 ff.; cf. Paus. II. xv. 5, V. vii. 2 ff.; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908, p. 434.
[7] Æschines, *Epist.* x. [8] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 226 ff.
[9] C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, i. 402.

[1] H. Goldie, *Calabar and its Mission*, Edinburgh and London, 1901, p. 43.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 76.
[3] Ps 93[4] 104[6] 135[6] 184. [4] Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. 2, col. v.
[5] For details see M. Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1905, i. 273 ff.

more important in the minds of the people were the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris and the Persian Gulf. Being mysterious, often beneficent, frequently destructive, never subject to control, they were considered from the very earliest times as manifestations of divine beings. They were worshipped, propitiated, and supplicated. All things, good and bad, came from them, and from them was no escape.

The source of all water was thought to be situated at the head of the Persian Gulf, or to *be* the head of the Persian Gulf. At a very early period this was personified and called **Ea**,[1] 'the house of water.'[2] Ea's home was at Eridu on the shore of the Persian Gulf. He was called *šar apsi*, 'king of the abyss,' but more especially, perhaps, he was god of the sweet waters which were believed to be under the earth and to fill streams, canals, and rivers. Tiamāt personified the salt waters. Ea and his consort, Damkina, are often represented as dwelling in the great deep, and hence it is that he was often worshipped as Dagan, the fish-god. As a water-god, all fountains and streams were sacred to him. Water, being a sacred, healing, and fertilizing agency, became the symbol of life, and Ea was the great physician. Because of the universal utility of water, Ea was claimed by all Babylonia as its champion, and, according to the Legend of Creation, when the gods decided to destroy mankind, Ea interceded. He befriended the Babylonian Noah, Ut-napištim, advising him to build a vessel so as to be prepared for the approaching deluge. He thus became the wise one, who taught men all the arts, and who even created mankind. Ea's consort was sometimes called Dam-gal-nun-na, 'great wife of the deep,' her Sumerian name being Nin-ki, 'lady of the earth'; but she was also called 'queen of the deep.' The god himself sometimes appeared under the name Nin-a-gal, 'god of great strength.' Ea is represented on a seal cylinder as sitting on his throne, while Damkina is leading a worshipper into his presence. The great fish or capricorn under the seat is the symbol of the god.[3] Sometimes he is seen carrying a vase of water with flowing streams and fish, and standing on a capricorn.[4] He is very often represented in the form of a fish, or of a man covered by the skin of a fish. In Assyria Ea appears as 'king of the ocean,' 'opener of fountains,' 'creator,' and god of wisdom. He is described by Berosus, under the name Oannes, as 'a creature endowed with reason, with a body like that of a fish, with feet below like those of a man, with a fish's tail.' When Babylon became prominent in the time of Ḫammurabi, Marduk was classified as son of Ea, and collaborated with him in incantations, being associated, as Ea was, with waters of life.

Adad (Sumerian, ^{d}Im), or **Ramman**, was a god of rain and lord of subterranean waters. He was never associated with any particular city, nor was he a very early Sumerian deity. He came from the west-lands, where he was a solar deity. In Babylonia he was usually associated with the destructive aspect of rain when accompanied by thunder and lightning, although sometimes he was considered a vegetation-god. Ḫammurabi, in the epilogue to his Code, calls upon Adad to deprive his enemy 'of the rain from heaven and the water-floods from the springs.' Nebuchadrezzar I. calls him 'the lord of springs and rains,'[5] and Meli-Shipak beseeches him to bestow 'abundant streams.'[1] Adad was symbolized by a thunderbolt, was associated with the sky-god, Anu, at Aššur, and often appeared under the name Numušda. Although Enlil was known as a rain-god[2] and was supposed to have brought on the flood, he was not very prominent as a water-deity. In like manner **Aššur**, the great Assyrian war-god, was associated with water as a corn- and water-deity and as a god of fertility, but his rôle as such was not very important. Innini, primarily the heavenly queen, was a water-goddess. She is represented with serpents and blades of grass, which in Oriental art are associated with water and vegetation. She bore the title *azag-sug*, 'sacred libator,' and, like Ašnan, a grain-goddess, was described as goddess of the 'holy meal water.'[3] **Ištar**, the great mother-goddess and goddess of love, was also prominently associated with water. She referred to herself as 'daughter of the ocean stream';[4] she was connected with the cleansing power of water; she was patroness of streams and canals, without whom 'no stream is opened, no stream is closed, which brings life,' without whom 'no canal is opened, no canal is closed, which gives the wide-dwelling peoples to drink';[5] and she is addressed as 'thou that rulest over springs and mountains and seas.'[6] She is represented in art with a vase of water. Besides being identified with Kir-gi-lu, or Nin-kir-gi-lu, a rain-goddess,[7] she appears as Ninā, Ea's daughter, who was originally a water-deity, and quite distinct from Ištar. But from time to time the goddesses Ištar, Ninā, Innini, and Anunit were confused one with another. Ninā was the goddess who rode upon the sea in a boat, was at one time known as Geštinanna, 'queen of waters,' and was a fish-goddess. In fact, her name is written with the ideogram which means 'goddess of the fish-house.' In time she became sister of Ningirsu, lord of the freshets. She was also called Nin-en and Nin-en-na-ge, 'lady of incantation.'[8] Ninā was also identified with **Išḫara**, goddess of water-animals, whose symbol was the scorpion,[9] and who bore the title, *tiamāt* (dragon) of the primeval waters (*^{ua}iš-ḫa-ra tiamat*).[10] Išḫara appeared at an earlier period as Išḫana, 'heavenly goddess of the fish-house,' and daughter of Ea, and still earlier as Ešḫa. Ur-Bau built a temple to **KU-anna** in Girsu. He says that she deluges the land with water, and it would thus seem that she was a storm-goddess. **Marduk**, who became the mighty god of Babylon, absorbed the attributes of many inferior deities. He succeeded Ninā as god of incantation by water; he was made a water-god, being Ea's son; and his consort was **Zer-panitum**, 'the lady of the abyss.' He became all-powerful, and was called 'king of the abyss.' A hymn says of him: 'Command the sea and the sea obeyeth';[11] he was addressed as 'lord of the mountain stream and of water, opener of sources and cisterns, controller of streams';[12] and he is represented in company with a water-dragon, and standing above the watery deep. His cult has been traced to Eridu. **Nabu**, a patron deity of Borsippa and son of Marduk, was a

[1] His Sumerian name was En-ki, 'lord of the earth.'

[2] *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum*, xxiv. 15, 50, xlix. 5.

[3] J. Menant, *Catalogue méthodique et raisonné de la Collection de Clercq*, Paris, 1886–90, no. 106.

[4] W. H. Ward, *Cylinders and Other Ancient Oriental Seals*, New York, 1909, no. 95.

[5] L. W. King, *Babylonian Boundary-Stones and Memorial Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1912, p. 36.

[1] King, *Babylonian Boundary-Stones*, p. 20.

[2] *CT* xv. 11. 13–16.

[3] S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909, p. 158. 64.

[4] S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914, p. 138.

[5] J. A. Craig, *Assyrian and Babylonian Religious Texts*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1895–97, vol. i. pl. 15, ll. 15–17.

[6] Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, p. 57. [7] *CT* xv. 23.

[8] F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königsinschriften* (hereafter cited as *SAK*), Leipzig, 1907, p. 263.

[9] S. A. B. Mercer, *Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature*, Paris, 1912, *passim*.

[10] *CT* xxvi. 42. 10. [11] *WAI* iv. 26, no. 4, l. 5*f*.

[12] See J. Hehn, *Hymnen und Gebete an Marduk* (*BASS* v.), p. 325.

counterpart of Ea. He was therefore a water-god and god of vegetation. He was also a god of wisdom, and as such was associated with the watery deep. In later times his character as a water-god was overshadowed by that of wisdom, and he became secretary of the gods and inspirer of mankind. His symbol was the stylus with which he recorded the decisions of fate. **Nâru** was a water-deity, but his or her character is otherwise unknown. Langdon says he was 'probably a male deity,'[1] although he also refers to her as a river-goddess.[2] **Nidaba**, a grain-goddess, was closely connected with the water-goddess Ninâ-Išḫara, one of her titles being *nu-maš-še-gín-nu*, which Langdon connects with *numašše*, a title of Ninâ. J. Krauss[3] likewise identifies Lugal-ki-sī-a, a consort of Ninâ, with Lugul-ki-sa-a, a consort of Nidaba. Ninâ refers to Nidaba as her sister,[4] and is called the 'holy reed-Nidaba';[5] and, on a seal dedicated to Naram-Sin, Nidaba is connected with the water-goddess Ninâ.[6] **Ninakha-kuddu**, also known as **Nin-karrak** and **Gula**, was a goddess of purification, and was connected with Ea and Eridu. In incantation texts she is associated with Ea and is called 'the lady of incantation.' In like manner **Ninhabursildu**, goddess of pure fountain-water, was queen of incantations. She was symbolized by a jar of holy water (*egubbû*). The war-god **Ninib** preserved water attributes. As the first-born of Ea, he was known as 'lord of wells and of the sea' and 'opener of wells.' He was therefore also a vegetation-god. According to a hymn to Enmešarra,[7] **Ningirsu**, brother of Ninâ, was connected with irrigation. It is there said, 'Great lord, without whom Ningirsu does not direct the water-course and canal.' He was also associated with Scorpio and the scorpion of Išḫara. The Sumerian name of **Tammuz** is Dumu-zi-abzu, 'the faithful child of the deep.'[8] Tammuz was called 'the real son of the deep,' and belonged to the family of Ea.[9] Of course he is well known as the Babylonian corn-spirit, who dies and comes to life again every year. He was one of Sumeria's oldest gods, and, when the Sumerians moved into the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Tammuz became a god of the fertilizing waters. He was then called *bêl girsû*, 'lord of the flood,'[10] and under this name or its equivalent, Nin-girsu, he became the local lord of Lagash. Belonging to the Eridu circle, he employed the holy water of the great basin, *pašiš apsî*, in incantations, and as the youthful god *par excellence* he represented the beneficent waters which flooded the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates in winter and which died away in summer. He bore the title ^{d}Niba-alam, 'image of Ea.' Many hymns were sung to Tammuz as vegetation-god, but in them there is frequent reference to his water attributes. The death of Tammuz was said to have been marked by the cessation of libating the waters of Eridu, but drowning in the waters was meant to induce Tammuz to send refreshing floods.[11]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

S. A. B. MERCER.

[1] *Babylonian Liturgies*, Paris, 1913, p. 140.
[2] *PSBA* xl. [1918] p. 45, n. 47.
[3] *Die Götternamen in den babylonischen Siegelcylinderlegenden*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 7.
[4] *SAK*, p. 94, col. 5, l. 25. [5] *RAssyr* vii. [1910] 107.
[6] W. H. Ward, *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910, p. 136.
[7] Craig, *Assyr. and Bab. Relig. Texts*, vol. i. pl. 13.
[8] In the great theological list in *CT* xxiv. pl. 16, l. 30, Tammuz is called 'the faithful son of the fresh waters which come forth from the earth.'
[9] Ur-Bau erected a temple to him in Girsu (*SAK*, p. 60, col. 6, ll. 9–12).
[10] Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, p. 160, l. 14, note 9, *Babylonian Liturgies*, p. 96.
[11] *RAssyr* viii. [1911] 161, col. i. 12; Langdon, *Tammuz and 'shtar*, passim.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Egyptian). — **1. Water.**—The Egyptians believed in a primeval watery mass, deep and boundless, out of which had come into existence the heavens, the earth, and everything that is in them. The germs of all life, human and divine, were in the watery mass, which was personified and received the name Nu. It was eternal, and part male and part female. The lowest circle of the watery mass was described as 'Osiris who encircles the under world'; but the whole watery realm was frequently identified or summarized as the ocean or the Nile. It was believed that the Nile sprang from the great watery abyss and divided into two rivers—the one the Nile of Egypt, and the other that of which it was said, 'Great and mighty is the river of the sky, flowing across the heavens and through the Duat, the world of night and thick darkness, and on that river floats the boat of Rā.' In other words, there were two rivers which sprang out of the watery abyss—an earthly and a heavenly. Water was sacred to the Egyptians and possessed all the qualities of a divine being. In all lakes, rivers, fountains, wells, and streams the divine essence was resident. For this reason all fish[1] were sacred, and were venerated from the earliest to the latest dynastic times. Those fish venerated at Latopolis and Oxyrhynchus were eaten sacramentally on the ninth day of the month Thoth. Some water-animals were even given names as deities—*e.g.*, the hippopotamus (Taurt) and the crocodile (Sebek). Fish were thus considered the abode of the gods.

Because of the divine character of water, it was considered fortunate to be drowned, a drowned person being sometimes regarded as a deity. Osiris was drowned,[2] just as Ino of Greece and Bhairwanand in India. The greatest service one could render a god was to be drowned, and thus be united with him. The word for 'drown,' *ḥsy*, originally meant 'praise.'[3] Gods and great men loved to be associated with sacred water; thus the 'mother of Mendes' is depicted carrying a fish upon her head, and Rameses II. was credited with powers as a rain-maker. To control divine water was greatly desired. Chapters lvii. and lviii. of the *Book of the Dead* are called 'The Chapter . . . of having the Mastery over the Water in the Underworld,' and the suppliant prays: 'Grant that I may have dominion over the water.' Water is not only a fertilizing and destroying force, to which offerings are made, but also a means of warding off demons. It played a great rôle in lustrations and incantations.

As a deity water was worshipped. The water worship of Canopus and its cult in Egypt are well known.[4] There were many instances of sacrifice to water, the victims being usually bulls, horses, or human beings. Even as men were sacrificed to the Tiber in Rome, and to the Ganges in India, so in Egypt human beings, especially girls, were sacrificed to the Nile. A favourite place for an altar, therefore, was on the banks of the Nile. But all streams and fountains, lakes and rivers, were the abode of spirits, which had to be propitiated.[5]

Even as Egypt was the gift of the Nile, so all life was sustained by the Nile, and the Nile was the water of life; and, as the inhabitants of Egypt depended upon the waters of the Nile for daily life, so the departed are represented as drinking the water of life from the celestial Nile. In this world sacred water was used for purification, and in pre-

[1] E. Mahler, 'Das Fischsymbol auf ägyp. Denkmälern,' *ZDMG* lxvii. [1913] 37–48.
[2] *ZÄ* xxxix. [1903] 41, pls. i., ii.
[3] *Ib.* xlvi. [1910] 132 ff.
[4] *Ib.* l. [1914] 132; Athanasius, *in Gent.* 24 (*PG* xxv. 48).
[5] *GB*^{3}, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii 155 ff.

paration for the next world it was used in an interesting ceremony called the 'Opening of the Mouth,' which consisted of sprinkling or pouring water over the statue of the departed to make it a pure abode for the *ka*. This ceremony not only purified and sanctified the person represented by the statue, but also removed from him all possibility of decay and death in the world to come.[1]

2. Water-gods.—At a time which antedates the earliest records Egyptians had deified the Nile and worshipped it under the name Ḥāpi.[2] In the Pyramid Texts his name occurs[3] as that of a well-established god. It was natural that such should be the case, for Egypt's welfare depended more upon the Nile than upon any other one thing. Because of the two great divisions of Egypt, Ḥāpi was worshipped with some distinctions in both north and south. In the north he was Ḥāp-Meḥt and in the south he was Ḥāp-Reset. But there were not two gods, for Ḥāpi is represented holding two plants, the papyrus and the lotus, or two vases from which the North and South Nile poured. He is usually depicted in the form of a man, with hanging breasts from which water streams, wearing the sign of water and holding lotus-flowers. Ḥāpi was at an early time identified with the primeval watery mass, personified as the god Nu, or, at least, he absorbed Nu's attributes. Because of the mystery to the Egyptians of the cause of the Nile's inundations, Ḥāpi's being was always shrouded in mystery.

In a hymn to the Nile it is said of him that he 'cannot be figured in stone, he is not to be seen in the image on which are set the crown of the South and the North with their uraei, offerings cannot be made to him, he cannot be brought forth from his secret places, his dwelling-place is not to be found out, he is not to be found in the shrines which are inscribed with texts, there is no habitation which is sufficiently large for him to dwell in, and the heart [of man] is unable to depict him.'[4]

Because of his great reputation, he was called 'father of the gods,' 'creator of things which exist,' 'vivifier,' 'the lord of fishes,' was identified with Osiris, Amon, and Ptaḥ, and was considered greater than Rā. In later times a festival of the annual rise of the Nile was celebrated with great solemnity throughout Egypt—an event mentioned by Heliodorus.[5] Hekataeus[6] speaks of a sanctuary of the Nile, and the early Church Fathers bear witness to his worship.[7] During the Nile festivals[8] hymns were sung to Ḥāpi in which the worshippers said:

'Offerings are made, oxen are slain to thee, great festivals are kept for thee, fowls are sacrificed to thee, beasts of the field are caught for thee, pure flames are offered to thee.'

Even the Nile's inundations were personified and called **Bāḥ**, and the waters of the Nile were sometimes deified as **Ānket**, a goddess, usually represented in the form of a woman with a crown of feathers on her head, arranged in such a way as to suggest a savage origin. Originally she was a goddess of some island in the First Cataract, but she was later identified with Nephthys. She personified the waters of the Nile which embrace and fructify the fields. She is sometimes pictured in a boat, seated in a shrine, with a table of offerings before her. **Set**, the personification of the forces of water which were supposed to resist light and order, was symbolized by the serpent **Āpep**, the great monster of the deep, whose four heads represent the four sources of the Nile. **Ageb** is mentioned in the Pyramid Texts as a god of the deep. **Hathor**, the cow-goddess and personification of the house in which Horus dwelt, was one of the oldest of Egypt's goddesses. She was the principal counterpart of Rā, and became the great mother-goddess. She was identified astronomically with the star Sepṭ, and was thereby connected with the rise of the Nile preparatory to its inundation. Being the mother of all, she was easily identified with phases of the Nile. There were supposed to be seven Hathors, but this is not surprising, since her popularity as mother-goddess caused many secondary deities to be identified with her and gave rise to a Hathor cult in many localities. She is represented in many forms and attitudes, but none is more interesting than a picture in a Theban tomb which depicts her in a persea-tree giving drink to a soul in Amentet. **Hekes**, 'lord of the mouth of the rivers,' is a rarely met god with stellar characteristics.[1] **Isis**, or **Ast**, was in pre-dynastic times a water-spirit or river-goddess, probably Libyan in origin. From the earliest to the latest times she was Egypt's greatest goddess, the beneficent goddess and mother, the highest type of the faithful, a loving wife and mother, the mother of Horus, the giver of food and life to the dead, 'wife of the lord of the abyss,' 'wife of the lord of the inundation,' and 'creatrix of the Nile flood.' As the power of the Nile, she was called Sati and Sepṭ, and, as the embracer of the land and producer of fertility by means of water, she was called Ānket. She was the female counterpart of the primeval abyss from which all life sprang, and she was so popular that at an early period she absorbed all characteristics of other goddesses. She was not only a water-deity, but also an earth-, corn-, and star-goddess. She is usually depicted as a woman with vulture head-dress and with a papyrus-sceptre in her hand. Sometimes she is crowned with a pair of horns, between which is a solar disk, surmounted by the sign for 'seat,' the symbol of her name. With the horns and disk are often two plumes; and sometimes she wears the double crown of Egypt, to the back of which is attached the feather *mȧȧt*. Her symbol was the star Sepṭ, which announced the inundation of the Nile. In the Roman period elaborate ceremonies, related by Apuleius and Pausanias, were conducted in connexion with the use of a vessel of Nile water in the Isis festival, which took place at the time of the Nile's inundation. **Khnemu**, the first member of the great triad, Khnemu, Satet, and Anḳet, at Ābu, or Elephantinē, was originally a river- or water-god, as were the other members of the triad. He was often identified with Nu and Ḥāpi. He was one of the oldest of Egypt's gods, being mentioned in the text of Uni. He was without doubt a pre-dynastic god, symbolized by the flat-horned ram from the East. At a very early period he became god of the Nile and of the annual Nile flood, and as such bore the name Ḳebḥ. He was called 'maker of heaven and earth, and Duat, the waters, and the mountains.' He says of himself, 'I am the primeval watery abyss, and I am the Nile who riseth at his will.' As a water-god, he became almost universal in Egypt, uniting in himself the attributes of Rā, Geb, and Osiris, and with his four rams' heads represented the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—and perhaps also the four sources of the Nile. He is depicted in the form of a ram-headed man, and, as a water-god, he is seen with outstretched hands over which

[1] E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of Opening the Mouth*, 2 vols., London, 1909, *passim*.

[2] A. Erman holds that the original form of the name was *ḥāpr* (*ZĀ* xliv. [1908] 114), but A. H. Gardiner suggests the possibility of *ḥyrp* or *ḥrp* (*ZĀ* xlv. [1909] 140 f.).

[3] *E.g.*, K. Sethe, *Die altägyptischen Pyramidentexte*, Leipzig, 1908, § 149.

[4] E. A. W. Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 147. Yet there are statues of him in the British Museum, in the Museum in Florence, in Turin, in the Cairo Museum, and in the Isis temple at Philæ.

[5] *Æthiop.* ix. 9.

[6] Stephen of Byz. *FHG* i. 277.

[7] F. Zimmermann, *Die ägyp. Religion nach der Darstellung der Kirchenschriftsteller und der ägyp. Denkmäler*, Paderborn, 1912, p. 72.

[8] An excellent description of two Nile festivals instituted by Rameses II. is to be seen in Lepsius, iii. 175*a*, 200*d*, 218*d*.

[1] *RTr* xxi. [1899] 3; cf. Sethe, § 452.

flows water. He is sometimes represented with a jug above his horns. His worship was especially common in that part of Egypt extending from Philæ to Thebes. **Meḥt-wrt**, the emblem of the primeval female creative principle, and the name of the celestial cow, was originally a female personification of the watery matter which formed the substance out of which the world proceeded. She is a pre-dynastic goddess, and is mentioned in the texts of Uni. **Meret**, depicted with an aquatic plant on her head, and therefore a water-goddess, was associated with Mut. Her name occurs in a dual form, Merti, and as such represented the Southern and Northern Nile. **Mut**, the great mother-goddess, 'who giveth birth, but was herself not born of any,' was an ancient water-goddess. She was called 'the watery one,' 'the watery flood,' and as such was called the wife of the Nile. Her principal temple was in Asher, a quarter of Thebes, which probably derived its name from the sacred lake which existed there. **Neit**, one of the oldest of Egyptian goddesses, was the personification of a form of the great primeval watery mass. At a later period she was represented with bow and arrows as a goddess of war and of the chase. **Nu**, in pre-dynastic Egypt, was the personification of the watery mass of heaven, whose counterpart was Nut. He was called 'the great god whose dwelling is in the waters of the sky,' and was sometimes identified with Kheper, the self-created one. He was ordinarily represented as an obese man, like the Nile, with whom he was often identified. **Nut** was the personification of the female aspect of the great watery mass out of which all things came. She was the daughter of Shu and Tefnut, the wife of Geb, and mother of Osiris, Isis, Nephthys, and Set. She is usually represented as a woman with a vase of water on her head. She sometimes wears the horns and disk of Hathor, and holds a papyrus-sceptre and sign of life in her hand. She is also depicted as a woman standing in a sycamore-tree pouring out water from a vase. In the *Book of the Dead* a suppliant prays, 'Grant thou to me of the water and of the air which dwell in thee.' Her attributes were many, because, like all water-deities, she absorbed the characteristics of many minor deities, and was recognized and worshipped in many different places in Egypt. **Osiris** was the god of the dead *par excellence*. He may have originally been a human being who was deified. When such transformation was made cannot be decided. But from the earliest dynastic period till the latest he was worshipped. He became the most popular, best known, and most powerful Egyptian deity. But what interests us is that he was originally a water-spirit or god of some portion of the waters of the Nile, and with the passage of time he became a great water-god, representing in general the creative and nutritive powers of the Nile, and particularly the inundation.[1] As a Nile-god he naturally became a creative and generative power. And, just as the Nile sank and rose, so Osiris died and rose again, becoming thus the god of resurrection. Osiris was depicted in many forms, the most usual being that of a mummy with a beard and wearing the white crown and a *menat*. He was from time to time identified with most of the greatest gods until he attained a position which made him appear as the natural god of Egypt. As a water-deity he was identified with Ḥāpi, and later with Nu, representing water as a life-giving element. As there were thought to be four sources of the Nile, so Osiris had four birth-genii, for he was the Nile personified. Plutarch records the belief of the Egypt of his day when he says that Osiris was looked upon as not only the Nile but also the ocean. Osorkon II., as an embodiment of Osiris, was represented with streams of water pouring from his hands.[1] In the Nebseni papyrus of the *Book of the Dead* Osiris himself says, 'I flood the land with water and Great Black One is my name'; and in the papyrus of Nu he says, 'I am the god of inundation and Great Black One of the Lake is my name'; and in a hymn to Osiris it is said of him, 'Thou drawest thy waters from the abyss of heaven.' **Ptaḥ**, sometimes considered the oldest of gods, was a co-worker with Khnemu in creation. He was identified with many other gods as well as with Nu, the primeval abyss, and with Ḥāpi, and he was called 'lord of fish.' **Rem** was perhaps the personification of Rā's tears. He may have been the same as **Remi**,[2] who was probably a fish-god, and associated with Sebek, a personification of Nu. **Sati**, originally connected with the chase, was worshipped at the First Cataract, where she was associated with Khnemu. Her name probably refers to the falling waters of the Cataract. She thus became a goddess of inundation, who pours out and spreads over the land the life-giving waters of the Nile. She is usually represented in human form with a high conical crown. **Sebek**, as lord of the Fayyum and deified crocodile, was most probably a water-god. **Selhet** was a scorpion-deity, and one of the four goddesses who assisted Nu and protected the four sources of the Nile. **Tetenen** was usually identified with Ptaḥ, and sometimes with Nu. **Tefnut** was a rain-goddess whose male counterpart was Shu. She was the personification of the moisture of the sky. They were both born of the great watery mass. The cult of Tefnut does not seem to have been associated with any special city.

LITERATURE.—On this subject there exist no separate articles, monographs, or books. Besides original texts, the literature used has been mentioned in the course of the article. Special mention should be made of E. A. W. Budge's great work, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols., London and Chicago, 1904.

S. A. B. MERCER.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Greek and Roman).—**I. Greek.**—The account given in art. NATURE (Greek) includes much information on this subject which need not be repeated here, especially as to the cult of river-gods, nymphs, and similar divinities. There are, however, certain aspects of the subject which require some addition.

The worship of rivers or of water generally as the origin of life was one expression of a belief which is also found in early speculation and philosophy. Thus Homer[3] speaks of Ὠκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, and says[4] that Ocean is the origin of all things. Hesiod fits Oceanus and Tethys into his *Theogony*[5] as children of Earth and Heaven. Ocean, according to the Homeric conception, was regarded as a river flowing round and bounding the earth; thus it was set around the rim of the shield of Achilles.[6] It is personified in art as an elderly man with flowing locks and beard, but has little importance in religious cult.

The gods of the sea may be divided into two classes: (1) the elemental beings who constantly occur in folk-lore and popular belief, and (2) the clearly defined and personal Olympian gods who rule over the sea. The former had as a rule little importance in the official worship, though we hear of a public cult of the Old Man of the Sea (Ἅλιος Γέρων) at Byzantium. Triton, Proteus, Glaucus, Nereus, and the Nereids have many of the qualities attributed to sea-divinities or dæmons

[1] E. Naville, *The Festival-Hall of Osorkon II. in the Great Temple of Bubastis* (*EEFM* x.), London, 1892, pl. xi.

[2] E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, London, 1898, clxxviii. 13.

[3] *Il.* xiv. 201.

[4] *Ib.* 246.

[5] 133–136.

[6] *Il.* xviii. 607

[1] E. A. W. Budge, *ad loc.*

in the folk-lore of various nations, such as the gift of soothsaying or foretelling the future, and the power of transforming themselves into various shapes. Thus Proteus, when seized by Menelaus, changed into various beasts, and into water, and could change into fire; but, if bound, he could be compelled to impart his knowledge. Similarly Thetis, the Nereid, changed into various forms when seized by the mortal Peleus. In the systematized religion of Greece all these were regarded as subordinate to Poseidon as supreme god of the sea. In this capacity Poseidon was associated with Amphitrite, possibly an old goddess or impersonation of the sea, though in later mythology sometimes regarded as one of the Nereids. She is often represented in art as the consort of Poseidon, both in the assembly of the gods on Olympus and in her bridal procession, which is escorted by Tritons and Nereids on hippocamps and other sea-monsters; but she has no important place in official worship. Poseidon, on the other hand, is one of the chief gods of the State worship of many Greek cities, and was regarded as the ancestor of many leading families, especially among the Ionians and Minyans. The tale of his contest with Athene for the land of Attica is familiar, and was the subject of the western pediment of the Parthenon. The Isthmian games at Corinth were celebrated in his honour. As god of the sea, Poseidon can arouse and pacify storms, and so is appealed to by seafarers; but it is noteworthy that, in the greatest of sea-poems, the *Odyssey*, he appears as a malignant, rather than a beneficent, god. He has little or nothing to do with ships. The Argo was built under the direction of Athene, and mariners often attribute their safety to Aphrodite Euploia or to the Dioscuri rather than to him. Odysseus owed his safety to Ino Leucothea, who was often appealed to by sailors.

As sea-god Poseidon is the sender of earthquakes (Ἐννοσίγαιος). He split the mountains to make the ravine of Tempe, and hurled about or submerged islands. Salt springs inland are also attributed to him. By a symbolism which is common and easy to understand, waves are often compared to sea-horses; and either the origin of the horse or its training to human service is attributed to Poseidon Hippios. Horses were sacrificed to him, sometimes by being thrown into the sea. The bull also was especially sacred to him, and bull-taming exhibitions were held in his honour. In connexion with this we are reminded of the mixed human and bull form often taken by river-gods.

We might naturally expect Poseidon, as the chief sea-god, to give victory in sea-fights; and in fact Persian galleys were dedicated to him at the Isthmus and at Sunium after the great naval victory at Salamis. But other gods often received thank-offerings for such victories.

A characteristic of all water-divinities and dæmons, from Poseidon down, in later Greek art is an expression of restless and passionate yearning, which is attributed to them as impersonating the restlessness of their element and its desire to embrace and engulf the land and its creatures. Apart from representations of sea-gods, the sea itself is often represented in art by conventional wave-patterns and by dolphins, fishes, and other sea-creatures.

2. Roman.—Here also the art. NATURE (Roman) gives most of the information required. The Romans were not a seafaring people, and their god Neptunus was not originally a sea-god, though he came later to be identified with the Greek Poseidon; but he may have been a *numen* associated with water, though very little is known as to his primitive worship. He appears, however, to be a god of springs, and so associated in worship with the nymphs. The worship of the nymphs in connexion with springs was very widespread in Italy and throughout the Roman empire, though it is not easy to distinguish how much was merely borrowed from Greece. Their frequent representations in art, like those of river-gods, evidently follow Greek models. The Camenæ, associated with soothsaying and poetry, appear to have been spring-goddesses in origin; and the nymph Egeria, Numa's counsellor, also had a similar character. River-gods, nymphs (often holding shells), and similar representations of water-deities are very common in Græco-Roman art, but they do not, as a rule, bear any distinctively Italian character. A more original conception is that of the famous figure of Jupiter Pluvius, the rain-god, on the Antonine Column,[1] who is represented hovering over the armies with outspread wings, and pouring down rain in torrents from his beard and outstretched arms. Such a naturalistic personification is alien to Greek anthropomorphism, and much more akin to mediæval and modern symbolism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to works quoted in artt. NATURE (Greek) and (Roman), articles in Roscher on 'Okeanos,' 'Poseidon,' 'Neptunus,' etc.; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, 2 vols., Munich, 1897–1906; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Cultus der Römer*, do. 1902, ²1912; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, 5 vols., Oxford, 1896–1910, iv. 1–97.

E. A. GARDNER.

WATER (Hebrew and Jewish).—The importance attached to water in Jewish belief and practice is so great that it embraces almost every manifestation of life, and can best be studied in the following subdivisions: (1) cosmogony, in its widest sense, (2) lustration, (3) rain.

1. Cosmogony.—According to the record of the Bible, the primordial element of creation was water. Only by the separation between the waters above and the waters below could the earth appear, but the waters above the firmament were not entirely separated from those that were gathering below, first into a great sea and then into rivers and fountains of the deep. On the contrary, an intimate connexion between the two was continually kept up.[2] A connexion was believed to exist between the upper and lower waters in the form of pipes which led from the heavens above to the sea below, and through the medium of such pipes the waters that had come down from above, and which slowly gathered into the sea, were sucked up into the heavens, thence to descend again upon earth.[3]

The primeval sea surrounds the earth like a snake; so it is seen by Alexander the Great in his attempted ascent to heaven.[4] This view is found often repeated in Rabbinical writings. The sea stands under the rule of a special prince or spirit (Sar), who opposes Moses when he tries to cleave the waters of the Red Sea. He refuses to obey a being created on the sixth day, whilst the sea was created on the second.[5] He is conjured by the sages to cast up the strength of a man thrown into the sea by a witch.[6]

The sea is the counterpart of the earth, and it contains every creature that is found upon the earth, save the fox, which by a stratagem escapes the fate of being cast into the sea.[7] The waves of the sea can be appeased by magical formulas.[8] On the other hand, the waves and storm are messengers sent to carry out divine ordinances, and cast up on land a man from a foundered boat whom divine providence wishes to save. Thus Aqiba is saved.[9] But ever since the flood, which in a supreme

[1] Mrs. Eugénie Strong, *Roman Sculpture, from Augustus to Constantine*, London, 1907, pl. lxxxvii.

[2] See below, § 3.

[3] *Pirqē R. Eliezer*, ch. 8.

[4] *The Exempla of the Rabbis*, ed. M. Gaster, London, 1896, no. 5.

[5] *Midrash Vayosha*, in *Oṣar Midrashim*, ed. J. D. Eisenstein, New York, 1915, p. 148.

[6] Jerus. *Sanhedrin*, vii. 25*d*; see *Maase Buch*, Amsterdam, 1725, no. 225.

[7] *Alphabetum Siracidicum*, ed. M. Steinschneider, Berlin, 1858, fol. 27*a* and *b*.

[8] *The Sword of Moses*, ed. M. Gaster, London, 1896, and Sepher Raziel.

[9] *Exempla of the Rabbis*, ed. Gaster, no. 262.

form carried out the divine decree of universal destruction, boundaries have been set to the sea which it cannot overthrow, especially the boundary of sand (Jer 5^{22}).[1] The waters of the deep are also part of the cosmogonous process. They are kept under ground; and, since they broke out in the time of the flood, they are now kept in check by the Eben Shetiyah, or 'the stone of foundation,' which, according to legend, is the centre of the earth and the corner-stone of the Temple in Jerusalem, or the stone upon which the Ark of the Covenant rested. When digging the foundations of the Temple, David came upon the floods of the deep; they started surging up, threatening to flood the world. David receded slowly step by step, and, whilst receding, he recited the seventeen Songs of Degrees (or Steps), until at last, writing the ineffable name of God upon a stone, he closed with it the mouth of the abyss, and, when the waters saw the divine name, they withdrew in terror, and thus the world was saved from a second flood.[2]

The waters under ground are flowing close to the fires of hell, hence the hot springs; and the waters of the flood which surged up from the deep were boiling and helped in the destruction of the wicked world, from which Og, king of Bashan, alone escaped through his gigantic stature. (He had boasted that he and the other giants could stop up with their heels the openings of the fountains.)

There are also miraculous wells and rivers. The well in the desert, created on the sixth day, accompanied the Israelites in their wanderings through the desert and ceased to flow with the death of Miriam.[3] There is then the famous Sabbath river Sambatyon (*q.v.*), which plays a great rôle in the history of the portents previous to the advent of the Messiah.

Just as Moses, Joshua, and Elijah divided the waters, so did also sages of a later period. Jesus walked upon the waters, and in another connexion we are told that the waters of the river flowed backwards when appealed to by a sage as a proof of the correctness of his interpretation of the Law.[4]

On the other hand, wells and rain-pipes were considered to be haunted by demons.

On one occasion a man who rested on one of the gutters was hurt by a demon because he trod upon his toe. Abbaye helped one demon to fight another who was trying to drive him from his own habitation. At the end of the fight some drops of blood of the slain demon were seen floating on the surface of the water in the well. On another occasion a many-headed monster came out from the well and was slain by Abbaye.

It was therefore forbidden to drink water from any vessel that was left open overnight, more especially over Wednesday or Saturday night,[5] for it might have become defiled or poisoned by a demon; and the only protection in such cases was to blow upon the water and to pour a few drops of it on the ground before drinking—a kind of libation. During the winter solstice (Tekufa) it is said that three drops of blood fall from heaven and contaminate all the water found in vessels in houses, and that water must be poured away.[6] This, by the way, is of a purely Egyptian origin, and belongs to the cycle of the Isis legends. The Angel of Death is said to dip the sword by which he has taken the life of man in the water found in the house. All the vessels must therefore be emptied. This, however, is a popular interpretation of the ancient law of purity, according to which death defiles all food and drink found under the same roof as a dead body.

2. Lustration.—Water is the great purifier and cleanser.[7] Practically and symbolically, just as water is identified with the spirit and the Law is described as the water of life, water cleanses man from all kinds of physical contaminations, mostly after contact either with dead bodies or with anything described by the Law as impure.[8] The degree of levitical purity claimed for service in the Temple was sometimes transferred to private life, and the sect of the Essenes obtained their name in all probability from their habit of constant lustration and purification, refraining as they did from mixing with the common people or touching any food or object not properly purified. The only means for such purification were bathing and ablution—complete immersion in a sufficient quantity of water, more especially running water, or the pouring of a quantity of water over the naked body. The spiritual significance attached to a ritual bath is of later origin; for bathing was never understood in Judaism to mean also washing of the soul. Physical contamination could be eliminated by immersion or by ablution, but the spiritual contamination remained the same; for, as one of the sages puts it, 'a man who sins and confesses his sin and yet continues to live in sin is like a man who takes the bath of purification and holds an unclean animal in his hand.'[1]

The question whether both immersion and ablution were required for purification from defilement seems to have been interpreted differently by Jews, Samaritans, and Karaites. The two last hold that ablution (pouring of the water over the body without immersion) is sufficient. How far this practice has prevailed in pre-Christian times is a question which lies outside the scope of this article and may have some importance for the history of baptism.[2] In later times the washing of hands alone was considered sufficient to eliminate the charge of defilement,[3] although, as no ashes of the red heifer are to be found—which were an indispensable adjunct to religious purification—all the people in modern times must be considered as living in a state of levitical impurity attenuated by this constant washing of hands and by occasional immersions in properly constructed baths. The priests, the descendants of the *kōhanîm*, even now have their hands washed by the Levites present in the synagogue before they ascend the rostrum to recite in a special cantilation the priestly benediction. Moreover, no dead person is shriven without being specially washed,[4] and the mourners when leaving the cemetery are also expected to wash their hands, for they have been in a place considered impure by the Law.

Water, again, was used for purification or as a token of innocence by the elders when a dead body was found and the murderer could not be traced; they went to the banks of a roaring stream and, washing their hands, declared publicly and solemnly their innocence of the murder (Dt $21^{6ff.}$). In the ceremony for testing the purity of a suspected wife she had to drink bitter waters (or rather 'waters of curse'), prepared by the priest.[5]

It is not unimportant to explain the words used in connexion with this kind of water. It is called 'holy water' (Nu 5^{17}), whilst in connexion with the purification of the leprous the priest used 'living water' or, according to the RV, 'running water' (Lv $14^{5.50}$), but the same word occurs in Genesis to denote the well digged by Isaac's servants where they found 'living water.' It is difficult to imagine how running water could be in a vessel. The operation in each case is of a symbolical and magical character, and the designation of the water as 'holy' can best be understood by comparing the use of water in other mystical processes. The vessel or the bowl must be filled with water which no one else has touched, and of which no one else has drunk. It is kept intact and sanctified for the purpose to which it is to be put. The moment it has been touched or some of it drunk, it becomes defiled or dead.

Bowls for water with magical inscriptions have

[1] So also in *Enoch*, lxxxix. 3 ff.; and, as shown by the present writer, the same chapter is incorporated into the Greek magical papyrus of Paris under the name of *Logos Ebraicos*, *i.e.* 'Jewish conjuration,' *JRAS*, 1901, p. 109 ff.

[2] *Midrash Tehillim*, ed. S. Buber, Wilna, 1891, Ps 93^{3}.

[3] *Pirqê Âbhôth*, v. 9.

[4] *Bâbâ Mᵉṣ'ia*, 59*b*; *Pᵉbhâmôth*, 121*a*.

[5] *Pesâḥîm*, 112; *'Âbôdah Zârâh*, 12.

[6] *Shulḥan 'Ârûkh*, *Yorê De'ah*, ch. 116, § 4.

[7] Cf. art. PURIFICATION (Hebrew).

[8] S. Krauss, *Talmudische Archäologie*, Leipzig, 1910, i. 208 ff., where also is full bibliography; and J. Döller, *Die Reinheits- und Speisegesetze des AT*, Münster, 1917.

[1] *Ta'anith*, 16*a*.

[2] See art. BAPTISM (Jewish), and W. Brandt, *Die jüdischen Baptismen* (*ZATW* xviii.), Giessen, 1910. Adam's spending 100 years in the waters of Gihon is an act of self-chastisement and repentance, not of purification. See *The Books of Adam and Eve*, ed. L. S. A. Wells, in R. H. Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the OT*, Oxford, 1913, ii. 134 ff.; and L. Ginsberg, *Legends of the Jews*, Philadelphia, 1909, i. 86 ff.

[3] *Ṭur* and *Shulḥan 'Ârûkh*, *Oraḥ Ḥayyim*, ch. 181.

[4] *Shulḥan 'Ârûkh*, *Yorê De'ah*.

[5] See art. ORDEAL (Hebrew).

often been used for such purposes in the well-known Lekanomaty.[1]

3. Rain.—It was natural that in an agricultural land like Palestine rain should be considered a blessing and drought a curse. In Dt 11^{14} the early and the latter rains are promised as a blessing for obedience to God's commandments. Palestine does not depend, like Egypt, on the water supplied by the overflow from the river, but 'drinketh water of the rain of heaven' (Dt 11^{11}).[2] The sources of rain were believed to be treasuries in the heavens. The 'waters above' are mentioned in Gn 1^{7}, and at the flood the 'windows of heaven were opened' (7^{11}). They are described in greater detail in *Enoch*, xli. 4, and in the *Revelation of Moses*.[3] According to the legend, the key which locks and unlocks this treasury was one of the three keys which God kept, and He only once delivered it up to man when He handed it over to the prophet Elijah, upon whose 'word' alone depended the drought or rainfall (1 K 17^{1}). The rainfall was therefore regarded as a divine gift and a blessing which followed the fulfilment of the Law, and drought was caused by sin; a moral connexion was established between the phenomena of nature and man's moral actions. It was thus natural that the action of the pious and the sinner should have a direct bearing upon obtaining rain or causing the withholding of it, and, furthermore, that the intercession of the pious could under certain conditions counteract the consequences of evil deeds.

According to the teaching of the Rabbis, rain fell only for the sake of the righteous, and was withheld when the Israelites deserved punishment. Drought was the consequence of remissness in paying tithes and heave-offerings, or of slander, impudence, and neglect of study of the Law.[4] Collective action no less than individual intercession would also have the desired effect of breaking up the drought. Prayers for rain and symbolical ceremonies would then become efficacious. The prophet, through his action on Mt. Carmel, brings back rain (1 K $18^{42ff.}$). In later times the high-priest prayed especially for rain on the Day of Atonement, when he performed the service in the Temple. He not only prayed for rain in due season, but went out of his way to pray that God should not heed the prayers of the wayfarers who might be greatly inconvenienced through the rain.

There was a special festival held in the Temple, the Day of the Water-Libation, which was the occasion of rather boisterous rejoicings. The Mishnāh[5] and Talmud[6] contain a graphic description of it. It was called *Simhath beth hashoebah*, 'the rejoicing at the place of the drawing' (*i.e.* of the water), and was kept on the 21st day of Tishri, the 7th day of the Feast of Tabernacles, the day of the Great Hosha-a-na. No explanation has hitherto been given for the use of water as a libation on that day instead of the regular wine-libation. It is, no doubt, of a propitiatory and symbolical character. It is an offering of the element which the people prayed to be blessed with during the year at the threshold of which they were standing. There may have been another reason for the libation as well as for the season chosen. According to the Bible narrative (Gn 7^{11}), the flood began and terminated about this time (it began on the 17th and ended on the 27th of the second month). There is now a difference of about a month between the two dates. Probably the coincidence of time was considered sufficient to celebrate the anniversary of the flood by a water-libation, and by such an act to obviate the recurrence of a flood and to show gratitude for the promise that henceforth the rain would come only as a blessing. There may also have been a closer correspondence of the time in the intercalary year, if the intercalation was made at the close of the civil year, at the end of what is now reckoned as the sixth month, but is really the twelfth month. Thus the seventh would become the eighth (second) and on the 17th of the second (eighth) the sluices of the heavens were opened (Gn 7^{11}). With the destruction of the Temple a special prayer for rain had been added to the service of the eighth day of Tabernacles.[1] Though the ceremony ceased in the Temple, the remembrance has been kept in the service of the seventh day of the Great Hosha-a-na, which is modelled on the service arranged for the occasion of drought.[2] A special significance has been given in later times to the service of the seventh day, for people seem to have forgotten the real meaning and origin of these supplementary prayers and ceremonies. Moreover, since Temple times special prayers are recited in the additional (*mūsāf*) *'amādhah* for the Day of Festive Assembly. Corresponding to the change of season, similar prayers for dew form an integral part of the liturgy for the first day of Passover.[3] The month of Tishri was also considered most propitious for prognosticating the weather.[4]

A most elaborate description has been preserved of the ceremonies instituted and the service arranged for the occasion of drought. It is, in fact, the most complete description found in the Talmud. The solemnity was increased by the strewing of ashes on the head, the blowing of trumpets, the insertion of supplicatory prayers, and the extension of a rigorous fast for young and old, strong and infirm, male and female. It was made the occasion of general mourning also by performing that service in the open market-place. The severity of the penance and the multiplication of prayers increased with the fear that the rain might fail. Such a service could not be performed anywhere except in the Holy Land.[5] Great men enjoyed the reputation of having obtained rain by their own merits.

Outside of Palestine no special service could be arranged on the lines of the Talmudic prescription. As far as possible, fasting and special prayers were used on the occasion of severe drought, but there is no fixed form. Each community may arrange it in its own way, and either use older compositions or compose its own prayers. They do not form part of the regular service, and are not included in the recognized standard forms of the Prayer-Book. Such prayers may be met with in collections of Occasional Prayers both in MS and in print.

The most important feature of that service has been introduced in a reduced form into that of the seventh day of Tabernacles, the exact day of the water-libation. It has been invested with the solemnity and character of a second Day of Atonement. In order to explain the supplicatory prayers and the other ceremonies which now form part of the additional service, it must also be remembered that the trumpets are blown exactly as prescribed in the Talmud for the day of solemn prayer for rain. The attributes of God are recited;

[1] See J. A. Montgomery, *Aramaic Incantations*, Philadelphia, 1913.

[2] Cf. Dt 32^{2}, Is 55^{10}.

[3] See Gaster, *JRAS*, 1893, p. 574, etc.

[4] *Ta'anith*, 8*a*, 24*a*. [5] *Sukk.* v. 1–4. [6] *Sukk.* 50*a*.

[1] *Book of Prayer and Order of Service according to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews*, ed. Gaster, London, 1901–06, iv. 176.

[2] See below. [3] *Book of Prayer*, v. 106.

[4] *Bābhā Bathrā*, 147*a*; see Gaster, 'Jewish Weather Lore,' in jubilee number of the *Jewish Chronicle*, 1891.

[5] This ceremony is described in the first chapter of the *Mishnāh Ta'anith* and the treatise of that name. It is still more fully described afterwards by Asheri (1250–1328) in his *Tur Orah Hayyim*. A fuller, though not complete, MS of this service, with the poems and supplicatory prayers, etc., has come from the Holy Land into the possession of the present writer. It must be anterior to the 16th century.

the procession of the palm-leaf and the willow takes place, just as in the time of the Temple; and prayers are offered up almost exclusively for rain in its due season. They are, in fact, the very prayers found in the Mishnāh and the treatise *Ta'anith*, and also in the description of Asheri. Curiously enough, similar prayers have also been arranged for the cessation of rain. In fact, all the supplicatory services for grave occasions like plague, etc., follow the lines of this liturgy for rain.[1] In addition to these special services, a regular change takes place in the form of the daily prayer (*'amīdhah*), or eighteen benedictions, in the special blessing for rain and dew. It is connected with the change of the equinox. It begins approximately sixty days after the winter solstice. This is also a season which is not free from superstitious beliefs and practices.[2]

A Talmudic legend[3] tells of a certain Nicodemus (Nakdimon), son of Gorion, who had obtained from the Hegemon a number of pits filled with water, which he distributed among the poor at the time of a great drought. He promised to pay a heavy fine if before a certain date the rain did not fill the pits. In the afternoon of the appointed day the sun was still shining brightly, and no sign of rain was visible. Nicodemus went up to the Temple and prayed, and the sun, which was sinking, rose up again and thus prolonged the day, before the close of which a heavy downpour of rain freed Nicodemus from his obligation. Honi,[4] another pious man, drew a circle, and, standing within it, prayed to God, and the rain came down in heavy drops. In another legend it is through the merit of the wife that drought is broken, the clouds gathering first in the corner where she was praying.[5]

The drought, according to a legend, is also broken up by the cry of the raven. It is said that it was granted to him as his reward for showing Adam how to bury Abel, by digging a grave and burying a dead raven.[6]

A new element has been added to these prayers for rain, in the processions to the cemetery and in the prayers to the pious and illustrious dead for their intercession. No man is found in the later generations so worthy of appealing to God as were those of old times; they therefore pray that those who 'slumber in the dust' may intercede with God in favour of the suffering people. Such processions are headed, as a rule, by the Rabbi, who is accompanied by the elders and the children. Sometimes—but rarely—the scrolls of the Law are carried in the procession. Litanies are sung and recited, and prayers are said over the graves.[7] It is the Jewish counterpart to the Christian procession, notably of the Eastern Church, in times of severe drought, when the relics of a saint are carried on the shoulders of the clergy in a solemn procession through the town, headed by the bishop or the metropolitan of the place.[8]

A local legend in Salonica heard by the present writer tells that the Jews who fled from the Inquisition in Spain at the end of the 15th cent. were admitted into Turkey on condition that they would bring rain in time of drought. The people of that town, especially the children, used to gather under the window of the *Haham* asking for rain. It is told that on such an occasion the late *Haham* Kovo, going out in procession to the cemetery, warned his people to prepare themselves with coverings for the rain, and they returned under such a downpour that the streets were turned into rivers.

The rain thus plays a very important part in the Jewish service. The prayer which is recited daily, and the introduction of special prayers on important occasions into the liturgy, as well as other ceremonies and practices, testify to the belief that a divine gift such as rain can be obtained only through piety and uprightness and by means of supplication and self-chastisement.

LITERATURE.—The bibliographical references are given in the footnotes. No special study exists anywhere on the subject.

M. GASTER.

[1] See Asheri, ch. 580. [2] *Book of Prayer*, i. 31 f., 232.
[3] *Ta'anith*, 19*b*–20*a*; see Gaster, *Exempla*, no. 85.
[4] *Ta'anith*, 23*a*; see Gaster, 'Beiträge zur vergleichenden Sagen und Märchenkunden,' in *MGWJ* xxix. [1882] 79 f.
[5] *Ta'anith*, 23*a*; see Gaster, 'Beiträge,' p. 79 f.
[6] *Pirqē R. Eliezer*, ch. xxi. [7] See Asheri, *loc. cit.*
[8] The present writer has seen such processions in Bukharest, when the relics of St. Demetrius were carried through the streets of the city.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Indian).

The special conditions of the Indian climate, producing, as in the western desert, a scanty and irregular rainfall, in other places excessive downpour resulting in loss of life and property from inundations, and the constant risk of failure or irregularity of the monsoon, promote the popular animistic beliefs and that of special deities ruling the ocean, rivers, tanks, and wells.

'Water runs up this whole gamut or scale of religious expression. The honours paid to the running brook, a hot spring or to a river that alternately floods and falls—causing famine or abundance, bringing riches or ruin—are intended for the living water itself by a large class of votaries; and this notion of material identity seems preserved by the custom of bathing in sacred streams, of self-drowning, and of witch-dipping, which last custom resembles exactly that of England. Suicide and witch-dipping in rivers present both sides of the same conception, acceptance or rejection by the divine element. Further on, the water-power is no longer deified Nature, but controlled by a supernatural spirit we have the kelpie who inhabits rivers under the form of a buffalo, and personifies their effects. His name is *Mahisoba*; he has no image, but a buffalo's head is cut off and deposited on his altar. After this we ascend to mythologic fictions about the origin and descent of the greater rivers from the Hindu heaven, and to legends of streams turned, stopped, or otherwise engineered by interposition of the divine energy incarnate.'[1]

In Mirzapur a pool in which some buffaloes were once drowned is now inhabited by the buffalo demon, Bhainsāsura, who in company with the *nāgās*, or serpent deities, is so malignant that no one dares to fish there until he has propitiated these powers by an offering; another form of demon attacks fishermen, appearing in the shape of a turban which fixes itself to his hook and increases in length as he tries to drag it ashore.[2] Sometimes the demon, as in the case of the Zalgur of Kashmīr, takes the shape of a horse, the foam-crested waves breaking on the bank naturally assuming this shape in the popular fancy.[3] Such sea-horses in the Hindu legend are provided by Varuṇa, the sea-god.[4] The custom of taking oaths on water conceived as a spirit is common among the Karens and other primitive tribes.[5]

1. Water-gods in the Veda and later literature.—Much controversy has arisen on the question of the amount of knowledge of the sea possessed by the Indo-Aryans. On the one hand, writers like H. H. Wilson[6] assert that they were a maritime and mercantile people, familiar with the ocean and its phenomena; and references in the Veda are quoted of merchants making expeditions to some foreign continent or island. Other writers represent them as living far from the coast and unfamiliar with the sea. The evidence quoted by Bühler of voyages in the Indian Ocean seems inadequate, and the use of the word Samudra for the ocean implies a knowledge of the sea which needs not to be confined to the estuary of the Indus.

'This is to circumscribe too narrowly the Vedic knowledge of the ocean which was almost inevitable to people who knew the Indus.'[7]

In later times this knowledge gradually increased. There seems to be no proof of sea trade with Babylon in Vedic times; this probably developed about A.D. 700.[8]

'The extensive and long-continued emigration from India to the East—including Pegu, Siam and Cambodia on the main-

[1] A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, London, 1899, i. 14.
[2] Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 44.
[3] J. H. Knowles, *Folk Tales of Kashmīr*, London, 1888, p. 313; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, do. 1898, iv. 291; *ERE* i. 501.
[4] J. Dowson, *A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion*, etc., London, 1879, p. 267.
[5] *JASB* xxxvii. [1868], pt. ii. p. 160 f.; cf. Frazer, p. 253 ff.
[6] *Rig-veda Sanhitā*, London, 1850–58, i. p. xll.; cf. P. T. Srinivas Iyengar, *Life in Ancient India in the Age of the Mantras*, Madras, 1912, p. 39 ff.
[7] A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, ii. 106 f.; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, and London, 1896, p. 34 ff.
[8] J. Kennedy, *JRAS*, 1898, pp. 241–288; V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 28 n.

land, with Java, Sumatra, Bali and Borneo among the islands of the Malay Peninsula—and the consequent establishment of Indian institutions and art in the countries named, constitute one of the darkest mysteries of history.'[1]

The deification of the great rivers by the Vedic Indo-Aryans was highly developed.[2]

2. Varuṇa.—The imperfect knowledge of the ocean possessed by the Indo-Aryans explains why Varuṇa, whose name probably corresponds with the Greek Οὐρανός, 'though the identification presents some phonetic difficulties,'[3] does not clearly rank as a sea-god in the Veda.

'Though Varuṇa is not generally regarded in the Rig-veda as the god of the ocean, he is yet in the following passages (i. 161. 14, vii. 49. 2, viii. 64. 2) connected with the element of water, both in the atmosphere and on the earth, in such a way as may have led to the conception of his character and functions which is fully established in the later mythology.'[4] 'With the growth of the conception of Prajāpati as a supreme deity, the characteristics of Varuṇa as a sovereign god naturally faded away, and the domain of the waters, only a part of his original sphere, alone remained to him. Thus he ultimately became in post-Vedic mythology an Indian Neptune, god of the sea.'[5]

In more recent times Varuṇa has lost the dignified position which he once occupied,[6] but he still retains some of the functions of a sea- or water-deity. The most famous festival in E. Bengal is held in his honour at the full moon of the month Kārttik (Oct.–Nov.), when devout Hindus bathe at a famous bathing-place.[7] In other parts of Bengal no image of Varuṇa is made, nor is he honoured at any festival or temple; but he is worshipped as one of the guardian-deities of the earth, and by fishermen before they start their work, or in time of drought to secure the needed rain.[8] In Gujarāt he is believed to live in the waters, or, by another account, he has five abodes—the sea, the river, the pond, the spring, and the well.[9] In ancient times he received human sacrifices, as in the story of Śunaśepa, the prototype of the offering of infants to the water-goddess Gangā at the confluence of that river with the sea.[10] He is invoked in daily worship as 'king of waters, who curbs the wicked, who made a road in the heavens to receive the rays of the Sun, I therefore follow that route.'[11] Like many water-gods, he is commemorated as a fertility-deity at marriages.[12]

3. Kṛṣṇa and Śiva; the Apsaras.—The place of Varuṇa as a sea-god was at a later period to some extent assumed by Kṛṣṇa and Śiva.

'Kṛṣṇa, a god who is the hero of many solar myths, the slayer of the demons, who dives under the sea and slays Kaṃsa and Kesi and Madhu, this semi-agricultural, semi-solar or atmospheric god is evidently connected with the dark sun and the storms of the rainy season, and his shrine is at Dwārkā on the sea shore, where the sun dips into the boundless western ocean.'[13]

During the 5th and 6th centuries A.D., on the arrival of the white Hūṇas in Gujarāt and Kāthiāwār, the sea began to influence these new-comers, as is shown by the fame which gathered round the new or revived gods, Śiva in his form as Somanātha or Someśvara ('lord of the moon'), with his shrine at Somnāth (*q.v.*), and Kṛṣṇa, the Apollo or St. Nicholas of Dwārkā (*q.v.*), to whom sailors pray to save them from shipwreck. Śiva, an inland god, is worshipped at river junctions.[1] But the place of the primitive rain-gods has been gradually assumed by figures drawn from the local animism. In Madras in time of drought, instead of worshipping Varuṇa, men pray to the spirit Kodumpāvi ('the wicked one'), or to some other local spirit, to send the rain.[2] The Apsaras (Skr. *ap, āpas*, 'water,' *sṛi*, 'going,' in the sense of moving in the waters or between the waters of the clouds), a kind of nymphs who even in the *Rigveda* appear completely separated from any physical basis, in the *Atharvaveda* have their abode in the waters, and in post-Vedic literature frequent lakes and rivers, especially the Ganges, were in later times believed by the Rājputs to convey the souls of dead warriors from the battlefield to the mansion of the sun, and have now little influence over the waters or on the rain.[3]

4. Modern ocean-worship.—The sea, known to modern Hindus as Ratnagarbha ('filled with jewels'), is revered by the pious, and at the Amāvas, or new moon, a sea bath is considered cleansing, as on that day the waters of 999 rivers are supposed to be brought into the sea by the spring tides. Bathing is also efficacious during the whole of the Laund, or intercalary month, and in parts of Kāthiāwār on the bright second of every month people light a fire on the shore, throw butter into the fire, and on the day when the fleet puts to sea fishermen pour milk, sugar, and liquor into the water and throw in flowers and coco-nuts.[4] In W. India Coconut Day (*nāriyal* or *nāral purnimā*) is held at the full moon of the month Śrāvan (July–August) in the height of the annual monsoon, when flowers and coco-nuts are thrown into the water to secure the favour of the sea, or as a thank-offering, because by this time the most serious storms are supposed to have ceased; and even as far inland as Poona clerks go to the riverside and fling coco-nuts into the water, and, when they return, the women of the house wave lighted lamps round their heads to disperse evil influences.[5] The Vāda fishermen on the east coast worship the sea-goddess Orusandiammā, who roams over the sea at night with a male deity, her brother Rāmasondi, and is worshipped with special rites.[6] On the west coast Kolī fisherwomen wear glass bangles only on the left wrist, because on their wedding-day the right arm bangles are thrown into the sea to win its favour.[7] In the *Purāṇas* we find a belief, which still survives, that the seven continents of the world are surrounded by seven great seas: Lavaṇa, or salt water; Ikshu, sugar-cane juice; Sura, wine; Ghṛita, clarified butter; Dadhi, curds; Dugdha, milk; Jala, fresh water; and this idea also appears in Musalmān traditions.[8]

5. Muhammadan sea-saints.—The objection felt by Hindus to travelling by sea resulted in the Arabs and Persians monopolizing the trade of India. Hence Musalmān saints became the guardians of the sea. One of the most important of these sea- or river-saints is Khwāja Khiḍr.

[1] V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 259; *BG* i. pt. i. [1896] p. 487.
[2] A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (=*GIAP* III. I.), Strassburg, 1897, p. 86 ff.
[3] Macdonell, *Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1900, p. 75; F. Max Müller, *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, do. 1897, i. 416 ff.
[4] J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1858–72, v. 72 ff.
[5] Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 28; Muir, v. 72 ff.
[6] *ERE* vi. 690.
[7] J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, London, 1883, p. 139.
[8] W. Ward, *View of the Hist., Lit., and Relig. of the Hindoos*[2], Serampore, 1815–18, ii. 57 ff.
[9] R. E. Enthoven, *Folklore Notes*, i., *Gujarāt*, Bombay, 1914, p. 40.
[10] Macdonell-Keith, ii. 385 f.; Rājendralala Mitra, *The Indo-Aryans*, London and Calcutta, 1881, i. 79.
[11] H. T. Colebrooke, *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus*, new ed., London, 1858, p. 86.
[12] Colebrooke, p. 134; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Madras, 1909, i. 280.
[13] Kennedy, p. 962.

[1] J. Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, new ed., Oxford, 1920, i. 18, ii. 704.
[2] Thurston, iii. 5, vii. 393.
[3] Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 134 f.; Muir, v. 309, 345, 409, 430; Tod, ii. 675, 696, 864, 991.
[4] *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 349.
[5] J. Murray Mitchell, *Hinduism Past and Present*, London, 1885, p. 205; *BG* xviii. pt. i. [1885] p. 245 f. See the account of sea propitiation in the Maldive Islands, F. Pyrard, *Voyages to the East Indies*, etc., tr. A. Gray (Hakluyt Society Publications, lxxvi., lxxvii., lxxx.), London, 1887–90, i. 175, with many references.
[6] Thurston, vii. 261 f.
[7] *BG* xi. [1883] 69, xiii. pt. i. [1882] p. 149.
[8] *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, tr. H. H. Wilson, London, 1840, p. 166; R. F. Burton, *The Book of a Thousand Nights and a Night*, London, 1893, iv. 255.

'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (*q.v.*), who takes his name from Gīlān or Jīlān in W. Persia (A.D. 1078–1166), rules the Arabian Sea, as Māmā Salmā watches the Persian Gulf and Zulaimah the Red Sea.[1] Qādirwalī Sāhib on the Coromandel coast helps sailors, and he is said to have done many strange miracles.[2] Daryā Pīr, the 'sea-saint,' sometimes identified with Khwāja Khidr, is in Gujarāt patron of the Lavānā merchants and lives in the sea, and offerings are made to him by pouring a little water on the ground through a sieve dedicated to him.[3]

6. Water-sprites or spirits.—Besides the greater water-gods a host of spirits or sprites are worshipped. This cult is specially prominent in the Buddhist *Jātaka*. Some of them are malevolent; in a bas-relief at the *stūpa* of Bharhut a sea-monster devours a ship and its crew.[4] Others, again, are kindly and are worshipped in conjunction with the *nāgās*, or serpent-gods.[5] Among spirits of this class at the present day in the Konkan, Bombay, the *asarās*, or *asrās*, are ghosts of young women who, after giving birth to one or more children, committed suicide by drowning; they live in the water, attack any one who approaches them, and go about in groups of seven; their victims are young women, and, when a girl is attacked, an exorcist is summoned, who makes an offering of food, red powder, and green clothes to the sprites.[6] Another Konkan sprite of the same kind is Hadal, the ghost of a drowned woman, who wears yellow clothes, lets her hair flow loose, and is plump in front and a skeleton behind; when women are attacked by her, they let their hair flow loose, shake all over, and scream.[7] The *girhā* entices men into deep water.[8] In Gujarāt the *mātā*, or 'mother,' and the *śankhinī*, or 'ogress,' haunt springs and pools and drown or enter the persons of those who venture near their haunts; an exorcist effects a cure by giving a charmed thread to the patient.[9] In Mysore the *akkagāru*, or 'seven sisters,' attack women, and in such cases the village washerman performs a rite of propitiation by setting up seven stones near the water and making an offering.[10] In the Salem District, Madras, the *āāsakanigal* are female sprites who occupy tanks and cause the embankments to burst as they tread on them while they are quarrelling.[11] In N. India the *ghāthhāī*, or 'ferry brother,' must be propitiated in rites of black magic.[12] In the United Provinces within the bed of the Jumnā 'was the fearful pool of the serpent Kāliya ("the black one") boiling with the fires of poison, from the fumes of which large trees on the bank were blighted, and by whose waters, when raised by a gale into the air, birds were scorched'; the demon was conquered by Krṣna and driven into the ocean.[13] In the Panjāb District of Kulū the *jalparī*, or water-fairy, can be conciliated by offering a lamb and flowers on the bank of a watercourse; if she catches a man, she compels him to cohabit with her, and kills him if he refuses.[1] In the Panjāb plains the *yoginī*, or *joginī*, haunts waterfalls, while the *jaljoginī* occupies wells and streams and casts spells on women and children, causing sickness and even death.[2] In Assam the Garos believe that still pools in rivers are the abode of the *bugarik*, a lovely siren, whose hair floats on the current; she has the body and arms of a woman, but no legs; some say that she is well disposed, but others allege that she kills women to add their lives to her own, and will kill men if she can catch them.[3]

Among the Mikirs 'localities of an impressive kind, such as mountains, waterfalls, great boulders, have each their Ārnam, who is concerned in the affairs of men, and has to be placated by sacrifices; all waterfalls, in particular, are haunted by them.'[4]

Sometimes these sprites demand human sacrifice, like that of the Pennār river, who, when the Mālas were escaping from their Musalmān enemies, demanded the sacrifice of a first-born child before she would allow them to cross.[5] The Kaivarta fishermen of Bengal at the rite for guarding their nets fling a live kid into the water.[6] The Gaddī shepherds of the Panjāb offer food, water, or a sheep made of flour to the Batal water-spirits.[7] The Khasis of Assam offer a goat to the river-goddess before a fisherman can cast his net; in old days she used to block the passage in the form of a crocodile until she was appeased.[8] In Burma a Kachin boy was accidentally drowned in a river, and for some years after the parents and other villagers used to come and hack the water with their knives.[9] The floods in the Pin river are so violent that it is said to eat people every three years.[10] Persons drowned being thus regarded as victims offered to the flood-spirit, the saving of a life from drowning is fraught with danger.[11] In Gujarāt and the Konkan the water-nymphs drown a person who tries to save a drowning man.[12]

The presence of such malignant water-spirits renders it dangerous to cross rivers, especially in the case of those who are unclean or under tabu.

The Nāyars and Vellālas of Madras impose stringent rules against crossing certain streams; for fear of arousing the wrath of the water-god, a Toda woman will not cross the sacred river of the tribe, the men will not use the water for any purpose; they will not touch it unless they are obliged to ford it, and then they make a bow when they reach the opposite bank.[13] The Nayādis, the lowest caste in Malabar, are not allowed to cross a bridge, and in the Central Provinces Pardhī women in their menses must not cross a river or sit on its bank, and the bar of pregnancy is also recognized.[14] At a wedding in the Magh tribe of Bengal the pair 'eat some curry and rice from the same dish, and what they leave is kept in a covered earthen vessel for seven days, during which time the married couple may not leave the village or cross running water'; at a wedding among the Kandhs there is a mock fight between the clans of bride and bridegroom, and, 'after the struggle is over, the priest attends the bride and bridegroom home, in order to avert by a charm the evil which would threaten their married life in case their path should cross a running brook.'[15]

[1] R. C. Temple, *Legends of the Panjāb*, Bombay, 1884–86, ii. 153; T. W. Beale, *An Oriental Biographical Dictionary*, new ed., London, 1894, p. 5; Wise, p. 13; J. J. Morier, *Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor*, London, 1812, p. 6; Burton, *Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*, ed. 1893, i. 199 f.

[2] Jaffur Shureef, *Qanoon-e-Islam*[2], Eng. tr., Madras, 1863, p. 160 ff.

[3] Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Gujarāt*, p. 40.

[4] *Jātaka*, Cambridge, 1895–1913, i. 25 f., 54 ff.; A. Cunningham, *The Stūpa of Bharhut*, London, 1879, p. 106, pl. v. fig. 2.

[5] *Jātaka*, ii. 77 f., i. 311.

[6] J. S. Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, p. 149 f.; Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Konkan*, 13; *ERE* iii. 314.

[7] Campbell, p. 150.

[8] Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Konkan*, p. 15.

[9] Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Gujarāt*, p. 40.

[10] *Ethnographic Survey Reports, Mysore*, no. 4, Bangalore, 1906, p. 17, no. 12, do. 1907, p. 16.

[11] F. J. Richards, *Salem Gazetteer*, Madras, 1918, i. 120.

[12] *NINQ* i. [1891] 46 f.

[13] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, bk. v. ch. vii., tr. H. H. Wilson, London, 1840, p. 512.

[1] H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1911–14, i. 216.

[2] *Ib.* 215.

[3] A. Playfair, *The Garos*, London, 1909, p. 116.

[4] E. Stack, *The Mikirs*, London, 1908, p. 33.

[5] Thurston, i. 139, iv. 344, v. 74 f. [6] Wise, p. 299.

[7] *Census of India, 1901*, xvii., *N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, pt. ii. p. 129.

[8] P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*[2], London, 1914, p. 114 f.

[9] J. G. Scott and J. P. Hardiman, *Gazetteer Upper Burma and the Shan States*, Rangoon, 1901, pt. i. vol. i. p. 416.

[10] *Ib.* pt. ii. vol. ii. p. 197; cf. the Scottish rhyme of the Tweed and Till (E. B. Tylor, *PC*[2] ii. 209).

[11] *PR*[2] i. 46.

[12] Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Gujarāt*, i. 41, *Konkan*, ii. 14.

[13] Thurston, v. 303 f., vii. 377 f., 135; W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 418 f., 501.

[14] Thurston, v. 274; R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, ii. 208, iv. 362, 551.

[15] H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, ii 32; W. W Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, ii. 83.

The wide-spread belief that a ghost cannot cross running water prevails in India;[1] a thread is passed over a stream to help the soul to return to its home, a belief developing into the Bridge of Death and Charon, the ferryman.[2]

7. Wells, tanks, lakes.—All over the country sacred wells, tanks, and lakes, and their indwelling spirits are reverenced. Their sanctity arises in various ways: they have been made, discovered, or occupied by some god or saint; hot water flows in them, a special mark of divine power;[3] their waters periodically increase or decrease; they possess curative power (especially in cases of leprosy); bathing in them may cause a change of sex.[4] No well is considered lucky until its spirit is solemnly wedded to that of the garden which it is intended to water, the former being represented by the *sālagrāma*, or ammonite, sacred to Viṣṇu, and the latter by the holy *tulasī*, or basil plant (*ocymum sanctum*).[5] In the same way, every tank should have a wooden pole in its centre to which the water-spirit is married; until this is done, the water will increase and not allay thirst and may cause disease; the pole also protects the tank-spirit from the attacks of demons.[6] The prince of Jaisalmer goes annually in state to the lake Gharsīsar to perform the sacred act of cleansing it from the accumulated mud and sand; first he takes out a handful, and then rich and poor follow his example.[7]

LITERATURE.—This is quoted in the footnotes.

W. CROOKE.

WEALTH.—Wealth is variously defined according to the standpoint from which it is regarded. But, in whatever aspect it may be viewed, its significance lies in its relation to life as a whole, and it can only be adequately understood when treated as a part of the larger study of man. It cannot be dissociated from the social and moral development of the race. It obtains its ultimate meaning from its place in the scale of values which determine the worth of life. Ethical considerations must therefore be dominant throughout the entire treatment of the subject. 'It is man's "good," or rather his goodness, that endows wealth with all its value.'[8] While the various phases of the question shade into each other, for the purposes of this article it will be convenient to consider the theme under three aspects—economic, ethical, and Christian.

I. *ECONOMIC ASPECT.*—**1. Historical sketch of the rise and progress of the science of wealth.**—Man alone among the denizens of the earth is the conscious possessor of its resources. Though he has many primary instincts in common with the lower animals, he differs from the brute creation in that he has the faculty of unifying his desires, postponing the present to the future, and making the accumulations of past labour the basis of fresh endeavour. In the growth of his needs and the methods of satisfying them we can trace the economic development of the human race. Very early in history questions of the right of property arose. In the patriarchate period, as depicted in the OT, there is evidence of the existence of private possessions. In early Greek philosophy investigations into the nature and extent of economic law occur. By Plato and Aristotle the industrial aspect of social life is treated as a part of politics. The Roman jurists, while recognizing the sacredness of property, direct their attention chiefly to questions of its tenure and transmission. The asceticism of the early and mediæval Church cast suspicion upon all forms of wealth and tended to check individual enterprise and private possession. The Renaissance gradually broke down the feudal system; and, with the enfranchisement of spirit which the Reformation brought, trade and adventure awoke and the possibilities of the physical world came within the vision of man. The search for unity and law underlying economic facts was greatly stimulated by the researches of Bacon and Newton, while the investigations of Grotius and Leibniz on the Continent and of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume in England aroused the thinking world to the bearing of industrial questions upon the progress of mankind. With the exception of the writings of French physiocrats, of whom Quesnay was the leader,[1] there was no really scientific treatment of the nature and functions of wealth till the appearance of Adam Smith's treatise on *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776.

This book marks an epoch in industrial thought and enterprise. Political economy for the first time becomes a science. Following Smith's work there appeared in quick succession Malthus's *Essay on Population* (1778), Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), and J. S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* (1848). Smith dealt with the causes of wealth, Malthus with the causes of poverty, while Ricardo and Mill treated mainly of the ways and means of distribution. *The Wealth of Nations* appeared at a propitious hour.

During the Middle Ages the successive phases of social disability which feudalism and serfdom had bequeathed tended to hinder the free life and development of man; and it was not till the individualistic gospel of Rousseau found a response among thinkers that a new sense of human right and freedom awoke. Adam Smith claimed to be the champion of popular liberties. He exposed several traditional fallacies in regard to property and its rights and uses. He showed that the progress of society depended upon individual initiative, division of labour, freedom of contract, and unrestricted interchange of goods. Money, he maintained, was not in itself wealth, but only a medium of exchanging commodities which constitute wealth; and the riches of a nation consisted not in the amount of gold hoarded in its coffers, but in the quantity, variety, and facility of its exports and imports. Unrestrained and widely distributed industry, he held, was the prime and dominant factor of a country's prosperity.

The historical treatment of economics generally adopted in recent years by French and German writers owes its inception largely to the historical insight and philosophical grasp of Adam Smith. But, though he was in advance of his times, many facts have emerged since his day which necessitate a reconstruction of economic science. The new historical instinct which was just awakening and has since been applied so effectively to many departments of inquiry; the general acceptance of the 'evolution theory,' with the light it has thrown upon the conflict and co-operation of man in the development of the race; the industrial reaction caused by the progress of science and the substitution of machinery for hand labour; the growth of democracy, with the spread of new ideas of liberty following in the wake of the French Revolution—these are among the factors which have greatly

[1] *ERE* ii. 368, iv. 604; J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, i. 152.
[2] T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of South-Eastern India*, London, 1870, p. 209 f.; Playfair, p. 108.
[3] Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 53; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, Westminster, 1899, p. 203; *Census of India, 1901*, xviii., *Baroda*, p. 16; *BG* vii. [1883] 582 f., viii. [1884] 91.
[4] Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 48 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 350 f.; Enthoven, *Folklore Notes, Gujarāt*, p. 38 ff., *Konkan*, p. 13 ff.
[5] Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 49. [6] *NINQ* iii. [1893] 160.
[7] J. Tod, ii. 1228; *NINQ* ii. [1892] 111; Thurston, ii. 360 f.
[8] Henry Jones, *The Principles of Citizenship*, p. 162.

[1] See Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iv. ch. 9.

modified economic study and made the problem of wealth a theme of vastly wider implication than its early investigators dreamt. Later writers, such as Spencer, Fawcett, Bagehot, Toynbee, and Marshall, have shown that political economy must be subservient to human progress in the highest sense and that the moral element cannot be eliminated.

2. Meaning of wealth.—We are now in a position to state generally what economists mean by wealth. The 'good' in the economic sense is every natural product which serves the satisfaction of man. By universal consent the word is applied to things which are material and exchangeable. Four attributes are usually comprehended in its definition: (1) materiality, (2) transferability, (3) limitation in quantity, (4) utility.[1] Of these the first is now regarded as doubtful, since wealth may embrace things not entirely material, such as some forms of service. The last is essential, but a larger meaning must be given to 'utility.' Shortly, wealth is said to consist of things that can be bought and sold, the amount they represent being measured by the quantity of money that they would fetch in the market. The definition, however, is defective on the side of both inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, a large trade exists in supplying certain satisfactions of a sensual nature which cannot be regarded as economically good or useful; and traffic of this kind, though involving exchange of money, does not contribute in any sense to the weal of man. On the other hand, light, air, even water, unless involving conveyance, have apparently no exchange value; but indirectly they are considerable elements in the wealth of nations. Further, 'potentiality of being bought and sold' excludes many goods, such as health, integrity of character, parental affection, which, though not saleable, have undoubted value, since they render their possessors more fit for the battle of life and more capable members of the national organism.

In protesting against the crude conception that wealth consists in the amount of gold or silver a nation possesses, Adam Smith deliberately describes the wealth of a country as 'the annual produce of its land and labour,' or 'the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes.' The important point in this statement is that wealth is not land, cattle, machinery, etc., possessed at *a particular point of time*, but rather the annual produce or fruits derived from these *in active use*. The English statisticians of the 17th cent. regarded the wealth of the country with the eyes of a farmer, and, like the French physiocratic school, denied the quality of productivity to all labour not employed immediately on the land. Hence a second important point to be noted is that Adam Smith rightly included in 'productive labour' not only labour employed on the land, but all kinds of work which improved material objects. The French economist, J. B. Say, extended the idea of productive labour to cover 'non-material products.' And from his time the annual produce has been conceived as including 'services' as well as commodities. Economically, wealth may be summed up as the product of what in modern life is termed 'the economic or industrial system,' meaning by industry 'all those articles which go to make any sort of wealth including the services of the judge, the clergyman, the acrobat';[2] not material goods alone, but 'the work of government, the learned professions, the fine arts, all gainful recreations, must be brought under the "industrial system."'

3. The factors of wealth.—In the production of wealth economists enumerate three factors: land, labour, capital. Land and labour are obviously requisite at all times and places; and, though in primitive societies capital existed only in very rudimentary forms, it also becomes essential in any community which is organized on a large scale.

(*a*) *Land.*—The two primary sources of wealth are material for work and work for material—Nature and man. The starting-point is found in the original needs which stimulate men to engage in labour for their satisfaction. But labour of itself produces nothing. It can exercise itself only upon the given. In one sense Nature is the mother of all wealth. We are rich when she gives, poor when she withholds. Yet Nature yields nothing for nothing. Her gifts are available only as man brings the toil of hand and brain to bear upon them. As economists put it (though not quite accurately), it is the land—including not its surface fruits only, but all that is contained in the bowels of the earth, coal, iron ore, minerals of all kinds, and even the sea with its manifold treasures—that is the prime source or factor of potential wealth.

(*b*) *Labour.*—It is the function of labour not to create but to extract, transform, and shape to the uses of man the potencies and raw material of the earth. The supreme service which labour renders to society is defined by J. S. Mill as 'putting things in fit places.'

> 'Labour in the physical world,' he says, 'is always and solely employed in putting objects in motion; the properties of matter, the laws of nature, do the rest.'[1]

Though no wealth can be produced without labour, there are some kinds of labour which may be very useful though not actually productive of material wealth. Hence a distinction has been drawn between 'productive' and 'non-productive' labour. But this distinction can hardly be sustained. Can it be said, *e.g.*, that the work of a miner is productive, that of a teacher, a poet, or a statesman unproductive? Men who do not work with their hands may be really contributing to the material well-being of man. And what seems at first sight to be fruitless or even wasted activity may in the highest sense be conducive to life. Indeed there are some things which, though not computable in money, greatly tend to increase the productive power of even physical labour. Three elements at least may be mentioned: division of labour, combination in effort, invention and application of tools and machinery. 'All tools and engines of the earth,' says Emerson, 'are only extensions of man's limbs and senses.'[2] But machines can only second; they cannot supply his unaided faculties. To these means must be added what, after all, is of most importance—the moral and intellectual elements — the skill, intelligence, character, and fidelity of the worker himself. A man is more than a machine; and, without the personality behind, physical and mechanical appliances, however complete, would fail of their results. In the production of wealth the economist is apt to overlook spiritual values. Education, the discipline and training of the home, the school, the college, the hardships and hazards of life, and all the moulding and informing institutions of society may appear to have no immediate monetary worth, but they are inestimable forces in the making of the workman, rendering him to himself and the community a more fit and effective agent of productive service.

(*c*) *Capital.*—It is difficult to define this element or designate precisely its functions. The term has become the storm-centre of modern industrial con-

[1] See *Dict. of Political Economy*, *s.v.* 'Wealth.'
[2] J. A. Hobson, *Science of Wealth*, p. 13.

[1] *Principles of Political Economy*, bk. i. ch. i. § 2.
[2] R. W. Emerson, *Society and Solitude*, 'Works and Days,' p. 1.

flict. Capital has unfortunately been regarded by labour as the instrument by which owners of property and possessors of money can make their own terms and manipulate work in their own interests. Capitalism has undoubtedly been a stern taskmaster in the past. The owners of capital may be said to have been, and to be still, the controlling power of our industrial system. They have taken the place formerly held by the landed aristocracy as the pivot of the social and industrial order. As the holders of power they have offered a stubborn opposition to all encroachments upon their privileges; and during the last quarter of a century all advancement of wages and improvement of environment on behalf of labour have been secured only by the pressure of trade unionism and the employment of the strike weapon. Hence the interests of employers and workmen have come to be regarded as inimical; and embitterment and class hatred have ensued which have led to conflicts costly alike to masters and to men. An impartial judgment is bound to recognize faults on both sides. At bottom of the perversity there has prevailed a materialistic philosophy involving a false exaltation of money and a vulgar conception of life which, as a result of the spell of commercial prosperity at the close of last century, has pervaded all classes of society. It is the pride of riches, the indifference, the cruelty, and the vulgarity—in a word, the selfishness of wealth that has roused jealousy and suspicion and become a danger to the community. The working classes have been too apt pupils of their masters and have indulged in habits of laxity and improvidence which are a menace to the true weal of the nation. But, whatever may have been its abuses, and however it may have tended to exploit labour for its own ends, absorbing within itself the legitimate fruits of toil, capital is an indispensable element in the production of wealth and an instrument of incalculable service in the development of the resources of civilization. In the economic sense, capital is wealth appropriated to productive employment. It may be defined as the aggregation of the surplus which has been saved from immediate use and is available for the further development of industry. It is of two kinds, circulating and fixed. Circulating capital consists of the wages paid to the workmen and of the raw material which is being actually used in the process of work. Fixed capital consists of buildings, machinery, tools, railway plant, shipping, etc. Circulating capital is being constantly used up, while fixed capital is permanent, more or less. Capital generally is the result of the industry of past generations used to promote and facilitate the industry of the present and the future. In every form of capital we trace the labour, ingenuity, and foresight of men who have built up the trade of the present. For the development of capital it is necessary that production should exceed consumption, leaving a margin for future increase and development of trade. It cannot be denied that labour has contributed to the making of capital and ought to have a share in its possession and employment. It is the duty and task of the capitalist to organize, direct, and supervise the labour of the country, so that it shall adequately meet the needs of the community. These services have been rendered in the past principally by private individuals. It has been argued that they might be equally well, if not better, supplied by the State, in which all have a stake and in the prosperity of which all have a claim to participate. But, whatever may be said in favour of collectivism, it must be noted that, whether controlled by the nation and supervised by State officials or possessed by private individuals, capital in the form of liquid assets is absolutely necessary for the organization and development of commerce; and without it labour would be practically incapable of producing its maximum results or obtaining for itself an assured or adequate return for its efforts. It is evident that the interests of capital and labour are mutual, and the success of their common enterprise depends upon their harmonious co-agency. But, to attain this unity of aim, both labour and capital will have to revise their ideas. Instead of an unending strife, by which each tries to secure as much and give as little as possible, a wider outlook must be sought in which each party shall realize that industry is only a means to an end and that life has more to offer than the things which can be estimated in terms of money alone.

II. *ETHICAL ASPECT.* — From the foregoing sketch of the economic aspects of wealth it will be seen that all industrial questions lead up inevitably to ethical issues. Economic proposals for the readjustment of society assert a principle the neglect of which was the great failure of the 19th century and is still the source of much of our avoidable social unrest.

'That principle is simply that industrial prosperity is not to be measured solely in terms of material wealth; or, in other words, that industry must be regulated by reference to supra-economic ends. Its profit and loss account must show human as well as material values; and that industry is neither prosperous nor healthy which shows a great output of material goods at the cost of a great deterioration of health, the character and the human capacity of the worker.'[1]

1. **Relation of economics and ethics.**—If economic science is designed for the advancement of life itself (and this is its tacit claim), then human considerations cannot be ignored. Work must serve man, not man work. Our starting-point must be that life is the principal thing and that every human being has a right to live and work; and that in giving his services to the good of the community he ought to have some share in the common weal. Even if a living wage be conceded, a living wage must be interpreted not as that which gives a mere subsistence, but as that which affords to each the opportunity of human self-expression.

It has been truly said that 'life without the means of living, personal gifts or skill that have no outlet, liberty that is only an inner consciousness and has no sphere of exercise, are all alike meaningless.'[2]

Considerations like these have led many to be suspicious of the doctrines of political economy and especially doubtful whether the conception of wealth as usually assumed in scientific works can be accepted as ultimate. The common fallacy of confounding wealth and money is not yet obsolete. The idea that wealth consists solely in material things of utility dies hard and continues to exert considerable influence upon economic thought.

'Property is meaningless, not wealth at all, apart from its purpose, or apart from its possible or actual practical use. . . . We have fallen into the error of regarding material wealth as having intrinsic value, and we tend not uncommonly to devote our energies to gaining possession of it, irrespective, or with the slightest consideration, of what is to be done with it. . . . Wealth is not wealth, but only its unrealized possibility, apart from the spending of it.'[3]

Hoarded wealth is not really wealth; and even less is misused or wasted wealth. Even the phrase 'satisfaction of wants' is ambiguous. 'What we want' may mean either what a particular individual or class desires at the moment or what is an essential need of our whole nature as men. In other words, in order to decide what constitutes wealth in its largest sense, it is necessary to know what is the true good of man—an inquiry with which political economy must reckon if its results are to be of vital import for mankind. But, while the

[1] H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, London, 1918, p. 191.
[2] H. Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p. 165.
[3] *Ib.* p. 161.

economist defines his subject as one of 'the sciences of man,' the conception of the human value of wealth does not rule either his thought or our practice in dealing with it. But it is only from this point of view that the problems of capital and labour, profit and wages, free trade and protection, or the respective rights and limits of production by the State and the individual are to be considered. It is the personal element that brings the science of economics into closest touch with ethics. Both have to do with the 'good'; but the economic 'good' is mostly regarded as material, whereas the 'goods' with which ethics is concerned are those acts which are the conditions of the attainment of the highest end of life. While it is perfectly legitimate to consider what will increase or diminish the material side of human happiness, it must never be forgotten that neither an individual's nor a nation's life consists in the abundance of the things which it possesses. If we are rightly to estimate the worth of economic goods, we must consider them ultimately in their relation to the highest good—the good of life itself. Social reform has been not a little retarded by writers who so exalt material prosperity as to encourage the belief that the possession of riches is the secret of happiness and the only reasonable motive of human endeavour.

2. Doctrine of values.—The conception of values, which has become a dominant idea of modern thought, has been applied with considerable effect by some recent writers to economic subjects. A distinction is drawn between 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' values. A thing has intrinsic value when it is an end in itself or is valued for its own sake apart from anything else to which it leads. A thing has instrumental value when it is merely a means to something else that follows from it as an effect, when it does not exist for itself but only for the sake of a further good. The value of any economic good is determined by its relation to other things which can be got in exchange for it. Thus, to use the technical phrase of economists, 'a thing's price is its value.' It is its 'value in exchange.' Its worth depends on what at the moment it can bring. It is relative, not absolute. It may be said that nearly everything in the world, the whole apparatus of living, has, in this sense, merely an instrumental or relative value. Things are nothing in themselves and would be useless in other conditions. Money, jewels, etc., would mean nothing on a desert island. But there are some things that must always retain their value in every world. If life has any meaning at all, there are objects, ideals, such as honour, purity, truth, belonging to life itself, and of the essence of man, which cannot be bought or sold, and are incomparable, unexchangeable, absolute. In the last resort it may be said that intrinsic value belongs to personalities rather than things—to things of the soul rather than things of the sense. All other values are relative and obtain such worth as they have from their power to minister to the highest enrichment of man.[1]

3. Real wealth.—Along this line of thought we are led to the absolute and all-inclusive conception of wealth as embracing everything that contributes to the fullness of life. 'There is no wealth but life,' says Ruskin, 'including all its powers of love, joy, and admiration.'[2] It is true that merely instrumental objects may be transmuted by their use into more than means and may partake of the character of the values to which they contribute. Objects of natural beauty, works of art, the affections and sympathies of life, intellectual knowledge and pursuits—everything, in short, that enlarges human vision and enriches heart and mind—are more than instruments: they are the constituents of real wealth. Things even that might be regarded as of themselves worthless, mean, or trivial may be elevated by becoming the vehicles of higher ends. The material world is the environment of the spiritual. Ideals require for their realization physical things. The soul must build its city of God of earthly materials, and the ordinary experiences and facts of life—man's common toil and trial, his instincts and passions—may be elevated and transfigured into assets of the spirit. Thus we see that money and all material possessions, like every other gift, may be consecrated to the highest service and be made a channel of enrichment and blessing to mankind.

The question of the place of luxury in life and the justification of expenditure upon things which go beyond the mere necessaries of existence naturally arises here. The manner of spending wealth from both an economic and an ethical point of view is not less important than the method of acquiring it. Yet it is hardly an injustice to say that the modern world is more given to the production of riches than the art of using them. But obviously the object for which an individual or a people uses its wealth is a decisive test of character and an index of worth. Before calling a man rich or poor, therefore, we must know to what uses he puts his possessions, whether they be broad or narrow. Are luxuries justifiable? Or must money be expended only on such objects as contribute to the bare support of life and the attainment of the simple decencies and moderate comforts of existence? Are we, as moral beings, to be ruled by the strictly ascetic view of life? Or can we vindicate a place for desires which, though not immediately useful or necessary, do in an indirect way help to enrich life and raise it to a higher level? It has been truly said that some objects, such as pictures, books, and even recreations, are so essential to the higher development of mankind that it may be fairly affirmed of them that 'the necessaries of life could be better spared than the superfluities.' Many objects which seem at first only to yield a momentary gratification are yet of considerable importance in so far as they 'serve to oil the wheels of existence and add a bloom to life.'[1]

If we take the word 'wealth' in its strictly etymological sense, as allied to 'weal' (as 'health' is related to 'heal' and means 'wholeness' or soundness of body), things which can be used as a means of contributing to a man's or nation's true well-being, to the fullest development and expression of the intellectual and spiritual life, are, in the last resort, the elements of wealth in its highest sense. That country is richest which nourishes the greatest number of efficient and happy human beings; that man is richest who uses his gifts to the utmost in perfecting the functions of his own life and in exerting his influence for the enrichment of the lives of others.[2]

III. *THE CHRISTIAN ASPECT.*—It does not lie within the scope of this article to discuss the remedies which have been proposed to overcome the most prominent evils accompanying a highly industrial state. In general the most radical of these proposals fall under the head of what may be described as a form of socialism (*q.v.*), or at least State control or collective ownership of all monopolies. It is urged by many, on the other hand, that the ultimate hope of a better order

[1] See W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1918, pp. 87 ff., 75 ff., 124 ff., 134 ff., 508 ff.

[2] *Unto this Last*, § 77.

[1] J. S. Mackenzie, *Introd. to Social Philosophy*, Glasgow, 1890, p. 305; see also some remarks on this subject, in Marshall, *Economics*, pp. 124, 131.

[2] See Ruskin, *op. cit.*

rests not in change of outward condition, but in the regeneration of inward character. And an honest application of the teaching of Christ to the practical affairs of life is, it is held, the secret of social and industrial betterment. It seems fitting here to give a rapid review of Christ's teaching in reference to wealth.

Jesus has much to say concerning wealth. The subject bulks largely in His teaching and enters prominently into the frame-work of nearly all His parables.

1. **The teaching of Jesus.**—Though Jesus dwells frequently on the perils of wealth, He does not condemn the possession of property or denounce ownership in land, goods, or money. There is no depreciation of riches in themselves. He lays emphasis on their deceitfulness (Mt 13^{22}); He warns His disciples against covetousness (Lk 12^{13-15}); and especially does He point out the danger of accumulating earthly treasures (Mt 6^{19}) and the impossibility of serving God and mammon (6^{24}). He lays down the principle that 'a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth' (Lk 12^{15}). Yet these sayings and warnings, so far from implying disapproval, imply rather that property and trading are the indispensable bases upon which the outward fabric of the social order is built. He shows no trace of belief that temporal possessions are evils in themselves. His parables constantly assume the right, and indeed the responsibility, of the individual to hold and administer wealth (Mt 25^{14}, Lk 19^{12} 16^{1}). Many of His sayings would be devoid of meaning if His attitude to the industrial system of His day had been one of uncompromising hostility. He could not, *e.g.*, have justly advised the young ruler to sell what was not really his, or have suggested that he should induce another to accept for money what it was unlawful for him to retain. Many of His parables deal with the use of money, without indicating a single reproof on account of its possession (Mt 25^{14-30}, Lk 19^{13-27} 16^{1-13} 12^{16-21}). Christ does not demand withdrawal from the activities of the world. The asceticism of the early Church and the renunciation practised by those sects which make a profession of poverty find no countenance in the Gospels. Jesus and His disciples honour work and recognize trade. Christ acknowledges the rights of the wage-earner. Within the circle of His followers were men and women who were possessed of worldly substance (Mt 27^{57}, Lk 8^{3} 19^{8}). His disciples had a common purse, and one of their number acted as treasurer.

2. **Wealth and the supreme end of life.**—The one and only aim of our Lord was the establishment of the rule of God in the hearts of men.[1] The Kingdom of God is first; all else is secondary and subsidiary. This is the test of all earthly things. Possessions and occupations have validity only in relation to the supreme end of life. His calls to renunciation were made not because He deemed wealth to be inherently evil, but because in each case the required act of denial would remove the special hindrance to the realization of the spiritual life (Mt 19^{24}, Mk 4^{19}, Lk 6^{24}). In Mk 10^{21} it is to be noticed that it is a deficiency of character that necessitates the repudiation of earthly possessions. Christ thus raises the whole question of material wealth to a spiritual plane. What He really condemns in connexion with riches is the spirit which holds them falsely, by non-use, misuse, or abuse.

3. **Wealth a trust and a test.**—Finally, wealth is everywhere regarded in reference to man's relation to God. It has thus a twofold significance. It is a trust and a test. There is no such thing as absolute ownership. All things belong to God our Father. We are but the pensioners on His bounty and the trustees for what He lends to us. No one can say, 'I can do what I like with my own' (Mt 20^{15}, Lk 12^{15}). The Gospels indicate three ways in which the stewardship of wealth may be exercised.

(*a*) *Almsgiving* (Lk 18^{22}).—The beauty of charity may be marred by ostentation (Mt 6^{2-4}) or consciousness of merit. A man's gift of money has no value except as the expression of himself (Lk 11^{41} 21^{3}, Mk 12^{43}).

(*b*) *Fidelity to one's daily work.*—Those who receive Christ's severest condemnation are the persons who have been unfaithful in the task entrusted to them (Mk 12^{1-11}, Mt 25^{24}, Mk 13^{34}, Lk 19^{20-24}); while those most highly commended are such as conscientiously discharge their duties in the appointed spheres of life.

(*c*) *Ministry of joy and beauty.*—A third form of stewardship is indicated in the employment of gifts in ministering to the joy and beauty of life. The most impressive instance of this use of private means is exhibited in the story of the woman who anointed the head and feet of Jesus with precious ointment. In answer to the reproachful question, 'To what purpose is this waste?' Jesus defends the act and appreciates the beauty and symbolism which it embodied. Here is the charter of all undertakings which propose in the name of Christ to feed the mind, to stir the imagination, to make life less meagre and dull, and more rich, beautiful, and spiritual.[1] Expenditure of wealth on art and music, on the graces which enrich the emotional and intellectual life, is justified not only by its elevating and enlarging effect, but also by the explicit authority of Christ's example and teaching.

From the standpoint of Christian ethics possessions of all kinds are subject to the law of conscience. What makes them right or wrong is their influence on character, and thus they become a test of life. Every gift is bestowed for purposes of service. God has no room for parasites or idlers. Every one, be he rich or poor, is a trustee for the Creator. There is no such thing as mere money. It is always a symbol or a measure. Property is but the expression and instrument of personality. We have only what we use. Hoarded wealth is barren. And only as we give forth our life in service and sacrifice is it fruitful.

LITERATURE.—All the larger works on political economy deal with the subject on its economic side. Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Political Economy*[6], London, 1907, and the older works of Adam Smith and J. S. Mill ought to be consulted. Edwin Cannon, *Wealth: a Brief Explanation of the Causes of Economic Welfare*, London, 1914; J. A. Hobson, *The Science of Wealth* (Home University Library), do. 1911; D. H. Macgregor, *The Evolution of Industry*, do. 1911, and S. J. Chapman, *Elements of Political Economy* (in same series), do. 1912, deserve mention.

On the ethical and religious side see T. von Haering, *The Ethics of the Christian Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, New York, 1901; Oliver Lodge, *Modern Problems*, London, 1912; J. MacCunn, *The Ethics of Citizenship*, Glasgow, 1894, and *The Making of Character*, Cambridge, 1900; Henry Jones, *The Principles of Citizenship*, London, 1919; J. Clark Murray, *A Handbook of Christian Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1908; J. Wilson Harper, *Christian Ethics and Social Progress*, London, 1912; Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, New York, 1907; W. N. Clarke, *The Ideal of Jesus*, Edinburgh, 1911; R. L. Ottley, *Christian Ideas and Ideals*, London, 1909; H. C. King, *The Ethics of Jesus*, New York, 1910; J. Stalker, *The Ethic of Jesus*, London, 1909; A. B. D. Alexander, *Ethics of St. Paul*, Glasgow, 1910, *Christianity and Ethics*, London, 1914. See also relevant articles in *ERE*; *Dictionary of Political Economy*, 3 vols., ed. R. H. Inglis Palgrave, London, 1894–1908; L. L. Price, *Political Economy in England from Adam Smith to Arnold Toynbee*, do. 1891.

A. B. D. ALEXANDER.

WELFARE.—(1) By the ethical term 'welfare' is meant the highest human good, the faring well or properly, the desirable human experience. In this formal use of the term nothing is implied as to the nature or constituents of this good. Aristotle notes this as the accepted usage in his day of the term *εὐδαιμονία*.[2]

(2) The term usually implies the highest human good conceived as consisting in certain objective conditions rather than in subjective feelings. In this sense it is opposed to pleasure as the supreme good. The term 'perfection' is nearly its equiva-

[1] See W. M. Clow, *Christ and the Social Order*, London, 1913, p. 81.

[1] F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 218 ff.

[2] *Nicom. Ethics*, i.

lent, but has usually a somewhat narrower significance, exclusion of pleasure, whereas welfare, though not in its essence pleasure, involves pleasure as its completion. As the supreme end perfection and happiness are usually conjoined, while welfare involves this conjunction.

Aristotle's usage is typical, but not without difficulties of interpretation. Human welfare is not pleasure, or practical activity, or the scientific life, but is the activity proper to man as man. This is reason, and human welfare consists in the excellence of rational activity. This rational activity is both theoretic and practical; in the former man is akin to the divine, but in the latter he is more specifically human. Outward goods, wealth, health, children, fame—these are good in so far as they are conditions of, or illustrations of, man's rational activity, but have no independent value. They exist for the sake of the rational life and not the life for them.[1] The position of pleasure relative to welfare is not wholly clear in the details of Aristotle's treatment, yet his fundamental principles seem certain. Pleasure is not the end of human action;[2] yet it is the universal concomitant of perfect activity and that which serves to mark and consummate this perfection.[3] If the two could be separated, the wise man would choose the activity without the pleasure rather than the pleasure without the activity,[4] but, as a matter of fact, this separation is not possible.[5] Yet, in all cases, it is the objective nature of the activity that determines the value of a pleasure, and not the amount of the pleasure itself. The emphasis in Aristotle's treatment is upon the idea of welfare as the right condition of the *whole* man. It consists in rational activity because this is not a specific and exclusive form of activity, but is one which includes and harmonizes all others. In reason all human activities find their interpretation and completion and hence their well-being.

So also Paulsen:

'The goal at which the will of every living creature aims [welfare] is the normal exercise of the vital functions which constitute its nature.' Man 'desires to live a human life and all that is implied in it; that is, a mental, historical life, in which there is room for the exercise of all human, mental powers and virtues.'[6]

LITERATURE.—J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1892; E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, ii.; J. H. Muirhead, *Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics*, do. 1900; F. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, Eng. tr., do. 1899, bk. ii. ch. ii.; James Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles*, do. 1894; S. G. Mezes, *Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory*, New York, 1901, ch. xv.

NORMAN WILDE.

WELLS.—See WATER, WATER-GODS.

WERWOLF.—See LYCANTHROPY.

WESLEY.—**1. Early life.**—John Wesley was born on 17th June (O.S.) 1703, at the rectory of Epworth, being the son of Samuel and Susannah Wesley. Both his grandfathers were among the ejected ministers of 1662, so there was a strong Puritan strain in him. His father, Samuel, was rector, poet, scholar: he spent ten years in preparing his work on the *Book of Job*. The mother, Susannah, trained her children in the great truths of the Christian faith. There is something singularly beautiful in the way in which this mother brought her many children into the audience chamber of God. On 28th Jan. 1714, John Wesley was nominated a pupil at Charterhouse, London. The treatment meted out to the boys of those days was Spartan, but Wesley always felt a true love for his school. As we read his *Journal*, and see him lovingly wander each year about the grounds, we note that Wesley never forgot his boyhood, and that age could not wither his affection for Charterhouse. On 24th June, 1720, he was elected to Christ Church, Oxford, and remained there until 1725, when he was ordained deacon by Bishop Potter. About this time the *Imitatio Christi* and *The Rules for Holy Living and Dying* became his frequent companions. The *Imitatio* taught him that 'true religion was seated in the heart, and that God's law extended to all our thoughts as well as words and actions.'[1] It is of the *Rules* that Wesley writes:

'In reading several parts of this book, I was exceedingly affected with that part in particular which relates to purity of intention. Instantly I resolved to dedicate all my life to God: all my thoughts, and words, and actions.'[2]

Wesley was now a determined seeker, there was a great hunger within him for something beyond the experience which he had—for thirteen years he sought peace by prayer, tears, and through difficult and tragic experience, and on 24th May, 1738, entered into a true evangelical experience of Divine love.

In March, 1726, he was elected Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. It is with this College, rather than Christ Church, that Wesley's name is so closely linked; for, though the great hall of Christ Church is adorned by the Romney painting of Wesley, Lincoln College has a greater treasure in the room in which the Holy Club met, and where the movement began which was to give new life to the Churches of this and other lands.

Much help came to Wesley by the reading of William Law's *Serious Call* and his *Christian Perfection*. Although some parts of Law's work offended him, he tells us: 'The light flowed in so mightily upon my soul, that everything appeared in a new view.'[3] Readers of the *Journal*, and especially of the diary, remember the strenuous efforts of Wesley to be accounted worthy; his early rising, his mastery over himself, his methodically planned day, with a task for every hour, his thoughtful care for his pupils, his ejaculations which sob forth even now after the lapse of so many years, his passionate and unceasing quest for a deeper experience—all these things are clearly recorded there. The Castle and the Bocardo at Oxford were both visited by him; for to the prisoners he must preach the message of Divine grace—even though he had not yet entered consciously into it. In August, 1727, Samuel Wesley being infirm, John Wesley went to his help, and remained in his parish for about two years. He then returned to Oxford. Later (1734) his father pleaded with great insistence that he should take his work and rectory. The reply of Wesley is elaborately wrought, and is a strong plea that his sphere is in Oxford, and not in Epworth. There is in it no splendid disregard of self such as we see in his later days; he seems more anxious to have circumstances conducive to his own soul's culture than to save the souls of others. On his return to Oxford he found that his brother Charles, who was then at Christ Church, had gathered round him a small group of men to read the New Testament. John Wesley joined this company, and soon became its leader. It is well to remember that the Holy Club showed a much greater diligence with regard to Holy Communion than the Church of those times, a tendency to guide their life by early Church practice, a passion for prisoners and outcasts, and a diligent and careful apportionment of time. As the members went with regularity to take the sacrament, they received much taunting from the undergraduates. It was at this time that they were called 'Sacramentarians,'

[1] *Nicom. Ethics*, vii. 14. [2] *Ib.* i. 3, x. 2.
[3] *Ib.* x. 3. [4] *Ib.* x. 2. [5] *Ib.* i. 9.
[6] *System of Ethics*, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 5.

[1] *The Journal of John Wesley*, standard ed., 8 vols., London, 1909–16, i. 466.
[2] Wesley's *Works*, 14 vols., London, 1829–31, xi. 366.
[3] *Journal*, i. 467.

'Bible Moths,' and Methodists (a double reference—both to a medical sect and to their 'method' in all religious practices). John Wesley was now, it seems, rooted in Oxford. A band of keen undergraduates gathered round him; he believed that he had found his work. Owing to the insistence of his family, however, he applied for the living of Epworth, but without success. His dying father spoke prophetic words; to John he said: 'The inward witness, son—the inward witness, that is the proof, the strongest proof of Christianity'; to Charles he said: 'Be steady. The Christian faith will surely revive in this Kingdom; you shall see it, though I shall not.'

2. The Georgia ministry.—In 1735 Wesley was invited to go on a mission to the colony of Georgia. His father now being dead, he with some diffidence mentioned the fact of the offer to his mother, who said: 'If I had twenty sons, I should rejoice if they were all so employed, though I should never see them more.' John and Charles Wesley embarked at Gravesend on 14th Oct. 1735. He tells a friend the motives which sent him forth as a missionary.

'My chief motive is to save my own soul . . . I hope to learn the true sense of the Gospel of Christ by preaching it to the heathen.'[1]

In later years he was not so anxious about his own salvation, but rather about that of others.[2] On the voyage, as at Oxford, he showed meticulous strictness in the apportioning of time: he learned German and studied his Greek Testament, and held services even amidst the storms. He was greatly impressed by a party of Moravians on board, especially by their conduct in the tempest. Amidst the storm they were quite unalarmed and went on singing. Wesley asked one of them, 'Were you not afraid?' He replied, 'I thank God, no.' 'But were not your women and children?' 'No, our women and children are not afraid to die.' Wesley landed at Savannah on 6th Feb. 1736. He soon met Spangenberg, the Moravian, who asked him, 'Do you know Jesus Christ?' 'I know He is the Saviour of the world.' 'True, but do you know that He has saved you?' 'I hope He has died to save me.' Spangenberg then asked, 'Do you know yourself?' Wesley answered, 'I do,' but, in telling the story of this conversation, says, 'I fear they were vain words.' Wesley's main purpose in going to Georgia was to become a missionary to the Indians. This was frustrated by the governor of the colony, General Oglethorpe, who desired his presence in the European settlement. Denied his chief end in coming, he nevertheless found work for each moment in the day; he taught the children, visited the sick, reproved the sinner, and gathered a few folk together for mutual conversation. He encouraged, he rebuked, he prepared communicants, and repelled those whom he thought not worthy. He was a rigorous High Churchman, and a most earnest seeker of the Light. In summing up the matter in his *Journal* Wesley tells us that he 'was a child of wrath, an heir of hell,' but in later years, when he revised his writings, he says, 'I believe not. . . . I had even then the faith of a servant, though not of a son.'[3] Grave misunderstandings arose between Oglethorpe and the Wesleys; but they were later reconciled. Suspicions and misunderstandings grew like weeds in the garden of this colony. As we now know from the standard edition of the *Journal*, Wesley fell in love with Sophy Hopkey, the niece of the chief magistrate of Savannah, Mr. Causton. A change, however, came in her affection, and she swiftly married Mr. Williamson. Soon after Wesley repelled her from Holy Communion—no doubt because he thought that she was not in a fit state of heart to receive it; but on the surface it appeared like the act of a disappointed man. Her uncle brought a charge against John Wesley, who refused to acknowledge the power of a civil court in ecclesiastical affairs. Wesley, realizing that no further good would come from his ministry there, left the colony, and sailed for England on 22nd Dec. 1737.

3. His evangelical conversion.—Wesley's comment on his Georgia ministry was:

'I went to America to convert the Indians; but oh, who shall convert me? . . . I have a fair summer religion. I can talk well; nay, and believe myself, while no danger is near. But let death look me in the face, and my spirit is troubled. . . . Oh, who will deliver me from this fear of death?'[1]

Eager and hungry, on his return to England he met Peter Böhler, who told him, 'My brother, my brother, that philosophy of yours must be purged away.' 'Preach faith till you have it, and then because you have it you will preach faith.' He gathered with the members of the little society in Fetter Lane. On 24th May, 1738, there came to Wesley his *Magna Dies*—the day of his evangelical conversion. No one had ever sought the haven of peace with more passionate devotion—it was a day never to be forgotten. He describes every part of it:

'I think,' he says, 'it was about five this morning, that I opened my Testament on those words, "There are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises."' He writes that, just as he went out, he opened the New Testament again on those words, 'Thou art not far from the kingdom of God.' He tells of his afternoon visit to St. Paul's, and notes that the anthem was 'Out of the deep have I called unto Thee, O Lord.' We now come to the *locus classicus* of the life of Wesley. 'In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate Street, where one was reading Luther's preface to the *Epistle to the Romans*. About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*, and saved *me* from the law of sin and death. I began to pray with all my might for those who had in a more especial manner despitefully used me and persecuted me. I then testified openly to all there what I now first felt in my heart.'[2]

Wesley had now received the gift of life; and what he did in Aldersgate Street—'I then testified openly to all there what I now first felt in my heart'—he continued to do until the end of his life. It was with him an appeal no longer to the practices and customs of the early Church, but to the experience of the Living Christ within his own heart. For fifty-two years he offered to all through Christ the grace of forgiving love. For the wonder of Wesley's life is not to be found in the fact that on a certain evening about a quarter before nine he felt his heart strangely warmed, but that the fires of that love never died down. His eye was indeed single, and thus his whole body was full of light.

4. The great offensive.—From 1738 to 1791 Wesley led the great offensive—he attacked sin in its strongholds, and everywhere proclaimed the free grace of Christ. He seized every opportunity: if he were in a coach, he spoke to his fellow-travellers; if he were staying at an inn, he told his fellow-guests of the love of Jesus; even when crossing to Ireland, when the ship was tossed by the storm, he held a service for the passengers. Driven out of the Churches, he, through necessity and quite against his taste, followed the example of Whitefield, and took his stand in the open air, and preached to the crowds at Kingswood, Bristol, and Moorfields. His greatest help came from his brother Charles, whose hymns were sung by the miners of Kingswood, the labourers of Lincoln-

[1] *Works*, xii. 38.

[2] Cf. 'The Twelve Rules of a Helper,' rule xi.: 'You have nothing to do but to save souls. Therefore spend and be spent in this work. And go always, not only to those who want you, but to those who want you most.'

[3] *Journal*, i. 421.

[1] *Journal*, i. 418. [2] *Ib.* i. 475.

shire and Cornwall and throughout the land. The Evangelical Revival spread by song as well as by sermon. There was much of the great military commander about Wesley; he chose three main strategic points—London, Bristol, and Newcastle-on-Tyne—and for the conquest of Ireland he made Dublin his base. When others were deaf to the calls of America he sent out a band of preachers to capture that continent for Christ. He moved constantly from place to place, riding on horseback until his later years, a sort of *avant-courier* of the Kingdom, the tireless rider, the invincible fighter, and the herald of the grace of God. J. Hampson, one of Wesley's preachers, who left with a grudge against him, published in 1791 a Life of Wesley. In its admissions it is of immense value, for he writes critically, and is a contemporary of the man of whom he writes. He thus sums up Wesley's life of toil:

'His public administrations were but a part of his labours, but from these we may form some conception of the rest. During fifty-two years he generally preached two sermons a day: very frequently four or five. Calculating, therefore, at twice a day, and allowing fifty sermons annually for extraordinary occasions, which is the lowest computation that can be made, the whole number in fifty-two years will be 40,462. To these may be added an infinite number of exhortations to societies. Of his travels, the lowest calculation we can make is 4000 miles annually, which, in fifty-two years, will give 208,000 miles. An almost incredible degree of labour: and which nothing but the best constitution, informed by the most active spirit, could have enabled him to support.'[1]

Augustine Birrell epitomizes his labours, and mingles with the telling of them his peculiar piquancy:

'John Wesley contested the whole kingdom in the cause of Christ during a campaign which lasted forty years. He did it for the most part on horseback. He paid more turnpikes than any man who ever bestrode a beast. Had he but preserved his scores at all the inns where he lodged, they would have made by themselves a history of prices. And throughout it all he never knew what depression of spirits meant, though he had much to try him—suits in Chancery and a jealous wife.'[2]

There is no other story of a life so crowded with toil, yet over which there broods so steadily the spirit of rest.[3] This man, like the Apostle Paul, could have drawn up his catalogue of sufferings; for he was stoned, enemies rose up against him on all sides, and besides there rested upon him the care of all his societies which were stationed from Land's End to Newcastle-on-Tyne, beyond the border, and across the Irish Sea. All this is written in Wesley's *Journal*.

'From which we can learn better than from anywhere else what manner of man he was, and the character of the times during which he lived and moved, and had his being.'[4]

This leads us to one of the most wonderful of his gifts. For fifty-two years he preached, visited his societies, entered prisons, galloped along the highways of England, the programme varying but little, and yet he never became stale; each day called him to a new adventure and was a fresh gift from God. His work never became to him a commonplace; he thrilled to it, he hailed it ever with a song. A comparison of the early years after his evangelical conversion and the later years of his life reveals that his enthusiasm never waned, but rather waxed stronger and stronger. Here is the record of 11th Sept. 1789.

'I went over to Kingswood. Sweet recess! where everything is now just as I wish. But—
"Man was not born in shades to lie!"
Let us work now; we shall rest by-and-by.'[5]

In March, 1790, he began a great preaching tour through England and Scotland, which lasted five months. Here is another entry—1st Jan. 1790:

'I am now an old man, decayed from head to foot. My eyes are dim; my right hand shakes much; my mouth is hot and dry every morning. I have a lingering fever almost every day. . . . However, blessed be God, I do not slack my labour. I can preach and write still.'[1]

He died on 2nd March, 1791.

5. His controversies.—As we have seen, Wesley owed a great deal to the Moravians. He was for a short time a great admirer of Zinzendorf. At first he hailed Herrnhut as a new city of God. But the breach between Wesley and the Moravians came soon after Wesley launched his great offensive. A section of them had a tendency towards a mistaken kind of pietism; they preached that there was no need for Bible or sacraments, that there was nothing to be done, and that the soul must wait in silence. These 'still-men,' as they were styled, roused his ire, and the break between the Methodist Societies and the Moravians was soon complete. The indictment of Wesley could only have referred to a small section, for in that Moravian band there were men and women of real saintliness. It was, however, an unfortunate happening, for it gave Wesley a somewhat violent antipathy to mysticism.

He speaks of 'the poison of mysticism,' and refers to 'Ralph Mather, a devoted young man, but almost driven out of his senses by Mystic Divinity. If he escapes out of this specious snare of the devil he will be an instrument of much good.'[2]

Wesley was right in speaking strongly against that which was mysticism falsely so called, but he was a mystic himself. The man who translated with such passion Tersteegen's hymn, 'Thou hidden love of God,' could not have been anything else. His controversy with William Law is surely due to a misunderstanding on the part of Wesley. Wesley wrote when he was perplexed, and his soul was strangely restless, and the honours are chiefly on the side of his teacher, Law. His greater and most fundamental controversy was with the Calvinists—and with logic and passionate love he claimed that Christ died for all. The battle was fought and won, but the victory came not through the strident notes of controversy, but rather through the rousing strains of song—

'For all, my Lord was crucified,
For all, for all my Saviour died.'[3]

One of the most beautiful things in the history of this controversy is the fact that such vital theological disagreements as there were between Wesley and Whitefield never broke their friendship, but seemed rather to deepen and strengthen it.

6. Wesley and the Church of England.—The Church of England never had a more loving son than John Wesley, and never one who strove more strenuously to be loyal to her. He was driven out of the Church, yet in 1789 he wrote:

'I declare once more that I live and die a member of the Church of England; and that none who regard my judgment or advice will separate from it.'[4]

But he did things which show that in another sense he did not belong to her. He believed in her, but he saw with his quick eye the needs of his age, and the organization of the Church of England was not flexible enough to meet the changing conditions of the time. He saw the great needs of America, and, realizing the urgency of its claims, in 1784 consecrated Coke as bishop and Whatcoat and Vasey as presbyters for that continent. In 1786 Wesley ordained preachers for Scotland. His loyalty was of that higher kind which would not allow rules to interfere with the advance to which he believed Christ was calling His people. This is seen early in the encounter with Joseph Butler, when bishop of Bristol. The great writer of *The Analogy* said that Wesley had no right to preach in that diocese. Wesley said, 'I can do

[1] *Memoirs of John Wesley*, 3 vols., Sunderland, 1791, iii. 190.
[2] Augustine Birrell, *Miscellanies*, London, 1901, 'Essay on John Wesley,' p. 12.
[3] 'By the grace of God I never fret. I repine at nothing. I am discontented with nothing' (*Journal*, iv. 131, note).
[4] Birrell, *Miscellanies*, p. 35. [5] *Journal*, viii. 10.

[1] *Journal*, viii. 35. [2] *Ib.* vi. 10.
[3] For the theology of Methodism see art. METHODISM.
[4] 'Farther Thoughts on Separation from the Church' (written 11th Dec. 1789), *Works*, xiii. 240.

most good here, so here I stay.' That was his one test. He was at heart a Catholic and like the scribe who brought out of his treasure things new and old. We see this in his 'Christian Library,' in which he included writings from men of all Christian communities, the only requirement being that each reprint should give spiritual strength to its readers.

7. **Wesley and humanism.**—It was the boast of Wesley that he was 'homo unius libri,' and so he was, though few men of his age read more books. His final appeal was to the Scriptures illumined by the living spirit. The variety and amount of his reading leaves us breathless. It was Hampson who wrote: 'With a book in his hand, he frequently rode from fifty to sixty or seventy miles a day.'[1] His *Primitive Physic* shows his quaint and practical knowledge: and the quotation he places at the beginning, 'Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto,' reveals his keen interest in human affairs. The *Journal* could have been written only by a man who had read enthusiastically the book of life. There may be little charm of style, but there is a conciseness, a forthrightness of writing, a perspicuity, that is hard to excel. He had not studied his Addison for nothing; the references in his early diary—'Read Addison'—are illuminating. He had much humour,[2] and we must not forget that Alexander Knox writes that his 'sportive sallies of innocent mirth delighted even the young and the thoughtless,' and Thomas Walsh writes of his 'witty proverbs.'[3] Hampson says: 'It was impossible to be long in his company without partaking his hilarity.'[4] This man, who could have chosen the company of the great, lived and loved to live with the unknown. There are many parallels between St. Francis and Wesley, and one is to be found in this, that both went to the people—what the Little Brothers were to Francis that wonderful band of men, the early Methodist preachers, were to Wesley. It is interesting to note that two men command the 18th cent., and one (Dr. Johnson) said of the other, 'He can talk well on any subject.' Johnson would fain have seen more of Wesley.

'John Wesley's conversation is good, but he is never at leisure. He is always obliged to go at a certain hour. This is very disagreeable to a man who loves to fold his legs, and have out his talk as I do.'[5]

Southey says:

'His manners were always irresistibly winning, and his cheerfulness was like perpetual sunshine.'[6]

It is true that his printed sermons do not best reveal his humanism; but they are treatises. A study of the *Journal* teaches us that the texts upon which he preached most were those which reveal his tenderness and his love of the doctrines of grace. The text 'When they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both' is met again and again in the *Journal*, and is the *motif* of his ministry. Horace Walpole informs us of his vivid way of preaching.

'I have been at one opera—Mr. Wesley's. . . . Wondrous clever, but as evidently an actor as Garrick . . . he told stories like Latimer, of the fool of his college who said "I *thanks* God for everything."'[7]

John Nelson, one of his early helpers, describes the power of Wesley's preaching:

'But I was like a wandering bird, cast out of the nest, till John Wesley came to preach his first sermon in Moorfields. O that was a blessed morning to my soul! He stroked back his hair, and turned his face towards where I stood, and I thought fixed his eyes upon me. When he had done I said, "This man can tell the secrets of my heart; he hath not left me there; he hath shewed me the remedy, even the blood of Jesus."'[1]

Sir Walter Scott tells us that he heard Wesley preach more than once in the churchyard at Kelso.

'He was a most venerable figure, but his sermons were vastly too colloquial for the taste of Saunders. He told many excellent stories.'[2]

This man, of five feet three inches, of weight eight stone ten, 'an eye the brightest and most piercing that can be conceived,'[3] with his finely chiselled face which came to view again in that of the Iron Duke,[4] loved men and women not for what they were but for what they might be: he loved colliers, drunkards, cock-fighters, prisoners, because he saw in them the children of the One Father. He gave first his love to God, and that exalted his love for men—that is why it never grew cold. He commands the 18th cent. on the religious side as much as Johnson on the literary. Lecky has told us that Wesley saved England from a revolution, but we must remember that he brought about another revolution which has done more to break down social barriers than men realize—for he taught men and women the essential oneness of us all, that One is our Father and we are all brethren. His doctrine of faith stripped off the superficial disguises of life and revealed the divine possibilities of all men. Wesley was always ahead of his century; he was a great forerunner with regard to social reform; he lived on as little as possible, and gave the rest away. Hampson says, 'Perhaps the most liberal man in England was Mr. Wesley. His liberality to the poor knew no bounds.'[5] He gave the people cheap literature, founded schools and orphanages, wrote numerous pamphlets on public questions, and his last letter was one in which he encouraged Wilberforce in his great fight against slavery—that traffic which he termed 'that execrable villainy, which is the scandal of England, of religion, and of human nature.' This 'brand plucked from the burning' broke up the frost of the 18th cent. by the glow of his flaming message. He formed a society which has become a world-wide Church; he brought inspiration to all the Churches, and his message still rings down the years—'The best of all is God is with us.'

LITERATURE.—See the literature under METHODISM.

W. BARDSLEY BRASH.

WESLEYAN METHODISM.—See METHODISM.

WEST AFRICA.—See NEGROES AND W. AFRICA.

WESTERN CHURCH.—The epithet 'Western' differentiates the Church of the West, or Roman Catholic Church, from that of the East, known as the Holy Orthodox Church.[6] The dis

[1] iii. 191.

[2] For illustrations of his humour see W. Bardsley Brash, 'Wesley's Wit and Humour,' in *London Quarterly Review*, January, 1921.

[3] For Alexander Knox see J. Whitehead, *Life of John Wesley*, Dublin, 1805, ii. 486. For Walsh see Wesley's *Journal*, vi. 10, footnote.

[4] iii. 178.

[5] Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, ed. Birkbeck Hill, Oxford, 1887, iii. 230.

[6] *Life of Wesley*, 2 vols., London, 1846, i. 409.

[7] Walpole's *Letters*, ed. Mrs. Paget Toynbee, 16 vols., Oxford, 1904, vii. 47, Letter 1143, dated 10th Oct. 1766.

[1] *The Lives of Early Methodist Preachers*, London, 1865, i. 14; cf. testimony of another, 'But when John Wesley began to speak, his words made me tremble. I thought he spoke to no one but me, and I durst not look up; for I imagined all the people were looking at me' (*ib.* p. 16).

[2] J. G. Lockhart, *Life of Sir Walter Scott*, Edinburgh, 1848, vi. 46.

[3] Hampson, iii. 167.

[4] The following is a most interesting reminiscence of Dr. George Osborn: 'Henry Moore, in whose house at City Road, as a young preacher, I lived, once took me to see a review by the Duke of Wellington in Hyde Park. During an interval the Duke, dismounting, stood by his horse near Mr. Moore and myself. Pointing to the Duke (for he was short of stature), Henry Moore said, "That is John Wesley as I knew him"' (*Journal*, vii. 462, footnote). Wesley and the Duke of Wellington sprang from collateral branches of the same family.

[5] iii. 185.

[6] See artt. EASTERN CHURCH, GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH, RUSSIAN CHURCH

tinction between these two branches of the Holy Catholic Church arose from the interaction of many causes, geographical, political, and theological, but ultimately it may be traced to an event of supreme importance in the historic evolution of the Christian faith.

1. Introduction: schism of East and West.—Up to A.D. 330, when Constantine the Great chose the ancient Byzantium as the new capital of the Roman Empire and gave it the name of Constantinople, the Catholic Church of Christendom had remained one and undivided; and, though the final schism was to be delayed for centuries, the rivalry between the old and the new Rome at once introduced a divisive factor into the ecclesiastical relationships of the empire. Constantinople, already a Greek city with a large Greek population, was destined to become a second metropolis of the faith, representing Christian life and thought of a distinctively Greek type. Indeed, it may be said that imperial Christianity had shifted its centre of gravity to the Ægean world of Hellenistic culture, intellectual and spiritual. It is significant that, when it was found necessary to formulate the terms of the orthodox creed in order to finish the desolating heresy of Arius,[1] Nicæa and not Rome had been chosen in A.D. 325 as the place of assembly for the historic council which, so far from pacifying the Christian world, was the forerunner of other councils—Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople[2]—where the various phases of the seemingly perpetual Christological problem received discussion and authoritative settlement. Christianity had spread with a relatively greater rapidity over the Eastern empire than in the provinces of the West. The Greek language known as 'common' Greek—the *lingua franca* in which the early records of the faith were written—was naturally the medium by which the symbols of the Christian faith found their most logical and accurate expression. It is true that the patriarch of Constantinople, who was always under the control of the emperor, was never to achieve a position like that of the pope, who, left free from civil control, became the undisputed pontiff and vicar of Christ upon earth; but by the 5th and 6th centuries he had secured a commanding influence and bore the title of 'œcumenical patriarch'—a designation which, in spite of papal protests, has continued till to-day. The relations of emperor and pope were severely strained during the period of the Christological heresies, and in 680 the Council of Constantinople, when it condemned the Monothelete position, did not hesitate to anathematize the memory of Pope Honorius I. In A.D. 725 the opposition of Pope Gregory II. to Leo the Isaurian, who on the outbreak of the Iconoclastic controversy[3] had vehemently condemned, and commended a crusade against, the use of images, led to a fatal separation between East and West; for Leo transferred Sicily, Southern Italy, and Illyricum from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the pope to that of Constantinople. A reaction in favour of images took place in the reign of Constantine VI., and in 786 the so-called Second Council of Nicæa gave a decision in favour of image-worship, which the pope approved. But this reconciliation was temporary and in effect was nullified in 800 on the coronation of Charlemagne by the pope; for, while in the West the pope became the religious head and the emperor the secular head of the Church, the process was reversed in the East, the emperor becoming head of the same Christian Church with a patriarch subordinate to him. Still, though the separation between East and West was complete in secular matters, the final breach did not occur for two centuries. The rejection of the *Filioque* clause,[1] which had been added by the Spanish Church to the Nicene creed in the 5th cent., and which was subsequently inserted in the Roman creed, was definitely decreed by the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 867), which excommunicated the pope. But, though this was significant of the steadily widening breach between the two sections of Catholicism, it was not till a century and a half later that the last blow was struck. The patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, closed the Latin churches and convents of the city in 1054, and this drastic act was followed by the written attacks of his clergy on the Latin religion and its observances, and especially the practice of celibacy on the part of its clergy. The pope's legate, Cardinal Humbert, entered St. Sophia on 16th July during divine service and laid on the altar a decree of excommunication against the patriarch and his adherents. This act rent the Catholic world in twain, and it was the climax of the long-continued and deep-rooted misunderstanding between the two great geographical sections of Christendom. The massacre of the Latins by the Greek populace in 1182 and the sack and capture of the city by the forces (chiefly Venetian) of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 were events which revealed and confirmed the hopeless fissure in the unity of the Church and led up to the fateful capture of Constantinople by Muhammad II. in 1453. Western Europe had left the Christian capital of the East to its fate: divided Christendom had enabled Muhammadanism to enshrine itself in Europe, and a sultan sat on the throne which Christian emperors had occupied since the days of Constantine.

The following survey is limited (1) to the general development in history of the polity, organization, and secular relationships of the Western Church, and (2) to its dogmatic history and its position in Christian thought, leaving the reader to study in other articles (to which reference is made) the more specialized treatment of the inner life of the Church, its observances and sacraments, its ritual and its liturgies, its canon law and discipline, its orders and congregations, the history of its movements in their religious, intellectual, and social aspects, and finally the biographies of its outstanding personalities in the annals of its government, sainthood, and scholarship.

Both sections of the survey are conveniently treated in chronological order under the following heads: (*a*) the early period (from Constantine to Charlemagne [A.D. 312–800]); (*b*) the mediæval period (from Charlemagne to Boniface VIII. [A.D. 800–1303]); (*c*) the modern period (from the later Middle Ages to the present time [A.D. 1303–1920]).

In the first period, the period of *expansion*, we have the rise of the papacy[2] with the conversion of the Teutonic races to Christianity; in the second, the period of *consolidation*, we have the papacy supreme in Europe, having attained the zenith of its influence and prosperity; in the third period—the period of *decline*—we have the waning power of the papacy and the rise of Protestantism, which eventually led up to the distinction between religions of authority and a religion of the spirit, and their conflicting ideals of ecclesiastical unity and catholicism.

2. Ecclesiastical polity and organization.—(*a*) *Early period.*—With the accession of Constantine in 323, Christianity became the imperial religion, and henceforth its destiny was to be closely associated with that of the empire. The vicissitudes through which the empire passed during the three

[1] See art. ARIANISM.
[2] See artt. COUNCILS AND SYNODS (Christian), CREEDS (Ecumenical), and CONFESSIONS.
[3] See art. ICONOCLASM.

[1] See artt. CONFESSIONS, CREEDS (Ecumenical).
[2] See art. PAPACY.

succeeding centuries under the attacks of the barbarians of Northern and Eastern Europe left an enduring mark on the constitution and organization of the Church. The monarchical episcopate, which was recognized by Ignatius and accepted by Cyprian as the basis of Church government, was the germ from which the primacy of the bishop of Rome was evolved. The doctrine of apostolic succession (*q.v.*) laid down by Irenæus ascribed a spiritual pre-eminence to the Church of Rome as founded by the two greatest apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, and Tertullian in his early pre-Montanist treatise, the *Prescription of Heresy*—always a favourite with the Roman Church—eloquently adopted the same line of argument, proclaiming the transmission of the apostolic 'deposit' through the succession of bishops. Established in 'the Eternal City,' which was the visible focus of imperial greatness and might, the bishopric of Rome was invested with a dignity which far surpassed that of the rival sees of Alexandria and Antioch. Moreover, the Latin conception of the Church as an external institution, moulded indeed on the type of the empire, but controlled by bishops who were the vicars of an absent Christ and depositaries of saving grace, led up to the papacy as a logical conclusion. No salvation outside the Church, the Church built on St. Peter as chief of the apostolic college, a hierarchy which traced its lineal descent by due succession from the first of apostles—these are the principles upon which the supremacy of the Roman see was established by Augustine, the greatest of the Latin theologians. In the 4th and 5th centuries the Church as it developed its organization on the new political divisions of the empire—especially Gaul and Spain, following the conquest by Christianity of the nations of the Franks and the Spaniards or Iberians — rose, by its beauty of ritual, its succession of distinguished Christian leaders, bishops, and kings, and its moral influence, to a position of great splendour. A generation after Augustine, Leo the Great, bishop of Rome (440–461), put forth a claim[1] for the authority of the Roman see which was never afterwards relaxed, and which saw its realization in the imperial authority over Christendom wielded by Hildebrand and Innocent III.

In 445 the emperor Valentinian III. issued a law declaring the bishop of Rome the supreme head of the Western Church on the three grounds of the primacy of St. Peter, the dignity of the city, and the decree of a holy synod. Resistance to the authority of St. Peter's successors in the Roman see was thus constituted a State offence.

The title 'papa' (pope), which was applied in the West to all the bishops, became in the 6th cent. the exclusive designation of the bishop of Rome. Gregory VII. was responsible for the decree which thenceforth limited the title to the occupant of the Roman see.[2]

Although for a short time Justinian the Great (527–565) held sway over Italy and placed the Roman bishops on a level with those of Constantinople, the Lombards finally broke the power of the Byzantine emperor in Italy and by their conquest practically assured the independence of the bishops of Rome. The decretals of the popes were codified in the year 500 by Dionysius Exiguus, who included in his collection the decrees of the councils and the chief canons of the provincial synods. The Donatist position,[3] which made holiness of life the test of catholicity, was defeated by the influence of Augustine, and the Donatists were in the end repressed by force of arms. The supremacy of the hierarchy and the efficacy of baptism and the Lord's Supper were maintained to be independent of the personal character of individual officials and members of a Church which was founded on the 'rock' Peter and owed its catholic authority as a visible holy community to its apostolic descent. On the other hand, the rise of monasticism in this period[1]—first in the form of hermit colonies under the inspiration of St. Antony, then in the form of religious communities with a *regula*, or rule, of common-life discipline under Cassian at Marseilles, Benedict of Nursia (480–545) at Monte Cassino, and his disciple Maurus (St. Maur) in Gaul and Sicily—was a movement within the Church towards a higher type of spirituality, though it tended to fix the orthodox separation between things sacred and profane or secular. From 590 to 800 Christianity spread over Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon England, Germany, and the new nations along the Danube, the missionary movement owing much to the inspiring zeal of Gregory I., known as 'the Great.' That the papal power not only survived the political and ecclesiastical fluctuations and unrest of the times, but emerged with added prestige, is due to the personality of this powerful leader who founded the Church in England, consolidated the Church in Spain, brought the Church of Gaul into close connexion with Rome, and checked the abuses which had crept into his own diocese. In contradistinction to the Eastern title of œcumenical patriarch, he assumed as pope (590–604) the title of 'servus servorum,' which his successors have always maintained. After Gregory's death the outstanding event is the anointing of Pepin, king of the Franks, in 751, probably by Boniface, Archbishop of Maintz, with the sanction of Pope Zacharias. A second coronation by Stephen II. of the same king at St. Denys in 754 was the price which a grateful papacy paid to him for his help against the Lombards and his presentation of the lost lands to the Roman Church. Here is a sequence of events which marks a beginning of the long-coveted temporal dominion of the papacy. But the political troubles were not at an end, and Pope Leo III., owing to the disaffection of the Roman nobles, had to flee for his life to the court of Charlemagne, king of the Franks. The result was that, when Charlemagne came to Rome to re-establish order, Leo crowned him at St. Peter's on Christmas Day 800 as emperor of Rome. This event, the significance of which can be paralleled only by Constantine's establishment of Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire, revealed the fact that the majestic traditions of that empire—for three centuries merely *magni nominis umbra* in the West—still swayed the minds of men. Church and State were once more united, and the Holy Roman Empire became a compelling ideal, if not as yet a historic reality.

(*b*) *Mediæval period.*—In this period the papacy held undisputed sway over Western Europe. Missionary enterprise widened the scope of its influence. If to Eastern Christianity is due the credit of the conversion of Russia under Vladimir, Scandinavia, the Slavic nations, the Moravians, Bohemia and Hungary, the Wends of the north and east of Germany were Christianized by the Church of the West. When warring factions broke up the empire on the death of Charlemagne, the popes took advantage of political changes to secure greater independence and strove to establish the ascendancy of the papal see over the State as the one solution of the European problem. The pseudo-Isidorian decretals (*c.* 850) proclaimed the

[1] Cf. *Serm.* iv. 2: 'De toto mundo unus Petrus eligitur, qui et universarum gentium vocationi, et omnibus apostolis, cunctisque ecclesiæ patribus præponatur: ut quamvis in populo Dei multi sacerdotes sint multique pastores, omnes tamen proprie regat Petrus, quos principaliter regit et Christus.'

[2] See *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Pope'; Ducange, *Gloss. Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis*, *s.v.* 'Papa.'

[3] See art. DONATISTS.

[1] See art. MONASTICISM.

inviolability of the hierarchy and the pope as the fountainhead of justice, while the *Donation of Constantine*, concocted on even more audacious lines, asserted that no earthly potentate may rule where God's anointed has his throne. In 962 Otto was crowned as the emperor of what is known as the Holy Roman Empire. Otto owed his crown to the chair of St. Peter, but had the power of deposing Christ's vicar and determining his successors; nevertheless this union of two world-rulers—one supreme in secular matters, the other in the spiritual realm—was a fact of transcendent historical moment. Hildebrand, a native of Tuscany, educated in the Cluny monastery at Rome though not himself a monk, was gifted with the instincts of leadership and a genius for statesmanship, and under the name of Gregory VII. ascended the throne of St. Peter in the year 1073 to claim absolute power in the affairs of the Church, the right to depose kings and to sit in judgment on their sins. On a memorable occasion during the year 1077 he proved his strength by reducing the defiant Henry IV. to penitence at Canossa, and his humiliation of the king of Germany had been preceded by threatening Philip I., king of France, with deposition, if he did not mend his ways. The policy of State domination was carried on by his successors Urban II., and, more notably, Innocent III. The protest of Arnold of Brescia, a pupil of Abelard, who advocated a return to apostolic simplicity and the abandonment of secular pretensions, was unavailing. The answer of the papacy was the destruction of the heresy of the Cathari and the Albigenses and the establishment of the Inquisition, while the policy of asserting independent control over the kings of France, Germany, and England was continued until 'Innocent III. had as his vassals the majority of the princes of Christendom.'[1] On the other hand, this struggle weakened the moral influence of the papacy. The Latin Empire in the East fell, and the Crusades (*q.v.*) came to an end in 1272. Monasticism under Bernard (*q.v.*) of Clairvaux (1090–1153) and the Cistercians assumed a more rigid tone and discipline, and the mendicant orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic aroused the conscience of the Church to the needs of the common people, social and spiritual. The Fratres Minores in particular enshrined in their labours and their lives of frugality and simplicity an ideal of self-renunciation joyous rather than austere, and by their care for the poor and their own self-imposed poverty leavened the decadence and corruption of the age with the true spirit of the Christian gospel.[2]

(*c*) *Modern period.*—The two and a half centuries which constitute the later Middle Ages (from the death of Boniface VIII. to the beginning of the Reformation—1303 to 1517) may be conveniently included under this head as bringing to a climax the tendencies prophetic of and preparatory to the rise of Protestantism. The famous papal bull *Unam Sanctam*, issued by Boniface VIII. in 1302, had declared that the belief that every human creature is subject to the pope was necessary to salvation. It was burnt by Philip IV. 'the Fair' of France in Notre Dame, and its author, when about to excommunicate Philip, was made a prisoner in a rising instigated by Philip and a month later died of a broken heart. Such was the tragic end of the papal claim to a world-leadership. The *de Monarchia* (*c.* 1314) of Dante expressed the sentiment of hostility to the papal ambition for temporal power and was significant of the growing reaction against papal pretensions. The 'Babylonian captivity' of the papacy at Avignon was a further blow to the prestige of the holy see. While William of Occam (1280–1347) placed the emperor and the general council above the pope as his judges, and Marsilius of Padua in his *Defensor Pacis* assumed the rôle of higher critic in the matter of the supremacy of St. Peter and the primacy of the Roman see, France reduced the pope to complete submission and Germany disregarded his anathemas. When Wyclif protested that the papal office was poisonous to the Church, the great schism which had resulted in the election of two popes in 1378 was the basis of his argument—an argument which became irresistible when, on the failure of the Council of Pisa in 1409 to solve the problem, three popes instead of two widened the schism. Five years later the Council of Constance condemned John Hus to death.[1] Stimulated by the writings of Wyclif, he had inaugurated a new religious movement in Bohemia and had been invited to the council under a safe-conduct granted by the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund. There he expounded his views and was called upon to retract what were considered to be erroneous teachings subversive of the authority of the pope. He refused on the grounds of fidelity to conscience, was condemned and on 6th July 1415 burned. A year later his friend and disciple, Jerome of Prague, suffered the same fate. The essence of the Hussite movement was its insistence on the rights of conscience and its appeal to a higher tribunal than that of pope and council. On the other hand, the Council of Constance had ended the schism by asserting its supreme authority over pope and Church. It had established its right to regulate the action of the pope and 'had secured the transformation of the papacy from an absolute into a constitutional monarchy'[2]—an event of great significance for the future history of the papacy. Constantinople fell in 1453, and in the latter half of this century the popes sought to restore their waning supremacy by invoking crusades against the Muslim. Savonarola ([*q.v.*] 1452–98), a Dominican monk of Florence under the rule of the Medici, became alarmed by the prevailing decadence of morals, and owing to his zeal for the purification of society was excommunicated by Pope Alexander VI., who after failing to bribe him into silence secured his death by working on the hostility of the Florentines to their noblest fellow-citizen. Such movements as those of Hus and Savonarola, who were both martyrs in the cause of a higher morality, and the exemplification of an inward and spiritual religion in the lives of mystics like Tauler and Thomas à Kempis,[3] were signs of the coming change. It was in vain that Pope Leo X. (1513–21) secured the repeal of the 'pragmatic sanction'—by which Louis IX. of France had in 1269 asserted the right of the State to refuse papal taxation—and in vain that his imitation of the warlike policy of his predecessor Julius II. and his successful diplomacy had enabled him to recover something of the old papal prestige. It was but a momentary rekindling of the embers of a dying cause. The Reformation had arrived. It is true that the Protestant movement,[4] triumphant in Northern and Central Europe, was checked in Italy, though even in the native land of the papacy hatred of the vices and corruptions of the papal régime rallied many adherents to the new movement. The traditional greatness of an institution which had brought wealth and influence to the Italian

[1] A. Lagarde, *The Latin Church in the Middle Ages*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1915, p. 243.
[2] See, besides art. MONASTICISM, art. RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

[1] See art. HUSSITES.
[2] Williston Walker, *A Hist. of the Christian Church*, p. 310.
[3] See art. MYSTICISM (Christian, Roman Catholic).
[4] See art. PROTESTANTISM, and esp. art. REFORMATION

people evoked a patriotic response to the forces of the Counter-Reformation. Moreover, the foundation of the Society of Jesus by Loyola (1491–1556),[1] with its régime of unquestioning obedience to the will of its general and its unswerving devotion to the papal see, was a powerful factor in withstanding the advance of Protestantism, while by its missionary zeal it carried Roman Catholic influence into new lands and reconquered lost territory. The Council of Trent met in 1545 and after two interruptions produced in 1563 under Pius IV. the famous *Professio Fidei*, to which all teachers and ecclesiastics were required to assent. The Catholic theologian Bellarmine with uncompromising dogmatism expounded the Tridentine symbol and the Roman Catechism, which even more rigidly supported the papal supremacy, and his labours for orthodoxy were continued by the Jesuit theologians Suarez and Petavius, while the mysticism of Francis of Sales, Molinos, and Fénelon wielded a powerful influence in favour of the Roman type of piety. The publication of the Catechism, the Breviary, and the Missal, together with an authorized edition of the Vulgate, aided the work of the Counter-Reformation by providing standards of Catholic orthodoxy. The Inquisition[2] was re-organized and carried on in Italy, though not with the fanatical excesses which in Spain under Torquemada had covered the holy office with lasting infamy. The *Index Expurgatorius* pronounced its ban on all anti-Roman books and particular passages of books. In 1685 the repeal of the Edict of Nantes, which was the great charter of Huguenot rights in France, marked the climax of a half-century of persecution and political ostracism. In the 18th cent. the efforts of the Western Church to withstand the Protestant movement had spent their vigour, just as Protestantism had lost its earlier glow and enthusiasm. A spiritual and intellectual lassitude prevailed—a reaction partly from the theological strife of the previous generations and partly from the dynastic struggles caused by the ambitions of Louis XIV. and Frederick the Great. The Society of Jesus was temporarily extinguished. Where religious reforms were attempted—*e.g.*, by Joseph II. in Austria—they proved abortive, probably because they were inspired by the free-thinking spirit rather than by genuine religious earnestness.

Under the French revolution the Church shared the fate of all the privileged classes, and the Catholic religion was formally abolished as being hostile to the new republic. The Goddess of Reason was enthroned in Notre Dame, and Robespierre's attempt to restore religion by enforcing a belief in God only checked for a moment the torrent of infidelity. In 1801 Napoleon concluded a concordat with Pius VII., in which the Catholic religion was declared to be the religion of the majority of the French people; but he provoked the pope's hostility by demanding the right to appoint a patriarch of France, the abolition of clerical celibacy, and the support of the pope against England. Excommunication of Napoleon was followed by a protracted struggle with the pope, which was only ended in 1814 by the fall of Napoleon. In Germany the ecclesiastical states were secularized and subjected to civil rule. In Spain the Inquisition was abolished. The pope espoused the cause of absolutism which the formation of the Holy Alliance of European Powers was intended to uphold, in order to prevent revolutionary and democratic movements aimed at the authority of kings. In 1814 the Jesuit order was revived. Lamennais's attempt in France to associate ultramontane ideas of the pope's spiritual supremacy[1] with the advocacy of freedom of worship and liberty of conscience was repudiated by Pope Gregory XVI. On the other hand, in England Catholic emancipation released Roman Catholics from the political disabilities imposed at the Restoration. In 1846 Pope Pius IX. began his policy of liberalism by providing for his kingdom a constitutional system and cherished a scheme for the unifying of Italy under his control. A quarter of a century later, on the capture of Rome by Victor Emmanuel (1870), Italy was unified under one kingdom with Rome as its capital, and the pope's temporal authority was finally lost. In 1854 Pius IX. had promulgated on his own authority without any conciliar sanction the dogma of the immaculate conception (*q.v.*), and in 1870 at the Vatican Council the dogma of papal infallibility[2] was decreed in spite of the opposition of the 'Old Catholics'[3] of Germany, who held that the concurrence of pope and council was required for the validity of a doctrinal definition. Some of these, like Hefele, submitted, but Döllinger and his associates seceded and formed a confederation of English, Americans, Swiss, Russians, and Greeks, while in Paris Père Hyacinthe Loyson formed an Old Catholic congregation. But the movement never captured the people. Both England and Germany were alarmed by the ultramontane policy of the papacy, and Germany under Bismarck gave political protection to the Old Catholics. In France the National Assembly in 1871 was possessed with the ultramontane ideals, and the Government four years later authorized the foundation of Catholic universities. The inevitable reaction followed, and under Ferry and Gambetta (1880–81) the 'March decrees,' breaking up the Jesuit Society and congregations not recognized by the State and requiring Catholic students to be enrolled in State universities, were carried. During the last generation the secularist movement in France advanced stage by stage—until in 1905 the separation of Church and State was decreed by the French government and all churches and church property became the possession of the State. A situation was thus created for both Catholics and Protestants which called for voluntary generosity on the part of their adherents, with the result that the cause of religion in France has not lost but rather gained in public esteem.

Even from this rapid survey, which has selected what may be called decisive events illustrative of the political aims of the papacy and the development of ecclesiastical life and order within the Roman Church, we may infer what the Western Church has stood for in European history since the days of Constantine. Its aim has been to include humanity within its spiritual fold, while exerting a dominating control over the secular fabric of the State, its kings and governing authorities. This fundamental dualism of spiritual authority and temporal domination, which reached its climax in the Holy Roman Empire, was held to be the secret of progress religious and social, and none can deny the splendour of the conception which inspired Hildebrand and lifted the Mediæval Church to a position of majestic influence and striking prosperity. But it was a glorious dream destined to vanish at the touch of reality, a harmony of incompatible opposites which could not endure, a service of two masters which was to end in disillusion and disaster. The interpenetration of Catholicism with political ambitions and with worldly aims of kingly power tended to weaken its spiritual life. History has but recorded its verdict on the unreality of the Western claim to catholicity by adopting the

[1] See artt. JESUITS and LOYOLA.
[2] See artt. INQUISITION and OFFICE, THE HOLY
[1] See art. ULTRAMONTANISM. [2] See art. INFALLIBILITY.
[3] See art. OLD CATHOLICISM.

limiting epithet 'Roman' in its designation of the Catholic Church of the West.[1] The narrowness of its conception of what constitutes catholicity abides, even when we take into account its splendid annals of saintliness, piety, missionary zeal, its strength and compactness of organization—a bulwark in dark and barbaric ages conserving spiritual truth and light against the powers of evil—its enduring services in the task of redeeming the world from atheism and saving it from sin, and further in its self-renouncing ministries to the poor, the sufferers and outcasts of mankind. From age to age it has received warnings and calls to forsake the path of earthly domination and to seek only the unity and freedom of the spirit; but its answer is the dogma of papal infallibility, which is the admission of a fatal weakness—a bold but despairing attempt to enforce an authority which cannot endure the light of reason and spiritual liberty. Paganism and traditionalism are the perils of most forms of faith—the one, according to Sabatier,[2] finding 'its most obvious and crudest expression in Catholicism, in the constitution of its priestly hierarchy, in the *opus operatum* of its sacraments, and all the superstitious practices with which Catholic devotion persists in overlaying itself'; the other revealing itself in the Catholic apotheosis of the past—whether the history of a period or the body of custom, tradition, and dogma—which in the course of time becomes a hindrance and a despotism fatal to spiritual progress. And the view that the Western Church has been materialized and narrowed by its persistent policy of confining the Spirit within forms and rites and hierarchical authority, and by its fatal distrust of reason and conscience, is confirmed as we trace the attitude of Rome to the developments of Christian thought in the ages under review.

3. Development of theology and religious thought in the Church of the West.—(*a*) *Early period: Augustinianism and influence of Greek theology.*—The evolution of the Christian Church into the unity of Catholicism was not entirely a development of organization necessitated by its progress over the Roman Empire and moulded by its imperial environment and its secular relationships. The external and institutional form of the Latin Church cannot be explained if the influence of its theological standpoint and its fundamental dogmas is ignored. Its claim to authority over the soul and conscience of mankind was based on a type of theology to which the distinguishing epithet 'Latin' has invariably been applied. From this point of view Augustine is more palpably the founder of the Western Church than St. Peter. This remarkable thinker[3] is reverenced by the Catholic and the Protestant alike: by the former because of his emphasis on the authority of the Church and the impossibility of salvation outside the Church, by the latter because of his assertion of the divine sovereignty and of predestination (*q.v.*) and his interpretation and practice of evangelical and experimental piety. But, though it is true that his personal witness to Christianity lifts him beyond all the divisions of Christianity, the fact remains that he devoted all the resources of his intellect and spiritual zeal to the service of the Catholic Church, which he believed to be the only possible medium of salvation to the world. The grace (*q.v.*) which saved came indeed from above, but it was deposited with the succession of bishops who alone were empowered to administer it to the elect. His God was essentially a deistic or transcendent Deity dwelling apart from mankind and regulating human affairs by His commissioned agents, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Original sin (*q.v.*) was an effectual barrier to man's reconciliation with God; and Augustine placed a greater emphasis on the external rite of baptism (*q.v.*) as a mode of regeneration than on the merits of Christ. The power of sin which is seated in the will could be broken only by the agency of the Church as the appointed channel of grace. In fact, 'grace' takes the place of Christ in Augustinian theology: on the one hand, it is the sovereign will of God who decrees the salvation of the elect, and, on the other, 'a kind of spiritual potency' deposited in the hierarchy and mediated by the priesthood in the sacraments to the people. Only a portion of the race could be generated in baptism; the residue were doomed to eternal punishment. It was by these views that Augustine made possible the development of the Church of the 5th cent. into the papal empire of the Middle Ages. There is hardly a distinctively Roman doctrine or practice—purgatory, the intermediate state, the celibacy of the clergy, the invocation of saints, reverence for relics and images, the distinction between mortal and venial sins, the loss of unbaptized children—which cannot be found at least in germ among his opinions. With all its defects, however, this can be said in favour of the Augustinian theology, that it consolidated the Western Church, its thinking and its discipline, and saved it from the wave of Muhammadanism which overwhelmed the Church of the East. Augustine was powerfully influenced by the Platonism of the Alexandrian teachers, especially in his earlier life; but his mature treatises show but scanty traces of sympathy with the standpoint of the Greek theologians and are obsessed by his theory of the Church, which in its rigidity and narrowness reveals the mind of a great ecclesiastic rather than of a profound philosopher.

It has often been asked if the principles of Greek theology influenced the thought of the West. While it is universally agreed that the Latin Church borrowed freely from the customs and ritual of paganism, to what extent was its dogmatic teaching affected by the views of Clement of Alexandria, who proclaimed the continuity between Christianity and the higher thought of the Greek philosophers? The Platonists of Alexandria derived this idea of continuity from the truth of the divine immanence (*q.v.*) in human nature, taught that the Incarnation revealed the organic union between God and man and was the real atonement for sin, asserted that there was no opposition between reason and faith, regarded the Church as a community whose spiritual life was that of the Logos (*q.v.*) and its sacraments as symbols of inner processes, and proclaimed that heresy was an aid to the discovery of truth. Origen[1] followed with a profounder learning and philosophic insight to lay the foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity in his teaching respecting the 'eternal generation of the Son.' Athanasius (*q.v.*) shaped in an atmosphere of controversy the orthodox Trinitarian formula against the deistic interpretation of Arius, and secured the insertion of the vital term ὁμοούσιος in the Nicene symbol. His triumph is for ever significant, and the creeds of Christendom show that Greek thought fulfilled a providential task in the reconciliation of Christianity with reason, while the genius of Latin Christianity built up on the model of the empire the government, law, and constitution of the Church. In other words, the Western Church, while in the

[1] Cf. A. V. G. Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, London, 1885, p. 387.

[2] *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, p. 388.

[3] See artt. AUGUSTINE; CHURCH, DOCTRINE OF THE (Roman Catholic), and cf. 'Ego . . . evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas' (*Contra Ep. Manich.* v. 6).

[1] See art. ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY and Allen, ch. i.

spirit of Tertullian's *Prescription of Heresy* always hostile to heretical thought[1] and the independent activities of reason, owed to Greek theology the intellectual gift, the philosophic insight and accuracy of definition, the logical subtlety and lucidity by which alone the truth could be established on a firm basis. It owed its symbols and the power of defending them, its doctrine, and its apologetic to Greek theology; but the findings of Greek theology were held to be valid only when enforced by its authority. Without the benediction of the hierarchy, no truth, no new conception of truth, could be tolerated. Indeed, there were certain principles of Greek thought, such as the essential kinship of man with God, which the Western Church has never regarded with complete conviction; rather it has clung to the conception of the infinite distance between the human and the divine which was characteristic of the theology of Antioch. It has to be remembered that, when Greek theology passed into the Western Church, new peoples and races were coming to the front and were eventually to be won to Christianity; hence the method of presenting the simpler type of Christian thought based on Church authority, rather than the more intellectual and philosophic aspects of the truth, might be justified on grounds of expediency. It remains true, however, that the earlier Greek theology of the Alexandrian type has never really rooted itself in the consciousness of the Latin Church; its breadth and universality of vision, its synthesis of the human and divine, has illuminated but not transformed the dogmatic teaching of Catholicism. With Clement and Origen Rome has shown less affinity than with the pseudo-Dionysius. The *Celestial Hierarchy* (translated by John Scotus Erigena), with its ranges of angelic intermediaries between God on the one hand and the bishops and deacons of the Church and finally common humanity on the other, and with its path to God by the practice of Oriental asceticism, was the very negation of the sane and logical teaching of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria.

(*b*) *Mediæval period: scholasticism.*—The age of Charlemagne marked a low stage of religious thought, although the culture of John Scotus Erigena,[2] based on his knowledge of Greek and in particular of Plato and Origen, enabled him to produce a philosophy of religion far ahead of his times. Alcuin of York was a popular teacher, but he was not an original theologian and has a larger place in the history of the Roman liturgy as a compiler of the Lectionary and works of private devotion. It is significant that in the 9th cent. the dogma of transubstantiation[3] first became the subject of formal discussion. Neither Cyprian nor Tertullian was an exponent of a materialistic conception of the Lord's Supper, while Augustine held that its benefits were available only for the elect. To the monk Paschasius Radbertus, who wrote about 831 a treatise *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, belongs the credit of introducing the view that the presence of Christ was not in the soul of the worshipper but in the eucharistic elements. On the other hand, the early Middle Ages had rejected the image-worship of the degenerate East, and it was at a later period, when society was in the state of confusion and unrest caused by the invasions of Huns and Northmen, Danes and Saxons, that a reaction in favour of the Church as the one stable institution and refuge in a world of chaos took place: the great cathedrals were built; gifts of nobles and people were lavished on majestic Gothic temples; art ministered to religious devotion in music, in the impressive ritual and fair pageantries of worship, in the composition of hymns like the *Dies Iræ* and the *Stabat Mater*,[1] which broke with the classic models of poetry, and in the mysteries and miracle-plays staged within the sacred walls. Above all, the scholastic theology of which Anselm[2] was the intellectual offspring expressed the wide-spread feeling that the dogma and ritual of the Church must be harmonized with the intellect and adjusted to the conscience of mankind. If monasticism fostered piety and devotion, scholasticism in schools and universities endeavoured to establish the Christian Church and its doctrine on an intellectual basis. Abelard (*q.v.*) resisted the blind acceptance of traditional dogmas, while sects like the Cathari and Waldenses (*q.v.*) upheld the principle that the Spirit of God was not limited in its operations to the Church but illuminated the soul of man. The supporters of the authority of the Church became alarmed by the prevalence of such teaching. The condemnation of Abelard at the instance of the saintly Bernard of Clairvaux was upheld by the Council of the Lateran (1215), which formally decreed the dogma of transubstantiation. Fourteen years later the Council of Toulouse declared it a sin for the laity to possess a Bible or to read the Psalter or the Breviary in the vernacular. *The Book of Sentences* by Peter the Lombard became the accepted standard of orthodoxy. And finally Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.*) took up the task of reconciling faith and reason and, as a counterblast to the Platonism of Scotus Erigena and Abelard, called to his aid the *a posteriori* method of Aristotle.[3] Rejecting the philosophy which had always produced rationalism—so he believed—by its search for reality in an ideal realm, he based his argument on the views of a thinker to whom reality lay in the actual physical universe. To Thomas Aquinas the ground of truth was in the visible Church, the sole channel of salvation, and in its dogmatic system with its corollaries of transubstantiation, purgatory, and indulgences.[4] The Roman Church has never abandoned the Thomist theology; and whenever, as in this generation, the human reason, curious of the secrets of the universe and enlightened by new discoveries and new aspects of truth, strives to relate traditional dogmas to the larger knowledge won by science and historical research, the papal authority bases its defence of accepted truth on the conclusions of the *Summa Theologiæ*.[5]

(*c*) *The Reformation Age to modern times: Protestantism, Rationalism, Modernism.* — The attempt of Aquinas to compromise with reason came too late. Reason, which had been flouted and repressed, took its revenge. The papacy had flourished on the ignorance of the masses. It had built itself up on a distrust of humanity, which was believed to be unequal to self-government and to stand in need of a controlling visible authority. In the dark ages, let it be admitted, there were grounds for this view of mankind. The world was in the melting-pot. The Church ministered to a great need. By the Crusades it introduced men to new lands and gave them knowledge of other nations than their own; by the worship of relics it cherished a vivid consciousness of the past; by the veneration of the saints it contributed to human reverence; by its art and ritual it ennobled and enlightened personality; by monasticism it ministered to the soul of the individual and recognized its claims; and by scholasticism it quickened the processes of the human mind. But a new order had arisen, and the Church, which had

[1] See art. HERESY (Christian). [2] See art. SCHOLASTICISM.
[3] See artt. EUCHARIST, SACRAMENTS (Christian, Western), and SACRAMENTS (Christian, Lutheran).

[1] See art. HYMNS (Latin Christian).
[2] See art. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY.
[3] See artt. REALISM, ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTELIANISM.
[4] See art. PENANCE (Roman Catholic).
[5] Cf. the encyclical *Pascendi* of 1907.

conferred indisputable benefits on the world, was found unequal to the opportunity. The world had widened; new nations and new languages had appeared. Latin was no longer a medium of communication for the Western world. Wyclif's translation of the Scriptures into homely English had opened the way to a new authority. The Bible, not the Church, was the source of revelation. Mysticism, whether of the Frankish saints belonging to the order of St. Victor, who used the tender and almost voluptuous imagery of love, or of the German saints like Eckhart and Tauler, whose expositions were cast in a sterner and more ethical mould, impressed on the world the truths of the immediate intuition of God by the soul and the divine immanence. The air of Europe was alive with new currents of spiritual and intellectual power. Even prior to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, when Greek scholarship and learning sought a fresh habitation in the cities of Europe, the Renaissance had inaugurated in Italy under Petrarch and Boccaccio the cult of beauty and classical literature and evoked a new sense of the many-sided interest of the present life—in a word, the humanism which was henceforth not only to transform the intellectual and ethical life of society as a whole but also to modify the Christian outlook on the world and the course of Christian thought and theology. It was on the intellectual side an expression of the individualism which within the realm of the spirit ecclesiasticism had failed to quench. By the work of Wyclif and Hus, by evangelical movements like that of the Waldensians, by the mysticism of the cloister and the pulpit and lay-societies such as the 'Friends of God' in Germany,[1] the individual soul had expressed its spiritual conviction and ideals and the way had been prepared for a revolution in Christian thought. Luther[2] entered into the heritage won for spiritual freedom by Wyclif and Hus, the latter of whom had died for the rights of conscience. The Reformation was not a break but a fresh stage in the evolution of Christianity. It was the re-assertion of vital principles of faith which had found expression from time to time in the history of the Church from the days of St. Paul onwards. In essence, the position taken up by Luther was not the negative conviction that certain abuses which called for destruction had crept into the Church: he declared afresh the positive conditions of human salvation. He began with the people, not the cloister, nor the hierarchy. It is true that he rejected the claims of Rome as the primal and absolute authority upon whose will depended the destiny of the soul; but his rejection arose from his broad and clear conception of the value of the individual soul. His emphasis on justification by faith was in effect a plea for human rights—the right of access to God and the right of communion with Him as the condition of ultimate salvation. In other words, Luther came into conflict with the Latin Church because it was founded on ideas repugnant to the Christian conscience. The practice of selling indulgences by which the sinner obtained remission of the 'temporal' penalties of his offence was to him only one among many results of the false assumptions on which Rome based her claims, viz. the supreme authority of the episcopate as constituting the Church and the denial of spiritual privilege to the laity (*q.v.*). He opposed the fatal distinction which the Mediæval Church had emphasized between things divine and human as inherently incompatible with each other—the distinction which had created the opposites, Church and State, clergy and people, nature and grace. It followed, if this dualism was erroneous, that a layman had the power to interpret the written revelation which hitherto had been claimed as a priestly prerogative. Finally, from these premisses flowed the truth of private judgment (*q.v.*)—a position upon which Melanchthon temporized when he appealed for the retention of a visible authority while admitting its human origin. In Switzerland Zwingli (*q.v.*) and Calvin[1] were the outstanding personalities of the new movement. The former by his emphasis on the divine immanence re-affirmed the standpoint of Greek theology, and he was Greek in his denial of original sin, in his assertion of the salvability of the heathen, and in his doctrine of the sacraments as symbolic and memorial. Calvin stood for order and discipline, and founded a Church the polity of which took root in Scotland, the Netherlands, in Germany, in Switzerland, in France among the Huguenots, and in England among the Puritans. He held that the Church consisted of the elect and that the clergy were endowed by the Holy Spirit in ordination with powers which gave them authority over the people. It was, however, less as an ecclesiastical administrator than as a theologian that he left his mark upon the world. His rigid insistence on the verbal inspiration of Scripture, his theory of the fall and election, his rejection of the doctrine of immanence, his assertion of the divine sovereignty which rendered God remote from nature and humanity and made progress depend on His arbitrary will, are the familiar elements of his theology. As compared with Zwingli, he continued the Latin tradition, but, on the other hand, he was essentially Protestant in his doctrine of the individual who, though his conscience was controlled by the clergy, yet owed his ultimate destiny to the sovereign majesty of God—a theory which made for human freedom and was destructive of clerical tyranny, while it disposed at once of the customs of image-worship and Mariolatry and brought to the profession of the Christian a robust ethical standard based on the teaching and example of Christ. As Thomism was wrought into the texture of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, Calvinism received a majestic setting in the epic of Milton, while Bunyan made an appeal alike to the humblest and to the most enlightened intellects by his immortal delineation of the Reformed theology in the *Pilgrim's Progress*.[2]

Protestantism left its mark on Catholicism by producing the kindred movements of Jansenism (*q.v.*) and Gallicanism (*q.v.*), the former for ever to be associated with Pascal as the latter was thenceforth to be distinguished by the great name of Bossuet. Pascal (*q.v.*) opposed the Jesuits with much of the Calvinistic fighting spirit and stands in the line of Augustine and Calvin as a theologian, though at heart a melancholy sceptic who never succeeded in harmonizing his beliefs with the dictates of reason and conscience. Calvinistic Protestantism had left to Christian thought the necessity of defending the Scriptures in an age of cold and unsparing rationalism. The *Augsburg Confession* (1530) and the *Institutes* of Calvin had proclaimed Scripture to be the very word of God—in fact it was the infallible external authority by which Protestantism had superseded the authority of Rome. The 18th century, the age of Voltaire and Rousseau in France and of the English deists,[3] notwithstanding its opposing tendencies—Cambridge Platonism (*q.v.*) upholding the divinity of reason, natural theology contesting the supremacy of revealed religion, new scientific discoveries revealing the reign of law in nature, the attack on the miraculous elements of Christian truth—was not wholly the barren and unspiritual

[1] See artt. FRIENDS OF GOD, DEUTSCH-KATHOLICISMUS.
[2] See artt. LUTHER, REFORMATION, PROTESTANTISM.

[1] See art. CALVINISM, and Allen, *op. cit.* p. 287 f.
[2] See art. BUNYAN. [3] See art. DEISM and Allen, p. 287 f.

epoch which it is often supposed to have been. The controversy aided the progress of vital Christianity in the sense that the deists were really preparing the ground for a sounder and more rational conception of the divine nature and government, while their opponents remained loyal to the truth of a divine revelation which had been made directly to the human soul. In fact, the evangelical revival under Whitefield and Wesley[1] provided a memorable and impressive demonstration of the truth which the orthodox apologists had propounded, by bringing to the soul of the 'common people' a divine salvation and assurance of pardon which were declared to be available for simple faith. The 'saving faith,' which enabled the sinner by immediate contact with God to find peace and the strength for a new life of ethical holiness, was the mighty note upon which a renascence of spiritual religion sounded abroad its message of hope for a world in transition.

The Illuminism of Germany[2] may also be claimed as a renascence of the spirit, if on intellectual lines, by virtue of its proclamation of the gospel that the moral consciousness is divinely inspired, and that the Divine Spirit, acting through the letter of Scripture but not bound to it, is universally revealing Himself in history. But the witness of Lessing (1729–81) was of less value as an exposition of the Christian view of history than that of a greater thinker, Schleiermacher (*q.v.*), to whom belongs the credit of originating the critical method as applied to Scripture and religion. His clear grasp of the solidarity of the race, his disbelief in the individualism of Protestant and Catholic as expressed in the doctrines of election and probation, his loyalty to the Church as an institution which expressed the idea that man is saved as the member of a redeemed family, and his conception of the progressiveness of revelation place him in the succession of Greek theologians as they make him the most formative of the Christian thinkers of the last century. His firm conviction of the immanence of God powerfully affected the art, literature, philosophy, and science of the 19th century. Romanticism, the poetry of Wordsworth and Shelley, the truth of evolution as expounded by Darwin, the art of Turner and his interpreter Ruskin, the Christian socialism of Maurice (*q.v.*) and Kingsley, Hegelianism,[3] and the Neo-Hegelianism (*q.v.*) of the Cairds and T. H. Green (*q.v.*)—all these phases and movements indicate the prevalence of a new spirit. The Victorian Age was in effect a period of revolt. The triumph of the critical and scientific method was not less marked in the realm of theology than in other fields of knowledge. De Maistre[4] (1754–1821) in France and John Henry Newman (*q.v.*), from quite different standpoints, opposed what appeared to them the deadly liberalism of Christian thought. Tractarianism resulted in a revival of mediæval practice and ritual in the worship of the Church of England; but Anglo-Catholicism has never, like Roman Catholicism, repudiated the methods and results of modern criticism. Mediævalism in the Anglican Church has shown itself in ecclesiastical observance and in a revival of the Catholic view of the continuity of orders and ecclesiastical tradition, but the Erastianism of the English Church has been a safeguard against the triumph of a narrow orthodoxy and has in fact aided the forces of liberal thought. As we have already seen, the Roman Church under Pius IX. and his successors has shown itself impervious to the newer currents of theological thought. The critical method is anathema to Rome. Science, comparative religion, psychology, have their place in the world, but are banned by the infallible fiat of the Church, whenever Catholic dogma is subjected to the test of their new light.

Newman paved the way to Modernism (*q.v.*)—the name given by Pope Leo XIII. (1878–1903) to the liberalizing movement within the Roman Church—by his famous *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845, new ed. 1878), but the logical issues of his attempt to bridge the chasm between Protestantism and Catholicism were repudiated by the papal see when they were expounded by Alfred Loisy and George Tyrrell. Pius X. (1903–14) in his decree *Lamentabili* (July 1907) condemned the 60 propositions in which he summed up the Modernist doctrine, and by his encyclical *Pascendi* shortly afterwards reasserted the scholastic dogmas of the Middle Ages as the necessary faith of a true Catholic.

The drift to Rome of individual mediævalists within the Anglican pale will continue, but there are no signs of any approach to reunion between Rome and Anglicanism, the validity of whose orders received contemptuous rejection in the bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* (1906). Roman Catholicism and the Holy Orthodox Church remain disjoined, apparently without the slightest sign of a possible reconciliation. In the Reformed and Protestant Churches the cause of intellectual and religious freedom has triumphed beyond the reach of reaction, while there are symptoms both in England and in Scotland of a growing movement towards reunion—in England taking the form of a proposed federation of the Free Churches, which inherit the Protestant tradition, while in Scotland the union of the Established Church and the United Free Church is widely desired and anticipated. Generally speaking, among such Churches the necessary re-adjustments of religious thought and restatements of doctrine are likely to be carried through without any controversial strain, while the authority of the Scriptures will be associated with a more profound and broader view of the Spirit of Truth as 'the Lord and Giver of Life,' not only to the writers and 'holy men' of the Scripture dispensations, but to all the saints of Christ in all ages and in the future. Already with this larger conception of revelation as the perpetual work of a controlling Spirit who is the eternal source of light amidst the fluctuations of dogmas, institutions, and forms, the religious outlook of Western Christendom has tended to a clearer vision of the social and spiritual needs of humanity. The reaction of the European War, which has affected nearly every country in the world, has deepened the sense of international solidarity and has created the ideal of a League of Nations. Whether this new vision of brotherhood will result in a new synthesis of the rival ideals of Catholic and Protestant remains to be seen. For the moment the vision of a new Catholicism of Christendom appears to be both less convincing and less capable of realization than that of a political League of Nations. The old Catholicism, in the sense of ecclesiasticism, is dead or dying. So long as Rome claims absorption into her fold as the price of Christian reunion and so long as she asserts her mediæval standard of authority, she will stand outside the progressive movements of social and spiritual thought. The trend of the modern mind is against any external authority, whether of pope or priesthood or sacred book; and this is in effect a reaction against the extravagant claims which both Catholic and Protestant have put forth on behalf of their respective standards of authority—claims which offend the moral consciousness and intellect of mankind. Nevertheless, the Holy Catholic Church and the written Word

[1] See artt. EVANGELICALISM, METHODISM.
[2] See artt. ENCYCLOPÆDISTS, ENLIGHTENMENT, LESSING.
[3] See art. HEGEL.
[4] Cf. his work *Du Pape*[2], Lyons, 1819.

alike reveal the directing and controlling authority of the Spirit of Truth: the one proclaims the reality of the *consensus sanctorum*—the community of experience and witness—in the life of Christendom; the other declares the reality of God's perpetual self-revelation in the history of the race. In this corporate and individual response to the Spirit of God, of which both the Scriptures and the Church as an institution are witnesses, is to be found the ground of our hope for mankind. The future lies with the religion of the Spirit of Christ which under many forms of worship, systems of discipline and organization, with interpretations and settings suited to the various peoples of the world, will yet embody the Christian idea. The essence of Christianity is not to be confined to this or that dogma, creed, or institution, but is at once a spiritual experience and an activity of love—a kingdom of heaven within—inspired by the unifying control of the Spirit of Truth over the individual and collective consciousness of mank ıd. However desirable the consummation of an organic union of Christendom may be to many minds, a review of the history of the Church affords but scanty support to the idea that this result is attainable, or that, granting the possibility of its attainment, it would minister to the highest welfare of humanity. On the other hand there is a wide-spread and growing assent to the interpretation of both Scripture and history which favours a unity that will be not less real because it will co-exist with diversity —the *ἑνότης πνεύματος* for which St. Paul intercedes —the oneness given by the Divine Spirit who at once overrules and is immanent within the whole body of the faithful upon earth.

LITERATURE.—The leading authorities have already been given under articles referred to above. For the general history of the Western Church the reader should consult lists under artt. CHRISTIANITY, PAPACY, CHURCH; for doctrine CHURCH, DOCTRINE OF (Roman Catholic), CREEDS, CONFESSIONS, and special phases under their own heading—*e.g.*, ARIANISM, NESTORIANISM, etc.; for worship SACRAMENTS (Christian, Western), EUCHARIST, etc.; for law LAW (Christian, Western). In a useful chapter entitled 'Bibliographical Suggestions' in Williston Walker, *A Hist. of the Christian Church*, Edinburgh, 1919, the reader will find the most recent literature in Church History indicated and classified.

R. MARTIN POPE.

WHEEL.—See JEWEL (Buddhist), PRAYER-WHEELS.

WHEEL OF THE LAW.—This Buddhist expression is derived from the earlier Buddhist legend of the Mystic Wheel. This legend, or edifying fairy tale, is told in almost identical terms in several of the most ancient Buddhist documents.[1] It is none the less essentially Buddhist because several details (the ethical, not the essential ones) can be traced back to details in one or other of the pre-Buddhistic sun-myths. The Wheel is said to be one of the treasures of a righteous king who rules in righteousness; and it is because of that righteousness that the Wheel appears. The legend says:

'When he [*i.e.* the king; the names of course differ] had gone up on to the upper storey of his palace on the sacred day, the day of the full moon, and had purified himself to keep the sacred day, there then appeared to him the heavenly treasure of the Wheel, with its nave, its tire, and all its thousand spokes complete.

Then the king arose from his seat, and reverently uncovering his robe from his right shoulder, he held in his left hand a pitcher and with his right he sprinkled water over the Wheel, as he said: "Roll onward, O my lord the Wheel! O my Lord, go forth and overcome."

Then the wondrous Wheel rolled onward toward the region of the East. And, after it, went the king with his fourfold army (cavalry and chariots, war-elephants and men). And wheresoever the Wheel stopped, there too the king stayed, and with him all his army in its fourfold array.

Then all the rival kings in the region of the East came to the king and said: "Come on, O mighty king! Welcome, O mighty king! All is thine, O mighty king! Do thou, O mighty king, be a Teacher to us!"

And the king said: "Ye shall slay no living thing. Ye shall not take that which has not been given. Ye shall not act wrongly touching the bodily desires. Ye shall speak no lie. Ye shall drink no maddening drink. And ye may still enjoy such privileges as ye have had of yore."[1]

Then all the rival kings in the region of the East became subject to the king. And the wondrous Wheel having plunged down into the great waters in the East, rose up out again, and rolled onward to the South . . . and to the West . . . and to the North [and all happened in each region as had happened in the region of the East].

Now when the wondrous Wheel had gone forth conquering and to conquer over the whole earth to its very ocean boundary, it returned back again to the royal city and remained fixed on the open terrace in front of the entrance to the inner apartments of the great king, shedding glory over them all.'[2]

So far the appearance and work of the Wheel. In another passage we are told that on the approach of the death of the righteous king the Wheel falls from its place, and on his death or abdication disappears. Should the successor carry on the Law of the Wheel, it will reappear and act as before, and this may continue for generations. But, should any successor fail in righteous rule, then the country will fall gradually into utter ruin, and remain so for generations till the Law of the Wheel has been revived. Then only will the Wheel reappear and with it wealth and power and the happiness of the people. All this is set out at length in the *Chakka-vatti Sīha-nada Suttanta*.

The *Chakka-vatti*, literally the 'Wheel-turner,' and by implication the ruler who conducts himself (and whose subjects therefore conduct themselves) according to the Law of the Wheel, is the technical term for the righteous king or over-lord. It has not been found in any pre-Buddhistic literature; and, though it is so frequent in later books, it has, in Hindu works, lost its ethical connotation, and simply means a war-lord, a mighty emperor, 'one who unhindered drives the wheels of his chariot over all lands.' But it should be noticed that the wondrous Wheel of the Buddhist legend is not really a chariot wheel. The idea of sovereignty is no doubt linked up with it. The Wheel, however, is a single disk, not one of a pair. And it is very clear that it is really a reminiscence, not of a chariot wheel, but of the disk of the sun, which travels over all lands from sea to sea and sheds glory over all. By the pouring of new wine into the old bottles, it is the sun-god himself, transmuted into a forerunner of the king of righteousness, whose rule of life brings happiness to all.

This is the legend made use of to give a title to the doctrine of the reign of law, the basis of the reformation we call Buddhism and which the leaders of that reformation called 'the Law.' The discourse summarizing this doctrine, the first discourse delivered by the founder of the new movement, is entitled 'The Setting in Motion onwards of the Wheel of Law' (*Dhamma-chakkappavattana*). The allusion is to the action of the king of righteousness in the foregoing legend when he baptizes the Wheel, and exhorts it to roll onward, to go forth and overcome. The allusion is apt; and it gains both in poetry and in its appeal to the mental attitude of the time by the irony with which it enlists the service of the ancient and repudiated sun-god in the propagation of the Buddha's doctrine that the gods too are under the domain of law. Just so was Brahmā made into a convert to the new teaching, and the old god of war and drink, the mighty Indra, had been transmuted into the peace-loving and sober Sakka, devoted to the doctrine of the reign, not of divine whim, but of law.

Very naturally the early European writers on Buddhism, ignorant of the legend of the Wheel,

[1] *E.g.*, the *Mahā Sudassana Suttanta*, *Dīgha*, ii. 172; the *Chakka-vatti Sīha-nāda Suttanta*, *Digha*, iii. 61.

[1] On this phrase see *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 203, *Kindred Sayings*, i. 15.

[2] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 202–204.

and ignorant also of the doctrine of the reign of law, completely failed to understand this curious title of the oldest summary of the new teaching. It would be wearisome to point out all their mistakes. Perhaps the worst of the many blunders is the identification of the Wheel with what Anglo-Indian writers call, quite erroneously, the praying-wheels of Tibet. They are not so called by any authority, Tibetan or Buddhist. They are not praying-wheels, but wheels of good luck, containing an invocation to some deity—the contrary therefore to the old doctrine of the Wheel. We may learn some day what the original meaning in Tibetan of *Oṁ maṇi padme Hūm* really was. The phrase is not likely to be less than about 1400 years later than the time of the Buddha. And it is most unlikely that, after that long lapse of time, any memory of the legend of the Wheel or of its adoption to the title of the First Discourse had still survived. To judge from what we know of Lāmaism, the Tibetans had quite forgotten that, in early Buddhism, the reign of gods had been superseded by the reign of law (or, to express the same fact in modern technical terms, that animism had given way to normalism).

It remains to add that some centuries after the canon had closed we find also another use of the figure or simile of the wheel. Only the wheel is here, not the disk of the sun, but a chariot wheel. The figure is used of the circle or cycle of rebirths. Mrs. Rhys Davids has pointed out the use of this simile in Greek and Sanskrit,[1] and it has since then been discovered in Pāli.[2] This is in harmony with the doctrine of the Wheel of Law in early Buddhism, but it is a supplementary idea, and has a different origin, and is never called the Wheel of the Law. It is *saṁsāra-chakka*, not *dhamma-chakka*.

LITERATURE.—*Dīgha Nikāya*, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (*PTS*), Oxford, 1890–1911; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, do. 1899–1910; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings* (*PTS*), do. 1917, *Buddhism*, London (Home University Library, no date); *Visuddhi Magga*, ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids (*PTS*), 1920.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

WIDOW.—See MARRIAGE, SATĪ.

WIFE.—See MARRIAGE.

WILL.—The word 'will' (Gr. *βούλησις*, Lat. *voluntas*, Germ. *Wille*, *Wollen*, Fr. *volonté*) is used in a wide variety of senses by philosophical and psychological writers. In the widest sense it means all the 'active powers' which the Aristotelian bipartite division in psychology contrasted with the 'intellectual,' and so includes all striving, appetition, and interest, even at an infraconscious level. In the narrowest sense it is taken to mean, or at least to imply, deliberate and responsible choice.

1. Physiological basis.—The analysis of will in the widest sense requires the analysis of the physiology of movement. Physiologists base their conceptions upon reflex action, and then discuss the integration of reflexes in the brain and spinal cord. The unit of this explanation is the simple reflex. The stimulation of an end-organ *must* issue in movement, and a simple reflex is the simplest possible response of an organism to stimulation. The simplicity of a simple reflex, however, is the result of analysis rather than a fact of observation. What we find in fact is a combination of reflexes into reflex patterns of various kinds.

All reflexes take place through a chain or arc of neurons which passes through the central nervous system, and it is important to notice the differences between the stimulation of a bare nerve-trunk and of a reflex arc. The latter shows slower speed, a marked 'after-discharge,' irreversibility of direction, greater liability to fatigue, notable inhibition, and 'refractory phase,' together with a very marked response to cumulative stimulation where the stimuli are too weak to lead to movement severally. These differences, taken conjointly, show that reflex action, so far from being a mere conduit of nervous discharge, is, even in its simplest form, a kind of response in which the organism counts for more than the stimulus.

Simple reflexes are allied when two or more work together. They alternate, *e.g.*, in the rhythmic contraction of the flexor and extensor muscles in walking. They compensate one another, inhibit one another, and form reflex patterns of great variety. The main points to notice about them, however, are (1) the way in which they reinforce one another in their conjoint eventual discharge through a final common path, and (2) the co-ordination of them in time. The first phenomenon is so marked that some observers believe that reflex patterns work on the 'all or nothing' principle. The second appears in its primary form in the successive stimulation of antagonistic reflexes, and many physiologists suppose this temporal co-ordination to be the principal office of the central nervous system.

This general conception applies to all reflex movements, and its connexion with will becomes manifest when we consider the relation between the nerve-endings specially adapted to the reception of distant stimuli and the muscles of the skeletal system. These skeletal muscles (with unimportant exceptions) are the voluntary ones, and they are intimately connected with senses like sight or hearing which are affected by stimuli from a relatively distant point of origin. It is easy to interpret these facts in a way that has great significance for the economy of organic behaviour. To use Sherrington's terms, while some reflexes are 'consummatory,' those connected with the skeletal muscles are for the most part 'precurrent.' They do not enjoy, but anticipate. The union between sight and the skeletal muscles enables the animal to adapt itself in advance. The end of its action, to be sure, is consummatory, swallowing or being swallowed; but the means to this end is a preparation in the way of movement—crouching, stalking, running, leaping. It is significant in this regard that the head is the organ of the 'distant' senses and of balance. For the head is the rudder of the body, and it steers the quicker in proportion as the path of the nervous impulse to the brain is shorter.

Psychology is concerned with consciousness, first and foremost, and the reasonable inference from this evidence is that consciousness continues the work of the nervous system. Pleasure gives an added zest to action; pain is the body's spur to release from its distress. Consciousness, again, implies a certain 'togetherness' of experiencing. A certain minimum of memory is held together in our consciousness, and this acquired experience is at the behest of action. Consciousness, once again, is most acute in connexion with the organs of exploration, and the connexion between eye or ear or finger-tip and the skeletal or voluntary muscles indicates that consciousness widens the range of precurrent adjustments especially in point of time.

2. Instinctive action.—The theory of impulse and instinct is the natural corollary to this account of neural integration. The connexion between reflexes and impulses or appetites is plainly very close indeed, and instincts are the great racial patterns of co-ordinated action. The moor-hen has a diving 'set' in its muscles when it is little

[1] *Visuddhi Magga* (*PTS*), 1920, p. 198.
[2] *JRAS*, 1894, p. 388; cf. also Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 98, and art. PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA, vol. ix. p. 674.

more than a fledgling, and it dives as soon as cause and opportunity offer.

The question how far human action or the action of the higher animals is fundamentally instinctive is still hotly debated, but the debate tends to become verbal since the partisans of the instincts insist upon the indefinite pliability of these responses, while their opponents try to narrow instincts down to mere racial routine. The other point in the dispute is the relation of nature to nurture, and this also is a thorny topic which a wise man leaves alone. It is clear, however, that most human activities, whether or not they have become habitual, are acquired in individual experience (even if they are grafted upon a primitive instinctive root), and all these problems are highly speculative in comparison with the fact of the reflective adaptation of human beings to their circumstances. Again, there is another reason why the analysis of will suffers when psychologists devote themselves exclusively to speculative theories concerning the instincts. However important the instincts may be, and however closely allied with normal human perception and action, the consciousness in instinctive behaviour does not differ in kind from acquired or from reflective consciousness, and its principal features cannot be discerned so readily at the instinctive level of consciousness as at others. It is best, therefore, to try to give a direct psychological analysis of the consciousness in ordinary human action.

3. Ideo-motor theory.—Probably the simplest type of conscious action is that which is called ideo-motor. This occurs when the thought of a movement leads directly (so far as consciousness is concerned) to the execution of the movement. A great many movements need no other explanation. Those who take the injunction 'Kill that fly!' seriously begin hostilities as soon as they see the fly; and 'Eight o'clock and time to get up' is frequently a sufficient and the only mental prelude to getting out of bed in the morning.

These instances show that the idea of a movement tends of itself to the execution of the movement, and some psychologists, generalizing somewhat hastily, have concluded that all voluntary action is ideo-motor and nothing else. According to this theory, we learn from impulse, instinct, imitation, and random muscular play what movements can be executed. The immediate antecedent of any movement which is consciously directed, however, is the temporary dominance in our consciousness of the idea of that movement; and this idea is always the cause of the movement.

This theory is plausible because the idea of a future action is a *sine qua non* of voluntary action of any kind, but there are serious objections to it. (1) Our ideas of movement are usually suffused with feeling and tense with conscious endeavour. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that these feelings, desires, and strivings do not play their part as directly and as effectually as the bare idea of movement. (2) There is universal testimony to prove that much of our action does not seem to be merely ideo-motor. The bare idea of movement is sometimes merely an idea. We may have to strive most resolutely to bring ourselves to the point of acting—*i.e.*, we may have to reinforce the idea by endeavouring after its end. And sometimes we have to choose between several conflicting ideas of movement simultaneously present to minds.

Since the ideo-motor theory does not dispute these facts (it would not be worth considering if it did), it has to provide an alternative explanation, and so it maintains that striving or choice in these cases secures the temporary dominance of some particular idea of movement. The only possible cause of conscious action, according to this way of it, is a man's temporary single-mindedness towards the idea of the action, and his temporary oblivion of all else. Choice or striving influences the action at second remove, and causes the temporary dominance of the idea of the action.

This theory is unnecessarily complicated. We seem to ourselves to choose this or that, and not merely to attend to some idea of movement exclusively; and there is no good reason why this seeming should not be actuality. Again, the idea of our chosen course of action often does not seem to be the only alternative before the mind either at the time of choosing or afterwards, even granting that we ought to stick to our plan, after we have adopted it, on pain of inefficiency or Hamlet-like vacillation. It is false in fact, therefore, that conscious action is always preceded by this exclusive possession of consciousness. Moreover, this theory is just an attempt to save the 'strongest motive' theory with as little violence as may be. It is assumed that action must be due to the 'strongest motive'; and therefore the motive which immediately precedes the action is assumed to be either predominant or else the only one present; but this argument is circular, since there is no way of telling which motive is the strongest except by saying, *après coup*, that it was *the* motive of the action which followed in fact. Again, even if this theory could account for most specific voluntary movements, it would still be too narrow for voluntary choice as a whole. When a barrister resolves to make out a case for his client, or a journalist tries to discover the gist of Einstein's theory or of Ludendorff's influence, the movements they make in the way of speaking, writing, or travel are quite subsidiary in importance. And the ideo-motor theory simply omits these cases. Movements are seldom chosen for their own sakes. They are usually chosen because they are means to an end, and the ideo-motor theory is so preoccupied with the means that it neglects the end altogether.

This theory, indeed, is too intellectual; for it resolves action into the automatic effect of mere thinking, and rejects the primary and direct influence of interest, passion, and striving. This mistake is not uncommon; it permeates, *e.g.*, the Benthamite theory of psychological hedonism (*q.v.*). To say, with Mill,[1] that 'happiness is the sole end of human action' may mean many things. It might mean, *e.g.*, that no one, on reflexion, judges anything to be good except his own happiness; and in that case the theory would have no bearing on unreflective action. It might also mean that the anticipation of pleasure is the only possible motive for action. This form of the argument is required as a premiss in many of the utilitarian arguments, and it is preposterously false. In impulsive or instinctive action, *e.g.*, the impulse comes first, and the gratification follows; and the baulked dispositions which are the root of psychasthenia (in nine cases out of ten) must exist before there is pain in the baulking of them.

4. Reason and will.—On the other hand, many theories are not intellectual enough, for they take volition to be an affair of impulse or desire, and they leave no place for reflexion, except the recognition of means and the discovery of bad reasons for some sentimental or impulsive *parti pris*. Most of the modern theories of this type, it is

[1] Bentham's argument (*Introd. to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. i. § 1) is even more explicitly fallacious. 'Nature,' he says, 'has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.'

true, do not seem to have descended *in linea recta* from Hume, but Hume gave what is still the clearest and the most concise expression of them.

Reason, he says, can have no original influence on the will, for reason is either the abstract demonstration of relationships or else the discovery of causes and effects. The will, however, has to do with sensible realities and not with abstract relationships; and the discovery of causes and effects cannot concern us in the least if we are indifferent to them. Hume assumes in the next place that the difference between interest and indifference is wholly identical with the presence or absence of passion, and then he argues with perfect logic that 'since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any action or emotion.'[1] He concludes that the so-called contrast between reason and passion is really the battle between calm emotions and sudden, tempestuous ones.

There is a double fallacy in this argument. (1) Even if reason were restricted to the means to action, and if the knowledge of these causes and effects were indifferent without emotion, it would not follow that reason was ineffective when allied with emotion. (2) Reason (unless it is robbed of this function by an arbitrary definition) can discriminate the values of ends as well as ascertain the means to them. The values that are important for action, to be sure, are those which are felt with emotion and followed with conviction, but this fact does not imply that the intellectual recognition of these values is of no account.

This consequence would not follow even if all these values were themselves emotions. That, however, is not the case. The principal values which we admit to be intrinsically good are happiness, social intercourse, knowledge, beauty, and righteousness; and perhaps also the bearers of these values—Plato, who had the knowledge, Keats, who was touched with the beauty, Cato, who did what was right, and the greyhound which leaps with the joy of coursing. Most of these values are not emotions, though all are felt with emotion. And there is another point. A man's emotion is his own; and, if nothing but emotion could touch his will, the happiness of others or the honour of his country could not influence him directly. In fact, however, we do not merely judge intellectually that another's good is worth as much as ours, but we frequently choose to sacrifice our own good to his. This personal sacrifice, it is true, is sometimes superficial only. That occurs when we choose a less obvious instead of a more commonplace personal satisfaction; and the existence of non-rational but altruistic impulses and emotions certainly lessens the gap between this theory and the facts. But often we have to accept the truth that a man may sacrifice ease, culture, and leisure to undertake work which he loathes, though he knows that his own loss is certain. For the good, he thinks, constrains him.

5. Analysis of voluntary action.—We may now analyse deliberate voluntary action. Action of this kind implies knowledge of the means which are needed, choice between alternative ends, and the belief that *we* can achieve, or help to achieve, the end by adopting the means. The end, to be sure, may not be wholly attainable by us, but we believe, in that case, that we can contribute towards its attainment; and, for the rest, the thought of *will* implies the thought of *can*. No one deliberately chooses anything which he knows to be utterly out of his reach. We choose between alternatives which we believe are within our power, and our choice, in the end, is a choice between conflicting values.

The difficulties of voluntary choice are due to the false perspective which nearer values may have in comparison with more remote ones, to preoccupation with our own personal welfare and our consequent blindness towards the claims of other people, to our lack of acquaintance with many attainable values, to our ignorance concerning the means which are necessary in fact, to the difficulty of knowing for certain which consequences are most probable, to the doubt whether some means could ever justify some ends, and so on. This subject is too wide to be treated adequately here, even in outline. And there are other complications.

(1) We usually have too little time for mature reflexion. Most of our deliberations are cut short because life is brief and the need for action clamant. We have to distinguish, therefore, between voluntary action and deliberate reflective action. Voluntary action is the genus of which deliberate choice is the species. It implies the adoption of an end (the fact of 'consent') together with belief in the possibility of attaining the end; but there need not be choice between alternatives, since we may be too much pressed for time to take account of more than the first expedient that occurs to us, and our belief may be little more than a vague expectation that something may be done on the lines we have adopted.

(2) The analysis given above was restricted to the deliberate choice of a single course of action, but will is a subtler thing than this, with a wider net. When we speak of a formed will, we mean the whole character of a man so far as it can be expressed in action. A man's habits of choice pertain to his will as well as his choice on this or the other occasion, and so do his capacities and his general aims. The formed or stable will, therefore, has to be examined very carefully in connexion with physiological and instinctive dispositions on the one hand and with conscious personality on the other, and the ramifications extend very far. On the other hand, there are limits set to it through the fact of personality and its 'tunicle' the body (to use Berkeley's phrase). We have no acquaintance with any will that is superpersonal, and, in particular, we are not acquainted with any *volonté générale*. The will of society is not *a* will any more than the spirit of the times is *a* mind. The general will, so called, means (*a*) that the majority of the members of a community may resolve, or act as if they had resolved, to pursue a common end which each of them furthers in his own way; and (*b*) that each member must take account of the other members in considering the ends to be attained and the means of attaining them. More than that it should not mean.

6. Voluntarism.—The most interesting questions arising out of the theory of will are voluntarism, or the metaphysical theory that the will is sovereign over the self or the world, and the perennial problem of the freedom of the will.[1] While voluntarism has many varieties, its main contention is either that knowledge is a phase of willing (or, perhaps, subordinate to it) or else that will is the *causa essendi* of all existing things. Knowing, we are told, must be only a phase of willing, because all speculative activities are either virtual actions or else merely delayed reactions. The psychology of development, *e.g.*, shows that knowledge is a kind of virtual action. *Am Anfang war die That.* Man's earliest and most fundamental business is just to adapt himself to his environment, and so his earliest and most important knowledge is only a retainer to this fundamental need. And it is claimed that knowledge never outgrows its small-clothes. The life of nations, broadly speaking, is the application of their knowledge in the way of machinery, armaments, navigation, and government for the ultimate purpose of maintaining human subsistence as

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. ii. pt. iii. § 3.

[1] See art. FREE WILL.

agreeably as possible on a large social scale. The theoretical adventures of the intellect are practical in their germ and in their fruit, and belief is either action or readiness for action.

This line of argument is obviously inconclusive. Even if it be granted that man, at the beginning, had to use all his wits to keep alive, and that most of the able-bodied members of a community have still, in a way, to co-operate for this purpose, there is plainly a huge lacuna between the premisses of this argument and its conclusion. For, even if much knowledge has to be given to the necessities of action, it does not follow that all must be given. The argument, indeed, is quite consistent with the belief that knowledge, originally a servant, may become a master and reign in its own right, or that it is possible, in an ordinary human community, for many people to spend their lives in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and for all members of the community to do so at some times. And the facts seem to support this hypothesis. Those who maintain that all knowledge is only a preparation for action may be invited to say what preparation for action is implied in my knowledge that Bolingbroke wore a wig, or that Sophocles was a greater poet than Dryden, and to explain why gossipy reminiscences or intellectual curiosity concerning Chinese puzzles (to mention trivial instances only) must be 'virtual actions.' They may also be reminded that practical men need not act the worse because their information is accurate. True belief is the most useful guide to action, but some truths do not concern action directly, and it is only a quibble to say that any connexion with action, however remote, is the same thing as 'virtual action.'

Similar arguments apply to the theory that all speculation is delayed reaction and nothing else. It is true, no doubt, that there cannot be deliberate reflective choice without delay in reaction, and that deliberation is a speculative activity. But controversies with circle-squarers, *e.g.*, are not merely delayed reactions; and it is a fallacy to argue either that all speculation is only delayed reaction because some speculations imply delayed reactions, or that the speculative activities which may occur during certain delayed reactions are themselves *only* delayed reactions.

The theory that knowledge is subordinate to will is based either on psychological description or on metaphysical grounds. In the former case it is argued, as a matter of psychological fact, that knowledge is only the attempt to discover ways and means for satisfying impulses. It is sufficient to reply to this argument that these impulses may include curiosity and disinterested impulses towards knowledge for its own sake, and that, even if impulses are always the primary *causes* of knowledge, it does not follow that the effect is subordinate to the cause.

The metaphysical argument is a *non sequitur* of the same type. It maintains that effects are always subordinate to their conditions, and that will is the cause of all mental process including every piece of knowing. This principle, as we have seen, is false, and, apart from that, the premiss of the argument is highly dubious. Will, in the sense of striving or of deliberate choice, is not the sole cause of mental process in any intelligible sense. We have no right to exclude any antecedent from the list of causes of any effect if this antecedent is always present in fact, and if it always seems to play its part along with the other antecedents. And knowledge and feeling are antecedents of any mental process just as plainly as will is. This metaphysical argument, in a word, finds no support in the psychological phenomenon of will.

It may be argued, to be sure, that the scholastic maxim *Operari sequitur esse* is false, or that 'function always determines structure'; and views of this kind (usually with more enthusiasm than knowledge) may even claim kinship with certain modern theories of physics. These arguments are irrelevant, however, because voluntarism is meaningless unless it is based on the psychological phenomenon of willing. The will, as we experience it, is at best only a useful analogy for such theories; and those pluralisms which maintain that the *conatus* (or the desires and appetitions) of every existing thing is its *causa essendi* cannot claim more than a metaphorical support from the facts of will, as we find them. A spiritualistic pluralism of this kind[1] may be true in fact; and voluntarism, possibly, may be the least inept name for it, but it is not a logical consequence from the relation of willing to personality, and it becomes nothing but conjecture when this vague psychological analogy is extended to unconscious things.

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On psychological hedonism: Bentham, *Introd. to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, London, 1789 (*Works*, ed. J. Bowring, Edinburgh, 1838-43, vol. i. ch. i.); J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. iv. (any ed.).

On the influence of reason and emotion in willing: Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1888, or T. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888), bk. ii. pt. iii. § 3; W. McDougall, *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913, ch. i. *f.*; Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, do. 1916, ch. i.; Graham Wallas, *The Great Society: a Psychological Analysis*, do. 1914, ch. iii.

On the analysis of choice: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. iii. ch. ii.

On voluntarism: Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (any ed.), and the works, *e.g.*, of Fichte or Bergson.

On freedom of the will: art. FREE WILL.

JOHN LAIRD.

WIND, WIND-GODS.—See AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR.

WINGS (Greek and Roman).—Wings, as an attribute of animals to whom they do not properly belong, were borrowed by the Greeks from Oriental art, mostly that of Mesopotamia.[2] They probably appeared first on composite animals into which the bird form entered as an element, such as the gryphon; but they seem to have been applied almost indiscriminately to quadruped and even human forms as symbolic of divine strength and swiftness. It is doubtful, however, whether this symbolism was what attracted the early Greeks; more probably it was the decorative value of wings, as seen in Oriental carvings and woven stuffs, that first appealed to the Greek artistic sense, though they doubtless were given a symbolic meaning in later Greek art.

In the art of Crete and Mycenæ we find both gryphons and sphinxes with wings, but we have no means of judging whether these had any meaning or were merely borrowed as elements of decoration; the fact that the sphinx is female and winged suffices to show that it came from Mesopotamia and not from Egypt. But the frequent appearance of winged creatures is conspicuous in the great influx of Eastern influence, at first through the medium of the Phœnicians and later, more directly, in the 'Orientalizing' Greek vases and in decorative carvings and reliefs of a similar period. On the sub-Mycenæan vases of Cyprus are various winged animals, including centaurs (a winged centaur appears in Mesopotamia about 1200 B.C.). On the later Orientalizing pottery from Rhodes, Asia Minor, and Corinth

[1] See art. PLURALISM, § 2.
[2] See art. ART (Greek and Roman), § 3 *f.*

the commonest winged forms, other than birds, are the gryphon, the sphinx, human-headed birds, and human beings; winged horses are also found, especially in chariots of the gods, on Melian and other vases, and winged horses, sea-horses, boars, and other animals, such as the gryphon and sphinx, are common on the so-called 'island gems' and on early coins.

In many of these cases it is evident that the decorative value of the wings, as helping the design to fill a given field, has been paramount; but there are other examples, in which a symbolic meaning may be inferred, and where such winged forms have become the accepted type of characteristic creations of Greek myth. In most of these instances, however, the types were not invented or composed by the Greek artist to express the idea of the myth, but were adopted from foreign or borrowed forms. Thus there is no evidence that the Sirens (*q.v.*) were thought of by Homer and his contemporaries in the form assigned to them by later art; either a fancied appropriateness or a chance coincidence may sometimes have led to such identifications. The type of the human-headed bird was not, however, used only for the Sirens; it occurs constantly on tombs or in connexion with them, and appears to represent a death-dæmon. The best known instance is on the misnamed 'Harpy monument,' which, though not Greek but Lycian, shows evident affinity with Greek ideas. Here the figures in question have not only human heads and breasts, but also human arms, as well as birds' legs and talons, both of which they use to carry off the souls of the dead. Thus they show the same unnatural reduplication of limbs which we find in other winged creatures, and which the human-headed bird sometimes escapes. The wings, here as in human or quadruped winged forms, appear to grow from the shoulder-blades, and yet to work independently of the arms. Such an inorganic composition seems to confirm the view that the wings, except where they belong properly to the bird form, are borrowed from an art in which they were purely symbolic. The funereal connexion in the case of the Siren may perhaps be explained by Egyptian influence, since the human-headed bird is used in Egypt as a symbol of the soul. It is often found as the crown of a tombstone in Athens.

It is not certain that the wonder-horse, Pegasus, was at first thought of as having wings; he appears without them on an early relief; but he early adopted the winged form in which he has been familiar to all later art. Gryphons have a place in myth, since they fought with the Arimaspi in the far North; though they have beaks, their body is that of a quadruped rather than a bird, and their wings are consequently as much out of place as on a horse or lion.

What is, however, most characteristic of the Greek application of wings is their addition to the human form. This also appears first in borrowed forms, such as that of the Oriental Artemis; a similar form is that of the Gorgon, whose hideous grimacing face is set in a human body with wings; here again we have no evidence that the 'head of the terrible monster, the Gorgon,'[1] was thought of in this form by the poet of the *Odyssey*. Another shape akin to the Gorgon is the Harpy. This sometimes seems to be a death-dæmon, though the bird-like figures on the Harpy tomb are probably wrongly named. On early vases Harpies appear in completely human form, winged, and sometimes with talons or claw-like hands; there is no doubt as to identification, since the name is written beside them. These Harpies are sometimes interpreted as maleficent wind-dæmons; and this is consistent with the tale of their being chased away by the Boreads, the sons of the North Wind. Wind-gods generally appear as winged human figures, and the small winged figures that are common on early vases—*e.g.*, those of Cyrene—are probably to be interpreted thus. Boreas himself, who is represented on Attic vases and elsewhere as carrying off Oreithyia, appears as a winged, bearded man, sometimes with a mane of feathers for hair and beard.

[1] *Od.* xi. 634.

It is probable that in early Greek art such winged figures are used with many different meanings; but they come to be differentiated into two main types of constant occurrence—the winged nude male figure or Eros, and the winged draped female figure or Nike. The sculptor Archermos of Chios is said to have been the first to represent Nike with wings, and the statue in which he did this has been discovered in Delos; it represents a female figure in rapid flight, with wings not only on the shoulders, but also on the ankles. Floating figures of winged Victories, as symbolical of victory either in war or in athletic contests, are extremely common throughout Greek and Roman art. Nike was placed on the outstretched right hand of the colossal gold and ivory statues of Zeus and Athene at Olympia and Athens, by Phidias. Eros in earlier Greek art always appears as a youth of fully-grown proportions, though sometimes of diminutive size. In the Hellenistic and Roman ages he becomes the baby Cupid familiar to Renaissance and modern art, and his wings are correspondingly small. Iris, as the messenger of the gods, is usually winged, and so is hardly to be distinguished from Nike, apart from her attribute of the rainbow.

A different series of winged figures, usually diminutive, represent the souls of the dead; as such they are sometimes depicted on Attic vases as hovering about the tomb. Similarly, in the weighing of the Keres of two warriors by the gods—as of Achilles and Hector in the *Iliad*—the usual representation is of two minute winged figures placed in the scales. Homer describes them as δύο κῆρε . . . θανάτοιο,[1] and hence it seems doubtful whether the two figures are to be regarded as the souls or lives of the heroes or rather their fates of death. But the resemblance to the little souls on the vases is striking. Keres (*q.v.*) seems to vary in meaning between death-dæmons, who seem usually thought of as horrible, though not necessarily winged, and ghosts or souls of the dead, who almost always are winged. But the Psyche of later times, who is associated with Eros and has butterfly wings—sometimes even takes the shape of a butterfly—is a creation of later allegory. Death (Thanatos) often appears as a winged figure in art; on Attic funeral vases he, with his brother Sleep, often bears the deceased to the tomb. Sleep is similar to him, but beardless, while he is bearded; and both usually have similar wings growing from their shoulders. But in the beautiful figure of Sleep of the Praxitelean age the god has only a small pair of wings growing from his temples: a similar position for the wings is seen in later sentimental versions of Medusa, who has exchanged the horror of the Gorgon for a death-like beauty, and occasionally in other figures.

A variation on wings actually growing from a part of the body, head, or limbs is seen in wings that can be attached to some article of dress, and so put on and off. The most familiar example is offered by the winged sandals of Hermes, which he lends to Perseus; the notion of lending wings to the feet is also seen in the earliest Nike, and in later allegorical figures such as Kairos (Occasion). Hermes sometimes wears also wings attached to

[1] *Il.* xxii. 210.

his cap; the resemblance to wings on Scandinavian helmets is probably accidental. Wings are sometimes attached to other objects—*e.g.*, to the tripod of Apollo when he travels on it,[1] or to the chariot on which Triptolemus carries the gift of corn over the earth, or to that in which Medea escapes after her revenge on Jason. Other gods also have means of swift flight, as exemplified by Athene, when she describes how she came πτερῶν ἄτερ ῥοιβδοῦσα κόλπον αἰγίδος.[2]

It is with much the same associations that gods are often described as coming like birds or even taking the shape of birds. The fatal attempt of Dædalus and Icarus to fly with mechanical wings is probably to be regarded as similar magic. The desires of mankind in this direction are wittily parodied in Aristophanes' *Birds*.

In Roman art the types handed down from the Greek and Hellenistic periods frequently recur, but without any essential additions or difference. Victories, both in the round and in relief, are especially common, and are chiefly interesting as supplying the type which was later to be adopted—with change or rather absence of sex—for the angel of Christian art.

So far, though the position of wings has been noted, nothing has been said as to their shape. The wings of early decorative types are almost always curved back at the end, in a manner which, if not quite unnatural, is at least greatly exaggerated. This is a characteristic which is also found among the winged creatures of Oriental art, and is borrowed from them, but is emphasized for decorative reasons in archaic Greek art. When wings came to be applied freely by Greek artists to various figures, human and other, they naturally supplemented and corrected the conventional forms by their own observation, using especially the wings of large birds as their models, often probably those of the eagle. The wings are frequently outstretched as in flight; when lowered, they do not lie folded close to the body, as in the case of a bird, but usually project at right angles behind the back of the figure. Smaller wings show many varieties; thus, according to H. Brunn,[3] the wings on the temples of the head of Sleep are those of a nighthawk. Such variety of imagination was readily suggested by the subjects themselves.

LITERATURE.—J. Langbehn, *Flügelgestalten der ältesten griech. Kunst*, Munich, 1881; G. Weicker, *Der Seelenvogel in der alten Litt. und Kunst*, Leipzig, 1902; articles on subjects quoted above in Roscher and Daremberg-Saglio—*e.g.*, 'Sphinx,' 'Harpyia,' 'Nike,' 'Eros,' 'Keres.'

E. A. GARDNER.

WISDOM.—As distinguished from the reasoned, systematic view of the world and man which is the conscious aim of philosophy (*q.v.*), wisdom may be defined as the direct, practical insight into the meaning and purpose of things that comes to 'shrewd, penetrating, and observant minds, from their own experience of life, and their daily commerce with the world.'[4] It is the fruit not so much of speculation as of native sagacity and wit. Consequently, while philosophy appeals only to the intellectual *élites*, wisdom appeals to all who are interested in life and have understanding enough to appreciate a word of truth well spoken. In spite of this distinction, however, the two are closely allied. The knowledge of life reached intuitively by wisdom is the raw material out of which philosophical systems are evolved. And in its bolder flights wisdom moves in the atmosphere of philosophy.

1. Proverbial wisdom.—The beginnings of wisdom are found embodied in the terse, sententious sayings known as proverbs (*q.v.*). The art of proverb-making is universal. It flourishes among the rudest of tribes as well as among the more brilliantly endowed peoples of India, Greece, and Palestine. Collections of high value—in substance often much alike—come to us from such widely separated sources as the North American Indians and Negroes and the natives of Australasia and West Africa. But among the most interesting, not only for their intrinsic merit, but also for the light they shed on the development of Semitic wisdom, are those of the Arabs, as they are preserved for us in the great thesaurus of al-Maidānī († A.D. 1124) and still thrown out with astonishing ease by the sharp-edged Bedouin tongue. The simplest are brief similitudes (*amthâl*), like 'bolder in onset than 'Amr b. Kulthûm,' 'faster friends than the two palm-trees of Ḥulwan,' and 'more unlucky than the hamstringer of the she-camel' (*Qudar al-Aḥmar*). But many are finely-polished epigrams on human life, distinguished alike for their literary grace and for the keenness of their moral perception. Though in general the motive is enlightened self-interest, they are by no means forgetful of the nobler qualities of character. Especially do they delight in extolling the virtues of contentment, cheerfulness, truth, self-respect, restraint in word and action, perseverance, kindness, friendship, neighbourliness, hospitality, and love of home and country. In all this they are a mirror of Arabian life at its best.

2. Egyptian wisdom.—While the proverbial lore of Arabia brings us close to the running fountain of Semitic wisdom, the Egyptian sages had at a far earlier date evolved a gnomic literature, in the shape of books of moral precept or instruction (*seb'oyet*), full of sound sense, and sometimes even high moral excellence. The earliest of these books, the *Wisdom of Imhotep*, chief architect of Zoser, founder of the IIIrd dynasty, is known to us only from allusions in later literature; but two products of the IIIrd and Vth dynasties, the *Wisdom of Kegemne* and the *Wisdom of Ptah-hotep*, not only enjoyed wide popularity in their own day, but have been preserved in MSS of the Middle Kingdom. The former is a simple treatise on deportment; the latter covers a much wider range, offering 'maxims of beautiful speech' (as the author himself phrases it) on such subjects as diligence, courtesy, faithfulness to trusts, humility, self-restraint, purity, loyalty to friends, love of wife and family, kindness to dependents. Of similar tenor, though richer in content, and fresher and more artistic in expression, are the later *Maxims of Ani* (from the XXIst dynasty), urging not merely the moral virtues of purity, temperance, modesty of speech, a gracious demeanour alike at home, in the street, and in social fellowship, kindness, consideration for the poor and aged, reverence towards parents, but also the strictly religious obligations of chaste and loving worship, prayer, praise, and sacrifice.

'Celebrate thou the festival of thy God, and repeat the celebration thereof in its appointed season. Bear testimony [to Him] after thy offering.'

'The sanctuary of God abhorreth noisy demonstrations. Pray thou with a loving heart, and let thy words be secret. Do this, and He will do thy business for thee. He will hearken unto thy words, and He will receive thy offering.'

'Devote thyself to God, take heed to thyself daily for the sake of God, and let to-morrow be as to-day. Work thou [for Him]. God seeth him that worketh for Him, and He esteemeth lightly the man who esteemeth Him lightly.'[1]

Couched in a more cynical vein is the *Wisdom of Amenemhet I.*, founder of the XIIth dynasty, written shortly before his death (*c.* 1980 B.C.). Embittered by the rebellion of his subjects, he warns his son Sesostris against putting any con-

[1] *Mon. dell' Inst. di Corr. Arch.* i. [1832] 46.
[2] Æsch. *Eum.* 404.
[3] *Griechische Götterideale in ihren Formen erläutert*, Munich, 1893, p. 31.
[4] J. Morley, *Studies in Literature*, London, 1891, p. 57.

[1] Tr. from E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 228 ff.

fidence in those around him. The only influence that really appeals to men is terror; so let him 'harden himself against all subordinates,' know neither friends nor intimates, 'wherein there is no end,' and guard himself well as he sleeps, 'for a man has no people in the day of evil.' Equally depressing are the *Lament of Khekheperre-Sonbu*, priest of Heliopolis under Sesostris II. (1906–1887 B.C.), with its dismal picture of the corruptions of the time, the *Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Soul*, ending in a wistful longing for death as the only release from evil, and the *Admonitions of Ipuwer*, the gloom of which, however, is relieved at the end by the vision of a righteous ruler, 'with no evil in his heart,' who goes about like a 'shepherd,' gathering together his scattered and 'fevered' herds. On a different key are the *Precepts of Duauf*, urging his son Pepi to diligence in learning, as the most 'beautiful' and honourable of callings, and the remarkable *Song of the Harper*, which finds the only consolation against the vanity and transience of life in the frank pursuit of pleasure.

'Give comfort to thy heart,
And let thy heart forget these things;
What is best for thee to do is
To follow thy heart's desire as long as thou livest.
Anoint thy head with scented unguents,
Let thine apparel be of byssus
Dipped in costly [perfumes],
In the veritable products (?) of the gods.

. . . . . .

Enjoy thyself more than thou hast ever done before,
And let not thy heart pine for lack of pleasure.

. . . . . .

Pursue thy heart's desire and thine own happiness.
Order thy surroundings on earth in such a way
That they may minister to the desire of thy heart;
[For] at length that day of lamentation shall come,
Wherein he whose heart is still shall not hear the lamentation.
Never shall cries of grief cause
To beat [again] the heart of a man who is in the grave.'[1]

3. Babylonian wisdom.—Thus far the cuneiform records have yielded little in the way of wisdom literature. In Rawlinson, II. p. 16, however, there is found an interesting bilingual tablet (Sumerian and Assyrian), containing a number of riddles, proverbs, and gnomic maxims, apparently but specimens of a class (selected for the training of scholars in 'the grammatical construction of short phrases'), and therefore evidence that in Babylonia also proverbial wisdom was the basis of more conscious reflexion on life and conduct. The following may be quoted as typical:

'The life of yesterday goeth on daily the same.'[2]
'Thou goest and takest the field [*i.e.* property] of thine enemy; The enemy hath come and taken thy field.'[3]
'If the seed be not good, the stalk will not grow, nor will grain be produced.'[4]
'I am a young heifer, yoked with a mule; On the wagon to which we are harnessed . . I bear the yoke.'[5]
'What man eateth when he is dead? Why then should he toil when he is alive?'[6]
'In the case of incurable sickness and insatiable hunger, a box full of silver and a chest full of gold are powerless to restore the health and to satisfy the hunger.'[7]
'He who says, "O that I might have revenge, and more so!" draws from a well without water, pours from a skin that is empty.'[8]

The Epicurean tendency revealed in the Egyptian *Song of the Harper* finds expression also in a remarkable fragment from the Gilgameš epic;[9] while the high ethical and religious note we have heard in *Ptah-hotep* and *Ani* rings through the Wisdom Tablet[10] deciphered and translated by K. D. Macmillan.

'Their freedom [?] thou shalt not take away,
Thou shalt not tyrannically oppress them.
For this [or, he who acts thus], his god is angry with him:
It is not pleasing to Šamaš, he will requite him with evil.

Give food to eat, give wine to drink,
Seek the right, provide for and . . .
For this [or, he who acts thus], his god is pleased with him:
It is pleasing to Šamaš, he will requite him [with good].

. . . . . .

Thou shalt not slander, but speak kindly,
Thou shalt not speak evil, but show mercy.
Him who slanders and speaks evil,
With its recompense will Šamaš visit (?) his head.

Thou shalt not make large thy mouth, but guard thy lip;
In the time of thine anger thou shalt not speak at once.
If thou speakest quickly, thou wilt repent (?) afterward,
And in silence wilt thou sadden thy mind.

Daily present to thy god
Offering and prayer, appropriate to incense.
Before thy god mayest thou have a pure heart,
For that is appropriate to the deity.'[1]

Akin to the more pessimistic wisdom literature of Egypt is the *Lament of Ṭâbi-utul-ellil*,[2] in which the old king grieves over his own misfortunes and the general evil in the world. As for himself, he has sought consistently to honour God's name and follow His righteous ways.

'I myself took thought only for prayers and supplication.
Prayer was my rule, sacrifice my order,
The day of God's honouring was my heart's joy,
The day of following after the goddess was for me gain and riches. . . .
I taught my land to keep God's name;
To honour the name of the goddess I cautioned my people.'[3]

But how very differently from his deserts has God treated him.

'My house is become a prison for me,
In the chains of my flesh are my arms laid,
In my own bonds [?] are my feet cast.

. . . . . .

With a whip he has beaten me, not . . .
With a staff he has pierced me, the point was strong.
All day long doth follow the avenger,
In the middle of the night he lets me not breathe for a moment.'[4]

Both theme and language remind one of Job. But the *dénouement* is different. Whereas Job returns to a deeper, more personal faith in God, the Babylonian sage finds no help in god or goddess. God's ways are too inscrutable for man to rely on Him. The only hope is in the mercy of one's 'guardian angel'—the ancestral spirit of the family.

'But I knew the time, of all my family,
When among the guardian angels their divinity had mercy.'[5]

4. Chinese wisdom.—Passing eastward to China, we enter upon a larger field. The grave, practical temperament of the Chinese predisposed them to ethical reflexion. And the logical sharpness and balanced harmony of their speech made it a happy medium for sententious expression. The old classics, especially the *Shu King*, are rich in proverbial lore. Confucius and his grandson Tse-sse, Mencius (*q.v.*), and the Confucian school generally[6] are distinguished, not for originality or depth of thought, but for the terseness and point of their sayings as well as for the attractive grace of their personalities. Even the mystical and sceptical writers, like Lao-tse, Yang Chu, and Hui Shih, make their impression not so much by the reasoned compactness of their systems as by the beauty and force of their aphorisms. Chinese literature as a whole is 'seasoned with the salt' of proverbs. And the common people are not far inferior to their masters in the art. 'Chinamen may be almost said to think in proverbs.'[7] And instruc-

1 Budge, p. 243.
2 Lines 7 f.; cf. Ec 1[9a].
3 Lines 14–17.
4 Lines 30–33.
5 Lines 34–38.
6 Lines 42–45; cf. Ec 2[18ff.].
7 Lines 46–53.
8 Lines 53–57 (tr. based on M. Jäger, *BASS* ii. 274 ff. and J. A. Craig [written communication]).
9 iii. 3 f.; cited by A. Jeremias in the art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Babylonian), vol. v. p. 447[b].
10 Brit. Mus. K. 7897.

1 Translation from K. D. Macmillan, *BASS* v. 557 ff.
2 Rawlinson, IV.[2] p. 60.
3 *Ib.* II. line 23 ff.
4 Reverse, line 1 ff.
5 Line 24 f. (Translations from R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the OT*, New York, 1912, p. 164 ff.)
6 See art. CONFUCIAN RELIGION.
7 H. A. Giles, *A Hist. of Chinese Literature*, p. 437; see art. LITERATURE (Chinese).

tion in proverbs is a main element in the education of the young.

The centre of interest throughout is the *Tao*—the true or normal way of life. Various qualities are singled out by the classical writers as essential to an all-round moral character. But these are reduced by Confucius to the five cardinal virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity.[1] As a virtue, therefore, wisdom (*chih*) is moral rather than intellectual. It includes, no doubt, knowledge of men and their affairs, acquaintance with the rules of propriety, and the command of language, as the key to success in the world; but its chief concern is with matters of ethical conduct. The wise man (*tse*) is he who knows the principles of right living and is able to instruct his fellows in them. Still higher stands the sage or holy man (*shêng jên*), who not merely knows these principles, but conducts his life in perfect harmony with them and thus becomes the moral teacher and guide of the ages. Such a man is the constant subject of praise in the Chinese classics:

'Perfection of nature is characteristic of Heaven. To attain to that perfection belongs to man. He who possesses that perfection hits what is right without any effort, and apprehends what is true without any exercise of thought;—he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the right way. He who attains to perfection is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast.'[2] 'Therefore the movements of the superior man [sage] mark out for ages the path for all under heaven; his actions are the law for ages for all under heaven; and his words are the pattern for ages for all under heaven. Those who are far from him look longingly for him, and those who are near are never weary of him.'[3]

'The superior man [sage] does not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to virtue. In moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it.'[4] He fulfils completely the rules of a virtuous life: 'when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family.'[5]

As the personal embodiment of the mean—*i.e.* the harmony of all the virtues—'he is all-embracing like heaven, deep and active as a fountain.' 'He is seen, and the people all reverence him; he speaks, and the people all believe him; he acts, and the people are all pleased with him.'[6]

'A man who commands our liking is what is called good. He whose goodness is part of himself is what is called a real man. He whose goodness is accumulated in full measure is called a beautiful man. He whose completed goodness is brightly displayed is called a great man. When this great man exercises a transforming influence [over others], he is what is called a sage.'[7]

On the more philosophical developments of Chinese wisdom see artt. MYSTICISM (Chinese), PHILOSOPHY (Chinese).

5. Indian wisdom.—The wisdom of the Semitic and Turanian races we have found to be predominantly practical; that of the higher Indo-European peoples is as distinctively intellectual. This underlying quality of Indian wisdom is suggested from the outset in the name Veda, 'knowledge,' applied to its classical literature; and bright foregleams of its future triumphs in speculative thought appear even in the *Rigveda*, with its questionings as to the 'wood' and the 'tree' from which were fashioned 'the earth and the heaven,'[8] and its bold theories of the evolution of *sat*, the existent, from *asat*, the non-existent.[9] At the same time, the poets of the *Rigveda* are not lost in the empyrean. They have a true feeling for human life, both in its dignity and in its weakness, and clothe this in sententious sayings which are worthy of comparison with the best in other literatures. Some are mildly humorous, such as the song on the pursuit of gain,[1] others pathetic, like the fine *Lament of the Gambler*,[2] still others cynical, especially those that moralize on women and their ways.[3] But others strike a high note—*e.g.*, the hymn in praise of wise speech,[4] and that on generosity:

'Who has the power should give unto the needy.
Regarding well the course of life hereafter:
Fortune, like the chariot wheels revolving,
Now to one man comes nigh, now to another.

Ploughing the soil, the share produces nurture;
He who bestirs his feet performs his journey;
A priest who speaks earns more than one who's silent;
A friend who gives is better than the niggard.'[5]

In the *Upaniṣads* and the fully developed Vedantic system[6] the incipient gnosticism of the Vedic poets reaches its climax. The *summum bonum* is union with Brahman, attained by the *jñāna-mārga*, 'way of knowledge,' though on the higher planes even knowledge is dispensed with, and the individual soul with all its activities is merged in the tideless ocean of the unknown and unknowable. The same intellectualism pervades the other orthodox systems[7] as well as the heresies of Jainism and Buddhism. Salvation is won by *vidyā* (Pāli *vijja*), *jñāna*, or *prajña* (Pāli *paññā*), knowledge of the real, *bodhi*, enlightenment (as distinguished from *avidyā*, ignorance, *i.e.* mere empirical knowledge, *māyā*, illusion, delusion). But for the ordinary man this way of salvation is too high to attain to. Thus we find a lower way offered him—the *karma-mārga*, 'way of works,' or salvation through sacrifice and moral conduct. The choicest expression is given to this 'way' in the later dramas and epics, notably the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* (*qq.v.*), the former of which is 'an inexhaustible mine of proverbial philosophy'[8]—and in the *nīti*, or wisdom literature, which corresponds very closely to the gnomic poetry of Greece. The outstanding examples of *nīti*—the *Pañchatantra* and *Hitopadeśa*—are manuals of instruction for rulers. But others, both Sanskrit and vernacular, are written for the people. With these may be classed the ethical sections of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), and the beautiful catena of Buddhist aphorisms entitled the *Dhammapada*, 'Pathway of Virtue.' A few examples of this wisdom may be given:

'To injure none, by thought or word or deed,
To give to others, and be kind to all—
This is the constant duty of the good.'[9]

'High-minded men delight in doing good,
Without a thought of their own interest;
When they confer a benefit on others,
They reckon not on favours in return.'[10]

'Hear thou a summary of righteousness,
And ponder well the maxim: Never do
To other persons what would pain thyself.'[11]

'A man of truest wisdom will resign
His wealth, and e'en his life, for good of others;
Better abandon life in a good cause,
When death in any case is sure to happen.'[12]

'The good show pity even to the worthless,
[As] the moon irradiates the meanest hovel.'[13]

'Act then and do thine own appointed task,
In every action my [*i.e.* Kṛṣṇa's] assistance ask;
Do all with heart and soul absorbed in me,
So shalt thou gain thine end and be from trouble free.'[14]

'Like a beautiful flower, full of colour but without scent, are the fine but fruitless words of him who does not act accord-

1 See ETHICS AND MORALITY (Chinese).
2 *Li Ki*, XXVIII. ii. 19 (*SBE* XXVIII. [1885] 317 f.).
3 *Ib.* 50 (*SBE* XXVIII. 325).
4 *Confucian Analects*, IV. v. 3.
5 *Ib.* XII. ii.
6 *Doctrine of the Mean*, XXXI. 3.
7 *Mencius*, VII. pt. II. XXV. 3–8 (trr. from J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, *passim*).
8 x. 81.
9 x. 72, 121, 129.
1 ix. 112.
2 x. 34.
3 viii. 33, x. 27, 95.
4 x. 71.
5 x. 117 (tr. from A. A. Macdonell, *A Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 129).
6 See art. BRAHMANISM.
7 See artt. NYĀYA, SĀNKHYA, YOGA.
8 Macdonell, p. 378.
9 *Mahābh.* iii. 16782.
10 *Ib.* 16796.
11 *Pañchatantra*, iii. 104.
12 *Hitopadeśa*, i. 45.
13 i. 63.
14 *Bhag.* xiii. 29 (tr. from M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], pp. 152, 442 ff.).

ingly. But like a beautiful flower, full of colour and full of scent, are the fine and fruitful words of him who acts accordingly.'[1]

'Do not have evil-doers for friends, do not have low people for friends: have virtuous people for friends, have for friends the best of men.'[2]

'Let no man forget his own duty for the sake of another's, however great; let a man, after he has discerned his own duty, be always attentive to his duty.'[3]

'If anything is to be done, let a man do it, let him attack it vigorously! A careless pilgrim only scatters the dust of his passions more widely.'[4]

6. Greek wisdom.—Intellectualism is as definitely the quality of Greek wisdom as of Indian. Σοφία (from root *σαφ*, 'to know') is primarily 'cleverness' or 'skill' in any of the arts or professions of life—*e.g.*, carpentry,[5] medicine or surgery,[6] poetry,[7] music and singing.[8] Thence it comes to mean 'sagacity,' 'soundness of judgment,' 'intelligence,' 'prudence,' 'political tact,' and general 'knowledge of life,' sometimes with the sinister suggestion of 'shrewdness,' 'cunning,' 'craft.' Finally, it is applied to knowledge in the pure sense of the term—'learning,' 'science,' and 'philosophy' (as the harmony of all the sciences).

The beginnings of Greek wisdom are found in the outcrop of gnomic poetry associated with the names of Hesiod (*q.v.*), Mimnermus, Solon, Phocylides, and especially Theognis (*q.v.*), who crystallized the current morality in lucid phrases and thus became the favourite teachers of their people. As a whole, their wisdom is trite and prosaic, the keynotes being moderation (*μηδὲν ἄγαν*) and fitness of act to time and situation (*καιρὸν γνῶθι*), though they have all an instinct for justice as the fundamental element in every true life. Through most of them, also, runs the strain of melancholy which reaches such tragic depths in later Greek literature.[9] The Seven Wise Men did little more than point the maxims of the poets. Chilon's *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, 'Know thyself,' however, lent the initial impulse to the great philosophical movement in Greece. Its first efforts, no doubt, were spent in rather futile cosmogonic speculations; but Pythagoras held fast to the idea 'that philosophy was above all "a way of life,"'[10] while the fragments of Heraclitus and Democritus (*qq.v.*) abound in moral maxims of considerable insight and aptness of expression. With the Sophists ([*q.v.*] *σοφισταί*, 'masters of wisdom') the interest reverted once for all to the problems of human life and conduct. In their persons the pursuit of wisdom—practically equivalent to intellectual culture as a preparation for private and public life[11]—became a conscious profession. The love of money, so often associated with professionalism, the critical and sceptical tendency of their teaching, the charge that they subordinated moral issues to expediency—that in fact they identified right with might[12]—all conspired to bring the later Sophists into disrepute as subverters of the popular faith and jugglers with the great spiritual realities of life. As a school, however, they deserve credit for having broken the crust of dead tradition, and cleared the way for the intellectual renaissance under Socrates and his disciples.

Socrates (*q.v.*) refused to be called either a *σοφός* or a *σοφιστής*. For him God alone was wise; and the man who claimed actual possession of wisdom was guilty of presumption, if not blasphemy.[13] Taking up, then, a term already used by Pythagoras, he described himself as *φιλόσοφος*, 'a lover of wisdom.' The wisdom he thus sought was essentially ethical: it turned on the principles of virtuous conduct. But with Socrates virtue was identical with knowledge. The enlightened understanding was *ipso facto* morally good character. On this basis Plato (*q.v.*) built up his majestic system of ethical idealism, with its four cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Of these, wisdom, or rationality, is the highest phase of virtue, for it inspires and regulates the whole inner life.[1] Though he recognizes the rationality of virtue in all men, Plato was conscious of a distinction between the virtue of the work-a-day world and that of the philosopher, who spends his days in the disinterested pursuit of truth.[2] The distinction thus vaguely apprehended by Plato was sharply drawn by Aristotle (*q.v.*). Practical wisdom, prudence, or good sense (*φρόνησις*) deals with matters of ordinary human interest; speculative wisdom, which is wisdom *par excellence* (*σοφία*), with the first principles of things. The former enables a man to apply the 'right rule' to every line of activity, whether professional, civic, or strictly moral; the latter leads, by a union of science and intuitive apprehension, to a knowledge of 'those things which are most precious in their nature.'[3]

The later schools also honoured wisdom as the root of all the virtues. For only through wisdom was man able either to know or to pursue the true end of life. Naturally their conceptions of wisdom differed according to their different ideals. For the Sceptics (*q.v.*) it meant the wholesome sense of the relativity of knowledge that permitted a man to suspend judgment where it was impossible to be certain; for the Epicureans (*q.v.*) the insight into life's conflicting motives and desires that set him free from false opinion and helped him to choose the sweetest and most lasting pleasures; for the Stoics (*q.v.*) the grasp of truth, both human and divine, that made him possessor of all virtue, freedom, and inward happiness. In their delineations of the 'wise man' the Stoic writers reach their highest level. He knows all there is to know, for he alone maintains that serenity of soul which is the spiritual presupposition of knowledge. He is thus fitted for every sphere of life. He is likewise free from fault or failing, weakness or passion. He is lord of his actions, as being responsible only to himself. He is truly rich, for he has all he needs. He is also happy at all times and under all circumstances, for the springs of his happiness are in himself.[4]

7. Hebrew wisdom.—In Israel we pass once more to the practical side of wisdom. חָכְמָה is used in a general sense of 'skill' in the ordinary affairs of life—*e.g.*, technical work (Ex 28^3 etc.), spinning (Ex 35^{25}), war (Is 10^{13}), seamanship (Ps 107^{27}), and often of 'sound judgment' in administration (Gn $41^{33f.}$, Dt 34^9, 1 K 3^{12} etc.)—but it comes to be applied peculiarly to 'moral principle.' The wise man is he who directs his life worthily and well. His wisdom is thus virtually equivalent to 'goodness.' And the root of this wisdom lies in religion. The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God' (Ps 14^1); the wise man makes God the centre of all his thoughts, hopes, and endeavours. For him 'the fear of the Lord' is not only 'the beginning' (Pr 1^7), but also 'the crown' and 'the perfect fulness' of wisdom (Sir $1^{14ff.}$).

As elsewhere, the simplest expressions of Israelite wisdom are in the shape of proverbs. Originally pointed similes (*mᵉshālîm*), like the Arabic *amthâl*—*e.g.*, 'Like Nimrod a mighty hunter before the

1 *Dhammapada*, iv. 51 f.
2 vi. 78.
3 xii. 166.
4 xxii. 313 (tr. from F. Max Müller, *SBE* x. [²1898] 18 ff.).
5 Hom. *Il.* xv. 412.
6 Pind. *Pyth.* iii. 96.
7 Pind. *Ol.* i. 187.
8 Hom. Hymns, *Hermes*, 483.
9 Cf. especially Theognis, 425–428.
10 J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*², p. 89.
11 Plato, *Prot.* 318 E, 319 A.
12 So Thrasymachus in Plato, *Rep.* 338 C ff., Callicles in *Gorgias*, 482 E ff.
13 Cf. Plato, *Apol.* 20 ff.

1 Cf. *Rep.* 441 C ff.
2 *Phædo*, 82 B, *Meno*, 100 A.
3 *Nic. Eth.* vi. v. 2, vii. i. 5.
4 See also artt. Ethics and Morality (Greek), Philosophy (Greek).

Lord' (Gn 10^9), or 'Like mother, like daughter' (Ezk 16^{44})—they gradually assume the perfect balance of thought and literary finish which we find in the couplets of Proverbs and Ben Sira. These two collections are a compendium of Hebrew wisdom at its purest. In clear-cut vignettes they portray the good man at his various tasks—as workman, citizen, neighbour, friend, husband, and father—and unveil the principles by which he conducts his life. The general motive may be eudæmonistic. Both collections show an undisguised appreciation of the good things of this world—its prizes, honours, riches, and pleasures—and direct men to the best way of winning these. Nevertheless, the moral tone is throughout honest and true. Righteousness is the first concern. Only as men follow after righteousness do they reach prosperity. In the emphasis thus laid on righteousness the proverbs of Israel outshine all other prudential literature. And at their higher levels they draw very near to the standard of Christ.

With this growing refinement in the art of proverbs there developed in Israel also a more professional interest in wisdom. On the pages of the greater prophets 'the wise' appear as a separate gild of spiritual advisers, whose 'counsel' ranked in influence with the *tôrāh* of the priests and the 'word' of the prophets (Is 29^{14}, Jer 18^{18} etc.). In the post-Exilic period the 'wise men' practically replaced the prophets as moral guides and teachers. Gaining wisdom from the study of the older Scriptures, or through prayer and supplication, or in the school of experience, as they wandered about the world, 'travelling through strange countries,' mingling with kings and princes, and 'testing the good and evil among men' (Sir $39^{1ff.}$), they took their stand in the market-place, or at the corners of bustling streets, or by the gates where people congregated, and appealed to the simple ones to embrace wisdom and to fools to turn from their folly and live (Pr $1^{20ff.}$ $8^{2ff.}$), or in their homes and lecture-halls instructed their pupils in the ways of wisdom (Sir 51^{23}). Out of this formal discipline arose not merely the gnomic wisdom of the *Pirḳē Âbôth*, 'Sayings of the Fathers,' but also the wisdom-speculation which we find in later elements of Proverbs, in the Apocryphal books of Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Enoch, Baruch, and 4 Maccabees, and in outside sources like Philo and the Odes of Solomon.

In Pr $8^{22ff.}$ Wisdom appears as the first creation of God, the 'foster-child' who played beside Him as He wrought His mighty works and now moves among men as His mouth-piece and representative on earth. It seems hardly possible here to deny the fertilizing influence of Greek thought. Yet the picture is Hebrew in its essence. Wisdom is no archetypal hypostasis emanating from the divine. She is still the impersonation of a moral quality, endowed with life by Jahweh, whose place in creation she nowhere usurps. The ethical character of Wisdom is equally evident in the great Song of Praise, Sir $24^{3ff.}$, where Wisdom is ultimately identified with 'the law that Moses commanded,' which found its resting-place and seat of authority in Israel. A similar linking of Wisdom with the Law appears in Bar $4^{1ff.}$ and 4 Mac 1^{17}. Following out the more ethical line, Enoch 42^1 49^1 etc. pictures her as descending from heaven to earth, being rejected by men, returning to heaven, and there awaiting the Messianic age, when she will be poured out in her fullness on the elect. A much bolder attitude is assumed in Wis $7^{22ff.}$, where she is celebrated as the spiritual 'artificer of all things,' an 'effulgence of the everlasting light, and an unstained mirror of the power of God,' which by her purity and mobility 'penetrates and permeates all things.' Here the concrete imagination of Israel has been caught up in the full sweep of Greek influence, and we seem to be actually moving within the inner circle of Neo-Platonic speculation. But the most systematic attempt to blend Hebrew wisdom with Greek idealism is met with in Philo (*q.v.*), whose doctrine of the Logos finds poetical reflexion in certain of the Odes of Solomon ($12^{9ff.}$ $13^{1ff.}$ $16^{9ff.}$ etc.).

In other phases of Hebrew literature there is a decided protest against the current ideas of wisdom. The book of Job challenges the whole theory that outward prosperity is the reward of righteousness, while Ḳoheleth leaves us with the cynical conclusion that 'all is vanity.' Elsewhere the speculations of the wise are traversed by a species of agnosticism which insists that Wisdom is undiscoverable by man. The most brilliant poetic expression is given to this tendency in the Song of Wisdom incorporated in Job 28. The poet has sought wisdom in the depths of the earth, where miners dig for gold and silver, in the heights of heaven, whither the eagles soar in flight, and in the desert places, where the beasts roam in solitary majesty. But nowhere can he find the object of his quest. A still more depressing view is expressed in 'the words of Agur, the son of Jakeh,' incorporated in Proverbs:

> 'I am wearied, O God, I am wearied;
> I am altogether spent.
> I am but a brute, and no man:
> I have nought of human intelligence.
> No wisdom have I learned,
> No knowledge I have of the Holy One.
> Who is He that hath mounted to heaven, and come down,
> That hath gathered the wind in His fists,
> The waters hath wrapped in His cloak,
> And established all ends of the earth?
> What is His name, and His son's name,
> If thou dost know?'[1]

It is significant, however, that Hebrew scepticism never touches the being of God. The beginning of wisdom was 'the fear of the Lord'; and, even when wisdom was despaired of, the fear of the Lord remained the sheet-anchor of faith and hope. However perplexed he was with the mysteries of Providence, Job still clung to God; and at the end he rose beyond himself and his questionings to a new sense of God's wisdom, power, and grace in the boundless universe of nature. Even Ḳoheleth's pessimism is quickened by the fear of God into a certain sanctified common sense. The poet of Job 28 has failed to reach wisdom. But 'God knoweth the place thereof'; He hath 'established and searched it out' (v.$^{23ff.}$). And for Agur, too, God is the great energizing Force behind all the phenomena of nature. He may not be able to 'name' Him; yet he feels His presence all about him. And to Him he addresses his prayer:

> 'Give me neither poverty nor riches,
> Feed me with food sufficient for my wants;
> Lest I be full, and deny thee,
> And say, Who is Jahweh?
> Or be poor, and steal,
> And profane the name of my God.'[2]

8. Christian wisdom.—Early Christianity is a return from speculation to the simple realities of faith and life, which are 'hid from the wise and prudent,' but 'revealed unto babes' (Mt 11^{25}, Lk 10^{21}). In preaching the gospel of the Kingdom Jesus avoided the idiom of the schools and addressed men in that concrete, parabolic style which we have found to be of the essence of the popular proverb. But those who listened to His preaching found in it a 'wisdom' beyond that of all their teachers (Mt 13^{54}, Mk 6^2). He Himself claimed to be 'greater than Solomon,' to hear whose wisdom the queen of Sheba came 'from the uttermost parts of the earth' (Mt 12^{42}, Lk 11^{31}). And this because He had been supremely endowed

[1] 30^{1-4}. [2] $30^{8f.}$.

with 'the grace of God' (Lk 2^{40}), so that the words He uttered were the very wisdom of God (Mt 11^{27}, Lk 10^{22}). To Jesus 'wisdom' was that practical understanding of the mind of God, that entire sympathy with His will and purpose, which enabled men to walk in His ways and do His will 'on earth as in heaven' (cf. Mt $6^{10f.}$ 7^{21} etc.). The same idea is set forth in Ja $3^{13ff.}$, where 'the wisdom that is from above' is contrasted with the wisdom that is 'earthly, sensual, devilish' by the fruit it yields in purity, meekness, gentleness, mercy, and 'a good conversation.' The Pauline Epistles and the Fourth Gospel show a much closer affinity with the Wisdom literature. The apostle, it is true, renounces the 'wisdom of the wise,' which leads to no real knowledge of God, and even obscures the gospel of 'Christ crucified' (1 Co $1^{20ff.}$). But in Him he finds a wisdom higher than that of men, even 'the power of God, and the wisdom of God' (v.[24]). In the sacred quaternion of graces personally manifested in Christ—wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption—wisdom takes the foremost place (v.[30]). But the pursuit of wisdom is reserved for the full-grown in Christ (τέλειοι), who alone have minds to comprehend the hidden mysteries of God (2^{6}). Himself increasingly filled with the spirit of heavenly wisdom, St. Paul elaborates in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians a real speculative philosophy, based on Him 'in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Col 2^{3}). Adapting ideas and phrases from the Wisdom of Solomon, he worships Christ as 'the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of the whole creation,' by whom all things were created—'that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible'—in whom all subsist, and through whom all are destined in the fullness of time to be 'gathered into one' (Col $1^{15ff.}$, Eph $1^{9ff.}$). Yet the apostle does not lose sight of the practical aspects of the case. For him true Christian wisdom is still that which consists in 'the knowledge of God's will' (Col 1^{9}) and leads to a consistent 'walk' before those both without and within the fold (4^{5}). Similarly, the Logos philosophy of the Fourth Gospel is valuable only for its results in character. The Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, that we might behold His glory—'glory as of the only begotten of the Father'—and be progressively transformed into the image of that glory (Jn $1^{14ff.}$).

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A. R. GORDON.

WISDOM TREE.—The venerable *Bo*-tree at Anurādhapura is the oldest historical tree in the world. The planting of the *Bo*-, or *Bodhi*-, tree (the Sinhalese *Bo* is merely a contraction of the Pali *Bodhi*, both meaning wisdom) is recorded at length in the Chronicles of Ceylon as having taken place in about 245 B.C.[1] Incidental references, in later centuries, to repairs to the enclosure, or to gifts of staircases or statues or ornaments by subsequent kings, show how great was the care that was continually devoted to it.[2] It is now (1920) 2165 years old.

Its botanical name is *ficus religiosa* (the Anglo-Indian *pipal*), and trees of this kind can put out fresh roots if a branch be planted, or if soil be heaped up near the base of the trunk. The soil has been thus so often raised that the tree now appears as three distinct trees (three branches of the old tree), growing from different points of an enclosed plateau about 25 ft. above the level of the spot where the tree was originally planted. A winding staircase of stone leads up to the enclosure of this plateau. Wherever the branches threaten to become too long they have been propped up by rough supports of wood or masonry. A stone slab, a *malāsana*, or flower-stand, has been provided for the memorial presentation of the white blossoms of the *champaka*. Everything about the spot gives the impression of a hoary antiquity. But we could not be sure of the identity of the tree without the long chain of documentary evidence.[3] The trees are somewhat like elms in size and shape; but the tapering leaves, about six inches long and four inches across the broadest part, are lighter in colour underneath, and the never-ceasing rustling of the leaves causes a constant flash of vanishing and reappearing light and colour curiously suggestive of one of the main doctrines both of the ancient Buddhist and of much modern philosophy.

Anurādhapura (*q.v.*) and the country round had been for nearly seven centuries, from the middle of the 12th to the middle of the 19th cent., almost abandoned. The Tamils, after centuries of intermittent attempts to take it, had been driven back to the north of the island. The Sinhalese, outnumbered ten to one, had retired to the fastnesses of the mountains to the south. East to west the jungle stretched from shore to shore, and north to south for a hundred miles. In what had been the most populous and prosperous part of Ceylon there were left a few far-scattered peasantry and woodmen; and the great capital had become a few mud huts. But there were always devoted *bhikkhus* to tend the *Bodhi*, the Wisdom Tree. A railway now runs through the jungle, and roads have been made. The magnificent reservoir, 50 miles in circumference, which had supplied half the country-side with water, has been restored to working order; and population and prosperity are slowly being restored. One consequence is

[1] *Dīpavaṃsa*, ch. xvi.; *Mahāvaṃsa*, ch. xix.

[2] See the appendix to vol. ii. of J. E. Tennent's *Ceylon* for a long list of such references

[3] Much of this is given in an appendix to the second volume of Tennent's *Ceylon*.

that a constant stream of pilgrims comes from all parts of the world to pay reverence to the tree.

Various different, and indeed contradictory, explanations have been given of this reverence paid to the *Bodhi*-tree. The oldest explanation is that given in Ceylon itself. This can be gathered from different passages in the Chronicles and in the Commentaries on the canon, and is best summarized in a book called the *Mahā-bodhivaṃsa* ('Story of the great Wisdom Tree'), probably written about A.D. 950. It is an amplified version in bombastic Sanskritized Pali prose of what had been already said in the older authorities just referred to; and, however interesting as a literary work, the oldest to show that acquaintance with Sanskrit then just beginning in Ceylon, it really adds nothing to the historical details contained in the older documents. The Ceylon view is that the tree is held in so much affectionate esteem and awe because it was grown from a branch of the original *Bodhi*-tree at Gayā (*q.v.*) in India (often distinguished as Bodh-Gayā, 'Gayā of the Wisdom Tree') under which the Buddha had actually sat when he passed through the intense mental crisis, the turning-point of his career, which led to his coming forward as the teacher of a new religion. The 'wisdom' is the wisdom, not of the tree, but of the teacher. It is derived not from the tree, or from any fruit of the tree, but from the mental struggles and the victory won by the founder of their faith. They adore the tree, not because of the power of any spirit or dryad within the tree, but because the outward form of it is a constant reminder of what they hold to have been the most important event in the history of the world. In other words, their attitude towards the tree is much the same as that of many Christians towards the Cross. And, just as opponents of Christianity have thought, quite illogically, that they could score a point against it by showing that the cross was a religious symbol (with quite different associations) before the rise of Christianity, so opponents of Buddhism have sought, and quite successfully, to show that the tree was a religious symbol (with quite different associations) before the rise of Buddhism. They fail to see that that is not the point. Granted that other people had previously used the same (or a similar) symbol in a different sense, the question is: In what sense did the Buddhists use it? We shall deal with only the more important of these theories of the tree.

James Fergusson, the eminent historian of Indian architecture, held that the main features of 'Turanian' belief were tree- and serpent-worship, that the despatch of a branch of the *Bodhi*-tree by Aśoka to Ceylon is a proof of the Turanian tree-worship practised by that Buddhist emperor of India, and that the monuments show that early Buddhism was a 'Turanian' faith. What exactly he means by Turanian he does not state. The conclusions put forward in his massive volume, entitled *Tree and Serpent Worship*, have not been accepted by any other scholar who has written on the subject.

E. Senart, the editor of the *Mahāvastu* and the interpreter of Aśoka's inscriptions, will have none of this. He holds that Buddhism was, in its origin, Aryan; that it was derived almost entirely from the Brāhman mythology contained in the Vedic records; that the legend of the Buddha is almost a myth; that in that myth the tree is almost, if not quite, as important as the teacher; and that the tree is the cloud-tree of the famous atmospheric struggle for the rain when the god with his thunderbolt defeats the demon who keeps back the rain in the clouds. The wisdom of the tree is the ambrosial rain, for is not their *nibbāna* sometimes called by the Buddhists 'ambrosia'?[1] All the author's literary skill, poetic imagination, and great learning have not availed to secure acceptance for this theory. For no attempt is made to explain how or why or when or where the transmutation of the one set of ideas into the other can have taken place.

Heinrich Kern, the late professor of Sanskrit at Leyden, was of yet another opinion. In his view the Buddhist accounts of their teacher's life are a euhemerized sun-myth. The Buddha is really the sun, and his disciples are the stars. He regards the tree, not (with Senart) as the cloud-tree, but as 'the world tree, the tree of life.' This is obscure, as the two are quite different; and he refers only to a post-Buddhistic *Upaniṣad* (*Kaṭha*, vi. 1) which does not clearly speak of either.[1] Even if it did, what evidence could that be of Buddhist belief?

It should be pointed out, briefly, that these theories are mutually exclusive, and cannot be combined. If any one of them is right, then each of the others is wrong. Secondly, they are all almost exclusively based, so far as the Buddhist side of the question is concerned, on late records—records eight hundred years or more later than the events they purport to describe. To the present writer it seems indisputable that, if a historian wishes to ascertain the genesis of a 'legend,' the only scientific method is, first of all, to ascertain what is the earliest form in which the legend is recorded. The earliest form of the legend about the original tree is as follows.

It is well known that there is no consecutive life (or legend) of the Buddha in the canon. But there are incidental references to certain episodes in his career. Of these at least twelve refer to the episode of the Wisdom Tree. But only two of them even mention the tree; and then it is merely to say that when seated under the tree the Teacher thought such and such things. This simple fact is enough to dispose of the theory that the tree was nearly, if not quite, as important as the teacher.[2] In one of the longer composite Suttantas contained in the *Dīgha* there is a short account of six previous Buddhas with a sketch of the life of Vipassi, the first of the six. This is so evidently drawn up as a mere imitation of the life of the historical Buddha that it is suggestive to find that the sketch contains no reference to a wisdom tree. This is the more remarkable since in the tabular paragraphs giving certain details about each of the six the name of the tree under which each attained to enlightenment is also given. In none of the cases is the tree called a wisdom tree.

If the above statements of fact are correct, it follows that the expression 'wisdom tree' or 'tree of enlightenment' does not occur at all in any of the oldest of those canonical works which deal with the Dhamma (the law or religion), that it occurs once in all the other canonical works on the Dhamma, that it occurs only once in those that deal with the regulations of the order (the *Vinaya*), that that single reference is in the very latest portion of the *Vinaya*,[3] and that the expression is then used merely to distinguish from other trees of the same kind and name that particular one under which the teacher was seated when he obtained enlightenment.

For the later history of the original 'wisdom tree' at Bodh-Gayā in India see art. GAYĀ.

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[1] Senart, *Légende du Buddha*, Index, *s.v.* 'Bodhi.'

[1] Kern, *Buddhismus*, ii. 224. For the world-tree and the tree of life see J. H. Philpot, *The Sacred Tree*, London, 1897, chs. iv. and vi.

[2] The mention of the tree is at the opening page of the *Vinaya* (translated in *Vinaya Texts*, i. 2=*Udāna*, i. 4, and in *Udāna*, iii. 10). The other passages, which do not refer to the tree, are *Saṃyutta*, i. 105, 136 (tr. in *Kindred Sayings*, i. 128, 171 ff.); *Majjhima*, i. 22, 167 ff., 240 ff., ii. 93–96; *Udāna*, i. 4, ii. 1. iii. 10.

[3] On the chronological relations of the various portions of the Vinaya to one another see the Introduction to *Vinaya Texts*.

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T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

WITCHCRAFT.—See DIVINATION, MAGIC.

WOMAN.—See BIRTH, EDUCATION, EMANCIPATION, ETHICS, FAMILY, MARRIAGE, and other articles.

WONDERS.—See MIRACLES, PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

WORD (Sumerian and Babylonian).—1. Original ideas.—The Sumerian vocable for 'word,' or formal expression of command, is *inim*, deflected early to *enem*, and it was carefully distinguished from the noun *dug*, 'discourse,' 'speech,' and the verb *dug*, 'to speak.' *Inim*, *enem*, is always a noun and was translated into Semitic by *amātu*. Both *enem* and *amātu* obtained the secondary meanings 'affair,' 'matter' (Latin *res*). The Sumerian word also developed the sense 'incantation,' *i.e.* the formal words of the magician, and hence the reduplicated form *inim-inim-ma* (pronounced *inim-nim-ma*) became the ordinary rubric in the magic literature for 'incantation' (Semitic *šiptu*). The present writer derives the noun *inim* from the verbal root *nim*, 'utter a decision,' 'issue a formal word,' whence is also derived the noun *nam*, 'fate,' 'decision.' The Semitic noun *amātu* is derived from a root *wamâ* (אמה), 'speak,' 'curse,' found otherwise only in Aramaic in the forms *iāmā'*, *'āmā'*. The Sumerians and consequently the Semites regarded a formally spoken 'word,' containing the force of a command or promise, as a definite and real thing. It possessed magical and terrible power if it issued from a deity, from a priest, or from a human being under formal circumstances. Hence witnesses who were present at a legal transaction which ordinarily involved an oath were called *galu inim-inim-ma*, 'men of the words,' or men who were present when formal 'words' or matters were arranged. A witness is sometimes called *inim-zu*, 'one who knows the word,' *i.e.* one who knows what formal words were stated in a transaction.

The formally spoken word of any of the great gods was regarded by the Sumerians as a real divine entity. For the early period we have only the personal names of Sumerians as a source for our study, but undoubtedly the conception of the word as an agent of god's wrath, which became in later times one of the principal features of Sumero-Babylonian religion, arose long before the liturgical texts in which alone this doctrine has been preserved. This is the aspect of the word which was chiefly developed in Sumerian theology, but they also held that the *enem*, or word, of a great god might be a good and kind agent of deity when not uttered in wrath to punish the sins of men. Before 2900 B.C. occur such personal names as the following: *Enem-ma-ni-zid*, 'His word is true,' *i.e.* the god's word is a faithful support;[1] *Enem-azag-zu-da-ri*, 'The word of the wise one is eternal.'[2] In the period of Ur (25th cent.) occur the names *Enem-dug-ga-(ni)*, 'His good word,'[3] and *Enim-^{d}Bau-ni-gi*, 'The word of the goddess Ban is true.'[4] Even in a passage to the destructive word of the gods Anu, Enlil, Marduk, and Nebo from a liturgy of the 21st cent. a line runs, 'His word has no evil,' *i.e.* does no wrong.[1] It is, therefore, certain that the Sumerian conception of the word of the gods was not necessarily that of an avenging messenger. Nor is the idea of a curse inherent in the original use of the term. They simply attributed to the formally spoken word of a great god a semi-personality; they thought of it as a divine agent.[2]

2. The 'word of wrath.'—The Sumerian liturgies in all periods of their evolution chant at great length the destructive work of the avenging word which is sent by the angered gods to chastise mankind for their sins.[3] In the earliest known liturgical fragment (period of Gudea, *c.* 2650) a passage to the *Verbum Iræ* occurs.

'Thy Word upon the sea has been projected and returns not.'[4]

But passages on the 'word of wrath' must have been employed in public choral services in pre-Sargonic times, *i.e.* before 2800 B.C. The name *Enem-dúg-dúg-ga-ni an-dūb*, 'The word which he spoke shakes the heavens,' is found on a temple record of Lugalanda (*c.* 2850),[5] and an abbreviated form of it, *Enem-du-du*, occurs in the period of Ur.[6] This name, like so many Sumerian personal names, has been taken from the liturgies, and the line which supplied it recurs frequently in passages to the destructive word.

'The Word which on high shaketh the heavens,
The Word which beneath causes the earth to tremble.'[7]

That alone is conclusive evidence for the existence of this theological conception and for these doleful descriptions of the destructive word in public song services at the very beginning of Sumerian civilization.

In the earlier stages of Sumerian liturgical worship, when only single song melodies or lamentations were employed, we find references to this idea. A long lament of the Weeping Mother, who is represented, as so frequently in later compositions, in the rôle of a mother-goddess wailing for her people, has in the very opening lines a passage which attributes all the woes of humanity to the words of Anu and Enlil. Sin invariably provokes the anger of the gods and they send the 'word of wrath' to hasten forth and afflict mankind. Hence the great earth-mother, who loves men and shares their sorrows, is also afflicted by the word.

'In the home it causes life to cease, in the flocks (?) it causes life to cease,
To the wedded ones it causes life to cease, among children it causes life to cease.
It has taken them as prey, it has caused them to disappear.
. . . . . .
His Word speeds me, speeds me forth, as oft as it comes to me my face is prostrated.
. . . . . .
When the Word of Anu came to me,
When the Word of Enlil came to me,
When to my temple he came,
When by the mountain road he entered.'[8]
. . . . . .

A liturgy of the compiled type, which preceded in order of evolution the canonical compositions of the Isin period,[9] has a remarkable melody of the Weeping Mother, in which she thus describes the misery of the city Ur:

'May Anu prevent his Word.
May Enlil order kindness.
. . . . . .

[1] M. V. Nikolski, *Documents de la plus ancienne époque chaldéenne de la collection Likhatcheff*, St. Petersburg, 1908, no. 3, col. vii. 3, and see p. 100; also Maurice Allotte de la Fuye, *Documents présargoniques*, Paris, 1908–13, no. 87, ii. 1 and *passim*; also frequent in the later period; E. Chiera, *A Syllabary of Personal Names*, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 69.

[2] Unpublished. 'The wise one' refers to a deity.

[3] E. Huber, *Die Personennamen in den Keilschrifturkunden aus der Zeit der Könige von Ur und Nisin*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 125.

[4] *Ib.*

[1] S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms* (hereafter cited as *SBP*), p. 76, 22.

[2] See, on both propitious and hostile views of the Word, § 3 below, *ud*, *udde*, the angry spirit.

[3] See art. PRAYER (Babylonian), vol. x. p. 165 f.

[4] *PSBA* xxxiv. [1912] 156.

[5] Allotte de la Fuye, no. 234, iii. 3. [6] Huber, p. 125.

[7] Langdon, *SBP*, p. 78, 13–14, see also pp. 98, 44; 38, 11; 100, 49. On personal names which refer to the hymns on the Word see *ERE* ix. 172.

[8] S. Langdon, 'Liturgy to Innini,' *RA* ix. [1912] 5–11.

[9] See the Introduction to Langdon, *Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms* (hereafter cited as *SLP*), Philadelphia, 1919.

Its foundations it has annihilated and reduced to the misery of silence.
Unto Anu I cry, "How long?"
Unto Enlil I myself do pray.
"My city has been destroyed," will I tell them.
"Ur has been destroyed," will I tell them.'[1]

The fifth melody of this early liturgy is the *Verbum Iræ*, and henceforth all the canonical Sumerian liturgies contain one song to the 'word of wrath.' Before giving a selection from this most notable song to the word, let us note that the idea of *enem*, 'word,' had become so fully associated with divine wrath that it was called *ud*, *udde*, 'storm,' 'angry spirit.' Portions of this melody to the word of Enlil follow:

'Enlil utters the angry spirit and the people wail.
The angry spirit has destroyed prosperity in the land and the people wail.
The angry spirit has taken peace from Sumer and the people wail.
He sent the woeful spirit of wrath and the people wail.
Kingaludda and Uddagubba into his hand he entrusted.
He has spoken the angry spirit which exterminates the Land and the nation wails.
Enlil sent the fire-god as his helper.
The mighty wrathful spirit of Anu was spoken and the people wail.
The city Ur like a garment thou hast destroyed, like . . . thou hast scattered.'[2]

The above is the most important passage in Sumerian literature for the personification of the word. Enlil sends two messengers, Ḳingaludda and Uddagubba, to attend the word as he goes forth to execute vengeance upon mankind for their sins. The name Ḳingaludda means 'messenger of the angry spirit,' and Uddagubba means 'he who stands by the angry spirit.' Both of these are minor deities, and the former became a well-known demon.[3] Here also the fire-god is sent forth by the earth-god Enlil as an attendant of the angry spirit—an idea which survived in post-Exilic Hebrew in connexion with the visitation of the *rūaḥ*, or spirit, of Jahweh among men. Joel describes the visitation of God's spirit in the words:

'I will place marvels in heaven and earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke.'[4]

And the idea appears notably in the gift of tongues at Pentecost in NT times:

'And there came suddenly from heaven a sound as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled the whole place in which they were sitting, and there appeared unto them cloven tongues as of fire.'[5]

In all the canonical Sumerian liturgies which were borrowed by the Semites and continued in use down to the age of Alexander the Great, and even into the era of the Seleucidæ, is found at least one song to the spirit of wrath. Since the word (*enem*) or spirit (*ud*) of Anu, the heaven-god and father of all gods, almost invariably comes first, we infer that the spoken word issued from heaven is the original idea, and then the same power was attributed to Enlil, the earth-god, and to a few others of the great deities. The following list of partially restored liturgies in which the song to the word or spirit has been preserved is in the present stage of Sumerology exhaustive:

(1) Enlil series: *babbar-ri babbar-ri-gim te-ga-bi zal*, 'Like the sun, like the sun his approach illuminates'; inserted in the first melody.[6] Here *ud* and *enem* are both employed.
'Spirit (*ud*) that brings the youth to extremity, spirit that brings the maid to extremity.
Spirit that destroys the stalls, spirit that desolates the folds.
Possessor of *wisdom*, spirit whose intentions are not discerned.
. . . . . .
Spirit that reduces all things to obedience.
The word of Enlil rushes forth and eye beholds it not.'

(2) Enlil series: *elum gudsun-e mu-zu kurkurra*, 'Mighty one that overwhelms, thy name is upon all lands'; fourth song.[1]
'A tempest it is, shattering the mountains.
As for the lord his word is a tempest.
The heart of the mighty one is a tempest.
The heart of Enlil is a tempest.'

(3) Enlil (?) series: *uddam gú-de-de-dè*, 'When like a storm he cries'; first song on tablet 2 of the Assyrian edition; song to the *enem* of Anu, Enlil, and Adad.[2]

(4) Weeping Mother series: *nimalla gu-dé-dúg ki-bi ba-da-nad*, 'The cow wailed and in her place lay down'; song to the word inserted in the first melody, lines 11–15.[3] An extremely long hymn to the word of Anu and Enlil of this series occupies two tablets.[3]

(5) Nergal series: a long hymn to the word of Nergal; the last song of the series, followed by the *eršemma*, or recessional.[4]

(6) Nergal series: two long hymns to the word of Nergal, the first of which is a duplicate of the one cited in no. 5; the last two songs of a liturgy to Nergal followed by the *eršemma*.[5]

(7) Nebo series: two songs to the word of Nebo in the third tablet of the series *ukkin-ta eš-bar-ra til-la*, 'In the assembly wisdom is departed.'[6]

(8) Weeping Mother series: contains two passages to the word of Anu and Enlil inserted into two songs.[7]

(9) A liturgy of songs, all devoted to the word. Particular attention is given to the word of Marduk, and the Weeping Mother is represented in two songs as afflicted by the word:
'The exalted one like a wind, like a wind,
The exalted one like a wind has cast me down, even me.
The exalted one, the lord of lands,
He of intangible thoughts, whose word is true,
Against whose command there is no turning back,
The exalted Enlil, the utterance of whose mouth is unalterable.
This angry spirit destroys the folds, rends the stalls.
My roots are rent, my forests are despoiled of leaves.
. . . . . .
Like a lone *willow*-tree by the river's bank he has made me,
Like a *cedar* in the desert he has made me.
Like a lone tamarisk in the storm he has made me.
Behold the mighty one like a lone rush-reed has brought me low.'
An exceedingly difficult passage attributes the following expression to the mother-goddess:
'I am the word of the lord, because of its misery wailing I sit.'[8]
The first half of the line is interpreted to mean that the mother-goddess is possessed by the wrathful word, she is completely in its power.[9]

(10) Nergal series: *agalgalla šel-susu*, 'Flood that drowns the harvest'; a song to the word of Nergal is inserted into the first litany, and it was followed by a second hymn to the word which has not yet been recovered.[10]

(11) A liturgy to the word of Anu arranged to commemorate the destruction of the city Ur: *anna elume ù-a enenmani*, 'Of exalted heaven lofty is his word.' The first two tablets only are preserved. They include hymns to the words of the moon-god, the sun-god, and the thunder-god. The second song of the liturgy, following upon the hymn to the word of Anu and Enlil, is devoted to the Weeping Mother.[11]

(12) Selection from an unknown series containing two hymns to the word. The first hymn begins, 'His word hastens forth from Ekur, his word is the burden of the storm.' It is an old hymn to the word of Enlil, the earth-god. The litany includes references to the word of Ea, of Damkina his spouse, of Marduk, of Nebo and of Sakkut, all of which are said to proceed from Ekur, the temple of Enlil in Nippur.[12] The second hymn on this tablet is among the most remarkable of all the songs to the word. Fifteen

[1] Selections from the fourth melody of Nippur 7080, published in *SLP*, no. 11.
[2] Selection from the fifth melody of Nippur 7080.
[3] See the note in *SLP*, p. 283.
[4] J1 2[30]. [5] Ac 2[22f.].
[6] Langdon, *Sumerian Liturgical Texts*, 158, 16–159, 25. It is probable that this liturgy contained a section entirely devoted to the word. A Weeping Mother series employs the same hymn; see below, no. 16.

[1] The text (after Zimmern) is ed. in *SLP*, pp. 292–308; see, for the song to the word, p. 299.
[2] See Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies* (hereafter cited as *BL*), p. 25.
[3] Published in *BL*, p. 43, and *SBP*, pp. 18–35.
[4] Published in *BL*, no. 73, pp. 47–49, to be restored from the duplicate, *SBP*, p. 76.
[5] Text in G. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896, no. 7; ed. in *SBP*, pp. 76–78.
[6] *BL*, pp. 65–68.
[7] For the text see *BL*, plates lxix.–lxx. For a tr. of the first passage see p. 74. For the second passage see pp. 107 f. and 74 f.
[8] That is clearly the meaning of the line (see *SBP*, p. 46, 15, where the end of the line should be read *še-dm-du dm-dù*).
[9] The series was called *uddam ki-ám-(mu)-uš*, 'Like the wrathful spirit (his word) has been established.' Six songs of tablets 1 and 2 are edited in *SBP*, pp. 38–55. The remainder of the series, *i.e.* tablets 3–6, are supposed to contain similar material.
[10] K. 69, ed. in J. Böllenrücher, *Gebete und Hymnen an Nergal*, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 32, 40–35. 35. See also for variant of a part of this song to the word, *SBP*, 43, 49–47, 18.
[11] Ed. in *SBP*, pp. 58–67.
[12] This remarkable hymn to the word is ed. in *SBP*, pp. 72–74 (lines 1–30), and the remainder of the hymn will be found on pp. 76–78, lines 16-reverse 4.

lines from the end of the composition have been preserved, but the opening lines are lost. It reads:

'Its *ṭaïl* (*ḫuluppu*) distresses small and great.
Small and great it crushes and pours into a heap.
When on the river it rushes, a deluge it causes.
When on the Tigris it rushes, a deluge it causes.
When on the Euphrates it rushes, a deluge it causes.
[When on the . . . it rushes, a deluge it causes].[1]
When it hastens in the ravines of the hills a deluge it causes.
When the Lord[2] speaks, then it hastens and a deluge it brings.
The child-bearing mother wailed, "Behold my son doth send (the word)."
The mother Damkina wailed, "Behold my son doth send."
Unto her chamber she entered, she hastened (wailing), "Behold my son doth send."
Son whom in the sacred bowl I baptized, "Behold my son doth send."
Son who from the stone bowl has eaten, "Behold my son doth send."
He who ate has of himself grown great, "Behold my son doth send."
Him that with a measuring-rod I proved, "Behold my son doth send."'[3]

We have here an interesting situation. Damkina, a mother-goddess, wife of Ea the water-god, laments the ruin caused by the word of her own son Marduk.

(13) Nergal series, second tablet: a long hymn to the word of Nergal occupies nearly the entire tablet; it is followed by a short song in which Nergal is imprecated to send his destructive word upon all wicked lands.[4]

(14) Enlil series: title unknown. Only one tablet of the series has been recovered. The liturgy contained two short hymns to the word of Enlil at the end of this tablet.[5]

(15) Enlil series: *ame barana-ra*, 'The hero to his sanctuary.' Four of the six tablets of this liturgy are known.[6] The liturgy contained at least one song to the word of Enlil.[7]

(16) Weeping Mother series: *uru ḫulage*, 'She whose city was destroyed.' Four of the six tablets of this liturgy are known. Tablet 5 has a song to the word of Enlil, identical with the one employed in the first tablet of the Enlil series, no. 1 above.[8]

3. The spirit (ud).—In the preceding discussion some attention is necessarily given to the identification of the word of a god with his breath or spirit. As in the case of the 'word' (*enem*, *inim*), the term for 'spirit' or 'breath' (*ud*) of a god had not originally a destructive and violent sense, but its use in that sense became almost universal and consequently should be rendered in most passages by 'angry spirit,' 'spirit of wrath.' In all of the present writer's translations 'angry spirit' renders the Sumerian *ud*=Semitic *ûmu*. The Sumerian *ud* is the ordinary word for 'day,' and so is the Semitic *ûmu*. The Sumerians, and after them the Semites, conceived the breath of a god as a warm flood of light. When a god's anger was aroused, his breath went forth as a storm, and consequently both *ud* and *ûmu* came to mean 'storm.' But the original idea of the divine spirit or breath must be defined. A passage on the wrathful word of Enlil is introduced by the remarkable statement, 'The utterance of thy mouth is a beneficent wind, the breath of life of the lands.' The soul of the god is here defined as a kindly wind[9] which gives life to mankind.[10] A proper name of a man in the period of the Ur dynasty was *Udde-nigšag*, 'the spirit (of god) is a blessing,' and another is *Udde-nigšig*, 'the spirit is goodness.'[11] A name in the pre-Sargonic period is *Ud-mukuš*, 'the spirit has become reconciled,' *i.e.* the wrath of god is appeased.[1] It is said of the mother-goddess Ishtar, *ud-de-da ba-e-šig*, 'by the spirit thou art filled,' *i.e.*, the spirit of one of the great gods was given unto her.[2] She is thus endowed with supreme power. In the same manner kings are given the divine 'word.' Ur-Ninā is called the man *inim-šig* ^{d}*Ninā*, 'unto whom was given the word of the goddess Ninā.'[3] Ur-Bau is described as the man *inim-ma-šig-ga* ^{d}*Innini*, 'unto whom was given the word of Ishtar.'[4] It is obvious, therefore, that the spirit or breath of a god was practically identical with his word, and it was personified as an agent of good works. This phase of its activity as a *verbum creator*, a spirit of wisdom and cosmic reason, appears only in Semitic texts where the Semitic word *mummu* is employed. In Sumerian texts the beneficent and philosophic aspect of the word is wholly overshadowed by its activity as an agent of wrath.

'The spirit (*ud*) of the heart of Anu which has become evilly disposed,' says a line of a hymn to the word, and the *ud* is called the messenger of the lord of the lands (*i.e.* Enlil).[5] Another passage states explicitly, 'The spirit is the word of Enlil.'[6] The expression, 'the merciless spirit,' was so common that it appears in grammatical texts.[7] And, when the wrathful word had executed judgment on the earth, the god who sent him forth recalled him. 'When Anu spoke, the word returned to its place.'[8]

4. The 'word of wrath' in Hebrew.—The Sumerian belief in the wrathful word of the gods passed into late Hebrew theological beliefs. The description of Jahweh's word by an Alexandrian Jew in the Greek book, the *Wisdom of Solomon*, is obviously under the influence of Sumerian liturgies which were being sung everywhere in Babylonia at that time:

'Thine all-powerful Word leaped from heaven down from the royal throne,
A stern warrior, into the midst of the doomed land,
Bearing as a sharp sword thine unfeigned commandment,
And standing filled all things with death.'[9]

A post-Exilic Psalm reflects clearly the Sumerian idea:

'He sendeth his commandment upon the earth;
His Word runneth very swiftly.'[10]

Even more direct is the evidence of the post-Exilic Isaiah, for here we have words written by a prophet who almost certainly lived in Babylonia.

'So shall my word be which goeth up from my mouth; it shall not return unto me void,
For it shall have done that which I desired,
And shall have accomplished that for which I sent it.'[11]

5. The word as creative wisdom.—The Sumerians and Babylonians invariably regarded water as the uncreated first principle and source of all things created. The creative form or principle resided in the primordial watery chaos. Since we do not have any Sumerian sources for the doctrine of the cosmic word, but only a syllabar which gave the term, now unfortunately broken away, it is impossible to state exactly what it was. Evidence deduced above for the beneficent activity of a god's word and breath induces the conjecture that the Sumerians employed the term *inim*, 'word,' for cosmic creative form or reason. At any rate we know that the term *mummu*[12] was said to mean 'loud voice,' apparently because the roar of the thunder- or rain-god was adopted as a term for the indwelling wisdom of water. We know that *ud*,

[1] This line is omitted on the variants.
[2] Marduk is referred to here.
[3] The text of this hymn has been reconstructed from Reisner, plate 14=*SBP*, p. 74; *BL*, no. 41, and a small fragment published by Bruno Meissner, *Assyriolog. Studien* (*MVG* xv. 5), Leipzig, 1912, no. 3, p. 79.
[4] Ed. in *SBP*, pp. 80–88.
[5] See *SBP*, p. 92, 8–13, for the first hymn to the word in this liturgy; and for the second hymn which followed here, see H. Zimmern, *Sumer. Kultlieder aus alt-babylon. Zeit*, Leipzig, 1913, no. 195, obv. 6 ff.
[6] Reisner, no. 26, tablet 3; no. 33, tablet 6. Nos. 14 and 15 belong to the series, but cannot be fixed in order.
[7] See *SBP*, pp. 99, 36–100, 59.
[8] Tr. in *SBP*, pp. 187, 19–188, 37.
[9] With this aspect of the divine breath is to be compared the Hebrew *rûaḥ* of Gn 6^{3}, 'Not shall my spirit abide in man.'
[10] *SBP*, p. 124, 17–18.
[11] L. Legrain, *Le Temps des rois d'Ur*, Paris, 1912, p. 105. See also Huber, *Personennamen*, p. 55, where read *Udde-nigšagga* for the *Utu-bil-gar-šagga*.

[1] Nikolski, 16, i. 11.
[2] *SLP*, no. 3, line 17.
[3] F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumer. und akkad. Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 4 c. col. v. 5.
[4] *Ib.* p. 60, ii. 1.
[5] *SBP*, p. 18, lines 10 and 28.
[6] Or 'the spirit of the word of Enlil,' the storm-breath of the word of Enlil (*SBP*, p. 98, 38; see also *BL*, p. 107, 16).
[7] *Ûmu la padû*.
[8] *PSBA* xl. [1918] 70, line 15.
[9] See S. Holmes in R. H. Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, Oxford, 1913, i. 565.
[10] Ps 147^{15}.
[11] Is 55^{11}.
[12] Commonly supposed to be Semitic. *Mummu* may be, however, Sumerian and a word for 'form.' See Thureau-Dangin in *RAssyr* xvi. [1920] 166, n. 3. The Semitic interpretation of

'breath,' 'storm,' was also identified with the thunder-god.[1] *Mummu* at any rate was the accepted Semitic[2] term, and means 'voice.' It was personified and survived in the writings of the Greek historian Damascius as Mōymis. According to Damascius, Mummu was the intelligible world and the only-begotten son of Apsū, the nether sea of fresh water, and Tiamat, the salt water sea. Since all things descended from water and wisdom resided in water, Enki, god of water, was called *mummu bān kala*, 'Mummu (creative reason) which creates all things.' Also Nebo, god of writing and son of Enki, was identified with *mummu*, 'who fashions the things created.' When Marduk, at the hands of the Babylonian priests, became the son of Enki and creator of the world, he also was identified with *mummu*.

According to Sumero-Babylonian philosophy, the reality of anything consists in its 'form' (*ḫar*; Semitic *uṣurtu*), *i.e.* the divine mental concept which is revealed to mankind by its name. For example, the word 'bowl' is a name by means of which its 'form' or the divine concept is revealed to man. All knowledge is revelation, and the reality of things is not their tangibleness but the mental concept, and things cannot exist until a god has this mental concept. Fundamentally all things, material and immaterial, rest upon the mental activity of the water-god, which is *mummu* and was personified cosmic reason. Hence the universe was conceived to be held together by a band or cord, *riksu*, *markasu*, a divine creative reason. Such was the philosophic and mystic concept of the word in Babylonia.[3]

6. The Greeks borrow the Babylonian idea of creative reason.—There can be little doubt but that Thales, founder of the Ionian school of hylozoism, who regarded water as the first principle, borrowed his ideas from Babylonia. Here in the Ionian school of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, all of Miletus, cosmic substance itself is reason, wisdom, and harmony.[1] That strikingly corresponds to the activity of the Babylonian Logos or Mummu. Heraclitus (*q.v.*) of Ephesus, who developed the ideas of his predecessors at Miletus at the end of the 6th cent. shortly after the fall of Babylonia, adopted fire as the universal element, sometimes defined as hot breath in his writings. He is the originator of the cosmic philosophy of 'becoming,' the ceaseless transformation of all things from fire or heat through various stages back again to fire. And the cosmic law or reason working beneath all this process of becoming is λόγος, or the word. We do not know whether the earlier Ionian philosophers employed λόγος in this sense, but there seems to be an apparent connexion between the creative wisdom or word of the Babylonians and the law of eternal becoming or the 'word' of Heraclitus.[2]

7. Influence of Babylonian creative word in Hebrew.—The Hebrew employs both 'word' (דָּבָר) and 'spirit' (רוּחַ) in much the same way as the Babylonians employed *mummu*. We have seen that the Sumerians and Babylonians regarded the spoken word and the breath of the god as intimately connected and originally as beneficent agents. Although Hebrew has not the profound mystic and cosmic philosophy of the Babylonian, there is an obvious connexion between the two cultures at this point. We may not infer borrowing here, but the similarity must be noted. A passage of an Exilic Psalm confirms the suspicion that the writer knew Babylonian theological ideas:

> 'By the word of Jahweh were the heavens created,
> And by the breath of his mouth all their host.'[3]

LITERATURE.—S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909, *Babylonian Liturgies*, do. 1913, *Sumerian Liturgical Texts*, Philadelphia, 1917, *Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms*, do. 1909, 'The Babylonian Conception of the Logos,' *JRAS*, 1918, pp. 433–449. Other texts and literature are cited in the footnotes.

S. LANGDON.

WORLD.—See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY.

WORSHIP.

Primitive (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 752.
Babylonian (S. LANGDON), p. 757.
Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 758.
Celtic.—See CELTS.
Chinese (R. F. JOHNSTON), p. 759.
Christian (J. V. BARTLET), p. 762.
Egyptian (A. M. BLACKMAN), p. 776.
Greek (A. W. MAIR), p. 782.
Hebrew (G. H. BOX), p. 788.
Hindu (A. F. A. HILLEBRANDT), p. 795.
Jain (M. STEVENSON), p. 799.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 802.
Jewish (H. LOEWE), p. 804.
Muslim.—See PILGRIMAGE (Muhammadan), PRAYER (Muhammadan).
Parsi (E. EDWARDS), p. 807.
Roman (J. S. REID), p. 808.
Slavic.—See SLAVS.
Teutonic.—See TEUTONIC RELIGION.

WORSHIP (Primitive).—What is worship? The word itself is English, and almost untranslatable into other languages. Originally it implied acts prompted by veneration, but with stress of time and weight of usage it has come to be applied to the whole range of religious behaviour, so that one might well say that worship is the active side of religion. Even so, the meaning does not stop with the notion of act; it is also the attitude which prompts the act; it is the belief which stays the attitude; it is the faculty which empowers the belief. In each of these guises it is multiform: *qua* act it includes cult and tabu, rites sacramental and rites ascetic, indulgence and devotion, feast and penance; *qua* attitude it pairs off fear and love, dread and adoration, or it mingles them in the sense of awe; *qua* belief it ranges from myth to philosophy, from creed to science, from passion for ideas to respect for truth; and *qua* faculty it is said to be absent in some men. Nor can it be defined by its objects; for in the context of worship is included not only communion with deity, but also traffic with the devil, while it cannot be

mummu as 'voice' would then be based upon a false etymology or be influenced by their use of the term *amātu*, 'word,' as a *verbum creator*.

[1] R. E. Brünnow, *A Classified List of . . . Cuneiform Ideographs*, pt. i., Leyden, 1837, no. 7791. It should be noted also that the Hebrews often spoke of the breath (רוּחַ) of Jahweh as a storm-wind (Ex 15[8], Is 59[19], Ps 18[15]) and as his wrath (Job 4[9] 15[30]).

[2] Perhaps a Semiticized Sumerian word *mumma*, 'form' (?).

[3] See, on this section, Langdon, 'The Babylonian Conception of the Logos,' *JRAS*, 1918, pp. 433–449.

[1] See art. IONIC PHILOSOPHY.

[2] For a definition of the metaphysical use of λόγος (word) in Heraclitus see H. Diels, *Herakleitos von Ephesos*[2], Berlin, 1909, p. ix. Diels translates λόγος in Heraclitus by 'world-law'; see also Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[2], Berlin, 1912, p. 77. This interpretation is generally adopted by all historians of philosophy. See P. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*, Paris, 1887, pp. 172, 186–189, and *passim*; E. Zeller, *Grundriss der Gesch. der griech. Philosophie*[7], Leipzig, 1905, p. 60, where λόγος in Heraclitus is rendered by 'universal intelligence'; Max Heinze's ed. of F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*[8], Berlin, 1894, pt. i., p. 55 and *passim*; also art. LOGOS, vol. viii. pp. 133–138.

[3] Ps 33[6].

separated from the intercourse of man with man. If we were to judge by phrase alone, its comprehensive complexity would be apparent: along with 'divine worship,' the 'house of worship,' etc., come 'ancestor-worship,' 'devil-worship,' 'idol-worship,' 'nature-worship,' 'snake-worship,' 'tree-worship,' and what not? The residual fact seems to be that the word is catholic of all activities—physical, psychical, social—to which the adjective 'religious' can be applied; while, by discourtesy, it passes on to every other kind of pursuit that may be regarded as governed by a sufficiently intense interest, as 'dollar-worship,' 'woman-worship.'

Probably no readier mode of suggesting the range of meaning embraced in the conception of worship is at hand than the presenting of a list of the principal articles in this Encyclopædia which portray its phases (and along with them should be taken the general art. RELIGION). They include ANOINTING, ASCETICISM, AUSTERITIES, BAPTISM, CELIBACY, CHASTITY, COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD, COMMUNION WITH DEITY, CONFESSION, CONSECRATION, DEIFICATION, DEVOTION AND DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE, EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, FASTING, FEASTING, HUMAN SACRIFICE, HYMNS, IMAGES AND IDOLS, INITIATION, MYSTERIES, OATH, ORDEAL, PENANCE, PILGRIMAGE, PRAYER, PRIEST AND PRIESTHOOD, PROCESSIONS AND DANCES, PROPHECY, PROPITIATION, PURIFICATION, SACRAMENTS, SACRIFICE, SECRET SOCIETIES, TABU, TOTEMISM. All these refer to modes or ideals of worship which are nearly universal among the races of men, while a multitude of special titles indicate particulars of rite and cult developed from these major forms. Along with these designations of ritual forms, constituting the acts of worship, should be considered those having to do with its occasions: BIRTH, DEATH, MARRIAGE, PUBERTY, or, in a social mode, seed-time (cf. PHALLISM), HARVEST, SABBATH, WAR; and again those designating its objects: ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, DEMONS AND SPIRITS, GOD, RELICS, SAINTS; while, finally, the psychical states induced by rites or regarded as their foundation cannot be excluded from the meaning of the term: ANIMISM (which is really a state of mind, not a system of thought), HOLINESS, LOVE (in its theological sense), MYSTICISM, POSSESSION, REVERENCE, SANCTIFICATION are examples. The whole idea is complex beyond definition, and, although it is undoubtedly primarily a designation of the active side of religion, especially of cult and rite, yet the activities are of such a nature as to be beyond characterization except when taken in connexion with their objects, their occasions, and their psychical effects.

1. Cult and culture.—Worship, broadly defined, is the active phase of religion, as made manifest in rite and cult. What, then, is its 'primitive' character? The question has been often debated and is really important: Are we to identify as the primitive (1) modes of worship found among contemporary or recent savage peoples, or (2) the historically and biologically first evidences of religious cult, or (3) the logically prior factors—*i.e.* the psychologically significant and the philosophically essential elements of human nature displayed throughout the whole course of the religious development of mankind? The first of these three is without question the current usage, and the second is commonly aligned with it; *i.e.*, contemporaneous savage cults are regarded as typical of historically primitive ideas by a majority of writers. Nevertheless, there has been in the past, and there is still, a vigorous current of opinion which maintains that savagery shows quite as much degeneration as it does conservation of religion, in its primitive value; and this opinion derives explicit support from the observed facts, for grossness and decadence in rite and cult belong not to the most utter savages, but frequently to peoples well advanced in material civilization, while an enormous amount of superstitious lumber is obvious survival from what was once significant custom or intelligible belief. In short, in the matter of religion, as in all other matters showing the form of evolution, the law of development seems to be that of the central and healthy type, following a true norm of nature, while over against it are all manner of fantastic outgrowths and by-plays, alike degenerative and destructive. Religious cult, formal worship, is, in fact, no direct variable of culture; it possesses a type and significance of its own which must be dissected out from the accompanying contexts of economic, political, æsthetic, and intellectual life, before it can be properly comprehended.

It is at this point that the third mode of consideration, the psychological and the philosophical, becomes important. Recent years have seen the rapid growth of a very considerable literature devoted to the psychology of religion, its effort being (1) to describe the particular states and processes of mind which lead to worship and define it, and (2) to explain their relationship to the whole context of human nature and the world which has created it. If there is a religious 'instinct,' the definition of its forms and occasions is the patent key to the interpretation of all religious phenomena, and from it the 'primitive' in religion must be trued to type. This is the task of the psychologist, while on the side of the philosopher there remain to be put the great problems of the truth and value of religion. The philosophic task, too, is receiving yearly more attention, with the 'philosophy of values' as the central controversy.

A broad observation of the whole range of facts connected with the relation of cult to culture fortifies the significance of the psychologico-philosophical view-point. Shamanism (*q.v.*), in one form or another, with its accompaniments of trance and ecstasy, is the most universal of the ritual forms known to the least cultured peoples; that it is primarily the development of a psychical aptitude is evident. In the higher societies by far the greater number of cults trace their foundation to an 'inspired' founder, be he ancestor or prophet. The great syncretistic religions hark directly back to the life of a master as their source and explanation. In every level of civilization the origin of religious forms and beliefs goes straight to the individual experiences of individual men for foundation and guidance; nowhere is there evidence of an original religious 'compact' (unless totemism may be regarded as such), although, of course, there are plenty of instances of the application of religious forms to social and state interests. On the whole, the type of cult development, in high civilization and low, is (1) the moral or mystical teacher; (2) the ritualization of the original ceremonies, songs, or prayers, accompanied by social recognition; (3) their corruption, partial or whole, through syncretism (*q.v.*); and (4) not infrequently an effort, through a subsequent prophet or reformer, to purify the cult and bring it back to norm. This is obviously the Hebrew development as represented by the OT; it may fairly be applied to Christianity, to Buddhism, to Brāhmanism; and it finds signal illustration in the more backward regions of the world; *e.g.*, the majority opinion of Americanists is that in the Aztec cults, with their horrible rites, we have a clear-cut case of degradation from what had once been a religion (probably Maya in origin) containing much that was clean and noble, while in Peru there is evidence of several successive purifications and degradations of worship; and in neither centre was the highest

religious development invariably concomitant with the greatest material power. Finally, in modern society, the Protestant tendency to identify 'personal' religion with 'primitive' Christianity is clearly a reaction towards a psychical valuation of worship; and, indeed, it is altogether pertinent to note that the three Christian virtues, faith, hope, and love, are essentially and exclusively personal and psychical: here the primitive in religion is clearly individual experience.

2. Ritualism.—However founded, worship inevitably passes over into ritual forms. Rites are variously classified, usually under a broad initial dichotomy, as magical and religious, positive and negative, attractive and avertive, participative and ascetic, etc., though nowhere are these divisions sharp and fast; there are always intermediate classes looking in both directions. Thus imitative magic passes insensibly into devotional prayer; propitiation and praise are directed to the same deity and in the same ceremony; asceticism terminates in its own ecstatic indulgence, hardly to be distinguished from vinal enthusiasm. Furthermore, even where the division is clear, such classifications over-simplify the facts. Similar magical rites may be employed to bind a lover or to destroy an enemy; sacrificial rites, indistinguishable in form, may be designed for propitiation of divine anger or the expression of gratitude for divine protection. Acts of worship no doubt all express desire, but the desires may vary *toto cælo* in the matter of conscious definition; they may be wholly specific or utterly vague, and their psychical backgrounds as complex as are human moods. The customary classifications afford convenient heads for the arrangement of the facts, but they become dangerous fictions when states of mind or theories of origin are inferred from them.

There are, of course, definable levels in the use of ritual expedients, and these correspond in a general way with cultural development. (1) At the simplest level of life the few rites employed are so nearly *instinctive* in character, and their occasions so spontaneous, that it is hardly necessary even to call upon tradition as an explanation of their presence. Perils which command propitiation, hours of plenty which invite feasting and song, the pains of disease calling for 'medicine' and vision-caught assuagement—all these have obvious, even if psychologically complex, human motives. It is but a step beyond this to the formation of tropaic and apotropaic rituals having to do with the changes which mark the normal lives of men and women: *rites de passage*, with birth, puberty, marriage, parentage, eldership, death, as their posts. Finally, just as there are seasons in the arc of a man's days, so there are the seasons of the natural year which men must observe: rites of seed-time and harvest are doubtless as ancient as is agriculture, while immemorially more ancient still are the simple reactions to the changes of the living world which all known men, at least, make articulate. The fetish, the burial, the primitive calendar, may be taken as symbols respectively of these three elemental directions of ritual life.

(2) Above this first level comes the cultural grade, wherein ritualism is modified to reflect and sustain *social* organization. Already with initiation and marriage rites, with sowing and harvest ceremonies, the social factor enters into the ritual occasion. As community life becomes complex, its enterprises are surrounded and emphasized by prohibitions and commands, tabus and sanctities, which serve as its bond and fixative. This is true not only of the internal life of a community, based on the instincts and the seasons, but also of its external relations: the making of war and the making of peace; and, as time passes, it becomes true in a third dimension, the historical, for the momentous events of tribal and national life inevitably appear to acquire a sanction from nature itself, and their commemoration becomes as seasonal and cyclic. It is worth noting, too, that morality finds its most cogent support in ritual emphasis. The virtues are all in the nature of inhibitions set upon the more animal instincts; they are all in the nature of conscious habits, and are, therefore, subject to deliberate education. It is therefore quite in the order of reason that communal ritualism should become marked by the presence of a definite class of men—the priesthoods—whose special province is the preservation of traditional wisdom and the enforcement of the moral sanctions. Here society becomes specialized, and the religious, as a man apart, answers as it were for the conscience of the group. Worship is no longer governed by the 'inner light' of the elemental instincts, but is established as a moral law.

(3) Still more complex, although by no means rare even among savage peoples, is the level marked by motives which govern *proselytizing*. Cults pass readily from people to people, along with other customs, but there is an especial impulse fathering the desire to convert which is certainly other than instinctive and more than moral. It may be accompanied by motives wholly sordid; it may be utilized by calculating leaders for entirely secular ends; but, whether its character be that of intolerance, of benevolence, or the two admixed, it comes finally to gather to itself the essential zeal of religion. Then it is that the State sheers off from a Church which outgrows it; then it is that religion and morality become divided in consciousness; and then it is, finally, that there arises a problem of reason *versus* faith, of intellectual as against spiritual interests.

(4) Doubtless, a last level should be added—that in which the secular life is felt to be lived in more or less separation from the religious, and in which the motives of the latter become matter of critical and sceptical interest. Conscious study of religion, conscious philosophizing about it, mark this finality; but it is to the point to observe that even here the essential experience maintains itself in the Protestant seclusion of the individual soul. The final rite, the ultimate worship, is retirement into the closet in the hour of spiritual need; and this, after all, is not radically different from the elemental act of instinctive worship, in propitiation or thanksgiving.

3. Objects of worship.—As the occasions of worship give only a partial key to its forms, so the forms afford but a partial clue to its objects. Not all ritual observances are regarded as worship; magical rites are usually placed in another class, and many rites having obvious social values—marriage rites, chief-making rites, the 'potlatch,' are examples—are connected with worship only incidentally, if at all. In order that the ritual form may be recognized as true worship, it must be accompanied by some evidence of a religious sanction; *i.e.*, it must in some sense be directed to powers superhuman, if not supernatural. This means recognition of deity. Ordinarily gods are defined as the objects of worship; the better mode would be to say that the act of worship is the definition of the god. Wherever the religious sanction is present, the conception of God is being created.

Such a reversal in the order of definition would clear the atmosphere of much controversial dust. Many a missionary has accused the heathen of atheism because of his failure to find belief in a Supreme Being with Christian attributes (not infrequently among people incapable of thinking either 'being' or 'attribute'), and many a field

anthropologist has described his savages as totally irreligious in one sentence and in the next has gone forward to describe rites which were obviously directed to superhuman powers. Nor need these be personified: personification is itself an act of some intellectual subtlety, and it appears to be the prime token of animism, as distinct from polytheism, just that the animist has failed of achieving this subtlety; but that animism is in the nature of religion, and its placations and reverences in the nature of true worship, few would care to deny. Again, magic: magical ends are usually clearly definable, but the means employed invariably rest upon an implied recognition of unseen or unfelt forces; and it is at least significant that, when gods come to be formulated in thought, their powers are of a piece with all magic potency: the Great Medicine is another name for the Great Mystery. Wherever men placate unseen foes or make offerings to hidden friends—and there are no human tribes so low in mind that these customs are not found among them — there worship is present and divinity recognized.

Above such formless minima the objects of worship build themselves up hierarchically. The definition of a 'thing' becomes the recognition of a 'power,' and the treatment of the power—if the thing be of any importance—becomes the symptom of a cult. Fetishes, 'medicine,' talismans, belong here; they are cherished, they are tended, they are regarded as vehicles of grace; there is no psychological gulf between the fetish and the idol, between the 'medicine' and the sacrament, between the talisman and the holy relic, or even the holy word. Worship is present even in gross superstition—perverted, no doubt, as to its object, but clear in the mode of its regard. As intelligence grows, the purification of human sentiments is accompanied by the elevation of the objects of regard; the near and trivial objects which attract the feebler animist or fetishist give place to the more inspiring or more august forces of nature, which become the spirits that move in wind and wave, that rise as luminous heavenly orbs, or circle through the year on the swift feet of the seasons. Nature-worship is, even to the last, the great fount of the imagery by which we represent to ourselves the augustness and sublimity of divinity, and if, in the end, we feast our imagination of things spiritual with celestial rather than terrestrial phenomena, this is surely but the natural projection of that recognition of the beneficence of light which makes us also liken our most intimate spiritual inward gift to an 'illumination'; the metaphor of light is equally inevitable when applied to wisdom and to grace.

There are, of course, other images which define the objects of adoration. Foremost among them are kinship terms, which, even among the least tutored of men, are the natural titles of gods. 'Father Heaven' and 'Mother Earth' have each a double title to reverence, for the kinship expressed adds to the sublimity and beauty of nature the whole context of humanity in its most winning character, while behind this is also that prophecy of life which parenthood and the whole mystery of procreation have made central in all religious veneration. Indeed, these two factors (natural sublimity and human kinship) are so powerful in appeal that the remaining imaginal mode, which utilizes the likenesses of human society to picture divinity, has never more than passingly and accessorily aided the picture: gods have been likened to warriors, judges, lords, kings, but in their supremacies the light of heaven and the love of the parent have always been their final attributes.

At the foundation, in the mind of the most beclouded savage, the object of worship is a power in strength transcending his own. Whether in his rite-making he goes forward, timidly, to active adoration and a sense of comradeship with his divinity, or, panic-stricken, strives to exorcize the presence and escape its dooms, may well turn upon the colour of his personal fortunes: the Power will be good or evil according to its effects. But, if good, what more inevitable than that very address by a kinship term which is so often enjoined in mythic teachings and which so naturally adds to the sense of power that of benevolence? The third step is that natural association of wisdom with solicitude which is represented by the idea of Providence and imaged by the idea of illumination. Thus the gods, even of dark-minded men, are conceived as more or less strong and good and wise; and it is only a metaphysical theology which universalizes these attributes into omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience. The presence of all three attributes is, of course, not necessary for the existence of worship, though all three are present where the deity is truly adored. But in many cases strength and knowledge are not known or thought to be accompanied by goodness, and out of the terror of evil appetites, immeasurable in power, have grown most of the cruelties and horrors of superstitious worship. If one may so put it, where there is deformity in cult, there will be found deformity in the conception of God.

4. **Psychical factors.**—Before the conception of worship can be fully developed, to its occasions and its objects must be added the consideration of the distinctive psychical values associated with rite and cult. Here again the problem of the primitive is not easily disengaged. More than any other objects of thought psychical values are dependent upon the associations of words for their designation; and consequently more than any other objects they are subject to the ambiguities and tricks of transference which verbal meanings further. Especially must this be true where the differences in linguistic level are great: words such as 'adoration,' 'communion,' 'reverence,' 'conscience' have no equivalents in untutored tongues, and it is difficult to make certain the presence of analogous experiences. The first problem, therefore, which presents itself to the psychologist is to endeavour to infer from the ritual forms and the imagery involved what modes of experience prompt them, and in particular to separate the symbolical from the literal interpretation.

For it should be borne in mind (and it is too often forgotten) that religious ideas are images or they are nothing. The great elementary psychical fact which makes ritualism ritual is that the act of worship is never realistic: it moves and lives in an atmosphere of double meaning; the feather, the pebble, the geometrical sign, the chanted word, the sacramental bread, and the sacrificial flesh are never what in the bald reality of the senses they appear to be; their sanctities are derived from supersensible modes of experience. That such modes of experience should for their expression resort to every type of the imagery of sensible experience is in the order of nature. That the most intimate of these images should be those most deeply founded in our own organic life, as physical human beings, and in our conscious relations, as social human beings, is equally intelligible. And it is not, therefore, unintelligible that religious meanings should be peculiarly easy to pervert; the very difficulties which make their communication to be symbolical call for a subtlety of response that frequently fails. Thus it is that many rites, conceived in spiritual purity, if their symbolism is lost, become gross because the images in which they are conveyed are bound to be gross.

In particular this is the peril of images of sex: the procreation of life is the most inevitable of human experiences, because of the social as well as the emotional significance, to stand as a religious emblem, and nearly all the noblest modes of religious expression rely upon it for their source (the fatherhood of God, divine love, eternal life); but in the course of religious change no imagery has given rise to more perversion.

Possibly this very fact of ready perversion—'spiritual blindness,' as it is called—may have something to do with the second great source of worship: the sense of a need of salvation. Literal fear and literal desire, sensible ends coupled with sensible means, are the emotions most dealt with as explanations of ritual acts. Bionomically, they are no explanations at all, for the phenomena of worship show little or nothing that can be interpreted as furthering a physical salvation; the irreligious is as healthy and safe as the religious. It is here once more that the images are full of deceit: paradise and hell are painted in the pigments of sensation, whereas the thing meant is supersensible. The fact that calls for a real accounting is just the fact that men (of high culture and of low) feel a need for a salvation which is as a matter of fact inexpressible, just as they feel reverence for a divinity which is indefinable. The quest of this salvation is bound up, on the emotional side, with the group of words ('awe,' 'adoration,' 'communion') whose contextual meaning harks back to the very roots of human life.

One may say, then, that, on the intellectual side, the great factor that is fundamental in the experience of worship is the sense of double-meaning, and therefore of the duality of nature. On the emotional side the key is the feeling of need for salvation (which might be negatively described as a conviction of sin). These two come as near to defining the religious 'instinct' as any broad partition is likely to come. In any case, they give the major forms under which the experiences defining worship are to be subsumed.

The psychology of worship, however, must advance a step beyond this, even to lay its foundations. The human mind, the human being, moves as a unit, as a person; and the act of worship is in some sense so complete an act that it characteristically creates the reciprocal figure in the worshipper of the image of his salvation. Religion in the long run tends to define man, not as an individual, but in his type and form. Animism, in ascribing souls to things, personifies them; personification is the first step towards anthropomorphism, which in itself is but the sensible rendering of a psycho-eidism that is both more elemental and more significant. It is more significant because it defines for us, inwardly, the traits which we regard as ideal, and therefore as divine; and it is thus that the whole psychic play of religious experience takes final form as the depiction of an ideal man, a pattern man, who becomes a saviour, if only through the fact of his recognition. Whether the pattern man be given an incarnation and a story as a human individual, or whether he be read as a man-like God, or whether, in the third place,[1] he be composed through the union of all active ideals, as an *anima mundi*, is accident of tradition. The psychical fundamental is that all forms of worship figure him forth, as in a true theophany.

5. **Philosophical implications.**—Portrayal and analysis of the facts of worship constitute the science of comparative religion. But, when all its labours are completed, there still remains for consideration the thinker's most profound problem, viz., that of the truth upon which it rests, the demand of nature to which it responds. Modes of thinking are as correspondent with their cosmic context as are modes of perceiving; the eye of the mind is as truly adapted to its formative forces as is the physical eye; in the end, no beliefs come into being save in orientation to some truth, and superstition is assigned its character from some measuring rectitude. The facts of worship and the facts of faith spring up in response to some spontaneous impulse of human nature, and, like all other human impulses, this becomes a ground of philosophy. In its first form philosophy of religion is theology: the reason's apology for the man's traditional beliefs. But in its sophistications the philosophy of religion assumes at least the form of utter detachment and sits in judgment not upon the article but upon the fact of faith, as a mode of cosmic intuition.

What the philosophic solution must be, in type, can be answered only by appeal to the whole history of thought. Philosophy is reflexion upon the whole range of human experience; this experience grows in variety and in implication with the continuance of life; philosophies, therefore, form and reform with the changing generations of men. Nevertheless, even as there is a generic human nature which defines the kind through the course of time, so there is a generic form which shapes and limits philosophic thinking; its sources are, after all, as few as are our gifts and aptitudes. Occasionally an anthropologist, with a gesture of impatience, would clean the slate of old significances. Reinach proposes as a definition of religion, 'un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle au libre exercice de nos facultés';[1] but this is literature, not science or philosophy. The very question that is most profound is that of the reality to which those scruples correspond: What, in the nature of the world, is their foundation and bearing? If men have prayed and sacrificed for naught, how is this to be accounted for? If their rites have suffered perversion, whence is the evil? and what good does it violate? If the symbolism and *double entente* which pertain to all worship is wholly fictive, what power has written so strange a gloss into the constitution of man? If conviction of sin and yearning for salvation are prompted by no truth, whence is the lie to which they give life? In its pragmatic way the fact of worship is ever rehabilitating the ontological argument. There is something in the old Stoic inference: 'If altars, then gods'; and the philosophy of religion is the exposition of what man may perceive in his own deeply impulsive belief in divinity.

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[1] A most interesting and enlightening example of this subtler form of anthropomorphic thinking, in a primitive community, is the account of 'The Symbolic Man of the Osage Tribe,' by Francis La Flesche, *Art and Archæology*, vol. ix. no. 2 [Feb. 1920].

[1] *Orpheus*, p. 4.

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H. B. ALEXANDER.

WORSHIP (Babylonian).—Form and content of Babylonian worship are almost entirely borrowed from the Sumerians. This is particularly true of the principles of formal worship or the gestures employed in religious devotion. As to the content of worship or the words spoken therein, the Babylonian public service or daily liturgies are without exception Sumerian. But the prayers of private devotion and all the intricate rituals of the magic cults are largely of Semitic Babylonian origin. The Assyrian religion and worship were thoroughly Babylonian, but here a distinct tendency to preserve the Semitic principle of gesture in private devotion is everywhere noticeable. The Assyrian religion likewise owed much to the Sumerians, and their liturgical offices were borrowed entirely from the old canonical Sumerian breviaries of the 23rd century.

I. *GESTURE IN SUMERIAN PRAYER.*—**1. Pre-historic period.**—Very early Sumerian seals which belong to the pre-historic period (*c.* 3500 B.C.) reveal three orthodox poses in private devotion, or in the gesture assumed by a Sumerian layman when he came before a seated deity to say his prayers.

(1) He is represented in the so-called processional scene, where his own protecting god[1] leads him by the hand and presents him to a seated deity. In the early pre-Sargonic period the posture of the adorant's free arm is not yet fixed. Occasionally the disengaged arm is employed to carry a lamb or kid as an offering. On one very early seal the unoccupied arm is folded across the waist.[2] It is remarkable that this idea is characteristic of both Sumerian and Egyptian religions and of these only—a fact which seems to reinforce much other evidence for an original pre-historic contact between Sumer and Egypt. Naturally the figure of a deity who conducts the worshipper is a pure fantasy. In reality a priest led the layman by the hand in this form of adoration, as we can see from a few scenes which depict the processional form of worship as it really was.[3] (2) The worshipper stands with one hand raised parallel to the breast, palm inward and fingers touching the lips; the other arm is folded across the waist. This is the very ancient salutation by throwing a kiss and is the most common gesture in the private devotions of Sumerians and Babylonians down to the Neo-Babylonian period.[1] (3) The worshipper stands with both hands folded at the waist; from statuettes in the round in all periods it can be seen that this gesture imposed a fixed custom of clasping the hands. The right hand is clasped by the left hand in an extraordinary manner so that the right thumb lies against the body and the fingers of the right hand lie almost horizontal. The position is physically impossible and only an exaggeration of the natural clasp seen in bas-reliefs of Assyria. The gesture seems to belong to the religion of pre-historic Sumer and is as ancient as the kissing hand gesture.

Such were the three positions assumed under various circumstances in private devotion by the Sumerians from pre-historic times down to the period of Agade, when the great Semitic dynasty of Sargon the Ancient seized the hegemony of all southern Mesopotamia for 197 years. Sargon may be dated about 2850.

2. Sargonic period.—The Semites of this period as well as those who had lived in close contact with and among the Sumerians in the pre-Sargonic age adopted the Sumerian principles of gesture. A seal dedicated to Narâm-Sin, fifth king of the Sargonic dynasty, represents the worshipper in the kissing hand position. Although the Sumerians recognized this attitude as consisting in throwing a kiss to a deity by the pictograph for the word 'to pray,' yet they commonly designated it, at any rate in later stages, by the term 'lifting of the hand.' In subsequent discussion, when the expression 'lifting of the hand' is employed, the attitude of the kiss-hand is always implied. Archæological evidence for religious gesture in this period is meagre, but a few seals seem to indicate that the folded hands position was also common. The old processional scene with intercessory priest disappears entirely in this age.

3. Period of Gudea and Ur dynasty (2650–2358).—In the age of the great Sumerian revival which terminated in the powerful dynasty of Ur we have first of all a return to the old processional scene. But now the disengaged arm, henceforth always the right arm, is held in the attitude of saluting with a kiss. In the time of the Ur dynasty the folded hand gesture becomes extremely common. The present writer has assumed that this gesture was employed in the penitential psalms or prayers of contrition and sorrow, later known as *eršaghunga* prayers. The kiss hand gesture he takes to be the one adopted in prayers of the magic rituals whose principal motif is praise of the deities. The ancient independent kiss hand gesture, *i.e.* without an interceding figure who leads the suppliant by the hand, appears rarely in this period.[2] In other words, the prayers of the lifting of the hand in the last great age of Sumerian civilization always imply a processional scene and a priest.

4. Period of Isin, Larsa, and Babylonian (Ist) dynasty (2357–1926).—Archæological evidence furnished by a great number of seals in this period leads to the inference that the processional scene with kiss hand gesture was abandoned for the independent attitude. The suppliant now stands with right hand raised and fingers touching the lips, the left arm folded at the waist. On the older seals of the period the priest still performs the act of intercession, but he stands before the seated deity in the folded hand pose.[3] The inference from the evidence of seals alone that the ancient custom of approaching a deity through

[1] The Sumero-Babylonian doctrine concerning man's relation to his own god and goddess is discussed in *ERE* v. 637 *f.*; see esp. Langdon, 'Religious Interpretation of Babylonian Seals,' in *RAssyr* xvi. [1919] 49–68.

[2] Langdon, 'Gesture in Sumerian and Babylonian Prayer,' *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 531–556, fig. 4.

[3] Stone tablet of Nabuapaliddin (890–854) published in Rawlinson, *WAI* v. 60, a copy of tablet of the 1st dynasty. Engraved memorial deed of Melishipak (end of 13th cent.) (V. Scheil, *Textes élamites-sémitiques*, Paris, 1908, x. pl. 13).

[1] For pre-historic examples see the seals cited in Langdon, 'Gesture in Sumerian and Babylonian Prayer,' p. 533 *f.*, from the publications of Delaporte and Ward.

[2] Cf. a seal dedicated to Dungi (J. Menant, *Recherches sur la glyptique orientale*, Paris, 1883, fig. 86).

[3] See, *e.g.*, L. Delaporte, *Catalogue du Musée Guimet, Cylindres orientaux*, Paris, 1909, no. 45; also *Catalogue des Cylindres orientaux de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, do. 1910, nos. 124–128.

the offices of a priest was abandoned after the Ur dynasty is clearly misleading; for two clear examples of this custom are illustrated on monuments of the Cassite period and on the stone tablet of Nabuapaliddin.[1] Moreover, in prayers of private devotion frequent reference is made to the priest who recites portions of the prayer.[2] But from this period onward until the rise of the Neo-Babylonian empire at the end of the 7th cent. the pose of the kiss hand with left arm folded at the waist is the ordinary gesture in Babylonia.

II. *GESTURE IN ASSYRIAN RELIGION.* — The Assyrians retained the old open hand Semitic pose in prayer, although the kiss hand was also adopted by them from the Sumerians. Since they also borrowed all the prayers and liturgies of the official cults from Sumer and Akkad, the retention of the Semitic gesture emphasizes the tenacity with which they adhered to racial customs. The open hand gesture, which was also the principal one used by the Hebrews, is made by extending both hands upward towards heaven, palms inward. In art the suppliant is always represented standing as in Sumer and Babylonia.[3] But the pose in taking up the gesture of the kiss hand in Assyria was ordinarily modified in two respects. The right arm is now thrown forward and the hand turned outward, the index finger pointing at the god or sacred object. The thumb is closed over the three remaining fingers. This attitude is similar to one seen on Greek monuments and represents the adorant in the later stages of the act of throwing a kiss. But under influence of the Assyrians and Aramæans the old Semitic spirit reasserted itself in Babylonia; seals of the Neo-Babylonian, Persian, Seleucid, and Parthian periods almost invariably represent the worshipper in the open hand pose.

Kneeling and prostration do not appear to have been admitted in the orthodox forms of Sumerian religion, but there is evidence for their use among the Babylonians and the Assyrians. Prostration and kneeling were certainly acts of worship at certain points in the recitation of prayers and penitential psalms among the Semites, and on the whole it seems probable that they are of Semitic origin. In Sumerian literature almost no prayers of the private cults have been preserved. We possess extensive catalogues of the titles of such prayers, and the seals show that they approached their deities in private devotion from the very earliest period. But the spirit of their religion asserted itself rather in communal or public worship, and the liturgies of their various cults are extensive. In the Ur and Isin periods liturgies became canonical and extremely intricate. They were accompanied by music, and in fact the names of instruments were employed as technical terms to describe kinds of songs; *e.g.*, the recessional or final song of a liturgy was sung to the double flute and called the flute song. The canonical liturgies of the Sumerians were borrowed by the Babylonians and the Assyrians and were always said in Sumerian. The greater portion of each liturgy was provided with an interlinear Semitic translation for laymen. No changes in the old Sumerian liturgies were ever permitted, and even in Assyria the national god Ašur is excluded from the deities mentioned in the litanies because his cult arose after the canon of sacred prayer books was closed.

The Babylonians usually employed Semitic prayers in the private rituals of purification, and these were known as the 'prayers of the lifting of the hand.' They were of course modelled on the Sumerian prayers of the kiss hand ceremonies, and a very great number of prayers of this kind have survived in Semitic. They form almost invariably part of the magic ceremonies of purification.[1] A considerable number of the prayers said by the priests in these services of healing and atonement have been recovered, and these were written and recited in Sumerian, and were known by the rubric (*kišub*). Prayers of penance which are pure religious prayers of great spiritual power and unconnected with magic rituals were not popular, and of these comparatively few have survived. They are all composed in Sumerian and probably represented the prayers said in the old Sumerian processional scene. Obviously they could not be employed by the ordinary layman, who knew no Sumerian. They represent the exclusive and aristocratic side of Sumerian and Babylonian religion. In them the priest takes a leading part, and they are usually provided with a Semitic translation.

LITERATURE.—*On gesture in worship.*—S. Langdon, 'Gesture in Sumerian and Babylonian Prayer,' *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 531–556; Friedrich Heiler, 'Die Körperhaltung beim Gebet,' *Orientalische Studien Fritz Hommel zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet*, Leipzig, 1918, ii. 168–177.

Liturgical worship.—S. Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies*, Paris, 1913 (esp. the Introduction concerning the use of musical instruments, the origin and development of the breviaries and their theological content), *Sumerian Liturgical Texts from Nippur*, Philadelphia, 1917, and *Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms*, do. 1919 (Introduction has a résumé of most recent knowledge on liturgical worship), *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909. For the liturgies of the Tammuz cult, whose festival was probably celebrated at mid-summer, see H. Zimmern, *Der babylonische Gott Tamūz*, Leipzig, 1909, and *Sumerisch-babylonische Tamūzlieder*, do. 1907; S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914. Liturgical worship in the cults of deified kings of the late Sumerian period is discussed in 'Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms,' and in 'Notes on the Deification of Kings,' by T. G. Pinches, *PSBA*, 1915, pp. 87–95, 126–134, and in 'Three New Hymns in the Cults of Deified Kings,' by S. Langdon, *PSBA*, 1918, pp. 30–40, 45–56.

Prayers of the lifting of the hand and penitential psalms are discussed and full literature given under PRAYER (Babylonian). In addition to the literature there see Erich Ebeling, *Quellen zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1918–19. What is known concerning the great New Year festival at the spring equinox will be found in H. Zimmern, *Zum babylonischen Neujahrfest*, Leipzig, 1903, [2]1918; S. Langdon, *Exp* VII. viii. [1909] 143–158. Benno Landsberger, *Der kultische Kalendar der Babylonier und Assyrer*, Leipzig, 1915, has begun a series of monographs upon the Sumerian and Semitic monthly festivals.

S. LANGDON.

WORSHIP (Buddhist).[2]—**1.** Worship (*pūjā, vandana, māna*, etc.) is no part of the Path (*mārga*). Path is insight into and meditation on the four truths (the four *nirvedhabhāgīya, satyadarśana, satyabhāvanā*); but worship is an important part of what is styled *mokṣabhāgīya* ('acts connected with or leading to deliverance'). No man can in this life enter into the Path, if he has not, in a previous existence, 'planted' some 'root of merit' (*kuśalamūla*). Among the 'roots of merit' worship is the best.

2. Worship is the best *dāna*, or giving. A man gives material gifts (*āmiṣadāna*) or security (*abhayadāna*) to his fellow-men, to animals, to *pretas*, for their benefit and also for his own benefit. He shall give to the Buddha, to the

[1] See above, p. 757[a], note 3.

[2] So, *e.g.*, in the *eršaghunga* prayer, iv. Rawlinson, no. 2= Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, Leipzig, 1885, no. 6. And a number of prayers of the 'lifting of the hand' end with the phrase 'I will sing thy praise and I the priest of magic thy servant will sing thy praise' (see E. Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur*, Leipzig, 1919, no. 25, rev. III. 10; C. D. Gray, *Shamash Religious Texts*, Chicago, 1901, K. 3394 rev. 14; L. W. King, *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896, no. 12, 94).

[3] See Langdon, 'Gesture in Sumerian and Babylonian Prayer,' figs. 16, 18–20, and p. 539.

[1] See artt. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian), MAGIC (Babylonian), and PRAYER (Babylonian).

[2] Details concerning Buddhist worship are to be found in all books dealing with Buddhism. Some of the sources are indicated below. But the principles that command the Buddhist Hinayāna doctrine of worship have never been elucidated, and there is the justification of the present short note.

Dharma, to the Church, for his own advantage, because they are 'fields of merit' (*punyakṣetra*) *par excellence*. The better the field, the better the fruit. Now the merit of giving is either *tyāgānvaya* or *paribhogānvaya*; *i.e.*, a merit accrues to the giver either because he gives away (*tyāga*) something or because the recipient enjoys (*paribhoga*) the thing that has been given away. Buddha does not enjoy the flowers, etc., that are offered to *chaityas*. The merit is not weaker for that. The point is discussed in Pali and Sanskrit sources.

LITERATURE.—*Abhidharmakośa*, iv. 32 (on the *triśaraṇagamana*), 112 (on the merit accruing to the future Śākyamuni on account of his worshipping Puṣya), 121 (on the worship of *chaityas*; why actual acts of worship are useful), vii. 34 (paradises and *nirvāṇa* obtained owing to a single thought of faith in the qualities of a Buddha), iii. 99 (avoiding *antarakalpas* by giving to the Saṅgha); *Milinda* (*SBE* xxxv. [1890]) 144–154, 246–248; *Kathāvatthu*, ed. A. C. Taylor (*PTS*), London, 1897, vii. 5 f. (*Points of Controversy*, tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids and S. Z. Aung [*PTS*], London, 1915, p. 200); Śāntideva, *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 39–40 (*Introduction à la pratique des futurs Boudhas*, tr. and ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1907, p. 119); *Madhyamakavṛtti* (*Bibl. Buddh.* v. [Petrograd, 1909]) xvii. 4 f.; *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* (*ib.* 1902), *kārikā* 5 f.; I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1896, p. 115 and *passim*; R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, do. 1860, p. 196; J. P. Minayeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, French tr., Paris, 1894, p. 155; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (=*GIAP* iii. viii.), Strassburg, 1896, p. 88; W. Wassilieff, *Der Buddhismus*, Petrograd, 1860, p. 244 (whether giving to the Saṅgha is useful); A. Foucher, *The Beginnings of Buddhist Art*, Eng. tr., London, 1918, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, 2 vols., Paris, 1905–17, *passim*.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

WORSHIP (Chinese).—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—It is not easy to find any Chinese word or phrase which conveys identically the same meaning as that which the word 'worship' conveys to one who has been brought up in a Christian environment. Probably the first word which would occur to most students of Chinese is *chi*. It consists of three parts—the symbols for 'spiritual beings,' 'flesh,' and 'the right hand,' giving the meaning, 'to hold a piece of flesh in the right hand and offer it to the spirits.' One of the pioneer Anglo-Chinese lexicographers, Morrison, gives as one of the meanings of the character *chi* 'to offer flesh in the rites of worship, to sacrifice with worship.' J. Legge criticizes this interpretation by pointing out that it is not countenanced by the compilers of the standard native dictionary, *K'ang Hsi*. He adds, 'The general idea symbolised by the character *chi* is—an offering whereby communication and communion with spiritual beings is effected.'[1] The importance of this criticism will be manifest when we remember that the symbol *chi* is the one which is commonly used to denote the religious side of the cult of ancestors. If *chi* does not mean 'worship,' a doubt at once suggests itself as to whether we are technically correct in describing that cult as the 'worship' of ancestors. This doubt is fully justified if to the word 'worship' in this phrase we attribute a meaning identical or nearly identical with that which it bears in Christianity. If we assume that 'worship' can only be offered to a god or gods (real or imagined), and we insist upon describing the Chinese ancestral cult as the 'worship' of ancestors, it follows that the ancestors so 'worshipped' are regarded as gods. And this is precisely the principal ground on which the cult in question has been attacked by Christian missionaries. Obviously the process of translation from one language into another can give rise to a great deal of misunderstanding and question-begging.

There are, of course, many other Chinese words and phrases which correspond, more or less roughly, to the word 'worship'; but no one of them can be regarded as strictly equivalent. *Pai* means merely 'to bow' or 'to salute'; when *ch'ung* is prefixed, the term acquires a religious meaning and may be translated 'to salute with reverence.' *Li-pai*, much used by Christian missionaries, does not necessarily mean more than to salute in accordance with the appropriate rites. *Ching-yang* means 'to respect and look up to.' There are several other terms which give the idea of ritual sacrifice. It may be urged that these and similar Chinese terms are, after all, just as satisfactory as the English term, which can hardly be said to contain within itself an adequate indication of what it has come to mean in Christian thought and ritual. If we are careful to remember that there are some not readily definable differences in spiritual content between the European and Chinese terms, not much harm will be done by regarding the two sets of terms as roughly equivalent.

In this article it is unnecessary to attempt to make any such subdivisions or differentiations as are used by the Church of Rome to distinguish the varieties of Christian worship. Such differences as those between λατρεία, ὑπερδουλεία, and δουλεία do not exist in China—simply because they have never been called into existence by the exigencies of religious controversy.

II. *CONFUCIANISM.*[1] — **1. Introductory.** — The clearest expression of the Confucian notions of worship is found in that remarkable collection of religious treatises which goes under the name of the *Li Chi* (*Record of Rites*). 'More may be learned,' says Legge, 'about the religion of the ancient Chinese from this classic than from all the others together.'[2] And it should be added that, as the *Record of Rites* forms one of the Five Classics of the orthodox Confucian learning, it still remains[3] what it has been for many centuries—the principal source of Chinese ideas regarding not only the ritual but also the inner significance of religious observances.

The reader must be warned, however, that, when we give the name of Confucianism to the religious beliefs and rites described in the *Li Chi* and other 'Confucian' classics, we are using the term in a somewhat vague sense as including all that Confucius and his school sanctioned, eulogized, or tacitly accepted. Confucius insisted that he was only 'a transmitter and not a maker,' and in any case he never posed as a religious prophet or as an inspired teacher of religious truth. Much that has come down to us as Confucianism is pre-Confucian in origin; and this we find to be specially true when we enter upon the sphere of religious thought. In the sections that follow it must be understood that 'Confucianism' is used in the looser sense here indicated.

2. Nature of true worship as understood in Confucianism. — (*a*) *Reverence.* — The *Record of Rites* opens with the striking words 'Always and in everything let there be reverence.'[4] In many parts of this classic (which came from many different hands and belongs to many different dates) the supreme necessity of reverence is emphasized, especially in connexion with all ceremonies which regulate the intercourse between the seen and the unseen worlds. Commenting on one of its subdivisions, Legge remarks:

'Throughout the Book it is mostly religious rites that are spoken of; especially as culminating in the worship of God. And nothing is more fully brought out than that all rites are valueless without truth and reverence.'[5]

The *Record* quotes Confucius as saying that in the ceremonial rites of mourning the most important thing is reverence,[6] and in another passage he is

[1] *SBE* xxviii. [1885] 201.

[1] Cf. artt. CONFUCIAN RELIGION, CONFUCIUS.

[2] *SBE* xxvii. [1885] 13.

[3] Or rather remained up to 1911. The whole Confucian system has been more or less on the defensive since that date.

[4] *SBE* xxvii. 61. Cf. Legge's comment on p. 12.

[5] *Ib.* p. 25. [6] *Ib.* xxviii. 153.

credited with the following remarkable utterance: 'With the ancients in their practice of government the love of men was the great point; in their regulation of this love of men, the rules of ceremony was the great point; in their regulation of those rules, reverence was the great point.'[1] It is an oft-reiterated Confucian theory that reverence in the performance of the prescribed rites and good conduct in the ordinary relations of man with man were inseparable.

'When one has mastered (the principle of) ceremonies, and regulates his person accordingly, he becomes grave and reverential. Grave and reverential, he is regarded with awe. If the heart be for a moment without the feeling of harmony and joy, meanness and deceitfulness enter it. If the outward demeanour be for a moment without gravity and reverentialness, indifference and rudeness show themselves.'[2]

It is evident that Confucius thoroughly approved of the strong emphasis laid by the ancients on the necessity of reverence. 'Authority without mercy, *ceremonial without reverence*, mourning without sorrow—what have I to do with these?'[3] The same lesson of reverence is inculcated in the Classics of Poetry and History.

'From of old, before our time, the former men set us the example;—How to be mild and humble from morning to night, and to be reverent in discharging the service.'[4] In the *Shu Ching* (Classic of History) there is a description of how the emperor Shun (23rd cent. B.C.), when appointing a high-priest or director of religious ceremonies, addressed the newly-appointed officer thus: 'You must be the Arranger of the ancestral temple. Morning and night you must be respectful. Be upright, be pure.' The officer did obeisance and suggested that one worthier than he should be appointed; but the emperor adhered to his decision and said, 'Do you go and undertake the duties. Be reverential.'[5] Similar exhortations are to be found in the *Tso Chuan*.[6]

Irreligion or irreverence is frequently declared to be the cause of the withdrawal of God's support from a reigning house.[7]

(*b*) *Sincerity.*—A fair acquaintance with Confucian thought shows that the true Confucianist is far from exaggerating the importance of ceremonies and ritual as such. He constantly insists that it is the spirit, not the letter, that really matters, and that rites in themselves are worthless without sincerity. A recent writer has said that the earlier types of 'commercialized' religion were displaced by 'faiths like those of Jesus and Mahomet which make God's favor depend on the *heart* of the worshipper rather than on his *sacrifice*.'[8] But this was precisely the teaching of classical Confucianism several centuries B.C. In one of the books of the *Record of Rites* we are told that the 'superior man' is not only extremely reverential in all ceremonial matters but is also absolutely sincere.[9]

'Sacrifice [which in this passage is practically synonymous with religion] is not a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it by ceremonies; and hence, only men of ability and virtue can give complete exhibition to the idea of sacrifice. The sacrifices of such men have their own blessing;—not indeed what the world calls blessing. Blessing here means perfection;—it is the name given to the complete and natural discharge of all duties. When nothing is left incomplete or improperly discharged;—this is what we call perfection, implying the doing everything that should be done in one's internal self, and externally the performance of everything according to the proper method.'[10]

In the *Tso Chuan* we are told that, when 'intelligence and sincerity' are present, almost any offerings, however common and easily obtained, may be 'presented to the spirits and set before kings and dukes.'[11] An English writer has commented on this in the following words:

'The idea that *intelligence* and *sincerity* are prerequisites to *sacrifice* indicates an advanced stage of religious culture on the part of the writer.'[1]

The testimony of the other classical books is to the same effect.

'God has no partialities,' the *Shu Ching* tells us, 'only to those who are reverent does He show favour. The people are not constant in their affections, except to those (rulers) who have charity of heart. The spirits do not necessarily enjoy sacrifices; what they enjoy is the sincerity.'[2]

(*c*) *Simplicity and dignity.*—Next to reverence and sincerity in prayers and sacrifices nothing is more earnestly insisted upon than simplicity and dignified restraint—something very near to the Greek *σωφροσύνη*. Ostentation and a lavish display of costly temple furniture is strongly discouraged; plain water is better than wine, coarse cloth is to be preferred to gorgeous embroideries, expensive mats of fine rushes and bamboo are no better than mats of coarse reeds and straw. The soup which formed part of the sacrificial offerings should be unseasoned, to denote simplicity; the grand symbols of jade should be left plain instead of being carved. The king, when about to take part in sacrificial rites, should not ride in a carved and lacquered state-carriage but in a plain one. 'In all these things it is simply the idea of the simplicity that is the occasion of the preference and honour.'[3] Sacrificial offerings should be chosen not from rare and expensive products, but from what is seasonable and abundant.[4] Self-restraint—a moral quality which manifests itself outwardly in simplicity—is one of the principal Confucian virtues. Without self-restraint there is necessarily a lack of dignity; and without dignity the rites of worship cannot be properly performed. It was not only the actual sacrificial rites that had to be conducted with quiet dignity and solemnity; the temple-dances, too, 'displayed the gravity of the performers, but did not awaken the emotion of delight.'[5] Similarly, 'the ancestral temple produced the impression of majesty, but did not dispose one to rest in it.'[6] This is because 'the idea which leads to intercourse with spiritual Beings is not interchangeable with that which finds its realisation in rest and pleasure.'[7]

3. Godward and manward aspects of Confucian worship.—There is another feature of Chinese religion which is perhaps more characteristically Chinese than any of those yet mentioned—a moral attitude which may be briefly summed up in the formula 'Look after the human and the divine will look after itself.' This 'manwardness,' if it may be so termed, does not necessarily imply a neglect of or contempt for the 'Godward' side of religion. It is based on a reasoned conviction that whatever is good for man will satisfy God; that God does not desire and will not accept any offerings or sacrifices that will hamper or impoverish His worshippers in their necessary mundane activities or human relationships; and that in the last resort divine and human interests are identical. To quote the words of Mencius—

'He who brings all his intellect to bear on the subject, will come to understand his own nature; he who understands his own nature will understand God. To preserve one's intellect, and to nourish one's nature—that is how to serve God. To waste no thoughts upon length of life, but to cultivate rectitude—that is to do the will of God.'[8]

Doubtless this view, or something like it, is one to which all evolving religions tend to approximate; what is remarkable is the very early date at which it was reached by the Chinese and the consistency with which it has been maintained.

1 *SBE* xxviii. 264. 2 *Ib.* p. 224.
3 H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals* (*HL*, 2nd ser.), London, 1915, p. 80 f.
4 *SBE* iii.[2] [1899] 305.
5 J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, vol. iii. pt. i. p. 47.
6 *Ib.* vol. v. pt. ii. p. 846.
7 *SBE* iii. 131 *f.*, 177 *f.*, 185, 187.
8 E. A. Ross, in *IJE* xxx. [1920] 292.
9 *SBE* xxvii. 404. 10 *Ib.* xxviii. 236.
11 Legge, vol. v. pt. i. p. 13.

1 H. K. Wright, in *JRAS*, *N. China Branch*, xlviii. [1917] 172 *f.*. See also *SBE* xxvii. 448, xxviii. 211; and art. PURIFICATION (Chinese), vol. x. p. 472[b].
2 Giles, p. 15 *f.*, and *SBE* iii. 99. See also *SBE* iii. 176, and Legge, vol. v. pt. i. p. 146.
3 *SBE* xxvii. 435 *f.* 4 *Ib.* p. 395.
5 *Ib.* p. 435. 6 *Ib.* 7 *Ib.*
8 Tr. by Giles, p. 95.

It may have hampered Chinese religion in its attempts to soar heavenward, but it has undoubtedly had the excellent result of enhancing the honour and prestige of moral values. Nor are these moral values confined to earth. Chinese religious speculation extends them to the spiritual world as well, and this is why we have no capricious or irresponsible despot in the Chinese pantheon, no acts or utterances ascribed to divine beings which are incompatible with the highest moral ideals known to Chinese humanity. In this we have a sufficient explanation of another remarkable fact that has often extorted the admiration of European students: the high moral tone of the whole body of the classical and sacred literature of China and the absence of all expressions suggestive of licentious thought.

A modern writer on Eastern religions remarks that in his opinion Confucius laid 'unnecessary emphasis upon social and political duties, and may not have been sufficiently interested in the honour to be paid to Shang-Ti or God. He practically ignored the Godward side of men's duties.'[1] More just are H. A. Giles's observations on Confucius's general attitude:

'In regard to the relative importance of serving God and serving man Confucius has often been blamed for setting man before God; but it should be remembered that his interpretation of true service to God was embodied in right and proper performance of duty to one's neighbour. The idea of personal service to God Himself, as understood by the Jewish patriarchs, is entirely foreign to the Chinese conception of a Supreme Being.'[2]

In one of the books of the Historical Classic we are told of the eight branches of administration which ought to engage the attention of good rulers. The first is agriculture—the most important of all, because it provides the people with the means of subsistence; the second, commerce, which regulates the distribution of commodities; the third, religious ceremonies. With the fourth, fifth, and sixth we need not concern ourselves; the eighth and last is preparation for war.[3] It is characteristic of China that the rites of religious worship should occupy only the third place; for religion, the Chinese would say, has small practical importance for men who have nothing to eat; and spiritual beings, if they deserve human homage at all, are not likely to demand sacrificial offerings from men who cannot find the wherewithal to feed themselves. The doctrine which is implicit in this ancient passage from the *Shu Ching* reappears in an explicit form in the teachings of Mencius: 'The most important element in the State is the people; next come the altars of the gods; least in importance is the king';[4] and is repeated in the utterances of the first emperor of the Ming dynasty:

'God puts the sovereign in charge of his people, and the sovereign who wishes to serve God properly must first show that he loves the people. To show love for the people—that is the way to serve God. . . . He who would be a true sovereign should regard Heaven as his father, Earth as his mother, and the people as his children, and must carry out his duties to each with the utmost devotion. He does not perform the sacrifice to Heaven and Earth in order to bring prosperity upon himself, he does it to promote the welfare of the whole realm.'[5]

4. The motives of worship.—What, then, is the principal motive of religious worship, according to Chinese theory? Confucius and the majority of thinking Chinese since his day would have assumed that the object of religious rites is a double one—to do honour to spiritual beings and to benefit living men. The benefits anticipated by the living are moral and spiritual as well as material. It cannot be disputed that a great deal of the ceremonial connected with the cult of ancestors has direct reference to purely worldly considerations. It is assumed that the ancestors, if approached with the proper rites and offerings, will maintain the family in a state of prosperity and save it from disaster or extinction. Nevertheless this is not the reason why Confucian orthodoxy sanctions the cult of ancestors. The truly filial son, we are told, should offer his sacrifices 'without seeking for anything to be gained by them.'[1] Further, it should be remembered that there is, and long has been, a very large number of people in China who have been more or less sceptical on the question of the continued existence of human individuals after death, and who have nevertheless been among the most zealous supporters of the ancestral cult. Those who study the cult not merely in books (whether Chinese or foreign) but as it is actually practised by the people will soon realize that the practical if not the theoretical basis of the cult is social and moral rather than religious. As the present writer has said elsewhere, Confucianism has insisted on 'the importance of keeping up the cult of ancestors not so much for the sake of the dead as because it fostered among living men feelings of love, respect, reverence, and duty towards family and state. The souls of the dead might or might not be conscious of what was done for them, but it was in the interests of social harmony and political stability that the traditional religious and commemorative ceremonies should be jealously preserved and handed down to posterity, and that during the performance of such ceremonies the presence of the ancestral spirits should at least be tacitly assumed.'[2] Filial piety is, of course, the principal virtue which the ancestral cult is expected to strengthen and confirm; and it should be remembered that filial piety in China has a much wider and deeper signification than it has elsewhere. We are told that it is the root of all virtue, and the stem which produces all moral teaching; that it is an all-embracing rule of conduct, by the practice of which the people are brought to live in peace and harmony, and ill-will between superiors and inferiors is extinguished; that it commences with the service of parents, proceeds to the service of the king, and is completed by the consolidation of the character.[3]

A well-known Christian missionary in China, J. Edkins, drew attention to what he conceived to be a serious defect in the Chinese attitude towards religion when he said:

'An ethical test is the only one they know. When the evidence of a new religion is presented to them, they at once refer it to a moral standard, and give their approval with the utmost readiness if it passes the test. They do not ask whether it is divine, but whether it is good.'[4]

It is not strictly accurate to say that an ethical test is the only one they know, but it is certainly the test which they show the greatest readiness to apply. Probably the most religiously-minded Chinese would cheerfully admit the truth of Edkins's observation that when confronted with a new religion they 'do not ask whether it is divine but whether it is good,' not because they are contemptuous or oblivious of the divine, but because they feel or believe that the direct and exclusive search for the divine may lead them into swamps and wildernesses, whereas the search for the good is in itself a great good, even if only partially successful; and that, although few glimpses of the divine may be vouchsafed during the arduous ascent of the mountain of good, it will be found, when the summit is reached, if not

[1] W. E. Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*[4], New York, 1901, p. 104. For observations on this statement see the present writer's *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*, London, 1910, p. 322.

[2] Giles, p. 73 f. [3] Legge, vol. iii. pt. ii. p. 327.

[4] For Chinese text see Legge, vol. ii. (rev. ed.), p. 483.

[5] This passage occurs in the official history of the Ming dynasty, under the date of the 20th year of Hung Wu (1387).

[1] *SBE* xxviii. 237.

[2] *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*, p. 347.

[3] See *SBE* iii. 465 f.; and cf. xxviii. 222.

[4] *Religion of China*, rev. ed., London, 1893, p. 74 f.

sooner, that the good and the divine are twin peaks joined by a level pathway over which men and gods may come and go at will, greeting one another as they pass with the friendly recognition of spiritual kinship.

III. *TAOISM.*[1]—It is unnecessary to deal at length with Taoist notions of worship, because, regarded as a religion, Taoism is almost wholly imitative. Primitive Taoism was not a religion, and, though the mysterious *Tao* was regarded as ineffable, wonderful, omnipotent, immanent in all the universe, infinitely great and infinitesimally small, it cannot be said to have been an object of worship. After the introduction of Buddhism, Taoism found it necessary to go through a process of reinterpretation and reconstruction in order to maintain its position in an environment that was becoming increasingly Confucian on its ethical, increasingly Buddhist on its religious, side; it therefore adapted to its own uses some of the religious formulations and rituals of its Indian rival, borrowed moral teachings from both Confucianism and Buddhism, and turned itself into an institutional religion by adopting monasticism and establishing temples for the worship of the numerous and ever-multiplying deities who began to throng its pantheon. It apotheosized its legendary founder, Lao-tse, and made him one of a divine triad which would certainly never have come into existence had a model not existed in the San Pao, the 'Three Precious Ones,' of Buddhism. As time went on, it also drew into its own system some of the divine beings of the pre-Confucian state religion of China; and so the Shang-Ti, or Supreme God, became (in comparatively recent times) the Yü Huang Shang-Ti, the 'Jade Imperial God,' who is one of the most prominent objects of worship in the debased Taoism of to-day. In spite of all its bare-faced borrowings, its crudely-artificial methods of turning dead men and women and shadowy abstractions into gods and goddesses, and its haphazard deification of animals, real and mythical, there is no doubt that even in these degenerate days the deities of Taoism are capable of inspiring religious devotion and that some of them at least are objects of real worship.

IV. *BUDDHISM.*[2]—It is often said that Buddhism is atheistic and therefore offers the believer no object of worship. However true this may be of Buddhism as a metaphysical system, and of the Hīnayāna (*q.v.*), in its primitive form, it is certainly not true of the Mahāyāna (*q.v.*), which claims the allegiance of practically all Chinese Buddhists. For all but a small minority of Buddhist scholars and mystics the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* cannot be fitly described as other than objects of worship. The cult of these beings has reached its greatest development in one subdivision of the Mahāyāna, which is known to Chinese as the 'Pure Land' and to Western students as the Amidist school. For adherents of this school the figure of Amitābha has practically taken the place of Śākyamuni, the historical Buddha; and the worship of which he is the object can hardly be described as anything less than λατρεία. For ordinary believers he is the sublime deity who rules over Sukhāvatī, the Western Paradise, and who, with the assistance of the great *bodhisattvas* Avalokiteśvara (Kuan-yin) and Mahāsthama (Ta-shih-chih), brings to salvation all those who invoke his name with sincerity. That Amitābha evokes feelings of deep and sincere devotion is often doubted or thought impossible by those who cannot understand how the contemplation of a non-existing being (for Amitābha is entirely a product of the religious imagination) can give rise to a really devotional attitude. Yet a close observation of the religious beliefs and practices of Amidists will certainly dispel any doubts. Perhaps no more conclusive testimony on this subject could be obtained than that of L. Wieger, whose evidence is all the more important and valuable from the fact that, as a loyal Catholic missionary, he may be regarded as incapable of unduly emphasizing the spiritual fervour that a pagan cult is capable of inspiring.

'The Amidist temples in China and Japan are the only ones in which the people pray—pray truly and from the bottom of their hearts, where they repent and implore, with attitudes so natural and so touching that no suspicion of make-believe is admissible. As long as I live I shall never forget the feelings that I experienced when I saw a young Amidist mother making her devotions before the lighted and empty throne.[1] She began by closing her eyes and concentrating her thoughts, her lips murmuring the words of repentance and petition. Then she brought two little children before the throne. The second could scarcely walk, but both did exactly as their mother had done, correctly and most gravely. Finally she took from her breast a third child, newly-born, and pressing his head very delicately between her thumb and forefinger, made him bow towards the throne.'[2]

In recent years some rather crude attempts have been made by a small school of English writers to prove that the beliefs and rites of Amidism, or some of their most striking features, were borrowed from or inspired by Christianity. Wieger, whose learning, conscientiousness, and comparative freedom from bias make him almost unique among Western missionaries who have studied Chinese religion, unreservedly rejects the theory. He believes, on the contrary, that all the characteristic features of the Mahāyāna—including the 'altruisme exubérant' and the 'fièvre salvifique' associated with the activities of the *bodhisattvas*—are a logical development of primitive Buddhist theory.[3] He sees nothing mysterious in the gradual expansion of the so-called egoism of the Hīnayāna into the altruism of the Mahāyāna; indeed he regards it as necessary and inevitable. He traces Mahāyānist origins to the centuries immediately succeeding the death of Gautama Buddha. The Mahāyāna 'serait donc antérieur de plusieurs siècles au Christianisme.'[4] These views appear to the present writer to be entirely just. The worship of Buddha, or of Amitābha, or of Kuan-yin is, at its best, as true and sincere as the worship of God, of Christ, or of the Virgin in Christendom; and its roots are planted very deep in Buddhist soil.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes.

R. F. JOHNSTON.

WORSHIP (Christian). — Religious worship being the expression of that sense of 'worth,' or title to honour, which man feels due to the Divine nature, its idea and forms will vary with the notion of God and man and of their mutual relations. Christian worship, moreover, as distinct from the other historic types, has a definite character due to the teaching and example of the Church's Founder Himself. This remains regulative for the whole history of Christian worship, deciding between true and false developments, and forming the standard by which reform or progress is to be judged.

The gospel of Christ itself emerged out of the religion of Israel, and accordingly its genius or distinctive nature defined itself largely in relation to Judaism, both as faith and as worship. In both Jesus claimed to 'fulfil' the religion of the Hebrew prophets, whose emphasis was on the heart or inward attitude, as determinative of real devotion to God and His will; 'obedience' of life was the truest 'sacrifice,' and moral relations, rather than

[1] That is, the canopied dais usually occupied by an image, but which is sometimes purposely left empty, to indicate that the real Buddha is not to be found in stone or clay but in the heart of man and of the universe (cf. R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913, pp. 111, 303).

[2] *Hist. des croyances religieuses et des opinions philosophiques en Chine*, Paris, 1917, p. 567 f.

[3] P. 561. [4] P. 563.

[1] Cf. art. TAOISM.

[2] Cf. artt. CHINA, CHINA (Buddhism in).

ritual or formal acts of worship, were the primary form and means of communion with God. Love to God as Father, and to all men as brethren in virtue of their relation to Him—this constitutes essential worship; to it all forms of specific worship are subordinate, and have value only as expressive of this and all it implies, according to Christ's idea of God's character. Where known moral relations are at fault, worship is inacceptable; the 'gift' of homage is to be left unoffered until it can be offered with a good conscience (Mt $5^{23f.}$).

Spirituality, then, in this sense, is the touchstone of Christian worship; and those forms of worship are most entitled to the term 'Christian' which conform most to the simplicity and naturalness which marked Jesus' own devotional practice, or are most analogous to these. This does not fix beforehand how far other modes of expressing the same ideas and emotions, under other conditions of culture and particularly of art, may or may not be allowable. But it does fix where the emphasis which determines the spirit of worship must lie, if worship is to be true to 'the mind of Christ.'

Worship has two senses, a wider and a stricter. The wider, expressing a man's devoutness in all his living, is equivalent to piety; the narrower, denoting specific forms of devotion, personal or social, is nearly synonymous with cultus. It is with the latter that this article has chiefly to do. Yet, since the relation between the two senses of worship, the inward or inclusive and the external and particular, is so intimate in Christianity, it is needful constantly to bear in mind the context of 'holy' or devout life in which worship is set, in so far as it is Christian at all. This we shall find to be very manifest in primitive Christianity, when 'holy' was *the* epithet of the Church, and when participation in its worship, as pure and loving—with the Kiss of Peace as its seal—was conditioned by serious moral Church discipline.

1. The NT idea of worship.—(*a*) Religion, according to Jesus, consists in filial trust and love towards God, and loyalty to His will for His Kingdom 'on earth as it is in heaven.' Thus the Christian norm of worship is the Lord's Prayer. In keeping with this, the effect of Jesus' whole teaching, alike by its emphasis and by its silence, is to change the relative importance attaching to heart religion and to outward expression in worship. He never treated ritual or cultus as determinative of man's real relation to God, as did current Judaism—a fact revolutionary in the history of ancient religion. Nor did He, while creating a new religious bond between His disciples and constituting them a new Israel within Israel spiritually, make them a new community for purposes of worship or prescribe new forms of worship proper.[1] 'Pray without ceasing: in everything give thanks' (1 Th $5^{17f.}$; cf. Eph 6^{18}), rightly became a watchword of the Christian life. Worship thus becomes relatively independent of any given forms of expression, so far as these are not bound up with normal human life, the fulfilment of all relations 'as unto God and not (merely) unto men.'

This comes out clearly in Paul's attitude to special seasons in Ro 14. 'One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike' (v.^{5}). 'He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord' (v.^{6}), and *vice versa*. Here we have a principle of all-embracing range, since it turns on the very nature of 'faith,' as Paul is using the term, viz. personal conviction before God. 'Whatever is not of faith is sin' to him who does or abstains. 'For the kingdom of God is not eating or drinking (as religious observance), but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. For he that herein serveth Christ is well-pleasing to God.' There can, then, be no absolute rules or laws of worship in Christianity. This principle of relativity is implied too in the great maxim which sums up the distinctive advance of Christian worship—because of the Christian idea of God—upon that of all previous religion, including Judaism. 'The hour . . . now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and truth [full reality]: for such doth the Father seek to be his worshippers. God is Spirit: and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth' (Jn $4^{23f.}$). As J. B. Lightfoot puts it,[1] 'The Kingdom of Christ . . . has no sacred days or seasons, no special sanctuaries, because every time and every place alike are holy. Above all it has no sacerdotal system. It interposes no sacrificial tribe or class between God and man, by whose intervention alone God is reconciled and man forgiven. Each individual member holds personal communion with the Divine Head.' The conception is indeed, as he adds, 'strictly an *ideal*,' which cannot be applied rigorously in the practical life either of individuals or of the Christian society, the Church. But it remains the regulative principle behind all Christian institutions of worship, as of organization generally, giving them only a conventional value, as expediencies tested by much experience, yet as such to be treated reverently, especially for the sake of others, *i.e.* in love as well as faith.

(*b*) *Forms of worship in the NT.*—Here the main fact is that Jesus' own example and teaching are associated with the synagogal type of worship rather than with the Temple, the seat of the sacrificial and priestly system of worship. For to Him the Temple was primarily 'a house of prayer,' and that private (Lk 18^{10}) rather than public prayer. Indeed the latter hardly seems to be alluded to by Jesus at all (not even in Mt 18^{19}). His teaching on worship is mainly on genuine prayer, as opposed to formal prayers, 'vain repetitions' (Mt $6^{5ff.}$; cf. Lk 18^{10-14}); and even 'the Lord's Prayer' is given as an example of prayer of the right sort rather than as a form for regular repetition. Such a valuation of forms of worship, in proportion as they express simply and directly the spirit of worship, is not only continuous with that of the prophets, as of parts of the Psalter and the Jewish Apocrypha; it appears also in some Rabbinic utterances, such as that of R. Menahem of Galilee (about the Christian era):

'One day all sacrifices will cease, only the Thankoffering will not cease; all prayers will cease, only the Thanksgiving prayers will not cease.' Compare the spirit of Ecclus 35^{1-3}.

This Rabbinic saying seems relative to the Messianic era of perfected worship, when sacrifices for sin should no longer be needful; and that is just the position in which the first followers of Jesus felt themselves to be, as spiritually united to Messiah. Thus their relation to God was now conditioned solely by the representative self-oblation of Jesus. This was at first conceived on the lines of 'the Suffering Servant' of Is 53, but was later worked out, as in the Epistle to Hebrews, in terms of the Mosaic sacrificial system, regarded as 'the shadow' of the perfected spiritual reality of purely personal relations, those of the devoted will (He 10^{1-18}). Thus the Christ, as God's sinless Son, is the abiding objective basis of His people's holiness ($2^{10c.}$ 10^{14}). All Christians, then, are in fact made priests to God, as united in spirit with the 'Great Priest,' and as such have access for communion with God of the most intimately spiritual kind (10^{19-22}).

This conception conditions the whole of primitive Christian worship. Its normal character is thanksgiving, at once praise and prayer, which, as Menahem said, remains after other kinds of 'prayers' have ceased. Christians 'offer up' through Jesus 'sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips which make confession to His Name' (He 13^{15}; cf. 1 P 2^5, Rev 1^6 5^8 $8^{3f.}$). As for outward sacrifices, only the thankoffering remains, viz. deeds of beneficence and fellowship, 'for with such sacrifices God is well pleased'[2] (He

[1] Mt 18^{17}, the language of which is probably secondary, is no real exception, while our evidence is divided in the case of even the Lord's Supper (see art. EUCHARIST [to end of Middle Ages], I.). But in any case the words 'This do in remembrance of me' would mean only the investing of a Jewish form of worship, the 'breaking of bread' with blessing of God or thanksgiving, with specific Christian associations, in fulfilment of the domestic Paschal meal.

[1] *The Christian Ministry*, London, 1901, *ad init.*

[2] Probably echoing the most striking OT anticipation of this conception of worship, found in Ecclus 35^{1-3}: 'He that keepeth

13^{16}). Here the word 'continually' shows that the abiding attitude of a worshipful spirit is what is chiefly in view, as in Paul's 'praying always,' and this on the part of Christians severally. And in fact the bulk of NT references to worship have this personal rather than corporate reference.

Such, *e.g.*, is the nature of another passage which affords striking illustration of the new conception of spirituality of life as itself worship. 'Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world' (Ja 1^{27}), where the word rendered 'religion' (*θρησκεία*) means 'devotion' expressed in devout acts.

Once we enter upon the history of Christian worship through the centuries, we shall have to confine ourselves in the main to the corporate or common worship of the Church, with only occasional glimpses at the forms of private devotion, though this all along exists in the background.[1] But here we may note that in the NT itself the relation between personal and corporate worship is peculiarly intimate, the former overflowing into the latter and constituting much of its contents, under the lead of individual members of the Spirit-filled Body of Christ's 'saints.' This meets us particularly in Paul's Gentile churches, *e.g.*, in his advice to the Church at Corinth (1 Co 11–14). 'What is it, then, brethren? When ye come together, each one hath a psalm, hath a teaching, hath a revelation, hath a tongue, hath an interpretation. Let all things be done unto edifying' (14^{26}, also 15–17, where praying, singing, blessing of God or 'eucharist,' all 'by the Spirit' on the part of individuals in Church worship, are specified; cf. Col 3^{16}, Eph 5^{18-21}).

Evidently the forms of worship in the Apostolic Age were not fixed or uniform. The new Christian spirit brought a fresh element of spontaneity (2 Co 3^{17}) into the forms of common worship, which otherwise followed in the main synagogal usage. To this the earliest converts, both Jews and proselytes, were accustomed; and it would naturally be adhered to, save for any feature distinctive of the new Messianic form of their faith, such as 'the breaking of bread' with thanksgiving to God for the Messianic redemption in Christ and in His Name. This note of *adoring gratitude* to God for His goodness in creation and redemption, which explains the term 'eucharist' as used for the central act of Christian worship, remains through all changes its abiding characteristic.

The blending here of old and new would be similar to the use of the Sabbath alongside the Lord's Day, as both special days of worship, though in different modes. But, as time went on and conditions changed, the need was felt (*e.g.*, in 'Barnabas' and Ignatius) to distinguish sharply between the two, as relative to different 'economies' in God's relation to man; and for the most part the Sabbath ceased, especially in the West, to have positive religious significance for Christians.

2. Worship, particularly eucharistic, in the ancient Church.—(*a*) *Worship in the sub-Apostolic Church.*—The forms of Sunday worship were still determined mainly by those of the Synagogue, as modified by the 'prophetic' spirit in the primitive Church. Synagogal worship included recitation of psalms, set prayers, Scripture lessons, address, benediction. Our first glimpse of Christian worship, as reported by Pliny *c.* A.D. 112, shows us, at the Christian assembly before dawn on a stated day (Sunday), 'a hymn (*carmen*) to Christ as to a God' (cf. 1 Ti 3^{16}, Eph 5^{14}, 2 Ti $2^{12t.}$ for snatches of such hymns), sung responsively, and a pledging of each and all in solemn form (*sacramento*) against theft, adultery, and other prevalent social wrongs. With the former we may compare the *Odes of Solomon*, and with the latter 2 Ti 2^{19}, for moral

the law (*ipso facto*) multiplieth offerings . . . and he that giveth alms sacrificeth a thankoffering. To depart from wickedness is a thing pleasing to the Lord; and to depart from unrighteousness is a propitiation.'

[1] See Christian sections of artt. PRAYER, FASTING, FESTIVALS AND FASTS

fealty as felt to be part of Christian religious allegiance, and as not only made explicit in baptismal vows—witness *Did.* vii. 1 and the *renuntiatio diaboli* found later—but perhaps also reaffirmed week by week in some solemn form during divine service. No doubt there were other less distinctive elements in the morning worship besides the two Pliny names, *e.g.* prayer, Scripture lessons, address, and benediction, as in the synagogal worship familiar to the Romans.

The essential atmosphere of Christian worship, as we see most clearly from the Ignatian Letters, was loving unity.

'For if the prayer of one and another hath so great strength, how much more that of the bishop and of the whole church. Whosoever therefore cometh not to fellowship' [lit. 'together,' as in Ac 2^{1}. ^{44}. ^{47}] stands apart from 'the altar' or 'the sanctuary' (*θυσιαστήριον*), the holy place where the assemblage of God's people [which Methodius also later styles 'a bloodless altar'] offers up the sacrifice of prayer, and particularly that of the eucharist.[1]

For a similar reason, viz. as specially devoted to the sacrifice of prayer, widows are called by Polycarp 'God's altar.'[2] The very boldness of these metaphorical uses of 'altar' for persons, in relation to their 'sacrifice' of prayer, shows how intense was the early Christians' sense of the sacredness of prayer as the supreme form of worship, and how spiritual and personal was their idea of the Christian sacrifice. Of this genus the eucharistic prayer of the whole Church corporately was the supreme species; and to this we must now turn.

It was perhaps the association of 'sacrifices' of 'beneficence,' for the service of God in His people (according to He 13^{16}), with the offering in prayer of part of such oblations (or 'gifts') for the special purpose of Holy Communion in 'the breaking of bread,' that led in time to the elements so used being also called the Christian 'sacrifice.'[3] But, before this occurred, the bread and the wine over which thanksgiving prayer (*eucharistia*, like the Jewish *Kiddûsh*, or 'hallowing') was uttered themselves came to be styled 'thanksgiving' (eucharist). In Ignatius 'eucharist' as a rule still denotes the communion service, the whole act of eucharistic worship associated with the memorial bread. This act seems also in *Did.* xiv.[4] to be called the Christians' 'pure sacrifice' of praise to God's Name (after Mal $1^{11.\ 14}$); and its profoundly spiritual nature is shown by the warning that the Church's 'sacrifice' will not be 'pure' if unbrotherly feeling be present even between two of the worshippers. Beyond this, for the time, the use of 'sacrifice' in this connexion does not go.

So far, then, Christian worship is the fulfilment, general or special, of Paul's exhortation, 'Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, well-pleasing to God—your spiritual [lit. rational, as distinct from material] service.' It is the kind of worship which Justin sets over against the pagan type, as worship of 'the Creator of this Universe,' One 'in no need of blood-offerings and libations and incense,' who is worthily to be honoured only by praise, 'in word of prayer and thanksgiving over all our food.'[5] Such worship, generally, does not differ in idea from that of the corporate Eucharist of the Church:[6] each is a form of the 'unbloody sacrifice' which befits the God Christians worship, viz. 'the service of the mind' (*τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν*; so Athenagoras, xiii. *fin.*; cf. Ro 12^{1}; so too Irenæus a little later).

Accordingly the prayer of 'eucharist' or thanksgiving was the heart of primitive Christian worship

[1] *Ad Eph.* 5, *Magn.* 7, *Trall.* 7, *Philad.* 4, *Smyrn.* 6 f.
[2] *Ad Phil.* iv.
[3] Ignatius, *ad Smyrn.* 6; *Didache*, ix. 5; Justin Martyr, *Apol.* i. 66; Iren. iv. 18; Orig. *c. Cels.* viii. 57.
[4] Cf. *de Aleatoribus*, 4.
[5] *Apol.* i. 13; see *Apost. Const.* vii. 49.
[6] *Ib.* i. 65.

(as of that of Judaism, which it modifies),[1] and this as co-extensive with life, in that 'it is very meet, right and our bounden duty, that we should at all times and in all places give thanks' unto God (ancient opening of the Eucharistic Prayer, adopted in the Anglican Prayer Book). But such worship attained special expression in all corporate meetings for Christian fellowship, of which '*the* Eucharist' of the whole local Church was the climax. To these principles striking witness is afforded by that 'missing link,' the Agape (*q.v.*).

This was, even after its separation from the eucharist proper (*c.* A.D. 100 in some, though not all, churches), a corporate meeting of the church, of a more family and informal nature than the liturgical eucharist (now the climax of a Sunday morning service). Such the love-feast still appears not only in the N. Africa of Tertullian's day but in that of Cyprian's,[2] as also in the Ancient Church Order commonly known as Hippolytean, though in this part it may rather reflect Syrian usage *c.* 300. There 'at the Supper of the congregation,' at the 'bringing in of lamps,' the bishop 'gives the Salutation' usual before eucharistic prayer, ending, 'Let us thanks-give to the Lord.' The people reply, 'Right and just,' as before the Anaphora proper; but it is added, 'And he shall not[3] say: Lift up your hearts' (the *sursum corda* formula), because that shall be said at the Oblation alone. Otherwise the prayer of 'eucharist' which follows is obviously regarded as a solemn one, and the fragments from the bread thus consecrated by prayer are taken from the hand of the bishop as *eulogia* (*i.e.* blessed bread), though 'not *eucharist*, as the body of our Lord.'

As regards the Eucharist, what has just been said prepares us for changes due to its separation from the associations of a social meal, and its inclusion in a morning service of the synagogue type, as its central element. Thus it took on a more liturgical and ere long (under the influence of current sacramental ideas other than Jewish) a mysteriously realistic character, alien to the original Jewish notion of a meal of religious fellowship with blessing or eucharist of God. The former of these developments, the liturgical, was fostered by the ancient notion of worship outside prophetic Judaism, that some material offering was essential to worship. Hence the self-oblation of the loyal heart came in time to appear to most Gentile Christians to fall short of perfect worship; and this led to a new meaning being attached to the eucharistic prayer over the bread and wine used for the purposes of Communion (originally as a meal of Christian fellowship), viz. as offering the elements to God, in worship of homage, *as a gift to the Giver of all* (a sanction in Scripture being seen in Mal $1^{11.\ 14}$). To this there was insensibly added, by a natural reaction of old associations as to such worship—particularly in connexion with the mysteries (the superficial likeness of which to the Christian Eucharist Justin feels and apologizes for)—the notion that God met the earthly gift with a divine gift in return, by filling it with a new and mysterious quality. The way in which this came about was probably in the first instance purely religious, arising out of the very intensity of the soul's experience of a special quickening in the act of corporate worship, while contemplating and partaking of the symbols of Christ's dying love. This is strongly suggested by the experimental atmosphere and language of the devotional utterances, including eucharistic prayers, in the earliest Apocryphal Acts, the basis of which, if semi-gnostic in type, yet probably reflects the general Christian devotional feeling at Holy Communion both before and after the middle of the 2nd century.

In the *Acts of Thomas* we have what seems a sample of the more enthusiastic and prophetic type of eucharistic invocation. 'And the Apostle, standing by it ("the bread of blessing"), said: Jesus, who hast deemed us worthy to have communion of the Eucharist of Thy holy body and blood, lo, we make bold with the eucharist and invocation of Thy holy name. Come now and commune with us. And he began to say, Come perfect Compassion; come, Communion of the male (=Christ), come, that [feminine, like 'communion,' the substantive preceding] knowest the mysteries of the Chosen one; come, that hast communion in all the contests of the noble Athlete [against the powers of Evil]; . . . come, Hidden Mother; come, that is manifest in her activities and affords joy and rest to those united to her; come and have communion with us in this Eucharist which we perform in [on the basis of] Thy name and in the love wherein we are assembled in [on the basis of] Thy calling.'[1]

Here what is specially noteworthy is the experimental nature of the grace of Christ's eucharistic presence thus invoked. Added to this, however, we find, first in Justin and then in Irenæus, the belief that the words of institution, cited in the Church's eucharistic prayer, were a formula of Divine power, producing in the elements themselves the presence of the *body and blood* of Christ, the Incarnate Logos; and therewith was laid the foundation of what came to be the specifically 'Catholic' doctrine of the Eucharist, and of the corresponding devotional attitude towards the elements themselves. In Justin and Irenæus it appears only as the belief that the worshippers' bodies are prepared for resurrection by participation in Christ's resurrection body and blood. That such presence of Christ's 'body and blood' was of benefit to the *soul* there is no suggestion. Such a realistic conception (present already in some sense[2] in Ignatius's mystical view of the Eucharist as 'medicine of immortality'[3]) fostered first the habit of taking portions home for private use (already in Tertullian), and then devotional anxiety as to what became of all parts of the consecrated elements. Adoration of Christ as present in the elements, and the notion that He in them was being offered as the Christian sacrifice—and that with propitiatory intent and effect—represent forms of devout thought and feeling of which we have no trace until after Cyprian's day, or indeed until the 4th century.

(*b*) *Justin Martyr's witness.*—At this point we must quote from the famous passages of Justin's *Apology*[4] which afford our one connected picture of Christian corporate Sunday worship in the 2nd century.

On Sundays 'there is a gathering together' of the local church, 'and the memoirs of the Apostles or the writings of the Prophets are read, as long as time allows. Then the president gives by way of discourse admonition and exhortation to copy these noble lessons. Next we all rise together and send up prayers,' 'making common prayers for ourselves . . . and for all others everywhere, earnestly, that we may be deemed worthy . . . by our deeds also to be found good livers and keepers of the commandments, that so we may be saved with the eternal salvation. When we cease from the prayers, we salute each other with a kiss.' 'Next, bread is brought and wine and water, and the president, taking them, sends up (*ἀναπέμπει*) as best he can prayers in like manner and thanksgivings,' 'sends up praise and glory to the Father of the Universe through the Name of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and makes thanksgiving (eucharist) at length for our having been deemed worthy of these (blessings) at His hands' . . . 'and the people chimes in with the Amen. Then takes place the distribution to each, and the partaking from the elements for which thanks were given; and to the absent portions are sent by the hand of the deacons.'

One or two aspects of the eucharistic prayer of the Church, through the lips of its president, are made clearer by the more general language already cited from ch. xiii. in describing the reasonable nature of Christian worship. But the main point is that in both connexions its essence lay in 'sending (*πέμπειν*) by reasonable word,' 'to the Creator of this Universe,' 'processions of homage (*πομπάς*) and hymns (as if on their way to the divine pres-

[1] See for full details F. E. Warren, *The Liturgy and Ritual of the Ante-Nicene Church*[2], London, 1912, ch. iv.

[2] In *Ep.* 62 (63) he says that at it 'we cannot convoke the people (the whole Church) to our banquet, so as to celebrate the truth of the sacrament [*i.e.* with 'the mingled cup' for which he is arguing] in the presence of *all* the brotherhood' (ch. 16).

[3] This caution suggests that an older usage to the contrary was in view. If so, the parallel to full eucharistic worship becomes yet more complete.

[1] Ch. 50; cf. ch. 27, for both text and sense.

[2] See art. EUCHARIST.

[3] *Eph.* 20; cf. *Smyrn.* 7.

[4] 65, 67.

ence), in acknowledgment of being and all the means of well-being,' as well as in 'sending requests to be once more in incorruption, on the ground of faith in Him';[1] or, as expressed in the later passages, 'sending up (*ἀναπέμπειν*) prayers and thanksgivings.'

If we have not here the very origin[2] of the term 'mass' (*missa*=*missio*=Gr. *ἀναφορά*=*ἀναπομπή*, which was not used in a special religious sense) and its original meaning, namely 'the oblation' of worship to God on high (cf. the Liturgy of St. Mark, just before offering of incense and a prayer of oblation, *σοὶ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀναπέμπομεν*), at any rate this, and nothing else, was *the primitive conception of the Christian sacrifice.* It is one continuous with the later Jewish notion of prayer, in the Dispersion in particular, and is quite distinct from any notion of the body and blood of Christ as 'the sacrifice of the altar'—a notion which had not yet arisen, even where realistic theories existed of the relation of the Incarnate Logos to the elements, as the Christian bread of life or 'food of immortality.' Another and closely connected aspect of the same contrast is the fact that eucharistic worship in Justin, as in Irenæus and during the 3rd cent. for the most part, has no relation to sin in the worshippers. Christians as such are consecrated by union with Christ,[3] and as such are 'counted worthy' of the high function of offering as priests their prayers and giving-of-thanks, as acceptable sacrifices to God.[4] Thus far, then, the Eucharist has no propitiatory aspect even for the living, let alone the dead, although on the anniversary of martyrs, from Polycarp (about the same date as Justin's *Apology*) onwards, eucharist was offered in their name also (as having *par excellence* 'offered their bodies as a living sacrifice'), 'the communion of saints' being conceived to include also the Church triumphant.

(*c*) *Justin and later 'Catholic' worship.*—The full significance of Justin's witness to the simple spirituality of Christian worship in his day becomes most apparent when we compare it, especially as to order, with extant liturgies from the latter part of the 3rd cent. onwards.[5] To the variations and changes of order in these he gives us the true key, as showing that they reflect a change in religious ideas and emphasis at different stages. The above table of the chief known types will exhibit this.

The changes of order here visible, a progressive series from Justin to the Roman Mass, receive their one adequate explanation in change in the idea of the eucharistic 'sacrifice,' from the people's self-oblation, in thanksgiving and thankofferings 'in memory of' Christ's thanksgiving at the Last Supper and self-oblation on the Cross, to that of the body and blood of Christ (thought of as present in the elements), as the Church's own sacrifice, presented and pleaded anew as propitiation for sins of dead and living Christians. It was natural that to the eucharistic sacrifice so conceived should gravitate the prayers of intercession (now for the sins of dead and living) which originally came before the eucharistic oblation (*ἀναφορά*, *missa*), in order to give them more efficacy with God. In the Gallican and Alexandrian liturgies, indeed, we see that the sacrifice with which these intercessions are associated is still the Christian people's own oblations, prior to what later was called 'consecration' with the sacred words of institution[1] (without or with invocation of the Holy Spirit to change the elements into body and blood of Christ). In the Roman Mass, however, as it is known to us, the process of change is complete. It has dropped the *Pax* proper, the kiss of brotherly unity which seals the people's fitness to offer their 'sacrifice' as 'pure' (according to early Christian ideas) and acceptable to God; and has only a formal trace of it in the words, 'The Lord's Peace be ever with you,' between the Mass proper and the Communion. It has also gone further than the other liturgies cited in effacing the idea of the service in Justin,

Justin.	Gallican Liturgy.	Egyptian.	Syrian.	Roman.
1. Common intercessions.	1. 'Preces.' Offertory. Intercessions for dead and living.	1. Common intercessions.	1. Common intercessions. Offertory.	1. ('Oremus.') Offertory.
2. Kiss of peace or unity. The elements brought. (Offertory)	2. *Pax.*	2. *Pax.*	2. *Pax.*	2. 'Pax' (simply a formula of peace).
3. Eucharistic prayer(s).	3. Eucharistic prayers.	3. Intercession for dead and living in preface of the eucharist prayers before consecration.	3. Eucharistic prayers. Intercessions for dead and living.	3. Eucharistic prayers. Intercessions for dead and living.
4. Communion.	4. Communion.	4. Communion.	4. Communion.	4. Communion.

by suppressing intercessions (without specific reference to sins) for Christians and all men before the eucharistic worship, retaining only the empty injunction, 'Let us pray.'

(*d*) *Irenæus on the Christian sacrifice.*—We are now prepared to appreciate to the full Irenæus's emphatic witness to the older idea of the Christian sacrifice, before passing on to refer to some intermediate stages in the change just indicated, as witnessed from the 3rd cent. onwards.

According to Irenæus, 'Our Lord gave counsel to His own disciples to offer firstfruits to God from His creatures, not as to one who stands in need, but so that they themselves may be neither unfruitful nor unthankful.' And so 'the Church offers to God, to Him who affords us food, firstfruits of His own gifts,' as Malachi prefigured.[2] This oblation 'is with God reckoned a pure sacrifice and one accepted of Him, . . . because he who offers is himself glorified in the offering if his gift be accepted.' 'Accordingly *sacrifices do not sanctify a man*, for God needs not a sacrifice, but *the conscience of him who offers sanctifies the sacrifice*, if it be already pure, and causes God to accept it as from a friend.' It is 'because the Church offers with singleheartedness' (*simplicitas*) that 'her gift is rightly accounted with God a pure sacrifice,' like the gift of the Philippians sent to Paul through Epaphroditus. 'For we ought to make oblation to God, and in all things to be found thankful to God the Creator, offering in a pure mind and faith without pretence, in firm hope and fervent love, firstfruits of those creatures which are His. And this oblation the Church alone offers in purity, offering to Him with thanksgiving from his creation.' The purpose of this is that we may

[1] Ch. 13.
[2] Most authorities favour another, connected with the 'dismission' of the worshippers (see Rietschel, *Liturgik*, i. 347 f.).
[3] *Dial.* 41. [4] *Ib.* 116 *fin.*, 117.
[5] See artt. EUCHARIST and PRAYER (Christian, Liturgical) for details.

[1] 'All liturgies of every type agree in bearing witness to the fact that the original form of consecration was a thanksgiving' (W. C. Bishop, *CQR* lxvi. 388).
[2] IV. xvii. 4 f.

thereby be fruitful, and so God 'may render to us the recompense of His benefits,' on the principle of Mt 25[34-36]. As 'the Word enjoined on the People (of the OT) the making of oblations, . . . that it might learn to do service to God; so and for that reason He wills us also to offer a gift at the altar often, without intermission. There is, then, an altar in heaven, for thither our prayers and oblations are directed; and a temple, as John in the Apocalypse says, And the temple of God was opened.'

(*e*) *Irenæus and certain 'Catholic' developments.*—Here we have several ideas characteristic of the Christian 'sacrifice' in worship towards the end of the 2nd century. Some are wholly primitive and rooted in the NT; *e.g.*, 'sacrifices do not sanctify a man,' but the worshipper's pure conscience the sacrifice; God's acceptance of a sacrificial gift 'as from a friend' honours the giver;[1] the real, *i.e.* the spiritual, gift is the thanksgiving of the heart, and is offered at the heavenly altar, to which 'prayers and oblations are directed.'[2] The last is implied in the call 'Hearts on high' (*sursum corda*), which prefaces ancient eucharistic prayers generally. But in time the idea lost its pure spirituality, as the notion arose that the material gifts themselves were received by God on His altar on high by the hands of His angels. This notion occurs already in the eucharistic prayer of the 4th cent. North Italian *de Sacramentis*, in several Eastern liturgies, and in the traditional Roman Canon of the Mass. The earlier of these, however, preserve in the main Irenæus's notion of an oblation of bread and wine which Christians were privileged to offer—with clear reference to Ro 12[1]—as expressing their self-oblation, in sacramental commemoration of the self-oblation of their Lord. But the Roman Canon, by substituting for 'since it is *figura* of the body and blood of our Lord' 'that it may become to us the body and blood of . . . our Lord,' and by a good deal else in the context, brings in another train of thought altogether, that of Christ's body being present on the Church's 'altar' on earth and partaken of by the communicants. This is the full realistic form assumed by the secondary and non-primitive element in Irenæus's principles set forth above, viz. that God gives *in this way*, in recompense for the Church's thanksgiving, a certain unique benefit in return. This, in extant liturgies generally, is conceived as communicated first to the consecrated elements themselves and through them to the communicants. In some early Eastern liturgies the Word or Spirit is thought to become present in the elements, so making them, in a metaphorical sense, His sacramental 'body and blood'; but in Irenæus's discussion of this aspect of the Eucharist, as in the Roman Canon and some later Eastern Anaphoras, the above realistic conception appears of Christ's human body as present in the elements. And with this added notion a fresh phase of worship begins to enter into the eucharistic service, viz. the adoration of the Incarnate Saviour in the elements of the oblation, conceived now as effecting afresh, in some sense (that of *re presentare*, 'really presenting'), the offering of His body, once for all offered on the Cross but perpetually presented in heaven with atoning efficacy.

(*f*) *Cyprian transitional.*—'Cyprian is here, as generally, transitional between the second century and the fourth. His eucharistic theory is in the main Tertullian's, as regards the sacramental rather than the proper body of Christ' being present in the elements after consecration. But as regards the prior *offering* of the elements in eucharistic *worship*, Cyprian insists that 'the priest' 'performs his office in Christ's place' (*i.e.* with His authority for the sacramental efficacy of his act) when he 'imitates that which Christ did.'[1] And, though he has in mind what Christ did at the Last Supper,[2] not on the Cross, yet his broad language elsewhere gave a footing for another and less experimental[3] sense being read into his words. So he says, 'The Lord's passion is the sacrifice which we offer,' sacramentally or commemoratively, as 'we make mention' of it in our 'sacrifices' of bread and wine, and speaks of 'offering the blood of Christ' in 'the sacrifice of the Lord,' as commemoratively observed by use of the sacred words of institution in the prayer of consecration.[4] 'Thus in time "the blood of Christ" and His body were thought of as actually present and offered in the wine and bread, and that not only as the prototype of His people's self-oblation, but as a propitiatory sacrifice "for the sins of living and dead."'[5]

(*g*) '*Catholic' eucharistic worship and survivals in it.*—From Cyprian's day the whole nature of eucharistic worship insensibly underwent profound alteration in the Church's thought and in the growingly elaborate ritual which expressed it, until in the course of the 4th cent. it attained in most localities that form which is known as 'Catholic.'[6] Yet down to the 5th cent. there remained clear traces of the older order in certain phrases not really of a piece with the conceptions then prevalent. Thus, in addition to those already alluded to, in the Anaphora of Serapion in Egypt, *c.* 350, before the words of institution we read:

'Full is heaven, full also is earth of thy excellent glory, Lord of Powers: fill also this sacrifice (*θυσίαν*) with thy power and participation: for to Thee have we offered this "living sacrifice" (*θυσίαν*, Ro 12[1]), this bloodless oblation (cf. Eph 5[2]): to thee we have offered this bread, the likeness (*ὁμοίωμα*) of the body of the Only-begotten.' Then comes the reference to Christ's example in the institution, followed by: 'Wherefore we also, making the likeness of His death, *have offered* the bread, and beseech Thee through *this sacrifice*, be reconciled to all of us and be propitious, O God of Truth.' Only after this do we get the invocation which is conceived to make the bread 'body of the Word' and the cup 'blood of the Truth,' and so 'medicine of life' for body and soul to those partaking.

Here there seems to be a blending of primitive and later elements.

(*h*) *Retrospect of eucharistic worship to the end of the 4th century.*—In idea it at first corresponded simply to its name, 'thanksgiving' to God for His benefits in nature and grace, as rooted in His adorable being or Name. As *1 Clem.* xxxviii. 4 puts it, 'Seeing, then, that we have all these things from Him, we ought in all things to render thanks [Eucharist] to Him, to whom be the glory for ever and ever, Amen.' Of such a life of thanksgiving the solemn corporate worship in full Church gathering is the climax, being the earthly imitation of the worship in heaven,[7] where (as pictured in Dn 7[10]) 'the whole company of His angels standing near Him do sacred service (*λειτουργία*) to Him,' the adoration attributed to the Seraphim in Is 6[3], 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of His glory.' As visible, concrete expression of this homage of thanksgiving, the Church's 'offerings' or 'gifts' in kind from the Creator's own gifts were presented in sacred service or *liturgy*, in the prayer

[1] So Justin, *Dial.* 28. The idea lies at the root of the gift-theory of sacrifice in much Greek religion, the gift being to an Iamblichus's mind, as to Irenæus, 'a symbol of friendship between the mortal and the deity'; see art. SACRIFICE (Greek).

[2] The fullest and still the truest discussion of 'the Christian sacrifice' in the ancient Church is in Bunsen's *Hippolytus and his Age*, 4 vols., London, 1852, iii. 253 ff., iv. 135 ff., where also much bearing on worship at large is well said.

[1] *Epist.* 63. 14. [2] *Ib.* 4.

[3] For his real meaning cf. ch. 11, where he dwells on *wine* as by natural and scriptural symbolism, or sacramental value, able to 'express (*exprimere*) the blood of Christ' as water could not, and so to produce the sense of newness and joy suggested by the blood or passion of Christ, which the wine 'shows forth' (*ostendit* [ch. 4]).

[4] *Ib.* 9. 14. 17.

[5] J. V. Bartlet and A. J. Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, London, 1917, p. 171 f., where also are quoted the chief liturgical types illustrating the developments here in question.

[6] See art. EUCHARIST. [7] 1 *Clem.* xxxiv.

of uplifting (*ἀναφορά*), directed to God's spiritual altar on high (cf. the imagery of the Apocalypse), where Christ the High-priest presents the Church 'sacrifice' of praise—if pure from defilement by sin, such as enmity between any of its members.[1] This prayer was led up to by 'common prayers' of intercession, as Justin says, 'for ourselves . . . and for all other men everywhere,' in urgent petition (*εὐτόνως*) 'that we may be counted worthy, after having learned the Truth, by our deeds also to be found, finally, good in conduct and keepers of the commandments, that we may be saved with the eternal salvation.' After these intercessions the kiss of peace sealed the spirit of unity which was specially asked for, and was the condition of the 'purity' and acceptableness of the coming eucharistic prayer, the Church's 'sacrifice' of praise to God's Name[2] or revealed nature. Of such intercessions as offered in Rome *c.* A.D. 95 we probably have the substance, and largely the very words, in the Epistle of Clement (lix.–lxi.); and we find them strikingly continuous with those of the OT and of contemporary Jewish public worship (cf. 'The Eighteen' Petitions)—a feature also common in the earliest extant Christian hymns. The changes which passed over Christian worship, especially the eucharistic part, show a steady decrease in this Biblical or Hebraic spirit (as distinct from Biblical quotations adapted to new uses), and a corresponding infusion of a non-Biblical or Hellenistic element of thought in the interpretation of the Eucharist as worship and means of grace, together with a transposition of traditional elements in the service generally, in keeping with the new ideas (*e.g.*, the place of the intercessions). This is the most momentous fact in the development of ancient Catholic worship out of primitive Christian forms, and has its parallels in other aspects of Catholic Christianity.[3] The change is associated, too, with a growing sense of sin in 'the saints' or 'the holy Church,' especially from the 4th cent., when Christian wholeheartedness on the average rapidly declined, owing largely to the new relations of State and Church tempting worldly people to join the latter. The eucharistic 'sacrifice' is more and more conceived in a propitiatory sense, which had its roots in the newer view of the elements, as literally made by consecration 'the body and blood' of Christ's passion, though as existing now in resurrection glory. Along with such changes of thought went those of form. The eucharistic prayer became more stereotyped, not only as the habitual usage of a given bishop but also as the fixed tradition from bishop to bishop; and what had once been a single prayer was broken up into specialized moments or phases, marking stages in the sacred drama of the Liturgy. This gave the service a 'hieratic' or formally sacred[4] effect, alien to the genius of primitive Christian worship, but quite congenial to the non-Christian cults around it. To these innovations was now added yet another characteristic of later Catholic worship generally, viz. the notion that the intercession of saints is a factor in the divine pardon provided in the Head Himself.

(*i*) *Persons to whom worship is addressed.*—The practice of direct invocation of saints as distinct from the earlier veneration, especially on a martyr's 'birthday,' itself appears in Catholic piety about the latter half of the 4th cent.;[5] but there is no invocation of this sort in eucharistic prayers, where Saints are 'commemorated,' 'that by their prayers and mediations God may receive our petition.'[1] The Church's prayers are addressed only to God the Father, in keeping with the strict theory of Christian prayer, as expounded by Origen.[2] According to this, the Father was the ultimate, the Son or Word the proximate, object of prayer, as of adoration and thanksgiving. Thus the Divine Word is 'to be petitioned as High-priest to offer up our prayer, that has first reached Him, unto His God and our God.' In practice, however, at least in individual devotions, Christ was directly addressed, all along, in prayer of invocation and petition in particular. In solemn doxologies, on the other hand, a gradual change is visible, both in eucharistic and in other connexions. There Christ, as God's historic Son (originally 'Child' or 'Servant,' *παῖς*, as in Acts), appears originally as the medium through whom glory is offered to the Father; and only from the latter part of the 3rd cent. (as it seems) becomes gradually associated, as the Logos-son, with the Father as also the object of such worship. Similarly the Holy Spirit, which earlier had been thought of as the element 'in' which worship was rendered to God,[3] came to be associated with the Father and the Son as co-equal object of praise. In many MSS the modification of the older form by later feeling gave rise to an awkward blend, like that in the 'Hippolytean' Church Order as current *c.* 350–400, viz. 'through Thy Child Jesus Christ, through (*or* with) whom to Thee (be) glory, dominion, honour — Father and Son, with Holy Spirit' (*or* 'with Holy Spirit,' only). Basil[4] says that 'with' is most fitting in relation to the Son in doxology, 'through' in thanksgiving; but this, while true enough, does not apply to the history of the matter.

3. **Special forms of Catholic cultus.**—(*a*) *The cult of 'saints.'*—It is needless here[5] to go into this subject further than to notice that both in its ritual forms, like so much other fresh ritual (in which the Gnostics often led the way) from the middle of the 2nd cent. onwards,[6] and in its origins this cultus owed much to the funeral and commemorative customs of pagan society, in which Christians lived and from which many of them passed into the Church. 'Prayers and appeals to the dead' were familiar ideas in the one sphere before they appeared in the other—in the case of 'saints,' from Basil's day († 379) onwards. 'Hence it seems probable that the prevalent atmosphere of paganism exercised some vague influence upon Christian feeling, especially in the case of the ruder populace. The strongly marked desire to be buried near the martyrs is no doubt to be attributed to a similar hope of protection. It was a matter not so much of logic as of a deep and primitive instinct—the same which in pagan times had led to the development of hero-worship.' These frank words of a modern Roman Catholic[7] deserve attention as pointing to a principle of wide possibilities of application in the history of 'Christian' worship, especially in view of his later statement that 'the ceremonial of Christianity and that of paganism include many identical elements—*e.g.*, the use of ablutions, lights, incense, prostrations, unctions, linen vestures, *ex votos*, etc.'[8] Few can doubt that they represent a kind of development which the NT writers, particularly St. Paul—not to name Paul's Master—would have found foreign, to say the least, to the genius of 'the Gospel,' as

[1] 1 *Clem.* xxxvi. 1; *Didache*, xiv. [2] Cf. *Did.* xiv. 3.
[3] See *Christianity in History*, bk. ii., *passim*, and E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, London, 1890.
[4] There was a corresponding change in the form and appointments of the place of worship.
[5] See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Christian).

[1] Cyril of Jerusalem, *Myst. Cat.* v. 9.
[2] *C. Cels.*, v. 4, viii. 26; see C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford, 1886, p. 185 ff.
[3] *E.g.*, Serapion's Prayer Book, 1A, 1C, 2, 7; cf. 'in the holy Church' in the 'Hippolytean' Church Order.
[4] *On the Spirit*, 16.
[5] See art. SAINTS AND MARTYRS (Christian).
[6] Cf. Hatch, *op. cit.* [7] *ERE* xi. 54b. [8] *Ib.* 58b.

'worship in spirit.' And, when one reads the words of St. Melania, in 438, at a shrine of the martyrs, 'O ye, who have always free speech with God that loves mankind, be my ambassadors (*πρεσβεύσατε*) with Him that He may receive my soul in peace'—along with the comment, 'It is just this *παρρησία*,' or free speech, 'attributed to the martyrs, that is put forward again and again in patristic writers as the motive for having recourse to their help'—one cannot but feel the distance, not so much of time but of spirit, between such worship and that of the NT.[1] For there the same 'free speech,' as of child with parent, is claimed as the glory of all sons of God in Jesus Christ, and particularly right of entry in this spirit into the Holy Place in heaven, as of priests in union with the 'Great Priest over the family of God' (He 10^{19}). As by a lightning-flash, such a comparison reveals the enormous change of attitude which has come about, by insensible stages, in the worship of Christians.

The cult of the relics of saints, as aids to devotion, especially in connexion with the celebration of the anniversary of martyrdom or spiritual birthday (*natalicia*), goes back in its simplest form to a relatively early date, as witness the contemporary *Acts of Polycarp* (*c.* 155). But its developments, both in the Catacombs, where martyrs' remains abounded, and elsewhere, later assumed extravagant and superstitious forms, especially in the 4th cent. and onwards, calling forth the scorn of Julian and many other cultured pagans.[2]

(*b*) *Artistic aids to devotion.*—The place of art in the expression of Christian thought and feeling, and the function of images (*eikons*) or representations of sacred persons to the eye, usually in paint or mosaic work, are dealt with in special articles.[3] There was at first great shyness of such things, on account both of the Jewish and other feeling against all that could be construed as idolatry and of the tainted nature of so much pagan art. Hence the earliest use of art (*e.g.*, in the Catacombs) was symbolic in character; and it was only in the 4th cent., when so many changes, especially in the way of coming to terms with pagan culture, first came about, that such restraint was largely thrown aside. One of the earliest forms in which art was used to assist devotion was in the form of Church buildings, which even from the end of the 3rd cent. begin to be more specially designed to suit the developing ritual of the worship carried on within them.[4] The veneration of 'images' of sacred persons, as manifestations of the divine in creaturely form, was probably stimulated in part by the preoccupation of Christian thought in the 4th and 5th centuries with the idea of the Incarnation.[5]

(*c*) *The Christian Year.*[6]—As the central service of Church worship, the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice came to represent dramatically, or in a series of sacred acts and words, the Christian redemption wrought by the Incarnate Son of God, so the Gospel story of the Incarnate Saviour was set forth ever more fully in the yearly festivals and holy seasons commemorative of the same. Naturally the week first felt the touch of Christ. The Lord's Day, the Christian's day of resurrection joy, took the place of the Sabbath, the Jewish day of grateful gladness. To this were soon added[7] Wednesday and Friday, as fast days, in remembrance of the sin that occasioned the Saving Cross. But what the Lord's Day was to the week, that the anniversary of the central act of redemption was to the year. Thus Easter, with its associated Friday, became the first season in the Christian devotional year; how early we cannot say. Then followed Pentecost, and gradually the other great 'moments' of the Redeemer's life, until each year became a time-sacrament of the divine drama of human salvation. The fact that the birthday of the Saviour came relatively late into the calendar points to the practical rather than theoretic nature of the Church's apprehension of its own salvation, in which the Cross, the final act of Redemption, is more central for Christian experience than His birth.[1] Into the calendar of the Christian salvation, in terms of Christ's history and its sequel in the gift of His Spirit, the Church's birthday, were fitted the 'birthdays' of martyrs into the heavenly realm of life eternal. Such, then, was the Christian Year in idea and as an aid to worship. The festivals in honour of the Virgin Mother of Jesus appeared only late in the calendar.

(*d*) *Devotional 'hours,' in private and corporate worship.*—From the Church Year we turn to the day as a unit of devotion.[2] 'Hours' of worship, other than the Sunday worship centring in the eucharist, came to be of two chief types: (*a*) those for special classes within the Church, particularly ascetics ('virgins' of both sexes), later known as monks and nuns; (*b*) Church services proper. The former type grew out of an earlier kind, namely individual devotions continuous with the three hours of prayer in later Judaism (Ps 55^{17}, Dn $6^{10ff.}$), which from apostolic precedents in Acts (3^{1} 10^{9}; cf. *Did.* viii.) came to be called 'the apostolic hours.'[3] Clement of Alexandria refers to Christians who set apart certain hours, viz. the third, sixth, and ninth.[4] Already in Cyprian's day[5] piety had found mystical reasons for the use of the apostolic hours, connecting them generally with the Trinity, and severally with two stages of Christ's Passion and the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost (the third hour). So far, however, such day-time hours were purely private devotions. The earliest Church service other than the Sunday one was the 'vigil,' a night service suggested by the NT calls for vigilance. But it was never of daily occurrence, only on the eve of a holy day—first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly fasts (*stationes*) of Wednesday and Friday, and the yearly festivals of local martyrs.

The night hours proper were, like the day hours, the outcome of private devotions, to judge from Cyprian,[6] who writes:

> 'Besides the hours observed from ancient times [the 'apostolic' day hours], both seasons and mystical reasons for prayer have now grown upon us. At morn, to celebrate the Lord's Resurrection . . . At sunset, when day ceases, prayer must needs again be offered,' alike for the return of the light and for the advent of Christ, the true sun and true day, with the grace of eternal light. 'Let us, however, who are ever in Christ, *i.e.* in the light, not cease from prayer even in the hours of night,' any more than Anna in the temple.

Here we find an hour of early morning prayer on rising, before the first of the 'apostolic hours,' ere putting hand to work, and also a vesper hour. These five hours mostly reappear in the East in the 'Hippolytean' Church Order—the last part of which reflects some circle of piety in Syria about A.D. 300—each with its mystical reference, though a different one from Cyprian's;[7] but there is no vesper hour in the old Eastern Order, possibly

1 Eph 3^{12}, He 3^{6} 4^{16} $10^{19, 35}$, 1 Jn 2^{28} 3^{21} 4^{17} 5^{14}.
2 See art. RELICS (Primitive and Western).
3 See Christian sections of artt. ART, IMAGES, SYMBOLISM.
4 See art. ARCHITECTURE (Christian).
5 See, further, art. ICONOCLASM.
6 See Christian sections of artt. CALENDAR and FESTIVALS AND FASTS.
7 Cf. *Did.* viii.

1 For Christmas Day, and the problems connected with it, see art. *s.v.*, and J. Wordsworth, *The Ministry of Grace*, p. 392 ff., and for the calendar as a whole, chs. vii., viii.
2 Cf. Wordsworth, ch. vi.
3 Tert. *de Orat. Dom.* 24, *de Jejun.* 10.
4 *Strom.* vii. 7. 4.
5 *De Orat. Dom.* 34 f. 6 *Ib.* 35 f.
7 Ps. Athan. *de Virg.* xii., xvi., and *Apost. Const.* viii. 33, have still later modifications.

because it was already set apart for more social worship. On the other hand, there are not in Cyprian any night hours, only prayer in the night seasons (*noctibus*). Thus our earliest witness for night hours proper is Syrian, viz. this 'Hippolytean' Church Order.

There, after passing reference to prayer before lying down, solemn prayer (with hand-washing) at midnight is enjoined, 'inasmuch as the fathers have handed down that at that hour all creation pauses for a moment to praise God, and all the angelic host does Him service (λειτουργία)—along with the souls of the righteous, hymning God (almighty) at that hour.' Prayer, too, at this hour fulfils the Lord's words, 'At midnight a cry arose . . . Therefore watch, for ye know not at what hour he (the Bridegroom) cometh.' 'Cock-crowing' is the last of its series of hours, the second of the night hours, when the believer rises to pray in memory of Christ's resurrection and 'in hope of eternal Light in the resurrection of the dead.' About a century later, namely in *de Virg.* 20, the midnight hour seems to last on till 'towards dawn' when come Ps 62[2], the *Benedicite opera omnia*, and *Gloria in excelsis*.

Here we see how the regular hours of those under vows, 'virgins' or 'religious' (in later Latin parlance), grew out of the more informal devotions of earnest Christians living in society or 'the world,' by increasing severity of requirement, which demanded first a midnight hour (a daily, rather than occasional, vigil) and then an hour when the cock heralded the approach of a new day. Such ascetic vigilance of worship was as a rule possible, physically as well as otherwise, only to those who were at leisure (from daily labours) to cultivate a professional and more individualistic life of piety. There is, however, no sign of distinct night hours (even for ascetics) before A.D. 300. Even in Egypt, where asceticism appeared earliest, as late as the end of the 4th cent. there were only two corporate daily seasons of worship, evening and morning. At Antioch we hear that *c.* 350 Bishop Leontius 'brought the congregations collected by the ascetics Flavian and Diodorus in the cemetery chapels, into the city churches,' and so introduced antiphonal singing, by two opposite choirs, into wider use. Here we seem to have a clear case of the transition from the daily corporate worship of ascetics, as a special class, to that of the Church under its clergy, of which Etheria, the female pilgrim to Eastern centres of devotion *c.* 385, affords us evidence at a rather later stage. Describing the public services in Jerusalem, she mentions matin hymns at dawn (= hour of rising, in the foregoing), the sixth (*sext*), and ninth (*none*) hours, vespers ('lighting-up' hour); to which the third (*terce*) was added in Lent. There was also an early vigil from cock-crow to dawn kept by 'all monks and virgins,' and by some lay-folk also. Of course the devotions at the central holy place of Christendom were more generally attended than elsewhere and more elaborate in form, including already four daily services at least. But the account gives us clear insight into the way in which worship became more specialized and developed. And by a good deal of evidence from the last quarter of the century we can 'fix the period A.D. 350–375 as that of the introduction of daily public evening and morning prayers into the Eastern Church, followed a few years later by that of Milan.'[1]

As regards *forms of devotion* dating from the 4th cent., neither the morning hymn (*Gloria in excelsis*) nor the evening one,[2] for instance, seems then to belong to public service. The former appears in varied contexts (*e.g.*, after the Biblical Canticles or 'Odes' in the *Codex Alex.*); and in the Eastern Church it is part of the Daily Office (Lauds), while in the Western it is in the Mass—whither most prized forms tended to gravitate. Once, however, both perhaps were part of the worship of an ascetic community. The evening hymn, like another vesper hymn, 'Hail, gladdening light' (φῶς ἱλαρόν), referred to by St. Basil[1] as already ancient, may originally have been a thanksgiving 'at the lighting of the lamps' either in the home or at an Agape,[2] passing later into use among ascetics, like the table-prayers of the *Didache* into *de Virg.* xii f. In this last the *Gloria* is part of the virgin's praise 'towards dawn.'[3] Closely connected in feeling and ideas with the *Gloria*, and perhaps with its fellow vesper hymn (*Te decet laus*), is the best known Latin hymn, the *Te Deum*, now traced to Nicetas of Remesiana, who as living on the road between the East and West would naturally feel the influence of Greek models. Nicetas in his works 'On Vigils' and 'On the good of Psalmody' illustrates further the similarity of ideals of private and corporate devotional hours in East and West *c.* A.D. 400;[4] and he was one of the pioneers of the newer feeling which allowed hymns other than those in Scripture, the Psalter above all, to form part of corporate Christian worship, though the prejudice against this died hard.[5] The authority of St. Ambrose, who himself wrote hymns for public worship, had no doubt great influence. The musical difficulty to their more general use was a real one. It was in monastic circles, then, that hymns proper took real root, and from their daily offices passed in the later Middle Ages into the Breviary of the ordinary clergy. The early Celtic monks in particular were active in the use and production of hymns; and from the 12th cent. onwards we can trace the periods of fresh revival in monastic religion by this spontaneous form of devotional expression—*e.g.*, in 'Jesus, the very thought of Thee,' *Dies Iræ* (by the Franciscan, Thomas of Celano), and the eucharistic hymns of St. Thomas Aquinas.[6] The Church of Rome did not adopt daily services so early as the N. Italian and Gallican Churches, under the influence of Eastern monastic practice, carried thither by a number of pilgrims and others from those regions, such as Hilary in the middle of the 4th cent. and Cassian of South Gaul towards its end. Rome was always conservative in usages, as appears most clearly in its manner of reciting the Psalms, which were the staple of worship other than prayer. The Eastern form was antiphonal singing between two choirs, a method which took definite shape at Antioch about 350, and spread westwards rapidly—through Cappadocia, Constantinople, Milan. In Rome, as also in Africa, the old 'plain song'—with its simpler style of music—continued longer to prevail, probably seeming to the Roman mind, as to Augustine, to be 'better adapted to the sober gravity of Divine worship.'[7] Yet the practical advantages of the new system, especially as 'winning weaker brethren to devotion by the delight which it ministered to the ear,' were manifest; and ere Augustine's death in 430 the change in Rome had begun to act, though it took effect only gradually.[8] Similarly as regards daily church services 'the recitation of the Cockcrow and Matins office does not appear to have been binding on the clergy, as distinct from monks and nuns, till the sixth century (perhaps under Pope Hormisdas, 514–523); and Vespers was made an obligation still later.'[9] In Gaul and Spain matins and vespers had taken general root rather earlier; while a civil law of Justinian also decreed that all clergy attached to

[1] J. Wordsworth, *The Ministry of Grace*, p. 347.
[2] Both in *Apost. Const.* vii. 47 f.

[1] *De Spir.* 73.
[2] Cf. Tert. *Apol.* 39 and the Ancient Church Order as extant in Ethiopic, 47.
[3] Ch. xx.
[4] Cf. A. E. Burn, *Niceta of Remesiana*, Cambridge, 1905.
[5] Cf. the Council of Laodicea, *c.* 360, of Braga, in 561.
[6] See art. HYMNS (Christian).
[7] Swete, *Services*, etc., p. 41.
[8] *Ib.* p. 41. [9] Wordsworth, p. 350 f

a church should sing Vespers, Matins, and Lauds themselves, and not leave the duty to others. Almost contemporary with it was the issue of the famous Rule of St. Benedict (c. A.D. 528), which prescribed the use of 'the complete circle of eight "hours" for monks which is the foundation of the Breviary.' These hours were much the same as the six of Syrian ascetics in the 4th cent., completed at its close in Jerome's Bethlehem monastery by a supplemental matins, between lauds at dawn and the third hour (to which prime in the West came to correspond), together with compline (*completorium*) before retiring to rest. The last was added by Benedict himself, who dropped the midnight hour, so as to give his monks a longer period of unbroken sleep, and placed matins about 2 a.m.[1]

4. Mediæval worship.—In the main mediæval worship, alike as piety and as cultus, shows simply the working out and adaptation of the traditional cultus to new conditions, created by the break-up of the Roman Empire and its civilization. This meant the flooding of the Church with crude fresh types of humanity, each with its religious bias and customs, largely superstitious, and so fostered those elements in the Church of the Empire which were farthest from primitive piety and cultus, as fundamentally Hebraic. Hence it is the element which Catholic worship owed to other sources than the Biblical—as already described or alluded to—that increasingly distinguishes its mediæval phase, both in the East and in the West.

In the East the hieratic and mystic tendencies, the latter parallel to and influenced by the rise and spread of Neo-Platonism, as a religion as well as a philosophy, are most marked. Particularly was this so in what we may call 'Byzantine' piety, as distinct from various national types of Oriental Christianity, comparatively unaffected by Greek influence. But in all the eucharistic service was essentially a divine drama or 'mystery,' appealing to the emotions through the senses, with the idea of the mystic sacrifice at its heart. The notion of the parallelism between the worship of heaven and of earth, of the celestial hierarchy and the terrestrial, was worked out elaborately and with surprising literalism. It finds its typical expression in the pseudo-Dionysius, through whom it also exercised a deep influence on the more practical and ethical genius of Western, particularly Latin, worship. In both, too, worship, so far as expressed in cultus, becomes more vicarious and sacerdotal, less congregational, in character. The connexion between priest and people, especially in the East—where the cultus went on in the sanctuary or altar-area, largely out of the people's sight—becomes a more formal one; worship is less corporate, less an active participation of all, with mind and voice, in common acts of spiritual and moral communion with the Christ of the Gospels, and through Him with the God unto whom and with whom all life is to be lived in harmony of will.

A special note of mediæval worship, inherited from this later patristic age, was the sense of sins calling for the constant 'propitiation' of God. This was to be achieved partly through special good works (such as alms of all sorts, and various mortifying exercises of penance), often prescribed by the priest through whom absolution was looked for, and partly by private eucharistic oblations or 'votive masses' offered in the donor's name in special services. Parallel with this went a development of purely clerical masses, without lay participants, which in the 7th cent. produced that contradiction in terms, according to primitive ideas of eucharistic worship, 'private masses.' In these the priest administered communion to himself alone. No doubt this unsocial type of cultus was condoned as being ideally corporate in spirit, the priest acting in intention as a member of the whole Church, in its name and as pleading for its welfare. But one result at least of such purely vicarious masses, together with the celebration of several masses by the same priest on the same day (10th cent. onwards), was natural; viz. a concomitant decrease in lay participation. The Church had to be content with two or three communions a year on the part of ordinary Christians; and many communicated once only in the year.[1]

As regards 'hours' services, the new impulse given by Benedict led to 'the erection of monastic communities in connexion with the parishes (*tituli*) of Rome,' which 'supplied the parish churches with clergy at liberty to conduct the daily offices, and qualified by their training in music to do so.'[2] Thus, soon, terce, sext, and none were sung in the Roman churches, and before 800 prime and vespers also. These early Roman offices became, through the abbot Augustine and others, the basis of English mediæval breviaries. Attempts were made, too, as time went on, to extend the 'hours' services to parish churches and get the laity to attend (witness the English names of such services). But for the most part the 'hours' proper remained a monastic or at least clerical form of service throughout the Middle Ages; and in England, owing to historical conditions which effaced the older type of non-Roman Christianity, they were virtually Roman 'offices' or dutiful acts of divine worship. Yet they contained some Gallican elements, especially before the Norman Conquest; and after it these survived in the distinct Uses of the great dioceses, of which that of Salisbury (Sarum) was the chief. Through its influence, in particular, there set in also in the latter part of the Middle Ages a tendency towards a uniform English Use.

Rise of the 'Breviary.'—Ever since the 'hours' services had been adopted, the mass of fixed forms of devotion—psalms, prayer, lessons (not only Biblical, but also *Legenda* from patristic sermons and expositions and from the Acts of the Saints)—had grown to ever greater dimensions. The process of its simplification and unification in one service-book, instead of several, first appears in England about the 11th cent., in the Breviary (*Brev. sive Ordo Officiorum*) or *Portiforium*, i.e. the book 'carried' by the priest when he went 'abroad,' the latter being a smaller and more portable form of the former. It was the Breviary, then, that formed the basis of the first efforts of those who early in the Protestant reformation of worship, as of Christian religion generally, tried to bring back its public forms to primitive and purer models. But an experiment in the way of a reformed Breviary on Catholic lines was also made in 1535 by Cardinal Quignon, general of the Franciscan Order in Spain. Much was omitted as superfluous, and a simplification all round, amounting to a revolution in effect, was carried out. It and its preface greatly influenced Cranmer's first Book of Common Prayer. But Cranmer's purpose was far more radical, viz. 'to produce not merely a good manual of devotion for the clergy, but a Book of Common Prayer'[3] for all Christians, learned and unlearned, if only they could read their mother tongue.

Transition to the new order.—The old service-books were for the use of the clergy and 'the religious': the layman had only the 'little Office,'

[1] For the Benedictine Rule, as for types of monastic piety generally, see art. MONASTICISM.

[1] Funk, *Manual of Church History*, i. 315.
[2] Swete, p. 43.
[3] *Ib.* p. 69.

whether the Latin *Horæ*[1] or the English *Prymer* based on it in the late Middle Ages. But the English Prayer Book became the layman's manual, as well as the clergy's, alike in church and in private use. Cranmer compiled it on the basis of the Sarum Breviary in particular, but in the light of principles of religion and worship drawn direct from the NT itself, with the aid of patristic precedent. Thus 'Whitsunday, June 9, 1549, witnessed the beginning of a new era in the public worship of the English Church,'[2] an era already inaugurated in most of the other countries which had gained a new sense of what the Christian 'gospel' was, and what sort of worship best befitted its nature.

In all of these the vital change took place that forms of worship were in a language 'understanded of the people.' This meant an enormous gain in spiritual reality, especially as their Biblical language and allusions could now be interpreted by and fitted into the regular reading of Scripture. The poverty of Scriptural background, and indeed the scarcity of 'the Word' of God in piety and worship, even in the later Middle Ages, when a certain amount of preaching existed in parts of the Church, is hard for us to realize to-day.

Cultus rites and ceremonies, as such, so predominated over the inward element or meaning, or 'faith' in the NT sense (esp. Ro $14^{22f.}$), that average mediæval worship was psychologically legal rather than filial in type. It was in fact such as Christ criticized in current Judaism, and Paul censured as persisting among Christians at Colosse (Col 2^{16} 3^{3}). Religion was statutory in nature and spirit, a being 'subject to ordinances' in daily life and in church, 'after the precepts and instructions of men.' Men were 'judged in meat or drink, or in respect of a feast day'—or a fast day or a saint's day—'which are a shadow of things to come.' Of course the mass alike of clergy and laity were not fit, as things were, for a NT type of worship, because those 'ages of Faith' had not the type of faith to which that belonged. This fact had historic causes, some of which have been indicated. But none the less such cultus, and such spiritually passive and unenlightened worship, represented no normal advance, save in the education of æsthetic and emotional sensibility to the divine, as majestic and mysterious in its nature and ways, with which it affected certain souls. Nor on these lines, from which the official Church through the papacy refused to depart, was there any promise of return to truer continuity with principles and methods of spiritual worship at the first.

It was small wonder, then, if, worshipping with but little direct aid from the NT and its distinctive spirit, mediæval piety was full of 'the spirit of bondage again unto fear,' and sadly devoid of 'the spirit of adoption whereby we cry Abba, Father.' This appears most vividly from many examples of the religious art which was used as an aid to worship.[3] But it was implied also in the elaborate system of mediators, both on earth and in the invisible world—patron saints and the saints at large, with the Mother of Jesus at their head—whose aid was felt needful to supplement the too exalted or remote help, or even to placate the too severe judgment, not only of God the Father but also of Jesus, the 'One mediator of God and man, himself man.' Nor was the element of fear—the fear of mystified minds, as well as of consciences not fully appeased by the Church's rites of penance and absolution that were a large part of the mediæval sacramental system—absent from the sense of mystery with which the central sacrament of worship, Christ's very Body and Blood, present in an inconceivably real sense[4] in the transubstantiated bread offered to God anew as 'the Host,' and eaten for the benefit of body and soul, was regarded by all mediæval Christians.

Finally, participation in the Church's cultus was largely viewed as of value *per se*, like sacraments on the *opus operatum* theory, and as a meritorious work before God, rather than a specially direct and effective mode of attaining spiritual fellowship with God, as the soul's supreme good. A radical revival of the original Christian spirit of faith was vitally needful to a new birth of worship, on lines which could lead to the development of a cultus more suited to the growing spiritual maturity of humanity at large. This needed a system of worship which could first stimulate and educate it in certain directions, and then by gradual modification of the traditional forms make available (for the adherents both of the old and of the new types of Christian piety) the elements of positive value latent in the historical forms of continuous Catholicism.

5. **Protestant worship.**—(i.) IN GENERAL.—The intimate connexion between the kind of religious faith and the worship which expresses it is nowhere clearer than in the change which passed over cultus as a result of the Protestant Reformation. The new experience of saving faith, with its correlative doctrine of grace (*q.v.*), summed up in the twin ideas, justification by faith and the priesthood of all believers, made itself manifest in the sphere of religious feeling to which worship belongs. The sense of assured access to God on the part of Christians, as children reconciled and accepted in His beloved Son, Jesus Christ, brought into worship a fresh note of glad thanksgiving. This ran through all, at first even the confession of sins (as of children in a family, rather than of debtors or lawbreakers before a judge—the prevalent mediæval conception), and particularly the Communion of the Lord's Supper. This was now viewed primarily as a memorial but efficacious pledge, both on God's part and on man's, of the abiding covenant relation of forgiveness and grace brought about by Christ crucified, which it 'sealed' anew by a sacramental or sensibly expressed act, and at the same time strengthened. There was generally no thought of this most sacred act of worship being a 'bare sign' of the spiritual relations which its forms suggested, those of vital communion with God in Christ, and with fellow-members of His mystical Body, the Church. But there was a definite setting aside of the notions specially marking the 'old religion' (as mediæval Catholicism was often called). These were (1) that consecration effected change in the elements themselves (transubstantiation); and (2) that the changed elements were 'offered' as a 'propitiatory sacrifice for living and dead' by the action of the celebrant, viewed as having a supernatural power as 'priest' in virtue of the sacrament of 'orders.' Thus the ritual of the Mass was generally felt by Protestants of all types to involve non-Scriptural, and therefore un-evangelic, ideas of the nature and means of the Christian salvation.

Accordingly, after attempts to retain some of the forms and formulas still dear to many by use and sentiment, both in Lutheranism and in Anglicanism (here the contrast between the First and Second Prayer Books of Edward VI. is most significant), the ritual effects of the new conscience about making NT teaching and precedent sovereign at any cost were accepted in all Protestant communions. The Holy Communion of the Lord's Table replaced the Mass and its distinctive worship.

The retention of old forms for the expression of the new type of faith was pushed to the furthest point of compromise in the Elizabethan Prayer Book, particularly in its juxtaposition of the formulas of administration characteristic of each of the two

[1] 'Besides the canonical hours the mediæval Church observed hours in honour of the Blessed Virgin Mary, known as the "little office."' Originally 'a monastic devotion,' in 1098 it was made binding on the secular clergy, and eventually became popular with the laity. 'Other devotional matter gathered round the Hours of the Virgin,' and the Sarum *Horæ B.V.M.* had its calendar of saints, its penitential psalms, litany, and especially vigils of the dead. 'In this fuller form the Horæ became the prayer-book of the educated laity' (Swete, p. 212 f.).

[2] Swete, p. 7.

[3] See, *e.g.*, T. M. Lindsay's study of Luther's early training in the *Cambridge Modern History*, ii. [1903] 106 f.

[4] See passages in Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, 2 vols., London, 1909, i. 277 ff., cited also in *Christianity in History*, p. 444 ff.

Edwardine editions. But the Articles of Religion, which define the distinctive beliefs of the Anglican Communion, as the Augsburg and other Confessions do those of other Protestant types, make plain the official sense in which these and other formulas were to be taken. See Article xxii. in particular.

Here the experimental cast of the new Anglican formula of administration, framed in 1552, is noteworthy, as well as the declaratory form of the words of absolution. Further the preaching of the Word now held a central place, if not the central one, in the whole service among Protestants. This brings us to the chief difference between Catholic and Protestant worship, viz. their respective emphasis on Word and Sacrament. For Catholicism, with its notion of grace as secretly infused participation in the divine nature, particularly as embodied in Christ's flesh and blood, emphasis falls on the sacrament of the Mass. For Protestantism, which conceives grace as the working of the Holy Spirit mediated primarily through the Word or uttered mind and will of God—the proper object of faith—it falls rather on preaching (*q.v.*); it is the means of grace which conditions the efficacy of all others, and prompts the worship that faith is helped by them to render to God. Even as regards the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, its Protestant form places the rite in a setting of the Word, partly by appropriate Scripture reading, partly by the communion address usual in non-Episcopal communions. Through the latter it is brought in idea within the scope of the 'prophetic' ministry of the Word, to which belongs also the prayer of thanksgiving where there is no fixed liturgy but it is left, as at the beginning, to the prophet 'to give thanks as much as he will.'[1] The Holy Communion being in fact, like other sacraments, 'a visible word' (to use Augustine's phrase), it speaks to the heart by the inward working of the Holy Spirit—the real agent in all grace, and especially in that faith of which other forms of grace are modes—whether mystically, by direct personal appeal through its symbolism, or by reflective unfolding of its meaning by ministry of the Word.

Protestantism, besides its emphasis on Word rather than Sacrament as means of communion with God, and in keeping with its idea of salvation by faith and not by deeds of 'merit' (rendered possible by sacramental grace), regards worship not as a meritorious action or 'service' (λειτουργία) to God, but rather in the light of realized fellowship with God through Christ, as of children with a father.

In worship God's perfections, especially His goodness, are simply answered by the homage of the heart's adoring and grateful recognition, and increasing conformity of man's will and personality to the divine character is sought after. The genius of Protestant religion, then, being to emphasize the filial consciousness, as making 'all things new' in man's outlook on life, all life becomes in idea a prolonged act of worship, because of filial trust and loyalty. Hence the line between such general worship 'in spirit and in truth,' and special acts of worship or cultus, whether private or corporate, is less marked than on the Catholic view—in virtue largely of the latter's sacerdotal and sacramental conception of the Church and its authoritative rites. Docile performance of the divinely appointed forms of cultus, in implicit reliance on Church authority, apart from personal consciousness of their effects in edification, is on the latter view 'meritorious' and will have its reward in divine blessing.

Another feature characteristic of the Protestant form of worship,[2] one expressive of its concern for the active participation of the whole congregation, with a faith fully conscious of its proper objects of adoration, is vernacular singing, whether of psalms or of other forms of devotion. Here a mode of worship which in mediæval Catholicism had been confined to the few, particularly those separated by vows to a specialized 'religious' life, was made part of common worship for all.[1] In this Luther and Lutheranism[2] took the lead, using every form of singing, and all available musical aids, while the Calvinistic branch of reformed religion for long held strictly to Scriptural models, the Psalter in particular. This leads to the consideration of the several species within the common Protestant or Evangelical genus of worship.

(ii.) SPECIFIC TYPES.—The difference, especially in emphasis, between Catholic and Protestant worship is great, as was fully realized by the early Protestants, who had themselves lived first under the one and then under the other. But the degree to which the forms of cultus developed under the one were set aside as alien to the genius of the other, which took as its model the type reflected in the NT, varied with different species of Protestantism (*q.v.*). Among Protestant types Lutheranism and Anglicanism were the most retentive of traditional forms, each in its own way.

(*a*) *Lutheranism.*—Lutheranism (*q.v.*), in keeping with Luther's personal genius,[3] was conservative of the old forms rather than of their informing spirit (which had failed him religiously), save as regards the Holy Communion, where his doctrine of consubstantiation shows much the same mode of conceiving the Real Presence as the traditional Catholic one. Naturally, however, as time went on, the spirit of Lutheran worship prevailed over its forms (even as Melanchthon's sacramental doctrine approximated to Calvin's), save in certain local varieties of High Lutheranism. This inherent tendency is reflected in various ways throughout its history, particularly in the eras of Pietism and the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), and under the influence of Schleiermacher's recoil from the latter in the direction of giving feeling its proper place in religion. The most concrete instance of this emphasis on the Evangelical core of Lutheran worship was the union between the Lutheran and 'Reformed' (Calvinistic) communions in the Prussian State Church in 1822, with a revised order of worship (the *Agenda*). It is true that the Romantic movement as a whole led to a certain reaction towards older traditional forms (*e.g.*, a revision of the Church Order of 1650 was adopted by Mecklenburg-Schwerin in 1867), but this meant a break with the mind and feeling of the people at large; and more recently Schleiermacher's ideas of cultus as a corporate representation and expression of the religious life of communion with God in Christ, its exact forms being only of relative moment, have gained ground in thoughtful circles.

[1] Cf. *Didachè*, x. *fin.*

[2] The hymn-singing of the 'Lollards' was personal rather than in public worship, but illustrates the tendency of fresh personal religion to break into song.

[1] See art. HYMNS (Modern Christian).

[2] F. C. Burkitt, in an address on 'The Growth of Christian Hymns' (*Proceedings of the Oxford Soc. of Hist. Theology*, 1907–08), points out that Luther's own part in this matter was less than is commonly supposed. German mediæval Christianity was specially rich in vernacular hymns (both original and from the Latin), and 'all he had to do was to select, to revise, and here and there to recast.' Even his own *Ein' feste Burg* is a paraphrase of Ps 46. 'It was the great merit of Luther to recognize the religious value' of vernacular hymnody and to give an impulse to its use and imitation. Conditions were different outside Germany.

[3] For Luther's varying attitudes on varying occasions towards cultus in Christian worship 'in spirit and in truth,' and his steady rejection of the statutory notion of cultus, see P. Drews art. 'Gottesdienst,' in *RGG*, on which also is based what follows on the development of Lutheran worship. For the Lutheran order of Sunday worship see Bersier's art. 'Culte,' in Lichtenberger's *Encyclopédie des Sciences religieuses*, iii.; and for extracts from Luther himself on cultus, Daniel, *Codex Liturgicus*.

(*b*) *'Reformed' or Calvinist worship.*—The germ of this type is seen already in Zwingli (*q.v.*), who made the Protestant emphasis on the Word of the gospel rather than its Sacraments determine the order and forms of public worship: such worship, too, was to him only a special mode of the worship of the whole Christian life, and here 'obedience is better than sacrifice' or any formal act of worship. Simplicity, then, in cultus was his practical rule, in the interests of worship 'in spirit and in truth.' Zwingli's influence, however, was soon withdrawn, and was confined to Switzerland save in so far as it was taken up into that of others. Of these Bucer of Strassburg[1] was the chief link in the development between him and Calvin, in whom the 'Reformed,' as distinct from the 'Lutheran,' type of worship took classic shape. Calvin shared his predecessor's suspicion of 'Catholic' cultus as too sensuous in form, leaving the worshippers too purely the subjects of passive impressions and transient emotions, for lack of the interpretative message of the Word, whether of Scripture read in their own tongue or of Scriptural preaching, conceived as a 'prophetic' and expository ministry for adapting and applying, through personal appeal to the conscience and reason, the gospel in all its range to the worshipping people. The traditional cultus, then, failed at the point of spiritual reality, which was the test of true religion for Calvin. Yet there was a true place for the symbolism of cultus and its action on man's complex nature, but one defined and limited by divine gospel ordinance and precedent in Scripture. This alone was binding; what went beyond it could only be justified by strict analogy, and related to minor details such as 'did not matter' in principle (ἀδιάφορα), but were only seemly or convenient in changing times and places.

In keeping with these principles, Calvin insisted on the value of congregational singing, as helping the soul to rise into the atmosphere of worship; but he limited the contents of sacred song to the inspired Scriptural models, the Psalter in particular, adapted only verbally to musical melody. Prayer, by the same canons, in order to be as real and close to personal life as possible, both for the minister and for the people, should include prophetic or unprescribed prayer (analogous to the preaching of the Word), as in the primitive Church, as well as forms familiar to all—the people expressing their co-operation in both by the Amen. The preaching of the Word became a central part of public worship on the Lord's Day, while once a month (not oftener, lest it should lose something of its sacredness and preparation of soul by self-examination [1 Co 11[28]]) the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was added. Before it a confession of faith was made, in the Apostles' Creed, at first sung by the people (in 1545 ed. of *La Forme des prières*, etc.), later as recited by the minister. The simplicity and ceremonial bareness of Calvin's order of worship, deliberately based as it was on Scripture, with its Hebraic forms, was at first made up for by the new realism of the vernacular as used in worship and the new warmth of congregational singing.

In the sphere of private devotion—which dispensed in the main with fixed forms of prayer (save over food)—fasting, for chastening of soul but not as a 'meritorious' work, was practised both on appointed fast days (not the traditional ones of unreformed religion) and at times chosen for personal reasons. The Church Year was set aside, as lacking Scriptural warrant and as having superstitious associations (here Luther's different attitude determined the more conservative practice of Lutheranism as to Church festivals, also as to the crucifix, images, and pictures as devotional aids). The Calvinistic type, with minor variations, came to prevail not only in Switzerland and France but also in parts of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, and in England among the chief Nonconformist bodies, both Presbyterian and Congregational (including Baptists), while it contributed not a little to the ethos and forms of the Church of England as established by law. Before, however, dealing further with English Christianity, as specially rich in varieties of Church life and worship, reference must be made to the non-established or minority type of worship as represented on the Continent.

(*c*) *Independent or 'Anabaptist' worship.*—From the nature of the case, the worship of these proscribed groups of radical reformers is hard to describe save in general terms.[1] As based on Scripture, read with strong emphasis on the illumination of the individual believer, it was very simple in form and spontaneous in method, having affinity with and aiming at reproducing the Spirit-prompted fervour and freedom reflected in parts of the Pauline Epistles, at which official religion everywhere looked askance. Free prayer, personal witnessing to God's working in religious experience, 'prophetic' exposition of Scripture in the light of this—in fact the features which marked the early 'Quakers' in England—were its chief characteristics. But, unlike the Quakers, the Continental Anabaptists practised both sacraments, in their own simple way and sense, and (so far as persecution allowed) the singing of praise to God in hymns expressive of their new-found and often deep religious feeling. Among them Luther's principle of 'the freedom of the Christian man,' along with love of the brethren, led to a thoroughgoing exercise of 'the priesthood of all believers,' on the lines of the autonomy of the local group or church—to the great scandal of all legally regulated types of State Church in the various lands—much as was the case later with the 'Separatists' under Elizabeth's system of uniformity in worship in England.[2]

(*d*) *Anglicanism.*—While the Elizabethan settlement, no less than Lutheranism, banished mediæval forms savouring of Roman doctrine, especially as to the Mass (not only transubstantiation but also consubstantiation was set aside), there was not the same check upon the return of the older associations of the ritual retained by the conservative and comprehensive policy of the Crown and its advisers that there was in Luther's own influence in Lutheranism. There was besides the extra influence in the same direction of the retention in the one case, and not in the other, of the Catholic order of the episcopate, and that in its mediæval form. Accordingly, although the type and forms of worship in the Elizabethan Prayer Book[3] were fundamentally Protestant rather than Catholic (in the opinion of a 'central' Churchman like Jewell, as of Calvin and other 'Reformed' rather than Lutheran Protestants), yet there were in it, as in Luther's Church order of worship, features proper to the standpoint and tone of 'Catholic' rather than 'Evangelical' religion, which were dropped by the types of Protestantism most careful to conform everything to the NT model and ethos.

Among such features was the litany, which, though it marks a great advance on the mediæval examples, and in its form 'is perhaps Cranmer's greatest liturgical triumph,' yet falls decidedly below the filial type of consciousness. This was partly due to its origin. It was not compiled by Cranmer for the Prayer Book at all, but in 1544 for use in a special season of

[1] See P. Drews, as above.

[1] See art. ANABAPTISM.

[2] See below, and cf. C. Burrage, *The Early English Dissenters*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1912.

[3] As also in that of 1662; see art. PRAYER, BOOK OF COMMON.

public calamities (like the earliest Western litanies),[1] yet 'was printed also in the Prymer of 1545,' which, like those of the 15th cent., was a book of devotion for lay-people. Thence it passed into the Prayer Book of 1549, with omission of the invocation of the saints. It is natural, then, that its tone is not the normal one for ordinary Christian prayers. It is significant that Luther's litany of 1529, the revision of a mediæval one, and itself a source of Cranmer's, was never part of normal Lutheran worship, but was used only on special occasions; and that the litany was one of the parts of the English rite which the Puritans most objected to as unfitting.

On the whole, then, the amount of traditional language retained in the Prayer Book—particularly its special offices of Baptism, Orders, Visitation of the Sick, etc.—gives no little warrant to those who in later times have gone on a view of its intention not in fact consonant with the Articles, which are of a piece with common Protestant doctrine, *e.g.*, on justification by faith, and with the experiential, rather than *ex opere operato* or Catholic, conception of sacramental grace which went with it. The result of the divergent readings of the Anglican cultus has been a diversity in ritual practice peculiar to Anglicanism among Protestant communions.[2]

(*e*) *The Puritans.*—Divergences began with those who, starting from the belief, probably a correct one, that the doctrinal affinities of the Elizabethan settlement of religion were with the Calvinistic type of Protestantism rather than the Lutheran, pressed for greater conformity to its form of worship as more Scriptural. Aiming at making the cultus yet more 'pure' from 'papal' or traditional Catholic ideas, usages, and especially vestments, the English 'Puritans' (*q.v.*) went further even than their foreign friends, who themselves lived under the Presbyterian system, thought necessary. When repressed by the Crown, using the bishops as its agents, many 'Puritans,' like Cartwright and Travers, worked for a Presbyterian Church polity, and issued in 1572 an 'Admonition to Parliament' to this effect.[3] Their objections to the rigid and exclusive use of fixed forms of prayer in public worship, their emphasis on 'preaching' of the Word, as distinct from mere fixed Scripture lections (with or without printed homilies), and their rejection of the traditional fasts and festivals of the Church Year, called forth from Richard Hooker (*q.v.*), a 'central' Anglican of the end of Elizabeth's reign, as Jewell had been in its earlier half, a classic defence of the worship of the Prayer Book as then understood. He writes, however, on the basis of essential agreement between the Reformed Churches, including the Anglican, as 'Sacramentarian,' not papal or Lutheran, in their view of the Lord's Supper.[4] In this he stands in contrast to those who in the next century went to the other extreme from the Puritan tendency in their views of Prayer Book worship, Laud and the High Church or Catholicizing divines often styled 'Caroline.'

(*f*) *Congregationalism.*—But, while the Puritans as a body remained inside the National Church, until after the Act of Uniformity in 1662, a minority among them gave up, under Elizabeth's coercive policy of ritual uniformity, all hope of further reform and began perforce to worship in semi-private church meetings or congregations. Their ideal of worship appears in R. Browne's *Booke which sheweth the Life and Manners of all True Christians* (1582), in a form which keeps remarkably close in spirit as well as idea to the NT picture of church fellowship in worship. This consists in (1) 'communion of the graces and offices in the Head of the Church, which is Christ,' (2) 'communion of the graces and offices in the Body, which is the Church of Christ,' and (3) 'using the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, as a seal of this communion.' In such worship on a definitely Congregational basis,[1] whether their baptismal practice was that of Protestantism at large or that of Anabaptism (*q.v.*), two highly primitive features were recovered, namely, the intimate union in idea of Christian worship and Christian walk, and the place assigned to personal graces of the Spirit in fitting each particular church for corporate fellowship in both spheres of its life of union with God in Christ. These were connected with the Separatists' idea of church membership proper, as conditional on a personal act of 'covenant' with God and His people, whereas in national Churches it was determined merely by infant baptism and catechizing,[2] supplemented in Calvinism and English Puritanism by 'a godly discipline' meant to ensure a reasonable loyalty in life and worship. When Congregational ideals and forms of worship had lost something of their original reality, they were more than revived in the Society of Friends (*q.v.*), with its characteristic emphasis on 'the inner light' and its reliance on the promptings of the Spirit of God, alike in life and in corporate worship. Here new traits were fellowship in silent adoration and meditation, waiting for the 'moving of the Spirit,' and complete spontaneity of utterance for mutual edification, whether in the reading or quoting of Scripture, exhortation based on it, or in the form of a more direct message of the Spirit or 'inner light.' Negatively Quakerism dispensed with sacraments and even singing in worship. But the latter received an important extension among Nonconformists at large (with whom adherence to the psalms in one form or another had been stricter than among Anglicans) early in the next century, through the hymns of Isaac Watts, written specially for public worship.

(*g*) *The Evangelical Revival.* — Thereafter in connexion with the Evangelical Revival, both Wesleyan and Calvinist, a greater outburst of hymns and hymn-singing in worship marked the fresh spirit of praise to God which filled men's newly inspired experience of His grace and goodness in Christ. And the like has been true of all revivals of religion, including the Tractarian, down to the revivalism of the latter half of the 19th century.

6. The present situation.—In the Evangelical Revival and the succeeding Romantic movement, within both Romanism and Protestantism, religious feeling came again to its rights after the chilling era of rationalism. In Evangelical circles, both in Germany and in England, it appeared mainly in the forms of hymnody and enhanced spontaneity in prayer and preaching; in Catholic and Catholicizing circles it infused fresh earnestness and reality into the ritual and ceremonial aspects of cultus. In Anglicanism in particular it created a zeal for the restoration of 'historic' and 'Catholic' forms, both those allowed by the Prayer Book but fallen into disuse, and others disallowed by it. During the last half-century, moreover, the taste for a 'richer' and more æsthetically suggestive cultus has spread to almost all religious circles in England, and even Scotland, as also in all English-speaking lands. But it remains unassociated for the most part with the specific Catholic and sacerdotal ideas for which ritual was chiefly valued by the leaders of the Oxford Movement and their followers. The fact is that the strong

[1] See artt. LITANY, §§ 5, 8.
[2] Cf. art. PROTESTANTISM.
[3] See art. PURITANISM, 2 (*b*).
[4] *Ib.*

[1] See artt. BROWNISM, CONGREGATIONALISM.
[2] In the Prayer Book by confirmation also, though it fell into wide disuse (Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* v. lxvi. 8) for a time. No reformed Church treated this 'rite or ceremony' (Hooker) as a sacrament, since it lacked Christ's own authority, and Calvinism disallowed it even as a 'profitable ceremony.' Lutheranism, after a period of disuse, like that in England, restored it in a simpler form as a result of Pietism (see art. SACRAMENTS [Lutheran]).

recoil from those ideas, especially in their extreme forms, at the eve of the Protestant Reformation led to an undue suspicion of not a few natural forms of symbolism, fitted to express the poetry of the feelings and give appropriate vent and exercise to the mystical side of religious faith, where the reflective expression of the same faith through the spoken word cannot equally secure this, especially for certain temperaments and even for certain moods of most men and women. That recoil has now spent itself, and to-day many are feeling after the proper redressing of the balance of worship long disturbed by historical causes, and are seeking a synthesis of the Protestant or Evangelical emphasis and ethos, on the one hand, and of the Catholic or sacramental, on the other.

The ruling tendency, then, in present-day worship is towards a harmony of the various historic types. These in the past have existed too much as rivals or at least in one-sided self-sufficiency, each as if alone legitimate. Now they are being felt to be all of them but partial embodiments of the possibilities of Christian worship, complementary rather than hostile to one another. They are seen to be methods of meeting the instinctive needs of different types of our manifold human nature, while yet each of us requires, for perfected communion with God and his fellows, a fulfilling on all sides of that nature; and to this end each needs also the help of modes of worship which do not at first come natural to him, but are suited to educate undeveloped capacity. Thus there is abroad a movement towards unity in and through diversity, not only in Church fellowship generally as needful to full Christian unity (cf. the Lambeth Appeal of 1920), but also in the sphere of worship. It is strongest in the younger generation, especially among University and College students, largely through the co-operative, 'interdenominational' spirit of the Student Christian Movement. In the 'give and take' of student life, where personal relationships at close quarters and on the same mental level favour the observation of the similarity of the Christian character fostered by varying modes of cultus, inherited bias least hinders the frank recognition of the strength as well as the limitations of each of these distinct types. Persons are not, as so often in the past, seen through their forms of worship, but these through the persons who practise them. Hence a new and more hopeful, indeed a more reverent, attitude to all such expressions of Christian life.

The result is an ideal of Catholicity in worship that is due, not to lack of personal conviction or preference, but to faith in God and love to all His sincere worshippers. Men conceive of a Catholic worship, within a reunited Church communion, that shall be inclusive of the genius and the more essential methods of 'Catholicism' and 'Evangelicalism,' whether in Orthodox, Roman, or Protestant circles. Historic approximations to a synthesis of such tendencies exist already in Anglican, Old Catholic, Catholic Apostolic (Irvingite) worship, while recently a League of Free Catholics has been formed to work out experiments in this direction. No doubt sure progress will also be gradual. Meantime for all who seek this ideal the master-thought must be, 'Pure worship under the Gospel stands neither in forms nor in the formal disuse of forms,'[1] but in spiritual reality of devotion, evidenced by the fruits of the Spirit in life and character.

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(*b*) *Special aspects.*—See Christian sections of artt. BAPTISM, CALENDAR, CONFIRMATION, EUCHARIST, FASTING, FESTIVALS AND FASTS, HYMNS, INCENSE, KNEELING, LITANY, PENANCE, PILGRIMAGE, PRAYER, SACRAMENTS, SAINTS AND MARTYRS; further E. von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit*, Leipzig, 1901, *Tischgebete und Abendmahlgebete*, do. 1905; F. Leitner, *Der gottesdienstliche Volksgesang im jüd. und christl. Altertum*, Freiburg i. Br., 1906; and W. Caspari, 'Unters. zur Kirchengesang im Altertum,' in *ZKG* xxvii., xxix.

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J. VERNON BARTLET.

WORSHIP (Egyptian). — I. *THE DAILY TEMPLE LITURGY.*—1. Its Heliopolitan origin.—

A striking feature of Egyptian temple worship is the fact that the same daily liturgy was celebrated on behalf of every god and goddess throughout the length and breadth of the land.[1] The reason for this uniformity, which seems to have prevailed as far back as the Old Kingdom, is as follows. The daily temple liturgy, as we know it, seems to be derived from that celebrated on behalf of the sun-god at Heliopolis, which city exercised in early times a very far-reaching religious and political influence. To enhance their prestige, therefore, a number of local gods were identified by their priests with the sun-god, of whom the king was regarded as the son. The king was thus also regarded as the son of the gods identified with the sun-god. As pointed out in the art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), II. 2, this idea of sonship would have soon affected the relationship of the king with all divinities, whether male or female. The king was likewise high-priest of the sun-god, and he became high-priest of all the local divinities of Egypt by the same process as that by which he came to be regarded as their son. The local high-

[1] Printed Epistle of the Society of Friends in 1885.

[1] A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr. p. 47 f.

priesthoods also, of course, devolved upon the Pharaoh as representative of the centralized government of Egypt, all political and religious functions, which once belonged to the local chiefs, being united in him. Accordingly, as their son and high-priest, the Pharaoh, or his priestly deputy, celebrated the same liturgy on behalf of the local divinities as on behalf of the Heliopolitan sun-god.[1]

Heliopolitan influence on Egyptian worship is to be recognized not only in the uniform cult of all divinities, but also in numerous cult-accessaries and in the very constitution of the priesthood; furthermore, in the temple structures themselves and the views which the Egyptians entertained about them.

(*a*) Egyptian temples, certainly in early times[2] and often later, looked east, so that the rising sun might light up their dark interiors.[3] Thus in an inscription on the shrine found by Griffith at El-'Arîsh we read that 'the face of this temple (*i.e.* of the god Shu) is towards the east wherein Rê' rises.'[4] The Egyptians, indeed, pictured to themselves the sun-god, before all other divinities, as dwelling in every temple, which they accordingly regarded as a miniature heaven.[5] In texts of the Ptolemaic age, though the idea is probably far older, the two pylon-towers are equated with the two sisters Isis and Nephthys, who, according to one conception, lifted up the sun-god into the sky every morning.[6] The sanctuary or naos, in which the cultus-image was kept, was not infrequently designated 'heaven' or 'the horizon,'[7] and a title often borne by the high-priests of Amûn of Thebes was 'Opener of the doors of heaven in Elect-of-Places (Karnak).'[8]

(*b*) Every temple in historic times seems, like the Heliopolitan sun-temple, to have possessed its House of the Morning (*pr-dw;t*), in which the Pharaoh underwent lustration before celebrating the daily liturgy.[9]

(*c*) The sacred pool for purification, a feature of all temples, was associated not with the presiding deity of the temple but with the sun-god.[10]

(*d*) The obelisk which generally stood in front of the pylon was closely associated with the sun-cult.[11]

(*e*) The boat-shrine was also probably in the first instance a feature of the sun-cult.[12]

(*f*) The practice of offering to a divinity the figure of Mê'et, righteousness personified, in the daily temple liturgy[13] must have grown up at Heliopolis;[14] the formula recited at the presentation of the figure is clearly of solar origin.[15]

(*g*) The historic priesthood also displays marks of Heliopolitan influence. The four watches (*s;w*), or phylæ, of priests bear the names of the four quarters of a ship, which names were also assigned to the four watches into which the crew of the sun-god's heavenly ship were divided.[16] It is evidently the sun-god's priests who were first divided into four watches bearing these names, the sun-god being supposed to traverse the sky in a ship and his priests being therefore regarded as his crew. Even the general term for a priest, *wê'eb*, may be Heliopolitan, for *wê'eb* means 'pure person,' and purity is a very marked feature of the sun-cult.[17]

(*h*) In many temples the high-priestess was identified with Ḥathor, the wife of the Heliopolitan sun-god, and in this capacity figured as the wife of the god to whom the temple in which she was high-priestess was dedicated.[18]

(*i*) The sistrum-shaking musician-priestesses,[19] who were attached to every Egyptian temple, and the human concubines, who were assigned to several divinities,[20] seem also originally to have been Heliopolitan institutions.[21]

1 See A. M. Blackman, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, v. [1918] 156, 162 f., *RTr* xxxix. [1920] 44 ff.
2 L. Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxviii. [1900] 13, note 4.
3 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 154.
4 E. Naville and F. Ll. Griffith, *The Mound of the Jew . . . and the Antiquities of Tell el Yahûdiyeh*, London, 1890, pl. xxiv., line 12.
5 W. Spiegelberg, *ZÄ* liii. [1917] 99.
6 *Ib.* p. 100.
7 K. Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, iv. [Leipzig, 1906] 159.
8 Spiegelberg, p. 99, note 4.
9 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 148 ff., 156, *RTr* xxxix. 44 ff., 65 ff., 75 ff.
10 Blackman, *PSBA* xl. [1918] 88, with note 97.
11 See J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1912, p. 70 ff.
12 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 156, with note 7.
13 Blackman, *Journ. of the Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Society*, 1918–19, pp. 49, 52.
14 See art. Righteousness (Egyptian), 6.
15 A. Moret, *Le Rituel du culte divin journalier en Égypte*, Paris, 1902, p. 138 ff.
16 Sethe, *ZÄ* liv. [1918] 3, note 5.
17 See artt. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), VIII. 1; Purification (Egyptian), V. 2; Blackman, *PSBA* xl. 57.
18 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vii. [1919] 11 ff.
19 Art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), VIII. 3 (*d*).
20 *Ib.* VII.
21 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vii. 14 ff.

2. **Its Osirianization.**—As pointed out in the art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), II. 2, the relationship of the king with any god or goddess was, owing to the influence of the Osiris myth, conceived of as that of Horus with Osiris. Accordingly for cult-purposes every divinity came to be regarded as an Osiris, while the king, or his deputy the priest, played the part of Horus. The formulæ, therefore, pronounced during the celebration of the originally solar temple liturgy constantly attempt to equate the various episodes composing it with events connected both with the death and resuscitation of Osiris and with the successful conflict of Horus with Sêth.[1] But, despite this Osirianization of the rite, many of the formulæ still retain clear traces of its solar origin.[2] Indeed, the Egyptian priests with their characteristic disregard for logic often employed both earlier solar and later Osirian formulæ side by side.[3] The Osirianization of the daily temple liturgy did not affect its outward form, which remained unchanged and in its main features is clearly solar.[4]

3. **The chief officiants.**—(1) *Pharaoh.*—With comparatively few exceptions the temple reliefs represent the Pharaoh not only in the capacity of high-priest in the temple services but as sole officiant. In historic times he could seldom have officiated in person, his place of course being taken by one of the priests who were his deputies.[5]

On the occasions when the Pharaoh actually did exercise his high-priestly functions he was conducted to the temple in procession.[6] At the head of the procession walked the 'pillar of his mother' (*ỉwn-mwt-f*),[7] burning incense. Immediately in front of the Pharaoh were carried a number of sacred standards, which are said to 'clear the way'[8] to the temple or to 'drive away what is evil.'[9] A chief lector might also walk in the procession, 'adoring the god,' *i.e.* reciting hymns in his honour, and thereby 'warding off those hostile to the king.'[10] On reaching the temple precincts the Pharaoh straightway proceeded to the House of the Morning (*i.e.* the temple vestry). Reliefs at Edfu[11] and Abydos[12] represent him as being welcomed by the souls of Buto and Nekhen[13] (the dead predynastic kings of Lower and Upper Egypt), who conduct him into the House of the Morning for the performance of his ceremonial toilet. Here he underwent lustration,[14] and then he was robed, anointed, decked with ornaments, crowned, and invested with royal insignia, and possibly also presented with a repast. He was then ready to enter the temple to officiate.[15]

(2) *Priest.*—The ordinary chief officiant at the daily temple liturgy was a prophet[16] (*ḥm-nṯr*), *i.e.* a member of the higher class of the priesthood,[17] or else a great *wê'eb*-priest[18] (*w'b* ';). All priests and priestesses had to purify themselves before entering upon their course, and while serving had to adopt various precautions in order to avoid ceremonial impurity. They had also, like the

1 See, *e.g.*, Erman, *Handbook*, p. 45; Blackman, *RTr* xxxix. 63 f.
2 See, *e.g.*, Moret, *Rituel*, pp. 16, 20 f., 26, 49, 79, 96, 105, 108, 138 ff.
3 Cf. Blackman, *RTr* xxxix. 66.
4 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 162.
5 See art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), II.
6 A. Mariette, *Denderah*, Paris, 1869–80, i. pl. 9; C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, Berlin, 1849–59, iv. pl. 71*a*; A. M. Blackman, *Temple of Bigeh*, Cairo, 1915, pl. xxvi.
7 See art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), VI. 1; Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 122, note 7.
8 H. Brugsch, *Hieroglyph.-demot. Wörterbuch*, 6 vols., Leipzig, 1867–82, vol. ii. p. 430.
9 J. Dümichen, *Altägyp. Kalenderinschriften*, Leipzig, 1866, pl. cxiii.
10 *Piankhi Stele*, line 103 = Schäfer, *Urkunden*, iii. 38.
11 Kees, *RTr* xxxvi. 6 f.
12 A. Mariette, *Abydos*, Paris, 1869–80, i. pl. 29.
13 The Edfu relief figures the souls of Buto and Nekhen, but the accompanying inscription speaks only of the souls of Heliopolis, an indication of the solar origin of the rite of the House of the Morning (Kees, *loc. cit.*).
14 For particulars see art. Purification (Egyptian), V. 1.
15 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* v. 161, note 10, *RTr* xxxix. 45 f.
16 Moret, *Rituel*, pp. 42, 105.
17 See art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), VIII. 2.
18 Moret, p. 7. Cf. *Canopus Decree*, hieroglyphic text, l. 30 = Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 147.

Pharaoh, to undergo purification before entering the temple to officiate.[1]

4. **The resemblance of the daily temple liturgy to the Pharaoh's ceremonial toilet.**—A large part of the daily temple liturgy consists of a series of toilet episodes and closely resembles the ceremonial toilet of the Pharaoh in the House of the Morning. This resemblance is due to the fact that both are based upon the same performance, the supposed daily matutinal lustration of the sun-god—the cultus-image of the sun-god undergoing lustration every day at dawn in the Heliopolitan sun-temple, as the god himself was conceived of as doing in the horizon. That the other toilet episodes of the rite of the House of the Morning, viz. robing, anointing, crowning, etc., had their equivalents in the daily temple liturgy is due to the sun-god being regarded as a king.[2]

5. **The three divisions of the daily temple liturgy.**—There are three main divisions of the daily temple liturgy; (1) a series of episodes preliminary to the performance of the divinity's toilet, (2) the actual toilet, and (3) the presentation of food- and drink-offerings.

We know of two editions of the first two divisions of the liturgy. The one, an illustrated edition, is carved on the walls of the chapels of Horsiēse, Isis, Osiris Onnophris, Amūn, Atum, and Ptaḥ, in the temple of Sēthos I. at Abydos. It consists of a series of reliefs representing the liturgy being performed, each relief being accompanied by the formula pronounced by the priest while the particular episode depicted was being enacted. The other edition, written for the temple of 'Amunrē' of Karnak,[3] is preserved on papyrus no. 3055 of the Berlin Museum and dates from the XXIInd dynasty.

The Abydos and Karnak liturgies are merely different editions of the same portions of the service-book. The formulæ for the toilet episodes are practically identical in both cases, and, when the pre-toilet episodes of the one correspond to those of the other edition, the accompanying formulæ are often either the same or have points in common.[4]

Both these editions are incomplete, but combined they no doubt supply us with a very adequate representation of the pre-toilet and toilet episodes of the daily liturgy in an Egyptian temple (originally the sun-temple), when the ceremonial was fully carried out.[5]

The third division of the liturgy can be fairly satisfactorily reconstructed from numerous representations and formulæ occurring among the reliefs which decorate the walls of the various temples.

There are numerous indications that the temple service-book assumed the form in which we possess it at a very early date, probably not later than the Old Kingdom.[6]

(1) *The pre-toilet episodes.*—Having undergone purification in the water of the sacred pool or tank, the priest entered the temple, reciting a formula as he did so. His first act after entering the temple was to kindle a fire, a bow-drill being used for that purpose, or perhaps only a spindle and 'hearth.'[7] The priest then picked up the principal part of the censer, which was of metal, usually bronze, and in the form of an outstretched arm with the hand open palm upwards.[8] Taking hold of the rest of the censer, the little brazier in which the incense was burned, he fixed it in its place, namely in the open hand at the end of the arm. Having filled the brazier with burning charcoal from the fire he had previously kindled, he set incense thereon, and, holding the smoking censer in one hand, proceeded to the sanctuary, the double doors of which were bolted and the bolts secured with a clay seal. The bolts seem often to have been tied with a strip of papyrus to which the clay seal was affixed. The priest broke the seal, drew back the bolts, and opened the doors of the sanctuary, whereupon the sacred boat was disclosed with the cultus-image enshrined therein.[1]

After the unfastening of the seal, and presumably the opening of the doors, the priest sometimes burned incense in honour of the uræus goddess. On beholding the image, the priest made a profound obeisance, 'kissing the ground prone,' as it was said, or 'placing himself upon the belly stretched out flat.' Then, standing or kneeling, he chanted first a hymn in honour of the divinity—lifting up both his hands as he did so in the attitude of worship, or else burning incense—and after that a second hymn in honour of *R'yt*, the female counterpart of the sun-god and identified with Ḥathor. The priest next offered the image scented honey, or a figure of the goddess Mē'et, and then burned more incense. Having swept the floor of the sanctuary with a cloth, he was now ready to 'lay his hands upon the god,' *i.e.* take the image out of the boat or naos in order to perform its toilet.

(2) *The toilet.*—The priest's first act after 'laying hands upon the god' was apparently to divest the image of the clothing and ornaments in which it had been arrayed the previous day and to remove the pat of scented grease that had been placed on its forehead.[2] Then, placing the image on a little heap of sand, which he had previously poured out for that purpose, and having fumigated it with incense, he proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four *nmst*- and then from four *dšrt*-vessels, or else with water from one so-called '-vessel. He then censed the image again, cleansed its mouth with different kinds of natron, and yet again censed it. Having thus purified the image, he began to dress it, putting on it the white head-cloth and arraying it in white, green, red, and dark red cloths in succession. After decking it with ornaments, he anointed it with unguents and then painted its eyelids with green and black cosmetic. Either immediately before or immediately after this application of unguent and cosmetics the priest invested the image with royal insignia—a diadem, *w'ś*-sceptre, crook, and whip. The toilet episodes were probably brought to a close with a final burning of incense.[3]

(3) *The presentation of food- and drink-offerings.*—The procedure observed at the presentation of food- and drink-offerings in the temple liturgy seems to have been practically identical with that observed at the corresponding part of the funerary liturgy. This is indicated among other things by the fact that in the temple reliefs depicting a divinity being fed there is sometimes inserted above the altar or offering-table, and between the divinity and the chief officiant, a so-called list of offerings identical to all intents and purposes with the lists occurring in the tomb reliefs and paintings.[4] This is only to be expected, since every divinity was regarded for cult-purposes as an Osiris.

Before the offerings could be laid upon it, the table or altar had to be purified.[5] The act of placing the offerings on the altar or table, or else on mats spread upon the ground, was variously

[1] See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 7.
[2] Blackman, *Journ. Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Soc.*, 1918–19, p. 30, *RTr* xxxix. 44 ff.
[3] On the same papyrus is a duplicate version for Mut, the consort of Amunrē'.
[4] Blackman, *Journ. Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Soc.*, p. 30 f.
[5] *Ib.* p. 51. [6] See also Erman, *Handbook*, p. 46.
[7] See W. S. Blackman, 'The Magical and Ceremonial Uses of Fire,' in *FL* xxvii. [1916] 355–358.
[8] For a picture of a censer see Erman, *Handbook*, p. 46.

[1] See H. Schäfer, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, iii. [Leipzig, 1908] 39. When a stone naos took the place of a boat-shrine, the ceremonies of breaking the seal and withdrawing the bolts would have been performed in connexion with the opening of its doors and not of those of the sanctuary.
[2] See Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vi. 58 ff.
[3] For this and the preceding paragraph see Blackman, *Journ. Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Soc.*, 1918–19, p. 51 ff.
[4] Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iii. 43, *b*, 244, *b*, 245, *a*; Mariette, *Denderah*, i. pl. 32; A. Gayet, *Le Temple de Louxor*, Paris, 1894, pl. xxvi. fig. 85.
[5] See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 5 (*b*); see also Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pl. 21; E. Naville, *The Temple of Deir el-Bahari*, London, 1895–1908, ii. pl. xxviii.; Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iii. 66*b*.

termed 'setting out the repast upon the altar,' 'setting down the divine offering,' 'setting down the repast.'[1] While thus engaged the officiant either stood or knelt.[2]

The god's meal having been laid before him, two closely connected ceremonies were performed, apparently in immediate succession, the one being variously designated 'presenting the repast,' 'presenting the divine offering,' 'performing the presentation of [or 'causing to be produced'] the divine offering,' and 'performing the presentation to, causing to be produced a great oblation for, NN,'[3] and the other being termed 'bringing the god to his repast.'[4]

At the former ceremony the officiant extended his right arm and bent the hand upwards in the prescribed manner[5] and pronounced the formula beginning with the words 'an offering which the king gives.'[6] When the king is depicted performing this ceremony, he is often shown holding a mace and staff in his left hand.[7] The recitation of the formula 'An offering which the king gives, etc.,' was closely associated with, and, on the analogy of the funerary liturgy, was doubtless preceded by, the burning of incense and the pouring out of a libation of water.[8] At the ceremony of bringing the god to his repast the officiant recited a formula calling (*dwi*)[9] upon the god to come to his bread, beer, roast flesh, etc.[10]

Various attitudes might be adopted by the officiant, whether king or priest, while he pronounced the summons. He might stand with right arm and hand extended in the prescribed manner and with left hand hanging at his side, or he might kneel with both hands, palms downwards, held above or beside the knees. Again he might kneel with left hand held in the attitude just mentioned or holding a censer, while with his right hand and arm he made the ritual gesture.[11]

The act of consecration, by which each item of food and drink was finally[12] made over to the god, was termed 'stretching out the arm four times.' According to the temple reliefs, it was performed in the following manner. The king, standing before what was to be offered, stretched out over or towards it four times the so-called *ḫrp*-baton, which he grasped in his right hand; in his left hand he held staff and mace, or else this hand hung at his side holding the symbol of life.[13]

In the series of temple reliefs depicting the god being fed is one representing the king in the act of 'elevating' (*f*;) a tray of offerings 'before the face' of the divinity.[14] Does this scene represent one special episode in this part of the liturgy; *i.e.*, after the pronouncement of 'An offering which the king gives, etc.' was a specimen of the offering elevated in the presence of the cultus image? More probably the scene is a summarization of a series of elevations; for doubtless, as in the funerary liturgy, each particular item of food mentioned in the list of food- and drink-offerings was elevated at its presentation to the accompaniment of a special formula. In the funerary liturgy, according to Utterances 108–171 of the *Pyramid Texts*,[1] each item was elevated four times.

In addition to the meal laid out before the image of the principal divinity in the sanctuary and before the images of the co-templar divinities in the adjacent chambers, offerings were also laid, of course, upon the great altar in the forecourt. If the procedure in the temple of the Aton at El-Amarna prevailed also in other Egyptian temples,[2] it was upon this altar that the Pharaoh mostly laid his oblations.

(4) *The removal of the footprints.*—The final act of the chief officiant before leaving the sanctuary, shutting the doors, and affixing the clay seal to the bolts, was to obliterate all traces of his own and his assistant's footprints. This he did by sweeping the floor with a cloth or with a besom made of twigs of the *ḥ'dn*-plant.[3] In the sanctuary of the temple of Derr, on either side of the door, is a representation of Ramesses II. holding a cloth for sweeping the floor in one hand and a vase (for sprinkling it?) in the other.[4]

6. The functions of the assistant officiants.—The ordinary schematic representations of the various episodes convey the impression that only one officiant, the king, or a priest acting as his deputy, took part in the celebration of the daily temple liturgy. Inscriptions and a few quite exceptionally detailed reliefs, however, show that in addition to the celebrant a number of other officiants participated in all these ceremonies. The ritual was no doubt particularly elaborate when the Pharaoh himself was celebrant.

(1) A scene in the temple of Luxor depicts in some detail the presentation of the cloths used for Amunrē''s ceremonial toilet. After the burning of incense, the episode immediately preceding the arraying of the image in the royal head-cloth (*nms*), there enters the sanctuary a long procession of priests bearing chests containing the cloths in question, with members of the higher class of the priesthood, the fathers of the god, walking at their head. Some of the latter carry smoking censers and libation- or lustration-vessels, while others clap their hands and sing, one of them rattling a sistrum. Bringing up the rear of the procession is the king, with 'the god's adorer, the god's hand' (the high-priestess of Amunrē')[5] walking in front of him. The king holds out the *ḫrp*-baton and is said to be 'extending the arm four times,' *i.e.* consecrating the offering. But he also forms part of the procession, for between him and the high-priestess are the words 'bringing clothing.' We have here, pictorially combined in one, what were really two distinct actions, namely the procession of priests, accompanied by the king and high-priestess, conveying the clothing into the sanctuary, and the consecration of that clothing by the king assisted by the high-priestess, who either sang a hymn or chanted some formula.[6]

(2) A number of jars of unguent, which another Luxor[7] relief represents the king as consecrating, have been solemnly brought in procession by ten priests.

(3) Another relief in the same temple[8] shows a procession of twenty-eight priests bearing a number of ewers of water, to be used for such purposes as the washing of the altar, the pouring out of the libation before the bringing of the food-offering,[9] and for various drink-offerings.[10] At the end of the procession walks the king. The theory of the ritual demanded that the king should draw the water himself, come running[11] with it into the sanctuary, as he is depicted doing in the adjacent

[1] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pls. 38*c*, 40*c*, 50; Lepsius, iii. 67*a*; Naville, i. pl. xxi.

[2] *Locc. citt.*

[3] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Denderah*, i. pl. 60*a*, *Abydos*, i. pls. 40*a*, 44; Naville, i. pls. xiv., xxiv., ii. pl. xxxvi., iv. pls. xcv., xcviii., v. pl. cxxxvii.; D. Randall-MacIver and C. R. Woolley, *Buhen*, Philadelphia, 1911, p. 49.

[4] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pls. 37*b*, 40*a*.

[5] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 28, line 17.

[6] That this suggestion is correct is indicated by the scene at Luxor described below, 6 (4), and also by the fact that the formula is closely associated with the ritual stretching out of the arm and the bending upwards of the hand (see Sethe, *loc. cit.*).

[7] *E.g.*, Naville, *Deir el-Baḥari*, iv. pl. xcv.

[8] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pls. 42*a*, 44.

[9] Naville, ii. pl. xxviii.; Gayet, *Temple de Louxor*, pl. xxxv., fig. 188.

[10] Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pl. 37*b*.

[11] *E.g.*, *ib.* i. pls. 37*b*, 40*a*, *b*, 51*b*; Naville and Gayet, *locc. citt.*

[12] H. Brugsch-Bey, *Drei Fest-Kalender des Tempels von Apollinopolis Magna*, Leipzig, 1877, pl. x. line 6 ff.

[13] See, *e.g.*, H. Kees, *Der Opfertanz des ägyp. Königs*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 59; Gayet, pls. xxxiv., xlv.; G. Legrain and E. Naville, *L'Aile nord du Pylône d'Aménophis III. à Karnak*, Paris, 1902, pl. xi. A; Mariette, *Denderah*, iii. pls. 54*y*, 56*d*.

[14] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pl. 47*a*, *Denderah*, i. pl. 65*b*, ii. pl. 13*a*.

[1] K. Sethe, *Die altägyp. Pyramidentexte*, Leipzig, 1908–10, §§ 72–100.

[2] See below, IV. 1 (ii.).

[3] See Mariette, *Abydos*, i. p. 56; A. M. Blackman, *The Rock Tombs of Meir*, London, 1914–15, i. 27 with note 4; ii. 17*a*, pp. 20 and 21 with note 1, *Journ. Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Soc.*, 1918–19, pp. 36, 39; N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *The Tomb of Amenemhēt*, London, 1914, p. 93 f.

[4] A. M. Blackman, *The Temple of Derr*, Cairo, 1913, pl. lxiv.

[5] The statement in art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), VII. 4, that 'the god's hand' was distinct from 'the god's adorer' is a mistake; see *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vii. p. 10, note 3, p. 18.

[6] Gayet, pl. ii. fig. 104. [7] *Ib.* pl. xxxviii. f.

[8] *Ib.* pl. i. fig. 106. [9] Lepsius, iii. 48*b*.

[10] See list of offerings in Lepsius, *loc. cit.*

[11] Cf. H. Junker, *Die Stundenwachen in den Osirismysterien*, Vienna, 1910, p. 102; Blackman, *RTr* xxxix. 68.

relief,[1] and then pour it out as a libation.[2] The two vessels which ancient custom prescribed the king should bear did not, of course, contain sufficient water for the elaborate rites of the historic periods. Accordingly the king's running with the water was in practice merely a symbolic act whereby he secured to himself the rôle of sole offerer of the water, whereas nearly the whole of the water actually used was brought in by the priests in a large number of vessels.[3]

(4) Yet another relief at Luxor,[4] depicting the presentation of food-offerings to Amūn and the co-templar divinities, gives one a good idea of the important rôles played by priests even when the king was celebrant. The king appears merely to be presiding during a considerable part of the performance. He stands holding a staff in his left and a mace in his right hand and is said to be 'viewing the presentation' of offerings. Facing the king and at some distance from him are four officiants, one of whom holds some indefinable object (perhaps a libation-vessel?). The other three with right arm extended and hand bent upwards are 'making the offering which the king gives.' Immediately in front of and facing the same way as the king stands another priest—a *sem*, or 'pillar of his mother'—accompanied by the high-priestess of Amūn, 'the god's adorer and god's hand.' This priest, whose right arm and hand are held out like those of the three above-mentioned officiants, is engaged in summoning the divinities to their repast: 'Come ye to this your bread, to your roast meat of the evening meal, which your son Amenōphis . . . has given you.' The high-priestess's hand is raised in adoration, palm outwards, and she is doubtless repeating simultaneously with her companion the formula of summoning the gods. In an adjacent relief[5] the king is seen with uplifted baton consecrating—'extending his arm four times' towards—the repast to which the gods had just been bidden.

7. Music.—Musician priestesses were attached to every temple, and male musicians and dancers also took part in the temple services.[6] The temple musicians of both sexes played a particularly important rôle in festival services and in the processions which were a special feature of these celebrations.[7] There is some reason for supposing that at Thebes and elsewhere, on the occasion of the annual festival of Ḥathor, that goddess's priestesses, when the temple service and the subsequent procession were ended, paraded the streets and, in company with the *ihwey*-priests, stopped at one house after another in order to bestow Ḥathor's blessing upon the inmates. This they did by dancing and singing and holding out to their audience—perhaps that they might touch them—the emblems of their goddess, the sistra and *mnit*-necklaces.[8]

It should be pointed out here that the rattling of the sistrum was supposed to keep at a distance what was evil or inimical to the gods.[9]

8. The object of official worship.—The whole object of official worship, as represented in the temple reliefs, was to obtain the favour of the divinities for the Pharaoh. In return for the offerings which he presents to them they promise him victory, gladness, life, stability, health, good fortune, abundance, millions of years, the duration of Rē', an eternity of jubilees, etc. The very temples of the gods were erected by the king that he might receive in return the 'duration of heaven,'[10] 'hundreds of thousands of years,'[11] and that he might 'be granted eternity as king.'[12] Thus the designation of every ritual act, 'giving [var. doing] this or that to [for] his father [var. mother] NN.' is followed by the words 'in order that he may make an "Endowed-with-life"[13] like Rē' forever,' the 'Endowed-with-life' being of course the king himself.

1 Gayet, pl. ii. fig. 105. 2 Kees, *ZÄ* lii. 66, fig. 2.
3 See Kees, *Opfertanz*, p. 60 ff.
4 Gayet, pl. xxxv. fig. 138. 5 *Ib.* pl. xxxiv. fig. 140.
6 See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), VIII. 3 (*d*) (musician priestesses), III. 2 (*ihy*-priests), XIII. 2 (*c*) (male dancers and musicians).
7 Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 23 *f.*; ii. 25, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vii. 21 *f.*; Davies-Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhēt*, 94 *f.*; Maspero, *Études de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptiennes*, Paris, 1893–1916, viii. 313; Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 151 *f.*; Kees, *Opfertanz*, pp. 105, 226 *f.*
8 Blackman, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* vii. 22.
9 *Ib.* 21 *f.*
10 H. Gauthier, *La grande Inscription dédicatoire d'Abydos*, Cairo, 1912, p. 1, l. 4.
11 *Ib.* p. 1, l. 6. 12 *Ib.* p. 2, l. 20 *ter.*
13 See T. E. Peet, *Journ. Egyp. Arch.* iii. [1916] 63.

II. *PRIVATE WORSHIP.*—We know very little about private worship. The individual citizen, we are told, refrained from what his local god hated,[1] avoided his wrath by joining in the celebration of his festivals,[2] and cared for the local sacred animals.[3] In some houses, if Mariette's account of excavations at Abydos is to be trusted, the innermost room served as a private chapel, in which was kept the image of a divinity, offering being made to it on a stone offering-table placed before it. Here, Erman supposes, the householder made his daily adoration.[4] A man would erect a shrine to Ernūtet, the harvest-goddess, in the yard of his granary,[5] or near his wine-press,[6] or he might, it would seem, set aside for his god a portion of his meal, placing it on an offering-stand prepared for that purpose.[7] To prosper his work the scribe, before he began to write, poured out from his water-bowl a libation to Imhotpe, the patron-divinity of scribes.[8] The ordinary citizen might be seen praying outside the great pylon of a temple, after having, perhaps, placed a gift for the god on an offering-table set up there to receive the contributions of humble folk.[9] The middle Kingdom citizens of Asyūt offered the first-fruits of the harvest to their local god Upwawet.[10] Theban landowners, or officials responsible for the harvest on temple- or crown-property, and no doubt the ordinary peasants as well, made offering to Amūn and the harvest-goddess Ernūtēt on the twenty-seventh day of the fourth month of Prōyet, *i.e.* the first day of the harvest festival. Also on the last day of that festival, the first day of the first month of Shōmu, the day the corn was winnowed, offering was made to Ernūtet.[11] On the last-named day the winnowers, ere they began their work, set up on the edge of the threshing-floor a rude figure of a harvest-divinity, apparently made out of a bundle of corn furnished with mud hands which grasp ears of corn. Before it they laid an offering consisting of dishes of food and a pot of water or beer.[12] On the analogy of harvest practices in other lands, may we not suppose that this 'divinity' is the first or last sheaf, the embodiment of the corn-spirit?[13]

III. *UNUSUAL POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF WORSHIP.*—Remarkable ideas about worship and man's relation to the gods were current among the middle and lower classes during the latter part of the New Kingdom—ideas which do not seem to have existed hitherto among the Egyptians and are not met with again till Christian times.

'To the sanctuary of God,' we are told, 'clamour is abhorrent. Pray to him with a loving heart whose words are all hidden; so will he grant thy request, hear what thou sayest, and accept thine offering.'[14] Similarly a hymn to Thōth of this date likens that god to a well in the desert which is 'closed for those who

1 Erman, *Life*, p. 272. 2 *Ib.*
3 *Ib.*; see also N. de G. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of Deir el-Gebrâwi*, London, 1902, ii. 30.
4 Erman, p. 272 f.; A. Mariette, *Catalogue général des monuments d'Abydos*, Paris, 1880, p. 1.
5 Erman, p. 273; cf. Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 120, and Davies, *El-Amarna*, i. pl. xxxi.
6 Erman, *loc. cit.*; J. G. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols., London, 1878, i. 385.
7 Davies, iii. pl. iv. p. 5b.
8 Gardiner, *ZÄ* xl. [1902–03] 146.
9 Erman, *SBAW* xlix. [1911] pl. xvi.
10 J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records*, 5 vols., Chicago, 1906–07, i. § 546.
11 N. de G. Davies, *The Tomb of Nakht at Thebes*, New York, 1917, p. 64 *f.*
12 Davies, pl. xx. p. 63 *f.*
13 For the purification of the lay-folk before entering a temple see art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 3. For the participation of the populace in the dramatic performances, at Abydos and elsewhere, illustrating the death, burial, and resuscitation of Osiris, see J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, pp. 287–290.
14 F. Chabas, *Les Maximes du scribe Ani*, Paris, 1876, p. 91 = Erman, *Handbook*, p. 84.

speak there and open for those who keep silence there. When the silent man cometh he findeth the spring.'[1]

IV. *The Aton-cult of King Amenophis IV.* ('Ôkhnatôn).—The liturgy celebrated in the temple or temples[2] erected by the heretic king 'Ôkhnatôn at El-Amarna differs in so many ways from the temple liturgy of the preceding and succeeding periods that it must receive separate treatment. For the beliefs responsible for these differences see Erman, *Handbook*, p. 62 ff.; Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, pp. 319–345.

1. **The daily liturgy in the temple of the Aton.**—There was no cultus-image of the Aton, and so all the toilet and pre-toilet ceremonies of the old temple liturgy were done away with. The worship of the Aton consisted mainly in the singing of hymns and presentation of food- and drink-offerings, of perfumes and flowers. The ritual acts, however, accompanying the presentation of these offerings were those of the old worship, the only difference visible in the representations of the various ceremonies being that the queen is shown acting in exactly the same capacity as the king.

As in the case of the old temple liturgy, the presentation of food- and drink-offerings was closely associated with the burning of incense and the pouring out of libation,[3] and the offerings were consecrated by the stretching out of the *ḥrp*-baton.[4] The practice of elevating trays of offerings was also continued.[5] As there was no cultus-image to anoint, unguent was held up to the Aton in alabaster jars and then placed on the altar.[6] The offering of unguent was evidently preceded by the burning of incense.[7]

It is possible that the offering of flowers was a more important feature in the Aton-cult than in the worship of the old Egyptian divinities, though they are constantly depicted as receiving a bouquet from the Pharaoh,[8] while their heaped-up food-offerings were regularly surmounted by a bunch of flowers.[9]

The El-Amarna reliefs permit us to reconstruct to some extent the sequence of episodes in the liturgy celebrated in the larger or outer temple.

(i.) When the king and queen came to this temple, their first act, according to a scene in the tomb-chapel of the high-priest Merirē',[10] was to make each an oblation at offering-stands set up in front of the pylon. After the burning of incense and the pouring out of a libation—the attendant high-priest is depicted bowing low and holding the censer and vase that have just been used for that purpose—the king and queen consecrated their gifts by extending over them the *ḥrp*-baton. During this performance the royal daughters rattled their sistra, and the attendant courtiers stood at a respectful distance bowing low with hands on knees.

(ii.) Having passed through the pylon, the king and queen, as we learn from a relief in the tomb-chapel of Panehesi,[11] proceeded to mount the steps to the high altar in the first court. On this altar a great oblation of joints of meat, poultry, vegetables, and bouquets of flowers was laid, and there was set on top of all three open pans of burning incense. The relief in question depicts the royal officiants in the act of scattering incense into these pans. One of their daughters stands near and holds out two bowls of incense to her parents, and the other two daughters rattle sistra. In front of the altar, facing the king and making profound obeisance, are the high-priest and the 'chief servitor of Aton.' The former, and probably the latter also, holds a bouquet of flowers—perhaps for the king to present after he has burned incense. Behind these two priests are four other priests in the same respectful attitude, each holding a round vessel containing liquid of some kind. Beside these again are four chanters, also bowing low and accompanying their singing with hand-clapping. The rest of the royal retinue remains in the entrance or outer court, or else altogether outside the temple precincts.

(iii.) While the king and queen were thus officiating at the high altar, priests placed offerings upon the altars in the outer court.[1] A relief in the tomb-chapel of Aḥmōse[2] also shows priests attending to the offering-tables, in this case in the outer court of the smaller temple, just before the arrival of the royal party.

(iv.) A visit of 'Ôkhnatôn to the temple was the occasion for the sacrifice of numerous oxen. The victims, beplumed and garlanded, were led straight to the slaughter-house,[3] or else to meet the royal cortège as it drew up at the temple-entrance.[4]

2. **The functions of musicians in the Aton-cult.**—(*a*) *Sistrum-players.*—While the king and queen burned incense, poured out libation, presented unguent, flowers, food- and drink-offerings, raised their hands in adoration before the altar, or performed the ceremony of consecration with outstretched *ḥrp*-baton, the royal daughters rattled their sistra.[5]

(*b*) *Temple choir.*—A body of blind vocalists accompanied by a blind harpist and sometimes by a lute-player, also blind, performed in the outer court or enclosure of the smaller temple.[6] An inscription in the tomb-chapel of Merirē' speaks of 'the singers and musicians . . . in the court of the House of the Benben . . . in Ikhtaton.'[7] The choir evidently sang and played off and on during the whole day, for they are depicted thus engaged both during and outside of the performance of the liturgy.[8]

(*c*) *Male chanters.*—Four chanters also figured in the Aton-worship. They are twice depicted singing and clapping their hands while the king and queen burn incense in the pans placed on the top of the food-offerings, in the one case in the great court of the larger temple,[9] and in the other apparently in the outer court of the smaller temple, where they are seen in close proximity to the blind vocalists and harpist who simultaneously make music.[10] They also ran in front of the royal procession to the temple,[11] thus, perhaps, performing the same functions as the lector of the old religion, who walked in front of the Pharaoh, when he went to the temple, and dispelled inimical powers by his recitations.[12]

(*d*) *Female musicians.*—According to the relief in the tomb-chapel of Panehesi discussed above, among those of the royal retinue who remained ontside the entrance to the enclosure or outer court of the larger temple, while the king and queen officiated at the high altar, were a number

[1] *Sallier Papyrus*, I. 8, 2 ff.; Erman, *Handbook*, p. 84. For a full account of this particular phase of Egyptian thought see B. Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. 81 ff.; Erman, *Handbook*, p. 78 f.; Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 344 ff.; see also art. Sin (Egyptian), 6.

[2] For the temple structure see Davies, *El-Amarna*, i. pls. x. A, xi. f., xxvi. ff., xxxiii., ii. pls. xviii. f. p. 20 ff., iii. pls. viii. ff., xxx., p. 19 ff., iv. pls. v. ff., xviii., xx., vi. pl. xx.

[3] Davies, ii. pl. v., v. pl. iii., vi. pl. xvi.

[4] *Ib.* i. pl. xxvii., ii. pl. vii., iv. pl. xv., vi. pl. xxvi.

[5] *Ib.* i. pl. xx. [6] *Ib.* ii. pl. vi.

[7] *Ib.* iv. pl. xxxv. [8] *E.g.*, Lepsius, iii. 141*a*.

[9] *E.g.*, Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pls. 32, 42*a*.

[10] Davies, i. pl. xxvii. [11] *Ib.* ii. pl. xviii.

[1] Davies, ii. pl. xviii. [2] *Ib.* iii. pl. xxv.

[3] *Ib.* [4] *Ib.* i. pl. x. A.

[5] *Ib.* i. pls. xxvi. f., ii. pls. v., vii. f., xviii., iv. pl. xv., v. pls. iii., xxviii.

[6] *Ib.* i. pls. xi., xxii., xxxiii., iii. pl. xxx.

[7] *Ib.* i. pl. xxxvii., ii. p. 26*b*.

[8] *Ib.* i. pls. xi., xxii. f., iii. pl. xxx.

[9] *Ib.* ii. pl. xviii. [10] *Ib.* i. pl. xxii.

[11] *Ib.* i. pls. x. A, xiv.

[12] *Piankhi Stele*, l. 104; Schäfer, *Urkunden*, iii. 23.

of female musicians. These are depicted singing to the accompaniment of hand-clapping, waving of palm-branches, and the beating of tambourines, or else lifting their hands in worship.[1] These female musicians likewise greeted the king on his arrival at the temple.[2] It was apparently also the same women who participated in the rejoicings at the decoration of courtiers.[3] It is to be noted that the female musicians are never shown performing inside the temple precincts.

3. Private worshippers in the temple of the Aton.—It seems to have been customary for a subject, after he had been decorated by 'Ôkhnatôn, to make a food- and drink-offering outside the pylon of the larger temple and to pray at the same time for the king's life, prosperity, and health, and that the Aton would 'vouchsafe him for ever.'[4]

In the top register of a scene in Merirê''s tomb-chapel depicting 'Ôkhnatôn's visit to the temple[5] two men wearing wigs, and carrying each a bouquet, lead along a beplumed and garlanded cow and a calf. Accompanying them, and also carrying bouquets, is a man with a shaven head, *i.e.* a priest. Possibly the two laymen are offering these victims themselves on the occasion of a royal visit, the presence of the priest being required in order that he might superintend the slaughter of the victims and make certain that they were pure.[6] In the same scene, bottom register, lay-folk are carrying bouquets and duck, while four priests follow, two leading oxen and two carrying bouquets. Both victims and duck are quite possibly private offerings. Davies[7] suggests, indeed, that the offerings placed on the altars in the outer or enclosing court of either temple were those of private people. This would account for priests serving these altars before the arrival of the king,[8] or while the royal party and chief priests were officiating at the high altar.[9]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the text and footnotes.

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WORSHIP (Greek).—I. *DEFINITION, ETC.*—Worship, in the widest sense, may be defined as the acknowledgment by man of his dependence on a power or powers beyond himself. And these powers, in whatever form they may be conceived, are believed by the worshipper to be more potent than himself; and, in whatever visible semblance or sign they are worshipped, they are imagined to be normally invisible.

At the outset of our study of Greek worship we are met by a consideration which it is important to realize. The central meaning of worship as we conceive it is the endeavour after a higher and better life. Whether as individuals or on stated occasions with our fellow-men we perform an act of worship, while we do indeed render thanks for blessings received and pray for blessings to come, yet the paramount intention of our worship is that we may be reminded, amid the clash and din of things temporal and fleeting, of the things which are unseen and eternal, to attune our hearts and minds to higher ideals of life. And, while we consider it right and seemly to bring to God offerings of a temporal kind, to beautify His sanctuary, to lay before Him tithes and firstfruits, and in His name to give our goods to feed the poor, yet we count it a better thing to bring the sacrifice of a contrite heart, which He will not despise.

Now, if we leave out of account some rare and sporadic utterances of the more advanced and enlightened thinkers and confine ourselves to the typical Greek conception of worship, we find that the motive and intention is of a wholly different kind. Man worships his god or gods not because he has any lively feeling of gratitude for blessings experienced, still less because he desires to live a better life, but because he has an overwhelming conviction of his dependence on his god or gods for all temporal blessings. H. Usener[1] perhaps rather overstates this point of view, but in general it is true.

'Pray now, O stranger, to the Lord Poseidon: for his feast it is on which you have happened in coming here. And when thou hast made libation and hast prayed, as is right (θέμις), then give to this man also a cup of honey-sweet wine to make libation, since I deem that he too prays to the immortals. All men have need of Zeus.'[2] 'From the gods come all means of mortal excellence—from the gods are men wise and mighty of hand and eloquent of tongue.'[3] 'Always we all have need of Zeus.'[4]

If our definition of worship is open to the objection that it would include magic, the defence must be that it is impossible to frame a definition of worship which would be at once sufficiently wide and yet exclude magic. The acts of worship and the acts of magic are in origin at least inseparable. If we so define worship as to distinguish it from magic, it will be by a definition applicable only to the higher kinds of worship. It is no more possible to distinguish worship and magic by absolute and generally valid *criteria* than it is to distinguish religion from superstition.

Essentially magic is the performance of an act accompanied by verbal incantations which invoke objects of worship not known or not recognized by ordinary society. And just so far the modern view may be justified which makes the prime distinction between religion and magic to be that religion is social and promotes the good of the community, while magic is anti-social and tends to exalt the individual to the detriment of the community.

II. *THE RELATION OF RITUAL TO RELIGION.*—It used to be the fashion to regard the practices of ritual as later than the religious ideas of which they were the expression. The religious theory was regarded as primitive and essential; the religious ritual was regarded as the reasoned form in which the theory found expression. But modern investigation suggests that the reverse is the case. A festival which in historical times is definitely religious in character and is accompanied by a theory which professes to account for the various practices of the ritual may easily have been in its origin of an entirely secular character. The wide-spread practice of seasonal festivals, particularly those of mid-winter and of spring, can hardly be accounted for on any supposition that they were originally religious in character. Their origin is much more reasonably explained and their universality is much more easily understood if we regard them as having been at first purely secular, the natural reaction to the character of the season. The tribe meet at mid-winter and in spring to hold their festival with song and story. The character of the season will naturally influence the character of the festival. But, save in so far as mere ecstasy is religious in character, there is nothing religious in the celebration until a theory is evolved. When at mid-winter all nature is asleep—*ἐνιαυτός*[5] can hardly mean anything else than the sleeping season—the tribal festival may be explained as intended to celebrate the passing of a god who is asleep or is slain. When in spring all nature awakes to life, the festival may be explained as the awakening or the resurrection of

[1] Davies, ii. pl. XVIII.
[2] *Ib.* i. pls. X. f., XIII.
[3] *Ib.* i. pl. VI., ii. pls. XI., XXXIII.
[4] *Ib.* iv. pl. XVIII. p. 15.
[5] *Ib.* i. pls. X. A, XIV.
[6] See artt. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 5, PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), XVI.
[7] ii. 22a.
[8] *Ib.* iii. pl. XXX.
[9] *Ib.* ii. pl. XVIII.

[1] *ARW* [1904].
[2] Hom. *Od.* iii. 45.
[3] Pind. *Pyth.* i. 41 f.
[4] Aratus, *Phæn.* 4.
[5] The old derivation from *ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ* ('Here we are again!'), though revived in recent times, is of course absurd.

the god. But the ritual in its main outlines precedes the theory. Indeed it is only with the utmost difficulty that the theory will produce any innovation in the ritual. Many of the ritual usages are probably in their origin purely accidental. When on a memorable occasion something happens to be done in a particular way, the tendency will be to do it in the same way again. The usage becomes stereotyped, and the theory will try to account for it: thenceforth it is held to be the only way that is valid and effective. Even if no convincing explanation is found in theory, ancestral custom will be sufficient to perpetuate it. This ancestral custom is what the Greeks call ὁ πάτριος νόμος.[1] This νόμος (or νόμοι) is believed to be of immemorial antiquity, with all the superior sanction that attaches to the unwritten as opposed to the written law, and is held to regulate all the fundamental sanctities of life. The point of view is beautifully expressed in the words of Antigone: *οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ᾠόμην τὰ σὰ | κηρύγμαθ' ὥστ' ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν | νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄνθ' ὑπερδραμεῖν. | οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε | ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδείς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.*[2]

Hence in the *Politicus*, 290 E, we find custom almost equated with sanctity: *τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν.* So the solemn supplication of Himilkas is carried out *κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος.*[3]

III. *OBJECTS OF WORSHIP.*—We may conveniently divide the objects of worship into primitive or non-anthropomorphic and later or anthropomorphic.

A. NON-ANTHROPOMORPHIC.[4]—The evidence for non-anthropomorphic worship cannot occupy much space in a brief sketch like the present, and there is the less need to discuss it in detail because in general the lower strata of Greek religious ideas resemble those found in the earlier stages of development of other peoples or among primitive peoples of the present day. As among these, so among the Greeks we find traces of the worship of inanimate things and of animals. But before we glance at the evidence it is desirable that we should represent clearly to ourselves what exactly such worship means.

The ultimate root of religion is to be found in the instinctive sense of the mysterious, the uncanny. This sense is not equally strong in all men any more than all men are equally religious, and the things by which it is excited vary indefinitely, from the uttermost of beauty to the uttermost of loathing. In the street and under the garish sun all experience is immediate and commonplace. But if, for instance, one make his way to some lonely glen high among the hills—'per loca pastorum deserta atque otia dia'—where only the moorfowl call and only the whaups are crying, then even the most commonplace feels an instinctive awe, a sense of mystery which he cannot express even to himself. This is what the Romans call 'religio loci.' The origin of the word *religio* is a matter of dispute to-day as it was among the Roman antiquaries themselves. But even through the perplexities of the Roman discussions[5] there shines some perception of what we believe to be the right idea of the word, which corresponds very closely to 'reflexion,' ἀναλογισμός, the 'sense of something far more deeply interfused,' the 'misgiving of a creature moving about in worlds not realized'—in a word, the sense of the uncanny. This sense may be awakened merely by the loathly, as, *e.g.*, the toad, to which the rustic mind ascribes all manner of strange powers,[1] or by the merely curious—a stone or tree of fantastic shape. Objects which in whatever form have power to excite such emotions are regarded with awe. They must be approached with circumspection. They are looked upon as things apart: they are ἱερά. When then we find it said that a certain Greek tribe worship a particular animal or a particular object, often no more is meant than this. Their worship is predominantly fear.

But there are higher mysteries than these: the mystery of death and birth, of growth and adolescence, of the regular recurrence of the seasons, of mother-love and self-sacrifice, of instincts which 'aspire to immortality and seem to promise it.' It is by way of such mysteries that the religion of fear becomes transformed and transfigured into something higher: if not into a religion of love, which is essentially a Christian idea, at least into a religion in which reverence is more prominent than fear, in which the gods are no longer imagined as the jealous enemies of mankind but as their protectors. Swift to punish transgression, yet they do not will that any should perish. They are givers of good things,[2] if they are also givers of evil. Even if they 'deal to men two evils for one good,' only the foolish murmur. Good men loyally accept the conditions of mortality, turning the bright side out.[3]

1. **Holy places.**—Among non-anthropomorphic things to which sanctity, in the sense we have described, attaches we have first of all holy places. The Mucklestane Moor was felt by Hobbie Elliot to be 'an unco bogilly bit.'[4] The same sort of feeling was perfectly familiar to the Greeks. A bush-clad hill in Arcadia was fabled to be the place where Rhea gave birth to Zeus:

'In Parrhasia (Arcadia) it was that Rhea bare thee, where was a hill sheltered with thickest brush. Thence is the place holy and no four-footed thing that hath need of Eileithyia nor any woman approacheth thereto, but the Apidanians call it the primeval childbed of Rhea.'[5]

As a typical case we have the cave sanctuaries all over Crete, particularly those on Mount Ida and Mount Dictæum associated with the worship of the Cretan Zeus.

2. **Holy animals.**—The same kind of sanctity attached to various animals in different localities: storks and ants in Thessaly; weasels in Thebes; especially the snake—*e.g.*, in connexion with Asklepios, Sopolis, Cychreus. Best known of all is the *οἰκουρὸς ὄφις* on the acropolis at Athens which every month received honey-cakes.[6] Other familiar cases are the mice in the temple of Apollo Smintheus, the owl of Athene, etc.

3. **Holy trees.**—Among proofs of the cult of living trees we have the familiar idea of the tree-nymphs under their various names—Dryads, Hamadryads, Meliæ, etc.—who live in the life and die with the death of the holy tree. Where myth gives an ætiological legend to explain just why a tree is sacred, we may quite confidently neglect the legend and infer that the holiness attached to the tree before myth gave the alleged reason.

Thus the Delian palm was sacred. Myth gave as the reason that this was the palm which supported Leto at the birth of Apollo. So the laurel in the vale of Tempe, from which crowns were made for the victor at the Pythian games, derived its sanctity, according to myth, from the purification of Apollo at Tempe after he had slain the Python. Similarly the stump of the wild strawberry-tree at Tanagra was held sacred for the alleged reason that Hermes had been reared under it.[7]

[1] Plato, *Laws*, 959 B; Thuc. ii. 34.
[2] Soph. *Ant.* 453 ff.; cf. Plato, *Laws*, 793 A, 680 A.
[3] Diodor. xiii. 86. See also E. Monseur, 'La Proscription religieuse de l'usage récent,' *RHR* liii. [1906].
[4] See M. W. de Wisser, *Die nicht menschengestaltigen Götter der Griechen*, Leyden, 1903.
[5] Esp. Aulus Gellius, iv. 9. 1; Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 28, 72; Cato, *ap.* Fest. *s.v.* 'Repulsior.'

[1] Hence the magic potency of 'Eye of newt, and toe of frog' (Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, iv. i. 14).
[2] *θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων*, Hom. *Od.* viii. 325.
[3] Pind. *Pyth.* iii. 81 ff.
[4] Scott, *The Black Dwarf*, ch. ii.
[5] Callim. *Hymn.* i. 10 ff. [6] Herod. viii. 41.
[7] Paus. ix. 22. 2.

In these and in numberless other cases we must recognize now that the holiness is a much earlier thing than the myth—which merely attempts to explain an existent fact.

4. Holy stones.—Stones to which a special sanctity attaches form one of the most common features of early legend everywhere. Greece is no exception.

Thus Phemios, king of the Ainianes, fought a duel with Hyperochos, king of the Inachians, for their land and guilefully slew him by hurling a stone, which was thenceforward regarded by the Ainianes as holy.[1]

There are a number of references in Pausanias to 'undressed stones,' *λίθοι ἀργοί*, which were the object of veneration.

Thus in vii. 22. 3 he tells us that at Pharai in Achaia certain square stones (*τετράγωνοι λίθοι*), about thirty in number, were worshipped by the people of Pharai, who applied to each of them the name of a god: and he adds an important remark: *τὰ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότερα καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι Ἕλλησι, τινὰς θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀγαλμάτων εἶχον ἀργοὶ λίθοι.* In ix. 24. 3 Pausanias mentions at Hyettos in Bœotia a shrine of Herakles where the image was 'not artistic but an undressed stone in the ancient fashion.' On the acropolis at Athens Pausanias, i. 28. 5, mentions two *λίθοι ἀργοί*: *τοὺς δὲ ἀργοὺς λίθους, ἐφ' ὧν ἑστᾶσιν ὅσοι δίκας ὑπέχουσι καὶ οἱ δώκοντες, τὸν μὲν Ὑβρεως τὸν δὲ Ἀναιδείας αὐτῶν ὀνομάζουσι.*

The typical case of the holy stone is the *βαίτυλος*, which legend explained to be the stone which Rhea gave to Cronus in place of the infant Zeus.[2] Pausanias, x. 24. 5, speaking of Delphi, says:

ἐπαναβάντι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μνήματος (of Neoptolemus), *λίθος ἐστὶν οὐ μέγας· τούτου καὶ ἔλαιον ὀσημέραι καταχέουσι, καὶ κατὰ ἑορτὴν ἑκάστην ἔρια ἐπιτιθέασι τὰ ἀργά· ἔστι δὲ καὶ δόξα ἐς αὐτόν, δοθῆναι Κρόνῳ τὸν λίθον ἀντὶ τοῦ παιδός, καὶ ὡς αὖθις ἥμεσεν αὐτὸν ὁ Κρόνος.*

This brings us to the question of the place in Greek worship of the holy pillar. Every one is familiar with the passage in Gn 28[18ff.] which tells how 'Jacob rose up early in the morning and took the stone that he had put under his head and set it up for a pillar (מַצֵּבָה), and poured oil upon the top of it [as the Delphians did with the *βαίτυλος* in Pausanias, *loc. cit.*]. And he called the name of that place Bethel [House of God], . . . and Jacob vowed a vow,' etc. It is an old suggestion that *βαίτυλος* is nothing else than a Greek transliteration of the Hebrew בֵּית־אֵל. But, in any case, the important thing to realize is that there are two kinds of sanctity attaching to such things as we have been discussing: natural sanctity and derivative sanctity. There is what may be called the natural sanctity which everywhere attaches to the uncanny. To this class belongs the *λίθος καππώτας* which is mentioned by Pausanias, iii. 22. 1:

Γυθείου δὲ τρεῖς μάλιστα ἀπέχει σταδίους ἀργὸς λίθος· Ὀρέστην λέγουσι καθεσθέντα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ παύσασθαι τῆς μανίας· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λίθος ὠνομάσθη Ζεὺς Καππώτας κατὰ γλῶσσαν τὴν Δωρίδα.

That is to say, there was something which seemed uncanny about this stone, and so an ætiological legend arose to explain it. But in the case of Jacob there is no hint that the stone which he selected for his pillow possessed in itself any unusual virtue, and, familiar as we are with the potency of, say, a bit of wedding-cake as a provoker of auspicious dreams, we seem to have no right to read any such meaning into Jacob's use of the stone. Indeed in Gn 28[22] it is rather emphasized that its particular meaning derives from the voluntary act of Jacob and not from any natural quality.

We hold, then, that the holy pillar in worship is originally purely symbolical. That this is the case and that we have here to do with no original sanctity is already obvious when we consider that the pillar is rather an artificial than a natural form. It seems to be generally assumed that the *ἀργὸς λίθος* of Pausanias is merely an 'undressed stone,' of no particular shape. We think there is better reason to suppose that it was a stone dressed to a quadrangular shape but not carved into a definite anthropomorphic type. The quadrangular block seems quite well established as a half-way stage to the fully developed image. There is a very significant passage in Pausanias, viii. 48. 6, where, speaking of Tegea in Arcadia, the natural home of 'pre-lunar' customs, he says:

'There is also erected an altar of Zeus Teleios and a square image (*ἄγαλμα τετράγωνον*): *for this is a type in which*, it seems to me, *the Arcadians particularly delight.*'

The two most familiar Greek forms of this type are the pillars of Hermes and the pillars of Apollo Agyieus. For the shape of the Hermai we have the very definite testimony of Thucydides, vi. 27:

ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων· εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον ἢ τετράγωνοι ἐργασία,

where, with Sir Richard Jebb (against Hude), we regard the last three words as thoroughly genuine. The shape of the Apollo pillars is perhaps not quite so clearly established by the ancient authorities. But it is quite clear that they had an artificial shape, and therefore an artificial, and not a natural, sanctity.[1]

But it is to be clearly understood that this is a question of origins only. Derivative sanctity may be quite as valid and quite as potent as natural sanctity. The landmark of my neighbour or the coffin in which he obtains his last landtenure may be made of common wood, but just because the timber is employed for this solemn purpose it acquires extraordinary virtues. And in the same way the symbolic pillar may easily acquire unnatural virtues, and may indeed, as seems well attested, be regarded as the abode, at least temporarily of the godhead. And the pillar may, of course, survive as a symbol even in a fully developed anthropomorphic worship—*e.g.*, the obelisk as the *βαιτύλιον* of Apollo Agyieus on coins of Ambracia.[2]

B. ANTHROPOMORPHIC CULTS.—It is characteristic of the objects of anthropomorphic cult that they are all, in greater or less degree, worshipped in the higher sense: that is to say, they are invoked with prayer and offerings. A rigid classification is difficult, because there is a continual transference of the members of one class into another, from higher to lower, no less than from lower to higher. But the classes of cults may be conveniently arranged as follows.

1. The dead.—We find in Homer that the funeral of a great prince is accompanied by funeral games. Thus in *Il.* xxiii. we have the *ἆθλα ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ*, in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 654, the *ἆθλα Ἀμφιδάμαντος*. In the case of a private individual doubtless the ceremonies were less elaborate, consisting of the offerings at the grave and the funeral feast,[3] with which we used to be familiar in Scotland, and which might be of decent proportions or might rise to the extravagance of Lord Ravenswood's funeral, when, according to Caleb Balderstone, 'there was as much wine drunk in this house as would have floated a pinnace.'[4] But in any case the funeral feast did not terminate the dues of the dead (*γέρα θανόντων*). In historical

[1] Cf. Harpocrat. *s.v.* *ἀγυιᾶς . . . ἀγυιεὺς δέ ἐστι κίων εἰς ὀξὺ λήγων* (*i.e.* terminating in a cone) *ὃν ἱστᾶσι πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ὡς σαφὲς ποιοῦσιν Ἀριστοφάνης τε ἐν Σφηξί* (875) *καὶ Εὔπολις*=Suid. =schol. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 870; cf. Hellad. *ap.* Phot. 535[b] 33 ff.; Æsch. *Ag.* 1081; Eur. *Ph.* 631; Pherecr. frag. 87; Plaut. *Bacch.* 170.

[2] B. V. Head, *Hist. Numorum*, Oxford, 1887, p. 319 *f.* Into the details of pillar cult we cannot here enter. For a somewhat extreme view the reader should consult the important paper by Arthur J. Evans in *JHS* xxi. [1901] 99–204, on 'Mycenæan Tree and Pillar Cult and its Mediterranean Relations,' and in the same volume, p. 268 ff., the reply by W. H. D. Rouse, and for a *via media* L. Ziehen, in *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, 1908, who thinks that both Evans and Rouse have rushed to extremes which the evidence does not justify.

[3] *περίδειπνον* (Dem. xviii. 288).

[4] Scott, *The Bride of Lammermoor*, ch. vii.

[1] Plut. *Qu. Gr.* 13.

[2] Cf. Hesych. *s.v.* *βαίτυλος· οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ δοθεὶς λίθος τῷ Κρόνῳ ἀντὶ Διός.*

times we hear of a further celebration on the third, ninth, and thirtieth days after the funeral.[1] The character of these celebrations, attended by the friends and relatives of the dead, is sufficiently attested.[2] The ceremonial on the thirtieth day, which apparently marked the end of the normal period of mourning,[3] was noteworthy for the fact that the company who met to banquet together in honour of the deceased (*ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποθανόντι*) did not *recline* but *sat*, in accordance with ancient custom; hence the ceremonial was called *καθέδρα*.[4] Still further there was the annual festival called *γενέσια*. It is disputed whether this celebration was held on the anniversary of the birthday of the deceased or on the anniversary of the day of his death.[5]

The generic term for offerings to the dead is *ἐναγίσματα*,[6] which is precisely the Latin *sacra* and implies that the offerings were 'consecrated' to the dead: that the living did not partake of them. The corresponding verb is *ἐναγίζειν*. These offerings (called also *χοαί*, because normally they were 'poured' into the grave) consisted of milk, honey, water, wine, oil.[7] The schol. on Eur. *Hec.* 527 adds *ἄλευρον* (wheaten-flour).[8] Eustath. *Hom. Od.* 519, says the *μελίκρατον*, as the offering was called, was honey and milk in Homeric times, but honey and water in historical times. Stengel holds that milk was always an ingredient.

The libation was poured upon the grave and was accompanied by prayer.[9] The tomb was sometimes so constructed that the liquid could easily reach to the bones or ashes below.

Besides the libation there were other offerings constituting the *δεῖπνον* of the dead.[10] Naturally the constitution of this would be fairly constant, but would vary to some extent with individual taste or with the locality of the offerer.

The meal presented to the dead was not one which the living could share and was therefore wholly burnt.[11] The lexicographers define *ἐναγισμοί* as *ὁλοκαυτώματα*.[12] In other words, they belong to that class of sacrifices which were called *θυσίαι ἄγευστοι*.[13] It is sometimes said that these offerings to the dead were made at night, but there is no evidence of this; and, since funerals took place by day, there seems no reason why offerings to the dead should not also take place by day. In classical times they certainly did so.[14] Hom. *Il.* xxiii. 217 ff. certainly does not prove the contrary for Homeric times.

Mourning dress was worn.[1] No garlands apparently were worn; the music (it is sometimes said there was none), if any, was provided not by the cithara but by the flute or pipe.[2] The usual statement that there were no *ὀλαί*[3] is highly disputable.

To sum up, the essential features of the ritual of the dead are: (1) the ritual is restricted to the tomb; (2) liquids are poured into the tomb; (3) foods are burnt entirely and are not partaken of by the offerer; (4) prayer is, or at any rate may be, made to the dead, at least by members of their family.

2. The heroes.—Greece, like other countries, was full of legends of an earlier race of men upon the earth, who were mightier than their degenerate successors.[4] It was natural to imagine those heroes as the offspring of gods and human beings. It is precisely the idea of Gn 6[4]: 'There were giants in the earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown.' Hence *ἥρως* was identified with *ἡμίθεος*. The idea was perfectly familiar to Homer. Every one admits that Hesiod equated *ἥρως* with *ἡμίθεος*. But equally in Hesiod and in Homer this express identification is confined to a single passage: Hom. *Il.* xii. 23; Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 160; cf. Hom. *Hymn.* xxxi. 19, xxxii. 19.

From these imagined heroes the great families of Greece traced their descent. It is easy enough to understand that this canonization or 'heroization' was extended to contemporaries: thus Brasidas, the famous Spartan who fell at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., received heroic honours.

The terms used in heroic worship are closely akin to those which are used in the worship of the dead.

The testimony is uniformly that hero-worship was performed by night.[11]

In the case of the hero the place of the tomb was taken by the Heroum (*Ἡρῷον*).

A very important feature was the solemn procession.[12]

The essential features of heroic worship are thus: (1) the offerings belong to the class of *θυσίαι ἄγευστοι*: they are *ὁλοκαυτώματα*, wholly burnt, and the offerer does not partake; (2) the place of offering is a trench (*βόθρος*) or at any rate an *ἐσχάρα* (hearth);[13] (3) normally these offerings are performed at night (this statement can be taken only

1 Cf. Poll. viii. 146: *τρίτα, ἔνατα, τριακάδες*; Aristoph. *Lys.* 611 ff.; Isæus, ii. 36, viii. 39.

2 Æschin. iii. 225: *τελευτήσαντος δὲ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὰ ἔνατα διεξίοι πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους*; Dem. xviii. 243: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσειέ τις καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ φέροιτο, ἀκολουθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μνῆμα διεξίοι.*

3 Lysias, i. 14: *ἔδοξε δέ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ πρόσωπον ἐψιμυθιῶσθαι, τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τεθνεῶτος οὔπω τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας.*

4 Cf. Phot.: *ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καθέδρα ὅτι καθεζόμενοι ἐδείπνουν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐπλήρουν.*

5 This question is fully discussed by W. Schmidt, *Geburtstag im Altertum*, Giessen, 1908, p. 37 ff. who reaches the conclusion that, while *γενέθλια* denotes the celebration of the birthday of the living, *γενέσια* is the anniversary celebration of the death-day of the dead: cf. Herod. iv. 26. The *γενέσια* thus correspond precisely to the Roman *parentalia*.

6 Poll. viii. 146.

7 Æsch. *Pers.* 609 ff.; Soph. *El.* 894; Eur. *Or.* 114, *Iph. in Taur.* 158, *El.* 511.

8 Cf. Æsch. *Ch.* 91, *πέλανον* (for discussion of the meaning of this word cf. P. Stengel, *Hermes*, xxix. [1894] 281, Herzog, *ib.* p. 625, Stengel, *Hermes*, xxxi. [1896] 477); Ovid, *Fast.* ii. 539: 'inque mero mollita Ceres.'

9 *Com. Att. Fr.*, ed. T. Kock, i. 517; Aristoph. n. 488, 12: *καὶ θύομεν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς ἐναγίσμασιν | ὥσπερ θεοῖσι καὶ χοὰς γε χεόμενοι | αἰτούμεθ' αὐτοὺς δεῦρ' ἀνεῖναι τἀγαθά*; Æsch. *Ch.* 91 ff.: *ἣ τοῦτο φάσκω τοὔπος, ὡς νόμος βροτοῖς, | ἔσθλ' ἀντιδοῦναι τοῖσι πέμπουσιν τάδε.*

10 *ἐν νεκρῶν δείπνοις* (Artemid. *Oneirocr.* i. 4); *δαῖτες ἔννομοι . . . χοάς* (Æsch. *Ch.* 483 ff.).

11 G. Kaibel, *Ep. Gr.*, Berlin, 1878, 646.

12 Hesych., Suid., etc.; cf. Lucian, *Char.* 22.

13 Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 124 B: *ἄν τέ τις παρέχων ἑστίασιν ὥσπερ θυσίαν ἄγευστον αὐτὸς ἀπέχηται.*

14 Æsch. *Pers.* 609 f., *Ch., ad init.* and 149; Soph. *El.* 326 f., 405, 431, 883; Eur. *Hec.* 521 f., *Or.* 1114 f.

1 Æsch. *Ch.* 11; Eur. *Hel.* 1038.

2 Heliodor. *Æth.* 3. 1; cf. Æsch. *Ch.* 151 f.; Eur. *Iph. in Taur.* 145.

3 For meaning cf. Keil, *Hermes*, xxxi. [1896] 472.

4 See art. HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Greek and Roman).

5 Pind. *Ol.* i. 90; Bacchyl. vi. 5.

6 Thuc. v. 11; Plut. *Sol.* 9; Sertor. 9.

7 Cf. Paus. x. 4. 7; Plut. *Arist.* 21; Eur. *Tr.* 381, *El.* 92; Plut. *Thes.* 4.

8 Thuc. *loc. cit.* 9 *Arist.* 21.

10 So Plut. *Sol.* 21, *Arist.* 58, *Cat. Maj.* 15.

11 Proclus, on Hes. *Works and Days*, 763; Diog. Laert. vii. 33; schol. Pind. *Isthm.* iv. 110, etc.; schol. Ap. Rh. i. 587; schol. *Il.* viii. 66.

12 Pind. *Nem.* vii. 46 ff.; Hel. *Æth.* iii.

13 Cf. Paus. ii. 10. 1.

ἐναγίζειν, ἐναγίσματα. Herod. ii. 44 f.: *δοκέουσι δέ μοι οὗτοι ὀρθότατα Ἑλλήνων ποιέειν, οἳ διξὰ Ἡράκλεια ἱδρυσάμενοι ἔκτηνται, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὡς ἀθανάτῳ Ὀλυμπίῳ δὲ ἐπωνυμίην θύουσι, τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ ὡς ἥρωι ἐναγίζουσι*; i. 167: *καὶ γὰρ ἐναγίζουσί* (sc. the people of Agylla) *σφι* (sc. the Phoceans whom they had stoned to death) *μεγάλως καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν καὶ ἱππικὸν ἐπιστᾶσι.*

The offerings, or *χοαί*, in the case of heroes consisted of blood, and the more strict term for those was *αἱμακουρίαι*.[9] It was the custom to kill the victims[6] over an *ἐσχάρα* (hearth) or over a trench (*βόθρος*), so that the blood flowed into the earth.[7] But other things than blood were offered. Thuc. iii. 58 speaks of firstfruits of the crops: *ὅσα ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν ἀνεδίδου ὡραῖα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες.* This refers to the annual offerings made to those who fell at Platæa (479 B.C.). They received also *ἐσθήματα καὶ τἆλλα νόμιμα*.[8] There is here no mention of blood-offerings. But Plutarch[9] very clearly recognizes blood-offerings.[10]

as a very general assertion); (4) it is usually, and very naturally, said that there were no ὅλαι in the worship of the heroes. But this statement, resting apparently on a non-fundamental hypothesis, is doubtful. In Heliod. *Æth.* iii. 2 there are certainly *κανᾶ*, which should normally imply ὅλαι.

3. The chthonian gods.—The term 'chthonian' as used in Greek is ambiguous. A god may be associated with earth as Mother of all and be in this sense chthonian. Or a god may be associated with this or that land and be χθόνιος in that sense.[1] Lastly, a god may be associated with the under world, *i.e.* chthonian in the strictest sense. But here again a god may be chthonian in one aspect who is in all others Olympian. Hence 'chthonian' really denotes rather an aspect of this or that god than a permanent attribute. Perhaps the only purely chthonian deity is Hades—and that only if we neglect his non-chthonian representative. Hecate also would seem to be a purely chthonian deity; but we are immediately confronted by her confusion or amalgamation with Artemis. The fact is that any god may assume a chthonian character. When, then, we speak here of 'chthonian' gods, we mean either specifically chthonian gods, if there be such, or gods in their chthonian character.

The ritual is, naturally, precisely parallel to that of the dead and the heroes. The offerings are θυσίαι ἄγευστοι; they are made, or are supposed to be made, at night; and so on.

But, as we shall see, this is only when the 'chthonians' as such preserve their full authority. In numerous cases, where the ultimate sanction lies with the chthonians, the sacrifices take place in name of the Olympians, and so take place by day.

4. The Olympian or Ouranian gods.—We come now to the highest rank of gods, who are most usually denoted as Olympian, sometimes as Ouranian. The two terms are to all intents identical since even in Homer Olympos, the abode of the gods, sometimes loses its geographical meaning of a mountain in Thessaly and is really identified with Heaven (*οὐρανός*)—*e.g.*, *Il.* viii. 25, where Zeus threatens to suspend earth and sea by a chain attached to a 'peak of Olympus.' They are conceived as dwelling somewhere 'on high'; and so the Homeric worshipper when he prays 'looks unto the wide Heaven.'[2] They are gods of mercy rather than of anger, of blessing rather than of bane.[3] They keep the cities of men, and hence their worship comes first.[4]

We propose now to sketch the main features of Olympian worship. It will be easily understood that there must have been innumerable divergences in detail, according to date, place, and circumstance, which cannot be noticed here. All that we can endeavour to do is to give a reasonably complete and intelligible account of the fundamental principles.

(i.) *The apparatus of worship.*—(*a*) *The image* (ἄγαλμα) *of the god.*—The image is a characteristic feature of Greek worship, and Herodotus, i. 131, notes it as a remarkable fact that the Persians have neither image nor temple nor altar, which he attributes to their non-anthropomorphic conception of the gods. It is, of course, to be remembered that the absence of images characterizes both the lowest and the highest stages of religion. But in historical times at least the absence of an image was so exceptional as to call for special remark.[1] That the image, and that too in a fully anthropomorphic form, was known to Homer is clear on any reasonable interpretation of *Il.* vi. 92=273=303, where the Trojans lay a robe (*πέπλος*) 'on the knees of fair-tressed Athene,' *i.e.* on the knees of the image in her temple on the acropolis of Ilios.

The motive of the ἄγαλμα is well put by Dio Prus. *Or.* xii. 60–61:

'Nor would one say that it were better that no statue or image of the gods had been shown among men, it being meet that one should look only to the heavenly things. For all those things the wise man worships, believing in blessed gods whom he beholds afar. But through their yearning for the supernatural (τὸ δαιμόνιον) all men are possessed by a strong passion to honour and worship the divine at close quarters, drawing nigh to them and touching them convincingly, sacrificing to them and crowning them with garlands. It is with men just as with little children, who, being separated from father or mother, out of their great desire and longing stretch out their arms many a time in their dreams to their absent parents. Even so men, loving the gods as is their duty both because of their benefits and by reason of their kinship, yearn everyway to be with them and to walk with them. Hence also many of the barbarians, through poverty and through lack of art, give the name of gods to mountains and to unhewn trees (δένδρα ἄργά) and undressed stones (λίθους ἀσήμους).'

Historically the image is probably a development from the symbolic pillar, and it is more likely that its sanctity was acquired than that the sanctity was original and the image developed from a fetish object. Had the latter been the case, we should have expected a greater diversity of form than there seems actually to have been. The best example and the most familiar of the gradual transition from pillar to a more or less anthropomorphic form is afforded by the Hermai busts to which we have already referred. Even in historical times the images in many temples seem to have been mere uncarved 'boards,' *βρέτη* or *ξόανα*.[2] It is a matter of dispute whether *ξόανον* necessarily means a wooden image or whether it might not include metal or other material. In later times it is true that the word is applied to other than wooden images.[3] Yet on the whole it seems likely that the word primarily denoted a wooden board, planed (*λεῖον*) but not carved. The making of these old *ξόανα* was frequently attributed to Daidalos.[4]

(*b*) *The altar* (*βωμός*).—The usual term for altar is *βωμός* (cognate with *βῆμα*, 'platform'), whether used (like the Hebrew מזבח העלה [Ex 38[1]]) for burnt offerings or for the burning of incense (like the Hebrew מזבח מקטר קטרת [Ex 30[1]]). In the strict sense the *βωμός* is a 'high place,' an erection on which offerings are made to the Olympians, as opposed to the low *ἐσχάρα*, or hearth, on which offerings are made to the chthonians, the heroes, and the dead.

The altar was of course an essential part of the equipment of a temple. The chief altar stood

[1] So the *χθόνιαι νύμφαι* (Ap. Rh. ii. 504, iv. 1322).

[2] *Il.* iii. 364, vii. 178, 201, xix. 257, xxi. 272.

[3] Cf. Isocr. *Philip.* 116 *f.*: 'Do not be surprised if throughout my speech I urge you to render benefits to the Greeks—urge you to mildness and to loving-kindness. For I observe that severity is painful both to the severe and to those that have dealings with them, whereas mildness not merely in the case of men and all other animals is in good repute, but also in the case of the gods those who are the authors of our good things are called Olympian, while those whose function is to bring affliction and punishment receive harsher titles; and to the former temples and altars are established both by individuals and by cities, while the latter are honoured neither in prayers nor in sacrifices: on the contrary we perform rites to avert (*ἀποπομπάς*) their anger.'

[4] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 717 A: 'In the first place, we say that next after the Olympian gods and those who keep the city, honour should be given to the chthonians,' etc.

[1] Paus. ix. 25. 4 mentions a temple of the Moirai at Thebes in which there was no image (*ταῖς Μοίραις δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγαλμα*); cf. x. 33. 11.

[2] Cf. Callim. frag. 3 Mair=105 Schneid.: *οὔ πω Σκέλμιον ἔργον εὔξοον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τεθμῷ | δηναιῷ γλυφάνων ἄξοος ἧσθα σανίς | ὧδε γὰρ ἱδρύσαντο θεοὺς τότε· καὶ γὰρ Ἀθήνης | ἐν Λίνδῳ Δαναὸς λεῖον ἔθηκεν ἔδος.*

[3] *E.g.*, Eurip. *Tr.* 1074: *χρυσέων τε ξοάνων τύποι*: Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 12: *καὶ τὸ ξόανον ἔοικεν ὡς κυπαρίσσινον χρυσῷ ὄντι τῷ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ*; cf. Ammon. p. 97.

[4] Cf. Paus. viii. 35. 2, ix. 39. 8, and x. 40. 2 *f.*, where he describes among other works of Daidalos a *ξόανον* of Aphrodite at Delos which *κάτεισι ἀντὶ ποδῶν ἐς τετράγωνον σχῆμα*—a good parallel to the Hermai at Athens (*ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία*, Thuc. vi. 27).

inside the temple proper.[1] But outside the temple there stood in the *περίβολος*, or temple-court, other altars—*βωμοὶ πρόναοι*.[2] To the number of these there seems to have been no limit, the dedication of an altar being much like any other offering and corresponding very much to our custom of putting a stained-glass window in a church.[3] Stengel is of opinion that usually the altars inside the temple were used only for unburnt offerings, though he admits there were exceptions to this.[4] He maintains, however, even in the face of Paus. ii. 35. 5, that animals were never slaughtered at these inner altars. We think it impossible to reconcile Stengel's view with Pausanias.[5]

As for altars unconnected with a temple, these were to be found anywhere and everywhere, in town and country, in street and in market-place, in the house and in public places, in the workshop and in the gymnasium.

The size, shape, and material varied indefinitely. Some of the most curious were the *κερατών*[6] or *βωμὸς κεράτινος*[7] of Apollo at Delos which was made entirely of horns,[8] and was reckoned among the Seven Wonders of the World; altars at Olympia, Pergamos, and Samos made from the ashes of victims;[9] and an altar at Miletus made from the blood of victims.[10]

Where no altar was at hand it could be improvised.[11] It was customary to garland the altar with leaves[12] or flowers.[13]

(*c*) *The temple.*—The earliest 'holy place,' as we have seen above, is simply a place which in one way or another suggested the presence of something more than human. Such a place was felt to be *lερός, sacer*, something with which man must deal circumspectly: it was a 'God's acre,' to be set apart from secular use. Now, when in Homer, *Il.* vi. 194, the Lycians gave Bellerophon a 'choice portion' of land, the phrase is *τέμενος τάμον ἔξοχον ἄλλων*. Precisely the same word *τέμενος* is used of the portion of ground set apart for a god. The Latin cognate *templum* (from which we get 'temple') had the same original meaning of a marked-out space. That old sense is still familiar in the *cæli cærula templa* of Ennius[14] and the *cæli lucida templa* of Lucretius, i. 1014. The extent of this *τέμενος* might vary indefinitely. Thus Hom. *Il.* ii. 696 speaks of Πύρασος as Δήμητρος *τέμενος*, and Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 2, of Syracuse as the *τέμενος* Ἄρεος. These are, of course, poetical expressions. More strictly the *τέμενος* includes only the immediate environs of the temple proper, and normally it was marked off by a fence (*περίβολος*). If we may take a modern analogue and suppose that a country church, the churchyard and other ground round the church, the manse and the manse garden, the stabling accommodation for worshippers from a distance, are all enclosed within a fence, which might even include the glebe, we have a good parallel to the Greek *τέμενος*.

It is natural to suppose that many of the places to which sanctity was felt to attach would be groves of trees. Again, even when trees were cut down elsewhere to enable the land to be made arable, the trees of the holy *τέμενος* would be spared. Hence *ἄλσος*, or grove, is in Greek almost a synonym of *τέμενος*. At the present day in an otherwise rather treeless landscape you may pick out the church by its clump of trees. When Herakles consecrated a *τέμενος* to Zeus at Olympia, Pindar tells us that suddenly Herakles was struck by the absence of trees and bethought him of the wild olives which he had once seen by the shadowy springs of the Ister (Danube), and so he went and brought the wild olive to Olympia to be at once a prize for the victor and a hospitable shade for the visitor.[1]

Within this *τέμενος* is the temple proper denoted by *ναός* (Attic *νεώς*) or by *τὸ lερόν*. When a distinction is made between these two words, *ναός* is rather the inner sanctuary, while *τὸ lερόν* is wider. Again *ναός* may have practically the same sense as *ἄδυτον*, the Holy of Holies,[2] or may mean the temple generally.

Historically the temple is doubtless later than the *τέμενος* and the *βωμός*. Thus Homer, *Il.* viii. 48,[3] mentions *τέμενος* and *βωμός*, but does not refer to any temple. Pindar, *Pyth.* iv. 204 ff., tells how the Argonauts came to the Axeine (Euxine), *ἔνθ' ἀγὼν Ποσειδάωνος ἔσσαντ' εἰναλίου τέμενος, φοίνισσα δὲ Θρηϊκίων ἀγέλα ταύρων ὑπῆρχεν καὶ νεόκτιστον λίθων βωμοῖο θέναρ.* What the motive of the temple (*ναός*) was is not easy to determine. It is suggested that it was meant to protect the image of the god and the dedicated offerings. Whether this be so or not, a motive which must have come quite early into force was the feeling that the god must have his house even as men: only it must be more splendid and more beautiful. But perhaps the most potent motive of all was to create a definite centre for the worship of the god.

The sanctity attaching to the temple proper was extended, though doubtless in less degree, to the whole space enclosed by the *peribolos*. Ritual purity—the details are infinitely various—was demanded of all who came within it, and *περιῤῥαντήρια*, or vessels of holy water, were provided for purposes of lustration. We may quote as a single example of the sort of prohibition practised an inscription from the temple at Jerusalem: *μηθένα ἀλλογενῆ εἰσπορεύεσθαι ἐντὸς τοῦ περὶ τὸ lερὸν τρυφάκτου (=δρυφάκτου) καὶ περιβόλου· ὃς δ' ἂν ληφθῇ, ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος ἔσται διὰ τὸ ἑξακολουθεῖν θάνατον.*[4]

(*d*) *The priest.*—See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Greek).

(ii.) *The ritual of worship.*—The two most essential elements of ritual are prayer and sacrifice. We frequently of course find prayer without sacrifice; but sacrifice without prayer occurs only when an offering is made by way of expiation. Perhaps it is hardly worthy of the name of sacrifice, but, when the soilure of purification is cast into the sea or into running water, or when the filth (*καθάρματα*) of the house is deposited at the No Man's Land of the cross ways, no words are spoken: *ἢ σῖγ' ἀτίμως, . . . τάδ' ἐκχέουσα, γάποτον χύσιν, | στείχω καθάρμαθ' ὡς τις ἐκπέμψας πάλιν, δικοῦσα τεῦχος ἀστρόφοισιν ὄμμασιν.*[5]

(*a*) *Prayer.*—There is no more characteristic expression of man's dependence on a higher power than prayer. The self-sufficient man—*ὁ αὐθάδης*—is *δεινὸς τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ ἐπεύχεσθαι.*[6] For the special characteristics of Greek prayer the reader is referred to the art. PRAYER (Greek).

[1] *τὸν βωμὸν τὸν ἐντὸς τοῦ ναοῦ* (Paus. v. 14. 4).
[2] Æsch. *Suppl.* 494.
[3] Cf. Herod. ii. 135: *ὄπισθε μὲν τοῦ βωμοῦ τὸν Χῖοι ἀνέθεσαν, ἀντίον δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νηοῦ.*
[4] *E.g.*, Eur. *Andr.* 113; Herod. vi. 81; inscr. from Cos, *JHS* ix. 328.
[5] *Loc. cit.*; cf. Hom. *Il.* vi. 93 f.: *δυοκαίδεκα βοῦς ἐνὶ νηῷ . . . ἱερεύσαμεν*, where of course it can be held that the actual slaughter takes place outside the temple.
[6] Plut. *Thes.* 21. [7] Plut. *Mor.* 983 E.
[8] Cf. Callim. *Hymn. Apoll.* 62 f.
[9] Paus. v. 13. 8. [10] *Ib.* v. 13. 11.
[11] Apoll. Rh. i. 1123: the Argonauts in Pontus 'heaped stones for an altar' (*βωμὸν χέραδος παρενήνεον*); cf. ii. 695: *βωμὸν τετύκοντο χερμάσιν*, Theocr. xxvi. 3 ff.
[12] Ap. Rh. i. 1123. [13] Callim. *Hymn. Apoll.* 80 f.
[14] *Ap.* Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 7. 6.

[1] Pind. *Ol.* iii. 13 ff.
[2] Ἅγια Ἁγίων (He 9[3]; cf. Ex 30[6] 40[5], which, however, seem to imply that the θυμιατήριον stood not in the Holy of Holies but in front of the curtain [לִפְנֵי הַפָּרֹכֶת] which shut off the Holy of Holies).
[3] Cf. xxiii. 148, *Od.* viii. 363.
[4] W. Dittenberger, *Orientis græci inscr. selectæ*, 2 vols., London, 1903–05, ii. no. 598.
[5] Æsch. *Ch.* 95 ff. [6] Theophr. *Char.* iii. (xv.).

(*b*) *Sacrifice.*—The general features of ritual sacrifice are sufficiently well known to us, and a comparison of Hom. *Od.* iii. 417 ff., *Il.* 410 ff.; Ap. Rh. i. 402 ff. with Aristophanes, *Peace*, 937 ff., where Trygaios sacrifices to the goddess of Peace, shows that, as we should expect, the ritual remained very conservative. The procedure is outlined in art. SACRIFICE (Greek), where also the oath-sacrifice is discussed. See also art. PROPITIATION (Greek) for expiatory sacrifice, and art. VOTIVE OFFERINGS (Greek).

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WORSHIP (Hebrew).—**I. Introductory.**—(*a*) *Terms and underlying conceptions.*—The fundamental idea of worship, as conceived by the Hebrews, was expressed by the term 'service' (*'abōdāh*), the corresponding Greek term being λατρεία ('servitus religionis quam λατρείαν Graeci vocant').[1] 'To perform the service of God (or the Lord)' means, in the Pentateuch, to carry out the worship of God in accordance with the requirements of the Levitical Law (Nu 8^{11}, Ex 12^{25}). While such 'service' is, on its external side, elaborated in a series of ceremonial and liturgical acts, its inward and spiritual side is also emphasized; it is essentially a 'service' of heart and soul (Dt 11^{13}: 'And it shall come to pass, if ye shall hearken diligently unto my commandments which I command you this day, *to love the Lord your God*, and to serve him with *all your heart and with all your soul*,' etc.).

From the time when worship at one central shrine was established (*i.e.* the 18th year of Josiah, 621 B.C.) down to the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in A.D. 70 the worship of God was regarded as finding its only complete and adequate expression in the Temple service, with its elaborate cultus of priesthood and sacrifice (cf. Jn 4^{20}).

'The immense and manifold religious activities that concentrated themselves in the temple worship, can only be adequately realized when it is remembered how unique was the position occupied [for nearly seven centuries] by Judaism's central shrine. It was absolutely the one and only sanctuary where the highest expressions of the religious life of a whole people could be offered. Judaism possessed but one sanctuary, and that was in Jerusalem.'[2]

Jerusalem was for a long period visited by pilgrims from all over the ancient world, who appeared in the Holy City laden with gifts for the Temple. They came to Jerusalem 'for to worship' (Ac 8^{27}; cf. 24^{11}), and it was a pious duty for every faithful Jew to visit in this way the sanctuary at least once in a lifetime. This happened more particularly at the great feasts.[3]

The term *'abōdāh*, while it primarily had reference to the worship of the Temple, and more particularly to the ministry of the officiating priesthood therein, received further an extended application, and is used in the sense of divine worship generally, and especially prayer. A famous dictum ascribed to the high-priest Simeon the Just (*c.* 200 B.C.) runs: 'On three things the world stands: On the Torah, on the 'Abōdāh (*i.e.* the Temple-service), and on acts of love.'[4] It was after the destruction of the Temple that the term was applied specifically to prayer; cf. *Ta'anith*, 2*a* (with ref. to Dt 11^{13}): What is meant by the 'service of the heart? Prayer'; and (with ref. to Dt 28^{47} and Nu 4^{47}) *'Arak*, 11*a*: 'What is meant by service (worship) in joy and cheerfulness of the heart? It is song . . . What service is that which accompanies sacrificial service (worship)? It is song.' This spiritualizing of the idea of sacrificial worship had already made progress within Judaism (cf. *e.g.*, Ps 51^{17}), and is strongly emphasized in the NT. St. Paul speaks of 'your reasonable service' (*τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν*, Ro 12^{1}), which means 'a service to God such as befits the reason' (λόγος), *i.e.* a spiritual sacrifice and not the offering of an irrational animal; cf. 1 Pet. ii. 5.[1]

The other general term for 'worship' is in Hebrew *hishtaḥawāh* (השתחוה), the Greek *προσκυνεῖν*. This means 'prostrate oneself,' the most characteristic form of which action was among Orientals to fall upon the knees and touch the ground with the forehead as a mark of supreme reverence (the 'salaam'). This was one of the attitudes of prayer—prostration for prayer—which is defined in the Talmud[2] as 'spreading out the hands and feet.' It is related in the Rabbinical sources that, when the Temple was thronged with pilgrims, assembled to worship at the great feasts, though the congregation was wedged together so tightly as to be unable to move freely, when the moment arrived for prostration, in some unexplained and miraculous manner every member was able to prostrate himself.[3] The term (השתחוה) is often employed in Scripture in the sense of 'worship,' though it is not confined to acts of worship directed to God. Thus it is used to express supplication or reverence towards men.[4] But it is applied to acts of public worship in the Temple, especially in the Psalms and Chronicles. Such characteristic phrases occur as 'O worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness' (*i.e.* in festal attire); Ps 29^{2} 96^{9} (cf. 1 Ch 16^{29}, 2 Ch 20^{21}). Perhaps the idea of worship is most fully expressed in Psalms 93 and 95–100, especially in such verses as the following:

'O come, let us worship and bow down:
Let us kneel before the Lord our Maker' (95^{6}).

The other great element in the fully developed worship was that of praise, or thanksgiving. One of the keynotes of the Psalms is 'give thanks' (*hōdú*)—cf., *e.g.*, Pss 118, 105–107—or 'praise' (*Hallel*); cf. Pss 111–113, etc. 'Praise ye the Lord' (*Hallelu-jah*).

A good illustration of the acts of worship which were typical of Jewish piety is contained in the following passages:

'Sing unto the Lord, all the earth;
Shew forth his salvation from day to day.
. . . . . .
Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name:
Bring an offering, and come before him:
Worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness' (1 Ch $16^{23.29}$).

'And Ezra opened the book in the sight of all the people; . . . and when he opened it, all the people stood up: and Ezra blessed the Lord, the great God. And all the people answered, Amen, Amen, with the lifting up of their hands: and they bowed their heads, and worshipped the Lord with their faces to the ground' (Neh 8^{5c}).

(*b*) *The ancient cultus.*—Before the centralization of the cultus in the Jerusalem Temple, worship was carried out at various local shrines or altars, which were numerous throughout the land. Probably every city or village had its *bāmāh*, or 'high place' (cf. 2 K 17^{9} 23^{8}, Ezk 6^{6}), and in some cases the seat of the local worship was of more than local importance. There were famous shrines at Dan, Bethel, Gilgal, Beersheba, Shechem, Gibeon, and Samaria, some (but by no means all) of which figure in the patriarchal history (cf., *e.g.*, for Bethel Gn 28^{19}, Am 5^{5}, etc., and for Beersheba Gn 26^{23-25}, Am 5^{5}).

That Jahweh could be worshipped at the local *bāmāh* in a perfectly legitimate way is clear from 1 S 9, 10, where Samuel the seer is represented as going up to the *bāmāh* to worship, and where his arrival to bless the sacrifice is awaited by the people. To this a room or hall (Heb. *lishkāh*) is attached, where the sacrificial meal is eaten by the assembled guests. In the time of David, and during the early years of Solomon, Gibeon was the great 'high place,' to which the king himself resorted for sacrifice (1 K $3^{3.4}$, 2 Ch $1^{3.13}$). In the earlier period (of the Judges) a special importance seems to have been attached to the place where the ark was located, and during the period of its existence Shiloh may be regarded as the principal sanctuary. Here a special building (a 'temple,' *hēkal*) was erected for the greater safety of the sacred symbol; a local priesthood, the house of Eli, was attached to it; and its annual festival was much frequented (cf. Jg 21^{19}, 1 S $1^{3.21}$). This sanctuary, which R. H. Kennett regards as a genuinely Israelitish sanctuary, not taken over from the Canaanites, and possibly the original sanctuary of the Levites, was probably destroyed by the Philistines after the battle of Ebenezer (1 S 4^{11}), a catastrophe to which Jeremiah, apparently, alludes (Jer 7^{12}). Subsequently the family of Eli was established at Nob, which thus became a sacred shrine.

[1] Augustine, *de Civ. Dei.* v. 15.
[2] G. H. Box, in *EBi*, col. 4948 (*s.v.* 'Temple-Service').
[3] 'The normal population [of Jerusalem] cannot possibly have ever exceeded 50,000, but at the great feasts more than a million were frequently gathered around the Temple' (*The Beginnings of Christianity*, ed. by F. J. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake, London, 1920, pt. i. vol. i. p. 1).
[4] *Pirqê Abôth*, i. 2.

[1] Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*[5] (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1902, *ad loc.* For the transformation of sacrificial ideas in the synagogue liturgy see below, p. 794, § 4.
[2] *T.B. Berāk.* 34*b*, *Meg.* 22*b*.
[3] *Ber. Rab.* v. on Gn 1^{9} and parallels.
[4] Cf. 1 S 25^{24}, 2 K 4^{37}, Est 8^{3}, Mt 18^{29}, Lk 8^{41}, Ac 10^{25}.

What became, however, the most important of all the Israelite sanctuaries was that of Jerusalem, which was held by the Jebusites till the time of David (cf. Jg 1^{21} $19^{11ff.}$, 2 S 5^{6-9}). Here the sacred rock and cave, which have played so conspicuous a part in Hebrew, Christian, and Muhammadan worship, may already have been the seat of an earlier Jebusite shrine. When Solomon built on this site his splendid Temple and royal palace, the former (as in the case of Shiloh) was sanctified by the presence of the ark.

An interesting survival of the earlier Israelite shrines is probably to be seen in the institution of Levitical cities. This is a feature of the late priestly legislation, and is probably to be accounted for by the fact that the Levites, who in the post-Exilic period occupied a position subordinate to the priesthood proper, were the descendants of the old local priestly families, which ministered at the local sanctuaries or 'high places.' The Levites possessed large estates at such places as Shechem, Gezer, Hebron, Beth-shemesh, Kedesh, Taanach Ashtaroth, Ramoth-Gilead, Bezer, Gibeon (cf. Jos 21^{1-42}). These priestly estates existed in the various localities where there had been a 'high place.' 'Could the complete history of these Levitical cities be written it seems probable that in each case it would be found that each had been the centre of an independent shrine in the days before Josiah's reform.'[1]

Recent excavation in Palestine has brought to light many remains of ancient 'high places' and altars.[2] It was around these shrines that the worship of the ancient Hebrews was concentrated. To these spots they flocked as the annual festivals came round, and at the recurring new moons and sabbaths, to offer their tithes, their firstfruits, and their sacrifices (cf. 2 K 4^{23}, Am 8^{5}, etc.). The character of this worship was essentially joyous, music, dancing, and revelry being marked features (cf. Am $6^{5f.}$). Unfortunately it is impossible for us to reconstruct fully and adequately the ceremonies that accompanied the ancient worship. All we can say with certainty is that its centre was the local altar—in some cases the local shrine being of more than local importance (Shiloh, later Dan, Bethel, and Jerusalem). The altar had as its practically indispensable adjuncts the sacred pillar (*maṣṣēbāh*) and *ăshērāh*, or sacred pole, which was the symbol, apparently, of a goddess.[3] Another adjunct was the sacrificial hall or room (Heb. *lishkāh*) where the sacrificial feast was held.

The local sanctuaries were served by a local priesthood, though it is improbable that, as a rule, more than one family exercised the priestly office at any smaller particular locality. The story of Micah given in the appendix to the book of Judges (ch. 17 *f.*) shows how a shrine could be set up by the head of a household, who could appoint one of his sons (an Ephraimite) to act as his priest. It is only later that a wandering Levite is appointed in his place, who subsequently was carried off by the Danites and became the founder of the long line of priests who ministered at the famous sanctuary of Dan in the far north. Similarly David made his sons priests (2 S 8^{18}), although the principal priest at the time was Abiathar, a descendant of Eli. It was natural that the priests who were attached to the more important shrines should themselves increase in importance and wealth, in course of time. 'The wealth thus acquired was in many instances invested in land in the vicinity of the city in which the priests officiated. In course of time, therefore, there were large priestly estates in and about the cities where temples or high places were situated.'[4] According to Ezk 44[7], in the pre-Exilic period the manual labour connected with the shrines and sacrifices had (doubtless only after wealth had increased) been performed by foreign slaves, who were kept by the more wealthy priests.

The character of the old simple worship of Jahweh was fundamentally transformed when the Israelites passed from the nomadic stage and became a settled agricultural community. Jahweh, who had at first been regarded as essentially a war-god, who led His chosen people to victory against enemies—though this was not the only aspect of His character—now became the God (Baal) of the land, and as such the God of agricultural law. The body of agricultural laws which gradually grew up under these conditions came to be looked upon as an essential part of the original covenant by which Jahweh became the God of the Hebrews (Ex 21–23). Another result was that the great festivals were placed upon an agricultural basis.

'To the simple Passover feast, which commemorated the yeaning time of domestic animals, an agricultural offering of first fruits in the form of unleavened bread was added. This occurred because the first ripe grain was gathered at the very season in which the old nomadic feast fell. Seven weeks later a new agricultural festival, commemorative of the completion of the harvest, was added, while the old autumn festival of the date harvest became the festival of the grape-gathering.'[1]

The local sanctuaries were the centres at which this worship was carried out, and it was at these shrines that for several centuries Jahweh was worshipped with the full sanction of the religious leaders (cf. 1 S 7^{17}, 1 K 3^{4} 18^{30}, etc.). 'Such local worship is alone contemplated in the oldest Hebrew legislation ("in every place where I record my name I will come unto thee and I will bless thee" [Ex 20^{24}]).'[2] But by this very fact it was exposed to serious dangers. The admixture of heathen Canaanitish elements threatened seriously to imperil the purity of the old simple tribal religion, and it was against this, the mixed cultus, that the 8th cent. prophets, especially Hosea, raised their powerful opposition. The great prophetic movement marked the conflict of Israel in strife with its own paganism. It is clear from the language of the prophets that in the 8th cent. B.C. during the prosperous reigns of Jeroboam II. and Uzziah public worship, both in the Northern and in the Southern Kingdom, was carried out, especially at the great central shrines (Bethel, Jerusalem), with great zeal, elaboration, and pomp. The ceremonial was splendid, wealth was lavished on the sanctuaries, and these were thronged with zealous worshippers. And all this, it must be remembered, was ostensibly worship of Jahweh. What Amos inveighs against is not open disloyalty to the national God, but a wrong conception of the kind of service acceptable to Him. The worship is Jahweh-worship, but inspired by heathenish ideas.[3] Doubtless this worship was, on the whole, purer in Judah than in N. Israel. But in Judah heathen tendencies, though submerged, were powerful, and asserted themselves in violent reactions, such as occurred, in the 7th cent., in the reign of Manasseh.

Perhaps the general character of the old worship at the local shrines, or *bāmôth*, may be illustrated from similar festivals that take place in Syria and the neighbouring lands to-day. S. I. Curtiss has illustrated this aspect of the matter in his *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*,[4] where the results of considerable and extensive research are gathered together. He shows that many sacred spots, probably in some cases the very sites of ancient 'high places,' are still venerated and resorted to by the peasantry. At many of these time-honoured spots 'there is virtually a priesthood in existence. . . . They do not have the designation of priests; they are known rather as sheiks of certain shrines, or as servants of certain saints. But their duties and emoluments correspond in some degree to those about which we read in the Old Testament.' Usually one priest or priestly family is connected with such a shrine, though cases occur where several priestly families live together at one shrine, as at Nebi Daud (outside the wall of Jerusalem). Sacrifices are still, apparently, offered at some of these shrines, especially in connexion with vows, and dues in the shape of the hide of the animal, and one of the quarters, are paid to the minister of the shrine, who in ordinary life is an orthodox Muslim.[5]

Vows at such spots play a considerable part in modern popular religion in Syria. 'During the year, at a popular makam [sacred spot or shrine], many sheep and goats, and sometimes larger animals, are killed in payment of vows. Besides there are vows of grain, which are promised on condition of good harvests. These vows are collected by a servant of a shrine.' According to a native authority,[6] 'if the sheik, that is, the minister of the shrine, is present, he kills the victim, otherwise any one who can read the first sura of the Koran. He uses the formula, "This is from thee and for thee." The *dahhiyeh* sacrifice is slaughtered by the one who brings it. If, however, it is brought by a woman, she puts her hand on that of the man who kills it.' The minister of the shrine is not

1 G. A. Barton, *The Religion of Israel*, New York, 1918, p. 167.
2 See art. HIGH PLACE. For a full discussion see S. R. Driver, *Modern Research as illustrating the Bible* (Schweich Lectures), London, 1909, p. 60 ff.
3 See C. F. Burney, *Judges*, London, 1918, p. 195 ff.
4 Barton, p. 162 f.

1 Barton, p. 79 f.
2 A. R. S. Kennedy, in *HDB* iv. 396[b].
3 See G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, London, 1896, i. ch. ix.
4 London, 1902.
5 Curtiss, p. 144 ff.
6 *Ib.* p. 148 f.

only its guardian, but also the repository of the legends connected with its origin and the life of the saint whose name and deeds are commemorated. Not all the modern shrines have annual festivals. Where such a festival occurs it is in some cases attended by thousands of people.

The festivals referred to by Amos (5$^{21-23}$) must have borne a strong general resemblance to these present-day celebrations, which are probably their lineal descendants. Reference may also be made in this connexion to the annual feast of Jahweh at Shiloh (Jg 21$^{19.21}$), where dancing by the maidens of the locality was a feature (cf. also Ex 32$^{5.6.19}$).

For the use of images by the early Hebrews, and the prevalence of idolatrous tendencies among them, see art. IMAGES AND IDOLS (Hebrew and Canaanite), vol. vii. pp. 138–142. It was by the 8th cent. prophets Hosea (8$^{4-6}$ 13$^{1f.}$; cf. 3^{4}) and Isaiah (2$^{8.20}$) that the first effective protest was made, apparently, against the use of idolatrous emblems in Jahweh-worship. It was probably at Isaiah's instigation that Hezekiah was moved to destroy the brazen serpent (*nehushtan*) which had long been an object of worship (2 K 18^{4}). Such serpent-worship was widespread in antiquity, and appears to have prevailed, as a popular superstitious practice, among the Hebrews, if we may judge from the results of the Gezer excavations.[1]

(*c*) *The effects of Josiah's reformation.*—The remarkable and far-reaching movement of reform which expressed itself in the Deuteronomic legislation and was inaugurated in practice by the drastic action of King Josiah in 621 B.C. was the outcome of an alliance between the prophetic party and the priesthood. We have already noted that the possibilities of such an alliance had always been greater in Judah than in the Northern Kingdom. It now became an accomplished fact, and the results were momentous. The two great elements in the religious life of the community now united in a sustained and sincere effort to translate the lessons of the teaching of the great 8th cent. prophets into practice, by fundamental reforms in the religious institutions of the nation. The aim was to make public worship a more fitting and adequate instrument for expressing the prophetic religion. It was essential that the rites of worship should be purified, and divorced from the heathen accompaniments and associations in which they were involved. To effect this end the reformers insisted on two things, the nationalization of the worship and its centralization in Jerusalem. The old time-honoured, local sacrifices of clan and family were to be suppressed, and all the worship (including the private sacrifices) was to be concentrated in one central sanctuary in Jerusalem.

It was only by such a drastic reform that the necessary break with age-long traditions and associations could be effected. We are expressly told that the Passover celebrated as a result of the reform movement was unprecedented (2 K 23$^{21f.}$). This was because it was kept, on this occasion, not as in the past by the people in their own homes, but by the united nation in Jerusalem.

The suppression of the local shrines and the centralization of the worship mark a revolution. With the publication and national acceptance of the Deuteronomic code the beginnings of the Canon were formed which was to grow into the Hebrew Bible; and with the centralization of the worship the first stone of the edifice was laid which was later to develop into the post-Exilic Jewish Church. The foundations of Judaism were laid.

The aim of the reformers was to gather up the local sacrificial rites into a truly national worship.

Deuteronomy 'cuts at the roots of the family and tribal sacrifices when it forbids the offering of sacrifice elsewhere than at the central sanctuary (12$^{13.19.27}$). But it does more than merely forbid. It provides the great festivals, which had their close association with the spring sowing and the harvest, and which, being common to all men, brought the people into contact with their heathen neighbours, with motives taken from the history of Jahveh's dealings with His people. The people, when they come together to worship their God, are to come to a shrine which has associations with their national life and with that alone; and they are to worship through forms which continually impress upon them the unity of their historic life as a people. Even when the private man comes to offer his personal recognition of Jahveh's bounty to him, he does it through a ritual in which he recounts how he belongs to a nation with a past which is great because it is full of God's grace (xxvi. 1–11).'[1]

This national impress upon the character of the worship was never lost. The old agricultural feasts, though their primitive features were not eliminated, acquired a new significance. The Passover became the festival of national redemption; Pentecost (the 'feast of weeks') was transformed into a commemoration of the giving of the Law—the festival of Revelation; and Tabernacles was invested with the associations of the wilderness life. The old unity of the nation, which had expressed itself in the nomadic period by the gathering of the clans at a central shrine, was recovered, and henceforth remains a permanent feature of the cultus.

Another momentous result was the disestablishment of the local priesthood. The legislation of Deuteronomy provides no complete law of the priesthood. It merely deals with the practical consequences of the centralization of the worship as these affected the old order of priests. The members of this order, who are referred to as 'Levites,' are still priests *de jure*. They are all 'levitical priests,' and are so styled in the Code ('the priests the Levites' [Dt 18^{1} etc.]). But in consequence of the new legislation the exercise of priestly functions can only be carried out legitimately in the central sanctuary. The rural priest ('the Levite within thy gates') can only secure the name and rights of a priest when he removes to Jerusalem (Dt 18$^{6f.}$).

It was only in the later legislation of P that the distinction between priests and Levites grew up. The Levites, who were the descendants of the old local order of priests, were then degraded to an inferior rank, and the priesthood proper was confined to the family of Aaron.

The immediate results of the Deuteronomic reform seem to have proved disappointing. So drastic a break with age-long tradition could not at once be absolutely successful. In the dark days that preceded the final extinction of the Southern Kingdom there were lapses to older practices, and even to idolatry. But a real step forward had been taken and the way had been prepared for the later reconstruction of the Jewish community who survived the Exile as a Church-nation with one holy sanctuary served by an official priesthood which is set apart for the performance of holy functions. The central idea of Ezekiel and his successors is that of a holy God, worshipped in the holy land in one holy sanctuary by a holy people whose sacrifices are offered by a sacred order of ministers, who constitute a holy priesthood.

2. The worship of the second Temple.—The erection of the second Temple was not improbably the work of the remnant of the old Israelites who had been left behind in the land; but the leaders seem to have been Babylonian Jews. It was from the exiles in Babylonia that the enthusiasm and energy were drawn which impelled the somewhat weary and sluggish Palestinians to move forward. But it was, at first, a 'day of small things.' The new structure appeared mean and despicable in the eyes of those who remembered 'this house in its former glory' (Hag 2^{3}). But Haggai's bold prophecy of future glory (2^{7}) was destined ultimately to be fulfilled.

It is important to realize that the worship of the restored Temple, though influenced to some extent by Ezekiel's ideas, did not at first conform to the elaborate prescriptions of P. It was based upon the Deuteronomic law, which was still the only written form of the Tôrâh of Moses. Even in Malachi (? *c.* 450 B.C.) the conception of the

[1] See R. A. S. Macalister, *The Excavation of Gezer*, ii. 399.

[1] A. C. Welch, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom*, London, 1912, p. 209.

priesthood is still essentially that of Deuteronomy; it belongs to the House of Levi (Mal $2^{4ff.}$). It is true that the distinction between priests and Levites had been recognized already at the time of the Return, if we may judge by the list of those who came up with Zerubbabel (Neh 7). But the relatively small number of Levites there given may be explained, perhaps, by supposing that most of those tabulated as priests were originally Levites whose claim to the priesthood had been recognized. Ezekiel's influence was obviously at work. A clear indication of this appears in Zec 3^{7}, where one of the principal functions of the high-priest is to keep God's courts.

'Here we have an unmistakable indication,' says Robertson Smith, 'that Ezekiel's conception of holiness, and his jealousy of profane contact with holy things, had been taken up by the spiritual leaders of the new Jerusalem. There is, therefore, a strong presumption that from the first the arrangements and ritual of the second Temple were more closely conformed to the principle of concentric circles of holiness than those of the first Temple had been.'[1]

The ideas of Ezekiel were potent—in particular the conception of the service offered as a stated and regular ceremonial; but the ceremonial had not yet attained the elaborateness of the Priestly Code. That was only realized later, when Ezra promulgated his edition of the Tôrāh.

The date for this event usually given (444 B.C.) is by no means certain. Ezra's mission may plausibly be assigned to the reign of the second Artaxerxes, in which case some date between 400 and 390 B.C. is more probable.

'That the stated services of the first ninety years of the new Jerusalem were much less elaborate and costly than the Priestly Code prescribes seems to follow from Ezr 9^{5}, where we learn that [at the time when Ezra arrived in Jerusalem] the evening oblation was still only a *minḥa* or cereal offering. The same thing follows still more clearly from Neh 10^{32}, where we see that a new voluntary tax became necessary when the full Pentateuchal ritual was introduced. Before that time the stated service appears to have been maintained, with much grumbling and in an imperfect way, at the expense of the priests (Mal 1^{6-13}).'[2]

With the promulgation and public acceptance of the full priestly law in Jerusalem by Ezra the services in the Temple became more elaborate and the priesthood more fully organized. This process, perhaps, did not begin till after 400 B.C. Unfortunately the history of the period 400–200 B.C. is very obscure. That Ezra encountered much opposition from the old conservative party in Jerusalem is clear; and this ultimately culminated in the Samaritan schism and the erection of a rival Temple on Mount Gerizim (probably about 330 B.C.). After this event the strict hierarchical party within the Jewish community held undisputed sway. The elaboration of the Temple worship proceeded, it would seem, without a check; and its effects are visible in the work of the chronicler (*c.* 300–250 B.C.). The elaborate organization of the Levitical arrangements in the Temple described in 1 Ch 23 ff. no doubt reflects the realities of the writer's own time. Here the duties of priests and Levites (now two completely distinct orders), with those of the subordinate classes of doorkeepers and singers, are fully set forth. The *teaching* of the Law to the people had now, apparently, become a recognized part of the functions of the priestly class. The priest was also a teacher (2 Ch 15^{3}). Possibly a system of schools for such teaching had been established (cf. 2 Ch 17^{7-9}). The priestly class was also in control of the courts of justice (2 Ch 19^{4-11}), and this function descended from them later to the Rabbinical doctors of the Law (scribes). The care for public worship and its elaborate organization which the chronicler ascribes to such kings as David, Solomon, Hezekiah, and Josiah illuminate the actual state of affairs as he knew them.

[1] *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*[2], London, 1892, p. 443.
[2] *Ib.* p. 444.

In these acts praise, supplication, and thanksgiving are a prominent feature. The old abuses of worship denounced by Isaiah and Jeremiah have passed away. We are confronted with a pious community that finds in the great services of the Temple its highest satisfaction and constant care. The ancient ritual of animal sacrifice was celebrated with pomp and impressive ceremonial. But it was no mere empty formality, devoid of spiritual significance and appeal. It was hallowed by true spiritual fervour, by the sense of sin forgiven and by unstinting recognition of the goodness of the Giver of all good things. Especially significant in this connexion is the large place given to prayer. 'It is hardly possible to read the prayers of the great kings in Chronicles and not feel that they echo a liturgy of prayer—for the individual and for the nation.'[1] It is indeed highly probable that some of the older liturgical prayers, embodied in the Prayer Book of the synagogue, were already, in an earlier form, in existence at the time of the chronicler. The service of music and praise was especially rich, and is dwelt upon with loving minuteness by the chronicler, who was himself, perhaps, a member of one of the Levitical choirs (cf., *e.g.*, 2 Ch $5^{12f.}$). The Psalter was the book of praise (cf. 1 Ch $16^{36f.}$).

That the service of prayer and praise was liturgical in character is clear from the fact that the people were expected to respond: 'And all the people said, Amen, and praised the Lord' (1 Ch 16^{36}). It is probable also that the Law was read in public worship. At any rate, the recital of the *Shᵉma'* ('Hear, O Israel') is almost certainly as old as this period, as can be shown by the antiquity of the present (synagogue) Benedictions that accompany it.

As Elmslie remarks: 'Even if it be thought that this picture represents rather the ideals of the Levites than the actual attainments of the community, it is still important that such a standard of worship was conceived by the priests and set before the people. One recalls the words of the great prophet of exilic or post-exilic times who wrote: "for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all peoples" (Is 56^{7}). His was a vision of the Temple as the centre of the whole world's worship. To the Chronicler it had at least become a true "house of prayer" for Israel.'[2]

How deep and real the devotional spirit could be that underlay the imposing ceremonial of the Temple worship can be seen from the Psalter, which may be regarded as the hymn-book (and also, to some extent, as the prayer-book) of the second Temple.

Here the worshipful spirit, which lingers so lovingly on the services and devotions of the House of God (cf. Ps 84, 27^{4} 42^{2} 100^{4}, 122, 15), which finds in that House the focus of its devotion (Ps 57 138^{2} $99^{5.9}$ 132[7]), which delights to celebrate the pomp ('the beauty of holiness'=holy adornment or vestments: Ps 29^{2} 96^{9}; cf. 1 Ch 16^{29}), and the stately processions (Ps 68^{25-29} $24^{3f.\ 7-10}$) of the Temple, has yet no narrow conception of worship. To the Psalmists the God of Israel is also the God of nature, and is celebrated as such in the splendid nature-psalms (8, 19^{2-6}, 29, 104, 107, 139, 147, 148); and the transition from one aspect to the other is easy (Ps $29^{2ff.}$). Thus in the composite Ps 19 the psalmist passes from extolling the wonders of nature (the light of nature) to praise of the Law (the light of revelation). But in truth the range of the Psalter is as wide as the outlook and experience of man; the Psalmists touch the height and depth of the human spirit; and the universality of their appeal reveals how an intense and particularistic religion can expand and deepen when it is founded upon a genuine and profound spiritual experience.

The feeling excited in the breast of a pious Jew by the splendid ceremonial of the Temple worship as it could be witnessed at the end of the century (about 200 B.C.) during which the Chronicler flourished, is fervently expressed by Ben Sira in his striking tribute to the high-priest Simon (II.), surnamed 'the Just.' He is pictured as he appeared in the Temple on the Day of Atonement, where 'clothed in his glorious robes' and surrounded by 'all the sons of Aaron in their glory' he 'went up to the altar of majesty and made glorious the court of the sanctuary.' The crowded court and

[1] W. A. L. Elmslie, *The Books of Chronicles*, Cambridge, 1916, p. lii.
[2] *Ib.* p. liif.

the worship of the people who receive the high-priestly blessing are vividly described:

'Then the sons of Aaron sounded
With the trumpets of beaten work;
Yea, they sounded and caused a mighty blast to be heard
For a remembrance before the Most High.
(Then) all flesh hasted together
And fell upon their faces to the earth,
To worship before the Most High,
Before the Holy One of Israel,' etc.[1]

The upheaval produced by the attempted suppression of Judaism at the hands of Antiochus Epiphanes, and the consequent Maccabean revolt, was fruitful in momentous consequences. Judaism was rooted more firmly than ever in the hearts of true believers by the persecution. Affection for the Law was deepened, and the study and knowledge of its ordinances was more widely diffused and more actively pursued among laymen. When the fury of the storm had spent itself, Judaism emerged profoundly modified in many important ways. New parties—the Pharisees and Sadducees—came into existence; a new literature, which found its classical example in the book of Daniel, emerged. A new native dynasty ruled, and communal life was re-organized. A new Temple-feast, commemorating the re-dedication of the sanctuary (164 B.C.) after its defilement by the Syrian tyrant, was added to the sacred calendar. This is known as the Feast of Dedication (cf. Jn 10^{22}), or *Chanukkah*, and is celebrated in the winter for eight days. It was inaugurated in the circumstances described in 1 Mac $4^{36ff.}$: 'After the Temple had been purified, a new altar of burnt-offering built, and new holy vessels made, the fire was kindled on the altar, the lamps of the candlestick lit, and the re-dedication of the altar celebrated for eight days.'[2] According to Josephus, its popular name was the 'Festival of lights.'[3] But during the period that followed the establishment of the new Jewish state a profound change in the whole character of Jewish piety manifested itself in the rise of the Pharisaic party and wide extension of the synagogue as a religious institution. The monopoly of religious leadership, which had hitherto been enjoyed by the priests, was now, perforce, shared by the popular party of the Pharisees, who represented the pious laymen, the old priestly party, which was still all-powerful in the Temple, being represented by the Sadducees.[4] The synagogues were under the control of the Pharisees.

The origin of the synagogue as a religious institution is enveloped in obscurity. The Jewish scholar Moriz Friedländer[5] regards it as a product of the Diaspora, which came in to Judæa from outside. If the synagogue had already become an institution in Judæa at the time of the Maccabean revolt, the silence of the books of Maccabees regarding it would be inexplicable. On the other hand, the existence of synagogues in Egypt during the second half of the 3rd cent. B.C. (during the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes, 247–222 B.C.) seems to be demonstrable;[6] while a famous synagogue was certainly in existence at Antioch in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. The circumstances of the Diaspora would naturally promote the growth of such an institution.

Friedländer insists that the synagogues of the Diaspora were pervaded by a much freer atmosphere than those of Palestine, which were under Pharisaic influence. The former, he thinks, were in reality places of teaching and instruction (*Lehrhäuser*). They were thus far more than houses of prayer; while the Pharisaic synagogues, which arose later, were more of the latter character. Though sections from Scripture were read, and edifying discourses were given in them, prayer still remained the principal element, and had many points of contact and relation with the sacrificial cultus, as the existing prayers of the synagogue liturgy, which originated from the time both before and after the Roman destruction of the Temple, testify. The Sabbath worship of the Diaspora was, according to Friedländer, of a different character; it consisted not merely of lections from Moses and the Prophets, and of prayer, but principally in the exposition of Holy Scripture, which was allegorical in character, which saw 'in the words [of the text] symbols of a secret nature revealed in allegories,' and deduced from them the loftiest philosophical ideas. The Diaspora synagogue also, according to Friedländer, had as a distinguishing feature that it did not derive its instruction from the authoritative oral teaching of the priest, but that whoever possessed knowledge in the Scriptures was here at liberty to come forward in order to expound God's word. This was still the case in the Diaspora synagogues in the times of the Apostles (Ac 13^{15}).

Friedländer in these contentions seems to exaggerate the difference between the orthodox synagogues of Palestine and those of the Diaspora. In both the element of instruction—the reading and exposition of the Law and the Prophets—was the main element. In both, also, prayer occupied an important place. Indeed, the most frequent designation of 'synagogue' in Philo is προσευχή—a term which also occurs in Josephus.[1] One principal difference there was: in the synagogues of the Diaspora the Scriptures, and probably the prayers, were recited in Greek. The allegorical method of expounding the Scriptures was more freely employed in the Dispersion—though it was by no means absent from the ancient homiletic discourses given in the synagogues of Palestine. Pharisaic restrictions only became marked after the close of the 1st century A.D. Up to that time a greater freedom prevailed, probably, in the synagogues of Palestine as well as in those of the Diaspora. A trace of the survival of such a spirit in certain Hellenistic synagogues may be seen in the fact that in the time of Origen the book of Baruch was still publicly read (in Greek).[2]

3. The later Temple service.—It has already been pointed out that the system of worship which was developed by the Jewish community in Palestine found its most elaborate expression in the services of the Temple of Herod. How elaborate the organization of these services was can be seen from the details that have been preserved regarding the priestly arrangements,[3] which need not be repeated here. Reference may also be made to such Rabbinical evidence as is contained in the Mishnah Tractates *Middôth* and *Yômā*—to cite only the most obvious sources. In the former minute details are given regarding the Temple structure and arrangements; while in the latter a full account is set forth of the elaborate Temple services and ceremonial on the Day of Atonement.[4]

It should be remembered that for the purposes of the national worship the land of Palestine was divided up into 24 districts (corresponding to the 24 'courses'), and one 'course' from each district (consisting of priests, Levites, and lay Israelites) was on duty in the Temple for a week at a time. Not all the priests belonging to a particular course could do duty at the same time at the sacrifice; the 'course' was therefore divided into 'father's houses.' In the same way not all the laymen belonging to a particular 'course' could be present during the whole week when its course was on duty in the Temple. It was consequently represented by a deputation at the sanctuary; the others, who had been left behind, assembled in the local synagogues (at the time when the sacrifice was actually being offered in the Temple) and engaged in prayer and the reading of Scripture.[5] To illustrate the character of the worship which was focused in the later Temple, it will suffice here (1) to describe the ceremonies associated with one of the more popular occasions for such service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; and (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service.

(1) The presentation of the firstfruits (*bikkurim*) was one of the occasions which gave opportunity for pompous pilgrimage to the Holy City outside the cycle of the great festivals. It was concerned with the fulfilment of the command: 'The first

[1] The text is cited in the translation given in the Oxford Corpus, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, i. 510.

[2] W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], p. 404.

[3] For the present-day celebration of the festival in the synagogues cf. Oesterley and Box, p. 404 ff.

[4] See artt. Pharisees, Sadducees.

[5] *Synagoge und Kirche in ihren Anfängen*, Berlin, 1908.

[6] Cf. W. Bousset, *Rel. des Judentums*, p. 72.

[1] *Vita*, 277.

[2] For the synagogue forms of worship, see, further, the end of this article.

[3] See art. Priest, Priesthood (Jewish).

[4] Cf. also the Tractate *Tāmîd* ('continual'), which describes the Daily Service of the sanctuary.

[5] Cf. Mishnah, *Ta'anîth*, iv. 2.

of the firstfruits of thy ground thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God' (Ex 23^{19} 34^{26}). These gifts formed part of the revenue of the priesthood, and were destined to be stored in the Temple. Great importance was attached to this offering, which alone among the offerings that were given to the priests by the people had to be brought by them directly to the Temple. It was of great antiquity and naturally lapsed with the destruction of the sanctuary. The description of the scene by Franz Delitzsch[1] is well known and need not be repeated.

(2) The daily routine of the Temple-worship, including the weekly Sabbath celebrations, was interrupted only by the great festivals, the most important of which were kept with special ceremonial, for several days. The characteristic features of the worship, however, are well illustrated by the ceremonial of the morning and evening sacrifice (*Tāmîd*). Delitzsch as before gives a good reconstruction.[2]

In the Temple itself the opening of the sanctuary gates was the signal for the actual slaughter of the sacrifice, the sprinkling of its blood upon the altar, and the flaying of the victim. The pieces into which the sacrifice was divided were carried by the six allotted priests (each taking one piece) to the altar, while a seventh carried the offering of flour, an eighth the baked meal-offering (of the high-priest), and a ninth the wine of the drink-offering. These were all laid at the foot of the altar-ascent and salted: and then all the priests assembled once more in the Hall of Polished Stones, there to celebrate, first of all, a service of prayer. It is highly significant that the sacrificial service should have been interrupted at this point and temporarily suspended. This can only have grown up as a concession to the overwhelming popular feeling in favour of the recital of the prescribed sections of the Law, with the appropriate accompaniment of prayer. The priests retired for this purpose to the Hall of Polished Stones, which was sufficiently near the court to allow of their quick withdrawal to it and rapid return to the sanctuary. It will be remembered that they had already assembled at early dawn in this chamber to cast the first lots for determining the distribution of certain priestly duties. The passage in the Mishnah[3] which speaks of this meeting and its purpose runs as follows:

(1) And they descended and entered the Hall of Polished Stones to read the *Shema*.
(2) The president said to them: 'Give one blessing'; and they blessed,
(3) And recited the Ten Commandments and the *Shema* (in its three sections)
(4) And they blessed the people with three blessings; viz. (the blessing) 'True and firm' (אמת ויציב), that of 'service' (עבודה), and 'the blessing of the priests' (ברכת כהנים).

This brief account is extraordinarily interesting, but not free from difficulty. The purpose for which the priests forgathered is described as 'to read (or recite) the Shema.' This is a summary way of describing the reading of certain portions of Scripture the most important of which was the *Shema* (Dt 6^{4-9}), and certain accompanying liturgical Blessings. The leader or 'president' is to be regarded, not as the minister who recites the prayers on behalf of the congregation, but as the leader who leads in the recitation, the assembled priests all joining in. Possibly 'Bless' here means merely 'Begin the liturgical service.'

It is explicitly stated in line three that the Decalogue was recited in close connexion with the *Shema*. This was the ancient practice, later discontinued because the *Minim* were wont to allege that the moral law, summed up in the Decalogue, was more important than all the rest.[1] Possibly the first two sections only of the *Shema* were recited in the ancient liturgy, and the addition of the third may be due to a gloss, reflecting the later practice. The recital of the *Shema* was *preceded* by a Benediction; but the Mishnah here gives no clue as to what it was, though, according to the Babylonian Talmud,[2] the question was early disputed by the Rabbinical schools. Probably the form used was that known as *Ahabah rabbah* ('with abounding love'), which is still chanted in the synagogue service.[3]

In the fourth line of the Mishnah passage the present text runs: 'And they blessed *the people* with three blessings.' As I. Elbogen has pointed out,[4] the words *the people* are probably an incorrect gloss. The priests were engaged in a service of prayer within a semi-private room, outside the Temple proper. There could be no question of blessing the people, which would naturally form part of the *public* service within the sanctuary. The three blessings that followed coincide partly with well-known liturgical forms: 'true and firm' is the name still given to the Blessing recited after the *Shema*—as used in the Temple its form was doubtless much shorter than the recension now current in the Prayer Books. 'Service' (עבודה) was probably an earlier form of the 17th paragraph of the *Shemōnēh 'Esrēh*,[5] and expressed gratitude for the splendid Temple-worship. The last 'Blessing of the Priests' was probably a petition uttered *for* the priests.

This liturgical service of prayer for the priests is noteworthy. It shows how high a place prayer had come to assume, even in the sacrificial worship. The high place accorded to the liturgical recitation of the Scriptures is also a remarkable feature, and serves, perhaps, to show how far-reaching the influence of Pharisaic and synagogal piety really was.

After the conclusion of this priestly liturgy the assembled priests again drew lots—the third and fourth—to determine who should offer the incense in the sanctuary, and who should lay the various parts of the victim upon the altar. Those on whom no lot had fallen were now free to go away, after divesting themselves of the priestly dress. Then followed the sacrifice proper—the offering of incense and of sacrifice, accompanied by prayer. At the solemn moment when the chief officiating priest, alone within the sanctuary, offered the incense, which became visible in clouds of smoke, the people withdrew from the inner court and prostrated themselves, spreading out their hands in silent prayer (cf. Rev $8^{13f.}$). The incensing priest, after prostrating himself for worship, also withdrew from the sanctuary. A period of silent prayer followed, and the people were then blessed by the priests, the five priests who had been engaged in the offering of the incense standing on the steps in front of the Temple proper, and, led by the principal officiant, pronouncing the blessing on the people with uplifted hands.

The offering of the burnt-offering now went forward, together with the appropriate accompaniments (meal-offerings and drink-offering), and then followed the musical part of the service. The Levitical choir, to the accompaniment of instrumental music, sang the psalm of the day. The psalm was sung in three sections, the end of each

[1] *Jewish Artisan Life*, London, 1902, ch. iv. ('A June Day in ancient Jerusalem during last Decade before Christ'). The firstfruits had to be presented annually between Pentecost and the Feast of Dedication.
[2] *Ib.* Cf. also the art. 'Temple-Service' in *EBi* (by the present writer), esp. cols. 4951–4956.
[3] *Tāmîd*, v. 1.

[1] See C. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*[2], Cambridge, 1897, *Exc.* 4. 119.
[2] *Berāk.* 11*b*.
[3] See Singer, p. 39 f. For the much shorter form recited in the Temple see *JE*, *s.v.* 'Ahabah Rabbah,' i. 281.
[4] *Studies in Jewish Literature*, Berlin, 1913, p. 80 f. There is some evidence that the text was read without the suspected words in earlier times.
[5] Cf. Singer, *The Authorised Daily Prayer Book* (*Hebrew and English*), p. 50 f.

being marked by three blasts on silver trumpets (blown by a body of priests), at the sound of which the people once more prostrated themselves for worship. This terminated the morning service, and private sacrifices were then proceeded with. The evening service (about 3 o'clock in the afternoon) was practically a repetition of the morning, the same priests officiating—except in the case of the incensing priest, for whom a fresh lot was taken. On the Sabbaths and great festivals the essential features of the services were the same. There was more elaboration, and a larger number of sacrifices were offered, but the character of the worship was substantially identical.

There are, of course, to be noted special ceremonies in connexion with particular occasions. The most remarkable of these, perhaps, was the Water-Feast held in connexion with the Feast of Tabernacles. It began at nightfall on Tishri 15 (first day of Tabernacles) and lasted till the following morning; and was repeated on other nights of the festival (except Friday). This was the only celebration in the Temple that took place by night. The place was the court of the women, which was specially illuminated for the occasion, the women looking on from their galleries. A torchlight procession, dances, and singing followed. Towards morning a more solemn note was introduced by the chanting of the fifteen 'songs of Degrees' (Pss 120–134) led by the Levitical choir to the accompaniment of various musical instruments. During the day the great feature was the procession which accompanied the priest who had been allotted the duty of drawing water for the libation from the pool of Siloam.[1] A relic of these processions still survives in the worship of the synagogue.

4. The synagogue worship.—For the transition, which had been gradually prepared for, between the sacrificial cultus and the form of worship which found expression in the synagogue, as well as for the rivalry between synagogue and Temple, the momentous consequences of the destruction of the Temple, and the character of the synagogue prayers, reference may be made to the article PRAYER (Jewish).[2] Here it must suffice to make a few general observations on the characteristic features of the synagogue worship. (1) In harmony with its origin the synagogue worship is essentially of a popular and democratic type. It has no organic connexion with the priesthood; its ministers are essentially laymen—at first it had no professional ministers at all, the Rabbis whom it singled out for special honour being simply learned laymen; its services, though liturgical in character, and provided with (in many cases) interesting and dignified ceremonial, are essentially simple in character; their tendency is to emphasize the element of instruction and edification (the reading and exposition of Scripture), with which is combined the service of praise and prayer.

(2) As has already been pointed out, the synagogue, as a religious institution, had already come into existence long before the destruction of the Temple and the consequent cessation of the sacrificial worship. It met a widespread religious need, owing to the centralization of the sacrificial worship in Jerusalem. While only a limited number of Jews could be present at any one time in the central sanctuary, and assist in the offering of the sacrifice, no such disability would apply to the services of the synagogue. To a certain, though limited, extent the synagogue was affiliated to the Temple worship.[3] It will be remembered that, for purposes of the daily sacrificial worship, not only the priests and Levites, but also the lay Israelites generally were divided into twenty-four courses of service, each of which had to take its turn in coming before God (in the Temple) every day for a whole week by way of representing the whole body of the people, while the daily sacrifice was being offered to Jahweh. But it appears that not the whole division of Israelites on duty but only a deputation from it was actually present at any given time in the Temple; the others, who had been left behind, assembled in the local synagogues (at the time when the sacrifice was actually offered in the Temple) and engaged in prayer and the reading of Scripture.[1] But in spite of this affiliation the synagogue was entirely free from the limitations applying to a centralized worship and a sacerdotal system. 'Hence, when the latter disappeared in the great catastrophe of 70 A.D., the synagogue was the one institution exactly fitted to be the instrument for the reconstruction of Judaism.'[2]

(3) At the same time it is important to remember that the Temple-worship has profoundly influenced not only the structure of the synagogue liturgy, but also the form and substance of its prayers.

The disappearance of the old sacrificial cultus was felt by pious Jews at the time as a real catastrophe. But the way had already been prepared by Rabbinical teaching (not to speak of that of the great prophets and some of the psalmists) for a spiritualizing of the sacrificial idea; and this tendency received a strong impulse from the exigencies of the situation which left the synagogue as the sole religious institution in which the Jewish religious consciousness could express itself. A real satisfaction of the instincts and cravings which had been, to some extent, met by the splendid Temple-worship was provided by the traditional liturgy of the synagogue, which could be regarded as a sort of parabolic and metaphorical fulfilment of sacrifice in the following ways:

(*a*) It furnished forms of prayer for daily worship which corresponded to the original daily sacrifice. In accordance with this principle those days for which additional sacrifices had been appointed (Sabbaths, new moons and Festivals) were provided with additional forms of prayer, called *musaf* (='additional').

(*b*) In the synagogue Liturgy special sections from the Law and the Mishnah, which contain the original enactments about the daily and Sabbath offerings, occupy a place at the beginning of the service:[3] and on high days and festivals it is the rule to supplement the Pentateuch lesson by the paragraph from the Law which prescribes the sacrifices appropriate to the day. For instance, during the Feast of Tabernacles the paragraph Nu 29[12-39] is read in addition from a second scroll.

The principle underlying all this is stated in a haggadic passage in the Talmud. Abraham is represented to have anxiously asked God 'how the sins of Israel would be forgiven when their Temple was destroyed, and they should have nowhere to bring their sacrifices, and he was told that to read the duty of these sacrifices from the *Torah* would be accepted as a full equivalent.'

(*c*) Further, various petitions have been introduced into the prayers for the restoration of the Temple services and sacrifices. In some cases an older prayer has been amplified in this sense.

In these various ways the sacrificial idea has been largely spiritualized. 'The daily offering of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving morning and afternoon in the Synagogue is a spiritual counterpart and fulfilment of the old daily sacrifice in the Temple. In this way the words of the prophet Hosea are in spirit fulfilled: *We shall render as bullocks* (*the offering of*) *our lips* (Hos 14[2]).'[4]

(4) The language employed in the synagogue liturgy is Hebrew, with a slight admixture of Aramaic. As has already been pointed out, the older elements in the prayers go back to a considerable antiquity (long before the Christian era) —possibly, in some cases, to the late Persian period. In such cases the prayers very probably

[1] See W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], p. 461.

[2] i. 3 ff.

[3] During the latter years of the Temple's existence there was, apparently, a synagogue within the Temple precincts.

[1] *Ta'anith*, iv. 2; Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], p. 360.

[2] Oesterley and Box, *loc. cit.*

[3] Cf. Singer, *The Authorised Daily Prayer Book* (*Hebrew and English*), p. 9 ff.

[4] Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], p. 362. It may be added that in the Talmudic period the synagogue building seems to have been modelled, to some extent, on the Temple. The entrance was from the east, and the ark, containing the scrolls of the Law, was in the west. In the modern synagogue the position is exactly reversed, the ark being placed in the east end, and the reader, while on the *bema*, facing east.

grew up in connexion with the Temple liturgy and were afterwards transferred to the liturgy of the synagogue.

The language in the fixed parts of the liturgy is not only Hebrew, but largely Biblical Hebrew—in fact a Scriptural character is deeply impressed upon the prayers generally. Whole passages (Psalms and other sections) are taken from the Bible, and Biblical language is interwoven into the texture of the prayers.

Outside Palestine among the Jews of the Dispersion in Greek-speaking countries the case was different. There Greek was largely, if not exclusively, used. It seems that not only the Scriptures, but also the most important parts (if not all) of the Liturgy—such as the *Shema* and *Shemōnēh 'Esrēh*—were regularly recited in the Hellenistic synagogues in Greek, and not in Hebrew at all.[1] In the vast synagogue at Alexandria, where the Jews who attended the services were ranged according to their trades, this was the case. We are told that the signal for the vast audience to join in the Amen response was given by the reader waving a cloth from the *bema*.[2] Even in the Mishnah sanction is given to the use of any language whatever in repeating the *Shema*, the *Shemōnēh 'Esrēh* ('Eighteen Blessings'), and the grace at meals.[3] In later practice, however, Hebrew has been the only language recognized as legitimate for prayer and worship in the orthodox synagogue.

(5) In studying the synagogue liturgy it is all-important to realize the central position of the Law. The recitation of the *Shema* (which may be regarded as a summary of the Law) is invested with great solemnity, and is preceded and followed by special Benedictions, as we have seen. But the Sabbath morning service—which is the principal one—culminates in the chanting of the lesson from the Law. The reading of the sections is the occasion of much ceremony—the carrying of the scrolls to and from the 'ark' is invested with great solemnity, not to speak of the scrolls themselves, which are prepared with the most elaborate care, according to minute rules, and are treasured in gorgeous and valuable vestments. The Law itself, *i.e.* the Pentateuch, is regarded as the supreme and final revelation of God. It stands at the head of the canonical books, and by the side of it the other two divisions of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Prophets and the 'writings' (Hagiographa), occupy quite a subordinate place. They but serve to illustrate and enforce its precepts, and are interpreted accordingly. All this is but the expression of a profound conviction that God has chosen to make a supreme revelation of Himself and His requirements in the divine Law; and that man is sanctified by the divine Law, which is the very principle of his perfection.[4]

Jewish piety thus exhausts and expresses itself in the minute and punctilious performance of the divine Law as elaborately codified and defined by the Rabbis. The performance of these duties is regarded as exercising a sanctifying influence on the worshipper; he feels that he is, by so doing, obeying the divine voice; and in this utter obedience he finds a real spiritual satisfaction; the practice of it evokes in the breast of a pious Jew a genuine devotional spirit which finds expression in constant and regular acts of praise and thanksgiving. A characteristic feature deeply impressed upon the liturgy is the regular recurrence of formulas of blessing or benediction (Heb. *berākāh*); something like a hundred are extant in Rabbinical literature. As a Jewish writer well says: 'Every manifestation of divine protection and help became an opportunity for the pious Israelite to offer up thanksgiving in the usual form of a benediction.'[5] In the liturgy proper the set Benediction plays an important part. One of the most famous of its constituent elements—the so-called 'Eighteen Blessings' (*Shemōnēh 'Esrēh* = 'Eighteen')—consists of a number of Benedictions constructed in regular form, which are strung together, and invariably end with the formula: 'Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who,' etc. Here remarkably the element of petition is mingled with that of blessing. The *Shemōnēh 'Esrēh*[1] is one of the central parts of the Prayer Book of the synagogue; it recurs in various forms in all the services, and, moreover, is recited in double form, first silently and then audibly, by the congregation. It is the Prayer (*Tephillah*) *par excellence* (*Tephillah* is one of its designations), and is recited by the congregation standing (*'Amidah* = 'standing' is another designation), the most solemn attitude for worship recognized in the synagogue service.

Special benedictions are also recited before and after the recitation of the Law, being introduced by the formula 'Bless ye.' This is in accordance with Biblical precedent (Neh 8[6]). The element of praise is also, of course, represented by the recitation of certain psalms, especially the Hallel (Pss 113–118). Another element of great importance is represented by various forms of confession of sin (Heb. *widduy*). The two great forms of this are the *Abinû malkēnû*, 'Our Father, our King,'[2] and the *'Al Ḥet*, 'for the sin.'[3] The latter is appended to the *'Amidah* prayer for each service of the Day of Atonement.[4]

LITERATURE.—For the ancient cultus: much new light has been thrown on this department of knowledge by excavation and discovery. For a good summary of these results see S. R. Driver, *Modern Research as illustrating the Bible (Schweich Lectures)*, London, 1909; cf. also, H. Vincent, *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente*, Paris, 1907. For the discoveries at Gezer and elsewhere, the *PEFSt* of recent years, and R. A. S. Macalister's full summary in his *Excavation of Gezer*, 2 vols., London, 1912. All-important, too, are such studies as those of W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894; W. W. Baudissin, *Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1876–78; and the researches of S. Ives Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, London, 1902. See also the Hebrew, Jewish, and Semitic sections of artt. ALTAR, HIGH PLACE, IMAGES AND IDOLS, PRAYER, PRIEST, PROPITIATION, SACRIFICE (with the literature cited), and the corresponding artt. in the Bible Dictionaries; and the art. 'Kultus (Gottesdienst)' in Hamburger, ii. 658 ff.

For the later Temple-service, Hamburger as just cited; the elder Lightfoot (J. Lightfoot), *The Temple-Service* (*Works*, ix.), London, 1823; A. Edersheim, *The Temple: its Ministry and Services*, do., n.d. (still useful); art. 'Temple-Service' in *EBi*, cols. 4948–4956; A. Büchler, *Die Priester und der Cultus*, Vienna, 1895; J. Hochman, *Jerusalem Temple Festivities*, London, 1908 (important for sources). See also G. H. Box, *Virgin Birth of Jesus*, do. 1916, where various ceremonial usages of the later Temple are described. For the synagogue worship see the art. 'Gottesdienst, synagogalen,' by G. Dalman, in Herzog-Hauck (with the literature cited). The various works of L. Zunz are important in this connexion; also I. Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung*, Leipzig, 1913 (indispensable); I. Abrahams, *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, London, 1914, *Festival Studies*, do. 1906; cf. also W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *A Short Survey of the Literature of Rabbinical and Mediæval Judaism*, London, 1920, pt. iii., *The Jewish Liturgy*; cf. also Lewis N. Dembitz, *Jewish Services in Synagogue and Home*, Philadelphia, 1898; and W. Rosenau, *Jewish Ceremonial*, Baltimore, 1908.

The following works of a general character deal with the worship both of the Temple and of the synagogue: Schürer, *GJV*[3], § 24; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*[2], Berlin, 1906; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], London, 1911. Other works have been cited in the body of the article.

G. H. Box.

WORSHIP (Hindu).—Worship springs from the inward feeling of dependence upon other powers, from the awe caused in man's mind by the perception of supernatural agents which influence his or others' welfare. The desire to gain their favour or propitiate them, to call forth their sympathy, to appease or inflame their wrath, has led men to invent that instrument of rite and spell which is thought to ensure and even to enforce

[1] See Schürer, *Hist. of the Jewish People*, iv. 283 ff.; also iii. p. 10.
[2] Cf. *Tosephta Sukkāh* (ed. Zukermandel), p. 198.
[3] Cf. *Sota*, vii. 1 (exceptions 2).
[4] A lesson is also read (from a separate scroll) from the Prophets (*Haphtara*).
[5] K. Kohler, in *JE* iii. 10.

[1] It can be read in full in Singer, pp. 44–54.
[2] Singer, pp. 55–57. [3] *Ib.* pp. 259–262.
[4] See, further, art. PRAYER (Jewish).

their assistance. Rite and spell form the centre of primitive belief and of institutions of religious or social character in ancient times. The hypothesis advanced by R. Karsten 'that strange and dangerous objects and phenomena as well as fatal events of every kind have suggested to primitive man the existence of invisible spiritual powers in the universe,' 'that at first only the cruel and destructive aspect attracted man's attention, whereas the fruitful and beneficial one almost entirely escaped him,'[1] is, though well founded otherwise, not in accordance with the facts to be gathered from Sanskrit texts and needs reconsideration in that respect, or the Indian sacrifice must be assumed to have already passed this supposed stage of primitive belief.

Hindu writers divide the various kinds of sacrifice into two principal classes: *nitya* ('regular') and *naimittika* ('accidental') *karmāṇi*, one following the course of the year or the duties imposed upon man during life, the other comprising incidental offerings occasioned by special wishes of the sacrificer. This is, of course, a distinction more of practice than of principle, but it seems better than the modern distinction into thanksgiving, suppliant, and expiatory sacrifices, which to the student of Indian rituals will not appear sufficient; *e.g.*, the series of regular periodical offerings cannot be subsumed under any of these three classes. On the other hand, some scholars (*e.g.*, Wundt)[2] seem to overestimate the importance of expiatory ceremonies. The *prāyaścitta*, though often mentioned, is more an accessory than a constructive element and mostly intended to rectify blunders committed against the ritual. We do meet with expiatory rites in Indian ritual,[3] but on the whole the idea of expiation, as far as sin is concerned, plays no prominent part; it is more a juridical than a ritual subject and is elaborately discussed in the lawbooks. We do not hear of thanksgiving sacrifice; even the term 'suppliant sacrifice' we cannot accept without restriction. Gods are invoked to come and take their share in offering, but there is no deep emotion, no uplifting of the heart or stirring of the soul; there always lingers the old idea that the god is ensnared by sacrifice and bound to render his assistance.

India thus testifies to the results arrived at by ethnographical writers 'that primitive worship, being prompted merely by the instinct of self-preservation or by interested motives, has no ethical character.'[4] It must, however, be added that in the *puruṣamedha* and the *sarvamedha* we find examples of the 'self-denying sacrifice'; for they enjoin abandonment of all property and renunciation of the world;[5] but it is to be remembered that the general tendency of these sacrifices has grown on Indian soil and seems to be somehow connected with the later idea of the *parivrājaka*, or 'religious mendicant.' Of the three purposes of sacrifice distinguished by La Grasserie[6] only the first can, in fact, be said to hold true of the Vedic sacrifice.

Every sacrifice forms an intrinsic unity, the special character of which throughout is dictated by the particular wishes for the fulfilment of which the sacrificer sets in motion the ritualistic apparatus. If the sacrificer aims at the life of an adversary, the priests offering the *śyena*-sacrifice must wear a red frontlet, sacrificial butter is made from the milk of a sick cow, and the skin necessary for *soma*-pressing is taken from a cow used as *anustaraṇī* during the burial ceremonies. Subjects who wish to prosper their king offer the *gosava*-sacrifice, in which he is anointed on a levelled piece of ground (*sthaṇḍila*) and addressed as '*sthapati*.'[1] Of still more interest are the *vrātya-stomas*[2] and the *mahāvrata*, or solstice-sacrifice, where drums are beaten in order to dispel the demons and assist the sun, and obscene rites symbolize the desired fertility. *Similia similibus* is the principle which permeates the whole cult.

The sacrifices of the domestic ritual, which are described in the *gṛhyasūtras*, are very simple; they are as a rule performed by the householder and his wife, but they often call in a *brāhmaṇa* or *pūjāri* to function in their stead or to assist. Persons of high rank, especially kings, had their spiritual adviser, the *purohita*; for the gods, it is said, do not eat the food of a king who has no *purohita*.[3] The sacrifices of the *śrauta* ritual, the complicated system of which is taught with the utmost care, all need priestly help, and the number of Brāhmanical functionaries increases up to sixteen in the *soma*-sacrifice, with its intricate ceremonial, its many hymns and chants.[4] Nearly all functions are left to this band of scholarly priests, with whom rests the power even to destroy the life of him who has entrusted them with their office. The *yajamāna* had to select the priests from the families of the Brāhmanical caste, and particular care had to be taken that they should be without bodily defects and well instructed; for any blunder in the strict observation of rules, in the proper wording or pronunciation of the sacred *mantras*, might annihilate the result of the sacrifice and even endanger the health and life of priests and *yajamāna*. It is comparatively little that the sacrificer and his wife can do themselves. Their part gradually became restricted to personal preparation or points of minor consequence.[5] An exception is found only in great *sattras*, or sacrificial sessions, where none but Brāhmans are admitted and the priestly duties devolve on the partakers. In India, therefore, more than elsewhere sacrifice has lost its social aspect, and, except in a few cases like the *rājasūya*, the *aśvamedha*, the aforesaid *sattras*, and a few traces of *sacra publica* in the *Rigveda*,[6] it can be regarded only as a private institution.

Particular care was bestowed on selecting the day fit for sacrifices and the place where the *tantra*, the sacrificial 'tissue,' was to be woven; there were no temples as in later times, but the special character of the sacrifice and priestly knowledge determined the spot where the holy grass had to be strewn as carpet for the gods and the fires had to be made. All *śrauta* sacrifices require three fires: the *āhavanīya*, the *dakṣiṇa*, and the *gārhapatya* fire, corresponding to heaven, antariksa, and earth, and dedicated to the world of gods, ancestors, and men.[7] No doubt, this way of selecting and preparing the sacred ground had its origin in the custom of pastoral tribes[8] pitching their tents anywhere, and had been retained by the conservative mechanism of sacrificial rules. Between the three fires (of which the *dakṣiṇa* serves also for conjuring purposes and is probably the successor of the old magic fire) the *vedi* is traced, a place of special sanctity, where the gods

[1] *Origin of Worship*, p. 40 ff.
[2] *Völkerpsychologie*, ii. 2, 330: 'der Ursprung des Opfers.'
[3] See art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hindu); J. Jolly, *GIAP* ii. 8, § 36.
[4] Karsten, p. 97.
[5] A. Hillebrandt, *GIAP* iii. 2, § 77 f.
[6] *RHR* xiv. 35: 'Alimentaire pour les dieux, social et cosmo-social pour l'homme, expiatoire pour l'individu et pour le genre humain, dans ce dernier cas altruiste.'

[1] *Kāt.* xxii. 11. 11. [2] *GIAP* iii. 2, p. 139, § 72.
[3] Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*[2], p. 375.
[4] See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Hindu); J. Eggeling, *SBE* xii. [1882], xxi.; *Yajñeśvarasarman Vidyāsudhākara*, p. 61; A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, x. [Leipzig, 1868] 141 ff.; W. Caland and V. Henry, *L'Agniṣṭoma*, 2 vols., Paris, 1905–07; Oldenberg[2], p. 758 and *passim*.
[5] Cf. Oltramare, 'Le Rôle du Yajamāna,' *Muséon* iv. i. [1903].
[6] Hillebrandt, *Vedic Myth.*, ii. 121 ff.
[7] *Ib.* 90. [8] Oldenberg[2], p. 345.

are supposed to sit down and take their meal, and every precaution is taken by word and action to ward off the demons and destroy their evil influences.

In the objects of sacrifice there is little variety. Different kinds of milk, cakes made of rice or barley, flour, etc., form the materials for the oblations of the new and full moon sacrifice and its almost endless modifications; the cakes are offered on potsherds or tablets, the number of which depends upon the character of the god to whom they are given. The ordinary *paśubandha*, or animal-sacrifice, requires goats, rams, bulls, which are offered almost indiscriminately to all gods, the difference generally being expressed by the shape, colour, and other bodily characteristics of the animal.[1] Horse-sacrifices (*aśvamedha* [*q.v.*]), which are regarded as an act of state and are of great importance, are of course an exception. There were in ancient India even human sacrifices, celebrated with the same pomp and following nearly the same ritual as the horse-sacrifice, till they were gradually replaced by the milder practice of an ordinary *paśubandha*.[2] Of other materials we find in a few cases *surā*, an intoxicating drink, sometimes in the *Rigveda* honey; the liquor the gods like best is the juice of the *soma*-plant, pressed and offered in the *agniṣṭoma* (a spring festival), and its numerous varieties. More than other sacrifices the *soma*-sacrifice is an imitation and representation of heavenly proceedings. As Soma, the moon, contains the heavenly ambrosia, so the yellow shoot of an unknown (and probably often changed) plant is supposed to yield that costly drink enjoyed by *devas* and *pitaras*. If an analogy to the 'sacrifice of the God,' so well treated by J. G. Frazer, ever existed in India, it cannot be looked for anywhere else than in the sacrifice of the plant representing a ray of the lunary god.

The norm of all sacrifices belonging to the *śrauta* ritual is given by the *darśa-pūrṇamāsaiṣṭi* (the new and full moon sacrifice), the *paśubandha* (animal-sacrifice), and the *agniṣṭoma* (the *soma*-offering); all other sacrifices follow these, with variations required by the special case. The whole series of ceremonies forms a *tantra*, 'tissue,' the framework, into which the *āvāpa* is inserted. The *tantra* remains the same for almost every sacrifice; the *āvāpa* consists of the chief offerings and invocations (verses, etc.) and varies according to circumstances. All ceremonies, unctions, libations, spells, etc., converge to the one point, to bring about that religious potency, 'the magical soul of the sacrifice,' as it may be called, which forms the spiritual instrument that ensures success. Hubert and Mauss[3] have well illustrated the metamorphosis which takes place in the persons as well as in the implements needed for sacrifice. All that concerns gods must be of divine character; the *yajamāna* must be prepared by certain rites in order to be worthy to approach the precincts of the supernatural. This is done by various penances, by shaving, bathing, abstaining from food and sexual intercourse, etc. Different substances are used to impart their mystic power, are poured over him, inhaled by him, etc. The implements are consecrated with *mantras* or *yajus*; *e.g.*, the rice is thrown into the winnowing basket with the words, 'I take you at the impulse of God Savitṛ, with the arms of the Aśvins,' etc. If they bring an animal-sacrifice, the sacrificial post erected on the *vedi* is sanctified by unctions and *mantras* and looked upon as a thing of superior holiness. The oblations are consecrated by various ceremonies, among which the *paryagnikaraṇa* deserves special mention.

The priest takes a firebrand and carries it three times round the oblation or the animal, describing thus a magic circle in order to keep off the demons and make the victim appropriate to the gods. Several libations precede the main offering. In an animal-sacrifice the divine essence, which permeates the animal when it is on the point of being immolated and sent along the path of gods, communicates itself to the *yajamāna*, who touches it on its way to the slaughtering place by means of the *vapāśrapaṇī*, the two spits upon which the *vapā* (the omentum) is later to be roasted. After the recitation of expiatory *mantras*, apologizing for the crime to be committed, the animal is 'quieted' by strangulation. Those performers who are not immediately concerned in this act step back and sit down, turning their face towards the *āhavanīya* fire in order to avoid being eye-witnesses of the act. The religious drama has then reached its climax. Among the parts of the animal assigned to the gods the omentum is most conspicuous; the blood is poured out for the demons, who later receive also the husks of the grain. Special parts of the principal oblations form the *iḍā*, which is the portion of the priests and the sacrificer and is regarded as a mystic deity who is invoked with great solemnity to come together with other mystic powers of the universe and bestow prosperity on the *yajamāna*. The ceremony then gradually relaxes: the 'tissue' has been woven, it must be dissolved again. As the drama after the peripetia, so the sacrifice must descend from the summit which it has reached and dismiss the performer from its magic circle to his worldly atmosphere. Various libations follow the *pradhānas*. The butter or fat that is left over is thrown into the fire; so are some of the implements, while others, especially those penetrated by some magic substance imparted to them by the purpose which they served, are concealed in the ground. The sacrificer finishes his vow by repeating the same *mantras* which he said at the beginning, of course with the modifications required by the different situation: he 'loosens' the sacrifice (*vimuñchati*). A bath in some cases concludes the sacrifice.

A good many accessory practices serve to enforce the general purpose of the sacrifice: the heads of certain animals, immured in the *agniciti*, give the altar strength and solidity; an *avakā* plant laid in the holes dug for the pillars or posts of the house prevents the house from breaking into a blaze. These accretions are like small rivulets which feed the main stream of sacrificial effectiveness. But secondary designs may also be fulfilled.

He who stands in need of rain has to fasten the rope by means of which the animal is tied to the sacrificial post, round the bottom; if the priest's intentions are friendly towards the sacrificer, he holds himself straight while offering; if his intentions are inimical, he stoops; if he wants somebody to be his friend, he turns the press-stones one towards the other. It is possible to foretell the future from single occurrences, to expiate certain blunders or faults, etc.—practices accompanying the sacrifice which crept into the ritual from an older stratum, from times when the ritual was less developed and mere symbolic actions sufficed to work man's will. But the difference is only one of degree. It is usual to draw a sharp line between magic and sacrifice (or, rather, religion; for sacrifice formed part of ancient religion). But the present writer fails to discover the line in the face of facts. Magic is the lowest stratum in the development of religion. The limits between magic and sacrifice are constantly shifting, in consequence not of change of system, of inward dissimilarity, but of intellectual progress and growing enlightenment.

'To the operator the magical act,' say R. R. Marett, 'is generally a projection of imperative will, and specifically one that moves on a supernormal plane.'[1]

If that will has become less imperative, a little more subdued by the feeling of being subjected to supernatural powers independent of itself, magical art has changed into religion. As the genius of Greek art lies concealed under the awkward attempts of antecedent times and awaits its release by the progress of intellect, so the genius of religion in order to be freed from the entangling net of magical superstition awaits the progress of civilization. If to a symbolic action the performer prefers a sacrifice, the instrument becomes some-

[1] Oldenberg[2], p. 356; Hillebrandt, *Tiere und Götter im ved. Ritual*, Breslau, 1905.

[2] Cf. artt. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Indian), SUICIDE (Hindu).

[3] 'Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice,' *ASoc* ii. [1897–98] 48, 51, 56 ff.

[1] 'From Spell to Prayer,' *FL* xv. 148.

what loftier, more refined by the invocation of higher powers, but remains altogether akin to the lower art of the magician. The god receives his share in order that he may grant the request; but he stands in need of the oblation as much as the sacrificer stands in need of his assistance. In the Indian sacrifice the mutuality begins to give way to the conception of the god's grace, but is not yet vanished. The mind of the ancient poets and ritualists is perfectly aware of the mystic power of sacrifice; we see it personified in the Vedic hymns and considered as a magical element by means of which the gods produced the world[1] and the ancestors achieved their wonderful deeds; to the ancient ritualists who invented countless legends in order to account for its origin, its disappearance and its single practices and variations,[2] it is still more; to them it appears as creator and creation, as centre of life and universe, even as a living being that is created and killed and reborn again in innumerable alternations. The present writer therefore agrees with Haug,[3] who was the first to define Indian sacrifice as 'a kind of witchcraft,' with Wundt,[4] who defines sacrifice as 'an outgrowth of magic art,' with Marett, who, though conceding that from one point of view magic and religion must be held apart in thought, yet thinks that from another point of view they may legitimately be brought together.[5] Sylvain Lévi is also of the same opinion:

'Le sacrifice qui règle les rapports de l'homme avec les divinités est une opération mécanique qui agit par son énergie intime; caché au sein de la nature, il ne s'en dégage que sous l'action magique du prêtre. Les dieux inquiets et malveillants se voient obligés de capituler, vaincus et soumis par la force même qui leur a donné la grandeur. . . . Le sacrifice a donc tous les caractères d'une opération magique.'[6]

The Indian sacrifice has, it is true, partly passed beyond this first stage and ascended a higher step; the very word *yajna*, equal to Iranian *yasna*, already betrays a loftier conception, and with still more reason this may be said of a great part of the Vedic hymns; but the ceremonial itself leaves no doubt that it is deeply rooted in magical art.

Inseparable from the sacrifice is the word.[7] With a few exceptions, which are met in ancestor-worship and offerings to malign deities and are easily accounted for,[8] the word, be it prose or verse, is the constant companion of ritual action, a kind of spiritual agent directing it to its goal.

'The spell or uttered "must,"' Marett says, 'will tend, I conceive, to embody the very life and soul of the affair. Nothing initiates an imperative more cleanly, cutting it away from the formative matrix of thought and launching it on its free career, than the spoken word. . . . It is the very type of a spiritual projectile.'[9]

The mystery of human speech has led to many speculations in India as well as elsewhere;[10] but it becomes, even according to Indian notions, especially important by association with sacrifice: [11] *vāg devebhyo yajñam vahati* ('speech leads the sacrifice to the gods'), says *Śat. Brāhm.* i. 4.4.2. Corresponding with the tendency to make everything subordinate to the general character of the sacrifice, the ritual tries not only by different modulations (low, loud, mezzo, very frequent stoppings) to accommodate speech to the different situations, but also to distinguish from the formulas and prayers of the ordinary sacrifice the imprecations aiming at the destruction of the foe and his prosperity. The person who utters the malediction has to use 'rudenesses of speech,' *i.e.* words distinguished by hard consonants or otherwise expressive of its inward tendency.[1] A hymn having this imprecatory character, which may have once accompanied an act of sorcery, is met with in the collection of the *Rigveda*.[2] It is worth mentioning that also in other cases verses or formulas try to indicate, by choosing adequate expressions, the action they are intended to accomplish; a conciliatory spell, *e.g.*, repeats the preposition *sam* ('together' or 'with'), the plant *arundhatī*, healing broken limbs, is addressed in a *mantra* that often makes use of derivations from the root *ruh*, 'to grow.' The magical art often presses verses or formulas of the higher descent into its low service; prayers addressed to Artemis, Helios, or Christian saints sometimes appear auxiliary to witchcraft practices. The question has as yet not been answered—and probably remains unanswerable—whether this abuse is not comparatively modern and the texts may not have replaced older wordings more in keeping with the stratum to which the practices they are alluding to belong. It is a long way from spell to prayer, as long as from magic to sacrifice. The word ceases to be spell and turns into prayer as soon as it is felt to be depending in its effect, not upon the imperative will of the speaker, but upon the good will or the grace of a superhuman power. The modern notion of prayer, fashioned under the influence of Jewish and Christian creed, as lifting the heart to God and abiding in His will and law has not yet sprung up in Indian sacrifice. Even the prayer which we find at the end of the new and full moon sacrifice[3] seems more a conclusive recapitulation of the principal wishes than a prayer in our sense. The only exception in the ritual seems to occur in the sacrificial atmosphere of Varuna, where devotion of heart and forgiveness of sin form a characteristic feature. But it must be owned that there are prayers, at least in the Vedic collections of hymns and also in India, that testify to the universal existence of prayer in primitive times.[4] The 'salvum fac regem' of India[5] is by no means inferior to national anthems of modern nations, and there are other hymns of still higher type in the *Rigveda*. It seems probable that they represent, though earlier in time, a higher state of civilization than the sacrificial practices, which, though later recorded, nevertheless were inherited from remote antiquity.

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[1] Bergaigne, *La Rel. véd.* (cf. Index, *s.v.* 'Sacrifice'); Ludwig, *Der Rigveda*, iii. 299 ff.; Oldenberg[2], p. 320.

[2] Sylvain Lévi, *La Doctrine du sacrifice*, Paris, 1898, *passim*.

[3] 'Ueber die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Wortes *brahma*,' *SBAW*, 1868, p. 16.

[4] *Völkerpsychologie*, ii. 2, 339, 342, 447.

[5] *FL* xv. 165; cf. also M. Winternitz, 'Witchcraft in Ancient India,' *New World*, vii. [1898] 523.

[6] *La Doctrine du sacrifice*, pp. 9 *f.*, 129. The views of Oldenberg[2] (p. 313 ff.), Oltramare ('Le Rôle du Yajamâna,' p. 3 ff.), and Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], ii. 75 ff.) are somewhat different.

[7] Bergaigne, i. 296, ii. 267.

[8] Cf. also Oldenberg[2], p. 431.

[9] *FL* xv. 150. See also Hubert's excellent treatise on 'Magie,' *Dictionnaire des antiquités*, v. 31, p. 25 *f.*; Hubert and Mauss, 'Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie,' *ASoc* [1902–03] 51 ff.; V. Henry, *La Magie*, *passim*.

[10] D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, London, 1898, p. 86; Bergaigne, Index, *s.v.* 'Prière.'

[11] Bergaigne, i. 296.

[1] Hillebrandt, *GIAP*, § 88, p. 170.

[2] vi. 53; *Ved. Myth.*, iii. 366.

[3] Hillebrandt, *Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena, 1880.

[4] M. Müller, 'On Ancient Prayers,' *Semitic Studies in Memory of Alex. Kohut*, p. 1 ff.

[5] *Atharvaveda*, iv. 22.

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A. F. Alfred Hillebrandt.

WORSHIP (Jain). — I. **Śvetāmbara.**[1] — (*a*) *Morning worship.*—The hour of the morning and more elaborate worship in a Śvetāmbara temple is 7.30. Leaving their shoes at the gateway that guards the temple courtyard, the worshippers come to a room where the more devout and more leisured exchange their secular dress for the two freshly-washed cloths[2] (a loin-cloth and a shoulder-scarf) in which alone they may enter the inner shrine. They also leave in this room any money they have brought and desire to keep, for the *tīrthaṅkara* must have everything on which his eye 'lights,' and those two cloths admit of no pockets for concealment. The worshippers now ascend the steps to the temple proper, at the doorway of which are two carved beasts supporting the threshold.[3] These are said to represent Yakṣa and Yakṣaṇī, the servants of the *tīrthaṅkara* to whom the temple is dedicated. It is left to the temple-servants to worship these beasts, the ordinary devotees having, so they say, no time to spend on them. The ritual acts of the lay-worshipper are our best guide in investigating this worship, for the temple-officiant, usually a Brāhman, or even a gardener by caste, can give no reliable instruction.[4]

In the open porch (*maṇḍapa*) outside the temple-door the devotee marks his own forehead with the auspicious saffron-mark (or *chandana*), using, of course, his third finger to make the mark, and then circumambulates the temple outside three times in the auspicious way, *i.e.* with his right hand nearest to the building. Still standing outside the temple, the worshipper joins his hands together in the attitude of prayer immortalized in Dürer's 'Praying Hands,' and says for the first time '*Nissahi*.' An instructed devout worshipper uses this expression not once (as is the common wont), but three times:[5] (1) he says it outside, in the temple-porch, asking that he may be cut off and freed from all worldly cares; (2) crossing the threshold and standing just inside, he again says it, asking that he may be cut off and freed from all thought of the temple-servants or his fellow-worshippers; (3) when he comes to the great spiritual point of his worship, he repeats the word once more, asking that he may be cut off from all thought of the worship he himself has offered, and enabled to concentrate all his thoughts on the qualities of the *tīrthaṅkara*.

As the worshipper crosses the raised threshold, it is interesting to see that he does not hesitate to put his foot on the plain boss of it—a thing no Brāhman would do, believing it to be the seat of Gaṇeśa.[6] The worshipper is now in the Hall of Assembly, or *sabhā maṇḍapa*, a hall supported by a circle of pillars and at the present day generally disfigured by the crudest colourings, terrible blues and reds and yellows mingled together on a plaster background; but in the older temples on Mount Abu (Rajputānā) or Śatruñjaya Hill (State of Palitāṇā) the delicate tracery in stone or marble of the struts between the pillars in this hall and the carved work surrounding the doorway leading to the inner shrine make the whole resemble a veritable ivory palace in fragility and delicacy. The worshipper proceeds at once to cross the threshold and enter the inner shrine (*gabhāro*). Visitors, however, must advance only up to the doorway; but, standing there, they can gain a view not only of the big image of the principal *tīrthaṅkara* (*muḷa nāyaka*) of that particular shrine,[1] perhaps Mahāvīra, to whom the whole temple is dedicated, and the two servants (Yakṣa and Yakṣaṇī) that flank the big image, but also of the rows of twenty-four smaller *tīrthaṅkara* that, arranged on a long altar-shelf, stretch on either side of the main image for the whole length of the inner shrine. There are very often two smaller doors leading from the Hall of Assembly to this inner shrine, and opposite each of these on the altar-shelf are arranged large images of some other *tīrthaṅkara*, perhaps Ādinātha and Ṛiṣabhadeva respectively. All the *tīrthaṅkara* in a Śvetāmbara temple are represented with staring glass eyes, and with carved stone loin-cloths. They are nearly always, too, seated figures, the larger images being adorned with jewels and flowers. Below the big central statue of Mahāvīra (let us say) may be seen a gleaming image of some *tīrthaṅkara* (perhaps Pārśvanātha) fashioned out of five metals.

On a lower altar-shelf there may or may not be a folding brass lotus-flower with some *tirthaṅkara* in the centre and twenty-three smaller images of *tīrthaṅkara* in bas-relief on the petals; or a little tray with the eight good omens that always precede a *tīrthaṅkara*; or a copper plate (the *mantra* of Vijaya) covered with mystic symbols; or twenty-four two-inch brass plates, each bearing outline pictures of the *tīrthaṅkara*. All of these may or may not be present, but there must be at least one *Siddha chakra*, for no temple is complete unless it contains this crystallized creed of Jainism. The *Siddha chakra* resembles a little tray; in the centre is a raised figure of an Arihanta, and around it the figures of Sādhu, Upādhyāya, Āchārya, and Siddha, and between the encircling figures are written the names of the Three Jewels of the Jain faith: Right Knowledge, Right Faith, and Right Conduct, and *tapa* (austerity), the key-word to the Jain system.[2]

In a Śvetāmbara temple the worshipper bids for the right to win merit by performing the worship under the form of 'auctioning the *ghī*.' Any number of worshippers may purchase the right for sums varying from five annas to one rupee or more, and each successful bidder starts the morning worship again from the very beginning as soon as his predecessor has finished. The first worshipper enters the inner shrine and, removing the jewels and old flowers, performs *jaḷa pūjā*, *i.e.* washes the idol with water and milk and the five nectars, drying it afterwards most carefully with different cloths (*aṅgaluñchchanā pūjā*). As soon as the idol is dry, the worshipper rubs a little *barāsa*[3] all over it with his second and third fingers, and then marks it with liquid saffron (*chandana pūjā*) in fourteen different places in the following order:

[1] The worship of the non-idolatrous Sthānakavāsī sect has already been described in art. Prayer (Jain).

[2] These two cloths the worshipper keeps in this room and pays the temple-servant to wash for him after every act of worship.

[3] These strange animals are also seen in every Hindu temple-threshold; for other explanations of them see the present writer's *Rites of the Twice-Born*, Oxford, 1920, p. 372.

[4] Śvetāmbara Jains can never in a Śvetāmbara temple receive money for worshipping; indeed they cannot even act as head clerk to the temple, so that those responsible for temple worship necessarily belong to an alien faith; hence the difficulty of gaining accurate knowledge of Śvetāmbara worship. Many Jains have private shrines in their own houses (there are said to be 360 in Aḥmadābād alone); if they have, they worship there first in private before coming on to public temple worship.

[5] So far the writer has found no trace of this custom in a Hindu temple.

[6] See the present writer's *Rites of the Twice-Born*, p. 373.

[1] Recognizable at once by the differing symbols at the base of the idols.

[2] See the present writer's *Heart of Jainism*, p. 262.

[3] This *barāsa* is so expensive that it can only be applied to the chief image. A very rich worshipper might also case the image all over with gold- or silver-leaf.

right toe, left toe, right knee, left knee, right wrist, left wrist, right shoulder, left shoulder, top of skull, forehead, throat, heart, navel, and centre of right palm; and, as he marks it, he sings ten separate verses in its praise.

If the worshipper is a very rich man, he may now offer fifty rupees, in return for which he or (if he be indolent as well as rich) the temple-officiant will put on the idol its very best jewellery[1] —crown, necklace, ear-rings, bracelets, armlets, girdle, sandals, all of gold—and give it a gold or silver coco-nut to hold in its hands. (The best jewellery may also include ropes of pearls.) If the worshipper cannot afford more than twenty-five rupees, the second-best jewellery only will be brought out. Except when a wealthy client is present or on great festivals, the ordinary worshipper proceeds at once to decorate the statue with flowers and garlands (*puṣpa pūjā*). He then steps outside[2] the inner shrine to perform the remaining ritual acts; he waves a stick of incense (*dhūpa pūjā*) and a lamp (*dīpa pūjā*) at the threshold of the shrine, and places on the table in the Hall of Assembly before the doorway of the inner shrine rice (*akṣata pūjā*), the only grain which (unlike Hindu ritual) can ever be offered in a Jain temple, sugar (*naivedya pūjā*), and fruit (*phaḷa pūjā*), such as coco-nut, plantains, mangoes, or almonds.[3] It is important to notice how the last three offerings are made.

The worshipper arranges the rice in the following form:



On the centre of (*a*), if a rich man, he places a coin of varying value, and beside it or on it he places the sugar and the fruit. This *swastika* sign (*a*) symbolizes the *gati* in which a man may be born according to his accumulated hoards of past *karma*, either as a dweller in heaven or in hell, as a man or a beast. The three little heaps (*b*) represent the Three Jewels of the Jain faith which lead a man to *mokṣa* (*c*), symbolized by the sign of one dot in the segment of a circle.

In studying the worship in a Jain or a Hindu temple special attention must always be paid to four points:

(1) Who is allowed to go into the inner shrine. It was surprising to be told that in a Śvetāmbara temple any devout Jain lady of position who had bathed and came wearing clean clothes might enter the inner shrine and indeed perform every ritual act that a layman is allowed to do.[4]

(2) What change the offering undergoes by being offered to a god. In a Jain temple the deeply interesting change from *naivedya* to *prasāda*[5] is unknown, and the word *prasāda* is never used, but in a Śvetāmbara or Digambara temple, once food has been offered to the *tīrthaṅkara*, it is called *deva dravya*, or, very often by the ignorant, *nirmalya*.[1]

(3) What may and may not be offered. In a Digambara temple no fresh fruit may be offered, and in a Śvetāmbara temple no over-ripe fruit may be given.

(4) Perhaps most illuminating of all, who eats the offering. In a temple of Viṣṇu all can take communion with their god and eat the food, which is known as *prasāda*; in a temple of Śiva only a fallen and despised set of *pujāris* known as *atita*[2] can eat the food, which, once it has been offered, is called *nirmalya*; but in some Śvetāmbara temples, as a mark of special honour, Bhāṭas are given the fruit and the sugar, the rice being sold to 'menial people' in open market, for no Jain of position would knowingly buy and eat *deva dravya*.

To account for the honour paid to the Bhāṭas, the legend is told of how, when Muhammad Ghazni was in power, two Bhāṭas laid their living bodies on the burning pyre at Pālitāṇā day after day and were burnt to death, to ransom the images on the sacred Hill of Śatruñjaya from desecration. In commemoration of their heroism, the whole offering (fruit, sugar, and rice) is given to Bhāṭas in the State of Pālitāṇā; elsewhere they are sometimes given the fruit and sugar only.

If there be no Bhāṭa, the head-clerk of the temple distributes the fruit and sugar among the temple-servants and their children.

As a rule, cooked food is not offered in a Śvetāmbara temple, but on the occasion of a marriage in his family some wealthy client might send down a specially dainty dish. This would be put on the open table in the Hall of Assembly, and not offered behind a curtain, as in a temple of Viṣṇu,[3] and would afterwards be eaten by a Bhāṭa or, failing him, by a temple-servant.

When these offerings have been duly made and arranged, all is ready for the great act of spiritual worship. 'As bread is flavourless without salt,' runs the proverb, 'so worship is without savour and useless, unless *bhāva pūjā* be performed.' The worshipper first prostrates himself three times (*chaityavandana pūjā*) before the main idol (the *mula nāyaka*), which gazes out from its shelf in the inner shrine into the Hall of Assembly, and then says the third *Nissahi*, asking to be cut off from all remembrance of his own acts of worship and offerings. He proceeds to perform *bhāva pūjā*; but neither then nor at any other time does he offer petitions for any spiritual or material boon; rather he encourages himself by remembering the virtues of the *tīrthaṅkara*, 'like a soldier before the tomb of Napoleon,' and devotes himself to singing the saint's praises. Finally he walks backwards, as though in the presence of royalty, to the main door, towards which the chief image is looking ('only a "fool-man" walks out by a side door'), and, arrived at the threshold, repeats the word *Āvissahi*, thereby asking to be allowed to follow his necessary avocations every day. As he says it, he bows with joined hands to the idol. A devout Jain will say this word again as he leaves the porch of the temple, and a third time before he passes out into the street from the gateway of the temple courtyard; but the uninstructed generally content themselves with saying it once.

'It is "compulsory" on us to do part of this worship in the early morning, and part of it at noon,' said a leading Jain official to the writer, 'but, as we are in Government offices at mid-day, we do it all together in the morning.'

On the great festivals, and at places of pilgrimage like Śatruñjaya, Abu, and Girnār, the writer has witnessed more elaborate worship. Sometimes royal worship is offered, when a brush of Tibetan cow's hair (*chamarī pūjā*) is waved in front of the main image, and three silver umbrellas are placed

[1] Note that, unlike a Vaiṣṇava idol, the images of the male *tirthaṅkara* are never draped in actual clothes.

[2] A worshipper in ordinary dress can perform the remaining acts, as they are done outside the inner shrine.

[3] If a child, *e.g.*, comes into a temple accidentally bringing with it a plantain, or some sugar, or a copper coin in its open hand, these must be added to the offering, for 'the eye of the god has lighted on them.'

[4] The present writer, however, has never actually seen a woman enter the inner shrine.

[5] For the change the offering undergoes in a Hindu temple see the present writer's *Rites of the Twice-Born*, p. 385.

[1] This word properly belongs to food offered to Śiva.

[2] See *Rites of the Twice-Born*, p. 320.

[3] *Ib.* p. 402.

over it. At other times a silver image of some *tīrthaṅkara* is placed on a silver throne in the Hall of Assembly. The men all sit on one side and the women on the other and offer *snātra pūjā*, by singing songs in its honour. Or a pilgrim may purchase the privilege of sitting in a silver chariot, holding a little silver image in his lap, and being thus dragged three times round outside the temple —a sort of circumambulation *de luxe*. On Śatruñjaya Hill a special pilgrimage is performed, known as 'the Ninety-nine,' when daily for over three months the pilgrim must toil up the stone stairway to the top of the hill, circumambulate the most famous temple, and tramp down again in honour of the ninety-nine thousand times that a *tīrthaṅkara* visited Śatruñjaya. 'But, as life is short, we only do it ninety-nine times, and leave out the thousands!' On the last day of the ninety-nine the pilgrim offers the eightfold worship with more than the usual 'harmony-barmony,'[1] as an English-speaking Jain once called it.

In a big Śvetāmbara temple there is often a map of Mount Abu, a plan of Sameta Sikhara (in Bengal), or a model of the great temple of Śatruñjaya. On the special days when merit is gained by going to these pilgrim resorts a man who is too poor or too busy to undertake the journey may yet gain merit by offering to the map or plan or model the fourfold *pūjā* of lamp, incense, rice, and fruit. In the same way, if a man is too ill to get out of bed and come to the temple, he may offer worship to a picture of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkara* at home,[2] for the Indian proverb runs prettily: 'If you cannot offer a flower, offer a petal.'

All through the day worshippers can come and do *bhāva pūjā*, for the god is never put down for a siesta as among the Hindus in a temple of Viṣṇu, though the wired doors of the inner shrine are often locked to keep off thieves.

(*b*) *Evening worship.*—In the evening, as a rule, only the paid temple-officiant enters the inner shrine, for no layman wants the trouble of bathing and donning the special dress so late in the day. At sunset the hanging lamps in the Hall of Assembly are lighted, as are also two or more lamps of clarified butter in the inner shrine; and, before beginning the evening service, the officiant lights some incense and places it in front of the chief idol of the temple. Then the right to perform the evening worship is auctioned (it can be sold to five successive worshippers), and the officiant from inside the shrine hands to the highest bidder the little *āratī* lamp. This consists of two tiers of lamps; in the upper tier is only one lamp, and in the lower there are five; in each of these six lamps a little wick is floating in clarified butter.[3] Five times the worshipper waves this from left to right, singing, as he does so, the special *āratī* hymn, whilst all the other worshippers bang gongs, beat drums, and make as much noise as possible. Each successful bidder follows suit. When the *āratī pūjā* is complete, the waving of the *maṅgala-dīpaka* is performed. A *maṅgala* lamp consists of a lamp in a saucer; it burns camphor in the saucer and *ghī* in the lamp itself; it has only one wick and can be auctioned to only one worshipper. As the worshipper waves it from left to right three times, he sings the *maṅgala-dīpaka* hymn, and again all the instruments, musical and unmusical, are played. The object of the *āratī*-waving is said to be to protect the worshippers themselves from all molestation by evil powers of darkness during the night. The *maṅgala-dīpaka* is waved for the welfare of the whole world. The incense is allowed to burn itself out, which it does by about 8.30 p.m., when all the shrine doors are locked by the officiant and (since the jewels are left on the idol all night) inspected by the temple watchman before the final shutting up of the temple about 9 o'clock. It is noticeable that (unlike the evening ritual in a temple of Viṣṇu), there is no stretching out of the hands by the worshippers to either *āratī* or *maṅgala-dīpaka*.

2. **Digambara.**—(*a*) *Morning worship.*—It is easier to obtain information in a Digambara temple, since the officiant there is himself a Jain. The main lines of the worship are the same as in the Śvetāmbara temple (washing, drying, offering rice, dry fruit, incense, and lamp); but between the worship in a Digambara temple which belongs to the Terāpanthī and that in one belonging to the Visapanthī there are many minor differences. In any Digambara temple the idols on the long shelf in the inner shrine have no eyes, no carved loin-cloths, and wear no jewels or flowers. Fresh fruit cannot be offered to them, and no woman on any consideration is allowed to enter the inner shrine (for with the Digambara no woman as such can obtain salvation). The privilege of performing worship is not put up to auction, and the *jala pūjā* can be performed only at one time, not at intervals of thirty minutes or an hour, as in a Śvetāmbara temple. The idol is washed with plain water (not water mixed with milk or nectars), and it has seemed to the writer, as she watched, that even greater care is shown by Digambara that not one drop of water should fall to the ground. Among the Visapanthī the idol is marked with *chandana* on both toes; but the Terāpanthī do not mark the idol itself when performing *chandana pūjā*, but mix the saffron with the rice on the table.

One main difference that strikes every visitor is that, whereas in a Śvetāmbara temple the whole Hall of Assembly is dotted with worshippers, who (having done at any time they chose as many of the ritual acts of washing, drying, marking, and offering as they had leisure for) are now seated each before a separate little stool, arranging the rice in the mystic way and offering coin and fruit, then telling their beads, and doing their *bhāva pūjā*, in a Digambara temple there is one united act of worship.[1] The rice and dried fruit are all arranged in separate little heaps on one tray on one table, and are removed by the priests from that tray to form a large mound on another tray. In front of the main idol on a table in the Hall of Assembly the officiant arranges a tall vase like an upturned chalice, two brass tumblers of water, a full tray containing rice, almonds, and sugar arranged in separate heaps, and an empty tray marked with a *swastika*. He then stands behind the table on a little stool and to the accompaniment of elaborate genuflexions and intonings transfers the contents of the full tray to the empty one[2] and the upturned chalice. The food thus ceremonially transferred in the presence of the idol changes from *naivedya* to *deva dravya*. But here again the most important part of the worship is the mental *bhāva pūjā*, when the officiant stands silent, then bows, and finally kneels, touching the floor with his head, mentally repeating *mantras* all the time. So essential do they count this that an officiant in a Digambara temple said to the writer: 'If any one spent a lakh of rupees on performing the eight-fold worship, it would all be worthless without *bhāva pūjā*.'

[1] See *Heart of Jainism*, p. 254.

[2] In this case, instead of marking it with freshly ground and moistened saffron, he scatters over the picture dried saffron (*vaskepa*) brought from the temple.

[3] No lamp may be burnt in the inner shrine, unless it contains *ghī* or camphor. Oil is never allowed there.

[1] At least in the writer's part of India.

[2] For full details of the transference see *Notes on Modern Jainism*, p. 91.

...ry of ... SEMINARY ... EAST ANAHEIM ...

(*b*) *Evening worship.*—All sects of the Śvetāmbara that the writer has met perform *āratī*; but, though among the Digambara it is performed by the Visapanthī, the Terāpanthī perform neither *āratī* nor *maṅgala-dīpaka*, contenting themselves with lighting a lamp, carefully protected by glass, in the inner shrine and burning incense there. But, though Terāpanthī have no lamps, they sing songs and read some of their scriptures aloud in the temples at their evening worship.

It is interesting to notice that (unlike the ritual in a Viṣṇu temple) neither among the Śvetāmbara nor among any sect of the Digambara is food ever offered to the gods at night.

'We account it a sin to eat after the lamps are lit, for inadvertently we might eat some insect; how could we then offer food in the temples after sunset and so force our *tīrthaṅkara* to sin?'

LITERATURE.—The writer has confined herself to temple worship, as other forms of worship have been dealt with under PRAYER (Jain), FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jain). The researcher should notice local differences; *e.g.*, temple worship on Mt. Abu is described in the present writer's *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910, while for temple worship in Rājkot and Pālitāṇā reference may be made to *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915. In addition to these, new material for the present article has been derived mainly from the worship in the temples at Junāgadh at the foot of Girnār, the famous Jain pilgrim resort.

MARGARET STEVENSON.

WORSHIP (Japanese).—I. *SHINTŌ CULT DESCRIBED IN THE ECLIPSE-MYTH.*—The various component parts of Shintō worship have already been treated in separate articles. The best way to gather them into a complete whole, and to picture the actual worship, will be to give the old account of the eclipse-myth, and by simple references connect with it the details already examined. For this story is not only the nucleus of Japanese mythology, but also the most primitive and most authentic description of Shintō worship, since it was written expressly for the purpose of giving the legendary origin of the chief ceremonies of this worship, as officially practised at the court of the mikado in the most ancient times, and of explaining the ascendancy of the great priestly families who officiated in them. We therefore have in this text, which is more than 1200 years old, a brief account of all that is essential in the rites of Shintō worship and its priests.[1]

First of all, let us recall how, by reason of certain offences committed by the terrible god Susa-no-wo,[2] the sun-goddess, Amaterasu, shut herself up in the rocky cavern of heaven, and left the world in darkness (*toko-yo*, 'eternal night'); how the eight hundred myriad gods in dismay then assembled in the dried-up bed of the Tranquil River of Heaven (the Milky Way), to take counsel as to how they might induce the goddess to come forth from her retreat; and how for this purpose their usual counsellor, the god of artifice, Omohikane, conceived a plan, which was nothing else than the transference to the sky of the terrestrial rites of Shintō, but which, naturally, is given us as having been, on the contrary, their prototype. The plan was as follows:

'Assembling the long-singing birds of eternal night and making them sing; taking the hard rocks of heaven from the river-bed of the Tranquil River of Heaven, and taking the iron from the heavenly Metal-Mountains; calling in the smith Amatsu-mara; charging His Augustness Ishi-kori dome to make a mirror, and charging His Augustness Tama-no-ya to make an augustly complete string of curved jewels eight feet long, of five hundred jewels; and summoning His Augustness Ame-no-Koyane and His Augustness Futo-dama, and causing them to pull out with a complete pulling the shoulder of a true stag from the heavenly Mount Kagu, and take heavenly *haha-ka*[1] from the heavenly Mount Kagu, and perform divination; and pulling up by pulling its roots a true *sakaki* with five hundred branches from the heavenly Mount Kagu; and taking and putting upon its upper branches the augustly complete string of curved jewels eight feet long, of five hundred jewels, and taking and tying to the middle branches the mirror eight feet long, and taking and hanging upon its lower branches the white soft offerings and the blue soft offerings; His Augustness Futo-dama taking these divers things and holding them together with the grand august offerings; and His Augustness Ame-no-Koyane prayerfully reciting a grand ritual; and the deity Ame-no-Tajikara-wo standing hidden beside the door; and Her Augustness Ame-no-Uzume hanging round her the heavenly *hikage* of the heavenly Mount Kagu as a sash, and making the heavenly *masaki-no-kazura* her head-dress, and binding the leaves of the *sasa* of the heavenly Mount Kagu in a posy for her hands, and laying a sounding-board before the door of the heavenly Rock-Dwelling, and stamping till she made it resound, and doing divine possession, and pulling out the nipples of her breasts, and pushing down her skirt-string *usque ad privatas partes*.'[2]

Thereupon, as the *Kojiki* says, 'the Plain of High Heaven shook and the eight hundred myriad Deities laughed together.' Amazed at this Homeric laughter, the sun-goddess slightly opens the door of the heavenly cavern. To entice her further, the artful Uzume explains to her that the gods are rejoicing 'because there is a Deity more illustrious than Thine Augustness,' and at the same time Ame-no-Koyane and Futo-dama push the mirror towards her, which induces her to come out still farther from the door. At this moment Ame-no-Tajikara-wo seizes her by the hand and drags her out, while Futo-dama immediately stretches behind her a' *shiri-kume-naha* ('bottom-tied-rope,' *i.e.* a rope made of straw drawn up by the roots, which stick out from the end of the rope), saying to her, 'Thou must not go back farther in than this.'[3] From this moment the universe is illuminated anew, to the great joy of gods and men.

II. *ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF CULT EMBODIED IN THIS MYTH.*—In this famous episode we observe certain rites which are more especially connected with the special object of the story, *i.e.* with the magical means to be employed to cause light to reappear when, for some reason or other (eclipse, typhoon, heavy clouds), the sun hides for such a long time that primitive man becomes afraid. These means are the 'long-singing birds of eternal night,'[4] *i.e.* cocks, which were made to utter their long cry in front of the cavern, and which are found symbolically represented in the old temple of the sun-goddess at Ise by dancers called *tona-ko* ('bird-cry'); with the roosts of those sacred birds (kept for the ordinary purpose of heralding the dawn, but also, when need arises, for evoking daylight by magical means) native philologists connect the origin of *tori-i*,[5] the well-known gateway of Shintō temples, although it seems rather to be a continental importation.[6] It is in the same spirit that, in another version of this myth,[7] it is stated that the goddess Uzume, in the midst of her dance, 'kindled a fire,' the aim of which was likewise to evoke the solar light by imitative magic, and which represents the legendary prototype of the *nihabi* ('courtyard fire'), practised in certain ceremonies of Shintō worship, especially in the nocturnal rite of the *nihi-name* ('new tasting'). But, besides those rites which belong more specially to eclipse-ceremonial, this episode also describes rites of a more general character.

1. The solar mirror, central point of the national worship.—First of all, we see the celestial gods

[1] The original text in Chinese characters, with reading in *kana* and transcription, is published in M. Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, pt. i., Paris, 1907, pp. 414–428. An English tr. will be found in B. H. Chamberlain, *Kojiki*[2] (*TASJ*, vol. x., suppl.), Tōkyō, 1906, p. 63 ff., and a French tr in M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*[4], Paris, 1919, p. 46 ff.

[2] See the enumeration of those *ama-tsu-tsumi* ('heavenly sins') in art. SIN (Japanese), § 2.

[1] The words not translated are explained below, p. 803[b].

[2] *Kojiki*[2], tr. Chamberlain, *loc. cit.*, into which, however, the present writer has introduced some modifications; cf. his *Anthologie*, *loc. cit.*

[3] *Kojiki*[2], p. 65.

[4] Or, perhaps, here, 'eternal land,' the continent of Asia, from which those animals were said to have been imported

[5] *Tori*, 'bird,' 'fowl'; *i*, from *iru*, 'dwelling.'

[6] On this question of *tori-i* see B. H. Chamberlain, 'A Preliminary Notice of the Luchuan Language,' in *JAI* xxvi. [1897] 47 ff., and *Things Japanese*[3], London, 1898, p. 407; S. Tuke, 'Notes on the Japanese Tori-i,' in *Trans. Japan Soc. of London*, iv. [1898] pt. ii. p. 81 ff.; W. G. Aston, 'Tori-wi, its Derivation,' in *TASJ* xxvii. [1899] pt. iv. p. 153 ff.; Eugène Goblet d'Alviella, *La Voie des Dieux*, Brussels, 1906, p. 22.

[7] *Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan . . . to A.D. 697*, tr. W. G. Aston, London, 1896, i. 44.

taking rocks from the River of Heaven and iron from the Metal Mountains, *i.e.* the iron mines of primitive Japan, for the purpose of manufacturing a mirror under the superintendence of the gods Ama-tsu-mara (the Cyclops of Japanese mythology, also with a single eye, whose name, meaning *cælestis penis*, is evidently connected with the old phallic cult)[1] and Ishi-kori-dome (the mythical ancestor of the manufacturers of mirrors, whose obscure name may mean 'stone-cutter,' and consequently call up the idea of stone moulds in which certain metal objects were cast). This 'mirror of eight feet' (*ya-ta-kagami*) is still a magical means of recalling the star whose form and brilliance it imitates, in the same way as other 'mirrors of the sun' (*hi-kagami*) which are discussed elsewhere.[2] But, besides the special function which it is called upon to perform in this episode, the solar mirror fills a much larger rôle in Shintō worship in general, in which, in the temple of Ise, it represents the sun-goddess herself, and therefore forms the very centre of the national worship.

The fact that the present mirror at Ise is, in the imagination of the Japanese, the same as was forged at the time of the eclipse is due both to the *Kojiki*[3] and to the *Nihongi*.[4] The latter says that the mirror of the eclipse 'is the great deity who is worshipped at Ise'; and, as this sacred object shows a slight flaw, it is explained quite naturally by the hypothesis of a blow which it received against the door of the cavern.[5] It is therefore a case of a primitive talisman which afterwards became the greatest national fetish. For before long the sun-goddess herself bestows it upon her grandson, Ninigi-no-mikoto, in terms which clearly show that her soul is united with it, by the application of a conception, wide-spread among primitive races, of the mysterious relations that may exist between a mirror and a soul.

'Regard it,' she said, 'as my august spirit, and worship it as if thou wert worshipping in my presence.'[6] And again: 'Let it be with thee in thy home, on thy mat; let it be sacred to thee!'[7] And, when she deputes two other gods to accompany her grandson on the earth, viz. Ame-no-Koyane and Futo-dama, who are precisely the ancestors of the great national sorcerers, 'Watch over me,' she commands them; 'take care, both of you, of this mirror and guard it well.'[8]

From that time the solar mirror becomes the most important and most precious of the three regalia (mirror, sword, and jewel) of the sovereign house. Later, however, a timid emperor, worried with his responsibilities in a time of public disorders, was uncomfortable at the thought that he was living with such a formidable deity; he broke the tradition which had been observed up to this time and entrusted the mirror to an imperial priestess, who kept it in a neighbouring village; she, in her turn, transferred it to the princess of Yamato, the famous vestal who, after various religious travels, stopped finally at Ise according to the instructions of the goddess.[9] There, in the bosom of the 'inner temple' (*naiku*), the mirror will henceforward rest, invisible in its precious tabernacle.

This supreme object of Shintō worship is, as a matter of fact, enclosed in a brocade bag, which is never opened; when the old material shows signs of giving way, the whole is put into a new bag: so that to-day the mirror is enfolded in several layers of silk. Thus protected, it is in addition enclosed in a box of *hi-no-ki*,[10] provided with eight handles, placed on a slightly raised stand, and covered with a piece of white silk. Lastly, above all this there is a sort of cage of white wood, with ornaments of pure gold, itself enveloped in a rough silk curtain, which reaches to the ground on every side. These coverings of the box are all that the people are allowed to see on the festivals on which the sanctuary is opened.

Viscount Mori, the Minister of Public Instruction, who dared to raise a corner of an outer curtain of the sanctuary at Ise, was soon after, on the very day on which the new constitution of Japan was proclaimed in 1889, assassinated by a fanatic Shintōist, whose tomb became a place of pilgrimage.

Although the sun-goddess was the only one in the mythology who assumed the particular form of a mirror, other deities are represented by the same object; *e.g.*, it is said that in the other great temple of Ise, the 'outer temple' (*geku*), the *mitama-shiro* (substitute for the august spirit) of the goddess of food is likewise a mirror, as well as the fetishes of the *ahi-dono no kami* (deities of a joint shrine), which are also worshipped in those two great temples. This is simply a natural generalization of the material side of the cult. The mirror of the sun has gradually become multiplied, and, under Buddhist influence, it has ended in being exhibited in all the temples, though the sacred fetish of Ise remained hidden from human eyes.

2. **The sacred jewel.**—The eclipse-myth relates further that the god Tama-no-ya ('jewel-ancestor'), from whom the hereditary corporation of jewellers claims to be descended, makes a necklace of numerous jewels. The name of this necklace is very difficult to interpret,[1] and its history throughout the centuries is no less uncertain.[2] The imperial jewel, at first identified with the necklace of the eclipse,[3] was gradually reduced to the single sacred stone, two or three inches in diameter, which is carefully preserved to this day in the palace of Tōkyō. But, in spite of the religious character of the mikados, this jewel is evidently of little cult importance compared with the sacred mirror.

3. **Priests.**—Later in the text there appear two gods who are important from the point of view of worship—Ame-no-Koyane (etymology uncertain), the ancestor of the *nakatomi*, the high priests, 'mediators' between the gods and the mikado, who recited the ritual in name of the latter, and Futo-dama (perhaps 'great jewel,' but more probably 'great gift'), the ancestor of the *imibe*, those 'abstaining' priests who were specially charged with preparing the offerings.[4]

4. **Divination.**—Those two gods pull out the shoulder of a stag from Mount Kagu (mountain of heaven, which quite naturally has its homonym in Yamato), and take from the same mountain the bark of a certain tree (*haha-ka* [cherry? or birch?]) in order to light a fire to roast the shoulder-blade, the cracks in which they will then examine for divinatory signs. The ancient Japanese, as a matter of fact, always practised divination when they found themselves in presence of any unusual phenomenon, and their gods naturally did the same, for they were by no means conceived as omniscient.[5] Omoplatoscopy was the favourite form of divination—the official 'greater divination.'[6]

5. **Sacred tree of Shintō.**—The gods then uproot a *sakaki*[7] with five hundred (*i.e.* countless) branches. This tree, which is evergreen, is the sacred tree of Shintō, and is usually found planted in the precincts of the temples; it furnishes wands

[1] See art. NATURE (Japanese), vol. ix. p. 239[a].
[2] See Revon, *Shinntoïsme*, pt. i. p. 212, note.
[3] P. 130.
[4] i. 48.
[5] *Ib.*
[6] *Kojiki*[2], p. 130.
[7] *Nihongi*, i. 83.
[8] *Ib.*: cf. i. 76.
[9] *Ib.* pp. 151 *f.*, 176 *f.*
[10] *Chamæcyparis obtusa*, a sort of *Thuya*.

[1] See Revon, *Shinntoïsme*, p. 224, note 5.
[2] *Ib.* p. 225.
[3] *Kojiki*[2], p. 130.
[4] See, for the *nakatomi*, art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 189[b], and, for the *imibe*, art. SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 22[a].
[5] See art. DIVINATION (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 801[b].
[6] *Ib.* p. 802[a].
[7] *Cleyera japonica*; a fairly good idea of this tree may be got from the fact that the family of *Ternstræmiaceæ*, to which it belongs, includes also the camellia and the tea-plant.

for the *oho-nusa* and the *tama-gushi*,[1] and its branches, which are always carried in funeral processions, make it possible to distinguish at a glance a Shintōist funeral from a Buddhist one. The use of evergreen trees, especially cypress, in ancient times in the West and also in China is analogous.

6. Offerings.—The gods now hang the necklace on the higher branches, the mirror midway, and the offerings of soft materials on the lower branches. The natives of Banks Islands have a similar rite to obtain sunlight; they employ a circular stone, called 'the stone of the sun,' which they decorate with ribbons and fix in a high tree.[2] The offerings of white and blue materials made on this occasion are the general type of Shintōist offerings which play the chief part in the worship,[3] and which have already been exhaustively treated.[4]

7. Recitation of the ritual.—While Futo-dama presents these offerings, Ame-no-Koyane fervently pronounces a ritual whose powerful words (*futo-norito-goto*) are to force the will of the goddess. The character of these Shintō liturgies has already been treated.[5] It should be noted that, besides the magical effect of the recited formula, those old Shintō prayers had also the intention of charming the gods by their literary beauty, as a sort of offering.[6] The respectful gestures accompanying them have also been described.[7]

8. Sacred dance of priestesses and divine possession.—Lastly there appears upon the scene Ame-no-Uzume ('heaven's dread female'), the legendary ancestress of the Sarume-no-kimi ('princesses of Saru,' from *saru*, 'monkey,' and *me* 'woman'), a priestly corporation of court dancers, so called by reason of another myth.[8] With some *hikage* she makes an arm-support (*tasuki*, 'hand-helper'), *i.e.* a kind of cord like that which the imperial stewards, referred to in this connexion in the Ritual of the Great Purification (*Oho-harahi*), had round their necks; the ends were fastened to their wrists to enable them to carry heavy things more easily; she makes a garland for her head (*kazura*) with *masaki-no-kazura*,[9] and a bouquet (*ta-gusa*) with leaves of *sasa*[10] (generic name of various small bamboos). Then she places in front of the cavern the sounding-board on which she is to perform her dance, the prototype of the sacred pantomime (*kagura*) which is still one of the regular rites of Shintō worship—an æsthetic offering to the gods—and which may be seen danced at the present day by young priestesses wearing masks and damask draperies, on the platform of a special building in the precincts of certain temples, like those of Ise and Nara.[11] Uzume soon reaches a state of ecstasy (*kamugakari*- or *kangakari-shite*), 'doing divine possession,' the real or simulated character of which may be disputed,[12] but which in any case corresponds exactly with what we know of the important rôle of nervous phenomena in the ancient practices of Shintō, as they may be observed even at the present day.[13]

As regards the indecent gesture with which this scene ends, and which the *Nihongi*, which appeared only eight years after the *Kojiki*, thought right to omit in the corresponding account,[1] but whose reproduction even the *Nihongi* mentions in another connexion,[2] it gives a good idea of the naively bold character of this goddess, whose sportive naturalness the mythology associates with that of the monkey-god Saruta—an interesting point for phallic worship.[3]

9. Magic cords.—All these rites having been performed, the sun-goddess is gradually attracted outside, first by the clamorous mirth of the gods, then by the mirror which, in the *Kojiki* account, seems mainly to have a psychological action, exciting the curiosity of the goddess, but which, in the original form of the myth, must have been regarded as having rather the action of imitative magic. The god Ame-no-Tajikara-wo ('hand-strength-male'), who is hiding near the door, seizes this moment to drag the sun-goddess forcibly outside, and Futo-dama immediately prevents her from stepping back by means of a magic cord, just as, in the Fiji Islands, they tie grasses to stop the sun.[4] This cord is the prototype of the *shime-naha* ('close-rope'), the cords of rice-straw which are usually to be seen in front of Shintō temples. At Ise a huge *shime-naha* unites two rocks between which one gets an admirable view of Fuji-yama, and which are regarded as the best point of view in the archipelago for admiring and worshipping the rising sun. In a more popular form of the cult these cords are hung in front of the houses at the New Year to ward off evil influences—a custom whose origin local legend of smaller importance attributes to an adventure of the god Susa-no-wo.[5]

10. Other cult-forms.—Thus the eclipse-myth is the central point towards which all the paths of Shintō converge, and it is only necessary to start from this centre to see radiating in all directions, not only the essential rites of this worship, but also branches which end in secondary practices. The only cult-forms of any importance which are not found here are those which naturally could not figure in a story of this kind, such as the custom of pilgrimages to distant sacred places—*e.g.*, to the ancient temples of Ise or to the top of Fuji-yama, to which thousands of worshippers flock every year—or, as a substitute for such pilgrimages, the custom of worship from a distance (*em-pai*) by going to some neighbouring temple easier of access. But, although these customs are highly developed in Japan, they are found in other religions also, and there is nothing specially Shintōist about them.

LITERATURE.—This is cited in the foot-notes.

MICHEL REVON.

WORSHIP (Jewish).—The Hebrew term for 'worship' is עֲבוֹדָה and in the famous saying of Simon the Just (*c.* 300 B.C.) with which the Tractate *Ethics of the Fathers* opens[6] '*abhōdah* is the second of the 'foundations of the world.' At that period, no doubt, the word '*abhōdah* primarily implied the sacrificial system of the Temple, though this system was also accompanied by prayers, but the meaning was not necessarily restricted to the altar. This term[7] has developed, but the saying

[1] Cf. art. SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 22b.
[2] See Revon, *Shinntoïsme*, p. 212, note; and cf. *Nihongi*, i. 46, which shows clearly that the 'sun mirror' of the Japanese myth is likewise an imitation star.
[3] See art. SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 21a.
[4] *Ib.* p. 22a, and p. 22b specially for the offerings of soft materials, the origin of the *gohei*, which has remained an essential cult-object, and the sight of which in a temple devoid of ornaments at once indicates a Shintō temple.
[5] See art. MAGIC (Japanese), vol. viii. p. 296 ff.
[6] See artt. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 190b, and SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 24a.
[7] Art. PRAYER (Japanese), vol. x. p. 190b.
[8] See *Kojiki*[2], pp. 129 f. and 138.
[9] Club-moss (*Lycopodium*).
[10] *Euonymus radicans*, a Japanese species, parent of our spindle-tree.
[11] See art. SACRIFICE (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 24a.
[12] See art. POSSESSION (Japanese), vol. x. p. 131a.
[13] *Ib.* p. 132a.

[1] *Nihongi*, i. 45. [2] *Ib.* i. 77.
[3] Cf. art NATURE (Japanese), vol. ix. p. 239b.
[4] See Revon, *Shinntoïsme*, p. 212, note.
[5] See art. HOSPITALITY (Japanese and Korean), vol. vi. p. 814b.
[6] See Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 184 (2). (The pagination is identical in all edd.)
[7] The literal meaning is 'work,' 'service,' and, like the English equivalent, it may be used in various senses. Thus '*Abhōdah Zārāh*, 'strange worship,' is idolatry. It can refer to song or gladness, *e.g.*, עבודה שבשפתה ובניוט לבב (*Erekhin*, 11*a*), or to prayer, *e.g.*, איזו היא עבודה שבלב הוי אמר זו תפלה (*Ta'anith*, 2*a*). With the article, it is sometimes used as an asseveration, 'By religion!' (see

of Simon remains none the less characteristic of Jewish theology, which lays more stress on *'abhōdah* (works) than on *'emūnāh* (faith).[1]

With the destruction of the Temple, worship naturally concentrated on the synagogues.[2] Had the altar system been the exclusive means of divine access available to the Israelite, the cessation of sacrifices would have marked a much greater liturgical disturbance than actually took place. As a fact, continuity was preserved; the keynote of the transition was Hos 14^3 (Heb. $=14^2$, RV), 'Let our prayers make up for the bullocks of our sacrifices.'[3] Even to-day the services, in particular those relating to atonement, re-echo this sentiment,[4] and, in almost every rite, the portion from the Pentateuch which ordains the morning, afternoon, or additional sacrifice is recited, at the appropriate occasion. This is done to show the correspondence between the particular service and the sacrifice instead of which it is offered. Nor must this feature be regarded as, *eo ipso*, a prayer for the restoration of sacrifices in their old form. It has often been shown that a belief in the restoration of the Temple, as a Messianic event, to be a centre of universal worship, may not necessarily be linked with the re-institution of the altar, and it cannot be demonstrated beyond doubt that this re-institution is an axiom of Jewish belief, for it has been repudiated by some orthodox Jewish authorities (as well as upheld by others; thus it is not included in the Thirteen Articles of Creed and Maimonides).[5]

In the synagogue worship subsequent to the Destruction the service developed on three lines: (1) prayers of repentance and penitence; (2) thanksgiving and praise; (3) petitions. Study and the recital of didactic passages of post-Biblical literature were a later institution.[6]

In (1), *i.e.* penitential worship, asceticism and fasting naturally find a place. But the limits of this asceticism were strictly defined. Fasting (*ta'anîth*, which really means 'affliction') was, generally speaking, restricted to prescribed occasions and rites. This element should be studied in connexion with FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish). Indiscriminate and exaggerated asceticism was rather the mark of sects, such as the Essenes, Zadokites, or certain Qabbālists; it was not general. Confession, expiation, and atonement constituted acts of worship in connexion with penitence.[7]

(2) Thanksgiving in worship centred in the festivals, with the ceremonial appropriate to each, such as the palm branch,[1] tabernacle,[2] the *Hallel*[3] Psalms, the *Qiddush*,[4] etc. There is a special benediction of thanksgiving for joyous occasions and anniversaries, 'Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast kept us in life, and hast preserved us, and hast enabled us to reach this season.'[5]

(3) Petitions, the outpourings of the heart in supplication for the private needs of the individual, have their proper place in the Jewish system of prayer.[6] Some of these needs are specifically mentioned, when they are objects for which every individual will necessarily pray, such as health, in the *'Amīdah*,[7] or sustenance, in the grace after meals.[8] But in most cases these petitions are formulated in the plural number; cf. 'Give *us* this day *our* daily bread' (*lēḥēm ḥuqqēnū*). There are opportunities accorded for the individual to offer his own special prayers. But the service represents rather a corporate act of worship on the part of the community. Hence in the confessions the plural number is always used.[9] On the other hand, 'ancient formulæ, written for individual prayer, were often adapted to public worship.'[10] The needs of the individual might come under the heading of תחנונים, though this word is used in *Mishnāh Berākhôth*, iv. 4,[11] in the sense of prayer in a proper spirit. For the necessity of devotion, and of praying when in a fitting mood, is over and over again prescribed in the *Mishnāh*. Early saints, we are told, used to spend a preliminary hour in attuning their minds,[12] and, when under the stress of strong emotion, such as deep sorrow or supreme joy,[13] or when in situations of difficulty,[14] the regular prayers were postponed or abrogated.

It is an axiom of worship that praise and thanksgiving should precede petition, as being more disinterested in quality.[15] For this reason the morning service opens with *Pesuqe de Zimra*, psalms and versicles of this description. After the recital of the sacrificial descriptions[16] the 'blessing of praise' (ברוך שאמר) introduces the thanksgiving of 1 Ch 16^{8-36}, Pss 100, 145–150, and the following doxologies: 1 Ch 29^{10-13}, Neh 9^{6-11}, and the Song of Moses (Ex 14^{30}–15^{18}). These passages are brought to an end by the formula of praise ישתבח,[17] and the first portion of the service is concluded. Then follows the שמע[18] (with its blessings) or, as this section is termed, 'the assumption of the yoke of the kingdom of heaven,'[19] and then, in the תפלה (*'Amīdah*), opportunity is given for private devotions. This order shows the Jewish scheme of worship. For this reason it was considered proper to 'join Redemption to the Prayer' (סוכבין גאלה לתפלה),[20] *i.e.* to proceed without interruption from the daily

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Levy's *Lexicon*, *s.v.*). In the daily *'Amīdah* the term is applied to the 16–17th benediction of the י"ש, in which the restoration of the *'abhōdah* is the subject of prayer (see Singer, p. 50, par. 2). In the *Muṣaf* service for the Day of Atonement, the *'Abhōdah* is the recital of the expiation ritual of the high priest in the Temple on that day, in the Holy of Holies (see M. Gaster, *Book of Prayer*, London, 1904, iii. 167 f., or H. M. Adler and H. Davis, *Service of the Synagogue Festivals*, etc., 'Atonement,' pt. ii. p. 159 f., London, 1904–08). Finally, see also the opening words of the concluding blessing after the reading of the prophetical lessons (Singer, p. 149, last line).

1 See *JE* ii. 148b.

2 See art. JUDAISM, vol. vii. p. 586a foot; see, however, art. PRAYER (Jewish), vol. x. p. 192b foot, for another view.

3 See *JE* viii. 132a, x. 166b, 622a, 625a.

4 See, *e.g.*, Adler and Davis, p. 169.

5 Singer, p. 89; see art. SACRIFICE (Jewish), but see also *JE* x. 628b.

6 After such passages a special *Qaddish* was pronounced (see Singer, p. 86). Such passages may be found in Singer, p. 167 f. Yemenite Jews more frequently do not read a set passage, but insert in their daily service a portion of the book they happen to be studying. The Mesopotamian rite assigns a greater place to study as an act of worship than do others. Not only are the first night of Pentecost and the night of *Hosha'ana Rabba* kept as vigils and devoted to study, as in Europe, but the custom called חתימה ('Sealing') on account of *Hosha'ana Rabba* associations prevails at other times.

7 See artt. ASCETICISM (Jewish), FASTING, FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish), CONFESSION (Hebrew), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish).

1 Singer, p. 218. 2 *Ib.* p. 232.

3 *Ib.* p. 219 f. 4 *Ib.* pp. 124, 174, 230, 243.

5 *Ib.* p. 292. See art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jewish).

6 *Berākhôth*, 31*a*, tr. Cohen, Cambridge, 1921, p. 206.

7 Singer, p. 47. 8 *Ib.* p. 281.

9 See *Ber.* 30*a* (=Cohen, p. 196); Singer, pp. 258–263.

10 See Abrahams, *Annotated Edition of Singer's Prayer Book*, p. xix.

11 העושה תפלתו קבע אין תפלתו תחנונים. The meaning of קבע is disputed; here, according to Bartinoro and others, it means 'that his prayer is burdensome, as much as to say that he has a fixed, distasteful task, which has to be accomplished.' See *Gemara*, f. 29*b*, p. 194 of Cohen's tr. But קבע usually is found in a good sense, *i.e.* regularity; cf. the *fixing* (קביעת) of the calendar, or תפלת השחר אין לו קבע (*Ber.* iv. 1), or עשה תורתך קבע (*Abhôth*, i. 16; see Taylor).

12 *Ber.* viii. 1.

13 The *Gemara* discusses, *e.g.*, the cases of bridegrooms and mourners.

14 *E.g.*, when riding (30*a* [Cohen, p. 197]), sailing, or in perilous surroundings. See also 31*a* (Cohen, p. 203 f.).

15 *Ber.* 32*a* foot (Cohen, p. 214), 34*a* (Cohen, p. 228).

16 Singer, pp. 9–13. 17 *Ib.* p. 36.

18 See art. GOD (Jewish), vol. vi. p. 298.

19 Singer, p. 37 f.

20 *Ber.* 30*a* (Cohen, p. 198).

thanksgiving for the deliverance from Egypt to the recital of the *'Amīdah*.[1]

Practically every item of Jewish ritual, synagogal or domestic, is an act of worship, for in Judaism the secular sphere has very little independent existence, and thus many acts, not in themselves religious, are associated with blessings and become acts of ceremonial. In order that these blessings should not be forgotten, or to give opportunity to an individual who might have omitted to say them, or to enable the congregation to respond 'Amen,' some of these blessings have been incorporated in the liturgy itself.[2] Others that have not been thus incorporated, because they were not likely to be needed every day, may be seen in Singer, p. 287 f. The ideal of the pious Jew was to pronounce a blessing on the name of God one hundred times a day;[3] 'in all thy ways know Him.'

'For every enjoyment and *in* every enjoyment he is to render thanks to God the Giver. He is to smell the rose, and to rejoice in its perfume. And he is to say and to feel: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who greatest fragrant plants."'[4]

The Sabbath, with all its domestic ceremonies, has become practically a day of acts of worship; the three meals are preceded by sanctification and followed by hymns and carols. But such a day, far from being a burden to an orthodox Jew, is to him a day of spiritual happiness, for the highest bliss in the world to come is poetically described as a period 'wholly a Sabbath,' which 'will bring rest in life everlasting.'[5]

The term 'worship,' therefore, logically includes many more operations, besides prayer, by which the Jew seeks to serve God, in addition to numerous acts of his daily life and his private and public devotions. A specific act of charity may become an adjunct of worship, if not worship itself. Thus, in the East, Jews sometimes make use of *tsedaqah* (charity) boxes containing eighteen apertures, each devoted to a different philanthropic institution. As each of the eighteen blessings of the *'Amīdah* is recited, a coin is placed in one of the slots.[6]

The scheme of synagogal worship may thus be analyzed.[7] The normal daily services, associated with the statutory Temple offerings,[8] and also ascribed by tradition to patriarchal institution,[9] are three—morning, afternoon, and evening. On Sabbaths, festivals, and new moons, and on the Day of Atonement, but not on the other fasts, there is an 'additional service,' called *Muṣaf*.[10] There is no *Muṣaf* on Ḥanuca (the Maccabæan Feast of Dedication, Encœnia), or on Purim, the Feast of Esther, because the ordinances for these days are post-Biblical and no special offering was brought. Every service includes an *'Amīdah*[11] as its essential element, other features being thanksgiving Psalms, *Sh'ma'*, *Hallel*, reading of the Law and Prophets. Propitiatory prayers, hymns (*pĭyyûṭim*),[12] study, and sermons are not original statutory components, though antiquity and popularity have often endowed them with an importance which their origin does not altogether warrant. The recital of the Ten Commandments in public worship was discontinued,[13] and the doxology was altered,[14] on account of the Minim, but the private reading both of the Decalogue and of the Maimonidean Creeds is regarded as desirable after the morning service.[1] The essential features of Jewish worship may thus be summarized:

At every morning service throughout the year.—(1) *Pesuqe de Zimra*, or introductory Psalms and versicles of thanksgiving; (2) *Shema'* and blessings; (3) *'Amidah*; (4) the *Hallel* Psalms on new moon, festivals, and Ḥanuca; (5) reading of the Law on Mondays and Thursdays, Sabbaths, fasts, festivals, New Year, Day of Atonement, new moon, Ḥanuca, Purim; (6) reading from the Prophets on Sabbaths, festivals, New Year, and Atonement, ninth of Ab; (7) *Muṣaf*, or 'additional' service, on Sabbaths, festivals, new moon, New Year, and Atonement; additional items where appropriate, such as *Selîḥoth*, blowing of *Shofar*, prayer for rain, *Hosha'anôth*, etc.

At every afternoon service throughout the year.—Passages reminiscent of sacrifices and incense, Ps 145, *'Amidah*; reading of the Law on Sabbaths and Day of Atonement and on certain fasts; *haftarah* on Atonement and certain fasts; Canticles, Ruth, Ecclesiastes on the Three Festivals.

At every evening service throughout the year.—*Shema'* with blessings, *'Amidah*, introductory Psalms on Friday night; special Psalms or poems for festivals in some rites; Lamentations on ninth of Ab, Esther on Purim, etc.

The two main divisions into which the present liturgy may be divided are the Ashkenazic and Sefardic rites. These correspond, to some extent, with the early Palestinian and Babylonian uses,[2] but there are other uses—*e.g.*, Italian, N. African, Turkish, Mesopotamian and Indian, Cochini, Persian, etc.—being modifications of the main Sefardic use, and certain Ḥassidic, Qabbālistic, and other rites in Russia and E. Europe, which are Ashkenazic variants. Among extinct rites may be mentioned the *Seder Amram* (use of Amram Gaon, 870 C.E.), Maḥzor Vitry, Maimonides, Isaac Lurya, and C. Vital, Castile, etc. Little is known of the ritual of the Falashas or of that current among the Chinese Jews. Qaraites and Samaritans have their own worship, which has been printed.[3] Modern Reform rites, generally speaking, contain vernacular translations and sometimes additions, and modify certain references to the restoration of sacrifices. The *piyyûṭim*, or hymns, are of two main types, Kalirian and Spanish;[4] they do not form a statutory constituent and are often shortened or omitted. The divergencies of rites are due to the circumstance that the liturgy was originally not stereotyped. 'Those who write down blessings' were considered as reprehensible.[5] The reader was told the subjects to be mentioned by him and their order; hence the variety of prayers arose. The whole of the tractate *B'rākhôth* is an indication of this method. The reader was 'free.'[6]

The underlying theory of the Jewish conception of worship can best be studied in chs. l. and li. of pt. iii. of the *Guide* of Maimonides.[7] Maimonides calls worship 'the highest aim man can attain.' He insists that worship must be based on the intellect, if it is to have real value. 'The intellect which emanates from God unto us is the link that joins us to Him.' The chapters should be carefully studied.

Pilgrimage as an act of worship occurs only sporadically in Judaism.

Other information may be found in artt. CONFESSION (Hebrew), FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish), FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jewish), GOD (Jewish), for *Sh'ma'* and *'Alenu*, vol. vi. p. 298, HYMNS (Hebrew and Jewish), MUSIC (Jewish), SABBATH (Jewish), PREACHING (Jewish), PRIESTHOOD (Jewish), PRAYER (Jewish), SACRIFICE (Jewish), and *JE*, *s.v.* 'Prayer,' 'Liturgy,' etc.

LITERATURE.—M. Duschak, *Gesch. und Darstellung des jüd. Cultus*, Mannheim, 1866; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box,

1 See Singer, p. 44; and Abrahams, note on p. liv.
2 See Singer, pp. 4–6; Abrahams, p. xviii.
3 *Menaḥôth*, iv.
4 C. G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul*, London, 1914, p. 40.
5 Singer, p. 168.
6 For the association of almsgiving and prayer see art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish), vol. v. p. 662b.
7 For the 'external form of the Service' see vol. x. p. 194a.
8 *Ber.* 24*a*. 9 See *JE* x. 166a.
10 See *ib.*, *s.vv.* 11 See *ib.*, *s.v.* 'Shemoneh Esreh.'
12 See *ERE* x. 195a, § 4.
13 *Mishnāh Tāmid*, v. 1; see Feibus' commentary *in loc.* given in Berlin ed. of 1833; see also *JE* viii. 133a.
14 *Mishnah Ber.* ix. 5.

1 *JE* x. 170a. 2 Abrahams, p. lf.
3 See art. PRAYER (Jewish), bibliography.
4 See Abrahams, p. li. 5 See vol. x. p. 193b.
6 See 'The Freedom of the Synagogue,' I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 1 ff.
7 P. 380 ff. in M. Friedländer's tr.[2], London, 1910.

The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue[2], London, 1911; artt. by L. Blau, I. Elbogen, A. Büchler, in *JQR* and *REJ*; a new translation, with full notes, of T.B. *Berākhōth*, by A. Cohen, is in course of being issued by the Cambridge Press; the annotated Singer's *Prayer Book*, by I. Abrahams, London, 1914, is invaluable. HERBERT LOEWE.

WORSHIP (Parsi). — **1. Pre-Zarathushtrian period.**—That the attitude of the early Iranians towards those whom they conceived as the Supreme Powers was one of adoration and worship is practically certain.[1] In what precise outward forms that attitude expressed itself during the earlier period is a question which can be only partially answered. We may safely assume, however, that Herodotus's description[2] of Persian habits and modes of worship was, in its essential features, applicable to the Iranians generally centuries before his own time, and probably more generally and truly applicable to the Persians of that period than it was to those who were his contemporaries. In the Greek historian's account of Persian worship the whole ceremony centres in an act of animal sacrifice.[3] It was accompanied by prayer on the part of the offerer and the intoning of some form of liturgy on the part of the priest. When this 'theogony' ceased to be a mere form of incantation or magic formula, which originally and for a long period it undoubtedly was, we have no means of determining. The sacrifice was individual in its presentation—there is no hint of a united offering—but the sacrificer was expected to be imbued with a sense of solidarity; for, in its main character and content, his prayer must needs be intercessory—embracing the welfare of the king and the whole Persian people. It is to do violence to the text of Herodotus, however, to make him say that the bringer of the sacrifice could ask nothing for himself. The natural inference from Herodotus's narrative is that, so far as the outward and visible forms of Persian worship were concerned, they consisted of merely an occasional act of animal sacrifice performed on a mountain top or beside a stream of water. We can scarcely imagine that all their religious impulses and beliefs found their full and only expression in such forms. Still, the small value the Persians placed upon architectural aids to outward worship prepares us to find among them a very simple ritual and perhaps a not very multiform mode of religious expression. Regard must also be had for the early period that we are treating—perhaps more than a millennium before our era.

2. Zarathushtra's time. — Like the founder of Christianity, Zarathushtra, so far as the records enable us to judge, made no provision whatever for ceremonial or outward forms of worship. The *Gāthas*, which are the truest reflexion of his teaching and spirit, contain not the remotest hint[4] of such matters. There we have an intensely earnest soul seeking to learn the truth and to get into the right inward relationship to its God. The outward expression and symbolization of that relationship receives no consideration at all. Spirit and conduct are the all-absorbing subjects of the *Gāthas*. *Vohumano*, best thought; *Asha*, right; and *Aramaiti*, piety, are the ever-recurring objects of the prophet's desire. It is hardly too much to say that Zarathushtra's ideal of worship is best expressed in Christ's great and final saying that 'they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth.' How far this high ideal was appreciated and accepted by his contemporaries, and to what extent his influence availed to ensure its persistence after his death cannot be ascertained. Certainly some of the divinities invoked and praised in the *Yasna haptanhaiti*, which, on linguistic grounds, cannot be assigned to a very much later date than the *Gāthas*, clearly indicate that at that early time there was a distinct descent from Zarathushtra's high spiritual conception of worship.

3. Late Avestan period.—By the time of the Later Avesta Mazdaism had developed an elaborate system of ceremonial worship. Animal sacrifices on the largest scale prevailed. *Haoma* had regained more than its pristine veneration in the new order; and henceforth the preparation of its juice (*para-haoma*) becomes the central point of the Mazdæan ritual[1]—a position from which, to this day, it has never receded.[2] The return of the old Iranian gods as angels (*yazatas*, beings meet to be worshipped) in the new pantheon increased enormously the ritual of Mazdaism and the acts of worship devolving upon the followers of the faith. Every day of every month was devoted to some special divinity, who was specially invoked, praised, and sacrificed to in addition to the regular worship of that day. Thus the 1st, 8th, 15th, and 23rd of each month were consecrated to Ahuramazda; the 3rd and 5th to the *ameshaspentas*; and in a similar manner the remaining days to other genii.[3] Over and above these were the special feasts, such as New Year in honour of Mazda. Prayers, hymns, and liturgies befitting all these occasions were utilized.[4] Each day was divided into five parts, and at each division a special prayer, one of the so-called *Gâhs*, was uttered. For the elaborate ritual associated with the rites of initiation and the disposal of the dead see under those headings. What worship gained in extent and elaborateness during this period it seems to have largely lost in inwardness and spirituality. The value of the prayers came to be regarded as consisting mainly in the words and their correct utterance. We get the impression that they came to be employed as mere charms and magic formulæ.[5]

4. Present time.—If animal sacrifices are excepted, Parsi worship is to-day, outwardly, practically what it has been from late Avestan days. Before the sacred fire of their temples the same Avestan liturgy is recited, accompanied by the priestly performance of the same ceremonies. The same divinities are invoked and praised by the orthodox Parsi to-day in the same prayers and hymns as were used two millennia earlier. But it should be noted that a strong reform movement has set in among many educated Parsis, the tendency of which seems to be not so much to work radical changes in the outward form of their worship as to change the whole emphasis from outward forms to the moral and spiritual ideas symbolized in the ceremonies. In one or two instances lately, it is true, the priest has gone to the length of introducing a sermon or address into the service. But this is exceptional.

5. Collective and individual worship.—Although devout Parsis often frequent the fire-temples, as, we gather from *Visparad*, iii., their ancestors also did, especially on sacred days, such as those consecrated to Atar (3rd, 9th, 17th, and 20th), yet the Parsi does not consider attendance at the temple

[1] Cf. Skr. *yaz*, 'worship,' 'dedicate,' 'offer'; Av. *yaz*, Gr. ἄζομαι; indicating that, before the separation, the habit of worship obtained among the Indo-Europeans.

[2] i. 131 f.

[3] See art. SACRIFICE (Iranian).

[4] The occurrence of the word *zaotar*, 'priest,' in one passage in the *Gāthas* (*Ys.* xxxiii. 6) cannot be held to require the modification of the above statement. See J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 116.

[1] For a detailed account of that ceremony and of the successive steps by which ritual and liturgy alternate in the preparation of the *haoma* juice see M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*, ed. E. W. West, London, 1907, p. 393 ff.; and art. HAOMA.

[2] See art. SACRIFICE (Iranian).

[3] See art. CALENDAR (Persian).

[4] See art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Parsi).

[5] See art. PRAYER (Iranian).

indispensable to worship, and places far less store upon it than the faithful Christian does upon church-going.[1] One reason for that fact is that much of the priestly worship at the temple is without special reference to any laity that may be present—the long *Yasna* ceremony is a conspicuous example. But, even when assembled in large numbers at the temples, their worship seems to be almost if not quite entirely individual and separate, not collective and united. These two facts are surely very significant. We noted them in Herodotus's description of early Persian worship—slight regard for religious edifices as aids to worship, and absence of united action in public worship. But they are in perfect keeping with the highly individual and independent character with which Zarathushtrianism imbues its adherents. Moreover, the private and individual devotions of a faithful Parsi are as numerous as those of the devotees of most religions. We give the following quotation to substantiate this fact:

'For the modern Parsees the precise forms of prayer are strictly laid down; a brief survey of them will be sufficient. On rising, washing, and dressing, especially on tying the sacred string, a series of prayers are to be repeated. Next follows the special morning-prayer. Before and after each meal, likewise, prayers are said; and in the evening, before the Parsee goes to sleep, he has, further, to reflect upon and examine what he has done in the course of the day, and then only, after reciting certain prayers, he retires to rest. To the prayers which form part of the order of the day are added a number of others which must be said on certain occurrences, viz. after sneezing, after connubial intercourse, after satisfying natural purposes, after pollutions during sleep, after the cutting of nails and hair, as well as after the lighting of candles.'[2]

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works already referred to see Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre*, 2 vols., Paris, 1771, 'Usages civils et religieux des Parses,' pp. 527–591, and 'Système théologique cérémonial et moral,' pp. 592–618; Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884; Maneckji Nusservanji Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914; J. H. Moulton, *The Treasure of the Magi*, Oxford, 1917. The reader will find much relevant material in the two last-mentioned works.

E. EDWARDS.

WORSHIP (Roman).—1. General principles.—The term 'worship' may be treated as comprising all modes of giving expression to the various feelings entertained towards the divine powers—feelings of awe, reverence, obligation, deprecation, gratitude, hope, and others. The forms given to the expression varied, first, according to the conceptions entertained about the nature and functions of the beings who swayed the destinies of men and women, next, with the development of civilization among the people. The limitations of certain kinds of worship to certain classes of people, public and private, also fall to be considered.

2. Worship as related to conceptions of divinity.—In the earliest known forms of Roman religion men's conceptions were vague, and the divine influences were not supposed to pertain to definite personal gods, being described by the shadowy phrase *numina*. Observances of worship were therefore naturally far more simple than they afterwards became. The early Roman did indeed regard divine power as perceptible in every portion of the world, and in every department of life. In a sense he may be said to have entertained the opinion of the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, who said that 'all things are full of gods' (*πάντα πλήρη θεῶν*). Every stage in human life was passed in contact with superhuman powers. The Roman nursery was haunted by a host of divinities, whom the fathers of the early Church were given to ridicule. The earliest religious observances reflect the life, mainly, of an agricultural community, and aimed at securing the safety of men and animals, and of the boundaries of the farm. In many cases the actual implements used in life, or accessory to it, were regarded as in some way the seats of the superhuman influences. Thus each *terminus*, or boundary-stone, was regarded as the seat of a *numen*, and this idea seems to be anterior to that of a god Terminus protecting all boundary-stones.[1] Another primitive notion which influenced the forms of worship was that each community had its own protecting divinities, who belonged to it and no other. Gods were generally supposed to confine their interest to particular tribes, clans, or civic organizations or to groups of persons within them. There were therefore in Italy infinite diversities of local religious usage, many of which, when Rome became the governing power, affected and complicated the religious practice of the dominant city.

Political and religious obligation were never held asunder in the ancient world. It was in theory the duty of every citizen to maintain intact the religious observances which had been handed down to him from his ancestors. But no such theory has ever prevented change. At most it has restrained changes not sanctioned by political authority. The literary Romans regarded all the institutions of religion as owing their existence to a single lawgiver, King Numa. Later rulers were only imitating him when they adapted religious practice to the changed needs of their times.

3. Rigorousness of ancient forms.—At all times the Roman was deeply impressed by the importance of ascertaining precisely the forms of the words, actions, and offerings which he should use in doing honour to divine personages. First, the proper divine title must be ascertained if possible. To the latest times expressions were introduced into formulæ which might obviate the evil effects of a slip. Thus, if there was a doubt as to the sex of the divinity, the words 'siue tu deus, siue dea es,' were added. Precise accuracy in the words of which the petition or salutation consisted was of the highest consequence. This rigorousness applied also to the secular formulæ of the law, to which, indeed, in early days, a certain sacredness attached. This strict formalism led to the publication by the priestly authorities of a religious document which bore the name of *Indigitamenta*, and preserved for later times names of divinities and lists of usages which would otherwise have died out of memory.[2] Down to the latest times the simple offerings which had satisfied the old *numina* were preserved side by side with the more elaborate dedications. At the family shrine the *far pium* and *saliens mica* of Horace continued to be presented, and the *mola salsa*, prepared according to a very primitive method, was placed before Vesta three times a year by her priestesses, the Vestals, who performed for the great State-family at the State altar the functions which belonged to the unmarried daughters of the private family. Similar offerings, prominent in the worship of different divinities, were bean-meal, lard, milk, wine, and honey.

As to animal sacrifices, their oldest form of which record is preserved was the peculiar ceremonial offering called *suouetaurilia*, in which a bull, a sheep, and a pig were led three times in procession round the farm, and then the victims were sacrificed, and a prayer couched in Latin of ancient form was pronounced, which is preserved by Cato.[3]

[1] See A. V. Williams Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 368.

[2] W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iránians in Ancient Times*, tr. Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, London, 1885, i. 71 f.

[1] W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 326.

[2] See the articles on 'Indigitamenta' in Pauly-Wissowa and in Roscher.

[3] *De Re Rustica*, 141; see Warde Fowler, p. 126.

4. Changes in worship due to external influences.—The Roman pantheon and Roman worship had doubtless gone through a number of changes before the earliest time which has left traces in historical practice of religion. Many attempts have been made by modern scholars to pierce the dense pre-historic darkness in which the state of early Italy is enveloped. The material, however, which has come down to us from ancient days is so completely untrustworthy that the efforts of scholars have chiefly testified to their power of imagination. This material indeed, if it deserves the name, was produced mainly by the unbridled imagination of poets, genealogists, annalists, grammarians, and antiquaries of the late Republic and early Empire. To correlate even the results of modern archæological research with this heterogeneous mass of statements, so as to produce any solid results, is a hopeless task. The earliest safe source of information about Roman cults is to be found in the inscriptions which have preserved the remains of the ancient Roman calendar. When ancient Roman scholars, like Varro and Verrius Flaccus, drew from the actual records of the cults illustrations of the ceremonies mentioned in the earliest calendar, they preserved actual religious history. And religious usage was so tenacious in Rome that the light thus obtained carries us back a long way.

Conservative as the early Roman State was with regard to religion, the recurring desire for novelties in cults was from a very early time satisfied in a remarkable way. When the demand became clamorous, in times marked by great public disasters, such as severe defeats at the hands of enemies or sore famines or pestilences, the Senate would order the mysterious *Sibylline Books* to be consulted, so that the proper mode of meeting the religious emergency might be discovered. It was felt that conjunctures occurred when the aid to be drawn from the gods who ordinarily protected the country was insufficient. It dawned upon the consciousness of the citizens that perhaps divinities who presided over foreign communities might be able to come to the rescue. At a very early time the Greeks were recognized as masters of divine lore, and the *Sibylline Books* were believed to enshrine precious results of their experience. An inquiry therefore into the proper mode of expiating disasters, which were naturally supposed to indicate divine wrath, almost invariably resulted in an injunction to adopt into the ceremonial of the State religion some rite derived from Greece. The *Sibylline Books* therefore constituted a sort of open door through which entered such a mass of new religious usage that the Roman religion was extensively Hellenized. Sometimes the new usage was connected with a divinity not previously worshipped by Romans, at other times the new practice was grafted on the cult of an old Roman divinity. For one great feature of the movement was the identification of Roman divinities with Greek, the divine beings concerned being supposed to differ only in names.

This process of Hellenization began very early, and the legend which attributed the introduction of these books to the period of the monarchy enshrined a particle of historic truth. But the religious revolution was much accelerated by the advance of Rome to world power, when important crises, giving rise oftentimes to superstitious fears, were multiplied. Some of the most archaic forms of Roman ritual survived in the late Republican time as popular festivals with disorderly accompaniments. Such were the Saturnalia and the *Festum geniale* of Anna Perenna,[1] the Floralia in April,[2] the festival of Fors Fortuna in June,[3] the *Ancillarum feriæ* in July (mentioned in late literature), and others. Many, however, of the most venerable survivals in Roman religious practice of the later time were maintained by the appointed administrators merely from a conservative sense, and were forms that excited little interest except among scholars and antiquarians. Such ceremonies were, *e.g.*, the driving of the nail into the wall of the temple of Fortuna, the Fordicidia,[4] and many others. The influence of Augustus led to an archaistic religious revival, which re-established many primitive rites that were all but forgotten, and prevented many others from sinking into complete oblivion, under the weight of indifference induced by many influences, especially the sceptical tendencies stimulated by the Hellenization of culture, and the manifold new impressions produced by contact with various peoples during the process of world conquest.

The Oriental religions came more and more to attract the Italic and Western populations after the establishment of the Empire. During the Republican age, the government had opposed barriers to the advancing tide of Orientalism in religion. The first Eastern cult to find a place in the official framework of Roman religion was that of the Magna Mater, adopted in 204 B.C. It is not easy to explain the official acceptance of a form of worship of such a frenzied character at so early a date, even when one takes into account the enormous strengthening of superstition by the tremendous experiences of the Hannibalic war: the old feeling reasserted itself in 186 B.C. when the so-called 'Bacchic conspiracy' was ruthlessly suppressed by the Senate, with whom rested the final authority in such matters. In the later days of the Republic many private attempts to establish at Rome Egyptian forms of worship, especially those of Isis and Serapis, were frustrated. These cults naturally tended to find a refuge in the seaports to which fleets from Egypt came, especially the Campanian maritime towns. At Puteoli, for instance, there was a temple of Serapis as early as 105 B.C., and near the coast, at Pompeii, a shrine of Isis existed even before the Roman conquest of the town. Three times in the ten years between 58 and 48 B.C. shrines of Isis were destroyed in Rome. Under Augustus the pressure produced by the popularity among the masses of Egyptian rites became very great, but naturally the ruler could not favour divinities who had allied themselves with his enemy Mark Antony. In 19 B.C. Tiberius, in consequence of a gross scandal, destroyed a shrine of Isis, and caused her image to be cast into the Tiber. Nevertheless private dedications of temples continued to be increasingly common. The government did attempt to prevent them from being erected within the *pomœrium*, but in vain; for in A.D. 69, when the army of Vitellius beset the city, Domitian assumed the garb of a devotee of Isis and sought safety among the servants of her temple.[2] The full tolerance of this divinity at Rome took place before the death of Lucan in A.D. 65, as we see from a scornful reference in his poem.[3] The actual formal inclusion of Egyptian deities in the Roman pantheon, whereby they were thoroughly naturalized and no longer restricted by authority to the space outside the *pomœrium*, came in the time of Caracalla. This emperor built a sumptuous temple of Serapis on the Quirinal. The attraction of the public to the ritual of the Egyptian deities was largely due to the mysteries which were connected with them. Brotherhoods and initiations, whereby these 'saviour' gods (*σωτῆρες*) rescued the

[1] Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 523 ff. [2] *Ib.* v. 331 ff. [3] *Ib.* vi. 775 ff.

[1] Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 631 ff. [2] Suet. *Domit.* i. [3] viii. 831 ff.

devotee from evil, exercised a powerful fascination. The Roman soldiers who had served in the East brought with them on their return, from the time of Sulla onwards, many Oriental cults, which tended to flourish greatly in the time of the Severi, whose origin was in the East. Some of these divinities assumed Roman names, such as Jupiter Dolichenus, Invictus Sol Elagabal (from whom the emperor Elagabalus took his name). The worship of Mithras reached its height in the West in the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D.

The divinization of the Roman emperors changed in many respects the whole face of Roman religion. Their cult became the strongest bond of union between the different populations of the Empire, and it became, from another point of view, an important element in the scheme of provincial government.

5. **Important public rituals.** — The different rituals under which the gods were officially venerated may be distinguished. At Rome the State priests came to bring together under the title of *ius sacrum* all the principles and practices of Roman religion, just as the secular law was comprised under the *ius publicum*. The severance between sacred and secular law was indeed not completed until a comparatively late date. Survivals in late Rome indicate that in early days a kind of religious sanctity attached to the formulæ of the civil law, and the great exponents of the two systems were often the same. The *pontifices maximi* were in primitive times generally distinguished lawyers also. And Roman religion was at all times under the final control of secular authorities, the magistrates and the Senate. When a colony was founded, the fundamental charter always required the first magistrates to consult their Senate as to the divinities whom the colonists were to serve, and the modes of their service. These divinities were naturally, as a rule, taken from the Roman pantheon, because, according to a common saying, a Roman colony was 'quasi effigies parua simulacrumque populi Romani';[1] but, like the parent city, the new community had full autonomy in the arrangement of its public worships.

Whenever the State undertook a new duty towards the divine power, it was expressed in the form first of a *uotum*. The conditions which constituted the validity of the *uotum* of the magistrate were well understood; but in important cases the magistrate would be careful to obtain a preliminary understanding with the Senate. The recorded cases in which a question was raised whether the *uotum* was binding on the community are few in number. The contents of the *uotum* might be of many descriptions, as its objects might vary from the perfectly general *uota pro rei publicæ salute* which the principal magistrates pronounced each New Year's Day to some specific thing. Sometimes the *uota pro salute* mentioned a particular number of years; the *decennalia uota* of the emperors asked for the safety of the empire during a period of ten years. There were also *quindecennalia* and *uicennalia*. The fulfilment of the *uota* was carried out by the secular magistrates, though the precise forms which had to be employed (concerning which usage was extremely conservative) were prescribed and supervised by the experts in the *ius sacrum*, the *pontifices*.

The fulfilment of the *uota* would generally issue in the dedication to sacred uses of some material thing — often a *templum*. This thing became technically *res sacra*, and was protected against secular encroachments by the *ius sacrum*. On the whole, the Roman government watched rather jealously the transference of rights in property from the secular to the sacred sphere, but when the transference was accomplished, it was rigidly maintained by law.

In the case of the *uota* the community, through its magistrates, approaches the divinity and practically enters into a legal compact with the god. Not only the community, but the god also is bound, and the procedure had a distinctly legal aspect.

There were other ways in which the community might be bound. Certain occurrences showed that in some way the gods were offended, and it was the duty of the public officers to find a way of averting the divine wrath. Thus *prodigia*, portents which seemed to interrupt the order of nature, called for *piacula*, offerings or services intended to secure appeasement of the offended deity. Thus Livy says:[1] 'C. Servilius pontifex maximus piacula irae Deum conquirere iussus.' In times of stress and public peril, *prodigia* (or *ostenta*) would be reported to the authorities in great numbers. The information was carefully sifted and often some of it was rejected; the signs of divine wrath which were accepted as real were then expiated (*procurata*). Signs which occurred 'in privato loco' or 'in loco peregrino' were not admitted.[2] The *haruspices* had a great part in these expiations.

It was also foreseen that, apart from such special indications, the community would continually contract pollution from the imperfect or erroneous performance of religious duties, so that provision was made for a general clearance of offences at regular intervals. The *lustrum* (literally 'washing') with which the proceedings of the census concluded was a clearance of this kind. The annual perambulation of the city (*amburbium*) was another. An ancient body of priests, the *Fratres Arvales*, annually performed a *segetum lustratio* at Rome. Similar, though not regular, was the *lustratio* of the army, when it was overcome by some superstitious dread. Scipio had to pause before crossing into Asia, in order to free his force from the sense of pollution. Similar was in part the purpose of the *supplicatio* which after a victory was held in honour of the whole body of divinities, in order to get rid of the taint of blood-shedding. The procession took place round all shrines ('circa omnia pulvinaria') and provided the population with an enjoyable holiday. The ancient temple was not freely open to be seen; there were no recurring services such as take place in a modern church. In most instances there was but one festival in a year at a temple. Therefore, as many contained wonderful monuments and precious treasures dedicated by Roman heroes of former times, there was great eagerness to survey them. The *supplicatio* took place in early times on one day only. Later, generals pressed to have the importance of a victory emphasized by repeating the *supplicatio* on succeeding days, and in the age of Cæsar the number of days might extend to forty or fifty. The triumphal procession also doubtless belonged to the same class. Both it and the *supplicatio* were probably of Hellenic origin. Similar was the procession of twenty-seven virgins, round the city, singing a sacred hymn, which was sometimes ordained.[3] All *ludi* were in one aspect religious performances, offered to some divinity. The gladiatorial *ludi* came from Etruria, and were intended to appease the partly divine spirits of the dead, which were reinvigorated by the blood which was shed. Even at the end of the Republic, these *ludi* were always, as a matter of form, declared to be held in honour of some deceased person con-

[1] Gellius, XVI. xiii. 9.

[1] XL. xxxvii. 5. [2] XLIII. xiii. 23. 25.
[3] Livy, XXVII. xxxvii. 7.

nected with the exhibitor. It is in connexion with the *ludi* in general that we hear most of the practice called *instauratio*, the repetition of a ceremony because of the discovery of some flaw which vitiated its effect. In the time of the later Republic, when men ambitious to obtain high office paved their way to it by vast expenditure on *ludi*, these flaws were artificially created in order to justify additional lavishness.

Rules relating to sacrifice were elaborate. Particular deities called for particular offerings, and the accompaniments of sacrifice were very various. The separation between the divinities of the under and the upper world was in this respect specially important. Thus to Varro is attributed the view that *altaria* were appropriate to the *di superi*, *aræ* to the *di terrestres*, and *foci* to the *di inferi*.[1]

Public and private cults to some extent were parallel. For example, the worship of Vesta was as important for the family circle as for the State, which, like the family, had its own *lares* and *penates*. Many cults were indeed adopted from patrician families by the community. Rites in honour of the dead were extensively rendered by private persons as well as by the magistrates and priests of the community. Almost every regularly constituted group within the State had its own special cults. Thus every *collegium*, whatever might be the principal bond of union between its members, had its own special form of worship. Some groups within the city of Rome, which had survived from very primitive times, such as those called *pagani* and *montani*, maintained down to a late date their special religious usages. The *sacra* attached to families occupied an important place in the *ius sacrum*, the policy of the religious lawyers having been to prevent, so far as possible, the extinction of these *sacra* by the dying out of the families. To the *gens* as well as the *familia* also appertained its own *sacra*.[2]

Among important public ceremonies to which reference has not been made above may be mentioned the *lectisternium*, certainly borrowed from the Greeks, and the *ludi sæculares*, which originated from the *ludi terentini*, a ceremony connected with departed spirits, celebrated at an altar of Dis pater. These *ludi* and the *ludi sæculares* which succeeded them were supposed to occur at the end of a *sæculum*, which was first assumed to comprise a hundred years, but in later times the period was fixed at 110 years. The ceremony is best known from the records of the celebration ordered by Augustus in 17 B.C., for which Horace wrote his *Carmen Sæculare*. This series of celebrations went on until A.D. 314, and another series, theoretically to celebrate the end of each century from the foundation of Rome, ran parallel with it.

The observances due annually to the gods were prescribed at settled dates on the calendar, published yearly under the supervision of the college of *pontifices*.

6. Ritual proper to groups.—Among celebrations (*feriæ*) connected with groups of men may be noted the *Quinquatrus*, observed by the *artifices* in honour of their patron divinity Minerva, and the *Quinquatrus minusculæ*, held by the flute-players (*tibicines*). There were many similar festivals. One was carried out by the *mercatores*, on the foundation-day of the temple of Mercurius by the Circus, another by the workmen where trade depended on the use of water (*aquatores*). The date for this was 11th Jan., a day sacred to Iuturna, a goddess of springs and fountains, fabled by Virgil to have been sister of Turnus, king of the Rutuli. Not all persons were qualified to be present at all services; from some women were excluded, and men from others.

7. Religious officers.—Along with the *pontifices*, the *augures*, and the keepers of the Sibylline oracles (*Quindecimviri sacris faciundis*) were the great priestly colleges; membership of these was a great object of ambition to men engaged in public life. The *haruspices* had not the same distinction; they did not really constitute a college, like the other bodies. Until a late date they were Etruscans, summoned by the Senate from time to time as occasion required, to expound the peculiarly Etruscan lore of means of expiation, chiefly for the evil sign of the thunderbolt. Later, *haruspices* trained in Etruria were settled in Rome and employed publicly and privately.

8. Minor collegia.—Real standing *collegia* of minor importance, but great antiquity, were those of the *fetiales*, the Salii, the Luperci. In order to assure itself that a war was correct in the eyes of heaven, the early State employed the *fetiales* to make a demand on the opposing power, according to a certain fixed form, and if the demand was not conceded, instructed the same priests to announce in another fixed ceremonial fashion to the opposing power that peace had been replaced by war. On the conclusion of the war, the same *fetiales* supervised ceremonially the conclusion of a treaty (*fœdus*). No compact was a *fœdus* unless its conclusion had been so carried out by the *fetiales*. The *ius fetiale* has often erroneously been regarded as a sort of international law. But the *fetiales* were not concerned with policy, or with questions of right and wrong. A *iustum piumque bellum* was not one which was morally correct, but one which was ceremonially flawless, having been opened with some forms on which the gods had looked with favour from immemorial time. The Salii were priests who specially served Mars. Priests bearing that name existed in a number of ancient Italic cities besides Rome. At Rome itself these priests were, even in late time, patricians. There were really two *collegia* which bore the name, one with a sanctuary on the Palatine hill, the other on the Quirinal. Each of the colleges must have originally represented a separate independent community, and both survived after the two had coalesced. The ceremonies, supposed to have been instituted by King Numa, were of the most archaic description. They sang hymns in honour of Mars as war-god, and danced in armour, in procession round the city, twice in the year, in March and October. They bore lances and the sacred *ancilia* (shields), preserved in shrines, from which they were taken on these occasions with great solemnity. The purification of the holy weapons (*armilustrium*) was performed with minute ceremony. Virgil[1] speaks with reverence of the ceremonial, but Seneca[2] allows himself to deal lightly with the *saltus saliaris*. The Luperci also had two distinct forms, like the Salii. One was connected with the Palatine hill, the other with the Quirinal. As in many other instances, it is clear that the State at an early time took the services out of the hands of particular families, for the two bore the names respectively of *Luperci Quinctiales* (from the Quinctii) and *Luperci Fabiani* (from the Fabii). In 44 B.C. Cæsar's memory was honoured by the creation of a third *collegium*, the *Luperci Iulii*, but its duration was brief. The ritual of the Luperci (evidently connected with a primitive pastoral community) was directed to purification and reconciliation with the divinity honoured (Faunus or Silvanus). The Luperci ran round the foot of the Palatine hill, on

[1] Servius on Virgil, *Ecl.* v. 66.
[2] Cf. G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 337.

[1] *Æn.* viii. 285. [2] *Ep.* xv 4.

the north-west side of which lay the sacred cave called Lupercal. The priests sacrificed goats, and ran their ceremonial course with the skins of the sacrificed animals round their hips, their bodies being otherwise unclad. They bore whips in their hands, made of strips of goatskin; with these they struck women who ran in their way, desirous to escape from the reproach of barrenness. The thongs bore the name of *februa*, a word connected (as in the name *mensis Februarius*) with purificatory ritual. It is no wonder that, as Plutarch says, the Luperci themselves were constrained to laugh at portions of the ceremonial.[1] The Lupercalia continued to be performed down to A.D. 494, when Pope Gelasius I. appointed the day for the ritual of the Purification of the Virgin. The worship of Faunus, the deity with whom the festival was concerned, was a cult almost peculiar to Rome and the country immediately round it.

Although the *Fratres Arvales* are only once mentioned in extant Latin literature[2] they are well known to us from inscriptions discovered on the site of the shrine of the brotherhood, a few miles from Rome on the right bank of the Tiber, in the direction of its mouth. The first discovery was made in 1570; afterwards fragments which had been removed from the site came to light, and then in the years 1867–71 excavations on the site greatly increased the number of fragments. The whole were carefully studied by a succession of scholars, especially by W. Henzen, who published the whole with a commentary (Rome, 1868, and Berlin, 1874); also (without commentary) in *CIL* vi. (1876). The inscriptions proved to be an important source for the earlier imperial history. They embody minutes of proceedings of the brotherhood from A.D. 14, when it was refounded by Augustus, to A.D. 238. The fact of the connexion of Augustus with the shrine seems to have given the brotherhood a special interest in events and anniversaries connected with the emperors and their families; on the suitable days offerings were made and recorded in the minutes. The inscriptions have preserved (in an entry relating to A.D. 218) a hymn in Saturnian metre which is the most ancient monument of the Latin language.[3]

One college of importance, that of the Vestal Virgins, was composed of women. The early Romans were conscious of a parallelism between the religion of the family, whose centre was the family hearth, and that of the great State family, for which the hearth was in the temple of Vesta. There, as in the separate families, the unmarried daughters had a great share in the family cults. The *rex sacrorum* stood in the same relation to the Vestals as the *paterfamilias* held with the maidens of his family; and this *rex* succeeded to some of the duties which had belonged to the old *reges* before the institution of the Republic.

Other brotherhoods subsisted, some from primitive days, like the *sodales Titii*, who traced their origin to King Titus Tatius, and were supposed to maintain a ritual borrowed from the old Sabines.[4] Others were of late creation, such as the *sodales Augustales*, devoted to the imperial cult, that of the *diui imperatores*, the divinized emperors. The brotherhood consisted of twenty-one ordinary members, chosen (Tacitus says) from the very highest ranks, with four members of the imperial family. The first of these representatives were Tiberius, Germanicus, Drusus, and Claudius. Similar brotherhoods were established in honour of later emperors, Claudius, Vespasian, Titus, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and others; but these never attained to the same importance.

Many separate priesthoods, to which the name *flamen* was attached, also existed; some, like the *flamen* of Jupiter (*flamen Dialis*), of Mars (*Martialis*), Quirinus (*Quirinalis*), from time immemorial, others of later creation and less consequence. The three just mentioned were *flamines par excellence*, sometimes called *maiores* in contrast to all others. The *flamines minores* were attached to the service of a great many divinities, and in later time were all of plebeian quality. The really ancient offices were concerned with ritual of a remarkably archaic type. The rigorous restrictions under which the *flamen Dialis* lived are well known. He and his wife (the *flaminica*) must be married by the very ancient form of *confarreatio*. If the *flaminica* died, the *flamen ipso facto* lost his office; he could originally undertake no civil duties, though he wore the distinctive robe of civil office, the *toga prætexta*, and sat on the chair of office (the *sella curulis*); could look on no armed array; could not absent himself from his house (the *regia*, attached to the temple of Vesta) without leave from the *pontifex maximus*. He was hemmed in by many minute rules of the nature of 'tabus'; for example, it was not permissible for him to have a knot anywhere in his clothing. The office of *flamen*, generally speaking, involved personal participation in certain definite sacrifices.

LITERATURE.—The course run by Roman religion during the time of the empire is brilliantly sketched by G. Boissier, *Religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins*[4], Paris, 1892, and *La Fin du paganisme*[2], do. 1894. For all the subjects mentioned in this article, the best work in English is W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, London, 1899; in German the most useful are J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, vol. v. 'Das Sacralwesen,' Leipzig, 1878, and G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902 (vol. v. pt. 4 of *Handbuch der klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, by Iwan Müller). Many valuable articles on separate topics are in Pauly-Wissowa, and also in Roscher. J. S. REID.

WRATH.—See ANGER.

WREATH.—See CROWN.

WRONG.—See ETHICS AND MORALITY.

WYCLIF.—I. *LIFE.*—1. Early years and parentage.—John Wyclif, or Wycliffe, 'drew his origin'[1] from the village of that name in Yorkshire on the southern banks of the Tees. The name of this village, the first syllable of which is *wy*, 'water,'[2] determines the spelling; the German form 'Wiclif' should be avoided. The manor of Wyclif was in the honour of Richmondshire, and the Wyclif family were undertenants of the Earl of Richmond. We first hear of the Wyclif family in 1253, when a certain Robert de Wyclif was granted a messuage in the manor; in 1263 he obtained the advowson of the church,[3] and in 1287 held of the mesne lord, William de Kirkton, twelve carucates of land in Wyclif, Girlington, and half of Thorpe.[4] In 1316 a Robert de Wyclif was lord of the manor.[5] His son or nephew Roger[6] married in 1319 Katherine, the Reformer's mother. At that time Roger's father or uncle, Robert, the lord of the manor, was still alive, and this may account for the uncertainty as to the birthplace of their

[1] *Quæst. Rom.* 21. [2] Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 85.
[3] See Mommsen's text and comments on *CIL*, n. 28.
[4] Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 54.

[1] J. Leland, *De rebus Britannicis collectanea*, ed. T. Hearne, 6 vols., Oxford, 1715, ii. 329.
[2] F. D. Matthew, in *Academy*, June 1884.
[3] C. W. Foster, *Final Concords of the County of Lincoln*, 1920, ii. 289.
[4] *J. de Kirkby's Inquest* (Surtees Soc.), London, 1867, p. 167 f.; *Vict. Co. Hist. Yorks. N.R.* i. 139, 142; R. Gale, *Registrum Honoris de Richmond*, London, 1722, p. 50.
[5] *Kirkby's Inquest*, p. 334.
[6] T. D. Whitaker, *Richmondshire*, 2 vols., London, 1823, i. 200; or better *Genealogist*, xx. 133–136, xxi. 95–99, for the Wyclif pedigree.

son. According to Leland,[1] he was born at 'Ipreswell, a poor village, a good mile from Richmond.' But Hipswell is at a considerable distance from Wyclif village, nor is there any proof that the Wyclifs owned land there.[2] On his marriage Roger Wyclif would be assigned one of the smaller houses on the estate, possibly Thorpe, close to Wycliffe, for which he paid the relief in 1319 of 25s. for three carucates of land that he held.[3] At what date Robert Wyclif died is unknown, but the Reformer's father Roger paid the subsidy for the whole estate in 1332–33[4] and was still alive in 1347–49.[5] The year of his death is also unknown, except that it was before 1362, for unfortunately the black letter inscription in the church at Wyclif over the tomb of Roger and Katherine gives no date.[6]

The date of birth of the son of Roger and Katherine is unknown. He is usually assumed to have been the eldest son, born shortly after the marriage.[7] But it is probable that there was an elder brother William.[8] Moreover, the date at which John Wyclif took his doctorate, in or about 1372, points to a later date of birth, nearer 1330 than 1320. Before 1362 Wyclif's father Roger died, and the Reformer became the lord of the manor. His mother was still alive in Oct. 1369, when John associated her with himself in a presentation to the living.[9] The only other connexion of Wyclif with his family estate was his nomination on 17th May 1367 on a commission issued to seven Yorkshire gentlemen to see to the keeping of the statute recently passed prohibiting the taking of salmon in certain seasons in the Tees and other rivers.[10] After Wyclif's death the estate passed to a Robert Wyclif, probably his brother, an energetic ecclesiastic who from 1390 to 1405 acted as chancellor to Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham. As such he took a prominent part in the trial at Bishop Auckland of the famous Lollard, Richard Wyche.[11] In 1412 Robert settled the estates on a John de Ellerton, who assumed the name of Wyclif[12] and from whom the later lords of the manor were descended. They were noted for their intense fidelity to Rome after the Reformation.

2. Early Oxford career.—At what date Wyclif went to Oxford is unknown. If he was born in 1330, it would be in or about 1345. Three colleges claim him. The claim of Queen's[13] may be dismissed as due to a confusion with a John Wyclif, possibly the Reformer's nephew, an 'almonry boy' in the Queen's grammar schools for whom in 1371 we find the college buying Latin grammars, etc.[14] The claim of Merton rests upon a catalogue of Fellows made in 1395 by Thomas Robert, still in the possession of Merton.[15] This John Wyclif, a steward or seneschal,[16] may be John Whitclif of Mayfield († Nov. 1383).[1] Possibly John Wyclif was the rare exception, a northerner in a southern college, and a recent writer claims that he had 'been worked into Merton to pacify the Northerners,'[2] and was thus the seneschal of the week expelled in 1356, as the result of a college struggle.

Wyclif's connexion with Balliol is certain. That he was Master of Balliol in the spring of 1360 (and therefore presumably previously a Fellow) is clear from a document citing his taking possession as such of a property in Gresham St. E.C.[3] His predecessor Robert Derby[4] still acted in 1356.[5] This gives the earliest possible date of Wyclif's Mastership. On 9th April 1361 Wyclif was still Master and took possession for the college of the living of Abbotsley.[6] But on 14th May 1361 he was instituted to the college living of Fillingham, near Lincoln, value 'thirty marks,' and by the then statutes was forced to resign his Mastership. Some delay, however, occurred, for in the following July he still signed himself 'Master' in a legal document connected with the transfer to the college of Abbotsley.[7] The restriction of the Fellowships at Balliol founded in 1340 by Sir Philip Somervile for those proceeding to a degree in theology to six in all will account for Wyclif leaving.

After his presentation to Fillingham Wyclif vanishes for a while from clear vision. But on 29th Aug. 1363 he obtained from his bishop, John Buckingham of Lincoln, a licence for non-residence at Fillingham 'that he might devote himself to the study of letters in the university.'[8] In consequence he paid a short visit to Oxford in Oct. 1363, living in rooms in Queen's, and a longer visit between 21st March 1365 and 26th Sept. 1366, paying 40s. 'for the rent of his room for two years.'[9] Meanwhile on 24th Nov. 1362 the University in presenting its annual 'roll of Masters' had petitioned Urban v. to provide Wyclif with 'a canonry and prebend in York, notwithstanding that he holds the church of Fillingham.' Urban granted instead the prebend of Aust in the ancient collegiate church of Westbury-on-Trim, near Bristol, worth £6, 13s. 4d. *p.a.*[10] Wyclif accepted the prebend[11] but did not reside. He was, as we have seen, reading for his doctorate at Oxford. In the spring of 1366 William Wittlesey, bishop of Worcester,[12] visited Westbury. He found that all the five canons were non-resident, and that only one had provided a vicar to discharge his duties. 'Master John Wynkele' (for thus the bishop spells the name) is expressly mentioned among the delinquents; and on 28th June 1366 Wyclif was cited to appear before the bishop on 18th July. Meanwhile his 'fruits' were sequestrated. Of any further action by Wittlesey there is no record. Wyclif continued to hold the prebend to the day of his death,[13]

1 *Itinerary*[2], 9 vols., ed. T. Hearne, Oxford, 1744, v. 112.

2 The clerical blunder in Hearne's ed. of Leland, *Collect.* of 'Spreswell' has deceived many—*e.g.*, G. V. Lechler, *John Wyclif and his English Precursors*, ed. 1884, p. 81. For this work (hereafter known as Lechler, *JW*) see Literature below, and for Hearne's blunder R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the Hist. of Medieval Thought*, p. 285, n. 3. No such village ever existed (Whitaker, ii. 41).

3 Gale, p. 73. 4 *Lay Subsidy Rec.* 211, no. 7*a*.

5 *Ib.* no. 23.

6 For this inscription see Whitaker, i. 198.

7 The current date, 1324, is a guess of John Lewis, *The Life and Sufferings of John Wiclife*, 1720, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Lewis, *JW*).

8 Whitaker, *loc. cit.* 9 *Ib.* i. 200.

10 *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III.*, xiii. 439. The Reformer was also returned as lord of the manor in 1375 (*Vict. Co. Hist. Yorks. N.R.* i. 139).

11 *Eng. Hist. Rev.* v. [1890] 530–544.

12 *Vict. Co. Hist. Yorks. N.R.* i. 139.

13 A. Wood, *History and Antiquities of the Colleges and Halls in the University of Oxford*, Oxford, 1786, p. 82.

14 *Hist. MSS Commission*, ii. App. 141.

15 G. C. Brodrick, *Memorials of Merton*, Oxford, 1885, p. viii.

16 Wood, p. 82.

1 A view strenuously maintained by W. Shirley, in *Fasciculi Zizaniorum* (1858), Rolls Series, p. 513*f.* (hereafter cited as *FZ*); following Courthope in *Gent. Mag.* ii. [1842] 146–180, and extensively adopted.

2 H. S. Cronin, in *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 1914, p. 73 n.

3 *Hist. MSS Com.* iv. 448.

4 Not William Kingston, as Lechler, *JW*, p. 101, following *FZ*, p. xiv.

5 *FZ*, p. xiv n. 6 *Hist. MSS Com.* iv. 447*f.*

7 *Reg. Ep. Gynwell*, *f.* 123, modern pagination ix f. 172; *FZ*, p. xiv.

8 Cronin, p. 74 n. This earlier licence is usually overlooked.

9 *Hist. MSS Com.*, *loc. cit.*

10 *Cal. Papal Petitions* (Rolls Ser.), i. 390; *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xv. [1900] 529, where the documents are given in full.

11 Rashdall's doubts in *DNB* lxiii. 205 are contrary to the evidence.

12 *DNB* lxi. 158.

13 In most lives of Wyclif (*e.g.*, *DNB* lxiii. 205) it is assumed that he resigned Aust in Nov. 1375. On 6th Nov., for reasons that are not clear, he was confirmed in this prebend, which on 18th Nov. was given by the king to Robert de Farrington. On 22nd Dec. 1376 this grant to Farrington was revoked on the 'information' of John of Gaunt as given in error under the

but of any discharge of duty there is no evidence.[1]

One other matter in connexion with Aust should be mentioned. By the constitution *Horribilis* of Urban v., 3rd May 1366, a return was demanded of all pluralities. Wyclif's return, which should have been made to Bishop Buckingham, does not exist, whether through his neglect or because now lost cannot be determined.[2]

While these matters were in dispute at Aust, Wyclif was nominated by Archbishop Islip[3] in a deed dated at Mayfield, 9th Dec. 1365, to be the warden of Canterbury College, Oxford, founded by Islip in 1361. Islip intended it to be a joint college of eight seculars and of four regulars from Christ Church, Canterbury. The college was started on 13th March 1363, Islip selecting as head Henry Wodehull, a monk of Abingdon. On 9th Dec. 1365 Islip dismissed Wodehull and substituted 'John de Wyclyve.' The regulars were driven out and three seculars from Merton introduced. Not content with this, Islip furthermore changed the statutes and altered the whole character of the college. While accepting the position, Wyclif did not choose to give up the rooms at Queen's. Wyclif's tenure of the office was brief. On the death of Islip (26th April 1366) the monks of Canterbury lodged an appeal. Islip's successor, Simon Langham,[4] deprived Wyclif of his office (30th March 1367), sequestrated the revenues, and finally expelled Wyclif and his three secular colleagues. Wyclif thereupon appealed to Urban v., but meanwhile for two years, if his opponents may be trusted, still lived on at Canterbury, spending freely the college goods. Wyclif's proctor, Richard Benger, one of his associates at Canterbury, failed to put in an appearance when summoned at Viterbo, and on 23rd July 1369 Cardinal Androin de la Roche, to whom Urban had referred the case, gave his decision at Monte Fiascone, though, owing to his death, it was not published until 15th May 1370. The action of Langham was upheld in every detail and Wyclif's appeal dismissed. The costs, however, were thrown upon the estate. There is no doubt that this decision was right. Islip had acted illegally in altering the trusts, upon which the royal licence in mortmain had been secured,[5] and for the condonation of this offence the monks of Canterbury were condemned on 8th April 1372 to pay a fine of 200 marks.[6] Urban evidently had some sympathy for Wyclif, for in 1369 he reserved for him a prebend in Lincoln, which, however, Wyclif never obtained or, if he obtained it, soon resigned.[1]

While the controversy over Canterbury College was still unsettled, Wyclif's licence for five years for absence from his cure expired. So on 13th April 1368 he obtained an extension 'for two years.'[2] In the following autumn he exchanged Fillingham for Ludgershall in Buckinghamshire, where he was instituted on 12th Nov. 1368. The nearness to Oxford would compensate for loss of income (10 marks instead of 30).[3] In Nov. 1371 Wyclif was one of the executors of the will of William de Askeby, archdeacon of Northampton, who in 1369 had been appointed chancellor of the exchequer.[4] Towards the close of 1372 Wyclif completed the long course of nine years and a term after Mastership necessary for taking his doctorate[5] and shortly afterwards entered the king's service.

3. In the king's service.—We date Wyclif's entrance into the civil service as about 1372. Possibly it may have been a little earlier, for Wyclif gives us a report of a speech which he himself 'heard' in the parliament which met in Westminster on 24th Feb. 1371.[6] At once he seems to have allied himself with John of Gaunt and his faction, altogether unconscious of the unscrupulous ambition and selfishness which underlay the duke's politics. But Wyclif's first appearance as a publicist was as the representative of the nation in resistance to papal exactions. On 6th June 1365[7] Urban v. had demanded the payment of the King John's annual tribute of 1000 marks together with arrears since the last payment made on 7th July 1333. Edward laid the matter before the parliament of May 1366, which indignantly refused.[8] Until recently it was believed that 'this solemn declaration set the question at rest for ever,'[9] and the older historians have all dated Wyclif's public life from 1366.[10] But there is evidence that the question of tribute was reopened by Gregory XI. in 1374, and it is in connexion with this later event that we would date Wyclif's first political tract. To consider this and other demands of Gregory a council was held at Westminster on 21st May 1374,[11] at which a prominent part in defence of papal claims was taken by a monk, John Ughtred of Boldon,[12] assisted later by William Binham, a monk of St. Albans. The debate and consequent controversy led to the publication by Wyclif,

belief that 'the prebend was vacant' (see H. J. Wilkins, *Was John Wyclif a Negligent Pluralist?*, Bristol, 1915, p. 33; *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III.*, xvi. 121, 195).

[1] For Wyclif and Aust reference should be made to the researches of H. J. Wilkins, *op. cit.*, and *An Appendix to John Wycliffe*, London, 1916.

[2] A. H. Thompson's note in Wilkins, *Negligent Pluralist*, p. 86.

[3] *DNB* xxix. 74. [4] *Ib.* xxxii. 99.

[5] *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III.*, xii. 139.

[6] The identification of the warden of Canterbury with the Reformer has been a matter of much controversy. It was accepted by N. Harpsfield in his *Historia Wiclefiana*, printed in his *Historia Anglicana ecclesiastica*, London, 1622, p. 668; then by A. Wood, Lewis, Vaughan, Lechler, Poole (*Med. Thought*, p. 287 n.), Milman, Matthew. The best arguments in defence are by Canon Wilkinson in *Church Quart. Rev.* v. [1877–78] 119–141; and Cronin, pp. 55–76. The main documents have been printed by Pratt in his ed. of Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*, 1870, ii. App. 922 ff. (hereafter cited as Foxe, *AM*). Doubts were first cast by W. Courthope in *Gent. Mag.* xvi. [1841] 146, followed by Shirley, *FZ*, pp. 513–528, H. Rashdall (*DNB* lxiii. 203 f., *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, London, 1895, ii. 498 n.), and others (*e.g.*, *Viet. Co. Hist. Oxford*, ii. 68), who identify the warden with John Whitclif, vicar of Mayfield, for whom see above. This identification should be rejected, for the scanty arguments in its favour cannot outweigh the evidence of contemporaries—*e.g.*, William Woodford in his *Septuaginta Questiones de sacramento altaris* (in *FZ*, p. 517), of the *Chronicon Angliæ* (Rolls Ser., 1874), p. 115. The present writer suspects also a reference in Netter, *Doctrinale*, ed. F. B. Blanchotti, Venice, 1757, iii. 485. In his *de Ecclesia*, p. 371, Wyclif makes a singularly impersonal reference to the matter.

[1] *Cal. Pap. Letters*, iv. 193.

[2] *Mem. Ep. Buckingham*, f. 56 d.

[3] *Reg. Buckingham Instit.* x. f. 419; cf. f. 130 d.

[4] A. W. Gibbons, *Early Lincoln Wills*, Lincoln, 1888, p. 25 f.; also in *Gent. Mag.* xxii. [1844] 136; Foxe, *AM* ii. 946.

[5] Knowledge of this important date, usually given, *e.g.*, by Shirley in *FZ*, p. 527, F. D. Matthew, *Eng. Works of Wyclif*, p. vi (hereafter cited as *EWW*), as 1366, can now be inferred from *Cal. Papal Letters*, iv. 193, from which we learn that Gregory XI. in a provision dated 26th Dec. 1373 (not Jan. 1373, as *DNB* lxiii. 206, copied by many) states that Wyclif recently became 'master of theology.' The date given by Bishop Bale, in the margin of *FZ*, p. 2, of 1372 is thus accurate. This date is of fundamental importance for the chronology of Wyclif's life and works, the earlier date leading to disastrous results. Unfortunately in many of the prefaces to the works of Wyclif printed by the Wyclif Society this earlier date is taken as a basis.

[6] *De Civ. Dom.* ii. c. 1. The idea of Lechler (*JW*, p. 130 f.) that Wyclif was a member of parliament either at this time or later should be dismissed. The speech in question is merely a tale taken from the contemporary *Vade mecum in tribulatione* written in 1349 by the Spiritual Franciscan, Jean de la Rochetaillade, and will be found in E. Brown's ed. of Ortuin Gratius' *Fasciculus rerum expetendarum*, London, 1690, ii. 496–507.

[7] *Cal. Pap. Lett.* iv. 16; not 13th June, as Raynaldus, xxvi. 116, followed by most historians.

[8] *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, London, 1783, ii. 289 f.

[9] J. Lingard, *Hist.*[5], London, 1849, iii. 253.

[10] *E.g.*, R. L. Poole, who is thus led as editor to date Wyclif's *de Dominio Divino* as shortly after 1366 (pp. xxiii–xxiv), following Shirley in *FZ*, pp. xvii, xxi n.; Lechler, *JW*. But see below, p. 819.

[11] Reported only in *Eulogium Historiarum*, iii. 337–339; in *DNB* lxi. 159 treated as fiction.

[12] For whom see *DNB* lviii. 17, or J. Loserth, 'Die ältesten Streitschriften Wiclifs,' in *SWAW*, 1908, pp. 7–23.

though possibly not until two years later, of his *Determinatio contra unum monachum* (*i.e.* Binham).[1] Special reference is made in the tract to the question of the tribute. Wyclif replies to Binham by giving the answer 'which I heard recently was given by secular lords in a secular council,' and reports seven so-called speeches. On analysis the speeches resolve themselves into the various 'conclusions' of Wyclif condemned by Gregory XI. in 1377, while the sixth lord gives us a brief outline of Wyclif's views of 'lordship.' To suppose that we have in them 'the earliest instance of a report of a parliamentary debate'[2] is absurd. They are all reflexions of Wyclif's own views, written, probably, eighteen months after the council.

Wyclif's services had already been rewarded by his presentation by the Crown to the rectory of Lutterworth (7th April 1374).[3] On 26th July 1374 he was appointed a member of a small commission, with John Gilbert, bishop of Bangor, as the head, to meet at Bruges a commission from Gregory.[4] For his travelling expenses Wyclif received 42s. 3d., and for his other expenses 20s. a day.[5] On the day before his departure Wyclif took some legal steps on behalf of his former proctor Richard Benger. Along with Ralph Strode, the Common Sergeant of London,[6] he went bail for him that Benger would not at Avignon attempt to obtain any papal provisions, etc.[7]

The conference at Bruges effected nothing, and by the middle of September Wyclif was back in Oxford, living in rooms at Queen's, which needed much repair, in that month.[8] In Aug. 1375 another deputation was appointed to go to Bruges to confer with Gregory's nuncio. In this deputation, though most of his former associates were retained, Wyclif was left out.[9] This omission (usually overlooked by historians, who have in consequence exaggerated his influence at Bruges) probably shows that he was too unbending for Edward's purpose. As a result on 1st Sept. 1375 a concordat between Gregory and Edward was struck.[10] Wyclif had thus no complicity in a great sham, in its main provisions a victory for the papacy.

As a result of the conference several of the actors in it received preferments. In after years Wyclif's enemies invented the story that he expected to obtain the bishopric of Worcester.[11] The story is worthless. Months before Wyclif sailed to Bruges a nomination had been made to the vacant see by Edward III.[12] That Wyclif, however, expected to receive the prebend of Caistor in Lincoln has more basis.[13] Wyclif returned from Bruges a disillusioned man. He formed the idea of writing a *Summa* of his doctrines, the introduction to which should deal with the philosophical positions which underlay the recent dispute. For the two years, Sept. 1374–Sept. 1376, he probably resided at Lutterworth, but with frequent visits to Oxford (Queen's). During those two years he developed his theory of 'lordship,' expanding his tracts against Ughtred and Binham into the two great political treatises *de Dominio Divino* and *de Civili Dominio*. He was probably engaged upon these writings during the meeting of the 'Good Parliament' (28th April 1376–6th July 1376). It is difficult to explain Wyclif's action in the autumn of 1376. John of Gaunt packed a parliament, which met on 27th Jan. 1377, with his followers, who at once proceeded to annul all the acts of the Good Parliament, while Wyclif, 'running about from church to church' in London, denounced the episcopate, who under the lead of Courtenay and Wykeham were the duke's chief opponents.[1] Wyclif's protest against the wealth, luxury, and worldliness of the clergy fell on willing ears; but nevertheless he unconsciously played the duke's reactionary game. The parliament of Jan. 1377, with its iniquitous poll-tax,[2] its restoration of Alice Perrers, and the aggrandisement of the duke by the creation of Lancashire into a county palatine,[3] is one of the worst on record.

The bishops, powerless in parliament, struck at the duke through Wyclif, and summoned the latter to appear before Convocation in St. Paul's on Thursday, 19th Feb. 1377.[4] The duke took up the challenge and, together with Earl Percy, the king's marshal, accompanied Wyclif to the trial. The proceedings ended in a riot. Wyclif was carried off by his supporters, while the London mob, on the following day, burned the duke's palace of Savoy.

Meanwhile some of Wyclif's old opponents at Oxford had accused him at the papal court. On 22nd May 1377[5] in S. Maria Maggiore in Rome Gregory issued a series of bulls directed against the Reformer.[6] With these bulls Gregory forwarded a schedule of nineteen erroneous 'propositions and conclusions,' culled from Wyclif's political and politico-ecclesiastical writings. These Gregory identified with the 'opinions and ignorant doctrine of Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun' condemned by John XXII.[7] An examination of the pope's schedule shows that the theses concern the status or polity rather than the doctrines of the Church.[8]

Before Edward could receive the bulls, he had passed away at Sheen (21st June 1377). His death caused delay, and the bulls were kept back until after the meeting of parliament on 13th October. This parliament was in no mood to truckle to Rome. By a writ dated 12th Dec. 1377 the bishops were ordered to make a return of all aliens, including cardinals, who held benefices.[9] To stop the drain the Council asked Wyclif for his advice 'whether the kingdom of England may lawfully . . . keep back the treasure of the kingdom.' Wyclif replied in a state-paper,[10] in which he advocated not only the stopping of all the drain to Rome but the 'prudent distribution to the glory

[1] For this tract, first imperfectly printed in Lewis, *JW*, pp. 363–371, we have now Loserth's ed. in *Op. Minora*, p. 415 f. The tract should be distinguished from the *Determinatio ad argumenta Outredi*, published at the same time (*Op. Minora*, p. 405 f.).

[2] Shirley, *FZ*, p. xix; Lechler, *JW*, p. 129.

[3] *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III.*, xv. 424.

[4] T. Rymer, *Fœdera*, Record ed. iii. 1007, or ed. 1704, vii. 41; *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III.*, xv. 462.

[5] F. Devon, *Issues of the Exchequer*, London, 1837, p. 197.

[6] For whom see *DNB* lv. 57 and the doubtful plea of J. Gollancz in his introduction to *The Pearl*, London, 1891. For Wyclif's debates with Strode see *Op. Minora*, pp. 175 f., 398 f.

[7] *Cal. Close Rolls Ed. III.*, xiv. 94.

[8] *Hist. MSS Com.* ii. App. 141.

[9] *Cal. Pap. Lett.* iv. 144.

[10] Rymer, iii. 1037–1039.

[11] Netter, *Doctrinale*, i. 560, 934; the story was repeated at Basel in 1433; see P. Zatacensis, 'Lib. Diurnus,' in *Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium sec.* xv., Vienna, 1857, i. 317.

[12] 7th Dec. 1373; see *Reg. Sede Vacante* (Worcester Hist. Soc.), 1897, pp. 283, 290 f.

[13] See references in *de Civ. Dom.* iii. 17; *Cal. Pap. Reg.* iv. 193; H. S. Cronin, in *Eng. Hist. Review*, xxxv. [1920] 564 f.

[1] *Chron. Angliæ*, 116.

[2] *Rotuli Parl.* ii. 364.

[3] Rymer, iii. 1073.

[4] For the events that follow the chief authority is the full *Chron. Angliæ*, 117–134, copied by Foxe, who had access to it, in *AM* ii. 800 f. Narratives written before the publication in 1874 of this long-lost *Chron. Angliæ* often go sadly astray.

[5] Not 30th May, as *FZ*, p. xxviii.

[6] For these bulls see Walsingham, *Hist. Ang.* i. 345–353; Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 116–118, who omits those to Oxford and to Edward III.; Lewis, *JW*, pp. 46–49, 254–264, or Foxe, *AM* iii. 4–7.

[7] From a study of Wyclif's works the present writer is of opinion that Wyclif knew nothing of Marsiglio first hand.

[8] The schedule is best studied in Wyclif's *Protestatio* (see below), or in *FZ*, pp. 245–257. The first eight theses are taken almost verbally from Wyclif's *de Civ. Dom.*

[9] *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 19; E. Powell and G. M. Trevelyan, *The Peasants' Rising and the Lollards*, London, 1899, p. 57 *f.*, gives the return.

[10] For this see *FZ*, pp. 258–271; partly translated in Foxe, *AM* iii. 54–56.

of God' of the goods of the Church. At this point 'silence was imposed upon him by the king.' Wyclif had probably been consulted by the Crown because of a paper recently published by him on the question of the oath sworn by the papal nuncio, Arnauld Garnier, on 13th Feb. 1372 that he would do nothing to the hurt of the kingdom.[1] Wyclif printed the oath and asked whether there was not a contradiction between its terms and the permission to collect monies for Rome.[2]

No steps had yet been taken to publish the bulls, though Thomas Brunton, bishop of Rochester,[3] told Wyclif in the hearing of many members of parliament that he had been condemned.[4] About this time Wyclif entered into controversy with a 'motley doctor' of Oxford, probably his accuser at Rome. This tract[5] is remarkably bold in tone. Wyclif calls upon 'the soldiers of Christ, especially the professors of evangelical poverty,' to rouse themselves against the claims of the papacy. On 28th Nov. parliament was dismissed,[6] and probably Wyclif returned to Oxford.[7] On 18th Dec. a mandate was issued to the chancellor of Oxford enclosing one of Gregory's bulls. The mandate ordered the chancellor to ascertain whether Wyclif had taught the theses in question, and to cite him to appear within thirty days at St. Paul's.[8] As the pope's bull demanded that Wyclif should be arrested,[9] the Oxford authorities were in a dilemma, for to obey 'would seem to give the pope lordship and regal authority in England.' So the vice-chancellor contented himself with ordering Wyclif 'to stay in Blackhall and not to go out.' Wyclif's theses were sent to the masters regent in theology, who 'all handed to the chancellor their conclusions.' They 'declared publicly in the schools that Wyclif's theses were true, though they sounded badly to the ear.' Wyclif replied that catholic truth should not be condemned because of its sound.[10] A few months later, on the occasion of a student-row, the vice-chancellor, who was a monk, was thrown into prison on the pretext 'that he had imprisoned John Wyclif at the mandate of the pope.'[11] About this time Wyclif published an edition of his *Protestatio* in a shortened, popular form.[12] The tract is really an appeal to the educated public against the pope's decisions. He also published an appeal to the nobility, in defence of disendowment, entitled *Speculum Secularium Dominorum*.[13]

The imprisonment by the Crown of the vice-chancellor of Oxford seems to have been intended as a warning to the papal commissioners that the Crown would not recognize papal penal jurisdiction. About the same time Wyclif appeared at Lambeth. The date is fixed by a statement of Walsingham[14] that it was shortly before the death of Gregory XI., *i.e.* before 27th March 1378, probably at the end of February, which would fit in with the summons given to Wyclif at Oxford to appear at St. Paul's. The queen-mother, Joan of Kent, sent a message to the bishops ordering them to abstain from pronouncing any final judgment. But the trial proceeded, and Wyclif put in a paper that he called a *Protestatio*[1] in which he expanded more fully the meaning of his theses. At the same time the citizens broke into the archbishop's chapel and tried to stop the trial. So the bishops contented themselves with prohibiting Wyclif 'from canvassing such theses in schools or sermons because of the scandal thereby given to the laity.'[2] Wyclif replied by publishing *Conclusiones Triginta tres de Paupertate Christi*, dealing with his idea of poverty and disendowment.[3]

In the autumn of 1378 Wyclif was seen, for the last time, in alliance with the Crown. On 11th Aug. 1378 by the order of the Government the sanctuary of Westminster was violated in order to capture two English knights between whom and the Government there had been a struggle over a Spanish captive, the count of Denia, and his ransom. One knight, Shakyl, was arrested—he had been enticed outside; the other, Haulay, was chased twice round the chancel and killed 'beside St. Edward's shrine.' Excommunications followed; and, as the outrage was popularly attributed to the hated John of Gaunt, London seethed with excitement. On 20th Oct. 1378 parliament met at Gloucester, and Archbishop Sudbury at once demanded satisfaction. The court retorted by claiming the right of arrest. The privilege of the Church was not denied, but the matter, it was pleaded, was one of debt, for which there were no rights of sanctuary. 'And on this there came into parliament doctors of theology and civil law who made argument against the prelates by many colourable and strong reasons.'[4] Among the doctors was John Wyclif, who interrupted the writing of his *de Ecclesia* to lay before parliament a defence of the Crown's action.[5] He claimed for the Crown a right to absolute obedience in all matters not contrary to God's law and, while admitting sanctuary for accidental homicide, subjects the right in general and of Westminster Abbey in particular to severe criticism. Shortly after this incident Wyclif finished his great treatise *de Ecclesia*. This was followed by a companion work, *de Officio Regis*, the two forming a complete exposition of his views on the relations of Church and State.

4. Break with the Mediæval Church.—The Great Schism in the autumn of 1378 flung Wyclif into complete antagonism to the papacy. Hitherto Wyclif had not disputed the spiritual primacy of the popes, though ready enough to attack papal pretensions and to speak ill of individual popes.[6] His position had been this: we must obey the pope as the vicar of Christ, but the vicar of Christ, who could have no temporal sovereignty, must be the holiest, the most God-enlightened man in Christendom. Moreover, 'no pope is to be believed unless he is teaching by the inspiration of God, or founding his utterances on Scripture.'[7] The whole authority of the office was thus determined by the pope's character as one of the elect, and, inasmuch as this knowledge was beyond human ken, could only be judged from his deeds. Obedience to the papacy was thus a matter of convenience and church order—a position in which Wyclif unconsciously closely followed Marsiglio in his *Defensor Pacis*.

The schism drew Wyclif from this standpoint. He had hailed the election of Urban VI. (8th April

1 Rymer, iii. 933; and cf. *Cal. Close Rolls Ed. III.*, xiii. 424.
2 For this paper, which is preserved in two Vienna MSS, see Lechler, *J W* (German ed.), App.
3 *DNB* vi. 360.
4 Wyclif, *de Ecclesia*, p. 354.
5 *FZ*, pp. 481–492. 6 *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 29.
7 *Eulog. Hist.* iii. 348.
8 Lewis, *J W*, p. 264 f.; also Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 123 f., with wrong date of 28th Dec.
9 Walsingham, *Hist. Ang.* i. 351.
10 *Eulog. Hist.* iii. 348
11 *Ib.* iii. 349; Rymer, iv. 32; Wilkins, iii. 137; and cf. Wyclif, *de Eccl.* p. 355; the tract, *de Incarcerandis Fidelibus* in *Op. Minora*, p. 92 f., should be assigned to this date.
12 *FZ*, pp. 245–257. 13 *Op. Minora*, p. 74 f.
14 *Hist. Ang.* i. 358.

1 Found in Walsingham, i. 357–363; *Chron. Angliæ*, 184–189, tr. in Foxe, *AM* iii. 13 f.
2 Walsingham, i. 363; *Chron. Angliæ*, 183.
3 *Op. Minora*, p. 19 f. 4 *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 37.
5 Wyclif's defence of the Crown and his general attack on sanctuary was expanded by him into six chapters which he incorporated in his *de Ecclesia*, pp. 142–274.
6 *De Eccl.* p. 358; cf. *ib.* p. 366.
7 *De Apostasia*, pp. 65, 173. Wyclif's middle views on the papacy can best be studied in his *de Potestate Pape*, ed. J. Loserth, 1907.

1378) and had 'thanked God for providing our mother church with a catholic head, an evangelical man.'[1] But the tactlessness of the new pope, the breaking out of the schism by the election at Fondi on 20th Sept. of the French pope, Clement VII., and the subsequent conduct of Urban drew Wyclif into a fierce antagonism, the more bitter because he acknowledged that Urban had been lawfully chosen. This antagonism became complete when on 6th Dec. 1382 Richard II. authorized Bishop Despenser[2] to proclaim a crusade on Urban's behalf against the antipope.[3] The later development of this crusade,[4] its disgraceful attack upon Dunkirk, its defeat at Ypres, and the return to England in Oct. 1383 of the discredited host infused into all Wyclif's later writings a deadly hatred to the papacy itself. At first he attempted to save his position by maintaining that 'our Urban' was innocent of this 'crime,' which was really the work of the friars.[5] But, when this argument was cut away by Urban's deeds, he averred that the cardinals had no right to choose a man who acted contrary to God's will.[6] All his theories were wrecked by the spectacle of two popes each claiming to be the sole head of the Church, each labelling the other as antichrist 'like dogs quarrelling for a bone,' 'like crows resting on their carrion,'[7] each seeking to bring about a general Armageddon for the destruction of his rival. The writings of his last years, especially in 1383, are full of this theme.

Wyclif's break with the papacy might have been passed over as an extreme form of the Gallicanism of the age which culminated in the Council of Constance. But his anti-papalism developed side by side with his attack upon the central doctrine of the mediæval Church, transubstantiation. Wyclif's attack flung Oxford into an uproar, and the new chancellor, William de Berton,[8] in the autumn of 1379 or early in 1380,[9] called a council of twelve doctors, of whom six were friars, to consider Wyclif's heresies. Their verdict, published late in 1380, was a foregone conclusion.[10] It was read unexpectedly in Wyclif's presence while he was sitting in the schools of the Augustinians and 'determining the contrary.' On hearing the condemnation Wyclif was 'confused,' but he recovered himself sufficiently to say that 'neither the chancellor nor any of his accomplices could alter his convictions.'[11] He might have appealed to the Congregation of Regent Masters and from their decision to the Great Congregation of the University;[12] characteristically he appealed instead to the king. John of Gaunt hurried down and urged him to be silent.[13] Wyclif refused. He had done with his entanglement in the Lancastrian alliance, and on 10th May 1381 published a Latin defence of his views called the *Confessio*.[14] This was followed at Oxford by a series of determinations against him, three of which have come down to us.[1]

After the publication of his *Confessio* Wyclif left Oxford for ever, and retired to Lutterworth. To those last months at Oxford must be assigned the familiar tale of his illness and of his declaring to certain friars who came to counsel him: 'I shall not die, but I shall live and declare the works of the Lord.'[2] To this period also we assign the commencement by Wyclif and his assistants of his translation of the Bible, and the full organization of his Poor Priests, who, however, had already been at work for some years.[3] The Poor Priests were not laymen, as is so often assumed, but 'unauthorised preachers,' *i.e.* without a bishop's licence, who moved from place to place, carrying Wyclif's tracts and sermons with them. Clad in russet robes of undressed wool, without sandals, purse, or scrip, for a few years they became a power in the land until crushed out by the legislation of Archbishop Arundel and Henry V.

Meanwhile at Oxford on 30th May 1381 Berton was turned out of the chancellorship, and Robert Rigg[4] took his place. Rigg allowed full liberty to teach the condemned doctrines, and during the winter of 1381–82 feeling ran high. The flames were fanned by the Peasant Insurrection of the summer of 1381. Both parties sought to fasten upon the other the opprobrium of this revolt. The regulars accused Wyclif and brought forward alleged confessions of John Ball.[5] Nicholas of Hereford[6] and the Lollards retorted by accusing the friars. On 18th Feb. 1382 the friars appealed to John of Gaunt through Stephen Patrington.[7] As the duke returned no answer, the friars appealed to Courtenay. On 7th May 1382, when parliament assembled,[8] Wyclif laid before it a memorial. He claimed that England should obey no prelate unless such obedience agreed with Christ's law, that money should not be sent to Rome unless it could be proved from Scripture to be due, that the Commonwealth 'should not be burdened with new tallages' until the endowments of the clergy be exhausted, that the king should employ neither 'bishop nor curate' in secular business, that the temporalities of any bishop 'living notoriously in contempt of God' should be confiscated, and that no one should be excommunicated until it is proved that the sentence is according to 'God's law.'[9]

Along with this formal petition Wyclif prepared an English *Complaint*, which has come down to us in an incomplete form.[10] In this *Complaint* he deals with four only of the seven matters of his petition, but includes the request that 'Christ's

[1] *De Eccl.* p. 37. [2] *DNB* xiv. 416.

[3] Rymer, iv. 157; Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 201–203; Wyclif, *Polem. Works*, 2 vols., London, 1883, ii. 660.

[4] There is a sketch in English by G. M. Wrong, *The Crusade of 1383*, London, 1892; for the Flemish account see J. Meyer, *Commentarii sive Annales rerum Flandricarum*, Antwerp, 1561, p. 193 f.

[5] *Polem. Works*, ii. 574, 593. [6] *Ib.* ii. 613.

[7] *Ib.* ii. 591. [8] *DNB* iv. 411.

[9] The date of Wyclif's attack is usually placed later (Matthew, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* v. 328–330, in the summer of 1380, and most writers later still), following *FZ*, p. 104. The date will depend upon that of the Council of Twelve, usually placed (*e.g.*, *DNB* ix. 229) as early in 1382. But this date is too late (see *DNB* iv. 412). Berton was chancellor from 1379 to 1381 (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* v. 329), and the council must have been held within these limits and before the publication of Wyclif's *Confessio*. According to a note on the MS of *FZ*, p. 115, this was published on 10th May 1381.

[10] *FZ*, pp. 110–113. [11] *Ib.* p. 113.

[12] *Munimenta Academica Oxon.*, in Rolls Series, 2 vols., London, 1868, i. 231.

[13] Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 171; *FZ*, p. 114.

[14] In *FZ*, pp. 115–132. There is a brief English abstract in *Select English Works of Wyclif*, ed. T. Arnold, Oxford, 1869–71, iii. 500, which Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 157, avers was by Wyclif, put in by him as a disavowal at the Blackfriars Synod (see below).

[1] *FZ*, pp. 133–241. [2] Foxe, *AM* iii. 20.

[3] The Poor Priests undoubtedly preceded the Peasants' Rising, in the organization of which they were accused of playing a part. See T. Wright, *Political Poems*, in Rolls Series, 2 vols., London, 1859–61, ii. 23–56; *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 124 f.; *Eulog. Hist.* iii. 351; Matthew, *EWW*, p. 444; Walsingham, i. 324.

[4] *DNB* i. 53.

[5] *FZ*, p. 273 f.; repeated in J. Stow, *Annales*, London, 1615, p. 294. For Ball see *DNB* iii. 73.

[6] *DNB* xl. 418.

[7] *FZ*, pp. 292–295; for Patrington see *DNB* xliv. 47; J. H. Wylie, *The Reign of Henry the Fifth*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 236 f.

[8] *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 122.

[9] For this petition, which Wyclif called *Imprecationes*, see Wyclif, *de Blasphemia*, p. 270 f. It is also found in Walsingham, ii. 51 f. where no. 4 really forms the last clause of no. 3. Walsingham or his editor, H. T. Riley, mistakenly calls it *Interpretationes*. Lechler, *JW*, p. 405, following R. Vaughan, *John de Wycliffe*, London, 1853, p. 289, wrongly dates as presented after the Blackfriars Synod to the parliament which met 6th–26th Oct. (*Rotuli Parl.* iii. 132). There is no mention of the Petition in the records of parliament.

[10] Printed by T. James in 1608; also very imperfectly by Lewis, *JW*, p. 83 f., and with rectification of the order of the text by Arnold, *SEW* iii. 507–523.

teaching concerning the Eucharist, that this sacrament is very bread and also very Christ's body,' 'may be taught only in churches.'

To these attacks the new archbishop, William Courtenay, replied by summoning a committee to meet on 17th May in the Blackfriars. Nine bishops, sixteen doctors of theology, eleven doctors of laws, seven bachelors of theology, and two bachelors of laws were selected by Courtenay.[1] Of the sixteen doctors of theology all but one, and he a monk, were friars, several of them noted opponents of Wyclif.[2] Wyclif himself was not summoned to appear,[3] nor was his name mentioned. Twenty-four conclusions from his writings were produced which were deemed 'heretical' or 'erroneous.'[4]

On Wednesday 21st May the Committee met again. Between two and three in the afternoon a terrific earthquake shook the city. Courtenay pointed out that it was the effort of the earth to purge itself, 'though not without violence,' of heresy. Courtenay's happy interpretation saved the Committee, and Wyclif found it necessary to publish an interpretation in an opposite sense. 'The earth-din,' he maintained, was the outcry of the world against the heretic prelates and friars.[5] Henceforth Wyclif always called it in contempt 'the Earthquake council,'[6] so much so that Netter complained that Wyclif treated the earthquake as a miracle wrought for his benefit.[7]

On the day after the Earthquake Synod Courtenay persuaded Richard to admit into the final statute of parliament a chapter ordering sheriffs, upon certification from the bishops, to arrest and imprison all itinerant preachers. The ordinance had never received the consent of the Commons.[8] This was followed on 26th June by letters patent from Richard directed against the itinerant preachers.[9] When parliament reassembled on 6th Oct., protest was at once made against the pretended statute,[10] but to no avail, for in after years it was treated as still valid.[11] Action more constitutional was taken by Courtenay when on 30th May, a week after the Blackfriars Synod, he forwarded a mandate to the bishops bidding them publish Wyclif's condemnation 'with all possible speed.'[12]

5. Last years.—After the Blackfriars Synod Wyclif took no further public part in controversy at Oxford. On 30th July 1382 his followers, Nicholas of Hereford and Repingdon,[13] were excommunicated, but Wyclif's name was not inserted.[14] Possibly he owed his immunity to John of Gaunt. The idea that Wyclif, when summoned in Nov. 1382 before a Synod at Oxford, made a recantation[15] may be dismissed. In the minutes of the Synod[16] there is no such record. The whole story rests upon a blunder of Knighton,[1] who has confused an uncompromising defence by Wyclif of his views[2] with a recantation.

Nothing in fact more emphatically marks the hold that Wyclif still had upon the nation than the reluctance of Courtenay to push matters to the extreme. Wyclif was left to close his days in peace at Lutterworth. In the autumn of 1382 he was stricken with paralysis[3] and thereafter was largely dependent on his curates, John Horn and Purvey. But his pen was never more prolific than in these latter days. He published polemic after polemic, as well as finishing the *Summa* of his doctrines in thirteen volumes. With tireless energy he repeated all his old attacks, dwelling especially on the need of disendowment—this he carried to the extreme of demanding even the confiscation of the revenues of Oxford colleges[4]—holding up to ridicule the misdeeds of the friars and the unapostolic character of the papacy, and defending at length his views of the Eucharist, to the need of which sacrament he attached less importance than formerly.[5] In matters of Church organization he became completely critical and destructive. He seems to have been occupied with many works at once, dictating the main lines of thought and leaving to his disciples the necessary copying of material, a method which led to repetition and frequent inconsistency. In two of his *Sermons* on the same Gospel we have a totally different translation.[6] Several of his works, including the important *Trialogus* and his *Opus Evangelicum*, were still unfinished when the end came.

Wyclif's English writings form one of the special features of these last years. Abandoning Oxford and the appeal to the Schoolmen, he became a popular pamphleteer, trusting to his Poor Preachers to scatter the tracts broadcast. To this period also we must ascribe the publication of his English *Sermons*. Wyclif's last works are also marked by an extreme bitterness of tone, especially in his attacks against the friars.[7] To this he was aroused by the part they had taken in 1383 in Bishop Despenser's blundering crusade in Flanders, and by their attacks upon his Poor Preachers. Despenser's crusade also completed the break between Wyclif and the papacy. No words became too strong with which to express his detestation of the whole institution.

There are grounds for believing that the friars in their anger appealed to Rome and that Urban replied by citing Wyclif to appear before his court. All we know, however, is deduction from a reply or letter of excuse which Wyclif addressed to Urban VI., in reality a keenly ironical statement of his attitude towards the papacy. He excuses himself from obeying 'this unskilful summoning' because of his physical infirmities, for the 'king of kings has willed it that he should not go.' The reference is to a stroke of paralysis from which he suffered 'for two years before his death.'[8]

The account of Wyclif's death has been handed down by John Horn, his curate at Lutterworth after his stroke. In 1441 Horn gave his evidence to Dr. Thomas Gascoigne. He stated on oath that on 28th Dec. 1384 'as Wyclif was hearing mass

1 Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 157.

2 Lists in *FZ*, pp. 286–288, and less completely in *FZ*, p. 498; also in Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 158. In all lists the names are inaccurate.

3 Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 157, is an error.

4 No direct record of this committee has come down to us. But we have copies of its conclusions in Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 157 *f.*, carefully copied into the *Register of Wykeham*, ed. T. F. Kirby, 2 vols., London, 1896, 1899, ii. 338–342; also in *FZ*, pp. 277–282; Walsingham, ii. 58 *f.*; Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 158 *f.*

5 Arnold, *SEW* iii. 503; Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 162; cf. Wyclif, *Trialogus*, p. 376.

6 *Trial.* p. 374, *Sermones*, iii. 292, 370, and *passim*.

7 *Doctrinale*, iii. 770.

8 For this see *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 124 *f.*, *Statutes of the Realm*, Record Com. ed. ii. 25, carefully entered into *Reg. Wykeham*, ii. 343.

9 *Cal. Pat. Ric. II.*, ii. 150; Wilkins, iii. 156, wrongly dated as 12th July; *Register of Thomas de Brantyngham*, ed. F. C. Hingeston-Randolph, London, 1901, i. 466 *f.*

10 *Rotuli Parl.* iii. 141.

11 *Statutes*, iii. 454, iv. 244.

12 Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 157 *f.*

13 *DNB* xlviii. 26.

14 Wilkins, iii. 167–168.

15 A. Wood, *Hist. and Antiquities of the University of Oxford*, ed. J. Gutch, 2 vols., Oxford, 1792, i. 500.

16 Wilkins, iii. 172.

1 *Chron.* ii. 156–158, 160–162.

2 Printed also in *SEW* iii. 502–503; very imperfectly in Lewis, *JW*, p. 87.

3 Lewis, *JW*, p. 286.

4 *Polem. Works*, i. 271 *f.*; cf. *Serm.* ii. 18.

5 *Polem. Works*, ii. 620; cf. i. 257.

6 *SEW* i. 235, ii. 393; a proof, probably, that the translation was by his followers.

7 See especially his *Polem. Works*.

8 For this incident see *Polem. Works*, ii. 556; *Op. Minora*, p. 159; *Op. Evang.* i. 2[1], 434; *FZ*, p. 341 *f.* The letter is also printed by J. Loserth, in *Op. Minora*, London, 1913, p. 1, who dates it 1378, for reasons that do not convince.

in his church at the time of the elevation of the host he fell down, smitten by a severe paralysis especially in the tongue so that neither then nor afterwards could he speak to the moment of his death.'[1] Three days later, Saturday, 31st Dec. 1384, he passed away.[2]

On 4th May 1415 the Council of Constance, acting on the request of an English Synod under Arundel held in the early spring of 1411,[3] condemned 260 propositions in Wyclif's writings and ordered 'his bones to be dug up and cast out of the consecrated ground, provided they could be identified from those of Christians buried near.'[4] After some years of delay the decree was carried out by the ex-Lollard Richard Fleming, bishop of Lincoln,[5] acting on the peremptory orders of Martin V. (9th Dec. 1427).[6] On 16th Dec. letters were sent by Martin V. to various mayors to assist.[7] So shortly after 25th March 1428 'his vile corpse they consigned to hell and the river (Swift) absorbed his ashes.'[8]

II. *TEACHING AND WRITINGS.* — **1. Philosophical.**—Wyclif's philosophical writings were written in his earlier Oxford career, when he was the 'flower of Oxford' Scholasticism. At a later date they were collected into a *Summa*. Some of the works have come down to us—*e.g.*, *de Compositione Hominis*—rather as notes for lectures or disputations than as mature treatises. All his works abound in quotations, often vague and inaccurate, from the accepted authorities of his day, including the great Arabians.

Judged as a Schoolman, Wyclif belonged to the moderate realists. He had learned much from the criticisms of Ockham,[9] of whom he speaks with respect. But the Platonism to which he leaned he had derived from St. Augustine, though in his method he bowed, as did all Schoolmen, to the authority of Aristotle. To Wyclif nominalism in any form was an impossible creed. He held that names stand for realities.[10] He therefore held, as his many writings on the subject show, that the most important question in metaphysics was that of universals.[11] As with all realists, Wyclif was at times in danger of pantheism. When he states that body and soul are united eternally, it is because he considers man as *materia prima*, 'in consequence created in the beginning of the world,' whose individuality therefore as distinct from the common 'form' of humanity becomes unreal and phenomenal, or at any rate hard to explain.[12]

2. Political and social.—(*a*) *His theory of 'dominion.'*—Shortly after his return from Bruges Wyclif commenced the expansion of his *Determinatio* into two large treatises, the *de Dominio Divino*—which work was intended to serve as an introduction to the *Summa*—and the *de Civili Dominio*. In both we note the influence upon Wyclif of Richard Fitzralph, archbishop of Armagh.[13] Wyclif 'has added no essential element to the doctrine which he read in the work of his predecessor.'[1] Wyclif commences his *de Dominio Divino* with a distinction between 'lordship' and 'use,' in which he followed, through Fitzralph, the views of William Ockham, and the Spiritual Franciscans to whom the distinction had been fundamental in their struggle with John XXII. 'Lordship' is the prerogative of God and is never separated from possession. The possession of the creature is always held subject to due service to the lord in chief; it is but the possession of a steward. Thus Wyclif works out by use of feudal ideas the same belief in the duties of property which modern reformers attempt to reach by other means. From this fundamental position it is an easy transition to the corollary that dominion is founded on grace and that mortal sin is a breach of tenure and so 'incurs forfeiture.'[2]

Wyclif's doctrine would have led to anarchical consequences, as indeed was pointed out to Hus at Constance,[3] had it not been for Wyclif's careful distinction between 'dominion,' which belongs to the righteous man alone, and power, which the wicked may have by God's permission. From this main thesis 'that every righteous man is lord over the whole sensible world' it was an easy step to Wyclif's doctrine of communism.[4] But Wyclif always insists that the righteous must in nowise attempt to acquire their inalienable rights by force. He had yet to learn, through the Peasants' Revolt, that a smouldering fire and a powder magazine are dangerous neighbours. When the blaze came, he was, in consequence, charged with being responsible. The charge was unjust; the two movements were coincident.[5] The confessions of John Ball were fictitious; nevertheless the Peasants' Revolt (1381) was but the rude translation into the world of practice of a theory of 'dominion' that destroyed the 'lordship' of the wicked. 'It is to Wyclif's credit that, when the Peasants were defeated, he dared to own his sympathy with their wrongs and to put in a plea for mercy.'[6] But sorrow for the woes of the poor runs through all his English writings like a wail of love and redeems his fiercest denunciations, his most impossible dreams. 'Poor men,' he cries, 'have naked sides, and dead walls have great plenty of waste gold.'[7]

(*b*) *Church and State.*—His theory of 'dominion' drew Wyclif into an examination of the limits of obedience[8] and of the prerogatives and duties of the kingly office in his *de Officio Regis*, in reality his most complete treatise on the relations of Church and State. The dignity of the king, he held, was derived immediately from God. The king represents the glorified and therefore ruling Christ, the priest the suffering and submissive Christ; the king represents the will, the priest the love of God.[9] As God's vicar the king has supremacy over the clergy.[10] Episcopal jurisdiction is derived from the king,[11] and the king may inquire into all sins[12] and must withdraw temporalities from those in sin—a duty which Wyclif soon widens into that of general disendowment. By His obedience to Pilate Christ has shown that even tyrants must be obeyed.[13] Henry VIII. could have asked no more thoroughgoing defence of Erastianism or of the divine right of kings against

[1] Leland, *Collect.* ii. 409. In Lewis, *JW*, p. 286, there is a slightly different version from *Cotton MSS* A. 14, said to be in Gascoigne's own handwriting.

[2] The date is given in Walsingham, ii. 119, and in Gascoigne, *Loci e libro veritatum* (ed. J. E. T. Rogers, Oxford, 1881), p. 116, as also in the official statement in the Lincoln registers recording the institution of his successor, John Morhouse, on 25th Jan. 1385 (H. J. Wilkins, *Chapters in the Ecclesiastical History of Westbury on Trim*, Bristol, 1909, p. 81).

[3] Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 350.

[4] H. von der Hardt, *Magnum œcumenicum Constantiense concilium*, iv. 149–157; F. Palacky, *Documenta J. Hus vitam, doctrinam, etc., illustrantia*, Prague, 1869, p. 569.

[5] *DNB* xix. 282.

[6] O. Raynaldus, *Annales*, ed. J. D. Mansi, Lucca, 1752, vol. xxviii. ann. 1427, § 14.

[7] *Cal. Pap. Letters*, vii. 23.

[8] Netter, *Doctrinale*, iii. 830; and for the date J. Bale, *Script. illust. Maj. Bryt. Catalogus*, i. 456.

[9] *DNB* xii. 357. [10] Cf. *de Apost.* pp. 136, 141, 142.

[11] Treated fully in *Miscell. Philosoph.* ii.

[12] *De Comp. Hom.* pp. 19 f., 33, 35.

[13] *DNB* xix. 194.

[1] R. L. Poole, in *de Dom. Div.* p. xlviii.

[2] *De Civ. Dom.* i. chs. 1–6.

[3] Palacky, *Doc.* p. 299. [4] *De Civ. Dom.* i. chs. 7, 14.

[5] So admitted in *Chron. Ang.* pp. 310–312.

[6] *EWW*, p. 233 f.; *de Blasphemia*, pp. 188–208.

[7] *SEW* iii. 170; *EWW*, p. 91.

[8] *De Civ. Dom.* i. ch. 28.

[9] *EWW*, p. 362; cf. *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xix. [1904] 333.

[10] *De Off. Reg.* p. 66 f.; cf. *de Eccl.* p. 322; *SEW* ii. 88.

[11] *De Off. Reg.* ch. 6. [12] *Ib.* p. 119.

[13] This is the origin of Wyclif's famous fatal contention that 'God must obey the devil,' Walsingham, pp. 52, 58.

Church and pope than this treatise, with its claim that it is lawful to pull down a church to build a (military) town, or to melt chalices to pay for soldiers.[1]

3. **Theological.**—(*a*) *Doctrine of the Church.*—Wyclif's realism lay at the root of all his views of the Church and its sacraments. It led him to warn his hearers against the nominalist heresy that there was no Church before the incarnation of Christ.[2] It drew him into an extreme determinism. Above all it brought him into collision with the prevailing nominalist heresies concerning the Sacrament. For the nominalist, who held that the universal name was but a mere *flatus vocis*, found it easy to believe in the Scotist doctrine of the annihilation of the substance of the elements. To Wyclif such an idea was an absurdity; his whole philosophical system fell to the ground with its mere possibility. If in one case accidents can exist without substance, why postulate substance at all?[3] Hence his realism is a protest against any doctrine of illusion. So, in the interpretation of his ideas, we must remember that, when Wyclif speaks, as he sometimes does, of the host as a 'sign,'[4] he does not use the word in any Zwinglian sense. With him every figure is a reality, with its own real though ideal existence, while every real is also of necessity universal. To this philosophic basis we may also attribute Wyclif's complete repudiation of the nihilianism as to the humanity of Jesus which through Peter Lombard's *Sentences* had infected the mediæval Church. He identifies Christ, especially in his early scholastic treatise, *de Benedicta Incarnatione*, with the *communis homo*, or universal man, who is identical with all His brethren.

Wyclif's views on the Church are best studied in his *de Ecclesia*, written about Easter 1378.[5] The key to the whole is his rigid predestinarianism, in which he shows the influence upon himself of Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine's *de Causa Dei*.[6] Like Bradwardine, he bases everything upon the all-conditioning absolute will of God. The Church Militant he defines as the whole number of the elect, containing 'only men that shall be saved,' and who cannot as predestinate cease to be such even by mortal sin, for theirs is the grace of final perseverance.[7] He adds that no man, not even a pope, 'wots whether he be of the church or whether he be a limb of the fiend,'[8] nor will he allow that 'the church can ever be called the whole body (*universitas*) of faithful travellers.' In this narrower view Wyclif shows a marked contrast to Marsiglio. He refuses therefore to allow that 'Christ is the head of all men, both of the faithful and unfaithful,' but claims that this is restricted to the predestinate.[9] Nevertheless he guards his doctrine from some of its dangers by his warning that, 'as each man shall hope that he is safe in bliss, so he should suppose that he be a limb of holy Church.'[10]

From this basis of the Church certain conclusions followed. The pope is not necessarily the head of the Church, for it is not certain that he is a member of it. His position is therefore determined not by his institutional status but by his conformity with the tests of the predestinate, especially harmony with the teachings of the Bible.[1] Much also of the Catholic system as then believed was swept away as needless for the predestinate and useless for the foreknown—*e.g.*, prayers for the dead, the cult of saints, absolution—nor is he clear as to the value of the priesthood, the sacraments, or even of prayer which 'standeth in good life' and 'holy desire to do God's will.'[2] We may note that Wyclif's theory of spiritual values grounded in worthiness, resting on the absolute Divine Will, was logically one with his theory of dominion grounded on grace, and led to a sweeping doctrine of disendowment.

(*b*) *Doctrine of the Eucharist.*[3]—In the mediæval theory of the Eucharist there was at consecration a twofold movement: the cessation of the bread and the creation of the Body. Wyclif's difficulties lay with the former of these. It was acknowledged that as regards the cessation of the bread the movement was not complete, for it did not extend to the accidents. The *noumenon* was changed, but the *phenomena* remained. Explanations of this mystery varied. Thomas Aquinas answered the question by his conception of *quantitas*—or, as we should now term it, 'subsistence' as distinct from 'substance.' 'Quantity' is not extension or a mere abstraction or a mere mode of being. It may be defined as the force which makes extension, *vis extensiva materiæ*. At the words of consecration 'quantity' takes the place of the substance of the bread and upholds the accidents, and therefore whatever the bread can do, even to feeding the body, is performed by the 'quantity' that remains.

The same question was answered by Duns Scotus, following Ægidius Romanus,[4] by his doctrine of absolute accidents, maintained, on the annihilation of the substance, by the unconditioned will of God. The Eucharist is thus the cons ant repetition of a stupendous miracle. To Wyclif as a realist the annihilation of anything was inconceivable.[5] At first he fell back in his defence of the Real Presence upon the Thomist idea of 'quantity,' then prevalent in Oxford, though he subjected it later to considerable criticism.

It is not possible out of Wyclif's later writings to deduce a consistent system. Of the Real Presence he had no doubt, and looked upon its denial as a renewal of the heresy of Berengarius,[6] but he lost himself in trying to explain his position. He was driven by his nominalist opponents from position to position until he put forth a theory practically identical with consubstantiation, full of hair-splitting distinctions. He regarded as

1 *De Off. Reg.* p. 185; cf. *de Eccl.* p. 876 *f.*
2 *De Eccl.* chs. 17, 18, also p. 123 *f.*
3 *De Euch.* p. 69 *f.*
4 *Ib.* p. 16, *de Apost.* p. 223.
5 Wyclif published in 1383 a compressed version which he called *de Fide Catholica* in *Op. Minora*, p. 98 *f.* This was widely disseminated in Bohemia.
6 For Bradwardine, who is not mentioned by Ueberweg, see *DNB* vi. 188, and the preface by H. Savile in his ed. of T. Bradwardine's *de Causa Dei*, London, 1618. Wyclif differed considerably from Bradwardine in his definition of free will (*de Ente*, p. 152 ff.).
7 *SEW* iii. 447; *de Eccl.* pp. 74, 111, 140.
8 *De Eccl.* pp. 3, 5, 29, 130, 464; cf. *SEW* iii. 339.
9 *De Eccl.* p. 57 *f.*; cf. *SEW* iii. 395; *EWW*, p. 198.
10 *EWW*, p. 350.

1 *De Eccl.* pp. 34, 88; *de Apost.* p. 200; *SEW* iii. 505.
2 *EWW*, pp. 76, 274; *SEW* iii. 219, 425.
3 Wyclif's earlier views are best summed up in *FZ*, pp. 104–109, 115–132. The last is of special importance, and should be studied by all. His later and larger Latin works add little but expansion and repetition to the above, and may be passed by save by the specialist. But the reader should not neglect Loserth's Introduction to the *de Eucharistia*, London, 1892, or M. H. Dziewicki's Introduction to the *de Apostasia*, do. 1889. (Of the body of the *de Apost.* chs. xv. and xvi. are the most valuable; of the *de Euch.* pp. 15, 16, 18, 53, 83, 84, 85, 90, 93, 99, 111, 113, 123.) Cf. also Dziewicki's Introduction, *de Simonia*, London, 1898, xvi–xxi. His views in English are best summed up in *SEW* iii. 426, 403–410, 502. This last is practically identical with the *Wycket*, which, if written by Wyclif, represents a very late phase, almost Zwinglian in outlook. The present writer inclines to ascribe it to his followers. For other important passages of Wyclif dealing with the Eucharist, see *EWW*, p. 465, *SEW* ii. 358, 386, 404, iii. 484, 500, *de Blas.* 26–80, 287, *Trial.* iv. 247–255, *Serm.* ii. 453 *f.*, 458 *f.*, 461–463. For the relation of Wyclif's doctrines of space and time to his doctrine of transubstantiation see M. H. Dziewicki, *Johannis Wyclif Tractatus de Logica*, London, 1893–96, iii. Introd. vii–viii. The withholding of the cup from the laity, which played so important a part in Bohemia, did not trouble Wyclif.
4 *Theoremata de Corpore Christi*, Venice, 1502, prop. v. 38 *f.*
5 *De Ente*, p. 288 *f.* 6 *De Apost.* p. 79.

beyond question 'that Christ lies hidden in the elements,' that we can 'see' Him there 'by faith,' and receive Him in the host as the sun's fire is received through a sphere of crystal, and that Christ is in every part of the host, as when you break a glass and in every part 'thou mayest see thy face, and thy face not parted' or 'as a man may light many candles at one candle.' But the words of consecration 'make the occasion only' of Christ's presence, who is there 'not identically according to substance,' but 'really and truly according to His whole humanity.' On the logical side Wyclif never wearied of pouring scorn upon the idea of 'accidents without subject.' Such a doctrine seemed to him to strike at the root of all being, including that of the saints, and by throwing a doubt on the testimony of our senses to discredit all science.[1] Unfortunately in his abhorrence of all Scotist annihilations he used language that easily became twisted, especially by his more ignorant followers. That which is not or which is mere phantasm is necessarily less perfect than that which is, especially that which has life. Hence the unfortunate comparisons of the host to 'rat's bread,' 'spiders,' and the like,[2] especially by the later Lollards—*e.g.*, John Badby.

Along with this main position Wyclif advocated other doctrines that seemed to him corollaries. In his earlier years he insisted on the sacramental function of the priest,[3] though regarding it as inferior to the duty of preaching, in Wyclif's view the highest duty of all clerics.[4] In his later developments he allowed that under certain circumstances the Eucharist might be consecrated even by a layman.[5] Nor did he always make clear even to himself the relation of sacramental grace to character and to foreknowledge. At one time he maintained that the foreknown even when in actual sin can administer the sacrament with profit to the faithful, though to his own damnation; Christ supplying all the defects of the priest;[6] but later that the value depended on the character of the priest and the nature of his prayers—in a word, on the priest 'being consecrated by God.'[7] But he is careful to redeem this last conclusion from perilous uncertainty by pointing out that the sanctity, which comes from Christ's presence, is always the same.[8]

4. Wyclif and the Bible.[9]—Even in his earlier days Wyclif, following Ockham, appealed to the Bible as the primary, unconditional, and absolute authority, of universal range and entire sufficiency. He differed from Ockham in distinguishing between the Bible and the teaching of the Church, which Ockham had regarded as in harmony. He further asserted the right of every man to examine the Bible for himself. This was a corollary from his theory of 'dominion.' Every man was God's tenant in chief holding direct under 'God's law,' Wyclif's usual title for the Scriptures. He had a right therefore to know on what conditions he held. Nor would he allow that the tradition of the Church is the standard of interpretation. He sweeps away therefore the whole mass of tradition, doctrine, and ordinance, whether papal or conciliar, which had claimed to be of equal or superior value to Scripture. Nor has he any place for a doctrine of development.

Wyclif's appeal to the Scriptures was followed by the translation under his inspiration of the whole Bible from the Vulgate into English.[1] The first form of this translation would seem to have been a translation of the Sunday Gospels, still extant in his English *Sermons*. Independently of this his followers brought out a version of the whole Bible. The exact share that Wyclif took is uncertain, and probably was slight. But the fact of this translation is beyond doubt, though recent research has shown that the so-called Wyclif version, the first of the complete Bible, had been preceded by other partial versions. Translation of the Bible was in the air. Wyclif's first version, a large part in whose production was taken by Nicholas of Hereford, was very unsatisfactory—a verbal, almost gloss-like, rendering into a midland dialect, without clearness of expression or idiomatic use of language. Accordingly before 1388 the revision of Wyclif's version was begun by John Purvey, Wyclif's secretary at Lutterworth, who smoothed out the harsh literalness of the original, changed its dialect to the uninflected type common at that time at Oxford, and contributed, about 1395, a notable General Prologue.[2] The two versions of Wyclif and Purvey have often been confused, and the influence of Wyclif's translation upon the development of the English language has been exaggerated. In later years the existence of Wyclif's version became almost forgotten, and its authorship unknown, though the translation of Purvey's version into Scots by Murdoch Nisbet, about 1520, proves the latter's continued influence.[3]

III. *INFLUENCE*.—**1. In England.**—During his lifetime Wyclif's influence passed through marked changes. At Oxford there was a time when he was acknowledged by his enemies to be supreme,[4] and in 1378 he bade fair to lead the nation in his own direction. But after that year, with the promulgation of his doctrine of the Eucharist, his influence rapidly waned both at Oxford and in the nation at large. Men woke up to find whither he was leading them, while the growing violence of his views estranged his more moderate adherents. Moreover, his influence was local rather than national. South of the Thames and north of the Trent it scarcely existed. Scholasticism also proved fatal to him. His prestige as a Schoolman, which first secured him a hearing and gave weight to the movement he started in Bohemia, ultimately reacted against the success of his reforms. When driven out of Oxford, he found no suitable environment for the spread of his ideas, and his intellectual type of piety lacked that

1 *De Euch.* pp. 78, 124, 132, 195.
2 *De Apost.* pp. 172, 205.
3 *De Euch.* p. 99, *de Eccl.* p. 457 *f.*
4 *SEW* i. 288, iii. 143; *EWW*, pp. 111, 189, 441; *Serm.* iv. 47; *Polem. Works*, i. 261.
5 *Trial.* p. 280.
6 *De Eccl.* pp. 448, 456 *f.*
7 *De Euch.* p. 113; *SEW* iii. 426. But in *SEW* iii. 227 the opposite is held.
8 *De Euch.* p. 114.
9 Wyclif's views on the authority of the Bible can be briefly studied in his *de Veritate Sacræ Scripturæ*, 3 vols., ed. R. Buddensieg, London, 1905, *Op. Evang.* i. 79, 308, *Trial.* p. 64, or, in English, *SEW* i. 225, ii. 343, iii. 186, 362.

1 The older views on Wyclif's version are set forth in Forshall and Madden's great ed. (1850) of Wyclif and Purvey's versions. For recent research on the partial versions of R. Rolle of Hampole and others see *Camb. Hist. Eng. Lit.*, Cambridge, 1908–16, ii. 43–48; A. C. Paues, *Fourteenth-Century English Version*, Cambridge, 1902; a less valuable reprint in 1904; H. R. Bramley, *Rolle's Psalter*, Oxford, 1884; M. J. Powell, *The Pauline Epistles contained in MS Parker 32* (E.E.T.S.), London, 1917, and, above all, M. Deanesly, *The Lollard Bible and other Medieval Biblical Versions*, Cambridge, 1920. Cardinal Gasquet's scepticism (*The Old English Bible*, London, 1897) has been answered by F. Matthew, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* x. 91–99, *Church Quart. Review*, li. [1900–1901] 188, 265, and Miss Deanesly. For early references to Wyclif's version see Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 152; Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 350, 498; Lyndwood, *Provinciale*, ed., Oxford, 1679, p. 286; and *Hist. et Monumenta J. Hus*, Nuremberg, 1558, i. 108. Gasquet's scepticism originated with Sir T. More, *Dialogus* (*Works*, London, 1557), i. 238, 241.

2 Deanesly, p. 275 *f.*; and for the proofs of Purvey's authorship, *ib.* pp. 260–267, 376 f. Gasquet's arguments were founded on failure to note the Lollardy of this General Prologue.

3 *The New Testament in Scots*, ed. T. G. Law, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1901.

4 Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 151; *Eulog. Hist.* iii. 345: 'flos Oxoniæ.'

personal magnetism which might have drawn the people to him.

To the end of his life Wyclif 'stammered out many things which he was unable clearly to make good.' He wanders about in worlds not realized. Like other men who have ventured on the great task of forming a scheme of religion for themselves, Wyclif often is and must be inconsistent. All attempts to hammer out of his writings a symmetrical body of doctrine must fail because they ignore the successive, contradictory stages of his own development.

Considered as a statesman, Wyclif was unfortunate in that there was no deep national movement with which he could ally himself. If he could have had in England the same conditions as in Bohemia, his success might have been equal. But in England the national movement lost itself in the follies of the Hundred Years War with France, and Wyclif mistook the selfish John of Gaunt for a leader. If in this Wyclif showed an unfortunate opportunism, at other times he lost much by mental detachment. In his idealism he even regarded the loss of Oxford with indifference, fatal though it proved to his cause. Like most Schoolmen, he trusted too much in his logic, and allowed it to lead him too far. We see this in his proposal to include the universities in his scheme of disendowment, and in his advocacy of a system of voluntaryism which would have reduced the clergy to beggars, to the level, in fact, of the mendicant friars whom in his last years he ceaselessly denounced, but with the spirit of whose founder he was always in more sympathy than he knew. Another illustration will be found in his demand that the life of the priests should be purely spiritual. He wished to narrow down their studies at the university to theology merely; 'the lore that Christ taught us is enough for this life; other lore,' even mathematical studies, should be 'suspended.'[1] Thus Wyclif destroyed his influence among the educated and reduced his movement to an illiterate sect[2] which in the hundred years after his death slowly lost balance and influence, though surviving, in spite of persecution, to the dawn of the Reformation. Nor did he know how to gain the reform that lay next to hand by keeping back ideas not immediately practicable. He failed also to see the injury he did his cause by mixing himself up with doubtful transactions, as in the affair of Shakyl and Haulay. He allowed his hatred of the false to get the better of his judgment, while by the violence of his language he estranged many. But the vehemence of his temper was not without its advantages. A calmer spirit would have counted the cost or awaited the future; Wyclif, who felt deeply the needs of the present, placed himself at the head of a forlorn hope.

We believe that the failure of Wyclif's premature reformation was, on the whole, for the good of the Church. His conception of the Church was too Erastian, his claim for the royal supremacy too absolute, and would have made the Church a mere department of the State. The unscrupulous pillage of the Church by Henry VIII. and Edward VI. was but slight compared with the disaster that would have followed an immediate acceptance of Wyclif's schemes and theories.

Finally, Wyclif's revolt was too negative. He swept away rather than established, though in his assertion of the supreme authority of Scripture he laid the foundation upon which a later age should build. But his teaching, though containing the principles of the 16th cent. Protestants, lacked the definiteness of their theological reconstruction. He abolished existing forms of Church government without devising, like Calvin, any scheme that should take their place. As his crude views on the marriage of brothers and sisters show, he was an individualist without the social instinct.[1] Viewed as an evangelist, he lacks the consciousness of the reality of sin. His doctrine that sin is a negation, 'that it has no idea,' linked on Wyclif the realist with the philosophers and St. Augustine, but proved a poor substitute for conversion. He identifies knowing and being, and in consequence his theology is intellectual and ethical and, unlike St. Augustine's, lacks a sufficient foundation in grace.[2]

2. **In Bohemia.**—It was in Bohemia that Wyclif's influence was greatest and, if the Moravians be included, most abiding. The marriage of Anne, the sister of Wenzel, king of Bohemia, to Richard II. of England on 14th Jan. 1382 led to much Czech intercourse.[3] On 4th March 1388 Adalbert Ranco founded in his will scholarships at Oxford for Czech students.[4] By these students the philosophical works of Wyclif were introduced into Prague shortly after Wyclif's death. In 1401 Jerome of Prague brought back from Oxford Wyclif's *Dialogue* and *Trialogus* together with some lesser works,[5] and introduced the writings to Hus, who had previously known only the philosophical works, five of which, written out in his own hand in 1398, are now at Stockholm.[6] Under the influence of Hus the influence of Wyclif soon became a dominant force in Bohemia, and large sums were given for corrected copies of the works of the English doctor.[7] Hence often the only MSS of works of Wyclif are now in Prague or Vienna, whither they were carried after the Thirty Years War. Of Wyclif's *de Ecclesia*, for instance, only one small fragment is found in Dublin; the MS at Vienna was 'corrected' at Oxford on 1st Feb. 1407 by two Czechs, and the only other MS of any value is at Prague.[8] The Vienna MS of his *de Officio Regis* belonged to a Czech student who took his degree in 1395. Other illustrations of the intercourse between English Lollards and Bohemia are found in the correspondence between Sir John Oldcastle, the most prominent Lollard of the generation after Wyclif,[9] and the Czech leaders in 1410, and Hus and Richard Wyche.[10] Hus's dependence on Wyclif is very complete. His *de Ecclesia* is taken almost word for word from that of Wyclif—with the omission of the incident of Haulay and Shakyl. By a strange historical injustice the doctrine of the Plagiarist, because linked with a national consciousness, came to be regarded as almost the original, while Wyclif, from whom Hus had borrowed, receded into obscurity, especially after the failure of Oldcastle's rebellion. No doubt this may be explained by the troublous wars and crusades which the doctrines caused in Bohemia.[11]

[1] *Op. Minora*, pp. 324 f., 439 f.
[2] *SEW* ii. 71. iii. 122; cf. i. 225, 310, iii. 326.

[1] *Trial.* p. 318.
[2] *SEW* i. 21, iii. 183, 219; *de Ente*, p. 221 f.
[3] See the list of Czechs whom Richard II. on 1st May 1381, when the marriage was settled, 'retained to stay with him for life,' in *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ric. II.*, ii. 4; Rymer, iv. 110.
[4] J. Loserth, *Wiclif and Hus*, London, 1884, p. 41; Count Lützow, *Life and Times of Master John Hus*, London, 1909, p. 43 f.
[5] Von der Hardt, *Cons. Con.* iv. 634, 650–652; F. Palacky, *Die Verläufer des Hussenthums*, Leipzig, 1845, pp. 113–116 *Eng. Hist. Rev.* vii. 306–311.
[6] Wyclif, *Miscell. Phil.* i. Introd. p. 47 ff.
[7] Palacky, *Documenta*, p. 389.
[8] Wyclif, *de Eccl.* p. xvii; and Poole's note in *de Dom. Div* p. xii.
[9] For Oldcastle the only complete study is in Wylie, *The Reign of Henry V.*, i.
[10] *Eng. Hist. Rev.* v. 530–544; H. B. Workman, *Letters of John Hus*, London, 1904, pp. 32–38.
[11] For Hus and the Hussites, and the dependence on Wyclif, see *ERE* vi. 886 f. This dependence is often exaggerated. See Workman, *The Letters of Hus*, pref. p. ix, who points out that both Wyclif and Hus were alike copying from Gratian's *Decretum*.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *Contemporary records.* — The most important of these is the collection of documents bearing on Lollardism made by the famous Carmelite, Thomas Netter of Walden or possibly by Stephen Patrington (*FZ*, pref. p. lxxvi), with additions by Netter, about the year 1428. Of this work, entitled *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, the only existing MS, now in the Bodleian, bearing date 1439, was freely annotated by Bishop Bale, and from Bale was borrowed by Foxe. In 1858 it was published by W. Shirley in the Rolls Series. Another work by Netter of great value for the study of Wyclif's doctrines is his *Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Ecclesiæ Catholicæ* (best ed. by F. B. Blanciotti, 3 vols., Venice, 1757, with valuable introduction and life of Netter), written by him in 1426–28. Other records published in the Rolls Series of great importance are the *Chronicon Angliæ*, ed. E. M. Thompson, London, 1874; Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols., do. 1869; Henry Knighton, *Chronicon*, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols., do. 1889–95 (the last is of special value for matters connected with Leicester, of whose abbey Knighton and his unknown continuator were inmates); also, in the same series, the continuation of the *Eulogium Historiarum*, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols., London, 1858–63. The usual sources of history, *Calendars of Patent Rolls*, *Calendars of Close Rolls*, *Calendars of Entries in Papal Registers*, *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, must not be neglected, while *Piers Plowman* (ed. W. W. Skeat for the E.E.T.S.) is indispensable for the knowledge of the age. D. Wilkins, *Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ*, 4 vols., London, 1737, iii., though badly edited, is of great value. The bishops' registers, which might throw much light, for the most part have not yet been printed—*e.g.*, the registers of Lincoln. For extracts from those of Courtenay we are still dependent on Wilkins. Wyclif's own writings are strangely impersonal and give little assistance to his biographer.

(*b*) *Wyclif's writings.*—Wyclif's voluminous writings have only recently become accessible in print, and some are still unpublished. The MSS of the Latin works for the most part were in Prague or Vienna, while the English works in British libraries, especially at Dublin and in Corpus Christi, Cambridge, were neglected. The earliest work of Wyclif to be printed was his *Trialogus* (under the title *Dialogorum libri quattuor*) at Basel on 7th March 1525, probably by Frobenius, reprinted in 1752 by J. G. Vierling, Frankfort and Leipzig, under the inspiration of P. W. Wirth. An English tract on the Eucharist, *The Wycket*, usually ascribed to Wyclif, was printed at Nuremberg in 1546, reprinted by Coverdale, London, 1548, 1550. In 1608 Bodley's first librarian, Thomas James, published at Oxford Wyclif's *Two Short Treatises against the Orders of the Begging Friars*, and in 1612 the *Wycket* was reprinted at Oxford. Apart from the publication in his appendix of a few short pieces by J. Lewis in 1720 and of Purvey's *New Testament* by J. Lewis in 1731 no other original work of Wyclif either in Latin or in English was printed for over two centuries, unless we may count the reprint of Purvey's *New Testament* by H. Baber, London, 1810, and S. Bagster, do. 1841. With his customary ill-luck, the first sign of revived interest was the publication of a spurious fanatical tract, probably the work of some Spiritual Franciscan, entitled *The Last Age of the Church*, and attributed by its editor, J. H. Todd, to Wyclif (Dublin, 1840; republished by Wilmot Marsh, *Biblical Versions of Divine Hymns*, London, 1845, p. 221 f.). This work deceived many and did not conduce to a higher estimate of the Reformer. In the same work Wilmot Marsh also published one of Wyclif's sermons on the Annunciation (pp. 91–93). The long neglect of Wyclif and Purvey's English versions of the Bible was broken by Lea Wilson's ed. of Wyclif's *New Testament*, London, 1848, and by the publication at Oxford in 1850 of the fine edition of the whole by J. Forshall and F. Madden in 4 vols. Of the Old Testament no part had hitherto been printed except Purvey's tr. of the Song of Songs, by Adam Clark in his *Commentary*, London, 1803. In 1851 Todd printed at Dublin *Three Treatises of John Wyclif*, namely, 'Of the Church and her Members,' 'Of the Apostacy of the Church,' and 'Of Antichrist and his Meynee.' In 1863 G. V. Lechler published at Leipzig Wyclif's *de Officio Pastorali*, and in 1869, at Oxford, his *Trialogus*. In 1865 W. Shirley pointed out what had yet to be done by his *Catalogue of the Original Works of John Wyclif*, Oxford. Though many of its details need correction, it is still of great value and superseded the inaccurate lists in J. Bale, *Scriptorum illustrium Majoris Brytanniæ Catalogus*, 2 vols., Basel, 1557, i. 451 f.; J. Bale, *Index Britanniæ Scriptorum*, ed. R. H. Poole and M. Bateson, Oxford, 1902; or T. Tanner, *de Scriptoribus*, London, 1748, p. 761 f. Between 1869 and 1871 Thomas Arnold edited for the Oxford University Press *The Select English Works of John Wyclif* in 3 vols. Several of the works included are by disciples and not by Wyclif himself.

On this matter of authorship no decisive opinion is yet possible. The student should note the able paper of E. D. Jones in *Anglia*, Halle, xxx. [1906] 261 f., and J. E. Wells, *Manual of the Writings in Middle English*, Yale, 1916, ch. 12. The approach of the fifth centenary of Wyclif's death brought home to English scholars the disgrace of their continued neglect. In 1880 F. D. Matthew brought out for the Early English Text Society *The English Works of Wyclif hitherto unprinted*, but much that is here included should be rejected. In the same year R. Buddensieg published at Gotha Wyclif's *Tractatus de Christo et suo adversario Antichristo*. At last in 1883 the foundation of the Wyclif Society led to the publication of Wyclif's more important Latin works. With but indifferent support from the public the society has brought out some 30 volumes of Wyclif's Latin works. To the more important of these reference has been made in our text. Their various prefaces are of great value, though often the works are dated too early owing to ignorance of the date of Wyclif's doctorate.

For the literature and views of the later Lollards reference should be made to the *Twelve Conclusions* presented to parliament in 1394. For this document, probably the work of J. Purvey, see *FZ*, pp. 360–369; Wilkins, *Concilia*, iii. 221–223; and H. S. Cronin, in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xxii. [1907] 292–304. For the reprobation by Boniface IX. see *Cal. Papal Letters*, iv. 515. To Purvey has also been assigned the *Ecclesiæ Regimen*, published in 1851 by J. Forshall with the title *Remonstrance against Romish Corruptions . . . in 1395*, London, 1851. The work is really of composite origin, its kernel consisting of the *Thirty-Seven Conclusions* of earlier date, the authorship of which is assigned in the flyleaf of the only existing MS to Wyclif. For this work see *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xxvi. [1911] 738–749. A work of considerable interest is *The Lantern of Light*, written after 1408, ed. 1917 by L. M. Swinburne for the E.E.T.S. This work is far more restrained in its judgments than Wyclif. About the same time there was brought out *An Apology for Lollard Doctrines*, ed. J. H. Todd, Dublin, 1842, and assigned to Wyclif. But the most interesting Lollard document is the *Examination of Master William Thorpe*, written by himself in 1407. This valuable autobiography was first edited 'from a text copied out and corrected by Master William Tyndale' by Foxe (*AM* iii. 249–285). It is also found in *The Select Works of John Bale* (Parker Soc.), Cambridge, 1849, pp. 62–133; in E. Arber's *English Garner*, 8 vols., London, 1895, vi.; and in A. W. Pollard, *Fifteenth Century Prose and Verse*, do. 1903, pp. 97–167.

(*c*) *Lives of Wyclif.*—The first life of Wyclif was that of Foxe in his well-known *Acts and Monuments* (best ed. by J. Pratt, 8 vols., London, 1877). Though the work of a partisan, it is still of value for its many official documents. From Foxe and Bale all other 'lives' were compiled, including that of T. James, *An Apologie for John Wicklyfe*, Oxford, 1608. The prejudiced references of Anthony Wood and T. Hearne culminated in the publication of *The Pretended Reformers*, by Matthias Earbery, London, 1717. This scurrilous work was really a translation of A. Varillas, *Histoire du Wiclefianisme*, Lyons, 1682. Its only importance lay in its leading John Lewis, 'minister of Margate' (for whom see *DNB* xxxiii. 186 f.), to write his valuable *History of the Life and Sufferings of the Reverend and Learned John Wiclif*, Oxford, 1720, 1723, and 1820. Its collection of documents made it for over a century the only life of Wyclif of value. In 1754 the first German biography of Wyclif, *D. Johannes* (*sic*) *Wiclef wahrhafte und gegründete Nachrichten von seinem Leben, Nachsaetzen und Schriften*, was published by P. W. Wirth. In 1828 Robert Vaughan brought out *The Life and Opinions of John de Wycliffe* in 2 vols., London, a work superseded by the writer's more mature judgments in *John de Wycliffe, D.D.: a Monograph*, do. 1853. Vaughan's work showed industry and sympathy, but suffered from his limited acquaintance with Wyclif's writings and with English history. Passing by as of little value C. W. Le Bas, *Life of Wiclif*, London, 1832; S. A. J. de Ruever Gronemann, *Diatribe in Johannis Wicliff reformationis prodromi, vitam, ingenium, scripta*, Utrecht, 1837; O. Jäger, *John Wycliffe*, Halle, 1854; A. Jeep, *Gerson, Wiclefus, Hussus inter se comparati*, Göttingen, 1857, we come in 1858 to W. W. Shirley's valuable study in his introduction to his *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*. In the same year G. V. Lechler published at Leipzig an inauguration thesis, *Wiclif, als Vorläufer der Reformation*. This was followed by his *Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation*, 2 vols., do. 1873. Lechler's knowledge of English mediæval life and history is very imperfect, and much has come to light since he wrote. But no student, except possibly J. Loserth, has ever surpassed Lechler in his intimate knowledge of Wyclif's writings and theological system. Though in many places misleading, Lechler's is still the only authoritative life of Wyclif (tr. into English, abridged, by P. Lorimer, *John Wiclif and his English Precursors*, 2 vols., London, 1878, new ed. 1 vol. in 1881, 1884; to this ed. the references in the art. have been made). The following, some written with a view to the quincentenary, should also be mentioned: the excellent introduction by F. D. Matthew in his *English Works of Wyclif hitherto unprinted* London, 1880; M. Burrows, *Wyclif's Place in History*, do. 1882–84; R. Buddensieg, *J. Wiclif und seine Zeit*, Halle, 1883, 1885, Eng. tr., *John Wyclif, Patriot and Reformer*, London, 1884; V. Vattier, *J. Wycluff, sa vie, ses œuvres, sa doctrine*, Paris, 1886, with good catalogue of Wyclif's writings; R. L. Poole, *Wyclife and Movements for Reform*, London, 1889. Poole has also given a valuable study of Wyclif's doctrine of 'dominion' in his *Illustrations of the Hist. of Medieval Thought*, London, 1884, ch. 16. L. Sergeant, *John Wyclif*, New York, 1893, is popular and often inaccurate. Its first chapter on the birthplace of Wyclif contains some material of value, previously printed in *Athenæum*, 1892, pp. 344, 405. The opposition views were given by J. Stevenson, a Jesuit, in his *The Truth about Wyclif*, London, 1885. The best sketch of Wyclif is undoubtedly H. Rashdall's in *DNB* lxiii. 202–223, especially if read with G. M. Trevelyan's study of Wyclif's environment in his *England in the Age of Wycliffe*, London, 1899, or J. H. Wylie's valuable *History of England under Henry IV.*, 4 vols., do. 1884–98. A short work by the present writer, *The Dawn of the Reformation*, 2 vols., vol. i., 'The Age of Wyclif' (London, 1901), will shortly be brought out as a comprehensive study.

H. B. WORKMAN.

X

XAVIER.—St. Francis Xavier was the son of Juan de Jassu, a hidalgo and formerly a high official at the court of the last kings of Navarre. The name Xavier was that of the castle (*castillo*), some thirty miles from Pampeluna, which belonged to the family of his mother, Maria de Azpilcueta, and in which he himself was born (7th April 1506). Francis apparently counted himself a Basque, for he said that Basque was his native tongue, but the language is now no longer spoken so close to the borders of Aragon. Whilst his brothers followed the career of arms, Francis, as the youngest son of an impoverished family, was driven to seek a livelihood in the profession of letters. His abilities were remarkable, and, on coming to the University of Paris in 1525, he seems to have been regarded as a student of exceptional promise. He took his degree of licentiate in 1530 from the Collège Ste. Barbe, and was then made reader in philosophy at another college of the University, known as the Dormans-Beauvais. While still at Ste. Barbe, he fell under the influence of Ignatius Loyola (*q.v.*), a man some fifteen years his senior. Ignatius (who was then feeling his way towards the organizing of a band of followers pledged to labour for the greater glory of God in whatsoever form the summons might come to them), discerning a conflict in Xavier's heart between worldly ambition and the call of grace, plied him again and again with the gospel warning: 'What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?' In the end Xavier surrendered, and he was one of the seven who, on 15th Aug. 1534, took vows of poverty and chastity at Montmartre, thus laying the foundations of the Company of Jesus or Jesuit Order.[1] Their original intention was that, after completing their theological studies and receiving ordination, they should all make their way to Palestine and take up the preaching of the gospel in the very spot where Christ Himself had lived. However, it was foreseen that it might be difficult to execute this plan, and they decided that, if after waiting a year in Venice, where they expected to arrive in Jan. 1537, it was found impossible to obtain a passage to the Holy Land, they should go to Rome and place themselves at the disposition of the pope. It was the latter alternative that was forced upon them. They were ordained priests at Venice in June 1537, spending their time in preaching and serving the sick in the hospitals; but in 1538 they all met in Rome and offered their services to Pope Paul III. It seems that already at this time Xavier had some strange presentiment of what his future career was to be, for in his dreams he thought he was carrying an Indian on his shoulders under whose overwhelming weight he cried out so loudly that he awakened his companions. It was not, however, Xavier who was first nominated when King John III. of Portugal in 1539 instructed his ambassador at Rome to obtain some of Loyola's followers from the pope to serve as missionaries in the Indies. The choice fell upon Rodriguez and Bobadilla, but the latter became ill, and his place was taken by Xavier.

During a long delay at Lisbon such wonderful results followed from the preaching and example of the fathers that the king wished to retain both in Portugal. Finally, by the decision of Loyola, Xavier alone set sail (7th April 1541), bearing with him briefs from the pope appointing him apostolic nuncio in the Indies. The voyage occupied more than a year. He reached Goa on 6th May 1542, and it was not until October that he began missionary work in a strict sense by preaching to the natives of the Fishery coast in the extreme south of the Indian peninsula. In this region, including Ceylon, he remained for over two years, interrupted only by one visit to Goa. The continuous strain of the work was almost beyond human endurance, but its manifold consolations buoyed him up. His letters to Europe give a most vivid picture of his methods, more particularly of his care to have the elements of Christian doctrine translated into the vernacular, so that they could be learned by heart and even sung by young and old alike. It was always characteristic of him to take immense pains with the children. He went about ringing his bell and apparently had a wonderful power of attracting and impressing the little ones. No doubt a large proportion of those whom he baptized were quite young children, the families of adult converts.

'Often,' he wrote on 15th Jan. 1544, 'my arms are weary from baptizing and I cannot speak another word from having so repeatedly recited the prayers to the people, one after another, and given instruction in Christian doctrine to them in their native tongue.'[1]

So again in a letter, written a year later from Cochin (27th Jan. 1545), in which he supplies much detail regarding his methods of instruction, he states that in the space of one month he had baptized more than 10,000 persons. The *Exposition of the Creed*, of which a good English translation is provided by Edith A. Stewart,[2] and which is by her rightly stated to be 'more characteristic of Xavier than anything else he has left except the letters,' may probably be accepted as representative of all the elementary instruction, to whomsoever addressed, which he made the foundation of his missionary efforts.

A contemporary letter from Portugal (dated 22nd Oct. 1545) reproduces the description of Xavier brought back by one who had known him well in the Indies:

'Father Xavier goes about with bare feet; his garments are shabby and torn. He is called the "great father," and all love him well. A rajah has given orders throughout his kingdom that all are to show obedience to his brother the "great father," as though it were to himself; all who wish are free to become Christians. He also gave him much money, but Xavier distributed it all among the poor. Along the coast he has built 44 or 45 churches. He has four native-born Indians with him whom he has had ordained as priests. Six other Indians from the College of Goa are on the point of taking Orders. He carries with him two, three, four, yea six thousand men into the open country, climbs a tree and then preaches to them.'[3]

The creation of the College of Goa, here referred to, was one of the most far-seeing of the measures adopted by Francis to secure the permanency of his conquests. By his influence with the Portuguese authorities, he obtained ample means of support for this foundation, and here he was able to train a considerable number of natives, many of whom persevered and after ordination did excellent work in the missions which Xavier himself had started.

The three years from 1545 to 1548 were almost entirely spent in the Eastern archipelago, Malacca, Amboyna, and the Moluccas. He was shipwrecked three times, lost his slender possessions, was attacked by the Muhammadans, and was always cut off from all human sympathy and congenial companionship, and yet he could write of his stay at Moretai:

[1] See art. JESUITS.

[1] *Monumenta Xaveriana*, i. 286.
[2] *Life of St. Francis Xavier*, pp. 242–251.
[3] *Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu* [Madrid, 1894], 'Epistolæ Mixtæ,' i. 231 f.

'I cannot remember having so much spiritual consolation anywhere else, nor more continuously. . . . These islands ought to be called the "Isles of Hope in God."'[1]

By the middle of January 1548 he was at Cochin, from which as a centre he revisited the Fishery coast. Thence he returned to Goa, but this was only to make preparations for a yet more adventurous expedition, with the idea of which he had been inspired by a meeting with a Portuguese merchant at Malacca who had brought in his company a native Japanese. This young man, called after his conversion Pablo de Santa Fé, was afterwards of great use. Even as early as 1547 Francis was convinced that in these newly discovered islands of Japan

'our holy faith might be spread with great success, and that there, more than any other country of the Indies, were great things to be hoped for, since the people of those islands were quick-witted and eager to learn.'[2]

Further intercourse with merchants returning from Japan seems only to have deepened the impression, and from that time forth Xavier's heart was set upon this new conquest, although it was not until April 1549 that he was able to carry out his purpose. He went by way of Malacca, making provision from there for the needs of his recent converts in the Moluccas. There seems, however, no ground for the assertion, which has sometimes been made, that Xavier ever landed in the Philippines. After many delays and inconceivable vexations Xavier eventually reached the port of Kagoshima in a Chinese junk on 15th Aug. 1549, accompanied by Father Cosmo de Torres, a lay brother named Juan Fernandez, and the Japanese convert Pablo de Santa Fé. As Kagoshima was the native place of the last-named, a kindly welcome was accorded to the missionaries by his relatives, and a breathing-space was found during which it was possible to learn something of the people and the language. Progress was at first slow, but three months after his arrival Xavier wrote most enthusiastically of the natural qualities of the Japanese, and two years later his admiration had not evaporated.

'This is the only country yet discovered in these regions,' he wrote to Ignatius on 29th Jan. 1552, 'where there is hope of Christianity permanently taking root.'

He planned an expedition to Meaco (the modern Kioto), then the residence of the mikado. The journey to and fro entailed terrible sufferings from cold and other causes. Owing to political disturbances, the visit was ill-timed and almost fruitless of results. But at Yamaguchi, and particularly in Bungo, many conversions were made, and there is good evidence of the steadfastness of these Christian communities.[3] In Yamaguchi a formal document[4] records the conveyance to the missionaries in 1552 of a former Buddhist monastery. The church founded in Japan by Xavier spread and prospered. Thirty years afterwards Father Coelho estimated the number of Christians there at 150,000, and James Murdoch, an unfriendly critic, while admitting that the estimate is reliable, remarks that this constituted a wonderful record for thirty years, when we consider the small number of missionaries engaged in the work.

It is Murdoch who informs us that 'in Hideyoshi's famous invasion of the Corea in 1592 the first and third divisions of the invading army totalling nearly 30,000 men were almost entirely composed of Christians,' while the great *daimyos* who commanded those divisions—Konishi, Kuroda, Otomo, Arima, Omura, and Só—were also all converts with the single exception of Omura.[5]

Some thirty years after this Christianity in Japan was exterminated literally by fire and sword; but even so, when Japan was again opened up to the missionaries in the middle of last century, some village communities were still found who retained the Christian beliefs and practices taught to their forefathers in the 17th century.

After two and a half years spent in Japan Xavier thought it necessary to return to his base at Goa, both to look after things there and to make better provision for a succession of suitable missionaries in the Far East. In a letter addressed to his brethren in Europe from Cochin in Jan. 1552 we find that a new field of labour had already attracted his attention. He had met a number of Chinese in Japan and had heard much of their country from merchants and others.

'Like the Japanese,' he wrote, 'they are acute and eager to learn. In intellect they are superior even to the Japanese.' 'I hope,' he added, 'to go there during this year, 1552, and penetrate even to the Emperor himself.'[1]

In intermediate letters he refers to this great design again and again, being full of courage and hope. Before the end of April he was well on his way. After overcoming interminable opposition from the Portuguese at Malacca and Singapore he reached the little island of San Cian, opposite the mouths of the Si-kiang, on which Canton is situated, before the end of August. He could find no one who would take the responsibility of conveying him across to the mainland. The trading ships began to sail away. Xavier, prostrate with illness, was left with only a Malabar servant and a Chinese boy. After endless alternations of hope and disappointment he himself began to lose heart. On 13th Nov. he wrote, 'Shall I reach China? I cannot tell . . . everything is against it.' To the last, however, he strained every nerve to accomplish his purpose, but his illness grew upon him, and on 27th Nov. 1552 (not 2nd Dec., as often stated) he died, in sight of the land which he had fought so hard to reach.

If Xavier has found many indiscreet panegyrists, he has also been much criticized. Many of these criticisms will be found effectively answered in the brilliant pen sketch of the great missionary by C. C. Martindale.[2] Others are discussed in *The Month* for Feb. and March 1905 and Dec. 1912. A good deal of the criticism turns upon the miraculous incidents with which the life has been overlaid by later biographers. As Astrain remarks:

'In the case of a life so extraordinary as that of Xavier, a life spent in such far distant lands, the presence of a legendary element was inevitable, and, in point of fact, it manifested itself at an early date. Already in the second half of the 16th century Fathers Teixeira and Valignano, in passing judgment upon the Life of St. Ignatius written by Ribadeneira, protested against various miracles falsely attributed to Xavier, and reduced to their just proportions the magnitude of certain of his missions and apostolic undertakings.'[3]

Again, Xavier has been accused of 'restlessness,' but is it sufficiently remembered that his charge embraced the whole mission field of the Indies, and that it was his duty to look after the base at Goa as well as to establish those advanced posts for which he, more than any other man, had the necessary enterprise and capacity? Shall we blame him because in many cases he was content, like the great *conquistadores* of the New World, to take possession of a vast province, to hoist a standard and leave a tiny garrison, knowing well that years must elapse before the full tide of Christian life could pulsate through its arteries? Nor can we admit, as is often alleged, that the conversions effected by him were 'mainly nominal.' The evidence of the Calvinist Dutch *predikant* Baldæus, who spent many years on the Malabar

[1] *Monumenta Xaveriana*, i. 427.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 433 f. and 444 f.
[3] See *The Month*, Feb. and March 1905.
[4] The text of this has been restored by Ernest Satow, *TASJ* vii. [1880] 140.
[5] *A Hist. of Japan, 1542–1651*, Kobe, 1903, p. 362.

[1] *Monumenta Xaveriana*, i. 694 f.
[2] *In God's Army*, vol. i. 'Commanders in Chief.'
[3] *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús*, p. 492, note.

coast and in Ceylon, a century after Xavier's time, goes far to prove the contrary, as does also the whole history of Japanese Christianity. Nor was the saint so fanatically intolerant as has sometimes been pretended. Xavier undoubtedly in his letters of Jan. 1548 to King John III. and to Simon Rodriguez speaks of forcing the governor to give the gospel to India. But, as E. A. Stewart remarks:

'The force, we have in fairness to observe, was not to be used towards the converts—he knew well enough that, with these southern tribes of which he was thinking, the Gospel had only to be preached in order to be received—it was the authorities who were to be forced to give opportunities of hearing the Word.'[1]

And Xavier himself adds:

'In this way the injustices and robberies towards the poor Christians will cease, and those who are ready to become Christians will get good courage to do so.'[2]

If Xavier can in any sense be described as fanatical, it is only in the heroic self-denial and austerity of his life. No missionary has realized more perfectly than he the counsel of becoming all things to all men, resolute to see and develop in every lawful way all the elements of good in those with whom he was brought into contact.

LITERATURE.—The sources, the most important of which are Xavier's own letters, are all, practically speaking, contained in the two volumes of *Monumenta Xaveriana ex autographis vel ex antiquioribus exemplis collecta* (forming vols. vi. and vii. of the *Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu*), Madrid, 1899–1912. For English readers the most reliable biography is that of Edith A. Stewart, *The Life of St. Francis Xavier, Evangelist Explorer, Mystic*, London, 1917; the most complete is that of A. Brou, *Saint François Xavier*, 2 vols., Paris, 1912. Other useful books are J. M. Cros, *Saint François de Xavier, sa vie et ses lettres*, 2 vols., Toulouse, 1900, *Saint François de Xavier de la Compagnie de Jésus, son pays, sa famille, sa vie*, do. 1894; H. J. Coleridge, *Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1886; C. C. Martindale, *In God's Army*, vol. i. 'Commanders in Chief,' do. 1915; A. Astrain *Hist. de la Compañia de Jesús*, vol. i.[2], Madrid, 1912; H. Haas *Gesch. des Christenthums in Japan*, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1902–04; J. Stephen, *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, 2 vols., London, 1849, and many subsequent edd., Essay no. 3, 'The Founders of Jesuitism'; A. Dickson White, *A Hist. of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, 2 vols., do. 1896; H. Thurston, in *The Month*, Feb. and March 1905, and Dec. 1912. HERBERT THURSTON.

XENOCRATES.—See ACADEMY.

XENOPHANES.—See IONIC PHILOSOPHY.

Y

YAKUT.—1. Distribution.—The northernmost branch of the Turkish race, the Yakut, live in the Yakutsk district, along the Lena as far south as the Amur and the Island of Sakhalin and to the north-west as far as the Yenisei.[3] The region between the Lena and the Aldan is especially densely populated. This region was formerly occupied by the Tungus (*q.v.*), with whom the Yakut, who came from the south, had many fights before they succeeded in obtaining the best pastures. From their metropolis, the district of Yakutsk, the Yakut went to Olekminsk, down the Lena to its mouth, and spread along the Vilui, Yana, and Indigirka, and a very few reached Kolima. Meanwhile another immigration to the north went along the Yenisei as far as the Lower Tunguska, thence to Lake Chirinda, where they met the Yakut who migrated north through the Lena. Their original home may have been in Central Asia between the sources of the Yenisei and the Amur. N. A. Aristoff[4] thinks that the Yakut are the remnant of a Turkic nation called the Sakha (Saka?). The Saka, who in the 2nd cent. B.C. were expelled from their home in the north of Syr Darya southwards by the Yuechi, migrated to India. Towards the end of the 2nd cent. A.D. they seem to have been driven northward again. On their way back they left one branch, now called the Kara-Kirgis, in West Tian-Shan. The Kara-Kirgis have a clan called Saka.[5] Recently noticed linguistic evidence (tribal and clan names) makes the two routes of Yakut migration from Central Asia to the north something more than a hypothesis.

In 1897 the Yakut numbered 225,772; in 1911, 245,406.

2. Physical type.—The Yakut are now much mixed, first with the Neo-Siberians, *i.e.* Tungus, Mongols, and Manchu, and then with the Russians. They seldom have any moustache or beard, their hair and eyes are dark, and their heads round. All these characters are Mongolian, but the setting of their eyes is not Mongolian. The Russian anthropologist A. A. Ivanovsky[1] thinks that he can distinguish a special Yakut group, but this group has more in common with the Northern Tungus and Astrakhan-Kalmuk than with other Turkish nations. They are of medium size with many tall individuals, broad-headed, but not pre-eminently so, and long-faced.

3. Technique.—Originally horse-breeders, the Yakut are now horse-breeders where the climate permits, and in the north reindeer-breeders; but, as far north as they can, they keep the horse for its meat and *kumys* (mare's milk). How highly the Yakut values his horse is shown by the fact that to the good gods he will sacrifice a horse, but to the bad gods only cattle. In matchmaking, to compare the girl to a mare and the youth to a colt is the greatest compliment that can be paid them. In their mythology the horse always appears as the adviser and friend of man, often wiser than man himself. The Yakut, many of whom have never seen a horse, trace the origin of man to a being half-horse and half-man. A horse must not be struck, nor even must unkind words be said to it. While cattle are used for heavy work, the horse is kept for riding. In the region where there are horses no longer, reindeer bucks are trained for riding—a custom known also to the Tungus, but not to the old inhabitants of the Tundra, as the Samoyed or Eskimo.

Where possible, the Yakut become seasonal nomads. Only the people south of Vilui, the agriculturists, are quite sedentary, and even these have a winter house (*balagan*) and a summer house (*urasa*, sometimes called *yurta*). The *urasa* is often covered with birch-bark beautifully engraved and painted, but the *balagan*, made of logs of wood and covered with earth and snow, is pre-

[1] *Life of St. Francis Xavier*, p. 259.
[2] *Monumenta Xaveriana*, i. 459; cf. p. 452.
[3] See art. TURKS.
[4] *Attempt at an Explanation of the Ethnic Composition of the Kirghis-Kaizak living in Ancient Times*, St. Petersburg, 1894, i.
[5] Leon Sternberg, 'Turks,' *Encyc. Andrecvsky*, St. Petersburg, 1902, xxxiv. 344.

[1] *Anthr. Composition of the Population of Russia*, Moscow, 1904.

ferable in winter. Their most strenuous time is the hay-making season.

The Northern Yakut are hunters, fishermen, and reindeer-breeders. As net- and trap-makers they are much superior to the other natives. They are also known as iron-smelters. They place their ore in the fire hole and pile coal round it, then they keep the fire blazing by means of hand-bellows. When the coal is used up, they dig out the metal and hammer it into implements. They used the iron ore of the Aldan near Yakutsk long before it was known to the Russians.

Like the Azarbaijan Tatars in the Caucasus, the Yakut are the cleverest traders in Northern Siberia; their language became a *lingua franca* and till recently had to be known even by Russian fur-traders. As reindeer-breeders, however, they are not so clever as the Palæo-Siberians or even as the Tungus. They are people of the Iron Age with all the characteristics which this age implies in Asia, pre-eminently horse-breeding. Since the clan crests are usually used as *tamga* (cattle or horse brands), it is possible to trace the Yakut's emigration and contact with other peoples by tracing the distribution of some particular *tamga*. The *tamga* usually represent an animal, but it would be an exaggeration to see in that any totemistic notions. Certain animals—*e.g.*, the bear, wolf, eagle, white crane, and goose—appear as the shaman's spirit assistants, but they are never called high gods.

4. **Sociology.**—The Yakut of to-day are grouped in clans (*aga-usa*), *naslegs*, and *uluses*. A clan is composed sometimes of only a few individuals, and sometimes of several hundred. A *nasleg* comprises from one to more than thirty clans. The *ulus* often includes several *naslegs*. The Yakut reckon as descendants of a clan only as far as the ninth generation. Of course at the present time the blood-relationship within the clan is hardly more than a tradition. When the Russians first came into contact with the Yakut, their clan system was quite highly developed, and the head of a clan had his power limited to that of a judge and leader in war.

All economic questions were decided by a council of elders, *i.e.* fathers, uncles, and elder brothers. Thus *aga* ('elder'; fem. *agas*) is the name for the father, *abaga* for other of his relatives older than himself, *ini* (fem. *balys*) for a father's younger brother and any other younger relative who was not his son. Relatives in the third degree are called *sian*. The name for mother is *yä* (literally 'embryo'), for wife *oyokh*, while there is no specific name for the husband, who must be called by his wife *är*, 'man,' or *ogonior*, 'old man.' The term *aga* used for the father really means 'older'; thus one asks about a person, 'Is he *aga* or *balys* ['younger'] than yourself?' There are special terms for the wife to use when addressing her husband's relatives (*e.g.*, *toyon*, 'chief,' for the husband's father), and for the husband addressing his wife's relatives (*e.g.*, *aga-kylyn*, 'wife's father'). The terminology of relationship takes into consideration primarily sex and degrees of age. Thus the Yakut clan is divided into two main groups: (*a*) men and women of the paternal and maternal line born earlier, and (*b*) men and women of the paternal and maternal line born later.

Clans sometimes made alliances. All the traditions testify to the great solidarity of these alliances between the chiefs of clans and also to their independent attitude to one another. Superior to them all was the council of the confederation.

(*a*) *Marriage.*—The Yakut are exogamous, so the wife must be taken from another clan (*aga-usa*) and another settlement (*ulus*). In their marriage ceremonies several stages may be distinguished: (1) the matchmaking, (2) the compact, (3) the betrothal, (4) the bringing home of the bride. Children are betrothed when only one or two years old, but the bride cannot leave her father's house till all the *kalym* (bride-price, called by the Yakut *suwu*) has been paid. Serving for a wife is often met with instead of the *suwu*. The young man has the rights of a husband after he has paid the first instalment of the *kalym*. After the betrothal the young man remains in the bride's house. At the head of the bed the first night a meal consisting of flour and melted butter is placed. If the bridegroom is not pleased with the bride, the meal is left untouched, and this is considered a great disgrace to the girl. This points to the fact that chastity is required of the bride.

The custom of avoidance is especially strictly observed in relations called *kinitti*—*i.e.* the bride to her father-in-law and all other older male relatives. Thus she must not show her hair or her bare feet, step in front of them, address them directly, or call objects of common use by their real names (a paraphrase must be used).

(*b*) *Birth.*—According to W. Sieroszewski,[1] Yakut marriages are generally fruitful, averaging ten children to a woman, but becoming less so in the northern districts, although the Yakut are everywhere more prolific than the Tungus. Lack of children they attribute entirely to the woman, as their proverb says, 'If there are no children, the woman is to blame.' According to Jochelson, the women of the north have very difficult deliveries. The Yakut regard the pains of childbirth as a sickness caused by evil spirits, and therefore, if the assistance of a midwife or the goddess of fertility, Ayisit, is of no avail, a shaman is called in to fight the evil spirits. No consideration is shown to either mother or child, for women possessed of evil spirits are regarded by the Yakut as no less perilous to society than those infected with germs of an epidemic. This accounts for the entire absence of compassion and for the cruelty manifested towards women suffering from the pains of labour. When a child is born, the Yakut make holiday on the first and after the third day. On the first day they prepare a large quantity of fat which they melt and drink, sacrificing a portion to the fire. After the third day the friends and relatives visit the mother and child, and it is customary for the former to serve the guests herself. Nowadays it is not fat but meat that forms the principal dish. The birth of a foal is accompanied by ceremonies slightly less important.

(*c*) *Burial.*—The only thing that the Yakut really cares for before death is to be certain that an animal will be slain directly after he dies in order that, accompanied by this animal, his soul may make its journey to the abode of the departed. On the death of a man a bullock or a horse is killed, on the death of a woman a cow or a calf. If the deceased is rich, the animal is fat and able to be ridden, otherwise the soul must drive it in front of him or drag it by the horns. The flesh of the dead animal is eaten by the gravediggers and all the funeral company. When a man dies, the body is clothed in a rich garment and placed in a corner of the dwelling, where it lies for three days; on the third day it is placed in a wooden coffin, which is drawn to the grave by a horse or bullock. No one accompanies it but the gravediggers, and even they hasten to complete their work and return home; on their way back they do not stop or look behind, and, when they enter the gate of the village, they and the animal must pass through a fire made from

[1] *The Yakut*, St. Petersburg, 1896

the straw on which the dead man lay and the wood left from the making of the coffin. Other things which have been in contact with the dead, such as the shovel, are also broken and burnt. On the death of a child its cradle is left on the grave and its toys hanging on the nearest tree. The Yakut have great fear of a corpse (especially that of a shaman) before it is buried; it is supposed to be able to disturb the forces of nature, producing great storms. A great wind is held to be favourable, as it will smooth out the tracks on the way to the place of the funeral; otherwise many of the living will follow the dead. There is another form of burial among the Yakut, which consists in abandoning the dead in the house with all the utensils belonging to him.

The custom formerly existed that an old or very weak person should request his relatives to bury him. All the villagers were invited to a three days' feast, at which the old man, attired in his finest garments, occupied the chief position. On the third day his relatives took him to the forest, where a grave had been prepared, and one of them would suddenly strike him down. Food and his weapons were placed with him in the grave. Until the corpse is buried the soul remains near the house and endeavours to remind the relatives of its existence.

Some souls never leave the earth and are never quiet; such souls are called *yor*. The souls of those who have died an untimely or a violent death, or who were buried without ceremonies, and those of shamans and great people become *yor*.

5. Soul.—Like other Turks, the Yakut believe in the existence of several souls all more or less material. *Kut* seems to be one of the most important of these. Thus they think that the *buorkut*, 'earth soul,' is communicated to the infant at the moment of birth from the earth; *salyn-kut*, 'air soul,' it receives from the air shortly afterwards; while the third element, *yä-kut*, 'mother soul,' comes to the child from the mother. *Kut* is a physical conception of the soul, while *sür*, although in some degree a material conception, has a more psychical character. After death *kut* is devoured by the *abassylar*, though there is a belief also that the *kut* remains for some days near the body of the deceased, and then departs to the other world. *Sür* is a kind of 'soul shadow' common to men and animals; it is even possessed by fishes.

6. Gods and spirits.—Although most of the Yakut are now officially reckoned as Christians, belief in the good old gods and shamanistic ceremonies is still alive. The gods are divided into nine *agas* (clans) or *bis*, and the malicious gods into eight. The natives are quite ready to give information about the clan arrangement of the kind gods, but it is very difficult to get similar information about the gods of the under world west and north, since few of the ordinary people know anything about them and the shamans are afraid of betraying the secrets of these formidable beings.

According to Sieroszewski, the chief of the sky-gods is Art-Toyon-Aga, the powerful ruler of light and life, speaking in the storm and thunder, somewhat indifferent to human affairs, and appealed to only in exceptional circumstances. In his honour are celebrated the great clan ceremonies, *ysakh*, in which the sacrifice of *kumys* is made to him. The *kumys* festival is a ceremony performed very regularly. Its object is to secure fertility for the family and for the herd. Lads and girls are placed opposite one another and sprinkle the *kumys* on one another as a sacrifice to the god. In the north, where horses cannot live, reindeer milk is used, though it is still called *kumys*.

The chief of the dark spirits is called Ulutuyer-Ulu-Toyon, 'omnipotent lord.' He is always described as living in the western sky, and, in contrast to the indolent Art-Toyon-Aga, he is the personification of action and of the passions. Ulu-Toyon is not always harmful to men, for he gives to them one of their souls, *sür*, and defends them from the attacks of *abassylar*. The *abassylar* are divided into 'upper,' living in the western sky, 'middle,' living on the earth, and 'lower,' inhabiting the subterranean world; but, wherever they live, they are all harmful to man.

Ichchi, literally 'owner,' signifies the 'owner-spirit' of various objects. Every river, lake, stone—and even parts of these sometimes—has its own *ichchi* controlling it. Movable objects and those which can produce sounds also have their *ichchi*.

The Yakut divide the universe into seventeen stories. They have also a horizontal division comprising two parts—east and south, the habitation of good spirits, and west and north, that of evil spirits. The great evil spirit, Allara-Ogonür, 'underground-old-man,' lives in the far north.

7. Shamanism.—The study of Yakut shamanism, which is one of the most developed forms of northern shamanism, can be limited to the study of the shaman (*oiun*), his ceremonial coat (*tanara*; same word for 'sky') and ceremonial drum (*tünür*). The preparation of his official garment is accompanied by ceremonies no less important than the shamanizing itself. Even those who, like the smith, prepare the metal symbolical adornments attached to the shaman's leather coat occupy a half-magical position, being credited with 'peculiar fingers.' The smith is often approached for assistance if there is no shaman to be found in the neighbourhood. The smith in the ninth generation acquires certain supernatural powers and can without harm to himself prepare the iron symbols of the shaman's costume and especially the *ämyägat* (a metal plate representing a human figure sewn on the ceremonial coat over the heart and symbolizing the special shaman's ancestor, *i.e.* the spirit of some dead shaman).

There are 'black' shamans and 'white' shamans; the duties of the latter are not clearly defined, for in cases of great urgency, as in sickness, it is the black shaman who is called in to fight the spirits of disease. At the spring festivals, however, performed in daylight and called *aiy-ysyakh*, it seems that white shamans always officiate, while the autumn festivals, *abassy-ysyakh*, performed in the darkness, are conducted by black shamans. Troshchanski,[1] who made an exhaustive study of Yakut shamanism, believes that the duties of the black shaman were originally in the hands of women, and that the Yakut black shaman even now assumes some women's characteristics: (*a*) two iron circles on his apron represent women's breasts; (*b*) he braids his long hair like a woman; (*c*) the place on the right side of the tent, covered with horseskins, is forbidden to shamans and women; (*d*) when he does not use the ceremonial dress, he wears that of a young girl; (*e*) he is allowed to visit a woman after childbirth before the three days are over and men are allowed to approach her. As the office of hereditary smiths became powerful, the duties of the black shamans passed to them. Seeing that the family among the Yakuts, as among the other Turks, is patriarchal, this theory seems very improbable. The women's characteristics adopted by the shaman point to something else, viz. that, being a person with supernatural powers, the black shaman is supposed to have both female and male qualities; whether sexual abuses follow this conception it is difficult to ascertain.[2] Generally speaking, women, being more nervous and suffering more often from the Arctic forms of hysteria (*menerik* and *amürakh*)

[1] *The Evolution of the 'Black' Faith*, Kazan, 1912.
[2] See M. A. Czaplicka, 'Shamanism and Sex,' in *Aboriginal Siberia*, London, 1914.

than men, are more successful as shamans.[1] The shamans, especially the black shamans, form a professional class, and a period of preparation under the guidance of an old shaman is necessary. The initiation into the shamanistic office is finally accomplished by the clothing of the novice in the ceremonial coat and presenting him with the drum and stick.

The shamanistic ceremony, as elsewhere,[2] is divided into the following parts: (*a*) preparations for the shaman's journey, (*b*) songs, which among the Yakut are unusually rhythmical and are answered by the chorus, beating the drums and dancing, (*c*) the going out of the fire, when the shaman is supposed to have gone away, (*d*) a period of silence, after which he comes back and relates his experiences.

8. Ceremonies.—There are among the Yakut two kinds of sacrificial ceremonies, bloody (to the *abassy*) and bloodless (to the *aïy* and *ichchi*). Although bloody sacrifices are not made to Urun-Aïy-Toyon, yet it is customary to dedicate certain animals to him; *i.e.*, such animals are not to be used for work, and mares so dedicated are not to be milked. Formerly it was the custom to dedicate in this manner all mares which had foals; they were let loose to wander on the tundra. The offerings to *abassylar* have the character of a compromise or bargain. The evil spirit wishes to have the *kut* (one of the souls) of a man, and the shaman gives instead the *kut* of an animal.

There are two tribal festivals: a spring festival, *aïy-ysyakh*, and an autumn festival, *abassy-ysyakh*. As the name shows, the first is celebrated for the good spirits in general, and for Urun-Aïy-Toyon in particular. After the sacrifice, which is followed by certain sports and games, a dramatic representation of the struggle between spring and winter is given. One man, called the *aïy-uola*, is dressed in white and mounted on a white horse to represent spring, while another, *abassy-uola*, represents winter, being dressed in black or reddish garments and mounted on a horse of corresponding colour. The *abassy-ysyakh* is held in autumn, and in the open air like the first festival, but at night. It is dedicated to the black spirits, and especially to Ulu-Toyon. While the first festival is conducted by the clan-father, the second is under the direction of nine shamans and nine shamanesses.[3]

9. Legends.—The Yakut possess the richest mythology, in both form and conception, of all the natives of Siberia. The richness of imagination shown in their oral compositions is only comparable to that of the Iranians, and one can indeed find some traces of Iranian mythology, probably brought from Central Asia. They are not lacking in the humour for which the Tungus legends are justly famed. The legend of creation bears witness.

> The evil spirit wished to show the good spirit that he had the greatest power, so he dived into the water and came up with a mouthful of clay. From this the good spirit created the earth, but, not having sufficient clay, he made it flat. He then noticed that the evil spirit had not given him all the clay; therefore he struck him on the neck so that he had to spit it all out. It fell on the earth and so mountains were formed.

The origin of grass is explained by a more romantic legend.

> The god Yassagai-Toyon directs the movements of all migratory birds. His seven daughters, in the form of seven white cranes, also often come down to the earth. Once Yassagai-Toyon commanded his most beautiful daughter to help and serve the Yakut. (The crane is always considered a sacred bird by these people.) The girl begged to be excused, and as a punishment the father cut off her wings and she became a blade of grass to feed the animals of the Yakut.[4]

These ætiological myths form but a small part of their literature, for it is the heroic stories that are the longest and the most elaborate.

The Yakut do not possess a written character, but the few who have been educated in Russian schools write in Russian.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works quoted in the footnotes, see N. N. Agapitoff and N. M. Khangaloff, 'Materials for the Study of Shamanism in Siberia' (Russ.), *E. Sib. Sect. Imp. Russ. Geog. Soc.* [Irkutsk, 1883], p. 169 ff.; M. A. Czaplicka, *My Siberian Year*, London, 1916, *The Turks of Central Asia*, Oxford, 1918; W. Jochelson, 'Kumiss Festivals of the Yakut,' *Boas Anniversary Volume*, New York, 1906; P. Klark, 'Viluisk and its District' (Russ.), *Mem. Sib. Sect. Imp. Russ. Geog. Soc.* VII. pt. 1 [St. Petersburg, 1864] pp. 91–165; F. Y. Kohn, *Physiological and Biological Data concerning the Yakut* (Russ.), Minusinsk, 1899; R. Maak, *The Vilui District of the Yakutsk Territory*, St. Petersburg, 1887; A. T. von Middendorff, *Reise in den äussersten Norden und Osten Sibiriens während der Jahre 1843–4*, do. 1847–74; V. A. Priklonski, 'Materials for the Ethnography of the Yakut of the Yakutsk Territory' (Russ.), *Bull. E. Sib. Sect. Imp. Russ. Geog. Soc.* xviii. [Irkutsk, 1887] 143; E. Piekarski and P. Vasilyeff, 'The Coat and Drum of the Yakut Shaman' (Russ.), *Mat. for the Ethn. of Russia*, i. [St. Petersburg, 1910] 93–116.

M. A. CZAPLICKA.

YASHTS.—See AVESTA.

YASNA.—See AVESTA.

YAWNING.

1. The primitive conception of the soul.—The conception of the soul among the lower races has been described as follows:

> 'It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapour, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things.'[1]

J. G. Frazer likewise maintains that the savage explains the phenomena of life by supposing the living body to be animated by some power within.

> 'If an animal lives and moves, it can only be, he thinks, because there is a little animal inside which moves it: if a man lives and moves, it can only be because he has a little man or animal inside who moves him. The animal inside the animal, the man inside the man, is the soul. And as the activity of an animal or man is explained by the presence of the soul, so the repose of sleep or death is explained by its absence; sleep or trance being the temporary, death being the permanent absence of the soul. Hence if death be the permanent absence of the soul, the way to guard against it is either to prevent the soul from leaving the body, or, if it does depart, to ensure that it shall return.'[2]

2. The escape of the soul through the mouth.—The soul is commonly supposed to escape by apertures of the body, especially the mouth and nose.

> 'The Marquesans used to hold the mouth and nose of a dying man, in order to prevent his soul from escaping; the same custom is reported of the New Caledonians. . . . The Itonamas in South America seal up the eyes, nose, and mouth of a dying person in case his ghost should get out and carry off others'; and the people of Nias, who identify the spirit of the deceased with the breath, tie up the jaws of the corpse to confine the vagrant soul.[3] The Hindus always snap their thumb and finger and repeat the name of some god, as Rāma, when a man yawns in their presence, believing that by so doing they prevent the soul from escaping through the open mouth. To neglect this is a sin as great as the murder of a Brāhman.[4]

Great care is taken at the time of a birth lest the soul of the child should escape and be swallowed by a gaping mouth.

> To prevent this calamity, the Alfoors of Celebes, when a woman is about to be delivered, 'tie up the mouths of all animals inside and outside the house'; and 'all persons present in the house, even the mother herself, are obliged to keep their mouths shut the whole time the birth is taking place.' Noses are not similarly secured because the breath is exhaled through the nostrils, and therefore 'the soul would be expelled before it could have time to settle down.'[5]

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[1] *PC*[3] i. 429.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 26 f.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 31.
[4] W. Ward, *View of the Lit., Hist., and Mythol. of the Hindoos*[4], London, 1822, i. 142.
[5] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 33.

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[1] Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, pp. 307–326.
[2] See artt. SHAMANISM, OSTYAKS, SAMOYED, TUNGUS.
[3] Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, p. 297 f.
[4] I. W. Shklovsky, *In Far North-east Siberia*, London, 1916, pp. 43, 227.

Even in sleep it is possible for the soul to escape through the sleeper's mouth if it is not kept tightly closed, its departure being sometimes indicated by snoring.[1]

Mary H. Kingsley tells of a Kruman who 'for several nights had smelt in his dreams the savoury smell of smoked crawfish seasoned with red peppers. He became anxious, and the headman decided some witch had set a trap baited with this dainty for his dream-soul, with intent to do him grievous bodily harm.' For the next few nights, to prevent his soul from straying abroad, he lay in the heat of a tropical night under a blanket, his nose and mouth tied up with a handkerchief.[2]

The legend of King Gunthram shows that this belief long survived in Europe. As the king lay asleep in the wood with his head in his henchman's lap, his servant saw as it were a snake issue from his mouth and run to the brook. His progress being hindered, the servant laid his sword across the water and the creature ran along it and up into a mountain; after a while it came back, and returned into the mouth of the reposing king, who, upon waking, told him how he had dreamt that he went over an iron bridge, and into a mountain full of gold.[3]

3. Possession through the open mouth.—As the human soul is considered to enter and leave the body by the mouth, so it is with other spiritual beings, particularly such as possess people with evil intentions.

According to the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, when the indwelling spirit has left the body, 'it behoves a man to be careful about opening his mouth, lest a homeless spirit should take advantage of the opportunity and enter his body. This, it appears, is considered most likely to take place while the man is eating.'[4] The Zulus, like the Persians, regard repeated yawning and sneezing as a sign of approaching spiritual possession,[5] and in N. Africa men constantly keep the lower part of their face veiled, even while eating and sleeping, in order to protect themselves against evil spirits.[6] The same reason may explain the custom observed among Arab women of muffling their faces.[7] In Samoa a man whose family god was the turtle was obliged to wear a bandage tied over his mouth if he were taking any part in the cutting up or cooking of the animal, lest an embryo turtle should enter his mouth and grow up within him.[8] In S.E. Australia a newly-initiated youth must always cover his mouth with a rug in the presence of a woman,[9] just as in W. Timor 'a man holds his right hand before his mouth in speaking lest a demon should enter his body,' and lest the person to whom he is speaking should harm his soul by magic.[10] To prevent the soul of a fox killed in the chase from escaping and revenging itself on the hunters or warning its fellows of their approach, the Ainus, in former days, took care to tie up the mouth of the animal tightly.[11]

From this brief survey of the part played by the open mouth in primitive cult it will readily be understood how the act of yawning has come to be associated with the exit of the soul and the entrance of evil spirits. This ancient belief still survives in the polite custom of putting the hand before the gaping mouth, thereby (it was originally supposed) impeding the flight of the soul, and barring the way to a spiritual foe. Even to this day, when a man yawns, the Muslim puts the back of his left hand to his mouth saying, 'I seek refuge with Allah from Satan the accursed,' just as in the Tyrol the sign of the cross is made to prevent the entrance of an evil spirit when a person gapes. The Jewish proverb, 'Open not thy mouth to Satan!' shows that the Hebrews associated the devil with a gaping mouth—a conclusion supported by the story narrated by Josephus,[12] describing how Eleazer, a Jew, cured demoniacs in Vespasian's time by drawing out demons through their nostrils by means of a ring containing a root of mystic virtue mentioned by Solomon. It was probably supposed that the evil spirits entered through the mouth and were exhaled through the nose, much in the same way as the Alfoors regard the wandering soul of a child as expelled with the exhaled breath, after having entered the body of a bystander through the mouth.

It will thus be seen that the folk-lore of yawning has arisen from the primitive doctrine of the separable soul and the notion of possession by spiritual beings. It is not surprising that the uncultured races should thus think of the relation of the human body to the spiritual world, since they are ignorant of the very rudiments of science and can only explain the phenomena of life, consciousness, disease, and death by what the senses seem to tell. In sleep, trance, and death the soul appears to leave the body. To the rude philosopher this is the only possible interpretation of the facts which his senses can give. The most natural means by which these exits and entrances are made is through the mouth, and therefore the opening and closing of this organ—especially in an involuntary act like that of yawning—is beset with no small danger. If the soul were to escape, it might never return, and, in consequence, death to the body would ensue. Likewise, when the mouth is open, a homeless spirit is liable to take up his abode in the body. To prevent this calamity, the entrance has to be carefully guarded.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

YEAR.—See CALENDAR.

YEMENITES.—See ARABIANS.

YENISEIANS.—See OSTYAKS.

YEZIDĪS.—The name of Yezidīs has been given to a religious sect numbering about 50,000 persons, scattered from Mossul to the Caucasic region (districts of Mossul, Van, Diarbekr, Bitlis). They call themselves Dasni and speak a Kurdish dialect.

At the head of the community is a *khalīfah*, who is a descendant of Shaikh Adi. Under him are *shaikhs*, *kawwals*, and *faqīrs*. Priesthood is hereditary. Morality is above the average in that part of the world. They are brave and shrewd. Their temperament is cheerful but calm. They have cleanly habits. Their women are not veiled and may receive strangers. They feel great repulsion for the colour blue. Being completely illiterate, they handed down their traditions orally. Their greatest festival is on 10th Aug., when a procession of flagellants takes place in the village of Ba'adri. There is the grave of their great saint, Shaikh Adi ben Musafir, who died in A.D. 1155. All around fires of naphtha and bitumen are kept burning.

The Yezidīs have been often persecuted by the Turks. During the 19th cent. efforts were made repeatedly to force them into the Turkish army. They have stubbornly resisted that pressure.

The origin of the word Yezidī has been much discussed. Most probably it is related to Av. *Yazata*, 'deity,' Pers. *Yazdān*, 'God.' It was given to them in contrast either to the Zoroastrians or to the Muhammadans. Although their priesthood is of the Muhammadan type and they recognize Muhammad and Abraham as prophets, they are far from being a Muhammadan sect. Nor are they Nestorians, although they have baptism and regard Christ as an angel in human form. In fact, they perpetuate with various admixtures a doctrine of the Magian type, combining Iranian and Assyrian elements. Their cult of fire is Iranian. They profess that the devil is a creative agent of the supreme God, inasmuch as he produced evil. Hence he deserves our adoration.

[1] E. H. Man, *On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, p. 94; *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 37.
[2] *Travels in West Africa*, London, 1897, p. 315.
[3] J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Göttingen, 1854, p. 1036.
[4] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, p. 107.
[5] H. Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1868–70, p. 263.
[6] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 122.
[7] Tertullian, *de Virginibus velandis*, 17.
[8] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 67 f.
[9] A. W. Howitt, *JAI* xiii. [1884] 456.
[10] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 122.
[11] H. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 504.
[12] *Ant.* VIII. ii. 5.

These ideas resemble closely Mazdæan cosmogony.[1] Zoroastrianism regarded the worship of the evil spirit (Ahriman) as an abomination, but this did not apply to all Iranian sects. The Mithraists used to offer sacrifices 'deo Arimanio,' and Plutarch[2] reports that the Magians invoked Hades and Darkness in a sombre place, with libations of the *haoma*-plant juice and of the blood of a wolf. No doubt, the devil-worship of the Yezidīs is a survival of the Magian sects who in those districts could resist orthodox Mazdæism.

The doctrine is supposed to be contained in a sacred book called *Yalvah*. It is said to be hidden on a mountain-top where nobody can go and see it. In fact, the real book, in the form in which it exists at present, is written in an obsolete dialect of Kurdish that apparently was in use in the time of Shaikh Adi. Particulars about the Yezidī books, their authenticity, and their contents are given by Bittner,[3] Mingana,[4] and Horten.[5]

Although the publication of these books has been on the whole disappointing, it has made more certain that Yezidism is an offshoot of Mazdæism. It is, in fact, simply an effort to bring unity in dualism. It secures that result through presenting darkness as a mere absence of light, and evil as imperfection the positive element of which is good in the eyes of God, whose plan it serves although, to our insufficient knowledge, it seems to be bad. The book literally says: "I [the Spirit of Good] am active in all events which the outsiders regard as bad because they do not answer to their wishes while they answer to mine." Sin therefore can only be a deficit which is to be made good through the wandering of the soul. The Good Spirit or First Principle is conceived in a pantheistic way as the light radiating from God and a kind of λόγος. It is compared to a white pearl in the sea of Chaos out of which everything has arisen. In this conception we recognize the White Hōm of Pahlavi books, a sacred plant growing in the sea Vourukasha and in which the creative power of God is contained. This white pearl is also a bird, a peacock, the most revered symbol of the Yezidīs (Malak-Tāus). It is also an old Iranian symbol. On the Gaokerna (another name of the White Hōm) growing in the cosmic sea roosts the marvellous bird Simūrgh (Av. *saēna*), who, under the name of Vāregha, is said to have seized the godly glory (Old Pers. *farnah*) that rested on Yima, the primeval king (also on Zoroaster). The λόγος-bird of the Yezidīs was also supposed to incorporate himself in prophets. They believe him to have manifested himself both in Christ and in Shaikh Adi. The Aryans often compared the sun to a bird. Preference is given to the peacock on account of its way of spreading out its tail like a wheel (the wheel is a still better known symbol of the sun). The same symbol has been found on a Coptic coffin, and in the sacred books of the Mandaites. To what extent the Yezidi doctrine is permeated by that old symbolism can be shown by a quotation from their books: "Before heaven and earth arose, God rested on the seas. He had made for Himself a boat and was sailing on the waves, glorifying Himself alone. Then emanated out of Him a white pearl, and He reigned upon it forty thousand years till He threw it off out of anger." This mysterious language is very much in the manner of the Iranian Bundahishn. It is clear only to those who know that the Iranians compared the sun not only to a bird but also to a ship.

1 Cf. art. ZOROASTRIANISM. 2 *De Is. et Osir.* 4.
3 'Die heiligen Bücher der Jeziden oder Teufelsanbeter,' *DWAW*, 1913.
4 *JRAS*, 1916, p. 505 ff.
5 *Der Neue Orient*, iii. [1918] 105–107.

LITERATURE.—J. Menant, *Les Yézidis*, Paris, 189?; J. B. Chabot, *Notice sur les Yézidis*, do. 1896; H. Lammens, *Le Massif du Gebel Simn*, Beirut, 1906; R. Frank, *Scheich 'Adi, der grosse Heilige der Jezidis*, Berlin, 1911; A. Mingana, 'Devil-worshippers: their Beliefs and their Sacred Books,' *JRAS*, 1916, pp. 505–526; M. Bittner, 'Die heiligen Bücher der Jeziden oder Teufelsanbeter,' *DWAW*, 1913; W. B. Heard, 'Notes on the Yezidis,' *JAI* xli. [1911] 200–219; M. Horten, 'Die Geheimlehre der Yezidi, der sogenannten Teufelsanbeter,' *Der Neue Orient*, iii. [1918] 105–107. A. J. CARNOY.

YGGDRASIL.—See NATURE (Teutonic).

YOGA.—

The word *yoga* has two meanings in India: (1) contemplation raised to a formal art, and (2) the system to be treated below, which is entirely taken up with it, gives it a philosophical basis, and ranks as one of the six systems of Brāhmanic philosophy. Contemplation exercises for the attainment of higher states of consciousness and faculties are very old in India. It has been shown, especially by Hermann Beckh (*Buddhismus*[2], 2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig, 1916), that they were of great influence at the foundation of Buddhism. The Yoga system had its rise at a later period, which cannot be determined with certainty. Nor is there absolute certainty yet about the age of the Yogasūtras, *i.e.* the text-book in which the system was first set forth by Patañjali. The Hindus unanimously regard Patañjali as the founder of the system and as identical with Patañjali, the grammarian, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, who lived in the 2nd cent. B.C. But Hermann Jacobi (*JAOS*, xxxi. [1911] 24 ff.) has made it probable on philosophic-historical grounds that the Yogasūtras were composed after A.D. 450 by another man of the same name. On the other hand, Bruno Liebich (*Zur Einführung in die indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft*, i. 'Das Kātantra,' Heidelberg, 1919, p. 7 ff.) has asserted noteworthy philological-critical grounds *for* the identity of the two Patañjalis. The question therefore still awaits the final solution. But in any case the Yoga system is in the main essentially older than the Yogasūtras of Patañjali. We find almost completely developed in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* the technique prescribed in the Yogasūtras.

In Indian literature the Yoga system is rightly regarded as a branch of the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*). For all the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya on cosmology, physiology, and psychology have been simply adopted by the Yoga. So, too, the doctrine of emancipation is the same—not merely the conception of emancipation itself as a complete separation of the soul from matter, but also the theory that this emancipation is effected solely by means of the clear distinction drawn between matter and spirit. The characteristics of the Yoga philosophy, apart from points of less importance, are—(1) the rejection of the atheistic views of the Sāṅkhya, and (2) the treatment of the doctrine of absorption as the most effectual means for the attainment of the knowledge that secures emancipation. The technical detail of the theory of absorption forms the proper contents of the Yoga system, and has given to it its own name; for *yoga* signifies originally 'yoking,' then 'diversion of the senses from the external world, and concentration of thought within.'

The object of the Yoga system in inserting the conception of a personal God into the Sāṅkhya is merely to satisfy the theists, and to facilitate the propagation of the theory of the universe expounded in the Sāṅkhya. The idea of God, far from being organically interwoven in the Yoga system, is only loosely inserted. In the Yogasūtras the passages that treat of God stand disconnected, and are, indeed, in direct contradiction to the contents and aim of the system. God neither creates the universe, nor does He rule it. He does not reward or punish the actions of men, and the

latter do not regard union with Him (at least according to the older doctrine of the Yoga) as the supreme object of their endeavour. God is only a 'particular soul,' not essentially different from the other individual souls which are coeternal with Him; the distinction consists solely in the manner of His connexion with matter. God cannot in this philosophy be conceived as existing unrelated to matter like an emancipated soul, for then He would be without consciousness. It is assumed, therefore, in the Yoga doctrine that the divine soul stands in an eternal and indissoluble connexion with the noblest and most refined constituent of matter, *sattva*, which is completely purified from the lower material elements; and that this soul is in consequence from and to all eternity endowed with supreme power, wisdom, and goodness. Being free from entanglement in worldly existence, which is full of misery, or in the cycle of births, God lives in eternal bliss, without merit or guilt, unaffected by all the impulses and fatal dispositions with which all other living beings are burdened.

It is evident that this is no God in our sense of the term, and that we have to do with perplexing speculations the aim of which is to conceal the originally atheistic character of the system, and to bring the assumption of God into bare accord with its fundamental teaching. Assuredly these speculations prove, were there any need at all for proof, that in the real Sāṅkhya-Yoga there is no room for a personal God. The two systems are frequently thus joined together in India, in order to emphasize their unity. The idea of God, however, once having been received into the Yoga system, it became necessary to establish a connexion between God and the world of mankind, for God could not continue to exist for His own sake alone. A relation between God and man was found in the fact that, while God does not bestow earthly or heavenly felicity (for this is to be obtained only by individual merit and springs necessarily from it), He in His mercy aids the man who is entirely devoted to Him to remove the hindrances which stand in the way of the attainment of deliverance. But even this slight relation dependent on human devotion to God and on divine favour is with difficulty intelligible as combined with the doctrine of the Yoga.

Nevertheless, in the later Yoga literature, especially in the numerous more recent Upaniṣads which are founded upon and develop the Yoga doctrine, the conception of God takes a much more definite place. God gradually becomes more personal, and the relation between God and man closer. Here also, therefore, the universal need of the human heart has proved stronger than the logical reasonings of philosophy.

The true subject of the Yoga is the doctrine, discussed at great length in the text-books, of *yoga*, or concentration of thought. These texts describe how the senses may be withdrawn from the objects of sense and reduced to inactivity, so that their natural tendency is reversed, and they assume altogether the character of the inner central organ, whose emanations they are; how, in the next place, the activity of the organ of thought, in which all the functions that are dependent upon the influence of the external world are suppressed, is wholly centred upon the *ātman* (the self, the soul); and how, finally, in the last stage of absorption, thought and its object completely coincide. By regular observance of the Yoga praxis the hindrances arising from our natural disposition, which make the attainment of saving knowledge so difficult, are most successfully overcome. When absorption has risen to such a height, or rather has penetrated so deep, that no wandering of thought towards other objects is any longer possible, when that disposition of our organ of thought which is prone to go astray can no longer manifest itself, the knowledge of the essential difference of soul and matter is revealed in the form of an intuitive perception, and therewith the final goal of human endeavour is reached.

The Yoga praxis consists in a series of stages which have to be traversed, in which external aids play a large part. Various bodily attitudes, named *āsana*, are prescribed, the counting of the inhalations and exhalations, but especially the holding of the breath, and the concentration of the gaze on a definite point—on the tip of the nose, the navel, etc. One result of these external Yoga practices is the loss of consciousness, the so-called Yoga-sleep (*yoganidrā*), which is considered to be a stage preceding emancipation, in those cases especially in which during the Yoga-sleep the life becomes extinct. That this Yoga-sleep, which naturally among Indians is regarded as a supremely marvellous phenomenon, is none other than the hypnotic sleep scarcely needs formal demonstration. In fact, the Yoga texts describe a whole series of hypnotic devices which have been effective at all times. Under the name of *trāṭaka*, for instance, Yoga texts which are themselves late, but rest upon an older tradition, enjoin the concentration of a steadfast gaze upon a small object until the eyes begin to shed tears. The result of such practices is declared to be that the body becomes as stiff as a piece of wood, *i.e.* becomes cataleptic. One method, which is especially significant in view of the artificial production of apparent death by the Yogins (see art. YOGĪS, and cf. James Braid, *Observations on Trance or Human Hybernation*, London and Edinburgh, 1850), is the so-called *khecharī*. This consists in artificially extending the tongue, bending it round and inserting the tip in the hollow of the throat, while at the same time the gaze is steadfastly directed on the spot between the eyebrows. Even among ourselves in recent times it has been noticed that the persistent turning upwards of the eyeball at a certain angle induces the hypnotic sleep.

When employing these methods the Yogī, according to the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* and other texts, before completely losing consciousness hears within his body (in the heart and throat, between the eyebrows, and in other parts) various sounds, viz. those of a drum, the roaring sea, the thunder, a bell, a shell, a reed, a lyre, and a bee. There can be no doubt that as a result of self-suggestion such sounds were actually heard.

The Yoga praxis when correctly and perseveringly observed has, according to the Indian view, therapeutic effects, and other consequences of various kinds. In particular, according to the belief universally held in India, the practice of Yoga procures for a man the miraculous powers often mentioned in Indian literature. When the authors of the Yoga texts hold out the promise of these supernatural powers, it must not be forgotten that these authors were men who regarded very seriously their task of expediting the final attainment of the supreme goal. They certainly did not intend consciously to deceive. They have simply given expression to the conviction of the Yogīs, who believed themselves by means of suggestion in the hypnotic state to be in possession of such powers. These alleged miraculous powers are, in fact, partly the same as our mesmerists think that they possess. Only a few of the many powers that are enumerated can here be named. Among them was the ability to become infinitely small or invisible; to swell to an

immense size, so as to reach even to the most distant objects—*e.g.*, to the moon with the tip of the finger—or to be transported anywhere by the simple act of will. There is mentioned also such an intensification of the perceptions that the most remote things, even though separated by intervening walls or the like, come under the cognizance of the senses, and the processes going on in the minds of other men become known in the same way (thought-reading). Other faculties obtainable are the knowledge of the past and future, especially of the hour of one's own death; or the ability to make the dead appear, and to hold converse with them. Many more are cited. That these miraculous powers may be gained by means of the Yoga praxis the most enlightened Brāhmans of the present day are themselves immovably convinced. The reason why such powers of the Yogī are not openly exercised is attributed to the preliminary condition of their attainment, viz. to the absolute indifference of the Yogī to the things of this world.

The conditions of ascetic contemplation practised in the Yoga are the final result of a long development, which takes us back to primitive times, to the ecstatic rites of savage peoples, of which we find traces also in the Veda. Following the analogy of primitive peoples of the present day, we may confidently ascribe to that early period the belief that it was possible by ascetic practices to win the power to hold intercourse with the spirit world, and in a marvellous way to change the ordinary course of nature. In ancient India the name for asceticism was *tapas*. This word signified in the first instance 'warmth,' 'heat,' 'fervour,' in the literal sense; then, 'the sweat generated by self-mortification,' and 'the condition of internal heat thus caused,' *i.e.* 'ecstasy.' As at the present day the conjurers among the Indians of America and among the Negro peoples are wont to proceed in a similar way, so according to the ancient Indian ritual the offerers of the Soma juice prepared themselves for their task by prolonged fastings, while, clad in dark skins of wild animals, and 'speaking in a stammering voice,' they tarried by the magic fire. The fact that the word *tapas* in its metaphorical meaning is found first in the later hymns of the Rigveda proves nothing against the extreme antiquity of the above-mentioned ideas or their practical application; for the circle in which the thought of the Rigveda moves has few points of contact with ascetic practices. *Tapas* meets us more frequently in the Yajur- and Atharvavedas, and very often in the literature of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. Since *tapas* occupies here the position of a cosmogonic power, by means of which the creator of the universe produces living beings and inanimate objects, it is evident that already at that period no less influence was ascribed to asceticism than in classical Sanskrit literature, in which the ascetics appear as all-powerful magicians. While, then, originally the ecstatic condition, in which man believes himself capable of rising to higher spheres, was sought mainly by fasting and other self-mortification, in India, owing to the increasingly introspective character of the spiritual life, stress was laid more and more on meditation and absorption. The conception of *yoga*, therefore, was developed out of that of *tapas*. In this meaning the word *yoga* is first met with considerably later than *tapas*. But the existence of the peculiar Yoga doctrine is certified already, as stated above, as early as pre-Buddhist times.

The attempt was made by A. E. Gough[1] to trace the origin of the Yoga praxis back to the influence of the dark-skinned races with whom the incoming Aryans mingled. For proof he relies upon Tylor's *Primitive Culture*,[1] where it is shown that the ecstatic conditions excited by meditation, fastings, narcotics, stimulants, or disease are held in high esteem among savage peoples. According to what has been stated above, there is no need to subject Gough's opinion to a more searching examination; for what he regards as a borrowing in historical times is, in fact, an inheritance from the most hoary antiquity of the Indo-Germanic race.

Mention must be made finally of a subordinate doctrine, which had its origin among the grammarians, but which then came to form a subject of discussion in the text-books of the Yoga system. This was a philosophical and philological theory on the relation of word and meaning. We read of a 'supersensible word' (*sphoṭa*), which is said to inhere in the word as formed by the letters, but to be distinct from it. That which thus conveys the meaning contained in the word as apprehended by the senses is explained to be an indivisible imperishable element which 'breaks forth,' *i.e.* manifests itself on the articulation of the sounds that form the word. It will be seen that a true thought is here presented, though obscurely expressed. This obscurity, however, will not appear strange to any one who considers that here for the first time a difficult problem is touched which since then has occupied many minds; for that 'supersensible word' is, of course, no other than the idea which is expressed by the combination of the letters.

LITERATURE.—R. Garbe, *GIAP* iii. 4B; cf. also A. Barth, *Religions of India*[3], London, 1891; Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[4], London, 1893; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, ch. vii., London, 1899; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, ch. xvi., tr. Edinburgh, 1905; J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903; *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*[2], tr. Cowell and Gough, ch. xv., London, 1894; P. Tuxen, *Yoga*, Copenhagen, 1911; F. H. Woods, *The Yoga-System of Patañjali*, Cambridge, Mass., 1914; T. W. Boissevain, *Yoga-Sootra's door Patanjali*, Haarlem, 1918; Emil Abegg, 'Die Lehre vom Sphoṭa,' in *Festschrift Windisch*, Leipzig, 1914. R. GARBE.

YOGIS.—*Yogī* is a term denoting in India a follower of the Yoga system (*q.v.*). The word is used especially as a name of the Brāhman ascetics, who devote themselves to the practice of *yoga* as laid down in the rules of the system, and seek thus to gain in the first instance the possession of miraculous powers, and finally deliverance from the cycle of existence. The *yogīs* in India are frequently, in consequence of the *yoga* exercises, plunged in hypnotic slumber, the so-called *yoga*-sleep; and several have been able to remain for a lengthened period in a cataleptic condition without any indication of life, thereby acquiring a reputation for sanctity. A few individuals, by virtue of peculiar disposition and constant training, have succeeded in so prolonging the cataleptic state that they have been able to allow themselves to be buried alive for several weeks without suffering any immediate injury to life and health.[2] In Indian story *yogīs* appear as wizards and all-powerful magicians. The feminine *yoginī* denotes a kind of witch in the train of Śiva and his wife Durgā. The most important of the Yogī sects are the Kānphaṭā Yogīs. See the following article.

LITERATURE.—J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903; R. Schmidt, *Fakire und Fakirtum im alten und modernen Indien*, Berlin, 1908. R. GARBE.

YOGIS (KĀNPHAṬĀ).—The Kānphaṭā Yogīs are a sub-sect of Śaiva ascetics, so called from their

[1] *Philosophy of the Upanishads*[2], London, 1891, p. 18 f.

[1] Vol. i. p. 277.

[2] Cf. James Braid, *Observations on Trance or Human Hybernation*, London and Edinburgh, 1850; Ernst Kuhn, as quoted in R. Garbe, 'Sāṅkhya und Yoga,' in *GIAP* iii. 4; R. Garbe, 'Über den willkürlichen Scheintod indischer Fakirs,' in his *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1903, p. 199 ff.

peculiar custom of slitting their ears (*kān*, 'ear,' and *phaṭā*, 'slit') and inserting huge earrings in the holes. They are also known under the names of Darśanīs from their earrings (see below), and Gorakhpanthīs or Gorakhnāthis from their founder Gorakhnāth (*q.v.*).

Their origin is involved in great obscurity. They trace their tenets to a much earlier period than Gorakhnāth's, and consider the latter as merely the reorganizer of the doctrine and the founder of the sub-sect. Gorakhnāth himself is said to have been a pupil of Machchhendarnāth (Skr. Matsyendranāth)—the Nepalese local deity [1]—who in his turn is represented as the pupil of Ādināth, and in some accounts the list is still more prolonged. A tradition current in N.E. Bengal (Rangpur District) identifies the Kānphaṭās with Śankarācharya's disciples, who, having taken to drinking, were consequently disowned by their teacher.[2] In the Tibetan tradition Gorakhnāth is recorded as a Buddhist thaumaturgus, and his Yogīs are accused of having passed from Buddhism to Śaivism simply to please their heretic rulers and to gain political favours.[3] What seems to be most likely, amidst the general confusion of the various accounts, is that the Kānphaṭā sect came from the north of India, where it was probably already in existence during the prevalence of Buddhism, but it grew to power only when the latter religion began to lose ground and Brāhmanism to make its reconquest. It is possible that, while Buddhism prevailed, the Yogīs could not help being in some way attracted into its sphere, and that Gorakhnāth was the man who rallied them out from the ranks of the Buddhists and brought their principles into harmony with the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*; and he was not much posterior to Śankara; at least he certainly acted under the influence of the Brāhmanic renaissance.

The particular tenets of the Kānphaṭās are also clad in darkness, not only for us, but even for their present adepts, who seem to have long forgotten them. Little light can be derived from the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*, a Yoga treatise,[4] which is said to be one of the books of the sect,[5] or from the *Gorakhnāth-kī Goṣṭhī*, a kind of controversial dialogue between Gorakhnāth and Kabīr concerning their respective doctrines.[6] All that can be gathered from the above sources is that the Kānphaṭās recognize Śiva as Supreme God, and hold that emancipation from worldly existence lies in the union of the individual soul with him, and recommend Yoga as the means of achieving this end. A short poetical composition, bearing the title *Gorakhnāth-ke Vacan*, is included among the works of Banārsī Dās,[7] a Digambara Jain poet, who flourished in the first half of the 17th cent., and who for some time in his youth had also been a follower of Śaivism (probably of the Lingāyat sect); but that too is of little help. The most important source of information, which has remained unedited to the present day, is, therefore, the *Gorakhbodh*, a work written in an old form of Hindī and reported to date from the 14th century.[8] The work is in rhymed prose, sixty stanzas in all, and is in the form of a conversation between Gorakhnāth and his *guru* Machchhendarnāth, the stanzas being a question and an answer alternately. Unfortunately the extreme conciseness and difficulty of the text and the particular character of the exposition make this source only partially utilizable; yet there seems to be sufficient ground in it for concluding that the system here expounded is a combination of Śaivism with the Yoga philosophy, and apparently closely related to the Śaivism comprehended by Mādhavāchārya under the name of *Śaiva*,[1] though different from it. The close alliance of the Kānphaṭā system to the Yoga both of Patañjali and of the *Upaniṣads* is visible from the prominent part given to the Yoga praxis as well as to the mystical theory of the circles in the body (*chakra, kausala*), arteries (*nāla*), vital air (*pavana*), and breaths (*haṃsa*).

According to the authority of the *Gorakhbodh*, the vital air resides in the circle of the navel (*nābhi*), and is supported by the void (*śūnya*), which is spread everywhere. In its turn, the vital air vivifies the *manas*, which resides in the heart. The *manas* is open to the influence of the moon (*chandra*), which resides in the sky, the vital air to the influence of the sun (*sūrya*), and the void to that of the time (*kāla*). There is, further, another element, the word (*śabda*), which resides in form (*rūpa*). Before the coming into existence of heart, navel, form, and sky, the *manas* was contained in the void, the vital air was shapeless (*nirākāra*), the word was unformed, and the moon resided in the intermediate space between heaven and earth. The void is of four kinds: *sahaja-*, *anubhava-*, *parama-*, and *atita-śūnya*, and it is to it that the vital spirits (*prāṇa*) resort during sleep or death. There are five principles (*tattva*), one of which seems to be *nirvāṇa*, and ten *dvāras*, or means of attaining perfection, which are not named.

From this it would seem that Gorakhnāth too resorted to a symbolism of the kind found in many of the *Upaniṣads*, especially the later ones,[2] to account for such metaphysical problems as cannot be solved by reason. The phrase *yato vācho nivartante*, occurring in the *Taittirīya* and *Brahma Upaniṣads* to signify incapability of definition, is also found in the *Gorakhbodh*, 50–51 (*vācha nivaiṭai*). Contrarily to what had been asserted on the authority of the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*,[3] a Kānphaṭā Yogī is not necessarily obliged to remain within a monastery, the second stanza in the *Gorakhbodh* allowing him to live in market-places and roads, and under the shade of trees. One of the most important features of the doctrine of Gorakhnāth is, no doubt, its universality, it being open to all castes and being not very particular in regard to food, in both respects bearing an analogy to the Vaiṣnava system of Rāmānanda. The affinity between the two systems is increased by the adoption of the same term *avadhūta* for the designation of their respective ascetics.[4]

The present Kānphaṭās are more or less spread all over India, and their customs are substantially the same in all places. They have no caste prejudices and freely eat flesh, with the exception of beef and pork, and indulge in spirits and opium, whenever they can afford it. They bury the dead. Those who take to secular callings are mostly money-lenders, weavers, cultivators, peddlers, or soldiers. They are said to be good soldiers, and

[1] S. Lévi, *Le Népal*, Paris, 1905, i. 347 ff.

[2] F. Buchanan, in R. Montgomery Martin's *Eastern India*, 3 vols., London, 1838, iii. 535 f.; G. A. Grierson, 'The Song of Mánik Chandra,' *JASBe* xlvii. pt. i. p. 139.

[3] Lévi, i. 355 f.; Tāranātha, *Gesch. des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. A. Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 255.

[4] See art. YOGA.

[5] H. H. Wilson, *Select Works*, ed. R. Rost, 2 vols., London, 1861–62, i. 214.

[6] W. Price, *Hindu and Hindustani Selections*, i. 140; Wilson, i. 213 f.

[7] See *Banārsī Vilas*, ed. Nāthū Rām Premī, Bombay, 1905, p. 209 f.

[8] The present writer was made acquainted with it through the kindness of Sir George Grierson, who lent him his own copy of the original MS, which is in the Darbār Library of Jodhpur.

[1] *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, vii.

[2] Cf. P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*², Leipzig, 1905, p. 542.

[3] Wilson, p. 216 n.; G. S. Leonard, 'Notes on the Kānphaṭā Yogīs,' *IA* vii. [1878] 300.

[4] Throughout the *Gorakhbodh* Gorakhnāth is addressed by Machchhendarnāth as *avadhu*, a corruption of *avadhūta*, and in the *Gorakhnāth-kī Goṣṭhī* he calls himself *Yogī Gorakha avadhūta*.

their military fame seems to be of an ancient date.[1] In some parts of India they live by singing cyclic poems[2] or religious songs.[3] They are generally believed to be soothsayers and sorcerers, and to have the power of curing children and protecting them from the evil eye.[4] Marriage is common among them.[5] Those who live by begging smear their bodies with ashes and wear a waist-cloth and an upper-sheet dyed in ochre, a woollen string (*jāneu, sailī*) round their neck with a horn-whistle (*nād*) attached to it, a wallet (*jholī*) hanging from their left shoulder, and a hollow gourd, in which to receive alms, in their right hand. But the great characteristic of the Kānphaṭās is the huge earrings (*darśana, mudra*) which they wear in their slit ears. These earrings are generally made of agate, horn, or glass, about 2¼ ounces in weight, and are conferred on the Kānphaṭās at the time of their initiation. They are worn as a kind of fetish and are regarded by them as the symbol of their faith.[6] The initiation takes place as follows:

> First there is a preparatory ceremony, in which the neophyte, after having been shaved and smeared with ashes, is invested with the woollen string and horn-whistle and is appointed to serve his *guru*. After a period of six to eight months, during which his conduct is strictly watched, the novice is admitted to the ear-slitting ceremony, which is performed before the head *guru* or the god Bhairava, with the novice sitting with his face turned to the north. The slit is made with a double-edged knife and is about three-fourths of an inch to an inch in length; in the wound a *nīmb* stick is inserted and the cure is made by a treatment of *nīmb* oil and daily bathings with pure water.[7] When the ear is well again, the earrings are conferred on the neophyte, and he has his name changed into a new one ending in *-nāth* and becomes a regular Yogi.

Of all Kānphaṭās of India the best known to us from trustworthy accounts are those of the west. These generally trace their origin to Dharamnāth, who is said to be one of Gorakhnāth's disciples, who went from Peśāwar to Kāṭhiāwār and Kachchh to perform penance and turned the sea between the two peninsulas into the present Raṇ. The Western Kānphaṭās live in monasteries, the most celebrated of which are that of Dhīnodhar in Kachchh on the edge of the Raṇ, which claims to have been founded by Dharamnāth himself on the spot of his penance,[8] and that of Gorakhmaḍhi in Kāṭhiāwār.[9] The characteristic of the Western Kānphaṭās is charity; they make it a rule to distribute provisions, twice every day, to any who ask for them;[10] they can well afford to do this, as they are rich and have been endowed with lands by more than one of the former Rāos. The monastery (*maṭh*) of Dhīnodhar Hill is the most important; it is a large fenced and turreted establishment, comprising dwelling-houses, temples, tombs of the former *pīrs*, halls for the treating of guests, etc. The *pīr*, or abbot, is held in great honour by the Rāo himself, who after his election invests him with a dress and instals him on his seat. Both the Yogīs and the *pīr* of Dhīnodhar are said to observe the strictest celibacy, but in the case of other monasteries the abbot (who takes also the name of *mahant* or *bāvā*) is allowed to marry and, failing issue, to adopt one of his disciples.[1] The chief object of worship of the Dhīnodhar Kānphaṭās is Dharamnāth, whom they habitually call by the term *dādā*, 'father.'

The Kānphaṭās of Bombay and Belgaum are peculiar in so far as they carry a trident (*triśūl*)—the emblem of the god Śiva—when they go for alms.[2] In Bombay they also carry a drum (*daur*), whence their name of Daurī Gosāins. These marry freely and are said to bury their dead in a sitting position. In most of Northern and Eastern India the Kānphaṭās still appear to perform some sort of sacerdotal functions, to officiate as priests in the temples of Bhairava, and even to offer sacrifices to the village-gods.[3] In Gorakhpur, where Gorakhnāth is said to be buried, they worship, besides Bhairava, a goddess called Bālā Sundarī,[4] which is probably another form of the Tripurasundarī of the Śāktas.[5] The Kānphaṭās of Benares have the temple of Kāl Bhairo as their headquarters and bury their dead in their own houses. The most depraved of all the Kānphaṭās of India seem to be those of the hills, who are said to follow the ritual of the *Tantras* and to indulge in the orgies of the left-hand Śākta cult.[6] These too, like the Kānphaṭās of Kachchh, trace their origin to Dharamnāth.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

L. P. TESSITORI.

YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.—The Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) was founded on 6th June, 1844, by George Williams. Twelve young men were present at the first meeting, which was held in his bedroom in St. Paul's Churchyard, London. Years afterwards it was discovered that of the twelve gathered in that upper room three belonged to the Established Church of England, three were Congregationalists, three Baptists, and three Methodists. It was the day of small things, and half a crown only was the weekly rent of the first headquarters of the movement. Organized Bible Classes became an important feature of the work in 1847, and in the following year the famous series of Exeter Hall Lectures was inaugurated. In 1851 Lord Shaftesbury became President, and in the following year a Y.M.C.A. was formed in Paris and another in Holland, whilst farther afield the movement took root in Adelaide, Calcutta, Montreal, and Boston, U.S.A. An epoch-making World Conference was held in Paris in 1855, when what is known as the Paris Basis was adopted, and on this simple statement of faith the Associations of the world, through their national organizations, are still affiliated. It reads:

> 'The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to unite those young men, who, regarding the Lord Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures, desire to be His disciples in their doctrine and in their life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of His Kingdom amongst young men.'

In 1863 the aims of the British movement were defined in the following words:

> 'The one great aim of the Association is to win young men for the Saviour,'

and that note has been dominant ever since. Educational features were adopted in 1864, and the Central International Committee as the executive of the World's Alliance was formed in 1878 with headquarters in Geneva. The jubilee of the movement was celebrated in London in 1894, and on that occasion the founder, George

1 See. J. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han*, 2 vols., London, 1829–32, i. 445 f.; K. Raghunāthjī, 'Bombay Beggars and Criers,' *IA* x. [1881] 145.
2 Martin, *Eastern India*, iii. 407, 534; Grierson, *op. cit.*
3 *IA* x. 146.
4 W. Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, iii. 158.
5 *BG* xxi. [1884] 183; *PNQ* ii. [1884–85] 964.
6 *BG* viii. [1884] 155; Crooke, iii. 156. According to George Le Grand Jacob's authority, a Kānphaṭā whose earring had been cut off did not allow his ear to be sewn up and a new earring provided, but chose to die instead.
7 *BG* v. [1880] 87, viii. [1884] 447; Crooke, iii. 156 f.
8 For a complete account of this monastery as well as of the Kachchhī legend of Dharamnāth see Dalpatrām Prāṇjivan Khakhar, in *IA* vii. [1878] 47–53; cf. also T. Postans, in *JRAS* v. 268–271.
9 *BG* viii. 155 f., 446 f.
10 According to the Kachchhī legend, this liberal distribution of food was enjoined on the monks of Dhīnodhar by Dharamnāth himself, as a reaction against the uncharitable character of the inhabitants of Kachchh.

1 *BG* viii. 155; Crooke, iii. 156.
2 *BG* xxi. 185; *PNQ* ii. 964.
3 Martin, *Eastern India*, iii. 536; Crooke, iii. 159.
4 Crooke, iii. 157.
5 Cf. R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* III. vi.), Strassburg, 1913, p. 146.
6 Crooke, iii. 158 f.

Williams, received the honour of knighthood from Queen Victoria. The official figures issued by the World's Committee show that on 1st Jan. 1920 the Y.M.C.A. was represented in 8789 centres, of which 6250 were in Europe, 32 in Africa, 2098 in America, 386 in Asia, and 23 in Australasia.

The Association has thus been in existence for three-quarters of a century, and in all parts of the world has proved the friend particularly of the young man away from home. The exceptional conditions of the Great War have brought it into the limelight and gathered round the Y.M.C.A. a host of new friends and naturally not a few critics. On the one hand, it has been urged by many that there is no need for the Y.M.C.A., and that the Churches can do all that is necessary as far as Christian work among young men is concerned. Many Christian people have gone even further and said, 'Drop the "Christian" out of your title and confine your efforts to social service, and you can count on our cordial support.' In like manner it was often said, even during the Great War, by certain Army people who had no sympathy with the higher aims of the Association: 'We have our own canteens, and, therefore, we do not need the Y.M.C.A.'—forgetting that the Association is something far more than a canteen and seeks to introduce through its programme that inspiration and uplift which men so greatly need.

Many have accused the Association of being too broad, and others have withheld sympathy and support because in their judgment it is administered on too narrow lines. Then, again, during the War many have accused the Y.M.C.A. of being too much commercialized, though, on the other hand, they insist on the work being self-supporting. The fact is that, if it was to meet the real need of the men during the War, it was compelled to trade, though never for trading's sake or for private profit, and indeed all the profits were spent for the direct and immediate benefit of the men.

The Y.M.C.A. commenced its work on somewhat narrow lines. It had a definite objective which it kept always before its members—to win men for Christ and to enlist them in His service. The story of the movement has been a story of gradual but steady and constant evolution. It has gradually extended, and to-day it stands for a broad progressive programme of Christian and social service. To appreciate the importance of the service it has rendered during the past seventy-five years, and the programme it is gradually evolving for the future, certain facts must be borne in mind concerning the Association.

1. **Its functions are those of the pioneer.**—It does not seek so much to build upon the foundations laid by others as to find new methods of serving and enlisting men. As an emergency organization it appealed to the imagination of the public in August, 1914, when, through its mobile machinery, it was able to meet a definite national emergency with unexpected rapidity. Long before the adaptation of the Labour Exchanges to meet the needs of discharged men, the Y.M.C.A. in London had its own employment agency, through which it found work for more than 20,000 ex-soldiers and sailors. Before the Armistice it had its own training workshops in London, Manchester, and other centres, and the little farm colony it has established in Dorset for tubercular ex-service men has been regarded by the authorities as one of the best things of the kind, though to meet the need fully the machinery of no private organization would be adequate. The Y.M.C.A. was the pioneer of the present Army system of education, and more than £140,000 was spent by the British movement on educational work among the soldiers in France. As the War went on, many other societies and private individuals organized recreation huts and tents on the lines mapped out by the Y.M.C.A., but it was the pioneering work in the early days of the century in volunteer and territorial camps that provided the experience upon which all this work in war-time has been built up.

2. **It is essentially an auxiliary movement.**—It does not profess to be an educational authority, but in a hundred ways it supplements the work of school, university, and educational committee. On the battlefield it supplemented the work of the official R.A.M.C., attending to the needs of the walking wounded, and in the base camps caring for the relatives who visited their loved ones when dangerously ill in hospital. So in like manner it seeks to supplement the work of the Churches, and has always resisted the temptation to develop into another denomination, whatever it may be called, or to take to itself functions that rightly belong to the Churches, or to supplant or in any way supersede their work.

3. **It is interdenominational rather than undenominational.**—It holds that the first duty of the member is to his Church. A recent official declaration states:

'(1) The Y.M.C.A. does not come on the scene to teach the Churches how to do their work, much less to supplant them. It desires to help and serve the Church as the permanent Divine Institution designed by God to help and save the world.

(2) It believes it is called of God to serve our soldiers, sailors, and airmen until demobilisation is complete, and then to continue to serve them when demobilised or disabled, and, as far as possible, all the young men and boys of the Nation in town and city, camp and barracks, village and hamlet, East End and West End, guiding and befriending them as they move from place to place, and looking after their interests when in response to the call of commerce or vocation they travel in search of health or wealth to the most distant parts of the British Empire, or to the utmost parts of the earth.

(3) It regards the whole world as its parish, believing that the work done during the war has demonstrated that the Red Triangle has a message for the men of every creed and nation. It believes it can help the Churches to find the key to the solution of one aspect of the Missionary problem, and that the "Hut" will prove as helpful to the young men of missionary lands as to those of our own country.

(4) It believes that the very success of its war service constitutes a challenge to undertake work on an adequate scale for the men and boys of every class.

(5) It holds that it is of more importance that the need should be met, and the work done, than that any particular society or organisation—even the Y.M.C.A.—should do it. It recognises that the field is so wide that there is ample scope for the activities of all societies that have the same end in view, and it earnestly desires that over-lapping and consequent waste of energy should be avoided, and all such work co-ordinated.

(6) It seeks to provide a rallying centre for those who, irrespective of distinctions of creed or party, desire to engage in social service and to work for the extension of the Kingdom of God.

(7) It would state definitely and categorically that, whilst fully recognising its position as an agency of the Christian Church, it regards as the primary aim of the movement the winning of young men for our Lord Jesus Christ, and the leading of them into the fellowship and service of the Churches.'

4. **It is missionary in its outlook.**—The mission of the Y.M.C.A. is to the man outside, and it seeks to touch him at every point and, as far as possible, in every place. It seeks to form a half-way house, a kind of communication trench, between the men of the nation and the Churches. It has always placed emphasis upon the work of the member in the sphere of his daily calling. Meetings for prayer and for the study of the Bible have ever held a prominent place in the programme of the Y.M.C.A., and it seeks through its members to proclaim the message of the Evangel in the language of the times. It has always made a feature of meetings in the open-air and in unexpected places. It counts more upon atmosphere than meetings, and depends, more than upon any other single factor, on the personality of its workers.

As may be inferred from the foregoing, the

Association has spread to non-Christian lands, where it has speedily become an indigenous movement. In India, China, and Japan it has been proved that the countries of the Orient can themselves provide leadership that will compare favourably with the best that the Western nations can produce.

5. It is essentially a layman's movement.—Possibly the greatest service the Association has rendered to the cause of Christianity has been in winning men when young for Christian discipleship and providing them with their first training in Christian service. Such training must often have been crude, but it has been practical and effective, and has provided the incentive to further study and an earnest longing for fuller knowledge. It will probably be conceded that the greatest weakness of many of the Churches to-day is to be found in their failure to fire the imagination of their male members and to enlist their co-operation in the work of winning men. This lack, to a certain extent, has been supplied by the Y.M.C.A.—to how large an extent has not been fully realized. Leading ministers of every denomination have told the story of the help and training the Association gave them at a critical period of their careers. It is true that many a branch of the Y.M.C.A. does not live up to the high ideals of the movement, but no Association is regarded as really efficient from the Y.M.C.A. standpoint unless it aims at keeping first things first and inspires young men to help their fellows in the daily fight against temptation. Emphasis is placed, too, on the importance of the voluntary worker. In the great city Association the General Secretary is the key to the situation. The work must be built up largely around his personality, but his business is to inspire men and work through his members. The very last thing to be desired is the development of a professional class of men, however able, who will do the work themselves rather than through others.

In the early days of the Great War the Y.M.C.A. had to face a serious crisis with regard to personnel. Hitherto it had been regarded as 'a work for young men by young men.' The very men on whom it relied for its ever-expanding war work were needed for the Army and Navy, and their places had to be taken by men who, through age or health, were disqualified for active service. It was soon found, however, that there were many things women could do even in the work of a Young Men's Christian Association, and, as a matter of fact, later on there were in the war service of the British Y.M.C.A. alone more than 40,000 women workers as compared with less than 4000 men. There can be no doubt that the Y.M.C.A. woman worker has come to stay, and that to the great advantage of the movement.

6. Emphasis is laid on practical service.—In the early days of the War some people spoke sneeringly of what they termed 'canteen religion.' As the War years passed slowly by, the vast majority saw its utility and learned that it was not incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord. He spoke of the 'cup of cold water' given in His name, and many a war-weary soldier saw the Master's hand in the hand that gave him a cup of hot coffee or cocoa when he was 'up against things' in the trenches. The Y.M.C.A. believes that the most effective way of combating intemperance is by providing an effective counter-attraction. Given the 'Hut' run by the right people and with a strong constructive programme, there will be little need to fear the wet canteen, the public-house, or the far more deadly drinking club. The Association seeks to promote purity of life, not only by education and precept, but also by making provision for the sexes to meet amidst wholesome surroundings and by catering for the leisure of young people. A well-equipped hostel is an important feature of most of the large city Associations at home and overseas, and in a hundred practical ways the all-round needs of young men and boys are being looked after. It is the conviction of the leaders of the movement that it is possible to serve God acceptably in any one of the many activities of the Association. The Hut, or the Red Triangle Club, as it is usually called, with its big lounge or common room, is regarded as a centre to work from, and an object lesson in practical Christianity. It is recognized that

> 'Where Truth in closest words may fail,
> Then Truth embodied in a tale
> Shall enter in by lowly doors.'

7. It is a unifying force.—Sir George Williams always regarded the prayer of the Master—'That they all may be one'—as a call and a challenge to the Association which he founded and with which his name will for ever be identified. Through the whole period of its existence the Y.M.C.A. has been a unifying force, though it has talked little about unity. It has provided a common platform for Christians of all denominations, and has actually succeeded in bringing together and uniting in Christian service those who never otherwise found opportunity to move beyond their denominational barriers. We believe it is destined to play an important part in years to come in bringing together class and class, party and party, creed and creed, nation and nation. None will be asked to give up their special beliefs or convictions, but all will be invited to co-operate in the service of the Kingdom of God. In the War the Association was allowed to serve the Indian troops only on condition that there should be no religious work as men commonly call work religious. There were to be no hymns, no prayers, no addresses, no distribution of Bibles or Testaments. The leaders of the movement gave their promise and carried it out to the letter. It is doubtful if anything that has ever been done will have more effect upon the future of Christianity in India than the unselfish Christian social service carried out by consecrated men under the sign of the Red Triangle. Not only during the War, but before and since, the Association has had the privilege of serving men of every nation and creed.

8. It begins with the boy.—The hope of the future of the Y.M.C.A. is to be found in the fact that it begins with the boy, and it seeks to get him at the age when he begins to feel too big for the Sunday School. If we can only reach and influence the boy during the crisis of adolescence, the future is assured.

9. The significance of the Red Triangle.—During the War the Red Triangle had become almost as familiar as the Red Cross itself. It typifies the service the Association seeks to render. Its very colour signifies sacrifice, and its three sides speak to the Association man of the needs of body, mind, and spirit, all of which may be consecrated to the service of the living God. Nothing that can be used to the glory of God is regarded by the Association as common or unclean. Its programme is ever widening and its roots getting deeper down. For years the leaders of the Y.M.C.A. set their faces steadily against even the most innocent of games, and, when these were included, another running fight, which lasted for years, took place over the proposed inclusion of smoking rooms and billiard tables. These have now become almost universal in Britain, though there are still many of the great Association buildings in the United States where smoking is

not permitted. More recent agitation has been in favour of cards, dancing, and the drama, and almost imperceptibly the Association has seemed to modify its position to meet the new needs of a new generation. Emphasis is placed on proper supervision, right company and hours, a programme that is clean and elevating and in connexion with which there is no gambling. It is urged that these innovations can only be included as part of a well-considered constructive programme. In these days, when there is a more or less general tendency to kill time, everything that can be done is being done to build up in every Association centre a programme that will lead the members on to aspiration and achievement.

Critics have accused the Y.M.C.A. of attempting the impossible, of building on the apex of the Triangle. They gladly accept the criticism. They *have* attempted the impossible, and by God's grace the impossible has been achieved, for the secret of the Red Triangle is that it is upheld by invisible hands.

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A. K. YAPP.

YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.—I. *IN GREAT BRITAIN.*—The Young Women's Christian Association (Y.W.C.A.) has been a growth, not an organization, a creation rather than a manufacture; its very nomenclature denotes this. Quite naturally and gradually branches have grown up all over the world. A branch involves a living organism, so that the Y.W.C.A. has sometimes been compared to a tree with its central stem and spreading branches whose leaves have been for the healing of the nations. As in all human activities, the spirit has been too often lost in the letter, and life cramped by form and substance; there have in consequence been many failures, but its motto, 'Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of hosts,' still binds the Y.W.C.A. together as an international federation; the British Y.W.C.A. was one of the first to join it.

1. **History.**—The history of the Association circles round three great events in the spiritual, social, and political realms which have in a special way affected women.

(1) First in 1855 began the spiritual movement which culminated in the revival of 1859–60 in Great Britain and Ireland, on the Continent, and in U.S.A. The idea that 'thy sons and thy daughters shall prophesy' was revived at this time, and it was then that women shared in the blessings which accrue from a fully developed spiritual ideal. To a daughter came the idea of forming a Y.W.C.A. worked as a prayer union for young women. Girls became anxious for the welfare of their friends, and, as the new tide of life began to flow, they were caught into it and began to realize their responsibilities. Up to that time it was not considered proper for a woman to attend even a missionary meeting, much less to go out as a missionary, or to take part in evangelistic work. The present writer remembers attending a meeting where no hymn could be sung, for it was not considered proper or right for a woman to raise the tune at a religious meeting, even when no man could do so. Emma Robarts asked ten friends to join her in intercession—a prayer union, as it was then called—and these women, filled with the spirit of revival, began to bring the names of others to be prayed for. A list of the first 27 members still remains in a tiny book, and a quarto sheet, of a few years later date, is in the writer's possession, containing a list of some 140 names, each undertaking some small piece of religious and social service. Gradually the list grew until 10,000 members were enrolled in different branches, each member being taught to realize her corporate as well as her individual responsibility. Thus the foundation of the Y.W.C.A. as a fellowship of service and prayer was laid.

(2) In 1887 came the social upheaval which followed the revelations of W. T. Stead. Wages boards were unknown, and few girls earned a living wage. The consequence was grave moral danger, and many indications of evil were discovered and made public at that time. It was an appeal to a Christian association of women. The London Y.W.C.A. made an appeal to the public which for the first time brought the Association into national prominence, and set it on its path of social as well as definitely religious work. Hostels were opened all over London and in other towns; the Travellers' Aid Society was inaugurated; the Park Mission for visiting in the London parks; and the Factory Helpers' Union, which has since developed into the Federation of Working Girls' Clubs, began its useful work under the Y.W.C.A.; while the Association gathered educated girls into a 'Time and Talents' movement, quickly followed by the Guild of Helpers.

An association which belongs to the British Empire and has its part in the life of a nation which has ever offered hospitality to the people of all nations could not fail to extend beyond its own borders. The Y.W.C.A. was carried to India, with Bombay as its first centre, to S. Africa at Cape Town, to the Continent, and to Australia. The Provincial Council (as the South of England Council was then called) had its links in many lands. The Y.W.C.A. became the office in England for the 'International Union of the Friends of Young Women,' an organization which had spread all over Europe. 'Prevention and Protection' was its watchword, and its motto 'By love serve one another.' A visit of the then president, the present Lord Kinnaird, with his sisters Gertrude

and Emily Kinnaird, to the U.S.A. brought the British Association into touch with a similar movement among students, which was organized along the lines of the Y.M.C.A., and formed the student department of the Y.W.C.A., which has been adopted in many lands as an integral part of the national Y.W.C.A. work of the country. This led to frequent communication and inter-visitation until finally an entirely new policy was adopted. All the branches which had been started by the British Association and linked to it, but which were not in Great Britain or Ireland, were cut off gradually and formed into national groups under national committees; each could make its own rules and affiliate to the World's Y.W.C.A. office.

(3) The third national movement which brought a call to the British Y.W.C.A. was the Great War of 1914–18. On the first day of war, 4th August, some of the workers met, and within a week called together the National Council to consider the responsibility of a women's association in time of war; it established a War Emergency Committee in the first month, which eventually developed into a War Department with six different committees. The Association put itself at the disposal of Government for anything that might concern women. It was found that London had become a cosmopolitan city, and girls of all lands were working in it. Immediately they were anxious to get back to their own country, the Y.W.C.A. provided the necessary links, and thousands of girls found that the Association Directory could guide them and that its membership meant friendship and fellowship above national or denominational ties. The Blue Triangle, similarly to the Red Triangle of the Y.M.C.A., became the symbol of Y.W.C.A. activities. It was evident to the nation that a Christian association could be looked to to provide for the physical and social well-being of the soldier boy and the girl war-worker. The War Department gradually became responsible for establishing and expanding work along two lines—those of providing for the mental and for the physical needs of girls—and on a third line to carry on the religious work of the Association, thereby completing the triangle symbol. The three—physical, mental, religious—are equally dependent on the spiritual force which energizes and binds them together. The Blue Triangle is now seen in Government enclosures and controlled factories, in the centre of busy cities and in the lonely countryside wherever munition and aerodrome settlements were established. It denotes to the girl of to-day, as the letters Y.W.C.A. denoted to the girl of yesterday, that family life, community life, and the life of the State are better if animated by the spirit of Jesus Christ their Lord, which is the animating spirit of the Y.W.C.A. The Association also makes its contribution to the Kingdom of God on earth by remaining in close relation to all the Christian Churches; it is strictly interdenominational, and its service is rendered to all women irrespective of creed.

2. Organization.—(*a*) *National.*—The activities of the Association are carried out on certain well-defined lines under the direction of: (1) the National Biennial Conference elected by the membership, thus aiming at the development of democratic management; (2) a National Council appointed at the Conference and composed largely of national and divisional office-bearers, with co-opted members, representative of labour and Church, meeting at least once a year; (3) a National Executive, meeting monthly to direct and evolve any activities necessary for the growing needs of the girls of the land. The work is directed by a president, four acting vice-presidents, a treasurer, a general secretary, and a staff of national secretaries.

(*b*) *Departmental.*—National, departmental, and sectional committees, meeting every month or in alternate months, are appointed for studying problems affecting girls, and thus a large body of women take part in and guide the activities of the Association. The Overseas and Foreign Committee seeks to interest members in Association work in non-Christian lands; secretaries are sent out to all parts of the world.

(*c*) *Basis and aims.*—All women taking up active work, salaried or honorary, on these councils and committees must agree with the basis and aims:

'Faith in God the Father as Creator, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, as Lord and Saviour, and in the Holy Spirit as Revealer of Truth and Source of Power for life and service, according to the teaching of Holy Scripture.'

'The aim of the Young Women's Christian Association is:—To call young women and girls to the allegiance of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the fellowship of His Church and the service of His Kingdom.

To unite them in a fellowship of prayer, Bible study and service, through which they may make their contribution to the spiritual, moral and social progress of the world.

To make available for them all that will minister to character, mental capacity and physical health.'

(*d*) *Training of secretaries.*—The aim is to have a well-staffed training centre where students offering for home or overseas work can receive a year or more of training, so that the Association secretaryship may be looked on as a vocation as important as teaching.

(*e*) *Headquarters.*—The Headquarters of the British Y.W.C.A. are at 22, 25, and 26 George Street, Hanover Square, London, W.1.

(*f*) *Membership.*—Membership in the Association is open to women who desire, in fulfilment of the motto, to serve one another and the world by love in the spirit of Jesus Christ. There are also associate membership and club membership which do not involve membership of the Association.

(*g*) *Magazines.*—By its literature the Association seeks to carry its ideals to all sections of the community. Its magazines are: *Woman's Outlook* (monthly), *Our Own Gazette* (monthly, for younger members), *Home and Overseas Bulletin*, *The World's Quarterly*, *The Y.W.C.A. Almanack and Motto Card*, *The Monthly Letter*.

(*h*) *Territorial work.*—The activities are carried on through divisions, embracing a given number of counties: London, East of England, Midlands, North of England, South of England, West of England, Scotland, Wales. Each has its president, general secretary, and council, and directs the work of the local branches by grouping them into district councils.

3. Methods.—Along the lines of the physical, intellectual, and religious development of the young women of the land, and through its departments, the Association moves forward. The most important methods are:

(*a*) *Canteens.*—The Y.W.C.A. has the honour of starting the first women's restaurant, which is still feeding hundreds of working girls at 'Ames House,' Mortimer Street, London, W.

(*b*) *Hostels.*—The largest of these is Bedford House, London. Others are Ashley House, London; 4 Saville Place, Newcastle; 116 George Street, Edinburgh; Sherbrook House, Bristol, etc.

(*c*) *Clubs.*—Clubs are carried on under the direction of a club-leader, who organizes their operations with the help of committees consisting of members, and encourages Y.W.C.A. membership, so that club-membership may lead to national and international interest in all that concerns young women.

(*d*) *Branches.*—Groups in any locality where there are a sufficient number of girls needing Y.W.C.A. fellowship and protection are called branches.

(*e*) *Holiday Homes.*—In Holiday Homes and Holiday Camps (with Convalescent and Holiday Club Department) recreation, fellowship, and comradeship are promoted, and all classes meet together.

(*f*) *The Social Question Department* is continually watching the needs of working girls and spreading information as to legislation on questions affecting women.

(*g*) *The International and Emigration Department* works in

co-operation with the Immigration Departments of other lands and the Employment Bureau (foreign), and seeks to solve some of the problems of household work by establishing training hostels and rewards for long service. The Blue Triangle Household Orderly Corps is the newest development.

(*h*) *The Educational Department*, with its libraries and a growing staff of secretaries, seeks to fit the girl of labour for her future life, and to induce the girl of education and leisure to share her opportunities with those who have fewer advantages. In clubs, though they are mainly recreational and social, it encourages study by means of circles and lectures. Co-operation with the Y.M.C.A. is being arranged. A Working Women's College has recently been established.

(*i*) *The Reception Hostel and Moral Question Department* has for its aim to maintain a Christian attitude towards all moral questions, and by practical work to help every girl to attain it.

(*j*) *The Religious Work Committee* touches the very centre of Y.W.C.A. work. Its aims are to promote the spiritual life of workers and members by Quiet Days, Retreat conferences, Camps, and Summer Schools. There are special secretaries for promoting Bible study, evangelistic efforts, prayer and fellowship, home study, and co-operation with the Church.

II. *THE WORLD'S Y.W.C.A.*—At first looked on as undenominational, the Y.W.C.A. has proved itself to be interdenominational. In its earliest years avoided by some sections of the Church, and its position misunderstood, it held to its principles, which have been formulated into a truly catholic basis, and with a truly world-wide aim—the winning of the girls of the world to recognize the claims of Jesus Christ as a personal Saviour and Lord.

The basis was at first that of the British Association, but at the Stockholm Conference the following was adopted:

'Faith in God the Father as Creator, and in Jesus Christ His only Son as Lord and Saviour, and in the Holy Spirit as revealer of truth and source of power for life and service, according to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures.'

The first World's Committee met in London in 1894; Mrs. J. H. Tritton was appointed president and Mary Morley treasurer. A sum of £800 was guaranteed by the United States and Canada, which were then united, and by Great Britain and Ireland, also united at that time. It was agreed that the general secretary of the World's Association should be from another country than that in which the World's Office was located, and therefore Annie M. Reynolds, the first general secretary, came from the U.S.A. An executive committee was chosen, composed of women resident at Headquarters, to which is committed the work for the period between one World's Conference and another. On this committee women of several nationalities have served during residence in London. The office was located first at 26 George Street, Hanover Square, and has since been removed to 22 York Place, W. 1. Although at present in London, there is no rule as to which country the office of the World's Y.W.C.A. should be located in. It is at the choice of the Quadrennial Conference. Two other national Associations were sharers equally with Great Britain and the United States in their moral earnestness and desire to form a World's Association—those of Norway and Sweden.

In the two years which intervened between the conference held in London, 8th–11th April 1892, and the formation of the World's Committee in 1894 the committee appointed had been carefully drawing up a constitution, which, while it should leave entire freedom of control and direction to each national organization, should guarantee federation on the basis of the voting membership of all branches according to each national membership. The object of the new body is threefold: (1) to bring into closer mutual knowledge the national associations already existing that they may be more practically helpful to those of their members who go out from their own country; (2) to help countries having only scattered Associations to form such into self-reliant national committees; (3) to develop a greater spirit of responsibility among the young women of Christian countries towards the young women of non-Christian countries.

The first four years—November 1894 to June 1898—had naturally to be spent in striving to attain the first object of the World's Association and in becoming mutually acquainted. The second object of the World's Association also had its place in the first year, when in May 1895 the Canadian Associations, through accredited representative and honorary secretary, made formal application for admittance. The American committee, under whose direction they had formerly been, appreciated their spirit of self-reliance and bade them God-speed. The year 1895 also saw a closer union established between the S. African as well as the Australian Associations. At the fifth regular meeting of the Executive Committee (9th March 1895), the third object, of greater interest in non-Christian countries, was foreshadowed by a note from Madras, India, recording that Agnes Hill 'has made a splendid start here and been greatly blessed in all her work since her arrival in India.' At the meeting of 18th Feb. 1897, formal notice was given of the organization of the National Committee of India, Burma, and Ceylon, with headquarters at Calcutta. Agnes Hill was asked to take the position of national secretary. China and Japan were not long in developing more purely Chinese and Japanese National Committees.

The first World's Y.W.C.A. Conference was held in London, 14th–18th June 1898. The basis of representation adopted was that each national committee should have the right to send ten voting delegates to the World's Conference, provided each national committee represented 100 or more branches; if it represented less than 100 branches it should have power to send only five voting delegates. Every five branches after that should have the right to send one delegate to the conference. It was recommended that a 'quarterly' from October 1898, called *The Women's International Quarterly*, be regarded as the official organ of the World's Y.W.C.A., that the second Sunday in November and the week following be considered as the International Week of Prayer for the World's Y.W.C.A., and that the Executive Committee be empowered to select a suitable international badge, which is now the Blue Triangle.

The first event of active importance after the conference was the application of the German national council for affiliation with the World's Association.

At the London conference eighteen countries were represented, at Geneva (1902) nineteen. At the London conference English had been the only language; in Geneva French was the prevailing language. The Geneva conference was privileged to welcome the Danish national committee to active membership in the World's Association.

All through the Great War, although no international work could be undertaken, there was no breach in the World's alliance, and most national associations developed on very similar lines. In June 1920 representatives of 28 countries met at Champeri, Switzerland, for a World Y.W.C.A. Commission to inquire into the social and industrial conditions which affect women so largely. It was followed by a meeting of the World's Y.W.C.A. Committee, the meeting of which had been suspended during hostilities. No affiliated country held aloof, and there were added representatives of South America and Central Europe, on which continents Associations are rapidly developing.

LITERATURE.—The work which the Y.W.C.A. is doing is recorded in its magazines. The chief of these are (1) *Our*

Own Gazette, (2) *The Y.W.C.A. Monthly Letter*, and (3) *The Y.W.C.A. Bulletin of Home and Overseas News.*

For further information the following publications may be consulted: *The Y.W.C.A. Overseas; The Y.W.C.A. in China; The Y.W.C.A. in Africa; The Woman's Movement in India; Social Service in South Africa: The Y.W.C.A. and Reconstruction; The Y.W.C.A. and Education; The Y.W.C.A. in the Twentieth Century.* These publications are all issued at the offices of the Y.W.C.A. in London and New York.

EMILY KINNAIRD.

YUAN-CHWANG, FA-HIAN, and I-TSING.

—Yuan-chwang (Hiuen-tsiang), the greatest Chinese traveller in India (A.D. 629–645), is also one of the most important figures in the history of the development of Chinese Buddhism. There were three pilgrims before him, among whom Fa-hian was the first to penetrate (A.D. 399–413) into the holy land of the Buddhists, and his return marks a step in the progress of the study of Buddhist literature, while the two others, Sun-yun and Hui-seng (A.D. 418) by name, left only a short narrative of their travel[1] and do not seem to have done any important work at home, though they brought back with them some 170 Buddhist texts. After Yuan-chwang in the T'ang dynasty there were so many travellers in India that those recorded by I-tsing alone amount to 56.[2] The recorder himself, who stayed for a prolonged period (A.D. 671–695) in India and the Malay islands, was by far the most prominent among them and the only scholar who could in any way be compared with Yuan-chwang himself.

The three, Fa-hian, Yuan-chwang, and I-tsing, are styled in Japan the 'three mirrors that reflect Indian Buddhism.' They are therefore treated together in the present article.

1. **The routes.**—There were from of old four principal routes into India, two through Central Asia, the northern and the southern. On his journey out Yuan-chwang took the northern road through Turfan, Kucha, Issik-kul, Tashkend, Samarkand, Kunduz, Kabul, and Peshawār, while on his way home he preferred the southern road, turning eastward from Kunduz and passing Pamir Kul, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and Nainshe (Ansi).[3] The southern road is much shorter and the most direct way to India, and corresponds roughly with the route of Fa-hian and other predecessors. The third route to India was through Tibet, leading either to Bhutan or Sikkim or sometimes to Nepal. During the T'ang dynasty there were many who took this road, especially after the marriage of a Chinese princess to the Tibetan king Srong-tsan-gampo, who sent envoys to India in A.D. 632.

The fourth route was the over-sea one which was chosen by I-tsing, who embarked in a Persian ship from Kwang-tung to Sumatra, where he changed to a Malay boat, sailing through the strait to Tāmralipti near Calcutta. Fa-hian as early as A.D. 413 embarked in a Brāhman ship to cross the Indian ocean to Java, there taking another merchant ship for China. Thus the journey to India of the earliest traveller Fa-hian was over-land, and his return journey over-sea *via* Ceylon and Java. Yuan-chwang, on the other hand, confined himself to the over-land route, not even crossing over to Ceylon, while the last pilgrim I-tsing took the sea route both ways.

2. **Records.**—(*a*) *Fa-hian.*—As he himself says towards the end of his record, Fa-hian started in A.D. 399 from Ch'ang-an, the western capital of China, reached India after six years, and, staying there another six years, returned in A.D. 413, spending three years on the way. His record, which was finally revised in A.D. 414, was called sometimes *Fo-kwo-ki*, 'Record of the Buddhist Countries,' or simply *Fa-hian-chüan*, 'Record of Fa-hian.'[1] The word 'high priest' is often added before the title *Fa-hian-chüan*, so it is certain that this designation was not given by the author himself. At the beginning of the record we find a note, 'Fa-hien's own record of his travels in India,' which is in all probability the writer's original title. The work was rendered into French by A. Rémusat in 1836, into English by S. Beal in 1869 and 1884, and again by J. Legge in 1886, the last with the Chinese text as well.

His six years' travel, beginning from Peshawār and ending at Tāmralipti, covers almost all parts of India, 30 countries in all, except the Dekkan, which he himself says that he could not visit. From Tāmralipti he crossed to Ceylon, thence to return to China.

When he left China, he was accompanied by some ten priests, but a party of three went to Turfan in the second year with the intention of getting the royal patronage there, and another party of three retraced their steps from Peshawār to China in the fourth year for a reason not stated, while two others died in Peshawār and on the Hindu Kush. Fa-hian with his sole companion Tao-chêng visited Mathurā, Kanauj, Śrāvastī, Kapilavastu, Vaiśālī, and Kuśinagara, and, having made a pilgrimage to all the sacred spots of the Buddha, came to Pāṭaliputra, whence they visited Rājagṛha, Gayā, Kukkuṭapadā, and Benares. They returned to Pāṭaliputra, where they sojourned three years and collected and copied the sacred texts of various schools. Tao-chêng was charmed with the fine discipline of the Buddhist order there, and, having been disgusted with the ill-regulated manners of the Chinese Buddhists, he decided to live in India and never to return home. Fa-hian, whose desire was to enlighten China by his newly-acquired knowledge, took leave of his companion and travelled alone farther down the Gangā to Campā and Tāmralipti on his way home. He seems to have found Buddhism in general in a very flourishing state, as it was in the imperial Gupta period. Though the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna are mentioned now and again, there are as yet no traces of a dispute between the two schools nor signs (such as we find in Yuan-chwang's record) of either being much more influential than the other.

(*b*) *Yuan-chwang.*—The record of the great traveller is handed down to us in three forms. The first is of course his own work, *Hsi-yü-chi*, 'Record of the Western Region,' in 12 volumes, translated by Yuan-chwang and compiled by Pien-chi, his pupil, A.D. 646.[2] The travels cover 138 countries in all—110 which he himself visited and 28 of which he gathered news from his informants, as we are told in an introduction by Ching-po.[3] The characters and usages of the people and the state of Buddhist learning and practices are minutely described. The book is unique and in-

[1] Samuel Beal, *Fô-kwô-ki by Fâ-hien*, London, 1869 and 1884, pp. 174–208.

[2] Edouard Chavannes, *Voyage des pèlerins bouddhistes, mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pays d'occident, par I-tsing*, Paris, 1894.

[3] Tao-hsüan, in his geography of the region of the Śākya (Bunyu Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1470), calls this route the 'middle' and the Tibetan road the 'southern.' Hui-lin, in his *In-i* (vol. 81), describes the Tibetan route rather minutely (Tokyo ed., case 39, vol. x. fol. 45a).

[1] Nanjio, no. 1496. [2] *Ib.* no. 1503.

[3] This introduction was not translated by Julien. The separate edition of Kyoto University has it. In the postscript of the record it is expressly said that the use of the word *hing* ('gone') indicates a country which was visited by Yuan-chwang himself, while the word *chih* ('arrive') shows a place which was described from hearsay. Thus we can easily distinguish the countries which the traveller did not visit, *i.e.* 21 countries in Central Asia (vol. i.), Nepal in the Himālayan district (vol. vii.), Ceylon and Persia (vol. xi.), and 4 countries again in Central Asia (vol. xii.), 28 altogether. It is strange that no scholar has hitherto called attention to this fact.

dispensable for the study of Indian history and the geography of the Buddhist period. In 1857 Stanislas Julien published his French translation with the title *Mémoires sur les contrées occidentales traduits du sanscrit en chinois, en l'an 648*[1] *par Hiouen-thsang*,[2] *et du chinois en français par St. Julien.* An English translation by S. Beal followed in 1884 with the title *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World, translated from the Chinese of Hiuen-tsiang*, 2 vols., London.

The second is a résumé of Yuan-chwang's travels contained in the *Record of the Region of the Sākya* in 8 books by Tao-hsüan.[3] It is interesting to note that the author was Yuan-chwang's pupil and one of his assistant translators, and that the work was compiled during Yuan-chwang's lifetime, *i.e.* A.D. 650.

There seems to have been another work in 10 books entitled *Hsi-yü-chïan*, 'Record of the Western Region,' by Yen-ts'ung, another pupil of the traveller. This record, it is said, treated more of the Indian life than the religion itself, whereas the traveller's own *Mémoires* paid more attention to the religion than the life. Tao-hsüan says in his own preface that both of these were too minute and copious for general information and that this very fact led him to a fresh compilation of his own work. No European translation of it has as yet appeared.

The third is a curtailed form of the *Mémoires* given in the life of Yuan-chwang in 10 volumes, compiled by Hui-li and annotated by Yen-ts'ung, A.D. 665.[4] Julien published it, at the same time as the *Mémoires*, in an abstract under the title *Histoire de la vie de Hiouen-Thsang et ses voyages dans l'Inde, 629–645*, London, 1853, and Beal has also given us a similar abstract.

So far as Yuan-chwang's routes and geographical names are concerned, Thomas Watters, a great Chinese scholar, did a great deal, and the result of his studies was published in 1904–05 by T. W. Rhys Davids and S. W. Bushell with the title *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–645, by Thomas Watters.* His researches are accurate as usual, and, if he could have made more use of the results of the Indian and Central-Asian excavations and several old MSS of the record discovered in Japan, nothing would remain to be desired.

Yuan-chwang's record can be divided roughly into five parts: (1) a general introduction to Jambudvīpa and a description of Central-Asian countries along the northern route, *i.e.* Agni to Kapiśa (vol. i.); (2) a detailed introduction to India (name, geography, calendar, life, language, customs, religion, castes, products, etc.) and a description of countries in the Panjāb and in the north of the Gangā as far down as the valley of the Gandaki, *i.e.* Lampā to Nepal (vols. ii.–vii.); (3) a detailed description of Magadha, including Nālanda (vols. viii.–ix.); (4) the lower region of the Gangā, countries on the south sea coast, in the Dekkan and on the lower Indus, *i.e.* Iraṇa to Varaṇa (vols. x.–xi.); (5) Central-Asian states along the southern route, *i.e.* Jāguda to Khotan (vol. xii.).

A résumé of the contents can be obtained best from Watters' work, which gives the travels in their shortest possible form. Further, a lengthy note on the itinerary was added by Vincent A. Smith at the end of the work.

When Yuan-chwang, as a young and brilliant scholar, expressed his desire to visit India, there seem to have been some willing to accompany him in his journey, but when he came near to the Desert he had only two companions, of whom one was sent back to China as he was thought unfit for the hardships of the journey, while the other started in advance to T'un-hwang and was heard of no more. Finally, when he took leave of his patron the king of Turfan, four novices were allotted to him as his attendants. The king helped him with brotherly care and introduced him to many of the Central-Asian chieftains; consequently he was welcomed everywhere and travelled with great facility. In India too he was patronized by King Harśa of Kanauj and had opportunities of meeting many worthies and savants of his time. At Nālanda, the then centre of the Mahāyāna learning, he found an able teacher in Śīla-bhadra, the president of the university, and there he spent several years[1] learning Sanskrit and chiefly Buddhist idealism, occasionally discussing or disputing with sectarian teachers. The interest of the Buddhists of his time seems to have centred in the Mahāyāna, though the Hīnayānistic schools too were followed in all India.[2]

(*c*) *I-tsing.*[3]—I-tsing's record was called *Nan-hai-chi-Kuei-nei-fa-chïan*, 'Record of the Buddhist Practices sent home from the Southern Sea,' in four volumes.[4] The 'Southern Sea' means in Chinese the Malay islands (Sumatra, Java, and the neighbouring places). It is so called because he sent his record home while he was sojourning in Palembang (Bhuje), Sumatra, collecting and copying Sanskrit Buddhist texts. The record was translated into English by the present writer in 1896 and published at Oxford with the title *A Record of the Buddhist Religion in India and Malay Archipelago* (A.D. *671–695*) *by I-tsing.* The text is entirely different from the two preceding ones, inasmuch as it records only the religious life and practices, especially discussing minute points of the Vinaya rules. The author does not describe his travels at all. The record will prove indispensable, however, when research into the Vinaya branch of Buddhist literature is seriously taken up. Further, it is very interesting that he limits his discussions of the Buddhist practices to the Sarvāstivāda (realistic) school. For it is a very difficult task definitely to class Vinaya practices of that epoch in various schools.

There is another record by I-tsing giving biographical notices of 56 Chinese priests who travelled in India before or during his stay abroad.[5] This is practically a book of travels, and it is in this that he describes the incidents which happened on his journey to India, the chance return to China, and the second sailing to Sumatra to copy the sacred texts.[6] E. Chavannes published his French translation of it in 1894, with the title *Voyages des pèlerins bouddhistes, mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pays d'occident, par I-tsing.* The two records of I-tsing should always be consulted together, for the whole of his life and work cannot be known without either one.

The biographer[7] tells us that I-tsing was 25 years (A.D. 671–695) abroad and travelled in more than 30 countries. That he made a pilgrimage to all the sacred spots of the Buddha can be seen from his own narratives, but we cannot state with certainty that he travelled in so many countries as the biographer asserts.

As was the case with Fa-hian and Yuan-chwang, he had some five or six followers at the outset, but finally started with only a young priest, Shan-hing by name. In India he himself says that he lived ten years in the University of Nālanda (probably A.D. 675–685), chiefly studying the Vinaya. On his way home he stayed in Palembang, Sumatra, to collect and copy more of the Sanskrit texts.

[1] This date must be a mistake. Yuan-chwang's own memorial to the emperor T'ai-tsung on the presentation of the record is dated the 18th of the 7th moon in the 20th year of the Chêng-kuan period, *i.e.* 646. Julien's Chinese text probably did not include this memorial.

[2] Hiouen-thsang = Yuan-chwang. Seven different ways of spelling the name have been discussed by Rhys Davids (see T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–645*, 2 vols., London, 1904–05, i. 17).

[3] Nanjio, no. 1470. [4] *Ib.* no. 1494.

[1] According to the life of Yuan-chwang (vol. iii.), he stayed there five years. Vincent Smith makes it two years (see Watters, ii. 325).

[2] *JRAS*, 1891, p. 420. [3] Otherwise spelt I-ching.

[4] Nanjio, no. 1492. [5] *Ib.* no. 1491.

[6] These facts are summed up in the present writer's introduction to *Life and Travels of I-tsing*, p. xxv.

[7] Nanjio, no. 1495.

One day he wanted to send letters home and went on board a merchant ship, when a favourable wind began to blow and the ship set sail at once. He thus came back by chance to Kuang-tung, and, meeting his old friends, tried to obtain some new companions for his work abroad. At last he succeeded in finding four able assistants, Chêng-ku, Tao-hung, etc., with whom he set out once again in A.D. 689, when he was fifty-five years of age. He finally returned in midsummer A.D. 695.

3. Their work at home.—Buddhism was introduced into China in A.D. 67. The emperor Min-ti sent envoys to India and invited two Buddhist priests, Kâśyapa Mâtaṅga and Fa-lan[1] by name, to come to China. They were stationed in a specially built monastery called the 'White Horse' and were kept busy translating. The following three centuries were a period of translation by foreign priests. This we can call the first period of translation (A.D. 67–414). Those foreign priests who came from India itself were surnamed 'Chu,' a curtailed form of 'Tien-chu' (=Sindhu, *i.e.* Indian),[2] while those from Yue-chi (Kuṣana) were styled 'Chi.'[3] Those surnamed 'An' are from An-hsi (=Arsak, Parthian),[4] 'K'ang' from K'ang-chü (=Samarkand)[5] and 'Po' from Kucha (for the royal family was so named).[6] There were practically no Chinese priests who carried out translations by themselves, though there were a few who assisted in the work as subordinates.

The second period of translation (A.D. 414–645) was inaugurated by Fa-hian's return. He brought home the Vinaya texts of the Mahâsaṅghika and the Sarvâstivâda schools, the *Mahâparinirvâṇa Sûtra* of the Mahâyânists, and also the *Abhidharma-hṛdaya Śâstra*; and he himself did the work of translating some of these texts[7] with the assistance of Buddha-bhadra, an Indian priest. Almost at the same time Chi-yen[8] and Pao-yun,[9] his companions half-way to India, and Chi-mang[10] and Tao-tai,[11] both of whom went to India soon after Fa-hian, followed the latter's brilliant example in independent translations. Many priests seem to have done the same, though some of their works are lost.[12]

This period of translation, though conducted by Chinese priests, was not without brilliant works achieved by gifted foreigners, such as Kumârajîva,[13] who is said to have had 3000 pupils, Guṇabhadra,[14] Paramârtha,[15] Bodhiruchi,[16] and Jñânagupta.[17]

The above two periods are generally designated the old era of translation. The following period opens the new era of translation (A.D. 646–1127), which was begun by the epoch-making work of Yuan-chwang[18] and was continued by I-tsing,[19] the two being the most prominent figures in the Buddhist culture of the T'ang dynasty. Yuan-chwang brought home the Mahâyâna *Sûtras* (224 texts), the Mahâyâna *Śâstras* (192 texts), the works of the Sthavira school (14), those of the Mahâsaṅghika school (15), those of the Sammitîya school (15), those of the Mahîśâsaka school (22), the Kâśyakîya texts (17), the Dharmaguptîya texts (42), the Sarvâstivâda texts (67), the Hetu-vidyâ (Logic) (36), and the Śabdavidyâ (Grammar) (13), altogether amounting to 520 bundles and 657 different texts. What he specially laid stress on was the Vijñânamâtra doctrine (idealism), and he may be deemed the founder of the Buddhist idealism in China.

The catalogue of I-tsing's collections is not given so minutely as his predecessor's. The Sanskrit texts of the *Tripiṭaka* collected by him during his stay of ten years at Nâlanda were nearly 400 in number, amounting to 500,000 *ślokas*, which he himself says he had in hand whilst in Palembang.[1] What he considered most important was the Vinaya literature, and his translations in this branch of study are very full and minute, especially in the Vinaya of the Sarvâstivâda (realistic) school, which amounts to 19 texts in 209 volumes out of 56 texts in 256 volumes in all. His works in this line are generally called the 'New Vinaya,' while those of Tao-hsüan, a pupil of Yuan-chwang, and of the other predecessors are styled the 'Old Vinaya.'

Thus he founded a new school in the study of this branch of Buddhist literature and made his own school the most influential of all. The work of translation in the T'ang dynasty was on a grand scale. All had to be done by the imperial sanction, so many officials and assistants being specially appointed. The completed texts had to be presented to the imperial court to be authorized for publication or to be incorporated into the Buddhist library.

This new era was further enriched by the works of Amoghavajra,[3] Dharma-deva,[3] Dâna-pâla,[4] etc., but their translations, numerous as they are, cannot be compared in nature and bulk with those of Yuan-chwang and I-tsing, for almost all of them are *dhâraṇîs*, *stotras*, or mystic texts of the kind.

With the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1127) the periods of translation which were so ably represented by the three travellers practically came to an end, Indian Buddhism gradually giving its place to Tibetan Lamaism.

LITERATURE.—All the translations of the records referred to have been indicated in the article. For reference the following may be recommended: J. Legge, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms, being an Account by the Chinese Monk Fâ-hien of his Travels in India and Ceylon* (A.D. 399–414), Oxford, 1886; S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World: translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang* (A.D. 629), 2 vols., London, 1884; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–645*, 2 vols., do. 1904–05; E. Chavannes, *Voyage des pèlerins bouddhistes, mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents . . . dans les pays d'occident, par I-tsing*, Paris, 1894; J. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion in India and Malay Archipelago* (A.D. 671–695) *by I-tsing*, Oxford, 1896; E. Chavannes, *Voyage de Song-yun dans l'Udyâna et le Gandhâra* (518–522), Hanoi, 1903; E. Chavannes and S. Lévi, *L'Itinéraire d'Ou-Kong* (751–790), Paris, 1895.

J. TAKAKUSU.

YUCATANS.—See MEXICANS.

YUGRA.—See OSTYAKS.

YULE.—See CALENDAR (Teutonic), CHRISTMAS CUSTOMS.

1 Nanjio, appendix ii. 1–2.
2 *Ib.* 2, 5, 11, 20, 23, 27, 38, 47, 48.
3 *Ib.* 3, 7, 18, 22, 33, 35, 37.
4 *Ib.* 4, 6, 17, 25.
5 *Ib.* 8, 14, 21, 41.
6 *Ib.* 16, 28(?), 36; see Sylvain Lévi, 'Le "Tokharien B," langue de Koutcha,' *JA*, Sept.–Oct. 1913, pp. 371, 377, 378.
7 *Ib.* 45 and *Cat.* nos. 118, 120, 676, 1150.
8 *Ib.* 76.
9 *Ib.* 77.
10 *Ib.* 70.
11 *Ib.* 71.
12 *Ib.* 49, 50, 51, 82, 84, 87–91.
13 *Ib.* 50 (he translated 50 texts).
14 *Ib.* 81 (he translated 27 texts).
15 *Ib.* 104–5 (42 translations).
16 *Ib.* 114 (30 translations).
17 *Ib.* 129 (36 translations).
18 *Ib.* 133 (76 translations).
19 *Ib.* 149 (56 translations).

1 Chavannes, *Mémoire d'I-tsing*, p. 125.
2 Nanjio, appendix ii. 155 (108 translations).
3 *Ib.* 159 (118 translations).
4 *It.* 161 (111 translations).

Z

ZAIDI.—Zaidi (Zaidiyyah; in Arabia Zuyud) is the name of a Muhammadan sect, called after Zaid, son of 'Alī, son of Ḥusain, son of 'Alī, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. This person came forward as a pretender in the reign of the Umayyad Hisham (121–122 A.H.) in Kufah, was defeated, and was put to death. His story is told with unnecessary prolixity by Ṭabarī.[1] His sect survived, though doubtless in secret, in Kufah, where they were concerned in various risings of 'Alid pretenders, such as those of 151, 250, and 251 A.H.;[2] on the last occasion they are called 'men of wool,' *i.e.* ascetics, and the same historian casually mentions them after this time among heretical sects.[3] If it be true that Harun al-Rashid employed one of the community to assassinate Idris, founder of the Idrisi dynasty of Fez,[4] it is likely that they were tolerated by the legitimate khalīfahs to the same extent and for the same services as were afterwards the Assassins by the Egyptian sultans.

1. History.—The first dynasty founded by a member of the sect was that of the Idrisids (172–362 A.H. = A.D. 788–973), called after Idris b. 'Abdallah, a descendant of Ḥasan, who, after a rising organized by a nephew of his in the Ḥijaz in the time of the 'Abbāsid Mahdī had been suppressed, escaped into Africa and gained a following among the Berbers of Ulīli (Volubilis) near one of the sources of the Sebou. After winning over or subduing a great number of tribes, he took the title khalīfah, and was, as has been seen, assassinated by an emissary from Baghdād in A.D. 793. He was succeeded by his infant son, called by the same name, who founded in 808 the city of Fez, which became the capital of the dynasty. Its population was supplemented in 814 by some 8000 families exiled by al-Ḥakam from Cordova, but welcomed by Idris II., 'whose subjects, being for the most part nomads, showed an invincible repugnance to becoming citizens.'[5] At the time of his death, in 828, his kingdom comprised the whole of the Farthest Maghrib and reached Mīna in the Central Maghrib. His successor Muhammad divided his territories (other than Fez itself and its neighbourhood) between eight of his relatives, reserving the capital and the suzerainty for himself; this act led to the permanent break up of the kingdom, which was left in a state of civil war at his death in 836. The princes who succeeded him in Fez were involved in wars with other sects, such as the Khārijīs and the Fāṭimids of Africa, the latter of whom took Fez in 959. In 973 it fell into the hands of the Spanish Umayyads, and the last of the Idrisi monarchs, named Ḥasan, was compelled to abandon his fortress, 'The Vulture's Nest,' somewhere in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, on condition of his life being spared.[6]

The next and most important dynasty of Zaidites was that founded in S. Arabia by a descendant of 'Alī, Yaḥyā b. Ḥusain b. Qāsim Rassī; his grandfather Qāsim was a son of one Ibrahim Ṭabāṭabā, and brother of a Muhammad whose abortive rising at Kufah about 200 A.H. is described at length by Ibn Khaldūn.[7] This Yaḥyā established a khalīfate at Ṣa'dah in Yemen, taking as his imperial title al-Hādī ila al-ḥaqq (280 A.H. = A.D. 893). The story of this dynasty, as told by Ibn Khaldūn,[8] is translated by H. C. Kay,[9] who corrects some mistakes. The name Rassi, whereby this dynasty is known, is said to come from Rass, a mountain in Najd, where Yaḥya's grandfather Qāsim took refuge. Yaḥya was himself the author of numerous works, among them refutations of the Shī'ah sect called the Imamiyyah, and of the views of the contemporary historian Ṭabarī. The capital of the dynasty was sometimes Ṣa'dah, sometimes Ṣan'a, and the territory included within its dominions varied greatly at different times; the earlier geographers (of the 3rd and 4th Islāmic centuries), so far as they allude to these princes, call them 'resident in Ṣa'dah.' In the 6th Islāmic cent. they were driven out of Ṣa'dah by the Meccan Sulaimanis, but towards the end of that century a Rassi monarch resumed possession of the place with the title Manṣūr. He is said to have dispatched missionaries to remote parts of the 'Abbāsid empire, such as Jilan, and to have attracted the notice of the 'Abbāsid Nāṣir (1180–1225), who, however, did not succeed in securing his person. In the year 1258 (about the same time as the fall of Baghdād) their imām Yaḥya b. Ḥusain was killed in battle.[1] Their political power was for the time broken; but imāms continued to be appointed, and to maintain themselves in some regions till the date at which Ibn Khaldūn's narrative closes, 793 A.H. Probably this condition was maintained till 945 A.H. (A.D. 1538), when the Yemen fell under the domination of the Ottomans; but in 1597 one Qāsim, who claimed to be a descendant of the Rassi family, assumed the imāmate at a place called Ḥadid-qara, and found numerous adherents; after a long series of struggles with the Turkish pashas, with varying success, in 1619 he obtained recognition from the Ottoman authorities as ruler of a considerable portion of Yemen; he died the next year (1620), and was succeeded by his son the imām Muhammad the Muayyad. In 1626 this person, owing to the execution of an agent of his by the Turkish governor Ḥaidar Pasha, started a fresh revolt, and with the aid of his brothers conducted it so successfully that before the end of the year few places, besides Ṣan'a, Aden, and the ports, remained in Ottoman hands; everywhere else the Zaidi power was recognized in Yemen. In 1629 Ṣan'a, after a siege of two years, was surrendered to the Muayyad; and in 1635 Yemen was definitely evacuated by the Ottomans, and the Zaidi ritual established in the mosques. These details are taken from the Turkish *History of Yemen and Ṣan'a*, by Aḥmad Rashīd,[2] who attributes the expulsion of the Ottomans chiefly to the incompetence, laziness, and corruption of the governor Ḥaidar Pasha, who was exiled in consequence. The new Zaidi ruler, as has been seen, took a title in the style of the khalīfahs, and similar titles were taken by his successors, of whom the first was his brother Ismā'īl, called the Mutawakkil, who captured Aden in 1640, and extended his rule into Ḥadramaut and other regions neighbouring Yemen. From this time till 1750, though there were numerous wars of succession and local revolts and insurrections, the Zaidi realm remained intact; after 1750 it split up into numerous petty governments, of which the most important continued to be that of Ṣan'a. To the list of imāms given by Stanley Lane-Poole,[3] after Niebuhr, we should add Mutawakkil, who ascended the throne on the death of his father Manṣūr in 1814, and Mutawakkil's son Mahdī, who succeeded in 1820–21, and after whose demise in 1830–31 there was a period of anarchy, which ended in 1846 with the restoration of the Ottomans, one Tewfiq Pasha being installed as governor in that year at Ṣan'a. Since that time, however, there have been numerous revolts and internal dissensions.[4]

Besides the Zaidites of Fez and Yemen there were in the 3rd and 4th Islāmic centuries those of Tabaristān and Jilan. Various pretenders of the family of 'Alī, entertaining the Zaidi system, established themselves, though ephemerally, in these regions, where they are thought to have made converts among the till then pagan populations.[5]

2. Characteristics.—In the Diplomatic Encyclopædia of Qalqashandī called *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*[6] some notices of the Zaidi court are collected from various authors. According to these, the imām lived in Arab simplicity with no attempt at magnificence or display. He claimed, however, to be the supreme sovereign, the usurpers of whose rank (such as the 'Abbāsid khalīfahs) would be punished in the next world for their rebellion. His followers looked forward to the time when his supremacy would be generally acknowledged, and expected that his family would produce the Mahdī who is to appear at the end of the world. His prayers were regarded as intercessory; his hand was laid on the sick; and at times of drought it was his business to procure rain. The emirs of Meccah (in the 6th Islāmic cent.) were supposed to favour his claims secretly. The imām was thought to possess a secret store of knowledge, handed down from his predecessors, and going back ultimately to 'Alī and

[1] *Chronicle*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1879–1901, ii. 1267–1298.
[2] Ṭabarī, iii. 360 f., 1515, 1617 f. [3] *Ib.* 1684.
[4] É. Mercier, *Hist. de l'Afrique septentrionale*, Paris, 1888, i. 260.
[5] R. Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, tr. F. G. Stokes, London, 1913, p. 254.
[6] See Mercier, i. 372.
[7] *Kitāb al 'Ibar*, Būlāq, 1867, iii. 242.
[8] iv. 111–113.
[9] In 'Omārah, *Yaman, its Mediæval History*, London, 1892, p. 184 ff.

[1] Khazraji, *The Pearl-Strings: a Hist. of the Rasúli Dynasty of Yaman*, tr. J. W. Redhouse (E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, III. i.–v.), Leyden, 1906–13, i. 150.
[2] Constantinople, 1290.
[3] *The Muhammadan Dynasties*, London, 1894.
[4] An account of the period commencing with that of the recovery of independence by the imāms is to be found in W. B. Harris, *Journey through the Yemen*, Edinburgh, 1893, chiefly after R. L. Playfair, *History of Arabia Felix*, Bombay, 1859.
[5] Some account of these persons is given in Ibn Isfandiyār's *History of Tabaristān* and by H. L. Rabino, 'Les Provinces caspiennes de la Perse,' *RMM* xxxii. [1915–16]. An abridged translation of the *History*, by E. G. Browne, was published as vol. ii. of the Gibb Memorial Series, London, 1905.
[6] Cairo, 1915, v. 51–54.

the Prophet (a common Shī'ah notion). He maintained agents who travelled over all Islāmic countries, associating with those who were already adherents and winning others. These were all on the look-out for the collapse of the khalīfate (in 732 A.H. that maintained by the Egyptian sultans) and the exaltation of the imām. In the effects of a man who had died in Aleppo (somewhat before this time) letters had been found addressed to him and to his ancestors from the imāms soliciting information about the Shī'ah in that country and also aid. There were different accounts of the number of the imām's armed followers, but there was no question of their valour. The Rasulids, who from 1229 to 1451 A.H. were the chief power in Yemen, ordinarily treated the imām with respect; during the reign of Nāṣir in Egypt (1293–1340) an imām had sent a proposal to form an alliance for the purpose of ousting the Rasulids, which had been rejected.

3. Doctrine.—The Zaidis in doctrine come between the Shī'ah (*q.v.*), to whom they technically belong, and the Sunnah (see SUNNITES). They maintain that the imāmate is inherent in the house of 'Alī and Fāṭimah; but they revere the memory of the first two khalīfahs, holding that, though 'Alī had a right to the office, there were political reasons which rendered his appointment undesirable. Their theory is known as *tafḍīl*, meaning the legitimacy of the appointment of the *mafḍūl*, *i.e.* the person whose claims are inferior, while the *fāḍil*, or person with superior qualifications, is accessible. Copious extracts from their literature on this subject are given by R. Strothmann.[1] The imām Hādi, as has been seen, compiled a treatise on the subject. In normal times the imāmate in their system belongs to the fittest person among the descendants of either Ḥasan or Ḥusain, the grandson of the Prophet whose duty it is to 'come out.' To rebel against an iniquitous ruler (*al-bāghī*) is in their opinion a duty. This, according to the author of *al-'Alam al-shāmikh* (Sālih b. Mahdī, † 1108 A.H.), is their most distinctive tenet and that which separates them from the other schools.

'Otherwise,' he says, 'there is little that is distinctive about them; in the articles of religion they agree with the Mu'tazils, whereas with respect to the Branches (*i.e.* the religious and civil code) they differ; with some of them the system of Abu Ḥanifah prevails, whereas with others that of Shafi'i, though this is not a case of following, but of agreement; some however are not of this sort, but are like other independent enquirers (*mujtahidūn*); only fanaticism makes people anxious to differ from others. Thus the Expiatory Prostration (*sujūd al-sahw*) has become a kind of badge of the Zaidites; the followers of the four Sunni systems are abandoning it altogether, indeed we have never seen them practise it; the reason being the anxiety of the Zaidites about it, which is like their caution in other matters, *e.g.* the Minor Ablution. Damaghani [perhaps Muhammad b. 'Ali Dāmaghāni, † 478 A.H.] found fault with them for over-ablution, which he rightly said is contrary to the Sunnah.'[2]

Of their law-books the first part of one called *Muntaza' al-Mukhtār* ('The Abstract of the Select'), based on the *Kitāb al-Azhār* of the imām al-Muhdi li-din Allah Aḥmad b. Yaḥya (775–840 A.H.), was published at Cairo in 1328, but has up to the present date remained unfinished. It deals only with ceremonies, and differs in minute points from the law-books of the Sunni schools. Many other law-books of the Zaidis are contained in MSS. A *Corpus Juris* of Zaid b. 'Alī, edited by E. Griffini, Milan, has been issued.

4. Divisions.—The classical heresiologists, 'Abd al-Qāhir[3] and Shahrastani,[4] divide the Zaidis into three sub-sects—the Jārūdiyyah, the Sulaimāniyyah or Jarīriyyah, and the Butriyyah, with whom the latter of these writers couples the Ṣālihiyyah. The three names Jārūdiyyah, Sulaimāniyyah, and Butriyyah are given in the *Mawāqif* of 'Adud al-Din Iji († A.D. 1355).[1] The second are called after one Sulaimān b. Jarīr; the third, according to this work, after Butair al-Thūmī, but, according to the *Firaq*, after Kuthayyir called Abtar and Ḥasan b. Ṣalih b. Ḥayy. In the *Ghunyah*[2] of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, who is but slightly later, they are divided into six sub-sects—Jārūdiyyah, Sulaimāniyyah, Butriyyah, Nu'aimiyyah, Ya'qūbiyyah, and a sixth. In the Persian *Bayān al-adyān*,[3] which is about a century earlier (A.D. 1092), the number of sub-sects is said to be five—Jārūdiyyah, Dhākiriyyah, Khashabiyyah (the followers of Sarḥāt Ṭabarī, who used wooden weapons at the time of their rising), and the Khalafiyyah. The questions about which they differed were mostly concerned with the imāmate, or aspects of it—*e.g.*, whether Muhammad had appointed 'Alī as his successor or not; whether he had also appointed his grandsons or not; it is asserted that the Jārūdiyyah (called after one Abu'l-Jārūd Ziyād) denied the death of Muḥammad b. 'Abdallah, a pretender of the time of the 'Abbāsid Manṣūr, and looked forward to his return as Mahdī (though some of them looked forward to the return of some other pretender); further, that they call the first two khalīfahs 'unbelievers,' and in consequence are execrated by the rest of the Zaidis, who in turn execrate them. The only claim of this sub-sect to be called Zaidis would then lie in their recognizing the imāmate of the Zaid after whom the sect is named. The doctrine mentioned above is usually regarded as characteristic—*e.g.*, by the Spanish traveller Ibn Jubair, who indeed does not expect his readers to have heard of the sect.[4] A traveller of a century earlier (1035–1042), Nāṣir-i-Khusrau, who found them in Yemamah, apparently expects his readers to know their name, but not to know that they were of the Shī'ah.[5] It is probable that the names of the sub-sects were little known.

LITERATURE.—A few works emanating from Zaidi theologians are mentioned in the *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871–72, i. 193. Their literature is, however, very copious, and there is a large MS collection of it lodged in the Ambrosiana of Milan, of which notices have been given by E. Griffini, in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, i.–iii., Rome, 1908–10; many Zaidi MSS are also to be found in the Berlin Library. A treatise on rhetoric called *al-Tirāz*, by the Zaidi khalifah Yaḥya b. Ḥamzah (729–749 A.H.), was published in Cairo in 1914.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

ZANZIBAR AND THE SWAHILI PEOPLE.—The name Zanzibar, now applied only to the town of that name and the island in which it is situated (both called in Swahili *Unguja*), anciently designated the whole coast, from the Juba River to Sofala.[6] Originally Zangibar (Zengibar, Zanguebar), from the Persian زنگی 'negro' and بار, 'region,' it was modified by Arab and Portuguese pronunciation into Zanjibar and Zanzibar. The town is said to have been founded by settlers from Shiraz, in the 8th or 9th cent.,[7] but there is less definite information available as to its early history than in the case of Kilwa, Lamu, and Pate. Sacleux[8] suggests that the Wahadimu (the early inhabitants, whose chief, the *Mwinyi mkuu*, ruled the island up to the time of Sayyid Barghash) may have been a colony from Kilwa. The coast

[1] *Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen*, Strassburg, 1912.
[2] P. 319.
[3] *Al-Farq bain al-firaq*, Cairo, 1910, pp. 22–26.
[4] *Kitāb al-milal wa'l-nihal*, tr. T. Haarbrücker, Halle, 1850, i. 174–184.

[1] Ed. T. Soerensen, Leipzig, 1848, p. 353.
[2] Cairo, 1208, i. 77.
[3] C. Schefer, *Chrestomathie persane*, 2 vols., Paris, 1883.
[4] *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr*, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Gibb Memorial Series, v.), London, 1907.
[5] *Safarnāmah*, ed. C. Schefer, Paris, 1881, p. 224.
[6] Mas'udi, quoted by Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, p. 746.
[7] Sacleux, *Grammaire des dialectes swahilis*, pp. xiv, xv.
[8] *Ib.* p. xv n.

is also known by its Arabic designation of ساحل (*sahil*, 'coast'—hence the term 'Swahili coast' is a pleonasm, like 'Lake Nyasa,' etc.), and its inhabitants as سواحل, 'coast-people'—in African pronunciation 'Swahili.' (They are spoken of in their own vernacular as Waswahili, pl. of Mswahili; the language as Kiswahili.) They are called by the 'Nyika' tribes Adzomba (Wajomba), by the Pokomo Watsawaa or Wadzawaa, and by the Galla Hamara.

The name 'Swahili'[1] does not belong to any one indigenous African race: it connotes the descendants of Arab settlers by native women of various tribes, chiefly Bantu. There are also traces of Persian descent, and possibly their pedigree includes other ethnic elements.

1. **Distribution of the Swahili.**—The territory inhabited by the Swahili is the strip of coast defined in 1886 as the Sayyid of Zanzibar's dominions—viz. from Warsheikh on the Somali coast to Cape Delgado. This, however, does not include all, as distinct dialects of Swahili are recognized for Ibo and the Kirimba Islands, nearly two degrees south of Cape Delgado, and for the Angoshi Islands, half-way between Mozambique and the mouth of the Zambesi. The people themselves—at any rate those of the northern parts—limit the expression 'Swahilini' (=the Swahili country) to the coast north-east of the Tana mouth, though some extend it as far south as Malindi. This fits in with the assertion made by various writers that the dialects of Lamu and the adjacent coast are reckoned the purest,[2] or, as Krapf says,[3] that 'the real home of the Swahili language is considered to be in the islands of Patta [Pate], Lamu, and in the country opposite to those islands.' Swahili, however, is spoken and understood far beyond the confines of its proper home: it has been carried half-way across the continent by traders and caravan porters and is current, in debased forms, both on the Congo and in Sindh.[4]

2. **Physical characteristics.**—There is probably no uniform Swahili type, and this is scarcely surprising when we consider, not only the composite origin of the people and the various sources whence their race has from time to time been recruited, but the fact that there are many persons calling themselves Swahili who have not the slightest claim to Arab descent. These may be the descendants of imported slaves, or they may be members of inland tribes who have adopted Islām and settled on the coast. Consequently shades of complexion (the darker and lighter being broadly distinguished by the people themselves as 'black' and 'red') and types of feature vary indefinitely; and we must remember that the compound factors are not merely the Oman Arab (with the possible, or indeed probable, Persian) and the Bantu native, but the tribes of Hamitic or 'Helot' stock, of whom the Wasanye and Dorobo are present-day representatives, and the various Galla, Abyssinian, Somali, and even Georgian or Circassian women who have at different times found their way into the harems of wealthy Arabs. Characteristics are apt to vary greatly, even within one and the same family; *e.g.*, a member of the 'l Batawi (Arab) clan, living at Mombasa, has decidedly negroid features and woolly hair, while his sister, as dark as himself in complexion, has fine, silky, and perfectly straight hair. As Baumann says:

'Gar leicht kann man schliesslich zur Ansicht gelangen, dass es überhaupt einen Swahili-*Stamm* nicht gebe, dass das Wort keine andere als die ursprüngliche arabische Bedeutung "Küstenbewohner" habe.'[1]

Burton's description[2] is too sweeping, as regards both appearance and character, though he appears to have chiefly in view the island of Zanzibar—perhaps the least favourable ground for observation.

3. **Origin.**—It is uncertain at present whether there were any Arab or Persian settlements in pre-Islāmic times; and the vexed question of the Zimbabwe mines cannot be discussed here; but it is worth noticing that the Karanga language of Rhodesia has some words in common with Swahili, which do not seem to occur in languages geographically intermediate.[3] There was, however, commercial intercourse at a very early period. The first Arab settlement to which a definite date is assigned is that of Pate, in A.D. 689;[4] the colonists are said to have been Syrians. Native tradition says they found Waboni and Waemezi hunters living in the island.[5] They intermarried with these people, though their descendants have tried to suppress the fact. Vague traditions (which the present writer has never been able to verify) of pre-Islāmic people worshipping a golden idol (a calf or bull?) at Kau may point to some early Persian or Hindu settlement of which no other record survives. Contact with the Bantu was probably, in the first instance, with the Pokomo, who, according to native tradition, were settled in the Tana valley long before the southward migration of the 'Nyika' peoples in the 16th century. The Pate colonists are said to have come from Syria; and some ascribe the same origin to Malindi, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Lamu, and Kilwa;[6] though the Kilwa Chronicle states that the founder of this city came from Shiraz. The settlement of the 'Emozeids' (Ummu Zayd), somewhat later than that of Pate,[7] seems to have introduced a considerable Persian element. Baumann says:

'Der Name Swahili ist bei den Angehörigen des Stammes selbst nicht sehr verbreitet; am liebsten hören sie sich *Schirazi* nennen und leiten ihre Abkunft von Schiraz her.'[8]

This probably applies to Tanga and neighbourhood: it is certainly not true of Mombasa or the coast north of it, where the present writer has never heard of the slightest objection to the name Swahili—not even on the part of some men at Jomvu who said their ancestors came from 'Shirazi.' In fact, the people of Jomvu are known to have emigrated thither, not more than three or four generations back, from Shirazi, near Vumba, which was originally a colony from the Persian Shiraz. Shaka, near Kipini (celebrated in connexion with Liongo Fumo, and possibly the 'Jaca' of the Portuguese inscription on the Mombasa fort), was also a Persian colony.

4. **History.**—The sources are: native tradition, Portuguese records and historians, and Arabic documents, of which only two have been published, viz. the Chronicle of Mombasa, printed in Owen[9] and also as an appendix to Guillain's first volume, and the *History of Kilwa*, edited by S. Arthur Strong.[10] This seems not to be quite identical with the *Chronica dos Reys*

[1] This is the commonly accepted spelling, though some French writers still cling to 'Souahéli'; and 'Suaheli' is the form current in Germany. Salt has 'Sowauli' and 'Sowaiel,' Owen, 'Sowhylese'; see Cust, *Modern Languages of Africa*, ii. 345.

[2] Sacleux, p. ix.

[3] *Vocabulary of Six East African Languages*, p. iv.

[4] Burton, *Sindh, and the Races that inhabit the Valley of the Indus*, p. 283.

[1] *Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete*, p. 22.

[2] *Zanzibar City, Island and Coast*, i. 414–420.

[3] These are not Arabic loan-words, such as *ndarama* and *mali*, which might have been derived from the later Arab settlements at Sena and Sofala.

[4] MS information, and Stigand, *The Land of Zinj*, p. 29.

[5] MS information, and Stigand, p. 160.

[6] Stigand, p. 29.

[7] Guillain, *Documents sur l'histoire, la géographie, et le commerce de l'Afrique orientale*, i. 140; Stigand, p. 6.

[8] P. 22.

[9] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages, etc.*, i. 414–422.

[10] 'The History of Kilwa,' *JRAS*, 1895, pp. 385–430.

de Quiloa, of which the substance has been fortunately preserved by Barros.[1] Another Arabic MS, known as the *Book of the Kings of Pate*, after being preserved at Pate for some time, was carried to Witu when Ahmad Simba fled thither (about 1856) and was finally destroyed in the bombardment of 1890; no other copy is known to be in existence. Some Swahili MSS, written down in recent times at Lamu, preserve what has hitherto been handed down orally; one of these was published in the *Journal of the African Society*, 1913–14. Similarly, the second chapter of Stigand's *Land of Zinj* embodies the result of conversations with the oldest living authority, 'Bwana Kitini' (Muhammad bin Fumo Umari) of Lamu. The scattered notices of E. Africa in the works of Greek and Roman geographers and other ancient writers, as well as in those of the mediæval Arabs, have been well summarized by Guillain in his first volume. The Arab geographers have also been carefully studied from this point of view by Gabriel Ferrand.

Intercourse between Arabia and the east coast of Africa seems to have taken place from very early times. Indonesian influence is also probable, and by Stuhlmann[2] is made responsible for the introduction of the coco-nut palm and the outrigger canoe; he assigns a similar origin to the curious kitchen implement (*mbuzi*) used for scraping coco-nuts. One of the Lamu MSS above referred to says that seedlings of coco-palms (*mite ya minazi*) were brought by certain Arabs from 'Kalhindi'—but there is no clue as to what is meant by this name. Ferrand[3] places the Indonesian colonization of Madagascar (which has notable Malayo-Polynesian affinities) not earlier than the Christian era; but it by no means follows that this was the earliest contact.

Pate was founded (A.H. 69, A.D. 689) by colonists of the il-Batawi tribe (or clan?)—hence, say some, the name (Ar. Bata or Batta). The royal house of these Batawi continued in power till A.D. 1204 (A.H. 600), when a fugitive from Maskat, Suliman b. Suliman of the house of Nabhan, landed there, was hospitably received, and ultimately married the daughter of the last Batawi chief. The Nabhans remained sultans of Pate till 1866.

About 740 the followers of Zaid, great-grandson of the 4th khālif, 'Ali, escaping from the persecution of the Umayyads, fled to E. Africa and became the ancestors of the people now called Wagunya (or Watikuu) who inhabit the mainland north of Lamu, speak a peculiar dialect of Swahili, and are regarded as in some respects a distinct people by their southern congeners. They are known in history as 'Emozeids' (Ummu Zaid). Makdishu and Barawa are said to have been founded about A.D. 909 and Kilwa in A.D. 975; but the Kilwa Chronicle quoted by De Barros and that published by Strong show some discrepancy with regard to these two migrations. Both agree in saying that Kilwa was founded by 'Ali ibn Hasan of Shiraz. One of his brothers is said by the latter authority to be the founder of Mombasa; but elsewhere[4] its origin is ascribed to Muhammad, son of 'Ali ibn Hasan. Zanzibar does not figure conspicuously in the early records; it was long tributary to Mombasa, though by some said to be equally ancient. The various small city-states were originally independent of one another, and, though one might, for a time, establish a sort of precarious hegemony—as was the case, in turn, with Kilwa, Mombasa, and Pate—no empire or permanent confederacy was ever established. Lamu differed from the rest in being ruled, not by a sultan, but by a council of elders (*wazee*).

The Portuguese arrived at Malindi in 1498 on their way to India, and established friendly relations with its ruler, who asked for help against his rival, the shaikh of Mombasa. Mombasa was burnt by Nuno da Cunha in 1529[5] (it had been previously in 1505 sacked and burnt by Almeida, who took Kilwa in the same year). By 1530 the whole coast, from Barawa to Cape Corrientes, was under Portuguese dominion, and this continued intermittently (one town or another being usually in a more or less successful state of revolt) until 1652. In that year an Arab fleet arrived from Oman, the Swahili towns having some time previously entreated the help of the *imām* in order to drive out the Portuguese, and the war thus begun culminated in the fall of Mombasa, 12th Dec. 1698, which was followed by the occupation of Kilwa, Zanzibar, and Pemba. Thenceforward, except for the short time during which they held Mombasa and Pate, retaken in 1728, the Portuguese were restricted to their present possessions, south of the Rovuma. It is curious that Pate, where their rule was far less continuous than at Mombasa, seems to keep the most vivid traditional memories of them. 'Violent [or 'proud'] as a Portuguese' is still a proverbial saying; and the townsmen of Pate point out, in the bed of the tidal creek, the remains of the causeway by which, as they affirm, the invaders dragged their cannon up from the anchorage at Shindakazi. It is impossible to assign a date for the destruction of the towns whose ruined sites occur almost every few miles between the Juba and Mombasa. Some may be accounted for by the invasion of the Zimbas, a warring people not yet certainly identified, in 1586–89.[1] Later came the Galla raids which (probably during the 18th cent.) reduced Malindi from a flourishing city to the heap of ruins found by Krapf in 1846.[2]

From 1729 onward the coast was supposed to be under the suzerainty of Maskat, and the *imām* placed governors in Mombasa and Zanzibar, but apparently not at Pate, which was frequently at war with both Lamu and Mombasa. The reigning family of Maskat, in the early part of the 18th cent., was that of Ya'arubi, and the first Liwali who administered Mombasa under him was Muhammad b. Said 'l Maamiri';[3] but in 1739 the appointment was given to Muhammad ibn 'Athman of the Mazrui clan, afterwards so famous. Shortly after this, in 1741, the imāmate was transferred from the Ya'arubi to the house of 'l Bu Said (Albunseyidi), from which the present sultan of Zanzibar is descended. One result of this change was the virtual independence of Mombasa under the Mazrui, which lasted till 1837. The Mazrui attempted, in 1823–24, to place themselves under British protection;[4] but their request was refused, owing to the representations of the Indian Government, who considered it important to keep on good terms with Maskat; and Mombasa was ultimately reconquered by Sayyid Said, who had, in 1832, removed from Maskat to Zanzibar and thenceforth made the latter his principal residence. Details of events subsequent to that date will be found in some of the works already referred to; also in those of Charles Eliot, Lyne, Craster, and the Blue Books.

5. **Religion.**—The Swahili are, almost without exception, Muslims and of the Shafi'i sect.[5] The Sayyid's family and most of the Oman Arabs are Ibadis.[6] The people in general, especially the women—so far as the present writer came in contact with them—seem better instructed than some writers admit.

E.g., Burton says: 'The Wasawahili calling themselves Moslems know little beyond the Kalmah, rarely pray, and fast only by compulsion';[7] and Baumann: 'besonders jüngere Leute stehen dem ganzen Islam auffallend gleichgiltig gegenüber und können oft nicht einmal die Fatha hersagen. Noch mehr ist diese Indifferenz bei Weibern zu beobachten.'[8]

This did not seem to be the case at Jomvu, Mambrui, or Lamu, where there is comparatively little contact with Europeans. It is quite true, however, that there is a marked absence of fanaticism. Strangers are admitted, even invited, into their mosques. Women do not as a rule go to the mosques, though 'some of them are as well or better read in the Koran than the men.'[9] Each town—even small ones of a few hundred inhabitants—has one or more schools, where boys are taught to read (and sometimes to write) the Arabic character, and learn the Qur'ān by heart. More advanced instruction is occasionally given by *mu'allims*, who hold evening classes at the mosque and explain the sacred text in the vernacular. The writer heard of schools for girls, both at Lamu and at Mambrui, though none were actually in existence at the time of her visit, and well-to-do parents, at least, engaged visiting teachers for their daughters.

'Among the pure Swahilis many of the women are well educated in reading and writing, while in the Lamu Archipelago they are often better than the men in versifying.'[10]

A feature which has hardly attracted the attention it deserves is the wide diffusion of a considerable body of religious poetry in the vernacular. MS copies are handed down in families, and many men and women who cannot read know long passages by heart. Among the most popular are: a poem of 264 stanzas, relating the death of the Prophet, another on the history of Job, the *Utenzi wa Shufaka* published by Büttner, and *Qissat Sayyidinā Isa*, which relates the life of Christ according to Muslim tradition and the Apocryphal

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[1] See Burton, *Zanzibar*, i. 411.

[2] *Handwerk und Industrie in Ostafrika* (vol. i. of *Abhandlungen des hamburgischen Kolonialinstituts*), pp. 82, 85, 113, 135.

[3] *Le K'ouen-louen*, p. 228.

[4] Strandes, *Die Portugiesenzeit von Deutsch- und Englisch-Ostafrika*, p. 84.

[5] Barros says the assault began on 17th Nov. 1528—no date is given for the actual taking, and the operations do not seem to have occupied more than a few days. Da Cunha stayed till the end of the monsoon allowed him to sail for India, which he did (from Malindi) 3rd April 1529—having previously burnt Mombasa—evidently towards the end of March (see J. Barros and D. de Couto, *Da Asia*, dec. iv. pt. i. bk. iii. vol. 7, chs. v.–viii. [pp. 276–305]).

[1] Strandes, p. 153 f.; Stigand, p. 17 f.

[2] *Reisen in Ost-Afrika, ausgeführt in den Jahren 1857–55*, i. 287–290.

[3] Owen, i. 418.

[4] *Ib.* i. 403.

[5] Baumann, p. 56; Burton, i. 421.

[6] Burton, i. 396 ff.: he calls them 'Abazi' and 'Bayazi'; see Eliot, p. 43, which seems to show that the sect is on the decline, and Badger, *Hist. of the Imâms and Seyyids of Oman*, p. 385 ff.

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] P. 56.

[9] Stigand, p. 114.

[10] *Ib.*

Gospels. A didactic and devotional poem known as the *Utendi wa Mwana Kupona*, composed by a Lamu woman, some 60 or 70 years ago, was published in 1917, in the *Harvard African Studies*.

As in other cases where the Muslim religion has been superimposed upon a system of primitive beliefs, it has absorbed all sorts of extraneous elements. The Bantu cult of the ancestral ghost has passed into something like saint-worship at the graves of noted shaikhs — *e.g.*, the shrine known as Pa Shehe Jundani at Mombasa. The diviner, instead of casting lots by means of the 'bones' or analogous objects (a practice still in vogue among the Giryama, etc.), uses the sand-board (*kupiga ramli*) or writes texts from the Qur'ân and the names of the four angels (Gabriel, Michael, Azrael, Israfil), on paper or parchment, to be used as charms.

'Descended from "devil-worshippers"'—a designation based on a misapprehension—'the Waswahili rather fear the "Shaytani" than love Allah, and to the malignant powers of preternatural beings they attribute sickness and all the evils of human life.'[1]

The word *shaitan* has been borrowed from the Arabs and is applied to the spirits haunting rocks, trees (more especially baobabs), etc., for which the genuine Swahili word is *wazimu* or *wazuka*. These are originally, in all probability, ghosts of the dead, but imported notions, such as that of the Arab *jinn*, have introduced some confusion. In Krapf's time every boatman who passed 'Makame's Rock' (on the landward side of Mombasa Island, almost opposite Frere Town) threw a lime into the sea; the custom is still remembered, but reduced to a mere symbolic act, like the throwing of a pin into a holy well in this country. Probably offerings were once made to propitiate the ghost of a man drowned there, but the story told to Krapf was that Makame was a fisherman who had been turned into a rock because he followed his occupation on a holy day.[2] Similarly, there are lonely spots in the bush, known as *kwa kibibi* ('the place of the little lady')—probably forgotten graves — where passing travellers are wont to lay down a stick, stone, leaf, or other trifle. Spirits haunting trees may at any time seize and possess passers-by; they are then known as *pepo*, and there are recognized and usually very elaborate formulas for exorcizing them. In fact, there is a whole hagiology of these *pepo*, and each one has his special *ngoma*, or 'dance.'[3]

6. Customs.—As may be inferred from what has already been said with regard to religion, we meet here with an interesting blend of imported and indigenous ideas. The reckoning of kinship in the male line cannot be counted as one of the former, as the transition from mother-right to father-right has already taken place in many Bantu tribes. But the prohibited degrees enumerated by Velten[4] are those recognized by Muslim law, and the clan system, still in full vigour among Giryama, Pokomo, Digo, etc., who may not marry inside their clan, has fallen into oblivion. (The so-called twelve 'clans' [*kabila*] of Mombasa, seem to be local associations, *i.e.* the Wapate, Wapaza, etc., are immigrants from the places denoted by their names.) The tabus (*miiko*) observed in families[5] would probably give a clue to former clan-relationships. All persons who have any claim to Arab descent keep the records of their genealogy with the greatest care, adding the clan name to their own—*e.g.*, 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn 'Umar 'l Batawi, or 'l Mandhiri, or 'l Auzii, etc., as the case may be. The Muslim rite of circumcision has been blended with the Bantu initiation-ceremonies (*kumbi*, *manyago*) and consequently takes place earlier than it would, as a rule, among the Bantu.[1] Girls are not operated on by the Swahili, though they are by some of the Arabs. Much valuable information, derived from native sources, is given by Velten; but it is by no means exhaustive and applies chiefly to the Mrima, the coast-land opposite Zanzibar. A native authority[2] says that, in all essentials, Swahili customs are the same from Lamu to Lindi—but this possibly needs some little qualification.

[1] Burton, i. 428. [2] Krapf, *Reisen*, i. 242.

[3] See Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli*, pp. 176–206; also R. R. Skene, in *JRAI* xlvii. [1917] 413–434; and M. Klamroth, in *Zeitschrift für Kolonialsprachen*, i. [1910–11] 37, 118, 189: 'Religiöse Vorstellungen der Saramo' (the Wazaramo, whose home is near Dar-es-Salaam, are probably among the tribes who have contributed most largely to the Swahili stock); also Baumann, pp. 142–144.

[4] P. 396. [5] *Ib.* p. 93 n.

7. Language and literature.—Swahili is not, as some have thought, a mere composite jargon, comparable to 'Pidgin-English' or 'Kitchen Kafir'; but it is not the language of any indigenous African tribe—*i.e.*, it did not exist before the Arab colonization. The Bantu groundwork may, as Krapf thought,[3] have been Pokomo; certainly it seems to have taken shape in the Lamu archipelago and adjacent mainland, including the Tana delta. But other tribes may have exercised a modifying influence, especially in the southern dialects, where intervocalic *l*, elsewhere consistently dropped out, has a tendency to re-appear (*fungula* for *fungua*, etc.). Arabic has contributed largely to the vocabulary (about to the same extent as Latin in English), but has not influenced the grammar to any appreciable degree. A few Persian and a few Portuguese words have been incorporated with the language—in the latter case, not nearly so many as might have been expected. It has been written (probably for some centuries, but at present it is difficult to procure evidence on this point) by means of the Arabic character, which, however, is by no means well adapted for the purpose; and even with the help of additional symbols such as are used in Persian—*e.g.*, for *p* and *v*—a Swahili MS may be very difficult to read, even for a native. It is obvious that the vowel points are indispensable; they are only omitted in Arabic words which are easily recognized, such as the conventional phrases at the beginning of a letter. The oldest MSS examined by European scholars may go back to the 18th or possibly the late 17th century; perhaps some still older ones may exist in the archives of the mosques. The poems (there are no ancient Swahili prose-writings)—if not the actual copies—may be of considerable antiquity, but we have no certain data on this point. W. E. Taylor thinks that the *Inkishafi* (a religious poem edited by him and published as the appendix to Stigand's *Dialect in Swahili*) may have been written before Vasco de Gama's arrival in Africa (1498), and, if the poems assigned to Liongo Fumo are genuine, they must go back at least to the 16th, and possibly to the 12th cent., or earlier. Very few of these poems have found their way into print. Büttner, in his *Anthologie*, published three long poems, all of a religious character, and a charming selection of recent lyrics and folk-songs and a large body of minor verse has been collected by Velten, while the *Chuo cha Herkal* ('Book of the Emperor Heraclius'), of which a MS was brought to Europe by Krapf, was published by Meinhof in the *Zeitschrift für Kolonialsprachen* for 1912–13. With the exception of the *Utendi wa Mwana Kupona* mentioned above, and the gnomic stanzas attributed to Liongo, in Steere's *Swahili Tales* (there is a MS of this poem in the British Museum), this is all that has been done so far in this direction. Swahili has eminent possibilities as a literary language, and some attempts recently made—notably the traditions of the Wakilindi (Usambara), written down by the late Abdallah ibn Hemedi Liajjemi—promise well for the development of prose writing.

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[1] Velten, pp. 75–100. [2] *Ib.* p. 1.

[3] *Vocabulary of Six East African Languages*, p. vii.

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ZAPOTECS.—See MEXICANS.

ZARATHUSHTRA.—See ZOROASTRIANISM.

ZEALOTS.—1. Name.

The term 'Zealots' (*i.e.* 'the zealous') is derived from ζηλωτής, the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew קַנָּא, *Qannā*, pl. *Qanna'im* and the Aramaic *Qannāi*, pl. *Qannā'in*.[1] The terms both in Hebrew and in Greek have a general and a specific usage. The former is naturally of most frequent occurrence in Scripture and Jewish literature.[2] The latter usage as a designation of the fanatic Jewish nationalists and opponents of Roman domination is rare. *Qanna'im* is not found in the Targum Onḳelos.[3]

The adjectives קַנָּא, קַנָּאִין, and קַנָּאי are found in the Talmud and Midrashim, but the plural in a technical or quasi-technical sense occurs only twice: *Sanh.* ix. 11, 'Whoever steals a libation-cup, or curses one by the Holy Name, or has intercourse with a Syrian woman shall be struck down by the *Qanna'in*' (קנאין, Zealots, apparently in a religious sense only); and *Ābôth de R. Nathan*, vi.: 'And when the emperor Vespasian came to destroy Jerusalem the *Qanna'im*[4] attempted to burn everything with fire'—the only Talmudic passage mentioning the political Zealots.

How early the title *Qanna'im* was applied to the extreme anti-Roman political party is uncertain. According to Josephus,[5] it was a self-designation. If this is so, it is impossible to determine whether 'Zealots' was a self-designation from the beginning of the movement under Judas the Galilæan and became generally known and recognized as their title under Gessius Florus because of their remarkable activity and increase then, or, on the other hand, whether these 'fanatics of Roman hate' had no definite appellation for the first sixty years (A.D. 6–66) of their history until the time of Florus, under whom Josephus first employs the term.[6]

The epithet 'the Cananæan' in Mk 3^{18}, Mt 10^{4} (for which 'the Zealot' is given in Lk 6^{15}, Ac 1^{13}), has been variously interpreted. The AV reads Χανανίτης, 'the Canaanite' (which is given in Mk by A and other second-rate uncials and later versions, and in Mt by ℵ and later authorities), but that would require χαναναῖος=קְנַנְיָא. Jerome interpreted it as *de vico Chana Galilææ*, and Holtzmann[1] as קְנָאנִי='a man from (an unknown) Kanan,' both of which interpretations would require the Greek Κανᾶιος. Dalman[2] considers Καναναῖος an error for Κανᾶιος by assimilation to the more familiar 'Canaanite.' These explanations are superfluous. Καναναῖος is simply the Greek transliteration of קַנָּאנָא, *i.e.* קנאן, with the post-positive article א—and so='the *Qanna'*' (Zealot), just as in Aramaic מלכא='the king.' Luke has therefore rightly and literally translated it ὁ ζηλωτής.[3] Whether Simon was an adherent of the Zealot party before he joined the company of Jesus, or the term was won subsequently through zeal in Jesus' service (as the brother of Andrew won the surname Peter, and the Zebedaides that of Boanerges) may not be quite certain, but the probabilities point to the former view.

2. Origin.

—As the oppression and Hellenizing policy of the Seleucids caused the Maccabæan revolt and the rise of the Ḥasîdîm, the policy of Rome, especially from A.D. 6, caused the rise of the Zealots. The genealogical descent of the Zealots may be traced from the Ḥasîdîm through the Perûshîm (Pharisees), who appeared in opposition to the Hellenizing sympathies of the aristocratic Sadducees about the time of John Hyrcanus (135–105 B.C.). The Zealots thus combined the policy of the Ḥasîdîm (against foreign domination) with that of the original Pharisees (against liberalism towards foreign thought and manners and laxity towards the Law).

Although the Zealot movement dates from A.D. 6, there had been for years previous a growing discontent against both Idumæan and Roman rule. The statement of Rabbi Kohler that 'the reign of the Idumæan Herod gave the impetus to the organization of the Zealots as a political party' seems to go beyond our evidence. But the Zealots had forerunners in the 'robber' bands of Herod's reign. Ezekias 'the arch-robber' (ὁ ἀρχιλῃστής) at the head of a strong 'robber' force caused great trouble to Herod, by whom he was finally captured and executed.[4] His son Judas, after the death of Herod, made an insurrection in Sepphoris in 4 B.C.[5] Even conspirators with concealed daggers banded together against Herod,[6] the forerunners of the later Sicarii.

The Jews had come into contact with Rome in the days of the Maccabees. If Pompey captured Jerusalem in 63 B.C., and abolished the Hasmonæan kingship, he left the Jews in the enjoyment of a considerable independence and respected their nationhood. In A.D. 6 Archelaus, who for ten years as ethnarch had ruled Judæa, Idumæa, and Samaria, was accused before Augustus by a joint commission of Jews and Samaritans of intolerable cruelties, for which the emperor recalled and banished him. Judæa was then loosely annexed to the Roman province of Syria, to be administered under a procurator.[7] From this date the Jews began to discover—what they learned better on the extinction of the Herodian dynasty in A.D. 44—that the sly half-Jewish Herods understood and respected their peculiarities and religious customs better than did the Romans. The Jews found the Roman administrators to be other than they had imagined. There was to be no return to the 'honours and alliances of the Romans and their emperors with our nation'[8] of Maccabæan days, nor to the δόγματα of the great Julius in the years 47 B.C. and following, which bestowed upon the Jews all the privileges of Roman protection together with religious toleration and political home rule. These Julian decrees were regarded later by the Jews as their Magna Charta, and by them all subsequent Roman administration was appraised.

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[1] קַנָּאי; not *Kenaïm*, as given in *PRE*[3] xxi. 655; cf. J. Levy, *Neuheb. und chald. Wörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1876–89, and M. Jastrow, *Dictionary of the Targumîm*, etc., London and New York, 1886–1903.

[2] It is found, *e.g.*, in Ex 20^{5} 34^{14}, Dt 4^{24}, Ac 21^{20}, Gal 1^{14}, 1 Co 14^{12}, and in Talmud; cf. Levy, *op. cit.*

[3] E. Brederek, *Konkordanz zum Targum Onkelos* (*ZATW* ix.), Giessen, 1906.

[4] קנים, but טקרין in S. Schechter's second version, London, 1887, p. 31 f.

[5] *BJ* iv. iii. 9: ζηλωταῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκάλεσαν.

[6] See § 4 below.

[1] *Hand-Kommentar zum NT*, Freiburg, 1889–91, *ad loc.*

[2] *Grammatik der jüd.-palästin. Aramaisch*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 174.

[3] Wellhausen and Schürer also interpret Καναναῖος as 'the Zealot,' but arrive at their interpretation in a way different from each other and from the above. Wellhausen (*Das Evang. Marci*, Berlin, 1903, p. 25) evidently regards the Greek as the equivalent of קַנָּאי, while Schürer (*GJV*[4] i. 487 f.) prefers to regard it as a Greek formation from קַנָּאנָא, plur. of קַנָּאן.

[4] *Ant.* xiv. ix. 2, *BJ* i. x. 5.

[5] *Ant.* xvii. x. 5, *BJ* ii. iv. 1.

[6] *Ant.* xv. viii. 3 f. [7] *Ib.* xvii. xiii.

[8] *Ib.* xiv. x. 1.

Roman interference had never been palatable to the masses of the people, and it was among the lower classes that the hatred of Rome now became intensified, though, as often in popular upheavals, many of the leaders were supplied from the aristocratic classes. The conflict began with the resentment caused by the census of Quirinius (A.D. 6–7) to which Judæa as a procuratorial province was subjected. The Jews at first resented the taxation, but were persuaded to submit by the high-priest Joazar. The Zealot movement began as a protest against this census when Coponius was procurator of Judæa.[1] The outbreak did not occur in Judæa, but in Galilee, which was not directly affected by the census. The insurrection was headed by Judas,[2] a Gaulonite of the city of Gamala (better known as 'the Galilæan'), who allied himself with a prominent Pharisee, named Sadduk, probably a member of the more nationalistic school of Shammai. Though Josephus speaks of Judas and Sadduk as joint authors of the Zealot movement,[3] he more frequently represents Judas as the prime mover.[4] Judas the Galilæan became leader of the fourth of these sects.[5] The motives of the party were partly political and partly religious, but the political and the religious were always conjoined in Jewish history. In the closing scenes the political and secular far overshadowed the religious. The Roman taxation meant 'nothing else than downright slavery';[6] it was a breach against the theocracy.[7] The census was a sign to the people that the Romans designed to destroy the last trace of their liberties: it was a gross insult both to them and to Jahweh. The object of the Zealots was to preserve intact Jewish nationalism and cult-traditions, and, by force if necessary, to throw off the Roman yoke and restore the theocracy. Thus they would hasten the Kingdom of God. The Zealot party was a 'combination of noble and base elements; superstitious enthusiasts, and political assassins, the so-called sicarii, were conjoined with honest but fanatical patriots.'[8]

3. **Subsequent history.**—The history of Zealotism extends from A.D. 6–7 to the fall of Jerusalem, Sept. A.D. 70, or to the capture of Masada, April 73. The slighting reference of the Pharisee, Gamaliel, in Ac 5[37ff.] might give the impression that the insurrection of Judas did not assume grave proportions, being suppressed immediately by the Roman authorities by the death of the leader and the scattering of his followers. Josephus does not chronicle either the fate of Judas or the history of the revolt, but affirms that it was the beginning of the end for the Jews.

'The daring plot made great headway. There is no evil that did not spring from these men [Judas and Sadduk], and the nation was filled with it to an incredible extent . . . whence seditions were engendered and as a result political bloodshed . . . and famine reducing us to extreme shamelessness, and the capture and sacking of cities, until finally this insurrection consumed the temple of God in the fire of the enemy.'[9]

Another proof of the importance of Judas's rebellion is the fact that his sons and descendants inherited his fanatical hate of Rome and became outstanding exponents of Zealotism until it was extinguished at Masada. Two sons of Judas, Jacob and Simon, were crucified by Tiberius Alexander.[10] Another son, Menahem, was a protagonist in the rising of A.D. 66.[11] A descendant, named Eleazar, was commander of the garrison of Masada and perished there, probably by his own hand.[1] The Roman question became the test question in political life and led to a fatal split in the Jewish nation. This internal division affected to a greater extent the Pharisaic party which had first resented the direct interference of Rome in the affairs of Palestine. The majority of Pharisees, however, were pacifists and fatalists; only a minority became extremists anxious to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword, and, under Sadduk, seceded to the Zealots.

After the first challenge of the Zealots to Rome was crushed, the Roman government seriously attempted to understand their Jewish subjects and in many ways humoured them. For a time the Zealot movement lost in numbers and influence, for lack of matters of complaint. Quirinius deposed the unpopular high-priest Joazar, who counselled compliance with the census.[2] The Jews were excused from Roman military levies: the auxiliary troops under the procurator were recruited from among the non-Jewish populations of Palestine.[3] The first four procurators were friendly disposed towards the Jews. Roman authority, most tolerant of Jewish customs and religious beliefs, placed the Jewish cult on the status of a *religio licita*. The cult of the Cæsars, elsewhere established and even welcomed in the empire, was not forced upon the Jews except during the mad attempt of Caligula which led to fearful massacres in Alexandria and caused much heart-searching in Judæa. On this occasion the holy city was spared desecration, through the tactful and generous management of P. Petronius, the legate of Syria, who pleaded the cause of the Jews at the risk of his own life, for Caligula, offended at Petronius's hesitation, ordered him to commit suicide—a command which fortunately did not arrive until after the assassination of Caligula. King Agrippa I., a special favourite with Caligula, likewise used all his influence to secure the withdrawal of the offensive decree.[4] The Romans, out of regard for Jewish scruples concerning the imperial image on coins, granted Judæa a copper coinage which bore only the name of the emperor and inoffensive symbols. When from time to time Roman troops marched into Jerusalem, they did so without the usual military banners which bore the image of the emperor—a considerable condescension on the part of the conquerors.[5] Unfortunately, between Jewish demands and scrupulosity on the one side and Roman arrogance and ignorance of their subjects on the other, even this *modus vivendi* was not destined to succeed or to reconcile Palestine to accept the Roman yoke. Moreover, Roman practice did not always harmonize with Roman theory. The result was an ever-widening cleft between the pro-Roman and the anti-Roman parties in the nation, with increasing bitterness and recklessness among the latter. The pro-Roman or pacifist party was represented by the Sadducees and the Herodian rulers and the aristocracy generally, together with the more prudent of the Pharisees; the anti-Roman party was composed chiefly of the Zealots and the populace. The Pharisees, at first decidedly anti-Roman, after A.D. 66 generally sided with the Sadducæan aristocracy and the party of law and order against the extremists.

Under the first four procurators (Coponius, A.D. 6–9; Marcus Ambibulus, A.D. 9–12; Annius Rufus, A.D. 12–15; Valerius Gratus, A.D. 15–26) Judæa seems on the whole to have been equitably

1 *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1, XX. v. 2, *BJ* II. viii. 1.

2 This Judas the Galilæan and Gaulonite cannot consistently with the language of Josephus be identified with Judas, son of Ezekias, as is done by Grätz and Schürer (*GJV* i. 486).

3 *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1: εἴ γε καὶ Ἰούδας καὶ Σάδδουκος τετάρτην φιλοσοφίαν ἐπεισάκτως ἡμῖν ἐγείραντες.

4 *Ib.* XVIII. i. 6.

5 *Ib.* XX. v. 2, *BJ* II. viii. 1.

6 *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1.

7 *Ib.* XVIII. i. 6, *BJ* II. viii. 1.

8 Wellhausen, *Proleg. to Hist. of Israel*, Eng. tr., p. 535.

9 *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1.

10 *Ib.* XX. v. 2.

11 *BJ* II. xvii. 8 f.

1 *BJ* II. xvii. 9, VII. viii. 1.

2 *Ant.* XVIII. ii. 1.

3 Cf. Schürer, *GJV*[4] i. 459.

4 Philo, *ad Gaium*, XXIX ff. (Mangey, ii. 573); Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. viii.

5 *Ant.* XVIII. iii. 1; cf. also the enumeration of Roman favours towards the Jews in the speech of Titus (*BJ* VI. vi. 2).

administered, and there was little disaffection to further the Zealot party. But the fifth procurator (Pontius Pilatus, A.D. 26–36) was a man of a different mind. He was, according to a letter of Agrippa I. to Caligula,[1] 'naturally inflexible and stubbornly relentless,' and guilty of 'acts of corruption, insults, rapine, outrages on the people, arrogance, repeated murders of innocent victims, and constant and most galling savagery'—a description quite in keeping with the impression given of him in the Gospels.[2] He defied Jewish religious prejudices by introducing a Roman garrison with the imperial ensigns into the city by night—an act which met with such opposition that Pilate was obliged to yield.[3] Another offence was his confiscation of part of the Temple treasury (the Corban) to build an aqueduct for Jerusalem. To the Jewish protests against this sacrilege Pilate replied by commanding the soldiery to punish the mob, which they did so thoroughly that many lives were lost.[4] Again, he set up gilt shields without the imperial image, but bearing his own and the emperor's name, in the palace of Herod within the city, 'not so much for the honour of Tiberius as to annoy the people.' He was ordered by the emperor to transfer them to the Augusteum at Cæsarea.[5] His last act of carnage was committed against the Samaritans, who laid their complaint before Vitellius, legate of Syria, by whom Pilate was sent to Rome to answer for his conduct, and Marcellus was appointed in his place.[6] All Vitellius's conciliatory acts could not undo the anti-Roman feelings engendered by the late procurator. It was under this Pilate, when the spirit of the dead Judas of Galilee again inspired the people with a desire for liberty, that Jesus taught and suffered. One of His disciples was probably a Zealot. In Galilee especially Jesus came in contact with Zealot propaganda which, in its advocacy of violence, ran counter to His preaching concerning the Kingdom of God, and against which He raised His protests.[7] Our Lord's death is also, possibly, linked with the history of Zealotism. It was the plots and violence of the Zealots which aggravated Pilate's apprehensions upon which the Jewish authorities played. At Jesus' trial before Pilate the multitude was granted the option between 'Jesus Barabbas' (Mt 27[16f.]) and 'Jesus called Christ.' This Barabbas was a 'robber' (Jn 18[40]) who had been 'imprisoned with the insurrectionists who in the insurrection had been guilty of murder' (Mk 15[7]). The word found in the Fourth Gospel (18[40]), λῃστής, is the word most frequently used by our chief historian of Zealotism (Josephus) as synonymous with Zealot; and Mark's account indicates that Barabbas was no ordinary highwayman, but one who had headed one of the numerous revolts (στάσις) against Roman authority. Barabbas was, therefore, probably a Zealot leader.

The objection urged against this interpretation is that as a Zealot leader Barabbas would be in favour with the masses and likely to be preferred by the people, whereas Pilate hoped, by permitting the choice, that the multitude would ask for the release of Jesus. But (1) the accounts are somewhat confused. According to the Fourth Gospel and Matthew, Pilate proposed the choice as a possible means of acquitting Jesus, while, according to the oldest account (Mark), the people reminded Pilate of his customary clemency at the feast. (2) The alternative was not between a popular Zealot and an unpopular Messiah. Both Barabbas and Jesus were popular. Pilate knew that Jesus was in such favour with the people as to be called 'King of the Jews' (cf. Jn 6[15]), but that by the authorities He was regarded with jealousy. Of these two popular prisoners Pilate was convinced that Jesus would be preferred by the multitude, which, however, partly under the influence of the high-priest, demanded Barabbas. It was not the first time that a procurator misunderstood Jewish feelings, nor the first occasion on which a ruler was misled by the psychology of the mob.

Little is known of the next two procurators—Marcellus (A.D. 36–37) and Marullus (A.D. 37–41).[1] Such was the Jewish national consciousness that the news of the bloody persecutions to which their brethren in Alexandria were subjected towards the close of A.D. 38 (and which continued fitfully until the close of Caligula's reign because of their opposition to the erection of the imperial image in the synagogues) would intensify the fanatical hate against Rome. The same demand for the recognition of the imperial cult was made upon Judæa the next year as a punishment for the act of the Jews of Jamnia in overthrowing an altar erected to Caligula.[2] After much hesitation the emperor yielded to the entreaties of the Syrian legate, Petronius, and Agrippa I. and withdrew the edict. The act of Claudius immediately on his accession, whereby he restored to Agrippa I. (the Herod of Ac 12) the dominions of his grandfather, Herod the Great, by adding Judæa and Samaria to his kingdom, was intended to placate Jewish nationalism. This arrangement continued in force till A.D. 44, when, on the death of Agrippa I., Rome passed over his twelve-year-old son and incorporated all Palestine with Syria under a procurator.[3] This disappearance of the semi-Jewish Herodian dynasty, which had stood as a buffer between Rome and the Jews, formed a crisis in Jewish history and caused a renewed outbreak of Zealotism. The social peace and material prosperity of the few years under Agrippa I., together with bitter memories of Roman procurators, made a return under direct Roman administration repugnant to the masses. Fuel was added to the fires of fanaticism. From this important date till A.D. 66 seven procurators administered Palestine.

'If the history of the Roman procurators, to whom Palestine was now entrusted, is reviewed, one might imagine that all, as if by some secret compact, systematically aimed at driving the people into revolt. Even the best of them—not to mention the others who trod all right under foot—had no idea that a people like the Jews desired above everything else tolerance toward their distinctive customs. Instead of practising mildness and caution, they opposed all the vital agitations (*Lebensregungen*) of the people with a pitiless severity.'[4]

The régime of the first two procurators after A.D. 44 (Fadus from 44, and Tiberius Alexander, nephew of Philo, till 48) was mild compared with that of the subsequent five: 'by making no innovations in our ancestral customs they kept the nation quiet.'[5] The misdeeds of Fadus recorded by Josephus are (1) his demand that the high-priest's vestment should be restored to Roman custody, which Claudius rescinded,[6] and (2) his suppression of the 'magician' or prophet Theudas, an idol of the people.[7] That Zealotism broke out with fresh vigour under Fadus's administration we may infer from the words of Josephus about the death of Tholomaios 'the arch-brigand'[8] and the clearance of all Judæa of 'robberies.'[9] We are

1 Philo, *ad Gaium*, xxxviii. (Mangey, ii. 590).

2 Cf. Lk 13[1]: 'the Galilæans, whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices.' It is quite possible that these Galilæans were Zealots whose opposition would be aroused by the cruel régime of Pilate. In the list of heresies in Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 80, and in Hegesippus (Eusebius, *HE* iv. 6) the Zealots are called Galilæans. The Zealot followers of John of Gischala are referred to as Galilæans in *BJ* iv. ix. 10.

3 *Ant.* xviii. iii. 1. 4 *Ib.* xviii. iii. 2, *BJ* ii. ix. 4.

5 Philo, *ad Gaium*, xxxviii. (Mangey, ii. 590).

6 *Ant.* xviii. iv.

7 Cf. J. Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, Göttingen, 1892, p. 24; and A. M. Hughes, 'Anti-Zealotism in the Gospels,' *ExpT* xxvii. [1915–16] 152. The words in Mt 11[12] (from the Logia)—ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν βιάζεται καὶ βιασταὶ ἁρπάζουσιν αὐτήν—may quite well be aimed against the Zealots. So Bousset, *Die Relig. des Judentums*[3], p. 101; K. Kohler, art. 'Zealots,' in *JE*.

1 *Ant.* xviii. iv. 2, vi. 10.

2 Philo, *ad Gaium*, xxx f. (Mangey, ii. 575 ff.); Jos. *Ant.* xviii. viii., *BJ* ii. 10.

3 *Ant.* xix. ix. 4 Schürer, i. 565.

5 *BJ* ii. xi. 6. 6 *Ant.* xx. i. 1.

7 *Ib.* xx. v. 1; Ac 5[36ff.].

8 ὁ ἀρχιλῃστής—οἱ λῃσταί being practically synonymous in Josephus for ζηλωταί.

9 *Ant.* xx. i. 1.

not informed whether the motive of Fadus was an insight into the nationalist danger or merely to keep order. The fact that the next procurator, Tiberius Alexander, deemed it necessary to crucify the Zealot leaders, Jacob and Simon, sons of Judas, shows that there was an alarming recrudescence of Zealot agitation such as to require summary treatment.[1] Under Ventidius Cumanus (A.D. 48–52) the people were in a constant state of insurrection.[2] Their resentment was embittered by (1) an indecent act of a Roman soldier at the Passover leading to a tumult, in which 30,000[3] Jews perished; (2) an order of Cumanus that whole villages be plundered in retaliation for the robbery of an imperial official by 'robbers' (probably Zealots): in the execution of this command a Roman soldier tore a copy of the Law to shreds with obscene language, upon which the people became so threatening that Cumanus beheaded the guilty soldier to placate them.[4] (3) As a result of the refusal of Cumanus to do justice to the Jews in a quarrel with the Samaritans, the people, against the advice of their elders, called in the help of the Zealot leader, 'Eleazar, son of Dinæus, a robber,' and Alexander, doubtless also a Zealot chief. Cumanus fell upon them and slew many. An appeal was carried to Ummidius Quadratus, legate of Syria, who referred the matter to Rome. Claudius, well-disposed through the offices of Agrippa II., condemned the Samaritans and banished Cumanus.[5] The administration of Felix (A.D. 52–60) formed 'the turning-point in the drama which commenced in 44 and reached its bloody issue in 70.'[6] 'The affairs of Judæa continued to grow steadily worse.'[7] Felix intensified the revolutionary spirit by (1) his offensive marriage with Drusilla; (2) his treacherous capture of the Zealot leader, Eleazar; (3) the murder of the high-priest, Jonathan, which he perpetrated by means of the Sicarii; (4) the slaughter of 400 followers of the Egyptian prophet who led 30,000 men[8] into the wilderness; (5) unfair treatment of the Jews of Cæsarea in their quarrel with their Syrian townsmen.[9] He endeavoured to exterminate the 'robbers' (Zealots), who, nevertheless, became increasingly numerous and influential among the masses. His conduct rendered the nationalist party eager to bring the matter to the issue of arms. The sympathies of the people, now driven to desperation, were alienated from the pacifist leaders to the side of the Zealot party. Further, alongside, or within, the Zealot movement appeared a more extreme faction known as Sicarii, or 'dagger-men,'[10] who from then till the end of the siege struck down indifferently pro-Roman and Roman. Under Porcius Festus (A.D. 60–62) the cancellation of the Jewish *isopoliteia* in Cæsarea roused bitter resentment. The imperial letter relative thereto 'furnished the causes of all the subsequent evils to our nation.' Another popular movement led by an 'impostor' (probably a would-be Messiah or a Zealot) was suppressed by Festus. The opposition of Agrippa II. and Festus to the erection by the Jews of the wall to prevent the Temple sacrifices from being overlooked from Agrippa's palace was another instance of blind neglect of Jewish sentiment.[11] Though Festus did not stain his office by the cruelties of his predecessor, the national party grew apace. The Sicarii who appeared under Felix became numerous. Festus attempted to exterminate the Zealots: 'he captured the majority of the "robbers" and destroyed many.'[1] The last two procurators, Albinus (A.D. 62–64) and Gessius Florus (A.D. 64–66), acted as if they were resolved to provoke the Jews to rebellion. They reduced the country to anarchy. Josephus relates of Albinus: 'There was no species of wickedness which he left undone.'[2] He levied oppressive taxes, plundered privately and publicly, sold justice, and released all prisoners who could pay. He alternately connived at and punished the actions of the Sicarii and Zealots. Hearing that Florus was coming as his successor, he executed his most dangerous prisoners and released the others. As the released prisoners belonged mostly to the Zealot faction, 'the land was filled with robbers.'[3] Josephus has left a terrible account of the villainies of the last procurator, Florus,[4] by comparison with whom Albinus was upright. He flaunted his crimes publicly, took bribes, and wrung all he could out of the miserable people. On the one hand Bernice interceded, but in vain, for a more humane treatment of the Jews, while Agrippa II. attempted to appease the people. Florus desired war to cover his misdeeds, and the younger men, mostly Zealots, were likewise eager for war. The provocation was furnished on Florus's part by his seizure of part of the Temple treasury and by his brutal attack on the people when they resented the insolence of the two cohorts which they were ordered to welcome from Cæsarea; and on the part of the Jews by a jest of some Jewish wags who pretended to beg for the destitute Florus, by the seizure of Masada and the slaughter of the Roman garrison by the Zealots, and by the discontinuance of the daily sacrifice for the emperor. Even now the peace party—the Sadducæan high-priests and the chiefs of the Pharisees—advocated conciliatory measures with the seditious Zealots, who refused to hearken.[5]

The insurgents under Eleazar, son of Ananias, allied with the Sicarii, attacked Agrippa's troops, upon whom the peace party relied.[6] Menahem, son of Judas the Galilæan, armed the Zealots, entered the city, and forced the capitulation of the soldiery of Agrippa and the citizens of the peace party. The war party further celebrated their victory by murdering the high-priest Ananias. Menahem's cruelty led to a quarrel with the other Zealot leader, Eleazar, which resulted in the death of Menahem. Eleazar celebrated his uncontested leadership by a shameful butchery of the Roman garrison under Metilius, which had capitulated on terms.[7] The successful defence of the capital against Cestius Gallus, governor of Syria, and his defeat at Beth-horon inspired enthusiasm in the Zealot and war party.[8] Many pro-Romans and moderates now abandoned the holy city. The war party came into control by violence or persuasion,[9] and the moderates were much disheartened.[10] As the die was now cast and an attack expected from Rome, the authorities proceeded to organize for war and appointed generals for Jerusalem and the provinces.[11] It should be noted that at this early stage those in authority were mostly members of the aristocracy—Sadducees and Pharisees—who considered it prudent to put themselves at the head of the popular revolution. The position of affairs was reversed after the misfortunes of the first year of the war, as fortress after fortress fell before the Romans. The revolution which unseated the native authorities and put provincial

1 *Ant.* xx. v. 2. 2 *BJ* II. xii. 1.
3 Josephus, *Opera*, ed. B. Niese, Berlin, 1887–95, vi. 98 (ὑπὲρ τρισμυρίους), *BJ* II. xii. 1, *Ant.* xx. v. 3.
4 *Ant.* xx. v. 4, *BJ* II. xii. 2.
5 *Ant.* xx. vi., *BJ* II. xii. 3 ff.
6 Schürer, i. 571. 7 Jos. *Ant.* xx. viii. 5.
8 *BJ* II. xiii. 5, but 4000, according to Ac 21[38].
9 *Ant.* xx. vii., *BJ* II. xii. 3.
10 *Ant.* xx. viii. 5, 10, *BJ* II. xiii. 3.
11 *Ant.* xx. viii. 9 ff.

1 *BJ* II. xiv. 1. 2 *Ib.*
3 *Ant.* xx. ix. 5. 4 *Ib.* xx. ix., *BJ* II. xiv. 2 ff.
5 *BJ* II. xvii. 3. 6 *Ib.* xvii. 6 ff.
7 *Ib.* 10. 8 *Ib.* xix.
9 *Ib.* xx. 1, 3. 10 *Ib.* xxii. 1.
11 *Ib.* xx. 3, *Vita*, 7.

radicals in power was brought about by the Zealot, John of Gischala, the enemy of Josephus, in the winter A.D. 67–68. On the fall of Gischala (Nov. A.D. 67) John fled to Jerusalem, gained over the youth of the city, and was abetted by the increasing numbers of provincial refugees entering the city.[1] The authorities were, with some truth, accused of lack of energy in the prosecution of the war and even of Roman sympathies. The Zealots believed that the safety of the nation lay in ousting the aristocratic native leaders and in taking control themselves. They began by imprisoning Antipas (one of the royal lineage and public treasurer) and other persons of rank, and elected a new high-priest from the proletariat. The native party of order strenuously opposed the provincials and their Zealot supporters. The former was led by Gorion, son of Joseph, Simon, son of Gamaliel, and the high-priests Ananus and Jesus, son of Gamaliel. A speech of Ananus roused a majority of the inhabitants against the Zealots, who, in self-defence, summoned the Idumæans on the pretext that the authorities of Jerusalem had made common cause with the Romans. The Idumæans on arrival were refused admission by the inhabitants, but were secretly introduced at night by the Zealots. The Idumæans signalized their entrance by the perpetration of intolerable cruelties, in which the Zealots heartily joined, against the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. This reign of terror accomplished the utter collapse of the native party of order and ended in a victory for the Zealots and reactionaries. The high-priests, Ananus and Jesus, and a prominent citizen, Zecharias, son of Baruch, were put out of the way. When the Idumæans, satiated with the blood of the citizens, realized the falsity of the pretence upon which they were introduced by the Zealots, they withdrew, but assassination and *sabotage* were continued by the Zealots. John, at the head of the Zealots, now became undisputed dictator of the city, while the Sicarii and Zealots carried on their brigandage and murders throughout the country. The Roman civil wars delayed military operations for a time. Meanwhile Simon, son of Giora, at the head of a mixed following of slaves and Zealots, overran a large portion of S. Palestine (A.D. 68–69) and came into conflict with the Zealots under John. The Romans, under Cerealis, put an end to Simon's marauding by conquering all Palestine outside the capital, except the three fortresses of Herodeion, Machærus, and Masada, held by the Zealots (summer of A.D. 69). Simon now appeared with his army before the walls of Jerusalem, the inhabitants of which, groaning under the tyranny of John, invited, at the suggestion of the high-priest Matthias, Simon 'as a second tyrant' within the city. There were now two factions, each distinguished by the same Zealot hatred of Rome and the same indifference to the rights of the citizens. Vespasian had meantime ascended the throne and commissioned Titus with the reduction of the Jewish rebellion. While the Romans were preparing to invest the city, there appeared a third faction headed by Eleazar, son of Simon, who, with a large following of priestly Zealots, revolted from John's party.[2] The incessant bickerings of these three tyrants, John, Simon, and Eleazar, caused terrible misery to the city and led to the disastrous burning of vast stores of grain sufficient to withstand a siege of many years.[1] A bloody riot occurred at the Passover of A.D. 70, in which John vanquished Eleazar's party and thus reduced the three Zealot factions to two.[2] As the Romans commenced to beleaguer the city, party faction was stilled. Eleazar with 2400 Zealots again united with John and his Zealots, while the Idumæans united with Simon.[3] The two leaders, John and Simon, made such an heroic and strategically planned defence against the Roman beleaguering forces that, had it not been for the previous internecine strife, which lessened the defenders, and the mad destruction of the ample supplies of grain, it is improbable that the Romans would have succeeded. In spite of Titus's desire to shorten the campaign and spare the city, the appeals of Josephus to his countrymen, and the famine prevailing within, the peace party was silenced by the Zealots. On the capture of the city (Sept. A.D. 70) John and Simon fell into the hands of the Romans; the former was condemned to life imprisonment, the latter was spared to grace the triumph and then executed. Herodeion, Machærus, and Masada still remained in the hands of the insurgents, chiefly Zealots and Sicarii. Lucilius Bassus captured Herodeion, and compelled Machærus to surrender. The last stronghold of the Zealots was Masada, occupied by the Sicarii and Zealots early in the war under Eleazar, a descendant of Judas the Galilæan.[4] This place fell in April, A.D. 73, before Flavius Silva, who discovered to his chagrin that the defenders had by agreement slain each other and the last survivor had committed suicide, only two women and five children surviving. With the fall of Masada the history of the Zealots as a party ends. The Jews had ceased to be a nation: it was, however, the spirit of the Zealots that inspired the sanguinary insurrections in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian.

There is much in the history of Zealotism which recalls the Highland devotion to hopeless causes. Zealot enthusiasm was doomed to failure because it was not guided by prudence. Their indiscretions, their separatist spirit, their disregard of the other parties in the nation, and their enormities led to the defeat of the cause to which they devoted themselves with such indefatigable heroism in a life-and-death struggle with the imperial might of Rome.

4. Relation to other Jewish parties.—The chief questions are those of the relation of the Zealots to the Pharisees and to the Sicarii.[5] Josephus speaks of the Zealots as a fourth party alongside of the Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes.[6] His description of the Zealot sect is:

'Of the fourth of these philosophies Judas, the Galilæan, became leader. In all other respects they agree with the opinions of the Pharisees, but they are distinguished by an unshakable devotion to liberty, holding that God alone is Ruler and Lord (ἡγέμονα καὶ δεσπότην). They consider it a trifling matter to endure extraordinary deaths and the tortures of relatives and dear ones, in their refusal to address any mortal as "Lord." And since multitudes have witnessed their immovable courage under such circumstances I do not dwell upon it in detail. For I am not afraid that anything related of them should be disbelieved, but on the contrary I fear lest the narrative may do less than justice to their contempt in enduring the misery of pain. The nation commenced to suffer from the malady of this madness through the reckless insolence of Gessius Florus, the procurator, in driving the people to revolt from Rome.'[7]

The Zealot movement arose in the bosom of Pharisaism and retained throughout its brief

[1] *BJ* IV. iii.

[2] Ewald (*Hist. of Israel*, Eng. tr., vii. 559 ff.) classifies these three Zealot factions into the learned Zealots (who came into power under John in spring of A.D. 68), the popular Zealots (admitted under Simon, April, A.D. 69), and the priestly Zealots (who seceded under Eleazar early in A.D. 70); *per contra* Jackson and Lake, *Beginnings of Christianity*, I. 423, who contend that the name 'Zealot' applies to John of Gischala's following and to no other.

[1] Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 12.

[2] *Ib.*; Jos. *BJ* v. iii. 1.

[3] *BJ* v. vi. 1.

[4] *Ib.* II. xvii. 9, VII. viii. 1.

[5] Hippolytus in his *Ref. of all Heresies*, ix. 21, represents the Zealots or Sicarii as an extreme sect of the Essenes. His account disagrees with all the other accounts of Essenism given by Philo, Josephus, Pliny, Hegesippus, Porphyry, and Epiphanius, and with that of Zealotism given by Josephus.

[6] See *Ant.* XVIII. i. 2 f., *BJ* II. viii. 2. In *Vita*, 2, he mentions only three parties.

[7] *Ant.* XVIII. i. 6.

history a striking resemblance to Pharisaism. The Pharisees represented generally the popular party, distinguished by their dislike of Roman overlordship and their zeal for the Law and the theocracy. The Roman question caused a split among the Pharisees into the majority of moderates and the minority of extremists or war party. The former were fatalists,[1] who viewed Roman domination as due to an act of the inscrutable will of God or as a punishment for the people's infidelity. While their ideal was national independence, their policy was passive resistance. The other party favoured war *à outrance*. The one party valued the liberal measure of tolerance granted by Rome for the exercise of their religion: the other believed that autonomous nationalism was requisite for the very existence of the theocracy. These extremists, led by Sadduk, gladly attached themselves to a nationalist like Judas. The Herodians[2] were probably not strictly a separate party, but belonged to, or for political purposes allied themselves with, the most pacific section of the Pharisees. Herodians and Pharisees would agree (1) in discountenancing everything which threatened to disturb the political *status quo*, while (2) preferring the Herodian dynasty (instead of a Roman procuratorship), which some Pharisees would view as a compromise for the fuller theocracy. The Zealots occupied, therefore, the extreme right of the Pharisees, and the Herodians the extreme left, on the question of the *status quo*.

Unfortunately our chief source for the history of Zealotism is Josephus—a moderate Pharisee and pro-Roman, with a decided penchant against the Zealots,[3] probably due to the fact that he wished in the minds of the Romans to throw the blame of the rebellion upon a party which became extinct with the Roman victories, and partly to screen his own sect, which after the end of the Jewish nation became the guardian of its traditions. The excesses of which the Zealots were guilty furnished him a feasible excuse. The Zealot movement not only arose within Pharisaism, but throughout its course really stood for the ideals of the Pharisees, though adopting different means.

'The latter [Zealot party] only drew the last practical conclusions out of the hate of the Pharisees against heathen domination. The Pharisees therefore never disapproved of their conduct until it degenerated into absolutely unlawful proceedings. Where this happened [*BJ* IV. v. 9], the doctors of the Pharisees broke loose from the Zealots, who now betrayed their connexion with the Pharisees by immediately falling upon the Sadducean aristocracy.'[4]

The Zealots did not scruple to accomplish the death of Sadducean high-priests. Even Josephus cannot conceal the close relations between Zealots and Pharisees, the Zealots being distinguished only by their marked devotion to independence,[5] though elsewhere[6] he speaks of Judas as *σοφιστὴς ἰδίας αἱρέσεως οὐδὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις προσεοικώς*. But from A.D. 66 the Pharisees, foreseeing the issue of a conflict with imperial Rome, withdrew more and more from the Zealots and joined the Sadducees in advocating conciliatory measures.[7] Josephus generally speaks of the Zealots as 'brigands' (*λησταί*). This nomenclature was due to (1) the absence for some time of any definite party name for these radicals, the title 'Zealot' being a self-designation of the party,[8] and perhaps not definitely chosen till the days of Florus, under whom Josephus first employs the term,[1] his ordinary designation up to this point being 'robbers' or 'assassins'; and (2) the fact that, being outlawed by the Romans and hated by and hating the pro-Romans, the Zealots in self-defence organized into bands and lived in troublous times by brigandage.

The Sicarii are thus described by Josephus:

'The Sicarii, as they are called (they are robbers), then grew very numerous. They use swords similar in length to the Persian *acinaces*, but curved and very like what the Romans call *sicæ*, from which the robbers received their appellation because they destroyed with this weapon many victims. They mingled themselves at the festivals, as described elsewhere, in the multitude of those who had assembled from all quarters for worship and easily murdered whom they chose. And often they proceeded armed against the villages of their enemies pillaging and burning.'[2]

Josephus seemingly identifies the Sicarii and the Zealots.[3] (1) He also indirectly identifies them by assigning to the Sicarii the same policy as that pursued by the Zealots[4] and their refusal to acknowledge the emperor as *δεσπότης*;[5] and (2) the Sicarii became prominent under Felix and Festus when the Zealots were a source of annoyance to the procurators.[6] Elsewhere[7] Josephus says that the Sicarii first appeared on the scene in the days of Quirinius synchronous with the rebellion of Judas the Galilæan, the father of all Zealotism; he apparently regards the agents in that rebellion indifferently as Sicarii or Zealots. But Josephus sometimes uses language which would also suggest some distinction in his mind between Zealots and Sicarii.[8] Originally the Sicarii were perhaps a separate group from the Zealots. As the Zealots were an extremist offshoot of the Pharisees, the Sicarii were originally an extremist offshoot from the Zealots. The Zealots were the soldiers of the theocracy and the Sicarii the *francs tirailleurs* of the Zealots. In the confused years following A.D. 66 the Sicarii increased in numbers and in frightfulness, and the line of demarcation between them and the Zealots, if remaining, became very faint. Whether the Sicarii remained the extremists of the Zealots or whether Zealots and Sicarii became ultimately synonyms (so Renan and Kohler) our sources do not determine with certainty.[9]

LITERATURE.—(1) *Ancient.*—The chief ancient source is Josephus, esp. *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1, *BJ* II. viii. 1 ff., and XV. Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 1–13; Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium*; Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* lxvi. 4 ff.; Hippolytus, *Ref. Omn. Hær.* ix. 21.

(2) *Modern.*—Artt. 'Zeloten' in *PRE*[3] (F. Sieffert), and 'Zealots' in *JE* (K. Kohler); J. Hamburger, *Real-Encyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, Leipzig, 1866–1900, ii. 1286 ff.; also artt. 'Judas Galiläus' in *PRE*[3] (K. Schmidt), and 'Pharisäer und Sadducäer,' *ib.* (Sieffert); J. Wellhausen, *Die Pharisäer und die Sadducäer*, Greifswald, 1874, and *Prolegomena to the Hist. of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1885, pp. 533–538; Schürer, *GJV*[4], Leipzig, 1901–11, i. 453–544 (a good account with detailed bibliography); T. Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, Eng. tr., London, 1873–83, i. 255 ff.; A. Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus*, do. 1883, i. 237 ff.; J. Derenbourg, *Essai sur l'hist. et la géographie de la Palestine d'après les Thalmuds*, Paris, 1867, p. 237 ff.; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906, pp. 99–103; A. M. Hughes, 'Anti-Zealotism in the Gospels,' *ExpT* XXVII. [1915–16] 151–154; H. Ewald,

[1] Cf. *Ant.* XVIII. i. 3, *BJ* II. viii. 14.
[2] τοὺς τὰ Ἡρῴδου φρονοῦντας (*Ant.* XIV. xv. 10).
[3] Cf. *Ant.* XVIII. i. 1, *BJ* IV. iii. 3, 9, v. i. 1, VII. viii. 1, etc.
[4] Sieffert, *PRE*[3] XV. 287.
[5] *Ant.* XVIII. i. 6. Zealotism 'was the philosophy which had the strongest influence on everyday life, and which maintained its principles with the greatest obstinacy: it was indeed, which is not mentioned by the politic Pharisee Josephus, simply and unreservedly Pharisaism' (Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, Eng. tr., i. 257). 'Zealotism was ultimately only thoroughgoing and logical Pharisaism' (Ewald, *Hist. of Israel*, Eng. tr., vii. 567).
[6] *BJ* II. viii. 1. [7] *Ib.* II. xvii. 3.
[8] *Ib.* VII. viii. 1.

[1] *BJ* IV. iii. 9.
[2] *Ant.* XX. viii. 10; cf. *ib.* viii. 5, *BJ* II. xiii. 3, 6, xvii. 6, IV. vii. 2, VII. x. 1; Ac 21[38].
[3] In *Ant.* XX. viii. 10: οἱ σικάριοι δὲ καλούμενοι, λησταὶ δὲ εἰσιν οὗτοι, λησταί being a common term in Josephus for 'Zealots'; and in *BJ* II. xvii. 6: 'the Sicarii—for so they called robbers carrying swords in their bosoms.'
[4] Cf. *BJ* II. xiii. 4, and esp. VII. viii. 1.
[5] *Ib.* VII. viii. 1; cf. with *Ant.* XVIII. i. 6.
[6] *Ant.* XX. viii. 5, *BJ* II. xiii. 3. [7] *BJ* VII. viii. 1.
[8] *E.g.*, after describing the Sicarii and really assigning to them the policy of the Zealots in *BJ* VII. viii. 1, he adds ἐν ᾗ τὸ τῶν ζηλωτῶν κληθέντων γένος ἤκμασεν, as if a different class from the Sicarii. Again, having related the policy of extermination of the 'brigands' (*i.e.* Zealots) pursued by Felix (II. xiii. 2), he proceeds καθαρείσης δὲ τῆς χώρας (of the Zealots) ἕτερον εἶδος λῃστῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ὑπεφύετο, οἱ καλούμενοι σικάριοι (*ib.* 3).
[9] Schechter's second version of the Talmud in *Abôth de Rabbi Nathan*, 8, reads קיקרין, where the first reads *Qanna'îm* (pp. 31–32).

The Hist. of Israel[4], Eng. tr., London, 1883–86, vi. 48–54, vii. 486–616 ('The Seven Years from 66 to 73 A.D.'—very readable); B. Stade, *Gesch. des Volkes Israel*, Berlin, 1887–88, ii. 628–654; J. E. H. Thomson, *Books which influenced our Lord and His Apostles*, Edinburgh, 1891, p. 66 ff.; F. J. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, i., London, 1920, pp. 421–425.

S. ANGUS.

ZENANA.—See FAMILY (Hindu).

ZEND AVESTA.—See AVESTA.

ZENO.—See ETHICS (Greek), STOICISM.

ZINZENDORF.—See MORAVIANS.

ZIONISM.—1. Title and object.

—Zionism is the designation of a modern nationalist movement among the Jews, the programme of which was definitely formulated at an international congress held in Basel, Switzerland, on 29th–31st Aug. 1897, in the following terms: 'The object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home in Palestine.'[1]

2. The basis.—The aim of Zionism, the re-establishment of the Jewish people in the land promised to the patriarchs as an eternal inheritance of the people of Israel, is a fundamental conception inherent in the religion of the Jews, and has actively asserted itself at various epochs since the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadrezzar.

ארץ, the land *par excellence*, became to Israel a symbol of God's grace. The possession of the land was a sign of Israel's faith, as its loss was to be the result of disobedience. In the Tôrâh this is a recurring theme, and the prophetic utterances ring its changes in every key. Concurrently with this idea the religious ordinances took shape in accordance with political circumstances—first in close attachment to the land, and then by reason of exile from it. Psalms 137 and 126 mirror the despair of those who were driven away from, and the joy of those who returned to, Zion. A special virtue or sanctity was ascribed to its very soil: 'For thy servants take pleasure in her stones, and have pity upon her dust' (Ps 102[14]). The Talmudic ritual and other legislation, which declares mere residence in Palestine, *Yishub Ereṣ Israel*, to be of the utmost merit, observes this standpoint throughout and contains special religious precepts, *Miṣwoth ha-teluyoth ha-areṣ*, applicable only to those living in *Ereṣ Israel*, as Palestine came to be called in the language and literature of the Jews.

Of essential importance to the religious mentality of the Jews became the yearning for the departed glory of Israel, of which the sanctuary on Mount Zion was the sacred symbol, and the prayer for the restoration of the kingdom of the house of David, which was synonymous with the Messianic age, is a *Leitmotiv* in the Jewish liturgy that is repeated in almost endless variety. The prophecies and incidents which accompanied the return of the exiles from the Babylonian captivity were applied to the ages and circumstances following the destruction of the Second Temple (A.D. 70). Even though in the course of time life proved stronger than ritual and the universalist aspirations of Judaism inspired a prophetic vision which turned the restoration of Israel into a far-off spiritual ideal, it nevertheless assumed concrete appearance at the first favourable opportunity.

The patriarchate and academies which maintained a Jewish spiritual centre in Palestine for centuries after the fall of the Jewish State, the pilgrimages to Judæa from all parts of the Diaspora, and the continuous attempt to create Jewish settlements on what was always regarded as Jewish soil, testified throughout the ages to the intense desire of the Jews to regain a footing in their ancestral country. The succession of pseudo-Messiahs, from Bar Kokhba († A.D. 135) to Shabbethai Ṣebi (1626–76), always appealed successfully to this Jewish passion.[1]

Even non-Jews (such as Napoleon, in his manifesto to the Jews of Asia and Africa to re-establish themselves under his auspices in Palestine [1799]; Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross, in his efforts to organize Jewish colonization there; Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Palmerston, and other Englishmen, in their sympathetic support; and Laurence Oliphant in his scheme in Gilead [1890]) realized the hold which the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine had on the Jews.

3. The revival of Jewish nationalism.—But it was only towards the middle of the 19th cent. that the sense of a national and political revival of the Jewish people assumed reality. The national resurrection of ancient Hellas, and the resurgence of national sentiment in Europe generally, proved a stimulus to Jewish hopes. The wave of Jewish solidarity that followed in the wake of the Damascus affair (1840) was a symptom, as the establishment of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (1860) was the first organized embodiment, of the re-awakened Jewish collective consciousness. Foremost in this direction was Sir Moses Montefiore (1784–1885), who, since his first visit to Palestine (1827), proved the forerunner in Western Europe of a keen, though none the less discriminating, interest in the Jewish future of Palestine. This inter-relation between Palestine and the Diaspora acted and reacted upon the general course of Jewish life, and eventually proved a measure of its vitality.

This was, however, the period of Jewish history when all the energies and resources of the Jews were wholly directed to their civil and political emancipation. This tendency, which derived its spiritual conception from the ideas of enlightenment and reform emanating from Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86) and his followers, received its most striking manifestation in the promulgation of the principles of the French Revolution, which, by the Napoleonic conquests, spread over Central Europe. The so-called Sanhedrin convened at the behest of Napoleon (1806) gave to the new orientation of Jewish life a formal sanction. It became an axiom of Jewish thought, at first in Western lands and then among the upper strata in the great communities in Eastern Europe and the Orient, that the Jews were no longer a nation but a faith, that the *beau idéal* of the Jewish future was a complete social and political adaptation to the dominant surroundings. Even in the religious sphere this process of 'assimilation,' as it is technically termed, came to be applied in an ever-widening measure. The national or particularist elements of Judaism were put into the background, and the universalist aspects emphasized. In the liturgy the references to the restoration and the rebuilding of the Temple were toned down, and in some prayer-books the words 'Zion' and 'Jerusalem' even eliminated; the vernacular began to rival, and gradually to supersede, the original Hebrew, and, while avoiding schismatic tendencies, this reform of Judaism assumed distinctive colourings adapted to the circumstances of time and place.

4. The Chovevé Zion.—While traditional and modernist conceptions of Judaism as a religion struggled for mastery on the question of the validity of ancient dogmas, forms, and ordinances, there set in a fermentation in the racial consciousness of the Jews that gave a new direction to their aspirations. True, in the West, the devoted efforts of Sir Moses Montefiore to bring his English co-religionists to a realization of Jewish potentialities in Palestine met with no effective response. The publication in 1862 by Moses Hess of *Rom und Jerusalem*, advocating the recognition of a distinctive Jewish nationality and a Jewish re-settlement in Palestine, also found no favour among the Jews of Germany, where it appeared. The publication of a pamphlet, *Auto-Emanzipation*, by Leo Pinsker, of Odessa (1881), definitely proclaiming the necessity for the establishment by the Jews of a country of their own marked, however, a definite stage in the emergence of a movement which was to captivate the imagination of the mass of the Jewish people.

The consequent rise of the movement of the Chovevé (Ḥobébé) Zion ('Lovers of Zion') broke

[1] The title 'Zionism' is said to have been used first in 1886 by Nathan Birnbaum (*nom de plume*, Matthias Acher) in his art. 'Selbst-Emanzipation,' *Ost und West*, 1902, p. 576. He subsequently, however, expressed his preference for the designation, 'Jewish Renaissance Movement,' as more comprehensive (cf. *Ost und West*, 1902, p. 526).

[1] See art. MESSIAHS (Pseudo-).

with the ideology of assimilation that had been taking hold of ever-increasing numbers of the Jewish people.[1]

5. Jewish nationalist aspirations.—The outward events detailed in art. ANTI-SEMITISM[2] reinforced the trend of sentiment and thought that was proceeding within Jewry. A complete spiritual transformation took place, particularly in the outlook of the younger generation. The effort to turn the Jews into a mere religious denomination, distinguished from their neighbours only by their religion, and even in this approximating to the ideas and customs of time and place, was opposed by the affirmation that the people of Israel, though dispersed over the whole earth, was still one people, not only bound together by a common past, but consecrated by the hopes and aspirations of a common future. It was put forward that the Jews had indeed a distinctive mission in the economy of the world—as was claimed by those who would insist upon the universality of Judaism as a world-religion—but, while recognizing that only a part of the Jewish people would settle in Palestine, it was asserted that the spiritual purpose of Israel could be worthily accomplished only in its hallowed homeland, whence, as in the days of old, it would draw inspiration from its native soil, and give again of its own genius, unaffected by alien influences, its distinctive contribution to the religion and civilization of the world. It was particularly in the cultivation of the specific Hebraic spirit of righteousness and social justice that the Jewish nationalists saw the Messianic fulfilment of the destiny of the Jew in history.

6. Modern Hebrew literature.—The nationalist conception of Jewish life found in time a host of advocates in the Jewish literature of all languages, so that it is now, particularly in the press, the most potent intellectual force in Jewry. In particular the Hebrew language, hitherto confined to prayer and study as well as to religious and literary correspondence, proved both a means and an end in nationalist propaganda. Hebrew, adapted to modern needs, became the vehicle for the issue of original works and translations, and a Hebrew press fashioned the ancient tongue for everyday use. It became the medium of instruction in schools, and finally in Palestine the vernacular of the younger generation. In the course of a few decades modern Hebrew literature revealed an intellectual individuality of a high order. Perez Smolenskin (1842–85), by his Hebrew periodical *Ha-shaḥar* ('The Dawn'), was a nationalist pioneer among the intellectuals of his time. Aḥad Ha-'am (Asher Ginzberg) (born 1856) is a thinker of profound depth and endowed with extraordinary clarity of judgment and diction. He has given a philosophical content to Jewish nationalism, and the idea of a Jewish spiritual centre in Palestine is emphasized by him in contradistinction to an exclusively politico-economic conception of the movement. Ḥaim Naḥman Bialik (b. 1873) and Saul Tchernichowsky (b. 1875) stand out among those who in these latter days have revived the inspiration of Hebrew poetic expression. Nahum Sokolow (b. 1859) wields the Hebrew language with a versatility and grace reminiscent of the wealth of classical Greek and the elegance of French literature. The new Hebrew University in Jerusalem will give modern Hebrew the definite scientific canons of which it is still in need.

Modern Hebrew is based on the Bible, with its developments in the Mishnāh, Talmud, and mediæval literature. A complete lexicon, with the latest terminology, is the מילון (*Thesaurus Totius Hebraitatis*) of Eliezer ben Yehudah, now in course of publication.

7. Jewish colonization in Palestine. — In its practical development the movement assumed the form of colonization in Palestine with the aspiration for the ultimate revival of the Jewish people, not only in its homeland but in the whole Diaspora. The work of agricultural colonization was initiated by Sir Moses Montefiore in 1854 by the settlement on the land of 35 families from Safed, and by Charles Netter in 1870 in the foundation of the still existing training farm Miqveh Israel, near Jaffa. There followed the establishment of the agricultural colony Petaḥ Tiqvah in 1878 and of Rishon le-Zion and Zikhron Ya'acob in 1882. The movement of the Chovevé Zion had by then gathered sufficient force to hold in 1884 an international conference at Kattowitz, Silesia. The idea of the colonization of Palestine, which, amid exceptional difficulties, has been put into effect by men of high ideals but no practical experience (notably, in 1882, by the so-called 'Bilu' group, composed mainly of Russo-Jewish students), enlisted the sympathies of the Western Jews more out of philanthropic than nationalist motives, while in Eastern Europe the imagination of enthusiasts was stirred by visions of a Jewish national revival. Baron Edmond de Rothschild, of Paris (b. 1845), with an idealism equalled only by his princely generosity, provided the financial means by which alone the colonies could have been maintained. In 1889 the Russian Jews established the Odessa Committee for the colonization of Jews in Syria and Palestine, while in Western Europe benevolent efforts were made to further this object. But the disappointingly slow progress in Palestine and the gradual restriction of the horizon of the Chovevé Zion led to general disillusionment and apathy.

8. Herzl and Political Zionism.—It was in 1896 that the Jewish world was aroused by the appearance of Theodor Herzl, of Vienna (1860–1904), who, in his *Judenstaat*, promulgated the view that Jews should leave the inhospitable lands inhabited by them, and set out in detail a scheme for the creation of a Jewish commonwealth. Though this publication may be said to have been distinguished by its boldness and lucidity, it was only the magnetic personality of Herzl that made of this apparently utopian project a living reality to the great masses of his people. In other ages he might have been invested with Messianic claims. In the authority he wielded and the extraordinary fascination he exercised over those who came under his sway he stands beyond compare among the Jews since Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), and time has confirmed his position in modern Jewry as that of judge and prophet in Israel. He found many notable adherents, such as Max Nordau (b. 1849), who, though holding no office, enjoys the moral leadership of the movement, and Israel Zangwill (b. 1864), who, since his secession, has become the 'candid friend' of Zionism. A congress of Jews from various parts of the Diaspora took place in Basel, 29th–31st Aug. 1897, at which there was established the Zionist Organization with its fundamental programme:

'The object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home (öffentlich-rechtlich gesicherte Heimstätte) in Palestine. In order to attain this object, the Congress adopts the following measures:—

1. To promote, in so far as it serves the above purpose, the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturiste, crafts- and tradesmen;
2. To select and organize the whole Jewish people in appropriate local and general bodies in conformity with the laws of the land;
3. To strengthen Jewish national sentiment and self-consciousness;
4. Preparatory measures to obtain the sanction of governments required for attaining the object of Zionism.'

[1] But see art. ANTI-SEMITISM.

[2] *ERE* i. 598 *f.*

From the fact that this new development of the nationalist movement laid special stress on the thesis that the Jewish question could not be solved in the Diaspora by the prevailing methods of philanthropy, but only in Palestine on political lines, the adherents of the Basel programme came to be known as Political Zionists, in contradistinction to the former Chovevé Zion and those who claimed that all faithful Jews are Zionists in the spiritual sense. The Zionist Organization further assumed a definite nationalist attitude on Jewish public matters, as, indeed, it developed a Jewish *Weltanschauung* generally, and thereby aroused fierce and wide-spread opposition from the leading ecclesiastical and lay heads of the Jewish communities. Zionism, however, continued to gather force in most parts of the Jewish Diaspora, and became the largest organized body of Jews since the days of Jewish independence. Altogether it exercised an ever-increasing influence on Jewish life. In Jewish communal politics, in literature, art, and education, it endeavoured to create a specific national Jewish note. The hold which it has obtained over the numerous Jewish university students, particularly on the European continent, has secured for Zionism the intellectual leadership of the Jewish people.

The immediate object of Zionism, which was to obtain from the sultan of Turkey a legal concession or charter for the settlement of large numbers of Jews on a basis of local self-government, failed. Three personal interviews of Herzl with Sultan Abdul Hamid (1901 and 1902) proved fruitless. Impelled by the pressure of urgent circumstances in the general condition of the Jews, Herzl considered the advisability of acquiring from the Anglo-Egyptian Government the region of El Arish, on the Sinai peninsula, for a Jewish autonomous settlement (1901); but, owing to the lack of water for irrigation, the scheme was found impracticable. This was followed in 1903 by an offer to the Zionists by Joseph Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) of the Guas Ngishu plateau in the East Africa Protectorate, which was submitted to a Zionist congress, but the mere suggestion of any project outside Palestine aroused violent opposition. A commission of exploration was sent out, but on its report to a subsequent congress this so-called Uganda scheme was definitely rejected. The secession of a number of Zionists followed and led to the establishment of the Jewish Territorial Organization (colloquially termed 'ITO') in order 'to procure a territory upon an autonomous basis for the Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they already live.' After unsuccessful attempts to find a suitable territory, in Cyrenaica, Canada, Australia, Mesopotamia, and Angola, the Jewish Territorial Organization has ceased to function.

The death of Herzl (who, in 1905, was followed in the office of president of the Zionist 'Actions Comité' [central executive] by David Wolffsohn, of Cologne, and in 1911 by Otto Warburg, of Berlin) created a profound depression in the movement, which, in the absence of political success, attempted to develop the existing institutions in Palestine and—with a hope for better prospects—to cultivate as *Gegenwartsarbeit* the nationalist idea in the Diaspora.

9. Organization and finance.—The membership of the Zionist Organization consists of those who pay annually the shekel (one shilling [raised in 1919 to 2/6], or its nominal equivalent in other coinage), which gives the right to a vote in the election of delegates to the congress, the highest Zionist forum. Women have the franchise on the same terms as men. About 800,000 persons paid the shekel in 5681 (1919–21).

The Zionist Organization is composed of national federations of Zionist societies or other bodies all over the world (*e.g.*, the English Zionist Federation, the Federation of American Zionists, etc.), and, in addition, there are recognized international federations representing specific principles, as, *e.g.*, the Misrahi, which endeavours to promote Zionism on an 'orthodox' religious basis, or the Poalé Zion, which professes Socialist doctrines.

As a general rule, Zionism is in favour of traditional Judaism, at least in a spiritual sense, but recognizes complete liberty of conscience for the individual, in accordance with the official declaration at the second congress (1898):

'Zionism does not only aim at the economic and political but also at the spiritual regeneration of the Jewish people, and in this respect stands on the basis of modern civilization, with the achievements of which it identifies itself. Zionism does not undertake anything which conflicts with the religious law of Judaism.'

In 1899 there was established, as the financial institution of the Organization, the Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd., with an authorized capital of £2,000,000, of which about £380,000 was subscribed by December 1920. Over 100,000 persons were holders of single £1 shares, the largest number of shareholders of any joint-stock company. In 1903 the Trust established a subsidiary body, the Anglo-Palestine Co. Ltd., for the special purpose of transacting banking business in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund was created in 1897 for the purchase of land in Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people. The principle regarding the nationalization of the land and the co-operative experiments undertaken by the Fund will render it not only one of the most useful agencies in the Jewish colonization of Palestine, but, from the general economic and sociological point of view, valuable and interesting in its practical application. During the Great War (1914–18), and even more since its conclusion, the Jewish National Fund has received wide-spread support all over the world.

10. Zionism since 1914.—The outbreak of the Great War necessarily created a cleavage in the international Zionist Organization, which, for geographical reasons, had its central office in Berlin. The political, and, later on, the administrative, headquarters were transferred to London, which, by the registration of its financial institutions, was already the legal *locale* of the movement.

Zionism received its most powerful impetus by the recognition on the part of the British Government of the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstruct Palestine as their national home.

There are in England traditions, dating back to Puritan times, which favour the restoration of the Jews to their ancient country. It was also in England that the first society for the Jewish colonization of Palestine was formed by George Gawler in 1845. George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* (1876) was in those days a remarkable revelation of the Jewish nationalist aspirations of a Gentile, while the romanticism of Benjamin Disraeli, with his strong Jewish sympathies, gave a glamour to the idea of the restoration of Israel, with which the English-speaking world is familiar through the Bible.

Since 1915 the diplomatic activities of the Organization have been centred in England and the United States. In the latter country the movement received its greatest impetus by the accession of Louis D. Brandeis, Justice of the Supreme Court (since 1920 President of the Organization). In England Chaim Weizmann, whose extraordinary gifts of eloquence and statesmanship have raised him to the leadership of the movement, and Nahum Sokolow (Chairman of the Executive), who combines the philosophical serenity of a man of letters with a keen judgment of men and affairs, were able to enlist the sympathies of British public opinion and ultimately the support of the British Government. Herbert Samuel (subsequently the first British High Commissioner for Palestine) ranged his Jewish influence, while in the Cabinet as well as out of it, definitely on the

side of Zionism, which found also convinced advocates among other British statesmen, notably Lloyd George, Arthur J. Balfour, and Lord Robert Cecil. Sir Mark Sykes (who in 1916 had acted for Great Britain in the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France) became the champion of Zionist interests in the settlement of the Palestine question.

On 2nd November 1917 Arthur J. Balfour, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed to Lord Rothschild a communication in the following terms:

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

This declaration, which was hailed in the Jewish world as a counterpart to the edict of Cyrus, was followed in 1918 by similar statements from the Governments of France and Italy, as well as by the support of President Wilson, and the friendly acquiescence of the pope.

On 3rd February 1919 a delegation, headed by Sokolow and Weizmann, and including the Russian Zionist leader M. Ussishkin, who spoke in Hebrew, submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris the Zionist claims in Palestine with these proposals:

'The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations, and the government entrusted to Great Britain as the mandatory of the League, it being a special condition of the mandate that Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous commonwealth.'

Following the conquest of Palestine by the British under Lord Allenby, in which officially designated 'Jewish troops' took part, the above Zionist proposals to the Peace Conference were on 25th April 1920 adopted at San Remo by the principal Allied Powers and incorporated in the British Mandate for Palestine under the League of Nations, as was also the Balfour Declaration in the Treaty of Sèvres. With this solemn international recognition of the Jewish title to Palestine there emerges after a millennial struggle the national revival of a people comparatively small in numbers but incomparable in endurance and faith.

LITERATURE.—There is an extensive Zionist literature in almost all the languages spoken by Jews, notably in Hebrew, Russian, German, and English. *Die Welt*, the official organ of the movement from its inception in 1897 till 1914, contains all official statements and current topics, while the Reports of the Congresses (in German) give a full reproduction of their deliberations. Among authoritative works on Zionism are Theodor Herzl, *Zionistische Schriften*, ed. Leon Kellner, Berlin, 1905; Leon Kellner, *Theodor Herzls Lehrjahre*, Vienna, 1920; Adolf Friedemann, *Das Leben Theodor Herzls*, Berlin, 1914; Max Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, Cologne, 1909; Marcel Bernfeld, *Le Sionisme*, Paris, 1920; N. Sokolow, *History of Zionism: 1600-1918*, 2 vols., London, 1919; Richard J. H. Gottheil, *Zionism*, Philadelphia, 1914; Aḥad Ha-'am, *Selected Essays*, tr. Leon Simon, do. 1912; *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, by various writers, ed. H. Sacher, London, 1916; *Zionism: Problems and Views*, by various writers, ed. Paul Goodman and Arthur D. Lewis, with an Introduction by Max Nordau, do. 1916; *Zionist Work in Palestine*, by various writers, ed. Israel Cohen, do. 1911; Frank G. Jannaway, *Palestine and the Powers*, do. 1914; H. Sidebotham, *England and Palestine*, do. 1919; Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, do. 1917; Norman Bentwich, *Palestine of the Jews*, do. 1919; Leon Simon, *Studies in Jewish Nationalism*, do. 1920; *Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation to the XII. Zionist Congress*, do. 1921. There are numerous pamphlets published by the English Zionist Federation (official organ, *The Zionist Review*) and the Federation of American Zionists (official organ, *The Maccabæan*, and, since 1921, *The New Palestine*). Views opposed to Jewish nationalism are to be found in the writings of Claude G. Montefiore, the leader of Liberal Judaism in England, and in America the Central Conference of American Rabbis (representing Reform Judaism) has repeatedly expressed itself in its *Year Book* and other publications against Zionism. Cf. also Laurie Magnus, *Aspects of the Jewish Question*, London, 1902; Morris Jastrow, Jr., *Zionism and the Future of Palestine: The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism*, New York, 1919; Lucien Wolf, art. 'Zionism' in *EBr*[11], and 'The Zionist Peril,' *JQR* xvii. [1905] 1 ff. On special subjects cf. *JE*.

PAUL GOODMAN.

ZÔHĀR. — From the 14th cent. the *Zôhār* ('Splendour') has been the fundamental book of Jewish Ḳabbālā (*q.v.*), the fountainhead of all mystical inspiration. It has exercised a deep influence upon the spiritual and religious life of the Jews, and has extended its influence beyond the borders of Judaism. An ever-increasing literature has gathered round it; for from its first appearance it excited the curiosity of the scholar and the mystical philosopher. Its origin seemed wrapt in mystery, and to this day the problem presented by the *Zôhār* has not been solved. It is a curious fact that only one manuscript prior to the first edition seems to exist. All the researches therefore start from the printed edition. And even then they have been limited to the *Zôhār* alone, instead of being extended over the whole range of the Ḳabbālistic literature, of which this book forms only one, though a very prominent, portion.

1. Problem of origin.—The most widely accepted theory as to the origin of this book is the somewhat legendary report of the investigation which a certain Rabbi Isaac made in Spain immediately after the book became known.

Rabbi Isaac belonged to a school of mystics which had made its headquarters in Acco, and was one of the foremost representatives of the Ḳabbālistic interpretation of the Law in accordance with the system of Naḥmanides; he himself composed a supercommentary on Naḥmanides, *Meïrat Enayim*, hitherto still in MS, a veritable mine of information on the pre-Zôḥārite phase of the Jewish Ḳabbālā. He is said to have travelled to Granada in Spain, and to have inquired of the widow of a certain Rabbi Moses de Leon what she knew about her husband's activity in connexion with the book which he for the first time had circulated among the scholars. He offered her a very high price for the original MS, from which Rabbi Moses said that he had made the copies which he sold. The woman declared that she knew of no such copy and that Rabbi Moses used to write the things himself. On the strength of this curious report modern scholars have not hesitated to declare that this book was a deliberate forgery made by Rabbi Moses and palmed off on his contemporaries as the work of Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, and that it was thus quite a modern fabrication by this obscure scholar of the 13th century. The reason assigned for ascribing this book to Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai (2nd cent.) was that, according to an ancient legend found in the Talmud, he and his son had taken refuge in a cave from the Roman persecution, and that he dwelt in it for thirteen years, giving himself up entirely to solitary meditation and mystical speculations. Proofs were then adduced to show the improbability of early origin, as the book teems with anachronisms. References made in it also to Talmudic laws and ceremonies of a later origin, and the author's knowledge of the system of vowels and accents, also precluded the possibility of such high antiquity.

But the whole investigation was vitiated by the fact that it rested exclusively on the printed text, which, as will be shown, was of a composite character. But even in this form the *Zôhār* is only a portion of a much larger mystical literature which has been preserved in part to this very day under various names. The relation of these independent treatises and works to the larger compilation commonly known as the *Zôhār* has not yet been investigated, and thus the true character of the *Zôhār* has remained obscure, and the legendary origin which ascribes it to an almost unknown scholar of the 13th cent. has most uncritically been accepted. It is utterly impossible to conceive that such a vast literature, containing elements of the most diverse and often contradictory character, should be the work of a single man. It is much more probable that the real *Zôhār* was only one out of many treatises of a similar kind, which by fortunate accident had come into the hands of a diligent scribe, who could easily make copies of it and profit by the sale.

(*a*) *Evidence from contents.*—The mystical speculations contained in these writings can often be traced back to those of the Hellenistic period, intermingled with later developments, but all centring in the word of the Bible. We find in them almost every system—new Platonism, the teachings of the Stoa in its later form, the allegorical interpretation so prominent in Philo, the

gnostic theories—and very often in a distorted form. No less prominent are the apocalyptic visions of heavenly halls and heavenly glories of the temple in heaven, and of the terrors of hell. The ineffable name of God forms another centre of speculation, and the mystical value of letters and vowels, just as in the ancient magical papyri according to the school of the new Pythagoreans. The theories of dualism are not wanting in these schools, and often develop into a kind of trinity, consisting of father, mother, and son. The demiurgos, the syzygies, and the archons have also found a place in them. They often dissolve the literal meaning of the words and rest upon fantastical etymologies, and apparent similarities in sound and form are often the only basis for these extraordinary speculations which never lead to a logical conclusion. Almost every principle or law or even every name in the Bible is subjected to this peculiar process of sublimation, and all the thoughts float and run into one another as so many nebulæ which change their shape and form constantly, and which elude the grasp. It is all a world of mystical and fantastic imagery, in which only one principle is constant, viz. that the harmony of this world, and especially that of the celestial world, is dependent on carrying out these laws, and that Israel has the merit of being chosen to be the foremost representative of the Law, charged with its fulfilment, and thus guaranteeing not only the stability of the world, but its ultimate perfection.

The conception of God is just as vague as all the rest, for each school seems to have had its own theory, and these are all hopelessly blended. God is the *Ên Sôf* ('Infinite'), the Hoary Head, the Long Face (or, rather, the Long Suffering), Erech Appaim. He is the centre of various emanations, or rather manifestations. He is depicted as the head of the divine college, and very numerous are the anthropomorphic representations of the Shekinah, and just as vague and contradictory are the systems of creation and the many conceptions concerning the evil power (the other, or left, side) with its hosts of demons male and female, all wishing to join man for his destruction, to cover him, as it were, with so many *kelipkin*, like invisible skins. There is also to be found the Platonic theory of Ideas, or divine prototypes for every earthly creature. In one separate treatise, also embodied in the *Zôhar*, the theory of metempsychosis is taught, the existence of which can be traced back to very early times in Syria and Palestine no less than in Egypt, and which later became one of the new principles carried by the Gnostic and Manichæan sects into Europe. Two physiognomic treatises called 'The Secret of Secrets' have also found a place in this compilation.

It is obvious from this brief sketch that a work of such complexity cannot be the result of a single man's activity. The utmost that can be said is that Moses de Leon either pieced some of these treatises together or copied them from older MSS in a haphazard manner.

Interspersed throughout the book there are numerous tales and legends, some of which have parallels in the other Rabbinical literature, but a large number are quite independent and cannot be found anywhere else. Some apocalyptic visions are also recorded which have a character of their own, and the whole setting reminds one strongly of the literature of the monks and cenobites, or ascetics, in Egypt and Palestine—*e.g.*, the *Lausiaca* of Palladius and others. The sages are represented as walking together in the open, discoursing on metaphysical problems, when they are joined by an aged man, the Saba, almost equal to the Abba in the *Lausiaca*, a Ta'yya, a travelling Arab, who explains the questions put and who afterwards disappears, being either the prophet Elijah or some other heavenly personage, even God Himself. The whole picture is one which can only be conceived as drawn by one of these ascetics, given up to his meditations in the wilds of Galilee or in some part east of Jordan.

Some beautiful hymns of a very exalted type, almost pantheistic, have enriched this compilation and, together with these tales, have largely contributed to its great popularity among those who were unable to follow the mystical speculation contained in its pages.

(*b*) *Evidence from language.*—The book, as printed, is not uniform. The largest part of it is written in a peculiar Aramaic dialect, which is unquestionably Palestinian. It is not the classical form, but a popularly corrupted form, such as would be the living language of the people of Galilee between the Hellenistic and Arabic periods. It approximates partly to the language of the Palestinian Talmud, which is also of Galilæan origin, and in many ways reminds one of the Targum to Ecclesiastes. It is evidently the language spoken by the Jews in Galilee, who refused to adopt Greek and to whom this was the only language. Some parts are written more correctly, others show greater corruption, and a few of the technical terms the present writer believes to be of Greek origin. Other sections of the book are in Hebrew, also of a popular form. Corruptions in either portion, especially in the Aramaic, are probably due to a large extent to the fault of copyists not fully conversant with the Aramaic, to whom these new words appeared strange. No forgery was intended, and even the association with the name of Moses de Leon as author is out of the question, and, even as copyist, should perhaps be limited to that portion of the compilation which is specifically called the *Zôhar* (for it must be made definitely clear that only a portion of the book has a right to claim this title).

The problem thus presented can now be more easily solved. It must be once for all established that the book is a compilation of a large number of independent treatises which belong to a wider circle; out of them a certain number have been selected in a haphazard manner and pieced together not by any author who endeavoured to write what it appears now to be, viz. a commentary to the five books of the Pentateuch, but by the enterprising publishers and printers of the first editions. These men have collected and selected a certain number of books, one of which—the largest one—was the *Zôhar*, or, as it was called, the *Midrash Ha-Zôhar*, or the Midrash of Rabbi Simeon b. Yoḥai. They have deliberately and arbitrarily arranged these writings together, like a chain or *catena patrum*, as a continuous commentary to the Pentateuch in the same manner as an unknown author has pieced together various other Midrashim of a Haggadic character and made out of them the well-known *Yalkut*. These writings were not intended to form continuous commentaries, and the largest portion deals almost exclusively with the first part of Genesis, whilst originally there was no commentary at all to Deuteronomy. In order to obtain such a commentary the publishers and printers transferred wholesale portions from one section to another, and, whenever this was found impossible as the text had already been allocated to another section, they contented themselves with inserting a note to the effect that an appropriate commentary to these passages would be found in some of the preceding sections. They did not even keep the various portions carefully separated; but, when the fragments were too small, they printed them one after the other, often omitting even the name, sometimes, however, inserting in the text the

title, such as *Raza* ('Mystery'), which a reader could not now easily understand, being unaware of the fact that it was an interpolation. Thus it confuses still more the already difficult text.

The printers, however, endeavoured to make it clear that the book published by them was a compilation of various treatises pieced together by them, for they stated on the title-page that in addition to the *Sepher Ha-Zôhār* they had included in this publication the following: *Sitre Tôrāh* ('Mysteries of the *Tôrāh*'), *Midrash Hane'lam* ('The Hidden Midrash'), *Tosefta* (additions to some sections), *Ra'ya Mehemna* ('*Pastor fides*,' 'The True Shepherd')—thus far in the Mantua edition, and in the Cremona edition the following are also added: the *Bahir*, *Midrash Ruth*, *Midrash Ḥazita* (on Songs), the section *Ta Hazi* ('Come and Behold'), *Hekhalot* ('The Halls of Heaven and Hell'), and again other additions, such as *Pikkudîm* ('Ordinances'). This fact, hitherto entirely ignored, is of decisive importance for the history of the *Zôhār*, inasmuch as it proves that in the very first editions both of Mantua and of Cremona we have only a compilation before us, and not a homogeneous work. All the investigators who have taken the *Zôhār* to be a homogeneous compilation, the skilful forgery of an ingenious author, have been led completely astray.

Moreover, no notice was taken by the scholars of the other books belonging to the same cycle. Nor have the two editions, which appeared almost simultaneously, been compared—the folio edition of Cremona (1558), which already contains various texts printed side by side, and the other edition at Mantua (1558–60) with the introduction by Rabbi Isaac de Lattes, in three quarto volumes, which has since become the authorized edition, all subsequent editions being faithful reprints page for page of this edition. The Cremona edition has only been reprinted twice, once in Lublin (1623) and a second time in Sulzbach with the help of the famous Knorr von Rosenroth (1684). In all the other (quarto) editions Genesis and Exodus form each a separate volume. The third volume contains the *Zôhār*, etc., of the remaining three books of the Pentateuch. Curiously enough, even before the *Zôhār* appeared in Mantua, the *Tikkune ha-Zôhār*, or 'Additions and Improvements to *ha-Zôhār*,' appeared in Mantua in 1557. It consists of 70 chapters, all dealing practically with the cosmogony and with the first verse of Genesis. They are all written in the same style (except that they are arranged in a more systematic order) and show the same peculiarities as the chief portion of the *Zôhār*. The language is also Aramaic, and there is scarcely anything to distinguish one from another. The same holds good of the *Zôhār Ḥadash*, 'the *New Zôhār*,' which appeared for the first time in Salonica (1597), compiled from MSS brought from Palestine. It contains, in addition to the new Zôhāric matter on the Pentateuch, similiar mystical commentaries to the five scrolls or *Megilloth*, *i.e.* Lamentations, Song, Esther, Ruth, and Ecclesiastes.

In addition it may now be mentioned that the present writer possesses separate MSS of those writings which have been incorporated in the *Zôhār*, such as *Sitre Tôrāh* and fragments of *Ra'ya Mehemna*, all corroborating the view that the book in its printed form is a compilation made in modern times of older material. A further and more decisive proof is now found in the MS of the *Zôhār* (*Codex Gaster*, no. 747) in the present writer's possession, older than the print and of Spanish Oriental origin. It differs very considerably from the printed edition. It contains only parts of what is now called the *Zôhār*, but none of the other texts which have been joined on to it in that edition. With the help of this MS also one of the chief problems connected with the *Zôhār* can now be satisfactorily solved. It is well known that the book is ascribed to Rabbi Simeon b. Yoḥai of the 2nd cent., and it was not very difficult for the critics to prove this claim untenable, inasmuch as the book in its entirety not only contains unquestionable anachronisms but also refers in sundry passages to and quotes from the Talmud and even from later forms of liturgy. But this wrong assumption of Simeon b. Yoḥai's authorship rests upon a mistake or a neglect on the part of the printers. The opening formula has been omitted, and this made all the difference, for it is a well-known fact in the Midrashic literature that many an ancient book is quoted by the first name which is mentioned at the opening of the book; it does not mean, *e.g.*, that R. Kahana is the author of the Pesiḳta or R. Tanhuma of the Midrash which go under their names. The title is derived from the opening sentence where these two scholars are mentioned. There are other books of a similar character, such as *Midrash Ḥazita*, mentioned on the title-page of the *Zôhār* and forming part of the compilation. It is the initial word of the book, and it is the same with the *Midrash Tadeshe*, etc., and the very title of the *Zôhār* is probably derived from that name occurring in the opening sentence. In the MS, similarly, the opening formula is 'Paṭaḥ R. Simeon b. Yoḥai,' which would thus explain absolutely the origin of the title *Midrash of R. Simeon b. Yoḥai*, by which this Midrash was quoted almost on its first appearance by the oldest authorities. This does not mean that R. Simeon was the author, but only that the book began with the mention of his name. Unfortunately the printers left out these initial words, for no obvious reason except perhaps in order to give prominence to that weighty mystical pronouncement which stands as a fitting introduction to this mystical book. Now there can no longer be any question of connecting this book with R. Simeon and considering him as the author. The anachronisms, on the other hand, are not general. The treatises embodied in the book may and probably do all belong to different periods. They represent a constant development which has been going on for a long time in various schools of Palestine. Each of these component elements must henceforth be studied separately, for we are dealing with a mass of material accumulated during centuries, much of which is evidently of high antiquity.

2. History and influence.—The history of Jewish mysticism has still to be written, for much of it which is very old has for some reason or other been declared to be of more recent origin. The *argumentum ex silentio* has been too often used to prove the non-existence of mystic speculations in olden times in spite of the apocalyptic and magical literature which flourished already in the early centuries before and after the destruction of the Temple. The mystics had very little in common with the scholars; they very seldom committed their speculations to writing—it was all secret lore; even that which they wrote down they hid away carefully. Yet the continuity was not broken, and the secret doctrine was handed down from generation to generation as Ḳabbālā, *i.e.* oral mystic tradition. Thus old and new were constantly blended; to old systems of theosophic speculations newer were added, until it was found necessary to fix them in writing, and in this Ḳabbālistic activity must be found the origin and the explanation of the *Zôhār* and the Zôhāric literature. In it we find embedded, side by side, those old speculations from the time of Philo downwards, on to probably the 5th and 6th cent., when they were the object of concentrated meditations in Galilee and there pre-

served until the time when they became the common property of scholars and mystics alike. It would be easy to trace almost every phase and aspect of older mysticism which flourished in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt in one page or another of the books referred to; they will often stand together on one page. It is therefore futile to draw up the system of the Ḳabbālā contained in the *Zôhār*, and those systems that have hitherto been evolved out of that book are only partial representations of one section or another, far from exhausting even one of the many writings embedded in the *Zôhār*. Mystical commentators have felt this, and have therefore often singled out one portion as the object of their interpretation. Such has been the case with the so-called *Idra Rabba*, 'The Big Hall,' and *Idra Zutta*, 'The Small Hall,' in Num. and Deut., or again the *Siphra de Seniuta*, 'The Book of the Veiled Mystery,' in Exodus. These were treated either together with other treatises or published and commented upon separately.

The philosophic movement which found its highest expression in Maimonides' († 1204) *Guide of the Perplexed* led to a rationalistic interpretation of the Law, which by its very extravagance called forth the mystical reaction which succeeded in practically extinguishing it.

The Ḳabbālistic doctrine then received a great impetus through the works of Naḥmanides (1263), especially through his widely read and highly appreciated commentary to the Pentateuch.

Mysticism flourished then. There were other great scholars who had been deeply impressed by the older Ḳabbālistic speculations by Naḥmanides, Solomon b. Adrat, and others who had formed a school of mystics in Palestine, and especially in Acco. These schools were probably revivals of older schools and mystic circles which continued to flourish unobserved in the mountains and caverns of Galilee, and also on the banks of the Jordan, where from immemorial times schools of prophets, of ascetics and recluses, of Essenes and Ḥasîdîm, have continued their mystical speculations and contemplative life. The storm of the Crusade swept over those parts, destroyed the schools, and drove the adepts into other countries. The remnants of their literature were also carried far and wide, and that is, to the present writer's mind, the only explanation of the sudden appearance in the 12th and 13th centuries of such a large number of mystical writings; it is probable that some of these fell into the hands of Moses de Leon, if he is at all to be connected with it. They represent often divergent tendencies, and are the outcome of various schools of thought.

The Ḳabbālā entered into ever-widening circles, especially as men of the highest authority in Rabbinical learning confessed themselves to be students of it. No wonder, therefore, that the new mass of Ḳabbālistic material should overflow its narrower borders and cover practically the whole field of Jewish learning. The political persecutions to which they were exposed also drove the Jews more and more to an inner contemplative life. Soon after their appearance these mystical writings spread far and wide, and within a short space of time had conquered the mind of the people.

Menaḥem Recanati (1290–1330) already makes full use of this *Midrash of R. Simeon b. Yoḥai* in his commentary to the Pentateuch, in which he gives large abstracts—a few years only, as it were, after the death of Moses de Leon. And, if it could be proved that the author of the *Libnat Hasappir* (Jerusalem) had lived before that period, that would at once destroy the legend of de Leon's authorship, for he also quotes large portions from the *Zôhār*. Be that as it may, the *Zôhār* henceforth held undisputed sway, and it was universally accepted in the form of the Mantua edition which had the 'imprimatur' of R. Isaac de Lattes. All the other mystical writings, some of which, as shown, were of equal antiquity and of equal importance, were none the less considered of less value.

The influence of the *Zôhār* became still greater when a new mystical school rose again in Galilee in the middle of the 16th century. There R. Isaac Luria (1534–72) evolved a new system of Ḳabbālā, a further development of some of the leading principles found in the *Zôhār*, and founded a school in Safed. It became the ruling system, being further developed by his colleagues and pupils, Ḥayim Vital Calabreze († 1620), Moses Cordovero († 1570), and Meir Popers († 1662). The Jews became then so deeply immersed in the study of the Ḳabbālā, and so much intoxicated by the fumes of these mystical speculations, that they easily fell a prey to the Messianic claims of Shabbethai Ṣebi. The pseudo-Messiah, his prophet Nathan of Gaza, and most of his followers were deeply versed in the study of the *Zôhār*, and were able to manipulate its obscure wordings to further their own purposes. Real learning was sapped by this mystic teaching of the *Zôhār*, which superseded the study of the Talmud and of Rabbinical literature. A prominent place having been given to the efficacy of prayers and their mystical meaning, the whole character of the Prayer Book became almost totally changed by the introduction of mystical formulas, and by the interpolation of mystical names and symbols which almost entirely destroyed the sublime simplicity of the original diction. Through the influence of the *Zôhār* and the Ḳabbālā, a new mystical force was developed among the Jews. A spiritual love, an immersion in the Divine, was taught by the founder of the Ḥasîdîm to be of higher value, if possible, than the strict observance of the letter of the Law. Thus light and shadow, action and reaction, have succeeded one another with the spread of the Ḳabbālā, and notably of the *Zôhār* and the Zôhāric literature. Its influence is now greatly on the wane, and the time has therefore come when all the problems connected with that literature can again be taken up and studied in the light of independent scholarship.

The study of the Ḳabbālā and subsequently of the *Zôhār* was not limited to Jews alone. One has only to mention Pico della Mirandola, Reuchlin, Paracelsus, and even Luther to show the keen interest Christian scholars have taken in it. Many a Christian scholar found in the *Zôhār* proof of the dogmas of the Trinity, hence a large number of pamphlets *c.* 1650–1800. Especially meritorious was the work of Knorr von Rosenroth, whose *Kabbala Denudata* (i., Sulzbach, 1677–78, ii., Frankfort, 1684) has remained the most reliable source for subsequent Christian scholars, down to the latest translation in *The Kabbala Unveiled*, by S. L. Macgregor Mathers (London, 1887).

Jewish commentators ever since the appearance of the *Zôhār* have been busy drawing up glossaries of its rare and technical expressions, and then explaining the text itself, or laying down rules of exegetical interpretation. Some attempted to draw up a system of the Ḳabbālistic teaching of the *Zôhār*, but these stood already under the influence of Luria and his school. Towards the middle of the 18th cent., and in Italy before that time, doubts began to be raised as to the genuineness of the authorship, and practically the whole controversy turned round the one question as to whether the *Zôhār* was written by R. Simeon b. Yoḥai or not. A commentary to the whole of the

Zôhâr, consisting of twelve folio volumes, the work of a modern scholar in Morocco, was seen by the present writer many years ago, in MS, but so far all traces of its whereabouts seem to have been lost.

LITERATURE.—The fullest bibliography on the *Zôhâr* and Zôhâric literature down to 1863 is that given by J. Furst, *Bibliotheca Judaica*, iii. [Leipzig, 1863] 329–335. For additional bibliography see *JE*, *s.v.* 'Zohar,' xii. 693, to which may be added the French translation by Pavly. M. GASTER.

ZOROASTRIANISM.—Zoroastrianism is the religious doctrine attributed to Zoroaster which gradually became the prevalent religion of Īrān and notably was the State religion under the Sasanian dynasty (A.D. 211–640). It is still professed by the Parsis of Bombay and by some sporadic communities in Persia. Zoroastrianism is one of the most interesting religions of the world. Its doctrines and rites are well known either in their present form or as they are to be found in the Pahlavi books and in the Avesta (*q.v.*).

1. Zoroaster (Zarathushtra).—There is much obscurity concerning the person of the founder and the time and place of his preaching. Although the Avesta is the Zoroastrian Bible, it is quite certain that only a small portion of the book can with probability be regarded as the work of the prophet. That portion is the *Gāthās*, or versified preachings, written in a dialect slightly different from the language of the rest of the Avesta. The Gāthic dialect, the late Avestan dialect, and the language of the inscriptions of the Achæmenids are three closely related forms of Old Iranian.

In the *Gāthās* Zoroaster appears as a very real and human personality, devoid of all the marvellous features which surround him in later literature. He is presented there as the son of Pourushaspa of the Spitama family. For ten years he had only one disciple, Maidhyoimaonha, his cousin. At last he converted to his doctrine Vīshtāspa, a local prince; but the *Gāthās* show that much resistance still was offered to the prophet, who, in some places, exhibits signs of anxiety. He had undertaken to reform not only the beliefs but also the social habits of the tribes of Eastern Īrān among which he had settled. His desire was to deter them from nomadic life and to induce them to devote themselves to husbandry. According to tradition, Zoroaster had come from Western Īrān (he is represented as a native of Raghæ in Media), a region which was more advanced in civilization. He was, so it seems, trying to introduce the Western customs into the wilder districts of the East. The names of Zoroaster and all the persons of his and Vīshtāspa's families have nothing mythical about them, but refer to horses, camels, etc. In later tradition Zoroaster's birth has been surrounded with marvels. He was supposed to have inherited the *xvarenaŋh* (=O. Pers. *farnah*), or 'glory,' of Yima, the law-giver of ancient ages. The *daēvas* repeatedly sought to kill him. Ahura Mazdāh and the *amesha spentas* entered into communication with him and revealed to him the tenets of the new faith. He is represented as having subsequently travelled in Bactria and in Seistan.

Vīshtāspa's conversion took place after the prophet had given miraculous signs of his power. It was followed by a long series of wars against the unbelievers. During those battles Zoroaster was killed near an altar with a group of priests. There was all the time a conflict going on between the sage and sorcerers—a feature which is probably truer to the facts than most of the other elements of the legend. Zoroaster was a Magian who, no doubt, rebelled against the practices of the majority of the members of his corporation. As will be shown later, Zoroaster's doctrine is a reform and an epuration.

The Magi (*q.v.*) are mentioned by Herodotus as a Median tribe along with the Ἀριζαντοί ('the nobles') and a few other names which may have referred to groups of the population more or less similar to the Indian castes. In *Museon*, new ser., ix. 121, the present writer has interpreted the name 'Magi' as meaning 'the helpful, the curers or the averters of evil spirits' (cf. Gr. Μαχάων, μῆχαρ, μηχάνη). This is quite consistent with what is known of their activities through the statements of the ancients. Astyages consulted them as oneiromancers.[1] They were astrologers, physicians, magicians. While there is little trace of those functions in the Avesta, two of their most characteristic customs have crept into Zoroastrianism—probably after Zoroaster's time: the giving over of dead bodies to the vultures and the next-of-kin marriages. The former of those practices is apparently borrowed from the populations of Central Asia, whose shamans are a kind of prototype of the Magians.

Although Zoroaster occupies a very special position among those Magians, he has been regarded by the Greeks as the Magian *par excellence*. Folk-etymology has connected Ζωροάστρης with ἀστήρ and has contributed in associating Chaldæan astrology with the Iranian sage. The Magi of Persia gradually adopted a form of Zoroastrianism combined with less exalted beliefs (cf. below). In this way the name of Zoroaster was attached to Magians and magic by the Greeks, who do not seem to have had—at an ancient period—any clear idea of the prophet's own teaching and real personality. In ancient as well as in modern times Persia was a country of religious thought. Moreover, the Aryans there were in contact with the ideas of Semites, Sumerians, Caucasians.[2] The unity of faith as it is found in Sasanian times is the final stage of an evolution and has resulted in the suppression of the records concerning the other forms of Mazdæism which existed in Media and Persia and of which some scanty trace seems to have been preserved in Armenian literature.[3] Zoroastrianism ignores the Achæmenians. On the other hand, neither these kings nor Herodotus, their contemporary, mention the name of the prophet. This circumstance, of course, is not in favour of the opinion often given that Darius and his successors were faithful Zoroastrians.[4]

2. His reform.—Herodotus gives a description of the religion of the Persians which applies admirably to what we know of primitive Aryan religion.

'The Persians ascend the highest peaks of the mountains and offer sacrifice to Zeus, calling the whole vault of the sky Zeus, and they also sacrifice to Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, Water and Winds. . . .'[5]

For many Persians this sky-god may still have been called Dyāus pitar. The Achæmenian inscriptions, however, show that Darius called his supreme god Auramazda, like the Zoroastrians, and this deity appears there with the lofty features which he possesses in the Avesta. He has an omnipotent will (*vashna*) and an absolute power (*xshathra*). There are representations of the 'confessions' (*fravarti*=Av. *fravashi*) or *genii* of the Mazdæans, an expression preserved also in the name of the Median king Phraortes. Names like Artaxerxes, Artaphernes, etc., show reverence both for *arta* (Av.=*asha*), 'truth,' 'justice,' and for *farnah* (Av.=*xvarenaŋh*), 'supernatural glory of the kings.' Moreover, there is a solemn con-

[1] Herod. i. 107.
[2] The Massagetæ and Caspii are reported as exposing their corpses (Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 192).
[3] A. Meillet, *JA* vii. 127.
[4] Most recently in Dhalla's *Zoroastrian Theology*.
[5] Herod. i. 13; cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION.

demnation of *drauga*, 'lie,' which recalls the hatred of the Zoroastrian for the *druj*. On the other hand, the specific name of the spirit of lie, Angra Mainyu, is not mentioned, while much emphasis is laid on other gods (*aniyā bagāha*), and especially on Mithra and Anāhita.

Now, it is precisely the originality of Zoroaster's reform to have rejected all the 'other gods,' including those two prominent deities who later found their way back into Zoroastrianism. The use of representations for the gods and the practice of burial are other un-Zoroastrian features, so that one is impressed equally by the striking resemblances and the essential differences between the two creeds. Darius's Mazdæism represents precisely the kind of *milieu* in which Zoroastrianism could have arisen as a special sect, under the influence of a reformer inspired by an exalted religious ideal. It is probable that Zoroaster's school, although it had not yet taken hold of Īrān at large, had already existed for some time at that period. The name of Darius's supreme god, Auramazda, is a crystallization of Mazdāh Ahura, 'Wisdom, the Lord,' as it appears in the *Gāthās*. The language of those hymns is much more archaic than Darius's language. Both versification and expression in Zoroaster's sermons have a flavour of antiquity quite familiar to a reader of the Veda. The fact that the dialect is different from the normal form of the sacred language of the Avesta makes it almost certain that it was the vernacular actually spoken by the prophet. This obliges us to push the date of his publication back at least two centuries before Darius's reign. This impression can only be confirmed by the great phonetic adulteration in the names of the Mazdæan religious terms as they appear in Pahlavi, the vernacular of Persia from 300 B.C. onwards.[1] While the Pahlavi translation of the later parts of the Avesta is not too far from the original, it gives a very poor rendering of the *Gāthās*, which have been misunderstood both in their expression and in their spirit. The translation of those hymns by J. Darmesteter, based mainly on the Pahlavi rendering, is a demonstration *ab absurdo* of the impossibility of understanding the *Gāthās* in the atmosphere of the 2nd cent. A.D. Darmesteter's great effort to place the composition of the whole Avesta in that period is no less of a failure. His argument is only secondarily based on a few passages of the latest parts of the Avesta which may show traces of Judaic or Buddhistic literature. His main reason for placing the Avesta in Neo-Platonic times is derived from resemblances between the religious allegories of the *Gāthās* and the *δυνάμεις* of Philo, and especially between Vohu Manah and the Logos. This circumstance has also struck Lagrange.[2] 'To suppose the gāthic system old,' he says, 'is to suppose the development of philosophy before the Greeks.' The fault of those scholars is that they have mistaken ethical abstractions or allegories for philosophical concepts and have ignored the fact that the antiquity of most of those very conceptions is vouchsafed by their presence both in the proper names of ancient Persia and in the Veda.

Asha (*arta*), 'justice,' 'truth,' the law of men, gods, and the universe is the Vedic *ṛta*. It appears in Artatama, the name of a Mittani king, and later in Artaxerxes, Artaphernes, Artachæes, etc. *Armaiti*, 'prudence,' 'wisdom,' is the Vedic Aramati, 'prudence,' 'piety'; *Haurvatāt*, 'salvation,' 'health,' is Ved. *saurvatāt*; *Xshathra Vairya*, 'wished-for kingdom,' recalls the *kṣatra* of Varuṇa, the great moral god of India, protector of the *ṛta*, in the same way as Mazdāh is the god of the *asha* (=*arta*). Varuṇa is called 'Wise Asura,' just as Mazdāh is 'Asura-Wisdom.'

[1] Οσλαγγο=Verethraghna, Μιθρο=Mithra, Φαρρο=Xvarenaŋh, Σαοσγοαρ=Xshathra Vairya, on the Indo-Scythian coins—Vohu Manah is rendered in Strabo by Ὠμανός.
[2] *RB*, 1904, pp. 42, 199.

The very name of Ahura Mazdāh, often regarded as characteristic of Zoroastrianism, has been found in a list of Assyrian gods published by Scheil[1] in the form of Assara Mazaash. It is immediately followed by the seven *igigi*, or 'good spirits,' which suggests that the association of Ahura Mazdāh with the *amesha spentas*, 'immortal holy spirits,' may be an old one like that of Varuṇa with the *ādityas* in India.[2] There are many abstractions in the Veda. It is clear that Zoroaster has combined in a coherent ethical system data which he found around him, transmitted in the teachings of the sages of Īrān as well as of India. By comparing the religion of the *Gāthās* with that of the oldest Vedic hymns and with what is known of the current beliefs of ancient Īrān one can form an idea of Zoroaster's originality. The Vedas knew of two series of gods, (1) the *devas*: sky, light, storm, etc., *i.e.* gods as powers of nature (sensuous deities—θεοί), and (2) the *asuras*, or gods in their relation to men as protectors of morality, inspiring awe, reverence, and fear (δαίμονες). Varuṇa, the great *asura*, was the ethical god *par excellence*. In later times the term *asura* came to be used of dreaded deities and evil spirits (the moral aspect of divinity with the Aryans was mostly associated with the cult of the souls—*e.g.*, in the Great Erinyes), while the *devas* became the real gods. The exaltation of Ahura Mazdāh in Īrān, which is certainly older than Zoroaster, shows that there was a school there promoting the ethical side of religion. As Herodotus shows, however, the people remained attached to the *daēvas* (=*devas*). Darius's religion is a combination in which the Magian ethical system is predominating. The same compromise eventually prevailed in later matured Zoroastrianism, which accepted Mithra (god of light, etc.), Anāhita (goddess of water, great mother), and the sacrifice of the *haoma* (=Ved. *soma*, 'the drink of life'). The old mythical apparel came back in the *yashts*, or hymns, addressed to the moon, Sirius, the god of victory, etc. But Zoroaster carefully avoids alluding to any of those deities and condemns the sacrifice of *haoma duraosha*[3] practised by the *kavis*. This very name, execrated in the *Gāthās*, is applied to the devotees of the *devas* in India and reappears in late Mazdæism as the name of a dynasty of legendary heroes. Zoroaster is evidently a radical reformer wishing to extricate the strict monotheism which existed potentially around him from all the concessions which it was making to tradition, and to rid man completely from all allegiance to deities implicated in magic.

The systematic character of his reform is even more clearly seen in his way of handling the moral abstractions. Much older than himself, they had had time to receive a materialization in the religion of the people, while their abstract meaning had not been lost by the priests. In Zoroaster's writings their moral meaning is always the real one, unmistakable for the initiated devotee, but at the same time there is in many passages an allusion to the material aspect of the hypostasis, so that sometimes the text has both an esoteric and an exoteric meaning.

So in *Ys.* xxxi. 10 the 'cattle-tending husbandman' is called 'the man that furthers Vohu-Manah,' 'Good Mind,' while for a simple devotee this would apply to Vohu Manah as 'the protecting genius of cattle. Xshathra Vairya is the 'Kingdom to be wished for,' the 'reign of justice and of Mazdāh,' but it is also 'the genius of metals.' In *Ys.* xxx. 7 one sees how both conceptions are reconciled: 'By thy retributions through the metal, man may gain the prize.' That prize is often called *xshathra savanham* ('kingdom of blessings'). It is paradise, the kingdom of the righteous, which will follow the universal ordeal through the molten metal. Asha (=Arta) 'Law,' 'Right' is the genius of fire, and, in *Ys.* xxxiv. 4, it is easy to

[1] *Rec.* xiv. 100. [2] Cf. art. ORMAZD.
[3] *Yasna*, xxxii. 14.

find that the connexion existed in Zoroaster's times, although Asha in his writings always means 'Law': 'Of thy Fire, O Ahura, that is mighty through Law (Asha), we desire that it may be for the faithful (*ashavan*) delight . . .' And, indeed, the relation of fire to the great law of the universe is much older, since it already transpires in the Vedas in which *agni*, 'fire,' is called *prathamajas ṛtasya*,[1] 'primogenitus Legis,' *ṛtaprajāta*,[2] 'natus de Lege,' and very often *ṛtavan*, 'the faithful of Law.'

Armaiti, 'Good Purpose,' 'Prudence,' 'Devotion,' was at the same time a name of the earth, as shown, *e.g.*, in a passage like *Ys.* xlvii. 3, which literally reads: 'Thou art, O Mazdāh, the Holy Father of that Spirit (Vohu Manah) that has created for us the Ox, bringer of blessings. Good Purpose (Armaiti) is his pasture giving him peace.'

Comparison with parallel passages shows that Xshathra, 'the Kingdom,' is compared to a meadow,[3] that the Ox, bringer of blessings, is another name of the paradise.[4] The passage, therefore, was quite spiritual, but, no doubt, the uninitiated were likely to find in it an invocation to obtain from Mazdāh, through the genius of cattle, that he bestow cattle, while earth would provide meadows and peace would reign. Similarly Haurvatāt, 'Perfect Happiness,' and Ameretāt, 'Immortality,' may express the blessings of future life, but they are also water and plants, and in *Ys.* li. 7 both meanings are present together: 'Give me, O Thou, the creator of cattle, water and plants, give me immortality and perfect happiness.'

In everything, thus, the reform of Zoroaster appears to us as a purification, a spiritualization of the beliefs current at the time among both the sages and the people. It is also a systematization. The preacher has built up a coherent religious doctrine out of elements provided by a tradition in which the ethical element was predominating.

3. His doctrine.—The substance of Zoroaster's doctrine is to be found in this sentence of *Ys.* xxx.:

'The two primal spirits who revealed themselves in vision as twins are the Better and the Bad in thought, word and action. And between these two the wise knew to choose aright, the foolish not so.'

This is the essence of Zoroaster's morals which developed later into a large cosmogonic system. By his right choice the man who obeys law (*ashavan*) helps in the final victory of the good spirit, the spirit of the wise lord (Ahura Mazdāh), over the spirit of deceit and treachery (*druj*, Angra Mainyu). Inspired by a right mind (Vohu Manah), he takes his stand against the whole world of the *druj*, its satellites (*daēva*), its priests (*kavi*, *karapan*), its sorcerers (*yatu*) and fairies (*pairikā*), and its cult (sacrifices of living creatures and of the intoxicating drink, *haoma*). He repudiates with special emphasis nomadic life with brigandage and strife, the life of infidels (*dregvant*) and Turks. He leads with wisdom of purpose (*ārmaiti*) an orderly existence, according to law (*asha*), in obedience (*sraosha*) to the good spirit represented by a moral adviser (*ratu*). In this way he will realize in this world and hereafter the 'wished-for kingdom' (Xshathra Vairya), the kingdom of blessings, the kingdom of the best (Vahista manah), the good reward (*ashi*, *adā*) with perfect happiness (Haurvatāt) and immortality (Ameretāt), that will follow the last ordeal (*yāh mazishta*) and the renovation of the world (*frashō-kereti*).

4. Mazdæism matured.—Although pure Zoroastrianism was not very mystical, it was fairly abstract and was very radical in its rejection of some essential elements of traditional Persian religion. The profound impression which the prophet made on some elements of the Iranian population has gradually secured the victory to the doctrine bearing his name, but only at the price of a compromise with the current beliefs. Dualism loses its strictly moral character. It is interpreted in terms derived from the old mythical contest found among both Babylonians (Marduk and Tiamat, Zu and Enlil,[5] etc.) and Aryans (storm-myths in which some god of light or sky kills a dragon).

There were from the beginning two principles, independent, hostile, and essentially opposed to one another. The evil spirit (Pahl. Ahriman), spirit of darkness, having arisen from the abyss, has rushed to destroy the light and the creatures of Ormazd (=Ahura Mazdāh). The latter hits him with the *Ahuna-vairya* prayer as a weapon, but the fight is not concluded. There will be a period during which there will be some kind of equilibrium between the power of the two spirits. The good spirit will finally conquer. There are pure and helpful creatures in the service of Ormazd, and impure ones constituting the host of his opponent. The whole world is divided in that way. Any defilement of a good being by an impure one helps Ahriman, but the moral contest of Zoroaster is introduced into this system also, and by his 'right choice,' his good deeds, good words, and good thoughts, man is fighting for the victory of Ormazd.

Mazdæan dualism approaches monotheism closely, since Ormazd is to prevail ultimately and since the evil spirit is a mere negative entity. Moreover, serious efforts were made in Īrān to reduce dualism to unity. The Zervanites placed *zervan akarana*, 'unlimited time,' at the beginning of things. Others presented *bakht*, 'fate,' as the ruler of everything. In that dualistic division of the universe the *daēvas* as a whole have remained the servants of Ahriman, and among them are even Indra and Nāsatya (=Aśvins), who are among the most revered gods of the Indo-Iranians. Yet, under the name of *yazatas*, a few have been admitted into the host of Ormazd. Among them in particular is Mithra, god of contracts and oaths, eye of Mazdāh, the god that gives victory to the armies. His association with the sun, his part as a mediator, as a benefactor of mankind by his killing of the primeval bull, etc., are explained in art. MITHRAISM. The longest hymn of the Late Avesta (*Yasht* x.) is addressed to Mithra. It is one of the finest, with *Yasht* v., devoted to Ardvī Sūra Anāhitā (Y+5), the female member of the great Persian triad: Mazdāh—Mithra—Anāhitā. She is 'lady of waters' and 'lady of birth,' the Iranian equivalent of Ishtar and of the Sumerian Nin-Ellā.[1] She is sometimes identified with a mythical source on Mount Hara, from which all waters flow down in a thousand outlets, fertilizing the earth.

Another *yazata* enjoying a very special position is Ātar, 'fire.' For Indo-Iranians fire was the most essential part of the cult. Their priests were *ātharvan*, 'fire-priests.' Fire was conceived as a representative of divine essence on earth. It was the great source of life, burning in the bodies of men and animals (as *vohu fryana*, 'good friend'), in the stems of plants (*urvazishta*), in air and ether, in paradise itself. As *berezisavaŋh*, 'very useful,' it shoots up before Ahura Mazdāh and is kept with great care in the fire temples. The fire that represents the emanation of divine essence in kings is the famous *xvarenaŋh* (=O. Pers. *farnah*) mentioned above. It decides the fate of the kings. The Avesta preserves a curious myth in which Frangrasyan (Pers. Afrāsiyāb), a fiend, in a series of onrushes endeavours to catch hold of the *xvarenaŋh*, just in the same way as Zu on high battles for the tablets of fate in Chaldæan mythology.[2]

As to Verethraghna, the genius of victory, he was destined to a brilliant destiny in some quarters —*e.g.*, in Armenia, where, under the name of Vahakan, he usurped all the Herculean exploits of a dragon-killer attributed in turn in Īrān to Thraētaona (Pers. Faridūn), Keresāspa, and Rustam.

The *amesha spentas*, 'holy immortal beings,'

[1] *Rigveda*, x. v. 7. [2] *Ib.* II. xxiii. 15.
[3] *Ys.* xlviii. 11. [4] *Ib.* xliv. 6–12.
[5] M. Jastrow, *The Rel. of Bab. and Assyr.*, Boston, 1898, pp. 338 ff.

[1] Cf. *JAOS* xxxvi. 301. [2] Jastrow, p. 537.

however, officially remain at the head of the Zoroastrian pantheon of good gods.[1] They form the court of Ormazd, and, although their moral aspect is not forgotten, their material functions have become paramount. Ahriman is able to neutralize those archangels with a host of arch-demons which incarnate the opposites of the virtues represented by the *amesha spentas*. Among them is Aka Manah, 'bad spirit,' opposed to Vohu Manah, Aēshma daēva, 'violence' (the Asmodeus of Tobit's story), etc.

If the *amesha spentas* may be considered as archangels, protectors of the most important portions of creation, the *fravashi* (Pahl. *fravarti*) are like the guardian-angels of all individual persons.[2] They are a duplicate of the soul, existing before birth and uniting themselves to the soul after death. The name seems to mean 'confession,' 'conscience,' and may be an equivalent of *daēnā*, 'conscience,' 'religion,' which survives a man and is shaped after his conduct during life. In origin, however, the *fravashi* probably are *dii manes*, and their festival among the Parsis has all the characters of an all-souls' day. *Gēush urvan*, 'the soul of the ox,' is to be considered as the *fravashi*, the deified soul, of the ox, and as such the protector of cattle and of all the good things of which it is the symbol. The *fravashi* of all creatures existed already before creation proper. Moreover, the creation of all living things was dependent upon the production of a prototype. The 'tree of all seeds' and the *gaokerena*, 'ox-horn,' 'tree of life,' growing in the sea Vourukasha, are causing all plants to grow and thrive. The primeval bull contained the germs of all animals, and, as mentioned above, its soul nourishes and protects the animal world. The first man, Gaya Maretan, born from the sweat of Ormazd, perished, but his seed brought forth the first pair, Mashya and Mashyoi, from whom all mankind has descended. The soul of Gaya is invoked with that of the bull.

Against all those prototypes of good creation Ahriman spent his rage. Against the *gaokerena*-tree he formed a lizard in the deep water of Vourukasha, that it might injure the tree, but the marvellous *kar*-fish protected it. The primeval ox was also killed by Ahriman, according to the *Bundahishn*, while another myth represents Mithra as the slayer of the animal. Gaya Maretan was a victim of the demons. His seed only escaped, preserved by Ārmaiti as goddess of the earth.

The cosmogonic struggle is thus found in all aspects of the Zoroastrian creed. As said before, it is also the leading feature in the moral and religious life of the faithful. By the practice of virtue man places himself on the side of Mazdāh. By sin he makes himself a prey to evil spirits. The duties of the righteous are the upkeep of the worship of Ormazd and the *yazatas*, the preservation of the sacred fire, and the veneration of the dead.

Of personal virtues it is honesty and straightforwardness that are most highly valued. Scrupulous purity is demanded, and this consists not only in abstinence from adultery, rape, unnatural vice, and the like, but also in all manner of ritual performances relating to sexual relations and to all contact with ceremonially unclean persons or objects, especially corpses.[3] Charity towards the poor and hospitality towards the stranger are likewise preached as virtues. In the sphere of social virtues, down from Zoroaster's time, the duty of the tillage of the soil and of cattle-breeding is exalted to the rank of a primary virtue. The tenderest care surrounds the ox and the dog. This extremely moral code is marred to a certain extent by the childish character of some minute observances for which, in the *Vendīdād*, sanctions are provided as grave as those which refer to genuinely criminal actions. Thus it is as grave an offence, *e.g.*, to refuse food to a dog as to allow a priest to die of starvation.[1] For a Western conscience the code is also disfigured by the canonization as a virtue in the Pahlavi books of the *khvetukh-dāh*, 'incestuous marriage.' This curious aberration was probably due to a custom of the nobility desirous to preserve purity of blood and breeding. Parsis to-day deny that the word in question is to be translated in this way at all.[2]

The penances imposed for the expiation of sins or the removal of pollution are manifold. They are indicated at length in the *Vendīdād*, which enlarges especially on the number of blows with an ox-goad. Offerings later replaced those bodily penances. Certain crimes, such as cremation and sins against nature, cannot be expiated and make the guilty *pesho-tanu*, 'lost body,' *i.e.* irretrievably the prey of the *druj*. This should be understood to mean that no good acts could make up for those great sins, since Zoroastrianism in its doctrine of merits accepts the principle of compensation.

5. Zoroastrian worship. — The Zoroastrian temples contain the urn in which the holy fire burns. Over it perfumes are sprinkled from time to time. Five times a day a *mobed*, 'priest,' enters the room. The lower part of his face is covered with a veil (Av. *paitidāna*), preventing his breath from polluting the sacred fire, and his hands are gloved. He lays down a log of sandal-wood and recites three times the words *duzhmata, duzhukhta, duzhvarshta*, to repel 'evil thoughts, evil words, evil deeds.' Every Zoroastrian has, moreover, a sacred fire in his own house.

The liturgy includes the daily recitation of a few verses of the Avesta. For this purpose the sacred book has been divided into short portions which are arranged according to the date on which they must be recited, not according to their natural interrelation, exactly like the Gospels in a Missal. While he recites the prayers, the priest holds in his hands the *baresman*, or bundle of twigs.

Each month and each day has its patron. The chief feasts are the New Year (Pers. *naurōz*), the equinoxes consecrated to Mithra, the *gahanbars* at the change from one season to another, the days of the dead at the end of the year, the days of full moon and new moon. The sacrifice consists of an oblation of bread and *myazda* (this term, applied originally to solid offerings, was later applied to milk). Besides this there was, despite Zoroaster's ban upon it, the sacrifice of the *haoma* (=Skr. *soma*), an intoxicating plant of which the stems were crushed in a mortar and the juice strained off; this was presented before the fire and drunk by the officiating priest (Av. *zaotar*, Pers. *zōt*) and his acolytes (*raspi*).

A child at birth has his lips steeped in *haoma*, but he does not become a full Zoroastrian until, between the ages of twelve and fifteen years, he receives the girdle (*kushtī*), which he will always wear thenceforward except at night. The presentation of this girdle forms the centre of a ceremony which lasts nine days.[3] On this occasion the young man makes choice of a director of conscience (*ratu*).

Marriage is a duty for the Zoroastrian, and its ritual, as celebrated to-day, is borrowed from Hindu customs. The customs and rites connected with death and the exposure of the corpse on *dakhmas*, 'towers of silence,' are described in artt. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Parsi) and

[1] Cf. art. AMESHA SPENTAS. [2] Cf. art. FRAVASHI.
[3] Cf. art. PURIFICATION (Iranian).

[1] *Vend.* xiii. 59 f. [2] Cf. art. MARRIAGE (Iranian).
[3] See art. INITIATION (Parsi).

PURIFICATION (Iranian). For three days the soul of the Mazdæan haunts his home, and then takes wing for the judgment tribunal (*ākā*), where it presents itself before Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu. Its merits and demerits are weighed in the balance. If neither scale sinks, the soul proceeds to the *hamēstakān*, 'equilibrium.' Otherwise it must take its way to the abode of bliss (Pers. Behesht = Av. *vahishta*, 'best,' or *garōnmāna*, 'house of songs,' home of eternal light, lovely dwelling of Vohu Manah, where the souls rest upon the rugs of gold), or, if it is to be damned, it falls from the bridge of Chinvat into the abyss of darkness with its great variety of torments described in the vision of Arṭa i-Virāf, the Persian Dante. But that hell is not eternal. There will be a general resurrection when the molten metal will have purified everything and everybody.[1]

6. **Influence of Zoroastrianism.**—The teaching of Zoroaster, after having spread among the Magians, eventually took hold of the whole of Irān. Did it extend beyond the borders of the Persian world? There is still surprisingly great uncertainty on this point, due not only to the fact that few persons have a real knowledge of Mazdæism but also to the difficulty of drawing a line between direct borrowing from Zoroastrianism proper and the more subtle penetration of ancient thought by Iranian (or Magian) conceptions in general. As said above, the probabilities are that Zoroaster preached in Eastern Irān and that the ideas especially associated with him can hardly have reached either Jews or Greeks in a pure form. In the question of the relation of Judaism to Mazdæism one must distinguish between Gāthism, late Zoroastrianism, the doctrines which are transmitted only through Pahlavi books of Sasanian times, and the doctrines which are common to Magism and to the various sects of Irān. As Gaster, after Söderblom, Böklen, etc., shows, there is little in Judaism that can be shown to have been actually borrowed from Zoroastrianism.[2] Yet this does not exclude a mutual interpenetration—especially in exilic times—between the ideas of Jews who had gone far into the Persian empire and those of the Persians with whom they appear to have felt themselves in real sympathy. It is, however, impossible in our present state of knowledge to obtain any certainty on any particular detail. An important angelology and the idea of a resurrection and of a kingdom of God are found at an earlier period in Irān than in Israel, but the development of those conceptions among the Jews, according to most Semitic scholars, can be accounted for without Persian influence. It is, however, hardly doubtful that this cause acted at least as a ferment.

The only part of the Bible which is directly inspired by Mazdæan (not Zoroastrian) ideas is the book of Tobit.[3]

As to the similarities of all kinds existing between Christian or late Jewish eschatology and cosmogony and the Mazdæan accounts as found in Pahlavi books, they of course are explainable by the interpenetration of all religious ideas in the near East at the beginning of our era. The Jews here have probably given much to the Zoroastrians, while, in other cases, both may have been submitted to the same influences.

Greek philosophy offers an analogy. Here also up to Hellenistic times one is confronted with an evolution which does not seem to be dependent upon any external factors. Yet, although the originality of Greek thought—as a whole—can hardly be questioned, it is probable that, if we knew more about the movement of ideas in Asia at that time, we should be able to discover various connexions which do not appear at present. As things are, one can only suspect the influence of the East in a general way on the old philosophers of the Ionian coast. Did Heraclitus, *e.g.*, who was born in Ephesus, hear indirectly of some Magian conceptions? There is in any case a curious resemblance between the conception of *asha* (=*arta*), 'law of the universe,' 'moral law, which manifests itself in fire,' and Heraclitus's first principle, which is a fire, a law of order (λόγος), a moral law (man's perfection is in his conformity to the law of the universe), and a manifestation of the godhead, opposed to darkness. He, moreover, believed in a world-conflict tending to greater order (*πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς*). It is not without interest to point out the fact that Heraclitus's conceptions are recognizable in the complex system of the Stoics. It is admitted by all historians of philosophy that, although this doctrine has to a large extent been derived from the teachings of Greek sages, it has been seriously influenced by Eastern thought. Now the founders of the school, with very few exceptions, came from Cilicia (Chrysippus of Soli, Zeno of Tarsus, Antipater of Tarsus) or Cyprus (Zeno of Citium). Tarsus, a great commercial and intellectual centre, was perhaps the most cosmopolitan city of the Mediterranean. With Hittite and Assyrian antecedents, it became for centuries the capital of a province of the Persian empire. It had a Greek and a Jewish colony. In common with Iranian thought (although one can hardly speak of real borrowing), Stoicism has a prevalent ethical preoccupation, a striving for submission to the law of nature (*asha*=*arta*). *Φύσις* for the Stoics is identical with λόγος. This cosmic law is identified with fire, which is God. Men are either wise and good (*σπουδαῖοι*) or fools and bad (*φαῦλοι*), just as Zoroastrianism only knows of *ashavan* and *dregvan*. Fire will finally consume the whole world in an *ἐκπύρωσις*, which is the exact equivalent of the *mazē yāh* of the Mazdæans. The ethical dualism of the Stoics is in contradiction with their cosmic pantheism, a fact that could be accounted for only by admitting that it has been imitated from an Eastern (Magian?) doctrine.

At Alexandria Hellenistic philosophy was in closer contact with Jewish than with Iranian conceptions. Philo, however, certainly heard of the Magian system. His *δυνάμεις*, or potencies, intermediary between God and the world, in spite of their Greek colouring, are reproducing the idea of the *amesha spentas*. Just as *asha*, 'law of the world,' is the greatest of the latter, the λόγος, who at the same time is a *σοφία*, is at the head of the *δυνάμεις*. In man the *νοῦς*, 'spirit,' works in the flesh to raise him through virtue to identify him with the pure spirit of God, just as Vohu Manah, the spirit of Mazdāh, brings man to salvation. This Iranian aspect of conceptions that were mostly Greek has struck Darmesteter to the extent of making him think that Zoroastrianism had developed out of Philonian philosophy. This, we have shown, is impossible, but there is some connexion in the reverse order.

The Neo-Pythagoreans have been most directly under Magian influence, although the fact does not seem to have sufficiently attracted the attention of the historians of philosophy. The fact had probably already struck the ancients, and this may be the origin of the tradition that represents Pythagoras as receiving at Babylon the teaching of the Magians. Although it would be impossible to verify this statement, the case is very different with those who in the 1st cent. B.C. tried to revive his teachings. They were Orientals, and the best

[1] Cf. art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Iranian).
[2] See art. PARSIISM IN JUDAISM.
[3] Moulton, p. 332 ff.

known of them, Apollonius, was from Tyana, in that province of Cappadocia which received a peculiarly strong Iranian influence. A sharp dualism of spirit and matter was the fundamental postulate of their theory in the sense that the former was the good principle in life and the latter the bad, unholy principle. God is the πνεῦμα (cf. Spenta Mainyu).[1] Between Him and the world there are mediating dæmons. In substance they are Plato's *ἰδέαι*, but they are regarded as 'thoughts of the divine mind,' which makes them the equivalent of the *amesha spentas*. Man's spirit is in a corporeal prison and has to free itself through purification. It is immortal. Neo-Pythagoreanism is the first Greek system which expressed the principle of authority in the form of divine revelation,[2] and in this especially it is inspired by Zoroastrianism. Its saints are divinely favoured men who have had the intuition of the divine good mind (cf. Vohu Manah), like Zoroaster and in general all the *ratu*.

Gnosticism with its syncretic tendencies could hardly have escaped absorbing Zoroastrian ideas. There are many systems of γνῶσις[3] which have a dualistic theory of the world in which matter is eventually bad. They all have mediating potencies between God and the world (*αἰῶνες*). Σοφία, one of the æons, attempts a union with God. Now in Plutarch's enumeration of the *amesha spentas*[4] σοφία is the translation of Ārmaiti, the genius of wisdom and the earth. There is a tradition of Ārmaiti as the spouse (or daughter) of Ahura Mazdāh and the mother of all creatures,[5] which is nothing but a Magian interpretation of the old mythical marriage of 'heaven and earth.' Christ's 'æon' has joined corporal Christ in the manner of a *fravashi*.[6] Christ saves the world through science (γνῶσις) from ignorance and deception (cf. *druj*).

As to Manichæism (*q.v.*), its relation to Iranian religion has never been doubted. The recent discovery of an important Manichæan literature in Eastern Turkestan, no doubt, will throw much light on the problems connected with that sect which had such a hold on the ancient world. Manichæan dualism is as radical and as cosmological as that of Mazdæism. It recognizes two principles eternally contiguous, distinct and separate. The kingdom of light is guarded by the æons (=good angels=*amesha spentas*). The good spirit has a series of virtues. The equilibrium is broken by an attack of the evil spirit, just as in Zoroastrian cosmogony. Man has to fight for the kingdom of God (cf. Xshathra Vairya). A great catastrophe (cf. *mazē yāh*) will restore the cosmic order. Jesus 'patibilis' is like a light diffused in the world (cf. Mithra). He is accompanied by a Jesus 'impatibilis' (*fravashi*). Salvation, as for the Gnostics, is operated by knowledge. In the ascetic rule of the Manichæan there is a threefold seal of mouth, hands, and bosom, corresponding to the Zoroastrian triad of good words, good works, and good thoughts. There is the same emphasis on purity as in Zoroastrianism, and the head of the society is supposed to represent Mani, just as the head of the *mobeds* was Zarathushtrotema. Manichæism, in fact, should be considered as a Mazdæan sect contaminated with Christian ideas. Mithraism (*q.v.*) is another scion from the Iranian religious stem. It should be considered, however, as a rival to Zoroastrianism—even to Mazdæism—rather than to one of its aspects.

[1] Windelband, tr. Cushman, p. 344 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 345
[3] The word γνῶσις is the exact translation of Avesta and of Zend interpretation.
[4] *De Is. et Os.* 47.
[5] Cf. West, *SBE* xviii. [1882] 417, app.
[6] The Gnostics, like the Mazdæans, gave two souls to man.

As to the doctrine of Mazdak (*q.v.*), which was presented in the 6th cent., it was more social than religious. It advocated State socialism with a communism extending even to women. These theories were associated with asceticism.

Although this review of the influence of Mazdæism is necessarily superficial, and in some parts only tentative, it shows how important has been the part played by that doctrine in the elaboration of the syncretic religious mentality of the near East. The seduction exerted by the Iranian conceptions is to be found in the simple solution which they give to the problem of evil. While the philosopher finds himself almost invariably attracted by some form of a more or less radical monism, the ethical man will find a simple and inspiring background sufficient for practical purposes in the doctrine of the conflict between the good principle and the powers of darkness. Iranian religion is ethical and pragmatic. It furthers activity, productivity, industry. It is decidedly unfanatical. It stands in sharp contrast to Indian faith, which out of the very same original data developed in a metaphysical direction towards pantheism and mysticism.

On both sides popular polytheism has been absorbed into a much more exalted doctrine, which is for the wise men. The Mazdæan system is much less profound, but much more intelligible. It makes for piety and good conduct, while the other is better adapted to meditation and asceticism. The aim of the former is the 'righteous man.' The ideal of the latter is the 'holy man.' The principle of revelation and of spiritual direction, so essential in Zoroastrianism (Zoroaster calls himself *ratu*, 'spiritual director,' or *saoshyant*, 'the coming helper'), is another aspect of its practical nature. The Zoroastrian not only has a clear vision of life after death, and of the means of reaching eternal happiness, but he is striving for the immediate realization in this world of a social, ethical, and religious organization of a very concrete character. This explains both why his religion extended by proselytism and why it gradually became closely associated with one nationality. All the characteristics had prepared it to be a State religion, and so it was under the Sasanian dynasty.

Its religious literature during that period is extensive, but not very appealing. There is no philosophy in it, no poetry, no religious transport, no sentiment. It is a collection of didactic, moralizing, interpretative considerations in which some myths, genealogies, and cosmological and eschatological considerations are enclosed. The translations and commentaries to the Avesta form a large part of it.

On account of its simplicity of cult and doctrine, its lack of mysticism, its belief in a revelation made by a prophet and preserved in a book, Zoroastrianism did not differ enough from Muhammadanism to be able to offer to it the long resistance displayed during so many centuries by Christians in Turkish and Arabic lands. The history of the conversion of Persia is not very well known, because it is to a large extent the story of an adaptation of a religious mentality to new forms without giving up any essential elements of the previous creed. All the traditions of Īrān were preserved in Persia under a thin cover of Muhammadanism. Moreover, Zoroastrianism never completely disappeared from Persia, where it is still practised by the Gabars around Yazd. Other orthodox Zoroastrians resorted to emigration and formed in Western India, especially at Bombay, the community of the Parsis which has survived up to the present time.[1]

[1] Cf. artt. GABARS and PARSIS.

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A. J. CARNOY.

ZULUS.—See BANTUS.

ZUÑI.

The religion of the Zuñi in the town of that name in western New Mexico is, like the religion of the other Pueblos, a highly ritualized structure elaborated upon the primitively animistic religion of the American Indians generally. This Pueblo religion is perhaps the most complex and also most closely welded system of native cults north of central Mexico. Within its compass the Zuñi have evolved an organization even more intricate at some points than that of the Hopi, Keres, and Tanoan groups. Being nearer the heart of Pueblo civilization on the Rio Grande, their religion is more representatively Pueblo in its forms, and more sharply crystallized, than that of the peripheral Hopi. Less exposed, on account of comparative remoteness, to the pervading competition of Roman Catholicism and the inevitably disintegrating influences of Caucasian civilization, than the Keres and Tanoans, the Zuñi have preserved their cults in greater intactness. And their concentration under Spanish influence for over two centuries in a single large town has provided the occasion or stimulus for a special set of elaborations that would not have been feasible while they lived, as the other Pueblos still do, in smaller settlements.

This religion may be examined as to the beliefs upon which it rests, as to the ritual apparatus which it uses, and as to its machinery for relating individuals to the national cults.

I. *BELIEFS.*—**1. Maize.**—The most pervading concept in Zuñi religion is a group of ideas connected with the fertilization and growth of maize. This lends a strong symbolic value to all parts of the plant, but especially the pollen, the ripe ear, and the meal; to water, springs, streams, lakes, which promote the growth of maize; to animals associated with water, such as frogs, tadpoles, turtles, dragon-flies; to the mythical horned serpent, inhabitant of waters; to the squash blossom, as the most conspicuous of the fertilizing mechanisms of cultivated plants; to rain, mist, clouds, and therefore to their accompaniments thunder, lightning, rainbow; to the sun as germinator and vivifier; and to the genital parts and functions and indications of the two sexes. A few random examples must suffice out of the thousands that might be cited.

The rooms where maize is stored are entered only after prayer and barefoot. Corn meal is sprinkled on altars, on dancers who impersonate gods, and as an offering generally; pollen enters as an ingredient into fetishes and medicines. Most flowing springs are shrines; the *kokko* gods and the Zuñi dead live in a lake; ceremonial objects are destroyed by burial in the Zuñi river. Yucca suds are raised by priests to denote and bring foam and clouds; their bowls bear tadpole and dragonfly symbols. A whole series of summer dances, and of penitential retreats by the priests, is designed to bring rain. The squash blossom, lightning, and rainbow appear on masks and dancers' accoutrements. The *Ololowishkya* dance is a frankly phallic, though decent, representation referring to maize.

This wealth of symbolic ideas and acts, being organized into a definitely centred system, differs from the equally magical but much more miscellaneous beliefs and practices of most non-Pueblo Indians. The coherence goes far to indicate the developmental antiquity of Zuñi and Pueblo religion; for an unsystematized condition must have preceded the existing interconnected one.

2. Ancestor-worship.—The dead, at least those of them who were Zuñi and tribally initiated, are thought to become *kokko* gods; the first of these originated, long ago, from Zuñi children that fell from their migrating mothers' backs. The *kokko* are the *kachina* or *katsuna* of the other Pueblos—a large and varied class of gods impersonated by masked dancers, whose appearance is thought to bring rain and other benefits. The Zuñi therefore are ancestor-worshippers; but in general it is the undifferentiated mass of the dead that is prayed to or honoured, and there exist no cults of family and lineage.

3. Animal-gods.—The practice of deifying animals the Zuñi share with all other Indians, but work out in peculiar Pueblo form. Since they possess no true shamans, they do not as individuals dream of animals or pretend to receive supernatural potence directly from them. They do, however, associate animals with medicine. The curative fraternities are thought to have been instituted with the help of animal-gods. The fetishes which these societies employ on their altars comprise figures of beasts, especially beasts of prey.

4. Witchcraft.—The belief in black magic and witches is very deeply rooted in the Pueblo and Zuñi mind. Witches are members of the community, often whole families, who practise in secret to the harm and death of other Zuñi or even the entire community. There is some idea that they constitute a society parallel to the recognized curative societies, but of course meeting only in the deepest secrecy. Besides producing epidemics and individual sickness, they cause accidents, blast crops, and neutralize the efforts of the constituted priests to bring rain-clouds. Public sentiment often runs mutteringly against a witch for many years and then suddenly crystallizes. Once an open charge has been made, the victim is tried and often executed by the Bow Priests of the Warrior society. Usually an attempt is first made to extort a confession by suspension by the thumbs or other torture. Until the suspect is accused, he is avoided as much as possible without any open giving of offence, and takes part in public and ritualistic acts as if he were not under the most threatening of clouds. No non-Pueblo Indians possess beliefs as to witchcraft that are so standardized or that so enter into daily life as those of the Zuñi. Among other tribes the evil wizard and the beneficent shaman are often not seriously differentiated. An individual is believed to use the identical spirit or magical power according to circumstances: every shaman is a potential witch and every witch *ipso facto* possesses shamanistic power. This is the attitude of the Pacific Coast tribes. For the central and eastern portions of the continent there does not seem to be so complete a merging of the two sets of powers as this, but the antithetical differentiation which the Pueblos make is also lacking. The causes of the anomalous specialization of Pueblo witchcraft beliefs appear to be twofold: (1) they have outgrown the normal American belief in the shaman, medicine being practised by the heads of highly organized and ritualistic societies, whose leaders enjoy their faculties by virtue of election to their offices instead of receiving them in personal communication with the spirit world; as the beneficent shaman has been replaced by these society heads, so the

evilly-minded shaman has crystallized among the Pueblos into the more or less professional although concealed witch; (2) influence of Spanish civilization must be reckoned with. The whole cast of Zuñi witchcraft suggests that of Europe a few centuries ago—the innate and persistent malignity of the witches, the complete secrecy of their operations, the legalized system of accusation, torture, and punishment. As yet there has been no demonstration of derivation from European sources. At the same time it is probable that, when the Spaniard settled among the Pueblos more than three hundred years ago, he was able to strengthen and solidify their beliefs as to witchcraft precisely because these beliefs were already tending towards a status more nearly resembling that of contemporary Europe than that of the other American Indians.

5. Supreme being. — Awonawilona has been described as 'the supreme life-giving bisexual power, the symbol and initiator of life pervading all space.'[1] The Zuñi do seem to regard Awonawilona as a sort of ultimate power, but the word appears to mean 'those who hold the roads'—'of life' being understood. Awonawilona is therefore not so much a defined single chief deity as a group or class of vague powers.

6. Origin beliefs.—The Zuñi have a long origin story. In the beginning of things there existed Awonawilona, Sun father and Moon mother, and Shiwani and his wife. *Shiwani* is the Zuñi word for 'priest,' but in other Pueblo languages the word denotes 'lightning' or 'thunder,' and in the present connexion it appears to express a deification of the power of priests. Shiwani and his female counterpart are said to have been the parents of the Zuñi, who were born in the lowermost of four subterranean worlds, called the fourth or Soot World. They were led out of this by a ladder cut from a pine-tree by two sons of the sun, Kowituma and Watsusi. From the third or Watermoss World they climbed by a spruce to the second or Mud World, and from this up an aspen to the first or highest of the subterranean levels, the Feather or Sunray World, where they first saw faint light. The two guides then led them by a silver-spruce to this world, the place of light of day, the spot of emergence, Chimikyanapkyatea, being located by the Zuñi in the west or northwest. They already had priests and fetishes in the lower world and brought with them witches and maize. In fact it was the witches who carried the seeds of things with them, and the Zuñi were forced to accept the death-bringers in order not to be deprived of maize. Kowituma and Watsusi appointed Yanowuluha as *pekwine*, or deputy of the sun—the spiritual leader of the nation. The people at first were human but with tails, long ears, webbed hands and feet, and a body-covering of moss. They travelled in a general easterly direction through a long series of places, staying in each four years (time periods), and were closely followed from the lower worlds by the Hopi, Havasupai, and Navaho tribes. Their first stop was at Awisho ('moss'), where their leaders cut their webbed hands and feet and organized the earliest of the ritual societies.

After long wanderings, the head priest sent out his son and daughter Siwulutsiwa and Siwulutsitsa to look for a new abode. The pair, however, committed incest, with the result that ten children of deformed appearance were born, nine of whom, together with their father, are impersonated by the Zuñi of to-day as the *koyemshi*, clowns who wear knobbed masks, act as attendants on the other masked dancers, and perform interludes of buffoonery. Siwulutsiwa also made the Little Colorado and Zuñi rivers, and near their junction a lake and in its depths a town, Kotluwalawa ('god-town'), which became the home of the *kokko* gods and the Zuñi dead.

In their farther journeyings, as the people crossed the river, the members of the *Tlewekwe*, or Staff society, preceding, the children scratched and bit their mothers' backs until the frightened women dropped them into the water. The children were transformed into tadpoles, turtles, frogs, and watersnakes, and then, swimming to Kotluwalawa, took on human form again and became the first of the *kokko*. The two divine leaders visited Kotluwalawa, found the children adult and masked, and returned to report that they had not really died.

Next Hantlipinkya was reached, where Kowituma and Watsusi assigned clan names to groups of the people. Their place as guides and directors now began to be taken by the diminutive war-god twins, Uyuyewi and Matsailema, sons of the sun and the waterfall. The war-gods soon led the Zuñi and allied *kokko* into battle against a group of hostile gods known as the Kyanakwe, the conflict with whom is dramatized in a quadrennial ritual of the same name. Two survivors of the Kyanakwe who possessed fetishes and maize-seeds were adopted into the Zuñi maize clan. Still continuing their search for the spot which was to be their ultimate home, the people finally reached the vicinity of modern Zuñi, and, after several tentative settlements, found the sought-for middle-place when Waterskate stretched his legs to the ends of the four directions and declared the centre of the world to be beneath his heart. Here Zuñi was built, which the Zuñi still call indifferently Itiwanna, 'the middle,' or Halonawa, 'ant place,' or Shiwanakwe, 'Zuñi place.'

The settlement of the people in this town was followed by the gradual completion of their religious institutions. The *kokko* came from Godtown to organize the performance of the masked dances, including the great *shalako* ritual. Then the corn maidens—divinities who had brought maize with them from the lower world—were discovered, frightened and driven away, found again after witches had reduced the Zuñi to famine, brought to the town, and induced to institute the *Tlahewe* ceremonial and leave their seed treasures. Kowituma and Watsusi visited Shipapolima, where lived Poshayanki, the great juggler. From him the existing societies received additional powers, and new ones were founded by him. The divine beings who had accompanied Poshayanki in his emergence from the lower worlds were converted into animals to preside over the six directions and to serve as fetishes in the society rituals. The twin war-gods, having taken the first scalp, instituted the victory dance and Warrior society.

Finally a flood drove the people to the summit of the mountain Towayalana until it was stayed by the sacrifice of the son and daughter of the high-priest. Redescending, the Zuñi lived in a number of villages (as the Spaniards found them in the 16th cent.); but one after the other these were destroyed by divine anger, until only Zuñi proper remained.

The striking elements and traits of this origin story are (1) the ideas of birth from the earth and wandering in search of a final abode; (2) the pseudo-historical cast of the entire myth; (3) the centring of its interest in the tribe as such, balanced by an indifference to speculations on the origin of mankind or animal life; (4) the fullness with which ritual institutions are explained and the contrasting lack of interest in non-ritualized divinities.

II. *APPARATUS.*—The concrete apparatus of Zuñi religion, both physical and intangible, is exceedingly elaborate, and only a few of the more striking developments can be touched upon. The

[1] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], p. 22.

content of their religion is essentially that of the other Pueblos, but is modified in many details.

1. Numbers, colours, directions.—Number symbolism is introduced into every aspect of ritual with monotonous insistence, but is enriched by linkage with reference to colour and direction. The directions are always thought of in a fixed order: north, west, south, east, above, below, to which the middle or whole is sometimes (although usually by implication rather than explicitly) added as the seventh. The corresponding colours are yellow, blue, red, white, variegated, and black. There are prey animals, birds, trees, and a variety of other classifiable natural objects identified with these directions and colours. Maize is actually grown in an astounding variety of colours of the grain, but these are reduced in the Zuñi mind and religious practice to the standard six varieties. Where six is not used, the ritual number is four, the above and below being in this case omitted. Periods of time are usually grouped by fours or multiples thereof. Thus certain ceremonials are performed quadrennially, and the number of days for which the priesthoods go into retreat is either four or eight.

2. Prayers.—Highly formalized prayers are much used by the Zuñi. They are definitely standardized, couched in a language which may be more or less archaic and is certainly ritualized, and are recited in a rapid muttering drone. Certain prayers belong to the constituted priests alone, others are spoken by religious officials or laymen. The tenor is understood even when many of the words are difficult of explanation by the speaker.

3. Feather sticks.—The visible embodiment of prayer, and at the same time the most important form of offering, is prayer sticks (*telikyinawe*), short rods to which feathers are tied according to exact rules and which are then set out in shrines or buried in the ground. These feather sticks are 'planted' by every priesthood before every ceremony, by the officials of all societies, for the dead, and on regular occasions such as the recurrent year or moon. They have many slightly differing forms according to their purpose. They are always deposited privately.

4. Altars.—Altars of some sort enter into all major rituals. The most elaborate are those of the curing societies. These consist of a painting made on the floor in coloured earths, behind which is set up an elaborate screen of slats which is carved or painted with symbols; and of animal images, stone concretions, sacred corn ears, offerings in bowls, and similar paraphernalia deposited on or about the ground painting. Priests' altars are simpler: the screen is wanting and the sand painting is replaced by one of coloured maize meal. In general, altars are set up indoors for esoteric portions of ceremonies, and put away at their conclusion. Allied to altars are shrines—nearly always out of doors—at which offerings, especially of prayer sticks, are made. These shrines may be springs, clefts in the rocks, or small stone cysts on the summit of knolls. They are visited by priests, by society officials, and by dance impersonators.

5. Masks.—The most spectacular apparatus of Zuñi ritual is the mask, which is made in enormous variety of elaborate and standardized forms. There are probably a hundred kinds, each with a name and definite place in cult. With a mask go a specific costume and style of body paint, although these are not as diversified as the masks. Every mask represents a deity, and the dancer who has donned one is himself called *kokko*, or god. These *kokko* being the *kachina* of the other Pueblos, many Zuñi masks recur among the Hopi or on the Rio Grande. The names are sometimes the same in towns of different stock; at other times they are as different as the masks themselves are similar. In some instances importation of a mask from one Pueblo to another can be traced by indirect evidence, or is admitted by the natives themselves. In this interchange the Zuñi seem to have given and received about equally. Most of the masks are monstrous, some animal-like. This does not argue that the Zuñi look upon their gods as terrifying rather than beneficent. It seems that limitations of technical skill prevented the Pueblos from making their masks representatively beautiful, but did not prevent their attaining effects that are grotesquely interesting and decoratively pleasing. In other words, their conceptions of the *kokko* are the result of the masks which it was within the powers of the Zuñi to make. Manual ability directed beliefs more than the reverse. This comes out clearly in the fact that many of the masks representing goddesses are bearded. The beard simplifies the construction and allows the wearer's song to issue unimpaired while effectually concealing his identity. It may be added that masks are regarded as extremely sacred, and that the uninitiated children and younger women seem to believe the wearers to be true gods.

6. Fetishes.—The most sacred of all material objects in the Zuñi religion are certain fetishes called *ettonne* (plural *ettowe*), and these they have developed to a greater extent than the other Pueblos. The *ettonne* shows a fundamental relationship to another class of fetishes called *mi'le* (plural *miwe*), 'maize ear,' which is the form more current elsewhere in the region. The *mi'le* is an ear of maize sheathed in feathers and otherwise specially prepared. It is the badge of membership in the curing orders of the societies. These *miwe* are individual property and are buried at the owner's death. The *ettowe*, on the contrary, are supposed to have been brought up in their present physical form from the lower world, and appertain to groups—priesthoods, societies, clans, etc. They are guarded with extreme care, 'fed' with offerings, never exposed except when ritual definitely provides; and even the room in which they are kept is tabu. They seem to consist of several reeds bundled together and filled with materials that are either precious in themselves or symbolic of the precious things of life: meal, pollen, seeds, turquoise, and the like. The *ettowe* are enclosed in native cotton and kept in wrappings. They number about fifteen each for the priesthoods, the societies, and the clans, besides a few of more special reference.

III. *ORGANIZATION.*—On the side of organization or hierarchy of functioning individuals, Zuñi religion has developed in three principal directions: (1) there is a series of thirteen societies or fraternities whose most distinctive function is the religious curing of disease; (2) there is a communal organization which conducts the dances in which the *kokko* are impersonated; (3) there is a series of priests, or rather priesthoods, devoted to the spiritual welfare of the nation. The communal society and the priesthoods are linked by the fact that their objectives, such as rainfall for the crops and other general blessings, are the same. This does not of course imply that they are the historical result of the same impetus. They share, however, in native theory a devotion to the interests of the community at large, whereas the factor of individual benefit enters more definitely into the scheme of the fraternities.

1. The fraternities.—The fraternities are thirteen in number and are treated by the Zuñi as full equivalents of one another. They are all organized on the same pattern, with membership by initiation, secret meetings, and esoteric rites; and in general they are open to men, women, and children

alike. The only exception is that one Hunters' and two Warriors' societies are entered by men only. These three bodies nevertheless are very similar in organization, rites, and paraphernalia to the curative bodies, thus evidencing the strong tendency of the Zuñi to equate all societies, irrespective of differences in their origin or avowed purpose. For instance, the Cholla-cactus people are a Warrior society secondary to that of the Bow Priests. They admit men who have not yet scalped an enemy and thereby attained to membership among the Bow Priests, but who have fought in battle or been wounded. At the same time they resemble the curing societies in that they heal wounds.

(*a*) *Warrior societies.*—The most unique of all the societies is that of the Bow Priests, not only on account of the limitation of membership, but especially because the members are looked upon as the guardians and physical executors of the decisions of other religious officials. They are the soldiers, as it were, who enforce the decrees of the paramount theocracy and guard the masked dancers. At least one of their number—and if possible two—is chosen as a member by each of the other fraternities to protect the altar and keep out intruders. This is the only case of an individual being an active member of more than one society. The Bow Priest fraternity is also unique in that it alone possesses two heads. These two are the representatives of the twin war-gods, and in this capacity sit with the supreme council of priests as watchers and administrators. It is to them that the execution of witches, *e.g.*, or the taking away of his staff of office from a deposed governor would be delegated.

A Warrior society corresponding to the Zuñi Bow Priests appears to have existed in every Pueblo, the development of the institution among the Tanoans and Keresans being very similar to that of the Zuñi, whereas among the Hopi the organization was less important, probably because Hopi religion was less centralized.

(*b*) *Hunters' society.*—The *Saniakyakwe*, or Coyote society, spiritually fosters the hunting interests of the tribe and supervises the rabbit hunts which are a conspicuous feature of the *kokko* worship. It does not treat illness, but its organization and ritual are wholly of a pattern with that of the curing societies.

(*c*) *Curing societies.*—The remaining societies all heal. They are, however, diverse in origin, according both to Zuñi belief and to comparative analysis. The oldest societies, according to native tradition, are the *Ne'wekwe* and *Shi'wanakwe*, which correspond to the Clown and Dancing societies of the Rio Grande, the *Koshairi* and *Kwirana*. The *Ne'wekwe* have kept the clown features of the *Koshairi*, and sometimes appear in public dances. They also cure, however; and the *Shi'wanakwe* have become purely a curing society, scarcely to be distinguished from any other. The *Tlewekwe*, or 'Wood' (*i.e.* Staff-swallowing) society, with the two foregoing, and the Hunters, are the four earliest fraternities in native belief. The *Tlewekwe* is given a special position in mythology (see above), and has particular rain-making functions. The Little Fire-brand and the Great Fire-brand societies are said to have originated later, the former being derived from the Hopi and the latter instituted in the period after the mythical Poshayanki began to instruct the societies in medicine. The *Uhuhu*, *Ant*, and *Shuma'* groups are also thought to owe their origin at least in part to Poshayanki. The first of these has no known equivalents among other Pueblos. The second seems to be a local equivalent of the Rio Grande Knife societies; and the *Shuma'* is the equivalent of a *Sayapa* or *Shumaikoli* society elsewhere, which is distinguished by the possession of masks. The last two Zuñi fraternities, the Rattlesnake-medicine-water and Bedbug, must be of comparatively recent origin, since tradition recalls that they arose as the result of splits within the *Uhuhu* and the Little Fire-brand bodies. A close parallelism of ritual confirms tradition on this point.

Each of these fraternities has a head or chief, a speaker or deputy to the chief, a medicine chief, and usually other functionaries. They are divided into orders, the most important distinction being between members who know medicine mystery and those who do not; in most societies only the former possess *mi'le* fetishes. There are special orders for fire-eating, staff-swallowing, and feats of jugglery which vary from society to society. Yet the orders recur: it is not only the Fire-brand societies that eat fire, and not only the Staff society that swallows.

Initiation into the societies takes several forms. The commonest is by sickness. A person seriously ill is 'given' to one of the officials and after cure by him remains almost in the position of an adopted child. If he can afford the necessary payments, he becomes a member. This idea that the purpose of the societies is to cure and that it is curing that constitutes membership is deeply impressed on Zuñi consciousness. Another method of admission is by trespass: a man breaks into an esoteric ritual, has seen what he should not see, and can expiate the offence, in fact save himself from the consequences, only by learning the remainder of the mysteries. In practice admission by trespass seems to be a means of legal fiction through which adults can quickly enter a society while in good health. It is also a rule that a member of any society can transfer from one to the other with only a nominal re-initiation. Such transfers are numerous as a result of personal disagreements.

2. The communal Dancing society.—Dances, or, it would be better to say, ritualistic exhibitions by masked performers representing *kokko*, are very numerous, and there is scarcely a month when they cannot be witnessed in the streets and plazas of the town. An elaborate set of exhibitions begins at the winter solstice, when a sequence of gods not seen at other times appears. Shortly after follows a series of rites known as the 'cleansing the earth.' Thereupon comes a series of dances called *koyupchunawe*, in which the members of the six estufas synchronously dance on six occasions for one to eight nights. A sort of aftermath are the 'little dances,' which continue irregularly for a couple of months. At about the same period, during spring, occurs the quadrennial initiation with the image of the sacred horned serpent. Towards the end of spring comes the rabbit hunt, participated in by masked performers and the people at large. At the summer solstice a visit is made to the sacred lake of the dead. The return from this is in masks and initiates the series of summer dances, six in number. In late summer and early autumn there fall three ceremonies: the *Owinawe*, a harvest festival under the direction of the Bow Priests, the *Tlahewe*, a maize ceremony performed quadrennially without masks, and the *Kyanakwe*, also quadrennial, which is an elaborate dramatization of a myth and introduces masks not worn on other occasions. The year is brought to a close in the month preceding the winter solstice by the *Shalako*, which from the exoteric aspect is the most sumptuous and elaborate of all Zuñi rituals.

These ceremonies are performed by the adult, *i.e.* initiated, males of the Zuñi nation, as constituted into the *Ko-tikyili*, or '*kokko* fraternity,' *i.e.* God society. It is interesting that the Zuñi name this organization as if it were a restricted curing society. Boys are initiated twice, in what

may be described as the involuntary and the voluntary initiations. After the second they wear masks in ceremonies. Women become members only under very exceptional circumstances. The membership is grouped into six sub-organizations about equal in numerical strength, each of which has its own *kiwitsine*, or 'estufa,' *i.e.* ceremonial chamber. Membership in these estufas is arranged on a criss-crossing plan. A man after initiation joins that estufa to which belongs the husband of the woman who first touched him at birth. This brings it about that estufa affiliation does not follow the lines of cleavage formed by clans, curing societies, or other groups, and normally puts father and son in different estufas. Each estufa makes its dances separately; and, even in what may be called strongly communal rituals, the mask allotment and other functions are on an estufa basis. The entire God society is under the direction of a 'god chief' and a 'god speaker' who must be members of certain clans. The whole organization is intricate, as is necessary for the continuous practice of so elaborate a ritual. At the same time it obviously is closely knit, as if designed to prevent its breaking apart into conflicting units. Even the competitive rivalry which the six estufas evince tends to make them feel themselves parts of a whole.

3. **Priests.**—Above and apart from the societies and the communal God society stand the 'rain priests,' *shiwani* (plural *ashiwani*), to whom is entrusted the spiritual welfare of the nation. They take as little part as possible in mundane affairs, do not dance, go into fixed retreats for fasting, penitence, and meditation, and by the blamelessness of their conduct, concentration of mind, and sacredness of office, are thought to keep peace, cause the community to prosper, and above all bring the rains upon which the crops and sustenance of the people depend. In Zuñi theory public ceremonies are largely only an exoteric accompaniment to the still more important esoteric activities of these priests. They are organized into fifteen sets, each of which consists in theory of a priest proper, his associate and prospective successor, two assistants, and a female associate. The last, in spite of her venerability, is not properly a priest, but has special duties connected with the care of the fetish which is the vehicle of continuity of each priesthood through the generations. In practice the constituted membership of each priesthood is sometimes greater or less than this scheme demands.

The first four of these fifteen priesthoods, those which 'go in' first in the series of penitential retreats, and represent the north, east, south, and west, are the most sacred. Among these the first, the 'house-chiefs,' again have the primacy. The fifth priesthood is anomalous in consisting only of the *pekwine*, or 'speaker,' of the sun, who is the regulator of the calendar and the guardian of public sanctity, and is expected to be the individual removed above all others from worldly affairs. He typifies the 'above,' whereas the 'below' is represented by the two head Bow Priests, representatives of the war-gods. Strictly, neither *pekwine* nor the Bow Priests are priests like the others; but they are so reckoned by the Zuñi, and, on occasions such as the retreats spoken of, function like them.

The source of government in Zuñi is theocratic. There are a governor and other civil officials; the priests do not interfere in the affairs of men. The civil officials, however, are chosen or nominated and can be deposed by a supreme council of six priests—the 'daylight people,' as they are called. These consist of the chief priests of the four first sets, with two additional priests from the first priesthood. The Bow Priests sit with the council as guardians and execute all its decisions. The head of the council, and in fact of the entire Zuñi hierarchy, is the *kyakwemosi*, or house-chief proper, whose power is almost that of a pope.

4. **Origin of the hierarchical system.**—This intricate hierarchical organization has parallels among other Pueblos, but has nowhere else attained the same degree of elaboration. Its power and sanctity are so great as to leave a first impression that the hierarchy is the basis of all Zuñi religious organization. Analysis and comparison, however, reveal that it is of secondary and probably rather late origin. The 50 or 60 priests represent an elaboration of a smaller number; probably this nucleus was the six 'daylight people,' since such a body functions on the Rio Grande without the accompaniment of additional priesthoods. The kernel of this group of six appears to be its primate, the house-chief, who in authority and sanctity corresponds to the *tiamoni*, or 'cacique,' of the Rio Grande Pueblos. There too he always has a speaker or deputy, has his decisions executed, if need be, by the heads of the Warrior society, and is aided in council by associates, who are normally the heads of the leading fraternal societies. This simpler organization of the Rio Grande obviously makes a less sharp distinction than the Zuñi one between priests, curing societies, and the communal dance organization. The course of development at Zuñi seems to have been that the concept of the cacique, or of the cacique *plus* deputy, was reduplicated first into a group of four or six priests; that then these were given associates and assistants; and that finally still other priests and associates were added, until the present large number had been attained. The luxuriance of this development led to such abundance of material for specific priestly purposes that the curing society heads became unnecessary in this connexion and came to withdraw from the hierarchical organization, restricting themselves almost exclusively to the functioning of their respective societies. The same process carried further probably led to a more complete separation of the communal, or *kokko*, society. As this grew in independence, it came to need more organization of its own. One result of this process of differentiations seems to have been the limitation of the estufas to the communal society—a condition which occurs only at Zuñi. In general, then, the special traits of Zuñi ritual organization are a greater functional differentiation and consequent greater elaborateness than elsewhere, but without loss of coherence.

The principal cause in this development is likely to have been the size of Zuñi Pueblo. It may be suspected that, while this people lived scattered in half-a-dozen independent towns, the organization of each was more similar to that of the Keresans and Tanoans. When, however, under the influence of the Spaniards and perhaps of Navaho and Apache raids, the Zuñi more than two centuries ago assembled in a single town, the concentration in numbers may have forced, and certainly stimulated, a tendency towards systematization. Where half-a-dozen ill-defined priests had sufficed for a population of a few hundreds, a larger number with more specialized functions would be called for in a closely compacted community of two or three thousand. It is also possible that the example of the ever-present Roman Catholic priest may have aided in this development, especially as regards the rain-priest as distinguished from the society heads and dance directors. It does not appear, however, that this influence was more than secondary at best. Both the nature of the priestly office in the Zuñi mind and the fact that a similar development failed to take place on the Rio Grande,

where Roman Catholic influence was even stronger, point in this direction.

LITERATURE. — **M. C. Stevenson**, 'The Zuñi Indians,' *23 RBEW* [1904], p. 13, 'The Religious Life of the Zuñi Child,' *5 RBEW* [1887], p. 539; **F. H. Cushing**, 'Zuñi Fetishes,' *2 RBEW* [1883], p. 9, 'Outlines of Zuñi Creation Myths,' *13 RBEW* [1896], p. 325, *Zuñi Folk Tales*, New York, 1901; **E. C. Parsons**, 'Notes on Zuñi,' pts. i. and ii., *Mem. Am. Anthr. Ass.*, iv. [1917] 149, 227, 'Zuñi Winter and Summer Dance Series in 1918,' *Univ. Calif. Publ. in Am. Arch. Ethn.* (in press); **A. L. Kroeber**, 'Zuñi Kin and Clan,' *Anthr. Pap. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, xviii. [1917] 39. There are dozens of brief studies, most of which are referred to in one or the other of the foregoing works. A. L. KROEBER.

ZWINGLI.—1. Early years.—Ulrich (Huldreich) Zwingli was born on 1st Jan. 1484, in the little township of Wildhaus—the highest village in the Toggenburg valley. He sprang from its most prominent family. His father was a leading farmer and the chief magistrate. His uncle Bartholomew was the parish priest, and afterwards (1487) dean of Wesen. The clerical traditions of the family on both sides determined the boy's career. His education, begun at Wesen with his uncle, was continued at Basel and Bern. In his school-days his progress in learning seems to have been less conspicuous than his proficiency in music. In fact, his musical gifts nearly made him a monk. At fourteen he was sent to the University of Vienna, apparently because it was a centre of the Humanists. He may have spent at least one term in the University of Paris.[1] But neither Vienna nor Paris was to be his real Alma Mater. In 1502 he returned to Basel. For four years he studied there, supporting himself by teaching, and graduated in 1504 as Bachelor and in 1506 as Master. So ended his school and university career, spent in Humanist schools and universities, but following the familiar Scholastic routine, for which there was as yet no substitute. It was not till later, during his first cure of souls, that the Humanist impulse was to become so strong that it burst the old bottles.

2. Early ministry.—Immediately on graduation he was appointed parish priest of Glarus, where he remained for ten years (1506–16). There his effective education began. He seems at first to have been absorbed in classical studies, in music, and in the history of his native land. Typical of those days is the *Fable of the Ox*, his first literary effort, a somewhat crude warning against the dangers that lurked in the popular mercenary service. But that his opposition was not irreconcilable is manifest from the fact that in the campaigns of 1513 and 1515 he served as chaplain with his own men from Glarus, being with them both at Novara and at Marignano. His experiences in Italy undermined some of his accepted tenets about the authority of the Church, and just at the moment when doubts and questions were jostling in his mind he came into contact with a whole new world of thought through Erasmus. Erasmus's programme of a 'restitution of Christianity' through the *philosophia Christi* fired his imagination. He caught at once his contempt for Scholasticism and his conviction that the true Christian philosophy was to be found only in the moral teaching of Jesus and of His great disciple, Paul. '*Ad fontes*' became his motto. So in 1516, when Erasmus published his Greek New Testament, Zwingli was an early reader, and very soon most of it was transcribed into note-books to be learned by heart. Acquaintance with it revealed how far the Church which he had so lately imagined unchanged and unchangeable had really fallen away from the NT standard. With an alert and critical mind he began to study what traces he could find of the stages of this decline in Christian history.

[1] So W. Köhler, *Zwingliana*, Gedenknummer auf Neujahr 1919, p. 7.

Meanwhile his hostility to the mercenary service had been growing, and a second poem called *The Labyrinth* proved unacceptable to the warlike parish of Glarus. Zwingli, therefore, accepted the position of preacher at Einsiedeln, the great pilgrimage resort of Switzerland. Here he came to know at first hand superstition, saint-worship, relic-worship, and the abuse of indulgences. During his two years at Einsiedeln Zwingli was advancing steadily towards the Reformed position. Can we say further, with some of the early historians of the Reformed Church, and as Zwingli himself more than once asserted, that in those days at Einsiedeln he had already reached his full Reformed position, and that, in consequence, he anticipated Luther? We cannot. The papal pension (continued till 1520) and the pilgrimage to Aachen (1517) are conclusive. But it is clear that, if his conscience was not yet touched, his mind was awake, and the amount of Scriptural and Patristic knowledge he acquired during those two years is a real matter for wonder. Alike in moral life and in teaching he was still Humanist rather than Reformer.

3. Work in Zürich.—On 27th Dec. 1518 Zwingli removed to Zürich, which was to be henceforward the centre of his activities. He went as people's priest in the Great Minster. At the beginning of the year he announced his programme from the pulpit. He was going to expound the Scriptures, book by book and chapter by chapter. He began with St. Matthew's Gospel, the favourite book of the Humanists because it contained the Sermon on the Mount, the basis of the *philosophia Christi*. Then came the Acts of the Apostles, that in the primitive Church men might see after what pattern the Church ought to be. Then followed Galatians and 1 and 2 Timothy, to make Paul's teaching familiar; then the two Epistles of Peter, to show how Peter agreed with Paul. By 1525 Zwingli had preached through the whole of the NT. Long before that, however, the Reformation had been established. From the first his preaching was so fresh, so full of new ideas, that the services were thronged. Very soon he had to begin a market-day series, on Fridays, on the Psalms. One of the strongest proofs of his popularity and influence is that, in the very first year of his preaching (1519), a bookseller came to Zürich and placed his printing-press at the service of the new movement. This was Christopher Froschauer; round Zwingli and him there gathered at Zürich a literary circle comparable to that already assembled at Basel round Erasmus and Froben.

The year 1519 saw a deepening of Zwingli's convictions. This was due partly to the early works of Luther and partly to the coming of the plague, with which Zwingli, who had fearlessly returned to duty after its outbreak, was attacked. These two together seem to have hastened him along the road he was unconsciously travelling, from Erasmian to Reformer. Simplification of the liturgy and drastic action in regard to mercenary service were premonitory symptoms of the breach that was coming. The first definite move in the religious revolution came in the Lent of 1522, as a result of Zwingli's preaching, though he himself took no part in it. The form it assumed was a revolt against the law of the Lenten fast. Zwingli was not slow in justifying the action of his friends. In their defence he published his first Reformation tract *Von Erkiesen und Freiheit der Speisen* ('Concerning Selection and Liberty in Foods'). The City Council incurred the anger of the bishop of Constance by dealing, and dealing leniently, with the offenders. In August 1522 Zwingli issued his first Reformation treatise of any length, the *Archeteles*, which did in Latin and for the learned

what his next works, the *67 Articles*, and their *Exposition*, did in German and for the common people. In the beginning of 1523 took place the first Zürich disputation, of which the *67 Articles* formed the programme. It was a triumph for the party of reform, and a great personal triumph for Zwingli. At its close the Great Council pronounced its decision that the accusations of heresy against Zwingli were unfounded, and that he was 'to continue as before to proclaim the Holy Gospel, and the true, Divine Scriptures.' Further it declared that all other preachers and pastors in the city and the country were 'not to preach anything which they could not establish by the Holy Gospel, and the pure, Divine Scriptures'; and that they were to refrain from personal controversy and bitter names. The victory of the Reformation in Zürich was thus assured. But the practical steps remained to be taken, and these involved divisions of policy and further disputations. The monasteries began to empty. Better uses were at once found for them as hospitals and academies. The Great Minster was transformed into something not unlike a Theological College. The energy spent in the performance of innumerable masses was transferred to Biblical and Biblico-theological instruction. A vernacular ritual came into use, first in the Sacrament of Baptism. Change in the Lord's Supper was much slower. The old service held its place in Zwingli's own Church till April 1525.

Sporadic and unauthorized removal of images and the imprisonment of the offenders led to the second disputation in Oct. 1523. The programme of removal and the gradual change of ritual were put into the hands of a committee of laymen and ministers whose business was to devise means 'for moving forward the work of Christ.' The line along which they moved forward proved unacceptable to the few remaining adherents of traditionalism in Zürich, and their protest was the occasion of the third disputation, in Jan. 1524. Its decision was an order to these Scholastics to carry out loyally the line of action of the Council. The breach with the old order was complete, and the new order rapidly took shape. The temporary committee gave place, in 1525, to church courts for discipline and for marriage cases. By 1527 a synodical organization was complete. During all these revolutionary actions the pope pronounced no anathema. He was still not without hope of military help from Zürich. Zürich, in turn, encouraged the hope, for it was waiting for arrears of military pay. The Swiss mercenary service had made the path of Reformation much smoother than in Saxony.

4. **His varied activities.**—During the third decade of the 16th cent. there can have been few busier men in Europe than Zwingli. One might thus catalogue his manifold labours.

A. He had to think out his plan of Reformation, and to communicate the conclusions he had reached to a great host of active sympathizers in other centres by letter and to the general public in book and pamphlet.

In addition to the works referred to above, mention should be made of the *Short Christian Introduction*, the nature and intention of which are fully indicated in its extended title, 'A short Christian introduction which the honourable Council of the city of Zürich has sent to the pastors and preachers, living in its cities, lands, and wherever its authority extends, so that they may in unison henceforth announce and preach the true Gospel to their dependants'; *Der Hirt* (1524), or, as it is called in the English translation of 1550, *The Image of Both Pastors*, an expansion of a sermon preached to the pastors present at the second disputation; the *Commentary on the True and False Religion*, the most comprehensive summary of his mature teaching; the treatise *On Divine Providence*; and the *Confession of Faith* presented to the Diet of Augsburg (1530), generally known as *Ratio Fidei*.

B. From the pulpit and by private interview he had so to educate the people of Zürich and, in particular, the members of its governing bodies, that they would be prepared to take action along the line of Reformation, no matter what it should cost.

Although Zwingli's official position from 1525 was that of head of the Carolinum, the theological college of Zürich, he continued his public expositions of Scripture, passing to the OT—especially the Prophets—when he had run through most of the NT.

C. In order that the Evangelical reforms might be firmly rooted in the intelligent sympathy of the people, it was necessary that the Bible should be put into their hands in the vernacular.

Here his task was lightened by the industry of Luther. Luther's NT, finished in the Wartburg in 1522, was being printed in Zürich in 1524. This was speedily followed by the historical books of the OT. But Zwingli could not wait for Luther's translation of the Prophets. So an independent translation was begun, and finished in 1529. A complete German Bible appeared in Zürich in 6 volumes by 1529, and a single-volume edition in 1530. Switzerland, therefore, had the Bible complete several years before Germany. Though the main burden of translation fell on his friend and colleague, Leo Jud, Zwingli's share in it is by no means negligible.

D. He had to defend his Reformation against radicals who thought that Zürich had not gone half far enough.

This radical element, which was to develop into Anabaptism, made its first public appearance at the second disputation. Conrad Grebel was their leader, and their point of view was that a clean sweep ought to be made at once of images and ritual and all the disastrous accumulations of fifteen centuries, and that this was Zwingli's esoteric teaching. In particular, they challenged Zwingli to produce any Scriptural warrant for tithes or infant baptism. In 1524 these dissidents were confirmed in their positions by two visitors from the Anabaptists of Germany, Thomas Münzer and Andreas Carlstadt. This widened the breach. Zwingli saw the Reformation movement slowly disintegrating into two, and saw some of his friends taken captive by what they felt to be the purer Biblicism of the new movement. He appealed to them not to form a separate body. The appeal was in vain. The separation took place. For the healing of the breach Zwingli proposed the inevitable public disputation. The first took place in Jan. 1525. The decision was against the Anabaptists. And it was followed by a decree that all unbaptized children must be baptized within a week, or their parents would be banished from Zürich. The council soon proceeded to severer measures. One of the leaders suffered death by drowning, and others were banished.

No movement could have given more trouble to Zwingli. As they took their stand on Scripture, and as Zwingli claimed to do the same, the controversy was the fiercest he was ever called upon to face. The impression left by his numerous treatises is that, to find grounds for condemning them and their practices, he was driven to exaggerate the non-essential peculiarities of the movement. It was not these writings, but the fate of the Peasants' Revolt in Germany, that eased the strain.

E. At the same time as he was called upon to encounter radicals within the movement he had to deal with champions of the old order. The most prominent phase of this was the disputation which, after long negotiation, took place at Baden in 1526. Œcolampadius of Basel and John Eck were the protagonists. Zwingli was not present. But

much of the work fell on him. Messengers were constantly coming and going. Thomas Platter's autobiography gives a vivid picture of the extent of his assistance. The disputation served Eck's purpose, in increasing Lutheran suspicion of the unsoundness of the Zwinglians in regard to the Lord's Supper. We note here also the more important of the relevant controversial works: the *Antibolon* (1524) against Jerome Emser, 'defender of the canon of the Mass'; and the *Answer to Valentin Compar* (1525).

F. He had to take a large part in the first phase of the prolonged controversy between Lutherans and Reformed concerning the Lord's Supper. For details see art. EUCHARIST (Reformation and post-Reformation period).

G. During those years Zwingli was drawn more and more into the main stream of federal politics. The rival confessions within the confederacy and their rival leagues created a situation which demanded the constant vigilance of a statesman. And it was on Zwingli that Zürich leaned.[1]

H. In the midst of all these labours Zwingli maintained his Humanist studies. In 1526 there was published in Basel Ceporin's edition of the poems of Pindar, with a preface and a conclusion by Huldrychus Geminius.

I. But the main concern of Zwingli during the later 20's was to secure the Reformation in Zürich by introducing Reformation teaching and practice into every city and canton of the confederacy.

In Bern the value of the preparatory work of Berthold Haller was revealed by the thoroughness of the Reformed victory in its disputation in Jan. 1528, in which Zwingli took the leading part. This same disputation brought to a head the new movement in Basel, where Œcolampadius had long been actively at work. Vadianus was his correspondent in St. Gall, which, with Glarus, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell, followed Zürich's example in Zwingli's lifetime. A certain measure of success was attained in the allied Graubund, but elsewhere the results were meagre.

5. The last years.—Certain of the cantons were untouched by the Reformation, and were as keen to retain the 'common lands' as Zwingli was to win them. A cleavage within the confederacy appeared, and deepened into uncompromising hostility. The League of the Forest Cantons, formed at Beckenried in 1524, was soon faced by a counter-alliance. Both parties made a strong bid for outside help, but, before any effective assistance had been secured by either, the first Civil War broke out. It was short and bloodless. There was no battle. The two armies which came face to face at Cappel (1529), instead of fighting, negotiated terms of peace. The terms were a triumph for Zürich, but it speedily appeared that there were more than one possible interpretation of them. The civil war had only been postponed. The feverish search for outside alliances continued. The Marburg Colloquy, in Zwingli's mind, was no unimportant part of this quest. More time was spent by Zürich and by Zwingli in fruitless foreign negotiations than in independent preparation. Amid all this talk of help from outside it ceased to manifest the old self-help. The war began by a blockade of the Forest Cantons, which only served to rouse them to more vigorous action. They took the field in force. Zürich's improvised resistance was a failure. For Zürich the battle of Cappel (1531) was a veritable Flodden. Zwingli was among the slain. In his forty-eighth year this great pacifist and patriot fell on the field of battle. The second treaty of Cappel reversed the first. But under Henry Bullinger and his associates the work of reformation continued, though the leadership of the Swiss Reformation soon passed into the hands of Geneva.

[1] For these political movements see an excellent brief account in *Cambridge Modern History*, ii. 326 ff.

6. Appreciation.—Very diverse judgments have been passed on Zwingli's doctrine and work. Apart altogether from those who know him only from some inadequate statement of his doctrine of the Lord's Supper and who, in consequence, use the name Zwinglian almost as equivalent to rationalist, among those who are professed students of his teaching there is a sharp division of opinion. On the one hand it is said: 'His world of thought, as a whole, and also in its inner component parts, is more mediæval' [than Luther's].[1] The opposite is just as confidently maintained: 'Luther took up his station on the ground already occupied by the Latin church: his desire was only to purify; to put an end to the contradictions between the doctrines of the church and the gospel. Zwingli, on the other hand, thought it necessary to restore, as far as possible, the primitive and simplest condition of the Christian church: he aimed at a complete revolution.'[2] Now, without doubt, in the collected works of Zwingli, written at different times, out of the heart of widely different controversies, it would be easy to find material for justifying either of these conclusions, but not much progress is made by bandying about the word 'mediæval' as a term of reproach. In essentials Zwingli and Luther were nearer each other than they let themselves believe, as Martin Bucer saw. Having regard to its purpose, one must call the Marburg Colloquy a failure, but it did reveal how much at one the protagonists were. There was, certainly, a difference of emphasis. Zwingli had not the same all-transforming, world-renewing experience to drive him onwards. His theology was more Biblical than experimental. Even when he had caught the thrill of Luther's protest, it came to deepen rather than to change the direction of the impulse he had received from Erasmus, the desire to explore the sources, to get back to the simplicities of primitive Christianity, to the pure, untainted Church of the NT. It is significant that the Zürich Reformation followed hard after Zwingli's exposition of the Acts of the Apostles, interpreted as historically as the knowledge of that day would permit. It is significant also that the full programme of the *67 Articles* has this preface:

'The articles and opinions below, I, Ulrich Zwingli, confess to have preached in the worthy city of Zürich *as based upon the Scriptures* which are called inspired by God, and I offer to protect and conquer with the said articles, and where I have not now correctly understood said Scriptures I shall allow myself to be taught better, but only from said Scriptures.'[3]

Further, largely in consequence of this Biblicism, the reformation he directed was more radical. What Zwingli specially detested in the later growths which had buried this early Christianity was anything that could be called 'the worship of the creature.' Worship belonged to God alone, 'the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.' He did not undervalue art or music in themselves—far from it—but, when they were so employed as to hinder an intelligent approach to the Creator, then to him they were anathema. The most conspicuous feature of Luther's protest against mediævalism was its anti-Judaic side—his hostility to its conception of work-righteousness: in Zwingli's it was the anti-pagan—his hostility to its idolatrous corruptions.

This note was dominant at the beginning, and, despite all alterations and deepenings, it remained dominant to the end.

[1] R. Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*[2], Leipzig, 1917, iv. i. 357.

[2] L. von Ranke, *Hist. of the Reformation in Germany*, London, 1905, p. 521.

[3] S. M. Jackson, *Selections from Zwingli*, Philadelphia, 1901, p. 111.

'Eight or nine years ago,' he wrote in 1523, 'I read a comfortable fiction written on the Lord Jesus by the learned Erasmus of Rotterdam: in which Jesus complains that men do not seek all good things from Him, whereas He is the fountain of all good. Then I thought if this be the case, why do we seek help from the creature? I began to search in Scripture, and the works of the fathers: whether I could find there any certain information with regard to prayer to Saints. In short I found nothing of it in the Bible at all; amongst the ancients I found it in some, and not in others. However, it did not much move it *they* did teach prayer to saints. For they always stood on testimony alone. And when I read the Scriptures which they quoted for this purpose, in the original, they had no such meaning as they wished thrust upon them; and the more I considered this doctrine of opinion, the less authority I found for it in Scripture, but rather more and more against it.'[1]

This and similar autobiographic reminiscences can be too strongly stressed. We must ever remember that most of them are influenced by his claim to independence of, and priority to, Luther. But in them all there appears, undesignedly, this anti-pagan interest.

Zwingli's radicalism is perhaps most apparent in his keen eye for, and his strong detestation of, what the Scottish Reformers were accustomed to call the 'dregs of papistry.'

Still further, this difference of emphasis is apparent in the doctrine of God, not so much in its content as in the place it occupies in the system. Though Zwingli doubtless owed here something both to Seneca and to Pico della Mirandola, his doctrine, like Luther's, is accurately enough described as Pauline and Augustinian. No one, however, would be likely to seek in his doctrine of God Luther's fundamental conception: it is otherwise with Zwingli.

'While Lutheran Protestantism protested against the Judaising righteousness by works, it asked the question, What is it in man that wins salvation? and gave the answer, Not works but faith, whereas the Reformed Protestantism asked, Who is it that saves, the creature or God?, and answered, God alone, salvation being referred to its ultimate source in the fore-ordaining and determining will of God.'[2]

This trend of Reformed Protestantism is not to be traced to Calvin alone; it goes back to Zwingli. Though not so evident in his earliest Reformation treatises, it began to be increasingly evident in the controversies with the Anabaptists. One of their strongest arguments against baptism as practised by the Reformers was that the infant was incapable of the faith which alone could give it meaning; to which Zwingli replied that baptism might easily precede faith, for election does: 'antecedit igitur electio fidem';[3] indeed, 'ii qui electi sunt, filii dei sunt anteaquam credant.'[4]

From all this, leaving out of account their great divergence on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper,[5] it is evident that Zwingli was no mere echo of Luther from the mountains of Switzerland, but that he evolved a type of reformation, pursuing a parallel path, which was determined largely before ever the news of Luther's heroic stand at Wittenberg gave it the momentum which carried it to victory. What Zwingli contributed to it was the Humanist training and the Humanist outlook.

[1] *Werke*, Zürich, 1828 ff., i. 298.
[2] W. Hastie, *Theology of the Reformed Church*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 145 (expounding Schweizer).
[3] *Werke*, Zürich, 1828 ff., iii. 426.
[4] iii. 426.
[5] For which see art. EUCHARIST (Reformation and post-Reformation).

Nor did he ever forget them. One of the things which made Luther doubtful if Zwingli were a fellow-worker or, indeed, a fellow-Christian was his continued regard for the heroes of classical antiquity, whom, in his very last writing, the *Fidei Expositio* (1531), addressed to Francis I., he placed along with the OT worthies and the saints and fathers of the Church in the heaven he hoped to reach.

'Denique non fuit vir bonus, non erit mens sancta, non est fidelis anima, ab ipso mundi exordio usque ad ejus consummationem, quem non sis isthic cum deo visurus.'[1]

Humanist, Biblical scholar, protestant, liberal, patriot as he was, Zwingli could never have been the main agent in carrying through an epoch-making reformation, even with the conditions to help him: he lacked the passionate earnestness and driving force of Luther; but, with the aid of Luther's work, he did accomplish a reformation to which many in our generation feel more strongly attracted than to either its great German counterpart or even its Genevan completion.

LITERATURE.—The best guide to all but the most recent Zwingli literature is to be found in G. Finsler, *Zwingli-Bibliographie*, Zürich, 1897. Later studies are fully dealt with in *Zwingliana*, do. 1897 ff.

i. *Works.*—The earliest collected ed. was that of R. Gualther, Zürich, 1545, which was superseded by the excellent ed. of M. Schuler and J. Schulthess, 8 vols., do. 1828–42 (Supplement, 1861), which in turn is now giving way to the ed. in progress in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. 88 ff., ed. E. Egli, G. Finsler, and W. Köhler, Berlin, 1905 ff. An English tr. was begun under the editorship of S. M. Jackson, vol. i., New York, 1912, to whom also we are indebted for *Selections from Zwingli*, Philadelphia, 1901. An admirable summary of the contents of Zwingli's writings is that of P. Wernle, *Der evangelische Glaube nach den Hauptschriften der Reformatoren*, vol. ii. 'Zwingli,' Tübingen, 1919. A popular ed. in modern German of Zwingli's main writings is that of G. Finsler, W. Köhler, and A. Rüegg, Zürich, 1918. Mention should be made, too, of O. Farner's similar ed. of Zwingli's letters, Zürich, 1918.

ii. *Life and teaching.*—Among the older biographies and the more recent treatments the most valuable are: J. C. Mörikofer, *Ulrich Zwingli nach den urkunditchen Quellen*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1867–69; A. Baur, *Zwinglis Theologie*, 2 vols., Halle, 1888–89; R. Stähelin, *Huldreich Zwingli; sein Leben und Wirken nach den Quellen dargestellt*, 2 vols., Basel, 1895–97; S. M. Jackson, *Huldreich Zwingli, 1484–1531*, New York, 1901; S. Simpson, *Life of Ulrich Zwingli*, London, 1903; T. M. Lindsay, *A Hist. of the Reformation*, vol. ii., Edinburgh, 1907; E. Egli, *Schweizerische Reformationsgeschichte*, ed. G. Finsler, vol. i., Zürich, 1910; A. Lang, *Zwingli und Calvin*, Bielefeld, 1913; W. Köhler, in *Unsere religiösen Erzieher*[2], Leipzig, 1917; O. Farner, *Huldreich Zwingli*, Zürich, 1917; P. Burckhardt, *Huldreich Zwingli, eine Darstellung seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Lebenswerkes*, do. 1918; W. Köhler, *Ulrich Zwingli und die Reformation in der Schweiz*, Tübingen, 1919, *Die Geisteswelt Ulrich Zwinglis*, Gotha, 1920.

iii. *Discussions on special points.*—W. Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*[2], Edinburgh, 1866; A. Schweizer, *Zwinglis Bedeutung neben Luther*, Zürich, 1884; J. M. Usteri, *Zwingli und Erasmus*, do. 1885; E. Nagel, *Zwinglis Stellung zur Schrift*, Freiburg, 1896; C. von Kügelgen, *Zwinglis Ethik*, Leipzig, 1902; W. Hastie, *The Theology of the Reformed Church in its Fundamental Principles*, Edinburgh, 1904; J. Kreutzer, *Zwinglis Lehre von der Obrigkeit*, Stuttgart, 1909; G. von Schulthess-Rechberg, *Luther, Zwingli, und Calvin in ihren Ansichten über das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche*, Aarau, 1909; J. I. Good, *The Reformed Reformation*, Philadelphia, 1916; E. Vischer, in *Zum Gedächtnis der Reformation*, Basel, 1917; P. Wernle, *Das Verhältnis der schweizerischen zur deutschen Reformation*, do. 1918; T. Pestalozzi, *Die Gegner Zwinglis am Grossmünsterstift in Zürich*, Zürich, 1918; O. Farner, *Zwinglis Bedeutung für die Gegenwart*, do. 1919; A. Lang, *Reformation und Gegenwart*, Detmold, 1918; and the special studies in the memorial volume, *Ulrich Zwingli, 1519–1919, Zum Gedächtnis der Züricher Reformation*, Zürich, 1919.

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[1] *Werke*, iv. 65.

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